Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00277/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00277-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Review Agency Decision

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gonzalo Mata,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Pima County, 

Defendant.

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 No. 04-CV-277-TUC-FRZ

 ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Pima County’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Gonzalo Mata did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. Also pending

before the Court is Pima County’s Rule 7.2(i) motion for a summary disposition of its motion

for summary judgment.

LRCiv 7.2(i) Motion

Pima County requests that, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i) of the Rules of Practice of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the Court summarily grant its motion

for summary judgment because Mata failed to respond to it.

LRCiv 7.2(i) provides, in relevant part, that, “if the opposing party does not serve and

file the required answering memoranda, . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent

to the . . . granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.”

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held that a motion for summary

judgment cannot be granted simply because the non-moving party violated a local rule.”

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The Court notes that the title of Count Two of the Complaint reads: “Employment

Discrimination; Race/National Origin.” But Mata makes no claim of discrimination based

on his race or national origin in the Complaint or in his December 9, 2003 Charge of

Discrimination, which was filed with the ACRD and Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) and is attached to the Complaint. The December 9, 2003 Charge of

Discrimination only alleges retaliation for filing a prior charge with the ACRD. The Court

will only consider the retaliation claims. See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 709

(9th Cir. 2001) (Court only has jurisdiction over charges of discrimination that are included

in a formal ACRD or EEOC charge, or are “‘like or reasonably related’ to the allegations in

the EEOC charge, or that fall within the ‘EEOC investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out [of] the charge of discrimination.’” (quoting Deppe v. United Airlines,

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Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2000). And, although

the Court has the discretion to determine whether failure to comply with a local rule should

constitute consent to the granting of a motion, the trial court abuses its discretion when it

“grant[s] a motion for summary judgment where the movant’s papers are insufficient to

support that motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact.” Henry v. Gill

Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Mata is “under no obligation to offer affidavits or any other materials in support of

[his] opposition. Summary judgment may be resisted and must be denied on no other

grounds than that the movant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the absence of

triable issues.” Id. 

Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will deny Pima County’s motion for summary

disposition and, instead, will evaluate the merits of the motion for summary judgment.

Motion for Summary Judgment

A. The Complaint

In his Complaint, Mata alleges that Pima County discriminated against him in

retaliation for filing a complaint with the Arizona Civil Rights Division (ACRD). He asserts

that Pima County gave him a poor performance evaluation on November 6, 2003, which

made him ineligible for a merit pay increase. He contends that this conduct violated Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1

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217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000))).

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B. Summary Judgment Standard

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d

202 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.

1987). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents “show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment

initially must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. The moving party merely needs to point out to the Court the

absence of evidence supporting its opponent’s claim; it does not need to disprove its

opponent’s claim. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If a moving party has made this

showing, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the

adverse party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at

2514; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). 

C. Discussion

The Court “evaluate[s] § 1981 claims the same as [it does] Title VII claims.” ElHakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W.

3407 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2005) (No. 05-846). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII or § 1981, the plaintiff must show that he was engaged in protected activity, he was

thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action by his employer, and there is a causal

link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or the protected

activity was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action. See Porter

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v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005); Coszalter v. City of

Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003).

Pima County alleges that it is entitled to summary judgment because Mata cannot

show that he suffered an adverse employment action. Pima County states that Mata’s

November 6, 2003 performance evaluation was “average”; he received an overall

performance rating of “meets job requirements.” Pima County asserts that this performance

rating made Mata eligible for a merit pay increase for the 2003-2004 fiscal year. Pima

County contends that Mata did not receive a merit pay increase because none of Pima

County’s employees received one because the Pima County Board of Supervisors did not

appropriate funds for merit pay increases for that year.

Pima County’s allegations are supported by affidavits from various Pima County

employees and Mata has not contradicted them or otherwise demonstrated that there is a

genuine issue of material fact. In addition, Pima County is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] performance

evaluation that was mediocre (rather than ‘sub-average’) and that did not give rise to any

further negative employment action did not violate Title VII.”); see also Sowell v. Alumina

Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 2001) (no adverse employment action where

policy applied to all employees).

The Court concludes that Mata has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue as to whether

he suffered an adverse employment action and Pima County is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Thus, the Court need not address Pima County’s alternative argument – that

Mata cannot show a causal link between the protected activity and an adverse employment

action because “Mata cannot show that the person who took the allegedly adverse

employment action was aware of his protected activity.”

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Conclusion

In light of the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Rule 7.2(i) motion for summary disposition

(U.S.D.C. document #42) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

(U.S.D.C. document #37) is GRANTED and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff accordingly.

DATED this 8th day of February, 2006.

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