Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00081/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0081 FCD JFM P

vs.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 conviction pursuant

to a guilty plea on charges of second degree robbery. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) his

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) his constitutional rights were violated when the

trial court accepted a plea agreement which violated state law; (3) his sentence pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes Law violated the plea agreements in his prior criminal proceedings; (4)

his due process rights were violated when the California Court of Appeal rejected his state

habeas petition before it received his traverse; and (5) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned

will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 Respondent has not filed a copy of petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus to 1

the Amador County Superior Court. However, the Superior Court addressed the following

claims in its opinion: (1) whether petitioner’s sentence should be set aside because application of

California’s Three Strikes Law resulted in an ex post facto violation; (2) whether petitioner’s

sentence of twenty-five years-to-life constituted cruel and unusual punishment; (3) whether the

imposition of the Three Strikes Law deprived petitioner of a liberty interest in being sentenced

under the statute in effect at the time of his prior convictions; and (4) whether “the prosecution

changed ‘a detriment in an offender’s decision to accept a plea agreement, after the fact.’” (Id. at

40-42.)

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pled guilty to one count of robbery and

admitted two prior “strike” felony convictions under California’s Three Strikes Law. (Clerk’s

Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 118-20.) Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years-to-life in

state prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction and sentence. (Answer, Ex. A.) 

Petitioner claimed that: (1) the trial court erroneously imposed a restitution fine; (2) the trial

court abused its discretion when it refused to strike one of his “strike” priors; and (3) his sentence

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.; Answer, Ex. B at 2.) The California Court of

Appeal modified the amount of the restitution fine and affirmed the judgment as modified. 

(Answer, Ex. B at 2.) Petitioner filed a timely petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. C.) The petition for review was summarily denied. (Id.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Amador

County Superior Court, which rejected petitioner’s claims in a reasoned decision dated July 19,

1999. (Answer, Ex. D.) On August 3, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 1

in the Shasta County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) Therein, petitioner claimed that

application of the Three Strikes law to his case violated his right to due process, constituted an ex

post facto law, and violated plea agreements in his prior criminal proceedings, because he was

not aware when he entered into the prior agreements that he could be sentenced later under a

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recidivist sentencing scheme. (Id.) The Shasta County Superior Court denied these claims in a

reasoned decision, as follows:

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed August 3, 1999, is

denied.

The sentence imposed was not in violation of the negotiated plea. 

(See People v. Michael David Anthony C028811). PC 1170.12 is

not an ex post facto law. People v. Brady (1995) 34 Cal.App.3d

651. Based on the facts presented herein, the length of

incarceration as applied to petitioner is not cruel and unusual

punishment.

(Id.) 

On March 13, 2000, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Shasta County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. F.) Therein, he claimed that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he: (1) coerced petitioner into entering into an illegal plea

bargain; (2) failed to alert the trial court to the fact that it was illegal to dismiss enhancements

under the Three Strikes Law; (3) failed to alert the trial court to the fact that “there was no time

credit reduction on a life sentence under the Three Strikes law;” and (4) failed to request a

competency hearing. (Id.) That petition was denied by order dated May 17, 2000. (Id.) An ex

parte motion for reconsideration was summarily denied by order dated August 1, 2000. (Id.)

On September 28, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. G.) Therein, he claimed that: (1) his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he advised petitioner to enter into an illegal plea bargain;

(2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he “brought the unauthorized dismissal

of enhancements to the [petitioner] as part of an illegal plea bargain, when he expressly knew

that the dismissal was not authorized;” (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to bring to the trial court’s attention the fact that there was no time credit reduction on a

life sentence under the Three Strikes Law; (4) the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction

when it approved the plea agreement; (5) the state of California breached its agreement with

petitioner on the issue of custody credits because, pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, custody

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credits are not allowed on a life sentence; and (6) his sentence was unlawful because it was not

authorized by California law. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal denied these claims with the

following reasoning:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied as to grounds I - IV

and VI. As to ground V of the petition for writ of habeas corpus,

the petition is denied without prejudice to filing in the Superior

Court in the first instance. (See In re Hillery (1962) 202

Cal.App.2d 293, 294.)

(Id.)

On February 22, 2001, petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Shasta County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. H.) Therein, he raised claim No. 5, above, in

an apparent attempt to follow the direction of the California Court of Appeal that the claim

should be raised in the Superior Court in the first instance. (Id.) The Superior Court denied the

claim on the grounds that it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (Id.) 

