Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55337/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NELSON HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KIM HOLLAND, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-55337

D.C. No.

2:07-cv-07036-DSF-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 4, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed April 24, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

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2 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition alleging a violation

of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), based on a midtrial conversation between petitioner and a court bailiff.

During a recess in his trial, petitioner had a conversation

with a court bailiff during which he made inculpatory

statements about the details of the crime. The trial court

ruled that the conversation was not an “interrogation” and

permitted the bailiff to testify to the jury. The panel held

that this determination did not involve an unreasonable

application of Miranda or its Supreme Court progeny. The

panel also held that, despite respondent’s failure to brief the

issue, the deferential standard of review under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act cannot be waived.

COUNSEL

Michael Weinstein (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender’s

Office, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tannaz Kouhpainezhad (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Dane R.

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 3

Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael R. Johnsen,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles,

California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether, in the context of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a mid-trial conversation between

a court bailiff and a criminal defendant constituted an

interrogation that must be preceded by a Miranda warning. 

We decide that the state court’s determination that the

conversation was not such an inquiry was reasonable.

Petitioner Nelson Hernandez seeks habeas relief from his

state murder conviction on the ground that his right against

self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966), was violated. During a recess in his trial, Hernandez

had a conversation with the court bailiff. Hernandez made

inculpatory statements about details of the crime. The trial

court, over Hernandez’ objections, ruled that the conversation

was not an “interrogation” under Miranda and permitted the

bailiff to testify to the jury about the statements. On direct

appeal, the California Court of Appeal, in a reasoned

decision, also held that the conversation was not an

“interrogation” under Miranda. The Los Angeles County

Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, and the

California Supreme Court later denied Hernandez’ state

habeas petitions without opinion. The district court then

denied Hernandez’ federal habeas petition under AEDPA,

holding that the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal

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4 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

did not apply Miranda unreasonably in its decision and that

the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination

of facts in state court proceedings. We affirm.

Underlying Facts and Trial

On January 12, 2002, John McMillian picked up his

friend Marylin West from her evening shift at a grocery store

in the Wilmington area of Los Angeles, with plans to drive

her to dinner. West asked McMillian to bring her back to her

apartment complex first so she could change out of her work

uniform. McMillian obliged. He waited outside the complex

in the driver’s seat of the car while West went inside.

A short time later, around 9:30 p.m., West walked back

outside toward the car. As she walked, a heavy-set Hispanic

male in a dark, hooded sweatshirt approached her, riding a

black and silver bike. Her walkway was well lighted; West

stated at trial that she could see the man’s face clearly, and

identified Nelson Hernandez in court as the man she saw that

night. West also testified that she had seen Hernandez in the

apartment complex five to ten times before during the six

months prior to that night and had spoken to him briefly on

occasion. She testified that as she walked Hernandez began

to follow her and asked her name, who the man in the car

was, and where they were going.

As the two neared the car, a second, thinner Hispanic

male joined them. When the three reached the car, according

to West, Hernandez’ attention turned to McMillian. West

testified that she attempted to open the passenger door, but

that Hernandez “had opened” it first, and that he stood

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 5

“inside” of the opened door on the passenger side.1 The two

men began to ask McMillian who he was, where he was from,

and if he “gang-banged.”2 McMillian looked straight ahead

and replied that he did not “gang-bang” and did not live

around there. According to West, the two men repeated their

interrogation for some five minutes, while she pleaded with

them to leave her friend alone. Meanwhile, a group of about

fifteen Hispanic males gathered. An older man from the

group approached and said something like “don’t do it.” At

that point, according to West, Hernandez pulled the hood of

his sweatshirt over his head, produced a gun, and began firing

at McMillian. West ran and hid in some bushes; McMillian

died at the scene. When police arrived, they took West to the

station, where she identified Hernandez in two photo “sixpacks.” Hernandez, who at first could not be located, was

arrested several months later and charged with first-degree

murder.

At trial, Hernandez’ defense was that he was a hundred

miles away that night at a party and that West mistakenly

identified him. As noted, West placed Hernandez at the

scene. Despite West’s inability on cross-examination to

remember precise details about themurder, includingwhether

Hernandez had piercings or marks, or the makeup of the

1 On cross examination, West repeated that Hernandez opened the

passenger door of the car. This seemingly insignificant detail was the

subject of the critical portion of the conversation that Hernandez had with

the bailiff shortly after West’s testimony. As discussed below, who

opened the door matters not; that Hernandez was there, instead of 100

miles away at a party, matters a great deal.

 

2

 McMillian was African-American and was in an area controlled by a

Hispanic street gang, the “Westside Wilmas.” Police officers testified that

Hernandez was a member of the gang; his gang name was “Humpty.”

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6 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

crowd that gathered, she told the jury that there was no

“uncertainty in [her] mind” that Hernandez was “the person

who shot John McMillian.” The jury evidently believed her.3

Conversation with the Bailiff

After West’s testimony the court took a morning recess. 

The bailiff, Sheriff’s Deputy Donald Moore, escorted

Hernandez out of the courtroom and back to a lockup cell. 

On the way there, Hernandez and Deputy Moore engaged in

the conversation that forms the basis of this appeal.

