Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01618/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EMILY MOODY BOYD, Administratrix of 

the Estate of CLYDE ALVA BOYD, III, 

and EMILY MOODY BOYD, Individually, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE UNI.TED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. 

THE UNITED STATES ARMY, CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS, 

Defendant~Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

PILBD 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir:.Uit 

AUG 2 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-1618 

Appeal from the United States District Cour.t 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 85-93-C) 

Harry Scoufos, Sallisaw, Oklahoma, (Glen E. Johnson, Okemah, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Ralph F. Keen, Assistant United States Attorney, (Roger Hilfiger, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, LOGAN, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 1 
The district court dismissed the suit of plaintiff Emily 

Moody Boyd against the United States for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, holding that it was barred by the discretionary 

function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 

u.s.c. § 2680(a). Boyd v. United States, 631 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. 

Okla. 1986). On appeal, Boyd argues that the challenged 

governmental activity does not fall within that exception, and 

thus the government is subject to suit. She also argues that the 

government i:s not immunized from suit by an Oklahoma recreational 

.use statute~ Okla~ Stat. tit. 2, § 1301-315(0), or a federal flbod 

control statute, 33 u.s.c. § 702c. We agree that neither the FTCA 

nor 33 u.s.c. § 702c bars suit in this case, but we remand for 

further consideration of the Oklahoma statute. 

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. In September 

1982, Clyde Alva Boyd, deceased husband of plaintiff Emily Boyd, 

went ~o Tenkiller State Park in Oklahoma. While snorkeling in 

Tenkiller Lake some twenty-five or thirty feet offshore, near an. 

area called Crappie Point, Boyd was struck by a boat and killed. 

Boyd alleges that the Crappie Point area was "held out to be 

and generally known to be used for a swimming, snorkeling, and 

diving area of the lake." IR. doc. I.at 2 ~ rv. 1 The parties 

stipulated .that there were no signs or other markers at Crappie 

Point warning boaters or swimmers of potential hazards. The State 

of Okiahoma operates Tenkiller State Park under a lease from the 

1 For purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept 

plaintiff's allegations as true and indulge reasonable inferences 

in her favor. See,~, Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 

F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1987). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 2 
United States, but the lake is under the jurisdiction and control 

of the United States, through the Army Corps of Engineers (COE). 

Boyd filed suit against the United States, alleging that the 

COE negligently had failed to warn swimmers that boats were 

permitted in the area of Crappie Point, or alternatively, that the 

COE was negligent in not zoning the area so as to restrict the 

entry of boats. The district court found, and neither party 

disputes, that Southwest Division Regulation (SDR) 1130-2-7, which 

governed the COE's responsibilities for administering reservoir 

lands and water. under its supervision, was applicable in this 

case. 2 After reviewing the cases dealing with the discretionary 

2 SDR 1130-2-7, which apparently was promulgated by the COE, 

provides as follows: 

"5-4. Zoning. Lakes will be zoned to protect the 

public and to promote safe water oriented sports and 

other activities. Zoned areas will be held to minimum 

number and size in order to permit the greatest use of 

the lake by all interests. Permanent zoning will be 

generally limited to swimming, boat launching, 

commercial dock areas, heavy use areas where congestion 

exists, and areas of danger. Zoning for aircraft will 

be in accordance with the applicabl~ section of Title 36 

CFR. 

5-5. Marking. Areas to be zoned will be clearly marked 

with buoys complying with the Uniform State Waterway 

Marking System. Buoys will contain the minimum 

information and be sufficiently legible for the using 

public to readily determine the zone restrictions. 

Channels will be marked with nun- and can-type buoys or 

midchannel marker buoys. Areas where boats are 

prohibited will be marked with appropriate buoys. When 

possible buoys should be connected by lines or cable to 

prevent boats from entering the area. For public safety 

all the uncleared areas of the reservoir will be clearly 

and permanently marked so that the public will be 

adequately advised that the areas are not cleared and 

that only low speed boating is permitted. Marking and 

warning devices which will be functional under 

fluctuating water surfaces, unmistakable as to intent, 

Continued to next page 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 3 
function exception, the district court concluded that the 

government conduct.challenged here fell within· that exception. 

