Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03587/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03587-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-3587

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Chinyere Jenkins, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Kansas City Missouri School District; * Appeal from the United States

American Federation of Teachers; * District Court for the

State Defendants, * Western District of Missouri.

*

Defendants - Appellees, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Missouri Charter Public School *

Association, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 14, 2007

Filed: February 27, 2008 (Corrected: 3/27/2008)

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Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 06-3587 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/27/2008 Entry ID: 3417536
1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

2

We affirm the District Court's Order of June 15, 2006, as amended, in another

opinion issued today, P.A.C.E. v. Kansas City Missouri School District, No. 06-3318.

A detailed history of this action can be found in that opinion.

-2-

This appeal is from a District Court1

 order denying a motion filed by the

Missouri Charter Public School Association ("MCPSA") to intervene in the Kansas

City, Missouri, School District ("KCMSD") desegregation lawsuit. We affirm the

denial of the motion.

The school desegregation lawsuit commenced in 1977 and continued for over

twenty-five years. In 2003, the District Court declared the KCMSD unitary and

entered judgment releasing it from court supervision. On February 22, 2006, certain

parties to the case filed a motion in the District Court seeking the enforcement of

previous orders entered by the courts and of an Agreement between the KCMSD and

the State of Missouri that was incorporated into court orders. After full briefing by

the parties, the District Court exercised its ancillary jurisdiction and granted the

motion on June 15, 2006.2

 On June 23, 2006, the MCPSA moved to intervene in the

lawsuit, either as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or permissively

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). The MCPSA stated that it sought

intervention for "the limited purpose of filing a Motion to Reconsider or Amend the

June 15, 2006 Order of [the District Court] and to present evidence crucial to a just

determination of the issues involved." MCPSA's Suggestions in Support of Its

Expedited Motion to Intervene, Appellant's App. at 60. The District Court denied

intervention on September 11, 2006.

We review the denial of mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) de novo and

the denial of permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) for abuse of discretion. Med.

Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis LLC, 485 F.3d 1006, 1008, 1009 (8th Cir. 2007).

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We reject the MCPSA's argument that the filing of the motion for enforcement

of judgments created a new action. See P.A.C.E. v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., No.

06-3318, slip op. at 9–10, 13–19 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2008) (discussing the District

Court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to enforce previous orders).

-3-

The District Court denied intervention on the basis that the MCPSA lacked Article III

standing, but we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Saulsberry

v. St. Mary's Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003). Because we find the

MCPSA's motion untimely, we affirm the denial of intervention. 

The first requirement of Rule 24 is that motions to intervene be "timely." See

NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973) ("Whether intervention be claimed

of right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial words of both Rule

24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the application must be 'timely.'"). "Among the

considerations that bear on the question of timeliness are how far the litigation had

progressed at the time of the motion for intervention, the prospective intervenor's prior

knowledge of the pending action, the reason for the delay in seeking intervention, and

the likelihood of prejudice to the parties in the action." Arrow v. Gambler's Supply,

Inc., 55 F.3d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1995). Motions for intervention filed after the entry

of judgment should be granted "only upon a strong showing of entitlement and of

justification for failure to request intervention sooner." United States v. Assoc. Milk

Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 116 (8th Cir. 1976). 

The MCPSA sought to intervene nearly thirty years after the filing of suit, three

years after final judgment was entered in the suit, four months after the motion for

enforcement of judgments was filed, and eight days after the District Court entered

judgment on the motion for enforcement of judgments.3

 To be sure, the proceedings

had progressed a considerable distance by this time. Intervention at such a late stage

would have unduly delayed enforcement of the remedy to which the KCMSD was

entitled. The MCPSA acknowledges that it knew about the filing of the motion for

enforcement of judgments. The reason offered by the MCPSA for its delay in seeking

Appellate Case: 06-3587 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/27/2008 Entry ID: 3417536
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intervention is that "it reasonably expected the district court to hold a hearing . . . to

determine the question of jurisdiction before moving on to the merits of the case."

Appellant's Reply Br. at 8. The District Court was under no obligation to hold a

hearing, and we are not sympathetic to the MCPSA's erroneous assumption. For these

reasons we conclude that intervention was properly denied. See Minn. Milk

Producers Assoc. v. Glickman, 153 F.3d 632, 646 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial

of intervention where the district court found it unlikely that the proposed intervenor

did not realize the potential effects of the action on its interests until the "latest

opportunity" and where a party would be prejudiced by having to respond to the

intervenor's arguments), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999); Nevilles v. EEOC, 511

F.2d 303, 306 (8th Cir. 1975) (affirming denial of intervention after entry of judgment

where the proposed intervenors failed to demonstrate that they did not know of the

suit during its pendency). Cf. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota,

989 F.2d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing denial of intervention where discovery

had not yet commenced on date intervention was sought); Liddell v. Caldwell, 546

F.2d 768, 770–01 (8th Cir. 1976) (reversing denial of intervention after approval of

consent decree where, among other things, the consent decree was interlocutory in

nature and did not set forth an overall plan for desegregation and where petitioners did

not learn until the entry of the decree that their interests were no longer being

represented by another party).

The order of the District Court is affirmed.

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