Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01425/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Craig Tucker, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

The City of Tempe, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV03-1425-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Doc. #66. Defendant opposes the

motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply. Docs. ##70, 72. 

The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and award fees in the amount of $51,232.50.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is the prevailing party within the meaning of

42 U.S.C. § 12205. Moreover, the Court concludes, in its discretion, that an award of fees

is appropriate in this case. The Court finds the amount of Plaintiff’s fee request to be

reasonable.

Defendant argues that the Court has discretion to deny Plaintiff’s fee request.

Although true, courts have made clear that attorneys’ fees ordinarily should be awarded to

prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 1989). Congress has

authorized the award of fees in order to minimize the burden of redressing civil rights.

Although Plaintiff was not successful on his retaliation and due process claims, he did obtain

redress through the jury’s award of $85,000 in damages for his ADA claim.

Case 2:03-cv-01425-DGC Document 73 Filed 07/12/06 Page 1 of 2
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Plaintiff identifies 12 factors that support an award of fees in this case. Although

Defendant takes issue with each of these factors, the Court does not find Defendant’s

arguments to be persuasive. Defendant appears to criticize Plaintiff’s counsel for failing to

invest sufficient time in this case, but counsel invested sufficient time to prevail at trial.

Defendant argues that some of the time recorded by Plaintiff’s counsel was devoted to other

matters, but Defendant presents no support for this allegation and the Court can find none in

the time sheets submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant notes that Plaintiff failed to

prevail on his retaliation and due process claims, but makes no attempt to show that fees

incurred on these claims were separate or divisible from fees incurred on the ADA claim, and

the Court’s review of counsel’s time sheets suggests that they were not divisible. Defendant

argues that Plaintiff’s fee recovery should be reduced because his counsel sought a seven

figure damages recovery and obtained only $85,000, but Defendant cites no authority for the

proposition that a prevailing party’s otherwise reasonable fee request should be reduced

because the jury did not award everything requested. The Court finds Defendant’s other

arguments equally unavailing.

The Court finds the hourly amount claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel – $275 – to be

reasonable given the skill of Plaintiff’s counsel and the complexity of trying an ADA case.

The Court also concludes that the total amount of fees sought by Plaintiff – $51,232.50 – is

supported by the time sheets submitted in support of Plaintiff’s application and is reasonable

for a case resolved after a five-day jury trial. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. #66)

is granted. Plaintiff is awarded $51,232.50 in attorneys’ fees.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-01425-DGC Document 73 Filed 07/12/06 Page 2 of 2