Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01896/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01896-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID THOMPSON BOYD,

Petitioner,

v.

DEAN BORDERS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 17cv1896-MMA (JLB)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

David Thompson Boyd (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis with a Second Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

1

(ECF No. 12.)2 Petitioner entered a guilty plea pursuant 

to a plea agreement in the San Diego Superior Court to filing a false instrument, and 

 

1 Although this case was randomly referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jill L. 

Burkhardt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a 

Report and Recommendation nor oral argument are necessary for the disposition of this

matter. See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 71.1(d).

2

 Petitioner initiated this action in the Central District of California and it was transferred 

here. (See Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) Nos. 1, 3.) He filed an amended petition in 

this Court on October 6, 2017 (ECF No. 8), and, prior to a response, filed another 

amended petition on November 7, 2017 (ECF No. 12). Both are titled “First Amended 

Petition.” The operative pleading in this action is the petition filed on November 7, 2017, 

which the Court refers to as the Second Amended Petition. 

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admitted a sentence enhancement allegation that he engaged in a pattern of theft-related 

felony conduct involving the taking or loss of more than $500,000. (ECF No. 18-2 at 14-

16; ECF No. 18-10 at 6-11.) He was sentenced to a stipulated term of four years in state 

prison, consisting of two years on the offense and two years on the enhancement, along 

with fees, fines and restitution. (ECF No. 18-2 at 40; ECF No. 18-10 at 6-11.) He

alleges here that the elements of the enhancement (multiple theft-related felonies 

involving the taking or loss of more than $500,000), were not proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt, despite his admission to them during his plea colloquy, because he was 

convicted of a single, non-theft related felony involving the loss of about $50,000, and 

that he only became aware of that defect in the prison law library while serving his 

sentence. (ECF No. 12 at 3-11.) He claims that as a result he is currently incarcerated in 

violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Id. at 6, 10-11.) He does not wish to withdraw his plea, but merely to 

invalidate the enhancement, which would result in his immediate release from custody, 

and although he has not presented his claims to the state supreme court, he contends he 

does not have a timely available remedy in state court where withdrawal of his plea is the 

only relief available. (Id. at 6.)

Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged the state court record. (ECF Nos. 17-

18, 20.) Respondent contends Petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies because 

he has not raised his claims in the state supreme court, but relief should be denied 

notwithstanding the failure to exhaust because, to the extent Petitioner relies on an error 

in state sentencing law, he fails to present a colorable federal claim. (ECF No. 17-1 at 7-

8.) Respondent alternately contends that even if a colorable federal claim is presented, 

relief is foreclosed by Petitioner’s guilty plea under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 

267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in 

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 

to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 

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of the guilty plea.”) (Id. at 9-10.) Petitioner has not filed a Traverse.

As discussed below, a liberal construction of the pro se Second Amended Petition 

reveals that it presents two federal due process claims, neither of which has been 

presented to the California Supreme Court, one alleging insufficient evidence to support 

the sentence enhancement and one alleging the plea to the enhancement was not knowing 

and voluntary. Although Petitioner did not exhaust state court remedies by presenting the 

claims to the state supreme court, the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied 

because state court remedies no longer remain available as to those claims, which has 

resulted in a procedural default in this Court. Because both claims fail on the merits

under a de novo review, it is unnecessary to determine if Petitioner can show cause and 

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the default. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2016, Petitioner and five other defendants were indicted on 135 felony 

offenses. (See ECF No. 20-1 at 11-62.) Petitioner was indicted on nineteen counts of 

procuring or offering a false or forged instrument for recording, two counts of grand 

theft, and one count of identity theft. (Id.) He was charged with two sentence

enhancements which alleged a pattern of related felony conduct involving the taking of, 

or resulting in the loss of, over $1,300,000 (first enhancement), and over $500,000

(second enhancement). (Id. at 63, 65.) The crimes charged are summarized in 

Petitioner’s probation report:

The codefendants were involved in a scheme to file fraudulent and forged 

documents with the State of California and Federal Courts involving 80 

properties. . . . [¶] This scheme involved defrauding lenders and owners of 

mortgages out of their residential properties. Distressed homeowners would 

pay them money in exchange for the promise of being able to keep their homes 

and receive large judgments in their favor. Many of the homeowners who 

followed this advice lost their homes to foreclosure and damaged their credit. 

