Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R.,

on behalf of themselves and

all other similarly 

situated juvenile parolees

in California,

NO. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, 

Governor, State of 

California, et al,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs, juvenile parolees in California, allege that

defendants have a policy and practice of denying juvenile parolees

their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection and

effective assistance of counsel. Plaintiffs also allege that

defendants have a policy and practice of denying class members with

disabilities their statutory rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and section

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504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. 

Pending before the court are three motions, plaintiffs’

motion for class certification and defendants’ motion to dismiss

and/or strike, as well as a motion to use plaintiffs’ full names.

The court resolves the motions based on the papers and after oral

argument.

I.

Factual Allegations & Background 

This suit is brought by four plaintiffs, L.H., A.Z., D.K., and

D.R., on behalf of "a class of over 4,000 juveniles who have been

or are at imminent risk of being wrongfully and unconstitutionally

deprived of their liberty in connection with the granting,

extending and/or revoking of their parole in California." First

Amended Complaint ¶ 1 (“FAC”). 

A. The Four Named Plaintiffs

1. L.H.

L.H. is a 23-year-old Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”)

parolee, who has spent approximately five years in DJJ facilities.

FAC ¶ 72. He was paroled and then placed under a parole hold

(arrested) for being under the influence of alcohol while living

at a residential substance abuse center. L.H. did not receive a

preliminary hearing. Plaintiffs aver that after more than a month

in custody, on the date appointed for L.H’s parole revocation

hearing, the parole officer assigned to the case failed to bring

the case file, resulting in an additional three weeks of delay.

L.H. was therefore in DJJ custody without a probable cause or

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revocation hearing for more than two months. Id.

When L.H.’s hearing occurred, L.H. avers that he did not know

he had the right to counsel and was not appointed counsel. FAC ¶

73. L.H. was sentenced to serve additional months in DJJ custody.

L.H. maintains that he has needed special education since

childhood and requires assistance with reading. FAC ¶ 74.

According to the complaint, L.H. suffered from developmental delays

attributable to premature birth and a head injury during childhood.

L.H. maintains that he is an individual with a disability as that

term is defined in Section 504 and the ADA.

L.H. is currently on parole until 2008.

2. A.Z.

A.Z. is a 22-year-old DJJ parolee, who recently served a six

month parole revocation term. A.Z. has been subject to parole

revocation proceedings on three separate occasions. In all three

proceedings, A.Z. asked for counsel but was informed that counsel

could not be appointed. A.Z. alleges that the hearings were

conducted without counsel. FAC ¶ 76. A.Z. also maintains that the

hearings occurred more than 50 miles from A.Z.’s residence, making

it difficult or impossible for him to present witnesses in his

favor. Id. Moreover, A.Z. had been in custody for several months

prior to the hearings. Id.

At A.Z.’s most recent revocation hearing, the hearing officer

asked whether he was “harmed” by the parole department’s inability

to find a police report of his arrest. A.Z., unrepresented by

counsel, replied in the negative. In retrospect, A.Z. maintains

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that this was incorrect. He was harmed because he had to serve an

additional 30 days in county jail while parole representatives

searched for the police report. FAC ¶ 77. 

A.Z. also maintains that at the last minute, and without any

notice or explanation, A.Z.’s parole agent changed the sentence

recommendation from continuation on parole to return to custody.

The hearing officer revoked A.Z.’s parole, refusing to give him

credit for the 30 days served in county jail. A.Z. promptly

attempted to appeal that decision, but his appeal was initially

“lost” and only granted after his attorney wrote to defendants. Id.

A.Z. alleges that his case was particularly complex because

criminal charges were brought in addition to parole revocation

charges, and, as discussed, the related police report was lost for

30 days. FAC ¶ 78.

A.Z. is currently on parole until 2008.

3. D.K.

D.K. is a 23-year-old currently released on parole

supervision. After being released on parole in June 2005, he was

arrested by his parole agent on or about August 15, 2005 for an

alleged “dirty” drug test and was incarcerated pending his parole

revocation hearing. D.K. avers that he did not receive a copy of

the drug test results, and he did not receive a preliminary

hearing. On or about September 1, 2005, D.K. received notice that

he would have a parole revocation hearing on September 8. With

such short notice, D.K. maintains that it was difficult or

impossible to obtain witnesses or evidence in his favor. Despite

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the short notice, his mentor, who helped D.K. find employment when

he was released on parole, appeared for the hearing. This witness,

however, was not permitted to speak. FAC ¶ 81. 

The revocation hearing was conducted without an attorney to

represent D.K. despite his request for assistance. Per his parole

agent’s recommendation, D.K. was continued on parole. He was

released to parole supervision on or about September 15, 2005, a

month after his initial arrest. D.K. alleges that he lost his job

as a result of the month in custody. Id.

D.K. avers that he has history of drug and alcohol abuse and

has participated in substance abuse counseling beginning before his

release from custody. FAC ¶ 82. He does not have a high school

diploma or G.E.D. At the time of his arrest and revocation

hearing, his DJJ file contained diagnoses of mental disorders. Id.

D.K. asserts that he is an individual with a disability as that

term is defined in Section 504, 29 U.S.C. section 705(20), and the

ADA.

D.K. is on parole until 2007.

4. D.R.

D.R. is a 23-year old DJJ parolee, who was first committed to

DJJ five years ago. D.R. paroled in January 2004, and was living

in the community. In or around December 2004, D.R. was arrested and

placed in custody on three alleged parole violations: use of

marijuana, driving on a suspended/revoked license, and failure to

report a police contact to his parole agent. D.R. received notice

of the alleged charges over a month after he was taken into

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custody, a mere four days before his revocation hearing. D.R. did

not receive a preliminary hearing. FAC ¶ 84.

At his hearing, D.R. maintains that he requested two

evidentiary witnesses, neither of whom was called by defendants.

D.R. also alleges that he was never shown the laboratory results

upon which the marijuana charge was based. D.R. asserts that he

did not request an attorney because he was informed that he was not

eligible for appointed counsel. Id.

D.R.’s parole was revoked in January 2005. He immediately

appealed the decision, stating that his due process rights were

violated by defendants’ failure to provide sufficient notice of the

hearing and the failure to call his witnesses. D.R. requested, but

never received, a copy of his hearing tape. Three months later, the

appeal was denied. FAC ¶ 86.

