Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00752/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00752-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv752

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY GOODRUM,

Petitioner,

v.

M.C. KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-0752-J (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Tony Goodrum(“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior

Court conviction in case number SCD170068 for voluntary manslaughter and personal use of a firearm. (Doc. No. 1; Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), at 276.) Petitioner contends

that the trial court instructed the jury improperly and that it

abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence of a prior

conviction. (See Petition, Grounds One, Two, and Three.)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer

[Doc. No. 9], Petitioner’s Traverse [Doc. No. 12], and all the

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supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the

documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the

reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition

be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶] Goodrum lived with his girlfriend Ieisa Wilson, her

two children, and another couple in a house on

Brookhaven Road. Goodrum and the victim, Dwayne

Stamps, were friends. About a year earlier Stamps had

rented a room in the Brookhaven house for a few months. 

In the past, Goodrum and Stamps had argued, even to the

point of pushing or shoving each other, but they had

never had a fist fight and Stamps had never made any

threats to kill Goodrum or anyone else. Goodrum and

Stamps had not seen each other for several months. 

Some animosity had developed between them because

Stamps had borrowed and not returned Wilson’s car

(Wilson and Goodrum viewed it as a theft of Wilson’s

car).

[¶] On September 24, 2002, Stamps had been terminated

from a drug rehabilitation program, his girlfriend

Lorraine Murray had complained about not being happy

with the relationship, and he had backed her vehicle

into a pole or tree, damaging it. After stopping at a

bar, Stamps and Murray drove to the Brookhaven

residence, arriving about 9:00 p.m. At the time of his

death, about 30 minutes later, Stamps had a blood

alcohol level of .17 percent.

[¶] When Stamps and Murray arrived, the garage door to

the Brookhaven residence was propped open six to seven

inches with a pipe. The lights were on in the garage,

which was often used by the residents of the house as

an additional living space. Goodrum was inside the

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garage with a woman playing dominoes. Goodrum, the

woman, and her friend had used methamphetamine that day

“for a few hours at least.”

[¶] When Stamps knocked loudly on the garage door,

Goodrum responded by opening the door. Stamps walked

in and said he was looking for Jason Cruz who had his

earring and other belongings. He was rude to the

woman, suggesting in a lewd manner that he knew her and

told her that if she saw Cruz to tell him that he was

going to kill him.

[¶] Stamps entered the house, took Wilson into the

bedroom and accused her of saying “mean things” about

him. According to Wilson, Stamps threatened to kill

her. When Goodrum entered the bedroom, Stamps accused

Goodrum of having his diamond earring. Goodrum said

the earring was in a duffel bag, which he took out of a

closet, carried out to the garage, and set down in

front of Murray’s vehicle. Stamps and Goodrum argued

in the garage and exchanged blows both in the garage

and in front of Murray’s vehicle. According to

Goodrum, Stamps said he was going to get a gun and

shoot everyone in the house.

[¶] Stamps went to Murray’s vehicle and pulled out a

roofing hammer, which was described as looking like a

tomahawk, hatchet, or axe. According to Goodrum,

Stamps threatened, “I’m gonna fuck you up. I’m gonna

fuck you up.” Goodrum pulled out a knife and picked up

a trash can with his other hand. The men continued

arguing but did not raise their weapons. Goodrum told

Stamps to leave.

[¶] There were other people in the garage area,

including the woman with whom Goodrum had been playing

dominoes, Murray, and Goodrum’s friend Howard Herring. 

According to some witnesses, things calmed down; both

men put down their weapons, they hugged, Stamps

apologized, and said he loved Goodrum as a brother. 

According to Goodrum, things did not calm down. Stamps

made a comment that he was “gonna get [his] strap and

shoot everybody in the house.” Goodrum responded he

was going into the house and when he came back he was

“gonna be shootin’ sparks.” Goodrum retrieved a rifle

from between the mattress and box springs of the bed in

the master bedroom. He cocked the rifle in the

bedroom.

[¶] When Goodrum entered the garage with the rifle,

Stamps stood near the rear of the driver’s side of a

car parked in the garage. When Stamps became aware of

the gun, he said something like, “Go ahead and shoot

me.” According to several witnesses, including

neighbors, Stamps was not holding anything in his

hands. A neighbor across the street saw Goodrum

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advance toward Stamps. Herring and Goodrum, as well as

another neighbor, testified Stamps started walking

toward Goodrum. Goodrum fired twice at Stamps, hitting

him once in the head and once in the chest.

