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Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1640

DAVID COCROFT and VEYNELCIA COCROFT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., as Trustee of the 

Deutsche ALT-A Mortgage Loan Trust Series 

2007-OA3; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SERVICES, INC.; AND BANK OF 

AMERICA , N.A., AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO 

COUNTRYWIDE BANK, FSB, AND AS SUCCESSOR BY 

MERGER TO BAC HOME LOAN SERVICING, LP

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 3408 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 31, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. David and Veynelcia Cocroft, husband and wife, acquired a home in Country Club Hills, IlliCase: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
2 No. 14-1640

nois. In 2007, they refinanced their mortgage on the home. 

As part of the refinancing transaction, the Cocrofts’ mortgage and loan were pooled into a mortgage loan trust. Approximately one year later, the Cocrofts permanently ceased 

making payments on the loan, and the trustee of the trust 

eventually initiated a foreclosure action against them. The 

Cocrofts raised a variety of claims against Appellees Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), Bank of 

America, N.A. (“Bank of America”), BAC Home Loans Servicing (“BACHLS” or the “loan servicer”), and HSBC Bank 

USA, N.A. (“HSBC Bank”). The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees on all claims. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

In March 2006, the Cocrofts acquired the subject property 

in Country Club Hills, Illinois. On April 17, 2007, the Cocrofts refinanced their mortgage on the home by obtaining a 

loan in the amount of $386,750.00 from Countrywide Bank, 

FSB (“Countrywide”). As a part of this transaction, the Cocrofts granted a mortgage to MERS, which was acting solely 

as nominee for Countrywide. Ultimately, Bank of America

became a successor in interest to Countrywide. BAC Home 

Loans Servicing, a Bank of America affiliate, took over servicing of the loan. The evidence suggests that it remained 

the servicer during the relevant period to this dispute.

The note and the mortgage were pooled into a trust, pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA” or 

“Agreement”). The PSA established HSBC Bank as the trustee. In addition, the Agreement set May 1, 2007 as the cutoff 

date for accepting loans into the trust, and it set May 31, 

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No. 14-1640 3

2007 as the trust’s closing date. The Mortgage Loan Purchase 

Agreement indicated that as of May 1, 2007, the note and 

mortgage were pooled into the trust. On October 8, 2009, 

MERS assigned its interest in the mortgage to HSBC Bank, as 

trustee.1

The Cocrofts apparently kept up with their loan payments until the summer of 2008. They made their last two 

payments by check in July and August (covering the months 

of May and June of 2008). Both of those payments were returned for insufficient funds. So, as far as we can tell, the final payment made by the Cocrofts occurred, at the latest, in 

April 2008. Countywide sent at least three letters to the Cocrofts notifying them of their delinquency, in May, June, and 

July of 2008.

By August 2008, Countrywide became aware that the Cocrofts’ property was vacant and “a mess.” Countrywide 

hired a contractor to change the locks, secure, and “winterize” the property. On August 29, David Cocroft attempted 

unsuccessfully to enter the home through the front door. He 

ultimately entered through the garage door instead.

The Cocrofts claim that in or about May 2009, they 

learned that Countrywide had made misrepresentations in 

connection with their loan. Between May and July 2009, the 

 

1 These financial transactions involve a complex series of transfers, assignments, and nominations, which the parties do little to elucidate. We 

note that these “mortgage pools” held in trust have been common in the 

context of mortgage-backed securities. The transactions at issue occurred 

in the midst of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and straddled Bank of 

America’s (now infamous) acquisition of Countrywide. See 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/08/21/bank-of-americas16-65-billion-settlement-and-the-last-dinosaur-of-the-financial-crisis/.

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4 No. 14-1640

couple sent Bank of America,2 MERS, and Cook County 

Sheriff Thomas Dart (through notary public Kathy Guinn) 

various documents that they termed “affidavits.” These documents stated, in brief, that the Cocrofts were exercising 

their right to cancel the loan. They claimed to have the right 

to rescission because the lender committed various unspecified disclosure violations in contravention of several federal 

statutes. The Cocrofts did not offer to remit any of the loan 

funds.

