Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08047/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Paul Eddy, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-08047-PCT-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On March 25, 2014, Petitioner Dennis Paul Eddy filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) In accordance with Court orders, 

Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition on December 8, 2014. (Docs. 7, 8, 22, 23.) 

On May 13, 2015, Respondents filed a notice of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

asserting the Court does not have jurisdiction over the pending Second Amended Petition 

because it is a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus (the Notice). (Doc. 33.) 

 The Court ordered Petitioner to file a response to the Notice by June 15, 2015. 

(Doc. 34.) On Petitioner’s motion, the Court later extended that deadline to August 17, 

2015. (Docs. 36, 38.) On August 13, 2015, Petitioner responded to the Notice. 

(Doc. 46.) Before filing his response, Petitioner filed a motion for declaratory judgment, 

a motion for relief from judgment, and requests for expedited rulings on those motions.1

 

(Docs. 39, 40, 41, 43.) 

 

1

 Respondents did not respond to any of these motions. 

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 As set forth below, the Court finds that the claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, 

and Three of the Second Amended Petition should be denied as successive, but that 

Respondents should be required to answer the claims asserted in Grounds Four, Five, and 

Six. The Court also recommends that Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from Judgment 

(Doc. 40) be denied, and that his Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 39) be 

construed as a motion to supplement the Second Amended Petition, and granted. 

I. Procedural Background 

 In June 1986, following a jury trial in Coconino County Superior Court Case No. 

CR85-11929, Petitioner was convicted of armed burglary, aggravated assault, and theft of 

property. (Doc. 33, Ex. A at 1.) The court imposed concurrent sentences; the longest 

sentenced imposed was life imprisonment without the possibility of release on parole 

until Petitioner served twenty-five calendar years. (Doc. 22 at 25-27.) 

 On April 25, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, captioned Dennis Paul Eddy v. Terry L. Stewart, CV-00-

750-PCT-ROS (LOA), in which he challenged his convictions and sentences in Coconino 

County Superior Court Case No. CR85-11929. (Doc. 33, Ex. A at 3; Eddy, CV-00-750-

PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 1.) With the Court’s permission, on January 29, 2001, Petitioner 

filed an amended petition in that case. (Eddy, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 29.) 

On March 12, 2003, the Court dismissed the amended petition with prejudice as untimely 

under the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 33, Ex. A; Eddy, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS 

(LOA), Doc. 120); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (setting forth a one-year limitations 

period for a state prisoner to file a petition for writ of habeas in federal court). 

 Over ten years later, on March 28, 2014, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, again challenging his 

convictions and sentences in Coconino County Superior Court Case No. CR85-11929. 

(Doc. 1.) Pursuant to Court orders, Petitioner amended his petition and later filed the 

pending Second Amended Petition on December 8, 2014. (Doc. 22.) The Second 

Amended Petition also challenges Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in Coconino 

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County Superior Court Case No. CR85-11929. (Doc. 22 at 1.) The Court directed 

Respondents to answer the Second Amended Petition. (Doc. 23.) 

 Rather than filing an answer, on May 13, 2015, Respondents filed a notice of lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction.2

 (Doc. 33.) In the Notice, Respondents assert that the 

Second Amended Petition is successive because the Court previously dismissed 

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition in Eddy v. Terry L. Stewart, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS 

(LOA), in which Petitioner challenged the same convictions and sentences that he 

challenges in the pending Second Amended Petition. (Doc. 33 at 3.) 

 Respondents explain that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Second 

Amended Petition because Petitioner did not obtain permission from the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) to file a successive petition as 

required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is 

filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for 

an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”). 

 In his Response, Petitioner argues that the AEDPA does not apply to him, he was 

not aware of the requirements for filing a second or successive § 2254 petition, and he 

should be permitted to challenge his State custody, which he asserts exceeds his parole 

eligibility date. (Doc. 46.) Alternatively, Petitioner requests a stay of this matter while 

he seeks permission to file a second or successive petition from the Ninth Circuit. (Id.) 

II. Discussion 

A. The AEDPA Applies to Petitioner and this Proceeding 

 Congress enacted the AEDPA to reduce delays in the execution of state and 

federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 386 (2000), and “to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). Petitioner argues that the AEPDA does 

 

2

 Respondents also requested that the Court stay or extend the deadline for their 

answer until after the Court resolved the jurisdictional issue. (Doc. 33.) The Court 

granted that request. (Doc. 34.) 

