Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00929/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00929-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff refers to this defendant as "IAM & AW." For

convenience, the Court will refer to this defendant as "IAMAW." 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLANDO GRAVES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PENINSULA AUTO MACHINISTS LODGE 

NO. 1414, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS;

IAP WORLD SERVICES, INC. (formerly

Johnson Control Services, Inc.),

Defendants. 

 

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No. C-06-0929 SC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Olando Graves ("Plaintiff" or "Graves") filed this

federal action in February 2006 asserting causes of action for

declaratory relief and breach of contract against Defendants

Peninsula Auto Mechanists Lodge No. 1414, International

Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAMAW")1,

Case 3:06-cv-00929-SC Document 38 Filed 07/28/06 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 In Graves I, Plaintiff erroneously sued Defendant IAP under

its former name, Johnson Control World Services, Inc., an

appellation the Court used in order to keep the Court's orders 

consistent with Plaintiff's filings. In the instant case,

Plaintiff has corrected this blunder. 

3

 Defendant IAMAW has filed a reply and a concluding reply in

support of IAP's motion to dismiss. See Docket Nos. 36 and 37. 

The Court's dismissal, therefore, will also apply to the claims

against IAMAW. 

4 Graves II was first before the Honorable Charles R. Breyer. 

Graves II was related to Graves I and the instant action was

transferred to this Court. See Docket No. 27.

2

Plaintiff's workers union, and IAP World Services, Inc. ("IAP")2

,

Plaintiff's former employer, stemming from Defendants' alleged

racial discrimination against Plaintiff during Plaintiff's

employment with IAP World Services from September 1999 to June

2003. 

Because this action is duplicative of a related action

formerly before this Court and because it is barred by the filing

limitations imposed by 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), the Court GRANTS IAP's

motion to dismiss the claims.3 This dismissal includes the claims

against IAMAW. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action WITH

PREJUDICE. 

II. BACKGROUND

The instant action ("Graves II") is duplicative of another

action formerly before this Court, Olando Graves v. Johnson

Control World Services, et al., C-05-1772-SC, ("Graves I").4 In

Graves I, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants IAP/Johnson Control World Services, Inc. and denied

Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See Order Granting

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, C-05-1772-SC, Docket No.

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62 ("OSJ"). IAMAW was not a party to Graves I, which is on

appeal. 

Because the facts of Graves I bear directly on the instant

action, the Court will restate those that are necessary. 

Plaintiff, an African-American male, began his employment with IAP

in September 1999 as an alarm technician. OSJ at 2. Plaintiff

was a member of the Peninsula Auto Mechanists Lodge No. 1414,

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,

with which IAP entered into a collective bargaining agreement

("CBA"). Id. at 23, FN 4. 

In January 2003, IAP changed its drug testing policy to

mandate a drug test of any employee involved in a reportable

accident. Id. at 3. After Plaintiff was in such an accident,

Defendant asked Graves to visit the medical clinic to have his eye

checked out by Defendant's medical staff. Id. at 3-4. While

there, Defendant sought to administer a drug test to Plaintiff in

accordance with Defendant's company policy, but Plaintiff refused. 

Id. at 4. When subsequent efforts to perform the drug test were

rebuffed, IAP dismissed Plaintiff from his position with IAP for

refusing to comply with company policy. Id. 

In response to his termination and to other incidents he

feels were motivated by racial animus, Plaintiff filed Graves I on

July 29, 2004 in the Superior Court for the County of Alameda,

alleging that in various ways IAP discriminated against him

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5

 In Graves I, Plaintiff alleged causes of action for

violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal.

Gov. Code § 12940 et seq., termination in violation of public

policy, breach of implied or express contract of continued

employment, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. OSJ at 7. 

4

because he was an African-American.5 Id. at 1. IAP removed the

action to the Northern District of California. Id. The Court

granted IAP's motion for summary judgment because, aside from the

allegations contained in the Complaint and repeated in Plaintiff's

declaration, no evidence was set forth to substantiate any of

these claims. Id. at 26. 

Plaintiff filed Graves II in the Northern District in 2006,

alleging causes of action against his former employer IAP and his

former workers union, IAMAW, alleging causes of action for 

(1) enforcement of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by issuing

an order of declaratory relief against Defendants IAP and IAMAW;

(2) breach of duty of fair representation under the CBA by IAMAW

alone; and (3) breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by

Defendants IAP and IAMAW. See Complaint ¶¶ 42-45, 46-64, 65-67. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Enforcement and Breach of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement against IAP

Plaintiff asks the Court to issue an order to enforce his

rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, specifically his

right to be free from discrimination, harassment and retaliation

based on race and his right to the remedy of money damages and

reinstatement. See Compl. ¶¶ 42-45, 66.

Defendant IAP contends that Plaintiff's action is barred by

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the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant IAP's Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4. 

Plaintiff contends that his claims are not so barred because

the claims are not identical and his claims under the CBA were not

at issue in Graves I. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to

Motion to Dismiss ("Pl's. Mem.") at 2. 

"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any

claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior

action." Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

2002) (internal quotation marks and citation removed). "The

elements necessary to establish res judicata are (1) an identity

of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity

between the parties." Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United

States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation

and quotation marks removed). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims under the CBA are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the elements of which are

present. 

Whether the first element of an identity of the claims is

present turns on: 

(1)whether rights or interests established in the prior

judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the

second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is

presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits

involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the

two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of

facts. The last of these criteria is the most important.

