Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00606/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00606-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IGNACIO SOTO,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-0606-AWI-DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 21)

I. Findings and Recommendations Addressing Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s complaint, filed April

20, 2006, against defendants Polk, Cuevas, Mendez, Adams, and Clark (“defendants”) for use of

excessive force and failure to protect him from serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

On June 25, 2007, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and on August 10, 2007

plaintiff filed an opposition. 

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the moving party’s burden to establish that

there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). 

“When the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the issue, he need show only

that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259

(6th Cir. 1986) (quoting from W. Schwarzer, SummaryJudgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining

Issues of Material Fact 99 F.R.D. 465, 487 (1984)). “But where the moving party has the burden -

the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense - his showing must be

sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving

party.” Id. Thus, as to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, “where the nonmoving party will

bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly

be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Indeed, summary judgment should

be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment,

as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

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required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e.,

a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d

1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369

U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810

F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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Plaintiff’s objections to paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17, of T. Wan’s Declaration are overruled. 

1

Mr. Wan’s attestation that he was the Associate Warden at the time of the incident and that as the Associate Warden

he was familiar with the plan and security measures implemented for the 2005 re-integration of Northern Hispanic

inmates from Facility C to Facility B is based on personal knowledge and is therefore properly set forth in the

declaration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Assoc., 897 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990)

(personal knowledge may be inferred from declaration). 

4

///

///

C. Undisputed Material Facts

1. Plaintiff was a state prisoner at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF) and State

Prison at Corcoran, California at all times relevant to his complaint. 

2. Since the activation of the SATF in 1997, Facility A and B were designated to house Level

II general population inmates. Because of continuing conflicts between the Northern

Hispanics Inmates and other gang affiliated inmates, all of the Nrthern Hispanic inamtes

were housed in Facility A. From 2000 to 2003, there were a series of violent incidents

caused by the Northern Hispanic inmates’ aggressive behavior towards other inmates on

Facility A. Because of the continuing problems with Northern Hispanics inmates, prison

officials decided that the Northern Hispanic inmates be removed from Facility A for the

safety and security of the institution. However, as there was no other facility at SATF to

house them, the decision was made to transfer all of the Northern Hispanic inmates to SATF.

Correspondingly, a plan was developed to exchange Northern Hispanic inmates with a

neighboring prison. In mid-2003, the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) decided to change Facility A to a special needs yard facility. Thus,

any Level II general population Northern Hispanic inamtes who arrive at SATF were placed

into administrative segregation for their safety and eventually transferred to another

institution.1

3. In October 2005, SATF received a policy clarification concerning the placement of Northern

Hispanic inmates. Up to that point, Northern Hispanic inmates could not be housed at

SATF’s Level II Facility (Facility B) for safety concerns because Facility B was

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predominately Southern Hispanic. Because of CDCR’s non-segregation policy and because

CDCR wanted more inmates to be allowed to program at SATF’s Level II Facility, CDCR

directed SATF officials to implement reintegration of Northern Hispanic inmates, including

inmate Soto, into Facility B, which was predominately Southern Hispanic. 

4. To prepare for re-integration, Facility A and B officers, supervisors and counselors were

assigned the task of gathering information from the affected inmates, including inmate Soto,

by interviewing then and observing and evaluating the reaction of the inmate population

regarding the arrival of the Northern Hispanic inmates into Facility B. 

5. SATF’s Investigative Services Unit monitored inmate mail, calls and interviewed

information to identify possible leaders within the Southern Hispanic inmates in Facility B

and the Northern Hispanic inmates in the FacilityC gymnasium who would instigate, incite,

or order the northern and Southern Hispanic inmates not to cooperate with the interrogation.

Defendants contend all identified instigators and inciters were removed from Facility B and

Facility C gymnasiums before re-integration.

6. Defendants contend that all Facility C correctional counselors reviewed the central files of

all Northern Hispanic inmates, including inmate Soto, who were to be re-integrated into

Facility B to ensure that each inmate met the Level II custody housing criteria and, most

importantly, that the re-integration inmates had no enemy concerns with inmates already in

Facility B.

7. Defendants contend that at all times up to the date of the incident on December 6, 2005,

inmate Soto informed no correctional staff or officials of any safety concerns that he had with

other inamtes or staff. Defendants contend there was no information that Soto had been

threatened by any person or faced any substantial risk of harm.

8. Before the re-integration, Facility B staff made bed moves in Facility B Building B1 and B3

to make room for the arriving Northern Hispanic inmates. The numbers of Southern

Hispanic inmates who were to remain in Facility B was to match the number of arriving

Northern Hispanic inmates. In addition, bed moves were made within Facility B to disrupt

territorial control by the inmates in the housing units.

