Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02562/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Soto,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02562-PHX-JJT (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Petitioner George Soto’s (“Petitioner”) Petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents 

filed their Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner did not file a Reply. The matter is deemed ripe 

for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny and dismiss the Petition. The undersigned further recommends that the Court 

deny Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and “funds to retain an investigator 

and mental health professional.”

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Convictions and Sentences

Petitioner seeks habeas relief in five criminal cases. On March 29, 2007, 

Petitioner entered into plea agreements in four of the cases: CR2005-115961-001; 

CR2006-006229-001; CR2006-106964-001; CR2007-006196-041 (collectively referred 

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to as the “Plea Conviction Cases”). (Doc. 13-1 at 30-44). Petitioner pled guilty to a total 

of four counts (i) possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony, with two prior 

felony convictions (Id. at 30); (ii) unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, a class 

5 felony, with two prior felony convictions (Id. at 34); (iii) attempted armed robbery, a 

class 3 felony, with two prior felony convictions (Id. at 38); and (iv) participation in a 

criminal syndicate, a class 2 felony, with two prior felony convictions (Id. at 42). 

Petitioner maintained a plea of not guilty in the fifth case, CR2005-011607-001 

(the “Trial Conviction Case”). (Doc. 13-1 at 25-27). The Trial Conviction Case, which 

involved multiple counts, was severed. The trial court held a bench trial on Count 1 (sale 

or transportation of dangerous drugs) and a jury trial on the remaining counts.1

 The trial 

court found Petitioner guilty of sale or transportation of dangerous drugs with one prior 

felony conviction. (Doc. 13-3 at 224; 13-4 at 30). The jury found Petitioner guilty of 

sale or transportation of marijuana with two prior felony convictions, misconduct 

involving weapons, and two counts of attempted aggravated assault as dangerous 

offenses. (Doc. 13-3 at 115-16). The jury also found the presence of aggravating factors 

on all four counts. (Id. at 153-54).

On April 30, 2007, the trial court held a sentencing hearing in all five criminal 

cases. (Doc. 13-4 at 26-53). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a combined prison 

term of twenty-two years with all sentences to run concurrently. (Id. at 49).

B. Direct Appeal and Post-Conviction Relief

Following Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in 

the Trial Conviction Case. (Doc. 13-4 at 74-229). On March 17, 2009, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals corrected an error in Petitioner’s sentencing judgment,

2 but otherwise 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in the Trial Conviction Case. (Doc. 13-5 

1 Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on Count 1. (Doc. 13-3 at 224-25; 13-4 

at 30).

2 Petitioner’s sentencing judgment originally reflected that he was convicted of sale or transportation of marijuana as a class 2 felony. The State conceded error and 

agreed with Petitioner’s argument that the judgment should reflect that the conviction is a 

class 3 felony. (Doc. 13-5 at 104).

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at 119). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review.

Regarding the Plea Conviction Cases, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction 

relief (“PCR”) on July 2, 2007 and a subsequent PCR petition. (Doc. 13-5 at 121-30). 

On December 4, 2008, the trial court summarily dismissed the PCR petition. (Id. at 132-

33). 

On July 9, 2009, Petitioner filed another PCR notice, which the trial court deemed 

timely as to the Trial Conviction Case and untimely as to the Plea Conviction Cases. (Id. 

at 135-41, 167). The trial court’s January 20, 2010 minute entry dismissed the PCR 

proceeding as to the Plea Conviction Cases. (Id. at 144-45). 

On August 4, 2010, Petitioner filed another PCR notice in the Plea Conviction 

Cases. (Id. at 147-56). When the trial court dismissed the PCR notice, counsel for 

Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider requesting that the PCR notice be reinstated in the 

Plea Conviction Cases. (Id. at 158-59; 161-63). The trial court granted the Motion. (Id. 

at 165). The trial court consolidated the Plea Conviction Cases for purposes of the PCR 

proceeding, but denied Petitioner’s request to consolidate the Plea Conviction Cases with 

the Trial Conviction Case. (Id. at 167). 

On August 29, 2011, Petitioner’s counsel filed a PCR petition (the “2011 PCR 

Petition”) in the Plea Conviction Cases and the Trial Conviction Case. (Id. at 170-217). 