D.R. asserts that he spent 21 months in custody and went to

four Parole Consideration Hearings before the BPH finally ended his

parole revocation term and released him. D.R. requested, but never

received, copies of two of his Parole Consideration Hearing tapes.

FAC ¶ 87.

D.R. maintains that he has a history of mental health

concerns, and attempted suicide while in custody for his parole

revocation. D.R. maintains that DJJ failed to provide him with

adequate treatment or counseling, yet at one of his parole

consideration hearings, BPH expressly denied parole to D.R. due to

his need for mental health treatment. After that hearing, D.R. did

not see a mental health professional again for months. FAC ¶ 88.

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D.R. is on parole until 2007.

B. Plaintiffs’ General Allegations 

Plaintiffs assert that these experiences are part of

defendants’ general practice of, among other things: (1) failing

to provide preliminary hearings to determine whether there is

probable cause to believe there has been a parole violation, FAC

¶ 28 (2) failing to provide or allow for assistance of counsel when

required by law, id. at ¶ 51-61 (3) failing to allow parolees an

opportunity to confront witnesses or present evidence, id. at ¶

33-38, 50 and (4) failing to hold final parole revocation

proceedings within a reasonable time, id. at ¶ 32. 

Plaintiffs maintain that their status as juveniles causes them

to be in particular need of constitutional and statutory

protections. Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth the ways in which

juvenile parolees are less educated, less mature and less able to

understand the revocation process as compared to adult parolees.

FAC ¶ 2, 5-23. For example, it is estimated that among juvenile

detainees in the United States, nearly 60 percent read at or below

a fifth to sixth grade level, with 32 percent reading at or below

a fourth grade level. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs also aver that one

report estimates that as many as 60 or 70 percent of incarcerated

youth nationwide have diagnosable mental disorders. Id. ¶ 12.

Plaintiffs assert that these sorts of factors exacerbate the

problems faced by juvenile parolees. In part because DJJ is

administered within the adult correctional system, plaintiffs

maintain that DJJ staff have no background or training in juvenile

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parole matters. Id. ¶ 21. 

C. The Proposed Class 

The proposed class consists of juvenile parolees in or under

the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile parolees

with disabilities as that term is defined in Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, who are: (i) in the community

under parole supervision or who are at large (ii) in custody in

California as alleged parole violators, and who are awaiting

revocation of their parole or (iii) in custody, having been found

in violation of parole and returned to custody. FAC ¶ 105.

D. Related Cases

On September 15, 2006, the court related the pending suit to

Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-94-0671 LKK/GGH (E.D. Cal.

1994). In Valdivia, plaintiffs are adult parolees in California.

The Valdivia plaintiffs brought suit alleging, inter alia, that

California’s parole process deprived them of due process and their

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See 2002 Complaint.

On June 14, 2002, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment, holding that the “current California parole revocation

system violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights.” Valdivia v.

Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (Karlton, J.).

A permanent injunction was issued on March 9, 2004. Pursuant

to the injunction, defendants were ordered to serve adult parolees

with, inter alia: (1) notice of charges within three business days

of the placement of a parole hold (2) the right to counsel in

probable cause and parole revocation and hearings (3) a preliminary

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hearing to determine good cause for detention within ten business

days after the deadline for notice and (4) a final revocation

hearing within 35 days of the hold, at which adult parolees can

present and cross-examine witnesses and offer documentary evidence.

Although not related by order of the court, there is a second

case which is also related to the pending suit. In Armstrong v.

Davis, No. C-94-2307 (N.D. Cal. 2001), plaintiffs are adult

prisoners and parolees with disabilities. A revised permanent

injunction was issued on February 11, 2002. The injunction ordered

that defendants identify, track, and provide reasonable

accommodations to adult parolees with disabilities at parole

proceedings, and required that adult parolees with disabilities

receive access to forms in alternate formats, to equipment and

assistance to effectively communicate, and to a grievance procedure

for processing denials of requests for accommodations.

Plaintiffs assert that since they will remain under DJJ

jurisdiction until the age of 25, they will not receive the

protections that adult parolees receive under Armstrong or

Valdivia. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. STANDING

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs have

failed to demonstrate standing to sue for equitable relief.

Defendants assert that since the plaintiffs are on parole, they are

not subject to defendants’ patterns and practices relating to

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parole revocation. It is pure speculation, defendants argue, that

plaintiffs will be subjected to parole revocation proceedings.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have no standing under Article III. For

the reasons discussed below, the court cannot agree.

1. Applicable Law 

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. Takhar v. Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th

Cir. 1996), quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The

court is bound to give plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable

inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the

complaint. Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, plaintiff need

not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.; see also

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)(inferring fact from

allegations of complaint).

To establish standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they

have: 

(1) suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete

and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and

(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that

the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,

528 U.S. 167, 181(2000). These requirements together constitute

the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The party

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invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing

these elements. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).

“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury

resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion

to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those

specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 561 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In class action suits, the named plaintiffs must also have

standing when the class is certified. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,

403 (1975). The named plaintiffs must be a “member of the class

which he or she seeks to represent at the time the class action is

certified by the district court.” Id. Since the class in this

case has not yet been certified, the court analyzes the standing

of the named plaintiffs and not the class as a whole. See Nelsen

v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the last two

standing requirements – causal connection and redresability.

Accordingly, the court will confine its analysis to the question

of injury. 

2. Injury In Fact

In order to enjoy standing, plaintiffs must plead an actual

or imminent injury; “speculative” injuries are insufficient to

confer standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Moreover, where, as

here, plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief, they must also

demonstrate “that he is realistically threatened by a repetition

of [the violation].” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109

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(1983)(holding that plaintiff cannot establish the requisite type

of harm simply by pointing to some past injury). The Ninth Circuit

has characterized this additional showing as the “realistic

repetition” requirement. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiffs may demonstrate that the harm is capable of

realistic repetition when the harm is part of a “pattern of

officially sanctioned. . . behavior, violative of the plaintiffs'

[federal] rights.” LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.

1985). As the Ninth Circuit explains, “where the defendants have

repeatedly engaged in the injurious acts in the past, there is a

sufficient possibility that they will engage in them in the near

future to satisfy the ‘realistic repetition’ requirement.” 

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861. When a named plaintiff asserts that

injuries have been inflicted upon a class of plaintiffs, the court

may consider the harm asserted by the class to determine if there

is a credible threat that the named plaintiff's injury will recur.

