Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01180/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01180-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PACIFIC GAS and ELECTRIC

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JESSE M. LANGE DISTRIBUTOR,

INC, et al.,

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-05-1180 DFL KJM

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Plaintiff Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) sued

defendant Shell Oil Company (“Shell”) for allegedly allowing

hazardous waste to migrate onto PG&E’s property. Shell moves:

(1) for a more definite statement; (2) to dismiss the Proposition

65 claim; and (3) to strike PG&E’s alter-ego and agency liability

theories and PG&E’s prayer for civil penalties and disgorgement. 

For the reasons stated below, the court: (1) DENIES Shell’s

motion for a more definite statement; (2) GRANTS Shell’s motion

to dismiss the second cause of action to the extent it seeks

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civil penalties for a period exceeding one year; (3) GRANTS

Shell’s motion to strike PG&E’s request for civil penalties and

disgorgement under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); 

and (4) DENIES Shell’s motion to strike the alter-ego and agency

theories of liability. 

I.

PG&E owns property located at 11239 Midway in Chico,

California. (Compl. ¶ 20.) PG&E avers that “considerable

environmental contamination is present in the soil and

groundwater” beneath this property. (Id. ¶ 22.) PG&E claims

that the contamination migrated from a nearby facility owned by

defendant Jesse M. Lange Distributor (“Lange facility”). (Id. ¶

24.) PG&E alleges that Shell is “a current or former owner

and/or operator” of the Lange facility, and that Shell’s “acts,

operations, omissions and decisions caused or resulted in” the

contamination of PG&E’s property. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

PG&E’s complaint asserts eleven causes of action seeking

damages and injunctive relief. The claims are based on: (1) the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a)(1)(A); (2) Proposition 65, Cal. Health & Safety Code §

25249.5; (3) nuisance; (4) trespass; (5) negligence; (6) the

California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

et seq.; and (7) defective product. PG&E also seeks declaratory

relief. 

II.

A. Motion for a More Definite Statement

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A party's pleading may be so vague or ambiguous that the

adversary cannot respond. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). When that occurs,

the court may, in its discretion, grant a Rule 12(e) motion for a

more definite statement. Id.; McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

1179 (9th Cir. 1996). However, motions for a more definite

statement are disfavored in light of the liberal pleading

standards of Rule 8, and should not be granted unless the moving

party “literally cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Bureerong

v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Indeed, a

Rule 12(e) motion is only proper where the complaint is so

indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the

claim being asserted. See Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Cellars v. Pac.

Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999);

Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1228

(C.D. Cal. 1998)(“If the moving party could obtain the missing

detail through discovery, the motion should be denied.”)

Shell argues that a more definite statement is required

because “[p]laintiff’s allegations with respect to Shell are so

vague as to frustrate any attempt at a proper answer.” (Mot. for

More Definite Statement at 2.) However, Shell has demonstrated

that it understands PG&E’s claims. For example, in its

Memorandum of Points and Authorities for the motions to dismiss

and strike, Shell clearly and accurately summarizes PG&E’s

claims. Shell states that: (1) the case involves contaminated

soil and groundwater beneath PG&E’s property that allegedly

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emanated from a property across the street owned by defendant

Lange; (2) PG&E is attempting to hold Shell liable for the soil

and groundwater contamination; and (3) the complaint alleges

eleven causes of action, including nine California law claims,

one federal law claim under the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and one claim for declaratory relief. 

(Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. to Strike at 1.) This is enough

information for Shell to determine the nature of the claim being

asserted. Indeed, every other defendant in this action has filed

an answer to PG&E’s complaint. Thus, Shell’s argument that the

complaint is so ambiguous that it cannot be expected to respond

is not persuasive. See Brown v. Maxaam, Inc., No. 90-1468, 1991

WL 13918, *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 1991) (“The ability of the other

defendants to answer the plaintiffs' complaint casts considerable

doubt on the proposition that the complaint is vague and

ambiguous enough to make it unreasonable to require [defendant]

to file a responsive pleading.”) 

Shell’s specific arguments attacking the complaint are also

unconvincing. Shell argues that PG&E’s complaint: (1) “offers

only ambiguous and contradictory allegations of Shell’s

relationship to the property” at issue; (2) “fails to specify

which causes of action apply to which defendants” even though

“ownership and control varied significantly over time;” and (3)

cites ambiguous factual allegations regarding its alter-ego and

agency theories against defendants. 

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1. Ambiguity of Shell’s Relationship to the Property at 

Issue

PG&E’s complaint alleges that Shell “is a current or former

owner and/or operator of the tank farm at 11226 Midway whose

acts, operations, omissions and decisions caused or resulted in

releases or discharges which form the basis of PG&E’s claims.” 