Apparently in response to these “affidavits,” on June 19, 

2009, Bank of America sent a letter notifying the Cocrofts

that their loan was valid and still in force. The letter also reminded the Cocrofts that their payments were severely delinquent. Nonetheless, the Cocrofts recorded their “rescission” documents with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds 

on July 2, 2009.

On September 2, 2009, the Cocrofts sent documents identified as “Settlement and Closure” and “Cease and Desist” 

letters to Bank of America and Countrywide. Those letters 

asserted that the Cocrofts had exercised their right to cancel 

the loan, and in doing so, had extinguished any financial liability to Bank of America and Countrywide. In addition, 

they alleged that the property had been lawfully conveyed 

to “The David Cocroft Living Trust.” The letters demanded 

that the recipients cease and desist any further activities related to the mortgage and loan, or face legal action.

On September 25, 2009, Codilis, a law firm hired by 

HSBC Bank, sent a letter notifying the Cocrofts that a fore-

 

2 By this point, Bank of America had become Countrywide’s successor in 

interest.

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No. 14-1640 5

closure proceeding would be initiated against them. That letter identified HSBC Bank as trustee of the mortgage loan 

trust and BACHLS as the loan servicer. Apparently in response to that letter, the Cocrofts sent cease-and-desist letters to Codilis on September 30 and October 28, 2009.

On November 2 and 3, 2009, the Cocrofts sent HSBC

Bank, Codilis, and the loan servicer a document they entitled 

a “Debt Collector Disclosure Statement,” which purported to 

be a “continuation of the Cease and Desist letters” that had 

been previously sent. The Disclosure Statement was an 

eight-page questionnaire that required the addressees to answer fifty-four questions regarding their transactions with 

the Cocrofts. It stated that:

[d]ebt collector’s and/or Creditor’s, failure/refusal, 

both intentional and otherwise, in completely, unambiguously answering points “1” through “54” 

above and returning this Debt Disclosure Statement, as well as providing Respondent with requisite verification validating he [sic] herein above reference [sic] alleged debt, constitutes the Debt Collector’s and alleged Creditor’s tacit acquiescence 

that Debt Collector and/or Creditor have no verifiable, lawful, bona fide claims against Respondent 

in above referred alleged account or any and all 

other alleged accounts not enumerated herein.

It also specified that failure to return a completed form within thirty days would result in the waiver of any claims 

against the Cocrofts, as well as the Cocrofts’ full indemnification.

On November 23, 2009, HSBC Mortgage Services sent a 

letter in response, which stated that HSBC Bank was “not 

Case: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
6 No. 14-1640

able to locate an account with the account number, your 

name, social security number, or address. Additionally, our 

search included our affiliates and accounts where we may be 

the trustee.” The letter provided contact information, should 

the Cocrofts “require any additional information.”

On December 17 and 18, 2009, both Bank of America and 

law firm Dilworth Paxson sent letters to the Cocrofts informing them that the loan had not been rescinded, was in full 

force, and that the Cocrofts’ mortgage had been referred for 

foreclosure. On January 2, 2010, the Cocrofts sent the loan 

servicer copies of some of their previous correspondence, 

including the cease-and-desist letters.

On January 19, 2010, HSBC Bank brought a foreclosure 

action against the Cocrofts in Illinois state court.3

B. Procedural History

The Cocrofts filed this federal lawsuit on June 3, 2010, alleging a variety of federal claims, as well as supplemental 

state law claims. Several of those claims were dismissed, and 

the Cocrofts do not appeal those dismissals. Defendants 

Bank of America, BACHLS, HSBC Bank, and MERS filed a 

motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, 

which the district court granted. The Cocrofts appeal the 

grant of summary judgment on several, but not all, of those 

claims.

 

3 We note that the Cocrofts are no strangers to foreclosure actions: record 

evidence suggests that banks have sought to foreclose on four of the nine 

homes the Cocrofts have purchased since 1985.

Case: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-1640 7

1. The Jenkins Affidavit and Testimony

Lanisa Jenkins was a “Vice President, Business Support 

Manager” at Bank of America. During the course of discovery, she provided both an affidavit and deposition testimony 

concerning Bank of America’s relationship with the Cocrofts. 

