Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-00693/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-00693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

Case No. 4:05CV00693 (DSD)

R.S. McCullough,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Stark Ligon, in his capacity

of Executive Director of

Arkansas Committee on Professional

Conduct, J. Michael Cogbill, in

capacity as Chairman of APCC Panel,

State of Arkansas,

Defendants.

This matter is before the court upon plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief and defendants’ two motions to dismiss. Based

upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for

the reasons stated, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), denies

defendants’ other motion to dismiss as moot and denies plaintiff’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff R.S. McCullough was a licensed attorney in Arkansas.

On December 30, 2004, defendant Stark Ligon, Executive Director of

the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct

(“Committee”), filed a petition for plaintiff’s disbarment. On

February 18, 2005, a panel of the Committee held a hearing on

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 Defendants apparently did not become aware of the lawsuit

until August 8, 2005, because plaintiff had not served them.

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Ligon’s petition. Plaintiff was present and made arguments to the

Committee panel, for which defendant J. Michael Cogbill served as

chairman. When the hearing concluded, the Committee decided to

initiate disbarment proceedings against plaintiff and to suspend

his law license in the interim.

On May 6, 2005, plaintiff filed this action and moved for a

preliminary injunction against the Committee’s February 18, 2005,

decision and against further disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff

claims that defendants Ligon, Cogbill and the State of Arkansas

violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the

Americans with Disabilities Act. Defendants responded to

plaintiff’s motion on August 12, 2005.1 On August 29, 2005,

defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s action pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff failed to respond to

both defendants’ opposition to his motion and their motion for

dismissal. As a result, defendants filed on November 10, 2005, a

supplemental motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure

to prosecute. On November 16, 2005, the court ordered plaintiff to

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 Because plaintiff filed a response, defendants’ motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute is now moot.

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file his response to defendants’ motions by December 1, 2005.

Plaintiff filed a response by December 1.2

DISCUSSION

A complaint may be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if, after taking all facts alleged as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the court finds no possible set of facts under which

plaintiff would be entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6); Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.

1997). Defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint is subject to

dismissal based on sovereign and absolute immunity, the RookerFeldman doctrine, the Younger abstention doctrine, the Colorado

River abstention doctrine and the Pullman abstention doctrine.

Plaintiff summarily disagrees with defendants’ arguments, but does

not set forth any authority to support his position.

The court will first address defendants’ argument concerning

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the doctrine, lower federal

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court

judgments. Prince v. Ark. Bd. of Exam’rs in Psychology, 380 F.3d

337, 340 (8th Cir. 2004). In particular, federal courts cannot

hear cases brought by non-prevailing parties in state court

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proceedings who allege “‘injury caused by the state-court judgment

and seek[] review and rejection of that judgment.’” Mosby v.

Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1526 (2005)). A

decision by the Committee to discipline an attorney “is the

functional equivalent of a state-court judgment.” Id. at 931-32

(citing Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1984)).

Here, plaintiff asks the court to review the Committee’s

decision to impose an interim suspension on his license. However,

this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review that

decision because it amounts to a state court judgment. Therefore,

dismissal is warranted as to plaintiff’s claims concerning the

interim suspension.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks an injunction against his

ongoing disciplinary matter, the Younger abstention doctrine

applies. See Mosby, 418 F.3d at 934 n.3 (abstention doctrine of

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), must be considered if

ongoing attorney disciplinary matter is challenged). Based on

concerns for comity and federalism, the Younger abstention doctrine

provides that a federal court should refrain from enjoining pending

state proceedings in which important state interests are involved.

Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S.

619, 626-27 (1986). Proceedings that involve important state

interests include “lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by

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state ethics committees if the proceedings are within the appellate

jurisdiction of the appropriate State Supreme Court.” Id. at 627

(citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423 (1982)). However, a federal court should not abstain

under Younger if bad faith, harassment or some other extraordinary

circumstance in the state proceedings would make abstention

inappropriate. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437; Aaron v. Target

Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 778-79 (8th Cir. 2004).

Here, it is undisputed that the disciplinary proceedings

against plaintiff were initiated by the Arkansas state ethics

committee and fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the

Arkansas Supreme Court. As a result, the Younger abstention

doctrine applies to plaintiff’s claims. Perhaps relating to a

potential exception to the doctrine, plaintiff summarily alleges

that the disciplinary proceedings are without merit and resulted

from unlawful discrimination, among other things. However, he does

not allege any facts to support the application of a bad faith,

harassment or extraordinary circumstance exception to Younger

abstention. See Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th

Cir. 2004) (when considering motion to dismiss, court may “ignore

legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences

and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations”). Therefore, the court finds that Younger abstention

is appropriate as to plaintiff’s claims against the pending

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disciplinary proceedings. For all of the above reasons,

plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief [Docket No. 2]

is denied.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Docket No. 28] pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted.

3. Defendants’ supplemental motion to dismiss [Docket No.

30] pursuant to Rule 41(b) is denied as moot.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: December 23, 2005

s/David S. Doty 

David S. Doty, Judge

United States District Court

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