Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07215/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07215-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 2, 1994 Decided January 17, 1995

No. 93-7215

CATHY S. NEUREN,

APPELLANT

v.

ADDUCI, MASTRIANI, MEEKS & SCHILL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

92cv01751

George M. Chuzi argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Joel P. Bennett argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees.

Before BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: In 1991 appellee Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill ("AMM&S"),

a Washington, D.C. law firm, terminated the employment of one of its senior associates, appellant

Cathy Neuren. Neuren filed suit against both AMM&S and its individual partners in the U.S. District

Court, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. (1988). At trial, AMM&S offered into evidence both documentary and testimonial

evidence relating to Neuren's performance at another law firm prior to her employment with

AMM&S, arguing that the evidence both impeached the credibility of Neuren's trial testimony and

supported AMM&S's defense that Neuren was fired for legitimate business reasons. The district

court admitted the evidence, and a jury subsequently found for the appellee AMM&S. Neuren

appeals to this Court, contending that Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence bars admission of

the disputed evidence. Although we agree that the district court erred in admitting the evidence

concerning Neuren's conduct in her prior employment, we conclude that the error did not

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substantially affect the outcome of the case; consequently, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

Between May, 1989, and August, 1991, Cathy Neuren was a senior associate attorney in the

Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, a small firm of about

15 lawyers. Neuren, a 1985 graduate of the University of Texas Law School, was previously

employed for a brief period with another Washington, D.C. law firm, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson

("DL&A"), but left that firm in 1987. At AMM&S, Neuren specialized in international trade and

property litigation before the International Trade Commission. In August, 1991, the partnership

decided to terminate Neuren's employment based upon concerns over her difficulty in meeting

deadlines and getting alongwith fellow employees. AMM&S partners notifiedNeurenofthe decision,

but kept her on the law firm's payroll until October 31, 1991, in order to ease her re-entry into the

job market. In July, 1992, Neuren filed suit in United States District Court, alleging, inter alia, that

her termination wasthe product ofsex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the CivilRights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988). The case was tried to a jury in October, 1993.

B. The Evidence at Trial

In attempting to prove sex discrimination, Neuren offered three days oftestimony concerning

her employment and termination at AMM&Sincluding testimony from a former co-counsel in a

litigation matter, testimony from AMM&S's bookkeeper, Neuren's own testimony, and hostile

testimony from an AMM&S partner. Her first witness, Donald Finkelstein, a Los Angeles attorney

with whom Neuren worked as co-counsel in a litigation matter, testified that he was unaware of any

deadline problems Neuren might have had in working together with him and that she did a "fine job"

on their joint project.

Neuren testified that she joined AMM&S after leaving her former employer, DL&A, because

she was "wasn't given very much international trade work" at DL&A. She testified that, early in her

tenure at AMM&S, two partners reported to her in an evaluation session that the firm was "pleased

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with [her] work." She did not attend another evaluation session until an April, 1991, meeting with

AMM&S partners Vincent J. Adduci and Barbara Murphy. In that session, Neuren testified that

Adduci told her that her work was "the best among associates" and that it was "outstanding." Neuren

admitted, however, that Adduci and Murphyexpressed some concerns about her behavior at the firm.

Specifically, they told her that she wasted too much time in casual conversations with the staff and

that she should be more prompt in meeting deadlines. She further testified that on August 2, 1991,

she was called into a meeting with Adduci and Michael Schaumberg, another AMM&S partner, in

which she was informed that she was being fired. Neuren testified that she was not given a reason

for the termination during the meeting; instead, the partners allegedly stated that the quality of her

work was good. Nevertheless, the firm kept her on the payroll until October 31, 1991, and provided

her a letter of reference to aid in her job search.

In order to demonstrate that Neuren's termination was the product of a legitimate,

non-discriminatory business decision, AMM&S presented extensive evidence concerning the reason

for her dismissal. First, several AMM&S partners testified concerning written evaluations of Neuren

prepared by them in which the evaluators expressed grave concerns about Neuren's interpersonal

skills and ability to meet deadlines. For instance, Schaumberg testified that several of the partners

expressed concerns about "how timely her work was [and] how well she was getting along with the

associates and staff." He further stated that these concerns limited Neuren's prospects of becoming

a partner in a small firm like AMM&S. Schaumberg testified that he told Neuren in the August,

1991, termination meeting that the reason for her dismissal was her difficulty meeting deadlines and

getting along with co-workers. He stated that Neuren's sex was "absolutely not" a factor in the

decision to terminate her. Schaumberg's testimony was corroborated by other partners at the firm.

