Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00962/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00962-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Blaine Kyle McNeese, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-00962 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles Ryan, Arizona Attorney ) 

General, )

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on or about May 7, 2012. Respondents

filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Answer”) (Doc. 10) on July 13, 2012. Petitioner filed a reply

to the answer to his petition on or about October 3, 2012. See

Doc. 16. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned December 18, 2008,

charged Petitioner with one count of theft of at least $25,000,

one count of forgery, and one count of identity theft. See

Answer, Exh. B. The charges were based on the events of

September 30, 2003, during which time Petitioner was an officer

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1

 The jury accepted the prosecution’s theory of the case:

Petitioner had arranged with a limousine driver that, acting in his

capacity as a DPS officer, Petitioner would “pull over” the limousine

on a particular date at a particular time while the driver was

transporting particular passengers who would be carrying a large sum

of cash. Petitioner would cite and arrest the driver and search the

vehicle pursuant to the arrest, removing $45,000 in cash that

Petitioner knew the passengers would have in the limousine.

Petitioner used the name of another DPS officer on the citation and

he and the limousine driver split the $45,000. The passengers

reported the loss of the money, leading to the investigation.

Petitioner resigned from the DPS in November of 2003.

2

 Attached to the state’s sentencing recommendation as

Exhibit 4 is a transcript of a portion (pages 32 through 42) of the

“freetalk.” Answer, Exh. F at Exhibit 4.

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with the Arizona Department of Public Safety (“DPS”).1

In June 2005, Detectives Vern Alley and Larry Landers

were investigating the robbery of $40,000 in cash from the

passengers of a limousine whose driver was arrested during a

traffic stop conducted by Petitioner on September 30, 2003.

Id., Exh. S. The detectives went to Petitioner’s home to

confront him with the evidence regarding Petitioner’s

participation in the robbery. The detectives discussed the

matter with Petitioner and his wife. During that conversation

with the detectives Petitioner admitted that he had coordinated

the traffic stop with the limousine driver and that he had

obtained cash from the car. Petitioner also stated that he “got

$20,000 out of it.” Id., Exh. S. Petitioner later engaged in

a “freetalk” with detectives; the detectives testified at

Petitioner’s trial that he admitted to the crimes during this

“freetalk.”2 Id., Exh. S. 

On January 7, 2010, after four days of trial, a jury

convicted Petitioner of all three counts alleged in the

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3 The evidence introduced at trial included phone records

indicating Petitioner and the limousine driver had spoken by phone on

79 occasions in the four months prior to the robbery and sixteen times

on the date of the robbery.

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indictment.3 However, the jury found that the theft was based

on a value of less than $25,000, rendering that offense a class

3 felony as opposed to the class 2 felony charged in the

indictment. 

On February 9, 2010, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated term of six years imprisonment

pursuant to his conviction on the theft charge and to an

aggravated term of three years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction on the charge of identity theft. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of 2.5 years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for forgery. The trial

court ordered that the forgery and identity theft sentences be

served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the

sentence imposed for theft. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted that the trial court abused its discretion when it

permitted the use of his “free talk” statements for impeachment

purposes; that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he

referred to a “free talk agreement” in direct examination and

closing argument; and that the trial court erred in admitting a

copy of the traffic citation issued to the limousine driver

during the robbery into evidence after the state had destroyed

the original. Id., Exh. P. 

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The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in a

decision entered June 21, 2011. The appellate court reviewed

Petitioner’s first claim for fundamental error, under state law.

Id., Exh. S. The court held that, although the trial court

erred by permitting the state to use Petitioner’s statements

during a “free talk” with police to impeach the testimony of

Petitioner’s wife at trial, the error was not fundamental. The

court noted that Petitioner had argued that “his state and

federal constitutional rights were violated in the heading for

this issue in his opening brief,” but that Petitioner had failed

“to provide citation to any authority or argument” for the

claim. Accordingly, citing Arizona v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452

n.9, 94 P.3d 1119, 1147 (2004), the court held Petitioner had

“abandoned these claims.” The state appellate court analyzed

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct under state law

and held that the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument

did not constitute fundamental error. The state court further

held that, under state law, the trial court’s admission of a

photocopy of the citation on which Petitioner had forged the

name of a fellow DPS officer was not reversible error. Id.,

Exh. S. 

