Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04114/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kelly Alice Franz,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-04114-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Kelly Alice Franz’s Application for Supplemental 

Security Income (SSI) by the Social Security Administration (SSA) under the Social 

Security Act (the Act). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking judicial review of that 

denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 15, Pl. Br.), Defendant 

SSA Commissioner’s Opposition (Doc. 16, Def. Br.), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 21, 

Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Doc. 12, R.) and 

now reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision (R. at 17–36).

I. BACKGROUND

On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Application for SSI, alleging a period of 

disability beginning on December 16, 2012. (R. at 20.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially 

on April 1, 2015, and upon reconsideration on September 1, 2015. (R. at 20.) Plaintiff 

testified at a hearing held before the ALJ on August 9, 2017. (R. at 20.) On January 12, 

2018, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s Application. (R. at 17–36.) On September 17, 2018, the 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 1 of 12
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s decision 

final. (R. at 1–6.)

The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and finds it unnecessary 

to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in 

addressing the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering the medical records 

and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following severe 

impairments: anxiety and depressive disorders, headaches, spine disorders, and 

fibromyalgia. (R. at 22.)

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 31.) The ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 23.) The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has the 

residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

416.967(b) with some limitations, including: occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; 

frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and simple, routine, and repetitive 

tasks. (R. at 24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work but can perform a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy. (R. at 29.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. To 

determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the 

record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 2 of 12
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. 

Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s 

RFC and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is 

not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony; (2) the ALJ erred by rejecting the treating physician’s opinion; and (3) the ALJ 

erred by not including certain limitations in Plaintiff’s mental RFC calculation.1

1 Plaintiff’s first two arguments are dispositive. Therefore, the Court need not 

address Plaintiff’s third argument. 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 3 of 12
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. The ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without 

providing specific, clear and convincing reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.

At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that fibromyalgia causes constant pain that requires 

her to lay down on average three times per day for approximately 30 minutes at a time. (R. 

at 41–42.) Plaintiff also testified that she can stand for 15 minutes at a time, walk for 15 to 

20 minutes at a time, and sit for 15 minutes at a time. (R. at 43–44.) She can lift about 15 

to 20 pounds without increasing her pain, and she has difficulty reaching, gripping, 

grasping, and using fine manipulation. (R. at 44–45.) She experiences migraines 

approximately three days per week that last six or seven hours and require her to go into a 

dark room. (R. at 45–46.) Plaintiff testified that she has anxiety especially when in cars, 

and she has difficulties with concentration and memory. (R. at 49.) Finally, Plaintiff 

testified that she may be able to work part-time if she only suffered from anxiety and 

depression, but that her fibromyalgia prevents her from working at all. (R. at 51–52.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Pl. Br. at 17–21.) The 

Court agrees. While credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse credibility 

determination requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting the claimant’s testimony” that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). This is the most demanding standard in Social 

Security cases. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). “[A]fter a claimant 

produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject 

a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 

2005). However, the ALJ may consider the lack of objective evidence along with the 

claimant’s daily activities; the effectiveness of any treatment; the nature, frequency, and 

intensity of the claimant’s pain; and inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony. Id.

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 4 of 12
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. The ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her physical impairments.

With regard to Plaintiff’s physical impairments—headaches, spine disorders, and 

fibromyalgia—the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s alleged limitations were inconsistent 

with the evidence of record because: (1) her daily activities—working during the period at 

issue, attending church, shopping, and doing household chores—were inconsistent with 

her subjective complaints; (2) her symptoms improved with treatment; and (3) the objective 

medical evidence does not support her alleged limitations. (R. at 25–27.) The Court finds 

that none of these reasons are sufficient to reject Plaintiff’s testimony. 

a. Plaintiff’s daily activities were not inconsistent with her 

testimony regarding her alleged limitations.

