Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cv-05108/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cv-05108-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD AVERY McPETERS

Petitioner,

vs.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, as Acting Warden of San

Quentin State Prison,*

Respondent.

_______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:95-cv-5108 LJO

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DIRECTING RESPONDENT TO

MEET AND CONFER WITH FRESNO

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY RE:

SETTLEMENT

* Kevin Chappell, as Acting Warden of San Quentin State Prison, is substituted for his predecessor

wardens and acting wardens pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). The Clerk is directed

to make the appropriate correction to the docket.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This matter is before the Court following the decision by the United States Supreme Court in

Ryan v. Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, 2013 WL 68690 (Jan. 8, 2013). In the unanimous decision by Justice

Thomas, the Court held that suspension of habeas proceedings for an indefinite period during a

petitioner’s mental incompetence “is inappropriate and merely frustrates the State’s attempts to defend

its presumptively valid judgment.” Id. at ___, 2013 WL 68690, *11. The Gonzales decision overruled

Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the statutory right to

counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) carried with it a right of competence to assist counsel). Id. at ___,

2013 WL 68690, *5-*8.

On September 7, 2007, this Court issued an order based on the stipulation of the parties that the

mental decomposition of Petitioner Ronald Avery McPeters (“McPeters”) had rendered him unable to

assist his appointed counsel with the prosecution of his federal habeas corpus petition and that pursuant

to Gates, 334 F.3d 803, the proceedings should be stayed until McPeters could be restored to a level of

competence (doc. 244). Since the Gates stay order was entered, McPeters’ appointed counsel have

submitted annual reports on the status of his condition. The last status report, filed September 27, 2012

(doc. 252), advised that mental health records maintained over the previous year revealed no material

changes in his condition and that he consistently exhibited paranoia as well as a chronic psychotic

disorder.

The facts before the Supreme Court in Gonzales, unlike the facts here, did not involve a

stipulation between the parties about Gonzales’ incompetence. Rather, in that case, the district court

denied Gonzales’ application to assess his competence to proceed with the litigation because the claims

properly before the court “were record based or resolvable as a matter of law and thus would not benefit

from Gonzales’ input.” Id. at ___, 2013 WL 68690, *3. The orderstaying the case came from the Ninth

Circuit on mandamus, where the appellate court held that even though Gonzales’ exhausted claims were

record-based, he nonetheless was entitled to a staypending a competencydetermination. In re Gonzales,

623 F.3d 1242. 1244 (2010). 

Notwithstanding the factual distinction between Gonzales and the present case, the Court cannot

ignore the mandate of the Supreme Court when it instructs: “when there is no reasonable hope of

competence, a stay is inappropriate.” Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, 2013 WL 68690, *11. Nor is the Court 

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 1

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unaware that McPeters’ enduring mental illness raises the issue of his amenability to execution under

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), even if habeas relief were to be denied. It is with these

1

foregoing principles in mind together with the ensuing review of the pertinent history of the case that

the Court directs the Warden to meet and confer with the District Attorney of the County of Fresno

(where McPeters was convicted) to discuss a course of action that brings the interests of the litigants,

the Court, and the tax payers to the forefront.

I. Background

McPeters was sentenced to death for the August 6, 1984 robbery and murder of Linda Pasnick

at a Der Wienerschnitzel restaurant in Fresno, California. Mrs. Pasnick was shot three times through

the driver’s window of her car as she was leaving the restaurant with her meal. Two witnesses testified

they saw McPeters leaning into Mrs. Pasnick’s car through the driver’s window at some point during

the first three shots. After Mrs. Pasnick drove out of the parking lot, and lay wounded in her car, she

was shot twice more. McPeters was seen by another witness in the street taking aim at Mrs. Pasnick’s

car through the passenger window. The basis for McPeters’ death eligibility is the robbery-murder

special circumstance codified in California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(I). The robbery charge was

predicated on the theory that when McPeters leaned into Mrs. Pasnick’s car, he took her red bill-fold

style wallet or an envelope containing $175 in cash, or both.