Id. citing LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326. In Armstrong, the court

explained:

Where a court, through its specific factual findings,

documents the threat of future harm to the plaintiff class

and establishes that the named plaintiffs (or some subset

thereof sufficient to confer standing on the class as a

whole) are personally subject to that harm, the “possibility

of recurring injury ceases to be speculative,” and standing

is appropriate.

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861 (internal citations omitted). 

a. Threat of Future Harm

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In the case at bar, the named plaintiffs have demonstrated

that they are realistically threatened by future harm. As in both

Valdivia (to which this case is related) and Armstrong, the

plaintiffs here base their standing on the “threat of future injury

from a systemically defective parole revocation procedure.”

Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-94-0671 LKK/GGH (E.D. Cal.

order issued Dec. 1, 1994)(“Valdivia Order”).

As in Valdivia, qualitative indicators are one factor the

court considers in its analysis of the likelihood of future injury.

See Valdivia Order at 8. See also Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861

(court may look at harm asserted by class as a whole). Plaintiffs

allege that juvenile parolees in California have an extremely high

recidivism rate. Approximately 70% of juvenile parolees are

arrested within 36 months of release. FAC ¶ 3. 

Many of the returns to custody are for technical violations.

Statistics from the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation’s Division of Juvenile Justice report that, of 3,599

parole violation actions handled in 2005, 490 were for being absent

without leave (AWOL), and of those, 132 (27.0%) resulted in

revocation or recommitment; 1,415 were for other technical

violations, and of those, 1,135 (80%) resulted in revocation or

recommitment; 238 were for law violations in which the person was

not prosecuted or found not guilty, and of those, 94 (39.5%)

resulted in revocation or recommitment. Id. 

As this court remarked in Valdivia, 

[t]hese statistics illustrate the unique degree to which

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parolees are subject to the challenged revocation procedures.

Parolees are, by definition, already subject to defendants’

oversight and control. Consequently, they are far more

likely to experience recurrent injuries than are plaintiffs

who have attempted to challenge practices that only randomly

affect members of the general public.

Valdivia Order at 8. For the same reasons, the named plaintiffs

in the case at bar are likely to experience recurrent injuries. 

Moreover, characteristics unique to juvenile parolees make it

more likely that they will face parole revocation proceedings in

the future. In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that juvenile

parolees demonstrate limited cognitive and emotional development,

as well as significant rates of educational deficiencies. See FAC

¶ 5-9. Plaintiffs also maintain that the incidences of serious

mental health and learning disabilities for juvenile parolees is

far higher as compared to the general public. See FAC ¶ 9-10.

Plaintiffs purport that in California, as many as half of the wards

in DJJ custody have mental, emotional, or learning disabilities.

Approximately 25 % of all wards within DJJ are registered with

Special Education and assigned individualized education plans. FAC

¶ 11. These factors suggest that juvenile parolees are uniquely

vulnerable to violating their parole and being subject to the

complained of practices. 

In Armstrong, the court was faced with very similar facts and

found that “a person with disabilities is more likely to be

suspected of conduct that results in the revocation of parole than

other parolees.” The court concluded: 

It is therefore likely that these individuals will have

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difficulty interacting with the personnel who supervise their

parole, explaining any innocent but non-conforming behavior,

and showing remorse for otherwise minor infractions of the

conditions of their parole that do not rise to the level of

unlawful conduct. These problems make it more likely that

such parolees will be subjected to the parole revocation

process, even though they have not committed any unlawful act

or violated any condition of their parole.

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 867. The same logic applies to the case

at bar.

Juvenile parolees’ relationship to the parole system is

comparable to the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants

in R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006). There,

three gay and lesbian youth sued the Hawaii Youth Corrections

Facility for discriminatory practices. Although the three

plaintiffs were not incarcerated at the time they filed their

complaint, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to seek

prospective injunctive relief. Relying in part on a statistic that

82.2% of wards in Hawaii are rearrested after released on parole,

the court held that this type of statistical evidence made it

“neither remote nor speculative” that plaintiffs would return to

the facility. Id. at 1136-37.

The personal experience of the named plaintiffs also suggest

that the complained of injury will reoccur. At the time the First

Amended Complaint was filed, one of the plaintiffs, A.Z. had

already been through three parole revocation proceedings. FAC ¶

76. Plaintiffs state that since the First Amended Complaint was

filed, A.Z. has been again subjected to parole revocation

proceedings on two separate occasions, and D.R. on one occasion.

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As in Valdivia, “these prior injuries serve as evidence that the

future threat is likely to actually occur.” Valdivia Order at 10.

See also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (noting that past wrongs are

evidence "bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat

of repeated injury"; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 n.3

(1983) (finding a "credible threat" of future injury in part based

on plaintiffs' past experiences with defendants' conduct).

Additionally, plaintiffs L.H and D.K. are substance abusers.

Like two of the named plaintiffs in Valdivia, L.H.’s and D.K.’s

problems with alcohol and drugs contributed to their exposure to

parole revocation proceedings. As this court observed in Valdivia,

alcohol or drug-related parole violations could again “catalyze the

revocation process.” Valdivia Order at 10. The same logic applies

here. Given L.H.’s and D.K.’s problems, there is a high likelihood

that they will continue to face parole revocation proceedings. 

Defendants argue that the “possibility of plaintiffs being

subjected to future parole revocation hearings is uniquely within

their control.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12. This argument has

been squarely rejected by this court and the Ninth Circuit. In

Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit found that adult parolee plaintiffs

could not control whether they would be injured again by the

defendants' illegal conduct because parolees can be subject to

revocation proceedings at any time without engaging in unlawful

conduct. Id. at 866. The court explained: 

The [parole] Board is not required to establish probable

cause to begin the parole revocation process, nor is it

necessary that any law enforcement officer observe the

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alleged violation, the Board may start parole revocation

proceedings when a rather low level of suspicion arises as

the result of “some minimal inquiry” into the facts of the

case.

Id. This court’s order in Valdivia also rejected the very argument

defendants now raises. This court concluded that “parolees are,

by definition, already subject to defendants' oversight and

control.” Valdivia Order at 9. See also R.G. v. Koller, 415 F.

Supp. 2d at 1137 (rejecting defendants argument the plaintiffs do

not have standing because they will only return to custody if they

violate the law). 

