Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00287/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT NELSON ATKINS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-0287 FCD GGH P

vs.

DAVID RUNNELS, Warden, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 conviction for arson (Cal.

Penal Code § 451(c)) for which he is serving a sentence of 31 years to life pursuant to the Three

Strikes law. Petitioner argues that the retrial of his prior conviction violated the doctrines of res

judicata and law of the case as well as his right to due process and equal protection. After

carefully considering the record, the court recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The AEDPA applies to this petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the

AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy,

117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,”

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establishing more deferential standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in

assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. 

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

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Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

III. Discussion

A. Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal discusses the background of

petitioner’s claims. After independently reviewing the record, the court finds this summary to be

accurate and adopts it below.

Defendant Robert Nelson Atkins was convicted after a jury trial of arson of forest 

land in violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (c). [Footnote 1.] 

Defendant was also charged with and found to have two strikes (§ 667, subds. (b)- 

[Footnote 1: Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.]

(I)) and two serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) arising from the same 

two convictions: a 1991 assault and a 1983 robbery conviction.

In an earlier appeal, we concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that 

his 1991 conviction for assault with a firearm was a strike under the “Three 

Strikes” law. In our disposition, we vacated the finding that defendant suffered a

strike conviction under the Three Strikes law or a serious felony conviction under 

section 667, subdivision (a), for his 1991 assault conviction. We further stated 

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that, if the prosecution elected to retry the strike-serious felony allegation 

regarding the 1991 assault conviction, it was required to do so within 60 days of 

the filing of our remittitur. (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 829, 831-

845; Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 724-734 [141 L.Ed.2d 615, 621-

628].) The cause was remanded to the trial court for resentencing and any other 

appropriate proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed.

Upon remand, the prosecution timely elected to retry the strike/serious felony 

allegation regarding the 1991 assault conviction. Additional evidence was 

presented and the allegation was found true. Defendant contends now, as he did 

in the trial court, that retrial of this prior conviction allegation was barred. We 

disagree.

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit A, pp. 1-2. 

B. Claim 1: Res Judicata and Law of the Case

Petitioner contends that retrial of his prior conviction was barred by the doctrines

of res judicata and law of the case. The California Court of Appeal rejected these claims:

Defendant concedes that the California and United States Supreme Court have 

both rejected double jeopardy challenges to retrial of prior conviction allegations. 

(People v. Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 829, 831-845; Monge v. California, 

supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 724-734.) Instead, he argues that the retrial of the prior 

conviction allegation was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the 

case and violated fundamental fairness principles.

As defendant acknowledges, we have already rejected the res judicata and law of 

the case arguments in People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, at pages 1454-

1457 (Franz). He asks we reconsider and distinguish Franz and follow the earlier 

case of People v. Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 132 (Mitchell). Defendant, 

however, has provided no convincing reason for us to reconsider or distinguish 

Franz and we decline to do so. [Footnote 2.]

[Footnote 2: We note that, although review was denied in both Franz and 

Mitchell, this precise issue is presently on review in the California 

Supreme Court in a case (which was unpublished) that followed Mitchell. 

(People v. Barragan (2002) WL 374043, review granted May 15, 2002, 

S105734.)]

Moreover, we concur with People v. Sotello (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1349, at pages

1354-1357 (Sotello), which rejected an argument (similar to defendant’s argument

in this case) that the retrial of a prior conviction allegation violates principles of 

fundamental fairness. In Sotello, the court recognized the possibility of an 

anomalous result where retrial is allowed on an allegation that should have been 

found not true in the first instance, but addressed the concern of fundamental 

fairness in a different light, stating: “Our concern in addressing the issue of 

fundamental fairness is that all defendants who have similar histories of past 

felonious conduct should be sentenced similarly. This goal serves the interests of 

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both defendants and the People and is promoted by allowing an allegation to be 

retried where appellate review has determined the trial court erroneously found 

sufficient evidence to sustain a true finding at the first trial.” (Sotello, supra, 94 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.) We share this concern.

Absent a contrary holding by our Supreme Court, we follow the majority of courts

in concluding that the proper procedure remains remand for retrial as set forth in 

People v. Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 845 and People v. Morton (1953) 4 

Cal.2d 536, 543-545. (See, e.g., Franz, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454-1457; 

Sotello, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354-1357; Cherry v. Superior Court (2001) 

86 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1301-1305; People v. Scott (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 905, 

909-926.)

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit A, pp. 2-4.

In the answer, respondent states that he knows of no United States Supreme Court

authority prohibiting the retrial of a prior conviction allegation after it has been overturned for

insufficiency of the evidence based on law of the case or res judicata. This court is also not

aware of any United States Supreme Court authority standing for this proposition. This court

also observes that in People v. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th 236, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (2004) the California

Supreme Court found that retrial of a prior conviction reversed on insufficiency of evidence

grounds did not violate the principles of res judicata or law of the case. Finally, if case law

establishes that double jeopardy protections, or even res judicata and law of the case, do not

preclude retrial of a prior conviction enhancement, it follows that retrial of the prior conviction

cannot be considered fundamentally unfair.

Accordingly, because the decision by the California Court of Appeal was not

contrary to any established Supreme Court authority, these claims should be denied. Pham v.