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9. Meetings were conducted between Facility B Southern and Northern Hispanic

representatives allowing them to express and resolve differences before the re-integration.

An additional meeting was held between Inmate Advisory Council representatives and the

Northern Hispanic inmates allowing them to air concerns about the Facility B program. 

10. On the day before the re-integration, Facility C staff conducted a thorough search of the

Facility C gymnasium to ensure that no inmates possessed weapons or dangerous contraband

that would be introduced to Facility B by the Northern Hispanic inmates. Similarly, in the

days before the re-integration, a massive search was conducted of Facility B to seize any

existing weapons or contraband. All weapons of convenience were closely controlled and

monitored by the housing staff of Facility B. 

11. During the week before reintegration, the Facility B vocational program was closed and

repeatedly searched to prevent dangerous contraband or weapons from being introduced into

Facility B. 

12. On the day of the integration, all Northern Hispanic inmates underwent an unclothed body

search as well as a search of their personal property. All transferred inmates went through

a metal detector before being escorted into Facility B. Facility C staff escorted the inmates

to their assigned housing units and remained at Facility B until the re-integration was

completed.

13. The re-integration was concluded on December 6, 2005, on second watch and on a Tuesday,

to specifically utilize the availability of extra correctional staff to enhance security and

protection for the re-integration.

14. Plaintiff indicated there were a lot of correctional officers in the area.

15. On the day of the re-integration the Facility A Code 3 Response Team consisting of three

officers was alerted and staged in readiness at the re-integration site and ordered to remain

on-site until informed that their services were not needed.

16. Defendants contend that at all relevant times, correctional staff and officials implemented

procedures both before and during the re-integration process and reasonably responded to the

risk of harm to all re-integrated inmates, including plaintiff.

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17. Defendants contend that at all relevant times, correctional staff or officials had no awareness

of any facts concerning inmate Soto which led to an inference, suspicion, conclusion or belief

that a substantial risk of harm existed for him. Defendants contend the risk of harm faced

by inmate Soto was no greater than that of any other similarly situated inmate connected with

the re-integration.

18. On December 6, 2005, defendant Mendez was the correctional officer assigned to the B-3

Control Booth at SATF. On that day, defendant Mendez was equipped with a forty

milliammeter launcher loaded only with wood baton rounds. 

19. On December 6, 2005, at approximately 1:50 p.m., a group of Northern Hispanic inmates

were being escorted into the B-3 section. The transfer of Northern Hispanic inmates into the

B-3 section was part of the process of reintegrating them into Facility B. On that day, the

Northern Hispanic group was dressed in the state issued denim pants and shirts. The

Southern Hispanic inmates, who were inside B-3 section, were dressed in white boxer shorts

and white t-shirts. Defendant Mendez’ position in the control booth was approximately ten

to fifteen yards from the bunk area.

20. As a group of four Northern Hispanic inmates were entering the B-3 section, they were first

attacked by one Southern Hispanic inmate, who was then joined by another co-attacker.

Mendez observed the two inmates hitting the entering inmates with closed fists. The

altercation with all six Northern and Southern Hispanic inmates involved exchanges of

blows, grabbing and quick and erratic changes in the positions of the combatants in relation

to each other and Mendez’s position in the control booth. Mendez saw all inmates actively

engaged in the fight.

21. Defendant Mendez activated his personal alarm which alerted other staff of an incident and

was a signal for available staff to assist on-site officers, respond to the incident and restore

order. After activating his alarm, defendant Mendez repeatedly ordered the inmates to “get

down.” This is an order for inmates to assume a prone position on the ground. The

significance of a “get down” order is that it is a command for the inamtes to immediately

stop fighting and lie spread-eagle on the ground. From this position inmates cannot attack

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Plaintiff’s objection to paragraph 5 and 12 of D. Mendez’s declaration is overruled. His statements are 2

based on personal knowledge as a correctional officer and are therefore properly set forth in plaintiff’s declaration. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Assoc., 897 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990) (personal

knowledge may be inferred from declaration). 

8

each other or officers and it allows responding officers to take charge of the situation in

relative safety. An inmate who remains standing signifies that he is still participating in the

incident, not complying with the order and thus, a threat to injure other inmates and staff.2

22. Defendants contend the inmates did not respond to Mendez’s “get down” orders and

continued fighting one another. Mendez fired four forty millimeter wood baton rounds.

Mendez contends he aimed all rounds to skip approximately three feet off the floor at the

inmates’ legs and that the firing of the rounds was intended to temporarily incapacitate the

inmate or discourage them from fighting each other. Mendez contends he did not discharge

the baton rounds with the intention of striking any specific inmate, but directed the rounds,

because of erratic movement of the inmates’, towards their legs. Mendez contends he did

not aim the baton rounds at any portion of the inmates’, including inmate Soto’s, upper torso

or head. Even after the discharge of the rounds, Mendez contends the inmates did not get

into a prone position until responding officers arrived at the scene. 

