Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08067/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael C. Isaacs,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-8067-PCT-EHC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents have filed an Answer (docket # 9) to which

Petitioner has not replied and the deadline in which to do has expired. Respondents assert

that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Alternatively, Respondents assert that

several of Petitioner’s claims should be denied as procedurally barred. As discussed below,

the Court finds the Petition untimely and, therefore, need not reach the exhaustion issue. 

I. Background

On November 5, 1998, Petitioner and William Wesley Duncan were indicted by a

Mohave County Grand Jury for first-degree murder. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 2) On

December 7, 1998, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. (Respondents’

Exh. A at 15) 

On October 19, 1999, Petitioner executed a Stipulated Guilty Plea (“Stipulated Plea”)

pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder. (Respondents’ Exh. A

at 84) The Stipulated Plea notified Petitioner that “SECOND DEGREE MURDER is

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1

 The Honorable Steven F. Conn presided over the proceedings in the Superior Court for

the State of Arizona, Mohave County. (Respondents’ Exh. 3) 

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punishable by a presumptive term of imprisonment of 16 years, which the court may

increase to 22 years or decrease to 10 years, and a fine not to exceed $150,000.00 plus

surcharges and assessments.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 84) The Stipulated Plea further

stated that “defendant will receive a sentence of: JUDGE’S DISCRETION; consistent with

the following additional terms: ALL OTHER TERMS AT THE JUDGE’S DISCRETION.”

(Id.) The Stipulated Plea also provided that “defendant shall not have a right to appeal from

the judgment or sentence imposed as a result of this stipulated guilty plea.” (Id.) 

On October 19, 1999, the Superior Court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea.1

 The

court first advised Petitioner of his rights, the possible penalties, and the terms of his plea

agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 85, 95) Specifically, the trial court advised Petitioner

that:

This offense is punishable by a presumptive or normal sentence of 16 years in 

prison. That could be increased up to as much as 22 years or it could be 

decreased down to as little as 10 years in prison.

* * * 

Now, the plea agreement says that if you plead guilty to Second Degree Murder, 

a Class 1 felony, as charged within count one, that the sentence that you receive

will be at my discretion so, I can give you at little as 10 years in prison or as much 

as 22 years in prison or anywhere in between those two. It will be completely up 

to me to decide where within that 12 year range of sentences your sentence will 

fall. 

(Respondents’ Exh. 3 at 3-4) The court also confirmed that Petitioner had reviewed the plea

agreement, discussed its terms with counsel, and had agreed to its terms voluntarily. (Id. at

8-10) 

On February 4, 2000, the Superior Court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced Petitioner to 22 years in prison. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 108, 111; Exh. 4 at 17-18) During the sentencing hearing, the court

advised Petitioner that it found the following aggravated circumstances: (1) Petitioner acted

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with premeditation; (2) Petitioner had an accomplice; (3) Petitioner’s conduct was heinous

or depraved; (4) Petitioner committed the offense while on felony release; (5) Petitioner had

a prior felony at the time of the commission of the offense; (6) the crime was committed by

Petitioner offering pecuniary gain to another person; (7) the emotional impact on the

victim’s family; and (8) the crime was committed with a firearm. (Respondents’ Exh. 4 at 5-

10) The court also reviewed possible mitigating factors and found that “the aggravating

factors in this case far outweigh the mitigating factors.” (Id. at 10-15, 17-18) 

A. Rule 32 "of-right" Proceeding

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. 

However, he retained his right to seek review in an "of-right proceeding" under Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4. On February 7, 2000,

Petitioner’s trial counsel, Billy Keith Sipe, Jr., filed a motion to withdraw as counsel,

advising the court that he had “prepar[ed] for the defendant a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 113) The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 117) 

On February 8, 2000, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and

Request for Appointment of Counsel in the Superior Court alleging that: (1) he was denied

the “constitutional right to representation by a competent lawyer at every critical stage of the

proceeding,” (2) he was unlawfully induced to enter a plea of guilty or no contest; and (3)

his sentence was “imposed other than in accordance with the sentencing procedures

established by rule or statute.” Petitioner requested a “correction of sentence.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 114) The court appointed Ronald Wood to represent Petitioner

during further proceedings and allowed counsel to file a Supplemental Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 120) 

On October 1, 2001, the court granted Petitioner until December 10, 2001 to file a

petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 133) On December 5, 2001,

Petitioner’s counsel requested an additional extension of time which the court granted

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extending the deadline to February 25, 2002. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 134, 135) On

February 19, 2002, Petitioner’s counsel filed another request for an extension of time

advising the court that he had not yet received a portion of the sentencing transcript. The

court directed the court reporter to prepare the requested sentencing transcript within 60

days and allowed Petitioner 60 days after the filing of that transcript within which to file his

petition. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 136-139) 

