Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00056/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00056-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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Defendants Integrated DNA Technologies, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., and Life

Technologies Corp. did not separately move to dismiss, but instead filed notices of joinder with

regard to the motion filed by Roche Diagnostics Corp.[Doc. Nos. 100, 101, 113.] 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROLL BUSTERS© LLC,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv56-IEG(WMc)

Order Granting Defendants’ Motions

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim1

[Doc. Nos. 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 102, 103,

105, 107, 111, 114]; Denying

Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH’s

Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient

Service of Process [Doc. 92]; Granting

Defendant Qiagen NV’s Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction [Doc. 111]; Granting

Defendant EMD Chemical Inc.’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 114]

vs.

ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS GMBH; ROCHE

MOLECULAR SYSTEMS (RMS); ROCHE

DIAGNOSTICS CORP. d/b/a/ ROCHE

APPLIED SCIENCES; EUROGENTEC NORTH

AMERICA, INC.; CLONTECH

LABORATORIES, INC.; INTEGRATED DNA

TECHNOLOGIES (IDT); LIFE

TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION;

QUIAGEN NV.; THERMO FISHER

SCIENTIFIC, INC.; GENE LINK, INC.;

GENSCRIPT USA, INC.; EMD CHEMICALS

INC.; TRILINK BIOTECHNOLOGIES INC.;

AND CEPHEID,,

Defendants.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for

failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the FAC fails to plead with

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Defendants also move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing the qui tam

provisions are unconstitutional. The Court stayed that portion of the motions pending decision by

the Federal Circuit on United States ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Civ. No. 2011-1067 (Fed.

Cir. 2011), which was argued in that court on July 7, 2011. The stay remains in effect until the

earlier of the date on which the Federal Circuit files its decision in the FLFMC case, or

November 14, 2011.

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sufficient particularity either (i) the conduct constituting false marking in violation of 35 U.S.C.

§ 292 or (ii) that defendant acted with intent to deceive.2

 Several Defendants have also filed

motions for dismissal on other grounds. Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH moves to dismiss

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. Defendant Qiagen NV moves to

quash service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant EMD Chemicals, Inc. moves to dismiss for

lack of standing, arguing a previous qui tam relator settled and released claims against it based

upon the same conduct alleged in the FAC. 

The Court held oral argument on Defendants’ motions on August 12, 2011. Based upon all

the parties’ arguments, for the reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART the Defendants’ motions.

Background

Troll Busters LLC provides a “freedom to operate service to invalidate patent claims that

are likely not valid, and is active in invalidating molecular diagnostic patents that artificially drive

up health care costs.” [FAC, ¶ 9.] Plaintiff alleges each of the Defendants “has and continues

(and/or have and continue to require others) to mark upon, affix to, and/or use expired patents in

advertising, sales and promotion through online sales channels and in providing their products

through Internet websites.” [FAC, ¶ 45.] Plaintiff alleges such conduct violates the false marking

provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 292. 

Plaintiff identifies 22 expired U.S. Patents allegedly used by Defendants to mark various

products. [Id.; FAC, ¶¶ 46-70.] Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants’ respective Internet catalogs contain statements or other patent marking

language that (a) certain products are marked with one or more of the Expired

Patents and/or (b) product categories are either allegedly protected by an Expired

Patent or require the customer to obtain a license to practice the invention of an

Expired Patent from one or more of the defendants.

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In addition to the form allegation that Defendant Life Technologies Corporation (“Life”)

marked products with or required customers to obtain licenses for expired patents, [FAC, ¶ 82.],

Plaintiff also alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that Life “acted as agent for Defendant

Roche and required licensees to mark products with specific lists of patents according to required

language.” [FAC, ¶ 81.] “The required language included Expired Patents, and there were no

provisions to require licensees to ... remove patents that had expired ....” Plaintiff goes on to list

the particular patents “upon information and belief” with which Life required its licensees to

falsely mark licensed products, and the product categories upon which those patents were marked. 

[Id.] 

4

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants GenLink, TriLink Biotechnologies, or Cepheid

failed to change their website. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Life “has not

successfully changed its website” noting that although it “apparently attempted to disable some

links within its website ... the falsely marked expired patents still appear.” [FAC, ¶ 83.]

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[FAC, ¶ 70.] As to each Defendant, Plaintiff identifies particular products and particular expired

patents. [See, e.g., FAC ¶ 71.] Plaintiff alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that each

Defendant “has advertised on its online catalog” at least those products identified in the tables, and

“either marked these products with, or required that the customers obtain licenses for” such

expired patents.3 [See, e.g., FAC ¶ 71.] 

In attempting to demonstrate intent as required by the statute, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

“did not have, and could not have had, a reasonable belief their products were properly marked,

particularly in light of Defendants Roche and Life requiring its licensees to mark its products or

requiring its licensees to advise its customers of the need for each customer to obtain a license to

an expired patent from either or both of Roche and Life.” [FAC, ¶ 96.] Defendants “are large,

sophisticated companies” which “have, or regularly retain, legal counsel, who are experienced in

patent matters.” [FAC, ¶¶ 97-98.] Further, “Defendants know that a patent expires and that an

expired patent cannot protect any product.” [FAC, ¶ 100.] All Defendants “are licensors and/or

licensees of the Expired Patents” and based thereon “defendants were acutely aware of when the

patents expired as that would stop the payment of royalties.” [FAC, ¶ 101.] Plaintiff alleges it

was common knowledge in the industry, based upon published articles, that several of the patents

expired in 2005 and 2006, and Defendants, as businesses in the industry, were aware of the

expiration of the patents. [FAC, ¶ 105.] Finally, Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,”

that most of the Defendants4

 have not changed their website since being served with the original

complaint, “indicating a continuing intent to deceive the public and chill competition from

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potential competitor companies.” [See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 72, 103, 104.]

