Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01953/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01953-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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When Petitioner filed the instant action, Dora Schriro was the Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections. Charles L. Ryan has now replaced Respondent Schriro as

Director. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Charles L. Ryan is substituted

as a Respondent to this action in place of Dora Schriro.

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL LAWLER, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-08-1953-GMS-PHX

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner

Michael Lawler (“Petitioner”), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. # 1.) On September

28, 2009, Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson issued a Report and Recommendation (“R

& R”) in favor of Respondents,1

 recommending that the Court deny the Petition. (Dkt. # 27.)

Petitioner has filed Written Objections to the R & R. (Dkt. # 28.) For the following reasons,

the Court adopts the R & R and dismisses the Petition with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On June 9, 1997, Petitioner was found guilty on two counts of sexual assault. (Dkt.

# 20, Ex. S at 16–17). Pursuant to his convictions, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

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concurrent terms of fourteen years’ imprisonment. (Dkt. # 20, Ex. W at 18–20.) The R & R

sets forth the factual and procedural background of this case, to which neither party offered

specific objections. Accordingly, the Court adopts that background as an accurate recital. 

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner raised the following two grounds

for relief:

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to relay the State’s plea offer to

Petitioner; and 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Pope hearing to

present evidence of victim’s prior false allegations of sexual misconduct.

(Dkt. # 1 at 5–6.) All parties agree that Petitioner properly exhausted these claims in state

court and that he has timely filed this Petition. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). It is “clear that the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,

but not otherwise.” Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp.2d 1219, 1225 (D. Ariz. 2003).

District courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the

subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R & R]

to which objection is made.”). 

DISCUSSION

On October 13, 2009, Petitioner timely brought forth Written Objections to the R &

R. (Dkt. #28.) In his Objections, Petitioner primarily argues that the Judge Anderson erred

when he credited several of the state court’s factual determinations. Petitioner asserts that the

state’s factual findings are constitutionally unreasonable. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), state

court findings of fact are given considerable deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “A

federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review

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of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually

unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S.

1038 (2004) (internal citation omitted). A state court decision is based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts if “an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding[s] [are] supported by the record.” See

id. at 1000. “[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s findings of fact is

insufficient.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). The habeas court

presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct, and petitioner bears the

burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a [s]tate court shall be

presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106

(9th Cir. 2004). “Clear and convincing evidence” within the meaning of § 2254 “requires

greater proof than preponderance of the evidence[;]” instead Petitioner must present evidence

that provides “an abiding conviction” that the factual contentions being advanced are “highly

probable.” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation

omitted).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Failure to Convey a Plea Offer

In his Ground I claim, Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because he failed to “[r]elay the State’s plea offer to Petitioner so that he could

make an informed decision to proceed to trial or accept the plea.” (Dkt. # 1 at 5.) The Court

agrees with Judge Anderson’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus

relief on Ground One. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), sets forth the relevant standard for

determining whether a criminal defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel. In

order to obtain habeas relief under Strickland, a petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s

performance was deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Id. at 687. 

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A. Counsel’s Performance Was Not Deficient. 

To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s

performance fell below what would be considered objectively reasonable. Id. at 687–88. The

Ninth Circuit has previously held that a defense attorney’s failure to communicate a plea

offer to his or her client constitutes deficient performance as a matter of law. See United

States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994). When a petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim is based on an attorney’s failure to communicate a plea offer, “the threshold

issue . . . is whether the government ever extended a plea offer to [defendant] through

[counsel].” Guerrero v. United States, 383 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2004). On “this . . . purely

factual issue,” id., the state post-conviction relief court held an evidentiary hearing and

determined that the government did not make a plea offer to Petitioner. (See Dkt. # 20, Ex.

FFF at 1.)

