Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05197/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05197-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLA PERKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROTECH-QUEST HEALTH CARE 

INC., ET AL.,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

No. C-04-5197 JCS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF CARLA

PERKINS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION

OF DEFENDANT ROTECH FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS

AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF

DEFENDANT ROTECH FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

[Docket Nos. 27, 44, 53]

I. INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, October 19, 2005 at 9:30 a.m., the following motions came on for hearing:

1) Plaintiff Carla Perkins’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (“the Motion to Amend”); 2)

Defendant Rotech’s Motion for Summary Judgment Or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of

Claims (“the Summary Judgment Motion”); and 3) Supplemental Motion of Defendant Rotech for

Summary Judgment Or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication (“the Supplemental Summary Judgment

Motion”). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Amend is GRANTED. The Summary Judgment

Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

Case 3:04-cv-05197-JCS Document 65 Filed 10/28/05 Page 1 of 26
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For the Northern District of California

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 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court relies on facts that the parties have stipulated are undisputed

as well as those facts the Court finds to be undisputed. 

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

On June 25, 2001, Plaintiff Carla Perkins was hired by Defendant Rotech as a CSR Patient

Coordinator in a division of Rotech doing business under the name of Quest Health Care (hereinafter,

“Rotech”), in Foster City, California. Declaration of Linda M. Inscoe in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Claims (“Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl.”), Ex.

A (Declaration of Anton Perdices in Support of Rotech’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the

Alternative, Summary Adjudication (“Perdices Summary Judgment Decl.”)), ¶ 3; Ex. B (Perkins Depo.) at

78, 80. Perkins was hired by Annette Mariel, who was Perkins’ direct supervisor at Rotech. Declaration

of Susan Rubenstein in Support of Plaintiff Carla Perkins’ Opposition to Rotech’ Motion for Summary

Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Claims (“Rubenstein Opposition Decl.”), Ex. E

(Mariel Depo.) at 36. 

Rotech is a nationwide healthcare company that provides home medical equipment and services,

with approximately 4,500 employees working at around 500 locations throughout the country and with

numerous offices in Northern California. Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl., Ex. A (Perdices Summary

Judgment Decl.) at ¶ 2, 6. At the time Perkins was hired, there were two offices in Foster City, across the

street from each other. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. C (Fannin Depo.) at 68. One of these offices

supported a contract with the Veteran’s Administration and the other supported a Medicare contract. 

Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. A (DFEH Response), 2A(III). 

Perkins worked in the office supporting the VA contract until August 28, 2003, when she

commenced a pregnancy related disability leave. Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl., Ex. B (Perkins Depo.)

at 81, 99; see also Rotech’s Separate Statement, No. 3 (stipulated), No. 9 (stipulated). Just prior to

going on leave, however, on August 25, 2003, she confirmed with area manager Nancy Fannin a transfer to

a position supporting the Medicare contract that was about to become available because the employee who

held that position had given two weeks’ notice of his resignation. Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl., Ex. B

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 There is no evidence in the record that prior to this leave Perkins had ever requested family leave.

She did, however, take a monthofmedicalleave inAugust 2002 aftershe was rushed to the emergency room

with an ectopic pregnancy. Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl., Ex. B (Perkins Depo.) at 84. 

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(Perkins Depo.) at 87. According to Perkins, in the August 25th conversation she asked Fannin if she

could “go ahead and accept that position before I went on leave, and she said yes, it’s definitely mine.” Id. 

Perkins testified that she initially requested this transfer when Nancy Fannin came to the Foster City office

earlier in the summer to meet the employees and to discuss the planned closing of the oxygen department in

which Perkins worked. Id. According to Perkins, one of the purposes of Fannin’s visit was to “see who

wanted to possibly move to the other side [that is, from the VA contract to the Medicare contract].” Id. 

Fannin testified that Rotech lost the VA contract to a competitor in mid-2003 and that the office in which

Perkins had worked was eventually closed, in January 2004. Declaration of Linda M. Inscoe in Support of

Rotech’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary

Adjudication of Claims (“Inscoe Summary Judgment Reply Decl.”), Ex. D (Fannin Depo.) at 69.

In August 2003, in the late stages of her pregnancy and on the recommendation of her medical

provider, Perkins gave notice to her manager, Mariel, that she intended to take family leave in connection

with her pregnancy.2 Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. E (Mariel Depo.) at 47; Ex. C (Fannin Depo.) at

109. Under Rotech’s policy, employees are allowed up to 12 weeks of family leave so long as they meet

the following conditions: 1) they have been employed by the company at least one year; 2) they have

worked a minimum of 1,250 hours for Rotech during the previous twelve months; and 3) they work at a

location where Rotech employs at least 50 employees within a 75-mile radius. Rubenstein Opposition

Decl., Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 (Employee Handbook excerpt). 

Perkins commenced her leave on August 28, 2003. Id., Ex. B (Perkins Depo.) at 100. Mariel

obtained the paperwork for Perkins’ leave from Rotech’s website and assisted Perkins in completing the

forms. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. E (Mariel Depo.) at 47. Both Mariel and Perkins believed that

Perkins met the three conditions listed above and therefore qualified for family leave. Id., Ex. B at 102-

103. Perkins turned in the signed paperwork on September 9, 2003. Id. at 106. 

Among the forms completed by Perkins was a Medical Provider Certification provided by her

midwife and a Leave of Absence Request. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. B (Medical Provider

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 In fact, the indicated dates covered less than the ten weeks that were requested and approved. A

full ten-week period would have required Perkins to return to work on November 7, 2003. A twelve-week

period would have ended on November 21, 2003.

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Certification) & Ex. E (Mariel Depo.), Deposition Exhibit B. The Medical Provider Certification, which

was completed by Perkins’ medical provider, estimated that Perkins would be able to return to work on

November 1, 2003. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. E (Mariel Depo.), Deposition Exhibit B. The Leave

of Absence Request form indicates that Perkins requested 10 weeks of maternity leave and listed the dates

of her requested leave as August 27, 2003 to November 1, 2003. Id. That form includes a separate box

labeled “Approvals,” carrying Mariel’s signature as evidence of “Manager Approval.” Id. Perkins testified

that at the time she completed the paperwork, she assumed the November 1, 2003 return date allowed her

12 weeks of leave from August 28, 2003. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. B (Perkins Depo.) at 104.3 It

was not until she later reviewed the paperwork at home that she realized the period set forth was less than

12 weeks. Id. At that point, however, she did not try to change the date because she believed she would

be ready to return to work on November 1. Id. 

