Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08299/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08299-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Philip Steven Matwyuk,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-08299-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The 

Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. Petitioner filed objections and 

Respondents responded to the objections. Petitioner moved to strike Respondents’ 

response to his objections, but since such response is specifically authorized by Local Rule 

Civil 72(b)(2), the motion to strike will be denied.

I. Review of R&R

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that 

de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

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otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

[Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report 

and recommendation] to which objection is made.”).

However, global or general objections are insufficient to cause the Court to engage 

in a de novo review of an R&R. See Kenniston v. McDonald, No. 15-CV-2724-AJB-BGS, 

2019 WL 2579965, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2019) (“‘When a specific objection is made

to a portion of a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion 

of the report-recommendation to a de novo review.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). To be ‘specific,’ the objection must, with particularity, identify the portions 

of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and the 

basis for the objection. See Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 

2002).”).

Here, Petitioner has filed both global objections and specific objections. (See e.g. 

Doc. 18 (Petitioner’s objections) at 1 (“Petitioner objects to all adverse rulings in the report 

and recommendation....”); Doc. 23 (Respondents’ response to Petitioner’s objections) 

(noting that Petitioner starts each section of his objections by objecting to all conclusions 

of the Magistrate Judge and responding to only the specific objections)). For the reasons 

stated above, this Court will not consider the global objections. The specific objections are 

considered, de novo, below.

II. Review of State Court Decision

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is 

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner 

exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must 

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deny the Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings 

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Additionally, “[a]n application for 

a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the 

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2). 

III. Factual Background

The R&R recounts the factual and procedural history of this case, as well as the 

governing law, at pages 2–19. (Doc. 17 at 2-19). Neither party objected to this portion of 

the R&R and the Court hereby accepts and adopts it.

IV. Claims in the Petition

Petitioner raises 6 grounds for relief in his Petition. Petitioner also mentions “actual 

innocence” in his objections. (Doc. 18 at 2). However, Petitioner make no factual 

argument in this regard, and it is unclear whether he is asserting it solely as a basis to 

overcome his procedural default of ground 1. Regardless, because Petitioner makes no 

substantive argument regarding actual innocence, this objection is overruled.

A. Ground 1

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims his right to self-representation was 

not honored. (Doc. 17 at 19). The R&R concluded that this claim was procedurally 

defaulted at the state court, without excuse. (Doc. 17 at 19-21). Additionally, the R&R 

determined the claim was without merit. (Id.). On the merits, the R&R concludes that 

Petitioner never unequivocally advised the state trial court that he wished to represent 

himself; and even if he did, he later abandoned that request when he requested new counsel. 

(Id.).

Petitioner objects and argues he requested to represent himself. (Doc. 18 at 3). All 

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evidence pointed to by Petitioner shows that he requested to see the judge, but not that he 

requested self-representation. (Id.; see also Doc. 23 at 2-3). Moreover, the R&R is correct 

that after those requests to see the judge, Petitioner specifically requested new counsel 

thereby abandoning any possible request for self-representation. (Doc. 17 at 19-21). 

Accordingly, while the Court agrees this claim is procedurally defaulted without 

excuse, the Court nonetheless denies relief on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) 

(allowing the Court to deny habeas relief on the merits notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure 

to exhaust the claim). Thus, Petitioner’s objections are overruled and the R&R is accepted 

on Ground 1.

B. Ground 2

Ground 2 centers on Petitioner’s belief that the prosecutor elicited testimony that 

was excluded via a motion in limine. (Doc. 17 at 22-25). Petitioner argues that eliciting 

this testimony was prosecutorial misconduct, and that his trial attorney was ineffective for 

not objecting to the testimony and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for not raising 

this issue on appeal. (Id.). 

As the R&R recounts, the in limine order precluded the victim from testifying that 

she believed that Petitioner had stolen her purse from inside her residence previously. (Id.

at 22). The victim testified that she had a chair propped under the door in her residence on 

the night in question because her purse had previously been stolen. (Id.). The prosecutor 

did not elicit, and the victim did not offer, any testimony that the purse was stolen by 

Petitioner. The state court, in interpreting its own order, held that the testimony did not 

violate the in limine order. (Id.). In his objections, Petitioner persists in arguing that as a 

matter of fact the in limine order was violated by this testimony. (Doc. 18 at 4-5).

