Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01662/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01662-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000ad Job Discrimination (Disability Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINA WESLEY-WILLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAJON VALLEY UNION 

SCHOOL DISTRICT; and DOES 

1–10, inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv1662-WQH-WVG

Order

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Cajon Valley 

Union School District. (ECF No. 20).

I. Procedural Background

On March 26, 2018, Plaintiff Christina Wesley-Willis (“Wesley-Willis”) filed a 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendant Cajon Valley Union School 

District (“School District”) and Does 1–10, inclusive. (ECF No. 18). 

On April 9, 2018, the School District filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 20). On April 30, 2018, 

Wesley-Willis filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 21). On May 7, 

2018, the School District filed a reply. (ECF No. 22).

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II. Factual Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint 

Wesley-Willis is a “member of various protected classes including but not limited 

to race (black), gender (female), age (45+) and disability.” (ECF No. 18 at ¶ 6). In 2005, 

Wesley-Willis was hired by the School District as an assistant principal and later 

promoted to the role of principal in 2007. In 2016, Wesley-Willis was “moved to an 

assistant principal position . . . and further removed as a site principal at Johnson 

Elementary School.” Id. ¶ 10. Wesley-Willis was the “only female black principal” or 

assistant principal in the School District “during the time in question.” Id. ¶ 21. 

The School District took various allegedly discriminatory actions towards WesleyWillis prior to her demotion. In 2015, the superintendent demanded that Wesley-Willis 

apologize to her staff members in response to “unsubstantiated complaints” made against 

her and did not permit her to address the staff about the alleged concerns. Id. ¶ 11. Male

administrators with multiple negative site surveys and grievances were not demoted or 

released as administrators. Id. ¶ 12. Male administrators were “advised of the negative 

comments and . . . given the opportunity to address staff members . . . and to make 

corrections.” Id.

In June 2015, the School District superintendent denied Wesley-Willis’s request 

for an assistant principal at her site which detrimentally affected Wesley-Willis’s ability 

to perform her job. Id. ¶ 14. Male principals had “access . . . to assistant principals” and 

administrative assistance at schools with “less disciplinary issues, less minority underprivileged enrollment and higher overall test scores.” Id.

In 2015 and 2016, Wesley-Willis suffered work-related injuries to her shoulder, 

neck and lower back. Id. ¶ 17. The School District was advised that Wesley-Willis “was 

not to be assigned duties that might cause further injuries to her” and that Wesley-Willis

was not to have physical contact with students. Id. The School District failed to 

accommodate Wesley-Willis for her work-related disability. The School District placed 

Wesley-Willis in “hazardous positions” and denied assistance in dealing with students

with violent behavioral issues. Id. ¶ 31

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The School District relied on false complaints and statements from various 

teachers to “force [Wesley-Willis] out of the District.” Id. ¶ 18. School District 

employees “improperly . . . obtain[ed] private materials from [Wesley-Willis’s] office 

and thereafter disseminate[d] false . . . statements about [her] as a means of discrediting 

[her].” Id. ¶ 19. Board members of the School District made public statements “that 

[Wesley-Willis] would be gone from the District[.]” Id. ¶ 21. In July 2016, the School 

District requested that Wesley-Willis sign a resignation letter. During this process, the 

superintendent “made reference to her race, as being an asset in finding another position.” 

Id. ¶ 25. Wesley-Willis was was demoted to an assistant principal and relieved of her 

duties as acting principal. “[Wesley-Willis] was assigned lesser administrative duties 

with limited access to support and advancement.” Id. ¶ 26. 

Around November of 2016, Wesley-Willis was “pre-approved to attend a human 

resource seminar[.]” Id. ¶ 30. A senior School District representative asked her to leave

the event, despite her invitation from the superintendent. Id. Wesley-Willis was denied 

promotion and assignment to vacant positions in the School District “in favor of nonminority individuals, who lacked experience, credentials and/or training” in comparison 

to Wesley-Willis. Id. ¶ 32. 

Wesley-Willis filed complaints with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission. The School District conducted an unreasonable and untimely investigation. 

“For the 2017/2018 academic year, [Wesley-Willis], despite being unable to return to 

work was assigned a ‘counselor position’ within the District” and has been “demoted in 

position, stature, and pay.” Id. ¶ 59. 

Wesley-Willis brings the following causes of action against the School District:

violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; violation of Civil Rights Act - hostile 

work environment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; and five claims arising under state law.

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III. Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move 

for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A 

jurisdictional attack pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 

F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 

allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 

jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a 

facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the court assumes the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Doe v. 

Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim 

for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A district court’s dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is 

a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

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Id. (citation omitted). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

IV. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

The School District moves the Court for an order dismissing the SAC for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the School District is immune from suit in 

federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment. The School District asserts that it is an 

“arm of the state and state actor” to which Eleventh Amendment immunity attaches. 

(ECF No. 20-1 at 10). 

