Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06771/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06771-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIKA RIVERA, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

CITY OF MERCED, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-6771 REC SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS. 

On March 28, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Upon due consideration of the written and oral

arguments and the record herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART the motion as set forth below.

I. Factual Background

On the evening of April 15, 2004, Merced Police Department

Officer Stephan Gray was killed. Plaintiff Erika Rivera’s son

was the primary suspect. On April 17, 2004, Plaintiff was

arrested pursuant to a warrant for suspected violation of section

32 California Penal Code, being an accessory by aiding her son

and hindering the law enforcement investigation.

Prior to arresting Plaintiff, officers came to Plaintiff’s

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house with weapons drawn. Plaintiff, her sixteen year old

daughter and eighteen year old son were required to lie on the

ground as officers pointed service pistols at their heads. The

officers apparently left, but returned to Plaintiff’s house at

approximately 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 17, 2004. The

officers served Plaintiff with an arrest warrant, which Plaintiff

alleges was falsely obtained. The officers took Plaintiff into

custody and transported her to the central station. Plaintiff

was handcuffed and shackled as she was transported.

At the station, Plaintiff was booked, searched and put into

custody. When Plaintiff was searched, she was made to undress

completely. A female officer conducted the search and a male

officer was present during the search. Plaintiff was interviewed

by Defendant Merced Police Officer Ray Sterling, who was assisted

by Defendant Officer Dabney who is fluent in Spanish and

translated the interview. The interview was videotaped and

recorded. During the course of the interview, Plaintiff was

repeatedly told in Spanish that officers were going to kill her

son. Plaintiff was held in a single cell for approximately seven

days and “was not provided with adequate clothing, bedding, heat,

medical care and other required comforts of jail.” Compl. ¶ 17. 

Defendants requested bail be set for $500,000 allegedly for

the puprose of keeping Plaintiff incarcerated for a longer period

of time. The purpose of this was to effectuate the apprehension

of Plaintiff’s son.

On Wednesday, April 21, 2004, a criminal complaint was filed

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against Plaintiff and she was taken before a court. The

arraignment began on April 21, 2004 and was continued to April

23, 2004. On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff was released on her own

recognizance. On July 8, 2004, the charge against Plaintiff was

dismissed for insufficient evidence.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 30, 2004. The

Complaint purports to be based on diversity and names as

Defendants the City of Merced; the City of Merced Police

Department; City of Merced Police Officers Dabney, Scott Skinner,

and Ray Sterling; the County of Merced; the County of Merced

Sheriff’s Department; City of Merced Police Officer Vernon

Warnke; the County of Merced District Attorney; and Bureau of

Narcotics Enforcement Agent Eloy Romero. The Complaint alleges

eight causes of action: assault by a peace officer, battery by a

peace officer, false arrest with a warrant by a peace officer,

unnecessary delay in processing and releasing Plaintiff,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation

of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

The County of Merced Defendants (“Defendants”), which

include the County, the Sheriff’s Department, Vernon Warnke and

the District Attorney’s Office, have moved to dismiss based on

failure to state a claim, failure to comply with the California

Tort Claims Act and immunity. Defendants also move to strike

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

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III. Plaintiff’s Non-Opposition

Plaintiff concedes that the claim for punitive damages is

barred by both state and federal law and should be stricken. See

Cal. Govt. Code § 818; Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247, 259-260, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981). 

Plaintiff also concedes that the Complaint incorrectly

alleges that the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is based on

diversity, which is plainly lacking in this case. The Complaint

does, however, include a federal section 1983 claim providing

federal question jurisdiction. Although the form was improper,

it is apparent that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction

based on a federal question. 

IV. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” North Star Int’l

v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The

Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979).

V. Discussion

A. Failure to State a Claim - Generally

Defendants argue that Plaintiff properly alleges the

existence of the County of Merced, the Merced Sheriff’s

Department and the Merced District Attorney, but fails to allege

that any of the individual Defendants are employees of these

public entities. Defendants correctly point out that the

Complaint alleges that, with the exception of Agent Romero, all

the individual Defendants are allegedly employees of the City of

Merced. Defendants also take issue with Plaintiff’s general

allegations against all Defendants, arguing that public entities,

being entities rather than individuals, cannot have committed the

acts against Plaintiff.

