Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cv-00118/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cv-00118-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard Dean Hurles, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondent. 

No. CV-00-0118-PHX-DLR 

ORDER 

 On January 21, 2015, this case was remanded by the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 118.) On January 29, 2016, pursuant to the remand order, the Court held 

an evidentiary hearing on Hurles’ claim of judicial bias. 

 The Ninth Circuit also ordered this Court to reconsider, in light of Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), Hurles’ claim that appellate counsel performed 

ineffectively by failing to raise a claim under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014). The parties briefed this issue. (Docs. 137, 

141, 148, 188, 190, 194.) 

 This order addresses both remanded issues. For the reasons set forth below, the 

judicial bias claim is denied. The Court also finds that Hurles is not entitled to relief on 

his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and that an evidentiary hearing on 

the claim is not necessary. 

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JUDICIAL BIAS 

I. Background 

The following facts are taken from the opinion and order remanding the case,

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014), the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion 

affirming Hurles’ conviction and sentence, State v. Hurles, 914 P.2d 1291 (Ariz. 1996) 

(en banc), and this Court’s review of the record. 

 A. Trial 

Hurles, on parole after serving nearly fifteen years in prison for sexually assaulting 

two young boys, went to the library in Buckeye, Arizona, on the afternoon of November 

12, 1992. After the last patron left, Hurles locked the front doors and attacked librarian 

Kay Blanton in the back room. He attempted to rape her, stabbed her thirty-seven times, 

and kicked her so violently that he tore her liver. She later died of her injuries. 

 Hurles left the library and proceeded to the home of his nephew, Thomas. He told 

Thomas that he had been in a fight with a Spanish man at the library. After changing his 

clothes and cleaning up, Hurles asked Thomas for a ride to Phoenix. On the way to 

Phoenix, Hurles had Thomas pull over so he could discard his bloody clothes. Thomas 

dropped Hurles off at the bus station in Phoenix, where Hurles purchased a ticket to Las 

Vegas. Thomas returned to Buckeye and contacted the police. Police intercepted the bus 

and arrested Hurles. 

 Hurles was charged with burglary, first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, 

and attempted sexual assault. A jury found him guilty of all charges. 

 The court then conducted an aggravation and mitigation hearing to determine the 

appropriate sentence. Hurles offered mitigating evidence about his dysfunctional family 

background, cognitive deficiencies, long-term substance abuse, mental illness, good 

behavior while incarcerated, and an expert opinion that he suffered from diminished 

capacity at the time of the crime. 

 The court found one statutory aggravating factor: that Hurles committed the crime 

in an especially cruel, heinous or depraved manner. The court found two nonstatutory 

mitigating circumstances: that Hurles suffered a deprived childhood in a dysfunctional 

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home and that he had behaved well in prison prior to the underlying crime. The court 

concluded that these circumstances did not warrant leniency and sentenced Hurles to 

death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Hurles, 914 P.2d 1291. 

 B. Special Action 

 Prior to trial, Hurles moved for appointment of a second attorney to assist in his 

defense. (SA at 30-34.)1 The trial judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Ruth 

Hilliard, summarily denied the motion. (Id. at 36.) Hurles sought interlocutory relief in 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, filing a petition for special action challenging the trial 

court’s ruling and asserting that defendants in capital cases are entitled to two lawyers. 

(Id. at 38.) The named parties were Richard Hurles, Petitioner; Maricopa County 

Superior Court and Judge Hilliard, Respondents; and Maricopa County Attorney Richard 

Romley as the “Real Party in Interest.” (SA at 64.) 

 The Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, which was prosecuting the case, declined 

to respond to the special action because under state law it lacked standing in the selection 

of defense counsel. See Hurles v. Super. Ct. in and for the Cty. of Maricopa, 849 P.2d 1, 

2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). At the request of the Presiding Criminal Judge of the Maricopa 

County Superior Court, Ronald Reinstein, the Arizona Attorney General filed a response. 

Id. 

 The response was prepared by Assistant Attorney General Colleen French. The 

response began, “Respondent Judge Hilliard, through her attorneys undersigned, hereby 

enters her response to Petitioner’s petition for special action.” (S.A. at 64.) In its 

“Statement of the Facts,” the response described the murder as “brutal” and characterized 

the State’s case against Hurles as “very simple and straightforward, compared to other 

capital cases.” (Id. at 65, 66.) The response then addressed Hurles’ legal arguments, 

including his request that the Arizona Court of Appeals follow California law, which 

presumed the necessity of second chair counsel in death-penalty cases, and his contention 

 1

 “SA” refers to documents filed in Petitioner’s Special Action Proceeding before 

the Arizona Court of Appeals (Case No. CV-93-0134-SA). Copies of these records as 

well as the original trial transcripts and appellate briefs were provided to this Court by the 

Arizona Supreme Court on August 24, 2000. 

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that the lack of second counsel would violate his Sixth Amendment and equal protection 

rights. (Id. at 67-73.) Finally, the response suggested that appointed counsel was 

ethically bound to withdraw from the case, and possibly the Maricopa County list of 

contract defense lawyers, if she believed herself incapable of competently representing 

Hurles. (Id. at 73.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of Judge 

Hilliard’s standing. French authored the response, arguing that judges had an interest in 

retaining discretion with respect to the appointment of counsel in capital cases. (Id. at 

78.) Specifically, French argued that it was appropriate for Judge Hilliard and the 

superior court bench to defend their interest in the bench’s authority to make case-bycase determinations in the appointment of capital counsel because the Real Party in 

Interest did not have standing to litigate the case. (Id.)

