Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSHUA JAMES FROST,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARGARET GILBERT,

Superintendent,*

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-35114

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-00725-

TSZ

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc June 26, 2013

Seattle, Washington

Filed March 21, 2016

Amended August 29, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Stephen

Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard

A. Paez, Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jay S.

Bybee, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr. and

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

* We substitute Superintendent Margaret Gilbert for Patrick Glebe as

the respondent-appellee on our own motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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2 FROST V. GILBERT

Order;

Opinion by Judge Kozinski

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

In light of the Washington State Bar Association Office

of Disciplinary Counsel’s dismissal of a grievance against

Zachary C. Wagnild, the en banc court filed an order

withdrawing an opinion and dissent filed March 21, 2016,

replacing the opinion and dissent with a unanimous amended

opinion, and ordering a petition for rehearing en banc filed by

the King County Prosecutor’s Office and Wagnild’s joinder

in the petition for rehearing filed as amicus briefs.

In the amended opinion, the en banc court, on remand

from the Supreme Court, affirmed the district court’s denial

of habeas corpus relief to Washington state prisoner Joshua

Frost, who challenged his conviction on charges stemming

from his participation in a spree of armed robberies and a

burglary.

The en banc court held that the King County Superior

Court’s erroneous refusal to allow defense counsel to make

alternative arguments during summation – that the state

hadn’t met its burden of proof, and that Frost committed the

crimes under duress – was harmless because the jury heard

overwhelming evidence that Frost committed the charged

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FROST V. GILBERT 3

offenses and any argument that the prosecution failed to meet

its burden of proof would have fallen on deaf ears.

The en banc court granted a certificate of appealability as

to Frost’s claims that the prosecution withheld material,

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and

that the prosecution called witness Edward Shaw to testify

falsely about the existence of that evidence in violation of

Napue v. Illinois. 

The en banc court held that while Frost may have shown

cause for failing to raise the Brady and Napue claims in his

2008 personal restraint petition, he cannot show prejudice. 

The en banc court explained that given the evidence of guilt

presented at trial, there is no reasonable likelihood that

Shaw’s false testimony about having only one plea agreement

could have affected the judgment of the jury, and there is no

reasonable likelihood that the jury could have acquitted Frost

based on his duress defense, even if they had learned of an

undisclosed signed version of Shaw’s plea agreement in a

firearm-and-drug possession case or an undisclosed plea

agreement in Shaw’s domestic-violence case.

COUNSEL

Erik B. Levin (argued), Law Office of Erik Levin, Berkeley,

California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

John Joseph Samson (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Corrections Division; Robert W. Ferguson, AttorneyGeneral,

Olympia, Washington, for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 FROST V. GILBERT

David M. Porter, Co-Chair, NACDL Amicus Committee,

Sacramento, California; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public

Defender and Keith J. Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amici Curiae Ninth Circuit

Federal Public and Community Defenders and National

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

James M. Whisman, Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney;

Daniel T. Satterberg, King County Prosecuting Attorney;

Seattle, Washington; as and for Amicus Curiae King County

Prosecuting Attorney.

Steven W. Fogg, Corr Cronin Michelson Baumgardner Fogg

& Moore LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Amicus Curiae

Zachary C. Wagnild.

ORDER

In light of the Washington State Bar Association Office

of Disciplinary Counsel’s dismissal of the grievance against

Zachary C. Wagnild, ODC File No. 16-00470, the previous

majority opinion and dissent filed March 21, 2016, and

reported at 818 F.3d 469, are WITHDRAWN and

REPLACED by the attached unanimous amended opinion. 

The petition for rehearing en banc filed by the King County

Prosecutor’s Office and Zachary C. Wagnild’s joinder in the

petition for rehearing are ordered to be FILED as amicus

briefs.

Future petitions for rehearing en banc will not be

entertained from the filing of the amended opinion.

