Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01397/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01397-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332pr Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANH BUI, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15-cv-1397-WQH-WVG

ORDER

v.

NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS

CORP., a Delaware Corporation; and

DOES 1-50, inclusive;

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 45) filed

by Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation.

I. Background

On April 14, 2015, Plaintiff Anh Bui commenced this action by filing a Class

Action Complaint against Defendant, her former employer, in San Diego County

Superior Court. (ECF No. 1-3 at 6). On May 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed the First

Amended Class Action Complaint (the “FAC”), the operative complaint in this case.

Id. at 30. The FAC asserts four individual and putative class claims under California

wage and hour laws, an individual and a putative class claim under California Business

& Professions Code § 17200 et seq., and a claim under California’s Private Attorneys’

General Act (the “PAGA Claim”). (ECF No. 1 at 3). In June 2015, Defendant removed

this action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. (ECF Nos. 1 at 2-3;

1-3 at 30-46).

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On July 2, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Bilateral Arbitration and

Stay Proceedings, or Alternatively, to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(3). (ECF No. 3). 

Defendant contended that the Court should dismiss or compel bilateral arbitration of all

six of Plaintiff’s claims because they “are governed by a valid and binding arbitration

agreement which requires bilateral arbitration.” Id. at 2. On August 10, 2015, Plaintiff

filed a “Non-Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Bilateral Arbitration of

Plaintiff’s Individual Claims . . . and Opposition to Motion to Compel Bilateral

Arbitration of [the] PAGA Claim.” (ECF No. 11 at 2). Plaintiff “agree[d] to dismiss

her putative class and putative class claims without prejudice and submit her individual

claims to arbitration except for the PAGA claim,” but contended that “Defendant cannot

compel arbitration of a PAGA claim.” Id. at 7. 

On December 10, 2015, the Court issued an order granting Defendant’s Motion

to Compel Bilateral Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (the “Order to Arbitrate”). (ECF

No. 20). The Court “ordered that, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, Plaintiff’s first

through fifth putative class and class claims are dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 15. 

 The Court “further ordered that the Motion to Compel Bilateral Arbitration and Stay

Proceedings is granted [and] . . . the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration in

accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Agreement with respect to all of Plaintiff’s

remaining claims.” Id.1

On September 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order

to Arbitrate based on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Morris v. Ernst & Young

LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). (ECF No. 32). 

1 In its Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant “seeks a ruling on . . . where plaintiff Anh Bui’s

claim under [PAGA] should be litigated.” (ECF No. 45 at 2). The Order to Arbitrate directed the

parties “to proceed to arbitration . . . with respect to all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims,” including the

PAGA claim (as well the rest of Plaintiff’s individual claims). (ECF No. 20 at 15). The Order

granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order to Arbitrate did not vacate the Order

directing the parties to arbitrate all of Plaintiff’s individual claims, including the PAGA claim. See

ECF No. 36 at 8 (“vacat[ing] the part of the [Order to Arbitrate] stating ‘that . . . Plaintiff’s first

through fifth putative class and class claims are dismissed with prejudice.’ (ECF No. 20 at 15).”). 

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In Morris, the plaintiffs signed a “concerted action waiver” as a condition of their

employment by Ernst & Young, LLP. 834 F.3d at 975. The concerted action waiver

required the plaintiffs “to (1) pursue legal claims against Ernst & Young exclusively

through arbitration and (2) arbitrate only as individuals and in ‘separate proceedings.’” 

Id. at 979. The Court of Appeals held that “[c]oncerted activity—the right of

employees to act together—is the essential, substantive right established by the

[National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)]. . . . Accordingly, the concerted action

waiver violates the NLRA and cannot be enforced.” Id. at 980. 

On December 9, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration,

concluding that, under Morris, the concerted action waiver in the Arbitration

Agreement was unenforceable. (ECF No. 36 at 7-8). The Court vacated the portion of

the Order to Arbitrate stating that “Plaintiff’s first through fifth putative class and class

claims are dismissed without prejudice.” Id. (quoting ECF No. 20 at 15).

On January 13, 2017, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in

Morris. Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, 137 S. Ct. 809 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (mem.). 

On February 6, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay this case pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Morris on the grounds that the “basis for . . . this Court’s [Order

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider] will disappear [and] Plaintiff will again be

required to arbitrate her wage-and-hour and UCL claims on an individual basis” if the

Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 39). On June 12, 2017, the

Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Stay. (ECF No. 43). 

On July 10, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order

Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay. (ECF No. 45). Plaintiff filed a Response to

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 48). Defendant filed a Reply to

Plaintiff’s Response. (ECF No. 49). Defendant also filed a Notice of Supplemental

Authority (ECF No. 52). Plaintiff filed a Response to the Notice of Supplemental

Authority, (ECF No. 59), and Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response, (ECF No.

60). 

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II. Contentions of the Parties

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to

Stay based on two recent developments related to Morris. (ECF Nos. 45, 52). 

Defendant’s first ground for reconsideration is an Order issued by the Court of Appeals

in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 15-17420 (9th Cir. September 22, 2017), (ECF

No. 52-1), that withdrew from submission several cases involving concerted action

waivers “pending [the Supreme Court’s] resolution of [Morris and its companion cases]

or until further order of [the Court of Appeals].” (ECF No. 52). Defendant’s second

ground for reconsideration is the change in the position of the United States Department

of Justice on whether the NLRA bars concerted against waivers like those at issue in

Morris and this case. (ECF No. 45-1 at 6).2

 Plaintiff contends that the O’Connor order

does not justify reconsideration of the Order Denying the Motion to Stay because

“O’Connor is an appellate case whose very determination is reliant upon the Supreme

Court’s decision in Morris.” (ECF No. 59 at 2). Plaintiff contends that the change in

the position of the United States Department of Justice does not justify reconsideration

of the Order Denying the Motion to Stay because “the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Morris remains controlling law.” (ECF No. 48 at 5). 

III. Analysis

A “court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,

order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

60(b)(6). Federal district courts have “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an

incident to its power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07

(1997) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “[T]he power

2 In September 2016, the Department of Justice submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari in

one of Morris’s companion cases in which it argued that the NLRA bars concerted action waivers. 

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., et al., (No. 16-307). “After the

change in administration, the [Department of Justice] reconsidered the issue and . . . reached the

opposite conclusion.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Nos.

16-285 and 16-300 and Supporting Respondents in No. 16-307, Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, (Nos. 16-285, 16 -300, 16-307). Accordingly, in June 2017, the Department of Justice filed an amicus

brief arguing that the NLRA does not preclude the enforcement of the concerted action waiver at issue

in Morris. Id.

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to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for

counsel, and for litigants.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. 

On June 12, 2017, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to stay after finding that

district courts “have no authority to await a ruling by the Supreme Court before

applying the circuit court’s decision as binding authority[.]” ECF No. 43 at 4 (quoting

Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). On September 22, 2017, the

Court of Appeals withdrew from submission several cases involving concerted action

waivers pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Morris. O’Connor v. Uber

Technologies, Inc., 15-17420 (9th Cir. September 22, 2017), (ECF No. 52-1). Federal

district courts have “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to

control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (citing Landis

v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In light of the Court of Appeal’s

decision to withdraw the cases before it pending Morris, the Court finds it appropriate

to stay this case. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

1. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED;

2. the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 43) is VACATED;

3. these proceedings are STAYED until the United States Supreme Court issues a

decision on Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, No. 16-300; and 

4. the parties shall file a joint report within thirty days from the date of the Supreme

Court’s decision on Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, No. 16-300, as to how they

intend to proceed in light of that decision.

DATED: November 9, 2017

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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