 In a published decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept 

jurisdiction on the merits, concluding it was premature in light of Hurles’ failure to make 

a particularized showing on the need for second counsel in his case. Hurles v. Super. Ct.,

849 P.2d at 2. However, the court addressed Judge Hilliard’s standing, holding that a 

responsive pleading from a trial judge may be filed only if the purpose is to explain or 

defend an administrative practice, policy, or local rule, not simply to advocate the 

correctness of the judge’s individual ruling. Id. at 3. Because the response filed by the 

Arizona Attorney General on behalf of Judge Hilliard fell into the inappropriate “I-ruledcorrectly” category, the appellate court declined to consider the pleading.2

 Id. at 4. As to 

Judge Hilliard’s involvement in the filing of the responsive pleading, the court observed: 

 

2

 French, representing the Maricopa Superior Court and Judge Reinstein as presiding criminal judge, subsequently filed a special action in the Arizona Supreme Court, naming as Respondents the judges of the Arizona Court of Appeals. (CV-93- 01335-SA at 1.) The special action contested the court of appeals’ ruling that judges who are named as respondents in special actions challenging their rulings do not have standing to appear and respond. (Id. at 2.) The Attorney General also filed a special action on the question of whether it was entitled to represent judges in special actions on the issue of 

appointment of counsel. (SA at 1.) The Attorney General attached to its reply an affidavit from Judge Reinstein attesting that, due to budget cuts and an increased number 

of requests, the Maricopa County Superior Court addressed requests for additional counsel on a case-by-case basis. (Id. at 105.) The special actions were consolidated. (Id.

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The record does not indicate whether Judge Hilliard, the nominal 

respondent, actually authorized such a pleading to be filed. From the 

statement of the Attorney General at oral argument, the pleading was 

requested by the presiding criminal judge, not by Judge Hilliard, and there 

was no contact between Judge Hilliard and the Attorney General’s office as 

the pleading was prepared. 

Id. at 2 n.2. 

 Judge Hilliard continued to preside in the case through trial, sentencing, and the 

first post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceeding. 

 C. Second PCR Proceeding 

 In his second PCR petition, Hurles raised a claim alleging that his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights had been violated when Judge Hilliard failed to recuse herself from 

his case after becoming a party in the special action proceedings. (Doc. 72, PCR at 24-

45, 163-72.)3

 Hurles also filed an accompanying Motion to Recuse Judge Hilliard. (Id. 

at 129-44.) Judge Hilliard referred the matter to the Presiding Judge, who appointed 

Judge Eddward Ballinger, Jr., to rule on the motion. (Id., ME at 1-2.) Judge Ballinger 

denied the motion, stating that “[w]ith respect to the objective evaluation of the judge’s 

actions in this matter, the Court finds no basis to transfer this case.” (Id., ME at 3.) 

 Judge Hilliard ultimately denied relief on Hurles’ second PCR petition. With 

respect to his judicial bias claim, the court ruled: 

 Defendant argues in claim 2 that this Judge should have recused 

herself from consideration of the first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

based on the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Hurles v. Superior Court, 174 

Ariz. 331, 849 P.2d 1 (App. 1993). Defendant argues that because the 

Court of Appeals determined that the response filed on behalf of this judge, 

(without her input) was wrong, this judge is thereby precluded from hearing 

any further matters in this case. However, Rule 81 of the Arizona Rules of 

the Supreme Court, Canon 3(E)(1) provides that “A judge shall disqualify 

himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned . . . .” The test is an objective one: whether a 

 at 93.) The Arizona Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction. (Id. at 106.) 

3

 “Doc. 72” consists of separately indexed and paginated PCR documents, minute 

entries (“ME”), and petition for review (“PR”) documents from Petitioner’s second PCR 

proceeding (Case No. CR-05-0118-PC). 

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reasonable and objective person knowing all the facts would harbor doubts 

concerning the judge’s impartiality. State ex rel Corbin v. Superior Court, 

155 Ariz. 560, 748 P.2d 1184 (1987); Liljeberg v. Health Services 

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). 

 The trial judge is presumed to be impartial and the party who seeks 

recusal must prove the grounds for disqualification by a preponderance of 

the evidence. State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 771 P.2d 1382 (1989); State 

v. Salazar, 182 Ariz. 604, 898 P.2d 982 (App. 1995). The facts here do not 

support disqualification and another judge, Judge Ballinger, so determined. 

In the special action in this case, the Attorney General filed a response on 

this judge’s behalf but without any specific authorization of such a 

pleading. No contact was made by this judge with the Attorney General 

and this judge was a nominal party only. The special action was resolved 

five years before the first PCR was filed. Based on the circumstances of 

this case, the Court finds that a reasonable and objective person would not 

find partiality. 

 As in Carver, Hurles simply alleges bias and prejudice but offers no 

factual evidence to support his allegations. There is no allegation of 

partiality during the trial or that rulings or conduct during the first PCR 

demonstrated any bias. “Appearance of interest or prejudice is more than 

the speculation suggested by the defendant. It occurs when the judge 

abandons the judicial role and acts in favor of one party or another.” Hurles 

has failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality. 

(Id., ME at 17-18.) 

 Judge Hilliard further held that, even if it was error not to recuse herself, such 

error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Hurles’ guilt and the 

absence of any risk that injustice would occur in other cases or that public confidence in 

the judicial process would be undermined. (Id. at 19.) The Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review. 

 D. Habeas Review 

 On habeas review, this Court denied the judicial bias claim on the merits. The 

Court found that: 

[N]othing in the record contradicts the assurances of Judge Hilliard and 

Assistant Arizona Attorney General French that the judge played no role in 

the preparation and filing of the special action brief. Petitioner has cited no 

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evidence to contradict their statements regarding the judge’s role, or lack 

thereof, in preparation of the brief. Nor is there any evidence to refute the 

conclusion that the positions raised in the brief were anything other than the 

positions of the Arizona Attorney General. 

(Doc. 99 at 17.) 

 In remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit found that Judge Hilliard came to an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in denying Hurles’ judicial bias claim, and that 

this Court abused its discretion by denying the claim without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 792. The Ninth Circuit explained that “this case presents an 

especially troubling example of defective fact-finding because the facts Judge Hilliard 

‘found’ involved her own conduct, and she based those ‘findings’ on her untested 

memory and understanding of the events.” Id. at 791. 

