Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00404/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00404-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 Officer Robert Hammac was originally identified in the complaint as Officer Robert

Ammac. Since both plaintiff and defendants refer to the officer as Robert Hammac in their more

recent filings, there appears to be no dispute that the correct designation for the officer in

question is Robert Hammac. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS BYTHER, by and through his )

guardian ad litem, IRENE BYTHER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-0404-CG-B

)

CITY OF MOBILE, OFFICER SCOTT )

CONGLETON, OFFICER JOSEPH GOFF, )

OFFICER D. BROOKS, OFFICER )

NELSON BROWN, OFFICER B. HINES, )

and OFFICER ROBERT AMMAC )

)

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant, Scott Congleton, for summary

judgment (Doc. 90), the motion of defendants, the City of Mobile, D. Brooks, Joseph Goff, B.

Hines, and Robert Hammac1

, for summary judgment (Doc. 94), the motion of defendant, Nelson

Brown, for summary judgment (Doc. 96), plaintiff’s responses to the motions for summary

judgment (Docs. 104, 110, 112), and defendants’ replies (Docs. 117, 118, 121). For the reasons

stated below, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of all

defendants on all claims. 

FACTS

This action arises from the events that took place during the capture and arrest of Carlos

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Byther on June 27, 2003. Byther himself claims to remember nothing about the morning of this

incident; thus he sets forth no facts of what he did or what occurred on the morning of June 27,

2003. (Byther Depo. pp. 73, 87). At the time of the incident, Nelson Brown and Scott Congleton

were police officers with the City of Mobile, Alabama. (Brown Depo. p. 13, Congleton Depo. p.

12). During the early morning hours of June 27, 2003, Brown and Congleton received dispatch

over the radio that a robbery involving a weapon had been reported at the Circle K on Cottage

Hill Road at Bel Air Boulevard. (Brown Depo. pp. 20-22, Congleton Depo. p. 24, Hammac

Depo. p. 9). Before arriving at the location of the Circle K, Officer Brown and Congleton also

heard a radio broadcast describing the suspect and reporting that the subject had told the clerk he

was armed with a gun and that he had left the store on foot. (Brown Depo. p. 22, Congleton

Depo. p. 24, Brooks Depo. p. 10). 

Officer Congleton was the first to arrive on the scene. (Congleton Depo. p. 27). The

store clerk informed Officer Congleton that an individual had entered the store, walked over to

the beverage aisle, then asked the clerk to come over to him for a question. The man asked the

clerk "do you have a gun?". The clerk said "no". The man then proceeded to reach into his

waistband and said "I do, now give me all the money." (Congleton Depo. p. 28). At that point,

the man forced the clerk into the store's cooler, then fled. (Congleton Depo. p. 29). When Brown

arrived at the store, he was directed to several areas in the store where the clerk thought the

subject may have touched surfaces, whereupon he attempted to lift fingerprints. (Brown Depo. p.

25). Officer Congleton obtained information from the clerk regarding the individual's physical

description and the clothing he was wearing, then he broadcast the information over the radio.

(Congleton Depo. pp. 32-33). Brown reports that he overheard the clerk tell another officer that

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he thought he saw a gun in Byther’s waistband; however, other testimony indicates that such a

statement was not made. (Brown Depo. p. 94, Hammac Depo. p. 13, Congleton Depo. p. 17,

Hines Depo. p. 10, Brooks Depo. p. 13). Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Enas Ready, the patrol

officers' supervisor, and several other officers, located an automobile around the corner from the

Circle K that contained items that matched those taken during the robbery. (Brooks Depo. p. 15). 

Found in the vehicle were a Cook's champagne bottle with condensation on it and clothing

matching the robber's description in the back seat. (Congleton Depo. p. 35). Smith's Towing

Company, the contract wrecker service for the city, was summoned to impound and tow away

the vehicle. (Brooks Depo. p. 16, Brown Depo. p. 28). As Smith's Towing was preparing to

remove the vehicle, the Smith's towing driver radioed his dispatcher that a subject was

attempting to take the vehicle, whereupon Officer Congleton left the Circle K store and went to

the location of the vehicle. Other officers returned to the scene. (Congleton Depo. pp. 56-57,

Brooks Depo. p. 19). Upon arriving at the vehicle, the Smith's driver informed Officer

Congleton that the subject came back to take his vehicle, and after being told he could not have

it, ran north behind the Brown and Root building. (Congleton Depo. p. 58). Officer Congleton

broadcasted this information to the other officers in the area, and they responded to that area.

(Brown Depo. pp. 29- 30). The officers began looking for the subject. (Congleton Depo. p. 58). 

