Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05192/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05192-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this

suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

VICKY L. STRANGE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5192

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Vicky L. Strange brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act). Both

parties have filed appeal briefs and the matter is now ripe for

review. The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and

orders as follows with respect thereto: 

BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on

July 30, 2003, alleging that she became disabled on June 5, 2003,

due to an L1 fracture in her lower back that she sustained in a

motor vehicle accident. (Tr. 69-71, 126.) 

2. In a written decision dated August 10, 2005, the ALJ

found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

“fracture of non-extremity (L1), hernia, diabetes mellitus, GERD

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and epilepsy.” (Tr. 15, 19.) The ALJ found, however, that

plaintiff was not disabled, as she retained the residual

functional capacity to perform a significant range of light work.

(Tr. 18-20.) 

3. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals

Council, and the Appeals Council denied review on September 23,

2005. (Tr. 3-5.) When the Appeals Council declined review, the

ALJ’s decision became the final action of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision.

APPLICABLE LAW

4. Our review of the Commissioner's determination is

limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's role is to

determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Siemers v.

Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence

means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, it means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993). In

deciding whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence, the Court must consider the evidence that

supports the Commissioner's decision, along with evidence that

detracts from it. Siemers, 47 F.3d at 301; Barrett v. Shalala, 38

F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1994).

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5. To be eligible for DIB benefits, a claimant has the

burden of establishing the existence of a disability under the

Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). To meet this burden, the claimant

must show:

* that she has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for at

least one year;

* that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and

* that this inability results from the impairment.

See Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8 Cir. 2001); see th

also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

6. The Commissioner follows a familiar five-step process to

determine whether a claimant is disabled:

(1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; 

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to

perform basic work activities; 

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively

disabling impairment listed in the regulations; 

(4) whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity (RFC) – that is, what she can do despite her limitations

-- to perform her past relevant work; and

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(5) if the claimant cannot perform her past work, the burden

then shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her

age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; see also Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217. 

DISCUSSION

7. In assessing plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ

found that plaintiff had “no objective findings with which to

support a finding that she experiences a debilitating decrease in

her ability to perform work-related activity.” (Tr. 17.) An ALJ

may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints solely

because the objective medical evidence does not fully support

them. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.

1984). The ALJ is required to take into account the following

factors in evaluating the credibility of a claimant's subjective

complaints: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (4) precipitating

and aggravating factors; and (5) functional restrictions. See id.

In the present case, the ALJ made no reference to any of these

factors. This error necessitates remand. 

8. Remand is warranted on other grounds as well.

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Anthony Burton, completed a 

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medical source statement assessing plaintiff’s RFC to be as

follows:

* plaintiff could lift up to ten pounds frequently;

* plaintiff could stand/walk less than two hours in an

eight-hour workday;

* it was necessary for plaintiff to alternate between

sitting and standing to relieve pain/discomfort;

* plaintiff had limitations pushing and pulling in both

her upper and lower extremities;

* plaintiff could not climb, kneel, crouch, or crawl, and

could only occasionally balance; and

* plaintiff had limitations in reaching, handling, and

feeling. (Tr. 620-22.)

The ALJ did not address Dr. Burton’s RFC assessment and

instead relied on an RFC assessment completed by Dr. Alice

Martinson, who saw plaintiff on one occasion for a consultative

examination. An ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion

if other medical assessments are supported by superior medical

evidence, of if the treating physician has offered inconsistent

opinions. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (8 Cir. th

2000). There is no indication in this case that superior medical

evidence supported the consultative examiner’s RFC assessment or

that plaintiff’s treating physician offered any inconsistent

opinions with regard to plaintiff’s RFC. The Court believes that

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remand is therefore warranted to allow the ALJ to address Dr.

Burton’s RFC assessment and, if the ALJ discredits the assessment,

the ALJ should state specific reasons for doing so.

9. Finally, the Court believes remand is warranted for the

ALJ to make further findings regarding plaintiff’s RFC. RFC

findings should “‘identify the individual’s functional limitations

or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a

function-by-function basis, including the functions in ... 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(b),’” which include sitting, standing, walking,

lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, reaching, handling, etc. See

Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567 (8 Cir. 2003) (quoting th

S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1).

The ALJ found that plaintiff could lift/carry twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The ALJ further found

that plaintiff had “additional exertional and/or non-exertional

limitations” (Tr. 18), but the ALJ did not identify these

limitations. On remand, the ALJ is directed to make specific

findings regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform the functions

outlined in § 404.1545(b). Depending on the ALJ’s findings, it

may then be necessary to obtain the testimony of a vocational

expert.

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CONCLUSION

10. Based on the foregoing, this case is hereby remanded to

the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22 day of March 2007. nd

/S/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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