 The Ninth Circuit directed this Court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 

“whether the probability that Judge Hilliard harbored actual [bias] against Hurles is too 

high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id. at 792 (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 

899, 904 (1997)). To answer that question, after noting the “tenor of Judge Hilliard’s 

responsive pleading in the special action,” the Ninth Circuit listed the following factors 

for this Court to consider: (1) whether Judge Hilliard participated in the special action 

proceedings as more than a nominal party; (2) had contact with French; (3) 

commissioned or authorized the responsive pleading; or (4) provided any input on the 

brief. Id.

 E. Evidentiary Hearing Testimony 

 The Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 29, 2016. Hurles called four 

witnesses: Colleen French; Judge Hilliard; Mark Harrison, a judicial ethics expert; and 

Noel Fidel, a former Maricopa County Superior Court and Arizona Court of Appeals 

judge. 

 Colleen French testified that she was assigned to file the response to Hurles’ 

special action by her supervisor, Paul McMurdie, who was asked to respond to the special 

action by Presiding Judge Reinstein, not by Judge Hilliard. (RT 1/29/16 at 32.) It was at 

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Judge Reinstein’s “insistence” that she filed the response. (Id. at 35.) He felt “very 

strongly” about the issue involved. (Id.) 

 French testified that, right after she was assigned the case, she called Judge 

Hilliard to inform the judge that she was filing a response to the special action. (Id. at 

34.) Judge Hilliard was “not cooperative,” but she did not tell French not to file the 

response. (Id. at 23.) Judge Hilliard provided no assistance in preparing the brief. (Id. at 

34.) French possibly sent a draft of the response to Judge Hilliard. (Id. at 35.) She sent a 

copy of the filing to Judge Hilliard, as required by the rules. (Id at 24.) She received 

nothing from Judge Hilliard. (Id. at 36.) French spoke with Judge Hilliard only once. 

(Id. at 34.) She felt her client was the Superior Court as well as Judge Hilliard. (Id. at 

25, 36.) Judge Hilliard did not authorize the response and provided no input. (Id. at 41.) 

The language in the response was French’s, and the characterization of the State’s 

evidence came from the prosecuting attorney. (Id. at 37-40.) French testified that Judge 

Hilliard was “not pleased” that the response was filed. (Id. at 42.) 

 Judge Hilliard testified that she had no recollection of the special action, nor did 

she recall ever speaking with French. (Id. at 60.) She testified that she did not request a 

special action be filed or solicit a response. (Id. at 74.) She did not recall reading the 

response, and it was possible she never saw it. (Id. at 72.) She did not dispute that her 

chambers received a copy of the response. (Id. at 62.) 

 Judge Hilliard testified that she offered no input and received no drafts of the 

response. (Id. at 75, 83.) She testified that, although the Attorney General represented 

her position, she was not responsible for the language in the response. (Id. at 78-79.) 

 She also testified that appearing in a special action to defend one of her rulings is 

“not something I have done.” (Id. at 67.) As a matter of policy, she generally did not 

read special actions, but forwarded them to the presiding judge. (Id. at 73.) Judge 

Hilliard believed that judges were represented by the Attorney General’s Office as a 

matter of course in all special actions. (Id. at 63, 77.) 

 Judge Hilliard testified that it was her practice to rule on motions, such as the 

motion for second counsel, after consulting with other more experienced criminal judges 

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or the presiding criminal judge. (Id. at 70.) She is sure that on such a motion she would 

have consulted with multiple other judges. (Id.) She recalled that at the time of Hurles’ 

trial there were financial issues that might have affected the appointment of second-chair 

counsel. (Id. at 71.) 

 Finally, Judge Hilliard testified that she did not recall whether she had notes on the 

case. (Id. at 68.) However, she disposed of whatever notes she did have when she retired 

from the bench. (Id.) 

 Mark Harrison, Petitioner’s expert witness on judicial ethics, testified that Judge 

Hilliard violated the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1 and 3, by becoming 

personally involved in the defense of her order and continuing to preside over the case, 

such that her impartiality might reasonably have been questioned. (Id. at 102.) 

 Noel Fidel, a former Maricopa County Superior Court and Arizona Court of 

Appeals judge, testified, in contradiction of Judge Hilliard’s belief, that it was 

extraordinarily rare for judges to appear and be represented in special actions. (Id. at 

132.) He testified that the Attorney General represented only judges who were actual, 

rather than nominal, parties. (Id. at 132-33.) However, in closing arguments, counsel for 

Hurles conceded that he was not challenging the veracity of Judge Hilliard or her 

testimony. (Id. at 142-43.) 

II. Analysis 

 The Court finds that an average judge, sitting in Judge Hilliard’s position, was 

likely to sit as a neutral, unbiased arbiter. Although the filing of a response in her name 

and the tenor of the response arguably suggested that Judge Hilliard was enmeshed and 

embroiled in controversy with Hurles and his counsel, the facts do not bear that out. 

 A. Findings of Fact 

Taking into account the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit in its remand order, 

the Court makes the following findings of fact based on the testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing and the record as a whole: 

 (1) Judge Hilliard ruled on the motion for second counsel after consulting with 

other more experienced criminal judges. When she was served with the special action, 

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Judge Hilliard followed the court protocol, as she understood it, by forwarding the 

complaint to the presiding criminal judge, Judge Reinstein. 

 (2) Judge Reinstein had strong feelings about the issue raised in the special 

action. He made the decision to request that the Arizona Attorney General respond. 

 (3) The case was assigned to French by her supervisor. From the time she was 

assigned the case, French understood she was representing the presiding criminal judge 

and the superior court at the behest of the criminal presiding judge. She understood she 

was not representing Judge Hilliard but it never crossed her mind to respond in the name 

of the presiding judge. 

 (4) French filed the response in the name of Judge Hilliard because Judge 

Hilliard was the named nominal defendant. French did not recognize the potential for the 

appearance of a conflict created by responding in the trial judge’s name. 

