Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00344/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00344-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA MARIE PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.F. CHANG’S CHINA BISTRO, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:15-cv-00344-RMW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 26

Following this court’s August 6, 2015 order granting defendant P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 

Inc.’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 23, on August 28, 2015, plaintiff Anna Marie Phillips filed a 

First Amended Class Action Complaint, Dkt. No. 25 (“FAC”), alleging under California law that 

defendant discriminated against her and other guests with a gluten intolerance. Before the court is 

P.F. Chang’s motion to dismiss the FAC, Dkt. No. 26.1 Plaintiff filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 29, 

and defendant filed a reply, Dkt. No. 31.2The court held a hearing on the motion on October 30, 

2015. For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES the motion to dismiss.

 

1 Defendant requests judicial notice of certain documents from P.F. Chang’s website. Dkt. No. 27. 

The court GRANTS defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice of these documents.

2 Defendant also requests judicial notice of certain documents it attaches to an appendix in support 

of its reply brief. Dkt. No. 31-1. Because the contents of those documents are, in the main, not 

subject to judicial notice and the court has not relied on them in reaching its decision on the 

current motion to dismiss, the court DENIES defendant’s request for judicial notice. Plaintiff’s 

objections to the appendix, Dkt. No. 34, are SUSTAINED.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that P.F. Chang’s discriminated against her 

and other guests with celiac disease or a gluten allergy or intolerance by charging $1.00 more for 

some gluten-free menu items than for comparable non-gluten-free menu items. Dkt. No. 25 

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 17-27. Plaintiff claims that P.F. Chang’s adds the additional charge to gluten-free 

items despite the fact that the difference in cost it incurs between providing regular menu items 

and their gluten-free counterparts is negligible. Id. ¶ 22. P.F. Chang’s allegedly accommodates 

customers’ other dietary requests at no additional charge. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff proposes to represent 

a class of “[a]ll persons who (1) have been diagnosed with celiac disease, or an intolerance or 

allergy to gluten, and (2) who purchased items from P.F. Chang’s gluten-free menu in California 

within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint and continuing to the present.” Id. ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from celiac disease and “must eat a diet of foods not containing 

gluten and that have not been exposed to gluten” and therefore must order from the gluten-free 

menu in order to eat at P.F. Chang’s. Id. ¶ 10.

Plaintiff alleges that charging an additional $1.00 for items on the gluten-free menu 

constitutes discrimination under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.) 

(“Unruh Act”) and the Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq.) (“DPA”). Plaintiff 

further alleges violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 

et seq.) (“UCL”) and makes a claim for “restitution based on quasi-contract/unjust enrichment.” 

Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive relief, and an award of attorney’s fees. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering 

whether the complaint is sufficient, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the court need 

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not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by 

exhibit” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citation omitted).

B. Claims Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act

As in her initial complaint, plaintiff’s first claim is brought under California’s Unruh Civil 

Rights Act (Cal. Civil Code § 51 et seq.) and is based upon two theories: (1) intentional 

discrimination and (2) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which 

constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

The Unruh Act provides that: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 

equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, 

medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full 

and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). It further provides that a 

violation of the right of any individual under the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

1. Threshold Issue of Disability or Medical Condition

A threshold issue to plaintiff’s claims is whether plaintiff, or anyone who suffers from 

celiac disease or has been diagnosed with an intolerance or allergy to gluten, has a “disability” or 

“medical condition” as defined under the Unruh Act. Both terms are specifically defined in 

California Government Code § 12926, to which the Unruh Act refers. 

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The definition of a “disability” under the Unruh Act is:

Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic 

disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following:

(A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: 

neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, 

respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, 

digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.

(B) Limits a major life activity. For purposes of this section:

(i) “Limits” shall be determined without regard to mitigating 

measures such as medications, assistive devices, prosthetics, 

or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating 

measure itself limits a major life activity.

(ii) A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic 

disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity 

if it makes the achievement of the major life activity 

difficult.

(iii) “Major life activities” shall be broadly construed and 

includes physical, mental, and social activities and working.

See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(e)(1); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(m) (emphasis added). 