 The paperwork also includes an “Employer Response” form. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. E

(Mariel Depo.), Deposition Exhibit C. Although the form is signed by Mariel, Mariel testified that the

boxes checked on the forms were filled in by someone at corporate headquarters. Id. at 58. The form

began by stating that Perkins had requested leave beginning August 28, 2003, and that she “expect[ed]

leave to continue until on or about 11-1-03.” Id., Deposition Ex. C. It then stated that Perkins was

“eligible . . . for leave under the FMLA” and explained that she “had the right under the FMLA for up to

12 weeks of unpaid leave in a 12-month period” because of the birth of her child. Id. The form specified

that Perkins would not be required to provide periodic reports of her “status and intent to return to work

every 30 days while on FMLA leave.” Id.

On October 10, 2003, Perkins came into the office with her baby to talk with location manager

Chris Anderson. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 39. Anderson was another

location manager who apparently assisted Perkins after Mariel resigned, at the end of September. Id. 

On Friday, October 31, 2003, Perkins came in to the office again to discuss her return with the

new location manager, Heidi Kirsch. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. B (Perkins Depo.) at 113. 

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According to Perkins, she discussed the new position she would be taking on and the possibility of a raise

when she returned. Id. In addition, she told Kirsch that there had been a delay in the processing of

paperwork by a child care program in which Perkins hoped to place her infant, making it possible she

would not be able to return to work on Monday and possibly, the entire week. Id. at 113, 115, 117. 

Kirsch did not have Perkins’ paperwork in front of her during this meeting and she informed Perkins of this

fact. Declaration of Linda M. Inscoe.in Support of Rotech’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Claims (“Inscoe Summary Judgment

Reply Decl.”), Ex. C (Perkins Depo.) at 118.

Perkins told Kirsch that, based on her “understanding of the family leave at that time . . . that I had another

week left [from Friday, October 31, 2003] before I had to come back” Id. at 117. Mariel responded by

telling Perkins that “if [she] needed to take the rest of her family time, that it was okay with her. She totally

understood. She appreciated [Perkins] coming into the office and meeting her. She would tell Nancy to

call me as far as about the position and how it has changed, and to also talk about the possible raise.” Id.

at 113.

According to Perkins, on Sunday, November 2, 2003, she called Kirsch because she had not

heard back from any Rotech representative regarding her position. Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. B

(Perkins Depo.) at 120. Perkins told Kirsch that she would not be able to come in on Monday because

she would have to go to the child care office to try to take care of the paperwork problem she had

discussed with Kirsch during the Friday meeting and that it was possible she would be able to come in on

Tuesday. Id. Kirsch told Perkins that she would not be at her desk on Monday, so Perkins should leave a

message and Kirsch would call her back either Monday night or, if Perkins couldn’t return to work for the

week, on Tuesday. Id. at 121. 

Perkins requested that Fannin call her, but Fannin did not do so on Sunday or Monday. Id. at 122;

see also id. at Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 54 (testifying that she “related a lot of information to Nancy Fannin”

and that there were “certain conversations where Nancy was not calling Carla back in a timely manner” and

when Kirsch reminded Fannin, Fannin responded by saying, “Just stay out of it. Leave me alone – or leave

it alone. I’m handling it.”)

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Perkins testified that on Monday, November 3, 2003, at around noon, she called Kirsch and left a

message telling her that she was going to take the rest of the week off because the child care arrangements

for her infant “was going to take a lot longer than [she] thought.” Id., Ex. B at 121. Kirsch played the

voice mail message for Fannin, who listened to the message with Kirsch. Id., Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 47,

50. Fannin said she would deal with the situation. Id. at 47.

On Tuesday, according to Perkins, Fannin called Perkins twice, once in the morning and once at

around 3 pm. Id., Ex. B at 122, 125. In the second call, Fannin told Perkins that she was entitled to only

ten weeks of leave and that because Perkins had not come to work on Monday or Tuesday, she was being

terminated as a “no/call no show.” Id. at 125. Perkins told Fannin that according to her calculation, the

ten-week period would not expire until Friday, November 7 and offered to come in that Friday if this was

necessary to retain her position. Id. at 126. Fannin refused to allow Perkins to do this, saying she would

“have to let [her] go.” Id. 

In late November, Rotech hired a woman to replace Perkins. Inscoe Summary Judgment Decl.,

Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 5-7.

B. Procedural History

On November 4, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court alleging the following claims: 1)

employment discrimination based on gender and pregnancy, in violation of the Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940; 2) employment discrimination based on violation of the

California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2; 3) failure to take all reasonable steps

to prevent discrimination from occurring, in violation of FEHA; 4) retaliation in violation of FEHA; and 5)

wrongful termination in violation of public policy based on FEHA and the CFRA. Plaintiff sought

compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and interest. Defendant removed the action to this

court on December 8, 2004. 

On September 2, 2005, Defendant filed its Summary Judgment Motion. Plaintiff opposed the

Summary Judgment Motion and brought a Motion to Amend to add a claim under the Family Medical

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615 and 2617 and to amend some of the claims in the original complaint. 

Defendant opposed the Motion to Amend and filed a Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion seeking

summary judgment on the additional claim in the event the Motion to Amend is granted. 

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C. The Motions

1. The Summary Judgment Motion

Defendant asserts in its Summary Judgment Motion that all of the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s original

complaint fail as a matter of law. 

First, Rotech asserts that Plaintiff is not entitled to family leave under the CFRA because at the time

Plaintiff went on leave, there were fewer than 50 Rotech workers within a 75-mile radius of the Foster City

office in which she worked, thus exempting Rotech from the leave requirements of the CFRA. In support

of this assertion, Rotech provides a declaration by Anton Perdices, a Human Resources Information

Systems Manager at Rotech, stating that there were fewer than 50 Rotech employees within a 75-mile

radius of the Foster City office in which Plaintiff worked. Inscoe Decl., Ex. A (Perdices Summary

Judgment Decl.) ¶¶ 4-6 & Exs. A, B. Perdices reached this conclusion by “running a report” from

Rotech’s personnel database that purportedly listed all of Rotech’s employees at the four locations

Perdices said were within 75 miles of the Foster City office (Foster City, Napa, Santa Rosa, and San

Carlos). The list generated by Rotech reflects a total of 33 Rotech employees. Id., Ex. B.

