Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00444/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00444-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Vistoso Partners, LLC, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-444-PHX-GMS

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Court held a non-jury trial on the

Plaintiff’s Complaint on December 13, 2011. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

52, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant Vistoso Partners, LLC is an Arizona Limited Liability Company that

was formed in 1993 to purchase a large piece of property, commonly referred to as Rancho

Vistoso, located in Oro Valley, Arizona. Vistoso developed this piece of property into a

master planned community.

2. The taxpayer, Desert Foothills Water Company, was initially incorporated in

the State of Arizona as Rancho Vistoso Water Company in 1979. The company changed its

name to Desert Foothills in 2001. Desert Foothills functioned as a water utility and provided

service to the Rancho Vistoso Master Plan.

3. Vistoso is the sole shareholder of Desert Foothills.

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4. Conley Wolfswinkel is a consultant for both Vistoso and Desert Foothills. He

was responsible for raising money to fund the Rancho Vistoso development and making

financial decisions for both entities.

5. Judy Windisch has been a certified public accountant since 1980 and has been

providing accounting services and accounting oversight of the business enterprises

commonly referred to as “W Holdings,” which include Vistoso and Desert Foothills, since

1982.

6. W Holdings routinely transfer money from one business enterprise to another

as needed, resulting in a receivable on the books of the transferor and a payable on the books

of the transferee.

7. The decisions to transfer money between the W Holdings enterprises are

primarily made by Conley Wolfswinkel.

8. On February 16, 1996, Desert Foothills entered into an asset purchase

agreement with the Town of Oro Valley to sell all of its assets for $10,500,000. The sale

closed on April 30, 1996, and Desert Foothills received net proceeds of $9,281,561.21.

9. The Sale of Assets to the Town of Oro Valley triggered a capital gain for

Desert Foothills for the tax year ending January 31, 1997. Desert Foothills elected to defer

recognition of the capital gain for two years pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1033 on its 1996 Form

1120 U.S. Corporate Income Tax return.

10. In May 1996, Desert Foothills transferred $9,115,000.00 (the “Transfer”) of

the funds it received in the sale of its assets to its sole-shareholder Vistoso. Vistoso

subsequently paid $2,984,611.95 of this amount to various parties to settle liabilities related

to Desert Foothills’ Line Extension Agreements.

11. After the sale, Desert Foothills became inactive, incurring only minimal

expenses.

12. The decision to make the Transfer from Desert Foothills to Vistoso was made

primarily by Conley Wolfswinkel.

13. The Transfer was made via an open advance account between Desert Foothills

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and Vistoso, thereby creating a receivable on the books of Desert Foothillls from Vistoso.

14. For tax year 1996, Desert Foothills included the Transfer as part of a $7,005,445

“Loan to Shareholders” under Schedule L, Line 6 on its form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income

Tax Return.

15. Vistoso has consistently reported the Transfer as an account payable on its

balance sheet since 1996.

16. Desert Foothills and Vistoso did not have any written agreement concerning

the terms or conditions for repayment of the Transfer.

17. The Transfer was not secured by any collateral and had no conditions or terms

for how it was to be repaid or the manner in which it was to be repaid.

18. At no time has Desert Foothills or Rancho Vistoso Water Company ever

demanded repayment of the Transfer.

19. Since 1996, Vistoso has transferred small amounts back to Desert Foothills to

pay various expenses incurred by Desert Foothills. These expenses include: Desert Foothills’

annual corporation commission filing fee, a $50 state income tax fee, and miscellaneous

accounting or legal expenses. When these amounts were repaid, Vistoso reduced the payable

on its balance sheet accordingly.

20. On November 6, 2001, Desert Foothills entered into a stipulated decision in the

United States Tax Court that it owed deficiencies in federal income tax for the taxable years

ending January 31, 1996 and January 31, 1997 in the amounts of $121,806 and $1,817,508

respectively.

21. As a result of the stipulated Tax Court Decision, a duly authorized delegate of

the Secretary of Treasury made federal income tax assessments against Desert Foothills for

its 1996 and 1997 taxes.

22. On November 17, 2006, the Internal Revenue Service sent Desert Foothills a

letter entitled “Final Notice: Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a

Hearing.”

