Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01627/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01627-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ENRIQUE DIAZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STU SHERMAN et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:13-cv-01627-DAD-MJS

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

(2) REVOKING PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS

(3) DIRECTING PLAINITFF TO PAY 

FILING FEE WITHIN TWENTY-ONE 

DAYS OF SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

(4) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING 

PLAINTIFF’S PAYMENT OF FILING 

FEE

(Doc. Nos. 33, 36, 38)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States 

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

Case 1:13-cv-01627-DAD-MJS Document 46 Filed 08/05/16 Page 1 of 5
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Before the court are defendants’ motions to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

status and to stay the case. (Doc. Nos. 33, 36.) On April 14, 2016, the assigned magistrate judge 

issued findings and recommendations, recommending that this court grant defendants’ motion to 

revoke plaintiff’s IFP status pursuant to the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (Doc. 

No. 38.) The magistrate judge recommended denying defendants’ request to dismiss plaintiff’s 

complaint outright, and instead recommended granting plaintiff an extension of twenty-one days 

to pay the required case filing fee in full or have his suit terminated. (Id. at 6.) The findings and 

recommendations directed the parties to file any objections thereto within fourteen days. (Id.) 

After requesting and receiving one extension of time, plaintiff filed his objections on May 11, 

2016. (Doc. Nos. 39, 40, 41.) On May 31, 2016, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s objections. 

(Doc. No. 42.) Plaintiff then filed a “supplemental argument” in support of his objections on June 

13, 2016. (Doc. No. 43.)

According to his objections and supplemental argument, plaintiff does not dispute the 

magistrate judge’s findings that he has brought three or more prior federal civil actions that were 

dismissed on the grounds specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Rather, plaintiff argues that the 

imminent danger exception of § 1915(g) applies because defendants withheld prison-supplied 

food from plaintiff for an extended period of time and that this denial of food prevented him from 

safely injecting his insulin for his diabetes. (Doc. Nos. 41, 43.) To the extent plaintiff alleges he 

regained access to prison-supplied food after October 5, 2013, plaintiff argues he was only 

allowed one meal per day instead of the three meals typically afforded other prisoners, until 

January 4, 2014 when he was placed in administrative segregation. (Doc. No. 41 at 1.) This

deprivation of food, plaintiff argues, resulted in an inability to safely inject his prescribed insulin. 

(Doc. Nos. 41, 43.) 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, the 

court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, 

including plaintiff’s objections and supplemental briefing, the court finds the findings and 

recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis and adopts them in full.

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Because there is no dispute plaintiff has previously incurred three qualifying strikes under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), plaintiff is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action 

unless he is able to demonstrate that he is under imminent danger of serious physical harm. 

Under the imminent danger exception of § 1915(g), a prisoner may use IFP status to bring a civil 

action despite three prior dismissals only where the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 

prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with a practice that has injured him or others 

similarly situated in the past will satisfy the ‘ongoing danger’ standard and meet the imminence 

prong of the three-strikes exception.”). “Prisoners qualify for [this] exception based on the 

alleged conditions at the time the complaint was filed. And qualifying prisoners can file their 

entire complaint IFP; the exception does not operate on a claim-by-claim basis or apply to only 

certain types of relief.” Id. at 1052. However, “the exception applies if the complaint makes a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the 

time of filing.” Id. at 1055.

Here, as noted by the magistrate judge, neither plaintiff’s original complaint nor his

amended complaint makes a plausible allegation that at the time of filing, plaintiff faced

imminent danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed October 9, 2013, 

stated only that plaintiff “was not allowed to eat any prison supplied food until 10/5/13.” (Doc. 

No. 1 at 2.)1It did not allege facts suggesting that plaintiff was then suffering from an ongoing 

deprivation of food. Nor did it allege facts to suggest that any such deprivation complicated 

plaintiff’s ability to inject insulin or otherwise posed an imminent danger to plaintiff. Moreover, 

plaintiff’s now-operative amended complaint, filed November 6, 2014, does not allege any 

instance of food deprivation occurring later than September 2013. (See Doc. No. 24 at 4.) Based

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Plaintiff’s original complaint was subsequently dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave 

to amend granted. (Doc. No. 10.)

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on these allegations, it is therefore not plausible that plaintiff faced an imminent danger of serious 

physical injury at the times he filed those pleadings.2 

Such allegations, if expounded upon with respect to a continuing practice, could 

conceivably meet the ongoing danger standard and the imminence prong of the three-strikes 

exception. See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1056–57. However, on February 3, 2014, plaintiff notified 

this court that he had been transferred to the California Medical Facility (“CMF”). (Doc. No. 12.)

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, which is based on actions that allegedly took place at the 

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, does not allege that any of the 

named defendants work at CMF. (See Doc. No. 24.) Thus, it is apparent that by the time plaintiff 

filed his amended complaint on November 6, 2014, he was not in any imminent danger of serious 

physical injury because of these defendants’ alleged failure to provide him food. Accordingly, 

the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision cannot and does not apply 

here. See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055; see also Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th 

Cir. 1999) (finding failure to protect allegations against prison officials who put an inmate 

convicted of sexual battery in general population failed to meet imminent danger standard 

because the threat had ceased prior to filing the complaint and there were no allegations that 

plaintiff was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint or 

that he was in jeopardy of any ongoing danger); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.

1998) (“Allegations that the prisoner faced imminent danger in the past are insufficient to trigger 

this exception to § 1915(g) and authorize the prisoner to pay the filing fee on the installment 

plan.”); Winfield v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:09-cv-0636-KJN-P, 2010 WL 3397397, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. Aug.27, 2010) (“At the time of filing the operative . . . complaint, plaintiff was incarcerated 

at [CSP-Sacramento]; thus, he is not facing imminent danger of serious physical injury based on 

allegations against defendant . . . at San Quentin State Prison.”)

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Plaintiff states additional facts in his objections and supplemental argument that he contends

establish the existence of an imminent danger. However, these facts, even if alleged in his 

amended complaint, would fail to support any such finding. 

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Accordingly, 

1. The April 14, 2016 findings and recommendations (Doc. No. 38) are adopted in full;

2. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is revoked; 

3. Plaintiff is directed to pay the $400 filing fee in full within twenty-one days of the date 

of service of this order; 

4. Failure to pay the filing fee in full will result in dismissal of this action, without 

prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

5. This action shall be stayed pending plaintiff’s payment of the filing fee or, in the 

alternative, dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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