The 2011 PCR Petition raised two claims for relief. The first claim sought relief in all 

five of the cases based on “newly discovered evidence which should have been 

discovered prior to [Petitioner’s] trial or plea . . . .” (Id. at 170). The alleged newly 

discovered evidence was evidence of Petitioner’s diagnoses of seizures, traumatic brain 

injury (“TBI”), and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Id. at 177-81). Petitioner 

submitted a report completed in 2011 by registered nurse Kathleen McGrane. (Id. at 188-

94). Nurse McGrane reviewed Petitioner’s medical records, noting Petitioner’s 

November 2007 PTSD diagnosis and April 2009 TBI diagnosis. (Id. at 190). Nurse 

McGrane stated that “If the new onset of PTSD, the new onset of seizures, the new onset 

of mental health problems and/or the possibility of TBI were not considered at the time of 

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[Petitioner’s] most recent trial, the possibility exists that he was not well represented.” 

(Id. at 191). 

The second claim in the 2011 PCR Petition was raised only in the Trial Conviction 

Case. (Id. at 181). Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate Petitioner’s mental health status. (Id. at 181-83). 

On February 7, 2012, the trial court dismissed the 2011 PCR Petition as to all of 

the cases. (Doc. 13-6 at 2-5). On March 11, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

Petitioner’s request for review, but denied relief. (Id. at 7-44; Doc. 13-1 at 51-54). On 

August 11, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for further 

review. (Doc. 13-1 at 50).

Petitioner filed this federal habeas action on November 20, 2014. In his Petition, 

Petitioner raises one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) as to all five 

criminal cases.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a 

state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year of the latest of: 

1. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

2. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

3. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

4. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). Although a procedural issue such as the statute of limitations should ordinarily be 

resolved first, the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and “judicial economy 

sometimes dictates reaching the merits [of a claim] if the merits are easily resolvable 

against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are complicated.” Barrett v. 

Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). A district 

court may reach the merits of a federal habeas claim rather than analyze whether the 

claim has been exhausted or is procedurally defaulted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); 

Barrett, 169 F.3d at 1162 (seeing no need to “belabor” the “difficult question” of 

a procedural bar when the claim was easily resolvable against the petitioner on 

the merits); Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (in the interest of 

judicial economy, choosing not to address issues of whether habeas claims were 

procedurally barred “because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on 

the merits”); Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991) (“In the present case, it 

is in the interest of judicial economy for this court to hear this cause in spite of the 

unresolved issues of exhaustion and procedural default.”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 

614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on 

the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable 

federal claim.”).

Here, Petitioner challenges his convictions and sentences in both the Trial 

Conviction Case and Plea Conviction Cases by alleging that his trial counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health status. 

Respondents concede that the Petition is timely as to the Trial Conviction Case and raise 

no exhaustion or procedural default issues. The undersigned finds that it is appropriate to 

review the Petition on the merits as to the Trial Conviction Case. Yet there is an issue 

regarding the timeliness of the Petition as to the Plea Conviction Cases. (Doc. 13 at 11-

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15). There may also be exhaustion or procedural default issues.

3 However, instead of 

analyzing those issues, the undersigned finds that it is more efficient to resolve the 

Petition on the merits as to both the Plea Conviction and Trial Conviction Cases. See 

Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 564 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The simplest way to 

decide a case is often the best.”).

B. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal 

courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 

1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be 

entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or 

her claims either:

A. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or 

B. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

3 It does not appear that the IAC claim in the Petition has been exhausted in state court as to the Plea Conviction Cases. The 2011 PCR Petition raised the claim in only 

the Trial Conviction Case. (Doc. 13-5 at 181). 

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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th 

Cir.2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

The “clearly established federal law” for an IAC claim is the two-part test 

articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a 

petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her counsel’s performance was 

(i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy 

task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, the issue is whether there is a 

“reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that 

the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state 

court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

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competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish the test’s performance prong in 

the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must establish that his or her counsel’s advice 

regarding the guilty plea was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985).

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. To establish prejudice in the 

context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d at 873 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-

59)).

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a defendant has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

 D. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 11). 

AEDPA imposes “an express limitation on the power of a federal court to grant an 

evidentiary hearing and [has] reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s 

discretion.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

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marks and citation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that if a habeas petitioner 

“has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” no 

evidentiary hearing on the claim will be held in federal court unless the petitioner shows 

that:

(A) the claim relies on:

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (bold in original).

