Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04405/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04405-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PLEXXIKON INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-04405-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

STRIKE DEFENDANT’S DAUBERT

MOTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 236

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Plexxikon Inc.’s motion to strike Defendant Novartis 

Pharmaceutical Corporation’s Daubert motions. See Dkt. No. 236. The Court held a hearing on 

November 1, 2019. Dkt. No. 337. As indicated during the hearing, and as detailed further below, 

the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. 

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges the timeliness of Defendant’s four Daubert motions, filed on June 6, 

2019. See Dkt. Nos. 200, 202, 204, 206. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks to strike a declaration 

filed in support of one of the Daubert motions. See Dkt. No. 200-1. The Court addresses each 

argument in turn. 

A. Motion to Strike Daubert Motions for Timeliness

Plaintiff first seeks to strike all of Defendant’s Daubert motions as untimely. See Dkt. No. 

236. In doing so, Plaintiff invokes the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. See, e.g., 

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (recognizing the power “inherent in every court to 

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel, and for litigants”). Plaintiff urges that Defendant’s June 6 Daubert motions contravene at 

least three of the Court’s prior orders and the Court’s Civil Pretrial and Trial Standing Order. 

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On June 20, 2018, the Court issued a revised scheduling order setting the deadline for 

hearing dispositive motions as June 20, 2019, and setting trial to begin on October 7, 2019. See

Dkt. No. 80. The schedule did not include a deadline for non-dispositive motions generally, or 

Daubert motions more specifically. Id. On May 21, 2019, the Court directed Defendant to file its 

dispositive motion by May 23, 2019, and continued the hearing on the parties’ dispositive 

motions. See Dkt. No. 173. Again, the order was silent as to the timing of non-dispositive 

motions. On May 28, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend its time to respond to 

Defendant’s pending motions. See Dkt. No. 183. The order adopted Plaintiff’s proposal—and 

language—to extend Plaintiff’s deadline to file oppositions to Defendant’s “dispositive and nondispositive motions,” as well as the corresponding reply deadline. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 180-6 

(Proposed Order). The order also continued the hearing on the non-dispositive motions to August 

29, 2019. See id. The order did not set a deadline for the filing of further non-dispositive motions. 

Indeed, none of these orders set a non-dispositive motion or Daubert motion deadline. 

The Court’s Civil Pretrial and Trial Standing Order states that “[m]otions in limine cannot 

be used to request summary judgment or raise Daubert challenges unless the Court has 

specifically granted prior approval.” See Civil Pretrial and Trial Standing Order ¶ 24. The Court’s 

general practice is to hear Daubert motions on or before the dispositive motions hearing deadline. 

However, the Court acknowledges that there is ambiguity in its standing order regarding when to 

file Daubert motions. The Court will not penalize Defendant based on a non-explicit deadline, 

particularly here where Plaintiff had ample time to oppose and argue the merits of Defendant’s 

Daubert motions. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s Daubert motions 

on this basis. 

B. Motion to Strike Expert Declaration 

One of Defendant’s June 6 Daubert motions, directed to the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert 

Dr. Michael L. Metzker, was supported by a declaration from Defendant’s expert, Dr. Phil Baran. 

See Dkt. No. 199-6. Plaintiff seeks, in the alternative, to strike Dr. Baran’s declaration in its 

entirety as an untimely supplemental expert report. See Dkt. No. 236 at 4.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires that a party’s expert witness disclose, in a 

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written report, “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express” at trial, and the 

basis and reasons for them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). Rebuttal disclosures of expert 

testimony are “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter 

identified by another party” in its expert disclosures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). Rule 26 

further provides that these disclosures be made at the times directed by the Court. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). Rule 37, in turn, provides that if a party fails to provide the information 

required by Rule 26(a), “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply 

evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or 

harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The Court has “particularly wide latitude . . . to issue 

sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 

1106 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Defendant acknowledges that Dr. Baran’s declaration contains some arguments and 

analysis not previously disclosed in his rebuttal report. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 247 at 7, 9–12. 

