Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00650/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00650-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

COURTNEY BOYD, )

AIS #208921, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:08-CV-650-TMH

) [WO]

)

NURSE MASSEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Courtney Boyd [“Boyd”], a state inmate and

frequent litigant in this court, challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him

on July 31, 2008 during his incarceration at the Bullock County Correctional Facility

[“Bullock”]. Boyd names Jacqueline Massey, a licensed practical nurse, Dr. Tahir Siddiq,

and Sgt. Anthony Jackson, all assigned to Bullock at the time of the actions made the basis

of the complaint, as defendants in this cause of action. The allegations central to Boyd’s

complaint are that on July 31, 2008 nurse Massey and Dr. Siddiq denied him adequate

medical treatment for his back. Boyd also complains that on this same date Lt. Jackson

used excessive force when removing him from a stretcher which had been placed on the

floor in the health care unit. Finally, Boyd alleges the actions of the defendants deprived

him of equal protection. Boyd seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages for the

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alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

The defendantsfiled specialreports and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

each of Boyd’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court

deems it appropriate to treat these reports as motions for summary judgment. Order of

January 6, 2009 - Court Doc. No. 49. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of such motions, the evidentiary

materials filed in support thereof and Boyd’s responses in opposition to the motions, the

court concludes that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

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summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word --

genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment

determination.“ Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to expressthe direction to grantsummary judgment.” Id. Thus, although

Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

When the moving parties meet their evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine

dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11

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Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly

support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by

[citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other

materials] the court may ... grantsummary judgment if the motion and supporting materials

-- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A

genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that

would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d

at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). The defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Consequently, to

survive the defendants’ properly supported motions for summary judgment, Boyd is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the

nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary

judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the

opposing party’s position will notsuffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier

of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106

S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577

(11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise

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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to

oppose a motion forsummary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc.,

276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir.

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1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting

evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d

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912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces

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nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants);

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own

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conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when

a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will

bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”);

Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any

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part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

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the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthat there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is appropriate

where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no

genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (To establish a

genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a

reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not

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mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil

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case. In this case, Boyd fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine issue of material fact in

order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Immunity

With respect to any claims Boyd lodges against the defendants in their official

capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official

capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his

[or her] official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,

see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900,

908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole

Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence,

916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated

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Alabama’simmunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought

against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419,

1429 (11 Cir. 1997).

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In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants are state actors entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claimsseeking monetary damages

from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia

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Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994). Thus, each of the

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defendantsis entitled to absolute immunity from those claimsfor monetary relief presented

against them in their official capacities. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11 Cir.

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1989).

B. Relevant Facts

At this stage of the proceedings, the court must “take the facts alleged in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [Boyd]. Pielage v.

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11 Cir. 2008).” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1304

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(11 Cir. 2008). In this light, the facts are that on July 31, 2008 Boyd “sign[ed] up for sick

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call to [request a] back brace, because of my lower back started going out [due to an injury

suffered in June of 2003]. I was seen by Dr. Siddiq [and] even show[ed] him my free

world doctor report [based upon an examination performed in August of 2006 which

indicated a disability due to the 2003 back injury but specifically rejected surgery or

therapy as treatment options and indicated treatment of Boyd’s muscle spasms through

medications]....” Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 4. Based on the results of

a July 2, 008 x-ray and his current evaluation of Boyd’s condition, Dr. Siddiq determined

issuance of a back brace to Boyd was not necessary or warranted. Dr. Siddiq prescribed

Boyd medications to relieve the pain and stiffness in his back and ordered Boyd to exit the

health care unit. Id.

