Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00769/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00769-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM W. HORSMAN, #110184, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-CV-769-MHT

) [WO]

)

ROBERT BENTLEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by

WilliamW. Horsman challenging conditions of confinement and actionstaken against him

during a prior term of incarceration at the Elmore Correctional Facility [“Elmore”]. The

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plaintiff names Governor Robert Bentley, Commissioner Kim Thomas, Warden Leeposey

Daniels, Alfreda Hooks, a kitchen steward at Elmore, correctional officers McKee,

Clemons, Jamison and Lynam,Correctional Medical Services, now known asCorizon,Inc.,

and Dr. Hood as defendants in this cause of action. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory

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judgment, injunctive relief, monetary damages, both compensatory and punitive, and “any

and all other relief the Court deems just and equitable.” Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6 at 14-

Horsman was transferred to the Limestone Correctional Facility on July 15, 2011 and remains incarcerated at 1

such facility. 

In the interest of clarity, any reference herein to “the correctional defendants” includes Governor Robert

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Bentley along with defendants Thomas, Daniels, McKee, Clemons, Hooks, Jamison and Lynam. 

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15. The court construes this latter “catch all” request for relief as one which encompasses

a request for nominal damages. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“Nominal damages are appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a fundamental

constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual injury sufficient to entitle him to

compensatory damages .”).

The defendantsfiled specialreports and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

the plaintiff’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems

it appropriate to treat each of these reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

February 16, 2012 - Doc. No. 59. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of these motions, the evidentiary

materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s response, the court concludes that the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

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dispute asto any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).

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The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the

[record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats &Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 3

summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current rule. 

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summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities[and medical personnel]. Unless

a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment

to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary

judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive the defendants’ properly supported motions for summary judgment, Horsman is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving

party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment

may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing

party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact]

could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir.

1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242). Conclusory allegations based on subjective

beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore,

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do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d

1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the absence of

[admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”);

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment

appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations”

challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir.

1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose

summary judgment”); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)

(“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”).

Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the

plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in

favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on

any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputes involving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74 Ave., Miami, Fla., 363

th

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F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children

and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are

material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary

judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the

case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there issome metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases

where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279

(11th Cir. 2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, nonmoving party must

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produce evidence such that reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670

(11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Horsman’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s

disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case,

Horsman fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to

preclude summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

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A. Claims for Relief - Eighth Amendment

In his complaint, Horsman allegesthat during hisincarceration at Elmore the facility

was overcrowded, understaffed and underfunded causing a myriad of alleged

unconstitutional conditions. The challenged conditions include the following: (a) The

physical plant of Elmore is constructed solely of Styrofoam, a few concrete blocks and

paint; (b) Elmore is housing almost double the number of inmates beyond its original

Although in his affidavits filed in response to the defendants’ special reports Horsman presented additional 4

claims for relief against defendant Jamison, this court limits its review to the allegations set forth in the complaint and

amendment thereto filed in this case. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A

plaintiff may not amend [his] complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”); Ganstine v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 502 F. App’x 905, 909-10 (11th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff may not amend complaint at the summary

judgment stage by raising a new claim or presenting a new basis for a pending claim); Chavis v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

300 F.3d 1288, 1291 n.4 (11thCir. 2002) (district court correctly refused to address a new theory raised during summary

judgment because the plaintiff had not properly amended the complaint). 

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design capacity; (c) The facility stays in a state of disrepair and repairs are not properly

undertaken, i.e., “jerry-rigging and band-aid methods are used to make repairs when

problems arise.”; (d) Yard space has been reduced due to security concerns; (e) Inmates are

subject to excessive heat as only a few fans are available to cool the dorms; (f) Guards

sometimes sleep while on duty; (g) Inmates break institutional rules “sodomizing each

other, tattooing each other with Hepatitis-C infected needles, gambling, smoking both

cigarettes and dope, talking on cell phones.”; (h) Pigeons and other birds leave droppings

on the yard and the outer walls of the facility; (i) Odors emit from the drains at Elmore and

the compost area of the nearby recycling plant; (j) Underground pipes break and leak due

to shifting soil; (k) Hazardous materials are dumped in the compost area and at the

Recycling Plant; (l) The number of toilets, urinals and showers are insufficient; (m) Mold

and peeling paint are present in the bathrooms;(n) Water pressure isinadequate; (o) “There

is no proper lock-up cell at Elmore . . . .” Officials utilize a small room with no running

water or toilet to hold troublesome inmates; (p) Inmates in lock-up for altercations with

other inmates gain release from the “make shift lock up cell . . . by signing an illegal

‘Living Agreement’” indicating that they will not “again or injure each other.”; (q) The

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Barber Shop at Elmore is housed in an old guard shack with no way for barbers to clean

The amendment to the complaint indicates that Horsman was not in lock-up for an altercation with another 5

inmate but was housed in this room due to correctional officials obtaining information indicating that in violation of

institutional rules he charged another inmate a monetary fee for performing legal work. Thus, it does not appear that

Horsman signed a living agreement to gain his release from lock-up. 

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their clippers and tools; (r) There are various issues with the kitchen including drainage

problems, lack of a sufficient number of utensils, storage of chemicals with food items,

lack of proper hygiene by kitchen staff and improper storage of food items; (s) Dietary

sandwiches are not served to inmates in a sanitary manner, meal portions have steadily

declined and left over food is thrown away; (t) Inmate clothing is only laundered once a

week and kitchen workers are not provided adequate soap to take daily showers; (u) The

health care provider “no longer provides pain management or pain meds to chronic care

inmates patients[,]” and there are deficienciesin the containment of infectious diseases;(v)

No medical staff is stationed at Elmore to address emergency situations; (w) At times,

Horsman and other inmates were required to wait in inclement weather to receive their

medications and, on occasion, other inmates received the wrong medication or no

medication at all because the nurses cannot read very well; and (x) Sometimes delays

occurred in Horsman’s receipt of prescribed medication which is designated as keep on

person (“KOP”). Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6 at 5-13. In an amendment to the complaint,

Horsman clarified the medical treatment claims with respect to the manner in which these

claims impacted his constitutional rights, expounded on his lock-up and barber shop

claims, further addressed the physical conditions at Elmore, and presented additional

claims alleging retaliation by the correctional defendants. Amendment to Complaint - Doc.

No. 34 at 1-7.

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B. Absolute Immunity - The Correctional Defendants

To the extent Horsman sues defendants Bentley, Thomas, Daniels, McKee,

Clemons, Hooks, Jamison and Lynam in their official capacities, they are immune from

monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . .

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985).

A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67

(1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe

v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,see Carr v. City

of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and

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Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official

capacities.

Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

In light of the foregoing, the correctional defendants are state actors entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claimsseeking monetary damages

from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t

of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th

Cir. 1989).

C. Speculative Claims

To the extent Horsman presents claims based on a fear of conditions or actions

which could have, but did not, occur during his incarceration at Elmore, do not warrant

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constitutional protection. Mere suppositious allegations that conditions could subsequently

result in constitutional violations and/or that prison officials may atsome time in the future

act unfavorably towards an inmate fail to implicate a constitutionally protected interest.

Conner v. Sticher, 801 F.2d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff’s subjective belief harm

may occur provides no basis for relief); Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir.

1985) (jurisdiction cannot be premised upon mere speculation); Carter v. Heard, 593 F.2d

10 (5th Cir. 1979) (Relief is not warranted when “the injury which [plaintiff’s] pleadings

contemplate is fancied, not real; prospective, not actual; and imagined, not threatened.”).

Thus, claims based on possible future adverse action are subject to dismissal as these

claims are purely speculative and without constitutional implication.

D. Lack of Standing - Claims Alleged on Behalf of Other Inmates

Standing is a cornerstone of American jurisprudence on which jurisdiction lies.

“[A] litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities.” McGowan v.

Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22

(1960)); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1974)

(plaintiff must assert a legally cognizable injury in fact before federal courts have

jurisdiction). “The essence of a standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged ‘such

a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the

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illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]’” Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812

F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); Harris

v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1981) (same).

Standing involves two aspects. The first is the minimum “case or controversy”

constitutional requirement of Article III. Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690. “To satisfy this

‘irreducible’ constitutional minimum required for standing, a litigant must show 1) that he

personally has suffered an actual or prospective injury as a result of the putatively illegal

conduct; 2) that the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged conduct; and 3) that the

injury is likely to be redressed through court action.” Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian

Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)); Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). If any element is lacking, a plaintiff’s claim is not

viable. In addition, the Supreme Court has established several requirements based on

prudential considerations. Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690 (internal citations omitted) (“The

Supreme Court has also stated that, in addition to these essential constitutional

requirements, a court should consider the case in light of three principles which might

counsel judicial constraint, referred to as ‘prudential’ considerations. . . . Those

considerations are 1) whether the plaintiff’s complaint falls within the zone of interests

protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue; 2) whether the complaint raises

abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately

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resolved by the legislative branches; and 3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own

legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties”).

The instant complaint containsseveral claimsrelative to conditions of confinement,

medical/mental health treatment and adverse actions by correctional officials and medical

personnel to which other inmates may have been or were subjected during their

confinement at Elmore. In accordance with applicable federal law as set forth herein,

Horsman lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other persons. Saladin, 812

F.2d at 690; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The prudential limitation

applicable in this case isthat a litigant may not assert the legal rights or interests of another

person. With respect to the claims arising from alleged violations of other inmates’

constitutional rights, Horsman is not “asserting [his] . . . own legal rights and interests[but]

rather . . . the legal rights and interests of third parties.” Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690. These

claims therefore entitle Horsman to no relief and summary judgment on such claims is due

to be granted in favor of the defendants.