[¶] Herring testified that after the first shot, Stamps

turned, grabbed his stomach and said something like, “I

can’t believe you shot me.” Herring saw blood in the

area of Stamp’s heart. As Stamps turned, Goodrum fired

a second shot and Stamps collapsed to the ground. 

According to Murray, the first shot hit Stamps in the

face and he staggered. The second one hit him in the

heart, he fell to the ground, and Goodrum was preparing

to fire again when Murray shouted at him to stop.

[¶] According to Goodrum, when he entered the garage,

Stamps commented in a sarcastic or mocking tone of

voice, “Oh, he’s got a gun. What are you gonna do with

a gun?” Goodrum thought Stamps was hiding something

behind his back, possibly a gun. Stamps kept advancing

despite Goodrum’s warning him that he was going to

shoot if Stamps came any closer and that he was “a damn

good aim.” Goodrum fired when Stamps started moving a

pipe from behind his legs. After the first shot,

Stamps continued to swing the pipe up, so Goodrum fired

again. A pipe was later found near Stamp’s body.

[¶] Stamps died as a result of the gunshot wounds,

either of which was potentially fatal. The head wound

likely would have caused immediate unconsciousness and

it would have been unlikely Stamps would have been able

to speak or move after the wound was inflicted. The

barrel of the rifle was two feet or further from the

head wound when it was inflicted. In contrast, the

barrel of the rifle was touching or nearly touching

Stamps when the chest wound was inflicted. It is

possible that if the chest wound were inflicted first

that Stamps might have remained standing and able to

speak.

[¶] Goodrum presented evidence that after the shooting

Murray had told some people earlier in the evening

Stamps stated he thought he was going to die that night

and purposely drove into ongoing traffic and hit a

light pole, in an effort to kill them both. She said

Stamps was upset about being terminated from the drug

rehabilitation program and was afraid if he “got a

dirty test” he would be sent back to jail. He told her

he was not going back to jail; they would have to kill

him first. She also said Stamps had grabbed a pipe and

had advanced toward Goodrum. Murray denied making any

of these statements.

(Lodgment No. 6, unpublished opinion of the Cal. Court of Appeal

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The court found, separately, that Petitioner had suffered a

prior felony conviction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1), (b)-

(i), and 1170.12. (CT at 319.) 

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filed August 19, 2004, at 2-5.)

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Petitioner with one count of murder and

personal use of a handgun in violation of California Penal Code

§§ 187(a) and 12022.5(a)(1) and one count of possession of a

firearm by a felon in violation of California Penal Code §

12021(a)(1). (CT at 1-3.) A jury found Petitioner guilty of the

lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (in violation

of Cal. Penal Code § 192(a)) and personal use of a handgun, and

he was sentenced to 21 years in state prison. (CT at 201-203,

276-277.)1

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging his conviction

and sentence in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 3-5.) In an unpublished

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. (Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner then

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court,

which was denied without comment. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a

Motion for Discovery Concerning Law Enforcement Officers in the

California Superior Court. These were denied by written order

filed September 29, 2005. (Lodgment Nos. 9-10.) Petitioner then

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Court of Appeal. The California Attorney General filed a

response, and the court denied the petition on April 20, 2006. 

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(Lodgment Nos. 11-13.) Petitioner then filed another Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Superior Court. That

court denied the petition. (Lodgment Nos. 14-15.) He filed a

state petition seeking habeas relief in the California Supreme

Court on November 3, 2006. That court denied the petition

without comment on June 13, 2007. (Lodgment Nos. 16-17.) While

that petition was pending, Petitioner filed one more Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Superior Court. That

court denied the petition. (Lodgment Nos. 18-19.) 

Petitioner filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in this Court on April 23, 2007. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Respondent filed an Answer on July 16, 2007, and Petitioner filed

a Traverse on July 27, 2007. [Doc. Nos. 9 and 12.]

