Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05085/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05085-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTEL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMERICAS NEWS INTEL PUBLISHING,

LLC,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-05085 CRB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

In this trademark infringement and dilution case, Defendant America News Intel

Publishing’s (“ANIP”) has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Intel Corporation’s First Amended

Complaint. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

FACTS ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT

 Plaintiff Intel Corp. is “a world-famous company that develops, manufactures and

sells a wide variety of computer, communications and Internet-related products and

services.” Compl. ¶ 11. “[O]ver eighty-six percent (86%) of the general public who

associate the term ‘intel’ with any word, definition, or mark, associate the term with Intel

Corporation.” Compl. ¶ 12.

“Among its myriad products and services, Intel offers newsletters and information

services under its INTEL mark covering diverse subjects including, but not limited to,

business forecasting, consumer trends, and business analysis.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14. These

newsletters “explore how technology can improve forecasting of markets and consumer

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

demand, implement more efficient and convenient healthcare, and secure business

information.” Compl. ¶ 14. The target audience for these publications “includes individuals

in the U.S. who are interested in technological business developments, trends and forecasts,

both domesitc and abroad.” Compl. ¶ 14.

Intel has extensive operations in Latin America generally and Mexico specifically. 

Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16. For instance, it operates a design center in Guadalajara, Mexico and field

offices in Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico. Compl. ¶ 16. “Consistent with its

significant presence in Latin America, Intel owns approximately 880 active or pending

trademark registrations for INTEL-formative trademarks throughout Latin America” and

“owns and uses numerous INTEL-formative, country code top-level domains to promote

Intel in Latin America.” Compl. ¶ ¶ 17, 18.

Defendant Americas News Intel Publishing, LLC “offers consulting services and

newsletter subscriptions on business, economics, travel and politics in Mexico under the

trade name AMERICAS NEWS INTEL PUBLISHING and the trademarks LATIN INTEL

and LATIN INTEL TRADE CENTER.” Compl. ¶ 9. ANIP “promotes its services on the

World Wide Web at the addresses http://www.latinintel.com and http://latinintel-tc.com.”

Compl. ¶ 9. 

According to Intel, ANIP “targets many of the same customers as Intel and

Defendant’s actual customers substantially overlap with Intel’s actual customers.” Compl. ¶

28. These customers include “the majority of Fortune 500 companies” and “multinational

business executives and other business professionals, among others, with an interest in North

American business trends affecting Mexico.” Compl. ¶ 28.

PLAINTIFF’S CAUSES OF ACTION

Intel asserts eight causes of action in its amended Complaint. Those are:

(1) Trademark Infringement, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114;

(2) False Designation of Origin, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A);

(3) Federal Trademark Dilution, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C);

(4) Injury to Business Reputation and Dilution under California law;

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(5) Infringement under California law;

(6) Common Law Passing Off and Unfair Competition;

(7) Unfair Competition, in violation of Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200;

(8) Federal Cybersquatting, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

Now pending before the Court is ANIP’s Motion to Dismiss all eight of Intel’s claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a

complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This

“facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 544, 555.

DISCUSSION

Defendant has moved to dismiss Intel’s Amended Complaint in its entirety. The

Court finds that, though a close question, Intel has set forth allegations sufficient to survive a

motion to dismiss. 

1. First and Second Cause of Action: Trademark Infringement and False

Designation of Origin

To state a claim for infringement of a registered trademark, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege that (1) it owns a registered trademark; (2) its use of that mark began before the

defendant’s use; (3) the defendant’s use is without the plaintiff’s consent; and (4) the

defendant’s use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. See 15

U.S.C. § 1114(a); Century 21 Real Estate v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The elements of a false designation of origin claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are identical,

with the exception that the plaintiff’s trademark need not be registered. See 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a). Both claims are subject to the same “ultimate test”: “whether the public is likely to

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks.” Century 21, 846 F.2d at 1178; see

also Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008). The “confusion must

be probable, not simply a possibility.” Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d

858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In its motion to dismiss, ANIP argues that Intel has failed to state a trademark

infringement claim for two reasons. First, it avers that Intel has failed to plausibly allege that

it has “used” the INTEL trademark. In ANIP’s view, the facts alleged in Intel’s amended

Complaint establish that ANIP’s trade name and trademarks use the word “intel” in its

generic or common sense, i.e., as a synonym for news or information, not as a reference to

the INTEL mark. Second, ANIP argues that Intel has failed to allege that its use of the term

“intel” is likely to deceive or confuse the public.

ANIP’s first argument is not without merit. Where a defendant uses a word “for its

literal dictionary definition,” the defendant cannot be held liable for trademark infringement. 

See Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 2010 WL 2559003 at * 3 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 9771 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)

(noting that “generic words” are not protectable). This rule “allays fears that producers will

deplete the stock of useful words by asserting exclusive rights in them.” New Kids on the

Block, 971 F.2d at 306.

