Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02180/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARNELL DUKES, Civil

No. 12cv2180 BAS (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 36.]

v.

D. FOSTON, CDCR Director; et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darnell Dukes, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed a Complaint on September 4, 2012, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against several

defendants including Defendants E. Alvarez, M. Chacon and D. Gambold. (“Compl.”,

ECF No. 1.) On March 1, 2013, Defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s two

causes of action alleging retaliation and the denial of access to courts. [ECF No. 15-1.]

On June 25, 2014, the Honorable Marilyn L. Huff granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for denial of access to courts against all of the defendants. [ECF

No. 28.] Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim was also dismissed against some,1

but not all of the defendants. Accordingly, out of the two causes of action originally

1

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim was dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants

Foston, Sullivan, Beauchemin and Briggs.

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pleaded in the Complaint, only a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants

E. Alvarez, M. Chacon and D. Gambold remains. 

On April 14, 2014, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [ECF No.

36.] Plaintiff was informed by the Court and by Defendants of the requirements for

opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.

1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) [ECF No. 36-2; ECF

No. 42.] 

After receiving an extension of time to oppose the motion for summary judgment

motion, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on June 6, 2014. [ECF. No. 43.] 

Defendants filed their reply on July 14, 2014. [ECF No. 46.] This matter has been

referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”). [ECF No. 41.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants E. Alvarez, M. Chacon and D. Gambold’s motion for summary judgment

be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On February 25, 2011, Dukes was transferred to the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) on “out-to-court status” to attend a civil trial. See Compl.

at 5. Duke arrived in the Receiving and Release department where he felt a large amount

of tension upon undergoing a strip search. Dukes was subsequently placed in a holding

cell where he observed correctional officers searching his personal property. Defendant

Chacon approached Dukes and asked him why he was transferred to RJD. When Dukes

responded that he was present for a court matter, Defendant Chacon stated that the

officers knew why he was there and walked away “agitated.” Id.

Next, an officer from the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) arrived to

escort Dukes to the ASU facility. Before being placed in restraints, Dukes asked if his

property would be sent with him because he was only in the ASU due to his out-to-court

status as opposed to disciplinary reasons. Id. at 5. Dukes then demanded to speak to

2

 These allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. [ECF Doc. No. 1.]

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supervisor Defendant Alvarez about taking, at the very least, his legal documents with

him to the ASU. Defendant Alvarez told Dukes “ No. You had something to do with one

of my fellow officers being fired so you ain’t getting sh*t in here!” After this exchange,

Dukes asked to talk with Defendants Chacon and Gambold. Both Chacon and Gambold

came to the holding cell door and said, “[I]t’s going to get ugly if we have to come in

there to cuff you up!” Gambold said, “This is part of the game ... you started filing

paperwork.” Id. at 6. Chacon stated, “Dukes this is your last chance to cuff up, you

should of thought about it before you got one of us fired.” Id. at 7.

Dukes observed various officers near the holding cell preparing for a confrontation

by taking out their pepper spray and batons. He then decided to ask the ASU officer if he

would handcuff him. The ASU officer placed Dukes in handcuffs and escorted him to

the ASU without any of his property. Id. at 8. Dukes did not receive his personal

property until March 4, 2011. However, his trial had ended by the time the property

was provided to him. Id. at 9.

III. LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact in

dispute and the moving party has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bias

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56c). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56c); Zoslaw

v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). The “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is

a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted).

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

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nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Bias, 508 F.3d at 1218. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party is “required to present significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is]

allegations,” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1218 (citations omitted), and must point to some evidence

in the record that demonstrates “a genuine issue of material fact [which], with all reasonable

inferences made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the

plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). To “defeat a summary judgment motion ..., the non-moving party

‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials’ in the pleadings.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e);

Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (opposing party cannot rest solely on

conclusory allegations of fact or law). Instead, the non-moving party “must establish the

existence of a genuine factual dispute on the basis of admissible evidence; bare allegations

without evidentiary support are insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Estate of Tucker

ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1033 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008).

However, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255; Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (The nonmoving

party’s declaration or sworn testimony “is to be accepted as true .... [The non-movant’s]

evidence should not be weighed against the evidence of the [movant].”) (citation

omitted). All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587;

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). At the summary judgment stage, “[c]redibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005); see

also Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1981)(finding district

court erred in granting summary judgment when the affidavits and other evidence raised

credibility issues); United States v. Two Tracts of Land in Cascade County, Montana, 5

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F.3d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing district judge’s decision to grant summary

judgment based upon an assessment of nonmoving party’s credibility).

IV. DISCUSSION

At the summary judgment stage, the Defendant, as the moving party, bears the

burden of proving no material facts are in dispute. FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Accordingly,

Defendants must demonstrate Dukes does not posses adequate evidence to establish he

was denied his property upon transfer to the ASU “in retaliation” for his filing complaints

and lawsuits and for having one of Defendants’ colleagues fired. [ECF No. 1 at 6:27-

7:3.]

Prisoners have a fundamental “right[s] to file prison grievances,” Bruce v. Ylst, 351

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to “pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). “Without those bedrock

constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy

prison injustices.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “And because

purely retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for having exercised those rights

necessarily undermine those protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart

from any underlying misconduct they are designed to shield.” Id. (citing Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Thomas v. Carpenter, 881

F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that because retaliation by prison officials may chill

an inmate’s exercise of his legitimate First Amendment rights, such conduct is actionable

even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

“[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1)

An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate; (2) because of;

(3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action; (4) chilled the inmate’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights; and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

815-16 (9th Cir. 1994)).

