Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00712/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00712-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dalia Spina,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Maricopa County Department of

Transportation, , a Political

Subdivision of Maricopa County,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-0712- PHX-SMM

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply RE: Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 119). Upon consideration of the arguments of the

parties, the Court makes the following ruling.

Neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 nor the local rules of practice for this

District provide for the filing of a surreply, and surreplies are not authorized by any other

rules of procedure absent express prior leave of the Court. By filing its Surreply and

Motion to File Surreply as one document, Plaintiff has essentially filed a Surreply without

first obtaining leave of this Court to do so. Plaintiff’s Surreply was, therefore, improper. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply fails to offer a

justifiable reason upon which the Court might grant the leave requested. Plaintiff argues

that Defendant raised a new argument in the Reply: whether Plaintiff has evidence to

show that the alleged retaliatory termination was carried out pursuant to a policy or

Case 2:05-cv-00712-SMM Document 124 Filed 04/01/09 Page 1 of 2
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custom as required by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978). However, this argument was raised in response to Plaintiff’s Response. In

her Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argued that she

had established a prima facie case on each of her claims against Defendant, including her

section 1983 claim. While Plaintiff did not refer to section 1983 in her Response per se,

she argued that she had shown the required elements for a First Amendment retaliation

claim, pled in her complaint as a section 1983 claim. Defendant sought to refute that

claim by pointing out that Plaintiff presented no evidence of an unconstitutional

municipal policy, which was her burden to do. Plaintiff will not now be afforded the

opportunity to submit a supplemental pleading, as Defendant did not raise a new and

material point in its Reply. As such, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is now

fully briefed, and ready for the Court’s review. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a

Surreply (Doc. 119). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED striking Plaintiff’s Surreply and Supplemental

Statement of Facts (Docs. 119-120).

DATED this 31st day of March, 2009.

Case 2:05-cv-00712-SMM Document 124 Filed 04/01/09 Page 2 of 2