E. Conditions Claims for Which Standing Exists

1. Claims Challenging Conditions at Elmore

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The correctional defendants deny that the conditions made the basis of the instant

complaint rise to the level of constitutional violations. Warden Daniels addresses these

It is clear to the court that these claims are directed solely at the correctional defendants. 6

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claims as follows:

1. The Plaintiff alleges that Elmore Correctional Facility houses more

inmates than its original design capacity, which is true, but that fact alone or

in combination with other claims, is not a constitutional violation. Additions

and improvements have been added over the years to accommodate more

inmates [than that of the original design capacity]. I absolutely deny that the

Elmore Correctional Facility houses “too many inmates” with respect to a

constitutional violation. The Facilityis not in “disrepair and/orjerry-rigged”.

Just like any building, repairs are occasionally needed and are done in a

professional manner. The building does have Styrofoam as insulation in the

walls but it is not just “covered with paint and a few concrete blocks mixed

in”. The Facility is a sound structure and does not subject the inmates

housed there to any harm or danger. If it was as the Plaintiff alleges, the

facility could not secure and/or hold inmates, which it obviously does. The

Plaintiff claims that “the yard size has been reduced”, but does not allege

how thisfact violates his constitutional rights. Over the yearsthe facility has

undergone security improvements since its original construction. . . . There

is sufficient room in the yard for inmates [to] exercise.

2. The Plaintiff alleges that inmates are required to exit their dorm during

hot periods of the year and this is true. Inmates are required to leave the

dorms at certain times during the day so that the dorms can be cleaned [and

may be placed outside for security reasons]. . . . [T]he temperature outside

is sometimes hot, but [the inmates] are not required to stand in the sun for

long periods of time. This again, is common with all ADOC facilities.

When the temperature rises, inmates are given accessto additional water and

ice. . . .

3. Inmates are required to maintain the Departmental dress code which

requires that shirts be wor[n] and tucked-in when [inmates] are outside their

living quarters. This is a requirement to help maintain order and so that the

inmates can be quickly identified due to their AIS number having been

stenciled on their shirts.

4. I deny that inmates are “allowed to sodomize one another, tattoo each

other with infected needles,smoke dope, and talk on cell phones”. This kind

of activity is strictly prohibited [by institutional rules], but unfortunately, it

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is a fact that some inmates do these things. Security officers are constantly

on the look-out for this kind of inmate activity and are diligently trying to

stop this kind of activity. When [the offending inmates are caught], they face

disciplinary action. Again, Inmate Horsman is making a general and nonspecific claim without any names and/or dates. . . .

5. The Plaintiff alleges that pigeons cause a health hazard at the Elmore

Correctional Facility. I have never heard of pigeons causing a health hazard

at ECF. Pigeons, of course, do leave their droppings occasionally on the

premises, . . . but [to my knowledge] it is not significant, nor is it a health

hazard. . . .

6. As Warden of the Facility, I make daily rounds through the Facility.

Since my tenure here at Elmore, I have not noticed any bad odors coming

from the drains, therefore I deny this allegation. The facility is cleaned on

a regular basis with cleaning materials that control odors. Occasionally, I

have noticed that you can smell the materials at the Compost Area of the

Recycling Plant, which is not surprising. At no time have I noticed . . . these

occasional odors to be overbearing or that they cause any health problems.

I deny that the Compost Area and/or the Recycling Plant handle any

hazardous materials and further deny that any hazardous materials are going

into the ground [or the water supply]. . . .

7. I deny that the bathrooms at ECF are inadequate. We do utilize water

saving devices as a conservation and cost-saving measure. Just like at every

other facility within ADOC, things break both from wear and tear and from

inmate destruction. When a plumbing fixture is broken, it is repaired and/or

replaced at the earliest opportunity. Water pressure in the facility is more

than adequate. The bathrooms are cleaned on a regular basis and are painted

as needed. I deny that the bathrooms are constantly covered with mold and

mildew.

8. I would agree that ADOC,state-wide, including Elmore, has occasionally

been short on correctional officers, but never to [the detriment] to the

security of the facility. Correctional Officers are under administrative

regulations concerning the treatment of inmates and if they violate those

regulations, they receive disciplinary action.

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9. I deny that Elmore doesn’t have a ‘lock-up area’. ECF has no segregation

cells but does have a holding area that is utilized as a temporary lock-up area.

Thislock-up area is used to temporarily hold unruly inmates[so that they can

be monitored more closely by correctional officers]. If an inmate needs to

go to a segregation cell, he is transferred to Draper Correctional Facility or

the Staton Correctional Facility, which both are in a close proximity to ECF.

Inmate[s] placed in that holding area are watched closely and are given

bathroom breaks as needed, food, and sleeping materials.

10. I deny that Elmore doesn’t have a proper barber shop. Inmates at ECF

use the barber shop within the facility. The barbering tools are sanitized [by

inmate barbers utilizing appropriate sterilization materials] before use.

Correctional Officers oversee the barbering services. To my knowledge and

belief, ECF has not received any complaint and/or information from the

contracted health care providers that the barbering at ECF has caused any

health problems. . . .

11. Inmates are allowed sufficient time to eat their meals at ECF. They are

not allowed to use meal time as [a] visiting and/or leisure period. I deny the

claim concerning insufficient time to eat.

12. I deny that inmates are required to sign “illegal living agreements”.

Inmates sign a living agreement stating that they can live together without

confrontation. If they cannot [and refuse to sign the living agreement], then

they are separated with one being sent to a different Facility.

13. ECF inmates who work in the kitchen are provided with sufficient clean

clothing. ECF inmates (all) are provided with sufficient soap to shower.

Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No.

57-1 at 2-6; Exh. B to the Correctional Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 6-2 at 1-3.

Although overcrowding and under staffing exists in the Alabama prison system,

these facts, standing alone, are not dispositive of the issues before this court. Only actions

which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are grave enough

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to establish constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The

Eighth Amendment proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the wanton

and unnecessary infliction of pain. Id. at 346. Specifically, it is concerned with

“deprivations of essentialfood, medical care, orsanitation” or “other conditionsintolerable

for prison confinement.” Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Prison conditions which may be

“restrictive and even harsh, [ ] are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their

offenses against society” and, therefore, do not necessarily constitute cruel and unusual

punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Conditions, however, may

not be “barbarous” nor may they contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.”

Id. at 345-46. “‘[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.’ Id. at 349, 101

S.Ct. at 2400. If prison conditions are merely ‘restrictive and even harsh, they are part of

the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ Id. at 347, 101

S.Ct. at 2399. Generally speaking, prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation only when they ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of

pain.’ Id.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Although the

Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . neither does it permit inhumane

ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).

Thus, it is well-settled that the conditions under which a prisoner is confined are subject

to constitutional scrutiny. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).

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A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmatesreceive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 526-27 (1984)); Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32. For liability to attach, the challenged

prison condition must be “extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable risk ofserious damage

to [the inmate’s] future health.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir.

2004). To demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of

confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. In Farmer, the Court identified both objective and subjective elements

necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite

objective elements, an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious

harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this

substantial risk, the official must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.”

Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-29. As to the subjective elements, “the official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw

cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’ . . . [A]n

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

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while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the

infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (emphasis added); Campbell v.

Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof that

the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v.

Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue “must involve

more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy

and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct

prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in

connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or

restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986) (emphasis added).

The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual

punishment when the conditions involve or result in “wanton and unnecessary infliction

of pain, [or] . . . [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting

imprisonment.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. “Conditions . . . alone or in combination, may

deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions

could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency. . . . But

conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are

not unconstitutional.” Id. at 347. To determine whether conditions of confinement

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constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the court must look to the effect the condition has

upon the inmate. Id. at 366. In a case involving conditions of confinement generally or

several different conditions, the courtshould consider whether the claimstogether amount

to conditions which fall below constitutionalstandards. Hamm v. De Kalb Cnty., 774 F.2d

1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied Hamm v. De Kalb Cnty., 475 U.S. 1096 (1986); see

also Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991). The court’s consideration of

whether the totality of a plaintiff’s claims amount to conditions which fall below applicable

constitutional standards is limited by the Supreme Court’s admonishment that “[s]ome

conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’

when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that

produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need. . . . To say that some prison

conditions may interact in thisfashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are

a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall

conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific

deprivation of a single human need exists.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991)

(emphasis in original).

A prison official may likewise be held liable underthe Eighth Amendmentfor acting

with “‘deliberate indifference’” to an inmate’s health orsafetywhen the official knowsthat

the inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and disregards that risk by failing to

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take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been

“subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have

had a ‘“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38,

114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321,

2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). . . . Even assuming the existence of a

serious risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of

specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists - and the prison official must also “draw that

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). “The known risk of injurymust

be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official’s]

failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,

1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As the foregoing makes

clear, “[m]erely negligent failure to protect an inmate . . . does not justify liability under

section 1983.” Id.