As to the federal claims, Plaintiff alleges failure to train

or supervise and that the civil rights violations were committed

in accordance with custom or policy. Compl. ¶¶ 51-52. This

allegation goes against the public entity defendants. As to the

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 Defendants asserted that there was “no need to reach” the 1

issue of whether the Complaint states a claim against a public

entity under the standard set forth in Monell v. New York City

Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d

806 (1986), so the Court will not address the issue at this time.

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state law claims, Plaintiff uses the language “Defendants, and

each of them” which Defendants argue is a “metaphysical

conundrum” because public entities, as entities, cannot be

individual actors. This argument, in addition to being

unsupported by any legal authority, fails to consider that, under

California law, a public entity may be vicariously liable for the

torts of its employees. See Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2(a). 

Defendants are correct, however, that Plaintiff erroneously

alleges that Vernon Warnke is a City of Merced Police Officer

rather than a Sheriff’s Deputy. This correction may be made in

an amended complaint. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

is GRANTED as to the state law claims and DENIED on this basis as

to the federal claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend

consistent with this order.

B. Section 1983 Claim1

Section 1983 provides an avenue of recovery for a person who

was deprived of a federally protected right by a person acting

under color of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s section

1983 claim is at least two claims and the Court has addressed

them separately. 

1. Fourth Amendment

The use of excessive force by an officer in making an arrest

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can support a claim under section 1983 based on a Fourth

Amendment violation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.

Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). The Fourth Amendment’s

“objective reasonableness” standard is used to evaluate such

claims. Id. at 388. 

Plaintiff alleges that the force used in completing her

arrest was excessive. Defendants argue that “a review of the

factual allegations surrounding her arrest reveals that

apparently no force whatsoever was used to effect it.” 

Although the Complaint does not specify which actors were

involved, it does allege that Plaintiff was held at gunpoint, was 

“harmed,” and required medical care. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 22, 55. 

Plaintiff was also shackled as she was transported, which

conceivably could result in injury. Additionally, the facts

allege that Plaintiff was subjected to a strip search, which can

also form the basis of a section 1983 claim based on the Fourth

Amendment. See Fuller v. M.B. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1445-46

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Accordingly, viewing the facts alleged in the Complaint, as

the Court must, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there

are sufficient facts alleged for Plaintiff to state a section

1983 claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation. Defendants’

motion is DENIED and this claim may be included in an amended

complaint. 

2. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of her confinement

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exposed her to risk of harm and that she was deprived of medical

care while incarcerated.

The “Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and

prisons . . . cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981). 

Nonetheless, conditions of confinement may amount to cruel and

unusual punishment in certain circumstances. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 304-05, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991). 

Similarly, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain” proscribed by the Eight Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S. Ct. 2909)). Not every claim of physical

pain or anguish caused by medical conditions is actionable; an

inadvertent failure to provide medical care cannot be said to

constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to

be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 105-06. 

In order to recover for a violation of the Eighth Amendment,

a plaintiff must demonstrate “more than ordinary lack of due care

for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986). She

must show that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” 

Deliberate indifference is satisfied by a showing that the

defendants recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of harm to

the inmates health or safety and it requires a showing that the

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official was subjectively aware of the risk and recklessly

disregarded it. Id. at 828-29.. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 828-29, 834-36, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). 

Defendants argue that “there are no factual allegations

which even remotely approach the deliberate indifference standard

required in order to find a Constitutional/Civil Rights

violation.” Defs.’ Mot. at 11. 

There is no heightened pleading standard in Constitutional

tort cases. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,

1127 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate

indifference based on the facts in order to recover for a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Such a showing is not

required to plead such a claim. The liberal notice pleading

standard set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure governs such claims. 

The Complaint alleges that the “general conditions of

Plaintiff’s confinement . . . exposed Plaintiff to a substantial

risk of serious harm Defendants knew of and disregarded by

failing to take reasonable measures to correct [them].” The

Complaint also alleges that while Plaintiff was confined in jail

she “was not provided with adequate clothing, bedding, heat,

medical care and other required comforts of jail.” These

allegations are sufficient to notify Defendants of the basis for

Plaintiff’s claim. Defendants’ motion is DENIED and this claim

may be included in Plaintiff’s amended complaint. 

