Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00548/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00548-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL JASSO,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT T. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 08-0548-JAH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Rafael Jasso (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state

prisoner proceeding with counsel, has filed a Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter “SAP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2254. Respondent Robert T. Hernandez (hereafter “Respondent“) filed an Answer to the SAP. Petitioner has filed a Traverse

to Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed the SAP, the

Answer, the Traverse and the documents lodged therewith, finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS

that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

 

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 1 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1/ All further references to code sections are to the California Penal

Code, unless otherwise noted.

08cv0548 2

 I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 26, 2003, an Information was filed charging Petitioner with making a criminal threat in violation of California

Penal Code §4221/ and attempted making of a criminal threat in

violation of §422 and §664. On March 16, 2004, a jury found

Petitioner guilty of attempted making of a criminal threat. The

trial court also found true that Petitioner had suffered two prior

strike convictions under the Three Strikes Law [§667(b)-(i),

1170.2.12], two prior serious felonies [§667(a)(1)], and one prison

prior [§667.5(b)]. The court sentenced Petitioner to 35 years to

life imprisonment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 80, 158-160,

Court of Appeal opinion at 12). The sentence was comprised of an

indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment and two fiveyear terms for prior felony convictions. (Court of Appeal Opinion at

12).

Plaintiff appealed his conviction and sentence to the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District. (Appellant’s

Opening Brief, attached to the SAP). The Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment and sentence in an unpublished decision. (Opinion of

Court of Appeal, attached to the SAP, hereafter “Court of Appeal

Opinion”).

On March 24, 2008, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On June 2, 2008, Petitioner,

still proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 2 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 3

On August 26, 2008, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel due to his allegations that he was mentally

incompetent to proceed pro se.

On November 26, 2008, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court

for purposes of exhausting Petitioner’s state court remedies. The

California Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment or

citation.

On August 20, 2009, the Court found that Petitioner’s

original Petition, filed on March 24, 2008, was barred by the

statute of limitations, but that Petitioner was entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to his mental

illnesses.

On January 5, 2009, Petitioner filed the SAP. Respondent has

filed an Answer to the SAP. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to the

SAP.

 II

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Statement of Facts is taken substantially from the

Court of Appeal Opinion, People v. Jasso, No. D044766 (Cal. Ct.

App., 4th Dist., Div. 1)(attached to the SAP). This Court relies on

these facts under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,

35-36 (1992)(holding that findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).

On June 6, 2003, at approximately 10:30 PM, licensed taxi cab

driver Jorge Santiago (hereafter “Santiago”) was at a taxi stand at

the San Ysidro border. While Santiago was discussing a taxi cab

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 3 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 4

ride with a customer, Petitioner interrupted the conversation to

tell the customer where the “raiteros” (unlicensed taxi cab drivers)

were. Santiago told Petitioner to go away. Petitioner persisted on

talking to the customer by stating, “The raiteros, we are over here.

We are cheaper. You should come over here.” The customer ignored

Petitioner. Petitioner continued to try to get the customer to come

with him. Santiago continued to tell Petitioner to leave.

Petitioner became angry. As Petitioner was moving away, he stated

that he was going to kill Santiago. The customer noticed Santiago’s

problem with Petitioner and left the area. Petitioner followed the

customer, but the customer left in another taxi cab.

Petitioner returned to Santiago. Petitioner was still angry.

Petitioner continued to threaten Santiago. Petitioner repeatedly

stated that he was going to kill Santiago, that he was going to

break the windows of Santiago’s taxi cab, and that he was going to

put Santiago in the trunk. Petitioner told Santiago that he

(Petitioner) had shot and stabbed people in the past. 

Juan Castro (hereafter “Castro”), another taxi cab driver who

was standing near Santiago, advised Santiago not to let Petitioner

near him and to call the police. When Castro told Santiago to call

the police, Petitioner stated that if Santiago called the police, he

would kill Santiago.

Santiago previously had heard that Petitioner had stabbed a

person and then disappeared. Santiago took Petitioner’s statements

seriously, and was afraid that at any moment, Petitioner would stab

him. Santiago felt that he could not move anywhere because

Petitioner would follow him wherever he went. Santiago leaned back

on a wall so he would not have to look behind him, and focused all

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 4 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 5

of his attention on Petitioner. Santiago felt that the situation

could not be controlled much longer, and that he was alert to see

what Petitioner would do. Since Petitioner kept returning to

threaten Santiago, Santiago felt that he had to call the police, and

did so twice on his cell phone.

After Santiago called the police the first time, Petitioner

returned and made threats to Santiago. Petitioner told Santiago

that he had “already talked to the Logan guys so they can put you in

the trunk.” About 15 to 20 minutes after Santiago’s first phone call

to the police, Santiago called the police again to tell the 911

operator that the police had not yet arrived and that Petitioner

continued to threaten him. Santiago told the 911 operator that he

could not see if Petitioner was carrying a weapon, but that

Petitioner had told Santiago that he had a “point” and he was going

to “poke him.” While Santiago was making the second 911 call,

Castro heard Petitioner state that if Santiago was calling the

police, he would kill Santiago.

When the police arrived, Petitioner hid in the bathroom of a

nearby fast food restaurant until he was brought out by the police.

While the police were interviewing Santiago and Castro, Petitioner

repeatedly stated that he was going to “hang” Santiago. (Court of

Appeal Opinion at 2-3).

