Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01028/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Teresa Lyn Remmers, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-01028-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Teresa Lyn Remmers’ appeal from the Social 

Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues that the 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by determining that Plaintiff was not credible, by 

inadequately explaining her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, and by 

failing to support her finding that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs 

existing in the national economy. The Court now rules on Plaintiff’s appeal. 

I. Background 

 A. Procedural Background 

 On May 21, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

and supplemental security income, alleging that she suffered from panic and anxiety 

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attacks and had been unable to work since April 1, 2010. (Tr. 33).1 Plaintiff’s claims were 

initially denied on October 22, 2010, and upon reconsideration on March 7, 2011. (Id.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff timely requested a hearing, which was conducted by ALJ Joan G. 

Knight on June 20, 2012 in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.) On December 13, 2012, the ALJ 

issued an unfavorable decision. (Id.) After Plaintiff’s request for review by the Social 

Security Administration Appeals Council was denied on March 4, 2014, she commenced 

this action in federal court on May 13, 2014. (Doc. 1). 

B. Plaintiff’s Background 

 Plaintiff was born on November 1, 1960 and lives with her husband and their two 

dogs. (Tr. 52, 62, 229–30). Plaintiff completed nineteen years of education (Doc. 3 at 4), 

earned bachelor’s degrees in Biochemistry and Medical Technology with a minor in 

Physics (Tr. 53), took course work towards a master’s degree (Tr. 57),2

 and self-reports 

fluency in both English and German (Tr. 343). Plaintiff also spent a considerable amount 

of time in vocational training throughout her professional career. (Tr. 53, 57). Plaintiff 

worked the majority of her adult life and by all appearances was a self-reliant, competent 

employee who “built [her] own cliental” and once earned over $52,000 in a year. (Tr. 59, 

215). Currently, Plaintiff’s primary source of income comes from monthly 

unemployment benefits. (Tr. 216–17). She does drink alcohol3

 and smokes cigarettes. 

(Tr. 291, 307, 343). 

 

1

 Citations to “Tr.” are to the certified administrative transcript of record. 

(Docs. 14, 15). 

2

 During Plaintiff’s evaluation with the Arizona Department of Economic Security 

in September of 2010, she stated that she had earned a bachelor’s degree in computer 

engineering, a master’s degree in electrical engineering, and had worked as a computernetworking expert. (Tr. 306). During a psychiatric evaluation in August of 2010, Plaintiff 

stated that she completed a master’s degree in biochemistry. (Tr. 313). 

3

 As the ALJ observed, the frequency of Plaintiff’s alcohol consumption is 

unclear. Since the date of her alleged disability, Plaintiff has reported that she drinks the 

following amounts: 1) “4 vodkas per day” (Tr. 372); 2) “drinks daily” (Tr. 291); 3) 

“drinks socially” (Tr. 394); 4) a glass of wine four to five times per week (Tr. 343); and 

5) three glasses of wine per month (Tr. 67). Further, on April 21, 2011, Plaintiff 

presented to her treating physician “smell[ing] of ETOH.” (Tr. 372). 

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 On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ regarding her alleged 

disability of anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. (Tr. 50–75). Plaintiff testified that she 

takes two prescription medications, Xanax and Paxil, to alleviate the symptoms of her 

anxiety. (Tr. 64). She further stated that she has taken Paxil for three years. (Id.) Plaintiff 

attested, however, that Xanax sometimes makes her feel “goofy” and Paxil occasionally 

gives her a “tingling” sensation. (Tr. 64, 69). Due to these side effects, Plaintiff noted that 

her doctor is shifting her from Paxil to Lintemint. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff also testified that she has difficulty sleeping and is “scared to sleep.” 

(Tr. 62). Nonetheless, Plaintiff explained that after a panic attack she gets “four solid 

hours of good hard sleep[,] . . . wake[s] up[,] . . . eat[s,] then go[es] back to sleep maybe 

for another hour or so.” (Id.) Previously, Plaintiff told evaluating physician Marcel Van 

Eerd, Ph.D., that she sleeps at least five straight hours per night, wakes up, sleeps more in 

the early morning, and then naps throughout the day. (Tr. 343). As for her daily routine, 

Plaintiff “wake[s] up in the morning” before her husband, cooks simple meals, washes 

the dishes, feeds and walks her two dogs, showers, dresses herself, watches television, 

and completes crosswords. (Tr. 62–63, 342). Plaintiff can also manage her own 

medications and hygiene, use the computer, pay bills, make telephone calls, do laundry, 

and read. (Tr. 342). As for her public endeavors, Plaintiff visits her husband’s parents 

three times per week (Tr. 83, 332), goes on mall outings (Tr. 406), uses public 

transportation to run errands (Tr. 67), rides bicycles (Tr. 376), shops (Tr. 342), and 

attends church regularly (Tr. 322). 

