Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01502/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01502-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WAYDE HOLLIS HARRIS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-cv-1502 AC P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Currently before the court is respondent’s fully 

briefed motion to dismiss, ECF No. 84, which was heard on the court’s regular law and motion 

calendar on October 12, 2016. Emry J. Allen appeared on behalf of petitioner, and Deputy 

Attorney General Max Feinstat appeared on behalf of respondent. ECF No. 87. The parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 305(a). ECF Nos. 8, 64. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 A jury convicted petitioner of (1) corporeal injury on a cohabitant, (2) assault with a 

firearm, (3) possession of a firearm, (4) possession of a firearm after inflicting corporeal injury on 

a cohabitant, (5) two counts of making a criminal threat, and (6) failure to appear after release on 

bail. ECF No. 61 at 2. He was sentenced on October 24, 2008. Id. 

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A. Direct Review 

 Petitioner, with assistance of counsel, appealed his conviction, concluding with a petition 

for review in the California Supreme Court filed on July 2, 2010. Lod. Doc. No. 3. The petition 

was denied on September 1, 2010. Lod. Doc. No. 4. Petitioner did not petition the United States 

Supreme Court for writ of certiorari (ECF No. 61 at 3) and the statute of limitations therefore 

began to run on December 1, 2010. See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petitioner had ninety days from entry 

of judgment to petition for writ of certiorari); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)) (the day the order or judgment becomes final is excluded and 

time begins to run the day after the judgment becomes final). 

B. State Collateral Review 

On June 26, 2008,1 petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 

Joaquin County Superior Court. Lod. Doc. No. 5. The petition was denied on September 16, 

2008. Lod. Doc. No. 6. 

 On October 4, 2008, petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeal. Lod. 

Doc. No. 7. The court of appeal denied the petition on October 16, 2009, with citation to In re 

Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 692 (Cal. 2004), and In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (Cal. App. 

1962). Lod. Doc. No. 8. 

 On October 28, 2009, petitioner filed a second pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Lod. Doc. No. 9. He appears to have simply re-filed the 

October 4, 2008 court of appeals petition. Compare Lod. Doc. No. 7 with Lod. Doc. No. 9. The 

petition was denied on December 18, 2009, on the ground that the petition “contains nothing but 

conclusory allegations and is devoid of any factual support” and therefore failed to state a prima 

facie case for relief. Lod. Doc. No. 10. 

 On January 4, 2010, petitioner submitted the same petition to the court of appeal. Lod. 

Doc. No. 11. The petition was denied without comment or citation on June 17, 2010. Lod. Doc. 

No. 12. 

 

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 The prison mailbox rule was used in determining the filing date of documents submitted when 

petitioner was proceeding pro se. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). 

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On November 23, 2011, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court. Lod. Doc. No. 13. The petition raised the same grounds as the court 

of appeal petition. Id. The petition was denied on May 23, 2012, without comment or citation. 

Lod. Doc. No. 14. 

On November 5, 2015, petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus with the California Supreme Court. ECF No. 78 at 10. The petition was essentially 

identical to the amended petition filed in this case on May 26, 2015. Compare ECF No. 61 to 

ECF No. 78 at 11-48. 

C. The Federal Petition 

On May 29, 2012, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. 

After the petition was screened, but before a response was filed, petitioner moved for leave to 

amend the petition (ECF No. 9) and counsel appeared on his behalf shortly thereafter (ECF No. 

11). The deadline for responding to the petition was vacated and petitioner was granted ninety 

days to file an amended petition. ECF No. 12. Thirteen requests for extension and two 

substitutions of counsel later, petitioner filed his amended petition on May 26, 2015, which also 

included a request for a stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). ECF No. 61. 

