Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00952/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00952-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER 

AUTHORITY, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 

INTERIOR, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:11-cv-00952 LJO GSA

ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 99, 100, 

104)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents a potential conflict between two provisions of the 1992 Central Valley 

Improvement Act (“CVPIA”), Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4700 (1992). CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) 

requires the Secretary of the Interior (the “Secretary”) to dedicate 800,000 acre-feet (“AF”) of water to 

serve certain fish and wildlife restoration purposes. CVPIA § 3411(b) requires the Secretary to comply 

with a 1985 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Department of Water Resources 

of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of the Central Valley Project and the State Water 

Project (otherwise referenced as “Coordinated Operations Agreement” or “COA”), Article 6(g) of which 

in turn requires the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation” or “the Bureau”) to export and store as 

much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits” when the Sacramento-San Joaquin

Delta (“Delta”) is in “excess water conditions.”1

Plaintiffs are San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority (“Authority”) and one of the 

 

1 “Excess water conditions,” are defined in the COA as “periods when it is agreed that releases from upstream reservoirs plus 

unregulated flow exceed Sacramento Valley inbasin uses plus exports.” COA ¶ 3(c) (USBR 00009). 

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Authority’s Member Districts, Westlands Water District (“Westlands”). Defendants are the United 

States Department of the Interior and its member agencies, Reclamation, and the United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service (“FWS”), along with various officials of those agencies (collectively, “Federal 

Defendants”). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 9, 2011, during a period when the Delta was in 

“excess water conditions,” complaining that, contrary to the mandate in CVPIA § 3411(b) to export as 

much water as possible, Reclamation ordered reduced export pumping for a two-week period starting on 

June 8, 2011, pursuant to the Secretary’s authority under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). 

Before the Court for decision are cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs request 

summary judgment on their Second Claim for Relief, arising under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which alleges that, by imposing pumping restrictions during June 2011, 

Federal Defendants undertook a final agency action not in accordance with law. See Doc. 99 (notice of 

motion); Doc. 1 (Complaint) at ¶¶ 50-55. Alternatively, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their 

First Claim for Relief, an APA claim arising under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which alleges Federal Defendants 

unlawfully withheld agency action by not maximizing exports during the period of reduced pumping in 

June 2011. See Doc. 99; Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 45-49. Federal Defendants filed a combined cross motion and 

opposition. Docs. 104 & 105. Plaintiffs filed a combined opposition and reply, Doc. 107, to which 

Federal Defendants replied, Doc. 109. The motions became ripe on June 24, 2014. Due to the 

convergence of pending motions in numerous related cases, the Court inquired whether the legal issues 

raised by these cases were likely to be of practical importance before the end of the 2014 water year. 

Doc. 108. All parties agreed that the Court could defer ruling on these motions without likely practical 

consequence in the interim. Doc. 110. In accordance with Local Rule 230(g), the Court decides the 

pending motions on the papers, without oral argument.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

When Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit, they filed simultaneous motions for temporary and 

permanent injunctive relief. Docs. 9 & 10. The previously assigned District Judge, Oliver W. Wanger,

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denied the motions on the grounds that, among other things, Plaintiffs failed to establish likelihood of 

success on the merits or that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, in 

part because it was unclear at the time whether the challenged action would result in any impact on 

Plaintiffs’ water supply. See Doc. 49 at 9-12.2 The pumping reduction expired of its own accord. 

Soon thereafter, this and other related cases were transferred to the undersigned upon Judge 

Wanger’s retirement. See Doc. 50. On January 27, 2014, Federal Defendants moved to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ claims on mootness grounds. Doc. 56. In denying the motion, the Court concluded Plaintiffs’

claims were technically moot, but were nevertheless cognizable because there was a reasonable 

expectation of repeat conduct in light of the fact that similar pumping reductions were ordered during 

excess conditions on at least one prior occasion. Doc. 66 at 12-27. 

On July 27, 2012, Federal Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, arguing that (a) Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and (b) Plaintiffs failed to challenge a 

final agency action. Doc. 69. The motion was denied. Doc. 73. 

The administrative record was lodged on February 8, 2013. Doc. 77. On May 1, 2013, Plaintiffs 

moved for discovery. Doc. 83. The magistrate judge denied that motion without prejudice on November 

22, 2013. Doc. 94. These cross-motions followed. 

 

2 This Court is not bound by the injunctive relief rulings. In general, “decisions at the preliminary injunction phase do not 

constitute the law of the case.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't. of Agric.,

499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). A preliminary injunction decision is just that: preliminary. Id. “This rule acknowledges 

that ‘decisions on preliminary injunctions ... must often be made hastily and on less than a full record.’” Id. (quoting S. Or. 

Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Federal Defendants argue that the district judge previously assigned to this matter cast doubt on Plaintiffs’ 

interpretation of the COA in another case. Specifically, Federal Defendants point to a 2010 decision in the Consolidated 

Salmonid Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1162-63 (E.D. Cal. 2010), supplemented (June 1, 2010), in which Plaintiffs argued 

that Federal Defendants acted unlawfully in the context of evaluating the Central Valley Project’s (“CVP”) impacts to 

endangered species by attributing to the CVP the effects of “mandatory” compliance with the COA. The district court 

rejected this argument, reasoning:

Even assuming, arguendo, that any mandatory obligation exists under the COA, a proposition that is questionable 

given the open-ended wording of the COA and language in the CVPIA subjecting project operations to the ESA, 

[the relevant caselaw] does not require the agency to segregate discretionary from non-discretionary activities during 

an ESA § 7 consultation.

Id. As the district court in the Consolidated Salmonid Cases did not examine the specific statutory provisions at issue in this 

case, the above-quoted reasoning is neither controlling nor persuasive here. 

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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A helpful summary of relevant history of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and COA is set 

forth in a 1985 House Report addressing H.R. 3113, which eventually would become Public Law 99-

546. H.R. Rep. No. 99, 257 (1985), “PROVIDING FOR THE COORDINATED OPERATION OF THE CENTRAL 

VALLEY PROJECT IN CALIFORNIA” (“COA House Report”). As the COA House Report explains, the CVP 

was planned in the 1920s and 1930s to be a state-funded project. Id. at 2. However, when California 

failed to finance fully the construction of the project, the federal government stepped in. Id. Among 

other things, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 844, 850, authorized the Secretary to construct 

the CVP as a federal project and stated that the purposes of the project were:

...improving navigation, regulating the flow of the San Joaquin and the 

Sacramento River, controlling floods, providing for storage and for the 

delivery of the stored water thereof, for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands and lands of the Indian Reservations, and other beneficial uses, 

and for the generation and sale of electric energy as a means of financially 

aiding and assisting such undertakings and in order to permit the full 

utilization of the works constructed to accomplish the aforesaid purposes. 

Pub. L. No. 75-392, § 2, 50 Stat. 844, 850. The Rivers and Harbors Act also prioritized the use of CVP 

facilities, indicating the CVP’s features “shall be used, first for river regulation, improvement of 

navigation, and flood control; second, for irrigation and domestic uses; and third, for power.” Id. In the 

late 1950s, the State of California began planning for the construction of a parallel State Water Project

(“SWP”), the construction of which was authorized and funded in 1960. COA House Report at 3. 

The Delta sits at the heart of both the CVP and SWP. 

The plan of development for the CVP and the SWP was to store millions 

of acre-feet of surplus flows from the rivers in the north in order to make 

water available for use as far south as Southern California. The essential 

link in these plans is the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. It is through this 

area that water stored in the north flows for delivery to water users in the 

San Joaquin Valley and Southern California....

Id. at 4. At the same time, the Delta itself is of critical geographic importance. 

The Delta is an integral part of the vast San Francisco Bay estuary and 

waterway system which supports major fisheries and waterfowl 

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populations. In addition, the Delta is one of California’s most fertile 

agricultural areas and supports a considerable industrial complex.

Id. 

As time passed, competition for water from the Sacramento and San Joaquin watersheds 

increased. See id. Complicating the landscape, the California State Water Resources Control Board 

(“SWRCB”), the State agency charged with the task of issuing permits to appropriate water and 

exercising functions related to water pollution and quality control, see Cal. Water Code § 179, began 

issuing water quality standards for the Delta in 1967. COA House Report at 5. These water quality 

standards have been extensively re-written several times, including in 1978, with the issuance of 

SWRCB Decision 1485 (“D-14853”). The SWRCB recognized in D-1485 that coordination between the 

CVP and SWP was essential to the implementation of D-1485’s water quality standards:

To ensure protection of Delta beneficial uses and to make optimum use of 

storage pumping and conveyance facilities, operation of the CVP and 

SWP must be coordinated. Separation of the effects of the two projects on 

Delta water supplies, uses and environment is not possible. Therefore, 

terms and conditions related to the Delta, including those for protection of 

fish and wildlife, must be the same in all of these permits. Inclusions of 

such terms in some, but not all, of the permits for the CVP and SWP

would create confusion and would be unworkable. Therefore, maintenance 

of the water quality standards set forth in this decision, including flows to 

be maintained for protection of fish and wildlife will be imposed as a 

condition of all of the CVP and SWP permits....

D-1485at 6.

There was never any serious dispute that the SWP, managed by the State, was required to 

comply with restrictions imposed to meet State water quality standards. However, the Bureau long 

maintained that it was not required to meet the State standards. See COA House Report at 5. This 

position ultimately led to litigation. Id. at 6. Uncertainty related to this dispute clouded water resource 

decision-making for many years. Id. As the COA House Report explained: 

Delta interests opposed water development projects until water quality 

 

3 Available at: http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/decisions/d1450_d1499/wrd1485.pdf 

(last visited Jan. 9, 2015).

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was protected. Those proposing new projects sought to authorize Federal 

or State facilities, notwithstanding the opposition of Delta interests. The 

result was stalemate. No new projects were authorized or built, and no 

assurances were given for Delta protection by the CVP.

Id. at 6-7. 

Building upon a 1960 agreement concerning coordinated operation of the CVP and SWP, which 

dealt with issues unrelated to water quality requirements, including allocation of shortages, in 1985 the 

Department of Water Resources (“DWR”), the California agency that manages the SWP, and the Bureau 

completed negotiations on a new agreement that, among other things, resolved the parties’ dispute over 

the Bureau’s contribution toward meeting State water quality goals. Id. at 6-7. This agreement broke the 

“logjam,” id. at 7, by calling for DWR and Reclamation to share responsibility for meeting Delta water 

quality standards during times of “balanced water conditions,” which exist when “it is agreed that 

releases from upstream reservoirs plus unregulated flow approximately equal the water supply needed to 

meet Sacramento Valley inbasin uses, plus exports.” COA § 3(b) (USBR 00009)4, § 6(c)-(d) (USBR

00014-16). In contrast, in times of “excess water conditions,” defined as “periods when it is agreed that 

releases from upstream reservoirs plus unregulated flow exceed Sacramento Valley inbasin uses, plus 

exports,” “each party has the responsibility to export and store as much water as possible within its 

physical and contractual limits.” COA § 3(d) (USBR00009); § 6(g) (USBR00017).

