Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03914/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Larry Joe Prince,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-3914-PHX-SRB (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure for further proceedings and a report and recommendation. (Doc. 7) On 

November 6, 20181, Petitioner Larry Joe Prince (“Petitioner”), who was then confined in 

the Arizona State Prison Eyman-Browning STG Unit in Florence, Arizona, electronically 

filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in 

State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) challenging his conviction on August 12, 

2013 in in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. 2011-007328. (Doc. 1)

2

 

1 The Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on November 6, 2018. (Doc. 1 at 1) 

The Petition contains a declaration indicating that Petitioner electronically filed his Petition 

on November 6, 2018 (Id. at 25).

2 Citation to the record indicates documents as displayed in the official Court electronic 

document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No. CV-18-
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Respondents filed their Answer on December 28, 2018. (Doc. 12) Counsel for Petitioner 

entered a notice of appearance on May 3, 2019 (Doc. 24), and filed a motion to extend time 

to file a reply the same day (Doc. 25). The Court granted Petitioner’s motion and extended 

the deadline to May 28, 2019. (Doc. 26) Petitioner did not file a Reply. This matter is 

ripe for decision.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that 

this Court dismiss the Petition with prejudice as untimely and deny a certificate of 

appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictment, Plea Agreement, and Sentencing

On July 27, 2011, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court Case 

No. 2011-007328 on charges of: one count of participating in a criminal street gang (Count 

1); two counts of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs (Counts 2 and 8); and five counts 

of sale or transportation of dangerous drugs (Counts 3, 5, 6, 9, 10). (Doc. 12-1 at 3-7) In 

October 2011, the State amended his indictment to include allegations that: (1) “[t]he 

crimes of all counts charged in the Indictment were committed with the intent to promote, 

further, or assist any criminal conduct by a criminal street gang”; (2) Petitioner had 

committed the offenses charged while released from confinement after his conviction of 

first-degree murder; and (3) he had been convicted of first-degree murder in May 1986 and 

of possession of narcotic drugs in April 1986. (Doc. 12-1 at 9-16)

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement on June 10, 2013, pleading guilty to Count 

2 of the indictment, amended to charge sale or transfer of narcotic drugs, a Class 2 felony. 

(Id. at 18-20) Under the agreement, Petitioner’s sentence was made to run concurrently 

with the “prison sentence imposed” in CR0000-151033, Petitioner’s first-degree murder 

conviction from 1986. (Id. at 18) This was the sole mention in the plea agreement of 

Petitioner’s previous murder conviction and the sentence thereon.

. . .

 

03914-PHX-SRB (DMF).
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Petitioner was sentenced on August 12, 2013, to a greater than presumptive term of 

6 years based on a finding of the aggravating factors of criminal history and that Petitioner 

had been on parole when he committed the offense. (Id. at 58-59)3 At his sentencing 

hearing, the superior court advised Petitioner:

You have a right to petition this Court for post-conviction relief and to have 

a lawyer represent you. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed 

for you. . . . If you want to petition for post-conviction relief, you must do 

so by filing a notice within 90 days of today, otherwise it will be deemed

waived.

(Doc. 12-1 at 60) Moreover, the superior court indicated that Petitioner had signed a 

“Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure” on the day he was sentenced 

which “clearly state[d] that a defendant has a right to petition for post-conviction relief, 

and that the petition must be filed within 90 days.” (Id. at 80)

B. Petitioner’s Sentence and Parole Proceedings in His Previous FirstDegree Murder Case

As noted, at the time of Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in Maricopa County 

Superior Court Case No. 2011-007328, Petitioner had a prior conviction for first-degree 

murder. (Doc. 1 at 190) In its memorandum decision on Petitioner’s appeal of the superior 

court’s orders dismissing Petitioner’s special action complaint and amended petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, discussed below, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that

[Petitioner] was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 

the 1980s. See State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 270 (1989). Our supreme 

court modified his death sentence to a life sentence without possibility of 

parole for 25 years. Id. at 276. After 25 years’ imprisonment, the Arizona 

Board of Executive Clemency (“Board”) granted him parole and he was 

released from prison in 2010.