Adduci testified that, in evaluating Neuren's work for him, he rated her timeliness and personal

relations with office staff as "unsatisfactory," noting that her "strengths [ ] are overshadowed by her

habitual tardiness in turning out work product." AMM&S offered several additional partner

evaluations in which these concerns were expressed.

In addition to the evidence concerning Neuren's performance at AMM&S, appellees offered

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the evidence which is at issue before us: written evaluations of Neuren's work at DL&A and related

testimony regarding Neuren's difficulty in getting along with staff and meeting deadlines while an

associate at DL&A. One DL&A attorney testified that he had written in his evaluation of Neuren that

she "must stick to deadlines and ask more questions when she does not understand the assignment,"

and that she "is sometimes difficult to work with...." Three other DL&A partners testified that they

had given Neuren substantiallysimilar evaluations. Neuren objected to the admission of the evidence,

arguing that it unduly prejudiced her because it supported an inference that she would behave in the

same manner at AMM&S. The court admitted the evidence over Neuren's objection.

Finally, Neuren offered limited evidence in order to demonstrate that AMM&S's asserted

business justification for her termination was simply a pretext for unlawful sex discrimination. She

admitted into evidence a 1991 evaluation of her work written by AMM&S partner Jeffrey Meeks, in

which Meeks described Neuren's relations with nonlegal staff by writing, "Extremely difficult on

secretarial and support staff. A bitch!" Trial Transcript, October 5, 1993 (Morning Session), at 67.

Neuren's pretext theory was also based upon evidence that a male associate with like problems at the

firm was retained after she was terminated. She testified that she had informed the partners that this

associate had allegedly made racist remarks to her on a continuous basis. She presented the

testimony of AMM&S bookkeeper Katherine Callwood, who asserted that the male associate spoke

to her infrequently because she was black. Callwood admitted on cross-examination that she had

never heard the associate make racist remarks, thatshe frequentlyworked with her office door closed

and locked, and that she had never related her concernsto anyone in the firm. Finally, Neuren elicited

testimony concerning this associate's 1991 evaluation by Barbara Murphy, in which she stated that

his writing skills needed some improvement and that he would occasionally take too much time on

a project if he were not otherwise busy. Murphy later testified, however, that the associate did not

exhibit the difficulties in relating to the support staff that Neuren did and has since improved his

writing skills.

After considering the evidence from both sides, including the DL&A evidence, the jury

determined that AMM&S did not violate Title VII in dismissing Neuren. Neuren appealed to this

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court, arguing that the district court improperly admitted the DL&A evidence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Impeachment and Character Evidence

AMM&S arguesthat the DL&Aevidence was admissible to demonstrate that Neuren had the

same difficulties at a previous law firm that she had at AMM&S or, failing that, to impeach her

testimony regarding her reasons for leaving DL&A. We review the district court's admission of the

DL&A evidence for abuse of discretion, see Jankins v. TDC Management Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 440

(D.C. Cir. 1994), and conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

AMM&S contends that the district court was correct in reasoning that the DL&A evidence

was admissible because it demonstrated that Neuren had displayed similar work-related problems in

her former employment. We disagree. Both AMM&S and the district court misapprehend the

FederalRules' treatment of character evidence. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404, "[e]vidence of

a person's character or a trait of[her] character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that [she]

acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion," except in certain defined circumstances none

of which is present here. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Additionally, Rule 404(a) provides specifically that

evidence of prior acts cannot be introduced to prove the character of a person in order to show that

she acted in conformity therewith. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). When the district court admitted the

DL&A evidence relating to Neuren's difficulties with personalrelationships at that firm, it noted that

the evidence was "relevant with respect to how she performed at another firm.... [AMM&S is] just

showing that this is the same problem that this woman had." Trial Transcript, October 7, 1993, at

98-99, reprinted in Joint Appendix, at 83-84. Thus, the district court admitted the evidence for the

purpose specifically prohibited by Rule 404as evidence that she acted in conformity with her

behavior at DL&A while working for AMM&S.

