Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02454/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02454-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR M. COLE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-2454 GEB DAD P

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 together with a motion for stay and abeyance. On

December 20, 2006, the undersigned ordered respondent to file and serve a response to

petitioner’s motion. On January 19, 2007, respondent filed an opposition in the form of a motion

to dismiss the petition. On February 21, 2007, petitioner filed a timely opposition to

respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered in the Sacramento County

Superior Court on June 13, 2003. Petitioner alleges that he had a jury trial, was convicted of first

degree burglary, attempted first degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and second degree

robbery, and was sentenced to a term of 29 years and 8 months in state prison. The California

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Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction on September 28, 2004. The California

Supreme Court denied his petition for review on December 22, 2004. 

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was dated October 19, 2006, and was received

by the court for filing on November 6, 2006. Therein, petitioner alleges three grounds for relief:

(1) denial of his right to contest consecutive sentencing under the decisions in Apprendi and

Blakely; (2) insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault with a firearm; and (3) a

Miranda rights violation because the trial court allowed a non-Mirandized statement into

evidence. Petitioner appears to allege that he intended to file a state habeas petition raising

ineffective assistance of counsel but had not yet done so when he filed his federal petition

because he believed his deadline was running out for filing a petition in federal court. Petitioner

attached to the back of his habeas petition a motion for stay and abeyance. Petitioner asserts that

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not exhausted on direct appeal because he

lacked evidence to present to the state courts due to a prison transfer. Petitioner requests a stay

of this action so that he can amend his petition to add newly exhausted claims at a later time.

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent has filed an opposition to petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance in

the form of a motion to dismiss. Respondent contends that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) applies to petitioner’s November 6, 2006 petition filed in this

court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Respondent argues that petitioner filed his petition for

writ of habeas corpus beyond the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1) & (2). (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Accordingly, respondent contends that the

court should deny petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance and dismiss this action with

prejudice. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)

Respondent argues that petitioner had one year to file his federal habeas petition

from the date on which his judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of time seeking such review. On September 28, 2004, the California

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Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment in petitioner’s case. On

December 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Petitioner’s time to seek direct review ended on March 22,

2005, upon the expiration of the 90-day period following denial of review in which petitioner had

to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 2-3.) The one year statute of limitations period began running the following day,

March 23, 2005. Respondent contends that the last day for petitioner to file a federal habeas

petition was on March 22, 2006, plus any time for tolling. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) 

However, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was dated October 19, 2006, and was not received

by this court for filing until November 6, 2006. 

Respondent acknowledges that proper filing of a state post-conviction application

with respect to the pertinent judgment tolls the one-year statute of limitations period. However,

respondent contends that petitioner did not file any state post-conviction actions within the

limitations period. In this regard, petitioner filed his sole state post-conviction challenge on

November 29, 2006, more than eight months after the statute of limitations for filing a federal

petition had expired. Thus, respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) 

Respondent concludes that it would be futile to grant petitioner’s motion for stay

and abeyance because petitioner’s federal petition is time-barred under § 2244(d). Accordingly,

respondent requests that the court deny petitioner’s motion and dismiss this action with

prejudice. 

PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

Petitioner argues that he did not file a post-conviction challenge before the statute

of limitations expired because he was deprived access to the prison law library. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to

Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Petitioner alleges that the prison where he was incarcerated was

on lock-down for 18 months, and only prisoners with proof of court deadlines were allowed to

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conduct research about their defenses. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) All

other prisoners were subject to a waiting list. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) 

Petitioner emphasizes that he was not placed on lock-down due to something he

did; all black and white inmates were placed on lockdown. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 4.) Petitioner argues that there is no way he could have known about a federal statute

of limitations because he was deprived of access to materials to read about federal law and

procedure. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Petitioner concludes that he was

subjected to circumstances beyond his control and requests that the court grant him relief from

the statute of limitations. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4 & 8.)

ANALYSIS

I. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

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pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas

corpus petitions filed after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to petitioner’s November

6, 2006 petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). 

II. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A)

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the judgment entered against

petitioner on June 13, 2003, became final on March 22, 2005, ninety days after the California

Supreme Court denied review on direct appeal on December 22, 2004. See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner did not file any state petitions for collateral relief

in the year following March 22, 2005. Thus, the one-year period of limitation ran without

interruption from March 23, 2005, until it expired on March 22, 2006. Petitioner’s federal

habeas petition dated October 19, 2006, was received by the court for filing on November 6,

2006. Accordingly, petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is untimely under the AEDPA

statute of limitations unless he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

III. Equitable Tolling

Because petitioner’s federal habeas petition was untimely, the court must dismiss

it unless petitioner demonstrates that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. The Supreme Court has held that,“a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (assuming

without deciding that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d)). Equitable tolling will be

unavailable in most cases. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). In the present case, the court finds that petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

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 Petitioner’s minimal effort to gain access to the library took place only after he filed his 1

federal petition. On November 16, 2006, petitioner filed an inmate appeal requesting library access

to photocopy his paper work. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at Ex. B.)

 “[T]he Constitution does not guarantee a prisoner unlimited access to a law library.” 2

Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). Prison officials

are permitted to regulate the time, place, and manner in which prison library facilities are used. Id.

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First, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has been pursuing his federal

claims diligently. Petitioner waited almost two years following the conclusion of his direct

appeal from his conviction in state court to advance those claims. In attempting to justify that

delay, petitioner alleges that the prison where he was incarcerated was on lockdown for 18

months, so that only prisoners with proof of court deadlines were allowed to conduct legal

research. However, as petitioner acknowledges, all prisoners without proof of a court deadline

were added to a waiting list in accordance with the Facility Captain’s Lockdown Plan. Between

March 23, 2005 and March 22, 2006, it does not appear that petitioner attempted to add his name

to the waiting list. Petitioner apparently thought it would be futile to attempt to do so. As he

notes in his opposition, “there wasn’t any telling when you [would] be able to come to the law

library” if added to the waiting list. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Although 1

petitioner may not have gained immediate access to the prison law library, he has not presented

any evidence demonstrating that prisoners on the waiting list were completely and indefinitely

denied access to the library.2

Second, petitioner has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control made it impossible for him to file a federal habeas petition on or before March 22,

2006. As noted above, the lockdown may have limited petitioner’s access to the prison law

library, but did not prevent him from adding his name to the waiting list and eventually obtaining

such access. Limited access to the prison law library does not alone amount to the “extraordinary

circumstances” necessary to support equitable tolling, particularly when it appears that

petitioner’s inaction was responsible for his delay in filing his petition. 

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The Supreme Court has cautioned that “stay and abeyance should be available only in 3

limited circumstances.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). A district court should not

grant a stay if petitioner’s claims are plainly meritless. Id. Where, as here, petitioner’s claims are

time-barred, the granting of a stay and abeyance would be futile. 

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Under the circumstances set forth above, the court concludes that petitioner’s

November 6, 2006 petition for a writ of habeas corpus is time-barred. Accordingly, petitioner’s

request for a stay and abeyance should be denied, and this action should be dismissed with 3

prejudice. 

OTHER MATTERS

In their motion to dismiss, respondent notes that Thomas Felker is the current

Warden of High Desert State Prison, not D.L. Runnels. Accordingly, respondent requests that

the court substitute Thomas Felker as respondent in this action. Good cause appearing, the court

will grant respondent’s request. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s request to substitute Thomas Felker, Warden of High Desert

State Prison, for D.L. Runnels, is granted; and 

2. The Clerk is directed to amend the court’s docket accordingly.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s November 6, 2006 motion for stay and abeyance be denied; 

2. Respondent’s January 19, 2007 motion to dismiss be granted; and

3. This action be dismissed with prejudice because the petition for writ of habeas

corpus was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations.

DATED: July 23, 2007.

DAD:9

cole2454.157

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