 In response to Plaintiff’s anticipated position that Rotech is estopped from denying Plaintiff’s

eligibility because it told her she was entitled to leave under the FMLA – which has the same exemption for

work places with fewer than 50 employees in a 75-mile radius – Rotech argues Plaintiff cannot rely on

estoppel because she did not assert a claim under the FMLA.

Second, Rotech asserts that Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims under FEHA fail

because Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of discrimination, and even if she has, Rotech has

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff and she has not come forth with

specific, probative evidence of pretext. In particular, Rotech points to the fact that Plaintiff did not return to

work at the end of her leave, which officially expired as of November 1, 2003. Rotech also points to a

statement in the employee handbook which states as follows: “The Company will separate from

employment an individual who does not return to work when the FMLA leave expires.” Inscoe Decl., Ex.

A (Perdices Summary Judgment Decl.), Ex. C thereto (Employee Handbook excerpt). As additional

evidence that Rotech could not have discriminated against Plaintiff, Rotech asserts that it had twice granted

Plaintiff pregnancy related disability leave, that the VA contract that Plaintiff had supported had not been

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 Defendant objects to this testimony as lacking foundation. The Court need notreachthis objection

because it does not rely on this testimony in deciding Defendant’s motions.

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renewed, that Plaintiff was “visibly pregnant” when Fannin agreed to transfer her to a position supporting

the Medicare contract, and that Rotech hired a “young woman of childbearing age” to replace Plaintiff.

Finally, Rotech asserts that the claims for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination

and wrongful termination in violation of public policy fail because they are based on the discrimination and

retaliation claims.

In her Opposition, Plaintiff challenges Rotech’s evidence regarding the number of Rotech

employees who worked within a 75-mile radius of the Foster City office. Plaintiff provides a declaration by

Bruce Cossairt, who was Rotech’s Divisional Human Resources Manager for the West Division when

Plaintiff was terminated, casting doubt on the validity of Perdices’ numbers. Declaration of Bruce Cossairt

in Support of Plaintiff Carla Perkins’ Opposition to Rotech’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the

Alternative, Summary Adjudication (“Cossairt Decl.”). Cossairt states:

As the former Divisional Human Resources Director for Rotech, I never

saw a report such as the one attached as Exhibit B. It appears the “report”

was created using Excel and it means nothing as far as showing the number

of employees in these locations. Payroll records would be the credible way

to show the number of employees in a given area at the time that Rotech

approved this leave for Carla Perkins.

Cossairt Decl., ¶ 10.4 She also notes that the list provided in the Perdices Summary Judgment Declaration

is inconsistent with Rotech’s response to the DFEH investigation, in which Rotech stated that during the

relevant period there were only 19 Rotech employees within a 75-mile radius of the Foster City location. 

See Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. A. 

Plaintiff goes on to point to testimony identifying a number of specific individuals who apparently

worked for Rotech within 75 miles of the Foster City location who were not included on Perdices’ list. See

Oppostion at 10. For example, Plaintiff identified two individuals, Judy Cook and Georgia Schilling, who

were managers for the Napa and Santa Rosa locations and who were not included on the list. See

Rubenstein Opposition Decl., Ex. C (Fannin Depo.) at 71-72. Two individuals who Kirsch allegedly

testified worked at the Foster City office – Jason Dewillers and Leslie Ianarello – also were not included on

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 Plaintiff cites pages 14 and 88 of the Kirsch Deposition in support of this assertion. Page 88

supports the assertion that Leslie Ianarelli worked at the Foster City office but does not mention Jason

Dewillers. Plaintiff failed to provide page 14 of the Kirsch Deposition in support of her Opposition brief.

Defendant did provide this page insupportofitsReply brief, but there is no mentionofJasonDewillers onpage

14. See Inscoe Summary Judgment Reply Decl., Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 14.

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Perdices’ list. See id., Ex. D (Kirsch Depo.) at 88.5 Plaintiff further points out that the list provided by

Perdices did not include any employees for Rotech’s facilities in Vacaville, San Carlos, Hayward, or

Sonoma. Plaintiff also asserts that the very fact that Rotech management approved her leave under the

FMLA is evidence that it employed more than 50 individuals within a 75-mile radius. 

Plaintiff argues that even if Rotech employed fewer than 50 employees within a 75-mile radius, it is

estopped from contending it did not have sufficient employees under the CFRA because it told Plaintiff she

qualified for leave under the FMLA, which has the same eligibility requirements.

With respect to the pregnancy and gender discrimination claims, Plaintiff argues that there is

sufficient evidence of pretext to create a fact question. Plaintiff points to evidence that although she was

terminated under Rotech’s no call, no show policy, she had, in fact, called in numerous times between her

Friday meeting and the Tuesday notification that she had been terminated. In addition, Plaintiff cites to the

declaration of Bruce Cossairt, who approved her termination, stating that he only approved Plaintiff’s’

termination because he was unaware of all of the circumstances and that the termination violated Rotech’s

established policy at the time. Cossairt states as follows:

As I understand the facts in this case, Ms. Carla Perkins was terminated as

a “no call, no show” on November 4, 2003. I have been informed and

believe that Ms. Perkins did not report to work on November 3, 2003 as

expected by Ms. Nancy Fannin, the Area Manager. Ms. Fannin testified

that on the following morning, November 4, 2003, at approximately 11:00

a.m., I instructed her to fire Ms. Perkins as a no call, no show.” I did in

fact instruct Ms. Fannin to terminate Ms. Perkins, however, I was not

provided with accurate information regarding Ms. Perkins’ status. I was

informed several times by Nancy Fannin that Ms. Perkins had missed work

and that she had not returned on her scheduled time. Only after being told

by Ms. Fannin that Ms. Perkins had missed her fourth day of work, did I

approve the termination as “no call - no show.” I would not have

recommended termination had I been apprised of Ms. Perkins’ status of

being on FMLA.

