Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03563/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3563

STEVEN OLSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BEMIS COMPANY, INCORPORATED, and

UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,

RUBBER MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,

ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE 

WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,

AFL-CIO/CLC LOCAL 2-0148,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-C-842 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 18, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 25, 2015

____________________

Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS,

District Judge.*

 

* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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SYKES, Circuit Judge. Steven Olson worked for Bemis 

Company, Inc., at its factory in Neenah, Wisconsin, and was 

a member of the Local 2-0148, an affiliate of the United Steel, 

Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied 

Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFLCIO/CLC (“the Union”). He was injured on the job and later 

fired. The Union filed a grievance on Olson’s behalf as 

permitted under its collective bargaining agreement

(“CBA”), and Bemis and the Union ultimately entered into a 

settlement under which Bemis agreed to pay Olson $20,000 

in exchange for a waiver of all legal claims he had against 

the company. Olson didn’t like the terms of the deal, so he

sued Bemis and the Union in federal court, challenging both 

his discharge and the legitimacy of the settlement. He lost on 

summary judgment.

Olson later filed a second suit against Bemis and the 

Union, this time in state court, arguing that if the settlement 

was a valid contract, then he was entitled to the $20,000 

payout. The defendants removed the case, and the district 

court held that it had federal-question jurisdiction over 

Olson’s state-law claims because they were preempted by 

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The court then dismissed the complaint 

for failure to state any valid claim. 

We affirm. Olson breached the waiver-of-claims clause in 

the settlement agreement by filing his first suit against 

Bemis, so the company had no obligation to pay him.

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No. 14-3563 3

I. Background

Olson worked as a machine operator at a plastics packaging factory in Neenah owned and operated by Bemis. On 

January 5, 2012, he injured his back while lifting one end of a 

130-pound shaft. Bemis investigated the incident and concluded that Olson had violated its worker safety code. It

wasn’t his first breach of safety protocol, so the company 

terminated his employment. 

The Union is empowered under the CBA to file grievances against the company on behalf of its members, a process 

that culminates in binding arbitration. It filed a grievance on 

Olson’s behalf alleging that he was wrongfully discharged

without cause. After looking into the accident more closely, 

however, the Union determined that an arbitrator would be 

unlikely to order Olson’s reinstatement or provide any 

compensation, so it proceeded to negotiate a settlement:

Olson wouldn’t get his job back, but Bemis agreed to pay a 

lump sum of $20,000 in exchange for a waiver of any legal

claims he might have against the company. The offer was 

good only until May 8, 2012; if it wasn’t accepted by then, 

the grievance would be sent to arbitration. 

Olson retained private counsel and made a counteroffer 

to Bemis, which the company rejected. On May 7, the day 

before the settlement offer expired, Union representatives 

went to Olson’s house. They told him that the settlement was 

more generous than what he could expect from an arbitrator

and then informed Olson that they had decided to accept the 

deal on his behalf (in fact, they had already signed it). Olson 

refused to consent. Bemis signed the agreement later that 

same day. One week later, the company mailed Olson a 

$20,000 check.

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Olson didn’t immediately cash the check. Instead he filed 

a “hybrid” § 301 suit against Bemis and the Union. Section 301 of the LMRA permits individual employees to sue 

their employers for violating a CBA. See Rutherford v. Judge & 

Dolph Ltd., 707 F.3d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). But “as a practical matter, an employee often cannot go straight to federal 

court with such a claim because many CBAs ... have mandatory provisions that require the employee, represented by 

his union, to pursue his grievances through arbitration.” Id. 

Unions have broad discretion to decide how to resolve

employees’ grievances. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 

392 F.3d 439, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he union is empowered to bind the individual employee to the result obtained 

through the grievance process.” (quoting Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 753 (D.C. Cir. 

1992))) (alterations omitted). Therefore, in order for an 

employee to prevail in a suit against his employer, he must

also prove that “the union representing the employee in the 

grievance/arbitration procedure act[ed] in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach 

its duty of fair representation.” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983).1 If he can’t, then the

grievance adjudication is final.

