Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01162/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01162-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LG CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HUANG XIAOWEN DBA TOPUUSHOP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-1162 JLS (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(ECF No. 136)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs LG Corporation’s, LG Electronics, Inc.’s, 

and LG Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc.’s (collectively, “LG”) Motion for Attorneys’ 

Fees (“Fee Mot.,” ECF No. 136), as well as their Supplemental Memorandum in Support 

of Their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, (“Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem.,” ECF No. 147). The Court

vacated the hearing on the motion and took the matter under submission without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 144.) After considering LG’s 

arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS LG’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2017, the Court granted LG’s Motion for Default Judgment against 

several Defendants (collectively, “Defaulting Defendants”). (“Amended D.J. Order,” ECF 

No. 127.) The Court also awarded Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and 

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invited LG to submit evidence of their attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 25.1) LG timely filed their 

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, which the Court now considers. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Lanham Act provides that in “exceptional cases” the court “may award 

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).2“To determine what 

fee should be awarded, the court must first determine the ‘lodestar,’ which is the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” 

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1990); see 

also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for 

determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”). There is a “strong presumption” 

that the lodestar represents the reasonable fee. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 

562 (1992). “Next, in appropriate cases, the district court may adjust the ‘presumptively 

reasonable’ lodestar figure based upon the factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 

Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir. 1975) (Kerr), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S. Ct. 1726, 

48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Intel 

Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993).

3

“The lodestar amount 

presumably reflects the novelty and complexity of the issues, the special skill and 

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

2 The Court has already determined that this case is exceptional as applied to the Defaulting Defendants. 

(See Amended D.J. Order 24–25.)

3 The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other 

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is 

fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount 

involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and 

(12) awards in similar cases. See Intel Corp., 6 F.3d at 622. 

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experience of counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained from the 

litigation.” Id.

ANALYSIS

LG seek a total of $383,134.354in attorneys’ fees apportioned per Defaulting 

Defendant. The Court will now consider the reasonableness of the hourly rates and the 

hours expended.

I. Reasonableness of Rate

“To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the 

fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own 

affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The relevant community is that in which 

the district court sits.” Weeks v. Kellogg Co., 2013 WL 6531177, No. CV 0908102(MMM) 

(RZx), at *32 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2013) (citing Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995)). “In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the 

court may take into account: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues; (2) the special 

skill and experience of counsel; (3) the quality of representation; and (4) the results 

obtained.” Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 

2015).

The billing rates for Finnegan attorneys and summer associates working on this case 

ranged from $130 to $890, depending on the individual’s experience. (Decl. of Mark 

Sommers in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Sommers Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 136-2.) 

Mr. Sommers, the lead counsel for LG since the inception of this case, was the only 

attorney charging $850 to $890 per hour, (id. ¶¶ 2–3), and LG further notes that Finnegan 

partners billed an average of $695 per hour, (Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem. 3). The billing rate for 

 

4 LG originally sought $405,443.69 in attorneys’ fees. (See generally Fee Mot.) However, LG is willing 

to reduce the hourly rates of their paralegal work, which shaves $22,309.34 off of the original request. 

(Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem. 8.)

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Finnegan paralegals ranged from $210 to $350, depending on the individual’s level of 

experience and responsibilities. (Id. ¶ 12.) In support of these rates LG cites market reports 

detailing the prevailing rates for intellectual property attorneys in San Diego and cases 

from this district discussing and finding reasonable similar rates. For the reasons outlined 

below, this evidence persuades the Court that these hourly rates are reasonable. See United 

Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407 (“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys 

regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, 

particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the 

prevailing market rate.”).

The Court finds these rates reasonable for a number of reasons. For one, Finnegan 

is an international intellectual property firm with numerous accolades for its intellectual 

property work. (Sommers Decl. ¶ 17 (collecting awards).) In addition, courts recognize that 

intellectual property work requires specialized knowledge. See, e.g., Yufa v. TSI Inc., No. 

09-cv-01315-KAW, 2014 WL 4071902, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014). Moreover, LG 

obtained favorable results in this case, including a temporary restraining order, preliminary 

and permanent injunctive relief, and statutory damages of over $168,000,000 spread out 

over the Defaulting Defendants. (See generally Amended D.J. Order.)

Furthermore, Finnegan’s hourly rates are in line with other cases in this district

approving similar fee requests by peer law firms. See, e.g., Zest IP Holdings, LLC v. 

Implant Direct Mfg., LLC, No. 10-CV-0541-GPC WVG, 2014 WL 6851612, at *5 (S.D. 

