Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00106/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pr Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE GHEZZI,

Plaintiff,

v.

ZIMMER HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 15cv106 JAH(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND AND

REQUEST FOR FEES AND COSTS

[Doc. No. 25] AND FINDING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RULING MOOT [Doc. No. 24]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Doc. No.

25. Also, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Ruling on a previously briefed motion to remand

before this case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to a transfer

order from the MDL panel on May 13, 2015. Doc. Nos. 7, 15, 24. Having read and

considered the papers by the parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to

Remand and finds MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Christine Ghezzi filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior Court

on September 11, 2014, against Defendants Zimmer Holdings, Inc., Zimmer, Inc.,

Zimmer U.S., Inc., Zimmer Pacific, and Does 1-100 (collectively “Defendants”), and

Defendant Joe Bisant. Doc. No. 1-2. Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action:

general negligence, products liability (strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty),

and fraud (intentional and negligent misrepresentations, and fraudulent concealment). 

15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 10. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for injuries she

suffered after she underwent a total knee replacement surgery with Zimmer NextGen knee

components that were manufactured, marketed, distributed and sold by Defendants. Doc.

No. 1-2 ¶¶ 11, 14, 25 at 2. 

On January 16, 2015, the Defendants removed the case to this Court based on

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Doc. No. 1. In their

removal pleading, Defendants explain that Joe Bisant is an improper defendant whose

citizenship should be disregarded for purposes of removal. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11. Specifically,

Defendants allege that Defendant Bisant is fraudulently joined in this action, so this Court

should disregard his citizenship in determining whether jurisdiction exists. Doc. No. 1 ¶

25. Also, Defendants argue that Defendant Bisant is outside the scope of individuals who

can be held liable on a products liability claim under California law. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 28. 

Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot recover damages from Defendant Bisant for the

following reasons: (1) Bisant was not present at the surgery and did not delivery the

surgical products; (2) Bisant never spoke to or met Plaintiff prior to her surgery; (3) Bisant

never was involved in the design, manufacturing, or labeling of Zimmer’s medical device

products; (4) Bisant did not participate in creating marketing or advertising materials

disseminated by Zimmer for Next Gen products; (5) Bisant did not create the warnings

Zimmer prepared for its NextGen products; and (6) Bisant did not participate in Zimmer

or the U.S. Food & Drug Administration’s compatibility determinations for NextGen

products. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 29. As such, Defendants argue Defendant Bisant is fraudulently

joined and his presence does not preclude removal because there is no reasonable basis for

imposing liability against him. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 31.

Plaintiff filed a motion to remand and request for fees and costs on February 6,

2015. Doc. No. 7. On March 23, 2015, Defendants filed their response in opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion. Doc. No. 10. Plaintiff filed her reply to Defendants’ response on

March 30, 2015. Doc. No. 15. On May 13, 2015, after the Court took the matter under

submission, this case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois by a transfer order

2 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from the MDL Panel, which extinguished the pending status of Plaintiff’s initial remand

motion. Doc. No. 20. After the case was conditionally remanded to this Court on July

15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to rule on her previously filed motion to remand. Doc.

No. 24. On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff renewed its Motion to Remand Action to State

Court and Request for Fees and Costs. Doc. No. 25. On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed

a reply to Defendants’ response to the renewed motion. Doc. No. 29. The Court then 1

took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to the local rules. Doc.

No. 31.

DISCUSSION

Diversity of citizenship is a basis for a federal court’s original jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a

citizen of a different state than each of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S.

61, 68 (1996). As a general rule, an action is removable to a federal court only if it might

have been brought there. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If at the time a defendant seeks to remove

an action to federal court, there is complete diversity among the parties and the matter of

controversy is in excess $75,000, the requirements for removal have been met. See 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If at any time, before final judgment, the district

court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded. 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, “fraudulently joined defendants will not defeat removal on

diversity grounds.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes the “fraudulent joinder” exception to the complete

diversity. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). The

Morris Court explains that “fraudulent joinder...is a ‘term of art.’ Joinder of a non-diverse

defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the defendant’s presence in the lawsuit is ignored for

purposes of determining diversity ‘[i]f the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against

The arguments raised in Plaintiff’s renewed motion to remand are identical to her initial 1

motion, which she submitted before the casewas transferred by the MDLPanel. Although Defendants

did not oppose the renewed motion, Plaintiff filed a motion for a ruling on the previously filed motion

to remand. Thus, the Court adopts the Defendants’ opposition pleading to the initial pleading as

opposition to the renewed motion.

3 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” 

Id. at 1067 (citing McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir.

1987)). In other words, the test is whether on the face of the complaint there is any

possibility that the plaintiff could prevail. Morris, 236 F.3d at 1068. If so, courts deny

a claim of fraudulent joinder and remand is appropriate. Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of

America, 5 F.Supp.2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Remand

In her renewed motion, Plaintiff argues that she has alleged valid state claims

against Defendant Joe Bisant, a California resident, and Defendants have not shown that

her causes of action lack viability. Doc. No. 25 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff contends

Defendants cannot meet their burden of proof to demonstrate there is no possibility that

she can recover against Defendant Bisant for negligence. Id. at 7-10. Plaintiff also

contends the Court should award “just costs” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and any

actual expenses incurred as a result of the removal if remand is granted. Id. at 10-11. 

