Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02003/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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10cv2003

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

 

 

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Case No. 10-CV-2003-MMA (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TO DENY MOTION TO

DISMISS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(1) FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION

Defendant Social Security Commissioner Michael J. Astrue (hereinafter

“Defendant”) challenges this Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff Mark Arnold’s (hereinafter

“Plaintiff”) Complaint. Defendant argues that the Court lacks the subject matter

jurisdiction to review Plaintiff’s claim because the Social Security Act precludes review

where no “final decision” of the Commissioner was rendered after a hearing and that

Plaintiff fails to raise a colorable constitutional claim that could otherwise give the Court

jurisdiction over this matter.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Defendant’s motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be DENIED.

//

//

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability benefits on February 27,

2008. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4; Herbst Decl., Doc. No. 7-2, ¶ 4(a).) The Social Security

Administration (hereinafter “SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s claim on July 23, 2008. (Herbst

Decl., ¶ 4(a) & Ex. 1.) Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration on August 22, 2008,

which was denied. (Id., Ex. 2 at 3; Compl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff filed a request for hearing on

December 15, 2008. (Compl., ¶ 5; Herbst Decl., ¶ 4(b) & Ex. 2 at 1-2.) On December

31, 2008, Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge James S. Carletti mailed an

acknowledgment confirming receipt of Plaintiff’s request for a hearing and providing

Plaintiff with information regarding the hearing process. (Herbst Decl., ¶ 4(b) & Ex. 3.) 

The acknowledgment was sent to 1139 Midway Dr., Alpine, CA 90901 (hereinafter

“Alpine address”). (Id.) On August 6, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Edward D.

Steinman (hereinafter “ALJ”) mailed to the Alpine address the “Notice of Hearing,” which

included the date, time and place of Plaintiff’s requested hearing and which highlighted

the consequences Plaintiff faced should he or his representative fail to appear. (Id. at ¶

4(b) & Ex. 4.) The Notice of Hearing included an “Acknowledgment of Receipt” that

Plaintiff was to sign and remit. (Id.) The ALJ mailed another letter to the Alpine address

titled “Notice of Hearing-Important Reminder” on August 31, 2009. (Id. at ¶ 4(b) & Ex.

5.) This notice indicated the ALJ had not received Plaintiff’s acknowledgment of having

received the Notice of Hearing, and requested that Plaintiff sign and return the enclosed

Acknowledgment of Receipt. (Id.)

According to Plaintiff,

In June of 2009 I moved from Alpine to Lakeside. I personally went to the

El Cajon [Social Security] office and completed a change of address form. 

I also inquired as to when I could expect my hearing, as I was planning on

retaining counsel. I was told that the hearing could take over a year to

schedule and that I would be notified by mail. I assumed this would be at

my new address in Lakeside.

On September 2, 2009[,] a voice mail message was left on my machine. 

The message indicated that a hearing had been scheduled for September

4, 2009. This was the first time that I became aware that a hearing had

been scheduled and of the date. I had not received any letters from the

hearing office. I also did not receive a computer disk with the exhibits and

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1

 Attorney Gastone Bebi, Esq. represents Plaintiff in this matter.

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documents relied upon by Social Security in reaching its decision.

When I received the voice mail message, it was after business hours. At

this time attorney Bebi was representing me on an unrelated personal

injury case.1

 I called him to see if he could represent me. He advised that

he needed to review the matter before accepting the case, and that he

could not appear at the hearing as he had other commitments that he

could not re-schedule on such short notice. He suggested that I call the

Social Security Hearing Office [and] advise them of the problem and see if

they would agree to a postponement. He provided me with their number. 

I hung up, and immediately called the number he provided. I left a

message explaining that I had not received notice and requested a

continuance. 