For instance, I was never advised that Ms. Perkins had been on an

authorized pregnancy leave as of August 28, 2003. . . . In fact, Ms. Fannin

did not advise me that Ms. Perkins had been on any leave at all. Ms.

Fannin’s testimony that she told me Ms. Perkins was on FMLA is not

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 Rotech objects that the cited testimony lacks foundation because Cossairt “worked at Rotech for

a scant three months.” Rotech’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence in Opposition to Rotech’s Motion for

Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication (“Rotech Objections”). Rotech also notes that some of the

statements are hearsay and/or are not based on personal knowledge to the extent Cossairt summarizes facts

that he has learned subsequent to the initiation of litigation. With respect to the latter category of statements,

the Court does not rely on Cossairt’s testimony and thus need not reach Rotech’s objection. With that

exception the Court overrules Rotech’s objections. Cossairt held a senior position in Rotech’s human

resources division and was ultimately responsible for Plaintiff’s termination. As such, Cossairt is qualified to

testify about Rotech’s personnelpolicies and the eventssurrounding Perkin’sterminationofwhichhe had firsthand knowledge.

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accurate. If I knew Ms. Perkins was on family leave, I would have never

authorized her termination.

I am familiar with Rotech’s “no call, no show” termination policy. This type

of termination is reserved for an employee who basically abandons the job

for four (4) consecutive days without notifying the company.

Under the circumstances in this case, a “no call, no show” termination

would not be appropriate. A “no call, no show” would not apply to an

employee on family leave. My understanding now is that Ms. Perkins had

been out on a family leave less than 10 weeks. Rotech’s policy was to

extend pregnancy-related FMLA for up to 12 weeks if requested by the

employee.

Cossairt Decl., ¶¶ 5-8.6

In its Reply, Rotech concedes that the Perdices Summary Judgment Declaration was incorrect but

maintains that nonetheless, the Court should find as a matter of law that the CFRA does not apply because

there were fewer than 50 Rotech employees in a 75-mile vicinity. In support of this assertion, Rotech

provides a new declaration by Perdices in which Perdices states that due to a “software problem” his

original list was “unreliable.” Declaration of Anton Perdices in Support of Rotech’s Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Claims

(“Perdices Reply Decl.”), ¶ 4. Perdices presents a revised list, which he asserts is now accurate because

he has reviewed payroll records for August 27 and 28 of 2003. Id., ¶ 5. According to Perdices, as a

result of his review Judith Cook was added to the list while a number of employees previously listed were

dropped, resulting in a total of 32 employees rather than the previous count of 33. Id. Perdices states that

Dewillers was not employed “in the relevant geographic area” on August 27 and 28, that the Vacaville, San

Carlos, and Sonoma locations had no employees on that date, and that the Vacaville location had already

closed. Id., ¶ 7. Perdices does not include Georgia Schilling or Leslie Ianarello on the list or address

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In the First Amended Complaint Plaintiff also cited §§ 2615(a)(2) (which prohibits discrimination

against any individual who has opposed a practice under the FMLA) and 2615(b) (which prohibits

discriminationagainst anindividualwho has filed a charge or participated inaninquiryor proceeding regarding

an alleged violation of the FMLA). At oral argument, however, Plaintiff stipulated that her claim under the

FMLA is limited to a claim for interference with her exercise of rights, in violation of § 2615(a). 

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Plaintiff’s assertion that these individuals should have been included. Perdices also notes that although he

included the Santa Rosa employees in the count out of caution, a MapQuest print-out indicates that the

Santa Rosa office is outside of the 75-mile radius because it is 78.06 miles from the Foster City office. Id.,

Ex. B.

With respect to the lower number of employees in the relevant area provided to the DFEH during

its investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, Rotech states that it doesn’t know how this number was derived, but

that there are many possible explanations for the discrepancy.

Rotech again rejects Plaintiff’s estoppel argument based on the fact that the Rotech paperwork

stated only that Plaintiff was eligible for family leave under the FMLA and not the CFRA.

Regarding pretext, Rotech reiterates its earlier arguments and rejects Cossairt’s testimony on the

basis that because Cossairt worked only a “scant three months” at Rotech, his statements lack foundation. 

Rotech also argues that Cossairt’s statement that an employee coming back from family leave would not

have been terminated under the circumstances here contradicts the statement in the employee handbook

that stating that employees who do not return from family leave will be terminated. 

2. Motion to Amend

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to add a claim under the FMLA, to incorporate the

FMLA as a basis for other claims and to correct several erroneous statutory references in her FEHA claims

for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint (hereinafter,

“First Amended Complaint”) asserts the following claims:

Claim One: Employment discrimination based on gender and pregnancy in violation of FEHA (Cal.

Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq.);

Claim Two: Employment discrimination in violation of the CFRA (Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2);

Claim Three: Employment discrimination in violation of the FMLA (29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1)and

2617);7

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8

 In the original complaint, Plaintiff erroneously cited Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h)(1) and (i). As was

evident fromthe allegations supporting this claimand the title ofthe claim, these sections had nothing to do with

Plaintiff’s claim. It is clear from Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion that Defendant understood the claim

asserted in the original complaint to be a claim under subsections (j)(1) and (k) rather than (h)(1) and (i).

9

 In the original complaint, Plaintiff erroneously cited Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(f) and (g). As was

evident fromthe allegations supporting this claimand the title ofthe claim, these sections had nothing to do with

Plaintiff’s claim. It is clear from Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion that Defendant understood the claim

asserted in the original complaint to be a claim under subsections (h) and (i) rather than (f) and (g).

10 In the original complaint, this claim was based on the alleged violation of FEHA and the CFRA.

Plaintiff has amended this claim to add the FMLA as a basis for the claim.

12

Claim Four: Failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination from occurring in violation

of FEHA (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940(j)(1) & (k);8

Claim Five: Retaliation in violation of FEHA (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 (h) and (i));9

Claim Six: Wrongful termination in violation of public policy based on violation of FEHA, the

CFRA and the FMLA.10

Plaintiff asserts that it is in the interest of justice to allow her to amend her complaint because the FMLA is

identical to the CFRA and therefore, Rotech will suffer no prejudice. Plaintiff further notes that discovery

has not yet closed and trial is more than five months away. Plaintiff attributes her failure to seek leave to

amend earlier in the case to inadvertence.

