Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01111/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01111-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNY RAMIREZ; MARIA RAMIREZ;

and as surviving heirs of JORGE RAMIREZ,

deceased,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06 CV 1111 JM (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Doc. No. 76

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

corporation; Captain ROB AHERN, an

individual; Deputy MARK RITCHIE, an

individual; and DOES 1 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Defendants County of San Diego, Rob Ahern, and Mark Ritchie, move for summary judgment

or partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint, which sets forth claims arising out of an officerinvolved, fatal shooting of Plaintiffs’ son, Jorge Ramirez (“Ramirez”). Plaintiffs filed an opposition

(Doc. No. 77, Opp’n) and Defendants submitted a reply brief (Doc. No. 79.) Following the parties’

oral arguments on April 3, 2009, the court took the matter under submission. After considering the

papers and the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART the motion for summary judgment. 

 The parties each made requests for judicial notice of various documentary evidence. (Doc.

Nos. 76-9 and 79-2 (Defs.) and 77-18 (Pls.).) Plaintiffs lodged numerous objections to evidence

offered by Defendants. (Doc. No. 77-19, Obj. to Evid.) Where the court makes reference to a

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particular document, the parties may assume the court has granted judicial notice thereof for the

purposes of the summary judgment rulings only. For documents not cited in the following discussion,

the court has declined to rule on the relevant request for judicial notice. Finally, any factual findings

contained in this order are based on the evidentiary records before the court and are made for the

limited purpose of aiding the court in its rulings herein.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2005, at about 9:00 p.m., a Circle K convenience store in Vista was robbed at

gunpoint by two Hispanic males in their twenties wearing dark gloves, clothing, and bandanas over

their faces. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Mot. (“Mot.”) at 2; Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 3-4.) Law enforcement agents

were immediately notified, and the particulars were broadcast by radio along with an alert regarding

a similar commercial burglary carried out the day before by similarly described suspects driving an

“all black” two-door Jeep Wrangler. (Id.; Doc. No. 77 (“Opp’n”), Exh. 11.)

Although Deputy Mark Ritchie was going on 15 hours of duty, he was on patrol and responded

to the call. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶¶ 3-4.) Based on his familiarity with the area, he reasoned the

nearby, low-traffic area of Thibodo Park might serve as a staging area or escape route for the robbers.

(Id. at ¶ 5.) As Deputy Ritchie neared the park entrance, he saw a “dark colored Jeep Wrangler”

(actually a navy Jeep Wrangler with a grey hard top, see Opp’n, Exh. 13) and a small car following

close behind exit the park’s parking lot onto Lupine Hills Drive. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 5.) Deputy

Ritchie shined his spotlight on the tailing vehicle, which abruptly pulled to the side of the road and

stopped. (Id. at ¶ 6; Opp’n, Exh. 2–Interview.) With his spotlight on the Jeep, Deputy Ritchie saw

three occupants inside, and the Jeep also stopped quickly after a short distance. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie

at ¶ 6.) The occupants of the Jeep jumped out and ran in different directions: the two passengers into

a wooded, residential area adjacent to the park and the driver, later identified as Jorge Ramirez, down

the street back toward the park entrance. (Id.; Opp’n, Exh. 2 at 90.) According to Deputy Ritchie,

the men matched the robbery suspects’ description. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 6.) Deputy Ritchie

exited the patrol car without transmitting his location by car radio and began chasing Ramirez on foot

in an easterly direction. (Id.) In his pursuit, Deputy Ritchie passed the second vehicle as it drove

away in the opposite direction. (Id.)

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After a short distance, Deputy Ritchie saw Ramirez reach to the front of his trousers waistband

with his right hand. (Id. at ¶ 7.) According to Deputy Ritchie, based on his experience, he was

concerned Ramirez was reaching for a weapon, particularly since the earlier robbery had been

perpetrated by suspects armed with a gun. (Id.) Deputy Ritchie therefore began firing his weapon at

Ramirez while the two continued running. Over the next tenth of a mile, while running at full speed,

Deputy Ritchie fired 16 rounds at Ramirez, including 11 in an area approximately 150-200 feet east

of the patrol car and another five approximately 300-400 feet farther east. (Opp’n, Exh. 12.) Two of

these latter five shots hit Ramirez in the posterior right leg. (Id.) Ramirez then slowed and fell to the

pavement on his right side. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 7.) According to Deputy Ritchie, he attempted

to call for back-up on his portable radio during the foot pursuit, but received low-battery signals from

the radio. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Two broadcasts made during the chase appear to have been cut off. (Mot.,

Exh. M-2.) 