Cal. Dec. 3, 2014) (finding rates reasonable where plaintiffs sought “an hourly rate of 

between $170 per hour and $895 per hour depending on the particular attorney or 

paralegal” for work by a “multi-state/national law firm”). As for partner billing rates, 

Finnegan’s rates appear to be within the median range of billing rates in 2015 for 

intellectual property suits in San Diego. See Flowrider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., 

No. 15CV1879-BEN (BLM), 2017 WL 2212029, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2017) (citing a 

publication noting that the 2015 median billing rates for intellectual property partners in 

San Diego was between $585.04 and $727.50). Although Mr. Sommers’ rate of $783 is 

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higher than this range, the Court finds that it is nevertheless reasonable because it falls 

within the range of rates charged by intellectual property partners of similar experience 

(which is $331–$870), (Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem. 3 (citing AIPLA 2015 Report of the 

Economic Survey (“AIPLA Survey”) I-25)), and is less than the lead counsel rate 

previously approved in Zest. See Zest, 2014 WL 6851612, at *5 (finding reasonable an 

hourly rate of $850–$895 for the plaintiffs’ lead counsel). Thus, the Court finds reasonable 

the rates charged by Finnegan partners in this case.

The associate billing rates are also reasonable. Finnegan associates billed between 

$370 and $488, for an average of $415. (Fee Mot. Suppl. Reply 4.) This average is within 

$2 of the median billing rate in 2015 for intellectual property associates in San Diego, (id.

(citing Flowrider Surf, 2017 WL 2212029, at *3 (noting that the average was $413.80)), 

and in some cases is lower than the rates approved by other courts in this district, (id. at 4–

5 (citing Zest, 2014 WL 6851612, at *5–6)). LG notes that only one of its associate’s rate 

of $444 falls outside the AIPLA Survey range. (Id. at 5.) The Court nevertheless finds this 

departure reasonable given that it is a small departure and that the Zest Court found 

reasonable a $565 hourly rate for an associate with similar experience. Zest, 2014 WL 

6851612, at *5. Thus, the Court finds reasonable the rates charged by the Finnegan 

associates in this case. (See also Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem. 5–6 (providing a chart that lists 

each attorney’s experience level and billing rate (accounting for LG’s fee agreement) and 

compares these rates to the AIPLA Survey, the 2016 Real Rate Report, and rates previously 

found reasonable in this district).)

Finally, the Court finds reasonable the paralegal rates. Here, Finnegan paralegals 

billed between $184.80 and $308 per hour, accounting for LG’s fee agreement. (Fee Mot. 

Suppl. Mem. 7.) However, LG notes that in this District paralegal rates between $125 and 

$175 are generally approved and have been approved as high as $290. (Id. (citing In re 

Maxwell Techs., Inc., Derivative Litig., No. 13-cv-966-BEN (RBB), 2015 WL 12791166, 

at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2015) (awarding $225 paralegal rate to paralegals with “significant 

experience”); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Coldwater Creek Inc., No. 06-cv-01848-H 

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(POR), 2009 WL 160235, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (concluding that $90 to $210 per 

hour was reasonable for paralegal work in a copyright infringement action); Flowrider 

Surf, 2017 WL 2212029, at *3 (awarding paralegal fees of $150 per hour in a patent 

infringement case)).) Given this authority, LG is willing to reduce the hourly rate for most 

of their paralegals to $175 per hour. (Id.) The Court finds such a reduction reasonable, 

particularly because Finnegan’s paralegals have significant experience in their respective 

positions, in most cases over ten years. (Id. (citing Sommers Decl., ¶¶ 12–16).) Two 

paralegals have a rate of $225 per hour, which the Court finds reasonable given that they 

both have been paralegals for over twenty years. (Id. (citing Sommers Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15)); 

see also Maxwell Techs., 2015 WL 12791166, at *5 (approving a $225 rate for paralegals 

with “significant experience”). Thus, the Court finds reasonable the rates charged by 

Finnegan paralegals in this case, and will adjust the final award accordingly. (Id. at 8 

(providing downward calculations based on paralegal rate reduction).)

II. Hours Reasonably Spent

“The moving party bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours spent in 

the litigation and submitting evidence in support of the hours worked.” Zest, 2014 WL 

6851612, at *6 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214

F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a party satisfies its burden by listing the hours 

spent and “identifying the general subject matter of [the] time expenditures”). “Even if the 

opposing party has not objected to the time billed, the district court ‘may not uncritically 

accept a fee request,’ but is obligated to review the time billed and assess whether it is 

reasonable in light of the work performed and the context of the case.” Zest, 2014 WL 

6851612, at *7 (citing Common Cause v. Jones, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 

2002)); see also McGrath v. Cty. of Nev., 67 F.3d 248, 254 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 

a court may not adopt the prevailing party’s representations without conducting an 

independent review of the fee application).