Boyd later returned to the health care unit continuing his complaints of back pain

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and stiffness. Ms. Wells, a registered nurse, evaluated Boyd, agreed with Dr. Siddiq’s

earlier assessment of his condition and released Boyd from sick call. Later that evening,

Boyd returned to the health care unit for a third time seeking treatment for his back, this

time on a flat stretcher carried by inmates. The medical defendants had not been advised

of the need for use of a stretcher regarding any injury to Boyd nor had they authorized its

use. Upon arrival at the health unit, the inmates placed the stretcher on the floor. Nurse

Massey ordered Boyd “to get up out that stretcher, and go to the back of the [health care

unit], because Dr. Siddiq [is] not here. I informed Nurse Massey that I could not move”

and Lt. Jackson removed me from “the stretcher onto the floor.” Plaintiff’s Complaint -

Court Doc. No. 1 at 4. Two inmates transported Boyd via wheelchair to the rear of the

health care unit where he waited for approximately 25 minutes until nurse Massey provided

him with the medications prescribed by Dr. Siddiq. Id. at 5.

Dr. Siddiq returned to the area and again evaluated Boyd regarding complaints of

back pain. Id. Dr. Siddiq advised Boyd that, in his medical opinion and based on his

current assessment of Boyd’s condition, Boyd did not “need a back brace” and the

appropriate course of treatment constituted medications to aid with pain and muscle

stiffness. Id. The medical defendants provided Boyd his medications and ordered him to

leave the health care unit at which time Boyd began walking to his cell. Boyd advised

nurse Massey “it was hurting to walk” and she responded with a derogatory remark

intimating he engaged in homosexual activities. Id.

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C. Equal Protection

Boyd makesthe conclusory allegation the defendants violated his “14 Amendment

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right to equal protection of the law.” Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 7.

To establish a claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, “a prisoner must

[at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he issimilarly situated to other prisoners who received

more favorable treatment; and (2)the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him

based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.

Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob.

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Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” Sweet v. Secretary, Department of

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Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006). “[O]fficial action will not be held

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unconstitutional solely because it results in a ... disproportionate impact.... Proof of ...

discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more than intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker ...

selected ... a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’

its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts

v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted); see also Hernandez

v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Evidence which merely indicates disparity of

treatment or even arbitrary administration of state powers, rather than instances of

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purposeful or invidious discrimination, is insufficient to show discriminatory intent.

McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).

Initially, the court notes Boyd failsto identify any similarly situated inmate nor does

he allege how the defendants acted in a more favorable manner towards any other inmate.

Thus, “[Boyd’s] equal protection claimnecessarily failsfirst because he has notshown that

he was treated differently from other, similarly situated prisoners.” Sweet, 467 F.3d at

1319. Additionally, Boyd completely fails to meet his pleading burden as he does not

allege the defendants subjected him to adverse treatment based on some constitutionally

impermissible reason, nor is there any evidence before the court to indicate any such

discrimination; rather, he simply makes the conclusory assertion that the defendants

violated his right to equal protection. Beyond this self-serving and conclusory allegation,

Boyd produces nothing which suggests the defendants took any action against him based

on a constitutionally protected interest. In light of the foregoing, the court concludes

Boyd’s mere conclusory assertion does not rise to the level of an equal protection violation

and therefore provides no basis for relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Consequently,

the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

D. Medical Treatment

Boyd complains nurse Massey and Dr. Siddiq acted with deliberate indifference to

recurring pain in his lower back on July 31, 2008. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No.

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1 at 4-5. The defendants adamantly deny this allegation.

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Correctional medical personal may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for

acting with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health when the official knowsthat the

inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and with such knowledge disregards that

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

828 (1994). A constitutional violation occurs only “when a substantial risk of serious

harm, of which the official issubjectively aware, exists and the official does not ‘respond[]

reasonably to the risk.’ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1982-83, 128

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). A plaintiff must also show that the constitutional violation caused his

injuries.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11 Cir. 2001) (en banc).

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In Farmer, the Court identified both objective and subjective elements necessary to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite objective elements,

an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm ... exist[ed].

Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official

must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-

1029. As to the subjective elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk ofserious harm exists, and he must also

The medical defendants also assert Boyd failed to properly exhaust the administrative remedy available to

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him during his confinement at Bullock as he did not file a grievance related to his medical treatment claim. Boyd,

however, maintains he repeatedly attempted to pursue the grievance procedure but his grievances were routinely

placed in the garbage and/or not accepted by medical personnel. In light of the foregoing, the court deems it

appropriate to address the merits of the claims lodged against the medical defendants.

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draw the inference.... The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual

‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’ ... [A]n official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned asthe infliction of punishment.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (emphasis added); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364

(11 Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof that the defendant should have

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perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491

(11 Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue “must involve more than ordinary lack of due

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care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.... It is obduracy and wantonness, not

inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official

control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)

(emphasis added).

To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical treatment,

an inmate must, at a minimum, show that the named defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v.

Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11 Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11 Cir.

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1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11 Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d

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1052, 1058 (11 Cir.1986). Specifically, health care personnel may not subject an inmate

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to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783,

787 (11 Cir.1989). When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is

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required to establish “an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to

that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of

required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255

(for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the

prisoner). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health orsafety; the [defendants] must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v.

Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4 Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a th

serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious

condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’sfailure

to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been

“subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have

had a ‘“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38,

114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321,

2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).... Even assuming the existence of a

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serious risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware

of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists - and the prison official must also “draw that

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir. 2003). “The known risk of injury must

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be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [an official’s] failure to act can

constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11 Cir. 1990)

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(citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, in order to survive summary judgment

on his deliberate indifference claim, Boyd is “required to produce sufficient evidence of

(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that

risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11 Cir. 1995);

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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (To evade entry of summary judgment on a properly

supported motion, plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence demonstrating (1) an

objectively substantial risk ofserious harm; (2)subjective awareness of thisrisk on the part

of the defendants; (3) the defendantsresponded to such risk in an objectively unreasonable

manner; and (4) the actions/omissions of the defendants caused his injuries).

Boyd has complained of back pain since a physical altercation with correctional

officers in June of 2003 at the Bibb Correctional Facility. As is relevant to the present

complaint, Boyd maintains the medical defendants denied him adequate treatment for his

back pain on July 31, 2008. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 4-5. The medical

defendants submitted various evidentiary materials which refute Boyd’s suppositious

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allegations. Specifically, Masseyand Siddiq denyknowledge of anyback problemsuffered

by Boyd on July 31, 2008 which required treatment other than the treatment provided to

him by medical personnel at Bullock on three different occasions on the date made the

basis of this complaint. Medical Defendants’ Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Dr. Tahir Siddiq) -

Court Doc. No. 17-2; Medical Defendants’ Exhibit 3 (Affidavit of Jacqueline Massey) -

Court Doc. No. 17-3.

Dr. Siddiq addresses Boyd’s allegations as follows:

I amfullyaware of the medical treatment provided to inmateCourtney

Boyd from the time of his transfer to Bullock County Correctional Facility

in approximately May, 2008, until the time he was transferred to Draper

Correctional Facility in August, 2008.

When Mr. Boyd initially arrived at the Bullock County Correctional

Facility ..., he came to the health care unit complaining of multiple physical

complaints, including alleged chronic back pain. Due to Mr. Boyd’s

complaints, x-rays were ordered and taken of his back [on July 2, 2008 by

American Mobile Imaging in Montgomery, Alabama. The x-ray report

indicates “[a]ll vertebral bodies demonstrate normal heights, and all

intervertebral disc spaces are normal. There is no spondylolysis or

spondylolisthesis, and there is no evidence for prior surgery. Surrounding

soft tissues are unremarkable. The sacrolliac joints are intact.

IMPRESSION: NORMAL LUMBAR SPINE.” Medical Defendants’

Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Dr. Tahir Siddiq - Court Doc. No. 17-2 at 5.]

After reviewing the x-rays and performing a physical examination of

Mr. Boyd, I determined that he was not in need of any chronic care and

certainly showed no indications of being disabled in any form or fashion.