(i) General Physical Conditions. Horsman presents conclusory allegations with

respect to the structural stability of the Elmore Correctional Facility, the state of repair of

the facility, the diminished size of the exercise yard, the presence of bird droppings, the

emission of odors from drains and the Recycling Plaint’s compost area, and peeling paint

in the bathrooms. Despite Horsman’s allegations regarding the aforementioned physical

conditions present at Elmore, he does not establish that the above described conditions

denied him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities or subjected them to a

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wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99; Rhodes, 452 U.S.

at 347. Furthermore, Horsman fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference or reckless

disregard by the named defendants with respect to his health orsafety with respect to these

conditions. Specifically, he does not identify any particular condition of which the

defendants were aware from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm existed. The record is also devoid of any evidence showing that the

defendants drew the requisite inference. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the correctional defendants on the plaintiff’s claims attacking general

physical conditions at Elmore. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999);

see also Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-50.

(ii) Heat Exposure, Laundering of Inmate Clothing, Provision of Soap, Sleeping

Guards, Living Agreements, Lack of Adequate Number of Restroom/Shower Facilities,

Lack of Shower During Confinement in Lock-Up, Inadequate Meal Time, Low Water

Pressure and Standing Outside Awaiting Medications. None of these conditions of

confinement present a severe or extreme condition that posed an unreasonable risk of

serious damage to Horsman’s health and safety, and Horsman has not alleged that he

suffered requisite harm as a result of periodic exposure to hot weather, the weekly

laundering of his clothes, occasional lack of soap, limited access to restroom/shower

facilities, short meal times, low water pressure, inattentive guards, the use of living

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agreements or occasional exposure to outdoor weather conditions during pill call. See

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prisoner must

prove that the prison condition he complains of is sufficiently serious and “extreme” to

violate the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, the court concludes that these alleged

conditions do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Alfred v. Bryant, 378

F. App’x 977, 980 (11th Cir. 2010) (“‘Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences

and services of a good hotel.’” (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir.

1988)).

(iii) Breaking of Rules by Other Inmates. Initially, the court finds that correctional

defendants are not liable for the actions of recalcitrant inmates who chose to act in

violation of institutional rules. To the extent this assertion can be construed to allege a

claim of deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety arising under the Eighth

Amendment, the court concludes that this claim entitles Horsman to no relief.

In the evidentiary materials filed by the correctional defendants, they adamantly

deny acting with either callous disregard or deliberate indifference to Horsman’s safety.

Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No.

57-1 at 3. Specifically, Warden Daniels asserts that he, along with the correctional staff at

Elmore, strive to enforce all institutional rules to prevent violations thereof by inmates.

Horsman presents no evidence of an objectively substantialrisk ofserious harmnor isthere

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any evidence demonstrating an actual, subjective awareness by the defendants of a

substantial risk of such harm to Horsman, each of which is a required element of this

Eighth Amendment claim. Neither an assertion that the defendants should have known of

potential dangers at Elmore nor the mere possibility that Horsman could be injured by other

inmates during the commission of rule violationsis enough to demonstrate a genuine issue

regarding deliberate indifference on the part of the correctional defendants. Brown, 894

F.2d 1537. “Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant[s] had a subjective

awareness of a substantial risk of serious physical [harm] to Plaintiff; thus, Plaintiff has

failed to establish a required element of this claim. When viewing the evidence most

favorably toward Plaintiff, a claim for deliberate indifference has not been established . .

. .” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 (footnote omitted). Thus, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the defendants on this claim.

(iv) Dumping of Hazardous Materials, Ground Contamination and Mold in the

Bathrooms. Horsman alleges that “hazardous substances are being poured out on the

ground” in the area of the Recycling Plant and asserts that “soil samples should be taken”

to determine whether health hazards exist at Elmore. Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6 at 7.

Horsman further alleges that mold is a “common sight[]” in the bathrooms. Id. Other than

his self-serving conclusory allegations, Horsman presents no evidence to support these

claims. The correctional defendants “deny that the Compost Area and/or Recycling Plant

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handle any hazardous materials and [therefore] deny that anyhazardous materials are going

into the ground [or the water supply].” Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second

Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 57-1 at 4. The defendants further deny that mold

is a constant presence in the bathrooms and assert that the bathrooms are “cleaned on a

regular basis.” Id. at 7.

Horsman fails to meet his burden at the summary judgement stage as he does not

establish that the allegations regarding hazardous materials and mold resulted in a denial

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities or subjected him to a wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

Specifically, Horsman’smere subjective beliefs and conclusoryallegations regarding these

conditions do not create a genuine dispute of material and, as such, “are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6. Hence, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

(v) Conditions of Lock-Up. Horsman maintains that in June of 2011, Warden

Daniels ordered his placement in “lock-up” because he received payment from a free world

individual “for allegedly helping someone with a legal matter” - an action violative of

institutional rules. Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 4. Horsman asserts that

the lock-up cell at Elmore is not an appropriate area in which to house inmates suspected

of rule violations. Complaint - Doc. No 1-6 at 8. In support of this claim, Horsman

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maintains that the lock-up room utilized at Elmore is not equipped with a sink or toilet

thereby requiring that inmates be escorted by correctional officers to the bathroom and,

therefore, he sometimes had to wait to use the restroom. Id. Horsman further complains

that this room lacks chairs or a bed on which an inmate may sit and he was only provided

a cot on which to sleep. Id. Horsman states that he was housed in this area for three days

and during this time he did not shower, brush his teeth or have his asthma medication in

his possession. Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 3-4. Horsman also alleges

that during his time assigned to lock-up he spent the majority of each day outdoors in a

small fenced area.

In response to these allegations, Warden Daniels asserts that although there are no

segregation cells at Elmore the facility does have a holding area that is utilized “to

temporarily hold unruly inmates.” Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second

Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 57-1 at 5. While on lock-up status, inmates are

closely monitored “and are given bathroom breaks as needed, food, and sleeping

materials.” Id. In addition, “[w]hen the temperature rises, inmates are given access to

additional water and ice” and they are not exposed to direct sunlight for long periods of

time. Id. at 2-3. Despite the lack of a sink and toilet in the holding area, Horsman

concedes he had access to restroom facilities, food, water, a cot and bed linens. Horsman

does not allege that he advised Warden Daniels or any other named defendant of his lack

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of asthma medication for the limited period of time he was confined in the lock-up room.

Moreover, Daniels indicates that he had no knowledge of Horsman’s lack of access to

asthma medication during his temporary confinement in the holding area.

As to the conditions of the holding area and confinement outside the facility, the

court finds that these claims provide no basis for relief. It is undisputed that during the 3-

day period of time during which Horsman was assigned to lock-up he had access to

restroom facilities, including running water, was provided meals, received sleeping

materials and, while outside, received ice and water. Although he did not have a chair or

framed bed on which to sit in the holding room, he could sit on the floor or, when

available, the sleeping materials provided to him. Cf. Alfred, 378 F. App’x at 980

(“Objectively speaking, sleeping on a steel bed without a mattress for eighteen days,

though uncomfortable, is not so extreme as to violate” the Eighth Amendment.). Finally,

the mere confinement of an inmate in an outdoor area, in and of itself, is not so extreme

that it constitutes a violation of the Constitution. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.

The Constitution does not mandate that prisons be comfortable, Rhodes, 452 U.S.

at 349, and “a prisoner’s mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth

Amendment.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004). Horsman has

failed to establish that the conditionsrelative to his time in the holding area denied him the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities or subjected him to a wanton and

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unnecessary infliction of pain. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

Consequently, the court concludes that the conditions associated with Horsman’s limited

stay in lock-up did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.

With respect Horsman’s allegation that he did not have possession of his asthma

medication while in the holding area, the court finds that Horsman fails to present

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect to his claim that

Warden Daniels or any other named defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his

medical needs during his 3-day confinement in the lock-up area. Specifically, the record

does not indicate that the named defendants had knowledge of specific facts from which

an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm existed to Horsman, that these

defendants actually drew this inference and thereafter ignored the risk. Horsman has

therefore failed to establish each of the requisite elements of his deliberate indifference

claim regarding a lack of medication while temporarily confined in the lock-up area.

Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350. Thus, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

defendants.

(vi) Inadequate Barber Shop. Horsman challenges the limited size of the barber

shop at Elmore and the sanitation procedures utilized by the inmate barbers. The

correctional defendants deny that the on-site barber shop is insufficient to meet the

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demands of inmates and assert that “[t]he barbering tools are sanitized before” use on an

inmate. Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report -

Doc. No. 57-1 at 5. Initially, it is clear that the size of the barber shop does not present a

severe or extreme condition which poses an unreasonable risk of serious harm to

Horsman’s health or safety. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. It is likewise clear that the

dimensions of the barber shop did not deprive Horsman “of the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities” so as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the challenge to

the size of the barber shop does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Horsman makes the conclusory and unsupported allegations that “due to unclean

barber tools” he suffered a “staph infection” causing sores on his head. Amendment to the

Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 6. Horsman acknowledges that he self-medicated these head

sores “which took several months to [heal].” Id. A review of the undisputed medical

records likewise establishes that Horsman did not seek medical treatment for these sores.

Consequently, there is no medical diagnosis to support Horsman’s assertion that the head

sores resulted from a staph infection. Other than his self-serving, conclusory and

unsupported allegation, Horsman presents no evidence supporting his claim that the

barbering procedures caused his head sores. Moreover, the evidentiarymaterialssubmitted

by the medical defendants indicate that health care personnel were not aware of any

medical issue arising from the tools used by inmate barbers. It is likewise clear that

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Horsman’s condition could have occurred due to a number of other reasons and been

caused by something other than a staph infection.

