Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00098/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Israel J. Alvarez, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV11-0098-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Israel J. Alvarez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of Alvarez 

convictions as follows: 

The evidence showed that Alvarez and S. had been together for two or 

three days in June 2001, smoking crack cocaine. After they met Ramon 

Cruz and Warren Nixon, the four took a drive in S.'s rented white 

Chevrolet Cavalier. At some point, the four went to a desert area to 

smoke more crack cocaine. According to Alvarez, Nixon then said he 

wanted to take the car from S., and Nixon and Cruz pulled S. out of the 

car and beat him. Nixon, Cruz, and Alvarez then drove away in the 

rental car. 

 Deputy Sheriff Maurice Othic found S. staggering down a road 

around 3:00 p.m. on June 10, with blood “all in his hair and all on his 

face.” Othic said S. had “pretty much collapsed” on the trunk of the 

patrol vehicle and had slipped in and out of consciousness. Othic was 

able to learn S.'s first name. Before S. lost consciousness again, he told 

Othic three men had “jumped him and [had taken] his '95 white 

Suzuki.” 

 In May 2001, S. had reported to police that his Suzuki had been 

stolen. In June, S. was driving a rental car, a white Chevrolet Cavalier. 

A customs inspector stopped the Cavalier about 4:30 p.m. on June 10 at 

the international border because its occupants were “looking out the 

windows . . . [and] didn't seem like they knew where they were going.” 

The men had no identification, and Alvarez gave conflicting stories 

about who owned the car. In the car, the inspector found a rental 

contract with S.'s name on it and called the rental company, whose 

representative asked him not to allow the three men to take the car to 

Mexico. Alvarez then walked into Mexico. 

 On June 12, S. died from multiple blunt force injuries to his 

head. His blood was found on clothing belonging to Alvarez, Cruz, and 

Nixon and on two concrete blocks found at the murder scene. 

 

State v. Alvarez (“Alvarez I”), 210 Ariz. 24, 26, 107 P.3d 350, 352 (App. 2005), 

opinion vacated in part and supplemented by State v. Alvarez (“Alvarez II”), 213 

Ariz. 467, 143 P.3d 668 (App. 2006). A jury convicted Alvarez of felony murder and 

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aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 

life and 6.5 years. Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. at 468. 

 Alvarez appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred (1) when 

defining reasonable doubt for the jurors; (2) when defining the crime of felony 

murder for the jurors; (3) by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because 

the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) by admitting alleged 

hearsay evidence; and (5) by dismissing a first indictment against him without 

prejudice. Exs. A, B.1

 The Court of Appeals denied Alvarez’s appeal on the merits. 

Alvarez I, 210 Ariz. 24, 107 P.3d 350. Alvarez sought review of the decision by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. C. The Supreme Court granted review and ultimately 

remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the United 

States Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 

(2006). Ex. D. 

 On remand, and after supplemental briefing by the parties, the Court of 

Appeals again denied Alvarez’s direct appeal on the merits. See Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. 

467, 143 P.3d 668. Alvarez again sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. 

E. On April 19, 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Ex. F. Alvarez 

did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court. Petition, p. 3. 

 On December 26, 2004, while his direct appeal remained pending, Alvarez 

initiated state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings by filing a notice. Ex. G. 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10). 

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Alvarez thereafter successfully moved to stay his PCR proceedings pending the 

resolution of his direct appeal. Exs. H, I.2

 

 After the trial court lifted the stay, Alvarez filed a PCR petition and an 

amended petition. Exs. J, K. Alvarez argued that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective 

during the plea bargaining process because he did no communicate to Alvarez the 

State’s plea offer and did not “adequately explain the relative strength of the state’s 

case;” (2) a then-recent change in state law would have induced him to accept the 

plea offer if he had been aware of it; and (3) he was entitled to be resentenced. Exs. 

J, K. The trial court denied each of Alvarez’s claims on the merits. Ex. L. Alvarez 

filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals and, on April 29, 2010, 

granted review, but denied relief. Ex. M. Alvarez did not petition the Supreme 

Court for review. Ex. N. 

