Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04109/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04109-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY FLETCHER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE WARDEN AT SALINAS VALLEY 

STATE PRISON, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 16-cv-04109-YGR (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff, as state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), 

filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a request for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a 

separate Order. 

The Court now reviews Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915. In the instant 

complaint, Plaintiff complains generally of the lack of cameras at the prison, and how such a lack 

of cameras has led to several alleged constitutional violations against “Black inmates.” Dkt. 1 at 

3. However, Plaintiff fails to specify any more details as to these alleged violations. Therefore, 

the Court finds that the aforementioned allegations fail to state a claim and this complaint will be 

dismissed, but Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend to attempt to cure the deficiencies 

described below. The Court also finds that the complaint is deficient because it fails to provide 

sufficient information regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies.1

 See id. at 1-2. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend 

and directs Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to exhaust. 

 1

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to 

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-58 (2016); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff can 

show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 

1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of 

section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act or omits to 

perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff 

complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). To 

state a claim a plaintiff must show a specific constitutional or federal guarantee safeguarding the 

interests that have been invaded. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). 

Although a plaintiff is not required to plead “specific factual details not ascertainable in 

advance of discovery,” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986), he does not 

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the allegations in the complaint are mere conclusions, 

Kennedy v. H & M Landing, Inc., 529 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 

663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979). A complaint must contain sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly 

on notice of the claims against them. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

complaint that fails to state the specific acts of the defendant which violated the plaintiff’s rights 

fails to meet the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hutchinson v. 

United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only ‘“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.”‘” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff asserts that there are “no cameras on A, B, C nor D Facility nor inside the 

buildings” at SVSP and “that’s why so many Black inmates ha[ve] been beaten up, set up, shot 

and assaulted . . . .” Dkt. 1 at 3. Plaintiff adds that: “racist officers ha[ve] hurt[] [him] and others 

and the Warden knows, but intentionally covered it all up”; “U.S. Legal Mail has been thrown 

away”; he has “been neglected [by] medical care [staff] . . . given wrong[] medications [and] lied 

to; and he “almost committed suicide.” Id. To state a claim in this context Plaintiff must give 

specific instances as to when or where any of the aforementioned alleged violations took place. 

He also fails to specifically name who are responsible for such violations. Finally, aside from 

generally alleging that “racists” officers “hurt” him and neglected his medical care, Plaintiff does 

not specifically state that he was the target of any of the other alleged violations. While the Count 

can understand Plaintiff’s frustration, these allegations are not sufficient to state a “plausible” 

claim under the law that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. The complaint will be 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

In amending, Plaintiff should provide enough facts to explain, for instance, in what way his 

particular constitutional rights were violated by SVSP prison staff. This Court considers only 

claims of violations of federal law; therefore, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that 

aforementioned violations he listed—including alleged problems with his safety, with the handling 

of his legal mail, or with his medical care—rise to the level of constitutional violations. 

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The Court further notes that the only defendant named is the Warden at SVSP. Plaintiff is 

attempting to hold an individual liable, so he must specifically allege facts showing what that 

individual did that violated his constitutional rights. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 634 (sweeping 

conclusory allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead “set forth specific facts as to each 

individual defendant’s” actions which violated his or her rights). There is no respondeat superior 

liability in section 1983 cases. Therefore, the warden cannot be held liable simply because he is in 

charge of the prison. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Lastly, as mentioned above, this Court finds that the complaint is deficient because it fails 

to provide sufficient information regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Dkt. 1 

at 1-2. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to provide specific dates for any of the alleged constitutional 

violations mentioned above. If any of the alleged violations occurred close in time to the date that 

he signed the instant complaint on July 11, 2016, then it would be unlikely that Plaintiff could 

have fully exhausted his claims between the incident and the filing of this action. Nor can 

Plaintiff proceed with this case if he exhausts his claim after the filing of this action. A prisoner 

must exhaust his administrative remedies for constitutional claims prior to asserting them in a civil 

rights complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If a prisoner exhausts a claim after bringing it before the court, his subsequent exhaustion cannot 

excuse his earlier failure to exhaust. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(“[A prisoner] may initiate litigation in federal court only after the administrative process ends and 

leaves his grievances unredressed. It would be inconsistent with the objectives of the statute to let 

him submit his complaint any earlier than that.”) When the district court concludes that the 

prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies on a claim, “the proper remedy is dismissal of 

the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d, 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled 

on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, as 

mentioned above, Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information regarding the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. See Dkt. 1. Plaintiff merely checks the box “NO” next to the question 

“[D]d you present the facts of your complaint for review through the grievance procedure?” Id. at 

1. When asked to explain why not, he states in a conclusory fashion, “Because I was threaten[ed] 

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and retaliated against [sic].” Id. Plaintiff has indicated the same conclusory response that he was 

“threaten[ed]” and “retaliated against [sic]” to the question, “If you did not present your claim for 

review through the grievance procedure, explain why?” Id. at 3. Such a vague and conclusory 

response is insufficient. Plaintiff has not alleged any extraordinary circumstances which might 

compel that he be excused from complying with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Cf. Booth, 532 

U.S. at 741 n.6 (courts should not read “futility or other exceptions” into section 1997e(a)). 

During the same time frame that he amends his complaint, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to 

show cause why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. 

Specifically, to avoid dismissal, Plaintiff needs to provide proof that extraordinary circumstances 

existed in order to excuse him from complying with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See e.g., 

Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60 (identifying “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative 

remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.”) 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

 1. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, as indicated above, 

within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this Order is filed. The amended complaint must 

include the caption and civil case number used in this Order (C 16-04109 YGR (PR)) and the 

words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely 

replaces the prior pleadings, Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the prior pleadings by 

reference but must include in the amended complaint all the claims and allegations he wishes to 

present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Failure to amend within 

the designated time and in accordance with this Order will result in the dismissal of this 

action. 

2. Also within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this Order is filed, Plaintiff must 

show cause why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, as 

directed above. Failure to reply will result in dismissal without prejudice. 

 3. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

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Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

 4. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form along 

with his copy of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 6, 2016 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

United States District Court Judge 

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