Consistent with the R&R, this Court finds that the state court’s determination that 

its in limine order was not violated was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

(Doc. 17 at 22). The Court also accepts the R&R’s conclusion that the law was not clearly 

established. (Doc. 17 at 24). Finally, the Court accepts the R&R’s conclusion that because 

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the in limine order was not violated, there was no prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting 

the testimony, nor ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel for not objecting to 

the testimony. (Doc. 17 at 25). Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections are overruled and 

relief on Ground 2 is denied.

C. Ground 3

In Ground 3, Petitioner claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for not investigating 

Petitioner’s allegations that the victims in his case made threats against him on Facebook 

a week before the incident in question. (Doc. 18 at 7). Petitioner claims such an 

investigation could have aided his self-defense theory of the case. (Id.).

The R&R concludes there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice under 

Strickland, (Doc. 17 at 25-27), and that the state court’s determination in this regard was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor an 

unreasonable determination of the facts (Id. at 27). Regarding deficient performance, as 

the R&R notes, Strickland cannot be satisfied by “vague and conclusory allegations that 

some unspecified and speculative testimony might have established a defense.” (Doc. 17 

at 26 (citations omitted)). 

Here, Petitioner cannot show deficient performance because he did not testify to 

establish self-defense. Further, A.R.S. § 13-404(A), the self-defense statute, requires an 

immediate threat. (Doc. 23 at 5). Thus, even if Petitioner’s counsel had investigated a 

week-old Facebook chat, it would not have been relevant to an “immediate” self-defense

claim. Finally, Petitioner cannot show prejudice because four eyewitnesses testified 

inconsistently with his current self-defense claim. (Doc. 17 at 27). 

Thus, the Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusions. Petitioner’s objections are 

overruled and relief on Ground 3 is denied.

D. Ground 4

In Ground 4 Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that 

his counsel gave him inadequate advice on whether he should take the plea agreement. 

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Both the state court and R&R concluded that Petitioner did not receive inadequate advice 

at the plea negotiation stage because, although Petitioner claims he did not understand the 

range of the plea agreement by claiming that he did not know the plea offered was for 5-

15 years, in fact the plea offered was for 15-45 years. (Doc. 17 at 28). Thus, Petitioner’s 

claim that he would have taken a plea of 5-15 years is irrelevant because no plea of 5-15 

years was ever offered by the State. Accordingly, his counsel could not be ineffective for 

failing to advise him of something that never existed. Thus, the state court’s decision on 

this issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. (See Doc. 17 at 28-29).

In his objections, Petitioner asserts that he was not advised of a plea to a stipulated 

sentence of 12 years (Doc. 18 at 9); but again, there is no evidence in the record that a 12-

year stipulated sentence plea was ever offered by the State. Additionally, in Petitioner’s 

Arizona Rule 11 examinations, Petitioner admitted that he understood that the pending plea 

offer was for a minimum of 15 years (Doc. 17 at 28), which undercuts any argument he 

makes now that his counsel did not explain it to him. Thus, Petitioner’s objections are 

overruled on his claim that his counsel did not explain the plea offer to him.

Finally, Petitioner believes he was denied his “right” to a Donald hearing. (Doc. 18 

at 10). 

A Donald hearing is a pre-trial hearing where a defendant is informed of any 

outstanding plea offer and the consequences of conviction so that a record of 

the defendant’s rejection of the plea offer can be made to guard against any 

“late, frivolous, or fabricated claims” of ineffective assistance of counsel 

“after a trial leading to conviction with resulting harsh consequences.”

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 14 (2012).

State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 455 P.3d 705, 715, ¶ 18 (Ct. App. 2019). The Court of 

Appeals explained further in an unpublished, non-binding decision:

The purpose of a Donald hearing is to establish whether a defendant has 

suffered a constitutional injury by losing a favorable plea bargain as a result 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Donald, 198 Ariz. at 418, ¶ 46, []....

