Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00697/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00697-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA ELIZABETH RICCHIO, Civil No. 15-0697 BEN (WVG)

Petitioner, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Linda Elizabeth Ricchio, a state prisoner represented by counsel, files

this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

denial of her parole and denial of her request to advance her parole hearing. (Pet., ECF

No. 1.)1

 The Court has read and considered the Petition [ECF No. 1], the Motion to

Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to

Dismiss [ECF No. 9], Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 17],

the lodgments and other documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented

/ / /

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those

imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing system, except for lodgments.

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by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ricchio was convicted of murdering Ronald Ruse in 1989. She received a

sentence of twenty-seven years-to-life in prison. (Pet. at 3.) 

On May 11, 2011, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) held a hearing to

determine whether Ricchio was a good candidate for parole. (Pet’rs Ex. H.) At the

beginning of the hearing, Ricchio’s attorney objected to the Board’s use of information

from Ricchio’s confidential file because he did not have access to the file and because,

he contended, material in the file was not true. (Id. at 14-15.) Ricchio’s attorney also

objected to the use of information from Ricchio’s “chrono” which referenced material

in the confidential file, which Ricchio’s attorney also contended was untrue. (Id. at 14-

16, 22-23.) Ricchio’s attorney noted the District Attorney had access to the confidential

file, and that he was therefore at a disadvantage in representing Ricchio. (Id. at 14-16,

20-21.) The Board denied Ricchio’s attorney’s request for access to the confidential

file, told him they “may or may not be using” the information from the confidential file

in their decision, and told him the Board would notify him if it was going to use such

information. (Id. at 21.) 

During the hearing, the Board heard testimony from Ricchio, reviewed

information about her behavior and programming while in prison and the therapy she

had undergone while in custody, reviewed a psychological exam by Dr. Pointkowski,

and read letters in support of her release. The Board also considered her plans for

parole. (See generally, Pet’rs Ex. H.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board

determined she was not suitable for parole at that time. The Board found that while

Ricchio had made a good deal of progress toward accepting responsibility for the

murder and gaining insight into herself, she was at the beginning of her process of doing

so. (Petr’s Ex. H at 144-46.) In particular, Presiding Commissioner Prizmich

/ / /

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noted Ricchio had not said much about the preparation and planning she had engaged

in leading up to the murder, and had “glossed over” the steps she had taken to do so: 

Your act was a prolonged effort on your part, a focused effort, practicing with the gun, getting someone to help you buy – you know, get the gun and practice. You know, it just went on and on, very focused, which belies someone who’s having a momentary anger fit. I mean, this was a prolonged thing. That gave us some concern, that you didn’t dwell on that enough. 

(Id. at 145-56.)

Commissioner Prizmich also noted Ricchio had “focused with criminal intent on

having this person . . . [and] I want to make sure you understand the effort that you went

through, and I don’t believe you do at this point.” (Id. at 148.) He said:

I mean, it’s chilling, when you think about it, the efforts that you went through. And I didn’t get the sense today, in talking to you, that you understand the depth of what you did, nor do I get the sense that you understand, in terms of who you are, how all of this affected you. You are at the very beginning – in my view, and like I said, I’ve done a bunch of

these – of going through this process. It was difficult at times to pull out

of you things like how deep your insight was or deep your understanding

of self-help programming. For example, we were talking about one area, and what came up was you felt you were codependent. I mean, that’s your call. You’re the one that has to make that assessment. But to draw from

you that programmized commentary, which is, “I’m codependent,” what does that mean? I mean, I know what it means, or at least I have an idea. 

It took me a number of other questions to draw that out of you. Now, you got there. My experience is, when someone has an understanding and had adequate and deep insight, they don’t use terms like, “I was codependent.” They explain it right off the bat. They provide us with an explanation of what that codependency was. Now, you finally got around to it, but it wasn’t without my efforts to try to draw you out of it. So, I mean, that’s indicative of very recent understanding of the issues that you grew up with and the character defects that you were left with and the process that you are just beginning to go through, to not only identify those character defects, to rebuild them, to find a better way to handle things.

(Id. at 150-51.)

The Board also considered Ricchio’s relationship, and subsequent marriage to,

a former prison guard, as well as an incident in which Ricchio was alleged to have been

“infatuated with an officer” and had attempted to obtain confidential information about

him. (Id. at 81-82,152.) Because the behavior was similar to behavior exhibited during

Ricchio’s commission of the crime, it concerned the Board. (Id. at 83.) In response,

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Ricchio alleged it was the guard, not her, who had been guilty of “sexual impropriety.” 

