Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07098/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 1997 Decided March 7, 1997

No. 96-7098

NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01476)

Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellant, with whom

Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel,

were on the briefs. Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Lisa A. Burns argued the cause for appellees, with whom Daniel J. Standish, Erik J. Salovaara,

Arthur B. Spitzer and Lawrence H. Mirel were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: The National Black Police Association and other organizations and

individuals ("plaintiffs") brought suit to challenge the campaign contribution limits enacted in the

District of Columbia ("District" or "D.C.") by the D.C. Campaign Contributions Limitation Initiative

of 1992 ("Initiative 41"). The district court enjoined the contribution limits as unconstitutional and

the District filed notice of appeal. During pendency of the District's appeal, however, legislation

passed by the District that significantly increased Initiative 41's contribution limits became effective.

We agree with the District that passage of this legislation has mooted this case and that the district

court's opinion should be vacated.

I. BACKGROUND

Initiative 41, which was enacted by voters in the District on November 3, 1992, and took

effect on March 17, 1993, imposed strict contribution limits on District races. Contributions to

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1The legislation also imposed a $5,000 limit on contributions to one political committee in an

election. See 43 D.C. Reg. at 2175 (1996). Initiative 41 had not imposed limits on political

committee contributions. 

2The two significant differences between the limits imposed by the new legislation and those

existing before passage of Initiative 41 are that under the pre-Initiative 41 law, contributions to

ward Council member candidates and at-large Board of Education member candidates could not

exceed $400 and the maximum cap on contributions per election was $4,000. See D.C. Code §§

1-1441(a), 1-1441(b) (1992 repl.), repealed by D.C. Law 11-144, 43 D.C. Reg. 2174 (1996). 

candidates for Mayor, D.C. Council Chairman or at-large Council member were limited to a

maximum of $100 per candidate, and contributions to ward Council member candidates or Board of

Education member candidates were limited to a maximum of $50 per candidate. Similar restrictions

were imposed on contributions seeking to recall members from these offices. In addition, Initiative

41 prohibited any contributor from giving more than $600 to all candidates in any one election. This

overall cap did not apply to contributions made in regard to initiative, referendumor recallmeasures.

D.C. Law 9-204, D.C. Code § 1-1441.1 (Supp. 1996), amended by D.C. Law 11-144, 43 D.C. Reg.

2174 (1996).

Initiative 41 took effect on March 17, 1993. Less than one year later, in February 1994, a bill

wasintroduced in the D.C. Council that proposed raising the campaign contribution limitsto $1,000

for the position of Mayor, D.C. Council Chairman and at-large Council member, and $400 for

Council ward member and Board of Education positions, but the bill was not enacted. See Jonetta

Rose Barras, Campaign Limits Face Repeal, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at C6; Yolanda

Woodlee, A Quest for Campaign Money, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1994, at B4. However, a similar

measure was eventually passed by the D.C. Council on April 2, 1996, and signed into law by the

Mayor onApril18, 1996. This new campaign legislation increased Initiative 41's contribution ceilings

so that the limits became $2,000 for mayoral candidates, $1,500 for Council Chairman candidates,

$1,000 for at-large Council member candidates, $500 for ward Council member candidates and

at-large Board of Education member candidates, and $200 for ward Board of Education member

candidates, and changed the maximum cap on contributions per election to $8,500.1 D.C. Law 11-

144, 43 D.C. Reg. 2174, 2174-75 (1996). These new limits are nearly identical to those in effect

before passage of Initiative 41.2See D.C. Code §§ 1-1441(a), 1-1441(b) (1992 repl.), repealed by

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D.C. Law 11-144, 43 D.C. Reg. 2174 (1996). The legislation became effective on June 13, 1996,

after the required thirty-day period for congressional review. See D.C. Code § 1-233(c)(1) (1992

repl.).

Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed suit on July 6, 1994, seeking to have Initiative 41's contribution

limits enjoined on the grounds that the limits violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S.

Constitution and the District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reorganization Act

of 1973. The suit was initially brought against only the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics

("Board"), but the district court granted a motion by the District to intervene as a defendant. After

the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and an injunction pending

appeal, a five-day bench trial was held in February 1996. On April 19, 1996, when the new campaign

legislation had been passed by the D.C. Council and signed by the Mayor and was pending

congressionalreview, the district court held that the contribution limits enacted by Initiative 41 were

unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.