 (5) Though it was not settled, Arizona law at the time arguably could have 

been interpreted to support French’s position that the trial judge had an unequivocal right 

to respond to a special action. Hurles v. Super. Ct., 849 P.2d at 3. 

(6) Judge Hilliard did not participate in the special action proceedings as more 

than a nominal party. Although she was provided copies of the briefs, she did not read 

them or provide French with any input. 

 (7) Judge Hilliard had contact with French concerning the special action on one 

occasion. On that occasion, French phoned Judge Hilliard to advise her that French 

would be preparing and filing a response. Judge Hilliard expressed disapproval that a 

response was going to be filed on her behalf. 

 B. Conclusions of Law

 The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and 

impartial judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Rhoades v. Henry, 598 

F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Due process requires that trials be conducted free of 

actual bias as well as the appearance of bias.”). An appearance of bias—as opposed to 

evidence of actual bias—necessitates recusal when the judge becomes embroiled in a 

running, bitter controversy with one of the litigants. Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 

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1131 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Due process 

also requires a judge to recuse herself when “it is plain that [s]he was so enmeshed in 

matters involving petitioner as to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit.” 

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1971). The inquiry is objective. “We do 

not ask whether [the judge] actually harbored subjective bias. Rather, we ask whether the 

average judge in her position was likely to be neutral or whether there existed an 

unconstitutional potential for bias.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 788. 

 Hurles alleges bias arising from Judge Hilliard’s role as a responsive party in the 

special action. However, Judge Hilliard was named only as a “nominal” party under the 

state rules for special actions. See Hurles v. Super. Ct., 849 P.2d at 2. Although the 

Arizona Attorney General filed a brief in the judge’s name, the evidence presented at the 

hearing is consistent with the record that Judge Hilliard was not involved in the 

proceedings or in the preparation of that brief. 

 Judge Hilliard testified that she presently has no recollection of the special action. 

However, French’s testimony about the judge’s lack of involvement in the special action 

is supported elsewhere in the record. Judge Hilliard noted in her order during the second 

PCR proceedings in 2002 that the actions by the Attorney General in response to the 

special action petition were made without her input, that “[n]o contact was made by [her] 

with the Attorney General,” and that she was a “nominal party only.” (See Doc. 72, ME 

8/13/02 at 2.) Likewise, at the time the special action was being litigated, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals noted French’s statement at oral argument that “the [Attorney 

General’s] pleading was requested by the presiding criminal judge not by Judge Hilliard, 

and there was no contact between Judge Hilliard and the Attorney General’s office as the 

pleading was prepared.” Hurles v. Super. Ct., 849 P.2d at 2 n.2. At the evidentiary 

hearing, French testified that her single contact with Judge Hilliard occurred before she 

prepared the response. Finally, again during the second PCR proceedings, an 

independent judge performed an “objective evaluation” and denied Hurles’ motion to 

recuse Judge Hilliard. (Doc. 72, ME at 3.) 

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 There is no evidence of personal antagonism between Hurles and Judge Hilliard 

that could be viewed as compromising the judge’s impartiality. There were no personal 

attacks on the judge, and Judge Hilliard was not personally embroiled in a controversy 

with Hurles. Judge Hilliard was not enmeshed in matters involving Hurles, and the 

question at issue in Hurles’ special action—whether under state law he was entitled to 

appointment of a second attorney—did not touch upon any substantive issues relating to 

Hurles’ guilt or innocence. 

 The facts in Crater are particularly instructive. There, the defendant alleged the 

trial judge was biased because at an in-camera pretrial conference the judge told him he 

should accept a plea deal offered by the State. The judge, who had presided over the trial 

of Crater’s co-defendant, stated that “based upon what I’ve heard about this case, I’m real 

sure that you’re going to be convicted of all of those robberies, that you’re going to be 

convicted of shooting the first robbery victim.” Crater, 491 F.3d at 1130. The judge also 

told Crater that “[a] jury is not going to like you” and “most judges . . . would throw the 

book at you.” Id. at 1130-31. The Ninth Circuit found no constitutional violation. It 

concluded that “the judge’s predictions did not suggest bias,” explaining that “opinions 

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of 

the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or 

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 1132 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994)). 

 The circumstances here contrast sharply with those in Crater. Judge Hilliard 

personally said nothing about the merits of the case against Hurles. The response filed on 

her behalf does not suggest any belief about Hurles’ guilt remotely akin to the remarks 

made by the trial judge in Crater—remarks that the Ninth Circuit found insufficient to 

compromise Crater’s due process rights in the absence of that judge’s recusal. Neither 

the tenor nor the contents of the response are attributable to Judge Hilliard. 

 Ultimately, Hurles argues that Judge Hilliard participated in the special action 

simply by referring it to Judge Reinstein, knowing or expecting that he would direct a 

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response to be filed, and that she knew the response was filed in her name but did not 

stop it. But this is insufficient to establish judicial bias. Judge Hilliard was not 

personally invested in the issue raised by the special action. It was Judge Hilliard’s 

practice to rule on motions, such as the motion for second counsel, after consulting with 

other more experienced criminal judges or the presiding criminal judge. She is sure she 

would have followed that practice with the motion for second counsel. The preservation 

of the discretion of trial judges to decide when to appoint a second defense attorney in a 

capital case was an issue of concern for the Presiding Criminal Judge, and it was Judge 

Reinstein who pursued the defense of the special action. Judge Hilliard herself had little 

or no interest in that issue and paid no attention to the filings. She was merely a nominal 

party. Judge Hilliard’s tenuous involvement in the special action did not affect her ability 

to sit as an unbiased judge. 