In reference to these claims, Warden Daniels advises that inmate barbers sanitize

their barbering tools utilizing appropriate sterilization procedures andmaterials before use.

“Correctional Officers oversee the barbering services. To my knowledge and belief, ECF

has not received any complaint and/or information from the contracted health care

providers that the barbering at ECF has cause any health problems . . . .” Exh. A to the

Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 57-1 at 5.

Horsman does not allege that any named defendant participated in the barbering

services provided to him. The law is well settled

that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or

vicarious liability]. . . . Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct.

1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888) (‘A public officer or agent is not responsible for

the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences,

or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly

employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties’). Because

vicarious liability isinapplicable to ... §1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th

Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts

of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”); Marsh v.

Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official “can have no

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respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228,

1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994)) (42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their

subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). “Absent

vicariousliability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable

for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, liability for haircuts

provided to Horsman could attach to the named defendants only if they “personally

participated” in the challenged conduct or a “causal connection” exists between their

actions and the alleged deprivation of Horsman’s constitutional rights. Cottone, 326 F.3d

at 1360. Horsman, however, has presented no evidence, nor can the court countenance the

existence of any evidence, which would create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect

to the claim of deliberate indifference by the correctional defendants as to the barbering

procedures. The record is devoid of evidence indicating that these defendants personally

participated in or had any involvement, direct or otherwise, with haircuts provided to

Horsman.

In light of the foregoing, Warden Daniels and the other correctional defendants can

be held liable for behavior of other correctional personnel only if their actions bear a causal

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relationship to the purported violation of Horsman’s constitutional rights. To establish the

requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of the

correctional defendants, Horsman must present sufficient evidence which would be

admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on

notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed] to do so” or “a . . .

custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or . .

. facts [that] support an inference that [the correctional defendants] directed the [facility’s

barbering staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed

to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations

omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this

case demonstrates that Horsman has failed to meet this burden.

The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference

that the named defendants directed the inmate barbers or correctional personnel assigned

to the barber shop to act unlawfully or knew that they would act/acted unlawfully and

failed to stop such action. In addition, Horsman has presented no evidence of obvious,

flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which the defendants failed

to take corrective action. Finally, it is undisputed that the actions about which Horsman

complains did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by the defendants. Thus, the requisite

causal connection does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy

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standard is not warranted. Cf. Empl’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Turner v.

Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of

the correctional defendants on this claim.

(vii) Kitchen and Dietary Issues. Horsman complains that “[t]he kitchen area has

drainage problems” which causes “standing water many places within the kitchen. . . .

Cleaning chemicals are stored in areas where food is and the odor of bleach . . . makes the

eyes of inmates working in these areas burn and turn red. Inmates handle food without

washing their hands or without wearing plastic gloves. The kitchen is surprisingly clean,

but there are many health code violations that need correcting.” Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6

at 10. Horsman also alleges that meal portions have diminished, extra food is thrown in

7

the trash, dietary sandwiches are not properly served to inmates, food items are not

properly stored, there is cross-contamination of food and the kitchen lacks adequate spoons

and trays to maintain efficient service. Id.

Defendant Hooks addresses these claims as follows:

1. The Plaintiff alleges that at most times there are stopped-up drains and

standing water in the Kitchen at the Elmore Correctional Facility (ECF).

This is untrue. The kitchen is cleaned on a regular basis. All cleaning

materials and water [either go] out the drain or [are] mopped up. Water is

not allowed to stand on the kitchen floor.

2. The cleaning materials for the kitchen . . . are stored separately [from the

food]. Bleach is one of the cleaners used to clean the kitchen and to kill

Horsman does not identify the “other” purported health code violations. 7

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bacteria. [Occasionally there is an order of bleach because of the use of a

bleach-based solution to kill bacteria and germs.] Inmate workers utilized

in the kitchen are required to was their hands and wear plastic gloves. The

kitchen at ECF is randomly inspected by the County Health Department and

by the ADOC Office of Health Services Environmental Supervisor. Any

violations noted are corrected as soon as reasonably possible. The kitchen

at ECF hassufficientsilverware and food traysto feed the inmate population.

The ADOC menu is set by the ADOC Dietician in accordance [with] dietary

guidelines. Inmate workers are provided clean clothes to work in the

kitchen. The food in the ECF kitchen is stored properly, in coolers and

otherwise. There is no ‘cross-contamination’ of food.

3. Leftover food is destroyed for sanitary and security reasons. Dietary

sandwiches are wrapped in sanitary wrapping and are not slid “across a dirty

counter”. Just as stated above, the kitchen is cleaned on a regular basis,

including all counters.

4. Although security in the dining area is not my responsibility, I have

observed that inmate[s] are allowed sufficient time to eat.

5. I deny that I have in any way violated the constitutional rights of Inmate

Horsman.

Exh. C to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No.

57-3 at 1-3; Exh. E to the Correctional Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 6-5 at 1-2.

Despite his contentions regarding the conditions of the kitchen, Horsman has failed

to establish that these conditions denied him the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities or subjected him to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Wilson, 501

U.S. at 298-99; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Furthermore, Horsman has failed to demonstrate

any deliberate indifference or reckless disregard by the named defendants with respect to

his health or safety. Specifically, Horsman has failed to identify any particular incident or

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condition occurring in the kitchen from which the defendants could infer that a substantial

risk of serious harm existed to him. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted

in favor of the correctional defendants on these claims. See McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-50.

(viii) Totality of Conditions. The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive

review of the claims presented byHorsman, the responsesto these claims by the defendants

and the probative evidentiary materials submitted by the defendants. After such review,

the court finds that the challenged conditions though uncomfortable, inconvenient,

unpleasant and/or objectionable were not so extreme as to violate the Eighth Amendment.

Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d at 1289 (11th Cir. 1991). Specifically, the totality of the

claims before this court do not amount to conditions which fall below applicable

constitutional standards as Horsman failed to demonstrate that the challenged conditions

had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. “To say that some prison conditions may interact

in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for

Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing so amorphous as‘overall conditions’ can rise to the

level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need

exists.” Id.

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2. Claims Regarding Medical Treatment

Due to the completely conlcusory nature of Horsman’s original allegation of

“deficiencies in both medical and mental health care” provided to inmates at Elmore,

Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6 at 11, the court required that Horsman file an amendment to his

complaint which “specifically describes how the defendants have denied him adequate

mental health and/or medical treatment[.]” Order of November 17, 2014 - Doc. No. 26 at

1. In response to this order, Horsman advised that he “has no specific complaints against

the health care defendants except to confirm that he has had to stay outside in bad weather

to pick up his K.O.P. medicine and that he’s witnessed others not being given their

medicine or given the wrong medicine. Many times K.O.P. medicine is not reordered and

an inmate has to wait days and sometimes weeks to get his medicine again. This has

happened to Horsman and to other inmates at Elmore. Also, there is no health care

personnel on duty at Elmore for emergency treatment if needed.” Amendment to the

Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 3.

As previously determined, Horsman lacks standing to present claims on behalf of

other inmates. Supra at 11-14. Thus, those claims addressing medical treatment provided

to other inmates entitle Horsman to no relief. With respect to the remaining medical

treatment claims, Michele Sagers-Copeland, a registered nurse who serves as the Health

Services Administrator at Staton Correctional Facility, addresses these claims as follows:

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As part of my duties and responsibilities as the HSA at Staton, I also

oversee the medical services provided to the inmates incarcerated at Elmore

Correctional Facility (“Elmore”), which is located approximately a quarter

of a mile from Staton. Because of the close proximity of Elmore and Staton,

the medical staff at Staton also oversees and ensures the delivery of medical

care to the inmates at Elmore as well.

* * *

A true and correct copy of [Horsman’s] medical records are . . .

attached hereto. . . .

Upon arriving at any facility operated by the ADOC, inmates are

notified of the procedures and processes for obtaining medical care and

prescribed medications. The health care units within ADOC facilities

generally rely upon the same procedures for obtaining emergency and nonemergency(i.e.,sick call) medical treatment, conducting chronic care clinics,

medication administration, segregation sick call and the like and permitting

an inmate’s invocation of and participation in a grievance process. As part

of this medical staff’s orientation of inmates, inmates are provided a form

entitled “ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE SERVICES” which also provides a

detailed explanation of the grievance process. Signed Access to Care forms

are included in [Horsman’s] medical records acknowledging [his]

understanding of these processes and procedures.

As part of the orientation process, inmates are instructed that, in the

event that they experience a non-emergency medical condition or complaint,

they should utilize the process known as “sick call,” which is initiated

through the completion of a sick call request form. An inmate making a sick

call request is required to complete the top portion of the sick call request

form (stating his name, the date of request, AIS number, date of birth, dorm

location, the nature of the problem or request and his signature). The inmate

then submits the sick call request form [to medical personnel] by placing it

in the locked box located outside the shift office. The sick call request forms

are removed from the locked box each day at approximately 12:00 p.m.,

brought to the Health Care Unit and marked as received [by medical

personnel] at that time.

Upon reviewing the sick callrequestforms, the medicalstaff compiles

a list of inmates that have submitted sick call request forms and provides the

list to the Alabama Department of Corrections officer assigned to the Health

Care Unit. The Health Care Unit officer summons the patients by radio.