Defendant also appears to acknowledge—as it must—that Dr. Baran’s declaration was submitted 

after the close of expert discovery. See Dkt. No. 80 (setting May 2, 2019, as the deadline for 

expert discovery). However, Defendant urges that this new information was solely in response to 

Dr. Metzker’s reply expert report, submitted on April 11, 2019, and Dr. Metzker’s deposition

testimony, taken on May 1, 2019. See id. at 7. As such, Defendant explains that Dr. Baran could 

not have included these arguments in his March 14, 2019, rebuttal expert report. Defendant 

contends that Dr. Baran’s declaration is thus an appropriate supplement under Rule 26(e)(2), and 

even if the Court disagrees with this characterization, Dr. Baran’s declaration is substantially 

justified and harmless and should not be precluded under Rule 37.

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[R]ule 26(e) creates a “duty to supplement,” but “not 

a right” to do so. See Luke v. Family Care & Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 Fed. App’x 496, 500 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that Rule 26(e) is not “a loophole through which a 

party who submits partial expert witness disclosures, or who wishes to revise [its] disclosures in 

light of [its] opponent’s challenges to the analysis and conclusions therein, can add to them to [its]

advantage after the court’s deadline for doing so has passed.” Id.; see also Mariscal v. Graco, 

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Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 973, 983–84 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Although Rule 26(e) obliges a party to 

supplement or correct its disclosures upon information later acquired, this does not give license to 

sandbag one’s opponent with claims and issues which should have been included in the expert 

witness’ report . . . .” (quotation omitted)). The Court is particularly alert to such gamesmanship 

where, as here, Defendant submitted the additional expert material in conjunction with its Daubert 

motions, and only after expert discovery had closed. The supplementation requirement is only 

intended to “correct[] inaccuracies, or fill[] the interstices of an incomplete report based on 

information that was not available at the time of the initial disclosure.”1Id. (quotation omitted).

The Court, therefore, looks closely at Dr. Baran’s declaration to determine what additions 

are derived from new information contained in Dr. Metzker’s reply report and his deposition. At a 

high level, Dr. Baran’s declaration, much like his rebuttal report, seeks to explain why Dr. 

Metzker’s education and experience are insufficient to qualify him as a person of ordinary skill in 

the art (“POSITA”) in this case. Compare Dkt. No. 236-2, Ex. 1 (“Baran Rebuttal Report”), with 

Dkt. No. 200-1 (“Baran Decl.”). But Dr. Baran’s declaration goes much further: the five 

paragraphs in his rebuttal report about whether Dr. Metzker is a POSITA expand to 60 paragraphs 

in his declaration. Id. The Court finds that only some of these paragraphs contain a reasonable 

synthesis of the arguments in Dr. Baran’s rebuttal report or turn on newly supplied information.

Plaintiff appears to concede in reply, and the Court finds, that ¶¶ 1–32 of Dr. Baran’s 

declaration do not contain new analysis, but rather summarize the background sections of his 

rebuttal expert report. See Baran Decl. at ¶¶ 1–32 (describing Dr. Baran’s qualifications, a 

summary of the asserted patents, his description of the pertinent art and a POSITA, and a

recitation of Dr. Metzker’s qualifications).

In contrast, ¶¶ 33–35 and ¶¶ 42–46 expand Dr. Baran’s prior analysis of Dr. Metzker’s 

education and experience. See Baran Decl. at ¶¶ 33–35, 42–46. Dr. Baran cites several of Dr. 

1 The Ninth Circuit has enumerated several factors to guide the Court’s analysis, including: 

“(1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that 

party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or 

willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” See Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 

375 Fed. App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). And although not binding authority, the Court considers 

the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lanard Toys as persuasive authority.

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Metzker’s publications to conclude that a third-party, and not Dr. Metzker, performed the relevant 

work, and that Dr. Metzker is not a POSITA. See id. at ¶¶ 35, 45–46. He also parses Dr. 

Metzker’s postgraduate experience to conclude it is irrelevant or insufficient. Yet Dr. Metzker’s 

CV and publications were available to Dr. Baran at the time he drafted his rebuttal report.