Plaintiff sues on its own behalf and on behalf of the United States, seeking an award of

monetary damages of not more than $500 for each instance of Defendants’ violations of § 292(a),

one half of which is to be paid to the United States. [FAC, ¶ 95.]

Discussion

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

because it fails to plead with particularity the facts demonstrating Defendants violated § 292 as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “'To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. “[W]hile the court assumes that the facts in a

complaint are true, it is not required to indulge in unwarranted inferences in order to save a

complaint from dismissal.” Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1064-65

(9th Cir.2008). 

Although § 292 provides for a civil fine, it is a criminal statute. Pequiqnot v. Solo Cup Co.,

608 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A false marking claim under 35 U.S.C. § 292 requires an

intent to deceive the public, and sounds in fraud. Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d

1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, “false marking claims must satisfy the heightened pleading

standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which provides that ‘a party must state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake’.” Id. “Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff alleging

violation of § 292 to plead in detail ‘the specific who, what, when, where, and how’ of the alleged

fraud.” In re BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In order to survive

dismissal, Plaintiff must “set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the

transaction” and instead must set forth the particularized factual bases demonstrating Defendants

violated § 292. Juniper Networks, Inc., 643 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567

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F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009)). “The Rule acts as a safety valve to assure that only viable claims

alleging fraud or mistake are allowed to proceed to discovery. By eliminating insufficient

pleadings at the initial stage of litigation, Rule 9(b) prevents relators from using discovery as a

fishing expedition.” Id. at 1310. Where a complaint is grounded in fraud, and its allegations fail

to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), the court properly dismisses such

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir.

2003). 

In relevant part, the false marking statute provides:

Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any

unpatented article, the word “patent” or any word or number importing that the

same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public; ... [s]hall be fined not

more than $500 for every such offense. 

35 U.S.C. § 292(a). The “two elements of a § 292 false marking claim are (1) marking an

unpatented article and (2) intent to deceive the public.” Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590

F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009). An article covered by an expired patent is “unpatented” within

the meaning of § 292. Pequiqnot, 608 F.3d at 1361. Conduct violating the “marks upon, or affixes

to” portions of the statute is relatively easy to identify – use of the word “patent” or any word or

number directly marked on or affixed to a product, conveying that an article is patented, is

prohibited. See Oakley, Inc. v. Bugaboos Eye Wear Corp., 757 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal.

2010); Hollander v. Timex Group USA, Inc., 2011 WL 1399806, *5 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 13, 2011). In

order to fall under the “uses in advertising” portion of § 292, the offending conduct “must have

occurred in a medium or through a channel designed to promote the unpatented product to

consumers.” Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1334

n.41 (S.D. Cal. 2010); see also Timex Group, 2011 WL 1399806 at*5 (“the term ‘advertising’

implies an act soliciting the general public regarding the product.”). 

A. Does Plaintiff’s FAC sufficiently allege conduct violating § 292?

Upon review, the Court concludes the FAC sufficiently alleges the “who” of Plaintiff’s

claim under § 292. Although Defendants argue Plaintiff must identify the specific individual

responsible for the conduct constituting false marking, the Federal Circuit has rejected such a

requirement. In re BP Lubricants, 637 F.3d at 1312 (“the naming of specific individuals is not the

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Defendant Roche cites U.S. ex rel. Heathcote Holdings Corp. v. Wm. K. Walthers, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 874148 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2011) for the proposition that Plaintiff must

identify, at the pleading stage, a particular individual at the Defendant corporations, with authority

to speak on behalf of the corporation, who possessed an intent to deceive. The court in that case,

however, was ruling upon cross-motions for summary judgment, and had received affirmative

evidence that no one employed by the defendant corporation was aware of the offending patent

marking.

6

Additionally, the court notes four of the patents expired more than five years before

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case. [FAC, ¶ 69 (listing expiration dates of the patents).] 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2462, any action for enforcement of a civil fine or penalty must be

commenced within five years after the claim first accrued. Thus, absent more particularity

regarding when the false marking occurred, some of Plaintiff’s claims may be time-barred.

See Juniper Network, 643 F.3d at 1351 (noting the statute of limitations provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2462 applies to false marking claims).

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only way to set forth facts upon which intent to deceive can be reasonably inferred”); see also

Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 1118689, *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2011)

(“imposition of a requirement that a plaintiff identify in his complaint particular individuals

responsible for false marking effectively would make it impossible to plead a violation of section

292, except perhaps in a case involving an internal whistleblower.”)5

However, the FAC does not sufficiently alleges “when” the false marking occurred. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ false marking is ongoing [FAC, ¶ 45.] Plaintiff identifies each of the

patents and their expiration dates. [FAC, ¶ 69 (identifying 22 patents and their dates of

expiration).] However, the FAC gives Defendants no notice of when, within that time period,

Plaintiff alleges they engaged in false marking in violation of § 292. Plaintiff pleads much of its

complaint “on information and belief” and based upon its “knowledge through searching the

Internet web sites of the foregoing Defendants.” [FAC, ¶ 1.] Plaintiff does not identify when this

search occurred, and therefore states no factual basis for the conclusion the false marking is

ongoing. In addition, neither the Court nor the Defendants may assume the alleged false marking

occurred from the date the patent expired, as Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support such a claim.6

