Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_12-cv-00128/USCOURTS-alnd-7_12-cv-00128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

ISRAEL HENRY,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ALLIED INTERSTATE, INC.,

 Defendant.

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 Case Number: 7:12-cv-00128-JHE

 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Israel Henry (“Henry”) initiated this action in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa 

County, Alabama, against Defendant Allied Interstate, Inc. (“Allied”) alleging claims under the 

Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count I) and state law 

claims for invasion of privacy (Count II); negligent, wanton, and/or intentional hiring, training, 

and supervision of debt collectors (Count III); and negligent, wanton, and intentional conduct 

(Count IV). (Doc. 1-1). Allied subsequently removed the action to this Court, (Doc. 1). Allied 

now moves for partial summary judgment, seeking a judgment on all of Henry’s state law claims 

and on two of Henry’s FDCPA claims. (Doc. 27). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for 

review. (Docs. 28, 33, & 37). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends 

Allied’s motion, (doc. 27), be GRANTED. Because the motion for summary judgment does not 

address all of Henry’s claims, several FDCPA claims remain pending. 

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if

the pleadings, the discovery, and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there

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FILED

 2015 Jan-12 AM 11:14

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:12-cv-00128-SLB Document 38 Filed 01/12/15 Page 1 of 14
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” “Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to

establish there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).

The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157,

(1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor). Any factual disputes will be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor when sufficient

competent evidence supports Plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco,

283 F.3d 1275, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2002) (a Court is not required to resolve disputes in the nonmoving party’s favor when that party’s version of the events is supported by insufficient

evidence). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally

insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mtn. Park, Ltd. V. Oliver, 836 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.

1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will

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not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” 

Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). 

II. Factual Background

In connection with his studies at ITT Technical Institute, Henry took out two student 

loans, one in approximately 2002 through Sallie Mae and a Direct Loan in 2006 through the 

Department of Education (“DOE”). (Doc. 29-1 at 16-17 (59:8-62:21)).1 Although Henry paid 

off the 2002 Sallie Mae loan, he only made approximately twelve payments of $400 on the 2006 

Direct Loan. (Id.). When Henry stopped making payments (approximately May 2010 because 

his wife lost her job), he did not contact the DOE regarding his asserted inability to make 

payments or to make arrangements for reduced payments. (Id. at 17 (63:1-3; 64:5-9)). 

On or about July 24, 2011, the DOE retained Allied to attempt to collect the balance 

Henry owed on the delinquent loan. (Doc. 29-2 at 12 (11:11-19)). Allied is a debt collection 

agency, and the DOE contracts with Allied to collect defaulted student loans. (Doc. 29-3 at 12 

(41:4-6; 43:13-17)). Henry asserts his first contact with anyone regarding the delinquency of his 

loan came from Allied. (29-1 at 17 (64:10-18)). On Friday, August 26, 2011, Henry received an 

email from one of his co-workers, George Odom, stating “[j]ust got a call wanting you and it was 

an ‘Unidentified’ 877 number so I screened it. When I inquired he said kind of rudely that it was 

‘personal business.’ His name and # is Mike Southerington @877-220-****.” (Id.at 18 (66:2-

67:20)). Henry agrees Southerington, an Allied collector, handled the call appropriately. (Id. at 

19 (69:8-14)). Henry “googled” Southerington’s phone number and discovered it belonged to 

Allied. (Id.at 19 (70:10-15)). Around this time, Henry discussed with this wife the possibility of 

1 All citations to the record are to document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s 

electronic filing system (CM-ECF), except for citations to depositions, which refer to both the 

CM-ECF page number and the deposition page (and often line numbers). Internal page numbers 

have been disregarded with the exception of page numbers for deposition transcripts. 

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paying $100 per month on the loan. (Id. at 19-20 (72:19-73:19)).

On Monday, August 29, 2011, Henry called Southerington from his workplace. (Doc. 