Officer Brown drove to the north end of the parking lot, got out of his car and conducted a brief

search on foot of the wooded area by the television station. (Brown Depo. p. 30). Not locating

the suspect, Officer Brown continued searching the parking lot area. He then went through a

hedge and a gap in a fence and came out onto a street in a residential area behind the parking lot,

where he met up with Officers Congleton and Brooks. (Brown Depo. pp. 44-45). Believing that

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the subject had to be in the general area of Sage Avenue, Officer Congleton began patrolling that

street when he saw a subject behind a house. (Congleton Depo. p. 59). Officer Congleton

ordered the suspect to "stop where he was at", whereupon the individual ran off to the back part

of a house on Sage Avenue. (Congleton Depo. pp. 60-61, Brown Depo. p. 77). Following the

subject, Officer Congleton approached a privacy fence on the side yard following the subject,

and Officer Brown ran around the front part of the house. (Congleton Depo. p. 62, Brown Depo.

p. 77). As Officer Congleton approached the backyard, he saw someone running behind the

wooden fence through slats in the fence. He opened the gate in the fence and confronted the

subject, Carlos Byther, standing approximately two to three feet away from him. (Congleton

Depo. p. 62). 

The occurrences up to this point on the day of the incident are predominantly undisputed. 

However, the officers’ statements regarding what took place when Congleton and Brown

encountered Byther vary to some degree. Because the extent and effect of these variances are at

issue in this case, the court will discuss them in considerable detail. 

Congleton’s original narrative report described the incident as follows:

I threw him to the ground. As the subject was going to the ground his hands went

to the inside of his waist band. I repeated to the subject “let me see your hands”

and he refused and I struck the subject several times to the back of the upper back

and neck until he gave me his hands. During the altercation the subject’s head

struck the ground and had a small injury to the head and medical was notified. 

After securing the subject the subject dropped several small blue bags containing

a white powder substance believed to be cocaine.

(Congleton narrative report). In a later statement, Congleton stated that he threw Byther down

and he landed chest down with his left hand concealed, almost in a prone position with his right

hand out. (Congleton Statement p. 2). Congleton was not sure when Brown came into control of

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Byther’s right hand, but knew Brown was holding the right hand when they got control of Byther

and handcuffed him. (Congleton Statement p. 3). Brown delivered some kicks to Byther’s head

while Byther was down in the prone position. (Congleton Statement p. 3). As far as Congleton

knew, Brown had control of Byther’s right arm before blows were delivered to the back of

Byther’s head. (Congleton Statement p. 3). Congleton and Brown were both striking Byther at

about the same time, and they both stopped when Congleton reached around the front of Byther

and grabbed his left hand and Byther stopped resisting. (Congleton Statement pp. 4, 5). 

Congleton remembered Brown delivering about 3 or 5 blows to Byther’s head. (Congleton

Statement p. 4). Two of those times, Congleton remembers Byther’s head hitting the concrete.

(Congleton Statement p. 4).

Congleton testified at his deposition on February 24, 2005, that after he opened the gate,

he grabbed Byther and Byther put his hand in his waistband, after which Congleton threw Byther

to the ground. (Congleton Depo. pp. 65-67). Later in Congleton’s deposition, he stated that from

the moment he opened the gate until he threw Byther to the ground, Byther’s left hand was in the

general area of his waistband. (Congleton Depo. pp. 78-80). After throwing Byther to the

ground, Congleton straddled Byther, sitting on his lower back or buttocks. (Congleton Depo. pp.

84-85, 89, 104-105, 149). Congleton repeatedly ordered Byther to show us his hands.

(Congleton Depo. p. 84). According to Congleton, Brown did not give orders, only Congleton

did. (Congleton Depo. p. 91). Congleton also stated that during the entire time that Byther was

on the ground face down Congleton could see Byther’s right hand and Officer Brown had control

of it. (Congleton Depo. pp. 86-87). Congleton testified that Byther “struggled” with him, in that

he refused to give him and Brown his hands, but he was not combative. (Congleton Depo. p.

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88). Congleton was concerned that Byther may have access to a gun. (Congleton Depo. pp. 86-

89). Congleton hit Byther three or four times with a closed fist in Byther’s upper back, neck or

head area. (Congleton Depo. pp. 89, 91-92). The incident happened so quickly, Congleton was

not exactly sure what happened. (Congleton Depo. p. 93). Congleton was hitting Byther to get

him to comply with their verbal commands to give Congleton his hand. (Congleton Depo. pp.