In April 2011, the Board held a parole hearing to determine whether it should 

revoke [Petitioner’s] parole because he allegedly violated his parole 

conditions by testing positive for drugs and by submitting diluted urine 

 

3 See section I(B), infra.
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samples. The hearing was continued to June 2011, at which time the Board 

revoked his parole.

. . . [On Petitioner’s special action challenging the Board’s revocation of 

parole, the court of appeals determined the Board erred by not providing a 

statement of the reasons for the revocation. The court of appeals remanded 

to the Board to determine whether Petitioner was delinquent pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes section 31-417.]

In October 2013, the Board conducted a hearing on remand and declined to 

revoke Petitioner's parole status. Unbeknownst to the Board, however, 

[Petitioner] had pled guilty to a class 2 felony in August 2013—after our May 

2013 memorandum decision, but before the Board’s October 2013 hearing. 

The Board was also unaware that the Arizona Department of Corrections

(“Department”) had issued and served [Petitioner] with Request for Warrant 

of Arrest # 2013W3260.4[Petitioner] then waived his right to a preliminary 

“recission [sic]/revocation hearing.”

In March 2014, the Board held a revocation hearing; [Petitioner] participated 

telephonically and his attorney appeared in person. [Petitioner] admitted he 

pled guilty to a drug offense and received a six-year sentence. After 

considering the evidence, the Board verbally announced that it found 

[Petitioner] violated conditions of his parole and lapsed into criminal ways. 

The Board therefore unanimously voted to revoke his parole. The Board’s 

written order indicated it was revoking [Petitioner’s] parole based on 

information in warrant number “[20]13W3260.”

(Doc. 1 at 190-191)

C. PCR and State Habeas Proceedings

From June 2014 through September 2018, Petitioner pursued a series of actions for 

post-conviction relief (“PCR”) pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. 2011-007328. Petitioner also 

pursued a petition for habeas corpus relief.

1. PCR action filed in June 2014

Petitioner signed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on June 10, 2014, which the 

 

4 The Arizona Court of Appeals explained that “[w]arrant number 2013W3260 alleged that 

‘[t]he offender pled guilty to one felony count of Sale or Transfer of Narcotic drugs on 

8/12/2013 in a Maricopa County Superior Courtroom where he received a six year sentence 

in the Arizona Department of Corrections.”’ (Doc. 1 at 191)
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superior court filed on June 13, 2014. (Doc. 12-1 at 70-77) Petitioner was not represented 

by counsel and indicated he did not wish the court to appoint him counsel for his PCR 

action. (Id. at 71) He specified that his notice was untimely filed but without fault on his 

part. (Id. at 72) Petitioner stated that his “brief delay” in filing his PCR notice was caused 

because his facility had been under lockdown since February 2014 and “access to research 

materials ha[d] been . . . real slow going.” (Id. at 76)

In the PCR notice, Petitioner argued that the State breached his plea agreement 

when, on October 28, 2013, the parole division of the Arizona Department of Corrections 

requested a warrant for his arrest to revoke parole in his first-degree murder case based on 

evidence obtained while investigating the drug case resulting in his plea agreement. (Id. at 

75) Petitioner noted that his parole was revoked in his first-degree murder case on March 

27, 2014. (Id.) He asserted that he could not have sought PCR relief regarding the alleged 

breach of his plea agreement until there were “grounds for relief,” that is, when his parole 

was revoked on March 27, 2014. (Id. at 76)

The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s notice of PCR on July 

2, 2014. (Id. at 79-80) The court concluded that Petitioner had failed to “state a claim for 

which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id. at 79)

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 1 at 

41-54), which in a memorandum decision dated September 6, 2016, granted review but 

denied relief. (Doc. 12-1 at 82-83) The court of appeals also concluded that Petitioner had 

failed to establish his PCR action was timely, citing Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.4(a), requiring that notice of PCR must be filed within 90 days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence. The court recognized that a petitioner could “avoid preclusion by 

showing, for example” his claim was “based on newly discovered material facts, . . . or a 

significant change in the law, . . . or that he was not at fault for failing to file a timely” 

notice of PCR. (Id. at 82)

The court of appeals then cautioned that

. . .
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Rule 32.2.b also provides, however, that when a defendant claims one of 

these exceptions to preclusion, “the notice of post-conviction relief must set 

forth the substance of the specific exception and the reasons for not raising 

the claim in the previous petition or in a timely manner.” Further, “[i]f the 

specific exception and meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the 

claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or 

in a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily dismissed.” Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2.b.

