Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05083/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 5, 2013 Decided May 24, 2013 

No. 12-5083 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

LOCAL 1709 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 

EMPLOYEES, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

v. 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cv-00692) 

Gony F. Goldberg argued the cause for the appellants. 

Joseph F. Henderson was on brief. David A. Borer and 

Eugene R. Fidell entered appearances. 

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr., United 

States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United 

States Attorney, were on brief. Mercedeh Momeni, Assistant 

United States Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 1 of 13
2 

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: 

Remember, a patch on your coat and money in your 

pocket is better and more creditable than a writ on 

your back and no money to take it off.1

* * * * 

 The American Federation of Government Employees 

(National AFGE), several AFGE locals2

 that represent Air 

Reserve Technicians (ARTs) and ART Mark Winstead 

(collectively, AFGE or appellants) challenge three Air Force 

instructions requiring ARTs to wear military uniforms while 

performing civilian duties. Because the exclusive remedial 

scheme of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 1101 et seq. (CSRA), precludes AFGE’s claims, we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

 1

 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 35 

(H.M. Caldwell Co. ed. 1900). 

2

 The AFGE Locals who are appellants in this case are 997, 

1364, 1367, 2077 and 2316. Additionally, AFGE Locals 1709, 

1778, 1869, 1952, 1997, 2361, 2568, 3707 and 3854 were plaintiffs 

in district court but did not join this appeal. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 2 of 13
3 

I. 

National AFGE is a national labor organization that 

represents employees throughout the federal government and 

AFGE locals represent, inter alia, several bargaining units of 

ARTs. An ART is a federal employee who is “required as a 

condition of [ ] employment to maintain membership in the 

Selected Reserve” of the Air Force and “is assigned to a 

civilian position as a technician in the organizing, 

administering, instructing, or training of the Selected Reserve 

or in the maintenance and repair of supplies or equipment 

issued to the Selected Reserve or the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. 

§ 10216(a). On August 6, 2007, the Air Force issued three 

instructions requiring ARTs to wear military uniforms while 

performing civilian duties. See Air Force Instruction 36-703 

at 4-5 (“Air Reserve Technicians will adhere to the 

requirements as those prescribed in AFI 36-2903, Dress and 

Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, when wearing 

the military uniform in civilian status”); Air Force Instruction 

36-801 at 6 (“Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Air 

Reserve Technicians (ART) must wear the military uniform 

while performing civilian duties as an ART”); Air Force 

Instruction 36-2903 at 9 (uniform wear requirements for 

ARTs). AFGE claims this requirement harms ARTs because, 

inter alia, (1) “the Air Force is causing confusion between 

military and civilian status in an era when having or not 

having the protections of the Geneva Conventions . . . is all 

too real an issue”; (2) “an ART may not stand or walk with 

hands in pockets other than to insert or remove items in 

military uniform”; (3) “[a]n ART may no longer use a 

personal cell phone, radio, [or] hands-free headset while 

walking and carry a personal cell phone on the flight line 

while in military uniform”; and (4) “an ART in military 

uniform is required to salute an officer in a hat-salute and to 

provide proper respect to those military members that are 

senior.” Br. for Appellants 4. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 3 of 13
4 

On April 23, 2008, AFGE filed a complaint in district 

court against the Secretary of the Air Force (Secretary). It 

argued that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 701 et seq. (APA), the Air Force instructions are (1) 

arbitrary and capricious; (2) contrary to law; and (3) in excess 

of the Secretary’s statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. 

§ 10216. The district court dismissed the complaint, 

concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 

the plaintiffs failed to “exhaust their administrative remedies” 

under the CSRA. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Sec’y of Air 

Force, 841 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 n.1 (D.D.C. 2012). AFGE 

timely appealed. 

II. 

 “We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction.” John Doe v. Metro. Police 

Dep’t of D.C., 445 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In so 

doing, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. 

See Schnitzer v. Harvey, 389 F.3d 200, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

AFGE argues that the dismissal of the complaint was error 

because its claims fall outside the CSRA’s scope. We 

disagree. 

A. CSRA/FSLMRS Remedial Scheme 

The CSRA is a “comprehensive and exclusive” statutory 

scheme that “protects covered federal employees against a 

broad range of personnel practices, and . . . supplies a variety 

of causes of action and remedies to employees when their 

rights under the statute are violated.” Grosdidier v. Chairman, 

Broad. Bd. of Governors, 560 F.3d 495, 497 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 

denied, 558 U.S. 989 (2009). The CSRA creates an 

“integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review,” 

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445 (1988), wherein 

the Congress “intentionally provid[ed]—and intentionally 

[chose] not [to] provid[e]—particular forums and procedures 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 4 of 13
5 

for particular kinds of claims.” Filebark v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Transp., 555 F.3d 1009, 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 558 

U.S. 1007 (2009). 