The House Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources held oversight hearings on the new 

agreement in May 1985. COA House Report at 7. As a result of those hearings, a bill was introduced to 

authorize and direct the Secretary to execute and implement the agreement. In addition, the legislation 

included provisions to formally impose upon the federal government responsibility to comply with state 

water quality standards for the Delta. The bill, which would eventually become Public Law 99-546

(“P.L. 99-546”), amended Section 2 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 by adding the following 

 

4 Federal Defendants produced the Administrative Record in this case in two parts. Documents from records of the Bureau 

bear bates numbers starting with “USBR.” Documents from the records of the Fish and Wildlife Service bear bates numbers 

starting with “FWS.” 

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relevant language:

(b)(1) Unless the Secretary of the Interior determines that operation of the 

Central Valley project in conformity with State water quality standards for 

the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta and Estuary is not 

consistent with the congressional directives applicable to the project, the 

Secretary is authorized and directed to operate the project, in conjunction 

with the State of California water project, in conformity with such 

standards. Should the Secretary of the Interior so determine, then the 

Secretary shall promptly request the Attorney General to bring an action in 

the court of proper jurisdiction for the purposes of determining the 

applicability of such standards to the project.

***

(d) The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to execute and 

implement the ‘Agreement Between the United States of America and the 

Department of Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated 

Operation of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project’ dated 

May 20, 1985....

Pub. L. 99–546, 100 Stat. 3050. DWR and Reclamation executed the COA on November 24, 1986. 

USBR 00006; USBR 00035.

Execution of the COA benefitted the federal government in several ways. The Senate Report 

addressing H.R. 3113 indicated that “[i]mplementation of the COA would free a substantial block of 

CVP water (estimates range up to 1.1 million acre-feet annually) for future long term water service 

contracts.” S. Rep. No. 99-265 (1986), IMPLEMENTING THE COORDINATED OPERATION AGREEMENT FOR 

THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND STATE WATER PROJECT, CALIFORNIA, TO IMPLEMENT THE SUISUN 

MARSH PRESERVATION AGREEMENT, CALIFORNIA, TO AMEND THE SMALL RECLAMATION PROJECTS ACT 

OF 1956, AS AMENDED, AND TO VALIDATE CERTAIN CONTRACTS (“COA Senate Report”) at 6; see also 

id. at 23 (letter of Robert Broadbent, Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, Department of Interior) 

(“Implementation of the COA would free a substantial block of CVP water for which the status is 

currently uncertain for future water service contracts. There have been numerous requests for additional 

water from current CVP contractors.”). The COA also “provides an institutional framework whereby 

both projects can operate conjunctively in such a way that the State, if it purchases water on an interim 

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basis from the [CVP], can help repay the Federal investment in project works.” Id. at 45 (statement of 

Robert N. Broadbent, Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, Department of the Interior).

In 1992, Congress enacted the CVPIA, which was designed: 

(a) To protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, and associated habitats 

in the Central Valley and Trinity River basins of California;

(b) To address impacts of the Central Valley Project on fish, wildlife and 

associated habitats;

(c) To improve the operational flexibility of the Central Valley Project;

(d) To increase water-related benefits provided by the Central Valley 

Project to the State of California through expanded use of voluntary water 

transfers and improved water conservation;

(e) To contribute to the State of California's interim and long-term efforts 

to protect the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary;

(f) To achieve a reasonable balance among competing demands for use of 

Central Valley Project water, including the requirements of fish and 

wildlife, agricultural, municipal and industrial and power contractors.

CVPIA § 3402(a). The CVPIA amended the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937’s original prioritization 

that the CVP’s features “shall be used, first for river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood 

control; second, for irrigation and domestic uses; and third, for power,” Pub. L. No. 75-392, § 2, 50 Stat. 

844, 850, to instead provide that the CVP’s features “shall be used, first for river regulation, 

improvement of navigation, and flood control; second, for irrigation domestic uses and fish and wildlife 

mitigation, protection and restoration purposes; and third, for power and fish and wildlife enhancement.” 

CVPIA § 3406(a)(2) (new language emphasized). 

At issue in this case are two other specific provisions of the CVPIA. CVPIA § 3406(b)(2), 

which, as discussed below, has been litigated extensively in this Court and the Ninth Circuit, directed 

the Secretary to dedicate and manage annually 800,000 AF of water to fish and wildlife purposes:

(b) FISH AND WILDLIFE RESTORATION ACTIVITIES.--The 

Secretary, immediately upon the enactment of this title, shall operate the 

Central Valley Project to meet all obligations under state and Federal law, 

including but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 

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U.S.C. 1531, et seq., and all decisions of the California State Water 

Resources Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses 

and permits for the project. The Secretary, in consultation with other State 

and Federal agencies, Indian tribes, and affected interest, is further 

authorized and directed to:

***

(2) upon enactment of this title dedicate and manage annually eight 

hundred thousand acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the 

primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat 

restoration purposes and measures authorized by this title; to assist 

the State of California in its efforts to protect the waters of the San 

Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Estuary; and to help meet 

such obligations as may be legally imposed upon the Central 

Valley Project under state or federal law following the date of 

enactment of this title, including but not limited to additional 

obligations under the federal Endangered Species Act....

The instruction in this provision to “dedicate and manage annually [800,000 AF] of [CVP] yield” is 

often referred to simply as the “(b)(2) program,” water subject to the program is often referred to as 

“(b)(2) water” or “(b)(2) assets,” the 800,000 AF is referenced as the “(b)(2) account,” and actions taken 

pursuant to fulfill CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s fishery purposes are referred to as “(b)(2) fish actions” or 

“(b)(2) fishery actions.” See USBR 00296, 01791.

At the same time, CVPIA § 3411(b) directs the Secretary to comply with the COA: 

SEC. 3411 - COMPLIANCE WITH STATE WATER LAW AND 

COORDINATED OPERATIONS AGREEMENT.

***

(b) The Secretary, in the implementation of the provisions of this title, 

shall fully comply with the United States’ obligations as set forth in the 

“Agreement Between the United States of America and the Department of 

Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of 

the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project” dated May 20, 

1985, and the provisions of Public Law 99-546; and shall take no action 

which shifts an obligation that otherwise should be borne by the Central 

Valley Project to any other lawful water rights permittee or licensee.

At the end of May 2011, Defendants began to consider how they should utilize the remaining 

“B2 assets” left in the water year. FWS 00001. As a May 26, 2011 email from National Marine Fisheries 

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Service (“NMFS”) fishery biologist Bruce Oppenheim indicated:

This year is a wet year [and] we are flush with B2 assets. The latest 

forecast ... shows only 614 [thousand acre-feet (“TAF”)] of 800 TAF 

available being used this year. This leaves approximately 186 TAF of 

water available for protective fish actions, banking for next year, or the 

Fall x2 study. We should be discussing what we are planning to do with 

this windfall. 

FWS 00001. Oppenheim’s May 26, 2011 email floated the idea of “using additional B2 water to keep 

the CVP exports lower through June.” Id. As Oppenheim explained: 

This action would protect late emigrating steelhead and fall-run Chinook 

salmon leaving the San Joaquin River. We are seeing large numbers of 

fall-run/spring-run juvenile[] [salmonids] at the pumps right now (8,000 

fish last week). With the high flows and low water temperatures on the 

San Joaquin R[iver] this is likely to continue. This action would cost about 

192 TAF if we keep the CVP down at 1 unit....

Id. Oppenheim’s email also identified three possible rationales for not ordering an export reduction in 

June 2011:

If we do not take an action to protect fall-run and steelhead in June we 

should at least have a reason if asked did we consider it [sic]. The 

rationale for not taking an action at this time could be; 1) The SWP would 

increase to cover the difference lending the export reduction at the CVP 

worthless, 2) We want to maintain high exports for VAMP and the 6 year 

acoustic study which are continuing to release salmon & steelhead the first 

2 weeks of June. This gives us a high and low export rate to compare, and 

lastly 3) the restrictions on OMR flows in the [biological opinions] are 

protective enough.

Id. Federal Defendants also “discussed the options of banking some b2 water for use [in 2012], or doing 

some re-operation to increase reservoir releases in the fall,” but “Reclamation deemed both options 

infeasible since all reservoirs [were] expected to fill ... and there [would] be no room to hold water 

over.” FWS 00065. 

It is undisputed that excess conditions existed for approximately two weeks beginning on June 8, 

2011. Doc. 48 (Answer) at ¶ 2. It is also undisputed that during this time, the United States sent a change 

order to the Authority directing the Authority to reduce export pumping at the CVP’s Jones Pumping 

Plant to only three pump units beginning at 6:59 a.m. on Wednesday June 8, 2011. USBR 01790. The 

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change order commented that the action was a “B2 fishery action.” Id. The Authority complied with the 

order, and reduced pumping to approximately 3,000 cubic feet per second (“cfs”). See FWS 00181. 

Reclamation issued another change order on June 23, 2011, directing the Authority to increase pumping 

to “five units” which equated to approximately 4,200 cfs. USBR 01805. 

IV. STANDARD OF DECISION

The claims in this case arise under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, pursuant to which “[a] person 

suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 

within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” Id. § 702.5 Under the 

APA, a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 

found to be”:

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law;

***

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 

statutory right; [and/or]

(D) without observance of procedure required by law[.]

Id. § 706(A). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record demonstrate that “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court conducting APA judicial review may not resolve factual questions, but 

instead determines “whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted 

the agency to make the decision it did.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[I]n a case involving review 

of a final agency action under the [APA] ... the standard set forth in Rule 56[(a)] does not apply because 

 

5 The CVPIA does not provide for a private right of action. Therefore, claims alleging that a federal agency acted contrary to 

the CVPIA must be brought under and are governed by the APA. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. United 

States, 672 F.3d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying APA to claim based upon the CVPIA). 

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of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Id. at 89. In this context, summary 

judgment becomes the “mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is 

supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Id. at 

90. 

Eastern District of California Local Rule 260(a) directs that each motion for summary judgment 

shall be accompanied by a “Statement of Undisputed Facts” that shall enumerate each of the specific 

material facts on which the motion is based and cite the particular portions of any document relied upon 

to establish that fact. In APA cases, such statements are generally redundant because all relevant facts 

are contained in the agency’s administrative record. See San Joaquin River Grp. Auth. v. Nat’l Marine 

Fisheries Serv., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083-84 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

This Court denied Federal Defendants’ previous motion to dismiss this case for lack of standing. 

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168-73 

(E.D. Cal. 2012). That decision articulated the applicable legal standard:

Standing is a judicially created doctrine that is an essential part of the 

case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. Pritikin v. Dept. of Energy, 

254 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 2001). “To satisfy the Article III case or 

controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury 

that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor 

Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). “In essence the question of 

standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the 

merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 

490, 498 (1975). To have standing, a plaintiff must show three elements.

