Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00909/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Louis Ernesto Corrales has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s direct appeal concluded on October 25, 2001. Petitioner’s postconviction proceedings concluded on October 20, 2003. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition was 

due on October 21, 2004, but was not filed until April 29, 2014.

 Statutory tolling is not warranted, and no equitable tolling is merited because 

Petitioner cannot justify delays after 2005. Insufficient evidence is presented to merit an 

actual innocence exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 

 For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are 

untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

Louis Ernesto Corrales, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-14-0909-PHX-GMS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS OF THE CASE 

 On April 9, 2000, Petitioner was visiting his wife Sylvia C.—from whom he was 

separated at the time—at the house she shared with her father and her children. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. YY at 110–12, Ex. ZZ at 210–11.) After returning to the house from a party, 

Petitioner and Sylvia had a loud argument. (Doc. 14, Ex. ZZ at 195, 211–13, 216, 284.) A 

witness heard someone yell “Louis,” which was followed by gunshots. (Id. at 189.) A 

nearby officer heard “several exchanges of [gun]fire,” and “[i]t sounded as if there was a 

large caliber weapon and smaller weapon being fired.” (Doc. 14, Ex. YY at 161–62.) 

Sylvia and two other individuals were wounded by the gunfire. (Doc. 14, Ex. ZZ at 194, 

197, 207, 214–15, Ex. YY at 109, 112–14, 164-66.) A witness spoke to police and 

identified Petitioner as the shooter. (Doc. 14, Ex. ZZ at 289, 293, 310–12.) Sylvia told 

police that Petitioner was “responsible” for the shooting. (Id. at 228.) Petitioner left the 

scene. (Id. at 217, 219.) 

 On April 24, 2000, an undercover Phoenix Police Department detective saw 

Petitioner sitting in a vehicle in Phoenix. (Doc. 14, Ex. YY at 128–30.) A uniformed 

officer responded to the scene and asked for Petitioner’s identification. (Id. at 132, 153.) 

When Petitioner attempted to place the vehicle into drive, the officer tried to stop 

Petitioner. (Id. at 133, 154.) Petitioner sped off and dragged the officer a short distance. 

(Id. at 133.) Shortly thereafter, Petitioner crashed his vehicle into a tree at a nearby 

intersection. (Id. at 135, 137, 155, Ex. ZZ at 184.) Petitioner jumped out of his vehicle, 

saw the police approaching, dropped a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun that he was 

carrying, and ran. (Doc. 14, Ex. YY at 138; Ex. ZZ at 184–85.) Petitioner was found in a 

nearby apartment he had broken into. (Doc. 14, Ex. YY at 136.) After he was read his 

Miranda1

 rights, Petitioner admitted he possessed the handgun and that he was a 

prohibited possessor. (Id. at 144–46.) 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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B. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 

 1. Trial and Sentencing

 On May 5, 2000, the State indicted Petitioner on nine counts: aggravated assault, a 

class 6 felony (Count 1); unlawful flight from law enforcement, a class 5 felony (Count 

2); misconduct involving weapons, class 4 felonies (Counts 3 and 5); criminal trespass, a 

class 6 felony (Count 4); endangerment, a class six dangerous felony (Count 7); and 

aggravated assault, class 3 dangerous felonies (Counts 6, 8, 9). (Doc. 14, Ex. A.) 

 On October 25, 2000, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged in the indictment. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. AAA at 387–92.) After his conviction and before sentencing, Petitioner 

admitted that the offenses occurred while he was on parole and that he had two prior 

felony convictions. (Id., Ex. BBB at 4–17.) On December 1, 2000, Petitioner was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of 47.5 years imprisonment.2

 (Id., Exs. E, CCC at 29–33.) 

 2. Direct Appeal 

 On December 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. 14, Ex. G.) 

In Petitioner’s appeal, he argued his admissions to prior convictions and parole status 

were invalid because the trial court did not advise him he was subject to community 

supervision following imprisonment. (Doc. 14, Ex. H at 7.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, and concluded the trial court 

“adequately advised [Corrales] that, for any term of imprisonment imposed on any count, 

the required term of community supervision would follow.” (Doc. 14, Ex. J.) Petitioner 

did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 14, Ex. K.) 

