Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02526/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02526-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:206 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROL M. LEONARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Case No.: 12-CV-2526 AJB (MDD)

ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S

OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION OF THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE;

(2) ADOPTING THE REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION OF THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE;

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; and

(4) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT.

[Doc. Nos. 25, 24, 18, and 19,

respectively]

On October 17, 2012, Carol M. Leonard (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint seeking

judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s decision denying

her claim for disability insurance benefits. (Doc. No. 1.) On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 18.) The Acting Commissioner of Social

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Security (“Defendant”) filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on April 22, 2013. 

(Doc. No. 19.) On January 21, 2014, Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin issued a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) finding the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ’s”) written opinion to be supported by substantial evidence, and recommending

the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 24.) On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed an

Objection to the R&R. (Doc. No. 25.) After a review of the parties’ pleadings and the

entire record before it, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections, ADOPTS the

R&R in its entirety, DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Plaintiff was born March 6, 1956, and was 48 years old on her alleged onset date

of disability of September 27, 2004. Plaintiff’s medical reports span the period of 2004

to 2009 and document Plaintiff’s conditions of cervical and lumbar degenerative disease

and spondylosis, mild to moderate pain disorder, mild arthritis of the right hip, and mild

carpal tunnel syndrome.

On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits under Title II of

the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning September 27, 2004. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 163, 340). On August 28, 2006, her claim was denied. (A.R. at

182). On February 9, 2007, after Plaintiff requested reconsideration, her claim was again

denied. (Id. at 190). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). (Id. at 197). On February 26, 2008, a hearing was held before ALJ James S.

Carletti. (Id. at 60-127). Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel. (A.R. at

60). At the hearing, Plaintiff, medical expert Dr. George Weilepp, and vocational expert

Mark Remas testified. (Id.)

 Magistrate Judge Dembin’s R&R provides a thorough and detailed summary of the relevant 1

factual background in this case, and the majority of this section has been taken directly from the R&R. 

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On October 8, 2008, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was

not disabled. (Id. at 167-178.) Plaintiff appealed and the Appeals Council remanded the

case to the ALJ for further proceedings. (Id. at 179.) The Appeals Council instructed

the ALJ to “[f]urther evaluate the claimant’s neck impairment . . . along with the claimant’s pain disorder.” The Council further instructed the ALJ to hear testimony from a

vocational expert regarding the expanded record before him.

On December 17, 2010, a second hearing was held before the ALJ. (Id. at 133-

162.) Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel. (Id. at 60.) At the hearing,

Plaintiff, medical expert Dr. George Weilepp (mistakenly referred to as Dr. Wyliff in the

transcript), and vocational expert Gloria Lasoff testified. (Id.) On December 27, 2010,

the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 37.) On August 24,

2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1-6.)

The ALJ’s written opinion found Plaintiff was not disabled at any time from

September 27, 2004, her alleged onset date, through December 31, 2006, the date last

insured. (Id. at 51.) The ALJ found Plaintiff had impairments that in combination are

“severe,” including cervical and lumbar degenerative disease and spondylosis, mild to

moderate pain disorder, mild arthritis of the right hip, and mild carpal tunnel syndrome

symptoms, but ultimately concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments

in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1530(d), 404.1525 and

404.1526). (Id. at 42, 46.) In addition, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b)

except she is able to stand, walk, and sit for six hours each in an eight workday; stand

and walk for forty minutes at a time; lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten

pounds frequently; no overhead reaching; and no climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds;

and must avoid hazards. (Id. at 46.) The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements concerning

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms and the extent to which those

symptoms limited her ability to work to be not credible. (Id. at 47.) 

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On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court seeking judicial

review of the Social Security Administration’s decision. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 21,

2013, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative record with the Court. (Doc.

No. 12.) On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 18.) On

April 22, 2013, Defendant cross-moved for Summary Judgment, and responded in

opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.) On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion. (Doc. No. 21.) On January 21,

2014, Magistrate Judge Dembin issued the R&R finding the ALJ’s written opinion to be

supported by substantial evidence, and recommending the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

No. 24.) On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the R&R. (Doc. No. 25.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Standard of Review for Social Security Determinations

An unsuccessful applicant for social security disability benefits may seek judicial

review of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm

the agency’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and applies the correct

legal standards. Id.; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Tidwell v. Apfel,

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457

(9th Cir. 1995). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.”