Deputy Moore’s version of the conversation was as

follows: he led Hernandez to the lockup cell after West’s

testimony. After passing through the door from the

courtroom toward the holding area, he asked Hernandez, “Are

you going to testify?” Hernandez replied that he “had an alibi

but that his attorney did not want him to use it.” Moore said

that “that was the end of” that “first conversation.” The two

were then silent for about “forty-five seconds to a minute” as

they proceeded up some stairs to the lockup cell area. When

they reached the landing at the top of the stairs, according to

Deputy Moore, Hernandez initiated a “second conversation”

on a “different topic” from the “topic as before that [we] had

been discussing.” To “initiate that conversation,” Hernandez

asked Moore “what [he] thought about [West’s] testimony.” 

Deputy Moore told Hernandez “I thought she was nervous

and [the defense] attorney tripped her up a little bit.” At this,

according to DeputyMoore, Hernandez “immediatelyblurted

out that ‘the bitch couldn’t recall anything. She opened the

door, we didn’t’—excuse me—‘she didn’t open the door, we

 

3

 They believed West, despite her impeachment with a criminal record

of forgery, providing a false financial statement, and grand theft.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 7

did.’”4 Although DeputyMoore was at first “overwhelm[ed]”

by the statement, and was initially unsure whether Hernandez

said that “she” or “we”opened the door, Moore testified he

was certain that one of the two statements—either “she” or

“we” opened the door—was correct. Upon further reflection,

Moore determined that Hernandez said “she didn’t open the

door; we did.” Deputy Moore wrote that version of the

statement down. That, stated Moore, was the “entire

conversation.”5

According to Moore, he asked the question “Are you

going to testify?” only out of “curiosity,” and “just to see”

about the “length of the trial,” “because the D.A.’s case was

moving along pretty fast, and I took the assumption that the

case was almost over.” Moore also said it was his

“preference” to talk to prisoners to let him “understand the

defendant and how he’s going to react in court” for “security

purposes.”

In Hernandez’ version of the conversation, Moore asked

no questions at all before Hernandez started talking first.6

4 West, as stated above, had testified that Hernandez opened the car

door.

5 Moore admitted that he never gave Hernandez Miranda warnings at

any point.

6 When asked at the suppression hearing by his own defense counsel,

“Do you think it’s accurate that, when you walked behind the east door,

[Moore was] the first one that said something to you?,” Hernandez said

“no.” When defense counsel asked “did you say anything to him first?” 

Hernandez answered “yes.” Hernandez testified that he heard Moore at

some point say “Are you going to testify?” but repeated that Moore was

not the first to speak. On Hernandez’ cross-examination, the following

exchange took place:

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8 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

Hernandez said that he started the conversation by asking

Moore “How [do you] think my case is looking?” Moore

responded, “I seen people walk on worse[] things than this.” 

After the two got up the stairs to lockup, Hernandez, in

reference to West, said “I think this girl’s lying.” Moore

replied, “Why is that?” Hernandez answered “because in the

police report it says that she stated she opened up the door.

And then, of course, she said I opened up the door.” 

Hernandez insisted that he did not say that “we” opened the

door, or that “she” did, but was only pointing out that there

was a discrepancy between West’s testimony and the police

report that quoted her.

Suppression Hearing

After the conversation, Moore informed the court clerk

and court reporter what had happened. (A detective, who was

in the courtroom as a prosecution witness, also overheard

what Moore told them). Moore then spoke to both counsel,

and ultimately to the court. The judge relieved Moore from

courtroom duty immediately and scheduled a hearing for the

next morning, Friday, September 12, at 9:00 a.m., to

[Prosecutor]: Sir, it’s your testimony that you initiated

the conversation with Deputy Moore?

A. Did I start the conversation first?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Deputy Moore did not. That is your testimony,

right?

A. Yes.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 9

determine what to do about the unexpected development. 

Scheduled prosecution testimony continued through the

afternoon.

At the Fridaymorning hearing, the prosecutor said that he

would call Moore as a witness. Defense counsel objected to

Moore’s proffered testimony and moved to exclude it. 

Defense counsel first argued that the judge could not “fairly

judge the credibility” of the bailiff in an evidentiary hearing

because of their relationship, and that the judge should recuse

himself. Defense counsel also requested a continuance so he

could consider whether to file a Pitchess motion7and so he

could investigate what happened in the conversation. The

judge stated that a continuance would result in a certain

mistrial because the jury was scheduled to sit only for three

more days. But the court deferred ruling for the morning,

ordered Moore to make a written report about the

7 A Pitchess motion asks for “access to records of complaints, or

investigations of complaints, or discipline imposed as a result of those

investigations” of “law enforcement and custodial personnel.” See

Pitchess v. Superior Court, 555 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974), superseded by Cal.

Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8, Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1045. The motion

must include an affidavit “showing good cause for the discovery or

disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereofto the subject matter

involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that

the governmental agency identified has the records or information from

the records.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1043(b)(3). The “materiality” prong can

be “satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for

discovery,” but must be “requested with adequate specificity to preclude

the possibility that defendant is engaging in a ‘fishing expedition.’” City

of Santa Cruz v. Mun. Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526 (Cal. 1989) (citation

omitted). Once good cause is shown, the court then makes an in camera

examination of the records to see whether they are relevant to the

“pending litigation,” but with instructions that the court is to take into

careful account the “privacy interests” of the officer. Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1045.

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10 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

conversation, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for the

afternoon to determine whether Hernandez’ Miranda rights

were violated. Previously scheduled prosecution testimony

then continued.

At the afternoon hearing, defense counsel renewed his

request for a continuance until the next Monday, citing

“potential conflict issues” with himself and people in his

office and “potential for my testimony.”8 The court denied

the request, reasoning that if it granted a continuance it would

“lose this jury” because their decision was scheduled to be

rendered by Tuesday afternoon, and the prosecution had not

yet closed its case. The judge also refused to recuse himself. 

