Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04981/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04981-87/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARGIE CHERRY and ESTORIA

CHERRY on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE CITY COLLEGE OF SAN

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-04981 WHA

ORDER CONFIRMING

JURISDICTION HAS ENDED

INTRODUCTION

In this class action to enforce state and federal disability laws, this order finds that the

consent decree and jurisdiction over the action expired on October 1, 2010.

STATEMENT

On the day trial was scheduled to begin several years ago, the parties reached a settlement. 

The parties presented their settlement to the Court in the form of a stipulated consent decree and

judgment, the final version of which was entered in April 2006 (Dkt. No. 676). Among other

things, this amended stipulated judgment and order required defendants “to make substantial

structural access improvements” to existing facilities and to expend at least $7.5 million to

implement the specified access work (ibid. at 7). It also included the following provisions:

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The Court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over this lawsuit

for the length of this Stipulated Judgment and Order for the

purpose of overseeing and enforcing the terms herein.

* * *

The Stipulated Judgment shall be deemed effective on May 1,

2006. The stipulated Judgment shall continue to be effective and

binding upon the parties for a period of four years after the

Effective Date, unless the Court approves and extension of time for

good cause shown.

* * *

Defendants may move the District Court for an Order terminating

its jurisdiction of this matter on the basis that all of Defendants’

obligations under the Stipulated Judgment have been fully

discharged.

* * *

Nothing in this Section shall bar Class Counsel from moving for an

extension of the Stipulated Judgment to enforce any of its

obligations.

(id. at 29).

Over the next four years, defendants expended nearly $18 million to implement a myriad

of accessibility improvements to their facilities. Additionally, defendants paid class counsel and a

designated access expert nearly half a million dollars in fees for inspections and monitoring

activities (Dkt. No. 859 at 5). The work done on facilities ranged from barrier removal to

construction modification and was accompanied by other access initiatives such as improving

programmatic access and evacuation plans. As required by the stipulated judgment, defendants

submitted periodic reports documenting the progress of this work.

In January 2010, defendants moved to extend one of the many compliance deadlines set

forth in the stipulated judgment. Due to a change in circumstances, defendants were unable to

complete construction access work on existing facilities by the deadline and requested an

extension of that deadline from April 1, 2010 to October 1, 2010 (Dkt. No. 846). Class counsel

did not oppose such an extension provided that it would be accompanied by certain additional

provisions, including “[t]hat Class Counsel . . . may bring a motion to enforce the Stipulated

Judgment by no later than December 3, 2010” and “[t]hat all other terms of the Amended

Stipulated Judgment shall remain in effect through December 3, 2010” (Dkt. No. 852). The

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extension of the compliance deadline to October 1, 2010 was granted, along with some but not all

of the additional provisions class counsel requested. Notably, contrary to the proposal, the order

did not grant class counsel until December 3, 2010 to file an enforcement motion and did not

extend the terms of the judgment through that date. Instead, the order provided: “All other

terms of the amended stipulated judgment shall remain in effect through October 1, 2010” (Dkt.

No. 855).

On November 2, 2010, defendants filed a motion to terminate jurisdiction, vacate the

amended stipulated judgment, and dismiss the entire action with prejudice. The motion

acknowledged that “the effective and binding term of the Judgment expired on October 1, 2010”

(Dkt. No. 859 at 2). Class counsel opposed the motion on the grounds that defendants had failed

to comply with the requirements of the stipulated judgment, identifying four respects in which

defendants were allegedly noncompliant (Dkt. No. 891). After full briefing, a hearing on the

motion was held on December 7, 2010. The arguments regarding the four compliance issues were

hopelessly mired in finger-pointing. In an attempt to clarify the parties’ contentions, three posthearing orders requested submission of supplemental briefing and evidence from both sides. 

These set forth specific questions to illuminate dark voids in the record (Dkt.

Nos. 902, 914, 915). The parties filed submissions in response.

The four disputed compliance issues were and remain as follows. First, plaintiffs allege

that adequate accessible seating has not been provided in the Diego Rivera Theater. Defendants

counter that adequate accessible seating has been provided, that other accessibility improvements

have been made to that facility, and that a new, fully-accessible theater is in the works. Second,

plaintiffs allege that 21 special-purpose classrooms in Cloud Hall were improperly excluded from

the scope of work performed and remain inaccessible. Defendants counter that accessibility

improvements were made to these classrooms, that further improvements are infeasible due to the

specialized nature of the equipment used for instruction in these classrooms, and that Cloud Hall

is in compliance despite these limitations because 30% of its classrooms are now fully accessible. 

Third, plaintiffs allege that the emergency egress locations in the lower level of the Visual Arts

building do not include life/safety features requested by plaintiffs’ access expert. Defendants

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counter that the emergency egress accessibility improvements made to this facility comply with

the judgment and were agreed to by plaintiffs’ access expert. Fourth, plaintiffs allege that a

number of light switches are non-compliant because they have not been lowered or fitted with

lock boxes which would transfer exclusive control of the lights to existing motion sensors. 

Defendants counter that the light switches are compliant because they are attached to motion

sensors and are not operated by students; defendants also insist that class counsel agreed to the

use of motion sensors as an alternative to lowering the switches, without any mention of

lock boxes.

Sadly, these problems are a mess. For example, the sufficiency of motion sensors as an

alternative to lowered light switches was one of the four contested issues, but the key fact that

these sensors were installed in 1996 (well before the commencement of this action and not in

reliance on the parties’ alleged agreements) did not come out until the Court issued additional

pointed questions after the hearing. To complicate matters further, the parties vehemently accuse

each other. Defense counsel swear that class counsel agreed to the use of motion sensors in lieu

of lowering light switches at a December 2009 meeting, yet class counsel swear that they made

no such agreement. Getting to the bottom of this mess would require live evidentiary hearings

with testimony from counsel and possibly further remedial orders, and would extend this case for

a considerable period.