An evidentiaryhearing was ordered onOctober 8, 2004 as to claims addressing McPeters’mental

state at the crime and trial (doc. 182). Under pre-AEDPA principles, an evidentiary hearing is a “matter 2

of right where the facts are disputed and two conditions are met: (1) the petitioner’s allegations would,

if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing,

The principle holding from Ford is stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, namely 1

that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of “those who are unaware of the punishment they are about

to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id. at 422, approved by Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333

(1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Claims addressing the continued viability of the robbery charge were reserved. After 2

considering the parties’ briefs, the Court determined on December 23, 2004 that further evidentiary

development was unwarranted for claims challenging the robbery conviction, because the robberymurder special circumstance was still viable under the theoryof attempted robbery(doc. 191). The Court

found uncontroverted evidence that McPeters reached into Mrs. Pasnick’s car, thus justifying an

attempted robbery finding, even if he did not actually take any personal property from her. Attempted

robbery, like completed robbery, supports a robbery-murderspecial circumstance under California law. 

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 2

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reliably found the relevant facts. Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002,1010 (9th Cir. 1997), citing Hendricks

v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992); see Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir.

1999); Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404- 1411

(9th Cir. 1998). 

In brief, the claims for which an evidentiary hearing was granted are described below.

Claim 4:That McPeters’ defense counsel prejudiciallyfailed to investigate or present an insanity

defense.

Under applicable California law at the time of McPeters’ trial, the standard for insanity was

defined in the alternative by the two-pronged test derived from M’Naghten’s Case. See People v.

Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 768, 775 (1985). Insanity under this standard is established where the

defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of either (1) knowing

or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act, or (2) distinguishing right from wrong at the

time of the commission of the offense. Id. at 768 (emphasis added). McPeters claims that a viable

insanity defense could have been established by his offers of proof. The Warden contests McPeters’

offers as contradicted, unsubstantiated, uncorroborated, insufficient, and unreliable. The Court ordered

an evidentiary hearing to resolve the following disputed factual issues:

1. The circumstances in the handling and testing of McPeters’ blood specimens as

well as the description of the test results misled the jury to believe his system was

free of drugs at the time of the offense.

2. In advance of trial, he spent much of his time at the Fresno County Jail in one of

the four safety cells.

3. Numerous people observed him to be suffering from mental illness and drug

intoxication during the 48 hours before the offense.

4. Immediately preceding the offense, he displayed poor memory, was

unresponsive, looked dazed, and appeared to be under the influence of PCP

and/or other drugs.

5. He was unable to remember personal information when arrested.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 3

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6. He exhibited overt symptoms of drug abuse and/or psychosis at booking into the

Fresno County Jail.

7. He was placed in a safety cell and given anti-psychotic drugs after being booked

into the jail.

8. He was given Haldol for several months in 1984 and 1985, beginning with the

date of his arrest.

9. He did not respond when personally addressed by the trial court at arraignment

following the preliminary hearing.

10. Purportedly negative drug screens of his blood do not diminish the viability of

an insanity defense.

11. He had a known, long-term history of drug and alcohol abuse, auditory

hallucinations, blackouts, and mental illness.

12. His mental health was adversely affected by the chronic and traumatic violence

he witnessed between his parents as well as by severe physical and psychological

abuse he personally endured.

Claim 6: That defense counsel prejudicially failed to investigate and present evidence that

McPeters lacked the requisite mens rea for murder and robbery and was legally unconscious due

to his mental illness and/or drug-induced psychosis in the days, weeks, and months preceding

the offense.

The gravamen of Claim 6 is McPeters’ assertion that if his defense attorney, Gerald Kahl had

provided qualified experts with information about McPeters’ behavior and appearance in the days prior

to the offense, his chronic PCP use, the drug screens, and his elevated blood pressure reading and pulse

rate at the time of arrest, the experts would have opined that the negative results of the conducted PCP

tests were not reliable indicators of whether he was intoxicated at the time of the crime, but rather, that

his behavior at the time of the offense was consistent with someone in a fugue or dissociated state who

did not premeditate, deliberate, or harbor the necessary intent to rob or kill. With a few additions, the

facts McPeters contends support Claim 6 and entitle him to further evidentiary development, including

an evidentiary hearing, are the same as the facts presented to support Claim 4. The additions include

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 4

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specific observations about McPeters having exhibited severe weight loss, poor hygiene, and memory

lapses in the months preceding the offense as well as having complained of headaches in the year prior

to the crime and while in County Jail. These are evidentiary details which add support to the contention

that McPeters suffered from long-term drug abuse and mental illness at the time of the offense. 

