Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC MCDAVID,

No. 2:06-cv-0638-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, LOU

BLANAS, Sheriff of Sacramento

County, an individual, UNITED

STATES MARSHALS SERVICE,

ANTHONY AMADOR, United States

Marshal of the Eastern

District of California, an

individual, and DOES 1 through

50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Eric McDavid is being held in the Sacramento

County Jail on federal charges and, through the present lawsuit,

has sued various individuals and entities allegedly involved in

the terms and conditions of that confinement. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights

under 48 U.S.C. § 1983 by, inter alia, refusing to accommodate

his request for strictly vegan meals. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ refusal to provide vegan

meals violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”).

Defendants County of Sacramento and Lou Blanas now move to

dismiss the above allegations for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Lou Blanas also asserts a defense

of qualified immunity even if the aforestated allegations could

otherwise be maintained against the County.

For reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

will be granted.1

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Eric McDavid was arrested on January 13, 2006, and

placed under the custody of the United States Marshals Service. 

He is currently being held in the Sacramento County Jail. On

January 25, 2006, McDavid was indicted in federal court on one

count of conspiracy. McDavid’s bail request was denied.

According to McDavid, both he and his attorneys have told

prison officials that because McDavid is a vegan he will not eat

any food made with animal products, which include meat, dairy and

any other products which are derived from animals or which are

tested on animals. McDavid claims to have been a vegan for three

years. 

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 In his Complaint, McDavid raises an Eighth Amendment claim 2

based on the jail’s failure to give him adequate opportunities to

exercise. Defendants do not address this claim in their Motion

to Dismiss.

3

He asserts that his veganism is a deeply sincere moral belief,

“held with the strength of a traditional religious conviction.” 

Because of this belief, McDavid asked jail officials to serve him

a strictly vegan diet.

McDavid alleges that the jail refused to accommodate his

request and continued to bring him its standard meals. He claims

to have become very ill as a result of that refusal, and asserts

that he is not provided enough fruit, protein and vitamins to

remain healthy given his veganism. After sending a series of

letters and grievance complaints to jail and law enforcement

officials, McDavid brought the current action on March 24, 2006.

Plaintiff McDavid contends that he has a constitutional

right to a vegan diet based on the Free Exercise Clause of the

First Amendment and on RLUIPA. He also argues that Defendants’

refusal to provide a vegan diet and their imposition of non-vegan

food on Plaintiff was “cruel and unusual punishment” under the

Eighth Amendment.2

Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims

are invalid as a matter of law because veganism is not a

“religion” for purposes of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. 

Defendants also contend that refusal to serve a vegan diet cannot

be cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 

Finally, Defendant Lou Blanas asserts that he is protected by

qualified immunity.

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4

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his or] her

claim that would entitle [him or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v.

Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545

(9th Cir. 1996)).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

"freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

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5

ANALYSIS

For purposes of this motion, Plaintiff’s First Amendment and

RLUIPA claims both hinge on the same issue: whether Plaintiff’s

veganism is a religious belief protected on constitutional or

statutory grounds.

1. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claim

RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a “substantial

burden” on the “religious exercise” of a prisoner. 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1 (2000). It defines “religious exercise” as “any

exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to,

a system of religious belief.” § 2000cc-5 (emphasis added). 

Though broadly protecting the exercise of religion, RLUIPA does

not define what “religion” is. In addition, since Congress

enacted RLUIPA in 2000, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth

Circuit has defined “religion” within the specific statutory

context. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709

(2005)(upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA without

addressing what constitutes “religion”).

Thus, no RLUIPA precedent bears on the issue of whether

Plaintiff’s veganism is a religion. However, courts have defined

religion for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment. It is therefore appropriate for the Court to combine

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and Free Exercise claims in addressing whether

Plaintiff’s veganism is a religion.

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6

2. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims

The First Amendment prohibits Congressional interference

with the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. A

religious claim under the Free Exercise Clause must satisfy two

criteria. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir.

1981). First, the religious belief must be sincere; the Free

Exercise Clause does not cover beliefs which are “obviously shams

and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of

religious sincerity.” Id. (quoting Theriault v. Carlson, 495

F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974)). In the instant case, given the

allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint and construing all facts in

his favor, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff McDavid lacks the

requisite sincerity with respect to his professed veganism.

