Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02859/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02859-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 690
Nature of Suit: Other Forfeiture and Penalty Suits
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 15-2859

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

ONE (1) PALMETTO STATE ARMORY PA-15 

MACHINEGUN RECEIVER/FRAME, UNKNOWN 

CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER: LW001804; 

WATSON FAMILY GUN TRUST, Claimant

(D.C. No. 15-cv-02202)

RYAN S. WATSON, Individually and as Trustee of the 

Watson Family Gun Trust

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

DIRECTOR BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, 

FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES

(D.C. No. 14-cv-06569)

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Ryan S. Watson, Individually and as 

Trustee of the Watson

Family Gun Trust,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. Nos. 2-15-cv-02202 and 2-14-cv-06569)

District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

______________

Argued April 4, 2016

Before: AMBRO and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, 

and THOMPSON,* District Judge

(Opinion filed: May 18, 2016)

Alan A. Beck, Esq.

2692 Harcourt Drive

San Diego, CA 92123

David R. Scott, Esq.

Law Offices of J. Scott Watson

24 Regency Plaza

Glen Mills, PA 19342

 

* The Honorable Anne E. Thompson, District Judge for the 

United States Court for District of New Jersey, sitting by 

designation.

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Stephen D. Stamboulieh, Esq. [Argued]

P.O. Box 4008

Madison, MS 39130

Counsel for Appellant

Patrick Nemeroff, Esq. [Argued]

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division

Room 7217

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Michael S. Raab, Esq.

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division

Room 7237

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Jacqueline C. Romero, Esq.

J. Alvin Stout, III, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

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Robert J. Olson, Esq.

William J. Olson

370 Maple Avenue West

Suite 4

Vienna, VA 22180

Counsel for Amicus-Appellants

Joran Eth, Esq.

James R. McGuire, Esq.

Morrison & Foerster

425 Market Street

Spear Street Tower

San Francisco, CA 94105

Adam M. Regoli, Esq.

Morrison & Foerster

370 17th Street

Suite 4200

Denver, CO 80202

Counsel for Amicus-Appellee

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

THOMPSON, District Judge

Appellant Ryan S. Watson (“Watson”), individually 

and on behalf of the Watson Family Gun Trust, filed this 

action claiming that the de facto ban on the possession of a 

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5

machine gun1found in 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is unconstitutional 

facially and as-applied to him under the Second Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution. Alternatively, Watson argues that § 

922(o) does not apply to the Watson Family Gun Trust 

because it only applies to “persons” and a trust is not a 

“person” under the statute’s definition. The District Court 

granted the government’s motion to dismiss, explaining that 

under the Supreme Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and this Court’s opinion in 

United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), the 

Second Amendment does not protect the possession of 

machine guns. Moreover, the Court found that a trust is not 

exempt from § 922(o) because a trust is not an entity distinct 

from its trustees, and therefore it cannot own property. 

Because we agree that the Second Amendment does not 

protect the possession of machine guns, and because trustees, 

and by extension trusts, are not exempt from § 922(o), we 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The National Firearms Act provides that prior to 

manufacturing a firearm, any prospective maker must apply 

for permission from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 26 U.S.C. §§ 5822, 5841. 

ATF will deny the application if making or possessing the 

firearm would place the person applying in violation of any 

law. See 26 U.S.C. § 5822; 27 C.F.R. § 479.65. Although a 

machine gun qualifies as a firearm under the National 

Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), a separate federal law, the 

 

1 Federal statutes and caselaw alternate between the spellings 

“machinegun” and “machine gun.” We will use “machine 

gun” except when quoting materials that spell the term 

otherwise.

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Gun Control Act, prohibits the private manufacture of 

machine guns in most instances by making it unlawful for any 

person “to transfer or possess a machine gun,” with narrow 

exceptions for certain government entities and machine guns 

lawfully possessed before 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The 

Gun Control Act defines a “person” as an “individual, 

corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, 

or joint stock company.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1).

