Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01164/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAVIN B. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY F. FRASER,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01164-CAB-NLS

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

On June 8, 2017, Petitioner Gavin B. Davis (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. [Doc. No. 1.] On June 18, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”). 

[Doc. No. 2.] While somewhat unclear, it appears that Petitioner is alleging that he is 

wrongfully incarcerated in federal custody in Vermont, as a result of a bench warrant 

issued by Judge Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, in a state court 

criminal proceeding. [Doc. No. 2 at 6, ¶(A)(1).] In the Amended Petition, Petitioner 

acknowledges that he has posted bond and is now “at liberty,” but complains that the bail 

has been set at an unreasonably high amount. [Doc. No. 2 at 8, ¶7.] On July 12, 2017, 

Petitioner filed a Supplement to Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 13] 

wherein he acknowledges that the state court criminal proceeding is ongoing. [Doc. No. 

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13 at 4, ¶4.] For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

DISCUSSION

Although there is no exhaustion requirement for a petition brought under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(c)(3), principles of federalism and comity require that a district court abstain until 

all state criminal proceedings are completed and the petitioner exhausts available judicial 

state remedies, unless the petitioner can show that special circumstances warrant federal 

intervention prior to the state criminal trial. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of 

Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973); Carden v. Montana, 

626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014, 101 S.Ct. 573, 66 L.Ed.2d 473 

(1980); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1971)(under principles of comity 

and federalism, a federal court should not intervene in a pending state criminal 

prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is 

both great and immediate, and cannot be eliminated by defense against the prosecution). 

“[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal 

interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, 

judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. 

Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir.1972).

Younger abstention is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if three criteria are 

met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state 

interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal 

constitutional challenges. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 

Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 

967 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 

L.Ed.2d 133 (1993). In Carden, the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]nly in cases of proven 

harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of 

obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where 

irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state 

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prosecutions appropriate.” Carden, 626 F.2d at 84 (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 

85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 677, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971)).

Here, all three criteria for Younger abstention are met with respect to the criminal 

proceeding still pending against Petitioner in San Diego Superior Court. Moreover, 

Petitioner has failed to allege the type of special circumstances that warrant federal 

intervention. First, Petitioner acknowledges that he is no longer in custody. Moreover, 

Petitioner's challenge to the allegedly excessive bail is a claim that can and should be 

addressed in the first instance by the trial court, and then by the state appellate courts, 

before Petitioner seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus. See Sojourner v. Reed, 2009 WL 

762517, *1 (N.D.Ga., March 20, 2009) (invoking abstention doctrine where state habeas 

petitioner making inter alia an excessive bail claim); Bembry v. St. Lawrence, 2006 WL 

3085511, * 1-*2 (S.D.Ga., Oct.27, 2006) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies where petitioner claiming excessive bail); Merrick v. Ornell, 1997 

WL 12128, * 1(N.D.Cal., Jan.8, 1997) (invoking abstention doctrine where state habeas 

petitioner claiming that he was being held on excessive bail); Woodruff v. Plummer, 1994 

WL 412438, *1 (N.D.Cal., Aug.1, 1994) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition without 

prejudice to refiling after state remedies exhausted where petitioner claiming excessive 

bail). Therefore, Younger abstention is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE the case.

Dated: August 22, 2017

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