Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01063/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joi N. Stirrup, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Education Management LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01063-TUC-CRP

ORDER 

 

 The Magistrate Judge has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ 

consent. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c). 

 Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and 

Stay These Proceedings Pending Arbitration (Doc. 10); (2) Plaintiff’s Combined Response 

to Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay These Proceedings and Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 12); and (3) Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment and Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration 

(Doc. 23). The parties have also filed supplemental briefing regarding newly decided 

cases. (Docs. 25, 26, 31, 32). On August 11, 2014, the pending motions came on for oral 

argument. For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Compel 

Arbitration and Stay These Proceedings Pending Arbitration and denies Plaintiff’s 

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Joi Stirrup alleges discrimination in the form of constructive discharge 

from her employment in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. ' 3730(h), and 

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wrongful termination in violation of A.R.S. ' 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i),(ii). (Complaint (Doc. 

1), &6). Stirrup alleges that she had been employed by Defendants Education 

Management, LLC, and Education Management Corporation (collectively referred to as 

“EM”) from December 2008 until the date of her constructive discharge in May 2013. 

(Id. at &&1-5, 10). At the time of her discharge, Stirrup was employed as the registrar at 

The Art Institute of Tucson (“AiTU”), which is owned and managed by EM. (Id. at &&5, 

11). 

 Stirrup alleges that while working at AiTU, she came to suspect that EM was not 

documenting or reporting the cancellations of newly enrolled students in order to keep: (1) 

tuition payments from lenders whose loans were insured by the U.S. government and/or 

(2) the students’ Pell grant funds; and/or (3) benefits paid for the students by the 

Department of Veterans Affairs or the Arizona Department of Economic Security, 

“all...of which EM was not entitled to receive or keep when a student timely exercised 

their right of cancellation.” (Id. at &13). Stirrup further alleges that failure to report that a 

student withdrew, unlawfully increased the amount of federal and state funding EM 

received. (Id. at &15; see also id. at && 18, 19 (citing two alleged instances of such 

conduct that Stirrup learned about in February 2013)). Stirrup also alleges that EM 

overstated “the schedules or case loads of some AiTU students in order to obtain more 

federally insured tuition money and federally funded Pell grants.” (Id. at &17), 

 Stirrup alleges that she spoke to superiors about correcting records regarding the 

conduct described above. (Id. at &20). Stirrup alleges that her superiors denied 

wrongdoing and acted toward her with “hostility, which increased to the point where her 

working conditions became intolerable by May 14, 2013, and she was compelled to resign 

on that day.” (Id.; see also id. at &21 (describing alleged retaliatory conduct)). 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY THESE PROCEEDINGS 

PENDING ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

 EM seeks to compel arbitration of Stirrup’s claims and to stay these proceedings 

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pending arbitration. EM argues that in October 2012, Stirrup agreed, pursuant to EM’s 

“Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy” (“ADR Policy”), to arbitrate claims of 

employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or wrongful termination. (Doc. 10, 

p.1). 

 In Response, Stirrup filed a combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion and a 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“MPSJ”). (Doc. 12). Stirrup asserts that she 

never entered into an arbitration agreement with EM and she was not aware of the ADR 

Policy until August 2013, several months after her constructive discharge. (MPSJ, p. 3). 

 After the Motion to Compel Arbitration and MPSJ were briefed, the Ninth Circuit 

decided Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) and the Court requested 

supplemental briefing in light of Davis. (See Docs. 22, 25, 26). After oral argument, 

Stirrup filed a notice of Supplemental Authority Re First Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 31), discussing the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Nguyen v. Barnes & 

Noble, Inc., __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 4056549 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2014), and EM filed a 

Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Authority (Doc. 32). 

STANDARD

 “The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. '' 1, et seq. reflects a ‘liberal 

policy in favor of arbitration.’” Davis, 755 F.3d at 1092 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. 

Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011)). It is well-settled that “‘arbitration is a 

matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 

which [s]he has not agreed so to submit.’” Samson v. Nama Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 

923 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)); 

see also Davis, 755 F.3d at 1092 (a contract to arbitrate will not be inferred absent a clear 

agreement). Further, the “district ‘court’s role under the [FAA]...is limited to determining 

(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement 

encompasses the dispute at issue. If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the 

Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.” 

Samson, 637 F.3d at 923-24 (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 

F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2000)). 

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“A motion to compel arbitration is decided according to the standard used by 

district courts in resolving summary judgment motions pursuant to Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P.” 

Coup v. The Scottsdale Plaza Resort, LLC, 823 F.Supp.2d 931, 939 (D. Ariz. 2011) 

(citations omitted). “‘If there is doubt as to whether such an agreement exists, the matter, 

upon a proper and timely demand, should be submitted to a jury.’” Id. (quoting Three 

Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.1991)). 

Thus, “‘[o]nly when there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the formation of the 

agreement should the court decide as a matter of law that the parties did or did not enter 

into such an agreement.’” Id. (quoting Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1141); see also Interbras 

Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory Shipping, Co., 663 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1981) (“To make a 

genuine issue entitling the plaintiff to a trial by jury, an unequivocal denial that the 

agreement had been made was needed, and some evidence should have been produced to 

substantiate the denial.”). Where there is a question of fact, and the party alleged to be in 

default of the arbitration agreement requests a jury trial, the matter shall be decided by 

jury. See 9 U.S.C. ' 4; see also Simpson v. Inter-Con Security Sys., Inc., 2013 WL 

1966145 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2013) (the court decides the question of whether the 

parties agreed to arbitrate on summary judgment if there is no dispute of material fact, 

otherwise the court conducts a jury or bench trial).1

 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The 

party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district 

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]...which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed true and 

all inferences are to be drawn in the light most favorable to that party. Eisenberg v. 

Insurance Co. of North Amer., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 

1

 Stirrup has requested a jury trial of the claims underlying her complaint and she has requested a jury trial on the issue whether there is a valid arbitration agreement. (Doc.1; Doc. 12, p. 15). 

