Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-01486/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-01486-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHEILA HOBSON, CHRISTINE

PICKNEY, SUSAN

ELLINGTON, and SANTRESSA

LOVELACE, individually and on

behalf of similarly situated

employees,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MURPHY OIL USA, INC.,

Defendant.

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 Civil Action No. CV-10-S-1486-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Sheila Hobson, Christine Pickney, Susan Ellington, and Santressa

Lovelace, filed a collective action against defendant, Murphy Oil USA, Inc.

(“Murphy Oil”), on June 11, 2010, seeking a judgment for themselves and others

similarly situated for unpaid overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). Defendant subsequently moved to compel

arbitration of this matter and dismissthe collective action allegations.

1 On September

18, 2012, this court adopted and approved the report and recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Harwell Davis, granted defendant’s motion, dismissed plaintiffs’

1

 Doc. no. 14.

FILED

 2015 Jul-08 AM 10:40

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 1 of 11
collective action allegations with prejudice, ordered plaintiffs to submit their

individual claims to arbitration, stayed this action pending resolution through

arbitration, and directed the Clerk to close the file for this case for administrative and

statistical purposes.

2 The court noted that “the file may be reopened, on either party’s

motion, for an appropriate purpose such as dismissal following settlement, entry of

judgment, vacatur, or modification of an arbitrator’s award.”3

On February 25, 2015, almost two and a half years later, plaintiffs moved for

reconsideration of the order dismissing the collective action allegations, requiring

plaintiffs to submit their individual claims to arbitration, and staying this action

pending resolution through arbitration.

4 This court denied that motion in an order

dated June 15, 2015.5 

In its response to plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, defendant pointed out

that plaintiffs had failed to submit their claims to arbitration, as required by the

September 18, 2012 order.

6 As a result, defendant asks this court to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).7

2

 Doc. no. 41.

3

Id. at 4.

4

 Doc. no. 43. 

5

 Doc. no. 47. 

6

See doc. no. 46, at 14-16. 

7

Id. 

2

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Plaintiffs were ordered to show cause, by June 22, 2015, why their complaint should

not be dismissed “for failing to adhere to the court’s order directing them to submit

their claims to arbitration.”

8 This order considers plaintiffs’ show cause response,

which was timely filed on June 22, 2015.9

Plaintiffs first assert that they “behaved reasonably in waiting to arbitrate and

should not be subject to the harsh penalty of having their complaint dismissed.”10

One of the plaintiffs in this case, Sheila Hobson, filed an unfair labor practice charge

with the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board” or “NLRB”) during January

of 2011, while the motion to compel arbitration still was pending before this court. 

See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Sheila M. Hobson, 361 NLRB No. 72, *4 (Oct. 28,

2014). In that charge, Hobson asserted that Murphy Oil’s arbitration agreement

violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) “by

maintaining and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement that prohibits

employees from engaging in protected, concerted activities,” and by leading

“employees reasonably to believe that they were prohibited from filing unfair labor

practice charges with the Board.” Id.

11 The Board ruled in Hobson’s favor on

8

 Doc. no. 47, at 2. 

9

 Doc. no. 48. 

10

Id. at 2. 

11 Section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. §

3

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 3 of 11
October 28, 2014, finding that Murphy Oil violated Section 8(a)(1) “by requiring its

employees to agree to resolve all employment-related claims through individual

arbitration, and by taking stepsto enforce the unlawful agreementsin Federal district

court when [Hobson] and three other employees filed a collective claim against

[Murphy Oil] under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Id. at *3 (alterations supplied). 

The Board ordered Murphy Oil to rescind its arbitration agreement, 

or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the

Agreement and Waiver does not constitute a waiver of their right to

maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all

forums, and that it does not restrict employees’ rights to file charges

with the National Labor Relations Board.

Id. at *29. Murphy Oil also was ordered to notify all current and former employees,

and all applicants for employment, who were required to sign the arbitration

agreement, that the agreement had been rescinded. Id. at *30. Further, Murphy Oil

was ordered to

[n]otify the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Alabama that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration

agreements upon which it based its motion to dismiss Sheila Hobson’s

and her coplaintiffs’ FLSA collective action and to compel arbitration

of their claims, and inform the court that it no longer opposes the

plaintiffs’ FLSA action on the basis of those agreements.