The statute defines “medical condition” as “[a]ny health impairment related to or 

associated with a diagnosis of cancer or a record or history of cancer” or “genetic characteristics.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(i) (emphasis added). The statute further clarifies:

For purposes of this section, “genetic characteristics” means either 

of the following:

(A) Any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or 

chromosome, or combination or alteration thereof, that is known to 

be a cause of a disease or disorder in a person or his or her offspring, 

or that is determined to be associated with a statistically increased 

risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that is presently not 

associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.

(B) Inherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or 

family member, that are known to be a cause of a disease or disorder 

in a person or his or her offspring, or that are determined to be 

associated with a statistically increased risk of development of a 

disease or disorder, and that are presently not associated with any 

symptoms of any disease or disorder.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(i)(2) (emphasis added).

Defendant argues that the FAC has again failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest that 

plaintiff’s celiac disease constitutes a “disability” under the Unruh Act or DPA or a “medical 

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condition” under the Unruh Act. Dkt. No. 26 at 17-21. 

The FAC adds detail to plaintiff’s previous allegations regarding the symptoms and effects 

of celiac disease. See FAC ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff alleges that she “has been diagnosed with celiac 

disease and must eat a diet of foods not containing gluten and that have not been exposed to 

gluten.” FAC ¶ 10. Plaintiff further alleges that she “will suffer adverse health consequences if 

she ingests gluten, including but not limited to abdominal pain and cramping, diarrhea, bloating, 

impaired motor skills, vomiting, nausea, headaches, pins and needles, and fatigue.” Id. Plaintiff 

states that she “has to pay careful attention to the foods she eats and cannot eat at some restaurants 

at all because of the risk of cross-contamination.” Id. The FAC alleges:

If Defendant did not provide gluten-free items, Plaintiff would be 

unable to eat at P.F. Chang’s restaurants because even items that are 

not made with wheat, barley, or rye could be cross-contaminated 

and thus cause Plaintiff intestinal distress. In other words, Plaintiff 

would have no way of avoiding gluten when dining at P.F. Chang’s 

restaurants absent gluten-free preparation. She could not simply eat 

some foods and avoid others but, absent a strictly gluten-free 

offering, she would have to avoid them all or risk dire consequences.

Id. Plaintiff further alleges that celiac disease “is associated with an increased risk of developing 

cancer, including intestinal lymphoma,” id. ¶ 15, and “is an inheritable and hence genetic 

characteristic.” Id. ¶ 16.

A few cases have held that an individual with a severe food allergy does not have a 

disability because he or she can avoid the consequences of ingestion of the offending food by 

merely avoiding it. Thus, according to these cases, the allergy has little effect on a major life 

activity.

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See, e.g., Land v. Baptist Medical Center, 164 F.3d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1999) (peanut 

allergy was not a disability); Slade v. Hershey Co., No. 1:09CV00541, 2011 WL 3159164 (M.D. 

Pa. Jul. 26, 2011) (same, where plaintiff was required to “strictly avoid ingestion, handling, and 

 

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Plaintiff argues, and the court agrees that the Unruh Act covers conditions that merely “limit” a 

major life activity (Cal. Govt. Code §12926(m)), whereas the ADA requires that the condition 

“substantially” limit a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. 12102 (1)(a)(o)(emphasis added). 

Nevertheless, the court “may look to the cases from the Americans with Disabilities Act when 

interpreting the [Unruh Act’s definition of a disability].” Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. 

App. 4th 215, 224 n.7 (1999)

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exposure to nuts or airborne nut particles”). 

Neither party has cited, and the court has not found, any case specifically discussing 

whether celiac disease constitutes a disability under the ADA or Unruh Act. However, accepting 

the additional detail in the FAC about the consequences of ingesting or being exposed to gluten,

which plaintiff must guard against, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support her claim that she 

has a disability that impacts a major life activity. The court notes that on a more complete factual 

record, the court might reach a different conclusion.

The plaintiff has also now pled sufficient facts to state a claim that celiac disease meets the 

definition of a “medical condition” under the Unruh Act. Plaintiff now alleges that “[c]eliac 

disease is an inheritable and hence genetic characteristic.” FAC ¶ 16. Defendant argues that 

plaintiff “must allege that she actually inherited characteristics known to cause disease” under the 

second prong of the “medical condition” definition. Dkt. No. 26 at 21. Defendant cites no 

authority in support of its argument, and defendant’s position appears to call for more than the 

statute requires. Accordingly, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that her celiac disease is an “inherited 

characteristic[]” and “known to be a cause of a disease or disorder.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§12926(i)(2).