III

 GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner raises 4 grounds for relief.

In Ground One, Petitioner contends that the improper

admission of prior “bad acts” evidence violated his due process

rights and deprived him of a fair trial.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 5 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 6

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted criminal

threats.

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that his 35-years-tolife sentence for attempted criminal threats constitutes a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on

cruel and unusual punishment.

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that he suffered

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because he was

“unable to help” them due to the psychotropic drugs he was taking.

Further, he contends that he suffered ineffective assistance of

trial counsel in that his trial counsel never told him that he was

facing a life sentence. Additionally, he contends that he suffered

ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel for failing to file

a petition in the California Supreme Court that would exhaust his

state court remedies.

 IV

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. The

current petition was filed on March 24, 2008 and is therefore

governed by the AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner

must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 6 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 7

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§ 2254(d)(1)and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 72-75 (2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where

it should not apply or unreasonably extends a legal principle from

our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 7 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 8

it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade, 538 U.S. at

76. 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77). 

 V

 GROUND ONE: Admission of Prior Bad Acts

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his rights to

due process and a fair trial by admitting evidence of his prior “bad

acts.” Respondent argues that the admission of Petitioner’s prior

“bad acts” did not violate his rights to due process and a fair

trial.

The prior “bad acts” evidence to which Petitioner refers is

Santiago’s trial testimony that he had heard that Petitioner had

stabbed someone before (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 103), and the

tape recording of Santiago’s phone call to the police during which

Santiago stated that Petitioner “ha(d) a reputation of having

injured people with a knife.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 23,

25-31).

During motions in limine before trial, the prosecutor

informed the Court that she would introduce prior “bad act” evidence

that Petitioner purportedly had stabbed another taxi cab driver in

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 8 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 9

1996. The court ruled that the evidence was relevant to prove the

criminal threat element and victim’s fear element of the charged

crime, Petitioner’s intent that his statements be taken as threats,

and that the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 18-25).

The elements of the crime of making criminal threats are:

(1)Defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will

result in death or great bodily injury; (2) Defendant made the

threat with the specific intent that the statement be taken as a

threat, even if without an intent to actually carry it out; (3) the

threat was, on its face and under the circumstances in which it was

made, so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to

convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an

immediate prospect of execution of the threat; (4) the threat

actually caused the person to be in sustained fear; and (5) the

person’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances. [Court of

Appeal Opinion at 8, citing People v. Toledo, 26 Cal. 4th 221,

228(2001)].

With regard to this claim, the Court of Appeal found the

following:

The prosecutor’s offer of proof indicated that the

prior and current offenses both involved (Petitioner’s) aggressive behavior towards a cab driver at

the border. The fact that (Petitioner) had actually

stabbed a cab driver on a previous occasion created

a strong inference that he intended his statements to

Santiago to be taken as a serious threat...

The offenses were similar enough to support an

inference of (Petitioner’s) intent that his statements be taken as threats. The same conclusion

applies to the issue of the victim’s sustained

fear...

(Court of Appeal Opinion at 5-6).

As a threshold matter, courts adjudicating petitions for writ

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 9 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 10

of habeas corpus do not ordinarily review questions about the

admissibility of evidence. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).

A federal court may not interfere with a state court evidentiary

ruling but may examine whether the evidence admitted was so

prejudicial that its admission violated due process and the right to

a fair trial. Fuller v. Roe 182 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1999). “A

federal court cannot disturb on due process grounds a state court’s

decision to admit prior bad acts evidence unless the admission of

the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357

(9th Cir. 1995).

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states in pertinent part:

Evidence of other crimes, or acts... may be admissible (to prove) motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident...

(emphasis added).

In McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381-1382 (9th Cir. 1992),

cert. denied 510 U.S. 1020 (1993), the Ninth Circuit addressed the

question of “whether the admitted evidence of Defendant’s other acts

was relevant to a fact of consequence, or was only evidence of

character to show propensity” to commit the charged crime. The

court determined that if the other act evidence “tended to make any

fact relevant and (the elements of the charged crime) more or less

probable, it was relevant and admissible. Smith v. Roe 232 F.Supp 2d

1073, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

Further, in Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

1991), the court acknowledged its previous holdings that admission

of prior “bad acts” only vitiates due process if there are no

permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 10 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2/ The Court recognizes that this evidence may have been inadmissible

hearsay. However, the evidence was not admitted for the truth of

the matters about which Santiago testified. See Fed. R. Evid.

801(c). The trial court did not give a limiting instruction that

this evidence could not be used to prove its truth. But, the

prosecutor did not argue to the jury that this evidence should be

considered for its truth or for any other impermissible purpose.

08cv0548 11

Here, it is clear that the Court of Appeal’s decision

regarding the admission of the “bad acts” evidence comported with

Petitioner’s rights to due process and a fair trial. The Court of

Appeal explicitly found that the “bad acts” evidence created the

strong permissible inferences that Petitioner intended his statements to be serious threats to Santiago and because of Santiago’s

previous knowledge about Petitioner, Santiago reasonably feared for

his safety. The intent that the statements be taken as a threat and

that the statements in fact caused the person to be in sustained

fear, are both elements of the crime of attempted criminal threats.

