Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00640/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00640-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDERICK LOVE,

Petitioner,

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER,

Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 06cv0640 WQH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1] AND

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING [DOC. NO.

7]

On March 22, 2006, Alfrederick Love, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1]. Petitioner alleges one claim for

relief: The prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude

“all black jurors from the seated panel” and the trial court’s

denial of Love’s motion to set aside the peremptory challenge of

the only African-American juror resulted in a violation of

Petitioner’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Pet. 5.) 

On May 12, 2006, Respondent filed an Answer, which included a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities [doc. no. 5] and a Notice of

Lodgment [doc. no. 6]. On June 20, 2006, Love filed his Traverse

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[doc. no. 7]. Petitioner also filed a Motion for Leave to Insert

Errata on June 22, 2006 [doc. no. 9]. The Court denied Love’s

Motion on July 18, 2006, but notified Love that the page attached

to his Motion will be “considered as page number one of Exhibit A

of his Traverse” [doc. no. 10]. 

After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the

Lodgments, and Petitioner’s Traverse, including the previously

omitted first page of Exhibit A, this Court finds that Love is not

entitled to the relief requested and recommends that his Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED for the reasons outlined below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. According to the Prosecution

On August 27, 2001, a prison riot broke out on the basketball

court in the yard at Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”) where

Petitioner was housed. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 156-58,

171, July 22, 2003.) California Department of Corrections (“CDC”)

Sergeant Kenneth R. Grady was working in the yard that day. (Id.

at 156.) All inmates in the yard were ordered to get down into a

seated position with their legs extended straight out in front of

them. (Id. at 167-69.) 

Love and two other inmates were standing next to a gate near

the basketball court when Sergeant Grady approached them and

ordered them to get down. (Id. at 171-72.) The two inmates next

to Petitioner sat down, but Love remained standing, even after

Grady gave the order a second and third time. (Id. at 173.) Grady

then sprayed Petitioner for three seconds with his oleoresin

capsicum (“O.C.”), or hot pepper, spray. (Id.) 

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Love finally complied with the order. (Id. at 175.) He sat

on the ground and “scooted” from his original spot on the asphalt

to a grassy area. (Id. at 177.) Grady then left Petitioner’s side

so that he could attend to the incident on the basketball court. 

(Id.) 

Approximately five minutes later, Sergeant Grady returned to

handcuff Love and escort him to the shower area for

decontamination. (Id. at 178.) Petitioner was yelling and

screaming at Grady that he did not have to spray him. (Id.) Grady

told Love, “‘Just let me cuff you up and get you to the water

shower area.’” (Id.) Petitioner was sitting on a step near an

emergency exit at that point, and he remained seated while Sergeant

Grady put a plastic handcuff around his left hand. (Id. at 179-

81.) Before Grady could get the other cuff on Love’s right hand,

Petitioner swung around and punched Grady in the left eye with his

free right hand. (Id. at 181, 184.) Petitioner’s fist caught the

sunglasses Sergeant Grady was wearing and caused a cut under

Grady’s left eye that required twenty-two stitches. (Id. at 186-

87.) 

Just before Sergeant Grady walked over to handcuff Love, he

asked Officer Brian K. Walker for assistance. (Id. at 247, 253.) 

Officer Walker was handcuffing someone on the basketball court, and

he agreed to assist Grady as soon as he finished. (Id. at 253.) 

Walker saw Petitioner stand up and punch Grady, so Walker “rushed

over and pushed Sergeant Grady out of the way.” (Id. at 254-55.) 

Love then began throwing punches at Walker, one of which connected

with Walker’s right cheek. (Id. at 255.) Officer Walker sprayed

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Petitioner with O.C. spray and then used his body weight to take

Love to the ground. (Id. at 256.) 

B. According to the Defense

On the morning of August 27, 2001, Petitioner was playing

Scrabble at a picnic table in the yard with inmate Andre Bailey. 

(Id. at 316, 318.) Bailey witnessed the incident between Love and

Sergeant Grady. (Id. at 322.) Bailey saw Grady grab Petitioner’s

arm and pick him up off the ground by the collar of his t-shirt to

handcuff him. (Id. at 323-24, 338-39.) As Love was being

handcuffed, he may have elbowed Sergeant Grady, but he did not

punch him. (Id. at 324.) Bailey saw Grady back up after

Petitioner threw an elbow at him, and then he saw other officers

take Love to the ground. (Id. at 346.) 