 In the petition now before the Court, Alvarez raises five claims. In Ground 

One, he alleges the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for judgment of 

acquittal based on insufficient evidence. In Ground Two, he alleges that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to tell him that the state had offered Alvarez a plea 

agreement. In Ground Three, he alleges that a then-recent state-court decision 

clarifying the application of accomplice liability under state law would have induced 

 

2

 Respondents note that they were unable to locate the trial court’s order granting 

Alvarez’s stay request; however, the original motion to stay (Ex. H) and a later trial 

court order lifting the stay (Ex. I), which is dated after the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review following the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in Alvarez II, 

evidence the stay. 

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him to take the plea had he been aware of it and understood it. In Ground Four, he 

alleges that the trial court did not properly define the crime of felony murder in the 

instructions given to the jury. Ground Five alleges that the trial court erred by 

admitting into evidence the victim’s statements that he had been “jumped” by three 

men and had his car stolen because that statement was inadmissible hearsay and 

violated the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. Petition, pp. 3-10. 

II. TIMELINESS 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Here, the record shows that after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on 

April 19, 2007. Ex. F. Alvarez then had 90 days to petition the United States 

Supreme Court for review. Sup.Ct.R. 13. He did not do so. Thus, his convictions 

became final on direct review 90-days later, on July 18, 2007. Bowen v. Roe, 188 

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (conclusion of direct review occurs when the 90-

day time period during which a defendant may file a petition for writ of certiorari in 

the United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether the petitioner files 

such a petition). 

 The one-year limitation period did not begin to run immediately because 

Alvarez’s PCR petition was still pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Alvarez’s 

PCR petition remained pending at least until April 29, 2010, when the Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied relief. Ex. M. Because Alvarez filed the instant petition on 

March 7, 2011, well within a year of that date, it is timely. 

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Grounds Three, Four, Five, and a portion of Ground 

One fail to state a federal claim that is cognizable on habeas review. Additionally, 

Respondents contend that to the extent the Court reaches the merits on Grounds One, 

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Two and Five, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal 

law in rejecting the claims. 

A. Non-Cognizable Claims 

A state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief only if his conviction violates 

the Constitution or the laws and treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; 

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982). Federal habeas corpus relief is not 

available for errors of state law. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Federal 

courts accept a state court's interpretation of state law “and alleged errors in the 

application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not the province of the federal courts 

to re-examine state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited 

to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States.” Id. at 68. 

 A petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by 

asserting a violation of due process.” Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. “[T]he Supreme 

Court has long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure immunity 

from judicial error or uniformity of judicial decisions.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 

1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). “The Due Process Clause does not permit the federal 

courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules.” 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983). “Beyond the specific 

guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited 

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operation.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). In the absence of a 

specific constitutional violation, federal habeas review of state court trial errors is 

limited to whether the error “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’“ Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780 (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). 

 1. Ground One

 In Ground One, Alvarez alleges that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 

a conviction and that the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal filed 

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 20. Respondents correctly assert that, to the extent this 

claim is based on the alleged misapplication of Rule 20, the federal courts must 

accept the state court's interpretation of the rule. Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. 

However, as Respondents recognize, to the extent that Alvarez is contending that his 

federal constitutional rights were violated because the evidence was insufficient to 

support the verdict, the claim is cognizable and is addressed on the merits herein. 

 2. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Alvarez alleges that a then-recent state-court decision 

clarifying the application of accomplice liability under state law would have induced 

him to take the plea had he been aware of it and understood it. In the state case to 

which Alvarez refers, State v. Garnica, 209 Ariz. 96, 98 P.3d 207 (App. 2004), the 

court addressed whether, under A.R.S. § 13-301, “a person can be an accomplice to 

an offense that is premised on a reckless mental state.” 209 Ariz. at 96. The 

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discussion in the case is based entirely on the interpretation of state law and no 

federal authority, constitutional or otherwise, is mentioned in the decision. 