Therefore, the statements tended to make those elements of the

charged crime more probable, relevant and admissible. Further, the

“bad acts” evidence comported with the Federal Rules of Evidence and

federal law as decided by the Ninth Circuit.2/

As a result, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the

introduction of the “bad acts” evidence was so prejudicial that it

violated his rights to due process and to a fair trial. See Jammal,

926 F.2d at 919.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s

adjudication of Petitioner’s claim in this regard was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 11 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 12

Petitioner’s claim in this regard be DENIED.

 VI

 GROUND TWO: Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to

establish all of the elements of attempted criminal threats.

Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his statements to Santiago

were not immediate and specific enough to convey a gravity of

purpose and an immediate prospect of execution. Respondent argues

that there was sufficient evidence to establish all of the elements

of attempted criminal threats. 

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of

the evidence claims in the criminal context is set forth in Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Court held

that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and

an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier

of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making this determination, habeas

courts must respect the province of the jury to determine the

credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw

reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury

resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Id.

at 319. Once a state court fact finder has found a defendant

guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the evidence “in the

light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Federal habeas

courts must also analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to

the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law.” Id. at 324 n.16 (emphasis added).

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 12 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 13

The Ninth Circuit has stated that: “After AEDPA, we apply the

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.” Juan

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005). In Allen, the

Ninth Circuit first reviewed the standard of review applied by the

state appellate court to a sufficiency of evidence claim, and found

that although the state court did not cite to the relevant federal

case law, “such a citation is not required ‘so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts’

Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1274 n. 12, quoting Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

In this case, the California Court of Appeal applied a

standard similar to Jackson and similar to that applied by the state

court in Allen (Court of Appeal Opinion at 9-11), and this Court

must similarly determine whether the state appellate court opinion

here “reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson . . . to the

facts of this case.” Allen, 408 F.3d at 1275.

Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

prosecution,” as this Court must, it is clear that sufficient

evidence was adduced at trial to support the gravity and immediacy

requirements of attempted criminal threats under California law. 

Plaintiff contends that there was insufficient evidence on

the third element of the charged crime: “the threat was, on its face

and under the circumstances in which it was made, so unequivocal,

unconditional immediate, and specific as to convey to the person

threatened, a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution

of the threat.” To support this argument, Petitioner cites the

testimony of Castro: Petitioner stated that if Santiago were to call

the police, he would kill Santiago (Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 2 at

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 13 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 14

50); when Petitioner approached Santiago, Santiago moved back and

away from Petitioner (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 53); Petitioner

left the area when Santiago called the police (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 2 at 53); Petitioner did not return for five to ten minutes

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 53-54); when Petitioner returned,

Santiago was on the phone with the police, and Petitioner did not

attempt to harm Santiago (Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 2 at 54-55);

shortly thereafter, the police arrived and Petitioner ran to

McDonald’s where he hid from the police (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

2 at 55); and it was not until the police had taken Petitioner into

custody that Petitioner stated that he would “hang” Santiago

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 55).

Petitioner concludes that the evidence demonstrates that

Santiago did not believe Petitioner’s threats to be grave and

immediate. If he did, Santiago would have tried to get help or get

away from Petitioner when Petitioner left the area, and immediately

would have called the police. Moreover, Petitioner’s failure to act

on any of his threats when Santiago was on the phone with the

police, indicate that the threats were not immediate.

The Court of Appeal stated the following with respect to this

claim:

The argument lacks merit both factually and legally.

The record contains evidence of both unconditional

and conditional threats to kill (Santiago). Santiago’s testimony described (Petitioner’s) repeated

statements that (Petitioner) was going to kill him,

without referring to a condition that the police be

called... Castro described threats conditioned on a

call to the police. Because our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us

to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

judgment, we presume the jury included Santiago’s

description of unconditional threats as among the

acts supporting a guilty verdict.

In any event, the law does not support (Petitioner’s)

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 14 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 15

assertion that the call-the-police condition removed

the threats from the ambit of section 422. Interpreting section 422's phrase ‘so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the

person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an

immediate prospect of execution of the threat,’ the

courts have concluded that the term ‘so’ indicates

‘that unequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy and

specificity are not absolutely mandated, but must be

sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding

circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and

immediate prospect of execution to the victim.’

Further, the ‘use of the word ‘unconditional’ was not

meant to prohibit prosecution of all threats whose

conditions precluded them from conveying a gravity of

purpose and imminent prospect of execution.’ ‘Language creating an apparent condition cannot save the

threatener from conviction when the condition is

illusory, given the reality of the circumstances

surrounding the threat. A seemingly conditional

threat contingent on an act highly likely to occur

may convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and

immediate prospect of execution.’

The jury could reasonably conclude that the threats

conditioned on a call to the police conveyed the

requisite gravity and immediate prospect of execution. Summoning the police is the expected response

to threatening behavior; thus, the condition was

illusory. Further, the condition attached to the

threat was ultimately satisfied because Santiago did

call the police. Indeed, Castro testified that as

Santiago was speaking with the 911 operator during

his second phone call, (Petitioner) stated “If you

are calling the police, I’m going to kill you.”

The concept of an immediate prospect of execution

does not require that the threat convey that it will

be carried out instantly. Rather, the element is

established if the circumstances show that the threat

communicates to the victim that it truly will be

carried out at some point.