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

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court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

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Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal before the

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the state

trial court in an unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) The

California Supreme Court denied review without citation of authority. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) Thus, the Court must “look through” to the decision

of the California Court of Appeal as the basis for its analysis. See

Ylst, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

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223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims

presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. The Trial Court’s Refusal to Give an Instruction on 

Previous Threats By the Victim

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by refusing

to instruct the jury that antecedent threats justified quicker

measures in self-defense. (Petition, Ground One and attached

pages.) Petitioner requested this jury instruction as part of

his self-defense theory, which was supported by some evidence at

trial, that the victim had threatened to kill him during their

confrontation. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal,

“RT,” 447-473 (direct testimony of Petitioner Tony Goodrum).) 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the court of appeal stated:2

[¶] Goodrum contends his voluntary manslaughter

conviction must be reversed because the trial court

committed prejudicial error when it refused to give an

instruction that previous threats by the victim may be

considered in deciding whether a defendant acted in

self-defense.

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[¶] The record we have on appeal does not contain a

copy of the requested instructions. It appears Goodrum

was requesting the jury be told that a defendant is

justified in acting more quickly or taking stronger

self-defense measures when the deceased had threatened

or harmed the defendant in the past. The court

indicated it was not “inclined to include the

instruction,” noted the instruction on justifiable

homicide in self-defense (CALJIC No. 5.12) was adequate

and stated it was proper for defense counsel to argue

the point.

[¶] The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on

general principles of law which are closely and openly

connected with the evidence and which are necessary to

the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v.

Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311.) The trial court

must instruct on a particular defense and its relevance

to the charged offense if it appears the defendant is

relying on the defense or if there is substantial

evidence to support the defense and the defense is not

inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. 

(People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047; People

v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1199.) Upon proper

request, a defendant has a right to an instruction

pinpointing the theory of defense, including an

instruction on the effect of antecedent threats or

assaults by the victim on the reasonableness of

defendant’s conduct when the defendant is asserting

self-defense. (People v. Randolph (1993) 20

Cal.App.4th 1836, 1841; People v. Gonzales (1992) 8

Cal.App.4th 1658, 1663-1664.)

[¶] “A trial court has no duty to instruct the jury on

a defense – even at the defendant’s request – unless

the defense is supported by substantial evidence.” 

(People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1355.) 

The appellate court will not reverse for an

instructional error unless there is “a reasonable

probability, not a mere theoretical possibility, that

the instructional error affected the outcome of the

trial.” (People v. Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 94,

italics omitted.)

[¶] Here, Goodrum testified that previously he and

Stamps had engaged in verbal arguments involving, at

most, some pushing or shoving and had never had a fist

fight with Stamps nor had Stamps threatened to kill

anyone before. Further, Goodrum testified that

generally he was not afraid of Stamps. During his

police interview, Goodrum denied having been afraid of

Stamps in the past. In other words, Goodrum’s

testimony and statements indicated Stamps had not

threatened or assaulted him in the past and, indeed, he

was not afraid of him.

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The parties stipulated Stamps had been convicted of assault with

a deadly weapon in 1998.

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“Herring testified after Stamps acted as if he were going to

strike him, they had a friendly conversation and hugged. He testified

there was no animosity between them and he believed Stamps ‘was just

playing.’”

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[¶] To support his claims the antecedent threats

instruction should have been given, Goodrum point to:

(1) his awareness Stamps had a previous conviction for

a violent felony;3 (2) Herring’s testimony that when

Stamps first entered the residence, Stamps acted “like

a wild man,” grabbed a lamp and acted as if he were

going to hit Herring;4

 (3) Stamps’s threats that evening to kill Jason Cruz, Wilson, and Goodrum; (4)

Stamps’s engaging in a fist fight with Goodrum; (5)

Stamps’s assault of Goodrum with a roofing hammer while

saying, “I’m gonna fuck you up. I’m gonna fuck you

up”; and (6) other evidence of Stamps’s hostility and

anger to others prior to the shooting.

[¶] The record shows that, other than Stamps’s prior

conviction, these violent statements and conduct

occurred over a relatively brief period of time, just

prior to the shooting, that is, between “about” 9:00

p.m. when Stamps arrived at the Brookhaven residence

and 9:37 p.m. when a neighbor reported the shooting. 

Aside from Stamps’s prior conviction, these acts and

statement did not occur on a prior occasion – the

situation addressed by the antecedent threats

instruction – but were part of the series of acts and

statements that led up to the shooting. Thus, they did

not warrant giving the instruction.

[¶] Moreover, even if we were to conclude the court

erred, we would not reverse. There is no reasonable

possibility the jury here did not consider Stamps’s

violent statements and conduct prior to the shooting. 