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 Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will prevent the 

entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, if the record taken as a whole “could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party,” summary judgment is warranted. Miller v. Glenn 

Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). If the burden of persuasion at 

trial would be on the nonmoving party, the movant may carry its initial burden of 

production under Rule 56(c) by producing, “evidence negating an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s claim or defense...,” or by showing, after suitable discovery, that the 

“nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or 

defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 

v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Because the summary judgment standard applies to the parties’ respective motions, 

the Court, in essence, is resolving cross-motions for summary judgment. The Ninth 

Circuit instructs that “[w]hen parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, we 

consider each motion on its merits. American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego, __ F.3d. 

__, 2014 WL 3953765, *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2014) (citing Fair Housing Council of 

Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)). Further, 

“the district court [is] required to review the evidence properly submitted in support of 

[plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment] as to determine whether [plaintiff] 

presented an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Defendants.” 

Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc., 249 F.3d at 1135 (footnote omitted); see 

also id. at 1134 (“We hold that, when simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment 

on the same claim are before the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary 

material identified and submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both 

motions, before ruling on each of them.”); Walters v. Odyssey Healthcare Management 

Long Term Disability Plan, 2014 WL 4371284, *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2014) (“when 

multiple parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court considers each 

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motion on its own merits but must consider all of the evidence presented in determining 

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.”).

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. On October 3, 2012, almost 4 years after Plaintiff began 

employment with EM, an e-mail was sent to employees notifying them of the adoption of 

the ADR Policy and providing a link to the Policy as follows: 

[EM] has implemented an Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy[2] to 

promptly and fairly address all work-related disputes. This new policy is 

being distributed to all employees and allows for both informal and formal 

avenues for resolving concerns. This Policy is a term and condition of your 

continued employment with [EM] Please click here to access the ADR 

Policy. 

Please acknowledge by clicking here that you received, reviewed and agree 

to comply with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy. Questions 

regarding the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy should be directed to 

your appropriate Human Resources or Employee Relations Representative. 

(Doc. 10, p. 3 (quoting Exh. 2, &3) (underline in original); see also Doc. 10, Exh. 1, &4 

(Vice President of Employee Relations Trisha Earls stating that on October 3, 2012, 

Stirrup received an e-mail with the language set out above)). EM submitted a declaration 

from August Thalman IV, the software engineer who wrote the program to distribute the 

e-mail3

, explaining the steps to enter acceptance of the ADR Policy, which included that: 

“Plaintiff clicked on the link in the...e-mail and was taken to a login Screen[]” which 

required Plaintiff “to affirmatively enter her unique Username and Password[4] in order to 

enter the ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Acceptance’ page.” (Doc. 10, Exh. 2, &4 

& internal exh. A). Thereafter, she had to click the “accept” button to show her agreement 

 

2

 The ADR Policy provides in relevant part that: “Accepting or continuing employment with the Company after receipt of this Policy constitutes agreement to abide by its terms.” (Doc. 10, p. 2 (quoting Exh. 1, &3 (internal exh. A)). 

3

 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Stirrup did not dispute that Thalman wrote a program that sent out the e-mail.

4

 Stirrup was required to change her unique password every 90 days. Thalman states that prior to October 3, 2012, Stirrup “last reset her password on July 30, 2012 using the same Username and IP address she used to accept the ADR [P]olicy.” (Doc. 10, Exh. 

2, &8). 

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to the ADR Policy,5 and she would then be taken to “the Alternative Dispute Resolution 

Policy Acceptance Summary Screen” which informed: “Your acceptance has been 

successfully recorded.” (Id. at &&5-6). Thalman attaches to his declaration “shots” of 

computer screens which he says show: (1) Stirrup entered her unique user name and 

password into the ADR Policy Acceptance page on October 3, 2012; (2) Stirrup checked 

the box indicating she accepted and agreed to the ADR Policy (Doc. 10, Exh. 2 (internal 

exh. B)); (3) Stirrup viewed the ADR Policy Acceptance Summary Screen (Doc. 10, Exh. 

2 (internal exh. C)). (Doc. 10, Exh. 2, &&4-6). Thalman also attaches a screen shot which 

he identifies as a “Result Message” confirming that Stirrup, identified as Employee Profile 

Number 85884, accepted the ADR Policy on October 36

, 2012 at 16:07 (4:07 p.m.). (Id. at 

&7 & internal exh. D). Thalman states that all the above were completed using the IP 

address assigned to the network at AiTU where Stirrup’s work computer is located. (Id. at 

&9). “When Plaintiff electronically accepted the ADR [P]olicy, a record of her acceptance 

was automatically entered into a secure database[]” that could only be altered by the 

employee’s use of the application. (Id. at &10). The secure database is password protected 

and maintained exclusively by EM’s Information Technology Department. (Id.). No one 

 

5

 The Acceptance Screen includes the following language: 

[EM] has implemented an Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy to promptly and fairly address all work-related disputes. This policy allows for both informal and formal avenues for resolving concerns. Please click here to access the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy. This Policy is a term and condition of your continued employment with [EM]. 

By clicking below, I agree to abide by the terms of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy. I agree that if I have any dispute with the Company arising out of my employment, I will use the Company’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy as the exclusive means for resolving such dispute. I further acknowledge that I have been given the opportunity to review the terms of the Company’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, as well as the opportunity to have any questions about that Policy answered. 

(Doc. 10, Exh. 2, (internal exh. B)). 

6

 Thalman’s declaration actually states that the “Result Message” was dated October 10, 2012, however, EM asserts that reference to October 10, 2012 was a 

typographical error and Thalman’s declaration should instead read that the Result 

Message was dated October 3, 2012. EM points out that the screen shot referenced by Thalman reflects an October 3, 2012 date stamp. (Reply (Doc. 18), p. 6 n.1). 

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at AiTU has such access. (Id.). No one has requested or received access to change any 

such information regarding Stirrup. (Id.). Thalman also states that Stirrup received the 

October 3, 2012 e-mail. (Id. at &3). 