For the reasons explained above, both Valdivia and Armstrong

are on point and instructive. Juvenile parolees, like adult

parolees and adult parolees with disabilities, continue to face the

real risk of future injury based on their status as parolees.

There is no reason for the court to now second guess either its own

prior order, or the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 

b. Actual Injury 

Plaintiffs have presented sufficient allegations of actual

injury to confer standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Plaintiffs

allege they are injured by defendants’ policies and practices

regarding parole revocation. The named plaintiffs have alleged

that defendants have violated their constitutional rights in

several ways: (1) failing to provide preliminary hearings to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe there has been

a parole violation, FAC ¶ 28 (2) failing to provide or allow for

assistance of counsel when required by law, id. at ¶ 51-61 (3)

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failing to allow parolees an opportunity to confront witnesses or

present evidence, id. at ¶ 33-38, 50 and (4) failing to hold final

parole revocation proceedings within a reasonable time, id. at ¶

32. 

This alleged treatment is sufficient to constitute an actual

injury. See Armstrong at 865. As in Armstrong, the consequences

of the defendants’ alleged unlawful actions is that plaintiffs have

been unable to meaningfully participate in the parole process.

This constitutes actual injury. Id.

In light of plaintiffs’ status as parolees, their ongoing

supervision by defendants, their high recidivism rate, their

allegations of past injury, and the specific experiences of the

named plaintiffs, the threat of parole revocation is sufficiently

real and imminent to satisfy the Article III injury requirement.

B. CLASS CERTIFICATION 

Plaintiffs move for class certification pursuant to Rule

23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed

class consists of juvenile parolees in or under the jurisdiction

of California, including all juvenile parolees with disabilities

as that term is defined in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

and the ADA, who are: (i) in the community under parole supervision

or who are at large (ii) in custody in California as alleged parole

violators, and who are awaiting revocation of their parole or (iii)

in custody, having been found in violation of parole and returned

to custody. See FAC ¶ 105.

1. Applicable Law 

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A party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that it

has met all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the

requirements of Rule 23(b). Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst.,

Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Rule 23(a) allows a class to be certified: 

only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or

fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses

of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In other words, the class must satisfy the

requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs here seek to certify the class under

Rule 23(b)(2), which allows a class to be certified if "the party

opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect

to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

This court must conduct a "rigorous analysis" of the moving

party's claims to examine whether the requirements are satisfied,

Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The

court is "at liberty" to consider evidence that relates to the

merits, if such evidence also goes to the requirements of Rule 23.

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992).

However, the court may not consider whether the party seeking class

certification has stated a cause of action or is likely to prevail

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on the merits, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178

(1974). If the court concludes that the moving party has met its

burden of proof, then the court has broad discretion to certify the

class. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. 

2. Numerosity 

Rule 23(a) allows a class to be certified only if the “the

class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The numerosity requirement does not require

that joinder of all members be impossible, but only that joinder

be impracticable. Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,

158 F.R.D. 439, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Moreover, plaintiffs need

not state the exact number of potential class members, nor is a

specific number of class members required for numerosity. Arnold,

158 F.R.D. at 448. Whether joinder is impracticable depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case. Id.

When the number of proposed class members does not, on its

own, satisfy the numerosity requirement, the court may consider

other factors such as the geographical diversity of class members,

the ability of individual claimants to institute separate suits,

and whether injunctive or declaratory relief is sought. Jordan v.

Los Angeles County, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th. Cir. 1982) (vacated

on other grounds by 459 U.S. 810 (1982)).

In the case at bar, plaintiffs assert that the proposed class

includes over 4,000 individuals. “This number includes juvenile

parolees who have been or are at imminent risk of being wrongfully

and unconstitutionally deprived of their liberty in connection with

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 The ADA defines disability as: (a) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities of such individual;(b) a record of such an impairment;

or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 12102 (2). 

2 The court notes that these numbers do not specifically

establish the exact number of juvenile parolees in California who

are disabled. However, it is not necessary that evidence of the

class size be exact. A reasonable estimate of the class size,

based on common sense assumptions of numerosity, is sufficient.

See Arnold, 158 F.R.D. at 448; Civic Ass'n of Deaf of New York

City, Inc. v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

("[P]recise quantification of the class members is not necessary

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the revoking, subsequent granting, and extending of their parole.”

Pls. Mot. for Class Cert. at 8. Defendants do not contest that

plaintiffs have satisfied this requirement as to their

constitutional claims. Defendants do, however, argue that

plaintiffs do not meet the numerosity requirement with respect to

plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims. Defendant avers that there

is no specific allegation regarding the number of juveniles who are

in danger of having their rights under the ADA and Section 504

violated. The court cannot agree.

Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth sufficient allegations to

suggest that, among the 4,000 juvenile parolees, many have

disabilities.1 Plaintiffs assert that one U.S. Department of

Justice Survey found learning disabilities in nearly 50% of

juveniles in custody. See FAC ¶ 10. Plaintiff also asserts that

in California as many as half of the wards in DJJ custody have

mental, emotional or learning disabilities. Approximately 25% of

all wards are registered with Special Education and assigned

individualized treatment plans. FAC ¶ 11.2 

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because the court may make 'common sense assumptions' to support

a finding of numerosity."); Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City

of Chicago, 141 F.R.D. 477, 484-85 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (numerosity

finding may be based on common sense assumptions), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part on other grounds, 7 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1993)

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Although the allegations in the complaint must be taken as

true for the purposes of class certification, Blackie v. Barrack,

524 F.2d 891, 901 n. 17 (9th. Cir. 1975), the court is "at liberty"

to consider evidence that relates to the merits if such evidence

also goes to the requirements of Rule 23, Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508.

Here, plaintiffs submitted evidence in the form of a report

entitled, “Identifying Mental Health Treatment Needs Amount Serious

Institutilized Delinquents Using Paper and Pencil Screening

Instruments: Finial Report to the National Institute of Justice”

(2003). The report found that the prevalence of diagnosable mental

disorders among incarcerated juvenile populations is as “as high

as 60-70 %.” See Reply Decl. of Kirsten A. Palumbo, Ex. A at 1.

 The very nature of the allegations also suggests that joinder

is impracticable. According to plaintiffs’ allegations,

deficiencies in DJJ make it difficult, if not impossible, to

identify and track the number of juvenile parolees with

disabilities. Given the difficulty in even identifying disabled

plaintiffs, joiner would be impracticable if not impossible. 