The fact that Santiago did not take... various

protective measures... did not compel a finding that

the threats did not convey an immediate prospect of

execution. In rendering its verdict, the jury could

have considered the evidence that (Petitioner) was

visibly angry; (Petitioner) was repeatedly returning

to make the threats to Santiago; (Petitioner) told

Santiago that he had stabbed people before; and

Santiago was sufficiently alarmed that he focused all

his attention on (Petitioner), stood by a wall to

protect his back, and called 911 twice. These

circumstances support the jury’s finding that the

threats conveyed an immediate prospect that they

would be carried out.

(Court of Appeal Opinion at 9-11);(citations and

footnotes omitted); (emphasis added).

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 15 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 16

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. The record

presented to the Court is replete with evidence that Petitioner

aggressively, menacingly, and angrily approached Santiago over at

least a 20 minute period. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 48, 51,

73-75, 93-94, 104). Further, Petitioner unconditionally threatened

to kill Santiago on at least two separate occasions, (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2 at 93-95), and that Petitioner unconditionally

threatened to break Santiago’s taxi cab’s windows and put Santiago

in the trunk of his own taxi cab. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at

94-95, 102). Additionally, Petitioner told Santiago that he shot and

stabbed people. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 101). Santiago was

fearful of Petitioner and believed that Petitioner would carry out

his threats. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 102-104). Santiago

believed he could not move anywhere without Petitioner threatening

him, so he moved himself to a location where he would not have to

look behind his back to see if Petitioner was there. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2 at 102-103).

Moreover, with regard to Petitioner’s threats not being

specific enough “to convey a gravity of purpose,” Santiago called

the police on two separate occasions. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2

at 102, 104). Calling the police is a reasonable response to being

criminally threatened. It is clear that the jury reasonably

concluded that Petitioner’s threats “convey(ed) a gravity of

purpose” because there would have been no reason for Santiago to

have called the police, other than in response to Petitioner’s

threats.

Further, that Santiago did not take protective measures in

light of Petitioner’s threats does not mean that Petitioner’s

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 16 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 17

threats did not convey an “immediate prospect of execution.” As

previously noted, the record presented to the Court clearly shows

that Petitioner was visibly angry when he made the threats to

Santiago, Petitioner told Santiago that he (Petitioner) shot and

stabbed people and Santiago responded to the threats by focusing all

of his attention on Petitioner and stood in a location so as to not

have to look behind himself. It is clear that the jury reasonably

concluded that Petitioner’s threats conveyed an “immediate prospect

of execution.” Santiago’s responses to Petitioner’s threats,

positioning himself in a location of seeming safety and twice

calling the police, were reasonable responses to Petitioner’s

behavior and threats and show that Santiago believed that Petitioner

would immediately act on this threats.

Therefore, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable

to the judgment, it is entirely reasonable that the jury found

Petitioner guilty of the third element of attempted criminal

threats. The Court respects the province of the jury to resolve

evidentiary conflicts, which it clearly did, because all conflicts

in the evidence were resolved in a manner that supported its

verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record to

support a finding of the third element of attempted criminal threats

beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim in this regard be DENIED.

 VII

 GROUND THREE: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner claims that his sentence of 35 years to life

imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is grossly

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 17 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 18

disproportionate to the crime of which he was convicted. Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s sentence does not constitute cruel and

unusual punishment and is not grossly disproportionate to Petitioner’s crime.

The Eighth Amendment proscribes the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishment.” U.S. Const., Amendment VIII. In Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the United States Supreme Court

explained that while the constitutional principle of proportionality

between crime and sentence applies in noncapital sentences, “(t)he

Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality... Rather

it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime. Id., at 23 (citations omitted). The gross

disproportionality principle applies “only in the ‘exceedingly rare’

and ‘extreme’ case. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73

(2003)(citations omitted). 

In Ewing, the United States Supreme Court held that a

sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for felony grand theft was

not “grossly disproportionate” to the crime when the defendant had

previously been convicted of three residential burglaries and a

robbery. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 30-31.

In Andrade, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that

its precedents had “not been the model of clarity” and that it had

“not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow.”

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

The Ninth Circuit has given this Court some guidance as to

the kind of “exceedingly rare” Eighth Amendment claim that warrants

federal habeas relief. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000) [“(Ninth Circuit) cases may be persuasive authority

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 18 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 19

for purposes of determining whether a particular state court

decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and

also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’”]. In

two recent cases, the court overturned Three Strikes Law sentences

where either the triggering offense or the defendant’s prior

criminal history were not sufficiently serious. 

In Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004), the court

concluded that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for a

nonviolent shoplifting of a $199.00 VCR where the defendant’s prior

convictions were two nonviolent second degree robberies violated the

Eighth Amendment. Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 775. Ramirez’s prior

robberies did not involve weapons, and the “force” in both was

minimal. Id. at 768. Moreover, the one-year jail term Ramirez

received for the two robberies was also indicative of the less-thanserious nature of the offenses, and it “was the only period of

incarceration ever imposed upon Ramirez prior to his Three Strikes

sentence.” Id. at 769. Comparing Ramirez’s case to Rummel v.

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),

and Andrade, the court concluded that “this [was] the extremely rare

case that gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.”