 Brian Castle, EM’s Database Services Manager reaffirms Thalman’s statements 

concerning communications received from Stirrup’s unique user name, password, and IP 

address, and that no one could alter the secure database containing the October 3, 2012 

information recorded from Stirrup’s computer unless that person had approval from two 

different people and no such approval was sought. (Doc. 18, Exh. 4, &&1, 4, 5). 

 EM also submits a declaration from Linda Hunter, Vice President of Human 

Resources for the Art Institutes, stating that on January 11, 2013, an e-mail entitled 

“Updates to Handbook and HR Policies” was sent to all employee e-mail addresses. 

(Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay of Proceedings 

and Response to MPSJ (Doc. 18), Exh. 2, &10). The e-mail stated: “‘Pleased be advised 

that the documents listed below have recently been updated.’ It then instructed all 

employees to ‘Please take the time to review the revised content.’ The ‘documents listed 

below’ included ‘Employee Handbook (revision date, December 2012)[]” and the e-mail 

contained a link to the revised Employee Handbook which “linked to the e-mail contained 

[sic] [EM’s] recently implemented [ADR] Policy as pages 20 through 24 of the 

Handbook.” (Id. at &&11, 13, 14).7

 Stirrup submits her sworn declaration statement that she never received “any 

notification at any time or in any way during my employment that EM had implemented 

or added or imposed any”...ADR Policy and if she had, she would not have assented to it 

but would have instead resigned. (Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“SOF”) (Doc. 11), Exh. 

1, &&8-10; see also id. &9). Stirrup explains her rationale for resigning from a job she has 

held since 2008, rather than agreeing to arbitration, as follows: 

 

7

 The ADR Policy beginning at p. 20 of the Employee Handbook cited by Hunter indicates the Policy applies to individuals who, inter alia, were “employed on or after the Effective Date of this Policy.” (Doc. 18, Exh. 2 (internal exh. D at pp. 20-24)). 

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I have a masters [sic] degree in management and would be very concerned 

about any limitations upon legal rights I would have in the event of any 

dispute with my employer. It’s common knowledge in the business world 

that employers try to force their employees to give up their rights to file 

lawsuits when their legal rights are violated, and divert them into private 

non-judicial arbitration where employees’ [sic] rarely prevail because the 

employers are regular “repeat customers” for the private arbitration 

companies, and if the arbitration companies don’t favor their “regular 

customers” with favorable results, their customers will go elsewhere, to 

some competing arbitration company. One only need look at the fee 

schedules charged by arbitration companies, particularly the AAA 

Employment Dispute Rules. These very high fees provide great income for 

the arbitration companies, which have minimal overhead.... 

*** 

If I had been notified of the [ADR Policy]...at any time before I was 

constructively discharged in May, 2013, I would not have assented to or 

worked subject to such an [ADR Policy]. If it was imposed upon me on a 

“take it or leave it basis”, I would have resigned, particularly since in 

October 2012, when it was supposedly transmitted to EM employees, I was 

already suspicious about possible illegal activities at EM and the 

consequences to me of doing something about such activities. 

(Doc. 11, Exh. 1, &&9-10). 

 Stirrup states she has never seen the computer screens that were submitted with 

EM’s Exhibits. (Id. at &11). Stirrup also rebuts EM’s statement that she received and/or 

acknowledged notice of the ADR Policy on Wednesday, October 3, 2012 at 4:07 p.m., by 

pointing out that she was not at her desk at that time: 

[T]hat week was the first week of the new quarter at AiTU, and I recall with 

certainty that I was away from my office and computer that afternoon, well 

before and well after 4pm, because my duties were to go to each classroom 

that afternoon to personally verify attendance in every single class. 

(Id., Exh. 1, &4).8

 

8

 Attached to Plaintiff’s Reply to Response to Her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 20) are: (1) the “Second Declaration of Plaintiff Joi N. Stirrup”; and (2) the Sworn Declaration of Sean Baker, who worked at AiTU as an IT specialist from July 2012 to December 2012. (Doc. 20, Exhs. 1, 2). “Ordinarily, a district court will not consider evidence in the context of a motion for summary judgment that is submitted for the first time in reply. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir.1996) (“Where new 

evidence is presented in a reply to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should not consider the new evidence without giving the non-movant an opportunity to respond”) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).” Head v. KommanditCase 4:13-cv-01063-CRP Document 33 Filed 09/17/14 Page 9 of 25
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 Stirrup also denies receiving an e-mail regarding the ADR Policy on January 11, 

2013 as alleged in Hunter’s declaration. (Doc. 20, Exh. 1, &5). Stirrup stresses that 

during her employment, she “read every e-mail I received because all such business 

communications were important to me and part of my duties.” (Id. at &12). Further, the 

only employee handbook Stirrup was ever given was revised May, 2011 and she has never 

before seen the version of the employee handbook attached to EM’s Response. (Id. at 

&&10-11). 

 Stirrup asserts that her password information was known to all EM IT employees 

including Thalman and Stacy Genchie, who is the EM Regional IT Director and who used 

Stirrup’s password information when attempting to correct a software issue. (Doc. 11, 

Exh. 1, &12), and “the new [Art Institute] IT female employee (whose name I do not 

recall, who assumed her job shortly before I left [in May 2013]) told me to write my 

password down (during my last 2 weeks), because the AiTU Director (CEO) Ralph 

William Van Zwol III wanted me to use a laptop instead of my desktop. I did as 

instructed and my password/log-in information was there for anyone to see in plain view 

at my workstation.” (Id.). Stirrup also submits a declaration from AiTU IT specialist and 

co-worker Sean Baker that employees have given him and other IT technicians their 

passwords to resolve equipment issues, and he recalls asking Plaintiff “at one point in 

time...” for her password for work purposes and she supplied it. (Doc. 20, Exh. 2, &&6-

