Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00560/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00560-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROGER ANDREW RAMON, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES RYAN, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-560-TUC-CKJ (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Roger Andrew Ramon, presently confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Central Unit, in Florence Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an answer to the

petition (“Answer”) with exhibits A through J attached. (Doc. 11.) No reply was filed. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. First Indictment

An indictment was filed in Pima County Superior Court on June 16, 2006, charging

Petitioner with: one count of armed robbery; one count of aggravated robbery; three counts

of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon/dangerous instrument, and; two counts of

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

prohibited possession of a deadly weapon. (Answer, Ex. A.) Allegations of dangerous

nature, prior convictions, prior convictions of a dangerous nature, and serious offense

conviction were filed. (Id.) 

B. Plea

On November 9, 2006, Petitioner signed a plea agreement, and entered a plea to one

count of armed robbery and one count of aggravated assault, a dangerous nature offense.

(Id., Exs. C, D.)

C. Sentence

At sentencing, on April 19, 2007, the State argued for consecutive sentences. (Id., Ex.

B, at 3.) Petitioner’s counsel requested concurrent sentences, noting Petitioner’s health and

family support. Counsel suggested that if the court was inclined to partially aggravate the

armed robbery sentence to add additional time but run the sentences concurrently, it would

be preferable to consecutive sentences. (Id., at 5-6.) The court sentenced Petitioner to the

presumptive term of ten and a half years for the armed robbery, and, the mitigated term of

five years for the aggravated assault, to run consecutive to the armed robbery. (Id. at 8;

Petition, Ex. G.) 

D. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the trial court on May 2,

2007. (Answer, Ex. E.) The trial court appointed counsel (Petition, Ex. A) and a petition for

post conviction relief was filed on October 18, 2007, alleging the trial court erred by

imposing consecutive sentences without stating on the record its reasons for doing so.

(Answer, Ex. F.) The state filed a response, conceding Petitioner’s argument that the trial

court failed to state on the record its reason for imposing consecutive sentences. (Petition.,

Ex. C.) The state had no objection to setting the case for a re-sentencing. (Id.) On

November 28, 2007, the trial court dismissed the petition, stating that under Arizona law,

Petitioner was not entitled to relief. (Answer, Ex. G.) 

On December 14, 2007, the trial court granted an extension of time until January 28,

2008, to file a petition for review. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review to the court

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

of appeals on January 15, 2008. (Answer, Ex. H.) Petitioner asserted that his sentences were

illegal under state law (Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-708 (A), currently renumbered as § 13-711(A))

and that his due process rights had been violated. (Id.) Petitioner also requested appointment

of counsel to brief the issues raised in his petition for review. (Id.) 

The court of appeals granted review, but denied relief in a memorandum decision filed

on August 28, 2008. (Answer, Ex. I.) The court of appeals found that Petitioner did not

challenge the trial court’s conclusion with respect to § 13-708 in his petition for review,

although it did find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing

the claim pursuant to Rule 32.6(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court of

appeals did not reach the additional allegations of illegal sentences and due process violation

raised in the petition for review for the first time, finding that pursuant to Rule 32.9(c)(1)(ii),

the issues were not properly before the court for review. (Id.) The court of appeals also

denied Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel. (Id.) The court of appeals mandate

was filed on October 8, 2008. (Answer, Ex. J, Petition, Ex. F.) 

E. Federal Habeas Petition

On October 1, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, raising four grounds

for relief. (Doc. 1.) In Ground I, he alleges that he was not sentenced in accordance with

Arizona law in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Ground I,

Petitioner alleges the sentencing judge abused his discretion in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to run Petitioner’s sentences concurrently on

post-conviction review. In Ground III, Petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance

of counsel in his post-conviction proceedings. In Ground IV, he alleges his Fourteenth

Amendment due process and equal protection rights were violated by the Arizona Court of

Appeals denial of review from his state post-conviction proceedings. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”).

B. Statute of Limitations

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, — S.Ct. —, 2010 WL 2346549 (U.S. June 14, 2010). A petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling only upon a showing of (1) a diligent pursuit of petitioner’s

rights; and (2) extraordinary circumstances that stood in petitioner’s way, preventing timely

filing. Id. (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Tolling is appropriate

when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a

petition on time." Id.; see also, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.

2002)(stating that "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may

be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The extraordinary

circumstances requirement is a "high hurdle," see Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc), and policy

considerations counsel against equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807

(1980). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also establish a "causal connection" between

the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona

Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007).

