Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02088/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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 Defendant was incorrectly named as Atlantis Plastics Injection 1

Molding, Inc. and Atlantis Plastic Films, Inc. but the correct Defendant is

Atlantis Plastics, Inc. (Doc. 5, p. 1, Answer.)

 Plaintiff received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter from the 2

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 8, 2005, and filed the 

present suit on June 3, 2005, within the 90 day time frame. See 

Doc. 1, p. 1, Exhibit A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

PAULA MARY STUHAN PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL NO. 05-2088

ATLANTIS PLASTICS INJECTION 

MOLDING, INCORPORATED, and

ATLANTIS PLASTIC FILMS, INCORPORATED DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer (Atlantis), which 1

alleged she was discriminated on the basis of her gender and age.2

Plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633a et seq. (Doc. 1.) Currently

before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

11), Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 20), Defendant’ s reply (Doc. 22),

and Plaintiff’s sur-reply (Doc. 26). For reasons that follow,

Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and this action

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted.

1. Plaintiff is a female. 

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2. During the time period in question, Plaintiff was employed by

Defendant for approximately four years as a press operator when

she entered into training to become a Mold Technician in late

2004. Plaintiff has continued her employment with Defendant

after reassignment back to the position of Press Operator.

3. Plaintiff was recommended for Mold Technician training by Mark

Linton and Kenneth Tedford. (Doc. 13, p. 2, Brief in Support

of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Doc. 11, Ex. B, King

Decl.; Doc. 11, Ex. C, Linton Decl.) 

4. In December 2004, Defendant conducted a mandatory training

session for all Mold Technicians at an off-plant site.

Plaintiff did not attend the training session. Plaintiff

alleges that she failed to attend the training session because

she was not advised when it would take place, even after she

inquired about it.

5. During Plaintiff’s on-site training Tedford, Plaintiff’s

Supervisor, reported to Randy King, Production Manager, that

Plaintiff’s training was not going well as she was being trained

on the same things over and over and not picking them up. (Doc.

11, Ex. B, King Decl.)

6. Plaintiff alleges that Linton and James Willett (another Mold

Technician who assisted in her training) intentionally did not

train her in the proper procedures. She specifically alleges

that Linton met her with open hostility regarding her gender and

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that he didn’t want to train her. She further alleges that she

complained to Tedford, her supervisor, about Linton’s

attitude(although it does not appear that she complained about

any form of gender discrimination).

7. In January 2005, Tedford recommended to King that Plaintiff be

removed from training. Due to the training problems to include

the failure to attend the off-site training session, King

removed Plaintiff from Mold Technician Training and reassigned

her back as a press operator. (Doc. 11, Ex. B, King Decl.) 

8. Linton trained two males who were unsuccessful in their Mold

Technician training during the same year as Plaintiff’s

training. Linton contends that he trained Plaintiff in the same

manner as all other trainees regardless of gender. (Doc. 11,

Ex. C, Linton Decl.) 

9. Plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination against Defendant

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter

“EEOC”). On March 8, 2005, the EEOC dismissed the complaint as

it could not conclude that the information obtained established

any violations of the statutes.

10. Plaintiff filed the present claim on June 3, 2005, within 90

days of the March 8, 2005 EEOC dismissal and notice of rights.

11. Plaintiff concedes Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on

the issue of age discrimination. (Doc. 20, p. 3.)

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of proof

is on the moving party to set forth the basis of its motion. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The court must view

all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574

(1986). “The non-moving party, however, must still ‘present[]

evidence sufficiently supporting the disputed material facts that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict in [their] favor.’” Pope v.

ESA Services, Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1003-4 (8 Cir. 2005) (quoting th

Gregory v. City of Rogers, Ark., 976 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8 Cir. 1992)). th

Summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to present

evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to an essential

element of her claim. See Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Manuf. & Tech.,

336 F.3d 716 (8 Cir. 2003). The Court must keep in mind, however, th

that summary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment

discrimination cases. See id. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not

contain an exception to discrimination cases, and it is useful in

determining whether a case merits a trial. See Pope, 406 F.3d at

1006 (citing Berg v. Norand Corp. 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8 Cir. 1999). th

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Plaintiff contends that the reason she was not successful in her

training as a Mold Technician was because she was female. Atlantis

denies its decision to remove Plaintiff from Mold Technician training

was motivated by Plaintiff’s gender and contends it made its decision

solely on Plaintiff’s inability to train within a reasonable time and

failure to attend a mandatory off-site training session. 

