Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00951/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00951-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN LAQUAN TRICE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

M. McDONALD, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:11-cv—00951-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DENY RESPONDENT’S MOTIONS TO

DISMISS THE PETITION (DOCS. 18,

20) AND TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENT

TO RESPOND TO THE PETITION IN

FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS AS MOOT PETITIONER’S

MOTIONS FOR A STAY (DOCS. 21, 24)

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules

302 through 304. Pending before the Court are the parties’

interrelated motions. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on August 12, 2011, on

the ground that state court remedies as to some of the claims in

the petition were not exhausted. A second, duplicative motion to

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dismiss was filed on August 15, 2011. Petitioner filed

opposition on October 18, 2011. No reply was filed. 

Petitioner filed motions for a stay and abeyance of the

action on August 22, 2011, and on October 17, 2011, in which he

sought a stay, including but not limited to a stay based on good

cause pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005).

On November 1, 2011, Respondent filed a “CONDITIONAL NONOPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A STAY AND ABEYANCE,” in

which Respondent opposed a Rhines stay because of what Respondent

perceived as a lack of good cause for a stay. Respondent

suggested a stay pursuant to Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th

Cir. 2003), and further stated that if Petitioner “should

disagree with this procedure,” Respondent sought thirty (30) days

to file formal opposition to the motion.

In light of Petitioner’s failure to reply to Respondent’s

conditional non-opposition, the Court granted Respondent

additional time to file formal opposition to Petitioner’s motion

for a stay. Respondent filed opposition on January 5, 2012.

Although the time for replying to the opposition had passed,

on February 16, 2012, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion for

an extension of time to file a reply to the opposition to the

motion for a stay. Although the time for Petitioner to file a

reply has passed, no reply has been filed.

I. Proceeding by a Motion to Dismiss

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d

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1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation

of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. –, -, 131 S.Ct. 13,

16 (2010) (per curiam). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) allows a district

court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face

of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file motions to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 4 instead of answers if the motion to

dismiss attacks the pleadings by claiming that the petitioner has

failed to exhaust state remedies or has violated the state’s

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418,

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate a motion to dismiss

a petition for failure to exhaust state remedies). Further, a

respondent may file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders

the respondent to respond, and the Court should use Rule 4

standards to review a motion to dismiss filed before a formal

answer. See, Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12.

In this case, upon being directed to respond to the petition

by way of answer or motion, Respondent filed the motion to

dismiss. The material facts pertinent to the motion are

contained in the pleadings and in copies of state records which

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have been provided by the parties, and as to which there is no

factual dispute. The Court will therefore review Respondent’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

II. Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Failure to Exhaust

 State Court Remedies 

A. Background

A jury convicted Petitioner of committing premeditated

murder with a special circumstance, two counts of robbery, and

two counts of false imprisonment. The jury also found

multiple firearm use and prior conviction allegations true. (V CT 

1231-1239.) The murder was committed in the course of a home

invasion robbery of the victim, who was a drug dealer and gang

member. 

On April 21, 2008, the court sentenced Petitioner to a term

of life without the possibility of parole, plus twenty-five years

to life in prison, and imposed additional concurrent and stayed

terms. (VI CT 1608, 1610, 1613-1616.)

Petitioner timely filed an opening brief in the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, appealing his

conviction on multiple grounds. (Lodged Item No. 1.) 

Respondent’s brief followed. (Lodged Items No. 2.) Petitioner

did not file a reply brief. On June 29, 2010, the Court of

Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and struck a restitution

order to the City of Modesto. (Lodged Item No. 3.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court on August 9, 2010 (Lodged Item No. 4), which was

denied on October 13, 2010 (Lodged Item No. 5).

///

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Petitioner filed the petition in this matter on May 25,

2011. (Doc. 1.) On June 14, 2011, this Court ordered Respondent

to file a response to the petition. (Doc. 6.)

