Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02948/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02948-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD ASHKER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. 09-02948 CW

ORDER REVIEWING

FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT UNDER

28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, ORDERING

SERVICE OF

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

AND DISMISSING

NON-COGNIZABLE

CLAIMS

On June 30, 2009, Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State

Prison (PBSP), filed this civil rights complaint against several

Defendants alleging, among other things, an Eighth Amendment claim

for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a

state medical malpractice claim. On February 16, 2010, this Court

issued an Order Reviewing Complaint Under 28 U.S.S. § 1915A and

found that Plaintiff had stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants James Flowers, Sue Risenhoover, Michael Sayre

and Maureen McLean and that he had stated a cognizable medical

malpractice claim against the aforementioned Defendants and

Defendants Pam Labans and R. Robinson. The Court dismissed with

leave to amend Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants Matthew Cate, Francisco Jacquez, Pam Labans, R.

Robinson, and Dwight Winslow and the negligence claim against

Defendants Cate, Jacquez and Winslow. Plaintiff has filed a First

Amended Complaint (FAC) seeking to state an Eighth Amendment claim

against these Defendants. The Court reviews the FAC under 28

Case 4:09-cv-02948-CW Document 12 Filed 06/01/10 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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U.S.C. § 1915A. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any

case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b).

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate indifference"

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response

to that need. Id.

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

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United States District Court

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indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that

a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards

that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not

only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also

draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated

the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v.

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

In order for deliberate indifference to be established,

therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the

part of the defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir. 1985). A finding that the defendant's activities

resulted in "substantial" harm to the prisoner is not necessary,

however.

Once the prerequisites are met, it is up to the fact-finder to

determine whether deliberate indifference was exhibited by the

defendant. Such indifference may appear when prison officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or

it may be shown in the way in which prison officials provide

medical care. McGuckin, 974 at 1062.

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

In the February 16, 2010 Order, the Court found that Plaintiff

had alleged that he had a serious medical need. Whether Plaintiff

has a cognizable claim against a particular Defendant for violation

of the Eighth Amendment due to deliberate indifference depends on

the nature of the Defendant's response to that need. The following

are Plaintiff's new allegations against Defendants.

I. Matthew Cate

Defendant Cate is the Secretary-Director of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). On February

1, 2008, Defendant Cate denied Plaintiff's 602 Appeal #07-11142

which addressed the alleged unconstitutional medical care PBSP

medical staff had provided to Plaintiff. On July 21, 2008,

Defendant Cate denied another 602 appeal addressing the ongoing

alleged unconstitutional medical treatment. On January 13, 2009,

Plaintiff sent another 602 appeal to Defendant Cate. Although

appeals are supposed to be reviewed and decided within sixty days,

it was not until December 16, 2009 that Defendant Cate responded by 

denying the appeal. 

In the February 16, 2010 Order, the Court dismissed the claims

against Defendant Cate because "the only specific allegations

concerning Defendant Cate are his failure to grant Plaintiff's 602

appeals. These allegations do not state a cognizable claim." 

 The allegations against Defendant Cate in the FAC are also

that he failed to grant Plaintiff's 602 appeals. As stated

previously, these allegations do not state a cognizable claim. 

Therefore, all claims against Defendant Cate are dismissed.

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United States District Court

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II. Francisco Jacquez and Dwight Winslow

The FAC does not make any allegations against Defendants

Jacquez and Winslow. Therefore, all claims against them are

dismissed.

III. Pam Labans and R. Robinson

Defendants Labans and Robinson are registered nurses employed

by PBSP. On March 19, 2008, they denied, at the first level of

review, Plaintiff's January 14, 2008 602 appeal regarding his

alleged unconstitutional medical treatment. As stated in the

February 16, 2010 Order, there is no cognizable claim for the

denial of a 602 appeal. Therefore, Plaintiff's allegations against

Labans and Robinson fail to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment

claim. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing and the February 16, 2010 Order,

Plaintiff has stated the following cognizable claims for relief:

1. An Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs against Defendants Flowers, Risenhoover,

Sayre and McLean.

2. A state law claim in negligence for breach of a

professional duty of care against Defendants Flowers, Risenhoover,

Sayre, McLean, Labans and Robinson.

3. All other claims against all other Defendants are

dismissed.

Because it appears that Plaintiff has not served his original

complaint on Defendants, the following, which was stated in the

Court's February 16, 2010, remains applicable. 

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4. Because Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis in

this action, he may not rely on the United States Marshal for

service of the summons, complaint and First Amended Complaint

without paying for this service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a)(A) provides that the United States

Marshal shall routinely collect, and the court may tax as costs,

fees for serving a summons and complaint. Title 28 C.F.R. 

§ 0.114(a)(3) provides that the United States Marshal shall collect

a fee for personal service of a summons and complaint at the rate

of $55.00 per hour, or portion thereof, plus travel expenses. 

Consequently, Plaintiff may himself arrange for service of all of

the Defendants against whom cognizable claims for relief have been

found or he may request the Court to order the Marshal to do so. 

If Plaintiff wishes the Marshal to serve the summons and complaint,

he must inform the Court of this within twenty days of the date of

this Order and he must arrange to pay the required fee. Rule 4(m)

of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure provides: 

If service and summons of a complaint is not made upon a

defendant within 120 days after the filing of the

complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own

initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss

the action without prejudice as to that defendant or

direct that service be effected within a specified time

. . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

5. Alternatively, Plaintiff may accomplish service of

Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) which

provides that plaintiffs may send to the defendants a notice that

they are being sued and a request that they waive service of a

summons. The notice must be in writing, addressed to the

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individual defendants, name the court where the complaint was

filed, be accompanied by a copy of the complaint and amended

complaint, two copies of the waiver form, and a prepaid means for

returning the form, be sent by first class mail or other reliable

means, state the date the request was sent and give the defendant a

reasonable time, at least thirty days after the request was sent,

to return the waiver. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(A)-(G). The

Clerk shall mail to Plaintiff sufficient copies of the Court’s

official “Waiver of Service of Summons” forms.

6. If Plaintiff asks that Defendants waive service, Defendants

are cautioned that Rule 4(d) requires them to cooperate in saving

unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2), if Defendants, after being notified of

this action and requested by Plaintiff to waive service of the

summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of

such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign

and return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will

proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii),

Defendants will not be required to serve and file an answer before

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required

if formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked

to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that

more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to

waiver of service of the summons. If service is waived after the

date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have been

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personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the

date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days

from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

7. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than ninety (90) days from the date their

answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment

or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they

shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly

served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

than sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

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When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of

defendants, your case will be dismissed and there will be

no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element

of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the

burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared

to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files

his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence

may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to

the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall

do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date Plaintiff's

opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

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8. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

9. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

10. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. 

11. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than seven days prior to the deadline sought

to be extended.

12. The Court orders the Clerk of the Court to send this

Order to PBSP Litigation Coordinator Harlan Watkins and to the

California Attorney General and to mail courtesy copies to each

Defendant so that Defendants have prior notice of this lawsuit and

of the consequences if they fail to waive formal service and

require service by the United States Marshal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD ASHKER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MATHEW CATE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV09-02948 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on June 1, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Todd Ashker C58191

D1-119

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532

Dated: June 1, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Ronnie Hersler, Administrative Law Clerk

Case 4:09-cv-02948-CW Document 12 Filed 06/01/10 Page 11 of 11