Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-03471/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-03471-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES WARNER, individually and in his

official capacity; COUNTY OF

MENDOCINO, a public entity; and COUNTY

OF MENDOCINO SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, a public entity,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 01-03471 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER 

Re: Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Complaint

Plaintiff Thomas Anderson (“plaintiff” or “Anderson”) brought this action against defendant

Charles Warner and defendants County of Mendocino and County of Mendocino Sheriff’s

Department (collectively “County”) asserting violations his federal civil rights and various state law

torts. On February 10, 2004, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

entered judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“section

1983”), against Warner and the County. The Ninth Circuit reversed as to Warner. Plaintiff now

seeks leave to amend his complaint in order to bring state law claims against the County. After

having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the

court rules as follows. 

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The factual background of this action is set forth in this court’s order on defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, Docket Entry 42 (hereinafter “Summary Judgment Order”). The basic facts

of this case are as follows. On the morning of July 30, 2001, while Anderson and Warner, a county

correctional officer, were driving in the vicinity of a gathering parade, they were involved in a traffic

accident in which Anderson rear-ended Warner’s truck. Warner subsequently approached

Anderson’s vehicle and punched Anderson in the neck and/or face. During the altercation, a female

witness yelled that Warner was a police officer. Anderson claims that Warner additionally told

onlookers that he was a “cop” and that they should not interfere. After the altercation, Anderson

claims that Warner told him not to say anything about the incident to the police. Warner adamantly

disputes Anderson’s allegations. Warner was not arrested on the day of the incident, and was not

subjected to any disciplinary action arising out of the incident.

II. Procedural History

Anderson filed this action on September 13, 2001 against Warner and the County. 

Anderson’s complaint asserts a cause of action under section 1983 against Warner and the County,

state law tort claims against Warner, and a negligent hiring, training and supervision claim against

the County. On February 10, 2004 this court granted summary judgment in favor of Warner and the

County on Anderson’s section 1983 claims. The court held that Anderson had adduced insufficient

evidence to show that Warner was acting under color of state law, and that Anderson had “provided

no evidence that Warner’s actions during the altercation were foreseeable so as to demonstrate that

the County’s inadequate training and supervision were the proximate cause of his injuries.” 

Summary Judgment Order at 6–7. The court dismissed plaintiff’s state law causes of action without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c)(3). Id. at 7.

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Anderson appealed the court’s summary judgment order. The Ninth Circuit reversed with

respect to Warner and affirmed with respect to the County. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063 (9th

Cir. 2006). Anderson therefore has no viable federal claim against the County.

Anderson now moves for leave to amend his complaint to add state law causes of action

against the County. Anderson’s proposed amended complaint re-asserts the original tort claims

against Warner and negligent hiring, training and supervision claim against the County, and seeks to

add a cause of action against Warner and the County for violations of California Civil Code sections

52.1 and 52.3. Anderson acknowledges that, with respect to these additional causes of action, “the

facts are the same, the parties are the same, the conduct alleged is the same,” and “[a]ll plaintiff

seeks to do is harmonize the defendants’ conduct with state law causes of action following the Court

of Appeal’s ruling.” Mot. at 4. The County opposes Anderson’s motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend be “freely given when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit has construed this broadly, requiring

that leave to amend be granted with “extraordinary liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.

Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990); see also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183,

186 (9th Cir. 1987) (Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with

“extreme liberality”); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 989 F. Supp.

1237, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (Jensen, J.) (“[T]he court must be very liberal in granting leave to

amend”); Poling v. Morgan, 829 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing a “strong policy

permitting amendment”).

Despite this liberal policy of amendment, leave will not be given where the district court has

“a substantial reason to deny” the motion. J.W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 15.14[1] (3d ed. 1998) (“[D]istrict judge[s] should freely grant leave to amend when justice

requires, absent a substantial reason to deny.”). The court may decline to grant leave where there is

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“any apparent or declared reason” for doing do. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also

Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Ninth Circuit has identified “four factors relevant to whether a motion for leave to

amend pleadings should be denied: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, futility of amendment,

and prejudice to the opposing party.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981); see

also Poling, 829 F.2d at 886. The enumerated factors are not of equal weight and delay alone is

insufficient to deny leave to amend. Id. (citing Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.