The disputed factual issues susceptible of resolution by further development include the

following:

1. McPeters’ mental and physical condition after his arrest and prior to his

booking into the Fresno County Jail;

2. Whether McPeters was placed in a safety cell contemporaneous with his booking

into the Fresno County Jail and the reasons therefor;

3. Whether anti-psychotic medication was prescribed for and administered to

McPeters contemporaneous with his booking into the Fresno County Jail;

4. Whether Mr. Kahl abandoned his guilt phase defense strategy to present mental

health experts because he was unable to establish a foundation of drug

involvement;

5. Whether the test results of drug tests conducted on McPeters’ blood were reliable

indicators of his intoxication and/or mental state at the time of the offense;

6. Whether Mr. Kahl fully appreciated the import of the toxicological test results,

erroneouslyaccepted Mr. Cooper’s inaccurate characterization that the blood vial

which tested positive for PCP in an appreciable quantity was contaminated, and

incompetently failed to investigate the matter himself; and

7. Whether the declarations of McPeters’ mental health experts, including the turn

around testimony of prosecution expert, psychiatrist Joel Fort, M.D., are based

on reliable, supportable facts, including McPeters’ alleged long-term history of

drug and alcohol abuse.

Claim 15: That defense counsel unreasonably and prejudicially failed to correct and/or impeach

the testimony of the prosecution psychiatrist expert.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 5

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McPeters contends his sentence of death is unconstitutional because Mr. Kahl did not develop

or present evidence in mitigation to the aggravating circumstances introduced by the prosecution during

the penalty proceedings. Four deficiencies are the subject of this claim. First, he claims Mr. Kahl did

not make any attempt to correct or impeach the opinion rendered by psychiatrist Joel Fort, M.D. that

McPeters was not psychotic or significantly under the influence of the present offense. Second, third,

and fourth, he claims Mr. Kahl did not investigate or introduce evidence which would have ameliorated

the aggravating nature of the circumstances surrounding the homicide of Walter Lieb, the assault on the

McMorris brothers, or the altercation with Daniel Malcher. The Court authorized further evidentiary

3

development only as to the portion of Claim 15 challenging Mr. Kahl’s failure to correct Dr. Fort’s

understanding of the facts and concomitant failure to impeach his opinions, denying the other

allegations.

McPeters offer of proof is Dr. Fort’s testimony repudiating this trial testimony based on an

expanded understanding of the case derived from review of trial testimony of percipient witnesses,

toxicology reports, mental health reports of various mental health experts, jail infirmary records, the

prosecutor’s opposition to retesting McPeters’ blood sample, and declarations of various law

enforcement personnel who observed McPeters at the time he was brought into the jail. Dr. Fort

renounced his trial opinion as inaccurate “because of incomplete and misleading information” provided

to him. With the additional information reviewed, he concluded that at the time of the offense, McPeters

was functioning in a psychotic state due to a combination of preexisting, ongoing psychosis and recent

use of PCP. He further averred that he would have revised is opinion during the trial proceedings if

either counsel had brought to his attention additional information. 

Separate and apart from Dr. Fort’s renunciation of his trial opinion, McPeters challenges Mr.

Kahl’s professional competence for the following omissions:

1. His failure to present Dr. Fort with evidence of recorded observations by jail

personnel that McPeters was uncooperative, disturbed, confused, under the

influence, and “5150" at booking;

These three incidents were introduced during penalty proceedings as factors in aggravation to 3

support the death penalty.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 6

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. His failure to provide Dr. Fort with reports of other mental health experts

reporting McPeters’ recent drug use in connection with his competence to stand

trial;

3. His failure to call into question Dr. Fort’s conclusion that McPeters’ behavior at

the crime scene was goal-directed by presenting evidence of McPeters’ bizarre

behavior the night prior to the offense and his irrational behavior at the crime

scene; and

4. His failure to challenge Dr. Fort’s opinion that McPeters’ attempt to “escape”

from the Acute PsychiatricUnit at ValleyMedical Center (“APU”) demonstrated

he was feigning mental illness, which Mr. Kahl could have accomplished by

presenting the eye witness account of the mental health worker who observed the

“escape” to explain what really happened.4

Claim 16: That defense counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and present compelling

mitigation evidence about McPeters’ background, mental health history, drug abuse, and

character.