Other courts have similarly found that joinder is impractical

where it is difficult to identify the members of the proposed

class. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d

1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1981) (numerosity found in race discrimination

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suit where neither party could count or identify class members, as

defendant-employer did not track applicants' race); Israel v. Avis

Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 372, 378 (S.D. Fla. 1999)

(numerosity found where identifying class members was difficult

because much of information was within defendant's control), rev'd

on other grounds, 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000).

For these reasons, the court concludes that joinder of the

class members would be impracticable. Plaintiffs have satisfied

the numerosity requirement. 

3. Common Issue of Law or Fact 

The commonality requirement is met if “plaintiffs' grievances

share a common question of law or of fact.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d

at 868. It is well established that “all questions of fact and law

need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared

legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient . .

.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019.

In civil-rights suits the commonality requirement “is

satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or

policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Armstrong

at 868, citing LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1332. 

In the case at bar, the common issue raised by plaintiffs is

whether “defendants’ policies, procedures and practices violate

[plaintiffs’] constitutional and statuary rights in parole

proceedings.” Pls. Mot. for Class Cert. at 10. Plaintiffs allege

that defendants defective practices affect all of the putative

class members.

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Defendants contend that the commonality requirement cannot be

met with respect to plaintiffs’ disability claims. Defendants

assert: 

Because of the uncertainty of the number of qualified

individuals with disabilities, the case-by-case review of

records and files necessary to determine if a plaintiff is a

qualified individual with disability, and the individualized

nature of the relief that may be required, certification of

the Plaintiffs' disability claims in the present case should

also be denied. 

Defs.’ Oppo. to Pls. Mot. at 12-13. This argument has been

squarely rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In Armstrong, defendants

argued that “a wide variation in the nature of the particular class

members' disabilities precludes a finding of commonality.”

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868. The court rejected this argument,

holding instead that, “in a civil-rights suit, that commonality is

satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or

policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Id.

The court went on to explain that:

In such circumstance, individual factual differences among

the individual litigants or groups of litigants will not

preclude a finding of commonality . . . Certainly, the

differences that exist here do not justify requiring groups

of persons with different disabilities, all of whom suffer

similar harm from the Board's failure to accommodate their

disabilities, to prosecute separate actions. The commonality

requirement is met.

Id. The reasoning of Armstrong applies with equal force to the

case at bar. Here, as in Armstrong, disabled plaintiffs are

challenging practices which prevent them from participating

meaningfully in the parole process. The allegations of system wide

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deficience affects all of the putative class members with

disabilities, regardless of the specific nature of their individual

disability.

For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs have

satisfied the commonality requirement. 

4. Typicality

The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a) is fulfilled if “the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).

Typicality requires that “the claims of the class representatives

be typical of those of the class, and to be ‘satisfied when each

class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and

each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the

defendant's liability.’” Armstrong, 275 at 868 (citing Marisol v.

Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2nd Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the

typicality requirement may be satisfied if “all the members of the

purported class would be benefitted by the suit plaintiffs seek to

bring.” Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, Cal., 404 F.

Supp. 391, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1975).

In the case at bar, plaintiffs satisfy the typicality

requirement. As previously discussed, the deprivations complained

of by plaintiffs affect the entire plaintiffs class. Minor

differences among the class are inconsequential. See Armstrong.

Moreover, plaintiffs assert a common claim, namely, that the

current parole process violates constitutional and statutory

rights. 

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Defendants assert that L.H. and D.K. are not in fact disabled

and therefore neither of these plaintiffs meet the typicality

requirement. See Defs.’ Oppo to Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. at 11.

In support of this assertion, defendants attached excerpts from

L.H.’s and D.K.’s files. Defendants maintain that these excerpts

demonstrate that the two plaintiffs are not, in fact, disabled.

For example, defendants point to certain records which document

that D.K. “completed all proficiency tests in math, reading, and

writing in order to take his G.E.D.” Defs.’ Oppo. at 10. Based

on these records and others, defendants conclude that D.K is not

disabled. 

With respect to L.H., defendants identify certain records and

conclude that although L.H. had “early educational problems . . .

these problems appear to be due to habitual truancy rather than any

developmental disability.” Id. at 10. In light of the assertion

that neither of these named plaintiffs are disabled, defendants

maintain that the typicality requirement is not met. The court

must reject defendants’ position. As the Ninth Circuit recently

reiterated, “arguments evaluating the weight of evidence or the

merits of a case are improper at the class certification stage.”

Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F. 3d 1214 at 6 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).

In Blackie v. Barrack, the Ninth Circuit set forth the

applicable standard to apply in this circumstance: 

The court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the

complaint as true, thus necessarily making the class order

speculative in the sense that the plaintiff may be altogether

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3 The court also notes in passing that even if it were

appropriate for the court to decide whether plaintiffs are

disabled, the evidence submitted by defendants is inconclusive. 

The excerpts of plaintiffs’ records which were submitted by

defendants reveal that both L.H. and D.K. have problems. Neither

the defendants, nor the court, is in a position to render an expert

opinion as to whether or not these problems are related to

disabilities. The records submitted by defendants fail to

demonstrate that L.H. and D.K. are not disabled; instead, it simply

reveals that these youths have problems. 

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unable to prove his allegations. While the court may not put

the plaintiff to preliminary proof of his claim, it does

require sufficient information to form a reasonable judgment.

Lacking that, the court may request the parties to supplement

the pleadings with sufficient material to allow an informed

judgment on each of the Rule's requirements. 

524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Westways World Travel,

Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 231 (C.D. Cal. 2003). In

Blackie, the court concluded that the lower court judge had, 

analyzed the allegations of the complaint . . . and the other

material before him (material sufficient to form a reasonable

judgment on each requirement), considered the nature and

range of proof necessary to establish those allegations,

determined as best he was able the future course of the

litigation, and then determined that the requirements were

met at that time. . . That is all that is required.

Blackie, 524 F.2d at 900-01. In short, at the class certification

stage, plaintiffs need only provide sufficient information for the

court to form a reasonable judgment about whether plaintiffs’

claims are typical. Id.

In examining the allegations set forth in the complaint, as

well as the evidence submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants,

the court finds that there is sufficient information to conclude

that plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class.3 

L.H. maintains that he has needed special education since

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childhood and requires assistance with reading. FAC ¶ 74.