C. Medical Background 

Plaintiff claims that anxiety and panic attacks have plagued her since she was a 

child but only became disabling on April 1, 2010. (Tr. 63). As her method of managing 

these issues in the past, Plaintiff explains that she “isolated” herself. (Id.) This isolation is 

apparently why Plaintiff married “later in life,”4

 never had children, does not have 

 

4

 Plaintiff also testified that she was married “in Indiana” at some point, which 

clarifies why her last name is “Dolezal” on the majority of her medical records from 2010 

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friends, keeps her family distant, and worked as a salesperson. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, 

never sought clinical assistance until months after her alleged disability onset date. See 

(Tr. 364). 

 Two and a half months after Plaintiff filed her application for benefits with the 

Social Security Administration, she contacted Jewish Family and Children Services 

(“JFCS”) for intake and evaluation. (Id.) Based on a preliminary psychiatric evaluation 

on August 10, 2010, the clinician observed that Plaintiff “[d]ressed appropriately”; was 

“casually groomed”; had an “anxious” mood; maintained “good” eye contact; had “good” 

memory, insight, and judgment; made “logical” associations; and presented with “no 

mannerisms of note.” (Tr. 314). After this initial evaluation, Plaintiff “no show[ed]” to 

subsequent appointments. (Tr. 316, 370). JFCS attempted to contact Plaintiff numerous 

times, but Plaintiff never responded. (Tr. 366–69). On December 9, 2010, without ever 

attending a clinical treatment session, Plaintiff was discharged for “lack of contact.” 

(Tr. 364). 

 Nearly a year after Plaintiff’s discharge from JFCS and eighteen months after 

Plaintiff filed her application with the Social Security Administration, Plaintiff presented 

to Marley House Behavioral Health (“Marley House”). (Tr. 404). Plaintiff attended six of 

her first eight weekly appointments. (Tr. 404–06). At these appointments, Plaintiff 

“appeared anxious” and used “rapid speech” but was “engaged.” (Id.) The clinician also 

noted that Plaintiff learned coping mechanisms and breathing techniques. (Id.) After this 

initial period, however, Plaintiff cancelled or failed to show up to eight of the next ten 

appointments. (Tr. 406–11). On March 19, 2012, Marley House advised Plaintiff that if 

she did not provide twenty-four hour notice before her next cancellation her file would be 

closed. (Tr. 410). One week later, Marley House closed Plaintiff’s file after she failed to 

 

to 2012. See (Tr. 66, 289–303, 313–40, 364–96, 404–11). Plaintiff explains that her “last 

name at that time of my marriage” was Remmers, but due to the Indiana “courthouse 

burn[ing] down,” she could not obtain the divorce decree to change her legal last name to 

Remmers. (Id.) Interestingly, Plaintiff’s current husband, John R. Tilton, wrote in July of 

2010 that he and Plaintiff had been “married for 11 years.” (Tr. 236). Exactly when, 

where, and to whom Plaintiff has been legally married is unknown. 

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show up to her appointment and did not provide the necessary notice. (Tr. 411). 

 No Appointment, M.D. (“No Appointment”) appears to be Plaintiff’s primary care 

facility. Since the onset of her alleged disability, Plaintiff received treatment from No 

Appointment several times for a variety of issues. For example, on July 26, 2011, 

Plaintiff was treated for a knee injury she suffered when she fell off her bicycle (Tr. 376–

77), and on November 5, 2011, Plaintiff was treated for a right arm injury resulting from 

a fall at a dog park (Tr. 384–85). Plaintiff’s anxiety is reported in four No Appointment 

records. On April 21, 2011, a No Appointment clinician noted that Plaintiff “would like 

Xanax” for her panic attacks. (Tr. 372). At this same appointment, Plaintiff “smell[ed] of 

ETOH” and reported that she “drinks 4 vodkas a day.” (Id.) On June 25, 2011 and 

January 3, 2012, the clinical impression of Plaintiff noted panic and anxiety. (Tr. 375, 

386). Finally, at a February 1, 2012 appointment, the clinician noted that Plaintiff 

“misplaced [her] Xanax” and was going through “4 days of anxiety.” (Tr. 390). The 

clinician also wrote that Plaintiff and her husband were experiencing a foreclosure and 

decreasing income. (Id.) Ultimately, the clinician prescribed Effexor, although Plaintiff 

never filled the prescription. (Tr. 391–92). 