Respondent was ordered to respond to the amended petition (ECF No. 62) and filed a 

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the amended petition was mixed and a Rhines stay was not 

appropriate. ECF No. 69. After petitioner responded to the motion to dismiss, respondent raised 

new arguments in his reply regarding the statute of limitations. ECF No. 82. The original motion 

to dismiss was vacated, and respondent was given an opportunity to file a comprehensive motion 

to dismiss. ECF No. 83. Respondent proceeded to file a motion to dismiss that addressed both 

exhaustion and the statute of limitations. ECF No. 84. That motion is now fully briefed and was 

argued before the court on October 12, 2016. ECF No. 87. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent argues that the amended petition should be dismissed because the new claims 

are untimely and do not relate back to the original petition and that even if they did relate back, 

the original petition was untimely as well. ECF No. 84 at 8-23. Respondent also argues that the 

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petition should be dismissed because the majority of the claims were not exhausted at the time the 

amended petition was filed and petitioner did not successfully pursue a Rhines stay. Id. at 23-24. 

III. Opposition 

Petitioner opposes the motion on the grounds that some of the claims relate back to the 

original petition and that the original petition was timely. ECF No. 85 at 2-3. Petitioner further 

argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the claims that do not relate back to the original 

petition and that his previously unexhausted claims should not be dismissed because he was 

entitled to a stay under Rhines. Id. at 3-8. 

IV. Statute of Limitations 

 Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code contains a one-year statute of 

limitations for filing a habeas petition in federal court. This statute of limitations applies to 

habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996, when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act (AEDPA) went into effect. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). The oneyear clock commences from one of several alternative triggering dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). In this case the applicable date is that “on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 

2244(d)(1)(A). The parties agree that, absent tolling, the statute of limitations in this case expired 

on December 1, 2011. ECF No. 84 at 8; ECF No. 85 at 3. The original petition in this case was 

filed on May 29, 2012. 

 If petitioner’s first California Supreme Court habeas petition, filed on November 23, 2011, 

was properly filed, then it tolled the statute of limitations and the original petition in this case was 

timely. If not, the original petition was filed outside the statute of limitations and must be 

dismissed. “Under California’s unusual system of independent collateral review, a prisoner seeks 

review of a lower court’s denial of relief by filing an original petition for habeas corpus in the 

reviewing court.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Evans v. Chavis, 546 

U.S. 189, 192-93 (2006); Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 2008)). To be timely, a 

petition must be “filed within a ‘reasonable time.’” Id. Therefore, in California, “collateral 

review is considered to be pending during the interim between a writ being denied at one court 

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level and a new petition being filed at the next higher court level as long as the petition at the next 

level is filed within a reasonable period of time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-25 (2002); Evans, 546 U.S. at 192-93)). 

Absent clear direction from the state courts, this court must determine whether a state court 

petition was timely filed. Banjo, 614 F.3d at 968 (citing Evans, 546 U.S. at 198). A decision on 

the merits or without comment does not necessarily mean a petition was timely, but a 

determination that a petition was untimely is dispositive. Id. (citations omitted). 

 If petitioner’s first California Supreme Court petition was an appeal from the court of 

appeals petition, which is a possibility since it asserted the same grounds for relief, then it was 

untimely. Petitioner did not file his petition in the California Supreme Court until almost a year 

and a half after his second appellate court habeas petition was denied. Lod. Doc. No. 12; Lod. 

Doc. No. 13. An unexplained one-year-and-five-month delay is significantly longer than the sixmonth delay the United States Supreme Court found to be unreasonable in Evans. 546 U.S. at 

201; see also Banjo, 614 F.3d at 970 (146 day delay unreasonable). At the October 12, 2016 

hearing, however, petitioner asserted that it was his position that the November 23, 2011 

California Supreme Court habeas petition was an original petition and not a part of the same 

round of collateral review as the superior court and court of appeals petitions. 

 In California 

[a] prisoner must seek habeas relief without “substantial delay,” [In 

re] Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th [770,] 780 [(Cal. 1998)]; [In re] Gallego, 

18 Cal. 4th [825,] 833 [(Cal. 1998)]; [In re] Clark, 5 Cal. 4th [750,] 

783 [(Cal. 1993)], as “measured from the time the petitioner or 

counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information 

offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” 

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 787. Petitioners in noncapital cases have 

“the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) 

good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an 

exception to the bar of untimeliness.” Id., at 780. 

