Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00903/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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09cv0903 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MALEN J. MARULLI,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 09-0903-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 18, 20)

On April 29, 2009, Plaintiff Malen J. Marulli (hereafter

“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint For Judicial Review And Remedy On

Administrative Decision Under The Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.

§405(g)]. On August 3, 2009, Defendant Michael J. Astrue (hereafter

“Defendant”), filed an Answer to the Complaint and the administrative record (hereafter “Record” or “Tr.”), pertaining to this case.

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant has

filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

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09cv0903 2

Judgment, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that Plaintiff is not

entitled to the relief requested and therefore RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. 

I

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was born on October 3, 1941. (Tr. 17, 22, 593,

701). She has had past relevant work experience as a customer

service representative, answering service operator and retail

clerk/cashier. (Tr. 17, 594, 701). Plaintiff alleges that she

suffers from a disability as of January 3, 2003 due to chronic

obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, non-alcohol

related cirrhosis, status post carpal tunnel surgery, hypothyroid,

urinary incontinence, umbilical hernia, and history of early

Alzheimer’s Disease, inability to sit or stand for significant

periods of time, and limited use of her right arm.

 II

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 11, 2005, Plaintiff filed applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental Social Security

income. (Tr. 271-273, 695-697). The Commissioner of Social Security

denied her applications. (Tr. 241-242). Thereafter, Plaintiff

requested a hearing. On February 9, 2006, Plaintiff appeared and

testified before Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”) Larry

Parker. (Tr. 589-614). On June 30, 2006, ALJ Parker found that

Plaintiff was disabled as of February 2, 2005. (Tr. 12-21). 

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09cv0903 3

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the

ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 7-8).

On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court.

On April 22, 2008, the Court remanded the case to the ALJ for

further proceedings. [07-0670-JLS(NLS), Docket Nos. 1, 22, Tr. 645-

653].

On December 1, 2008, ALJ Parker held another hearing pursuant

to the Court’s remand. The purpose of the hearing was for the ALJ to

determine whether Plaintiff was disabled from her alleged onset date

of January 3, 2003 to February 1, 2005. Plaintiff testified at the

hearing. (Tr. 698-715). On January 5, 2009, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff was not disabled during the time period noted above. (Tr.

615-628). The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final

decision.

On April 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed this action. On August 3,

2009, Defendant filed an Answer and the administrative record

pertaining to this case. On January 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 5, 2010, Defendant filed

an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and a

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

 III

 SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382

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09cv0903 4

(a). Both titles of the Act define “disability as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20

C.F. R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will

find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,

therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your

age, education, and work experience. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

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09cv0903 5

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities

for seeing, hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions”; [u]se of judgment”;

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or

equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is

conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to

the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents

the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If

the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant

cannot perform his previous work, the fifth and final step of the

process determines whether he is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not

able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

 

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09cv0903 6

 IV

 ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. (Plaintiff) met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,

2005.

2. (Plaintiff) has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity from January 3, 2003 through February

1, 2005, the relevant time period.

3. During the relevant period, (Plaintiff) had

the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive

pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, non-alcohol

related cirrhosis, status post carpal surgery,

hypothyroid, urinary incontinence, umbilical hernia

and history of early Alzheimer’s disease.

4. (Plaintiff) does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals one of the listed impairments in ... 20 C.F.R.

404.1525, 404.1526, 416.925 and 416.926.

... In activities of daily living, (Plaintiff)

has mild restriction.

... In social functioning, (Plaintiff) has mild

difficulties.

... With regard to concentration, persistence or

pace, (Plaintiff) has mild difficulties.

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the undersigned finds that the (Plaintiff) has

the residual functional capacity to perform light work

as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).

Additionally, she may use a cane but it is not

required. She can only occasionally bend, stoop,

crouch, crawl, kneel and climb. She can only perform

frequent reaching, handling, feeling, grasping, and

fingering.

In making this finding, the undersigned has

considered all symptoms and the extent to which these

symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with

the objective medical evidence and other evidence...

The undersigned has also considered opinion evidence...

After careful consideration of the evidence, the

undersigned finds that the (Plaintiff’s) medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the (Plaintiff’s) statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

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09cv0903 7

credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the

above residual functional capacity assessment.

