Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00188/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00188-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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Case No. 15-CV-00188-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MEENA ARTHUR DATTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ASSET RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-CV-00188-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 43

Plaintiff Meena Arthur Datta (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Asset 

Recovery Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”).

1

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification. ECF No. 43-1 (“Mot.”). The Court finds this motion suitable for decision without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and thus vacates the motion hearing set for 

April 7, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the 

record in this case, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.

I. BACKGROUND

 

1

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint against Defendants Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC and 

Oliphant Financial, LLC. ECF No. 1. Defendant Oliphant Financial, LLC was dismissed from 

this action pursuant to a stipulation of dismissal on March 9, 2015. ECF No. 22.

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A. Factual Background

This putative class action arises out of Defendant’s attempt to collect upon consumer debts 

from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. Plaintiff alleges that, at some previous point in time,

she incurred a consumer debt issued by HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., for personal, family, or 

household purposes. ECF No. 21 ¶ 8. This debt was later consigned, placed, or otherwise 

assigned to Defendant for collection. Id. ¶ 9. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sent her a collection letter on January 14, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 10, 

12; ECF No. 21-1. This collection letter was sent in a glassine window envelope. ECF No. 21 ¶ 

14; ECF No. 21-2. Plaintiff alleges that the collection letter and the glassine window envelope 

were designed so as to disclose (1) Plaintiff’s name and address, (2) Defendant’s identifying 

number for Plaintiff’s account (i.e. “ARSL/1/6474509”), and (3) a barcode containing the same 

information to anyone who handled or processed the envelope while in transit to Plaintiff. ECF 

No. 21 ¶¶ 16–17. Furthermore, the glassine window envelope listed Defendant’s business name, 

“Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC,” in the return address. Id. ¶ 18; ECF No. 21-2. Plaintiff alleges 

that the business name “Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC” indicates that the letter was sent by a 

company engaged in the business of debt collection. ECF No. 21 ¶ 19. Finally, Plaintiff avers

that Defendant routinely sends collection letters in this manner. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. 

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on January 13, 2015. ECF No. 1. On March 4, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 21. The FAC asserts two causes of 

action, based on violations of (1) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and (2) the 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”). Defendant answered the FAC on 

March 18, 2015. ECF No. 23. On October 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for class 

certification, which seeks certification of the following class:

(i) all persons with addresses in California, (ii) to whom Defendant sent, or caused 

to be sent, a collection letter in the form of Exhibit “1” in an envelope in the form 

of Exhibit “2,” (iii) in an attempt to collect an alleged debt originally owed to 

HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., (iv) which was incurred primarily for personal, family, 

or household purposes, (v) which were not returned as undeliverable by the U.S. 

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Post Office, (vi) during the period one year prior to the date of filing this action 

through the date of class certification.

Mot. at 1. Plaintiff seeks certification of this class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(b)(3). Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on December 17, 2015, ECF No. 52 

(“Opp’n”), and Plaintiff filed a reply on January 15, 2016, ECF No. 55 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class certification, has two sets of 

requirements that a plaintiff must meet before the Court may certify a class: a plaintiff must meet 

all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and must satisfy at least one of the prongs of Rule 23(b). 

Under Rule 23(a), the Court may certify a class only where “(1) the class is so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 

class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 

of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Courts refer to these requirements as “numerosity, commonality, 

typicality and adequacy,” respectively. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

In addition to meeting these Rule 23(a) requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy one of 

the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).

With respect to Rule 23(b)(3), the Court may certify such a class if the Court finds that “questions 

of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 

adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Further, parties seeking to certify a Rule 

23(b)(3) class must also demonstrate that the class is sufficiently ascertainable. See Marcus v. 

BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2012); Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 

274 F.R.D. 666, 671–72 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

“[A] court’s class-certification analysis must be rigorous and may entail some overlap with 

the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 

133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013). Nevertheless, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in freeCase 5:15-cv-00188-LHK Document 66 Filed 03/18/16 Page 3 of 19
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ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the 

extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 

prerequisites . . . are satisfied.” Id. at 1194–95. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 23(a)

In the instant case, Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)’s 

requirements for numerosity, commonality, and typicality. Nonetheless, the Court briefly 

addresses these requirements before addressing the adequacy requirement—which Defendant does 

contest—at greater length. 

1. Numerosity

Under Rule 23(a)(1), class certification is appropriate if “the class is so numerous that 

joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Here, Plaintiff has identified at 

least 10,000 recipients of the allegedly illegal collection letters described in the class definition, 

based upon an examination of Defendant’s business records. Mot. at 4. As other district courts 

have noted, “the numerosity requirement is usually satisfied where the class comprises 40 or more 

members.” See Twegbe v. Pharmaca Integrative Pharmacy, Inc., 2013 WL 3802807, *2 (N.D. 

Cal. July 17, 2013) (citing cases). Defendant does not dispute that the putative class is sufficiently 

numerous. Under these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established numerosity for 

purposes of Rule 23(a)(1).

2. Commonality

Next, Rule 23(a)(2) states that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 

representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . there are questions of law or fact 

common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This requirement has “been construed 

permissively”—all questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. Ellis v. 

Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589 

(“[C]ommonality only requires a single significant question of law or fact.”). 

With respect to commonality, the Court finds instructive its recent decision in Jacobson v. 

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Persolve, LLC, 2015 WL 3523696 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2015). In Jacobson, plaintiff brought suit

against defendants under the FDCPA and RFDCPA because defendants had sent plaintiff a debt 

collection letter which did not disclose the name of the creditor to whom plaintiff’s debt was 

owed. Id. at *4. As in this case, plaintiff in Jacobson sought certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class,

comprised of all individuals in California who had received a similar letter. This Court granted 

plaintiff’s motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, and stated that plaintiff had satisfied the 

commonality requirement because plaintiff had “identified a ‘common contention’ . . . capable of 

classwide resolution.” Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).

Similar to Jacobson, in Gold v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 623, 627 

(N.D. Cal. 2014), defendants sent plaintiff and all proposed class members a standardized letter 

which contained allegedly misleading passages. In adjudicating plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification, the Gold court held that plaintiff had sufficiently established commonality because, 

based on the facts presented, defendants’ liability under the FDCPA was an issue of law that 

would “generate a dispositive common answer” for all class members. Id. at 631. 

The circumstances are analogous to the circumstances in Jacobson and in Gold. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant sent all putative class members the same collection letter in identical

glassine window envelopes. In addition, according to Plaintiff, this collection letter violates the 

FDCPA and RFDCPA because the letter displayed Defendant’s business name and disclosed 

information which could have been used to identify Plaintiff to anyone who handled the letter

while in transit. Plaintiff has thus presented the Court with a common question of law—whether 

or not such letters violate the FDCPA and RFDCPA—based on a common course of conduct. 

Accordingly, consistent with Jacobson and Gold, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 

23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. 

3. Typicality

Under Rule 23(a)(3), the representative party must have claims or defenses that are 

“typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality is satisfied 

“when each class member’s claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member 

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makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 

1105, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). This requirement is “permissive” and requires only 

that the representative’s claims be “reasonably co-extensive with those of the absent class 

members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 

1020 (9th Cir. 1998). “The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of 

the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 

976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the parties do not dispute that each proposed class member received the same 

collection letter and therefore suffered the same alleged injury under the FDCPA and RFDCPA. 

Each class member’s claims thus “arise[] from the same course of events, and each class member 

makes similar legal arguments to prove . . . [D]efendant’s liability.” Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1124. 

In addition, Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff has sufficiently established typicality. Under 

these circumstances, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality 

requirement. 