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999)).

//

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2. Standard of Review for the Magistrate Judge’s R & R

A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

[R&R] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(91); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);

see United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). The district judge “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the finding or recommendations made by

the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff objects to the R&R on two grounds: (1) The Magistrate Judge improperly

found Dr. Weilepp’s opinions constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s

decision that Plaintiff was not disabled; and (2) the Magistrate Judge improperly found

that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Ms. Leonard’s testimony to be “clear and convincing.” The Court will address Plaintiff’s contentions in turn.

1. The ALJ’s Conclusion that Plaintiff Was Not Disabled is Supported by

Relevant Evidence that a Reasonable Person Might Accept as Adequate

to Support the Conclusion

Plaintiff’s first objection to the R&R involves the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion

that the opinions of the non-examining medical expert, Dr. Weilepp, constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge

improperly relied on evidence of decreased pain to support his conclusion, and in doing

so, failed to address Plaintiff’s main point of contention - that her decreased pain has not

resulted in increased functioning capacities. (Doc. No. 25 at 4.) For the reasons outlined

below, the Court finds the Magistrate did not err in concluding Dr. Weilepp’s testimony

rose to the level of substantial evidence.

The ALJ concurred with the opinion of Dr. Weilepp, who after examining the

entire record, found the Plaintiff’s pain disorder to be mild to moderate in nature. (A.R.

at 49.) The ALJ explained his findings concerning Dr. Weilepp’s testimony as follows:

[Dr. Weilepp] tesitifed that he had reviewed the entire medical file [and] [h]e

gave a detailed and longitudinal summary of the claimant’s medical history

finding that the claimant had transferred from OxyContin in December, 2006

and as of August 22, 2006, her head was clearer. He testified that ablation

killed her pain, but it grew back in 3-6 months. Dr. Weilepp found that the

claimant has pain disorder from multiple vehicle accidents and had been

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treated with surgical care, nerve ablation, physical therapy, and narcotics until

2006 that was mild to moderate in nature. He also found cervical and lumber

spondylosis that was mild to moderate in severity, severe, and long standing

with aggravation by injuries and mild arthritis of the right hip with hip disease

that was not significantly severe. She also had carpal tunnelsymptoms without

surgery and was mild in nature. Her restrictions were not found due to a lack

of neurological deficiency and other than her complaints of pain her restrictions of activities were consistent with her cervical or lumbar problem. Based

on these records, it was his expert, medical opinion that the claimant did not

meet or equal the criteria of 1.04 or 1.02A or B. The claimant was found to be

able to perform restricted light activities and could not perform continuous

reaching or climbing ladders and able to perform frequent overhead reaching

with her medications as of the date of the hearing. The undersigned concurs

with the Medical Expert’s opinion and so finds.

(Id.) 

Plaintiff argues Dr. Weilepp’s conclusion is inconsistent with the evidence on

record, and therefore does not provide adequate support for the ALJ’s opinion. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Dr. Weilepp’s findings were “predicated upon the false impression

that [Plaintiff] benefitted from her ablation and narcotic pain regimen to the extent that it

directly translated to her ability to physically function.” (Doc. No. 18 at 5.) Plaintiff

claims the medical evidence of record demonstrates she has not benefitted from her

treatment to the extent that she is now able to physically function or engage in gainful

activity. (Id.; Doc. No. 25 at 4.) As such, Plaintiff argues that because Dr. Weilepp’s

testimony reflects a different interpretation of the medical evidence - i.e. that Plaintiff is

able to perform restricted light work, - that “a reasonable person would not accept Dr.

Weilepp’s testimony,” and for that reason it fails to rise to the level of substantial

evidence. (Doc. No. 18 at 5.)

After considering Plaintiff’s argument, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ

properly found Dr. Weilepp’s opinion of Plaintiff’s claimed disabilities was based upon

the record as a whole and generally consistent with that record. (Doc. No. 24 at 13.) The

ALJ and the Magistrate Judge both noted that Dr. Weilepp reviewed Plaintiff’s entire

medical record including the findings of Dr. Yee, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Phillip, all of

whom independently reported impairments mild to moderate in nature and that the

Plaintiff was generally responsive to medical treatment. (Id. at 6, 11-12; A.R. at 47, 151.) 

