Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04206/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04206-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEISHA HAWKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant. ___________________________________

BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

JEAN MURRELL ADAMS, et al.,

Counter-Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-4206 EMC

ORDER GRANTING COUNTERDEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 22)

Plaintiff Keisha Hawkins has filed suit against the Berkeley Unified School District

(“District”), alleging that the District denied her minor child (the “Student”) a free and appropriate

public education (“FAPE”) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)

and seeking review of an ALJ decision, which was partially unfavorable to the Student. In its

response to the complaint, the District asserted a counterclaim against Jean Murrell Adams and her

law firm, Adams Esq. Adams Esq. represented Ms. Hawkins during the administrative proceedings

and represents Ms. Hawkins in the instant litigation. Ms. Adams and Adams Esq. (collectively,

“Counter-Defendants”) now move to dismiss the counterclaim asserted by the District. 

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Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral

argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed

below, the counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In her complaint, Ms. Hawkins alleges that the Student was born on December 26, 1993, and

is a child with a disability pursuant to the IDEA. See Compl. ¶ 4; see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)

(defining “child with a disability”). Under the IDEA, every child with a disability has a right to a

FAPE. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all children with

disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive . . . .”). To achieve this goal,

the IDEA relies on a cooperative process between parents and schools. See generally Schaffer ex rel.

Schaeffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). Central to this cooperative process is the individualized

education program (“IEP”).

An IEP is created for every disabled student and serves as a road map for the student’s

education. See id. at 53-54. “Each IEP must include an assessment of the child’s current

educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature

of the special services that the school will provide.” Id. at 53. IEPs must be reviewed at least once a

year. See id.

Parents play a significant role in the IEP process. As the Supreme Court has explained:

[Parents] must be informed about and consent to evaluations of their

child under the Act. [20 U.S.C] § 1414(c)(3). Parents are included as

members of “IEP teams.” § 1414(d)(1)(B). They have the right to

examine any records relating to their child, and to obtain an

“independent educational evaluation of the[ir] child.” § 1415(b)(1). 

They must be given written prior notice of any changes in an IEP, §

1415(b)(3), and be notified in writing of the procedural safeguards

available to them under the Act, § 1415(d)(1). If parents believe that

an IEP is not appropriate, they may seek an administrative “impartial

due process hearing.” § 1415(f).

Id. If the parents of a disabled student do not prevail at the administrative due process hearing, they

may seek, as Ms. Hawkins does here, review through a civil action in state or federal court. See 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

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In the instant case, Ms. Hawkins sought an administrative due process hearing on the basis

that the District had denied the Student a FAPE. The due process hearing was held before Judge

John A. Hawley (an ALJ) in April and May 2007. See Compl. ¶ 6; Rolen Decl., Ex. A

(administrative decision, dated May 18, 2007) [hereinafter “Decision”]. The specific issues before

Judge Hawley were as follows:

(1) Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE by failing to conduct annual IEP team

meetings due on September 29, 2006, to the present;

(2) Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE by moving him from a special day class to

general education without Ms. Hawkins’s consent;

(3) Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE by failing to provide placement and services

to meet his unique needs and reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit in

conformity with the IEP;

(4) Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE by failing to timely produce his educational

records to Ms. Hawkins; and 

(5) Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE by failing to provide Ms. Hawkins with

prior written notice regarding the Student’s change of placement, failing to hold the annual

IEP meeting, and failing to design an educational placement satisfactory under the IDEA. 

See Decision at 2.

Judge Thawley found that the District prevailed on Claims 2, 4, and 5 and that the Student

prevailed on portions of Claims 1 and 3. See Decision at 16. As to Claim 1, the ALJ found that the

District violated the Student’s right to a FAPE but only during the six-week delay between

September 29, 2006, and November 13, 2006, when no IEP meeting was conducted. See Decision at

14 (Legal Conclusion ¶ 12). The ALJ limited the period of the violations because he found that Ms.