Id. at 770, 775. After conducting intra- and interjurisdictional

comparisons of Ramirez’s sentence, the court found the state court’s

decision to uphold Ramirez’s sentence was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Id. at

770-73 ; see also Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2005)

(noting that Reyes’ sentence of 26 years to life imprisonment for a

“triggering felony” of perjury on a driver’s licence application

stated a “plausible case” for relief under Ramirez and remanding to

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 19 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 20

the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the gravity of

Reyes’s prior conviction for armed robbery).

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit struck down a sentence of

25 years to life imprisonment imposed on a defendant who had failed

to update his sex offender registration within five days of his

birthday. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2008). The

court first considered whether the sentence gave rise to an

inference of gross disproportionality by examining both the gravity

of the offense and the severity of the penalty. Id. at 883-87. 

With regard to the gravity of the offense, the court

concluded that California law had defined Gonzalez’s crime as simply

a “technical regulatory requirement that resulted in no social harm

and to which little or no moral culpability attaches.” Id. at 887.

It also considered Gonzalez’s prior criminal history, which was

extensive and serious, including possession of drugs, car theft,

attempted forcible rape, lewd conduct with a child under the age of

fourteen, robbery and spousal abuse. The Court found, however, that

there was no “rational relationship between Gonzalez’s failure to

update his sex offender registration annually and the probability

that he will recidivate as a violent criminal or sex offender." Id.

at 887. This lack of connection between Gonzalez’s past behavior

and his current conviction could not justify an increased sentence

for the "passive, harmless and technical violation of the registration law" of which Gonzalez was convicted. Id. at 885. Gonzalez’s

sentence was the "third most severe penalty available under

California law, exceeded in severity only by death and life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole." Id. at 886.

Accordingly, his sentence raised an inference of gross

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 20 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 21

disproportionality. Id. at 887. 

The Gonzalez court then conducted intra- and

interjurisdictional comparisons and found that the 28 year to life

imprisonment sentence imposed on Gonzalez was "substantially more

severe than penalties California imposes for far more serious

crimes,” including second degree murder (fifteen years to life),

voluntary manslaughter (three, six, or eleven years), and rape

(three, six, or eight years). Id. Moreover, the court found that

"[i]n at least ten jurisdictions, a first registration offense is a

misdemeanor[,]" and "Texas appears to be the only state besides

California that would mandate a sentence of 25 years or longer for

a third felony offense, including a violation of a sex offender

registration law." Id. at 888. Accordingly, Gonzalez’s sentence

violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 889.

However, the Ninth Circuit has upheld Three Strikes sentences

in cases where either the triggering offense or the defendant’s

prior record involve violence or the threat of violence. Thus, in

Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the court concluded

that a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for a conviction

for a felony petty theft did not violate the Eighth Amendment

because Rios “struggled with the loss prevention officer and tried

to avoid apprehension, . . . his prior robbery ‘strikes’ involved

the threat of violence because his cohort used a knife, [and]...

Rios [had] a lengthy criminal history, beginning in 1982, and he

ha[d] been incarcerated several times.” Id. at 1086. 

In Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2006) the Court

upheld a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for felony

possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernaCase 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 21 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 22

lia. Although the triggering offense was nonviolent, Taylor’s prior

convictions included second-degree burglary, robbery with a firearm,

and voluntary manslaughter with the use of a weapon. Id. at 1100.

Furthermore, “[his] history of recidivism, marked by violence and

the intentional taking of human life and spanning some 30 years, is

a great deal more severe than the criminal records considered in

Rummel and Andrade and probably even more severe than in Ewing.”

Id. at 1101.

Similarly, in Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432 (9th Cir.

2007), the Ninth Circuit upheld a sentence of 25 years to life

imprisonment for a felony petty theft charge where the defendant’s

prior record was lengthy and violent. His prior record included two

rape convictions and various convictions for burglary, robbery and

thefts and began in 1945 when Nunes was twenty years old. Id. at

436-37, 439. 

Petitioner’s case is readily distinguished from Ramirez and

Gonzalez, and is much closer factually to Rios, Taylor and Nunes.

Petitioner has a lengthy criminal record and has had frequent

contact with the criminal justice system since he was first arrested

in 1978 and 1979 for two vehicular offenses, one of which was a

felony. For these offenses, Petitioner was given probation. 

In 1980, Petitioner was convicted in the same case of three

felonies: lewd act on a child, attempting to induce false testimony,

and burglary. For these offenses, he was given probation. 

In 1983, Petitioner was convicted with assault with a

firearm. He was sentenced to four years in prison. This was his

first strike prior.

In 1992, he was convicted of burglary for which he was

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 22 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 23

sentenced to two years in prison after violating his probation.

In 1995, he pled guilty to misdemeanor drunk driving.

In 1996, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon

with personal infliction of great bodily injury. This conviction

was the result of the prior stabbing at the border. He was

sentenced to seven years imprisonment. This was his second strike

prior.

In 2003, he committed, and in 2004, was convicted of,

attempted criminal threats, the offense that is the subject of the

instant Petition.

Petitioner’s long history of recidivism, which includes

violence or the threat of violence, coupled with the fact that

attempted criminal threats is not a “technical” violation of the

law, compel this Court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s case is not

the "extremely rare" case which gives rise to an inference of

disproportionality. Therefore, the Court need not engage in an

intra- and interjurisdictional comparison of Petitioner’s sentence

as the “threshold question” of an “inference of gross

disproportionality” has not been met. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

U.S. 957, 1005 (1991), Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 770; see also Nunes, 485

F.3d at 439; Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1101; Rios, 390 F.3d at 1086.