Moore then testified about the conversation. Defense counsel

asked permission to call the court reporter, the court clerk,

and the detective who were present when Moore first reported

the conversation.9 The court denied the requests without

8 Counsel did not mention a Pitchess motion as a reason for his renewed

request for a continuance. Nor did he explain what the “potential conflict”

might be. Further, he made no proffer as to the subject matter of any of

his potential testimony.

9

It was apparently only during the course of Deputy Moore’s testimony

that defense counsel learned that Moore reported the conversation to the

clerk, court reporter, and detective. Defense counsel asked Moore on

cross-examination which people he told “about the statement” “She didn’t

open the door, we did.” Moore said he told the clerk, and that the court

reporter and detective were present. Defense counsel, however, did not

ask Moore what exactly he told the clerk, other than that Moore told her

“about the statement.” Counsel did not request a recess to interview the

potential witnesses. Further, counsel made no proffer of proof that he

intended to adduce from these persons. Counsel evidently did not know

what the witnesses might say; he asked to call the reporter because “I’d

like to hear what she has to say.” The court denied the request.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 11

explanation. Hernandez then testified to his version of the

conversation.

Trial Court Ruling: No Miranda Interrogation

The court then heard counsels’ argument on the motion to

suppress Deputy Moore’s testimony. Defense counsel stated

that he wanted the court to exclude Moore’s testimony

“notwithstanding the fact that both my client and the deputy

have essentially testified that it was a consensual, noninterrogation style encounter” because “the circumstances and

the unusual relationship that exist between a jailer and a

person in custody are inherently—create a situation that is

inherently similar to an interrogation.” The prosecutor

responded that “there was clearly no Miranda violation as

there was no interrogation as required by the custodial

interrogation aspects of Miranda.” The court agreed with the

prosecutor:

I’m satisfied there’s no Miranda violations. 

There was no interrogation. There was one

question according to the bailiff—but I don’t

think it had anything to do with this statement,

nor did it have anything really to do with this

case except for scheduling, and so I find no

Miranda violation.

The court also stated “I don’t think it’s my role here to

determine which interpretation should be given to the words

that were spoken or even make a determination as to what

words were spoken. That’s a jury function.”

The judge accordingly permitted Deputy Moore to testify

to the jury, with the instruction directly after Moore’s

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12 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

testimony that the jury was not to give Moore’s testimony any

extra weight because he was the court’s bailiff. Moore

admitted to the jury that there were “two possibilities” of who

Hernandez said opened the car door, but settled on “she

didn’t open the door. We did.” After Moore’s testimony,

which obviously placed Hernandez at the scene no matter

who he said opened the car door, and thus bolstered West’s

identification of Hernandez, the state rested. Hernandez did

not take the stand in his case-in-chief, wherein two alibi

witnesses—including his mother—said he was at a party in

another city that night. The jury convicted.

Post-conviction Proceedings

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the conviction and held, in a reasoned decision, that there had

been no Miranda interrogation because “the bailiff’s neutral

question was not the functional equivalent of interrogation

because it was not the type of question likely to elicit an

incriminating response.” The California Supreme Court

denied review without opinion.

After Hernandez’ state habeas petitions were denied,

Hernandez filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas

petition, in part on the ground that the trial court erred in

allowing Moore to testify. The district court denied the

petition because, under AEDPA, there had been no

unreasonable application of federal precedent or unreasonable

finding of fact in permitting Moore’s testimony. We granted

Hernandez a certificate of appealability on the following

issue: “whether appellant’s rights, under Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966), were violated by the trial court’s

admission of the court bailiff’s testimony.” We now affirm.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 13

Standard of Review

AEDPA bars the relitigation in federal court of any

habeas claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). There are two

narrow exceptions: a petitioner may bring an adjudicated

habeas claim if 1) the state court’s adjudication of the claim

has “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or 2) the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. 

A federal court must analyze the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court—here, the California Court of Appeal opinion

that rejected Hernandez’ state direct appeal. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804–06 (1991); Delgadillo v.

Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). We review de

novo a district court’s decision to deny a state convict’s

federal habeas petition. Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 2000).

Discussion

Under AEDPA, Hernandez must show either 1) that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision on direct appeal was an

unreasonable application of federal law, as “clearly

established” by Supreme Court precedent, or 2) that its

decision rested on an underlying unreasonable determination

of fact. Hernandez argues that both statutory grounds are

met. First, he asserts that the California Court of Appeal’s

application of Miranda and of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.

291 (1980) to find that the conversation with the bailiff was

not an “interrogation” was objectively unreasonable. Second,

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14 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

he argues that the trial court’s fact-finding process in

allowing Moore to testify was so defective—an un-recused

judge, denial of continuance, refusal to hear the clerk,

reporter, and detective—that the Court of Appeal’s decision

rested on an unreasonable determination of fact. Third,

Hernandez argues that those procedural deficiencies were so

egregious as to be themselves an objectively unreasonable

application of federal law. The Warden has made our task

more difficult by briefing only Hernandez’ first contention:

that Deputy Moore improperly interrogated him to produce

the incriminatory admission. We accordingly attend to that

contention first, then turn to the other two arguments and

discuss the result of the Warden’s failure to brief those issues.

I. The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably

apply Miranda or its Supreme Court progeny.

