Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-189/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944-SC

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND 

GRANTING MOTION FOR 

JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

This Order Relates To:

Case No. C-13-1173 SC

SHARP ELECTRONICS CORP. and 

SHARP ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING 

COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

 HITACHI LTD., et al, 

 Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Defendant Thomson S.A.'s ("Defendant") 

motion to dismiss the above-captioned Sharp Plaintiffs' 

("Plaintiffs") complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Case 

No. 13-1173 ECF No. 1 ("Compl."), Case No. 07-5944 ECF No. 1765 

("MTD"). The motion is fully briefed. Case No. 07-5944 ECF Nos. 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 1 of 17
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1835 ("Opp'n") (filed under seal), 1875 ("Reply").1 Finding this 

matter suitable for disposition without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b), the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant's motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint and GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for 

jurisdictional discovery for the reasons explained below. 

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is a French holding company with its principal place 

of business is in Issy-les-Moulineaux, France. Compl. ¶ 72. 

Thomson Consumer Electronics Corporation ("Thomson Consumer")2 is a 

wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant, through which Plaintiffs 

allege Defendant manufactured cathode ray tubes ("CRTs"), the goods 

at issue in this antitrust MDL. Id. Plaintiffs contend that 

"[Defendant] dominated and/or controlled the finances, policies, 

and/or affairs of [Thomson Consumer] relating to the antitrust 

violations alleged in [Plaintiffs' Complaint]." Id. ¶ 73. Thomson 

Consumer is based in Indiana, but its United States CRT plants 

closed in 2004. Id. 

According to Plaintiffs, Defendant "sold its CRTs internally 

to its television-manufacturing division, which had plants in the 

 1 In its reply brief, Defendant provides two new declarations, to 

which Plaintiffs object on the grounds that Defendant cannot 

present new evidence on reply, per Civil Local Rule 7-3(d)(1). ECF 

No. 1890. The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs' objections. Defendant 

knew that its reply evidence was pertinent to this dispute and 

should have presented it earlier, providing Plaintiffs with an 

opportunity to respond. In any event, the Court does not find the 

declarations at issue dispositive of the parties' dispute.

2 Plaintiffs' Complaint refers to Defendant and Thomson Consumer 

collectively as "Thomson," but since resolution of this motion 

requires the Court to evaluate the two entities' relationships and 

connections to this jurisdiction, the Court refers to them 

separately.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 2 of 17
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

United States and Mexico, and to other television manufacturers in 

the United States and elsewhere." Id. ¶ 72. Defendant sold its 

CRT business in 2005, but Plaintiffs allege that between March 1, 

1995, and December 2007, Defendant "manufactured, marketed, sold 

and/or distributed [products containing CRTs ("CRT Products")] 

either directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates 

throughout the United States." Id. 

Plaintiffs sued Defendant under federal and state antitrust 

laws. Defendant now moves to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Defendant filed a declaration from its current 

General Secretary with its motion. ECF No. 1765-1 ("Cadieux 

Decl."). That declaration states (among other things) that 

Defendant is purely a holding company, with no operations, offices, 

employees, property, books, records, bank accounts, agents, 

registrations, or business activities in the United States. Id. at 

2-3. It also asserts that Defendant has never manufactured CRTs or 

CRT Products in the United States or elsewhere, and that Defendant 

and Thomson Consumer maintain separate corporate structures, 

offices, finances, and business activities. Id. According the the 

declaration, Thomson Consumer -- over which the Court undisputedly 

has jurisdiction -- was solely responsible for CRT sales, 

marketing, and pricing in the United States. Id. at 3. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The Court may consider evidence presented in affidavits and 

declarations determining personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 3 of 17
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006). "[T]his demonstration requires that the plaintiff 

make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 

withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). 

"[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff 

. . . ." Id. (quotations omitted). "The plaintiff cannot simply 

rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, but uncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true." Mavrix Photo, 

Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quotations and citations omitted). The Court may not assume the 

truth of allegations that are contradicted by affidavit. Data 

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1977).

Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

only if (1) a statute confers jurisdiction and (2) exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process. See

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 

1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Since the federal Clayton Act, 15

U.S.C. § 22,3 fulfills the statutory requirement for jurisdiction 

 3 The statute reads in relevant part: "Any suit, or proceeding 

under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not 

only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also 

in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; 

and all process in such cases may be served in the district of 

which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." Under the 

Clayton Act, the basis for minimum contacts inquiry is the United 

States -- not an individual state -- because that statute provides 

for nationwide service of process. The Court finds on this point 

that exercise of pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law 

claims is appropriate. See Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1180-81; 

see also Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 4 of 17
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

in this case, the question on this motion is whether exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with due process. For a court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

consistent with due process, the defendant must have "certain 

minimum contacts" with the relevant forum "such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 

463 (1940)). If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts, 

personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction 

or specific jurisdiction. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 

F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction applies where a defendant's activities in 

the state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," even if 

the cause of action is unrelated to those activities. Data Disc, 

557 F.2d at 1287.

For general jurisdiction to exist over a 

nonresident defendant . . . , the defendant 

must engage in "continuous and systematic 

general business contacts," . . . that "approximate physical presence" in the forum 

state . . . . This is an exacting standard, 

as it should be, because a finding of 

general jurisdiction permits a defendant to 

be haled into court in the forum state to 

answer for any of its activities anywhere in 

the world.

 

Cir. 1977). Those claims arise out of the same nucleus of 

operative facts as Plaintiffs' federal claims, see id., and the 

Court finds that judicial economy, fairness, and convenience 

counsel in favor of retaining jurisdiction over all claims.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 5 of 17
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). This is a high standard. The 

Ninth Circuit has regularly declined to find general jurisdiction 

even where the contacts were quite extensive. See, e.g., Amoco 

Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.3 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (citing cases). "Factors to be taken into consideration 

are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in 

business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an 

agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated 

there." Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 

1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).

Generally, the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship 

"is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the 

parent on the basis of the subsidiaries' minimum contacts with the 

forum." Unocal, 248 F.3d at 925. However, "if the parent and 

subsidiary are not really separate entities [i.e., alter egos], or 

one acts as an agent of the other, the local subsidiary's contacts 

with the forum may be imputed to the foreign parent corporation."

Id. at 926 (quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should exercise general 

jurisdiction over Defendant because Thomson Consumer is Defendant's 

agent, and Thomson Consumer is within the Court's general 

jurisdiction. See Opp'n at 12-18. Plaintiffs do not argue that 

Defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in its own right, 

though they reserve the right to make that argument pending 

jurisdictional discovery. Id. at 18 n.17.

In support of their agency argument, Plaintiffs contend that 

Defendant is not a mere holding company, since Defendant's 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 6 of 17
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

executive officers during the conspiracy period had titles 

reflecting operational responsibilities, and several of Defendant's 

executives served on Thomson Consumer's board, suggesting that 

Defendant performed direct operational and oversight functions for 

Thomson Consumer. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs also claim that 

Defendant had control over Thomson Consumer because Plaintiffs 

alleged that Defendant "dominated or controlled Thomson Consumer's 

finances, policies, and/or affairs." Compl. ¶ 73. Here, 

Plaintiffs cite facts from their exhibits, stating that there was 

overlap between Defendant and Thomson Consumer's executive officers 

and board; that the United States CRT market was so important to 

Defendant that it would have been directly involved in it if not 

for Thomson Consumer; and that some of Defendant's executive 

officers worked from Thomson Consumer's United States office. Id.

at 15-16. 

Defendant argues that the declaration of its General Secretary 

controverts all of Plaintiffs' allegations. Specifically, 

Defendant claims that it is located in France and has no 

operations, employees, bank accounts, registered agents for 

process, or offices in the United States. MTD at 5-6 (citing 

Cadieux Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6-7, 8, 10-11, 13). Defendant also points to a 

declaration and SEC filing -- filed as exhibits to Plaintiff's 

opposition -- stating that Defendant is and has always been a mere

holding company, with its principal assets being "the stock of its 

subsidiaries," and that the holding company's principal function 

was to perform corporate activities and secure financing for its 

subsidiaries. Reply at 2 (citing Opp'n Exs. T ¶ 4, HH at 152). 