The evidence was thoroughly presented to the jury and

was the subject of closing argument. The jury was

fully instructed on self-defense. (See, e.g., CALJIC

No. 5.12, “Justifiable Homicide in Self-Defense.”) The

jury’s verdict indicates the jury took Stamps’s conduct

into account. The jury, instead of finding Goodrum

guilty of murder, a finding that would have been

supported by substantial evidence, determined Goodrum

had an honest belief in the need to defend himself and

returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 6-9.)

Federal habeas corpus relief is granted “only on the ground

that [the state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the

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Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Generally, matters relating to a state court’s

interpretation of state law do not implicate federal

constitutional issues. In fact, this Court defers to and is

bound by a state court’s interpretation of its own laws. 

Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983); Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner has provided no authority

to indicate that this case does not fall within that general

rule. Moreover, “[a] federal court may not issue the writ [of

habeas corpus] on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

To set aside a conviction based on improper omission of a

jury instruction, the Court must find that the jury instruction

was not only improperly omitted, but that the omission “so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) (citing

Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at 72). The Naughten Court also noted

that “we [] bear in mind our previous admonition that we ‘have

defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental

fairness’ very narrowly.’ [citation omitted]. ‘Beyond the

specific guarantees enumerated by the Bill of Rights, the Due

Process Clause has limited operation. [citation omitted].’” Id.

at 73. Further, “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). Denial of a

proposed theory of defense jury instruction is not error if other

jury instructions adequately address the theory of defense. U.S.

v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990).

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The state court’s decision was not the result of an

unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court law. At the close

of Petitioner’s trial, the jury was given instructions concerning

self-defense. The trial judge instructed the jury:

[¶] The killing of another person in self-defense is

justifiable and not unlawful when the person who does

the killing actually and reasonably believes that there

is imminent danger that the other person will either

kill him or cause him great bodily injury; and it was

necessary under the circumstances for him to use in

self-defense force or means that might cause the death

of the other person for the purpose of avoiding his own

death or great bodily injury to himself.

[¶] So the person who does the killing must actually

and reasonably know that there’s that imminent danger

and that it is necessary under all the circumstances

for him to use deadly force in order to avoid his own

death or great bodily injury to himself. Remember,

we’re talking about murder versus voluntary

manslaughter. We’re talking about an actual but

unreasonable belief, in the necessity to act in selfdefense and use deadly force in doing so.

[¶] A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not

sufficient to justify a homicide. To justify the

taking of a life of another in self-defense, the

circumstances must be such as would excite the fears of

a reasonable person placed in a similar position, the

party doing the killing must act under the influence of

those fears alone. 

[¶] The danger must be apparent, present, immediate and

instantly dealt with, or must so appear at the time to

the slayer as a reasonable person, and the killing must

be under a well-founded belief that it is necessary to

save one-self from death or great bodily harm.

[¶] Actual danger is not necessary to justify selfdefense. If one is confronted by the appearance of

danger which arouses in his mind as a reasonable

person, an actual belief and fear that he is about to

suffer great bodily injury, and if a reasonable person

in a like situation, seeing and knowing the same facts,

will be justified as to be a danger of your own death

or great bodily injury to yourself.

[¶] If a reasonable person under the same circumstances

would be justified in believing himself in that danger,

and if the individual so confronted acts in selfdefense upon these appearances, from that fear and

those actual beliefs, the right of self-defense is the

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same, whether the danger is real or merely apparent.

...

...

[¶] In the exercise of his justified right of selfdefense, a person may stand his ground and defend

himself by the use of all force and means which would

appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a

similar situation with the same knowledge. A person

may pursue his assailant until he has secured himself

from danger even if that course likewise appears

reasonably necessary. ... 

(RT 831-833.)

These instructions adequately addressed Petitioner’s selfdefense theory because the terms and phrases “imminent danger,”

“necessary under the circumstances,” “similar circumstances,”

“avoiding his own death or great bodily injury,” “the

circumstances must be such as would excite the fears of a

reasonable person placed in a similar position,” and “wellfounded belief that it is necessary to save one-self from death

or great bodily harm” allowed the jury to fully consider the

threats made by decedent Stamps against Petitioner. An

antecedent threat jury instruction was not appropriate because,

as the California Court of Appeal correctly noted, the acts and

statements made by decedent Stamps “did not occur on a prior

occasion,” “but were part of the series of acts and statements

that led up to the shooting.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 8.) In

addition, the instructions given were sufficient to apprise the

jury of the evidence it could consider in support of Petitioner’s

self-defense theory. Plainly, the jury not only considered, but

believed at least in part, Petitioner’s self-defense theory

because it convicted him of manslaughter, not murder. 

