Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04575/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE L.,

1

Plaintiff,

v.

Andrew M. Saul, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-04575-TSH 

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 22, 27

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tyron L. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review 

of a final decision of Nancy A Berryhill, then-Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying 

Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits.

2

 Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 22 (Pl.’s Mot.), 27 (Def.’s Mot.). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

16-5, the motions have been submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having reviewed the 

parties’ positions, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and relevant legal authority, the Court 

hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for the following 

reasons.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Age, Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff is 49 years old. AR 79. While attending school he was assigned to special 

education classes due to a learning disability. AR 38. He completed either the eighth or ninth 

 

1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the 

recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial 

Conference of the United States.

2 This action was originally brought against Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill. Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25(d), Andrew M. Saul was automatically substituted as the Defendant.

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grade of school but was “kicked out” for being a “problem child.” AR 36-37. Plaintiff’s last job 

was at Nordstrom through the temp agency Volt in 2004. AR 39. His duties encompassed 

“basically just hanging up clothes.” AR 44. He was fired due to missing too many days of work. 

AR 46. Prior to Nordstrom, Plaintiff worked in a warehouse doing various temp jobs. AR 427. 

B. Medical Evidence

1. Eastmont Wellness Center

On September 30, 2014, Plaintiff met with a treating mental health provider at Eastmont 

Wellness Center, Jacqueline Shiels, acting under the supervision of Hilary Combs, Psy.D., who 

diagnosed him with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). AR 427-35. Plaintiff reported that 

he had learning problems, including a history of special education and a lack of education beyond 

the ninth grade. AR 428, 430. He also reported sleep- and pain-related concerns. AR 430. 

Plaintiff told Ms. Shiels, “I am not that good with paperwork . . . I did not do good in school.” Id. 

Ms. Shiels assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning score of 58,3and upon a mental status 

examination, documented that Plaintiff exhibited slowed thinking, partial insight, and moderately 

impaired ability to make reasonable decisions. AR 426, 431.

Plaintiff saw Ms. Shield once more on October 7, 2014. AR 424-26. His primary concern 

was getting refills of pain medication. AR 424. Ms. Shields told Plaintiff to consult with a 

primary care practitioner about an antidepressant that could help him with his pain management, 

and she suggested a psychology follow up in four to six weeks. AR 425.

2. Katherine Wiebe, Ph.D.

Katherine Wiebe, Ph.D., is an examining psychologist who performed a psychological 

evaluation of Plaintiff on March 6, 2017, including a clinical interview, administration of ten 

separate psychological tests, and review of Plaintiff’s medical and mental health records. AR 516-

 

3 A Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score is a numerical summary of a clinician’s 

judgment of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical 

continuum of mental health on a scale of one hundred. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). A GAF of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms 

(e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in 

social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or coworkers). 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) 31-34 (4th ed. 2000).

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533. As noted in her report, the evaluation was based on one session of client contact. AR 517. 

Dr. Wiebe diagnosed Plaintiff with: Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent episode, severe 

with anxious distress; PTSD; other specified personality disorder with Schizoid Personality Traits, 

Avoidant Personality Traits, Paranoid Personality Features, and Antisocial Personality Features; 

Unspecified neurocognitive disorder; Specific learning disorder, with impairment in written 

expression. AR 529. She determined his PTSD was associated with his history of violence, 

including having been stabbed. AR 528. She also noted that he takes medication to treat his 

anxiety, depression and pain. Id. 

Dr. Wiebe also indicated that Plaintiff has severe impairments in attention/concentration, 

short-term memory, long-term memory, language, visual-spatial organization, and ADLs. AR 

532. She determined that he has moderate to severe impairment in executive functioning and 

social functioning; moderate impairment in judgment/insight; and mild impairment in intellectual 

functioning, orientation, and motor/praxis. Id. She explained that Plaintiff’s cognitive problems 

impair his ability to attend to, remember, and follow through with tasks and directions. AR 529. 

Dr. Wiebe also determined he has problems accomplishing activities of daily living due to his 

psychiatric and cognitive functioning problems. Id. She noted he has tendencies for cognitive 

distortions, emotional dysregulation, and problems with social interactions. Id. He also has 

problems with depression, irritability, social avoidance, paranoid thinking, hypervigilance, 

suspiciousness, fatigue, and anger outbursts. Id. Dr. Wiebe concluded that he would have 

difficulties being able to relate and communicate effectively and reliably with supervisors, coworkers, and the public in a work environment and that, due to his long-term cognitive and 

psychiatric disorder symptoms, he would have difficulty being able to work on a full-time basis 

for two years, even if he did not use any more substances. Id. 

Dr. Wiebe did not evaluate his physical medical problems as they are beyond the scope of 

her assessment. Id. As to potential for treatment, Dr. Wiebe reported that “[a]lthough there may 

be some difficulty in engaging him in serious therapy, compliance need not be problematic with 

extra efforts devoted to showing a caring attitude.” AR 525. 

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3. Gino Inesi, MFT

On December 24, 2012, Gino Inesi, MFT, completed a “Mental Health Clinician’s 

Confidential Report” form that documented a diagnosis of PTSD and a GAF of 55. AR 536-37. 

Inesi found Plaintiff had marked limitations in several mental work-related categories, including 

the ability to: carry out very short and simple instructions; maintain attention for extended periodstwo hour segments or more; work in coordination or proximity to others without being unduly 

distracted by others; make simple work-related decisions; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and respond appropriate to changes in 

a routine. AR 536-37.

4. Farrell Barnett, M.D.

On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff saw primary care doctor Farrell Barnett, M.D., complaining 

of back, neck, and knee pain and requesting Dr. Barnett complete a form for General Assistance. 

AR 448-50. Plaintiff reported that he could not stand to be around people and therefore he felt he 

was unable to work. AR 448. On psychiatric exam, Dr. Barnett found Plaintiff oriented as to 

time, place, person, and situation; had normal insight and exhibits normal judgment; and 

demonstrated appropriate mood and affect. AR 450. Psychiatric findings at a subsequent 

appointment on September 16, 2014, were likewise normal. AR 439-41. In a patient plan dated 

September 16, 2014, Dr. Barnett instructed Plaintiff to stop using marijuana to help with insomnia. 

AR 442. Dr. Barnett indicated he would refer Plaintiff “to psychology” for possible anxiety. Id. 

Subsequent treatment records from Dr. Barnett consistently show normal mental status findings 

and do not mention any mental disorders. AR 510, 514-15, 548.

5. Patricia Spivey, Psy.D.

On December 4, 2014, Patricia Spivey, Psy.D., performed a psychological evaluation. AR 

478-81. Dr. Spivey documented Plaintiff’s complaints of paranoia and fear of heights and small 

spaces. AR 479. However, she observed that he was alert and oriented, had a neutral mood and 

congruent affect, had unremarkable thought content, and had a linear, goal-directed thought 

process. Id. Her test results showed Plaintiff had deficits across areas including verbal 

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comprehension, reasoning, calculations, processing speed, memory, calculation, abstraction 

ability, and he had borderline to extremely low IQ scores. AR 479-80. However, she questioned 

the validity of the test results, noting that Plaintiff made little effort on the test and responded “I do 

not know” after numerous questions, when the answers could have been worked out with minimal 

effort. AR 480. Ultimately, Dr. Spivey diagnosed Plaintiff with Polysubstance Dependence, 

Anxiety Disorder, and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Id. She found that Plaintiff has no 

impairment in his ability to: follow simple or complex instructions, maintain adequate pace or 

persistence to complete 1-2 step simple repetitive tasks or complex tasks, maintain adequate 

attention/concentration, adapt to changes in job routine, verbally communicate effectively with 

others, and communicate effectively in writing. AR 480-81. Further, she found that Plaintiff only 

had mild impairment in the ability to maintain emotional stability/predictability and moderate 

impairment in withstanding the stress of a routine work day and in interacting appropriately with 

coworkers, supervisors and the public on a daily basis. AR 481.

III. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

On July 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 

disability beginning on January 1, 1997. AR 79-80, 93-94, 214, 218. Plaintiff subsequently 

amended his alleged onset date to September 1, 2004. AR 15, 335. On January 23, 2015, the 

Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s claim, finding he did not qualify for disability 

benefits. AR 136-45. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied 

on May 8, 2015. AR 149-59. On September 10, 2015, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 162, 164-67. ALJ Evangelina P. Hernandez conducted a 

hearing on April 10, 2017. AR 34-78. Plaintiff testified in person at the hearing and was 

represented by counsel, Alan Dunnigan. 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified he has anxiety that is triggered when he is around a lot of people. AR 50. 

He gets nervous, dizzy, has difficulty breathing, and he starts to feel like he is going to faint. Id. 

For example, he testified to being nervous during his testimony and as a result feeling like his 

heart was racing and he wanted to leave. Id. He feels the same way in public spaces. Id. Plaintiff 

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testified to feeling paranoid around crowds of people and “being on heights.” AR 51. The effects 

of his paranoia are the same as those of his anxiety: dizziness, difficulty breathing, and feeling 

faint. Id. At the time of his testimony, he was taking Trazadone, a sleep aid, and pain medication. 

Id. 

Plaintiff testified that he was fired in 2004 during his probationary period at Nordstrom

because he missed too many days of work, which he said was due to being stressed out and 

hospitalized. AR 39-40, 43-46. He testified he was fired from every job he ever had, with the 

reasons varying from being too late to not getting along with others. AR 49. All his employers 

said he had an “attitude problem.” Id. He also struggled with following instructions at work. AR 

68.

Plaintiff stays mostly at home, watching television or playing games on his phone, and 

does not have any hobbies or activities outside the home. AR 53. For the most part, he only 

ventures outside to smoke a cigarette and stretch his legs. AR 54. He lives with his landlady who 

performs most household tasks for him (such as cooking and cleaning) and reminds him of his 

medical appointments. AR 54, 57. Plaintiff stated that he has thought about suicide, has hurt 

other people, and been hurt by others through physical violence. AR 56. He testified that he had 

been beaten up and he was in a number of motorcycle accidents and bad car accidents, but he was 

never treated at a hospital, explaining that he did not like hospitals and went only if he had to. AR 

47. He testified that when he was messing around with “a bunch of friends,” a car fell on his left 

leg and crushed it, but he did not pursue treatment. AR 48.

Regarding physical ailments, Plaintiff testified that he can probably lift 10 to 15 pounds. 

AR 60. He stated that simple tasks like making the bed cause pain in his back. Id. 

Plaintiff struggled with alcoholism since his teenage years. AR 63. He stopped drinking 

liquor and switched to beers after doctors warned him about long term effects of drinking on his 

liver. AR 63-64. He also smokes marijuana a couple of times a month. AR 66.

B. ALJ’s Decision and Plaintiff’s Appeal

On June 19, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not 

disabled. AR 12-25. This decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it 

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on March 13, 2017. AR 1-3. Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff commenced 

this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On January 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed 

the present Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 14, 2019, Defendant filed a Cross-Motion 

for Summary Judgment. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). An ALJ’s decision to deny benefits must be set aside only when it is “based on 

legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 

664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek 

v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). It requires 

“more than a mere scintilla,” but “less than a preponderance” of the evidence. Id.; Trevizo, 871 

F.3d at 674. 

The court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). However, “[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the harmless error rule applies where substantial evidence otherwise supports 

the ALJ’s decision. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n error is 

harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error 

does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). A court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision because of a harmless error. Id. at 1111 

(citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party 

attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Framework for Determining Whether a Claimant Is Disabled

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Social Security provide for a fivestep sequential analysis to determine whether a Social Security claimant is disabled.4

 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520. The sequential inquiry is terminated when “a question is answered affirmatively or 

negatively in such a way that a decision can be made that a claimant is or is not disabled.” Pitzer 

v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). During the first four steps of this sequential 

inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate disability. Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner “to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.” Id. (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is performing “substantial gainful 

activity,” which would mandate that the claimant be found not disabled regardless of medical 

condition, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Here, the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2004. AR 

18.

At step two, the ALJ must determine, based on medical findings, whether the claimant has 

a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

alcohol abuse, anxiety disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. AR 18. 

If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a severe impairment, the process proceeds to 

the third step, where the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meet or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 1 (the “Listing of Impairments”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant’s 

 

4 Disability is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” because of a medical 

impairment which can result in death or “which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the 

criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering age, 

education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 19.

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual Function 

Capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC refers to what an individual can do in a work 

setting, despite mental or physical limitations caused by impairments or related symptoms. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including the medically determinable 

impairments that are nonsevere. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). 

In the RFC assessment, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s physical and mental abilities, as 

well as other abilities affected by the claimant’s impairments. Id. §§ 404.1545(b)-(d), 416.945(b)-

(d). With respect to a claimant’s physical abilities, “[a] limited ability to perform certain physical 

demands of work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or 

other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, 

stooping or crouching), may reduce [a claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work.” Id. §§ 

404.1545(b), 416.945(b). With respect to a claimant’s mental abilities, “[a] limited ability to carry 

out certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out 

instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a 

work setting, may reduce [the claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work.” Id. §§ 

404.1545(c), 416.945(c). Additionally, “[s]ome medically determinable impairment(s), such as 

skin impairment(s), epilepsy, impairment(s) of vision, hearing or other senses, and impairment(s) 

which impose environmental restrictions, may cause limitations and restrictions which affect other 

work-related abilities.” Id. §§ 404.1545(d), 416.945(d).

Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work: he could lift and/or 

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand, or walk six hours each in an 

eight-hour workday; frequently perform all postural activities; perform simple work with routine 

and repetitive tasks; and could occasionally interact with the general public, coworkers, and 

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supervisors. AR 20. 

The fourth step of the evaluation process requires that the ALJ determine whether the 

claimant’s RFC is sufficient to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 

404.1520(f). Past relevant work is work performed within the past 15 years that was substantial 

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to do his past relevant work, the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (iv). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform 

past relevant work. AR 23. 

In the fifth step of the analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there 

are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can 

perform consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(g); 404.1560(c). The Commissioner can meet this burden by relying on the testimony of 

a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 2. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 5 Here, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff is not disabled and could perform to other jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy. AR 24. 

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff raises six arguments: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating medical opinions; (2) the

ALJ erred in finding his Neurocognitive Disorder, Specific Learning Disorder, PTSD, and Major 

Depressive Disorder were not severe at Step Two; (3) the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony; (4) the ALJ erred in determining his impairments did not meet or equal a listing; and 

(5) the ALJ erred in determining his RFC; and (6) the ALJ erred in determining he could perform 

other work at step five.

C. Medical Opinions

Plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinions of record, arguing she 

rejected the opinions of examining psychologist Dr. Wiebe and MFT Inesi without providing 

 

5 The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are commonly known as “the grids”. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d 

at 1114.

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specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, and erred in according great 

weight to consultative examiner Dr. Spivey. Pl.’s Mot. at 4-12.

1. Legal Standard6

When determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider each medical 

opinion in the record together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); 

Algazzali v. Colvin, 2016 WL 394009, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016). In deciding how much 

weight to give to any medical opinion, the ALJ considers the extent to which the medical source 

presents relevant evidence to support the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3). Generally, more 

weight will be given to an opinion that is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, and 

the degree to which the opinion provides supporting explanations and is consistent with the record 

as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3)-(4).