 

2

 Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive sentences of 3.75 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on Counts 1, 4, and 7, a term of 5 years on Count 2, a term of 10 years on Counts 3 and 5, and 11.25 years imprisonment for Counts 6, 8, and 9. (Doc. 14, Ex. E, Ex. CCC at 29–32.) The court ordered the sentences for 

Counts 1 through 5 to run concurrently and the sentences for Counts 6 through 9 to run consecutively to each other and to Counts 1 through 5. (Id., Ex. E, Ex. CCC at 32–33.) 

The court ordered consecutive sentences on Counts 6 through 9 because “each of these 

crimes involved separate victims and an extreme and grave risk to human life.” (Id., Ex. 

CCC at 32.) 

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 C. PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 1. First Petition 

 On November 26, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice for Post-Conviction Relief. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. L.) Petitioner was represented by retained counsel in his post-conviction 

proceeding. (Doc 14, Ex. L, Ex. M.) Petitioner asserted trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to move to sever counts, failing to object to impeachment testimony, and failing to 

object to the admission of evidence tags at trial. (Doc. 14, Ex. O.) 

 On July 25, 2002, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition, addressing 

each ineffective assistance of counsel claim and concluding that Petitioner “failed to raise 

a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 14, Ex. S.) The state court 

determined it was unlikely that the outcome of Petitioner’s criminal proceedings would 

have been different if counsel had moved to sever the counts for trial, noting the evidence 

of guilt with regard to the shooting was “compelling” and that the evidence of guilt with 

regard to the flight charges was “overwhelming.” (Doc. 14, Ex. S at 3 (“At least two 

eyewitnesses (the defendant’s ex-wife and sister-in-law) identified Defendant to the 

police as the shooter. A third witness heard others call out the name “Louie” shortly 

before the shots rang out.”). The court found that the admission of the evidence tags was 

a benefit to Petitioner at trial. (Doc. 14, Ex. S at 6.) 

 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely petition for review to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. T, Ex. U.) He presented the same arguments he had presented 

to the trial court for review. (Doc. 14, Ex. U.) The State filed a response, and Petitioner 

filed a reply. (Doc. 14, Ex. V, Ex. W.) On October 20, 203, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review. (Doc. 14, Ex. X.)3

 

3

 On March 29, 2012, Petitioner also filed a motion for extension of time “to file 

an appeal/reconsideration,” which was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals as untimely. (Doc. 14, Ex. Y, Ex. Z.) On December 27, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for 

filing a delayed petition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court, which was also denied because “review was denied in this matter over thirty-eight months ago” and Petitioner failed to establish “excusable neglect.” (Doc. 14, Ex. AA, Ex. CC.) In March 

2005, Petitioner filed a pro se motion in Maricopa County Superior Court to “confirm ruling on all Post-Conviction Relief, Reconsideration, and Review motions,” which was 

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 2. Second Petition 

 On July 26, 2011, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, initiated a second Rule 32 

proceeding by filing a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.” (Doc. 14, Ex. JJ.) On the 

form, Petitioner alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the existence of 

newly-discovered material facts that probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence. Petitioner asserted his failure to timely file these claims “was without fault on 

the defendant’s part.” Petitioner further asserted there was “clear and convincing 

evidence that the defendant is actually innocent.” (Doc. 14, Ex. JJ.) The second notice 

did not include argument or facts in support of Petitioner’s claims. 

 Petitioner filed an additional “motion for clarification to file writ of habeas 

corpus” in August 2011. (Doc. 14, Ex. KK, Ex. LL.) The pleading did not include 

argument or any facts in support of the second notice. 

 On September 15, 2011, the state trial court dismissed the second Rule 32 action 

(Doc. 14, Ex. MM.) The court found that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel could not be raised in an “untimely or successive petition for post-conviction 

relief.” (Id.) The trial court also found Petitioner failed to provide any facts or evidence 

to support his claims. (Id.) Because Petitioner “fail[ed] to state a claim for which relief 

can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding,” the court dismissed the second Rule 

32 petition. (Id.) 

