Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00332/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00332-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG ALAN CLARK AND CHRISTINA

CLARK, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

TRANSPACK CORPORATION; BUCKLEY

& ASSOCIATES, INC.;

TRANSAMERICA HOME LOAN;

WILSHIRE CREDIT CORPORATION;

OCWEN FEDERAL BANK; and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CIV-S-04-0332 DFL PAN 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Craig and Christina Clark (“the Clarks”) sued

defendants Transpack Corporation (“Transpack”), Buckley &

Associates (“Buckley”), Transamerica Financial Services

(“Transamerica”), and Wilshire Credit Corporation (“Wilshire”),

for alleged wrongdoing in connection with the foreclosure sale of

the Clarks’ home. Both sides move for summary judgment or, in

the alternative, partial summary judgment. The defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., (FDCPA) claim is GRANTED. The

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). The case

is remanded to the Sacramento County Superior Court. 

I.

In 1989, the Clarks bought a home located at 209 West

Elkhorn Boulevard in Rio Linda, California. (PUF ¶ 3.) In June

1992, they borrowed $49,846.23 from Transamerica. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

The Clarks secured this loan by executing a deed of trust on the

home. (FAC ¶ 11.) Transamerica subsequently lost the promissory

note evidencing the terms of the June 1992 loan. (PUF ¶ 8.)

In October 1993, the Clarks filed for bankruptcy. (DUF ¶

4.) On October 5, 1993, the Clarks reaffirmed Transamerica’s

lien by executing a Statement of Intention. (Id. ¶ 7.) The

bankruptcy court discharged the Clarks’ case in January 1994. 

(Id. ¶ 5.) The Clarks continued to make monthly payments

according to the alleged terms of the loan until July 1995. 

(Virgil Decl. Ex. 15 at 5-8, 19-37.) Beginning in August 1995,

the Clarks reduced their loan payments by almost half. (Id.) 

They paid this reduced amount each month until July 1996. (Id.) 

At that time, the Clarks stopped making any payments on the loan

even though there was an outstanding balance. (Id.) 

On November 13, 2001, Transamerica sold the loan and deed to

Transpack. (Defs.’Opp’n at 4-5.) On November 26, 2001,

Transpack substituted Buckley as trustee under the Deed of Trust. 

(Id. at 5.) On that same day, Buckley recorded with the

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Sacramento County Recorder a “Notice of Default and Election to

Sell Under Deed of Trust” (the “Notice of Default”). (Bowditch

Decl. Ex. 2.) On December 3, 2001, Buckley sent the Clarks a

debt validation notice indicating the amount owed on the debt

(the “Debt Validation Notice”). (Buchanan Decl. Ex. G.) In

February 2002, Buckley recorded a “Notice of Trustee’s Sale.” 

(Id. Ex. H.) The notice indicated that the sale was scheduled

for March 27, 2002. (Id.) 

Transpack postponed the initial sale from March 27, 2002

until April 24, 2002. (Bowditch Decl. ¶ 21.) Both parties then

agreed to postpone the sale again from April 24, 2002 until April

30, 2002. (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 25, 2002, the Clarks filed a

second bankruptcy. (Clark Decl. ¶ 7.) Buckley postponed the

sale an additional fourteen times during this bankruptcy. 

(Bowditch Decl. ¶ 24.) The bankruptcy court dismissed the

Clarks’ case on January 16, 2003. (DUF ¶ 27.) Buckley held the

foreclosure sale on February 5, 2003. (Id. ¶ 29.) Transpack

purchased the subject property for $84,000.00 at the sale. (Id.

¶¶ 29-30.) 

On February 6, 2003, the Clarks found a “three-day notice”

posted on their property. (Clark Decl. ¶ 7.) On February 11,

2003 the Clarks filed a third bankruptcy. (DUF ¶ 41.) Transpack

moved for relief from the automatic stay. (Id. ¶ 43.) The court

granted Transpack’s motion on May 20, 2003. (Id.) On June 9,

2003, Transpack filed an unlawful detainer action against the

Clarks. (Id. ¶ 45.) On September 24, 2003, a Sacramento County

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In their amended complaint, the Clarks list nine state 1

claims and a federal claim under the FDCPA. (Compl. ¶¶ 54-55.) 

However, in their summary judgment motion, the Clarks briefly

accuse the defendants of violating the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 12601 et seq. (RESPA). This claim

is not included in the complaint. The Clarks did not seek leave

of court to amend the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Because

the Clarks did not properly plead this claim, the court will not

consider it. 

4

Superior Court judge issued Transpack a writ of possession for

the subject property. (Id. ¶ 47.) On November 14, 2003,

Transpack sold the house to Kukis Home Repair, Inc. for

$161,500.00. (Id. ¶ 48.) The property was sold about six

months later for $256,000. (Clark Decl. at 5.) 

