Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02156/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

MELODY ROGERS MINER PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2156

LOCAL 373, INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

and LOCAL 516, INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS DEFENDANT

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Now on this 30th day of January, 2007, there comes on for

consideration Defendant Local 516, International Brotherhood of

Teamsters’ (“Local 516") Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting documents (Docs. 14-16, 18, 23, and 24) and

Plaintiff’s Response and supporting documents (Doc. 27 ). Also

before the court is Defendant Local 373, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters’ (“Local 373") Motion for Summary

Judgment and supporting documents (Docs. 19-22) and Plaintiff’s

response and supporting documents (Doc. 27), as well as Local

516's Reply (Doc. 32). 

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co.,

122 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden

of establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the

record and of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a

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 Plaintiff asserts in her response to summary judgment 1

that there are common law or state law claims for breach of

contract which are not addressed in Defendants’ Motions for

Summary Judgment and as a result Defendants’ Motions are for

partial summary judgment. However, as stated below, the Court

finds these state law claims preempted and thus the Motion for

Summary Judgment is relevant to all claims.

2

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). To defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond

the pleadings and designate specific facts showing a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324. Thus, the “basic

inquiry” for purposes of summary judgment is “whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Quick v. Donaldson Co.,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted). 

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 10, 2005. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff alleges breach of contract/collective bargaining

agreement by Local 373 and a breach of the duty of fair

representation by Local 516. Defendants separately seek summary

judgment as to all counts of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

1

Background

Plaintiff began working for Local 373 in 1986 as an

Executive Secretary. In 1991, Local 373 and Local 516 entered

into an Office Clerical Addendum which covered Plaintiff’s

employment with Local 373. Local 516 was to represent Plaintiff

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in matters with her employer, Local 373. The agreement was for

clerical staff, and Plaintiff was the only clerical staff member

of Local 373. Plaintiff then paid a service fee and

administrative fee to Local 516. Defendants claim this fee was

for representation, while Plaintiff claims it was voluntary on

her part and representation was not predicated on its payment.

The Clerical staff agreement provided for Plaintiff to be

covered under the Teamsters’ National Master Freight Agreement,

with a modification of the pay scale.

In 1997, a “Titan” message was sent to Teamsters Locals

directing them to issue withdrawal cards to all employees and

staff who are members of, or represented by, another labor

organization and are also dues paying members of a Teamster

local union. This Titan message referenced a message sent in

1995 which discussed the conflict of interest that could arise

in such situations. Plaintiff was aware of both directives and

ceased paying the administrative fee approximately the same time

it was issued. 

When Plaintiff was hired as a secretary for Local 373, her

father was the Business Manager/Secretary Treasurer. After her

father retired, Randall Sanderson took over as the Business

Manager/Secretary Treasurer of Local 373. Plaintiff continued

in her position. When Sanderson resigned, Plaintiff let it be

known she was interested in the Business Manager/ Secretary

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Treasurer position. However, Stacy Fox was appointed.

Plaintiff made comments that she did not want to work with Fox

and the relationship between the two became strained to the

point Plaintiff characterized it as “horrible.” Plaintiff was

sent home on May 2, 2005 and terminated the following day. 

Plaintiff claims that under the agreement made with Local

373 and Local 516, she was covered under the National Master

Freight Agreement. Plaintiff further claims that under that

contract, she was entitled to a statement of reason for her

termination and a warning, but received neither. Additionally,

under the National Master Freight Agreement, Plaintiff could not

be terminated without just cause. 

Plaintiff filed a protest with the office of the Election

Supervisor alleging termination because she sought a union

office. The Office of Election Supervisor denied Plaintiff’s

protest and Plaintiff did not appeal. She also filed a Charge

Against Labor Organization or its Agents with the National Labor

Relations Board alleging Local 516 had violated the National

Labor Relations Act for failing to process a grievance. That

charge was later withdrawn. Plaintiff filed a general grievance

seeking review of her termination by the Multi-State Grievance

Committee. In the hearing before the Multi-State Grievance

Committee, Plaintiff was represented by Local 516. The MultiState Grievance Committee sustained Local 373's objection that

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there was no collective bargaining agreement and her grievance

was not heard on the merits. Both Local 373 and Local 516 agree

there is no collective bargaining agreement in effect covering

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff then brought this case, alleging a violation of

Section 301 of the Nation Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Plaintiff alleges a violation of a collective bargaining

agreement and a breach of duty of fair representation.

Defendants argue there was no collective bargaining agreement in

effect when Plaintiff was terminated. Further, Defendants claim

that even if such a bargaining agreement existed, the acts by

Local 516 did not violate the duty of fair representation. 

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides that

“[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees may be brought in any

district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the

parties . . ..” The Supreme Court has held that this section

preempts state law claims that allege a violation of a provision

of a collective bargaining agreement. Local 174, Teamsters v.

Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962). Such claims must be

resolved through the grievance and arbitration procedures

contained in the collective bargaining agreement or brought

under § 301 of the LMRA. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

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202, 219-20 (1985). 

State law claims that are “substantially dependent” upon an

analysis of the terms or provisions of a collective bargaining

agreement or are “inextricably intertwined” with consideration

of the terms or provisions of a collective bargaining agreement

are also preempted by § 301. Id. at 213. However, when a “state

law claim is independent - in that its resolution ‘does not

require construing the collective-bargaining agreement’ - it is

not preempted.” St. John v. International Association of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local No. 1010, 139 F.3d 1214,

1217 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,

Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988)). 

