Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02258/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02258-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX G., a minor, by and

through DR. STEVEN G., his

Guardian Ad Litem; DR. STEPHEN

G.; and HELEN G., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF DAVIS

JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

et al., 

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-2258 DFL CMK

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Alex G. (“Alex”) is an elementary school student

who is eligible for special education services under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §

1400 et seq. He and his parents, Dr. Stephen G. and Helen G.,

assert several claims against the Davis Joint Unified School

District (the “District”), the District’s board of trustees (the

“Board”), and a number of its administrators and educators. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiffs’

discrimination and retaliation claims under § 504 of the

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 During this “serious behavior incident,” Alex assaulted 1

and injured four staff members. (Wedner Decl. Ex. A at 4 n.3.)

2

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 793. The

motion is GRANTED.

 I. 

Alex is a third-grader with autism. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 6.) In

August 2001, Alex’s family moved to Davis and enrolled Alex in

the first grade in the District for the 2001-02 school year. 

(Id.; Wedner Decl. Ex. A at 4.) In accordance with Alex’s

individualized education plan (“IEP”) from the transferring

school district, the District placed Alex in a regular education

classroom at Valley Oak Elementary School (“Valley Oak”) with

support services. (Mot. at 2.) In addition, the District

developed a behavior intervention plan (“BIP”) to address Alex’s

history of aggressive outbursts and violent tendencies. (Defs.’

SUF ¶ 9.) 

 As part of Alex’s BIP, the District established an

emergency plan that allowed the use of physical restraints when

necessary to protect other students or staff from physical harm. 

(Id.) Alex’s parents initially consented to implementation of

the BIP and the use of physical restraints. (Id. ¶ 8.) However,

in June 2002, just prior to Alex starting the second grade,

Alex’s parents withdrew their consent. (Id.) 

Alex’s behavior problems continued in the second grade. On

the first day of school, Alex had a serious behavior incident

that resulted in a three-day suspension. (Id. ¶ 29.) Alex had 1

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Alex was taken to a resource room, where the staff put themselves

in the four corners of the room. (Id.) All furniture was slowly

removed so Alex could not throw or destroy the furniture. (Id.) 

Eventually, Alex wore himself out. (Id.) 

 Because of continuing disagreements between the District 2

and Alex’s parents, Alex did not return to school until October. 

(Mot. at 3.) During these incidents in early October, Alex was

jumping across wet tabletops. Defendants restrained him, they

contend, because they believed his actions posed a serious danger

to his own safety. (Wedner Decl. Ex. X at 12.) 

 Arosteguy and Inchausti used “wall restraints” on these 3

occasions. (Wedner Decl. Ex. X at 13.) Based upon a description

provided at the hearing on this matter, wall restraints involve

pinning the child up against a wall until he calmed down. 

 During this incident, Alex punched his teacher in the 4

stomach twice and kicked another student in the head. (Id.) 

3

two more serious behavior incidents in October 2002, during the

first week he returned to school. (Id. ¶ 12.) During these 2

incidents, two of Alex’s special education assistants --

defendant paraeducator Robert Arosteguy (“Arosteguy”) and

defendant special education teacher Michael Inchausti

(“Inchausti”) -- used emergency physical restraints to bring Alex

under control. (Id.) Inchausti and Arosteguy used the physical 3

restraints in accordance with the District’s plan for emergency

interventions. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

On December 4, 2002, Alex’s parents requested a due process

hearing to resolve their continuing dispute with the District

over Alex’s special education services and his placement for the

2001-02 and 2002-03 school years. (Id. ¶ 32.) While this

dispute was ongoing, Alex had another serious behavior incident

involving his teacher, defendant Penelope Dwyer (“Dwyer”), and

another student, resulting in another three-day suspension.4

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(Wedner Decl. Ex. A.) Alex’s parents decided to keep Alex out of

school until they resolved their disputes with the District. 

(Id.) 

The District and Alex’s parents entered into a settlement

agreement on January 31, 2003. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 33.) The

settlement agreement covered the provision of special education

services for the 2001-02 and 2002-03 school years. (Wedner Decl.

Ex. H.) As part of the agreement, the District agreed to: (1)

contract with an outside organization, Bridges, to conduct a

functional analysis assessment and develop a behavior

intervention plan for Alex within the school setting; and (2)

conduct a comprehensive academic assessment of Alex. (Id.) In

return, Alex’s parents released all claims under the IDEA up to

the date of the settlement agreement. (Id.) 

