Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02020/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RODOLFO ROMERO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-02020 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

CHARLES RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On or about October 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an answer (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12)

to the petition on May 12, 2009. The time allowed Petitioner to

file a traverse to the answer expired on or about June 12, 2009.

I Background

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned June

21, 1988, charged Petitioner and a co-defendant, Mr. Conde, with

one count of first-degree murder, one count of burglary in the

first-degree, five counts of armed robbery, one count of

attempted armed robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault.

See Answer, Exh. A. The charges arose from a bank robbery

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 The following is taken from the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision in Mr. Conde’s appeal:

The evidence at trial showed that [Mr. Conde] and

an accomplice entered a bank armed with handguns

which they pointed at customers and bank

personnel. Conde leaped on the top of a counter

and ordered a teller to place money in a plastic

bag. He then ordered a customer to surrender her

car keys so that he and his accomplice could

escape. They obtained their getaway vehicle in

the bank parking lot by taking it from its driver

at gunpoint. At this juncture, the police

officer, working off-duty as a bank security

guard, opened fire on Conde and his accomplice.

In the exchange of shots the officer was killed.

 The robbers fled the scene in the stolen car.

During the next half-hour, they commandeered two

other vehicles at gunpoint. When police located

Conde and ordered him to stop, he fired at them.

He was wounded and was eventually taken into

custody.

Arizona v. Conde, 174 Ariz. 30, 31, 846 P.2d 843, 844 (1992). See

also Conde v. Flanagan, CIV 02-2034 PHX SRB GEE (D. Ariz).

At a pretrial conference in Petitioner’s case the state

indicated its theory of Petitioner’s case was that Mr. Conde actually

shot the bullet that killed the police officer; the charge of murder

against Petitioner was predicated on acccomplice liability. See

Response, Exh. G at 46-48.

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occurring on May 27, 1988, in Phoenix, Arizona.1 A police

officer was shot and killed as he attempted to stop the fleeing

robbers. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner’s co-defendant was taken into custody the

day the crimes occurred. Id., Exh. C at 3. Petitioner left the

United States after the crimes occurred. Petitioner’s codefendant was tried and convicted by a jury of the charges

stated in the indictment in late 1989, and was sentenced to an

aggregate in excess of 200 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. TT at

2. 

In May of 1996, eight years after the indictment was

issued, the Arizona Attorney General submitted an extradition

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request to the United States Department of Justice, asking for

Petitioner’s extradition in the event that law enforcement

authorities could locate Petitioner in Mexico. Id., Exh. CC at

3 & App. A at 1. Approximately four years later, in June of

2000, Petitioner was arrested by Mexican authorities in Mexico.

Id., Exh. C at 3. 

On February 20, 2001, a Mexican district court approved

the United States’ request to extradite Petitioner to Arizona.

Id., Exh. CC at 34. On March 15, 2001, Mexico’s Secretary of

Foreign Relations formally granted the extradition request.

Id., Exh. CC at 34. Before Petitioner could be brought to the

United States, however, on October 2, 2001, the Mexico Supreme

Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment

constituted cruel and unusual punishment and could not be

imposed on a Mexican national by any court. Id., Exh. CC at 34.

Accordingly, Petitioner subsequently successfully moved a Mexico

federal court to set aside the grant of extradition because one

of the offenses charged by Arizona, i.e., first degree murder,

was punishable by life imprisonment. Id., Exh. CC at 35. The

Mexican federal court’s opinion setting aside the approval of

extradition allowed Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations to

file a pleading addressing whether Petitioner’s extradition was

barred by the possible imposition of a life sentence. Id., Exh.

CC at 35.

Accordingly, on October 18, 2001, Mexico’s Secretary of

Foreign Relations requested assurances from the United States

that Petitioner “[would] not be subject to imprisonment for life

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 Mexico did not extradite on this charge because the

Mexican criminal code lacked an offense equivalent to second degree

burglary. See Answer, Exh. DD at 28 & App. A at 7, 14-15

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for murder...” if extradited to Arizona. Id., Exh. F, Attach.