Similarly, the FAC does not sufficiently identify “where” the false marking occurred. All

of the allegations as to each Defendant are made “on information and belief” and in the alternative

(i.e. Defendant “either marked these products with, or required that the customers obtain licenses

for” such expired patents). At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff conceded it is unaware of any

place that the expired patents are actually marked upon or affixed to any product, and also that

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requiring customers to obtain licenses for expired patents does not violate § 292. Therefore, the

conduct at issue is “patent number markings in online product catalogs denoting that the advertised

products are protected by one of more expired patents.” [See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response in

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Roche Molecular Systems and Roche Diagnostics

Corp., Doc. No. 123, p. 6.] Nonetheless, Plaintiff identifies not a single website it viewed. 

Most troubling, however, is Plaintiff’s failure to allege with particularity “what” statements

by Defendants constitute false marking and “how.” Plaintiff argues the offending conduct is the

use of the expired patents “in advertising in connection with any unpatented article.” It is

ordinarily insufficient to allege claims sounding in fraud “on information and belief.” Shroyer v.

New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). Pleading “on

information and belief” suffices under Rule 9(b) only where such allegations are accompanied by a

statement of the facts on which the belief is founded. Id. Here, however, the only factual basis

supporting Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants “marked these products with” expired patents is

that Plaintiff “search[ed] the Internet web sites of the foregoing Defendants.” [FAC, ¶ 1.] 

Plaintiff’s FAC identifies no particular website (or location on a website) where the false marking

may be found, and no particular statement from the Defendants’ online catalog constituting false

marking. 

Plaintiff argues, in opposition to the motions to dismiss, that the use of an expired patent in

connection with a product in a catalog on a website may constitute advertising in violation of

§ 292. See Presidio Components, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (liability may be

imposed under § 292 for using an expired patent in advertising); Timex Group, 2011 WL 1399806

at*5 (“the term ‘advertising’ implies an act soliciting the general public regarding the product.”). 

However, a defendant does not violate § 292 merely by using an expired patent somewhere on the

internet or in a product manual or catalog. Bugaboos Eye Wear Corp., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1057

(advertising under § 292 requires that the patent be used in such a manner as to call attention to it

before the product is purchased); Presidio Components, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 n.41 (“[t]o

be used ‘in advertising’ the false marking must have occurred in a medium or through a channel

designed to promote the unpatented product to consumers.”). However, Plaintiff has failed to

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7

In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant TriLink attaches excerpts from its online

catalog and web page. TriLink directs the Court to references to patents contained in the catalog

and web page, all of which appear to be disclaimers regarding the licensing of those products. In

deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court may only consider evidence which was

not attached to the complaint but upon which the complaint “necessarily relies” where “(1) the

complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no

party questions the authenticity of the document.” United States v. Corinthia Colleges, __ F.3d __,

2011 WL 3524208 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011). Here, Plaintiff’s FAC broadly refers to TriLink’s

“online catalog” such that the Court cannot determine whether the specific statements referenced

by TriLink in its motion are those which Plaintiff contends constitutes false marking. Therefore,

the Court concludes it may not properly consider the materials submitted by TriLink in ruling on

the motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Nonetheless, the Court notes, upon cursory review, that the

statements identified by TriLink do not appear to constitute statements “used in advertising” in

violation of § 292. This underscores the need for Plaintiff to identify, with particularity, the

conduct and statements it asserts constitutes false marking, so that Defendants may properly

defend against such allegations.

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identify any particular language from any of the Defendants’ online catalogs or websites that

constitute “advertising.” Plaintiff does not identify any particular publication or website where the

allegedly offending statements may be found, and does not plead any facts showing Defendants

used the expired patents in a manner “importing” or suggesting the products were covered by

those patents. Plaintiff’s FAC merely identifies the neutral facts necessary to identify the

allegedly offending marks and then alleges “on information and belief” that Defendants have

“advertised” those products “on its online catalog.”7

 These allegations fall short of the specificity

required to plead a violation of the false marking statute. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to

dismissal of the FAC based purely on Plaintiff’s failure to allege with specificity the conduct

which constitutes false marking.

B. Intent to deceive the public

Even assuming the FAC alleges sufficient facts regarding Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff

has not pleaded facts with sufficient particularity to support the allegation that Defendants engaged

in false marking with an intent to deceive. The mismarking of an article does not trigger liability

under § 292 in the absence of intent to deceive. Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.,

406 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Intent to deceive is a state of mind arising when a party

acts with sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of

its saying will be misled into thinking that the statement is true.” Id. At the pleading stage, a

relator must do more than simply aver the existence of intent to deceive. Exergen Corp. v. WalCase 3:11-cv-00056-IEG-WVG Document 162 Filed 08/31/11 Page 8 of 22
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Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must in the § 292

context provide some objective indication to reasonably infer that the defendant was aware that the

patent expired.” In re BP Lubricants, 637 F.3d at 1311. 

In BP Lubricants the court held plaintiff/relator’s allegations were insufficient to

demonstrate scienter under § 292. In particular, the relator in BP Lubricants alleged, “upon

information and belief,” that:

(1) BP knew or should have known that the patent expired; (2) BP is a sophisticated

company and has experience applying for, obtaining, and litigating patents; and (3)

BP marked the CASTROL products with the patent numbers for the purpose of

deceiving the public and its competitors into believing that something contained or

embodied in the products is covered or protected by the expired patent.

