Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02536/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02536-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANDREW WARD,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2536 FCD DAD P

vs.

D. ADAMS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment imposed by the Tehama

County Superior Court on January 16, 2004. Before the court is respondents’ motion to dismiss

the petition as a mixed petition containing one exhausted claim and three unexhausted claims. 

Respondents assert that, if petitioner seeks stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of his

unexhausted claims, limitations should be applied as set forth in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269

(2005).

In timely opposition to respondents’ motion, petitioner contends that three of his

four claims were properly presented to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal and that he

has no knowledge of whether appellate counsel presented the fourth claim to the California

Supreme Court by a means other than direct appeal. Petitioner does not wish to delete the claim

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that may be unexhausted and requests stay and abeyance so that he may exhaust that claim if the

court finds it to be unexhausted. Respondents have not filed a reply to petitioner’s opposition.

ANALYSIS

More than twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a federal

district court may not adjudicate a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted

state court remedies with respect to each claim raised in the petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 516 (1982). Pursuant to that ruling, district courts were required to dismiss mixed petitions

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Id. at 522. Recently, the Court concluded

that district courts may stay, rather than dismiss, a mixed petition if there is good cause for the

petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court, the claims are potentially meritorious,

and the petitioner has not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, , 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005).

In the present case, petitioner has alleged the following grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE: Petitioner’s 5th and 14th Amendment rights

under the U.S. Const. were violated when the court allowed

evidence of a C.D. showing appellant engaged with adult women

in sexual conduct to impeach his expert witness, thereby forcing

appellant to withdraw the expert’s testimony.

GROUND TWO: Petitioner’s due process rights under the 5th and

14th Amendments of the U.S. Const. were violated by the court’s

admission of uncharged incident involving Alicia S., as propensity

evidence. Said admission was highly prejudicial to petitioner.

GROUND THREE: Petitioner was denied his 6th and 14th

Amendment rights to jury trial and due process under the U.S.

Const. when the court imposed an aggravated sentence on the basis

of facts not admitted or found true by a jury that went beyond the

elements of the crime.

GROUND FOUR: Petitioner was denied his 6th and 14th

Amendment rights under the U.S. Const. when the trial court

refused to permit him to call a vital witness in his defense, denying

him due process and the right to a fair trial, and to call favorable

witnesses.

(Pet. filed Dec. 14, 2005, at pages that would be 5, 24, 36, and 45 if numbered consecutively.)

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Respondents have conceded that Ground Three advances a claim that was

properly presented to the California Supreme Court, and petitioner has not demonstrated that

Ground Four was presented to the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, the undersigned finds

that petitioner’s federal habeas petition is a mixed petition containing at least one exhausted

claim and at least one unexhausted claim.

The parties dispute whether Grounds One and Two are exhausted. Respondents

contend that petitioner did not fairly present either ground to the California Supreme Court. 

More specifically, respondents assert that Ground One, as presented to the California Supreme

Court, did not allege a constitutional violation or place the state court on notice of the

constitutional basis for the claim and that Ground Two, as presented to the California Supreme

Court, merely asserted in passing that any erroneous admission of evidence of uncharged

offenses “constitutes a violation of a defendant’s federal due process rights.” Respondents argue

that it is not enough for purposes of the fair presentation requirement to make a general appeal to

a broad constitutional guarantee such as due process.

The federal exhaustion requirement is satisfied by fairly presenting to the state’s

highest court all federal claims before presenting them to a federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam); Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996). The

petitioner must alert the state courts that a claim under the United States Constitution is being

presented. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hiivala v. Wood, 195

F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (“If state courts are to be

given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States

Constitution.”).

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel gave the California Supreme Court

fair notice of petitioner’s federal claims in the paragraph titled “Necessity for Review” and in

“the Due Process questions presented along with their arguments” in the Petition for Review.