Referencing the governing extradition treaty between the United

States and Mexico, the American ambassador responded inter alia

that, in the event of Petitioner’s conviction, “the State of

Arizona [would not] seek or recommend a penalty of 25 years to

life imprisonment at the sentencing phase of the judicial

proceeding in this case,” but that instead the State of Arizona

would recommend imposition of a sentence of “50 to 60 years’

imprisonment.” Id., Exh. F, Attach. Regarding the possibility

that the Arizona trial court might impose a life sentence upon

Petitioner’s conviction, notwithstanding the above-referenced

recommendation, the United States ambassador informed Mexico

that, should that circumstance arise, “the State of Arizona will

take appropriate action to formally request that the court

reduce such sentence to a term of years.” Id., Exh. F, Attach.

The ambassador acknowledged that, nonetheless, “[i]t would then

be for the court to decide whether to accept the executive

authority’s determination.” Id., Exh. F, Attach. 

On November 28, 2001, Mexico granted the United States’

request to extradite Petitioner on every requested charge except

the charge of burglary. Id., Exh. CC, App. A at 7.2 The opinion

approving the extradition noted the agreement complied with the

relevant treaty in that Petitioner was not facing a death

sentence and also noted the exchange of diplomatic notes

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regarding Mexico’s insistence that Petitioner be sentenced to a

term of years, rather than an indeterminate sentence, i.e., a

sentence of life imprisonment. Id., Exh. CC, App. A at 13-14.

On March 21, 2002, Mexico extradited Petitioner to Arizona.

Id., Exh. CC at 3.

Just prior to trial, Petitioner’s counsel moved the

court to reduce the charge of first-degree murder to seconddegree murder, citing the extradition treaty and agreement

between Mexico and the United States. Id., Exh. E & Exh. G.

After the matter was fully pled, the trial court heard argument

on the motion November 18, 2002. Id., Exh. G. The trial court

denied the motion at that time. Id., Exh. G at 15.

 Petitioner’s jury trial on the 1988 charges began on

November 18, 2002. Id., Exh. H. Due to unavailability of

witnesses, the trial court granted the state’s motion to

dismiss one count of armed robbery and one count of aggravated

assault. Id., Exh. O at 132-33; Exh. S. Without any objection

from the defense, the jury was instructed as to the lesserincluded offense of second-degree murder. Id., Exh. EE at 4 &

Exh. P at 38. Defense counsel told the jury during closing

argument that Petitioner was “only guilty of Second Degree

Murder.” Id., Exh. P at 94.

The jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of

first-degree murder, one count of burglary, four counts of armed

robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and three counts of

aggravated assault. Id., Exh. P at 112–17. 

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 A letter from a Mexican diplomat states: 

I reiterate that the government of Mexico is

interested in seeing that the aforementioned

reassurance of no application of life sentence on

the accused, is complied with, this in case he is

found guilty in the legal process being pursued

against him in the United States of America, he

is handed down a sentence of a determined number

of years and not a life sentence, without concern

for how these assurances are complied with by the

United States government...

Answer, Exh. DD at 33.

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During the trial, and after Petitioner was convicted

but prior to sentencing, his defense counsel notified the

Mexican government of Petitioner’s trial and conviction on the

charge of first degree murder. Id., Exh. DD at 33; Exh. EE at

5. The Mexican government responded that it was not in favor of

the imposition of a life sentence. Id., Exh. DD at 33;3 Exh. EE.

Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a motion for a new

trial asserting Petitioner could not be convicted of murder in

the first degree or burglary because the charges were precluded

by the extradition agreement. Defense counsel also moved to

dismiss both these charges. Id., Exh. CC at 6. At a hearing

on February 7, 2003, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the

conviction for burglary. Id., Exh. CC at 6. 

 In response to Petitioner’s post-trial motion to

dismiss, the state offered to reduce the murder charge; however,

Petitioner wanted dismissal of the count on the basis that

jurisdiction was not proper. Id., Exh. CC at 6. On March 19,

2003, the state moved the trial court to reduce Petitioner’s

conviction from guilty of first-degree murder to guilty of

second-degree murder, which would allow for a sentence of less

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than life imprisonment. Id., Exh. UU. The motion states it was

“made to satisfy extradition agreement between the governments

of the United States and Mexico. Defendant and defense counsel

are aware of this motion and have no objection thereto.” Id.,

Exh. UU. The trial court granted the motion on March 21, 2003.

