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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID W. SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ENERGY NORTHWEST, a Washington

municipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35368

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00580-

TOR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 17, 2015—Richland, Washington

Filed February 12, 2016

Before: Edward Leavy, Susan P. Graber,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Leavy;

Dissent by Judge Graber

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2 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

SUMMARY*

Labor Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment on a

claim of whistleblower retaliation in violation of the Energy

Reorganization Act, the panel held that the plaintiff did not

engage in protected activity when he objected to the security

level designation given to an internal “condition report” of a

safety procedure violation concerning access badges.

Dissenting, Judge Graber wrote that the majoritywrongly

narrowed the scope of the Energy Reorganization Act by

rejecting the whistleblower claim on the basis that the safety

problems were not overlooked, neglected, or concealed by

management and were not concrete and ongoing issues.

COUNSEL

David Whedbee (argued), MacDonald Hoague & Bayless,

Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William G. Miossi (argued) and Matthew W. Lewis, Winston

& Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C.; Angel D. Rains and

Robert A. Dutton, Office of General Counsel, Energy

Northwest, Richland, Washington, for Defendant-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 3

OPINION

LEAVY, Senior Circuit Judge:

David W. Sanders appeals the grant of summary

judgment to his former employer, Energy Northwest, on his

claims of retaliation in violation 42 U.S.C. § 5851 of the

EnergyReorganization Act (“the Act”). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Keenan v.

Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1996), and we affirm.

I. Background

EnergyNorthwest is a Washington municipal corporation

that owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Richland,

Washington. Sanders was a maintenance manager whose

responsibilities included overseeing maintenance contractors

working at the power plant. Sanders also administered

temporary staffing contracts for Energy Northwest. Energy

Northwest terminated Sanders’ employment in April, 2011,

after nineteen years of employment. Energy Northwest

maintains that it terminated Sanders after determining that he

had improperly approved temporary staffing per diem and

travel payments to the father of his daughter’s child. Sanders

maintains that he was terminated for protected behavior under

the whistleblower retaliation provision of 42 U.S.C. § 5851. 

Namely, Sanders claims his objection to the severity level

designation of an internal “condition report” constitutes

protected activity under the Act.

A “condition report” is a report generated by employees

when safety procedures may have been violated. Energy

Northwest, as a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee, is

required to maintain an internal system for documenting

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4 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

potential safety violations. See 10 C.F.R. § 21.21 (requiring

the adoption of reporting procedures for noncompliance with

safety standards, including evaluation and recordkeeping

requirements). Employees are encouraged to create condition

reports on any issue perceived to pose safety concerns. Once

a condition report is created, a condition review group meets

to determine the severity level of the report. The condition

review group is composed of managers in various

departments. This group reviews each condition report and

assigns a severity level in decreasing order of severity: 

“Alpha,” “Bravo,” “Charlie,” or “Delta,” with Alpha

requiring the most effort to review and correct. The condition

review group has latitude in its designation decisions. After

a severity designation is made, the condition report is

reviewed in an operational focus meeting to ensure that

remediation is properly undertaken.

Energy Northwest is also required to maintain an “access

authorization program” to regulate access to its nuclear

facility. See 10 C.F.R. § 73.56 (personnel access

authorization requirements for nuclear power plants). Certain

background checks and assessments are required before a

worker is granted unescorted access, and certain procedures

are prescribed for cancellation of access privileges once a

worker is terminated. A worker who has been granted an

unescorted access badge generally must turn in the badge

within a prescribed time frame after his employment has been

completed.

In October, 2010, Sanders learned that several contractors

working in his maintenance department had completed their

employment without turning in their access badges within the

required time frame of seven days. The maintenance

department was cited in an internal condition report, which

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 5

was designated as a “Bravo.” Sanders wanted his

maintenance department to investigate and fix this problem. 

