Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01380/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01380-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN A. BARNES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-1380 GGH P

vs.

SHERIFF JIM DENNEY, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER 

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, seeks relief pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

filed on December 7, 2009 (Docket # 69), to which plaintiff filed an opposition, including a

response to defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts and a supporting declaration, on

December 23, 2009 (Docket # 73, #74 and # 75), after which defendants filed their reply on

December 31, 2009 (Docket # 76), along with objections and a motion to strike evidence. 

Plaintiff filed his response to defendants’ objections and motion to strike, on January 6, 2010

(Docket # 77), along with another declaration (Docket # 78), one day before this matter came on

for hearing before the undersigned, on January 7, 2010. At the hearing Brendan McShane and

Laura Vartain Horn of Latham and Watkins appeared for plaintiff, while defendants were

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 The oral argument on the summary judgment, “restricted to specific users,” has been 1

transcribed. See filing dated February 24, 2010 (Docket # 80). 

 The court is somewhat puzzled as to why plaintiff limited himself to disputing the 2

majority of defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and did not file his own separate statement

of material facts in dispute.

 Docket # 80, Transcript of January 7, 2010, hearing on defendants’ motion for summary 3

judgment, pp. 5-6. 

 The court quotes from Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 485 (9th 4

Cir.1991), which in turn relies on Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

2553 (1986), for the proposition that “the nonmoving party need not produce evidence in a form

that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Fraser, supra, at 1037.

But see Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (“well

established that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary

judgment”).

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987). 5

2

represented by John Whitefleet from Porter Scott. With respect to objections raised by 1

defendants to plaintiff’s evidence in support of their opposition to defendants’ undisputed

material facts, the court will affirm at the outset, as originally expressed at the hearing, that a 2 3

Ninth Circuit panel, going seemingly afield from prior rulings regarding the significance of

authentication of exhibits for summary judgment purposes, basically disavowed that stance. See

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9 Cir. 2003) (“[a]t the summary judgment stage, we do th

not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. We instead focus on the admissibility of

its contents.” ) Thus, the court is not overly concerned with a question of the authentication of 4

exhibits at this stage, unless as the undersigned stated, it involves “the case breakers.” Docket #

80, p. 6. 

Second Amended Complaint (Verified and Constitutes a Declaration By Plaintiff)5

The complaint in this case was originally filed on July 12, 2007, but now proceeds

on a second amended complaint, filed on May 14, 2009. The parties subsequently stipulated to

the dismissal without prejudice of the Sutter County Board of Supervisors as a defendant (Docket

# 65), and the court, by Order filed on July 7, 2009 (Docket # 66) directed the Clerk of the Court

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to note the voluntary dismissal in the case docket. 

In the second amended complaint for damages and equitable relief, plaintiff now

proceeds against defendants County of Sutter, Sheriff Jim Denney, Officer Willy Mitchell and

Officer J. Rouna. The County of Sutter and Sheriff Denney are each sued only in an official

capacity. Second Amended Complaint (SAC), ¶¶ 7, 9. Officers Mitchell and Rouna are each

sued in both their official and individual capacities. SAC, ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff alleges that while

he was a pretrial detainee at the Sutter County Jail, he was attacked, on November 26, 2005, by a

group of six classified violent gang members, directly resulting from the actions and omissions of

the defendants. SAC, ¶ 1. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in a protective custody unit reserved for

pretrial or convicted sex offenders, but was taken from the unit for recreational (rec) yard time

outside by defendant Sutter County Jail Correction Officer (C/O) Willy Mitchell along with the

six classified gang members separately housed in a cell unit reserved for inmates “prone to

assault.” SAC, ¶¶1, 12. Plaintiff at the time did not know these inmates were classified gang

members or whether he was supposed to have contact with them or not. Id., ¶ 12.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mitchell came in the late morning and

asked plaintiff if he wanted to go outside for rec yard time, at which point plaintiff told that he

did and stepped out of his cell unit. Id., at ¶ 13-14. Plaintiff noticed as he stepped out some

seven to ten feet in front of him that there were six inmates with shaved heads, apparently of

white or Hispanic ethnicity. Id., at ¶ 14. As this was plaintiff’s first time at Sutter County (SC)

Jail, plaintiff did not know the protocol for associating with the other inmates, but was led to

believe that C/O Mitchell with sound judgment knew the procedures involved with his duties and

post orders. Id. Plaintiff depended on defendant Mitchell and believed he would not jeopardize

his life or subject plaintiff to a high danger risk, especially in light of plaintiff’s having been

segregated from other inmates purposely as a convicted sex offender. Id.

\\\\\

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Once plaintiff was outside his protective custody cell unit, defendant Mitchell

called over the radio to inform correctional officers operating the SC Jail’s main control room

responsible for monitoring all inmate movements in the facility which units he planned to escort

to the rec area (or SCU yard). Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiff was directed by defendant Mitchell to stand in

line with the six other inmates waiting in the hall outside his cell unit. Id. 

In addition to being responsible for monitoring inmate movements in the jail, the

main control room C/O’s were to maintain video surveillance of security areas inside and outside

the facility. Id., ¶ 16. Plaintiff, on information and belief, alleges that defendants knew or should

have known that he, as a protective custody inmate, should not have been escorted or left alone in

an unsupervised, enclosed rec area with six other inmates housed in the “Max 4” unit, a housing

unit “‘for those inmates who are prone to assault.’” Id. Plaintiff believes that defendants were,

or should have been, aware after defendant Mitchell communicated his intention to take plaintiff

with the six other inmates to the SCU yard to be left alone without the presence of officers that

plaintiff was at substantial risk of physical harm, but they nevertheless acted with deliberate

indifference to his safety and a substantial likelihood of injury to plaintiff, permitting, acting in

concert or failing to prevent defendant Mitchell from locking plaintiff in the SCU yard with the

classified violent gang members “in clear violation of Sutter County Jail policy.” Id. 

After defendant Mitchell secured the SCU yard door, leaving plaintiff with the

other six inmates, he walked off nonchalantly. Id., ¶ 17. Shortly afterward, one of the six

inmates began to ask plaintiff questions, repeatedly asking why plaintiff was in jail and whether

he was a gang member. Id. Plaintiff told him he was not affiliated with a gang and that he was

being detained for second degree robbery; when the inmate asked if that was “all he was there

for,” plaintiff fabricated other burglary-related charges to dissuade him from further inquiry. Id. 

Plaintiff thought he was successful in doing so because the inmate walked away to rejoin the

others, wishing plaintiff luck in court; plaintiff could not hear what they said but observed the

inmates in animated conversation. Id. 

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When most of the inmates began hitting a handball around the yard, plaintiff, less

worried, stopped paying attention to them; however, the inmate who originally confronted

plaintiff (according to a written incident witness report by C/O Rouna) came back and punched

him in the head while plaintiff was not paying attention. Id., ¶ 18. As if at a planned signal or

cue, the other inmates then rushed over and joined in the attack on plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff lost

consciousness at some point and when he regained consciousness, he was still on the ground

being kicked and hit by the other inmates in the yard. Id.