For a “federal court to find a state court’s application of

[Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). Instead, the

application must have been “‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. 

AEDPA thus precludes a federal court from granting habeas

relief if “fairminded jurists could disagree” whether the state

court incorrectly applied federal Supreme Court precedent. 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

The precedents at issue here are Miranda and its Supreme

Court progeny. They forbid a prosecutor from using

statements “stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless [he] demonstrates the use of procedural

safeguards” such as the familiar Miranda warnings: that the

accused has the right to remain silent, to consult with an

attorney, and to have his counsel present with him during

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 15

questioning. 384 U.S. at 444. The parties here do not dispute

that Hernandez was in “custody” for Miranda purposes or

that DeputyMoore never gave Hernandez Miranda warnings. 

Instead, the question is whether the California Court of

Appeal was “objectivelyunreasonable” when it found that the

conversation between the two did not amount to an

“interrogation” under federal Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court has instructed that an “interrogation”

is “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the

police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at

300–01 (1980) (footnote omitted).10 Nevertheless,

“‘[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the

Fifth Amendment.’” Id. at 300, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 478); see also United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 409

(9th Cir. 1996) (“‘Spontaneous’ or ‘volunteered’ confessions

of a suspect in custody are admissible despite the absence of

a prior Miranda warning.”).

As the district court noted below, Hernandez initiated a

second conversation by asking Moore a question after the two

10 In Innis, two officers arrested a robbery suspect and put him in the

back seat of the patrol car. As they drove to the police station, the officers

engaged in a conversation within Innis’ hearing about the missing weapon,

which the officers stated was being searched for in an area near a school

for handicapped children. One officer expressed to the other his concern

that a child could be hurt by the missing firearm. At this, Innis

“interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car

around so he could show them where the gun was located.” 446 U.S. at

295. The Supreme Court held that the officers’ conversation did not

amount to “interrogation” because the officers had no reason to know that

their “conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response from” Innis. Id. at 302.

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16 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

walked up the stairs and were on a different topic. Hernandez

v. Hedgpeth, CV-07-7036-DSF-AGR, 2011 WL488402 at *8

(C.D. Cal. 2011) report and recommendation adopted, CV

07-7036-DSF AGR, 2011 WL 503530 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7,

2011), citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.

Assuming that Deputy Moore’s version of events is

correct,11there was a gap of some forty-five seconds to a

minute between Moore’s question “Are you going to testify?”

and Hernandez’ question “What did you think of [West’s]

testimony?” To be sure, it would be reasonable to conclude

that the walk up the stairs was only a pause in an extended

discussion that Deputy Moore—and not Hernandez, again

assuming Hernandez’ version is wrong—started about the

case. But it is also reasonable to see two conversations, the

second initiated by Hernandez, followed by Hernandez’

“spontaneous” and “volunteered” “blurt[ing] out” that West

“couldn’t remember anything.” It is particularly reasonable

to see two conversations because Hernandez changed topics

after the walk up the stairs: from himself and his own un-used

alibi to West and her veracity. In light of Supreme Court

precedent about volunteered or spontaneous statements, the

California Court of Appeal was not thus “unreasonable” in its

determination that there was no “interrogation” and that

Hernandez’ inculpatory diatribe as to West was volunteered.

More important, we cannot say that the California Court

of Appeal was unreasonable when it found that Moore’s

question was not itself an “interrogation.” The Court of

Appeal specifically applied Innis to Hernandez’ facts, and

11 If Hernandez’ own version of events is correct, Moore said nothing

until Hernandez spontaneously initiated the entire conversation. 

Hernandez chose not to testify to his version before the jury.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 17

found that Deputy Moore’s question “Are you going to

testify?” was a “neutral question which called only for an

equally neutral answer. [Hernandez], for example, could

have answered ‘Yes,’ ‘No’ or ‘Maybe.’” People v.

Hernandez, B170634, 2004 WL 2428700 at *8–9 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2004) (unpublished).

Of course, no matter Moore’s claim that his reason for

asking the question was merely to check the timing of the

trial, Innis demands that we ask whether Moore “should have

known” that his question “Are you going to testify?”

12 was

“reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.” 

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. To be sure, it would not be

unreasonable to take Moore’s question as prying for

information about the crime, the equivalent of “She says

you’re guilty—what’s your side of the story?” Such a

question, so construed, might be reasonably likely to provoke

an incriminating response.

However, we think that it would also be reasonable to

conclude that the question was “neutral,” a request simply to

know whether Hernandez would take the stand, just as

Hernandez clearly took it when he answered that he indeed

would not testify. Moreover, it would be reasonable to find

that Moore neither could nor should have known that his

question would elicit an incriminating statement. Moore was

aware, having been the bailiff during opening statements and

West’s cross-examination, that Hernandez’ entire trial

strategy was to claim mistaken identification. It would be

reasonable to conclude that Moore could never expect that his

simple question would prompt Hernandez to correct the

 

12 Again assuming, contrary to Hernandez’ testimony, that Moore, and

not Hernandez, initiated the conversation with this question.

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18 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

details of West’s testimony as a claimed percipient witness to

West’s actions at the scene of the crime. The possibility of

such a response would be so unlikely as to take any officer

completely aback—just as Moore said happened. See Innis,

446 U.S. at 302–03 (holding that, “under the circumstances,”

including the officers’ lack of knowledge that Innis might

respond with concern for handicapped children, the officers’

comments about the murder weapon were not “particularly

‘evocative’”). We therefore again cannot say that the

California Court of Appeal was unreasonable in its

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent

when it determined that Deputy Moore did not “interrogate”

Hernandez.