153-154). Byther’s head hit the ground three or four times. (Congleton Depo. p. 95). Congleton

testified that Brown used his foot to “stomp, like a downward motion” Byther in the head three

or four times. (Congleton Depo. pp. 105-106, 163). Congleton did not hear Byther say anything

during the incident. (Congleton Depo. pp. 163-164). After striking Byther three or four times,

Congleton realized that what he was doing was not working and he reached around and grabbed

Byther’s left hand. (Congleton Depo. pp. 120, 165, 171). Congleton stated that, at the time of

the incident, Congleton was 6' 3" tall and weighed 200 pounds and estimated that Byther was

about 6' 3" and 210 pounds. (Congleton Depo. pp. 22-23). When Congleton first saw Byther, he

believed Byther had a gun. (Congleton Depo. p. 73). Congleton testified that the whole incident

happened within 15 to 20 seconds. (Congleton Depo. p. 78). Later in his deposition, Congleton

stated that the incident occurred within about five to ten seconds. (Congleton Depo. p. 119).

Brown stated in his initial narrative report that the information he had been given was

that the subject was believed to be armed with a gun. Brown described the incident as follows:

Ofc Congleton attempted to grab the subject and ordered him onto the ground. 

The subject resisted and became combative and began frantically trying to get

something from his pockets. Ofc Congleton and I were screaming repeatedly for

the subject to show us his hands. I believed the subject to be armed based on the

earlier information. We were able to briefly gain control of the subject and got

him to his knees at which time he plunged his hands back into his waistband area. 

I began screaming again for him to give up his hands to which he refused. 

Believing him to be going for a weapon, I kicked the subject once in the head

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with my right foot and continued ordering him to give me his hands. The subject

continued digging in his pockets/waistband, at which time I began forcing the

subject’s head into the concrete driveway, ordering him to give up his hands. The

subject finally released his hands and at that time Ofc Congleton and I struggled

with him briefly to get him cuffed. We then discovered numerous blue zip-lock

“dime bags” used to package drugs which had come loose from the subject ‘s

clothing during the struggle.

In a later statement to Internal Affairs, Brown stated that he used his right foot and applied it to

the back of the subject’s neck to force his head down into the concrete. (Brown Statement p. 18). 

Brown struck Byther five or six times with his foot. (Brown Statement p. 28). Byther resisted,

he refused to produce his right arm. (Brown Statement p. 28). Brown was not sure when the

subject’s chest went down on the concrete. (Brown Statement p. 19). Brown was not aware of a

lot of what Congleton was doing during the incident. (Brown Statement p. 20). Brown said the

subject finally threw his hand out, the blue bags came out, and that is when they were finally

able to gain control. (Brown Statement p. 20). Once Brown got hold of Byther’s hand, Brown

stopped kicking him. (Brown Statement p. 25). Brown believes Byther sustained the injuries to

his face and head when they were trying to get control of Byther’s right hand, when Brown

forced his head into the concrete. (Brown Statement pp. 21, 28).

In a second statement, Brown described the incident in more detail:

I approached [Congleton and Byther] from the front at approximately a 45 o angle

on the subject’s right side and attempted to gain control of his right arm. Ah,

Officer Congleton and I both then, ah, ordered the subject to get on the ground

and we tried taking him to the ground. I grabbed the subject, ah, by the clothing,

ah, in the area of, ah his right shoulder and pulled him forward. And, ah, in

pulling him forward I didn’t maintain my grip on him. I lost control of him, let

him went down. The subject went down in to a partially upright position where

he was on his knees with, ah, one arm, his left arm down in front of him holding

himself up toward his chest. And his head was approximately 12 to 18 inches off

the ground. Ah, I ordered him, ah, several times to, give me his, his right hand

and he refused. I kept giving him that instruction; Officer Congleton was, was

screaming that instruction to him. Ah, from the position I was standing, which

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was slightly in front of him and to the right and so I gained (unintelligible) by his

head, his shoulder. I kicked the subject once, ah, with my right foot in the head

on the face. Ah, my foot, a portion of my, my foot had struck him it was the top

of my foot or my foot (unintelligible). Ah, at that point, or shortly thereafter, the

subject, ah, dropped down closer to the ground on top of both of his arms. Ah,

both of his arms are underneath him. Officer Congleton and I continued to, to

instruct to-to give us his hands. Ah, at that point, or shortly thereafter, Officer