2. Discrimination Based on Surcharge

Although plaintiff may have a protected disability or medical condition, to prevail on her

claim of discrimination based on a surcharge, plaintiff must show that defendant denied full and 

equal accommodations to patrons such as plaintiff who have celiac disease. Defendant argues that 

plaintiff cannot do so because at defendant’s restaurants, “[a]ll guests pay the same price for a 

gluten-free menu item, whether or not the particular guest has celiac disease.” Dkt. No. 26 at 6.

As the court’s prior order explained, plaintiff’s theory of discrimination is that P.F. 

Chang’s alters its menu items for free for certain customers, but not for persons suffering from 

celiac disease; therefore, P.F. Chang’s does not provide “full and equal” accommodations or 

services to those suffering from celiac disease. Dkt. No. 29 at 3-4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges, 

among other things, that:

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(b) Defendant created an entirely separate—and higher priced—

gluten-free menu targeted to persons with celiac disease; (c) 

Defendant directs customers with celiac disease to the gluten-free 

menu rather than offering to make modifications for celiac 

customers the way Defendant does for other customers (e.g., 

vegetarians, persons with peanut allergies); (d) the price differential 

between the regular-menu items and their gluten-free-menu 

equivalents is the same across the board, regardless of the specific 

additional cost of preparing each dish, if any . . . .

Id. at 4 (citing FAC ¶¶ 3-6, 12, 17-19, 22). In contrast to the way defendant handles requested 

accommodations for celiac disease, “P.F. Chang’s does not impose a surcharge for making dietary 

accommodations to its regular menu items,” such as making items spicier or vegetarian and 

“ensuring no cross-contamination.” FAC ¶ 4. In summary, plaintiff alleges that customers with 

celiac disease are singled out and charged more for meals that are no different from regular meals 

for which P.F. Chang’s makes adjustments for food preferences for dietary needs without extra 

charge. 

As the court’s prior order explained, there is limited authority discussing whether a 

restaurant, if requested, must accommodate a customer’s food allergy by serving a comparable 

substitute meal that has the offending ingredients omitted, let alone whether the restaurant must 

provide the substitute meal at the same price. The Ninth Circuit has explained in construing the 

ADA, which served as a model for the Unruh Act, that:

Title III [of the ADA] prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of 

the “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” The 

ordinary meaning of this language is that whatever goods or services 

the place provides, it cannot discriminate on the basis of disability in 

providing enjoyment of those goods and services. This language 

does not require provision of different goods or services, just 

nondiscriminatory enjoyment of those that are provided. Thus, a 

bookstore cannot discriminate against disabled people in granting 

access, but need not assure that the books are available in Braille as 

well as print. Likewise, an insurance office must be physically 

accessible to the disabled but need not provide insurance that treats 

the disabled equally with the non-disabled.

Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 

2010) quoting Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 1990)

(emphasis added); see also Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999); 

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Ford v. Schering–Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998). Harkins offers some support 

for defendant’s argument that since defendant makes gluten-free meals available to all customers

at the same price, it is like the bookstore that offers access to everybody and charges the same 

price to all customers for their books but does not offer Braille products or at least not at the same 

price as regular books. 

The court’s prior order cited an Information Sheet prepared by the Disability Rights 

Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for the proposition that a

restaurant “does not have to make a fundamental alteration of its operations to accommodate a 

disability such as alter its menu or provide different foods to meet a patron’s particular dietary 

needs.” Dkt. No. 23 at 9 (citing Dkt. No. 13-1 at 67). Defendant submits that the Information 

Sheet supports defendant’s position that P.F. Chang’s may offer fundamentally different meus 

items (gluten-free meals) at the same price to all customers. However, the Information Sheet does 

suggest that a restaurant may be required to omit or substitute certain ingredients upon request of a 

patron if the restaurant does this for other customers. That is all that plaintiff contends that P.F.

Chang’s is required to do to make a menu item gluten free. 

Plaintiff has pleaded that making gluten-free meals merely requires substituting for gluten 

or omitting gluten, which is similar to what P.F. Chang’s does for customers who want less spicy

or vegetarian dishes. Plaintiff further pleads that offering gluten-free meals involves negligible, if 

any, additional cost, FAC ¶ 22, but P.F. Chang’s has targeted customers with celiac disease and 

discriminated against them by charging more for gluten-free meals. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may not be able to be proved. As with plaintiff’s prior complaint, 

plaintiff admits certain facts that seem to contradict plaintiff’s assertion that the items on 

defendant’s gluten-free menu are, in essence, the same as those on defendant’s regular menu.