The Board chose not to appeal the district court's decision, but the District filed a notice of

appeal on May 16, 1996. On appeal, however, the District does not challenge the merits of the

district court's decision. Instead, it seeks only to have this court declare the case moot because of

passage of the new legislation and vacate the decision below. Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that

the case is either not moot or comes under the exception for cases that are capable of repetition yet

evading review. They further argue that, even if the case is moot, vacatur is not appropriate here.

We turn first to a determination of whether this case has become moot and, concluding that it has,

to the question of whether vacatur should be granted.

II. MOOTNESS

Article III of the Constitution restricts the federal courts to deciding only "actual, ongoing

controversies," Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988), and a federal court has no "power to render

advisory opinions[or] ... "decide questionsthat cannot affect the rights of litigantsin the case before

them.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.

244, 246 (1971)). Moreover, a live controversy must exist at all stages of review. Lewis v.

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Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401-02. Hence, "[e]ven

where litigation poses a live controversy when filed, ... [this] court [must] refrain from deciding it if

"events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have

a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.' " Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d

699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (in banc) (quoting Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 897 F.2d 570, 575

(D.C. Cir. 1990)). The intervening event arguably ending any live controversy between plaintiffs and

the District was the District's enactment of the new campaign contribution legislation that amended

Initiative 41's contribution limits. Thus, voluntary cessation analysis governs our mootness inquiry.

Although generally voluntary cessation of challenged activity does not moot a case, a court may

conclude that voluntarycessation hasrendered a case moot ifthe partyurgingmootness demonstrates

that (1) "there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur," and (2) "interim

relief or events have completelyor irrevocablyeradicated the effects ofthe alleged violation." County

of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (internal quotations omitted); Reeve Aleutian

Airways, Inc. v. United States, 889 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Clarke, 915 F.2d

at 705 (noting that voluntary cessation analysis has been extended to apply to legislative bodies other

than Congress).

Both of these requirements for mootness are satisfied here. To begin with, there is no

reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur. Although voluntary cessation analysis

applies where a challenge to government action is mooted by passage of legislation, the mere power

to reenact a challenged law is not a sufficient basis on which a court can conclude that a reasonable

expectation of recurrence exists. Rather, there must be evidence indicating that the challenged law

likely will be reenacted. See Jones v. Temmer, 57 F.3d 921, 923 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[D]efendants

assert that the claims are not moot because the Colorado legislature remains free to reinstate the old

law at a later date. We view this possibility as too conjectural and speculative to avoid a finding of

mootness"); Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994) ("a

statutory change ... is usually enough to render a case moot, even if the legislature possesses the

power to reenact the statute after the lawsuit is dismissed" unless "it is virtually certain that the

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repealed law will be reenacted"); see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283,

296 n.* (1982) (White, J., concurring) (challenge to city ordinance was not mooted by city's

amendment of the ordinance because city announced an intention to reenact ordinance if lower

opinion vacated, whereas change in university's regulations in Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S.

100 (1982) (per curiam), had mooted case because "Princeton gave no indication that it desired to

return to the originalregulatoryscheme"). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the D.C.

Council might repeal the new legislation and reenact strict contribution limits. The Council has not

"announced ... such an intention," City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289 n.11, and indeed its enactment

of the new legislation evinces an intent to the contrary. It is also clear that enactment of the new

legislation does not represent a sudden shift in position on the part of the Council; the challenged

contribution limits were originally enacted not by any action by the D.C. Council but rather by a voter

initiative and legislative efforts to amend Initiative 41 began within one year of the Initiative's

becoming effective.

There is also no reason to conclude that D.C. voters are likely to enact a new initiative that

imposes contribution limits akin to those found in Initiative 41. Although Initiative 41's backers

proposed such a new initiative on March 14, 1996, theywithdrew this proposed initiative a little over

a month later, on April 25, 1996, and no initiative to reimpose strict contribution limits is currently

pending. See Joint Appendix at 159; Brian Blomquist, Campaign Cash Cap Contested, WASH.

TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at A12. Plaintiffs also point to the high passage rate of Initiative 41 and of

popular initiatives generallyin the District as demonstrating the likelihood that voters will enact a new

initiative incorporating Initiative 41's limits. But we are not willing to presume that the District's

electorate remains committed to Initiative 41 simply because it wasinitially passed by a wide margin.