At some point while he was being attacked, plaintiff looked up to see that

defendant Rouna was watching the assault through a large observation window. Id., ¶ 19. 

Although plaintiff thought defendant Rouna would intervene or in some way come out and stop

the attack, instead he simply appeared to watch the entire beating. Id.

In his subsequent written incident report, defendant Rouna indicates having

witnessed the whole attack on plaintiff but does not mention any effort on Rouna’s part to

intervene or prevent the attack, resulting in the attack being prolonged and in greater bodily

injury to plaintiff. Id., ¶ 20. While being beaten, plaintiff heard derogatory remarks made about

African-Americans and sex offenders. When toward the end of the attack, plaintiff cried out

“why are you doing this to me,” he recalls one inmate saying, “that’s what you get you fucking

rapist.” Id. When defendant Mitchell eventually returned, this time with another officer, he told

the inmates “alright he’s had enough,” at which point the inmates began to back away from

plaintiff. Id., p 21. 

On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that when an inmate is being assaulted

at SC Jail, the procedure for those officers made aware of the incident by radio communication is

to respond immediately to the scene; plaintiff has never seen an instance when even a one-on-one

fight involving two inmates did not require the presence on the scene of eight or ten officers. Id.,

¶ 22. Thus, plaintiff was surprised when only two officers showed up while he was being beaten

by several inmates over an extended period, particularly since main control room officers are

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required to observe by video security areas and to visually supervise inmate movement. Id. The

other officer with defendant Mitchell was very small and elderly, weighing no more than 100

pounds. Id. 

Plaintiff found it suspicious that neither of the officers placed handcuffs on the

assailants, something plaintiff knows to be a strict mandatory procedure; not handcuffing the

assailants unnecessarily exposed plaintiff to further risk. Id., ¶ 23. These officers, including

defendants Mitchell and Rouna disregarded SC Jail policy and their obligation to protect plaintiff;

defendant Mitchell even told plaintiff it was nobody’s fault but his own that he was attacked. Id.,

¶ 24. 

Plaintiff asked SC Jail staff if they could put away the video tape of the incident for

future prosecution evidence against the inmates, but was told once that the tape was mixed up and

lost, and another time that there was no tape because the camera was not on at the time of the

assault. Id., ¶ 25. The video camera was pointed in exactly the area of the beating and was ten

feet from where it happened. Id.

 A Yuba City Sheriff’s Department officer came to the SC jail to investigate the

crime because plaintiff had expressed his intent to press charges against the six inmates; a

correctional officer alerted the sheriff’s deputy that there were no written reports of the incident as

though no crime had ever occurred. Id. ¶ 26. The deputy directed SC Jail personnel to prepare

written incident reports and immediately deliver them to his department. Id. Although plaintiff

was in custody of SC Jail when he received a subpoena to appear in superior court for preliminary

testimony against the inmates, SC Jail personnel never transported him so that he could testify. 

Id.

Following the attack, Sutter County doctors and nurses determined that plaintiff

needed to be taken to Rideout Memorial Hospital to treat his injuries. Id. p 27. Plaintiff suffered

permanent physical and emotional injuries from the attack, which he continues to suffer. Id. 

\\\\\

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Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment resulting in serious physical and emotional injury as a result of defendants’ deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s safety and their failure to protect him. Id., ¶¶ 29-31. Plaintiff claims

that defendants Mitchell and Rouna acted in conflict with SC Jail policy and their duties and were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety and knew of a significant likelihood of harm by their

actions and omissions. Id. ¶ 29. Defendants County of Sutter and Sheriff Denney failed to

adequately train the defendant officers and the SC Jail staff and otherwise failed to create,

implement and enforce policies, measures or directives to segregate and prevent attacks against

protective custody inmates and to implement or enforce such policies to immediately stop an

attack on inmates once it has begun. Id. p 30. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages, as well as costs and attorney’s

fees. 

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue,

a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

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and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention

that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11, 106 S. Ct. at

1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v.

Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at

1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

On October 24, 2007 (Docket # 11), the court advised plaintiff (pro se) of the

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849

F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Thereafter, pro bono counsel was appointed for plaintiff. See

Order, filed on June 9, 2008 (Docket # 22). Current counsel for plaintiff, also of Latham &

Watkins, LLP, were substituted in by Order, filed on August 19, 2008 (Docket # 28), with an

additional attorney filing a notice of appearance on plaintiff’s behalf, on September 24, 2008

(Docket # 33).

Motion Overview

Lest the adjudication of this motion gets lost amidst a welter of allegations and

counter-allegations concerning the regulations which governed inmate classification and

procedures, it is important to set forth the three themes of plaintiff’s case. The first theme

concerns the County’s alleged policy of mixing all inmates in so-called protective custody on the

recreation yard regardless of whether those inmates would mix well in any setting. The second

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theme focuses on the individual defendants, and asserts that regardless of any policy about inmate

mixing, a reasonable jail officer would know that allowing sex offenders to mix with documented

gang members posed unacceptable risks of injury. The third theme, distinct from the first two

themes, is that the two individual defendants purposefully set up plaintiff to be beaten, or at least,

with knowledge that plaintiff would be beaten if events took their course, and they callously

allowed it to happen.

The third theme is distinct somewhat from the first two on a causation basis. That

is, if the officers (Mitchell and Ruona) purposefully set up plaintiff for a beating, the bona fides of

the policy referenced in the first two themes become irrelevant because the policy did not cause

the set-up. While the policy may have facilitated the set-up, the overriding cause of the beating

stemmed from the alleged purposeful desire of the two officers to cause plaintiff harm. The

alleged set-up can only be seen as the ultra vires acts of two individuals. There are no facts which

suggest that the County had a policy of purposefully setting up its jail inmates for non-judicial

punishment, or placing an inmate in a situation where that was likely to happen.

The fact that theme three is inconsistent in a sense with the first two themes is of

no import in this summary judgment motion. Plaintiff does not have to choose at this juncture the

themes he will present before the jury; indeed, plaintiff may present differing scenarios before that

trier of fact.

Applicable Legal Standard

As plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, and not a convicted prisoner, at the time of the

incident, the applicable standard is by way of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment:

Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A

sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that

punishment may not be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth

Amendment.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1873 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152

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 Plaintiff cited as further precedent Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dept., 565 F. 3d 6

1205, 1216-17 (9 Cir. 2009) (Opp. p. 10, note 6); however, rehearing en banc has been granted

th

for that decision, with the admonition that the opinion of the three-judge panel is “not to be cited

as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.” 583 F.3d 673 (9 Cir. Oct. 9, 2009). th

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F.3d 1124, 1128 (“[c]laims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment”). Nevertheless, as the rights of

 pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment “are comparable” to prisoners’ Eighth

Amendment rights, the same standards are applied. Frost, supra, at 1128, citing Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir.1991).6

This is not a case involving the application of force to quell a disturbance in which

case a cruel and sadistic standard would apply. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct.

