Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-16236/USCOURTS-ca9-16-16236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FOWLER PACKING COMPANY, INC.;

GERAWAN FARMING, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DAVID M. LANIER, in his official

capacity as Secretary of the

California Labor and Workforce

Development Agency; CHRISTINE

BAKER, in her official capacity as the

Director of the Department of

Industrial Relations; JULIE A. SU, in

her official capacity as California

Labor Commissioner,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16236

D.C. No.

1:16-cv-00106-

DAD-SAB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed December 20, 2016

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Richard R. Clifton,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 1 of 20
2 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel provided reasoning for its order filed on

December 9, 2016, which affirmed in part and reversed in

part the district court’s dismissal of a complaint against

California officials alleging that certain “carve-out”

provisions in California Assembly Bill (AB) 1513 violated

the Equal Protection Clause and the Bill of Attainder Clause.

California passed AssemblyBill 1513 in response to state

appellate court decisions that exposed employers to

significant and unexpected minimum wage liability. This law

created a “safe harbor” that gave employers an affirmative

defense against the new claims so long as the employer made

back payments under certain conditions. The legislation,

however, also included specific “carve-outs” that were crafted

such that three or four employers, including plaintiffs, would

be precluded from using the safe harbor in then-pending

litigation against them.

The panel held that accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as

true, the only conceivable explanation for AB 1513’s carveouts was that they were necessary to procure the United Farm

Workers’ support in passing the legislation. The panel held

that because this justification would not survive even rational

basis scrutiny, plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly stated a claim

that the cut-out provisions violated the Equal Protection

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 2 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 3

Clause. The panel remanded the case to the district court for

further proceedings with respect to the equal protection claim.

The panel further held that AB 1513’s carve-outs did not

impose punishment upon plaintiffs. Because punishment is

a necessary element of a bill of attainder, the district court

properly dismissed this claim. 

COUNSEL

David A. Schwarz (argued) and Michael D. Harbour, Irell &

Manella LLP, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Thomas Patton (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Mark R.

Beckington, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Douglas

J. Woods, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,

Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

Damien M. Schiff and Wencong Fa, Pacific Legal

Foundation, Sacramento, California, for Amici Curiae

Western Growers, California Fresh Fruit Association,

African-American Farmers of California, California Farm

Bureau Federation, Fresno County Farm Bureau, and Nisei

Farmers League.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 3 of 20
4 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

In response to recent state appellate court decisions that

exposed employers to significant and unexpected minimum

wage liability, California passed Assembly Bill 1513 (AB

1513). This law created a “safe harbor” that gave employers

an affirmative defense against the new claims so long as the

employer made back payments under certain conditions. AB

1513 allowed the employers to avoid the costs and statutory

penalties that they would otherwise face as a result of

underpayment litigation. The legislation, however, also

included specific “carve-outs” that were crafted such that

three or four employers would be precluded from using the

safe harbor in then-pending litigation against them. Plaintiffs

Fowler Packing Company, Inc. (Fowler) and Gerawan

Farming, Inc. (Gerawan), assert that the legislature added

these carve-outs to AB 1513 to obtain the necessary support

of a labor union. Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants,

who are California officials, asserting that the carve-outs

violated the Bill of Attainder Clause and the Equal Protection

Clause of the United States Constitution, as well as Article

IV, Section 16 of the California Constitution. The district

court dismissed their complaint as to all claims. Plaintiffs

appeal the dismissal of their federal constitutional claims

only.

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that Plaintiffs’ complaint

states a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection

Clause, but fails to state a plausible claim that AB 1513’s

carve-outs amount to a bill of attainder. The panel has

previously filed an order on December 9, 2016, stating:

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 4 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 5

We conclude that the district court correctly

dismissed the bill of attainder claim, but

erroneously dismissed the equal protection

claim. We therefore AFFIRM in part and

REVERSE in part, and REMAND the case

to the district court for further proceedings

with respect to the equal protection claim

only. A written opinion giving the court’s

reasoning will follow in due course.

The time for filing any petition for rehearing

or petition for rehearing en banc shall be

extended and shall not begin to run until the

court has filed its written opinion giving its

reasoning.

We now in this opinion provide our reasoning and note that

the time for filing any petition for rehearing or rehearing en

banc shall run from the filed date of this opinion.