Deputy Ritchie approached Ramirez with his handgun trained on the suspect. (Mot., Decl.

Ritchie at ¶ 7.) He then saw the second vehicle returning down Lupine Hills Drive toward him. (Id.)

In addition, Deputy Ritchie observed Ramirez moving his body, particularly his arms moving about

his midsection. (Id. at ¶ 7-8.) According to Deputy Ritchie, because of the dark of night and

Ramirez’s dark clothing and gloves, he was unable to distinguish the exact movements, but believed

Ramirez was still attempting to reach a weapon to use against him. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Deputy Ritchie felt

“Ramirez’s actions constituted an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death,” particularly in

light of the returning second vehicle and unknown locations of the other Jeep passengers, so he

reloaded his weapon and fired an additional six times, striking Ramirez in the chest. (Id.; Opp’n, Exh.

2–Interview, Exh.12.) Ramirez fell back to the pavement, ending in a prone position with his arms

outstretched. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 8.) The driver of the approaching second vehicle, Ariana Sosa,

testified in her deposition that she believed Ramirez was attempting to raise his hands in surrender but

her testimony is unclear as to whether she believed Ramirez’s hands were raised before, during, or

after the point when Deputy Ritchie fired his weapon. (Opp’n, Exh. 10 at 65:20-21, 66:22-67:25;

Defs. Reply, Exh. W at 63:14-20.) After firing the final six shots, Deputy Ritchie successfully

broadcast a request for someone to call his cell phone. (Mot., Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 10.)

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1

Although Defendants present arguments seeking an award of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

state law claims for battery and negligence, Plaintiffs dropped these claims when they filed their First

Amended Complaint. Thus, the court denies as moot Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

the state law claims.

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Based on Plaintiffs’ representations during oral argument, four claims remain to be litigated.

(See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 81.) Two claims are alleged against Deputy

Ritchie, including the decedent’s § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the 4th Amendment

and the § 1983 claim for loss of familial association in violation of the 14th Amendment by the

decedent’s parents, Plaintiffs Benny and Maria Ramirez. (Id.) Against the County and Captain

Ahern, Captain for the Sheriff Department’s Vista Patrol Station at the time of the shooting, Plaintiffs

assert Monell municipal federal civil rights claims for failure to train and supervise, predicated in turn

on the constitutional violations alleged as part of the two § 1983 claims.1 (Id.) During oral argument,

Plaintiffs clarified the Monell claims stem from the narrowly defined factual theory that the County,

as a policy, practice, or custom, provided inadequate training to its deputies as to what constitutes

“imminent danger” in the context of a fleeing suspect.

//

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise several points in their motion. First, they argue Plaintiffs lack standing to

assert the decedent’s § 1983/excessive force claim as well as their own § 1983/14th Amendment

claims (and by inference, the related Monell claims). Second, Defendants assert Deputy Ritchie’s use

of force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Third, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’

§ 1983/14th Amendment claim fails because Plaintiffs did not show: 1) a sufficiently close

relationship with their son such that his death constituted deprivation of a constitutionally protected

liberty interest and 2) Deputy Ritchie acted with a purpose to harm Ramirez unrelated to legitimate

law enforcement objectives. Fourth, Defendants assert Deputy Ritchie is otherwise entitled to

qualified immunity. Fifth, they contend the County is not liable under Monell because no County

policy, custom, or practice resulted in any constitutional violation. Finally, Defendants argue any

award of punitive damages would be improper as a matter of law because no evidence has been

presented to show Defendants acted with the requisite culpability. 

