Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07006/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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.. 

( 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

F!::B 11991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk J.R. JONES, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JAMES SAFFEL, Warden; ROBERT H. HENRY, ) 

Attorney General, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-7006 

(D.C. No. 89-157-C) 

( E • D. Okla. ) 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,** District 

J~dge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. 

B. Sparr, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7006 Document: 010110098408 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 

S 2254 from his conviction for first degree murder in Oklahoma in 

1980. The district court denied the petition and petitioner 

appeals. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal and seeks a certificate of probable cause. 

Petitioner contends on appeal that he was denied due process 

because he was convicted upon insufficient evidence and he was 

arbitrarily denied a state-created right not to be convicted on 

the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 

law, 

Under Oklahoma 

[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an 

accomplice unless he be corroborated by such other 

evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not 

sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the 

offense or circumstances thereof. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, S 742 (1971). 

The test used to determine whether a witness is an 

accomplice is whether he could be indicted for the 

offense for which the accused is being tried. If the 

evidence is uncontroverted and it establishes that the 

witness is an accomplice, the trial judge must so rule 

as a matter of law and instruct the jury that his 

testimony requires corroboration. Likewise, if the 

undisputed evidence indicates that the connection of the 

witness with the crime was innocent and lacking in 

criminal intent, or that he merely had knowledge and 

therefore is not an accomplice, the trial judge must so 

rule. However, if the evidence is susceptible to 

alternative findings that the witness is or is not an 

accomplice, then the issue is a question of fact to be 

submitted to the jury under proper instruction. 

Nunley v. State, 601 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) 

(citation omitted). 

Petitioner's due process claim has two parts. First, he 

contends that three witnesses--Roy Lee Leeds, Gene Sexton, and 

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Appellate Case: 90-7006 Document: 010110098408 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 2 
Charlie Maines--were accomplices, whose testimony had to be 

corroborated. Petitioner asserts that the evidence in the record 

other than the testimony of those three witnesses was not 

sufficient to corroborate their testimony or support a conviction 

for first degree murder. Second, he contends that while the state 

trial court correctly instructed the jury that Messrs. Sexton and 

Maines were accomplices as a matter of law, the court erroneously 

submitted to the jury as an issue of fact the question whether Mr. 

Leeds was an accomplice. Petitioner argues that the jury should 

have been instructed that Mr. Leeds was an accomplice as a matter 

of law. 

Petitioner raised the same arguments in his direct appeal in 

state court. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 

petitioner's conviction, ruling: 

did not warrant an instruction 

"The evidence presented at trial 

that witness Leeds was an 

accomplice as a matter of law .... We find this question was 

- properly placed before the jury for determination and that witness 

Leeds' testimony was corroborative of the accomplices' testimony." 

Jones v. State, 654 P.2d 635, 637 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 

Petitioner argues that because Mr. 

charged with the crime of first degree 

victims, he was an accomplice as a matter of 

Leeds initially was 

murder of one of the 

law. The criminal 

information was dismissed for insufficient evidence shortly after 

it was filed, however, and its filing was not dispositive of the 

issue in any event. Cf. Williams v. State, 518 P.2d 322, 323-24 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1974)(issue of whether codefendant charged with 

same crime as defendant was accomplice should have been submitted 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7006 Document: 010110098408 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 3 
to jury). Petitioner also argues that since the jury in the trial 

of his codefendant Pete Kay acquitted Mr. Kay, it must have 

determined that Mr. Leeds was an accomplice, and respondent was 

estopped from relitigating the issue in petitioner's trial. We 

are not persuaded by this argument. 

Our review of the state court record reveals that the 

evidence concerning whether Mr. Leeds was an accomplice was 

reasonably susceptible to either interpretation. Therefore, the 

issue properly was submitted to the jury. See Nunley v. State, 

601 P.2d at 463; Tabor v. State, 582 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1978). 

The record contains more than sufficient evidence to support 

petitioner's conviction. Mr. Leeds' testimony corroborated that 

of Messrs. Sexton and Maines, who testified at length to 

petitioner's involvement in the murders. Furthermore, even if the 

jury found that Mr. Leeds was an accomplice whose testimony 

required corroboration, there was independent evidence from Mr. 

Scott elicited during the guilt phase of the trial that 

corroborated a portion of Mr. Sexton's testimony, which permitted 

the jury to infer that all of Mr. Sexton's testimony was 

truthful. See Frye v. State, 606 P.2d 599, 606 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1980)("If an accomplice's testimony is so corroborated as to a 

single material fact, the jury may infer that he speaks the truth 

as to all, and this Court will take the strongest view of the 

corroborating testimony that it warrants."). 

Petitioner also argues on appeal that he was denied due 

process in the district court because he did not receive a copy of 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-7006 Document: 010110098408 Date Filed: 02/01/1991 Page: 4 
' 

respondents' response. Respondents contend that they sent 

petitioner a copy. Since the response raised the same issues that 

were addressed in the subsequent findings and recononendations of 

the magistrate, to which petitioner responded, petitioner had an 

adequate opportunity to present his arguments to the court on 

those issues. 

In sum, petitioner was neither convicted upon insufficient 

evidence nor arbitrarily deprived of a state-created right. 

Petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal and his application for a certificate of probable cause are 

GRANTED and his claims are denied on the merits. The judgment of 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

notice are denied. 

Petitioner's motions to take judicial 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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