Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01279/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01279-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIN ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONAGRA FOODS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-01279-VC 

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION; 

DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

STRIKE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 89, 113

Erin Allen brings this proposed class action against ConAgra Foods, Inc., alleging that the 

label on ConAgra's "Parkay Spray" misleads people about the product's fat and calorie content. 

Allen now moves for certification of a multi-state class, divided into several subclasses. The 

motion is denied, but denial is without prejudice to filing a renewed motion for class certification 

after discovery is complete.

The party seeking class certification bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 23 are met. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 

S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). To certify a class, the Court must also be satisfied that the party 

seeking certification has met the requirements of one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). See

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). Here, the motion for class certification 

contains at least four defects that preclude certification of the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) damages 

class.

1. As Judge Tigar explained in Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-CV-02998-JST, 2014 WL 

4652283 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014), to demonstrate ascertainability in a case like this, a class 

action plaintiff should present a plan for how the class members will be identified. See id. at *4–6. 

Allen has not done so here, and therefore she does not satisfy the ascertainability requirement. 

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However, the Court declines ConAgra's invitation to follow the Third Circuit's approach to 

ascertainability as reflected in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013), also for the 

reasons thoroughly set forth by Judge Tigar in Lilly. 2014 WL 4652283, at *4–6.

2. At the beginning of the class period, the front label of the Parkay Spray bottle stated 

that the product contained zero grams of fat and zero calories. Later in the period, the label stated 

that the product contained zero grams of fat and zero calories "per serving." See Gordon Decl., 

Ex. 1–3. Allen only purchased the product with the revised label. And it's conceivable that a jury 

could find the original label misleading while finding that the revised label is not. If so, Allen's 

claim would fail, leaving no one to represent the absent class members who did have a claim based 

on their purchase of Parkay Spray with the earlier label.

3. Although Allen's damages expert, Colin Weir, appears to have identified a methodology 

that could reasonably measure, on a classwide basis, those damages attributable to the allegedly 

misleading labeling, see Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432, his declaration does not explain in sufficient 

detail how he would apply that methodology on the facts of this case. But it would be 

unreasonable to require that Weir conduct pilot surveys or any pretesting when the parties have 

not yet completed discovery. See Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, No. 12-CV-01831-LHK, 

2014 WL 2466559, at *18 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014).1

4. Allen seeks to certify a class of people from different states, including subclasses for 

claims of breach of express warranty and for violation of the consumer protection laws of many of 

those states. But she has not adequately shown how this case is distinguishable from Mazza v. 

Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012), where the Court identified a number of 

state consumer protection laws and concluded that variance among them precluded certification of 

a multi-state class. In other words, she has not adequately shown how common questions would 

predominate in a case involving so many states, and has not adequately demonstrated how the 

proposed multi-state class action would be manageable. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 

253 F.3d 1180, 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.), amended, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001); Hanlon v. 

 

1

For this reason, ConAgra's motion to strike Weir's declaration, Docket No. 113, is denied.

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Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). For instance, Allen may well be correct 

that, among each of the states in the proposed consumer protection subclass, a plaintiff need not 

provide individualized proof of reliance where the plaintiff can show that an alleged 

misrepresentation is material under a "reasonable consumer" standard. But it appears that 

differences remain in areas such as scienter requirements and damages, and Allen offers only 

conclusory statements that these differences are immaterial. Moreover, while the various 

consumer protection statutes appear largely uniform in their prohibition of "unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices," see Gordon Decl., Ex. 24, Allen has not adequately shown that these terms are 

applied in a uniform manner by courts of the respective states. Cf. Matter of Rhone-Poulenc 

Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The law of negligence, including subsidiary 

concepts such as duty of care, foreseeability, and proximate cause, may . . . differ among the states 

only in nuance . . . . But nuance can be important[.]"). 

For these reasons, the motion for certification of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) is 

denied. However, because it appears likely that Allen could cure the first three of these defects, 

and because it is at least conceivable that she could cure the fourth, denial is without prejudice to 

filing a renewed motion for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class no later than 60 days after the 

close of discovery. 

Allen also argues that, in the event she cannot meet the requirements of a Rule 23(b)(3) 

class, the Court should nonetheless certify a multi-state class for purposes of injunctive relief 

under Rule 23(b)(2). Although "[c]lass certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where 

the primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive," Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 

970, 986 (9th Cir. 2011), nothing would prevent the Court from . . . grant[ing] class certification 

for the purposes of declaratory and injunctive relief and den[ying] [it] to the extent plaintiffs seek 

monetary damages." Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 WL 2702726, at 

*12 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). But to establish Article III 

standing to pursue a claim for prospective relief, "a named plaintiff must show that [s]he h[er]self 

is subject to a likelihood of future injury. Allegations that a defendant's conduct will subject 

unnamed class members to the alleged harm is insufficient to establish standing to seek injunctive 

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relief on behalf of the class." Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045–45 (9th Cir. 

1999). Here, Allen stated in her deposition that she has no interest in buying Parkay Spray as it is 

currently constituted, regardless of whether its label is accurate. Coombe Decl., Ex. 1, p. 33. 

Therefore, Allen cannot possibly be subject to a likelihood of future injury. As a result, even if the 

Court ultimately denied a renewed motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class with prejudice, it would 

not certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 

In the event of a renewed motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, and the event Allen

continues to seek certification of a multi-state class, she should, as part of her required showing as 

to the predominance of common questions and the manageability of such a class, attach, as an 

exhibit to her motion, a set of proposed jury instructions that would govern the trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2015

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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