Rotech opposes the Motion to Amend on the basis that Plaintiff’s request comes too late and is

merely a bad faith attempt to avoid summary judgment. Rotech also asserts that amendment would be futile

because the FMLA claims also fail on summary judgment (as discussed in Rotech’s Supplemental

Summary Judgment Motion). Rotech argues that it will be prejudiced because it will be forced to expend

additional resources to respond to the new claims.

3. The Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion

In its Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion, Rotech seeks summary judgment on all of the

claims asserted in First Amended Complaint, making essentially the same arguments as to the FMLA claims

it raised in the Summary Judgment Motion regarding the CFRA claims. In particular, Rotech argues that

the FMLA does not apply because Rotech did not employ 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius. 

Rotech also suggests that the estoppel argument may not apply because the Ninth Circuit has not applied

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11

 According to Plaintiff, on August 23, 2005, she requested production of documents showing the

total number of employees at Rotech’s Northern California facilities but only received from Rotech

“unauthenticated computerized documents which are essentially non-responsive, unintelligible, and redacted

so asto obscure the meaning ofthe documents. Declaration of Susan Rubenstein in Support of Plaintiff Carla

Perkins’Oppositionto Rotech’s SupplementalMotionfor SummaryJudgment or, inthe Alternative, Summary

Adjudication of Claims (“Rubenstein Supplemental Summary Judgment Opposition Decl.”), ¶ 11. Plaintiff

notes that these documents were not accompanied by a privilege log and were not provided to the Court in

support of its summary judgment motions. Id. Plaintiff did not, however, bring a motion to compel.

12 Accordingly, Defendant’s SupplementalSummaryJudgment Motionis granted on this issue on the

basis that it is unopposed.

13

this doctrine in the context of the FMLA. In any event, Rotech asserts, there can be no estoppel because

the FMLA “plainly” did not apply and therefore, there was no reasonable reliance. In addition, Rotech

argues that Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot show that her taking

FMLA was a negative factor in Rotech’s decision to terminate her. Finally, Rotech asserts that Plaintiff is

not entitled to punitive damages under the FMLA, citing Lui v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1133 n. 6

(9th Cir. 2003).

In her Opposition, Plaintiff again challenges the evidence on which Rotech relies regarding the

number of Rotech employees within a 75-mile radius, this time addressing the statements in the Perdices

Reply Declaration. Plaintiff asserts that the continually changing numbers offered by Rotech, if not evidence

of outright bad faith, at least support an inference that the numbers are unreliable, especially in light of

Rotech’s failure to proffer any credible evidence, such as payroll records or EEO-1 data, in support of its

defense.11 Plaintiff argues further that she has presented sufficient evidence to support her claims of

discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff does not dispute that she is not entitled to punitive damages under the

FMLA.12

In its Reply, Rotech disputes Plaintiff’s assertion that it did not provide payroll information in

response to Plaintiff’s August 23, 2005 request for production. According to Rotech counsel Linda Inscoe,

Rotech timely produced the requested documents, including payroll records, on September 26, 2005. 

Declaration of Linda M. Inscoe in Support of Rotech’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Supplemental

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Claims (“Inscoe

Supplemental Summary Judgment Reply Decl.”). Rotech further asserts that Plaintiff’s complaints about its

evidence concerning the number of employees within a 75-mile radius are unfounded and fail to make up

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for the fact that Plaintiff herself has produced no admissible evidence that Rotech employed 50 or more

individuals within that area.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Amend

Because Defendant has already filed a responsive pleading in this action, Plaintiff must obtain leave

to file an Amended Complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) provides that “leave shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” In determining whether to grant leave to amend, courts consider the

following factors: “1) bad faith, 2) undue delay, 3) prejudice to the opposing party, 4) futility of amendment,

and 5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d

367, 373 (9th Cir.1990). However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “not all of the factors merit equal

weight [and that] it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, in the absence of

prejudice, or a “strong showing” of any of the remaining factors, “there exists a presumption under Rule

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id.

Here, the proposed amendment will result in little or no prejudice to Defendant because the FMLA

claims Plaintiff seeks to add are not based on any new facts or theories. Indeed, Defendant does not

dispute that the requirements for Plaintiff’s FMLA claims are identical to the requirements for her claims

under the CFRA. In fact, the only prejudice Defendant identifies is the additional resources it will need to

expend to defend against this claim. Given that the new claims are virtually identical to the claims in the

original complaint, this prejudice is minimal and does not justify denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. 

Nor does the Court find that Defendant has made a “strong showing” of bad faith sufficient to

overcome the presumption in favor of allowing amendment. While the Court is troubled by the fact that

Plaintiff did not seek to amend her complaint earlier in the case, for instance, when the case was first

removed to federal court, the Court finds no evidence that this delay was due to anything but inadvertence. 

See Abels, 229 F.R.D. at 155 (“In the Ninth Circuit, delay alone is insufficient to provide grounds for

denying leave to amend”). Finally, as discussed below, the Court concludes that amendment is not futile. 

Accordingly, the Motion to Amend is GRANTED.

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13 Hereinafter, the Court frames its discussion in terms of the claims and allegations as set forth in the

First AmendedComplaint. To the extent Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion referred to specific claims

in the original complaint, the Court treats these arguments as applying equally to the same claims in the First

Amended Complaint, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. 

15

B. The Summary Judgment Motions 13

1. Legal Standard

Rule 56 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there are no

genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a

defense on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This can be done by either producing evidence that negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or by showing that the nonmoving party does

not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos. Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has

made this showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “designate specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

2. Gender and Pregnancy Discrimination Claim (FEHA)

Rotech asserts that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim under FEHA fails because she has not made out

a prima facie case of discrimination, and even if she has, she has not presented specific and probative

evidence of pretext in the face of the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons offered by Rotech for Plaintiff’s

termination. The Court disagrees. Based on the evidence offered by Plaintiff, a jury could reasonably

conclude that Plaintiff was terminated based on her gender and pregnancy.

