Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00005/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

German Felipe Reyes-Reyes, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 14-00005 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

January 2, 2014. Respondents filed an Answer to First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 11) on May

1, 2014. Petitioner docketed a reply (Doc. 12) to the answer to

his petition on May 16, 2014.

I Procedural History

An indictment filed in Maricopa County Superior Court

on February 6, 2012, charged Petitioner with one count of

possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony (Count

1), and three counts of misconduct involving weapons, alleged as

class 4 felonies (Counts 2, 3, 4). See Answer, Exh. B. The

state subsequently filed allegations of prior convictions and

allegations of aggravating circumstances other than prior

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convictions, asserting that Petitioner committed the charged

offenses while on felony release. Id., Exhs. C, D, E. Prior to

trial, Counts 3 and 4 were dismissed without prejudice. Id.,

Exh. F at 4. 

The testimony at Petitioner’s trial is summarized by

Respondents as follows:

On the evening of January 13, 2012, Phoenix

Police Officers David Walker and Ann Hughes,

who were working in an off-duty capacity

although in uniform, providing security for

an apartment complex located at 1717 West

Glendale in Phoenix. At about 8:00 p.m., as

they were driving through the complex, the

officers saw a black 1994 Mercedes parked “in

one of the parking coves on the east side of

the apartment complex.” A registration check

on the Mercedes revealed that it was

registered to Amy Marie Siegel at 411 West

Lincoln Avenue in Phoenix. Officers Walker

and Hughes approached the Mercedes on foot,

saw that the sole occupant of the vehicle,

Petitioner, was talking on a cell phone, and

engaged him in a consensual encounter.

Petitioner said he was “waiting for a

friend.” Upon learning that there was an

outstanding misdemeanor warrant out for

Petitioner’s arrest, Officer Walker placed

him under arrest and handcuffed him. Pursuant

to the arrest, Officer Walker searched

Petitioner. In Petitioner’s right front

pants pocket, Officer Walker found a baggie

of methamphetamine (meth). In Petitioner’s

“corner” (watch) pocket, Officer Walker found

a second baggie of meth. Before beginning a

search of the Mercedes, while standing

outside the driver’s door, Officer Walker saw

a “black handgun” on top of a black canvas

bag underneath the folding armrest of the

center console; though the canvas bag itself

was not visible from outside the vehicle, the

gun was sticking out 1 to 2 inches. The gun

was loaded. Officer Walker found another

baggie of meth inside the black canvas bag,

as well as an empty baggie.

Id. at 3-4.

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 Prior to his trial, Petitioner filed a pretrial motion

to suppress all evidence collected following his allegedly

“illegal seizure” by law enforcement officers, claiming that the

officers lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to

“contact him.” Id., Exh. I at 1 & 5. At an evidentiary hearing

conducted by the state trial court regarding the motion to

suppress, Petitioner and Officers Walker and Hughes testified.

Petitioner testified that, after being contacted in his car and

telling the police officer that he did not have a driver’s

license,

 Officer Walker then asked for his “name and

Social Security number,” and that he provided

that information to them. Petitioner said

that he was then told he was under arrest for

an outstanding warrant. Petitioner testified

that he told the officer that he was “on

probation,” had just come from his “probation

officer” who had not arrested him, and that

it was “impossible” that he had an

outstanding warrant. Petitioner said that

the warrant was “from 2007 in Yuma,” and the

officers showed it to him on their computer

screen. Petitioner said his interaction with

the officers felt like “an interview” and he

did not feel “free to leave.” 

 Petitioner claimed that the officers’ patrol

car was parked “[r]ight behind” the Mercedes

[he was driving], and Officer Hughes “was

right in the back” behind the Mercedes, so he

could not back up, and that there was a

“sidewalk” in front of him. 

 Petitioner acknowledged that the officers

never activated their red and blue flashing

lights, did not tell him to stay or that he

was not free to leave, and that he never told

the officers that he did not want to talk to

them or wanted to leave.

Answer at 5-6. 

Respondents summarize the arresting officer’s testimony

as follows:

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 On January 13, 2012, at about 8:15 p.m.,

Officers Walker and Hughes saw a black

Mercedes parked on the east side of the

complex “taking up two parking spaces.”

Officer Hughes conducted a registration check

on the Mercedes, and they continued their

patrol through the apartment complex. About

10 to 15 minutes later, they saw the Mercedes

“coming back through the complex” southbound,

as the officers were approaching northbound.

The Mercedes pulled into “the second parking

cove just south of Glendale,” then “parked

directly in front of a known drug location.”

Officer Walker, who had worked security at

the complex for about 3 months, arrested two

to three people in a “normal night” for drug

possession in the apartment complex. After

the Mercedes parked in front of the drug

house, Officers Walker and Hughes pulled into

a parking lot just north of the cove and

parked for “about five minutes” to see if the

Mercedes “would come back out.” Officer

Walker did not activate the patrol car’s

overhead lights. He approached the driver’s

side of the Mercedes and greeted Petitioner

by asking, “[H]ey, how are you doing?”

Officer Walker asked Petitioner, “[D]o you

have a driver’s license?” Petitioner said he

did not. Petitioner said he was “waiting for

a friend that was in one of the apartments.”

