Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00397/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Gregory was previously considered disabled from May 1, 1988 until July 12, 1993,

based, in part, on his bipolar disorder. [Record of Proceedings (ROP) 55, 57]

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Gregory, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. 03-CV-397-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Robert Gregory’s motion for summary

judgment and Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart’s (the Commissioner) motion to remand.

On November 23, 2004, United States Magistrate Judge James C. Carruth issued a

Report and Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court grant the

Commissioner’s motion for remand and partially grant the motion for summary judgment.

Gregory filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. The

Commissioner did not file a response.

Background

Gregory filed a claim for Social Security disability benefits on June 27, 2000, alleging

that his disability, based on his bipolar disorder, began on February 25, 2000.1

 [Record of

Proceedings (ROP) 87, 98] 

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The parties did not present the Court with complete information regarding the

subsequent decision.

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Administrative Law Judge Norman R. Buls (the ALJ) issued a decision on November

8, 2001, in which he applied the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential

evaluation process and determined, at step four, that Gregory was not disabled at any time

from February 25, 2000, through November 8, 2001. [ROP 15-20] 

In determining Gregory’s residual functioning capacity, the ALJ gave “significant

weight” to the consulting physician’s opinion, and found that it was consistent with the

medical record as a whole. [ROP 18] The ALJ also found Gregory’s “allegations of

disabling limitations [were] not credible to the extent alleged.” [ROP 18] The ALJ

concluded that: (1) Gregory had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February

25, 2000; (2) Gregory had severe bipolar disorder, (3) his bipolar disorder did not equal the

impairments in the Listing of Impairments; and (4) his bipolar disorder did not prevent him

from performing his past relevant work as a telemarketer. [ROP 19-20]

In December 2001, Gregory filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the

Social Security Administration’s Office of Hearings and Appeals (the Appeals Council).

[ROP 10-11] 

In January 2002, while his request for review was pending before the Appeals

Council, Gregory filed a second application for benefits. According to the Commissioner,

“[o]n May of 2002, the Agency issued a favorable finding of disability with an onset date of

November 9, 2001. The Commissioner noted that the award of benefits was based on

Plaintiff’s mood disorder.”2

 [U.S.D.C. document #15 at 3.]

 On May 28, 2003, the Appeals Council denied Gregory’s request for review.

[ROP 5] 

The Pending Motions

In his motion for summary judgment, Gregory argues that the ALJ disregarded the

opinions and conclusions of Gregory’s treating psychiatrist and, instead, accorded significant

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weight to the opinions of a non-treating, non-examining physician. He contends that the nonexamining, non-treating physician’s opinion was not consistent with other evidence in the

record. Gregory asserts that the ALJ failed to consider whether Gregory met the

requirements of listed impairment 12.04(3). Gregory also argues that the ALJ did not have

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony. Gregory contends that the Court

should credit his and his treating psychiatrist’s testimony as a matter of law and award him

benefits.

In her motion to remand, the Commissioner requests that the Court remand the current

case so she can “conduct additional administrative proceedings, including resolving the

discrepant conclusions of the Appeals Council and the State Agency regarding the

appropriate evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments.” The Commissioner also argues

that summary judgment is inappropriate because the record has not been fully developed and

there are outstanding issues that must be resolved. And the Commissioner contends that

remand for an immediate payment of benefits is not appropriate because the ALJ properly

analyzed Gregory’s impairments, resolved conflicts in the medical testimony, and analyzed

the evidence before him. 

In his response to the motion to remand, Gregory states that he opposes a remand

because the Court “does not have the jurisdiction to make a determination or remand for a

determination regarding the subsequent favorable disability determination.” He also argues

that there are no outstanding issues remaining, the record has been fully developed, and

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Gregory requests that the

Court reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for the payment of benefits. Alternatively,

Gregory request that the Court limit the issue on remand to Gregory’s entitlement to benefits

between February 25, 2000, and January 30, 2002. And, if the case is remanded, Gregory

requests that it be remanded to the Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge, rather

than the ALJ who issued the November 8, 2001 decision. 

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The Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Carruth recommended that the Court grant the motion to remand

“with the understanding that expert medical opinions and supporting clinical data from

additional proceedings may be submitted to supplement the evidence on this application

concerning the period between February 25, 2000 and January 30, 2002 only.” Magistrate

Judge Carruth also recommended that the Court partially grant the motion for summary

judgment on the issue of the lack of substantial evidence to resolve conflicts in the expert

medical opinions because the “[i]t does appear that the ALJ did not have a complete medical

record before him when he attempted to resolve conflicts . . . , specifically lacking in medical

opinions backed with sufficient supporting clinical data.” Magistrate Judge Carruth

concluded that “[a]ll relevant and available medical evaluations and opinions were not made

available to the ALJ to render his decision and consequently the ALJ’s decision may not be

affirmed on that issue.”

In his objections to Magistrate Judge Carruth’s Report and Recommendation, Gregory

argues that remand for further administrative proceedings is unnecessary because the existing

administrative record clearly establishes that he was disabled from February 25, 2000, to

January 30, 2002. Gregory also objects to the fact that Magistrate Judge Carruth did not

grant any relief on Gregory’s claim that the ALJ erred in his findings regarding Gregory’s

credibility. 

