Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00971/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00971-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALPHALON CORPORATION,

NO. CIV. S-05-0971 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

MEYER CORPORATION, U.S.,

Defendant.

______________________________

MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. and 

MEYER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES

LIMITED,

Counterclaimants,

v.

CALPHALON CORPORATION,

Counterdefendant. 

 ----oo0oo---- 

Plaintiff-counterdefendant Calphalon Corporation

(“Calphalon”) filed a complaint charging defendantcounterclaimant Meyer Corporation, U.S. (“Meyer”) with violating

35 U.S.C. § 271 (infringement of patent) by infringing

Calphalon’s design patent on a handle for cookware. (See

Stipulation to File Second Am. Compl. Ex. 1 (“Second Am.

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1 Calphalon states in its reply that it does not

challenge the joinder of MIlP as an additional counterclaimant on

the patent infringement claim on this motion to dismiss. (Pl.’s

Reply at 5-6). 

2

Compl.”)). Meyer in turn asserted counterclaims for, inter alia,

(1) false advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (the

Lanham Act) and California Business and Professions Code §§ 17500

(false advertising) and 17200 (unfair competition by false

advertising) (see Def.’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Counterclaims

(collectively “false advertising counterclaims”)); and (2) for

patent infringement in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (the

Patent Act) (see Def.’s Third Counterclaim). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

Calphalon has moved to dismiss the false advertising

counterclaims for failure to state a claim and to dismiss Meyer’s

patent infringement counterclaim for lack of standing. In

response to Calphalon’s motion to dismiss, Meyer has amended its

patent infringement counterclaim to join Meyer Intellectual

Properties Limited (“MIPL”) as an additional counterclaimant.1

Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (civil action arising under any

Act of Congress relating to patents), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367

(supplemental jurisdiction). 

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Meyer is a Delaware corporation, with its principal

place of business in Vallejo, California. (Def.’s First Am.

Countercl. ¶ 1). MILP is organized under the laws of the British

Virgin Islands. (Id. ¶ 2). Calphalon is a Delaware Corporation

with its principal place of business in Illinois. (Id. ¶ 3). On

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2 Meyer is the sole counterclaimant as to the false

advertising counterclaims. (See First Am. Counterclms. ¶¶ 27-

45).

3

August 10, 2004, the United States Design Patent D494,007 (“the

‘007 Patent”) was duly issued by the United States Patent and

Trademark Office. Since that date, MILP has been and still is

the owner of the ‘007 patent. (Id. ¶ 18). Meyer is an exclusive

licensee of the ‘007 Patent. (Id. ¶ 19).

Counterclaimants allege that Calphalon “has been and

still is infringing the ‘007 Patent by making, using, selling,

and offering to sell products (the Calphalon One Infused Anodized

Sauce Pans) embodying the patent invention.” (Id. ¶ 22). They

further allege that Calphalon’s infringement of the ‘007 Patent

is willful, deliberate and intentional. (Id. ¶ 24).

According to Meyer,2 Calphalon has also advertised and

promoted, and continues to advertise and promote, its Calphalon®

Contemporary Nonstick line of products. (Id. ¶ 28). Calphalon

allegedly represents in its advertising and promotional materials

that the design of the handle sold with this cookware is

functional in that it stays cool while cooking. (Id. ¶ 37). 

Packaging for Calphalon’s Contemporary Nonstick Daily Sizzle 10"

Omelet Pan with Cover also allegedly promotes the functionality

of the cookware handle designs as a “stay cool long handle [sic]

Comfortable through hours of stovetop cooking.” (Id. ¶ 29). 

Calphalon’s website also states that “The rolled stainless steel

Cool Touch handle . . . stays cool on the stove top.” (Id. ¶ 30). 

Meyer alleges that, in prosecuting the application for

a separate patent and in bringing this action, Calphalon has

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asserted that the “stay-cool” features marketed as functional are

actually nonfunctional and protectable both as a design patent

and under the California Unfair Business Practices Act. (Id. ¶

31). Meyer alleges “[u]pon information and belief, [that] these

statements actually deceived or have the tendency to deceive a

substantial segment of consumers who were induced to believe that

the elements depicted and described serve to keep the cookware

handle cool.” (Id. ¶ 32). Finally, Meyer alleges that it

“denies” that the features of Calphalon’s Contemporary Nonstick

cookware handles are ornamental and nonfunctional, but that to

the extent they are, Calphalon has somehow misrepresented the

nature, characteristics, and qualities of its goods, and misled

the public. (See id. ¶¶ 33, 40, 43). 

II. Discussion

A. Standard For Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of a

countercomplaint must be taken as true and read in the light most

favorable to the counterclaimant. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell

Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 (1972). The court may not dismiss for failure to state a

claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the counterclaimant can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which entitle him

or her to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). Dismissal is appropriate only when the counterclaimant

fails to put forth either: (1) a cognizable legal theory, or (2)

sufficient allegations of fact under a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). Dismissal must not be granted if the counterclaimant has

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met the liberal standard of notice pleading enshrined in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d

1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004). A counterclaim may survive a motion

to dismiss even where it contains inconsistent allegations. See

Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 827

(C.D. Cal. 2004)(pleading inconsistent claims not enough to

justify dismissal under Rule 12(b)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(e). 