It is unlawful, under FEHA, for an employer “because of . . . sex . . . to discharge the person from

employment . . . or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). “Sex” is defined as including, but not limited to,

“pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.” Cal. Gov. Code §

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12926(p). California courts consider FEHA claims to be analogous to discrimination claims brought under

Title VII and apply the burden-shifting framework developed by federal courts to address such claims. See

Flait v. North Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 475 (1992).

Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). For the purposes of summary

judgment, a prima facie case requires the plaintiff to “produc[e] enough evidence to permit the trier of fact

to infer the fact at issue.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n. 7 (1981). The

burden of proving a prima facie case is “not onerous.” Id. at 253. Once a plaintiff has established a prima

facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce some evidence that it had legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.

977, 985 (1988). Once an employer has produced such evidence, the plaintiff can survive summary

judgment only by providing “significant, substantial evidence of pretext.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703

F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983).

To make a prima facie case of discrimination based on pregnancy, Plaintiff must show that (1) she

was pregnant, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action,

and (4) a non-pregnant individual was hired to replace her. See Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113

F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). Even where the fourth element is not met, a prima facie case may be made

where “the plaintiff show[s] through circumstantial, statistical, or direct evidence that the discharge occurred

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of . . . discrimination.” Id. (quoting Rose v. Wells Fargo &

Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the four elements listed above. In particular, she has presented evidence

that she was pregnant, that she was qualified for her position, that she was discharged when she sought to

take the full family leave Rotech had told her she was entitled to, and she was replaced by a non-pregnant

employee. Thus, she has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination.

Rotech, however, counters that it terminated Plaintiff for a nondiscriminatory reason under its no

call/no show policy when Plaintiff did not show up for work on the Monday following the official expiration

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14 Rotech also suggests that Plaintiff was terminated for the nondiscriminatory reason that the VA

contract had ended. This argument is without merit. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had already been granted a

transfer to a new position supporting the Medicare contract. 

17

of her leave period, on November 1.14 It also asserts that a strong inference of non-discrimination arises

from the fact that Fannin agreed to transfer Plaintiff to a new position even though she knew Plaintiff was

pregnant and that Plaintiff was allowed to take a medical leave a year earlier when she experienced an

ectopic pregnancy. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

that “where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and

both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory

motive”). Because Rotech has presented evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions,

the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present substantial evidence of pretext. The Court concludes that she has

done so.

“A plaintiff can prove pretext either (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2)

directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Fonseca v. Sysco

Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has

presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that the explanation offered by Rotech – that Plaintiff

was fired based on Rotech’s no call, no show policy – is unworthy of credence. 

First, there is evidence, albeit contested, that Rotech’s policy was to terminate an employee on this

basis only after the employee had failed to show up for work for four days. Plaintiff was terminated after

only two days. Second, there is some evidence that Plaintiff did not fail to call to explain her absence but

rather, called several times to apprise her immediate supervisor of the situation, and that her supervisor

passed these messages on to Nancy Fannin, who was the individual most directly responsible for Plaintiff’s

termination. In particular, there is testimony that Fannin listened to the telephone message Plaintiff left for

Schwartz on Monday, that she was aware Plaintiff had recently met with Schwartz and was apprised by

Schwartz of Plaintiff’s communications with Schwartz concerning her return to work. Third, there is

testimony that Fannin, in seeking permission to terminate Plaintiff, did not tell Cossairt that Plaintiff was on

family leave and misrepresented to him that Plaintiff had failed to call or show up for work for four

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consecutive days. Fourth, the reason offered by Rotech is undermined by evidence that notwithstanding the

November 1 return date (a date which fell on a Sunday), Rotech had approved a ten-week leave which

had not expired when Plaintiff was terminated and further, that Rotech did not permit Plaintiff to return at

the end of that ten-week period when she offered to do so. Taken together, this evidence of pretext is

sufficiently substantial to defeat Rotech’s summary judgment motion. 

Rotech’s reliance on the statement in the Employee Handbook that Rotech will “separate from

employment an individual who does not return to work when the FMLA leave expires” is misplaced. 

According to Rotech, on the basis of this statement the Court should discount all of the evidence cited

above as contrary to Rotech’s established policy. Yet the bare statement cited by Rotech offers no

guidance as to when Rotech would terminate an employee coming off of family leave or under what

circumstances it would grant requests to extend family leave. 

The Court also notes that Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., on which Defendant relies, is

distinguishable. 104 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1996). There, the plaintiff alleged gender discrimination after she

was terminated on the basis of poor performance. Id. at 269. In particular, the defendant presented

evidence that there had been “numerous complaints” about the plaintiff’s work. Id. The plaintiff had also

asked a subordinate to serve as a reference for her husband and to tell his potential employers that he

worked for the defendant when he did not. Id. The plaintiff did not dispute that she had asked the

subordinate to lie. Id. at 270. Indeed, she produced “no meaningful evidence” of pretext. Id. The only

evidence she offered to show pretext were her own assertions that her supervisor had conversations with

her male subordinate that she was left out of, trusted his opinions more than hers and called him

“wonderful.” Id. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded, the plaintiff had failed to rebut the

inference of non-discrimination that arose from the fact that the plaintiff was fired by the same individual

who had hired her less than a year earlier. Id. Here, in contrast, there is evidence to rebut the inference of

non-discrimination that arises from Fannin’s having granted Plaintiff a transfer to a new position.

3. CFRA and FMLA Claims

Rotech asks the Court to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims under the CFRA and the

FMLA on the basis that Rotech did not employee the minimum 50 workers within a 75-mile radius as

required under both statutes and further, that it cannot be estopped from relying this defense on the basis

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15 The parties do not dispute that the requirements ofthe FMLA and the CFRA as they relate to the

issues in this case are identical. See Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) Therefore,

the Court conducts a single analysis for the CFRA and FMLA claims.