On May 29, 2002, the court entered an order finding that the sentencing transcript had

been filed and granting counsel until July 29, 2002 to file a petition. (Respondents’ Exh. A

at 140) On July 29, 2002, Petitioner’s counsel requested an additional 60-day extension in

view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The court

entered an order granting Petitioner until September 27, 2002 to file a petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 141, 142) 

On October 1, 2002, Petitioner’s counsel filed a supplemental petition for postconviction relief challenging Petitioner’s sentence on the following grounds: (1) the trial

court erred in finding that the use of a deadly weapon was an aggravating circumstance; (2)

the trial court erred in finding the crime was committed in a heinous and depraved manner;

and (3) the trial court erred in declining to find that Petitioner’s lack of a prior felony

conviction was a mitigating circumstance. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 143) On October 21,

2002, the court denied relief. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 146) 

Petitioner did not seek review of the Superior Court’s ruling in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. 1) Rather, on November 21, 2002, Petitioner filed a pro se

Motion for Rehearing in the Superior Court. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 147) The court denied

the motion on December 5, 2002 as untimely pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a) and

because it appeared to raise an issue that had not been raised in the petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 148) Petitioner did not appeal the ruling on the

motion for rehearing. (Respondents’ Exh. 1) 

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B. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Several years later, on April 19, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of PostConviction relief and related documents (“second PCR”) claiming that: (1) counsel in his

first post-conviction proceeding was ineffective for failing to raise a claim under Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and for failing to seek review from the court’s denial of his

first petition for post-conviction relief; (2) the Superior Court abused its discretion by

imposing an aggravated sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702; (3) he was entitled to

resentencing under Apprendi and its progeny; and (4) A.R.S. § 13-702 is unconstitutionally

vague as it relates to sentencing aggravation. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 149-152) Petitioner

requested the appointment of counsel. 

On May 6, 2005, the Superior Court issued an order (1) denying Petitioner’s request

for counsel, (2) denying Petitioner’s Apprendi/Blakely claim on grounds that Petitioner’s

conviction was final before Blakely was decided; and (3) holding that although Petitioner

was entitled to effective assistance of counsel in his first post-conviction proceedings, (a)

counsel’s failure to argue in 2002 that Apprendi mandated jury findings of aggravated

factors was not ineffective, and (b) counsel’s failure to appeal the denial of the first Rule 32

petition was not ineffective. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 155) 

On June 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. 2) On June 17, 2005, the court denied the petition as untimely. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 159) Petitioner, however, subsequently filed a motion in the

Superior Court seeking permission to file a delayed petition for review which the court

granted on September 1, 2005. (Respondents’ Exh. A 161) In view of the Superior Court’s

ruling, the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition for review. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 162-

63) Thereafter, on August 14, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for

review. (Respondents’ Exh. 5) Petitioner did not seek further review of the appellate court’s

order. (Respondents’ Exh. 1) 

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C. The Pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, on July 31, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus challenging his sentence. (docket # 1) Respondents assert that the Petition should be

dismissed as untimely. Respondents alternatively argue that several of Petitioner’s claims

are procedurally barred. Petitioner has not filed a reply. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

went into effect drastically altering the time limit imposed on state prisoners filing habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. Before the AEDPA, virtually no time limit restrained the

filing of federal habeas petitions. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283,

1286 (9th Cir. 1997) (Beeler), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061

(1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1377 (1999). The AEDPA established a oneyear period in which to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date of the AEDPA, it

governs this action. 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(D)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)(emphasis added).

A. “Final by Conclusion of Direct Review”

To assess the timeliness of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court

must first determine the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by conclusion

of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In making this determination, it is significant

that by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. 

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A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). Petitioner, however, retained the right to seek review in an “of-right”

proceeding pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4.

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed, as a matter of first impression, the question of

when the conviction of a pleading defendant in Arizona becomes “final by the conclusion of

direct review” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 410,

411 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit held that an “‘of-right proceeding,’available under

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of

‘direct review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).” Id. at 711. The Summers

court explained that “[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review,

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time

for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id.

Under Summers, because Petitioner pleaded guilty, his conviction became final upon

“the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon]

the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 418 F.3d at

711. Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced on February 4, 2000. By virtue of

his plea, the only avenue of “direct” review was a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. Under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, Petitioner had ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence

within which to file a notice of review under Rule 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4(a)(stating

that “[i]n a Rule 32 of-right proceeding the notice must be filed within ninety days after the

entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief

proceeding.”) Petitioner filed a timely notice of Rule 32 review on February 8, 2000. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 114) On October 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 ofright proceeding. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 146) After the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

Rule 32 of-right proceedings, Petitioner had thirty days within which to petition the

appellate court for review. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Petitioner did not seek appellate review

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of the trial court’s October 21, 2002 order dismissing his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

Accordingly, his conviction became final on November 20, 2002, when the time for seeking

review of the denial of his Rule 32 of-right petition expired. Summers, 481 F.3d at 411. 