I

Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts the following facts. Fowler

and Gerawan are California corporations engaged in the

agriculture business that pay some of their employees on a

“piece-rate” basis. Piece-rate payment is a system in which

employees are compensated according to tasks completed

rather than hours worked. Relying on the then-prevailing

interpretation of federal minimum wage statutes, Plaintiffs

ensured they met California minimum wage laws by

averaging their piece-rate employees’ payment during a fixed

period of time and supplementing any deficiency below the

applicable state minimum wage. In 2013, two California

Court of Appeal decisions, Gonzalez v. Downtown LA

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 5 of 20
6 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

Motors, LP, 215 Cal. App. 4th 36 (2013), and Bluford v.

Safeway Stores, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 864 (2013), held that

piece-rate workers must also be paid for each hour of

“nonproductive time”—time in which a worker was at work

but not completing a task—and for rest, recovery, and meal

periods. According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, these decisions

exposed many employers, including Plaintiffs, to

unanticipated and potentially crippling class litigation.

In response, California enacted Assembly Bill 1513 (AB

1513) on October 10, 2015, which codified the holdings in

Gonzalez and Bluford. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a). To protect

California businesses from unforeseen liability arising from

Gonzalez and Bluford, however, AB1513 also created a “safe

harbor” that provided employers with an affirmative defense

against claims alleging failure to pay previously for

nonproductive work time. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(b). 

Employers can use the safe harbor so long as they pay, no

later than December 15, 2016, any minimum wage

deficiencies occurring between July 1, 2012, and December

31, 2015. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(b)(1)(A).

But another provision of AB 1513, set forth in Cal. Lab.

Code § 226.2(g), makes certain defendants facing

nonproductive work time claims ineligible for the safe harbor. 

One of these “carve-outs” makes a defendant ineligible if

facing:

[c]laims based on the failure to provide paid

rest or recovery periods or pay for other

nonproductive time for which all of the

following are true:

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 6 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 7

(A) The claim was asserted in a court

pleading filed prior to March 1,

2014, or was asserted in an

amendment to a claim that relates

back to a court pleading filed prior

to March 1, 2014, and the

amendment or permission for

amendment was filed prior to July

1, 2015.

(B) The claim was asserted against a

defendant named with specificity

and joined as a defendant, other

than as an unnamed (DOE)

defendant . . . in the pleading

referred to in subparagraph (A), or

another pleading or amendment

filed in the same action prior to

January 1, 2015.

Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(g)(2). Section 226.2(g)(2) makes

Gerawan ineligible to assert the safe harbor as an affirmative

defense in a class action suit filed against it by the General

Counsel of the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) on

February 3, 2014, Amaro v. Gerawan Farming, Inc., No.

1:14-cv-00147-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.). It also would have

precluded Delano Farms Company (Delano), another

agricultural company that is not a party to this litigation, from

asserting the safe harbor as an affirmative defense in a class

action suit filed against it by the UFW, in which the plaintiffs

filed a motion for leave to add nonproductive time allegations

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 7 of 20
8 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

to their complaint on June 22, 2015, Arredondo v. Delano

Farms Company, No. 1:09-cv-01247-MJS (E.D. Cal.).1

Still another carve-out provision precludes the use of the

safe harbor as an affirmative defense by a defendant facing:

[c]laims for paid rest or recovery periods or

pay for other nonproductive time that were

made in any case filed prior to April 1, 2015,

when the case contained by that date an

allegation that the employer has intentionally

stolen, diminished, or otherwise deprived

employees of wages through the use of

fictitious worker names or names of workers

that were not actually working.

Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(g)(5). This carve-out prevents

Fowler from asserting the safe harbor as an affirmative

defense in a class action suit filed against it by the UFW on

March 17, 2015, Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Co., Inc., No.

1:15-cv-00420-JAM-SAB (E.D. Cal.). According to

Plaintiffs, the class actions against Fowler, Gerawan, and

Delano are the only three pending wage and hour class

actions filed by the UFW in seven years before the filing of

Plaintiffs’ complaint.2

1 The district court in Arredondo denied the plaintiffs’ motion for

leave to amend on October 22, 2015, twelve days after AB 1513 was

signed into law.