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a petitioner must

exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court every claim raised

in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845

(1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must exhaust his federal claims in the state

courts “by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”

before he may submit those claims in a federal habeas petition). Exhaustion of state remedies

is required in order to give the state the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations

of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have

"fairly present [ed] his claim in each appropriate state court ... thereby alerting that court to the

federal nature of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365-66 (1995). A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or

legal bases for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the ... [petitioner is]

asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. See also

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim

raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-366.

A petitioner does not ordinarily “fairly present” a federal claim to a state court if that

court must read beyond a petition, brief, or similar papers to find material that will alert it to the

presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32-33 (rejecting contention that petition fairly

presented federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “ineffective” is a term of art

in Oregon that refers only to federal law claims, since petitioner failed to demonstrate that state

law uses “ineffective assistance” as referring only to federal law rather than a similar state law

claim); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (holding that mere presentation of facts

necessary to support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar to federal claim, is

insufficient; petitioner must fairly present the substance of the federal claim); Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue

in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds); Gatlin v.

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to “fairly present” federal

claim to state courts where he failed to identify the federal legal basis for his claim). 

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not necessary for

purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir, 1999); State

v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are

exhausted by review by the court of appeals); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes for assertion that in cases not carrying a life sentence or the

death penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”). Contrary to Respondents’ assertion,

in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement

is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Crowell v. Knowles,

483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz.2007)(discussing Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)("A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him."). A claim is procedurally defaulted

if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-805 (1991); Franklin v.

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained the distinction between exhaustion and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule. The

exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been presented with

an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that opportunity may still

be available to the petitioner under state law. In contrast, the procedural

default rule barring consideration of a federal claim applies only when a state

court has been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim

procedurally barred. Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to

exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are

exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies

remain available for claims that require a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.2005). The

issue of waiver must be affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty

v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002).

- 7 -

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

“available” to him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court pursuant to

an adequate and independent procedural bar may not be considered in federal

court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice for the default, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the federal

court refused to consider the claim. 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from

federal review in either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state

procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, the claim may be procedurally

defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court

and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1.

This is often referred to as “technical” exhaustion, because although the claim was not

actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.1

 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263

n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing

post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies when a

petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal constitutional

challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which

could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his

sentence has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered

material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed

the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of

post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there has been a

significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's

conviction if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by

clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b) (citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)).

- 8 -

exception of certain claims2

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile when it is timebarred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410

(9th Cir.1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court unless

the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state court, or

demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992).

Cause is defined as a “legitimate excuse for the default,” and prejudice is defined as

“actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a showing of

cause requires a petitioner to show that “some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule”). Prejudice need not

be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. To bring

himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice,

a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence,” Sistrunk v.

Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted), which can be shown when “a petitioner ‘presents evidence of innocence so strong

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also

satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. at 673 (quoting

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

Respondents submit that the Petition exceeded the 1-year statute of limitations and

there is no statutory or equitable basis for tolling the limitations period. (See Answer, at 4-6.)

Respondents assert that Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on September 22,

2009, the first court day after the conclusion of the 30-day period during which Petitioner

could have, but did not, petition the Arizona Supreme Court to review the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ August 22, 2008 memorandum decision. Under Respondents calculation,

Petitioner’s federal petition, filed on November October 1, 2009, is untimely, absent statutory

or equitable tolling, by 41 days.

Petitioner asserts that his petition is timely, having been filed within a year of the final

mandate issued October 8, 2008.

1. Date on which conviction and sentence became final

The first “of-right proceeding,” available under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty is a form of “direct review” within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus,

“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time

for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that the

judgment becomes final at the later of either the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of time for seeking such review). 

In Arizona, when the court of appeals grants review of a petition, but denies the

petition, direct review is not final until the mandate has issued. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.23.

Rule 32.23(a)(1) states that “[i]f there has been no motion for reconsideration and no petition

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

for review filed, the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall issue the mandate at the expiration

of the time for the filing of such motion or petition.” (emphasis added). 

