Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01281/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01281-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL LEE HUNT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

T. FELKER, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-01281-OWW-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR VIOLATION OF

THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS (Doc. 1)

ORDER TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN

TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant petition was filed on September 5, 2007. (Doc. 1). On

January 14, 2008, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be dismissed

as untimely. (Doc. 3). On February 1, 2008, Petitioner filed his response. (Doc. 4). A further

review of the evidence now before the Court confirms the Court’s preliminary finding that the

petition is untimely and should be dismissed.. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

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dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. The Court has

afforded Petitioner such an opportunity by permitting him to respond to the Order to Show Cause

with information that would rebut the Court’s preliminary conclusion that the petition was untimely.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds

by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320. The instant petition was filed on September 5, 2007, and thus,

it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2. Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus relief is

non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal

denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may instead

file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on January 18, 2002. (Doc. 1, p. 1). In this

case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on February 24, 2004. 

Thus, direct review would conclude on May 24, 2004, when the ninety-day period for seeking review

in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887. 103 S.Ct. 3383

(1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347

(8th Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from May 24, 2004, or until May 24, 2005, absent

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned the instant petition was filed on September 5, 2007, over two years after the

limitations period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 1

557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned

that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the

next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent

the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitations period is

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Petitioner provided no filing date for his petition in the California Supreme Court and the Supreme Court’s order 1

does not indicate the filing date. The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989

F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9

(9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see

also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d

736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for

filings in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, are subject to judicial notice. The Court accessed the

California courts’ electronic database for the California Supreme Court and determined that Petitioner filed his petition on

September 30, 2005, and takes judicial notice of such filing. 

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not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001). 

Petitioner asserts that he filed a “round” of state habeas petitions to exhaust the claims in the

instant petition, beginning with a petition in the Kern County Superior Court. (Doc. 1, pp. 149-154). 

 That petition was filed on January 27, 2004 and denied on March 26, 2004, both dates occurring

before the one-year limitations period had even begun to run in Petitioner’s case. (Id.). Thus, they

are irrelevant to the Court’s calculation of tolling.

Then, on August 3, 2005, again before the one-year statute had commenced, Petitioner filed a

habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”) that was

denied on July 22, 2005, after the one-year period had commenced. (Doc. 1, Exh. O). Petitioner

thereafter waited seventy days, until September 30, 2005 to file another petition in the California

Supreme Court that was denied on September 13, 2006. (Doc. 1, Exh. P).1

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition on September 5, 2007. However, the Court

will use August 30, 2007, the date Petitioner signed the petition and, presumably, delivered it to

prison officials for mailing to this Court under the “mailbox” rule. The time elapsed between the

California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s last state petition on September 13, 2006, and the

filing of the instant petition is thus 351 days. However, in addition, Petitioner waited for seventy

days between the 5th DCA’s denial of his petition on July 22, 2005, and the date he filed his petition

in the California Supreme Court on September 30, 2005. The total un-tolled time, therefore, is 421

days, which makes the instant petition 56 days late. 

Petitioner’s response to the Order to Show Cause contends that the Court should toll the

period between July 22, 2005 and September 30, 2005, since, normally, the AEDPA provides that

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In Evans, the Supreme Court held that when the state court denies a state habeas petition without any explanation 2

or indication as to timeliness, the federal court must conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the state habeas petition

was filed within “a reasonable time.” 546 U.S. at 189. 

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the intervals between successive petitions in a state “round” of petitions is tolled along with the time

the petitions are actually pending. (Doc. 4, pp. 3-4). Petitioner cites Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003

(9th Cir. 1999), in support of this proposition.

While the general rule is certainly that the interval between state petitions is tolled, case law

subsequent to Nino has further limited a petitioner’s right to interval tolling. In Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. 189, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006), the United States Supreme Court held that a California state prisoner

was not entitled to statutory tolling under the AEDPA where there was an unjustifiable six month

delay between petitions in the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, recognizing that

California did not have strict time deadlines for the filing of a habeas petition at the next appellate

level, indicated that most states provide for a shorter period of 30 to 60 days within which to timely

file a petition at the next appellate level. Evans, 546 U.S. at 201. Following the Supreme Court’s

suggestion, this Court assumes, arguendo, that a 60 day delay would be at the outer limits of what the

High Court would consider reasonable.

Here, the delay between the 5th DCA’s denial of Petitioner’s petition on July 22, 2005, and

the date he filed his petition in the California Supreme Court on September 30, 2005, was seventy

days. Under the implicit guidelines in Evans, which also requires the district court to conduct its

own independent inquiry into the timeliness of state petitions, 546 U.S. at 198, this seventy day 2

interval was unreasonable and therefore are not entitled to tolling. Id. at 201; Culver v. Director of

Corrections, 450 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1140-1141 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(delays of 97 and 71 days

unreasonable); Forrister v. Woodford, 2007 WL 809991, *2-3 (E.D. Cal. March 15, 2007)(88 day

delay unreasonable). Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition is untimely

and must be dismissed. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

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F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be

appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner makes no claim of entitlement to equitable tolling, and, based on the record now

before the Court, the Court is aware of none. Accordingly, the period is not equitably tolled.

 RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus petition (Doc. 1),

be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation

period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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