In conjunction with the relevant regulations, the Ninth Circuit “developed standards that 

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Courts “distinguish among the 

opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 

those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither 

examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). Where an examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, as in 

this case, an ALJ may reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Analysis

a. Dr. Wiebe

In her decision, the ALJ explained that she gave “little weight” to Dr. Wiebe’s 

psychological evaluation “because her findings are not consistent with the claimant’s limited 

 

6 Rules regarding the evaluation of medical opinion evidence were recently updated, but the 

updates were made effective only for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 

5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). As Plaintiff’s claim was filed before 2017, the Court evaluates the medical 

opinion evidence in his case under the older framework as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) and in Social Security Ruling 96-2p.

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treatment and normal mental examination findings of record” and “Dr. Wiebe’s opinion appears 

overly reliant on claimant’s subjective complaints.” AR 23. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erroneously 

gave “less weight” to Dr. Wiebe’s examination report based on the ALJ’s view that “her findings 

are not consistent with the claimant’s limited treatment and normal mental examination findings of 

record. Dr. Wiebe’s opinion appears overly reliant on the claimant’s subjective complaints.” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 5. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ properly weighed conflicting medical-opinion 

evidence and provided specific and legitimate reasons explaining how she weighed the evidence 

and identified substantial evidence in the record supporting her findings. Def.’s Mot. at 11. 

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds the ALJ permissibly assigned “little weight” 

to Dr. Wiebe’s opinion because the marked limitations were inconsistent with the evidence of 

record, including Plaintiff’s limited treatment and normal mental status findings. AR 23, 516-33. 

An ALJ may appropriately give less weight to an opinion that is inconsistent with the record as a 

whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, 

the more weight we will give to that opinion”). The ALJ identified specific inconsistencies 

between Dr. Wiebe’s findings and the record as a whole. AR 18, 23. For example, in discussing 

Plaintiff’s alleged PTSD, Dr. Wiebe wrote that he “appears to have experienced a traumatic event 

that may have involved a threatening situation or serious injury during which he suffered intense 

fear or pain,” but provided no reference to any specific triggering event. AR 527. She added, 

“The residuals of this experience appear to persistently recur through distressing recollections, and 

he is likely to avoid exposure to the cues that resemble or symbolize aspects of the traumatic event 

in question.” Id. When they cannot be avoided, he experiences “recurring nightmares or 

flashbacks,” which “may result in . . . outbursts of anger, panic attacks, hypervigilance, an 

exaggerated startle response,” or a detached disposition. AR 528. However, as the ALJ noted, the 

record contains no evidence of any specific traumatic event or place that triggers flashbacks or 

nightmares, and there is no discussion of flashbacks or nightmares in any treatment records other 

than during a single meeting with Hilary Combs, Psy.D., in the fall of 2014, right after Plaintiff 

applied for benefits. AR 18, 431. 

Plaintiff argues that the existence of some “normal mental status findings” in the record 

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containing abnormal mental status findings is not a specific and legitimate reason and contends the 

ALJ erred by picking out isolated examples of improvement and relying on these to conclude that 

a claimant does not have a disabling mental illness. Pl.’s Mot. at 7. Contrary to Plaintiff’s 

assertion, and in stark contrast to Dr. Wiebe’s findings, mental status findings throughout the 

record are frequently unremarkable. AR 441, 450, 506, 510, 514, 548. 

Plaintiff also criticizes the ALJ’s finding that he had limited mental health treatment, 

arguing that is not a proper basis for rejecting a medical opinion regarding mental health. Pl.’s

Mot. at 7-8. Plaintiff cites Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Security, 166 F.3d 1294 (9th 

Cir. 1999). In that case, the claimant did not seek treatment primarily because he could not afford 

it and was thousands of dollars in debt. Id. at 1296-97. Here, Plaintiff has made no similar 

showing that he is unable to afford care and in fact testified that that he did not go to hospitals 

because he did not like them and went only if he had to. AR 47. Plaintiff next cites Nguyen v. 

Chater, where the Ninth Circuit found it questionable” to “chastise” one with a mental impairment 

for failure to seek psychiatric treatment, where the claimant had neither sought nor received any 

mental health treatment. 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (1996). However, unlike the claimant in Nguyen, 

Plaintiff is not someone who failed to “recognize that [his] condition reflects a potentially serious 

mental illness.” Id. Plaintiff alleged disability due to purported paranoia and claustrophobia, 

indicating that he is well aware of his condition. AR 248. He also testified that he did not follow 

through with a recommendation for counseling only because he never received a referral letter.

AR 73. Regardless, the ALJ in this case did not chastise Plaintiff for failure to seek treatment; the 

ALJ merely stated that the absence of any treatment is inconsistent with the severity of mental 

impairments as reported in Dr. Wiebe’s opinion. AR 18-19, 20, 23.

Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ wrongly discounted Dr. Wiebe’s opinion because it was 

overly reliant on subjective complaints, arguing that this is not a specific or legitimate reason. 

Pl.’s Mot. at 8. However, undue reliance on a claimant’s subjective complaints is a specific and 

legitimate reason to reject a medical opinion – particularly when the opinion is based on subjective 

complaints that are discredited. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216-17 (holding that an ALJ may reject a 

physician’s finding that is unsupported by the record or premised on a claimant’s properly 

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discredited subjective complaints); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (opinions based on “medical signs 

and laboratory findings” are entitled to more weight than opinions based on an individual’s 

subjective representations). Plaintiff argues that Dr. Wiebe’s report documents extensive 

objective clinical findings, but this ignores the fact that much of Dr. Wiebe’s report is based on 

representations Plaintiff made during a one-time examination arranged by his disability attorney 

for the purpose of supporting Plaintiff’s disability claim. Dr. Wiebe explicitly acknowledged that 

her findings were “limited in scoped” and based on a single session, with background information 

“provided by the client.” AR 517. Throughout her report, she referenced her reliance on 

Plaintiff’s representations: “He reported” . . . difficulty with anxiety, depression, pain, and 

interpersonal relations, AR 517; he “reported” that he witnessed childhood violence, had seen 30 

people killed, that he was kicked out of school, and he got into trouble whenever he was around 

people, id.; he “reported” he repeated a couple of grades in school and was in special education,

AR 518; he “reported” a history of multiple head injuries and unconsciousness, AR 519; he 

“reported” that he was told he had a concussion, id.; he “reported” that he was unable to clean, and 

sometimes unable to put on his shoes, AR 520; he reported anxiety around people and difficulty 

taking public transportation, id.; he “reported” recent suicidal ideation. id.; he “reported” problems 

with numbness, tingling, trembling, dizziness, abdominal discomfort, and cold sweats, nightmares 

and flashbacks, AR 522-23; he “reported” a history of physical violence to others, and claimed he 

was sometimes so angry he wanted to kill someone, AR 523; and he “reported” that he had no 

friends, AR 524. These reports are often unsupported by or inconsistent with representations 

made elsewhere in the record. Nothing in Dr. Wiebe’s report suggests that she observed 

Plaintiff’s alleged nightmares, flashbacks, or angry outbursts; her findings are based on Plaintiff’s 

own reports.

While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the record as a whole 

constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Further, even “where the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984); Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)). It is the ALJ, not 

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the Court, that must resolve determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical 

testimony, and all other ambiguities. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196

(9th Cir. 2004). Thus, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

Accordingly, because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for her evaluation 

of Dr. Wiebe’s opinion, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the decision must be 

affirmed.

b. Mr. Inesi

Mr. Inesi examined Plaintiff on December 24, 2012 at the request of Alameda County 

Social Services and opined that he had marked limitations in his ability to carry out very short and 

simple instructions, work around others, and concentrate. AR 536-37. The ALJ assigned “little 

weight” to Mr. Inesi’s opinion “because not only is a therapist not an acceptable medical source, 

but his assessment is not consistent with the evidence as a whole.” AR 23. Plaintiff argues the 

ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for discounting his opinion. Pl.’s Mot. at 9-10. The Court 

disagrees.

