Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02330/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02330-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R’MON ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY ALLISON, Warden,

Respondent.

 

 

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Case No. 11-CV-2330-LAB-(JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDING GRANTING

OF RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS

UNTIMELY FILED [Doc. No. 24]

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus As Untimely Filed submitted by Respondent Kathy Allison

(hereafter “Respondent”). [Doc. No. 24] For the reasons set forth below,

the Court recommends that District Judge Larry Alan Burns grant Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On February 9, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of robbery and murder

in San Diego County Superior Court. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 87(a), 211,

212.5.) Petitioner received a sentence of 128 years in prison, including a

sentence of life in prison without parole for counts one and two, and a

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consecutive 28 year sentence enhancement for felony murder. [Doc. No.

6, at 1]

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California

Court of Appeal, alleging: (1) he was not afforded his constitutional right to

a representative and impartial jury; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to

justify the robbery special circumstance penalty; (3) the special

circumstance should be overturned due to prosecutorial misconduct; (4)

the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider evidence of an

unrelated shooting; and (5) the trial court erred by admitting an outdated

photo of the victim’s son into evidence. [Lodgment No. 2] The California

Court of Appeal affirmed the San Diego County Superior Court’s judgment. 

[Lodgment No. 5] 

Petitioner then appealed his case to the California Supreme Court,

raising, in addition to the claims he raised in the Court of Appeal, the

following claims: (6) the prosecutor misstated the law of special

circumstances; (7) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider

evidence of unrelated bullet holes in Petitioner’s truck; and (8) the trial

court erred by not conducting individual interviews of the jurors to

determine whether they had knowledge of materials not in evidence.

[Lodgment No. 6] The California Supreme Court denied the petition for

review on June 9, 2010.1 [Lodgment No. 8] 

Petitioner initiated this federal habeas action on October 7, 2011. 

[Doc. No. 1] On September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed the Second Amended

Petition, which is the operative habeas petition, alleging two claims: (1) the

evidence was not sufficient to support the robbery special

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1

In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent incorrectly states the California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review on July 9, 2010, and calculates the statute of limitations based on

this erroneous date. See e.g. Doc. No. 24-1, p. 2, ln. 11 and p. 7, ln. 12.

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circumstance penalty; and (2) he was not afforded his constitutional right to

a representative and impartial jury. [Doc. No. 19, at 2]

On November 7, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging the Petition was untimely filed. 

[Doc. No. 24] Petitioner subsequently filed an opposition brief on January

3, 2013. [Doc. No. 30]

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Petitioner’s claims are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereafter “AEDPA”) which provides a one-year

statute of limitations period for prisoners to file petitions for writs of habeas

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In the present case, the statute of limitations

period for Petitioner’s claims began to run when his judgment of conviction

“became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of such time

seeking such review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, the judgment

became final on September 7, 2010 -- 90 days after the California Supreme

Court denied his petition for review. [Lodgment No. 8]; See Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the statute of

limitations period began the following day, September 8, 2010, and, absent

tolling, ended one year later, on September 8, 2011.2

Petitioner, however, did not file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

until October 7, 2011. [Doc. No. 1] Therefore, unless he can show he is

entitled to tolling, pursuant to 28 USC § 2244(d)(2), his claims are timebarred.

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Although Petitioner and Respondent indicate in their filings that the statute of limitations period for

Petitioner’s claims began on October 7, 2010, the statute of limitations period for these claims actually began on

September 8, 2010 (i.e. the day following 90 days after the Supreme Court of California denied Petitioner’s appeal

on June 9, 2010). [Lodgment 8; Doc. No. 24, at 7; Doc. No. 30, at 3]

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IV. STATUTORY TOLLING 

Under AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations period is tolled for

the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Additionally, “[a]n application for post-conviction review is pending while a

California petitioner completes a full round of state collateral review,

including during the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse

determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided

that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Waldrip v.

Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations

omitted, emphasis in original). Under California law, “[a]s long as the

prisoner filed a petition for appellate review within a ‘reasonable time,’ he

could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-year time limit) the days

between (1) the time the lower state court reached an adverse decision,

and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state court.” Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

222-23 (2002)).

Petitioner, however, has not filed an application for State postconviction review, or an application for any other collateral review. 

Therefore, AEDPA will not toll the statute of limitations period for his

claims. 

V. EQUITABLE TOLLING

In the Ninth Circuit, equitable tolling is available to prisoners who

have filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Espinoza-Matthews v. State

of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Holland v.

Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that equitable tolling is

available in cases involving petitions for writs of habeas corpus under

appropriate circumstances). However, in such situations the petitioner

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bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is appropriate

given the facts of his or her case. Id. In order to be eligible for equitable

tolling, the petitioner must satisfy two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way” and prevented him from filing his petition within the

statute of limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005).

In the present case, Petitioner has presented no evidence to suggest

that the claims raised in his petition should be subject to equitable tolling.

He does not allege that he acted diligently in pursuing his claims during the

statute of limitations period, nor does he allege that any “extraordinary

circumstance” prevented him from filing his Petition within said period. 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Therefore, equitable tolling is not appropriate in this

case.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Because Petitioner did not file his claims within the one-year statute

of limitations period, and has not shown that statutory or equitable tolling is

appropriate given the facts of his case, the undersigned magistrate judge

recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 24] be

GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Larry Alan Burns, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 19, 2013 any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties within 10 days of being served

with the objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: June 28, 2013

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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