29-1 at 20 (75:19-76:4)). Henry and Southerington discussed the defaulted loan and payment 

arrangements. (Id.at 21 (77:1-15)). At this point, Southerington asked for Henry’s monthly 

income and monthly bills and told Henry he needed to make a down payment of “three hundred 

and something [dollars]” and then make monthly payments of two hundred dollars for ten 

consecutive months. (Id. at 21 (77:7-78:6)). Henry told Southerington he could not afford to 

make those payments, and he could only make $100 payments. (Id. at 21 (78:8-17)). 

Southerington informed Henry that paying only $100 a month was not an option and that the 

previous option was “what [Allied] could take.” (Id.at 21 (78:18-79:2)). 

Henry initially testified Southerington then told him “[A]llied would start – or that they 

would garnish [his] wages.” (Doc. 29-1 at 21 (79:3-10)). Henry continued by testifying “[w]hen 

I told [Southerington] what I could pay, he said that they would garnish my wages, and then I 

told him that I couldn’t pay that, there was no way, and that’s when he said, well, the 

garnishment process is already started.” (Id.at 22 (81:1-6)). It is unclear from Henry’s testimony 

whether he is alleging Southerington said Allied would garnish his wages, Allied had already 

began garnishing his wages, or both. (See id.at 22 (80-82)). Henry testified this alleged threat of 

garnishment got a lot of things “going through [his] head” including losing vehicles. (Id. at 26 

(99:8-16). There is no evidence Allied ever garnished Henry’s wages. 

During this call, Henry asked Southerington whether he had added up his monthly bills, 

and Southerington replied that he had not. (Doc. 29-1 at 22, 23 (82:20-22; 87:1-21)). Henry told 

Southerington if he would add up the monthly expenses, he would see a negative cash flow of 

about $70 per month. (Id.at 23 (87:1-21)). Opposing counsel questioned Henry about this, 

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because, based on the numbers, it appeared Henry had approximately $1,000 left over each 

month. (Id.at 23 (87:22-88:4). Henry testified he must have given additional bill amounts to 

Southerington, but could not specifically identify any at his deposition. (Id.). Later in the 

deposition, Henry testified he could not remember whether he had given a total amount to 

Southerington or if he had provided him the amount of each individual bill. (Doc. 29-1 at 22-23 

(82-91)). At his deposition, Southerington confirmed the contents of his accounts notes from the 

August 29, 2011 call (specifically the call at 9:42). (Doc. 29-4 at 44 (171:5-17)). The notes state 

he “[e]xplained rehab and told him possibility of AWG [administrative wage garnishment], 

taxes, et cetera. Updated financial information.

2

 Told me he only had $160 a month left over. 

Told me not possible to garnish. Told him his is a federal loan and need to go to court since it’s 

a federal loan. Told him $360 a month first month then $190 a month.” (Id.). When asked 

about Allied’s account notes for the August 29, 2011 call, Henry could not recall whether 

Southerington explained the rehabilitation process, mentioned the possibility of garnishment or 

the possibility his income tax refund could be seized, or stated that because it was a federal loan, 

there was no need to go to court to get a garnishment order. (Doc. 29-1 at 30 (113:3-114:19)). 

Nor could Henry recall whether he told Southerington he only had $160 per month after bills 

were paid or that it was not possible to for Allied to garnish his wages on this call. (Id.). 

Southerington then handed the call to assistant vice-president of operations Jonathan 

Hannahs, whom Henry described as a “wage garnishment specialist.” (Doc. 29-1 at 27 (104:10-

15). Hannahs testified Henry refused a rehabilitation of his Direct Loan and stated Allied could 

2 Henry’s contention Southerington did not record or write down his financial information 

is not supported by the record. The cited testimony only refers to Southerington not adding up 

the numbers or computing the figures. (Doc. 29-1 at 22-23 (82-91)). It is also unclear from 

Henry’s testimony whether he gave Southerington the amount of each of his monthly bills or if 

he just gave him a monthly total. (Id.). 