The DL&A character evidence does not fall within any of the exceptions expressly

contemplated by Rule 404(b). See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (exceptions for proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident).

Moreover, appellee's argument that this evidence is admissible because character was "in issue" in the

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case is equally unavailing. Under the "character in issue" doctrine, character evidence is admissible

where character itself is "an element of a crime, claim, or defense." FED. R. EVID. 404(a), NOTES OF

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROPOSED RULES. An example of evidence admissible where character

is "in issue" is evidence of the chastity of a victim in a prosecution for the crime of seduction where

chastity is an element of that crime. Id. In this case, AMM&S has not offered a plausible theory

under which Neuren's character could be considered an element of its defense. AMM&S's business

justification for Neuren's termination was that she had difficulty in interpersonal relationships with

co-workers and in meeting deadlines. Strictly speaking, this defense is based on Neuren's behavior

at the firm, not her character. Consequently, her character was not "in issue" in the sense

contemplated by the exception to the rule.

AMM&S argues that the DL&A evidence is nonetheless admissible for the purpose of

impeaching Neuren's trial testimony concerning her reasons for leaving that firm. Although a party

may generally attack the credibility of any witness, FED. R. EVID. 607, and evidence of character and

conduct of a witness may be offered for the purpose of impeachment under Rule 608, these rules do

not provide the basis for AMM&S's argument nor can they provide a basis for admission of the

evidence. Rule 608 restricts the character evidence admissible for impeachment to evidence

"refer[ring] only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." That Rule obviously does not cover

the evidence at issue in the present case referring to Ms. Neuren's alleged traits of tardiness and

difficulty in personal relations. Rather, AMM&S's argument relies on Rule 404(b) which provides

that evidence, although not admissible to prove character traits of a person in order to "show action

in conformity therewith," may nonetheless "be admissible for other purposes." FED.R.EVID. 404(b).

Therefore, AMM&S would assert, the evidence of Neuren's past behavior, though inadmissible to

support an inference that she acted in conformity therewith in her later employment, is nonetheless

admissible for the relevant purposes of rebutting statements in her prior testimony. While the

argument may have theoretical validity, it has no applicability to the facts before us.

In considering the admissibility of impeachment evidence, we apply the same standards of

relevance that we apply to other questions of admissibility. See Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995,

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1011 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 511 (1994). See also FED. R. EVID. 401-02. On direct

examination, Neuren testified that the reason she left DL&A was that she was not getting enough

international trade work. The DL&A evidence does nothing to impeach that statement. None of the

DL&A evidence speaks to the reason for Neuren leaving the firm; rather, it merely explains that

Neurenwas not given certain assignments because she was difficult to get along with. If this evidence

does anything, then, it confirms, rather than rebuts, Neuren's reason for departing DL&A by

explaining why she was not getting enough international trade work.

We conclude that the district court erred in admitting the DL&A evaluations and testimony

into evidence. The DL&A evidence was not admissible to prove that Neuren acted in conformity

with the evidence while working for AMM&S nor is it relevant to impeach her testimony.

B. Harmless Error and Title VII

Our conclusion that the district court erred does not end our inquiry, however. We must next

ask whether the district court's erroneous admission of the DL&A evidence prejudiced the outcome

at trial or was harmless error. See FED. R. EVID. 103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling

which admits ... evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.").

The harmless error inquiry "involves an assessment of the likelihood that the error affected

the outcome of the case.... "[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, ... that the judgment was not

substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not

affected.' " Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). The application of the harmless error test is fact-specific,

depending upon the balance of the evidence bearing upon the issue which the error arguably affected

and the centrality ofthat issue to the ultimate decision. Jordan, 711 F.2d at 219. "The proper inquiry

is "whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the

[verdict] cannot stand.' " Williams v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 920 F.2d 1019, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). In order to decide whether the admission of the DL&A

evidence was harmless error, then, we must look to the standards for determining whether Neuren's

termination contravened Title VII and determine whether the judgment wassubstantially affected by

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admission of the DL&A evidence.