II. Legal Standard 

 The ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence” means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 

would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. 

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining whether 

there is substantial evidence to support a decision, the Court considers the record as a 

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and the evidence 

that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “Where evidence is 

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susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion which 

must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences 

logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted); see 

Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is 

because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); 

see Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports 

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On the other hand, the Court “may 

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

 Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own 

judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. Rather, the Court’s inquiry is 

constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of 

those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show that, among other things, she is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 

Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is: 

under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments 

are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but 

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cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

 B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 

721. A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential process will end the inquiry. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, 

but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The 

five steps are as follows: 

 1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be considered severe, the impairment must “significantly limit[] 

[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c). Basic work activities are the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs,” such 

as lifting, carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and remembering simple 

instructions, responding appropriately to co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either have lasted for “a 

continuous period of at least twelve months,” be expected to last for such a period, or be 

expected “to result in death.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to 

dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If 

the claimant does not have a severe impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. 

 3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without further inquiry. If not, 

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before proceeding to the next step, the ALJ will make a finding regarding the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] 

case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is the 

most he can still do despite all his impairments, including those that are not severe, and 

any related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 

 4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the claimant 

can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this 

determination, the ALJ compares its “residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the 

physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work he previously did, the 

claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step. 

 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity” and his “age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled. If the claimant 

cannot perform other work, he will be found disabled. 

 In evaluating the claimant’s disability under this five-step process, the ALJ must 

consider all evidence in the case record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520b. This includes medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and thirdparty reporting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 06–3p, 71 Fed. 

Reg. 45593-03. 

C. The ALJ’s Evaluation under the Five-Step Process 

 In step one of the sequential evaluation process the ALJ found that Plaintiff did 

not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of April 1, 2010. 

(Tr. 36). At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following medically 

determinable impairments: “panic disorder without agoraphobia; and depressive disorder, 

not otherwise specified.” (Id.) The ALJ deemed these impairments “severe” because they 

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had caused and would continue to cause more than minimal work-related functional 

limitations. (Id.) Under step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in the Social Security 

regulations. (Id.) 

 Before moving on to step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC determination in light 

of Plaintiff’s testimony and objective medical evidence. (Tr. 38). The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: [Plaintiff] can perform 

the mental demands of simple work.” (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

could not perform her past work. (Tr. 41). Finally, the ALJ concluded at step five that 

based on Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, Plaintiff could perform 

significant numbers of jobs existing in the national economy. (Tr. 42). Consequently, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. 43). 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff makes three arguments for why the Court should set aside the ALJ’s 

decision. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed the following errors: 1) 

rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without clear and convincing reasons for doing 

so, 2) assigning Plaintiff an RFC with a mental limitation of “simple work,” and 3) 

failing to consult a vocational expert (“VE”) to determine the vocational impact of 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments and failing to adequately support her finding that Plaintiff 

can perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Doc. 19). 

The Court will now address each argument in turn. 

 A. Whether the ALJ Properly Discredited Plaintiff’s Testimony 

The Court first turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred when she 

determined that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was “not fully credible.” 

 1. Legal Standard 

 An ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective symptoms is credible. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

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1112 (9th Cir. 2012). First, as a threshold matter, “the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 

947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the claimant meets the first test, then “the 

ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely 

because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical 

evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749–750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell, 

947 F.2d at 346–47). Rather, “unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on 

affirmative evidence thereof,” the ALJ may only find the claimant not credible by making 

specific findings supported by the record that provide clear and convincing reasons to 

explain her credibility evaluation. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84); see Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. 

 2. Analysis 

 In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff satisfied the first step because 

Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 39). After apparently finding no affirmative evidence of 

malingering, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the [“simple work”] residual functional capacity assessment.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh her subjective complaints 

because the ALJ did not give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. 

(Doc. 19 at 7). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by “repeatedly 

impugning” Plaintiff for failing to seek treatment, follow up with treatment, and comply 

with prescribed treatment. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erred by 

discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony because Plaintiff was “more active than one would 

expect for an individual who is precluded from all work as a result of mental 

impairments.” (Id.) The Court will analyze each argument in turn. 