She attested to having personal knowledge of the facts contained in the affidavit, based on her duties and responsibilities as a Bank of America Vice President. She also had personal knowledge of Bank of America’s business records practices.

Jenkins attested in her affidavit that her duties included 

“maintaining, accessing, reviewing and being familiar with 

Bank of America’s mortgage loan records, including residential loan applications.” She further attested that those records were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the 

matters described by the records, and that those records 

were kept as part of Bank of America’s regular business practices. She then described and attached as exhibits, among 

other documents, the original note for the loan at issue, held 

by Bank of America; the wiring instructions for the closing of 

the loan; the loan’s payment history; and correspondence 

with the Cocrofts regarding the loan.

Bank of America filed a copy of Jenkins’s affidavit with 

its materials in support of summary judgment. In their 

memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, the Cocrofts requested that Jenkins’s affidavit and deposition testimony be stricken for failure to comply with Rule 56(c). 

They argued that (1) at least some of Jenkins’s statements 

were not based on her own personal knowledge, but on the 

knowledge of other parties; and (2) that the affidavit “alleges 

new and different facts then [sic] she previously alleged at 

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8 No. 14-1640

her deposition which Plaintiffs’ [sic] view as contradictory 

statements.”

The district court overruled the Cocrofts’ objection to the 

affidavit. It credited Jenkins’s under-oath attestations that 

her statements were based on her own personal knowledge 

of Bank of America’s business records, which she was responsible for maintaining. The district court also noted that 

the Cocrofts had not pointed to any specific inconsistencies 

between the deposition testimony and the affidavit that 

would render either inadmissible.

2. Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 

Act Claim

The Cocrofts alleged a violation of the Illinois Consumer 

Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”). They 

contended that HSBC Bank’s November 23 letter, in which it

indicated that it was unable to locate an account for the Cocrofts, constituted a deceptive business practice. The district 

court concluded that the Cocrofts “offered no evidence that 

this was deceptive (HSBC Bank may have held the mortgage 

as trustee, but it was not servicing the loan), and given the 

lack of evidence, no reasonable finder of fact could find in 

their favor on this allegation.” The district court granted 

summary judgment for HSBC Bank.

3. Fraudulent Possession Claim

The Cocrofts alleged a state law fraudulent possession

claim based on Countrywide’s actions in August 2008, when 

it changed the locks and “winterized” the property. The district court concluded that Countrywide did interfere with 

the Cocrofts’ property interest, but that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that such interference was wrongful. 

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No. 14-1640 9

The court found that a provision in the mortgage entitled 

Countrywide to the type of entry it made, and that the Cocrofts consented to such an entry in signing the mortgage 

instrument. The court granted summary judgment for Appellees on this claim.

4. Quiet Title Claim

Finally, the Cocrofts raised a claim to quiet title, on the 

grounds that their loan was transferred into the mortgage 

loan trust in violation of the pooling and servicing agreement. The Cocrofts alleged that the loan was actually transferred into the trust after May 1, 2007. As such, they argued, 

the transfer was void, and HSBC Bank subsequently lacked 

title to the property.

The district court concluded that the Cocrofts had standing to challenge the transfer, but that they did not offer any 

evidence “that would allow a reasonable finder of fact to determine that their loan was improperly transferred into the 

trust.” The court granted summary judgment for Appellees.

II. ANALYSIS

We conclude that the Cocrofts fail to raise any genuine issues of material fact, and we affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment. We treat each claim in turn.

A. The Jenkins Affidavit and Testimony

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s refusal 

to strike or disregard an affidavit (or portions thereof) in a 

motion opposing summary judgment. Balderston v. Fairbanks 

Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 

2003), as amended (May 22, 2003).

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10 No. 14-1640

In their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, the Cocrofts requested that the district court strike

both Jenkins’s affidavit and her deposition testimony that 

had been submitted by Appellees. The Cocrofts raised two 

arguments in support of their request: (1) that the affidavit 

failed to satisfy Rule 56’s requirement that “an affidavit or 

declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be 

made on personal knowledge,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); and 

(2) that because portions of the affidavit and deposition testimony conflicted, both must be stricken. The district court 

overruled the Cocrofts’ objection.