Watson is the sole trustee of the Watson Family Gun 

Trust (“the Trust”). On May 23, 2014 and June 24, 2014, 

Watson submitted applications on behalf of the Trust for 

permission to make and register an M-16-style machine gun. 

On August 5, 2014, an ATF examiner mistakenly approved 

one of Watson’s applications. Shortly thereafter, Watson had 

a machine gun manufactured pursuant to that approval. 

However, on or about September 10, 2014, ATF informed 

Watson that the approval had been a mistake and that his 

application had been “disapproved.” ATF explained in a 

letter that Watson’s application was denied because he was 

prohibited by law from possessing a machine gun. Watson 

claimed to be exempt from the prohibition on possessing 

machine guns because he had applied on behalf of a trust, 

which he argued was not a “person” covered by the Gun 

Control Act. ATF explained that although a trust is not a 

“person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold 

property. Therefore, ATF considers the individual acting on 

behalf of the trust to be the proposed maker and possessor of 

the machine gun. 

Watson received a telephone call from an ATF agent 

on October 10, 2014 inquiring whether a machine gun had 

been made pursuant to the initial application approval. The 

ATF agent indicated that if any machine gun had been made, 

the gun must be surrendered to ATF. On November 14, 

2014, Watson met with an ATF agent and surrendered his 

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machine gun under protest. That same day, he filed suit 

against the U.S. Attorney General and the ATF Director 

(collectively, “the government”), seeking declarative and 

injunctive relief from 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et 

seq., and the implementing regulations found in 27 C.F.R. § 

479.1 et seq. Watson alleged that these statutory and 

regulatory provisions act as a de facto ban on an entire class 

of arms in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Second, 

Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

Additionally, Watson alleged violations of his due process 

rights under the Fifth Amendment and his equal protection 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a claim 

for detrimental reliance based on the ATF’s initial approval of 

his application. The government separately initiated a 

forfeiture action for Watson’s machine gun, which was later 

consolidated with his challenge. 

On January 16, 2015, the government moved to 

dismiss Watson’s action for lack of standing and failure to 

state a claim. On July 22, 2015, the District Court ruled that 

Watson did have standing, but that he failed to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.2 Among other holdings, 

the Court held that Watson failed to state a claim under the 

Second Amendment because the Second Amendment does 

not protect the possession of machine guns. He appeals that 

decision as well as the District Court’s finding that a trust is 

incapable of owning a machine gun under § 922(o). Because 

these are the only issues briefed by Watson on appeal, we will 

not discuss the District Court’s other holdings. See Laborers’ 

 

2 On appeal, the government continued to argue that Watson 

lacked standing, but based on Watson’s position at oral 

argument that he is challenging the Gun Control Act and not 

the National Firearms Act, the government essentially 

conceded this point.

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Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy 

Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (issues not briefed on 

appeal are waived). However, we note that all of Watson’s 

claims against the government were dismissed. 

The government’s consolidated forfeiture claims are 

still pending, which led us to question whether the decision 

being appealed was a final order, and thus whether we had 

jurisdiction. But on August 13, 2015, the District Court 

issued a certification of entry of final judgment. This cured 

any jurisdictional defect in the case. See In re Fosamax 

(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 

150, 156 (3d Cir. 2014).

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1346. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Foglia v. Renal Ventures 

Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014); Ballentine 

v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007). We “are 

required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and 

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 

construing them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant.” Foglia, 754 F.3d at 154 n.1 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As a matter of constitutional avoidance, we will first 

turn to Watson’s argument that § 922(o) of the Gun Control 

Act does not apply to a trust. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 

U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the 

Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of 

constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 

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Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute 

is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 

Watson argues that § 922(o) of the Gun Control Act does not 

apply to a trust because § 922(o) applies only to “persons” 

and a trust is not a “person” under the terms of the statute. 