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not pursue garnishment due to the loan being a “Sallie Mae . . . loan.” (Doc. 29-2 at 45 (44:2-

12)). Hannahs tried to explain that was incorrect and that he did not want Henry making a 

decision based on inaccurate information. (Id.). Hannahs also told Henry the only requirement 

to start wage garnishment on this type of loan would be to send a letter to the employer. (Id. at 

27 (104:17-23)). Henry asked whether any check he sent should be made payable to the DOE 

and stated he would send in what he could, i.e., something less than the amount that would 

qualify him for a rehabilitation program. (Id.at 45-46 (44:14-45:15)). According to Hannahs, 

Henry again said Allied could not garnish his wages due to him “making payments.” (Doc. 29-2 

at 46-47 (45:19-46:16)). Hannah testified he advised Henry that payment arrangements need to 

be “acceptable,” such as qualifying for a rehabilitation program, and that Hannahs would mark 

the account as “unable to pay.” (Id.at 48 (47:4-22)). The testimony Henry cites in response to 

Hannahs’ testimony does not contradict or dispute it. (See doc. 33 at 12-13 (citing doc. 29-1 at 

27, 28 (104:14-23, 107:10-16)). Regarding this conversation, Henry testified he may have told 

Hannahs he could not do a rehabilitation and that Allied could not pursue garnishment due to the 

type of loan at issue. (Doc. 29 at 28 (105:12-106:17)). Henry testified he could not recall 

whether Hannahs stated Henry had incorrect information, whether he (Henry) asked if any check 

he wrote should be made payable to the DOE, whether he told Hannahs he would send what he 

could, whether he told Hannahs that Allied could not garnish his wages due to him making 

payments, and whether Hannahs told him any payment arrangement would need to be 

acceptable. (Doc. 29-1 at 28 (106:2-23)). 

Henry called Allied a second time on August 29, 2011. (Doc. 29-1 at 29 (112:10-18)). 

Henry testified he did not recall, as the account notes indicate, whether he hung upon 

Southerington after Southerington tried to assist him. (Id. at 29-30 (112:19-113:5)). Henry 

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further testified he was on his cell phone at the time and could have lost cellular service (as 

opposed to intentionally terminating the call). (Id.). 

Henry further testified during a final call with Allied on August 29, 2011, he spoke with 

another representative.3 (Doc. 29-1 at 30 (115:9-14)). Henry told the representative he’d like to 

make payments, and (according to Henry) the representative told him they could work out some 

sort of payment arrangement. (Id.at 31 (117:1-4)). Henry asked the representative to send a 

letter confirming this. (Id (117:4-6)). Henry said he needed to talk with his wife, but would be 

waiting on the letter and would call back. (Id. (117:6-11)). Henry did not call Allied back the 

next morning or at any time, explaining he “could have got busy at work.” (Id. (117: 21-118:6)). 

Henry further testified he did not call Allied back because he was waiting on a letter confirming 

Allied would work out a payment arrangement and not garnish his wages. (Doc. 29-1 at 31)

(119:11-17)). Henry also testified this representative told him there was no bill information in 

his file. (Id. at 30 (116:4-9)). However, this representative testified the account note indication 

“updated financial statement [F/S]” indicates there was already financial information contained 

in the file. (Doc. 29-5 at 30 (109:1-110:8)). 

While the DOE allows Allied to send letters to consumers, the only letters that can be 

sent are form letters the DOE has preapproved, which do not include the kind of letter Henry 

requested. (Doc. 29-5 at 36-37 (136:22-137:9)). If Henry would have requested a non-form 

letter, the representative testified he would have advised Henry he could not send such a letter. 

(Id. at 37 (137:10-138:10)). Henry never received any correspondence from Allied. (Doc. 29-1 

at 28 (102:2-4)).

3 While Henry testified he spoke with a “Mr. Hart,” (doc. 29-1 at 30 (115)), Allied states 

Henry spoke with a representative named Jeff Howard, who is Allied’s administrative supervisor 

on the DOE contract, (doc. 28 at 12). 

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Although Henry could not recall the exact number of conversations he had with an Allied 

employee, he agreed it could be between three and five. (Doc. 29-1 at 31 (120:13-23)). 