In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court

described the three-step analysis with respect to the burden of proof in a Title VII case alleging

discriminatory treatment. Id. at 252-53 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973)). First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima

facie case of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. In order to meet her prima facie case of

sex discrimination in a discharge decision, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) membership in a

protected class, i.e., that she is a woman, (2) performance at or near the employer's legitimate

expectations, (3) discharge, and (4) replacement by a person of equal or lesser ability who is not a

member of a protected class or, alternatively, the position remains open after termination. Parton v.

GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir. 1992). If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima

facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee'stermination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Finally, should

the defendant meet this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were

rather a pretext for discrimination. Id. We evaluate the effect of admission of the DL&A evidence

in light of this burden-shifting framework.

Although Burdine admonishes that the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case is

"not onerous," id., it is not clear that Neuren has met it here. Though she was a member of a

protected class who was discharged and not replaced, she was only arguably performing near her

employer'slegitimate expectations. Nonetheless, we assume arguendo that the prima facie case was

met. The burden then shifted to AMM&S to come forward with evidence of legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for the discharge.

Apart from the disputed DL&A evidence, AMM&S produced substantial evidence that

Neuren's discharge was for legitimate reasons. Specifically, AMM&S offered testimony regarding

several partner evaluations prepared in 1991 in which each partner expressed serious concerns about

Neuren's difficulties in meeting deadlines and getting along with co-workers. See Trial Transcript,

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October 5, 1993 (Afternoon Session), at 83-84, 86-94 (testimonyofBarbara Murphy); see also Trial

Transcript, October 6, 1993, at 55, 57-58 (testimony of Michael Schaumberg); id. at 105-110

(testimony of Vincent J. Adduci); Trial Transcript, October 7, 1993, at 65 (testimony of Louis

Mastriani). When viewing this evidence separately from the DL&A evaluations, we can say with

certainty that AMM&S met its burden of production to establish a legitimate business justification

for Neuren's discharge.

Because it is clear that AMM&S met its burden of production, the burden shifted back to

Neuren to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that AMM&S's legitimate business

justification was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. At trial Neuren

attempted to establish pretext through both direct and indirect evidence of discrimination. Her direct

evidence consisted of a statement in an evaluation byAMM&S partnerJeffreyMeeksin which Meeks

describedNeuren'sinterpersonalrelations with staff bywriting, "Extremelydifficult onsecretarialand

support staff. A bitch!" Neuren also introduced indirect evidence of pretext to support her theory

of disparate treatment of a similarly situated male associate. Her evidentiary offer consisted entirely

of (1) the statement quoted above; (2) Neuren's own testimony describing as a racist the younger

male associate who had been retained by the firm; (3) testimony by the firm's bookkeeper, who

asserted her opinion that the male associate did not speak to her because she was black; and (4) a

partner evaluation of the male associate describing problems with his writing style and billing

practices. We consider each piece of evidence offered in determining whether Neuren met her burden

of proof.

Neuren argues that Meeks' written evaluation of her provides strong direct evidence of sex

discrimination, in that it refers to her as a "bitch." We disagree. Although this pejorative term may

support an inference that an employment decision is discriminatoryunder different circumstances,see

Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 857 F.2d 1047, 1049,

1054 (granting Title VII reliefto female employee based upon evidence which included statement by

supervisor that "Ain't no bitch going to get this job."), in itself, the term is not always conclusive of

sex discrimination. See Williams v. KETVTV, Inc., 26 F.3d 1439, 1441 n.2 (8thCir. 1994) (affirming

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judgment for employer on sex and race discrimination despite evidence at trialthat personnelinvolved

in hiring decision referred to plaintiff as a "black bitch."); Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d

252, 253-54 n.1, 256-57 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming judgment for employer on sex and race

discrimination despite evidence at trial that employer told plaintiff she would have to be more of a

"bitch" to become manager).

In this case, when considered in conjunction with the accompanying commentarythat Neuren

was "extremely difficult on secretarial and support staff," Meeks' evaluation of Neuren, though

possiblyinappropriatelyphrased, was obviouslygrounded in gender-neutral concerns about Neuren's

interpersonal relations with co-workers, rather than discriminatory considerations. Viewed in its

totality, in fact, Meeks' evaluation further supports AMM&S'stheory that Neuren was dismissed for

her difficulties in getting along with others in the firm. Without other evidence that gender was a

factor in her evaluation, this crude word choice does no more to meet Neuren's burden of proof than

would any other gender-specific noun.