The CSRA provides “the exclusive avenue for suit” to a 

plaintiff whose claims fall within its scope. Grosdidier, 560 

F.3d at 497. The plaintiff must rely on the “variety of causes 

of action and remedies” created by the CSRA and “may not 

circumvent the Act’s requirements and limitations by 

resorting to the catchall APA to challenge agency 

employment actions.” Id. Even if the plaintiff “cannot prevail 

in a claim under the CSRA,” id., no other relief is available. 

Title VII of the CSRA, also known as the Federal Service 

Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et 

seq. (FSLMRS), governs federal labor-management relations. 

The FSLMRS “establishes a comprehensive scheme to deal 

with labor relations in federal employment.” Dep’t of Def. v. 

FLRA, 685 F.2d 641, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For example, the 

FSLMRS creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority 

(FLRA), a five-member decisionmaking body that is the 

public-sector counterpart of the National Labor Relations 

Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104; Rizzitelli v. FLRA, 212 F.3d 710, 

712 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). The FSLMRS spells out various 

unfair labor practices, see, e.g., id. § 7116, and defines the 

duty to bargain between federal management and unions, see 

id. § 7117. With the FSLMRS, as with all of the CSRA: 

“Congress passed an enormously complicated and subtle 

scheme to govern employee relations in the federal sector, 

including the authorization of collective bargaining. It 

follows, then, that federal employees may not circumvent that 

structure” by seeking judicial review outside the CSRA’s 

procedures. Steadman v. Governor, U.S. Soldiers’ & Airmen’s 

Home, 918 F.2d 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted). 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 5 of 13
6 

The FSLMRS provides several alternative mechanisms to 

challenge management actions, three of which are pertinent 

here. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121. First, an aggrieved party may 

resort to a grievance resolution and arbitration procedure that 

the FSLMRS requires be included in every collective 

bargaining agreement. Unless a specific statutory or contract 

exception applies, that procedure is “the exclusive 

administrative procedure[ ] for resolving grievances which 

fall within its coverage.” Id. § 7121(a)(1). After arbitration, 

either party may file with the FLRA exceptions to an 

arbitrator’s award. Id. § 7122(a). The FLRA reviews the 

award to ensure that it is not “contrary to any law, rule, or 

regulation” or otherwise deficient on any ground “similar to 

those applied by Federal courts in private sector labormanagement relations.” Id. Second, the FSLMRS permits a 

union to bargain over a challenged management action; and if 

management asserts that the matter is non-negotiable, the 

union can pursue a negotiability appeal with the FLRA. See 

id. § 7117(c); see also Dep’t of Def., 685 F.2d at 644-45. 

Third, to the extent that management enforces a policy that 

violates a collective bargaining agreement predating the 

policy, “any person” can lodge an unfair labor practice charge 

with the FLRA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116(a)(7), 7118(a)(1). 

 The FSLMRS also provides for judicial review of an 

FLRA order by petitioning for review in this circuit or “in the 

circuit in which the person resides or transacts business.” Id. 

§ 7123(a). And, although there are two exceptions to judicial 

review in the appropriate court of appeals,3

 “this does not 

 3

 The two exceptions are: an order under “(1) section 7122 of 

this title (involving an award by an arbitrator), unless the order 

involves an unfair labor practice under section 7118 of this title, or 

(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit 

determination).” 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 6 of 13
7 

mean the district courts are open. It means that review is 

precluded in any court.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Empls. v. Loy, 

367 F.3d 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To the extent an FLRA 

order is judicially reviewable, then, it may be reviewed only

in the appropriate court of appeals, not in district court. Id.

B. The Jurisdictional Issue 

 Because the FSLMRS’s remedial regime is exclusive, 

providing AFGE with multiple options to challenge the dress 

code, AFGE cannot circumvent this regime by instead 

bringing a suit in district court. 

 Specifically, AFGE has at least three administrative 

options it can use to challenge the dress code. First, a local 

can attempt to bargain over the dress code and, if the Air 

Force claims the dress code is non-negotiable, the local can 

file a negotiability appeal. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(c). In fact, the 

record includes the example of AFGE Local 1367—one of the 

appellants—bargaining with the Air Force over this issue and 

ultimately pursuing a negotiability appeal with the FLRA 

(which the FLRA rejected). Second, an AFGE local can 

allege that imposition of the dress code violates 10 U.S.C. 