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Inesi is not an acceptable medical source and his opinion may 

therefore be afforded less weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (“Medical opinions are 

statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect ... what you can still do despite 

impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”); Michalski v. Colvin, 2016 WL 

4585770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (MFT opinion entitled to less weight). Thus, the ALJ 

need only provide germane reasons for discounting the statement. Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Plaintiff asserts that the fact that Mr. Inesi is an MFT is not an appropriate reason for discrediting 

the opinion because the agency’s rules recognize the validity of opinions from clinicians other 

than acceptable medical sources. Pl.’s Mot. at 10. Indeed, the agency’s policy guidance 

recognizes that information from “other sources” may be based on special knowledge of a 

claimant and may provide insight into the severity of a claimant’s impairments and how they 

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affect the claimant’s ability to function. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06-03p (Considering 

Opinions and Other Evidence from Sources Who Are Not Acceptable Medical Sources).7 Thus, 

opinions from other sources, like all evidence of record, warrant consideration in the disability 

determination process. Id. The policy does not, however, require that an ALJ give any particular 

weight to the opinion. As explained in Ruling 06-03p, although the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d) explicitly apply only to medical opinions from acceptable medical sources, they 

represent basic principles that apply to consideration of opinions from other medical sources. 

Those factors include how long the source has known and how frequently the source has seen the 

claimant, how consistent the opinion is with other evidence, the degree to which the source 

presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, how well the source explains the opinion, and 

whether the source has special expertise related to the claimant’s impairment. SSR 06-03p.

Plaintiff argues: “Had the ALJ properly applied the correct legal standard, she would have 

accorded more weight to MFT Inesi’s opinion.” Pl.’s Mot. at 11. But he fails to identify what that 

“correct legal standard” is, as the ALJ need only provide germane reasons for the weight accorded 

Mr. Inesi’s statement. Assuming one considers the factors set forth in Ruling 06-03p to be the

“correct legal standard” for evaluation of a non-acceptable medical source’s opinion, Plaintiff fails 

to show that the unsupported, unexplained opinion of a clinician whose only documented 

relationship with Plaintiff is filling out a checklist form on his behalf warrants greater weight. 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s second reason for discounting the opinion, –

inconsistency with the evidence as a whole – is not specific, legitimate, or supported by substantial 

evidence. Id. at 10. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, inconsistency with the record is a specific 

and appropriate reason for discounting a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Mr. 

Inesi’s opinion is a check-the-box form that contains no clinical observations, no supporting 

 

7 Social Security Rulings are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and 

interpretations” issued by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). While SSRs do not have 

the force of law, the Ninth Circuit gives the rulings deference “unless they are plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989); see 

also Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (“SSRs reflect the official 

interpretation of the [SSA] and are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they are consistent with 

the Social Security Act and regulations”). SSR 06-03p was rescinded effective March 27, 2017, 

and does not apply to claims filed after that date.

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treatment records, no description of Plaintiff’s alleged impairments, no narrative explanation, and 

no explanation of Mr. Inesi’s relationship with Plaintiff. AR 536-37. In fact, Plaintiff had no 

recollection of any examination by Mr. Inesi. AR 66-67. Further, in contrast to Mr. Inesi’s

opinion, mental status findings throughout the record are frequently unremarkable. AR 441, 450, 

506, 510, 514, 548. The ALJ evaluated all the medical evidence and it is “solely the province of 

the ALJ to resolve” such conflicts in medical opinion evidence. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002). It is not this Court’s role to second-guess the ALJ’s resolution of 

conflicting medical testimony. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for her evaluation 

of Mr. Inesi’s opinion, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the decision must be 

affirmed.

3. Dr. Spivey

The ALJ assigned “great weight” to Dr. Spivey’s opinion that Plaintiff had mild to 

moderate mental limitations because the opinion was supported by relevant evidence and an 

explanation, and it was generally consistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. AR 22, 478-

81. Plaintiff argues Dr. Spivey’s evaluation was neither as comprehensive nor in-depth as Dr. 

Wiebe’s evaluation; as Dr. Wiebe’s report is 18 pages in length while Dr. Spivey’s report is four. 

Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Spivey’s conclusions are internally inconsistent 

with her objective test results and mental status examination findings because these showed 

significant cognitive deficits in many areas including IQ, verbal comprehension, reasoning, 

calculations, processing speed, memory, attention. Id. (citing AR 479-81). He maintains Dr. 

Spivey’s opinion “is the only opinion inconsistent with the mental health evidence and opinions in 

the record, as well as with her own objective exam results.” Id. at 11-12. 

In reviewing Dr. Spivey’s opinion, the Court notes that her test results showed Plaintiff 

had deficits across areas including verbal comprehension, reasoning, calculations, processing 

speed, memory, calculation, abstraction ability, and he had borderline to extremely low IQ scores. 

AR 479-80. However, she questioned the validity of the test results, noting that Plaintiff made 

little effort on the test and responded “I do not know” after numerous questions, when the answers 

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could have been worked out with minimal effort. AR 480. Dr. Spivey also observed that Plaintiff 

described symptoms of anxiety and complained of paranoia, but he did not display any symptoms

of anxiety. AR 480. In fact, he was alert and oriented, with neutral mood and affect. AR 479.

These findings are consistent with the limited treatment and normal mental status findings 

throughout the record. AR 441, 450, 506, 510, 514, 516-33, 548. “[T]he more consistent an 

opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (when evaluating opinions, ALJ appropriately considers 

supportability, consistency with evidence in the record, and factors that tend to support or 

undermine the opinion, among other things). Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in 

assigning great weight to Dr. Spivey’s opinion.

D. Step Two

At step two in the analysis, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: alcohol abuse, anxiety disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. AR 18. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding his neurocognitive disorder, specific learning disorder, 

PTSD, and major depressive disorder were not severe for three reasons. First, he notes that it is 

unclear whether the ALJ found these to be nonmedically determinable impairments or medicallydeterminable impairments, which affects the ALJ’s assessment of his RFC. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. 

Second, he argues the ALJ failed to discuss his major depressive disorder. Id. Third, Plaintiff 

contends that had the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence, she would have determined that his 

PTSD, major depressive order, neurocognitive disorder, and learning disorder constitute severe 

impairments. Id. at 13-14. In response, Defendant notes that Plaintiff did not mention these 

disorders when he applied for disability, despite being asked to list all conditions that limited his 

ability to work, and these alleged impairments were introduced shortly before the hearing with 

little mention of them throughout the treatment records. Def.’s Mot. at 17.

Step two serves as a “de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ is to determine whether the 

claimant has a “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Id. A severe 

impairment is that “which significantly limits [a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic 

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work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The claimant has the burden at step two to show that 

he has a severe impairment. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222.

Here, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in finding these disorders are not severe 

impairments. As a preliminary matter, a diagnosis alone does not establish disability. Matthews v. 

Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient 

proof of a disability.”); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although the 

appellant clearly [has] diabetes, high blood pressure, and arthritis, there is no evidence to support 

his claim that those impairments are ‘severe.’”). To show that an impairment is severe, a claimant 

must show that the impairment is medically-determinable, meets the 12-month duration 

requirement at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, and significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic 

work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and 404.1521(a). Basic work activities include 

physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, and lifting; and mental functions such as 

understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions, using judgment, responding 

appropriately to supervisors and coworkers, and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s allegations of PTSD but found there was no documentation 

in the record of any events that triggered flashbacks, no documentation of any significant 

treatment for this alleged condition, and no evidence that this condition affected Plaintiff for at 

least 12 continuous months. AR 18. In fact, Plaintiff first mentioned issues with depression, 

anxiety, and cognition after he filed for disability, curious about how antidepressant medication 

might help with pain management. AR 18, 424-25. A single treatment record from September 

2014 referenced PTSD. AR 429-30. It showed a diagnosis of PTSD based on Plaintiff’s 

endorsements of PTSD symptoms, such as hypervigilance, nightmares, flashbacks, and avoidance, 

as findings on mental status examination just two weeks earlier were completely normal. AR 18, 

430, 441. The only other mention of flashbacks in the record are in Dr. Wiebe’s report two-and-ahalf years later, when Plaintiff reported flashbacks. AR 523, 528. As the ALJ noted, the record 

does not contain any reports of specific events or places that trigger flashbacks, and the normal 

psychiatric findings on multiple occasions do not support the allegations of ongoing PTSD. AR 

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18. Accordingly, the ALJ found no evidence to show that PTSD affected Plaintiff for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months, as required to show a severe impairment. The ALJ also 

considered Plaintiff’s allegations of learning disorder and neurocognitive impairment, again first 

alleged at the administrative hearing in April 2017, and found that there was no diagnosis by a 

treating clinician and no treatment for cognitive impairment, even though Plaintiff was 

incarcerated on many occasions and had health services available. AR 18-19. The ALJ also found 

the allegations were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s work history, school records, and the lack of any 

cognitive complaints in the treatment records. AR 19, 242-46. Based on this record, the ALJ 

correctly found these disorders were not severe. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c) (whether 

an impairment “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work 

activities” is a finding that falls within the purview of the ALJ, not a physician). Although the 

ALJ did not specifically address major depressive disorder, such a diagnosis alone does not 

establish disability, and Plaintiff fails to show how the impairment is medically-determinable, 

meets the 12-month duration requirement at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, and significantly limits his 

ability to do basic work activities. Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and 

404.1521(a). 

Regardless, even if the Court were to find the ALJ committed any error at step by failing to 

specifically address Plaintiff’s major depressive disorder, “[o]missions at step two are often 

harmless error if step two is decided in plaintiff's favor.” Martinez v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 

5900191, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 

2005)); Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 587 Fed. App’x 367, 370 (9th Cir. 2014) (any error in not 

identifying depression as severe at step two was harmless because “the ALJ proceeded through the 

entire sequential analysis, carefully considering all of [the] mental health records in assessing her 

[RFC]”) (citing Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that where the ALJ 

considered evidence of limitations posed by claimant’s bursitis at step four, any error in failing to 

consider bursitis severe at step two was harmless)); Raymond G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 

1332399, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019) (where ALJ found PTSD was not severe at step two, 

any error in that determination was harmless because ALJ proceeded through the entire sequential 

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analysis). If the ALJ finds that a claimant has a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments, the analysis continues, and any error in not specifically identifying an additional 

impairment is of no consequence, as the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all 

impairments, both severe and otherwise, in assessing RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) 

(discussing the step two evaluation), 404.1523 (addressing multiple impairments).

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of alcohol abuse, anxiety 

disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. AR 18. Because the ALJ found in favor of Plaintiff 

at step two, the sequential evaluation process continued to step three. “Thus, as the ALJ found 

Plaintiff had [at least] one severe impairment and moved on to complete the sequential analysis, 

giving consideration to all her severe and non-severe impairments, any error in failing to name 

additional impairments as severe is harmless.” King v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4586726, at *11 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1042-43). Even if Plaintiff were able to show 

that these impairments were severe, absent a showing that they result in limitations not accounted 

for in the RFC, any error in not identifying the impairments as severe is of no consequence. In 

assessing RFC, the ALJ is required to consider all impairments, even those found not severe at 

step two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations 

in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace; and mild limitations in adapting and managing himself. AR 

19-20. Considering these limitations, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks, and he was limited to occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers, 

and supervisors. AR 20. Plaintiff not only fails to show that these additional impairments are 

severe, he fails to show that they would result in any limitations not already accounted for in the 

RFC. See Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911 (finding harmless error where ALJ did not include an

impairment as ‘severe’ at step two, but included limitations stemming from the impairment in the 

RFC). Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversible error at step two, and the 

ALJ's decision must be affirmed.

E. Credibility

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

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expected to cause his symptoms but his testimony concerning the persistence and limiting effects 

of these symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. 

AR 21-22. Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons or to consider 

the entire case record in finding that his testimony about the severity and frequency of his 

symptoms was not credible. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ set forth 

specific and legitimate reasons, explaining how she weighed the allegations and identifying 

substantial evidence in the record supporting her findings. Def.’s Mot. at 17. 

1. Legal Standard

Congress expressly prohibits granting disability benefits based solely on a claimant’s 

subjective complaints. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or 

other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (an 

ALJ will consider all of a claimant’s statements about symptoms, including pain, but statements 

about pain or other symptoms “will not alone establish” the claimant's disability). “An ALJ 

cannot be required to believe every allegation of [disability], or else disability benefits would be 

available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to [the Social Security Act].” Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ is, however, required to make specific credibility findings. 

See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (the credibility finding “must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight”).

A two-step analysis is used when determining whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

their subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th 

Cir. 2007). First, it must be determined “whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 

1991) (en banc); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)). A claimant does not need to “show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; 

she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). 

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Second, if the claimant has met the first step and “there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the 

ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). “The 

ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record 

lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Courts must not engage in second-guessing, 

where the ALJ “has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of 

excess pain, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Fair, 885 

F.2d at 604. However, “a finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on 

a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 

792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 

1986) (per curiam) (“‘Excess pain’ is, by definition, pain that is unsupported by objective medical 

findings.”).

Factors an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include: “[claimant’s] 

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or between [his] 

testimony and [his] conduct, claimant’s daily activities, [his] work record, and testimony from 

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which 

[claimant] complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (quoting Light, 119 F.3d at 792). An ALJ’s 

credibility finding must be properly supported by the record, and sufficiently specific to ensure a 

reviewing court he did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective testimony. Id. at 958 

(citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46). 

2. Analysis

The ALJ articulated several reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were 

not wholly reliable. First, the ALJ considered the extent to which Plaintiff’s statements were 

consistent with the objective clinical findings, evidence obtained from the application of medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) 

(“Objective medical evidence . . . is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable 

conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms” and their impact on your 

ability to work). The ALJ discerned that many of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were 

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unsupported by objective evidence. AR 18. While Plaintiff complained of disabling back and 

neck pain, imaging of his lumbar spine showed only mild degenerative changes at L5-S1, and 

imaging of his cervical and thoracic spine was normal. AR 18, 388-90. Although Plaintiff said he 

could lift only five pounds and was unable to walk for more than one block, findings on 

musculoskeletal examinations were unremarkable, showing normal strength and no muscular 

atrophy. AR 18, 21-22, 273, 474, 441, 502, 514. The record does not document any gait 

disturbances or limitations in range of motion, and imaging studies generally showed mostly 

unremarkable or mild findings. AR 19, 388-90, 474, 502. With respect to mental impairments, 

the ALJ likewise found the objective findings were not consistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of 

wholly disabling impairments. AR 18, 21. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(g) (psychological 

abnormalities must be shown by observable facts that can be medically described and evaluated, 

apart from an individual’s statement of symptoms). Treatment records consistently reflect that 

Plaintiff was alert and cooperative, oriented to time, place, person, and situation, with appropriate 

mood and affect, normal insight, and normal judgment. AR 18-19, 21, 441, 450, 502, 506, 510, 

548. Clinicians further noted that he voiced good understanding of treatment and could respond 

appropriately to questions. AR 18, 371, 403. This objective medical evidence is not consistent 

with Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling back, neck, and mental impairments. See Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (while claimant’s statements “cannot be rejected on 

the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical 

evidence is still a relevant factor”).