4. Adequacy

Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires “the representative parties [to] fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requirement turns upon resolution of two 

questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other 

class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously 

on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The Court addresses these inquiries in turn.

a. Conflict of Interest

With respect to the conflict of interest inquiry, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “a 

class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same 

injury as the class members.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997)

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

In the instant case, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not an adequate class representative 

because Plaintiff has provided no proof as to “how the letter was mailed and whether any improper 

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information was visible either through a glassine window on the envelope or on the envelope 

itself.” Opp’n at 4 (emphasis removed). In addition, Defendant avers that Plaintiff is visually 

impaired. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot identify the contents of the collection letter and glassine

window envelope. Defendant argues that, considered together, Plaintiff’s lack of proof and 

Plaintiff’s visual impairment demonstrate that Plaintiff is not an adequate class representative.

These arguments lack merit. First, contrary to Defendant’s contentions, Plaintiff has in 

fact produced two key forms of proof as to Defendant’s alleged misconduct. Attached to the FAC 

are copies of Defendant’s debt collection letter and the glassine window envelope in which this 

letter was sent. See ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2. Furthermore, Defendant has admitted to sending 

substantially similar letters in identical envelopes to at least 10,000 individuals. 

This evidence distinguishes the instant case from Everage v. National Recovery Agency, 

2015 WL 1071757 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2015). In Everage, which involved a nearly identical 

FDCPA claim, plaintiff produced only a copy of the debt collection letter; the Everage plaintiff 

acknowledged that he could not produce a copy of the envelope in which this letter was sent. Id. 

at *11. On the other hand, in the instant case, Plaintiff has produced a copy of the debt collection 

letter and the envelope in which the letter was sent. Defendant has, moreover, conceded that 

Defendant sent substantially similar letters in identical envelopes to thousands of other 

individuals.

Second, Plaintiff’s alleged visual impairment is not relevant. The basis of Plaintiffs’ 

claims is that Plaintiff’s identifying information was made available to any individual who might 

have handled Defendant’s debt collection letter while this letter was in transit. Thus, whether or 

not Plaintiff is visually impaired is immaterial—what matters is whether the third parties who 

handled Defendant’s debt collection letter saw Plaintiff’s identifying information and, if so, 

whether such circumstances give rise to a colorable FDCPA and RFDCPA claim.

Third, Defendant’s arguments appear to conflate Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement 

with Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Defendant, for instance, relies primarily upon 

the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Amgen. See Opp’n at 4. However, the Amgen Court did not 

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discuss or examine the adequacy requirement. Instead, the Amgen Court focused solely on the 

predominance requirement, and reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court’s longstanding view that 

extensive individualized inquiries can defeat a finding of predominance. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 

1194 (“The only issue before us in this case is whether [Defendant] has satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

requirement that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 

added). As discussed in greater detail below, the instant case does not require the Court to engage 

in any individualized inquiries. Plaintiff and the putative class possess the same interest and have 

suffered the same alleged injury, all based upon the same conduct undertaken by Defendant. 

Plaintiff has thus sufficiently demonstrated predominance for purposes of class certification. In 

any event, pursuant to Amgen, this discussion is properly addressed in the context of Rule 

23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, and not in the context of Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy 

requirement. 

In sum, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments. Instead, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff is a “part of the class” and “possess[es] the same interest and suffer[s] the same injury as 

[other] class members.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–26. Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied the 

adequacy inquiry’s conflict of interest prong. 

b. Vigorous Prosecution 

The second prong of the adequacy inquiry requires the Court to determine whether “the 

named plaintiffs and their counsel [will] prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.” 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “Although there are no fixed standards by which ‘vigor’ can be 

assayed, considerations include competency of counsel and, in the context of a settlement-only 

class, an assessment of the rationale for not pursuing further litigation.” Id. at 1021. In the instant 

case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel will prosecute this action 

vigorously. In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted several declarations which describe 

counsel’s experience in prosecuting consumer protection and FDCPA/RFDCPA class actions. See 

ECF Nos. 43-3, 43-6, 43-7. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the vigorous 

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prosecution requirement. 

