Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05142/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2006 Decided February 6, 2007

No. 05-5142

WILLIE E. BOYD,

APPELLANT

v.

CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

No. 04-5369

WILLIE E. BOYD,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

USCA Case #05-5142 Document #1021342 Filed: 02/06/2007 Page 1 of 16
2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01100)

(No. 99cv02712)

Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs as amicus curiae for appellant Willie

E. Boyd.

Willie E. Boyd, pro se, filed briefs.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees Criminal Division of the United States Department

of Justice, et al. and United States Marshals Service, et al. With

her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Atttorney at

the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. Julia K. Douds and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Following his conviction of drugs

and weapons charges, Willie Boyd filed a series of requests for

information under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5

U.S.C. § 552, in an attempt to uncover alleged violations of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), during his trial.

Although various documents were disclosed, the government

agencies withheld others pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On

appeal, Boyd challenges the grants of summary judgment to the

agencies, contending through court-appointed amicus curiae that

the district court erred in ruling that the FOIA exemptions were

USCA Case #05-5142 Document #1021342 Filed: 02/06/2007 Page 2 of 16
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properly invoked, in failing to grant other remedies and to award

costs. We affirm.

I.

Boyd was arrested on a parole violation warrant at his

girlfriend’s house on February 1, 1997. Based on a gun and a

black bag containing cocaine that were found in the master

bedroom closet, Boyd was indicted and convicted of drugs and

weapons charges, including being a felon in possession of a

firearm and of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. His

conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Boyd, 180

F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1999). Following his trial, Boyd learned that

his girlfriend’s brother, Bryant Troupe, had been a government

informant for several years and had sold drugs in the past. This

information was contained in the prosecutor’s Brady disclosure

letter in a case in which Troupe had testified at trial as a

government informant. See Miller v. United States, 135 F.3d

1254, 1255-56 (8th Cir. 1998). Amicus contends that this

information, which he believes could have been used to support

Boyd’s defense that the gun and drugs found in the closet

belonged to Troupe and to suggest that the government may

have failed to investigate that possibility because it had an

interest in not jeopardizing convictions that Troupe, acting as an

informant, had helped to obtain, was withheld from Boyd during

his criminal trial in violation of Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 

In 1998 Boyd filed the first of several FOIA requests

seeking information about himself and Troupe from several

federal agencies involved in Boyd’s prosecution, including the

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“Attorneys’

Office”), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives (“BATF”), and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The

agencies released some documents and withheld others pursuant

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1

 The government also withheld documents pursuant to

Exemption 3, which covers “matters that are . . . specifically exempted

from disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Because the

government advised during oral argument that these documents have

been released to Boyd, Amicus’s challenge to the invocation of

Exemption 3 is moot. See Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C.

Cir. 1982).

to FOIA Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(D).1 In 1999, Boyd filed

a complaint, and later an amended complaint, challenging the

agencies’ invocations of FOIA exemptions and the adequacy of

their searches. The district court granted summary judgment to

the Attorneys’ Office and BOP, but denied judgment to BATF

based, in part, on its failure to demonstrate the adequacy of its

search. 

Upon a further search, BATF located a work file that had

been kept by the BATF agent in charge of the investigation in

Boyd’s criminal case. Because the work file contained

documents that were not part of the official case file, BATF

processed it for release in accordance with Boyd’s FOIA

request. The district court, after appointing counsel for Boyd

and ordering discovery, granted summary judgment to BATF.

The district court denied Boyd’s request for costs on the ground

that he had not substantially prevailed. 

Following new FOIA requests in 2003 and 2004 to the

Criminal Division of the Justice Department (“Criminal

Division”) and the United States Marshals Service (“Marshals

Service”) for information about himself and Troupe, Boyd filed

another complaint. The district court granted summary

judgment to the agencies, finding that they had demonstrated the

adequacy of their searches and ruling that they had properly

invoked exemptions to withhold information. By order of

December 27, 2005, this court consolidated Boyd’s appeals. 

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II.