Id., Exh. BB & Exh. VV.

The trial court conducted an aggravation and mitigation

hearing on March 21, 2003, at which hearing Petitioner spoke on

his own behalf. Id., Exh. R & Exh. XX. At that time the court

imposed an aggravated term of 20 years incarceration pursuant to

Petitioner’s conviction on the charge of second-degree murder.

Id., Exh. BB. The trial court found as aggravating

circumstances the fact that the victim was a police officer who

acted in his official capacity by trying to prevent the bank

robbery, and the severe emotional harm to the officer’s family.

The state court also found as aggravating circumstances the

presence of an accomplice, Petitioner’s flight from the scene,

and Petitioner’s failure to self-surrender. The trial court

found as other aggravating circumstances the fact that the

murder occurred “in the immediate flight from a robbery to

prevent detection” and Petitioner’s decision to arm himself with

assault rifles equipped with “banana-clips” and high-powered

ammunition to ensure that he was “not apprehended at all costs.”

Id., Exh. R at 68–69. Stating that “the aggravating factors

far, far outweigh the mitigating factors,” the trial court

indicated it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had

disregarded the victim’s status as a police officer and the

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pecuniary motive of the underlying armed robbery. The trial

court also stated the sentence was warranted by the aggravating

factors, which outweighed Petitioner’s youthfulness and lack of

a prior criminal record at the time of the crime. Id., Exh. R

at 69.

The trial court imposed aggravated prison terms on the

remaining convictions based upon the presence of an accomplice,

flight from the scene, and the fact that the murder committed in

immediate flight to prevent detection. Id., Exh. R at 70–72.

The aggregate length of Petitioner’s sentences is 106 years.

Id., Exh. R.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences, arguing:

The trial court erroneously replaced

Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction

with a second-degree murder conviction

because the conviction for that crime is not

expressly allowed by the controlling

extradition agreement between the United

States and Mexico. And, the Supremacy Clause

requires that the first-degree murder

conviction be vacated because it conflicts

with the controlling extradition agreement.

Id., Exh. CC at 32. Petitioner argued the State of Arizona had

violated the extradition agreement between the United States and

Mexico and the “doctrine of specialty” by reducing the charge

after conviction and by imposing consecutive sentences. Id.,

Exh. CC. In his direct appeal Petitioner also argued that the

trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial

by enhancing his sentence using facts that were neither admitted

by Petitioner nor found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt by

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a jury. Id., Exh. CC at 52.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in a decision issued August 16, 2005.

Id., Exh. EE. The Court of Appeals noted that Mexico had agreed

to extradite Petitioner on a charge of first-degree murder.

Id., Exh. EE. The Court of Appeals noted Mexico had agreed to

extradite Petitioner on that charge if the State of Arizona

agreed to oppose the imposition of a life sentence if convicted.

Id., Exh. EE. Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals

reiterated the fact that, after Petitioner was convicted, his

counsel notified the Mexican government of Petitioner’s

conviction. Id., Exh. EE. The Mexican government responded

that it was not in favor of the imposition of a life sentence.

Id., Exh. EE. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Petitioner’s

extradition, trial, and conviction on the charge of first degree

murder was not in violation of the extradition agreement

because the agreement specifically provided Petitioner could be

extradited to face that charge. Id., Exh. EE. The appellate

court concluded that the means used to bring the sentence

mandated by the extradition agreement into compliance with

Arizona law did not deprive Petitioner of any substantive right.

Id., Exh. EE. Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded that relief based on the application of the doctrine

of specialty would depend on the wishes of Mexico, which country

had indicated only a desire that Petitioner not be sentenced to

life imprisonment if convicted of first-degree murder. Id.,

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Exh. EE.

The Arizona Court of Appeals also determined that, if

there had been any violation of the specialty doctrine, the

error was invited by Petitioner because there was no

contemporaneous objection to the state’s motion for diminution

of the murder count and because prior to trial and in closing

argument Petitioner himself had argued for conviction on the

lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Id., Exh. EE.

