Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01333/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACY STEWART, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1333 DFL GGH P

vs.

KEITH HIGGINS, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $ 6.23 will be assessed by this

order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to

collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the

Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the

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preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be

forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s

account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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The complaint states a colorable claim for relief against defendants Keith Higgins,

Tevin Tiang Trong, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Sgt. Roy Ulatan (sp?) refused to come to plaintiff’s

cell after he had been pepper sprayed by defendant Higgins on July 24, 2005, and when plaintiff

refused to come out to be decontaminated, which he was apparently afraid to do because of

threats made by defendant Higgins. Complaint, p. 9. In this complaint seeking money damages

only, plaintiff rests his allegations against defendant Ulatan on his capacity as building

supervisor. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). Plaintiff’s complaint as to defendant Ulatan will be dismissed but he will be given

leave to amend.

As to defendant Sgt. B. Kukrall, plaintiff alleges that he was aware of the pepper

spraying incident but allowed bed moves wherein plaintiff was moved back in to the cell where

defendant Higgins subjected plaintiff to “mental cruel and unusual punishment.” Complaint, pp.

6, 10. Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to “mental punishment” do not state a claim. 

A prison official has a duty to protect an inmate from harm. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

‘sufficiently serious’ ...For a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the

inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. Second, “[t]o violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause, a prison officials must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ ... [T]hat state of mind

is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. The prison official will be

liable only if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;

the officials must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct.

at 1979. In this case plaintiff alleges only that, as a result of the cell move, he was subjected or

exposed to “mental” harm. 

To the extent that he alleges the form of such harm was exposure to verbal threats

or harassment, verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v.

Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). Even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to

state a claim, because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut

v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, in general, prison officials’ housing and

classification decisions do not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the

protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See

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 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 1

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct.1254, 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494

U.S. 210, 221- 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic

drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

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Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Plaintiff’s claim against defendant

Kukrall will be dismissed but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. 

As to plaintiff’s claims against defendants V. Garcia and S. Shannon, plaintiff

alleges that these individuals did not provide him with a fair hearing on his 602 inmate appeal

because they did not interview defendant C/O Tiang Trong, who claimed to be “permanently ill.” 

Complaint, pp. 9-10. Prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific

prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of

prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison

system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988). See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d

728 (8th Cir. 1991). Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (“[A prison]

grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the

inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment”). Specifically, a failure to process a

grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to

a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those

regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Plaintiff’s due process claims against these defendants will 1

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be dismissed; plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $ 6.23. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against Roy Ulatan; B. Kukrall; S. Shannon; V. Garcia are

dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty

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days from the date of service of this Order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in a

recommendation that these defendants be dismissed from this action.

4. Upon filing an amended complaint or expiration of the time allowed therefor,

the court will make further orders for service of process upon some or all of the defendants.

DATED: 11/7/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

stew1333.b1

 

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