2321, 2324 (1991). Rather, the issue here is one of failure to protect (whether purposeful or

otherwise) which would be governed by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994)

Deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard to be applied here.

A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate

violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 1974. To

succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury by another

prisoner, plaintiff must demonstrate that the deprivation of his rights was “objectively, sufficiently

serious.” Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. When the claim is predicated upon the failure to protect,

the deprivation is deemed to be sufficiently serious if there was a substantial risk that the prisoner

would suffer serious harm. Id. The prisoner must also demonstrate that the defendant had a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. The prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety: “the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Similarly, any alleged entity policy asserted to have caused harm must rise to the

level of deliberate indifference.

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 Defendants maintain that this practice was consistent with Title 15, while plaintiff 7

argues that it was not. See Defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts (DUF) # 11 and plaintiff’s

response. Docket # 74, # 76-2.

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Undisputed Facts

The following of defendants’ undisputed material facts are expressly admitted by

plaintiff or is a fact that the record reveals is not subject to dispute. The Sutter County Jail

Manual generally provides the policies and practices employed at the jail and “addresses the

functions and management of the Sutter County Jail.[”] At the time of the event, defendant

Sheriff Jim Denney was the primary executive and policy-maker of the Sutter County Sheriff’s

Office, overseeing all policies, procedures, hiring, and firing. In addition, the Sutter County Jail

(SC Jail) policies and procedures in effect on November 26, 2005, were approved by the Board of

Corrections. The SC Jail Manual, in electronic form or in hard copy, is distributed throughout the

jail down through the chain of command, made available to correctional officers and placed in

specific areas of the jail for availability. Max-4, Max-5 and Max-6 tanks are protective custody

special housing units. Prior to the incident of November 26, 2005, the practice at the jail was to

allow the protective custody tanks – Max-4, Max-5, and Max-6 – to take part in Single- Cell Unit

(SCU) recreational yard time simultaneously. 

7

Plaintiff was transported to and booked into SC Jail on November 11, 2005. 

Plaintiff was designated as a sex offender, classified as requiring protective custody, and placed in

special housing in the Max-5 protective custody tank. Defendant Denney did not personally take

part in the classification, housing assignment, inmate transportation, or direct supervision of

plaintiff during the duration of his incarceration at Sutter County Jail. 

Plaintiff proceeded out to the yard with six or seven other inmates from another

tank. At the time, plaintiff had never previously spoken to any of the inmates and did not know

they were Sureños. While in the yard, one inmate approached plaintiff. He asked plaintiff why he

was in jail, and plaintiff said burglary and second-degree robbery, but mentioned nothing of his

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 “As administrator of the jail, the Sheriff is responsible for developing and implementing 8

policies pertaining to inmate housing. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1050. Part of this task entails the

establishment of policies and procedures for the segregation of inmates who either pose a danger

or are a target for assault, as is necessary ‘to obtain the objective of protecting the welfare of

inmates and staff.’ Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1053; see also id. § 1006 (defining goal of

administrative segregation as providing ‘that level of control and security necessary for good

management and the protection of staff and inmates’).” Cortez, supra, at 1190.

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prior sexual offense. The other inmate asked if plaintiff was in a gang, to which plaintiff said no,

but the inmate did not identify himself as a Sureño. After the conversation, the inmate walked

away. Shortly thereafter, several of the other inmates commenced to physically assault plaintiff. 

At 3:37 p.m., defendant C/O Ruona transported plaintiff to Rideout Medical Center to obtain

further medical care. 

Defendants Denney and County of Sutter – the Monell Policy Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Sheriff Denney in

his official capacity are redundant to the official capacity claims against defendant County of

Sutter, and defendant Denney should be granted summary judgment (or adjudication). Defendants

rely on Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985)(“[o]fficial capacity

suits [under § 1983]...‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which an officer is an agent’”(quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55 (1978)); see also, Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,

472, 105 S. Ct. 873, 878 (1985) (actions of department head in his official capacity equates with

actions of municipality itself); Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9 Cir. th

2002) (county subject to § 1983 liability for sheriff’s actions pursuant to his role as county jail 8

administrator); Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 561 (9th Cir.2001)) (sheriff acts on

behalf of county in “the oversight and management of the local jail”). As defendants further

contend, plaintiff does not dispute that defendant Denney is sued solely in his official capacity

(Docket # 76, reply, p. 13, note 5), the court finds the motion for summary judgment should be

granted as to defendant Denney. 

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As to defendant County of Sutter, 

Section 1983 provides a method by which individuals can sue for

violations of their federal rights. One of the requisite elements for

stating a claim under § 1983 is that the violation was committed by

a “person” acting under color of state law. Will v. Mich. Dep't of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45

(1989). A municipality or other local government entity is deemed

such a “person” and may be sued for constitutional torts committed

by its officials according to an official policy, practice, or custom.

Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct.

2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

 Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 294 F.3d at 1188.

Defendants frame plaintiff’s claims against defendant County of Sutter as

allegations that “there were insufficient policies to train officers to prevent or stop such attacks

once begun,” citing SAC, ¶ 30 [Docket # 62]. Docket # 69, Motion for Summary Judgment

(MSJ), p. 20. As defendants note in their reply, however, plaintiff focuses on defendant County’s

practice of placing all the protective custody units on the rec yard at the same time. Docket # 69,

p. 13; see Docket # 73, Opp., pp. 31-34. Defendants maintain that the custom of classifying and

housing inmates in protective custody is the type of reasonable action the law contemplates in

efforts to protect prisoners, that the practice of permitting the protective custody inmates to use

the rec yard together is not unconstitutional and that plaintiff does not cite authority that the

mixing of Sureño and sex offender inmates, all in protective custody at SC Jail, shows deliberate

indifference. Reply, p. 13. 

The court will consider the parties’ arguments about certain facts in dispute. The

parties battle on the jail regulations that governed plaintiff’s classification and his activities while

in the protective custody. The court considers these regulations, not because a violation of these

would be an unconstitutional act per se, but only because their violation may be evidence of acts

demonstrating deliberate indifference and an issue of fact is raised.

Courts interpreting “cruel and unusual punishment” in jail conditions cases have

stated that it is improper to constitutionalize state standards or regulations. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682

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 There may be some regulations which deal with such basic rights as to warrant a 9

conclusion that the Eighth Amendment is violated if the regulation is violated, those type of

regulations are not involved here. 

 The court could give the following instruction: “When deciding whether defendant 10

violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, you may

consider the state prison regulations that have been admitted into evidence. If you find defendant

did not comply with the regulations, this does not mean that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights

were violated per se. However, if you do find non-compliance, you may consider this when

deciding whether defendant’s actions were deliberately indifferent.”