Petitioner did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’

decision in his direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on October 25, 2005. Id., Exh. HH. This action was

dismissed on Petitioner’s motion on November 14, 2005. 

Petitioner filed another Rule 32 action on December 2,

2005. Id., Exh. KK. Petitioner was appointed counsel, who

informed the state trial court on October 10, 2006, that she

could not find any colorable claims to raise in a Rule 32

petition. Id., Exh. LL. Petitioner filed a pro per petition

for relief, reasserting the claims raised in his direct appeal.

Id., Exh. MM. The state trial court denied relief and the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied review in a decision issued

September 26, 2008. Id., Exh. PP & Exh. QQ.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief from his

convictions because the trial court’s reduction of the

first-degree murder conviction to second-degree murder was, he

contends, erroneous. Petitioner asserts that “the conviction

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for that [second-degree murder] is not expressly allowed by the

controlling extradition agreement between the United States and

Mexico.” Accordingly, he argues, “the Supremacy Clause requires

that the first-degree [murder conviction] be vacated because it

conflicts with the extradition agreement”. Petitioner also

contends his sentences must be vacated because the trial court

aggravated his sentence based on facts not found by the jury, in

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

Respondents maintain the petition must be denied and

dismissed. Respondents assert that Petitioner’s challenge to

the reduction of his first-degree murder conviction to

second-degree murder is procedurally barred because the Arizona

Court of Appeals found that Petitioner invited any error by

requesting the challenged reduction in charge. Respondents also

contend this claim may be denied because the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ ruling on the merits was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court

precedent. Respondents assert the second claim for relief must

be denied because Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

II Analysis

The principles of exhaustion of claims and the presence

of an “adequate and independent” state law basis for denial of

habeas corpus relief on the merits of the claim

A federal court may not grant habeas relief

to a state prisoner unless the prisoner has

first exhausted his state court remedies. See

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner

satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fully

and fairly presenting each claim to the

highest state court. [] A petitioner fully

and fairly presents a claim to the state

courts if he presents the claim (1) to the

correct forum, see § 2254(c); (2) through the

proper vehicle, []; and (3) by providing the

factual and legal basis for the claim, [].

Full and fair presentation additionally

requires a petitioner to present the

substance of his claim to the state courts,

including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.

[]

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

citations omitted).

“If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221

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n.6 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a

procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, comply[]

with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.”

Id., 567 F.3d at 581-82, quoting Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). It is Respondents’ burden to prove

the rule cited and relied upon by the state court in denying

relief was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time the rule was applied to Petitioner’s case. Id. 

Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to

preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985)

(emphasis added). See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

261-62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989). 

“[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state

court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038 [].

... Sanders v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th

Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate court’s

discussion of waiver is intertwined with its

merits analysis, the state court’s decision

does not rest on an independent and adequate

state law ground)....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567

F.3d at 581-82.

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Respondents argue that the Court should not review the

merits of Petitioner’s extradition-based claim regarding the

propriety of his conviction for first-degree murder and the

reduction in his conviction to second-degree murder because the

state court’s decision denying his specialty doctrine claim in

Petitioner’s direct appeal rested on an adequate and independent

basis for barring federal habeas relief. Respondents contend

the adequate and independent state basis for rejecting

Petitioner’s claim is that Petitioner waived the objection by

inviting any error. Respondents cite to cases indicating the

rule was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal. See Answer (Docket No.

12) at 51-52. 

Some federal courts have concluded that a state’s

common law “invited error” rule is an independent and adequate

state law that is sufficient to bar federal habeas review of a

claim for relief. See Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 832-33

(9th Cir. 2004) (stating “[t]here is no reason that we should

treat the invited error rule differently from other state

procedural bars”); Wilson v. Ozmint, 357 F.3d 461, 467 (4th Cir.

2004); Coleman v. O’Leary, 845 F.2d 696, 699-701 (7th Cir.

1988); Francois v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir.

1984); Tillman v. Cook, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1274-76 (D. Utah

1998).