///

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 Defendants attached certified copy of Plaintiff’s two page 2

claim to their motion and request that the Court take judicial

notice of the filing. In certain cases a court may take judicial

notice of facts outside the pleadings, such as “records and reports

of administrative bodies,” on motion to dismiss without converting

the motion to one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Mack

v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). Accordingly, the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the

claim.

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C. Compliance with the California Tort Claims Act

Defendants argue that claims one, two, four, six and seven -

all the state law claims except for false arrest and malicious

prosecution - are barred because Plaintiff has failed to comply

with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act. The

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff filed claims with both the City

of Merced and the County of Merced and that these claims were

rejected on October 22, 2004 and November 12, 2004, respectively. 

Defendants argue that the claim that was filed was so lacking 2

“in factual details that it fails to satisfy the Tort Claims Act

for many of Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action.” Defs.’ Mot.

at 4. Defendants also argue that the claims against Defendant

Warnke fail because the claims against his employer fail.

1. Standard for Claims Under the Tort Claims Act

Government Code section 945.4 prohibits suits against public

entities until after a written claim for damages has been

presented to the public entity and rejected. Cal. Govt. Code §

945.4. A claim must be timely filed and include the name of the

claimant, the “date, place and other circumstances of the

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted”

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and provide “[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage

or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of

presentation of the claim.” Id. at § 910. An amount must be

included if less than $10,000 in damages is being claimed.

The California Supreme Court recently considered the purpose

of the claim requirement in determining whether a claim met with

the specificity required by section 910. In Stockett v.

Association of California Water Agengies Joint Power Insurance

Authority the court stated that:

The purpose of these statutes is to provide the public

entity sufficient information to enable it to

adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if

appropriate, without the expense of litigation. 

Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and

specificity required of a pleading, but need only

fairly describe what the entity is alleged to have

done. As the purpose of the claim is to give the

government entity notice sufficient for it to

investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate

meritorious actions, the claims statute should not be

applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been

satisfied.

34 Cal. 4th 441, 446 (2004) (quotations, citations omitted)

(emphasis added). The court also explained that while a claim

must allege all factual bases for recovery from the public

entity, it “need not specify each particular act or omission

later proven to have caused the injury.” Id. at 447. If the

complaint shifts allegations to entirely different facts or

events, the claims requirement is not met, but if the complaint

“merely elaborates or adds further detail to a claim, but is

predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by

the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly

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reflects the facts pled in the complaint.” Id. 

Further, the claims act requirements should be “given a

liberal construction to permit full adjudication on the merits. 

If the claim gives adequate information for the public entity to

investigate, additional detail and elaboration in the complaint

is permitted.” Id. at 449 (quotations, citations omitted). 

Unlike the case with public entities, a claim is not

required in order to maintain an action against a public employee

for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of the

public employee’s employment. See Cal. Govt. Code § 950. 

However, if an action against the employing public entity is

barred, so is an action against any employee thereof. Cal. Govt.

Code § 950.2.

2. Application to Plaintiff’s Claim

The claim submitted to the County of Merced includes the

following (Plaintiff’s response in italics): 

6. Date of Accident/Incident/Loss: April 17, 2004

8. Provide your description of how the Accident/

Incident/Loss/Occurred: This is a claim for the false

arrest, false imprisonment, and false criminal charges

against claimant in violation of her state and federal

constitutional rights.

9. Describe the Damage/Injury/Loss being claimed: The

violation of constitutional rights.

The claim also specifies that the County of Merced, the Merced

Police Department and the District Attorney caused the damage,

indicates that there are no known witness and indicates no

medical professional treated Plaintiff for claimed injuries. 

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This claim is sufficient. It provided notice to the County

of the date of the loss and the factual gist of Plaintiff’s

claim, that she was allegedly falsely arrested and taken to jail. 

This would be enough information for the County to begin an

investigation and indeed the County apparently found it a

sufficient enough claim to warrant rejection. 

Additionally, there is no material difference between the

facts alleged claim and the complaint. The Court acknowledges

that there are no real details in the claim, but the crucial

issue here is that the Complaint elaborates on the basic facts

alleged. Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s causes of action

differ does not change the fact that Plaintiff’s claim and

Complaint are based on the same events. It is the factual and

not the legal basis that is the concern in the Claims Act

requirements. See Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447. Defendants cite

no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must assert

each and every conceivable legal cause of action within a

government claim.