Case law has clarified that review under Section 2254(d) is limited to the record 

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited 

to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”); 

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that Pinholster and 

the statutory text make clear that limitation on evidentiary hearings applies to Section 

2254(d)(2) claims as well). In Gulbrandson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 

a U.S. District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a habeas petitioner’s request 

for an evidentiary hearing regarding the petitioner’s IAC claims. The Court explained 

that “the state court’s rejections of these claims were neither contrary to, nor involved 

unreasonable applications, of Strickland. Thus, Pinholster bars a habeas court from any 

further factual development on these claims.” Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 994; see also 

Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a habeas petitioner was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as the petitioner failed to present a colorable IAC 

claim).

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As explained below, the Arizona state court’s denial of Petitioner’s IAC claim was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Under 

Pinholster, Gulbrandson, and Stokley, Petitioner is therefore not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing. As the Court’s review of the Petition is limited to the state-court 

record, the undersigned also recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for 

“funds to retain an investigator and mental health professional.” (Doc. 1 at 11).

E. Merits of Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation of Petitioner’s mental 

health status. (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner alleges that he incurred a TBI from a cranial 

gunshot wound in 2004 and developed PTSD and seizures. (Id. at 6-7). Petitioner 

contends that his trial counsel should have consulted a mental health professional to 

determine Petitioner’s competence and mental impairments. (Id. at 8). To support this 

contention, Petitioner references the “Medical Records Analysis” prepared by psychiatric 

registered nurse Kathleen McGrane, which was submitted with the 2011 PCR Petition. 

(Doc. 13-5 at 189-94). Petitioner asserts that “[h]ad trial counsel done even a basic 

investigation and acknowledged [Petitioner’s] mental impairments [trial counsel’s]

decisions, as well as [Petitioner’s] decisions might very well have been different.” (Doc. 

1 at 8). 

The last state court decision reviewing the claim in Ground One is the March 2014 

Arizona Court of Appeals ruling that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s 

2011 PCR Petition. The Court of Appeals found that:

[i]n a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry, the trial court 

identified the claims [Petitioner] raised and resolved them 

correctly and in a manner permitting this court to review and

determine the propriety of that order. . . . No purpose would 

be served by repeating the court’s ruling in its entirety, and 

we therefore adopt it.

(Doc. 13-1 at 54). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s 

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reasoning, the U.S. District Court may review the trial court’s decision as part of the 

review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when the last reasoned decision is a state appellate 

court decision which adopts or substantially incorporates lower state court decisions, the 

lower state court decisions may be reviewed as part of the review of the state appellate 

court’s decision). As discussed below, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s IAC 

claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

1. Strickland’s Performance Prong

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable investigations or to 

reasonably determine that a particular investigation is unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691; Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1998). This duty extends to 

the issue of mental health. See Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir.

2003) (“Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant’s mental state if there is 

evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.”); United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 

873, 881 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When counsel has reason to question his client's competence 

to plead guilty, failure to investigate further may constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.”). 

The trial court found that the performance of Petitioner’s trial counsel was neither 

deficient nor below any objective standard of reasonableness. The trial court recounted 

that:

At sentencing, [Petitioner’s trial counsel] remarked to the 

Court that [Petitioner] was one of the most intelligent clients 

she ever had and that he had many talents. The Court 

remembers how articulate and well-spoken he was. Thus, 

trial counsel did not fall below the objective standard of 

reasonableness in failing to request a psychological 

evaluation when her own experience caused her to believe 

that he was highly competent.

(Doc. 13-6 at 5). 

In support of Ground One, Petitioner states that he told his trial counsel that he 

was on psychotropic medication. (Doc. 1 at 8). But Petitioner does not offer any 

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evidence to corroborate this allegation. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2007) (finding petitioner’s own self-serving statements insufficient to support 

IAC claim without corroborating evidence). Moreover, Petitioner has not shown how 

any psychotropic medication he was taking impaired his mental competency. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 379 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s denial 

of defendant’s IAC claim because defendant had offered no evidence for his asserted 

incompetence to plead guilty as a result of taking psychotropic drugs); Sturgis v. 

Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to present evidence of 

medication petitioner was taking or “how [the medication] might have affected his 

competence at trial” failed to raise a bona fide doubt as to the petitioner's competency to 

stand trial); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Even if true, 

the bare allegation that he has seen a psychiatrist and taken psychotropic medication, 

without more, would not suffice to establish reasonable grounds to believe that [the 

habeas petitioner] might be so mentally compromised as to be unable to understand trial 

proceedings or to assist in his own defense.”).