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s claim in tis regard be DENIED.

 

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 23 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 24

 VIII

 GROUND FOUR: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Failure To Raise Competence

Petitioner claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial and on appeal because his trial and appellate

counsel failed to raise the issue of his incompetence to stand trial

and to assist in his defense. Respondent asserts that Petitioner

was competent to stand trial and to assist in his defense, and there

is no evidence in the record to establish that he was not competent

to stand trial and to assist in his defense.

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme

Court which this Court allowed him to file in order to exhaust his

state court remedies. The California Supreme Court denied this claim

on the merits without comment or citation. Where, as here, the

denial of the claim on the merits is without comment or citation, a

federal court independently reviews the record to determine whether

the silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable. 

Himes v. Thompson 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d

1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long been

clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States.”). Under Strickland, Petitioner must show both

incompetence of counsel and prejudice in order to justify issuance

of the writ. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. However, the Court need

not address both prongs if the defendant fails to make a sufficient

showing of either one. Id. at 697.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 24 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 25

A petitioner can establish ineffective assistance of counsel

by showing counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 688. However, judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance should be highly deferential. Id. at 689.

There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87.

Furthermore, where the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise viable issues, a

petitioner’s burden is even higher. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,

288 (2000). In such cases it is more difficult for a petitioner to

establish that appellate counsel was incompetent because “only when

ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the

presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Id.,

citing Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986).

A petitioner can establish prejudice by showing that “there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also

Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). With respect to

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this means

that a petitioner must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on

appeal absent counsel’s errors. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285 (2000),

citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986).

In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966), the United

States Supreme Court held that a state must follow adequate

procedures to protect against the conviction of a criminal defendant

who is incompetent to stand trial. “To be competent to stand trial,

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 25 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3/ Seroquel is a medication used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar

disorder. (www.drugs.com).

08cv0548 26

a defendant must demonstrate an ability ‘to consult with his lawyer

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and a ‘rational

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”

McMurtrey v. Ryan 539 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)(citations omitted). When

the “evidence raises a bona fide doubt” about the defendant’s

competence to stand trial, a trial judge must sua sponte conduct an

evidentiary hearing. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (emphasis in original).

Due process requires a state court to hold a hearing where

substantial evidence before the court “indicate(s) the need for

further inquiry” into the defendant’s competency. Since there are

no “fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for

further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed, the question is a

difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle

nuances are implicated.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180

(1975). “Although no particular facts signal a defendant’s incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant’s demeanor before

the trial judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available

medical evaluations of the defendant’s competence to stand trial.”

McMurtrey, 539 F.3d at 1118-1119, quoting Williams v. Woodford, 384

F.3d 567, 604 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel had reason

to question his competence to stand trial and to assist in his

defense. Petitioner states that prior to and during his trial, he

was taking numerous psychotropic medications including Seroquel,3/

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 26 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4/ Sinequan is a medication used to treat depression and anxiety.

(www.drugs.com).

5/ Prozac is a medication used to treat depression and anxiety.

(www.drugs.com).

6/

 Compazine is a medication used to treat schizophrenia.

(www.drugs.com).

7/ Lorazepam is a medication used to treat depression and anxiety.

(www.drugs.com).

8/ Risperdal is a medication used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar

disorder. (www.drugs.com).

08cv0548 27

Sinequan,4/ Prozac,5/ Compazine,6/ Lorazapam,7/ and Risperdal.8/

(Petitioner’s Lodgment SD at 2030-2035). Further, Petitioner

contends that prior to and during trial, he complained of hearing

voices and was on suicide precaution status. (Petitioner’s Lodgment

SD at 47, 1479-1480, 1482-1483, 1489, 1510-1511, 1521, 1539, 1546).

Further, he was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, depressive type, and possible bipolar disorder. (Petitioner’s Lodgment RJ

at 441, 581). In addition, at Petitioner’s Preliminary Hearing, he

requested to see medical personnel at the prison for a “psychiatric

problem.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Transcript of Preliminary

Hearing at 22).

However, the only evidence before the court that Petitioner

was suffering from a mental illness was presented in the May 11,

2004 Probation Officer’s Report. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

127-137). In the Probation Officer’s Report, the Probation Officer

noted, “(t)he defendant has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and

schizophrenia. He has been taking medications prescribed by the

clinic for those disorders...” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 133).

Notably, the Probation Officer stated that there were no possible

circumstances in mitigation that should be considered in sentencing.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 133). The Court also notes that

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 27 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 28

Petitioner’s counsel’s June 3, 2004 Sentencing Statement does not

mention Petitioner’s mental illnesses nor the medication Petitioner

had been prescribed. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 139-146).

Further, at Petitioner’s June 14, 2004 sentencing hearing, the court

noted that it had read the Probation Officer’s Report (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 5 at 701), and Petitioner’s counsel’s Sentencing Statement (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 5 at 702), and

acknowledged that Petitioner had been diagnosed with bipolar

disorder and schizophrenia. However, the court noted that “(Petitioner) continues his use of alcohol and is a danger to society,

which is the bottom line for the court.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

2, Vol. 5 at 703). Significantly, the court did not address

Petitioner’s mental illnesses, presumably because Petitioner had not

acted inappropriately at any time during the court proceedings.