Terhune, 400 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 2005) (in reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a habeas

petition, the court must look through the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision);

Exhibit C to answer (postcard denial of petition for review by California Supreme Court).

C. Claim 2

Petitioner argues that retrial of his prior conviction violated his right to due

process and equal protection. Respondent argues that these claims are procedurally defaulted.

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The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner waived these claims because

he failed to make a timely objection in the trial court on these specific grounds. Answer, Exhibit

A, pp. 4, 5. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991) (federal courts look

through to last reasoned state court judgment to determine whether claim is procedurally barred);

answer, exhibit C (unreasoned decision by California Supreme Court denying petition for

review). 

The court is somewhat puzzled by the claimed distinction between due process

and what was decided with respect to Claim 1. In Claim 1, all recognized that double jeopardy

did not apply, and the Court of Appeals determined that fundamental fairness did not preclude

the retrial of the prior conviction sentencing enhancement. Moreover, the somewhat related state

law concepts of res judicata and law of the case were held not to apply. The undersigned is at a

loss to determine what “due process” theory is left, and neither the state appellate court nor the

parties herein have been able to define another theory for “due process” separate from

fundamental fairness. Thus, the procedural default entered by the state Court of Appeal to the

due process objection is inconsequential. Nevertheless, for the sake of analysis, the undersigned

continues. 

Based on concerns of comity and federalism, federal courts will not review a

habeas petitioner’s claims if the state court decision denying relief rests on a state law ground

that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-62, 109 S. Ct.

1038 (1989). Generally, the only state law grounds meeting these requirements are state

procedural rules. However, the procedural basis of the ruling must be clear. Ambiguous

reference to procedural rules is insufficient for invocation of procedural bar. Calderon v. United

States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, where the procedural

and merits analysis are intermixed, it cannot be said that the procedural bar is independent of

federal law, i.e., there is no plain statement of reliance on procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, supra.

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If there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision, the federal

court may still consider the claim if the petitioner demonstrates: (1) cause for the default and

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109 S. Ct. at 1043. The existence of cause for a

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1476 (1991). Examples of

cause include showings “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to

counsel,” “that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable,” or “of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. Prejudice is difficult to

demonstrate:

The showing of prejudice required under Wainwright v. Sykes is

significantly greater than that necessary under “the more vague

inquiry suggested by the words ‘plain error.’” Engle, 456 U.S., at

135, 102 S.Ct., at 1575; Frady, supra, 456 U.S., at 166, 102 S.Ct.,

at 1593. See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct.

1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). The habeas petitioner must

show “not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” Frady, supra, at 170, 102 S.Ct., at 1596.

Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. at 493-494, 106 S. Ct. at 2648 (1986). 

Although different phraseology is used in the default context from that used in the ineffective

assistance of counsel prejudice inquiry, as stated above, the ultimate application of the two

prejudice inquiries is essentially similar—that is, whether the prejudice is sufficient to have

undermined the reviewer’s confidence in the result of the trial.

If the state adequately pleads an independent and adequate state procedural

ground, the burden shifts to petitioner to come forward with “specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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1

 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).

2

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).

8

In finding that petitioner waived these claims, the California Court of Appeal

cited People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 972-973, ns. 10, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1991), In re Josue

S., 72 Cal. App. 4th 168, 170, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (1999), and People v. Garceau, 6 Cal. 4th

140, 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (1993). These cases stand for the general proposition that a

defendant waives his federal constitutional claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. In People

v. Yoeman, 31 Cal. 4th 93, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186 (2003), the California Supreme Court found that a

defendant who raises a Wheeler1 claim at trial does not waive his Batson2 claim. In Yoeman, the

California Supreme Court disapproved of Ashmus and Garceau as they applied to Batson claims

only. Therefore, the reliance on these cases by the California Court of Appeal in the instant case

to find the claims waived was proper.

By arguing that petitioner waived this claim by failing to object, the state has met

its burden of pleading an independent and adequate state procedural ground. That the California

Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this rule for Batson claims does not undermine

respondent’s position. Petitioner has not come forward with any evidence demonstrating that the

rule applied by the state appellate court is not firmly established and not regularly followed by

the California courts. 

The court now considers whether petitioner suffered prejudice from the alleged

violation of federal law or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To succeed on either prong

petitioner must demonstrate that the denial of these claims by the California Court of Appeal,

which went on to address the merits, was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

authority. This he has not done. This court is aware of no United States Supreme Court case

holding that the retrial of a prior conviction reversed on insufficiency of evidence grounds

violates either due process or equal protection. 

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For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that petitioner’s due process and

equal protection claims are procedurally barred. 

D. Blakely

In his traverse, petitioner raises a new claim: the retrial of his prior conviction

violated Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Although it is unclear

whether this claim has been exhausted, the court may consider this claim because it has no merit. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The United States has not made Blakely retroactive to cases on

collateral review. Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (order). Petitioner

was convicted in 1998. Moreover, Blakely and its predecessor cases recognize that the Supreme

Court has not required a jury trial for prior conviction enhancements. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at

2536. Therefore, no relief is available to petitioner based on Blakely.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 5/13/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

at287.157

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