Also, the claim form itself provides only four lines in

which to describe an incident and does not indicate that

additional pages may be attached. By its own form the County has

indicated that it needs only the minimum amount of information to

begin an investigation. This is especially relevant given that

Government Code section 910.4 provides that an entity “shall

provide forms specifying the information to be contained in

claims” and that a party “shall use the form” provided to be in

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conformity with the statute. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law

claims against the County public entities are not defeated by the

California Tort Claims Act. 

As to Defendant Warnke, Plaintiff was not required to file a

claim against him under the Tort Claims Act. Because the claims

against his employing public entity (the County) are not barred,

the claims against him are likewise not barred. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law causes

of action for failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act is

DENIED.

D. Immunity Issues

1. Claim Three - False Arrest

Defendants argue that their actions are immune under both

section 43.55 of the California Civil Code and section 847 of the

California Penal Code. Section 43.55 of the California Civil

Code provides immunity for “any peace officer who makes an arrest

pursuant to a warrant of arrest regular upon its face if the

peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in the

reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to

in the warrant.” Cal. Govt. Code § 43.55. Similarly, section

847(b) of the California Penal Code provides that there may be no

civil liability or cause of action against a peace officer

“acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false

arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest” if “the

arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the

arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” 

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 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of 3

the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest and the accompanying affidavit.

Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifies that

judicial notice may only be taken of a fact that is “not subject to

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Cal. Penal Code § 847(b). 

However, as Defendants acknowledge, the immunity provided by

sections 43.55 and 847(b) is conditional. There is no immunity

if an officer acts on deliberately false information and executes

the warrant with malice or if the officer lacks reasonable cause

to believe the arrest was lawful. 

Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was arrested

pursuant to a warrant but alleges that the warrant was “falsely

obtained.” Compl. ¶ 11. The Complaint further alleges that

Defendants procured Plaintiff’s arrest by “knowingly providing

false or materially incomplete information of a character that

could be expected to stimulate an arrest by knowingly,

oppressively, maliciously, despicably concealing true facts and

providing false facts to obtain a warrant.” Compl. ¶ 35. 

Defendants argue that these allegations are conclusory and

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Defendants cite 

cases involving a criminal suppression hearing and an

administrative warrant for housing violations. These cases are

irrelevant to this civil case. To the extent Defendants argue

that the officer’s belief was reasonable, it is inappropriate at

this juncture. Such an argument is one for summary judgment and

would require, at a minimum, evidence from the arresting

officer. 

3

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reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Given that Plaintiff argues that her

arrest was based on false information, there is a dispute as to

whether the “facts” stated in the affidavit are true. Accordingly,

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is denied. 

 Defendants fail to note that at least one federal court has 4

held that section 821.6 also shields parties such as Defendants

here for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff’s

seventh cause of action. See Crowe v. County of San Diego, 303 F.

Supp. 2d 1050, 1085-86 (S.D. Cal. 2004).

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Bearing in mind that the allegations in the Complaint are

taken as true and that doubts are resolved in favor of Plaintiff, 

dismissal based on immunity is inappropriate at this time and

Defendants’ motion on this basis is DENIED. 

2. Claim Five - Malicious Prosecution

Defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity from

Plaintiff’s state law claim for malicious prosecution under

section 821.6 of the California Government Code . Section 821.6 4

provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury

caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or

administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment,

even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal.

Govt. Code § 821.6. Prosecutors are public employees within the

meaning of the Government Code. Randle v. City and County of San

Francisco, 186 Cal. App. 3d 449, 455-56 (1986). Section 821.6

“is not limited to the act of filing a criminal complaint. 

Instead, it also extends to actions taken in preparation for

formal proceedings. Because investigation is ‘an essential step’

toward the institution of formal proceedings, it ‘is also cloaked

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with immunity.’” Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 28 Cal. App.

4th 1205, 1209-10 (1994). 

Under section 815.2, a public entity is not liable for

injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity if the employee is immune. Cal. Govt. Code §

815.2. This immunity could potentially absolve all Defendants

involved in this motion of liability on the state law malicious

prosecution claim.