Moreover, the record presented to the Court is silent that Petitioner’s counsel and the trial court knew the medications Petitioner

was taking to control his mental illnesses. Therefore, the Court

cannot conclude that there was substantial evidence before the trial

court, or that Petitioner’s counsel had any reason to know, that

Petitioner was not able to consult with his counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual

understanding of the proceedings against him. Therefore, there was

no “bona fide doubt” about Petitioner’s competence to stand trial

and to assist his attorney with his defense. In fact, the contrary

appears to be true.

First, there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner’s

counsel or the court, knew before, during and after trial that

Petitioner was taking the above-noted medications. Further, there

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 28 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 29

is no evidence in the record to establish that Petitioner’s demeanor

or behavior while in court or otherwise, raised even a doubt, much

less a “bona fide doubt,” that Petitioner was not competent to stand

trial or to assist in his defense. 

On March 8, 2004, the date Petitioner’s trial began,

Petitioner personally made a motion to replace his counsel. The

motion was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 178). Petitioner’s ability to make the motion to replace his counsel demonstrated his ability to consult with his counsel with a rational

degree of understanding. In making the motion, Petitioner exhibited

the ability to formulate his opinion that he disagreed with the

advice his counsel had given him, or with what his counsel was doing

or not doing to present his defense.

Second, on March 22, 2004, at the trial on Petitioner’s prior

convictions, Petitioner exhibited the ability to insist, against his

counsel’s advice, to submit a neatly written letter to the court

that acknowledged that he was facing a sentence of life imprisonment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 606). The letter states in

pertinent part:

I understand that for some reason, I am facing 25

years to life for my case... I simply cannot bear the

thought of spending the rest of my life isolated from

my family, which I love so dearly - especially after

finally beginning to make the kind of changes in my

life I need to make to stay out of trouble and be

there for my family.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 126)

Petitioner’s writing of the letter and insistence on

submitting the letter to the court demonstrates that he had a

rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.

His writing of the letter and insistence upon its submission to the

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 29 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9/ Petitioner was arrested on June 6, 2003. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

1 at 1).

Petitioner’s Preliminary Examination was held on June 25, 2003.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing).

Petitioner’s trial was held from March 8, 2004 to March 16, 2004.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Vols. 1-4).

The trial on Petitioner’s prior convictions was held on March 22,

2004. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 4).

Petitioner’s sentencing hearing was held on June 14, 2004.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 5).

08cv0548 30

court certainly did not raise a “bona fide doubt” about Petitioner’s

competence to stand trial or assist in his defense.

Third, the medical and psychiatric records submitted by

Petitioner in connection with his Motion for Equitable Tolling

confirm that Petitioner had the competency to stand trial and to

assist with his defense. The medical and psychiatric records dated

from prior to Petitioner’s trial through Petitioner’ sentencing9/

indicate that mental health professionals at the prison where

Petitioner was housed found Petitioner to be “alert” and “oriented.”

Petitioner was prescribed and took medications to address his mental

illnesses as well as his physical problems. Petitioner was aware

and sought help for his medical and mental illnesses when the need

arose. Petitioner was aware of and discussed his court proceedings

with medical and mental health personnel. Petitioner generally

interacted appropriately with prison staff and other inmates.

(Petitioner’s Lodgment SD at 23-24, 31, 47, 61, 353, 1473-1491,

1494-1495, 1510 - 1511, 1513-1515, 1521-1522, 1525-1526, 1530-1531,

1534-1535, 1540, 1546, 1553, 1558, 1560-1567, 2203-2204).

On March 8, 2004, the date Petitioner’s trial began,

Petitioner’s treating physician and mental health professionals at

the prison stated, “(Petitioner) has not displayed any overt (signs)

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 30 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 31

of thought disorder lately... He has been medically stable here and

is being monitored on an ongoing basis.” Petitioner’s mental health

professionals also noted that they were aware that Petitioner was

scheduled to be in court, that Petitioner may be stressed by the

legal proceedings, and that Petitioner is “likely to face serious

prison time.” (Petitioner’s Lodgment SD at 1510). That same day,

Petitioner was observed as he left the prison to go to court, to be

“alert, coherent and ambulatory.” (Petitioner’s Lodgment SD at

1553).

After Petitioner was found guilty of attempted criminal

threats, on March 17, 2004, Petitioner’s mental health professionals

reported that Petitioner was “alert and oriented,” “speech (was)

clear and coherent with good eye contact,” that Petitioner reported

“he was at court for a week and a half and claimed they found him

guilty and (that he) planned to appeal for another trial.” The

report also noted that “earlier that day, (Petitioner) heard voices

telling him to hurt himself so right away (he stood) up and went to

(the) patio and talk to people,” and that at the time of the report,

Petitioner “no longer heard voices and felt better.” (Petitioner’s

Lodgment SD at 1561). Another report from the same day indicated

that Petitioner was aware he had additional court appearances, he

thought his legal rights were being violated and that he wanted a

new set of jurors and a different attorney. Also, Petitioner joined

a group activity with good participation, and socialized with select

peers. (Petitioner’s Lodgment SD at 1563).

