Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07187/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07187-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LUIS ARROYO,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 14

Plaintiff Luis Arroyo (“Plaintiff”) brings a putative class action against his former 

employer, Defendant J.R. Simplot Co. (“Defendant”), for violations of federal and California 

credit reporting statutes and for wage and hour violations. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion 

to remand. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this 

case, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant is a Nevada corporation doing business in California. ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) 

Plaintiff was an hourly employee of Defendant’s from July 2014 through October 6, 2017. Id. at ¶ 

22. 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 1 of 7
2

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant hired Plaintiff, Defendant conditioned Plaintiff’s 

hiring on completion of a background check, and that Defendant “did not provide legally 

compliant disclosure and authorization forms to Plaintiff and the putative class as they contained 

extraneous and superfluous language.” Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not provide Plaintiff or other employees 

compliant meal periods or rest periods. Id. at ¶¶ 25–31. Plaintiff also alleges that although

“Plaintiff and the putative class regularly worked in excess of 8 hours in a workday and/or forty 

hour hours [sic] in a workweek,” Defendant did not properly record all of Plaintiff and other 

employees’ overtime hours. Id. at ¶¶ 32–36. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not 

provide accurate wage statements to Plaintiff and other employees. Id. at ¶¶ 37–41. 

B. Procedural History

On October 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint in California Superior 

Court for the County of Santa Clara. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges ten causes of 

action. Plaintiff’s first two causes of action arise under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq. Id. at ¶¶ 42–75. Plaintiff’s remaining eight causes of action all 

arise under state law. Id. at ¶¶ 76–194. Plaintiff seeks to represent five different classes of 

current, former, and prospective applicants for employment with Defendant. Id. at ¶ 14. 

In Plaintiff’s first FCRA cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 

U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), which requires an employer to provide a “clear and conspicuous 

disclosure” to a prospective employee before procuring a consumer credit report during the hiring 

process. Id. at ¶¶ 42-63. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s disclosures to Plaintiff 

and other employees violated the FCRA because the disclosures “are embedded with extraneous 

information and are not clear and unambiguous disclosures in stand-alone documents.” Id. at ¶ 51. 

Plaintiff alleges that due to “Defendants’ [sic] unlawful procurement of credit and background 

reports by way of their inadequate disclosures . . . Plaintiff and class members have been injured, 

including but not limited to, having their privacy and statutory rights invaded.” Id. at ¶ 61. 

Plaintiff seeks “statutory damages and/or actual damages,” among other relief, for Defendant’s 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 2 of 7
3

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

alleged violation of the FCRA’s disclosure requirement. Id. at ¶ 62. 

In Plaintiff’s second FCRA cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1681d(a)(1) and 1681g(c), which require an employer procuring a consumer 

investigative report on a consumer to provide that consumer a written summary of the consumer’s 

rights under the FCRA. Id. at ¶¶ 64–75. Among those rights are the “right of a consumer to 

obtain a copy of a consumer report . . . from each consumer reporting agency.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1681g(c)(1)(B). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not comply with those FCRA disclosure 

requirements because, for example, Defendant’s “disclosures did not state the right of a consumer 

to obtain a copy of a consumer report from each consumer reporting agency.” Compl. at ¶ 70. 

On November 28, 2018, Defendant removed the case to federal court on the grounds of 

federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Specifically, Defendant stated in its notice of removal 

that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claims, which “arise[] under 

the laws of the United States.” Id. at 3. In addition, Defendant stated that the Court may exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Id. 

On February 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. ECF No. 14 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff 

also filed a concurrent request for judicial notice. ECF No. 14-1. The Court denies as moot 

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, as the Court’s order does not rely on the documents attached 

to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. On March 7, 2019, Defendant filed its opposition, ECF 

No. 21 (“Opp.”), and on March 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed his reply. ECF No. 22 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would 

have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 

in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). If it appears at any time 

before final judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must 

remand the action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Provincial 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 3 of 7
4

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal 

statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor 

of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. DISCUSSION

The instant motion to remand presents a single question: whether the Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claims. Plaintiff argues that the Court must remand the 

case to state court because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert his FCRA claims. Mot. at 

2. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that in FCRA cases, a plaintiff has standing only if the plaintiff 

alleges more than a procedural violation of the FCRA. A plaintiff “may not show an injury-in-fact 

merely by pointing to a statutory cause of action.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 

(9th Cir. 2017). Rather, a plaintiff must allege how “the specific procedural violations alleged in 

this case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm” to the interests protected by the FCRA. 

Id. For example, in Robins, the Ninth Circuit held that the “dissemination of false information in 

consumer reports” is a concrete harm protected by the FCRA. Id. at 1114. However, the Ninth 

Circuit acknowledged that in many instances, “a reporting agency’s failure to follow certain 

FCRA requirements may not result in the creation or dissemination of an inaccurate consumer 

report.” Id. at 1115–16. 