We agree with the district court that the affidavit satisfied

the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56. The Cocrofts concede that Jenkins was familiar with Bank of America’s business records. They argue, however, that the affidavit 

was nonetheless inadmissible, for three reasons: (1) Jenkins 

couldn’t be adequately familiar with the procedures used by 

Countrywide before it was acquired by Bank of America; (2)

Jenkins didn’t offer any testimony regarding how accurate 

Bank of America’s records were; and (3) at least some of the 

records were prepared by other Bank of America employees, 

not Jenkins herself.

All three of these arguments fail. First, Jenkins was qualified to attest to the business records obtained by virtue of 

Bank of America’s acquisition of Countrywide. Second, Rule 

56 does not impose the onerous personal knowledge requirements that the Cocrofts read into it. Jenkins stated that 

her job duties included familiarity with and maintenance of 

Bank of America’s records. When it comes to testifying about 

business records, “the custodian need not be the individual 

who personally gather[ed] ... a business record. The custodiCase: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-1640 11

an of the records need not be in control of or have individual 

knowledge of the particular corporate records, but need only 

be familiar with the company's recordkeeping practices.” 

Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 777 (7th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Cocrofts point to no evidence suggesting that any of 

the business records at issue were inaccurate, or somehow 

unreliable. Jenkins provided sufficient indicia of their reliability by attesting to the fact that they were prepared in the 

regular course of business and close in time to the actions 

they described. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 

(7th Cir. 2000). This comports with the very rationale underlying the business record exception to the hearsay rule.

[T]he reliability of business records is supplied by 

systematic checking, by regularity and continuity 

which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, and/or by 

a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation. Given the nature of the 

reliability of business records, it makes no difference whether the records are those of a party or of a 

third person.

30C Michael H. Graham, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7047

(2014 ed.). Jenkins’s testimony and affidavit satisfied the requirements of Rule 56.

As for the Cocrofts’ second argument, they contend that 

portions of the affidavit contradict aspects of Jenkins’s deposition testimony. Those contradictions, they argue, render 

both Jenkins’s affidavit and her testimony inadmissible. The 

Cocrofts cite a Supreme Court case as establishing that “an 

affiant may not contradict or undermine their [sic] deposiCase: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
12 No. 14-1640

tion testimony with a later affidavit.” See Cleveland v. Policy 

Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999). The Cocrofts misread that case.

First, Cleveland does not state the proposition that the Cocrofts claim. Cleveland had nothing to do with the admissibility of conflicting evidence. Instead, the Court noted by way 

of analogy, without offering an opinion, that the circuits had 

held “with virtual unanimity that a party cannot create a 

genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn 

statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.” 

Id. at 806. This statement does not create an evidentiary ban 

on conflicting testimony. It simply notes a piece of uniformity among the circuits: a party cannot “manufacture” a dispute by offering its own (inexplicably) contradictory testimony.

And second, the situation described by Cleveland doesn’t 

exist in this case. Here, Appellees moved for summary 

judgment, and Appellees offered the allegedly conflicting 

pieces of evidence. Appellees obviously were not attempting 

to survive summary judgment—they were attempting to 

win it. Cleveland, therefore, has no application here.

In fact, Appellees’ submission of conflicting pieces of evidence could, at least in theory, have helped the Cocrofts. If 

they had identified specific, material factual discrepancies, 

and if those discrepancies had established a genuine dispute, 

the Cocrofts might have argued that they should survive

summary judgment. The Cocrofts, however, identified no 

such specific, material contradictions. Instead, they argued 

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No. 14-1640 13

that the affidavit and deposition must be stricken in toto.

Even if portions of the affidavit and deposition had conflicted, excluding them in their entirety would not have been the 

appropriate remedy. So the Cocrofts’ argument fails.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the Cocrofts’ objection.

B. The ICFA Claim

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ICFA claim, and we review de novo a grant

of summary judgment. Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Center, 

788 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2015).4

The district court correctly identified the standard for a 

plaintiff to prevail on an ICFA claim. The plaintiff must 

prove that (1) the defendant committed a deceptive act or 

practice; (2) the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely 

on the deception; (3) the deception happened in the course 

of trade or commerce; and (4) the deception proximately 

caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 

675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996). A showing of actual reliance is 

not required. Id.