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 A. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where, based on the pleadings, affidavits,

and other supporting papers permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

440 U.S. 981 (1979). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant

has made such a showing, “the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings

in order to preclude summary judgment.” Nillson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La.

Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1542 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, the opposing

party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). At least some “significant probative

evidence” must be produced to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Nilsson, 854 F.2d at 1542. An

issue is “genuine” only if, viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.

654, 655 (1962); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

 B. Standing

1. Decedent’s § 1983/Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue Plaintiffs, as decedent Ramirez’s parents, lack standing to pursue the §

1983/excessive force claim on Ramirez’s behalf. Fourth Amendment rights are “personal rights”

which may not be enforced vicariously but only by “one whose own protection was infringed by

the...seizure.” Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968). Defendants cite to Plaintiffs’ responses

to interrogatories and production requests which show they were never appointed as the decedent’s

personal representative and that Ramirez has a child who is now age 12. (Mot. at 23, Exhs. F-1, F-2,

G-1, G-2.) Since no probate proceedings were ever initiated, that child is Ramirez’s sole heir and

successor in interest, yet is not a party to this lawsuit. Cal. Prob. Code § 6402(a). Because Plaintiffs

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are neither appointed estate representatives nor his successor in interest, they may not assert Ramirez’s

§ 1983/excessive force claim. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30; Cal. Prob. Code § 9820. Plaintiffs raise

no substantive opposition to Defendants’ argument, but challenge the admissibility of the discovery

documents mentioned above for lack of authentication. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764,

774 (9th Cir. 2002); (Obj. to Evid. at 10-11.) During oral argument, Plaintiffs acquiesced on this point

and declined to challenge the accuracy of Defendants’ exhibits. The court therefore OVERRULES

Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendants’ Exhibits F-1, F-2, G-1, and G-2 and GRANTS Defendants’

request for judicial notice of these exhibits. The court also notes that, absent a constitutional violation,

there can be no liability under Monell. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir.

1996) (listing deprivation of a constitutional right as the first element of a Monell claim). Based on

Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

decedent’s § 1983/excessive force claim and the related Monell claim.

2. Parents’ § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Defendants also argue Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their own § 1983/Fourteenth

Amendment claim. The sole basis for Defendants’ challenge is their contention that in order to litigate

their claim, Plaintiffs would also have to litigate the same excessive force issue they lack standing to

raise on Ramirez’s behalf. 

The parents’ due process claim does not require them to prove a Fourth Amendment violation,

but rather, Plaintiffs must demonstrate Deputy Ritchie’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” U.S. v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)(“So-called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the government from

engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’”) (internal citation omitted). To satisfy this test

under the factual circumstances present here, discussed further below, Plaintiffs must show Deputy

Ritchie’s use of force was done with a purpose to harm Ramirez unrelated to legitimate law

enforcement objectives. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (the “purpose

to harm” standard, rather than the “deliberate indifference” standard, is appropriately applied where

an officer acts in a rapidly evolving situation where split-second decisions are required). Although

the Ninth Circuit in Porter recognized parallels between the excessive force and due process inquiries,

“a parent’s loss of a child’s society ‘raises a different constitutional claim’ than the child’s direct

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Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 1141 (“This is the kind of analysis applied in the analogous

jurisprudence governing constitutional claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment” but

“a different standard of culpability applies to the [parents’] due process claim”); Byrd v. Guess, 137

F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.

1991). Plaintiff’s lack of standing to pursue Ramirez’s Fourth Amendment claim does not prevent

them from relying on similar factual arguments to support a wholly separate claim. The court finds

Plaintiffs do have standing to pursue their own § 1983 claim and the Monell claim based thereon.

 C. Parents’ § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment Claim

With the standing issues resolved, the court now turns to a substantive analysis of Plaintiffs’

§ 1983/Fourteenth Amendment claim.

1. Identification of a Right Cognizable under § 1983

Section 1983 authorizes private parties to enforce their federal constitutional rights, including

those substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Under certain

circumstances, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the family relationship

from unwanted state government interference. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18

(1984). In general, a parent may assert such a claim under § 1983 when his or her child is killed by

law enforcement officials. Curnow, 952 F.2d at 325.