 Gesellschaft MS San Alvaro Offen Reederei GMBH & Co., __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 688645, 

*6 n.11 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2014). Since the filing of Stirrup’s Reply and additional exhibits, the parties have briefed Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and have filed supplemental memoranda regarding recently decided cases. At no time has 

EM objected to Stirrup’s submission of the additional declarations or requested leave to file a sur-reply or additional evidence in response. “[B]y failing to object to or otherwise challenge the introduction of the [evidence submitted in reply] in the district court, [the 

non-moving party has] waived any challenge on the admissibility of th[e] evidence.” Getz 

v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Head, __ F.3d. at __, 2014 WL 

688645 at*6 n.11 (“Because [plaintiff] has not objected to [defendant’s] introduction of an additional declaration in reply, the court may in its discretion consider this evidence when 

deciding [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.”). Given that EM has seen no 

reason to object to the submission of additional declarations with Stirrup’s Reply, the Court will exercise its discretion to consider this evidence in resolving the pending motions. See id.

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7). Further, there is no formal process for requesting and receiving such passwords. (Id.at 

&6). 

DISCUSSION. 

At the outset, the Court addresses Stirrup’s challenges to the documents attached at 

A through C to Thalman’s declaration and upon which EM relies to support its position 

that Stirrup received and assented to the ADR Policy. (Doc. 12, pp. 5-9). According to 

Stirrup, the exhibits “are basically blank screens or views that depict absolutely nothing.” 

(Id. at p. 7). Stirrup further argues that the declarations submitted by Thalman and Earls 

lack foundation and are hearsay given that they “offer no proof as to how either Declarant 

would know for certain...” that Stirrup received the e-mail, especially given that 

“[n]either Declarant alleges they were present with Stirrup when such e-mail(s) were sent 

or received....” (Id. at p. 8). 

 Stirrup’s argument is well-taken with regard to Earls’ Declaration. Earls, who states 

that she was responsible for assisting all of the EM “schools in rolling out the ADR Policy 

to all existing employees” (Doc. 10, Exh. 1, &2), does not provide any basis whatsoever to 

support her statement at paragraph 4 of her declaration that Stirrup received the October 3, 

2012 e-mail, and the Court will not consider this statement. 

 Thalman, on the other hand, states that he personally wrote the program that sent the 

“bulk e[-]mail to employees of the Art Institute...”, including Stirrup, on October 3, 2012. 

(Id., Exh 2, &3). While the screen shots attached to Thalman’s Declaration may require 

some explanation, Thalman’s Declaration does just that. He also avows that the screen 

shots he references are true and accurate. (Id. at && 4-7). Moreover, EM also submits the 

Declaration of Database Services Manager Brian Castle confirming that “the record 

reflecting Ms. Stirrup’s agreement to the ADR Policy was submitted using her unique 

Username and Password from [her assigned] IP address....[T]he record has not been 

changed since it was recorded and stored in the secure database on October 3, 2012 at 4:07 

p.m. and I can confirm that the record is a true and accurate reflection of the record 

submitted utilizing Ms. Stirrup’s unique Username and Password from [her assigned] IP 

address....” (Doc. 18, Exh.4, &&4-5)). 

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 With regard to summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce 

evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the 

requirements of Rule 56. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (“We do not mean that the nonmoving 

party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid 

summary judgment.”). Plaintiff does not argue that the screen shots “cannot be presented 

in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). A fair reading of 

Thalman’s and Castle’s declarations supports the conclusion that the records submitted 

qualify as business records falling within the hearsay exception at Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). See 

e.g. U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co, 576 F.3d 1040, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citations omitted). Further, Fed.R.Evid. 901 “states that for authentication there 

must be ‘evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 

proponent claims.’” United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir 1996). “A 

document can be authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge.” Id.

(citation omitted). The proponent of the evidence “need only make a prima facie showing 

of authenticity ‘so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or 

identification.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 996 (9th 

Cir.1991)). “Once the prima facie case for authenticity is met, the probative value of the 

evidence is a matter for the jury.” Id. Knowledge may be inferred from a declarant’s 

professional position. In re Kaypro, 218 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2000). On the instant 

record, Thalman’s declaration and attached screen shots are properly considered in 

resolving the pending motions. However, Thalman’s statements that Stirrup received the 

e-mail and/or that she was the person who clicked on the various links and accept box are 

unsupported. Thalman only has knowledge that someone using Stirrup’s username and 

password made the entries from the IP address assigned to AiTU where Stirrup’s work 

computer was located, and the Court considers Thalman’s statements mindful of this 

limitation. 

EM’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. EM argues that Stirrup has not established a 

question of fact as to whether she assented to the ADR Policy. According to EM, 

arbitration is mandated by the fact that Stirrup continued working at AiTU after the 

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October 2012 notification to employees about implementation of the ADR Policy. (Doc. 

18, p. 39

). To support this position, EM relies heavily on a decision from this District in 

EEOC v. Cheesecake Factory, 2009 WL 1259359 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2009). In Cheesecake 

Factory, the court recognized that: “‘At-will employment contracts are unilateral and 

typically start with an employer's offer of a wage in exchange for work performed; 

subsequent performance by the employee provides consideration to create the contract.’” 

Cheesecake Factory, 2009 WL 1259359, at *4 (quoting Demasse v. ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 

500, 984 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Ariz.1999)). Moreover, because an at-will employment 

relationship can be modified at any time, the employer has the right to change the 

arbitration agreement and exercising that right would merely create a new offer of 

employment for the future, and the employee may accept that new offer by performance—

i.e., continuing to work for the employer. Id. (citations omitted); see also Davis, 755 F.3d 

at 1094 (under California10 law, where an employee continues in his or her employment 

after being given notice of the changed terms or conditions, she has accepted those new 

terms or conditions). EM also relies on Cheesecake Factory for the premise that there is no 

requirement that the employee affirmatively assent to the arbitration policy. However, EM 

overlooks that Cheesecake Factory did not involve the question whether the employees had 

notice of such policy. In Cheesecake Factory, the employees signed a two-page document 

stating they had received the employee handbook and initialed paragraphs about the 

arbitration policy. Instead, the issue in Cheesecake Factory ̧ concerned whether the 

arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Likewise, Batiste v. U.S. Veterans Initiative,

2012 WL 300729, *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2012), also cited by EM for premise that the 

employee did not have to assent to the arbitration policy, is distinguishable because 

although it is not clear whether employee signed any agreement containing the arbitration 

 

9

 Reference to page numbers correlate to the page number assigned by the CM/ECF System appearing at the top of each page of Doc. 18. 