B. False Advertising Counterclaims

Calphalon contends that Meyer’s counterclaims for false

advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and California Business and

Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500 fail and should be dismissed

because Meyer fails to allege that Calphalon made any false or

misleading statements. To state a claim for false advertising

against Calphalon under any of these statutes, Meyer must indeed

allege that Calphalon made false or misleading statements of fact

in the subject advertisements. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d

1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003)(noting that party bringing false

advertising claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) must show that

“defendant made false statements of fact about its own or

another’s product. . . .”); Conifer Secs., LLC v. Conifer Capital

LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5859, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that

“[t]o prevail on a claim for false advertising under Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17500, a plaintiff must show that . . . defendant

made a statement . . . that is untrue or misleading . . .”);

Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 506-07

(2003)(holding that to state claim for false advertising in

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violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200,

plaintiff must show that reasonable consumer is likely to be

deceived).

Meyer alleges that Calphalon represents in its

advertising and promotional materials that the design of the

handle sold with Calphalon’s cookware is functional in that it

stays cool while cooking. (Def.’s First Am. Countercl. ¶ 37). 

Meyer also alleges that Calphalon’s product’s “Cool Touch Handle

. . . stays cool on the stove top.” (Id. ¶ 30). Meyer further

alleges that “these statements actually deceived or have the

tendency to deceive a substantial segment of consumers who were

induced to believe that the elements depicted and described serve

to keep the cookware handle cool.” (Id. ¶ 32). This is

sufficient to meet the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8

required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514; Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1062. 

The fact that other portions of Meyer’s counterclaim

may seem inconsistent with Meyer’s claim that Calphalon’s

advertisements are misleading is of no moment. Meyer

specifically alleges (in its Fourth and Fifth counterclaims, the

allegations of which are incorporated in its Sixth counterclaim)

that it “denies” that Calphalon’s cookware handles are

nonfunctional. (Id. ¶ 33, 40, 42). This could be interpreted to

suggest that the handles are in fact functional and do stay cool. 

However, at this stage of the litigation, the court is bound to

read Meyer’s counterclaims in the light most favorable to Meyer,

H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249, undeterred by any apparent

inconsistency in the pleadings. Kiss Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at

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827. Therefore, Calphalon’s motion to dismiss Meyer’s false

advertising counterclaims must be denied. 

 C. Patent Infringement Counterclaim

Calphalon originally contended that Meyer did not have

standing to bring this claim because it neither alleged that it

was an exclusive licensee nor joined MILP, the alleged assignee

of the ‘007 patent, as a counterclaimant in its original

Counterclaims. (See Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss at 6-7). 

A licensee is not entitled to bring suit in its own

name as a patentee, unless it is an exclusive licensee and holds

all substantial rights under the patent. Biagro W. Sales, Inc.

v. Helena Chem. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 

Where the exclusive licensee is not granted all substantial

rights in the patent, the exclusive licensee has standing to sue

third parties only as a co-plaintiff with the patentee. Id. A

“‘patentee’ is defined as including ‘not only the patentee to

whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to

the patentee.’” Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,

240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(d)).

Meyer has never alleged that it holds all substantial

rights under the ‘007 patent. (See Def.’s Answer to Pl.’s Second

Am. Compl. & Countercls.; Def.’s First Am. Countercls.). 

Therefore, to have standing to sue Calphalon for infringing the

‘007 patent, Meyer must not only be an exclusive licensee but

must join the patentee in the counterclaim. Biagro, 160 F. Supp.

2d at 1143. In its original counterclaim, Meyer failed to allege

that it was an exclusive licensee of the ‘007 patent and failed

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to join MILP, the assignee/patentee of the ‘077 patent, as a

counterclaimant. (See generally Def.’s Answer to Pl.’s Second

Am. Compl. & Countercls.). However, Meyer rectified the latter

omissions in its First Amended Counterclaims by alleging that it

is in fact an exclusive licensee of the ‘007 patent and by

joining MILP, the assignee/patentee, as a counterclaimant. (See

Def.’s First Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 18-19). These amendments

establish that Meyer has standing to bring this counterclaim. 

Biagro, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. Calphalon tacitly acknowledges

this in a footnote in its reply wherein it states that it “is not

moving to dismiss Meyer [] and [MILP]’s [p]atent [c]laim in the

Amended Counterclaims, as part of [its motion to dismiss].” 

(Pl.’s Reply at 1 n.1). Therefore, Calphalon’s motion to dismiss

this counterclaim for lack of standing must be denied.

D. Markman Hearing

At oral argument, the parties turned the court’s

attention to the fact that, in a recently filed status report,

Calphalon had proposed that the court hold a Markman hearing to

determine the proper construction of the patents at issue in this

litigation. After reviewing the joint status report, the court

notes that Meyer represented that it was unsure about whether a

Markman hearing was necessary. (See August 1, 2005 Joint Status

Report at 12). Therefore, if the parties agree that a Markman

hearing is necessary, they may contact the court clerk to

schedule the hearing. If the parties disagree as to whether the

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hearing is necessary, the question will be decided at the final

pretrial conference set for July 17, 2006. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s third,

fourth, fifth, and sixth counterclaims for patent infringement

under 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. and false advertising under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a), and California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200

and 17500 be, and the same hereby is, DENIED; and

(2) any Markman hearing be set as provided in section

II(D) of this memorandum and order. 

DATED: August 16, 2005

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