Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01936/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01936-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL LEE DUNSMORE,

CDCR #AD-6237,

Civil No. 12cv1936 JAH (DHB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF No. 7]; and 

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND AS

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; JOHN DOE,

Director of Finance; RICHARD ROE,

Agency or Agencies; JOHN DOE #2,

Department of Justice, 

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Darryl Lee Dunsmore, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding in pro

se, initially filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 6, 2012. (ECF

No. 1). In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2). However, because Plaintiff failed to a certified copy of his

prison trust account statement, as required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court denied

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissed the action. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff was given

forty-five (45) days to file a new Motion to Proceed IFP, with a trust account statement, in order

to reopen the action. (Id.) Although untimely, on March 6, 2013, this Court permitted Plaintiff

to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), along with a certified copy of his inmate trust

account statement. (ECF Nos. 5, 7). The Court will now liberally construe Plaintiff’s inmate

trust account statement to be a pending Motion to Proceed IFP.

II.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

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forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 7] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages fromdefendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

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plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a

pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

Section 1983 imposes two essential proofrequirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

While far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that the PLRA is

unconstitutional, including the provision that requires garnishment of the civil filing fee from

prisoners. (See FAC at 20.) Plaintiff argues that his right to equal protection has been violated

and “it is unconstitutional to require a fee for that which the Constitution declares to be a free

exercise of a right.” (Id.) “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals

are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based

on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must

show that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,

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564 (2000). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that the “PLRA filing fee provisions

satisfy rational basis scrutiny and thus do not violate an indigent prisoner’s constitutional right

to equal protection of the laws.” Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Thus, Plaintiff is unable to allege an equal protection claim as it relates to the PLRA’s filing fee

provision.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint also sets forth claims that appear to be delusional. 

A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that from

2004 to 2010, unnamed “agencies” which he claims were “under the [Director] of Finance

targeted, evaluated, studied, experimented with and entrapped said Plaintiff by instigating,

invoking or other means through the use of psychological efforts or programs to induce a

particular sought out behavior or by some other means to induce criminal activity of the

Plaintiff.” (FAC at 9.) As is the case with the majority of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,

there are very few coherent sentences from which the Court could even attempt to liberally

construe a constitutional claim. It is not clear who the Defendants are alleged to be and it is not

clear what agencies Plaintiff is referring to throughout his First Amended Complaint. Thus, the

Court finds the claims against the named Defendants in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

to be frivolous because they lack even “an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and appear

“fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.7] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this

case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of

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the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey Beard,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous and

for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and

1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is

“Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the

Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th

Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a

“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2013

_________________________________________

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

 United States District Judge 

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