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not 

the result of the independent action of some third party not before 

the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 

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decision. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

The Supreme Court has described a plaintiff's burden of proving standing 

at various stages of a case as follows:

Since [the standing elements] are not mere pleading requirements 

but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element 

must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which 

the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 

litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of 

injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a 

motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace 

those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In 

response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff 

can no longer rest on such “mere allegations,” but must “set forth” 

by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 

56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be 

taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) 

must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.

Id. at 561. 

In addition, where an organization or association is bringing suit on behalf 

of its members, that organization or association must demonstrate that: (1) 

its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (ii) 

the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; 

and (iii) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 

participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).

Id. at 1168-69.6

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court determined each of the elements of standing was 

supported by evidence presented by Plaintiffs. This same evidence supports an identical finding at the 

summary judgment stage and the Court incorporates by this reference its previous analysis. See id. at 

1169-73. Federal Defendants have not submitted any argument or evidence suggesting otherwise. 

 

6 The Court also previously articulated the well-established principle that standing is measured at the time the complaint is 

filed. San Luis, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. While Federal Defendants do not question this in their present motion, they do 

mention that the pumping reduction at issue in this case did not actually end up impacting Plaintiffs’ allocation. Doc. 105 at 

6. As previously addressed, this fact does not undermine Plaintiffs’ standing, nor can the Court discern how it is relevant to 

any aspect of this case. 

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Plaintiffs have standing to sue. 

B. Merits of the Cross Motions.

Generally, Plaintiffs argue in their motion for summary judgment that the June 2011 pumping 

reduction was “contrary to law” for purposes of the APA because the reduction violated P.L. 99-546 and 

CVPIA § 3411(b), both of which require the Secretary to comply with the COA. Doc. 100. More 

specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the pumping reduction violated COA Article 6(g), which requires, 

during excess conditions, “each party ... to export and store as much water as possible within its physical 

and contractual limits.” COA Art. 3(d) (USBR00009); Art. 6(g) (USBR00017).

Federal Defendants concede they have a duty to comply with CVPIA § 3411, see Doc. 96 (joint 

status report) at 3, and, therefore, that they have a duty to comply with the COA, but they maintain that 

they nonetheless possessed discretion to order the pumping reductions pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)

during the period of excess conditions that existed in June 2011. Federal Defendants emphasize that the 

CVPIA elsewhere requires the Secretary to operate the CVP to “meet all obligations under State and 

Federal law.” Doc. 109 at 9 (citing CVPIA § 3406(b)). Thus, according to Federal Defendants, the 

obligation in COA Article 6(g) “to export and store as much water as possible within its physical and 

contractual limits” is limited by other state and federal laws. Id. Federal Defendants maintain that the 

commands contained in CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) limit CVP operations, even during times of excess 

conditions.

The remainder of this Memorandum Decision addresses the parties’ competing positions 

regarding the relative priority of CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) vis-a-vis CVPIA § 3411(b) and COA Article 6(g). 

First, the Court addresses threshold arguments regarding the level of deference owed to the agency in 

this case. Then, the Court proceeds to the remaining issues of statutory interpretation. In so doing, the 

Court follows the established procedure of first examining the plain meaning of the relevant statutory 

provisions for any instruction regarding the prioritization of CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) vis-a-vis CVPIA § 

3411(b) and COA Article 6(g). The Court addresses numerous plain meaning arguments raised in the 

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briefs, but finds that none definitively settles how CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) and CVPIA § 3411(b)/COA 

Article 6(g) relate to one another. The Court next finds that there is an ambiguity created by the 

existence of these competing provisions. Having so found, the Court turns to the canons of statutory 

construction. In particular, the one canon that is discussed at length by the parties – the specific v. 

general canon – does provide a basis for prioritizing COA Article 6(g) over CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) during 

times when Article 6(g) is triggered.7 

1. Deference.

Normally, the standard of review is highly deferential in an APA case; the agency’s decision is 

usually “entitled to a presumption of regularity,” and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the agency. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971), abrogated in 

part on other grounds as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Plaintiffs argue, 

however, that Federal Defendants’ current litigation position -- that Federal Defendants possessed 

discretion to reduce pumping pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) notwithstanding CVPIA § 3411(b) -- is a 

post hoc rationalization entitled to no deference because nothing in the record indicates Federal 

Defendants considered CVPIA § 3411(b). Doc. 100 at 13. Federal Defendants rejoin that Plaintiffs 

“misunderstand what constitutes a post hoc rationalization,” and erroneously assert that Federal 

Defendants “were required to expressly consider [COA] Article 6(g)’s instruction to ‘export and store as 

much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits’ at the time of the decision.” Doc. 106 

at 25. While Federal Defendants correctly point out that the record does contain an explanation for the 

action in the record, id., Plaintiffs do not challenge that explanation per se. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that 

the action violated CVPIA § 3411(b) and that because Federal Defendants did not consider CVPIA § 

3411(b) anywhere in the record, Federal Defendants’ litigation position is not entitled to deference. 

Federal Defendants argue that their position in this case is not a post hoc rationalization because 

 

7 The Court notes that the briefs are not organized in such a deliberate manner. The Court has endeavored to situate the 

parties’ arguments into the statutory interpretation framework. 

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they “fully explained why they took the action they did.” Doc. 105 at 26. Federal Defendants maintain 

that the fact that the record does not “explicitly discuss Article 6(g) or the interplay between Article 

6(g), CVPIA § 3411(b), and CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) is of no import ... [] because [the agency’s] rationale is 

that Reclamation has the discretion to apply § 3406(b)(2), Article 6(g) notwithstanding.’” Id. Federal 

Defendants cite In re Operation of Missouri River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 634 (8th Cir. 2005), for the 

proposition that there is “no requirement that every detail of the agency’s decision be stated expressly in 

the” decision itself. Doc. 105 at 26. But, Federal Defendants misapply Missouri River. As the Eighth 

Circuit held in that case, while an agency’s rationale need not be articulated in the formal decision 

document, it does need to appear in the administrative record underlying that document. See id. Here, 

nothing in the record indicates the agency considered COA Article 6(g) at all when implementing the 

June 2011 pumping reduction. 

Federal Defendants next cite McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 

2008), for the proposition that an agency’s rationale must be upheld where its reasoning can be 

“reasonably discerned” from the entire record. Doc. 105 at 26. Federal Defendants suggest that their 

rationale, namely that Reclamation has the discretion to apply CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) notwithstanding 

COA Article 6(g), reasonably can be discerned from the entire record. But, the bald fact that the agency 

implemented the June 2011 Pumping Restrictions pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) does not in any way 

indicate that the agency gave any thought to how its authority under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) related to its 

obligations under COA Article 6(g). Pac. Coast Fed’n Fishermen’s Assns. v. U.S. Bureau of 

Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot infer an agency's reasoning from mere 

silence,” and “an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency.”)).

In contrast, Plaintiffs’ position finds some support in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Defenders of 

Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). In Defenders, plaintiffs challenged the 

Secretary’s decision not to designate a lizard species as threatened under the Endangered Species Act 

(“ESA”). The term “threatened species” means “any species which is likely to become an endangered 

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species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 

1532(2). At issue in Defenders was the meaning of the phrase “throughout ... a significant portion of its 

range.” Defenders, 258 F.3d at 1141. While the Secretary advanced an interpretation of the phrase for 

purposes of the litigation, the agency did not expressly consider “throughout ... a significant portion of 

[the species’] range” during the administrative process. Id. at 1141-43, 1145-46. Accordingly, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded the Secretary’s interpretation was due no deference under Chevron v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), nor was deference owed to the “interpretation of the 

statute now advocated by the Secretary’s counsel - newly minted, it seems, for this lawsuit, and 

inconsistent with prior agency actions - as [a court should] not defer ‘to agency positions that are wholly 

unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.’” Id. at 1145 n. 11 (quoting Bowen v. 

Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).

Defenders is not directly on point because, unlike in Defenders, where the agency’s position was 

not only newly minted but was also inconsistent with prior agency action, here, there is no evidence of a 

prior agency position inconsistent with the one being advanced in this case regarding CVPIA § 3411. 

However, more recent Ninth Circuit authority suggests that an agency position created solely for 

litigation is entitled to no deference, even where the interpretation is not in conflict with prior agency 

action. See Alaska v. Fed. Subsistence Bd., 544 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We do not afford 

Chevron or [even] Skidmore [v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)] deference to litigation positions 

unmoored from any official agency interpretation because Congress has delegated to the administrative 

official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory 

commands.”). Federal Defendants have pointed to nothing in the record that indicates the agency ever 

considered whether during excess conditions CVPIA § 3411(b)’s command to comply with the COA 

would take precedence over CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s command to dedicate 800,000 AF of water to fish 

and wildlife purposes.

Even if some form of deference lesser than Chevron does apply here, the agency decision “is 

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entitled to a measure of deference proportional to its power to persuade, in accordance with the 

principles set forth in Skidmore.” Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United 

States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228, 234 (2001)). Under this framework, a court should “look to the 

process the agency used to arrive at its decision.” Id. “Among the factors [to be] considered are the 

interpretation’s thoroughness, rational validity, consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements, 

the logic and expertness of an agency decision, the care used in reaching the decision, as well as the 

formality of the process used.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). For example, an internal 

agency guideline that is “akin to an interpretive rule,” but does not require notice and comment, is 

entitled to a measure of deference under Skidmore. Id. As Federal Defendants offer no formal 

interpretation that incorporates any reference to COA Article 6(g) or even CVPIA § 3411(b), most of 

these factors are inapposite, leaving only the “rational validity” factor, which simply calls for an 

evaluation of whether Federal Defendants’ position is rational. 

2. P.L. 99-546.

As explained above, P.L. 99-546 “authorize[s] and direct[s]” the Secretary “to execute and 

implement the [COA].” 100 Stat. 1050, § 103.8 The language of P.L. 99-546 is not the direct focus of 

any of the parties’ briefs, perhaps because its command to “implement” the COA is arguably 

overshadowed by the command in CVPIA § 3411(b) to “fully comply with” the COA. Plaintiffs argue 

that P.L. 99-546 gave the COA the “force of law,” Doc. 100 at 9, but do not explain how it does so in 

any way that is unique or more powerful than CVPIA § 3411. Accordingly, the Court does not believe 

that P.L. 99-546 materially impacts the analysis in this case. 

3. CVPIA.

The thrust of the dispute in this case revolves around the interplay of CVPIA § 3406(b) and 

CVPIA § 3411(b). “The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.” United 

 

8 The relevant portion of P.L. 99-546 contains two provisos, neither of which is implicated in this case. 

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States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid,

490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)). A court must first determine whether the language to be interpreted is “plain 

and unambiguous.” United States v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. 

Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). “The statutory language is interpreted by reference ‘to the 

language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute 

as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341). “If the plain language of a statute renders its 

meaning reasonably clear, [a court] will not investigate further unless its application leads to 

unreasonable or impracticable results.” Fei Ye, 436 F.3d at 1120 (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). If, on the other hand, the language to be interpreted is ambiguous, “we may use canons of 

construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall purpose to illuminate Congress’s intent.” Ileto 

v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

a. Plain Meaning: Statutory Language.

The analysis, therefore, begins with an examination of the plain language of the statutory

provisions at issue. As previously set forth, CVPIA § 3406(b) commands that the Secretary 

immediately upon the enactment of this title, shall operate the Central 

Valley Project to meet all obligations under state and Federal law, 

including but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 

U.S.C. 1531, et seq., and all decisions of the California State Water 

Resources Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses 

and permits for the project. 

(Emphasis added.) CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) commands the Secretary to 

dedicate and manage annually eight hundred thousand acre-feet of Central 

Valley Project yield for the primary purpose of implementing the fish, 

wildlife, and habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by this 

title; to assist the State of California in its efforts to protect the waters of 

the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Estuary; and to help meet 

such obligations as may be legally imposed upon the Central Valley 

Project under state or federal law following the date of enactment of this 

title, including but not limited to additional obligations under the federal 

Endangered Species Act....

There is no dispute that Federal Defendants ordered the pumping restrictions at issue in this case to 

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serve the “primary” (b)(2) purpose of “implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration purposes 

and measures authorized by [the CVPIA].” See USBR 01788. Plaintiffs do not challenge the scientific 

basis for Federal Defendants’ conclusion that the pumping restrictions would serve that primary 

purpose, nor do Plaintiffs otherwise argue that this conclusion was irrational or otherwise unsupported 

by the record.9 Rather, Plaintiffs maintain that Federal Defendants lacked discretion to order the 

reductions during excess conditions because of CVPIA § 3411(b). 

As explained above, CVPIA § 3411(b) directs the Secretary to comply with the COA: 

SEC. 3411 - COMPLIANCE WITH STATE WATER LAW AND 

COORDINATED OPERATIONS AGREEMENT.

***

(b) The Secretary, in the implementation of the provisions of this title, 

shall fully comply with the United States’ obligations as set forth in the 

“Agreement Between the United States of America and the Department of 

Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of 

the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project” dated May 20, 

1985, and the provisions of Public Law 99-546; and shall take no action 

which shifts an obligation that otherwise should be borne by the Central 

Valley Project to any other lawful water rights permittee or licensee.

Plaintiffs focus on the first clause of CVPIA § 3411(b), which instructs the Secretary to “fully comply 

with the United States’ obligations as set forth in the [COA].”10 The most straightforward interpretation 

of this language is that Congress intended to incorporate by reference the terms of the COA itself as 

 

9 This renders almost irrelevant Federal Defendants’ frequent assertion in their papers that Reclamation’s decision was 

supported by the record. See, e.g., Doc. 105 at 12. 10 Plaintiffs do not contend that Federal Defendants’ actions ran afoul of the second clause of CVPIA § 3411(b), which 

prohibits the Secretary from “tak[ing] action which shifts an obligation that otherwise should be borne by the [CVP] to any 

other lawful water rights permittee or licensee.” See Doc. 107 at 6. Federal Defendants nevertheless argue that the second 

clause informs the first and is evidence that the purpose of the COA is to ensure that both the CVP and the SWP retain their 

shares of water and bear their shares of the burdens imposed by the COA’s terms. Doc. 109 at 14-15. While the second clause 

of CVPIA § 3411 certainly does direct the parties to the COA to maintain their respective burdens, rather than pass them 

along to the other party or any other water rights permittee, Federal Defendants do not explain how this should alter the 

Court’s interpretation of COA Article 6(g), which calls upon each party to the COA to “during excess conditions ... export 

and store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits,” in light of the first clause of the CVPIA § 

3411(b), which directs the Secretary to “fully comply” with the COA. Nothing in the record suggests that exporting and 

storing as much water as possible within the physical and contractual limits of the CVA, in lieu of implementing the June 

2011 pumping reduction, would have shifted any burden from the CVP onto either the SWP or any other water rights 

permittee. To the extent the second clause informs the first, any such influence is not directly relevant to the interpretive 

questions central to this case. 

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obligations under CVPIA § 3411. 

Plaintiffs maintain that in implementing the pumping reductions, Federal Defendants failed to 

“fully comply with the United States’ obligations as set forth in the [COA],” because COA Article 6(g) 

provides that “during excess conditions each party has a responsibility to export and store as much water 

as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” USBR 00017. As previously mentioned, it is 

undisputed that excess conditions existed during the relevant period in June 2011. Nor do Federal 

Defendants argue that any physical or contractual limitation required Federal Defendants to reduce 

pumping in June 2011. See Docs. 105 and 109. 

(1) “Export and Store” Arguments.

COA Article 6(g) provides that “during excess conditions each party has a responsibility to 

export and store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” Plaintiffs argue 

that the order of the words “export and store” in Article 6(g) demonstrates that Article 6(g) requires “the 

export and storage, in that order, of water out of the Delta.” Doc. 100 at 19. In contrast, Federal 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ interpretation attempts to add requirements to Article 6(g) and that the 

plain language of Article 6(g) allows Reclamation to store water in upstream reservoirs during periods 

of excess conditions. Doc. 105 at 21-23.11

Article 6(g) can be read in a manner that accommodates both parties’ interpretive positions

regarding the phrase “export and store.” According to the COA, “[e]xcess water conditions” means the 

conditions that exist when “releases from upstream reservoirs plus unregulated flow exceed Sacramento 

Valley inbasin uses, plus exports.” COA Art. 3(c) (USBR 00009). “Sacramento Valley inbasin uses” are 

“legal uses of water in the Sacramento basin including the water required under” the Delta water quality 

standards included in Exhibit A to the COA. Id.; COA Ex. A (USBR 00036-42). “Export” means 

 

11 Although the parties make little effort to frame these argument (or many of their other arguments) in terms of any of the 

principles of statutory construction, the Court believes this argument is best evaluated as an interpretation of the plain 

language of Article 6(g).

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“diversions by the United States and the State through export facilities specified in subarticle (g)” COA 

Art. 3(f) (USBR 00011). These export facilities are: the Contra Costa Pumping Plant #1 and the Jones 

Pumping Plant for the CVP; and the Harvey O. Banks Delta Pumping Plant, including the Clifton Court 

Forebay (“Banks Pumping Plant”) for the SWP. COA Art. 5(b) (USBR 00013). 

The definition of excess conditions renders upstream storage decisions an input to the operation 

of Article 6(g). Excess conditions only exist when “releases from upstream reservoirs plus unregulated 

flow exceed Sacramento Valley inbasin uses, plus exports.” Nothing in the COA or any other authority 

presented to the Court precludes Reclamation from storing water upstream during periods of excess 

conditions. Doing so simply impacts whether excess conditions persist.

12 Under certain circumstances, it 

might be possible for Reclamation to increase storage at upstream reservoirs enough that excess 

conditions would no longer persist. Obviously, if excess conditions no longer exist, the obligation to 

export and store as much water as possible would no longer apply. If, however, excess conditions persist

despite upstream storage, either because Reclamation could not or chose not to store additional water 

upstream, Reclamation’s obligation to export and store as much water as possible would also persist. 

In such a circumstance, upstream storage would not be a viable alternative to the export water of water 

through one of the “export facilities,” namely the Contra Costa Pumping Plant, the Jones Pumping Plant, 

and/or the Banks Pumping Plant. 

Here, however, nothing in the record suggests that Reclamation endeavored to comply with COA 

Article 6(g) by making efforts to increase upstream storage in June 2011. The very fact that excess 

conditions persisted for the entire period in question in this case demonstrates either that Reclamation 

could not or would not increase upstream storage in such a manner as to cause excess conditions to 

dissipate. Therefore, it is Reclamation’s failure to export, rather than its failure to store, water that is the 

 

12 Reclamation and the State’s obligations under the COA are computed on a daily basis. See generally Article 6. The Parties 

do not present argument on and the Court does not address the question of what Reclamation might be required to do if 

excess conditions existed for a single day, but Reclamation was in the process of implementing plans to increase storage such

that excess conditions were likely to dissipate. This is not such a case. 

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focus of this case. 

In a related argument, Federal Defendants argue that “[a]ccording to Plaintiffs’ interpretation, 

Reclamation must export and store every drop of water” and therefore “would be unable to release any 

water from the reservoirs during excess water conditions, which might have unintended consequences 

for San Luis farmers who would benefit from releases of the stored water.” Doc. 105 at 21 n.6. This is a 

straw man of Federal Defendants’ own construction that may be knocked down by reference to the plain 

language of Article 6(g), which limits Reclamation’s obligation to “export and store as much water as 

possible within its physical and contractual limits.” As Plaintiffs explain in reply, “if Defendants’ 

hypothetical ever occurred – i.e., San Luis Reservoir were approaching storage limits during excess 

water conditions – then those physical limits may justify reducing exports that could not be stored.” 

Doc. 107 at 13. Likewise, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that “[t]o the extent Reclamation delivered 

water pursuant to its obligations under its water service contracts during excess water conditions, 

Reclamation would not be in violation of Article 6(g) because its failure to maximize storage of 

exported water during excess conditions would be due to a contractual limitation....” Id. at 14. 

(2) CVPIA § 3406(b)’s Command that the Secretary Operate the CVP “to 

Meet All Obligations Under State and Federal Law.” 

Another of Federal Defendants’ arguments that arguably falls under the rubric of plain language 

analysis is their contention that CVPIA § 3406(b)’s requirement that the Secretary operate the CVP “to 

meet all obligations under state and Federal law” permits the Secretary to implement actions pursuant to 

CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) notwithstanding the requirements of CVPIA § 3411 (and, by extension, 

notwithstanding COA Article 6(g)). Doc. 105 at 20. Relatedly, Federal Defendants assert that 

Reclamation did in fact export and store “as much water as possible” because CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s 

direction to dedicate and manage 800,000 AF of water for fish and wildlife purposes is a “legal mandate 

with which Defendants must comply.” Doc. 109 at 6. 

Federal Defendants support these arguments by pointing to the undisputed fact that mandatory 

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legal obligations imposed upon the CVP by state and Federal law, such as those imposed by the ESA, do 

trump all other discretionary operational plans for the CVP. Plaintiffs do not and cannot dispute, for 

example, that the Secretary could have implemented the pumping reductions at issue in this case had 

they been imposed pursuant to a valid biological opinion promulgated pursuant to the ESA. See Doc. 

107 at 18 n. 8. 

But, an examination of the reasons why obligations imposed pursuant to the ESA trump the 

Bureau’s operational discretion over the CVP reveals why the same conclusion does not apply to actions 

undertaken pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). Because numerous endangered and threatened species are 

impacted by CVP operations, the ESA requires Reclamation to consult with other agencies that 

implement the ESA, namely FWS and/or NMFS, to determine whether CVP operations will threaten the 

continued existence of the impacted species and/or adversely modify their critical habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 

1536(a)(2). 