Defendants first argue, in effect, that Plaintiffs’ relationship with Ramirez was too attenuated

for his death to constitute the loss of a protected liberty interest. (Mot. at 14 n. 2.) Although the Ninth

Circuit has not addressed this issue, the Seventh Circuit denied a parent’s due process claim for loss

of familial association where the child decedent was emancipated and had his own family. Russ v.

Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2005) (decedent was shot by officers following a car chase). Here,

at the time of Ramirez’s death, he was approximately 26 years old and had an eight-year old son who

may have been living with the child’s grandparents. (Mot., Exh. I at 9-10.) Because the parties have

not argued these issues directly and the Ninth Circuit has not ruled out parental claims under similar

circumstances, the court declines to award summary judgment for Defendants based on this argument.

2. Violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right

To show Deputy Richie’s conduct violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right of familial

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While Defendants accurately identify the governing standard for Plaintiffs’ § 1983/Fourteenth

Amendment claim, Plaintiffs repeatedly recite the standards for a Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim. As discussed herein, the standards are different but rely on similar factual analyses.

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association under such circumstances, they must therefore prove Deputy Ritchie’s use of force was

done with a purpose to harm Ramirez unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.2

 Porter, 546

F.3d at 1137; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). An intent to inflict harm

“beyond that which is required be a legitimate law enforcement objective that ‘shocks the conscience’

and gives rise to liability under § 1983” is required. Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Davis v.

Township of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 172 (3rd. Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring)). Liability may

attach in those “rare situations where the nature of an officer’s deliberate physical contact is such that

a reasonable factfinder would conclude the officer intended to harm, terrorize or kill.” Lewis, 523

U.S. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). While an officer generally does not act with a purpose

to harm when “responding to an emergency,” a reasonable factfinder might conclude the officer does

intend to harm when he “creates the very emergency he then resorts to deadly force to resolve....” 

Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008); Porter, 546 F.3d at 1141. The “denial of

due process ‘is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.’” Porter, 546 F.3d

at 1141 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850). The fact-intensive analysis parallels that undertaken to

resolve direct Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, and similarly must account for the “delicate

balancing act between citizens’ rights to be free from undue police force and the legitimate safety

concerns of officers who make these life and death decisions.” Id.

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ due process claim

because the evidence fails to show Deputy Ritchie acted with a purpose to harm Ramirez unrelated

to any legitimate law enforcement objective. They contend Deputy Ritchie responded to an

emergency call about an armed robbery, located individuals matching the description of the robbery

suspects, proceeded to chase Ramirez on foot, realized during the chase that he had no portable radio

contact, and then began firing at Ramirez when he believed Ramirez was reaching for a weapon to use

against him. Once Ramirez fell, Deputy Ritchie again interpreted Ramirez’s movements as a threat

and, when he noticed the second suspect vehicle returning towards him, and without being aware of

the location of the other two Jeep occupants, fired the final shots at the fallen Ramirez. Defendants

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Plaintiffs allege “Ramirez was trying to get away, not attack [Ritchie].” (Opp’n at 6:20-25.)

However, while Deputy Ritchie did state he felt Ramirez was “running for his life” and “was not

gonna stop and give up,” no evidence has been submitted to question Deputy Ritchie’s belief Ramirez

might attack him. (Decl. Ritchie; Opp’n, Exh. 2-Interview at 8.)

4

Plaintiffs’ inference is not well-supported by the facts of the case. Several of Deputy

Ritchie’s are cut off, consistent with his statement that the unit had a low battery which hindered his

ability to transmit successfully. (Mot., Exh. M-2.)

5

In the photo provided by Plaintiffs, the spotlight of at least one patrol car lights the area, and

Sosa’s and the other officers’ headlights illuminated the scene for each of them as they approached.

(See Defs. Exh. W at 73:13-15; Exhs. R and T.) The distances at which the officers said they could

see clearly appear to be misstated by Plaintiffs.