[Inmates at Elmore on the sick call list are transported to the Health Care

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Unit at Staton for evaluation and treatment.] . . .

A submitted sick call request form that is not [subsequently]

completed by the medical staff indicates that an inmate failed to report when

summoned to sick call. A refusal must also be completed; signed by the sick

call nurse and a witness (medical staff) and placed in the inmate[’s] file. If

the medical complaints or problems identified by an inmate in a sick call

request form appear to be urgent or life-threatening, the medical staff will

immediately have the inmate brought to the Health Care Unit for medical

treatment, and the inmate will not be required to wait until sick call begins.

As evident through[out] the records of [Horsman, he has] relied upon and

regularly utilized this sick call process to receive medical attention.

Inmates with chronic medical conditions at Elmore are also eligible

to attend regularly scheduled evaluations called “chronic care clinics.”

Chronic care clinics are held on approximately a quarterly basis for inmates

diagnosed with a chronic medical condition such as hypertension, diabetes,

hepatitis C, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Inmates are not

charged any type of co-pay in order to attend a chronic care clinic. These

chronic care clinics are particularly important for inmates prescribed certain

types of medications or treatments that require regular monitoring, such as

diabetics receiving insulin on a sliding scale. Mr. Horsman . . . participated

in chronic care clinics conducted for the inmates at Elmore.

Asset forth in the “ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE SERVICES” form,

inmates at Elmore also receive prescribed medication through the process

commonly referred to as “pill call.” During pill call, inmates line up outside

the pill call windows outside the pill call room at Elmore. When the inmate

arrives at the pill call window, he provides a member of the medical staff

[conducting pill call] with his identification badge which is issued by the

ADOC. The member of the medical staff then retrieves the inmate’s

medication which is organized alphabeticallyand punchesthe medication out

of a medication blister pack into a small plastic cup. The medication is

provided to the inmate who is required to immediately take the medication.

As the pill call process progresses, the medical staff conducting pill

call records the disbursement of medication on forms known as “Medication

Administration Records” or MARs. These MARs are maintained and filed

in the individual inmate[’s] medical records. Once the medications are

dispensed, the medicalstaff member recordsthe dispensing of medication by

placing his initial or initials in the space provided on the corresponding

MAR. If an inmate does not report to pill call to retrieve his medication, the

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medical staff member will [place a notation of “A” or “a” in the MAR]

indicating the inmate was “absent.” If the medical staff conducting pill call

discovers an inmate’s medication has run out, expired or cannot otherwise

be dispensed to the inmate, the medical staff at Elmore is instructed to

document the unavailability of the medication and notify their supervisor or

the prescribing physician immediately. The . . . medical records reflect

[Horsman’s] receipt of medication through the pill call process. In the event

that any inmate is not compliant with his medications, then the medical staff

will confirm in writing a counseling session with the inmate in which the

medical staff informs the inmate as to the importance of appearing for pill

call to receive his medication.

In addition to the pill call process, some inmates at Elmore are

permitted to maintain their prescription medication on their person and

administer this medication without oversight from the medical staff. This

process is known as “Keep on Person” or “KOP” medication administration

which is more efficient and sometimes [a] more effective medication

administration process. Certain medicationsfor certain conditions cannot be

administered through the KOP program, such as narcotics and certain

psychotropic medications. When an inmate is enrolled in KOP medication

administration, he or she is required to consent to such enrollment and is

notified of the specifics of the process itself. Inmates enrolled in the KOP

program are given blister packs containing their medication. These blister

packs of medication provide explicit directions as to the order in which the

medications should be taken. . . . In short, inmates enrolled in the KOP

programare personally responsible for taking their medication as prescribed.

However, these inmates enrolled in the KOP program are not required to

receive medication through pill call. Specifically, Mr. Horsman . . . [has]

received certain medications by virtue of this KOP protocol.

. . . [I]nmates at Elmore are well-aware of and utilize the grievance

process to voice a complaint regarding any medical treatment sought or

received during their incarceration at Elmore. The initial orientation process

. . . includes educating inmates asto the availability of the grievance process.

. . .

The grievance process is initiated when an inmate submits a Medical

Grievance form to me. . . . After reviewing the Medical Grievance, I then

provide a written response within approximately ten (10) days of receipt of

the Inmate Grievance. The written response to a Medical Grievance is

included on the bottom portion of the same form containing an inmate’s

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Medical Grievance. Below the portion of the form designated for the

“Response,” the following notation appears:

IF YOU WISH TO APPEAL THIS REVIEW

YOU MAY REQUEST A GRIEVANCE

APPEAL FORM FROM THE HEALTH

SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR. RETURN

THE COMPLETED FORM TO THE

ATTENTION OF THE HEALTH SERVICE

ADMINISTRATOR. YOU MAY PLACE THE

FORM IN THE SICK CALL REQUEST BOX

OR GIVE IT TO THE SEGREGATION SICK

CALL NURSE ON ROUNDS.

As stated in the Medical Grievance forms, the second step of the grievance

process involves the submission of a formal Medical Grievance Appeal, at

which time the inmatemaybe brought in for one-on-one communication with

the medical staff, myself and/or the Director of Nursing. A written response

to a formal Medical Grievance Appeal is provided within approximately ten

(10) days of receipt. Medical Grievance and Medical Grievance Appeal

forms are available from the Health Care Unit and the correctional shift

commander office at Staton. Inmates are instructed to place completed

Medical Grievance and Medical Grievance Appeal forms in the sick call

boxes located outside the shift office. [Members of] [t]he medical staff at

Staton review[] the grievances daily, provide a written response within

approximately ten (10) days at the bottom of the form and return a copy of

the completed forms [to an authorized correctional officer] who distributes

them to the inmates. Inmates who have complaints about the medical care

they have sought or received at Elmore are encouraged to utilize this

grievance process.

While [Horsman] filed Medical Grievances [regarding the need for a

chronic care appointment and an issue with his KOP medication on June 26,

2009 and July 5, 2009, respectively, he] did not file any Medical Grievance

Appeal in response to the response[s] [he] received to [either of these]

Medical Grievance[s]. [Horsman filed no other Medical Grievances with

respect to any issues regarding medical treatment.]

* * *

Contrary to the allegations in the Complaint, I am not aware of any

instance with the medical staff at Staton provid[ing] the wrong or incorrect

medication to [Horsman]. The suggestion that Staton medicalstaff provided

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any inmate with the wrong medication because nurses “cannot even read very

well” is simply false. These nurses are licensed by the State of Alabama. If

the nurses on staff at Staton could not “read very well,” they would not have

passed the written examinations and course study required to obtain their

licenses to practice nursing at various levels.

[Horsman] also complainsthat “pain management” or pain medication

is not available to the inmate population. This is simply untrue. Physicians

along with other clinicians at Elmore have prescribed narcotic medications

to patients who require such medications because of their underlying medical

conditions. The physicians to a prison population are routinely requested to

provide inmates with a certain level of pain medication beyond over-thecounter medications. In some instances, it has been abundantly clear that

some inmates voicing these requests were simply undertaking unjustified

drug seek[ing] activities. In other instances, it has been determined that the

request was well-founded and inmates are provided with pain medication.

However, I am unaware of any inmate being denied any necessary pain

medication when it was warranted by the facts presented upon [a] physician’s

medical judgment.

The suggestion in the Complaint that the medicalstaff at Staton is not

properly monitoring infection control at Elmore is simply incorrect. The

medical staff at Staton relies on a variety of infection control and prevention

practices which are intended to prevent widespread outbreaks of infectious

diseases among the inmate populations at both Staton and Elmore. For

example, the medical staff at Staton maintains an infectious control nurse

who is responsible for overseeing any inmate who experiences a suspicious

boil or ulcer or is otherwise diagnosed with MRSA or some other similar

infectious disease. Once an inmate is diagnosed with any sort of potential

skin infection, he or she is required to undergo evaluation by a physician as

well as an examination by the infectious control nurse until the infection is

resolved.

The medical staff routinely educates Elmore inmates of proper

hygiene practices to prevent the widespread outbreak of infectious diseases.

The medical staff also relies upon routine vaccinations for the inmate

population as an additional means of infection control. The medical staff

also completes documentation for food service workers at Elmore to ensure

that no inmate with infectious diseases are permitted to serve food to other

inmates.

The [Complaint] specifically mention[s] alleged violations of

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“[t]uberculosis detection and control procedures.[”] However, I am not

aware of any instance when the policies and/or procedures adopted by

Corizon, Inc. relative to tuberculosis have been violated in any way. As a

general matter, inmates undergo tuberculosis testing upon their initial intake

into the state correctional system at Kilby. After an inmate’s arrival at

Elmore, the medical staff will monitor for tuberculosis in many ways. First,

in the event any inmate reports symptoms which are reasonably indicative of

tuberculosis, the medical staff will test the inmate for tuberculosis and will

likely order a chest x-ray. In the event that the chest x-ray is indicative of a

possible tuberculosis infection, then the medical staff may isolate the inmate

from the general population. Even if an inmate does not report symptoms of

tuberculosis, the medical staff also monitors for tuberculosis through the

annual physical process. Inmates are also allowed to refuse their annual

physical examinations; however, they are not allowed to refuse an annual

tuberculosis test. This process is even reflected in Mr. Horsman’s medical

records. Mr. Horsman received a full annual physical on January 22, 2009,

including a TB skin test. However, Mr. Horsman refused his annual health

evaluation on November 16, 2010, but was required to submit to a TB skin

test. . . . [Horsman did not test positive for tuberculosis.]