On May 22, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. I.) Therein, he claimed that: (1) his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he advised petitioner to enter into an illegal plea bargain;

(2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he “brought the unauthorized dismissal

of enhancements as an inducement” to enter into the plea agreement; (3) his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he “failed to advise petitioner of the zero credit rule

contained in the Three Strikes Law” and failed to correct the trial court’s incorrect advice to

petitioner that he was entitled to time credits; (4) the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction

when it allowed petitioner to enter into the plea agreement, in violation of petitioner’s right to

due process; (5) the implementation of the Three Strikes Law to petitioner’s sentence constituted

a breach of plea agreements entered into in prior proceedings and also violated contract law and

petitioner’s right to due process; and (6) the trial court erred when it decided his petition for writ

of habeas corpus without considering petitioner’s traverse or his motion to vacate judgment,

thereby violating his right to due process. (Id.) On August 23, 2001, petitioner filed an

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 This statement of facts is taken from the February 26, 1999, opinion by the California 2

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-3, appended as 

Exhibit B to Respondent’s Answer, filed on June 3, 2003. 

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amendment to this petition, in which he added a claim that his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when he failed to request a hearing to determine whether petitioner was competent to

stand trial. (Answer, Ex. J.) This petition, including the amendment, was summarily denied by

the California Supreme Court by order dated November 28, 2001. (Answer, Ex. K.) 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

About 10 p.m. on April 29, 1997, [petitioner] robbed Scott

Alexander who worked at the World Gym in Redding. Alexander

reported that [petitioner] had been at the gym earlier seeking a

membership application which he filled out and then left claiming

he would return later that evening with his first payment. When

[petitioner] returned, he placed a note on the counter, told

Alexander to read it and pulled a blue steel handgun partly out of

his jacket. The note stated, “This is a robbery. Before you think of

being a hero, I have a gun and I will kill you.”

Alexander asked whether [petitioner] was sure he wanted to

commit a robbery. Defendant replied that he was tired of being

cold, hungry and homeless and ordered Alexander to retrieve the

money from the register and safe. After obtaining about $510 from

the register and the safe, [petitioner] bound Alexander’s hands with

duct tape. Alexander again asked whether [petitioner] was sure he

wanted to commit a robbery. [Petitioner] responded, “Yes that

they had screwed him here.”

The owner of World Gym, Wayde Welch, identified [petitioner]

from a videotape. [Petitioner] had worked for the gym in January

and February 1997.

[Petitioner] was arrested at his girlfriend’s apartment. 

[Petitioner’s] athletic bag contained numerous items, including

$500 in cash and two robbery notes.

[Petitioner’s] former roommate, Charles McDermot, claimed

[petitioner] owned a BB gun, not an actual firearm, and gave an

officer a plastic display carton which had held an air pistol.

(People v. Anthony, slip op. at 2-3.)

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ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

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reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner’s first claim is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

when he: (1) advised petitioner to enter into a plea agreement even though plea agreements are

barred under California’s Three Strikes Law; (2) allowed the plea agreement to go forward even

though it violated state law by requiring the dismissal of two of petitioner’s prior convictions; (3)

incorrectly advised petitioner as to the amount of custody credits he would receive; and (4) failed

to request a hearing to determine whether petitioner was competent to stand trial. The court will

analyze these claims below after setting forth the appropriate standards of review and the

applicable law. 

1. Standards of Review

As described above, petitioner raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

for the first time in a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Shasta County Superior Court. 

(Answer, Ex. F at 18-29.) The Superior Court denied the first three prongs of the claim on the

procedural grounds that these claims could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. (Id. at

consecutive p. 2.) The court denied the fourth prong on the merits, on the basis that petitioner

had failed to demonstrate either that trial counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing was

unreasonable or that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s actions. (Id. at

consecutive pgs. 2-3.) 

Petitioner next raised the first three prongs of his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. G.) 

The appellate court summarily denied the claims, thereby adopting the reasoning of the Superior

Court as to these claims. (Id.) See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (federal

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court will “look through” an unexplained state court decision to the last reasoned decision as the

basis for the state court’s judgment). Petitioner next raised all four prongs of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court. (Answer, Exs. I, J.) The Supreme Court summarily denied all of petitioner’s claims,

thereby adopting the reasoning of the California Superior Court as to these claims. (Answer, Ex.

K.) Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803-04.

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

should be denied on the merits. He does not argue that any part of the claim is procedurally

barred and has therefore waived any such defense. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 584-86

(9th Cir. 2003). Because the California courts denied the first three prongs of petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim on procedural grounds, there is no state court decision on

the merits of these claims. When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a

petitioner’s claim, the AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court

must review the claim de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Killian v.

Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (AEDPA standard of review not applicable because

state court did not reach the merits of petitioner’s perjury claim). Accordingly, this court will

review de novo the first three prongs of petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. 

The fourth prong of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied

on the merits by the California courts. Accordingly, as to this part of petitioner’s claim, the court

will utilize the standards set forth in AEDPA. 

2. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

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performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally, competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide

range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

3. Analysis

In the first two prongs of petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

petitioner argues that his trial counsel improperly allowed him to enter into a plea agreement that

was illegal under California law. Specifically, petitioner contends that: (1) plea bargains are not

allowed under California’s Three Strikes Law; and (2) a specific provision in the plea agreement

requiring the dismissal of prior “strike” allegations is prohibited by the California Penal Code. 

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Counsel’s actions in advising petitioner to enter into the plea agreement occurred

prior to the entry of petitioner’s plea. Petitioner may not raise claims of deprivation of his

constitutional rights that occurred prior to his guilty plea. “When a criminal defendant has

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,

he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights

that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267

(1973). See also Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary and

intelligent guilty plea precludes federal habeas relief based upon “independent claims” of preplea constitutional violations); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“petitioner’s nolo contendere plea precludes him from challenging alleged constitutional

violations that occurred prior to the entry of that plea”). Petitioner waived these ineffective

assistance of counsel claims when he chose to plead guilty. 

A defendant may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea

by showing that he received incompetent advice from counsel in connection with entry of the

plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267 (a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel “may

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he

received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann” [v. Richardson, 397

U.S. 759 (1970)] (holding that all defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective

assistance of competent counsel); Mitchell v. Superior Court for City of Santa Clara, 632 F.2d

767, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Assuming arguendo that petitioner is attacking the voluntary and intelligent

character of his guilty plea by alleging that the advice he received from counsel to plead guilty

was improper, his claim should be denied. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of

counsel in the context of a challenge to a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that counsel’s

advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as well as reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

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trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). Petitioner has not

made either showing. 

The prosecution’s case against petitioner was overwhelming. Petitioner admitted

the crime to the police. The robbery was videotaped. The cashier and gym owner, both of whom

knew petitioner, identified him as the robber. Robbery notes and the same amount of cash stolen

from the gym were found in petitioner’s residence. Further, petitioner’s plea ultimately resulted

in a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. Without a plea agreement, petitioner would

have faced a sentence of thirty-five-years-to-life. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 7-8.)

These facts preclude a reasonable claim that petitioner would have insisted on going to trial if he

had been informed that his favorable plea agreement was in technical violation of state law. 

Further, counsel’s advice to plead guilty under these circumstances was certainly within the wide

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

Accordingly, the first two prongs of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim should be denied.

In the third prong of petitioner’s claim, he argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when he advised petitioner “that he would receive 20 percent credits on his

sentence and thus be eligible for parole in 20 years.” (Traverse at 18.) In fact, petitioner will not

be eligible for parole until he has served 25 years of his sentence. In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th 1073,

1080 (2001) (holding that third-strike defendants serving indeterminate sentences of 25 years-tolife are not eligible for parole until they have served 25 years). Petitioner argues that counsel

“had an obligation to investigate relevant law and know that California’s three strikes law

prohibits granting custody credits on an indeterminate sentence.” (Traverse at 18.) Petitioner 

summarizes his claim as follows: “What was counsel’s role in this? He has a duty to his client to

investigate all applicable laws. By failing to do so, he erroneously informed petitioner that he

would be eligible for parole in 20 years. As this was one of the components of the illegal plea 

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 The state court record reflects that it was the trial judge who informed petitioner that he 3

would accrue custody credits to advance his parole date. (See RT at 7-8.) In his answer,

respondent correctly points out that there is no evidence in the record that petitioner’s counsel

also made such a statement. However, petitioner contends his attorney also informed him that he

was eligible for these custody credits. (Pet. at 11; Traverse at 18-20.) 

12

bargain, and it’s not being fulfilled, the State of California is in Breach of the plea bargain.” 