The court held that the decision to zone and mark public 

recreation areas, as embodied in SDR 1130-2-7, was discretionary 

and relying on our decision in Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 

656, 665 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983), reasoned 

that "if an alleged failure to warn goes to the manner of exercise 

of a discretionary function, then the conduct is. immunized from 

suit by§ 2680(a)." Boyd, 631 F. Supp. at 817. 

I 

The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States 

for negligence to the extent that a private person would be liable 

in like circumstances under local law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This 

waiver, however, is limited by the discretionary function 

exception, which prohibits claims against the United States "based 

upon the exercise or performance or. the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function o~ duty on the part of a federal 

agency or an employee of the Gov~rnment, whether or not the 

discretion involved be abused." Id. § ,2680 (a). 

The United States Supreme Court recently "restat(ed] and 

clarif(ied] the scope of the discretionary function exception" by 

setting forth c~rtain principles to guide the application of the 

exception. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 s. Ct. 1954, 1959 

( 1988). · First, a court must consider whether the challenged 

Continued from previous page 

and economical to install and maintain will be designed. 

This design should not be limited to devices and methods 

previously used." 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 4 
action "is a matter of choice for the acting employee," or whether 

the statute, regulation, or policy at issue prescribes a specific 

course of conduct. Id. at 1958. In the latter instance, the 

exception has no application since an employee must "adhere to the 

directive" and no discretion is involved. Id. at 1958-59. 

If a decision does involve an element of judgment, a court 

then must determine whether it is of the kind Congress intended to 

shield through the exception. In this vein, the Court noted that 

Congress only intended to insulate "governmental decisions based 

on considerations of public policy," id. at 1959; that is, those 

decisions "'grounded in social, economic, and political policy.'" 

Id. (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 

(1984)). Thus, if an agency's "policy leaves no room for an 

official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or 

if the act simply does not involve the exercise of such judgment, 

the discretionary function exception does not bar a claim that the 

act was negligent or wrongful." Id. at l964. To support this 

latter proposition, the Court cited Indian Towing Co. v. United 

States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955), in which the Court held that a 

negligent failure by the government to maintain a lighthouse in 

proper working order was actionable even though the initial 

decision to install it was a discretionary policy judgment. See 

also Berkovitz, 108 s. Ct. at 1959 n.3 (failure to maintain the 

lighthouse "did not involve any permissible exercise of policy 

judgment"). 

In the instant case, we believe the decision to zone lakes, 

including which parts to zone and which parts to leave 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 5 
unrestricted, constitutes an exercise of discretion involving 

competing economic and social considerations. The government 

officials were required to strike a balance between public safety, 

including the amount of funds to expend in promoting that 

objective, and recreational use, allowing the greatest possible 

variety of unrestricted use by the public. See SOR 1130-2-7. 

Thus, the COE's decision not to zone the Crappie Point area for 

swimming was discretionary. 

The government argues that because it was a discretionary 

decision not to zone Crappie Point, ·

11 the regulations in force at 

the time[) also meant that no warning signs or other safety 

devices would be installed in the area." Brief of Appellee at 6. 

In other words, the government asserts that a discretionary 

decision not to zone an area necessarily .makes discretionary a 

decision that nothing be done there, regardless of potential 

hazards. We do not agree. We decline to extend the veil of 

discretion so that it covers the failure to warn swimmers at 

Crappie Point of potential hazards, or the failure to prohibi~ 

swimming in that area altogether. 

An alleged failure to warn swimmers of dangerous conditions 

in a pop,ular swimming area does not implicate any social, 

economic, or political policy judgments with which the 

discretionary function exception properly is concerned. The 

government's alleged omission in this case "simply does not 

involve the exercise of such judgment." Berkovitz, 108 S. Ct. at 

1964; see Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69; see also Ducey v. United 

States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1983) ("While the government's 

-6-

' 

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 6 
decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the 

exercise of a discretionary function, the government's duty to 

warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may 

nonetheless be actionable"); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 

876-77 (10th Cir. 1976) (government's failure to warn about 

hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though 

decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was 

discretionary); cf. Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 423 (7th 

Cir. 1983) (government did not argue its· failure to warn of 

dangerous diving conditions was discretionary). 