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a. Plaintiff’s Delay in Seeking Treatment, Failure to Attend 

 Treatment Appointments, and Failure to Comply with 

 Treatment Advice 

 As one factor for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ noted that despite 

Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date of April 1, 2010, Plaintiff did not seek clinical 

treatment for nearly four months. (Tr. 40). Additionally, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff 

repeatedly failed to comply with treatment advice or attend treatment appointments. (Id.) 

For example, Plaintiff only attended the intake and psychiatric evaluation at JFCS, “no 

show[ed]” to subsequent appointments, and did not respond to JFCS’s phone calls. 

(Tr. 316, 366–70).5

 Likewise, after an initial period of attending six of eight sessions, 

Plaintiff cancelled or failed to show up to eight of ten appointments at Marley House, 

leading to her discharge. (Tr. 406–11). To explain her failure to attend clinical 

appointments, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to “get out of the house” because she 

“couldn’t move” due to anxiety and panic attacks. (Tr. 65). 

 The Ninth Circuit has long held that “unexplained, or inadequately explained, 

failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” is a relevant factor in 

assessing credibility of a claimant’s testimony. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346; see Meanal v. 

Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that an ALJ may consider claimant’s 

failure to follow treatment advice as a factor in assessing claimant’s credibility). 

Similarly, the Social Security Rulings (“SSR”) express that an “individual’s statements 

may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of 

complaints, or if the medical reports or records show that the individual is not following 

the treatment as prescribed and there are no good reasons for this failure.” SSR 96-7p, 

1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996).6

 

5

 Notably, after only attending the initial intake and psychiatric evaluation at 

JFCS, Plaintiff did not seek clinical treatment again until November 2011—over a year 

and a half after she allegedly became disabled. (Tr. 404). 

6

 SSRs “do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs 

nonetheless.” Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The Rulings “‘reflect the official interpretation of the [Social Security Administration] 

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 Although the Court agrees with Plaintiff that it would be problematic to chastise a 

claimant with a “mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking 

rehabilitation,” Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299–300 

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996)), in this 

case, “there was no medical evidence that [Plaintiff’s] resistance [to] treatment was 

attributable to her mental impairment rather than her own personal preference, and it was 

reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that the ‘level or frequency of treatment was 

inconsistent with the level of complaints,’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (quoting SSR 96-

7p). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the record evidence indicates that Plaintiff has 

“good” judgment, insight, and knowledge (Tr. 314) and “very good” intellectual 

functioning and general memory (Tr. 344). Further, despite Plaintiff’s claim that she 

“could [not] get out of the house,” the ALJ repeatedly noted that Plaintiff engaged in 

numerous public activities, including: 1) walking her dogs, 2) using public transportation 

to run errands, 3) attending church regularly, 4) grocery shopping, 5) taking her dogs to 

the dog park, 6) riding her bicycle, 7) visiting her husband’s parents three times per week, 

and 8) shopping in the mall. (Tr. 37, 40).7

 The high volume of activity plainly contradicts 

Plaintiff’s alleged inability to leave her house. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by considering Plaintiff’s 

substantial delay in seeking treatment, her repeated failure to follow treatment advice, 

and her consistent failure to attend treatment appointments as reasons for discrediting 

Plaintiff’s testimony. These reasons provide specific, clear and convincing evidence for 

 

and are entitled to some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security 

Act and regulations.’” Id. (quoting Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 

2006)). 

7

 The Court also notes that by attending the first six of eight appointments at 

Marley House, Plaintiff has the ability to timely attend and function at treatment sessions. 

Plaintiff’s ability to attend treatment is further evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff 

presented to her primary care facility nearly a dozen times within the course of eleven 

months, including four times within a span of seventeen days, for treatment related to 

physical injuries. (Tr. 372–93). In addition, Plaintiff explained to Dr. Van Eerd that she 

attends “regular meetings on a weekly basis.” (Tr. 342). 

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the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. 

See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. 

 b. Plaintiff’s Daily Activities 

 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s daily activities 

undermined her subjective complaints. (Doc. 19 at 8). Namely, Plaintiff argues that the 

ALJ erred by considering activities of daily living that were not transferrable to a work 

setting. (Id.) 

 The ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(5)(A).” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). In evaluating the 

claimant’s testimony, the ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,” 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284, and may “consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s 

testimony or between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct, unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment, and whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the 

alleged symptoms.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (citations omitted). While a claimant need 

not “vegetate in a dark room” in order to be eligible for benefits, Cooper v. Bowen, 815 

F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted), the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s 

testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating 

capacities that are transferable to a work setting. See Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. Moreover, “[e]ven 

where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for 

discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally 

debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (citing Turner, 613 F.3d at 1225; 

Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693). 

