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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CHARLES LEWIS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 15-1394 

(D.C. Nos. 1:11-CV-01537-REB and 

1:04-CR-00103-REB-4) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Charles Lewis, a federal prisoner appearing pro se,1

 seeks a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) 

(requiring a COA to appeal an order denying a § 2255 petition). Mr. Lewis also requests 

 

* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Although we liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings, see Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we may not “assume the role of advocate,” Yang v. Archuleta, 

525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. 

Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009), and we do not “fashion . . . arguments for 

him,” United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 25, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 

deny both requests and dismiss this matter.

I. BACKGROUND 

In 2007, Mr. Lewis was convicted of conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, securities 

fraud, and money laundering. He was sentenced to 360 months in prison. At trial, the 

Government presented evidence to show that Mr. Lewis and his coconspirator, Norman 

Schmidt, operated a fraudulent scheme to solicit investments. We affirmed his 

convictions and sentence on direct appeal. United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270 (10th 

Cir. 2010). 

In 2011, Mr. Lewis moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct 

his sentence. He argued ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that 

newly discovered evidence showed he was not knowingly involved in fraud.2

 

The district court ruled that Mr. Lewis’s claims failed on the merits, denied his 

motion, and refused to issue a COA.3

 

2

 The district court understood one of Mr. Lewis’s arguments as challenging the 

sufficiency of the trial evidence for money laundering. We construe this argument to be 

part of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. But if this argument challenges 

only the sufficiency of the evidence, it should have been raised on direct appeal and is 

procedurally barred here. See Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(“[H]abeas proceedings ‘are not available to test the legality of matters which should 

have been raised on direct appeal.’”) (quoting United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 

(10th Cir. 1994)). 

3

 The district court also disposed of several claims as time-barred, denied Mr. 

Lewis’s motion for discovery and to extend time, and denied his motion to amend. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Lewis limits his COA request to two issues. First, he argues that his trial 

counsel’s failure to investigate, interview, and call witnesses at trial deprived him of his 

Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Second, he claims newly discovered 

evidence proves his innocence. 

“The issuance of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from the 

denial of an issue raised in a § 2255 motion.” United States v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 

1241 (10th Cir.2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). To obtain a COA, Mr. Lewis 

must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). He may do so by 

“showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the [motion] should have been 

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (quotations omitted). 

A. Ineffective Assistance Claim 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 movant must show 

(1) constitutionally deficient performance that (2) resulted in prejudice by demonstrating 

“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

case would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 

(1984). If the applicant is unable to show either “deficient performance” or “sufficient 

prejudice,” the claim “necessarily fails.” Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715, 724 (10th 

Cir. 2010). 

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To show sufficient prejudice, the movant must establish that “counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. 

(quotations omitted). “Establishing a reasonable probability of a different outcome 

requires something less than a showing counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not 

altered the outcome in the case. Instead, a reasonable probability is one sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[M]ere speculation is 

not sufficient to satisfy this burden.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 

2011). 

Mr. Lewis argues that his trial counsel should have investigated his deposit of a 

$55,000 check made out to him in August 2002, which formed the basis of his money 

laundering conviction. He contends that counsel should have discovered that (1) Norman 

Schmidt induced him to do this; (2) a real estate attorney and an accountant informed Mr. 

Lewis of the fraud in 2003, prompting him to report the fraud to the office manager of 

Capitol Holdings, LLC, the company founded by Mr. Schmidt; (3) Mr. Lewis told the 

manager to stop all transactions with investors; (4) he tried to set up a meeting with 

others in the company to discuss what he had discovered; and (5) he intended to 

investigate whether the company was truly engaging in fraud. He does not explain why 

he could not have provided much of this information to counsel in the first place. 

Mr. Lewis further contends that a proper investigation would have led to finding 

witnesses who would have supported his theory that he could not have laundered money 

in 2002 because such a crime involves knowing the money is derived from unlawful 

activity. See 18 U.S.C § 1956 (money laundering includes “knowing that the property 

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involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful 

activity”); United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991). Mr. 

Lewis contends he had no knowledge the $55,000 check he deposited in 2002 was 

derived from the fraudulent scheme. 

The district court determined that, assuming defense counsel’s performance was 

deficient, Mr. Lewis failed to show prejudice: 

The conspiracy and fraud offenses which constituted the underlying 

unlawful activity for Count 41 took place between April 1999 and the time 

the check was cleared on August 15, 2002. The record contains ample 

evidence of the long-term involvement of both Mr. Lewis and Capitol 

Holdings, LLC in the conspiracy. The record contains ample evidence of 

the knowing involvement of Mr. Lewis in clearing the check from Capital 

Holdings to Mr. Lewis on August 15, 2002. Further, the record contains 

ample evidence that Mr. Lewis knew these funds were derived from the 

unlawful activity of mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud in which he, 

Capital Holdings, LLC, and others were involved. 

ROA at 410. 

In his appellate brief requesting a COA, Mr. Lewis does not contest the district 

court’s conclusion that there was ample evidence of his involvement in the fraudulent 

scheme before 2002 to support his money laundering conviction. He therefore cannot 

show reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s determination that he failed to 

show prejudice. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. We therefore deny a COA on his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. 

B. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 

“When claiming newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show that due 

diligence on his part could not have revealed the evidence prior to trial and that the 

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evidence would have likely led to a different result.” Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 

250, 253-54 (10th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). 

In district court, Mr. Lewis sought to show he was not involved in the fraudulent 

scheme by producing (1) affidavits from Mr. Schmidt attesting to Mr. Lewis’s innocence 

and (2) affidavits from prisoners acquainted with Mr. Schmidt, stating they heard Mr. 

Schmidt tell them Mr. Lewis is innocent. 

The district court determined that, even if the information in the affidavits could 

be considered newly discovered, Mr. Lewis cannot show the evidence would lead to a 

different result in light of the trial evidence showing Mr. Lewis’s involvement in the 

fraudulent scheme. 

Once again, Mr. Lewis’s brief to this court does not challenge the district court’s 

determination that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the newly procured affidavits 

would not have changed the result of his case. He is therefore unable to show that 

“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the [motion] should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (quotations omitted). We again deny a COA. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

We deny Mr. Lewis’s application for a COA and dismiss this matter. We also 

deny his request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT, 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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