Congleton began delivering strikes to the subject and I was able to gain control of

his right arm. Ah, while Officer Congleton was-was punching or delivering

strikes, ah, with a closed fist, I believe it was his right fist, to, ah , ah, the

subject’s back between his shoulder blades and, ah, the back of his head, ah

screaming at him to-to give up his hand, his other hand, his left hand. Ah, I was

trying to, ah, maintain control of his right arm and, ah, to instruct him to produce

his other hand. Ah, the subject still had his hand underneath him and, ah, was

refusing to produce it. Ah, I then, ah, ah, with-with my right foot, ah, exerted a

force on the back of the subject’s head, forcing his head down into the pavement

to the point that it struck the, ah, concrete driveway, ah, there; and continued to,

ah, to instruct him to give up his hands. Ah, the subject continued to, to keep his

hand underneath him and was, appeared to be fumbling with something or-or

trying to get something out from under him. And I continued to, ah, force his

head, ah, into the concrete, ah, approximately 5 or 6 times. Ah, instruct him to, to

give up his hands, ah, at-at that point the subject sort of sort of, ah, acquiesced. 

And, ah, Officer Congleton was able to pull his left arm out from underneath him

and, ah, I maintained the, the subject’s right arm slightly backward and extended. 

(Brown Second Statement pp. 2-3). 

At his deposition, which was taken on February 24, 2005, Brown testified that it was

broadcast over the police radio that the suspect had told the store clerk he had a gun. (Brown

Depo. p. 22). When Brown caught up to Congleton and Byther, he grabbed Byther’s right arm

and tried to pull it from under Byther’s shirt away from his waistband area, but was

unsuccessful. (Brown Depo. p. 85). At the time of the incident, Brown was approximately 5'

11" and about 150 pounds. (Brown Depo. p. 86). Brown estimates Byther was approximately 6

feet tall and 200 pounds. (Brown Depo. p. 86). Brown testified to the following:

Q. So after you made this attempt to get Mr. Byther’s right hand from his waistband,

what next occurred?

A. I didn’t feel like we were going to accomplish anything standing up, so I started

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pulling Mr. Byther forward trying to get him on the ground.

Q. And what was Officer Congleton doing at that time”

A. He was still on his right side. I believe I said let’s go to the ground and I started

pulling him forward. I believe Officer Congleton did the same.

Q. And what happened at that point?

A. We started taking Mr. Byther to the ground.

* * * *

Q. So at that point what happens?

A. I was able to get Mr. Byther partially to the ground.

Q. Okay. And when you say you got him partially to the ground, what do you mean?

A. I mean instead of being able to get him flat on to his chest where I wanted him to be,

he put down one of his hands - - I believe it was his left hand - - to stop him from going

straight to the ground.

* * * *

Q. Okay. Did you see [Officer Congleton take Mr. Byther to the ground in a prone

position as he testified during his deposition]?

A. I’m not sure I can - - I can answer that. Because - - I was not standing to the side as

a spectator, you know, when Officer Congleton, you know, that was described. So I - -

I’m not sure I can answer that the way it’s been asked - - the way it’s been phrased.

Q. Did you see Officer Congleton throw Mr. Byther to the ground where he went to the

ground in a prone position without him placing a knee or a hand down to brace himself

from the fall, did you see ever see that personally?

A. Did I see him go straight to the ground in a prone position without stopping himself?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Now when - - as you described Mr. Byther goes down to the ground, is he on

his knees and one hand?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the one hand is in his left hand?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the left hand is closest to Officer Congleton?

A. It was the side away from me. I’m not - - I don’t know exactly where Officer

Congleton was at that point, his orientation of Mr. Byther.

 

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Q. You were on the right side of Mr. Byther

A . Right.

Q. Was Officer Congleton at that time on his left side?

A. He was either behind him or to his left side. I don’t - - I don’t know exactly what

Officer Congleton’s position was when we were going to the ground.

Q. Okay. Now, when Mr. Byther goes to the ground and he has his left hand out as you

described, where is Mr. Byther’s right hand?

A. It’s still in the area of his waistband underneath his shirt.

Q. So, he has one hand at that time, his right hand in his waistband?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Has his left hand on the ground?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And he’s on the ground with his knees?

A. Yes, sir. And this is in the span of a second or so, a second or two.

Q. And Okay. And did you at any time see Officer Congleton grab Mr. Byther’s left

hand?

A. No, sir, not at that time. At the end of the encounter, he grabbed his left hand and

handcuffed.

Q. What was the - - after you saw Mr. Byther go down in the fashion that you described,

what was the next thing that occurred?

A. I ordered him down to the ground. I said that this was - - I mean from the time I

grabbed hold of him to the position that I described him in now was incredibly fast, a

couple seconds. I ordered him to lay flat. He didn’t Like I say I was on his right side. 