B. Gender Discrimination

A plaintiff in a Title VII gender discrimination case can

proceed in one of two ways. Russell v. Kansas City, 414 F.3d 863,

866-67 (8 Cir. 2005). When a plaintiff produces direct evidence, th

such as statements by decisionmakers clearly showing that gender was

a motivating factor in the employment decision; or at least

significant circumstantial evidence showing a specific link between

the discriminatory animus and the challenged employment decision, the

burden-shifting standards established by Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins,

490 U.S. 228 (1989) come into play. Simmons v. New Pub. Sch. Dist.

No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8 Cir. 2001). “The Supreme Court th

has defined direct evidence in the negative by stating that it

excludes ‘stray remarks in the workplace,’‘statements by

nondecisionmakers,’ and ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to

the decisional process itself.’” EEOC v. Liberal R-II, 314 F.3d 920,

923 (8 Cir. 2002) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. th

228, 227 (1989)). Once direct evidence exists, “the burden shifts

to the employer to show that it would have reached the same

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 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding statements made by Linton are not 3

consistent with the fact that Linton was the person who recommended her to

train for the Mold Technician position. See Doc. 11, Ex. B, King Decl.;

Ex. C, Linton Decl. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to produce any

evidence besides her own affidavit and deposition, although she has

contended that Linton’s hostility towards her regarding her gender was

open. Plaintiff has also alleged that her training was sabotaged, however,

she has offered no proof other than her own opinion.

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employment decision absent any discrimination.” Id. (additional

citations omitted). In the absence of such evidence, the guidelines

set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) are

applicable. Pope, 406 F.3d at 1006 (additional citations omitted).

Plaintiff contends that she has produced direct evidence of

gender discrimination, specifically statements by Mark Linton, her

trainer, that he did not want to train a female. Therefore, 3

Plaintiff contends the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test is

inappropriate. (Doc. 20, p. 3, Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of

Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.) She argues

that Atlantis failed to argue or prove “that the decision to drop the

Plaintiff from the training program was based on anything other than

the evaluation of her trainer.” (Doc. 26, p. 3, Plaintiff’s Response

to Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s motion for

Summary Judgment.) She concludes her argument by stating that

“Linton was far more of a decision maker in the process than the

Defendant wants to admit.” Id. 

We find that Plaintiff has failed to produce direct evidence of

gender discrimination against her. The only evidence of

discrimination produced by Plaintiff was her allegation that Linton

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Plaintiff states that Atlantis “has not argued nor proved that the 4

decision to drop the Plaintiff from the training program was based on 

anything other than the evaluation of her trainer.” (Doc. 26, p. 3, 

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment.) However, the burden is on the Plaintiff to 

show the existence of direct evidence, i.e., that Linton is a 

decisionmaker or closely involved in the decision process. Prior to a 

showing of direct evidence, no burden has shifted to Atlantis. 

Another way of stating the applicable test is to say that Plaintiff 5

must show that she “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was 

qualified to perform her job; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; 

and (4) was treated differently than similarly situated persons of the 

opposite sex.” LaCroix v. Sears Roebuck, and Co., 240 F.3d 688, 693 (8th 

Cir. 2001). 

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made several comments about not wanting to train a woman. However,

the evidence she asserts as direct evidence were made by the person

assigned to train her as a Mold Technician. There is no evidence

that Linton was a decisionmaker, nor has evidence been produced that

Linton was closely involved in the decision making process.4

Plaintiff failed to produce direct evidence or specific

circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination, and Plaintiff’s

discrimination claims should be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas

standard.

To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in a

failure-to-promote case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a

member of a protected group, (2)she was qualified and applied for a

promotion to an available position; (3) she was rejected; and (4) a

similarly-situated candidate, not part of the protected group, was

hired for the position instead. See Pope, 406 F.3d at 1007 5

(additional citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the

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employer who must “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for the employee’s rejection.” McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140

F.3d 1123 (8 Cir. 1998). If the employer meets this burden, the th

presumption of discrimination fails and the employee must show that

the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is, in reality, a pretext.

