Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01730/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brittian Willie Young,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

1 Attorney General of the State 

of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 19-01730 PHX DWL (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA:

Petitioner Brittian Young, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 13, 2019.2 Young challenges his conviction 

on one count of attempted kidnapping, asserting claims of prosecutorial misconduct, 

malicious prosecution, and violation of his right to due process of law. Respondents 

answered the petition on July 15, 2019 (ECF No. 19), and Young filed a pleading construed 

as a reply on October 2, 2019. (ECF No. 25).

1 Effective October 21, 2019, David Shinn replaced Charles Ryan as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Shinn is 

automatically substituted as the party of record.

2

In an order entered April 19, 2019, the Court deemed the operative petition the petition 

at ECF No. 1. (ECF No. 9 at 2). 

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I. Background

A. State criminal proceedings

The following background is taken from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

denying relief in Young’s appeal:

Judge Lisa Flores was a superior court judge with the Maricopa 

County Superior Court in 2016. She sat on the juvenile court bench, where 

she heard a dependency action involving Young’s child. Judge Flores 

terminated Young’s parental rights.

Several months later, Judge Flores held a status hearing in the 

dependency action. Young’s role had concluded upon termination and he was 

not a party. He still attended the hearing. He entered the courtroom with the 

hearing in progress and sat in the last row. He held a bunch of zip ties in one 

hand and papers in the other.

As the hearing concluded, Young stood up and quickly approached 

Judge Flores. He yelled, “Motion to Strike! Motion to Strike!” Judge Flores 

pushed her panic button to alert court security and rose to her feet. Young 

paused in front of the bench and asked, “Are you Flores?” He added, “I have 

a warrant for your arrest,” and began “shaking” the papers in his hand, stating 

that “it was a warrant for [Judge Flores’] arrest signed by a judge.”

Young marched around the clerk’s desk, climbed the stairs to the 

bench and approached Judge Flores. He announced that she had the “right to 

remain silent.” He told her “not to resist” and “to put [her] hands up.” Judge 

Flores responded that Young “can’t be up here,” directing him to “get down” 

and “get away from [her].” The courtroom clerk added that Young must 

“stop” or “he probably would be in a lot of trouble.” Young seemed 

“determined,” however, to restrain Judge Flores with zip ties and escort her 

from the courtroom.

The bailiff heard the commotion and saw Young standing “behind the 

bench where [the] judge sits.” The bailiff believed that Judge Flores was in 

danger and thus inserted herself between Young and Judge Flores. Two 

sheriff’s deputies soon arrived and removed Young. Young told the deputies 

he was “there to make a citizen’s arrest.”

Young was indicted for one count of attempted kidnapping under 

A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(5) (interference with the performance of a 

governmental or political function). He moved to represent himself. The 

superior court granted his motion but appointed advisory counsel to assist 

him.

The State moved to preclude Young from presenting evidence on two 

subjects, including an unrelated property dispute and Judge Flores’

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termination of his parental rights. The State argued this evidence was 

irrelevant to the charge of attempted kidnapping. The court agreed and 

limited the evidence “to the fact that Judge Flores is a Superior Court Judge 

in Maricopa County, that she handled a civil matter involving the defendant 

and knows the defendant because of that matter, that she ruled against the 

defendant, and that the defendant was no longer a party in the case on 

September 21, 2016.”

The court held a two-day jury trial. Several witnesses testified, 

including Judge Flores, her bailiff, the courtroom clerk and the arresting 

deputy. Young cross-examined each witness. He chose not to testify. He 

introduced no evidence at trial and called no witnesses. The jury found him 

guilty. After accounting for Young’s previous manslaughter conviction, the 

court sentenced him to the presumptive term of 6.5 years’ imprisonment.

State v. Young, 2018 WL 4017336, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2018).

Young appealed his conviction, asserting he could not have “kidnapped” Judge 

Flores because he had the legal authority to arrest her. Id. at *2. The appellate court rejected 

this claim, finding:

Young first insists he had legal authority to arrest Judge Flores, 

meaning he could not have kidnapped her. A.R.S. § 13-1301(2) (defining 

“restrain” in kidnapping context as “restrict[ing] a person’s movements 

without consent, without legal authority”) (emphasis added). He did not. 

Young had no arrest warrant. Moreover, only a police officer may execute 

an arrest warrant. A.R.S. § 13-3812 (“it shall command the officer to 

forthwith arrest the person complained of . . .”) (emphasis added).