With certain narrow exceptions, the provision states 

that “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess 

a machinegun.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The Gun Control Act 

defines a person as “any individual, company, association, 

firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(a)(1). As Watson notes, a “trust” is not one of the 

listed entities. However, this does not mean that a trust is 

therefore entitled to possess a machine gun.

As the District Court stated, a trust is not an entity 

distinct from its trustees, nor is it capable of legal action on its 

own behalf. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 3 (citing Restatement 

(Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003)). Indeed, Watson himself does 

not dispute that he is the “individual human being” seeking to 

possess a gun on behalf of the Trust. He argues, however, 

that because trusts are not “persons” under the statute, he may 

act on behalf of the Trust in his capacity as a trustee without 

triggering the prohibition on natural persons transferring or 

possessing a machine gun. Appellant’s Br. 55-56. But 

nothing in the Gun Control Act supports such a reading. 

Irrespective of whether Watson is a trustee, he is also a 

natural person and therefore prohibited from performing any 

of the acts forbidden of natural persons under the Gun 

Control Act. His inability to comply with the Gun Control 

Act, in turn, prevents ATF from granting his application 

under the National Firearms Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 5822; 27 

C.F.R. § 479.65.

Moreover, this holding is necessarily correct because 

to interpret the Gun Control Act as Watson suggests would 

allow any party—including convicted felons, who are 

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expressly prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—to avoid liability under this section 

simply by placing a machine gun “in trust.” Any “individual, 

company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint 

stock company” could lawfully possess a machine gun using 

this method. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1). Interpreting the statute 

so as to include this exception would thereby swallow the 

rule. We refuse to conclude that with one hand Congress 

intended to enact a statutory rule that would restrict the 

transfer or possession of certain firearms, but with the other 

hand it created an exception that would destroy that very rule. 

See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 

2001) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that would allow 

the exception to swallow the rule); In re New York City 

Shoes, Inc., 880 F.2d 679, 685 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); see 

also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (same). 

We turn next to Watson’s argument that § 922(o) is 

unconstitutional facially and as-applied to Watson under the 

Second Amendment. We agree with the District Court that 

Watson offers no facts to distinguish why the challenged laws 

should not apply to him. Therefore, we will treat Watson’s 

claim as a facial challenge. The Second Amendment reads, 

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 

free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 

not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. To determine 

whether § 922(o) impermissibly burdens the Second 

Amendment right, we must begin with District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 

In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down several 

statutes in the District of Columbia prohibiting the possession 

of handguns and requiring lawfully owned firearms to be kept 

inoperable. 554 U.S. at 635. Grounding its inquiry in 

historical analysis, the Court found that the Second 

Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms, 

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at least for purposes of self-defense in the home. Id. at 576, 

636. However, the Court warned that “the right [is] not a 

right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 

whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at 626; see also 

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) 

(plurality opinion). The Court recognized that “the Second 

Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain 

types of weapons,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (citing United 

States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)), and specified that it 

was referring to those weapons “in common use” and not 

“those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 

citizens for lawful purposes,” id. at 625, 627. Turning to the 

handgun ban at issue in the case, the Court struck down the 

ban because it “amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class 

of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American 

society” for the “lawful purpose” of self-defense in the home, 

“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is 

most acute.” Id. at 628. 

Based on Heller, we adopted a two-pronged approach 

to Second Amendment challenges. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 

89. “First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a 

burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second 

Amendment’s guarantee.” Id. If it does not, the inquiry ends. 

Id. If it does, we move on to the second step: “[W]e evaluate 

the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law 

passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it 

fails, it is invalid.” Id. 

Heller and subsequent decisions in our Court make 

clear that the de facto ban on machine guns found in § 922(o) 

does not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope 

of the Second Amendment. Turning first to Heller, we note 

that that opinion discusses machine guns on several 

occasions, and each time suggests that these weapons may be 

banned without burdening Second Amendment rights. See 

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Heller, 554 U.S. at 627-28 (“It may be objected that if 

weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles 

and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment 

right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. . . . 