For the relevant period set out by the Appeals Council

ending on February 1, 2005, I find that the (Plaintiff) failed to demonstrate a severe disabling

impairment or combination of impairments...

6. (Plaintiff) was capable of performing past

relevant work as an answering service operator,

customer service representative and cashier/retail.

This work does not require the performance of workrelated activities precluded by the (Plaintiff’s)

residual functional capacity...

7. (Plaintiff) was not been (sic) under a

disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at

any time prior to February 1, 2005...

(Tr. 623-628)

 

 V

 THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED PLAINTIFF’S MENTAL IMPAIRMENT

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found Plaintiff’s

mental impairment to be severe. Plaintiff supports her argument by

pointing to evidence of her early Alzheimer’s Disease. Defendant

argues that Plaintiff’s argument is erroneous in that the ALJ found

Plaintiff’s early Alzheimer’s Disease to be a severe impairment.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument with regard to the

ALJ’s assessment of her mental impairment is erroneous. While

Plaintiff’s initially argues that the ALJ did not find her early

Alzheimer’s Disease to be a severe impairment, she later argues that

the ALJ did find her early Alzheimer’s Disease to be a severe

impairment. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 6, 7). In fact, the

ALJ found Plaintiff’s early Alzheimer’s Disease to be a severe

impairment. (Tr. 624).

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s finding that her severe

mental impairment caused only mild mental limitations should have

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09cv0903 8

been included in his findings regarding her residual functioning

capacity (hereafter “RFC”). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s

contention lacks merit.

In Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007), the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while an ALJ found the

claimant’s mental and physical impairments to be severe, the ALJ was

not obligated to include the claimant’s mental impairment in

determining the claimant’s RFC. In Hoopai, the court specifically

noted that an ALJ’s finding of a severe impairment is merely a

threshold determination of whether a claimant is able to perform his

past work. Therefore, a finding of a severe impairment simply

raises a prima facie case of disability. Further, the court

explained that a finding of a severe mental impairment does not lead

to a conclusion of a claimant’s RFC, or what jobs a claimant with

that severe mental impairment can perform.

Here, Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. Hoopai demonstrates

that if a claimant has a mental impairment, the ALJ is not obligated

to include that impairment in his findings regarding the claimant’s

RFC. Therefore, the ALJ’s non-inclusion of Plaintiff’s severe

mental impairment in his determination of Plaintiff’s RFC was

proper.

As a result, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err as

Plaintiff contends. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 

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09cv0903 9

 VI

THE ALJ’S EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF’S ABILITY TO PERFORM HER PAST WORK

 WAS PROPER

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient

legal basis to determine that she could return to her past work.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that her past jobs of answering

service operator, customer service representative and retail cashier

require constant or frequent reaching, handling, feeling, grasping

and fingering, which do not comport with the ALJ’s findings

regarding her RFC. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err in his

evaluation that Plaintiff could perform her past work.

The ALJ specifically found:

(Plaintiff) has the (RFC) to perform light work... She

can only perform frequent reaching, handling, feeling,

grasping and fingering. (Tr. 625).

...(Plaintiff) was capable of performing past relevant

work as an answering service operator, customer

service representative, and cashier/retail. This work

does not require performance of work-related activities precluded by (Plaintiff’s) (RFC). (Tr. 627).

The ALJ based his conclusions on the March 21, 2006 report of

Dr. Frederick W. Close (hereafter “Dr. Close”), the May 23, 2005

report of Dr. Albert Lizarraras (hereafter “Dr. Lizarraras”), and

the June 17, 2002 report of Dr. Leonard Markman (herafter “Dr.

Markman”). The ALJ also based his conclusion on the Plaintiff’s own

reported work history and the descriptions of Plaintiff’s past work

as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereafter

“DOT”).

Dr. Close, an orthopedist, examined Plaintiff, reviewed

Plaintiff’s medical records, and opined that Plaintiff should be

able to sit and stand for six hours out of an eight hour day, that

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09cv0903 10

she can lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently,

and that she should be limited to no more than frequent reaching,

handling, feeling, grasping and fingering. (Tr. 584-588).

