Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00220/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1355 Petition for Return of Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LYLE LEFLER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv220-LAB (POR)

ORDER SCREENING

COMPLAINT; AND

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JERRY

CONRAD, Agent, and OTHER

UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF THE

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,

Defendant.

Plaintiff David Lefler, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action,

filed a verified complaint seeking damages in connection with the seizure of his motor home

by federal authorities.

Lefler entered the United States at the Andrade, California port of entry on November

27, 2005, driving his motor home. U.S. customs officials at the port questioned him,

searched his vehicle, and found 556.97 pounds of marijuana concealed in it. Officials

arrested him and confiscated both the marijuana and the vehicle. He later pleaded guilty to

importing the marijuana, in case 05cr2313, United States v. Lefler. He was held in custody

from the time of his arrest until his sentence was completed, on July 16, 2010. Beginning

in August of 2009, he attempted to file a series of motions in the criminal docket seeking

Case 3:11-cv-00220-LAB-POR Document 14 Filed 05/26/11 Page 1 of 5
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return of his motor home. The Court ultimately rejected his motion for filing, but on appeal

the Ninth Circuit held it should have been treated as a civil complaint. Following remand, the

Court therefore opened a civil docket, granted Lefler leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP), and directed him to file a complaint. On May 19, 2011, he filed his verified complaint.

Because Lefler is proceeding IFP, the Court is required to screen his complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and to dismiss it to the extent it fails to state a claim. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("[S]ection 1915(e) not only

permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to

state a claim."); see also id. at 1129 (holding that § 1915(e)’s screening requirement

““applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners”).

In conducting the screening, the Court applies the same standard as for motions to

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th

Cir. 1998). The Court therefore accepts as true all allegations of material fact and construes

those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th

Cir. 2000). "However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form

of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

The complaint seeks relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346 et seq.), and under a Bivens theory, for violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

amendment rights. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). This is based solely on Lefler’s claim that the federal agents unreasonably

searched and seized his motor home and wouldn’t give it back to him. The Court is not

required to, and does not, accept Lefler’s conclusory allegation that U.S. officials’ search and

seizure his vehicle was unreasonable.

Lefler’s own allegations, under penalty of perjury, establish that he used the motor

home to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States. The motor home therefore fits easily

into the forfeiture provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), and under § 881(b) is subject to seizure

in the manner set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 981(b). Under § 981(b)(2), no warrant is required for

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the seizure and forfeiture if it is made pursuant to a lawful arrest. Again, Lefler’s own

allegations establish beyond doubt the motor home was seized pursuant to an arrest. Under

§ 881(c), the motor home remains in the custody of the Attorney General until disposed of

as provided under law; it is not subject to being returned to Lefler.

Before Lefler’s property was actually forfeited (as opposed to merely seized), both the

forfeiture statutes and due process required that he be given notice and an opportunity to

be heard, so that he could contest the forfeiture. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,

163–64, 167 (2002) (describing required notice under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 19 U.S.C.

§§ 1607–09, and general due process requirements). Because the value of the motor home

was well under $500,000, § 1607(a) required both notice by publication, and written notice

sent to Lefler. Lefler alleges he never received notice of the forfeiture or an opportunity to

contest it. But all that is required both statutorily and constitutionally is that the notice be

sent, not that Lefler have actually received it. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170 and n.5. No

additional efforts to give notice were required merely because Lefler was in custody at the

time. Id. 

Even if Lefler could show notice was never sent, and that he would have contested

the forfeiture if it had been sent, a Bivens action would not lie because Lefler has a remedy

under § 983(e). See King v. D.E.A., 2009 WL 6849443, slip op. at *1 (D.S.C., Feb. 3, 2009)

(noting that § 983(e) motion was the exclusive remedy, and that a Bivens action would not

lie); Bermudez v. City of N.Y. Police Dept., 2008 WL 3397919 at *2 n.6 (holding that Bivens

claim was not cognizable, because ”Plaintiff’s sole remedy to challenge a completed

administrative forfeiture is a motion pursuant to 983(e)”); North Carolina ex rel. Haywood v.

Barrington, 256 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (M.D.N.C., 2003) (holding that availability of other

adequate remedies, i.e., a § 983(e) motion, precluded Bivens claim based on allegedly

wrongful forfeiture). See also 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(5) (“A motion filed under this subsection

shall be the exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a civil

forfeiture statute.”)

/ / /

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There is no reason, however, to allow Lefler to amend his complaint so as to

transform it into a § 983(e) motion, because such a motion would fail. Lefler knew, or at the

very least, had reason to know of the seizure within a sufficient time to file a timely claim.

See § 983(e)(1)(B) (“[The] motion shall be granted if . . . the moving party did not know or

have reason to know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim.”) Lefler

immediately knew of the motor home’s seizure, however. Most obviously, he knew because

the seizure happened in his presence, when he was arrested. (See Compl., ¶ 7 (“Plaintiff’s

motor home was seized and confiscated on this date [November 27, 2005] by defendant.”)

See In re Sowell, 2009 WL 799570, slip op. at *3 (E.D.Mich., Mar. 19, 2009) (citing cases

for the principle that § 983(e)(1)(B)’s requirement cannot be met when claimants were

present at the time of the seizure). Second, the financial affidavit Lefler signed and filed in

his criminal case the day after his arrest shows he knew the motor home had been seized;

it lists his property solely as a 2002 Toyota pickup truck and $360 in cash. (See case no.

05cr2313, docket no. 4, dated and filed November 28, 2005.) If Lefler, as he now claims,

had no idea his motor home had been seized and thought it belonged to him, he would have

listed it here.

The only remaining questions in the Bivens inquiry are whether Lefler’s arrest was

legal, and whether U.S. authorities’ search and seizure of his motor home violated his rights,

and these are easily answered. Because Lefler was passing through a port of entry,

customs officials were entitled to search his vehicle without a warrant or probable cause, in

order to identify the illegal transportation of contraband. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d

993, 999 (9th Cir. 2008). This is exactly what they did. Having found a large amount of

marijuana concealed in the vehicle, federal officials lawfully arrested him for importing the

marijuana and seized the vehicle.

Lefler also brings a FTCA claim for “deprivation of his motor home.” (Compl., ¶ 18(c).)

It is unclear whether he is referring to the seizure or forfeiture or both, but regardless of what

it was, he has no cognizable claim. The officers arresting him and seizing his vehicle were

privileged to do so and committed no tort. To the extent it is based on the forfeiture of his

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vehicle, it falls within the exception to FTCA claims embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).

Furthermore, although he sought relief via other avenues (see Complaint ¶¶ 13–16), he did

not exhaust his remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (establishing exhaustion requirements).

Lefler is therefore clearly not entitled to the return of his motor vehicle, and cannot

amend his complaint to state a claim. The complaint, and this action, are therefore

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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