His hand was underneath his shirt in his waistband area. All the information that I had

at that point was that he was armed with a firearm in the waistband of his pants. The

next thing I did was from the position I was standing, I brought my right foot - - my

right leg up in a sweeping motion and kicked Mr. Byther once in a sweeping motion and

kicked Mr Byther once in the side of the face - - the head with my right foot. I struck

him with the portion - - the top portion of my boot where my ankle and my shin come

together.

* * * *

Q. When you kicked him, how close was his face to the concrete.?

A. Maybe a foot.

Q. At that time did his head hit the concrete?

A. No, sir. 

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Q. After you kicked him in the face, did he continue to remain with one hand on the

ground, his left hand, and his right hand in his waistband?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Where was his right hand and his left hand at that point?

A. At that - - again, this is - - I mean the entire incident or the entire sequence that you

and I have just discussed was in a mater of a couple seconds. So if you’re asking

immediately where were both of his hands, It’s difficult for me to answer. You know, I 

- - yeah, after he went down to the prone position, he went down to a prone position

with his left hand underneath him and his right arm was actually at that point in a

position where I could get ahold of it.

Q. Okay. Where was his right arm at that point?

A. When he went down to a prone position, like I said, his right arm relaxed to the

extend that I was able to grab hold of it and get it away from his body.

Q. And up to that point had you hit Mr. Byther anymore times other than that one kick?

A. No sir. That was the first - - my first physical contact with him was grabbing him

and pulling him forward to the ground. The kick was the first, if I understood your

question correctly, that was the - - I’m sorry. I’ve probably lost my train of thought. 

What specifically was your question?

Q. Did you hit Mr. Byther in any fashion from the time that you kicked him in the face

until the time that you grabbed hold of his right hand?

A. In between the kick and me grabbing his arm, no, sir.

Q. Where was Officer Congleton at the time you kicked Mr. Byther in the face?

A. Specifically, I don’t know exactly what his position was.

Q. Was he on his back?

A. No, sir, I don’t believe yet.

Q. Was he sitting on him?

A. No, sir. 

Q. Did you see at that point in time Officer Congleton hitting Mr. Byther?

A. At which point in time?

Q. At the time that you have kicked him and he now goes into a prone position?

A. At that specific moment, and again, I mean this is - - I mean the time frame that

you’re asking about is probably less than a second. So in that less than a second time

frame between me grabbing his arm and him being in a prone position, no, sir, Officer

Congleton was not yet doing anything that I’m aware of. 

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Q. Did you ever see Officer Congleton sitting on Mr. Byther?

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. When is it that you first saw that?

A. Immediately after the - - the time frame we’re discussing now. After he went flat

into a prone position, once he laid flat.

* * * *

(Brown Depo. pp. 86-100, 121-122). Brown said he kicked Byther with enough force to cause

Byther’s face to firmly hit the pavement, and that he kicked Byther five or six times. (Brown Depo. p.

137). Brown also testified that he had not seen anything in Byther’s right hand and had not seen Byther

throw anything or drop anything from his right hand. (Brown Depo. pp. 121-122). Brown admitted at

his deposition that in an earlier statement he had said that Byther “eventually pulled his hand out from

his pants, threw it up in front of him and contained in his hand - - in his hand were numerous, I would

say fifteen to twenty blue” “dime bags.” (Brown Depo. pp. 122-123). Brown thought he remembered

that there were a number of empty baggies and four or five of them contained what appeared to be

cocaine. (Brown Depo. p. 123). Empty baggies were not catalogued or visible in any photographs

taken of the evidence. 

Defendant Officers Scott Congleton and Nelson Brown were members of the Mobile Police

Department’s Training Class #28 and received 736 hours of training. Much of this concerned use of

force. (City's Response To Interrogatory #11). Officer Congleton testified that he was never given any

instruction by the Mobile Police Department indicating that it was ever appropriate to kick a suspect in

the head or concerning when it was appropriate to strike a suspect in the head. (Congleton Depo. p.

20). 

The plaintiff's police procedures expert, Donald Perry Van Blaricom, testified that he had no

criticisms of the training provided to the City of Mobile Police Officers. Furthermore, he testified that

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he had no criticism or complaints about the way the City of Mobile conducted its Internal Affairs

Investigation, only with the conclusion reached by that investigation. (Van Blaricom Depo.

pp.198-199).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56©) provides that summary judgment shall be granted: “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court’s function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the nonmoving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’" Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284

F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). "If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, at 249-250.

(internal citations omitted).