10Stirrup has not disputed EM’s assertion that “[t]here is no meaningful difference between the Arizona state contract law principles applicable in this case and the California 

state contract law principles applied by the Davis court.” (Supplemental Brief (Doc. 25), p. 2) 

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provision, there was no dispute that he read the Employee Handbook containing the 

mandatory arbitration provision. 

 EM also argues that even if Stirrup “failed to read...[the October 2012 and January 

201311] e-mails, their distribution to Plaintiff is sufficient to bind her.” (Doc. 18, pp. 9-10 

(citing Coup, 823 F.Supp.2d 931 (citing Darner Motor Sales Inc. v. Universal 

Underwriters Insur. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 394, 682 P.2d 388, 399 (Ariz. 1984)); Ellerbee v. 

GameStop, Inc., 604 F.Supp.2d 349, 354 (D. Mass. 2009)). However, it was undisputed in 

Coup and Ellerbee that the respective plaintiffs received notice of the arbitration policy. 

See e.g. Coup, 823 F.Supp.2d at 949 (“there is no evidence that Plaintiffs’ were not given 

a copy of [defendant’s] arbitration procedures...”). Instead, the issue in Coup involved the 

plaintiffs’ failure to read the employee manual containing the arbitration policy and the 

employer’s alleged failure to provide adequate time to do so. Id. Likewise, in Ellerbee, 

the issue did not involve whether the plaintiffs received notice of the policy, but rather 

whether their refusal to sign the rules prevented the plaintiffs from being bound by the 

arbitration policy. Ellerbee, 604 F.Supp. 2d at 355. Unlike the plaintiffs in Coup and 

Ellerbee who did not dispute that they received the arbitration policy, Stirrup denies that 

she received the ADR Policy at issue. As such, Coup and Ellerbee are inapposite. 

 In contrast to cases cited by EM where the parties had in fact received the 

arbitration policy, the issue here is whether Stirrup had notice of the ADR Policy. In 

Davis, the Ninth Circuit determined that under California law, the employer was required 

 

11 EM’s distribution of the January 2013 e-mail notice about the “Update to Handbook and 

HR Policies” (Doc. 18, Exh. 2, &10), alone, (i.e., without prior notice of the ADR Policy), 

is not sufficient to bind Stirrup. Nothing in the content of the e-mail alerted employees 

about implementation of the ADR Policy, which modified the conditions of their at-will 

employment. See e.g. Davis, 755 F.3d. at 1092-93 (finding sufficient notice where a letter 

was sent to employees informing them about the modification and where a copy of the 

dispute resolution policy, including a copy of the arbitration provision, was enclosed). 

Moreover, in light of the steps EM took to inform employees of implementation of the 

ADR Policy in October 2012, EM’s argument that the January 2013 e-mail constituted 

sufficient notice fails.

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to provide employees with “reasonable notice” of the modification.12 Davis, 755 F.3d at 

1093 (also noting that if an employer has a prescribed method of notice of modification, it 

is incumbent upon the employer to follow such method). The Davis court held that the 

employer “satisfied the minimal requirements under California law for providing 

employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee handbook by sending a 

letter to...” the employees informing them of the modification, id. at 1094, together with 

“a copy of the entire Dispute Resolution Program, including the arbitration provision.” Id. 

at 1092 (also holding that under California law the employer was not required to inform 

the employee that continued employment constituted their assent to the arbitration 

provisions). 

 EM argues that Stirrup presents nothing but speculation to support her opposition 

to the Motion to Compel Arbitration. Although Stirrup states that Thalman and Genchie 

had access to her password information, she does not specify when they had such access. 

She submits an affidavit from EM IT specialist Baker that during his employment at AiTU 

from July 2012 to December 2012, employees including Stirrup gave him their passwords 

to resolve computer issues. She also states that during her last two weeks of employment 

in May 2013, she was required to write her password down and her “password/log-in 

information was there for anyone to see in plain view at my work station.” (Doc. 11, Exh. 

1, &12). Of course, this latter instance occurred after October 3, 2012 and, thus, is 

irrelevant to the matter at hand. Even assuming that Thalman and Genchie or other IT 

employees, like Baker, had access to Stirrup’s password information during the relevant 

time, Stirrup provides no rationale whatsoever as to why one of them would have accessed 

her e-mail on October 3, 2012 and accepted the ADR Policy. “Lack of motive bears on 

the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence....” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596. Although Stirrup states in her declaration that by October 

2012 she had suspicions “about possible illegal activities” at EM (Doc. 11, Exh. 1, &10), 

she does not cite any instances of such alleged illegal activity occurring until 2013 (see 

 

12 The parties do not dispute that there is no meaningful difference between California law discussed in Davis and Arizona law. 

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Doc. 1 at &&18-19), and she does not allege or state that she reported her suspicions to her 

superiors close in time to October 3, 2012. 

 However, speculation based on circumstantial evidence that someone else who had 

access to her computer login information might have entered her assent to the ADR Policy 

on October 3, 2012 is not all that Stirrup offers. She also submits her declaration that she 

“never received any notification at any time or in any way during my employment that 

EM had implemented or added or imposed any...” ADR Policy. (Doc. 11, Exh. 1, &8; see 

also id. at &6 (“The first time [Stirrup] ever knew of or heard of the...” ADR Policy was 

after she had left EM’s employ)). Stirrup also states that she would not have assented to 

the ADR Policy in October 2012 because of her belief that arbitration favors employers 

and because by that time she had suspicions about possible illegal activity at EM and the 

consequences she might face if she reported it. (Id. at &&9-10). She also states that she 

was not at her computer at the time when Thalman says she responded to the e-mail. (See

Doc. 20, Exh. 1, &4). 