Hawkins unreasonably refused to participate in the IEP meeting proposed by the District. See

Decision at 5 (Factual Finding ¶ 9). As to Claim 3, the ALJ found that the Student’s placement in

school was reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit and that the District violated

Student’s right to a FAPE only insofar as it failed to provide speech and language training for

approximately eleven weeks between August 31, 2006, and November 13, 2006. See Decision at

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14-15 (Legal Conclusions ¶¶ 14-15). Again, the time period of the delay was limited because the

ALJ found Ms. Hawkins’ refusal to participate in the IEP meeting was unreasonable. For purposes

of this opinion, it is notable that, although the Student did prevail on portions of Claims 1 and 3, the

District contends it had conceded the basis for these partial claims. See Decision at 16; see also

Decision at 3 (discussing two concessions).

On August 16, 2007, Ms. Hawkins filed a complaint in this Court, reiterating the allegations

that she made in the administrative due process hearing. In her complaint, Ms. Hawkins alleges that

the ALJ erred insofar as he found in favor of the District and requests that this Court reverse the

ALJ’s findings. See Compl. ¶ 32. Ms. Hawkins seeks (1) independent assessments for the Student,

(2) an IEP with appropriate notice to her, (3) compensatory education and services, and (4)

attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).

On September 17, 2007, the District responded to Ms. Hawkins’s complaint. As part of its

response, the District included a counterclaim for attorney’s fees against Ms. Adams and Adams

Esq., asserting that the District was the prevailing party on Claims 2, 4, 5 and on portions of Claims

1 and 3 and that Counter-Defendants had filed an administrative complaint that was frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation or presented an administrative complaint for an improper

purpose. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III) (providing that a court may, in its discretion,

award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who is a state or local educational agency

against the attorney of a parent “who files a complaint or subsequent cause of action that is

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” or “if the parent’s complaint or subsequent cause of

action was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to

needlessly increase the cost of litigation”). In support of its counterclaim, the District points to

portions of the ALJ decision, in which the ALJ indicated that Ms. Adams had (1) unreasonably

refused to cooperate with the District in scheduling the IEP and (2) improperly failed to review with

Ms. Hawkins the administrative complaint which contained demonstrably false allegations.

After the District filed its counterclaim for fees, Counter-Defendants moved the Court for

dismissal of the counterclaim with prejudice. This is the motion currently pending before the Court.

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II. DISCUSSION

In their motion, Counter-Defendants argue for dismissal on two grounds: (1) for improper

joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and (2) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). Alternatively, Counter-Defendants ask for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule

12(e).

A. Improper Joinder

Counter-Defendants first move to dismiss on the basis of improper joinder under Rule 13. 

Rule 13 permits the assertion of a counterclaim “against an opposing party.” Counter-Defendants

argue that under Rule 13, a defendant may assert a counterclaim only against an existing party in the

litigation who has already asserted a claim against the defendant. Because only Ms. Hawkins and

not Counter-Defendants was an original plaintiff in this litigation, Counter-Defendants maintain that

they cannot be joined in a counterclaim under Rule 13.

The Court agrees. “In order for a defending party to assert a compulsory counterclaim, the

claim must be raised against an existing party.” Moore’s Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 13.90[2][b] (3d ed.

2007); see also Rainbow Mgmt. Group Ltd. v. Atlantis Submarines Haw., L.P., 158 F.R.D. 656, 660

(D. Haw. 1994) (holding that co-parties become opposing parties within the meaning of Rule 13(a)

after one party pleads a crossclaim against the other). Counter-Defendants are not “opposing

parties” under Rule 13. 

To be sure, Rule 13(h) permits a party to join additional parties (who are not original to the

litigation) to a counterclaim or crossclaim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h) (“Rules 19 and 20 govern the

addition of a person as a party to a counterclaim or crossclaim.”). However, the courts have held

that Rule 13(h) requires that any such joinder of a new party be anchored to a counterclaim or crossclaim against an original party. A Rule 13(h) “counterclaim or cross-claim may not be directed

solely against persons who are not already parties to the original action but must involve at least one

existing party.” 6 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc., Civ. 2d § 1435, at 270-71 (1990). See, e.g.,

Brown v. Int’l Union, United Auto, etc., 85 F.R.D. 328, 333 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that any

attempt to add a new person as a cross-defendant under 13(h) is improper if he is the sole crossdefendant because “it is well established . . . that the cross-claim must include as a cross-defendant

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at least one existing co-party”); United States v. Techno Fund, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D. Ohio

1967) (denying defendant’s motion to join a nonparty and construing Rule 13(h) to “mean that an

additional party may not be brought in for purposes of a counterclaim where the counterclaim is

directed solely against the new party and asserts no rights against the original plaintiff”). Here the

District’s counterclaim names only Adams and Adams Esq. and does not join any of the named

Plaintiffs. Joinder is therefore improper under Rule 13(h).