In this case, there is some force to ANIP’s assertion that it is using the term “intel” in

connection with its generic meaning. According to Intel’s Complaint, ANIP “offers for sale

newsletters and information services to its U.S. customers that track and forecast business,

economics and politics, with an emphasis on the business environment in Mexico.” Compl. ¶

27. In other words, ANIP provides “news” and “information” about the business, economic,

and political climate in Mexico. Thus, ANIP’s use of the term of “intel” appears to be

consistent with the term’s common meaning. See Miriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2010)

(defining “intel” as “information, news”). 

Despite the potential strength of ANIP’s argument, the Court finds that dismissing

Intel’s Complaint on this ground would be premature. Intel notes in its Complaint that the

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

others words ANIP uses in its trademarks also convey that it is selling news and information

about Latin America. Compl. ¶ 29. For example, ANIP stands for “Americas News Intel

Publishing.” Because the terms “Americas,” “News,” and “Publishing” also signify that

ANIP is providing news and information about the Americas, ANIP’s use of the additional,

arguably redundant, term “intel” could plausibly be viewed as an effort to “free-rid[e] on

[Intel’s] marks.” New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305. 

The obvious similarities of the marks and the alleged strength of the INTEL mark also

support Intel’s assertion that ANIP is attempting to tread on the software maker’s reputation. 

See Compl. ¶ 12 (alleging that “over eighty-six (86%) of the general public who associate the

term ‘intel’ with any word, definition, or mark associate the term with Intel Corporation”).

What’s more, the Court cannot, at this stage in the litigation, determine with certainty

how ANIP is using the term “intel.” The Court has not, for instance, had the opportunity to

review copies of ANIP’s newsletters, its customer solicitations, or the content of its websites. 

The only information available to the Court at the moment are the allegations contained

within Intel’s Complaint. As noted, those allegations support a plausible claim that ANIP

chose to use the term “intel” in order to take advantage of Intel’s reputation and goodwill.

In a second, related argument, ANIP asserts that Intel’s infringement claims fail

because the company has not adequately alleged that ANIP’s use of “intel” is likely to cause

confusion among ANIP’s potential customers regarding the source of ANIP’s services. The

Court disagrees.

In determining whether confusion between goods and services is likely, this Court

considers eight factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) relatedness of the goods and services; (3)

similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channel used; (6)

type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the

defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 

AMF, Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.3d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979).

The Court finds that Intel has alleged facts sufficient to support a plausible claim that

customer confusion is likely to result from ANIP’s use of the Intel mark. Intel alleges, and

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

ANIP does not dispute, that the Intel mark “is among the most famous and distinctive in the

world.” Compl. ¶ 1 & ¶ 12 (alleging that eight-six percent of the general public associate the

term “intel” with the Intel trademark). Intel has therefore alleged sufficient facts to place the

first factor in its column.

Intel has also alleged facts sufficient to support a plausible finding that its services are

closely related to ANIP’s services. Specifically, Intel asserts that it “offers newsletters and

information services under its INTEL mark covering diverse subjects including, but not

limited to, business forecasting, consumer trends, and business analysis.” Compl. ¶ 1. The

company further alleges that ANIP sells “newsletters featuring similar subject matter to many

of the same customers.” Id.; see also Compl. ¶ 28 (alleging that ANIP “targets many of the

same customers as Intel and [ANIP’s] actual customers substantially overlap with Intel’s

actual customers.”); Compl. ¶ 28 (specifically identifying the overlapping customers as “the

“majority of Fortune 500 companies” and “multinational business executives and other

business professionals, among others, with an interest in Northern American business trends

affecting Mexico”). 

ANIP vigorously disputes that Intel is selling newsletters that cover topics similar to

those that it covers. It likewise contests Intel’s allegation that the two companies serve the

same customers. ANIP may be correct. But, again, at this stage in the litigation the Court

must accept Intel’s allegations as true. Doing so, the Court finds that Intel has plausibly

alleged that it and ANIP’s services are related.

Intel’s allegations likewise establish that ANIP’s allegedly infringing marks and trade

names are similar to the INTEL mark. ANIP’s marks, which are only two or four words

long, all prominently feature and emphasize the term “intel.” The LATIN INTEL mark is

particularly similar to Intel’s mark. Therefore, the “similarity of the marks” factor also

weighs in Intel’s favor.

With respect to the fourth factor, Intel does not allege that there has been any actual

confusion among its current or potential customers. This factor therefore does not support its

infringement claim.

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 6 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

However, Intel has alleged that it uses the same marketing channels as ANIP to

market its newsletters. Namely, the company asserts that ANIP, “along with Intel, offers [its]

newsletters through websites and by email subscription.” Compl. ¶ 28. Intel also alleges

that, at some point, ANIP’s website featured advertisements for Intel’s products. Compl. ¶

30. This allegation, which the Court must accept as true, lends further support to Intel’s

argument that customer confusion is likely. 

Finally, Intel alleges that ANIP acted “with the bad faith intent to profit from Intel’s

INTEL trademark.” Compl. ¶ 73. ANIP’s “intent in selecting the mark” therefore also

weighs in favor of a finding of customer confusion.