* * *

In the event that any inmate at Elmore tests positive for “active”

tuberculosis, he would be transported immediately to Kilby for isolation.

Most importantly, I am not aware of any significant incidents or outbreaks

of any infectious diseases at Elmore [during the relevant time period] or any

other information which would support [Horsman’s] allegations relative to

infectious diseases at Elmore.

In the event that an inmate housed at Elmore experiences any type of

urgent or emergency medical condition, such an inmate would be

immediately brought . . . down the road to Staton (approximately one quarter

mile) for immediate evaluation. In the event that the inmate requires some

type of hospital or special care, an ambulance would be summoned to Staton

for transfer of the inmate. I am not aware of any instance when any inmate

has suffered any medical emergency and not received appropriate or timely

medical attention for his complaints and/ormedical condition. Moreover, the

suggestion in the Complaint that inmates have died as a result of any delay

in emergency medicalservicesissimply false. I cannot identify one instance

when an inmate at Elmore experienced any unnecessary delay in receiving

emergency medical treatment because of this process.

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Exh. 1 to the Medical Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 7-1 at 2-11 (citations to

medial records and paragraph numbering omitted). Nurse Sagers-Copeland filed a

supplemental affidavit in which she addresses the assertions set forth by Horsman in the

amendment. The relevant portion of this affidavit reads as follows:

With respect to Mr. Horsman’s complaints about K.O.P. medications,

it is clear from his medical records that Mr. Horsman has received

medications pursuant to the Keep-on-person or “KOP” program which is

available to inmates at Elmore Correctional Facility (“Elmore”). The KOP

program was [previously] discussed in detail. . . . [A]n inmate enrolled in the

KOP program such as Mr. Horsman is tasked with the responsibility of

notifying members of the medical staff when his medication requires reordering [to ensure the medication is in stock when his allotment is

depleted]. Specifically, we encourage inmates to notify the medical staff

when they have approximately five (5) to seven (7) days of remaining

medication so that we have sufficient time to re-order and receive his

medication. Mr. Horsman signed the KOP protocol form dated July 15,

2011, in which he clearly acknowledged, “I am to bring the package to the

health care unit when it gets down to seven days of pillsin my individual

packs so the nursing staff can reorder my medications . . . .” In addition

to the responsibility assumed by inmates to request a refill of their

medications, the medical staff has employed a “tickler” system for

medications for chronic conditions which are taken at regular intervals. For

example, if a patientreceives a pre-determined dosage of medication through

the KOP protocol, he willreceive a sufficient amount of medication for thirty

(30) days and a refill is automatically ordered for him prior to the expiration

of the 30-day period. However, this is true for only specific categories of

medications and does not apply to inhalers or medication taken on a “prn” or

as needed basis [such as the inhalers and medications prescribed to

Horsman]. Mr. Horsman’s medical records also reflect timely and consistent

orders from the site physician renewing his prescriptions for medications.

On the occasions Mr. Horsman was evaluated during the chronic care clinics,

he did not notify members of the medical staff of any problems receiving his

KOP medications. [In] June of 2011, Mr. Horsman reported to the medical

staff that he was, in fact, “doing well.”

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If any significant delay occurred in Mr. Horsman receiving his

medication, such a delay is the result of Mr. Horsman not notifying the

medical staff on a timely basis of his need for a refill of his medications,

especially the inhalers and “prn” medications which he has utilized during

hisincarceration at Elmore. Mr. Horsman’s records do not indicate any such

delay in the provision of medication. For example, Mr. Horsman received

a QVAR inhaler on March 27, 2011, which should have lasted at least 30

days. Mr. Horsman received another inhaler on April 24, 2011. In fact, I

cannot identify any occasion in Mr. Horsman’srecords when he experienced

any significant or serious delay in receiving any medications. Not only has

the medical staff ensured that Mr. Horsman received his medication, a

member of the medical staff actually provided counseling to Mr. Horsman

in April of 2009 because he had missed 11 consecutive days of his

medication. [With respect to the claims timely presented in this cause of

action,] Mr. Horsman did not file any sick call request form notifying the

medical staff that he was not receiving refills for his KOP medications on a

timely basis. However, he did request to receive certain medication via the

KOP protocols. Finally, there is nothing in Mr. Horsman’s medical records

indicating that he ever reported any “injury” or harm resulting from not

receiving any medication in a timely fashion.

Prior to the filing of this action by Mr. Horsman, Mr. Horsman filed

two Medical Grievances pursuant to the long-standing grievance process. .

. . Mr. Horsman never filed a Medical Grievance Appeal after receiving the

responses to these Medical Grievances.[Horsman submitted the first Medical

Grievance on June 26, 2009 in which he questioned a missed appointment

with the chronic care clinic. Medical personnel responded to this grievance

on June 30, 2009 advising Horsman that he had a pending chronic care

appointment. Horsman did not appeal the response provided to this

grievance.] In a Medical Grievance dated July 5, 2009, . . . Mr. Horsman

complained that he was not receiving his “K.O.P. for [his] asthma.” After

being instructed to check at the pill call window for his new medication

refills, Mr. Horsman did not file a Medical Grievance Appeal. Additionally,

8

I cannot find any other complaint from Mr. Horsman regarding his KOP

medication since July of 2009.

While Mr. Horsman complains about the availability of emergency

Each of these grievances addressed medical claims arising more than two years prior to the filing of the instant 8

complaint - claims which would be barred by the two-year period of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions. 

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medical services to inmates at Elmore, I cannot find any documentation

indicating that Mr. Horsman ever experienced any medical emergency at

Elmore. Also, the Alabama Department of Corrections and the Staton

medical staff have adopted and enacted specific practices and procedures in

the event that an inmate at Elmore experiences a medial emergency. For

example, if an inmate at Elmore experiences a medical emergency, the Staton

medical staff is less than a mile [from Elmore]. Moreover, if a medical

emergency occurs at Elmore which requirestransportation to a local hospital,

the time frame within which an inmate is transported [for emergency

treatment] does not differ in any meaningful respect . . . whether the inmate

is housed at Staton or Elmore. Therefore, I cannot identify any basis for any

concern on the part of Mr. Horsman regarding the availability of emergency

medical services at Elmore.

. . . I am not aware of any additional medical treatment of any kind that

should have been provided to Mr. Horsman. I have not denied and am not

aware of any other member of the medical staff at Staton who denied Mr.

Horsman any necessary medical treatment or ignored any of his complaints.

Exh. 1 to the Medical Defendants’ Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 55-1 at 2-5

(citations to medial records and paragraph numbering omitted) (emphasis in original)

(footnote added). The information set forth by Nurse Sagers-Copeland in her affidavits is

supported bythe records compiled contemporaneouslywith the medical treatment provided

to Horsman.

The defendants deny Horsman’s allegations challenging the adequacy of medical

treatment he received while at Elmore and likewise maintain that these claims are subject

to dismissal because Horsman failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided via the

medical care provider prior to filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

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When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the court

should first consider the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ versions of the facts,

and if they conflict, take the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true. ‘If in that

light, the defendant[s] [are] entitled to have the [unexhausted claims]

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, [the claims] must

be dismissed.’ Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.2008)

(citing Bryant [v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (11th Cir. 2008)]). If the

complaint is not subject to dismissal at this step, then the court should make

‘specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to

exhaustion.’ Id. (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74, 1376).

Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. and Rehab. Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir.

2012).

(i) Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

compels exhaustion of available administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief

in federal court on a § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that “[n]o

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “Congress has

provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief

sought and offered through administrative remedies.” Booth v.Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement appliesto all inmate suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a

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federal court cannot waive the exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander

v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Id. at 93

(emphasis added). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines

and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because

no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure

on the courts of its proceedings. . . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion

. . . fits with the generalscheme of the PLRA, whereas[a contrary] interpretation [allowing

an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative remedies are no longer

available] would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage.” 548 U.S. at 90-91,

93. The Court reasoned that because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is

necessary an inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion

requirement . . . by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

grievance or appeal[,]” or by effectively bypassing the administrative process simply by

waiting until the grievance procedure is no longer available to him. Id.; Johnson v.

Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance

or simply spurns the administrative process until it is no longer available failsto satisfy the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA). “The only facts pertinent to determining whether

a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he

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filed his original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam). Even where an inmate litigant “attempt[s] to amend or supplement his original

complaint” regarding efforts at subsequent exhaustion, it does “not change the important

historical fact: his administrative remedies were unexhausted when he filed his original

complaint. Therefore, he cannot cure the exhaustion defect.” Id.

 The record in this case is undisputed that the health care provider for the Alabama

Department of Corrections provides a grievance procedure for inmate complaints related

to the provision of medical treatment. The evidentiary materials submitted by the medical

defendants further demonstrate that Horsman failed to file a requisite grievance challenging

the medical claims presented in this federal civil action which are filed within the

applicable two-year period of limitations, i.e., actions which occurred on or after July 11,

2009. Moreover, with respect to the grievances filed by Horsman on June 26, 2009 and

9

July 5, 2009, Horsman did not appeal the responses to these grievances.

Horsman verified completion of the complaint on July 12, 2011, Complaint - Doc. No. 1-6 at 16, and this date 9

constitutes the earliest date on which Horsman could have submitted the complaint to prison officials for mailing. The

law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing.