On September 3, 2009[,] I again called and left a message. I received a

return call from the judge’s assistant. I asked if I needed to appear, and I

understood her to say that she would convey my continuance request to

the judge, and that I need not appear. I did not receive notice that failure

to appear could result in dismissal of my case. I had no experience in

these matters, and did not think I needed to do anything further. If it would

have been made clear to me that I could only obtain a continuance by

personally appearing, I would [have] arranged to be present. I would not

have been able to present my case, as I did not have the documents

necessary and could not obtain them on such short notice.

The next day, September 4, 2009, I retrieved a voice mail message from

the judge’s assistant stating that the judge required my attendance. I did

not receive this message until after the hearing had concluded. I

immediately called upon receipt of the message, and left a message

explaining that I did not receive the earlier message and requesting

information as to my options.

On September 7, 2009, I followed up with several messages, but never

received a return call.

(Arnold Decl., Doc. 9, ¶¶ 5-10.)

On September 10, 2009, the ALJ mailed to the Alpine address a “Notice of

Dismissal” and an “Order of Dismissal,” in which the ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s hearing

request because Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing without good cause. (Herbst

Decl., ¶ 4(c) & Ex. 6.) The ALJ stated:

On September 3, 2009, the claimant called and indicated that he was

interested in obtaining legal representation. A check of the record

indicates that no representative has informed this office of his or her

representation. Moreover, the claimant was informed by a member of the

office staff to attend the hearing and explain his circumstances to the

administrative law judge. The claimant did not appear for his scheduled

hearing. The claimant was given an opportunity to attend the hearing and

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provide information regarding any attempts to seek counsel or to provide

other good cause grounds for continuing the scheduled hearing. As

indicated he did not appear, nor provide any good cause for his absence. 

There is no indication that he has sought counsel or that any

representative has agreed to appear on his behalf. 

The undersigned has considered the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §

404.957(b)(2) and finds that there is no good cause for the claimant’s

failure to appear at the time and place of hearing. [¶] Accordingly, the

request for hearing dated December 15, 2008 is dismissed and the

determination dated October 31, 2008 remains in effect.

(Herbst Decl., Ex. 6 at 4-5.)

On November 2, 2009, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the

ALJ’s dismissal. (Id. at ¶ 4(c) & Ex. 7.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request

for review on August 13, 2010, finding that Plaintiff did not provide information sufficient

to change the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at ¶ 4(d) & Ex. 8.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this

Court on September 27, 2010 pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g). 

(Compl. at 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks an order directing the SSA to provide

him with a benefits eligibility hearing. (Id. at 4.) On January 27, 2011, Defendant filed

the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 7.) On February 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed an

opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 8.) Defendant did not file a Reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the party asserting

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the case is properly in federal court.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party may

assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). “A

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations

of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp.,

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court

“may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss

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into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into

a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the

court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary

to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Savage v.

Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)).

B. Finality and Exhaustion Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be

sued.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). “[T]he terms of its

consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id.

Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) is the vehicle by which private parties may

sue the United States Government in the social security context. Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 327 (1976). Section 405(g) states in relevant part:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the

amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil

action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of

such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social

Security may allow.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). Section 405(h) limits judicial review to section

405(g):

The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a

hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such

hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental

agency except as herein provided.

42 U.S.C. § 405(h). “The hearing requirement of [section] 405(g) is intended to ensure

that claimants do not bypass the administrative procedure established to resolve their

claims.” McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Weinberger v.

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)). The “final decision” of the Commissioner consists of

two elements: “(1) the ‘jurisdictional’ non-waivable requirement of presentment of the

claim for benefits (presentment); and (2) the ‘waivable’ requirement of exhaustion of

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administrative remedies (exhaustion).” Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.

1987). 

“Presentment can be fulfilled by contesting tentative agency determinations.” Id.