The purpose of consultation is to obtain the expert opinion of wildlife 

agencies to determine whether the action is likely to jeopardize a listed 

species or adversely modify its critical habitat and, if so, to identify 

reasonable and prudent alternatives that will avoid the action's unfavorable 

impacts. The consultation requirement reflects “a conscious decision by 

Congress to give endangered species priority over the ‘primary missions' 

of federal agencies.”

Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tenn. Valley 

Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978)). Once ESA consultation is complete, the FWS or the NMFS 

must provide the agency with a written biological opinion “setting forth [an] opinion, and a summary of 

the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its 

critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). If the Secretary concludes 

that the proposed agency action would place the listed species in jeopardy or adversely modify its 

critical habitat, “the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes 

would not violate [the ESA] and can be taken by the Federal agency ... in implementing the agency 

action.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 

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At least two major biological opinions apply to operation of the CVP, each of which found CVP 

operations are likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify their critical habitat, and identify 

reasonable and prudent alternatives (“RPAs”) that impose various restrictions on CVP operations. San 

Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014) (“San Luis v. Jewell”); San 

Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, __ F.3d __, No. 12-15144, 2014 WL 7240003 (9th Cir. 

Dec. 22, 2014) (“San Luis v. Locke”). The RPAs imposed in these two biological opinions have very 

specific trigger points and require specific actions during key periods for the various species. See San 

Luis v. Jewell, 747 F.3d at 598-99; San Luis v. Locke, 2014 WL 7240003, at *6. If the implementing 

agency (in this case, Reclamation) chooses to implement the proposed agency action (in this case,

operation of the CVP), it may only lawfully do so if it also implements the RPAs suggested by the 

relevant wildlife agency. In other words, implementing the RPAs is mandatory and many of those RPAs 

require specific actions at specific times. Plaintiffs concede that Defendants must follow any “specific 

legal mandates under the ESA or otherwise.” Doc. 107 at 18 n.8. 

However, it is undisputed that compliance with the ESA was not offered as a basis for 

implementing the June 2011 pumping reductions, which were, instead, exclusively categorized as an 

action taken pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). USBR 01788. Unlike the ESA, CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s 

command to “dedicate and manage annually eight hundred thousand acre feet of [CVP] project yield” to 

serve the purposes listed in that subsection, including the “primary” purpose of fish and wildlife and 

habitat restoration, has been interpreted to afford Reclamation a large degree of flexibility. While the 

requirement that the Secretary “dedicate and manage annually eight hundred thousand acre-feet of 

Central Valley Project yield for the primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat 

restoration purpose and measures authorized by [the CVPIA]” has been described as a “mandate,” see, 

e.g., San Luis & Delta- Mendota Water Authority v. United States, 672 F.3d 676, 693, 719 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“San Luis v. United States”), Federal Defendants exercise considerable discretion in dedicating 

and managing their 800,000 AF (b)(2) annual “budget” to meet this mandate. For example, Federal 

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Defendants have discretion to determine the type of (b)(2) actions to take. The Bureau’s 2003 “Guidance 

for Implementation of Section 3406(b)(2) of the CVPIA” Memorandum (“2003 (b)(2) Guidance 

Memo”), explains that (b)(2) actions can include measures on “Clear Creek [(the first major tributary to 

the Sacramento River downstream of Shasta Dam)]; the Sacramento, American, and Stanislaus Rivers; 

and in the Delta.” USBR 00309. Other record documents make it clear that many of these actions target 

areas upstream of the Delta and would not impact Reclamation’s ability to export during excess 

conditions. See USBR 365-66. 

Federal Defendants also have discretion to determine when to take (b)(2) actions within the 

(b)(2) accounting period, which runs from October 1 to September 30. See USBR 00308. As the 2003 

(b)(2) Guidance Memo explains:

The seasonality of actions fits into the accounting period and the time 

dependent order for determining the priority of actions and need for 

adjustments to allocations, in general. Fall flow improvements, impacts to 

export due to DCC gate closures, some wintertime export reductions 

during fishery migration windows, some wintertime and spring flow and 

export costs to fishery beneficial uses of the WQCP, Vernalis Adaptive 

Management Plan (VAMP), and some other spring export reductions 

during the sensitive estuarine species periods are examples of actions that 

reflect the seasonality of decisions and operations.

USBR 00309. Other guidance documents provide some targets for using quantities of water in different 

portions of the year. For example, the May 2003 “Decision on Implementation of Section 3406(b)(2) of 

the Central Valley Project Improvement Act” (“May 2003 Decision”) states that “the Service will target 

using approximately 200,000 acre feet of (b)(2) water in October through January for fishery purposes.” 

USBR 00299. However, these targets “are not [] cap[s] and may vary from year to year depending on 

fishery needs.” Id. 

To a certain extent, Federal Defendants also have discretion to determine whether to take (b)(2) 

actions at all in a given year. Federal Defendants may decide to “bank” some quantity of their (b)(2) 

budget for a future year. The May 2003 Decision explains that “Interior has discretion to determine 

whether to bank (b)(2) water,” after FWS has “request[ed] that (b)(2) water be banked in CVP or nonCase 1:11-cv-00952-LJO-GSA Document 111 Filed 03/02/15 Page 26 of 45
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CVP facilities for fish and wildlife purposes.” USBR 00304. In addition, Federal Defendants may 

manage their 800,000 AF (b)(2) budget by making some portion of the water available for other CVP 

purposes. CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)(D) states: “If the quantity of water dedicated under this paragraph, or 

any portion thereof, is not needed for the purposes of this section, based on a finding by the Secretary, 

the Secretary is authorized to make such water available for other project purposes.” In San Luis v. 

United States, 672 F.3d at 705 n.29, the Ninth Circuit explained: “if the Secretary finds that there is a 

portion of that yield which is not needed for purposes of section 3406, the Secretary is ‘authorized’ (not 

ordered) to make such water available for other project purposes.” However, there is no clear indication 

in the record that the Secretary made a finding that the full 800,000 AF was “not needed” for (b)(2) 

purposes in 2011.

13 Accordingly, the fact that the Secretary has some discretion to reallocate (b)(2) 

water to other project purposes appears not to be relevant in this case.14

Nevertheless, overall, the Secretary has considerable discretion in the timing and manner by 

which it may implement CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). In sum, while CVPIA § 3406(b)’s command that the 

Secretary operate the CVP “to meet all obligations under state and Federal law,” elevates specific legal 

mandates, such as those imposed by ESA biological opinions, over other provisions of the CVPIA, the 

800,000 AF dedication set forth in CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) is not such a specific legal mandate. The 

Secretary is entitled to considerable discretion in the timing of and manner by which it may make 

 

13 Plaintiffs also argue that the record indicates Defendants anticipated that they would not use the entire 800,000 AF budget 

in the 2011 water year for fish actions. Doc. 100 at 27. In June 2011, Reclamation deemed options that would bank (b)(2) 

water for the next year “infeasible” because “all reservoirs are expected to fill this summer and there will be no room to hold 

water over.” FWS 00065. In a June 3, 2011 email, NMFS staff acknowledged that even if the agencies made a June export 

reduction with a 90,000 AF water cost, the (b)(2) accounting projected using only 690,000 AF of the 800,000 AF (b)(2) 

budget. FWS 00088. But, this does not establish that the agency had unbridled discretion to not utilize the entire 800,000 AF

in any given year, as any decision to do so would have to be supported by a finding under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)(D) that the 

water was “not needed.”

14 Plaintiffs suggest that Federal Defendants “understood they were not required to reduce exports during June 2011,” 

pointing to the May 26, 2011 email from Oppenheim, in which he explained that the agencies had, at that time, 

“approximately 186 TAF of [(b)(2)] water for protective fish actions, banking for next year, or the Fall X2 study” and 

indicated to the group that, as decision-makers, “[w]e should be discussing what we are planning on doing with this 

windfall.” FWS 00001. The email discussed potential export reductions through June, and noted that if the agencies decided 

not take the action, they “should at least have a reason” for rejecting it. Id. The email then identified three possible rationales 

for not ordering export reductions in June. Id. But, absent any evidence that Oppenheim’s email presents the legal position of 

the agency, the fact that Oppenheim searched for a rationale for not taking the action establishes nothing more than what an 

individual within the agency believed. 

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dedications under the (b)(2) program. This fact distinguishes actions take under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) 

from those taken pursuant to ESA biological opinions. 

Federal Defendants argue that the existence of alternative types of actions and alternative times 

during which actions could be taken is not dispositive, because being forced to redirect (b)(2) water 

away from (b)(2) purposes identified by agency staff to instead comply with Article 6(g)’s command

impermissibly hamstrings Reclamation’s discretion under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). See Doc. 109 at 13. A

footnote in San Luis v. United States, 672 F.3d 676, helps to explain why this argument is not 

persuasive. There, the Ninth Circuit explained that Reclamation’s implementation of CVPIA § 

3406(b)(2) is itself constrained by the limiting language in CVPIA § 3406(b), which requires the CVP to 

“meet all obligations under State and Federal law”:

It is not true, of course, that Interior's discretion is unlimited. First, the 

referenced discretion pertains to the allocation among competing uses for 

the 800,000 AF in the (b)(2) account. Second, at the very least, it is 

constrained by the limiting language in the CVPIA itself that requires the 

CVP “to meet all obligations under State and Federal law,” as this court 

has acknowledged. See Central Delta [Water Agency v. Bureau of 

Reclamation], 452 F.3d [1021,] 1024 [(9th Cir. 2006)]. 

Id. at 697 n. 22. According to this reasoning, CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) is itself limited by the “obligations 

under State and Federal law.” It would be entirely circular to conclude, as Federal Defendants suggest, 

that CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) is, instead, an “obligation under ... Federal law” that limits the operation of 

other provisions of the CVPIA, such as CVPIA § 3411(b). 

Relatedly, Federal Defendants suggest that Article 6(g)’s phrase “as much water as possible” 

operates as a back door mechanism for elevating CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s direction to dedicate 800,000 

AF to fish and wildlife purposes over COA Article 6(g)’s own mandate. See Doc. 109 at 6 (Federal 

Defendants arguing that Reclamation “exported and stored ‘as much water as possible’ given [Federal] 

Defendants’ obligations under § 3406(b)(2)”). However, Federal Defendants fail to consider the phrase 

“as much water as possible” in context. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341(1997) (“The 

plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 

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specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 

COA Article 6(g) requires each party to “export and store as much water as possible within its physical 

and contractual limits.” Because there is no mention in COA Article 6(g) that the COA parties’ 

obligations may be offset by “legal” requirements, there is no basis for reading such an exception into 

the plain language.15 See Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The 

incorporation of one statutory provision to the exclusion of another must be presumed intentional under 

the statutory canon of expressio unius.”); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 n.2 (9th Cir.1992) 

(“The maxim of statutory construction, ‘expressio unius est esclusio alterius’ provides that ‘[w]hen a 

statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.’”).