Hells Canyon, 403 F.3d at 690.

Focusing on the final and most important criterion, the Court

finds that the allegations against IAP in Graves II arise from the

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6

 Specifically, in Graves I, the Court determined the

relevance of the CBA:

The Court is aware that Plaintiff was a member of a union with

which Johnson Control entered into a Collective Bargaining

Agreement[]. That agreement certainly affected the terms and

conditions of employment, however, Plaintiff does not and

cannot assert that his Fourth claim for breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on

Defendant's breach of the CBA, as that agreement designates a

specific and exclusive procedure for resolution of grievances. 

In fact, Plaintiff has already filed a motion to remand in

this case, in which Plaintiff specifically argued that his

Fourth claim is not based on the CBA, and does not even

require interpretation of the terms of that agreement. [] 

Plaintiff has apparently already exhausted his remedies under

the CBA.

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, C-05-1772-SC, Docket

No. 62. 

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same transactional nucleus of facts from which the allegations in

Graves I arose. Specifically, the allegedly discriminatory events

and acts leading up to Plaintiff's 2003 termination of employment

and the termination itself, as a perusal of the Complaints in

Graves I and Graves II indicates. 

Furthermore, the same evidence is presented in both actions

and both suits involve the same alleged infringement of

Plaintiff's right to be free from racial discrimination by his

employer. Furthermore, the rights and interests of the parties

established by the Court's entry of summary judgment for

Defendants in Graves I would be destroyed or impaired by the

prosecution of Graves II - specifically, IAP's right and interest

in the efficient and final adjudication of this controversy.

At the time of filing Graves I, Plaintiff knew of the CBA and

his rights under it.6 Any claims he had against IAP under the CBA

should have been brought at that time. His failure to raise these

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claims in Graves I is fatal to their continued existence in Graves

II. 

The remaining elements of res judicata are present. There

was a judgment on the merits of Graves I when the Court issued its

order granting summary judgment for IAP. Summary judgment is "a

judgment 'on the merits' and thus [it is] entitled to res judicata

effect in subsequent litigation (both claim preclusion and issue

preclusion effect)." Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe,

California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial,

14:28 (2004). 

Also, because IAP and Plaintiff were parties in Graves I and

Graves II, the element of privity of the parties is present. 

Even if Plaintiff's claims against IAP are not barred by res

judicata, they are barred by the filing limitation imposed by 29

U.S.C. § 160(b), as the Court will discuss in the next section.

B. Alleged Breach of the CBA and Breach of the Duty of Fair

Representation by IAMAW

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant IAMAW breached the duty

of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to investigate and

"process" his meritorious grievance and by declining to proceed to

arbitration. Compl. ¶¶ 46-64. Plaintiff was terminated in June

2003 and was informed in January of 2004 that the Union would take

no further action. IAMAW's Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Dismiss at 2. As stated above, Plaintiff filed the instant action

in 2006, more than six months after the alleged breach of fair

representation. 

Defendant IAMAW contends that Plaintiff's claim is barred by

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the statute of limitations established in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) and

confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in DelCostello v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al., 462 U.S. 151

(1983). IAMAW's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1-

2. 

The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Delcostello that in

suits by an employee against an employer for breaches of a

collective bargaining agreement and suits against a union that had

allegedly breached its "duty of fair representation by mishandling

the ensuring "grievance and arbitration proceedings" are governed

by the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(b) of the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). DelCostello,

462 U.S. at 154-155. The applicable time period under Section

160(b) is six months. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims under the CBA are

barred by the statute of limitations established by 29 U.S.C. 

§ 160(b). As stated above, suits such as the one Plaintiff

brings, are governed by the six-month limitations period of

section 160(b). Plaintiff's present action was filed in February

2006, far beyond the filing limitation imposed by the statute.

Plaintiff contends otherwise. He asserts that he could not

file his suit until he received a "right to sue" letter from the

California Department of Fair Housing and Employment. See

Declaration of Olando Graves in Support of Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss ("Graves Decl.") at 2-3. While this may be the case in

claims under California's Fair Housing and Employment Act, it

cannot be true of Plaintiff's filing of his CBA claim which is

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governed by 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). 

Plaintiff also asserts that the filing limitation imposed by

29 U.S.C. § 160(b) should be equitably tolled under the condition

set forth in California law. See Graves Decl. at 3-4. Plaintiff

cites Auto Workers v. Hoosier, 383 U.S. 696 (1966) for the

proposition that state law timing statutes should govern the

filing deadlines in his case. In Hoosier, the U.S. Supreme Court

stated that if no federal provision governs, the applicable state

statute should govern filing. Id. at 704-705. In Delcostello,

cited above, the Court distinguished Hoosier, stressing that it

"did not involve any agreement to submit disputes to arbitration,

and the suit was brought by the union itself rather than by an

individual employee." 462 U.S. at 162. As the quote from

Delcostello regarding 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) indicates, Graves II,

being a suit by an employee against his union and former employer,

is governed by the six-month limitation imposed by the statute. 

The Court's determination only mandates dismissal of the

claims against IAMAW, but it also provides another basis for

dismissing the claims against IAP. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's claims and the Complaint, and thereby the case. These

claims, the Complaint and the case are hereby DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

//

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata

and by the filing limitation imposed by 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claim and

the Complaint. The claims, the Complaint, and the case are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2006

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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