Defendants argue there is no reasonable basis for imposing liability on Defendant

Bisant. Doc. No. 10 at 5. Specifically, Defendants contend the surgical femoral, tibial,

and tibial articular surface components used in Plaintiff’s total knee replacement were

compatible which undercuts Plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 5-12. Defendants claim that

Defendant Bisant’s limited role surrounding Plaintiff’s surgery cannot subject him to

liability under California law. Id. at 12-14. In addition, Defendants argue the Court

should deny Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs because removal is objectively reasonable. 

Id. at 14-15. 

In her reply, Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to meet its clear and convincing

evidence burden as the evidence supports Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ heavily rely

on authority ruling recovery impossible under products liability when Plaintiff also alleges

negligence and fraud. See Doc. No. 29. The Court agrees. 

Under the Ninth Circuit test, removal is improper here because Plaintiff states at

4 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

least one valid state law claim, negligence, against non-resident Defendant Bisant on which

she could possibly prevail. California Civil Jury Instructions suggest it is helpful to ask

and answer the question whether or not, if a person of ordinary prudence had been in the

same situation and possessed of the same knowledge, he would have foreseen or

anticipated that someone might have been injured as a result of his action or inaction.2

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had a duty to ensure that the

implant did not pose a significant increased risk of bodily injury to users like Plaintiff. 

Doc. No. 1-2 at 28 ¶ GN-3. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants had a duty to warn

Plaintiff and other consumers of the dangers associated with the knee implant or the

compatibility of the implant components when used in certain combinations that were or

should have been known by Defendants at the time the implants were sold to Plaintiff. 

Id. at ¶ GN-4. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants breached their duty in the design

of the NexGen knee implant as Defendants knew or should have known that the implant

had a propensity to cause serious injury, pain, and/or revision surgery. Id. at ¶ GN-5. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached their duty to warn by failing to warn Plaintiff and

the public about the incompatibility issues associated with the implants and the risk of

the injury to Plaintiff. Id. at GN-7. In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ breach

caused Plaintiff’s injuries, including, the need for a revision surgery. Id. 

Plaintiff also asserts Defendant Bisant’s design, communication, and logistic roles

are significant such that there is a possibility that he could be held liable for Plaintiff’s

injuries. Although Defendants attempt to minimize Defendant Bisant’s role in the

surgical preparation, Defendants concede that Defendant Bisant, along with Plaintiff’s

surgeon, templated Plaintiff’s x-rays to determine the necessary sizes of her replacement

knee components. Doc. No. 10 at 10. Templating involves estimating the sizes of two

of the four components that were used in Plaintiff’s surgery. The templating process set

the parameters of permissible materials, in the surgeon’s estimation, to be used during

California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI) 3.11, A Test for Determining the Question of 2

Negligence (March 2016).

5 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s surgery. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth the

elements of negligence under California law. 

Defendants contend, however, that no liability can be found as to Defendant Bisant

for templating because the four components actually used are picked during surgery, where

Bisant was not present, and the other two components, the articular surface and the

patellar component, were not selected as a result of templating. Doc. No. 10 at 11-12. 

This Court disagrees. An ordinary person in the position of Defendant Bisant possibly has

a duty to inform the performing surgeon of any incompatibility between the components

identified as permissible for use in Plaintiff’s surgery. As acknowledged by Defendants,

both components templated by Defendant Bisant and Plaintiff’s surgeon required

replacement during her revision surgery, which further lends support to Plaintiff’s

possibility to prevail on her negligence claim against Defendant Bisant. Accordingly, the

Court finds removal was improper here as Plaintiff alleges a viable claim against a nondiverse defendant. 

Therefore, the Court REMANDS this case to state court as the complete diversity

requirement is not satisfied.

II. Request for Just Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff requests this Court award her costs and fees in the amount of $2,775

under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Doc. No. 7-1 at 10. Defendants contend the Court should

deny Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs because Defendant Bisant played a limited role

in Plaintiff’s surgery. Doc. No. 10 at 14-15. 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that “[a]n order remanding [a] case may require

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result

of the removal.” The decision to award such fees is within the district court’s discretion

and does not require a finding of bad faith removal because the purpose of such an award

is not punitive, but rather to reimburse a plaintiff for wholly unnecessary litigation costs

caused by defendant. Moore, 981 F.2d at 446-447.

Complete diversity does not exist here and remand is required, so an award of costs

6 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and fees is appropriate. Plaintiff’s counsel declares she spent 9.25 hours working on

Plaintiff’s motion to remand at $300 per hour. Plaintiff simply requests the amount

actually incurred in her assertion of an improper removal. As such, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s request for costs and fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and awards $2,775 be

reimbursed to Plaintiff. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and Request for Fees and Costs (doc. no. 25)

is GRANTED in its entirety; and

2. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s costs and fees in the amount of $2,775; and

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling on Previously Briefed Motion to Remand

(doc. no. 24) is MOOT; 

Dated: May 31, 2016

 

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

7 15cv106

Case 3:15-cv-00106-JAH-RBB Document 33 Filed 06/02/16 Page 7 of 7