Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00306/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00306-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH BARAJAS,

Petitioner,

v.

TIM V. VERGA,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00306-SKO HC

ORDER DENYING THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The sole ground for the petition is ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel.

I. Procedural Background2

On March 24, 2010, a jury in the California Superior Court for the County of Kern convicted 

Petitioner of two counts of first degree robbery within an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Penal Code § 

212.5(A)); first degree burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 460(A)); two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(B)); false imprisonment of an elder adult (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 368(F)); theft from an elder adult (Cal. Penal Code § 368(D)); false imprisonment (Cal. Penal 

 

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate 

Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

2 The following information is derived from the pleadings in this case and from state court records lodged by Respondent 

with his response.

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Code § 236); resisting arrest by use of force (Cal. Penal Code § 69); and active participation in a 

criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22);[. The jury found multiple sentencing enhancements

to be true. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total determinate prison 

term of twenty years and eight months.

Petitioner filed an appeal3to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which 

affirmed the judgment on May 8, 2012. Petitioner did not file a petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court.

On July 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in Kern County Superior Court, 

alleging a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from his trial attorney's failure to 

object to hearsay testimony of David Prince regarding several statements made by Zeus Sanchez in 

the course of the robbery. The superior court denied the petition on August 8, 2012. On August 30, 

2012, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Fifth Appellate District Court, which denied the 

petition on September 6, 2012. Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court 

on September 14, 2012. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on November 20, 2012.

On February 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court; 

Respondent answered on September 5, 2013. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

II. Factual Background4

For a period of roughly six months, approximately 10 to 12 years prior to 

trial, [Petitioner] lived with David and Barbara Prince as a foster child. David 

was a gun collector and has a gun safe in his house; [Petitioner] was aware, when 

he lived with the Princes, that David had guns. [Petitioner's] foster child 

relationship with the Princes ended when, at about age 15, he decided he no 

longer wanted to live with the Princes and moved back to Los Angeles.

On April 26, 2009 (April 26), David was 72 years old. He was at home 

that day, in the kitchen, when a person both David and Barbara later identified as 

Zeus Sanchez entered the house through an open door, put a gun to David's head, 

grabbed him by the back of the shirt, and ordered him to get down on the floor. 

 

3

Petitioner's appellate attorney filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979), requesting that 

the appellate court independently review the entire record of appeal. See Lodged Doc. 2.

4 The factual background, taken from the opinion of the state appellate court (People v. Barajas, 2012 WL 1595120 at 

*3-5 (A.D. May 8, 2012) (No. F061549)), is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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David complied. Barbara, who was in another room, heard Sanchez, at which 

point she turned and saw him. He pointed the gun at her and told her to get down 

on the floor; she too complied. David testified Sanchez said "he had his boys in 

the house," they were "going through the house," and "they wouldn't be there very 

long." Barbara could hear someone opening drawers and ransacking the house. 

She testified that Sanchez "made several references to other people in the house . . 

. ." Barbara also testified that Sanchez "tried to take" rings she was wearing, but 

she" told him to stop and not touch [her]" and took the rings off herself.

At some point thereafter, Sanchez asked David where the guns were. 

David told him they were in a safe in the garage. Sanchez grabbed David by the 

shirt, got him to his feet, and, pointing the gun at David, walked him to the 

garage. There, Sanchez demanded that David open the safe, but David told him 

the safe belonged to his son and he did not have the combination. At that point, 

David testified, Sanchez became "upset" and "started bouncing [David] off the

safe or off the garage door wall." Sanchez then grabbed David by the back of the 

neck and, holding the gun to David's head, walked him back to the kitchen.

While David and Sanchez were in the garage, Barbara noticed her cell 

phone was lying on a table in the living room. She grabbed the phone and called 

911.

Sanchez and David returned to the kitchen, at which point Sanchez made 

David and Barbara lie face down on the ground and tied their hands with an 

electrical cord. At that point, Sanchez made a call on a cell phone and, Barbara 

testified, stated that "they were done and it was time to go." Sanchez then left the 

room, and shortly thereafter, the Princes heard the front door close.

On April 26, City of Bakersfield police officers went to the Prince's home 

in response to a report of a home invasion robbery. As officers approached the 

house, Zeus Sanchez came out of the house and began running. Officers ordered 

Sanchez to stop, he did so, and as he was raising his arms in response to a 

directive from the officers, a loaded semi-automatic pistol fell from the area of his 

waistband onto the ground. Officers took Sanchez into custody.

Officer Sean Underhill saw Sanchez being taken into custody, and shortly 

thereafter, saw Petitioner walk out the front door of the house. [Petitioner] began 

walking away but when he saw police cars, he turned and began running. 

