Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03062/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FILbD 

United State& Coμrt of Appea1' Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT DEC 18 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BRIAN K. LITTLEJOHN, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MICHAEL A. NELSON; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ) 

THE STATE OF KANSAS, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 92-3062 

(D.C . No. 90-3104-S) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis 

District Court for 

designation. 

T. Babcock, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument . 

The case is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3062 Document: 010110152682 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 1 
Petitioner-appellant Brian K. LittleJohn appeals the district 

court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 

pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 2254. Mr. LittleJohn is presently an 

inmate at Ellsworth Correctional Facility in Kansas, having been 

convicted of first degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery. 

In this action, he challenges his convictions on the basis that a 

statement made to police officers, and admitted at trial, was not 

freely and voluntarily given because it was made in response to 

police questioning after he allegedly made a request for counsel. 

He claims that use of the statement violated his due process 

rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, citing 

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 

We review the ultimate conclusion on the voluntariness of a 

post-arrest statement under the de novo standard. Miller v. 

Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) . However, factual findings by 

the state trial and appellate courts are presumed correct under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d) unless they are not fairly supported by the 

record. Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1516 (10th Cir. 

1991). After review of the record in this case, we find that the 

district court's denial of Mr. LittleJohn's petition was correct. 

During his state court proceeding, Mr. LittleJohn filed a 

motion to suppress in which he first raised the due process 

claims. During the hearing on the motion, Mr. LittleJohn admitted 

that he did not specifically request counsel, but claimed that 

during an initial interrogation he asked an officer, 11Am I, ain't 

I suppose to have an attorney?" Mr. LittleJohn argued that this 

statement, coupled with invoking his right to remain silent during 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-3062 Document: 010110152682 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 2 
the first interrogation, "indicated" that he wanted to consult 

with an attorney, therefore, the interrogation initiated by the 

police the following morning was prohibited by K.S . A. § 38-839 and 

the Edwards case. The interrogating police officers denied that 

Mr. LittleJohn had ever made such a request. Ultimately, the 

trial court found as a factual matter that he did not request 

counsel, and denied the motion. 

On appeal, Mr. LittleJohn claims only that the invocation of 

his right to remain silent "indicated in any manner" that he 

wished to consult with an attorney as defined by K.S.A. § 38-839. 

We reject this argument as it would unnecessarily merge two of the 

four protections enumerated in the Miranda warnings. The right to 

remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during 

questioning are separate rights, and invoking one's right to 

terminate an interrogation is not equivalent to or indicative of a 

request for counsel. Consequently, we find that there is 

substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court's 

conclusion that Mr. Littlejohn did not request counsel. 

There remains another issue that was not explicitly addressed 

by the district court, i.e., whether Mr. LittleJohn's due process 

rights were violated by the police-initiated second interrogation 

when he had invoked his right to remain silent the previous day. 

The applicable test is whether the police scrupulously honored the 

suspect's right to cut off questioning . Michigan v. Mosley. 423 

U.S. 96, 106 (1975). Other circuits have noted that whether the 

police satisfied this test requires a case-by-case analysis, but 

at a minimum the police must refrain from further questioning the 

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Appellate Case: 92-3062 Document: 010110152682 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 3 
suspect for a significant period of time. See Jacobs v. 

Singletary. 952 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 199 2) ; United Stat es v . Udey. 

748 F . 2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1984 ); United States v . Hernandez, 574 

F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1978 ). See also Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F . 2d 

1469 (11th Cir. 1988) (suspect's being given Miranda warnings five 

t i mes in six hours did not violate due process) . 

In denying Mr. LittleJohn' s petition, the district court 

noted that : 

"[T]he trial court found the petitioner was 

intelligent, able to understand the nature of 

the proceedings, filled out a waiver of 

[Miranda] rights form declaring he would talk 

to the officer, displayed no difficulty in 

thi nking, and was not physically distressed 

during the course of the interrogations. In 

addition, the court found that the officers 

complied with petitioner's request to cease 

discussion and terminated any further 

conversation." 

Based on the record before us, we find that the police officers 

scrupulously honored Mr . LittleJohn's right to remain silent 

because they inunediately terminated the initial interrogation upon 

his request and because the second int errogation did not occur 

until the following morning, after Mr. LittleJohn was given fresh 

Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. 

We must conclude, as did 

Mr. LittleJohn's incriminating 

the district 

statement was 

court, 

"freely 

that 

and 

voluntarily given and not the result of promises or coercion 

sufficient to overbear his will . " Thus, for substantially the 

same reasons as the district court gave, we hold that 

Mr . LittleJohn's due process rights were not violated by admission 

of his statement at trial. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3062 Document: 010110152682 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 4 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED, and the motion for an expedited 

hearing is DENIED as moot. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-3062 Document: 010110152682 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 5