Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05216/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05216-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY C. HAYES,

aka HENRY M. MITCHELL, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05216-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF 

TO FILE AN AMENDED 

COMPLAINT OR A WRITTEN 

INDICATION TO PROCEED WITH 

THE COGNIZABLE CLAIM ONLY

INTRODUCTION

For at least the second time, plaintiff Henry C. Hayes, aka Henry M. Mitchell, Jr., 

challenges a California prison regulation that forbids prisoners from receiving mail that 

exceeds 16 ounces. His prior suit was unsuccessful. Mitchell v. Gipson, 1:12-cv-00469-

LJO-DLB (E.D. Cal. 2016). The damages claims were dismissed by the Eastern District 

on grounds of qualified immunity, (id., Dkt. No. 30), a ruling that the Ninth Circuit upheld 

on appeal, (id., Dkt. No. 36). Because qualified immunity does not bar claims for 

declaratory, injunctive, or prospective relief, the suit was remanded to the Eastern District. 

(Id.) The suit was eventually dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Hayes having transferred 

prisons. (Id., Dkt. No. 53.) 

Hayes should be aware that if he pursues his present suit, his damages claims will 

likely be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity, assuming that defendants choose to 

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

raise that affirmative defense. The ruling on his prior case would appear to be applicable, 

although I understand that Hayes disputes that defendants are entitled to such immunity. 

(Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 at 13-15.) 

Hayes should also be aware that because he paid the filing fee, he is not proceeding 

in forma pauperis (IFP).1 If this action goes forward, Hayes is responsible for serving 

defendants in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Instructions on how to 

serve defendant(s) will be sent to plaintiff after he has complied with the instant order. 

Some of the defendants and claims will have to be dismissed, as I explain below. 

Hayes has two choices. On or before May 18, 2020, he must file (i) an amended 

complaint that cures the deficiencies in the claim against Z. Love; or (ii) a written 

indication that he wishes to proceed only with the cognizable claim against Josey. Failure 

to comply with these instructions by that date will result in the dismissal of this action and 

entry of judgment in favor of defendants. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 

See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

 

1 Hayes filed a motion to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 2.) He was ordered to show cause why 

pauper status was not barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Hayes having brought at least 

three actions or appeals that counted as strikes under the statute. (The Order to Show 

Cause identified seven prior actions or appeals that were dismissed by a federal court on 

grounds that they were frivolous or malicious, or because they failed to state a claim for 

relief. (Dkt. No. 3 at 2-3).) Rather than show cause, Hayes paid the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 

4.) His IFP motion was then denied. (Dkt. No. 8.) 

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 

be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 

(9th Cir. 1994). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

1. Original Complaint

In his original complaint, Hayes alleged that in February 2019 his jailors at Pelican 

Bay State Prison interfered with his First Amendment rights by refusing him a package 

that exceeded the CDCR’s 16-ounce weight limit, as codified at 15 California Code of 

Regulations § 3134(a)(11). 

The complaint was dismissed because Hayes failed to attach liability to anyone. 

Hayes then filed a first amended complaint, which is the subject of this order.

2. First Amended Complaint

In the first amended complaint, Hayes alleges that his jailors at Pelican Bay violated 

the First Amendment and his due process rights by refusing him a piece of incoming mail 

that exceeded the CDCR’s 16-ounce weight limit for standard mail. (First Am. Compl., 

Dkt. No. 9 at 1-2.) He alleges that his mail was “Priority Mail” and therefore did not fall 

within the ambit of the standard mail limit of 16 ounces. (Id.) He names as defendants Z. 

Love, the mailroom supervisor and the person who interviewed Hayes during the 

grievance process; S. Josey, the Pelican Bay employee who “drafted and signed” the 

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

disapproval notification (id. at 7); D. Wilcox, a correctional captain, who approved the 

immediate return of the package “base[d] upon his arbitrary discretion,” (id. at 10); and 

Jim Robertson, the Warden of Pelican Bay. 

Hayes alleges both First Amendment and procedural due process claims. He 

alleges defendants’ enforcement of the regulation violated his First Amendment right to 

receive mail. Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See 

Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 

401, 407 (1989)). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge 

on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related 

to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). He 

alleges also that defendants violated his procedural due process right (i) to have the mail 

held at the prison (rather than returned to the sender) during the grievance process; and 

(ii) by failing to rule in his favor. 

When liberally construed, Hayes has stated a cognizable First Amendment claim 

against S. Josey, who drafted and signed the disapproval of Hayes’s mail. 

The First Amendment and due process claims against D. Wilcox are based on 

Wilcox having returned the mail to the sender rather than holding it while the grievance 

process played out. But it was Josey, not Wilcox, who disapproved the package and 

committed the alleged First Amendment violation. Wilcox merely acted in response to the 

disapproval. His random and unauthorized conduct is not remediable under section 1983. 

These two claims against him are DISMISSED.

Hayes alleges that Wilcox acted arbitrarily and in violation of CDCR policy by 

returning the mail before the grievance process was completed. But neither the negligent 

nor intentional deprivation of property states a claim under § 1983 if the deprivation was, 

as here, random and unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981). 

The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action, 

precludes relief because it provides sufficient process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 

113, 128 (1990). California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any 

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

property deprivations. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. 

Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). 

Hayes’s due process claims against Josey, Love, and Robertson, which are based on 

the same arbitrary conduct, are DISMISSED on the same grounds. These claims are 

dismissed without prejudice to Hayes pursuing his state court remedies. 

The due process claims against Z. Love and J. Robertson, based on their conduct as 

grievance reviewers, are DISMISSED without leave to amend; grievance reviewers are not 

responsible for the underlying constitutional violation. Mere involvement in reviewing an 

inmate’s administrative grievance does not necessarily demonstrate awareness of an 

alleged violation, or contribute to the underlying violation. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

609 (7th Cir. 2007). “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are 

responsible.” Id. “Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause 

or contribute to the violation.” Id.

Any First Amendment claim against Robertson is also DISMISSED without leave 

to amend because he had no involvement in the alleged violation. Robertson did not bar 

Hayes from receiving the package; he acted only as a grievance reviewer. 

Hayes claims Z. Love had the authority to change the allegedly unconstitutional 

regulation, and by not changing it, he violated Hayes’s First Amendment rights. This 

claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. It is unlikely that Love had the authority to 

change a regulation that applied to all CDCR institutions, and Hayes has provided no facts 

plausibly indicating that he had such authority. 

In sum, all claims against D. Wilcox and J. Robertson are DISMISSED without 

leave to amend. Hayes’s First Amendment claim against Z. Love for failing to change the 

regulation is DISMISSED with leave to amend. His due process claims against Love and 

Josey are DISMISSED without leave to amend. His First Amendment claim against Josey 

is cognizable. 

CONCLUSION

On or before May 18, 2020, plaintiff must file (i) an amended complaint that cures 

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the deficiencies against Z. Love (and omits the claims dismissed without leave to amend); 

or (ii) a written indication that he wishes to proceed only with the cognizable claim against 

Josey. Failure to comply with these instructions by that date will result in the dismissal of 

this action and entry of judgment in favor of defendants. 

The new complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this 

order (19-05216 WHO (PR)) and the words SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on the 

first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaints, 

plaintiff must include in his first amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present 

and all of the defendants he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 

(9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. 

Failure to comply with (i) or (ii) on or before May 18, 2020 will result in dismissal 

of this action without further notice to plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2020

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-05216-WHO Document 10 Filed 04/02/20 Page 6 of 6