Petitioner sought review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied

review on January 10, 2012. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner initiated a state action for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on May 18, 2010, while his direct appeal was pending. Id., Exh.

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K. On June 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion “to withdraw

[his] notice of post-conviction relief without prejudice so that

it [could] be filed at a later date.” Id., Exh. M. The trial

court dismissed the Rule 32 action without prejudice on August

3, 2010. Id., Exh. O. 

On July 15, 2011, Petitioner initiated a second Rule 32

action. Id., Exh. U. The state trial court appointed counsel

to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32 proceedings. On January

3, 2012, Petitioner’s appointed counsel informed the trial court

that he had reviewed the trial and appellate proceedings and was

“unable to find any claims for relief to raise in

post-conviction relief proceedings.” On May 12, 2012, the Rule

32 action was dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to timely file

a pro per pleading by February 21, 2012, as ordered by the state

trial court. Id., Exh. FF. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts:

1. His right to due process of law was violated

because the state used Petitioner’s statements during a “free

talk” to impeach his wife’s trial testimony; 

2. The prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to

Petitioner’s “free talk” in direct examination and closing

argument; 

3. The trial court erred by admitting a photocopy of a

traffic citation at trial after the state had destroyed the

original; 

4. The two detectives who testified at Petitioner’s

trial “perjured themselves” by testifying that Petitioner

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4

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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admitted to the crimes of conviction.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).4 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

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To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

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Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner did not present any claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner in his Rule 32

action, which was dismissed by the state trial court for

Petitioner’s failure to prosecute any specific claims in that

action. Accordingly, because the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of

claims bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to

exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has

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exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously

fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct

appeal. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir.

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See

also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

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his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted, for example in a state action for postconviction relief. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451,

120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S.

Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

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establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

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E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends his right to due process was

violated because the state used Petitioner’s statements during

a “free talk” to impeach his wife’s trial testimony and because

the state never “disclosed a copy of the ‘freetalk.’”

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the trial

court erred by allowing the introduction of statements he made

during a “freetalk” to be used to impeach his wife’s trial

testimony. When discussing the merits of this claim the state

court noted that, although Petitioner had stated in the heading

of this section of his brief that his state and federal

constitutional rights were violated by this error, Petitioner

did not argue anywhere in the brief that these rights were

violated, nor did he cite to any legal opinion so holding.

Accordingly, the state court found Petitioner had abandoned any

claim that this error by the trial court violated his state or

constitutional rights. See Answer Exh. S at 18 n. 10. 

The state court then reviewed the argument pursuant to

state law and concluded that although the trial court erred, the

error was not fundamental because it did not permeate the

proceedings and deny Petitioner a fair trial, inter alia, given

the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt.

Petitioner did not provide the state court the

opportunity to review the merits of the federal constitutional

claim presented in his section 2254 petition. The state court

decided the merits of the claim based solely on state law.

Accordingly, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim in

the state courts. Because the state court’s decision is an

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adequate and independent basis for declining to consider the

merits of the federal habeas claim, the Court need not consider

the merits of the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur. 

In his reply to the answer to his petition Petitioner

contends: 

The Petitioner’s claims are not procedurally

barred.... Claims 1 through 3 were handled by

a state appointed attorney []. He followed

all appropriate rules and applications for

the petitioner’s state appeals. ... Since the

Petitioner is not an attorney and has limited

experience with the law the Petitioner

assumes all the correct procedures were

followed. If this is not the case the

Petitioner should not be responsible.

Doc. 16 at 2-3.

With regard to the merits of his claim, Petitioner

contends that the use of the “freetalk” violated Petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment rights because it was plain error and

prejudicial and in violation of the Arizona state rules

regarding admission of evidence and his right to not be forced

to incriminate himself. Doc. 16 at 5-6. Petitioner asserts

repeatedly that because “the state never turned over a copy of

Petitioner’s ‘freetalk’”, that the “trial court erred by

allowing the state to attempt to impeach Petitioner’s wife with

the ‘freetalk,” resulting in a violation of his constitutional

rights. Petitioner further contends that he never voluntarily

confessed to the alleged crimes. Petitioner alleges that the

two detectives had a “vendetta” against him and lied and

fabricated evidence to make him look guilty.

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Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.