The codefendants received over $1,000,000 from these homeowners, with one 

homeowner paying as much as $42,000 to them and still lost their house. 

Attorneys did not work on the lawsuits as homeowners had been promised 

they would. . . . [¶] David Boyd’s role was to create fraudulent documents 

that he then provided to Jacob Orona for use in the scheme. Boyd was referred 

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to as an “attorney” by others involved.

(ECF No. 18-2 at 32-33.)

On January 9, 2017, Petitioner, while representing himself, entered a guilty plea to 

count 131 of the 135-count indictment, procuring or offering a false or forged instrument 

in violation of California Penal Code § 115(a), and admitted: “I filed a forged document.”

(ECF No. 18-2 at 14-16; ECF No. 18-9 at 3-8.) He further admitted the truth of one of 

the two sentence enhancement allegations pursuant to California Penal Code 

§ 186.11(a)(2), and admitted “that the defendants in this case committed two or more 

felonies, and that involved a pattern of felony conduct and the taking of or more than 

$500,000.” (Id.) On February 7, 2017, he was sentenced to a stipulated term of four 

years in prison, consisting of two years on the false instrument charge and two years on 

the enhancement, and was ordered to pay court fees, a general restitution fine of $1,200, 

and $50,601.49 in restitution to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation specific to 

the loss related to the victim in count 131. (ECF No. 18-2 at 14-16, 40; ECF No. 18-10 at 

6-11.)

Petitioner appealed, challenging only his sentence, claiming that the mid-term of 

18 months on the forged instrument count was the appropriate term rather than the upper 

term of two years because no finding was made as to the degree of that offense, and 

claiming, as he does here, that the sentence enhancement was not applicable because it 

required multiple felonies and he was convicted of a single felony. (ECF No. 18-2 at 42-

45; ECF No. 18-15 at 7-10.) On April 25, 2017, while the appeal was pending, he filed a 

habeas petition in the state superior court presenting the same claims. (ECF No. 18-15.) 

That petition was dismissed without prejudice on April 27, 2017, on the basis that the 

superior court lacked jurisdiction while the appeal was pending. (ECF No. 18-16.)

Petitioner signed a notice of abandonment of his appeal on October 7, 2017. (ECF 

No. 18-11 at 1-2.) He informed the court that his attorney advised him that the appeal 

would not provide the relief he sought, invalidation of the enhancement, but would likely 

invalidate his plea, exposing him to additional charges and restitution. (ECF No. 18-17 at 

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2.) The appeal was dismissed as abandoned on October 25, 2017. (ECF No. 18-12.)

On October 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in the state superior court, claiming he discovered in the prison law library that the

sentence enhancement was invalid because he was convicted of a single felony. (ECF 

No. 18-17.) The petition was denied on October 23, 2017, on the basis that the appeal 

was not final because the appellate court had yet to issue a remittitur, and, alternately, 

because Petitioner had not stated a prima facie case for relief as his allegations were 

“vague and confusing.” (ECF No. 18-18.) He did not thereafter present the claim any 

other state court.

II. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of the claims, the Court will address Respondent’s 

contention that federal habeas relief is unavailable because Petitioner has not exhausted 

state court remedies. 

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

Generally, applications for writs of habeas corpus which contain unexhausted 

claims must be dismissed. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). However, the 

exhaustion requirement applies only to claims which are cognizable on federal habeas. 

See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that Rose presumes 

the claims are cognizable on federal habeas, and that it would be futile to require the 

petitioner to exhaust state court remedies as to claims that “clearly do not rise to the level 

of alleged deprivations of [federal] constitutional rights and that may be denied 

summarily on their merits.”), citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987) 

(holding that in light of Rose a district court may deny a habeas petition “if it is perfectly 

clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.”) 