The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff’s course of treatment was not consistent with his 

allegations of disabling impairments. AR 18, 21; see 20 C.F. R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(vi) 

(medication, course of treatment other than medication, and other measures a claimant employs to 

alleviate alleged symptoms are properly considered in the consistency analysis). For most of the 

alleged period of disability, Plaintiff took no medications. AR 19, 21, 344, 369, 380, 401, 415, 

438, 440. The record indicates that Dr. Barnett first prescribed medication for sleep and pain in 

September 2014, a full decade after Plaintiff’s alleged onset of disability. AR 435. Moreover, 

Plaintiff received only conservative treatment; there is no evidence of record suggesting that he 

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required surgery or hospitalization for any allegedly disabling impairment. AR 21. In June 2013, 

Plaintiff stated that he had “no past medical history” other than a surgical repair of a stab wound in 

his neck 13 years earlier. AR 380. Conservative treatment is inconsistent with subjective

allegations of disabling symptoms. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039-40.

Likewise, Plaintiff had virtually no treatment for his mental impairments. AR 18, 67, 479.

Plaintiff denied any history of treatment for psychiatric issues, acknowledging that he had never 

been in a psychiatric facility or taken any psychiatric medications. AR 479. Even though he was 

incarcerated many times, he was never flagged for mental health treatment while in prison. AR 

19, 74. Plaintiff first had a psychiatric diagnostic evaluation in September 2014, two months after 

he filed for disability and 10 years into his alleged period of disability, after he told his primary 

care doctor he could not work as a condition of receiving state General Assistance because he 

could not be around other people, but there is no indication that he continued with a course of 

therapy. AR 67, 432. Plaintiff’s brief course of treatment is not consistent with allegations of 

disabling mental or physical impairments. AR 18.

In evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective claims, the ALJ further observed that he was 

noncompliant with the treatment he did pursue. AR 21. He did not follow up with appointments 

despite receiving multiple reminders from clinicians, failed to participate in a single session of 

physical therapy beyond the initial evaluation, and did not follow up on counseling. AR 21, 373, 

377, 401, 498, 501. Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment recommendations suggests his pain 

and other impairments are not as limiting as he alleged them to be. AR 21.

In addition to the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s allegations and the objective clinical 

evidence, the ALJ identified other bases for discounting his allegations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(c)(3) (after considering consistency with the objective medical evidence, the ALJ 

considers whether and to what extent the claimant’s subjective statements are consistent with 

“other evidence” in the record, such as treatment, daily activities, and other factors). The ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff claimed he barely left his house, but at one point he cancelled medical 

appointments because he was traveling out of the country. AR 22, 371-72, 383, 387. The ALJ 

also noted Plaintiff could take care of personal hygiene, maintain good grooming, and shave his 

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head. AR 19, 257, 479, 520. He could go out alone, to the barber, or shopping for groceries, 

clothes, and candy. AR 18, 20, 61, 72-73, 258, 271, 424, 520, 524. He went outside every day, 

watched television and sports, and played video games. AR 55, 258-59, 271, 524. Although he 

claimed to have no friends and no relationship with family members, the record shows that he 

lived with a girlfriend and could rely on his brother for transportation on occasion. AR 20, 370, 

377, 380-81, 391, 402, 480. The ALJ found that while Plaintiff’s activities may have been limited 

by his impairments, they did not appear to be as limited as he alleged them to be. AR 18-20; see 

Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a claimant’s self-reported 

activities suggested a higher level of functionality than claimant alleged); Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1112-13 (ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the 

alleged symptoms”). And, even if Plaintiff’s activities were not particularly extensive, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that he was not as limited as he claimed was a reasonable and valid basis for 

discounting his self-reported symptoms. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (“Even where those 

activities suggest some difficulty in functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the 

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (the ALJ properly determined that the claimant 

“demonstrated better abilities than he acknowledged in his written statements and testimony” and 

that his “non-work activities . . . are inconsistent with the degree of impairment he alleges”). 

The ALJ noted other inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s representations that undermined his 

subjective allegations of disabling symptoms. AR 21-22. Although Plaintiff contends that he is

unable to work due to disabling pain, he represented to various clinicians that he was feeling well 

overall and was not taking any medications. AR 19, 21, 282, 310, 369, 377, 387, 424. He claimed 

he was in constant back and neck pain, yet treatment records showed that he denied any tenderness

in those areas on examination. AR 22, 392, 403. He testified at the hearing that he had been 

losing weight due to his impairments, yet he denied weight loss concerns when talking to 

clinicians. AR 22, 59, 369, 272. He claimed he could not walk far, yet his doctors observed that 

he was able to climb two flights of stairs comfortably. AR 369, 377, 380. He claimed he could 

lift only five pounds, but at the hearing, he testified that he could lift 15 pounds. AR 21-22, 60, 

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273. He represented that he did not know how to drive and did not have a license, yet he had past 

work as a truck driver. AR 244, 271, 478. Plaintiff’s representations that he was feeling well, his 

denial of tenderness during examinations, and other inconsistencies all contradict his allegations of 

disabling pain and other limitations.

Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ analysis of daily activities, alleging she disregarded his

testimony that he had not left his house since grocery shopping at the first of the month and did 

not consider whether he had difficulty leaving his house. Pl.’s Mot. at 16. The Court notes that on 

October 7, 2014, Plaintiff told a therapist he had not left his house since he went shopping with 

food stamps on the first of the month. AR 424. However, Plaintiff did not explain why he did not 

leave his house and he did not report that he had difficulty leaving his house due to any 

impairments. Id. As the therapist noted, Plaintiff’s primary concern that day was getting his 

narcotic pain medication refilled. Id. Regardless, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did 

consider his representations that he could not leave his house due to his inability to be around the 

public but found that it was inconsistent with other evidence of record, including traveling out of 

the country and shopping. AR 22. Even if Plaintiff did not leave his home frequently, or he 

experienced some discomfort when he did leave his home, this is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s 

finding that he could do so, along with other daily activities. An ALJ is not required to discuss 

every piece of evidence; she need only discuss evidence that is significant and probative. Howard 

ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). By pointing out the specific 

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ permissibly engaged in “ordinary techniques of 

credibility evaluation” and properly found Plaintiff not fully reliable. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 

(ALJ permitted to “engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering . . .

inconsistencies in [the plaintiff’s] testimony”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) (“We will consider 

whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any 

conflicts between your statements and the rest of the evidence.”). 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that “even if there were times when [he] did not take medication, 

that is still not a legitimate ground to reject his testimony as it is a questionable practice to chastise 

one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.” Pl.’s 

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Mot. at 16-17 (citing Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465) (finding it questionable to “chastise” one with a 

mental impairment for failure to seek psychiatric treatment, where the claimant had neither sought 

nor received any mental health treatment). However, Plaintiff is not someone who failed to 

“recognize that [his] condition reflects a potentially serious mental illness.” Id. He alleged 

disability due to purported paranoia and claustrophobia, indicating that he is aware of his 

condition, but testified he did not get treatment because he did not “like being at hospitals or 

around doctors” and that he did not follow through with a recommendation for counseling because 

he never received a referral letter. AR 72-73, 248. Regardless, there is no indication the ALJ 

chastised Plaintiff for not seeking rehabilitation; she found that his “conservative treatment and 

multiple reports that he is not on any medications severely undermines the limiting effects of his 

physical and mental conditions.” AR 22. Even if the Court were to determine the ALJ made this 

finding an error, it would be harmless because, as discussed above, the ALJ provided a number of 

other reasons for finding that his subjective allegations were not wholly reliable.