 EM argues that “[w]hile Plaintiff’s self-serving statements do establish that 

Plaintiff is willing to swear to absolutely anything in an effort to further her position in 

this litigation, they do not create a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff is bound by the 

ADR Policy. No reasonable fact-finder would credit Plaintiff’s self-serving after-the-fact 

fictional account in the face of EM[]’s substantial objective evidence establishing that, on 

October 3, 2012, she acknowledged receipt of the ADR Policy.” (Doc. 18, p. 7). 

Defendant overlooks “the long-standing rule that credibility may not be resolved by 

summary judgment....” McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Stirrup’s statements that she did not receive the e-mail, was 

never notified about the ADR Policy, and was away from her computer at the relevant 

time are “direct evidence of the central fact in dispute. [Stirrup] does not ask that 

inferences be drawn in [her] favor, but that [her] testimony be taken as true.” Id. at 1208. 

As the respondent to EM’s Motion, Stirrup’s evidence is to be believed. Leslie v. Groupo, 

ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has “specifically 

rejected the notion that a court could disregard direct evidence on the ground that no 

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reasonable jury would believe it.” Id. at 1159 (citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 

Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 631 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McLaughlin, 849 F.2d 

at 1208 (“We have upheld summary judgment on the basis of Matsushita's ‘implausibility’ 

standard only where the non-movant relied on inferences from circumstantial evidence.”) 

(footnote omitted). “If the nonmoving party produces direct evidence of a material fact, 

the court may not assess the credibility of this evidence nor weigh against it any 

conflicting evidence presented by the moving party. The nonmoving party’s evidence 

must be taken as true.” T.W. Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d at 631. 

EM’s argument that Stirrup’s statements are self-serving is unavailing. See United 

States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating plaintiff’s “affidavit was 

of course ‘self-serving,’....[a]nd properly so, because otherwise there would be no point in 

his submitting it” when reversing entry of summary judgment against plaintiff where 

district court rejected affidavit as self-serving). “That an affidavit is self-serving bears on 

its credibility, not on its cognizability for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Id. Further, “[i]f the affidavit stated only conclusions, and not ‘such facts 

as would be admissible in evidence,’ then it would be too conclusory to be cognizable, 

but...”, id. (footnote omitted), here Stirrup does state material facts based on her personal 

knowledge. 

 EM also attempts to undermine Stirrup’s credibility and ability to accurately 

remember events by challenging Stirrup’s statement that in May or June of 2013, EM 

Human Resources Manager Shannon Fulmer e-mailed her a copy of the employee 

handbook, “and the handbook said nothing about any arbitration process or the...” ADR 

Policy. (Doc. 11, Exh. 1, &16). EM submits Fulmer’s declaration denying Stirrup’s 

statement that Fulmer e-mailed Stirrup the employee handbook; instead, Fulmer states she 

sent the Code of Conduct, which referenced EM’s non-retaliation policy. (Doc. 18, Exh. 

3, &5; see also id. internal Exh. A (e-mail correspondence from Fulmer to Stirrup)). EM 

argues that if Stirrup “misrepresents to this Court the document she received in May 2013, 

just a few months prior to filing her Complaint, one must question her ability to credibly 

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represent to this Court that she never received the October 3, 2012 e-mail...” notifying her 

of the ADR Policy. (Doc. 18, p. 5). 

 “It is for the trier of fact to determine the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony.” 

LaMarr v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 2006 WL 1160098, *2 (D. Ariz. May 1, 

2006) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff submitted statements that he never 

received the information that would have put him on notice of insurance policy’s 

limitations). Because Stirrup’s sworn statements constitute direct evidence of a material 

fact, Stirrup has satisfied her burden as the respondent to EM’s Motion to Compel 

Arbitration by pointing to evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See e.g. 

Id.; McLaughlin, 849 F.2d at 1209 (“Because [defendant’s] sworn statement...was direct 

evidence of a material fact...the district court erred in grating summary judgment....” in 

favor of plaintiff) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Consequently, EM’s 

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay These Proceedings Pending Arbitration is denied 

to the extent that the issue must proceed to a jury trial in accordance with '4 of the FAA. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. In addition to asserting that 

she never received the October 2012 e-mail about implementation of the ADR Policy,13

Stirrup argues that the “blast” e-mail in this case did not provide sufficient notice. 

Plaintiff cites cases where courts have found insufficient notice when employees were 

notified of arbitration agreements via e-mail. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief (Doc. 26) 

citing Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t. Sys. Corp. 407 F.3d. 546 (1st Cir. 2005); 

Hudyka v. Sunoco, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 712 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). These cases, however, did 

not hold that mass e-mail notice of arbitration policies was insufficient in and of itself. In 

fact, the First Circuit stressed that the use of mass e-mail is not determinative to the 

appropriateness of the notice. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 556. It was the content that rendered 

the notice insufficient in both Campbell and Hudyka. See e.g. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 557; 

Hudyka, 474 F.Supp.2d at 716-17. Like the Court in Campbell, this Court declines to hold 

 

13 Stirrup also challenges the January 2013 blast e-mail referenced in Hunter’s 

declaration. As discussed supra that e-mail, alone, does not constitute sufficient notice of 

the ADR Policy under Davis. 

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that notice of an arbitration policy made by mass e-mail in and of itself is per se 

unreasonable and/or otherwise insufficient. 

