Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01374/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

REABURN LENAU, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and 

DOES 1–10, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB 

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER 

This case will be remanded to the state court from 

which Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) removed it, since 

BANA has not established that the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 

BANA removed this case from the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento, asserting in its Notice of 

Removal that the sole basis for removal is diversity of 

citizenship jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Notice of 

Removal (“NOR”) 1:24–28, 2:1–3, 3:18–22, ECF No. 1.) 

“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the 

parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy 

exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 

F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 1 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

“The court may—indeed must—remand an action sua sponte

if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” GFD, 

LLC v. Carter, No. CV 12-08985 MMM (FFMx), 2012 WL 5830079, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (citing Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n 

v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); see 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)(“If at any time before final judgment it 

appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify an amount in 

controversy. Instead, Plaintiff seeks as relief: damages for 

BANA’s alleged violations of state law; an injunction enjoining 

BANA “from attempting to foreclose on the Subject Property 

including the recording of a Notice of Default until [BANA] has 

fairly evaluated and delivered a written determination on 

Plaintiff’s application for BANA’s ‘in house’ loan modification;” 

punitive and/or exemplary damages; prejudgment interest; costs; 

and attorneys’ fees. (Compl. Prayer for Relief, ECF No. 1.) 

“Where the complaint does not specify the amount of 

damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 

requirement has been met.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 

443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “Under 

this burden, the defendant must provide evidence establishing 

that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy 

exceeds that amount.” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 

F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“To determine whether the removing party has met its 

burden of showing that the amount in controversy requirement is 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 2 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

satisfied, the court can consider the contents of the notice of 

removal and ‘summary-judgment-type evidence’ relevant to the 

amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Jackson v. 

Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 14-05981 MMM (PLAx), 2014 

WL 5514142, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (citing Valdez v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004)). The 

court may also consider supplemental evidence later provided by 

the removing defendant, which was not originally included in the 

notice of removal. Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Further, the court has discretion 

to “allow discovery relevant to jurisdictional amount prior to 

[determining whether a case should be] remand[ed].” Abrego 

Abrego, 443 F.3d at 691 (citations omitted); Andrews v. Pride 

Indus., No. 2:14-CV-02154-KJM, 2015 WL 1014133, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 6, 2015) (citing Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 

1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“A district court has broad 

discretion to permit or deny discovery to establish subject 

matter jurisdiction.”). “A court cannot base a finding of 

jurisdiction on a defendant’s speculation and conjecture; 

‘[r]ather, [the] defendant must set forth the underlying facts 

supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds 

the statutory minimum.’” Jackson, 2014 WL 5514142, at *8 

(alterations in original) (quoting Fong v. Regis Corp., No. C 13-

04497 RS, 2014 WL 26996, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014)). 

Here, BANA asserts the jurisdictional amount “can be 

established by the value of the Property and/or the amount of the 

mortgage debt at issue.” (NOR 4:25–27.) BANA further asserts “the 

subject mortgage loan is valued at $781,446.27 and the Property 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 3 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

was worth at least $461,488 as of May 20, 2014.” (NOR 5:2–3 

(citing Compl. ¶ 44, 46).)1 BANA also contends “[t]he amount in 

controversy may include punitive damages when they are 

recoverable as a matter of law.” (NOR 5:6–10 (citation omitted).) 

I. 

The Entire Value of the Loan or Property Is Not in Controversy 

BANA’s assertion in its Notice of Removal that the 

mortgage loan balance establishes the amount in controversy for 

purposes of diversity jurisdiction is an unsupported conclusory 

assertion. “Courts have roundly rejected the argument that the 

amount in controversy is the entire amount of the loan where a 

plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enjoin a foreclosure sale 

pending decision on a loan modification application.” Vergara v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. SACV 15-00058-JLS (RNBx), 2015 WL 

1240421, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (footnote omitted); see 

also Vonderscher v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-00490-

MCE-EFB, 2013 WL 1858431, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) 

(“Numerous other courts have found that when a plaintiff does not 

seek to rescind the loan at issue, but instead seeks damages in 

an unspecified amount under claims such as breach of fiduciary 

duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional 

misrepresentation, fraud, violation of California Business and 

Professions Code section 17200, slander of title, defamation, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, the amount in 

controversy is ‘not properly gauged by the loan amount.’” 