Defendant concludes that Thomson Consumer was merely an investment, 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 7 of 17
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

and that in any event, Defendant lacked control over Thomson

Consumer.

Much of Defendant's argument concerns the import of two Ninth 

Circuit cases concerning foreign defendants' agents and general 

jurisdiction. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., the Ninth Circuit held, "The 

existence of a relationship between a parent and its subsidiaries 

is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the 

parent on the basis of the subsidiaries' minimum contacts with the 

forum." 248 F.3d at 925. Relying on the fundamental principle of 

corporate separateness, by which corporations are distinct entities 

from their shareholders over which jurisdiction must be established 

individually, the Unocal Court found a distinction between active 

parent corporations, involved directly in decision-making about 

their subsidiaries' holdings, and "super-corporations," which exert 

so much control over their subsidiaries that the subsidiaries' 

presence substitutes for the parent's. Id. at 928-30. 

The Unocal Court relied on a body of Ninth Circuit law holding 

that a subsidiary functions as a parent corporation's 

representative if it performs services that are "sufficiently 

important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a 

representative to perform them, the corporation's own officials 

would undertake to perform substantially similar services." See

id. at 929-30 (citing Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 

1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells 

Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 423 (9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth 

Circuit did not find that the plaintiffs in its case had alleged 

that the defendant would have conducted and controlled operations 

in America absent a subsidiary. Id. The court found insufficient 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 8 of 17
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant held stock, directly 

or indirectly, in an American subsidiary, and that the defendant 

stated in an annual report that its "US unit" would expand the 

defendant's marketing network and produce more valuable products in 

the United States. 

In a more recent case, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 

F.3d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 

(Apr. 22, 2013), the Ninth Circuit found general jurisdiction 

because the foreign defendant had a complex "General Distributor 

Agreement" with its American subsidiary. That Agreement gave the 

defendant almost complete control over its subsidiary's activities. 

Id. at 914-15, 920-21. The Bauman Court also found that since the 

United States market was 19 percent of defendant's worldwide sales, 

the defendant "could not afford to be without a U.S. distribution 

system," the activities of its United States subsidiary were so 

important that the defendant would have found a way to have those 

activities performed if its subsidiary did not exist. Id. at 922. 

Under those circumstances, any United States affiliate of the 

defendant -- whether it was a subsidiary or a non-subsidiary --

would have been a representative of the defendant for purposes of 

the agency test. Id. 

Defendant accordingly argues that Plaintiffs' allegations are 

directly controverted by the Cadieux Declaration, and that 

Plaintiffs' pleadings are too vague and general to establish a 

prima facie case that Thomson Consumer was Defendant's agent. 

Reply at 9-10. Defendant then argues that Plaintiffs are wrong 

that Thomson Consumer was so important to Defendant that Defendant 

would have undertaken CRT sales and marketing in the United States 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 9 of 17
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

absent its relationship with Thomson Consumer. Id. at 10. 

According to Defendant, its status as a holding company -- as 

opposed to a manufacturer, like the defendant in Bauman -- means 

that it could simply hold a different type of company as an 

investment, contradicting any argument that Thomson Consumer was so 

important to Defendant that Defendant would have done Thomson 

Consumer's work itself if Thomson Consumer were not Defendant's 

subsidiary. Reply at 10 (citing Unocal, 248 F.3d at 929 

(suggesting that imputing a subsidiary's jurisdictional conducts to 

the parent would be improper where a holding company could simply 

hold another type of subsidiary)). Finally, Defendant claims that 

Thomson Consumer's CRT manufacturing business was not sufficiently 

important to Defendant since Thomson Consumer sold its United 

States-based CRT plants and its CRT business in 2005. Id. (citing 

Compl. ¶ 73).