Neuren's indirect evidence offered to demonstrate disparate treatment is equally inadequate.

According to Neuren, her limited evidence to the effect that the firm retained a racist male attorney

of whom partners had concerns about his writing and billing practices demonstrates that AMM&S

did not treat a similarly situated male attorney in a like manner. Obviously disparate treatment in

employment decisionsisthe very essence ofsex discrimination. See, e.g., Palmer v. Baker, 905 F.2d

1544 (D.C. Cir. 1990). But Neuren's evidence fails to demonstrate disparate treatment for two

reasons: (1) evidence of the firm's response to the male associate's alleged racism was inconclusive,

and (2) the evidence as a whole demonstrated that Neuren was not similarly situated to the male

associate.

Neuren attempted to paint the male associate as a racist in order to demonstrate that the firm

was unwilling to dismiss a male associate who had similar interpersonal difficulties. She testified that

the male associate regularly made racist remarks to her and that she reported that problem to

AMM&S partner Adduci. She attempted to support her testimony by offering the testimony of

Katherine Callwood, who asserted that the associate spoke to her infrequentlybecause she was black.

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Neuren's evidentiary offer fails to establish that the partnership was unresponsive to the male

associate's alleged problems, however. First, Callwood admitted that she never communicated her

concerns about the associate's alleged racism to any AMM&S partner, and that she usually worked

with her office door closed and locked so that no one could have spoken frequently to her. At most

Callwood'stestimony evinces personal opinion regarding the male associate's alleged racism without

demonstrated foundation. Further, even if her testimony were fully factual, it is irrelevant in

establishing that AMM&S did nothing to dealwith the problembecause she never communicated the

problem to any partner.

Second, Adduci testified that Neuren's allegations were immediately discussed with the male

associate, that he was warned that racist behavior was grounds for immediate termination, and that

no other employee besides Neuren had ever alleged racism on the part of the male associate. Adduci

further testified that,several years before Neuren joined the firm, AMM&S had fired a male associate

specifically because he made racist comments. Even assuming that the male associate had behaved

in a racist manner, an assumption which is no more than speculative, then Adduci's testimony rebuts

Neuren'stheorythat the firmwas unresponsive to the male associate's difficultiesin getting along with

others.

In order to show that she was similarly situated to the male employee, Neuren was required

to demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were "nearly identical" to

those of the male associate. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 33426,

at *15 (6th Cir.). Neuren offered no evidence to demonstrate identity of their situations.

First, as discussed above, she presented little credible evidence that the male associate had

difficulty getting along with othersin the firm. In fact, Barbara Murphy testified at trial that the male

associate got along better with co-workers than Neuren. Second, it is undisputed that the male

associate waslower in seniority than Neuren; thus, the partners weren't as pressed to make a decision

regarding his partnership prospects as they were with Neuren. Finally, Neuren offered partner

evaluations of the male associate's work which showed that AMM&S partners were concerned with

the associate's legal writing abilities and histendency to stretch work out when he was not otherwise

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busy, but these are problems entirely different than Neuren's. Neuren was dismissed for repeated

difficultiesin meeting deadlines and problemsin her relations with staff. Both were viewed as serious

difficulties by the firm management, especially in light of the small, personal environment in the firm.

The evaluations of the male associate highlight unrelated criticisms which the firm viewed as less

serious. Neuren's offer thus failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because the male associate was

not similarly situated.

While the DL&A evidence may have had some effect on the jury's weighing of the evidence,

we can say with certainty that the DL&A evidence did not have a substantial impact on the result at

trial. Even without consideration of the DL&A evidence, AMM&S provided substantial evidence

to meet its burden of production regarding its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Neuren's

dismissal, and Neuren provided insufficient evidence to meet her burden of establishing pretext by a

preponderance of the evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

Consequently, although we conclude that admission of the evidence at trial was error by the

district court, we are convinced that the error was harmless. The decision of the district court is thus

Affirmed.

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