Neither CVPIA § 3406(b) nor the text of Article 6(g) itself elevate CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s 

“mandate” over that Article 6(g)’s command to “export and store as much water as possible within its 

physical and contractual limits.”

(3) “Possible” Argument. 

COA Article 6(g) states: “during excess conditions each party has a responsibility to export and 

store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” USBR 00017. Federal 

Defendants assert that the use of the term “possible” leaves the determination of whether something is 

“possible” to agency discretion. Doc. 109 at 10-11. Federal Defendants point out that in litigation 

surrounding CVPIA § 3406(b)(2), the Ninth Circuit found that a provision of the CVPIA using the 

phrase “to the greatest degree practicable” was “left to Interior’s expertise and discretion.” San Luis v. 

United States, 672 F.3d at 707. Federal Defendants also point to numerous other cases in which the 

terms “possible” and “practicable” were interpreted permissively. Doc. 109 at 10-11 (citing Freeze v. 

City of Decherd, Tenn., 753 F.3d 661, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2014) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Tuft v. McDonnell 

Douglass, 517 F.2d 1301, 1307 (8th Cir. 1975); Joihner v. McEvers, 898 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1990); 

 

15 Whether CVPIA § 3406(b) imposes such a requirement is a separate question addressed below. 

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Miami Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Sec’y of Def., 143 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2001); Figueroa 

v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (D. Utah 1999); Rivera Acevedo v. United States, No. Civ. 

04-1232 (JAF), Civ. 04-1372 (JAF), 2005 WL 5610230, at *5 (D.P.R. Apr. 25, 2005); Loughlin v. 

United States, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2003); Whalen v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1098 

(D.S.D. 1998)).

The Court has examined all of these cases and the statutory provisions at issue in them and finds 

COA Article 6(g)’s use of the term “possible” distinguishable. In each case cited, the statutory language 

at issue, when read in context, rendered permissive otherwise mandatory language. For example, at issue 

in San Luis, 672 F.3d at 707, was CVPIA § 3406(b)(1)(C), which provides that:

The Secretary shall cooperate with the State of California to ensure that, to 

the greatest degree practicable, the specific quantities of yield dedicated to 

and managed for fish and wildlife purposes under this title are credited 

against any additional obligations of the Central Valley Project which may 

be imposed by the State of California following enactment of this title, 

including but not limited to increased flow and reduced export obligations 

which may be imposed by the California State Water Resources Control 

Board in implementing San Francisco Bay/Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta 

Estuary standards pursuant to the review ordered by the California Court 

of Appeals in United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 

Cal.App.3d 82 [] (1986), and that, to the greatest degree practicable, the 

programs and plans required by this title are developed and implemented 

in a way that avoids inconsistent or duplicative obligations from being 

imposed upon Central Valley Project water and power contractors.

Id. (citing 106 Stat. at 4715) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “to the greatest 

degree practicable” language indicated that

any crediting against the dedicated 800,000 AF of CVP yield stemming 

from the overlap between actions taken for the primary (b)(2) purpose and 

actions required by post-1992 water quality and ESA measures would be 

left to Interior's expertise and discretion.

Id. 

At issue in Tuft, 517 F.2d at 1307, was a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

that provides, in pertinent part:

The [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission shall make its 

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determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as 

practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of 

the charge or ... from the date upon which the Commission is authorized to 

take action with respect to the charge. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit concluded that the language “as promptly 

as possible and, so far as practicable” demonstrates that Congress did not set specific administrative 

deadlines. Tuft, 517 F.2d at 1307. 

Joihner, 898 F.2d at 571, concerned a provision of Illinois law addressing prisoner transfers to 

work camps that provided: 

The [Illinois] Department [of Corrections] shall, insofar as possible, 

employ at useful work committed persons confined in institutions and 

facilities of the Department, who are over the age of compulsory school 

attendance, physically capable of such employment, and not otherwise 

occupied in the programs of the Department.

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 1003–12–1 (emphasis added). At issue was whether the prison regulations 

contained the kind of mandatory language necessary to create a protectable liberty interest for purposes 

of establishing a procedural due process claim. Joihner, 898 F.2d at 570-71. Because the statute required 

employment only “insofar as possible,” the Eighth Circuit found the existence of such discretion negated

the creation of a protected liberty interest. Id. at 571. 

Miami Building, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 25, addressed a provision of the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990, which provided: 

Not later than 12 months after the date of the submittal to the Secretary of 

Defense of a redevelopment plan for an installation approved for closure 

under a base closure law, the Secretary of Defense shall, to the extent 

practicable, complete any environmental impact analyses required with 

respect to the installation, and with respect to the redevelopment plan, if 

any, for the installation, pursuant to the base closure law under which the 

installation is closed, and pursuant to the [National Environmental Policy 

Act (“NEPA”)].

(Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs in Miami Building argued this provision operated “as an absolute 

requirement that all procedures that defendants have to follow under NEPA must be completed within 

12 months.” Id. The district court concluded that the statute’s use of phrase “to the extent practicable” 

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suggested “that there is some discretion and flexibility given to the Air Force to complete the 

[environmental impact statement (“EIS”)] as required by NEPA.” Id. 

The Court concludes that the best reading of Section 2911 is that the 

phrase “to the extent practicable” modifies the time in which the EIS must 

be prepared and does not modify or eliminate the Air Force's 

responsibilities under NEPA. Here, it was not practicable—that is, feasible 

or possible—to comply with all the requirements of NEPA within 12 

months from the date the redevelopment plan had been submitted to the 

Air Force. 

Id. 

In Figueroa, the district court in Utah examined the following language in a Forest Service 

Manual 

2332.12 - Other Natural Hazards. If possible, correct known natural 

hazards when a site is developed and opened for public use. If it is not 

possible to remove the hazard, take immediate steps to protect the public 

from the hazard. Tailor the action taken to each hazardous situation. Post 

signs or other notices at a minimum. Consider installing barriers or closing 

the site altogether to ensure public safety.

64 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (emphasis added). Citing Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 824 (10th Cir. 

1998), the district court noted that the Tenth Circuit had “already held that such language ‘is a prime 

example of discretionary language, which g[ives] federal agencies a choice or judgment on what action 

to take, if any.’” Id. 

In Loughlin, claimants contended that the Army did not comply with a set of internal guidelines 

applicable to the cleanup of former military establishments. 286 F. Supp. 2d at 16. Specifically,

claimants alleged the Army “failed to establish a Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) to facilitate public 

education about the cleanup effort,” arguably required by 10 U.S.C. § 2705(c), which provides: 

Whenever possible and practical, the Secretary shall establish a technical 

review committee [TRC] to review and comment on Department of 

Defense actions and proposed actions with respect to releases or 

threatened releases of hazardous substances at installations.

See also 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d) (allowing a RAB to take the place of a TRC “where the Secretary is 

planning or implementing environmental restoration activities”). Citing Aragon, the district court 

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concluded that “[t]he statute leaves the establishment of a RAB firmly within the discretion of the 

Secretary of Defense.” 286 F. Supp. 2d at 16.

A RAB is not required under any and all circumstances; instead, one is 

properly formed where doing so is “possible and practical.” Such language 

is fundamentally at odds with the [existence] of [a] mandatory directive ....

Id. 

Rivera Acevedo concerned a 1983 memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) between the Navy 

and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that required 

that the Navy undertake certain efforts including, in relevant part, that the

Navy, “to the extent possible,” keep the use of live ordnance to the 

absolute minimum, that noise from the bombing be reduced, remain 

sensitive to fragile ecological and environmental matters, and assist the 

community through increased investment.

2005 WL 5610230, at *5. Citing both Aragon and Loughlin for the proposition that the phrase “to the 

extent possible” is a prime example of discretionary language, the district court concluded that the MOU 

“does not contain any specific and mandatory directives; rather, it contains broad goals for the Navy to 

attempt to meet.” Id.

The MOU clearly leaves to the Navy's best judgment and choice precisely 

how to achieve these worthy goals while at the same time fulfilling its 

mission .... 

Id.

In Whalen, the district court in South Dakota examined Badlands National Park management 

guidelines that indicated “hazards are ‘to the greatest degree possible’ to be made aware to visitors.” 29 

F. Supp. 2d. at 1098. The estate of an injured visitor argued that the language required the National Park 

service to put up signs in a particular hazard area. The district court interpreted this provision “less 

stringently than d[id] plaintiffs,” finding “the language ‘to the greatest degree possible’ is inherently 

discretionary and requires a balancing of factors by park officials.” Id. 

Here, COA Article 6(g) states: “during excess conditions each party has a responsibility to 

export and store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” USBR 00017. 

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This is an affirmative command to export and store “as much water as possible.” If that were all COA 

Article 6(g) required, Federal Defendants might have a stronger argument with regard to the 

implications of the word “possible.” But, instead, COA Article 6(g) modifies the term possible with the 

phrase “within its physical and contractual limits.” In so doing, COA Article 6(g) indicates intent to 

transform the normally permissive term into a command, subject only to “physical and contractual 

limits.” As previously discussed, neither physical nor contractual limits constrained Reclamation’s 

actions in June 2011.

(4) “Notwithstanding” Argument. 

Federal Defendants also argue that CVPIA § 3411 itself indicates that this provision is not meant 

to control over other provisions in the CVPIA. Federal Defendants point to Section 3411(a), which 

provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Secretary shall, prior 

to the reallocation of water from any purpose of use or place of use 

specified within applicable Central Valley Project water rights permits and 

licenses to a purpose of use or place of use not specified within said 

permits or licenses, obtain a modification in those permits and licenses, in 

a manner consistent with the provisions of applicable State law, to allow 

such change in purpose of use or place of use.

While it is true that courts typically have construed a “notwithstanding” clause as “clearly signal[ing] 

the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions 

of any other section,” Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993); see also United States v. 

Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2007), CVPIA § 3411(a) is not at issue in this case. In contrast, 

CVPIA § 3411(b) provides: 

The Secretary, in the implementation of the provisions of this title, shall 

fully comply with the United States' obligations as set forth in the 

"Agreement Between the United States of America and the Department of 

Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of 

the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project: dated May 20, 

1985, and the provisions of Pub. L. 99-546; and shall take no action which 

shifts an obligation that otherwise should be borne by the Central Valley 

Project to any other lawful water rights permittee or licensee.

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(Emphasis added.) The “notwithstanding” language in CVPIA § 3411(a) is simply inapposite here. If 

anything, it serves to set off in contrast the language of CVPIA § 3411(b) indicating its terms should be 

applied to the entirety of the CVP.

b. Canons of Statutory Construction.

(1) Are the Relevant Statutory Provisions Ambiguous? 