Even if the trial judge erred by not specifically

instructing the jury as to antecedent threats, the failure to

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5

Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal before the

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the state

trial court in an unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) The

California Supreme Court denied review without citation of authority. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) Thus, the Court must “look through” to the decision

of the California Court of Appeal as the basis for its analysis. See

Ylst, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

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give the instruction did not “infect the entire trial, rendering

it fundamentally unfair.” Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at

72. As noted above, the instructions given were sufficient to

inform the jury of the requirements for self-defense and not only

allowed for, but invited, the jury to consider the threats and

actions by decedent Stamps, whether technically “antecedent” in

nature or not. In this context, the omission of a jury

instruction solely addressing antecedent threats under state law

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation

entitling Petitioner to habeas relief.

Accordingly, the decision of the California Court of Appeal

was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, U.S.

Supreme Court law, and the claim should be denied.

C. The Trial Court’s Refusal to Give a Special Instruction

based on CALJIC No. 5.42 and Penal Code Section 198.5 -

“Use of Force Within Residence”

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by refusing

to instruct the jury that a defendant is presumed to have had a

reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily injury in

defending himself or others against another person who unlawfully

or forcibly enters the defendant’s home. (Petition, Ground Two

and attached pages.) In denying Petitioner’s claim, the

appellate court stated:5

[¶] Goodrum contends the trial court erred in refusing

to give his requested instruction on the use of force

within a residence.

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6

“Even if we were to reach these issues, we would agree with the

trial court. Goodrum’s theory Stamps intended to steal Wilson’s car

is based on an attempt to link Stamps’s anger at Wilson with other

evidence of Stamps’s agitation about keys to support a conclusion

Stamps was seeking the keys to Wilson’s car in order to steal it. The

evidence, however, indicated Stamps was agitated about losing the keys

to Murray’s vehicle, keys that were not located until the following

day. As to Goodrum’s theory that Stamps entered with an intent to

commit an assault with the roofing hammer, we note the evidence shows

Stamps retrieved the hammer only after he and Goodrum had argued.”

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[¶] The instruction, derived from CALJIC No. 5.42 and

section 198.5, stated:

“Any person using force intended or likely to

cause death or great bodily injury within his

or her residence shall be presumed to have

held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of

death or great bodily injury to self, family,

or a member of the household when that force

is used against another person, not a member

of the family or household, who unlawfully

and forcibly enters or has unlawfully

forcibly entered the residence and the person

using force knew or had reason to believe

that a unlawful and forcible entry had

occurred.

As used in this section, great bodily injury

means a significant or substantial physical

injury.”

[¶] For the presumption of self-defense in section

198.5 to apply, there must be an unlawful and forcible

entry into the residence. (See People v. Brown (1992)

6 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1494.)

[¶] Here there was no evidence of a forcible entry. 

The undisputed evidence shows Goodrum, in response to

Stamps’s knocking on the garage door, opened the door

and allowed Stamps to enter. Since the evidence does

not support a finding of a forcible entry, we need not

address Goodrum’s claim the court erred in concluding

there was no substantial evidence to support a finding

Stamps entered with an intent to steal Wilson’s car or

to assault Goodrum with the roofing hammer.6

[¶] We find no error by the court in refusing to

instruct the jury with Goodrum’s proposed “Use of Force

Within Residence” instruction.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 9-10; CT at 121.)

//

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The state appellate court’s decision was not the result of

an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court law. As set

out above, to set aside a conviction based on improper omission

of a jury instruction, the Court must find that the jury

instruction was not only improperly omitted, but that the

omission “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, supra, 414

U.S. at 147. Here, the record supports the conclusion that the

instruction was properly refused by the trial court.

Under California law:

Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who either:

1. By breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a

house, or by any kind of violence or circumstance of

terror enters upon or into any real property; or,

2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property,

turns out by force, threats, or menacing conduct, the

party in possession.

