Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01647/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01647-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Kelly Graff,

Petitioner,

vs.

Claude E. Finn,

Respondent. 

________________________________/

2:07-CV-01647-ATG

ORDER 

Kelly Graff ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner serving a twenty-six-years-tolife sentence for the first degree murder of his estranged wife in 1984, brings this

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the

California Board of Parole Hearings' ("BHP") 2006 decision denying him a

parole date. Respondent concedes that Petitioner exhausted his state court

remedies and the petition is not time barred. Proceedings in this court were

stayed pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit, en banc, in Hayward v. Marshall,

No. 06-55392, ___ F.3d ___ , 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8411 (9th Cir. Cal. Apr.

22, 2010). The stay is hereby VACATED and the petition is DENIED. 

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving a person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A protected liberty interest

may arise from the United States Constitution or from state laws or policies. 

Case 2:07-cv-01647-ATG Document 21 Filed 05/20/10 Page 1 of 3
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Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Although the United States

Constitution does not entitle a prisoner to parole, California prisoners have a

liberty interest in parole under state law. Hayward, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8411,

35-36. Thus, a California prisoner may be denied parole only if "some evidence"

supports the BHP's conclusion that the prisoner poses a danger to the public

safety. Id. at 37. The aggravated circumstances of a prisoner's crime of

conviction can be sufficient to deny parole, but a rational nexus must exist

between those facts and the conclusion that the prisoner poses a current threat to

the public safety. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 564 (Cal. 2008). See also Biggs

v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the BHP denied Petitioner parole based solely on the facts of

Petitioner's crime of conviction. (Petition Ex. D at 56 ("[W]e're basing this on

the only thing we can base it on, it has everything to do with the crime.").) The

circumstances of the crime showed an angry husband whose wife had left him to

move into a residence with another man, taking with her their two-year old child. 

Petitioner, armed with a hammer, broke into the residence and, when his wife

returned, attacked his wife in the presence of the child with hammer blows until

she fell unconscious. Petitioner then retrieved a steak knife from the kitchen and

stabbed her with resulting mutilation. 

The BHP did not identify a rational nexus between those facts and

Petitioner's current danger to the public safety. Indeed, all other relevant facts

discussed by the BHP support Petitioner's suitability for parole. Under 15

California Code of Regulations Section 2402(d), circumstances tending to show

suitability for parole include: (1) no juvenile record, (2) stable social history, (3)

signs of remorse, (4) motivation for the crime includes significant stress in his

life, (5) battered woman syndrome, (6) lack of criminal history, (7) the prisoner's

present age, (8) realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills, and

(9) Institutional Behavior.

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The BHP acknowledged that Petitioner had no previous criminal history,

he performs well in his work assignments, his "institutional behavior is second to

none," and his performance in vocational programs is "outstanding," (Id. at 57.) 

Petitioner's 2005 mental health evaluation states: "Assessment of dangerousness

if released into the community is seen as minimal in comparison with other

inmates. History of substance abuse appears to be the only possible risk factor

for this inmate." (Id. Ex B at 8.) The BHP acknowledged Petitioner plans to

continue Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous upon release, and

had a schedule of the local meetings among his papers, and that his psychiatric

factors are "very positive." (Id. Ex. D at 59.) The BHP also noted that petitioner

has marketable skills and several job offers. (Id.)

However, in Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2007), the court

noted that "in all the cases in which we have held that a parole board's decision to

deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment

offense comports with due process, the decision was made before the inmate had

served the minimum number of years required by his sentence." Here, Petitioner

had not served twenty-six years of his twenty-six-years-to-life sentence when the

BHP denied him a parole date in 2006. Therefore, the BHP's decision did not, at

that time, violate Petitioner's right to due process.

Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED.

Dated: May 19, 2010

 /s/ Alfred T. Goodwin 

_____________________

ALFRED T. GOODWIN

United States Circuit Judge

Sitting by designation

Case 2:07-cv-01647-ATG Document 21 Filed 05/20/10 Page 3 of 3