Petitioner’s mental health professionals’ observations and

reports about Petitioner from prior to trial to after Petitioner’s

sentencing do not show that Petitioner’s mental illnesses or the

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 31 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 32

medications he was taking for his mental illnesses, in any way

compromised his ability to assist his counsel with a rational degree

of understanding. Nor do those observations and reports reflect

that Petitioner did not have a rational and factual understanding of

the proceedings against him. Therefore, even if Petitioner’s

counsel and the court were aware of Petitioner’s mental health

records generated prior to, during, and after Petitioner’s trial,

there was no doubt, much less a “bona fide doubt,” about Petitioner’s competence to stand trial and to assist in his defense.

Consequently, the Court can not find that Petitioner’s trial

and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise

Petitioner’s competence to stand trial and assist in his defense.

Petitioner has failed to show that his trial and appellate counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The

record is silent that Petitioner’s counsel knew or should have known

that Petitioner suffered from mental illnesses. If she did not know

that Petitioner suffered from illnesses, she could not present that

fact to the trial court. Further, the record is silent that

Petitioner’s counsel, and the court, knew exactly what medications

Petitioner was taking to control his mental illnesses or how these

medications may have affected his ability to stand trial and to

assist in his defense. Further, not only did Petitioner’s counsel

not present anything to the Court to suggest that Petitioner was

taking psychotropic medications, but the evidence available to

Petitioner’s counsel and the court prior, during, and after

Petitioner’s trial shows that Petitioner displayed behavior

consistent with being competent to stand trial and to assist in his

defense. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show that, even if his

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 32 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 33

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness (which the court has found not to be the case), he

was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in

this regard be DENIED.

2. Failure to Inform Petitioner of Potential Life

Sentence

Petitioner contends that his counsel did not advise him that

he was facing a potential sentence of life imprisonment. Respondent

argues that Petitioner was fully advised of his potential sentence.

Similar to Petitioner’s claim that he suffered ineffective

assistance of counsel for his counsel’s failure to raise his

competence, (see Section VIII.1. of this Report and Recommendation),

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court denied the claim on the merits without

comment or citation. Therefore, a federal court independently

reviews the record to determine of the state court decision is

objectively reasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Here, Petitioner fails to point to anything in the record

which could lead this Court to conclude that his counsel did not

advise him of the potential life sentence he faced. In fact, the

record reflects that the contrary appears to be true.

The Information filed against Petitioner stated that

Petitioner was subject to California’s Three Strikes Law. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. at 1-3). It is reasonable to infer that

Petitioner’s counsel discussed the Information with Petitioner. 

During Petitioner’s trial, when the court was discussing an

ill juror, the court stated:

This trial, although it’s a single count, is important

to (Petitioner). Because of his prior record, he’s got

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 33 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 34

a lot of time resting on this jury’s verdict. The

jury has been out considering his case for a day and

a half on a single count, and I don’t want to jeopardize the work that this jury has done.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 502). 

Petitioner did not make any statements to the court in response to

the court’s comments regarding his sentence when it would have been

appropriate to do so. Therefore, the court infers that had Petitioner not known of his potential sentence, he would have sought

clarification of the courts comments. He did not do so.

Petitioner’s letter to the court, noted in Section VIII.1. of

this Report and Recommendation, (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

126), affirms that Petitioner was aware he was facing a potential

sentence of life imprisonment. Notably, the letter does not inform

the court that Petitioner’s counsel did not advise Petitioner that

he was facing such a sentence. If Petitioner insisted on presenting

the letter to the court as he did, it is reasonable to infer that he

would have mentioned in the letter that his counsel did not advise

him of his potential sentence.

Consequently, the Court is left with nothing, other than

Petitioner’s self-serving statements, that his counsel did not

advise him of his potential sentence of life imprisonment. Without

more, the Court can not conclude that Petitioner’s counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he

was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged failure to advise him of his

potential sentence. Petitioner does not state that had he known his

potential sentence, he would not have proceeded to trial or that he

would have accepted another disposition of his case.

As a result, the Court can not find that the California

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 34 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 35

Supreme Court’s decision on this claim was unreasonable, nor that

Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective for his alleged failure to

advise Petitioner of his potential sentence. Further, Petitioner

fails to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged failure. The

Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this regard be DENIED.

3. Failure to File Petition to Exhaust State Court

Remedies

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for his failure to exhaust his state court remedies. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is moot.

Petitioner does not have the right to be represented by

counsel to file a petition to the state’s highest court in order to

exhaust his state court remedies. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,

610-615 (1974). Therefore, Petitioner can not support his claim

that his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.

Moreover, on August 20, 2009, this Court found that on

November 26, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Supreme Court for the purposes of exhausting his state court remedies. On May 20, 2009, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition. Therefore, the Court concluded

that all of Petitioner’s claims were exhausted. (Order filed August

20, 2009, Doc. # 29 at 9-10). Therefore, Petitioner can not support

his claim that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his

appellate counsel’s alleged failure.

As a result, the Court can not find that the California

Supreme Court’s decision on this claim was unreasonable, nor that

Petitioner’s appellate counsel was ineffective for his alleged

failure to file a petition to exhaust Petitioner’s state court

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 35 of 36
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv0548 36

remedies. Further, Petitioner fails to show that he was prejudiced

by the alleged failure. The Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

claim in this regard be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 28, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

June 18, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 27, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00548-JAH-WVG Document 37 Filed 04/27/10 Page 36 of 36