To conclude, the Court finds Plaintiff to be an adequate class representative. Plaintiff and 

the proposed class share the same claims and interest in obtaining relief, and Plaintiff is assisted 

by experienced counsel in prosecuting this action. 

B. Rule 23(b)(3)

1. Predominance

In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiff here seeks certification of a damages 

class under Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the district court must “find[] that the questions 

of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “While similar to Rule 23(a)’s requirements for typicality 

and commonality, ‘the predominance criterion is far more demanding.’” Messner v. Northshore 

Univ. HealthSys., 669 F.3d 802, 814 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623). The 

predominance inquiry “entails identifying the substantive issues that will control the outcome, 

assessing which issues will predominate, and then determining whether the issues are common to 

the class, a process that ultimately prevents the class from degenerating into a series of individual 

trials.” Gene and Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). 

As discussed above, this Court recently addressed class certification in a nearly identical 

context in Jacobson. As in Jacobson, the common question of fact in the instant case is whether 

Defendant sent every putative class member substantively identical collection letters, and the 

common question of law is whether these letters violate the FDCPA and RFDCPA. See Jacobson,

2015 WL 3523696, *6. In other words, because the collection letters sent to the class are 

substantively identical to one another and the legal issues are the same for each class member, the 

instant case requires the Court to answer a single question: does Defendant’s standardized practice 

of sending collection letters in glassine window envelopes that disclose (1) information that 

identifies the recipient and (2) Defendant’s business name violate the FDCPA and/or RFDCPA? 

As this Court determined in Jacobson, “resolution of whether Defendant’s practice . . . violates the 

FDCPA and/or RFDCPA will resolve the claims of the entire class.” Id. Thus, consistent with 

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Jacobson, the Court concludes that “common questions present a significant aspect of the case and 

they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1022; see also Abels v. JBC Legal Grp. P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding 

predominance requirement satisfied where the defendants sent identical collection letters to each 

class member). 

Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. In challenging predominance,

Defendant contends that individual inquiries will overwhelm common class questions because 

class members must present “individual and fact intensive” evidence in order to establish 

Defendant’s alleged liability. Opp’n at 8. In making this argument, Defendant relies upon four 

cases: Soto v. Commercial Recovery Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 6024514 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011); 

Robinson v. Mun. Servs. Bureau, 2015 WL 7568644 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015); Gelinas v. 

Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 2015 WL 4639949 (W.D.N.Y. July 22, 2015); and 

Gardner v. Credit Mgmt. LP, 2015 WL 6442246 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015). The Court finds these

cases inapposite.

In Soto, plaintiff sought to certify a FDCPA class consisting of “all California residents 

who . . . took out one or more loans subject to California Code of Civil Procedure § 580b.” 2011 

WL 6024514, *2. As a matter of California law, § 580b applies only to loans secured by primary

owner-occupied residences. Id. at *7. In order to establish class membership, plaintiff in Soto 

intended to rely upon class members’ uniform residential loan applications. Id. However, during

discovery, defendant in Soto established that a significant number of putative class members had

misstated the purpose of their loan on their uniform residential loan applications: the loan was 

really for a second home, and not for a primary residence. Id. Under such circumstances, the

district court found class certification inappropriate, as the uniform residential loan applications 

were demonstrably unreliable and “expose[d] a need for” the district court to undertake numerous 

“individualized inquir[ies].” Id.

These circumstances do not apply to the instant case. Here, Defendant has offered no

evidence that the collection letters and glassine window envelopes are demonstrably unreliable to 

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establish class membership. Moreover, under Plaintiff’s theory of the case, any individual who

received such a collection letter may bring an FDCPA and RFDCPA claim against Defendant. 