The district judge held that no reasonable jury could find 

that the Union had failed to represent Olson fairly. See Olson 

v. Bemis Co., Inc. (“Olson I”), No. 12-C-1126, 2014 WL 

1576786, at *18 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 17, 2014). In so holding, the 

 1 In a hybrid § 301 action, “[t]he employee may, if he chooses, sue one 

defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same 

whether he sues one, the other, or both.” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).

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judge confirmed that the Union had the authority to settle 

the grievance over Olson’s objection and that the settlement 

was effective as of the date it was signed: May 7, 2012. Id. at 

*9, *15. The judge accordingly entered summary judgment 

for the defendants. Id. at *18.

Olson didn’t appeal that decision. He did, however, try to 

cash the settlement check—but Bemis had put a stop on the 

funds. Olson then filed another lawsuit, this time in Wisconsin state court. His complaint again named Bemis and the 

Union as codefendants and alleged four state-law causes of 

action arising out of Bemis’s failure to pay him the $20,000: 

(1) breach of a written contract; (2) breach of an oral contract; 

(3) equitable estoppel; and (4) promissory estoppel.2

The defendants removed the case to federal court, where 

it was assigned to the same judge who presided in Olson I. 

Olson moved to remand, challenging the district court’s 

jurisdiction. The judge held that Olson’s claim for breach of a 

written contract was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and 

that his other claims were, at minimum, within the scope of 

its supplemental jurisdiction. 

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The judge took judicial 

notice of Olson I, the hybrid § 301 suit, and held that “in light 

of his earlier action against Bemis and the Union,” Olson had 

repudiated the settlement agreement and had no right to 

enforce its terms. The judge granted the defendants’ motion 

to dismiss, and this appeal followed. 

 2 In the two contract claims, Olson alleged that he was a third-party 

beneficiary of a contract between Bemis and the Union.

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II. Discussion

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Although the parties did not brief the issue of jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent ‘obligation at each 

stage of the proceedings to ensure that they have subject 

matter jurisdiction over the dispute.’” Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, 

Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ne. Rural Elec. 

Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 707 F.3d 

883, 890 (7th Cir. 2013)) (alteration omitted). Here, Olson 

filed suit in state court asserting contract and estoppel claims 

arising out of Bemis’s alleged breach of the grievance settlement. The defendants removed the case to federal court, 

relying on federal-question jurisdiction and arguing that

§ 301 of the LMRA preempted the state-law claims. Olson 

moved to remand, but the judge concluded that Olson’s 

claims were preempted by § 301, giving rise to federalquestion jurisdiction.

Ordinarily “[a] disagreement about whether parties to a 

settlement have honored their commitments is a contract 

dispute. Suits for breach of contract ... arise under state law. 

They cannot be adjudicated in federal court unless there is 

an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction ... .” Jones 

v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, 778 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 

2015) (citation omitted); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1994). An independent

jurisdictional basis exists, however, when the substance of a 

plaintiff’s state-law claim is “inextricably intertwined with 

consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). In those 

circumstances, § 301 of the LMRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185(a), completely preempts the state-law cause of action.

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Id. at 209–10. “Once an area of state law has been completely 

pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal 

claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, 

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). 

Section 301(a) of the LMRA states: “Suits for violation of 

contracts between an employer and a labor organization 

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United 

States having jurisdiction of the parties ... .” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185(a). State-law suits of this sort are completely preempted because “[t]he subject matter of § 301(a) is peculiarly one 

that calls for uniform law. ... The possibility that individual 

contract terms might have different meanings under state 

and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 210 (quoting 

Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)).