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over this action expired along with the stipulated judgment on

October 1, 2010. The plain language of the stipulated judgment and order dictates this holding. 

The stipulated judgment called for “continuing jurisdiction over this lawsuit for the length of this

Stipulated Judgment and Order.” The stipulated judgment originally was set to expire on

May 1, 2010 (four years after its effective date) and was extended once through October 1, 2010. 

Significantly, this extension was ordered without additional provisions requested by class counsel

which would have extended the judgment’s terms and the deadline to file enforcement motions

until December 3, 2010. Thus, the stipulated judgment (and jurisdiction over the action) would

expire on October 1, 2010, unless a motion to extend or enforce the judgment was then pending. 

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The provision of the judgment allowing defendants to move to terminate jurisdiction on the

grounds that they have reached full compliance enabled termination of jurisdiction before the

built-in expiration date, but independently of any such motion jurisdiction was designed to

evaporate on the appointed date. Class counsel had the explicit rights to inspect the work being

done by defendants and to move “for an extension of the Stipulated Judgment to enforce any of its

obligations” if class counsel believed such an extension was necessary. Class counsel, however,

made no such motion. Accordingly, October 1 came and went, extinguishing both the effective

period of the stipulated judgment and the period of mandatory jurisdiction over the action. See

Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1116–18

(9th Cir. 2009) (finding that consent decree language identical in pertinent part to the provision

relevant here meant that the district court’s jurisdiction over the decree was explicitly set to

expire after the designated period of time).

Although the stipulated judgment provided that the Court might approve an extension of

time for good cause shown, that option required that the motion be filed prior to expiration. This

was not done.

We should step back and see the larger picture. First, a vast amount of good remedial

work has occurred via the judgment, and both sides should be proud of that accomplishment. 

Defendants are in near-total compliance with the stipulated judgment and order. Defendants have

completed a massive amount of renovations and improvements to comply with state and federal

disability law. They have devoted an enormous sum of resources to this major undertaking,

spending more than twice the amount of money required by the stipulated judgment and filing

numerous reports that document the extensive work completed. If defendants have not achieved

full, perfect compliance with the stipulated judgment and order, then they have complied

substantially; the remaining disputes are small compared to the large good accomplished by the

decree. Second, there is no unfairness in holding both sides to the terms of the judgment. Here,

class counsel was paid by defendants to inspect and monitor the work undertaken pursuant to the

stipulated judgment. Class counsel received numerous progress reports from defendants and from

the access expert, and class counsel claim to have actively exercised their rights to inspect and

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monitor defendants’ work. If, as October 1 drew near, there were still punch list items, class

counsel should have identified this problem, drafted a motion to enforce or extend the stipulated

judgment, and filed that motion before the October 1 deadline passed.

The Court is disappointed that the four remaining issues were not timely raised. The

undersigned judge has invested considerable public resources in enforcing the judgment to date

and providing the class of students with the facilities they deserve. It would have been better to

end with perfection, but in these circumstances near-total compliance will have to do.

Class counsel, in their supplemental brief on this topic, make a variety of arguments as to

why jurisdiction persists. None is persuasive. First, class counsel state that “it is not correct that

the ‘terms’ of the Amended Stipulated Judgment were extended through October 1, 2010”

because the January 2010 order modifying the stipulated judgment “did not expressly address the

issue of the duration of the Court’s jurisdiction under the terms of the stipulated judgment and

order” and “[i]t only addressed the Defendants’ ‘compliance deadline’” (Dkt. No. 919 at 1). This

statement is untrue. In addition to extending the compliance deadline, the January 2010 order

specifically provided that “[a]ll other terms of the amended stipulated judgment shall remain in

effect through October 1, 2010” (Dkt. No. 855 at 3) (emphasis added). These “terms” included

the jurisdictional provisions. Second, class counsel assert that if jurisdiction automatically

terminated on the same extended date by which defendants were required to comply, “there

would be no reasonable opportunity for Mr. Waters, Class Counsel, or the Court to review and

enforce those aspects of the judgment for which compliance is alleged to have been completed

near the end of the compliance period” (Dkt. No. 919 at 2). This statement is also untrue. As this

order already explained, class counsel had ample opportunity to monitor and inspect defendants’

work and to timely move for an extension of enforcement jurisdiction if necessary. Third, class

counsel argue that defendants’ “conduct in filing their motion to terminate jurisdiction”

effectively concedes that jurisdiction did not expire on October 1, or, alternatively, invokes the

Court’s jurisdiction (ibid. at 2–3). Not so. The motion acknowledges that “the effective and

binding term of the Judgment expired on October 1, 2010,” so the motion was filed only out of an

abundance of caution (Dkt. No. 859 at 2). Finally, class counsel argue that even if mandatory

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jurisdiction has lapsed, the Court may extend its jurisdiction under the terms of the judgment or

under its own “inherent authority to enforce its own orders and to ensure compliance with them”

(Dkt. No. 919 at 3–4). This argument flies in the face of the express terms of the judgment itself

and is unsupported by our circuit authority.

CONCLUSION

It would be unwise for all concerned to invest further in extensive fact proceedings and

further remedial hearings only to learn later that all was for naught, given a lack of jurisdiction. 

Obligatory jurisdiction over this action expired on October 1, 2010. Whether or not a new

remedial action could be brought by a new student with appropriate standing is not addressed by

this order. This order holds that jurisdiction has ended and all pending motions are

DENIED AS MOOT.

THE CLERK SHALL CLOSE THE FILE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2011. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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