Respondent has always conceded that Petitioner exhausted his

state court remedies as to the following claims raised in the

petition: 1) Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated when the detective testifying in his case gave

false testimony and withheld evidence; 2) his rights to due

process and equal protection, along with his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, were violated when the prosecutor displayed a

photograph of his co-defendant wearing jail attire; 3) his

constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct

when the prosecutor improperly characterized one of Petitioner’s

prior convictions as a home invasion robbery in violation of the

trial court’s ruling; 4) his right to due process as well as his

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when

the trial court ruled that his co-defendant’s counsel could not

refer to convictions of innocent persons during his closing

argument; 5) his constitutional rights were violated by the trial

court’s failure to bifurcate proceedings involving the

presentation of evidence supporting gang enhancement allegations;

6) his right to the effective assistance of counsel and other

constitutional protections were violated by the admission of an

improperly suggestive identification; and 7) his right to

confrontation was violated by the admission of testimony by a

doctor who did not perform the victim’s autopsy. (Pet. 4-7; Mot.

to Dismiss, Doc. 18, 4-6.)

///

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In the motion to dismiss, Respondent initially contended

that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies with

respect to the following three claims because Petitioner failed

to present them to the California Supreme Court: 1) (Petitioner’s

eighth ground) Petitioner’s right to due process and his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the

prosecution failed to correct a variety of inaccurate and

misleading statements by prosecution witnesses; 2) (Petitioner’s

ninth ground) Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments and his right to due process were violated

by the sentence imposed by the trial court; and 3) (Petitioner’s

tenth ground) various constitutional rights were violated because

of the cumulative errors that occurred at his trial. (Doc. 26;

Pet. 4-7.) 

In his formal opposition to the stay motion, Respondent

acknowledged Petitioner’s allegations that he had effectively

exhausted the claims by joining in co-defendants’ contentions in

state court, and Respondent conceded that Petitioner had

exhausted his eighth and ninth claims. Petitioner had joined in

his co-appellants’ arguments on direct appeal, which included a

claim regarding the prosecution’s failure to correct false

testimony (current claim eight), and a claim regarding

insufficient evidence of a firearm enhancement (current claim

nine). (Lodged Item No. 1, No. 3 at 32-40, 112-18.) After their

claims were rejected by the Court of Appeal, the co-defendants

filed petitions for review in the California Supreme Court. Codefendant Nichols renewed the claim regarding the failure to

correct false testimony, and co-defendant Dean renewed the claim

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regarding insufficient evidence of the firearm enhancement. 

(Lodged Item No. 7 at claim one, Lodged Item No. 8 at claim

seven.) In his petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s

affirmance of the judgment on direct appeal, Petitioner asked the

California Supreme Court to deem any arguments properly raised by

his co-defendants to be raised by Petitioner also. (Lodged Item

No. 4.) Thus, the record demonstrates that state court remedies

were exhausted as to Petitioner’s claims eight and nine. 

Respondent presently maintains that state judicial remedies

as to Petitioner’s tenth claim were not exhausted because neither

Petitioner nor his co-defendants raised a claim regarding the

cumulation of prejudice and error.

B. Legal Standards 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

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1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

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in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

A federal court cannot entertain a petition that is “mixed,”

or which contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). A district court must dismiss a

mixed petition; however, it must give the petitioner the choice

of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending

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or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted

claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 510 (1982); Jefferson v.

Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005).

In the absence of a clear, strategic choice to forego

presentation of a federal issue, a petitioner has “fairly

presented” a claim not named in a petition if it is “sufficiently

related” to an exhausted claim. Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d

1019, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374

F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that by exhausting his

procedural due process challenge in his state court petition, the

petitioner had fairly presented his substantive due process claim

that he was tried while mentally incompetent because “the clear

implication of his claim was that by following a constitutionally

defective procedure, the state court erred in finding him

competent”)). Claims are “sufficiently related” or “intertwined”

for exhaustion purposes when, by raising one claim, the petition

clearly implies another error. Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025. 

However, briefing a number of isolated errors that turn out to be

insufficient to warrant reversal does not automatically require

the court to consider whether the cumulative effect of the

alleged errors prejudiced the petitioner. Id.