The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the interests protected by the specific FCRA 

disclosure requirements at issue in this case. Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017). In 

Syed, the Ninth Circuit stated that the FCRA’s disclosure requirements “create[] a right to privacy 

by enabling applicants to withhold permission to obtain the report from the prospective employer, 

and a concrete injury when applicants are deprived of their ability to meaningfully authorize the 

credit check.” Id. at 499. The plaintiff in Syed alleged such an injury because the plaintiff alleged 

that he “was confused by the inclusion of the liability waiver with the disclosure and would not 

have signed it had it contained a sufficiently clear disclosure, as required by the statute.” Id. at 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 4 of 7
5

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

499–500; see also Mitchell v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 743 F. App’x 889, 889 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding 

that under Syed, a plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to support an inference of confusion” to 

establish standing based on a defendant’s FCRA disclosure violation). 

By contrast, Plaintiff has made no such allegations of confusion or that Defendant 

disseminated inaccurate information about Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff has conclusorily alleged 

only that due to Defendant’s violation of the FCRA’s disclosure requirements, “Plaintiff and other 

class members have been injured, including but not limited to, having their privacy and statutory 

rights invaded in violation of the FCRA.” Compl. at ¶ 61. Plaintiff’s allegations are precisely 

those that Robins held were insufficient: “[Plaintiff] may not show an injury-in-fact merely by 

pointing to a statutory cause of action.” 867 F.3d at 1113. 

Other district courts have reached similar conclusions about nearly identical pleadings in 

FCRA cases. For example, in Williams v. Nichols Demos, Inc., 2018 WL 3046507 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 

20, 2018), the plaintiff alleged that as a result of the defendant’s violation of the FCRA’s 

disclosure requirements, “[the plaintiff] and class members ‘have allegedly been injured, 

including, but not limited to, having their privacy and statutory rights invaded in violation of the 

FCRA.’” Id. at *2 (citing the plaintiff’s complaint). That language mirrors the language in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Cf. Compl. at ¶ 61 (“Plaintiff and other class members have been injured, 

including but not limited to, having their privacy and statutory rights invaded in violation of the 

FCRA.”). In Williams, the plaintiff did “not allege that she was ‘confused’ by the disclosure or 

that she would not have signed the authorization had it been presented separately from the 

waiver,” nor did the plaintiff allege that the consumer report was inaccurate. 2018 WL 3046507, 

at *5. Thus, absent any concrete harm like that identified in Robins or Syed, the Williams court 

concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing. 

The same analysis applies here. Defendant is unable to point to any decision in which a 

court held that conclusory allegations of harm to “privacy and statutory rights” resulting from a 

failure to comply with the FCRA’s disclosure requirements suffice to allege Article III standing. 

Instead, Defendant argues only that the FCRA cases Plaintiff cites all “involve a defendant 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 5 of 7
6

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

seeking dismissal for lack of a concrete injury,” rather than, as here, a plaintiff seeking remand 

based on lack of standing. Opp. at 4. However, Defendant’s argument is contradicted by a case 

that Defendant itself cites. 

Specifically, in Bercut v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 2807515 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 29, 

2017), the plaintiff moved for remand on the grounds that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege 

any injury-in-fact based on the defendant’s alleged FCRA violations. Id. at *4. As here, the 

plaintiff did not “allege that she was confused or otherwise concretely harmed by the stand-alone 

disclosure violation,” and the Bercut court thus granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand. Id. at *5; 

see also Larroque v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols., Inc., 2016 WL 4577257, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (remanding because “[the plaintiff’s] complaint contain[ed] no allegations of 

any type of actual harm” based on defendant’s alleged FCRA violations). Accordingly, it is well 

established that Plaintiff’s mere allegation of a statutory violation of the FCRA is insufficient to 

establish Article III standing. Defendant identifies no allegations of actual harm in Plaintiff’s 

complaint. 

Therefore, consistent with Plaintiff’s own concession, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his 

FCRA causes of action in federal court. Defendant removed this case solely on the basis of 

federal question jurisdiction arising from Plaintiff’s FCRA causes of action, and does not contend 

that the Court otherwise may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint. When 

the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that has been removed

to federal court, the Court must remand the case to state court. Polo v. Innoventions Int’l LLC, 

833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal 

subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the 

matter. State courts are not bound by the constraints of Article III.”). Thus, the Court must 

remand Plaintiff’s complaint to state court. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand and 

REMANDS the instant case to California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. The 

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 6 of 7
7

Case No. 18-CV-07187-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:18-cv-07187-LHK Document 27 Filed 06/03/19 Page 7 of 7