Thus, beyond identifying those individuals who received from Defendant the same standardized 

collection letters in the same glassine window envelope—which Plaintiff has already done—there 

is no need for an individualized inquiry. 

Defendant’s reliance on Robinson, Gelinas, and Gardner is likewise unavailing. Plaintiffs 

did not file motions for class certification in any of these cases. Instead, in each of these cases, the 

district court examined plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim on the merits, either in the context of a motion 

brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings). 

However, whether or not Plaintiff can prevail on the merits is a different question from

whether class treatment of Plaintiff’s claims is appropriate. Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 

emphasized, “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that 

they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are 

satisfied.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195. In accordance with Amgen, numerous courts have held that 

merits questions and class certification questions are separate inquiries. See Edwards v. First Am. 

Corp., 798 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A court, when asked to certify a class, is merely to 

decide a suitable method of adjudicating the case and should not turn class certification into a 

mini-trial on the merits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Schlaud v. Snyder, 785 F.3d 1119, 

1125 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Whether a class should be certified and whether the claims raised by that 

class have any merit are two different questions.”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 

492, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“A district court must resolve factual disputes necessary to class 

certification, but the court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal 

for the trial on the merits.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

In the instant case, Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the merits, 

and the Court need not examine the merits of Plaintiff’s claims for purposes of deciding Plaintiff’s

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motion for class certification. Instead, the Court must only determine whether Plaintiff has 

established that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Here, because the claims

at issue arise from a common course of conduct and present a common legal question, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.

2. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) provides four factors that a court must consider in determining whether a 

class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. These factors are: 

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 

defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 

begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in 

the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Court addresses these factors in turn. 

a. Individual Interest in Controlling Litigation

With respect to the interest of each class member in controlling the prosecution or defense 

of separate actions, Defendant argues that a class action is not a superior means for adjudicating 

the claims at issue because “any possible recovery by class members would be de minimis.” 

Opp’n at 5. In an FDCPA class action, the maximum recovery is “the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per 

centum of the net worth of the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(b). Based on Defendant’s 

net worth, Defendant argues that the 10,000 proposed class members would receive a mere $1.50. 

Opp’n at 6. In comparison, individuals suing under the FDCPA can recover actual damages and 

up to $1,000 in statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(2)(A). Similar remedies are 

available under the RFDCPA. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30. Based on these provisions, Defendant 

contends that the claims at issue are better resolved in individual actions, where recovery would be 

higher on an individual basis. Opp’n at 7. 

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive for four reasons. First, the Court observes 

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that, as a general matter, courts routinely certify class actions where monetary recovery would be 

small. In Amchem, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not 

exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the Advisory Committee 

had dominantly in mind vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be 

without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.” 521 U.S. at 617 (internal 

quotation marks omitted omitted). Circuit and district courts have applied this principle in a 

variety of contexts. In Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001), 

for instance, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[w]here damages suffered by each putative class 

member are not large,” the “interest of each member in ‘individually controlling the prosecution or 

defense of separate actions’ . . . weighs in favor of certifying a class action.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Palana v. Mission Bay Inc., 2015 WL 4110432, *8 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 

2015) (citing Zinser and stating that “[c]lass treatment would increase the class members’ access 

to redress by unifying what otherwise may be multiple small claims.”). Likewise, in approving a 

class action settlement in In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 391 F.3d 516, 534 (3d Cir. 

2004), the Third Circuit stated that, where “each consumer has a very small claim in relation to the 

cost of prosecuting a lawsuit,” a class action “facilitates spreading of the litigation costs among the 

numerous injured parties and encourages private enforcement of the statutes.” 

Second, the efficacy of a single class action lawsuit to resolve the FDCPA and RFDCPA 

issues that Plaintiff has raised outweighs the possibility of a small class recovery. In this case, 

Defendant’s liability will turn on the legality of the allegedly defective standardized collection 

letter sent to approximately 10,000 class members. Rather than litigate 10,000 individual cases 

that raise the same questions of law and fact, class litigation would efficiently and consistently 

adjudicate the issue of Defendants’ liability under the FDCPA and the RFDCPA in a single action. 