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not apply to him because it only applies to terrorists or defendants sentenced to death. 

(Doc. 46.) Petitioner does not cite any authority for this proposition. Petitioner made 

these same arguments in his prior § 2254 proceeding and the Court rejected them. 

(Doc. 33, Ex. A at 6-7.) 

 As the Court previously noted, the Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA 

applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 

effective date. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481 (2000). Accordingly, the 

AEDPA applies to this § 2254 proceeding, which was commenced after April 24, 1996. 

Additionally, the AEDPA applies regardless of Petitioner’s familiarity with the AEDPA. 

See Benefield v. Ryan, 2012 WL 3228784, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jul. 2, 2012) (stating a 

petitioner’s ignorance of the law and indigent status did not excuse compliance with the 

AEDPA’s limitations period); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling of the AEPDA limitations period because 

neither the district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition 

to include unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the 

limitations period were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). 

B. Requirements for Bringing a Second or Successive Petition 

 State habeas petitioners generally may file only one federal habeas petition 

challenging a particular state conviction and sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) 

(courts must dismiss a claim presented in a second or successive petition when that claim 

was presented in a prior petition); § 2244(b)(2) (courts must dismiss a claim presented in 

a second or successive petition when that claim was not presented in a prior petition and 

the failure to present that claim previously is not excused by the statutory exceptions). 

“A habeas petition is second or successive . . . if it raises claims that were or could have 

been adjudicated on the merits” in an earlier § 2254 petition. McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 

1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 State habeas petitioners must first obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit 

before filing a second or successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (“Before a 

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second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the 

applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the 

district court to consider the application.”); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) 

(“The long and short of it is that Burton neither sought nor received authorization from 

the Court of Appeals before filing his 2002 petition, a ‘second or successive’ petition 

challenging his custody, and so the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain 

it.”). The Ninth Circuit “may authorize the filing of the second or successive [petition] 

only if it presents a claim not previously raised that satisfies one of the two grounds 

articulated in § 2244(b)(2).” Burton, 549 U.S. at 153. 

C. Petitioner’s Claims in the Second Amended Petition 

 As set forth in Section I above, the Second Amended Petition generally challenges 

the same convictions and sentences that Petitioner challenged in his previous petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. In Ground One, Petitioner claims that his sentence for first degree 

burglary was illegally enhanced. (Doc. 22 at 6.) In Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner 

argues that he was sentenced under a statute that has since been held unconstitutional. 

(Doc. 22 at 7-8.) In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that Respondents are “subjecting 

[him] to cruel and unusual punishment by making it appear to other inmates that 

Petitioner is being held on a sex crimes statute.” (Id. at 9.) In Grounds Five and Six, 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s handling of his petition for post-conviction relief 

and his state petition for writ of habeas corpus violated his due process rights. (Id. at 10-

13.) As set forth below, the Court considers whether these claims were or could have 

been brought in Petitioner’s earlier § 2254 proceeding and finds that Grounds One, Two, 

and Three are successive and that Grounds Four, Five, and Six are not successive. 

 1. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that in 1986, after his conviction for first degree 

burglary, the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 

because the jury did not find him guilty of violating that statute. (Doc. 22 at 6, 22, 25.) 

Petitioner’s challenge to his sentence, imposed in June 1986, “[was] or could have been 

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adjudicated on their merits in an earlier petition,” which he filed in 2000. See Cooper v. 

Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that, “[g]enerally, a new petition 

is ‘second or successive’ if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on 

their merits in an earlier petition.”). Accordingly, the claim in Ground One is successive 

and is not properly before this Court because Petitioner did not obtain authorization from 

the Ninth Circuit before filing a petition including this successive claim. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). 

 2. Grounds Two and Three 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts violations of his due process rights because he is 

being held in custody on the authority of a statute that has been declared unconstitutional. 

(Doc. 22 at 7.) Petitioner asserts that in 1986 his sentence was enhanced pursuant to 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, but the Arizona Supreme Court later held that statute 

unconstitutional in State v. Gross, 31 P.3d 815 (Ariz. 2001) (concluding that Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-604 was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 

to the extent that release status was decided by the court, not a jury). 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that his continued detention under the authority 

of this statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due 

Process Clause. (Doc. 22 at 8.) Petitioner explains that § 13-604 was declared 

unconstitutional in 2001 and was replaced with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-708. (Id.) He 

argues that § 13-708 does not provide for a life sentence, but for a twenty-five percent 

increase of the statutory maximum sentence. (Id.) Petitioner argues that he should be 

resentenced under § 13-708. He also states that he did not obtain a copy of the decision 

in Gross until March 21, 2011. (Doc. 22 at 16.) 