(Pet. at 11.)3

A guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). "The voluntariness of [a petitioner's] guilty plea can be determined

only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 749. The Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that where counsel’s erroneous advice about a client’s

sentence reflects a gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome Strickland error may be

present. See e.g., Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F. 2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996) (counsel misinformed

petitioner that there was almost no chance of receiving an extended life sentence if he pled guilty,

and that he had a chance to receive probation; petitioner received three life sentences. The court

stated: “[t]hough a mere inaccurate prediction, standing alone, would not constitute ineffective

assistance (citations omitted) the gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome presented in

this case, combined with the erroneous advice on the possible effects of going to trial, falls below

the level of competence required of defense attorneys”); Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th

Cir. 1986) (failure to advise a defendant of lifelong parole consequences); U.S. ex rel. Pebworth

v. Conte, 489 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1974) (petitioner waived an attorney but was not told that

the punishment for forgery might be 20 years). However, absent such a gross

mischaracterization, a mere “erroneous prediction by a defense attorney concerning sentencing

does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea.” United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896,

899 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990) and

United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1989); Doganiere v. U.S., 914 F.2d 165, 168

(9th Cir. 1990).

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Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because of his advice to petitioner that he would receive time credits against his

sentence and would therefore be eligible for parole in 20 years. The court notes that the allegedly

erroneous advice petitioner received did not relate to the length of his sentence, but rather to the

earliest date that he would become eligible for parole. Petitioner acknowledges that “there is not

[sic] guarantee that petitioner will be granted parole at all . . .” (Traverse at 20.) The difference

between parole eligibility in 20 years and parole eligibility in 25 years, although important, does

not rise to the level of a gross mischaracterization of the likely sentencing outcome so as to

invalidate petitioner’s guilty plea. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. As

discussed above, the evidence against petitioner was overwhelming. By entering into the plea

agreement, petitioner received ten years off a likely sentence of thirty-five years-to-life. Under

these circumstances, petitioner’s plea of guilty was certainly in his best interests. There is no

evidence that petitioner was reluctant to plead guilty or that he placed particular emphasis on his

parole eligibility in deciding whether to plead guilty. In fact, by signing the plea agreement

petitioner acknowledged that “no one has promised to suggested to me that I will receive a lighter

sentence, probation, reward, immunity or anything else to get me to plead as indicated.” (CT at

87.) Because petitioner has failed to show either incompetence or prejudice, he is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

Petitioner also argues that the state of California is in breach of the plea agreement

because of the fact that, contrary to the advice of his attorney and the trial court, he will not

receive time credits against his sentence but will have to serve 25 years before becoming eligible

for parole. (Traverse at 19.) This court rejects that argument. The state did not have a

constitutional obligation to inform petitioner of his parole eligibility. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56

(“[w]e have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a

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 Petitioner is not claiming that his plea was actually involuntary due to mental 4

incompetence, nor does he claim that the trial court should have raised the issue of petitioner’s

competence sua sponte. Accordingly, cases cited by petitioner addressing such claims are not on

point.

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defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to

be voluntary”). Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s advice at the sentencing hearing

constituted a term of the plea agreement. Further, petitioner has not pointed to any part of the

plea agreement that was breached. Petitioner received the exact sentence he was promised: 25

years-to-life. (See RT at 5-11.) Accordingly, any claim that his plea agreement was breached by

the state should be denied. 

In the fourth and final prong of this claim, petitioner argues that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to investigate petitioner’s mental health and failed

to request a hearing to determine whether petitioner was competent to stand trial. He states that

counsel had in his possession records that demonstrated petitioner had “a documented Bi-Polar

disorder” and had spent two months in the hospital when he was a child because of a suicide

attempt. (Pet. at 11.) Petitioner also states that he was depressed, homeless, and without a job at

the time of the crime, but “counsel failed to even investigate this as a possible defense.” (Id.) 

Finally, petitioner states that when his trial counsel visited him in jail, petitioner informed him

that he had been placed in a “safety cell” because of a suicide attempt. (Id.) 

4

In support of his claim in this regard, petitioner has filed medical records

indicating that when he was 12 years old he was admitted to the hospital because he had

attempted suicide by standing in front of a speeding truck. (Traverse, Ex. 1.) Shortly prior to

this incident, petitioner had been removed from his family and placed in foster care. (Id.) 

Petitioner was diagnosed with “atypical bipolar disorder” and was prescribed medication to

control his mood swings and “angry spells.” (Id.) Petitioner has also filed a letter dated March

25, 2003, which he received from Irwin S. Rosenfarb, a professor at the California School of

Professional Psychology, after writing to ask some general questions about bi-polar disorder. 

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(Traverse, Ex. 2.) In his letter, Dr. Rosenfarb states that bipolar disorder is a severe psychiatric

disorder characterized by manic and depressive episodes, that patients with this disorder need to

be treated continually with medication, that stress may bring on manic or depressive episodes,

and that the disorder will get worse if left untreated. (Id.) 