The Cocrofts argue that HSBC Bank’s November 23 

statement, which indicated that it was unable to locate an 

account for the Cocrofts, constituted a deceptive practice. 

We need not determine whether the letter was deceptive, 

because we conclude that the Cocrofts did not show that 

they suffered any injury as a result of the statement. Without 

establishing injury, the Cocrofts cannot fulfill the fourth el-

 

4 The same standard applies to the Cocrofts’ claims for fraudulent possession and quiet title, discussed below.

Case: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
14 No. 14-1640

ement of the ICFA claim. Therefore, they cannot survive 

summary judgment.

In their briefs, the Cocrofts do not identify what injury 

they suffered as a result of the November 23 letter. The only 

statement that might be reasonably construed as asserting an 

injury is that “[t]he Cocrofts spent their resources and time 

attempting to communicate with the proper parties regarding the loan.” Presumably, the Cocrofts’ argument is that 

they forfeited some opportunity to send a necessary communication to HSBC Bank regarding the loan, because they 

believed, following the letter, that it did not hold an interest 

in their loan.

But by November 23, the Cocrofts were well aware that 

HSBC Bank had instituted foreclosure actions against them. 

Had it denied any interest in the loan, the Cocrofts could 

have used that denial against HSBC Bank in its foreclosure 

action. If anything, any misrepresentation committed by 

HSBC Bank in that letter would have benefitted the Cocrofts—not injured them.

Without alleging a cognizable injury, the Cocrofts cannot 

succeed in their ICFA claim. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

C. The Fraudulent Possession Claim

In their complaint, the Cocrofts raised a claim of “fraudulent possession” against Countrywide, HSBC Bank, MERS, 

and Bank of America. The complaint did not cite an applicable statute. In their response to Bank of America’s and 

BACHLS’s motion for summary judgment, the Cocrofts alCase: 14-1640 Document: 45 Filed: 07/31/2015 Pages: 18
No. 14-1640 15

leged that Bank of America and BACHLS violated Illinois 

Code of Civil Procedure § 15-1701(b)(1).5

That code section governs “the right to possession of ... 

mortgaged real estate during foreclosure.” 735 ILCS § 5/15-

1701(a). Section (b)(1) provides that “the mortgagor shall be 

entitled to possession of the real estate except if (i) the mortgagee shall show good cause, (ii) the mortgagee is so authorized by the terms of the mortgage or other written instrument, and (iii) the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable 

probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing 

of the cause.” 735 ILCS § 5/15-1701(b)(1). The Cocrofts claim 

that Bank of America and BACHLS cannot satisfy the standard set out in this provision, and thus engaged in fraudulent 

possession.

We need not describe in detail the Cocrofts’ arguments in 

support of their contention that Bank of America and 

BACHLS violated this statute, for the simple reason that the 

statute does not apply. The allegedly offending entry occurred in August 2008. HSBC Bank did not file the foreclosure action against the Cocrofts until January of 2010. This

statute governs “the right to possession of the mortgaged 

real estate during foreclosure.” 735 ILCS § 5/15-1701(a) (emphasis added). The Cocrofts have not identified any authority—either case law or statutory—to suggest that this statute 

applies before foreclosure has been initiated. Therefore, we 

 

5 The Cocrofts also sometimes refer to this as a “trespass” claim, as did 

the district court. As the Cocrofts only cite 735 ILCS § 5/15-1701(b)(1) as 

the applicable statute, they do not appear to raise a trespass claim. 

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16 No. 14-1640

conclude that the Cocrofts did not raise a genuine issue of 

material fact, and summary judgment was appropriate.6

D. The Quiet Title Claim

An action to quiet title in property “is an equitable proceeding in which a party seeks to remove a cloud on his title 

to the property.” Hoch v. Boehme, 990 N.E.2d 362, 374 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2013). The Cocrofts argue that their loan (or their 

mortgage—their arguments are not entirely clear) was transferred into the trust after the trust’s closing date, in violation 

of the pooling and servicing agreement. They claim that under New York law (which all parties agree governs the PSA), 

that transfer was automatically void; as a result, HSBC Bank

does not hold title to the property.

