Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07149/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07149-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLIE R. LARA,

Petitioner,

v.

BEN CURRY, warden, 

Respondent. /

No. C 06-7149 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Charlie R. Lara, a pro se prisoner, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

challenging a 2005 parole denial. Now before the court for consideration is respondent's

motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds

the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismisses it. 

BACKGROUND

Lara was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of second degree murder

and was sentenced in 1980 to 15 years to life in prison. His habeas petition does not

challenge his conviction but instead challenges a June 27, 2005 decision by Governor

Schwarzenegger that reversed the parole board's decision and found him not suitable for

parole. 

The lone claim in the petition remaining for adjudication is a claim that the Governor's

decision violated the plea agreement in that Lara's offense is being treated as a higher degree

offense than that agreed to by the parties at the time he agreed to plead no contest to second

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degree murder. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Lara asserts that the maximum

term was set at 15 years and that not releasing him after 15 years breached the plea

agreement. Opposition, pp. 3, 5. 

The parties agree that Lara filed his federal petition within a year after the Governor's

decision, minus the time during which his state habeas petitions were pending in state court. 

His federal petition was filed about 16 months after the Governor's decision, and he had state

court habeas petitions pending during about 10 months of that intervening period. However,

respondent contends that the one-year period for purposes of the statute of limitations did not

start when the Governor issued his decision but instead started much earlier, when the

alleged breach of the plea agreement occurred.

DISCUSSION

“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The limitations period applies to Lara's petition because he is in custody pursuant to a state

court judgment, even though he challenges an administrative decision rather than his

conviction. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2004); White v.

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). There are four alternative starting dates

under section 2244(d)(1), and the one that is applicable here is the “date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The factual predicate for Lara's breach of plea agreement claim was the state's failure

to release him on parole upon the completion of 15 years in custody as allegedly required by

the plea agreement. He was sentenced in 1980, and completed 15 years in prison in 1995. 

The factual predicate of the claim that he was not released after fifteen years was or could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in 1995. The breach of plea

agreement claim is untimely under the statute of limitations because it was not filed until

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2006, about eleven years after the factual predicate of the claim did or should have become

known to Lara. See Redd, 343 F.3d at 1083 (date of the factual predicate is determined "by

inquiring when [the petitioner] could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through

the exercise of due diligence."

Lara's assumption that the one-year limitations period did not start until the Governor

issued his adverse decision in June 2005 is incorrect. That would be the starting date for an

insufficient evidence claim but not for the breach of plea agreement claim. Under his

reasoning, a statute of limitations would never bar a breach of contract kind of claim because

one could simply demand further performance on a long-breached contract that the other

party had clearly shown he was not going to perform and then file suit on it. But that is not

the law. The limitations period clock started ticking when the breach first occurred, and here

that was when the allegedly agreed-upon date for release arrived in 1995 and Lara remained

in prison. 

Finally, Lara argues that the state has suffered no prejudice as a result of any delay in

the filing of the federal petition. This argument does not help him because a party need not

show prejudice to assert a statute of limitations defense. 

The breach of the plea agreement claim is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations

because the federal petition was not filed until more than ten years after the statute of

limitations deadline had passed. 

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 11.) The petition for writ

of habeas corpus is dismissed because it was not filed before the expiration of the limitations

period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The clerk will close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 16, 2010 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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