2 Defendants note that one other case was pending at the time of AB

1513’s enactment in which nonproductive time allegations were asserted,

Moreno v. Castlerock Farming and Trans., Inc., 1:12-cv-0056-AWI-JTL

(E.D. Cal.), which was filed on April 10, 2012. We take judicial notice of

the fact that this case was filed and that a nonproductive time claim was

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 8 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 9

Plaintiffs’ complaint also sets forth allegations relating to

AB 1513’s legislative history. According to the complaint,

late in the 2014 legislative term, a bill that established the

safe harbor, but one without any of the carve-outs, was

proposed to the California legislature. That bill was never

formally introduced. On March 5, 2015, an initial version of

AB 1513 was introduced. This initial version did not address

piece-rate compensation or the Gonzalez or Bluford

decisions; it instead addressed an unrelated labor issue. On

August 27, 2015, a new version of AB 1513 was reintroduced. Bearing no resemblance to its initial version, the

new AB 1513 contained the carve-out provisions challenged

here. The new AB 1513 was a result of “closed negotiations”

between the California Labor and Workforce Development

Agency, labor unions including the UFW, and employer

groups. Assemblymember Das Williams presented the bill to

the legislature with sixteen days left in the 2015 session, a

fact that prompted one Senator to comment that “not only is

the ink wet, there’s no ink on the paper on some of these

issues that have been surfaced that are . . . core, fundamental

issues.” Plaintiffs allege, based on a September 30, 2015,

article published in the Sacramento Bee, which they attached

to their complaint, that the carve-outs were demanded by the

UFW as necessary conditions to obtain UFW’s support for

the safe harbor provision. Plaintiffs also allege that UFW

sought the carve-outs as retribution for Gerawan’s resistance

in contractual negotiations with the union.

alleged. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741,

746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendants asserted at oral argument that there

were additional cases that fell within the carve-outs, but they have not

provided the Court with any information about such cases.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 9 of 20
10 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts federal constitutional claims,

contending that AB 1513’s carve-outs violate the prohibition

against bills of attainder as well as the Equal Protection

Clause. It also asserts a claim under Article IV, Section 16 of

the California Constitution. The district court dismissed all

three claims with prejudice. It dismissed the California

Constitution claim because the court lacked jurisdiction to

address it. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). The district court dismissed the bill

of attainder claim on the grounds that AB 1513’s carve-outs

did not amount to punishment and the legislative record did

not show an intent to punish. And the district court dismissed

the Equal Protection Clause claim on the grounds that the

carve-outs were reasonably related to a legitimate

government interest. Plaintiffs timely appeal the dismissal of

their federal claims only. We therefore address the bill of

attainder and equal protection claims, but need not address

the claim under the California Constitution.

II

We review the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’

complaint de novo. Brewster v. Sun Trust Mortg., Inc.,

742 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2014). We must determine

whether Plaintiffs’ complaint pleads “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). “In doing so, we accept

as true all factual allegations and determine whether they are

sufficient to state a claim for relief; we do not, however,

accept as true allegations that are conclusory. . . . [The

f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig.,

768 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 10 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 11

III

We first consider whether the district court erred in

dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim under the Equal Protection

Clause. We conclude that it did.

The parties agree, as do we, that AB 1513 implicates no

suspect class or fundamental right. As a result, we scrutinize

the carve-outs using rational basis review. Romero-Ochoa v.

Holder, 712 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 2013). This analysis

asks whether “there is any reasonably conceivable state of

facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” 

F.C.C. v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 

This inquiry is not a “license for courts to judge the wisdom,

fairness, or logic of legislative choices”; if we find a

“plausible reason[] for [California’s] action, our inquiry is at

an end,” and we must affirm the dismissal of this claim. Id.

at 313–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that AB 1513 fails to satisfy rational basis

review because the only reason the carve-outs were included

in the final bill was to procure the support of the UFW. As

Defendants conceded at oral argument and as we conclude, if

that is the only justification for the carve-outs, that

justification alone does not survive constitutional scrutiny. 