 In challenging the sufficiency of notice, Stirrup relies heavily on Campbell, which 

she argues is indistinguishable from the instant case. (Doc. 26, p. 7). However, Campbell

involved arbitration of claims under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 

Stirrup’s action does not. In the First Circuit, which decided Campbell, “[w]hen a party 

relies on the FAA to assert a contractual right to arbitrate a claim arising under a federal 

employment discrimination statute, the court must undertake a supplemental inquiry...” to 

determine whether “Congress, in enacting a particular statute, intended to preclude a 

waiver of a judicial forum for certain statutory claims.” Campbell, 407 F.3d at 552. The 

First Circuit determined that “[t]he appropriateness of enforcing an agreement to arbitrate 

an ADA claim hinges on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the employer's 

communications to its employees afforded ‘some minimal level of notice’ sufficient to 

apprise those employees that continued employment would effect a waiver of the right to 

pursue the claim in a judicial forum.” Id.; see also Kummetz v. Tech Mold Inc., 152 F.3d 

1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1998) (an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the ADA or 

Title VII “must at least be knowing, which means that []the choice must be explicitly 

presented to the employee and the employee must explicitly agree to waive the specific 

right in question.[]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, Davis

where the ADA was not at issue, the Ninth Circuit found notice was reasonable where the 

employer sent a letter notifying the employee that modifications had been made and 

included a copy of the alternative dispute resolution policy and the arbitration provision. 

Compare with Hudyka, 474 F.Supp. 2d 712 (e-mail notice was insufficient where, inter 

alia, there was no evidence that employees received a copy of the policy). Because 

Stirrup does not advance a claim under the ADA or other federal employment 

discrimination statute, Campbell is distinguishable. See e.g. Awuah v. Coverall North 

America, Inc., 703 F.3d 36, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Campbell limited its holding to 

‘purported waiver[s] of the right to litigate ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] 

claims.’”) (citing Campbell, 407 F.3d at 559). 

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 Stirrup also takes specific issue with the fact that EM used a link to provide access 

to the ADR Policy. (See e.g. Doc. 31). Certainly, an obscure link could tend to support a 

finding against the employer. See e.g. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548-49 (finding fault with 

link embedded at the bottom of the e-mail); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,

306 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining to enforce terms of use that “would have 

become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to the next screen”). In 

addition to Campbell and Specht, Stirrup also cites the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 

Nguyen, addressing agreements to arbitrate in the consumer context over the internet, 

which held that even if a website uses a “conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the 

website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any 

affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant 

buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive 

notice.” Nguyen, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 4056549 at *6. In contrast to the cases upon 

which Stirrup relies, the October 3, 2012 e-mail, which consisted of two paragraphs, 

reflects the link to the ADR Policy was by no means obscure, but was contained within 

the message language itself, appearing as the last sentence of the first paragraph: “Please 

click here to access the ADR Policy.” (Doc. 10, Exh. 2, &3). Upon clicking the link, the 

user would have access to the entire ADR Policy. Moreover, EM also required employees 

to enter acceptance of the ADR Policy and employees were informed that the ADR Policy 

was a term and condition of continued employment. 

 Stirrup also argues, “[f]or notice of this importance, EM could or should 

have...used e-mail which it sent directly to the employee and then confirm receipt by 

requiring an e-mail response from the employee (which EM did not do, and EM has no email confirmation from Stirrup)....” (Doc. 26, p. 6). Stirrup’s suggested procedure for 

notice is essentially what EM contends occurred in this case. First, as discussed supra, the 

case law does not reject notice merely because it was distributed by mass e-mail. Further, 

EM did in fact require the employee to affirmatively “accept” the ADR Policy. Compare 

Hudyka, 474 F.Supp. 2d 712 (e-mail notice was insufficient where, inter alia, the 

employee was not required to manifest his intention to be bound by the agreement). 

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Requiring the employee to click on the “accept” box is akin to Stirrup’s suggestion that 

the employee send an e-mail confirming receipt and acceptance, and Stirrup articulates no 

meaningful difference between the two methods.14 The procedure employed by EM in 

October 2012 case is not significantly different from the process Stirrup suggests 

constitutes adequate notice. 

 Stirrup submits her sworn statements that she never received the e-mail, she never 

was informed about the ADR Policy while working at EM, and that she was not at her 

computer when the e-mail was sent and when an acceptance was entered using her 

password and unique user name. Stirrup also states that other EM employees had access 

to her computer log-in information, though she provides no motive why these employees 

would access her e-mail in October 2012 and enter her acceptance of the ADR Policy. 

 While all inferences are to be drawn in EM’s favor as the non-moving party 

responding to Stirrup’s motion, EM must produce evidence to support its claim or defense 

by more than simply showing “there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. EM has produced evidence that management 

had “significant discussions around the topic of ensuring...that the ADR Policy was 

distributed to all employees’ e-mail addresses.” (Doc. 18, Exh. 2, &2) (emphasis in 

original). In furtherance of that goal, Thalman wrote the program that would send the email to all Art Institute employees on October 3, 2012. (Doc. 10, Exh. 2, &3). EM has 

submitted copies of screen shots, which Thalman attests are true and accurate, indicating 

that Stirrup’s unique user name and password were entered from AiTU’s IP network 

 

14 Stirrup has not pointed to binding authority supporting the conclusion that for notice to be valid in the employment context, the employee must indicate his or her acceptance of the provision. For example, in Davis ̧ there was no mention of any such acceptance on the employee’s part. Nor was the employer required to inform the employee that continued employment constituted acceptance. Davis, 755 F.3d. at 1094. 

Stirrup cites Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 4056549, which held 

that notice of an arbitration provision was not sufficient in the context of consumer transactions over the internet where the website did not provide notice to users of the term nor prompted users to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent. Ngyuen may be distinguished because it does not involve the employment context. Moreover, because 

EM did require the employee to indicate acceptance, whether assent is required for notice to be reasonable is not at issue here. 

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address, in order to: (1) access the ADR Policy acceptance page; and (2) place a check 

mark in a box indicating the ADR Policy was accepted. (Id. at &&4-5 (internal exhs. A,B). 