637 F.3d at 1309. The court concluded these averments were insufficient under Rule 9(b), because

they were “only generalized allegations rather than specific underlying facts from which we can

reasonably infer the requisite intent.” Id. at 1312.

Since BP Lubricants, a number of district courts have reviewed allegations of scienter

under § 292 and found those allegations lacking. In Promote Innovation LLC v. Roche

Diagnostics Corp., 2011 WL 2181243 (S.D. Ind. June 3, 2011), the plaintiff/relator’s second

amended complaint generally alleged defendant was a sophisticated company which knew or

should have known the patent expired. Beyond this general allegation, plaintiff asserted, based

purely upon information and belief, the existence of a license agreement. “Because patent licenses

terminate with the expiration of the patent, upon information and belief, the license agreement

between Quadrant ... and Roche included the date of expiration of the ‘319 Patent.” Id. at *7. The

court found this allegation bereft of factual content – “this paragraph only invites the Court to

engage in speculation based on the existence of a licensing agreement; it in no way establishes

intent or knowledge.” Id.

Similarly, in Brown v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2011 WL 1131516 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2011), the

plaintiff alleged “Defendant is a sophisticated business with experience with patents; that

Defendant owns, or has licenses under, a substantial number of patents, and patent applications;

and that Defendant has in-house or outside counsel responsible for managing its intellectual

property.” Id. at *2. The court concluded that “as in BP Lubricants, those allegations do no more

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8

Plaintiff incorporates by reference its argument regarding the reasonable inferences to be

raised by its allegations of licensor/licensee relationships into the other opposition briefs,

modifying the argument to fit the particular Defendant. Those differences are not significant for

purposes of evaluating the existence of a factual basis for the allegation Defendants engaged in

false marking with an intent to deceive.

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than allege Kraft should have known the patents expired. They do not suffice to present specific

facts from which this Court can infer Kraft knew the ‘695 and ‘696 Patents had expired.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint contains many of the types of speculative allegations, on

information and belief, which were rejected by the Federal Circuit in BP Lubricants. [See FAC,

¶¶ 97-98 (Defendants “are large, sophisticated companies” which “have, or regularly retain, legal

counsel, who are experienced in patent matters.”); ¶ 100 (“Defendants know that a patent expires

and that an expired patent cannot protect any product.”; ¶ 101 (All Defendants “are licensors

and/or licensees of the Expired Patents” and based thereon “defendants were acutely aware of

when the patents expired as that would stop the payment of royalties.” ] Based upon these

speculative allegations, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer intent to deceive as follows:

(1) Roche was licensor of the Roche Expired Patents; (2) Roche collected royalties

related to the Roche Expired Patents; (3) Roche notified its licensees that the Roche

Expired Patents had expired; (4) Roche stopped receiving royalties for the Roche

Expired Patents once they expired; (5) Roche was aware that it stopped receiving

royalties for the Roche Expired Patents; (6) despite such notice and adjustment to

the royalty payments, Roche continued to falsely mark products with the Roche

Expired Patents; (7) Roche required licensees to continue to mark products with the

Roche Expired Patents; (8) Roche was complicit in a strategy to prevent or

diminish market competition; (9) Life, another Defendant, acted as an agent of

Roche and required licensees to mark products with specific lists of patents

according to required language; and (10) the patent licenses at issue did not require

licensees to remove patent marking language once the patents had expired.

[Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Roche Molecular Systems

and Roche Diagnostics Corp., Doc. No. 123, p.108

.] As Defendants point out in their motions,

however, the inferential steps Plaintiff asks this Court to make are gigantic. The FAC lacks facts

demonstrating how Plaintiff would “know or believe” the terms of the licensing agreements

between Roche, Life, and the other Defendants contained the expiration dates of the relevant

patents. There are no facts upon which Plaintiff bases its belief the alleged licenses called for

ongoing royalty payments (rather than a one-time payment or some other manner of

compensation) which in fact terminated. Although Plaintiff alleges some Defendants have

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Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants GenScript, TriLink, or Cepheid failed to change

their website. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Life “has not successfully changed its

website” noting that although it “apparently attempted to disable some links within its website ...

the falsely marked expired patents still appear.” [FAC, ¶ 83.] Plaintiff does not explain how the

changes to Life’s website gives rise to an inference those changes were made based upon

knowledge that the patents had expired or with an intent to deceive.

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modified the markings on their websites after expiration of the patents at issue [FAC, ¶ 103], the

FAC contains no underlying facts regarding those purported amendments which would allow an

inference that any particular Defendant knew the patents had expired. 

Plaintiff alleges it was common knowledge in the industry, based upon published articles,

that several of the patents expired in 2005 and 2006 [FAC, ¶ 105], but Plaintiff identifies no other

company which purportedly learned of the expiration of the patents (and changed its practices) due

to these publications. In addition, the existence of publications in 2005 and 2006 in no way

establishes intent with regard to the vast majority of the patents which expired after that time. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,” that most of the Defendants9

have not changed their website since being served with the original complaint, “indicating a

continuing intent to deceive the public and chill competition from potential competitor

companies.” [See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 72, 103, 104.] However, as discussed above, even the FAC fails to

allege with factual specificity the conduct which Plaintiff asserts constitutes false marking. The

original complaint alleged, with far less particularity, the factual basis of the false marking claim. 

Thus, it is questionable whether the original complaint put Defendants on notice of the alleged

false marking. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC for failure

to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b).