The grant of further evidentiary development as to Claim 16 is addressed to anecdotal evidence

of McPeters’ disturbing childhood and drug use. Family member declarations submitted in postconviction proceedings describe behavior of both parents toward their children as bordering on sadistic

and violent toward each other, thus creating a terrifying existence. As a result of (or in addition to) his

tumultuousfamily life, McPeters’scholastic performance is alleged to have been below average and his

mental development marred by extreme introversion, nervousness, and fear. His tenuous coping ability

is said to have been further compromised when he began using drugs which lead to paranoia and

hallucinations. 

The evidence to be introduced at the evidentiaryhearing includes testimonyconsistent with these

familial declarations. In additional, the Court directed McPeters to provide eye witness accounts

The declaration testimony of the attending mental health worker, Woody Moreau, McPeters 4

simply started to walk through and open door. Mr. Moreau averred McPeters did not appear to engaged

in a stealth act, but rather, appeared disturbed and disoriented.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 7

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McPeters was using drugs contemporaneous with the offense, including documentary support by any

medical establishment or law enforcement agency recording symptoms.5

Claim 21:That McPeters was prosecuted, convicted, and sentencedwhilementallyincompetent,

unable to understand the proceedings or effectively communicate and assist trial counsel.

Claim 21 alleges that McPeters’ due process rights were violated because he lacked the ability

to consult meaningfully with counsel and to understand the proceedings. Claim 21 raises a claim of

substantive due process because McPeters was incompetent at the time of trial. 

6

First relying on the jail infirmary records, safety cell records, and APU records, McPeters

contends he was confined in one or more jail safety cells for the majority of his first ten months in jail

and transferred to the APU for exhibiting psychotic behavior in June of 1985. Following his July 1,

1985 discharge from the APU, he was variously returned to safety cells through July 24, 1985, again on

December 8, 1985, and again on May 9, 1986. His recorded psychotic behavior was manifested by

hallucinations, as documented in the jail infirmaryrecords, and byrepeated instances of bizarre behavior,

as reported in the safety cell records (to justify his confinement in those safety cells). Based on the

declarations of his aunt, Juanita McPeters, his cousins, Hansel Baber and Levester Johnson, his brother

Lonzel, and his sister, Denise, McPeters further points to lay observations of behavior consistent with

psychosis and his incompetence to stand trial, including, suffering severe, chronic headaches, waving

his arms in the air, yelling at non-existent people, mumbling to himself as if he were hearing voices, and

generally exhibiting bizarre behavior. From the personal observations of defense experts Allen

Middleton, Ph.D., Marham Kirsten, M.D., Paul Levy, M.D. and Mary Heatly, R.N. (the County Jail

nurse present when McPeters was brought in for booking), as noted in their respective declarations,

McPeters was actively hallucinating at the times these professionals were called upon to evaluate his

behavior. 

Currently the evidence supporting McPeters’ drug use is inferential, based on red, glassy eyes 5

and “weird” behavior.

Claims 7 and 23 similarly alleges McPeters’ incompetence to be tried, but rather than a

6

substantive due process violation, he relies on a procedural due process violation for the trial court’s

failure to hold a competence hearing sua sponte. The Court rejected the procedural due process claims

in the October 8, 2004 order.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 8

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Next, McPeters claims his incompetence was evident from the fact of his surprising trial

testimony that he was not present at the Der Wienerschnitzel restaurant on the day of the offense and

that someone placed his fingerprints on his gun after it was wiped clean. This testimony was contrary

to that of the several percipient witnesses who positively identified McPeters as having shot Mrs.

Pasnick as well as the forensic evidence establishing McPeters’ fingerprints on his gun and a ballistics

match between bullets fired from this weapon and those recovered from Mrs. Pasnick’s body. In a

similar vein, McPeters contends he totally did not comprehend the nature, purpose, or content of the in

camera hearing before Judge Stephen Henry directly after his trial testimony. The transcript of this

hearing does intimate McPeters’ general confusion and incoherence. 

Finally, there is the expert testimony now offered in the various declarations that McPeters was

incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Kirsten declared McPeters was not competent to assist his counsel in

conducting his trial. Allan Hedberg, Ph.D. also opined that McPeters was incapable of meaningfully

assisting counsel due to his mental impairments and that his competence during trial proceedings could

not have been sustained without continued administration of anti-psychotic medication. David Foster.

M.D. concluded McPeters’ incompetence followed from his being out of touch with reality and his

inability to understand the nature and consequences of his actions. Dr. Levy, like Dr. Hedberg,

concluded that McPeters could not maintain any level of mental competence without anti-psychotic

medications and the abrupt discontinuation of anti-psychotic medication was medically ill-advised.