Having found that none of the parties’ competing arguments regarding the plain language of the 

relevant statutory provisions definitively settles how CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) and CVPIA § 3411(b)/COA 

Article 6(g) relate to one another, the Court next turns to the question of whether the provisions are 

ambiguous. Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that Federal Defendants fail to identify specifically any 

ambiguity in any of the relevant statutory provisions. Doc. 107 at 7. However, statutory language can be 

rendered ambiguous by other, inconsistent statutory language. See Carlson v. C.I.R., 712 F.2d 1314, 

1315 (9th Cir. 1983); see also C.I.R. v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 315 (1983) (“apparent conflict of [statute’s] 

subsections renders the facial meaning of the statute ambiguous, and therefore [a court] must look to the 

statute's structure and legislative history”). As discussed above, neither CVPIA § 3406(b) nor the text of 

Article 6(g) itself explicitly elevate CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s “mandate” over COA Article 6(g)’s 

command to “export and store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” 

However, the absence of an explicit command elevating CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) over § 3411 does not 

settle the dispute in this case. When the key provisions at issue are considered together, an apparent 

conflict exists between CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s mandate to dedicate 800,000 AF of water to fish and 

wildlife purposes coupled with CVPIA § 3411’s command to comply with the COA. This creates 

enough of an ambiguity on the question of how the Secretary may implement CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) 

during times of excess conditions to warrant resort to the canons of statutory interpretation. In so doing, 

“[a] court must interpret the statute “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if 

possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

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a. Purpose/Context.

When the language to be interpreted is ambiguous, a court may use the statute’s overall purpose 

to “illuminate Congress’s intent.” Ileto., 565 F.3d at 1133. Here, Plaintiffs argue and Federal Defendants 

do not materially dispute that the COA was a historic peace treaty wherein the federal government 

received a reprieve from ongoing litigation and a more secure water supply in exchange for agreeing to 

contribute to meeting water quality standards. See generally COA House Report at 6-7. But, while 

establishing that the COA was intended to be a peace treaty provides some context for interpretation of 

its provisions, it does not aid substantially resolution of the specific dispute in this case.

Federal Defendants point out that the COA was also designed to preserve operational flexibility 

and argue that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of COA Article 6(g) is inconsistent with that purpose. But, the 

devil is in the details. Federal Defendants do point to many provisions of the COA that promote 

operational flexibility. See, e.g., COA, Art. 2 (“Both the State and the United States are dedicated to 

utilizing their existing and future water conservation facilities so as to provide the maximum benefits to 

the people of California and the Nation and believe that through the coordinated and cooperative 

operation of State and Federal facilities, these benefits can be maximized.”), USBR 00008-9; Art. 

6(a)(3) (“As either party proceeds toward the full utilization of its project, any changes in the underlying 

assumptions with respect to the development of the two projects and the demands for water from each 

project will be reflected by recomputing the annual water supplies specified [elsewhere in the COA.”), 

USBR 00013-14; Art. 6(f) (“If the Sacramento Valley inbasin use changes, upstream reservoir releases 

and/ or exports will be modified based on the current accumulation identified in subarticle 6(e) and/ or 

the daily share of responsibility computed in subarticles 6(c) and 6(d).”), USBR 00016; Art. 6(h)

(“Unless otherwise agreed, whenever a party’s storage withdrawal available for export is greater than its 

export capability, the difference shall be available for export by the other party without affecting either 

party’s future respo-nsibility for providing storage withdrawals to meet Sacramento Valley inbasin 

use.”), USBR 00017; Art. 6(i) (Unless otherwise agreed, whenever a party's share of· unstored water for 

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export exceeds its exports, the unusable portion is available for export by the other party without 

affecting either party's daily sum of stored water.”), USBR 00017; Art. 9 (“If any forecast indicates that 

either the United States or the State, or both, will be unable to meet the anticipated demands of its water 

users during the balance of the calendar year, representatives of the United States and the State shall 

confer on possible procedures for making joint operational changes to minimize the shortage.”), USBR 

00018-19; Art. 10a (“Either party may make use of its facilities available to the other party for pumping 

and conveyance of water by written agreement.”), USBR 00019; Art. 11(a) (“Should the State Water 

Resources Control Board establish new Delta standards, and the United States determines that operation 

of the [CVP] in conformity with the new Delta standards is not inconsistent with Congressional 

directives the parties shall amend Exhibit A to conform with the new Delta standards and amend this 

agreement to the extent necessary to provide for continued operation of both projects to accomplish the 

purposes of this agreement.”), USBR 00024, 00026; Art. 14(a) (explaining process by which the parties 

to the COA periodically meet and confer to review project operations and agree upon revisions to the 

COA), USBR 00028. 

In contrast, COA Article 6(g) contains no such language, instead declaring very specifically that: 

“During excess water conditions each party has the responsibility to export and store as much water as 

possible within its physical and contractual limits.” USBR 00017. Operational flexibility is certainly a 

goal of the COA as a whole, but as a historic “peace treaty,” the COA also included provisions that 

operate as firm requirements, the omission of flexibility in light of the maxim of statutory construction 

expressio unius est esclusio alterius. See Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832.

Federal Defendants also point to the purposes of the CVPIA, which are: 

(a) To protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, and associated habitats 

in the Central Valley and Trinity River basins of California;

(b) To address impacts of the Central Valley Project on fish, wildlife and 

associated habitats;

(c) To improve the operational flexibility of the Central Valley Project;

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(d) To increase water-related benefits provided by the Central Valley 

Project to the State of California through expanded use of voluntary water 

transfers and improved water conservation;

(e) To contribute to the State of California's interim and long-term efforts 

to protect the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary;

(f) To achieve a reasonable balance among competing demands for use of 

Central Valley Project water, including the requirements of fish and 

wildlife, agricultural, municipal and industrial and power contractors.

CVPIA § 3402. While the stated purposes of the CVPIA include protection and restoration of fish and 

wildlife, as well as operational flexibility, they also include achievement of balance between competing 

demands for use. The CVPIA, like the COA, was a compromise. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water 

Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 637 F. Supp. 2d 777, 793 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The CVPIA represented a 

compromise between competing needs for limited CVPIA yield.”). As with the COA’s purposes, the 

CVPIA’s stated purposes do not substantially resolve the present dispute.16

b. Specific v. General.

Both parties invoke the “well established canon of statutory interpretation ... that the specific 

governs the general.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070-71 

(2012) (internal citation and quotation omitted). This canon is “most frequently applied to statutes in 

which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission,” in 

which case the specific provision is construed as an exception to the general one.” Id. “But the canon has 

full application as well to statutes ... in which a general authorization and a more limited, specific 

authorization exist side-by-side. There the canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a 

 

16 Relatedly, Federal Defendants point out that while CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) cites numerous purposes to which the 800,000 AF 

designation could be put, primacy is given to the purpose of “implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration purposes 

and measures authorized by [the CVPIA],” including restoring anadromous fish populations. See Doc. 105 at 4. But, there is 

no dispute that the June 2011 pumping reduction was implemented to serve the primary purpose. Nor do Plaintiffs dispute 

that the record supports the agency’s conclusion, from a scientific perspective, that the pumping reduction would aid 

anadromous fish. To the extent Federal Defendants suggest that the primacy of anadromous fish protection vis-a-vis the other 

purposes articulated as permissible uses of the 800,000 AF of water translates into primacy of fishery purposes over other 

provisions of the CVPIA, Federal Defendants offer no support for such a proposition. 

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specific provision that is swallowed by the general one, [and supports the] cardinal rule that, if possible, 

effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).

17

Federal Defendants argue that the COA is a “general agreement meant to allow for coordinated 

operation of the CVP and the [SWP] to serve the purposes of conserving water and maximizing benefits 

to California and the nation.” Doc. 105 at 2. Federal Defendants maintain that CVPIA § 3406 is the 

more specific congressional command because it is aimed at a particular problem and offers specific 

solutions, and therefore that it takes precedence over the general responsibilities set forth in CVPIA § 

3411. But Federal Defendants’ argument only rings true if one avoids examination of the COA itself, 

with which CVPIA § 3411 commands that the Secretary comply. The Court has been unable to locate 

(and the parties have not cited) any case that addresses statutory language that commands a federal 

agency to comply with the terms of a contractual agreement. As explained above, the most 

straightforward interpretation of the language at issue in this case – which directs the Secretary to “fully 

comply with the United States’ obligations as set forth in the COA” – is that Congress intended to 

incorporate by reference the terms of the COA itself as obligations under CVPIA § 3411. In light of this, 

the question is whether the relevant provisions of the COA, not the language of CVPIA § 3411, are more 

or less specific than CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). As previously discussed, the key COA provision, Article 6(g),

provides that during periods of excess conditions “each party has the responsibility to export and store as 

much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” Art. 6(g) (USBR00017).

On the one hand, CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) specifies a particular volume of water, 800,000 AF, to be 

utilized, while COA Article 6(g) does not.18 CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) also specifies purposes to which that 

 

17 Plaintiffs also rely on an infrequently cited canon of statutory construction that stands for the proposition that, even if there 

is an irreconcilable conflict between two statutory provisions, the provision that is latest in sequence within the statute (i.e., 

the highest numbered) controls. See United States v. Jackson, 143 F. 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1906); see also United States v. 

Moore, 567 F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 2009). The Court finds it unnecessary to rely on this canon, as there is no irreconcilable 

conflict in this case. 18 Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that Article 6(g) is less specific than other language in COA Article 6, such as Article 6(d), 

which provides for the sharing of responsibility between Reclamation and DWR during balanced water conditions and 

specifies particular percentages each entity is responsible for contributing. Doc. 105 at 18. But this case is not about resolving 

any conflict between the various sub-articles within Article 6. The question here is whether Article 6(g) is more specific than 

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water is to be dedicated. However -- and this is critical to this case -- CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) does not say 

exactly how the 800,000 AF should be managed or scheduled (i.e., where it should be utilized and for 

what specific purposes, let alone when the water should be dedicated). As the key dispute in this case is 

whether or not the Secretary acted unlawfully in choosing to time CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) releases during a 

period of excess conditions in such a way as to interfere with the “export and storage” of water pursuant 

to COA Article 6(g), the relative specificity of the two provisions prescriptions regarding timing is key.

Article 6(g), in contrast, requires the Secretary to “export and store as much water as possible within its 

physical and contractual limits” during periods of “excess conditions,” the occurrence of which is 

defined specifically in the COA.19

All in all, the Court finds COA Article 6(g) to be more specific than CVPIA § 3406(b)(2).

Because the more specific governs the general, during excess conditions, the Secretary cannot invoke 

CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) in a manner that renders ineffectual the commands of COA Article 6(g).20

c. Avoiding Absurd Results.

Federal Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the relevant statutory and COA 

 

CVPIA § 3406(b)(2).

19 In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 

Injunction, this Court stated that “[t]he COA’s statutory duty ‘to export and store as much water as possible’ during excess 

water conditions is not temporally limited, as the current 2011 water year does not end until September 30, 2011.” Doc. 100 

at 18 n.3. On further reflection, particularly in light of the fact that the existence of excess conditions is evaluated on a daily 

basis under the COA, the Court does not adopt this preliminary finding here. 