The District cites Taylor P. v. Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education,

No. 06-4254-CV-C-NKL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59570 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 2007), in support of its

position, but its reliance on the case is misplaced. In Taylor P., the court permitted the defendant

school district to assert a counterclaim against the former attorneys of the student’s parents but only

because the counterclaim was brought against not only the attorneys but also the parents (original

plaintiffs), and therefore joinder was proper under Rule 13(h). See id. at *2, 8-9.

At the hearing, the District argued for the first time that the amendment of the IDEA in

December 2004 should be construed to override the joinder rules provided for by Rule 13. The

District noted that, prior to the amendment, attorney’s fees could only be sought by a prevailing

parent. With the amendment, fees can now be sought by the prevailing party, be it the plaintiff

parent or the defendant educational agency. The educational agency may seek fees against either the

parent or the parent’s attorney. According to the District, since the IDEA now allows a claim for

fees solely against the parent’s attorney -- i.e., it does not require a claim against both the parent and

the parent’s attorney -- then the District should not be required to assert both a claim against Ms.

Hawkins and her attorneys in order to have a proper joinder under Rule 13. 

While the District’s position has a logical appeal, it has cited no case law to support its

proposition. More important, the amendment to the IDEA is silent on the issue. The Court is

reluctant to imply an override of Rule 13 where Congress could have, but did not, include any

qualifying language about joinder procedures in the legislation, particularly since the requirements

of Rule 13(h) are longstanding. Finally, even though joinder of Counter-Defendants may not be

possible under Rule 13 in the instant case, the District is not necessarily without any relief. The

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District could initiate a separate suit against Ms. Adams and Adams Esq. for fees pursuant to the

IDEA and then seek to have that suit related or consolidated with the instant case.

The Court, therefore, grants Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss because they were not

properly joined to the case at bar pursuant to Rule 13. Although dismissal is warranted on this basis

alone, the Court still addresses the merits of Counter-Defendants’ contention that, as a matter of law,

the District has failed to state a claim for relief because, if so, this would entitle Counter-Defendants

to a dismissal with prejudice.

B. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). In

its analysis, a court must take “all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Parks Sch. of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9thCir. 1995). A court may dismiss a complaint “based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Counter-Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the District’s counterclaim fails to

state a claim for relief because, during the administrative proceedings, the Student prevailed on at

least some of the claims. In response, the District contends that it was the prevailing party on the

vast majority of claims and therefore is entitled to fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). The

basic question for the Court, therefore, is whether an educational agency in an IDEA case may be

awarded fees if it is only partially successful. 

1. Christiansburg Standard

In order to address this specific question, the Court must, as a preliminary matter, address a

dispute between the parties over the interpretation of the IDEA’s fee provision. Under the IDEA, a

court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing educational agency “against the attorney of a parent

who files a complaint or subsequent cause of action that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation, or against the attorney of a parent who continued to litigate after the litigation clearly

became frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). A court may

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also award fees to a prevailing educational agency “against the attorney of a parent, or against the

parent, if the parent’s complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any improper

purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of

litigation.” Id. 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).

As is clear from the language above, an educational agency is not automatically entitled to

fees simply because it prevails in an IDEA case; rather, something more must be shown -- e.g., that

the parent’s administrative complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. In this

respect, the IDEA fee provision is similar to fee provisions in civil rights cases. The Supreme Court

has held that, in civil rights cases, fees shift in favor of a prevailing defendant only where the

“plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” even where the fee-shifting

statute does not explicitly include that requirement. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

412, 421 (1978). In Christiansburg, the Court explained that this strict standard does not apply to

fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs because (1) “the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to

vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority’” and (2) “when a district court

awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law.” 