Section 301 is premised on the principle that the

relationships created by a collective bargaining agreement must

be defined by application of “an evolving federal common law

grounded in national labor policy.” Bowen v. United States

Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1983); see also Lucas

Flour, 369 U.S. at 103 (“The possibility that individual

contract terms might have different meanings under state and

federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon

both the negotiation and administration of collective

[bargaining] agreements.”). Further, § 301 preemption is

necessary to “preserve[ ] the central role of arbitration in our

system of industrial self-government.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S.

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at 219.

In this case, the employment contract Plaintiff alleges was

breached is the collective bargaining agreement and those claims

are preempted. See Oberkramer v. IBEW-NECA Service Center,

Inc., 151 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 1998).

Existence/Validity of Collective Bargaining Agreement

Although Local 373 and Local 516 entered into an agreement

regarding Plaintiff, Defendants contend this agreement ceased

when the 1997 Titan directive was issued. As a result, the

Defendants argue this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction

under § 301 as no contract exists. Plaintiff contends the 1997

Titan does not in and of itself terminate the contract. She

contends that she was treated as if the agreement was in place

after the 1997 Titan, and never was given notice that the

agreement was not in place. 

Before the Multi-State Grievance Committee, Defendant 373

elicited a point of order that no Collective Bargaining

Agreement existed between Local 516 and Local 373. Defendant

373 argued the Titan sent in 1997 terminated any agreement that

may have existed. The Multi-State Grievance Committee

determined “based upon the facts presented and the unsigned

contractual agreement, the company, which is Local 373's point

of order is upheld.” and Defendants argue this determination is

due deference. While the Grievance Committee did not have a

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copy of the signed agreement it saw an unsigned version, and

heard argument setting forth the basic arguments the parties

made to this Court. It is clear that the committee did not, as

Plaintiff appears to contend, base its decision solely on the

lack of a signed contract. 

The Court agrees the Grievance Committee is due some

deference. See McKinney v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 954 F.2d

590 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that determination of whether a

contract was expired or terminated is the province of the

grievance panel or arbiter). Moreover, the Court finds there

was no contract in place at the time of Plaintiff’s termination.

The undisputed facts demonstrate the Titan messages sent are

clear that any such contracts are to be disclaimed. Thus, there

was no contract in place and this court lacks jurisdiction under

Section 301.

In addition, Defendants argue that a bargaining unit of

only one employee is not appropriate, so no valid bargaining

unit ever existed. Given the Court’s decision regarding the

termination of the contract, the Court does not reach this

issue.

Breach of Duty of Fair Representation

Even if a valid contract were in place, the Court finds

that as a matter of law there was no breach of a duty of fair

representation. If an employee does not agree with the results

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reached through the procedures of the collective bargaining

agreement, the employee, in order to bring an individual suit

directly against the employer for breach of the agreement, must

allege and prove the union breached its duty of fair

representation. See Bills v. United States Steel L.L.C., 267

F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Carter v. Ford Motor Co.,

121 F.3d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir.1997)); Trompeter v. Boise Cascade

Corp., 877 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir.1989). This type of “hybrid”

action requires the employee to show both the union breached its

duty of fair representation and the employer breached the

agreement in order to prevail against the employer. Scott v.

United Auto., 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Vaca, 386

U.S. at 186-87). If the Plaintiff fails to establish a breach

of duty of fair representation in the processing of a grievance

through arbitration or joint state grievance committee, the

Court can not review the decision. Warren v. Teamsters, 544

F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1976).

A union is granted broad latitude in dealing with its

members and its performance is viewed in a highly deferential

light. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78

(1991). A breach of the duty of fair representation occurs only

when a union's conduct is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad

faith.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); see also Carter

v. Ford Motor Co., 121 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1997). A breach can

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also occur when the conduct is so unreasonable as to be

“irrational.” O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78. “Mere negligence, poor

judgment, or ineptitude by a union is insufficient to establish

a breach of the duty of fair representation.” Buford v. Runyon,

160 F.3d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that Local

373 or Local 516 was acting in an arbitrary or discriminatory

manner to her or that its actions were unreasonable to the point

of being “irrational.” Plaintiff appears to be alleging the

breach of fair representation occurred due to Local 516's bad

faith – primarily because it failed to provide the grievance

committee with a signed copy of the agreement between it and

Local 373. However, the undisputed facts show that Local 516

did pursue representation once a copy of the contract was

received. Additionally, it is undisputed that Local 516 sought

a signed copy of the contract, but was unable to locate one. 

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that Local 516 did attempt

to find the contract, but contends it did not do enough or use

all available avenues for finding the contract. 

Plaintiff was represented at the Grievance Committee by

Local 516, who Plaintiff stated took up her cause and tried to

convince the grievance committee to hear her grievance.

Plaintiff even stated she was thankful for her representation

and thought that Local 516 did a good job representing her at

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the committee hearing. 

Union representatives are not lawyers and are not held to

the same standards in presenting cases as attorneys. Buford,

160 F.3d at 1203. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a breach

of the duty of fair representation occurred and no material

issue of fact exists that would preclude summary judgment.

Accordingly, Defendant 373 and Defendant 516's Motions for

Summary Judgment (Docs. 14 and 19) are GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2007.

 /s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Dated: January 30, 2007 Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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