Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00466/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00466-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT STRAVERS, JR., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHRIRO, 

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-0466-PHX-DCG (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On March 1, 2007, Robert Stravers, Jr., (“Petitioner”), an inmate confined under

Department of Corrections custody in the Diamondback Correctional Facility in

Watonga, Oklahoma, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State

Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Doc. No. 1.) Named as

Respondent in the Petition is Dora B. Schriro. Respondent filed an Answer (“Answer”)

to the Petition on June 11, 2007, with exhibits A through O attached. (Doc No. 7) No

reply was filed.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2000, Petitioner was charged by the Grand Jurors of Maricopa

County, Arizona, with: Count 1, Second Degree Murder; Count 2, Endangerment;

Count 3, Leaving the Scene of a Fatal Accident; Count 4, Possession of Dangerous

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

Drugs; and Count 5, Possession or use of Marijuana, in violation of Arizona statutes.

(Answer, Ex. A) 

On December 22, 2000, Petitioner entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to the

amended charge of manslaughter, a class 2 dangerous felony, and the State agreed to

dismiss the remaining charges, and also agreed that there would be no theft-related

charges based on the property found in the Petitioner’s vehicle. (Id., Ex. B) The trial

court accepted the Petitioner’s plea on that same date. (Id., Ex. C, at 14.) 

On March 30, 2001, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 18 years’

imprisonment in the Arizona Department of Corrections. (Id., Ex. E.) 

B. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On June 7, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Id.,

Ex. F) On November 25, 2001, appointed counsel, having reviewed the files and finding

no claim for relief, filed a “Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review by

Counsel; Request for Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File Pro Per Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Id., Ex. G) 

On December 6, 2001, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to permit the

filing of a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, and an extension to and including

January 18, 2002, within which to file a pro per petition. (Id., Ex. H) On January 31,

2002, the court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR proceeding because Petitioner failed to file

his petition. (Id., Ex. I) The dismissal was filed on February 5, 2002. (Id.) 

C. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 19, 2005, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of postconviction relief. (Id., Ex. J) Petitioner acknowledged the untimeliness of the petition,

but stated that his claim was pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), specifically, that there had been

a “significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would

probably overturn the conviction or sentence.” (Id., at 2) Petitioner further stated as

support for the claim that “Defendant was sentenced in violation of principles

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Respondent did not attach the first pages, including the caption page, to

Exhibit N of her Answer. Exhibit N, at page 9, includes a signature line

that corresponds in date to Petitioner’s assertion that a Petition for Review

was filed before the Arizona Court of Appeals, and indicates that it was

submitted for Petitioner Robert Stravers, Jr. This Court concludes,

therefore, that Exhibit N is pages 2-9 of the Petition for Review to the

Court of Appeals filed by Petitioner on April 20, 2005. 

- 3 -

announced in Blakely v. Washington when sentenced to an aggravated term of

imprisonment on the basis of aggravating factors not admitted by the defendant nor

found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Defendant was unaware at the time of the

prior post conviction action that he had a Blakely-type claim for post conviction relief.”

(Id.) 

On February 7, 2005, the trial court dismissed the notice of post-conviction

relief, finding that Petitioner’s conviction became final when he did not seek further

review after the dismissal of his PCR by the trial court on June 14, 2002. (Id., Ex. K)

The trial court explained that Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that

are final, citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 124. S.Ct. 2519 (2004). (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing on February 16, 2005, arguing that

summary dismissal of the notice of post-conviction relief was improper. (Id., Ex. L)

The trial court denied the motion for rehearing on March 18, 2005. (Id., Ex. M) 

On April 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Petition, ¶ 7, Answer, Ex. N1

) The Court of Appeals denied review

on March 2, 2006. (Petition, ¶ 8, Ex. H) 

D. Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

March 1, 2007. (Doc. No. 1) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In the wake of Bowles v. Russell, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the

availability of equitable tolling is in question. This Court, however, need

not resolve the issue because even assuming equitable tolling remains

viable after Bowles, Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements for such

tolling.