158(a)(1). Section 157 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]mployees shall have the right to

self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of

collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (alteration supplied). 

4

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Id. (alteration supplied). 

MurphyOilfiled a Petition For Review of the Board’s decision with the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on November 7, 2014, and Murphy Oil’s

counsel represented to this court in a March 6, 2015 filing that the review still was

pending.

12 Moreover, as the Fifth Circuit found in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737

F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), the NLRB’s decisions are not entitled to deference when

they concern the interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, or any statutory

provision other than the NLRA. Id. at 356. 

Even so, plaintiffs assert that, until the Board issued its decision on October 28,

2014, “the question of whether, and to what extent, Defendant could enforce an

individual arbitration agreement against its employees was litigated through two

parallel but closely related proceedings: one before this Court and one before the

NLRB.”13

 Plaintiffs follow that assertion with this one:

Had Plaintiffsfiled for individual arbitration during this period [between

this court’s September 18, 2012 order compelling arbitration and the

NLRB’s October 28, 2014 ruling], they would have effectively mooted

their NLRB proceeding — at least with respect to their own claims —

and deprived themselves of the ability to seek redress for the unfair

labor practices they alleged.

14

 

12 Doc. no. 46, at 2. A review of the KeyCite history of the NLRB’s decision on Westlaw

confirms that no decision has been rendered, or at least published, on appeal. 

13

 Doc. no. 48, at 3. 

14

Id. at 3-4 (alteration supplied). 

5

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 5 of 11
As an initial matter, “plaintiffs” did not have an NLRB proceeding. Only one

plaintiff, Sheila Hobson, filed a complaint with the NLRB. The other plaintiffs

cannot assert any prejudice from being unable to seek redress in that forum for any

labor practices they believe are unfair. 

More substantively, plaintiffs have not cited any authority to support their

outlandish suggestion that a federal court order is without effect if there is a related

proceeding pending before the NLRB. If plaintiffs truly were concerned about their

rights under the NLRA being “irreparably harmed” by the requirement to arbitrate

their individual claims, they could have requested either a stay of the arbitration order

pending an outcome of the proceedings before the NLRB, or permission to seek an

interlocutory appeal. They did neither. Instead, they simply disregarded this court’s

order because it required them to do something they did not want to do. That is not

“reasonable behavior.” 

Plaintiffs also assert that, even if their decision to wait to initiate arbitration

proceedings was not reasonable, dismissal of their claims with prejudice is too harsh

of a punishment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), upon which defendant’s

request for dismissal is based, provides: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to

comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action

or any claim against it.” 

6

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Rule 41(b) makes clear that a trial court has discretion to impose

sanctions on a party who fails to adhere to court rules. Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(b). But that discretion is not unlimited, and the “[d]ismissal of a case

with prejudice is considered a sanction of last resort, applicable only in

extreme circumstances.” Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th

Cir. 1985). Dismissal with prejudice is not proper unless “the district

court finds a clear record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser

sanctions are inadequate to correctsuch conduct.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd.

[ v. M/V MONADA,] 432 F.3d [1333,] 1339[ (11th Cir. 2005)]. Mere

negligence or confusion is not sufficient to justify a finding of delay or

willful misconduct. McKelvey v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d 1518,

1520 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006) (first alteration in original,

other alterations supplied).

Here, there is a clear record of delay and willful misconduct. As discussed

above, plaintiffs’ decision to delay their filing of arbitration proceedings was not

reasonable, and instead constituted a willful disregard of court orders for the purpose

of gaining strategic advantage. Plaintiffs allege confusion or negligence, but the

circumstancessupport the inference that plaintiffs acted willfully and knowingly, not

that they were confused or careless. Finally, no lesser sanction would adequately

correct plaintiff’s conduct. If, for example, plaintiffs were subjected to a monetary

fine and required to immediately submit their claims to arbitration, they still would

have received the benefit of their willful non-compliance with this court’s order for

nearly two and a half years. There is no way to undo the effect of plaintiffs’ dilatory

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Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 7 of 11
tactics. 

