Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01117/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Justin Gabriel Lincoln, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-01117-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Justin Gabriel Lincoln has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that the Petition should be 

dismissed because Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

(Doc. 9.) Respondents alternatively argue that the Petition should be dismissed as 

untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which 

provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas 

corpus relief, or because Petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas 

corpus review. (Id.) Petitioner has filed a reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 14.) 

For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed as untimely. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On July 24, 2008, Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of kidnapping, class two 

felonies and dangerous crimes against children. (Doc. 9, Exs A-C.) Petitioner pleaded 

guilty and, as part of his plea, admitted the following factual basis: 

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In CR 2007–048617–002 in Maricopa County, Arizona, on September 23rd, 2007 Brandon Larue Williams along with the defendant Justin Gabriel Lincoln knowingly restrained [E.B.], a child under the age of 15, with the intent to place [E.B.] in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to him or to otherwise aid in the commission of a 

felony and the felony was to commit an armed robbery at a 

Game Stop Store. Additionally, on that date both Brandon 

Larue Williams and Justin Gabriel Lincoln knowingly restrained [D.V.], a child under 15 years of age, with the intent to place [D.V.] in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury or to otherwise aid in the commission of a 

felony which was again the armed robbery at the Game Stop 

store. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. P at 10-12.) 

 Petitioner also admitted that he restrained both children during the robbery by 

putting them on the ground and threatening them with a gun. (Id.) On August 28, 2008, 

the trial court sentenced Petitioner to seventeen years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 9, Ex. D.) 

B. Rule 32 Of-Right Proceeding 

 Because he pleaded guilty, Petitioner’s only avenue of direct review was an “of 

right” proceeding under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) (“[I]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a 

judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . shall have the right to file a postconviction relief proceeding known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding”). On November 

14, 2008, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. E.) Petitioner then filed a petition raising the following four claims: (1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him pursuant to the 

dangerous crimes against children (DCAC) statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–604.01, because 

his offenses were not specifically directed at children; (3) the trial court violated 

Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to enforce Arizona Ethical Rule 1.3; and (4) the 

trial court violated Petitioner’s due process rights by setting a cut-off date for a plea. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. F.) 

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 On February 11, 2010, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. H.) The court found that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel lacked merit, Petitioner was properly sentenced under the DCAC statute because 

his conduct in restraining the victims was directed at everyone in the store, including two 

victims under the age fifteen, and Petitioner waived his due process claims by pleading 

guilty. (Doc. 9, Ex. H.) Almost a year later, on January 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a 

petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9, Ex. I.) On January 31, 

2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely under Rule 

32.9(c). (Doc. 9, Ex. J.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On October 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief in 

the trial court. (Doc. 9, Ex. K.) Petitioner later filed a petition arguing that newly 

discovered facts entitled him to relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. L.) Specifically, Petitioner asserted 

that he had recently learned that too much time passed between his initial appearance and 

when the State filed a complaint. (Id.) On October 27, 2011, the trial court dismissed the 

proceeding as untimely. (Doc. 9, Ex. M.) The court determined that Petitioner failed to 

state a claim sufficient to excuse the untimeliness. (Id.) 

 On November 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a “Request for Leave to File Amendment 

of Pleadings.” (Doc. 9, Ex. N.) Because Petitioner did not have a pending Rule 32 

proceeding and therefore no pleading to amend, the court treated the filing as a third 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. O.) In that petition, Petitioner asserted 

that the State violated Rule 4.1(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure when it did 

not file the complaint within forty-eight hours of Petitioner’s initial appearance, did not 

release him from jail during that time, and did not appoint Petitioner counsel to challenge 

that unlawful incarceration. (Doc. 9, Ex. N.) On December 13, 2011, the court denied 

relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. O.) The court found that Petitioner’s claim was waived because he 

could have raised it in his prior post-conviction proceeding. (Id.) The court alternatively 

found that Rule 4.1(b) was not violated and, even if a violation occurred, Petitioner had 

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not shown how it affected his subsequent guilty plea and sentence. (Id.) Petitioner did 

not file a petition for review. 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On April 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court raising a single claim that he is “actually innocent as it pertains to sentencing 

[because the State] failed to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to 

activate the sentencing enhancement Petitioner ple[aded] guilty to.” (Doc. 1.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner does not present a cognizable claim, the Petition is 

untimely, and Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review. (Doc. 9.) As set forth below, the Court concludes that the Petition is 

untimely and should be dismissed on that basis. Therefore, the Court does not address 

Respondents’ other grounds for denying relief. 