Wesley-Willis contends that the Eleventh Amendment “does not immunize local 

governments from all private suits” and exceptions to immunity are applicable in this 

action. (ECF No. 21). Wesley-Willis contends that Congress has abrogated state 

immunity with respect to the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wesley-Willis 

contends that sovereign immunity is not a bar to employment discrimination suits in 

which a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Wesley-Willis contends that sovereign 

immunity has been waived through the state’s acceptance of federal funds. WesleyWillis contends that the Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 

claims. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “[t]he 

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The 

Eleventh Amendment precludes federal court jurisdiction “over suits against 

nonconsenting States.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies and arms of the state. See

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that California school districts 

are arms of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 

Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that 

“California school districts . . . remain arms of the state and continue to enjoy Eleventh 

Amendment immunity” following passage of state legislation which “reformed the 

financing and governance of California public schools”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 459 

(2017); Belanger, 963 F.2d at 251 (“[U]nder California law, the school district is a state 

agency . . . . Thus, the school district is protected by the Eleventh Amendment”). In this 

case, the School District, a California school district, is an arm of the state protected by 

Eleventh Amendment immunity, absent an applicable exception. 

There are three exceptions to the general rule that the Eleventh Amendment 

protects states from suits brought by citizens in federal court. 

First, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment defense. Second, Congress 

may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity by acting pursuant to a grant 

of constitutional authority. Third, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the 

Eleventh Amendment does not bar a “suit against a state official when that 

suit seeks . . . prospective injunctive relief.”

Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817–18 (9th Cir. 2001), 

amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

In recent years, the Supreme Court has imposed a two-part inquiry for 

determining whether Congress acts within its powers when it attempts to 

abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe,

517 U.S. at 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114. First, courts must ask “whether Congress 

unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate” the states’ immunity in the 

legislation itself. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 631. If the answer to this 

first inquiry is yes, then courts must next ask “whether Congress acted 

pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Id.

Douglas, 271 F.3d at 818.

a. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Wesley-Willis brings the first and third causes of action for violations of the Civil 

Rights Act. Wesley-Willis does not identify the Title of the Civil Rights Act under which 

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she brings her claims; however, the alleged facts describe discrimination in the

employment context. The Court construes Wesley-Willis’s first and third causes of 

action to arise under Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in hiring and treatment of 

employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

The Supreme Court has determined that Congress has validly and unequivocally 

abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under Title VII. 

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976) (“[I]n this Title VII case the 

‘threshold fact of congressional authorization,’ . . . to sue the State as employer is clearly 

present.”); see also Cerrato v. San Francisco Comm. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 976 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court has held that Congress has abrogated the Eleventh 

Amendment with respect to Title VII claims.”). Accordingly, Wesley-Willis’s causes of 

action under Title VII against the School District, the first and third causes of action in 

the SAC, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

b. Americans with Disabilities Act

Wesley-Willis brings her second cause of action against the School District under 

the ADA. (ECF No. 18 at ¶¶ 77–83). Wesley-Willis alleges that she was an employee of 

the School District during the time of the events giving rise to her claims. Id. ¶¶ 7–71. 

Wesley-Willis alleges that the School District failed to make accommodations for her 

disability and discriminated against her because of her disability during her employment 

with the School District. Id. ¶¶ 79–81. Based on the allegations of the SAC, the Court 

construes this claim to arise under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination 

against disabled individuals in the employment context. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Supreme Court 

held that Congress did not constitutionally abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 

immunity from suits brought under Title I of the ADA. 531 U.S. 356, 360, 374 (2001); 

see also Douglas, 271 F.3d at 818, 821 (“In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that claims 

brought under Title I of the ADA against states for money damages are barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment.”). Congress has not abrogated California’s immunity from suits 

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brought under Title I of the ADA.1 The School District enjoys Eleventh Amendment 

immunity with respect to Wesley-Willis’s cause of action under Title I of the ADA. 

Pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine, Eleventh Amendment immunity “does 

not . . . bar actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in 

their official capacities for their alleged violations of federal law.” Coal. to Defend 

Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). In this case, WesleyWillis brings suit only against the School District. Wesley-Willis has not named a state 

official. Accordingly, Ex parte Young is inapplicable and her claim under the ADA is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment in its entirety. Douglas, 271 F.3d at 821 n.6

(“Because Douglas has not named a state official as a defendant in this suit, the Ex parte 

Young doctrine does not apply.). 

c. State Law Claims

Wesley-Willis brings the following state law causes of action against the School 

District: violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, breach of 

contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 18).

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against nonconsenting states in federal court, 

including suits that arise under state law. The Supreme Court of the United States has 

stated, “[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a 

federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); Gilbreath v. 

Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“the Eleventh Amendment 

 

1 The School District has raised Eleventh Amendment immunity in this motion to dismiss and has not 

waived immunity with respect to this action. See Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“However, a state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity merely by defending in 

federal court. Instead, waiver turns on the state’s failure to raise immunity during the litigation.”). 

Further, Wesley-Willis fails to demonstrate that the State of California has waived its immunity to ADA 

suits under Title I by a “clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” Id.