Hernandez suggests four reasons whyhe nevertheless was

interrogated. None is availing. First, Hernandez argues that

his youth (nineteen at the time) “made him more susceptible

to the coercive pressures of interrogations” when the deputy

“confronted” him. He cites J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.

Ct. 2394 (2011), for the proposition that the Supreme Court

has acknowledged that “juveniles do not have the mental,

physical, and emotional ability to deal with the coercive

pressures of interrogations as well as adults can.” But J.D.B.

was about whether “the Miranda custody analysis includes

consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.” J.D.B., 131 S. Ct.

at 2401 (emphasis added). A Miranda custody

analysis—whether Hernandezwould have felt “free to leave,”

id. at 2399—is not in question here. Instead, the question

here is whether Hernandez was being interrogated at all;

Hernandez has given no reason why his youth affected

Moore’s knowledge that his question had any possibility of

leading Hernandez to talk about who opened the car door, and

who was there to observe the event. See Innis, 446 U.S. at

302 (“There is nothing in the record to suggest that the

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 19

officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly

susceptible to an appeal to his conscience . . . .”). It was

therefore again not objectively unreasonable for the

California Court of Appeal to see the question as neutral,

even if it considered Hernandez’ youth.

Second, Hernandez argues that the “timing of the

encounter” turned the conversation into an interrogation

because he had just been “confronted” with a witness who

accused him of murder. Hernandez argues that he was being

“forced to answer a law enforcement officer’s question”

during the “heat of trial,” meaning, presumably, that the

question was in effect a cross-examination. But neither

version of the conversation reveals anything resembling

coercion. And even if Hernandez’ view is reasonable, it does

not make the alternate view that the question was “neutral”

unreasonable beyond the agreement of fairminded jurists. 

And again, all that assumes that Moore’s version of the

conversation—and not Hernandez’ own—is accurate. If

Hernandez’ version is accurate, Hernandez initiated whatever

conversation took place, and his question could not

reasonably be interpreted as a request that he be interrogated.

Third, Hernandez argues that the “physical setting” turned

the encounterinto an interrogation: “isolated, handcuffed, and

alone, he was confronted by a presumably armed deputy

sheriff” and by the “evidence against him.” But the

defendant in Innis, for example, was found not to have been

interrogated even though he was confined in the back seat of

a police car and was “confronted” by two armed officers who

were driving him to a police station while talking about the

murder weapon. 446 U.S. at 294–95. And it bears repeating

that Hernandez’ own testimony was that he pressed the issue

on Deputy Moore.

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20 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

Fourth, Hernandez argues that “[a]ny defendant could

reasonably interpret [Moore’s] question . . . as an inquiry to

see what they thought of the evidence the prosecutor had just

introduced at trial” and thus was a question that was

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response. We

have already largely addressed this point. There is nothing

unreasonable in construing Deputy Moore’s question exactly

as Hernandez wishes. But neither would a court be

objectively unreasonable in construing it as a neutral

question, with an unreasonablylow probabilityof evoking the

response, in effect, “That’s not how it was; I was there.”13

In sum, while we might have found differently had we

been the trial judge or the California Court of Appeal, the

Court of Appeal was not “objectively unreasonable” when it

found no Miranda interrogation. The district court was

accordingly correct that it could not grant relief under

AEDPA on this theory. We turn to Hernandez’ other theories

of relief, but pause first to discuss a disturbing error on this

appeal by the Warden.

13 Hernandez’supplemental citation to U.S. v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938 (7th

Cir. 2013), only makes the Warden’s point. In Hunter, the suspect was in

the hospital after being shot by police while fleeing a felony, and asked an

officer to call his mother, father, and a lawyer. The officer asked “What

do you want me to tell these people?,” which prompted an incriminating

response. The Seventh Circuit held that the question was an interrogation

and an “invitation to disaster,” and rhetorically asked “what answer could

[Hunter] give . . . that would not be incriminatory?” Id. at 947–48. The

answer to the same rhetorical question in Hernandez’ case, however, could

be just what the California Court of Appeal reasonably said: when Moore

asked “Are you going to testify?,” Hernandez could have answered “Yes,”

“No,” or “Maybe”—and then initiated nothing further—or answer as he

did: “I have an alibi but my attorney doesn’t want me to use it.” None of

these responsive answers would have placed him at the crime scene when

McMillian was shot to death.

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 21

II. Respondent’s failure to brief and AEDPA

Hernandez briefed fully his three theories of relief:

unreasonable application of Miranda, deficient fact-finding

at the trial court level, and unreasonable application of federal

law because of that deficient fact-finding. The Warden,

however, briefed a response only to the first theory and

ignored the other two theories entirely. Hernandez in his

reply brief pointed out that silence and argued that the

Warden waived the two unanswered issues, that AEDPA

accordingly did not apply to bar relief, and thus that he was

entitled to a review of the Miranda issue de novo and without

AEDPA’s “objectively unreasonable” standard of review.14

At oral argument, the panel questioned Respondent’s attorney

about her failure to brief. Counsel repeatedly apologized, but

offered no reason why the oversight happened.