(Compl. ¶ 14.) Shell complains that this paragraph is vague and

ambiguous because it could implicate Shell based on: (1) its own

conduct; (2) vicarious responsibility based on the conduct of

others; (3) duties that flow from property ownership; or (4)

Shell’s decisions to give control to others. (Reply at 4.

However, the specific information that Shell requests is not

required by Rule 8(e) and would be more properly obtained through

discovery. See Famolare, 525 F.Supp. at 949. Shell is better

positioned than PG&E to know when and whether it owned or

operated the Lange facility. Furthermore, “[a] party may plead

alternative theories of liability, even if those theories are

inconsistent or independently sufficient.” Cellars, 189 F.R.D.

at 578-79 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2)). In a RCRA action,

liability can be based on past or present ownership or operation. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 6972. PG&E is entitled to plead these

alternative theories of Shell’s potential liability. If Shell

believes that all of the allegations regarding its relationship

to the property are untrue, it can deny them in its answer. It

can seek further clarification of plaintiff’s theories by

contention interrogatories. But a more definite statement is not

necessary to an answer.

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2. Failure to Specify Which Causes of Action Apply to Each

Defendant

Shell complains that PG&E’s failure to specify which causes

of action apply to each defendant prevents each defendant from

responding appropriately. This is a strange argument given that

all other defendants already have answered. The Complaint is not

so confusing as Shell would have it: claims against “The

Defendants” are made against all defendants; where a claim only

implicates a few of the defendants, PG&E lists them individually.

(See, e.g. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, 43, 60). 

Shell also asserts that “several of these claims . . . refer

vaguely to ‘acts and omissions’ without specifying what those

acts or omissions may be when they occurred.” (Id. at 4, citing

Compl. ¶¶ 57, 68.) However, the reference to “the acts and

omissions of The Defendants” in paragraphs 57 and 68 is not

vague. The complaint makes clear that PG&E is referring to the

facts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 31, which are

unambiguous. (See Compl. ¶¶ 56, 67.) 

Finally, Shell argues that PG&E has not sufficiently defined

which parts of “23 C.C.R. §§ 2720 et seq.” each defendant has

violated. (Id. at 4, citing Compl. ¶ 35.) However, PG&E has no

obligation to do so. Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake, 314

F.Supp.2d 1017, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “Absent special

circumstances, a Rule 12(e) motion cannot be used to require the

pleader to set forth ‘the statutory or constitutional basis for

his claim, only the facts underlying it.’” Id. at 1022 (quoting

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McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir.

1990)). Shell has not presented any “special circumstances” to

justify making an exception here.

3. Ambiguous Factual Allegations Regarding the Alter-Ego 

and Agency Liability Theories

In paragraphs 5 and 18, PG&E alleges that “Lange . . . was

an alter ego of Shell” and that “[e]ach of The Defendants was the

agent of the Other Defendants, and that each of The Defendants

ratified the acts and omissions of the Other Defendants.” (Id.

at 5.) Shell argues that a more definite statement is required

because these allegations “are so ambiguous or contradictory that

Shell cannot determine how to respond.” (Mot. for More Definite

Statement at 4.) 

In addition, Shell claims that PG&E has failed to provide

sufficient facts to support an alter-ego or agency theory. (Id.

at 5.) Specifically, it asserts that PG&E must make “specific

factual allegations establishing the requisite control over the

corporation in question or specific allegations of other

hallmarks of an ‘alter ego’ situation.” (Mot. to Dismiss and

Mot. to Strike at 7.) According to Shell, a heightened pleading

standard applies to agency allegations. 

“Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all

civil actions,” except for those stated in Rule 9(b). 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Rule 9(b)

“provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or

mistake.” Id. The Supreme Court has declined to create or

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recognize any other exceptions. Id. Rule 9(b) makes no mention

of alter-ego or agency theories. Therefore, PG&E “must satisfy

only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).” Swierkiewicz, 534

U.S. at 513. Thus, the court can only grant a motion for more

definite statement if the “pleading fails to specify the

allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice.” Id. at

514. 

PG&E has alleged the following relevant facts in the

complaint: (1) defendant Jesse M. Lange Distributor, Inc. sells

Shell fuels and solvents at the Lange facility; (2) Shell

originally constructed, operated, and maintained the Lange

facility; and (3) Shell “is a current or former owner and/or

operator of the [Lange facility] whose acts, operations,

omissions and decisions caused or resulted in releases or

discharges which form the basis of PG and E’s claims.” (Compl. ¶

6, 8, 14, 19.)