 It is well-established that the definition of the scope and nature of state law 

crimes is left to the state legislatures and courts. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 

197, 201-02 (1977). To the extent Alvarez requests that the Court conclude that a 

purported change in accomplice liability would have compelled him to take the plea 

he was offered, it would be improper to do so. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67–68 

(federal habeas courts should not re-examine state court determinations of state law 

questions). Thus, this claim, to the extent it requests the court to reexamine state law, 

is not cognizable. 

 However, the claim can also be read as evidencing ineffective assistance by 

Alvarez’s counsel in advising him on the nature and implications of entering into the 

plea agreement. To the extent that this is the case, the arguments raised in this claim 

will be considered in conjunction with the examination of Claim Two, which directly 

raises the ineffectiveness claim. 

 3. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Alvarez alleges that the trial court did not properly define the 

crime of felony murder in the instructions given to the jury. This claim is clearly not 

cognizable. “Under our federal system, the States possess primary authority for 

defining and enforcing the criminal law.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 

n.3 (1995) (citations omitted). A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error 

under state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus 

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proceedings. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71–72. Alvarez alleges only that the trial 

court wrongly instructed the jury under the state felony murder law. That claim is 

not within the purview of federal habeas relief. 

 4. Ground Five 

 Ground Five alleges that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the 

victim’s statements that he had been “jumped” by three men and had his car stolen 

because that statement was inadmissible hearsay and violated the Sixth 

Amendment’s confrontation clause. State evidentiary rulings are not cognizable in a 

federal habeas proceeding unless federal constitutional rights are affected. McGuire, 

502 U.S. at 68; Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, to the 

extent Alvarez is challenging the admission of the victim’s statement on state law 

grounds, it is not cognizable. However, his contention that the statement’s admission 

violated the U.S. Constitution’s confrontation clause is reviewed below on the merits. 

 B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

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authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground One 

 A habeas petitioner who contends that the evidence introduced at trial was 

insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict states a cognizable federal habeas 

claim. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1993). Under Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the standard is whether “any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

The Jackson standard is applied with reference to the state law defining the elements 

of the crime at issue. See Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956 (2004). 

 On habeas review, the court “makes no determination of the facts in the 

ordinary sense of resolving factual disputes.” Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 678 

(9th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated in part on other grounds on 

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reh'g, 503 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 555 U.S. 179 (2009). 

The reviewing federal court “must respect the province of the jury to determine the 

credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences 

from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that 

supports the verdict.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.1995); see also 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 324, 326. 

 Where, as here, a state court has issued a reasoned decision rejecting a claim 

of insufficient evidence under a standard that is not “contrary to” Jackson, a 

reviewing federal court applies an additional layer of deference. See Juan H. v. 

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir.2005) (as amended), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1137 

(2006). Habeas relief is warranted only where “the state court's application of the 

Jackson standard [was] ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 1275 n. 13. Thus, a state 

court's resolution of an insufficiency of the evidence claim is evaluated under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), rather than § 2254(d)(2). See Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 677–78. 

 In rejecting this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals applied standards 

applicable to Rule 20, Ariz.R.Crim.P., that are consistent with, and not contrary to, 

Jackson’s standard that a claim of insufficient evidence be granted only where no 

rational trier of fact “could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The standard applied by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals required reversal only where “there is no substantial evidence to 

support the conviction,” and where there is “a complete absence of probative facts to 

support a conviction.” Alvarez I, 210 Ariz. at 27 (citations and internal quotations 

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omitted). The Court of Appeals noted that “[i]f reasonable minds can differ on the 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence, a trial court has no discretion to enter a 

judgment of acquittal and must submit the case to the jury.” Id. 

Applying these standards, the Court of Appeals concluded: 

Substantial evidence supports Alvarez’s convictions. S.’s statement, 

Alvarez’s confession, the testimony that S.’s blood had been found on 

Alvarez’s shoe, and the testimony of the customs inspector about 

Alvarez’s behavior at the border constituted sufficient evidence to 

require the trial court to submit the case to submit the case to the jury. 