According to the complaint, L.H. suffered from developmental delays

attributable to premature birth and a head injury during childhood.

Without passing judgment on whether L.H. is in fact disabled, the

court finds that the evidence submitted by plaintiffs supports the

allegations. The records filed under seal by plaintiffs reveal

that L.H. has a learning disability and received special education.

See Reply Decl. of Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, ¶ 11-14 & Exs. E-H. 

The complaint also alleges that D.K.’s DJJ file contained

diagnoses of mental disorders. See FAC ¶ 82. The sealed records

submitted by plaintiffs confirm that D.K. has been diagnosed with

mental disorders while in DJJ/CYA custody. See Reply Decl. of Gay

Crosthwait Grunfeld, Ex. D. Again, without deciding whether or not

D.K. is in fact disabled, the court concludes that plaintiffs have

submitted sufficient information so as to meet the typicality

requirement of Rule 23. 

Moreover, part of plaintiffs’ allegation is that defendants

fail to properly identify, document, and treat juvenile parolees

with disabilities. See FAC ¶ 148 ("In violation of Section 504 and

the ADA, defendants have failed to develop adequate policies and

practices that enable them to identify, assess or reasonably

accommodate juvenile parolees with disabilities"). For example,

plaintiffs aver that the Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) and

school records for L.H. are missing from his central file despite

several references to the existence of these documents elsewhere

in his file. See Grunfeld Decl., ¶ 15-16 & Ex. I. For the reasons

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4

 The proposed class is defined as those juveniles who are:

(i) in the community under parole supervision or who are at large;

(ii) in custody in California as alleged parole violators, and who

are awaiting revocation of their parole; or (iii) in custody,

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explained, the court finds that plaintiffs have provided

“sufficient information to form a reasonable judgment” that the

typicality requirement is met. See Blackie at 901.

5. Adequacy of Representation 

The fourth and final Rule 23(a) requirement - adequacy -

requires: (1) that the class representatives and class counsel not

have conflicts of interest with the class and (2) that the class

be represented by qualified counsel who will vigorously prosecute

the case on behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

With respect to the first part of the requirement, the named

plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with those of the class as a

whole. The same is true for plaintiffs’ counsel. Moreover,

neither party has altered the court as to any potential conflict

of interest.

Defendants do, however, argue that D.K. is not a proper

representative since he no longer resides in California. See Defs.

Oppo. at 13. Plaintiffs concede that D.K. does presently live in

Kansas. However, according to the Interstate Compact and its

Rules, California retains authority to revoke parole. See Palumbo

Decl., Ex. C at § 3.3.5 (Interstate Compact Bench Book for Judges

and Court Personnel). In fact, the receiving state (Kansas) cannot

revoke D.K.'s parole. Id. Only California can. Id. Accordingly,

D.K. continues to share interests with the class.4 

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having been found in violation of parole and returned to custody.

See FAC ¶ 105.

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Defendants do not dispute that the class will be represented

by qualified counsel who will vigorously prosecute the case on

behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The court finds

that the law firms representing plaintiffs are competent and

experienced. All three firms have had cases before this court on

prior occasions. The court has observed first hand the high level

of competence exhibited by plaintiffs’ counsel. 

For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs have

satisfied the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23.

6. Rule 23(b) Criteria

The plaintiff class must also satisfy one of the requirements

of Rule 23(b). Here, plaintiffs seek certification pursuant Rule

23(b)(2), which applies where a defendant "has acted or refused to

act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(2). For a class to be certified under this section, "[i]t

is sufficient if class members complain of a pattern or practice

that is generally applicable to the class as a whole," even if not

all class members have been injured by the challenged practice.

Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).

For all the reasons previously discussed, it is evident that

the class members complain of a pattern and practice that applies

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to the class as a whole, namely, the parole revocation proceedings.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule

23(b). 

With good cause appearing for all of the reasons discussed

above, plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted.

Accordingly, the court certifies the following class for all claims

raised in plaintiffs' first amended complaint: juvenile parolees

in or under the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile

parolees with disabilities as that term is defined in Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, who are: (i) in the

community under parole supervision or who are at large; (ii) in

custody in California as alleged parole violators, and who are

awaiting revocation of their parole; or (iii) in custody, having

been found in violation of parole and returned to custody. FAC ¶

105. 

C. USE OF PLAINTIFF’S FULL NAMES

The parties disagree on whether plaintiffs may proceed in

pseudonym, without identifying themselves in court papers. In the

interest of moving the case forward, the parties initially

stipulated to allow plaintiffs to temporarily proceed in pseudonym.

See November 14, 2006 stipulation and order. Defendants now move

to use plaintiffs’ full names. Defendants argue that plaintiffs

have little interest in proceeding anonymously, particularly when

weighed against the prejudice defendants would face and the

public's interest in full disclosure. For the reasons discussed

below, the court disagrees.

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1. Applicable Law 

In general, all parties to a suit must include their full

names on the face of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)(stating

that the complaint "shall include the names of all the parties").

Under this rule and the cases interpreting it, there is no express

right to conceal names. Doe v. Rotsker, 89 F.R.D. 159, 161 (D.

Cal. 1981). However, where a party can show a substantial privacy

interest that outweighs the presumption of openness, the party may

proceed with anonymity. Id.

In Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058

(9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit sets the controlling legal

standard for "a district court's discretionary decision to permit

a party to proceed anonymously." Id. at 1968. The court explains

that "a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial

proceedings in special circumstances when the party's need for

anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the

public's interest in knowing the party's identity." Id. The Ninth

Circuit identified three circumstances in which anonymity is

appropriate, two of which are relevant here: (1) when use of a

party’s real name creates a risk of “retaliatory physical or mental

harm” against the party; and (2) when anonymity is necessary to

preserve privacy in a sensitive and highly personal matter. Id.

Several factors are considered in evaluating a plaintiff's interest

in proceeding anonymously: (1) the severity of the threatened harm,

(2) the reasonableness of plaintiffs' fears, and (3) the

plaintiffs' particular vulnerability. Id. at 1068. The court

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addresses each element in turn.