Exhaustion requires a claimant to proceed through all stages of the administrative

appeals process. The Code of Federal Regulations provides the method by which a

claimant exhausts his or her administrative remedies. A claimant seeking benefits first

receives an initial determination on the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902. A dissatisfied

claimant may then seek reconsideration of the initial determination. 20 C.F.R. §

404.907. A claimant may request a hearing before an ALJ if still dissatisfied with the

outcome of the reconsideration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907, 404.929. Finally, the

dissatisfied claimant may seek review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. 20

C.F.R. § 404.967. “The Appeals Council may deny a party's request for review or it may

decide to review a case and make a decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. “The Appeals

Council's decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if the request for

review is denied, is binding unless you or another party file an action in Federal district

court, or the decision is revised.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

Exhaustion may be waived, either by the Commissioner or by the courts. Bowen

v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482 (1986) (citations omitted). “Courts may waive

exhaustion because cases may arise where a claimant’s interest in having a particular

issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency’s judgment is

inappropriate.” Cassim, 824 F.2d at 795 (quotation omitted). The claimant must satisfy

a three-part test: “The claim must be (1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement

(collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that denial of relief will cause irreparable harm

(irreparability), and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the purposes of

exhaustion (futility).” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Courts also recognize an exception to the limitations imposed by Section 405(h)

on judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision: when a claim rests on colorable

constitutional grounds. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). “Constitutional

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questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and,

therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.” Id. “[T]he

Sanders exception applies to any colorable constitutional claim of due process violation

that ‘implicates a due process right . . . to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’” Evans

v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Panages v. Bowen, 871 F.2d

91, 93 (9th Cir. 1989)). “A challenge that is not ‘wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or

frivolous’ raises a colorable constitutional claim.” Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096,

1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Boettcher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 759 F.2d

719, 722 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Has Met the Jurisdictional Requirements of Section 405(g)

1. Plaintiff Has Met the Hearing Requirement Under McNatt v. Apfel

As set forth above, a claimant must have obtained a “final decision . . . made

after a hearing” in order to obtain judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). It is undisputed in this case that there was no “hearing” at which the

ALJ examined the evidence and questioned witnesses in accordance with 20 C.F.R. §

404.929. Following McNatt, however, the Court finds that “‘hearing, as used in [section]

405(g), has a broader meaning.” McNatt, 201 F.3d at 1087. 

Under Ninth Circuit authority, a claimant who is properly notified of a hearing

before an ALJ and who knowingly refuses to attend is not entitled to judicial review of a

dismissal of a request for hearing. See Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1992)

(claimant refused to attend ALJ hearing because his attorney advised him that the ALJ

was prejudiced against the attorney); Subia v. Comm’r of Social Security, 264 F.3d 899

(9th Cir. 2001) (claimant refused to attend ALJ hearing on the grounds that the ALJ

resided out of state and the notice of hearing was deficient). “By refusing to attend the

hearing, [the claimant] waived [his or her] opportunity for a hearing and . . . failed to

exhaust the administrative remedy upon which judicial review depends.” Hoye, 985

F.2d at 991 (emphasis added). 

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It does not follow, however, that because a claimant who is properly notified of an

ALJ hearing and who knowingly refuses to attend waives judicial review, a claimant who

was not properly notified and who did not refuse to attend a scheduled hearing also

waives review. “[I]t would be curious indeed if the [Commissioner] could foreclose

judicial review, for whatever reason, by merely denying the claimant a hearing . . . and

[t]his concern is heightened where, as here, the claimant alleges that the agency denied

him a hearing in violation of its own regulations.” McNatt, 201 F.3d at 1087 (quotation

omitted). 

Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ may dismiss a request for a hearing if

the claimant was provided notice, but failed to appear at the time and place of the

hearing without good cause. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1)(i). To provide notice, the SSA

mails notice of the hearing to the claimant’s last known address at least twenty days

before the hearing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(a). The claimant must acknowledge having

received notice. 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(c). If the claimant or claimant’s representative

does not acknowledge receipt of the notice of the hearing, the SSA will attempt to

contact the claimant for an explanation. Id. If the claimant informs the SSA that he or

she did not receive the notice of hearing, an amended notice will be sent. Id. A

claimant’s attempt to obtain representation may constitute good cause for changing the

time or place of a scheduled hearing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.936(f)(1). 