 On January 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, asserting he was improperly sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. 

Petitioner also argued that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel 

because counsel failed to call fact and expert witnesses who would have assisted 

Petitioner. (Doc. 14, Ex. QQ.) Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was overworked 

during his trial and had been repeatedly disciplined and later suspended from practice for 

four years in 2003 by the State Bar of Arizona. (Id.) 

 On May 30, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. 

 also denied. (Doc. 14, Ex. DD, Ex. EE.) 

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(Doc. 14, Ex. SS.) The court found that, if Petitioner had been allowed to raise his claims 

in the trial court, they would have been precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id.) The appellate court also found that, even if 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based upon newly-discovered 

evidence, specifically the various disciplinary actions that had been taken against his trial 

counsel since Petitioner’s trial, this claim would still be precluded for failure to comply 

with Rule 32.2(b) because Petitioner “did not set forth in his notice ‘meritorious reasons . 

. . substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in the previous 

petition or in a timely manner.’” (Id. (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)).) 

 Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. TT, Ex. UU, Ex. VV.) On December 20, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review. (Doc. 14, Ex. WW.) 

D. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On April 29, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, which advances five 

grounds for relief: 

Ground 1: Whether consecutive sentences were improperly imposed. 

Ground 2: Whether trial counsel was ineffective for: 

(1) failing secure testimony from Rene Lopez; 

(2) failing “to have expert testimony at trial for D.N.A., forensic science, eyewitness testimony, and ballistics for guns”; and 

(3) investigation and trial error. 

Ground 3: Whether the admission of ‘other-act’ evidence was 

prejudicial error. 

Ground 4: Whether the jury instructions for Counts 5 through 9 misstated the law. 

Ground 5: Whether there was insufficient evidence requiring reversal. 

(Doc. 1.) 

 On November 13, 2014, the State filed a Response to the Petition. The State 

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argues the Petition is untimely, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and not 

cognizable, and his claims are vague and conclusory. (Doc. 14.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY.

 1. Time Calculation 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision in Petitioner’s direct appeal on 

October 25, 2001. Petitioner had 30 days to seek review of this decision by the Arizona 

Supreme Court.4

 Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on 

November 24, 2001. See, e.g., Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s habeas action expired on 

November 24, 2002, unless statutorily or equitably tolled. 

 2. Statutory tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

 

4

 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (requiring petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court to be filed “[w]ithin 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision”). Respondent would grant Petitioner five days for mailing pursuant to Ariz. R.Crim. P. 1.3 

(adding “five calendar days” after service by mail). Because the five days have no bearing on the resolution of the case, the Court does not address the issue further. 

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Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 On November 26, 2001, Petitioner initiated a timely action for post-conviction 

relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute of 

limitations was tolled until the Arizona Court of Appeals denied post-conviction relief 

and dismissed the action on October 20, 2003. Therefore, the statute of limitations on 

Petitioner’s habeas claims began to run on October 21, 2003, and expired on October 21, 

2004. The instant Petition was filed on April 29, 2014. 

 The statute of limitations was not tolled by Petitioner’s miscellaneous filings 

discussed in footnote 3 above, or his second state action for post-conviction relief. These 

filings and the second Rule 32 action were not “properly filed” state actions for postconviction relief. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state 

post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that an application for state postconviction relief filed after expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations did not 

reinitiate the limitations period). 

 Petitioner’s second PCR was not a continuation of the first PCR petition, but a 

separate proceeding asserting new claims of ineffective assistance and newly-discovered 

evidence, thus gap tolling does not apply.5 See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003) (gap tolling between successive rounds of state proceedings only applies if second 

petition limited to seeking review of first petition). The second petition was also 

untimely, which also precludes statutory tolling on this basis. (Id.) 

 Accordingly, statutory tolling does not apply. 

