Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01371/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIOLET RAMIREZ, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

CITY OF STOCKTON, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:07-cv-01371-OWW-SMS 

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

SUBMIT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER A

CERTIFICATION REGARDING THE

AVERAGE MONTHLY BALANCE AND THE

AVERAGE MONTHLY DEPOSITS IN HER

TRUST ACCOUNT FOR THE SIX MONTHS

PRECEDING THE FILING OF THE

COMPLAINT

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN

THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER (DOC. 1) 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304.

I. Additional Orders regarding Plaintiff’s in Forma

 Pauperis Status

On October 5, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis. However, the Court did not address

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whether an initial partial filing fee would be assessed. Further,

the Court has not yet directed the California Department of

Corrections to collect and forward monthly payments of the filing

fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Review of the application reveals that Plaintiff failed to

comply with the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) in that she failed

to have an authorized officer at the institution where she is

incarcerated certify the average monthly balance in Plaintiff’s

trust account during the six months before the filing of the

complaint on September 19, 2007, and the average of monthly

deposits to Plaintiff’s account during that six-month period.

This information is necessary in order for the Court to determine

what amount of initial partial filing fee to assess. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff will be ordered to file a

certification of an authorized officer as to the average monthly

balance in Plaintiff’s trust account during the six months before

the filing of the complaint on September 19, 2007, and the

average of monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account during that

six-month period. Thereafter, the Court will proceed to assess an

initial partial fee.

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) provides that after the

payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be

required to make monthly payments of twenty per cent of the

preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account; the

agency with custody shall forward payments from the prisoner’s

account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fees are paid. 

Review of Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

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pauperis reveals that Plaintiff had some funds in her account.

Therefore, while awaiting Plaintiff’s submission of the required

information as detailed above, the Court will order Plaintiff’s

custodian to forward payments from Plaintiff’s account to the

clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds

$10.00 until the $350.00 filing fee is paid. 

II. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

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appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id.

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

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The documents are copies of the claim filed by the 1

decedent’s sister with the City of Stockton and the city’s denial

of the claim. These documents appear to be pertinent to the

allegations of the complaint and do not appear to relate to the

application to proceed in forma pauperis. Further, the complaint

expressly refers to Plaintiff’s daughter’s having filed a claim

or complaint, and the City’s denying it. Thus, the Court will

consider the documents as part of the complaint for the purpose

of screening the complaint.

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disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

Plaintiff sues the city of Stockton and Police Officers W.

Grinder and J. Aguilar for compensatory, punitive, and nominal

damages. Plaintiff alleges that in April 2003 they violated her

son’s civil rights while working under color of law by engaging

in a speed chase of a third-party suspect and causing the death

of Plaintiff’s son. Plaintiff submits supporting documents

attached to her application to proceed in forma pauperis .

1

Plaintiff expressly states:

Officer Grinder and Officer Aguilar violated my

sons (sic) civil rights while working under the color

of law by way of a high way speed chase causing a

wrongful death of an innocent citizen. The 

afforementioned (sic) officers violated the Eighth

U.S.C.A. by causation of an indifference that was

deliberate by pursuit of suspects who fatally crashed

into my son’s vehicle whom (sic) was not a suspect but

an innocent victim. The City of Stockton is also

liable on the basis of sufficient policy of deliberate

indifference in training existing.

(Cmplt. at p. 3.)

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim

regarding an alleged violation of her son’s civil rights that

caused his death. 

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A. Plaintiff’s Standing to Assert a Violation of

 Her Deceased Son’s Civil Rights 

Plaintiff is clearly suing for a violation of her son’s

constitutional rights; no mention is made of any violation of

Plaintiff’s own rights.

It is established that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent’s

death, and if state law authorizes a survival action. Tatum v.

City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 n. 2 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) and Moreland v. Las Vegas

Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9 Cir. 1998)). th

Under California law, if an injury giving rise to liability

occurs before a decedent’s death, then the claim passes to the

decedent’s successor in interest. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. P. Code §

377.30). Cal. Civ. P. § 377.30 provides that the claim may be

commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none,

by the decedent’s successor in interest. Section 377.11 provides

that for purposes of the chapter, the successor in interest means

the beneficiary of the decedent’s estate or other successor in

interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular

item of the property that is the subject of a cause of action.

Cal. Civ. P. Code § 377.10 provides that for purposes of the

chapter, a beneficiary of the decedent’s estate means that if the

decedent died leaving a will, the sole beneficiary or all of the

beneficiaries who succeed to a cause of action, under the will;

if the decedent died without leaving a will, the sole person or

all the persons who succeed to a cause of action, or to a

particular item of property that is the subject of the cause of

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action, under section 6401 and 6402 of the Probate Code, or

pursuant to the law of a sister state or foreign nation if that

law governs. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 6401 and 6402 provide in

substance that the intestate succession in California with

respect to separate property is first to the surviving spouse or

domestic partner, or among the spouse and specified family

members; the share not going to a surviving spouse passes first

to surviving issue; but if no surviving issue, then to the

decedent’s parent or parents equally.