Petitioner, however, offers multiple objections suggesting that the Arizona state court

and Judge Anderson erred in determining that the State never made a plea offer. (Dkt. # 28

at 4.) Petitioner asserts that such a finding is unreasonable in light of the evidence presented

at his evidentiary hearing. Specifically, Petitioner points to statements from his trial attorney,

Bill Stephens (“Mr. Stephens”), offered in response to questioning at the evidentiary hearing:

Q: When you first received the case did you shortly thereafter

begin any plea negotiations at all with the prosecutor?

A: No. Because Mr. Lawler informed me that he would not

accept any type of plea. The prosecutor is now a judge,

Heilman. Judge Heilman and I walked out one time, and he was

still with the county attorney’s office, and he said he would put

together a plea. And I did inform him that Mr. Lawler informed

me that he would not accept any kind of plea. 

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Q: Other than the prosecutor approaching you one day—and you

say he offered something? Was that sort of casual off-of-thecuff?

A: No . . . County Attorney Heilman[] was walking with me. We

were walking out together and he said, I will put together a plea

agreement. And that I said, well, Mr. Lawler will not accept a

plea agreement. 

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Petitioner objects to the R & R’s depiction of Mr. Saienni. Petitioner claims Mr.

Saienni had more involvement in Petitioner’s case than the R & R suggests. (Dkt. # 28 at 2.)

The degree of Mr. Saienni’s involvement in Petitioner’s trial, however, has no effect on the

Court’s analysis of this case. It appears that Judge Anderson chose not to include all of these

facts for brevity and to improve readability.

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Q: Did he ever put anything together for you to consider?

A: Not to my knowledge.

(Dkt. # 20, Ex. CCC at 8–10.) Petitioner argues that these statements indicate that a plea

agreement was offered. During the hearing, Petitioner also testified and indicated that the

government did make a plea offer. (Dkt. # 20 , Ex. EEE at 22–23, 34–35.) Petitioner further

presents evidence that Mr. Saienni, one of trial counsel’s colleagues, testified that the

government was receptive to a plea.2

At the evidentiary hearing, however, Petitioner’s trial attorney specifically testified

that the state never extended a plea offer. Mr. Saienni also conceded that no formal plea offer

was made. And, while Petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that his attorney failed

to convey a plea offer, Petitioner admitted that “ no formal offer” was ever made. (Dkt. # 20,

Ex. EEE, at 32.) Additionally, while Petitioner alleges in his Objections and his Petition that

the plea offer provided a sentence of “lifetime probation,” the trial court observed that such

an offer seemed implausible in a case involving sexual assault since the alleged offer did not

include any “prison time.” (Dkt. # 20, Ex. EEE at 46.) Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that

“an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review could . . . reasonably

conclude that the state court’s finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor, 366 F.3d at

1000 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, with respect to his Ground I claim, Petitioner appears

to raise three additional objections to Judge Anderson’s R & R. 

First, Petitioner objects to the determination that the post-conviction relief court

“implicitly found Mr. Stephen’s testimony more credible than any contrary testimony in

concluding that the state had never offered a plea agreement.” (See Dkt. # 27 at 13.) But, as

the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held, “The presumption of correctness applies not only to

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express findings of fact, but also applies equally to unarticulated findings that are necessary

to the state court’s conclusions of mixed questions of fact and law.” Cooper v. Brown, 510

F.3d 870, 919 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the presumption of correctness to a credibility

determination that was implicit to the state court’s rejection of the petitioner’s claims) (citing

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983)). Here, two versions of the facts were

presented at Petitioner’s evidentiary hearing. The state court credited the government’s

version of those facts; therefore, the state court inherently determined that Petitioner’s trial

counsel presented more credible testimony than did Petitioner. And, to the extent that

Petitioner challenges the credibility of Mr. Stephens’ testimony, this Court on habeas review

may not “redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the

state trial court.” Aiken v. Blodgett, 921 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Lonberger, 549

U.S. at 434). 

Next, Petitioner’s objection to the fact-finding process employed by the state court is

also without merit. (See Dkt. # 28 at 2.) According to the Ninth Circuit, 

[B]efore we can determine that the state-court fact-finding

process is defective in some material way, or perhaps

non-existent, we must more than merely doubt whether the

process operated properly. Rather, we must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding

process was adequate.

