Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05213/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05213-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT PINHOLSTER and LUIS MACIEL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

DONALD SPECTER, STEVEN FAMA and

PRISON LAW OFFICE,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05213 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

REMAND AND DENYING

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this attorney-malpractice action filed by condemned inmates, plaintiffs move to

remand the case on the grounds that this Court lacks removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

1441(b). Having reviewed defendants’ notice of removal, this Court concludes that it has

federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED. In

addition, defendants have filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. This order

treats defendants’ motion to dismiss also as a motion to remand. For the following reasons, this

motion is also DENIED. 

ANALYSIS

1. REMOVAL JURISDICTION.

Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the Superior Court of California for the

County of Marin against defendants who serve as class counsel for prisoners at San Quentin. 

Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court, asserting federal jurisdiction under

Case 3:05-cv-05213-WHA Document 20 Filed 10/26/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Removal is permissible where a claim brought in state court seeks to attack

or undermine an order of a federal district court. See Wilson v. City of San Jose, 1995 WL

241452, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1995) (citing Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 960 (5th Cir.

1995)). In their complaint, plaintiffs challenge the legality of the existing consent decree and

seek relief from its classification provisions (Compl. 5–7). Plaintiffs’ claims constitute a valid

collateral attack on the substance of the Thompson consent decree. This Court therefore has

proper removal jurisdiction over this action.

2. SUBSTANCE OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS.

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaints is that defendants have not provided effective

assistance of counsel and have failed to protect the constitutional and state-created rights of the

prisoner class in Thompson, specifically Grade B inmates. Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that

the Thompson consent decree’s classification provisions violate Title 15 of the California Code

of Regulations and are constitutionally defective.

In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel (Br. 5–8). To support their contention, defendants rely on

Golden v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 786 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). In Golden, a named class

representative in a federal class action that had resulted in a consent decree filed a malpractice

action against class counsel in state court. Id. at 1426. The plaintiff alleged that defendant had

misrepresented to him that the prior class action was not, in fact, a class action and that

defendant had falsely declared to the court that the plaintiff had approved of the class action. 

Ibid. The district court enjoined the state malpractice action pursuant to the Anti-Injunction

Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the same issues in the Golden class action in fairness hearings. Id. at

1427. The court also found an inference of harassment. Ibid. 

Defendants’ reliance on Golden is misplaced considering Golden is factually

distinguishable from this case. The plaintiff in Golden was a named class representative in the

class action at issue. Here, plaintiffs are unnamed class members. Furthermore, the plaintiff in

Golden previously objected to the attorney’s competency during fairness hearings, which led

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the court to make specific findings regarding the class counsel’s competency. Plaintiffs in this

case have not had the same opportunity to object to the Thompson consent decree. 

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs may seek relief from the consent decree only

through intervention, objection or a collateral equitable action limited to the question of

adequacy of representation (Br. 8–9). Plaintiffs have since moved to intervene in the Thompson

action. Plaintiffs’ requests to intervene were denied, however, because this Court determined

that Intervenor Freddy Fuiava would adequately represent plaintiffs’ interests. 

Finally, defendants contend that they do not owe plaintiffs a duty to prevent conduct by

prison officials (Br. 9–10). Defendants argue that class counsel do not have a duty to ensure

that the consent decree produces optimal results for each individual class member (Br. 9–10). 

This may or may not be correct. This order does not resolve the issue. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is also DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05213-WHA Document 20 Filed 10/26/06 Page 3 of 3