23. Plaintiff did not see the projectiles before, during or after the injury.

24. Plaintiff does not know the number of projectiles that were fired.

25. Shortly after the incident, plaintiff reported that the type of projectile that struck him in the

eye was a “stinger” round.

26. In addition to Mendez and the other officers responding to the incident, another officer, who

was equipped with a forty-millimeter launcher loaded only with direct impact “stinger”

rounds, provided cover support. The officer discharged three “stinger” rounds. “Stinger”

rounds deliver multiple sets of small rubber balls or pellets that are markedly different than

the wood baton rounds deployed by Mendez.

27. Based on defendant Mendez’ training and experience and in compliance with Department

policy, he assessed the incident as one that did not necessarily involve a threat of death to the

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combatants and the number of inmates involved in the melee was limited. Mendez was

aware that there were additional groups of inmates in the yard outside the section building

who were waiting to be re-integrated. Therefore, in addition to Mendez wanting to stop the

fight to prevent injury to the combatants, he also wanted to subdue the inmates fighting

inside to prevent unrest spreading to the inmates in the yard. In this situation, officers are

authorized to use non-lethal force to subdue and control the fighting inmates. Mendez was

the closest officer to the incident and no other officer had entered the area.

28. The baton rounds are designed to subdue groups of inmates engaged in close quarter combat.

In situations that do not involve a threat to the lives of inmates and staff, the appropriate

discharge of baton rounds is to skip them off the ground to strike legs, buttocks and feet of

the inmates. The skipping of the rounds off the floor lessens their force and the rounds

striking less vital areas of the legs, buttocks and feet diminishes the possibility of serious

injury. Defendant Mendez contends he followed department policyand discharged the baton

rounds to skip off the floor with the intention of striking the legs of the combatants to subdue

the inmates.

29. At all relevant times, defendant Mendez was not ordered, commanded or otherwise told by

any staff or supervisor to discharge baton rounds at inmate Soto.

D. Discussion

1. Excessive Force Claim

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2005, defendants deliberately forced

groups of Northern Hispanic prisoners into sections occupied by Southern Hispanic prisoners who

had been forewarned of the ”plan.” Comp. p. 3. Plaintiff contends that when reluctant Northern

Hispanic prisoners were forced into Southern Hispanic sections, they were immediately attacked by

forewarned Southern Hispanic prisoners and the fighting inmates were fired upon with wooden

blocks and beaten by correctional officers. Id. Plaintiff contends that defendant Mendez was

working the gunner station and during one of the “staged events,” plaintiff, a Northern Hispanic

prisoner, was shot with rubber type blocks by defendant Mendez after he had been attacked by

Southern Hispanic inmates. Id. Plaintiff contends he was struck on his body and in his right eye by

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plaintiff does not present evidence to dispute the fact that Mendez ordered the inmates to “get down.”

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at least one block causing permanent damage to his eye.

Defendants contend that defendant Mendez was not the shooter of the “stinger” round that hit

plaintiff. However, assuming defendant Mendez did fire the projectile that hit plaintiff, defendants

contend that plaintiff’s claim that he was struck by the projectile does not rise to the level of a

constitutional claim of excessive force. Defendants point out that plaintiff was one of the six

combatants in the fight, which involved close quarter combat with the inmates constantly moving and

changing positions. DUF 20. At the start of the fight, defendant Mendez was the nearest to the

scene. DUF 27. After Mendez activated his personal alarm, he ordered the inmates to “get down.”

DUF 21. Defendants contend that none of the inmates, including plaintiff, complied with the “get 3

down” orders and continued to fight. DUF 22. Mendez therefore fired four forty-millimeter wood

baton rounds, with the intention of the striking the legs of the combatants to subdue the inmates.

DUF 22. Defendants argue that Mendez’s response was a good faith effort to restore order and the

firing of the baton rounds was the action of one officer to subdue six inmates as quickly as possible.

Defendants contend Mendez tempered his actions by firing his rounds to skip off the ground, which

lessened the force of the impact and he aimed at non-vital areas of the inmates’ bodies. Defendants

argue the use of force by Mendez was a proper and tempered response to an active threat and not

malicious or sadistic. 

The courtfinds that defendants havemet their initial burden of informing the court of the basis

for their motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but

is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973).

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In his opposition, plaintiff contends any force used by prison staff was the result of the

inappropriate manner in which the re-integration process was initiated and was therefore excessive

physical force. Plaintiff argues that the need for the application of the force was induced by the

actions of defendants in forcing plaintiff into a hostile environment in which it was known that he

would face harm. Plaintiff also argues that he was being attacked by several Northern Hispanic

inmates when Mendez gave the “get down” order and thus he could not have responded to any other

order until his attackers were subdued. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . .

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at

9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarilyexcludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant

to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.”

Id. 

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Here, it is undisuted that plaintiff and the other inmates did not complywith defendant’s order

to “get down.” While plaintiff argues generally that defendants inappropriately initiated the

reintegration process, plaintiff provides no evidence as to defendant Mendez’s involvement in the

process. Plaintiff does not dispute that at the time the order was made, he was involved in a fight

with other inmates and did not respond to the order. Insubordination is a matter taken very seriously

within the confines of an institutional setting. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the direct orders of

defendant created a need for the application of force to gain plaintiff’s compliance, and the force at

issue was employed for the very purpose of gaining plaintiff’s compliance with the order. When an

inmate refuses to comply with the order of a staff member, a threat may be reasonably perceived by

staff. Finally, the firing of baton rounds to skip off the ground was use of force tailored to gain

plaintiff’s compliance with defendants’ orders to get down on the ground.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the general allegations that the

re-integration process was inappropriate and that he did not hear defendant’s orders to get down

because he was involved in a fight do not support a claim for relief under section 1983 for use of

excessive physical force against defendant Mendez.

2. Failure to Protect Plaintiff from Harm 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that pursuant to a “preconceived plan,” on December 6,

2005, defendants “deliberately, repeatedly and with full knowledge and/or reckless indifference to

the consequences, forced groups of Northern Hispanic prisoners into sections occupied by Southern

Hispanics prisoners who had been forewarned of the plan.” Plaintiff contends that defendant Polk

directed the events and that when “reluctant Northern Hispanic prisoners were forced into Southern

Hispanic sections, they were immediately attacked by forwarded Southern Hispanic prisoners and the

fighting inmates were then fired upon with wooden blocks and beaten by correctional guards.”

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to establish their individual involvement in the

alleged constitutional violations. Defendants further argue that assuming plaintiff can establish a

causal connection between the actions of defendants and the alleged constitutional violations,

defendants had no knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to plaintiff and whatever risk that may

have existed was dealt with both before and during the incident. DUF 4-6. Plaintiff did not inform

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correction staff of any safety concerns (DUF 7) and correctional staff had no specific information that

plaintiff had been threatened or faced a substantial risk of harm greater than that of any other similarly

situated inmate connected with the re-integration. DUF 7. 

The court finds that defendants havemet theirinitial burden of informing the court of the basis

for their motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of

an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Where a prisoner alleges

injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if

they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a

subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . .

. .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

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Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id.

at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of

the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at

844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but

rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

Although plaintiff contends that defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to him and

disregarded that risk, plaintiff has submitted no evidence in support of this contention. Plaintiff

makes general allegationsthat “the historic rivalry between Northern and Southern Mexicans within

the California Department of Corrections is well documented and admitted.” However, plaintiff

provides no evidence regarding the individual defendants knowledge or conduct. Speculative and/or

conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact. At this stage in the proceedings,

plaintiff must do more than set forth general assertions regarding the risk to his safety or the

knowledge and intent of defendants. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quotingGibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290

F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all justifiable

inferences in plaintiff’s favor, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456

(1992); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, the evidence of a risk to plaintiff is limited to defendants’ general

knowledge of a historic rivalry between Northern and Southern Mexicans within the California

Department of Corrections and defendants’ knowledge that plaintiff was a Northern Mexican inmate.

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on the merits, the court does not reach defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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However, it is undisputed that in October 2005, SATF received a policy clarification concerning the

placement of Northern Hispanic inmates in Facility B based on CDCR’s non-segregation policy and

CDCR directed SATF officials to implement reintegration. DUF 3. There is no evidence that any

of the named defendants had responsibility or participation in the creation of this policy. The court

finds that this is insufficient to support a claim that defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial

risk of harm. There is no evidence beyond plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, that defendants knew

of any particular risk of harm to plaintiff, beyond that faced by any other inmate. Nor is there

evidence that the defendants had any authority or control over the reintegration process. Indeed, the

only evidence regarding the individual defendants specific conduct on December 6, 2005, is inmate

Pappas’ declaration which states that he witnessed defendant Polk direct his staff to “use force.”

Plaintiff asserts that he was injured as a result of the “reckless method in which the attempted reintegration effort was implemented.” However, plaintiff does provide any evidence regarding the

named defendants involvement in the process nor does he dispute the efforts taken prior to the reintegration process to prevent or at least limit potential problems with the inmates. DUF 8-12. In

sum, plaintiff has not presented any evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact on his

Eighth Amendment claim against defendants for acting with deliberate indifference to his safety, and

defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4

 F. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed June 25, 2007, be GRANTED, thereby concluding this action in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 

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objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 25, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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