During the period at issue, Plaintiff reportedly worked at Fry’s and Action Moving 

and Storage.2(R. at 25.) According to the ALJ, this reflected Plaintiff’s ability “to perform 

at least a range of light work.” (R. at 25.) Plaintiff argues that this was an insufficient basis 

for the ALJ to reject her testimony because the jobs were “short-lived attempts to work 

[that] ended because of her impairments.” (Pl. Br. at 19.) The Court agrees. Although an 

ALJ can consider a claimant’s daily activities when weighing credibility, “[i]t does not 

follow from the fact that a claimant tried to work for a short period of time and, because of 

his impairments, failed, that he did not then experience pain and limitations severe enough 

to preclude him from maintaining substantial gainful employment.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 

504 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ cited to a record from October 2016 

and noted that Plaintiff was working 40 hours per week. (R. at 25.) However, that record 

also reflects that Plaintiff was only scheduled to work 20 hours per week, and that she was 

suffering from headaches, vomiting, fatigue, worsening foot pain, and blisters on her foot. 

(R. at 626.) Moreover, at Plaintiff’s next appointment on November 23, 2016, she reported 

that she had to quit her job after they would not accept her requested accommodations. (R. 

2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s earnings from 2016 were $2,618.11 from Fry’s and 

$920.02 from Action Moving and Storage. (R. at 22.)

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 5 of 12
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 621.) Notably, the fact that Plaintiff tried working and failed due to her impairments may 

actually support her alleged limitations. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1038. Therefore, this 

reason was not supported by substantial evidence. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s church attendance, shopping, and chores, the Court finds 

that the ALJ did not specify how these activities undermine Plaintiff’s credibility. See Orn, 

495 F.3d at 639 (“[D]aily activities may be grounds for an adverse credibility finding if a 

claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the 

performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.”) (quotations and 

citations omitted). For example, Plaintiff reported that she cleans, does laundry, and shops

(R. at 186, 354, 417), but the ALJ did not determine the extent to which Plaintiff takes 

breaks or how long these activities take her. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. Similarly, Plaintiff 

reported that she leaves her home three to five times per week, including attending church 

two times per week. (R. at 186–87.) However, the record does not describe the activities 

Plaintiff engages in while at church or how long she is there. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s daily activities, including her attempts to work, her church 

attendance, and her performance of household chores and shopping, are not inconsistent 

with her statements regarding her pain and limitations stemming from her physical 

impairments. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony based on her daily activities. 

b. Plaintiff’s temporary improvement in her symptoms was 

an insufficient reason for rejecting her testimony.

The second reason the ALJ gave for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony is that 

her physical impairments improved with treatment such that her symptoms were not as 

debilitating as she alleged at the hearing. (R. at 26.) Plaintiff argues that this was error 

because her improvement was short-lived. (Pl. Br. at 14.) The Court agrees. 

The ALJ cited to medical records that include reports of some pain relief and

improvement in Plaintiff’s symptoms. (R. at 26.) However, the ALJ was required to 

consider this evidence of improvement in the broader context of Plaintiff’s impairments. 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 6 of 12
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“An ALJ cannot simply pick out 

a few isolated instances of improvement . . . but must interpret reports of improvement 

with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the nature of her 

symptoms.”). 

For example, the ALJ cited a record showing that in May 2015, Plaintiff reported 

that pain medication helped with her back and neck pain. (R. at 26.) However, that record 

also states that Plaintiff was experiencing “generalized pain to palpation with increased 

pain at the 18 [fibromyalgia] tenderpoints” which medication was not alleviating. (R. at 

436–37.) The ALJ also noted that in June 2015, Plaintiff “reported some improvement in 

her overall tingling with gabapentin.” (R. at 26.) However, by October 2015, Plaintiff 

claimed that gabapentin was not addressing her neck pain, and by November 2015, Plaintiff 

stopped taking gabapentin because of its side effects. (R. at 642, 750.) The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff reported decreased neck pain and migraines after undergoing radiofrequency 

ablations of the spine in 2015 and 2016. (R. at 26.) However, in August 2017, Plaintiff 

reported that despite greater than 80 percent improvement from the ablations, the relief

wore off after one year and she continued to experience low back pain and headaches. (R. 

at 779.) 

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s reliance on isolated instances of improvement 

was not a specific, clear and convincing reason to find Plaintiff’s testimony incredible. 

c. The ALJ cannot rely solely on a lack of objective support

in the record to discount Plaintiff’s testimony.

The final reason the ALJ gave for finding Plaintiff less credible is that the objective 

medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. (R. at 25–26.) An ALJ is 

permitted to reduce the weight given to a claimant’s testimony because it is unsupported 

by objective medical evidence, but it cannot be the sole reason the testimony is rejected. 

Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Because the ALJ’s other reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 7 of 12
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

were neither clear nor convincing, a mere lack of objective support, without more, is 

insufficient to reject Plaintiff’s testimony.3Id. at 680. 

2. The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding 

her mental impairments were peripheral since her mental 

impairments were minor relative to her physical impairments.

With regard to Plaintiff’s mental impairments—anxiety and depression—the ALJ 

found Plaintiff incredible because: (1) the record reflects conservative mental health

treatment during the period at issue; and (2) Plaintiff’s daily activities, including work and 

church, “suggest a greater degree of functioning than alleged.” (R. at 27.) However, during 

the hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged that her anxiety and depression were not as limiting as 

her fibromyalgia. (R. at 52.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s mental impairments were minor 

relative to her physical impairments, and it was error for the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s 

testimony for reasons relating to her alleged mental limitations. See Zaldana v. Astrue, No. 

CV 11-07728-RNB, 2012 WL 3307007, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012) (finding that 

evidence regarding a claimant’s relatively minor impairments is not a clear and convincing 

reason to discredit the claimant’s testimony regarding her more serious impairments). 

B. The ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of Dr. Stacia Kagie, Plaintiff’s 

treating physician.

The ALJ assigned little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Stacia Kagie, because it was not supported by the evidence of record. (R. at 27–28.) More 

specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Kagie’s opinion was unsupported by her own treatment 

notes, and that Plaintiff’s reported improvement, ability to do chores, and attempts to work 

3 The Court notes that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s rationale 

regarding the objective evidence. For example, the ALJ identified that many of Plaintiff’s 

records are normal “except for tender points in multiple joints.” (R. at 26.) Similarly, the 

ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s pain management records show that Plaintiff had “tenderness of 

the spine and throughout the body on palpation but generally maintained normal gait and 

exhibited no lower extremity weakness.” (R. at 26.) However, Plaintiff was suffering from 

fibromyalgia and spine disorders, which would likely cause the tenderness and pain 

documented throughout the record. 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 8 of 12
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rendered Dr. Kagie’s opinion unpersuasive. (R. at 28.) The Court finds that these reasons 

are not supported by substantial evidence. 

“The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given ‘controlling 

weight’ so long as ‘it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the 

record].’” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2)). An ALJ may only reject a treating or examining physician’s contradicted 

medical opinion “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2008).

In October 2016, Dr. Kagie wrote a statement in which she noted that Plaintiff could 

work no more than 20 hours per week, was unable to lift or carry more than 20 pounds, 

and was unable to sweep and mop repetitively. (R. at 562.) In July 2017, Dr. Kagie 

completed a medical assessment in which she noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms are chronic 

and would likely remain chronic. (R. at 527.) Dr. Kagie opined that due to Plaintiff’s 

impairments, she was limited to sitting for three and a half hours in an eight-hour workday

and standing or walking for a total of three and a half hours in an eight-hour workday for

no more than 30 minutes at a time. (R. at 525.) Dr. Kagie also opined that Plaintiff would 

need to change positions regularly and would need frequent breaks to rest or lie down. (R. 

at 525.) Finally, Dr. Kagie opined that Plaintiff would be unable to work two consecutive 

days and would need to request leave from work more than six days per month. (R. at 527.)

The ALJ first found that Dr. Kagie’s records from December 2014 to June 2017 

were “generally unremarkable aside from the claimant looking uncomfortable at times and 

tenderness on palpation of the joints.” (R. at 28.) The Court first notes that Dr. Kagie was 

treating Plaintiff for fibromyalgia, a condition that often results in chronic body pain. See 

Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 663 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff’s reports of joint tenderness 

and discomfort are therefore particularly relevant to her claim. Id. (“Fibromyalgia is 

diagnosed entirely on the basis of patients’ reports of pain and other symptoms, and there 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 9 of 12
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

are no laboratory tests to confirm the diagnosis.”) (quotations and citations omitted). In 

addition to joint tenderness and discomfort, Dr. Kagie also repeatedly reported that Plaintiff 

had generalized and specific body aches and pain. (R. at 621, 636, 642, 651, 655, 668, 672, 

675.) Therefore, even if Dr. Kagie’s records contained some normal findings, the ALJ’s 

dismissal of Dr. Kagie’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. Revels, 874 

F.3d at 663 (finding that a person with fibromyalgia may have normal muscle strength, 

reflexes, and sensory functions). 