Plaintiffs' facts and allegations about Defendant's 

relationship with Thomson Consumer are inconclusive under both 

Unocal and Bauman. 

First, the Court finds that the fact that some of Defendant's 

executives served on Thomson Consumer's board or even shared office 

space with Thomson Consumer, without more, does not establish 

enough involvement in Thomson Consumer to treat that entity as 

Defendant's agent. The Ninth Circuit has found that the latter

activities do not necessarily lead to a finding of agency, and 

Plaintiffs' facts do not push Defendant's relationship with Thomson 

Consumer over the line into an agency relationship. See Unocal, 

248 F.3d at 926-27. 

Further, the Court does not find Plaintiffs' allegations 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 10 of 17
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

regarding job titles to be sufficient in this case. Even resolving 

this factual dispute in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court finds that the 

job titles given -- e.g., "Senior Executive Vice President[s] of 

Operations Coordination" -- do not, without more, suggest actual 

involvement in Thomson Consumer's activities. They are too vague.

Finally, the Court finds that the remaining facts Plaintiffs 

cite in support of their contention that Defendant is not only a 

holding company and that Thomson Consumer is Defendant's agent do 

not support the conclusion that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie 

case for general jurisdiction. The facts Plaintiffs cite are 

mostly references to Defendant's work either in general or with 

other parties. In any event, they do not directly controvert 

Defendant's declaration that -- at least as to Thomson Consumer --

Defendant was merely a majority shareholder, not a controlling 

corporation. Even if the Court considers the significance of the 

United States CRT market to Defendant, the Court cannot find from 

the facts on record that Thomson Consumer is Defendant's agent, or 

that they have the kind of synergistic relationship that would 

warrant linking the two companies for jurisdictional purposes. See

Chan, 39 F.3d at 1406. The fact that some of Defendant's executive 

officers appear to have worked in Thomson Consumer's office during 

the relevant period cuts closer, but on balance and resolving 

disputes in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court does not find that these 

connections are close enough to warrant finding that Thomson 

Consumer is Defendant's agent.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet 

their burden of showing that general jurisdiction is appropriate. 

However, as explained below, the Court finds that jurisdictional 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 11 of 17
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

discovery is appropriate on this issue and the matter of specific 

jurisdiction. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction

If a finding of general jurisdiction is inappropriate, a court 

may still exercise specific personal jurisdiction depending on "the 

nature and quality of the defendant's contacts in relation to the 

cause of action." Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The Ninth Circuit 

applies a three-prong test when analyzing a claim of specific 

jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct his activities or consummate some transaction 

with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; 

and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with 

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 

reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff bears the burden of 

satisfying the first two prongs, and if he or she fails to satisfy 

either, specific jurisdiction is not established. Sher v. Johnson, 

911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff satisfies 

these prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant "to present a 

compelling case" that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477

(1985).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court has specific jurisdiction over 

Defendant because (1) Defendant purposefully directed its CRT 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 12 of 17
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

conspiracy activity at the United States and (2) Plaintiffs' claims 

arise out of Defendant's conspiracy activity in the United States. 

Plaintiffs also contend that exercising personal jurisdiction over 

Defendant would be reasonable. Defendant opposes all of these 

points.

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test for purposeful 

direction: "the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 

the forum state." Id. 

When considering the first prong, "something more than mere 

foreseeability" of an effect in the forum state is necessary. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit has warned, "the foreign-actswith-forum-effects jurisdictional principle must be applied with 

caution, particularly in an international context." Kramer Motors, 

Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' complaint is too vague to 

allege specific conduct on Defendant's part. See Reply at 11-12. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' references to "defendants" or a 

combined "Thomson" entity are insufficiently vague, and that the 

exhibits Plaintiffs attached to its opposition brief are similarly 

inconclusive as to which entity is at issue when, for example, 

other defendants refer to allegedly conspiratorial meetings 

involving "Thomson" generally. See id. at 12 (citing Opp'n Exs. CI). Further, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs' allegations and 

evidence do not demonstrate that Defendant aimed any act at the 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 13 of 17
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

United States, since Defendant has never manufactured or sold CRTs, 

or conducted any CRT business at all, in the United States. 

However, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant participated in 

meetings concerning pricing and production information related to 

CRTs and CRT Products' market in the United States, and that 

Defendant's actions had a "direct, substantial, and reasonably 

foreseeable effect on U.S. Commerce." See Opp'n at 18-19 (citing 

Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 136, 169, 199); see also Opp'n at 3-4 nn. 2-4 

(citing exhibits concerning other defendants' discovery materials 

that reference "Thomson").

Failure to satisfy this first prong would be enough to show 

that Plaintiffs fail to meet the Ninth Circuit's standard for 

specific jurisdiction. However, Defendant also argues that 

Plaintiffs fail to allege facts or submit evidence establishing 

that any of Defendant's acts were a but-for cause of Plaintiffs' 

antitrust claims. See Reply at 13-14. Defendant contends that 

Plaintiffs' argument on this point is attenuated. Plaintiffs 

alleged that their claims would not have arisen absent all of the 

defendants' global price-fixing conspiracy and that Defendant 

participated in the conspiracy, so Defendant's forum-related 

activities were necessarily a but-for cause of Plaintiffs' 

antitrust injuries. See Opp'n at 20 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 11, 27-29, 

72-73, 169, 287). 

An antitrust defendant "expressly aims" an intentional act at 

a forum state when its allegedly anticompetitive behavior is 

targeted at a resident of the forum, or at the forum itself. See

In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 

716, 743 (9th Cir. 2013). On Plaintiffs' allegations and evidence, 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 14 of 17
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the Court cannot find that Defendant engaged in any intentional 

acts directed at the United States. The Court finds Plaintiffs' 

allegations as to Defendant in particular are unacceptably bare and 

conclusory, and Plaintiffs' evidence, which often references 

"Thomson" generally, is similarly inconclusive. Under these 

circumstances, the Court cannot find that Defendant intentionally 

aimed any action toward the United States, that Defendant's actions 

were the but-for cause of Plaintiffs' claims, and especially that 

exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable. 

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise specific 

jurisdiction over Defendant. However, the Court finds 

jurisdictional discovery appropriate.

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

The district court has discretion to allow a plaintiff to 

conduct jurisdictional discovery. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo 

Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977). Requests for 

such discovery should ordinarily be granted "where pertinent facts 

bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted . . . or 

where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary." Id.

(quotations omitted). However, a district court need not permit 

discovery "[w]here a plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction 

appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the 

face of specific denials made by the defendants . . . ." Pebble 

Beach, 453 F.3d at 1160 (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs argue 

that since the record is not fully developed on this issue, and 

central facts are contested, jurisdictional discovery is warranted. 

See Opp'n at 23-24. They also argue that they have shown "some 

evidence" of jurisdiction, and that their allegations are not so 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 15 of 17
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

bare as to warrant denying limited jurisdictional discovery. 

Defendant argues otherwise.

The Court finds that jurisdictional discovery is appropriate 

here. Defendant argues that Thomson Consumer is not its agent, but 

jurisdictional discovery could discover the truth of that matter. 

Jurisdictional discovery could also reveal whether the "Thomson" of 

Plaintiffs' vague allegations and evidence is Defendant or Thomson 

Consumer. Even though Plaintiffs have not made a prima facie 

showing of jurisdiction, their allegations and evidence are not 

entirely bare, and they have made a sufficient case for conducting 

limited jurisdictional discovery to collect evidence related to 

their agency argument and Defendant's intentional conduct toward 

the United States. After discovery has been completed, Defendant 

may again move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 16 of 17
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction WITHOUT PREJUDICE and 

GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery to 

collect evidence related to their agency argument and Defendant's 

intentional conduct toward the United States. Plaintiffs are to 

complete discovery within sixty (60) days of this Order's signature 

date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2013

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2252 Filed 12/11/13 Page 17 of 17