§ 10216—the claim AFGE raises sub judice. Such an 

allegation easily falls within the definition of a “grievance”4

under the FSLMRS and thus can be challenged using 

collective bargaining agreement grievance and arbitration 

procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 7121. For example, AFGE Local 

2361—a plaintiff in district court but not an appellant here—

filed a grievance regarding the Air Force instructions and 

obtained a favorable ruling from the arbitrator. See, e.g., 

 4

 A “grievance” includes a complaint “by any employee, labor 

organization, or agency concerning . . . any claimed violation, 

misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation 

affecting conditions of employment.” 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii). 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 7 of 13
8 

Appendix 21-44 (“The Employer violates the Agreement by 

unilaterally requiring ARTs employees to wear military 

uniforms while in civilian status performing civilian duties. . . 

. The Employer shall . . . . not apply the uniform requirements 

for ARTs in civilian status . . . for the life of the Agreement 

unless and until the Union agrees to modify the Agreement to 

permit those requirements or similar changes.”); see also 

Appendix 78 (denying grievance brought by AFGE Local 

1778, another non-appealing plaintiff). Third, to the extent the 

dress code conflicts with an existing collective bargaining 

agreement, an aggrieved party can file an unfair labor practice 

charge over the issue. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116(a)(7), 7118(a)(1). 

For example, AFGE Locals 2316 (an appellant here) and 3854 

(a plaintiff in district court but not an appellant here) have 

attempted to challenge the Air Force instructions in this 

manner. In fact, we have already decided a petition for review 

regarding one local’s different challenge to the same Air 

Force instructions. See U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. FLRA, 

648 F.3d 841, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (granting Air Force’s 

petition for review of FLRA decision that union proposal for 

uniform cleaning is negotiable condition of employment). The 

FSLMRS does not, however, authorize the dress code to be 

challenged by way of a lawsuit begun in district court. 

 The CSRA can preclude a claim from being brought in a 

district court even if it forecloses the claim from 

administrative review and has not “identified some other kind 

of plaintiff or some other kind of procedure for bringing the 

claim.” Filebark, 555 F.3d at 1013. The case for preclusion is 

stronger here because the FSLMRS in fact provides a means 

to review the Air Force instructions—including, in some 

circumstances, judicial review—via at least these three routes. 

While the appellants may not prevail using one of these 

procedures or would prefer to challenge the Air Force 

instructions by some other means, that does not mean their 

claims may be brought outside the CSRA’s exclusive 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 8 of 13
9 

remedial scheme. Rather, as we have explained, “it is the 

comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the 

‘adequacy’ of specific remedies thereunder, that counsels 

judicial abstention.” Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 227 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam). 

The appellants argue that while the CSRA may preclude 

the AFGE locals’ claims, it does not preclude the claims of 

National AFGE. Specifically, they complain that National 

AFGE—unlike an employee or a union local with a collective 

bargaining agreement with the Air Force—has no relief under 

the FSLMRS and thus should be permitted to proceed outside 

the CSRA to seek relief. But the fact that National AFGE may 

not pursue a claim through the CSRA does not mean that it 

has access to the courts. Rather, it means that National AFGE 

may not raise the claim at all. The CSRA’s exclusion of 

certain parties from judicial review is “not an invitation to 

those [parties] to sue under other statutes but a ‘manifestation 

of a considered congressional judgment that they should not 

have statutory entitlement to review.’ ” Filebark, 555 F.3d at 

1013 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 448-49); Davis v. 

Billington, 681 F.3d 377, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Indeed, the 

only evidence Davis uses to suggest he is not ‘included’ in the 

CSRA’s comprehensive remedial scheme is the lack of relief 

available to him under that scheme. . . . [T]his is certainly not 

a sufficient reason to place a claimant and his claims outside 

the ambit of a comprehensive remedial scheme . . . . ”). The 

FSLMRS provides the exclusive procedures by which federal 

employees and their bargaining representatives may assert 

federal labor-management relations claims. To the extent the 

procedures omit other parties—like a national labor 

organization (at least one that is not party to a collective 

bargaining agreement)—we presume that exclusion is 

intentional. Were we to hold otherwise, a union local could 

circumvent the CSRA’s strictures by requesting that a 

national union file general APA claims outside the CSRA on 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 9 of 13
10 

its behalf. We decline to allow National AFGE, which here 

asserts only the rights of its member-employees and memberunion locals, to file a suit outside the CSRA simply because it 

cannot do so under the CSRA. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 

1367, 1374 (2012) (“Where a statute provides that particular 

agency action is reviewable at the instance of one party, who 

must first exhaust administrative remedies, the inference that 

it is not reviewable at the instance of other parties, who are 

not subject to the administrative process, is strong.”); see also 

Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (2012) 

