Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02399/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02399-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS KOHLER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2399 WQH (POR)

ORDER DECLINING

SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION OVER

PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW

CLAIMS

(Docs. # 40, 43, 58)

vs.

MIRA MESA MARKETPLACE WEST,

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

HAYES, J:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant SWH

Corporation dba Mimi’s Cafe #0050 (“SWH”) (Doc. # 40), as well as the motions for, or

notices of, joinder in SWH’s Motion to Dismiss filed by seven other Defendants (Docs. # 43,

44, 45, 46, 49, 56, 58). The Court finds this matter suitable for submission on the papers and

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2006, Plaintiff Chris Kohler filed the Complaint in this matter, asserting

federal Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) claims as well as California state law claims

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pursuant to the Disabled Person Act (“DPA”), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), and

the California Health & Safety Code against twelve businesses located in a business mall at

Westview Parkway in San Diego. (Doc. # 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he is physically disabled,

and “visited [each Defendant’s] facilities and encountered barriers (both physical and

intangible) that interfered with--if not outright denied--his ability to use and enjoy the goods,

services, privileges, and accommodations offered at these facilities.” (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 28.)

Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys fees and costs

pursuant to the ADA and California statutes.

SWH moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c), arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an Unruh Act cause of action,

or, alternatively, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “A state

law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of

operative fact’ with the federal claims . . . .” Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th

Cir. 2004). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law

claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. §1367(c); see also Cross v. Pacific Coast Plaza Investments, L.P., No. 06 CV 2543

JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007). In deciding whether to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction, a court must consider the underlying objective of “most sensibly

accommodating the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Executive

Software N. Am., Inc. v. USDC for the Cent. Dist. of Calif., 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Complaint includes one federal ADA claim and three state claims pursuant to the

DPA, the Unruh Act, and the California Health and Safety Code against each Defendant. The

underlying factual allegations are the same for all of Plaintiff’s claims, and therefore Plaintiff’s

state law claims share the requisite “common nucleus of operative facts” with the federal

claims to allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Org. for the Advancement of Minorities with Disabilities v. Brick Oven

Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2005).

SWH argues that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims because the state law claims present novel and complex issues of

state law in light of the recent California Court of Appeal decision in Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.

App. 4th 223 (2006), which held that CAL. CIV. CODE § 52's statutory damages provision

requires proof of intentional discrimination. SWH argues that the issue of whether the Unruh

Act and CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 require proof of intentional discrimination to obtain statutory

minimum damages is a complex and unsettled area of the law.

The California Supreme Court first addressed the question in Koire v. Metro Car Wash,

40 Cal. 3d 24, 33 n.12 (1985), stating in a footnote that the Unruh Act did not require proof

of discriminatory intent. Six years later, the issue squarely presented itself again in Harris v.

Capital Growth Investors, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 172-73 (1991), where, after reviewing the statute

in detail, the California Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under

the Unruh Act must plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations.”

After Harris, the California State Legislature amended CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 in 1992, and

added a provision which states that a defendant violates the Unruh Act whenever it violates

the ADA. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f). The amendment raised the question of whether the

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statute as amended and read in conjunction with CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 required proof of

intentional discrimination.

In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the 1992 Unruh Act

amendments superseded Harris, and held that where a defendant violates the ADA, the Unruh

Act is also violated regardless of whether a Plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination. See

Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2004). In 2006, the California

Court of Appeal held that Harris was still viable, rejected Lentini as an incorrect interpretation

of California law, and held that CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 required proof of intentional

discrimination. See Gunther, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 252-57. Since Gunther, at least one federal

court has followed Lentini and disregarded Gunther, see Wilson v. Haria and Gogri Corp., No.

CIV.S-05-1239 LKK/DAD, 2007 WL 851744, *6-11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007), while at least

another federal court has noted the unsettled nature of the Unruh Act’s damages provision and

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state Unruh Act and DPA claims, see Cross

v. Pacific Coast Plaza Investments, L.P., No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *4-5

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007).

This Court concludes that Plaintiff’s state law claims are more appropriately resolved

by state courts in light of Gunther and the current state of California disability law. At this

point in time, the Unruh Act’s remedial provisions present novel and complex matters of state

law that are “better left to the California courts” to resolve “what is at the moment and

irreconcilable tension between the ADA and the Unruh Act.” Cross, No. 06 CV 2543 JM

(RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (citing Brick Oven Restaurant, 406 F.

Supp. 2d at 1130). Though the Court has the power to retain jurisdiction over the state law

claims, the Court concludes that,“on balance . . . the novelty and complexity of the state law

is such that comity supports the granting” of the motion to dismiss the state law claims. Cross,

No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, SWH’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 40) is GRANTED.

The Motions for Joinder to SWH’s Motion to Dismiss (Docs. # 43, 58) are GRANTED. All

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of Plaintiff’s state law claims against all remaining Defendants are DISMISSED without

prejudice to the Plaintiff refiling those claims in state court. Plaintiff’s ADA claims against

all remaining Defendants remain pending in this Court.

DATED: June 4, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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