Congress established FOIA to allow private persons to

access government records and thereby be informed about “what

their government is up to.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Congress also recognized,

however, that the disclosure of certain information “may harm

legitimate governmental or private interests” and accordingly

enacted several exemptions to FOIA disclosure requirements.

Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.

1998); see also Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 737 F.2d

84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Upon de novo review of the grants of

summary judgment, see Iturralde v. Comptroller of the

Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2003), this court must

determine whether the agencies sustained their burden of

demonstrating that the withheld documents are exempt from

disclosure under FOIA, see Johnson v. Executive Office for U.S.

Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Summers, 140

F.3d at 1080. 

A.

Exemption 7(A) authorizes the withholding of “records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to

the extent that the production of such law enforcement records

or information . . . could reasonably be expected to interfere

with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). The

government meets its burden by demonstrating that release of

the requested information would reveal “the size, scope and

direction of [the] investigation” and thereby “allow for the

destruction or alteration of relevant evidence, and the fabrication

of fraudulent alibis.” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. U.S. Envtl.

Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

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In Boyd’s case, the government explained that disclosure

would “promote the criminal activity of” the targets of the

investigation, “allow [the targets] to avoid arrest and

prosecution,” and “provide them information that would allow

them to change their operations to avoid detection.” Because

the individuals under investigation are all “related [to],

controlled [by], or influenced by” Boyd, disclosure of the

information could reasonably be expected to reveal to the targets

“the size, scope, and direction of [the] investigation,” Alyeska,

856 F.2d at 312, and allow them to destroy or alter evidence,

fabricate fraudulent alibis, and take other actions to frustrate the

government’s case. 

The government’s explanation also adequately meets

Amicus’s contentions that the government has not identified “a

concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding,” see Bevis v.

Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting

Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir.

1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted), or specified that the

enforcement proceeding is pending or reasonably anticipated,

see Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1540 (D.C. Cir.

1993). In Bevis, this court held that investigations related to

potential prosecutions for the murders of several Americans in

El Salvador constituted concrete law enforcement proceedings.

Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1387-89. Amicus maintains that here the

government has asserted only that its investigation concerned

“illegal activities” and “criminal activities” without specifying

the type of criminal activity under investigation. Unlike in

Bevis, however, sufficient specificity regarding the

government’s investigation is provided by its identification of

the targets of the investigation: “individuals . . . to some degree,

related [to], controlled [by], or influenced by” Boyd. 

Although Amicus implied during oral argument that no

investigations involving Boyd were still active, the

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government’s affidavit states that the investigation at issue

involves the “ongoing collection of data” and that the withheld

records relate to “potential criminal proceedings against

individuals.” See Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1540; Coastal States Gas

Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The duration of the investigation was brief; the documents at

issue are dated 1997, Boyd was convicted in April 1998, and the

government invoked Exemption 7(A) in early 1999. Therefore,

Amicus fails to show that Exemption 7(A) was improperly

invoked.

B.

Exemption 7(C) authorizes the government to withhold

“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,

but only to the extent that the production of such law

enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). The government may

nonetheless be required to disclose the documents if the

individual seeking the information demonstrates a public interest

in the information that is sufficient to overcome the privacy

interest at issue. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762, 776.

In order to trigger the balancing of public interests against

private interests, a FOIA requester must (1) “show that the

public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an

interest more specific than having the information for its own

sake,” and (2) “show the information is likely to advance that

interest.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S.

157, 172 (2004). If the public interest is government

wrongdoing, then the requester must “produce evidence that

would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged

Government impropriety might have occurred.” Id. at 174. 

Amicus posits district court error on the government’s

obligation under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence in

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Boyd’s criminal trial. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that

“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at

87. The Court later explained that “evidence is material only if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682

(1985). Because the duty to disclose under Brady “encompasses

evidence ‘known only to police investigators,’” Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)), “[i]n order to comply with Brady

. . . ‘the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any

favorable evidence known to [those] acting on the government’s

behalf,’” id. at 281 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437).