Further, the decision in Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 930

(9th Cir. 2000), cert. den., 534 U.S. 839 (2001), suggests that a

cumulative error claim must be clearly identified in a

petitioner's brief before a state court to be exhausted. Wooten,

540 F.3d at 1026. In Solis, the petitioner set forth his

cumulative error claim in the penultimate paragraph of a lengthy

brief, stating that the “errors complained of above, individually

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and cumulatively denied appellant Due Process and a fair trial

under federal and state constitutions.” The petitioner did not

label his cumulative error claim as an issue in the contents

section of the brief; he did not argue the claim or cite

authority for it. The government did not address the claim in

its brief. The Solis court held that the district court properly

declined to review the cumulative error claim. Id. at 930.

C. Analysis 

The cumulative prejudice claim raised by Petitioner in the

petition before the Court is that Petitioner’s rights to due

process of law, present an effective defense, and a fundamentally

fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were

violated by the cumulative errors of the trial court. (Pet. 7.) 

Petitioner does not enumerate the specific errors in his initial

statement of the claim in the petition. (Id.) However, in his

statement of his case, Petitioner specifies the following:

Cumulative Prejudice, with respect to every issue not

concerning disclosure of the confidential informant

or alleged sentencing error, petitioners contend that, 

even if not prejudicial by itself, the error was 

prejudicial in the context of all the trial errors. 

Trial errors cumulatively denied them their rights to 

due process, to present an effective defense, and to a 

fundamentally fair trial.

(Id. at 15.)

Petitioner’s petition for review filed in the California

Supreme Court did not expressly mention cumulative error or list

it as an issue in the contents section. Therefore, Petitioner’s

presentation of a claim of cumulative error or prejudice must

rest on the portion of his petition for review that precedes the

heading “JOINDER IN ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY CO11

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APPELLANTS,” and which states the following: 

As permitted by rule 8.504(e)(3) of the California

Rules of Court, appellant and petitioner KEVIN LAQUAN

TRICE hereby joins in, and incorporates herein by this 

reference, the issues presented for review and the

arguments presented in support thereof set forth in 

the petitions filed by his co-appellants and copetitioners Tommy Jackson Nichols and Jermaine 

Michael Dean, as set forth in this petition, post,

at pages 3-13.

(Lodged Document 4, 2.) The cited pages of the petition

contained arguments concerning other allegations of error. 

However, in context, the quoted text incorporates all the copetitioners' arguments regardless of whether or not the arguments

were separately addressed in Petitioner’s petition for review.

The petition for review filed by co-petitioner Jermaine

Michael Dean does not contain a cumulative error argument labeled

as such. However, the petition expressly raises the cumulative,

prejudicial effect of admitting gang enhancement evidence and the

failure of the trial court to instruct on accomplice testimony

with respect to a chief prosecution witness, Philip Collins. 

(Lodged Document 8, 22.) The petition also argues that the

failure to bifurcate trial of gang enhancement allegations, in

light of the trial court’s ruling that the extensive gang

evidence of predicate offenses was ultimately not admissible, was

extremely prejudicial in light of the possibility of the jury’s

having had a reasonable doubt as to Dean’s guilt because of the

doubtful credibility of Philip Collins, and in light of further

doubt premised on the unreliability of suggestive photographic

identifications. (Id. at 32.) It was argued that a suggestive

identification of Dean tainted Collins’ in-court identification

of Dean; a series of suggestive identifications of Dean were the

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only substantial evidence linking Dean to the crime. (Id. at

37.) The petition also noted the failure to disclose evidence in

the form of a detective’s report that labeled witness Collins as

a gang member, which contradicted the detective’s testimony that

Collins was not a gang member, and argued that the failure of

disclosure had a significant effect on the verdict. (Id. at 38,

40.) The petition contained a challenge to the prosecutor’s

misrepresentation in opening argument concerning Dean’s having

repeatedly telephoned Nichols, a co-participant identified as a

perpetrator of the murder-robbery. The misstatement was

corrected by the testimony of a detective, who noted that the

number called was actually Dean’s girlfriend’s number, but Dean

argued that it had a substantial impact of the verdict because it

suggested planning activity between Dean and Nichols. Dean

expressly argued that in light of the other doubts concerning

Dean’s participation in the robbery, and considering the absence

of an accomplice testimony instruction, the failure to grant

bifurcation of the gang enhancement allegation, and the

suggestive photographic line-up, the error was prejudicial. (Id.

at 41-43.) The individual claims of error in Dean’s petition

were thus expressly presented in the context of the prejudicial

effect of the totality of the errors. 

