Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06761/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOSEA BYRD,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHREDNITZ, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 6761 AWI LJO P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS ACTION (Doc. 1.) 

 Hosea Byrd (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action on

December 28, 2004, naming T. Schrednitz, D. Ortiz, J.R. Andrews, D. Tepperman and D.

Maldonado as Defendants. Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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Plaintiff does not clarify what he means by “release date.” The Court presumes Plaintiff means his release

from administrative segregation rather than release from the institution has Plaintiff was still incarcerated at the time

he filed the action. However, should Plaintiff mean release from the institution due to the expiration of his prison

sentence, Plaintiff’s complaint is still not cognizable in a civil rights action. 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that while in a classification committee hearing on July 17, 2003, hearing

officers recommended and ordered that Plaintiff be placed in administrative segregation. 

Plaintiff states that he was in administrative segregation past his “release date.”1 As a result,

Plaintiff states his prison privileges were limited. Plaintiff names T. Schrednitz, D. Ortiz, J.R.

Andrews and D. Tepperman as Defendants. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights have been violated in conjunction with his

placement and retention in Ad-Seg. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being

deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first

establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests

may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,

466-68 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

being confined in the general prison population instead of administrative segregation. See

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. With respect to liberty interests arising from state law, the existence

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of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the

deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by prison

regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff is not entitled to procedural due process protections in a vacuum. In order to be

entitled under federal law to any procedural due process protections, plaintiff must first have a

liberty interest at stake. Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty

interest in remaining free from Ad-Seg. Id.; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th

Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in

freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted);

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the

SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary

incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from

confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not established the

existence of a liberty interest in remaining free from Ad-Seg, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for

relief under section 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process. 

D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief

under section 1983. Further, the Court finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable

of being cured by amendment, and therefore leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed in its entirety.

It is HEREBY ORDERED that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with a copy

of this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and

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serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed

within TEN (10) court days (plus three (3) days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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