Moreover, ¶¶ 40, 50–57 explain the differences between Dr. Metzker’s background and 

what Dr. Baran defines as the pertinent arts. See id. at ¶¶ 40, 50–57 (contrasting use of DNA 

sequencing technology, biochemistry, and biophysics with medicinal chemistry and synthetic 

organic chemistry). Defendant suggests that it did not know such detail would be necessary until 

Dr. Metzker explained in reply and deposition that his experience was “equivalent” to the parties’ 

agreed-upon definition of a POSITA. See Dkt. No. 247 at 11–12. However, Defendant was on 

notice as early as February 4, 2019, that Plaintiff intended to offer Dr. Metzker as an expert in this 

case. See Dkt. No. 80 (setting February 4 as date for exchange of opening expert reports). The 

Court is not persuaded that Defendant “could not have known” that Dr. Metzker would conclude 

his background was sufficient to qualify as a POSITA until after Dr. Metzker’s deposition. See 

Dkt. No. 247 at 11. Dr. Baran could have reviewed Dr. Metzker’s CV and explained in similar 

detail in his rebuttal report why Dr. Metzker’s B.S. in Biochemistry and Biophysics and his Ph.D. 

in Molecular and Human Genetics do not qualify him as a POSITA in this case. Instead, Dr. 

Baran waited to include this detail in a declaration attached to a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. 

Metzker. This is precisely the kind of invocation of Rule 26(e) against which the Ninth Circuit 

has cautioned. See Luke, 323 Fed. App’x at 500. Likewise, the Court is not persuaded that the 

inclusion of these paragraphs is “substantially justified.” Dr. Baran could have proffered more indepth analysis of Dr. Metzker’s background in his rebuttal report and chose not to do so.

The only two paragraphs in Dr. Baran’s declaration that appear to turn on new information 

contained in Dr. Metzker’s deposition are ¶¶ 41 and 47. Paragraph 41 states that Dr. Metzker 

testified that he supervised a postdoctoral chemist during his time as an adjunct professor, and Dr. 

Baran concludes that supervising a chemist is not the same as actually having experience in 

organic or medicinal chemistry. And ¶ 47 states that during his deposition, Dr. Metzker could not 

point to any particular compound that he developed. The Court is cognizant that if an expert’s 

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subsequent reply report or deposition could always be used as a justification to supplement

existing expert reports, then the Court’s expert discovery deadlines would be rendered merely 

advisory. Neither the Federal Rules nor the Court’s scheduling order contemplate preparation of 

expert reports in perpetuity. Still, the Court agrees that Dr. Baran could not have obtained this 

information about Dr. Metzker’s experience, or lack thereof, simply by reviewing Dr. Metzker’s 

CV. The Court finds that these two paragraphs are thus appropriate supplementation under Rule 

26(e).

Defendant argues that regardless, Dr. Baran’s declaration is harmless because Plaintiff had 

the opportunity to respond to it in its opposition to the Daubert motion, and Plaintiff could have 

taken Dr. Baran’s deposition about these new topics. See Dkt. No. 247 at 12–13. However, 

Defendant ignores that expert discovery had closed on May 2, 2019, over a month before Dr. 

Baran’s declaration was filed. See Dkt. No. 80. And although the Court ultimately continued the 

dispositive hearing and trial dates to accommodate the complexity of this case and volume of the 

parties’ disputes, this was not an invitation to expand discovery. As Defendant points out, 

“whether Dr. Metzker should be able to offer his opinion to the jury [] is extremely 

important . . . .” See Dkt. No. 247 at 13. As such, if the Court were to authorize Dr. Baran’s 

untimely supplementation, the Court would have to substantially modify the case schedule to 

reopen discovery on the eve of trial. The Court declines to do so, particularly as the Court has 

already had to modify the case schedule significantly. The Court finds that Defendant will not be 

unduly prejudiced by the exclusion because it may continue to rely on Dr. Baran’s rebuttal report 

and several paragraphs in Dr. Baran’s declaration. Moreover, should Dr. Metzker testify at trial, 

Defendant will have the opportunity to challenge Dr. Metzker’s qualifications at that point.

The Court, therefore, GRANTS IN PART the motion to strike Dr. Baran’s declaration, 

finding that the untimely disclosure of the additional information contained in ¶¶ 33–35, 38–40, 

42–46, and 50–57 was not substantially justified or harmless.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s Daubert motions 

as untimely, but GRANTS IN PART the motion to strike ¶¶ 33–35, 38–40, 42–46, 50–57 of Dr. 

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Baran’s declaration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

3/20/2020

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