Because there is no evidence that counsel failed to adequately communicate 

a plea offer or the consequences of a conviction to Defendant, the court did 

not err[] in failing to hold a Donald hearing.

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State v. Svanoe, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0942, 2009 WL 5149956, at *5 ¶ 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 

29, 2009).

If the State of Arizona had created a right to a Donald hearing, the failure to hold 

one for Petitioner would have been an error of state law that is not cognizable as a federal 

habeas claim. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Moreover, as the foregoing 

cases illustrate, applying state law, there is no “right” to a Donald hearing in every case. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s objection that he was denied his Donald hearing is overruled.

Based on all of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the R&R that the state court’s 

decision that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for allegedly not communicating the 

plea agreement to him was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. (See Doc. 17 at 28-

29). Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections on Ground 4 are overruled and relief on this 

claim is denied.

E. Ground 5

In ground 5, Petitioner claims that even if no one error entitles him to relief, the 

errors alleged in grounds 2, 3, and 4, cumulatively, should entitle him to relief. (Doc. 18 

at 12). Petitioner raised this claim in state court, and the state court concluded that “the 

cumulative effect of multiple zeros is still zero.” (Doc. 17 at 30 quoting Doc. 11-2 at 8). 

The R&R found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

(Doc. 17 at 30). This Court agrees that based on the foregoing, there were no errors; 

accordingly, there are no errors to cumulate.

Petitioner objects, but again re-argues the same errors in grounds 2, 3, and 4. (Doc. 

18 at 12). Based on the foregoing, this objection is overruled. Relief on ground 5 is denied.

F. Ground 6

Finally, Petitioner alleges in ground 6 that the police had a conflict of interest and

that their failure to handle that conflict of interest in a particular way was a policy violation. 

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(Doc. 17 at 31). Additionally, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting regarding this alleged conflict. (Id.). Specifically, Petitioner argues that one of 

the investigating officers was a cousin of two of the victims. (Id.). The state court rejected 

this claim for 3 reasons: 1) there was no evidence the officer was actually a cousin to two 

of the victims; 2) even if the officer was a cousin to two of the victims, there was no 

evidence that there was a policy that was violated; and 3) even if one and two were true, 

there was no prejudice because Petitioner’s conviction was based on the 4 eyewitnesses’ 

testimony. (Doc. 17 at 31-32). The R&R concluded that all of these reasons were not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.).

With regard to reason one, Petitioner objects and argues he has proof that the officer 

was related to two of the victims. (Doc. 18 at 13). Petitioner cites Doc. 15 at page 70, 

which is an email from the officer. The officer states, “I have no idea if they are actually 

cousins of mine or not...[I have] never met or spoken with [victim 1] or [victim 2] prior to 

the case and was unaware of any familial relationship if there is one.” As a matter of fact, 

the Court overrules Petitioner’s objection claiming that this email is proof that the officer

was related to the victims. Accordingly, the state court’s finding on reason one was not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts.

With regard to reason two, Petitioner still fails to cite to any policy of the police 

department that would be implicated in this situation (assume there was a relationship). In 

his objections, Petitioner argues that the same conflict of interest rules that apply to 

attorneys should apply to police officers. (Doc. 18 at 14). Regardless of what Petitioner 

thinks should be true, the attorney conflict of interest rules do not apply to police officers. 

Therefore, the state court’s determination that even if the officer was related to two of the 

victims, that did not create an error in Petitioner’s trial nor was his attorney ineffective for 

not raising this issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

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With regard to reason three, Petitioner makes no objection. The Court finds that the 

state court’s third reason for denying ground six was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s objections to the R&R on ground 6 are 

overruled. Relief on this claim is denied.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to strike (Doc. 26) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17) is 

accepted and adopted; the objections (Doc. 18) are overruled; the Clerk of the Court shall 

enter judgment denying the Petition, with prejudice.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Dated this 5th day of June, 2020.

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