Id. at 418. These policy considerations are inapplicable in the case of a prevailing defendant. See

id. at 419. The Supreme Court further acknowledged the risk of discouraging civil rights suits by

cautioning district courts to “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by

concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been

unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most

airtight claims, for seldom can a plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. Id. at 421-22; see also

Mitchell v. Office of LA County Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1986)

(reversing defendant’s fee award and holding that courts should award defendants fees only in

exceptional circumstances; adding that, in this case, the “chilling effect upon civil rights plaintiffs

would be disproportionate to any protection defendants might receive”).

Notably, the legislative history for the IDEA indicates that its fee provision was in fact

intended to codify the Christiansburg standard. In the Congressional Record for the December 2004

amendment of the IDEA, Senator Kennedy took note of the “important issue of attorney’s fees” and

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referred to the “language of the conference report that provided the explanation for the attorney’s

fees language,” stating that “the conferees intend[ed] to codify the standards set forth in

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).” 150 Cong. Rec. S 11543; 150 Cong.

Rec. S 11654. Senator Kennedy specifically recited the Christiansburg standard, affirming that

“attorney’s fees may only be awarded to defendants in civil rights cases where the plaintiff’s claims

are frivolous, without foundation or brought in bad faith.” 150 Cong. Rec. S 11543; 150 Cong. Rec.

S 11654; see also 150 Cong. Rec. H 10006 (stating that “the Conferees intend to codify the

standards set forth in Christiansburg”). And the Second Circuit has explicitly held that, in an IDEA

case, “[w]ith respect to prevailing-defendant educational agencies, . . . Congress explicitly adopted

the standard applicable to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases established in Christiansburg . .

. .” Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 407 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006). The Court therefore applies the

Christiansburg standard to the counterclaim herein.

 2. Complete v. Partial Victory

As a preliminary matter, the Court must address an argument that the District raised for the

first time at the hearing on Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the District

contended that it actually obtained a complete victory at the administrative level, and not a partial

one, because even though the Student obtained partial relief for Claims 1 and 3 of the administrative

complaint, see Part I, supra, the District had conceded those partial claims, as the ALJ recognized in

his decision. This argument made by the District is related to another argument that was presented

in its opposition brief to the motion to dismiss, i.e., that the relief the Student obtained at the

administrative level was too insignificant to entitle Ms. Hawkins to prevailing parent status.

The Court does not find either argument persuasive. As to the latter contention, a plaintiff in

a civil rights case need not prevail on every issue in the action to achieve prevailing party”status for

attorney’s fees. See Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782

(1989) (holding that a plaintiff need not succeed on the entirety of her action in order to be a

prevailing party entitled to attorneys fees under § 1988). Rather, the “touchstone of the prevailing

party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 792-93;

see also Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 506 U.S. 103, 107, 111-12 (1992) (stating that a party prevails

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“when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the

parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff”). The key

is whether there is a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” 

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605

(2001). Here, the ALJ found that the Student partially prevailed on some of the claims and awarded

the Student twenty-two hours of compensatory speech and language theory, which constitutes actual

relief modifying the District’s behavior in a way that directly benefits him. 

As to the first argument -- i.e., that the District obtained a complete victory since it had

already conceded the claims on which the Student prevailed -- the record does not reflect when the

District made its concessions. The District has provided no evidence, e.g., that it conceded the

matters on which the Student prevailed prior to the filing of the administrative complaint. In fact, at

the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties did not dispute that the District’s initial response to

the administrative claim was to deny it and that the concessions were not made until after the

administrative hearing commenced. In short, it took the filing of the administrative complaint to

obtain any concession from the District. The Court therefore rejects the District’s characterization

of its victory as a complete, rather than partial, one.

