Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01801/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01801-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN BERNSTEIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-01801-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SANCTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 54

Karen Bernstein alleges violations of the Song Beverly Warranty Act with respect to a 

vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant BMW of North America. During the course of 

discovery the Court ordered Defendant to make percipient witness Nancy McDonald available for 

deposition. Over a month after the close of discovery, Plaintiff filed the now pending motion for 

sanctions based on Defendant’s failure to produce Ms. McDonald for deposition. (Dkt. No. 54.) 

After considering the parties’ briefs, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see

Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the July 18, 2019 hearing, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2019, the Court ordered Defendant to produce percipient witness Nancy 

McDonald, who resides in New Jersey, for deposition. (Dkt. No. 51.1) Although Plaintiff had 

previously offered to depose her via video to reduce expense, Defendant declined. (Id.) 

Following the Court’s March 25 Order, Plaintiff issued a deposition notice for Ms. McDonald for 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

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a deposition on Monday, April 29 at 10:00 am at US Legal Support at 206 East 161st Street, 

Bronx, NY. (Dkt. N. 54-3.) On April 24—the Thursday before Ms. McDonald’s Monday 

deposition—Defense counsel, Mr. Curtis, emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Barry, stating that Ms. 

McDonald would be produced at a court reporter’s office in New Jersey at 25 East Spring Valley 

Avenue, Suite 320, Maywood, N.J., rather than the location in the deposition notice.2 (Dkt. No. 

59-1 at 6.) Mr. Barry responded by stating that the deposition would go forward in the Bronx as 

previously noticed. (Dkt. No. 59-1 at 8.) The following day, Mr. Barry was contacted by a Philip 

Semprevivo who indicated that he represented Defendant BMW and who again stated that Ms. 

McDonald would be produced in New Jersey at the previously specified location.3(Dtk. No. 59-3 

at 6.) Mr. Semprevivo also attests that he called and sent additional emails to Mr. Barry although 

these emails are not attached to his declaration. (Dkt. No. 59-3 at ¶¶ 4-7.) In any event, there is 

no dispute that Mr. Barry did not respond to Mr. Semprevivo’s emails or calls. On April 29 at 

10:00 am, Mr. Barry appeared at the court reporter’s office in the Bronx and Ms. Chou (an 

attorney with Mr. Semprevivo’s office) appeared at the court reporter’s office in New Jersey with 

Ms. McDonald. (Dkt. No. 54-3; Dkt. No. 59-2.) Five weeks later, Plaintiff filed the now pending 

motion for sanctions.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) authorizes sanctions against a party for failing to 

obey a discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (C). The district court has wide latitude in 

exercising its discretion to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1). Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers 

Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 

(9th Cir. 1981) (“Imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b), and the selection of the particular 

sanction, are matters left to the discretion of the trial court.”). However, the district court’s 

 

2 Mr. Barry’s letter is dated June 21, 2019, but the email to which it was attached is dated April 

25, 2019. Because Plaintiff’s counsel does not dispute that he received the letter on April 25, the 

Court assumes that the June 21 date is a typographical error.

3 While Mr. Curtis’s declaration attests that his April 24 email “put [Mr. Barry] in contact with 

Mr. Semprevivo,” Mr. Curtis did not state in his email that Mr. Semprevivo would be handling the 

matter for Defendant and instead simply cc’d a philip.semprevivo@lawbhs.com on the email to 

Mr. Barry. (Compare Dkt. No. 59-1 at ¶ 6 with Dkt. No. 59-1 at 6.)

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discretion to issue sanctions is subject to the following limitations: (1) the sanction must be just

and (2) the sanction must specifically relate to the particular claim at issue in the discovery order. 

See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 947 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, where a party seeks payment 

of expenses for failure to comply with a court order, “the court must order the disobedient party, 

the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 

caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an 

award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

Here, Plaintiff seeks evidentiary sanctions as well as monetary sanctions under Rule

37(b)(2) based on Defendant’s failure to produce Ms. McDonald in response to the deposition 

notice and this Court’s Order. The Court is troubled by the lack of professionalism apparent in 

both counsels’ conduct in this matter. Plaintiff’s counsel refused to acknowledge or communicate 

with Defendant’s east coast counsel. Defendant’s counsel refused to acknowledge that Plaintiff as 

the deposing party—and not Defendant—was entitled to select the place of the deposition. See 

Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that generally, a 

party may notice deposition of another party to take place wherever it chooses). Defendant’s 

insistence that the Court ordered the deposition to occur in New Jersey is wrong—the Court 

ordered Defendant to make her available for deposition, but did not order anything regarding the 

location of the deposition. (Dkt. No. 51.) If Defendant objected to the place of the deposition, it 

was not entitled to unilaterally change the location, and instead, was required to move for a 

protective order to prevent the deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2) (“A failure [to appear for a 

deposition] is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the 

party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).”); see id. 

advisory committee’s note (1970) (“If [a party] desires not to appear or not to respond, he must 

apply for a protective order.”). Given Defendant’s failure to move for a protective order, its 

failure to produce Ms. McDonald for deposition was not substantially justified. The Court thus 

ORDERS Defendant to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses. 

However, the Court in its discretion declines to impose any of the evidentiary sanctions 

sought by Plaintiff. If Ms. McDonald’s testimony was as critical as Plaintiff now insists, Plaintiff 

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should have moved to compel her deposition within the time allowed to do so by the Local Rules 

rather than wait until a month after the close of fact discovery and seek evidentiary sanctions 

instead; the delay suggests an attempt to obtain a procedural advantage rather than necessary 

discovery. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. 

No. 54.) Lewis Brisbois Bisaard & Smith LLP shall pay Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and 

costs of $3,800.

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 These sanctions must be paid within 30 days, by August 16, 2019. The motion

for sanctions is DENIED in all other respects. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

 

4 This amount is $475 less than that sought by Plaintiff as the Court vacates the hearing and 

Plaintiff’s counsel will thus incur no additional expenses for preparing for or attending the 

hearing.

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