Id. “At all times, the burden of persuasion remains with the

plaintiff.” Pope, 406 F.3d at 1007. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was denied the opportunity to

successfully continue her training as a Mold Technician because she

was purposely trained improperly and that males were properly trained

and allowed to successfully complete their training. Plaintiff has

established a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Plaintiff

is a female who entered training and was denied the position of Mold

Technician, and Atlantis accepted another person, a male, to the

training position (a person who successfully completed training and

was employed as a Mold Technician). We next determine whether the

reasons provided by Atlantis for failing to promote Plaintiff are

legitimate and nondiscriminatory.

Atlantis contends that Plaintiff was not promoted and then

returned to her previous position as a press operator was only

because she did not successfully complete training and failed to

attend a mandatory off-site training session. Atlantis concluded

Plaintiff was not qualified to fill the position of Mold Technician.

(Doc. 13, p. 11, Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

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Judgment). The Court finds Atlantis’s reasons for failing to promote

Plaintiff to the position of Mold Technician to be legitimate and

nondiscriminatory as Atlantis chose the person it deemed objectively

more qualified for the position based upon the successful completion

of training and adherence to training requirements. Accordingly, the

burden then shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence that creates a

fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons are mere

pretext and that the failure to promote was an act of intentional

discrimination based on her gender. See McCullough, 140 F.3d 1123;

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 

A plaintiff shows that a reason is pretextual “directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dept. of Cmty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (once Plaintiff establishes

prima facie case of discrimination, burden shifts to employer to

offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action). An

employer’s reason is pretextual when it is a lie - a phony reason

meant to cover up a disallowed reason. Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d

861, 867 (7 Cir. 2005). “Otherwise, an employer’s decision to favor th

one candidate over another can be mistaken, ill-considered or

foolish, but so long as the employer honestly believed those reasons,

pretext has not been shown.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted)

(additional citations omitted).

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 Plaintiff contends that she has adequately provided direct evidence 6

regarding gender discrimination against her. See Doc. 26. Plaintiff 

specifically states that the McDonnell Douglas standard is not 

applicable; therefore “[t]he Plaintiff will not further address the issue 

of pretext.” (Doc. 26, p. 3.) Plaintiff has not presented any facts 

to support a finding of pretext on Atlantis’s part.

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Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to raise a genuine issue

of fact that Atlantis’s reason was pretextual for Plaintiff has

refused to address the issue. See Henthorn v. Capitol Commc’ns, 6

Ins., 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8 Cir. 2004) (mere allegations not th

supported with specific facts are insufficient to establish material

issue of fact and will not withstand summary judgment motion); Smith

v. Allen Health Care Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002)

(whereby the Court found that the plaintiff failed to show that the

defendant’s “justification for the firing was unworthy of

credence.”); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th

Cir. 1995) (employment discrimination laws have not vested in federal

courts authority to review wisdom and fairness of business judgments

made by employers, except to extent those judgments involve

intentional discrimination).

Plaintiff has not shown that her gender played any role in

Atlantis’s failure to promote her (or allow her to continue training

for a position that would have been a promotion) or that she was

treated differently than similarly situated males. Atlantis has

shown that at least two other males were unsuccessful in their

training under Linton during the same relative time frame as

Plaintiff’s training. It appears that Atlantis was aware that she

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was a female at the time that Linton recommended her to train for the

Mold Technician position. Accordingly, Atlantis’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII failure to promote claims is

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Title VII gender discrimination claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Age Discrimination

Plaintiff conceded that Atlantis is entitled to summary judgment

on the issue of age discrimination (Doc. 20, p. 3), and Plaintiff’s

claim of age discrimination is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

D. Harassment

Although Atlantis raises defenses to any alleged harassment of

Plaintiff, Plaintiff states that she has never raised a claim of

harassment against Atlantis. The Complaint (Doc. 1) and additional

filings by Plaintiff do not sustain a harassment claim and the

“Harassment Claim” is considered moot. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Atlantis’s motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 11) is GRANTED. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. A separate judgment will be entered accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29 day of June 2006. th

/S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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