Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07182/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07182-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 15, 1997 Decided June 18, 1999

No. 96-7182

Ronnie Holmes,

Appellant

v.

Amerex Rent-a-Car et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Jonathan E. Halperin argued the cause for appellant.

Terence J. O'Connell argued the cause for appellee, with

whom James M. Linsao was on the brief.

Before: Silberman, Ginsburg, and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

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Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: We previously determined that

the answers to two novel questions of District of Columbia

law would be dispositive of this appeal and therefore certified

those questions to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 113 F.3d 1285, 1286

(1997). The questions were:

Under District of Columbia law, may a plaintiff recover

against a defendant who has negligently or recklessly

destroyed or allowed to be destroyed evidence that would

have assisted the plaintiff in pursuing a claim against a

third party?

If a plaintiff may proceed under such a theory, what

standard of proximate cause must he meet?

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has now given its

answers:

In response to the first certified question, we hold that

negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence is an independent and actionable tort in the District of Columbia.

In response to the second certified question, we hold that

in order to demonstrate that the defendant's actions

proximately caused the harm alleged, plaintiff must

show, on the basis of reasonable inferences derived from

both existing and spoliated evidence, that (1) the plaintiff's ability to prevail in the underlying lawsuit was

significantly impaired due to the absence of the spoliated

evidence; and (2) there had been a significant possibility

of success in the underlying claim against the third

party.

Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 847 (D.C. 1998).

We now apply the law of the District, as clarified, to the facts

of this case.

I. Background

The essential facts, as set forth in our prior opinion, are as

follows. In November, 1988, while driving a car he had

rented from Amerex Rent-a-Car, Ronnie Holmes was involved in an accident that left him seriously injured. He

asked Amerex, which had taken possession of the wrecked car

following the accident, to hold it so that he could have it

inspected by an expert. Amerex agreed to leave the car

undisturbed until June 15, 1989. On June 14, an Amerex

claims representative agreed to sell the car to Holmes for

$200. Unbeknownst to the claims representative, however,

another Amerex employee had already sold the car to a

salvage company, which had destroyed its engine. Without

the engine, it was impossible to determine whether the car

was defectively designed or manufactured or maintained in a

way that might have caused the accident.

Holmes sued Chrysler (the manufacturer of the car) and

Amerex in the District of Columbia Superior Court, alleging

that Chrysler had negligently designed, and that Amerex had

negligently maintained, the engine of the car. After Chrysler

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removed the case to federal court, Holmes filed an amended

complaint naming Amerex as the sole defendant. The

amended complaint asserts claims for negligent spoliation of

evidence and tortious interference with Holmes's prospective

civil action against Chrysler (again by spoliation of evidence).

In support of these claims Holmes submitted an affidavit

from an expert in biomechanics, crashworthiness, and accident reconstruction stating that "if the vehicle were available

in the same condition that it was immediately following the

accident, [Holmes] would have a substantial possibility of

proving that the [car] at issue was defectively designed and/or

manufactured and/or maintained." The district judge granted summary judgment to Amerex on this claim, concluding

that Holmes had not met what it (erroneously) thought was

the law of spoliation in the District of Columbia, namely, that

a plaintiff must demonstrate that, were it not for the destruction of the evidence, it is more probable than not that he

would prevail upon the underlying claim.

Holmes's amended complaint also included counts for

breach of contract and promissory estoppel arising out of

Amerex's sale of the car to the salvage company. The district

court referred those claims to a magistrate judge. After a

bench trial, the magistrate first found for Holmes on the

contract claim but awarded him only nominal damages beUSCA Case #96-7182 Document #443391 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 3 of 7
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cause his "purpose in seeking possession of the salvage was

not for its intrinsic value but solely for its evidential [sic]

value in a potential tort action against the manufacturer";

when the district court had granted summary judgment in

favor of Amerex on the spoliation claims, it had "removed the

basis for any damages [Holmes] could claim" arising out of

Amerex's breach of contract. The magistrate then rejected

Holmes's promissory estoppel claim, upon the ground that

Holmes had been "less than diligent in protecting his own

interests with respect to an inspection of the salvage of the

vehicle." The district court adopted the magistrate's report

and recommendation in full.