However, Bruce Peace, the then-head of the security

department, wanted his department to investigate and fix this

problem. After a heated discussion during the operational

focus meeting, management told Pease and Sanders to resolve

these differences outside the meeting. The next day, Sanders

told management that he and Pease could not agree. 

Management sided with Sanders, allowing Sanders’

maintenance group to investigate and remediate this issue.

About two weeks later, the security department received

an internal condition report concerning one employee who

was terminated without turning in his access badge within the

seven-day time frame. The condition review group initially

designated this condition report as a “Bravo.” During the

morning management meeting, Pease offered his opinion that

this condition report should have a “Charlie” designation, and

management agreed. Sanders, however, disagreed, and

opined that this condition report should be designated a

“Bravo.” Management again asked Pease and Sanders to

resolve their differences outside the meeting, but they again

were unable to reach an agreement. The next day, Sanders

told the plant manager, “Well, I don’t agree with their

standards. I believe that they’re lower standards than what

we’re expecting from the plant. If you guys want to let it go

as a Charlie, I’ll let it go as a Charlie, but I’m not in

agreement.” Sanders maintains that this objection over the

“Charlie” designation constitutes protected activity under the

whistleblower protections of the Act.

On September 1, 2011, Sanders filed a whistleblower

complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department of

Labor failed to issue a final decision within one year, and

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6 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

Sanders then filed a complaint in the district court. See

42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(4) (allowing a complainant to bring an

action in federal district court if the Department of Labor has

not issued a final decision within one year of filing); see also

Tamosaitis v. URS, Inc., 781 F.3d 468, 477–78 (9th Cir.

2015) (explaining the operation of the opt-out provision). 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Energy Northwest on the ground that Sanders failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation because his activity

did not “rise to the level of protected activity under [the Act]

or the associated case law.” Sanders timely appealed.

II. Retaliation Claim under the Act

The whistleblower retaliation provision of the Act,

42 U.S.C. § 5851,1protects energy workers who report or

 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) Discrimination against employee:

(1) No employer may discharge any employee or

otherwise discriminate against any employee with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment because the employee (or any

person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)–

(A) notified his employer of an alleged violation of this

chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2011 et seq.);

(B) refused to engage in any practice made unlawful by

this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if the

employee has identified the alleged illegality to the

employer;

(C) testified before Congress or at any Federal or State

proceeding regarding any provision (or proposed

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 7

otherwise act upon safety concerns. The statute specifically

prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise

discriminating against employees for several enumerated acts,

including notifying an employer of a violation, initiating an

enforcement proceeding, or testifying in a safety or

enforcement proceeding. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(A–E). 

The statute also includes a catch-all provision protecting

employees “in any other action to carry out the purposes of

this chapter . . . .” Id. at § 5851(a)(1)(F).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the

Act, an employee must show that “(1) he engaged in a

protected activity; (2) the respondent knew or suspected . . .

that the employee engaged in the protected activity; (3) [t]he

employee suffered an adverse action; and (4) [t]he

circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the

protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse

provision) of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of

1954;

(D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about

to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding

under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended, or a proceeding for the administration or

enforcement of any requirement imposed under this

chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(E) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding

or;

(F) assisted or participated or is about to assist or

participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in

any other manner in such a proceeding or in any other

action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

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8 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

action.” Tamosaitis, 781 F.3d at 481 (alternations in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the [Act’s]

burden-shifting approach to retaliation claims, if an employee

shows that his participation in protected activity ‘was a

contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action

alleged,’ the burden shifts to the employer.” Id. (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(C)). An employer can rebut the

employee’s prima facie case under the Act if it introduces

“clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the

same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of [the

employee’s participation in] such behavior.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 5851(b)(3)(D).

We have held that the Act serves a “broad, remedial

purpose of protecting workers from retaliation based on their

concerns for safety and quality.” Mackowiak v. Univ.

Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984). The

Eleventh Circuit has noted that a broad interpretation is

“appropriate” because it “promotes the remedial purposes of

the statute and avoids the unwitting consequence of

preemptive retaliation, which would allowthewhistleblowers

to be fired or otherwise discriminated against with impunity

for internal complaints before they have a chance to bring

them before an appropriate agency.” Bechtel Constr. Co. v.

Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1995).

In Bechtel, an employee carpenter disagreed with his

foreman about the safety procedures for measuring the

amount of radioactive contamination of the carpentry tools. 

Id. at 929. The carpenter raised his concerns initially with his

foreman, and then with the foreman’s supervisor. Id. at 931. 

The Eleventh Circuit held that the carpenter’s conduct

qualified as protected activity, noting that he “did not merely

make general inquiries regarding safety but, rather, he raised

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 9

particular, repeated concerns about safety procedures for

handling contaminated tools.” Id. The court also noted that

“questioning one’s supervisor’s instructions on safety

procedures [is] ‘tantamount to a complaint.’” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit has also stated that “Section 5851

does not protect every act that an employee commits under

the auspices of safety,” and that “[w]histleblowing must

occur through prescribed channels.” Stone & Webster Eng’g

Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1574 (11th Cir. 1997). In

Stone & Webster, Harrison, an employee ironworker, was

responsible for holding a weekly safety meeting. Id. at 1570. 

Ironworkers had recently been assigned a new responsibility,

ensuring fire safety. Id. At the weekly safety meeting, the

ironworkers complained that this procedure was unsafe. Id. 

Harrison, as foreman, raised the safety issue with the

company’s fire marshal and also filed a complaint with the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. at 1570–71. The

Eleventh Circuit concluded, “If an employee talks about

safety to a plant fire official, an employer and an industry

regulator, he or she acts squarely within the zone of conduct

that Congress marked out under 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1).” Id.

at 1573.

III. Sanders’ Conduct

Sanders maintains that his difference in opinion about the

“Charlie” designation of a condition report was an objection

to a specific practice, policy, or occurrence that he reasonably

believed was a nuclear safety issue, similar to the employees’

complaints in Bechtel and Stone & Webster. Sanders’

conduct, however, is distinguishable. Unlike the carpenter

and the ironworker employees who raised first-hand safety

concerns with their supervisors, Sanders had no independent

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10 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

knowledge of possible safety violations prior to the creation

of the internal condition reports at issue. Sanders did not

generate these condition reports. His employer, Energy

Northwest, was already aware of the potential safety

violations, and its internal process for remediation was

underway.

The essence of Sanders’ complaint concerned which

department - maintenance or security - would take

responsibility for the internal condition reports about access

badges, and at what level of inquiry - “Bravo” or “Charlie.” 

Sanders was given the responsibility for a “Bravo” condition

report involving access badges for several maintenance

contractors. Two weeks later, Pease was given responsibility

for a “Charlie” condition report that involved the access

badge of one terminated employee. Sanders objected to this

“Charlie” designation, but ultimately “let it go as a Charlie.” 

There is no suggestion in the record that because these

condition reports were labeled a “Bravo” or a “Charlie,” they

would not be remedied in due course. Nor is there any

suggestion of any safety concern that was overlooked,

neglected, or concealed by management.

The designation process for condition reportsinvolved the

managers’ collaborative opinions as to the assigned severity

level. The record indicates that if two managers disagreed,

theywere asked to resolve their different opinions, and if they

couldn’t agree, other managers would assign the severity

designation. Here, Sanders expressed a different opinion

from a co-manager, then “let it go.” Under these facts,

Sanders’ single expression of a difference of opinion about

the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition

report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety

concern. See Am. Nuclear Res. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor,

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 11

134 F.3d 1292, 1296 (6th Cir. 1998) (employee never alleged

that employer was ignoring safety procedures; employee

complained about an isolated incident, not a concrete and

continuing safety concern).

Because Sanders’ conduct falls outside the scope of the

Act’s protection, the district court properly granted summary

judgment.