After speaking with these Allied representatives, Henry lost one or two hours of sleep a 

night for three or four nights before resuming a normal sleep schedule. (Doc. 29-1 at 39 (145:3-

22)). Henry did not see a healthcare provider for the alleged sleep interruption and took no 

medication for it. (Id. (145:23-146:4)). He also contends some of Allied’s employees were rude 

to him, cutting him off mid-sentence and talking over him. (Id.at 32 (121:1-122:4)). Henry 

testified this made him feel “worthless” because he owed money and wouldn’t pay it when he 

contends he was trying to make a reasonable payment. (Id. (122:5-16)). He also testified the 

alleged threats of garnishment caused him nervousness and stress because he believed he would 

not be able to afford rent if his wages were garnished or because he believed Allied would 

collect the payments by any means necessary. (Id. (39, 41, 42) (151, 157, 163)). Although 

Henry testified he was embarrassed when Allied called his work and “put his debt in the open,” 

(id. at 45 (174:22-175:5)), he agreed Southerington only stated the reason for his call was 

“personal business” and that Southerington handled the call appropriately, (id. at 19 (69:8-14)).

Since defaulting on the loan and since Allied’s collection efforts, Henry has made no 

payments on the loan. (Doc. 29-1 at 33 (127:7-11)). 

Prior to this action, Allied has disciplined Southerington on two unrelated occasions since 

the beginning of his employment in June 2011. (Doc. 29-4 at 7 (21:13-18)). The first occasion 

was when Southerington failed to document that an individual had requested Allied not 

telephone him. (Id. at 8 (25:13-26:18)). In response, Allied warned him about the 

documentation omission, sent him home for a day, and docked a day’s worth of wages. (Id.). 

Allied disciplined Southerington on a second occasion when he failed to meet his monthly 

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collection goals over a three-month period. (Id. at 9 (30:14-17)).

III. Analysis

A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claims

Allied seeks summary judgment on two of Henry’s FDCPA claims, specifically arguing 

it did not violate § 1692c(a)(1) (calling at an inconvenient time, i.e., before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m.) 

or § 1692(b)(1) (third-party disclosure) of the FDCPA. (Doc. 27 at 17-18). Henry concedes that 

both of these claims are due to be dismissed, although not necessarily for the same reasons as 

Allied asserts. (Doc. 33 at 7, 19). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends these claims be 

DISMISSED. Henry’s other FDCPA claims remain pending. (See doc. 1-1 listing the following 

claims: §§ 1692c(a)(3), 1692d, 1692d(5), 1692e, 1692e(1), 1692e(2), 1692e(4), 1692e(5), 

1692e(7), 1692e(10), 1692e(11), 1692f, 1692f(1), 1692f(6), and 1692g). 

B. State Law Claims

1. Invasion of Privacy4

Alabama courts recognize the tort of invasion of privacy in the context of a debt 

collector’s attempts to collect a debt, particularly recognizing that certain unreasonable collection 

efforts can be an “intrusion upon the plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion.”5 See Phillips v. 

Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 

4 As there is no federal cause of action for “invasion of privacy” and Henry has 

abandoned any such claim, the undersigned addresses invasion of privacy as only a state law 

claim. 

5 It is generally accepted that the invasion of privacy tort consists of four distinct wrongs: 

(1) the intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion; (2) publicity which violates 

the ordinary decencies; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, 

position in the public eye; and (4) the appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality 

for a commercial use. Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So.2d 321 (Ala.1961) (citing W. 

Prosser, Law of Torts, at 637-39 (2d ed. 1955)).

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652B (1977). Specifically, the Alabama Supreme Court has characterized invasion of privacy in 

this context as “the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as to outrage 

or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person or ordinary sensibilities” and 

requires the creditor’s actions to “exceed the bounds of reasonableness.” Shuler v. Ingram & 

Associates, 441 Fed. Appx. 712, 720 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jacksonville State Bank v. 