When Alex returned to school on February 19, 2003, his

disruptive behavior continued to escalate. He was unable to

remain in the classroom for more than ten minutes at a time and

spent the majority of his day outside with one or two of his

aides. (Id. Ex. A at 5.) His behavior included kicking,

screaming, yelling, spitting, biting, and throwing objects. 

(Id.) Additionally, Alex pulled the school’s fire alarms on five

separate occasions during the early weeks of March. (Id.) The

Bridges staff advised the District that the best way to handle

Alex’s maladaptive behavior, including the pulling of the fire

alarms, was to ignore it and deny him the reaction he was

seeking. (Id.) The District made efforts to implement this

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strategy, but at least some teachers continued to reprimand Alex

for pulling fire alarms. (Pls.’ SUF ¶ 78.) 

Alex’s disruptive tendencies put a strain on Dwyer, who his

regular classroom teacher. (Id. ¶ 80.) She started receiving

counseling for anxiety and began keeping a log of daily events

regarding Alex after his return to school in February 2003. (Id.

¶ 85.) At some point during February or March, Dwyer informed

the District’s special education coordinator, defendant Laurel

Clumpner (“Clumpner”), of her issues with Alex and her concerns

about her and other students’ safety. (Id. ¶ 79.) She also

sought the assistance of her teacher’s union. (Id. ¶ 86.) The

District did not inform Alex’s parents of Dwyer’s anxiety. 

(Opp’n at 4-5.) 

On March 19, 2003, an IEP meeting was held to discuss the

functional analysis assessment, the proposed behavior

intervention plan from Bridges, and the District’s academic

assessments of Alex. (Id.) During the IEP meeting, the Bridges

staff discussed the idea of implementing a “whole class

reinforcement” system in Dwyer’s classroom. (Id.) The proposed

“whole class reinforcement” system involved giving the class some

sort of tangible reward, such as putting a marble in a jar, when

the majority of the class performed a task well. (Varma Decl.

Ex. 3 at 25.) However, Bridges had not yet completed the

functional analysis assessment and the parties could not agree on

Alex’s IEP, so they scheduled another meeting for a week later. 

(Id.) 

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During the week between the March 19th and March 26th IEP

meetings, Dwyer developed her own classroom program, called

“Penny’s Proud” and “Grant thinks I’m great.” (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 38.) 

Her program involved giving students a small piece of paper with

a happy graphic on it when they exhibited positive behavior

choices. (Wedner Decl. Ex. Z at 278-79.) During the March 26th

IEP meeting, Bridges told the IEP team that Dwyer’s program was

insufficient to meet Alex’s needs and made some alternative

suggestions. (Id. Ex. A. at 6.) The IEP meeting concluded

without the parties reaching an agreement on this issue or on

Alex’s goals and objectives for his IEP plan. (Id.) However,

the District did agree to have its staff undergo further training

in Bridges’ behavior modification methodologies. (SUF ¶ 40.) 

That training was held on April 4, 2003. (Id.) 

In late March 2003, the principal of Valley Oak, defendant

Consuelo Coughran (“Coughran”), contacted the District’s

superintendent, defendant David Murphy (“Murphy”), about Alex’s

escalating behavior and the five fire alarm incidents. (Id. ¶

22.) Murphy directed his staff to investigate the District’s

legal options. (Mot. at 4.) While the District was considering

its options, Alex’s parents wrote a letter to Murphy and the

Board in which they complained that the District had not complied

with the settlement agreement. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 28.) Alex’s

parents received no response from the District. (Opp’n at 4.) 

On April 18, 2003, following several conversations with its

legal counsel, the District filed a request for a temporary

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restraining order (“TRO”) against Alex in the Yolo County

Superior Court. (Wedner Decl. Ex. H.) The District sought to

have Alex transferred to Patwin Behavior Learning Center

(“Patwin”), a public school within the District for children with

behavior difficulties. (Id.) The court granted the TRO that

day, ordering Alex to attend Patwin. (Id.) However, two months

later, following a preliminary injunction hearing, the court

modified its ruling. (Varma Decl. Ex. 8.) While the court

prohibited Alex from returning to Valley Oak prior to August 31,

2003, it refused to issue any orders regarding Alex’s educational

placement and vacated the portion of the TRO ordering Alex to

attend Patwin. (Id.) Instead, the court directed the District’s

special hearing office to exercise its discretion under

applicable authority to address Alex’s placement. (Id.) 