C. Leave to Amend

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to further amend. “As with Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals,

dismissals for failure to comply with Rule 9(b) should ordinarily be without prejudice.” Vess, 317

F.3d at 1108. Thus, leave to amend should be granted “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff

can cure the defect.” Id (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir.

1988)). Here, both the content of Plaintiff’s opposition papers and representation made by counsel

at the hearing, lead the Court to believe it is possible Plaintiff can cure the defects of the FAC. 

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28 10If Plaintiff wishes to shorten its second amended complaint, it can omit the copies of the

22 allegedly expired patents which were attached to the original and amended complaints.

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The Court notes there are issues of both conduct and intent unique to several of the

individual Defendants, which Plaintiff fails to address in its allegations in the FAC. For example,

one of Plaintiff’s primary allegations against Life Technologies is that in its capacity as agent for

Roche, Life Technologies “required licensees to mark products with specific lists of patents

according to required language ... and there were no provisions to require licensees to either

remove patents that had expired ....” [FAC, ¶ 81.] However, it is not at all clear that an agent or

licensor can be held liable for false marking under § 292 based upon marking done by its

licensees. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges all Defendants are “large, sophisticated companies” but goes

on to specifically include only “Roche, Qiagen, Thermo, EMD, Ceipheid and Life.” [FAC, ¶ 97.] 

Thus, it may be inferred that Eurogentec, Clontech, Integrated DNA Technologies, Quanta

Biosciences, Gene Link, and TriLink Biosciences are not necessarily “large, sophisticated

companies” and subject to all of Plaintiff’s inferences regarding intent to deceive. In amending its

complaint, Plaintiff must tailor its allegations regarding Defendants’ offending conduct and intent

to deceive to more closely track the conduct and position of the individual companies.

Throughout its oppositions to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff states it has not identified

with more particularity the exact language used with regard to each of the alleged false markings

“as to do so would bury the court in a needless mountain of paper at this early stage of the

proceedings.” The Court does not believe meeting the heightened pleading standard would require

Plaintiff to produce such a “mountain” of paper.10 In a single paragraph (or perhaps 2) as to each

Defendant, Plaintiff could identify the website (or online publication) it reviewed, the date on

which it was reviewed, and identify one or more of the statements it contends constitutes false

marking. Pleading with this level of specificity with regard to one or more of the alleged instances

of false marking as to each Defendant would provide a factual basis for alleging “on information

and belief” that such Defendant has engaged in similar acts of false marking. 

2. Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)

for insufficient service of process

Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH (“RDG”), a German corporation, also moves to

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11RDG does not challenge personal jurisdiction. See American Ass’n of Naturopathic

Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between motion to

dismiss for insufficiency of service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) and one based on lack of

personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2)).

12In addition, Plaintiff attempted to serve the original complaint upon RDG on January 17,

2011 by delivering a copy to an individual by the name of Gene Chowardy-Shakim. [Proof of

Service, Doc. No. 54, p.2.] Plaintiff apparently concedes service on Mr. Chowardy-Shakim was

not proper, as they do not mention it in their opposition papers.

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dismiss the FAC under Rule 12(b)(5) for failure to effect proper service of process.11 According to

the FAC, “Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH is a German corporation, with its principal place

of business at Freidrich-Ebert Strasse 100, D-68298 Mannheim, Germany and having United

States operations at 9115 Hague Road, Indianapolis, IN 50457 [sic].” RDG disputes it has offices

in or conducts business from the Roche Diagnostics Corporation (“RDC”) offices located at 9115

Hague Road, in Indianapolis, IN. [Declaration of Steve Oldham, Doc. No. 92-3, ¶ 3(c).] 

On January 18, 2011, Plaintiff’s process server delivered a copy of its original complaint to

Steve Oldham, General Counsel for RDC, at RDC’s offices in Indianapolis, IN.12 [Proof of

Service, Doc. No. 54, p.3.] At the time, Mr. Oldham told the process server he would accept

service only on behalf of RDC and Roche Applied Sciences, but not on behalf of RDG. [Oldham

Decl., Doc. No. 92-3¶ 3(e).] Mr. Oldham is not designated as RDG’s agent for service of process,

and RDG has not authorized RDC to act as its agent for service of process within the United

States. [Id., ¶ 3(d) and (f).] Based thereon, RDG moves to dismiss for insufficient service of

process pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). 

Where a defendant challenges the method of service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(5), plaintiff bears the burden of establishing service was valid under Rule 4. Brockmeyer v.

May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Where factual issues are presented on a motion under

Rule 12(b)(5), the court may hear evidence and determine the facts. Old Republic Ins. Co. v.

Pacific Financial Svcs., 301 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2002). “Service of process is the means by which

a court asserts its jurisdiction over the person.” SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (“[s]ervice.of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to

establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant”). “[I]n the absence of proper service of

process, the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s person or

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13An individual visiting the website is asked to indicate the country where he or she is

located. If the customer selects the United States, the contact information directs customers to

RDC (d/b/a/ Roche Applied Science), in Indianapolis, IN. If the customer selects Germany, the

contact information directs customers to Roche Diagnostics Deutschland GmbH (d/b/a/ Roche

Applied Science), in Mannheim, Germany. 