Discussion

Because Gregory filed timely objections to Magistrate Judge Carruth’s Report and

Recommendation, the Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The Court has independently and carefully reviewed the record in this case, the

motions and responses, the relevant case law, the Report and Recommendation, and

Gregory’s objections to the Report and Recommendation. The Court agrees with Magistrate

Judge Carruth that the case should be remanded to reconsider Gregory’s disability in light

of the subsequent decision to award benefits based on the same disability. 

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Although Gregory has cited Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2001), in

support of his claim that “a subsequent grant of benefits does not affect a prior application

on appeal,” the Court finds Bruton distinguishable. In Bruton, the claimant sought review

of the district court’s denial of his motion to remand an initial benefits denial in light of a

subsequent benefits award. 268 F.3d at 826-27. The Court of Appeals upheld the district

court’s decision, concluding that the benefits denial and award were not inconsistent because

the two applications “involved different medical evidence, a different time period, and a

different age classification.” Id. at 827. 

In contrast to Bruton, it is the Commissioner here who is seeking the remand in order

to reconcile the two conflicting decisions. In addition, it appears that the disability onset date

in the second application was the day after the ALJ’s initial denial and based on the same

medical condition. Therefore, it appears that the subsequent decision was based on the same

medical condition, the same age classification, and the same time period.

The Court finds this case more similar to Reichard v. Barnhart, 285 F. Supp. 2d 728

(S.D.W. Va. 2003). In that case, the district court cited to the Commissioner’s December 30,

1999 policy, SSA-EM-99147, which addresses situations like Gregory’s, where a claimant

has an application pending before the Appeals Council, files a subsequent application for

benefits, and the subsequent application is granted while the appeal of the initial claim is

pending. 285 F. Supp. 2d at 730 n.3. The policy provides that “the subsequent claim will

be sent to the [Appeals Council] to determine if it contains new and material evidence

relating to the period that was before the ALJ on the prior claim.” Id. (quoting SSA-EM99147 at ¶2). In Reichard, the district court found the administrative law judge’s

“[subsequent] decision finding disability commencing less than a week after he first

pronounced that Claimant was not disabled is new and material evidence” that “begs the

question whether Claimant was actually disabled before that[,] during the period of time

relevant to consideration of Claimant’s first application.” Id. at 734. 

The Court finds that remand is appropriate so the Commissioner can determine

whether the subsequent claim contains new and material evidence relating to the time period

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The Appeals Council considered as additional evidence an August 15, 2002

memorandum from Gregory’s attorney, and a June 7, 2002 letter from Gregory’s treating

psychiatrist. [ROP 8] Although Gregory’s attorney noted the subsequent decision in the

August 15 memorandum and indicated that the Notice of Award was attached to the

memorandum, [ROP 246], neither the subsequent application, the related medical records,

the Notice of Award, nor any information relating to the subsequent decision are included

in the Record of Proceedings. In addition, the Appeals Council’s denial does not mention

the subsequent decision.

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that the ALJ was evaluating and can reconsider the decision to deny benefits to Gregory.

Pursuant to its own policy, the Appeals Council should have done this before denying

Gregory’s request for review, but apparently did not.3

 The Court agrees with Gregory and

Magistrate Judge Carruth that the remand should be limited to reconsideration of the initial

decision denying benefits, not the subsequent decision granting benefits. 

Gregory has requested that the matter be remanded to the Hearing Office Chief

Administrative Law Judge, rather than the ALJ who issued the November 8, 2001 decision.

But 20 C.F.R. § 404.983 states:

When a Federal Court remands a case to the Commissioner for

further consideration, the Appeals Council, acting on behalf of

the Commissioner, may make a decision, or it may remand the

case to an administrative law judge with instructions to take

action and issue a decision or return the case to the Appeals

Council with a recommended decision.

Thus, it would be inappropriate for the Court to remand the case to the Hearing Office Chief

Administrative Law Judge.

Gregory and Magistrate Judge Carruth refer to the period from February 25, 2000, to

January 30, 2002, as the relevant period for a possible benefits award on remand. Although

Gregory initially sought disability benefits from February 25, 2000, he later amended his date

of disability onset to September 7, 2000. [ROP 84] Thus, the relevant period is from

September 7, 2000 to January 30, 2002.

Because the Court is remanding the case for reconsideration, the Commissioner will

have the opportunity to consider additional evidence from the subsequent application and

address the issues Gregory has raised in the motion for summary judgment. Thus, the Court

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will deny Gregory’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice as moot. Accordingly,

the Court will not adopt Magistrate Judge Carruth’s recommendation that the Court partially

grant the motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that United States Magistrate Judge James C. Carruth’s November

23, 2004 Report and Recommendation (U.S.D.C. document #19) is ADOPTED IN PART

as applied to the motion to remand and NOT ADOPTED IN PART as applied to the

motion for summary judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Remand (U.S.D.C.

document #15) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(U.S.D.C. document #6) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner

of Social Security for reconsideration of the initial benefits decision (for benefits between

September 7, 2000 and January 30, 2002) in light of the subsequent decision. This matter

is not remanded for reconsideration of the subsequent decision awarding benefits. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2005.

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