Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00397/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00397-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGELIO CUEVAS ESPINOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

SHAWN HATTON, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 10-cv-397-WQH-BGS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate 

Judge (ECF No. 158) recommending that the Court deny Petitioner Rogelio Cuevas 

Espinoza’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) following remand and an

evidentiary hearing.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On March 10, 2001, Rosea Barajas held a party at a convention hall in 

National City to celebrate the baptism of her son. (Lodgment 6 at 2). Sandy 

Barajas, sister of Rosea Barajas and wife of Petitioner, is the child’s 

godmother. Id. “[Petitioner] attended the party but there was conflicting 

evidence about whether he was expected there. Arturo, also known as Pedro 

 

1 The Court quotes the facts from its September 10, 2013, Order (ECF No. 47), which recited the 

undisputed factual findings of the California Court of Appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (a presumption 

of correctness attaches to state court determinations of factual issues). 

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Rivera, and his brother, Adan Rivera, were told [that Petitioner] would not 

attend the party.” Id. at 2-3 (alterations omitted). “[T]here were ill feelings 

between Adan and [Petitioner] due to a fight between the two about a year 

earlier.” Id. at 2.

Shortly after the Rivera brothers arrived at the party, “a fight erupted inside 

the hall” involving Petitioner, the Rivera brothers and others. Id. The evidence 

conflicted as to whether Petitioner or Adan initiated the fight, but the fight 

was eventually broken up by others. Id. at 2-3. The fight left Petitioner injured. 

Id. at 3. “[O]ne witness described seeing a gash above [Petitioner’s] eye.” Id. 

“Adan believed he had broken [Petitioner’s] nose because he was bleeding 

profusely.” Id. Barajas told everyone to leave the party. Id. Petitioner exited 

through a back door and the Rivera brothers and others left through the hall’s 

front entrance. Id.

“Soon thereafter, [Petitioner] approached the Rivera brothers with a 

semiautomatic gun in his hand. Adan ran back towards the hall. [Petitioner] 

fired into the air. There was evidence [that Petitioner] pointed the gun at 

[Arturo] Rivera, fired at [Arturo] Rivera’s feet or lower body, fired at the 

ground, fired toward the crowd of people outside the hall and fired toward 

[Arturo] Rivera as he fled. Some people struggled with [Petitioner] for the 

gun.” Id. A neighbor heard a man yell, “I’m going to kill you, motherfucker,” 

and saw the man “chasing [Arturo] Rivera and shooting at him, while [Arturo] 

Rivera crouched behind a truck.” Id. Arturo Rivera was shot in the right eye, 

which he lost as a result. Id. “There was not stippling or burning around the 

entrance wound, indicating the bullet was fired from a distance of more than 

three or four feet.” Id. Eight cartridge casings and a bullet fragment were 

recovered. Id. Based on the distribution of the cartridge casings, it was 

determined that all the bullets had been fired from the same gun by a gunman 

who had been moving while firing the gun. Id. “A number of people from the 

party went to the police station to be interviewed. [Petitioner’s] wife told the 

group, ‘nobody rats, nothing will happen.’ The interviews were taped.” Id.

Petitioner fled to Mexico. Id. at 4.

In 2005, San Diego police officers stopped a car with expired registration tags

that was driven by Petitioner. Id. “[Petitioner] was very nervous, and he 

provided the officers with a driver’s license in the name of Victor Gallego and 

said the car belonged to a female friend.” Id. Suspecting the driver’s license 

was false, the police conducted a records check. Id. “As soon as [Petitioner] 

heard he was going to be arrested, he knocked one of the officers to the ground 

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and fled across a busy street. He was arrested nearby in a culvert.” Id.

(ECF No. 47 at 1-3 (alterations in original)). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

a. State Proceedings

In March 2006, approximately five years after the shooting, Petitioner was tried by 

a jury in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego. Petitioner’s 

case consisted entirely of his own testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarized 

Petitioner’s version of the events:

[Petitioner] testified Barajas invited him to the party because his wife was 

going to be the child’s godmother. He arrived early at the party because his 

wife said they needed help, but before contacting his wife, he had something 

to eat at the hall. About 20 to 40 minutes later, he started looking for his wife.