(citing Coll. Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 537 U.S. 666, 675 

(1999)). 

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deprives federal courts jurisdiction to order state actors to comply with state law”). As an 

arm of the state, the School District is immune from suit under state law in federal court. 

Further, the Ex Parte Young doctrine, which permits some suits otherwise barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment where the relief sought is declaratory or injunctive, is inapplicable 

to state law claims. See Halderman, 465 U.S. at 106. 

Wesley-Willis contends that federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over state claims that are closely related to federal claims brought by litigants. Pursuant 

to the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute,

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, 

the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 

that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, supplemental jurisdiction does not provide grounds for a 

district court to hear claims otherwise barred under the Eleventh Amendment. See 

Halderman, 465 U.S. at 121. 

The Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force 

to [pendent jurisdiction] than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear 

federal claims. . . . If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award 

damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim. . . . [P]endent 

jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by 

the Eleventh Amendment.

Id. at 120–21. Wesley-Willis’s state law causes of action are barred by the state’s 

Eleventh Amendment immunity in their entirety.

V. Failure to State a Claim 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Wesley-Willis’s causes of action under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first and second causes of action alleged in 

the SAC. However, the School District moves to dismiss Wesley-Willis’s hostile work 

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environment claim under Title VII under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

2

 The 

School District contends that Wesle-Willis has not alleged facts sufficient to establish a 

hostile work environment claim. (ECF No. 20 at 2). The School District asserts that 

“[t]he allegations [of the SAC] are either so general, conclusory and lack[ing] specificity 

or have nothing. . . to do with a hostile work environment.” (ECF No. 20-1 at 15). 

Wesley-Willis contends that the allegations set forth in the SAC “show[] a continuous 

pattern of events, which . . . comprise a constant and continuous stream of 

actions/conduct by Defendant amounting to . . . a hostile work environment.” (ECF No. 

21 at 14). 

Title VII guarantees employees “the right to work in an environment free from 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 

U.S. 57, 65 (1986). Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). 

A prima facie case for a hostile work environment under Title VII requires a 

plaintiff to show (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of her race 

or gender; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct “was sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work 

environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003), as 

amended (Jan. 2, 2004); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 871 

(9th Cir. 2001). The alleged conduct must establish that “the workplace is permeated 

with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 

U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 

65)). “[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, 

 

2 The School District does not move to dismiss the first cause of action, also brought under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” Meritor Sav. 

Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. “The working environment must both subjectively and objectively 

be perceived as abusive.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22). “In determining whether an actionable hostile work 

environment claim exists, we look to ‘all the circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of 

the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 

employee’s work performance.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 

116 (2002); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined 

that an employer was entitled to summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim 

in which the employee provided evidence that his supervisor had yelled at him on a few 

occasions, made false complaints against him, and made two racially offensive remarks

in the span of approximately one year. 349 F.3d at 643–44. The Court found that the 

conduct was “less frequent, less severe, and less humiliating” than the conduct in cases in 

which the Court had previously determined to create a hostile work environment. Id. at 

644.

In this case, Wesley-Willis does not specify the basis on which she was 

discriminated against under Title VII. However, Wesley-Willis alleges that she is a 

“black female.” (ECF No. 18 at ¶ 6). Accordingly the Court concludes that the hostile 

work environment claim is premised on discrimination based on race and gender. The 

SAC provides factual allegations about administrative actions the School District took in 

relation to Wesley-Willis over a period of approximately two years, including demoting 

Wesley-Willis, asking Wesley-Willis to leave a conference, demanding that WesleyWillis apologize to her staff members, and denying her promotions. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 87, 

11, 30). Although the factual allegations of the SAC support the conclusion that the 

School District took negative employment decisions with respect to Wesley-Willis and 

that Wesley-Willis was unhappy with the employment relationship, the allegations of the 

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SAC do not establish conduct supporting a hostile work environment claim under Title 

VII. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that Title 

VII is not a “general civility code”). Wesley-Willis alleges that the superintendent 

referenced her race in one conversation in which the superintendent stated that her race 

would be “an asset in finding another position.” Id. ¶ 25. However, this statement does 

not rise to the severity and frequency of conduct that would support a Title VII hostile 

work environment claim. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 

991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A violation is not established merely by evidence showing 

‘sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’”);

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 n.1 (quoting Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 

569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989)) (stating that incidents of harassment “must be more than 

episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed 

pervasive”). As currently pleaded, the factual allegations of the SAC are insufficient to 

support a reasonable inference that Wesley-Willis was subjected to verbal or physical 

conduct because of her race or gender that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the 

conditions of her employment. The motion to dismiss the hostile work environment 

claim is granted for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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VI. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Cajon 

Valley Union School District (ECF No. 20) is granted in part and denied in part. The 

Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice with respect to the ADA 

claim (second cause of action), the hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (third cause of action), and all state law causes of action (fourth, 

fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action). The motion to dismiss is denied with 

respect to the discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (first 

cause of action). 

Dated: August 8, 2018

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