Dr. Lizarraras, a consultive physician, examined Plaintiff

and opined that Plaintiff should be able to sit and stand for six

hours out of an eight hour day, that she can lift twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently, that she has no limitations

as to climbing, crouching, but limitations as to climbing ladders,

rope and scaffolds, and that she has no limitations as to reaching

in all directions including overhead, feeling, fingering, but is

limited to frequent handling. (Tr. 496-497).

Dr. Markman, a treating physician, examined Plaintiff,

reviewed her medical records, and opined that Plaintiff was to be

released to temporary light duty from June 17, 2002 through July 31,

2002 with the limitations of no repetitive hand motions with either

hand and no reaching above her shoulder with her right arm. (Tr.

119).

Plaintiff’s Work History Report details her own descriptions

of her past work activities. As an answering service operator,

Plaintiff reported that she answered the telephone, took hand

written messages, used the computer, periodically typed orders and

filed. She reported that in this job, she wrote, typed and handled

small objects for the entire eight hours per day that she worked.

As a customer service representative, she reported that she made and

received telephone calls and used the computer. She noted that the

heaviest weight she lifted was less than ten pounds. As a retail

sales cashier, she reported that she stocked items, cleaned her work

area, assisted customers, operated a cash register and made popcorn.

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1/ The Court notes that the DOT describes an answering service operator

in the national economy as being able to reach, handle and finger

constantly. DOT 235.662-026. While the ALJ may have relied on the

DOT description, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s own

description of her past relevant work as an answering service

operator does not suggest that she had to reach, handle and finger

constantly, as the DOT describes.

09cv0903 11

This work entailed lifting clothes, putting the clothes on racks and

pricing items. Plaintiff noted that in this job, she frequently

lifted less than ten pounds. (Tr. 89-92).

Plaintiff must show that she is precluded from engaging in

her past relevant work. Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th

Cir. 1993). Plaintiff must show that she was unable to return to

her past relevant work either as she actually performed that work or

as that work is customarily performed in the national economy. Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n. 5 (1987). The ALJ may use the DOT

to determine a claimant’s ability to perform past relevant work. 20

C.F.R. §404.1560(b)(2).

1. Answering Service Operator

Plaintiff’s past relevant work included performing the duties

of an answering service operator. As noted above, Plaintiff

reported that in this job, she answered the telephone, took hand

written messages, used the computer, typed and filed. None of these

duties appear to require more than frequent reaching, handling,

feeling, grasping and fingering. Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that

she could perform the work of an answering service operator as she

actually had performed that job in the past, was proper.1/

Further, the ALJ’s decision comports with the opinions of Dr.

Close, Dr. Lizarraras and Dr. Markman. Dr. Close limited Plaintiff’s activity to no more than frequent reaching, handling,

grasping and fingering. Dr. Lizarraras did not limit Plaintiff’s

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09cv0903 12

reaching in all directions, feeling and fingering, but limited

Plaintiff to frequent handling. Dr. Markman limited, for approximately six weeks in 2002, Plaintiff’s repetitive hand movements with

either hand and reaching overhead with her right arm.

As a result, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could

perform her past relevant work as an answering service operator as

she actually performed that work, was proper.

2. Customer Service Representative

Plaintiff’s past relevant work included performing the duties

of a customer service representative. As noted above, Plaintiff

reported that in this job, she made and received telephone calls and

used the computer. None of the activities entailed in this job

appear to require more than frequent reaching, handling, feeling,

grasping and fingering.

Further, the DOT describes a customer service representative

as being able to reach, handle, feel and finger frequently. DOT

299.367-010. These limitations comport with the opinions of Drs.

Close, Lizarraras, and Markman.

As a result, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could

perform her past relevant work as a customer service representative

was proper.

3. Retail Sales Cashier

Plaintiff’s past relevant work included performing the duties

of a retail sales cashier. As noted above, Plaintiff reported that

in this job, she stocked items, cleaned her work area, assisted

customers, operated a cash register and made popcorn. None of these

activities appear to require more than frequent reaching, handling,

feeling, grasping and fingering.

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2/

Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are unclear.

09cv0903 13

Further, the DOT describes a retail sales cashier as being

able to reach, handle, feel and finger frequently. DOT 211.462-010.

These limitations comport with the opinions of Drs. Close,

Lizarraras, and Markman.

As a result, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could

perform her past relevant work as a retail sales cashier was proper.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show

that she was precluded from engaging in her past relevant work

either as she actually performed that work or as that work is

customarily performed in the national economy. Consequently, the

Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in

this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in

this regard be GRANTED.