This court then ordered supplemental briefing on the

following questions: “1) Can the State waive the argument

that the [AEDPA] standard of review applies; and 2) If so,

should the court exercise its discretion to treat the State’s

failure to brief this issue as a waiver and thus review the

merits of Appellant’s claims de novo?” The parties filed

letter briefs. After review, we conclude that—despite the

Warden’s counsel’s unexplained and unexcused error—did

not waive AEDPA’s standard of review, nor did the failure to

brief constitute concession or waiver of the legal issues at

stake.

14

See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 494–95 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen

a state court adjudication is based on an antecedent unreasonable

determination offact, we proceed to consider the petitioner’s related claim

de novo.”).

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22 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

a. There has been no waiver of AEDPA’s standard of

review.

The week before this panel heard oral argument in this

case, the Ninth Circuit handed down an opinion in another

AEDPA case, Amado v. Gonzalez, 734 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.

Oct. 30, 2013). Neither party in that case addressed the

proper standard of review in its briefs, but we held that we

had “the obligation to apply the correct standard, for the

[AEDPA standard] is non-waivable.” Id. at 946; see also Eze

v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2003) (“AEDPA’s

standard of review . . . is not a procedural defense, but a

standard of general applicability for all petitions filed by state

prisoners after the statute’s effective date presenting claims

that have been adjudicated on the merits by a state court.”). 

Thus, as both parties agreed in their letter briefs, the AEDPA

standard of review itself cannot be waived.

b. The panel will address Hernandez’ theories.

Hernandez nevertheless urges in his letter brief that we

hold that the Warden has waived any argument that the trial

court’s decision did not rest on an unreasonable determination

of the facts, or that the Warden by silence has conceded that

the trial court’s decision rested on unreasonable

determination of the facts or unreasonable application of law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Hernandez again

asks us to review the state court adjudication of the Miranda

question de novo, without AEPDA’s standard of review.

But even if the Warden by silence conceded that AEDPA

does not bar issuance of the writ, such concession cannot bind

us. See United States v. Miller, 822 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir.

1987) (holding that appeals panel cannot be “bound by the

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 23

government’s ‘erroneous view of the law’”) (citations

omitted).

15 We will evaluate for ourselves AEDPA’s

directives to determine whether we must view the sole issue

posed by the Certificate of Appealability—whether

Hernandez’ Miranda rights were violated by the admission of

Moore’s testimony—through AEDPA’s deferential lens.16

15 See also Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 174 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2010) (chastising government for arguing in appellee’s brief only

jurisdiction and not responding to the merits of petitioner’s opening brief

that argued that his due process rights were violated by deficient notice of

a removal hearing, which “fail[ed] to assist the Court in evaluating the

specifics of Petitioner’s arguments [and] required the Court to conduct a

special, searching analysis of Petitioner’s contentions,” but making “clear

that the answering party’s dereliction, as here, could not constitute a

waiver because, in the final analysis, it is for the Court to evaluate the

issues presented by the appellant or petitioner,” and construing the failure

to argue as a failure to brief, the remedy for which under Fed. R. App. P.

31(c) was waiver of oral argument on the issue).

 

16 But we should not have to do so without the assistance of one of the

parties. We, like the Leslie court, express our displeasure with the

Warden’s lawyers in this case. As the Supreme Court has cogently

explained, we “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and to

assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present

. . . . [A]s a general rule, ‘[o]ur adversary system is designed around the

premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible

for advancing the facts and arguments entitling themto relief.’” Greenlaw

v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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24 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

III. There was no “unreasonable determination of the

facts.”

a. Standards of review

A state court’s decision is based on unreasonable

determination of the facts under §2254(d)(2) if the state

court’s findings are “unsupported by sufficient evidence,” if

the “process employed by the state court is defective,” or “if

no finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). While “not

impossible to meet,” that is a “daunting standard—one that

will be satisfied in relatively few cases,” especially because

we must be “particularly deferential to our state-court

colleagues.” Id. at 1000. Thus,

before we can determine that the state-court

factfinding process is defective in some

material way, or perhaps non-existent, we

must more than merely doubt whether the

process operated properly. Rather, we must

be satisfied that any appellate court to whom

the defect is pointed out would be

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s

fact-finding process was adequate.

Id. (emphasis added). That is because § 2254(d) “reflects the

view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citation

omitted).

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 25

b. Hernandez’ claims.

Hernandez argues that the suppression hearing on Deputy

Moore’s testimony was defective and inadequate for three

reasons: 1) the trial court held the admissibility hearing on

Moore’s testimony in an “unreasonablyshort time frame” and

should have granted a continuance, 2) the judge did not

recuse himself before the hearing even though he had worked

with Moore for two years, and 3) the judge did not allow

“necessary and appropriate” witnesses—the clerk, reporter,

and detective to whom Moore reported the conversation with

Hernandez—to testify. Additionally, Hernandez argues that

the fact-finding process was so defective for those three

reasons that the trial court (and Court of Appeal)

unreasonably applied clearly established federal precedent

that requires “minimum procedures” for the “ascertainment

of the truth” that provide a “constitutionally adequate

opportunity to be heard.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.

930, 949, 952, 954 (2007) (citation omitted).

Hernandez’ pro se petition states that he should be

granted relief because “[a]llowing the bailiff to testify” was

“prejudicial error for [multiple] reasons as was a denial of

continuance or a mistrial.” Hernandez stated on his petition

form that he had brought the claim up on direct appeal to the

California Court of Appeal. Hernandez therefore has clearly

presented us with the lack of continuance issue. However,

although we construe pro se petitions liberally, Allen v.

Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), lack of

recusal appears to be an entirely new theory in this appeal. It

was mentioned briefly in the trial court, but was distinctly

argued neither in the district court nor in the California Court

of Appeal on direct appeal. We therefore do not address it. 

See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As

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26 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised

for the first time on appeal.”); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971) (holding that a claim is exhausted for federal

habeas purposes if it “has been fairly presented to the state

courts”).

Additionally, it is not clear that the court staff witnesses

issue was squarely argued to the district court—there is no

mention of it in the court’s decision.17

(Hernandez did,

however, raise it clearly in the California Court of Appeal.) 

Nevertheless, even if issue is properly preserved, we hold that

neither the trial court’s denial of a continuance nor its refusal

to call the courtroom witnesses constituted an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

c. Failure to grant a continuance did not result in an

“unreasonable determination” of fact.

Both the California Court of Appeal and the district court

considered the trial judge’s failure to grant a continuance to

allow the defense to pursue the goals vaguely stated. They

concluded, respectively, that there was no abuse of discretion

or unreasonable application of law or unreasonable finding of

fact. People v. Hernandez, B170634, 2004 WL 2428700, at

*10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Hernandez v. Hedgpeth,

CV-07-7036-DSF-AGR, 2011 WL 488402, at *8–9 (C.D.

Cal. 2011). The district court was correct. “There are no

mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

17 See Arizona v. Components Inc., 66 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding that an “argument must be raised sufficiently for the trial court

to rule on it” and that “nowhere in the district court’s opinion does the

issue . . . appear, which is further indication that [appellant] did not raise

the issue with the district court”).

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 27

is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be

found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly

in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the

request is denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589

(1964); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983)

(“[B]road discretion must be granted trial courts on matters

of continuances; onlyan unreasoning and arbitrary‘insistence

upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for

delay’” would violate a constitutional right) (quoting Ungar,

376 U.S. at 589).

At the first hearing after the court discovered the

conversation between Moore and Hernandez, on Friday

morning, defense counsel asked for a continuance to get a

report from Moore of what happened. The court ordered

Moore to provide one. Counsel then suggested that he

needed a continuance to make a Pitchess motion. But Moore

had been a deputy for only three years, and had been the

court’s bailiff for the past two of those three. Both Moore

and the judge made clear that nothing like this had ever

happened before. The court therefore reasonably considered

that a continuance to go through the process of a Pitchess

motion would likely reveal nothing and weighed that against

the strong likelihood of a mistrial.18 The decision not to grant

the continuance in the face of trial scheduling was therefore

not “unreasoning” or “arbitrary.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 11–12.

18 As it turned out, Hernandez did not contradict Deputy Moore’s

version of the conversation in any way that would have altered the critical

conclusion that Deputy Moore did not interrogate Hernandez. Thus,

anything in Moore’s file that might have impeached him would not have

made a difference to that discrete issue. Whether a history of false

accusations of prisoners would have made a difference to DeputyMoore’s

credibility to the jury about the content of Hernandez’statement about the

car door is beyond the scope of our Certificate of Appealability.

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28 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

Counsel also asked for a continuance at the evidentiary

hearing itself at noon because he or colleagues in his office

might have some “conflicts” he needed to investigate, that

there were “serious issues regarding my representation,” and

that he might even need to testify. But counsel did not state

the nature of the “conflict” or the “serious issues,” nor did he

explain what he would need to testify about. Nor did he

request an ex parte hearing to give some substance to his

conclusory claims. Rather, he then proceeded anyway. We

therefore have no basis to consider the court unreasonable on

this point.

Finally, counsel asked for a continuance because he had

not had time to investigate the facts. But both Deputy Moore

and Hernandez were thoroughly examined and crossexamined at the hearing, and, critically, differed on the facts

only in two material ways. Deputy Moore candidly stated

that he started the entire conversation with “Are you going to

testify?”; Hernandez insisted that he, Hernandez, started the

conversation himself by asking “How do you think my case

is looking?” The two also did not agree about the content of

Hernandez’ statement about the car door, but that was not

relevant to the issue whether there was an interrogation. 

Thus, a continuance for investigation over the weekend could

have added no relevant facts to the only question before the

court at the hearing: was the conversation between the

testifying conversants an interrogation within the meaning of

Miranda? The factfinding process of the trial court was

adequate to answer that question. The trial court therefore

also did not unreasonably misapply applicable federal dueprocess precedent by depriving Hernandez of “minimum

procedures” for the “ascertainment of the truth” or a

“constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard.” Panetti,

551 U.S. at 949, 952, 954. We accordingly cannot say on this

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 29

issue that the trial court’s findings were “unsupported by

sufficient evidence,” or based on a “defective” process, nor

that § 2254(d)’s “daunting” standard has been overcome. 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999, 1000.

d. Failure to call witnesses.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, criminal defendants must be afforded a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). The Sixth

Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment,

grants an accused the right to call witnesses in his favor. 

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).19 But it is

normally within the power of the State to

regulate procedures under which its laws are

carried out, including the burden of producing

evidence and the burden of persuasion, and its

decision in this regard is not subject to

proscription under the Due Process Clause

unless it offends some principle of justice so

rooted in the traditions and conscience of our

people as to be ranked as fundamental.

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Crane v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“[W]e have never questioned the

power of States to exclude evidence through the application

of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of

fairness and reliability even if the defendant would prefer to

19 We note that a California judge can order persons within his presence

to testify, without the service of subpoena. See Cal. Evid. Code § 770.

