Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01665/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01665-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC C. CHATMAN,

CDCR #BD-5474,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SUPER 8 in Oceanside, CA; 

SUPER 8 Corporation,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01665-CAB-KSC

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTIONS TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND TO APPOINT COUNSEL AS 

BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF Nos. 2, 3]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

ERIC C. CHATMAN (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State 

Prison in Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and against the Super 8 Hotel in Oceanside, California, and 

the Super 8 Corporation, in the Northern District of California, on June 22, 2018. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. 

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On July 19, 2018, United States District Judge James Donato transferred the case 

here for lack of proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (ECF No. 5). In view of the 

transfer, Judge Donato declined to rule on Plaintiff’s pending Motions to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2), and to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3). 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims he was “jumped by 4 guys” and robbed at the 

Super 8 in Oceanside while he was recycling on the premises sometime “around 2016 or 

2017.” Id. at 3. He claims he “could’ve died,” and therefore seeks hundreds of thousands 

of dollars in “lump sum” damages and ownership interests in Super 8 hotels, casinos, and 

race tracks. Id.

He has since filed a letter addressed to the Court and marked as an “Exhibit” that 

re-states his claims and seeks to subpoena a video of the incident. See ECF No. 9. His 

letter has been accepted for filing in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and despite Local 

Civil Rule 83.9, which clearly prohibits such ex parte communications. See ECF No. 8.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 

of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

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provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(noting that when court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, 

the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central 

question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure 

to state a claim.’”) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is simply prohibited by section 

1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he 

alleges he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP 

complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger 

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

B. Application to Plaintiff

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and his letter, and concludes neither 

pleading contains any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of 

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serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as described above, Plaintiff’s seeks to sue a hotel chain 

based on claims that several unidentified persons “jumped” and robbed him while he was 

on their premises on an unspecified occasion in 2016 or 2017.

1 See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 

3; see also In re Gonzalez, 2008 WL 666465 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2008) (finding 

prisoner with a “delusional tale” of having a “special genetic structure,” and being 

“irradiated ... by radioactive smoke” by “government scientists,” did not plausibly allege 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Holz v. McFadden, 2010 WL 3069745 at 

*3 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (finding “imminent danger” exception to § 1915(g) 

inapplicable where prisoner implausibly claimed the FBI and BOP were “going to kill 

him.”); Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493 at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) (finding 

“long, narrative, rambling statements regarding a cycle of violence, and vague references 

to motives to harm” insufficient to show Plaintiff faced an “ongoing danger” as required 

by Cervantes).

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court 

docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 

under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120.

That is the case here.

 

1 The Court further notes that Plaintiff has previously filed multiple similar Complaints in 

the Southern District of California against the same Defendants and alleging the same 

claims. See Chatman v. Super 8 Motel, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-02517-

DMS-JMA (filed Dec. 11, 2017); Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Co., et al., S.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 3:18-cv-00213-BAS-NLS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2018); and Chatman v. Super 8 

Motel Corp., et al., S.D. Cal. 3:18-cv-00436-CAB (RBB) (filed Feb. 23, 2018). The first 

two cases were dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and are counted as “strikes” against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). Plaintiff was denied leave to proceed IFP in the third case, as he is in this case,

due to his previous litigation history. 

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A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, Eric Chatman, identified as 

CDCR Inmate #BD-5474, has had four prior prisoner civil actions dismissed in this 

district alone on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted.

They are: 

1) Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01853-BAS 

JLB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and 

Dismissing Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without leave to amend) (Doc. No. 18) (“strike one”);

2) Chatman v. Cush Acura, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01852-WQH-JLB

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 

Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and without leave to amend) (Doc. No. 20) (“strike two”);

3) Chatman v. Super 8 Motel, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-02517-DMS-JMA 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 

Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and without leave to amend) (Doc. No. 6) (“strike three”); and 

4) Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Co., et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-00213-BASNLS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and 

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Dismissing Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without leave to amend) (Doc. No. 6) (“strike four”).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a plausible allegation that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

In addition to his Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint 

Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (ECF No. 3). 

However, a motion to appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) 

necessarily depends upon Plaintiff’s ability to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) 

(“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”). 

It requires that Plaintiff has been determined eligible to proceed pursuant to the IFP 

statute due to indigence, is within “the sound discretion of the trial court[,] and is granted 

only in exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the presence of exceptional 

circumstances, and is not entitled to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in this 

case, he is also not entitled to the appointment of counsel under § 1915(e)(1).

III. Conclusion and Order

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and to Appoint 

Counsel (ECF No. 3) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

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2) DISMISSES this action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay 

the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2018

 

2

 While the Court has previously accepted Plaintiff’s letter for filing despite his failure to 

comply with the Court’s Local Rules, he is hereby cautioned that S.D. Cal. Local Civil 

Rule 83.9 provides that “attorneys or parties to any action must refrain from writing letters 

to the judge,” and that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, any 

additional letter he attempts to file in this matter will be summarily rejected based on Local 

Rule 83.9, and because this Order terminates his case.

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