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argue Deputy Ritchie’s conduct was appropriate because he reasonably (even if mistakenly) believed,

under all the circumstances, that Ramirez posed a threat of imminent danger to him. 

Plaintiffs counter Defendant Ritchie’s actions were not “objectively reasonable” under the

circumstances and that several disputed issues of material fact preclude an award of summary

judgment to Defendants. First, Plaintiffs suggest Deputy Ritchie acted unreasonably when he shined

his spotlight at the Jeep and then pursued Ramirez alone on foot without calling for back-up. Second,

Plaintiffs argue Deputy Ritchie could not have reasonably believed Ramirez posed an immediate

threat to the his safety or the safety of others at any point during the encounter. Plaintiffs contend that

since Deputy Ritchie thought Ramirez was “running for his life,” he should have realized Ramirez was

attempting to escape rather than mount an attack. (Opp’n at 6.)3 Plaintiffs also allege Ritchie did not

call for back-up because he “voluntarily cut off his portable radio transmissions.”4

 (Opp’n at 5.)

Further, Plaintiffs assert that since Deputy Ritchie had observed Ramirez wearing baggy pants and

had been trained to know a running suspect might use one hand to hold up his pants, Deputy Ritchie’s

assumption that Ramirez was reaching for weapon was unreasonable. (Opp’n at 6.) Finally, Deputy

Ritchie declared he was unable to tell exactly what Ramirez was doing with his hands after Ramirez

fell because Ramirez’s dark gloves and clothing blended together in the low light setting. (Mot. at 16,

Decl. Ritchie at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs point to the fact that there is a street light near the scene and that laterarriving witnesses could see Ramirez’s hands at a distance greater than a few feet to support their

hypothesis that the area where Ramirez fell was well-lit at the time of the fatal shots.5

 (Opp’n, Exhs.

14; Exhs. R and T.) Plaintiffs therefore suggest Deputy Ritchie could see Ramirez well enough to

negate any reasonable conclusion that Ramirez was reaching for a weapon after he had fallen to the

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6

In Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 808, 821-22, the Supreme Court held the

Saucier protocol is not mandatory in all cases and that district courts may exercise discretion in

applying it. This court finds application of the Saucier methodology appropriate in this case.

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pavement. In addition, Plaintiffs assert there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Ramirez

was actively resisting or evading arrest at the time of the fatal shooting. As mentioned above, the

testimony of Adriana Sosa is conflicting on this point.

In support of their conclusions regarding Deputy Ritchie’s tactical decisions, Plaintiffs rely

on the declaration of their “expert on police procedures and policies, Jack Smith.” (Opp’n, Exh. 1.)

However, the Ninth Circuit has found such expert testimony, which offers a more reasonable course

of action based on hindsight, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the

reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Reynolds v. San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir.

1996) (overruled on other grounds in Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997)). “The fact

that an expert disagrees with an officer’s actions does not render the officer’s actions unreasonable.”

Id. The court finds the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning applicable here and therefore accords little weight

to Smith’s retrospective analysis at this juncture of the case.

Based on the current evidentiary record before the court, there exist genuine issues of material

fact on the broad question of whether Deputy Ritchie’s use of force was done with a purpose to harm

Ramirez unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives, as this standard has been defined by

controlling law. Therefore, Plaintiffs have resolved this portion of the analysis to their advantage by

coming forth with evidence sufficient to create these genuine issues of material fact.

3. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In assessing

a claim of qualified immunity, the court generally follows the two-step sequence laid out in Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194.6 First, the court determines whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff show

the defendant violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. If so, the court then asks whether the violated

right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 202. If the defendant did

violate a clearly established constitutional right, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

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With regard to the first prong of the Saucier test, the court concludes, as discussed above, that

while Plaintiffs do have a constitutional right to be free from governmental interference with their

relationship with their son, there exist genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Deputy

Ritchie’s use of force was done with a purpose to harm Ramirez unrelated to legitimate law

enforcement objectives. Curnow, 952 F.2d at 325; Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836.

