Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02257/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WAYNE LLOYD MAGNUSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

. . fILED 

U<m«l States Court of Appeals 'r,--~·1, ( " . .. · .ru .. d . ..,!f(l.1!": 

MAR .1 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 89-2257 

) 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS in ) 

its official capacity; ROBERT ) 

CHARLES BARBAREE, Sheriff, Lea ) 

County, personally a nd in his ) 

official capacity; GEORGE TEAGUE, ) 

Administrator, Lea County ) 

Detention Facility, personally and) 

in his official capacity; GEORGE ) 

MARTIN, Head Jailer, Lea County ) 

Detention Facility, personally and) 

in his official capacity; MARY ANN) 

SWAIN, Nurse, Lea County Detent i on) 

Facility, personally and in her ) 

official capacity, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-1072-M) 

(District of New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2257 Document: 01019966105 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

In this case, Wayne Lloyd Magnuson, a prisoner at the 

Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility, filed an action against 

appellees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In his complaint, appellant alleged that his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment was violated in that appellees exercised 

deliberate indifference to appellant's medical needs. Appellees 

filed an answer denying all allegations on January 12, 1988. On 

January 19, 1988, appellant filed another pleading which he titled 

"Plaintiff's Response To Answer Filed By Defendants." Record, 

vol. 1, Doc. 5. In this response appellant renewed a number of 

allegations and controverted appellees' denials. In the last sentence of h i s response , a1:-JpelldnL "rnuve[d] i..he courL 

case for trial." Record, vol. 1, Doc. 5, at 2. 

Following his response, no trial date was set and nothing 

happened in the case for seventeen months. Finally, on June 29, 

1989, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed the action without 

prejudice due to "Plaintiff's failure to prosecute and [the] 

Court's inherent power to regulate its docket." Record, vol. 1, 

Doc. 11, Order, June 29, 1989. On July 11, 1989, appellant filed 

a motion which he labeled as a "Motion For Relief From Order Of 

Dismissal" pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Record, vol. 1, 

Doc. 12. The court denied appellant's motion by order dated 

October 11, 1989. Record, vol. 1, Doc. 16. Appellant then filed 

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Appellate Case: 89-2257 Document: 01019966105 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 2 
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a notice of appeal on October 24, 1989. Record, vol. 1, Doc. 18. 

We now reverse for the reasons stated below. 

Appellees argue that appellant is barred on appeal from raising any challenge to the merits of the dismissal. This is so, 

according to appellees, because the dismissal took place on 

June 29, 1989, and appellant did not file his notice of appeal 

until October 24, 1989, well past the thirty-day period allowed. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). We note, however, that appellant filed 

his motion for relief from the dismissal under Rule 60(b) on 

July 11, 1989. In that motion, appellant asks the court to "reopen the case, and to set a date for trial at the earliest date 

convenient." Record, vol. 1, Doc. 12. Because this motion calls 

into question the validity of the dismissal and was filed within 

to Rule 59. See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 882-83 

(10th Cir. 1986); Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 

1983). Because motions pursuant to Rule 59 toll the period for 

filing a timely appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l), appellant was 

allowed additional time to file his appeal after his motion was 

denied on October 1, 1989. We hold, therefore, that appellant's 

motion of July 11, 1989, fairly raises a Rule 59 issue and that 

his appeal as to the merits of the dismissal is timely raised as 

1 Appellant's motion was filed on July 11, 1989, which fell on 

a Thursday. Thus, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Independence 

Day, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), appellant's motion could have been 

filed any time up until July 14, 1989 under Rule 59. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2257 Document: 01019966105 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 3 
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well as his challenge to the court's denial of his motion. 

Accordingly, we examine the merits of appellant's challenge to the 

dismissal using an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

In our review of the record, we find no instance in which 

appellant was given notice and opportunity to respond before the 

case was dismissed. Given the informal circumstances of this 

case, in which appellant proceeded E!.9_ se, and in which he had 

requested that the court set the case for trial, we conclude that 

it was an abuse of the court's discretion to dismiss the case 

without some opportunity to respond. 

We therefore REVERSE the dismissal of appellant's action and 

REMAND for further proceedings. The mandate shall issue 

f or chwich . 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-2257 Document: 01019966105 Date Filed: 03/12/1990 Page: 4