Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00518-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER ) 2:05-cv-518-GEB-PAN

RESOURCES, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

POWEREX CORP., a Canadian )

Corporation, dba POWEREX ENERGY )

CORP., and DOES 1 - 100, )

)

 Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”)

moves to remand this action to the Sacramento County Superior Court. 

Defendant Powerex Corp. opposes the motion, contending that federal

question removal jurisdiction exists. Further, Defendant moves to

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes this dismissal motion.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of the California energy crisis of

2000-2001. In January 2001, California Governor Gray Davis authorized

the State of California, through Plaintiff, to purchase electricity to

protect the health, safety, and economic interests of California

citizens and businesses. That same month, the California Legislature

passed legislation charging Plaintiff with the task of procuring

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

energy to provide California consumers with a stable supply of

electricity. See Cal. Water Code §§ 80000-80270. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff entered into numerous energy

transactions with Defendant, a Canadian corporation. Plaintiff’s

complaint alleges that those transactions were the result of duress

and/or undue influence and were contrary to public policy, and seeks

damages for unjust enrichment; rescission; and restitution. Finally,

the complaint seeks “a declaration that all of the transactions

between the parties for the period January 17, 2001 through December

31, 2001, are void and of no force and effect on the grounds that

Plaintiff’s agreements to the terms of each of the transactions was

induced by duress and/or undue influence, and/or that the transactions

were contrary to public policy of the State of California and to the

public interest within the meaning of California Civil Code section

1689.” (Compl. at 14.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff argues that federal question removal jurisdiction

is absent since its complaint “solely challenges the formation of the

individual contracts based on state-law causes of action [and] Powerex

cannot seek removal based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 15.) Plaintiff further contends that

“compelling [it] to move its state-law related case to federal court

would violate the Eleventh Amendment’s provision protecting a state’s

sovereign immunity.” (Id.)

Defendant counters that removal was proper for two

independent reasons: (1) there is federal question jurisdiction under

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825p (“FPA”) and (2) Defendant is a

“foreign state” as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1603, et seq. (“FSIA”). 

A. Standard

Defendant bears the burden of establishing federal removal

jurisdiction, “and the removal statute is strictly construed against

removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167

F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). “The presence or absence of federalquestion [removal] jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only

when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s

properly pleaded complaint. . . . The rule makes the plaintiff the

master of the claim; [Plaintiff] may avoid federal jurisdiction by

exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482

U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act

Plaintiff argues this action must be remanded because its

“well-pleaded Complaint solely challenges the formation of the

individual contracts based on state-law causes of action.” (Pl.’s

Mot. to Remand at 15.) Plaintiff contends that it “challenges the

validity of its individual contracts with Powerex due to duress and

undue influence pursuant to California Civil Code section 1575, and

because the formation of the contracts under such conditions violate

public policy under California Civil Code section 1689(b)(6).” (Id.

at 5.) Further, Plaintiff argues, “because the Complaint does not

rely on any federal law to create the causes of action or to seek

relief, it is clear that the Complaint does not present a federal

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

question. Thus, based on the face of the well-pleaded Complaint,

removal is improper.” (Id.) 

Defendant counters that Plaintiff cannot rely on the wellpleaded complaint rule since Plaintiff’s complaint is “artfully pled”

to avoid federal jurisdiction. “The artful pleading doctrine allows

courts to delve beyond the face of the state court complaint and find

federal question jurisdiction by recharacteriz[ing] a plaintiff’s

state-law claim as a federal claim,” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin.

Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted), under the circumstances “where a

plaintiff articulates an inherently federal claim in state-law terms.” 

Brennan v. S.W. Airlines Co., 134 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“Whether the artful pleading exception to the well-pled complaint rule

applies requires an analysis of whether plaintiff[’s] claims ‘arise

under’ federal law.” In re Cal. Retail Natural Gas & Elec. Antitrust

Litig., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (D. Nev. 2001). “[C]ourts have

used the artful pleading doctrine in: (1) complete preemption cases,

and (2) substantial federal question cases. Subsumed within this

second category are those cases where the claim is necessarily federal

in character, or where the right to relief depends on the resolution

of a substantial, disputed federal question.” Lippitt, 340 F.3d at

1041-42 (internal citations omitted); see also Arco Envtl.

Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Cal. Retail Natural Gas & Elec.

Antitrust Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1058 n.7 (D. Nev. 2001)

(stating that the two exceptions, for claims that are “necessarily

federal in character,” and claims raising a “substantial, disputed

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

1 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s claims are completely

preempted by the Federal Power Act. This issue need not be decided

because of the ruling which follows. 