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. Here, Petitioner presents no evidence suggesting that the process

or method of the state’s fact-finding process was unreasonable, defective, or non-existent.

All of the facts demonstrate otherwise. Petitioner was afforded an evidentiary hearing

wherein counsel was appointed, and he was given the opportunity to testify, present

witnesses, and to cross-examine the government’s witnesses. This was adequate to afford

Petitioner a full and fair hearing for determining the facts relevant to Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. 

In his third objection, Petitioner appears to argue that the R & R omits “critical”

portions of a letter contained in the record and that this omitted fact demonstrates that the

state court’s factual findings are unreasonable. (Dkt. # 28 at 9.) The omitted portion of the

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The R & R did include the following: “In support of his claim, Petitioner submits a

letter written by Stephens which includes a statement that, ‘I am confident that we are going

to walk Mike out.’” (Dkt. # 27 at 18–19.)

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letter, which Mr. Stephens wrote to Petitioner’s parents shortly before trial, provides, “It is

my intention to do everything I can to walk [Petitioner] out of the courtroom absolutely

innocent of all charges . . . [w]ith the information that we have on hand with our ongoing

investigation to this point in time, I am confident that we are going to walk [Petitioner] out.”

(Dkt. # 26 at 11.)3

 Here, the omitted portion of the letter does nothing to change the analysis

and it has no bearing on the state court’s factual findings. The omitted portion does not

provide clear and convincing evidence that counsel failed to convey a plea agreement to

Petitioner. 

Thus, despite Petitioner’s averments and objections, the state court’s determination

that there was no government plea offer was not unreasonable. At the most, Petitioner has

presented evidence that the government had extended an invitation to enter into plea

negotiations. Those courts that have addressed this issue have held that failure to convey an

invitation to negotiate does not constitute ineffective assistance. See Berthoff v. United

States, 140 F. Supp.2d 50, 58 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that failure to communicate an

invitation to enter plea negotiations did not constitute deficient performance under

Strickland); Frost v. United States, 2002 WL 1941469 at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002)

(holding that Counsel’s failure to inform the defendant of a letter from the government

concerning a possible plea agreement did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,

since the letter was merely an invitation to enter into plea negotiations). Hence, Arizona did

not engage in a decision “contrary to” or “involving an unreasonable application of federal

law” when it decided that Petitioner’s attorney was not constitutionally deficient for failing

to convey an invitation to enter plea negotiations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

B. Counsel’s Performance Did Not Prejudice Petitioner’s Defense.

Even if counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, Petitioneris not entitled

to habeas relief on his Ground I claim because he fails to demonstrate prejudice. See

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In cases where counsel fails to convey the government’s plea

offer, a petitioner may establish the requisite prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable

probability” that if he had been notified of the plea offer, he would have accepted it. Jones

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466–67).

In cases where a petitioner “[goes] to trial, [takes] the stand, and steadfastly professe[s] his

[or her] innocence,” courts have frequently held that a petitioner fails to demonstrate a

“reasonable probability” that he or she would have accepted the plea. See Gallo-Vasquez v.

United States, 402 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2005); Jones, 114 F.3d at 1012 (finding it unlikely

that a petitioner would have accepted a plea in light of his “steadfast and unmoving claims

of innocence”). 

Here, Petitioner objects to Judge Anderson’s refusal to credit Petitioner’s own

testimony during the state court’s evidentiary hearing wherein Petitioner indicated that he

would have “absolutely” accepted a plea if one had been offered. (Dkt. # 28 at 11–12.)