 Here, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling mental 

impairments were undermined by her ability to 1) attend church “regularly,” 2) use public 

transportation to run errands, 3) walk and care for her dogs on a daily basis, 4) engage in 

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mall outings, 5) grocery shop, 6) ride her bicycle, 7) perform household chores, 8) cook 

simple meals, 9) provide care for her husband, 10) clean the house, and 11) develop 

coping strategies to deal with her occasional symptomology. (Tr. 40). Plaintiff’s 

engagement in these pursuits reveals that Plaintiff has the ability to interact appropriately 

on a social level, function in public settings, cope with her symptoms, and concentrate for 

sustained periods of time. Although Plaintiff’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about 

how well she could keep up with her activities without the help of her husband, and the 

ALJ’s interpretation of her testimony might not be the only reasonable interpretation, it is 

still a reasonable interpretation that is supported by substantial evidence. See Rollins, 261 

F.3d at 857; see also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679–80 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(upholding ALJ’s rejection of claimant’s subjective complaints where ALJ found that 

claimant’s performance of daily activities like housecleaning, light gardening, and 

shopping undermined claimant’s assertion of disabling pain).8

 

 c. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the ALJ’s negative credibility finding was a reasonable 

interpretation of the evidence. The ALJ made specific findings supported by the record 

that provided clear and convincing reasons to explain her credibility evaluation.9

Consequently, “it is not [the Court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 

(citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 604). 

 

8

 The Court finds that Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) is 

inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. In particular, the Vertigan court remarked that the 

claimant’s “constant quest for medical treatment and pain relief” refuted the ALJ’s 

finding that the claimant’s ability to grocery shop, walk an hour in the malls, get together 

with friends, play cards, swim, watch television, and read undermined her testimony of 

disabling physical pain. Here, Plaintiff never embarked upon a “constant quest” for 

clinical treatment. In fact, all evidence in the record points to a contrary conclusion. 

9

 The Court notes that the ALJ also discredited Plaintiff’s testimony for several 

other reasons, including Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements regarding her medication 

usage, alcohol consumption, and familial relationships. (Tr. 40). While Plaintiff does not 

challenge the ALJ’s findings in this regard, these reasons provide additional support for 

the ALJ’s decision to discredit Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

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 B. Whether the ALJ Properly Assigned Plaintiff’s RFC 

The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred when she assigned 

Plaintiff an RFC without physical limitations but with a mental limitation of “simple 

work.” (Doc. 19 at 4). Plaintiff highlights two portions of the ALJ’s decision to support 

her argument. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by not incorporating into the RFC 

all of the limitations identified by consultative examiner Dr. Van Eerd. (Id. at 5). Second, 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to follow the “function-by-function 

assessment required by SSR 85-15.” (Id.) 

 1. Dr. Van Eerd’s Opinions 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when she did not adopt all of consultative 

examiner Dr. Van Eerd’s opinions. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s 

decision to reject Dr. Van Eerd’s opinions that Plaintiff had moderate to severe 

limitations in sustaining routine, an avoidant approach to social interaction, a poor ability 

to manage stress, a dependent approach requiring considerable support to meet basic 

requirements, and a poor ability to interact with coworkers and supervisors. (Id.) 

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of three types of physicians: 

1) those who treat the claimant (“treating physicians”); 2) those who examine but do not 

treat the claimant (“examining physicians”); and 3) those who neither examine nor treat 

the claimant (“non-examining physicians”). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th 

Cir. 1995). As a general rule, the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater 

weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, but less than a treating physician. 

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1454. In order to reject the un-contradicted opinion of an examining 

physician, the Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons. Id. Notably, 

even if contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of an examining doctor can only be 

rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043. 

 In this case, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Van Eerd “overstated” Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations because his opinions were internally inconsistent with his own examination 

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findings. (Tr. 41). The ALJ specifically noted that during Dr. Van Eerd’s examination, 

Plaintiff achieved a perfect score on a cognition test. (Tr. 41). The ALJ also observed that 

Dr. Van Eerd’s examination findings were the sole source of his opinions because he 

examined Plaintiff on only one occasion and reviewed few, if any, of Plaintiff’s mental 

health records. (Id.) Consequently, the ALJ remarked that due to the limited nature of the 

evaluation, Dr. Van Eerd was unable to accurately consider the longitudinal perspective 

of Plaintiff’s impairments. (Id.)