- 4 -

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of

limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA's limitations period may be

equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 2

 Calderon

v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), overruled, in

part, on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.(Kelly) 163 F.3d 530, 540

(9th Cir.1998). Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Id.; see also, Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2002)(stating that "the threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003). "When

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The extraordinary circumstances

requirement is a "high hurdle," see Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy

considerations counsel against equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807

(1980). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161

L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a "causal connection" between the

extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona

Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.2007).

C. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in

this Court is untimely. Petitioner had until one year after his convictions and sentences

became final to file his federal petition. 

D. Limitation Period Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were based upon a guilty plea, and thus,

under Arizona law, Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings were “of-right.” See

Rule 32.1, Az.R.Cr.P. Accordingly, AEDPA’s statute of limitations did not begin to

run until the conclusion of Petitioner’s Rule 32 “of-right” proceedings. See Summers

v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “[b]ecause a Rule 32 ofright proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review

of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or

review.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(a)(A) (stating that a judgment becomes final

at the later of either the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review). Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on March 7,

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

2002, thirty (30) days after the trail court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s petition for

post-conviction relief, when Petitioner’s opportunity to petition the Arizona Court of

Appeals for review had expired. See Rule 32.9(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P. (stating that

defendant has 30 days after the filing of a decision to file a petition for review by the

Arizona Court of Appeals). Although direct review is not normally complete until the

time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has expired, see

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999), certiorari can only be sought

following a decision or denial of discretionary review by the state court of last resort,

i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. See SupCt.R.13. Accordingly, Petitioner was required

to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within 1 year of the date his convictions

became final, i.e., one year from March 7, 2002, absent statutory tolling.

E. Limitation Period Under § 2244(d)(1)(C)

Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that a new rule of federal law was announced by

the United States Supreme Court on the subject of aggravated sentencing, i.e., Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

and Petitioner sought post conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), filing a notice of

post conviction relief in state court on January 19, 2005. (Petition, ¶ 5) 

While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date for the

habeas limitations period, the statute does provide an exception for changes in the law.

Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the period can run from "the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review."

Petitioner's direct review ended on March 7, 2002. This was long after the June

26, 2000 decision in Apprendi and before the 2004 decision in Blakely. Because it was

long after Apprendi, Petitioner's reliance on that case does not affect his limitations

period. Because it was before Blakely, it could serve to provide a later commencement

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

date, but only if Blakely has been "made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

In Rees v. Hill, 286 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.2002), the Ninth Circuit concluded that

Apprendi was not retroactively applicable on habeas review, under the retroactivity

standards established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308- 310 (1989) (decisions

establishing new rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied retroactively on

habeas review, absent certain circumstances). Similarly, in Cook v. U.S., 386 F.3d 949,

950 (9th Cir.2004), the Ninth Circuit drew upon its decision in Rees to conclude that

Blakely was not retroactively applicable on habeas. Accordingly, the later decision in

Blakely does not delay the commencement of Petitioner's one year limitations period.

Accordingly, Petitioner's one year on all his claims began running on the expiration of

his time for seeking review in his "of right" PCR proceeding, on March 7, 2002.

Barring any applicable tolling, Petitioner's limitations period would have commenced

running thereafter, and expired one year later on March 7, 2003.

F. Statutory Tolling

The only tolling events occurring after the limitations period started were the

filing of the notice of post conviction relief, motion for rehearing, and petition for

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The AEDPA allows for tolling during the time

"which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending...." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The filing of the second notice on January 19, 2005 could not restart the statute of

limitations because it had already lapsed. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Thus, unless there is a basis for equitably tolling the limitations period,

Petitioner's habeas petition, filed on March 1, 2007, is untimely.

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

G. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner raises no grounds for equitable tolling in his petition, and did not file

a reply. Petitioner does not make a sufficient showing that these are “extraordinary

circumstances” that caused the untimely filing of his Petition. “A pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting

equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The

Magistrate Judge does not reach the Petitioner's or Respondent’s alternate arguments

the merits of this case. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, dismiss this action in its entirety as untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 07-466-PHX-DGC.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 16th day of June, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00466-DGC Document 8 Filed 06/16/08 Page 8 of 8