 VII

 THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED THE OPINIONS OF

 PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIANS

Plaintiff appears to argue2/ that the ALJ erred by failing to

properly reject the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.

Specifically, Plaintiff appears to contend that the ALJ failed to

state clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr.

Markman, Dr. Rakesh Patel, a public health physician, (hereafter

“Dr. Patel”), and Dr. Seenu Reddy, a cardiologist, (hereafter “Dr.

Reddy”). Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the

opinions of these doctors.

An ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to the

opinion of a treating physician. Batson v. Comm. of Social Security,

359 F.3d 1190, 1194-1195 (9th Cir. 2004). “Although a treating

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09cv0903 14

physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in

disability cases, it is not binding on the ALJ with respect to the

existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of

disability.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.

2001). “The ALJ may disregard the treating physician’s opinion 

whether or not that opinion is contradicted.” Magallanes v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

When an ALJ is presented with conflicting medical opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physicians and the opinions of consultive

physicians, greater weight must be given to the opinion of the

treating physicians, unless the ALJ gives specific, legitimate

reasons for disregarding the opinion of the treating physician.

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195.

An ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion if it is

presented in the form of a check list and does not have supportive

objective evidence and is contradicted by other statements and

assessments of a claimant’s medical condition. Id. at 1195, Crane v.

Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996)

1. Dr. Markman

Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ did not offer any

reason for rejecting Dr. Markman’s opinion that Plaintiff be

prohibited from bilateral repetitive hand motions and over shoulder

reaching with the right arm.

As noted in Section VI of this Report and Recommendation, Dr.

Markman examined Plaintiff, reviewed her medical records, and opined

that Plaintiff was to be released to temporary light duty from June

17, 2002 through July 31, 2002, with the limitations of no repetiCase 3:09-cv-00903-MMA-WVG Document 21 Filed 06/15/10 Page 14 of 25
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09cv0903 15

tive hand motions with either hand and no reaching above the

shoulder with her right arm. (Tr. 119).

Here, Plaintiff misinterprets the ALJ’s opinion and the

evidence in the record. The ALJ specifically stated that Dr.

Close’s and Dr. Lizarraras’ opinions, (Tr. 584-588, 496-497),

comported with Dr. Markman’s opinion. Therefore, he accorded

significant weight to Dr. Markman’s opinion. (Tr. 626). Consequently, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Markman’s opinion. Further,

Plaintiff fails to mention that Dr. Markman specifically limited

Plaintiff’s repetitive hand motions and right arm over shoulder

reaching from June 17, 2002 to July 31, 2002, a period of approximately six weeks. A six week limitation period does not signify that

Plaintiff was permanently limited from repetitive hand motions and

right arm over shoulder reaching.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not reject

Dr. Markman’s opinion. Instead, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr.

Markman’s opinion.

2. Dr. Patel

On April 22, 2004, Dr. Patel opined that Plaintiff could sit,

stand and walk for one to two hours per day, lift and carry five

pounds, use both of her hands for simple grasping, pushing and

pulling of arm controls and fine manipulation, but that she could

not perform work at a consistent pace for eight hours, and could not

complete a normal work day or work week without interruptions from

her physical symptoms. (Tr. 555-557). Dr. Patel’s opinions noted

above were presented in the form of a check list.

On January 19, 2005, Dr. Patel opined that Plaintiff could

only occasionally reach, handle, finger and feel, that she was not

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09cv0903 16

capable of performing light work on a regular and continuing basis,

that she had a moderately severe limitation in the ability to

complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from

medically based symptoms, and that Plaintiff’s limitations and

symptoms began in January 2004. (Tr. 421-424). Dr. Patel’s opinions

noted above were presented in the form of a check list. 

The Court notes that the ALJ’s opinion does not mention Dr.

Patel’s opinions even though the record contains Dr. Patel’s

treatment records. (Tr. 442-492, 503-515, 558-570). However, the

Court’s review of Dr. Patel’s treatment records shows that those

records do not provide objective medical evidence of Plaintiff’s

limitations that he asserted in his opinions. Therefore, any

failure of the ALJ to address Dr. Patel’s treatment records could

not have affected his conclusions.