10 Finally, regarding Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, 

and pace, the ALJ found that Dr. Van Eerd “overestimate[d]” Plaintiff’s limitations due 

to her “educational background and reported continued daily activities including reading, 

doing crossword puzzles, and watching television, all of which would require some 

amount of sustained concentration.” (Tr. 37). 

 The Court finds that the stark discrepancy between Dr. Van Eerd’s own 

examination findings and opinions constitutes a “specific and legitimate reason” to reject 

his opinions that were unsupported by his clinical findings. See Matney on Behalf of 

Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The ALJ need not accept an 

opinion of a physician—even a treating physician—if it is conclusionary and brief and is 

unsupported by clinical findings.” (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th 

Cir. 1989))). For example, Dr. Van Eerd’s opinions that Plaintiff had an avoidant 

approach to social interaction and a poor ability to interact with coworkers and 

supervisors directly contradicted his findings that Plaintiff had good social awareness and 

social judgment, was “polite” and “respectful” during the interview, and had “fair” one-

 

10 Dr. Van Eerd also observed in his clinical findings that Plaintiff 1) presented 

with “good basic work decision making ability”; 2) had fair “one-on-one behavior and 

cognitive ability”; 3) had an adequate ability to manage critique and follow work rules; 4) 

had “very good” intellectual functioning and general memory; 5) was “polite” and 

“respectful” during the interview; 6) had good “persistence to task”; 7) correctly 

completed a mental math problem and phonics tests; 8) had “good effort and motivation”; 

9) was “oriented as to time, place, person, and situation”; 10) was able to recall three of 

three items after three minutes; and 11) had good social awareness and judgment. 

(Tr. 341–44). 

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on-one behavior. (Tr. 342–45). Dr. Van Eerd’s opinion that Plaintiff had a moderate to 

severe limitation in sustaining routine was undermined by his finding that Plaintiff had 

“good” persistence to task, “good” effort and motivation, and an “adequate” ability to 

follow work rules. (Id.) Finally, his opinion that Plaintiff required considerable support to 

meet even basic everyday needs contradicted his findings that Plaintiff possessed “very 

good” intellectual functioning and an adequate ability to manage critique and follow 

work rules. (Id.) 

 The Court concludes that due to the inconsistencies between Dr. Van Eerd’s 

clinical findings and opinions, coupled with the fact that he only examined Plaintiff on 

one occasion, substantial evidence existed for the ALJ to determine that Dr. Van Eerd 

“overstated” the severity of Plaintiff’s mental limitations. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043; 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld.”). Consequently, the ALJ did not err by not 

incorporating all of Dr. Van Eerd’s opinions in Plaintiff’s RFC. 

 2. SSR 85-15 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to follow the “function-byfunction assessment required by SSR 85-15.” (Doc. 19 at 4–5). Specifically, Plaintiff 

claims that a mental RFC of “simple work” is “ill-defined” and “inadequate” because it is 

an “objective skill-level classification” not “unique” to Plaintiff’s circumstances. (Id.)

11

 SSR 85-15 governs the evaluation of whether a claimant with only non-exertional 

impairments is capable of work. SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (Jan. 1, 1985). The Ruling 

articulates that a person’s “response to the demands of work is highly individualized.” Id.

Because of this, “the skill level of a position is not necessarily related to the difficulty an 

11 As to Plaintiff’s exertional limitations, the ALJ correctly determined that the 

objective evidence portrayed Plaintiff engaging in an active lifestyle with no exertional 

prohibitions—a view confirmed by internist Keith Cunningham, M.D., and state agency 

consultant Paul Schenk, M.D. See (Tr. 81, 306–10). Consequently, the RFC properly 

reflects, and Plaintiff does not dispute, Plaintiff’s lack of exertional limitations. 

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individual will have in meeting the demands of the job.” Id. Accordingly, “[a]ny 

impairment-related limitations created by an individual’s response to demands of work . . 

. must be reflected in the RFC assessment.” Id. 

The Court finds that the ALJ adequately applied SSR 85-15. The ALJ 

methodically reviewed Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and the extent to which they were 

consistent with the objective medical evidence, longitudinal medical history, clinical 

findings, observations of Plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians, and lay opinions 

of Plaintiff’s parents and husband. (Tr. 38–41). After review of this evidence, the ALJ 

concluded that the assessed RFC was “well-supported by greater weight of the entire 

evidence of record, including the opinion evidence . . . as well as the limited treatment 

records in evidence. Moreover, the claimant’s diminished credibility does little to 

corroborate her allegations in this matter, mandating that the objective and opinion 

evidence of record in this matter be given great weight.” (Id.) 