5

federal question,” often “blend together in the case law.”) “Under

Ninth Circuit law, a case is ‘necessarily federal’ when it falls

within the express terms of a statute granting federal courts

exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.” 

Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161

(S.D. Cal. 2001). “A claim raises a substantial question of federal

law when its resolution requires reference to or interpretation of

federal law." Id.

The Ninth Circuit cautions that the artful pleading doctrine

“should [be] invoke[d] only in limited circumstances as it raises

difficult issues of state and federal relationships and often yields

unsatisfactory results. While the artful pleading doctrine is a

useful procedural sieve to detect traces of federal subject matter

jurisdiction in a particular case, it also has substantive

implications on the scope of federal jurisdiction and efficiency.” 

Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Defendant contends “Plaintiff’s claims for restitution and

unjust enrichment implicate substantial questions of federal law.”1

(Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. at 6.) Defendant argues, “In order to

award Plaintiff restitution for Powerex’s alleged ‘exorbitant prices,’

the state court ‘would be expressly required to assume a hypothetical

rate different from that actually set by [the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)]’ pursuant to the agency’s exclusive

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

authority under the FPA.” (Id. at 6-7 (citing In re Cal. Wholesale

Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2003).) 

Defendant also contends “Plaintiff’s direct challenge to the

reasonableness of the rates charged by Powerex therefore implicates a

substantial disputed question of federal law making removal of the

claims for restitution and unjust enrichment appropriate.” (Def.’s

Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. at 7.) 

Furthermore, Defendant contends “Plaintiff’s claim for

rescission under California Civil Code § 1689(a)(6) for violation of

public policy . . . implicates FERC’s exclusive rate-setting

authority” because “Plaintiff has relied solely on the alleged

unreasonableness of the prices charged by Powerex to justify

rescission.” (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s

claims for duress and undue influence repeatedly challenge the

‘exorbitant prices’ and ‘onerous transaction terms’ in the contract as

the source of [its] injury[; and that resolution of] these claims

‘seems to require the [] court, at some point, to determine the fair

price of the electricity that was delivered under the contract’ [which

is] a determination that is ‘clearly within FERC’s jurisdiction’ and

the plain language of the FPA.” (Id. at 9 (citing Pub. Util. Dist.

No. 1 of Grays Harbor County Wash. v. Idacorp, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 648

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Grays Harbor”).) 

Plaintiff counters that removal was inappropriate under the

artful pleading doctrine because Plaintiff “is not seeking to enforce

compliance of terms of the contracts under any regulation of federal

law.” (Pl.’s Reply at 4.) Rather, Plaintiff contends its “action

simply depends on whether there were defects in contract formation

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

under California law.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues its “requests for

rescission and restitution do not directly implicate substantial

questions of federal law,” and “do[] not require any determination of

the fair price of electricity. . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff contends its

complaint “alleges that the contracts were improperly formed because

of the wide-spread market manipulation in which Powerex had

participated, and which resulted in an unfair bargaining position

among the parties under California law.” (Id.) In support of its

position that removal was improper, Plaintiff cites to Grays Harbor

for the proposition that a complaint that merely alleges contract

formation issues does not necessarily intrude upon the rate-setting

jurisdiction of FERC. (Id. at 4-5 (citing Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at

652).) 

Plaintiff also counters Defendant’s contention that its

restitution claim invokes federal removal jurisdiction, contending

that if Plaintiff succeeds on its state contract formation claims “any

subsequent remedy claim (such as restitution) may involve FERC’s ratesetting jurisdiction [and would therefore be within FERC’s exclusive

jurisdiction] and would be outside the jurisdiction of courts. 

Consequently, . . . [Plaintiff] cannot legitimately assert this claim

in federal court.” (Pl.’s Reply at 5.)

1. Substantial Federal Question

The FPA contains an exclusive jurisdictional provision,

which provides in pertinent part:

The District Courts of the United States . . .

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violation of

this chapter or the rules, regulations, and orders

thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions

at law brought to enforce any liability or duty

created by, or to enjoin any violation of, this

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

chapter or any rule, regulation, or order

thereunder.

16 U.S.C. § 825p. The FPA empowers FERC with “the exclusive authority

to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.” Grays Harbor,

379 F.3d at 647; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824e (Upon a determination by

FERC that “any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed,

charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or

sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule,

regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or

classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or

preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable

rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract

to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by

order.”). 