He did not find her inside the hall, and he was about to look outside when the 

Rivera brothers and others arrived. [Petitioner] indicated to Adan that he 

wanted to go outside. Adan, without warning, punched [Petitioner]. 

[Petitioner] defended himself.

After the fight ended, [Petitioner] went out the back door of the hall. He had 

been badly beaten and was afraid and confused. His uncle told him the Rivera 

brothers wanted to kill him, handed him a gun and showed him how to use it. 

As [Petitioner] walked toward his car, the Rivera brothers and other people 

confronted him. He fired the gun into the ground and into the air to keep them 

away. He was surrounded by people who were trying to get the gun from him, 

and he believed they would harm him if they got the gun. During the struggle, 

the group moved him into the street; he stumbled but did not fall as they went 

over the curb. He fired the gun until it would fire no more. He also testified 

the gun fired because people were ‘yanking’ at his hand. Someone yelled 

‘Policia’ and everybody dispersed. [Petitioner] ran to his car and drove home. 

He did not turn himself in because he was afraid he would be imprisoned even 

though he was innocent.

(Lodgment 6 at 4-5). Petitioner testified that “there was only one gun,” that he “never saw 

anybody else with a gun,” and that he was “the only person with a gun.” (Lodgment 2, vol. 

5, at 751-52).

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On March 3, 2006, the jury found Petitioner guilty of mayhem2and assault with a 

semi-automatic firearm,3and deadlocked on a count of attempted murder. The court 

declared a mistrial on the attempted murder count. On September 18, 2006, the court 

sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of twenty-nine years to life.4(Lodgment 6 at 1-2). 

On April 13, 2007, Petitioner directly appealed his conviction to the California Court 

of Appeal. (Lodgments 3-5). Petitioner did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim on direct appeal. On March 12, 2008, the California Court of Appeal unanimously 

affirmed the rulings of the trial court. (Lodgment 6). On April 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a 

petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 7). On June 25, 2008, 

the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. (Lodgment 8).

On August 31, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, asserting several grounds for relief including ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 9). On October 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for 

discovery and interrogatories, seeking evidence to substantiate his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. (ECF No. 1-1 at 27-48). On February 10, 2010, the California Supreme 

Court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment 10). The court did not rule on the 

discovery motion. 

b. Federal Proceedings

On February 18, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner raises six claims for relief: 

two claims alleging deprivation of Petitioner’s right to due process; three claims alleging 

 

2 Cal. Pen. Code §§ 203; 12022.53(d).

3 Cal. Pen. Code §§ 245(b); 12022.5(a)(1); 12022.7(a).

4 Petitioner was sentenced to a four-year term for mayhem and a twenty-five-year to life term for 

personally discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury during the mayhem. Cal. Pen. Code § 

12022.53(d).

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ineffective assistance of counsel; and one claim alleging a violation of Brady v. Maryland5. 

In claim three, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel, Jan Ronis, was ineffective for failing 

to investigate witnesses to the shooting. Petitioner alleges that Ronis failed to investigate 

witnesses Miguel Rubio and Sylvia Escamilla, who submitted sworn declarations with the 

Petition stating that they 1) saw someone other than Petitioner shoot the victim, Arturo 

Rivera; 2) informed Ronis there was a second shooter; and 3) were not interviewed by 

Ronis or called to testify at trial. Petitioner further alleges that Ronis failed to investigate 

witnesses on a list that his ex-wife, Sandy Barajas, provided to Ronis. 

On May 28, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. (ECF No. 16).

On September 4, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the Court deny the Petition in its entirety. (ECF No. 40). On September 

10, 2013, the Court issued an Order adopting the Report and Recommendation in part, 

denying the Petition, denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and granting 

a certificate of appealability as to claim three—that Ronis’s failure to investigate witnesses 

to the shooting constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 47). Petitioner 

appealed. (ECF No. 49). 

On December 19, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate 

“revers[ing] the district court’s denial of [Petitioner]’s habeas petition and remand[ing] to 

the district court for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two 

witnesses,” Miguel Rubio and Sylvia Escamilla. (ECF No. 64 at 5). This Court referred the 

action to the Magistrate Judge to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue a report and 

recommendation. (ECF No. 65). 