(citations omitted)); Landa v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, No. 10CV1429-

 

1

 Plaintiff also alleges BANA valued the property at $451,457 two-months 

later, on July 21, 2014. (Compl. ¶ 45.) 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 4 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

L(BGS), 2010 WL 2772629, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2010) (holding 

“the amount in controversy is not properly gauged by the loan 

amount or the property value” where plaintiffs sought, in part, 

an “injunction against foreclosure” but were “not seeking loan 

rescission”). 

Similarly, courts have also rejected using the 

property’s appraised value to establish the amount in controversy 

where plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pending a loan 

modification. Vo-Ta v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. SACV 14-1646 

AG(DFMx), 2014 WL 8480451, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) 

(holding the property’s value is not “the object of the 

litigation[,]” for measuring the amount in controversy, where 

plaintiffs seek “injunctions that only temporarily delay 

foreclosure”); Vonderscher, 2013 WL 1858431, at *4 (“[C]ourts 

have rejected using the appraised value of the property as a 

measure of the amount in controversy when [p]laintiffs’ action is 

‘essentially a common law fraud action rather than a typical 

mortgage foreclosure action.’” (quoting Landa, 2010 WL 2772629, 

at *2)). 

BANA’s reliance on Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 

C-10-01667JCS, 2010 WL 2629785 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010), is 

misplaced, since in Reyes, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the bank 

“from selling the foreclosed property to a third party.” Id. at 

*5. Conversely, here Plaintiff seeks in part to delay foreclosure 

proceedings temporarily, pending a decision on his “in-house” 

loan modification application. Further unlike Reyes, Plaintiff 

has not alleged his loan is in default, there has not been a 

notice of default filed, and there is no actual or pending 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 5 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

foreclosure. See id. at *1–2. Thus, BANA has not provided 

authority supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy 

is properly gauged “by the value of the Property and/or the 

amount of the mortgage debt at issue” where, in addition to 

temporary injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks unspecified damages 

for alleged violations of state law. (See NOR 4:25–26.) 

Moreover, the relevant binding authority is 

distinguishable from the present case. The Ninth Circuit has held 

“[i]n actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is 

well established that the amount in controversy is measured by 

the value of the object of the litigation.” Chapman v. Deutsche 

Bank Nat. Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citations omitted). Chapman, however, concerned a quiet title 

action and therefore “the object in litigation [wa]s the 

[p]roperty.” Id. In Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074 

(9th Cir. 1973), the court held the amount in controversy was 

satisfied, since either the amount of plaintiff’s indebtedness on 

the loan or the property’s fair market value exceeded the 

statutory minimum. Id. at 1076. There, the Garfinkle plaintiff 

sought to enjoin the bank from selling the property on grounds 

that California’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute was 

unconstitutional. Id. 

II. 

BANA Does Not Provide Any Support that Plaintiff’s Remaining 

Damages Claims Exceed the $75,000 Amount in Controversy 

Requirement 

In its Notice of Removal, BANA lists Plaintiff’s 

requests for unspecified damages. (NOR 5:4–5.) “Such general 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 6 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

statements cannot establish that the jurisdictional threshold of 

$75,000 is met by a preponderance of the evidence, however.” 

Jauregui v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. EDCV 15-00382-VAP, 2015 

WL 2154148, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2015). 

Further, the possibility of a punitive damages award is 

insufficient to prove that the amount in controversy has been 

met. Otherwise, the mere reference to possible punitive damages’ 

exposure would satisfy the amount in controversy requirement in 

every removed case containing a prayer for punitive damages. 

Instead, “[i]n order to meet their burden for removal, a 

defendant must provide factual support that punitive damages 

should be considered and that the amount the plaintiff seeks 

will, more likely than not, exceed the amount needed to increase 

the amount in controversy to $75,000.” MXI Corp. v. Webb, No. 

3:10-CV-00721-LRH, 2011 WL 336720, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2011). 

Thus, while “punitive damages are part of the amount in 

controversy in a civil action[,]” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 

F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001), here BANA has not attempted to 

quantify Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. See Matheson, 319 

F.3d at 1090-91 (“Conclusory allegations as to the amount in 

controversy are insufficient.”). 

III. 

Conclusion 

Therefore, BANA has failed to meet its burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 

683. 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 7 of 8
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

For the stated reasons, this case is remanded to the 

Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. 

Dated: September 15, 2015 

 

Case 2:15-cv-01374-GEB-EFB Document 10 Filed 09/16/15 Page 8 of 8