(Id. at 81-82, 152.) Ricchio’s attorney also objected to the Board’s consideration of the

information about the alleged infatuation with the guard because it was from the

confidential file to which he had no access, and because the information had been

proven false. (Id. at 84-85.) In addition, the Board considered a psychological

evaluation which found Ricchio had a low likelihood of recidivism, but that she still

lacked some insight into the causes and roots of her behavior. (Id. at 74-79.)

Ricchio filed a habeas corpus petition in San Diego Superior Court challenging

the Board’s denial of parole on October 19, 2011. (Lodgment No. 1.) She alleged the

Board’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence, the Board’s continuing

denial of parole based on unchanging factors violated her due process rights, the

Board’s decision to set her next parole hearing in seven years was arbitrary, and her due

process rights were violated by the Board’s use of confidential material, its refusal to

permit her attorney access to the confidential material, permitting the District Attorney

to ask her questions at the hearing, permitting the victim’s next of kin to speak, and the

presence of a Board member who was a friend of the victim’s sister. (Id.) The superior

court denied the petition on December 21, 2011, finding the BPH relied upon sufficient

evidence in denying Ricchio parole. (Lodgment No. 2.) The court also noted that

although the Board considered the confidential material, the material did not play a

substantial role in the Board’s decision. (Id. at 5.) 

Ricchio then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal on January 26, 2012, challenging her parole denial on the same grounds. 

(Lodgment No. 3.) Citing California law, the appellate court denied the petition on

February 28, 2012, finding the BPH’s denial of parole was supported by “some

evidence,” which is all that is required. (Lodgment No. 4.) 

On March 14, 2012, Ricchio filed a petition to the BPH to advance her parole

hearing. (Pet’rs Ex. B.) She then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California

Supreme Court on March 24, 2012, in which she again challenged her denial of parole

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on the same grounds as she had in her superior and appellate court petitions. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) On March 29, 2012, while her habeas corpus petition was pending

in the California Supreme Court, Ricchio settled a federal lawsuit she had filed in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California regarding her

confidential prison file. (Pet’rs Ex. A at 2.) As part of the settlement agreement, the

parties agreed that several documents were to be redacted or expunged from her file,

including material from the confidential file which referenced her alleged infatuation

with a guard, her alleged attempt to garner confidential information about that guard,

and a psychological report prepared by Dr. Pointkowski. (Id.; Pet’rs Exs. I-J.) Also on

March 29, 2012, Deputy Attorney General Gretchen K. Buechsenschuetz wrote a letter

urging the advancement of Ricchio’s next parole suitability hearing. (Pet’rs Ex. C.) On

March 30, 2012, the BPH denied both Ricchio’s petition and Ms. Buechsenschuetz’s

request to advance her parole hearing date. (Pet’rs Ex. D.) 

Ricchio constructively filed a habeas corpus petition in the San Diego Superior

Court on June 2, 2012, challenging the denial of her petition to advance her parole

hearing date. (Lodgment No. 8.) The superior court ordered informal briefing from 

respondent. (See Lodgment No. 9.) Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court denied

Ricchio’s habeas corpus petition challenging her 2011 parole denial (filed March 24,

2012) on June 20, 2012. (Lodgment No. 7-8.) While her June 2, 2012 habeas corpus

petition was pending in the San Diego Superior Court, Ricchio filed a habeas corpus

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California challenging her 2007 and 2011 parole denials on grounds the BPH

considered inaccurate information in denying her parole and violated her due process

rights by denying parole based on insufficient evidence. (Lodgment No. 23.) Ricchio

also challenged the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 9. (Id.) The Eastern

District dismissed her petition on November 21, 2012. The court concluded her claim

regarding the use of inaccurate information was not ripe because at the time of her 2011 

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parole hearing, Ricchio’s federal lawsuit had not yet been settled and documents had

not yet been ordered redacted or expunged from her file. The court found as follows:

Petitioner’s latest parole hearing took place in 2011, and the civil rights action settlement agreement did not occur until 2012; thus, is it clear

that at the time the Board of Parole Hearings conducted the 2011 hearing there was no settlement agreement to expunge and/or redact certain

information from Petitioner’s central file. In this instance, the Court finds

Petitioner would not be subject to “hardship” if review is delayed because she can re-file a new habeas corpus petition if and when the Board of Parole Hearings continues to rely on information that was expunged and/or redacted from her central file, which has not yet occurred. Second, judicial intervention at this juncture could interfere with the Board of

Parole’s future action in response to Deputy California Attorney General, Gretchen Buechsenschuetz’s request to advance a new parole suitability within a reasonable time without reliance on the expunged and redacted information and its response thereto. As Petitioner specifically states, she is still in the process of expunging information from her central file and

Petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated that CDCR has declined to

conduct a new suitability hearing without reference to the expunged and redacted information. (Petition, at 24.) Third, the Court would benefit

from future factual development of the issues presented such as a determination of what information was specifically redacted from

Petitioner’s central file and how that impacts the Board of Parole’s finding of suitability for release.