Appellees argue, on the other hand, that even if the transfer occurred in violation of the PSA, the transfer would be 

voidable, not void. And under New York law, third-party 

non-beneficiaries of a trust lack standing to challenge a 

 

6 We note that the Cocrofts may have had a viable claim for criminal 

trespass under 720 ILCS § 5/21-3—an entirely different statute than that 

relied upon by the Cocrofts. That statute makes it unlawful for an individual to “knowingly and without lawful authority [enter] or [remain] 

within or on a building.” 720 ILCS § 5/21-3(a)(1). That subdivision, however, includes an exception that applies to the mortgagee, or agent of the 

mortgagee, for “entering, securing, or maintaining an abandoned residential property.” 720 ILCS § 5/21-3(e-5). Abandoned residential property is defined in cross-referenced section 735 ILCS 5/15-1200.5. The Cocrofts might have plausibly argued that the property did not satisfy the 

requirements to be considered abandoned, and thus that Countrywide’s 

(Bank of America’s) entry was unlawful. We need not address this issue, 

however, because the Cocrofts waived it by failing to raise it below.

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No. 14-1640 17

merely voidable transfer. For the purposes of this discussion,

we assume without deciding that a late transfer occurred.

New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 7-2.4 concerns when the actions of a trustee are considered void. It 

provides that “[i]f the trust is expressed in the instrument 

creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or 

other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except 

as authorized by this article and by any other provision of 

law, is void.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-2.4 (McKinney).

The Cocrofts argue that the late transfer constituted an 

ultra vires act that, under § 7-2.4, was automatically void. In 

interpreting this statute, however, New York courts appear 

to have almost uniformly concluded that a beneficiary retains the authority to ratify a trustee’s ultra vires act, such as 

a late transfer. See Mooney v. Madden, 597 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776

(N.Y. App. Div. 1993); see also Anh Nguyet Tran v. Bank of New 

York, No. 13 Civ. 580, 2014 WL 1225575 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 

24, 2014) (collecting New York cases holding the same). And 

therefore, the cases hold, because the act can be ratified, it 

must not be void; it must merely be voidable.

The Cocrofts have presented no evidence to suggest that

the trust’s beneficiaries lacked the authority to ratify acts by 

the trustee. They have pointed to no provision in the PSA, or 

any other document, that would indicate such a limitation 

on the power of the beneficiaries. We conclude, therefore,

that the transfer was not void, but at most merely voidable. 

That brings the transfer outside the ambit of § 7-2.4.

Given that the transfer was only voidable, we now turn 

to whether the Cocrofts have standing to challenge it. The 

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18 No. 14-1640

weight of New York Law establishes that “litigants who are 

not beneficiaries of a trust lack standing to enforce the trust’s 

terms or to challenge the actions of the trustee.” Tran, 2014 

WL 1225575 at *3. The Cocrofts do not allege that they were 

intended third-party beneficiaries of the trust. Nor do they 

point to any provision in the PSA that extended them rights 

or obligations under the trust.

The Cocrofts cite one New York case, an unreported disposition, in support of their contention that they have standing to challenge the transfer. In that case, the Kings County 

Supreme Court determined that a non-beneficiary third party had standing to challenge a trustee’s acceptance of a note 

and mortgage into the trust after its closing date. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, 39 Misc. 3d 1220(A) at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

2013). We need not dwell on the court’s reasoning in that 

case, because in April 2015 that decision was reversed by the 

Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. On appeal, the court held that “Erobobo, as a mortgagor whose 

loan is owned by a trust, does not have standing to challenge 

the plaintiff’s possession or status as assignee of the note and 

mortgage based on purported noncompliance with ... the 

PSA.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, 9 N.Y.S.3d 312, 314 

(N.Y. App. Div. 2015).

We conclude that the Cocrofts lack standing to challenge 

the transfer. Their action to quiet title must fail, and summary judgment for Appellees was appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED.

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