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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 19-2616

__________

JUNE RODGERS, individually and as administrator of

the Estate of Christian Phillip Nolan Rodgers,

Appellant

v.

GOVERNOR CHRISTOPHER JAMES CHRISTIE, in his individual and 

official capacity; CHRISTOPHER S. PORRINO, in his individual

and official capacity; LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. No. 1:17-cv-05556)

Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez, United States District Judge

__________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on March 5, 2020

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 6, 2020 )

__________

OPINION*

__________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.

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2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

June Rodgers’s son was tragically murdered, allegedly by a man who days before 

had been granted pretrial release by a New Jersey state court. She brought products liability 

claims against the foundation responsible for the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), a multifactor risk estimation model that forms part of the state’s pretrial release system.1

 The 

District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the PSA is not a “product” under 

the New Jersey Products Liability Act (NJPLA). We agree and therefore will affirm.

DISCUSSION2

The NJPLA imposes strict liability on manufacturers or sellers of certain defective 

“product[s].” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2. But the Act does not define that term. To fill 

the gap, the District Court looked to the Third Restatement of Torts, which defines “product” as “tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or consumption” or 

any “[o]ther item[]” whose “context of . . . distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to 

[that] of tangible personal property.” App. 6 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 19(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1998)). It had good reason to do so, as New Jersey 

courts often look to the Third Restatement in deciding issues related to the state’s products 

liability regime. See, e.g., Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 48 (N.J. 1999);

Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 975, 979 (N.J. 1998); Boyle v. Ford Motor Co., 

1 Rodgers also sued two New Jersey officials, who were later dismissed without 

prejudice, as well as the PSA’s “chief architect,” App. 29, who is not at issue in this appeal.

2 As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case, 

we need not reiterate the factual or procedural history. Because the Supreme Court of New 

Jersey has not answered the precise question we confront in this appeal, we must “predict 

how that court would decide the issue.” Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 

143, 145 (3d Cir. 1998).

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3

942 A.2d 850, 853–54, 860–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 960 A.2d 393 

(N.J. 2008); Mathews v. Univ. Loft Co., 903 A.2d 1120, 1126–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div.), cert. denied, 911 A.2d 69 (2006).

3

 And on appeal, both parties agree the Third Restatement’s definition is the appropriate one. We therefore assume that to give rise to an 

NJPLA action, the “product” at issue must fall within section 19 of the Third Restatement. 

The PSA does not fit within that definition for two reasons. First, as the District 

Court concluded, it is not distributed commercially. Rather, it was designed as an “objective, standardized, and . . . empirical” “risk assessment instrument” to be used by pretrial 

services programs like New Jersey’s. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-25(c)(1). Rodgers makes 

no effort to challenge this conclusion in her briefing and has thus forfeited the issue. In re 

Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2016). Second, the PSA is neither “tangible personal 

property” nor remotely “analogous to” it. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 

§ 19(a). As Rodgers’ complaint recognizes, it is an “algorithm” or “formula” using various 

factors to estimate a defendant’s risk of absconding or endangering the community. 

App. 30. As the District Court recognized, “information, guidance, ideas, and recommendations” are not “product[s]” under the Third Restatement, both as a definitional matter 

3 Some state court decisions note the NJPLA was “based, in part, upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” E.g., Mathews, 903 A.2d at 1127 (citing Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990)). But whether we look to the Second or Third 

Restatement makes little difference here. The Second, like the Third, imposed strict liability on sellers of defective “product[s].” 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (Am. 

Law Inst. 1965). And its commentary makes clear that the term refers to “chattels,” id.

§ 402A cmt. a, such as “an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, 

a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, [or] an insecticide,” id. § 402A cmt. d. 

See Chattel, Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“[a]n article of personal property; . . . [a] thing personal and movable”). If anything, therefore, the District Court’s reliance on the Third Restatement was more favorable to Rodgers, as the Third Restatement 

recognizes that at least some intangible items may qualify as products.

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and because extending strict liability to the distribution of ideas would raise serious First 

Amendment concerns. App. 7–8 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 19 cmt. d). Rodgers’s only response is that the PSA’s defects “undermine[]” New Jersey’s pretrial release 

system, making it “not reasonably fit, suitable or safe” for its intended use. Appellant’s 

Br. 18–19 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2). But the NJPLA applies only to defective 

products, not to anything that causes harm or fails to achieve its purpose.

Rather than engaging with the definition of “product,” Rodgers argues the District 

Court erred in another respect: by considering itself bound by our decision in Holland v. 

Rosen, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018), which rejected a federal constitutional challenge to 

New Jersey’s nonmonetary pretrial release system, id. at 278–79. Indeed, she calls that the 

“sole issue[]” before us. Appellant’s Br. 2. But the District Court properly cited Holland

twice, both times for general and uncontested propositions about “the PSA and how it 

works.” App. 8–9. And because Rodgers identifies no other reason why the District Court 

erred in concluding the PSA is not a “product” under the NJPLA, we agree with its decision 

to dismiss her complaint.4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the 

complaint.

4 Accordingly, we need not consider the District Court’s alternative holding that 

Rodgers’s complaint failed to plausibly plead proximate causation.

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