Arizona courts have expressly stated that a judgment is not final until the mandate has

issued. “"The decision of the appellate court does not become final until the order (or

mandate) is filed." State v. Ward, 120 Ariz. 413, 415, 586 P.2d 974 (1978); see also Borrow

v. El Dorado Lodge, Inc., 75 Ariz. 218, 220, 254 P.2d 1027 (1953) (stating appellate court's

judgment becomes effective on "the date of the issuance of the mandate"); State v. Sepulveda,

201 Ariz. 158, 159 n. 2, 32 P.3d 1085 (Ariz.App.2001) ("A conviction becomes final upon

the issuance of the mandate affirming the conviction on direct appeal and the expiration of

the time for seeking certiorari in the United States Supreme Court."); State v. Dalglish, 183

Ariz. 188, 190, 901 P.2d 1218 (Ariz.App.1995) ("We conclude that Petitioner's case was

final on ... the date the Arizona Supreme court issued its mandate."); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz.

432, 432-434, 897 P.2d 734 (Ariz.App.1995) ("It is true that, in cases where there is an

appeal pending, the final deadline [to file for post-conviction relief] will be unknown until

the appeal is resolved and the mandate has issued."); Owen v. Shores, 24 Ariz.App. 250, 537

P.2d 978, 981 (1975) ( "There was still the necessity for issuance of the Court's mandate, and

for the trial court to take the necessary action to enforce the mandate...."); State v. Febles,

210 Ariz. 589, 592, 115 P.3d 629 (Ariz.App.2005) (Conviction became final on date the

court issued the mandate after time for further review expired.). Because the appellate court

issued a decision denying relief and petitioner did not seek review, the mandate issued on

October 8, 2008, and concluded appellate review.

In Hemmerle v Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2007), the Ninth Circuit

held that a state petition for post-conviction relief becomes final when appellate review is

denied because then there is nothing for the state courts to do and, therefore, nothing remains

pending. Hemmerle is inapplicable because there was no denial of review by any reviewing

court. Under the Arizona rules, there is no requirement for a mandate to issue from a denial

of review. Under such circumstances, review is final when denied. There is nothing more for

the reviewing court to do.

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Here, the appellate court granted review and issued a decision, which became final

when it issued the mandate as required by Rule 31.23. Here, once the appellate court issued

its decision, it still needed to issue the mandate, which issued on October 8, 2008. Therefore,

Petitioner had 365 from October 8, 2008, or until October 8, 2009, to file his federal habeas

petition. Under the “prison mailbox rule” a prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed

when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing to the district court. Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266 (1988). Petitioner’s federal petition indicates he placed the federal petition in

the prison mailing system on September 23, 2009. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds

that the Petition is timely filed. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Alternatively, should the District Court conclude that Petitioner's conviction and

sentence became final on September 22, 2009, the first court day after the conclusion of the

30-day period following the entry of the memorandum decision denying relief by the Arizona

Court of Appeals’ on August 22, 2008, then the federal Petition, filed one day late, on

September 23, 2009, is untimely

Petitioner raises no grounds for equitable tolling in his petition, and did not file a

reply. Petitioner does not make a sufficient showing that there are "extraordinary

circumstances" that would have caused the untimely filing of his Petition. "A pro se

petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling." Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, this Court finds no cause for equitably tolling the limitations period in this case.

B. Ground I:

Petitioner argues in Ground I of his Petition that he was not sentenced in accordance

with Arizona Revised Statutes. Specifically, the sentencing judge failed to give a reason for

imposing consecutive sentences (“subclaim (A)”), the sentencing judge failed to give a

specific reasons for imposing a mitigated sentence consecutive to a presumptive sentence

(“subclaim (B)”), and failed to sentence Petitioner concurrently on two counts which resulted

from the same indictment, or “spree” offense, all in violation of state law (“subclaim (C)).

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

(Petition, p. 6.) Petitioner states that this violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of

the United States Constitution. 

1. Cognizable Federal Claim

Respondents assert that Ground I (subclaims A-C) of the Petition is not amenable to

federal review. Respondents are correct. A violation of state law is not grounds for habeas

relief. See Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court

is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States). Petitioner argues no set of facts that support a federal claim. 

Although Petitioner did assert a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of

the Constitution, Petitioner does not elaborate in these federal habeas proceedings how the

alleged error by the State Courts presents a cognizable federal claim. Petitioner's reference

to federal law does not transform this claim into a federal claim. See Langford v. Day, 110

F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)(Petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a federal

one merely by asserting a constitutional violation; alleged errors in the application of state

law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.) Petitioner is challenging the State Court's

application of a state law, not a federal law. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Ground I be dismissed as failing

to present a cognizable federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

2. Procedural Default

Alternatively, Petitioner failed to exhaust subclaim A of Ground I in the state courts.

Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to present this claim

in an additional petition for post-conviction relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under

Arizona law, notice of post-conviction relief must be filed within ninety days after the entry

of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief

proceeding. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner were to fairly present this issue in

another petition for post-conviction relief, such presentation would be untimely, Rules 32.1

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

and 32.4(a), and precluded, Rule 32.2. Such a new petition, therefore, would be subject to

summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182

Ariz. 432 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) (timeliness is a

separate inquiry from preclusion). These claims, therefore, are procedurally defaulted. Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded

where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has

expired). 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of subclaim A of Ground I is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

Petitioner argued subclaims B and C of Ground I for the first time in his petition for

review to the court of appeals. (See Doc. No. 11, Ex. I, Court of Appeals Memorandum

Decision, at 2.) The court of appeals summarily denied review on these claims. The court

of appeals further found that the one claim he raised in his petition for post-conviction relief

to the trial court (subclaim A) was specifically not raised in his petition for review. (See Id,

at 3.)

If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner attempted to raise

the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both "independent" and

"adequate"--review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See Ylst,

501 U.S. at 801 ("When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits

of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.") (citing

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87- 88 (1977) and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at

485-492. A state procedural default rule is "independent" if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). A state

procedural default rule is "adequate" if it is "strictly or regularly followed." Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53

(1982)). The Magistrate Judge finds that the State appellate court’s preclusionary ruling is

an independent and adequate procedural bar. Because the procedural bar is adequate and

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

independent, federal review of subclaims B and C is foreclosed unless Petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

3. Cause and Prejudice/Fundamental Miscarriage

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claims asserted in Ground I of his federal

habeas petition. Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural default for either

claim. 

Petitioner's status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause

for his failure to present any of his grounds for relief to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986)(finding that an illiterate pro se

petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988)(finding that petitioner's arguments

concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause.)

There was no objective factor external to the defense which impeded Petitioner’s

efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule, as demonstrated by his ability to file his

petition for post-conviction relief and petition for review - Petitioner merely failed to raise

the procedurally defaulted issues. 

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard. Additionally, Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence to support any

assertion of innocence which would allow this court to consider these claims as a ground for

a writ of habeas corpus in spite of the procedural default. Because petitioner has not

presented any new reliable evidence that he is innocent of these crimes, a miscarriage of

justice will not occur if the court declined to review the procedurally defaulted claims on the

merits. 

C. Ground II:

Petitioner argues in Ground II of his Petition that the trial court abused its discretion

by failing to correct or modify his sentences to run concurrently, especially since the State

conceded to a resentencing. Petitioner asserts that this is a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

violation. (Doc. 1, at 7.)

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

1. Cognizable Federal Claim

Respondents assert that Ground II of the Petition is not amenable to federal review.

Respondents are correct. A violation of state law is not grounds for habeas relief. See

Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (it is not the province of a federal habeas court

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States). Petitioner presents no legal theory nor does he argue a set of facts that support a

federal claim.

 Although Petitioner does assert a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

of the Constitution, Petitioner does not elaborate as to how the alleged error by the state

courts presents a cognizable federal claim. Petitioner's reference to federal law does not

transform this claim into a federal claim. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.

1996)(Petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting

a constitutional violation; alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus.) Petitioner is challenging the state court's application of a state law,

not a federal law. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Ground II be dismissed as failing

to present a cognizable federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

2. Procedural Default

Alternatively, Petitioner argued in his petition for review to the court of appeals that

he was deprived due process of law under the United States Constitution by the trial court’s

decision to deny him an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 11, Ex. H, at 2F.) The court of appeals

acknowledged that Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review, but made a

determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner an

evidentiary hearing because it correctly resolved the purely legal issue raised in Petitioner’s

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. I, at 3.) The court of appeals specifically

noted, however, that Petitioner did “not challenge the trial court’s conclusion with respect

to § 13-708 in his petition for review, but raises new claims of alleged error that were never

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

considered or decided by the court.” (Id.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that

Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground II of this habeas petition. 

Because Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground II, and his right to direct review is

completed, he would have to present this claim in an additional petition for post-conviction

relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under Arizona law, notice of post-conviction relief must

be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after

the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first

petition for post-conviction relief proceeding. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner

were to fairly present this issue in another petition for post-conviction relief, such

presentation would be untimely, Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), and precluded, Rule 32.2. Such a

new petition, therefore, would be subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz.