20 The Parties make reference to Arizona Power Pooling Ass’n v. Morton, 527 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1975), which concerned a 

provision of the Colorado River Basin Project Act (“CRBPA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1523(a), which authorized the Secretary to 

devise “the most feasible plan” for obtaining pumping power for the Central Arizona Project. Id. at 723. While this language 

“would seem to endow [the Secretary] with almost unlimited authority in orchestrating all phases of the project, id. at 727, 

another provision of the CRBPA incorporated by reference all other “Federal reclamation laws.” Id. at 724 (citing 43 U.S.C. 

§ 1554). Specifically, the Federal Reclamation Project Act of 1939 contains a preference clause applying to any sale of 

electric power or lease of power privileges by the United States, giving preference to municipalities, other public 

corporations or agencies, and cooperatives and nonprofit organizations. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c). Customers preferred under this 

provision sued. Id. at 724. Federal Defendants asserted that the Secretary had so much discretion under the “most feasible 

plan” language that the APA’s judicial review provisions did not even apply, citing 5 U.S.C. § 701 (indicating the APA does 

not apply to “agency action ... committed to agency discretion by law”). Id. at 725. The Ninth Circuit found that Congress 

“circumscribed [the Secretary’s] discretion in at least one way by making [the Secretary’s] actions subject to the federal 

reclamation laws.” Id. at 727. Plaintiffs argue that the present case is analogous to Arizona Power insofar as this case 

involves a general grant of discretion (CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s instruction to dedicate and manage 800,000 AF of CVP yield 

for fish and wildlife purposes) that is circumscribed by the specific commands of CVPIA § 3411. Doc. 107 at 19-20. While 

this case is distantly analogous to Arizona Power, because the key holding in Arizona Power framed in terms of the APA’s 

“committed to agency discretion by law” standard, which is inapplicable here, the Court finds that Arizona Power provides 

little guidance. 

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language “could mean that in some years, [Federal] Defendants would be entirely unable to meet their 

obligations under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)....” Doc. 105 at 20. Federal Defendants explain this concern as 

follows:

For example ... the system might be in excess water conditions for an 

entire water year or most of any given water year. In that case, under 

Plaintiffs’ interpretation, Defendants would be required to export and then 

store in downstream reservoirs as much water as possible for most or all of 

the water year. In that situation, Defendants might be unable to meet their 

statutory responsibilities under the ESA21 or § 3406(b)(2), despite the very 

clear congressional mandate to do so.

Id. 

Federal Defendants urge an interpretation that would avoid this “absurd result.” Doc. 109 at 14. 

In construing statutes, “absurd results are to be avoided.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 

(1981); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[S]tatutory interpretations which 

would produce absurd results are to be avoided.”). In contrast, a court should interpret the statute “as a 

symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” 

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (internal citation and quotation omitted). Federal 

Defendants maintain that their interpretation evidences a “reasonable harmonization” of the competing 

statutory provisions. 

The record simply does not reflect that the result hypothesized by Federal Defendants is likely to 

occur. The record is devoid of information suggesting Federal Defendants would have been unable to 

meet their obligations under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) had they been unable to implement the 2011 pumping 

reductions.22 In contrast, as discussed above, the record does reflect that Reclamation had discretion to 

 

21 As explained elsewhere in this Memorandum Decision, the Court is not persuaded by Federal Defendants’ repeated 

suggestion that Reclamation’s obligations under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) are equivalent to those under the ESA. Here, the Court 

focuses on only the statutory commands of CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). 

22 For example, Federal Defendants posit a hypothetical situation in which excess water conditions existed for the entire 

water year. Doc. 105 at 20-21. According to Plaintiffs such circumstances are “rare,” Doc. 107 at 22 n.11, but no party

presents record evidence (or, for that matter, any evidence) that would permit the Court to actually determine the frequency 

of such events. Regardless, even in such years, as discussed above, Defendants would have numerous options other than 

export reductions to “dedicate and manage” water under the (b)(2) program.

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implement other types of (b)(2) actions during the relevant time period that would not have necessitated 

export cuts during excess water conditions. The Court will not base its statutory interpretation upon a 

hypothesis that is unsupported by record evidence. 

d. Legislative History.

If statutory language is ambiguous, a court may refer to legislative history to discern 

Congressional intent. Tides v. The Boing Co., 644 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court has 

thoroughly examined the legislative history of both P.L. 99-546 and the CVPIA for any information that 

might illuminate the present dispute. The legislative history of P.L. 99-546 underscores the importance 

of the COA as a means for resolving a dangerous “logjam” in the operation of the CVP, COA House 

Report at 6-7, but does not otherwise shed light on the questions critical to this case. The legislative 

history of the CVPIA, which has been examined in detail in other decisions and has been re-examined 

by the Court in this case, is likewise essentially silent with respect to the purpose and relative weight of 

CVPIA § 3411 vis-a-vis any other CVPIA provision. 

e. Third Party Beneficiaries/Waiver. 

Federal Defendants advance two additional arguments that merit some discussion. First, Federal 

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs are third parties “seeking to interpret and enforce [a] contract to 

which they are not [] partie[s]... their interpretation should not control over the interpretation of the 

parties to the COA.” Doc. 109 at 16. Federal Defendants cite Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. 

Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1999), for the well-established rule that third-party 

beneficiaries may not enforce a contract absent clear intent to the contrary expressed in that contract. 

While Federal Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs, as third-party beneficiaries of the COA, likely have 

no right to enforce the COA’s terms under contract law, Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the APA. As 

discussed above, CVPIA § 3411 incorporated the terms of the COA into the CVPIA. Therefore, as 

Federal Defendants acknowledge, Doc. 109 at 16, Plaintiffs may allege under the APA that Defendants 

acted contrary to law. 

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Federal Defendants appear to emphasize Plaintiffs’ status as third-party beneficiaries to 

encourage the Court to find reasonable Federal Defendants’ interpretation of the relevant statutory 

provisions. Doc. 109 at 16. Federal Defendants point out that the two parties to the COA, Reclamation 

and DWR, acted in coordination to implement the June 2011 pumping reductions. In a footnote, Federal 

Defendants suggest that, under COA Article 19, the parties to the COA can waive violations of the COA

and that this “cast[s] further doubt on the idea that a third party, through the APA or otherwise, can 

bring suit to enforce the COA when neither of the parties to the COA objected to operations.” Id. at 16 

n.5. 

This argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the suggestion that Plaintiffs, as thirdparty beneficiaries, may not “bring suit to enforce the COA” conflicts with Federal Defendants’ own 

admission on the same page that Plaintiffs may bring an APA claim that Federal Defendants acted 

contrary to law. Second, it is not entirely clear that Article 19 provides the type of waiver mechanism 

claimed by Federal Defendants. Article 19 states:

The waiver of a breach of any of the provisions of this agreement shall not 

be deemed to be a waiver of any other provisions hereof or of a 

subsequent breach of such provisions.

USBR 00030. While this language does imply that the parties may waive breaches of the COA’s terms, 

there is no evidence suggesting the parties to the COA viewed implementation of the June 2011 

pumping reductions as a waiver of any obligations under Article 6(g). Even if the parties’ conduct could 

be interpreted under contract principles as an implied waiver, Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 

407 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Implied waiver may be inferred by conduct or actions that 

mislead the breaching party into reasonably believing that the rights to a claim arising from the breach 

was waived.”) (cited with approval in Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 

2008)), the Court has been unable to identify and Federal Defendants have not cited any authority that 

suggests it would be appropriate for a Court to apply the doctrine of implied waiver to bar a third party 

from raising an APA claim based on a contract term incorporated by reference into a federal statute. 

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C. Summary of Statutory Construction/Analysis.

To summarize, Federal Defendants’ interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is a post 

hoc rationalization entitled to no significant deference. Even if Federal Defendants are entitled to some 

limited deference under Skidmore, the applicable standard is whether Federal Defendants’ interpretation 

is “reasonable.” The Court finds it is not. 

Federal Defendants’ arguments regarding the plain language of the relevant statutory and COA 

provisions are not reasonable. 

• While the term “export and store” does not absolutely preclude Federal Defendants from 

satisfying their obligations under Article 6(g) through upstream storage, nothing in the record 

indicates Federal Defendants attempted to or could have done so in June 2011. Nor does 

Plaintiffs’ position regarding the term “export and store” mean that Reclamation would be 

unable to release any water from reservoirs downstream of the Delta during excess conditions. 

This potentially absurd scenario is avoided by the language in Article 6(g) requiring Reclamation 

to “export and store as much water as possible within its physical and contractual limits.” 

(Emphasis added.)

• CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s direction to the Secretary to “dedicate and manage” 800,000 AF of water 

for fish and wildlife purposes is not an “obligation under ... Federal law” for purposes of CVPIA 

§ 3406(b)’s requirement that the Secretary operate the CVP “to meet all obligations under state 

and Federal law.” Unlike mandatory obligations imposed under ESA biological opinions, the 

(b)(2) program is discretionary in both the timing and manner of its implementation. 

• Inclusion of the word “possible” in COA Article 6(g) does not render its otherwise mandatory 

language permissive. 

• Inclusion of the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title...” in CVPIA § 

3411(a) is inapposite to the interpretation of CVPIA § 3411(b), which contains contrasting 

language.

In the absence of an explicit command elevating CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) over CVPIA § 3411, an 

apparent conflict exists between CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)’s mandate to dedicate 800,000 AF of water to fish 

and wildlife purposes and CVPIA § 3411’s command to comply with the COA. This creates enough of 

an ambiguity on the question of how the Secretary may implement CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) during times of 

excess conditions to warrant resort to the canons of statutory interpretation. 

The stated purposes of the CVPIA are by no means dispositive of the relative priority of the 

(b)(2) program vis-à-vis the COA. 

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The specific/general canon is more instructive. While CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) specifies a particular 

volume of water, 800,000 AF, to be utilized and specifies purposes to which that water is to be 

dedicated, it does not say exactly how the 800,000 AF should be managed or scheduled (i.e., where it 

should be utilized and for what specific purposes, let alone when the water should be dedicated). COA 

Article 6(g), in contrast, requires the Secretary to “export and store as much water as possible within its 

physical and contractual limits” during periods of “excess conditions,” the occurrence of which is 

defined specifically in the COA. The Court finds COA Article 6(g) to be more specific than CVPIA § 

3406(b)(2). Because the more specific governs the general, during excess conditions, the Secretary 

cannot invoke CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) in a manner that renders ineffectual the commands of COA Article 

6(g).

While Federal Defendants raise the “avoidance of absurd consequences” canon, the record is 

devoid of information suggesting that Federal Defendants would have been unable to meet their 

obligations under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) had they been unable to implement the 2011 pumping reductions 

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their APA claim 

under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) that, by imposing pumping restrictions during June 2011, Federal Defendants 

undertook a final agency action not in accordance with law. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as 

to that claim is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ alternative motion for summary judgment on their 5 U.S.C. § 

706(1) claim therefore is MOOT. Federal Defendants’ cross motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED

Dated: March 2, 2015

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

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