Further, the fact that Dr. Levy determined McPeters to be competent to stand trial in October of 1985

had no bearing on whether he was competent to stand trial four months later. In Dr. Levy’s opinion, 7

McPeters mental competency should have been continuously monitored up to and throughout his trial. 

Dr. Middleton stated that McPeters was incompetent to stand trial because he did not grasp the nature

of the legal proceedings or understand the strategies undertaken on his behalf. Social historian Shirley

Reece, M.S.W. opined McPeters was not competent to assist his trial counsel at trial and has continued

in a psychotic state in San Quentin State Prison. 

Claim 22:That McPeters was deprived access to and assistance of appropriate experts to prepare

and present his defense.

 Jury selection commenced on February 3, 1986. 7

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 9

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Claim 22 alleges an additional theory for further evidentiary development of Claims 4, 6, 15, 16,

and 21, that is, he was deprived of the assistance of competent mental health examinations to assist in

his defense under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), because of the constitutionally ineffective

representation of his attorney. McPeters claims that had Mr. Kahl developed and provided the mental 8

health evidence described in Claims 4, 6, and 15, as well as the background evidence referred to in

Claim 16 to mental health experts, those experts would have provided testimony consistent with guilt

phase and penalty phase defenses. In addition, he alleges, defense mental health experts would have

determined McPeters incompetent to stand trial, as alleged in Claim 21.

II. Discussion

Were the Court to proceed with an evidentiary hearing on the above-referenced claims and to

determine the mental state issues to be so compelling that relief must be granted, the matter ultimately

could be returned to the Fresno Superior Court for retrial. Given McPeters’ current mental state, which 9

appears to be at best static, McPeters could not be retried. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1368. In that event, he

would become the responsibility of the County, possibly for as long as he lives.

On the other hand, if after proceeding with an evidentiary hearing the Court were to determine

reliefshould not be granted and all appeals were to favor the Warden, McPeters would resort to a claim

challenging any ensuing execution proceedings on the ground that he is incompetent to be executed

under Ford, 477 U.S. 399. The state court would then be obliged to conduct a hearing at which

McPeters could submit his own psychiatric evidence. See Panetta v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 949-50

(2007) (quoting Ford, 447 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J. plurality opn.)). Should the state court enter an order

unfavorable to McPeters, the matter very well could end up again before this Court.

Either way, if McPeters remains as mentally impaired in the future as he is currently, the chances

the State of California will be able to carry out execution of his death sentence are remote, at best. The

case is ripe for resolution, which, in turn will promote judicial economy and stem further taxpayer

expenditure on pointless litigation. Yet, members of the federal bench in the California District Courts

Claim 22 also claims the deprivation of mental health assistance due to prosecutorial 8

misconduct. The Court rejected this basis.

 The Court does not discount the possibility that the Warden may appeal a decision favorable 9

to McPeters. This text is drawing a hypothetical.

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 10

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have been informed by various deputy attorneys general, that the Warden does not have settlement

authority in federal cases reviewing state convictions. That authority is said to remain vested in the

County District Attorneys. 

Because the Court can see clearly that further litigation of McPeters’ case very likely will not

alter his need for ongoing psychiatric treatment, and necessarily will cost taxpayers tens of thousands

dollars, the State Attorney General is directed to meet and confer with the District Attorney of Fresno

County to discuss the potential of settlement in light of this order.

III. Return on this Directive

The Warden’s counsel shall make contact with the District Attorney of Fresno within seven days

(one calendar week) from entry of this order to discuss the District Attorney’s position on settlement. 

To facilitate discussions between the District Attorney and the Attorney General, the Court is providing

a courtesy copy of this order to the District Attorney. 

Following contact, the Warden shall make arrangements to confer in depth with the District

Attorney within three (calendar) weeks of the entry of this order (if necessary), and to provide a status

report of said discussions within four (calendar) weeks of the entry of this order. 

Nothing in this order shall preclude appointed counsel for McPeters, the Habeas Corpus

ResourceCenter, from participating in any discussions with the Warden or the District Attorney or both.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2013 

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

O4Respt2ConfWithDAreSettlement.McPwpd.wpd 11

Case 1:95-cv-05108-DAD-SAB Document 253 Filed 01/29/13 Page 12 of 12