Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00803/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00803-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Alan Boyd, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

McWilliams; Attorney General of the State

of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-803-PHX-ROS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Robert Alan Boyd filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 20, 2006,

challenging his convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for two counts each of first

degree murder, kidnaping, and armed robbery, and the trial court's imposition of terms of

imprisonment totaling 50 years. He raises four alleged constitutional violations in his

petition: (1) a juror was biased and the trial court failed to properly conduct a hearing to

ensure a fair and impartial jury; (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because

counsel failed to file a motion to vacate the judgment due to juror misconduct; (3) his double

jeopardy rights were violated because the court removed his attorney, declared a mistrial, and

required him to pick another jury and undergo a second trial, and (4) prosecutorial

misconduct occurred when the prosecution allowed a witness to commit perjury and

informed the jury that they could still credit the witness's testimony. Respondents contend

that the petition is untimely and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. The Court agrees

and recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:06-cv-00803-ROS Document 15 Filed 02/26/07 Page 1 of 5
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1

Although Boyd filed two subsequent post-conviction petitions in August, 2003 and

February, 2005, they were filed following the expiration of the one-year limitations period,

and the Court will not address them, because they are not relevant to a calculation of the

limitations period, the trial court having found them untimely as well (Id., Exh I-M); See

Pace v. DiGiguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

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On August 23, 2001, the court of appeals affirmed Boyd's convictions and sentences;

on March 21, 2002, the supreme court denied review (Doc. #13, Exh D, F). On May 7, 2002,

the court of appeals issued its mandate. On August 15, 2002, Boyd filed a notice of postconviction relief; on September 24, 2002, the trial court summarily dismissed the proceedings

as untimely,1

 finding as follows:

Defendant filed on August 15, 2002, a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

in this case where the appellate mandate affirming his conviction and sentence

on direct appeal was issued on May 7, 2002. Pursuant to Rule 32.4(a) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the notice must be filed within 30 days

of the issuance of the appellate mandate. Defendant claims he should be

excused from the timeliness requirement because he was unaware of the

availability to file post-conviction relief. The record shows that defendant was

advised at sentencing, and in the Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction

and Procedure he signed on May 19, 2000, of his rights to seek post-conviction

relief and the 30-day time period. Defendant has not shown that the failure to

timely file the notice was without fault on his part, as required by Rule 32.1(f).

(Id., Exh H).

Boyd was required to file his federal petition within one year of the time his

conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Boyd's case was final on direct review

on June 19, 2002, the date upon which the time for filing a petition for review to the United

States Supreme Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Boyd was required to file his habeas petition by June 19,

2003, absent any tolling. However, "the time during which a properly filed application for

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation." See § 2244(d)(2). The trial

court dismissed his initial post-conviction petition as untimely, and therefore it was not

"properly filed" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGiguglielmo, 544 U.S.

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It is also inconsistent with the reasons stated for his delayed petitions filed in 2003

and 2005. See Doc. #13, Exh I, L.

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408 (2005). In addition, once the limitations period lapsed, Boyd could not "restart" the

period by filing a state court action that would have tolled the limitations period, had it been

timely filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Finally, Boyd is not entitled to equitable tolling. He has not shown extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible for him to timely file: that he

diligently pursued his rights and that some "extraordinary circumstance stood in his way."

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. In his reply, he alleges as follows:

My first Rule 32 was late because it took over three weeks to get in to see the

paralegal at the max security facility I was in. When I was moved to a lower

custody facility in 2003 I put in to see the paralegal. I tried to file my writ of

habeas corpus then. The paralegal told me I should file another Rule 32 and

when I asked about the time frame she told me my time started over from the

time a ruling was made by the State. When I got the denial of my second Rule

32 I went to see her again and she told me to file a motion to reconsider. So

I did. The State never responded to the motion. Then I was advised to file a

third Rule 32 w[h]ich I did it was also denied. After being told my time started

over after the State's response to my Rule 32, I filed my writ of habeas before

the year ran out. Now the State is saying that isn't the case. I would have filed

on time if not for the advi[c]e of the State's paralegals. We have no access to

a law library anymore and not knowing anything about the law, I was forced

to rely on the prison[']s State paralegals. Under the Constitution I am

guaranteed a fair trial and the state doesn't argue against any of my issues

raised they just want the whole thing thrown out. I don[']t think I should be

punished for following the only legal help given to me by the State and my

case should not be dismissed. So I leave it in your hands to give me the fair

trial the Constitution g[u]arantees me to have. 

(Doc. #14) (emphasis added).

First, this argument is inconsistent with what he stated to the trial court in his delayed

petition: that his untimeliness should be excused because he "was unaware of the availability

to file post-conviction relief," a claim rejected by the trial court. See Doc. #13, Exh G, H.2

Second, Boyd is not entitled to counsel in a federal habeas proceeding. Relying on a prison

paralegal whose function is to provide forms and administrative assistance, and who is

specifically prohibited from giving legal advice, cannot be the basis for equitable tolling.

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It also appears he may have confused some dates, because he states in his reply that

he filed his second petition for post-conviction relief after his transfer to "a lower custody

facility in 2003." However, he was transferred to ASPC Florence - Central Unit in 2000, and

remained there until 2002, when he was transferred to Kaibab. He remained there until

November, 2003. Maricopa County Superior Court records reflect that he filed his second

petition on August 5, 2003, prior to his transfer from Kaibab, but past the one-year

limitations period as well. Therefore, his argument that had he not been given inaccurate

legal advice from the paralegals, he would have timely filed his habeas petition, also fails.

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Finally, a review of ADC records reveals that Boyd was transferred from ASPC SMU I (a

maximum security facility) to ASPC Central on October 11, 2000, and remained there

working both as a skilled kitchen worker and landscaper until he was transferred to ASPC

Kaibab, Winslow on November 7, 2002. He was later transferred to ASPC SMU II on

November 5, 2003,3

 beyond the one-year limitations period of June, 2003. Therefore,

whatever information he might have received at SMU following this date is irrelevant in

determining whether or not to apply equitable tolling. That he may have been diligent

following the expiration of the limitations period is not the test: it is the diligence with which

he pursued his rights and the presence of some extraordinary circumstance prior to the

expiration that is examined.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Robert Alan Boyd's petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaCase 2:06-cv-00803-ROS Document 15 Filed 02/26/07 Page 4 of 5
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Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-00803-ROS Document 15 Filed 02/26/07 Page 5 of 5