And since § 301 completely preempts state-law claims, “[b]y 

its terms, this provision [also] confers federal subject-matter 

jurisdiction ... over ‘suits for violation of contracts.’” Textron 

Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. UAW & Its 

Local 787, 523 U.S. 653, 656 (1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The question here is whether a grievance settlement is a 

contract under § 301. The district court thought it was, and 

numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion (in 

fact, we’re not aware of any that have found otherwise). See, 

e.g., Freeman v. Duke Power Co., 114 F. App’x 526, 531 (4th Cir. 

2004) (per curiam); Davis v. Bell Atl.–W. Va., Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 

249 (4th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 

382 (6th Cir. 1991); Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Joyce 

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Installation Co., No. 10 C 5314, 2011 WL 635864, at *2 (N.D. 

Ill. Feb. 10, 2011); SEIU, Local 4 v. EMI Enters., Inc., No. 04 C 

3598, 2004 WL 1899217, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2004). We 

agree.

Section 301 refers, without qualification, to “contracts between an employer and a labor organization.”3 Although 

most § 301 litigation involves alleged violations of CBAs, the 

Supreme Court has squarely held that “[a] federal forum 

was provided for actions on other labor contracts besides

collective bargaining contracts.” Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 

Unions Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26 

(1962); see also id. at 25 (“The Section says ‘contracts’ though 

Congress knew well the phrase ‘collective bargaining contracts.’”). Because a grievance settlement is a contract between a union and an employer (at least when the grievance 

is controlled by the union), it’s a contract under § 301. Thus, 

it’s irrelevant whether the interpretation of the settlement 

agreement requires reference to the CBA. Cf. Jones, 939 F.2d

at 382–83 (“The resolution of this claim will not involve the 

direct interpretation of a precise term of the CBA, but it will 

require a court to address relationships that have been 

created through the collective bargaining process and to 

mediate a dispute founded upon rights created by a CBA.”).

 3 The text of § 301 also clearly excludes certain labor-related contracts. 

Notably, suits involving contracts between parties other than employers 

and unions are not within its scope and thus are not preempted. See, e.g., 

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1987) (finding no 

preemption of suit alleging breach of individual employment contracts 

between employees and their employer distinct from the unionnegotiated CBA); Loewen Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1423 

(7th Cir. 1995) (same).

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On its way to holding that a strike-settlement agreement 

was “plainly” covered by § 301, the Supreme Court has said 

that “[i]t is enough that this is clearly an agreement between 

employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them.” Lion Dry Goods, 

369 U.S. at 28. Given the Court’s textual analysis in Lion Dry 

Goods, we doubt that the “maintenance of labor peace” is a 

distinct requirement for a contract to fall within § 301. Even 

if it is, however, the violation of a grievance settlement 

agreement is, by nature, every bit as disruptive to labor 

peace as the refusal to participate in a grievance adjudication

or the repudiation of an arbitration award.4 And since “[t]he 

first characteristic of a good jurisdictional rule is predictability and uniform application,” Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. 

Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1985), we see little benefit 

in requiring litigants and courts to debate whether a given 

settlement agreement meets some amorphous threshold of 

“disruptiveness” to labor peace. A grievance settlement is a 

contract between a union and an employer—that ends the 

§ 301 inquiry.5 The district court correctly concluded that

 4 Several courts have emphasized that grievance settlements are closely 

tied to the CBAs that authorize them. See, e.g., Davis v. Bell Atl.–W. Va., 

Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1997) (“That agreement’s entire vitality 

and legitimacy ... draws on the underlying collective-bargaining 

agreement.”); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991)

(“[T]he settlement agreement itself is a creature wholly begotten by the 

CBA.”). The close settlement-CBA connection underscores that the 

breach of a grievance settlement is a direct challenge to the authority of 

the CBA’s dispute-resolution mechanisms. 

5 The Supreme Court has held that “[i]f the policies that animate § 301 

are to be given their proper range ... , the pre-emptive effect of § 301 

must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations.” Allis-Chalmers 

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). When a plaintiff brings a state-law 

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Olson’s claim for breach of a written contract was preempted 

by § 301.

