Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-00196/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-00196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 3/19/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CORINNA LOVELAND,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY HEALTH SYSTEM

AND SAINT LOUISE REGIONAL HOSPITAL, et

al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

REMAND

[re: docket no. 6]

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from the termination of Plaintiff Corinna Loveland’s employment by

Defendant Daughters of Charity Health System and Saint Louise Regional Hospital (“DCHS”). 

On December 12, 2006, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action in Santa Clara Superior Court. 

The complaint asserts claims for (i) retaliation in violation of the California Fair Employment

and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940; and (ii) wrongful termination in violation

of public policy. Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against after complaining of “racial

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 The complaint is attached as Ex. A to Defendant Daughters of Charity Health System 2

and Saint Louise Regional Hospital’s Certification of Interested Entities or Persons

(“Certification of Interested Entities”).

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Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

slurs, hostile environment and patient safety issues.” Complaint 2. On January 9, 2007, DCHS 2

answered the complaint. See Certification of Interested Entities Ex. C. On January 10, 2007,

DCHS removed the action to this Court on the basis that one of Plaintiff’s claims is subject to

preemption because it is covered by the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between

DCHS and the California Nurses Association (“CNA”). DCHS certified the CNA as an

interested entity on the same date. See Certification of Interested Entities 2. On January 26,

2006, Plaintiff moved to remand the case on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. DCHS opposes the motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), often referred to as “the removal statute,” a defendant

may remove an action to federal court if the plaintiff could have filed the action in federal court

initially. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389,

1393 (9th Cir.1988). A party may file an action in federal court if there is diversity of citizenship

among the parties or if the action raises a substantial federal question. Ethridge at 1393. The

party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id. The

removal statute is strictly construed against removal. Id. The matter therefore should be

remanded if there is any doubt as to the existence of federal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that DCHS may not remove the action because the claims for violation of

FEHA and for violation of public policy are not preempted under section 301 of the Labor

Relations Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“the LRMA”). DCHS responds that “Section

301 preempts Plaintiff’s claims that she was retaliated against and terminated because of health

and safety concerns and/or ability to perform her job safely.” Opposition 8. As an initial matter,

the Court concludes that DCHS’s characterization of the complaint is incorrect. The complaint

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Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

does not seek relief on the basis that DCHS retaliated against Plaintiff because of complaints of

health and safety concerns, nor does it allege that Plaintiff was terminated because of her

inability to perform her job safely. Instead, Plaintiff complains that DCHS retaliated against her

because of her complaints of racial harassment and her report to the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing of alleged danger to patients. The question posed by this motion is

whether these claims, correctly characterized, are preempted by Section 301. 

“[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a

collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent

results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and

federal labor-law principles-necessarily uniform throughout the Nation-must be employed to

resolve the dispute.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). 

“[A]n application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of

1947 only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”

Id. at 413. “[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the

one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as

long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is

‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 409. A plaintiff may not

avoid federal jurisdiction by omitting from the complaint allegations of federal law that are

essential to the claim. If the plaintiff does so, a court may construe the “artfully pleaded”

complaint as though it had been “well-pleaded.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(g)-(h) makes it an unlawful employment practice

(g) For any employer, labor organization, or employment agency to harass,

discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person

has made a report pursuant to Section 11161.8 of the Penal Code that prohibits

retaliation against hospital employees who report suspected patient abuse by

health facilities or community care facilities.

(h) For any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to

discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person

has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has

filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.

The allegations in the complaint pertain to exactly the type of behavior made illegal by

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 DCHS suggests that the Court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over the FEHA 3

claim. The Court could achieve this by reading alleged violations of the CBA into the complaint

and then also taking jurisdiction over claims based on facts already in the complaint. The Court

concludes that such an approach is not justified by the record.

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Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

these statutory sections. Plaintiff alleges (i) that she submitted “a complaint to defendants about

ongoing racial slurs, hostile environment and patient safety issues,” Complaint ¶ 7, (ii) that she

filed complaints relating to the same actions with the Department of Fair Employment and

Housing, Adult Protective Services, and the Board of Nursing, the Department of Health

Services, the Joint Commission of Hospital Accreditation, and the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Complaint ¶¶ 9, 11-12, and (iii) that she was suspended and then

terminated from her employment “in retaliation for her complaints of racial harassment, her

complaints to the DFEH, and her complaints of ongoing retaliation which ultimately were

involved in the death of a patient.” Complaint ¶¶ 13-14. While Plaintiff also alleges that she

was exposed to unsafe conditions, that allegation is not asserted as an independent ground for

relief, but as a factual allegation describing the type of retaliation she claims was undertaken by

DCHS. See Complaint ¶ 10 (alleging that DCHS retaliated by putting Plaintiff’s safety at risk). 

From the face of the complaint, the claims for retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of

public policy are independent and do not require interpretation of any clause of the CBA. There

is no indication that the complaint omits assertions essential to the claims and, on its face, it is

not subject to preemption. 

DCHS argues that the complaint was artfully pleaded to avoid preemption. This

argument suggests that in fact Plaintiff seeks relief for violations of safety provisions and

termination provisions contained in the CBA. However, to reach such a conclusion, the Court

would not be required simply to recharacterize the claims as if they were well-pleaded; it would

be required to rewrite entirely the factual allegations of the complaint. It may be that Plaintiff 3

has filed grievances that allege facts that would support preemption, but she has not done so in

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 Moreover, as Plaintiff’s counsel stated at oral argument, allegations of unsafe work 4

conditions might not be covered by the CBA, as the CBA expressly excludes such disputes from

the scope of the grievance procedure: “Disputes concerning conditions of health and safety will

not be subject to the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure of this Agreement but will be subject

to the applicable administrative procedure established by federal and California laws.” CBA Art.

23.

 Counsel for Plaintiff declares that he spent 7.5 hours preparing the three page motion, 5

which amounts to $2,437 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff also anticipated spending further time

preparing a reply, but the Court did not receive a reply. 

5

Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

the instant action.4

The federal removal statute allows the Court to “require payment of just costs and any

actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). In this instance, the Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to seek removal was 5

not unreasonable and will not require payment of costs or attorney’s fees. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to remand is

GRANTED.

DATED: March 19, 2007.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 07-0196 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Harry Michael DeCourcy 

hdecourcy@littler.com, fskaggs@littler.com 

Thomas J. Dowdalls tdowdalls@littler.com 

Brian Stuart Kreger briank@lambertokreger.com, 

James Y. Wu jywu@littler.com 

Case 5:07-cv-00196-JF Document 16 Filed 03/19/07 Page 6 of 6