Federal courts have discretion to deny a habeas petition on the merits 

notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to fully exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 

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the courts of the State.”) However, the Court may deny relief on the merits of an 

unexhausted claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), “only when it is perfectly clear that the 

applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 

614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).

Thus, the exhaustion requirement only applies if Petitioner’s claims are cognizable 

on federal habeas, that is, if they raise “colorable” claims for relief. If the claims are 

cognizable and the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, the Court can address the merits. 

If the claims are colorable and the exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied, the 

Court cannot grant or deny relief on the merits, but would be required either to dismiss 

the Second Amended Petition without prejudice to raise the claims after exhaustion, or, if 

that might result in Petitioner losing the opportunity to present his claims due to the 

operation of the one-year statute of limitations, consider whether to exercise its discretion 

to stay this action and hold the petition in abeyance during the exhaustion process. 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005); Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21.

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review 

for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he 

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). 

Thus, to present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim under § 2254, a state 

prisoner must allege both that he is in custody pursuant to a “judgment of a State court,” 

and that he is in custody in “violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” Id. The first condition is satisfied because Petitioner was sentenced on February 

7, 2017, to four years in prison as a result of a guilty plea, and at that time was given 421 

days of custody credits. (ECF No. 18-10 at 9.) Respondent does not contend Petitioner

is not currently, or was not at the time he initiated these proceedings, in custody pursuant 

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to the state court judgment he challenges here. In fact, the record indicates that his 

earliest possible release date on his current conviction is July 6, 2018. (ECF No. 18-13 at 

12.)

With respect to the second requirement, Petitioner alleges he is currently in 

custody in violation of federal due process and equal protection principles because he is 

serving two years on an enhancement which does not apply to him, and his admission 

was based on a “misunderstanding” which he only corrected after he was incarcerated. 

(ECF No. 12 at 3-11.) He argues that he was convicted of one non-theft related felony 

which resulted in a loss of just over $50,000, whereas the enhancement requires proof 

that he was convicted of multiple felonies and engaged in a pattern of felony conduct 

involving fraud or embezzlement which resulted in the taking or loss of more than 

$500,000. (Id.)

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 

‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 

1987), quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982). Liberal construction of 

pro se prisoner habeas petitions is especially important with regard to the determination 

as to which claims are presented. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal 

habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no 

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The Supreme Court has extended those due 

process protections to sentence enhancements. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466, 490 (2000) (holding, with respect to a sentence enhancement allegation, “[o]ther 

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 

the proscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 

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reasonable doubt.”) In addition, federal due process provides that a guilty plea must be 

knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1983). Among the

requirements for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must receive notice of 

the true nature of the charges against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 

(1976). 

The Court finds that under a liberal construction of the pro se Second Amended 

Petition there are two claims for relief presented. The first alleges a federal due process 

violation arising from the lack of sufficient evidence to prove the sentence enhancement 

true beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Petitioner claims the enhancement requires 

proof that he was convicted of multiple felonies and engaged in a pattern of felony 

conduct involving fraud or embezzlement which resulted in the taking or loss of more 

than $500,000, whereas he was convicted of one non-theft related felony which resulted 

in a loss of just over $50,000. (See ECF No. 12 at 8-11.) The second claim alleges a 

federal due process violation arising from the admission to the enhancement during the 

guilty plea. Petitioner contends he was not aware of the elements of the enhancement at 

the time of his plea, only discovering them later in the prison law library, and his 

admission was therefore based on a “misunderstanding” that the elements of the 

enhancement had been satisfied, rendering his plea involuntary.

3

 (See id. at 3.) 

 

3

 The Second Amended Petition makes a single, unexplained reference in passing that 

Petitioner was “deprived of life, liberty and property (Corpus) in violation of the equal 

protection clause of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (ECF No. 12 

at 10.) The Court will not construe the Second Amended Petition as presenting an equal 

protection claim because the claim is devoid of any supporting factual allegations and 

therefore wholly conclusory. As such, it does not present a claim for relief. See James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (conclusory allegations insufficient to state a claim 

for habeas relief); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1995) (“conclusory 

allegations do not establish an equal protection violation.”); see also City of Cleburne, 

Tex. v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (holding that in order to state an 

equal protection claim a petitioner must allege that he was intentionally treated 

differently than other similarly situated individuals based on membership in a protected 

class). 