Officer Hughes informed Officer Walker that

Petitioner “had a warrant,” so Officer Walker

arrested Petitioner, and then searched him

incident to arrest. Officer Walker testified

that he did not tell Petitioner he had to

stay or talk to him, that Petitioner could

have driven away, and that the officers would

not have pursued Petitioner had he driven

off. Nevertheless, because Petitioner had

been “parked directly in front of a known

drug location” for 5 minutes, Officer Walker

felt it was “suspicious.” Based upon his

“current job” in narcotics, Officer Walker

believed they had “reasonable probable cause

[reasonable suspicion] to stop the vehicle”

and “talk to them.”

Id. at 6-7.

The state trial court denied the motion to suppress,

concluding that “[a] police officer does not need reasonable

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suspicion or cause to approach a person and ask questions” and

Petitioner “was free to leave or not talk to the officers.”

Id., Exh. F at 78. Because the court found there was no Fourth

Amendment seizure, the trial court did not reach the issue of

whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain

Petitioner. 

In a decision issued July 12, 2012, a jury convicted

Petitioner on Counts 1 and 2. Id., Ex. G at 45 & 133-34. The

trial court found that Petitioner had three historical prior

felony convictions and that he had committed the offenses while

on probation. Id., Exh. H at 42. Petitioner was sentenced to

presumptive, concurrent terms of ten years imprisonment on each

count of conviction. Id., Exh. H at 46.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner asserted the

trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to

suppress the evidence based upon an alleged Fourth Amendment

violation when officers seized him and required him to identify

himself in order to conduct a warrant check. Id., Exh. L. In

a decision issued June 20, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals

rejected Petitioner’s argument and affirmed his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. N. The appellate court held that the

trial court had not abused its discretion in denying

Petitioner’s motion, and that the encounter between Petitioner

and the officers was consensual. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner

sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,

which denied review on December 4, 2013. Id., Exh. P.

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 On December 18, 2013, Petitioner initiated a state

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner was appointed counsel

to represent him in that action. See Doc. 4, Exh. R.

Respondents aver that proceeding is still pending. 

On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant

federal habeas action, asserting a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights. In the order directing Respondents to answer

the habeas corpus petition, the Court noted Petitioner’s pending

petition for post-conviction relief and cautioned Petitioner

that, “if he [chose] to proceed only on the claim in his current

habeas corpus case, this Court likely will be unable to consider

any claims in his pending Rule 32 proceeding unless Petitioner

first obtains authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals to file a second or successive habeas corpus case...”

See id. at 2. Petitioner has not sought to withdraw or stay his

habeas action. 

Respondents allow that the petition is timely and that

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was exhausted in the state

courts.

II Analysis

A federal District Court may not grant federal habeas

relief on a Fourth Amendment claim in a section 2254 action.

See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976);

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997);

Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990). A

federal court may review Fourth Amendment claims in habeas

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corpus proceedings only if the state court proceeding denied the

petitioner an “opportunity for full and fair litigation of a

Fourth Amendment claim.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 482, 96 S. Ct. at

3051–53. See also Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-28 (9th

Cir. 1993) (“We reverse the district court’s decision granting

[the petitioner] habeas relief without consideration of Stone v.

Powell. We remand for further proceedings to afford [the

petitioner] the opportunity to show that the state court did not

offer him a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claim.”). 

Whether the state court correctly decided the claim, is

irrelevant on habeas review. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81

F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996)(“[t]he inquiry is whether

petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was

correctly decided.”).

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492–495, 96

S.Ct. 3037, 3051–3053 [] (1976), the Supreme

Court held that “where the State has provided

an opportunity for full and fair litigation

of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted federal habeas corpus

relief on the ground that evidence obtained

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at trial.” 428 U.S. at 494, 96

S.Ct. at 3052 (internal citation omitted)[].

Stephens concedes he had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his claim in the

state court. Thus, Stone barred the district

court from considering on collateral review

whether the state court erred in ruling that

the search was lawful.

Stephens v. Attorney General of Calif., 23 F.3d 248, 249 (9th

Cir. 1994). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

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the state courts did not fully and fairly consider his Fourth

Amendment claim. See Woolery, 8 F.3d at 1328; Young v. Conway,

715 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2013). 

The record of the state proceedings in this case

compels the conclusion that Petitioner received a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. See Moormann

v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner’s

counsel filed a motion to suppress in the trial court and the

trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The

state trial court’s ruling and the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision in Petitioner’s direct appeal indicate Petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment arguments were carefully considered by both the

trial and the appellate court.

In his reply to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts the state courts’ conclusions that his Fourth

Amendment rights were not violated were “unreasonable and claim

did not receive full and fair consideration” and were contrary

to published opinions of the United States Supreme Court.

Petitioner contends the officers could not lawfully contact him

regarding a “non-extraditable misdemeanor traffic warrant” and

that after his initial contact with the officers he was not free

to leave because once a police officer asks for identification

an individual has been “stopped” and the stop is no longer

consensual. Petitioner contends that “no reasonable person”

would feel free to ignore an officer’s request to provide

identification and “just walk off.” Doc. 12. 

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Other than disputing the legal holding reached by the

Arizona courts, Petitioner does not identify a basis for

claiming that the evidentiary hearing was not a full or fair

opportunity to present his Fourth Amendment claims. Based on

the record, Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity in the

state court to litigate his claims, and took full advantage of

the opportunity. Therefore, the Court should not consider the

merits of and may not grant relief on Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s claim of a Fourth Amendment violation was

fully and fairly litigated in the state courts and, accordingly,

consideration of the merits of the claim is barred by the

doctrine of Stone v. Powell.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Reyes Reyes’

motion for federal habeas relief be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

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parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 20th day of May, 2014.

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