Voters may well have changed their minds on the merits of strict contribution limits in light of the

public debate that occurred during consideration of the new contribution limits legislation and after

seeing how Initiative 41'slimits worked during the 1994 elections. And, needless to say, the fact that

voter initiatives are usually very successful is a wholly inadequate basis for us to find that there is a

reasonable expectation that a voter initiative incorporating strict contribution limits will be proposed

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and passed.

Second, passage of the new legislation has completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects

of the alleged violation. Plaintiffs sought only to have Initiative 41's limits declared unconstitutional

and enjoined. But as a result of the new legislation Initiative 41's limits are no longer in force, and

plaintiffs do not contend that these limits continue to have any residual effect. Hence, declaratory and

injunctive relief would no longer be appropriate. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of

Miami, 404 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972); see also In re Bunker Ltd Partnership, 820 F.2d 308, 311 (9th

Cir.1987) ("[w]here intervening legislation has settled a controversy involving only injunctive or

declaratoryrelief, the controversyhas become moot"). Nor do plaintiffs suggest that the contribution

limits enacted by the new legislation, which are substantially higher than those imposed by Initiative

41 and nearly identical to the limits in place prior to the initiative, are also unconstitutional. Indeed,

neither plaintiffs nor the District have presented any arguments to this court regarding the

constitutionality of campaign contribution limits in general or the limits imposed by the new

legislation or Initiative 41 in particular.

Finally, it is also apparent that this case does not trigger the exception in the mootness

doctrine for controversiesthat are capable ofrepetition yet evading review. The capable of repetition

exception only applies if " "(1) the challenged action wasin its duration too short to be fully litigated

prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.' " Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370,

1376 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (alterations in

original); Clarke, 915 F.2d at 704. There is nothing in the nature of Initiative 41's contribution limits

that inherently prevents review. See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(proper question to determine whether future challenge would provide an opportunity to fully litigate

is "whether the challenged activity is by its very nature short in duration, so that it could not, or

probably would not, be able to be adjudicated while fully live") (internal quotations and additions

omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the capable of repetition exception nonetheless applies here because

ifstrict contribution limits akin to Initiative 41's were enacted by another initiative, the D.C. Council

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would pass legislation amending the limits before plaintiffs could obtain judicial review. But there

is no reason to presume either that the D.C. Councilwould passsuch legislation againthereby twice

thwarting the popular will of the D.C. electorateor that it would do so too quickly to allow for

judicialreview. The latter claim is particularly dubious in light of the fact that it took the Council four

years to amend Initiative 41, nearly double the two-year period that we have held is sufficient to

sustain an evading review claim. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d

685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that "both Supreme Court and circuit precedent hold that orders

of less than two years' duration ordinarily evade review"). In any event, as discussed above, there

is no reasonable probability that Initiative 41's limits will be reenacted, so the second requirement of

the capable of repetition exception is not met here. See Native Village, 38 F.3d at 1511 (noting that

reasonable probability inquiry under voluntary cessation analysis and the capable of repetition

exception is the same).

Thus, we conclude that passage of the new campaign contribution legislation amending

Initiative 41's contribution limits has mooted this appeal. We now turn to the question of whether

our conclusion that the case is moot should lead us to vacate the district court's decision holding

Initiative 41's limits to be unconstitutional.

III. VACATUR

Relying on the Supreme Court'sstatement that vacatur "clears the path for future relitigation

of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented by

happenstance," United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), for many years lower

courts followed a practice of vacating the decision below and dismissing the case in most instances

when a matter was rendered moot pending appeal. However, two years ago in U.S. Bancorp

Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership the Supreme Court clarified that vacatur is an equitable

remedy, not an automatic right, and held that vacatur is usually inappropriate when "the partyseeking

relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action." 115 S. Ct. 386, 391

(1994). According to the Court, to grant vacatur automatically in such instances would be to treat

judicial precedents as "the property of private litigants" and "wouldquite apart from any

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considerations offairnessto the partiesdisturb the orderly operation ofthe federal judicialsystem."