But the fact that modern developments have limited the 

degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected 

right cannot change our interpretation of the right.”); id. at 

624 (suggesting that it would be a “startling” reading of 

Miller that restrictions on machine guns are unconstitutional). 

Next, we turn to our Circuit’s caselaw. We examined 

this question in Marzzarella. Marzzarella concerned whether 

Appellant Michael Marzzarella’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(k) for possession of a handgun with an obliterated 

serial number violated his Second Amendment rights. 614 

F.3d at 87. We reiterated that “[a]t its core, the Second 

Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens to 

possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in the 

home,” and thus, under Heller, “restrictions on the possession 

of dangerous and unusual weapons are not constitutionally 

suspect because these weapons are outside the ambit of the

amendment.” Id. at 91, 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 

635). Marzzarella argued that because he possessed the 

unlawful weapon in his home, the challenged statute 

regulated protected conduct. However, we found that “it 

cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home 

for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all 

circumstances.” Id. at 94. If this were the case, “[p]ossession 

of machine guns or short-barreled shotguns—or any other 

dangerous and unusual weapon—so long as they were kept in 

the home, would then fall within the Second Amendment. 

But the Supreme Court has made clear that the Second 

Amendment does not protect those types of weapons.” Id. 

(citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; United States v. Fincher, 538 

F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1174 

(2009)). 

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In case Marzzarella left any doubt, we repeat today 

that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession 

of machine guns. They are not in common use for lawful 

purposes. See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 

(1968) (describing machine guns as “weapons used 

principally by persons engaged in unlawful activities”); 

United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 799 n.4 (5th Cir. 

1999) (noting “machine guns . . . are primarily weapons of

war and have no appropriate sporting use or use for personal 

protection”) (quoting S. Rep No. 90-1501, at 28 (1968)); H.R. 

Rep. No. 99-495, at 4 (1986) (noting that machine guns are 

“used by racketeers and drug traffickers for intimidation, 

murder and protection of drugs and the proceeds of crime”); 

H.R. Rep. No. 90-1956, at 34 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), as 

reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4434 (describing 

machine guns as “gangster-type weapons”). They are also 

exceedingly dangerous weapons. See, e.g., United States v. 

O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 230 (2010) (noting “[t]he immense 

danger posed by machineguns”); United States v. Henry, 688 

F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996 

(2013) (“A modern machine gun can fire more than 1,000 

rounds per minute, allowing a shooter to kill dozens of people 

within a matter of seconds. Short of bombs, missiles, and 

biochemical agents, we can conceive of few weapons that are 

more dangerous than machine guns.”) (internal citation 

omitted); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 

1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) 

(“Machine guns possess a firepower that outstrips any other 

kind of gun.”). As such, Heller dictates that they fall outside 

the protection of the Second Amendment.

Our sister circuits have consistently come to similar 

conclusions. In Fincher, the Eighth Circuit found that 

“[m]achine guns are not in common use by law-abiding 

citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the 

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category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the 

government can prohibit for individual use.” 538 F.3d at 874. 

We previously quoted this very sentence in our opinion in 

Marzzarella. In Henry, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “machine 

guns are highly ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ that are not 

‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 

purposes.’” 688 F.3d at 640. And in Heller v. District of 

Columbia (“Heller II”), the D.C. Circuit noted that “Heller 

suggests that ‘M-16 rifles and the like’ may be banned 

because they are ‘dangerous and unusual.’” 670 F.3d 1244, 

1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 

471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1115 (2010) 

(the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of 

unregistered machine guns); Friedman v. City of Highland 

Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub 

nom. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447 

(2015) (upholding a ban on semi-automatic assault weapons 

against a Second Amendment challenge).