(Id. at 3-4.)

The court also concluded the claim was unexhausted. (Id. at 4-6; Lodgment No.

24.) As to Ricchio’s claim that there was not sufficient evidence presented to support

the denial of parole, the court, citing Swarthout v. Cooke, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 859

(2011), found that ‘[federal courts’] review of parole determinations is limited to

whether the ‘minimal’ procedural protections set forth in Greenholtz [v. Inmates of Neb.

Penal, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)] were met, that there is ‘an opportunity to be heard and a

statement of the reasons why parole was denied.’ Id. at 862,” and concluded those

protections had been provided to Ricchio. (Lodgment No. 23 at 6-7; Lodgment No. 24.) 

The court also rejected Ricchio’s challenge to Proposition 9. (Lodgment No. 23 at 7-9;

Lodgment No. 24.)2

/ / /

2

 The Court also told Ricchio that she could not challenge her 2007 and 2011 parole denials

in a single habeas corpus proceeding.

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On December 6, 2012, the San Diego Superior Court denied Ricchio’s habeas

corpus petition, filed June 2, 2012, challenging the denial of her petition to advance her

parole hearing. (Lodgment No. 9.) Ricchio then constructively filed a habeas corpus

action in the California Court of Appeal challenging the denial of her petition to

advance her parole hearing on December 24, 2012. (Lodgment No. 10.) The appellate

court issued an Order to Show Cause and appointed counsel for Ricchio on February

14, 2013. (Lodgment No. 11.) Counsel filed a supplemental habeas corpus petition in

the appellate court on September 4, 2013. (Lodgment No. 12.) In that petition, counsel

argued: (1) the BPH relied on expunged and redacted information to deny Ricchio

parole in 2011, and without that evidence, there was not sufficient evidence to support

the denial; and (2) the BPH’s refusal to give Ricchio’s attorney access to the

confidential file during her 2011 parole hearing violated her due process rights, her

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and her confrontation clause rights. (Id.) On April

2, 2014, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 13.) It

found that even without the redacted and expunged evidence, the BPH reasonably

denied Ricchio’s petition to advance her parole hearing:

[¶] The BPH relied on numerous factors when it made its 2011 decision

finding Ricchio unsuitable for parole, including her lack of insight into the causative factors that led to the murder, her minimization of her

responsibility for the murder, her lack of credibility in trying to portray her understanding of what led her to commit the crime, and her lack of

credibility in accepting complete responsibility for the murder. It noted,

for example, that she “glossed over” the “tremendous amount” of planning she engaged in leading up to the murder, including acquiring the gun,

engaging in target practice, and moving into an apartment next door to the victim after their relationship ended. The BPH was also concerned that

she testified to an incident in which the victim struck her with a towel

without mentioning that “one of the things that prompted all of that . . . was [Ricchio’s] constant harassment” of the victim, suggesting she might be trying to mitigate her actions. Her other testimony at the BPH hearing additionally suggested she still partially minimized her responsibility, because she claimed she shot the victim when “[h]e was coming at me, either with a grocery bag or a lunge,” “[i]t startled me,” and she responded by shooting him. She had elsewhere explained her basis for fearing the

victim, noting he had “threatened to have me killed”and been "physically violent" toward her. She also claimed at the hearing that, after firing numerous shots at him, she “knelt down and . . . touched him,” and the

BPH expressed doubt over the veracity of her claim that she “checked on

him” because there was “no indication of that,” which “gives us concern”

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about “how honest you’re being with us [b]ecause this is very

contradictory [of] what we see the facts to be.” The BPH was also

concerned that she had only a superficial understanding of how childhood abandonment issues contributed to her desire to hang onto the victim, since she claimed to understand how abandonment issues contributed to

her crime, but characterized her upbringing as “pretty good” even though her parents in effect abandoned her when she was young. The BPH also questioned the degree to which she understood her codependency issues because Ricchio, rather than responding to the BPH’s questions about codependency by “explain[ing] it right off the bat” and giving an “explanation of what codependency was,” gave a “programmized” statement that she was a codependent and only elaborated after the BPH asked her numerous questions trying to “draw that out of you.” Finally, the BPH was concerned about statements suggesting she continued to

attribute some blame to the victim, and stated Ricchio needed to “come to

grips with you and what you did, and blaming or shifting focus to someone else . . . is again indicative of not having adequately come to grips with

this, not certainly having adequate remorse or insight into it.”