III. Conclusion 

 Judge Hilliard’s nominal participation in the special action did not cause her to 

become “so enmeshed in matters involving [Hurles] as to make it appropriate for another 

judge to sit” or become “embroiled in a running, bitter controversy” with Hurles or his 

counsel. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 792. Under the facts established at the evidentiary hearing, 

which confirmed Judge Hilliard’s findings during the second PCR proceeding, no 

unconstitutional risk of bias arose from the fact that the response to Hurles’ special action 

was filed on her behalf. In sum, the average judge in Judge Hilliard’s position was likely 

to sit as a neutral, unbiased arbiter and there was no unconstitutional risk of bias. 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 

 The Ninth Circuit directed this Court to reconsider, pursuant to Martinez, Hurles’ 

claim that his appellate counsel performed ineffectively by failing to raise a claim 

challenging the trial court’s denial of funds for neurological testing, in violation of Ake. 

Hurles, 752 F.3d at 792. This Court had found the claim, included in Claim 6 of Hurles’ 

amended habeas petition, procedurally defaulted because Hurles did not raise it in state 

court. (Doc. 73 at 8-9.) 

I. Background 

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 Hurles’ trial counsel filed notice of an insanity defense and moved for a 

competency hearing. (ROA 52, 53.) The court granted the motion. (ME 5/6/93.) 

 At the pre-trial competency hearing, Hurles’ expert, neuropsychologist Dr. Marc 

Stuart Walter, testified that his testing suggested Hurles had “areas of the brain that are 

dysfunctional.” (RT 11/19/93 at 42-43.) Dr. Walter did not know the extent of the brain 

damage. (Id. at 43.) He was “fairly certain” that “further neurological studies, such as 

sophisticated brain mapping” would show brain damage but could not “guarantee” it. 

(Id.) 

 Dr. Walter explained that diagnosing such an injury would require more 

sophisticated testing than MRI and CAT scans. (Id. at 43-44.) He recommended a 

“Beam [Brain Electrical Activity Mapping] Study or a Computerized Topographic 

Mapping [CTM] Test which is a more sensitive test of brain dysfunction.” (Id. at 45.) 

Dr. Walter was not qualified to perform these neurological studies. (Id. at 48.) 

 The State’s expert, psychiatrist Dr. Alexander Don, agreed that some objective 

neurological investigation, like a CTM scan or electroencephalogram, would be useful in 

detecting brain impairment. (RT 11/23/93 at 14.) He recommended “either a CT scan or 

an MRI. The computer EG scan is not regarded as a useful tool in psychiatric testing at 

this time.” (Id.) However, from his interview with Hurles, Dr. Don did not see any type 

of organic impairment warranting a CT scan or MRI. (Id. at 16.) 

 The court found Hurles competent to stand trial. (ME 11/23/93.) 

 On December 6, 1993, Hurles’ trial counsel filed an ex parte request with the trial 

court for funds to pay Dr. Drake Duane, a behavioral neurologist, to perform 

“Electrophysiological studies” on Hurles. (Doc. 137-1 at 2.) Counsel’s request had 

previously been denied by the Maricopa County Superior Court Contract Administrator. 

(Id. at 6.) In January 1994, counsel supplemented her ex parte request with information 

concerning the “scientific acceptability” of the CTM “brain mapping procedure.” (Doc. 

141, Ex. C at 1.) 

 On February 14, 1994, the trial court ruled that it could not consider counsel’s 

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request on an ex parte basis.4 The court ordered that, “[i]f defendant chooses to assert the 

Motion and Request, a copy must be sent to the State and the State must have an 

opportunity to respond.” (Doc. 141, Ex. D.) As Respondents note, the record does not 

reflect that Hurles ever renewed his request for brain mapping before trial. 

 After the trial commenced, there was further discussion about the ex parte request 

for funding. (RT 3/18/94 at 3-7.) Hurles’ trial counsel thought she had filed a motion to 

reconsider, but the court believed it had ruled on everything and no motions were 

pending. (Id. at 4.) The court then reiterated that “[s]o the record is clear, there cannot 

be any further ex parte motions of any sort.” (Id.) The record shows that the only ruling 

concerning the request for funds to conduct a CTM examination was the court’s February 

14, 1994 order. (Doc. 141, Exs. D, F.) 

 At trial, Dr. Walter testified about the neuropsychological tests he performed on 

Hurles. (RT 4/12/94 at 13-23.) Based on these test results, together with Hurles’ 

dysfunctional family background and history of substance abuse, Dr. Walters testified 

that Hurles suffered from mild brain damage, which nevertheless can have “very serious 

consequences.” (Id. at 36.) He also diagnosed Hurles with organic mental disorder, with 

a thought disorder (learning disability), and with organic personality disorder. (Id. at 52.) 

 Dr. Walter testified that Hurles was in a “psychotic state of mind” at the time of 

the murder. (Id. at 43.) He testified that Hurles did not know what he was doing or that 

it was wrong. (Id.) 

 Dr. Don, testifying for the State, discussed testing that could be done to determine 

whether a person suffered from mild brain damage. (RT 4/13/94 at 27-29.) He then 

explained that the correlation between a finding of brain damage and its effect on a 

person’s functionality is “quite tenuous, meaning that there aren’t really good correlations 

between what is found on neuropsychological testing or what is found on an EEG or what 

is found on a CAT scan and an individual’s ability to function.” (Id. at 30-31.) 

 Dr. Don testified that Hurles was not insane at the time of the murder. (Id. at 15.) 

 

4

 The court relied on a recent Arizona Supreme Court decision, State v. Apelt (Michael), 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993). 

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He “wasn’t suffering from a mental illness that affected him at the time the crime 

occurred such that he knew neither the nature or quality or the wrongfulness of his 

conduct.” (Id.) 

 After the guilt phase of trial but before sentencing, the court approved funds for a 

brain scan. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 782. Dr. Duane conducted the CTM scan. He 

summarized his findings as follows: 

The routine electroencephalogram shows a mild and nonspecific 

abnormality in the left frontal region. The date of its development is 

indeterminate. The risk for epileptogenesis would appear to be low. The 

differential factors include developmental deviation of cerebral 

organization, prior head injury versus focal infection. Structural disease, 

such as neoplasm, is improbable. 

