Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00345/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL E. JACQUES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JEFF MACOMBER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0345 AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has also 

filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 3. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). ECF Nos. 1, 6. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

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These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). 

II. Complaint 

A. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

“frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 

theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 

constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

“Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 

of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain 

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something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 

Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 In the complaint, plaintiff claims that defendants Macomber, Lynch, and Franceschi 

violated her1 rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. Macomber 

is the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and has 

general oversight responsibilities over all of CDCR, including making sure that policies and 

procedures of California prisons are lawful. Id. at 7-8. Lynch is the warden at California State 

Prison-Sacramento (CSP-SAC), and his duties include policy and procedure management, as well 

as equipment installation and operation. Id. at 8. Franceschi, as Chief of Mental Health for 

CDCR, is responsible for providing adequate treatment to prisoners regarding their mental health. 

Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that her right to privacy was violated with the installation of cameras 

within the all-purpose mental health treatment rooms where she receives therapy. Id. at 9. 

Although plaintiff was told the cameras were not operational and would be removed, the cameras 

were later activated, leading to custody staff becoming aware of and exposing the issues she 

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 Plaintiff states that she uses she/her pronouns. ECF No. 1 at 7. If at any time plaintiff wishes 

the court to use different pronouns, she may so inform the court. 

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discussed with her mental health provider. Id. at 10. This has had devastating effects on 

plaintiff’s mental health and well-being. Id. at 10-11, 18. There is no safety related reason to 

have cameras in the rooms because prior to treatment inmates are strip searched, placed in 

restraints, and then secured in a holding cell with an outside lock. Id. at 12. Plaintiff’s health 

care providers have expressed concern over the privacy implications of having these cameras in 

the treatment room to their superiors, and the privacy violations extend to all inmates receiving 

treatment in those rooms, particularly transgender women. Id. at 11, 17. This concern has led 

plaintiff to file multiple appeals to CDCR administration regarding this matter with no apparent 

resolution. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an 

injunction requiring the removal of the cameras. Id. at 23. 

C. Discussion 

i. Deliberate Indifference 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 

to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 

(2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

In this case, plaintiff alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her 

serious medical needs because the disclosure of the contents of her private mental health 

treatment sessions has affected her treatment and led to extreme levels of distress that has resulted 

in concerns over her ability to speak freely, difficulties concentrating, increased paranoia, 

avoidance of others, increased PTSD, trauma, losing her appetite, inability to sleep, and racing 

thoughts. ECF No. 1 at 5, 18, 21. The allegation that plaintiff’s direct mental health care 

providers expressed their concerns to “their leadership,” supports an inference that Franceschi, as 

Chief of Mental Health, was aware of the cameras use, the possibility of harm, and resulting harm 

and had some authority to intervene. Similarly, the allegedly widespread nature of the violations, 

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coupled with Lynch’s responsibility for the decision to install and turn on the cameras, supports 

an inference that Lynch, as warden of CSP-SAC, was aware of the privacy violations and 

detrimental effect they would have. Despite Franceschi and Lynch’s awareness of the violations, 

neither took any action and plaintiff therefore sufficiently states deliberate indifference claims 

against them. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Other than 

general supervisory responsibilities, plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would suggest that 

Macomber “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, plaintiff has not 

sufficiently stated a claim for deliberate indifference against Macomber. 

ii. Right to Privacy 

The Constitution protects the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 

matters. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). This includes medical information. Tucson 

Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Dobbs 

v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022). The privacy protections afforded to 

personal information, however, are not absolute, and can be infringed when there is a “proper 

governmental interest.” United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 

1980). 

 In this case, plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated her right to privacy, specifically 

as it pertains to her medical treatment, gender identity, and sexual orientation. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. 

Plaintiff’s complaint hinges on the viewing of her private medical treatment sessions by custody 

officials, as well as the subsequent disclosure of her transgender status and sexual orientation to 

other inmates in her unit. Id. at 10. As there appears no legitimate penological interest in custody 

officials watching and then sharing the contents of plaintiff’s private therapy sessions, she has 

sufficiently stated a claim for violation of her right to privacy. For the same reasons plaintiff 

sufficiently alleged that Franceschi and Lynch were liable for violating her Eighth Amendment 

rights, she has sufficiently alleged that they are liable for the violation of her Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. However, as with the Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff fails to state a 

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Macomber. 

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iii. Official Capacity 

Plaintiff states she is suing the defendants in their individual and official capacities. ECF 

No. 1 at 18. However, claims for damages against state officials acting in their official capacity 

are barred by sovereign immunity because “a suit against a state official in his or her official 

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office” and 

therefore “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). Accordingly, any claim for damages against 

defendants in their official capacities is barred. 