Moreover, the FDCPA appears to specifically contemplate class actions for these sorts of 

situations. As then U.S. District Judge Martin Jenkins observed, individual claimants are “most 

likely unaware of their rights under the FDCPA,” and “the size of any individual damages claims 

under the FDCPA are usually so small that there is little incentive to sue individually.” Hunt v. 

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Check Recovery Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 505, 514–15 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Gold, 2014 WL 

5026270, *9 (“[I]ndividual recovery [under the FDCPA] is small, and resorting to alternative 

mechanisms would be unduly inefficient.”); Jacobson, 2015 WL 3523696, *7. The Court agrees 

with this reasoning, and finds that many class members here are likely unaware of their rights and 

unlikely to sue individually. Thus, in the interest of efficiency and fairness, a class action is 

superior to the alternative methods of adjudication available in this case. 

Third, the mandatory notice and opt-out provisions under Rule 23(c)(2) can help protect 

the interests of the proposed class members should they wish to pursue individual claims. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Jacobson, 2015 WL 3523696, *9. Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B), each 

class member will be sent a notice that informs them of the claims at issue and the right to be 

excluded from the class. At that point, any prospective class member who is dissatisfied with the 

potential recovery may choose to opt out of the class and bring an individual lawsuit against 

Defendant under the FDCPA and RFDCPA. 

Fourth, although the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed de minimis recoveries in the 

FDCPA context, every district court within the Ninth Circuit has, when presented with this

question, held that “the likelihood of a de minimis class recovery under the FDCPA is not a bar to 

class certification.” Jacobson, 2015 WL 3523696, *8. Indeed, as noted in Jacobson, district 

courts in this circuit have certified FDCPA class actions where the estimated recovery per class 

member ranged from $0.00000111 to $11.28. See, e.g., del Campo v. Am. Corrective Counseling 

Servs., Inc., 254 F.R.D. 585, 596 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ($0.00000111 per class member); Abels, 

227 F.R.D. at 547 ($0.25 per class member); Bogner v. Masari Invs., LLC, 2010 WL 2595273, *2 

(D. Ariz. June 24, 2010) ($11.28 per class member). Here, the estimated potential recovery—

approximately $1.50—falls squarely within the range set forth in del Campo, Abels, and Bogner. 

In addition to these district court decisions, in Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 

344 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit concluded that a recovery of only $0.28 per class member 

would not bar class certification in the FDCPA context. As the Seventh Circuit explained, 

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[W]e believe that a de minimis recovery (in monetary terms) should not 

automatically bar a class action. The policy at the very core of the class action 

mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 

incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A 

class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 

recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.

True, the FDCPA allows for individual recoveries of up to $1000. But this 

assumes that the plaintiff will be aware of her rights, willing to subject herself to all 

the burdens of suing and able to find an attorney willing to take her case. These are 

considerations that cannot be dismissed lightly in assessing whether a class action 

or a series of individual lawsuits would be more appropriate for pursuing the 

FDCPA’s objectives.

Id. Numerous federal courts have followed Mace to hold that the possibility of a de minimis 

recovery does not automatically bar a class action. See, e.g., Kalish v. Karp & Kalamotousakis,

LLP, 246 F.R.D. 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (certifying FDCPA class based on potential recovery 

of $2.50 per class member); Warcholek v. Med. Collections Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 291, 295–96 

(N.D. Ill. 2006) (certifying FDCPA class where defendant claimed negative net worth); Tripp v. 

Berman & Rabin, P.A., 310 F.R.D. 499, 508 (D. Kan. 2015) (certifying FDCPA class based on 

potential recovery of $2.63 per class member).