The ALJ also discounted Dr. Kagie’s opinion because Plaintiff’s symptoms 

improved with treatment. (R. at 28.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “reported 

improvement with ablation and improvement or decrease in migraines.” (R. at 28.) As 

discussed above, though a claimant’s improvement could be a legitimate reason for 

discounting a physician’s opinion, the recorded improvement in this case is not substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Dr. Kagie’s own treatment records reflect that 

Plaintiff continued to suffer from headaches and neck and back pain from 2015 to 2017, 

and the relief she experienced from ablations did not last. (R. at 612, 615, 621, 636, 647, 

651, 655.) 

Finally, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Kagie’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

daily activities, including attempting to work and doing chores independently. (R. at 28.) 

However, as with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ failed to provide information 

about the exertional requirements, frequency, or duration of Plaintiff’s daily activities and 

how they undermine her alleged limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ’s rationale is not 

sufficiently specific or supported. 

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Kagie’s opinion

because his stated reasons were neither specific nor legitimate. 

C. The proper remedy is to remand for computation of benefits.

The final issue is whether the Court should remand Plaintiff’s case for computation 

of benefits. Plaintiff asks that the Court apply the credit-as-true rule, which would result in 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 10 of 12
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a remand of Plaintiff’s case for payment of benefits rather than for further proceedings. (Pl. 

Br. at 24–25.) 

The credit-as-true rule applies if each part of a three-part test is satisfied. Treichler,

775 F.3d at 1099–1102. First, the ALJ must have failed to provide legally sufficient reasons 

for rejecting medical evidence or testimony. Id. at 1100–01. Second, the record must be 

fully developed, there must be no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, and the Court must find that further administrative 

proceedings would not be useful. Id. at 1101. Further proceedings are considered useful 

when there are conflicts and ambiguities that must be resolved. Id. Third, “if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even if these requirements are met, “the 

Court still retains the flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a 

whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act.” Guillen v. Colvin, No. CV 13-0817-RNB, 2014 WL 

4656422, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020–21).

Here, each of the elements of the credit-as-true rule are met. First, the ALJ provided 

insufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and Dr. Kagie’s opinion. 

Next, the record is fully developed and remand for additional proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose. Finally, if Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and Dr. Kagie’s opinion were 

credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. The vocational expert 

at Plaintiff’s hearing testified that Plaintiff would be unable to work if she was limited to 

standing, walking, and sitting for 15 minutes; lifting 15 pounds; and gripping, grasping, 

reaching, and using fine manipulation occasionally. (R. at 58.) Plaintiff testified that she 

can stand for 15 minutes at a time, walk for 15 to 20 minutes at a time, and sit for 15 

minutes at a time; she can lift 15 to 20 pounds without increasing her pain; and she has 

difficulty reaching, gripping, grasping, and using fine manipulation. (R. at 44–45.) The 

vocational expert also testified that Plaintiff would be unable to work if she missed work 

two or more days per month. (R. at 57.) Dr. Kagie’s 2016 statement and 2017 medical 

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 11 of 12
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

assessment establish that Plaintiff would be unable to work more than 20 hours per week, 

would be unable to work two consecutive days, and would need to request leave from work 

more than six days per month. (R. at 527.) 

Finally, there is not serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff is, in fact, disabled. Her 

physical impairments and resulting pain are well-documented throughout the records, 

which the ALJ noted. (R. at 26–28.) Furthermore, although the record does not confirm 

beyond all doubt that Plaintiff’s impairments prevent her from working, it does not create 

a serious doubt that she is disabled. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1023. 

Accordingly, the Court will remand this case for computation and entry of benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED reversing the January 1, 2018 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (R. at 17–36). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this case to the Social Security 

Administration for a calculation of benefits. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close the case.

Dated this 6th day of February, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

Case 2:18-cv-04114-DLR Document 22 Filed 02/06/20 Page 12 of 12