To the extent plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of removal of the cameras in the 

two mental health all-purpose rooms (ECF No. 1 at 23), Lynch, as the person who is responsible 

for equipment installation, appears to be the appropriate person from whom to request this 

relief. Plaintiff therefore properly states a claim for injunctive relief against Lynch in his official 

capacity. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a claim for 

injunctive relief plaintiff must “identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation 

and name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief” 

(citation omitted)). Because Lynch appears to be the most appropriate defendant to provide the 

requested injunctive relief, any official capacity claims against Macomber and Franceschi are 

redundant because an official capacity claim is equivalent to a claim against the entity and they 

can therefore be dismissed. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff 

Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008) (where local government entity and officer are both 

named and officer is named in official capacity only, officer may be dismissed as redundant) 

(citations omitted); Hodgins v. Woodford, No. 05-cv-0682 MCE GGH, 2006 WL 2482423, at *2, 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63991, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006) (“It is not necessary to name 

multiple defendants in their official capacity. Plaintiff need only name that official who has some 

cognizance over the policy at issue and who could effectively issue orders within CDCR if the 

court were to rule in plaintiff’s favor.”). 

D. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the complaint does not state any 

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cognizable claims against Macomber in his individual capacity and that the official capacity 

claims against Macomber and Franceschi are redundant. However, it appears that plaintiff may 

be able to allege facts to remedy some of the deficiencies and she will be given the opportunity to 

amend the complaint if she desires. Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Lynch 

and Franceschi on her claims that they violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment and on her official capacity claim against Lynch, or she may delay serving any 

defendant and amend the complaint. 

Plaintiff will be required to complete and return the attached notice advising the court how 

she wishes to proceed. If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, she will be given thirty days 

to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed on her claims against defendants 

Franceschi and Lynch without amending the complaint, the court will proceed to serve the 

complaint. A decision to go forward without amending the complaint will be considered a 

voluntarily dismissal without prejudice of all claims against Macomber and the official capacity 

claims against Francheschi. 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must demonstrate how the 

conditions about which she complains resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th 

Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link 

or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

her amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 

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Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled 

in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, 

any previous complaints no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. 

III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in which she requests an order 

directing that all cameras be removed from the mental health treatment rooms in the short-term 

restrictive housing unit at CSP-SAC. ECF No. 3. 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [s]he is likely to succeed 

on the merits, that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

that the balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). The propriety of 

a request for injunctive relief hinges on a threat of irreparable injury that must be imminent in 

nature. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a 

preliminary injunction.” (citing Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 

(9th Cir. 1984))). 

Because plaintiff has been transferred out of CSP-SAC and has not alleged any facts 

showing she has a reasonable expectation of being transferred back, her request for preliminary 

injunctive relief is moot, and therefore, should be denied. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 

519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (claims for injunctive relief related to conditions of confinement 

were moot where prisoner was transferred to another facility and “demonstrated no reasonable 

expectation of returning to [the original facility]” (citing Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 

(9th Cir. 1986))). 

IV. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. That means you do not have to pay 

the entire filing fee now. You will pay it over time, out of your trust account. 

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 Some of the allegations in the complaint state claims against the defendants and some do 

not. Your right to privacy and deliberate indifference claims against Franceschi and Lynch 

properly state a claim, while those same claims against Macomber do not. To link the claims to 

Macomber more information is needed about how he was personally involved in the violations or 

had knowledge of the violations and failed to stop them. 

You have a choice to make. You may either (1) proceed immediately on your right to 

privacy and deliberate indifference claims against Franceschi and Lynch and claim for injunctive 

relief against Lynch and voluntarily dismiss the other claims or (2) try to amend the complaint. If 

you want to go forward without amending the complaint, you will be voluntarily dismissing 

without prejudice all claims against Macomber and the claim for injunctive relief against 

Franceschi. If you choose to file an amended complaint, it must include all claims you want to 

bring. Once an amended complaint is filed, the court will not look at any information in the 

original complaint. Any claims and information not in the first amended complaint will not 

be considered. You must complete the attached notification showing what you want to do and 

return it to the court. Once the court receives the notice, it will issue an order telling you what 

you need to do next (i.e. file an amended complaint or wait for defendants to be served). 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 

3. Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Macomber in his individual capacity do not 

state claims for which relief can be granted and her official capacity claims against Macomber 

and Franceschi are redundant. 

4. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on her Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims against defendants Franceschi and Lynch in their individual capacities and 

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against Lynch in his official capacity as set forth in Section II.C above, or to amend the 

complaint. 

5. Within fourteen days of service of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the 

attached form notifying the court whether she wants to proceed on the screened complaint or 

whether she wants to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court 

will assume that she is choosing to proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend 

dismissal without prejudice of all claims against defendant Macomber and the official capacity 

claims against Franceschi. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction 

(ECF No. 3) be DENIED as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: September 20, 2024 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL E. JACQUES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JEFF MACOMBER, et. al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0345 AC P 

NOTICE OF ELECTION 

 Check one: 

_____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims 

against defendants Franceschi and Lynch in their individual capacities and against Lynch 

in his official capacity without amending the complaint. Plaintiff understands that by 

going forward without amending the complaint she is voluntarily dismissing without 

prejudice all claims against Macomber and her official capacity claims against Franceschi 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 

_____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. 

DATED:_______________________ 

 

 Michael E. Jacques 

 Plaintiff pro se

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