Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAMELA CHYBA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, 

AKA BAYVIEW; DAVID ERTEL; 

MARILYN CORO, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

RENEWED MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 98] 

 Before this Court is Defendant Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC’s (“Bayview”) 

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot., ECF No. 98.) Plaintiff opposed the 

Motion. (Opp’n, ECF No. 99.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff claims that Bayview illegally tried to collect a debt from her. After this 

Court’s May 3, 2016 summary judgment order, the only remaining cause of action is 

Plaintiff’s claim against Bayview for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection 

Act (“TCPA”). The TCPA prohibits “mak[ing] any call (other than a call made for 

emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any 

automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any 

telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 

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227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff argues that Bayview placed at least eleven automated phone 

calls from the number 215-664-1300 to her cell phone number ending in “2400” without 

her consent. In the Court’s May 3, 2016 order, it held that the only remaining dispute is 

whether Bayview called Plaintiff’s cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing 

system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. (Summ. J. Order at 10, ECF No. 95.) The 

Court ordered the parties to conduct additional discovery related to the TCPA claim and 

file renewed motions for summary judgment by June 6, 2016. (Id. at 11.) In particular, 

the Court stated that discovery “should concern whether the 1300 phone line is able to 

and did use an automated system to call Plaintiff’s cell phone on the dates Plaintiff claims 

and whether or not Plaintiff provided Bayview prior express consent.” (Id.) 

 Bayview filed a renewed motion for summary judgment by the deadline, which is 

now before this Court. It also filed a motion for sanctions for Plaintiff’s failure to appear 

at two noticed depositions.1

 (ECF No. 97.) Bayview’s renewed motion notes that it has 

not received any discovery requests from Plaintiff since entry of the Court’s initial 

summary judgment order. (Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she has not 

conducted any new discovery. (Opp’n at 2.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In 

considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255. 

                                               

1

 The motion for sanctions has been referred to Magistrate Judge Major. In addition to 

monetary sanctions, Bayview’s motion for sanctions requests case-dispositive evidentiary 

sanctions. Because this Court can decide the motion for summary judgment on the 

merits, it need not impose evidentiary sanctions. The Court expresses no opinion on 

whether sanctions are warranted. 

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 A moving party bears the initial burden of showing there are no genuine issues of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can do so by 

negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s case, or by showing that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The burden 

then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. 

 “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As a 

general rule, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” will be insufficient to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the non-moving party. Id. at 252. 

DISCUSSION

As explained below, the Court holds that Bayview is entitled to summary judgment 

because Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential element 

of her case—whether she was contacted using an automatic telephone dialing system or 

an artificial or prerecorded voice. 

A. Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

The TCPA prohibits anyone from using an “automatic telephone dialing system or 

an artificial or prerecorded voice” to call a cell phone number without the called party’s 

prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). An essential element of a TCPA 

claim is whether the caller used an “automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 

prerecorded voice.” 

The term “automatic telephone dialing system” is defined in the statute as 

“equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). An “automatic telephone dialing system” includes predictive 

dialers, which are “equipment that dials numbers and, when certain computer software is 

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attached, also assists telemarketers in predicting when a sales agent will be available to 

take calls. The hardware, when paired with certain software, has the capacity to store or 

produce numbers and dial those numbers at random, in sequential order, or from a 

database of numbers.” In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer 

Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14091 (July 3, 2003). Nevertheless, no 

matter the name given to the equipment, the “basic function” of an autodialer is “the 

capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” Id. at 14092. 

While there is no statutory definition of “an artificial or prerecorded voice,” case 

law differentiates a call using “an artificial or prerecorded voice” from a call with a live 

person. See, e.g., Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-0964-GPC-DHB, 

2013 WL 4774763, at *2, *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013); see also S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 

4-5 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972 (“[I]t is clear that automated 

telephone calls that deliver an artificial or prerecorded voice message are more of a 

nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by ‘live’ persons. . . . [I]t is 

legitimate and consistent with the constitution to impose greater restrictions on automated 

calls than on calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”). 