1973)). By the same token, “[p]rejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor.” 

Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). However, futility alone can justify

the denial of a motion to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). The party

opposing amendment bears the burden of showing why amendment should not be granted. See

Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

DISCUSSION

The County argues that allowing Anderson to amend his complaint would be futile, that

Anderson has engaged in undue delay before seeking to amend his complaint, and that allowing

Anderson to amend would be prejudicial to the County.

I. Futility

The County asserts that Anderson’s proposed amended complaint is futile for three reasons. 

First, the County states that Anderson’s claim for negligent hiring, training and supervision is futile

because this court has previously determined that Anderson provided insufficient evidence that the

County’s training and supervision were the proximate cause of Anderson’s injury. Second, the

County asserts that Anderson’s proposed amended complaint alleges no facts showing a violation of

section 52.3. Finally, the County likewise claims that plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint fails

to allege sufficient facts showing a violation of section 52.1.

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Anderson’s negligent hiring, training and supervision claim alleges that “[a]s a proximate

result of Defendants’ negligence alleged above, WARNER severely battered Plaintiff, and abused

and exceeded his authority as an officer of the COUNTY OF MENDOCINO SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, causing Plaintiff to fear his safety, and to suffer severe emotional distress as a

result of his injuries.” Proposed Amended Complaint ¶ 55. Because this court has previously held

that Anderson had failed to adduce sufficient evidence showing proximate causation, Anderson’s

proposed negligent hiring, training and supervision claim fails as a matter of law and would be

futile.

Turning to Anderson’s statutory claims, California Civil Code section 52.1 provides a cause

of action where a person interferes with the individual rights of another “by threats, intimidation, or

coercion.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). Although Anderson’s complaint makes allegations of threats,

intimidation or coercion related to Warner, the proposed amended complaint makes no such

allegations related to the County. Accordingly, Anderson’s section 52.1 claim against the County

fails as a matter of law and amendment would be futile.

California Civil Code section 52.1 provides:

No governmental authority, or agent of a governmental authority, or

person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, shall engage in a

pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that

deprives any person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or

protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States or by the

Constitution or laws of California.

Cal Civ. Code § 52.3(a). Anderson’s cause of action against the County based on section 52.3 is

premised on the County’s alleged failure to adequately and properly investigate the incident, and its

failure to discipline Warner. Because this may constitute an unlawful pattern or practice of conduct

designed to deprive Anderson of certain legal rights, amending the complaint to include this cause of

action would not be futile.

II. Undue Delay and Prejudice

Anderson seeks to file an amended complaint more then five years after filing his original

complaint. By plaintiff’s own admission, the underlying facts related to the new causes of action are

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identical to those underlying plaintiff’s original complaint. In other words, all relevant facts were

known to plaintiff when he filed his original complaint more than five years ago. “Relevant to

evaluating the delay issue is whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and

theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” Jackson, 829 F.2d at 1388. Anderson

offers no justification for this delay other than attempting to maintain the County as a defendant in

light of prior rulings by this court and the Ninth Circuit. In fact, plaintiff goes so far as to argue that

his claim under California Civil Code section 52.3 is “like an easier version of Section 1983 . . . .” 

Rep. Br. at 2.

Anderson further acknowledges that his state law claims are subject to different legal

standards than a section 1983 claim. The County therefore claims that it would be prejudiced if,

after nearly six years of investigation and defense in this action, it were required to reinitiate its

investigation based on the framework of the new state law causes of action. In particular, Anderson

now asserts a cause of action based specifically on the County’s allegedly inadequate investigation

and discipline of Warner. Requiring the County to defend this claim would be manifestly

prejudicial, particularly where all relevant facts have been known to Anderson since the inception of

the lawsuit.

Because Anderson offers no valid reason for his delay in seeking amendment, and because

the County would be prejudiced by having to respond to new legal theories at this late stage of the

litigation, Anderson’s motion must be denied on the basis of substantial prejudice brought about by

undue delay.

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2007 ________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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