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999);

Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or

other records, [this court] must assume that [the instant complaint] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Horsman]

signed it . . . .” Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, for purposes of this

Recommendation, the court considers July 12, 2011 as the date of filing. “All constitutional claims brought under § 1983

are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action

has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985). [The

plaintiff’s] claimwas brought in Alabama where the governing limitations period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones

v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to have his claim heard, [the

plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date the limitations period began to run.” McNair v. Allen,

515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). 

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Horsman does not dispute hisfailure to exhaust the administrative remedy available

to him for medical claims prior to filing this case which is a precondition to proceeding

before this court on such claims. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94. Horsman has presented no

circumstances which justify his failure to exhaust the grievance procedure provided by the

medical care provider. Under these circumstances, the court finds that the medical

treatment claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal for Horsman’s

failure to exhaust an administrative remedy, Id., and that dismissal with prejudice as to the

exhaustion defense is appropriate. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.1 (acknowledging that

where administrative remedies are clearly time barred or otherwise infeasible inmate’s

failure to exhaust may “correctly result in a dismissal with prejudice.”); Marsh v. Jones,

53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a

prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative grievance or

by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative remedies and

gaining accessto a federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies.”); Johnson,

418 F.3d at 1157 (same); Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted)

(indicating inmate’s “federal lawsuits ... properly dismissed with prejudice” where

previously available “administrative remedies have become unavailable after prisoner had

ample opportunity to use them and no special circumstances justified failure to exhaust.”).

Even had Horsman exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his

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medical treatment claims, the court finds that Horsman is nonetheless entitled to no relief

as he has failed to establish deliberate indifference by either the correctional or medical

defendants.

(ii) Correctional Defendants. The claims made against the correctional defendants

challenging the constitutionality of treatment provided by medical professionals entitles

Horsman to no relief as

[t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to

directly supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy

for the medical staff or to intervene in treatment decisions

where they have no actual knowledge that intervention is

necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong. See Vinnedge v.

Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977) (a medical treatment claim

cannot be brought against managing officers of a prison absent

allegations that they were personally connected with the

alleged denial of treatment). Moreover, “supervisory

[correctional] officials are entitled to rely on medical

judgments made by medical professionals responsible for

prisoner care. See, e.g., Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69

(3d Cir. 1993); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir.

1988).” Williams v. Limestone County, Ala., 198 Fed. Appx.

893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006).

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

To the extent Horsman seeks relief from the correctional defendants for the

treatment furnished to him by medical personnel, assuming arguendo the aforementioned

defendants exerted some authority over the manner in which those persons responsible for

the provision of medical treatment rendered such treatment, the law is well settled, as

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discussed above, “that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious

liability]. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “Absent vicarious liability, each Government official,

his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id. at 677.

Thus, liability for medical treatment provided to Horsman could attach to the correctional

defendants only if they “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct

or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions. . . and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

Horsman, however, has presented no evidence and the court cannot envision the

existence of any evidence which would create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect

to deliberate indifference by the correctional defendants. The record is devoid of evidence

indicating that these defendants personally participated in or had any involvement, direct

or otherwise, with the medical treatment provided to Horsman; rather, it is undisputed that

correctional officials did not participate in the provision of treatment to Horsman. The

evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel made all

decisions relative to the courses of treatment provided to Horsman and that they provided

treatment to Horsman in accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of

his physical condition.

 In light of the foregoing, defendants Bentley, Thomas, Daniels, McKee, Clemons,

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Hooks, Jamison and Lynam can be held liable for decisions of medical personnel only if

their actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of Horsman’s

constitutionalrights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry

of summary judgment in favor of the aforementioned defendants, Horsman must present

sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread

abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation,

and [he] fail[ed] to do so” or “a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate

indifference to [his medical needs], or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [the

correctional defendants] directed the [facility’s health care staff]to act unlawfully, or knew

that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326

F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). After extensive review of the

pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this case, it is clear that Horsman has

failed to meet this burden.

The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference

that the correctional defendants directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that

they would act/acted unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Horsman has

presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the

face of which these defendants failed to take corrective action; instead, the undisputed

medical records indicate that Horsman had continuous access to medical personnel and

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routinely received treatment for his conditions. Finally, the undisputed medical records

demonstrate that the challenged course of medical treatment did not occur pursuant to a

policy enacted by the correctional defendants. Thus, the requisite causal connection does

not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy standard is not justified. Cf.

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of defendants Bentley, Thomas,

Daniels, McKee, Clemons, Hooks, Jamison and Lynam. Furthermore, even had Horsman

presented a proper basisfor the claimslodged against these defendants, the medicalrecords

before the court indicate that health care personnel did not act with deliberate indifference

to Horsman’s medical needs.

(iii) Medical Defendants. To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of

adequate medical treatment, an inmate must, at a minimum,show that health care personnel

acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182

F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989);

Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986). Specifically, medical personnel

may notsubject an inmate to “acts or omissionssufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d

1537, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by

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Estelle, a plaintiff must establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the

knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the

acknowledged necessary] treatment.”).

That medical malpractice-negligence by a physician-is insufficient to form

the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well settled. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976);

Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). Instead, something

more must be shown. Evidence must support a conclusion that a prison

physician’s harmful acts were intentional or reckless. See Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811

(1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating

that deliberate indifference is equivalent of recklessly disregarding

substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543 (stating

that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert an Eighth

Amendment violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40

F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 (11th Cir.1994) (recognizing that Supreme Court has

defined “deliberate indifference” asrequiring more than mere negligence and

has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from criminal law); Qian

v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating “deliberate indifference”

is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct

describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).

In order to properly establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need .

. . , Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s

injury.” Mann v. TaserInt’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking

relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively

serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of

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facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.”

Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official

must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Thus, deliberate

indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168

(4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just

knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of

deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk

that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under

our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . emphasized that not ‘every claim

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S. Ct. at

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth

amendment onlywhen it is‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ 

Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence

or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.’);

Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not

sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor

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does a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical

staff and the inmate asto the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatmentsupport

a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258

(citation and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that [the] defendants’ response to the need was

more than “merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even

medical malpractice actionable under state law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether

government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of

treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d

at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion

as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”);

Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (mere fact inmate desires

a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference violative

of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (prison

medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions

concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). Self-serving

statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th

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Cir. 1990).

The affidavits filed by the medical defendants thoroughly address the claims made

by Horsman alleging a lack of adequate medical treatment. Supra at 37-46. A thorough

review of the evidentiary materials filed in this case demonstrates that these affidavits are

corroborated bythe objective medicalrecords compiled contemporaneouslywith treatment

provided to Horsman relative to the instant claims of deliberate indifference. These

evidentiary materials refute the self-serving, conclusory allegations set forth by Horsman.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the course of

treatment undertaken by the medical defendants in addressing Horsman’s medical

conditions and supply of KOP medications did not violate his constitutional rights. The

medical care Horsman received was certainly not “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or

excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.”

Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. The allegations presented byHorsman fail to establish deliberate

indifference by the medical defendants. Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898 (difference of opinion

regarding manner in which condition should be treated failsto demonstrate a constitutional

violation); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545-1546 (Whether medical personnel “should have

employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis” on which to ground

constitutional liability. In addition, an inmate’s allegation that prison physicians did not

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diligently pursue alternative means of treating condition “did not ‘rise beyond negligence’.

. . to the level of deliberate indifference.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (inmate’s desire for

some other form of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative

of the Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of opinions between

medical personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment).

It is undisputed that Horsman received treatment for his medical issues and had

access to medical personnel throughout his confinement at Elmore. It is likewise evident

that the defendants rendered treatment to Horsman in accordance with their professional

judgment. Moreover, Horsman has failed to present any evidence which indicates the

medical defendants knew that the manner in which they provided treatment created a

substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously disregarded such

risk. The record contains no evidence, significantly probative or otherwise, showing that

the medical defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Horsman’s medical needs.

Consequently,summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the medical care provider

and Dr. Hood. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

F. First Amendment Claims - Retaliation

Horsman alleges that defendant McKee removed him from his job as an inmate law

clerk and placed him on a recycling job then subsequently placed him on kitchen duty in

retaliation for his work in the law library. Horsman further alleges that defendant McKee

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and, by implication, defendant Daniels “transferred him to Limestone in retaliation” for

filing this civil action on behalf of himself and other inmates. Amendment to the

Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 2. The defendants deny these allegations and argue that the

actions about which Horsman complains did not occur in retaliation for Horsman

exercising any constitutionally protected right.

Initially, defendant McKee maintains that he did not have the authority to

unilaterally issue a job change to Horsman as this action was undertaken by the job board

at Elmore. Exh. C to the Correctional Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 6-3 at 1; Exh.

B to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 57-2

at 2. Moreover, the record before the court demonstrates that correctional officials at

Elmore had recently obtained information indicating that Horsman received payment for

assisting another inmate in a legal matter, i.e., receipt of a money order in the amount of

$56.00, Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 34 at 4, an action prohibited by

institutional rules, thereby warranting the removal of Horsman from his job as an inmate

law clerk. The record further establishes that correctional officials re-assigned Horsman

10

from his recycling job to kitchen duty upon the job board’s receipt of a special needs form

completed by medical personnel recommending placement of Horsman in a job other than

his assignment to the Recycling Plant because his “asthma is made worse while in [the]

As discussed infra, this type of behavior also provided a valid basis for Horsman’s transfer from Elmore.