Consequently, Amicus contends, the public has an interest in

knowing both whether Brady-related misconduct occurred

during Boyd’s criminal trial and whether the government

generally complies with its Brady obligations, including whether

the Justice Department has adequate procedures to ensure that

trial prosecutors are made aware of all Brady information in the

government’s possession. 

Even assuming Amicus has identified a sufficient public

interest, we conclude that Exemption 7(C) was properly invoked

because Amicus has failed to “produce evidence that would

warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged

Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541

U.S. at 174. Of the two evidentiary showings that Amicus

contends would warrant a belief of government misconduct,

neither suffices. First, Amicus suggests that Boyd’s discovery

of the disclosure letter in the Miller case containing potentially

exculpatory information about Troupe suggests the government

failed to comply with its Brady obligations. Even after

discovery, however, Amicus makes no showing that Boyd has

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identified anything withheld at his criminal trial but produced

under FOIA that would suggest an actual Brady or Jencks

violation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Amicus also points to letters

from Boyd’s defense counsel indicating that he never received

certain allegedly exculpatory documents and to the prosecutor’s

answer, when asked by defense counsel about his disclosures

several years after the case, that no such documents had been

disclosed because they did not constitute Brady material.

However, letters the prosecutor wrote in 1998 suggest that the

documents at issue were turned over and it is doubtful that a

reasonable person would infer government misconduct from

unsworn letters from defense counsel years after Boyd’s 1998

conviction. The record shows that the prosecutor in Boyd’s

criminal case turned over materials to Boyd’s defense counsel

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, such as any

statements made by Boyd and written summaries of expert

testimony that the government intended to use at trial. Boyd

acknowledges that the prosecutor also turned over exculpatory

grand jury testimony that implicated Troupe. He offers no

reason for the government to have been selective in its

production. 

Second, Amicus points to the discovery of the BATF

agent’s work file during Boyd’s FOIA litigation as indicating

that the government may not have complied with its Brady

obligations. Amicus suggests that the prosecutor in Boyd’s

criminal case may have been unaware of the documents in that

file and therefore may have mistakenly thought he had disclosed

all material exculpatory evidence. Neither Amicus nor Boyd,

however, produces any evidence that the work file actually

contained Brady or Jencks material that had not been disclosed.

Although Boyd had sought a report of an interview of a man

named Albert Greer, because the report was located in the work

file and subsequently disclosed, the issue is moot for purposes

of this FOIA action. See Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 125

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(D.C. Cir. 1982). Boyd also suggests that the BATF agent

deliberately concealed records based on an email revealing the

BATF agent’s personal views about releasing documents. These

documents, however, were released, and the agent’s opinion is

immaterial. 

Thus both Amicus and Boyd fail to produce evidence

sufficient to meet the Favish standard. Unsubstantiated

assertions of government wrongdoing—e.g., regarding the

seizure of Boyd’s jailhouse phone conversations, lies by the

prosecutor, and alleged perjury by a U.S. Marshal—do not

establish “a meaningful evidentiary showing.” See Favish, 541

U.S. at 175. Absent evidence to support most of the alleged

improprieties, and clearly not enough for a reasonable person to

conclude that the remaining allegations of government

malfeasance might be true, see id. at 174, there is no

“counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance

against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested

records,” id. at 174-75, and thus the challenge to the

government’s invocation of Exemption 7(C) fails, see id. In any

event, although Amicus stated during oral argument that the

BATF agent’s creation of a separate work file in Boyd’s case

suggests that the agent might be engaging in similar behavior in

other cases, and more generally suggests a vulnerability in

Justice Department procedures for ensuring that prosecutors are

informed of all exculpatory evidence in the government’s

possession, a single instance of a Brady violation in Boyd’s case

would not suffice to show a pattern of government wrongdoing

as could overcome the significant privacy interest at stake. See

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780; Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, 997

F.2d 1489, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

In addition to withholding and redacting information under

Exemption 7(C), in response to Boyd’s requests for information

concerning Troupe, the Attorneys’ Office and the Marshals

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2

 Section 552(c)(2) provides: 

Whenever informant records maintained by a

criminal law enforcement agency under an

informant’s name or personal identifier are requested

by a third party according to the informant’s name or

personal identifier, the agency may treat the records

as not subject to the requirements of this section

unless the informant’s status as an informant has been

officially confirmed. 