II. Timeliness of Petition 

 Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely under the AEDPA one-year 

limitations period. (Doc. 9 at 5.) Petitioner does not dispute that his Petition is untimely. 

(Doc. 14.) Rather, he argues that the Court should excuse his untimely filing. (Id.) As 

discussed below, the Court finds the Petition untimely. 

 The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “Section 

2244(d)(1) ‘contain[s] multiple provisions relating to the events that trigger its running.’” 

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010)). “The triggering events are the dates on which: direct review 

becomes final, an unlawful state-created impediment to filing is removed, a new 

constitutional right is made retroactively available, or the factual predicate of the claim(s) 

presented could have been discovered with ‘due diligence.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)). The one-year statute of limitations begins running on the latest of 

these dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2001). Because the Petition does not implicate any of the starting dates in 

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§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), the Court determines the triggering date for the limitations period 

under § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

 Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins to run on “the date on which 

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for 

seeking such review.” As previously noted, by pleading guilty, Petitioner was precluded 

from pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-

4033(B). However, Petitioner could seek review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to 

Rule 32, which is the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

and 32.4; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Arizona 

courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct review). On November 14, 

2008, Petitioner commenced a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Doc. 9, Ex. E.) The trial 

court denied relief and dismissed that proceeding on February 11, 2010. (Doc. 9, Ex. H.) 

 Petitioner had thirty days in which to file a petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Respondents add five days to the thirtyday deadline citing Rule 1.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides 

that “whenever a party has the right or is required to take some action within a prescribed 

period after service of a notice or other paper and such service is allowed and made by 

mail, 5 days shall be added to the prescribed period.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a); see State 

v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that Rule 1.3 applies to petitions 

for review in post-conviction proceedings). With the additional five days, Petitioner had 

until March 18, 2010 to file a petition for review. Petitioner did not file a petition for 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals by that deadline.1

 Therefore, Petitioner’s 

conviction became final upon the expiration of the time for seeking direct review on 

 

1

 After March 18, 2010 deadline for seeking review in the appellate court expired, on January 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and the court dismissed it as untimely. (Doc. 9, Exs. I and J.) Petitioner’s untimely filing does not change the time for seeking direct review which expired on March 18, 2010, and does not affect the commencement of the statute of limitations. See

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1068, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (a conviction is final on 

direct review upon the expiration of the time for seeking further review). 

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March 18, 2010, and the one–year limitations period began running the next day. See 

Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1073-74 (a petitioner’s conviction was final on direct review upon 

the expiration of the time for seeking review of the court of appeals decision in the 

Arizona Supreme Court); Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012) 

(direct review becomes “final” on the date the time for seeking such review expires). 

Accordingly, the limitations period expired on March 18, 2011. Thus, unless statutory 

tolling, equitable tolling, or an exception to the statute of limitations applies, the Petition, 

which was filed on April 18, 2016, is untimely. 

B. Statutory Tolling

 The AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 After the limitations period expired, Petitioner commenced his second and third 

post-conviction proceedings in October and November 2011. (Doc. 9, Exs. K, N.) 

However, once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed postconviction relief proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) does not 

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition 

was filed”). Because the AEDPA statute of limitations had expired by the time Petitioner 

commenced his post-conviction proceedings in October and November 2011, those 

proceedings did not toll the limitations period. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

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However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Whether to apply the 

doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Petitioner has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any extraordinary 

circumstance that prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. 

(Docs. 1 and 14.) Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance 

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. See 

Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s 

pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing 

period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

Accordingly, equitable tolling does not apply. 

D. Equitable Exception to the Statute of Limitations 

 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts the Court should excuse his non-compliance with 

the statute of limitations under an equitable exception to the statute of limitations. 

(Doc. 14.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that he is “actually innocent” of the 

enhancement of his sentence based on the commission of a dangerous crime against 

children because although minors were present during the robbery, there is no evidence 

that he directed his conduct at them. (Doc. 14 at 5-8.) As discussed below, Petitioner has 

not shown that an equitable exception of the limitations period applies. 

 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013), the United 

States Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a 

claim of actual innocence. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct at 1928 (“Actual innocence, if proved, 

serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a 

procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” The Court adopted the 

actual innocence gateway previously recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 

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(1995), for excusing the bar to federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted 

claims.2

 McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38) (holding that 

“actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass 

whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House [v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518 (2006), or . . . expiration of the statute of limitations.”). 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. In the sentencing context, actual innocence means 

“actual[] innocen[ce] of the act on which [the petitioner’s] harsher sentence was based.” 

Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 

2000). In this context, “the actual innocence inquiry will focus on the reliability of those 

facts that make defendant eligible for a harsher sentence . . . .” Id. (citing Sawyer v. 

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1992)). “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway pleas are 

rare.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928. The Schlup standard permits review only in the 

“extraordinary” case. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27. 

 Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is based on his assertion that the trial court 

improperly sentenced him pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, which applies to 

convictions for dangerous crimes against children, because Petitioner believes his 

conduct did not target children as required by that statute.3

 (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 14.) Under 

 

2

 Respondents argue that the actual innocence exception does not apply to non- capital cases. (Doc. 9 at 9.) The Court does not need to resolve this issue because 

assuming the actual innocence exception applies to Petitioner’s case, Petitioner does not 

satisfy that exception. See Section II.C.

3

 At time of Petitioner’s offenses, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01(D) (2007) 

provided that: 

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who is at least eighteen years of age or who has been tried as an adult 

and who stands convicted of a dangerous crime against children in the first degree involving aggravated assault, molestation of a child, commercial sexual exploitation of a 

minor, sexual exploitation of a minor, child abuse or 

kidnapping shall be sentenced to a presumptive term of 

imprisonment for seventeen years. If the convicted person has been previously convicted of one predicate felony the 

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the statute, a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced as a dangerous crime against 

children if the State “prov[es] the defendant committed a crime enumerated by the statute 

that ‘focused on, [was] directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of 

fifteen.’” State v. Miranda–Cabrera, 99 P.3d 35, 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State 

v. Sepahi, 78 P.3d 732, 735 (Ariz. 2003)). Petitioner argues that the DCAC statute does 

not apply to his conduct because children were merely present at the scene of the robbery, 

but he did not specifically target children.4

 (Doc. 14 at 5.) 

 As previously noted, Petitioner pleaded guilty and admitted that during a robbery, 

he restrained two children under the age of fifteen by putting them on the ground and 

threatening them with a gun. (Doc 9, Ex. P at 10-12.) He also admitted that he acted 

with the intent to place the children in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical 

injury or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony. (Id.) Petitioner does not dispute 

the facts upon which his conviction and sentences were based, but argues that those facts 

do not support the application of Arizona’s dangerous crimes against children statute to 

his sentence. (Doc. 14 at 5.) However, as part of the factual basis for his guilty plea, 

Petitioner specifically admitted that he knowingly restrained two children who were 

under the age of fifteen with the intent to aid the armed robbery of the Game Stop store. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. P at 10-12.) Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, the record reflects that his 

conduct was directed at the victims under the age of fifteen and, as such, satisfied the 

requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01. See State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131, 136-

37 (Ariz. 1993) (naming kidnapping as an offense for which, “[a]s a practical matter, . . . 

impossible to imagine . . . could be committed without targeting persons); Sepahi, 78 

P.3d at 734 (Ariz. 2003) (stating that there is “no doubt that” confronting child with 

 person shall be sentenced to a presumptive term of 

imprisonment for twenty-eight years. 

4

 To support this argument Petitioner cites United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 

F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992). (Doc. 14 at 6.) That case does not involve Arizona’s 

DCAC statute. Rather in that case the Ninth Circuit concluded that a “mere presence” jury instruction was unnecessary when the government’s case related to drug charges against the defendant was based on more than the defendant’s presence and the jury was instructed on the elements of the crime. Id. 

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deadly weapon satisfies Williams’s focus requirement and that crime is a deadly crime 

against children.) Therefore, Petitioner has not met Schlup’s high standard and the actual 

innocence exception does not excuse his untimely filing. 

III. Conclusion 

 The Court concludes that the Petition is untimely and that Petitioner has not 

established a basis to extend or avoid the statute of limitations. Because Petitioner has 

not established any basis to extend or avoid the AEDPA statute of limitations, his § 2254 

petition should be denied as untimely. Therefore, the Court does not consider 

Respondents’ other arguments for denying habeas corpus relief.5

 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

 

5

 Alternatively, the Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas corpus relief based on his claim of actual innocence asserted in Ground One. The 

Supreme Court has not recognized a free-standing claim of actual innocence in non- capital cases. See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931 (stating that the Court has “not resolved 

whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993)). “[T]he [Supreme] Court [has] explained that if habeas relief depends upon the resolution of ‘an open question in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence,’ § 2254(d)(1) precludes relief.” Crater v. 

Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cary v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 

(2009)). Additionally, Petitioner admits that his claim is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 14 at 8; see Doc. 9 at 11-19 (discussing procedural default and procedural bar).) 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 24th day of October, 2016. 

 

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