Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01252/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01252-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BENTKOWSKY,

Plaintiff,

v.

BENCHMARK RECOVERY, INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-01252-VC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT; 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 

ALTER JUDGMENT

Re: Doc. Nos. 90, 91

A. Introduction

William Bentkowsky sued Benchmark Recovery and its principal, Jeffrey Lasnier, for 

violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), the California Rosenthal 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California Civil Code sections 1812.700-1812.702. On 

October 28, 2014, the Court granted Bentkowsky's motion for summary judgment and denied the 

defendants' cross motion for summary judgment. The Court entered judgment on November 5, 

2014. Both sides now move to amend that judgment. 

B. The Defendants' Motion

In its prior order, the Court found that Benchmark's first written notice to Bentkowsky 

violated section 1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA by failing to disclose the current creditor to whom 

Bentkowsky owed his debt. Although the letter identified the correct creditor, it did not identify it 

as the current creditor. It instead labeled the creditor as the "Original Creditor." The letter 

therefore was confusing and left the reader unaware of the current creditor, in violation of the 

FDCPA. And because California has incorporated section 1692g into the Rosenthal Act through 

section 1788.17 of the California Civil Code, the letter violated the Rosenthal Act as well. The 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court awarded Bentkowsky $1,000 in damages under the FDCPA and another $1,000 under 

section 1788.17 of the Rosenthal Act. 

The defendants contend that the award of $1,000 under the FDCPA was too high. But the 

Court finds no basis for deviating from its conclusion on this point. The FDCPA identifies three 

factors that courts should consider when assessing damages, namely, the "frequency and 

persistence of noncompliance," "the nature of such noncompliance," and the "extent to which such 

noncompliance was intentional." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b). It adds that courts should consider "other 

relevant factors." Id. Bentkowsky has shown that the collection letter did not merely violate the 

FDCPA for failing to identify the current creditor; it also failed to include a notice to consumers 

required by California Civil Code section 1812.700. See Order 2 n.2. It is difficult to imagine 

something that could fit more squarely within the meaning of "other relevant factor" under section 

1692k(b) than a finding that the same letter violated a different consumer protection statute for a 

different reason. And this justifies an award of $1,000, rather than some lesser amount, under the 

FDCPA. 

The defendants also contend that the Court lacked authority to award $1,000 more in 

damages, for the same violation, under section 1788.17. On further reflection, the Court 

concludes that an additional $1,000 in damages under section 1788.17 of the Rosenthal Act is not 

warranted, although not for the reason the defendants have articulated. 

The defendants contend that any damages award under section 1788.17 must be 

accompanied by a finding that the violation was knowing and willful. But that intent requirement 

is contained in section 1788.30(b) of the Rosenthal Act, not section 1788.17. Section 1788.17 was 

enacted later, and by its own terms incorporates the exact liability provisions and remedies as the 

FDCPA – specifically, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b-1692j and 1692k. And it does so "[n]otwithstanding 

any other provision of this title." To construe section 1788.17 as requiring a finding of intent as a 

prerequisite to a statutory damages award seems contrary to the plain language of the provision, 

since the federal statute that it incorporates indisputably does not contain such a requirement.

To illustrate the point, imagine that the plaintiff in this case preferred to sue the defendants 

in state court, under only the Rosenthal Act. And imagine the plaintiff alleged that the defendants 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

violated section 1788.17, because the letter's failure to identify the current creditor was a violation 

of the FDCPA. Further imagine that the plaintiff sought $1,000 in strict-liability damages, 

because section 1788.17 incorporates the strict-liability statutory damages provision of 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692k. It would seem strange for the defendants to argue that the plaintiff is required to prove 

intent, simply because a separate and earlier-enacted liability provision of the Rosenthal Act –

namely, section 1788.30(b) – requires a showing of intent.

In any event, the Court does not definitively reach this question, because it has concluded,

after giving the matter more careful consideration, that an award of an additional $1,000 under the 

Rosenthal Act, over and above the $1,000 that the plaintiff will receive under the FDCPA, is not 

warranted. As discussed in the prior order, there is no indication in the record that the defendants 

acted with any level of intent to deceive Bentkowsky. This is true for all claims Bentkowsky 

asserts in connection with the single letter he received from the defendants – the claims the Court 

reached in its summary judgment ruling and the claims it didn't reach. Therefore, even if 

Bentkowsky prevailed on all his claims against the defendants – the ones on which the Court has 

ruled for Bentkowsky and the ones Bentkowsky has asserted but the Court did not reach – an 

award of more than $1,000 would not be justified. The Court exercises its discretion to amend this 

award, because it did not give proper consideration to the appropriate amount of the award the first 

time around.

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C. The Plaintiff's Motion

Bentkowsky seeks to amend the judgment to clarify that Lasnier is jointly and severally 

liable for the award. This point is well-taken, because that was the intent of the Court's prior 

order, even though the order did not make that clear.

Lasnier personally violated the FDCPA, because he is a debt collector under the FDCPA 

and he took an action that violated the FDCPA. See Cruz v. Int'l Collection Corp., 673 F.3d 991, 

 

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There could be an additional reason for declining to award Bentkowsky an additional $1,000 

under section 1788.18. There is an argument that such an award would exceed a cap set for 

awards authorized by the FDCPA. Cf. Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 660 F.3d 1055, 1068 n.15 

(9th Cir. 2011). But even if the Court could award additional damages under section 1788.18, it 

would not do so in light of the record in this case. 

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1000 (9th Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute that Lasnier is a "debt collector" within the 

meaning of the FDCPA. See Doc. No. 92, Defendants' Opp. at 1. And Lasnier testified at 

deposition that he personally drafted the collection letter that was sent to Bentkowsky. See Doc. 

No. 77, Dec. of Schwinn, Ex. A at 12. By drafting the letter to Bentkowsky – a letter which 

violated the FDCPA – Lasnier took an action that violated the FDCPA. See Cruz, 673 F.3d at 

1000. And Lasnier was, in part, responsible for the failure to prevent the exclusion of the 

consumer collection notice from the letter. Doc. No. 77, Ex. A. at 112-13. Lasnier is therefore 

jointly and severally liable for the damages award. See e.g., Carrizosa v. Stassinos, 2010 WL 

4393900, at *1-2, 5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2010) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable for 

award of statutory damages). 

Bentkowsky also takes issue with the fact that the judgment did not include a finding that 

he is entitled to attorneys' fees. But Bentkowsky has yet to file a motion for attorneys' fees. 

Under Local Rule 54-5, the prevailing party is to submit a motion for attorneys' fees within 14 

days of entry of judgment. 

D. Conclusion

The defendants' motion to alter the judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is 

denied to the extent the defendants seek a reduction in the award given under the FDCPA, but 

granted to the extent the defendants seek a reduction in the award given under the Rosenthal Act. 

The plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to the extent the plaintiff 

seeks a clarification that the defendants are both liable for the award, and denied to the extent the 

plaintiff seeks a ruling, at this point, that he is entitled to attorneys' fees. The Court will issue an 

amended judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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