On April 21, 2003, Alex’s parents requested another

administrative due process hearing before a hearing officer,

challenging, among other things, the District’s implementation of

the settlement agreement. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 43.) The hearing took

place on July 31, 2003. (Id. ¶ 45.) The hearing officer issued

a written decision shortly thereafter, finding in favor of the

District on some issues and in favor of Alex on other issues. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiffs filed this first amended complaint on December

24, 2003, bringing claims under the IDEA, § 504, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, and state law against the District, the Board, and numerous

administrators and educators in the District (the “individual

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defendants”). Following the court’s July 30, 2004 order, the

only remaining claims are: (1) under the IDEA, a challenge to

certain portions of the Hearing Office’s decision; (2) a

discrimination claim under § 504 against the District, the Board,

and the individual defendants; and (3) a retaliation claim under

§ 504, also brought against the District, the Board, and the

individual defendants. Defendants move for summary judgment on

the discrimination and retaliation claims only. 

II. 

A. § 504 Discrimination Claim 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under §

504, plaintiffs must show that: (1) Alex is disabled; (2) he is

otherwise qualified to participate in the District’s program; (3)

he has been subject to discrimination by defendants solely

because of his disability; and (4) defendants are recipients of

federal funding. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807,

816 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, plaintiffs bringing § 504

claims in the special education context must show that the

educational decisions relating to the student were so

inappropriate as to constitute either bad faith or gross

misjudgment. See, e.g., N.L. v. Knox County Schs., 315 F.3d 688,

695-96 (6th Cir. 2003); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529

(4th Cir. 1998); Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (8th

Cir. 1982); Reid v. Petaluma Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 2000

WL 1229059, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In support of this

requirement, courts have explained that: 

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[t]he language of the statute is instructive. It

prohibits exclusion, denial of benefits, and

discrimination ‘solely by reason of . . . handicap.’

Manifestly, in order to show a violation of the

Rehabilitation Act, something more than a mere failure

to provide the ‘free appropriate education’ . . . must

be shown. . . . We do not read § 504 as creating a

general tort liability for educational malpractice,

especially since the Supreme Court . . . has warned

against a court’s substitution of its own judgment for

educational decisions made by state officials. We

think, rather, that either bad faith or gross

misjudgment should be shown before a § 504 violation

can be made out, at least in the context of education

of handicapped children.

Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1170-71. Thus, the establishment of an IDEA

violation is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of

plaintiffs’ § 504 claim. 

Finally, a plaintiff seeking monetary damages under § 504

must prove that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. 

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Deliberate indifference is similar to the bad faith or gross

misjudgment standard, requiring “knowledge that a harm to a

federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure

to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139. 

Defendants contend that, even if plaintiffs make a

sufficient showing of an IDEA violation, they fail to show that

defendants acted with bad faith, gross misjudgment, or deliberate

indifference. (Mot. at 19-30.) In response, plaintiffs assert

that the totality of events reveals a pattern of defendants

repeatedly punishing Alex for behaviors that are part of his

disability and sabotaging his education program to justify

removing him from the regular classroom setting. (Opp’n at 7.) 

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 Plaintiffs also make a conclusory allegation that the 5

District had an inappropriate BIP in place in October 2002. 

(Opp’n at 7.) However, plaintiffs present no evidence in support

of this allegation. Moreover, the January 2003 settlement

agreement bars plaintiffs from challenging the appropriateness of

the BIP. The requirements for a BIP are discussed and set forth

under the IDEA and corresponding state law, and plaintiffs waived

all claims under the IDEA as part of the settlement agreement. 

10

This pattern began, they assert, when Alex’s parents withdrew

their consent to physical restraints, and it escalated until

defendants succeeded in removing Alex from Valley Oak by means of

the TRO. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ characterization of the evidence is not

reasonable and could not be accepted by a reasonable factfinder. 

The actions/omissions plaintiffs identify, whether taken as a

whole or looked at individually, do not suggest bad faith, gross

misjudgment, or deliberate indifference on the part of the

District. First, plaintiffs allege that defendants wrongfully

used physical restraints on Alex on two occasions in October

2002, despite the explicit withdrawal of consent to such

restraints by Alex’s parents in June 2002. (Id.) These actions

demonstrate bad faith or gross misjudgment, they contend, because

the withdrawal of consent was explicit, and there could have been

no confusion on this issue. (Id.) 5

As an initial matter, it is unclear that the Districts’

actions violated any law, given that state law explicitly allows

school officials to physically restrain students when the student

poses an immediate danger to himself or others. Cal. Code. Regs.

tit.5, § 3052(I). Here, Alex was restrained because he was

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restraints were improperly applied, but they provide no evidence

to support this assertion. 