District courts “may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over state law claims that share ‘a common nucleus of 

operative facts’ with a federal claim properly before the 

court.” Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 

2015); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The district court held that 

if Olson’s other state-law claims were not preempted, they

arose out of the same set of facts as the claim for breach of a 

written contract and therefore were properly before the 

court. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion, Bailey, 779 F.3d at 696, and we see no 

abuse of discretion here.

B. Substantive Law Under § 301 of the LMRA

“[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially 

dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made 

between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must 

either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted 

 

cause of action other than for breach of a contract that literally falls within 

§ 301, the court must carefully assess whether the claim is “inextricably 

intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” Id. at 

213. There is no § 301 preemption “when the meaning of contract terms 

is not the subject of dispute.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994);

see, e.g., id. at 125 (“[T]he mere need to ‘look to’ the collective-bargaining 

agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law 

claim defeated by § 301.”); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 

399, 407–08 (1988) (holding that a retaliatory discharge claim was not 

preempted because the elements of the state tort did not necessitate

interpretation of a labor contract); Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 

795, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2013) (same).

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by federal labor-contract law.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220

(citation omitted). Here, the judge elected not to dismiss 

Olson’s suit but rather to evaluate whether he stated a valid 

claim under § 301. The judge concluded that he had not.

The conversion of a state-law contract action into a claim 

under § 301 raises some preliminary questions, most notably

this one: Under what circumstances can an individual 

employee (or former employee) sue under § 301 “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees”? Such suits are clearly allowed, at least in some circumstances. See Wooddell v. Int’l 

Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1991) (“We

[have] held that § 301 suits [are] not limited to suits brought 

by the contracting parties and that an individual employee 

[can] sue under § 301 for violation of an employer-union 

contract.”); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 

U.S. 851, 865 n.7 (1987) (noting that in the § 301 context, 

“third-party beneficiaries to a contract ordinarily have the 

right to bring a claim based on the contract”). 

As we’ve noted, however, “[o]rdinarily ... an employee is 

required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration 

remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement” 

before going to court. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163. This principle applies equally to the alleged breach of a settlement 

agreement as to the dispute that sparked the grievance in the 

first place. And as with the initial adjudication, the union 

controls the grievance. If the employee is not satisfied with 

the result, he must show that the union failed to represent 

him in good faith—in other words, he must file a hybrid 

§ 301 suit. See Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 296–97 (7th 

Cir. 1994) (“The plaintiffs lack standing to enforce the arbiCase: 14-3563 Document: 40 Filed: 08/25/2015 Pages: 18
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tration award ... because when employees are represented 

by a union they are not parties to either the collective bargaining agreement or any union-company arbitration. They 

therefore generally cannot challenge, modify, or confirm the 

award in court. An exception to this general rule exists ... 

‘but only if the employees state a claim for a Section 301 fair 

representation case ... .’” (quoting Martin v. Youngstown Sheet 

& Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990))) (citations

omitted). 

On the other hand, if the employee’s claim is not subject 

to mandatory alternative-dispute resolution (under the CBA 

or otherwise), he can bring “a straightforward breach of 

contract suit under § 301,” which “closely resembles an 

action for breach of contract cognizable at common law.”

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 163. Like all § 301 claims, such 

suits are governed by federal common law. See AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 209.

The preemption of Olson’s state-law claims thus raises 

the question whether his § 301 suit must be treated as a 

hybrid § 301 suit.6 The answer turns on whether the CBA 

obligated him (through the Union) to grieve the alleged 

settlement breach. We’ve recognized the presumption that 

“a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the 

underlying dispute is arbitrable, except in circumstances 

where the parties expressly exclude the settlement agreement from being arbitrated.” Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 

173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987). 

 6 The applicable statute of limitations also turns on whether the plaintiff’s § 301 suit is properly characterized as hybrid or straightforward. See 

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168–70.

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Here, there’s no express opt-out in the settlement agreement or in the portions of the CBA that are in the record. 