15

F.2d 1237, 1248-1249 (9th Cir.1982). Courts analyzing the Eighth Amendment have relied on

state regulations as persuasive of “evolving norms of decency” which form the hallmark of an

Eighth Amendment violation. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 335 (9 Cir. 1988) th

(relying on a Nevada state regulation in an excessive force taser case); Spain v. Procunier, 600

F.2d 189, 196 (9th Cir.1979) (court may take into account, but is not bound by, state prison

regulations concerning the use of force [tear gas] ).9

Thus, the court is faced with the choice of “constitutionalizing” state prison

regulations for use in the Eighth Amendment context akin to creating a liberty interest in a

Fourteenth Amendment context, or in simply using them as evidence to determine what evolving

standards of decency are in the Eighth Amendment context. The cases support both choices,

however, the court believes that the latter choice is more correct. While the Constitution may be

able to tolerate a state-by-state definition of property and liberty interests that are subject to a due

process analysis, the term “cruel and unusual punishment” cannot be subject to dispositive

state-by-state definition. The Eighth Amendment is one of national concern, and should be

applied uniformly. State regulations may be indicative of what the national standards should be,

but they are not dispositive of the issue. Therefore, the regulations proffered by plaintiff will be

received into evidence for whatever value testimony and argument may give to them, but they will

not be constitutionalized. The jury shall be instructed on how to use the state regulations

accordingly.10

/////

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16

In DUF # 3, defendants maintain that defendant Denney was the final authority 11

signing off on their enactment “after being satisfied they met the requirements provided by the

Standards and Training for Corrections (“STC”) and the Board of Corrections (now known as

Correctional Standards Authority).” Docket # 69-3, p. 2, citing in support the deposition of

defendant Denney, 34:15-35:2, 114:10-24. Plaintiff takes issue only with any implication that the

existing policies met the requirements of the STC and Board of Corrections. Docket # 74, p. 2. 

Plaintiff avers that the “admitted ‘common practice’ and policy of mixing inmates from the Max 4

(Sureno, “prone to assault”) tank and the Max 5 (Sexual Offender) tank is inconsistent with the

plain language and requirements of Title 15.” Id. Plaintiff contends that “the policy of mixing

inmate classifications out on the exercise yard is inconsistent with Title 15,” quoting a portion of

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 1050(a) (2009) (“Each administrator of a Type II or III facility shall

establish and implement a classification system which will include the use of classification

officers or a classification committee in order to properly assign inmates to housing, work,

rehabilitation programs, and leisure activities. Such a plan shall include the use of as much

information as is available about the inmate....”). Docket # 76-2, pp. 2-3. Plaintiff also contends

that defendants’ expert [Jeffrey Hislop] acknowledges, “leisure activities” includes yard time. 

Docket # 76-2, p. 3, citing Declaration of Brendan McShane (McShane Dec. in support of

Opposition (Opp.) to MSJ, Exh. 8 at 114:11-16:

Q. And do you have an understanding as to what leisure activities

refers to?

A. Leisure activities are anything that is not programming,

education or vocational programming, not in-house duty

assignments or work assignments. It’s off time, yard time, watching

TV, those kinds of things.

However, when plaintiff asserts that to the extent that defendants had a policy of classifying

admitted gang members or inmates “prone to assault” as “protective custody” inmates, it was

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contrary to CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3341.5(a)(3), which precludes protective housing for inmates

who are documented prison gang members or affiliates or (4) who pose a threat to other inmates

in protective housing, the court finds defendants’ objection on this point well-taken. As

defendants maintain, “Division 3 of Title 15 applies to adult facilities run by the state Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not local detention facilities like the Sutter County Jail, which

is governed by CCR Title 15, Division 1, Chapter 1, Subchapter 4: Minimum Standards for Local

Detention Facilities.” Docket # 76-2, pp. 3-4. Therefore, plaintiff’s dispute based on regulations

appropriate for state adult prison facilities is not germane; however, plaintiff raises a genuine

issue with regard to whether the policies in effect at the relevant time, i.e., mixing protective

custody inmates on the rec yard, were consistent with the admittedly applicable CAL. CODE REGS.

tit.xv, § 1050(classifying inmates in protective custody units) in terms of proper assignment for

leisure activities. 

In DUF # 6, defendants excerpt a number of the written policies set forth in the SC

Jail Manual with regard to the classification process:

J103.30 - INMATE CLASSIFICATION AND PLACEMENT:

The Sergeant, [Officer in Charge] or assigned Correctional

Officer shall gather sufficient information on each inmate to

properly assign him/her to a housing area, based on the

needs and security of the jail and the needs of the inmate.

J121.00 - CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES: The classification

system in place at the Sutter County Jail is designed to

utilize to the fullest advantage the physical design of the

custody facility while meeting the requirements of law under

California Administrative Code, Title 15, and Minimum Jail

Standards, section 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, and 1082

and under California Penal Code sections 4001 and 4021.

The ultimate goal of the classification system is to

assign housing to inmates in such a way as to maximize

individual compatibility and unit stability for both inmate

and staff safety. The effectiveness of this classification system will

be demonstrated by a low incident rate within the Sutter County

Jail.

J121.30 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: The classification

system considers a limited but significant, specific list of

variables which describes and identifies the kinds of basic

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problems that inmates may present to a custody operation.

The system objectives are to specify the critical variables

utilized in making housing decisions and to structure the

decision making process to reduce disparity in treatment

of inmates. Specific objectives are as follows:

[1] Provide the legally mandated segregation of

prisoners, i.e. male from female, civil from criminal,

mentally disturbed, physically dangerous or physically

diseased from general population.

[2] Reduce the number of assaults on both inmates and

staff.

[3] Provide for segregation of vulnerable prisoners from

assaulting, and aggressive prisoners and both

groups from the general population.

[4] Provide for segregation by degree of security risk and

criminal sophistication.

[5] Provide that no prisoner be held in a more secure status

than his/her potential risk dictates.

[6] Provide a system consistent with individual dignity and

basic concepts of fairness.

[7] Provide individual prisoners participation in

decisions regarding their placement/designation.

J121 .50 - CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA: Each incoming

prisoner will be evaluated on a five point scale in each of

the following areas during booking. Additionally the

prisoner will be asked if there is anything that the staff

should know before making a housing decision. Based on

the evaluated areas the booking officer will issue the

prisoner a wristband and make a temporary housing

assignment.

The classification and housing assignment will be recorded in

the prisoner’s arrest package on the form provided. The

classification and housing assignment will be reviewed

by a member of the Classification Committee. 

Prisoners will be evaluated in each of the following areas:

[1] Current charges - Lightweight misdemeanor to

major violent felony charges.

[2] Criminal history - No record to multiple major

felonies.

[3] Physical appearance - Small/mild to large/prison

gang tattoos.

[4] Attitude at booking - Cooperative/pleasant to

violent/combative.

[5] Medical issues - No medical problems to life threatening or

suicidal.

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 Defendants also include as a provision in their DUF: “J121.80 -RECLASSIFICATION: 12

An inmate may be reclassified based on his behavior while incarcerated. An inmate may request

a review of his classification every thirty days . Permanent reclassification will be enacted or

approved by a supervisor. A simple housing change does not necessarily require reclassification.” 