B. Bayview’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 

Bayview contends that Plaintiff has failed to present any factual dispute with 

respect to her TCPA claim. It argues that she offers no evidence that Bayview used an 

autodialer to contact her, that the 215-664-1300 number is used for autodialed calls, or 

that she received a call using an artificial or prerecorded voice. (Mot. at 2.) In fact, 

Plaintiff failed to conduct discovery on these issues, despite the Court re-opening 

discovery for the express purpose of allowing the parties to discover evidence to properly 

support their contentions. She also refused to appear at two noticed depositions. 

According to Bayview, Plaintiff simply contends that she received calls that had an 

“artificial time delay” before she, admittedly, spoke to a live person on the phone. 

Bayview also presents evidence—a declaration and notes in Plaintiff’s loan history 

/ / / 

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regarding attempts to contact her—that calls from 215-664-1300 are generated by a live 

person and do not use prerecorded messages. (Mot., Molina Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-10 & Ex. A.) 

In rebuttal, Plaintiff submits an affidavit, a handwritten call log,2

 and photographs 

of a cell phone showing Bayview’s number on the screen. In her affidavit, Plaintiff 

declares that she heard “silence and an ‘artificial time delay’ on the onset of each call 

before Darrin Wilson started to speak.” (Opp’n, Chyba Decl. ¶ 4, 12.) She also requests 

that the Court take judicial notice of certain public records that she argues establishes that 

Bayview uses autodialers. (Opp’n at 6-9; Request for Judicial Notice, ECF Nos. 101, 

102.) 

C. Analysis 

The Court agrees with Bayview that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact. Plaintiff does not offer “any significant probative evidence tending” to show that 

Bayview used an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice 

to contact her. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (internal citation omitted). As an initial matter, 

she admits that she spoke to a live person. (Chyba Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Bayview also submits 

evidence that its callers were live persons who left personal messages for Plaintiff when 

/ / / 

                                               

2

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s call log (ECF No. 83-1 at 14-15) states that she was 

called on October 3, 2012, but Bayview submits notes from two calls on October 31, 

2012 (Mot., Ex. A.). Plaintiff also contends that she was called on May 18, 2013, but 

Bayview does not provide any call notes from that date. These discrepancies do not 

change the Court’s view that there are no genuine issues of material fact given that 

Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of her claim. 

Bayview’s call notes also indicate that Bayview attempted to contact Plaintiff’s home 

phone. The TCPA prohibits “initiat[ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone 

line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express 

consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). However, Plaintiff’s operative 

complaint does not plead a violation of this section (3d Am. Compl., ECF No. 48) and, as 

discussed below, there is no evidence that Bayview used an artificial or prerecorded voice 

to contact Plaintiff. 

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their calls were unsuccessful. (Molina Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 & Ex. A.) Therefore, Plaintiff has 

not established that Bayview used an “artificial or prerecorded voice” in its calls to her. 

Plaintiff also has not offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bayview used 

an “automatic telephone dialing system” when it called her cellphone. Her contention 

that there was an “artificial time delay” at the beginning of each call does not raise a 

dispute regarding whether Bayview used equipment having the capacity to store, 

produce, and autodial numbers. Her handwritten call log and photographs also do not 

raise a genuine dispute because, at most, they show that Bayview contacted her, 

something that does not violate the statute without more and something that Bayview 

does not contest. 

Plaintiff relies on public records in which Bayview corporate officers allegedly 

attest to the use of autodialers. However, even if this Court took judicial notice of these 

records, which it does not,3

 these documents do not show that Bayview used an autodialer 

when it contacted her from the 1300 number. Although this Court declines to take 

judicial notice of these documents, it will be discuss them for the purpose of 

demonstrating that Plaintiff’s proffered evidence is insufficient for this claim to proceed 

to a jury. She first submits a Bayview job posting for a customer relations business 

analyst. (Opp’n, Ex. 1.) The analyst must have “[w]orking knowledge of Avaya Call 

Management System, Witness Call Center Recording System, [and] Presence Contact 

                                               

3

 This Court declined to take judicial notice of the same documents in its prior summary 

judgment order, finding the requests to be untimely, irrelevant, and/or subject to dispute. 