This issue has not been briefed, however, so we’re reluctant 

to conclude definitively that Olson was required (and failed)

to exhaust a mandatory grievance procedure. Fortunately, 

we need not get caught up in this issue. Whether Olson’s

§ 301 action is straightforward or hybrid, he would have to 

state a valid claim. The district court held that he had not 

done so, and we agree.

C. Dismissal of the Claim for Breach of a Written Contract

Notice pleading requires the plaintiff’s complaint to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible 

on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Facial 

plausibility” means that there must be sufficient factual 

content to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the alleged wrong. Id. An 

allegation that gives rise to an “obvious alternative explanation” is not plausible. Id. at 682. We review de novo the

district court’s decision to dismiss the case for failure to state 

a claim. See Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 

736 (7th Cir. 2014).

Olson’s complaint rests on the premise that if the Union

accepted the settlement agreement on his behalf, as Olson I

held that it did, see 2014 WL 1576786, at *9, then he must be 

entitled to $20,000. He ignores the inconvenient fact that the 

agreement obligated him to waive his claims against Bemis, 

either absolutely or (at the very least) as a condition of 

payment by Bemis. The agreement—formally titled the 

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“Settlement Agreement and Release” (emphasis added)—

could not have been clearer on this point:

The Employee, for good and valuable consideration in 

the gross amount of $20,000.00 does hereby absolutely 

and unconditionally release and forever discharge 

Employer of and from any and all grievances, suits, 

claims, demands, damages, actions, and causes of action, judgment and executions whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, whether related or 

unrelated to the present dispute as to law or facts or 

both, which Employee ever had, claimed to have or 

has against Employer ... .”

A few lines later, the settlement agreement added, “The 

parties agree that they consider the Employer’s tender of any 

consideration as being motivated by a desire of avoiding the 

costs, inconveniences, and nuisance of additional litigation.”

In Olson I the district judge determined that the Union

had the authority to accept the settlement offer on Olson’s 

behalf, even over his objection, and then concluded that the 

Union used that authority to settle Olson’s grievance.7 Id. at 

*7–8. Neither of those rulings is appealable here. The only 

remaining question is whether Bemis acted impermissibly in 

stopping payment on Olson’s check, in light of the terms of 

 7 Admittedly, the settlement agreement was written as though Olson 

would be party to it and would sign it. For example, it had a signature 

line for him, several provisions addressed his responsibilities directly, 

and the agreement gave “the Employee” seven days in which to revoke 

the settlement after it was executed (though only “if he signs this 

Agreement”). But the district court held in Olson I that the CBA gave the 

Union the authority to accept the agreement on Olson’s behalf, without 

his signature and over his objection, and that issue is not before us.

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the settlement agreement. The judge held that Olson had 

“repudiated” the agreement by failing to sign it. Ordinarily

the repudiation of a contract precedes an act that would

independently constitute a breach. See RESTATEMENT 

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981). Since Bemis mailed

Olson a $20,000 check even though he had not signed the 

settlement, apparently Bemis didn’t interpret the absence of 

Olson’s signature as a sign of repudiation. Presumably, the 

company would’ve been satisfied if Olson had cashed his 

check and stayed out of court.

Regardless, Bemis’s promise to pay hinged on Olson’s 

waiver of his claims against the company. If we treat Olson’s 

waiver obligation as an independent contractual obligation, 

then there’s no doubt that Olson materially breached the 

contract by filing his hybrid § 301 suit. This excused Bemis 

from any subsequent obligation it may have had under the 

agreement.8 Similarly, if we treat the waiver obligation as a 

condition precedent to Bemis’s payment, then Olson failed to 

satisfy that condition and Bemis never was under any obligation to pay. The $20,000 payment was consideration for the 

waiver of all of Olson’s claims—including those related to 

 

8 By tendering a $20,000 check to Olson, Bemis fully performed under 

the settlement agreement, at least until the time that it stopped payment. 