11

jumping across wet tabletops. The teachers could reasonably have

determined that Alex posed an immediate physical danger to

himself. Moreover, Inchausti and Arosteguy used physical

restraints approved by the District as part of the District’s

emergency intervention plan. 

6

Furthermore, even if the use of physical restraints did

violate the IDEA, there is no evidence that defendants acted with

bad faith, gross misjudgment, or deliberate indifference in doing

so. Rather, the evidence suggests that the teachers believed

they were acting within their discretion to protect Alex from

imminent harm to himself. In fact, Inchausti and Arosteguy have

both stated that they believed that Alex’s prior BIP, which

allowed physical restraints, was still in effect in October 2002. 

(Defs.’ SUF ¶ 15.) Alex has presented no evidence calling into

question their good-faith belief. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

argument regarding the physical restraints is unpersuasive. 

Second, plaintiffs argue that Dwyer’s behavior towards Alex

upon his return to her classroom in February 2003 is further

evidence of this alleged pattern of discriminatory acts. (Opp’n

at 7-8.) Specifically, plaintiffs suggest there was some

ulterior, discriminatory motive behind Dwyer’s decision to begin

keeping a daily log of events related to Alex. (Id.) 

Additionally, plaintiffs take issue with the District’s failure

to inform Alex’s parents of Dwyer’s negative feelings toward him. 

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(Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs argue that a full-inclusion, regular

education program only works where the teacher is open to having

the student in the class, such that the District’s failure to

inform plaintiffs of Dwyer’s feelings toward Alex ensured the

failure of the program. (Id.) 

This argument is equally unconvincing. Even if these

actions violate the IDEA, there is no evidence that they were

done with bad faith or rise to the level of gross misjudgment or

deliberate indifference. The evidence shows that Dwyer began

keeping a daily log about Alex because she was worried and scared

about having him in her classroom. This does not suggest bad

faith or gross misjudgment, but rather a legitimate fear for her

safety. Likewise, the District’s failure to inform plaintiffs

about Dwyer’s concerns about Alex constitutes, at most,

professional misjudgment. There is no showing of inappropriate

or hostile behavior by Dwyer toward Alex. Nor should a school

district be required to inform parents every time a teacher has

legitimate concerns about a disruptive child. Plaintiffs’

suggestion that the District deliberately placed Alex with a

teacher who was scared of him in order to sabotage Alex’s

education is not supported by any evidence. 

Third, plaintiffs argue that defendants discriminated

against Alex, and intentionally attempted to force him out of

Valley Oak, by refusing to implement the Bridges’ behavioral

program. (Id. at 8.) Defendants allegedly failed to implement

the program in two key ways: (1) by Dwyer’s refusal to implement

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Bridges’ whole-class reinforcement system; and (2) by school

officials’ repeated failure to follow Bridges’ advice to ignore

Alex’s maladaptive behaviors, specifically with regard to the

fire-alarm incidents. (Id.) The Hearing Office analyzed and

rejected both of these arguments. (Wedner Decl. Ex. A. at 8-11.) 

These actions, like the others, are insufficient to

establish bad faith or gross misjudgment on the part of

defendants. To the contrary, the evidence shows the District

making a good faith effort to implement the Bridges’ program. 

For instance, the District had several teachers, including Dwyer,

attend a special training session on Bridges’ behavior

philosophy. Likewise, following the March 19th IEP meeting in

which Bridges first suggested the creation of a whole-class

reinforcement system, Dwyer took immediate steps to create such a

program in her classroom. Although plaintiffs contend that

Dwyer’s program was not a whole-class reinforcement program as

described by Bridges, the differences between the Bridges’

proposal and her plan were not great. In any event, plaintiffs

concede that Dwyer was never told that she was required to

implement the exact program suggested by Bridges. (Defs.’ SUF ¶

46.) 

Similarly, while some school officials may have reprimanded

Alex for pulling the fire alarms, there is no evidence that these

actions were done in bad faith or constitute gross misjudgment. 

In fact, plaintiffs’ own evidence shows that the District made

efforts to prevent the school staff from continuing to reprimand

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 Alex complains about the use of descriptive terms in the 7

declarations, such as “unpredictably violent,” “methodical [in

planning violence],” “intimidating,” “threatening,” “ticking time

bomb,” “menacing,” “physically abusive,” “psychotic,” “going

ballistic,” “toughest year of teaching in thirteen years” to

describe him and the circumstances. (Opp’n at 10.) 