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If these two claims present colorable claims for federal habeas relief, the 

exhaustion requirement must be satisfied before the Court can address their merits. 

Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134-35; Acosta-Huerta, 7 F.3d at 142. As discussed below, it 

appears the claim regarding proof of every element of the enhancement beyond a 

reasonable doubt does not present a colorable federal due process claim because 

Petitioner admitted in open court to the truth of the elements of the sentence 

enhancement, and the due process protection extended to sentence enhancements by

Apprendi does not apply in that situation. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 

(2004) (“Our precedents make clear, however, that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”) (emphasis added). Also as 

discussed below, there is no support in the record whatsoever that Petitioner’s admission 

to the enhancement was not knowing and voluntary. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 

U.S. 25, 31 (1979) (holding that a petitioner must show that his guilty plea did not 

represent “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open 

to the defendant.”) 

The Court need not make a determination as to whether the claims are “colorable” 

however, because even assuming Petitioner has presented colorable claims for relief it is 

clear the exhaustion requirement is now technically satisfied. In order to exhaust state 

judicial remedies, a California state prisoner generally must present the California 

Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or 

her federal habeas petition. Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. The petitioner must have 

raised the very same federal claims brought in the federal petition before the state 

supreme court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (“[i]f a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the 

due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in 

federal court, but in state court.”); Rose, 455 U.S. at 515 (holding that as a matter of 

federal-state comity, federal habeas courts generally will not consider a claim until the 

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state court has had an opportunity to act upon the claim); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

275 (1971) (noting that the exhaustion requirement assures the state court of the “initial 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”) 

Petitioner deprived the state court of a fair opportunity to address the merits of his federal 

claims by failing to present them to the state supreme court.

The exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied, however, if state judicial 

remedies no longer remain available. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) 

(“The requisite exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of course, if it is clear that respondent’s 

claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law.”), citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 

107, 125 n.28 (1982) (“[The exhaustion] requirement, however, refers only to remedies 

still available at the time of the federal petition.”) It appears that if Petitioner were now 

to present his claim for the first time to the state supreme court it would be met with a 

state timeliness bar. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 312-21 (2011) (holding that 

California’s timeliness rule requiring that a petitioner must seek relief without 

“substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or should 

reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal 

basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied). Petitioner was aware 

of his claim as early as October 7, 2017, the date he signed the notice of abandonment of 

his appeal. (ECF No. 18-11.) He states in his state habeas petition, filed on October 17, 

2017, that he abandoned his appeal because his attorney advised him that if the appeal 

succeeded he would not obtain the remedy he sought, invalidation of the two-year 

sentence on the enhancement, but would likely cause his guilty plea to be withdrawn,

exposing him to additional charges and additional restitution.

4

 (ECF No. 18-17 at 2.) 

Petitioner is now likely barred from returning to state court by California’s

 

4

 Petitioner states that he “lacks a ‘timely’ state remedy” because “circumstances exist 

that render such state processes as ineffective to protect” his due process rights. (ECF 

No. 12 at 2, 6, 11.) He appears to rest that contention on his belief that the state court 

will not invalidate the sentence enhancement without invalidating his plea.

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untimeliness bar. Walker, 562 U.S. at 312-21; see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268 

(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]n determining whether a remedy for a particular 

constitutional claim is ‘available,’ the federal courts are authorized, and indeed required, 

to assess the likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a hearing on the 

merits of his claim.”) Thus, his claim is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted 

in this Court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (holding that a 

procedural default arises when “the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.”); see id. at 729-30 (a procedural default arises from a violation of a 

state procedural rule which is independent of federal law, and which is clearly established 

and consistently applied.); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We 

conclude that because the California untimeliness rule is not interwoven with federal law, 

it is an independent state procedural ground.”) The default can be excused by showing

cause for the failure to satisfy the state procedural rule and prejudice arising from the 

default, or if a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from not addressing the 

claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

The Court need not make a determination whether Petitioner could make a 

showing sufficient to excuse any default because his claims are insufficiently meritorious 

to provide for federal habeas relief under any standard of review. The Ninth Circuit has 

indicated that: “Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits 

issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed to 

the merits if the result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th 

Cir. 2002), citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“We do not mean to 

suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it 

ordinarily should be.”) 