264, 266 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192

Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). This claim,

therefore, is procedurally defaulted. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th

Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the

state courts and the time for doing so has expired). 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground II is barred absent a showing of “cause

and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386,

393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. As noted above, Petitioner has not established

cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that would excuse the

procedural default of Ground II.

D. Ground III

Petitioner argues in Ground III that counsel appointed to represent him in his postconviction relief proceedings provided ineffective representation by failing to properly

present issues to the sentencing judge, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment Constitutional rights.

1. Procedural Default

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

Petitioner failed to present his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the trial

court in either his petition for review to the court of appeals, or in a subsequent round of

post-conviction proceedings. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner failed

to properly exhaust Ground III of this habeas petition. 

Because Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground III, and his right to direct review is

completed, he would have to present this claim in an additional petition for post-conviction

relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under Arizona law, notice of post-conviction relief must

be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after

the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first

petition for post-conviction relief proceeding. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner

were to fairly present this issue in another petition for post-conviction relief, such

presentation would be untimely, Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a). Such a new petition, therefore,

would be subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.1999);

State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135 (1998)

(timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). This claim, therefore, is procedurally

defaulted. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review

is precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing

so has expired). 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground III is barred absent a showing of “cause

and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386,

393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

2. Cause and Prejudice/Fundamental Miscarriage

Petitioner asserts that he “was incorrectly advised ... that he ... could not complain

about his lawyer in the petition for review.” (Doc. 1, at 8.) The Court construes this

assertion as an argument that procedural default of Ground III was caused by ineffective

assistance of Rule 32 counsel. The ineffectiveness of constitutionally required counsel can

establish “cause.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). Although there is no

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, Moormann v.

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir.2005), there is such a right with respect to counsel on

the first appeal as of right, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Petitioner forfeited his

right to direct appeal by entering a guilty plea. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-4033(B). Consequently,

his first round of post-conviction proceedings was his first appeal as of right, and he may

challenge the effectiveness of his post-conviction counsel. See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128,

130 (1995). However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing "cause" is itself

subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray, 477 U.S. at 492; Edwards v. Carpenter,

529 U.S. 446 (2000). Before an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) may

be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been presented to the state

court as an independent claim. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-53. Here, Petitioner never

exhausted this claim directly in that he never asked any state court to grant him a new round

of post-conviction-relief based on his claim that his “of-right” counsel was ineffective.

Consequently, Petitioner has failed to establish cause for the default. Moreover, it is unlikely

Petitioner could establish that counsel’s advice was, in fact, defective, as, under Arizona law,

review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought raised in PCR

proceedings rather than on direct appeal. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3(2002). 

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard. Additionally, Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence to support any

assertion of innocence which would allow this court to consider this claims as a ground for

a writ of habeas corpus in spite of the procedural default. Because petitioner has not

presented any new reliable evidence that he is innocent of these crimes, a miscarriage of

justice will not occur if the court declined to review the procedurally defaulted claim on the

merits. The Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice,

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that would excuse the procedural default of Ground

III.

E. Ground IV

Petitioner argues in Ground IV that the court of appeals chose not to consider claims

presented in the petition for review, citing that the issues had not been presented properly,

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

although it was evident that serious errors had occurred at the state level that rose to the

magnitude of constitutional violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the

14th Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 9.) Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust

this claim, and it is not procedurally defaulted.

1. Procedural Default

Petitioner failed to raise his claim that the appellate court’s procedural default ruling

violated his right to due process or equal protection in the state courts. Accordingly, the

Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground IV of this habeas petition. 

Because Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground IV, and his right to direct review is

completed, he would have to present this claim in an additional petition for post-conviction

relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under Arizona law, notice of post-conviction relief must

be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after

the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first

petition for post-conviction relief proceeding. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner

were to fairly present this issue in another petition for post-conviction relief, such

presentation would be untimely, Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), and precluded, Rule 32.2. Such a

new petition, therefore, would be subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz.

264, 266 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192

Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). This claim,

therefore, is procedurally defaulted. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th

Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the

state courts and the time for doing so has expired). 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground IV is barred absent a showing of

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S.

386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. As noted above, Petitioner has not established

cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that would excuse the

procedural default of Ground IV.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court DISMISS this action in its

entirety.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party

may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy

thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the following case

number: CIV 09-0560-TUC-CKJ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir)(2003).

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2010.

Case 4:09-cv-00560-CKJ Document 19 Filed 07/23/10 Page 20 of 20