In opposition, Defendant cites two cases where district courts have decertified an FDCPA 

class after finding the potential class recovery to be too low—Fairbrun v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P.,

2008 WL 750550 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2008), and Granisher v. Check Enf’t Unit, 209 F.R.D. 392 

(W.D. Mich. 2002). Opp’n at 5 n.1. These cases are distinguishable for two reasons. First, 

Defendant has not filed a motion to decertify. Thus, these decertification cases are of little 

assistance in adjudicating the instant motion for class certification. Second, and more importantly, 

the potential recovery in these decertification cases—less than one cent in Fairbrun and 

approximately six cents in Granisher—is far less than the estimated potential recovery in the 

instant case. Here, on the other hand, each class member would receive at least $1.50, with the 

potential of a higher recovery if potential class members opt out. 

Defendant also cites several cases where district courts outside the Ninth Circuit have 

denied class certification under the FDCPA because of the possibility of a de minimis recovery to 

class members. The Court finds these cases inapposite. Opp’n at 7. In Lewis v. Riddle, 1998 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 20465 (W.D. La. Nov. 18, 1998), for instance, the district court denied class 

certification because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate predominance. Accordingly, “the trial of 

the proposed class action [would] require the resolution of fact issues for each individual 

member.” Id. at *26. In contrast, in the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficiently established 

predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). Thus, the trial of the proposed class action here would not 

“require the resolution of fact issues for each individual [class] member.” Id. 

The remaining cases upon which Defendant relies—Sonmore v. CheckRite Recovery 

Services., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 257 (D. Minn. 2001), Jones v. CBE Group, 215 F.R.D. 558, 570 (D. 

Minn. 2003), and Lyles v. Rosenfeld Attorney Network, 2000 WL 798824 (N.D. Miss. May 17, 

2000)—are likewise unavailing. In Sonmore, the district court concluded that an estimated 

recovery between $0.15 and $25 per class member was insufficient. 206 F.R.D. at 265. Similarly, 

in Jones, the district court, citing Sonmore, denied class certification because “the potential 

recovery for unnamed class members [was], at most, de minimis.” 215 F.R.D. at 570. Finally, in 

Lyles, the maximum recovery would have been $18.68 per class member. The Lyles court found 

that a class action was not a superior adjudication method because “[b]y certifying the class, the 

court would [significantly reduce] each class members’ potential [individual] recovery.” 2000 

WL 798824, *6. 

However, in Sonmore, Jones, and Lyles, the district courts did not consider the hurdles that

an individual plaintiff might face in the absence of a class action. Specifically, the Sonmore, 

Jones, and Lyles courts did not consider an individual plaintiff’s lack of knowledge regarding the 

FDCPA and the difficulty that an individual plaintiff might have in finding counsel in light of the 

small recovery. Rather, the district courts in these cases assumed that there was “no lack of 

incentive for either plaintiffs or counsel to pursue individual FDCPA actions.” Jones, 215 F.R.D. 

at 570. 

The Court is not convinced that denying class certification here would result in 10,000 

plaintiffs bringing individual claims. On this particular point, the Court notes that Sonmore, 

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every federal court—including this Court—has allowed parties to bring FDCPA class actions 

precisely because individual claims are unlikely to be brought. Aggregating claims thus 

encourages lawsuits that produce the “deterrent and curative effect of eliminating abusive 

collection practices intended by Congress.” Jacobson, 2015 WL 3523696, *8. Moreover, as the 

Seventh Circuit stated in Mace, “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to 

overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to 

bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” 109 F.3d at 344. “A class action solves this 

problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s 

(usually an attorney’s) labor.” Id. 

Indeed, in Hartley v. Suburban Radiologic Consultants, Ltd., 295 F.R.D. 357, 378 (D. 