In ruling that this case fell within the discretionary 

function exception, the district court apparently believed that 

our decision in Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 

1983), mandated such a result. That case involved an alleged 

failure to warn of dangerous highway conditions where the federal 

government supervised and helped 'fund state construction and 

maintenance. of highways. Although the federal government had 

promulgateo certain building and safety regulations for the states 

to follow, we held that the administration and enforcement of 

those regulations was infused with such a "welter of public policy 

considerations," id. at 665, that the alleged government omission 

in that case fell within the discretionary exception. Id. at 662-

66. Further, we distinguished our decision in Smith, 546 F.2d 

872, on the grounds that that case "was premised on the direct 

acts or omissions of the Government, through its agents as a 

landowner." Miller, 710 F.2d at 665 n.16. The claim in the 

present case, as in Smith, is based on an alleged direct omission 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 7 
by the government as landowner. Additionally, as previously 

discussed, the act at issue·· here did not involve any 

considerations.of public policy. We hold that Boyd's claim is not 

barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 3 

II 

The government next argues that an Oklahoma recreational use 

statute immunizes it from suit in this case. See Klepper v. City 

of Milford,, 825 F. 2d 1440, 14.43 ( 10th Cir. 1987) (United States 

not liable under FTCA if comparably situated person would be 

immunized by state statute). While the district court did not 

find it·necessary to decide this issue, at this court's request it 

has been briefed by both parties. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 1301-315, provides in pertinent 

part as follows: 

3 The dissent argues that if the decision to zone is discretionary so is the decision to allow mixed uses and not to zone. 

Dissenting Op. at 1.· We agree and so stated, ante at 5-6. The 

dissent continues, however, to assert that because the decision 

not to zone the area was discretionary the COE had no duty to 

warn. Dissenting Op. at 2. ·The dissent in effect ignores the law 

in this circuit that the duty to warn must be considered 

separateiy from the initial zoning decision in determining the 

applicability of the discretionary functiort exception. Smith v. 

United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir. 1976); see also Ducey 

v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1983). In addition, 

Berkovitz mandates that only decisions involving policy judgments 

are discretionary and immune from liability, 108 S. Ct. at 1959, 

and the dissent fails to point out what public policy 

considerations possibly could be involved in the· COE's decision 

not to warn snorkelers or swimmers of known dangers in the Crappie 

Point area. Finally, we note that despite the dissent's 

intimations to the contrary, we are not holding that a decision 

not to zone carries with it a duty to warn. Whether that duty 

exists is a question of state negligence law. We hold only that 

the "alleged failure to warn swimmers of dangerous conditions in a 

popular swimming area does not implicate any social, economic, or 

political policy judgments with which the discretionary function 

exception properly is concerned." Ante at 6. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 8 
"B. An owner or lessee who provides the public with a 

park area for outdoor recreational purposes owes no duty 

of care to keep that park area safe for entry or use by 

others, or to give warning to persons entering or going 

on that park area. of any hazardous conditions, 

structures or activities thereon •••. 

c. This section shall not apply if there is any charge 

made or usually made by entering or using such park 

area, or any part thereof, or if any commercial or other 

activity for profit is conducted on such park area, or 

any part thereof. 

D. An owner of land or water area leased to the state 

for outdoor recreational purposes owes no duty of care 

to keep that land or water area safe for entry or use by 

others, or to give warning to persons entering or going 

on that land .or water of any hazardous conditions, 

structures or activities thereon." 

This statute apparently has not been construed by the 

Oklahoma courts, but it is more narrowly drawn than the model 

recreational use statute Kansas adopted and we construed in 

Klepper. Because the government concedes that the water area of 

the park was not leased to the state, Supplemental Brief of 

Appellee at 14, and the death occurred offshore, subsection D does 

not appear to apply here. Thus, this leaves subsections Band C 

for our consideration. 

The government asserts that it receives no monies from the 

State of Oklahoma for the lease of the park "nor does the United 

States operate any commercial activities for profit on the lake." 

Id. at Exh. A p. 1 (emphasis added). Boyd, however, asserts that 

the COE "receives a percentage of gross sales from many 

concessionaires and charges various fees to lake users." 

Appellant's Reply to Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 2. We 

believe a development of the facts is necessary to a resolution of 

this issue. If indeed the COE charges lake user fees or receives 

-9-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 9 
some revenue from commercial activities on the areas controlled by 

the COE, subsection C clearly applies to knock out the immunity 

provided by subse~tion B. 4 This may not be the only construction 

of which the statute is susceptible that could subject the United 

States to potential liability. ct.,~' Ducey, 713 F.2d at 509-

15. Thus, on remand we direct the district court to consider and 

resolve whether the United States is protected from liability by 

the Oklahoma statute. 