II. Analysis

Holmes appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for Amerex on the spoliation claims, the magistrate's

failure to award him more than nominal damages for Amerex's breach of contract, and the magistrate's denial of his

promissory estoppel claim.

In answer to our certification of questions of law, the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals enumerated the elements of a cause of action for negligent or reckless spoliation

of evidence, as follows:

(1) existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or

contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant

to that action; (3) destruction of that evidence by the

duty-bound defendant; (4) significant impairment in the

ability to prove the potential civil action; (5) a proximate

relationship between the impairment of the underlying

suit and the unavailability of the destroyed evidence; (6)

a significant possibility of success of the potential civil

action if the evidence were available; and (7) damages

adjusted for the estimated likelihood of success in the

potential civil action.

710 A.2d at 854. The evidence presented in this case, viewed

in the light most favorable to Holmes, would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that (1) Holmes had a potential civil

action arising out of the accident in which he was involved;

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(2) Amerex had a contractual obligation to preserve the car

for Holmes; (3) Amerex negligently allowed the car to be sold

and dismantled; (4) Holmes's ability to prove his case in the

potential civil action was significantly impaired; (5) the impairment of the underlying suit was proximately related to

the dismantling of the car and the attendant loss of evidence

relating to the design, manufacturing, and maintenance of the

car; (6) Holmes would have had a significant possibility of

success in the potential civil action if the evidence were

available; and (7) Holmes suffered damages.

In concluding that a reasonable juror could find that

Holmes would have had a "significant possibility" of success

in his underlying lawsuit if the evidence had not been lost, we

are mindful that the District of Columbia has, unlike some

states, see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829,

836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), rejected the requirement that a

plaintiff demonstrate a "reasonable probability" of success.

A "reasonable probability" of success still requires a

showing that success was probable. In our view, this

comes too close to requiring that the plaintiff show

success by what amounts to "a preponderance of the

evidence." ... [T]his standard is too high. Instead, we

believe we should require that the plaintiff show that the

underlying lawsuit enjoyed a significant possibility of

success. We choose this term as it implies a showing

higher than the already recognized standard of "significant evidence" but lower than the standard of "preponderance of the evidence." The plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of succeeding,

but need not cross the threshold of demonstrating that

such success was more likely than not, something that

would be realistically impractical of proof.

710 A.2d at 852.

Holmes submitted the affidavit of an expert in accident

reconstruction who, after reviewing photographs of the car

taken after the accident, determined that the car appears to

have lacked reasonable "crashworthiness." He therefore concluded that "if the vehicle were available in the same condiUSCA Case #96-7182 Document #443391 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 5 of 7
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tion that it was immediately following the accident, [Holmes]

would have a substantial possibility of proving that the [car]

... was defectively designed and/or manufactured and/or

maintained." We think a reasonable jury could find that the

evidence that led Holmes's expert to conclude that he would

have a "substantial possibility" of success gives rise to the

"significant possibility" of success Holmes needs in order to

recover for the negligent spoliation of his evidence. It follows

that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of Amerex on the negligent spoliation claim. It

follows as well that the magistrate judges's decision to award

Holmes only nominal damages on his breach of contract

claim, upon the premise that his spoliation claim could not

succeed, must be reconsidered in light of the ultimate resolution of the spoliation claim.

Turning to the promissory estoppel count, we affirm the

judgment in favor of Amerex. The judge first found that

Holmes unreasonably failed to inspect the car despite having

had ample opportunity to do so. He then held that judgment

for Amerex was appropriate because promissory estoppel

"requires the promisee to have acted reasonably in justifiable

reliance on the promise." Although Holmes urges us to

reverse the judge's decision, he challenges neither step of this

reasoning. Instead, he focuses upon evidence showing that

he relied upon Amerex's representation that it would preserve the car and that he was injured when that representation proved false. That may be so, but it does nothing to

undermine the magistrate's finding that he was unreasonably

dilatory in inspecting the car. Therefore, we are constrained

to approve the magistrate's denial of the claim based upon

promissory estoppel.

III. Conclusion

In view of the answer given by the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals to the questions of law we certified, we

reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Amerex

on the claim for negligent spoliation of evidence, vacate the

award of nominal damages on the claim for breach of conUSCA Case #96-7182 Document #443391 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 6 of 7
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tract, and affirm the judgment of the district court on the

claim based upon promissory estoppel. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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