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FROST V. GILBERT 5

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

In 2003, Joshua Frost was charged in state court with

participating in an eleven-day spree of armed robberies and

a burglary. Frost’s attorney wanted to argue during

summation that the state hadn’t met its burden of proof and,

in the alternative, that Frost committed the crimes under

duress. The KingCounty Superior Court erroneously refused

to allow counsel to make these alternative arguments, so he

chose to argue duress. The Washington Supreme Court held

that the superior court’s error was harmless. State v. Frost,

161 P.3d 361, 370–71 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). In a previous

en banc opinion, we held that the restriction on Frost’s

closing argument was structural error. Frost v. Van Boening,

757 F.3d 910, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The

Supreme Court reversed. Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 432

(2014) (per curiam). We must now decide whether Frost is

nevertheless entitled to habeas relief because the error,

though not structural, was prejudicial. In addition, we

consider Brady and Napue issues that the district court did not

certify for appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The Harmless Error Issue

Our reviewoftheWashington Supreme Court’s harmlesserror decision is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (requiring

petitioners to demonstrate that a state court’s decision on the

merits is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established [f]ederal law” to obtain

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6 FROST V. GILBERT

habeas relief). We may reverse the state supreme court’s

harmlessness determination only if Frost experienced “actual

prejudice,” that is, where we have “grave doubt about

whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–98

(2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436

(1995) and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993)); see also id. at 2198–99 (explaining that the Brecht

standard “subsumes” the requirements of AEDPA, which

“sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief”

(quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007))). 

Specifically, the inquiry is whether, in light of the record as

a whole, the improper limitation on defense counsel’s closing

argument substantially influenced the verdict. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638–39.

The jury heard overwhelming evidence that Frost

committed the charged offenses. The prosecution introduced

Frost’s recorded confessions, and he testified that he

participated in the robberies and the burglary. The

prosecution also linked evidence found in Frost’s home to the

crimes. On this record, any argument that the prosecution

failed to meet its burden of proof would have fallen on deaf

ears. Accordingly, Frost wasn’t prejudiced by the superior

court’s error in denying him the right to make that argument. 

See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38; see also Davis, 135 S. Ct. at

2199.

II. The Brady and Napue Issues

Frost maintains that the prosecution withheld material,

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). He claims that the evidence would

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FROST V. GILBERT 7

have undermined the testimony of Edward Shaw, a key

prosecution witness. He also argues that the prosecution

called Shaw to testify falsely about the existence of that

exculpatory evidence in violation of Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264, 269–70 (1959).

Shaw wasn’t involved in the robberies and burglary at the

heart of the prosecution’s case. Rather, he was an

acquaintance who testified about how Frost interacted with

ringleader Matthew Williams, who Frost claimed coerced him

into participating in the crimes. In April 2003, Shaw met

with detectives to discuss what he knew about Frost’s

involvement. At that time, Shaw had pending charges for

unlawful possession of drugs and a firearm. Shaw asked for

favorable treatment in exchange for information about Frost’s

criminal activity but the prosecution refused to make a deal. 

Nevertheless, Shaw disclosed what he knew. Frost was

arrested the same day. State v. Frost, 161 P.3d at 364.

Subsequently, but before Frost’s trial, Shaw was charged

with second-degree assault with a deadlyweapon growing out

of a domestic-violence incident. Shaw negotiated two plea

agreements, which are dated November 2003, a few weeks

before Frost’s trial. He received a nine-month sentence for

all his crimes, conditioned on his testifying truthfully against

Frost.

At trial, Shaw testified that Frost was “giggling” when

Shaw asked whether he was involved in the robberies and

burglary. The prosecution highlighted this testimony in its

closing: “When Mr. Shaw talked to the defendant about his

involvement in these robberies, the defendant was giggling. 

Does that sound like duress?”

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Shaw also testified about the plea agreement for his

unlawful-possession case. The prosecution introduced an

unsigned letter summarizing that agreement. Shaw testified

that he had signed a version of the agreement that was

identical to the letter the state presented at trial. Shaw didn’t

mention that he was also negotiating a separate agreement to

resolve his domestic-violence charges. The prosecution did

not disclose the existence of Shaw’s domestic-violence plea

agreement, which ultimately provided that the sentence for

that offense would run concurrently with that for unlawful

possession; nor did it otherwise correct his testimony.

Nor was the signed version of Shaw’s unlawfulpossession plea agreement identical to the letter presented at

trial; it contained a handwritten reference to his domesticviolence case number. The prosecution didn’t produce the

annotated version of the unlawful-possession plea agreement

or the domestic-violence plea agreement. Rather, the

prosecution waited until two days after Frost was convicted

to file both plea agreements in Shaw’s state-court cases. The

state doesn’t dispute that the prosecution was required by

Brady to turn over both plea agreements before Frost’s trial.

In March 2008, shortly after exhausting his direct appeal,

Frost sent a letter requesting “any documentation that could

be used to establish the credibility and or expierance [sic] Mr.