3. Partial Success and Hensley

Counter-Defendants’ primary argument is that, as a matter of law, the District cannot recover

fees because the Student prevailed, at least in part, at the administrative hearing. However, CounterDefendants have not cited any case holding that, as a matter of law, a defendant is barred from

obtaining fees where a plaintiff is partially successful. Likewise, the District has similarly failed to

cite any authority demonstrating that a partially prevailing defendant may in fact be awarded fees

under the IDEA. In the absence of directly applicable case law and in light of the fact that the

attorney fee provision of the IDEA is modeled in part upon other civil rights fee statutes, see 150

Cong. Rec. S 11543; 150 Cong. Rec. S 11654; 150 Cong. Rec. H 10006, the Court finds guidance on

this question in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). In Hensley, the Supreme Court

indicated -- albeit in dicta -- that, even where a plaintiff is partially successful, a defendant may still

be able to recover fees on plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if such claims are

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 This Court has found no case in which a court has applied the dicta of footnote 10 of Hensley

and granted attorney’s fees to a defendant in a split victory case. Although there is some case law

supporting a claim-by-claim analysis in determining whether individual unsuccessful claims were

frivolous, all such cases are in the context of a complete defense victory. See, e.g., Tutor-Saliba Corp.

v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (summary judgement granted for defendant on

all claims and holding fees permissible on frivolous claims); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.

1993) (judgment entered for defendants based on special questions to jury but remanded to determined

which claims were frivolous and could support defense fees); and Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306,

1309 (11th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment granted for defendant on both plaintiff’s claims but remanded

to ensure fee award based only on frivolous claim); cf. Marquart v. Lodge 837, Intl Ass’n of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing the case law and policy of the

standards of prevailing party for plaintiffs and defendants under Title VII and declining to import the

broader plaintiff standard for defendant because as a matter of public policy a defendant should not

enjoy a plaintiff’s standard for achieving “prevailing party” status). 

11

unrelated to the successful claims and are frivolous.1 See id. at 435. The Court noted that, where a

plaintiff is only partially successful, unrelated unsuccessful claims may be treated as if they were

raised in separate lawsuits. See id. In this regard, “[i]f the unsuccessful claim is frivolous, the

defendant may recover attorneys fees incurred in responding to it.” See id. 435 n.10. Thus, in the

instant case, where Ms. Hawkins prevailed in part on Claims 1 and 3, the question is whether those

claims are related to claims on which she was unsuccessful -- i.e., Claims 2, 4, and 5.

4. Relatedness of Claims

In Hensley, the Supreme Court explained that, where a plaintiff obtains partial relief, a twopart analysis must be applied. “First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to

the claims on which he prevailed? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the

hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?” Id. at 434. If the claims

are unrelated, “the final fee award may not include the time expended on the unsuccessful claims.” 

Thorne v. El Segundo, 802 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986). If the claims are related, “the court

must apply the second part of the analysis, in which the court evaluates the ‘significance of the

overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). Hence, the issue of relatedness in cases

involving split or partial victories is an integral part of the analysis under Hensley.

The Court noted in Hensley that “there is no certain method of determining when claims are

‘related’ or ‘unrelated.’” Id. at 437 n.12. See also Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141 (“The test for

relatedness is not precise.”). Typically, the Court explained, related claims “will involve a common

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core of facts or will be based on related legal theories.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. In these cases, an

attorney’s time is “devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the

hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis,” and “[s]uch a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of

discrete claims.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit applied Hensley’s test of relatedness liberally, holding that claims are

“related if either the facts or the legal theories are the same.” Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1169

(9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit has also stated that, in assessing the issue

of relatedness, a court should consider “whether the relief sought on the unsuccessful claim ‘is

intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct that

gave rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised.’” Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141 (quoting

Mary Beth. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1279 (7th Cir. 1983)). Other factors informing the

issue of relatedness are “whether the unsuccessful claims were presented separately, whether

testimony on the successful and unsuccessful claims overlapped, and whether evidence concerning

one issue was material and relevant to other issues.” Id.

As noted above, of the five issues at the due process hearing, the ALJ found that Hawkins

prevailed on portions of Claims 1 and 3. Claim 1 asserted the District denied Student a FAPE by not

conducting annual IEP team meetings due on September 29, 2006. Claim 3 asserted the District

denied Student a FAPE by failing to provide placement and services to meet his unique needs and

reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit in conformity with the IEP. The

District’s claim for attorney’s fees can proceed only if Claim 2, 4, or 5 is unrelated to both Claims 1

and 3. In light of the policies articulated by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg -- e.g., the risk of

“chilling” plaintiffs’ suits if fee awards were liberally awarded to prevailing defendants -- the Court

concludes that doubt as to relatedness should be resolved in favor of civil rights plaintiffs and their

counsel.

a. Claim 5

Claim 5 asserted the District procedurally denied the Student a FAPE by failing to provide

Ms. Hawkins with prior written notice regarding Student’s change of placement, failing to hold the

annual IEP meeting, and failing to design an educational placement satisfactory under the IDEA. 