However, this section is not included within the evidence cited in support of this DUF. On the

other hand, plaintiff does not dispute that this provision is included in the jail manual; moreover,

this section is produced among plaintiff’s exhibits. Resp. to DUF in Opp., McShane Dec., Exh.

18.

19

DUF# 6, SC Jail Manual, 19, 63-65 (attached as Exh. A to Bidwell Dec.) The court’s review 12

indicates, with the exception noted in footnote 12, that the provisions set forth by defendants in

their DUF are contained in the SC Jail Manual, stamped as updated on 7/26/05, which plaintiff

essentially concedes, and in that sense DUF # 6 is essentially undisputed. However, plaintiff

takes issue with any assertion that these written policies represent the only written policies

regarding the classification process, pointing to the following provision: 

J.133.00 – ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION:

The Jail provides for the administrative segregation of inmates who

are determined to be prone to escape, assault staff or other

inmates, if such segregation is determined necessary for the welfare

of the inmates and/or staff. 

Administrative segregation shall consist of separate and secure

housing but shall not involve any other deprivation of privileges

other than is necessary to obtain the objective of protecting inmates

and staff. 

Response to DUF in Opp., McShane Dec., Exh. 18 at SCJ0152 (emphasis added by plaintiff). 

While defendants consider this response irrelevant and argumentative, asserting that the inmates

at issue herein were not housed in ad seg but in protective custody (Docket # 76-2, p. 4, reply to

response in opp. to defs. DUF #6 and Docket # 76, Reply, p. 14), this provision might arguably

beg the question why the Sureños were not so classified.

In DUF # 11, defendants assert:

Prior to the incident of November 26, 2005, the practice at the jail

was to allow the protective custody tanks - Max-4, Max-5, and

Max-6 - to take part in Single- Cell Unit recreational yard time, as

per Title 15, simultaneously.

Docket # 69-3, p. 5, citing in support, Bidwell Decl., ¶10.

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 In citing the Ruona Dep. at 137:11-23, plaintiff does not point to the appropriate point 13

in Ruona’s Dep. for the testimony about his “speculating;” however, the court in its review has

noted the correct page and lines.

20

Plaintiff disputes no part of this DUF, except to the extent that “it suggests that

mixing such groups was consistent with Title 15.” Docket # 74, p. 6. To the extent that plaintiff

suggests that the policy of simultaneous rec-yard use by the three protective custody tanks is

inconsistent with those regulations governing adult state prison facilities, the basis for this aspect

of any dispute is not well-grounded. Docket # 74, p. 6; Docket # 76-2, p. 9. However, plaintiff

does again raise an issue with regard to how compliant such a procedure is with CAL. CODE REGS.

tit.xv, § 1050(a). Plaintiff cites again to the evidence he produced in response to DUF # 3. 

Plaintiff also points to defendant Ruona’s testimony that he “do(es)n’t know” and that he would

be “speculating” in trying to answer the question whether “any protective custody inmates can be

mixed together,” and to his testimony that since the incident at issue he was not aware of any

other instance in which Max 4 and Max 5 inmates have been on the SCU yard at the same time. 

Docket # 74, pp. 6-7, citing [Docket # 75-7] McShane Dec., Exh. 6, defendant Ruona’s Dep.:

139:6-19, 150:20-25. Plaintiff also notes testimony from defendant Mitchell indicating that he 13

was not aware of any rules or policy concerning whether inmates from different housing units

could be on the exercise yard together. Docket # 74, p. 7, citing [Docket # 75-5] McShane Dec.,

Exh. 4, Mitchell Dep.: 152:8-15.

In DUF # 12 through DUF # 15, defendants attest to the SC Jail staff training

requirements, including assertions that defendant Mitchell has taken training courses on gangs and

gang identification and that defendant Ruona has had further training in the classification of

inmates, most of which plaintiff takes issue with. The court, however, regards the statements

regarding the training policy of the SC Jail, whether strictly complied with or not, as something of

a red herring. Both sides have agreed that before the November 26, 2005, incident, the practice at

SC Jail was to allow the protective custody tanks – Max-4, Max-5, and Max-6 – to take part in

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 Norman Bidwell in his declaration identifies himself as a Jail Lieutenant employed at 14

SC Jail by the Sutter County Sheriff’s Office and one who is “familiar with the policies and

procedures included in the Sutter County Jail Manual as well as the custom and practice of jail

operations.” MSJ, Bidwell Dec. ¶ 1. 

 Brendan McShane submits his declaration as counsel for plaintiff in opposition to the 15

MSJ. Docket # 75.

 “My definition of prone to assault doesn’t necessarily mean that they are prone to 16

assault other people. It also can mean they are prone to be victims of assault.”

21

single-cell unit recreational yard time simultaneously (and to that extent, DUF # 11 is undisputed).

In light of this undisputed policy, plaintiff confusingly argues that the individual defendants were

not trained on what they contend is a constitutionally deficient policy, or that they were trained in

the deficient policy and followed it. The first contention is a “so what,” the second contention is

adjudicated below in the individual defendants section. If plaintiff is arguing that the officers

should have been trained in a “correct policy,” that issue is completely subsumed in whether the

County’s policy was deficient in the first place – an allegation about training adds nothing to the

case. The court will not further speak about training. 

Plaintiff disputes with regard to DUF # 24 that in the context of Max-4, Max-5,

Max-6 protective custody special housing units for inmates “prone to assault” that prone to assault

solely means inmates who may be likely to be assaulted by other inmates. Defendants cite the

Bidwell Declaration for support for that proposition, ¶ 4, while plaintiff counters that defendant 14

Mitchell declared that “prone to assault” also describes inmates “who may be likely to assault

other inmates,” citing defendant Mitchell’s Dec., ¶ 3, in support of the motion for summary

judgment (MSJ). Plaintiff also points to testimony of defendants’ expert. Exhibit 8 to McShane

Dec. in Opposition (Opp.) to MSJ, [Jeffrey] Hislop Deposition (Dep.), 130:20-23. Plaintiff’s 15 16

expert, [Daniel] Vasquez, testified that prone to assault “mean[s] you are assaultive, you’re

potentially assaultive toward inmates or staff.” McShane Dec., Exh. 7, Vasquez Dep. 101:9-13,

108:6-8. In addition, plaintiff contends that when defendants refer to aggressive/assaultive

inmates in other circumstances, they have used the phrase “prone to assault,” citing McShane

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Dec., Exh. 18 at SCJ0152 (“The Jail provides for the administrative segregation of inmates who

are determined to be prone to escape, assault staff or other inmates if such segregation is

determined necessary...”). Thus, the record demonstrates, at a minimum, that a material issue of

fact is in dispute as to whether “prone to assault” is limited to signifying prone to being assaulted,

rather than prone to assaulting others.