III 

The government also relies on the Supreme Court's decision in 

United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986), for the proposition 

that the immunity provision of the Flood Control Act, 33 u.s.c. 

§ 702c, exempts it from liability in this case. That provision 

provides that "[n]o.liability of any kind shall attach to or rest 

upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood 

waters at any place." Apparently Tenkiller Lake was cr·eated by 

the COE for flood control purposes .. We will assume that this is 

the case for purposes of the foll~wing discussion. 5 

4 The government argues that even if fees were charged to users 

of Tenkiller Lake, Boyd did not pay one and thus the subsection C 

exception is inapplicable to him. The statute, however, does not 

require, nor is any authority cited for the proposition, that a 

person must actually pay a charge before invoking subsection c. 

On the contrary, the plain language "any charge" compels the 

opposite conclusion. 

5 Boyd argues that this issue is not properly before us since it 

was not raised in the district court. Generally, we will not 

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. However, 

as James was decided after the district court's ruling, the 

question presented primarily is one of law, and both parties have 

briefed this issue, we elect to address it here. See,~, 

Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 107 S. Ct. 2183 (1987). 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 10 
In James, recreational users of a reservoir were injured or 

killed when they were swept through flood gates opened by the COE 

for flood control purposes. 478 U.S. at 599, 601. The Court held 

that 33 u.s.c. § 702c immunized the government from suit for any 

damages caused by floods or flood waters, and thus the government 

was immune from the claims in that case. Id. at 612. There is 

some broad language in James, but the Court appeared to 

distinguish cases where damages occur in waters not being actively 

used for flood control purposes, by twice noting that the district 

and appellate courts in that case had found that the waters were 

being released for flood control purposes at the time of the 

accident. Id. at 605 & n.7, 610. Indeed, the Supreme Court 

quoted a portion of a Fourth Circuit case, and highlighted certain 

language, where the court had stated "[i]f the plaintiff could 

prove damage to his farm as a result of the dam's operation as a 

recreational facility without relation to the operation of the dam 

as a flood control project, he would avoid the absolute bar of 

§ 702c." Id. at 605 n.7 (quoting Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 

701, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1978)). 

Notwithstanding this distinction made in James, the Ninth 

Circuit recently ruled that§ 702c barred a negligence suit 

against the government for injuries sustained as a result of 

diving into a flood control lake also used for recreational 

purposes. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 562 (9th 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989). The court 

reached this result primarily through adherence to a standard set 

forth in pre-James cases from that circuit, which dictated that 

-11-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 11 
§ 702c applies unless damages resulting from the operation of a 

federal flood control project are "'wholly unrelated to any Act of 

Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood 

control, or any act undertaken pursuant to any such 

authorization.'" Id. at 562 (quoting Morici Corp. v. United 

States, 681 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1982), quoting Peterson v. 

United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966)) (emphasis 

added);~ also James, 478 U.S. at 605 n.7. Thus, the McCarthy 

court concluded that the diving injuries sustained in that case 

were not "wholly unrelated'' to Congress' flood control efforts. 

850 F.2d at 563. 6 

For our part, we cannot agree that Congress intended to 

stretch the shield of flood control immunity to the limits 

contemplated· by the "wholly unrelated" standard. This standard 

essentially creates a ''but for" connection between flood control 

activity and damages occurring at a flood control project--if. the 

.injury would not have occured but for the creation of a flood 

control lake, the government is immune. Such a connection between 

flood control activity and recreational injuries is too attenuated 

to warrant the invocation of§ 702c. The government has presented 

no evidence that Congress intended§ 702c to cover this situation. 

We believe Congress' concern was to shield the government from 

liability associated with flood control operations, see James, 478 

' 6 The court also declined to distinguish between the active and 

passive operations of a flood control facility due to. the 

difficulty of making such distinctions. McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 

561. In our view, while such a distinction may be difficult in 

some cases, this does not justify a grant of blanket immunity for 

all cases and especially in the one sub. judice where the 

distinction is clear. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 12 
( U.S. at 608, not liability associated with operating a 

recreational facility. Without attempting to delineate for every 

conceivable situation the necessary link between flood control 

activities and injuries sustained at a flood control project 

before § 702c immunity applies, in the present case we hold that 

the requisite nexus has not been established. 