The Court finds the hours spent reasonable for two reasons. First, LG provides 

detailed monthly billing statements from counsel, as well as various charts summarizing 

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those statements. (Fee Mot. 3 (citing Sommers Decl. ¶ 19, Exs. 2–5).) These statements 

reflect the date, amount, and nature of work LG’s attorney’s performed. (Id.) These fees 

represent over a year of work on this case, from initiation to obtaining and enforcing a 

temporary restraining and show cause order through default judgment. (Id. at 4.) After an 

independent review of these billing statements, the Court finds that they reasonably 

represent the hours spent in pertinent litigation against the Defaulting Defendants.

Second, LG reasonably apportioned their fees as to each Defendant. LG’s 

calculation of the lodestar was complicated by the complex nature of this case, including 

the large number of defendants (22) and claims involved. To accurately apportion their 

fees, LG conducted a thorough analysis of their attorneys’ billing statements, excluding 

billing entries for Defendants Doe 1, Phuong Nguyen, Lam Le, Bestcom Wireless 

Network, Inc., and N&K Trading, Inc. (collectively, the “Non-Defaulting Defendants”). 

(Id. (citing Sommers Decl. ¶ 20).) Out of an abundance of caution, LG further excluded 

any billing entries that encompassed work relating to the Defaulting Defendants and the 

Non-Defaulting Defendants (i.e., LG does not seek fees for any overlapping work). (Id.) 

And LG excluded all travel and correspondence costs from their calculation. (Id.) LG 

categorized the remaining billing entries as follows:

 Category 1: Entries that relate to Finnegan’s work on LG’s claims 

against all defendants, e.g., investigatory and preparatory work for the 

complaint, work relating to LG’s motion for a temporary restraining 

order, service efforts, etc. For purposes of allocating fees to each 

individual Defaulting Defendant, the total in Category 1 has been 

divided by 22 to reflect fees incurred per defendant.

 Category 2: Entries that relate to Finnegan’s work on LG’s claims 

against Shenzhen ZL Times Technology Co., Shenzhen Powerfire 

Technology Co. Ltd., Shenzhen Newsinte Electronics Co. Ltd., and 

Shenzhen Leisen Technology Co., Ltd. (the “Shenzhen Defendants”), 

e.g., LG’s ex parte application for an order to show cause (Dkts. 19, 20) 

and LG’s response to the Court’s request for additional briefing on this 

matter (Dkt. 37). For purposes of allocating fees to each individual 

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Shenzhen Defendant, the total in Category 2 has been divided by 4 to

reflect fees incurred per defendant.

 Category 3: Entries that relate to Finnegan’s work on LG’s claims 

against the Defaulting Defendants, e.g., LG’s motion for default 

judgment. For purposes of allocating fees to each individual Defaulting 

Defendant, the total in Category 3 has been divided by 17 to reflect fees

incurred per defendant.

 Category 4: Entries that relate to Finnegan’s work on LG’s claims 

against Yoon Hee Park and Herman Wheeler, Inc., e.g. service efforts. 

Where possible, these entries were allocated to the appropriate 

defendant. The total for the remaining entries in Category 4 has been 

divided by 2 to reflect fees incurred per defendant.

(Id.)

LG then added the amounts from each category per Defaulting Defendant to arrive 

at the following individualized totals:5

Defendant Attorney’s Fees Claimed

Xiaowen $21,383.54

Enjoy $21,383.54

Hosphone Electronic $21,383.54

Shenzhen Bingos $21,383.54

Shenzhen ZL $31,161.66

Winding Electronic $21,383.54

Shenzhen Powerfire $31,161.66

Newkingser $21,383.54

 

5 The Court notes that these totals are necessarily adjusted based on LG’s decision to lower their hourly 

rates for Finnegan’s paralegal work; this chart was submitted prior to LG making their decision.

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Little Link $21,383.54

King Flash $21,383.54

Shenzhen Newsinte $31,161.66

Smart Link $21,383.54

Ruilin Tech $21,383.54

Shenzhen Leisen $31,161.66

Herman Wheeler $22,844.96

Lu $31,161.66

Park $22,733.15

TOTAL: $405,443.69

(Id. at 5–6.) Given the foregoing, the Court finds that LG has met their burden of 

documenting the appropriate hours spent in this case. In addition, The Court finds that LG

have made “a good faith effort to exclude from [their] fee request hours that are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that LG’s requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable and thus GRANTS LG’s 

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS LG’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

(ECF No. 136) and thus AWARDS LG $383,134.35 in attorneys’ fees apportioned per 

Defendant pursuant to LG’s calculations, (Fee Mot. 5–6), and accounting for any variances 

in these calculations based on their decision to reduce the hourly rates of their paralegal 

work, (Fee Mot. Suppl. Mem. 8). Additionally, because this appears to be the final matter

/ / /

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/ / /

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in this case, the Court ORDERS LG to show cause why this case should not be closed on 

or before seven days from the date on which this Order is electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2017

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