Moreover, Dr. Patel’s opinions were presented in the form of

check lists that were not supported by any objective evidence and

were contradicted by other treating and consultive physicians’

statements and assessments of Plaintiff’s medical condition. As a

result, any failure of the ALJ to address Dr. Patel’s opinions could

not have affected his conclusions because any such unsupported check

list opinions may be discounted by the ALJ. Batson, 359 F.3d at

1195, Crane, 76 F.3d at 253.

Therefore, the Court can not conclude that the ALJ gave

specific legitimate reasons for disregarding Dr. Patel’s opinions.

However, the Court concludes that Dr. Patel’s opinions are properly

discounted because they are in the form of check lists and are

unsupported by objective medical evidence.

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3/ Dr. Reddy’s opinions are inconsistent in that he also opined that

Plaintiff had the unlimited ability to reach in all directions, and

unlimited ability to handle and feel. He also opined that Plaintiff

had limited ability for fine manipulation. (Tr. 233).

09cv0903 17

3. Dr. Reddy

On April 19, 2004, Dr. Reddy opined that Plaintiff was

severely limited in her ability to complete a normal work day and

work week with interruptions from medically based symptoms, she

could not sit, stand or walk for one hour per work day, she could

lift five pounds, she could use both of her hands for simple

grasping, pushing and pulling of arm controls and for fine manipulation, and she could reach and finger occasionally.3/ (Tr. 230-234).

Dr. Reddy’s opinions noted above were presented in the form of check

lists.

The ALJ specifically addressed Dr. Reddy’s opinions and

discounted them because there was no objective medical evidence in

Dr. Reddy’s records to support his opinions, nor any cross-references or explanations as to how he arrived at his conclusions.

Consequently, the ALJ determined that Dr. Reddy’s opinions were not

entitled to controlling weight and were internally inconsistent with

other evidence in the record. The ALJ also rejected Dr. Reddy’s

opinions regarding Plaintiff’s most severe limitations, as not

supported by the record. (Tr. 627).

The ALJ specifically and legitimately discounted Dr. Reddy’s

opinions because Dr. Reddy’s records do not provide objective

medical evidence of Plaintiff’s limitations as asserted in his

opinions. Further, Dr. Reddy’s opinions were properly discounted

because they were presented in the form of check lists that were

unsupported by objective evidence and were contradicted by other

treating and consultive physicians’ statements and assessments of

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Plaintiff’s limitations. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195, Crane, 76 F. 3d

at 253.

As a result of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians were properly evaluated.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 VIII

THE ALJ PROPERLY DETERMINED PLAINTIFF’S RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ erred in determining

her RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have

determined her RFC not only in terms of light work, but by a

function-by-function assessment. Defendant contends that the ALJ

did not err in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.

It is the responsibility of the ALJ, not a claimant’s

physician, to determine a claimant’s RFC. Vertigan v. Halter, 260

F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s determination of a

Plaintiff’s RFC must be supported by substantial evidence. Morgan v.

Comm. of Social Security, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). When

the ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC, he must take into account those

limitations for which there is support in the record that do not

depend on the claimant’s subjective complaints. If the ALJ’s

determination of a claimant’s RFC takes into account a claimant’s

limitations which have support in the record, a function-by-function

analysis for medical conditions and impairments is unnecessary.

Bayliss v. Barnhart 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff appears to contend that the ALJ simply

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09cv0903 19

described Plaintiff’s RFC in terms of the exertional category of

light work. This contention lacks merit. Plaintiff fails to

acknowledge that the ALJ specifically found:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform light work. Additionally, she may use a cane, but it is not required. She

can only occasionally bend, stoop, crouch, crawl,

kneel and climb. She can only perform frequent

reaching, handling, feeling, grasping and fingering.

(Tr. 625)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).

Further, as noted in Section VI of this Report and Recommendation, the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC was based on

Plaintiff’s own reported work history and on the opinions of Dr.

Close, Dr. Lizarraras, and Dr. Markman. Therefore, the Court

concludes that there was substantial evidence in the record upon

which the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC. As a result, a functionby-function analysis was unnecessary. Id. at 1217.