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the cut-off dates in

sections (g)(2) and (g)(5) were included in AB 1513 for only

that illegitimate purpose. Each cut-off date corresponds,

within a matter of weeks (or even a matter of days), to the

corresponding filing dates of the cases against Fowler,

Gerawan, and Delano. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as

true, as we must at this stage of the litigation, we can

conceive of no other reason why the California legislature

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 11 of 20
12 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

would choose to carve out these three employers other than

to respond to the demands of a political constituent.3

Wemust, however, consider the justifications Defendants

offer. With respect to section (g)(2)(A), Defendants contend

that the government sought to protect expectations developed

as a result of already-pending litigation and to prevent

unlimited relief to employers. We need not question the

legitimacy of such a justification. Although we defer to

legislatures in the necessary process of regulatory linedrawing, Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315–16,

legislatures may not draw lines for the purpose of arbitrarily

excluding individuals, see Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d

978, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a California statute

excluding certain workers from an exemption from licensing

requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause because

the exclusion was not rationally related to a legitimate

3 We recognize, as stated in the famous quotation often attributed to

Bismarck, that laws are like sausages, in that it is better not to see them

being made. So too courts rarely inquire into the sausage-making of

political compromise. Equal protection doctrine reflects this

attitude—outside of the infringement of fundamental rights and suspect

class-based discrimination—by asking us to imagine any conceivable

basis supporting a law, even if not advanced by the government. E.g.,

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 463 (1988) (in rational

basis review, the court is “not bound by explanations of the statute’s

rationality that may be offered by litigants or other courts”); U.S. R.R. Ret.

Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (under the rational basis test,

“[w]here, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our

inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether

this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). We accept these principles. But here, we cannot

imagine a plausible legitimate basis for the package of legislative

classifications set by the legislature in AB 1513’s carve-outs, which

requires us to conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged a plausible equal

protection claim.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 12 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 13

government interest). This is exactly what AB 1513, as

alleged, does to Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs have plausibly

alleged that the choice of cut-off dates can only be explained

as a concession to the UFW in exchange for its support for

AB 1513, section (g)(2) does not reasonably further this

suggested justification.

Subsection (g)(2)(B)’s language supports this point. That

subsection limits the section (g)(2) carve-out to only those

claims in which “[t]he claim was asserted against a defendant

named with specificity and joined as a defendant, other than

as an unnamed (DOE) defendant pursuant to Section 474 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, in the pleading referred to in

subparagraph (A), or another pleading or amendment filed in

the same action prior to January 1, 2015.” Cal. Lab. Code

§ 226.2(g)(2)(B). Appellees offer no explanation for this

subsection. They suggest no justification in their briefing and

could not explain the provision when asked about it during

oral argument.4 We also cannot conceive of any legitimate

justification for this perplexing provision, except that it was

tailored to keep other employers from being carved out of the

safe harbor being denied to Fowler, Gerawan, and Delano.

The justifications Defendants offer in explanation of

section (g)(5) are also insufficient to support dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Defendants assert that

damages in “ghost worker” claims are more difficult to

calculate and that the legislature may not have wanted to

extend relief to employers who use ghost workers to engage

in wage theft. But ghost worker claims are completely

4

See Oral Arg., Fowler Packing Co., Inc. v. Lanier, No. 16-16236

(November 16, 2016), at 25:22–27:22, https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=mSn643L1YhA.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 13 of 20
14 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

irrelevant to AB 1513’s safe harbor, which deals with claims

of underpayment as a result of failing to pay for

nonproductive work time. It would be no less rational to base

the ability of a defendant to use the safe harbor on the

grounds of whether that defendant has ever received a

speeding ticket.

Moreover, section (g)(5)’s reliance on particular

allegations directed to a completely unrelated claim as the

basis for denying an affirmative defense further supports the

inference that its purpose is to target the class action against

Fowler. We could understand if California wanted to prevent

employers who stole employees’ wages by using ghost

worker manipulation from enjoying the benefits of the safe

harbor in an unrelated claim because they have engaged in

particularly wrongful conduct. But section (g)(5) does no

such thing. It excludes employers from the safe harbor based

on mere allegations made against them, even if those

allegations turn out to be completely frivolous.

As a final matter, we note that Defendants’ offered

justification does not explain why section (g)(5) uses a cut-off

date different from that used in section (g)(2). Again, we

cannot conceive of a legitimate interest that would explain

this decision.

Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the only

conceivable explanation for AB1513’s carve-outs is that they

were necessary to procure the UFW’s support in passing that

legislation. Because that justification would not survive even

rational basis scrutiny, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaint

plausibly states a claim that those provisions violate the Equal

Protection Clause.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 14 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 15

IV

We next address Plaintiffs’ bill of attainder claim. Article

I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution

provides that, “[n]o State shall . . . . pass any Bill of

Attainder.”5 A bill of attainder is a “law that legislatively

determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable

individual without provision of the protections of a judicial

trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468

(1977). For purposes of this analysis, we assume without

deciding that corporations may seek the protection of the Bill

of Attainder Clauses—a proposition not yet endorsed by this

circuit. See SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 668 n.3 (assuming without

deciding that the Article I, Section 9 Bill of Attainder Clause

protects corporations).

The Supreme Court has identified three elements of a bill

of attainder claim: “[1] specification of the affected persons,

[2] punishment, and [3] lack of a judicial trial.” Selective

Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S.

841, 847 (1984). “In judging the constitutionality of [the

challenged legislation], we may only look to its terms, to the

intent expressed by [members of the legislature] who voted

[for] its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of

5 We note that much of the relevant case law interpreting the term

“bill of attainder” does so in the context of Article I, Section 9, Clause 3

of the Constitution. That provision prohibits the federal government from

enacting bills of attainder. Plaintiffs assert a violation of Article I, Section

10, Clause 1, which prohibits states from enacting bills of attainder. We

see no reason, however, why the same term should be treated differently

when applied to state legislatures, at least in the context of this case. See

SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 622, 672 n.6

(9th Cir. 2002). We refer to these two constitutional provisions together

as the “Bill of Attainder Clauses.”

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 15 of 20
16 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

legitimate explanations for its apparent effect.” SeaRiver,

309 F.3d at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

conclude that AB 1513’s carve-outs do not impose

punishment and we need not address whether they satisfy the

other two elements of a bill of attainder claim.

The Supreme Court has also identified three “necessary

inquiries” that can indicate whether a law inflicts punishment

for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clauses: “(1) whether

the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of

legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in

terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably

can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; and

(3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a congressional

intent to punish.’” Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852 (quoting

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475–76, 478). We must consider

these three inquiries together, none of which is by itself

necessary or dispositive. SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 673. Further,

as case law requires, we must view the law functionally as we

engage in this analysis. E.g., Selective Service, 468 U.S. at

852 (“It is . . . apparent that, though the governing criteria for

an attainder may be readily indicated, ‘each case has turned

on its own highlyparticularized context.’” (quotingFlemming

v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960)). In so doing, we

conclude that the carve-outs do not impose punishment. Any

liability Plaintiffs face in the class action cases being pursued

against them is a result of judicial interpretations of preexisting California law, not any action by the legislature

linked to the passage of AB 1513. For that reason, AB 1513

cannot be held to impose punishment.

First, the carve-outs do not fall within the historical

meaning of legislative punishment, which includes execution,

imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of property,

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 16 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 17

and the prohibition of “participation by individuals or groups

in specific employments or professions.” Selective Service,

468 U.S. at 852; see also id. at 852 n.9 (collecting cases). A

law making a defendant ineligible to assert an affirmative

defense in a civil lawsuit simply does not fit within that

category of legislative action.

The second inquiry,which “ensure[s]that the [l]egislature

has not created an impermissible penalty not previously held”

to constitute punishment, id. at 853, requires us to engage in

a “functional test” by asking “whether the law under

challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens

imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive

legislative purposes,” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–76. As

discussed above, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the

only justification that reasonablyexplains California’s choice

of cut-off dates is that it capitulated to the political demands

of the UFW. And as Defendants have conceded, that is not

a legitimate government interest. Moreover, section (g)(5)

exempts companies from the safe harbor based on allegations

of unrelated conduct. Because neither section (g)(2) nor

(g)(5) can be said to further a legitimate government interest,

it is at least conceivable that the California legislature

intended to punish Plaintiffs by carving them out of AB

1513’s safe harbor.

Third, we consider “whether the legislative record is

probative of nonpunitive intentions or instead evidences

legislative overreaching that enlivens ‘the fear that the

legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular

constituency,’ found it ‘expedient openly to assume the

mantle of judge—or, worse still, lynch mob.’” SeaRiver, 309

F.3d at 676 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480). Outright

statements of punitive intent are not necessary; instead, we

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 17 of 20
18 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

look for evidence permitting an inference of punitive intent. 