However, it is at least arguable whether the Arizona

Court of Appeals’ decision denying this claim in Petitioner’s

direct appeal rested on the bar of invited error. The appellate

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court did begin discussion of the specialty doctrine claim by

noting Petitioner had repeatedly sought the outcome achieved,

i.e., conviction on second degree, rather than first degree,

murder. After then thoroughly discussing the doctrine of

specialty and applicable federal law and the merits of the

claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily stated that, “even

if” Petitioner’s conviction on second-degree murder had violated

the specialty doctrine, any error was invited error and,

accordingly, not reversible.

Because the claim may be denied on the merits and it is

arguable if the state court decision may be affirmed based on

the “adequate and independent” state bar, it is necessary to

discuss whether the Court of Appeals’ denial of the claim on the

merits of the claim was clearly contrary to established federal

law.

Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649,

653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir.

2009).

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A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions or if it reaches a different result than a Supreme

Court case on the presentation of materially indistinguishable

facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1519 (2000). The state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. Id., 529 U.S.

at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521. United States Supreme Court

holdings at the time of the state court’s decision are the

source of “clearly established federal law” for the purpose of

the “unreasonable application” prong of federal habeas review.

Id., 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523; Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1093 (2005).

Violation of extradition agreement

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated the

extradition treaty between the United States of America and

Mexico by convicting him of first degree murder because,

Petitioner argues, the governing treaty did not allow for a

Mexican national’s extradition for prosecution on an offense

which could result in life imprisonment. Petitioner also

contends that reducing the conviction from first-degree murder

to second-degree murder violates the specialty doctrine, i.e.,

the doctrine that one can only be tried for the offense

specified in the extradition agreement. 

Petitioner raised these issues in a pre-trial motion.

The motion was denied by the state trial judge after briefing

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and oral argument regarding the diplomatic note, the relevant

treaty, the current status of the interpretation and extension

of the treaty, the circumstance of Petitioner’s case, including

the exchange of notes between Mexican and United States

officials regarding Petitioner’s extradition agreement, and

Arizona law. See Response, Exh. G.

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the extraditionbased claims on the merits when presented in petitioner’s direct

appeal. The Court of Appeals determined: 

The doctrine of specialty provides that a

state that has obtained extradition of a

person is prohibited from prosecuting that

person “for any offense other than that for

which the surrendering state agreed to

extradite.” United States v. Andonian, 29

F.3d 1432, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal

citations omitted).

An extradited person may be tried for

offenses other than those for which the

person was surrendered if the extraditing

country consents. The proceedings did not

violate the doctrine of specialty. Romero was

extradited for first-degree murder, all in

compliance with the extradition agreement and

the doctrine of specialty. The subsequent

reduction to the lesser-included offense of

second-degree murder in order to comply with

the sentencing provisions of the agreement

does not mandate reversal of Romero’s

conviction.

***

Extradition treaties are construed liberally

to effect their purpose of surrendering

fugitives to be tried for their alleged

offenses. United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d

549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984). Under these

circumstances, the reduction of Romero’s

conviction to a lesser-included offense

constituted a reclassification contemplated

by the treaty. Romero does not contest that

the charge of second-degree murder, as a

lesser included offense of first-degree

murder, was based on the same factual

allegations as those established in the

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request for extradition based on first-degree

murder, or that the punishment for second

degree murder provided for a sentence of less

than life imprisonment. Therefore, the treaty

itself permitted a conviction for

second-degree murder.

Answer, Exh. EE at 9-10.

In “United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S. Ct.

234 (1886), and Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 27 S. Ct. 539

(1907), the Supreme Court set forth principles for interpreting

extradition treaties and analyzed the effect of limitations on

what offenses may be punished by the extraditing country.”

Rodriguez Benitez v. Garcia, 495 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying Petitioner’s

claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of the

holdings in these cases. 

Rauscher established the doctrine of

specialty, which provides that an extradited

defendant may not be prosecuted for any

offense other than that for which the

surrendering country agreed to extradite.[].

...