The standard of review for claims which are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted is unclear. Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 751 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). 

However, denial of the claim under a de novo review assures a finding that Petitioner is 

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not entitled to federal habeas relief irrespective of any procedural default or failure to 

exhaust. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (holding that when the 

standard of review is unclear, a federal habeas court may conduct a de novo review to 

deny a petition “because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus 

if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review.”) Under a de novo review, “state court 

judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality and 

may be set aside only when a state prisoner carries his burden of proving that (his) 

detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against state action 

by the Federal Constitution.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc).

2. Merits

Respondent contends that by entering a guilty plea Petitioner has forfeited his 

ability to challenge his sentence on federal habeas. The Supreme Court has stated that: 

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has 

preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly 

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is 

charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty 

plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty 

plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the 

standards set forth in McMann.

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)

(holding that a challenge to a plea entered on the advice of counsel requires a showing 

that the advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.”) The Tollett bar does not apply to an involuntary plea or one induced by 

ineffective assistance of counsel.5 Mitchell v. Superior Court for County of Santa Clara, 

 

5

 The Supreme Court has recognized other exceptions to Tollett not applicable here. See

United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1019 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that such 

exceptions “include only those claims in which, judged on the face of the indictment and 

record, the charge in question is one which the state may not constitutionally 

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632 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The following exchange took place during Petitioner’s guilty plea:

The Court: Mr. Boyd, how do you plead to count 131, which reads as 

follows: On or about August 1st, 2002, in the County of Los Angeles, you 

committed the crime of procuring or offering a false or forged instrument, in 

violation of Penal Code Section 115(a), a felony; that was committed by you, 

and you did unlawfully, knowingly procure and offer this to be filed, 

registered, or recorded in a public office in California? 

Defendant Boyd: I plead guilty.

The Court: This was a grant deed, Federal Home Mortgage Corporation, to 

the Ancestral Acquisition Trust; correct?

Defendant Boyd: That’s right.

The Court: You plead guilty? All right. [¶] Now, do you admit or deny 

this: This second special allegation, it’s further alleged that, pursuant to Penal 

Code Section 186.11(a)(2), that you committed – that the defendants in this 

case committed two or more felonies, and that involved a pattern of felony 

conduct and the taking of or more than $500,000. Do you admit or deny that?

Defendant Boyd: I admit it.

(ECF No. 18-9 at 6-7.)

Petitioner cannot attack his plea under the McMann ineffective assistance 

exception to Tollett because he was proceeding pro se when he entered his guilty plea. 

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[W]hatever else may or may 

not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot 

thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective 

assistance of counsel.’”) Because he admitted the elements of the enhancement, his 

claim that his federal due process right to have every element of the enhancement proven 

 

prosecute.”), citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (double jeopardy) and 

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (vindictive prosecution).

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beyond a reasonable doubt clearly fails. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (“Our precedents make 

clear, however, that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 

sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict 

or admitted by the defendant.”) (emphasis added).

Finally, a challenge to the plea on the basis that it was not knowing and voluntary 

also clearly fails. Petitioner alleges he was unaware at the time he admitted the truth of 

the enhancement that it required him to be convicted of multiple theft-related felonies

which resulted in the loss of more than $500,000, a discovery he says he made while later 

conducting research in the prison law library. (ECF No. 12 at 3-4.) In order for a plea to 

be knowing and voluntary, the defendant must receive notice of the true nature of the 

charges against him. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645. Petitioner was one of six individuals 

named in a 135-count indictment which included conspiracy to procuring or offering a 

false or forged instrument for recording, conspiracy to commit grand theft, procuring or 

offering a forged instrument for recording, grand theft and identity theft. (ECF No. 20-1 

at 11-62.) The counts naming Petitioner included nineteen counts of procuring or offering 

a false or forged instrument for recording, two counts of grand theft, and one count of 

identity theft, in addition to the two sentence enhancements. (Id. at 19-20, 56-63, 65.) 