By then Olson had already materially breached by filing his hybrid § 301 

suit. If the contract implicitly imposed a continuing obligation on Bemis 

not to stop payment when Olson didn’t deposit the check right away, 

Bemis’s breach of that obligation was preceded by (and therefore excused 

by) Olson’s incurable material breach of the agreement. See RESTATEMENT 

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981) (“[I]t is a condition of each party’s 

remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged ... that there 

be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any such 

performance due at an earlier time.”). 

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his termination—and Olson chose to challenge his discharge 

in court rather than take the money. He was free to make 

that choice, but now he must live with the consequences.

Olson suggests that his breach was not apparent from the 

face of his complaint, so the complaint shouldn’t have been 

dismissed. But a court ruling on a motion to dismiss can rely 

on “the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and 

referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper 

judicial notice.” Cohen v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 601, 604 

n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 

675 F.3d 743, 745–46 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)). Olson attached the 

settlement agreement to the complaint as Exhibit A, see FED.

R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“[A]n exhibit to a pleading is a part of the 

pleading for all purposes.”), and the court took judicial 

notice of Olson I. Olson now questions the court’s use of 

judicial notice, but that decision is reviewed only for abuse 

of discretion, and court records are among the most commonly noticed facts. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease 

Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 1997); FED.

R. EVID. 201(b). We see no reason why the court should have 

feigned ignorance of its own decision in Olson I.

In sum, the complaint, the copy of the settlement agreement, and Olson I together plainly established that the 

$20,000 payout was consideration for Olson’s waiver of his 

legal claims, and yet Olson sued Bemis after the settlement 

went into effect. The judge correctly concluded that Olson’s 

complaint failed to state a facially plausible claim that Bemis 

was contractually obligated to pay him. 

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D. Olson’s Other Causes of Action

Regarding Olson’s other three claims—breach of an oral 

contract, equitable estoppel, and promissory estoppel—the 

judge held that they were “little more than repetitions of his 

claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement,” in which case 

they failed as a matter of federal common law for the same 

reasons, or if they were not preempted and Wisconsin state 

law applied, they “likewise fail to state a claim on which 

relief can be granted.” 

We agree that none of Olson’s remaining claims state a 

legally cognizable claim under either state or federal law. 

First, Olson has pleaded no facts supporting an oral agreement distinct from the written settlement signed by Bemis 

and the Union; this makes his oral contract claim facially 

implausible under any standard. Second, equitable estoppel 

is a defense under Wisconsin law, not a cause of action, see 

Murray v. City of Milwaukee, 642 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Wis. Ct. 

App. 2002), and we strongly doubt that it’s an independent 

cause of action under federal labor common law either. In 

any case, it certainly would not apply here since neither 

Bemis nor the Union misrepresented the terms of the settlement agreement (and Olson had a copy). See Kennedy v. 

United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The traditional elements of equitable estoppel are (1) misrepresentation by the party against whom estoppel is asserted; 

(2) reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation by the 

party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment to the party 

asserting estoppel.”).

Finally, promissory estoppel is inapplicable under 

Wisconsin law when there is a written contract. See Scott v. 

Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715, 729 (Wis. 2003). 

Case: 14-3563 Document: 40 Filed: 08/25/2015 Pages: 18
18 No. 14-3563

And while it has been recognized as a federal cause of action 

under § 301, see Local 107 Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union v. 

Offshore Logistics, Inc., 380 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2004); Burton 

v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 1:95-cv-1054-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 

3853329, at *15–17 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008), promissory 

estoppel requires, at minimum, that the plaintiff show that 

he both reasonably and detrimentally relied on a promise,

see Shields v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 

188 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing promissory 

estoppel under federal common law in the ERISA context).

Olson failed to allege any facially plausible promises other 

than the ones embodied in the settlement agreement. Therefore, none of Olson’s claims could possibly entitle him to 

relief, and the court was correct to dismiss them.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-3563 Document: 40 Filed: 08/25/2015 Pages: 18