Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01747/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01747-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BABETTE BERIONES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV1747-LAB (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Dkt No. 23]

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICER

DANIEL MAKIS, OFFICER GUILLERMO

MENDEZ and DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is before the court on defendants' Motion To Dismiss

Second Amended Complaint ("Motion") for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed

Opposition to the Motion. Defendants filed a Reply. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court

finds the issues appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral argument. For the reasons

discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Babette Beriones ("Beriones") seeks money damages from the State of California and

two named California Highway Patrol officers. She alleges, in the three iterations of her complaint,

the officers arrested her in the early morning hours of September 5, 2003 for driving under the

influence. She contends, among other things, they lacked reasonable cause to do so, denied her request

to speak with her attorney, and filed false police reports. She alleges, among other things, she suffered

physical and emotional injury from the manner in which the officers treated her during the arrest

process, loss of income when the DMV suspended her driving privileges for refusing a chemical test

after her arrest, and a conviction following trial on misdemeanor DUI charges she alleges were

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predicated on false evidence. By Order entered May 8, 2006, the court granted without prejudice

Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Beriones' original Complaint. By Order entered September 19, 2006,

the court granted Defendants' Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint, on modified reasoning

and without prejudice. Beriones filed her Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), the subject of this

Order, on October 6, 2006.

The SAC names the same three defendants as the two prior iterations of her claims. She relies

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her first two causes of action (Excessive Force alleged against "all

defendants," and Unlawful Policies, Customs Or Habits against the State of California). She alleges

the same five pendant state law claims as in her prior pleadings: perjury; battery; false imprisonment;

negligence; and damages under CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (Interference With Exercise of Civil Rights).

Although she no longer presents a separate unlawful search and seizure claim, she characterizes the

alleged use of excessive force in her First Cause of Action as "constitut[ing] an unlawful seizure"

(SAC ¶ 39), and her general allegations continue to assert the officers lacked probable cause to arrest

her. With respect to the pendant state law claims, the SAC alleges Beriones complied with the

California Tort Claims Act ("CTCA") and timely presented the claims to the State of California's

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, pursuant to CAL. GOV. CODE § 945.4, which

the Board rejected on about April 23, 2004. SAC ¶ 37. That SAC paragraph addresses a deficiency

identified in her First Amended Complaint, where she failed to allege the essential element of

prerequisite compliance with the CTCA. 

Defendants move to dismiss the SAC on grounds: the Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim is barred by the CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1 two-year statute of limitations; any latent

unlawful arrest claim is barred by the "favorable termination" rule ofHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994) ; and her state law claims are barred by the CAL. GOV. CODE § 945.6(a)(1) six-month statute

of limitations. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

A motion to dismiss under FED.R.CIV.PROC. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is

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 To the extent Beriones may still be attempting to pursue an unlawful arrest claim, the court reiterates

its prior determination that claim is foreclosed by the Heck v. Humphrey rule, as elaborated in the court's Order

May 8, 2006 Order dismissing her Complaint.

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appropriate only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Timebarred claims provide no basis for relief, as the court lacks jurisdiction to address such claims. 

B. The Federal Claims Are Time-Barred

 To state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege deprivation of federal

rights secured by the United States Constitution or laws caused by a person acting under color of state

law. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). The court construes the SAC First Cause of

Action as abandoning the unlawful arrest claim this court previously found would be barred by the

Heck v. Humphrey rule, leaving only a Fourth Amendment claim defendants used excessive force in

effectuating Beriones' arrest on September 5, 2003.1 The SAC challenges the type and use of physical

force and intimidation allegedly associated with the arrest, which can trigger Fourth Amendment

protections. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.10. Were she successful on such a claim, it would not

necessarily implicate the validity of her underlying convictions, affirmed on appeal, for violation of

California's drunk driving laws, CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23152(a), 23152(b). 

