Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01546/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01546-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 06CV1546-WQH(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHAN SPENCER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06CV1546 WQH (NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION AND

DISMISSING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS

MOOT

vs.

R. WONG, Warden,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Nita L.

Stormes, filed on July 12, 2007, recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. # 34) Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1).

BACKGROUND

On November 29, 2005, the State of California revoked Petitioner’s parole and remanded

Petitioner to the custody of the California Department of Corrections for a term of ten months. 

(Doc. # 1 at 1-2; Doc. # 34 at Ex. 1, p. 3). On July 31, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his

parole revocation hearing on multiple grounds.

On July 17, 2007, Magistrate Judge Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. #

44), recommending that the District Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition. 

(Doc. # 44 at 4). The Report and Recommendation concluded that the Court could no longer

Case 3:06-cv-01546-WQH-NLS Document 47 Filed 09/18/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 06CV1546-WQH(NLS)

provide habeas relief because Petitioner was paroled on August 28, 2006, and had thus completed

the entire term of incarceration imposed for the challenged parole revocation. (Doc. # 44 at 3). 

The Report and Recommendation further concluded that Petitioner failed to allege legally

cognizable “collateral consequences” which would entitle Petitioner to an exception to the

mootness doctrine. (Doc. #44 at 3.) 

On August 9, 2007, Petitioner filed Objections (Doc. # 46) to the Report and

Recommendation, contending that the Magistrate Judge improperly relied on Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1 (1998), in recommending dismissal of Petitioner’s Petition. (Doc. # 46 at 1-2). 

Petitioner notes that the parolee in Spencer had completed his entire term of imprisonment,

including the parole period, at the time that the Supreme Court found the parolee’s petition moot. 

Petitioner concludes that because he has not yet completed his entire term of imprisonment for the

underlying offense, his Petition is not moot. Petitioner contends that he is suffering “collateral

consequences” sufficient to overcome the Magistrate Judge’s mootness determination because he

is restricted from contacting certain family members and is currently taking medications for

depression. Finally, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the “capable of repetition, yet

evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with the Report and Recommendation of a

Magistrate Judge are set forth in FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The District Judge

“must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is

made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s Habeas Petition challenges Petitioner’s November 2005 parole revocation

hearing which resulted in Petitioner’s ten-month incarceration for a parole violation. Respondent

moved to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that Petitioner was paroled on August 28, 2006, and

had therefore completed the term of incarceration imposed for the challenged parole revocation. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s August 28, 2006, release on parole rendered Petitioner’s

Case 3:06-cv-01546-WQH-NLS Document 47 Filed 09/18/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 06CV1546-WQH(NLS)

Habeas Petition moot because the Petition only challenged the November 2005 parole revocation

hearing and the resulting ten-month detention for the parole violation.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss required the Magistrate Judge to determine whether the

issues raised by the instant Habeas Petition present an actual “case or controversy.” Spencer, 523

U.S. at 7 (1998). For an actual “case or controversy” to exist, the Petitioner “must have suffered,

or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477

(1990)). In answering this question, the Magistrate Judge relied in part on Spencer v. Kemna, a

case in which the Supreme Court held that, in order for a petitioner to challenge a parole

revocation hearing after release from serving the parole revocation term, a petitioner must show

that (1) he was incarcerated by reason of the parole revocation at the time that the petition was

filed, and (2) he continues to experience some “collateral consequence” from the wrongful parole

revocation. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-8. Unlike cases involving claims of wrongful criminal

conviction, the Spencer Court refused to apply a presumption of collateral consequences in cases

where a petitioner challenges parole revocation. Rather, the Court held that a petitioner must

demonstrate that actual collateral consequences resulting from the unlawful parole revocation

continue to exist after the petitioner has been released from custody. Id. at 14.

Petitioner contends that his Petition is not moot because he was only paroled, and not freed

from his total term of imprisonment, on August 28, 2006. Petitioner contends that this fact renders

Spencer inapplicable. However, after reviewing Spencer, the Court concludes the Magistrate

Judge correctly found that Spencer does apply. Indeed, Spencer involved a factual scenario almost

identical to the one at bar, and Spencer cannot be distinguished on the grounds that the parolee in

Spencer had served his entire term of imprisonment for the underlying offense. In addition,

though Petitioner claims that a “strained” relationship with his family and an inability to contact

particular family members constitute collateral consequences, the Magistrate Judge correctly

concluded that these consequences of imprisonment do not qualify as legally cognizable collateral

consequences that defeat a mootness determination. Doc. # 44 at 3; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16.

Petitioner also contends that his case falls within the “capable of repetition, yet evading

Case 3:06-cv-01546-WQH-NLS Document 47 Filed 09/18/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 06CV1546-WQH(NLS)

review” exception to the mootness doctrine. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held

that this exception is applied in only “exceptional situations.” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

109 (1983); Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17. To invoke the exception, Petitioner must show that (1) the

challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,

and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that he will be subject to the same action again. Spencer,

523 U.S. at 17; Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481 (1990); Fed. Election Comm’n

v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2007). Petitioner has not demonstrated that the time

between parole revocation and release from custody is always so short as to evade review, and the

Court concludes that Spencer specifically rejected the exception in a factual scenario almost

identical to the one here. 

After reviewing de novo those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which

Petitioner objected, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge correctly applied the law to the

facts of this case, and correctly determined that Petitioner’s Petition should be dismissed as moot.

CONCLUSION 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 44) is

adopted in its entirety, (2) the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 34) is granted, and (3)

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1) is dismissed as moot. The Clerk of the

Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 18, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01546-WQH-NLS Document 47 Filed 09/18/07 Page 4 of 4