Here, uncontested evidence in the record demonstrates that Plaintiff moved from

Alpine to Lakeside in June 2009, and that Plaintiff informed the SSA of his change of

address by completing a change of address form at the El Cajon office. Arnold Decl., ¶

5. Thus, the SSA violated its own regulations by mailing Plaintiff’s notice of hearing, in

August 2009, to Plaintiff’s Alpine address (see Herbst Decl., Ex. 4), an address not

constituting his last known address as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(a). There is

also evidence in the record that upon being verbally notified, just two days before the

hearing, of the hearing date and time, Plaintiff informed the SSA that he had not

received a notice of hearing. Arnold Decl., ¶¶ 6-7. Despite this, the SSA apparently

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did not provide an amended notice of hearing as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(c). 

Moreover, although the ALJ himself acknowledged Plaintiff’s stated intent to obtain legal

representation (see Order of Dismissal, Herbst Decl., Ex. 6 at 4), the ALJ did not find

that this constituted good cause for a continuance of the hearing, in contravention of 20

C.F.R. § 404.936(f)(1), which states that good cause for a change of the date of the

hearing may be shown if the claimant has attempted to obtain a representative but

needs additional time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.936(f)(1). Rather than provide Plaintiff with any

additional time, despite knowing that he hoped to retain counsel, the ALJ merely

conducted a “check of the record” which indicated that “no representative had informed

this office of his or her representation” and, only six days after the scheduled hearing,

dismissed Plaintiff’s request for a hearing. Order of Dismissal, Herbst Decl., Ex. 6 at 4-

5.

The Court is troubled by the SSA’s apparent multiple failures to follow its own

regulations, and is concerned that Plaintiff was not given a fair opportunity to show good

cause for his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing. Although the SSA disputes

Plaintiff’s assertion that he was initially told by the judge’s assistant that he need not

appear for the hearing (compare Arnold Decl., ¶ 8 with Order of Dismissal, Herbst Decl.,

Ex. 6 at 4-5), Plaintiff should, at the very least, have been given the opportunity to

demonstrate good cause for his failure to appear at the hearing. Judicial review should

not be foreclosed under such circumstances. This does not appear to be a situation in

which Plaintiff intentionally bypassed the administrative procedure in order to seek

judicial review. Rather, it is for the very reason that he was not provided a hearing in

the course of administrative review that he seeks review in this Court. 

Under McNatt, when a claimant has appeared before the ALJ and has sought a

continuance of his hearing, and “when the ALJ’s decision denying the claim is final

except for modification or reversal on appeal, [the] claimant has had a hearing within the

meaning of § 405(g).” McNatt, 201 F.3d at 1087. The Court finds that where, as here,

a claimant shows that he did not receive notice of his hearing in accordance with the

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applicable regulations, and when he claims he advised the SSA of this, asked for a

continuance of the hearing, and advised that he wished to retain counsel, and then did

not appear at a scheduled hearing under the belief that the judge did not require him to

do so, he similarly has had a hearing within the meaning of § 405(g). 

2. Plaintiff Has Established the Two Elements of a Final Decision

As set forth above, the “final decision” of the Commissioner consists of (1) a nonwaivable requirement of presentment of the claim for benefits and (2) a waivable

requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Cassim, 824 F.2d at 794. The

non-waivable jurisdictional element -- that the claimant present a claim for benefits to

the Commissioner -- is not in dispute between the parties. Plaintiff filed an application

for Social Security disability benefits on February 27, 2008 and contested the SSA’s 

determinations at each step of the administrative review process. This is sufficient to

satisfy the presentment element under Cassim. See id. Plaintiff has also shown

exhaustion, in that he exhausted his administrative remedies by proceeding through all

stages of the administrative appeals process, to the extent that was possible under the

circumstances of this case. “Only a claimant who proceeds through all three stages [of

the administrative appeals process] receives a final decision from the [Commissioner].” 