The sincerity of Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs does not,

however, end the analysis. Plaintiff must also show, as a second

prerequisite for maintaining a viable Free Exercise claim, that

his professed concerns are “rooted in religious belief,” not in

“purely secular” philosophical concerns. Callahan, 658 F.2d at

683 (quoting Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). All courts

recognize some distinction between a religious belief and a nonreligious lifestyle decision; courts will protect the former, but

not the latter, from government interference under the Free

Exercise Clause. While courts have differed on how broadly to

interpret “religious belief,” there is no precedent under which

Plaintiff’s veganism can be considered a religion protected by

the First Amendment.

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7

In his reply, Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the widest

possible definition of “religious belief” from several Vietnamera cases dealing with conscientious objectors: United States v.

Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.

333 (1970). At issue in Seeger was § 6(j) of the Universal

Military Training and Service Act, as amended 50 App. U.S.C. §

456(j), providing religious conscientious objectors exemption

from military service. The Seeger court found that “religious

belief” included not only belief in a “Supreme Being” but also

beliefs “parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” 

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66. Similarly, the Welsh court held that

Welsh’s beliefs were “religious” within the statutory context

because they were “held with the strength of more traditional

religious convictions.” Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339.

Seeger and Welsh are inapposite to this case. Both deal

with a narrow question of statutory construction, not

constitutional interpretation. The Seeger court explicitly

stated that “in [defining the phrases “religious training and

belief” and “Supreme Being”] we resolve it solely in relation to

the language of § 6(j) and not otherwise.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at

174 (emphasis added); see also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343-44. In

addition, Seeger and Welsh are factually distinguishable from

Plaintiff’s situation. The court in both cases held that the

government could not compel Seeger and Welsh to participate in a

war they opposed on religious grounds. By contrast, Plaintiff

argues that the government has restricted the exercise of his

“religion” by not providing him with special meals.

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 In United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993), 3

the Ninth Circuit adopted language from Seeger and Welsh, holding

that a defendant was entitled to use an alternative form of the

standard trial oath. The Ward court’s analysis of Seeger and

Welsh is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claim for the same reasons

that Seeger and Welsh are not relevant, as detailed above. Ward

is also distinguishable from the current inquiry because the oath

formula does not require any invocation of religion or religious

belief. Instead, “all that the common law requires is a form or

statement which impresses upon the mind and conscience of a

witness the necessity for telling the truth.” Id. at 1019. This

flexible standard was designed to accommodate almost anyone who

might appear before the court; it does not provide guidance on

the narrower question of what is “religion” for Free Exercise

purposes.

8

Any comparison is inapt. 

3

Even if Seeger and Welsh were on point, two years after

Welsh the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of “religion” for

Free Exercise purposes in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205

(1972). In Yoder, the court held that Wisconsin’s compulsory

education system infringed on the Free Exercise rights of Amish

parents who, for religious reasons, removed their children from

public schools before they reached age 16. Id. The court made a

clear distinction between the Amish religious faith and the Amish

way of life. Id. The Free Exercise Clause would protect the

parents’ decision only if they based it on religious belief:

A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be

interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 

education if it is based on purely secular considerations;

to have the protection of the Religious Clauses, the claims

must be rooted in religious belief . . . thus, if the Amish

asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation

and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by

the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of

his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims 

would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was

philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such 

belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.

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9

Id. at 215-16. The court then found that the Amish parents’

actions were rooted in a religious belief, thereby receiving

First Amendment protection. Id. While the court did not define

what “religion” was under the Free Exercise Clause, its rejection

of “purely secular” and “philosophical and personal” beliefs in

the constitutional context signaled a withdrawal from the openended language of Seeger and Ward. 

The Ninth Circuit explicitly utilized this distinction

between “religious” beliefs and “purely secular,” philosophical

beliefs in Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981). 

However, because the religion in question in that case was a

conventional one (Christianity), the Callahan court, like the

Supreme Court in Yoder, did not attempt to define the outer

bounds of “religion” in the Free Exercise context. Id. at 685.

Eventually, though, in Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d

1223 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit adopted a clear

definition of “religion” for purposes of the First Amendment. In

Alvarado, the city of San Jose commissioned a sculpture depicting

Quetzalcoatl, the “Plumed Serpent” of Aztec mythology. Id. at

1225. The plaintiffs brought an action, alleging that the city

violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by setting up

a “religious” object. Id. The court found that the sculpture

was not “religious” under the Establishment Clause. Id.