Ct. 509, 512-13 (1971), they must do more than present the

facts necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A claim is not “fairly presented” if the

state court “must read beyond a petition or

a brief ... in order to find material” that

alerts it to the presence of a federal claim.

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32, 124 S. Ct. 1347

(concluding that a petitioner does not

“fairly present” an issue for exhaustion

purposes when the appellate judge can only

discover the issue by reading a lower court

opinion in the case).

Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such

as due process, is insufficient to achieve fair presentation.

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly,

a federal claim is not exhausted merely because its factual

basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds--a

“mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is

insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Id., 223 F.3d at 988

(quotations omitted); see also Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

2. Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed

misconduct by referring to Petitioner’s “free talk” in direct

examination and closing argument. 

Petitioner presented a claim based on these facts to

the Arizona state court in his direct appeal. The state court

analyzed this claim pursuant to state law and held that the

prosecutor’s statements in closing argument did not constitute

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5

 Counsel did object to the statements as assuming facts not

in evidence.

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fundamental error. The state court examined the claim for

fundamental error because Petitioner’s counsel had not objected

to the statements at trial as prosecutorial misconduct.5 The

appellate court specifically found that there was no evidence

that the prosecutor was “reading” from the “freetalk” during

closing argument, but concluded that the “objectionable

statements appear to be the State’s somewhat overzealous

characterizations of Defendant’s admissions to Detectives A and

L as well as to some of the other evidence introduced at

trial.....” Answer, Exh. S at 29-30 & n.15. The appellate

court also concluded that any erroneously admitted statements

were not prejudicial in light of the weight of the evidence

against Petitioner. Id., Exh. S at 32.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

this claim for the reasons stated with regard to his first claim

for habeas relief. Petitioner did not present any federal

constitutional claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his

direct appeal with regard to the arguments raised in his second

claim for federal habeas relief. When raising this claim in the

state courts Petitioner’s brief did not state any federal claim

and did not cite any federal constitutional provision or any

federal case law. Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this

claim in the state courts. Because he has not shown cause for

nor prejudice arising from his default of this claim, nor has

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice as

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that term is defined in federal habeas law, he is not entitled

to relief on this claim.

3. Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by

admitting a photocopy of a traffic citation at trial after the

state had destroyed the original. 

The state appellate court reviewed this assertion

pursuant to state law, as a claim that the trial court erred in

the admission of evidence. The appellate court concluded that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence because the state had provided sufficient evidence of

authenticity regarding the copies.

Relief on this claim is not warranted for the reasons

cited with regard to Petitioner’s first two claims for relief.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the state

courts because he did not present a federal constitutional claim

to the state courts when discussing this alleged error. When

raising a similar claim in the state courts Petitioner’s brief

did not cite any federal constitutional provision or any federal

case law. Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim in

the state courts. Because he has not shown cause for nor

prejudice arising from his default of this claim, nor has

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur absent review of the claim, he is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

4. The two detectives “perjured themselves” by

testifying that Petitioner admitted to the crimes and to other

acts.

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

allows that he did not present this claim to the state courts.

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Petitioner asserts that he did not present the claim to the

state courts because his counsel in his direct appeal advised

him that the claim was not likely to succeed.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the

state courts. Petitioner contends: “[C]ounsel ... had all the

information in relationship to Ground 4 and stated that I did

not have a colorful claim. Since my claim in Ground 4 is one of

the main causes that the Petitioner was convicted I believe that

Edwards +v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) applies.” Doc.

16 at 3. Petitioner contends that failure to review this claim

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,

notwithstanding that the state court found the error was not

fundamental. 

 The ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not

sufficient cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim

unless the habeas petitioner exhausted an ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claim in the state courts, which Petitioner

has not done. Additionally, counsel’s failure to raise what

counsel considers to be a losing argument is not deficient

performance and is generally not prejudicial. 

Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of this claim.

Additionally, no fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur

absent consideration of this claim because there is sufficient

evidence that Petitioner was not factually innocent. Although

Petitioner alleges numerous legal errors in his habeas pleadings

he does not argue his factual innocence nor discuss a plausible

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theory regarding the other evidence introduced against him at

trial.

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas

claims by not fairly presenting them to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not

established cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of his claims, nor has Petitioner established a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent substantive

review of the merits of the claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. McNeese’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 20th day of November, 2012.

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