Gluten-free means that barley, wheat, and rye cannot be used. FAC ¶ 10. Gluten-free meals 

cannot “have been exposed to gluten.” FAC ¶ 2. Thus, according to plaintiff’s own allegations, 

even if two menu items contain the same naturally gluten-free ingredients, they cannot be prepared 

in the same way. The evidence may establish that gluten-free items are different products for 

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which defendant can charge what it determines is appropriate. That would not be discriminating 

against a customer with celiac disease because the gluten-free meals are offered to all customers at 

the same price.

The ultimate question is whether P.F. Chang’s, in providing gluten-free meals, is providing 

different products or whether the price differential with regular meals is a pretext for 

discrimination against those with celiac disease. Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, she has 

stated a plausible claim for relief.

3. Intentional Discrimination Under the Unruh Act

Even assuming that plaintiff has a disability and was discriminated against, plaintiff must 

also allege that P.F. Chang’s intentionally discriminated in order to state a claim for intentional 

discrimination. To prevail on a disability discrimination claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act 

other than one that involves a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she was 

denied the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in a 

business establishment; (2) her disability was a motivating factor for this denial; (3) defendants 

denied plaintiff the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services; 

and (4) defendants’ wrongful conduct caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. 

Wilkins-Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Intentional 

discrimination is required for an independent violation of the Unruh Act but not for a violation of 

the Unruh Act that is based upon a violation of the ADA. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 

4th 661, 665 (2009). “[A] plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act must plead and 

prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.” 

Hankins v. El Torito Rests. Trsts, 63 Cal. App. 4th, 510, 517-18. “A disparate impact analysis or 

test does not apply to Unruh Act claims.” Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 

824, 854 (2005). Evidence of disparate impact, however, may be probative of intentional 

discrimination in some cases. Id.

Plaintiff’s central argument is that that the existence of a separate, gluten-free menu is 

evidence of defendant’s discriminatory intent. Dkt. No. 29 at 12. The FAC asserts: “The fact that 

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Defendant created an entirely separate menu of gluten-free items shows that it is targeting a 

special group of people—persons with celiac disease.” FAC ¶ 48. Plaintiff contends that 

defendant’s argument that anyone can order from the gluten-free menu is merely a pretext to 

discriminate against people with celiac disease. Dkt. No. 29 at 9.

The court’s previous order considered and rejected the argument that defendant 

intentionally discriminates. However, since the court now finds that plaintiff has adequately pled 

that P.F. Chang’s discriminates by charging more for gluten-free meals, one can reasonably infer 

that P.F. Chang’s intentionally discriminates by targeting customers with celiac disease.

Accordingly, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that P.F. Chang’s 

intended to discriminate against patrons with celiac disease.

4. Unruh Act Violation Based on an ADA Violation

As a separate theory for a violation of the Unruh Act, plaintiff once again alleges a 

violation of the ADA. A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act and does 

not require a showing of intentional discrimination. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); Munson, 46 Cal.4th at

692 (2009). A plaintiff states a cause of action for violation of the ADA where she alleges that (1) 

she is disabled, (2) defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 

accommodation, and (3) plaintiff was denied public accommodation by the defendant because of 

her disability. See Dunlap v. Association of Bay Area Governments, 996 F. Supp. 962, 965 (N.D. 

Cal. 1998). As discussed above, plaintiff’s complaint now sufficiently pleads a viable claim that 

plaintiff suffers from a disability and that she was denied accommodation by the failure of P.F. 

Chang’s to provide her with a gluten-free meal at the same price as a comparable regular meal.

Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion to dismiss the Unruh Act claim based on an ADA 

violation. 

C. Disabled Persons Act

Plaintiff’s second claim is for a violation of California’s Disabled Persons Act, California 

Civil Code § 54 et seq. The DPA guarantees “[i]ndividuals with disabilities . . . full and equal 

access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, . . . 