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30 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

see that evidence admitted.”). Furthermore, to make out a

constitutional violation, a petitioner must “at least make some

plausible showing of how [a witness’] testimony would have

been both material and favorable to his defense.” United

States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 859 (1982).

Thus, to violate AEDPA, Hernandez would have to make

a plausible showing that some disallowed evidence would

have aided him and that the trial court in disallowing it

misapplied some Supreme Court-decreed “fundamental”

“principle of justice,” Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201–02, or

rendered the evidentiary hearing “unsupported by sufficient

evidence,” or “defective,” to the point that “any appellate

court to whom the defect is pointed out would be

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding

process was adequate.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999, 1000

(emphasis added).

At the afternoon hearing, Hernandez wished to call the

court reporter, the court clerk, and a detective who was also

a trial witness. These three heard Deputy Moore report

something about his conversation with Hernandez. Defense

counsel attempted to call these witnesses, but the court

refused, without explanation. Hernandez argues that the court

should not have refused him the right to call these “necessary

and appropriate” witnesses. Doing so, Hernandez argues,

resulted in his “being deprived of an opportunity to present

relevant and perhaps exculpatory evidence.” He points out

that the witnesses were all present, and asserts that examining

them would not have “greatly expanded” the hearing.

The California Court of Appeal inferred, however, that

the testimony of the extra witnesses would have been

cumulative. A California trial judge has broad discretion to

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 31

exclude cumulative evidence. Cal. Evid. Code § 352(a). 

Moore testified in the hearing and in front of the jury to both

versions of Hernandez’statement—“she” or “we” opened the

car door—and admitted that at first he could not remember

which was accurate. Thus, the California Court of Appeal

reasoned, no matter which version of Hernandez’ statement

the bailiff reported to the court staff witnesses, all versions

placed Hernandez at the scene of the crime, and not 100 miles

away.

Given the great importance of DeputyMoore’s testimony,

of course, the court would have been reasonable to allow the

witnesses. But a reasonable appellate court could also find,

as the Court of Appeal did, that their testimony would have

been cumulative under well-settled rules of evidence and thus

not necessary to the court’s factfinding on Miranda. 

Hernandez heard Moore testify and was asked at the

suppression hearing whether Moore’s testimony was

accurate. Given this chance, Hernandez corrected only the

points that he, Hernandez, spoke first, and then disputed

precisely what he had said about the car door. Once

Hernandez testified essentially to the same facts as Moore as

to the discrete Miranda question, there would be little the

three witnesses could likely add except to repeat the same

story that Moore told them.20 Defense counsel also did not

20

It is true that the court denied defense counsel’s request for the

witnesses right before or during Hernandez’ testimony at the hearing. 

(The detective walked into the courtroom a few seconds into Hernandez’

direct examination.) But had Hernandez vehemently disputed Moore’s

testimony on any point material to whether there was an interrogation,

defense counsel would have been on firm ground to renew his requests. 

Instead, counsel admitted that both Hernandez and Deputy Moore “have

essentially testified that it was a consensual, non-interrogation style

encounter”—even if counsel then immediately argued that the “jailer”

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32 HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND

ask for a recess to interview the three witnesses to find out

what Deputy Moore might have said to them so that he could

proffer what the witnesses might say and why it would be

useful.21 For that matter, defense counsel did not press

Deputy Moore on cross-examination about the details of

what, precisely, he reported to the witnesses. Instead, counsel

asked Deputy Moore only when and to whom he spoke

“about the statement,” but did not search for inconsistencies

in the content of what Moore told the witnesses.

Thus, we cannot say the court’s handling of the hearing

was so “defective” or unreasonably “unsupported” by

sufficient evidence on the Miranda question that no appeals

court could support it. Nor has Hernandez shown that the

hearing violated any “fundamental” principle of justice or

deprived him of a “meaningful opportunity” to present a

complete defense on that question.22 Therefore, the trial court

relationship in and of itself rendered the conversation “inherently similar

to an interrogation.” That argument stemmed from the obvious fact of

Hernandez’ custody, not any testimony at the hearing.

21 We note that at no point—direct appeal, state habeas, or district court

habeas—has Hernandez proffered any evidence of what the three

witnesses would have testified had they been called. Hence, Hernandez

has shown no prejudice to the extent he claims a violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to call witnesses in his favor. See Valenzuela-Bernal,

458 U.S. at 867 (holding that, while a criminal defendant cannot be

deprived of his right to call witnesses in his favor “arbitrarily,” the

defendant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [the

proposed witness’] testimony would have been both material and

favorable to his defense”).

22 Again, to the extent that the witnesses might have clarified to the jury

anything relevant about the content of what Moore said that Hernandez

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HERNANDEZ V. HOLLAND 33

was not unreasonable in its factfinding, nor did the trial court

(or the California Court of Appeal) unreasonably apply

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. While the trial

court’s decisions could be second-guessed, they were not an

“extreme malfunction[]” for which habeas should be a

“substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation marks

omitted). (Indeed, the California Court of Appeal found no

abuse of discretion on this point.) Nor, finally, has

Hernandez raised a plausible inference of prejudice. As a

result, AEDPA’s deferential standard applies, and bars the

relief that Hernandez seeks.

Conclusion

The California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in

its application of Miranda and did not base its decision on

unreasonable factual determinations. Despite the Warden’s

failure to brief the issue, AEDPA’s deferential standard of

review still applies. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district

court’s denial of habeas relief per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

said about the car door, that is beyond the scope of our Certificate of

Appealability.

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