Minn. 2013), a district court in the District of Minnesota—the same district court as Sonmore and 

Jones—recently found that superiority was met where the class recovery was estimated to be 

between $0.13 and $22.73 per class member. The Hartley court expressly declined to follow 

Sonmore and Jones, and instead found more persuasive recent case law where courts have 

reasoned that “the potential maximum recovery is not the only, or most relevant, consideration 

when determining whether an FDCPA class action may be certified.” Id. Although the putative 

class members in Hartley could have “potentially obtain[ed] a greater amount of damages in an 

individual suit,” the district court found that these plaintiffs were unlikely to know their rights and 

therefore “unlikely to bring their own claims for FDCPA violations.” Id. at 379. In the instant 

case, the Court finds that, as in Hartley, Jacobson, Mace, and the numerous other cases cited 

above, class members are unlikely to bring individual claims against Defendant for Defendant’s 

alleged FDCPA and RFDCPA violations. 

In sum, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that a class action in this case is well 

suited to address “the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective 

strength to bring their opponents into court at all.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently established superiority for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3). 

b. Remaining Superiority Factors

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Although the parties do not address the remaining superiority factors, the Court addresses 

these factors briefly below. 

The second factor, “the extent and nature of any [other] litigation concerning the 

controversy,” weighs in favor of certification. To the Court’s knowledge, this case is the only 

action that has been brought against Defendant concerning Defendant’s practice of sending 

collection letters in glassine window envelopes that disclose (1) Plaintiff’s name and address, (2) 

Defendant’s identifying number for Plaintiff’s account, and (3) a barcode containing the same 

information. See, e.g., Wright & Miller, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1780 (describing 

Rule 23(b)(3)(B) as “intended to serve the purpose of assuring judicial economy and reducing the 

possibility of multiple lawsuits.”). 

The third factor, the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a particular forum, also 

counsels in favor of certification. Plaintiff’s proposed class is limited to “persons with addresses 

in California.” Mot. at 1. Defendant’s actions affected California residents and, to the Court’s 

knowledge, there is no indication that this particular forum is any less desirable than any other 

forum within California. 

Finally, the fourth factor, which concerns the difficulty of managing a class action, 

depends largely on whether Plaintiff’s case “rises and falls [on] common evidence.” In re HighTech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2013). This factor thus 

overlaps with the Court’s commonality, typicality, and predominance analysis. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that this fourth factor weighs in favor of class certification. 

In sum, after weighing the four superiority factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 

satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement.

3. Ascertainability

Courts addressing class certification motions under Rule 23(b)(3) have held that, “apart 

from the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a) [and Rule 23(b)(3)], the party seeking class 

certification must demonstrate that an identifiable and ascertainable class exists.” Sethavanish v. 

ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., 2014 WL 580696, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014). A class is 

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ascertainable if the class is defined with “objective criteria” and if it is “administratively feasible 

to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class.” Id.

The parties do not dispute that ascertaining class membership would be relatively 

straightforward. With respect to administrative feasibility, for example, the parties have, by 

examining Defendant’s business records, identified at least 10,000 putative class members who 

received the same form letter during the class period. Accordingly, the Court finds the class 

sufficiently ascertainable.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. 

Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3), and the Court CERTIFIES the 

following Rule 23(b)(3) class:

(i) all persons with addresses in California, (ii) to whom Defendant sent, or caused 

to be sent, a collection letter in the form of Exhibit “1” in an envelope in the form 

of Exhibit “2,” (iii) in an attempt to collect an alleged debt originally owed to 

HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., (iv) which was incurred primarily for personal, family, 

or household purposes, (v) which were not returned as undeliverable by the U.S. 

Post Office, (vi) during the period one year prior to the date of filing this action 

through the date of class certification.

The Court APPOINTS Meena Arthur Datta as representative of the class. As Defendants 

do not challenge the adequacy of proposed class counsel, the Court also APPOINTS Fred Schwinn 

and Raeon Roulston of the Consumer Law Center and Randolph Bragg of Horwitz, Horwitz & 

Associates as class counsel to represent the class. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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