On July 31, 2008, Mr. Boyd was seen by me at the health care unit at

Bullock County Correctional Facility. At this time, he requested to be fitted

and prescribed a back brace. However, I told Mr. Boyd that the x-rays

showed no indications of any abnormalities and, therefore he was not a

candidate for a back brace. I did prescribe Advil and a muscle relaxer for

Mr. Boyd ... due to his complaints of back pain.

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Medical Defendants’ Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Dr. Tahir Siddiq) - Court Doc. No. 17-2 at 2-3.

In addressing the claims raised by Boyd, nurse Massey, in relevant part, maintains

that:

When Mr. Boyd arrived at the Bullock County Correctional Facility

in approximately May, 2008 ... he had multiple physical complaints,

including chronic back pain. X-rays were ordered [of Boyd’s lumbar spine]

and read by [the attending free-world radiologist and] Dr. Tahir Siddiq which

showed no abnormalities.

On July 31, 2008, Mr. Boyd signed up for sick call and requested to

be given a back brace for his alleged chronic back pain. Due to the fact that

the x-rays showed no abnormalities, Dr. Siddiq informed Mr. Boyd that he

was not going to prescribe Mr. Boyd a back brace. Dr. Siddiq did, however,

prescribe[] Advil and a muscle relaxer due to Mr. Boyd’s complaints of back

pain. Mr. Boyd was then released from sick call by Dr. Siddiq.

After being released by Dr. Siddiq, Mr. Boyd returned to sick call and

was seen by Ms. Wells, a Registered Nurse, again complaining of back pain.

Ms. Wells informed Mr. Boyd that he had recently been [examined and]

released by Dr. Siddiq and therefore [she] had [no further treatment] to offer

him and again released Mr. Boyd from sick call.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Boyd again, for the third time that day,

returned to sick call, this time being carried by fellow inmates on a stretcher.

The stretchers are available in the health care unit and no one witnessed the

inmates placing Mr. Boyd on the stretcher. The inmates placed Mr. Boyd on

the floor in the health care unit. [Boyd remained on the stretcher on the

floor. I ordered Mr. Boyd to get off the stretcher.] Sargent Jackson ... then

told Mr. Boyd to get up off the stretcher. When Mr. Boyd refused to get up

off the stretcher, Sargent Jackson attempted to make Mr. Boyd get up off the

floor. Mr. Boyd thereafter crawled over to the wall and sat propped up

against the wall....

Sometime thereafter, Mr. Boyd ... left the health care unit. No

conversations were had between Mr. Boyd and any other employees of CMS

and/or the Alabama Department of Corrections at the time Mr. Boyd left the

health care unit.

Medical Defendants’ Exhibit 3 (Affidavit of Jacquelilne Massey) - Court Doc. No. 17-3 at

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3-5.

The record before the court demonstrates that during the period of time made the

basis of this complaint medical personnel, including the individuals named as defendants,

examined Boyd, thoroughly evaluated his complaints, monitored his condition, prescribed

various medications and provided treatmentfor his back condition in accordance with their

professional judgment. Boyd fails to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to his claim that defendants Massey and Siddiq acted with

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Specifically, the record does not indicate that

the defendants had knowledge of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of harm existed to Boyd, that the defendants actually drew this

inference and thereafter ignored the risk. Boyd hastherefore failed to establish each of the

requisite elements of his deliberate indifference claim. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

Defendants Massey and Siddiq are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the

deliberate indifference claim.

E. The Derogatory Comment

Boyd complains defendant Massey made a derogatory comment regarding his

sexuality when he departed the health care unit. Massey deniesthis allegation. This claim,

however, provides no basis for federal relief.

An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is that the conduct complained

of deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or

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laws of the United States. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.

40 (1999); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The statement about which the plaintiff

complains does not violate any right protected by the Constitution. McFadden v. Lucas,

713 F.2d 143, 146 (5 Cir. 1983) (threatening or abusive language directed at inmate by

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correctional official does not amount to constitutional violations); King v. Olmstead

County, 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8 Cir. 1997) (neither verbal threats nor harassment by

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government official violates an inmate’s constitutional right to due process); Pittsley v.

Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1 Cir. 1991) (verbal harassment or idle threats generally not

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sufficient to constitute violation of liberty interest); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,

1274 n.1 (11 Cir. 1989) (verbal taunts directed at plaintiff do not violate his constitutional

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rights); Sepulveda v. Burnside, 170 Fed. Appx. 119, 124 (11 Cir. 2006) (reference to

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plaintiff “as a ‘snitch’ in the presence of other inmates” does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation). It istherefore clear that threatening, derogatory, harassing and/or

abusive comments made by a medical official with respect to an inmate do not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. Thus, nurse Massey’s alleged reference to Boyd’s

homosexual activitiesfailsto demonstrate the deprivation of any constitutionally protected

right, privilege or immunity and, consequently, this claim entitles Boyd to no relief.

F. The Excessive Force Claim

When Boyd arrived at the health care unit on the stretcher, the inmates placed the

stretcher supine on the floor. Massey and Jackson ordered Boyd to get off the stretcher.

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Boyd, due to alleged back pain, refused these orders. Defendant Jackson grasped Boyd by

the arm and removed him from the stretcher to the floor directly adjacent to the stretcher.

Boyd does not allege he suffered any injury as a result of hisremoval from the stretcher and

merely asserts because Jackson was not one of the medical personnel he “had no right to

grasp[] inmate Boyd.” Plaintiff’s January 21, 2009 Response - Court Doc. No. 52 at 1.

Boyd acknowledges Dr. Siddiq examined him within a few minute after his removal from

the stretcher and concedes Dr. Siddiq could not find any physical evidence to support his

allegation that his back was “going out.” Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 5.

Dr. Siddiq released Boyd from the health care unit with no additional orders for treatment

and Boyd ambulated to his cell under his own power. Id.

Sgt. Jackson denies he used excessive force to remove Boyd from the stretcher.

Specifically, Jackson maintains the force used against Boyd was minimal and only the

amount of force necessary under the circumstances to have Boyd comply with the orders

of both he and nurse Massey. The evidentiary materials filed by all the parties support this

assertion.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments

and this “proscription ... governs prison officials’ use of force against convicted inmates.”

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11 Cir. 1990).

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Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial

setting as long as it is applied “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Whitley v.

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Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2 Cir.1973)); see also

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Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

To determine if an application of force was applied maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm, a variety of factors are considered including: “the

need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”

Hudson, at 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct.

1078; Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11 Cir.1996). From

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consideration of such factors, “inferences may be drawn as to whether the

use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced

such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is

tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at

321, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).

Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300-1301 (11 Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted); Johnson

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v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11 Cir. 2002) (The standard applied to an Eighth

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Amendment excessive force claim is whether the challenged use of force was applied “in

a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” or instead “maliciously and sadistically

for the very purpose of causing harm.”); Campbell, 169 F.3d 1374 (“To establish an Eighth

Amendment claim for excessive force, ... Plaintiff must meet [a heightened] intent

requirement ... [and] must prove that ‘force was applied ... maliciously and sadistically for

the very purpose of causing harm.’ Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (quoting

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2 Cir. 1973).... [F]orce does not violate the

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Eighth Amendment merely because it is unreasonable or unnecessary.”). In addition, “a

mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of

arguably superior alternatives” is not enough to support a claim of excessive force in a

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prison setting. Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375. The law is likewise well settled that:

[N]ot ... every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal

cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033 (“Not every push

or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s

chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”). The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,

provided that the use of force is not of a sort “‘repugnant to the conscience

of mankind.’” Whitley, 475 U.S., at 27, 106 S.Ct., at 1088....

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. “[A] wide range of deference [is afforded]

to prison officials action to preserve discipline and security.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-

322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. A relevant factor in ascertaining whether a correctional officer used

de minimis force is the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at

1302; Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375. “Nevertheless, a court ultimately should decide an

excessive force claim ‘based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury.’ 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. at ---, ----, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1177, [175 L.Ed.2d 995] (2010).”

