Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-mc-00110/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-mc-00110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7609 IRS: Petition to Quash IRS Summons

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard R. Zurek, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

United States Internal Revenue Service; 

Samuel Martin Ely, 

Respondents. 

No. MC-12-00110-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of the United States Internal 

Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Doc. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, the IRS’s Motion to 

Dismiss is granted. 

 On or about October 16, 2012, IRS Revenue Agent and Defendant Samuel Martin 

Ely issued administrative summonses to Bank of America, Farmers Insurance Federal 

Credit Union (“Farmers”), and Desert Schools Federal Credit Union (“Desert Schools”). 

(See Docs. 1, 2, 3.) The summonses were issued in connection with the IRS’s 

investigation of Petitioner Richard Zurek’s federal income tax liability for the years 2008 

through 2011. (Doc. 6 at 1.) Zurek subsequently filed Petitions to Quash the summonses 

within the twenty-day period set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2). (Docs. 1, 2, 3.) Zurek 

claimed that Agent Ely was improperly “using the summons power to expand the tax 

years being reviewed.” (Id.) However, Zurek failed to mail registered or certified copies 

of the petitions to the entities summoned within twenty days of filing his petition, as 

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required by 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B). Defendants thus moved to dismiss Zurek’s 

Petitions as lacking in subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 6 at 7–8.) Zurek did not file a 

Response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

 The IRS, as a unit of the federal government, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit 

unless Congress has expressly consented to such suits. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 

(1996). Similarly, “a suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a 

suit against the United States” and thus requires “express statutory consent to sue.” 

Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Here, Congress has given express consent to sue in 28 U.S.C. 7609(b)(2), which 

waives sovereign immunity for actions to quash summonses by the IRS. Mollison v. 

United States, 568 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “limitations and conditions 

upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions 

thereto are not to be implied.” Id. (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 

(1957)). Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over “any action that does not fit 

within the scope of the Congressional waiver. Taylor v. United States, 292 F. App'x 383, 

385 (5th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has observed that “when Congress attaches 

conditions to waiving sovereign immunity . . . those conditions must be ‘strictly 

observed.’” Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Here, the statutory waiver contains a requirement that the petitioner mail by 

regular or certified mail a copy of the petition to the parties summoned within twenty 

days of filing the petition. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B). However, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that statutes of limitation and other statutory deadlines can be equitably tolled 

in some circumstances. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 

(2008). Conversely, when the limitations period is absolute and equitable tolling cannot 

be applied, the timing requirement is “referred to, in ‘shorthand,’ as ‘jurisdictional. ’” 

Marley, 567 F.3d at 1035 (quoting John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 133). The difference turns 

on whether the statutory limitation functions “to protect a defendant’s case-specific 

interest in timeliness” or to “achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating 

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the administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign 

immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency.” Id.

 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the petitioner’s failure to comply with the twentyday limit in 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) strips the district court of jurisdiction. See 

Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); Bharose v. United States, 

210 F. App'x 713, 714 (9th Cir. 2006). The purpose of § 7609(b)(2)(B) supports a finding 

that the twenty-day limit is jurisdictional in nature. The requirement that petitioner mail 

the petition to the summoned party within a delineated period of time serves to ensure 

that the summoned party is notified of a potential problem with the summons, preventing 

them from complying with a faulty subpoena. It also limits the scope of Congress’s 

waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, the statutory limitation functions to achieve a 

broader system-related goal and should be considered jurisdictional. 

 Zurek failed to comply with the twenty-day deadline for mailing copies of the 

petition to the summoned parties set out in § 7609(b)(2)(B). Thus, this Court has no 

subject matter jurisdiction over his Motions to Quash. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 4th day of April, 2013. 

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