In Browne, a defendant who was convicted in

the United States of conspiracy to defraud

the government fled the country and was

extradited from Canada under a treaty which

did not cover conspiracy. [] Because of the

treaty’s limitations, Canadian authorities

surrendered the defendant for another offense

but not for the conspiracy charge. [] The

Supreme Court, looking to the agreed-upon

terms of extradition and to the relevant

treaty language, refused to uphold a

reinstated conviction on the conspiracy

charge.

Rodriguez Benitez, 495 F.3d at 643-44 (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

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Similar to the circumstance of the petitioner in

Rodriguez Benitez, the terms of the agreement regarding the

Petitioner’s extradition indicated Mexico’s concern about the

sentence which could be imposed on Petitioner and not the degree

of murder on which Petitioner could be tried. The Arizona trial

court’s reduction of the crime of conviction, which was

supported by the evidence adduced at trial and which reduction

was not contemporaneously opposed by Petitioner, did not deprive

Petitioner of a substantive constitutional right. Cf. United

States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 2002)

(recognizing a difference between extradition terms limiting

what sentence could be entered by the receiving state’s courts

and what sentence the receiving state could force the prisoner

to serve).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in

Rodriguez Benitez that, because Supreme Court precedent, i.e.,

Rauscher and Browne, addressed limitations on charged offenses

and the case before them involved limitations on the

petitioner’s sentence, it could not be said that the state

court’s opinion was contrary to clearly established federal law

because to decide otherwise would have required an extension of

the specialty doctrine. See 495 F.3d at 644. “Only if the

refusal to extend Rauscher’s and Browne’s holdings was

objectively unreasonable must Benitez be granted a writ.” Id.

“Refusing to extend Supreme Court holdings governing limitations

on charged offenses to unilaterally imposed sentencing

conditions was not objectively unreasonable, and therefore AEDPA

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requires us to leave the decision of the California court

undisturbed.” Id. Similarly, the Arizona court’s decision

regarding Petitioner’s claims based on the specialty doctrine

and the reduction of Petitioner’s conviction was not objectively

unreasonable and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

this claim. 

Sixth Amendment sentencing claim

Petitioner asserts his aggravated prison terms violate

his Sixth Amendment rights and the doctrine of Blakely v.

Washington because the trial court, rather than a jury, found

the existence of the six circumstances used to aggravate his

sentence for second-degree murder.

In rejecting relief on this claim, the Arizona Court of

Appeals applied the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona

v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005), interpreting

Blakely. Answer, Exh. EE at 16-17. The appellate court

concluded that, pursuant to Martinez, Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated because Petitioner had

conceded at least one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the

presence of an accomplice. The Court of Appeals reiterated the

holding of Martinez that, once it was established that a single

Blakely-compliant aggravating factor existed, i.e., a jury had

found or the defendant had admitted the existence of an

aggravating factor, the defendant’s rights were not violated

because the trial judge found additional aggravating factors. 

The Arizona courts have interpreted Blakely to allow

for the imposition of an aggravated sentence founded partially

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on facts not found by a jury if at least one aggravating factor

is compliant with Blakely, i.e., found by a jury or admitted by

the defendant. See Arizona v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d

618 (2005); Arizona v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601

(2005). The sentencing scheme iterated in Martinez was upheld

upon review by the United States Supreme Court. See Martinez v.

Arizona, 546 U.S. 1044, 126 S. Ct. 762 (2005).

Arizona’s response to Blakely as explained in Martinez

has been found to be not clearly contrary to federal law. See

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 n.17, 127 S. Ct.

856, 871 n.17 (2007) (finding California’s sentencing process

unconstitutional and analyzing the Colorado Supreme Court’s

response to Blakely in Colorado v. Lopez, 113 P.3d 713, 716

(Colo. 2005); Colorado’s Lopez decision is materially similar to

the Arizona Supreme Court’s Martinez opinion); Stokes v.

Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding “the

Arizona state courts’ interpretation of these [sentencing]

provisions does not contradict clearly established federal

law”). Accordingly, the Arizona court’s decision denying this

claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal was not clearly contrary to

federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim.

III Conclusion

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying

Petitioner’s claims for relief was not clearly contrary to

federal law with regard to any stated claim for relief.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Romero’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 19th day of August, 2009.

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