(Lodgment No. 13 at 14-16.)

The appellate court also found Ricchio’s claim that insufficient evidence

supported her 2011 parole denial was successive pursuant to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750,

767-68 (1993). (Id. at 13-14.) Moreover, the court concluded Ricchio’s claims

regarding denial of her right to counsel and the violation of her confrontation clause

rights were also barred under Clark. (Id. at 6, n.4.)

Ricchio’s counsel next filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

on May 15, 2014. (Lodgment No. 14.) In that petition, Ricchio alleged her due process

right to a fair parole hearing was violated when the BPH used expunged and redacted

material to deny her parole, the state appellate court improperly applied Clark to her

claims, the reasons given by the BPH to deny her parole were insufficient, and Ricchio

was denied her federal due process by the state’s improper application of state law. 

(Lodgment No. 14.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on

June 25, 2014. (Lodgment No. 15.)

On August 5, 2014, Ricchio constructively filed another pro se habeas corpus

petition in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 16.) She raised new claims,

including violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of: (1)

the BPH’s refusal to advance her parole hearing; (2) the Attorney General’s reliance on

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redacted and expunged information in arguing for denial of her petition; and (3) the

federal court’s reliance on redacted and expunged information to deny her petition. 

(Lodgment No. 16.) The superior court denied the petition on October 14, 2014, on

grounds it was successive under Clark. (Lodgment No. 17.)

Ricchio next filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the California appellate court

on December 2, 2014. (Lodgment No. 18.) In that petition, she alleged she was being

retaliated against for filing legal actions regarding her prison file and that her

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by disparate sentencing. (Id.) The state

appellate court denied that petition on December 16, 2014, finding Ricchio had not

made a prima facie case for relief. (Lodgment No. 19.)

Ricchio filed her final state habeas corpus petition on January 27, 2015, in pro

se. (Lodgment No. 20.) In that petition, Ricchio again alleged she was denied due

process when her attorney was denied access to her confidential file at the 2011 parole

hearing, and that the BPH relied on redacted and expunged information to deny her

parole in 2011. (Id.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition stating: “The

petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750,

767-769; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300,

304; In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal.2d 734, 735.)” (Lodgment No. 21.)

Ricchio filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

in this Court on March 30, 2015 [ECF No. 1]. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition on June 19, 2015 [ECF No. 9]. Ricchio filed an opposition to the motion to

dismiss on July 24, 2015 [ECF No. 17].

III. DISCUSSION

Ricchio contends her due process right to a fair parole hearing was violated by

the Board’s use of material in a confidential file which was later redacted or expunged. 

Ricchio also argues her Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and effective assistance of

counsel were violated by the Board’s refusal to provide her attorney access to the

/ / /

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confidential file. In addition, Ricchio argues her due process rights were violated by

the denial of her petition to advance her parole hearing. (Pet. at 1-39.)

Respondent contends Ricchio’s claims are successive and time barred. (Mot. to

Dismiss at 15-18.) Respondent also contends her confrontation clause and Sixth

Amendment right to counsel claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Id.

at 18-20.) Respondent further argues Ricchio does not state a federal claim with regard

to whether the state court properly applied a state procedural bar to her case. (Id. 20-

21.) Finally, Respondent contends Ricchio’s challenge to the denial of her petition to

advance her parole date is not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Id. at 22-23.)

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding

a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether

it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung,

386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases,

or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may

grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly

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identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than

incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). The Court may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis

for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the

record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See

Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not

be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for

purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at

72. 

B. Whether the Petition is Successive

Respondent contends Ricchio’s claims regarding her 2011 parole hearing are

successive because she has already challenged her 2011 parole denial in the Eastern

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District, case no. 12cv1318 LJO (DLB), and the claim was decided on the merits. (Mot.

to Dismiss at 15-16.) 28 U.S.C. 2244(a) §§ (a) and (b)(3)(A) state:

(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court or the Untied States if it appears that the legality of such detention and has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas

corpus, except as provided in section 2255.

. . . .

(b)[(3)(A)] Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b)(3)(A) (West 2006).