(Summ. J. Order at 5 n.3.) The Court again declines to take judicial notice (ECF Nos. 

101, 102) because the contents of the documents are irrelevant or subject to dispute. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute.”); Fed. R. Evid. 201 cmt. a, b (“A high degree of indisputability is the 

essential prerequisite” to taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts and “the tradition has 

been one of caution in requiring that the matter be beyond reasonable controversy.”); 

Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 991 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2012) (declining to take judicial notice of facts not relevant). 

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Solution Technology.” (Id.) This document does not demonstrate that the named 

telephone equipment is an automatic telephone dialing system, and it is not evidence that 

the people who called Plaintiff used an autodialer. 

Similarly, she offers a 2009 Form S-11 for registration of securities that she found 

on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s website. The document states that 

Bayview’s “Customer Service call center operates on an advanced Avaya phone system, 

call center and auto-dialer.” (Opp’n, Ex. 6, ECF No. 101 at 19.) However, this statement 

refers to the incoming calls that Bayview receives from customers, not outgoing calls to 

delinquent borrowers. 

She also submits two Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) “servicer evaluation[s]” of 

Bayview. (Opp’n, Exs. 2-3.) In relevant part, the evaluations state that Bayview 

“operates in a well-automated environment” and uses “automated call distribution 

(ACD), and interactive voice response (IVR) systems.” (Opp’n, Ex. 2, ECF No. 101 at 7; 

Ex. 3, ECF No. 101 at 17.) But the IVR system merely “enables callers to route their call 

to a particular department,” and the ACD system “distributes incoming calls to customer 

relations agents.” (Opp’n, Ex. 2, ECF No. 101 at 8 (emphasis added).) 

The strongest evidence that Bayview uses autodialers comes from two statements 

in the S&P evaluations, which note that loan counselors “may begin early intervention 

calling campaigns through an auto-dialer” and that a “predictive dialer allows customized 

calling campaigns.” (Opp’n, Ex. 2, ECF No. 101 at 9 (emphasis added); Ex. 3, ECF No. 

101 at 19.) Again, these statements fail to raise a genuine dispute about whether 

Bayview called her using equipment with the capacity to autodial. At most, they 

demonstrate that Bayview may use autodialers sometimes, but that autodialers are not 

used every time a loan counselor contacts a delinquent borrower. There is no indication 

when predictive dialers are used and whether the equipment is “paired with” the required 

software that allows it to autodial. 18 FCC Rcd. at 14091; see also In re Rules and 

Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 

7972 n.39 (July 1, 2015) (“The Commission’s finding that predictive dialers fall within 

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the statutory autodialer definition thus focuses on whether equipment has the requisite 

‘capacity,’ and therefore is not limited to any specific piece of equipment and is without 

regard to the name given the equipment for marketing purposes.”). There is certainly no 

evidence that Bayview called Plaintiff with an autodialing predictive dialer or other 

automatic telephone dialing system. 

Bayview has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff has failed to make a showing 

sufficient to establish an essential element to her last remaining claim. Celotex Corp., 

477 U.S. at 323. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has not 

carried her burden to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Her proffered 

evidence does not tend to show that Bayview contacted her cellular telephone using an 

“automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” Therefore, the 

Court grants summary judgment to Bayview on Plaintiff’s TCPA claim. See Anderson v. 

Security Fin. of Idaho, LLC, No. 4:12-cv-00487-BLW, 2015 WL 1478440, at *3 (D. 

Idaho Mar. 31, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because 

plaintiff could not establish that defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system to 

contact him on his cell phone). 

CONCLUSION4

Bayview’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

There are no remaining claims in this case as the Court’s prior order granted 

summary judgment to Bayview on all other claims asserted against it and to Defendant 

Marilyn Coro on all claims asserted against her. (Summ. J. Order, ECF. No 95.) 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                               

4

 The parties’ objections to the evidence are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent 

with this Order. 

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The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all 

claims and close the case.5

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 27, 2016 

                                              

5

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the Court finds there is no just reason to 

delay the entry of judgment.

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