The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing that took place over four days: 

February 28, 2018; March 2, 2018; March 9, 2018; and September 14, 2018. (ECF Nos. 

110, 111, 112, 136). During the hearing the parties submitted numerous exhibits, including 

 

5

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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police reports that Petitioner received for the first time after remand. The following 

witnesses testified at the hearing: Daniel Alatorre, Sylvia Escamilla, Sergeant Steve 

Shephard, Sergeant Estella Cordero, Jan Ronis, Esq., Juan Antonio Lopez, Sandy Barajas, 

and Barbara Ann Smith, Esq. Neither Miguel Rubio nor Petitioner testified at the hearing. 

On August 15, 2019, Respondent filed a Post-Evidentiary Hearing Brief. (ECF No. 

152). On September 12, 2019, Petitioner filed a Post-Evidentiary Hearing Brief. (ECF No. 

157). 

On January 28, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation. 

(ECF No. 158). The Report and Recommendation concludes that the scope of the remand 

is limited to determining whether Petitioner satisfied the first prong of the Strickland v. 

Washington6ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry—whether counsel was deficient—

by “conduct[ing] ‘an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two 

witnesses’, Escamilla and Rubio.” (Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting ECF No. 65 at 

5)). The Report and Recommendation concludes that Escamilla and Rubio are not credible 

witnesses, and Ronis was not deficient for failing to interview them or present their 

testimony at trial. The Report and Recommendation concludes that Petitioner’s other 

claims regarding Ronis’s deficiency are outside the scope of the mandate, and Ronis was 

not deficient for failing to interview witnesses other than Escamilla and Rubio who 

identified a shooter in the police reports that did not match Petitioner’s description or for 

selecting the defenses of self-defense and accident. The Report and Recommendation 

recommends that the Court find: “(1) Miguel Rubio and Sylvia Escamilla are not credible 

witnesses; (2) trial counsel was not deficient in not interviewing them and presenting their 

testimony at trial; (3) trial counsel’s actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel; and accordingly, (4) the Petition should be DENIED.” (Id. at 3).

 

6

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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On July 8, 2020, Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. 

(ECF No. 165). Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that the 

scope of the remand is limited to determining the credibility of Escamilla and Rubio and 

whether Ronis was deficient in failing to interview them or call them to testify at trial. 

Petitioner objects to the “Report and Recommendation’s findings of fact based on police 

reports.” (ECF No. 165 at 29). Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s 

conclusion that Ronis was not deficient.

On August 3, 2020, Respondent filed a Reply. (ECF No. 170).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. Review of the Report and Recommendation

The duties of the district court in connection with a report and recommendation of a 

magistrate judge are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions 

of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). The district court need not review de novo those portions of a report and 

recommendation to which neither party objects. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 

n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc) (“Neither the Constitution nor the [Magistrates Act] requires a district judge to 

review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as 

correct.”).

a. Review of the Petition

Review of the Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) because the Petition was filed in 2010, well after AEDPA’s

effective date. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). Under AEDPA, a 

federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of the claim 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

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Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a petitioner satisfies subdivision (1) or (2) of § 2254(d), the federal 

court considers Petitioner’s claim de novo. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-

54 (2007) (when section 2254(d) is satisfied, “[a] federal court must then resolve the claim 

without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires”). 

In this case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that 

“the state court decision constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),” and “constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland

. . . .” (ECF No. 64 at 5, 11). Accordingly, the Court addresses Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim de novo. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[W]here the analysis on federal habeas, in whatever order conducted, results in 

the conclusion that § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied, then federal habeas courts must review the 

substantive constitutionality of the state custody de novo.”). 

IV. SCOPE OF THE MANDATE

The Report and Recommendation concludes that “the scope of the remand is clear: 

the Ninth Circuit ‘REVERSE[D] and REMAND[ED] for an evidentiary hearing before the 

district court on [Petitioner]’s Strickland claim to consider whether trial counsel was 

deficient as well as Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility.’” (ECF No. 158 at 8 (first and second 

alterations in original) (quoting ECF No. 65 at 12)). The Report and Recommendation 

concludes that the mandate requires the district court to “conduct ‘an evidentiary hearing 

on counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses’, Escamilla and Rubio . . . . This requires 

assessing the credibility of the two declarants and whether trial counsel was deficient in 

not calling them to testify.” (Id. at 10-11 (quoting ECF No. 65 at 5)). The Report and 