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property ....” Id. at 1138-39. Thus, service of process “must be ‘notice reasonably calculated ... to

apprise interested parties of the pendency of an action and afford them an opportunity to present

their objections’.” Id. at 1138 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314 (1950)). 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B), a corporation may be served “by delivering a copy

of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Service may also be effected

by any method authorized under the law of the state in which the district court is located or in

which service was made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A) (authorizing service pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1),

which looks to state law). California Code of Civil Procedure provides for service of process on

corporations through its officers, including any “general manager.” “Service of process under

Rule 4 is not limited solely to officially designated officers, managing agents, or agents appointed

by law for the receipt of process.” Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840

F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).

The rules are to be applied in a manner that will best effectuate their purpose of

giving the defendant adequate notice. Thus, the service can be made “upon a

representative so integrated with the organization that he will know what to do with

the papers.”

Id. As a general matter, “[t]he determination of whether a given individual is a ‘managing or

general agent’ depends on a factual analysis of that person’s authority within the organization.” 

Id. (citing 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 4.22[2], at 4-205).

Plaintiff argues it effectively served RDG by delivering the summons and complaint to Mr.

Oldham, as General Counsel of RDC. Plaintiff points to the close relationship between the two

companies. Both companies are subsidiaries of Roche Holding AG, both do business under the

name Roche Applied Science, and the companies share the same website (www.roche-appliedscience.com).13 As General Counsel for RDC, Mr. Oldham would have known what to do with the

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summons and complaint directed to RDG. Moreover, Mr. Oldham in fact notified RDG of the

complaint.

Based upon these facts, the Court concludes Mr. Oldham can be considered a “general

agent” for service of process upon RDG under federal law or Cal. Civ. Code. There is ample

authority for the proposition that a domestic corporation may be considered the “general agent” of

a foreign corporation for purposes of service of process. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp.

Co., 556 F.2d 406, 423 (9th Cir. 1977) (based upon relationship between companies, district court

correctly concluded Nevada corporation was the “general agent” of German corporation, for

purposes of service of process, under the Nevada long-arm statute); Chan v. Society Expeditions,

Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (Washington corporation was the general agent of a foreign

corporation for purposes of service of process on the foreign corporation); Khachatryan v. Toyota

Motor Sales, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“case law clearly allows for an

organization to function as a general manager for service of process purposes”); Yamaha Motor

Co. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 4th 264, 271 (2009) (service upon foreign subsidiary may be

effected through domestic subsidiary). Given the close relationship between RDC and RDG, RDC

can be considered the domestic general agent for purposes of service of process. As General

Counsel of RDC, RDG’s domestic operating arm, Mr. Oldham would “stand[] in such a position as

to render it fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority on his part to receive service.”

Defendant argues RDG has not designated Mr. Oldham to accept service of process, and

has not (for at least the past two years) authorized RDC or any of its personnel to receive service

of process on its behalf. [Declaration of Martin Meisiek, Doc. 92-2, ¶ 4.] In fact, RDG has not

authorized any agent in the United States to accept service of process. [Id., ¶ 5.] Thus, Defendant

argues Plaintiff may only correctly effect service by serving RDG in Germany through the Hague

Convention. However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected rigid reference to “official” designations in

favor of a more practical approach focused on fairness and reason. Direct Mail Specialists, 840

F.2d 685 at 688. Given the relationship between RDC and RDG, and Mr. Oldham’s position, it is

reasonable to conclude service of process upon Mr. Oldham was reasonably calculated to provide

notice to RDG. RDG’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process is DENIED.

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3. Defendant Qiagen NV’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and lack of

personal jurisdiction

Defendant Qiagen NV moves to dismiss the FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and for insufficient service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).

According to the FAC, Qiagen NV “is a Dutch corporation with its principal place of business at

Spoorstraat 50, Venlo 59111KJ, the Netherlands.” [FAC, ¶ 24.] Although Plaintiff alleges Qiagen

NV has a United States operation as Qiagen, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal place

of business in Valencia, California, Qiagen disputes such allegation. According to Defendant,

Qiagen NV is a publicly traded Dutch holding company that does not manufacture or distribute

any products. [Declaration of Jürgen Schneider (“Schneider Decl.”, Doc. 111-2, ¶ 2.] Qiagen NV

has three direct subsidiaries: (1) Qiagen U.S. Financial Holding Company (“Qiagen

Luxembourg”), a Luxembourg corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary, (2) Qiagen Deutschland

Holdings GmbH, a German corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary, and (3) Qiagen GmbH, a

German corporation, which Qiagen NV co-owns with Qiagen Deutschland Holding GmbH. 

[Schneider Decl., ¶ 3.] Qiagen Luxembourg owns Qiagen North American Holdings, Inc., which

owns Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc. [Id.] Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc. is the parent to two whollyowned subsidiaries: Qiagen Inc. and Qiagen Sciences LLC. Each U.S. entity has its primary place

of business in Germantown, Maryland. [Id.] 

Qiagen GmbH, with offices located in Germany, is the primary manufacturer and

distributor of products relating to sample and assay technologies, and also develops the printed

materials for those products. [Schneider Decl., ¶ 6.] Qiagen NV is not a party to any licenses with

the third party entities that manufacture and distribute the products. [Id., ¶ 7.] Plaintiff in this case

effected service of process upon Qiagen NV by serving Qiagen Inc. (also referred to by Plaintiff as

Qiagen-CA) through its designated agent for service of process. [Doc. No. 50.] Qiagen NV

argues it has no contacts with the state of California such that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. 

In evaluating the existence of personal jurisdiction, the court determines whether the

exercise of jurisdiction (1) satisfies the requirements of the state’s long-arm statute, and

(2) comports with due process. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 919 (9th Cir.