Alvarez argues that only S.’s statement—that three men had “jumped 

him”—inculpated Alvarez and that the other evidence only placed him 

at the scene. He also contends S.’s statement was hearsay. In fact S.’s 

statement to Othic did not name Alvarez or describe him. Only when 

connected to other evidence does S.’s statement inculpate Alvarez. In 

any event, even disregarding S.’s statement, the state presented 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have inferred 

that Alvarez had been more than a “passive observer.” The trial court 

thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarez’s Rule 20 motion. 

 

Alvarez I, 210 Ariz. at 27-28. Alvarez argues that this decision was unreasonable 

because there was “no evidence” or “eye witness testimony” to support his 

conviction and that evidence was “made up.” Petition, pp. 6, 10. Alvarez’s 

arguments are unconvincing and the state courts reasonably rejected this claim. 

 Alvarez was convicted of aggravated robbery and felony murder. Aggravated 

robbery is defined under two statutes, A.R.S. § 13-1902 and 1903,3

 which taken 

together, and as applicable here, provide that an individual commits aggravated 

robbery by, under the use or threatened use of force, taking another’s property from 

 

3

 The statutes referenced are those in effect at the time of Alvarez’s conviction. 

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his person or immediate presence while aided by one or more accomplices. A.R.S. 

§§ 13-1902 & 1903 (West 2001). The basic underlying facts of Alvarez’s 

conviction, as determined by the state court support his conviction on this count. 

Alvarez was stopped at the border riding in the victim’s rental car with two other 

men. The victim was found bleeding and later died from his wounds. Alvarez 

admitted his involvement and the victim’s blood was found on his shoe. These facts 

alone would allow a rational trier of fact to find Alvarez guilty of aggravated 

robbery. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. Adding the victim’s statement that he had 

been jumped by three men who stole his car, which as discussed below was 

reasonably admitted at Alvarez’s trial, only adds to the evidence upon which the state 

court relied in rejecting this claim. 

 As the Respondents note, once the jury concluded that Alvarez was guilty of 

aggravated robbery, his conviction for felony murder under Arizona law was also 

reasonable. At the time of Alvarez’s conviction, Arizona first degree murder statute, 

in pertinent part, provided that a person commits first degree murder if “the person or 

another person causes the death of any person” in the course of committing a 

robbery. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2) (West 2001). It is undisputed that the victim died 

of the injuries he sustained when Alvarez and his accomplices took his car. Based on 

these facts, a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-319. 

 In the face of these facts, Alvarez cannot support his contentions that there 

was “no evidence” or that the evidence was “made up.” His statements, the victim’s 

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statement, and the physical and circumstantial evidence all constitute evidence that 

was not “made up.” Additionally, the allegation that there were no eye witnesses is 

not accurate and, even if it were, not a basis for relief. There were at least three eyewitnesses to the crime—Alvarez and two men with him. Alvarez’s confession 

provided eye witness testimony. Moreover, “circumstantial evidence can be used to 

prove any fact, including facts from which another fact is to be inferred, and is not to 

be distinguished from testimonial evidence insofar as the jury's fact-finding function 

is concerned.” Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 

U.S. 843 (1993). Thus, the circumstantial evidence cited by the state court supported 

the rejection of this claim and the state court’s decision was “objectively reasonable.”

Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. (9th Cir.2005) (as amended), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1137 

(2006). 

 2. Ground Two 

Ground Two, and the portion of Ground Three that is cognizable, is based on 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Criminal defendants have a Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel that extends to the plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. 

Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) (citations omitted). “During plea negotiations 

defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The familiar Strickland test applies to 

challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984)). Under Strickland, Alvarez must show both deficient performance and 

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prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was ineffective. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established by a petitioner’s 

showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In the 

context of rejecting a plea offer, the question is “not whether ‘counsel’s advice [was] 

right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 

“Counsel cannot be required to accurately predict what the jury or court might find, 

but he can be required to give the defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent 

decision.” Id. at 881. 