Nor did Young have authority to conduct a citizen’s arrest under 

A.R.S. § 13-3884. Arizona law authorizes a citizen’s arrest only “[w]hen the 

person to be arrested has in his presence committed a misdemeanor 

amounting to a breach of the peace, or a felony” or “[w]hen a felony has been 

in fact committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to 

be arrested has committed it.” A.R.S. § 13-3884(1), (2).

Young seems to argue his attempted “arrest” was justified because 

Judge Flores allegedly conspired with the Department of Child Safety to 

terminate his parental rights. We disagree. Judge Flores did not commit a 

crime when she heard the evidence in a severance action and terminated 

Young’s parental rights. A.R.S. § 13-3884(1)-(2). She simply did her job. 

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 81, Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 2.7 (“A judge shall hear 

and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is 

required by Rule 2.11 or other law.”). Arizona law does not authorize private 

individuals to arrest and detain judges based on adverse decisions.

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Id.

Young also argued on appeal that the State lacked probable cause to charge him 

with attempted kidnapping under A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(5). Id. The Court of Appeals 

rejected this claim, finding: “Any lingering questions about probable cause were 

dispatched after a jury heard the evidence and found unanimously that Young was guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing State v. Neese, 126 Ariz. 499, 502-03 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1980). The appellate court further concluded: 

Young fares no better if we interpret his argument as a claim that 

insufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict. “When reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence 

to decide if it would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” State v. 

Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). We will affirm if “substantial evidence” 

supports the verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is “[m]ore than a scintilla and 

is such proof as a reasonable mind would employ to support the conclusion 

reached.” Id. (quotation omitted).

A person commits attempted kidnapping under A.R.S. § 13-

1304(A)(5) by knowingly restraining another person with the intent to 

interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function. 

Young obliquely argues he lacked “criminal intentions,” but the record 

includes substantial evidence to the contrary. The record indicates that Judge 

Flores scheduled a status conference in a dependency action involving 

Young’s child. Young’s role in the action had concluded when his parental 

rights were terminated. Undeterred, Young attended the hearing. He sat in 

the last row. Judge Flores was seated on the bench in her courtroom. As the 

hearing concluded, Young stood and quickly approached Judge Flores, 

clutching zip ties in his hand. He directed Judge Flores “not to resist” and “to 

put [her] hands up.” Judge Flores told Young to “get down” and that he “can't 

be up here.” The courtroom clerk warned Young to stop or he would be in 

trouble. Judge Flores testified that Young was determined to restrain her and 

remove her from the courtroom.

The jury thus heard substantial evidence to support its verdict. 

Young’s plot to arrest a superior court judge on the bench in a courtroom 

squarely demonstrated an intent to interfere with the performance of the 

judicial function. See State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 29 (1993) (defendant 

“clearly interfered” with a governmental function when he grabbed and 

wrestled a uniformed deputy).

Id. at *2-3.

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Young also asserted the trial court prohibited him from presenting evidence that 

“could easily prove [his] innocence.” Id. at *3. The appellate court rejected this claim, 

concluding: 

Young never identifies the evidence he was prevented from 

introducing, but we assume he means the court’s decision on the State’s 

motion in limine. . . .

The superior court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence 

of an unrelated property dispute or the court’s prior termination of Young’s 

parental rights. This evidence had no relevance to the charged offense of 

attempted kidnapping. Young has no justification defense, for instance, 

based on his self-perceived ill-treatment and injustice. At bottom, this 

evidence was unrelated to any “fact . . . of consequence” and likely to 

“confus[e] the issues.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403.

Id.

Young sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on 

January 25, 2019. (ECF No. 19-4 at 49). Young did not seek state post-conviction relief.

B. Claims for federal habeas relief

In his federal habeas petition Young asserts four claims for relief:

1. “The State of Arizona has demonstrated actions of Prosecutorial Misconduct by 

Insufficiency of State Evidence. Which is Malicious Prosecution that then lead to the 

Unlawful and Wrongful Conviction which then lead to the Unlawful Imprisonment [sic].” 

(ECF No. 1 at 6). Young contends he had a legitimate “Notice to Arrest” and that the “jury 

heard statements that were false and not supported by evidence. That is too many visible 

violations of Rule 42, Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.” (Id.).