 

5

 In his first PCR, Petitioner asserted trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to sever counts, failing to object to impeachment testimony, and failing to object to the admission of evidence tags at trial. (Doc. 14, Ex. O.) In his second PCR, Petitioner 

alleged his consecutive sentences were invalid and counsel was ineffective by failing to call a witness, failing to present expert testimony, and “individual and cumulative” errors. (Doc. 14, Ex. QQ.) 

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 3. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 

2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). The 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only 

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for 

the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048–49 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. 

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda, 292 F.3d 

at 1066 (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner asserts equitable tolling should be granted because his first 

attorney “dropped the ball in March 2005.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) Petitioner asserts that counsel 

also “said he would file a motion for permission to file a delayed petition for review by 

the Arizona Supreme Court by then 38 months had passed.” (Id.) 

 On December 27, 2006, Petitioner’s attorney filed a motion requesting permission 

to file a delayed petition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 14, Ex. 

AA.) He asserted that Petitioner had “relied upon undersigned counsel” to file “a timely 

petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ ruling with the Arizona Supreme Court.” 

(Id.) In an affidavit, he avowed that he had agreed to represent Petitioner pro bono on 

appeal, and that his “[f]ailure to file a timely petition for review to the Arizona Supreme 

Court was due to [his] overwhelming case load.” (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

denied the motion, stating: 

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 The court has considered petitioner’s motion for permission to file a 

delayed petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. A review of the 

record in this matter indicates that on October 20, 2003, this court entered 

an order denying review. On April 1, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for 

extension of time to file for reconsideration or for review. On April 15, 

2005, the court denied the motion. Presently, counsel requests this court to 

enter an order allowing a delayed filing of a petition for review based on 

counsel’s “overwhelming case load.” The court notes that review was 

denied in this matter over thirty-eight months ago. At no time did petitioner 

or counsel file a motion for extension of time in which to file a petition for 

review. The court does not believe that petitioner has established 

“excuseable neglect” and therefore, 

 IT IS ORDERED denying the motion. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. CC.) 

 Petitioner has not established that equitable tolling should apply in this case. 

Petitioner’s claim that his attorney “dropped the ball”—supported by the attorney’s 

affidavit to the Arizona Court of Appeals—explains the delay until 2005. Petitioner filed 

this Petition in April 2014. Petitioner does not justify the delay from 2005 to 2014. See 

Waldron–Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1014 (stating that petitioner “could have prepared a basic 

form habeas petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline.”); United States v. 

Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (even without access to his case file, 

petitioner must “at least consult his own memory of the trial proceedings.”). 

 4. Actual Innocence 

 To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude this Court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence. “Actual innocence, if proved, 

serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a 

procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). “When an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner 

‘presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error,’ the Court may consider the petition on the merits. See 

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Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Stewart v. Cate, 

757 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner “‘must show that 

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 

of the new evidence.’” Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Such a claim must be founded upon “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Significantly, “[t]his is a high 

threshold that is rarely met.” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). See also 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (“tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare”). 

 Here, Petitioner presents no new evidence of actual innocence, and he fails to 

satisfy the “demanding” standard for a miscarriage-of-justice exception to the procedural 

bar. Schlup instructed that a claim of actual innocence must be supported by “new 

reliable evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner does not meet this standard. 

B. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including 

equitable tolling, because the record is sufficiently developed to resolve Petitioner’s 

assertion that his attorney’s conduct from 2003-2005 precluded him from filing a timely 

petition. A habeas petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary 

hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to 

equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. 

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). An evidentiary hearing is not mandatory. 

“Where the record is amply developed, and where it indicates that the petitioner’s mental 

incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his habeas petition, a 

district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual 

record, notwithstanding a petitioner’s allegations of mental incompetence.” Roberts v. 

Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). See also, Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming conclusion that “[b]ecause [Gaston] was capable of 

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preparing and filing state court petitions [during the limitations period], it appears that he 

was capable of preparing and filing a [federal] petition during the [same time]”). 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

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and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 24th day of June, 2015. 

 

 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00909-GMS Document 18 Filed 06/24/15 Page 13 of 13