Barnwell, 481 So. 2d 863, 865-66 (Ala. 1985)). However, FDCPA violations do not necessarily 

constitute invasion of privacy under Alabama law. Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 756 

F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 2010). “The mere effort . . . to collect a debt cannot without 

more be considered a wrongful and actionable instruction. The Alabama Supreme Court has 

‘recognized the right of a creditor to take reasonable action to pursue a debtor and collect a 

debt.’” Shuler, 441 Fed. App’x at 720 (quoting Barnwell, 481 So. 2d at 865). Moreover, efforts 

to collect a debt may be annoying, embarrassing, and upsetting without rising to the level of an 

invasion of privacy. Leahey, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28. 

Henry first argues summary judgment on this claim is inappropriate because whether a 

particular intrusion is sufficiently outrageous or offensive to a reasonable person to create 

liability is a question of fact for the jury. (Doc. 33 at 22 (citing Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 

2d 979, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)). As this Court explained in Hunt v. 21st Century Mortgage 

Corp.:

The Alabama courts have not addressed directly whether [the invasion of privacy]

standard is to be applied as a question of law or of fact, but they appear to treat it 

as a mixed question following the same general pattern as negligence law. The 

courts perform a gatekeeping role, determining whether the alleged privacy 

interest is a type protected by the law. See, e.g., Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 

700, 702–03 (Ala.1997) (determining at summary judgment stage that a claim 

based on “voluntary interviews in which the defendants learned information 

already known to others ... is not protected by the limited scope of the wrongfulintrusion branch of the invasion-of-privacy tort”). . . . The jury, however, makes 

the final determination of whether a particular intrusion is sufficiently outrageous 

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or offensive to a reasonable person to create liability. See Cunningham v. Dabbs, 

703 So.2d 979, 982 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (“[W]e hold that whether this conduct 

was severe enough to constitute an invasion of Cunningham's right to privacy is a 

question of fact to be determined by a jury.”); K–Mart Corp. v. Weston, 530 So.2d 

736, 739 (Ala.1988) (“It was within the jury's province to conclude that the 

plaintiff's desire for anonymity had been interfered with and that the defendant 

had intruded beyond the limits of decency.”); Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell,

481 So.2d 863, 866 (Ala.1985) (“[T]he record raises issues of fact regarding 

whether the actions of [the defendant] constituted a campaign of harassment and 

were beyond the bounds of reasonableness, giving rise to liability for invasion of 

privacy.”).

No. 2:12-cv-02697-WMA, 2014 WL 426275, *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2014). Thus, the Court must 

first determine whether the alleged privacy interest is a type protected by the law and then 

whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to present the second question, whether a 

particular intrusion is sufficiently outrageous or offensive to a reasonable person to create 

liability, to the jury.

As noted above, Alabama courts recognize the tort of invasion of privacy in the context 

of a debt collector’s attempts to collect a debt, particularly recognizing that certain unreasonable 

collection efforts can be an “intrusion upon the plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion.” See 

Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 708. As to the second question, although he relies heavily on Hunt, Henry 

does not allege the number of debt collection phone calls made the collection efforts outrageous 

or offensive to a reasonable person, and for this and other reasons, Hunt is clearly 

distinguishable. Hunt turned on three key pieces of evidence – none of which are present in this 

case. 2014 WL 426275 at *8. Specifically, the plaintiff presented evidence the defendant’s calls 

were outrageous because the plaintiff was not the debtor, the plaintiff alleged the defendant 

called more than 100 times, and the plaintiff alleged the defendant not only called him, but also 

called his neighbors and relatives. Id. There is no such evidence in this case. Instead, Henry 

argues Allied representatives made “illegal threats,” pretending to work with him when asking

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about his finances and threatening immediate garnishment, which he claims is a 

misrepresentation of the law. (Doc. 33 at 23-24). Henry contends these actions were not 

“legitimate efforts to collect the debt” and therefore unreasonably invaded his privacy. (Id. at 

25).