In 2012, Ricchio challenged her 2011 parole denial hearing in the United States

Court for the Eastern District of California on the following grounds: (1) the BHP

violated her right to due process when it relied on false information to deny her parole

at the 2011 hearing; (2) the BPH violated her right to due process when it relied on

material in her confidential file to deny parole; and (3) the BPH denied her substantive

due process rights by refusing to apply ex post facto principles to her case. (See Ricchio

v. Board of Parole Hearings, 12cv1318 LJO-DLB (HC) (E.D. Cal.).)3

 Thus, to the

extent Ricchio is again challenging her 2011 parole denial because her due process

rights to a fair parole hearing were violated, she was denied her right to counsel, denied

the effective assistance of counsel, and denied her Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause rights, she is seeking to challenge the same proceeding she challenged in her

prior federal habeas petition. Unless Ricchio can show she has obtained an Order from

the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider a successive

petition, the petition may not be filed in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A). Here, there is no indication the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

granted Petitioner leave to file a successive petition, and thus the Court recommends her

3

 Ricchio also sought to challenge her 2007 parole denial hearing in the Eastern District case,

but that is not the subject of her petition in this Court.

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claims regarding her 2011 parole hearing be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a),

(b)(3)(A). 

C. Whether the Petition is Time Barred

Respondent also contends Ricchio’s petition is time barred by AEDPA’s statute

of limitations. (Mot. to Dismiss at 16-18.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), petitioner has

one year from the date his or her conviction is final to file a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The

statute of limitations, however, is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

1. Commencement of the One-Year Statute of Limitations

The Ninth Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations applies

to administrative decisions such as challenges to a state parole board denial. See Redd

v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2003). Since a parole denial is not a

“judgment of a state court,” subsection (d)(1)(D) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is the applicable

section for calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run. Id. at 1082-83 (9th

Cir. 2003). That section states the limitations period runs from “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Respondent argues the factual predicate of Ricchio’s claims could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence when the Board’s May 11, 2011

decision became final on September 8, 2011. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (Board

of Parole Hearings decisions become final 120 days after the date of the hearing). An

argument can be made, however, that Ricchio discovered the factual predicate of her

claims through the exercise of due diligence on March 29, 2012, when her federal

lawsuit regarding specific materials in her confidential file was settled and those

materials were ordered expunged or removed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

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Although the result is the same, this Court will analyze the timeliness of Ricchio’s

federal petition under both dates.

In her opposition, Ricchio contends that AEDPA’s statute of limitations began

running when she completed exhaustion of her claims in state court on June 25, 2014. 

(Opp’n at 4.) As discussed below in section III(C)(2), however, Ricchio is entitled to

some statutory tolling, but not for the entire period while she was pursuing remedies in

state court. 

2. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not

be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). The Supreme Court has stated that “an application is pending as long as

the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ – i.e., ‘until the

completion of’ that process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). This

includes the time during which a petition is being considered by a state court and,

generally speaking, the time between filings (gap tolling), unless the petitions filed in

the state courts were untimely or successive. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 953, 958

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-200 (2006). 

a. Scenario One

If the statute of limitations began running when the BPH’s decision became final,

Ricchio is entitled to statutory tolling for the period her first round of state court

petitions challenging her parole denial were pending. From September 8, 2011 (the date

the Board of Parole Hearings’ decision became final) to June 20, 2012, (the date the

California Supreme Court denied her first petition) (286 days), the statute of limitations

was tolled because none of those petitions were denied as untimely or successive, and

all were filed within a reasonable time period, which the Supreme Court has noted is 30

to 60 days. Evans, 546 U.S. at 199-201 (citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-23).

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Ricchio is entitled to additional statutory tolling for the period her second habeas

corpus petition was pending in the San Diego Superior Court because that petition was

not denied as successive, but rather on the merits. (See Lodgment No. 9.) Ricchio’s

second San Diego Superior Court petition was filed on June 2, 2012, (while Ricchio’s

first petition was still pending in the California Supreme Court) and was not decided

until December 6, 2012. Accordingly, from June 20, 2012 (the date the California

Supreme Court decided her first habeas corpus petition) to December 6, 2012, (the date

the San Diego Superior Court decided her second petition) (169 days), the statute of

limitations was tolled. Therefore, Ricchio is entitled to a total of 455 days of statutory

tolling (286 days plus 169 days).