(Id.) The court of appeals held that the trial court could reasonably conclude the 

information Petitioner submitted to support his late filing was insufficient. (Id. at 83)

The court of appeals also rejected Petitioner’s argument that he had been unable to 

seek post-conviction relief based on a breach of his plea agreement prior to revocation of

parole in his murder conviction case in March 2014. (Id.) The court concluded that 

Petitioner possessed “actual notice of the State’s breach of the alleged agreement not to use 

the investigation against him prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period for filing a 

timely notice of post-conviction relief of right” because the State served Petitioner “with a 

warrant for his arrest on October 28, 2013,” which was within ninety days of the August 

12, 2013, judgment of conviction and sentence. (Id.) The court of appeals additionally 

found that “even if the State’s breach could be deemed to start a new ninety-day period for 

filing a timely notice of post-conviction relief, that ninety-day period would have expired 

in January 2014, months before [Petitioner] filed his untimely notice of post-conviction 

relief in June 2014.” (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the court of appeals’ decision to the Supreme 

Court of Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 55-65) The supreme court summarily denied the petition on 

March 6, 2017. (Id. at 68)

2. PCR action filed in August 2015

Petitioner prepared and signed a subsequent notice of PCR on August 20, 2015, that 

the superior court filed on August 31, 2015. (Doc. 12-1 at 85-89) Petitioner indicated that 

his notice was untimely without fault on his part and that he was actually innocent of the 

drug charge on which he had been convicted. (Id.) Petitioner explained that the drug 
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charge was based on his transfer without remuneration to a paid government informant of 

two 30 milligram oxycodone pills that had been prescribed for Petitioner. (Id. at 88) 

Petitioner contended that his plea was illegal because he pleaded to a violation of Arizona 

Revised Statutes § 13-3408(A)(7), and § 13-3412(A)(7) provided that the provisions of §

13-3408 do not apply to “[p]ersons lawfully in possession or control of controlled 

substances authorized by title 36, chapter 27.” (Id.) Petitioner argued that he could not be 

guilty of violating a statute that did not apply to him, and that he was therefore actually 

innocent. (Id. at 89)

The superior court dismissed the notice of PCR on February 4, 2016, after holding 

the notice was untimely and that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving “by 

clear and convincing evidence that based on the new facts presented, a reasonable fact 

finder could not find the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.” (Id. at 92) 

Addressing the substance of Petitioner’s actual innocence claim, the superior court stated:

Having a prescription for the medication would be a defense if [Petitioner]

had been charged with possession of narcotic drugs under A.R.S. § 13-

3412(A)(7), but he was not. Instead, [Petitioner] was charged and pled guilty 

to one count of sale or transfer of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony. Having a 

prescription is not a defense to this crime. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3412 and 36-

2531(A)(6). [Petitioner] has failed to show any proof, let alone clear and 

convincing proof, that he was not guilty of the underlying offense.

(Id.) Petitioner sought review of the superior court’s dismissal from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id. at 94) In its memorandum decision filed on October 12, 2017, the court of 

appeals granted review but denied relief, finding no abuse of discretion in the superior 

court’s order. (Id.)