14

Alex for such behavior. Specifically, the District’s former

special education coordinator went to Valley Oak on at least one

occasion to remind the teachers not to reprimand Alex. (Varma

Decl. Ex. 4.) In short, rather than suggesting bad faith or

gross misjudgment, defendants’ implementation of Bridges’ program

reflects a good faith effort to carry out the program while still

protecting other students and staff.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendants’ discriminatory

plan culminated with the District’s decision to unilaterally

change Alex’s educational placement through a TRO, without first

exploring less aggressive options or contacting his parents. 

(Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ bad faith and

discriminatory intent in taking such actions is evidenced by

three facts: (1) the filing of the TRO request without first

responding to the letter Alex’s parents sent one week prior to

the filing; (2) the use of negative and hyperbolic language to

describe Alex in the various declarations submitted by school

officials in support of the TRO; and (3) the judge’s later 7

decision at the preliminary injunction hearing to vacate the

portions of the TRO regarding the educational placement of Alex. 

(Id. at 9-10.) 

This argument fails for many of the same reasons described

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above. For one, the District’s decision to change Alex’s

educational placement through a TRO request does not necessarily

violate the IDEA. The Supreme Court held in Honig v. Doe, 484

U.S. 305, 324-28, 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988) that although school

officials do not have unilateral authority to exclude a disabled

student based on violent and dangerous behavior, they can, in

certain circumstances, seek judicial relief to change the

educational placement of a dangerous child. Courts since Honig

have repeatedly held that they can order the removal of dangerous

children where the district shows that maintaining the child in

the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury

to himself or others and that the District has done all that it

reasonably can to reduce the risk that the child will cause that

injury. See, e.g., Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d

1223, 1228 (8th Cir. 1995) (articulating this standard); Office

of Special Education Programs Memorandum, 97-7, 26 IDELR 981, at

*4 (Aug. 9, 1997) (affirming that IDEA continues to allow

districts to seek removal of children through court process in

appropriate circumstances); Henry v. Sch. Dist. Admin. Unit No.

29, 70 F.Supp.2d 52, 58 (D.N.H. 1999) (same). 

Even if the District did violate the IDEA by seeking a TRO

without first exhausting the IDEA’s administrative procedures,

there is no evidence that the District’s actions constitute bad

faith or gross misjudgment. Rather, the evidence suggests that

the District was acting reasonably and in good faith to resolve a

difficult situation posed by a disruptive and violent student. 

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Given the case law described above, its decision to pursue a TRO,

on the advice of legal counsel, cannot be the basis for a finding

of discrimination. Although the District did not first contact

Alex’s parents, their failure to do so neither violates the IDEA

nor establishes bad faith or gross misjudgment. Finally, the

Yolo County Superior Court’s ruling does not change this

conclusion, as the court simply referred the issue of Alex’s

placement to the District’s Hearing Office. The court in no way

suggested that it was bad faith or gross misjudgment for the

District to have sought a TRO. 

Likewise, the descriptions of Alex included in the various

declarations do not provide evidence of bad faith or gross

misjudgment. Although plaintiffs may disagree with the school

officials’ description of Alex, they have presented no evidence

establishing that the statements were false or that school

officials did not honestly believe these statements to be true. 

For the above reasons, plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the TRO

lack merit. 

In sum, whether taken individually or as a whole,

plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that defendants’ actions

amount to bad faith, gross misjudgment, or deliberate

indifference. No reasonable factfinder could so find.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on this claim. 

B. § 504 Retaliation Claim

For similar reasons, plaintiffs fail to establish a § 504

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 Plaintiffs do allege that Clumpner, the District’s former 8

special education coordinator, commented at an IEP meeting in

December 2002 that filing for due process is “a very difficult

process,” and that if plaintiffs chose to file for due process,

“relationship [between the parties] would never be the same.” 

(Wedner Decl. Ex. W at 247.) This sole, ambiguous statement is

insufficient to constitute direct evidence of retaliation. 

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retaliation claim. Because plaintiffs present no direct evidence

of retaliation on the part of defendants, the court analyzes

their claim under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test used

to evaluate Title VII retaliation claims. See Peebles v. Potter, 8

354 F.3d 761, 770 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the

McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test is used to analyze § 504

retaliation claims where no direct evidence of retaliation

exists). To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under §

504, plaintiffs must show that: (1) they engaged in a protected

activity; (2) the defendants knew they were involved in the

protected activity; (3) an adverse action was taken against them;

and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity

and the adverse action. See, e.g., Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287

F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2002); Hunt v. St. Peter Sch., 963 F.Supp.