The basic issue before the Court on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party bears

the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d

1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about

the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999). “If

reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny

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summary judgment.” Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992)

(citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56©), the non-moving party "must make

a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Howard v. BP Oil Company, 32 F.3d 520, 524

(11th Cir.1994)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary

judgment.” See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving

party “may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the [non-moving] party’s pleading, but ....

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) “A

mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the [non-moving] party’s position will not suffice; there must be

enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d

1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and

justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994,

998 (11th Cir. 1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 at 587 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

B. Claims against Officers Goff, Brooks, Hines and Hammac

Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment is due to be granted as to defendant officers, Goff,

Brooks, Hines, and Hammac. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment in their favor. 

C. Claims against the City of Mobile

Plaintiff only opposes the City’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s state law

claims. Thus, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the City of Mobile on plaintiff’s

federal claims.

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Under Alabama law, the liability of a municipality is limited to injuries suffered through

“neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness.” ALA. CODE § 11-47-190; Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670

So.2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995). A municipality can be held liable “where the officer committing the

alleged assault or battery was unskilled as a consequence of inadequate training or supervision of the

municipality.” Nolin v. Town of Springville, 45 F.Supp.2d 894, 914 (N.D. Ala. 1999), reversed on

other grounds, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). The City contends that there is no evidence that the

actions of officers Congleton and Brown were the result of unskillfullness caused by inadequate

training or supervision. Officer Congleton testified that he was never given any instruction by the

Mobile Police Department indicating that it was ever appropriate to kick a suspect in the head or

concerning when it was appropriate to strike a suspect in the head. However, the court finds that

Congleton’s statement does not demonstrate insufficient training or supervision. Plaintiff’s police

procedures expert testified that he had no criticisms of the training provided to the City of Mobile

Police Officers. 

Plaintiff cites cases where courts have allowed assault claims against municipalities to go

forward. However, most of those cases involved motions to dismiss in which only the four corners of

the complaint are considered. See e.g. Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 101 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1365 (M.D.

Ala. 2000)(motion to dismiss); Campbell v. Sims, 686 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (motion

to dismiss); Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848, 852 (Ala.1995)(motion to dismiss); Borders

v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168 (Ala. 2003) (motion to dismiss). The issue in those cases was

whether facts could be developed to support plaintiff’s claims. While City of Birmingham v.

Thompson did not address a motion to dismiss, it merely stated that an assault claim can be based on

unskillfulness. 404 So.2d 589, 592 (Ala. 1981) (addressing adequacy of jury charges). None of the

cases support plaintiff’s contention that the evidence against the City submitted in this case is sufficient

to survive summary judgment. Although the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint may be sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss, discovery is closed and any supporting facts should have been developed. 

The court finds the evidence of unskillfulness insufficient to survive summary judgment.

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In addition, as will be discussed in more detail below, under Alabama law, Officers Congleton

and Brown are entitled to discretionary function immunity. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-338(a) (1975). Pursuant

to Alabama Code § 6-5-338(b), this immunity is extended to the City of Mobile. City of Crossville v.

Haynes, ____ So. 2d ____, 2005 WL 1926435, *11 (Ala. Aug. 12, 2005) (citation omitted); Stovall v.

Allums, 2005 WL 2002069, *11 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2005) (citations omitted). 

D. Claims against Congleton and Brown

Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Congleton and Brown in their individual and

official capacities: (1) a § 1983 claim for the officer’s use of excessive force, (2) assault and battery,

(3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

1. § 1983, Excessive Force

a. Against the officers in their official capacity

When an officer is sued under § 1983 in his official capacity, the suit is simply “another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931

F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105

, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)[internal quotations omitted]). 

Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the

city that the officer represents. See [Kentucky,] 473 U.S. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3105;

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877-78, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985);

Monell [v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York], 436 U.S. [658] at 691

[(U.S.N.Y. 1978)], 98 S.Ct. [2018] at 2036 [(1978)]; Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530,

1532 (11th Cir.1990). Consequently, a plaintiff cannot rely on a respondeat superior

theory to hold a municipality liable for individual actions of its officers. Monell, 436

U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1328, 1334 (11th

Cir.1982). "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (emphasis in original). Instead, in

order to recover against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged racial

discrimination or harassment occurred pursuant to a custom or policy of the

municipality. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037; Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495,

1503 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654

(1986); Hearn, 688 F.2d at 1334.

Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct

suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to

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bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local

government units can be sued directly (provided, of course, that the public entity

receives notice and an opportunity to respond). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at

166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. at 471-72, 105 S.Ct. at 877-78. ...