The FFT analysis confirms the above observations to be valid. There is no 

evidence of epileptogenesis. The N-100/P-300 yield a slightly long latency 

for the N-100 which may represent developmental anomalous cognition as 

is common in attention deficit disorder. A mood disorder would appear to 

be absent. The visual evoked potential studies yield no definitive evidence 

of dysfunction within the visual system nor additional evidence of cerebral 

dysfunction. 

In summary, the data reveal subtle nonspecific abnormalities in the left 

frontal areas, associated with mild processing difficulty which may be 

developmental or acquired without risk for epileptogenesis and no evidence 

of intercurrent anxiety or depression. These data provide a physiologic 

baseline against which future comparison may be made. These studies 

supplement, but do not replace clinical judgments. 

(Doc. 25, Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) 

 At the sentencing hearing, Hurles presented an expert, Dr. Donald Stonefeld, who 

diagnosed Hurles as suffering from the following conditions: dysthymic disorder, mild 

retardation, learning disorder NOS, substance-induced persisting dementia, and 

substance-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations. (RT 9/30/94 at 66-77.) Dr. 

Stonefeld reviewed the “brain mapping data” in reaching his opinions. (Id. at 85.) 

Nonetheless, although he opined that Hurles had brain damage, Stonefeld testified that 

his opinion was not based on any imaging tests but on Dr. Walter’s neuropsychological 

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testing. (Id. at 73, 88-89.) Dr. Stonefeld did not discuss the results of the brain mapping 

test. 

 Despite Dr. Stonefeld’s testimony, the trial court found that the statutory 

“diminished capacity” mitigating factor, set forth in A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(1), was not 

proved. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence on independent review. 

Hurles, 914 P.2d at 1299-1300. Appellate counsel did not raise an Ake claim challenging 

the trial court’s initial denial of funds for a CTM scan. 

II. Applicable Law 

 Federal review generally is not available for a state prisoner’s claims when those 

claims have been denied pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In such situations, federal habeas 

review is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” for his failure to follow the 

state procedural rule, and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. Coleman

further held that ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings does not 

establish cause for the procedural default of a claim. Id.

In Martinez, however, the Court announced a new, “narrow exception” to the rule 

set out in Coleman. The Court explained: 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural 

default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim 

of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 

ineffective. 

132 S. Ct. at 1320; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (noting that 

Martinez may apply to a procedurally defaulted trial-phase ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim if “the claim . . . was a ‘substantial’ claim [and] the ‘cause’ consisted of 

there being ‘no counsel’ or only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding” (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320)). 

 The Ninth Circuit has expanded Martinez to include procedurally defaulted claims 

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1294-96 

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(9th Cir. 2013); see Hurles, 752 F.3d at 781. 

 Accordingly, under Martinez a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural 

default of an ineffective assistance claim “by demonstrating two things: (1) ‘counsel in 

the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was 

ineffective under the standards of Strickland . . .’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner 

must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318); see Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 

377 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 818 

(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc); Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 

 The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on the cause standard set out in Martinez. In 

Clabourne, the court explained that “to establish ‘cause,’ [the petitioner] must establish 

that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective under the standards 

of Strickland. Strickland, in turn, requires him to establish that both (a) post-conviction 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable probability that, 

absent the deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would 

have been different.” Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (citations omitted). Determining 

whether there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome “is necessarily 

connected to the strength of the argument that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective.” 

Id. 

 Under Martinez, a claim is substantial for prejudice purposes if it meets the 

standard for issuing a certificate of appealability. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1318-19. 

According to that standard, “a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1245 (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19). 

 Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims are evaluated under the standard 

set forth in Strickland. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); see Moormann v. 

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Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). First, Hurles must show that appellate 

counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, which requires him to demonstrate 

that counsel acted unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a meritorious issue. Id. 

Second, Hurles has the burden of showing prejudice, which in this context means he must 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the 

Ake claim, he would have prevailed in his appeal. Id. 

 The Ninth Circuit has explained that in applying Strickland to a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: 

[t]hese two prongs partially overlap. . . . In many instances, appellate 

counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood 

of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely 

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. . . . 

Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain above an objective 

standard of competence (prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice 

(prong two) for the same reason—because she declined to raise a weak 

issue. 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and footnotes omitted); 

see Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001). The salient question in 

analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is whether the unraised 

issue, if raised, would have “led to a reasonable probability of reversal.” Id. at 1434-35.

In Ake, the Supreme Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial 

judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State 

must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will 

conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and 

presentation of the defense.” 470 U.S. at 83. Failure to appoint an expert under Ake is 

subject to harmless error analysis. See Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

III. Analysis 

In remanding for reconsideration of this ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

claim, the Ninth Circuit explained: 

 Here, the sole defense at guilt was insanity, and Hurles’s expert 

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offered testimony in support of that defense. The state offered a contrary 

opinion, resulting in a battle of the experts. Both experts agreed that 

objective testing could show brain damage, but the trial court denied 

funding for this test until after the guilt phase concluded. The state used the 

absence of such an objective test to its advantage, tipping the scales of the 

battle of the experts in its favor. 

 Appellate counsel’s failure to raise this claim on appeal was 

deficient. Appellate counsel “unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous 

issues” to appeal, and Hurles’s Ake claim was “clearly stronger than those 

presented” on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 288, 120 S. Ct. 

746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hurles 

also can show prejudice from this error, as the brain scan conducted after 

trial showed brain damage. The Supreme Court held in Martinez that 

“[a]llowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance 

of [appellate] counsel when an attorney’s errors . . . caused a procedural 

default in an initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an 

equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken 

. . . with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that 

proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.” Martinez, 132 S. 

Ct. at 1318. We find cause sufficient to excuse the procedural default of 

Hurles’s Ake claim and remand. 

Hurles, 752 F.3d at 783. The court then considered Hurles’ remaining ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claims before concluding: 

We remand for consideration by the district court in the first instance 

Hurles’s claim that appellate counsel failed to raise the Ake claim on 

appeal. The district court should afford Hurles an evidentiary hearing on 

this issue if one is warranted and shall enter a new judgment on the 

remanded claim. 