In no way are we passing on the government's culpability for 

negligence in this particular incident. We simply hold that 

plaintiff is not barred from suing the government on the grounds 

considered in this appeal. The judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 13 
No. 86-1618, Boyd v. U.S. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent. The majority here decides that the 

decision whether to zone a particular area "constitutes an 

exercise of discretion involving competing economic and social 

considerations" and therefore concludes that the decision not to 

zone the Crappie Point area for swimming was discretfonary. Thus, 

in the absence of the duty to warn upon which the majority relies, 

the discretionary function exception to governmental liability 

would apply he're to exempt the United States from liability. The 

law in this circuit clearly requires that the duty to warn of 

preexisting, natural hazards be considered separately from the 

initial zoning decision in determining the applicability of the 

discretionary function exception. See Smith v. United States, 546 

F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir. 1976). When there are competing economic 

and social considerations, ·as concededly exist here, I cannot 

agree. that all decisions not to zone carry~ corresponding duty to 

warp of all possible hazards. that might result from the decision 

not to zone. That, however, is the effect of the majority holding 

in this case. 

Zoning decisions inherently involve the identification of 

areas appropriate for particular uses. When government officials 

exercise their authority to zone, they affirmatively identify 

areas in which specific activities can occur. In this case, for 

example, one specified area was designated for swimming only. 

Inherent in a zoning decision is the premise that the approved use 

or uses are appropriate, safe, and consistent with the 

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 14 
government's policy considerations, while other uses are not. · The 

decision not to zone carries with it the implicit policy 

determination that the government will not warn of all conjectural 

hazards that may result from mixed uses of areas when those uses 

are neither inherently dangerous, natural hazards, nor unforeseen. 

Swimming, snorkeling, boating, fishing, and a host of other 

activities are permissible in an unzoned area. In my view, if the 

decision to zone is discretionary, the decision to allow mixed 

uses -- that is, the decision not to zone -- is similarly 

discretionary. In this case, one of the government's appropriate 

policy choices was to mix zoned and unzoned areas in this lake, 

thereby maximizing usage and safety for all those taking advantage 

of the recreational opportunities on the entire lake. Indeed, the 

applicable regulation requires that zoned areas be held to a 

minimum number and size in order to permit the greatest use of the 

lake by all interests. See majority opinion at n.2. The 

discretionary policy choice itself included the choice not to 

warn, for the very decision to allow mixed uses implemented the 

policy choice. Congress cannot have intended to waive immunity 

for such a clear policy choice as the decision to allow mixed uses 

of government lands and lakes. 

The fact that a particular group of swimmers -- or snorkelers 

in this case -- choose to pursue their interests in an area left 

unzoned and thus open to mixed uses, rather than in the safer 

zoned area, does not change the fact that the decision not to zone 

the area was discretionary and carried with it no duty to warn of 

authorized but mixed uses of the area. Any danger to which the 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 15 
plaintiff was subjected arose from the policy determination itself 

the decision to permit mixed uses. 

This case. does not present the problem of a preexisting or 

natural hazard as was presented in Smith, 546 F.2d at 874. In 

Smith, "[t]he decision to develop only certain areas did not 

create the problem or the need to decide whether warning signs 

should be erected." Id. at 877. The danger in Smith came from 

thermal springs, and this court declared that the need to decide 

whether to warn of such a hazard "has existed ever since 

Yellowstone was opened to the public.". Id. The danger here, 

unlike the danger in Smith, was the danger of the decision 

itself -- that is, that the area was not to be restricted to just 

boating or just snorkeling, but rather kept open to all legitimate 

uses. 

We are also not confronted here with a situation in which the 

government affirmatively undertook to provide a safety device and 

the device malfunctioned. See Indian Towing Co.~ United States, 

350 U.S. 61, 62 (1955) (involving negligence in operation of 

lighthouse on island in Gulf of Mexico). The decision not to zone 

in this case is more nearly like the decision regarding where to 

locate the lighthouse in Indian Towing. I daresay no one would 

venture to require a .warning sign saying "Warning, no lighthouse" 

on every dangerous promontory or sandbar in the Gulf of Mexico. I 

would hold that the discretionary function exception immunizes the 

government from liability in this case. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-1618 Document: 01019830668 Date Filed: 08/02/1989 Page: 16