19

that it erroneously told Plaintiff she qualified for leave under the FMLA.15 Rotech argues further that even if

the FMLA and CFRA apply, Plaintiff has not established a material issue of fact on the merits as to these

claims. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established a triable issue of fact regarding the number of

employees employed by Rotech. For that reason her claim under the CFRA fails. However, the Court

further finds that there exist material issues of fact both as to whether Defendant is estopped from denying

that Plaintiff was eligible for leave under the FMLA and on the merits of that claim and therefore, summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim is inappropriate.

a. Number of Rotech Employees

Under bother the FMLA and the CFRA, the obligation to grant family leave does not apply in

cases where an employer employs less than 50 employees within a 75-mile radius of the employee’s

worksite. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (FMLA); Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2 (CFRA). Thus, to prevail on

either claim the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the employer is a covered employer, that is, that the

employer does not fall within this exemption. See Price v. Multnomah County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1290

(D. Or. 2001) (holding that to prevail on a claim under the FMLA, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that

he is an “eligible” employee under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B) (excluding from

definition of “eligible employee” any employee who works at a worksite where the employer employees

fewer than 50 employees within a 75-mile radius). Because the ultimate burden falls on the plaintiff on this

issue, to prevail on summary judgment Defendant is not itself required to produce evidence regarding the

number of employees if it can show that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient and does not create a material

issue of fact. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos. Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.

2000).

Plaintiff heavily criticizes the evidence offered by Rotech in support of its position that it does not

employee the requisite number of employees for the FMLA and CFRA to apply. 

The Court, however, need not reach the reliability (and hence admissibility) of Rotech’s figures because

Plaintiff herself has offered no admissible evidence suggesting there is a material issue of fact on this

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16 In determining whether the requirement has been met, the date on which the employee gave notice

of her need to take leave is the relevant date. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(f) (“Whether 50 employees are

employed within 75 miles to ascertain an employee's eligibility for FMLA benefits is determined when the

employee gives notice of the need for leave”). 

17 Rotech provides a Mapquest print-out showing the distance is 78.06 miles. Rotech is correct that

the relevant distance isthe distance ofthe driving route and that the 75 milesis not measured “asthe crowflies.”

See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(b). 

20

question. Plaintiff relies on Perkins’ testimony that she and Mariel both believed Rotech employed more

than 50 individuals within a 75-mile radius but she offers no evidence concerning the basis for this belief. In

the absence of any evidence that either individual had personal knowledge regarding the number of

employees who worked at the various offices at the time Plaintiff gave notice of her request for leave,16 this

testimony lacks foundation and fails to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56(e). See SeaLand Servs., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, this evidence is

inadmissible and cannot be considered on

summary judgment. Plaintiff also points to the fact that Rotech approved the family leave as evidence that

this requirement was met. This evidence, however, is simply too tenuous to create a material issue of fact,

given that there is no evidence in the record that anyone at Rotech actually addressed this question in

approving Plaintiff’s leave request.

Nor does evidence of a handful of individuals who may have worked at Rotech facilities in the

summer of 2003 that were not included on the Perdices list persuade the Court otherwise. See

Supplemental Summary Judgment Opposition at 4, n. 4 (listing six employees omitted from original list filed

with Perdices Summary Judgment Declaration – one of whom (Judy Cook) was added to the revised list

provided with the Perdices Summary Judgment Reply Declaration). Even assuming all of these individuals

worked for Rotech within a 75-mile radius of the Foster City Office, this evidence does not establish a fact

question, as this would bring the total employees up to only 37 based on Perdices revised list. 

In addition, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to counter the evidence that the Santa Rosa offices

does not fall within the 75-mile radius.17 Therefore, these employees cannot be included in the count. 

Given that Perdices listed seven Santa Rosa employees in the original list and nine Santa Rosa employees in

the revised list, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude Rotech

employed 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius. 

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b. Equitable Estoppel

Plaintiff asserts that even if Rotech does not employ the requisite number of employees in the vicinty

of her worksite, Rotech is estopped from denying that she is entitled to family leave under the FMLA and

the CFRA under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. She points to the September 9, 2003 Employer

Response reflecting that she had been granted family leave under the FMLA and as such, had the right to

up to 12 weeks of family leave. The Court finds that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to Plaintiff’s

FMLA claim but not her CFRA claim.

To establish equitable estoppel, the following requirements must be met: “1) the party to be

estopped must know the facts; 2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the

party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; 3) the latter must be ignorant of the true

facts; and 4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.” Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985). Generally, whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies is a question of

fact. See Whitney v. United States, 826 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied in

cases involving the FMLA. See Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1057 (D. Az.

2003). Other Circuits have, however. For example, in Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, the Seventh

Circuit concluded that the doctrine may be applied in FMLA cases:

 Like other equitable doctrines, the doctrine of estoppel is invoked in a

variety of statutory contexts without reference to particular statutory

language. True, if the statute creates or excludes a right to plead estoppel,

the creative power of the administering court or agency is suspended. But

there is nothing in the Family Leave and Medical Act that relates to

misleading eligibility notices or absences of notice; so far as notice is

concerned, the statute merely requires the employer to post a general

summary of the Act in the workplace. 26 U.S.C. § 2619. We do not read

this provision to exclude the application of the doctrine of an estoppel in an

appropriate case. And so an employer who by his silence misled an

employee concerning the employee's entitlement to family leave might, if the

employee reasonably relied and was harmed as a result, be estopped to

plead the defense of ineligibility to the employee's claim of entitlement to

family leave. 

223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Woodford v. Cmty. Action of Green County, Inc., 268

F.3d 51, 57 (concluding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied in FMLA cases).

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This Court also has applied the doctrine of equitable in FMLA cases. See Headlee v. Vindra Inc.,

2005 WL 946981 (N.D. Cal.). The facts of Headlee are similar to the facts here. In that case, the plaintiff

requested intermittent family leave to care for her adult daughter, who was diagnosed with cancer, on a

series of Fridays. Id. at *1. Her employer granted the leave request in letter stating that the leave would be

treated as “Family Medical Leave for which [plaintiff is] eligible for a total of twelve weeks leave.” Id. A

month later, however, it reversed its position, notifying the plaintiff that the leave approval would not be

honored and she would have to take either a 12-week unpaid leave of absence from all her duties or she

would be terminated. Id. The plaintiff could not afford to take a 12-week unpaid leave of absence and

was terminated. Id. The plaintiff sued her employer for violation of the CFRA and the Family Leave Act

and the defendant brought a motion to dismiss. The defendant asserted that because adult children are not

covered under the CFRA and FMLA, the plaintiff failed to state a claim. 