According to another inmate, Olymeous Matthews, Petitioner was

already sitting on the ground when an officer sprayed him with O.C.

spray. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 358, 362, July 23,

2003.) Other CDC officers testified that they saw Love strike or

hit Sergeant Grady, but they did not see whether Grady had done

something to Petitioner to injure Love’s hands, wrists, or arms

before Petitioner struck him. (Id. at 426, 436-37, 481, 487-90;

Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 554, 581-86, July 24, 2003.)

C. Jury Selection

Love represented himself during the jury selection process and

at trial. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5, 126, July

17, 2003.) On the first day of the selection process, the trial

judge excused or deferred service for all of the potential jurors

with qualifying hardships. (Id. at 126-63, 170-73.) The judge

then conducted judicial voir dire of the twenty-four remaining

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potential jurors. (Id. at 173-201.) After everyone with hardships

was dismissed, Ms. McGee was the only African-American left in the

jury pool. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 372, July

21, 2003.) The prosecution used its eighth peremptory challenge to

excuse Ms. McGee. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6,

368-69.) 

As soon as peremptory challenges were completed, Love made a

“Wheeler/Batson” objection to her dismissal. (Id. at 371); see

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the

prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to eliminate AfricanAmericans from a jury pool violates the Equal Protection Clause);

People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62,

148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (Cal. 1978) (holding that peremptory

challenges to potential jurors on the basis of “group bias,”

including challenges to jurors on the basis of membership in a

certain racial group, violate the California constitution). 

The court heard brief oral argument from both parties. 

(Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 371-73.) The

prosecutor argued that he excused McGee because she was “a social

worker and an eligibility worker.” (Id. at 371.) Excusing social

workers from jury service was his “personal jury selection”

preference. (Id.) The prosecutor did not believe that social

workers or teachers should sit on the jury because “[t]hey are not

favorable jurors to the prosecution.” (Id.) Love countered:

From my notes, she’s not a teacher and social

worker. The only thing about her background has been law

enforcement, which makes it seem –- conventionally she

would be leaning toward the District Attorney. The only

thing I can see that you would possibly dismiss her for

is that she’s African/American.

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(Id. at 372.)

During voir dire, however, Ms. McGee described herself as an

“eligibility worker.” (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol.

5, 268.) In addition, she disclosed that her brother-in-law is a

correctional officer at Calipatria State Prison, and her sister is

a supervisor in the records section of the Sheriff’s department. 

(Id. at 275.) The prosecutor asked her additional questions about

her contacts and conversations with her sister and brother-in-law. 

(Id. at 291-92.) 

The trial judge overruled Petitioner’s objection and denied

his motion to set aside the prosecution’s peremptory challenge. 

(Id. at 372-73.) He found no pattern of discrimination, which he

believed was required. (Id. at 372.) Furthermore, even if a

pattern were established, the judge decided McGee’s employment

background was a reasonable, nondiscriminatory explanation for

excusing her from jury service. (Id. at 373.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2002, the Imperial County District Attorney

filed an information charging Love with two counts of battery on a

nonconfined person by a prisoner in violation of California Penal

Code section 4501.5 for his attacks against Sergeant Grady and

Officer Walker. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 1C-2.) The

information also alleged the following sentencing enhancements: 

(1) Petitioner committed the charged batteries while confined in

state prison within the meaning of California Penal Code section

1170.1(c); and (2) Love had three prior serious or violent felony

convictions for robbery, see Cal. Penal Code § 211 (West 1999),

which would provide sentencing enhancements under California Penal

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Code sections 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12(a)-(d). (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 1C-2.) 

On July 28, 2003, the jury convicted Petitioner of battery on

Sergeant Grady but acquitted him of the charge of battery on

Officer Walker. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 361-62.) The

jurors found the allegations of three prior felony convictions were

true. (Id. at 365.) 

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on August 11, 2003. 

(Id. at 377.) One of the bases of Love’s motion was the trial

court’s denial of his Wheeler/Batson motion to set aside the

prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of juror McGee. (Id. at 389-90.) 

Love also complained that the trial court excused the only two

other African-Americans from the “petit venire.” (Id. at 390.) In

addition, Petitioner moved to strike his prior convictions. (Id.

at 370.) 

The trial judge denied Love’s motions. (Id. at 415.) The

court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life in prison,

and this term was to run consecutively to the term he was already

serving. (Id.) Love was also ordered to pay a restitution fine of

$200 pursuant to California Penal Code section 1202.4(b). (Id.) 

