Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02337/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2337

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Columbian Bank & Trust Company; *

MCK Partnership, LLC, *

*

Appellees, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Danieal Howard Miller; *

Danieal Howard Miller, PC, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellants. *

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Submitted: February 8, 2010

Filed: July 15, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge,1

 SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Columbian Bank and Trust Company ("Columbian Bank") obtained summary

judgment against Danieal Miller, et. al ("Miller"). Shortly thereafter, the Kansas State

Bank Commissioner closed Columbian Bank and named the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. MCK Partnership, LLC ("MCK") moved

the district court to be named substitute party for the FDIC based upon the FDIC's

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The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

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assignment. The district court2

 granted MCK's motion for substitution. On appeal,

Miller argues that the district court erred and abused its discretion in sustaining

MCK's motion to substitute. We affirm.

I. Background

On June 9, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment to Columbian

Bank, the original named plaintiff in this diversity case, against the original

defendants Miller, a Missouri resident, and a Missouri professional corporation. The

court awarded damages against Miller personally on July 2, 2008. On August 8, 2008,

the Kansas office of the State Bank Commissioner closed Columbian Bank and the

FDIC was named receiver. On March 17, 2009, Craig Porter, Managing Member of

MCK, a Missouri limited liability company, signed a document labeled "Assignment"

on behalf of the FDIC as receiver for the original plaintiff purporting to assign the

FDIC's interest in the judgment against Miller to MCK.

In April 2009, MCK moved to substitute for Columbian Bank as party-plaintiff

in the case, citing the above mentioned assignment as authority for its request. In

response to the motion, Miller denied that such an assignment had been effected and

requested that MCK be held to strict proof of all allegations of fact in its motion for

substitution. The district court granted MCK's motion for substitution without an

evidentiary hearing.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Miller maintains that the district court abused its discretion in

sustaining MCK's motion to substitute parties because no authenticated evidence

established that the FDIC granted MCK a power of attorney. Miller contends that the

validity of the assignment is determined by the existence or genuineness of the power

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of attorney. Miller further argues that while Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) only

requires a prima facie showing that the power of attorney is what MCK claims (i.e. a

power of attorney), MCK did not supply the district court with a copy of the power

of attorney.

Miller further argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) applies only to

pending litigation. Miller maintains that because the present case had been closed for

ten months before the attempted transfer, Rule 25(c) is therefore inapplicable. 

Finally, Miller defends the failure to raise certain facts by claiming an

expectation to raise such issues at the hearing required by Rule 25(a)(3). 

"We review district court determinations regarding substitution for an abuse of

discretion." ELCA Enters, Inc. v. Sisco Equip. Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186,

190–1 (8th Cir. 1995).

"Rule 25(c) permits substitutions when . . . an interest is transferred during a

lawsuit." Id. The rule states "[i]f an interest is transferred, the action may be continued

by or against the original party unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to be

substituted in the action or joined with the original party. The motion must be served

as provided in Rule 25(a)(3)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). "A motion to substitute, together

with a notice of hearing, must be served on the parties . . . . Service may be made in

any judicial district." Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(3). 

Rule 901(a) provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification

as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."

Miller's failure to raise the Rule 901(a) issue before the district court issued its

order waived their ability to do so on appeal. While Rule 25(a)(3) does anticipate a

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hearing, Miller cites no authority that establishes that the lack of such hearing excuses

his procedural default.

Additionally, Rule 901(a) does not require Columbian Bank to produce the

power of attorney. The rule simply requires "evidence sufficient to support a finding

that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). This

evidence may take many forms, and Miller has not established, or even alleged, that

Columbian Bank did not authenticate the power of attorney by other means. 

Finally, while Miller cites cases purporting to establish that Rule 25(c) applies

only to pending litigation, this interpretation is not mandatory. First, the rule on its

face does not restrict its application to pending cases. Second, although precedent

from this circuit establishes that the rule does apply to pending litigation, see ELCA

Enters, Inc., 53 F.3d at 191, there is no precedent that establishes that the rule applies

exclusively to pending litigation. 

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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