Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00223/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00223-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MARTIN DANKS,

Petitioner,

vs.

MICHAEL MARTEL, as Acting Warden of San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

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Case No. 1:11-cv-00223 LJO

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER FOLLOWING PHASE II CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

HEARING DATE: May 4, 2011

TIME: 8:30 a.m.

COURTROOM FOUR

This matter came on for a Phase IICase Management Conference (“CMC”) May 4, 2011 at 8:30

a.m. in the above referenced Court, the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill presiding. Petitioner Joseph

Martin Danks (“Danks”) was represented by appointed counsel from the Habeas Corpus Resource

Center (“HCRC”), Gary Sowards, Margo Hunter, and Kevin Bringuel. Respondent Michael Martel, as

Acting Warden of San Quentin State Prison (the “Warden”), was represented by Deputy Attorney

General Leanne LeMon. All counsel appeared telephonically.

Since the March 17, 2011 Phase ICMC, the Warden timely filed an index of lodged state records

on April 8, 2011. Fourteen volumes of state court records, including extensive exhibits presented to the

California Supreme Court during state habeas proceedings, were lodged on the same day. Four days

prior to that, the Supreme Court issued Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), a decision which

will have an impact on granting federal court evidentiary hearings and calls into question the propriety

of pre-petition claims development investigation. Specifically, Pinholster holds that an evaluation of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) state court decision reasonableness “is limited to the record that was before the state

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court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. at 1398. Prompted by Pinholster, the Court issued

an order revising the Phase I budget stating as follows: 

1. In the case of legally exhausted claims for which a factual basis was presented in the California

Supreme Court, pre-petition fact development will be precluded, unless the factual basis

presented in state court is shown to have been incomplete so that additional fact development

would lead to the formation of a new, unexhausted claim.

2. For unexhausted claims, the authorization of funds for pre-petition fact development will be

determined bythe following factors in addition to guiding principles outlined in the Ninth Circuit

Judicial Council CJA Capital Habeas Costs Policy:

a. Efforts previouslyundertaken to develop the evidence sought and the reason these efforts

were unsuccessful.

b. A description of the evidence sought to be uncovered.

c. Reasonable assurance by counsel that the investigation, expert service, or other ancillary

assistance will be efficacious in uncovering the evidence sought.

d. Whether the evidence sought existed and was reasonably accessible at the time of trial.

e. The connection of the evidence sought to a prospective claim that will be raised in the

federal petition.

Applying these guidelines will allow the development of unexhausted claims where petitioners

can establish diligence, efficacy, and claim cognizability. This approach also will facilitate any further

(d)(1) determination of state decision reasonableness based on the same record in federal court as in state

court prior to granting further evidentiary development. The Court is mindful that the development of

evidentiary facts does not necessarily render existing claims unexhausted. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474

U.S. 254, 257-58-260 (1986) (rejecting challenge to new evidence because it did not fundamentally alter

the legal claim the state courts previously considered).

Under this budget revision order, Phase I investigation and claims development was suspended

as of the date of the order, with further explanation and justification to be provided in the proposed

Phase II budget and discussed at the Phase II CMC. In the Phase II budget materials, as well as at the

Phase II CMC, Mr. Sowards has confirmed publicly that the pre-petition investigation and factual

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development contemplated on behalf of Danks is expected to augment existing, legallyexhausted claims

only, rather than give rise to new, unexhausted claims. Referencing the Vasquez v. Hillery opinion,

during theCMC he expressed his good faith belief that the additional fact development investigation will

not render the existing claims unexhausted.

Prior to the CMC, the HCRC attorneys, on behalf of Danks, conferred telephonically with Ms.

LeMon, on behalf of the Warden, to work out a schedule for Phase II litigation tasks. All parties

recognize that the major work to be completed in Phase II is Danks’ preparation and presentation of a

timely federal petition as well as to resolve all exhaustion and statute of limitations issues. This includes

the filing of an answer by the Warden that responds to the allegations of the petition and frames disputed

issues consistent with Rule 5(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. In light of the Phase I budget

revision order, Danks also requested the opportunity to brief the impact of the Pinholster opinion on the

propriety of pre-petition investigation of legally exhausted claims.

Expanding further on the purpose and scope of the proposed Pinholster briefing at the CMC,

Messrs. Sowards and Bringuel noted the complexity of the issues Pinholster raises, including the

appropriate application of § 2254(d)(1) and (2), Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), Landrigan

v. Schriro, 550 U.S. 465 (2007), Wood v. Allen, 130 S.Ct. 841 (2010), the California Constitution, as

well as other California authorities describing controlling principles of California state habeas corpus

practice. Danks believes his Pinholster brief will be comprehensive in explaining the inter-relation of

various controlling precedents, statutes, and conventions. The Court is under the impression the

California Attorney General’s Office is taking the position that Pinholster precludes federal district

courts from considering any evidence beyond what was presented in state court in proceedings governed

by § 2254(d)(1), and therefore that evidentiary hearings will be barred in post-Pinholsterfederal habeas

litigation. While the Court has not yet received any definitive briefing on the issue from the Attorney

General’s Office, the issue framed, as presently understood, relates to a petitioner’s entitlement to an

evidentiary hearing, not pre-petition investigation. The authorities referenced by Danks’ attorneys also

pertain to ascertaining the meaning of a colorable claim, a prima facie case, an unreasonable application

of federal law under § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable determination of facts under § 2254(d)(2) as well as

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the inter-relation between § 2254(d)(2) and the presumption of correctness of state factual findings under

§ 2254(e)(1). All of these issues exceed the scope of litigation tasks to be completed in Phase II.

Since Danks, through his attorneys, concede that he intends to present only exhausted claims in

his anticipated federal petition, the Court directs the parties to defer their Pinholster briefing efforts until

the case is at issue, with the legal and factual issues fully framed and all exhaustion as well as statute

of limitations issues resolved. Further proceedings to discuss a budget and case management plan for

Danks’ case were conducted confidentially. A separate order will be issued and filed under seal

establishing a budget for Phase II of the litigation.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFOR, the parties will adhere to the following schedule:

1. Danks shall file his federal petition no later than September 15, 2011. The petition shall be

presented without points and authorities.

2. Within 60 days from the filing of the petition (November 14, 2011 if the petition is filed on

September 15, 2011), the Warden shall file his answer in conformance with Rule 5(b) of the

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The answer shall address and respond to the allegations of the

petition so as to frame the issues in dispute and raise all substantive and procedural affirmative

defenses. The answer also shall be presented without points and authorities.

3. Within 45 days from the filing of the answer (December 29, 2011 if the answer is filed on

November 14, 2011), the parties will confer and file a joint statement setting forth their

respective positions regarding Danks’ compliance with the statute of limitations and the

exhaustion status of the petition. The matter will stand submitted for the Court to settle the

parties’ disagreements (if any), at which time the Court will take such further action as is

necessary to advance the case. When the Court issues the order resolving exhaustion issues,

Phase II will terminate and Phase III will commence. Under this schedule, Phase II should be

completed by January 15, 2012. A Phase III CMC thereafter will be scheduled by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2011 

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

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