Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00593/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00593-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIS RANDOLPH,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; JIM 

OBBLIGER; KATHERINE HART; BOB 

JOHANSEN; and PETE CHAVEZ,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00593-AWI-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) 

DAYS

(ECF No. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Willis Randolph (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed a Complaint on April 27, 

2016. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of 

California, Jim Obbliger, Katherine Hart, Bob Johansen, and Pete Chavez (collectively, the 

“Defendants”). Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants engaged in conduct in 1987 that lead to 

his conviction for murder, despite his asserted innocence. The Court has screened the Complaint

and makes its recommendations herein, namely, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without 

leave to amend.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct a review of a pro se complaint to 

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determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or 

malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If 

the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. Leave to 

amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff must set 

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 

allegations in the complaint as true, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins 

v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 

Iqbal). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The Complaint alleges that in 1987, Defendant Obbliger, then a deputy district attorney, 

visited Plaintiff at San Quentin State Prison. Obbliger was accompanied by Defendants Chavez 

and Johansen, both of whom were deputy sheriffs at the time. The Defendants informed Plaintiff 

that they had obtained the cooperation of a jailhouse informant who would place Plaintiff at the 

scene of a crime. They further informed him that they would seek an all-white jury and that 

Plaintiff would be placed in in prison “for a long time.” (Complaint at 3, ECF No. 1.) Defendant 

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Katherine Hart represented Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings (it is unclear from the Complaint 

whether Hart was Plaintiff’s attorney during his initial trial, on the appeal of his eventual 

conviction, or both). Plaintiff asks for an evidentiary hearing and for the reversal of his 

conviction because of his allegedly wrongful conviction in his 1989 trial, which he asserts 

constitutes a violation of his constitutional civil rights. 

This is not Plaintiff’s first complaint to make these allegations. In Randolph v. Rainwater, 

Case No. 1:13-cv-00016-AWI-JLT, Plaintiff sued Defendants Obbliger and Hart, as well as 

Robert Rainwater, who represented Plaintiff at some point, alleging that Obbliger withheld 

exculpatory evidence, Hart failed to raise appropriate issues on appeal, and Rainwater provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Complaint was dismissed without leave to amend on 

February 20, 2013. Similarly, Plaintiff has filed at least three separate habeas petitions before the 

U.S. District Court making similar allegations, the most recent of which was filed on the same 

date this Complaint was filed. See Randolph v. State of California, Case No. 1:16-cv-00592-

AWI-JLT; Randolph v. Swarthout, Case No. 1:13-cv-00543-SAB; Randolph v. People of 

California, Case No. 1:93-cv-05604-LJO. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claim constitutes a challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement. As a 

result, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus and a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 

inappropriate. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) (“Release from penal custody is 

not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act”); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“Where a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole 

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”). 

Moreover, a § 1983 claim is barred where a judgment in favor of a plaintiff “would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892, 

896 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (“in order to recover 

damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must 

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

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order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”). Plaintiff explicitly requests 

relief invalidating his conviction because it was based on unconstitutional conduct by Defendants. 

Plaintiff has not, however, demonstrated that his conviction has already been reversed, expunged, 

or otherwise called into question. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable and must be 

dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction 

or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”).

Even if Plaintiff’s claims were cognizable under § 1983, they would be barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 use the applicable state 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In 

California, this statute of limitations is two years. Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City 

of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 701 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Claims under § 1983 are subject to the state 

statute of limitations for personal injury claims. In California, that state rule is two years.”). State 

tolling rules also apply. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394 (“We have generally referred to state law for 

tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.”). California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 352.1(a) allows a statute of limitations to be tolled for up to two years when a 

plaintiff is “at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge.” Thus, a 

prisoner typically has four years to assert a § 1983 action for a cause of action that accrues while 

they are imprisoned. “A federal claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of 

the injury which is the basis of the action.” Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 823 F.2d 758, 760 

(9th Cir. 1991). The conduct Plaintiff complains of occurred nearly thirty years ago, in 1987. 

This is far beyond the applicable statute of limitations. 

Finally, the allegations in the Complaint cannot state a claim against Defendant Hart as a 

matter of law. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege a violation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that he was denied his constitutional rights 

by Defendant Hart, his attorney. It is well-settled, however, that attorneys do “not act under color 

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of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a 

criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (upholding dismissal of 

a § 1983 claim by a pro se prisoner against a public defender that alleged that she failed to 

adequately represent him in criminal proceedings). Thus, none of Plaintiff’s legal claims against 

Defendant Hart are colorable on their merits and they do not state a claim for which relief can be 

granted.

Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is appropriate where any 

opportunity to amend the complaint would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (“a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.”). No additional facts could cure the deficiencies in the Complaint. The problem is 

not that it is missing important facts; it is that the requested relief is simply unavailable through a 

§ 1983 lawsuit. Dismissal without leave to amend is thus appropriate. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Complaint be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code section 

636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, 

the parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right 

to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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