3. PCR action filed in November 2016

Petitioner signed another PCR notice on November 15, 2016, which was filed on 

November 22, 2016, and was accompanied by legal argument. (Doc. 12-1 at 96-104) He 

argued that it was a breach of his plea agreement in his 2011 drug case and a violation of 

his constitutional due process protections for the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency 

(“BOEC”) to use his conviction in the drug case to support revocation of parole in his 
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murder conviction. (Id. at 102-104) In its response, the State argued: (1) Petitioner was 

precluded from relief on non-jurisdictional defenses and defects that occurred prior to the 

plea, including deprivations of constitutional rights; (2) his claims that the State breached 

the plea agreement and withheld exculpatory material were waived and meritless; and (3) 

his petition was untimely and successive. (Doc. 12-3 at 108-134)

On September 7, 2017, the superior court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s PCR 

petition, stating it agreed with the State’s arguments in its response. (Doc. 12-3 at 122) 

On petition for review, after reviewing the record, the petition for review, and the superior 

court’s order, the Arizona Court of Appeals found Petitioner had not established that the 

superior court abused its discretion. (Id. at 124) The memorandum decision granting 

review and denying relief was filed on May 15, 2018. (Id.) Petitioner did not file a petition 

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 5)

4. State Petition for Habeas Corpus filed April 6, 2017

On April 6, 2017, through counsel, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 1 at 106-111) Petitioner did not 

argue that his conviction in the 2011 drug case was illegal or the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction, but rather Petitioner requested relief on the ground that he was being held 

beyond the expiration of his sentence in that case. (Doc. 1 at 106) Petitioner argued that 

revocation of his parole status in his murder case by the Arizona Board of Executive 

Clemency (“BOEC”) was contrary to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ order on remand 

addressing necessary findings the BOEC must make when revoking parole in Petitioner’s 

murder case. (Id. at 108-109) Petitioner contended that his sentence in his drug case was 

completed on March 1, 2017, and that his continued confinement pursuant to revocation of 

parole in his murder case was illegal. (Id. at 109-110) At oral argument on the petition for 

habeas corpus, the superior court granted Petitioner’s request to amend the petition. (Id. at 

112) Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 26, 2017. (Id.

at 120-130)

. . .
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The superior court issued a minute entry on June 30, 2017, noting that Petitioner’s 

habeas corpus action and a previous special action proceeding had been consolidated.

(Doc. 1 at 160) The superior court explained that in his 2016 special action proceeding, 

Petitioner sought an order releasing him on parole in his murder case upon competition of 

his sentence in his 2011 drug case, Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. 2011-

007328. (Id.) The court noted it had denied relief in the special action and that Petitioner 

had served his sentence in the 2011 drug case and was being held only on the murder 

conviction. (Id.) The court instructed that “[a]n inmate may use the extraordinary relief 

of habeas corpus to have the court order that the inmate be ‘discharged from custody or 

restraint.’ See A.R.S. § 13-4131. Habeas corpus is not available to an inmate who seeks 

anything short of ‘absolute release.’” (Id. at 161 (citations omitted)) The court found that 

Petitioner did not seek an absolute release, but rather a change in his custody status, that 

is, release on lifetime parole. (Id.) The court denied Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus 

relief and dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s orders denying 

Petitioner’s special action and his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 189-

196)

5. PCR action filed in June 2018

On June 12, 2018, Petitioner signed a PCR notice which the superior court filed on 

June 25, 2018. (Doc. 12-3 at 126-130) Petitioner indicated his notice was untimely and 

asserted the notice qualified for exception under Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure because he was being held in custody after his sentence had expired, and because 

newly-discovered material facts existed that probably would have changed his verdict or 

sentence. (Id. at 127) He again argued that “[p]rior to sentencing I received absolute 

agreement and understanding from the Deputy County Attorney . . . that this cause of action 

would not be used against me by the State of Arizona” in his murder case BOEC 

proceedings. (Id. at 129)

. . .
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The superior court dismissed the notice of PCR. (Id. at 132-134) The court rejected 

Petitioner’s argument that newly-discovered evidence in his case provided grounds under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e) to except the untimeliness of his notice. (Id.) 

The court found that Petitioner’s plea agreement “did not guarantee any particular result 

before the [BOEC].” (Id. at 134) The court further noted that to the extent Petitioner 

claimed relief based on breach of his plea agreement “and alleged promises not contained 

[in the plea agreement] that already were litigated in this case,” such relief was precluded. 