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Defendants move for summary judgment of Dukes’ retaliation claim against

officers Alvarez, Chacon and Gambold on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of

material fact in support of the adverse action or causation elements of Dukes’ retaliation

claim. Specifically, Defendants argue that as correctional officers assigned to the

Receiving and Release Department, they had no control or authority over Dukes’

property, which was under the authority and control of the property officer in the ASU

where Dukes was housed. (See Defs. Memo of Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ, ECF Doc. No.

53-1, at 4-10.) In the declaration of K. Spence, a Lieutenant in the ASU at the Donovan

prison, he explains the property and policy procedures for the ASU as follows:

“When inmates are transferred to a new prison for court proceedings, they first arrive in the Receiving and Release department of the receiving prison. They arrive directly in this department, and are processed inside the department. 

Once this intake process is done, inmates are automatically transferred to the ASU. Inmates are kept in ASU until an Institutional Classification Committee

meets with the inmate to determine their new housing assignment. This process is

done in order to protect the safety and security of the inmate, other inmates, and staff by determining the most appropriate housing assignment for the transferred inmate. In other words, virtually every inmate transferred to Donovan prison for court proceedings is sent to ASU. 

When inmates are done with processing in the Receiving and Release department, they are escorted to ASU by ASU officers. Officers from the Receiving and Release department do not escort or transfer the inmates to ASU.

Inmates are allowed limited personal property in ASU. If an inmate wants personal property in ASU, the inmate must request the property from the ASU

officers using a property request form. In fact, there is an assigned ASU property

officer who serves this very role of controlling and delivering property for ASU inmates.

All requests for property made by ASU inmates are controlled and

responded to by the ASU property officer. If the ASU property officer grants an

inmate’s request for property, the ASU officer must personally search the property and deliver it from Receiving and Release to the inmate in ASU. Thus, the timing and receipt of an ASU inmate’s property is controlled by ASU staff.”

Spence Decl., ECF No. 36-6 at 2:5-3:5.

///

///

///

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1. Element One - Was an Adverse Action Taken Against an Inmate?

Defendants argue they did not take any adverse action against Dukes because the

RJD policy does not permit officers assigned to the Receiving and Release Department to

authorize or provide property to inmates; therefore, they lacked the authority or ability to

withhold Dukes’ property from him. [Alvarez Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 4:1-12.] Each of

the defendants states in their declarations that the Receiving and Release department is

just a temporary way station for inmates admitted to RJD and that the property officer for

the ASU, where Dukes was actually housed, had control over the disposition of his

property. Id.; see also Gambold Decl., ECF No. 36-5 at 3:19-4:2; Chacon Decl., ECF

No. 36-4 at 3:19-4:2.]

In opposition, Dukes contends Alvarez told him “you ain’t getting sh*t in here”

and consequently, he did not receive his property until March 4, 2011, which occurred

seven days after his arrival at RJD on February 25, 2011. [See Dukes Opp’n, ECF No. 43

at 4:2-5:11.] Dukes also submits his own declaration and a declaration from fellow

inmate, Gerry Williams, in support of the assertion that despite the RJD policy, there

have been instances where inmates have received their property at the same time they are

transferred and escorted to ASU. 

In the declarations, Dukes and Williams recount separate, unrelated incidents

occurring before and after the 2011 incident at issue in this case, where they arrived in the

Receiving and Release department at RJD and were allowed to have their documents

transferred with them to the ASU. Specifically, inmate Williams states that in June of

2007, upon transfer to RJD, he was allowed to keep his legal documents. Williams,

however, does not identify whether a Receiving & Release officer or an ASU officer

authorized him to have property at the time of his transfer to ASU. Plaintiff states in his

declaration that in December of 2012, upon transfer to RJD, Defendant Gambold

“searched plaintiff’s property and immediately issued it to plaintiff.” [See Dukes’ Opp’n ,

ECF No. 43 at 9.]

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Defendants have established their burden of demonstrating that there is a policy at

RJD that gives control over the transfer of property to the ASU to the designated ASU

property officer, not Receiving & Release officers. In response, Plaintiff contends that

there is an off-the-books exception to this policy which the defendants could have

exercised, but did not, that would have allowed his property to be transferred with him to

the ASU. This information, however, is insufficient to combat Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. It is undisputed that there is a policy preventing Receiving and

Release officers from authorizing a transfer of inmate property to the ASU. Plaintiff’s

declaration does not negate the existence of this policy. What Plaintiff’s declaration

essentially does is confirm that Defendants followed the policy on the day of the incident

at issue in this suit, but may have violated that policy in their discretion in other years. 

The fact that Defendants followed the policy with respect to Dukes is not an adverse

action, and Dukes does not submit evidence showing that a mandatory “out-to-court

status” exception to the policy exists that would otherwise authorize Receiving and

Release officers to transfer inmates to the ASU with their property. No genuine issue of

material fact exists as to the first required element of Dukes’ First Amendment retaliation

claim. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants E. Alvarez, M. Chacon

and D. Gambold’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.3

V. CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provision of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth above, it is

3

 The Court has recommended a finding that Dukes fails to meet the first element necessary to

prevail on a retaliation cause of action. Therefore, there is no need to address Defendants’ arguments as

to the second element; causation. The Court does note, however, that Dukes has failed to show a causal

connection between the three defendants in Receiving and Release, who were following policy, and a

chilling effect. The delay Dukes experienced in receiving his property may have occurred due to his

failure to follow ASU policy. Specifically, there has been no evidence submitted to the Court indicating

that upon his arrival in the ASU, Dukes submitted a property request form to the ASU property officer

as required. See Spence Decl., ECF No. 36-6 at 2:5-3:5 (stating an inmate must request property from

the ASU property officer using a property request form). If Dukes had completed the form and

submitted it to the designated ASU property officer in conformance with the policy, he may not have

experienced a delay.

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RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 29, 2014 any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 12, 2015. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: December 10, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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