In DUF # 25, defendants maintain that both Sureños and inmates with a sex

offender designation come within the protective custody classification “and will generally be

housed in either Max-4, Max-5, or Max-6 tank,” citing Bidwell Dec., ¶ 4, Docket # 69-3 [Docket

# 69-7]. Plaintiff, in dispute, cites, inter alia, a December 7, 2002, SC Jail memorandum entitled

“Cell designation for Classification Purposes” directed to “All Jail Staff,” which states in part,

“Max W4, W5 and W6 are ‘special housing’ units. Max 4 is for those inmates who are prone to

assault, and Max 5 and 6 are for sex offenders.” Docket # 74, p. 14, Rsp. to DUF, [Docket # 75-

7] McShane Dec., Exh. 17 (copy of the 12/7/02 memo). Plaintiff also identifies the report by the

investigating officer of the incident, Paul Hillegrass, wherein reports that a C/O named Wicker

stated that Max 4 housed admitted Sureños. Id., [Docket 75-11], McShane Dec., Exh. 10,

SCJ0011. Thus, a material fact in dispute is whether a tank housing Sureños, admitted

gangmembers, is virtually interchangeable with sex offenders. Defendants insist in DUF #30 and

# 31 that prior to the incident at issue they were unaware of any prior attacks at SC Jail between

Sureños and African American inmates or of any animus by the Sureños against either African

American inmates or those classified as sex offenders. Docket # 69, pp. 7-8, citing defendant

Denney Dec. ¶ 4; defendant Mitchell Dec., ¶ 5; defendant Ruona Dec.¶ 5, and Bidwell Dec.,¶¶ 7-

8. While plaintiff does not counter with specific prior incidents of attacks between Sureños

against either African American inmates or sex offender inmates, plaintiff produces enough

evidence to raise an issue as to this point. See Docket # 74, # 75 and below. 

It is undisputed that Max-4, Max-5 and Max-6 tanks are protective custody special

housing units and that prior to the November 26, 2005, incident, it was the practice at SC Jail to

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allow these protective custody tanks – Max-4, Max-5, and Max-6 – to take part in Single- Cell

Unit (SCU) recreational yard time simultaneously, notwithstanding that one of the tanks housed

gangmembers and at least one other housed sex offenders.

Monell Liability

The Supreme Court has established that:

[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a

government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible

for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local

governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” by the very terms of

the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited

pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom has

not received formal approval through the body’s official

decisionmaking channels.

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, at 690-691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; see also

Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997) 

(“[A] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a

municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's injury.”). On the other hand, a

government entity cannot, under § 1983, be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability only “because it employs a tortfeasor” or “for an injury caused solely by its

employees or agents.” Monell, supra, at 691, 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2036-2037. Thus, it is only “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the government as as an

entity is responsible under section §1983.” Id. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-2038. 

The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury

alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was

taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate

a direct causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.

Board of County Com’rs., supra, at 404, 117 S. Ct. at 1388 [emphasis in original]. 

Under § 1983, the practice of mixing inmates in the rec yard must amount to

“deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s rights. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823,

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105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (1985) (“[a]t the very least there must be an affirmative link between the

policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.”)

In this instance, plaintiff contends that the custom of defendant County to permit

the mixing of special housing inmates on the rec yard, acknowledged by defendants as a jail

practice (or former practice until the incident at issue), notwithstanding that these inmates could

be several gangmembers mixed with a single sex offender, evinced deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s constitutional rights and was a direct cause of his injury. On this motion, as previously

noted, all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. There

is enough evidence “from which a reasonable jury could find that the jail officials were acting

pursuant to County policies or customs” when defendant Mitchell placed plaintiff on the rec yard

alone with the Max-4 inmates. Docket # 73, Opp. to MSJ, pp. 31, 34; Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1444-1445 (9 Cir. 1991) (custom may be unwritten). th

Regulations and disputes about their application aside (and it may be that the

parties are losing sight of the constitutional forest for the regulatory trees), defendants’ position is

inconsistent, begs the issue, and raises questions of fact by itself. Defendants acknowledge that

plaintiff, classified as a sex offender, needed to be placed in protective custody so as to be

separate from the general population (which contains a mix of inmates awaiting trial or convicted

of a myriad offenses) simply because it would be dangerous to house sex offenders in the general

population. However, defendants then essentially argue the remarkable assertion that their policy

can stop there. That is, no matter how dangerous the persons to sex offenders may be who are

housed within protective custody for other reasons, there is no duty to fashion further policies that

would protect the potential sex offender victims. If defendant’s arguments were to hold sway,

persons like the mythical Hannibal Lecter of Silence of the Lambs would be permitted

unrestrained access to all persons within protective custody, so long as Hannibal were housed

there as well.

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The point here is not whether the minority-in-number Surenos (when in general

population) needed protection from a larger gang, but whether when in the confines of protective

custody, the minority might become the majority aggressor. Inmates’ dislike of sex offenders, and

propensity for violence thereto, does not evaporate simply because the inmates are placed in

protective custody along with sex offenders. It might well be deliberately indifferent to give gang

members unrestrained access to sex offenders in the recreation yard wherever the gang members

are housed. This determination about a defective policy within protective housing (one size fits

all), or a lack of a differentiated policy within protective housing, is for the trier of fact.

Defendants Mitchell and Ruona

As set forth in the Overview, plaintiff maintains two theories against these officers

in their individual capacity: (1) that they purposefully set up plaintiff for a beating, or at the very

least, knowingly allowed events to take their natural course with the predictable harm ensuing,

and/or (2) they applied a jail policy which they knew was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

safety given the circumstances. The undersigned takes the easier scenario first.

Legitimate inferences can be drawn which suggest that plaintiff was set up by these

officers. The undersigned emphasizes that these inferences are not the only ones to be drawn and

that the trier of fact might well believe the officers at trial. The undersigned understands full well

that the officer defendants will testify to different and/or additional facts which they believe

exonerate them. This is summary judgment, however, and the reasonable inferences which favor

plaintiff must be drawn. The court sees no need to detail all the refutations of the officer

defendants here, as such a refutation simply demonstrates that there are two sides to the

allegations – something that gives defendants no aid on summary judgment. Thus, the court is not

simply taking a one-view only by recitation of plaintiff’s points below; the court is simply not

wasting time and paper for no purpose herein by simply repeating defendants’ contrary

contentions which must await trial in any event.

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The facts produced by plaintiff upon which the inference (1) can be drawn include:

(1) that plaintiff was procured for the exercise yard after the Surenos had been lined up, i.e., these

gang members knew that plaintiff was coming from the “special” protective custody:

(2) the common knowledge that mixing a sex offender in with potentially aggressive inmates on

the yard was a volatile mix, see below;

(3) the testified-to impassiveness exhibited by Officer Ruona as he allegedly watched plaintiff be

beaten on the yard, Verified Complaint, Ruona Dep. 91. 100, 101, 102;

(4) the fact that the aggressors were dispatched so easily when Officer Mitchell and the slightly

built other officer arrived to break up the fight, Verified Complaint, Barnes Depo at 71; 

(5) the comments allegedly made by Mitchell to call off the fight: “alright, he’s had enough,”

Barnes Depo at 72, and that “it’s nobody’s fault but your own that you were attacked;” Verified

Complaint;

(6) the “lost” or turned off video surveillance of the fight; See Barnes Depo at 76, Ruona Depo at

76, Arana Depo at 113.