In his petition for review, co-petitioner Tommy Jackson

Nichols did not set forth a claim of cumulative error as such. 

However, Nichols argued that the failure to disclose a testifying

detective’s report that had listed informant Collins, a chief

prosecution witness, as a gang member was material and

prejudicial because it directly contradicted the testimony of two

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detectives and informant Collins at trial and thus impeached the

credibility of crucial prosecution witnesses. (Lodged Document

7, 10-12.) It was argued that Collins’ testimony corroborated

witness Tatum’s identification of the defendants, linked the

defendants to the crime, and impeached Petitioner Trice. (Id. at

13-14.) Nichols argued that there was no physical evidence

linking the defendants to the crime scene or to a getaway trail

of discarded items, and there were discrepancies between the

physical evidence and the prosecution’s theory of the crime which

involved the location of the victim when shot and whether

Petitioner Trice had been shot at the scene of the robbery and

murder. Nichols argued that in view of the totality of the

evidence, the undisclosed evidence was material. (Id. at 17-18.) 

Nichols argued that the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct of

displaying to the jury a photograph of Nichols shackled and in

jail garb was prejudicial when combined with the perjury of the

detectives and Collins and the introduction of inflammatory gang

information. (Id. at 19-22.) Nichols argued that the

prosecutor’s repeated references to one of Petitioner Trice’s

prior convictions as an “attempted home invasion robbery” instead

of as an “attempted first-degree robbery” was prejudicial because

the instant case involved a home invasion robbery. Nichols

expressly contended that this error contributed to the cumulative

effect of the trial errors previously noted in connection with

the argument concerning the display of the inflammatory

photograph, namely, the perjury of the detectives and witness

Collins as well as the introduction of inflammatory gang

evidence. (Id. at 22-24.) Nichols challenged suggestive

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identifications of Petitioner Trice as well as co-defendants

Nichols and Dean and the tainting of subsequent in-court

identifications; he argued that trial counsel’s failure to

preserve the issue violated Petitioner’s rights. (Id. at 31-35.)

In summary, although there was no labeling of a contention

of cumulative error as such, the issue of the cumulative effect

of almost all the claims of trial error set forth in the present

petition was expressly presented to the California Supreme Court

by way of Petitioner’s joinder in the co-petitioners’

contentions. The contention regarding the trial court’s refusal

to permit counsel to argue about innocently convicted persons and

a claim concerning the right to confront an expert who performed

an autopsy were not expressly raised as part of a cumulative

error claim before the state’s highest court. However, fairly

read, in the petitions for review the cumulative effect of the

trial errors was expressly raised and argued. Further, legal

argument was made in support of the claim of cumulative error. 

(See, e.g., Lodged Document 8 at 24.) 

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s tenth claim concerning

the cumulative effect of the trial errors was fairly presented to

the state courts because it was set forth with sufficient clarity

and was accompanied by argument and authority. Accordingly, it

will be recommended that Respondent’s motion to dismiss the

petition be denied.

Further, because it appears that all Petitioner’s claims

were exhausted, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s motion

for a stay to exhaust any unexhausted claims be dismissed as

moot, the Respondent be directed to file a response to the

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petition, and the parties otherwise proceed in accordance with

the Court’s previous order of June 14, 2011, which directed a

response to the petition. 

III. Recommendation 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be DENIED;

and 2) Petitioner’s motion for a stay of this proceeding be

DISMISSED as moot; and

3) Respondent be DIRECTED to file a response to the petition

no later than forty-five (45) days after the date of service of

this order, and the parties be DIRECTED to proceed in accordance

with the Court’s previous order of June 14, 2011, concerning the

filing of a response and traverse.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if

served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

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1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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