5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(2). 

Service also issued Glomar responses, refusing either to confirm

or to deny the existence of responsive information, see Phillippi

v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 5 U.S.C. §

552(c)(2),2 but claiming that, if such information existed, it

would be protected under Exemption 7(C). Where an

informant’s status has been officially confirmed, a Glomar

response is unavailable, and the agency must acknowledge the

existence of any responsive records it holds. See Benavides v.

Drug Enforcement Admin., 968 F.2d 1243, 1246 (D.C. Cir.

1992). Boyd’s request for information concerning Troupe was

not limited to his own criminal prosecution, but sought from the

agencies “any and all information in your files on Bryant

Troupe, as a confidential informant.” His request thus

encompasses information about Troupe’s involvement in the

Miller case, in which the government admits Troupe’s status as

an informant was officially confirmed. 

Although in other circumstances a remand might be

required for the district court to determine whether the

government possesses the requested information and, if so,

whether its withholding of the information is justified, as was

true in Benavides, id., none is required here. The government

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properly invoked Exemption 7(C) to protect information

concerning Troupe. Because Boyd was not entitled to this

information, he was not harmed by the government’s refusal to

confirm or deny whether it possessed responsive information.

Any error, then, in invoking Glomar would not entitle Boyd to

anything more under FOIA. See also Oguaju v. United States,

288 F.3d 448, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds

sub nom. Oguaju v. Marshals Serv., 541 U.S. 970, judgment

reinstated, 378 F.3d 1115, amended, reh’g denied, 386 F.3d 273

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

C.

Exemption 7(D) authorizes the withholding of “records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to

the extent that the production of such law enforcement records

or information . . . could reasonably be expected to disclose the

identity of a confidential source . . . and, in the case of a record

or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority

in the course of a criminal investigation . . . information

furnished by a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).

“[A] source is confidential within the meaning of Exemption

7(D) if the source provided information under an express

assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which

such an assurance could be reasonably inferred.” U.S. Dep’t of

Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Amicus does not claim that the informant in Boyd’s case

did not receive an assurance of confidentiality. Boyd’s assertion

that the government’s declarations are inconsistent, because one

refers to an express assurance while another refers to an implied

assurance, ignores the possibility that more than one informant

may have been involved in his case or that the informant may

have received both assurances, albeit at different times; in any

event, Boyd offers nothing that would call into question the

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evidence cited in the BATF affidavit to demonstrate the

informant received an express grant of confidentiality. Hence,

the government may properly invoke Exemption 7(D) to

withhold the identity of the confidential informant in Boyd’s

case and the information furnished by the informant. Although

Amicus makes much of the fact that Troupe’s status as an

informant was confirmed in Miller, that confirmation does not

amount to an admission that he was an informant in Boyd’s case

as well. We need not address Amicus’s contention that the

government is nonetheless required to disclose the same

information that was officially disclosed in the Miller case, see

Wolf v. CIA, Nos. 05-5394 & 06-5072, slip op. at 13-14 (D.C.

Cir. Jan. 16, 2007), because the Attorneys’ Office advised Boyd

that, upon request, it would provide him with all public

information concerning Troupe in its possession. 

Amicus also contends that the government is precluded

from invoking Glomar in conjunction with Exemption 7(D) in

response to Boyd’s requests for information concerning Troupe

because his status as an informant was officially confirmed in

Miller. Because we concluded that the government’s invocation

of Glomar in conjunction with Exemption 7(C) deprived Boyd

of no information to which he was entitled, there is no need to

revisit the issue with regard to Exemption 7(D). Any

information that may have been the subject of an erroneous

invocation of Glomar was nonetheless properly withheld under

Exemption 7(C). 