Sanders moved to amend his complaint to include statelaw disability and retaliation claims. This motion was made

less than three weeks before the close of discovery and a year

after filing the complaint. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion. See Royal Ins. Co. of Am.

v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Late

amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed

favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to

the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause

of action.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Energy Northwest, we need not decide whether

Sanders waived the jury trial issue by failing to include the

correct order in his notice of appeal.

AFFIRMED.

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12 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent with respect to the claim of

retaliation under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,

42 U.S.C. § 5851, on two grounds.1

First, the majority rejects Sanders’ claim because the

safety problems were not “overlooked, neglected, or

concealed by management” and were not “concrete [and]

ongoing” issues. Maj. op. at 10–11. But the statute does not

require management to overlook, neglect, or conceal a safety

issue before the protection against retaliation comes into play. 

Nor does the statute require the safety concern to be concrete

and ongoing when the complaint is made.2 Section

5851(a)(1)(F) casts a wide net; it forbids discrimination

against an employee who engages “in any other action to

carry out the purposes of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) 

See Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926 (11th

Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint that

procedures the employer was using to handle an already

identified safety risk was protected activity).

1

I concur in the portion of the opinion that affirms the district court’s

ruling on the motion to amend the complaint.

2

Indeed, the Sixth Circuit case that the majority cites, in support of the

“concrete [and] ongoing” standard, notes that “concrete and continuous”

are not requirements, but only characteristics “typically” found in acts

covered by the statute. Am. Nuclear Res., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

134 F.3d 1292, 1296 (6th Cir. 1998). The opinion goes on to emphasize

that “[a] single act or inquiry may, of course, fall under the [Energy

Reorganization Act’s] scope,” so long as it bears a close nexus to safety. 

Id.

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SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 13

The majority is wrong to narrow the scope of the statute. 

The majority fails to follow Mackowiak v. University Nuclear

Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984), which

held that the statute serves the “broad, remedial purpose of

protecting workers from retaliation based on their concerns

for safety and quality.” In my view, insisting on a faster or

more complete solution to a safety problem about which the

employer is aware plainly falls within the terms of the

statutory “catch-all,” as well as the purpose of the law. In

short, Sanders engaged in protected activity.

Second, the majority improperly resolves factual issues

against the non-moving party, Sanders. The district court

granted summary judgment to the employer. Accordingly, on

de novo review we must construe all facts in favor of

Sanders. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d

1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995).

The majority states that, although Sanders initially

objected to the “Charlie” designation because he believed that

the safety problem deserved a “Bravo” designation requiring

faster and more complete action, he ultimately “let it go as a

Charlie.” Maj. op. at 10. That characterization tells only half

the story. Sanders told the plant manager:

Well, I don’t agree with their standards. I

believe that they’re lower standards than what

we’re expecting from the plant. If you guys

want to let it go as a Charlie, I’ll let it go as a

Charlie, but I’m not in agreement.

Thus, Sanders began by stating his disagreement and ended

by emphasizing his disagreement. A better reading of this

statement to the plant manager is that Sanders gave up trying

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14 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST

to change the outcome, but stronglymaintained his complaint

that the facility was not living up to appropriate safety

standards. A reasonable jury could find that the dispute over

the condition report was protected activity.

Additionally, a reasonable jury could find that this

activity was a contributing factor in Sanders’ termination and

that the reason given was pretextual. See Tamosaitis v. URS

Inc., 781 F.3d 468, 481 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing elements

of proof and burden-shifting; holding that protected activity

need only be a contributing factor in the unfavorable

personnel action). For example, Pease confronted Sanders

over the policy change and threatened: “That’s twice and I

owe you one.” The timing of the investigation also is

suspect, as is Pease’s involvement and his testimony that

contradicted Atkinson’s testimony.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the grant of

summary judgment on Sanders’ retaliation claim. I dissent

from the majority’s contrary holding.

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