Shaw has or had as a Police Informant.” The public records

officer responded by identifying several docket numbers

involving Shaw, including his domestic-violence case. The

records officer estimated that there were “1000 pages of

documents” responsive to Frost’s request, which would cost

$195.00 to copy and ship. In his reply, Frost explained that

he wasn’t “looking for complete case files, as that would be

quite expensive.” Rather, he sought “any documents” that

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FROST V. GILBERT 9

could show “any special treatment [Shaw] was given in

regards to . . . cooperation with [the prosecuting attorney’s]

office or the King County Police Department.” The records

officer responded that she did not “find any records

responsive to [Frost’s] request.”

Frost persisted: He wrote back that he knew Shaw had

given statements in a particular case, which he identified by

number. He asked the records officer to “please try and comb

through the above-mentioned case files” for Shaw’s

statements and “please send [Frost] a list of any and all King

County Police Case Numbers brought up in those files.” The

records officer responded by identifying two docket

numbers—neither of which was the domestic-violence

case—and informing Frost that she found a statement that

Shaw made in the unlawful-possession case file. No

documents were provided pertaining to the domestic-violence

case. Frost filed a personal restraint petition shortly

afterward in which he raised a number of claims for relief, but

didn’t allege any Brady or Napue violations.

The undisclosed plea agreements first came to light in

2009 when the Federal Public Defender for the Western

District of Washington, appointed by the district court to

represent Frost in his federal habeas proceeding, searched

Shaw’s records at the King County Superior Court Clerk’s

Office. Counsel quickly filed another personal restraint

petition based on this evidence, but the Washington Supreme

Court denied it as untimely. The federal magistrate judge

found that the supreme court relied on a valid procedural rule

in dismissing Frost’s Brady and Napue claims and that Frost

hadn’t shown cause to overcome this default.

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In objecting to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, Frost argued that the prosecution’s

continued failure to disclose the domestic-violence plea

agreement frustrated his ability to raise timely Brady and

Napue claims. He presented his 2008 communications with

the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. 

Accordingly, he asserted that he had cause for his procedural

default.

The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation in full. He concluded that Frost’s

evidence didn’t demonstrate that the prosecuting attorney’s

office engaged in “persistent efforts to suppress”

impeachment evidence. The district judge also found that

Shaw’s testimony wasn’t pivotal in light of the prosecution’s

ample evidence establishing Frost’s involvement in the

charged crimes. The district judge declined to grant

certificates of appealability on Frost’s Brady and Napue

claims.

A.

The standard for granting a certificate of appealability is

low. Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 790 (9th Cir. 2013)

(as amended). All that’s required is that “reasonable jurists

could debate” whether the petition states a “valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right” and whether the district court

“was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As explained below, these issues

are at least debatable and implicate Frost’s constitutional

rights. Accordingly, Frost has met the standard for granting

a certificate of appealability, and we do so here.

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FROST V. GILBERT 11

B.

Because the Washington Supreme Court held that Frost

defaulted on his Brady and Napue claims, he must overcome

the default by showing cause and prejudice. See Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).

Cause. Frost started researching his Brady and Napue

claims well before the deadline for filing a personal restraint

petition had passed. The Supreme Court denied Frost’s

petition for certiorari on January 14, 2008, see Frost v.

Washington, 552 U.S. 1145 (Jan. 14, 2008), so he had until

January 14, 2009 to seek relief through collateral review. See

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(2), (3)(c) (2008). Frost made

his first inquiry to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s

Office about documents that would call Shaw’s credibility

into question in March 2008. Had the prosecuting attorney’s

office responded accurately to Frost’s document requests, he

could have filed a timely petition.

Frost first asked for “any documents . . . that could be

used to establish the credibility . . . Mr. Shaw has or had as a

Police Informant.” The records officer represented that she

could provide complete case files for $195 or that Frost could

narrow his search. Frost narrowed the search by asking for

“any documents . . . in regards to any special treatment

[Shaw] was given in regards to . . . cooperation with your

office or the King County Police Department.” The officer

responded that she did “not find any records responsive to

[Frost’s] request.” Frost then rephrased his query as for

“information . . . that would show [Shaw’s] reliability,” but

maintains that the records officer was unresponsive to his

request.

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12 FROST V. GILBERT

Frost explains that his delay in bringing his Brady and

Napue claims is due to the KingCounty Prosecuting Attorney

Office’s initial failure to disclose potentially exculpatory

information surrounding Shaw’s plea agreements. And its

later failure to disgorge Shaw’s plea agreements, despite

Frost’s repeated requests, may amount to “interference by

officials” that supplies cause to excuse Frost’s procedural

default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)

(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953)). At the

least, it shows “some objective factor external to the defense”

that prevented Frost from complying with Washington’s rule

setting time limits for bringing personal restraint petitions. 