Plaintiff argues that the FPA is inapplicable to its

contract formation claims, relying principally on Grays Harbor, 379

F.3d at 648, for the proposition that the determination “whether there

was a contract formation problem” could be decided by a court. But

here the allegations underpinning Plaintiff’s claims that the

contracts are not valid allege that Plaintiff’s contracts with

Defendant were the result of duress and undue influence since

Defendant participated in market manipulation and then demanded

exorbitant prices. These allegations can only be resolved by looking

to FERC’s prescribed wholesale rates.

For example, Plaintiff alleges that “Powerex took unfair

advantage of the state of emergency to demand exorbitant prices for

OOM energy and onerous terms in exchanges and in all other

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

transactions between the parties.” (Compl. ¶ 55.) Additionally,

Plaintiff’s basis for rescission of the contracts is the allegation

that Plaintiff suffered substantial harm from the onerous transaction

terms in the contracts. (Id. ¶ 42 (“DWR was compelled to procure OOM

energy and agree to onerous transaction terms dictated by Powerex. 

DWR has suffered substantial harm under the terms of the transactions

with Powerex and seeks to rescind each of the transactions . . . .”).) 

Also, Plaintiff contends the contracts violated public policy since

Plaintiff “had an interest and obligation to furnish reliable

reasonably priced service,” which would require a determination of

what prices were “reasonable.” (Id. ¶ 51 (“The transactions between

Powerex and DWR, if allowed to stand, would prejudice the public

interest and frustrate public policy . . . . DWR had an interest and

obligation to furnish reliable reasonably priced service to California

consumers.”).) (See also id. ¶ 30 (“As a result of the manipulation of

the California energy markets, and through its own participation in

the manipulation of these markets, Powerex was able to demand and

insist on numerous onerous transaction terms, including exorbitant

prices, for energy it sold to DWR.”); ¶ 38 (“The market manipulation

and market gaming created conditions that enabled Powerex to demand

exorbitant prices through duress and undue influence in the

transactions with DWR.”); ¶ 39 (“Powerex used [the knowledge that no

other energy marketers were able to supply DWR with large volumes of

energy on a real-time basis] to demand exorbitant prices . . .”); ¶ 43

(“DWR seeks restitution of . . . benefits unjustly received and

retained by Powerex.”); ¶ 46 (“Powerex took unfair advantage of DWR 

. . . and induced DWR to agree to onerous transaction terms through

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

2 Plaintiff contends that if the state court were to find that 

valid contracts were formed, the case would be at an end, and no

federal law issue would need to be reached; and if the state court

found that the contracts were not valid, the calculation of monetary

relief would be up to FERC, so the state court would not need to

resolve any federal issue. See Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 653. 

However, because of the way Plaintiff elected to draft its complaint,

before a state court could determine whether the contracts were

improperly formed, it would need to decide whether the rates charged

were reasonable, which is within FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.

 

3 Since Plaintiff’s complaint raises a substantial federal

question, Defendant’s arguments regarding complete preemption and

Defendants’ arguments regarding FSIA need not be discussed. 

10

undue influence.”); ¶ 47 (“DWR seeks restitution of . . . benefits

unjustly received and retained by Powerex.”). 

As the Ninth Circuit stated in Grays Harbor, a Plaintiff

“must not require the district court to make a determination as to

what the ‘fair’ rate would have been,” and “may not turn to the

district court for monetary relief” because theories of recovery

rooted in these determinations are within the exclusive jurisdiction

of FERC.2 Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 653. Since the basis for

Plaintiff’s duress, undue influence, and public policy state law

claims is the determination of what constituted a “just and reasonable

rate” for the sales of electrical energy in interstate commerce, it is

evident that Plaintiff’s claims are stated under the guise of

California law but can only be resolved by decision on the federal

question of what is a “just and reasonable rate.” For the stated

reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is artfully pled.3

C. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff argues removal violates the California’s Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

4 Plaintiff asserts that a petition for certiorari challenging

this decision is currently pending before the United States Supreme

Court. (Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 14.) However, the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Dynegy is the current precedent which must be followed.

 

5 Defendant has requested that judicial notice be taken of

several documents which it contends support its dismissal motion. 

(Def.’s Request for Judicial Not. in Opp’n to Mot. to Remand.)

However, this issue need not be reached since Defendant’s motion is

granted without reliance upon any of the requested documents. 

11

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend

to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of

the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” However, in California ex rel.