Accordingly, the AEPDA limitations period commenced on November 20, 2002 and

expired on or about November 20, 2003. Petitioner did not file his pending § 2254 petition

until July 31, 2007. (docket # 1) Accordingly, absent tolling, it is untimely. 

B. Tolling the Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that

a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that an application for collateral review is pending in

State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use

of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to particular post-conviction

proceedings.”) This time period includes the intervals between the disposition of an appeal

or post-conviction petition and the filing of an appeal or successive petition at the next state

appellate level. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. However, the ADEPA limitations period is “not

tolled from the time a final decision issued on a state direct appeal and the time the first state

collateral challenge is filed because there is no case pending during that interval.” Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006. See also, Curtiss v. Mt. Pleasant Correctional Facility, 338 F.3d 851, 854 (8th

Cir. 2003)(no tolling during the time between the completion of direct review and the

initiation of post-conviction proceedings).

As previously stated, the AEDPA limitations period commenced on November 20,

2002 upon the conclusion of Petitioner’s Rule 32-of right proceedings. Petitioner did not

file his second Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief until over two years later, on April

19, 2005. In the interim, the ADEPA limitations period had expired on November 20, 2003. 

Because Petitioner’s second notice of post-conviction review was filed after the limitations

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period expired, it could not toll the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive

‘the limitation period (i.e. restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that

has not yet fully run. Once the limitation period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer

serve to avoid a statute of limitation.’” Johnson v. Galaza, No. C 00-0450 CRB (PR), 2001

WL 125312, * 1(N.D.Ca., Feb. 7, 2001)(quoting Rashia v. Kuhlman, 991 F.Supp.2d 254,

259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). See also, Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003);

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)(noting that application for state

post-conviction relief filed after expiration of AEDPA statute of limitations did not reinitiate

limitations period, even though application was timely.) Thus, the post-conviction

proceedings commenced on April 19, 2005 did not toll the already expired limitations

period. Id. 

Petitioner did not file his pending § 2254 petition until July 31, 2007, over three years

after the AEDPA limitations period expired. (docket # 1) Accordingly, the pending Petition

is untimely absent equitable tolling. 

2. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the § 2244(d) limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon (Beeler), 128

F.3d at 1288. Tolling is appropriate when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see also, Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)(stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”)(citations

omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “When external forces, rather

than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The extraordinary circumstances requirement is a “high hurdle,” see

Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy considerations counsel against equitable

tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). A petitioner seeking equitable

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tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection” between the

extraordinary circumstances and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona

Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir 2007). 

 The circumstances in this case do not support a finding that Petitioner pursued his

rights diligently where his Petition was filed nearly four years after the limitations period

expired. Petitioner allowed 151 days to elapse between his first and second petitions for

post-conviction relief, and allowed an additional 321 days to pass between the conclusion of

his second Rule 32 proceedings and the filing of his pending habeas corpus petition. See,

Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)(noting that “[s]uch a result would be

inconsistent with our previous decisions applying equitable tolling only where ‘external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence account for the failure to file a timely

claim.”). 

Additionally, Petitioner has not offered any extraordinary circumstances which

prevented him from filing a timely petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner’s status as a

prison inmate does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control

warranting the tolling of the one-year limitations period. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217,

1220 (10th Cir. 2000). The ordinary difficulties inherent in prison life do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the AEDPA limitations period. Shannon v.

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that “[e]ach of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state officials

or occasionally, by the petitioner's counsel.”). Likewise, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with

the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient

to toll the limitations period. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that a

pro se prisoner’s illiteracy was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective, external

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factor amounting to “cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas

claim). 

Petitioner has failed to present any circumstances that would justify equitably tolling

the AEDPA statute of limitations. Accordingly, his § 2254 Petition should be denied as

untimely. 

III. Application of AEDPA to Blakely Claim

The Court notes that in Ground IV of the pending petition and in Petitioner’s second

petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner appears to argue that pursuant to Blakely

v.Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations commences on the “date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(C). 

As previously stated, Petitioner’s conviction was final on direct review in 2002. 

Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. The Ninth Circuit has held that Blakely does not

apply retroactively to cases that were final on direct review before Blakely was decided on

June 24, 2004. Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)(holding that Blakely

does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final before that decision was

announced.). Because Blakely does not apply retroactively to Petitioner’s case, §

2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply.

IV. Conclusion

In summary, because the Petition is untimely and Petitioner has not established any

basis for tolling the AEDPA limitations period, the Petition should be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket # 1) be DENIED.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2008.

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