Ricchio is not entitled to any additional statutory tolling because all subsequent

state habeas corpus petitions were denied as successive and were thus not “properly

filed.” (See Lodgment Nos. 13, 15, 17, 19, 21; Porter, 620 F.3d at 958.) A total of

1299 days have passed from September 8, 2011 (the date the statute of limitations

began running) to March 30, 2015 (the date she filed her instant federal habeas corpus

petition). As noted above, Ricchio is entitled to 455 days of statutory tolling during

that time period. Thus, a total of 844 days have passed (1299 days minus 455 days)

without any statutory tolling. Applying AEDPA’s one-year statue of limitations,

Richhio’s federal habeas corpus petition is 479 days late (844 days minus 365 days).

b. Scenario Two

In the alternative, if the statute of limitations began running on March 29, 2012,

when her federal lawsuit regarding her confidential file was settled, she is still only

entitled to statutory tolling for the period her “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petitions were pending. On March 29, 2012, Ricchio had a “properly filed” habeas

corpus petition pending in the California Supreme Court (the first petition). (Lodgment

No. 6.) From March 29, 2012 (the date her federal lawsuit regarding her confidential

file was settled) to June 20, 2012, (the date the California Supreme Court denied her

first petition) (83 days), the statute of limitations was tolled. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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While her first petition was pending in the California Supreme Court, she constructively

filed a second habeas corpus petition in the San Diego Superior Court, which was

denied on December 6, 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) From June 20, 2012 (the date the

California Supreme Court denied her first petition) to December 6, 2012 (the date the

superior court denied her second habeas corpus petition) (169 days), the statute of

limitations was tolled. Therefore, Ricchio is entitled to a total of 252 days of statutory

tolling (83 days plus 169 days).

Ricchio is not entitled to any additional statutory tolling because all subsequent

state habeas corpus petitions were denied as successive and were thus not “properly

filed.” (See Lodgment Nos. 13, 15, 17, 19, 21; Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958

(9th Cir. 2010). A total of 1096 days have passed from March 29, 2012 (the date the

statute of limitations began running) to March 30, 2015 (the date she filed her instant

federal habeas corpus petition). As noted above, Ricchio is entitled to 252 days of

statutory tolling during that time period. Thus, a total of 844 days have passed (1096

days minus 252 days) without any statutory tolling. Applying AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations, Ricchio’s federal habeas corpus petition is 479 days late (844

days minus 365 days).

3. Equitable tolling

“To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way’ and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007),

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Equitable tolling is

unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Ricchio has not alleged she is entitled to equitable tolling, nor are there any facts

in the record before the Court which would appear to entitle her to such tolling. The

Court therefore concludes Ricchio’s challenge to her 2011 parole denial is untimely,

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and recommends those claims must be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

224(d).

D. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondent argues Ricchio’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and right

to counsel claims are not exhausted because they have never been fairly presented to the

California Supreme Court. (Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19.) Specifically, Respondent

contends that Ricchio’s petition for review only argued the state appellate court

erroneously applied a successiveness procedural bar to Ricchio’s claim that she was

deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at her 2011 parole hearing, but did not

argue her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights and right to counsel were

violated. (Id.) 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “‘fairly present[]’ his

federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or . . .

demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). To fairly present a claim so as to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement a petitioner must first provide the state courts with a “‘fair

opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [or her]

constitutional claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (quoting Picard, 404

U.S. at 276-77). 

In the supplemental habeas corpus petition counsel filed in the state appellate

court, Ricchio argued the failure of the BPH to provide her attorney access to the

confidential file deprived her of due process, her confrontation clause rights and her

right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Lodgment No. 12 at 7,

63-67.) The state appellate court denied the petition, and specifically declined to

address Ricchio’s confrontation clause and right to counsel claims applying the

successiveness bar of Clark. (Lodgment No. 13 at 5, n. 4.) 

In the “Questions Presented” section of the petition for review counsel then filed

in the California Supreme Court, Ricchio stated as question no. 1: “Did the Court of

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Appeal constitutionally err by refusing to hear the issue that her attorney at her 2011

Board of Parole Hearing (BPH) was denied access to her confidential file on which the

BPH relied to deny her parole.” (Lodgment No. 14 at 7.) In the “Necessity for Review”

section of the petition for review, she argued her case should be remanded to the

appellate court to “decide the issue of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

by the BPH refusing petitioner’s counsel access to confidential material on which the

BPH was relying and with directions to decide the right to counsel question.” (Id. at 8.) 

