Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01554/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE B. HICKMAN, SR.,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1554 GEB GGH P

vs.

HARPER MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently

without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall be collected

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and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Plaintiff names the following as defendants in this action: Harper Medical Group,

Inc.; Lori Jackson (or Jackman), Counselor at Harper Med. Group; Dr. Mark Grayball, Director

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of Harper Med. Group; Butte County Sheriff Perry Reniff; Sacramento County Sheriff Lou

Blanas. Plaintiff alleges that the staff of defendant Harper Medical Group, Inc., particularly

defendant Jackson and defendant Grayball, conspired with defendant party or parties unknown in

the Butte County Sheriff’s Dept. and in the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dept., the actions of

which sheriff’s departments plaintiff imputes to defendant Sheriffs Reniff and Blanas, to

wrongfully incarcerate plaintiff, “all due to my business invention product for the U.S.A.” 

Complaint, pp. 2-3. Plaintiff asks for an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice and for

money damages.

Plaintiff’s allegations violate even the liberal pleading rules of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

Rule 8 requires “sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against

them.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). The rambling, vague,

conclusory, frivolous and even deluded one-(or two)- sentence complaint does not contain

sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47,

78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645

(7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty allegations fails to satisfy the notice

requirement of Rule 8); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202 (2d ed.

1990).

Moreover, plaintiff makes wholly unsupported allegations of conspiracy. Vague 

and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for civil rights violations based on

conspiracy. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). 

More fundamentally, plaintiff makes no substantive allegation as to why his

incarceration is wrongful, as to how these defendants are responsible for it (as opposed to, for

example, his being incarcerated as the result of a judicial procedure). Further, plaintiff seeks

money damages before having demonstrated that any judgment upon which he was incarcerated

has been reversed, expunged or otherwise invalidated. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114

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S. Ct. 2364 (1994), an Indiana state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for

damages. Claiming that state and county officials violated his constitutional rights, he sought

damages for improprieties in the investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of

evidence, and for conduct during his trial (“illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure”). 

Convicted on voluntary manslaughter charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not

seek injunctive relief or release from custody. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the

Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly held that a cause of action for

damages under § 1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id. This action will be

dismissed but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. However, plaintiff is cautioned that if the

allegations of an amended complaint are similarly frivolous, the court will recommend dismissal

of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) on the ground that it is “frivolous....or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted....” Such a dismissal would constitute a “strike” under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

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deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s requests for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Napa State

Hospital filed concurrently herewith.

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3. The complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file

an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file an

amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed. Should

plaintiff file an amended complaint that is similarly frivolous and fails to state a claim, the court

will recommend dismissal of this action on that ground as set forth above.

4. Plaintiff’s July 13, 2006, and August 17, 2006 requests for the appointment of

counsel are denied.

DATED: 12/19/06 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

hick1554.bnf

 

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