An additional $200 fine was suspended. (Id.)

Petitioner obtained appellate counsel and filed an appeal on

June 16, 2004, arguing that the denial of his Wheeler motion was in

error and required reversal. (Lodgment No. 2, Appellant’s Opening

Brief at 8, People v. Love, No. D043053 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2,

2005).) The California Court of Appeal affirmed Love’s conviction

on February 2, 2005. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053,

slip op. at 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2005).)

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Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, raising the same Wheeler argument regarding the

prosecutor’s alleged impermissible use of a peremptory challenge. 

(Lodgment No. 6, Petition for Review at 3, People v. Love, No.

S132156 (Cal. Apr. 13, 2005).) The California Supreme Court

summarily denied Love’s petition on April 13, 2005. (Lodgment No.

7, People v. Love, No. S132156, order at 1 (Cal. Apr. 13, 2005).)

Love then filed his federal habeas Petition in this Court on

March 22, 2006 [doc. no. 1], arguing that his Fourteenth Amendment

right to equal protection was violated when the prosecutor used a

peremptory challenge to exclude “all black jurors” and when the

trial court denied Love’s motion to set aside that peremptory

challenge. (Pet. 5.) Respondent Warden Scribner filed an Answer

including a Memorandum of Points and Authorities on May 12, 2006

[doc. no. 5], and Petitioner filed his Traverse on June 20, 2006

[doc. no. 7]. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006), applies to all federal

habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326

(1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Love’s Petition was filed on March 22, 2006,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 2006). 

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed, 512 U.S. at

347; Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990).

An application for habeas corpus relief may not be granted

“unless it appears that –- (A) the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is

an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)

circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect

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the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A)-(B)

(West Supp. 2006). To satisfy exhaustion, a habeas petition must

“‘fairly present’ federal claims to the state courts in order to

give the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon and to correct alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights . . . .’” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971)); see also Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 887

(9th Cir. 1999). To fairly present a federal claim, the petitioner

“must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63

(1996); see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.

2000).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

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under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). A federal court is

not required to review the state court decision de novo. Id.

Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness

analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West Supp. 2006).

//

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IV. DISCUSSION

In his current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Love claims

the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge that resulted in the

exclusion of the only African-American juror, as well as the trial

court’s denial of Love’s motion to set aside the peremptory

challenge, resulted in a violation of Petitioner’s right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Pet. 5.) 

A. Love’s Jury Selection Claim Fails.

Although Petitioner does not cite any cases in his pending

Petition, his Traverse makes it clear that he challenges the

constitutionality of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge based on

the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny. (See Traverse 6-11.) 

The standard for a Batson challenge was restated earlier this

year in the Supreme Court case of Rice v. Collins:

A defendant’s Batson challenge to a peremptory

strike requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial

court must determine whether the defendant has made a

prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a

peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if

the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor

to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the

juror in question. . . . Third, the court must then

determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of

proving purposeful discrimination.

Rice v. Collins, __ U.S. __, __, 126 S. Ct. 969, 973-74 (2006)

(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,

__, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324-25 (2005)). 

1. The First Batson Step Requires A Prima Facie Showing.

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Love’s

petition for review (see Lodgment No. 7, People v. Love, No.

S132156, order at 1), this Court “looks through” that opinion and

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Love cited Batson in his opening appellate brief. (Lodgment No. 2,

Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10-11, People v. Love, No. D043053 (citing Batson,

476 U.S. at 79, 95).) Therefore, although the California Court of Appeal did

not cite or refer to Batson in its opinion, the federal claim was “fairly

presented” to the state court. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365.

13 06cv0640 WQH(RBB)

reviews the “last reasoned” state court decision. Medina v.

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, the last

reasoned decision was by the California Court of Appeal on direct

appeal. (See Lodgment No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053, slip op.

at 1-9.)

In addressing Petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler argument1, the

California appellate court stated: “The prima facie showing

requires the objector to produce evidence showing it is more likely

than not the peremptory challenge, if unexplained, was based on

impermissible group bias.” (Id. at 5 (citation omitted).) Since

that decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected the

California standard as “an inappropriate yardstick by which to

measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case.” Johnson v.

California, 545 U.S. 162, __, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005). 

“Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first

step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to

draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id., 545 U.S.

at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. This is a lesser standard than the one

the California appellate court applied. See Williams v. Runnels,

432 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing id., 545 U.S. at __,

125 S. Ct. at 2416). 

To establish an inference of discrimination solely from

evidence of a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, a criminal

defendant must make the following showing: 

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[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a

cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has

exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire

members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant

is entitled to rely on the fact . . . that peremptory

challenges constitute a jury selection practice that

permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to

discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that

these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an

inference that the prosecutor used that practice to

exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of

their race.

Johnson, 545 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2416-17 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). A pattern of striking jurors of a

particular race or specific comments or questions by the prosecutor

may be other relevant circumstances that support an inference of

discriminatory purpose, but evidence of a pattern is not required. 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d

900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994).

The state appellate court’s holding that there was no prima

facie showing of bias is a factual finding that would normally be

entitled to deference on habeas review. Paulino v. Castro, 371

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). But because

the state court applied the incorrect legal standard in deciding

whether Love stated a prima facie case under Batson, this Court

must review Petitioner’s Batson claim de novo. Williams, 432 F.3d

at 1105 & n.3 (citing and quoting id.). 

Both Love and McGee are African-American. (See Traverse 8.) 

Thus, they are members of the same cognizable racial group. Ms.

McGee was the only African-American potential juror remaining in

the jury pool after two other African-American potential jurors

were excused for hardships. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr.

vol. 6, 371-72.) 

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Mr. Kowalski was the prosecutor originally assigned to

Petitioner’s case, but he became ill during voir dire and was

replaced by Mr. Baker. (Id. at 307, 348.) By the time Baker had

come into the case, seven peremptory challenges had been used by

the prosecution. (Id. at 368.) Baker conducted a brief voir dire

of the remaining jurors, only addressing one juror directly. (Id.

at 364-66.) Ms. McGee was the first juror excused during Baker’s

use of the prosecution’s final four peremptory challenges. (Id. at

369-70.) 

“The ‘Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective

juror for a discriminatory purpose.’” Williams v. Runnels, 432

F.3d at 1107 (quoting Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902). Contrary to

the trial judge’s ruling in Love’s case (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s

Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 372-73), no pattern of discrimination need be

shown. A prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is

established if “(1) the prospective juror is a member of a

‘cognizable racial group,’ (2) the prosecutor used a peremptory

strike to remove the juror, and (3) the totality of the

circumstances raises an inference that the strike was motivated by

race.” Boyd v. Newland, 455 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Both the state trial court and the state appellate court

applied incorrect legal standards in assessing whether Love made a

prima facie case of discriminatory purpose under Batson. The trial

court erroneously held that Petitioner needed to show a pattern of

discrimination. (See Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6,

372-73.) Furthermore, the trial judge did not permit Love to

present evidence that would have allowed the judge to draw an

inference that discrimination had occurred. (See Id. at 371

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(addressing the prosecutor to hear his reasons for striking

McGee).) The appellate court held Love to a higher standard than

required for presenting a prima facie case under Batson. (See

Lodgment No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053, slip op. at 5.) 

Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal’s decision

affirming Petitioner’s conviction did not rest solely on the basis

that Love failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination in

the jury selection process. The state court alternatively held

that even “[a]ssuming Love’s showing satisfied his prima facie

obligation, there is substantial evidence to support the trial

court’s finding the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of Ms.

M[cGee] was not based on an improper group bias.” (Id. at 7.) 

This alternative holding will be examined to determine whether Love

is entitled to habeas relief under AEDPA.

2. This Court Will Review the California Court 

of Appeal’s Alternative Holding De Novo.

In Love’s case, the California Court of Appeal required him to

make a prima facie case with evidence showing that it was “more

likely than not” that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was

based on impermissible group bias. (Lodgment No. 5, People v.

Love, No. D043053, slip op. at 5.) The Supreme Court rejected that

standard as too onerous under Batson. Johnson v. California, 545

U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. Whether Love made a prima facie

showing of bias and can satisfy the other two elements of a Batson

claim must be determined de novo. Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d at

1105 n.3 (quoting Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d at 1090.)

This Court’s evaluation of the three elements of a Batson

challenge mirrors the discussion by the California Court of Appeal.

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The state court did not mention Batson in its alternative holding

affirming Love’s conviction. (See Lodgment No. 5, People v. Love,

No. D043053, slip op. at 7-9.) Nonetheless, its opinion

essentially analyzes the last two steps outlined in Batson. (See

id. (examining whether the prosecutor offered a legitimate raceneutral reason for its challenge and whether the trial court

properly determined the stated reason was genuine).) 

Under the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Johnson v.