23. On November 20, 2006, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien relating to the tax

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assessments against Desert Foothills was filed and recorded with the Secretary of State’s

Office in Phoenix, Arizona.

24. On November 28, 2008, the Internal Revenue Service issued and served upon

Vistoso a Notice of Levy (Form 668-A) notifying it that Desert Foothills owed over $5

million in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties, and that Vistoso was required to surrender to

the IRS any “property or rights to property (such as money, credits and bank deposits) that

you have or which you are already obligated to pay” Desert Foothills. The Notice of Levy

also instructed Vistoso that if it did not owe any money to Desert Foothills, it was to

complete “the back of Part 3” of the levy document and mail that part back to the IRS. The

back of Part 3 instructed Vistoso to state the next date upon which it would owe funds to

Desert Foothills and any “[o]ther information you believe may help us.” 

25. S. Ross, who worked as a receptionist for Vistoso, signed for receipt of the

Notice of Levy.

26. At the time the Notice of Levy was served, Desert Foothills owed

$5,772,393.10 in tax, penalties, and interest for its 1996 and 1997 tax liabilities.

27. At the time the Notice of Levy was served, Vistoso had the account payable

to Desert Foothills listed on its balance sheet. The account payable to Desert Foothills was

only reported as $4,271,021 on Vistoso’s balance sheet for the period ending December 31,

2008. This amount, however, reflects the net of the payable to Desert Foothills, Vistoso’s

$2,715,324 basis in Desert Foothills’ stock, and small expenses Vistoso paid on Desert

Foothills’ behalf. The account payable to Desert Foothills was also reported on Vistoso’s

Consolidated Balance Sheet for the period ending December 31, 2009, as part of a

consolidated receivable/payable entry in the amount of $6,986,013.

28. At the time the Notice of Levy was served, Desert Foothills reported the

Transfer as an account receivable on its books. On its tax return for the tax year ending

January 31, 2008, Desert Foothills reported the Transfer as part of a $6,990,898 “Loan to

Shareholders” under Schedule L, Line 6.

29. As of December 31, 2008, Vistoso’s balance sheet reported total outstanding

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secured debts of $37,764,617 and total assets of $30,919,273.

30. On January 15, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service issued and served upon

Vistoso a Final Demand for Payment (Form 668-C). This Final Demand instructed Vistoso

that “[i]f you don’t pay within 5 days, we will consider you to have refused our demand and

we may then enforce Code Section 6332.”

31. Autumn Ahland, who at the time was an assistant to Judy Windisch, signed for

receipt of the Final Demand.

32. Vistoso did not respond to Notice of Levy or Final Demand for Payment.

33. Vistoso’s main assets are land holdings. During the time period of November

2008 through January 2009, Vistoso owned a 5.7 acre parcel of property free and clear of any

liens. Vistoso’s other land holdings were encumbered.

34. As of December 31, 2008, Vistoso had on hand $142,375 of unrestricted cash.

35. In 2008, Vistoso paid $8,568,752 in cash for general and administrative

expenses.

36. In 2009, Vistoso paid $1,020,190 in cash for general and administrative

expenses.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Plaintiff brings two causes of action. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant

Vistoso is liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1) (2006) for failure to honor a levy. Second,

Plaintiff claims that Defendant is liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(2) for failure to honor a

levy “without reasonable cause” for such failure.

2. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1), an entity which fails to comply with a levy upon

demand by the IRS becomes personally liable to the U.S.:

Any person who fails or refuses to surrender any property or

rights to property, subject to levy, upon demand by the

Secretary, shall be liable in his own person and estate to the

United States in a sum equal to the value of the property or

rights not so surrendered, . . . together with costs and interest on

such sum. 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1) (emphasis added).

3. As the Court held in its June 6, 2011 Order, when Plaintiff levied Desert

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Foothills’ account receivable it acquired Desert Foothills’ right to repayment from

Defendant. (Doc. 48 at 7). Defendant’s debt to Desert Foothills, however, was greater than

the $5,772,393 Desert Foothills owed Plaintiff. Therefore Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff

under § 6332(d)(1) is capped at $5,772,393 plus any additional “costs and interest on such

sum.”

4. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s right to repayment has not yet matured

because there were no terms or conditions of repayment for the loan. Where there is no due

date on a loan, however, a debtor is obligated to immediately pay back the full amount of the

debt upon the lender’s demand. See Matter of Estate of Musgrove, 144 Ariz. 168, 171, 696

P.2d 720, 723 (App. 1985) (adopting the “majority position” that where an oral loan

agreement is silent as to time of repayment, the loan is “repayable upon demand”); In re Bell

& Beckwith, 50 B.R. 419, 421–22 (Bk. Ohio 1985) (holding that an oral loan agreement with

no due date is payable on demand because otherwise a debtor “could interminably forestall

ever having to satisfy [its] obligation”). Plaintiff therefore had the right to immediately

collect the account receivable it levied.

5. Defendant also contends that the applicable “value” of Plaintiff’s right to

repayment is the amount Defendant would have been able to pay Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff

issued the Notice of Levy. To support this argument, Defendant cites U.S. v. Bailey, a First

Circuit case. 707 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1983). In Bailey, the defendant failed to release stock

certificates on which the government had issued a tax levy. Bailey, 707 F.2d at 21. At the

time of the ensuing litigation, those stock certificates were worthless. Id. The court held,

however, that the defendant was liable to the government for the “value” of the stock as of

the time the levy was issued. Id. at 22. Unlike the parties in Bailey, however, the Parties in

this case do not dispute the book value of the taxpayer’s property at the time of levy; both

Defendant and Plaintiff agree that the amount Defendant owed Desert Foothills was greater

than the levied amount. Whether or not Defendant would have been able to pay that amount

upon demand by Desert Foothills is not a matter or liability, but of collectibility.

6. In sum, by failing to respond to either the Notice of Levy or Demand Letter and

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surrender payment on the loan, Defendant failed to surrender rights to property. Defendant

is therefore liable “in [its] own person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the

value of the . . . rights not so surrendered.” 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1). In other words,

Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for $5,772,393 plus any additional “costs and interest on such

sum.” Id.

7. In its post-trial memorandum, Defendant argues for the first time that any claim

on Defendant’s outstanding debt is barred by A.R.S. § 12-543’s statute of limitations. (Doc.

84 at 4–5). A.R.S. § 12-543 states that “[f]or debt where the indebtedness is not evidenced

by a contract in writing,” an action “shall be commenced and prosecuted within three years

after the cause of action accrues.” The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in Matter of Musgrove

that where an oral contract “is silent as to time of repayment, a cause of action accrues at the

time the contract is made.” 144 Ariz. 168, 171, 696 P.2d 720, 723 (App. 1985). Accordingly,

if the Court were to apply the Musgrove rule, Desert Foothills’ cause of action accrued in

May 1996—the time the loan was made. The limitation period therefore would have expired

in May 1999. See id. Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-508 states, however, that an

“acknowledgment of the justness of the claim made subsequent to the time it became due

shall be admitted in evidence to take the action out of the operation of the [limitations

period]” where such acknowledgment is “in writing and signed.” Defendant has made

numerous signed, written statements during the course of this action in which it

acknowledges the existence and validity of its debt to Desert Foothills. For example,

Defendant has stipulated that “[f]rom the date of the transfer to the present and throughout

the intervening years” it has “continuously and consistently reported the transfer as an

outstanding obligation.” (Doc. 39 at ¶ 30). Moreover, Defendant has stipulated that it

continued to treat the transfer as a subsisting debt even after Plaintiff brought suit against

Defendant. (Doc. 56 at ¶ 29). Indeed, Defendant’s position throughout the proceedings of this

case has been “[w]e owe the taxpayer” but are not liable because the debt is “not yet due.”

(Doc. 72 at 4; see also Doc. 39 at ¶ 28, Doc. 78 at 8). Defendant has further acknowledged

that “[d]enying the obligation would set [Defendant] up for . . . possible tax fraud or perjury.”

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(Doc. 72 at 4). 

8. These statements and stipulations, taken together, constitute “acknowledgment

of the justness of [Desert Foothills’] claim.” See A.R.S. § 12-508. As the Arizona Supreme

Court has stated, acknowledgment of debt can be legally sufficient to toll the statute of

limitations even where a defendant does not expressly promise to repay its debt:

Although a defendant has not expressly promised to repay the

indebtedness, where an acknowledgment discloses that the

writer treats the indebtedness as subsisting and contains an

expression of willingness to pay, as well as directly or impliedly

an expression by the writer that a moral obligation rests upon

him to pay the original debt, the acknowledgment will be

sufficient . . . as to the justness of the claim. 