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “In the context of pleas, a defendant must show the outcome of the plea 

process would have been different with competent advice.” Id. When applying these 

standards to a claim that ineffective assistance led to the improvident rejection of a 

guilty plea, the petitioner must show “that but for the ineffective advice of counsel 

there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the 

court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution 

would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court 

would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 

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offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that 

in fact were imposed.” Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1386. 

 Federal habeas rules also instruct that, if the state court has already rejected a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief 

only if it finds the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003). The review of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must 

adopt counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged decision or conduct, in 

order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme Court had described federal review of a 

state court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly 

deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112-113 (2009)). 

 In his ineffective assistance claims, Alvarez alleges that his lawyer never told 

him that the state had offered him a plea agreement, did not explain the plea 

agreement to him, only explained plea agreements “in theory,” told him a plea 

agreement would not change his sentence, and told him that his was the sort of case 

to take to trial. Alvarez also explains that when he stated “I didn’t do nothing,” he 

really meant he “was not denying any plea the state is offering me.” Petition, pp. 7-

8. 

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 Addressing this claim in Alvarez’s Rule 32 proceedings, the trial court, in a 

ruling later adopted by the Arizona Court of Appeals (Ex. M), described the 

following background: 

 The Petitioner was indicted on October 16, 2001, on one count 

of first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. He was 

represented at trial by Edward Nesbitt, Esq. The State offered the 

Petitioner a plea agreement to manslaughter with a sentencing cap of 

fifteen years. The Petitioner rejected this offer. During a hearing held 

on January 18, 2002, the Court—at the request of the State—conducted 

an impromptu Donald hearing to determine whether counsel had 

conveyed the offer to the Petitioner. Counsel indicated that he had 

conveyed the offer to the Petitioner and felt that he understood it. 

Counsel also informed the Court—both during this hearing and later at 

sentencing—that the Petitioner did not feel that he had committed a 

crime and was rejecting the plea because he did not feel that he could 

lay a factual basis. Counsel stated that he had told the Petitioner to take 

the plea if he had “[taken] any part” in the offense. At one point during 

the Donald hearing while the State was explaining the terms of the plea 

agreement, the Petitioner stated, “I didn’t do nothing.” 

Answer, Ex. L, p. 1 (citations to transcript omitted). Then, applying the two-prong 

Strickland standard, the trial court provided the following analysis: 

 The Petitioner argues that Counsel was ineffective because he 

failed to adequately explain the plea agreement offered by the State, or 

to explain how strong the State’s case was. He argues that, had counsel 

done either, he would have accepted the plea agreement because it 

would have limited his sentencing exposure to fifteen years. Counsel 

informed the Court at the Donald hearing that he had explained the plea 

offer to the Petitioner and felt he understood it. However, even 

assuming for the sake of argument that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, the Court finds that the Petitioner suffered no prejudice and, 

therefore, is not entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

 At the Donald hearing, counsel indicated that the Petitioner was 

rejecting the plea agreement because he did not feel he was involved in 

the victim’s death. Counsel stated, “I conveyed all the offers that were 

made to [the Petitioner] and [his] position is that he cannot support a 

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factual basis for manslaughter.” [sic] When the assigned prosecutor 

explained the terms of the plea agreement and the charges the 

Petitioner would have to lay a factual basis for to the Court, the 

Petitioner stated, “I didn’t do nothing.” During the sentencing hearing 

held in this case, counsel made the following speech: 

“He told me that he didn’t do this, he told me that he did 

not beat up that individual. . . . When he was offered a 

plea with the top end of 15 years and we talked about 

whether he should take it or not, my advice was if you 

took any part in this, take the deal, if you did anything. 

Take the deal even if, though you may not have hit him or 

maybe you hit him or pushed him any part of this, take 

the deal. But if you’re telling me you didn’t do any part 

of this, then don’t do it. You’re going to have to come 

into court and tell the Judge that you did something, and 

then you can’t take the plea. 