Because the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

Plaintiff’s testimony, and her decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds the 

ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.

F. Step Three

Plaintiff argues that had the ALJ not erred in her evaluation of the medical evidence, she 

would have determined that his conditions meet or equal a listed impairment at step three of the 

sequential evaluation process. Pl.’s Mot. at 17. Although the ALJ did find he has two severe 

mental impairments (an anxiety disorder and a personality disorder), Plaintiff maintains she erred

in not discussing how those disorders affect him in combination, which would result in more 

severe limitations. Id. at 18. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ acknowledged that she 

considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination, but Plaintiff misunderstands the distinction 

between a diagnosis and an impairment. Def.’s Mot. at 20-21. Defendant notes the ALJ 

considered listings 12.04, 12.05, 12.06, 12.08, 12.11, and 12.15 and found that because Plaintiff 

had no marked or extreme limitations in any broad area of functioning, his mental impairments 

were not of listing-level severity. Id. at 20. 

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1. Legal Standard

At step three in the sequential process, an ALJ must consider whether a claimant’s 

conditions meet or equal any of the impairments outlined in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The listings describe 

impairments that “would prevent an adult, regardless of his age, education, or work experience, 

from performing any gainful activity.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (emphasis in 

original). If a claimant’s “impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant 

is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

disability under the listings. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

An impairment meets a listing when all the medical criteria required of that listing is 

satisfied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To 

meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a 

listed impairment relevant to his or her claim.”); Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (“For a claimant to 

show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An 

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”). 

“To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must establish symptoms, signs and laboratory findings 

‘at least equal in severity and duration’ to the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment. . . .” 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). 

“If a claimant suffers from multiple impairments and none of them individually meets or 

equals a listed impairment, the collective symptoms, signs and laboratory findings of all of the 

claimant’s impairments will be evaluated to determine whether they meet or equal the 

characteristics of any relevant listed impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). However, 

“‘[m]edical equivalence must be based on medical findings,” and “[a] generalized assertion of 

functional problems is not enough to establish disability at step three.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). Further, an impairment does not meet the criteria of a listing based only on 

a diagnosis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d); Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (“For a claimant to show that his 

impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment 

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that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”); Moncada v. 

Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Analysis

Without identifying the specific criteria of any listing or explaining the reasoning behind 

his position, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have determined his conditions meet listings 

12.04, 12.05, 12.06, 12.08, 12.11, and 12.15. Pl.’s Mot. at 17. However, he does not point to any 

evidence showing the ALJ erred or that his impairments—either singly or in combination—met or 

equaled the requirements of a specific listing. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514 (claimant “offered no 

theory, plausible or otherwise, as to how his [impairments] combined to equal a listed 

impairment” and did not “point[ ] to evidence that shows that his combined impairments equal a 

listed impairment.”). Regardless, having reviewed the record, the Court finds the ALJ performed 

the required review under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a.

In her decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had moderate limitations in understanding, 

remembering, or applying information; moderate limitations in interacting with others; moderate 

limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace; and mild limitations in self-management. AR 

19-20. The ALJ specifically considered mental listings 12.04, 12.05, 12.06, 12.08, 12.11, and 

12.15, finding that “[t]he severity of [his] mental impairments, considered singly and in 

combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings.” AR 19. Despite this, 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not consider the combined effects of his impairments, and rather 

considered his impairments only in isolation. Pl.’s Mot. at 18. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 

“at no point does the ALJ discuss how the effects of [Plaintiff’s two impairments,] anxiety and 

personality disorder affect him in combination.” Id. However, “[a]n ALJ is not required to 

discuss the combined effects of a claimant’s impairments or [to] compare them to any listing in an 

equivalency determination, unless the claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish 

equivalence.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 683. Plaintiff points to no such evidence here, nor does he 

identify any particular listing that he meets or equals, much less explain how he meets or equals it. 

Merely alleging ALJ error does not warrant remand. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (a court “may 

not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless” and “‘the burden of showing 

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that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination’”) 

(quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

In any event, the ALJ specifically acknowledged that she considered Plaintiff’s 

impairments in combination. AR 19. She also cited specific evidence in support of her decision, 

including Plaintiff’s reports that he does not need special reminders to complete his grooming 

needs and take his medication; that he is able to pay bills, count change, and handle a savings 

account; that treatment notes describe him as alert and cooperative, with “good understanding,” 

and that he communicates comfortably; that he attended college; that he has a girlfriend and is able 

to live with a roommate and able to go out on his own, including shopping; that he watches 

television, plays games on his phone, makes his bed, does laundry, and sweeps; and that he 

reported no problem taking care of his personal care needs like dressing and bathing. AR 19-20. 

Although Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence, he does not cite any 

treatment records to rebut the ALJ’s findings. 

Since the record reflects no more than moderate mental limitations, the Court finds the 

ALJ properly evaluated the relevant evidence. And, since Plaintiff did not have at least two 

marked limitations or one marked limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, he did not 

meet a mental disorder listing. See 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00C. Accordingly, 

the Court finds the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed 

impairment was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and the decision must 

be affirmed.

G. RFC

Next, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in determining his RFC. Consisting of two sentences, 

Plaintiff’s entire argument is as follows: “Had the ALJ not erred in evaluating the medical 

evidence, she would have included [his] moderate and marked mental impairments in his RFC. 

AR 532-533, 536-537. The ALJ’s determination of [his] RFC is based on legal error, and is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Pl.’s Mot. at 19. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ 

discusses the evidence of record supporting here RFC assessment throughout the decision and, 

“[r]ather than responding to this evidence, Plaintiff simply declares that greater limitations were 

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warranted.” Def.’s Mot. at 22. 

RFC is the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It 

is assessed by considering all the relevant evidence in a claimant’s case record. Id.; see also 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When a case is before an ALJ, it is the ALJ’s 

responsibility to assess a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 

260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the 

claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”). “Generally, the more consistent 

an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4).

After consideration of the record, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform light work, as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following limitations: he could lift and or carry 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand, or walk six hours each in an eight-hour 

workday; frequently perform all postural activities; and his is limited to simple work, with routine 

and repetitive tasks; he could occasionally interact with the general public, coworkers, and 

supervisors. AR 20. Although Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating the evidence, the Court 

disagrees. As discussed above, the ALJ correctly assigned little weight to Dr. Wiebe’s and Mr. 

Inesi’s opinions because the marked limitations opined therein were inconsistent with the evidence 

of record, including Plaintiff’s limited treatment and normal mental status findings. Further, the 

Court notes that RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical determination, and need not 

match any physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions 

from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final 

responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner”); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 

1049 (“[i]t is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to 

determine residual functional capacity”). The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC 

based on the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 

Accordingly, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment and 

the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.

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H. Step Five

At step five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC and 

found he was not disabled because jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

he could perform. AR 24. Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s finding is insufficient because it is not 

supported by vocational expert testimony. Pl.’s Mot. at 20. He notes the ALJ made nonexertional 

limitation findings (see AR 19-20 (moderate limitations in understanding, remembering or 

applying information; moderate limitation in interacting with others; moderate limitations of 

concentrating, persisting or maintain pace; and mild limitations of adapting and managing 

himself)), yet made no mention of these limitations in her RFC findings. Pl.’s Mot. at 20. 