These facts, combined with PG&E’s allegations in paragraphs

5 and 18, are sufficient to put Shell on notice that PG&E is

asserting claims based on an alter-ego or agency theory of

liability. The factual allegations are not confusing. Shell

should be able to admit or deny that it had an alter-ego or

agency relationship with Lange, owned the Lange property, or

contributed to the release of hazardous waste onto PG&E’s

property. It cannot contend that the claims are “so ambiguous or

contradictory” that it cannot respond. 

Shell’s reliance on Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.

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Co. of Am., 216 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2002) is

misplaced. In Wady, the plaintiff attempted to raise an alterego theory of liability for the first time on summary judgment. 

Plaintiff made no mention of an alter-ego theory in its

complaint, nor did it plead any facts which could have given the

defendant sufficient notice of such a claim. Id. at 1066-67. On

these facts, the court concluded that it would not allow the

plaintiff “to argue an ‘unpleaded’ alter ego theory to avoid

summary judgment.” Id. 

As demonstrated above, the facts here differ significantly. 

Unlike the plaintiffs in Wady, PG&E specifically alleges alterego and agency theories of liability in the complaint. Moreover,

it alleges facts to support these theories. 

Shell also relies on Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 566

F.Supp. 636, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1983). In Hokama, limited partners

brought an action against the limited partnership, general

partners, and others to recover for alleged securities fraud

violations. Plaintiffs relied, in part, on an alter-ego theory

of liability. The Hokama court stated that “to pursue such a

theory of liability, [plaintiffs had to] allege the elements of

the doctrine. Conclusory allegations of alter ego status . . .

are not sufficient.” Id. 

However, Hokama differs from the present case because the

underlying allegations were based on fraud, which is subject to

the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b). Here, PG&E

does not allege fraud or any other claim subject to the standards

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of Rule 9(b). Therefore, Hokama is inapposite. Moreover, Hokama

predates the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of notice pleading in

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Shell’s

motion for more definite statement. 

B. Motion to Dismiss Second Cause of Action

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may

be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

This rule provides for dismissal of a claim if, as a matter of

law, “plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his

claim that would entitle him to relief.” Parks Sch. of Bus.,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In

reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,

287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Shell moves to dismiss the Proposition 65 claims in the

Second Cause of Action, arguing that “both the civil penalty and

injunctive relief claims are barred by the applicable statutes of

limitations under California law.” (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) 

Shell centers its argument on the dates set forth in paragraph 43

of the complaint which alleges:

[O]n or before 1995, [defendants] knowingly and

continuously have discharged and released petroleum

products into the soil of the [Lange facility] where

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these products are migrating and have migrated through

the groundwater and into the soil underlying PG and E’s

Midway property.

(Compl. ¶ 43.) Shell argues that this paragraph alleges a

discharge that occurred ten years ago. (Mot. to Dismiss at 3). 

Shell assumes that any “continuous discharge” referred to in the

paragraph must refer to passive migration that resulted from the

original ten-year-old discharge. (Id.) Because passive

migration does not constitute a “discharge” for the purposes of

Proposition 65, Shell claims that the statute of limitations

began to run ten years ago. (Id. at 3-4.) Therefore, Shell

concludes that PG&E’s claims for civil penalties and injunctive

relief are completely time-barred. (Id.) 

However, Shell misreads the complaint. PG&E alleges that

discharges continue today, not by way of passive migration, but

via actual discharge. Paragraph 21 of the complaint states, “PG

and E avers that the releases and discharges occurred and started

many years preceding the report to the Board, and that said

releases and discharges continue to this day.” PG&E admits that

paragraph 43 may have been ambiguous. It could have said

“beginning on or before 1995,” or it could have added the words

“and continuing to the present.” However, dismissal of the claim

on this technicality would be unwarranted. The complaint, when

read in a light most favorable to PG&E, states a claim upon which

relief could be granted. 

However, PG&E’s right to relief is more limited than it

asserts. PG&E claims that the four-year statute of limitations

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available under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)

applies to its Proposition 65 claim for civil penalties. 

Therefore, it claims that it can recover civil penalties for any

releases that occurred over a four-year time period. This is

incorrect. 

The UCL “permits violations of other laws to be treated as

unfair competition.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 949

(2002). In the present case, PG&E “borrowed” the alleged

Proposition 65 violation from its second cause of action to

support a separate UCL claim in its ninth cause of action. As

the law above demonstrates, this was proper. 

However, when a plaintiff takes advantage of the UCL in this

way, the two causes of action do not become one. The UCL claim

must remain a separate cause of action because the UCL provides

its own procedural guidelines and limited remedies. See Korea

Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144

(2003); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17203-17208. In particular, the

UCL does not provide a damage remedy. Id. Thus, PG&E cannot

apply the four-year statute of limitations available under the

UCL to its Proposition 65 claim for civil penalties, which is

ordinarily subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 

Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield, Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 977-78

(2003). 