(7) the lack of immediate investigation of the fight by these defendants and other local jail

officials, e.g., Verified Complaint; Ruona Depo at 120-121.

The undersigned will not belabor the obvious – all of these facts, especially when

taken together, can suggest that these two defendants were controlling events which led up to the

beating, or at the very least bespeak a knowledge that these officers knew precisely what was

going to occur. Nor will the undersigned belabor an analysis on qualified immunity for this

scenario. Any and every reasonable corrections officer would know that the Eighth Amendment

would be violated if an officer set up the beating of an inmate by other inmates, or knowingly,

permitted or facilitated the inevitable beating. Cf. Baird v. Renberger, 576 F.3d 340, 345 (7 Cir. th

2009) (some propositions are obvious without case authority).

The second scenario is more difficult. Again, it is undisputed that the jail policy

was to allow, indeed, require, the use of the recreation yard by all of those in protective custody at

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in support of MSJ. 

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the same time. Such a policy was probably born of the not unimportant need for administrative

efficiency in putting the inmates through their day. However, the issue here is whether reasonable

officers would have known that an exception to the policy was in order given the make-up of

protective custody at the time plaintiff was housed therein.

The court finds that an issue of fact exists with respect to this second scenario. 

First, Officers Mitchell and Ruona knew of the fact that it was dangerous to allow sex offenders to

be housed and to intermix with non-sex offender inmates. 

In support of DUF # 7, defendants rely on both the deposition of defendant

Denney, attached as Exh. A to the Whitefleet Dec., at 40:8-25, 51:12-24 and the Bidwell Dec., ¶ 17

2, stating that:

The purpose of the policy of classifying inmates is to place them in

the most appropriate housing unit for inmate safety, as based upon

the level of inmate sophistication, as determined by affiliations, past

criminal history, and current charges.

 

In response to this DUF, while not disputing that this is a purpose of classifying

inmates, plaintiff argues that it is not the only purpose, that is, that “classification applies more

broadly to the separation of inmates for other purposes, including recreational yard time,” citing in

support McShane Dec., Exh. 4 at 74:22-77:6 (defendant Mitchell Dep.) (Docket # 75) (plaintiff

generalizes defendant Mitchell’s testimony as supporting the premise that having separate yards

serves the purpose of keeping inmates in general housing and those in protective custody who

cannot be mixed from being mixed). The court’s review of plaintiff’s exhibit shows the following

to be part of defendant Mitchell’s testimony:

Q. And what’s your understanding as to what classification

purposes does having separate yards fulfill?

A. Inmates can be in general housing, for whatever reason, they go

to different yards.

Q. ... It separates the inmates that are housed in the dorms from the

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 Objections are omitted from this excerpt. 18

 Again any objections, and there were several, are omitted from this excerpt. 19

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inmates that are housed in other areas for recreational yard time?

A. Yes.

Q. And to the best of your understanding, why would this - - why is

this important?

A. Because you don’t want to get an inmate hurt or injured.

Q. And why would an inmate be likely to be hurt or injured if they

weren’t separated?

...

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The Witness: Because classification, if he’s protective custody, I

couldn’t throw him in the dorm yard.

By Ms. Chang: So would a protective custody inmate be likely to be

hurt in the dorm yard?

A. Oh, yes. 

Q. And why is that?

...

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The Witness. Why is that? Why is - - I mean you got - - you know,

you got sex offenders. You got rapers. You know, you have to

keep them, you know - - they can’t be together. They don’t get

along, you know.

Q: And when you say they can’t be together, do you mean sex

offenders and rapers and the general inmate population?

A. Right. Right.

Q. And why couldn’t they be mixed together?

...

A. Because those guys don’t - - they don’t like molesters and

rapers, you know.

 

Mitchell Dep., 75: 7-24; 76:2-9, 12-21; 77:5-6. 

Moreover, plaintiff asserts, excerpting a portion of section J121.30 (set forth

above) that another purpose of the policy of classifying inmates is to “[p]rovide for segregation of

vulnerable prisoners from assaulting, and aggressive prisoners and both groups from the general

population.” See also Docket # 75, Exh. 18 to McShane Dec. at SCJ0147. Plaintiff also

contends that defendant Ruona understood that the “purpose of classification” was that “no fights

or anything occur,” citing McShane Dec. (Docket # 75), Exh. 6 (defendant Ruona Dep.) at 30:2-7;

65:16-19; 86:8-87:2 and Exh. 3 at 21:16-22 ([Nola] Thompson Dep.) (wherein a Sutter County

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 Objection omitted. 21

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Jail sergeant testified that her understanding of the purpose of protective custody is “[i]n my 20

opinion, it’s to keep somebody safe from the general population for getting their face bashed in.”)

The court sets forth a little more fully some of the specific testimony of defendant

Ruona cited by plaintiff on this point:

Question: What is your understanding of the purpose for classifying

inmates?

The Witness: .... So, they do not - - so they all get along, basically

no fights or anything occur.

Defendant Ruona Dep.: 30:2-7.

Q. And is it your understanding that Max 5 at Sutter County Jail

during the November, 2005 time frame housed sexual offenders?

A. Yes.

Defendant Ruona Dep.: 65:16-19.

[Regarding Max 5 protective custody on November 26, 2005 (Ruona Dep.: 86:8,

13-15]:

Q. ... was it your understanding at that time that it was not only just

protective custody but sexual offenders?

...

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The witness: Yes, but I’m not a classification officer, so I wouldn’t know. I mean... 

Defendant Ruona Dep.: 86:21-23; 87:1-2.

Plaintiff’s point is well-taken that Sgt. Thompson, a current correctional SC Jail

sergeant who has been employed by Sutter County for a number of years, apparently a period

which encompasses the date of the incident at issue, offers testimony, qualified by her as her own

opinion, that is both relevant and admissible. As to defendant Mitchell, plaintiff is also correct

(id.) that this defendant’s deposition testimony is an admission. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 

Moreover, his testimony focuses on his experience and is that of a percipient witness. Docket #

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expert at least at one point. Docket # 74, p. 10.

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77, pp. 7-8. Similarly, defendant Ruona can testify to his own knowledge or understanding of jail

classification policy and his testimony as well constitutes an admission. 

Furthermore, the experts have testified to the common knowledge of not

intermixing sex offenders and various other inmates. Plaintiff’s expert testified: 22

The witness: I don’t know if he knew if there were any specific

threats but he should have known better. That’s corrections 1A that

I mentioned earlier, he should have known better than to take an

African-American inmate with the charges of sex charges and mix

them with Sureno gang members. That should have never

happened. 

Vasquez Dep.: 122:7-18. 