 In Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner again challenges his sentence imposed in 

1986, based on an Arizona Supreme Court decision that was issued on September 4, 

2001. Those claims could have been raised in the prior habeas corpus proceeding, which 

was pending in this Court until 2003. (See CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 125.) 

 The prior habeas corpus proceeding was filed on April 25, 2000 and amended on 

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January 29, 2001. (CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Docs. 1, 29.) On June 15, 2001, the 

assigned magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the 

amended petition be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 80, Ex. B.) Petitioner filed several 

motions and objections. (CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Docs. 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 

91.) On August 23, 2001, the assigned magistrate judge issued a Supplemental Report 

and Recommendation, addressing the issues raised in Petitioner’s motions and objections 

and again recommended that the Court deny habeas corpus relief for the reasons set forth 

in the June 15, 2001 Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 92.) 

 Petitioner then filed numerous documents, including a notice of interlocutory 

appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (Docs. 93-105.) On May 29, 2012, the Ninth Circuit 

dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 106.) Petitioner again 

filed numerous documents and motions with the Court. (Docs. 107-118.) On March 12, 

2003, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, dismissed Petitioner’s claims 

with prejudice, and entered judgment. (CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Docs. 125-26.) 

 Thus, the prior § 2254 petition was pending for nearly eighteen months after the 

Arizona Supreme Court issued its decision in Gross on September 4, 2001 Petitioner, 

who filed numerous motions and other documents in his prior § 2254 proceeding, could 

have raised the claims asserted in Grounds Two and Three in that proceeding Petitioner 

explains that he did not present the claims asserted in Grounds Two and Three in his 

earlier petition because he did not receive a copy of the Gross decision until March 21, 

2011. (Doc. 22 at 18.) He explains that the prison law libraries “had been closed” and 

that he did not know that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 had been declared unconstitutional 

until March 2011 when another inmate told him about the decision and he was able to 

obtain a copy of the case. (Id. at 15.) 

 This issue is not properly before this Court. Whether “the factual predicate for 

[Grounds Two and Three] could not have been discovered previously through the 

exercise of due diligence[,]” is an issue for the Ninth Circuit to consider when deciding 

whether to authorize Petitioner to file a second or successive § 2254 petition including 

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the claims asserted in Grounds Two and Three. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B); Burton, 

549 U.S. at 153 (the Ninth Circuit “may authorize the filing of the second or successive 

[petition] only if it presents a claim not previously raised that satisfies one of the two 

grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2).”). Therefore, the claims asserted in Grounds Two 

and Three are successive and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider those claims 

because Petitioner did not obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit to present these 

successive claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 

 3. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights 

because the Arizona legislature abolished Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 as unconstitutional, 

and enacted a new statute that is also numbered Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, but pertains to 

sex crimes. (Doc. 22 at 9.) Petitioner alleges that because he was convicted under a 

statute with that same number, it appears that he is being held for violating a sex crimes 

statute and is a sex offender, which has placed his life in jeopardy. 

 Respondents generally assert that the Second Amended Petition challenges the 

same convictions and sentences at issue in the prior habeas proceeding, but do not 

specifically explain why the claims asserted in Ground Four are successive. (Doc. 33.) 

In Ground Four, Petitioner does not specify when Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 was 

amended. However, the current version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 was amended 

effective January 1, 2009. It is entitled “Class 6 felony; designation,” and does not 

appear to be limited to sex crimes. Because Petitioner alleges that he is currently in 

danger, the Court assumes that Ground Four is based on the most recent version of Ariz. 

Stat. § 13-604, which was amended in 2009. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have 

presented this claim in his prior habeas corpus proceeding and it is not successive. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Respondents be required to answer Count Four. 

 4. Grounds Five and Six 

 Ground Five pertains to post-conviction proceedings that Petitioner filed in the 

state court on March 31, 2011, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

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Procedure. (Doc. 22 at 10.) Petitioner argues that the State did not file a timely response 

to his petition for post-conviction relief, as Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4236(A) requires. 

(Doc. 22 at 10.) He also argues that the trial court violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4236(C) 

by failing to issue a ruling on the petition within the required time frame. (Id. at 11.) In 

Ground Six, Petitioner argues a violation of his due process rights because the State did 

not comply with the time frames for processing a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

which he allegedly filed on June 7, 2011. (Doc. 22 at 12.) Petitioner asserts that the trial 

court did not comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4124(A). (Id. at 12-13.) 