 The Court has already found that the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony. The Court also concluded that the ALJ appropriately 

dismissed Dr. Van Eerd’s opinions that did not correlate with his objective examination 

findings. In addition, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s family member’s opinions 

because they were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record, were likely 

biased due to the close relationship with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s parents lived out of state 

and had minimal day-to-day contact with Plaintiff. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 

1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding an ALJ may discount lay testimony that conflicts 

with medical evidence). 

 In terms of clinical findings, the ALJ considered and incorporated the objective 

findings of Dr. Van Eerd’s mental examination, which showed that Plaintiff had strong 

cognitive recall and memory, coupled with an ability to appropriately interact with others 

on a social level. (Tr. 37, 41, 341–44). The ALJ also accounted for Plaintiff’s psychiatric 

evaluation with JFCS, which indicated that Plaintiff was casually dressed and groomed 

appropriately; had no mental abnormalities; and possessed good memory, insight, and 

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judgment. (Tr. 40, 314). By limiting Plaintiff’s mental RFC to “simple work,” the ALJ 

also considered the clinical findings that showed Plaintiff experiences periodic mental 

limitations. See Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding ALJ’s 

decision that medical evidence supported an RFC determination of “simple work”). 

 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC because the 

“simple work” mental limitation “took into account those limitations for which there was 

record support that did not depend on [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 

C. Whether the ALJ Properly Relied on the Medical Vocational

 Guidelines to Support Her Finding that Plaintiff Could Perform 

 Substantial Gainful Work Existing in the National Economy 

Plaintiff’s final contention is that the ALJ erred at the fifth step of the sequential 

evaluation process by relying on the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) rather than 

consulting a VE to determine whether Plaintiff could perform work existing in the 

national economy. (Doc. 19 at 5–7). Plaintiff provides two general reasons to support her 

argument. First, Plaintiff asserts that because the Grids do not adequately and accurately 

represent her non-exertional limitations, the ALJ erred by applying them rather than 

consulting a VE. (Id. at 6). Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to support her 

finding that Plaintiff could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national 

economy. (Id. at 6–7). 

1. Whether the Grids Adequately and Accurately Represent 

 Plaintiff’s Non-Exertional Limitations 

 At step five in the sequential process, the ALJ considers whether a claimant can 

perform work that exists in the national economy in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2). The ALJ 

can make this determination by using either “the testimony of a vocational expert or by 

reference to the Medical Vocational Guidelines.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955. The Grids 

“consist of a matrix of [claimant’s RFC, age, work experience and education] and set 

forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring a specific combination of these factors 

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exist in significant numbers in the national economy.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 

458, 461–62 (1983); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, 416.969a. 

 “The [Social Security Administration’s] need for efficiency justifies use of the 

grids at step five where they completely and accurately represent a claimant’s 

limitations.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The 

Grids should not be used, however, if they “fail to accurately describe a claimant’s 

particular limitations.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985). On the other 

hand, an alleged non-exertional limitation “does not automatically preclude application of 

the grids. The ALJ should first determine if a claimant’s non-exertional limitations 

significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations.” Tackett, 180 

F.3d at 1102. “A vocational expert is required only when there are significant and 

‘sufficiently severe’ non-exertional limitations not accounted for in the grid.” Hoopai v. 

Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 SSR 85-15 provides guidance for applying the Grids to cases involving claimants 

with only non-exertional limitations. According to the Ruling, 

 Where a person’s only impairment is mental, is not of listing 

severity, but does prevent the person from meeting the mental demands of 

past relevant work and prevents the transferability of acquired work skills, 

the final consideration is whether the person can be expected to perform 

unskilled work. The basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, 

unskilled work include the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, 

carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to 

supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes 

in a routine work setting. . . . 

 . . . . 

 Where there is no exertional impairment, unskilled jobs at all levels 

of exertion constitute the potential occupational base for persons who can 

meet the mental demands of unskilled work. These jobs ordinarily involve 

dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people, and they 

generally provide substantial vocational opportunity for persons with solely 

mental impairments who retain the capacity to meet the intellectual and 

emotional demands of such jobs on a sustained basis. 