Plaintiff further argues the ALJ’s analysis under SSR 85-15 was in error because she “seems to 

suggest that ‘interaction with the general public, coworkers and supervisors’ is somehow 

qualitatively different that the ability to ‘respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and 

usual work situations.’” Id. at 21. Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to assess how his 

nonexertional limitations erode the occupational base as required by SSR 9-9p. Id. 

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ’s citation to SSR 85-15 “is on point and provides 

sufficient support for the conclusion that the non-exertional limitations, including the limitation to 

non-public tasks, have little effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional 

levels.” Def.’s Mot. at 22. Defendant further argues the ALJ was not precluded from relying 

upon the grids rather than a vocational expert’s testimony because Plaintiff’s nonexertional 

limitations do not significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations. Id.

at 23.

1. Legal Standard

At step five of the sequential analysis, which occurs after a finding that a severe 

impairment prevents a claimant from performing past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner 

to show that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and a “significant number of 

jobs exist in the national economy” which he can perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g); 

404.1560(c); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). Where a claimant suffers 

from exertional impairments, the ALJ refers to the medical-vocational guidelines or “grids,” which 

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“present, in table form, a short-hand method for determining the availability and numbers of 

suitable jobs for a claimant.” Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101). 

“The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional requirements, and set forth a table for each 

category.” Id. “A claimant’s placement with the appropriate table is determined by applying a 

matrix of four factors identified by Congress—a claimant’s age, education, previous work 

experience, and physical ability. For each combination of these factors, they direct a finding of 

either ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ based on the number of jobs in the national economy in that 

category of physical-exertional requirements.” Id. at 1114-15 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101). 

In cases where the claimant has only exertional limitations, “the rule is simple: the grids 

provide the answer. Where the grids dictate a finding of disability, the claimant is eligible for 

benefits; where the grids indicate that the claimant is not disabled, benefits may not be awarded.” 

Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a claimant suffers only nonexertional limitations, the grids are inappropriate, and the ALJ must rely on other evidence. 

Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115. “The reason for this limitation on the grids’ application is that, 

despite having the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of unskilled occupations at a 

given exertional level, a claimant may not be able to adjust to these jobs because of non-exertional 

limitations.” Id. “In particular, non-exertional impairments—including postural and manipulative 

limitations such as difficulty reaching, handling, stooping, climbing, crawling, or crouching—

may, if sufficiently severe, limit a claimant’s functional capacity in ways not contemplated by the 

grids.” Id. Where a claimant suffers from both exertional and non-exertional limitations, the ALJ 

must still consult the grids first. Id. 

Alternatively, the ALJ may call a vocational expert “to testify as to (1) what jobs the 

claimant, given his or her functional capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such 

jobs in the national economy.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101; see also SSR 00-4p1, 2000 WL 

1898704 at *2 (“In making disability determinations, we rely primarily on the DOT . . . for 

information about the requirements of work in the national economy.”). 

2. Analysis

As noted above, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform light work with certain exertional 

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limitations: he could lift and or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand, 

or walk six hours each in an eight-hour workday; frequently perform all postural activities; and his 

is limited to simple work, with routine and repetitive tasks; he could occasionally interact with the 

general public, coworkers, and supervisors. AR 20. She also determined Plaintiff had 

nonexertional limitations, but they “had little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled 

light work.” AR 24. The ALJ did not call a vocational expert.

Plaintiff first argues the ALJ was required to consult a vocational expert because the grids 

do not accurately describe his abilities and limitations. Pl.’s Mot. at 20. However, the mere 

existence of nonexertional limitations “does not automatically preclude application of the grids.”

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. Use of the grids is only precluded if the ALJ determines that the 

“claimant’s non-exertional limitations significantly limit the range of work permitted by his 

exertional limitations.” Id. at 1102. Further, where a claimant suffers from both exertional and 

nonexertional limitations, the ALJ must consult the grids first. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115. 

Here, the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations and found they would 

not have a significant limitation on the relevant job base. AR 24. The record supports this 

finding, with frequently unremarkable mental status findings and limited treatment throughout. 

AR 23, 441, 450, 506, 510, 514, 516-33, 548. As such, it was not error for the ALJ to consult the 

grids. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115. 

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred because she misstates the nonexertional limitations in 

the context of SSR 85-15 and 96-9p. Pl.’s Mot. at 21. Ruling 85-15 provides that “[i]f a person 

has a severe medically determinable impairment which, though not meeting or equaling the 

criteria in the Listing of Impairments, prevents the person from doing past relevant work, it must 

be determined whether the person can do other work.” 1985 WL 56857, at *1. Ruling 96-9p 

provides that “once it has been determined that an individual is not engaging in substantial gainful 

activity and has a ‘severe’ medically determinable impairment(s) which, though not meeting or 

equaling the criteria of any listing, prevents the individual from performing past relevant work 

(PRW), it must be determined whether the individual can do any other work, considering the 

individual’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.” 1996 WL 374185, at *1. 

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The Court finds the ALJ correctly applied these standards. Although Plaintiff argues the 

ALJ’s RFC finding makes no mention of his nonexertional limitations, the ALJ specifically 

considered these limitations and found they would not have a significant limitation on the relevant 

job base. AR 24 (“as long as the claimant is able [to] understand, remember, and carry out simple 

instructions, make judgments that are commensurate with the functions of unskilled work, respond 

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations, deal with changes in a routine 

work setting, the unskilled occupation base is not eroded.”). The ALJ also noted that 

“[i]nteraction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors is not one of the basic mental 

demands generally required by competitive, remunerative work, the limitation of which would 

substantially erode the occupational base.” Id. Even if an individual has the ability to do less than 

a full range of work, this “does not necessarily equate with a decision of ‘disabled.’” SSR 96-9p, 

1996 WL 374185, at *1. “[C]onsideration must still be given to whether there is other work in the 

national economy that the individual is able to do, considering age, education, and work 

experience.” Id. 

The grids provide that “[t]he functional capacity to perform a wide or full range of light 

work represents substantial work capability compatible with making a work adjustment to 

substantial numbers of unskilled jobs, and, thus, generally provides sufficient occupational 

mobility even for severely impaired individuals who are not of advanced age and have sufficient 

educational competencies for unskilled work.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, § 

202.00(b). Here, Plaintiff’s limitations cannot be said to deprive him of the functional capacity to 

perform a wide range of light work. Moreover, an individual capable of performing light work is 

also capable of performing sedentary work (in the absence of limiting factors not present here), as 

noted in the grids. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b); id. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, § 202.00(a). 

Therefore, the ALJ did not err by concluding that Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations were 

insufficiently severe to warrant vocational expert testimony. See SSR 96-9p (noting that postural 

limitations related to climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, or crawling “would not usually 

erode the occupational base for a full range of unskilled sedentary work” and that “restriction to 

occasional stooping” would “only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary 

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work”); SSR 85-15 (noting that limitations in climbing and balancing “would not ordinarily have a 

significant impact on the broad world of work”; limitations in kneeling and crawling would have 

almost no impact on the occupational base; and limitations in crouching would limit the 

occupational base for “medium, heavy, and very heavy jobs,” but not for light or sedentary work; 

and “[i]f a person can stoop occasionally . . . the sedentary and light occupational base is virtually 

intact”).

The ALJ also did not err in determining that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were 

insufficiently severe to warrant vocational expert testimony. As discussed above, Plaintiff was 

assessed with only mild to moderate limitations in some areas of mental functioning, and the ALJ 

properly concluded that his mental impairments were insufficiently severe to warrant vocational 

expert testimony. See Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that steptwo findings that claimant was moderately limited in several areas of mental functioning did not 

preclude ALJ's reliance on grids without use of vocational expert). 

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s step five determination is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and free of legal error. The decision must therefore be affirmed.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court shall 

enter a separate judgment, after which the Clerk of Court shall terminate the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2019

 

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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