Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_03-cv-03098/USCOURTS-arwd-3_03-cv-03098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

PAULA M. KARNO PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 03-3098

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Paul Karno, appealed to this Court from the denial of disability insurance

benefits (hereinafter "DIB"), and supplemental security income benefits (hereinafter “SSI”),

by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner").

On March 28, 2005, the undersigned remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further

consideration (Doc. #19 & 20). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Rick Spencer, filed a Motion For Approval of Application For

Attorney Fees Under The Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter the "EAJA"), on June 9,

2005 (Doc. #22-25). The Commissioner filed her Response on June 15, 2005 (Doc. #26).

This matter is now ready for consideration.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits

was substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of

benefits was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner does not object to

the award of reasonable attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA, does not object to the

hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel and she does object to the number of hours

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 In his motion and brief in support, counsel for the plaintiff seeks, alternatively, the 1

award of a fee under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. #22, p. 2). Counsel’s request for a fee under

this statute is premature, as there has not yet been a favorable decision after this court’s remand

of the matter. Accordingly, that portion of counsel’s fee request is denied. 

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claimed by counsel for his representation of the plaintiff before this court. The Court

construes this lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the

government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 1

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002),

citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the

necessary standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out

of a claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for

his or her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees

under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation;

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the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services;

the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved.

Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).

The statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff’s attorney requests an award under the EAJA, at the rate of $140.00

per hour for the 12 hours which he asserts were devoted to the representation of plaintiff in

this Court. In support of his request for a higher hourly rate, he has attached a copy of the

Consumer Price Index indicating an increase in the cost of living (Doc. #23, attachment).

Without objection, we note that an award based upon this hourly rate, reflecting an

increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas.

See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above

factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is

$140.00 per hour. 

Further, we have reviewed counsel’s itemization of time attached to his Affidavit

(Doc. #20, Exhibit A-1). We find the time asserted to have been spent in the representation

of the plaintiff before this court to be reasonable. Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is

entitled to compensation under the EAJA for 12 hours. Counsel also seeks reimbursement of

expenses in the amount of $16.02, and we find this request should be granted.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation for 12 hours at the rate

of $140.00 per hour, and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $16.02, for a total

attorney's fee award of $1,696.02 under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

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account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order

to prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29 day of September, 2005. th

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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