2. “Violation of Judicial Code of Conduct by Lack of Intent In a Criminal Case . . .”

3

(ECF No. 1 at 7). Young asserts:

This case stems from professional and judicial misconduct equal to 

committing a criminal act which is why a move to strike was executed. [] 

The court erred by not granting mistrial []; it also erred by not reporting Judge 

3 Young adds the language “Which is Malicious Prosecution that then lead to the Unlawful 

and Wrongful Conviction which then lead to the Unlawful Imprisonment” to each of his claims 

for relief.

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Flores to proper authorities where allegations and question about character 

were raised concerning fraud.

(Id. (citations to exhibits deleted)). 

3. “Violation of Constitution for My Mere Presence Was Turned Into Criminal Case

. . .” (ECF No. 1 at 8). Young asserts:

State of Arizona violated all the privileges and immunities I have a citizen.

[] The IX Amendment as well as the XIV Amendment due process and equal 

protection of law where Judge committed crime first which gave me the right 

to execute move to strike. Instead of protecting me and child as potential 

victim: I was indicted two weeks later with frivolous charge because I 

advised a Judge of Miranda Right. Freedom of speech is my Constitutional 

right as well. No threats were used and no physical fore used. I was gently 

escorted out of court room by deputy. My mere presence is not a crime § 13-

3884 of A.R.S. is my right as a citizen. No one is exempt from arrest 

according to constitution.

(Id. (citations to exhibits deleted)). 

4. “Obstruction of Justice where There is No Criminal Intent From Defendant . . .” 

(ECF No. 1 at 9). 

. . . Obstruction of Justice where jury heard statements and comments not 

supported by evidence because we were not permitted to present facts. I 

would have evidence on prosecution witness if I bring up matter from Judge 

Flores’ court. However, the prosecuting agency must seek evidence the 

defense cannot directly obtain, such as video surveillance to show exactly 

what happened. Judge Flores committed perjury and her testimony should 

not be allowed. [] Witness should be impeached I can obtain the media in 

that Juvenile hearing. There is use of security camera. Judge Flores has 

continued to conspire in the Obstruction of Justice and it has been brought to 

the Court’s attention I am a South Mountain Regional of the United States 

and capable of executing a legal Move to Strike on that violator. I was not 

allowed to confront all witnesses and accusers to present my case. Too much 

valuable evidence withheld by State of Arizona. . . .

(Id. (citations to exhibits deleted)).

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II. Analysis

Relief from a state court conviction by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 extends only to a person in custody if the custody is in 

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). And, absent 

specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the merits of a 

claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). To 

properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the state courts the 

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the 

state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 

U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the 

“highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner 

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct appeal or in a petition 

for state post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 

483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim 

to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir.2005) (citations omitted).

Fair presentation requires a petitioner to describe both the operative facts and the 

legal theory relied upon in their federal habeas petition to the state courts. Baldwin v. Reese, 

541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 27576 (1971) (holding a claim is 

considered “fairly presented” only if the petitioner “present[s] the state courts with the 

same claim he urges upon the federal courts”). 

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In Baldwin, the Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give 

the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 

U.S. at 29. Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas claim to the state 

court as asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to 

violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas claim was not “fairly 

presented” to the state court. Id. In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner 

must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal 

court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 278; Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.

2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner 

need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the 

state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, they must do more than present the facts necessary

to support the federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were 

before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin,

541 U.S. at 29 (stating that a mere reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not 

alert the court to federal nature of the claim); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995)

(holding a “mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust.”). Rather, in his state court

pleadings the habeas petitioner must cite to the specific constitutional guarantee upon 

which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 

2001). General appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a 

federal constitutional claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996); Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by 

citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.”); 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly, a mere reference to the 

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“Constitution of the United States” does not satisfy the fair presentment requirement. 

Gray, 518 U.S. at 162-63. Even if the federal constitutional basis of a claim presented in 

the state court was “self-evident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same 

considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of 

the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts. . . .” ” 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted), amended on 

other grounds at 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). A state prisoner does not fairly present a 

claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to 

discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32.