California, this Court finds Love’s showing “sufficient to permit

the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has

occurred.” 545 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. McGee was the only

African-American on the panel, and prosecutor Baker used his first

peremptory strike to remove her. See Boyd v. Newland, 455 F.3d at

901. Furthermore, the prosecutor did not follow his personal

preference of striking teachers or social workers; he permitted

three teaching-connected jurors to remain on the jury. (Compare

Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 371, with Lodgment No.

5, People v. Love, D043053, slip op. at 8 n.5.) 

After a prima facie showing of bias, the last two steps of the

Batson inquiry are whether the prosecutor presented “a race-neutral

explanation for striking the juror in question” and whether, after

evaluating the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s stated

justification, “the defendant has carried his burden of proving

purposeful discrimination.” Rice, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at

973-74 (citations omitted). “‘[T]he second step of this process

does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even

plausible’; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory,

it suffices.” Id. 

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The prosecutor stated that his reason for challenging juror

McGee was “that she’s a social worker and eligibility worker.” 

(Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 371.) Prosecutor

Baker explained that it was his personal jury-selection preference

not to allow teachers or social workers to sit on the jury because

“[t]hey are not favorable jurors to the prosecution[,]” and he

noticed from Kowalski’s notes that McGee was an eligibility worker. 

(Id. at 371-72.) 

Petitioner questioned whether Baker had removed all teachers

and social workers from the jury. (Id. at 373.) Neither Baker nor

the trial judge answered that question. (See id.) Instead, the

court found no pattern of discrimination and denied Love’s motion. 

Id. The court added: “[I]f a pattern were established, the

employment background of Ms. McGee . . . would be a reasonable

explanation” for striking her. (Id.)

The racial composition of the jury after the prosecutor’s

challenge of McGee is not part of the record, other than the

challenge eliminated the only African-American potential juror. 

There is no indication from the prosecution’s questions and

statements during voir dire that the decision to strike McGee had

anything to do with race. (See Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented

Tr. vol. 5, 291-92 (Kowalski’s questions to McGee and McGee’s

statement that inmates are “not [in prison] because they want to

be”); Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 364-66 (Baker’s

voir dire).) 

The government’s other peremptory challenges were exercised

against a variety of potential jurors -- the first seven by Mr.

Kowalski, the original prosecutor, and the last four by Mr. Baker,

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his replacement. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5,

261-63, 297-98; Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 369-

70.) One of the jurors struck by Baker has a Hispanic last name;

six of the seven struck by Kowalski have Hispanic last names. 

(Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5, 261-63, 297-98;

Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 369.) 

The questions asked of some of those potential jurors during

voir dire and their responses tend to refute an inference of

racially discriminatory motive, however. (See Lodgment No. 9,

Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5, 207-08 (indicating potential juror

wondered why Petitioner could not get an attorney), 222 (revealing

that potential juror’s ex-husband and father of her children served

time in prison), 226 (showing potential juror’s definition of

beyond a reasonable doubt standard was less favorable to the

prosecution), 241-42 (revealing same potential juror believed selfdefense was the only circumstance in which a correctional officer

should hit an inmate), 252 (indicating a couple of potential jurors

noticed Love was wearing handcuffs), 261 (showing potential juror

believed Petitioner should get “an extra point” for representing

himself), 278-84 (indicating potential juror believed correctional

officers should know physical abuse is likely to be a part of their

job).)

The trial judge’s decision to credit the prosecutor’s raceneutral reason for striking Ms. McGee from the jury was supported

by the record. As the appellate court stated, the supporting

record evidence included “the fact the prosecution also

peremptorily challenged the only other juror whose occupation was

connected to social work. Moreover, the fact the prosecution left

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three persons connected with teaching on the jury does not detract

from the conclusion the prosecution had a genuine antipathy towards

social workers.” (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053,

slip op. at 8.) 

None of the final twelve jurors or the alternate were social

workers. (See Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5, 155

(pharmacy technician), 176 (instructional assistant), 180 (customer

service manager), 268-69 (recent San Diego State University

graduate and team coordinator at General Dynamics); Lodgment No. 9,

Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 351-54 (homemaker, postal worker,

licensed optician, teacher’s aid, school teacher, clerical worker,

and employee of the Calexico School District).) Of the three

peremptory challenges used to strike others from the jury, Baker

used one to strike a potential juror who worked at the Social

Security office. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 5,

176; Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6, 369.) This was

consistent with the reason he gave for striking juror McGee. 

