Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00383/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00383-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL A. JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF MACOMBER,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00383-GSA HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 

TO CLOSE THE CASE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 2, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this Court.

1

 (ECF No. 1). He has consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 6). 

On June 22, 2015, the Court issued an order for Petitioner to show cause within thirty 

days why the petition should not be dismissed for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. 

2244(d) and for failure to exhaust state remedies. (ECF No. 8). Petitioner was also given the 

option to withdraw his unexhausted claims within thirty days. However, Petitioner did not file a 

response to the Court’s order to show cause. On June 25, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to 

amend the petition to name the proper respondent. 

 

1

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petitions filed on the date they were signed and presumably 

handed to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001).

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I.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to 

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua 

sponte a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the 

petitioner adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 

1041-42.

B. Exhaustion

Petitioner has failed to exhaust all of his claims in the instant petition. A petitioner who 

is in state custody proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial 

remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court 

and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional 

deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court 

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest 

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); 

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising 

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a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th 

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States 

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that 

exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly 

presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations 

of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct 

alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be 

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 

that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must 

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Petitioner admits that grounds three and four of the instant petition are unexhausted. 

(ECF No. 1 at 8-12). Therefore, the petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and 

unexhausted claims. A mixed petition must be dismissed. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 

568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court provided Petitioner with the opportunity to amend the 

mixed petition by striking the unexhausted claims, but Petitioner has not moved to withdraw the 

unexhausted claims. Therefore, the mixed petition must be dismissed.2 

C. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 

S.Ct. 586 (1997). As the instant petition was filed on October 13, 2014, it is subject to the 

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a 

 

2 Although the dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies would usually be without prejudice, in this case, the 

dismissal is on the merits because the petition also violate the limitations period. 

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federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, 

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. In this case, Petitioner states that his appeal was denied by the Fifth 

District Court of Appeal on December 3, 2012. (Pet. at 2). Based upon the information in the 

petition, it appears that Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court. (Pet. at 3). Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rules 24(a), 28(b), and 45(a), direct review 

concluded when the conviction became final forty days after the appellate court filed its opinion. 

In this case, the period of direct review concluded on January 14, 2013. Petitioner had one year 

from the conclusion of direct review, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Petitioner had until January 14, 2014 to file his 

federal petition. As Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until March 2, 2015, it 

appears that Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely by over a year.

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. In his 

federal petition, Petitioner notes having filed several petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the 

state courts. (Pet. at 2-3). According to the petition, it appears that Petitioner’s first habeas 

petition was filed on February 18, 2014, in Fresno County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 28-31). 

That petition was denied on March 26, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 28-31). On August 7, 2014, 

Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Fresno County Superior Court, and the 

motion was denied on August 20, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 26-27). Petitioner subsequently filed a

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court that was denied on November 25, 2014. (ECF 

No. 1 at 25).

It appears that Petitioner filed his February 18, 2014 and November 25, 2014, state 

habeas petitions after the expiration of the limitations period. Therefore, those state petitions had 

no tolling consequences. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run). Therefore, 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

Absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely. The limitations period 

is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner argues that he has not been able to comply with the statute of limitations because of 

his mental illness. (ECF No. 1 at 13-14). 

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-part test to determine whether a Petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling because of a mental impairment. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th 

Cir. 2010). The impairment must have (1) been “so severe that the petitioner was unable 

personally ... to understand the need to timely file ... a habeas petition,” and (2) “made it 

impossible under the totality of the circumstances to meet the filing deadline despite petitioner's 

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diligence.” Id. at 1093. 

Based upon Petitioner’s claims in his petition and the evidence before the Court at this 

time, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that his mental impairment was so severe 

between January 15, 2013, and March 2, 2015, that he was unable to personally understand the 

need to timely file a habeas petition and that it was impossible for him to meet the filing deadline 

despite his diligence. Therefore, it appears that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and 

that Petitioner’s petition is untimely.

II.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining 

whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 

2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to 

review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which 

the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a 

proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another 

district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a 

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of 

such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of 

appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which 

the detention complained of arises out of process issued by 

a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 

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required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must 

demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on 

his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

determination that Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition should be dismissed debatable, 

wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, the Court declines to issue

a certificate of appealability. 

III.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The petition is DIMSMISSED for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. 

2244(d) and for failure to exhaust state remedies;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case; and 

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00383-GSA Document 11 Filed 08/25/15 Page 7 of 7