Recommendation concludes that Petitioner’s claims that Ronis was deficient for failing to 

interview witnesses other than Escamilla and Rubio who provided statements in police 

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reports purportedly identifying a shooter whose description did not match Petitioner and

for selecting the defenses of self-defense and accident are outside the scope of the mandate. 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that the scope of 

the remand is limited to assessing the credibility of Escamilla and Rubio and whether Ronis 

was deficient in failing to interview them or call them to testify. Petitioner contends that 

the mandate allows the Court to consider whether Ronis was deficient for failing to 

interview witnesses other than Escamilla and Rubio and whether Ronis was deficient for 

selecting the defenses of self-defense and accidental shooting. Petitioner contends that the 

police reports from the shooting were not available to Petitioner until August 2017, so 

“[w]hen the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, neither that Court, nor the parties, were 

aware that several witnesses identified in the police reports had described a shooter who 

did not match or resemble [Petitioner] . . . .” (ECF No. 165 at 24). Petitioner contends that 

the police reports and the hearing testimony from one of the witnesses identified in the 

police reports, Daniel Alatorre, are relevant to Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility and 

“demonstrate that Ronis was deficient in failing to investigate or interview these witnesses 

and in selecting and presenting his chosen defense.” (Id. at 25).

Respondent contends that the Report and Recommendation correctly concludes that 

the scope of the remand limits the Court to assessing Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility and 

whether Ronis was deficient for failing to interview them or call them as witnesses. 

Respondent contends that whether Ronis was deficient for failing to interview witnesses 

other than Escamilla and Rubio and whether Ronis was deficient for his selection of a 

defense is outside the scope of the remand. Respondent contends that the Magistrate Judge 

gave Petitioner the opportunity to present witnesses at the hearing who identified a shooter 

to police that did not match Petitioner’s description, and the only witnesses Petitioner 

presented was Daniel Alatorre, whom the Magistrate Judge found not credible. Respondent 

contends that the Report and Recommendation considers claims outside the scope of the 

mandate and rejects them on the merits. 

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“The rule of mandate is similar to, but broader than, the law of the case doctrine.” 

Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Cote, 51 

F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly 

held, in both civil and criminal cases, that a district court is limited by [the court of 

appeals’] remand where the scope of the remand is clear.” United States v. Thrasher, 483 

F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 

(9th Cir. 2006)), as amended (Apr. 25, 2007). “The rule [of mandate] provides that any 

‘district court that has received the mandate of an appellate court cannot vary or examine 

that mandate for any purpose other than executing it.’” Stacy, 825 F.3d at 568 (quoting 

Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), as corrected (Feb. 15, 

2013)). “The district court may, however, ‘decide anything not foreclosed by the 

mandate.’” Id. (quoting Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067). “[W]hen a court is confronted with issues 

the remanding court never considered, the ‘mandate[ ] require[s] respect for what the 

higher court decided, not for what it did not decide.’” Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067 (second and 

third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). “[I]f a district court errs by violating the rule of mandate, the error is a 

jurisdictional one.” Thrasher, 483 F.3d at 982. “[T]he ultimate task is to distinguish matters 

that have been decided on appeal, and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the lower 

court, from matters that have not[.]” Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1093.

In this case, the Court certified Petitioner’s third claim for appeal, which included 

allegations that Ronis was ineffective for failing to investigate and call witnesses Sylvia 

Escamilla and Miguel Rubio—who would have testified that someone other than Petitioner 

shot Arturo Rivera—and for failing to investigate witnesses on a list that Petitioner’s exwife, Sandy Barajas, provided to Ronis.7

(See ECF No. 1-11 at 35-36). Escamilla and Rubio 

 

7 Sandy Barajas states in her declaration submitted with the Petition that the list of witnesses included: 

Sylvia Escamilla, Miguel Rubio, Juliete Sillas, Rosefe Cuevas, Adolfo Cuevas, Leticia Hernandez, and 

Antonio Hernandez. (ECF No. 1-7 at 8).