Vicks v. Knight, 380 Fed.Appx 847, 851 (11 Cir. 2010).

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After thorough review of the facts and viewing such in a light most favorable to

Boyd, the court concludes Boyd fails to establish the use of excessive force in violation of

his constitutional rights. Specifically, there is no dispute of material fact about whether

Jackson “maliciously and sadistically” used force for the very purpose of causing harm to

Boyd. Initially, it is undisputed Jackson merely grasped Boyd by his upper right arm in an

attempt to remove him from the stretcher which had been placed on the floor. Jackson did

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so only after Boyd refused orders to remove himself from the stretcher/floor. Plainly, the

force was applied only to restore disorder caused by Boyd’s refusal to comply with a

legitimate order. Moreover, the record indicates Boyd suffered no injury due to the force

utilized by Jackson. It is clear the physical contact about which Boyd complains alleges,

at best, a “de minimis use[] of physical force” which is excluded from “[t]he Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments” as such contact “is not of

a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Hall v. Santa

Rosa Correctional Institution, 403 Fed.Appx. 479, 482 (11 Cir. 2010) (officers who

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forced inmate’s hands behind his back to apply handcuffs after inmate refused orders and

became combative “did not use unconstitutional excessive force [and] no constitutional

violation occurred.”); McCall v.Crosthwait, 336 Fed.Appx. 871, 873 (11 Cir. 2009)(push

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of inmate into steel cell door and plexiglass window, which caused bruises to inmate’s

right elbow and shoulder, constituted de minimis use of force not violative of the

Constitution). In light of the foregoing, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor

of defendant Jackson on Boyd’s excessive force claim.

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In his response to defendant Jackson’s written report, Boyd alleges Jackson grasping his arm “constitutes

3

a violation of Excessive Force” because this use of force violated the Administrative Regulation of the Alabama

Department of Corrections governing the use of force by correctional officers. Plaintiff’s Traverse to Defendant

Jackson’s Special Report - Court Doc. No. 52 at 1. The court notes that this assertion entitles Boyd to no relief as

the alleged circumvention of departmental rules, regulations or policies does not constitute a violation of an inmate’s

constitutional rights. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)

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(Correctional officials “failure to follow [administrative policy or] procedures does not, by itself, raise to the level

of [a constitutional violation]....”); Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 817 F.2d 1525 (11 Cir. 1987). In th

addition, the regulation cited by Boyd allows the use of force by a correctional officer when justified under the

circumstances of the event at issue. 

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G. Supplemental Jurisdiction - State Tort Claims

With respect to the pendentstate law claimsfor medical malpractice and negligence

presented byBoyd, the court concludesthese claims provide no basisfor relief in this cause

of action. Review of any pendent state law claim is only appropriate upon exercise of this

court’s supplemental jurisdiction. In the posture of this case, however, the court deemsthe

exercise of such jurisdiction over the state tort claims inappropriate.

Two factors determine whether state law claims lacking an independent

federal jurisdictional basis can be heard in federal court with a federal claim

over which the court has jurisdiction. To exercise pendent jurisdiction [or

what is now identified assupplemental jurisdiction] overstate law claims not

otherwise cognizable in federal court, “the court must have jurisdiction over

a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from

a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d

462, 470 (5 Cir.1981) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

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715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). See generally C. Wright, A.

Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3567

pp. 443-47 (1975).

L.A. Draper and Son v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11 Cir. 1984). The

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exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is completely discretionary. United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). “If the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs

strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the state claims.” L.A. Draper and Son,

735 F.2d at 428. In view of the resolution of the federal claims presented by Boyd, the

court concludes the pendent state claims of medical malpractice and negligence are due to

be dismissed. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the

state claims should be dismissed as well); see also Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677

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F.2d 818 (11 Cir. 1982). The court therefore declines to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over the pendent state tort claims presented in this cause of action.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 25, 2011, the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 11 day of July, 2011.

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/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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