Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04147/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04147-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

GARY RAYBURN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-4147

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Gary Rayburn, appealed to this Court from the denial of supplemental

security income benefits (hereinafter “SSI”), by the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"). On December 7, 2005, the undersigned

remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #11 & 12). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Todd Cockrill, filed a Petition For Attorney's Fees Under EAJA

(The Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"), on February 10, 2006 (Doc. #13

& 14). The Commissioner filed her Response on February 16, 2006 (Doc. #15). This

matter is now ready for consideration.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits

was substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of

benefits was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner’s does not object to

the award of a reasonable attorney’s fees, does not dispute the number of hours for which

counsel seeks payment and does not object to the hourly rate for which counsel seeks

compensation (Doc. #5, pp. 1-2). The Court construes this lack of opposition to the award of

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(Rev. 8/82)

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a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not

"substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See

Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, P.L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 1983

(1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the

necessary standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out

of a claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for

his or her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees

under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation;

the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services;

the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved.

Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

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amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at the rate of $125.00 per hour,

for the 12.8 hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this Court.

The Commissioner has offered no objection. We note that an award based upon this

hourly rate, reflecting an increase in the cost of living as set by Congress, will result in

consistent hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503,

505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly

rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $125.00 per hour. 

Further, we have reviewed counsel’s itemization of time (Doc. #13, Exhibit A). We

note that the defendant has not objected to the number of hours for which counsel seeks a fee

award, and we find the time asserted to be spent in representation of the plaintiff before the

district court, to be reasonable. Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to

compensation under the EAJA for 12.8 hours. 

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation for 12.8 hours at the

rate of $125.00 per hour, for a total attorney's fee award of $1,600.00 under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order

to prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14 day of April, 2006 th

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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