Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01722/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01722-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL S. BERMAN and DARRELL 

B. STAPP, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor 

of California, in his official capacity, and 

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation, in their official 

capacities, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-01722-MCE-KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Plaintiffs Michael S. Berman and Darrell B. Stapp (“Plaintiffs”) initiated this action 

against Defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, and Jeffrey A. Beard, 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), in 

their official capacities (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff claims Defendants’ exclusion 

of men from California’s Alternative Custody Program (“ACP”), as authorized by 

California Penal Code section 1170.05, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On September 1, 2015, the 

Court ordered that this case is related to Sassman v. Brown, 2:14-cv-1679-MCE-KJN 

(“Sassman”), a case in which Plaintiff William Sassman pursued identical challenges to 

Case 2:15-cv-01722-MCE-KJN Document 41 Filed 12/15/15 Page 1 of 4
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those raised here. Subsequently, on September 9, 2015, this Court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Mr. Sassman and directed Defendants to permit male inmates to 

apply to the ACP. Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 31) and Defendants’ Motion to Stay (ECF No. 33). For the following 

reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Motion to Stay is 

DENIED as moot.1 

ANALYSIS2

Plaintiffs seek an order of summary judgment because this Court has already 

ruled in Sassman that the ACP’s exclusion of male inmates does not pass constitutional 

scrutiny. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are collaterally estopped from 

relitigating those issues here. Defendants disagree, arguing that Plaintiffs should not be 

permitted to offensively invoke the collateral estoppel doctrine when they could easily 

have joined Mr. Sassman’s action. They also contend that this Court’s decision in 

Sassman is not sufficiently firm because Defendants have noticed an appeal in that 

case. Plaintiffs have the better arguments. 

Reliance on collateral estoppel as a bar to further litigation “is appropriate only if 

(1) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior action; 

(2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue was decided in a final 

judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in 

privity with a party to the prior action.” Syverson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 472 F.3d 

1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “[T]rial courts have broad 

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 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 

 

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 The facts pertaining to the ACP and the State’s exclusion of men from that program are set forth 

in detail in the Court’s memorandum and order granting William Sassman’s motion for summary judgment. 

See Sassman v. Brown, 2:14-cv-01679-MCE-KJN, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). That decision is 

incorporated here in its entirety. 

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discretion to determine when [offensive collateral estoppel] should be applied.” Parklane 

Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). “The general rule should be that in 

cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the 

application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not 

allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.” Id. 

 Collateral estoppel bars Defendants from defending against Plaintiffs’ action. 

Defendants were parties to the Sassman action, where they litigated issues identical to 

those raised here, and a final judgment was issued against them. Moreover, despite 

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, it is not clear to the Court that the Plaintiffs in this 

action could easily have joined the Sassman proceedings. By the time Plaintiffs 

contacted counsel to initiate this action, the Court was preparing to rule on the Sassman 

motions for summary judgment. Regardless, the Court fails to see how Plaintiffs in this 

case would have gained much tactical advantage by taking a “wait and see” approach 

with regard to the Sassman proceedings. Had the Court ruled against Mr. Sassman on 

what were essentially purely legal issues, Plaintiffs’ claims would have fallen as well. It 

is thus implausible Plaintiffs could have maneuvered themselves into a position to take 

another bite at the apple simply by waiting for a ruling in the related case. Furthermore, 

Defendants identify no prejudice they will suffer by entry of judgment in this case, when 

the Court has already ruled that all eligible male inmates must be considered for the 

ACP. Finally, Defendants’ argument that this Court’s decision is not “sufficiently firm” is 

rejected. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a pending appeal renders 

a judgment less final. To the contrary, appeals do not affect the firmness of district court 

decisions. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 327 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs 

are entitled to summary judgment, and Defendants’ request for a stay is moot. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 

No. 31) is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Stay (ECF No. 33) is DENIED. This 

Court’s orders in Sassman are incorporated herein and any future orders with regard to 

Defendant’s compliance with the Court’s orders in that case shall be incorporated herein 

as well. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 15, 2015 

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