Henry’s testimony regarding these alleged “illegal threats” do not support the arguments 

in his brief. First, Henry contends the collection efforts were unreasonable because the 

representative pretended to work with him when asking about his finances because the 

representative later admitted he did not document all of Henry’s financial information. (Doc. 33 

at 23-24). Henry’s deposition testimony does not support his argument. It is clear from Henry’s 

deposition testimony that Southerington presented Henry with a specific loan rehabilitation plan 

requiring an immediate payment of $300 and monthly payments of $200. (Doc. 29-1 at 21 

(77:7-78:6)).). The representative presented this rehabilitation plan at the same time he asked 

about Henry’s finances and never waivered from the terms of the rehabilitation plan. (See id.). 

There is simply no evidence to present to a jury to support the argument that Allied pretended to 

work with Henry.

There is also no evidence Allied representatives made illegal threats regarding 

garnishment. Henry’s testimony is inconsistent regarding whether the Allied representative said 

the garnishment process had begun or whether they could initiate it. Furthermore, it is 

undisputed that the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, provides that a federal guaranty 

agency may administratively garnish a student loan debtor’s disposable wages. 20 U.S.C. § 

1095a. Although the Act provides for an opportunity for a hearing, it is an administrative

process, and the representative was correct in advising Henry this was not the type of 

garnishment that required a court case. See 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(5). 

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Henry has not offered any evidence that Allied’s actions were sufficiently outrageous or 

offensive to a reasonable person to send this claim to a jury. Accordingly, summary judgment is 

due to be granted on this claim. 

2. Negligent, 6 Wanton, and Intentional Conduct 

Henry’s claim for wanton and intentional conduct fails because there is no evidence 

Allied consciously or intentionally committed a wrongful act causing injury to Henry. 

Wantonness is “the conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty under knowledge of 

existing conditions, while conscious that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty 

injury will likely or probably result.” Sellers v. Sexton, 576 So. 2d 172, 175 (Ala. 1991); see also 

Ala. Code § 6-11-20. Although wantonness, once proven, can support a wider range or damages 

than negligence, the “injury” prong of the wantonness test mirrors that of negligence. Hunt, 

2014 WL 426275, at *9 (citing Alabama state cases). 

Here, there is no evidence Allied had any reason to expect injury would likely or 

probably result from the less than five telephone conversations its representatives had with 

Henry, and there is no evidence of any physical or monetary injury. See id. Furthermore, as 

explained above, Henry’s testimony does not support his assertions Allied intentionally

misrepresented the law regarding garnishment and lied to Henry about whether they could force 

him to pay his debt through garnishment, whether he could stop it, or what amounts he had to 

pay. See doc. 33 at 27. 

3. Negligent,7 Wanton, and/or Intentional Hiring, Training, and Supervision

A plaintiff alleging defects in hiring, training, and supervision must prove an underlying 

6 Henry has withdrawn his claim for negligence. (Doc. 33 at 26). 

7 Henry does not address his claim for negligent hiring, training and supervision, (doc. 

33), and therefore it is deemed abandoned. 

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tort, i.e., the underlying wrongful conduct of the employee. Shuler, 441 Fed. App’x at 720 

(citing Voyager Ins. Cos. v. Whitson, 867 So. 2d 1065, 1073 (Ala. 2003); Thrasher v. Ivan 

Leonard Chevrolet, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2002)). Because all of Henry’s 

state law tort claims fail, his claim for wanton and/or intentional hiring, training, and supervision 

fail as a matter of law and is due to be dismissed.

IV. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Allied’s motion for summary 

judgment, (doc. 27), be GRANTED. Henry’s FDCPA claims pursuant to §§ 1692c(a)(1) and § 

1692(b)(1) and his state law claims are to be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Henry’s other 

FDCPA claims remain pending. 

V. Notice of Right to Object

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., any party may 

file specific written objections to this report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days from 

the date it is filed in the office of the Clerk. Failure to file written objections to the proposed 

findings and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation within fourteen (14) 

days from the date it is filed shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings on 

appeal. Written objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and 

recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. A copy of the 

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. 

DONE this 12th day of January 2015.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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