(Id.) The court also held that Petitioner failed to state a claim on which it could grant relief 

as to his argument that he was being held beyond expiration of his sentence as pertinent to 

a Rule 32.1(d) exception to untimeliness. (Id.) The court concluded that Petitioner had 

been “absolutely discharged” from the sentence on his 2011 drug case on July 27, 2017, 

and remained incarcerated only under his murder conviction. (Id.) The court emphasized 

that the availability of parole in his murder case was up to the BOEC in its sole discretion, 

and that Petitioner did not argue the BOEC had found him eligible for parole and had set a 

release date for him. (Id.) The court concluded Petitioner had failed to assert a substantive 

claim and “adequately explain the reasons for [its] timely assertion.” (Id.)

D. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

Petitioner asserts three grounds for relief. Under Ground One, he contends his 

constitutional due process protections were violated when his plea agreement in Maricopa 

County Superior Court Case No. 2011-007328 was breached by the State’s use of his 

conviction in that drug case to revoke parole in his earlier murder case. (Doc. 1 at 7-16)

In Ground Two, Petitioner claims that his guilty plea pursuant to the plea agreement was 

involuntary, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea, he had been 

“misinformed” about the critical elements of the charges, and that he was actually innocent 

of the charges. (Id. at 17-19) In Ground Three, Petitioner argues violations of his due 

process and Sixth Amendment rights when the State suppressed exculpatory evidence. (Id.

at 20-22) Petitioner further asserted an “[u]nderlying [c]laim of [a]ctual [i]nnocence.” (Id.

at 17-20) Petitioner’s claimed actual innocence is based on the argument that Petitioner
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was not advised that “A.R.S. § 3412(A)(7) prohibits prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-

3408(A)(7) when possessing & transferring lawfully possessed Oxycodone.” (Doc. 1 at 

17) This actual innocence argument had been rejected by the state courts in the PCR 

proceedings initiated by Petitioner in August of 2015. (See section I(C)(2), supra.)

Regarding timeliness of the Petition, Petitioner avers:

Simply put, my Rule 32 actions have been continuous and overlapping since 

the breach of plea agreement on March 27, 2014 (First Notice of PCR filed 

6/13/2014). There was no need and I possessed no information that would 

have allowed me to file a proper Rule 32 Notice within 90 days of August 

12, 2013 (judgment and sentence), because I believed in the faith that the 

plea agreement would not be breached and I did not discovery the new 

material evidence of the suppressed recording agreements until I began 

litigating the breach of the plea agreements. Please see §2244(d)(1)(D).

(Doc. 1 at 25).

Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, two of the claims are procedurally 

defaulted, and all of the claims are meritless. (Doc. 12)

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. AEDPA Statute of Limitations

1. The AEDPA limitations period

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)).

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty 
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plea in the Arizona state courts, then the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a 

form of direct review and the conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 of right proceeding concludes or the time for filing such 

expires. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea 

agreement is final on expiration of the time for seeking Rule 32 relief).

Petitioner pleaded guilty, waiving his right to a direct appeal. After Petitioner’s

sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea on August 12, 2013 (Doc. 12-1 at 65), he had 90 days

to file his of right notice of PCR with the superior court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(C).

That 90-day period ran on November 10, 2013. As noted, Petitioner did not file his initial 

notice of PCR until June 2014 (Id. at 70-77), approximately 7 months later. The superior 

court found the notice untimely (Id. at 79-80), a decision upheld on petition for review by 

the court of appeals. (Id. at 82-83)5 The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. 1 at 68)

Under these circumstances, the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations began to run 

the day after his “judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review,” which was November 11, 2013. Thus, 

Petitioner was required to file a federal habeas petition on or before November 10, 2014. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Excluding the day on which 

[the prisoner’s] petition was denied by the Supreme Court, as required by Rule 6(a)’s 

‘anniversary method,’ [AEDPA’s] one-year grace period began to run on June 20, 1997 

 

5 Notably, the court of appeals also rejected Petitioner’s argument that he had been unable 

to seek post-conviction relief based on a breach of his plea agreement prior to revocation 

of parole in his murder conviction case in March 2014. (Doc. 12-1 at 83) The court of 

appeals concluded that Petitioner possessed “actual notice of the State’s breach of the 

alleged agreement not to use the investigation against him prior to the expiration of the 

ninety-day period for filing a timely notice of post-conviction relief of right” because the 