The court in Headlee agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff was not entitled to leave under the

CFRA or FMLA to care for an adult child. On that basis, the Court dismissed the CFRA claim. With

respect to the FMLA claim, however, the court found that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a

claim under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at *2. Citing Dormeyer, the court found that the

“plaintiff may be able to show that she reasonably believed defendants’ letter granted her leave under the

FMLA, that she reasonably relied on defendants’ letter, and that she was harmed as a result of defendants’

failure to honor their approval for leave.” Id. The court distinguished the FMLA claim from the CFRA

claim on the basis that the letter approving her leave referred only to the FMLA and therefore, the plaintiff

could not have reasonably relied as to the CFRA claim. Id. at *3.

The Court finds the reasoning in Headlee to be persuasive. In particular, the doctrine of equitable

estoppel does not apply to Plaintiff’s CFRA claim because Rotech’s response referred only to the FMLA

and therefore, Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied as to the CFRA claim. On the other hand, a jury

could conclude that Plaintiff relied, to her detriment, on the erroneous notification that she qualified for leave

under the FMLA. There is evidence, which if believed would lead a jury to conclude that: 1) in reliance on

Rotech’s Response – which expressly stated that she had a right to up to 12 weeks of family leave – 

Perkins told Kirsch that she believed she was entitled to at least another week of family leave beyond her

scheduled return date; 2) Kirsch, in turn relied on this information to advise Perkins that she could “take her

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time” and that Perkins could take an additional week if she needed it; and 3) as a result of her reliance on

her belief that she had not exhausted her 12 weeks of family leave, Perkins didn’t come in on Monday or

Tuesday, resulting in her termination.

The Court rejects Rotech’s assertion that Plaintiff’s reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law

because she knew her leave expired on November 1, 2003. First, the Court notes that the Rotech

Response stated that Plaintiff “expected” to return “on or about” November 1. This language indicates the

date was not necessarily a date certain but might be subject to revision – a conclusion that is further

supported by the fact that November 1, 2003, fell on a Sunday. Second, the Response expressly stated

that Perkins had been granted ten weeks of leave, which would not have expired until Friday, November 7,

further supporting the conclusion that Perkins could reasonably have relied on Rotech’s representation that

she was entitled to family leave when she did not return to work on the Monday or Tuesday following

November 1, 2003. Third, Perkins testified that Kirsch told her, based on her understanding that Perkins’

family leave under the FMLA had not expired, that Perkins could delay her return, thus reinforcing

Plaintiff’s belief that she was entitled to delay her return because she had not yet used up her 12 weeks of

family leave.

The cases on which Rotech relies to support a contrary position are not on point. In Wells v. WalMart Stores, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1197, the court held that equitable estoppel did not apply to the plaintiff’s

FMLA claim because his reliance, if any, was not reasonable. In particular, the employee had been notified

that he was eligible for family leave under the FMLA even though he had not worked the required minimum

hours to qualify for leave under the FMLA. Id. at 1207. The court concluded that the plaintiff “plainly

was not eligible for any benefits.” Id. Although the court in Wells did not provide any meaningful

discussion of its conclusion, it apparently concluded that the plaintiff’s lack of eligibility should have been so

obvious that the plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on the mistaken notification that he qualified for

family leave. That is not the situation here. The reason Rotech now states it was not required to extend

family leave to Plaintiff was the number of employees working at its various facilities in the area. Given that

Rotech was a large company with numerous employees throughout the state and a constantly shifting work

force, Plaintiff could not have been expected to know that Rotech did not employee 50 or more individuals

within a 75-mile area at the time she gave notice of her request for family leave. Indeed, Rotech’s own

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difficulties coming up with a reliable number illustrate just how difficult it would have been for Perkins to

determine whether Rotech was a covered employer.

Defendant’s reliance on Nordquist v. City Fin. Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 537 (N.D.Miss. 2001) is

also misplaced. There, the court concluded that the estoppel doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff’s FMLA

claim because the plaintiff had presented no evidence of any reliance. Id. at 540. Again, that is not the

case here, where Plaintiff has presented evidence that she did rely on Rotech’s representation that she was

entitled to leave under the FMLA. Similarly, in Farina, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable

estoppel did not apply because there was no detrimental reliance. 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. There, the

letter stating that the plaintiff was entitled to leave under the FMLA was sent after the plaintiff had used up

her 12 weeks of leave and had not returned to work. Id.

Therefore, the Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the

doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. On the other hand, Plaintiff could not

have reasonably relied with respect to the CFRA claim, and thus Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on that claim.

c. Evidence Supporting FMLA Claims

Defendant asserts that even if it is estopped from denying that the FMLA applies, the evidence is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s FMLA claims because she

cannot show that her termination was causally related to her FMLA leave. See Bachelder v. Am. West

Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

approach does not apply to FMLA claims and that plaintiff could prevail on claim by proving that “her

taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her”). The Court

disagrees. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to pretext, the Court concludes there is

sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was terminated

because she sought to exercise her rights under the FMLA.

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4. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Wrongful Termination in Violation of

Public Policy

Rotech asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for failure to prevent

discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of public policy because these claims are based on her

claims under FEHA, the CFRA and the FMLA, which Defendant asserts fail for the reasons discussed

above. Because Rotech is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim under the CFRA, it is also

entitled to summary judgment on her failure to prevent discrimination and wrongful termination claims to the

extent they are based on the CFRA. To the extent these claims are based on Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA

and the FMLA, however, summary judgment on these claims is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is GRANTED. Defendant’s Summary

Judgment Motion and Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART as follows:

Claim One (FEHA– discrimination): The Summary Judgment Motion is DENIED;

Claim Two (CFRA): The Summary Judgment Motion is GRANTED, and the claim is dismissed

with prejudice;

Claim Three (FMLA): The Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion is DENIED; 

Claim Four (FEHA – failure to prevent discrimination): The Summary Judgment Motion is

DENIED;

Claim Five (FEHA – retaliation): The Summary Judgment Motion is DENIED;

Claim Six (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy): The Summary Judgment Motion is

GRANTED to the extent the claim is based on violation of the CFRA; the Summary Judgment

Motion and Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion are DENIED to the extent the claim is based

on FEHA or the FMLA.

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Finally, the Supplemental Summary Judgment Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s request for punitive

damages on her claim under the FMLA. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2005

 

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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