 As described above, the California Superior Court provided a reasoned decision

on the merits of petitioner’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of his

failure to request suspension of the criminal proceedings to determine whether petitioner was

competent to stand trial. (Answer, Ex. F at consecutive pgs. 2-3.) Accordingly, that opinion

provides the basis for the state court judgment. Avila, 297 F.3d at 918. The Superior Court

rejected the claim as follows:

Regarding petitioner’s fourth reason, the court record reveals

petitioner entered his plea on October 2, 1997. He wasn’t

sentenced until February 19, 1998, and had several court

appearances in the interim. The trial court never made any

observations petitioner may have been incompetent. His trial

counsel filed a declaration, attached to the People’s Return, which

indicates petitioner never appeared incompetent during the

proceedings. 

Moreover, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, petitioner must establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s

alleged deficient representation. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)

466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Other than

making general assertions he was prejudiced, quoting extensively

the definition of prejudice, and making a bare assertion that his

prior convictions were somehow unconstitutional, petitioner

provides no facts from which the court could conclude the showing

of prejudice has been made. 

(Answer, Ex. F at consecutive pgs. 2-3.)

Assuming arguendo that this pre-plea claim has not been waived, it should be

denied. Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

Therefore, counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to

make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d

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1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994)

(internal citation and quotations omitted). On the other hand, where an attorney has consciously

decided not to conduct further investigation because of reasonable tactical evaluations, his or her

performance is not constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 734

(1998); Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d

181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691). A reviewing court must “examine the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct ‘as of

the time of counsel’s conduct.’” United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

 A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks sufficient present ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or lacks a rational as

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.

402, 402 (1960). See also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993); Williams v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 567, 608 (9th Cir. 2004). In the end, whether a defendant is capable of understanding

the proceedings and assisting counsel depends on “evidence of the defendant’s irrational

behavior, his demeanor in court, and any prior medical opinions on competence to stand trial.” 

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). None of these factors is determinative, but any

one of them may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt regarding competence. Id. The burden

of establishing mental incompetence rests with the petitioner. Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341,

1343 (9th Cir. 1985); Lee v. United States, 468 F.2d 906, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1972); see also

Williams, 384 F.3d at 608. Retrospective determinations of incompetency are disfavored and

considerable weight is to be given to any lack of contemporaneous evidence of a petitioner’s

incompetence to stand trial. Williams, 306 F.3d at 608.

Petitioner has provided no specific examples or evidence to demonstrate that he

was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist counsel. As

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explained by one court, “[i]n cases finding sufficient evidence of incompetency, the petitioners

have been able to show either extremely erratic and irrational behavior during the course of the

trial . . . or lengthy histories of acute psychosis and psychiatric treatment . . . .” Boag, 769 F.2d at

1343 (citations omitted). There is no such evidence here. There is also no evidence that anyone

perceived petitioner was unable to comprehend or help with the proceedings. No party raised a

question as to petitioner’s competency before the trial court. See Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 528 (9th

Cir. 1993) (a defense counsel’s silence on the petitioner’s competency is some evidence that the

petitioner showed no signs of incompetence at that time). See also Medina v. California, 505

U.S. 437, 450 (1992) (“defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s

ability to participate in his defense”); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1094 (2003) (finding

it significant that neither the prosecutor or the trial judge expressed any concerns about

petitioner’s competence). On the contrary, respondent has submitted the declaration of

petitioner’s counsel, wherein counsel declares that it did not appear petitioner was or may have

been incompetent to stand trial, he believed that petitioner understood the proceedings and the

consequences of the charges against him, and petitioner was able to effectively assist him in

preparing a defense. (Answer, Ex. L.)

 Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that his bi-polar disorder rendered him

incompetent to enter a plea or to understand the proceedings. See Chavez, 656 F.2d 512, 518

(9th Cir. 1981) (“evidence of possible present incompetence, such as a history of psychiatric

problems in the remote past, may be so overshadowed by other evidence of present competence

that it does not demand further investigation at an evidentiary hearing”). In connection with his

guilty plea, petitioner declared that he fully understood his plea and its consequences. (CT at 86-

87.) At the change of plea hearing, petitioner informed the court that he read and understood the

change of plea form that he had signed. (RT at 5.) Petitioner also stated that he had no questions

about the plea. (Id. at 6.) Although petitioner now contends that his attorney took advantage of 

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his mental condition to coerce him to plead guilty, petitioner informed the trial judge that he had

not “been forced or threatened into entering this plea in any way.” (Id. at 7.) 