Under the second prong of Saucier, the question becomes whether this constitutional right, cognizable

under § 1983, was “clearly established” at the time Deputy Ritchie acted. Under clear and controlling

authority in place before July, 2005, police officers may not use deadly force indiscriminately to

prevent the escape of a felony suspect no matter the circumstances but rather, may only do so if the

officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a risk of serious physical harm, either to

the officer or to others....” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). In turn, as of July, 2005, the

courts had “clearly established” the right of a decedent’s parents to recover for a loss of familial

association when an officer unreasonably kills a fleeing suspect. Curnow, 952 F.2d at 325. 

In sum, the court finds it inappropriate to award summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claim. The Ninth Circuit has observed that in excessive force cases, the inquiry “nearly always

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,”

“summary judgment...in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d

846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim

for loss of familial association is DENIED.

 D. Parents’ Monell Claim against Captain Ahern and the County

In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a failure to train or supervise on the part

of County and Captain Ahern. (Doc. No. 81.) In particular, Plaintiffs contend the County and Captain

Ahern maintained a custom, policy, or practice of using excessive force against Latino males in an

effort to intimidate those who might be subject to the gang injunction in Vista, employed an

unconstitutional force policy regarding the use of alternative force, knew lives could be saved by

providing adequate training in such alternatives, failed to maintain adequate training to prevent the

systematic use of excessive force during arrests, failed to educate deputies on the constitutional rights

of arrestees, and failed to adequately investigate, supervise, and discipline offending officers. (Doc.

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Plaintiffs included Captain Ahern as an object of their Monell claim, but they make the same

allegations against both Captain Ahern and the County. Defendants challenge the claim against

Captain Ahern as an improper Monell claim. The court agrees and, in light of the narrowly tailored

Monell inquiry discussed at oral argument, the court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants

on the failure to train claim against Captain Ahern.

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No. 81.) At oral argument, Plaintiffs limited their claim to a narrowly focused factual theory of

liability: whether the County7

 had a policy of providing inadequate training to its deputies on what

constitutes “imminent danger” in the context of a fleeing suspect.

Municipal liability lies in a policy or custom that leads to the commission of a constitutional

violation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In the context of an

inadequate training assertion, a plaintiff must show not that a particular officer reacted inappropriately

to a situation or was unsatisfactorily trained or supervised, but that there is a “widespread practice”

of inadequately training officers under circumstances showing a deliberate indifference to the need

for new or additional training. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989);

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989). Further, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Canton, 489

U.S. at 385.

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is without merit because their constitutional rights

were not violated and because there is no evidence of a deliberately indifferent policy or custom that

caused Ramirez’s death. In particular, Defendants allege the use of force policy and related training

are adequate, citing to the deposition testimony of various training officers and Deputy Ritchie. 

According to the declaration of Captain Ahern, the Sheriff’s Department had no policy of

failing to train deputies on the use of force or laws related to arrest or of encouraging or condoning

the use of excessive force. (Mot., Decl. Ahern at 2.) Deputies were trained at the academy and

through in-service programs in accordance with the California Commission on Peace Officer

Standards & Training. (Id.) Situations involving lethal force are investigated by individual

departments’ Internal Affairs and Homicide divisions. (Id.) Deputy misconduct is sanctioned through

disciplinary actions in accordance with the County Civil Service Rules and the California Peace

Officer’s Bill of Rights. (Id. at 2-3.) Captain Ahern also stated the department had no policy to

discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity, age, or gender in providing law

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enforcement services nor to use gang injunctions to impermissibly stop individuals not subject to the

injunctions. (Id. at 3.) The deposition testimony of the other officers indicates deputies were trained

in the use of lethal force in response to a range of conduct by a suspect. (See generally, Mot., Decls.

Ritchie, Sanfilippo, Crysler, Cross, Miller.) 