Id. at 784. 

 The Court draws several conclusions from these passages. First, in finding cause 

for the default, the Ninth Circuit has implicitly determined that PCR counsel’s 

performance in failing to raise the appellate ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 

both deficient and prejudicial. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 

377. 

 Next, although the first passage refers to the “procedural default of Hurles’s Ake

claim,” i.e. the claim that the trial court erred by denying Hurles’ pre-trial request for 

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neurological testing, Hurles, 752 F.3d at 783, it is clear that this Court is tasked with 

“consideration of appellate counsel’s failure to raise” an Ake claim. Id. at 792; see id. at 

784. Hurles raised the Ake claim in Claim 1 of his amended habeas petition, and the 

Court found it procedurally defaulted and barred from review. (Doc. 73 at 7.) Its default 

cannot be excused under Martinez, which applies only to defaulted claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel.5 See Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1177 

(9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has “not allowed petitioners to 

substantially expand the scope of Martinez beyond the circumstances present in 

Martinez”); Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying 

petitioner’s claim that Martinez permitted the resuscitation of a procedurally defaulted 

Brady claim, holding that only the Supreme Court could expand the application of 

Martinez to other areas). Therefore, contrary to Hurles’ argument, (Doc. 188 at 8), at 

issue is Hurles’ claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise the 

Ake claim, not the Ake claim itself. 

 Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of whether appellate counsel’s performance 

was deficient under Strickland must have been intended only to support its determination 

that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was “substantial” for purposes of 

Martinez, because otherwise remand would serve no meaningful purpose. Accordingly, 

the Court will undertake de novo review of Hurles’ claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Appellant Counsel 

 In assessing the viability of an Ake claim, appellate counsel first was faced with 

the fact that a motion for a brain mapping expert was not denied on its merits by the trial 

court. Trial counsel abandoned her request for a neurological examination by failing to 

file a non-ex parte motion as directed by the trial court. See McKinley v. Smith, 838 F.2d 

 

5

 Because the Court finds that Hurles’ claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the Ake claim is defaulted and barred, the Court need not 

revisit its determination that the Ake claim itself is defaulted and barred. See Edwards v. 

Carpenter, 529 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be 

procedurally defaulted.”). 

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1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that under Ake the defendant must show that he 

made a timely request to the trial court for expert assistance and that the request was 

improperly denied). There is no suggestion that there was error in the trial court’s ruling 

that the motion for a brain mapping expert was not appropriate for ex parte filing. 

Therefore, on appeal the Arizona Supreme Court would have reviewed the Ake claim 

under a fundamental error standard. See State v. Gendron, 812 P.2d 626, 627 (Ariz. 

1991) (explaining that failure to raise an issue at trial waives the issue on appeal absent 

fundamental error). To be fundamental, the error “must be clear, egregious, and curable 

only via a new trial.” Id. at 628. Appellate counsel would have factored in the difficulty 

of proving fundamental error when deciding which claims to raise. See Miller, 882 F.2d 

1434. 

 Second, although the Supreme Court in Ake held that the State must, at a 

minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist, it “limited the right” 

to expert assistance to “the provision of one competent psychiatrist.” 470 U.S. at 79. The 

Ninth Circuit has acknowledged this limitation. See Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815, 823 

(9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that under Ake “due process guarantees a defendant access to 

a single, competent psychiatrist”); cf. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 615 (9th Cir. 

1998) (noting open question as to “whether the Constitution requires a State to provide an 

indigent defendant access to diagnostic testing necessary to prepare an effective 

defense”). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Leavitt v. Arave, 646 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 

2011): 

By its own terms, Ake “limit[ed] the right [it] recognize[d]” to “provision of 

one competent psychiatrist.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added). Given 

this unambiguous language, we’ve held that the defendant “lacks the right 

to appointment of a second psychiatrist,” Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815, 

824 (9th Cir. 2001), even where the first psychiatrist is alleged to be 

incompetent or reaches a diagnosis unfavorable to the defense. We’ve 

recognized that Ake’s “limitation to a single, independent psychiatrist is 

critical given that ‘[p]sychiatry is not . . . an exact science, and psychiatrists 

disagree widely and frequently . . . on the appropriate diagnosis.’” Pawlyk, 

248 F.3d at 823 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 80). Accordingly, neither we, 

nor the Supreme Court, has ever held that a trial court violated Ake by 

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refusing to appoint a second, let alone third, mental health expert. 

Id. at 610 (additional citations omitted). 

 Citing Pawlyk and Leavitt, the Northern District of California recently rejected a 

petitioner’s argument that “because there was insufficient funding for the two courtappointed psychiatrists to conduct additional neurological or neuropsychological testing 

to confirm their opinions that Petitioner was incompetent, the examinations that the 

psychiatrists did conduct were not ‘appropriate’ under Ake.” Marks v. Davis, 112 F. 

Supp.3d 949, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The district court reiterated that under Ake the 

petitioner was entitled to one competent psychiatrist. Id. The court also noted that “the 

Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt that a right to an ‘appropriate examination’ even 

exists.” Id. at 963 (citing Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 610); see also Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 

1220, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding state trial court’s refusal to appoint 

neuropsychologist to assist petitioner charged with murder did not violate due process 

where court had already appointed expert). 

 Here, the trial court provided Hurles with a competent psychologist, Dr. Walter, 

who examined Hurles and testified at trial, thus vindicating Hurles’ due process rights 

under Ake. See Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 610 (“Due process does not require a state to fund 

every technologically conceivable test to rule out the possibility of an organic mental 

disorder.”) Given the holding in Ake and its progeny, appellate counsel reasonably could 

have determined that no legitimate Ake claim arose from the trial court’s failure to 

provide funding for an additional expert to conduct brain mapping procedures. 