2011). Because California “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent

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permitted by due process,” this Court need only determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction

over Qiagen NV in this case comports with due process. Id. (citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.

Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. General jurisdiction exists over a

nonresident defendant where the defendant “engage[s] in ‘continuous and systematic general

business contacts,’ ... that ‘approximate physical presence’ in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger v.

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). By contrast, specific jurisdiction exists

where the non-resident defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” arising from, or related to,

the conduct which gives rise to the suit. Id. at 801-02; see also Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d

1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth a three-prong test for judging existence of specific

jurisdiction).

Plaintiff argues exercise of general jurisdiction over Qiagen NV is appropriate based upon

the following “substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts in California”:

• In its 2006 SEC Form 20-F, Qiagen NV admitted that it operates “U.S. facilities in

... Valencia, California (customer service and technical service) ... and San

Francisco, California (manufacturing and research and development)” [Plaintiff’s

Exhibit I, Doc. 126-9];

• In the same document, Qiagen NV states that it operated a facility in Fremont,

California; and

• Qiagen’s website directly solicits business in California and even invites California

residents to apply for employment positions within the company.

Plaintiff also argues this Court may exercise of specific jurisdiction over Qiagen NV based upon

the allegation in its FAC that Qiagen has engaged in false marking based upon statements made on

its online catalog, which is accessible by Internet everywhere including California. Finally,

Plaintiff argues the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Qiagen NV based solely upon

the California contacts of its related company, Qiagen Inc.

As indicated above, Qiagen NV has submitted a declaration demonstrating (contrary to

Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations in the FAC based upon information and belief) that it is a Dutch

holding company with no business in California. Qiagen NV also establishes, by declaration, that

the contacts upon which Plaintiff relies to establish personal jurisdiction over Qiagen NV (i.e. the

statements in its SEC filings and on its website), occurred through its U.S. sub-subsidiary

companies. In its opposition to Qiagen’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff comes forth with no

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additional evidence to support its bare allegation that Qiagen NV operates in the United States

through Qiagen Inc.

Given the lack of evidence of Qiagen NV’s contacts with the State of California, the Court

must decide whether the contacts of its sub-subsidiary companies in the United States may be

attributed to Qiagen NV for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit in

Bauman recently re-addressed the standards to be applied in determining whether the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent company, by virtue of its relationship to a subsidiary

that has continual operations in the forum, comports with due process. The contacts of a

subsidiary may form the basis of exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation

under the “alter ego” test or the “agency” test. 

The two prongs of the ‘alter ego’ test are as follows:

(1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate

personalities of the two entities no longer exist and (2) that failure to

disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or injustice. 

The first prong of this test has alternatively been stated as requiring a

showing that the parent controls the subsidiary to such a degree as to

render the latter the mere instrumentality of the former.

Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920 (quoting Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001)). Under the

“agency” test, the important inquiry is the “special importance of the services performed by the

subsidiary.” Id. “The agency test is satisfied by a showing that the subsidiary functions as the

parent corporation’s representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently important to the

foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own

officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.” Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928. 

There is no evidence to suggest Qiagen NV is the alter ego of its U.S. sub-subsidiaries.

Furthermore, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated the contacts of Qiagen NV’s U.S.

sub-subsidiary companies with the state can be attributed to Qiagen NV under the “agency” test. 

The annual business reports of a foreign parent company often recites facts regarding the operation

of its subsidiaries. “[C]onsolidating the activities of a subsidiary into the parent’s reports is a

common business practice” which does not justify the conclusion the U.S. subsidiaries are

“representative” of the foreign holding company. Unocal, 248 F.3d at 929. Leaving aside the

statements in the SEC forms, that Qiagen has business facilities in California, the only evidence

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14In a footnote, Plaintiff asks that if the Court finds it has not made its prima facie showing

of facts establishing personal jurisdiction over Qiagen NV, it should be permitted to conduct

jurisdictional discovery to further develop the record. “[W]here a plaintiff's claim of personal

jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of specific

denials made by the defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery....” Pebble

Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has made no attempt to identify

pertinent facts (or even a theory) which are disputed and which could be further developed by

discovery. See Herman v. Yellowpages.com, LLC, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 1615078 (S.D.

Cal., Mar. 29, 2011) (JAH) (denying jurisdictional discovery under similar circumstances).

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offered by Plaintiff in support of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Qiagen NV is the

existence of allegedly false markings on its website, which may be accessed by individuals in

California. However, the website is maintained by Qiagen GmbH, Qiagen’s Netherlands affiliate,

not Qiagen NV or its sub-subsidiaries in the United States [Schneider Decl., ¶ 3.] 

Plaintiff asks the Court to make too great a leap to find that Qiagen NV, a foreign holding

company which does not manufacture, distribute, package, or sell any products, is subject to

personal jurisdiction in California. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Qiagen NV’s motion to dismiss

based on lack of personal jurisdiction.14 Qiagen’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of

process under Rule 12(b)(5) is DENIED AS MOOT.

4. Defendant EMD Chemicals Inc.’s motion to dismiss under the first-filed rule for qui

tam actions

Defendant EMD Chemicals seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against it based upon the

first-filed suit rule for qui tam actions or, alternatively, under the doctrine of res judicata. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims are duplicative of claims already asserted against it earlier this

year by a company called Tex Pat in the Eastern District of Texas. Tex Pat filed suit against

Merck KGaA and EMD Chemicals on January 9, 2011, alleging those defendants falsely marked

products with expired patent numbers. The parties in that case entered into a settlement agreement,

releasing all claims relating to EMD’s alleged false marking of certain products specified therein. 