 The record clearly shows that the Petitioner rejected the plea 

agreement in this case because he did not feel that he had any 

involvement with the victim’s death. Therefore, he would not have 

been able to lay a factual basis for the plea. Although the Petitioner 

repeatedly argues that he would have taken the plea if counsel had 

explained it to him more thoroughly, he had not shown that he would 

have been able to lay a factual basis that would have allowed the Court 

to accept his plea. Because the Petitioner has failed to show that the 

plea would have been accepted, he has failed to state a colorable claim 

that he was prejudiced and the Court finds that he is not entitled to 

relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 The Petitioner also argues that counsel failed to adequately 

explain the concept of accomplice liability to him and claims that, if he 

had understood that concept, he would have taken the plea. However, 

the Petitioner concedes that counsel advised him to accept the plea if he 

“took any part” in the offense, “even if . . . [he] may not have hit” the 

victim. Under the circumstances, the Court finds that counsel made the 

Petitioner aware that he could take the plea if he had any involvement 

whatsoever in the offense, and that this was a sufficient explanation of 

accomplice liability. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Petitioner 

has failed to colorably show that he [sic] counsel filed to adequately 

explain accomplice liability, or that he suffered any prejudice. 

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Ex. L, pp. 2-3. 

 The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or constitutes an 

unreasonable application of, the Strickland standards. The trial court first determined 

that counsel explained the plea offer to Alvarez and believed that he understood it 

and rejected it and insisted he was innocent. This conclusion is borne out by the 

portions of the record that were cited and relied upon by the trial court. See Ex. P, 

pp. 54-56. In fact, other than Alvarez’s contentions to the contrary, there is nothing 

in the record that evidences a failure on his counsel’s part to inform him of the 

existence and nature of the plea agreement. 

 The trial court’s conclusion that Alvarez’s counsel adequately explained the 

implications of accomplice liability is also supported by the record. As the trial court 

noted, Alvarez counsel recommended he take the plea even if he had not “took any 

part” in the offense, and “even if . . . [he] may not have hit” the victim. Ex. Q, p. 16. 

Those statements adequately convey that Alvarez was at risk of conviction and 

should have taken the plea even if he was merely present when the victim was 

beaten. However, Alvarez nevertheless steadfastly claimed innocence and rejected 

the plea. 

 As the trial court also concluded, Alvarez’s continued claims of innocence 

establish that, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Alvarez is unable to 

establish prejudice. To establish prejudice, Alvarez must show a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

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694). As is relevant here, showing prejudice would require that Alvarez establish a 

reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been accepted by the court. 

Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1386. However, Alvarez has consistently maintained his 

innocence, even at the time of sentencing. Ex. Q, pp. 11-12. Likewise, he offered 

nothing in his PCR petition or in the instant petition that suggests he could have 

offered a factual basis for the acceptance of the plea by the trial court. Simply put, 

Alvarez cannot establish prejudice in light of his steadfast and repeated insistence of 

innocence. On this record, the trial court’s denial of this claim was not an 

unreasonably application of Strickland. 

 3. Ground Five

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment affords a criminal 

defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses against him. Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). In Ground Five, Alvarez claims this right was 

violated by the admission into evidence of the victim’s statement to Deputy Othic 

that three men had “jumped him and [had taken] his '95 white Suzuki.” Alvarez I, 

210 Ariz. at 26. Alvarez specifically notes that cross-examination would have 

disclosed that the victim had in fact been carjacked a few weeks prior and his Suzuki 

was taken, and that the rental car Alvarez was traveling in was not a Suzuki. 

Petition, pp. 10-11. 

 This issue was the subject of the Arizona Supreme Court’s remand of this case 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. In Alvarez I, the Court of Appeals denied the claim 

after determining that the victim’s statement to Deputy Othic “was nontestimonial 

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hearsay” outside the scope of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and that 

the admission of the statement therefore did not violate Alvarez’s confrontation 

rights under the Sixth Amendment. Alvarez I, 210 Ariz. at 30. However, while 

Alvarez’s petition seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision was pending 

before the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court issued its 

decision in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), which also addressed the 

scope of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. The Arizona Supreme Court 

then remanded the case back to the Arizona Court of Appeals to reconsider its 

decision in light of Davis. Ex. D (remand order). 