10

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recycling center.” Exh. 2 to the Medical Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 7-2 at 34;

Exh. 1 to the Plaintiff’s Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 34-1 at 3.

Asto the retaliatory transfer claim, the defendants assert that defendant McKee was

not in any way involved with the decision to transfer Horsman. Exh. C to the Correctional

Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 6-3 at 1; Exh. B to the Correctional Defendants’

Second Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 57-2 at 2. The defendants further argue

that Horsman’s transfer was not in retaliation for Horsman exercising his right of access

to the courts; rather, the maintain that he was transferred in accordance with applicable

prison rules and procedures.

Federal law recognizes “that ‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly

urgent problems of prison administration and reform.’ [Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.

396, 405 (1974)]. As the Martinez Court acknowledged, ‘the problems of prisons in

America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily

susceptible of resolution by decree.’ Id., at 404-05, 94 S. Ct. at 1807. Running a prison

is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the

commitment of resources . . . .” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). Correctional

officials are therefore “accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs[,]” Cruz v.

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972), which necessarily includes “the [inescapable] withdrawal

or limitation of many [inmate] privileges and rights.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822

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(1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).

“In the First Amendment context, . . . some rights are simply inconsistent with the

status of a prisoner or ‘with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections

system.’” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001), quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822. In

accordance with this principle, an inmate’s rights established under the First Amendment

are not protected if allowing such protection is “inconsistent with his status as a prisoner

or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell, 417 U.S. at

822. Thus, while inmates retain a constitutional right protected by the First Amendment

to freely exercise their right of access to the courts, this right is limited by the fact of

incarceration and valid penological objectives such as maintaining institutional security

and order. The law is well settled that “central to all other corrections goals is the

institutional consideration ofinternalsecuritywithin the correctionsfacilitiesthemselves.”

Pell, 417 U.S. at 823; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546 (“[M]aintaining institutionalsecurity

and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation

or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial

detainees.”). It is therefore clear that preservation of security and order within a

correctional facility is essential to the facility’s effective administration and constitutes

both a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Pell, 417 U.S. at 823; Lawson

v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512 (11th Cir. 1996); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504

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(11th Cir. 1996).

“The first amendment prohibits state officials from retaliating against prisoners for

exercising their right of free speech. See, e.g., Wright v. Newsome, [795 F.2d 964, 968

(11th Cir. 1986)]. . . . The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for

exercising a right [protected by the First Amendment].” Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235,

1241-42 (11th Cir. 1989); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). “In

prison, of course, first amendment rights are not absolute. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,

94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). Legitimate policies and goals of the correction

system may justify restrictions limiting prisoners’ [First Amendment] rights. 417 U.S. at

821.” Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11 Cir. 1986).

th

A prisoner retains those First Amendment rights that are ‘not inconsistent

with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of

the corrective system.’ Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1149

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union,

Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (resist)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). . . . [P]rison authorities have a legitimate

penological interest in the consistent enforcement of prison rules and . . .

disciplining prisoners who attempt to coerce a guard into not enforcing

prison rules is reasonably related to that interest.

Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 409-10 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d

1235, 1248 (5th Cir. 1989). The situation is somewhat complicated when the alleged act

of retaliation is undertaken to assure compliance with prison rules asinmates often attempt

to “inappropriately insulate themselves from [such] actions by drawing the shield of

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retaliation around them.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied

sub nom Palermo v. Woods, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996).

To proceed on a claim for retaliation and withstand the entry of summary judgment,

an “inmate must establish . . . three elements: (1) hisspeech was constitutionally protected;

(2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the [defendants’] allegedly retaliatory

conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech;

and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected

speech.” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,

175 F.3d 378, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). With respect to the causal relationship element, a

prisoner must demonstrate that correctional officials intended to retaliate for his exercise

of a right protected under the First Amendment and, but for the retaliatory motive, the

adverse act complained of would not have occurred. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; Smith, 532

F.3d at 1278.

Horsman alleges that the correctional defendants in changing his job assignments

and effectuating histransferfromElmore to Limestone retaliated against himfor exercising

his right of access to the courts, thus satisfying the first element of his retaliation claim.

Smith, 532 F.3d at 1277. The second element requires Horsman to demonstrate that these

adverse actions “would likely deter a [prisoner] of ordinary firmness” from filing legal

actions. Id. This “presents an objective standard and a factual inquiry.” Id. The court

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assumes arguendo that this standard has been met. Nevertheless, Horsman fails to satisfy

the third requisite element of a retaliation claim - a causal connection between his

constitutionally protected activity and the adverse actions of the correctional defendants.

The causal connection inquiry focuses on the “subjective motivation of the defendants[,]”

Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399, and this court must therefore determine “whether the

defendants were subjectively motivated to” undertake the challenged actions against

Horsman for his engaging in legal activities. Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278. The subjective

motivation issue is resolved by most courts under the burden-shifting formula set forth in

Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). This

formula requires that the plaintiff first meet “his burden of establishing that his protected

conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm” and then “the burden of production

shiftsto the defendant. If the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action

in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.”

Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399 (referencing the Mt. Healthy motive analysis).

It is essential that federal courts “carefully scrutinize retaliation claims” brought by

prisoners challenging adverse actions of correctional personnel. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

“[C]ourts must approach prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care.

See Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983). This is [necessary because

prisoners’] . . . claims of retaliation are . . . easily fabricated [and] pose a substantial risk

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of unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general prison administration. This is so

because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official--even

those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation--can be characterized

[by the prisoner] as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Dawes v. Walker, 239

F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506 (2002).

An inmate has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation by showing “that his conduct was constitutionally protected and that this

conduct ... was a ‘motivating factor’” behind the adverse action of the defendant. Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Merely alleging the ultimate fact of retaliation, however, is

insufficient. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142, n.6 (7th Cir. 1988); Woods, 60 F.3d at

1166. Additionally, conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the existence

of each element requisite to establishing retaliation. Morales, 278 F.3d at 131; Bennett v.

Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (Because prisoner retaliation claims are prone to

abuse, “we are careful to require non-conclusory allegations.”). If an inmate meets his

burden with appropriate evidence, the burden of production shiftsto the defendant to show

that he “would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected

conduct.” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. “Under the Mt. Healthy approach, if the

government official ‘can prove that [he] would have taken the adverse action in the

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absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct, [he] cannot be held liable.’” Smith, 532 F.3d

at 1278 n.22 (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388 n.4).

The correctional defendants categorically denyHorsman’s allegations of retaliation

and emphatically aver that retaliation played no role in the challenged decisions. The

defendants argue and the evidentiary materials contained in the record indicate that the

adverse actions about which Horsman complains did not occur due to retaliation against

Horsman for filing this or any other lawsuit. Instead, the defendants assert that these

actions occurred for the following reasons: (i) a request by medical personnel that

Horsman be assigned a job away from the Recycling Plant, (ii) to maintain security and

preserve order through the enforcement of institutional rules, (iii) Horsman’s history of

charging other inmates for legal work, and (v) by Horsman’s own admission, correctional

officials receiving information indicating that Horsman had continued this practice while

at Elmore.

11

Horsman offers only his conclusory allegations of ultimate fact that the defendants

retaliated against him for exercising his right of access to the court. These allegations are

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279; Holifield, 115 F.3d

at 1564, n.6. The record before the court, when viewed as a whole, does not support

Additionally, the defendants assert that the transfer at issue transpired due to “an institutional warden swap” 11

agreed upon on July 11, 2013, prior to the initiation of this case, Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Third

Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 67-1 at 1, and that such transfers often occur to maintain security and order in

the prisons. See Exh. A to the Correctional Defendants’ Second Supplemental Special Report- Doc. No. 57-1 at 6. 

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Horsman’s allegations and provides no basis on which a reasonable fact finder could fairly

infer the requisite subjective motivating factor. The facts and circumstances of this case

simply do not support making such an inference as there is no probative evidence

indicating that the defendants intended to retaliate against Horsman. Thus, Horsman’s

retaliation claims falter on this element.

Moreover, even assuming a reasonable fact finder could infer the motivating factor

element, it is clear under Mt. Healthy that correctional officials would have changed each

of Horsman’s respective job assignments regardless of his accessing the court because

Horsman’s actionsin soliciting and/orreceiving paymentfromotherinmatesfor legal work

performed on their behalf violated institutional rules and likewise clearly constituted an

abuse of the position of inmate law clerk, Turner, 482 U.S. 91-92, and medical personnel

issued a profile recommending that he be re-assigned from the Recycling Plant due to a

health issue. It is also apparent that correctional officials would have transferred Horsman

despite his seeking access to this court as his transfer occurred due to an institutional swap

completed between the relevant facilities’ wardens in an effort to maintain security at

Elmore which had been adversely affected by Horsman’s activities with respect to his

obtaining payment from other inmatesfor the preparation of legal work. “Objective prison

administratorsstanding in [the defendants’]shoes would assume that [allowing a violation

of institutional rules] . . . would be noised about the prison’s population and, if ignored,

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could seriously impede their ability to maintain order and thus achieve the institution’s

penological objectives.” Smith, 532 F.3d at 1279. In light of the foregoing, the defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claims as Horsman fails to

establish by appropriate evidence a causal relationship between any alleged protected

activity and the adverse actions taken against him. Id. at 1278-79.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. Costs be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before October 20, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

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Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981). 

Done this 6th day of October, 2014.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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