West’s Ann. Cal.C.C.P. § 1159. Petitioner himself testified at

trial that decedent Stamps “banged” on the garage door, “and he

opened the door and Dwayne Stamps came in.” (RT 449-451.) There

is no evidence in the record that decedent Stamps broke into the

house or entered the house violently or by terrorizing the

occupants, nor is there any evidence that he forcibly “turned

out” the occupants. In light of the absence of evidence of

forcible entry, the court of appeal reasonably concluded that the

trial court was correct in finding that the evidence did not

support the giving of a “Use of Force Within Residence”

instruction.

//

Accordingly, the decision of the California Court of Appeal

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7

Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal before the

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the state

trial court in an unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) The

California Supreme Court denied review without citation of authority. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) Thus, the Court must “look through” to the decision

of the California Court of Appeal as the basis for its analysis. See

Ylst, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

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was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, U.S.

Supreme Court law, and the claim should be denied.

D. Admission of Prior Conviction in Evidence

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s admission of his

1981 attempted armed robbery conviction violated his right to due

process and deprived him of a fair trial. He contends that the

only possible inference the jury could have drawn when confronted

with the prior conviction was an impermissible one – that because

Petitioner had committed a violent felony in the past, he was

guilty of crimes alleged at trial. (Petition, Ground Three and

attached pages.) On appeal in state court, Petitioner

additionally contended that the prior conviction was improperly

admitted as impeachment evidence against him. In denying

Petitioner’s direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal

stated:7

[¶] Goodrum contends the court abused its discretion in

admitting his 1981 attempted armed robbery conviction

over his Evidence Code section 352 objection. He

contends the conviction had minimal probative value

because it was remote in time.

[¶] The trial court initially ruled Goodrum’s 1981

conviction could not be used for impeachment because it

was too remote but later admitted the prior conviction

under Evidence Code section 1103, sub division (b). 

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Goodrum

if he had ever used a gun before this case other than

on hunting trips. When Goodrum answered, “Yes,” the

prosecutor elicited that Goodrum had used a gun in an

attempted robbery of a former employer whom he believed

owed him money. On redirect, Goodrum explained the

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conviction had occurred in 1981 and he had pleaded

guilty.

[¶] Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (b) allows

introduction of evidence of a defendant’s violent acts

and reputation for violence if a defendant presents

evidence as to the bad acts or reputation of the victim

of a crime. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,

1083.) Nonetheless, pursuant to Evidence Code section

352, the court may exercise its discretion to exclude

such evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a

danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Among

the factors tending to undercut a finding that a

defendant’s prior violent conviction is probative is

that the conviction occurred in the remote past and the

defendant subsequently led a blameless life. (See

People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 182-183.)

[¶] [Evidence Code] section 352 uses the word

‘prejudice’ ... in its etymological sense of

‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of

extraneous factors.” (People v. Farmer (1989) 47

Cal.3d 888, 912, overruled on other grounds as stated

in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6.) 

“[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is

prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case. The

stronger the evidence the more it is “prejudicial.” 

The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section

352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke

an emotional bias against the defendant as an

individual and which has very little effect on the

issues. In applying [Evidence Code] section 352,

“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.”’”

(People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)

[¶] “‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion will not

be disturbed unless it appears that the resulting

injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage

of justice. [Citation.] In other words, discretion is

abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason,

all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People

v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 182-183.)

[¶] Goodrum acknowledges Evidence Code section 1103,

subdivision (b) authorized admission of his prior

conviction, but argues the court should have exercised

its discretion to exclude the conviction because it

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8

“The Attorney General argues the 1981 conviction was not too

remote because Goodrum had not thereafter led a crime free life. 

While it is true that the probation report shows Goodrum was convicted

of Vehicle Code violations and contempt of court in 1990, 1993, and

2000 and that his probation in the 1990 offense was twice revoked, the

record on appeal does not reflect that the prosecutor presented this

evidence to the court at the time it made its ruling.”

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occurred 21 years ago.8 While we agree the conviction

was remote in time, it was not necessarily so remote in

time as to have not probative value, particularly since

it involved the use of a gun. More importantly, even

if we were to conclude the court erred in admitting the

conviction, we would not reverse.

[¶] The examination on the prior conviction was very

brief. It was not mentioned during closing argument. 