City of New York, 476 U.S. at 482; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424

(1988) (“Once these elaborate administrative remedies have been exhausted, a

claimant is entitled to seek judicial review, including review of constitutional claims.”). 

Even assuming Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, due to the

lack of a decision by the ALJ on the merits, the exhaustion element of a final decision is

waivable. Id. Again, the three-part test for determining whether the exhaustion element

should be waived requires that the claim be (1) collateral to a substantive claim of

entitlement (“collaterality”), (2) colorable in its showing that denial of relief will cause

irreparable harm (“irreparability”), and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the

purposes of exhaustion (“futility”). Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1082. 

Plaintiff has shown collaterality. His due process claim that he did not receive

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reasonable notice of an administrative hearing (see Compl., ¶ 13) is collateral to his

request for benefits. Cassim, 824 F.2d at 795; see also City of New York, 476 U.S. at

483 (finding an allegation that the agency failed to follow applicable regulations

collateral to a claim for benefits). Plaintiff has also shown irreparability. “A colorable

claim of irreparable harm is one that is not wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.” 

Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1083 (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff raises a serious

constitutional challenge that is not insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous. See, e.g.,

Cassim, 824 F.2d at 795. Finally, Plaintiff has established futility, as he has already

fully attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies and, absent an order from this

Court, will receive no benefit from seeking any further administrative review. 

The Court accordingly concludes that Plaintiff has fulfilled the jurisdictional

requirements of section 405(g). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claim Also Satisfies the Sanders Exception

“[T]he Sanders exception [to the jurisdictional requirements of sections 405(g)

and (h)] applies to any colorable constitutional claim of due process violation that

implicates a due process right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek

reconsideration of an adverse benefits determination.” Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099 (citing 

Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483). “A challenge that is not ‘wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or

frivolous’ raises a colorable constitutional claim.” Id. (quoting Boettcher, 759 F.2d at

722). Procedural due process guarantees apply to social security determinations. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02. “It is axiomatic that due process requires

that a claimant receive meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before his

claim for disability benefits may be denied.” Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099 (citing Mathews,

424 U.S. at 333). Plaintiff’s allegation of failure to receive meaningful notice of the ALJ

hearing therefore gives rise to a colorable constitutional claim. Thus, not only has

Plaintiff fulfilled the jurisdictional requirements of section 405(g), but his claim satisfies

the Sanders exception to these jurisdictional requirements.

//

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C. Remand is Appropriate

“Ordinarily, when a due process violation requires that an application for benefits

be reopened, the case is remanded to the Commissioner so that the agency can rule on

the merits of the plaintiff’s disability claim in the first instance.” Udd, 245 F.3d at 1102. 

Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence that he did not receive sufficient notice of the

September 4, 2009 hearing before the ALJ. The uncontested evidence in the record

before the Court shows that Plaintiff moved from Alpine to Lakeside in June 2009 and

provided his change of address to the Social Security office in El Cajon. The

regulations require notice of an ALJ hearing to be mailed to a claimant’s last known

address at least twenty days before hearing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(a). Based on the

present record, by mailing notice of the hearing to the old Alpine address, the SSA

failed to provide proper notice, and then further compounded the problem by not

continuing the hearing, despite Plaintiff’s telephone calls to the hearing office, and by

not providing Plaintiff with an opportunity to show good cause for his failure to appear at

the scheduled hearing. The ALJ’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for hearing was

therefore in error, and the case should be remanded for a hearing before an ALJ and a

decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s disability claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction should be DENIED, and the case should be remanded for further

proceedings.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the Honorable Michael M.

Anello, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties on or before July 25, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be

served and filed on or before August 4, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

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order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 27, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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