Officers gave chase, apprehended [Petitioner] and, after a struggle, succeeded in 

taking him into custody. Officer Underhill searched [Petitioner's] pockets and, in 

[Petitioner's] front pants pocket, found David's wallet.

After officers took [Petitioner] and Sanchez into custody, a duffel bag 

belonging to David, filled with items belonging to him, was found in the family 

room.

People v. Barajas, 2012 WL 1595120 at *3-5 (A.D. May 8, 2012) (No. F061549) 

(footnotes omitted).

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The parties do not dispute jurisdiction, venue, or service.

III. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of the 

merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) 

(Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme malfunctions" in 

state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 ("AEDPA"), a petitioner can prevail only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of 

his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413.

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, 

subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 538 

U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme 

Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must then consider 

whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court 

contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court must apply the presumption 

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that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The

petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 

1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The AEDPA standard is difficult to satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not 

demonstrate that the state court's determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. "A 

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 

incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the 

state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,

664 (2004)). 

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense 

attorney did not object to David Prince's testifying to statements made by Zeus Sanchez in the course 

of the robbery, which Petitioner contends was hearsay. 

The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives 

a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). "[T]he right to counsel is the right 

to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). "The 

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that 

his trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" at the time of 

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trial and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 688, 694. The Strickland test requires 

Petitioner to establish two elements: (1) his attorneys' representation was deficient and (2) prejudice. 

Both elements are mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 698.

These elements need not be considered in order. Id. at 697. "The object of an 

ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance." Id. If a court can resolve an 

ineffectiveness claim by finding a lack of prejudice, it need not consider whether counsel's 

performance was deficient. Id.

In the state habeas proceedings, both the Fifth Appellate District Court and the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Accordingly, 

the last reasoned decision was that of the Kern County Superior Court:

To prevail in a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, petitioner must show that 

counsel's conduct fell below professional norms causing prejudice. In the absence 

of such prejudice, it would be probable that a more favorable outcome would 

result. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694, 697.

Generally, failure to object to inadmissible evidence is ineffective assistance of 

counsel. People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1216. However, counsel 

need not make unmeritorious objections. Knowles v. Mirzayance (2009) 556 U.S. 

111, 125.

Since the testimony of David Prince was admissible on both hearsay and nonhearsay exceptions, and the testimony of Officer Yoon was admissible under the 

above-mentioned hearsay exceptions, there was no error by counsel.

Even assuming arguendo that the testimony of both witnesses were inadmissible, 

there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction due to the apprehension of 

both co-defendants, the in-court and out-of-court identification, as well as the 

seized evidence from the robbery.

Lodged Doc. 5: Barajas v. Virga at *5 (Cal.Super.Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (No. 

HC013161A).

When a petitioner challenges a state court's application of governing federal law, such as the 

Strickland test, he must demonstrate that the Court's action was not only erroneous, but objectively 

unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). In this case, Petitioner's 

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misunderstanding of the rules of evidence governing hearsay led him to misinterpret the absence of 

an objection as error. In fact, Mr. Prince's testimony was not hearsay in that it was not offered for 

the truth of the matters stated but as a means of explaining his actions in the greater context of the 

incident in his home that gave rise to the criminal charges against Petitioner. As a result, Sanchez's 

statements explained Prince's actions—first, lying on the living room floor under Sanchez's guard; 

then, proceeding to the garage where the gun safe was located; and finally, submitting to being tied 

up with electrical cord and remaining still in the living room until he heard Sanchez close the front 

door behind himself. Prince testified that he complied with Sanchez's commands in fear for his life 

and expecting that he would be shot at any minute. As a result, admission of Mr. Prince's testimony 

did not constitute hearsay.

Even if Prince's testimony were hearsay, the trial court held that Sanchez's statements were 

admissible under the state of mind exception of California Evidence Code § 1250. The statements to 

which Prince testified indicated Sanchez's intent or plan to ransack the Prince's home and to steal 

Mr. Prince's guns, the cooperation of Sanchez's "boys" in the planned crime, and his intent to please 

his "people," the street gang.

Because the state court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively 

reasonable and no fair-minded jurist could disagree that the state court's decision conflicted with 

Supreme Court's precedent, this Court may not grant the writ based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

V. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of 

appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or 

trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test 

the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

 appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention 

 complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

 right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

 specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

I 

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability "if 

jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that 

jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the 

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than 

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate

of appealability.

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VI. Conclusion

The Court hereby DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is directed to 

enter judgment for the Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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