2. The Severity of the Threatened Harm

A severe harm falls somewhere between social stigma, Rotsker,

89 F.R.D. 159 (holding that professional embarrassment did not

amount to severe harm), and the combination of job loss,

deportation, and reprisals against family members, Advanced

Textile, 214 F.3d 1058. In Advanced Textile, the court considered

the threatened harm to be severe because, as non-resident workers

in Saipan, plaintiffs were susceptible to deportation and economic

harm if they lost their jobs in retaliation for the lawsuit. Id.

at 1071.

In the case at bar, it is evident that the threatened harm

faced by plaintiffs is severe. Should plaintiffs’ names be

revealed, plaintiffs allege that they will face “retaliatory acts

including physical harm, denial of privileges, groundless

revocation of parole, addition of time to their sentences, denial

of necessary medical or mental health treatment, denial of

educational opportunities, and housing placements that expose them

to the threat of harm.” Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. at 5. 

Defendants argue that the severity of threatened harm is low

because the only harm is parole revocation. The court cannot

agree. The groundless revocation of parole is very much a severe

harm as it necessarily implicates, inter alia, parolees’ liberty

interests. Moreover, a groundless parole revocation exposes a

parolee to a host of other possible harms including retaliation.

Plaintiff D.K. alleges, “retaliation against wards by CYA/DJJ staff

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is part of the Youth Authority system.” Decl. of D.K. in Oppo. to

Defs. Mot. As D.K. explains, “[t]here is an ‘us versus them’

mentality and when a ward mentions the lawsuits against the DJJ,

such as the Farrell case, or mentions the Prison Law Office, parole

agents and correctional officers become very tense and retaliate

against wards by giving arbitrary time-adds, putting wards on

lookdown and taking away privileges.” Id.

D.K. maintains that when he pursued a personal injury lawsuit

against DJJ and filed grievances against individual DJJ employees,

he faced retaliatory actions. For example, when a guard found out

D.K. had filed a grievance against him, the guard began refusing

D.K. access to a shower. Id. Similarly, when D.K. investigated the

possibility of a lawsuit against DJJ, custody staff terminated D.K.

from his job in landscaping. Id. DK’s time in custody was also

extended by six months. Id. These allegations support plaintiffs’

position that the threatened harm is in fact severe. 

Defendants also argue that, pursuant to the November 14

Stipulation and Order, plaintiffs' names have been revealed to

defendants so proceeding with anonymity is unnecessary. See, e.g.,

Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that

there is no need for anonymity when the persons from whom

retaliation is feared already know plaintiffs' full names).

This argument is equally unavailing. The stipulation makes

clear that knowledge of plaintiffs' identities should be used only

to the extent necessary to proceed with the case and only by those

parties directly involved. As such, not all persons from whom

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retaliation is feared know the plaintiffs' names. Pursuant to the

stipulation, parole agents, counselors, guards, wardens, or other

employees of DJJ do not - and will not - know plaintiffs’ real

names.

In short, plaintiffs have established that there is a threat

of severe harm. 

3. The Reasonableness of Plaintiffs' Fears

The second prong of the Advanced Textile test requires that

plaintiffs’ fears of threatened retaliation be reasonable.

Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068. Fear of threatened retaliation

is reasonable if a reasonable person would believe the threat could

be carried out. Id. at 1071. Under this prong, the court considers

whether plaintiffs were actually threatened, and may also consider

evidence of a history of retaliatory practices. Id.

As previously discussed, plaintiff D.K. alleges that he was

retaliated against and that there is a culture of retaliation in

the DJJ. Moreover, the declarations of other persons familiar with

the parole system indicate that retaliation is a common practice

within the system. See Decl. of Grunfeld in Opp'n to Defs.’

Mot.(stating that ongoing investigation into DJJ practices revealed

retaliatory practices); Decl. of Norman in Opp'n to Defs.’

Mot.(discussing the retaliatory practices that occurred in relation

to Stevens v. Harper, No. CIV-S-01-0675 DFL-PAN). Their claims

indicate that defendants and their employees have the power not

only to threaten retaliation, but also to carry it out. Id. As

such, plaintiffs' fears are reasonable.

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4. The Plaintiffs' Particular Vulnerability

The Ninth Circuit has explained that when one party is under

the control or power of the other party, the former is particularly

vulnerable to retaliation. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1072

(finding that plaintiffs were subject to the will of the

defendants, who could at any time terminate their employment,

deport them, and affect their living situations). 

Because plaintiffs are on parole and remain wards of the

juvenile system, they are subject to the power and control of the

defendants. Id. Moreover, plaintiffs’ status as juveniles make

them, in many respects, more vulnerable than adults. Plaintiffs’

complaint sets forth the ways in which juvenile parolees are less

educated, less mature and less able to understand the revocation

process as compared to adult parolees. FAC ¶ 2, 5-23. These age

related characteristics make plaintiffs’ particularly more

vulnerable to threats and retaliatory actions. 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs can find recourse within the

court system should abuses occur. This argument is without merit.

As the Ninth Circuit explained in Advanced Textile, “[plaintiffs]

are more effectively protected from retaliation by concealing their

identities than by relying on the deterrent effect of post hoc

remedies.” 214 F.3d at 1071. 

For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs are

particularly vulnerable to threats of retaliation from the

defendants. Given that plaintiffs have a substantial interest in

proceeding anonymously, the court next addresses the possible

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prejudice to defendants and the public. 

5. Plaintiffs' Interests Balanced Against Prejudice to

Defendants and the Public's Interest in Full Disclosure

Plaintiffs' substantial interest in proceeding anonymously

must be balanced against any prejudice to the defendant, as well

as the public's interest in full disclosure of plaintiffs' names.

Advanced Textile, at 1068. For the reasons set forth below, the

court finds that any prejudice to the defendants is minimal and the

public's interest in full disclosure is outweighed by the public's

interest in cases such as this proceeding on the merits.

a. Prejudice Against the Defendant

Defendants fail to demonstrate how they will be prejudiced by

plaintiffs preceding anonymously. Pursuant to the November 14

stipulation and order, defendants have access to plaintiffs’ full

names, which they can use to the extent needed to investigate

plaintiffs’ claims. 

Defendants claim that they face adverse publicity from the

using initials. They argue that using initials supports the

plaintiffs’ allegations that DJJ participates in retaliatory

practices. Defendants claim they will be unable to disprove or

challenge these allegations without the use of full names. These

arguments are unconvincing. There is no evidence that revealing

the full names to the public will allow defendants to better

challenge or disprove the allegations. 