State served Petitioner “with a warrant for his arrest on October 28, 2013,” which was 

within ninety days of the August 12, 2013, judgment of conviction and sentence. (Id.) The 

court of appeals additionally found that “even if the State’s breach could be deemed to start 

a new ninety-day period for filing a timely notice of post-conviction relief, that ninety-day 

period would have expired in January 2014, months before [Petitioner] filed his untimely 

notice of post-conviction relief in June 2014.” (Id.)
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and expired one year later, on June 19, 1998 ... .”). Petitioner did not file the Petition until 

November 6, 2018, making the filing of the Petition untimely by almost four years.

2. Alternate Starting Date for Limitations Period

Under AEDPA, there are four possible starting dates for the beginning of the 

limitations period:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

As discussed above, the Petition is untimely under the starting date identified by

“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner 

cites to no state action “impediment” to filing a timely habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B). Further, Petitioner does not attempt to rely on a new constitutional right 

recently “recognized by the [United States] Supreme Court” and “made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

However, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner appears to argue that he was 

unaware of the factual predicate for his Ground Three claim that the prosecution had 

withheld exculpatory evidence. (Doc. 1 at 25) In Ground Three, Petitioner argues his due 

process and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the State suppressed exculpatory 

evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (Doc. 1 at 20-22) Petitioner 

states that on or about March 9, 2017, he received records from the government from which 

he discovered that the FBI-paid informant to whom he transferred the oxycodone had 
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entered into a consensual recording agreement listing “the twelve persons [the informant]

was consenting to record conversations with[.]” (Id. at 21) Petitioner asserts that his name 

was not on the list. (Id.) Petitioner alleges the prosecution had not disclosed this list to 

him or his counsel before his guilty plea and that the prosecution had represented that it 

possessed consensual recordings to induce him to enter the plea agreement. (Id. at 22) 

However, even assuming Petitioner first learned the factual predicate for his Ground Three 

claim through the exercise of due diligence in March 2017, his AEDPA one-year 

limitations period would have run in March 2018. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner 

did not file his Petition until November 6, 2018, more than seven months later.

Therefore, the Petition, which was filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations ran, is 

time barred unless statutory and/or equitable tolling apply to render such timely or 

Petitioner has made a credible showing of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 327 (1995).

3. Statutory tolling

AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) petition not filed within the state’s required time limit, however, is not “properly 

filed,” and the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling during those proceedings. Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition 

was not “properly filed” under AEDPA’s tolling provision, and reiterating its holding in 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414). A collateral review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery 

and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked 

to Nevada state filing requirements in determining whether habeas petitioner’s PCR

petition was a “properly filed” application that is eligible for tolling). This includes 
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compliance with filing deadlines. An untimely state collateral review petition is not 

“properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that “time limits, no matter their form,

are 'filing' conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it 

was rejected by the state court as untimely). In Arizona, the time between a first and second 

application for post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” 

during that period. See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does 

not reinitiate a limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The reason Petitioner offers for the untimeliness of the Petition is that his state Rule 

32 actions were “continuous and overlapping” after he filed his first PCR action. (Doc. 1 

at 25) Yet Petitioner’s first PCR action was determined to be untimely by the state courts

and provides no basis for statutory tolling. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17 (holding that 

“[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner’s PCR petition as untimely, it was not 

‘properly filed,’ and he was not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”).

Petitioner filed his subsequent PCR actions in August 2015 (Doc. 12-1 at 85-89), 

April 2017 (Id. at 96-104), and June 2018 (Doc. 12-3 at 126-130), and his state habeas 

petition on November 22, 2016 (Doc. 12-1 at 96-104), after the AEDPA statute of 

limitations had expired on November 10, 2014. Once the statute of limitations has run, 

subsequent collateral review petitions do not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Palmateer, 321 F.3d at 823 (“we hold that section 2244(d) does 

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition 

was filed.”). These actions filed after running of the AEDPA limitations period thus had 

no statutory tolling effect.6 Accordingly, absent equitable tolling or a credible showing of 

actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327, the Petition filed on November 6, 

2018 is time-barred.