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are the only witnesses who submitted declarations stating that they would have testified 

that someone other than Petitioner shot Arturo Rivera. The court of appeals framed its 

mandate in terms of the only two witnesses who submitted declarations and did not address 

Petitioner’s allegation that Ronis was deficient for failing to investigate witnesses other 

than Escamilla and Rubio. The court of appeals stated:

Escamilla and Rubio both would have testified that someone got the gun away 

from [Petitioner] and fired it at Arturo . . . . We are convinced that Escamilla 

and Rubio’s testimony creates “a reasonable probability” that “the fact-finder 

would have had a reasonable doubt as to [Petitioner’s] guilt[.]” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 695 . . . . Because there is no record about trial counsel’s failure 

to investigate Escamilla and Rubio, there is an issue as to whether an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter is appropriate . . . . We conclude that 

[Petitioner] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because “his allegations, if 

proved, would entitle him to relief.” Hurles [v. Ryan], 752 F.3d [768,] 791-92 

[(9th Cir. 2014)] . . . . “[W]e REVERSE and REMAND for an evidentiary 

hearing before the district court on [Petitioner’s] Strickland claim to consider 

whether trial counsel was deficient as well as Escamilla and Rubio’s 

credibility.

(ECF No. 64 at 8-12). The Report and Recommendation correctly states that the district 

court is limited on remand by the scope of the mandate. The Report and Recommendation 

correctly concludes that the scope of the remand is limited to “conduct[ing] ‘an evidentiary 

hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses’, Escamilla and Rubio,” which 

“requires assessing the credibility of the two declarants and whether trial counsel was 

deficient in not calling them to testify.” (ECF No. 158 at 10-11 (quoting ECF No. 64 at 5)). 

On remand, the Magistrate Judge properly considered new evidence relevant to 

Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility and Ronis’s deficiency. The Magistrate Judge admitted 

the police reports obtained after appeal into evidence for the purposes of impeachment and 

for their effect on Ronis in his preparation for Petitioner’s trial. (See id. at 112). The 

Magistrate Judge considered the contents of the police reports and testimony from 

witnesses at the hearing in determining that Escamilla and Rubio are not credible and that 

Ronis was not deficient for failing to interview them or call them to testify. In addition, 

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although the Report and Recommendation concludes that Petitioner’s additional claims 

regarding Ronis’s deficiency are outside the scope of the remand, the Magistrate Judge 

allowed Petitioner to present exhibits and witness testimony related to Petitioner’s claims 

that Ronis was deficient failing to interview and present the testimony of witnesses other 

than Escamilla and Rubio and for selecting the defenses of self-defense and accident.8 The 

Report and Recommendation dedicates nineteen pages to analyzing these additional claims

on the merits and concludes that Ronis’s decision not to investigate and present the 

testimony of witnesses other than Escamilla and Rubio was reasonable, and Ronis was not 

deficient for presenting defenses of self-defense and accident at trial. (See id. at 91-92 

(“While the Court finds that Petitioner’s argument about the witnesses who observed the 

shooter wearing a cowboy hat or being of Asian descent are outside the scope of the 

remand, . . . Ronis’ decision not to further investigate this string of ‘cowboy hat’ witnesses 

regarding a potential second shooter defense [was] reasonable.”); id. at 92 

(“Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s remand to apply the deficiency prong to trial counsel 

Ronis’s alleged failure to interview declarants Rubio and Escamilla, this Court also finds 

that Ronis’ actions in not presenting a second shooter defense were reasonable, the decision 

was based on sound trial strategy, and it does not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”)).

Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation’s conclusions regarding the 

scope of the mandate de novo, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation 

correctly identifies the scope of the remand and that the Magistrate Judge considered 

evidence relevant to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was obtained 

after the court of appeals’ mandate. 

 

8 The only witness on Sandy Barajas’ list who testified at the hearing was Sylvia Escamilla, whom the 

Magistrate Judge found not credible. The only witness who identified a shooter in the police reports who 

did not match Petitioner’s description who testified at the hearing was Daniel Alatorre, whom the 

Magistrate Judge found not credible.