 Respondents do not explain why these claims are second or successive. (Doc. 33.) 

Because Grounds Five and Six pertain to events that occurred years after the Court 

dismissed the prior post-conviction proceeding, the Court finds that the claims in 

Grounds Five and Six are not second or successive. Although these claim may not be 

cognizable in a § 2254 petition for other reasons or otherwise lack merit, Respondents 

have not asserted any other ground for denying relief on these claims (Doc. 33.) 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Respondents be required to answer these 

claims. 

D. Motion for Relief from Judgment 

 In an apparent attempt to avoid the requirements for filing a second or successive 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. 

(Doc. 40.) In that motion, Petitioner seeks an order under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. (Doc. 40.) Specifically, Petitioner requests “that he be granted leave to 

proceed [with the pending habeas corpus proceeding] as relief from [Judge Silver’s 

March 12, 2003] judgment or order.” (Id.) In other words, Petitioner seeks authorization 

from this Court to present his successive claims in the pending § 2254 proceeding. As 

discussed in Section II.B, this Court is not authorized to grant Petitioner permission to 

file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rather, he must make such 

a request in the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (“Before a second or 

successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant 

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shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to 

consider the application.”). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the motion for 

relief from judgment be denied. 

 E. Motion for Declaratory Judgment

 Petitioner has also filed a motion for declaratory judgment. (Doc. 39.) In that 

motion, Petitioner requests an order declaring that the State of Arizona has violated Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 14-1604.10(A) and the Due Process Clause by keeping him in custody past 

his parole eligibility date. (Doc. 39.) A motion for declaratory judgment is not the 

proper vehicle for Petitioner to challenge the duration of his confinement. However, a 

federal challenge to the duration of his confinement could be included in a § 2254 

petition. See Stewart v. Stewart, 152 Fed. App’x. 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering a 

§ 2254 petitioner’s claims that the State failed to properly calculate his sentence); see 

also Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding 

that refusal to set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence implicated 

prisoner’s liberty interest in release on parole which cannot be denied without adequate 

procedural due process protections). Petitioner, however, did not include this claim in the 

Second Amended Petition. (Doc. 22.) In an abundance of caution, the Court 

recommends that the motion for declaratory judgment be construed as a motion to 

supplement the Second Amended Petition and granted, and that Respondents be required 

to file an answer to the claims included in the supplement. 

III. Conclusion 

 The Court finds the claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, and Three of the 

pending Second Amended Petition are successive and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider those claims because Petitioner presented them without first obtaining 

permission from the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Grounds 

One, Two, and Three be dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner seeking permission 

from the Ninth Circuit to bring those claims in a successive petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The Court finds the claims asserted in Grounds 

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Four, Five, and Six are not successive and recommends that Respondents be directed to 

answer those claims. 

 The Court also recommends that motion for declaratory judgment (Doc. 39) be 

construed as a motion to supplement the Second Amended Petition and granted, and that 

Respondents be ordered to answer the claims in that filing.3

 Finally, the Court 

recommends that Petitioner’s remaining motions (Docs. 40, 41, 42) be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Grounds One, Two, and Three 

without prejudice to Petitioner seeking authorization from the Ninth Circuit to bring those 

claims in a successive § 2254 petition, and that the Court deny Petitioner’s request to stay 

this matter (Doc. 46 at 4) while he seeks such authorization. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Petitioner’s Motion 

for Relief from Judgment or Order. (Doc. 40.) 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court construe Petitioner’s 

Motion for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 39) as a motion to supplement the Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and grant that motion. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if the Court adopts this Report and 

Recommendation, it order Respondents to file an answer to Grounds Four, Five, and Six 

and to the motion for declaratory relief (construed as a motion to supplement the Second 

Amended Petition) within thirty days of the Court’s order, and state in its order that 

Petitioner may file a rely within thirty days of service of Respondents’ answer. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Petitioner’s motions 

for expedited ruling on his Motion for Declaratory Relief and Motion for Relief from 

Judgment. (Docs. 41, 42.) 

 

3

 The Court makes no determination regarding the merits of the claims asserted in Grounds Four, Five, Six, and in the motion for declaratory judgment (construed as a motion to supplement the Second Amended Petition), or as to any defenses Respondents could assert in an answer to those claims. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. The parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 20th day of August, 2015. 

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