Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02454/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02454-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN W. JONES,

CDCR #BB-6806,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RICHARD J. DONOVAN (CDCR); 

DANIEL PARAMO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-2454-BTM-BLM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING REQUEST TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2];

2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[ECF No. 3];

AND

3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Kevin W. Jones (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the California Medical 

Facility (“CMF”), in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights 

action in the Northern District of California on November 17, 2017 (ECF No. 1), together 

with a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3). 

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Because Plaintiff claims prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California violated his constitutional rights while he was 

incarcerated there, the Honorable Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. transferred his case to this 

Court for lack of proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1406(a) on 

December 5, 2017 (ECF No. 5). 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his request to proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate 

authorized by a CMF accounting official and a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report. See ECF No. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

at 1119. These documents shows that Plaintiff had an available balance of zero at the 

time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 5-6. Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his 

designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff also requests that the Court appoint him counsel due to his indigence. 

(ECF No. 3 at 1.) All documents filed pro se are liberally construed, and “a pro se 

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)). But there is no 

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case; and Plaintiff’s Complaint does not compel 

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that the Court exercise its limited discretion to request than an attorney represent him pro 

bono pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) at this stage of the case. See Lassiter v. Dept. of 

Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 

1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). Only “exceptional circumstances” support such a 

discretionary appointment. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Exceptional circumstances exist 

where there is cumulative showing of both a likelihood of success on the merits and a 

demonstrated inability of the pro se litigant to articulate his claims in light of their legal 

complexity. Id.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates that while he may not be 

formally trained in law, he nevertheless is fully capable of legibly articulating the facts 

and circumstances relevant to his claims, which are typical and not legally “complex.” 

Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has yet 

to show he is likely to succeed on the merits of the claims.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

(ECF No. 3).

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. 

Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

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Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s alleges that on June 20, 2017, he was “in general population at RJD” 

when he began “hearing voices and having thoughts of suicide.” (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff 

was placed on a “72 hour hold” in a holding cell at RJD “pending transfer to a CDCR 

(ADA) crisis bed facility.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that RJD Defendants made the decision 

to transfer him to a “non (ADA)” prison which was California State Prison - Los Angeles 

County (“CSP-LAC”). (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff claims this intent to transfer him to a “non 

ADA” prison demonstrated “reckless [and] callous discriminatory practice with 

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intentional ‘malice’.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that RJD officials “routinely and 

systemically made it difficult, if not impossible, for prisoner appeals or grievance to be 

heard or processed.” (Id.) 

In addition, Plaintiff is claiming that RJD officials are “intentionally withholding 

all of inmate Jones’ personal property.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff has repeatedly requested that 

his property be shipped to him at his current place of incarceration but he has yet to 

receive any of his property. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he is unable to “litigate his case in 

the appellate courts” and the value of the loss of his property is “$3,539.20.” (Id.) 

C. Eighth Amendment and ADA claims

Plaintiff’s claims that RJD prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his 

mental and medical health needs because they chose to transfer him to CSP-LAC rather 

than to an ADA compliant prison. Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any facts as to when 

he was transferred there or for how long he was housed at CSP-LAC. Plaintiff does not 

allege any facts that indicate he suffered any injury while housed at CSP-LAC. Plaintiff’s 

inmate trust account statement filed in support of his IFP Motion indicates that he was 

housed at CMF as of September 20, 2017. (See ECF No. 2 at 6.) When Plaintiff filed his 

action he was housed at CMF. (See ECF No. 1.) According to the CDCR’s inmate 

locator, Plaintiff is currently housed at CMF.2 Plaintiff does not allege facts to 

demonstrate that CMF is unable to meet his medical or mental health needs. 

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed in the institution of his 

choice. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 

39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of 

prison administrators’ expertise.”) If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended pleading, he 

must allege facts to show how long he was housed at CSP-LAC, as well as facts 

 

2

See https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Results.aspx (website last visited Feb. 9, 2018.)

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supporting his claims that his medical and mental health needs were not addressed at 

CSP-LAC. 

D. Grievance claims

Plaintiff alleges that RJD officials have “routinely and systematically made it 

difficult, if not impossible, for prisoner appeals or grievances to be heard or processed.” 

(Compl. at 2.) However, a prison official’s alleged improper processing of an inmate’s 

grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability.

See generally Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not 

have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”) 

(citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not 

violated simply because defendant fails properly to process grievances submitted for 

consideration).

E. Property claims

Plaintiff also contends that RJD officials have failed to transport his personal 

property to CMF. (See Compl. at 3-4.) The Due Process Clause protects against 

deprivations of property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

556 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has also held, however, that “an 

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a 

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). California’s tort claim process provides an adequate 

post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per 

curiam) (“[A] negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner’s property fails to state a 

claim under section 1983 if the state has an adequate post deprivation remedy.”); see also 

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Kemp v. Skolnik, No. 

2:09-CV-02002-PMP, 2012 WL 366946, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 3, 2012) (finding prisoner’s 

alleged loss or destruction of newspaper, magazines, and books failed to state a 

Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to Hudson and noting that “[i]f Plaintiff wishes to 

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recoup the value of the alleged lost materials, he will have to file a claim in small claims 

court in state court.”).

F. Access to Courts

Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible access to courts claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1). Prisoners have a constitutional right of access 

to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). In order to state a claim of a 

denial of the right to access the courts, a prisoner must establish that he has suffered “actual 

injury,” a jurisdictional requirement derived from the standing doctrine. Lewis, 518 U.S. 

at 349. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing 

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348 

(citation and internal quotations omitted).

The right of access does not require the State to “enable the prisoner to discover 

grievances,” or even to “litigate effectively once in court.” Id. at 354; see also Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the “inability to file a 

complaint or defend against a charge”). Instead, Lewis limits the right of access to the 

courts, as follows: 

the injury requirement is [limited to those tools] that the inmates need in order 

to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the 

conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity 

is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of 

conviction and incarceration. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346. Plaintiff’s failure to set forth any allegations regarding an “actual 

injury” here is “fatal” to his claim. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“Failure to show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”), quoting 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.4.

In addition to failing to allege an “actual injury,” Plaintiff has also failed to allege 

facts sufficient to describe the “non-frivolous” or “arguable” nature of an underlying 

claim he contends was lost as result of Defendants’ actions. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). The nature and description of the underlying claim must be set 

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forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently pursued.” Id. at 417. Plaintiff’s 

Complaint contains no allegations whatsoever regarding his inability to access the courts, 

or any “actual injury” with respect to a “non-frivolous” criminal appeal, habeas action, or 

conditions of confinement claim. Id.

G. Improper Defendants 

Finally, the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief 

may be granted as to either Defendant RJD, or its Warden, Daniel Paramo. See ECF No. 

1 at 1-2. RJD is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Hale v. State of Arizona, 

993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is 

an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983).

In addition, while RJD’s Warden Paramo may be subject to suit under § 1983, 

nowhere in the body of his Complaint does Plaintiff include “further factual 

enhancement” to describes when, how, or to what extent Paramo personally caused him 

any constitutional injury. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. There is no respondeat superior liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must plead that 

each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community 

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even 

pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte because it 

fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV . Conclusion and Orders

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

3. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A;

6. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, 

however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by 

itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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7. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil 

rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2018

HON. BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

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