Defendants’ expert testified that “it’s a well-known fact that assaults occur when

people are out of their individual living spaces .... []in the yard” and that “if there is a unit that is

only sex offenders and in a small jail like that it would be hard to keep that knowledge from

becoming general knowledge...” Docket # 74, p. 12 [Docket # 75-9] Hislop Dec. 157:7-10;

168:1-14. 

Plaintiff insists defendants’ own expert testified that he would not put any single

sex offender with any six other inmates who knew he was a sex offender. Docket # 75-9, Exh. 8,

McShane Dec., Hislop Dep.: 173:19-22. Defendants’ contention in reply that their expert was

referring to San Joaquin County Jail and not Sutter County Jail appears to be hair-splitting. 

Docket # 76, Reply, pp. 4-5 & note 2. Plaintiff also observes that Josefina Arana, an SC Jail

officer working on the date plaintiff was attacked, testified that she recalled being told that sex

offenders were housed in Max 5 “basically to protect them from being assaulted, bothered or any

type of violence towards them to protect them” and that “sex offense charges are not very liked by

other inmates, so they needed protection basically from them.” Docket # 74, p. 12 [Docket # 75-

3], Exh. 2, Arana Dep.: 54:6-55-1. Plaintiff again emphasizes that CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 1050(a)

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southern California and Norteños from northern California, are rivals, while insisting that

Norteños are not their only rivals, i.e., providing some support for including African-Americans

as their rivals [Docket # 74, p. 18].

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that inmate classification extends to inmates’ “leisure activities,” which encompasses rec yard

activity.

When defendants in DUF # 29, maintain that Sureños “are a significant minority

housed in protective custody” (citing MSJ, Bidwell Dec. ¶ 6) to be kept separate “from the sizable

number of Norteños in the jail’s general population,” plaintiff challenges, inter alia, the 23

appropriateness of housing these gang inmates in protective custody, citing again Cal. Code Regs.

tit.xv, § 3341.5(a)(3), which the court has found inapposite in the context of a local detention

facility. In any event, as previously stated, what is at issue herein is not where the Sureños were

housed, as the fact that they were housed in a separate unit of the protective custody housing in a

jail facility is not particularly germane to the question of whether or not allowing the sex offender

and gang member inmates to intermix during recreation time on the same yard violated the Eighth

Amendment.

Defendants now argue, despite admissions to the contrary, that defendants Mitchell

and Ruona did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, focusing on their subjective awareness,

or claimed lack thereof, of any instance of prior attacks by Sureños upon either African-American

or sex offender inmates, or of any animus harbored by Sureños against either of these groups of

inmates. MSJ, pp. 15-16. They assert that these defendants knew of no specific or general threat

against plaintiff; that plaintiff failed to inform them of any risk to himself and that they were as

surprised as plaintiff when plaintiff was attacked. Id., at 16. As noted above, plaintiff provides

ample evidence to belie the notion that defendants Mitchell and Ruona, both jail correctional

officers, had what might charitably be characterized as a naive lack of awareness of animosity of

almost any class of inmates generally against sex offender inmates, despite the protective housing

the SC Jail provided for them and despite the fact that such animosity is well-known even among

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attempt to assert, noting, nonetheless, that such a claim has not been separately pled. See MSJ,

p. 18. No equal protection claim is at issue herein. 

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(Docket # 69, MSJ., p. 6), but, of course, qualified immunity is not available or apposite for a

defendant sued only in an official capacity.

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common citizenry. That the SC Jail had a policy allowing the intermixing of gang inmates with

sex offenders notwithstanding, it is hard to discern how any reasonable jail officer could have

believed that an unsupervised mix of six gang members with any inmate not so associated, much

less a sex offender, could have been anything but a potentially potent mix. In other words, was 24

it deliberately indifferent not to recognize a needed exception to the then overall policy of

intermixing all protective housing inmates. Suffice it to say, plaintiff has raised a genuine factual

issue as to whether these officers, in the circumstances, were deliberately indifferent to his safety,

an issue that must be resolved by a jury.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend that defendants Mitchell and Ruona are entitled to qualified

immunity. Docket # 69, MSJ, pp. 18-20. In resolving a claim for qualified immunity the court

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addresses two questions: (1) whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

demonstrate that the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and (2) whether a reasonable

officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the

information the officer possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987). 

Although the Supreme Court at one time mandated that lower courts consider these two questions

in the order just presented, more recently the Supreme Court announced that it is within the lower

courts’ discretion to address these questions in the order that makes the most sense given the

circumstances of the case. Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009).

Based on the issue raised by the conceded practice, prior to the event at issue, of

permitting the mixing of inmates on the rec yard from the various protective custody units,

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defendants Mitchell and Ruona have a colorable argument to make for qualified immunity with

respect to inference or Scenario 2. However, on qualified immunity analysis, if issues of fact

exist– issues which must be determined by the trier of fact at trial – qualified immunity cannot be

found on summary judgment. Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078,

1095 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, contrary to defendants’ argument that the policy at Sutter

County Jail permitting all inmates in protective custody (regardless of potential danger

engendered thereby) to use the recreation yard simultaneously has never been found

unconstitutional, the precise situation need not have been developed in prior case law. 

Reasonable extrapolations of prior law to circumstances where it would have been apparent to

reasonable officers will suffice to determine reasonableness in the particular circumstances. 

Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009).

The undersigned will not repeat all of the facts and inferences favorable to plaintiff

which have been previously set forth. Suffice it to say here, that the law recognizing the danger of

intermixing sex offenders with other classifications of inmates – even in jail settings as opposed

to prison – is well established. Bylery v. Deputy Warden, 246 Fed. Appx. 512 (9th Cir. 2007);

Glick v. Walker, 272 Fed.Appx.514 (7th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

2004) (recognizing that California law, as applied to jails, requires that sex offenders within

county jails awaiting trial for SVP purposes must be “confined separately and distinctly” from

general population). It is only a small, reasonable expansion of Blanas to find that within

protective custody itself, if potentially violent prisoners are housed within protective custody

simply because they represent a minority-in-numbers gang membership, sex offenders should be

confined (including for recreation purposes) “separately and distinctly” from the “minority” gang

members. See also Sexton v. Ellison, 2009 WL 1544311 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

The undersigned pauses because adherence to an official policy is a factor which

should be considered when determining qualified immunity, but it is only a factor, not an

immunity card. “Such a[n] [official] policy, of course, could not make reasonable a belief that

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was contrary to a decided body of case law.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct.

1692, 1701 (1999). In balancing the common knowledge prohibiting the intermixing of sex

offenders and other inmates, especially those prone to violence, e.g., gang members, and the case

law set forth above, with a claimed adherence in Scenario 2 of “just following policy,” the

undersigned finds issues of fact which require trial.

Conclusion

Again emphasizing that the undersigned has found issues of fact – not liability – 

 IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on December 7, 2009

(Docket # 69), which came on for hearing on January 7, 2010 (Docket #’s 79-80), is granted as to

defendant Denney, and denied as to all other defendants.

DATED: 03/17/2010

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

barn1380.msj

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