Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01489/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01489-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH MARIO HERNANDEZ, 1:07-cv-01489-OWW-TAG HC

Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

PETITION SHOULD NOT 

vs. BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 

EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

WARDEN, DUEL VOCATIONAL

INSTITUTION, 

[Doc. 1]

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court has reviewed the petition and finds that it contains claims that have not been

exhausted through the state court remedies. Petitioner contends that he accepted a plea agreement

that resulted in a July 10, 2002 sentence of four years, eight months. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Petitioner

contends he served that sentence but was then placed on three years of parole. (Id. at p. 7). 

Apparently, thereafter, Petitioner’s parole was revoked and he is presently incarcerated. (Id. at p. 8). 

Petitioner contends that he never agreed to the additional three years of parole. (Id.). 

However, it does not appear from the petition that Petitioner has ever presented this claim to

any California court, much less to the California Supreme Court. Nor does Petitioner allege that he

has filed any collateral relief in the state courts raising this issue.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

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exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-366, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888.

The Court must dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains

exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-522, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997).

Here, it appears that Petitioner has never exhausted his claim in the California Supreme

Court regarding the purportedly illegal imposition of a three-year term of parole subsequent to his

original 2002 sentence. Since this is the only claim in the instant petition, it thus appears that the

entire petition is completely unexhausted. 

Petitioner will therefore be ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be dismissed

for failing to exhaust state court remedies. Should it be the case that the claims were exhausted and

Petitioner has simply neglected to inform the Court of that fact, Petitioner should make clear when

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A copy of the California Supreme Court’s denial alone is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion. The proper

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documentation to provide would be a copy of the Petition filed in the California Supreme Court that includes the claim now

presented and a file stamp showing that it was indeed filed in that Court. 

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and in what court the claims were raised. If possible, Petitioner should present to the Court

documentary evidence that the claims were indeed presented to the California Supreme Court.

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Normally, if the petition contains some unexhausted claims, Petitioner will be given the

option to withdraw the unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Anthony v.

Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“habeas litigants must have opportunity to amend their

mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal”). Here,

however, it does not appear to the Court that any claims are exhausted. 

Petitioner may alternatively move to withdraw the entire Petition and return to federal court

only when he has finally exhausted his state court remedies. Petitioner should bear in mind,

however, that there exists a one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas corpus

petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Ford, 305 F.3d at 885-885. In most cases, the one-year period

starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct review. See id. 

Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in

state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal

court. Duncan v. Walker, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

Finally, Petitioner can do nothing and risk dismissal of the entire Petition should the Court

later find that the Petition contains unexhausted claims. 

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of

service of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for failing to exhaust

state court remedies. 

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Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a Recommendation

that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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