Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02244/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02244-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES ROBERT PECK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL G. BULLARD,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-2244 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

Case 2:15-cv-02244-KJN Document 6 Filed 12/07/15 Page 1 of 4
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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bullard, a public defender not of plaintiff’s choosing, 

engaged in legal malpractice when representing plaintiff in criminal case No. LF011459A in San 

Joaquin County, resulting in plaintiff being convicted and sentenced to 80 years to life in state 

prison.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Claims of negligence by an attorney are not based on federal law and so 

are not cognizable under Section 1983. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 13445 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(claims of legal malpractice not cognizable in federal court). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim that 

defendant Bullard was negligent, even when liberally construed, is not cognizable.

Moreover, even if plaintiff could amend his complaint to assert a violation of his federal 

constitutional right to due process, which guarantees effective assistance of counsel on appeal of a 

state court criminal judgment,1see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985), his claims 

 

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 Plaintiff raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

that was denied on the merits. Peck v. Lizarraga, No. 2:13-cv-1265 JKS (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 

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would still not be cognizable because defendant Bullard is not a state actor. Defendants in state 

court prosecutions cannot generally sue their lawyers under Section 1983 for mistakes in their 

representation. A public defender does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering 

pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, and making closing 

arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); cf. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 

U.S. 81, 84 (2009) (state court erred in ranking assigned counsel essentially as state actors for 

purposes of evaluating speedy trial claim). Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Bullard fall 

squarely within the scope of work that Polk County has determined is not actionable under 

Section 1983, namely alleged errors in the representation of plaintiff in his state court criminal 

proceedings. For this reason, such claims may not proceed in this action.

Finally, the deficiencies in plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured by amendment because 

the deficiencies identified above cannot be remedied by alleging additional facts. Regarding his 

§ 1983 claim, it is a matter of settled law that defendant Bullard, in representing plaintiff in his 

criminal action, is not a state actor, and that legal malpractice claims are not cognizable in federal 

court. Thus, such deficiencies in the complaint cannot be remedied by supplying additional facts 

concerning the quality of defendant’s representation of plaintiff, and the complaint should be 

dismissed. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is 

proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, because plaintiff may seek to bring 

additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a second federal habeas petition, the 

complaint is dismissed without leave to amend, but without prejudice.

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2014). If plaintiff seeks to raise additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims against 

defendant, he must first exhaust his state court remedies as to such claims, and then seek 

authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for filing a second or 

successive federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted solely for the purposes of 

screening his complaint; and

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 

Dated: December 7, 2015

/peck2244.dm

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