To the extent Amicus also contends that the government

should not be able to withhold under Exemption 7(D) material

exculpatory evidence that was wrongfully withheld at Boyd’s

trial, Amicus presents a policy argument for Congress’s

consideration. The disclosure obligation that Brady imposes at

a defendant’s criminal trial based on constitutional

considerations is not the same disclosure obligation imposed

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under FOIA by Congress. To vindicate the former, a defendant

may collaterally attack his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421-22. To vindicate the latter, a

defendant may appeal the agency’s withholding of requested

information for failure properly to invoke a FOIA exemption or

otherwise to comply with FOIA search obligations. In other

words, the disclosure requirements are not coextensive.

Amicus’s suggestion that an agency’s compliance with FOIA is

nonetheless deficient where the agency may allegedly have

failed to make the trial prosecutor aware of Brady material

conflates two separate procedures by which a defendant may

obtain information from the government. It ignores that “a

disclosure made to any FOIA requester is effectively a

disclosure to the world at large.” Students Against Genocide v.

Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also

Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. Congress, however, not only enacted

section 2255 to allow correction of convictions imposed in

violation of the law, it also enacted exemptions to FOIA

disclosure obligations under specified circumstances. Amicus’s

contention that wrongfully withheld Brady material may never

be protected under Exemption 7(D) would rewrite Congress’s

statutory scheme. In any event, this court has rejected a

balancing of interests under Exemption 7(D). See Parker v.

Dep’t of Justice, 934 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

D.

Amicus’s other challenges to the grants of summary

judgment fail. Boyd’s pro se briefs also provide no basis for

finding district court error.

The affidavits filed by the agencies in response to Boyd’s

FOIA requests make clear that their “search[es] [were]

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”

Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Perry, 684

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F.2d at 126-27. Although Amicus makes much of the failure to

uncover or account for particular audio tapes, the fact that a

particular document was not found does not demonstrate the

inadequacy of a search. See Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 315;

Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). 

The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in

declining to conduct an in camera inspection of the BATF

agent’s work file and of the documents withheld under

Exemption 7(D). See Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 830

F.2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Envtl.

Prot. Agency, 731 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although in

camera review may be particularly appropriate if the agency

affidavits do not describe the documents and justifications for

withholding in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the claimed

exemption applies, Carter, 830 F.2d at 392-93, Amicus has not

demonstrated that the agencies failed to provide sufficiently

detailed affidavits, nor offered evidence of bad faith. Upon

discovering the work file, BATF released responsive nonexempt documents. Under the circumstances, Amicus fails to

show the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct

in camera review of the withheld documents.

Neither did the district court abuse its discretion by

declining to order the government to disclose all segregable

information in records withheld under Exemption 7(D).

Observing that grand jury testimony associated Troupe with the

gun and drugs found in his sister’s home where Boyd was

arrested, Amicus speculates that the government may have

questioned Troupe about the items without giving him

assurances of confidentiality, and thus segregable non-exempt

documents may exist. The agencies are entitled to a

presumption that they complied with their obligation to disclose

“any reasonably segregable portion of a record,” 5 U.S.C. §

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16

552(b); cf. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001)

(citing United States v. Chem. Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15

(1926)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965

F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and the record indicates that

they did segregate non-exempt information in documents

withheld under other FOIA exemptions.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by not

requiring the government to specify the date on which the

Criminal Division destroyed responsive documents. Amicus,

noting the several month delay between Boyd’s request for

documents and the Criminal Division’s response, suggests that

the Criminal Division may have acted in bad faith in destroying

the documents and seeks the date of destruction to support its

claims. This court has rejected the notion that an initial agency

delay in responding to a FOIA request constitutes bad faith. See

Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 314-15. But even if the documents were

destroyed during the relevant time frame, their destruction, if

performed in accordance with specified guidelines, would not

imply bad faith. Amicus has made no proffer of a contrary

records destruction schedule.

Finally, the district court did not err in denying Boyd’s

request for costs because he did not “substantially prevail[].” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). In neither of the March 15, 2002 orders

on which Amicus relies did the district court order the

government to turn over documents to Boyd. See Edmonds v.

Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 417 F.3d 1319, 1321-23 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.

Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601, 604-05

(2001)); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v.

Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, we affirm the grants of summary judgment.

 

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