Although Alvarado was an Establishment Clause case, the

court approvingly applied the Third Circuit’s Free Exercise test

from Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), to

determine if worship of Quetzalcoatl was a “religion.” Alvarado,

94 F.3d at 1229. 

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10

In Africa, a prisoner claimed that it would violate the tenets of

his religious group–-a “revolutionary” organization that was

“absolutely opposed to all that is wrong”–- to eat anything other

than raw foods. Afr., 662 F.2d at 1026. The Africa court

departed from its own Circuit’s earlier interpretations of

“religion,” derived in part from the broad language of Seeger and

Welsh as discussed above. Id. at 1228-1229. It replaced them

with a new test utilizing certain “indicia” to determine if a

belief was “religious” in nature. Id. The Third Circuit

formulated its test as follows:

First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate

questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters.

Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists

of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching.

Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of

certain formal and external signs [including “formal

services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy,

structure and organization, efforts at propagation, 

observance of holidays and other similar manifestations 

associated with the traditional religions”].

Afr., 662 F.2d at 1032. After evaluating the prisoner’s Free

Exercise claim against these indicia, the Africa court found that

the prisoner’s dietary requirement was not a “religious belief”

warranting First Amendment protection.

Applying this test to the plaintiff’s claim, the Alvarado

court found that Quetzalcoatl worship was not a religion for

First Amendment purposes. Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229. While

recognizing the difference between a Free Exercise and an

Establishment Clause analysis, the court deemed it immaterial in

defining what “religion” was. Id. at 1230. In this way, the

Ninth Circuit adopted the Africa test, which has also become the

standard in other federal circuits. 

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See, e.g., Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 102 Cal.

App. 4th 39, 60 (Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the influence of the

Africa test).

Because of its incorporation in Alvarado, the Africa test is

the controlling standard for Plaintiff’s claim. Under the Africa

test, Plaintiff’s veganism, standing alone, cannot be a religion. 

It does not address “fundamental and ultimate questions;” it has

no formal and external signs. Plaintiff does not allege the

existence of any larger body of adherents to which he belongs. 

Instead, he describes his veganism as a “right and appropriate

way to live.” Complaint ¶ 24. Like the prisoner in Africa,

Plaintiff’s dietary regimen is a purely secular lifestyle choice,

not protected by the Free Exercise Clause.

Therefore, although the Court cannot say that Plaintiff

lacks the requisite sincerity in his veganism, Plaintiff’s

veganism cannot be a “religion” for purposes of the Free Exercise

Clause and RLUIPA. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is therefore

proper as to these claims. 

3. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and

unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. XIII. When challenging

the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must first demonstrate

that the treatment was “sufficiently serious” to be an Eighth

Amendment violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). 

This is an objective standard. Id. If a prisoner is successful

in demonstrating this first element, he must then show that the

official in question acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id.

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Deprivation of food is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). When

the institution provides food, it must be “adequate to maintain

health.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint establishes that the jail provided

sufficient food that was adequate to maintain health. While

Plaintiff states that the jail has not provided him vegan meals,

he notes that “animal products [have] constantly [been] imposed

upon him with every [meal].” Complaint ¶ 27 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff also declares that the jail “continuously provide[s]

dead animal products . . . several times a day . . .” Complaint

¶ 38. Plaintiff has not alleged, however, that the jail fails to

provide food of adequate quantity and quality to maintain the

health of its general population. Under the objective standard

found in Wilson, Defendants’ failure to provide specific foods to

one prisoner cannot be “sufficiently serious” to be an Eighth

Amendment violation.

The imposition of “dead animal products” on a vegan prisoner

also is not serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The jail “provides” the

food; it does not force Plaintiff to eat it. Complaint ¶ 27. 

“Animal products” include milk and meat, and are legitimate

sources of food. Under an objective standard, no cognizable

legal claim exists for Plaintiff’s idiosyncratic fear of normal

food. 

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 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state 4

any cognizable claim concerning his vegan diet under either the

First or Eighth Amendment, it is not necessary to determine

whether Defendant Blanas would have been entitled to qualified

immunity had those claims been otherwise viable.

13

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims

(First and Second Causes of Action), as well as to Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim regarding his vegan diet (as set forth in

the Third Cause of Action). No leave to amend will be permitted 4

inasmuch as the Court does not believe that further amendment can

cure the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to these

claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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