Each of the products listed in Plaintiff’s FAC in this case were included in the schedule of

products and expired patents for which Tex Pat released its claims in Texas. The Texas case was

dismissed on March 15, 2011. 

Plaintiff concedes that all claims against EMD prior to the dismissal of the Texas case were

extinguished. However, Plaintiff argues it may assert a “new cause of action ... for all false

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marking violations that occurred subsequent to the Tex Pat settlement and EMD dismissal (to wit,

all violations occurring after March 15, 2011).” [Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant

EMD Chemicals, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 124, p. 11.] 

The false marking statute provides that “[a]ny person may sue for the penalty, in which

event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States.” Based

upon the plain language of the statute, viewed in light of years of caselaw under the False Claims

Act, at least two courts in the past year have concluded that a second or subsequent plaintiff lacks

standing to assert a qui tam claim under § 292. In San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. The Glad

Products Co., 2010 WL 2943537 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2010), the court noted that a qui tam relator

stands in the shoes of the United States for purposes of a false marking claim under § 292, such

claims having been assigned to the relator by virtue of the statute. In that case, the products and

expired patents asserted in both actions were the same, but the plaintiff argued it was entitled to

proceed with a second action because the packaging upon which the alleged false marking

occurred was different. Nonetheless, the court concluded the claims were previously assigned to

the relator of the first-filed action, such that the plaintiff in the second-filed case lacked standing to

assert them. Id. at *4.

The court reached the same conclusion in Simonian v. Quigley Corp., 2010 WL 2837180

(N.D. Ill. July 19, 2010). In that case, plaintiff filed an action against the same defendant,

asserting identical claims as those filed by another plaintiff hours earlier in New York. In

dismissing the second-filed action, the court noted § 292 “contemplates only a single action

brought by a private individual on behalf of the United States.” Id. at *2. “Just as the United

States could not bring multiple identical actions under the false marking statute, multiple private

plaintiffs cannot do so on the government’s behalf.” Id. These cases are consistent with the

general line of cases under the False Claims Act (prior to its amendment to add an explicit first-tofile bar), that the statute contemplates only a single action brought by a private individual on

behalf of the United States. 

In its opposition brief, Plaintiff argues the Simonian case is indistiguishable, but does not

mention the San Francisco Tech. Inc. case or attempt, generally, to rebut the notion there is a firstCase 3:11-cv-00056-IEG-WVG Document 162 Filed 08/31/11 Page 20 of 22
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15EMD also moves to dismiss because although EMD Chemicals Inc. is named in the

caption of the FAC, the body of the complaint contains allegations only against EMD BioScience. 

EMD argues EMD BioScience, the party named in the body of the FAC, has been dissolved and

merged into EMD Chemicals, Inc. This is clearly an error in pleading which may be corrected

upon any amendment.

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to-file rule applicable to cases under § 292. Instead, Plaintiff rests on the contention this action

covers conduct different than what was litigated and settled by Tex Pat. Plaintiff argues a new

cause of action arose when Tex Pat settled its action against EMD, and EMD thereafter failed to

correct its false marking behavior. As Defendant points out in its reply, however, the FAC does

not plead a claim for false marking arising after March 15, 2011. Instead, the broad factual

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s FAC have no boundary in time, place, or manner, making it

impossible for the Court to find the claims alleged in this case are separate and distinct from those

previously brought, and dismissed, by Tex Pat (and the United States). 

More importantly, it appears the release in the Tex Pat case covers the allegations in this

case, barring Plaintiff from proceeding against EMD:

Tex Pat, in its capacity as alleged qui tam relator under 35 U.S.C. § 292, hereby

releases, acquits, and forever discharges Merck [defined in the agreement to include

EMD Chemicals US Holdings Inc and EMD Biosciences Inc.15] from any and all

claims of liability for false marking under 35 U.S.C. § 292 related to the Accused

Products, including those identified in the Actin and on Schedule A.

[Settlement Agreement, filed under seal as Exhibit C to EMD’s motion to dismiss, p. 2.] Based

upon this broad release, the Court has serious doubts as to whether Plaintiff can state any claim for

false marking against EMD. Nonetheless, because the allegations of the FAC are so lacking in

specificity, the Court cannot decide as a matter of law whether Plaintiff’s claims against EMD are

barred. Therefore, the Court GRANTS EMD’s motion to dismiss based upon the first-filed rule

for qui tam actions, but grants Plaintiff leave to amend. To the extent Plaintiff can state a claim

under § 292 with sufficient factual particularity to withstand dismissal under Rule 9, the Court will

be in a better position to evaluate whether such claim is barred by Tex Pat’s prior action.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim [Doc. Nos. 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 111, 114]; DENIES

Defendant Roche Diagnostics GmbH’s Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process

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[Doc. 92]; GRANTS Defendant Qiagen NV’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

and DENIES AS MOOT Qiagen NV’s Motion to Dismiss based on Insufficient Service of Process

[Doc. 111]; and GRANTS Defendant EMD Chemical Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss based on the firstfiled rule [Doc. 114]. The Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed as to all Defendants;

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Qiagen NV are dismissed with prejudice based upon lack

of personal jurisdiction;

3. Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants are dismissed without prejudice

and with leave to amend.

Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint, addressing the deficiencies noted herein, within

thirty (30) days of the filing of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2011

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:11-cv-00056-IEG-WVG Document 162 Filed 08/31/11 Page 22 of 22