Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02613/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02613-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL THORNBROUGH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

WESTERN PLACER UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, SCOTT LEAMAN, DAVID

GIRARD, KATHY ALLEN, ROBERT

NOYES, 

 Defendants.

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2:09-cv-02613-GEB-GGH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT GIRARD’S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES*

On June 23, 2010, Defendant David Girard filed a motion

seeking to recover $71,069.50 in attorneys’ fees for prevailing on his

anti-SLAPP motion, brought under California Code of Civil Procedure

425.16(c). (Docket No. 70.) Plaintiff opposes Girard’s motion,

arguing that the amount of fees sought is unreasonable and that Girard

is only entitled to recover $13,969.50 in fees. For the reasons

stated below, Girard is awarded $31,026.25 in attorneys’ fees for

prevailing on his anti-SLAPP motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this action on

September 17, 2009, in which he alleged state and federal claims

against Defendants related to his termination from employment with the

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Western Placer Unified School District. On November 12, 2009,

Defendant Girard filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), a motion to strike under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) (“Rule 12(f)”), and a motion to strike

under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil

Procedure 425.16. Girard’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was

granted in an order filed on December 29, 2009, which also provided

Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, and rendered moot Girard’s

Rule 12(f) motion to strike and his anti-SLAPP motion. 

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 12,

2010, in which he re-alleged his federal and state claims against

Defendants. Girard again filed a dismissal motion under Rule

12(b)(6), a Rule 12(f) motion to strike and an anti-SLAPP motion to

strike. In an order filed on May 27, 2010, Girard’s dismissal motion

was granted and Plaintiff’s claims alleged against Girard were

dismissed with prejudice. The May 27 order also granted Girard’s

anti-SLAPP motion and denied as moot Girard’s Rule 12(f) motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under California Code of Civil Procedure section

425.16(c)(1), “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike

shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” 

See also Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081,

1091 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “defendants sued in federal courts

can bring anti-SLAPP motions to strike state law claims and are

entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs when they prevail”); Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001) (stating that a defendant

prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion “is entitled to mandatory attorney

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fees”). This provision has been interpreted to allow for recovery of

the fees and costs “incurred in connection with the motion to strike

 . . . .” Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1362

n.4 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v.

Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 68 (2002); see also Metabolife

Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223-24 (S.D. Cal. 2002)

(holding that under California law, the party prevailing on an antiSLAPP motion is entitled to recover fees and costs incurred in

connection with the motion to strike). The prevailing party is also

entitled to recover fees “incurred in litigating the award of attorney

fees.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1141.

The amount of fees awarded to a prevailing party on an antiSLAPP motion is determined by the “lodestar adjustment method.” Id.

at 1131. The “lodestar” amount consists of “the number of hours

reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at

1134. However, “[t]he court has broad discretion in determining the

reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs to award to a prevailing

defendant.” Metabolife, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (citations omitted). 

Further, the prevailing party “bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended

and hourly rates.” Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 165 Cal.

App. 4th 1315, 1320 (2008) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he

trial court need not simply award the sum requested” and “has broad

discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee

altogether.” Id. at 1321-22 (quoting Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138).

III. DISCUSSION

Girard argues he is entitled to recover $71,069.50 for

prevailing on his anti-SLAPP motion. He argues this sum reflects the

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attorneys’ fees incurred to file both anti-SLAPP motions, to obtain

dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims, and to file the pending

motion for attorneys’ fees. Girard does not seek to recover

attorneys’ fees incurred for obtaining dismissal of Plaintiff’s

federal claims nor for filing his Rule 12(f)motion to strike. 

Girard’s request is supported by his counsel’s declaration and billing

records. 

Plaintiff argues Girard is not entitled to recover fees for

filing the initial anti-SLAPP motion nor for either of his dismissal

motions. Plaintiff further contends that the hourly rate Girard used

to calculate the lodestar figure is unreasonable.