Additionally, Kowalski used one of his peremptory challenges

to strike the only potential juror other than McGee who identified

herself as an eligibility worker. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s

Augmented Tr. vol. 5, 181, 297.) Baker relied on Kowalski’s notes

in striking McGee from the jury. (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented

Tr. vol. 6, 371.) 

At step three of the Batson analysis, Love has the burden of

proving purposeful discrimination. Rice, __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct.

at 974. “[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial

motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the

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strike.” Id. (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 

Petitioner has not carried his burden.

The trial court found that the prosecution provided a

reasonable explanation for striking McGee from the jury and “there

was not a discriminatory motive based upon her membership of the

protective class.” (Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6,

373.) For these reasons, it denied Love’s People v. Wheeler

motion. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal determined that the

trial court’s conclusion was supported by the record. (Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053, slip op. at 8-9.) 

“Since the trial judge’s findings [regarding a discriminatory

motive] largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing

court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.” 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. After conducting a de novo review of

the record and a comparative juror analysis, this Court finds that

Love has not established a Batson violation. See also Boyd v.

Newland, 455 F.3d at 903 (noting the use of comparative juror

analysis). Consequently, the decision by the state court was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Furthermore, the

trial court’s decision to credit the prosecutor’s stated raceneutral reason for striking McGee was not “an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 

See id. § 2254(d)(2). 

For these reasons, Love’s Batson claim does not entitle him to

habeas relief, and his Petition should be DENIED.

//

//

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B. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing.

In his Traverse, Love requests an evidentiary hearing. 

(Traverse 2.) This request may merely have been made in response

to Respondent’s assertion that Petitioner “is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.” (Answer 2, ¶ VI; see Traverse 2 (arguing

that “Petitioner is entitled to said [evidentiary] hearing . . .

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)”).)

When deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate,

the Court’s first task is to determine whether Love failed to

develop the factual basis for his claim in state court. 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). “Under

AEDPA, ‘a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not

established unless there is a lack of diligence, or some greater

fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel.’”

Id. at 670 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000)).

If a petitioner developed the record in state court, the

federal habeas court examines whether an evidentiary hearing is

appropriate or required under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293

(1963). There are six Townsend factors to consider:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved

in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination

is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the

fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was

not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there

is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears

that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313). 

When a Petitioner has developed the factual basis of his claim in

state court and meets one of the Townsend factors, “‘[a]n

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evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition is required

whenever petitioner's allegations, if proved, would entitle him to

relief.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 815 (9th

Cir. 1995)). 

If Love failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in

state court, this Court is precluded from holding an evidentiary

hearing unless he shows the claim relies on either: 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by

the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise

of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). Even after satisfying § 2254(e)(2)

(A)-(B), Petitioner must also “meet one of the Townsend factors and

make colorable allegations that, if proved at an evidentiary

hearing, would entitle him to habeas relief.” Insyxiengmay, 403

F.3d at 670. 

Love takes no position on whether the facts underlying his

claim were developed in state court. (See Traverse 2.) The

factual basis for his Batson challenge, although sparse, was before

the trial judge. (See Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vol. 6,

371-73 (denying Petitioner’s motion).) Furthermore, Love’s claim

that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge in a racially

discriminatory manner was fully developed in the state court record

and considered by the appellate court, even if it was not fully

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articulated in Petitioner’s argument to the trial judge. (See

Lodgment No. 9, Rep.’s Augmented Tr. vols. 5-6; See also Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Love, No. D043053, slip op. 5-8.) 

Nevertheless, a transcript of the jury voir dire and the

exercise of peremptory challenges was part of the appellate record. 

Because the factual basis of Petitioner’s claim was developed in

state court, he must satisfy one of the six Townsend factors to be

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670. 

None of the factors requires a hearing. The merits of Love’s claim

were resolved in the state court -- at both the trial and appellate

levels. As discussed above, the state courts’ resolution of the

factual questions regarding the credibility and genuineness of the

prosecutor’s race-neutral reason is fairly supported by the record. 

Moreover, the fact-finding procedure employed was adequate to give

Love a full and fair hearing; Petitioner has made no allegation of

newly discovered evidence; the material facts were adequately

developed in the state courts; and there is no indication that the

state courts did not provide Love a full and fair hearing. 

Petitioner does not satisfy any of the Townsend factors;

consequently, his request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Love’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus should be DENIED. In addition, Petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the district court and serve a copy on all parties

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on or before October 6, 2006. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before October 23, 2006. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2006

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

All parties of record

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