4. Equitable Tolling

The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

 

6 Further, all of the subsequent PCR actions were held untimely.
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appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). AEDPA’s limitations 

period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 

Id. at 645-46. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent 

permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 

limitations period ‘only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make 

it impossible to file a petition on time.’” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 

1999) (quoting Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), 

abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (citations 

omitted)). Put another way, for equitable tolling to apply, Petitioner must show “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 

stood in his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Holland, 560 

U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). “The diligence required for equitable tolling 

purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is 

highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable 

tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions 

swallow the rule”) (citations and internal emphasis omitted).

A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, 

or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (“[A] pro 

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.”); see also Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV 06-675-PHX-EHC 
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(MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and 

temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). A prisoner’s 

“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of 

those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner does not allege or argue for equitable tolling. After reviewing the record, 

undersigned concludes that neither the Petition nor the record sets forth grounds that justify 

equitable tolling. Because Petitioner has not met his burden of showing extraordinary 

circumstances that made it impossible for him to file a timely petition for habeas corpus 

and he has not shown reasonable diligence, equitable tolling is unavailable.

5. Actual Innocence Exception

If a district court finds that a federal habeas petition is untimely, the untimeliness 

may be excused in rare instances by an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-396 (2013), the Supreme Court 

held that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that applies to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327, and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), extends 

to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 (petitioner 

must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district court 

that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

Petitioner’s actual innocence claim is based on his argument that he was not advised 

that “A.R.S. § 3412(A)(7) prohibits prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7) when 

possessing & transferring lawfully possessed Oxycodone.” (Doc. 1 at 17) He asserts that 

his claims of actual innocence for all the grounds raised in the Petition are based on this 

argument. (Id.) As Respondents indicate, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

Petitioner’s argument as a matter of Arizona law (Doc. 12-1 at 92), a ruling the Arizona 

Court of Appeals upheld (Id. at 94). “[A] state court’s interpretation of state law . . . binds 

a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005).
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Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually 

innocent of his convictions. In addition, Petitioner has not shown that Arizona case law 

issued after his convictions rendered his conduct non-criminal. See Vosgien v. Persson, 

742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014).

Petitioner fails to establish he qualifies for this rare equitable exception to 

untimeliness.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the undersigned finds the Petition is untimely. Because 

the Petition is untimely, undersigned did not reach the other ground(s) discussed by 

Respondents. The undersigned recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be dismissed as untimely and with prejudice. Assuming the recommendations 

herein are followed in the District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be 

on procedural grounds. Under the reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not 

find it debatable whether the District Judge was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent the District Judge adopts this Report and Recommendation 

regarding the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

IV. MOTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF PETITIONER TO THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA FOR THE PENDENCY OF THIS PROCEEDING

On December 9, 2019, through counsel, Petitioner filed a motion for the immediate 

return of Petitioner to the State of Arizona for the pendency of this proceeding. (Doc. 28)

Petitioner cites Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as support 

for the motion. This rule is inapplicable here because this case is still pending in the United 

States District Court and is not on appeal. See Rule 1(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure (“These Rules govern procedure in the United States courts of appeals.”); see 

also Rule 22, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, (regarding certificates of 

appealability). There are federal rules of procedure that apply at this stage. Such rules are 

the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254, and, at the discretion of the 

district court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to the extent that they are not 
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inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.]” Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 12, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. Petitioner has not cited any 

applicable federal rule in support of the motion.

Petitioner also cites A.R.S. §31-472 in support of the motion, but the legal issue 

raised by this statute is beyond the scope of the Petition at issue in this habeas proceeding.

The rule cited by Petitioner does not apply, the legal issue raised by the Arizona 

statute cited is beyond the scope of these habeas proceedings, and the recommendations 

herein are to dismiss the Petition as untimely and deny a certificate of appealability. Thus,

undersigned recommends that the motion (Doc. 28) be denied at this stage of the 

proceedings without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists 

would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion for the immediate return of 

Petitioner to the State of Arizona for the pendency of this proceeding (Doc. 28) be denied

without prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 
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determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 10th day of December, 2019.