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privileges of all . . . hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement, resort, 

and other places to which the general public is invited[.]” Id. § 54.1(a)(1). A violation of the 

ADA also constitutes a violation of the DPA. Id. § 54.1(d). Plaintiff’s DPA theory is that the 

surcharge for gluten-free items constitutes a violation of the ADA. FAC ¶ 64-72. Because the 

court holds that plaintiff has adequately pled an ADA violation, she has also pled a DPA claim. 

Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion to dismiss the DPA claim. 

D. Unfair Business Practices

Plaintiff’s third claim is for a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. See Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 

business act or practice.” Id. Under the “unfair” prong, plaintiff alleges that “defendants 

discriminated against customers with celiac disease and gluten sensitivities by surcharging them 

for purchasing gluten-free items.” FAC ¶ 77. The UCL prohibits unfair business practices, which 

includes those practices that are “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially 

injurious to consumers and requires the court to weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct 

against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Ass’n., 

182 Cal. App. 4th 247, 257 (2010). 

Plaintiff argues that P.F. Chang’s “took advantage of celiac customers, who it knew could 

not simply forego gluten-free items if they did not wish to incur a surcharge owing to the dire 

health consequences of consuming gluten.” Dkt. No. 29 at 20 (citing FAC ¶¶ 5, 25, 77). Since the 

court now holds that plaintiff sufficiently alleges discrimination, she adequately states an unfair 

business practice. The motion to dismiss the unfair business practice claim is DENIED.

E. Unlawful Business Practices

Plaintiff’s fourth claim is for a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, 

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. Under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, 

plaintiff alleges that defendant’s surcharge was unlawful because it violated the Unruh Act or the 

Disabled Persons Act. FAC ¶ 84. As explained above, plaintiff has pleaded a claim for violation 

of the Unruh Act or Disabled Persons Act. The court therefore DENIES the motion to dismiss the 

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UCL unlawful claim.

F. Restitution Based on Quasi-Contract / Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiff’s fifth claim is for restitution based on quasi-contract or unjust enrichment. As 

she did in her initial complaint, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendant took additional monies from 

plaintiff and members of the putative class for gluten-free menu items that were substantially 

identical to non-gluten free menu items except for the presence of gluten based solely on the fact 

that plaintiff and the putative class cannot consume foods with gluten and had no choice but to pay 

a surcharge for gluten-free foods.” FAC ¶ 87. Plaintiff adds an allegation that “is unjust to 

provide goods or services to disabled customers at a premium when modifications are provided to 

non-disabled customers upon request free of charge, as alleged.” Id. ¶ 88.

As the court previously explained, the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment or 

restitution based on quasi-contract are not well settled in California. See, e.g., Astiana v. Hain 

Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[U]njust enrichment and restitution are 

not irrelevant in California law. Rather, they describe the theory underlying a claim that a 

defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit ‘through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.’). 

Nonetheless, “it is well settled that an action based on an implied-in-fact or quasi-contract cannot 

lie where there exists between the parties a valid express contract covering the same subject 

matter.” See Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indem. Co., 44 Cal. App. 4th 194, 203 (1996).

P.F. Chang’s argues that plaintiff cannot recover under an unjust enrichment theory 

because plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract regarding the meal. Defendant argues that 

“[i]n exchange for monetary payment, plaintiff received the gluten-free menu items she ordered.” 

Dkt. No. 26 at 16. The FAC does not dispute the existence of a contract; rather, plaintiff asserts: 

To the extent that any contract existed between Plaintiff and other 

putative class members, on the one hand, and Defendant on the 

other, these contracts were procured through fraud and/or are 

unenforceable or ineffective because, among other reasons, the 

contracts were illegal and violated public policy in that they violated 

the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Disabled Persons Act and the 

Business Practices Act..

FAC ¶ 89. 

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Plaintiff has not identified any basis for finding that a contract between P.F. Chang’s and 

its customer was procured by fraud or is unenforceable or ineffective for some reason. The FAC 

merely recites a legal conclusion. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, to the extent that P.F. Chang’s and plaintiff entered into a 

contract, plaintiff cannot bring an unjust enrichment claim. 

However, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendant unjustly retained a benefit from 

plaintiff. As explained above, plaintiff has pled, and repeatedly argued, that gluten-free foods are 

not materially different from other foods, in ingredients or difficulty of preparation, yet celiac

customers are forced to pay more for gluten-free meals. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a claim 

for unjust enrichment, and the court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Dated: November 23, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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