Nevertheless, like the Petitioner in Gallo-Vasquez, Petitioner “went to trial, took the stand,

and steadfastly professed his innocense.” See 402 F.3d at 799. Moreover, Petitioner’s

contention that he would have accepted the plea is implausible in light of Petitioner’s own

“steadfast and unmoving claims of innocence.” See Jones, 114 F.3d at 1012. There is no

doubt that Petitioner would prefer a lesser sentence to the one he received; the Court,

however, must look to Petitioner’s statements and beliefs at the time of trial to determine

whether there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have pled guilty. During his

evidentiary hearing on this matter, Petitioner conceded that before trial he never “expressed

a desire to plead guilty;” instead he “expressed a desire to go to trial.” (Dkt. # 20, Ex. EEE,

at 28.)

And, while Petitioner did plead guilty to sexual assault in a subsequent case involving

similar allegations Judge Anderson determined that the latter decision was almost certainly

influenced by his conviction in this case. On post-conviction review, Mr. Saienni testified

that after Petitioner was convicted, he told Petitioner, “that [anything else] that comes down

the pike is going to be consecutive. And we had—they had to bundle them up and plead them

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out. He couldn’t risk going to trial.” (Dkt. # 20, Ex. EEE at 10, 15.) As Judge Anderson

observed, “Rather than supporting a finding that there is [a] reasonable probability that

Petitioner would have entered a plea in this case,” Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty in a

subsequent case “indicatesthat Petitioner, having once been found guilty on similar charges,

chose not to gamble on a jury a second time.” (Dkt # 27 at 21.) 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Failure to Request a Pope Hearing

In his Ground II claim, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a hearing to determine the admissibility of the victim’s prior, allegedly

false, accusations of sexual misconduct in the workplace. (Dkt. # 1 at 6.) Here, Petitioner

claims that Mr. Stephens was ineffective because he failed to “offer of proof or argument that

the false allegations were relevant or material to the victim’s credibility, a necessary

prerequisite to their admission under Arizona law.” (Id.) State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court,

113 Ariz. 22, 24–29, 545 P.2d 946, 948–53 (1976) (holding that evidence of a rape victim’s

“unchastity would be admissible in conjunction with an effort by the defense to show that

the complaining witness has made unsubstantiated charges of rape in the past,” but that

before admitting such evidence a court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the

jury). Judge Anderson rejected this claim because under Strickland, counsel’s performance

was neither deficient nor prejudicial given that Petitioner did not produce any evidence that

the victim had previously made false accusations of sexual misconduct.

A. Counsel’s Performance Was Not Deficient. 

The post-conviction relief court determined that counsel’s performance was not

deficient for failing to request a Pope hearing. (Dkt. # 20, Ex. FFF at 2.) The state court

noted that Mr. Stephens hired an investigator who found no evidence that the victim had

previously made false allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment. (Id.) Similarly, the

state court noted that trial counsel’s failure to request the hearing was not deficient because

Mr. Stephens did not have a good faith basis to request the hearing. (Id.) 

At the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, none of the witnesses

presented any objective evidence supporting Petitioner’s claim that the victim in this case had

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made prior false accusations of sexual misconduct. Mr. Stephens testified that he found “no

evidence whatsoever that the victim . . . had made a false claim regarding a sexual offense

against her.” (Dkt. # 20, Ex. CCC at 26.) Mr. Saienni also testified that he recalled Mr.

Stephens attempting to locate witnesses who would testify that the victim had made “similar

allegations” in the past to show she “had a history of crying wolf,” but could not recall

whether Mr. Stephens had located any witnesses. (Dkt. # 20, Ex. EEE at 17–20.) And while

Petitioner testified that his attorney’s confidence in this case emanated from a belief that the

victim had made similar accusations in the past, Petitioner later admitted that he was not

aware of any affidavits or interview transcripts from witnesses who would substantiate his

accusations against the victim. (Dkt. # 20, Ex. EEE at 35–36.) Petitioner identifies a police

report wherein the victim told police that she had been raped by her uncle; however,

Petitioner presents no evidence that the victim’s accusation of rape against her uncle was

somehow fabricated. (Id.) This evidence supports the state court’s factual finding that there

was no evidence to support a request for a Pope hearing. (Dkt. # 20, Ex. FFF at 2.) These

findings are entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and Petitioner fails in his

Petition and his Objections to present any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence,

that these factual findings are unreasonable. Since there was no basis for Petitioner’s attorney

to request a Pope hearing, Mr. Stephens was not deficient for failing to make such a request.

