Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01448/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM FREDERICK GILBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 14-CR-0634 W

 16-CV-1448 W

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[DOC. 49]; AND

(2) DENYING AS MOOT 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

STAY [DOC. 52]

Pending before the Court is Petitioner William Gilbert’s motion to vacate pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. 49.] Respondent United States of America opposes, and it

moves to temporarily stay proceedings. [Doc. 52.] The Court decides the matter on the 

papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1 (d)(1). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court DENIES the petition and DENIES AS MOOT Respondent’s 

motion to stay.

//

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I. BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2014, Mr. Gilbert pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery and 

one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). (Petition

[Doc. 49] 2:25–28.) As Gilbert had multiple prior convictions for crimes of violence, one 

of which was a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the Court enhanced his 

sentence as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). (Sentencing Hearing

[Doc. 49, Exh. B] 12.) 

In his motion to vacate, Gilbert now argues that the Court erred in applying this 

enhancement because it considered his previous bank robbery conviction a “crime of 

violence.” (Petition [Doc. 49].) According to Mr. Gilbert, bank robbery is not a crime of 

violence pursuant to the definition provided in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)—it could only 

qualify as a crime of violence pursuant to an ostensibly unconstitutional residual clause

that appeared in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) at the time.

1

 (Id.)

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Gilbert waived the right to collaterally attack his sentence as part of his plea 

agreement. (See Plea Agreement [Doc. 25] 14.) He now argues that the waiver is 

ineffective because the Court must have illegally deemed his previous bank robbery a

crime of violence per the residual clause noted above, in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2) (2015). 

 

1 Gilbert references the recent Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015). (Petition [Doc. 49].) In Johnson, the Court held that to increase a defendant’s sentence pursuant 

to the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), violates the Due 

Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. That residual clause 

defines a violent felony as one that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another”—a definition the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutionally vague. See id.; 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

At the time of Mr. Gilbert’s sentencing, the guidelines contained an analogous residual clause that could 

have classified certain violations as crimes of violence when they did not meet that phrase’s definition 

by their elements. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015) (defining a crime of violence residually as one 

that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). 

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(See Pet.’s Reply [Doc. 53] 4:25–5:25.) See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 

(9th Cir. 2016) (“A waiver of appellate rights will . . . not apply if a defendant’s sentence 

is illegal . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)). This is incorrect. Bank robbery is a crime 

of violence by its elements, per U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), without reference to the residual 

clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015).

U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 provides:

A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old 

at the time of the incident offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony 

that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the 

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or 

a controlled substance offense.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) defines “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal 

or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as 

an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 

of another[.]”

Conviction for bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) requires proof of 

either “force and violence” or “intimidation.” Both force and violence and intimidation 

constitute “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 

of another.” United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[P]ersons 

convicted of robbing a bank ‘by force and violence’ or ‘intimidation’ under 18 U.S.C. § 

2113(a) have been convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of Guideline 

Section 4B1.1.”); accord United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 153 (4th Cir. 2016), 

cert. denied, 2016 WL 3552855 (Oct. 3, 2016); United States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293, 

296 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Jones, 932 F.2d 624, 625 (7th Cir. 1991); United 

States v. Wright, 957 F.2d 520, 522 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856 (1992). 

The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Selfa is directly on point. It finds ample support in 

decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 

//

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Bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), 

without reference to the allegedly unconstitutional residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 

4B1.2(a)(2) (2015). As such, Mr. Gilbert’s contention that his sentence is illegal based 

on that allegedly unconstitutional residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015) is without merit.

His collateral attack waiver applies. (See Plea Agreement [Doc. 25] 14.)

The petition is DENIED. The clerk is directed to close the associated civil case.

Respondent’s motion to stay proceedings is DENIED AS MOOT.

2

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2016

 

2 Respondent moves to stay pending resolution of the Supreme Court case of Beckles v. United States, 

No. 15-8544, which it argues presents two issues: (1) whether Johnson applies retroactively in this 

context; and (2) whether the holding of Johnson applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

(Resp.’s Opp’n [Doc. 52] 3:23–4:23.) For the reasons stated above, these issues are not relevant to the 

disposition of this petition. 

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