Watson nonetheless argues that the District Court 

misapplied Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language 

because the doctrine does not pertain to “the mere possession 

of a firearm,” but only applies to “the manner in which that 

right is exercised.” Appellant’s Br. 18. As the above 

discussion suggests, Watson’s unconventional reading 

contradicts the interpretation adopted by all of the federal 

circuits that have considered this language. See, e.g.,

Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409; New York State Rifle & Pistol 

Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 256 (2d Cir. 2015); Henry, 

688 F.3d 637; Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244; Marzzarella, 614 

F.3d 85; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 

2010); Fincher, 538 F.3d 868. Watson himself concedes that 

“a majority of courts” interpret the “dangerous and unusual” 

language in Heller to describe possession of a weapon, 

Appellant’s Reply Br. 12, but in fact no case was found 

adopting the alternative analysis proposed by Watson. 

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This is likely because Heller plainly states that mere 

possession of certain weapons may be prohibited. See, e.g., 

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting that the Second Amendment 

is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever”) 

(emphasis added); id. at 627 (suggesting that the possession 

of “M-16 rifles and the like” may be banned); id. at 624 

(same); see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (holding that shortbarreled shotguns are unprotected under the Second 

Amendment). And looking at the “dangerous and unusual” 

phrase in context, the most logical reading is that “dangerous 

and unusual” describes certain categories of weapons, and not 

the manner in which the weapons are used. The Court 

discusses “dangerous and unusual” weapons immediately 

after discussing what “sorts of weapons” Miller protects, and 

just before the Court discusses why certain types of weapons, 

even those “that are most useful in military service—M-16 

rifles and the like—” may be banned. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 

627. We therefore decline to adopt Watson’s interpretation of 

Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language.

Similarly, Watson’s arguments against categorical 

bans on certain firearms fail to persuade. Heller limits its 

holding to bans on “handguns held and used for self-defense 

in the home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Heller gives special 

consideration to the District of Columbia’s categorical ban on 

handguns because they “are the most popular weapon chosen 

by Americans for self-defense in the home.” Id. at 629. This 

does not mean that a categorical ban on any particular type of 

bearable arm is unconstitutional. As explained above, Heller 

contains clear statements to the contrary. 

Nor does our opinion in Marzzarella support Watson’s 

argument, as he suggests. When Marzzarella discusses 

categorical decisions, the opinion objects to the idea of 

categorically protecting certain weapons, not categorically 

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banning them. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94 (“[I]t also 

would make little sense to categorically protect a class of 

weapons bearing a certain characteristic wholly unrelated to 

their utility.”). In fact, Marzzarella specifically recognizes 

that there are particular categories of weapons that fall outside 

the protection of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 90-

91 (noting that “the right to bear arms, as codified in the 

Second Amendment, affords no protection to weapons not 

typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 

purposes”); id. at 92 (noting that “the Second Amendment 

affords no protection for the possession of dangerous and 

unusual weapons”). When discussing machine guns and 

short-barreled shotguns, the opinion states that “the Supreme 

Court made clear the Second Amendment does not protect 

those types of weapons.” Id. at 94-95. Nothing in Heller or 

Marzzarella supports Watson’s argument.

Because we find that under Heller and Marzzarella the 

possession of a machine gun is not protected under the 

Second Amendment, our inquiry is at an end. These cases 

make clear that § 922(o) does not burden conduct falling 

within the scope of the Second Amendment, and thus, 

Watson’s facial challenge to § 922(o) must fail. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller, courts 

nationwide have debated the parameters of that decision, and 

the extent to which government regulation may be reconciled 

with the Second Amendment. However, on at least one issue 

the courts are in agreement: governments may restrict the 

possession of machine guns. This finding follows from prior 

caselaw and the plain language provided by the Supreme 

Court. We decline to depart from this standard today. 

Further, we decline to reinterpret the Gun Control Act to 

allow an individual to circumvent the law through the use of a 

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17

trust. For these reasons, the District Court’s opinion will be 

affirmed. 

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