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V. FINDINGS OF FACT

At the hearing on remand, the Magistrate Judge admitted into evidence Respondent’s 

“Exhibit M”—“the police reports Ronis received from the District Attorney’s office.” (Id.

at 51). The Magistrate Judge admitted the police reports “not for the truth of the matters 

asserted, but for the purposes of impeachment and for the effect of these reports on Jan 

Ronis in his preparation of Petitioner’s defense at trial.” (Id. at 112). The Report and 

Recommendation states:

More than ninety potential witnesses amongst party-goers and residents 

surrounding KP Hall were interviewed about the shooting. Their responses 

are documented in various police reports. (See Ex. M.) Of the total potential 

witnesses, over seventy did not see the shooting and/or only heard shots fired. 

(Id.) . . . . Critically, no witnesses to the shooting described a second shooter 

or anyone else brandishing or using a gun during the altercation. (See Ex. M.)

Eight witnesses stated Petitioner . . . was shooting the gun and provided 

detailed statements to the police: Eva Gallegos (id. at 8, 62); Roman 

Rodriguez Rubio (id. at 47-48, 69-70); Joaquina Soltero (id. at 24, 37, 52-53); 

the victim, Pedro Arturo Rivera (id. at 24, 26, 75-77); Norma Soltero (id. at 

27, 72-73); Adan Rivera (id. at 56-58, 64-66); Juan Bolanos (id. at 79-80); 

and Herman Lopez (id. at 80). Additionally, . . . Sylvia Escamilla initially 

stated she saw Petitioner fire the gun up into the air. (Id. at 37; Ex. A.)

(Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted)). The Report and Recommendation states that “Pedro Arturo 

Rivera, the victim, provided a detailed account of Petitioner shooting him in the eye.” (Id.

at 52). The Report and Recommendation states that Pedro Arturo Rivera told police that he 

“‘turned around and saw [Petitioner] shoot at him. Pedro saw the muzzle flash from the 

gun . . . [and] felt a pain in his head . . . . After being shot, Pedro believed [Petitioner] was 

going to continue to shoot him.’” (Id. at 52 (quoting Ex. M at 77)). The Report and 

Recommendation further states that “five witnesses to the shooting who did not know 

Petitioner’s name, Jose Sanchez, Antoinette Gonzales, Daniel Alatorre, Beginia Carillo, 

and Olivia Addison, described the shooter as a thin Hispanic male . . . .” (Id. at 53; see also 

id. at 94-96 (describing witness statements)). 

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Petitioner objects to the “Report and Recommendation’s findings of fact based on 

police reports.” (ECF No. 165 at 29). Petitioner contends that the court of appeals stated 

that none of the witnesses saw Petitioner shoot Arturo, and “the Magistrate Judge attempts 

to create a different impression in efforts to justify that Ronis was not deficient.” (Id. at 

30). Petitioner contends that the witness statements in the police reports are not admissible 

to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Petitioner contends that none of the prosecution 

witnesses saw Petitioner shoot Arturo, and Petitioner testified at trial that he did not chase 

or shoot Arturo. Therefore, “any suggestion that anyone saw Espinoza shoot Arturo in the 

eye [is] refuted by the evidence.” (Id. at 31). 

Respondent contends that that the Report and Recommendation’s conclusions are 

legally and factually correct.

The Magistrate Judge properly admitted the police reports into evidence and 

considered the police reports, “not for the truth of the matters asserted, but for the purposes 

of impeachment and for the effect of these reports on Jan Ronis in his preparation of 

Petitioner’s defense at trial.” (ECF No. 158 at 112). The court of appeals only had the trial 

record before it when it stated that “none [of the prosecution’s witnesses] actually saw 

[Petitioner] shot Arturo.” (ECF No. 64 at 8). The court of appeals did not have access to

the police reports that the Magistrate Judge admitted into evidence on remand. (See ECF 

No. 158 at 96 (“The Ninth Circuit did not have the benefit of knowing these witness 

statements were contained in the police reports Ronis reviewed prior to Petitioner’s 

trial.”)). The victim, Arturo Rivera, who did not testify at Petitioner’s trial, identified 

Petitioner in the police reports as “the person who shot [him].” (Ex. M at 77). Other 

witnesses identified Petitioner in the police reports as the person they saw shooting the gun 

at Arturo Rivera before they saw Rivera fall to the ground. (See, e.g., id. at 27, 37). Having 

reviewed the Report and Recommendation’s findings of fact regarding the police reports 

de novo, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation’s factual findings are 

an accurate statement of the contents of the police reports.