In his state appellate brief Young did not mention or cite to the United States 

Constitution, or discuss how his federal constitutional rights were violated in his state 

criminal proceedings. Nor did he identify any specific federal constitutional right he 

believed was violated during his state criminal proceedings. In his state appellate brief 

Young cited the “Constitution of the State of Arizona,” and the Arizona Code of Judicial 

Conduct, and the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct. (ECF No. 19-4 at 9-17). The only 

reference to any federal constitutional right, federal law, or federal legal opinion cited by 

Young in his state proceedings is his assertion that his “arrest” of Judge Flores was legal 

because, inter alia, he “advised her of her ‘Miranda Rights.’” (ECF No. 19-4 at 13). Young 

also makes a passing reference to “Constitutional Law” in his state appellate proceedings, 

alleging: “It is a violation of Constitutional Law to ignore misconduct by a lawyer or judge 

where in this case it was a judge identified to have questionable behavior . . .,” however 

this appears to be a reference to the Arizona Constitution rather than the United States 

Constitution. (ECF No. 19-4 at 15). Furthermore, in denying relief on Young’s claims the 

Arizona Court of Appeals did not mention the United States Constitution or any federal 

constitutional right. Young, 2018 WL 4017336, at *1-3.

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, unambiguously provides that a federal 

court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(a). Accordingly, “[a] habeas petition must allege the petitioner’s detention violates 

the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.

1989). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). A “mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.” Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 

U.S. 333, 349 (1993). Furthermore, a habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state law issue 

into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 

F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999).

4 Accordingly, because Young did not present any claim 

asserting his federal constitutional rights were violated to the state’s highest court, he failed 

to exhaust any cognizable basis for federal habeas relief in the Arizona courts. See Cooper 

v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “to fairly present a claim, the 

petitioner must clearly state the federal basis and federal nature of the claim, along with 

relevant facts.”).

If a petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the state court to which they 

would be required to present their claim in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would 

now find the claims procedurally barred, the claim is considered procedurally defaulted

and, absent specific circumstances, the federal court must dismiss the petition. Whaley v. 

Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar Young from 

returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claim, his federal 

habeas claims, to the extent they can be construed as asserting a cognizable claim regarding

the violation of a federal constitutional right, are procedurally barred. See Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

4

In his federal habeas petition Young summarily asserts his “IX” and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated because “judge commited

[sic] crime first which gave me the right to execute move to strike. . . . Freedom of speech is my 

constitution[al] right as well.” (ECF No. 1 at 8). This is the only reference to the United States 

Constitution or any federal constitutional right in Young’s petition.

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If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not entitled 

to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing of both 

cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court 

may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to consider the 

merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 750; Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017); Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327.

2011). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim, 

i.e., an objective factor outside of his control, and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from 

the alleged constitutional violation. Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To demonstrate cause, a 

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which impeded his efforts to 

comply with the state’s procedural rules. See Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 

1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error 

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.” Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. Establishing prejudice requires the 

petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable 

probability he would not have been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 

224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir.1999). 

It is the petitioner’s burden to establish both cause and prejudice with regard to their 

procedural default of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 

1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

exception by “establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of 

factual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found 

him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Young fails to establish cause for his procedural default of his federal habeas claims. 

Additionally, Young is unable to establish prejudice arising from his default of his claims, 

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as none of his claims are meritorious; a thorough review of the entire record in this matter, 

which includes the trial transcripts, indicates there was sufficient evidence to sustain 

Young’s conviction. Furthermore, the state appellate court found none of Young’s 

allegations regarding the purported violations of state law were meritorious, and the 

conclusion of an Arizona appellate court regarding an issue of state law are binding on this 

Court. See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Hartman v. 

Summers, 120 F.3d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

“If a state law issue must be decided in order to decide a federal habeas claim, the state’s 

construction of its own law is binding on the federal court.” Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 

570, 576 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975).

Additionally, alleged violations of a state’s procedural rules do not establish that Young’s 

federal constitutional right to due process of law was violated, as federal habeas relief is 

not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. See, e.g., 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, (1991). 

Nor can Young establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent a 

consideration of the merits of his claims. Young presents only conclusory allegations of 

error and does not offer clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could 

have found him guilty of the offenses charged. 

III. Conclusion

Young did not properly exhaust any claim that his federal constitutional rights were 

violated in the state courts and he has not shown cause for, or prejudice arising from his 

procedural default of any cognizable § 2254 claim. Young’s federal habeas petition does 

not state a cognizable claim that his federal constitutional rights were violated in his state 

criminal proceedings. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Young’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Young seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 11th day of May, 2020.

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