Busby, 931 F.2d at 776. Based on the above, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be

granted as to claims brought against Officers Nelson and Bowden in their official capacities. 

b. Against the officers in their individual capacity

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive

force. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

civil trials ... and from liability if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d

1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The purpose of this

immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of

personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who

is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

To receive qualified immunity, the public official “must first prove that he was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that Officers

Congleton and Brown were acting within the course and scope of their discretionary authority in

responding to the dispatched report of an armed robbery, apprehending the suspect, and arresting the

suspect. “Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Id. 

In considering the merits of a qualified immunity defense in excessive force cases, courts

previously considered whether the right was clearly established and, if so, whether, in light of such

clearly established law, a reasonable officer could have known that his/her conduct was unlawful. See

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (citing Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

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635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). However, the Supreme Court revisited the above

analysis, clarifying the sequence of inquiries for qualified immunity cases. Id.

The Supreme Court held in Saucier that a qualified immunity analysis must begin with the

threshold determination of whether, based upon the facts taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the officer's conduct violates a constitutional right. Id. at 201; Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). If no constitutional right was violated, the court need not inquire

further. Id. If, however, a constitutional violation occurred, the court must then determine whether the

right was clearly established. Id.

In considering the first step of Saucier's two-step qualified immunity inquiry, we must

determine whether plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force was violated Under

the Fourth Amendment, officers may only use such force as is “objectively reasonable” under the

circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The

court, in making this determination, must presume that the plaintiff’s version of events is true. See

Hope, 536 U.S. at 736 (The threshold inquiry is “whether plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a

constitutional violation.” emphasis added). The Supreme Court described the “objectively reasonable”

standard to be applied in such excessive force cases as follows:

Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable"

under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of " 'the nature and quality of

the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' " against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). 

Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.[1], at 22-27

[(U.S. Ohio 1968)], 88 S.Ct. [1868], at 1880-1883 [(1968)]. Because "[t]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60

L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. [1], at 8-9 [(1985)], 105 S.Ct.[1694], at 1699-1700

[(1985)] (the question is "whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular

sort of ... seizure").

The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the

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perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881. . . . 

With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the

moment applies: "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge's chambers," Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028], at 1033 [(2d Cir.

1973)], violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the "reasonableness" inquiry

in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers'

actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States,

436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); see also

Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness

of a particular search or seizure, "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an

objective standard"). An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment

violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good

intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See Scott v.

United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723, citing United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-1872. “[T]o determine whether the amount of force

used by a police officer was proper, a court must ask whether a reasonable officer would believe that

this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th

Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a

suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in

fact was needed.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

If the court determines that defendants violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court

must then turn to the second step in the analysis, whether those rights were clearly established. Even if

the court were to hold that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, the officers are still entitled to

immunity if their actions resulted from reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions. Id. at 206. 

“[T]he law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it

obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant’s place, that ‘what he is doing’ violates

federal law.” Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)(quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). A plaintiff can establish that the state of the law

Case 1:04-cv-00404-CG-B Document 137 Filed 11/09/05 Page 19 of 23
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provided clear notice or warning to the officers that the conduct was unconstitutional by submitting

fact-specific precedents, or demonstrating that the very conduct “lies so obviously at the very core of

what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent.”

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199).

According to plaintiff, the officers unnecessarily used deadly force against Byther because he

was unarmed, was not combative, and did not resist arrest. Plaintiff has not offered his own version of

the facts, but contends that because of the variances in the officers’ statements and testimony the

officers should not be believed. The court disagrees. After a thorough review of the officers’

statements and testimony, the court finds that the differences result primarily from the officers’

different perceptions during an intense encounter that happened in a matter of seconds. Plaintiff’s own

expert testified that when officers have to engage in the use of force or in a struggle, they may not

remember everything accurately. (Blaricom Depo. pp. 218-220). The officers are so focused on

survival that everything else is excluded. Id. The court also notes that the officers’ depositions were

taken more than a year and a half after the event, while their original narratives were written the same

day as the event. It is natural for the officers’ memory and understanding of their exact movements and

actions and the actions of others during the quick event to change somewhat upon reflection and the

passage of time. Moreover, the officers’ statements and testimony are consistent as to the most

important facts. 

