Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02980/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02980-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LAURA BETTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-02980 PHX MEA

) 

MARICOPA COUNTY, MARICOPA COUNTY ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, JOE ARPAIO, )

)

 Defendants. )

_________________________________)

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 14).

Background

On November 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the

Maricopa County Superior Court. Docket No. 1. The case was

removed to federal court on December 23, 2004. Id. Service of

a summons and the complaint was executed on Defendants, and the

Court set a Rule 16 case management conference, which was

continued on motion of Plaintiff until October 28, 2005. Docket

No. 10. On October 27, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. Docket No. 14. On October 28, 2005,

the parties all acquiesced to the exercise of magistrate judge

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jurisdiction over this matter and the case was reassigned.

Docket No. 15. On December 22, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion

seeking an extension of the time allowed to respond to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Docket No. 18. On January 23,

2006, the Court allowed Plaintiff until February 17, 2006, to

file a response to the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 19. As of

March 1, 2006, Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’

motion to dismiss. On March 2, 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel

represented to the Court that a response to the motion to

dismiss would not be filed.

Analysis

Defendant asserts that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim

of negligent supervision is warranted pursuant to Rule 12(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In reviewing the defendants’ motions under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the district court

views the facts as presented in the pleadings

in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, accepting as true all the

allegations in their complaint and treating

as false those allegations in the answer that

contradict the plaintiffs’ allegations.

Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th

Cir. 1992). See also Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he allegations of the

non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations

of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be

false.”).

Like Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c) requires that

the Court “accept the allegations in the

complaint as true, and draw all reasonable

factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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[The motion can be granted] only if no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved.” Turbe v. Government of the

Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.

1991) (citation omitted); see also Summit

Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 111 S.

Ct. 1842, 1845, 114 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1991);

Cardio-Medical, 536 F. Supp. at 1072 (“If a

complaint contains even the most basic of

allegations that, when read with great

liberality, could justify plaintiff’s claim

for relief, motions for judgment on the

pleadings should be denied.”). The Court

need not, however, adopt “conclusory

allegations or statements of law.” In re

General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec.

Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (D. Del.

1988).

Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 776 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.

Del. 1991). See also Austad v. United States, 386 F.2d 147, 149

(9th Cir. 1967); Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly

Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The standard for

granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is

identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state

a claim.”); Pooley v. National Hole-In-One Assoc., 89 F. Supp.

2d 1108, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2000).

Judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be granted when the

pleadings indicate that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of her claims which would entitle her to relief. See

Enron Oil Training & Transp. Co. v. Welbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132

F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). When deciding a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

the Court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the

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 Subsection A of section 12-821.01 provides: 

Persons who have claims against a public entity

or a public employee shall file claims with the

person or persons authorized to accept service

for the public entity or public employee as set

forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure

within one hundred eighty days after the cause of

action accrues. The claim shall contain facts

sufficient to permit the public entity or public

employee to understand the basis upon which

liability is claimed. The claim shall also

contain a specific amount for which the claim can

be settled and the facts supporting that amount.

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plaintiff. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83

F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff’s complaint states causes of action for false

arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, conspiracy, outrageous conduct, libel and slander,

negligence, and state constitutional violations. Plaintiff’s

claims arise from events occurring on February 6, 2003, during

the execution of a search warrant at her home by Maricopa County

Sheriffs. Plaintiff also alleges that a defendant falsely

arrested her and harassed her, and that Defendants are

improperly holding property wrongfully seized during the

execution of the search warrant.

Defendants assert the complaint must be dismissed

because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Arizona’s “notice of

claims” statute, codified at Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated

§ 12-821.01. Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not comply

with the time limitations stated in the notice of claim statute

and, therefore, that her claims are barred.1 Defendants also

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Any claim which is not filed within one hundred

eighty days after the cause of action accrues is

barred and no action may be maintained thereon.

2

 This statute provides: “All actions against any public

entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the

cause of action accrues and not afterward.”

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argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations. Because Plaintiff’s complaint states

claims based on events occurring on February 6, 2003, Defendants

argue, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to

Plaintiff’s claims, see Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 12-

821,2 expired approximately 9 months prior to the date that

Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Arizona state court.

Conclusion

A failure to respond to a defendant’s motion to dismiss

may be deemed consent to granting the motion. Subparagraph (i),

Rule 7.2, United States District Court for the District of

Arizona Local Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

... if the opposing party does not serve and

file the required answering memoranda [to a

motion], or if counsel for any party fails to

appear at the time and place assigned for

oral argument, such non-compliance may be

deemed a consent to the denial or granting of

the motion and the court may dispose of the

motion summarily. 

Plaintiff does not offer any allegation that she has

complied with Arizona’s notice of claims statute, which alleged

non-compliance would bar her claims. Additionally, Plaintiff

does not offer any reason why the applicable statute of

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limitations should be statutorily or equitably tolled with

regard to her claims and therefore, her claims are apparently

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, the

complaint must be dismissed for its failure, on its face, to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. See, e.g., London

v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 1981); Gibson

v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 2002);

Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 340 (E.D.

Mo. 1981).

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, Docket No. 14, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is

hereby dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this 3rd day of March, 2006.

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