Ricchio also asked, in the alternative, that the California Supreme Court decide the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel issue on its own. (Id.) In the body of the petition,

Ricchio argued the appellate court erroneously applied the Clark procedural bar to her

claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel, without mentioning the

right to counsel or her confrontation clause rights. (Id. at 16-18.) She also alleged the

following:

[T]he facts underlying her deprivation of counsel fairly jumped off the

page of the [Board of Parole Hearings] hearing which was attached . . . [and] her attorney at the 2011 board hearing complained loudly about the denial of the right to counsel which occurred by not

letting him have access to [the confidential file].

(Lodgment No. 14 at 17.)

She went on to ask that “[r]eview [be] granted to allow a hearing on the merits

of this deprivation of counsel at her BPH hearing.” (Id. at 18.) Nowhere in the petition

for review has this Court found a reference to Ricchio’s Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause rights. In her federal petition, Ricchio presents her Sixth

Amendment claims in an argument heading as follows: “The Use of A Confidential File

Without Giving Access to that File to Petitioner’s Attorney Was A ‘Star Chamber’

Proceeding Which Deprived Petitioner of Her Constitutional Rights to Confrontation,

Due Process and Assistance of Counsel Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

(Pet. at 33.) 

Given the above, the Court cannot conclude Ricchio “fairly presented” her right

to counsel claim to the California Supreme Court. The main thrust of Ricchio’s

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argument to that court was her contention the appellate court had improperly applied

Clark to bar consideration of the merits of that claim, not to argue the merits of the

claim itself. While Ricchio did ask the state supreme court to, in the alternative, decide

the claim on its own, such a throwaway line cannot be considered a “fair presentation”

of the claim. There is no reference at all to a claim that her confrontation clause rights

were violated in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. The

claims are thus unexhausted.

“A claim that has not been fairly presented [to the state’s highest court] may also

be deemed technically exhausted if the petitioner has defaulted on the claim in state

court and no longer has a remedy in that court.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109,

1129 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546,

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default

is an affirmative defense, Respondent must first “adequately [plead] the existence of an

independent and adequate state procedural ground . . . .” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d

573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to place the defense at issue, Ricchio must then

“assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving procedural default, however,

belongs to the state. Id. If the state meets its burden under Bennett, federal review of

the claim is foreclosed unless Ricchio can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman,

501 U.S. at 750.

 A state procedural rule is “independent” if the state law basis for the decision is

not interwoven with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983);

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). A ground is “interwoven” with federal law

if the state has made application of the procedural bar dependent on an antecedent

ruling on federal law such as the determination of whether federal constitutional error

has been committed. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). “To qualify as an

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‘adequate’ procedural ground, a state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly

followed’.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558

U.S. 60-61 (2009).) 

Respondent cites to Walker as support for her contention the successiveness bar

of Clark is independent and adequate. (See Answer at 20.) Walker, however,

concluded only the timeliness bar of Clark was independent and adequate. Walker, 562

U.S. at 131 S. Ct. at 1127-30.) Nevertheless, although neither the Supreme Court nor

the Ninth Circuit have ruled on whether the Clark successiveness bar is independent and

adequate, several California District Courts have. See Throop v. Diaz, 2015 WL

847445, *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb 26, 2015); Bucci v. Busby, 2014 WL 4249669, *12 (E.D. Cal.

Aug. 26, 2014); Ray v. Cate, 2014 WL 3831214, *15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014); Stoot

v. Gipson, 2014 WL 1364903, *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2014); Rutledge v. Katavich, 2012

WL 2054975, *7 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (California’s procedural rule against

successive petitions bars federal habeas review); Arroyo v. Curry, 2009 WL 723877,

at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009). This Court find the reasoning in those cases

persuasive, adopts the reasoning of these decisions, and finds that In re Clark

constitutes an independent and adequate state procedural ground for the California

Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims, barring federal habeas review. The

burden therefore shifts to Ricchio to establish the rule is not independent or adequate. 

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. She has not presented any evidence or argument

demonstrating the rule is not independent or adequate. Accordingly, she has failed to

meet her burden under Bennett. Id.

Ricchio has also not established either cause or prejudice sufficient to excuse the

default. Cause is satisfied if Ricchio can demonstrate some “objective factor” that

precluded her from raising her claims in state court, such as interference by state

officials or constitutionally ineffective counsel. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-

94 (1991). While Ricchio alleges the Board’s actions denied her the effective assistance

of counsel, her right to counsel, and her confrontation clause rights at her parole

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hearing, she has not established that ineffective assistance of counsel or any other

“objective factor” prevented her from raising those claims in state court and avoiding

default. 