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SSR 85-15. The Code of Federal Regulations further describes “unskilled” work as 

“work that needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job 

in a short period of time.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(a). 

 Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental limitation to simple work would 

not significantly affect the range of unskilled work she was able to perform at all levels of 

exertion. (Tr. 42). The Court finds that substantial evidence supports this conclusion. 

 Initially, there was substantial evidence for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff could 

perform unskilled work as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations and SSR 85-15. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff presented to JCFS with no mental abnormalities but with 

“good” judgment, impulse control, and insight. (Tr. 40). The ALJ also referenced Dr. 

Van Eerd’s examination findings (Tr. 41), which indicated that Plaintiff was “very good” 

with “[i]ntellectual functioning and general memory,” had “fair” cognitive capacity, and 

possessed “good effort and motivation” (Tr. 344). Dr. Van Eerd also opined that Plaintiff 

possessed “good basic work decision-making ability,” her approach to authority was 

“respectful,” her “persistence to task was also good,” and she had “good” social 

awareness and social judgment. (Tr. 344–45).12 

 Applying these attributes to the demands of unskilled work, Plaintiff’s “very 

good” intellectual functioning, “good” insight, and “fair” cognitive capacity enable her to 

understand simple instructions and deal with changes in a routine work setting. Her “very 

good” general memory allows her to remember simple instructions, while her “good” 

persistence to task empowers her to carry them out. Finally, Plaintiff’s “respectful” 

approach to authority, “good” impulse control, “good basic work decision making 

ability,” and “good” social awareness and social judgment permit her to respond 

appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations. 

 Of course, Plaintiff must be able to perform unskilled work “on a sustained basis.” 

 

12 While Dr. Van Eerd also opined that Plaintiff experienced more restrictive 

limitations, the ALJ properly rejected these opinions due to their inconsistency with the 

doctor’s own examination findings as discussed above. 

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See SSR 85-15. In this regard, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had only moderate limitations 

in concentration, persistence, and pace due to her extensive educational background; 

lengthy career as a proficient, self-reliant employee; and daily activities that include 

reading, watching television, and doing crossword puzzles. (Tr. 37). The ALJ also 

observed that when Plaintiff actually attended a treatment session, she was able to stay 

for the entire appointment. (Tr. 40). The ALJ reasonably interpreted this evidence to 

show that Plaintiff had the ability to meet the demands of unskilled work on a sustained 

basis. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 

that an RFC finding for unskilled work is consistent with finding that a claimant had 

moderate limitations in persistence, pace, and concentration). 

 Finally, as readily seen from the Code of Federal Regulations and SSR 85-15 

definitions of “unskilled” work, Plaintiff’s mental limitation to “simple” work had little 

or no effect on her occupational base at all exertional levels. The definitions already limit 

the occupational base of unskilled work to “simple” duties and instructions. Thus, by 

limiting Plaintiff occupational base to “simple work,” the range of available jobs was not 

significantly decreased. 

 In short, the ALJ’s decision to apply the Grids in lieu of posing hypotheticals to a 

VE was not error. “Considering the other reasons given by the ALJ for [Plaintiff]’s lack 

of credibility and [her] RFC, and in the face of the substantial evidence relied on by the 

ALJ, [Plaintiff] has not persuaded [the Court] that the ALJ overlooked any non-exertional 

impairments ‘significant enough to limit the range of work permitted by exertional 

limitations’ so as to preclude application of the grids.’” Haynes v. Colvin, __ F. App’x 

__, 2015 WL 3620679, at *2 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 

1111, 1115 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

2. Whether the ALJ Adequately Supported Her Finding that 

 Significant Numbers of Jobs Exist in the National Economy 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ failed to support her finding that Plaintiff could 

perform significant numbers of jobs existing in the national economy. (Doc. 19 at 6–7). 

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Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when she did not “list in the written 

decision any other jobs that existed in the national economy that would be suitable for 

claimant.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff argues that the occupational base available to her would be 

“substantially reduce[d]” due to her limitations as evidenced by her medical records and 

symptom testimony. (Id. at 7). 

 The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that an ALJ’s reliance on 

the Grids alone is a valid basis for denying a claim for benefits when the Grids accurately 

describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 468, 470. As 

discussed, the Court finds that the ALJ properly concluded that the Grids accurately 

reflect Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations. The ALJ, therefore, did not err when she relied 

solely on the Grids to deny Plaintiff’s claim without enumerating specific jobs that exist 

in the national economy. See id. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 28th day of October, 2015. 

 

 

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