(“Just as the CSRA’s ‘elaborate’ framework demonstrates 

Congress’ intent to entirely foreclose judicial review to 

employees to whom the CSRA denies statutory review, it 

similarly indicates that extrastatutory review is not available 

to those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative 

and judicial review.” (citation omitted)).5

Similarly, we reject AFGE’s argument that the district 

court has jurisdiction because it can more efficiently 

adjudicate AFGE’s claim that the Air Force instructions are 

contrary to statute on a nationwide, rather than local-by-local, 

basis. But a plaintiff’s inability to use the APA to circumvent 

the CSRA’s requirements “applies to a ‘systemwide 

challenge’ to an agency policy interpreting a statute just as it 

does to the implementation of such a policy in a particular 

case.” Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d 

 5

 We reject the argument that “[t]he doctrine of associational 

standing entitles the National AFGE to adjudicate a nationwide 

claim.” Br. for Appellants 15. Standing vel non is a different issue 

from claim preclusion under the CSRA. See, e.g., Nyunt v. 

Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (plaintiff’s claim precluded by CSRA notwithstanding 

plaintiff’s standing). 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 10 of 13
11 

445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2009).6

 Nor may a party avoid the CSRA 

because it provides only an “inconvenient” remedy: 

The controllers do have a remedy: if the FAA fails to 

live up to its agreements, the union can pursue the 

matter and if the union fails to live up to its duty of 

representation, the controllers can pursue the union. 

These procedures surely lack the directness and 

immediacy of an APA suit, and the controllers have 

apparently found them frustrating. But the choice of 

procedures lies with Congress[.] 

Filebark, 555 F.3d at 1014 (citations omitted). 

Furthermore, AFGE’s reliance on AFGE Local 446 v. 

Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341 (D.C. Cir. 2007) is misplaced. In 

Nicholson, an AFGE local representing nurses employed by 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) won an arbitration 

award against the VA. Id. at 346. When the VA refused to 

recognize the award, the local filed an unfair labor practice 

charge with the FLRA. Id. at 345. Subsequently, the VA 

 6

 AFGE does not request that we apply the exception discussed 

in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), nor would we apply it if 

AFGE had so argued. See Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449 (Leedom 

exception permits “judicial review of agency action for alleged 

statutory violations even when a statute precludes review . . . . 

where (i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than 

express; (ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the 

statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly acts in excess of its 

delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the 

statute that is ‘clear and mandatory’ ”; to satisfy the third 

requirement the “agency error must be so extreme that one may 

view it as jurisdictional or nearly so” (citations and quotation marks 

omitted)). In Nyunt, we emphasized that the Leedom exception is 

like “a Hail Mary pass” that “rarely succeeds.” Id. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 11 of 13
12 

Under Secretary—acting under a specific statute pertaining 

only to VA employees—issued an order making it impossible 

to enforce the arbitration award. See id. at 345. The statute 

provided that the Under Secretary’s order “ ‘may not be 

reviewed by any other agency.’ ” Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7422(d)). The FLRA dismissed the unfair labor practice 

charge, concluding that both the order and the statute deprived 

it of jurisdiction. Id. The local then filed a complaint in 

district court challenging the Under Secretary’s decision 

insulating the unfair labor practice claim from FLRA review. 

Id. Emphasizing that the local challenged the Under 

Secretary’s decision as opposed to an FLRA decision, we held 

that the CSRA did not deprive the district court of 

jurisdiction. Id. at 347-48. Nicholson is distinguishable 

because it involved a challenge to the Under Secretary’s order 

insulating the underlying dispute from review, an order that is 

“expressly outside the FLRA’s purview.” Id. at 348. 

 Finally, we note that the district court erroneously used 

the administrative exhaustion doctrine to dismiss the 

complaint. See Am. Fed. of Gov’t Empls., 841 F. Supp. 2d at 

236. Administrative exhaustion means that a party cannot 

bring a claim in a particular court until that party follows 

certain administrative steps. But if judicial review were 

available to AFGE, it would be available in circuit, not 

district, court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Thus, AFGE’s 

argument that we should waive the requirements of 

“administrative exhaustion” for equitable reasons misses the 

point: the exclusive remedial scheme of the CSRA keeps 

these claims out of the district court entirely.

 In sum, the Congress has provided multiple paths by 

which AFGE can challenge the Air Force instructions. And 

AFGE cannot disturb the CSRA’s exclusive remedial regime 

by following a path the Congress has closed. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 12 of 13
13 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #12-5083 Document #1437802 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 13 of 13