///

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VI. TRIAL COUNSEL’S DEFICIENCY

The Report and Recommendation concludes that “Ronis was not deficient in failing 

to interview Escamilla and Rubio as witnesses or to call them to testify” (ECF No. 158 at 

82 (footnote omitted)). The Report and Recommendation further concludes that although 

“outside the scope of the remand,” “Ronis’ decision not to further investigate [the] string 

of ‘cowboy hat’ witnesses regarding a potential second shooter defense [was] reasonable,” 

and “Ronis’ actions in not presenting a second shooter defense were reasonable, the 

decision was based on sound trial strategy, and it does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel” (id. at 91-92).

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Ronis was 

not deficient. Petitioner contends that Ronis was deficient in failing to conduct sufficient 

pretrial investigation and in selecting and presenting a defense. Petitioner contends that 

Ronis failed to interview any witnesses, and his failure to “at least interview the witnesses 

identified in the police reports,” including Daniel Alatorre, Sylvia Escamilla, and Miguel 

Rubio, “cannot be justified.” (ECF No. 165 at 46). Petitioner contends that Ronis’s decision 

not call these witnesses at trial, was not a tactical decision because Ronis did not know if 

the witnesses would be useful. Petitioner contends that Ronis did not have sufficient facts 

to determine the appropriate defense. Petitioner contends that Ronis’s statement that 

Petitioner told Ronis he was the shooter is false and inconsistent with Petitioner’s trial 

testimony. Petitioner asserts that his statements to Ronis do not absolve Ronis of his duty 

to independently investigate.

Respondent contends that the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Ronis 

was not deficient is legally and factually correct. Respondent contends that “a second 

shooter theory cannot be said to be stronger than the accident theory, which actually 

produced a hung jury on the attempted murder charge.” (ECF No. 170 at 9). Respondent 

contends that based on Petitioner’s trial testimony that there was only one gun and that 

Petitioner was the only person with a gun, a witness would have had to see two shooters 

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with two guns to corroborate a second shooter theory. Respondent contends that no witness 

statements in the police reports indicate that any witness saw two different guns. 

To obtain habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner “first . . . 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. “Second, the 

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” which 

“requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. The petitioner must establish both deficient 

performance and prejudice to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. “Recognizing 

the ‘tempt[ation] for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or 

adverse sentence,’ . . . counsel should be ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689-90). “To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed 

to act ‘reasonabl[y] considering all the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688).

“[C]ounsel must, at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to 

make informed decisions about how to best represent his client.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 

F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 

“This includes a duty to investigate the defendant’s most important defense,’ Sanders, 21 

F.3d at 1457, and a duty adequately to investigate and introduce into evidence records that 

demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine 

confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, “the duty to investigate 

and prepare a defense is not limitless,’ and [ ] ‘it does not necessarily require that every 

conceivable witness be interviewed or that counsel must pursue every path until it bears 

fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.’” Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1129 (9th 

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Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 584 (9th Cir. 1983)). “A claim 

of failure to interview a witness . . . cannot establish ineffective assistance when the 

person’s account is otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.” Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088 

(quoting Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). “When the record 

clearly shows that the lawyer was well-informed, and the defendant fails to state what 

additional information would be gained by the discovery he or she now claims was 

necessary, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.” Id. (citing Eggleston, 798 F.2d 

at 376). “Counsel is not obligated to interview every witness personally in order to be 

adjudged to have performed effectively.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095 n.8 (9th Cir. 

1999). “Few decisions a lawyer makes draw so heavily on professional judgment as 

whether or not to proffer a witness at trial.” Id. at 1095.

“To determine the reasonableness of a decision not to investigate, the court must 

apply ‘a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 

F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691), as amended (Aug. 

27, 1998).

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 

after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 

that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 

investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially 

influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions 

are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the 

defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what 

investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. 

For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are 

generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need 

for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated 

altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that 

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pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's 

failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as 

unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the 

defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s investigation 

decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s other 

litigation decisions.

Id. 