 As discussed, supra, EM also challenges Stirrup’s ability to recall events by 

submitting Fulmer’s declaration that she did not send Stirrup the employee handbook, as 

Stirrup contends, but, instead, Fulmer sent Stirrup the Code of Conduct. (Doc. 18, Exh. 3, 

&5; see also id. internal Exh. A (e-mail correspondence from Fulmer to Stirrup)). 

 Drawing all inferences in favor of EM supports the conclusion that EM has pointed 

to evidence that calls Stirrup’s credibility into question. Credibility determinations are the 

province of the trier of fact. Consequently, EM has set forth facts upon which a rational 

jury might return a verdict in its favor based on the evidence. See T.W. Electrical Serv., 

Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257). As such, Stirrup’s MPSJ is denied. 

ARIZONA’S ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION ACT. Stirrup also argues that the October 3, 

2012 e-mail failed to comply with the Arizona Electronic Transactions Act (“AETA), 

A.R.S. ' 44-7001, et seq. (Doc. 12, pp. 7-8). AETA provides in pertinent part: 

If the parties to a transaction have agreed to conduct the transaction by 

electronic means and a law requires a person to provide, send or deliver 

information in writing to another person, the requirement is satisfied if the 

information is provided, sent or delivered, as the case may be, in an 

electronic record that is capable of retention by the recipient at the time of 

receipt. An electronic record is not capable of retention by the recipient if 

the sender or the sender's information processing system inhibits the ability 

of the recipient to print or store the electronic record. 

A.R.S. '44-7008(A). There is no showing that the e-mails sent by EM failed to comply 

with AETA. EM submits Castle’s declaration statement that “Ms. Stirrup was able to 

retain, print, and store a copy of the ADR Policy and the screen confirming her agreement 

to the ADR Policy if she chose to do so.” (Doc. 18, Exh. 4, &6). Stirrup cites four 

additional requirements: (1) the recipient must be given an opportunity to print out and be 

provided with a hard copy; (2) the employee must be informed of the hardware and 

software required to access and receive such information; (3) the employee must be 

informed how to withdraw consent to receiving documents in electronic form; and (4) the 

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employee must be told how to obtain a hard copy of the electronic document. (Doc. 12, p. 

7). EM correctly asserts that these four “requirements” are not found in AETA. (Doc. 18, 

p. 9). Stirrup fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on this issue and her MPSJ 

as it pertains to AETA is denied.

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Stirrup argues that her claims are not subject to arbitration in light of the DoddFrank Act. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act which, in part, amended the 

Sarbanes–Oxley Act (“SOX”) to bar the arbitration of whistleblower claims. Wong v. 

CKX, Inc., 890 F.Supp.2d 411, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In light of that amendment, SOX 

now provides: 

No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the 

agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under [the Sarbanes–

Oxley whistleblower protection provision]. 

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. ' 1514(e)(2)). SOX sets out “six categories of employer conduct 

against which an employee is protected from retaliation for reporting: violations of 18 

U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343 (wire fraud), § 1344 (bank fraud), § 1348 (securities 

fraud), any rule or regulation of the SEC, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud 

against shareholders.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Administrative Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t. 

of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121, 1130 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing 18 U.S.C. ' 1514A(a)(1)).The 

Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[a] plaintiff seeking whistleblower protection under 

SOX must first file an administrative complaint with OSHA...” not later than 90 days 

after the date on which the violation occurs. Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 

749(9th Cir. 2010); see also Lockheed Martin Corp., 717 F.3d at 1128, (plaintiff bringing 

claim under SOX first filed administrative complaint with OSHA); Wong, 890 F.Supp.2d 

411 (same). 

 Stirrup argues that her claims are protected under SOX because they “contain all 

the elements of at least three of the specific offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. ['] 1514A(a)...”, 

such as: 18 US.C. ' 1341 (frauds and swindles); 18 U.S.C. ' 1343 (wire fraud); and 18 

U.S.C. ' 1344 (bank fraud—“student loans from banks based upon misrepresentations by 

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EM”). (Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“MPSJ2”) (Doc. 23), 

pp. 4-8). However, Stirrup also asserts that she was not required to exhaust administrative 

remedies under SOX, because she “does not present any claim under SOX; her Complaint 

plainly states she is seeking relief solely upon her claims for relief for (1) Discrimination 

(constructive discharge) in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.SC. ['] 3730(h), and 

(2) and [w]rongful termination of employment...in violation of Arizona law.” (MPSJ2 

Reply (Doc. 29), p. 2; see also id. at pp. 3-5). 

 The Dodd-Frank Act amended the whistleblower provisions of SOX. James v. 

Conceptus, Inc., 851 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1029-30 (S.D. Tex. 2012) “Dodd-Frank did not 

similarly amend the False Claims Act’s antiretaliation provision under which [Plaintiff] 

sues.” (Id.). (“Dodd–Frank's antiarbitration amendments to other statutes cannot be 

extended by implication to the antiretaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 

especially when Dodd–Frank amended other parts of the False Claims Act but not the 

provision at issue.”) “When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it 

is presumed to have acted intentionally.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)). Stirrup has framed her claims under the False Claims Act and 

Arizona law. As such, her claims do not qualify for the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation 

amendment to SOX, and Plaintiff’s MSPJ2 arguing otherwise is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Stirrup has presented evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material 

fact so as to defeat EM’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to require a jury to determine 

whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. Likewise, EM has presented evidence 

sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact so as to defeat Stirrup’s Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. 

Additionally, Stirrup fails to establish that she is entitled to summary judgment under 

Arizona’s Electronic Transaction Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

motions for partial summary judgment are denied. 

 

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 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 

 (1) Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay These Proceedings 

Pending Arbitration (Doc. 10) is DENIED to the extent that the matter must proceed to 

jury trial on the issue whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) is DENIED; and 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is 

DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is SET for a status conference 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2014 AT 1:45 P.M. in Courtroom 5F. 

 Dated this 16th day of September, 2014. 

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