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The section titled “Necessity for Review” consists of the following paragraph:

The issues in this case are presented for review because

they raise important questions of federal and state constitutional

law for this Court’s authoritative resolution and because this

petition is required in order to fulfill petitioner’s obligation to

exhaust his remedies in the courts of California in the event that he

decides to seek relief in federal court. (O’Sullivan v. Boerckel

(1999) 526 U.S. 838.)

(Resp’ts’ Lodged Doc. No. 2, Pet. for Review filed in Cal. Supreme Ct., at 3.) The section titled

“Questions Presented” includes the following questions pertinent to Grounds One and Two:

1. Is a criminal defendant denied Due Process and the right to

a fair trial when the prosecution is allowed to use irrelevant

and highly inflammatory evidence to force a defense

witness to be withdrawn from presenting testimony?

2. Is a criminal defendant denied Due Process and the right to

fair trial when the prosecution is allowed [to] present

prejudicial, other-crimes evidence?

(Id. at 1.)

The undersigned finds that Grounds One and Two were fairly presented to the

California Supreme Court as federal claims invoking the rights to due process and a fair trial. 

Although the arguments offered in support of Question 1 include a citation to California

Evidence Code § 721 and citations to two decisions of the California Supreme Court, Question 1

is not grounded on an alleged error of state law. (See id. at 4-7.) Similarly, the arguments

offered in support of Question 2 include citations to California Evidence Code §§ 1101(b) and

1108 and numerous state court decisions (see id. at 7-11), but the arguments are grounded on and

expressly invoke federal due process:

The erroneous admission of evidence of uncharged offenses

not only is error under California law, but also constitutes a

violation of a defendant’s federal due process rights if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence and

the evidence is of such quality as to prevent a fair trial. (Jammal v.

Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920.)

(Id. at 7.) The petition for review alerted the California Supreme Court that claims under the

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United States Constitution were being presented and gave the state’s highest court an opportunity

to correct the alleged violations of petitioner’s federal rights to due process and a fair trial.

Grounds One, Two, and Three are exhausted. Petitioner has indicated that he

wishes to return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted Ground Four. The pro se petitioner has

stated his belief “that his attorney argued this issue on appeal of this case” and his “impression

that this issue had been raised on appeal in the Superior Court and that it had been exhausted

when denied by the court(s).” (Pet. at pages that would be 45 and 46 if numbered consecutively.) 

In opposition to respondents’ motion to dismiss, petitioner states that he “cannot say with any

certainty exactly what counsel did and or did not file outside of the direct appeal” because

counsel has refused to provide him with the state court records. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss at 2.) The undersigned finds that petitioner has shown good cause for his failure to

exhaust Ground Four prior to filing this action.

The record does not reflect dilatory litigation tactics by petitioner, and the

unexhausted claim is not plainly meritless. Accordingly, this is an appropriate case for the stay

and abeyance procedure. See Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535 (“[I]t likely would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court to deny a stay and dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had

good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and

there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.”) The

undersigned will recommend that respondents’ motion to dismiss the mixed petition be granted

in part and that this action be stayed and held in abeyance pending exhaustion of Ground Four. 

In accordance with Rhines, reasonable time limits should be placed on petitioner’s trip to state

court and back.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ February 7, 2006 motion to dismiss be granted in part;

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2. Petitioner be directed to present unexhausted Ground Four to the California

Supreme Court in a state habeas petition within thirty days after this action is stayed by order of

the district judge;

3. This action be stayed and the Clerk of the Court be directed to administratively

close the case;

4. Petitioner be directed to file and serve a status report in this case on the first

court day of each month after the case is stayed; and

5. Petitioner be directed to file and serve a motion to lift the stay of this action

within thirty days after petitioner is served with the California Supreme Court’s order disposing

of the state exhaustion petition.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and shall serve a copy on all other parties. A document

containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to objections should be titled “Reply to Objections” and shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the

right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 19, 2006.

DAD:13

ward2536.mtd

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