See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480 (“We, of course, do not suggest

that such a formal legislative announcement of moral

blameworthiness or punishment is necessary to an unlawful

bill of attainder.”). The only allegations in Plaintiffs’

complaint relevant to this analysis are (1) the last-minute

nature of AB 1513’s enactment and (2) post-enactment

statements purportedlymade byAssemblymember Williams.

6

With respect to the first, “departure from established

legislative procedures may suggest an improper purpose.” 

SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 677. The fact that Assemblymember

Williams may have introduced AB 1513 only sixteen days

before the end of the session, however, does not appear to be

an unusual path to enactment. Legislative compromise can at

times be hard fought, and it would be unwise to infer bad

intent simply because negotiations were prolonged but

ultimately successful.

The second set of allegations, the post-enactment

statements purportedlymade byAssemblymember Williams,

suggests that the carve-outs were motivated by political

expediency, but not, in our view, an intent to punish. 

According to Plaintiffs’ allegations, Assemblymember

Williams stated that the carve-outs were necessary to

6

 Defendants argue that we may not consider allegations concerning

the post-enactment statements because they are outside the formal

legislative record. Plaintiffs respond that we may consider such

allegations because they are probative of the intent that motivated the

carve-outs. We agree with Plaintiffs that post-enactment statements by the

sponsoring member of the legislature are pertinent to this assessment

because they allow insight into the legislature’s intent. See Nixon,

309 F.3d at 484 (“In judging the constitutionality of the Act, we may . . .

look . . . to the intent expressed by Members of [the legislature] who voted

[for] its passage . . . .”).

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 18 of 20
FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER 19

maintain the support of labor, and that “[f]rom [his]

perspective, if we’re going to create a grand compromise that

helps most growers and helps most workers, you don’t want

to let it get blown up because there’s somebody who’s a

potential bad actor.” These statements support the contention

that the carve-outs served only as a concession to the UFW in

exchange for its support for AB 1513 as a whole. While such

intent does not align with a legitimate justification for a law,

it is distinct from an intent to punish. An intent to punish

must be accompanied by the imposition of some sort of harm

on certain individuals, and the carve-outs do no such thing. 

Stated another way, the carve-outs do not punish Plaintiffs;

rather, it is the pre-existing law that creates the monetary

exposures for Plaintiffs to the extent they violated wage laws. 

While the novel issue is not clear cut, the weight of precedent

leads us to conclude AB 1513 by its carve-outs imposes no

punishment. This is fatal to Plaintiffs’ bill of attainder claim. 

Before AB 1513’s enactment, Plaintiffs faced class action

litigation regarding their purported failure to meet the

minimum wage requirements set byCalifornia law. After AB

1513’s enactment, Plaintiffs face the exact same potential

liability. AB 1513 neither changes the law governing

Plaintiffs’ litigation, nor the amount of potential liability they

face.

Plaintiffs argue that AB 1513 places a “functional

burden” on them because their competitors now avoid costly

litigation and statutory fees using the safe harbor. We first

note that such an argument is much more appropriate in the

context of an equal protection challenge because it challenges

the reason a legislature subjected one group to a particular

policy, but not another. Second, denying certain individuals

a benefit that had not previously existed is not an imposition

of punishment. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. To be sure,

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 19 of 20
20 FOWLER PACKING CO. V. LANIER

a plaintiff need not be entitled to the benefit denied her by a

bill of attainder. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.

437 (1965) (holding that a law barring Communist Party

members from offices in labor unions is a bill of attainder). 

But the benefit at issue must have been in some way available

to the plaintiff before the enactment of the law being

challenged. Because the safe harbor was never available to

Plaintiffs in the first place, they cannot claim they have been

punished by being excluded from AB 1513’s protections.

Viewing the effect of AB 1513’s carve-outs functionally,

we conclude AB1513’s carve-outs do not impose punishment

upon Plaintiffs. Because punishment is a necessary element

of a bill of attainder, the district court properly dismissed this

claim.

V

The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ equal

protection claim, but correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ bill of

attainder claim. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in

part, and REMAND for further proceedings.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

 Case: 16-16236, 12/20/2016, ID: 10239538, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 20 of 20