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 312 (2011) (parallel citations omitted). Review of petitioner’s 

first California Supreme Court habeas petition does not support a finding that the petition was 

timely filed. It is clear, both from their very nature and petitioner’s explicit inclusion of them in 

his state superior and appellate court petitions, that petitioner either “knew or reasonably should 

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have known” the legal and factual bases of the claims contained within his California Supreme 

Court petition no later than October 4, 2009, when he filed his first state appellate court habeas 

petition. Lod. Doc. No. 7; Lod. Doc. No. 13. Petitioner’s first state appellate court habeas 

petition was filed over two years before he filed his first California Supreme Court petition. The 

petition does not address any cause for the delay in filing the petition with the California Supreme 

Court, nor does it allege any exceptions to the untimeliness bar. Lod. Doc. No. 13. In the portion 

of the petition where petitioner is instructed to “[e]xplain any delay in the discovery of the 

claimed grounds for relief and in raising the claims in this petition,” petitioner wrote “N/A.” Id. 

at 60. 

 At the October 12, 2016 hearing, counsel for petitioner argued that conducting an ongoing 

investigation into meritorious claims could establish good cause for the delay in filing a habeas 

petition. To the extent counsel pointed to his efforts to investigate after the filing of the petition 

in this court, that investigation would have no bearing on petitioner’s delay in filing in the 

California Supreme Court. Moreover, “known claims ‘must be presented promptly unless facts 

known to counsel suggest the existence of other potentially meritorious claims which cannot be 

stated without additional investigation.’” Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 805 (emphasis in original) 

(quoting Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 784). The claims briefed in the California Supreme Court were 

known to petitioner at least two years prior to the filing of his habeas petition in that court and 

petitioner has not identified any additional potentially meritorious claims, not previously briefed 

in the state superior and appellate court petitions, that required additional investigation and 

thereby justified the delay in filing the state supreme court habeas petition so as to avoid filing 

piecemeal petitions. 

Counsel also argued that petitioner was clearly making a claim of actual innocence, 

thereby excusing him from any untimeliness. To qualify for this exception in California, 

the petitioner would bear a heavy burden of satisfying the court that 

the evidence of innocence could not have been, and presently 

cannot be, refuted. The requirement that a petitioner demonstrate 

his or her innocence requires more than a showing that the evidence 

might have raised a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the 

petitioner. The petitioner must establish actual innocence, a 

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standard that cannot be met with evidence that a reasonable jury 

could have rejected. 

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 798 n.33. “Evidence relevant only to an issue already disputed at trial, which 

does no more than conflict with trial evidence, does not constitute ‘“new evidence” that 

fundamentally undermines the judgment.’” Id. (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 

1247 (Cal. 1990)). Petitioner did not request this exception in his state petition (Lod. Doc. No. 

13), nor did he identify, either in his opposition to the motion to dismiss or during the hearing, 

anywhere within the petition that, even absent an explicit request, made the showing required by 

the California state courts to support his assertion of actual innocence such that it would excuse 

untimely filing. 

In light of petitioner’s claim of actual innocence at the hearing, the court notes that a 

showing of actual innocence can also satisfy the requirements for equitable tolling in federal 

court. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). However, petitioner did not raise this argument in his opposition to the 

motion to dismiss or at the October 12, 2016 hearing. Nor does the petitioner point to any new 

evidence that demonstrates “‘that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Lee, 653 at 938 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Absent new evidence, there are no grounds for the court to determine that 

reasonable jurors would find other than they already have. 

V. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the November 23, 2011 California Supreme 

Court habeas petition was not timely filed and therefore did not toll the statute of limitations. The 

original petition in this action was therefore untimely and the petition must be dismissed. 

Because the original petition was untimely, it is unnecessary to address whether the claims in 

amended petition were entitled to equitable tolling, were exhausted in state court, or related back 

to the original petition and the court declines to do so. 

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VI. Certificate of Appealability 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in this order, a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been made in this case. 

Therefore, no certificate of appealability should issue. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 84) is granted and petitioner’s application 

for writ of habeas corpus is denied as untimely. 

2. This court declines to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 

2253. 

DATED: October 17, 2016 

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