There is no Eleventh Circuit decision directly supporting this outcome, but a

number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that dismissal is an appropriate

remedy for a plaintiff who disregards a district court’s order compelling arbitration. 

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.

2005), is instructive. There, the district court ordered James to submit her claims to

arbitration on February 4, 2003. Id. at 675. For months, she did not do so, asserting

that the costs of initiating the arbitration proceedings were prohibitive. Instead, she

filed a request for reconsideration nearly one year later, on January 15, 2004, and

alternatively requested that her case be dismissed so she could exercise her right of

appeal. Id. The district court denied the motion as untimely, explaining:

This request comes far too late in the day. . . . James took no

steps following the Court’s February 2003 order compelling arbitration

to carry out that order’s directive, seek reconsideration, or request

certification for an interlocutory appeal. Our ruling did not give James

the option of foregoing arbitration, waiting nearly a year, asking this

Court for another bite at the same apple, and then reviving for appeal

purposes a ruling made more than a year ago. If James wanted to appeal

the February 2003 order, she should have made that request within a

reasonable time after the order was entered.

Id. at 675-76, 681. The court allowed Ms. James one week to show cause why her

claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute in arbitration. She responded

three weeks later, and then only reiterated her previous arguments. Id. at 676. The

8

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 8 of 11
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, stating that, once the district

court ordered Ms. James to submit her claims to arbitration, “it was incumbent upon

Ms. James to abide by the district court’s ruling and not to continue submitting

arguments that the district court already had determined were meritless.” Id. at 681. 

As a result of Ms. James’s “failure to pursue promptly the [district] court’s

reconsideration, or this court’s review on interlocutory appeal,” the district court’s

decision was not an abuse of discretion. Id. (alteration supplied). See also Renobato

v. Compass Bank Corp., 480 F. App’x 764, 766-67 (5th Cir. 2012) (dismissal not an

abuse of discretion when plaintiff did not initiate arbitration proceedings for three

years, even after being given a second chance to do so by the district court); Salt Lick

Bancorp v. F.D.I.C., 187 F. App’x 428, 446-47 (6th Cir. 2006) (dismissal not an

abuse of discretion when plaintiff did not initiate arbitration proceedings for two and

a half years, despite plaintiff’s alleged inability to retain counsel and obtain

documents from a third party); Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reinsurance

Co., 123 F. App’x 481, 483-84 (3rd Cir. 2005) (dismissal not an abuse of discretion

after a six-year delay in initiating arbitration).

Plaintiffs assert that the issue of their delay in commencing arbitration

proceedings is a matter for the arbitrator, not this court, to decide. It is generally true

that “‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final

9

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 9 of 11
disposition should be left to the arbitrator.” Aluminum Brick and Glass Workers

International Union v. AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp., 991 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.

1993) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)). 

Even so, this “procedural” question does not grow out of the underlying dispute; it

grows out of plaintiffs’ failure to comply with this court’s order. Under similar

circumstances, the Third Circuit in Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life

Reinsurance Co., 123 F. App’x 481 (3rd Cir. 2005), held that the issue of a plaintiff’s

failure to submit a claim to arbitration was for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. 

Id. at 483-84. 

It cannot be that the arbitration agreement demands the submission of

Windward’sfailure to appoint an arbitrator to an arbitration panel which

has not yet been constituted. Were this a failure to cooperate with the

arbitration panel or some other form of foot-dragging on the part of

Windward post-appointment of the panel, we might well be compelled

. . . to leave any issues of delay to the broad jurisdiction of the

arbitrators under the agreement. Where, however, a party fails for many

yearsto abide by a district court order to initiate arbitration proceedings,

it is an issue for the district court, and not the non-existent arbitration

panel. 

Id. (footnote omitted). Although that decision is unpublished, this court finds its

reasoning to be persuasive. This court has jurisdiction to determine the appropriate

penalty for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with this court’s orders. 

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED, with

10

Case 2:10-cv-01486-CLS Document 49 Filed 07/08/15 Page 10 of 11
prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Costs are taxed to

plaintiffs, but defendant’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED. The Clerk is

directed to close this file. 

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of July, 2015.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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