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Clearly, Claim 5 overlaps with both Claims 1 and 3. It asserts that the District failed to hold the

annual IEP meeting and failed to design a satisfactory educational placement program for Student,

which are the issues raised in Claims 1 and 3. Notice is integrally related to the Plaintiff’s ability to

exercise the rights at issue in Claims 1 and 3. Moreover, if no substantive violations of Claims 1 and

3 were found, Claim 5 would for practical purposes be moot. Accordingly, the claims are

transactionally related and involve overlapping evidence.

b. Claim 2

Claim 2 asserted the District denied Student a FAPE by moving him from a special day class

to general education without Hawkins’ consent. Claims 2 and 3 are related because the adequacy of

the education and services that the Student received (at issue in Claim 3) was informed in part by his

move from a special day class to general education (at issue in Claim 2). Claims 2 and 3 are also

related as both claims concern the issue of placement. Determining whether, as Ms. Hawkins asserts

in Claim 2, her consent was needed for the move from a special day class to general education

requires a determination of whether this was actually a “change in placement.” Claim 3 is related as

it asserts that the Student was denied a FAPE, in part, by failing to provide appropriate placement. 

See Burston v. Virginia, 595 F. Supp. 644, 650 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding that claims were related as

they were “part and parcel of a series of events between plaintiffs and defendants, occurring within a

relative short time span in one particular setting”). Were Claim 3 found to be without merit, Claim 2

would be moot for practical purposes. Again there is an overlap in evidence, and the same general

course of conduct was at issue. See Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141.

c. Claim 4

In Claim 4, Ms. Hawkins sought to remedy a procedural violation, asserting that the District

denied the Student a FAPE by failing to completely and timely produce his education records upon

her request. Claim 4 is related to Claim 3 because Ms. Hawkins needed the Student’s records in

order to evaluate whether he was getting the appropriate educational and related services that

conformed to his IEP. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (noting that a

student’s substantive right to a FAPE is ensured by the state’s obligation to “adopt procedures which

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 Even if the District did successfully state a counterclaim for fees, it would be with respect to

Adams Esq. only, and not Ms. Adam herself. The counterclaim contains no substantive allegations

against Ms. Adams in her individual capacity. Thus, dismissal as to Ms. Adams in her individual

capacity is further warranted on this ground.

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would result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each child”). Hence, the same

substantive rights were affected.

Furthermore, that Claim 4 is related to Claim 1 is underscored by the ALJ’s decision. In his

decision, Judge Thawley found that, under Claim 4, the District’s initial production of records was

not complete and may have been untimely, but he held that this was not a significant procedural

error and did not impede Ms. Hawkins’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making process

because of her unreasonable refusal to conduct an IEP meeting, the same reason why the ALJ

limited relief on Claim 1. Cf. Johnston v. Harris Country Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1582

(5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the plaintiff’s successful retaliation claim and unsuccessful age and

handicap discrimination claims were related and “‘integrally bound up’” because the defendants had

raised plaintiff’s age and infirmity to defend against the retaliation claim”). Hence, a common core

of facts underlie both Claims 1 and 4. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141.

d. Summary

Accordingly, the Court concludes that each of the claims on which the District was

successful at the administrative level (i.e., Claims 2, 4, and 5) was related to at least one claim, if not

both, on which the Student was partially successful (i.e., Claim 1 and 2). Because the unsuccessful

claims are related to the successful claims, the District may not, as a matter of law, recover fees

under Hensley. Its counterclaim for fees must therefore be dismissed with prejudice.2

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Counter-Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The

dismissal shall be with prejudice because even if Counter-Defendants were properly joined to this

case, the District has, as a matter of law, failed to state a claim for attorney’s fees.

This order disposes of Docket No. 22.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008 ________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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