Freeman v. Wilson, 107 Ariz. 271, 276, 485 P.2d 1161, 1166 (1971). Defendant clearly

“treats the indebtedness as subsisting” as evidenced by its statement that it has “continuously

and consistently reported the transfer as an outstanding obligation.” (Doc. 39 at ¶ 30; see also

Docs. 37-1 at 32; 44 at 32). Moreover, the Defendant’s classification of the debt in the

stipulations of fact as an “outstanding obligation” sufficiently expresses both its willingness

to pay the debt once it has matured and the moral obligation to do so. (Doc. 39 at ¶¶ 28, 30).

Defendant’s acknowledgments of the debt, taken together, are therefore sufficient to

constitute an acknowledgment of the justness of Plaintiff’s claim. 

 9. Finally, even if Defendant’s statements did not constitute a legally enforceable

acknowledgment, the unique facts in this case evidence an abuse of corporate formalities

based on which Defendant should be required to repay its debt to Desert Foothills upon the

government’s request. See cf. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309,

1311–12 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that “adherence to the fiction of separate corporate

existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice” where “a parent corporation that

caused a sub’s liabilities and its inability to pay for them would escape those liabilities; or

an intentional scheme to squirrel assets into a liability-free corporation while heaping

liabilities upon an asset-free corporation would be successful”) (citing Sea-Land Services,

Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1991)). As stated, the court in Musgrove

determined that the limitation period for oral loan agreements with no due date begins to

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accrue “at the time the contract is made.” 144 Ariz. at 171. The court also stated, however,

that “[t]he rationale for this rule is to prevent a creditor from extending the limitations period

by failing to make a demand.” Id. This rationale does not exist in situations like that in the

instant case where the debtor owns the creditor and the debtor’s repayment of loan funds

would go straight to the creditor’s outstanding tax obligations. In such a situation, the

creditor has every incentive to extinguish the debtor’s liability, and a three-year limitations

period would encourage, rather than prevent a creditor from demanding payment. In short,

accrual from the time a contract is made is the appropriate rule for situations like that in

Musgrove where the debtor and creditor do not share some the same financial interests. See

144 Ariz. at 171. Were the Court to apply the same three-year accrual rule to loans between

parents and their subsidiaries, however, no self-interested subsidiary which owes taxes and

lacks assets would ever require repayment from its parent. 

10. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(2), an entity which fails to honor a levy “without

reasonable cause” for such failure is subject to an additional 50 percent penalty:

In addition to the personal liability imposed by paragraph (1), if

any person required to surrender property or rights to property

fails or refuses to surrender such property or rights to property

without reasonable cause, such person shall be liable for a

penalty equal to 50 percent of the amount recoverable under

paragraph (1). 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(2).

11. Under the tax code, the United States has the burden of “production” with

respect to the liability of any individual for any penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 7491(c) (2006). In other

words, the United States “must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is

appropriate to impose the relevant penalty.” Higbee v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).

Given the legislative history of the tax code, however, the United States “need not introduce

evidence regarding reasonable cause . . . [as] the taxpayer bears the burden of proof with

regard to [this] issu[e].” Id. (“Congress did not desire that the burden of proof be placed on

the Commissioner with regard to penalties.”) (emphasis added). By virtue of the Parties’

stipulations and the Court’s holding that Defendant violated § 6332(d)(1), Plaintiff has met

its burden of production with respect to § 6332(d)(2). Defendant therefore has the burden of

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proof that it had reasonable cause for its failure to surrender payment to Plaintiff.

12. The Treasury Department regulations regarding § 6332(d)(2) state that

reasonable cause exists where there is a bona fide dispute over: 1) “the amount of property

to be surrendered,” or 2) “the legal effectiveness of the levy.” 26 CFR § 301.6332-1(b)(2).