In her opposition Plaintiff argues that immunity does not

apply because the acts of Defendants were outside the scope of

their employment. Defendants point out in response that the

Complaint alleges that “Individual Defendants Scott Skinner,

Officer Dabney, Ray Sterling and Vernon Warnke are City of Merced

Officers acting within the coarse [sic] and scope of their

government employment . . ..” Compl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). The

Complaint does not allege that either the district attorney or

any representative of the County of Merced was acting outside the

scope of his or her employment in prosecuting or investigating

this case.

Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state

law malicious prosecution claim is GRANTED. Plaintiff is given

leave to amend this claim, however an amendment will only be

successful if Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that Defendants

were acting outside the scope of their employment. Plaintiff is

reminded that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

will apply to any amended pleading. 

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 At Defendants’ request, the Court hereby takes judicial 5

notice, as public records, of the certified copies of the criminal

complaint and minute orders issued in Plaintiff’s prosecution. 

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E. Failure to State a Claim- Claim Four - Delay

Plaintiff alleges that the delay she experienced between

being arrested and being taken before a court was undue. 

Plaintiff was arrested on April 17, 2004. The criminal

complaint was filed on April 21, 2004 and Plaintiff was brought 5

to court for arraignment on the same day. Plaintiff was released

from custody on her own recognizance on April 23, 2004. 

Defendants argue that the forty-eight hour rule for probable

cause determination that applies in cases in which a person was

arrested without a warrant is inapplicable here and that the

delay in this case was acceptable. Defendants further argue that

Plaintiff’s allegation that the officers were holding her in jail

in an effort to expedite her son’s arrest is irrelevant because

the arrest was valid.

Defendants are incorrect on the law. Section 821 of the

California Penal Code provides that if a person is arrested

pursuant to a warrant, the arresting officer must “take the

defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant or some

other magistrate of the same county.” Cal. Pen. Code § 821. 

Section 825 further specifies that the “defendant shall in all

cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay,

and, in any event, within 48 hours after his or her arrest,

excluding Sundays and holidays.” Cal. Pen. Code § 825(a)(1). 

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 [The time limit was changed from two days to 48 hours in 6

1995, however even prior to the amendment courts often applied a 48

hour standard, so the case law remains on point.]

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As the statute has been interpreted, it appears from the

facts alleged that Plaintiff was probably brought before a

magistrate within 48 hours. Plaintiff was arrested in the early

morning hours of Saturday, April 17, 2004. Saturday and Sunday

would be excluded. The 48 hour period would begin in the early

morning hours of Monday, April 19, 2004. Early morning Tuesday

would be 24 hours and the time period would run out in the early

morning hours of Wednesday, April 21. Because the courts would

not be open at that time, the appearance on Wednesday morning 

would be in compliance with section 825. 

That said, it appears to the Court that the statute does not

provide a blanket authorization for a delay in all cases. The

California Supreme Court has explained that section 825 “does not

authorize a two-day detention in all cases but, instead, places [6]

a limit upon what may be considered a necessary delay, and a

detention of less than two-days, if unreasonable under the

circumstances, is in violation of the statute.” Dragna v. White,

45 Cal. 2d 469, 473 (1955). “Where the arrest is lawful,

subsequent unreasonable delay in taking the person before a

magistrate will not affect the legality of the arrest, although

it will subject the offending person to liability for so much of

the imprisonment as occurs after the period of necessary or

reasonable delay.” Id. California courts have held that the

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only permissible delay is that necessary to “complete the arrest;

to book the accused; to transport the accused to court; for the

district attorney to evaluate the evidence for the limited

purpose of determining what charge, if any, is to be filed; and

to complete the necessary clerical and administrative tasks to

prepare a formal pleading.” Youngblood v. Gates, 200 Cal. App.

3d 1302, 1319 (1988) (quoting People v. Williams, 68 Cal. App. 3d

36, 43 (1977)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intended to induce

Plaintiff’s son to surrender by retaining custody of Plaintiff. 

This is a sufficient allegation of unreasonable delay to state a

claim, particularly in light of the two full business days

between when Plaintiff was placed in custody and when she was

arraigned. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claim four

on this basis is DENIED. 

ACCORDINGLY, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART and Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

FURTHER, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART as

to Plaintiff’s federal Claims.

FURTHER, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is STRICKEN.

///

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FURTHER, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a first amended

complaint consistent with this order. Such pleading shall

contain a proper jurisdictional allegation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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