Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00005/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00005-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

---

1

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES LINLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHASE BANKCARD 

SERVICES, INC. and CHASE 

BANK USA, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are (1) the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 

Defendants Chase Bankcard Services, Inc. and Chase Bank USA, N.A. (ECF No. 70), (2) 

the Request for Oral Argument filed by Plaintiff James Linlor (ECF No. 72), (3) the Motion

to Lodge DVDs filed by Linlor (ECF No. 76), (4) the Requests for Dispositive Sanctions 

filed by Linlor (ECF Nos. 78, 83), and (5) the Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed 

by Defendants (ECF No. 80). 

I. Background

On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff James Linlor filed the First Amended Complaint (ECF 

No. 22) (the “FAC”). The FAC brings a claim against Defendants Chase Bankcard 

Services, Inc. and Chase Bank USA, N.A. for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). (ECF No. 22 at 9). 

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
2

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 15, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70). 

On May 30, 2018, Linlor filed a Request for Oral Argument (ECF No. 72), a Motion to 

Lodge DVDs (ECF No. 76), and an Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Request for Dispositive Sanctions (ECF No. 78). On June 11, 2018, Defendants filed a 

Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 79) and a Motion to File 

Documents Under Seal (ECF No. 80). On June 13, 2018, Linlor filed another Opposition 

to Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Dispositive Sanctions (ECF No. 83). 

On June 20, 2018, Defendants filed a Sur-Reply in Support of Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 86).

II. Facts

Plaintiff applied for and was issued a Rapid Rewards® Premier credit card 

account by Chase Card on or about September 28, 2011 (the 

‘Account’). . . . [O]n or about October 1, 2015, Chase Card mailed a new 

credit card, with a chip, to Plaintiff to replace his old credit card that had no 

chip. . . . Plaintiff . . . did not receive new credit cards sent to him by Chase 

Card. As a result, and to prevent potential fraudulent activity, . . . Chase Card 

re-issued Plaintiff a replacement credit card and changed the account number. 

Despite changing the numbers on Plaintiffs replacement card, his Account 

remained unchanged. . . . [W]hile the account number changed, the previous 

balance carried over.

Declaration of Robert J. Perry, ECF No. 70-3, at ¶¶ 4–7.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or

the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are 

no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). A material fact 

is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect 

the outcome of the suit. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
3

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). The materiality of a fact is determined by the substantive law 

governing the claim or defense. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986). “[A] dispute about a 

material fact is ‘genuine[]’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is 

proper. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153 (1970). The burden then shifts 

to the opposing party to provide admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that 

summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322, 324. The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To avoid summary judgment, 

the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations of fact or law. See Berg v. 

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, the nonmovant must designate 

which specific facts show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 256. 

B. Discussion 

Defendants contend that they have introduced “clear, admissible evidence 

establishing the fact that Defendants’ records do not reflect any purported fraud.” ECF No. 

79 at 2 (citing Perry Decl. ¶¶ 6–8.). Defendants contend that they have “satisfied their 

burden of establishing this material fact,” and, consequently, Linlor must introduce 

evidence of fraudulent charges to the Account to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 3 (citing 

Sluimer v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2010)). Linlor contends that “[s]ince 

Plaintiff has not been given an opportunity to complete [d]iscovery due to Defendants’ 

stonewalling and refusals to cooperate, full discovery should first be allowed, so that 

Plaintiff can then move for (or defend) Rule 56 motions.” (ECF No. 78 at 4). Linlor 

contends that it is “impossible” for him to identify which charges to his account were 

fraudulent “without the database and fraud system/network specifics.” (ECF No. 83 at 6, 

11). Defendants contend that the Court should not defer consideration of the Motion for 

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
4

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Summary Judgment and allow additional discovery because “Plaintiff fails to submit the 

requisite declaration or affidavit [and] . . . fails to explain what facts additional discovery 

would reveal and how those facts would preclude summary judgment.” (ECF No. 79 at 6).

To recover for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff “must make a ‘prima 

facie showing of inaccurate reporting.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 

876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dennis v. BEH–1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.

2008) (citing DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2008)) (“Although 

the FCRA’s reinvestigation provision . . . does not on its face require that an actual 

inaccuracy exist for a plaintiff to state a claim, many courts, including our own, have 

imposed such a requirement.”). 

[A]n item on a credit report can be “incomplete or inaccurate” within the 

meaning of the FCRA’s furnisher investigation provision . . . “because it is 

patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an 

extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.”

Id. (quoting Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

Consequently, for Linlor to avoid summary judgment, there must be evidence from which 

a reasonable jury could conclude that there were charges on the Account that were patently 

incorrect or misleading. See id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

The Court finds that Linlor has not come forward with any evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that there were charges on the Account that were patently 

incorrect or misleading. Linlor does not contend that he has identified evidence that any 

specific charges on the Account were fraudulent, inaccurate, or misleading. See ECF Nos. 

78, 83. 

Linlor contends that he has not identified which charge(s) were fraudulent because 

he is not able to do so “without the database and fraud system/network specifics.” (ECF 

No. 83 at 6, 11). A party requesting additional discovery in opposition to summary 

judgment “must identify by affidavit the specific facts that further discovery would reveal, 

and explain why those facts would preclude summary judgment.” Tatum v. City & Cty. of 

San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court finds that Linlor has not 

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
5

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

shown by affidavit that “the database and fraud system/network specifics” would allow 

him to identify which charge(s) were fraudulent, inaccurate, or misleading. Accordingly, 

Linlor’s request for additional discovery is denied, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment is granted. 

IV. Requests for Sanctions

Linlor seeks the following sanctions against Defendants: “partial summary judgment 

for Plaintiff on those topics which Defendants have refused after 5 months to provide 

evidence to deny,” “full summary judgment,” and “sanctions barring prior, undelivered 

evidence from use by Defendants in their motion or at trial.” (ECF No. 83 at 3, 9). Linlor 

contends that those sanctions are warranted because Defendants “refus[e] to submit 

complete and responsive answers to all Interrogatories,” (ECF No. 78 at 5); “fail to 

supplement and cure defects [in their discovery responses] documented by Plaintiff,” id.; 

“claim[ed] . . . that Plaintiff failed to respond to Rule 36 or Rule 26 requests for over 3 

months,” (ECF No. 83 at 7); and “willfully misstated four key elements” in their Statement 

of Undisputed Facts (ECF No. 70-2), id. 

The Court finds that Linlor has not established that Defendants “fail[ed] to provide 

information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). 

Accordingly, the Court will not impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37(c). 

The Court also finds that Linlor has not established that Defendants do not have 

evidentiary support for any of the factual contentions in the Statement of Undisputed Facts

(ECF No. 70-2). Accordingly, the Court will not impose any sanctions under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, 

written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that . . . . the 

factual contentions have evidentiary support”).

V. Conclusion

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70) is GRANTED. The 

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against Linlor. 

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
6

17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Linlor’s Request for Oral Argument (ECF No. 72) and Requests for Dispositive Sanctions 

(ECF No. 78, 83) are DENIED. Linlor’s Motion to Lodge DVDs (ECF No. 78) and

Defendants’ Motion to File Documents Under Seal (ECF No. 80) are GRANTED. 

Dated: August 7, 2018

Case 3:17-cv-00005-WQH-KSC Document 90 Filed 08/07/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6