 The decision of the California Superior Court rejecting petitioner’s claim in this

regard is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. The record before the

court does not substantiate petitioner’s claim that he was unable to understand the proceedings

against him or to enter a voluntary and knowing guilty plea, nor does it raise a “bona fide doubt”

as to his competency to stand trial. In light of petitioner’s demeanor and actions during the

relevant proceedings and a relative lack of any other indication that petitioner was not competent

to enter a plea, counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a competency hearing.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Petitioner “submits that an evidentiary hearing is imperative to resolving this

issue.” (Traverse at 26.) In a habeas proceeding, “a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial if he presents sufficient facts to create a real and

substantial doubt as to his competency, even if those facts were not presented to the trial court.”

Deere v. Woodford, 339 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Boag, 769 F.2d at 1343). A

“good faith” or “substantial doubt” exists in this regard “when there is substantial evidence of

incompetence.” Deere, 339 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Cuffle v. Goldsmith, 906 F.2d 385, 392 (9th

Cir. 1990)). For the reasons explained above, petitioner has failed to show a real and substantial

doubt as to his competency to stand trial. Accordingly, the court does not find good cause to

conduct an evidentiary hearing.

B. Trial Court’s Acceptance of Plea Agreement

In his next claim, petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

when the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by allowing petitioner to enter into a plea

agreement that violated California law. (Pet. at 5.) As in the claim above, petitioner argues that

the plea bargain itself was illegal under California’s Three Strikes Law and that the provision

allowing for dismissal of his prior serious felony conviction enhancements was invalid. (Id. at 5,

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Petitioner’s plea agreement provided that petitioner was: 5

pleading guilty to and admitting all of the charges and the

allegations on the information with some understandings. 

That understanding is, first of all, that you will be making a request

to the Court through your counsel to exercise its discretion and

strike at least one of the strikes, 1170.12 allegations. If the Court

strikes the allegation, then everything else will remain and you will

be sentenced accordingly. If the Court does not strike the

allegation, the DA has agreed to strike the two 667(a) allegations

which are the enhancements of five years each for prior serious

felonies.

(RT at 5-6.) The trial court ultimately declined to strike any of the prior conviction allegations

contained in the information against petitioner. (Id. at 54.) However, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the prosecutor made a motion to strike the Cal. Pen. Code § 667(a) enhancement

allegations. (Id. at 54-55.) That motion was granted and petitioner received a 10-year reduction

in his sentence. (Id. at 55.) 

Petitioner argues that these facts violated the following California statutes:

Prior felony convictions shall not be used in plea bargaining as

defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7. The prosecution shall

plead and prove all known prior felony convictions and shall not

enter into any agreement to strike or seek the dismissal of any prior

felony conviction allegation except as provided in paragraph (2) of

subdivision (f).

Cal. Pen. Code § 667(g). See also Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(e). 

The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior

felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant

to Section 1385, or if there is insufficient evidence to prove the

prior conviction. If upon the satisfaction of the court that there is

insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction, the court

may dismiss or strike the allegation.

Cal. Pen. Code § 667(f)(2). See also Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(d)(2).

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11.) Petitioner argues: “[w]hen the court violated the law in order to obtain a conviction,

petitioner was denied [the] right to a fair hearing.” (Id. at 12.) 

5

Respondent counters that: (1) petitioner’s challenge to the terms of the plea

agreement is not cognizable because it concerns matters that occurred prior to petitioner’s plea of

guilty and petitioner has received the benefit of his bargain; (2) petitioner lacks standing because

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he has suffered no injury but, instead, received a benefit from the plea bargain in the form of a

reduced sentence; and (3) petitioner has suffered no prejudice because he received a ten-year

reduction in his sentence. Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that: (1) his claim is cognizable

because jurisdictional challenges to a conviction are not waived by a guilty plea; and (2) even

though he obtained a ten-year reduction in his sentence as a result of the plea bargain, he suffered

prejudice because his “sentence and conviction are void” and, therefore, he “in fact can’t receive

any benefit.” (Traverse at 32.)

Petitioner’s claim in this regard was raised for the first time in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. G.) The Court of Appeal

summarily denied the petition. (Id.) Petitioner subsequently raised this claim in a petition for

writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied it. (Answer,

Exs. I, K.) Under those circumstances, this court must independently review the record to

determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado, 223 F.3d at 

982.

As explained above, a guilty plea generally waives all claims of constitutional

violation occurring before the plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. However, "jurisdictional" claims

are an exception to this rule. See United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989),

amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir.1990). Claims that an applicable statute is unconstitutional or

that an indictment fails to state an offense are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea. 