Lockyer v. Dynegy, 375 F.3d 831, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Dynegy”), the

Ninth Circuit held that “a state that voluntarily brings suit as a

plaintiff in state court cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment when the

defendant seeks removal to a federal court of competent

jurisdiction.”4

Therefore, because there is federal question removal

jurisdiction under the FPA and since the Eleventh Amendment does not

bar removal, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.

II. Motion to Dismiss5

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, contending

that the FPA vests FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale

electricity transactions and that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

field preemption doctrine. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 10-14.) 

Plaintiff counters that this doctrine does not apply because its

common law contract formation action seeks reformation or rescission

of contracts and the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction is not so broad as

to exclude a state common law contract formation action. (Pl.’s Opp’n

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

at 6-10.) 

Defendant contends “Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed

because the FPA grants FERC ‘exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the

transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate

commerce.’” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 10 (citations omitted).) 

Defendant argues that “FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over the field of

wholesale electricity sales preempts Plaintiff’s claims.” (Id. at

11.) Plaintiff counters that its claims are not barred by field

preemption “[b]ecause FERC does not completely occupy the field of

interstate transmission and sale of energy at wholesale, and

particularly because contract formation issues under state common law

are not within the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at

10.) 

“Federal preemption of state law is rooted in the Supremacy

Clause, Article VI, clause 2, of the United States Constitution.”

Transmission Agency of Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918,

928 (9th Cir. 2002). “In the absence of express preemption, federal

law may pre-empt state claims in two ways . . . . Under field

preemption, if Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field,

any state law falling within that field is preempted. Alternatively,

there is conflict preemption: if Congress has not entirely displaced

state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still

pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that

is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law,

or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of

the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Dynegy, 375 F.3d at

849 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine “just and

reasonable” wholesale energy rates. Furthermore, “[T]he interstate

‘transmission’ or ‘sale’ of wholesale energy pursuant to a federal

tariff--not merely the ‘rates’--falls within FERC's exclusive

jurisdiction. States do, of course, have jurisdiction over certain

sales, but we have enunciated a bright-line distinction between

wholesale sales, which fall within FERC's plenary jurisdiction, and

retail sales, over which the states exercise jurisdiction.” Id.

In Grays Harbor, the Plaintiff, Grays Harbor, challenged a

motion to dismiss by contending that its action was not preempted by

the FPA since its action involved only questions of contract

formation. The Ninth Circuit responded to that contention, stating:

Grays Harbor’s arguments ignore the fundamental

thrust of its complaint. In its current form,

Grays Harbor’s complaint seems to require the

district court, at some point, to determine the

fair price of the electricity that was delivered

under the contract. This determination is clearly

within FERC's jurisdiction for determining the

reasonableness of wholesale rates. At the very

least, the requested relief intrudes on an

“identifiable portion" of a field that the federal

government has occupied and addresses a matter

that is “in any way regulated by the federal

government."

It may be true that the district court could

decide simply whether, for instance, there was

duress or mutual mistake such that reformation or

rescission may be appropriate, i.e., whether there

was a contract formation problem. In fact, FERC

has stated that such a determination, by itself,

may be more appropriately resolved in the courts.

But the district court could do no more without

intruding into an area of exclusive FERC

authority. Thus, the situation is analogous to

that in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453

U.S. 571, 580 . . . (1981), where the Supreme

Court held: “the mere fact that respondents

brought th[eir] suit under state law [does] not

rescue it, for when [C]ongress has established an

exclusive form of regulation, there can be no

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

6 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred

because they “conflict with existing FERC proceedings and orders,” and

that they are “barred by the filed-rate doctrine because each of

[Plaintiff’s] claims necessarily and inescapably challenges the

propriety of rates for wholesale sales of electricity made under FERCapproved tariffs.” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 14, 17.) However,

because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by field preemption, these

issues need not be discussed.

14

divided authority over interstate commerce.

Congress here has granted exclusive authority over

rate regulation to the Commission.”

Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 648-49 (internal citations omitted); see

also Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Dynegy Power

Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that because the

plaintiff’s claims “ask[ed] the district court to determine the rates

that ‘would have been achieved in a competitive market’ [and that] is

the same determination as the ‘fair price’ determination that we held

was barred by preemption principles in Grays Harbor, [the plaintiff’s]

claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine, by field preemption, and

by conflict preemption.”).

Since Plaintiff’s claims require the determination of the

fair price of the electricity that was delivered under the contracts,

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by field preemption.6 Therefore,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-00518-GEB -EFB Document 53 Filed 08/23/05 Page 14 of 14