The party seeking to bring a survival action bears the

burden of demonstrating that a particular state law authorizes a

survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s

requirements for bringing a survival action. Moreland v. Las

Vagas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9 Cir. th

1998). 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she is the mother of the

decedent; it is also alleged that the decedent had a sister.

(Cmplt. pp. 2, 3.) The complaint does not address whether or not

the decedent left a will or its terms; there are no allegations

concerning whether the decedent left a surviving spouse, domestic

partner, or issue. However, Plaintiff will be given an

opportunity to allege facts showing that she qualifies as a

beneficiary or successor in interest to the decedent. 

B. Civil Rights Claim for Deliberately Indifferent

 High-Speed Chase

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

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Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986).

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 

Plaintiff appears to allude to the Eighth Amendment.

However, it does not appear that the decedent was in custody at

the time of the allegedly wrongful conduct; it was not alleged

that the decedent was detained by law enforcement. The Eighth

Amendment applies only after conviction and sentence, i.e., to

convicted prisoners, and does not apply to pretrial detainees.

Lee v. City of Lost Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9 Cir. 2001); th

Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9 Cir. 1987); Jones th

v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9 Cir. 1986). It thus does not th

appear that the decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated

because the decedent was not seized, arrested, or in custody

simply by virtue of the chase or the collision. County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998).

It is established, however, that one has a substantive due

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process right, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

to be free from clearly arbitrary and unreasonable governmental

action that has no substantial relation to the public health,

safety, morals, or general welfare. See, County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998). The touchstone for a violation

of substantive due process based on executive action is conduct

of a governmental officer that is so egregious and so outrageous

that is may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). However,

in a suit by the parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a

high-speed police chase of a motorcyclist, it was held that no

claim for denial of the passenger’s substantive due process right

to life was stated where there was no intent or purpose to cause

harm, unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest, to suspects

physically or to worsen their legal plight. County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1998). Allegations of

recklessness, gross negligence, or conscious disregard for safety

are insufficient. Id. at 854. This standard has been held to be

applicable even to innocent third persons injured by the suspect

in a high-speed law enforcement chase. Onossian v. Block, 175

F.3d 1169, 1171 (9 Cir. 1999) (where motorists whose vehicle th

was struck by a fleeing suspect sued for violation of their due

process rights, the court held that the officers’ actions did not

shock the conscience). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges only the “causation of an

indifference that was deliberate,” or deliberate indifference;

Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that any harm was

intended. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a

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violation of her son’s rights under § 1983.

D. City of Stockton as a Defendant

Plaintiff sues for damages and has named the City of

Stockton as a defendant. However, Plaintiff does not allege facts

concerning any conduct engaged in by that entity, other than to

state somewhat cryptically that the city was liable “on the basis

of sufficient policy of deliberate indifference in training

existing.” (Cmplt. p. 3.) The Court notes that a local

governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its

employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability; a

municipality could be liable for its own actions in the nature of

policy or customs. See, Bd. of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 403 (1997). However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts

sufficient to describe what the policy or custom was. Thus, the

complaint does not state a claim against the municipality as a

defendant.

E. Officers and City as Defendants

Plaintiff sues the individual officers as well as the city

that employed them. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not stated

whether she is suing the officer defendants in their individual

or official capacities. Plaintiff will have an opportunity to

specify the capacity or capacities in which she sues Defendants

in an amended complaint. 

For the purpose of securing a useful amended complaint, the

Court notes that a suit against a governmental officer in his

official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the

governmental entity itself. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527

(9 Cir. 1996). When officers in their official capacity and the th

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local government entity for whom they work are both named in a

lawsuit, the officers in their official capacity are redundant

defendants and may be dismissed in that capacity. Wisler v. City

of Fresno, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 18666, *19 (E.D.Cal. 2007); Luke

v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp.2d 202, 203-04 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 

III. Amendment of the Complaint 

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim against the defendants and has failed to plead

facts demonstrating jurisdiction in this Court. However, it is

possible that Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent

with the allegations, in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies of

this complaint. Failure to cure the deficiencies will result in

dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id. 

An amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997);

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

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pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at

567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff SHALL FILE a certification of an authorized

officer as to the average monthly balance in Plaintiff’s trust

account during the six months before the filing of the complaint

on September 19, 2007, and the average of monthly deposits to

Plaintiff’s account during that six-month period; and

2) Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED with leave to amend;

and

3) Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of service

of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the

requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended

complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must

be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; failure to file an amended

complaint in accordance with this order will be considered to be

a failure to comply with an order of the Court pursuant to Local

Rule 11-110 and will result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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