United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991). However, petitioner is not claiming

that any California statute is unconstitutional or that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction. Rather, he claims that the plea bargain he entered into was in technical violation of

a valid California statute. Accordingly, his claim does not implicate the jurisdiction of the court

and was waived by the entry of a guilty plea. If petitioner’s sentence had been imposed under an

invalid statute and/or was in excess of that actually permitted under state law, a federal due

process violation might be presented. See Marzano, 915 F.2d at 552 (due process violation

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found where petitioner’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole could not

be constitutionally imposed under the state statute upon which his conviction was based). 

However, petitioner has failed to make any such showing. Petitioner’s sentence was not imposed

under an invalid statute and was actually lower than permitted under state law. 

Even assuming that petitioner’s claim was not waived, it should be denied. 

Petitioner is claiming, in essence, that his right to due process was violated because his plea

bargain violated California sentencing law. Habeas relief for a sentencing error may be available

if a petitioner can show that a state court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws resulted in

fundamental unfairness. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir.1994) ("[a]bsent a

showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws does

not justify federal habeas relief."). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). 

Any state law error in petitioner’s plea bargain did not result in a complete

miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, petitioner received a benefit from the plea bargain in the

sense that he received a ten-year reduction on the sentence he would have received had he been

found guilty after a trial. The court notes in this regard, once again, that the evidence against

petitioner was overwhelming. It was clearly in petitioner’s best interests to enter a guilty plea in

this case. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Whether Application of Three Strikes Law Violated Petitioner’s Previous Plea

Agreements

In his next claim, petitioner argues that “because both of petitioner’s prior plea

bargains/contracts occurred before the enactment of California’s Three Strikes Law on May 7,

1994, and because petitioner’s prior contracts with the state made no mention of the subsequent

enactment being added into the contract – California’s Three Strikes law cannot become a part of

the contract, and, therefore, petitioner’s prior plea bargains cannot be used as strikes.” (Pet. at

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 Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from, among 6

other things, impairing the obligation of contracts. Any claim that use of petitioner’s prior

convictions as “strikes” under the Three Strikes Law violated the California constitution is not 

cognizable in this federal habeas corpus petition. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Middleton, 768

F.2d at 1085. 

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13.) He contends that use of his prior convictions as “strikes” violated his rights to due process

and equal protection. (Id. at 6.) In the traverse, petitioner further clarifies the nature of his claim

as follows:

Petitioner’s claim can be summed up thus: The use of Petitioner’s

prior plea bargains as “strikes” violates Article I, Section 10 of the

United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 9 of the

California Constitution because California’s three strikes law was

never a part of the original plea bargain/contract, nor can it become

a part of the contract.” 

(Traverse at 33-34.)6

Petitioner’s claim in this regard was raised for the first time in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the Shasta County Superior Court, and again in a petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E at 30; Ex. I at 83.) The

claim was denied on the merits in a reasoned decision by the Shasta County Superior Court, as

follows:

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed August 3, 1999, is

denied.

The sentence imposed was not in violation of the negotiated plea. 

(See People v. Michael David Anthony C028811). PC 1170.12 is

not an ex post facto law. People v. Brady (1995) 34 Cal.App.3d

651. 

(Answer, Ex. E.) The opinion of the Superior Court provides the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila, 297 F.3d at 918. 

To the extent petitioner is arguing that his prior convictions are invalid because he

was not informed they could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings to enhance his sentence,

his claim is barred by Lackawanna v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna the Supreme

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Court held that where, as here, a petitioner's state court conviction was later used to enhance a

criminal sentence, "the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a

petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained."

532 U.S. at 403-04. The Supreme Court has allowed a petitioner to collaterally challenge a prior

conviction only "where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment." Id. at 404. Because there is no evidence that petitioner was proceeding without

counsel in connection with his prior guilty pleas, the "failure to appoint counsel" exception does

not apply and he is precluded from collaterally attacking those convictions through a § 2254

petition. See id. at 406. 

In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that his prior guilty pleas were

invalid. “Before a court may accept a defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant must be advised of

the ‘range of allowable punishment’ that will result from his plea.” Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d

234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988). However, state courts are not required to advise criminal defendants of

all collateral consequences of a plea or of all possible ancillary or consequential results which

may flow from a plea of guilty. Id. at 235; see also United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965

(9th Cir. 2000). Thus, a defendant's ignorance of collateral consequences does not deprive a

guilty plea of its voluntary character. United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (1990);

Torrey, 842 F.2d at 235. The possibility of future sentence enhancement is a collateral, not a

direct, consequence of a guilty plea. Brownlie, 915 F.2d at 528; United States v. Garrett, 680

F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, petitioner’s guilty pleas were not rendered involuntary

by his ignorance of the possibility of future sentence enhancement under California’s Three

Strikes Law. See Wheeler v. Yarbrough, 352 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1094-95 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In

short, petitioner’s prior guilty pleas were not involuntary or unintelligent based on the fact that he

was not advised that the law might change and that his conviction might result in a longer

sentence enhancement than that in force when he pled guilty.