Because defendants can use the plaintiffs’ names to the extent

necessary to investigate the claims and there is no evidence to

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 Plaintiffs also make a compelling argument regarding the

sensitivity of the plaintiffs' juvenile records. Because the court

finds that anonymity is appropriate under the Advanced Textile

balancing test, the plaintiffs' second argument is not addressed.

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suggest that using full names would alleviate adverse publicity,

defendants’ interest in full disclosure is minimal.

b. Public Interest in Full Disclosure

In general, the public has an interest in access to judicial

proceedings, which is supported by the use of full names. Advanced

Textile at 1067. However, when the willingness to file suit is

chilled by fear of retaliatory action, the public interest in

seeing the suit move forward on its merits outweighs the public

interest in knowing the plaintiffs' names. Id. at 1073. A chilling

effect is likely to occur where defendants would be able to exert

leverage over plaintiffs who file suit. See id. at 1073 (discussing

the effects of the employer-employee relationship). Revealing

plaintiffs’ full names could have a chilling effect on this case

and others like it. As previously discussed, plaintiffs are

subject to DJJ control and their status as juveniles makes them

uniquely vulnerable. As such, defendants could exert leverage on

plaintiffs should their names be revealed, thereby chilling their

willingness to bring suit. Because the public has an interest in

having this case heard on the merits, anonymity is appropriate. 

In balancing the prejudice to defendants against the public’s

interest in having the case proceed on the merits, the scale

clearly tips in favor of plaintiffs.5

For the reasons discussed herein, the court finds that the

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plaintiffs may move forward using only their initials.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to proceed using plaintiffs’ full

names must be denied. 

D. Motion to Strike 

Defendants request that certain “irrelevant and immaterial

allegations” be struck from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint.

 Defendants object to allegations regarding conditions of

confinement as well as allegations pertaining to certain records.

For the reasons discussed herein, defendants’ motion to strike must

be denied. 

1. Applicable Law 

Rule 12(f) provides that a court “may order stricken from any

pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Immaterial matter is that which has “no

essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the

defenses being pleaded, or a statement of unnecessary particulars

in connection with and descriptive of that which is material.” 5

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1382 (2006). Impertinent matter consists of

“statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the

issues in question.” Id. Finally, scandalous matter is that “which

improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, most typically on

a party to the action.” Id. 

“[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trialA...”

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Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

1983). 

It is well established that “motions to strike should not be

granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could

have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.

Cal. 1991), see also Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159,

1170 (E.D.Cal. 2005)(J. Wanger). For this reason, “[m]otions to

strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” Neveu, 392 F.

Supp.2d at 1170.

2. Allegations regarding conditions of confinement 

Defendants request that the court strike allegations relating

to general allegations regarding national and state-wide

characteristics of juveniles and allegations regarding educational,

medical, mental health and custody conditions and services at DJJ.

See Defs.’ Motion to Strike at 16. 

As evidenced by this court’s discussion on standing, the

allegations regarding characteristics of juvenile parolees has a

direct connection to the subject matter of this litigation. 

Parolees’ education, medical and mental health conditions relate

to their ability to fully participate in parole revocation

proceedings. Similarly, these characteristics are also relevant

in determining the need for legal representation. In Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, the Supreme Court specifically observed that in the

context of parole revocation proceedings, “the unskilled or

uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in

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 Plaintiffs represent that the Farrel case is in the remedial

phase.

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presenting his version of a disputed set of facts.” Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). Accordingly, the Supreme

Court held that, “in passing on a request for the appointment of

counsel, the responsible agency. . . should consider, especially

in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable

of speaking effectively for himself.” Id. at 790-791. In light

of the Supreme Court’s clear concern about parolees’ ability to

represent themselves, the court finds that the characteristics of

juvenile parolees very much relevant. 

Defendants also argue that allegations regarding conditions

of confinement are irrelevant and immaterial since they are subject

to a consent decree in Farrell v. Hickman, No. RG 03079344

(Alameda County Super. Ct. filed Jan. 16, 2003). Defendants

argue that the allegations regarding conditions in DJJ facilities

“distracts from the focus of this litigation . . . and allow

plaintiffs the opportunity to relitigating [sic] issues that have

been resolved by another court.” Defs’. Mot. to Strike at 18.

The Farrell case pertains to conditions of confinement in DJJ

facilities, including, inter alia, mental health services, medical

services, and educational services.6 The Farrell case does not

address parole or parole revocation proceedings. While there is

some overlap in the types of issues (for example, the prevalence

of juveniles with mental health problems), the legal claims in the

two cases are completely separate, as are the requested remedies.

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Given that motions to strike are strongly disfavored, the existence

of the Farrell case is not a sufficient reason which would justify

striking allegations which pertain to conditions of confinement.

3. Allegations Regarding Public Records

Defendants also move to strike paragraph 24 of plaintiffs’

first amended complaint. The paragraph reads: 

The process of imposing parole holds and parole

consideration and revocation for juveniles is an opaque

system lacking clear rules or standards to guide staff,

juvenile parolees, attorneys, and parents. As

demonstrated by defendants' inadequate and confused

response to a Public Records Act request by plaintiffs'

counsel concerning parole procedures, even defendants

are unable to articulate the way the system is intended

to function.

First Amended Complaint ¶ 24. Defendants contend that the

statement is incorrect, inaccurate and has “no place” in the

complaint. Defs.’ Mot. at 19. Defendants then proceed to explain

the ways in which the records request was misdirected and extremely

broad. Accordingly, defendants maintain that this statement

“mischaraterizes” the truth of the circumstances. Id.

Defendants’ argument is without merit. The allegation that

defendants cannot articulate how the system is intended to function

is clearly related to plaintiffs’ more general claims regarding the

deficiencies in the parole revocation proceedings. Determining

whether the allegation is a mischaracterization of the facts is a

question the court need not address on a motion to strike.

Instead, the court need only evaluate whether “it is clear that the

matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject

matter of the litigation.” Colaprico, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1339.

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Here, the allegation clearly may bear on the subject matter of the

litigation.

In sum, defendants have failed to establish that any of the

challenged allegations are “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” F. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Accordingly, the court

denies defendants’ motion to strike. 

III.

Conclusion 

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and or Strike is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ Motion to use Plaintiffs’ Full Names is DENIED.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 28, 2007. 

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