 On remand, the Appeals Court briefly reviewed the facts and procedural 

history of the case and, after concluding that Alvarez was entitled only to review for 

fundamental error, addressed the question of whether the trial court had committed 

constitutional error by allowing Deputy Othic to testify about the victim’s statement. 

Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. at 467-470. The court then set-out the general rule from 

Crawford that “the Sixth Amendment bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a 

witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the 

defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Id. at 470 (quoting 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, and citing Davis, 547 U.S. 813). The court next set 

forth Crawford’s description of a “core class” of testimonial statements, which 

included “’statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use 

at a later trial,’ . . . [and] [s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

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interrogations.” Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. at 470 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52) 

(other citations omitted). 

 The Court of Appeals then turned to Davis and its companion case Hammon v. 

Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), noting that the cases “attempted to clarify the 

distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements for purposes of the 

Confrontation Clause.” 213 Ariz. at 470. In Davis, the question before the Court 

was whether statements made to a 911 operator by a victim during a domestic 

disturbance were testimonial in nature. The Court concluded that the statements were 

non-testimonial because the objective circumstances indicated that the “primary 

purpose” of the police interrogation was to address an ongoing emergency, not to 

create a record for trial. Therefore, the statements were found to be admissible. 547 

U.S. at 821–822. On the other hand, in Hammon, the Supreme Court found that 

statements made by a victim in a written affidavit given to police who responded to a 

domestic disturbance call were testimonial. Id. at 832. The Court explained that 

there was “no emergency in progress,” as the perpetrator was with police in another 

room, and the purpose of the questioning was not seeking to determine “what is 

happening,” but rather “what happened.” Id. at 830. 

 After contrasting Davis and Hammond, the Arizona Court of Appeals again 

noted that the Supreme Court again had not attempted to provide an exhaustive list of 

testimonial and nontestimonial statements, but did hold: 

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 

interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 

primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 

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meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 

emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 

prosecution. 

Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. at 470 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). With this standard 

serving as a basis, the Court of Appeals then offered the following analysis: 

 First, assuming Othic's brief questioning of the victim during his 

one-minute encounter with him constituted “interrogation,” nothing in 

the record suggests the victim “would [have] reasonably expect[ed] [his 

statement] to be used prosecutorially or . . . made [it] under 

circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to 

believe the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” [State 

v.] Parks, 211 Ariz. 19 [(2005)]; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52, 

124 S.Ct. at 1364; [State v.] King, 212 Ariz. 372 [(2006)]; State v. 

Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis.Ct.App. 2006) (domestic violence 

victim's excited utterances to investigating officer, in which she 

described incident in detail and identified assailant, deemed 

nontestimonial). The record does not reflect that the semi-conscious 

victim was even aware that the person to whom he spoke was a law 

enforcement officer. As the state correctly points out, S. “did not 

identify any of the persons who ‘jumped’ him and took his vehicle,” 

“provided no details concerning what those persons did to him,” and 

“never mentioned, nor implicated, [Alvarez].” Nor did Deputy Othic 

ask for any such information. 

213 Ariz. at 472. The court then proceeded to conclude that the circumstances under 

which Othic obtained the statement indicated that the purpose of the questioning was 

to meet an ongoing emergency and was not intended to establish events that might be 

relevant to a future prosecution. Id. (citations omitted). The court reasoned as 

follows: 

 Here, S. was found staggering in a roadway, bleeding profusely 

from his head, and slipping in and out of consciousness, prompting 

Deputy Othic to immediately summon medical assistance. S.'s injuries 

obviously were serious; indeed, they resulted in his death within fortyCase 4:11-cv-00098-FRZ Document 16 Filed 08/14/13 Page 24 of 28
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eight hours. We disagree with Alvarez's contentions that these facts do 

not reflect any “ongoing emergency,” Davis, 547 U.S. at ––––, 126 

S.Ct. at 2273, and that Othic's asking S. “what happened” bore no 

relation to that emergency or S.'s injuries. Although the criminal 

activity that resulted in S.'s injuries and the ensuing charges against 

Alvarez had ended, the emergency that those events set in motion was 

very much ongoing. Under these circumstances, “[a]ny reasonable 

observer would understand that [the victim] was facing an ongoing 

emergency and that the purpose of the interrogation was to enable 

police assistance to meet that emergency.” [United States v.] 