Id. at 392. Instead, where mootness results from voluntary action, vacatur should not be granted

unlessto do so would serve the public interest. Id. at 392-93; see also Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365,

1370 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing Bancorp); National Football League Players Ass'n v. ProFootball, Inc., 79 F.3d 1215, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacating in part on rehearing, 56 F.3d 1525,

1530 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Bancorp accords with the longstanding practice of this court, under which

we have denied vacatur in some instances so as "to avoid unfairness to parties who prevailed in the

lower court," and in particular refused to order vacatur where mootness resulted from " "the

deliberate action of the losing party before the district court.' " United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d

1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Regan, 727 F.2d

1161, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

The issue we face here is whether Bancorp's presumption against vacaturshould applywhere

the party seeking relieffrom the judgment below isthe government and the case has been mooted by

passage of new legislation. Clearly, the passage of new legislation represents voluntary action, and

thus on its face the Bancorp presumption might seem to govern. We believe, however, that

application of the Bancorp presumption in this context is not required by the Bancorp opinion's

rationale and would be inappropriate, at least ifthere is no evidence indicating that the legislation was

enacted in order to overturn an unfavorable precedent. The rationale underlying the Bancorp

presumption isthat litigantsshould not be able to manipulate the judicialsystem by "roll[ing] the dice

... in the district court" and then "wash[ing] away" any "unfavorable outcome" through use of

settlement and vacatur. Bancorp, 115 S. Ct. at 393; see also Garde, 848 F.2d at 1311 ("We do not

wish to encourage litigants who are dissatisfied with the decision[s] of ... trial court[s] to have them

wiped from the books by merely filing an appeal, then complying with the order or judgment below

and petitioning for vacatur.") (internal quotations omitted). The mere fact that a legislature has

enacted legislation that moots an appeal, without more, provides no grounds for assuming that the

legislature was motivated by such a manipulative purpose. The legislature may act out of reasons

totally independent of the pending lawsuit, or because the lawsuit has convinced it that the existing

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law isflawed. In American Library Association v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992), we rejected

the argument that vacatur was not appropriate where a case had become moot on appeal due to

Congress' passage of new legislation, arguing that Congress' action "to repair what may have been

a constitutionally defective statute ... represents responsible lawmaking, not manipulation of the

judicial process." Id. at 1187.

Moreover, the respect that courts owe other organs of government should make us wary of

impugning the motivations that underlie a legislature's actions. As we stated in Clarke v. United

States, where an appealhad becomemoot becauseCongress had allowed the challenged law to sunset

and this court in banc granted vacatur, "it would seem inappropriate for the courts either to impute

such manipulative conduct to a coordinate branch of government or to apply against that branch a

doctrine that appears to rest on the likelihood of a manipulative purpose." 915 F.2d at 705. This

belief that legislative actions are presumptively legitimate animates other areas of the law, such as

equal protection jurisprudence and statutory construction doctrines. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (refusing to hold "that a law, neutral on itsface and serving ends otherwise

within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply

because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another"); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.

v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (describing rule

of statutory construction providing that courts will construe statutes so as "to avoid [serious

constitutional] problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress," as

based in part on the fact that "courts will ... not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe

constitutional liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it").

Significantly, the record here demonstrates that the District did not adopt the new legislation

in order to erase an unfavorable decision from the books. All of the acts required to be performed

by the District in order for a proposed bill to become lawnamely passage by the D.C. Council and

signing by the Mayorhad occurred before the district court held Initiative 41's limits to be

unconstitutional. The D.C. Council passed the measure on April 2nd and the Mayor signed it on

April 18th, the day before the district court issued its opinion. Moreover, legislative efforts to repeal

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3The District filed notice of appeal on May 16, 1996, and therefore this court had jurisdiction

over matters directly relating to the judgment below by the time the new legislation became

effective on June 13, 1996. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58

(1982) ("filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significanceit confers

jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over aspects of the

case involved in the appeal"). Although the 1993 amendments to the Rules of Appellate

Procedure provide that filing of certain post-trial motions before the district court will serve to

suspend a notice of appeal, the District would have had to raise its claim of mootness before the

district court in the form of a Rule 60(b) motion and such a motion only suspends a notice of

appeal if it is filed ten days after the judgment is entered. See FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 4(a)(4); FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b). The district court entered its

judgment on April 19, 1996, and thus this ten-day deadline had long passed by the time the new

legislation became effective. 

Initiative 41's strict limits had been ongoing for over two years, and the first unsuccessful bill to

amend Initiative 41's limits was introduced even before this litigation was filed. The only evidence

that callsthe District's motivations at all into question isthat in this appeal the District has offered no

defense of Initiative 41 on the merits; it only argues that this case has become moot and that the

decision down below should be vacated. However, a thorough defense of the constitutionality of

Initiative 41's limits would have been a time-consuming endeavor, and we accept the District's claim

that it should not be required to expend resources to defend laws that are no longer in force.3

Separationofpowers concerns provide furtherreasonto exemptfromBancorp's presumption

against vacatur the situation of a case which has becomemoot on appealdue to passage oflegislation.