PG&E mistakenly relies on Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration

Prods. Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 179 (2000). In Cortez, the

California Supreme Court stated that “[a]ny action on any UCL

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cause of action is subject to the four-year period of limitations

created by that section.” Thus, if a plaintiff brings a UCL

cause of action based on a violation of Proposition 65, the

statute of limitations for the UCL cause of action is four years. 

However, the statute of limitations for the Proposition 65 claim

is still one year. Merely bringing a UCL claim does not allow a

plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations already

developed by the California legislature for different remedies

under a different statute. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 182 (1999). 

For these reasons, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to

dismiss the second cause of action to the extent it seeks civil

penalties for a period that exceeds one year. 

D. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “the court may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Also,

“[a] motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the

prayer for relief when the damages sought are not recoverable as

a matter of law.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479

(C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Tapley v. Lockwood Green Eng’rs, Inc.,

502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974)). Rule 12(f) aims to prevent

“the expenditure of time and money that must arise from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior

to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885

(9th Cir. 1983). However, courts generally disfavor motions to

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strike because litigants often use them to delay proceedings and

because pleadings have limited importance in federal practice. 

Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.

Cal. 1991). 

Under Rule 12(f), Shell seeks to strike the following from

PG&E’s complaint: (1) the sections seeking civil penalties and

disgorgement under the UCL; and (2) the alter-ego and agency

allegations. (Mot. to Strike at 4-6.) 

1. Civil Penalty and Disgorgement Remedies under the UCL

PG&E sets forth the relief it seeks for its second and ninth

causes of action in paragraph 2 of the prayer for relief. The

second cause of action is the Proposition 65 claim and the ninth

cause of action is the UCL claim. PG&E seeks the same relief for

both, specifically: (1) injunctive relief; (2) civil penalties of

$2,500 per day for a four-year period; and (3) disgorgement of

“all monies saved by [defendants] by using PG and E’s Midway

property . . . as a disposal site for their wastes.” 

As discussed above in the previous section, a UCL claim is

distinct from the “borrowed” claim on which it is based. For the

same reasons PG&E cannot borrow the UCL’s statute of limitations

and apply it to the Proposition 65 claim, it cannot borrow the

remedies available under Proposition 65 and apply them to the UCL

claim. See Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1144. Instead, PG&E can

only seek the remedies available under the UCL, namely injunctive

relief and restitution. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 179. 

In light of the overbroad pleading, Shell moves to strike

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and disgorgement in paragraph 104. However, there is no such

language in paragraph 104.

15

any reference to civil penalties and disgorgement from paragraph

2 of PG&E’s prayer for relief. (Mot. to Strike at 6.) However, 1

Shell’s suggested solution is somewhat problematic. PG&E can

still recover civil penalties under Proposition 65. Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 25249.7. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to

strike the prayer for civil penalties from the entire paragraph. 

See Bureerong, 922 F.Supp. at 1479. Rather, the reference in

paragraph 2 to civil penalties shall be deemed limited to the

Proposition 65 claim. 

Similarly, PG&E’s prayer for disgorgement of profits in

paragraph 2 is non-restitutionary and therefore unavailable under

the UCL. This remedy shall also be deemed to apply only to the

Proposition 65 claim.

2. Alter-Ego and Agency Allegations

Shell also seeks to strike the alter-ego and agency

allegations from paragraphs 5 and 18 of the complaint. Shell

claims that these allegations are “impertinent” and “immaterial”

to any valid claims as defined under Rule 12(f). “Immaterial

matter is that which has no essential or important relationship

to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy,

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on

other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct.

1023 (1994). “Impertinent matter consists of statements that do

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not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.”

Id. 

The alter ego and agency theories are pertinent and have an

important relationship to PG&E’s claim for relief because they

allege a connection between Shell and the hazardous waste

release. Under Rule 8 and Swierkiewicz, PG&E need only assert “a

short and plain statement of the claim.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a);

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513. PG&E has complied with this rule. 

Therefore, the court DENIES Shell’s motion to strike the alter

ego and agency theories of liability from the complaint. 

III.

For the reasons stated, the court: (1) DENIES defendant’s

motion for a more definite statement; (2) GRANTS defendant’s

motion to dismiss the second cause of action to the extent it

seeks civil penalties for a period exceeding one year; (3) GRANTS

Shell’s motion to strike PG&E’s UCL remedy request for civil

penalties and disgorgement in paragraph 2 of the prayer for

relief; and (4) DENIES Shell’s motion to strike the alter ego and

agency theories of liability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/21/2005 /s/ David F. Levi 

 DAVID F. LEVI

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

Case 2:05-cv-01180-JAM -KJM Document 46 Filed 12/22/05 Page 16 of 16