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Petitioner also argues that his current sentence breached the plea agreements

entered with respect to his prior convictions because he did not agree, in entering the agreements,

that the conviction later could be used to enhance his sentence under the Three Strikes law. 

Assuming arguendo that this claim is not barred by Lackawanna, it should be denied. A guilty

plea is invalid if induced by a promise which renders the plea involuntary. Machibroda v. United

States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1986). When a

plea agreement rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so

that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 

Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Due process concerns of fundamental fairness require that a prosecutor keep the promises upon

which a defendant relies in entering into a plea agreement. Claims of a breached plea agreement

are analyzed according to contract law standards of interpretation, such that a court looks to what

was reasonably understood by the parties to be the terms of the agreement and whether or not

those terms were fulfilled. See United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Petitioner’s claim fails because he does not allege that the prosecutor failed to

abide by any particular term of the prior plea agreements. He has not shown any promise by the

prosecutor that the convictions would not be used later to enhance a future sentence under a law

that did not yet exist and he has not shown that there was a promise that the law would not

change. In fact, petitioner concedes that this subject was not addressed in the earlier proceeding. 

Any contention that the trial court that imposed petitioner’s current sentence breached his prior

plea agreements does not compel a different conclusion. The sentencing court was not a party to

petitioner's earlier agreements and was not bound or restricted by them. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that the decision of the state

courts rejecting this claim was an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

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D. Failure of the California Court of Appeal to Consider Petitioner’s Traverse Prior to

Issuing its Ruling

Petitioner claims that the California Court of Appeal violated his right to due

process when it issued a ruling on his petition for writ of habeas corpus before receiving his

traverse. He argues, “[i]f this court concludes that petitioner has a constitutional right to pursue a

writ of habeas corpus, then due process demands that petitioner be entitled to all the steps in

habeas corpus proceedings. It stands to reason that if petitioner is denied his right to a traverse

and a chance to rebut the States arguments, then he has been denied his constitutional right to due

process of law.” (Traverse at 41.) 

This allegation fails to state a federal claim. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d

26 (9th Cir. 1989) (errors in a state post-conviction review proceeding are not addressable

through federal habeas corpus). Accordingly, it should be denied.

E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In his final claim, petitioner argues that his sentence of twenty-five years to life

for a non-violent felony constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Pet. at 6, 16-20.) This claim

was raised on petitioner’s direct appeal and summarily denied by the California Supreme Court

on petition for review. (Answer, Exs. B, C.) Accordingly, the court will analyze this claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Successful challenges in federal court to the proportionality of particular sentences

are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983). See also Ramirez v.

Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004). “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict

proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are

‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, in recent years the United States Supreme Court has held that it

was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the California Court of

Appeal to affirm a sentence of two consecutive 25 year-to-life imprisonment terms for a petty

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theft with a prior conviction involving theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (holding

that a sentence of 25 years-to-life in prison imposed on a grand theft conviction involving the

theft of three golf clubs from a pro shop was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the

Eighth Amendment). 

Because petitioner was sentenced as a recidivist under California’s Three Strikes

law, “in weighing the gravity” of his offense for purposes of a proportionality analysis, the court

“must place on the scales not only his current felony,” but also his criminal history. Ewing, 538

U.S. at 29. See also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 768. This is not a case in which the petitioner’s

criminal history is comprised solely of non-violent offenses stemming from a single, dated

incident and single guilty plea resulting in the imposition of only a one-year jail (as opposed to

prison) sentence. See Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 768-69. Rather, petitioner suffered prior convictions

for first degree burglary and second degree robbery and received a five-year prison sentence as a

result of his robbery conviction. (Traverse at 12-13.). 

Although harsh, petitioner’s sentence is not inconsistent with federal law as set

forth in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court noted above. The sentence imposed

was within the statutory maximum for the offense committed by petitioner and was not grossly

disproportionate to the crime of conviction in light of his criminal history. See Andrade, 538

U.S. at 77; Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on his Eighth Amendment challenge to his conviction. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 11, 2005.

JFM:8:anthony0081.hc

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