Consequently, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly

determined Plaintiff’s RFC. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 IX

 PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED

Plaintiff argues that her due process rights were violated

when the ALJ refused to reopen her prior application for disability

benefits. Plaintiff also argues that her due process rights were

violated because the ALJ predetermined the outcome of the December

2008 hearing before the hearing was held. Defendant contends that

both of Plaintiff’s contentions lack merit.

1. ALJ Decision To Not Reopen Plaintiff’s

 Prior Application

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4/ The District Court noted that on September 5, 2002, Defendant denied

Plaintiff’s initial application for disability benefits. On November

24, 2002, Plaintiff filed a “Request for Rehearing” form, which

Defendant interpreted as a request for reconsideration of his

initial denial. On January 3, 2003, Defendant sent to Plaintiff a

“Notice of Reconsideration,” which stated that Plaintiff’s

reconsidered claim was denied and that Plaintiff had 60 days to

request a rehearing before an ALJ. On December 9, 2003, Plaintiff

obtained counsel. On January 6, 2004, Plaintiff filed a request for

hearing before an ALJ. On February 1, 2005, an ALJ dismissed

Plaintiff’s request for a hearing as untimely by 303 days.

09cv0903 20

On April 22, 2008, the District Court remanded this case to

the ALJ because the ALJ failed to consider whether, between January

3, 2003 and March 9, 2003, Plaintiff was incapable of pursuing her

administrative remedies to reopen her case, due to her memory

problems.4/ On December 1, 2008, the ALJ held a hearing in this case

pursuant to the District Court’s remand. On January 15, 2009, the

ALJ issued a decision. In the decision, the ALJ stated in pertinent

part as follows:

1. He reviewed all of the evidence in the record related to

Plaintiff’s prior filings and the prior decisions through the date

of the first hearing prior to his scheduling the second hearing.

(Tr. 620).

2. At the first hearing, he asked Plaintiff’s counsel about

the 2003 Kaiser records that indicated white matter in Plaintiff’s

brain and an MRI. (Tr. 620).

3. Plaintiff had been referred for consultive examinations,

but she did not attend them. She did not provide a valid reason for

not attending the consultive examinations, except for stating that

her counsel advised her not to attend the consultive examinations.

(Tr. 620).

4. Plaintiff’s counsel admitted that Plaintiff had not begun

to see a psychiatrist when a consultive examination was ordered, “so

our case was not to be built or premised on her mental disorder...

We don’t have any documentation of it [extreme depression], although

she has some symptoms of it, but no new documentations (sic), so we

are not forwarding that as an impairment.” (Tr. 620) (citations

omitted).

5. He gave significant weight to the Commissioner’s argument

that Plaintiff failed to adduce any medical evidence that she had 

disabling dementia from January through March 2003 which prevented

her from pursuing her administrative options. (Tr. 620).

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09cv0903 21

6. He noted that pursuant to case law, Plaintiff must show

that her allegation of mental impairment which precluded her from

pursuing administrative or judicial remedies “must be substantiated,

and courts have held that claimants succeed in vaulting the

‘colorable claim’ (of violation of due process rights) hurdle when

they adduce evidence tending to show not only that they suffered at

the relevant time from a mental impairment or condition, but also

that the impairment or condition affected their ability to understand and/or pursue appeal rights.” (Tr. 620)(emphasis in original)(citations omitted).

7. Plaintiff did not show that she suffered a mental

impairment or condition (during) the relevant time and that any such

impairment or condition affected her ability to understand and/or

pursue her appeal rights. (Tr. 620).

8. His review of Plaintiff’s medical records reveal that the

brain MRIs of March 20, 2003 show only a minimal amount of deep

white matter change. A follow-up brain MRI taken on August 12, 2003

demonstrated additional change “greater than expected for age with

allegations of short term memory loss and worsening gait.” The

August 2003 MRI was not taken until almost six months after the

deadline for Plaintiff to request a hearing. (Tr. 620-621).

9. He considered and gave significant weight to the January

27, 2003 neurological consultation evaluation of Dr. Mazaira, which

concluded that Plaintiff’s memory problems were subjective. (Tr.

621).

10. He found that there was not reasonable substantiated

evidence to establish a colorable constitutional claim and that

Plaintiff’s first application should not be reopened as there is no

good cause established for the late filing. (Tr. 621).