In his Objections, Petitioner argues that during the evidentiary hearing, the

government stipulated that Mr. Stephen’s failure to request a Pope hearing constituted error

under Strickland’s deficient performance standard. (Dkt. # 28 at 13.) According to Petitioner,

the following exchange transpired sometime during the evidentiary hearing:

State: Your Honor I will stipulate to the error prong, Strickland

error prong, but not the prejudice prong.

The Court: Correct . . . .

PCR Counsel: Your Honor, I guess our position is – both

counsel and myself agree that there was in error her (sic) in this

case. What we disagree on is whether or not there was prejudice.

So we are effectively arguing the second prong of Strickland . . . .

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With respect to Petitioner’s Ground II claim, the Court did locate the following

statement from Petitioner’s counsel during his post-conviction relief proceedings: “I think

we have concurred, or at least consented that there was, there was (sic) error in this case. So

the issue is whether it was prejudicial.” (Dkt. # 26, Ex. CCC at 35.)

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(Id.) The cited portion of the record, however, does not contain this verbal exchange. (See

Dkt. # 20, Ex. CCC at 4–5.) And, upon review of the record, the Court is unable to locate this

dialog anywhere in the evidentiary hearing transcripts.4

 Nevertheless, even assuming the

parties did stipulate that Mr. Stephen’s failure to request a Pope hearing constituted deficient

performance, to the extent that the post-conviction relief court ignored such a stipulation, the

court only committed harmless error because the attorney’s failure to request a Pope hearing

did not prejudice Petitioner under Strickland. 

B. Counsel’s Performance Did Not Prejudice Petitioner’s Defense.

Even assuming counsel was deficient for failing to request a Pope hearing, Petitioner

has not established that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error. To demonstrate

prejudice based on counsel’s failure to request a Pope hearing, Petitioner must establish that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to do so, the court would have

found the victim’s prior accusations relevant and admissible. See Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (holding that in order to demonstrate prejudice when the alleged

deficiency was the failure to challenge the admission of evidence, the petitioner must show

that the challenge would have been meritorious and that there is a “reasonable probability

that the verdict would have been different”); see also United States v. Malone, 484 F.3d 916,

919–20 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing that even if counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress

constituted deficient performance, counsel’s performance was not prejudicial because “there

is nothing . . . that would have compelled the court to grant a motion to suppress even if one

had been filed”). 

In this case, Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that the victim’s prior

allegations of sexual misconduct were false. Hence, Petitioner has failed to show that they

would have been admissible at trial. See Pope, 113 Ariz. at 24–29, 545 P.2d at 948–53.

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Contrary to Petitioner’s averment that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to decide whether

counsel’s failure to request a Pope hearing was prejudicial, (Dkt. # 28 at 13–14), the trial

court has already determined that there was no basis to admit the victim’s prior accusations

since there was no evidence that such accusations were false. Indeed, the state postconviction court specifically determined that Petitioner’s trial counsel conducted an

investigation and had no basis to “represent to the court that the victim had [previously] made

false accusations of sexual assault or rape.” (Dkt. # 20, Ex. FFF at 2.)

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to establish that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner is unable to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his trial

attorney failed to communicate a government plea offer. Additionally, Petitioner has failed

to establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a Pope hearing.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

(1) Charles L. Ryan is substituted as a Respondent to this action in place of Dora

Schriro. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the docket to reflect this substitution.

(1) Judge Anderson’s R & R (Dkt. # 27) is ACCEPTED. 

(2) Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1) is DENIED.

(3) Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

(4) The Clerk fo Court shall TERMINATE this action. 

(5) A certificate of appealability is DENIED with respect to Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. Here, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right

DATED this 2nd day of December, 2009.

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