As the Graham Court stated, factors to consider when determining whether excessive force was

used include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871. In this case, there is no dispute that the crime

which Byther had reportedly committed was armed robbery, a very serious crime. Because Byther was

believed to be armed with a gun, he clearly posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and

others in the area. Although plaintiff disputes that Byther was armed, there is no dispute that Byther

told the store clerk that he had a gun and that this information was reported to the officers. Although

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Byther reportedly did not display a gun during the robbery, that does not diminish the fact that the

officers believed Byther had committed armed robbery and was likely to be armed when they

encountered him. Plaintiff points to differences in testimony as to whether Brown overheard the clerk

tell another officer that he thought he saw a gun in Byther’s waistband; however, regardless whether

Brown heard or misheard such a statement, the facts as reported by all witnesses demonstrate that

Byther reported he had a gun and the officers considered Byther to be armed. The testimony also

varies slightly as to the extent Congleton could see Byther’s hands (and whether they had anything in

them) when he encountered Byther. However, even if Congleton had full view of Byther’s hands and

sufficient time to consider the fact that no gun was visible before reacting, Byther was reportedly

carrying the gun in his waistband and, thus, the gun could still be hidden from view. Plaintiff appears

to put much emphasis on Congleton’s varying accounts of exactly when Byther put his hand in his

waistband. However, the entire struggle took less than half a minute and the differences in testimony

are slight. Moreover, the court finds it immaterial whether Byther’s hand was already in his waistband

or whether he reached for his waistband upon Congleton confronting him. The evidence also shows

that Byther had attempted to evade arrest by flight and suggests that he actively resisted arrest upon

being confronted by the officers. Byther had clearly fled the scene and run from the officers. Although

Byther never “fought” with the officers in that he did not attempt to hit or strike them in any way, the

evidence clearly demonstrates that he would not give the officers his hands upon repeatedly being

ordered to do so and that he struggled with the officers. 

Plaintiff cites Tennessee v. Garner, to support the contention that the force used was excessive.

471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985). In Garner, the Supreme Court stated the following:

Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious

physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to

prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a

weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the

infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if

necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694,1701 (1985). Clearly, the crime of armed robbery

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constitutes a crime involving “threatened infliction of serious physical harm. Thus, even if the officer’s

action constituted “deadly force” such force is not unconstitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape of

a suspect, such as Byther, who was believed to have committed armed robbery. Garner states that

some warning should be given where feasible, but the evidence demonstrates that Byther was aware the

officers were pursuing him, Congleton had ordered Byther to stop. More importantly, there is no

indication that the officers intended to use deadly force prior to beginning their struggle with Byther. 

Neither officer had his gun drawn. Congleton grabbed Byther and attempted to gain control of Byther. 

If Byther had submitted, giving the officers his hands, no additional force would have been necessary

for the officers to gain control of the suspect. It was not reasonably feasible to give Byther any

warning under the circumstances of this case. As the Graham court stated “reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. Thus, the court finds

that the officers did not violate Byther’s constitutional rights. 

Even if Byther’s constitutional rights had been violated, the court finds that it was not readily

apparent that the officers’ conduct was unlawful and, therefore, their conduct did not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The

cases cited by plaintiff are not analogous. For instance in Smith v. Mattox, the court found that an

officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in “a very close case” where the officer deliberately

broke a subdued suspect’s arm while in the process of handcuffing him. Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d

1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff in Smith had “docilely submitted to arrest” by getting down

on the ground in compliance with the officer’s instructions. Id. at 1418. In this case, it is evident that

plaintiff did not comply with the officers’ orders and resisted arrest. Thus, Officers Congleton and

Brown are entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of

officers Congleton and Brown as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

2. State law claims

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Under Alabama law, municipal police officers are afforded “immunity from tort liability arising

out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his

or her law enforcement duties.” ALA. CODE § 6-5-338 (1975). “Alabama law has defined discretionary

acts as [t]hose acts [as to which] there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or

must not take and those requiring exercise in judgment and choice and [involving] what is just and

proper under the circumstances. Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2d 305, 310 -311

(Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Officers Congleton and Brown were

clearly engaged in a discretionary function within the line and scop of their law enforcement duties.

See Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). (“Because making an arrest is

within the official responsibilities of a sheriff's deputy, Terry was performing a discretionary function

when he arrested Crosby.”). Since the officers’ conduct constituted discretionary acts within the line

and scope of their duties, the officers are entitled to discretionary immunity unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the officers’ conduct “is so egregious as to amount to malicious conduct or conduct

engaged in bad faith.” Couch v. City of Shefflield, 708 So.2d 144, 153 (Ala. 1998) (citation omitted). 

There is no evidence that Officers Congleton or Brown acted in bad faith or maliciously. Therefore,

the court finds that Officers Congleton and Brown are entitled to discretionary immunity under ALA.

CODE. § 6-5-338. Thus, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Officers Congleton and

Brown as to plaintiff’s state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in favor of all

defendants on all claims.

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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