Here, it is clear that the ALJ reviewed all of the evidence

in the record pertaining to Plaintiff’s mental condition between

January 3, 2003 and March 9, 2003. That evidence indicated that

Plaintiff’s mental condition during that time period did not show

that Plaintiff suffered from a mental impairment or condition that

affected her ability to pursue her administrative appeal rights.

Therefore, the ALJ so concluded. His conclusion was supported by

Dr. Mazaira’s January 27, 2003 neurological consultation evaluation,

which concluded that Plaintiff’s memory problems were subjective.

As a result, the ALJ concluded that the evidence in the record for

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09cv0903 22

the relevant time period did not establish good cause to reopen

Plaintiff’s first application for disability benefits. Further, the

ALJ noted that at Plaintiff’s first hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel

explicitly stated that Plaintiff’s claim was not based on a mental

impairment. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the ALJ

did not review evidence in the record that existed at the time of

the first hearing that pertained to Plaintiff’s mental impairment.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision finding no good cause

to reopen Plaintiff’s first application for disability benefits was

proper. The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

2. December 2008 Hearing

Plaintiff claims that at the December 2008 hearing, the ALJ

violated her due process rights because he made his decision before

conducting the hearing. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s statements

at the hearing were argumentative and did not indicate an interest

in reviewing the record or the issues presented.

A claimant’s allegation that the ALJ “prejudged his case in

some way,” is insufficient to show a violation of due process.

Valentine v. Comm. of Social Security, 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir.

2009). Instead, a claimant must show that the “ALJ’s behavior, in

the context of the whole case, was ‘so extreme as to display clear

inability to render fair judgment.’” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d

853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001)[quoting Liteky v. USA, 510 U.S. 540, 551

(1994)].

Review of the transcript of the December 2008 hearing

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5/ The following pertinent exchanges took place at the December 2008

hearing:

Plaintiff’s Attorney: Okay, your honor, I direct the court’s attention to

B1F-18.

ALJ: Let’s try it again, Ms. Mitchell. You invite my attention to what,

B1F-18.

... (cont’d)

ALJ: It’s always a good thing to remember in courts to invite a court’s

attention not to direct them.

(Tr. 705).

... ALJ: ... (The evidence is) either here or it isn’t here. You’re not

going to manufacture new evidence to go back five, to five years ago

because that just not, it’s not applicable. We’re talking about

that period that they say for me to go there and that’s why I said

direction for me to do it. I’m just affording you if you have

anything or want to, to do so for that period January of 2003 to

February 2, 2005, and I’m not trying to put you on the spot or under

the gun. I’m just affording you that opportunity for the hearing

consistent with the language in the remand. (Tr. 712).

...

Plaintiff’s Attorney: ... Well, your honor, if it would please the court

if I could have some exhibits to invite your attention to as you

make your decision. Because there’s no point in holding you up.

ALJ: Well, that’s basically all I say I can do because the evidence is

there or it isn’t there– ... --and if it wasn’t there (sic) you

would have presented it to me which you haven’t done because it is

there and the direction is for me to reassess it and rewrite it and

apply whether or not, well, I’ve given the direction earlier, I

won’t repeat them within the remand here, and to do so and make the

subsequent and then write it... (Tr. 713).

09cv0903 23

indicates that the ALJ may have been impatient, dissatisfied and

annoyed.5/ However, “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,

annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what

imperfect men and women... sometimes display,” do not establish (an

ALJ’s) bias or prejudice. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858, citing Liteky,

510 U.S. 540, 555-556. Nor does Plaintiff show that the ALJ’s

behavior, in the context of the whole case, was so extreme as to

display clear inability to render fair judgment. Plaintiff fails to

indicate what statements made by the ALJ were argumentative or that

show that the ALJ was disinterested in the reviewing the record or

the issues presented. In fact, the contrary appears true. In this

case, the ALJ reviewed all of the evidence in the record not only

once, but twice. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ issued two

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09cv0903 24

decisions which were amply supported by evidence in the record.

Additionally, the ALJ applied the correct legal standards to the

issues presented, but may have become frustrated by Plaintiff’s

counsel’s statements and representations made at both hearings. As

a result, the Court can not conclude that the ALJ prejudged

Plaintiff’s case or that his behavior was so extreme as to display

clear inability to render fair judgment.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 X

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 15, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

July 30, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

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951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 15, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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