“A defense attorney’s failure to consider alternate defenses constitutes deficient 

performance when the attorney ‘neither conducts a reasonable investigation nor makes a 

showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.’” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1456). However, once counsel reasonably selects 

a defense, his duty to investigate other defenses that would “directly conflict[ ] with the 

[chosen] defense theory end[s].” Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), as 

amended (June 20, 1997) (explaining that “[a]fter [counsel] reviewed the preliminary facts 

of the case, he reasonably decided that he would pursue only a theory of self-defense. Even 

if [defendant] told [counsel] of his mental problems, [counsel] did not need to investigate 

[defendant]’s competency”). “[T]he viability of the selected defense bears on the 

reasonableness of counsel’s actions.” Bohana v. Vaughn, 389 F. App’x 600, 602 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Turk, 116 F.3d at 1267). “In previous cases where [the Court of Appeal for 

the Ninth Circuit] found counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present alternative 

defenses, the defenses selected were not viable and there were multiple witnesses that 

counsel failed to investigate who would have easily yielded contradictory evidence to the 

selected defenses.” Id.

In this case, the Report and Recommendation correctly identifies and applies the 

deferential standard for determining whether counsel was deficient. The record does not 

demonstrate that Ronis failed to interview any witnesses or failed to conduct pretrial 

investigation to determine the appropriate defense. The Magistrate Judge found that Ronis 

credibly testified at the hearing that he reviewed and was familiar with all police reports 

and that any important witnesses would have been interviewed. Petitioner fails to identify 

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any information that would have been gained by interviewing the witnesses identified in 

the police reports. The only witnesses to the shooting who submitted declarations stating 

that there was a second shooter were Sylvia Escamilla and Miguel Rubio. Rubio did not 

testify at the hearing, and the Magistrate Judge concluded that Rubio’s declaration is 

inadmissible hearsay and not credible. Escamilla testified at the hearing, and the Magistrate 

Judge concluded that Escamilla is not credible. Daniel Alatorre was the only witness who 

testified at the hearing that he saw a shooter who did not match Petitioner’s description, 

and the Magistrate Judge found Alatorre not credible. No other witness testified at the 

hearing who identified a shooter in the police reports with physical characteristics different 

from Petitioner—wearing a cowboy hat or sombrero, or of Asian descent. None of the 

witnesses in the police reports stated that there was more than one shooter. There is no 

evidence in the record that at the time Ronis was preparing for trial there was any indication 

of a second shooter or that any witness would have testified to seeing a second shooter. In 

addition, any witness testimony at trial that there was a second shooter would have 

conflicted with Petitioner’s own testimony that “there was only one gun,” that he “never 

saw anybody else with a gun,” and that he was “the only person with a gun.” (Lodgment 

2, vol. 5, at 751-52). The Report and Recommendation correctly concludes that Petitioner 

fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Ronis failed to conduct 

sufficient pretrial investigation. The Report and Recommendation correctly concludes that 

Ronis was not deficient for failing to interview or call Rubio, Escamilla, Alatorre, or the 

other “cowboy hat” witnesses at trial. 

Further, the Report and Recommendation correctly concludes that Ronis’s decision 

to proffer a self-defense and accident theory of defense was reasonable based on the police 

reports, the forensic evidence that the bullets all came from the same gun, Petitioner’s 

statements to Ronis that he was the shooter, and on Petitioner’s own testimony at trial that 

he was the only person with a gun. A second shooter defense would have been a weaker 

choice. Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Ronis was not 

deficient de novo, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation’s correctly 

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determines that Ronis was not deficient. See Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088 (“[Petitioner] does 

nothing more than speculate that, if interviewed, [the witness] might have given 

information helpful to [Petitioner]. There is no evidence that investigating [the witnesse] 

would be akin to investigating the most important defense.”).

VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability must be obtained by a petitioner in order to pursue an 

appeal from a final order in a Section 2254 habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may 

issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). It must appear that reasonable jurists could find the district 

court’s assessment of the petitioner’s constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). The Court concludes that reasonable jurists 

could find debatable the scope of the mandate and whether this Court was correct in 

denying Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A certificate of appealability 

is granted as to claim three of the Petition.

VIII. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 158) is 

adopted in full. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and 

Recommendation (ECF No. 165) are overruled.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 

1) is denied. A certificate of appeal is granted as to claim three.

Dated: November 9, 2020

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