As to the enhancement, the indictment states: “It is further alleged pursuant to Penal 

Code § 186.11(a)(2), that each and every defendant in the Indictment committed two or 

more related felonies to wit: Counts 1 through 135, a material element of which is fraud, 

involving a pattern of related felony conduct and the taking of, or resulted in the loss by 

another person or entity of, more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).” (ECF 

No. 20-1 at 63.) The enhancement allegation itself reads: “If the pattern of related felony 

conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss by another person or entity of, more 

than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the addition term of punishment shall be 

two, three, or five years in the state prison.” California Penal Code § 186.11(a)(2). 

The transcript of the plea colloquy indicates Petitioner admitted in open court 

“that, pursuant to Penal Code Section 186.11(a)(2), that you committed – that the 

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defendants in this case committed two or more felonies, and that involved a pattern of 

felony conduct and the taking of or more than $500,000.” (ECF No. 18-9 at 7.) 

Petitioner was therefore given notice of the elements of the enhancement both in the 

indictment and by the trial judge during his plea. His contention that, despite admitting 

in open court that the elements of the enhancement had been satisfied he only discovered 

later they had not been satisfied, does not support his claim. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 

645 (holding that in order for a plea to be knowing and voluntary the defendant must 

receive notice of the true nature of the charges); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63, 74 (1977) (holding that statements in open court carry a “strong presumption of 

verity,” and the “subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by 

specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record 

are wholly incredible.”) 

In addition, Petitioner was exposed to over 20 years imprisonment based on the 22 

counts and the two enhancements on which he was indicted. (See ECF No. 18-2 at 6.) 

His plea to a single count and a single enhancement substantially limited restitution to the 

loss related to just one victim of about $50,000, as the prosecutor submitted a declaration 

stating that the total loss from the entire scheme had so far been calculated at over four 

million dollars and was expected to be significantly higher. (Id. at 80.) Petitioner 

submits a letter from his appellate counsel which states that Petitioner had “negotiated an 

amazing plea bargain on your own behalf,” that “based on the provisions of Prop 57, you 

may be eligible for early release, possibly quite soon,” indicating that withdrawal of the 

plea was the only relief available, and warning Petitioner that proceeding with the appeal 

risked a dramatic increase in the amount of restitution he could be ordered to pay. (ECF 

No. 12 at 16-20.) Those considerations, coupled with his stated desire not to withdraw

his guilty plea, along with his anticipated release after serving about two and one-half 

years on the four-year sentence (see ECF No. 18-13 at 12), the record supports a finding 

that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 

31 (holding that a petitioner must show that his guilty plea did not represent “a voluntary 

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and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”);

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (“The voluntariness of [a] plea can be 

determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. One of 

these circumstances was the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict 

after a trial.”); Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74 (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a 

strong presumption of verity.”) 

Having admitted the elements of the enhancement were satisfied, and absent a 

viable challenge to the voluntariness of his plea, Petitioner has failed to show a federal 

due process violation arising from his admission to the sentence enhancement. This 

claim fails under a de novo review because Petitioner has not carried “his burden of 

proving that (his) detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded 

against state action by the Federal Constitution.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978. Petitioner has 

therefore failed to show a federal due process violation arising from his admission to the 

sentence enhancement, and has therefore failed to show that he is in custody in “violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that “the district 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse 

to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability is not issued unless there is “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this 

standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336 (2003), quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds this standard has not been met. 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that his claims amounted to a denial of his 

constitutional rights, nor has he demonstrated that a reasonable jurist would find this 

Court’s denial of his claims to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue 

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a certificate of appealability as to any claims or issues raised in the Second Amended 

Petition.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Second Amended Petition (ECF No. 12) is DENIED. 

Further, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court 

is instructed to terminate the case and enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2018

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