A. Girard’s Initial Anti-SLAPP and Dismissal Motions

Girard’s first anti-SLAPP motion, which challenged

Plaintiff’s original complaint, was denied as moot since Girard’s Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal motion was granted and Plaintiff was provided leave

to amend his complaint. Girard, therefore, did not prevail on his

initial anti-SLAPP motion and is not entitled to recover any attorneys

fees incurred in connection with filing that motion. See Brown v.

Electronic Arts, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2010 WL 2757774, at *6-8

(C.D. Cal. July 13, 2010) (holding that defendant was not a prevailing

party where anti-SLAPP motion was granted but plaintiff was provided

leave to amend complaint); see also Mann v. Quality Old Time Service,

Inc., 139 Cal. App. 4th 328, 340 (2006) (holding that a party does not

prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion when the “results of the motion were

so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit

from bringing the motion”); Moran v. Endres, 135 Cal. App. 4th 952,

956 (2006) (holding that “when a defendant cannot in any realistic

sense be said to have been successful, fees need not be awarded”). 

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Therefore, the fees Girard incurred for filing his initial dismissal

and anti-SLAPP motions will be subtracted from the fee award he seeks.

B. Girard’s Second Anti-SLAPP and Dismissal Motions

“[D]efendants sued in federal courts can bring anti-SLAPP

motions to strike state law claims . . . .” Verizon, 377 F.3d at 1091

(emphasis added). “[T]he California anti-SLAPP statute applies to

pendant state law claims, but not to federal question claims.” 

Coulter v. Murrell, 2010 WL 2775627, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2010). 

Therefore, the attorneys fees Girard incurred for obtaining dismissal

of Plaintiff’s federal claims were not incurred “in connection” with

Girard’s anti-SLAPP motion. See id. (holding that plaintiff was not

entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for the portion of his dismissal

motion that challenged federal claims).

However, the portion of Girard’s second dismissal motion

which achieved dismissal of Plaintiff’s state claims was “in

connection” with Girard’s anti-SLAPP motion. This portion of Girard’s

dismissal motion was necessary to prevail on his anti-SLAPP motion

because it demonstrated that Plaintiff had not shown a probability of

prevailing on his claims alleged against Girard. Girard, therefore,

is entitled to recover the attorneys fees incurred to obtain dismissal

of Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Girard states in his reply brief that he only seeks to

recover 50 percent of the fees incurred for filing his second

dismissal motion since “three of the seven claims were based on

federal law.” (Reply 6:22-24.) Girard is entitled to recover this

fraction of the fees incurred for filing his second dismissal motion.

//

//

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C. The Hourly Rate Used to Calculate the Fee Award

Plaintiff appears to argue in his opposition that the hourly

rate Girard used to calculate the lodestar figure is unreasonable

since it does not reflect the actual rate billed. (Opp’n 6:5-7:10.) 

Girard responds that “[t]he California Supreme Court has . . . held

that an attorney is entitled to be compensated at the hourly rates

that reflect the reasonable market rate of [an attorney’s] services in

the community.” (Reply 7:19-27.) 

The lodestar is calculated by using “prevailing hourly

rates” which is “the basic fee for comparable legal services in the

community.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132; see also Christian

Research, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 1321 (stating that “[t]he court

tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the

number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate

prevailing in the community for similar work”). Girard has

demonstrated that the hourly rates used to calculate the fee request

in this case are reasonable. 

D. The Amount of Fees That Are Recoverable

A careful, line-by-line review of Girard’s request for

attorneys’ fees reveals that Girard is entitled to recover $26,526.25

for attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with filing his second

anti-SLAPP motion. This figure represents the fees incurred for

filing his second anti-SLAPP motion and for obtaining dismissal of his

state law claims. Girard is also entitled to $4,500 for fees incurred

in filing this motion to recover fees. Therefore, in total, Girard is

entitled to an award of $31,026.25.

///

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Girard is awarded $31,026.25

in attorneys’ fees as a result of prevailing on his anti-SLAPP motion.

Dated: August 2, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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