The prior conviction was much less inflammatory than

the charged offense. The prior conviction involved

only an attempted crime while Goodrum was young. In

contrast, the charged offense was murder using a

firearm. Further, the charged offense was committed

while small children were present.

[¶] The focus of the trial and closing argument was on

whether Goodrum was justified in killing Stamps. The

jury evidently gave careful consideration to the

defense evidence; they rejected the prosecution’s

theory Goodrum had committed either first or second

degree murder and instead found Goodrum was guilty only

of voluntary manslaughter. There is ample evidence in

the record to support the jury’s conviction of

voluntary manslaughter.

[¶] Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable

possibility the jury’s verdict of voluntary

manslaughter was the result of passion or prejudice

deriving from the 1981 conviction rather than based on

the evidence presented at trial.

[¶] Goodrum contends the admission of his 1981

conviction violated his federal due process rights and

deprived him of a fair trial because it constituted

improper “other acts” evidence. He explains “there

were no permissible inferences that the jury could draw

from the 1981 attempted robbery conviction, other than

the [improper inference] that if [he] committed a

violent felony before, he was guilty in this case.” He

contends it was highly probable the prior conviction

“had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” We disagree. As we

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9

Cal. Evid. Code § 1103(b) provides: “In a criminal action,

evidence of the defendant’s character for violence or trait of

character for violence (in the form of an opinion, evidence of

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101 [inadmissibility of prior bad acts

evidence] if the evidence is offered by the prosecution to prove

conduct of the defendant in conformity with the character or trait of

character and is offered after evidence that the victim had a

character for violence or a trait of character tending to show

violence has been adduced by the defendant ... .”

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explained [above], there is no reasonable probability

the admission of the 1981 conviction adversely affected

the verdict.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 10-13.)

Prior to trial, Petitioner moved the court to disallow

admission of his 1981 conviction for attempted armed robbery as

improper impeachment evidence under California law. (CT 16-18.) 

He argued that the 22-year-old conviction was “stale” and

therefore lacked any probative value and amounted to improper

character and prior bad acts evidence. (Id.; CT 10.) Based on

those arguments, the trial court initially ruled that evidence of

the prior conviction was inadmissible. (RT 23.)

Later, the trial court ruled evidence of the felony prior

admissible based on the separate legal argument that, under

California law, evidence of a defendant’s violent character is

admissible if offered to prove conduct in conformity therewith

after defendant has already offered similar evidence regarding

the victim. (RT 56-61.)9 At trial, the defense introduced or

elicited evidence of examples of decedent Stamps’ violent nature,

e.g., threats to kill Petitioner’s roommate Ieisa Wilson (RT 418,

424, 453), threats to attack Petitioner with an axe (RT 459), an

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10Fed. Rule Evid. 404 (a)(1) provides in part: “Evidence of a

person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the

purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular

occasion, except ... [i]n a criminal case, ... if evidence of a trait

of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an

accused and admitted ... , evidence of the same trait of character of

the accused offered by the prosecution.” 

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attack by Stamps with a pipe (RT 500-504), and the fact that

Stamps frequently carried a pistol “in the back of his

waistband.” (RT 150.) Thus, the trial court’s ruling that

evidence of Petitioner’s prior conviction was admissible, and the

court of appeal’s affirmance of that ruling, was proper under

California law (and under analogous Fed. R. Evid. 404).10

In this context, under AEDPA, Petitioner is entitled to

federal habeas relief only if he shows that the state court’s

reasoning “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). There is no

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the U.S.

Supreme Court, on the issue of “whether a state law would violate

the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’

evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.” Alberni

v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006), citing Estelle v.

McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5.

Moreover, even applying general principles of due process

articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief. The California Court of Appeal’s

decision indicates that, irrespective of whether the trial court

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erred in admitting evidence of the prior conviction, no prejudice

resulted to Petitioner because examination on the prior conviction was “very brief,” it was not mentioned during closing

argument, and the record contains ample evidence to support the

jury’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter. (Lodgment 6 at 12-

13.) Thus, Petitioner cannot establish that admitting the fact

of his prior conviction resulted in a trial that was

fundamentally unfair. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384-1386

(9th Cir. 1993), citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342

(1990); see also Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.

1993).

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the California

Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to clearly established

U.S. Supreme Court law or the result of an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence, and the

claim should be denied.

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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IT IS ORDERED that not later than February 15, 2008, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than February 29, 2008. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 14, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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