Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02362/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS P. STEIN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11CV2362-LAB (RBB)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

vs.

THE CITY OF CORONADO; AARON

MANSKER; CPO (CORONADO POLICE

OFFICER) BAUTISTA; KEITH JAMES;

CPO GILMAN; CPO WALKER; MARK

PORTER; CPO MCGEHEE; CPO

O’NEILL; MARY ANN CASTELLANO;

JEROME TORRES; CPO MURDOCH;

CPO AYRES; and DOES 1 through 10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Nicholas Stein originally filed this lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court, naming the City

of Coronado and 12 police officers and dispatchers as Defendants. The Defendants

removed it to this Court because Stein’s complaint mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

implication being that at least one of Stein’s claims arises under federal law. (See Notice of

Removal ¶ 3.) But Stein’s amended complaint alleges only state law claims: (1) negligence;

(2) battery; (3) assault; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) false imprisonment;

and (6) abuse of process. It explicitly says “[t]his is a state court action with state common

law causes of action for negligence, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

battery, false imprisonment, and abuse of process.” (FAC ¶ 36.)

When Stein does mention § 1983 in his complaint, he seems not to understand that

it “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

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federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal

quotations omitted). In fact, he seems not to understand § 1983 at all. First, he suggests

it gives rise to a general duty of care. (FAC ¶ 35.) Second, he suggests it “sets forth”

constitutional rights. (FAC ¶ 37.) Third, he suggests it is a California law. (FAC ¶ 41.) None

of these things is true, and the fact that Stein’s named claims arise only under state law

causes the Court to question whether there really is a § 1983 claim here. And that, of

course, causes the Court to question its own jurisdiction. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) (holding that courts are “obliged to inquire sua

sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction”); B.C. v. Plumas

Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999) (“But federal courts are required sua

sponte to examine jurisdictional issues . . . .”).

 “A § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendant acted under color of state

law.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). “The first step in any such claim

is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 811. 

And this is where Stein’s complaint is obviously deficient. Even if he intends to state a §

1983 claim, it’s unclear what the constitutional deprivations are that are the basis of it. On

one reading, they are violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights:

The Defendants owed a Duty of Care to Plaintiff under California

Civil Code 52.3, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States . . . .

As set forth herein, none of the Petitioner’s California and U.S.

Constitutional Rights expressly set Forth in California Civil Code

Section 52.3, Title 42 U.S.C. sub section 1983 or the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States

were preserved or protected at the time of the incidents, which

serves as the basis for this action.

(Compl. ¶¶ 35, 37.) If this is Stein’s intent, to base a § 1983 claim on his Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights being violated, the Court presumes he means to allege that

the Defendants denied him of liberty and property without due process under both

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Amendments, and that they denied him equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The problem is that he makes no effort to plead facts specific to these claims. 

The Court could also look to Stein’s named claims, all of which arise under California

law, and determine whether the alleged facts behind them would also constitute a violation

of his constitutional rights such that a § 1983 claim is plausible. For example, Stein’s second

cause of action, for battery, alleges the use of unreasonable and excessive force in detaining

him, and “[c]laims for excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition against unreasonable seizures.” Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156,

1161 (9th Cir. 2011). So, it’s conceivable that in stating a claim for battery Stein also meant

to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

This won’t work, however, for all of Stein’s claims, some of which cannot also be

maintained under § 1983. For example, “[i]ntentional infliction of emotional distress is a state

tort claim, and therefore is not remediable under § 1983 . . . .” Corothers v. Salinas Valley

State Prison, 2011 WL 2415631 at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011). As for Stein’s abuse of

process claim, “[i]t is unclear whether an abuse of process claim may even be maintained

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since abuse of process is a state law tort.” Alston v. Tassone, 2012

WL 2377015 at *12 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2012). Similarly, “[a] claim for wrongful detention or

false imprisonment, absent a cognizable claim for wrongful arrest, will not ordinarily state an

independent claim under § 1983.” Fonua v. City of San Mateo, 2011 WL 2433040 at *4 (N.D.

Cal. June 13, 2011). And finally, it is hard to see how negligence could rise to the level of

a constitutional rights violation that is cognizable under § 1983. See County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (recognizing holding that “the Constitution does not

guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is

categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process”). That leaves only two of

Stein’s six claims—battery and assault—that are cognizable under § 1983, and as violations

of the Fourth Amendment at that. 

The bottom line here is that the Court questions Defendants’ statement in their

removal notice that Stein alleges a deprivation of civil rights under § 1983. Stein does

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incorporate § 1983 into his complaint, to be sure, but it’s very clear that he doesn’t

understand exactly what § 1983 does, and as a result it’s unclear that he actually intends to

bring a § 1983 claim. On the other hand, if Stein does intend to bring a federal claim under

§ 1983, it’s completely unclear to the Court, and probably to Defendants, which particular

federal rights he believes Defendants have violated.1 

With the mere existence of a § 1983 claim uncertain, the Court can’t proceed much

further, given that its jurisdiction hangs on such a claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

therefore DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Within two weeks of the date this Order is

entered, Stein must either: (1) file a Second Amended Complaint that adds a seventh cause

of action for violation of § 1983 (and makes no other changes), explaining in detail what the

basis of the claim is; or (2) file a notice that he has no intention of bringing a § 1983 claim

and wishes to proceed only with the six state law claims listed in his complaint. If he chooses

(1), Stein is only to add a § 1983 claim to his causes of action; he is not to modify any other

portion of the complaint. The Court will then reconsider Defendants’ arguments for dismissal

of the claim, and if persuaded by those arguments it will dismiss the claim and remand this

case to San Diego Superior Court. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing that district courts may decline to exercise supplement jurisdiction 

over state law claims when federal claims are dismissed before trial). If Stein 

//

//

1

 Stein’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss only muddies the picture. 

Initially, Stein asserts a claim under Monell, which is a particular kind of § 1983 claim that

Stein’s complaint doesn’t contain a hint of. He also alleges Fourth Amendment and Eighth

Amendment violations under federal law and a trespass violation under state law, all of which

are new. In short, Stein’s opposition is barely responsive to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and while it does mention “federal claims” it fails to shed any light on whether he is in fact

asserting a § 1983 claim and, if so, what the basis of that claim is. In places, Stein’s

opposition is just completely off. For example, he cites the California Code of Civil Procedure

and argues that Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied because he didn’t receive 75

days notice. He also includes an “Authority” section that contains only what appear to be

lengthy excerpts from other judicial opinions, without explaining what their relevance is to

Defendants’ arguments or why he is including them in his analysis.

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chooses (2), the Court will remand this case for an obvious lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

and again, Stein can return to San Diego Superior Court to pursue his claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 25, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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