As is true of the District, in most multi-branch governments defense of existing laws falls to the

executive whereas initiation of legislation is the responsibility of the legislature. Although the

executive has the option of refusing to sign legislation, so as to avoid mooting litigation, this option

is a hollow one if the executive believes both that the new legislation would be beneficial and that the

pending challenge has no merit. To a degree, therefore, the executive branch is in a position akin to

a party who finds its case mooted on appeal by "happenstance," rather than events within its control.

This argument suggests that the Bancorp presumption against vacatur might apply if the case has

been rendered moot on appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation, even though the courts accord

the executive branch the same presumption of legitimate motive as is given the legislative branch.

See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9thCir. 1996) (refusing to vacate lower court

decision that became moot on appeal when government reinstated officer and replaced challenged

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regulation). We need not reach this question, however, and therefore express no views on the matter

other than to note the limits of our holding here that the Bancorp presumption is usually inapplicable

when legislative action moots a case and the government seeks vacatur.

Plaintiffs use the Tenth Circuit's decision in 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics v. City

of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142 (1996) ("19 Mechanics"), to argue against vacating the district court's

decision here. The court in 19 Mechanics held that a challenge to Albuquerque's drug testing policy

had become moot on appeal because the city adopted a new testing policy, but refused vacatur, citing

the Bancorp presumption against vacating where mootness results from voluntary action. Id. at

1144. However, 19 Mechanicsis clearly distinguishable from this case, since Albuquerque admitted

that it had adopted the new policy in response to the district court's decision enjoining the existing

policy as unconstitutional whereas the District's enactment of new legislation in this case was not

motivated by the district court's decision below. It is also not apparent whether the change in

Albuquerque's drug testing policyrepresented legislative orregulatoryaction. In any event, the Tenth

Circuit proceeded to grant vacatur in a later case where a challenge to prison conditions had become

moot because Albuquerque had complied with a settlement agreement; the court there described the

city's actions as "responsible governmental conduct to be commended." McClendon v. City of

Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 868 (1996). In McClendon, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the

decision whether or not to grant vacatur should be determined on the basis of "particular

circumstances," id. (internal quotations omitted), thus suggesting that 19 Mechanics should be

viewed as simply a specific instance where refusing vacatur served the public interest and not as

establishing a general rule against vacatur where mootness results from voluntary governmental

action. See 19 Mechanics, 76 F.3d at 1145 (arguing that vacatur "does not appear to serve any

interest other than the City's own").

Finally, we also note that granting vacatur serves the public interest here. The issue in this

case was the constitutionality of contribution limits, and it is a well-established principle that courts

should avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,

345-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Indeed, we have previously "emphasized the avoidance

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of constitutional questions as one of the bases for vacatur." Clarke, 915 F.2d at 708; see also

Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128, 133-34 & n.15 (1977) (underscoring policy of avoiding

unnecessary constitutional decisions in holding that passage of new legislation mooted case and

ordering that lower decisions be vacated); In re City of El Paso, 887 F.3d 1103, 1106 (D.C. Cir.

1989) (affirming decision to quash subpoenas on grounds of mootness but vacating part of decision

that reached constitutional question because of principle of avoiding constitutional questions).

Moreover,since the district court's opinion willremain "on the books" even if vacated, albeit without

any preclusive effect, future courts will be able to consult its reasoning.

The presumption of integrity that attaches to legislative action and the difficulties that

separation of powers creates for attributing one branch's actions to another support not applying the

Bancorp rule to situations where the party seeking vacatur is the government and mootness results

on appeal because of legislative action. In this context, absent additional evidence of an illegitimate

motive, we believe the general rule in favor of vacatur still applies. Needless to say, this does not

mean that vacatur should be granted in all cases of this kind. As the Court underscored in Bancorp,

vacatur is an equitable remedy and the record in particular cases may militate in favor of denying

vacatur. Here, however, we find that the equitable balance tips clearly in favor of granting vacatur;

the timing of the District's actions precludes any inference of manipulative intent, and there is no

suggestion of such an intent in the record. Vacatur also ensures that a decision on a constitutional

matter of great significance and current public interest does not remain in force unreviewed.

We hold that this appeal is moot and that equity would best be served by granting vacatur.

We therefore dismissthis appeal as moot, vacate the district court's decision and remand for this case

to be dismissed.

So ordered.

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