Id.; accord Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988).

Frost filed a personal restraint petition in 2008 raising

multiple claims for relief. No doubt, he would have presented

allegations of Brady and Napue violations in that petition, had

he been aware of the facts supporting those arguments. 

“[T]he reason for [Frost’s] failure to develop facts in [s]tatecourt proceedings may have been the [s]tate’s suppression of

the relevant evidence.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691

(2004) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282). If so, Frost has

demonstrated cause for failing to raise his Brady and Napue

claims in his 2008 personal restraint petition. See, e.g.,

Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222 (finding “ample cause to excuse [a

petitioner’s] procedural default” where county officials

concealed a key document and counsel had no tactical reason

for failing to raise the claim); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d

1288, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) (petitioner demonstrated cause

where state failed to disclose Brady material in its possession

despite multiple requests from counsel); Crivens v. Roth,

172 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1999) (petitioner had cause to

overcome procedural default of Brady claim where

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FROST V. GILBERT 13

prosecution didn’t provide the criminal record of its witness

until after the habeas petition was filed).

Prejudice. While Frost may have shown cause, he cannot

show prejudice. Given the evidence of guilt presented at trial,

there is no “reasonable likelihood” that Shaw’s false

testimony about only having one plea agreement could have

“affected the judgment of the jury.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658

F.3d 898, 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jackson v.

Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008)) (finding no

prejudice at trial from a Napue violation where the

defendant’s own testimony and physical evidence “pointed to

his guilt”). Had the jury learned of Shaw’s second plea

agreement, there is no “reasonable probability” that the

outcome would have been different. See Strickler, 527 U.S.

at 296.

Shaw’s undisclosed domestic-violence offense carried a

maximum sentence of five years—the same as his unlawfulpossession offenses. It is unlikely that the prosecution could

have put pressure on Shaw to change his testimony by

threatening to seek consecutive sentences for his offenses. In

Washington, there is a presumption that sentences imposed at

the same time will be served concurrently. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9.94A.589(1)(a); State v. Vance, 230 P.3d 1055, 1058–59

(Wash. 2010) (en banc). Nothing in the record suggests that

the state could have overcome this presumption. Neither of

Shaw’s crimes were “serious violent offenses.” Wash. Rev.

Code § 9.94A.030(37) (2002) (defining “serious violent

offense”); id. § 9.94A.589(1)(b) (requiring consecutive

sentences for defendants who’ve committed two or more

serious violent offenses). Nor is there evidence of any other

factor that Washington courts normally rely on in justifying

consecutive sentences, such as the use of a “high degree of

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14 FROST V. GILBERT

sophistication or planning,” or an abuse of a “position of

trust.” See id. § 9.94A.535(2)(e)(v)–(vi).

While Frost could have shown that Shaw was a bad guy

because he not only unlawfully possessed a firearm and drugs

but also assaulted his girlfriend, it wouldn’t have gotten him

far. The jury already knew that Shaw received benefits in

exchange for his testimony. The jury also heard that Shaw

gave information about Frost’s crimes to the police even after

they declined a deal on his pending unlawful-possession

charges. And the jury was aware that Shaw approached

authorities with information about Frost in April, well before

he committed the assault in August.

Any impact of this impeachment evidence would have

been vitiated by Frost’s own testimony, which cast doubt on

his duress defense. Frost didn’t have a good answer for why

he didn’t attempt to escape from Williams when he had a

chance. He admitted that he was left alone in the car when

his accomplices committed one of the robberies. Frost also

admitted that he picked up Williams on several occasions, as

Williams didn’t have a car. Frost acknowledged that he never

tried to get his mother and brother to a safe place in response

to Williams’s alleged threats against them. Nor did he call

911, although he’d previously done so when he felt

threatened by others. Finally, Frost admitted that, during his

first interview with the police, he didn’t say that he had been

threatened by Williams, even though the officer twice urged

him to say “anything” he wanted. There’s no reasonable

likelihood that the jury could have acquitted Frost based on

his duress defense, even if they had learned of the

undisclosed plea agreements.

* * *

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FROST V. GILBERT 15

Because Frost can’t show prejudice as a result of the

errors committed at his trial, he is entitled to no relief in

federal court.

AFFIRMED.

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