 Finally, appellate counsel would have been aware of the limited utility of the brain 

mapping results obtained by Dr. Duane, which showed only that Hurles suffered from a 

“subtle and nonspecific abnormality” consistent with attention deficient disorder. 

Although Hurles’ expert at sentencing reviewed the brain mapping, he did not testify 

about its results, and counsel did not present the abnormality as a mitigating 

circumstance. (See ROA 222, 226.) 

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court finds based on these factors that 

appellate counsel’s decision not to raise an Ake claim fell within the “exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Hurles has not shown 

that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the Ake claim on appeal was objectively 

unreasonable. 

 Moreover, even if appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, the Court finds 

no prejudice resulting from the failure to raise the Ake claim. The factors discussed 

above figure into the Court’s analysis of prejudice, which requires an assessment of 

whether there was a reasonable probability relief would have been granted if appellate 

counsel had raised the Ake issue. 

 In assessing such a claim, the Arizona Supreme Court would have applied Ake’s 

“own terms,” Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 610, and found that Hurles’ due process rights were 

satisfied by the appointment of Dr. Walter as a defense expert. Under any standard of 

review, particularly fundamental error, there is not a reasonable probability that the 

Arizona Supreme Court would have found the Ake claim meritorious. 

 As noted, Dr. Duane prepared a CTM report before the sentencing hearing. He 

found “subtle nonspecific abnormalities in the left frontal area,” which were “associated 

with mild processing difficulty.” (Doc. 25, Ex. 1.) At sentencing, the trial court held in 

its special verdict: 

As to statutory mitigating circumstances, number one set out in Arizona 

Revised Statutes 12-703(G)(1), that is, the defendant’s capacity to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of law, was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to 

constitute a defense to prosecution has not been proved and does not exist. 

(Ex. H, at 15-16.) The evidence was not sufficient to satisfy even the preponderance of 

evidence burden with respect to the (G)(1) factor, which by definition is less burdensome 

than the insanity standard. 

 In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court on appeal conducted “a thorough and 

independent review of the record and of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to 

determine whether the sentence is justified.” Hurles, 914 P.2d at 1299. The court held 

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that the mitigation was insufficient to warrant leniency in light of the “quality of the 

aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 1300. 

 Because the Arizona Supreme Court found that the (G)(1) mitigating factor was 

not proved, there is no reasonable probability that, if appellate counsel had raised the Ake

claim, the court would have found that the lack of additional testing affected the guiltphase verdict. To establish an insanity defense, Hurles was required to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect such that he did 

not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know that what he was doing was 

wrong. A.R.S. § 13-502(A). Arizona law does not provide for a diminished capacity 

defense. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753 (2006) (rejecting challenge to the 

constitutionality of Arizona’s “abbreviated” version of the M’Naghten standard). Having 

determined, like the trial court, that the mitigating information was not sufficient to 

satisfy the (G)(1) factor by a preponderance of the evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court 

would not have found that it proved insanity by the higher standard of clear and 

convincing evidence. 

 If it had been presented with an Ake claim, the Arizona Supreme Court would 

have evaluated “the probable value of additional testing” and the “risk of erroneous 

deprivation” of Hurles’ rights from denial of the testing. State v. Vickers, 768 P.2d at 

1177, 1181-82 (Ariz. 1989) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 74). As already described, the brain 

scan prepared for Hurles’ sentencing showed only that he suffered from a “subtle and 

nonspecific abnormality” consistent with attention deficient disorder and mild processing 

difficulties. These bran scan results were not helpful to Hurles’ insanity defense, and the 

denial of such testing did not deprive Hurles of his rights. Evidence that Hurles suffered 

only from the “subtle and nonspecific abnormality” identified by the CTM would not 

have been consistent with Dr. Walter’s testimony that Hurles was psychotic at the time of 

the crimes due to brain impairment. Moreover, given the circumstances of the crime, 

including Hurles’ efforts to evade capture, the evidence did not support a finding that 

Hurles was in a psychotic state and did not know that what he was doing was wrong. 

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together with the fact that Hurles’ rights were satisfied by the appointment of a competent 

expert, there is no reasonable probability that the Arizona Supreme Court would have 

reversed Hurles’ conviction if appellate counsel had raised an Ake claim. 

B. Evidentiary hearing 

 Hurles asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion “strongly suggests” that the court 

ruled on the merits of the ineffective assistance appellate counsel claim. (Doc. 188 at 9.) 

He argues, therefore, that this Court either should grant relief or order an evidentiary 

hearing on the Ake issue. (Id. at 10.) Respondents contend that an evidentiary hearing is 

not required to resolve the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. (Doc. 190 at 

11-12.) The Court agrees. 

 The Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he district court should afford Hurles an evidentiary 

hearing on this issue if one is warranted.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 784. An evidentiary 

hearing is not warranted here because the record is complete with respect to appellate 

counsel’s performance. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (explaining 

that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary where claim can be resolved on state court 

record); Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding petitioner not 

entitled to evidentiary hearing where ineffective assistance claim could be “resolved by 

reference to the state court record”). “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

is based on failure to raise issues on appeal, . . . it is the exceptional case that could not be 

resolved on an examination of the record alone.” Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 647 (7th 

Cir. 1986). 

 Hurles contends an evidentiary hearing is necessary to allow him “to present the 

evidence he was wrongly denied from presenting at trial.” (Doc. 188 at 10.) The CTM 

brain mapping results are in the record, however, and Hurles has not identified any 

disputed facts that would be relevant to a review of appellate counsel’s performance. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an applicant 

cannot take an appeal unless a certificate of appealability has been issued by an 

appropriate judicial officer. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 

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provides that the district judge must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. If a certificate is issued, the court 

must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 Under § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only when the 

petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” This 

showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 The Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of Hurles’ 

judicial bias claim and his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing,

 IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Hurles’ claim of judicial bias is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hurles’ claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting a certificate of appealability on Hurles’ 

judicial bias claim and his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 19th day of May, 2016. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge 

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