“Prejudice [sufficient to excuse procedurally barred claims] is actual harm

resulting from the alleged error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The possibility of prejudice is not enough. The error, in this case, the denial of counsel,

effective assistance of counsel, and denial of the right of confrontation, “worked to

[Ricchio’s] actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting [the] entire [proceeding] with

error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986)

quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 

Such is not the case here. While the BPH did consider evidence from the confidential

file later ordered redacted or expunged by the federal court, its decision rested heavily

on Ricchio’s failure to make adequate progress toward accepting responsibility for the

murder, the fact that she was only at the beginning of the process of gaining insight into

herself and what led her to commit Ruse’s murder, her “glossing over” of her extensive

stalking of Ruse prior to the murder, and the preparation and planning of the murder. 

(Petr’s Ex. H at 144-46, 145-56.) Thus, Ricchio has shown only the possibility of

prejudice, that is, only a possibility that her attorney’s lack of access to the confidential

file at the parole hearing “worked to [her] actual and substantial disadvantage.” 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

Finally, Ricchio has also not demonstrated that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The

Supreme Court has limited the “miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can

show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (emphasis added). “Actual

innocence” means factual innocence, not simply legal insufficiency; a mere showing of

reasonable doubt is not enough. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Although Ricchio argues there were errors committed at her parole hearing, she has not

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presented evidence sufficient to establish she is actually and factually innocent of the

charges of which she was convicted, or that she would have been granted parole absent

the errors. Thus, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327;

Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327.4

E. Ricchio’s Challenge to the Denial of Her Petition to Advance Her Parole

Hearing Date

Finally, Respondent argues that Ricchio’s challenge to the BPH’s denial of her

petition to advance her parole hearing, if upheld, would not necessarily result in her

speedier release from prison, and therefore there is no federal habeas jurisdiction over

the claim. (Mot. to Dismiss at 22-23.) Respondent argues the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

in Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015) settles this issue. In Nettles, a

prisoner sought federal habeas relief to expunge a rules violation report from his file,

which he said would result in an advanced hearing date. The Ninth Circuit concluded 

the claim was not properly brought as a habeas corpus action because, if Nettles won,

he would not necessarily gain speedier release, but only a new hearing. Id. at 1003.

Ricchio argues her case is fundamentally different from Nettles because of the false

material that was relied upon in denying her parole and because Nettles involved a

prison disciplinary hearing, not a parole hearing. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8.) 

No Ninth Circuit case has yet applied Nettles to the question of parole suitability. 

This Court has located only one Court which has considered the question. See

Ontiveros v. Subia, 2015 WL 3893236 (E.D. Cal., June 24, 2015). In Ontiveros, the

petitioner contended his due process rights were violated by the BPH because the Board

was, and remained, biased against him. Id. at *6. He also argued he was entitled to a

new parole hearing “before unbiased decisionmakers.” Id. Respondent argued there

4

 Respondent contends Ricchio’s petition raises a claim that Clark was not properly applied

to Ricchio’s case. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 20-21.) In her Opposition, Ricchio states that this claim

is a “non-issue,” and was not raised as a separate claim. In any event, as Respondent notes, the

application of Clark to Ricchio’s claims is a matter of the application of state law. Federal habeas

relief is not available for alleged violations of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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was no subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because any relief granted would not

“necessarily accelerate [petitioner’s] release from prison.” Id. at *8. In its analysis, the

court noted the Ninth Circuit had very recently decided Nettles, and agreed that

“petitioner’s success on his claim of Board bias cannot be said to ‘necessarily’ result

in his speedier release from prison.” Id. at 9. The court also noted, however, that

Nettles had not yet been extended to the parole suitability context and, given the

Supreme Court in Swarthout affirmed that due process challenges to parole denials are

properly brought as federal habeas corpus actions, the most prudent course would be

to conclude the Court had federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over Ontiveros’s due

process challenge to his parole suitability hearing. Id. at *10.

Ontiveros’ reasoning is persuasive to this Court. Moreover, given the fact that

material has been ordered expunged and redacted from Ricchio’s file, and that no

hearing has yet been conducted without reference to that expunged and redacted

material, the Court concludes it has subject matter jurisdiction over Ricchio’s claim that

her due process rights to a fair parole hearing were violated, as well as her challenge to

the Board’s denial of her petition to advance her next parole hearing. As discussed in

section III(C) of this Report and Recommendation, however, the Court concludes the

petition is time barred and recommends the motion to dismiss be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Roger T. Benitez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4)

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and request for

evidentiary hearing.

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 9, 2015, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than October 23, 2015. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2015

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

24 15cv0697

Case 3:15-cv-00697-BEN-WVG Document 21 Filed 09/11/15 Page 24 of 24