Petitioner also emphasizes his TBI and PTSD diagnoses to support Ground One. 

(Doc. 1 at 6). However, Petitioner was not diagnosed with TBI and PTSD until after his 

trial counsel’s representation had concluded. (Doc. 13-5 at 190). At the time of trial

counsel’s representation, Petitioner’s medical records reflected that his cranial gunshot 

wound was a “grazing.” (Id. at 188). Petitioner has not presented any evidence that a 

reasonable attorney in his trial counsel’s position would have had any doubts about 

Petitioner’s mental fitness to make reasoned decisions concerning his cases. See 

Howard, 381 F.3d at 878. 

The undersigned has reviewed the hearing transcripts produced with Respondents’ 

Answer. The transcripts do not reflect that Petitioner displayed any evidence of mental 

impairment. For example, at his sentencing hearing, Petitioner gave a rational and lucid 

explanation of why he entered into the plea agreements: “I took that plea because I –

they showed me a list of eight officers and like five or six witnesses that are coming into 

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testify to me. I think eight officers alone without even the victim being here, I would be 

found guilty.” (Doc. 13-4 at 46). At Petitioner’s change of plea hearing, Petitioner gave 

logical and coherent responses to the trial court’s questions. (Id. at 4-23). The trial court

found that Petitioner’s guilty pleas were “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.” 

(Id. at 20). This finding constitutes a “formidable barrier” to Petitioner’s allegation that 

his “decisions might very well have been different” had his trial counsel investigated his 

mental health status. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, at 73-74 (1977).

In sum, the undersigned finds that the state court’s ruling that the performance of 

Petitioner’s trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient is not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Even if trial counsel’s performance was 

constitutionally deficient with respect to Ground One, Petitioner cannot show that the 

state court unreasonably applied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

2. Strickland’s Prejudice Prong

In analyzing Petitioner’s IAC claim under the prejudice prong of Strickland’s twopart test, the trial court discussed Nurse McGrane’s report and noted that 

Here, neither [Petitioner] nor Ms. McGrane state what effect 

[Petitioner’s] mental impairment had on his guilty pleas in the 

four cases he pled guilty on or in the one case he took to trial. 

Nothing is alleged that he was incompetent to make his pleas, 

that his pleas were involuntary, that he could not assist 

counsel in his representation, or that he did not understand 

what was going on. The fact that [Petitioner] might have had 

PTSD or a TBI is not enough without evidence that these 

impairments somehow affected his cases.

. . . .

Here, in the Court’s judgment, it is mere speculation on 

[Petitioner’s] part to claim that but for counsel’s failure to 

investigate his mental problems, the outcome of the case 

would have been different.

(Doc. 13-6 at 4). The state court’s findings above are consistent with Nurse McGrane’s 

inconclusive report. Nurse McGrane noted that TBI “causes numerous and sundry 

behavioral and cognitive changes which could impair [Petitioner’s] ability to cooperate 

with counsel or understand court processes,” but found that “[t]here is not enough 

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information in the chart to make any conclusions about this possibility.” (Doc. 13-5 

at 191) (emphasis added). As mentioned by the trial court, Petitioner does not allege that 

he was incompetent, merely that he should have been psychologically evaluated. (Doc. 

13-6 at 5). A “claim of prejudice [that] amounts to mere speculation” is insufficient to 

establish an IAC claim. See Cooks v. Spalding, 660 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1981) (per 

curiam ); see also Gonzalez, 515 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (“As to the failure to

investigate mental health mitigation, Gonzalez does not contend that he actually suffered 

from a mental illness; he merely argues that if tests had been done, and if they had shown 

evidence of some brain damage or trauma, it might have resulted in a lower sentence. 

Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice.”) (italics in original); 

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (speculative claim of prejudice 

insufficient to satisfy Strickland standard).

The undersigned does not find that the state court’s ruling that Petitioner failed to 

establish prejudice is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that it was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, Strickland for the Arizona state court to reject Petitioner’s IAC claim 

contained in the Petition. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court deny the 

claim on the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and “funds to retain an investigator and 

mental health professional.” The undersigned further recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and 

“funds to retain an investigator and mental health professional” be DENIED.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 24th day of December, 2015. 

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