Clemmons, 461 F.3d [1057] at 1060–61 [(8th Cir. 2006)]. “The 

Confrontation Clause does not prohibit questioning when, as here, its 

purpose, viewed objectively, is to ascertain if there is an ongoing 

emergency.” Vinson [v. State], 2006 WL 2291000, at *7, 221 S.W.3d at 

–––– [(2006)], citing Davis, 547 U.S. at ––––, 126 S.Ct. at 2276. 

Alvarez II, 213 Ariz. Based on this analysis, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that 

the admission of Othic’s testimony about the victim’s statement did not violate the 

Confrontation clause. Id. 

 There is no dispute that the Arizona Court of Appeals applied the correct 

controlling authority to his issue. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150. The only 

question then is whether the court’s application of these legal principles was 

“objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez, 282 F.3d 1132. It was not. The 

circumstances surrounding the victim’s statement clearly set it apart from that class 

of statements, such as a “solemn declaration or affirmation,” that were specifically 

characterized as “testimonial” in Crawford. 541 U.S. at 51, 68. Deputy Othic had no 

idea what had caused the victim’s injuries and his attackers, if there were any, were 

presumably still at large when he asked the questions that elicited the victim’s 

statement. As such, the Court of Appeals determination that the primary purpose of 

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the questioning was to confront an ongoing emergency was not unreasonable under 

Davis. 

 The state court’s conclusion is further bolstered by the United States Supreme 

Court decision in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011). Although Bryant was 

decided subsequent to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision, it did not establish 

new law and “simply elucidates” the standards established in Crawford and Davis. 

See Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1107 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that Davis

simply elucidates the governing clearly established Supreme Court precedent found 

in Crawford). 

 In Bryant, the Supreme Court clarified that, when the primary purpose of 

police questioning is to enable the police to meet an “ongoing emergency,” the 

victim’s statements to the police identifying his assailants are admissible at trial, even 

where the victim dies before trial and is not available for cross-examination. 

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1154–55 (2011). Not unlike the case now 

before the Court, in Bryant the statements at issue were made by a shooting victim 

who was asked by the police arriving at the scene “what had happened, who had shot 

him, and where the shooting had occurred.” Id. at 1163. The shooter was not present 

at the scene and the victim identified Bryant as the shooter. Id. at 1163–64. The 

victim later died, but his statement identifying Bryant was introduced at Bryant's trial 

through the police officer. The Supreme Court held that the victim's statement was 

not testimonial because the circumstances surrounding the questioning demonstrated 

that the primary purpose of the questioning was to enable the police to meet an 

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ongoing emergency—locating an armed assailant—not to obtain evidence for trial. 

Id. at 1165–67. As a result, the court held that the admission of the victim's 

statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1167. 

 The facts in Alvarez’s case are quite similar in several material respects to 

those addressed in Bryant. Officer Othic came upon the scene and discovered a man 

that was bleeding profusely. He understandably questioned the victim to determine, 

at least in part, what had happened and who had done it. At that time Deputy Othic 

had no information as to whether the victim’s attacker was still at large, still in the 

immediate area, or possibly pursuing other victims. Under the circumstances, it was 

reasonable for the Court of Appeals to conclude that Officer Othic’s questioning was 

intended to address an ongoing emergency and not intended to obtain testimony for a 

future prosecution. Thus, the admission of victim's statements did not violate the 

Confrontation Clause because they were not testimonial in nature. As such, the state 

court's decision denying this claim was a reasonable application of Crawford. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Alvarez’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-0098-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 14th day of August, 2013. 

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