843, 854 (W.D.Mo. 1996). 

If the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to defendants to show a legitimate, non-retaliatory

purpose for their acts. Hunt, 963 F.Supp. at 854; Johnson v.

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1991). Upon this

showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to demonstrate

that the proffered reason was pretextual. Johnson, 945 F.2d at

980-81. To overcome defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory

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reason, plaintiffs must “show that the articulated reason is

pretextual ‘either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the [school district]

or indirectly by showing that the [school district’s] proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

plaintiffs are relying solely on indirect or circumstantial

evidence of pretext, then the evidence must be “specific” and

“substantial” to survive summary judgment. Id. (citing Godwin

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Here, plaintiffs have arguably established a prima facie

case of retaliation. (Opp’n at 11.) First, plaintiffs have

identified several protected activities engaged in by Alex’s

parents, namely: (1) withdrawing their consent to the use of

physical restraints in June 2002; (2) filing a request for a due

process hearing in December 2002; (3) refusing to agree to the

District’s IEP proposal in March 2003; and (4) writing a letter

to the District on April 11, 2003 complaining about the

implementation of the settlement agreement. (Id.) Second,

plaintiffs assert that the District and its staff were aware of

all the above protected activities. (Id.) 

Third, plaintiffs identify several allegedly retaliatory,

adverse actions taken by defendants, many of which the court has

already discussed, including: (1) failing to develop an

appropriate behavior plan; (2) using physical restraints when the

inappropriate behavior plan failed; (3) not revealing that Dwyer

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not “adverse” because they do not constitute a violation of the

IDEA. (Mot. at 26.) However, this still remains an open

question because defendants have not moved for summary judgment

on Alex’s IDEA claim. 

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was suffering emotional distress and was afraid of Alex; (4)

refusing to abide by the behavior recommendations of Bridges; (5)

sabotaging Bridges’ behavior techniques regarding the fire alarm;

(6) requesting a TRO to unilaterally change Alex’s educational

placement; and (7) embellishing descriptions of him as a

dangerous individual to support its TRO request. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Even though many of these allegations are weak, as described

above, they are sufficient to meet plaintiffs’ low prima facie

burden. 

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Finally, Alex has established a sufficient causal connection

to satisfy the prima facie test. Courts have generally held that

causation can be inferred from timing alone where the adverse

action follows closely on the heels of the protected activity. 

See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,

273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (2001) (stating that the temporal

proximity must be “very close”). Here, Alex’s parents engaged in

several protected activities between June 2002 and April 2003. 

Although some of the alleged adverse actions did not occur

immediately after these actions, several others did. For

instance, the District’s request for a TRO occurred a month or

less after Alex’s parents rejected the District’s IEP proposal in

March 2003. Courts have found a one-month period sufficiently

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between their TRO application and the April 11, 2003 letter

because they started the process of seeking a TRO before April

11. (Mot. at 25.) However, the refusal of Alex’s parents to

agree to an IEP plan in mid-March 2003 was also a protected

activity and, as noted above, the District began to consider a

TRO application less than a month thereafter. Therefore, a

causal connection can be inferred from the timing of the

District’s actions. 

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close to create an inference of a causal connection.10

Calero-Cerezo v. DOJ, 355 F.3d 6, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2004). 

Furthermore, when looked at as a whole, plaintiffs are alleging a

pattern of escalating retaliatory actions in response to various

protected activities taken by Alex’s parents. The interrelated

nature of the protected activities and the alleged adverse

actions is probably sufficient to establish the causal connection

element of the prima facie case. 

Even if plaintiffs have established a prima facie case,

however, they fail to present any evidence rebutting or

overcoming defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 

Defendants contend that their actions, rather than being

retaliatory, were motivated by a desire to protect Alex, the

other students, and the staff from Alex’s dangerous behavior, and

to provide Alex with a FAPE. (Mot. at 26.) Far from rebutting

this proffered reason, the parties’ evidence supports defendants’

position. As described more fully above, the evidence shows

defendants struggling to handle an undisputedly difficult child

and making good faith efforts to meet Alex’s needs while also

protecting Alex, the other students, and the school staff from

Alex’s disruptive behavior. In short, plaintiffs’ evidence falls

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far short of the “specific” and “substantial” evidence of pretext

necessary to overcome defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on this claim. 

III. 

For the forgoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ retaliation and discrimination

claims brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as against

all defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/19/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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