In sum, the Court finds that, assuming Intel’s allegations are true, nearly all the

Sleekcraft factors weigh in favor of a finding that customer confusion is likely. Accordingly,

Intel has stated a plausible trademark infringement and false designation of origin cause of

action. 

2. Claim 3: Federal Trademark Dilution

Intel has likewise succeeded in stating a plausible claim for trademark dilution. To

state a claim for trademark dilution, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the mark is famous and

distinctive; (2) the defendant is making use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use

began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to

cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.” Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518

F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2008). 

ANIP concedes that the first three factors are satisfied here. Therefore, the only issue

is whether Intel has plausibly alleged that ANIP’s use of the term “intel” is likely to cause

dilution by blurring. The Court finds that it has.

Dilution by blurring “occurs when a mark previously associated with one product also

becomes associated with a second.” Visa Int’l, 2010 WL 2559003 at * 1. “Congress has

enumerated factors courts may use to analyze the likelihood of dilution [by blurring] . . . ” 

Id. Those factors include: “(i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and

the famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark;

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

(iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive

use of the mark; (iv) the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (v) whether the defendant

intended to create an association with the famous mark; and (vi) any actual association

between the defendant’s mark and the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(2)(B). 

The allegations in Intel’s Complaint establish several of these factors in its favor. 

First, as already discussed, ANIP’s three marks are very similar to the INTEL mark. All

three are short phrases that prominently feature and emphasize the word INTEL. Second,

Intel alleges that its mark is “world-renowned” and “distinctive,” allegations ANIP does not

dispute. Compl. ¶¶ 50-52. Third, Intel asserts that “over eighty-six percent (86%) of the

general public who associate the term ‘intel’ with any word, definition, or mark, associate the

term with Intel Corporation,” indicating that its mark has a high degree of recognition.

Compl. ¶ 12. Fourth, Intel avers that ANIP intended to create an association with the Intel

mark so as “to profit from Intel’s INTEL trademark.” Compl. ¶ 73. These allegations

collectively support a plausible claim for dilution by blurring.

Arguing to the contrary, ANIP maintains, in a repeat of a previous argument, that

Intel’s dilution claim fails because ANIP is using the term “intel” in its generic sense. If

ANIP’s assertion is true, then Intel’s dilution claim, like its infringement claim, is not

cognizable. See Visa Int’l, 2010 WL 2559003, at *3 (noting that use of a word “for its literal

dictionary definition” is not actionable). For the reasons discussed above, however, the

Court finds that it would be premature to dismiss Intel’s dilution claim on this ground. See

supra, p. 4. 

3. Claims 4 - 7: State Law Claims

Intel’s California state law infringement, dilution, and unfair competition claims are

subject to the same tests as its federal claims. See Jada Toys, 518 F.3d at 631 n.1, 632, 634. 

The company’s state claims therefore survive ANIP’s motion to dismiss for the same reasons

as its federal claims.

/ / / / 

/ / / /

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

4. Claim 8: Federal Cybersquatting

To state a claim for cybersquatting, the plaintiff must show: (1) defendant registered,

trafficked in or used a domain name that is identical to, confusing similar to, or dilutive of,

(2) plaintiff’s distinctive or famous mark, (3) with a bad faith intent to profit. 15 U.S.C. §

1125(d)(1)(B)(1). 

Intel alleges that ANIP’s registration of the domain names www.latinintel.com and

www.latinintel-tc.com constitutes unlawful cybersquatting, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1125(d). As already noted, Intel has alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that

LATIN INTEL is dilutive of the INTEL trademark. The domain names latinintel.com and

latinintel-tc.com are likewise plausibly dilutive. In addition, it is undisputed that the Intel

mark is famous and distinctive. Intel has therefore plead sufficient facts to satisfy the first

two elements of a cybersquatting claim.

Whether Intel has alleged sufficient facts to meet the third element of a valid

cybersquatting claim is a somewaht closer question. In support of its allegation that ANIP

registered the domain names “with the bad faith intent to profit from Intel’s INTEL

trademark,” Intel asserts that ANIP’s “website has prominently featured unauthorized uses of

Intel’s trademarks and products, in an effort to [cause] consumer confusion.” Compl. ¶ 21. 

ANIP denies that it uses Intel’s trademarks or advertises its products on its website. The

Court, however, must accept Intel’s allegations as true. 

Moreover, the allegation that ANIP’s websites prominently feature Intel’s trademarks

and products, combined with the fact that ANIP’s domain names use and emphasize the term

“intel,” is sufficient to state a plausible claim that ANIP registered its domain names with the

bad faith intent to “divert business from the trademark holder to the domain name holder.” 

Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, Intel’s

allegations support a plausible claim that ANIP registered its domain names with a “bad faith

intent to profit” from Intel’s mark. Accordingly, the company’s cybersquatting claim is

sufficiently plead to survive ANIP’s motion to dismiss.

/ / / /

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2009\5085\Order re Motion to Dismiss FAC.wpd 10

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed above, ANIP’s Motion to Dismiss Intel’s Amended

Complaint is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-05085-CRB Document 53 Filed 07/12/10 Page 10 of 10