The Clarks filed the original complaint in Sacramento County

Superior Court on June 17, 2003. (DUF ¶ 49.) On October 24,

2003, Wilshire removed the action based on the Clarks’ single

federal claim. (Id. ¶ 50.) The Clarks filed a First Amended

Complaint on August 18, 2004. (Id. ¶ 51.) The amended complaint

includes one federal and nine state causes of action. (Id.) On

May 13, 2005, Wilshire was dismissed with prejudice. (Id. ¶ 53.) 

On June 10, 2005, the Clarks settled with Transamerica for

$2,500. (Id. ¶ 62.) Transpack and Buckley are the only

remaining defendants in this case (collectively “the

defendants”).

II.

Both parties seek summary judgment on the Clarks’ claim that

the defendants violated the FDCPA. (Pls.’ Mot. at 13.) The 1

Clarks allege that the defendants violated FDCPA by: (1)

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

“repeatedly demanding arbitrary and varying amounts of principal

and interest and other unexplained amounts” without possession of

the actual promissory note; (2) failing to set forth the method

of calculating the amount due on the loan; and (3) “obfuscat[ing]

their identity and role in their communications” with the Clarks. 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 14.) 

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment on the FDCPA claim because none of the alleged

violations occurred during the limitations period. (Defs.’ Mot.

at 26.) Section 1692k(d) requires plaintiffs to bring FDCPA

claims “within one year from the date on which the violation

occurs.” The Clarks filed the original complaint in this action

on June 17, 2003. (Notice of Removal Ex. A.) Therefore, the

Clarks can only bring claims for violations that occurred on or

after June 17, 2002. 

The Notice of Default, Debt Validation Notice, and Notice of

Trustee’s Sale were all delivered prior to June 17, 2002. 

(Buchanan Decl. Exs. E, G, H.) Therefore, the Clarks cannot

assert a FDCPA claim based on alleged irregularities in those

documents. Although the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was generated

within the limitations period, it is not covered by the FDCPA

because the document serves to evidence a sale, not collect a

debt. The FDCPA is limited to debt collection activities. See

15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting misleading communications in

connection with the collection of a debt); Wade v. Reg’l Credit

Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the FDCPA

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In their opposition, the Clarks list two other statements 2

of debt: (1) the First American Title Trustee’s Sale Guarantee;

and (2) the Notice of Servicing Transfer. The information on

these documents does not afford the Clarks a cause of action

under the FDCPA because: (1) neither attempts to recover a debt;

(2) the defendants did not participate in creating or

distributing the Notice of Servicing Transfer; and (3) the sale

guarantee was not uncovered until discovery, therefore it could

not have misled the Clarks prior to the foreclosure sale. 

(Buchanan Decl. Exs. B, D.)

6

aims to prevent abusive debt collection practices). Therefore,

even if the defendants listed an incorrect amount of debt on that

instrument, they did not violate the FDCPA. 

The Clarks allege no other instance where the defendants

declared an incorrect amount due on the loan in an effort to

collect the debt. Similarly, there is no evidence of the 2

defendants making a deceptive communication after June 17, 2002.

However, at the hearing on this motion, the Clarks contended that

their claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because

the defendants engaged in a “course of conduct” after June 17,

2002 that deceived the Clarks. This argument also fails.

To determine when the limitations period begins to run for

an FDCPA claim, courts look to the debt collector’s “last

opportunity to comply with the [Act].” Mattson v. U.S. West

Communications, 967 F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Naas

v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997); Maloy v. Phillips,

64 F.3d 607, 608 (11th Cir. 1995). For example, if the FDCPA

violation is the filing of a meritless collection action in state

court, then the statute of limitations begins to run when the

debt collector files suit. Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. Similarly, if

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

the violation is a harassing debt collection letter, then the

statute of limitations begins to run when the debt collector

mails the letter. Maloy, 64 F.3d at 608. This is true even

though the effects of these actions might persist for months or

even years.

The evidence shows that after June 17, 2002, the defendants:

(1) postponed the sale of the property thirteen times; (2)

obtained leave from the automatic stay to sell the property; and

(3) sold the property. There is no evidence that defendants’

“course of conduct” after June 17, 2002 included making any

misrepresentations in an effort to collect the debt. Therefore,

even if the Clarks were deterred from repaying the loan because

it was misstated on the Notice of Default, Debt Validation

Notice, or in some other pre-June 17, 2002 communication, their

claims under the FDCPA are time-barred. 

III.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the FDCPA claim

is GRANTED. The court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The clerk

shall: (1) remand the case to the Sacramento County Superior

Court, and (2) enter judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 11/11/2005 /s/ David F. Levi 

 DAVID F. LEVI

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:04-cv-00332-DFL-PAN Document 109 Filed 11/14/05 Page 7 of 7