See also U.S. v. Donahue Indus. Inc., 905 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the

same two grounds for reasonable cause). Defendant does not dispute the legal effectiveness

of the levy. As stated, however, Defendant disputes whether the debt is immediately due

upon demand, which is in essence a dispute over the amount of property it must surrender

to Plaintiff. Therefore, whether Defendant had reasonable cause for its failure to surrender

the loan amount turns on whether its dispute over the “payable on demand” nature of the loan

is a bona fide legal dispute. In the Ninth Circuit, a bona fide legal dispute exists where there

is an “unsettled question of law.” Donahue Indust., Inc., 905 F.2d at 1332 (citing United

States v. Sterling Nat’l Bank, 494 F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1974)). There is no such unsettled

question of law in this case. As stated, in Arizona a loan is payable on demand in the absence

of a specific due date. Musgrove, 144 Ariz. at 171. Defendant cites Hamad v. Zhili, 2010 WL

2352051 (Cal. App. 2010), as authority to the contrary. That case, however, was not decided

under Arizona law. Defendant has not, therefore, established the existence of a bona fide

legal dispute over the amount of property to be surrendered. See cf. Sterling, 494 F.2d at 923

(holding that a bona fide legal dispute existed where “there were cases within this circuit that

supported the [defendant’s] position”) (emphasis added). Although Defendant now makes

the perfunctory, eleventh-hour claim that its debt to Desert Foothills has been extinguished

by the statute of limitations, Defendant has never argued—much less provided

evidence—that its failure to honor the levy was due to its reliance on the statute of limitations

issue. To the contrary, Defendant’s position throughout this action has been that it could not

be required to “pay a debt not yet due with money it did not have.” (Doc. 72 at 4). In short,

Defendant does not argue that it failed to honor Plaintiff’s levy due to the statute of

limitations issue. The Court need not determine, therefore, whether the limitations issue was

a bona fide legal issue.

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13. Defendant also claims that its failure to comply with the levy was the result of

negligence by its lower-level employees, and that this negligence provides reasonable cause

for Defendant’s failure to comply. Defendant contends that there was a high volume of mail

coming into its office and that the receptionists who signed for the Notice of Levy and the

Demand Letter simply failed to understand the importance of these documents and therefore

failed to give them to management. Courts, however, have routinely rejected defendants’

attempts to characterize employee misconduct in handling notices of levy as reasonable

cause. See, e.g., United States v. MPM Fin. Group, Inc., 215 Fed. Appx. 476, 478 (6th Cir.

2007)(“[Defendant’s] lack of internal controls cannot amount to reasonable cause for failing

to honor the levy.”); U.S. v. Heli USA Airways, Inc., 2011 WL 5554277, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov.

14, 2011) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “[employee] incompetence provides

‘reasonable cause’ for failure to comply with the levy”). Moreover, Autumn Ahland, who

signed for the Demand Letter, was at the time the assistant to Ms. Judy Windisch,

Defendant’s in-house accountant. As the assistant to one of Vistoso’s key financial officers,

Ms. Ahland would have understood the importance of forwarding this document to

management.

14. Defendant also claims that reasonable cause existed because it was “unable to

pay” the amount demanded by Plaintiff in the levy documents. The Defendant has not

provided, however, nor has the Court been able to find, any authority for the proposition that

an inability to pay constitutes reasonable cause. And even if the Court were to recognize this

defense, Defendant has failed to establish that it was unable to pay at least a portion of the

demanded debt. As of December 31, 2008, Defendant had $142,375 of cash on hand.

Moreover, during 2008 Defendant spent $8,568,752 in cash to cover various general and

administrative expenses. In 2009, Defendant spent an additional $1,020,190 in cash on such

expenses. Defendant has not shown why it would have been unable to use some of this cash

to pay off a portion of its obligation to Plaintiff under the levy. Moreover, Defendant could

have generated additional funds by selling its 5.7 acres of unencumbered property. Yet

Defendant made no attempt to do so. Any inability Defendant may have had to satisfy the full

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amount of the levy did not excuse Defendant from surrendering the funds which it had

available. 

15. In sum, Defendant has failed to establish a bona fide dispute over the amount

of property to be surrendered or the legal effectiveness of the levy. Defendant has also failed

to establish other grounds which might constitute reasonable cause. Defendant is therefore

liable for § 6332(d)(2)’s 50 percent penalty.

16. Any conclusion of law deemed a finding of fact is so adopted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff and will enter

judgment in its favor. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed final judgment by January

17, 2012.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2012.

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