In opposition, Plaintiffs generally rely on rather attenuated inferences from various officer

testimony in an attempt to show Sheriff’s deputies do not engage in any use of lethal force training

nor do they understand when such force should be used. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Deputy

“Ritchie does not recall being trained in the use of force” when Ritchie was responding to questions

about in-service training and did state he had been trained in the use of force at the Academy. (Opp’n

at 9:23-28; Opp’n, Exh. 2 at 38-42, 49.) Although Deputy Ritchie describes scenario training

involving de-escalation tactics, Plaintiffs state Deputy Ritchie “was not trained in the use of deescalation tactics or the use [of] verbal commands.” (Opp’n, Exh. 2 at 51-52; Opp’n at 10:1-2.) In

describing a “Use of Force Options Chart,” used for training purposes, Plaintiffs state that Lieutenant

Margaret Sanfilippo “testified [the chart depicts] that any response, including deadly force, is allowed

in response to any action by a suspect.” (Opp’n at 10:24-26.) However, Lieutenant Sanfilippo’s

testimony states that the chart “tells a deputy sheriff that they can choose any response reasonable to

control any type of subject” within the range shown by the chart for particular defined conduct by a

suspect. (Opp’n. Exh. 9 at 48-49.) Similarly, while Plaintiffs make much of Sergeant Miller’s

testimony that “Sheriff’s deputies may go to use of deadly force immediately, ‘without having to yell

or talk to suspects nicely,’” the statement should be interpreted in conjunction with the Use of Force

Chart described above, which shows a range of appropriate responses for a deputy faced with a certain

level of suspect conduct. (Opp’n at 10:21-23; Opp’n, Exh. 5 at 87-89.) 

Focusing on the narrow allegation regarding the use of force where “imminent danger” is

present, Plaintiffs allege the County does not train its deputies to understand how this concept should

apply to the use of force on a fleeing suspect. Plaintiffs allege Deputy Crysler stated that “use of

deadly force is justified by whatever the deputy’s feelings are at the time.” (Opp’n at 10:17-21, Exh.

3 at 77-78.) As Defendants point out, Crysler actually stated: “The lethal force is to be applied for the

preservation of life, to protect one’s life, a deputy, or to prevent a violent felon from possibly incurring

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death or harming subjects that they may encounter in the near future” and is justified based on “the

totality of the circumstances.” (Defs. Reply, Exh. R at 65, 76.) Plaintiffs contend that Deputy Ritchie

himself “received poor training on what is imminent danger, which is a vague term to Ritchie.”

(Opp’n at 10:4-6, Exh. 2 at 36-37.) However, Deputy Ritchie himself identified that while “imminent”

is a “vague” word, to him it meant “immediate danger of” or “about to happen.” (Defs. Reply, Exh.

U at 68.) It is difficult to identify a lack of training where even the deputy whose conduct is at issue

can adequately define the “imminent danger” standard.

Finally, Plaintiffs point to the testimony of their police expert, Jack Smith, who concluded

Deputy Ritchie “may be the subject of negligent training and retention...on the use of lethal force to

apprehend a fleeing subject.” (Opp’n at 23 (emphasis added).) Even if the expert’s conclusions are

taken as true, negligence alone does not establish municipal liability. Plaintiffs must show the County

made a conscious decision indicating “deliberate indifference” to their constitutional rights. Canton,

489 U.S. at 389.

Here, there is no credible evidence of any failure to train or supervise, and further, no evidence

the County made a deliberate choice to avoid adequate training, nor that such a choice was made

where “the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result

in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers...can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id., 489 U.S. at 390. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, there is no genuine issue of material fact to advance Plaintiffs’ claim. The

court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim

against the County of San Diego.

 E. Punitive Damages

Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ claim for “exemplary” or punitive damages, arguing there is

no evidence any of the defendants exhibited conduct motivated by evil motive or intent or involving

reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ federally protected rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,

56 (1983). Plaintiffs make no comment on this issue in their opposition. Because a finding of mental

culpability will flow from an evaluation of the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim, the court

DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the parties’ requests for judicial notice as

to the particular documents cited herein. In addition, the court:

1) GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the decedent’s § 1983 excessive force

claim and the Monell claim derived therefrom;

2) DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for loss of familial

association;

3) DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the availability of punitive damages;

4) GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against Captain

Ahern and the County of San Diego, which are derived from their § 1983 claim for loss of familial

association; and

5) DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the decedent’s state law

claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 15, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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