Defendants move to dismiss the excessive force claim on statute of limitations grounds. "State

law determines the statute of limitations for § 1983 suits." Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159

F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995)

(per curiam) ("Section 1983 actions are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of

limitations purposes"); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). California's personal injury

statute of limitations appears at CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 335.1 and provides a limitations period of two

years. "However, federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations

begins to run in a § 1983 action." Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 379, citing Elliott v. City of Union City, 25

F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994). "The accrual of a § 1983 claim depends upon the substantive basis

of the claim." Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 380. Generally, a claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 179, citing Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802. In its May 8, 2006

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Order granting defendants' Motion To Dismiss the Complaint, this court determined Beriones knew

or had reason to know her neck condition was made worse at the time of the arrest, so that her

excessive force claim accrued contemporaneously with her arrest, and finds nothing in the SAC to alter

that determination. Her SAC allegations relate to the manner in which she was arrested, the allegedly

aggressive way in which the arresting officer handcuffed her and drove her to the CHP office, the

manner in which she was addressed while there, denial of opportunity to use the rest room or a

telephone, her unsuccessful attempts to provide a breath sample to test her sobriety resulting in a nonconsensual blood test instead, the fear and intimidation she alleges she felt, and the like, all comprising

conduct occurring on September 5, 2003 and thus known to Beriones no later than that date. Beriones

filed her Complaint September 8, 2005, after the limitations period deadline. 

Beriones contends in her Opposition that she had the assistance of retained counsel, James

Dunn, Esq., in pursuing her CTCA claim. She was informed that claim was denied in a May 7, 2004

letter. Beriones Decl. ¶ 4. With no explanation for the time lag, and suggesting she had representation

through and including the filing of her Complaint in this action, she declares: "On Monday,

September 5, 2005 my then retained attorney James Dunn attempted to file a civil claim on my behalf,

but was unable to do so because it was a Court holiday, Labor Day," but he told her "he would be given

a couple of extra days to file." Id. ¶ 5. She represents her counsel filed the Complaint on

September 8, 2005, and that she was purportedly "unaware that my claim had been filed in pro per."

Id. Notwithstanding Berione's representations, on its face, the Complaint caption identifies no counsel,

identifies herself as proceeding pro per, and bears what purports to be her own signature with a date

of September 8, 2005. Dkt No. 1. Although the latitude accorded pro se plaintiffs does not excuse noncompliance with the rules of civil procedure, courts liberally construe pro se filings. The court

permitted Beriones to file a SAC, despite the appearance her claims are time-barred, because the court's

records indicate she is not represented by counsel in this action. The court accorded her the

opportunity to demonstrate any tolling theory or other showing of a later accrual date for her claims in

consideration of her pro se status. Her amended pleading and her Opposition to the Motion make no

showing adequate to relieve her from the strictures of the statute of limitations, and she is silent

regarding any explanation for the sixteen (16) months delay between her CTCA claim result and the

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filing of this action. Moreover, from her Declaration, it appears she was actually assisted by counsel

from the administrative claim process through the preparation and filing of her Complaint, warranting

no further leniency in this case. 

Under FED.R.CIV.P. ("Rule") 6(a), the day of the event giving rise to a claim is not included in

the calculation of a statute of limitations period. Beriones' two-year statute of limitations to pursue

Section 1983 claims accordingly began to run on September 6, 2003. The last day of a limitations

period is included in the calculation and, in her case, would normally have been September 5, 2005.

However, when the last day of a limitations period falls on a weekend or a legal holiday, "the period

runs until the end of the next day. . . ." Rule 6(a). September 5, 2005 was a legal holiday. Accordingly,

in order to be timely, Beriones' Complaint had to be filed no later than September 6, 2005. The

Complaint was filed September 8, 2005. Consequently, her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are barred by the

two-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed. 

C. The State Law Claims Are Time-Barred

Defendants move to dismiss all Beriones' state law claims as barred by CAL. GOV. CODE §

945.6(a)(1), setting a six-month statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit against a public

entity/employee following receipt of written notice of the result on a cause of action for which an

administrative claim must first be presented. Beriones acknowledges the state Claims Board rejected

her claim on April 23, 2004. She avers she received a letter dated May 7, 2004 informing her of that

decision. Beriones Decl. ¶ 4. She delayed filing her Complaint for sixteen (16) months thereafter.

Accordingly, all her state law claims must also be dismissed as untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendants' Motion To Dismiss is

GRANTED. This action is dismissed as to all claims and all parties, with prejudice, as plaintiff's

causes of action are all barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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