In fact, Dr. Phillip, Plaintiff’s treating physician, reported on March 28, 2006, that the

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claimant reported her pain was much more manageable and that she had benefit from the

cervical radiofrequency ablation. Ultimately, the ALJ found that “no treating or examining source determined that the claimant’s impairments were totally debilitating or

rendered the claimant unemployable.” (A.R. at 48.)

“Opinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial

evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with

it.” Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). As described above and in the

R&R, Dr. Weilepp’s opinion was based on a review of the Plaintiff’s entire medical

record, and was generally consistent with the opinions of the other examining and

treating physicians of record. (Doc. No. 24 at 10-12) Thus, to the extent Plaintiff

suggests the ALJ’s opinion was based entirely on Dr. Weilepp’s testimony, Plaintiff’s

objection and the corresponding argument in her Motion for Summary Judgment are

unpersuasive. 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument that the Magistrate Judge failed to address

her main contention - that her decreased pain has not resulted in increased functioning

abilities - unpersuasive and unsupported by the record as a whole. On the contrary, as

the R&R points out at length, the evidence Plaintiff use to support her conclusion also

contain information that could reasonably be interpreted to support the ALJ’s conclusion. (Doc. No. 24 at 12-13.) The ALJ provided a detailed and thorough summary of the

facts and medical evidence on record, stated his interpretation thereof, and made findings

which were rationally supported by the evidence. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600-01. 

Numerous examining and treating physicians - not just Dr. Weilepp - found Plaintiff’s

pain to be mild to moderate in nature and responsive to medical treatment. (A.R. at 47,

49.) After reviewing the entire record, Dr. Weilepp testified that there was “a paucity of

evidence of upper extremity restriction, neurologically intact or otherwise, other than the

pain issue . . . . So if pain is improved enough to be functional for six months after

ablation or for use of Oxy versus Vicodin, she could probably be allowed to be func7 12-cv-2526 AJB (MDD)

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tional . . . as I suggested.” (Id. at 157.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the numerous

medications she has taken and the medical procedures she has undergone have reduced

her level of her pain. (Doc. No. 25 at 3.) 

“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002 ) (citing Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599). Because

the medical evidence shows Plaintiff’s alleged inability to work stems from pain, (A.R.

at 42), and because Plaintiff and the aforementioned physicians reported reduced pain

through medication and treatment, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity to perform restricted light work was rational and should not be

disturbed.

2. The ALJ Provided Clear and Convincing Reasons for Discounting the

Plaintiff’s Testimony.

An ALJ must perform a two step analysis when deciding whether to accept a

claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th

Cir. 1996). The first step is a threshold test set out in Cotton v. Bowen that requires the

claimant “produce medical evidence of an underlying impairment which is reasonably

likely to be the cause of the alleged pain.” 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); see also

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991). “Once a claimant meets the

Cotton test and there is no affirmative evidence suggesting she is malingering, the ALJ

may reject the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he

makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1283-84 (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993)). “If the

ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we may not

engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59.

Here, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff met her burden under the Cotton test, but

ultimately found her testimony “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects

of these symptoms [is] not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above

residual functioning capacity assessment.” (A.R. at 45.) As such, the ALJ was required

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to make specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her

subjective testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84. 

Plaintiff objects to the R&R on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge improperly

concluded the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective

pain testimony. (Doc. No. 25 at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the Magistrate Judge

erred when he found the ALJ to have properly relied on: (1) a lack of hospitalization and

conservative, routine maintenance; (2) a lack of objective evidence; (3) the effectiveness

of the medications and treatment; and (4) Plaintiff’s ability to perform certain activities

of daily living. (Id. at 4-5). For the reasons outlined below, the Court agrees with the

R&R and finds the ALJ to have provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony. 

a. Lack of Hospitalization and Conservative Routine Maintenance

Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the

ALJ properly relied on a lack of hospitalization and conservative routine maintenance to

reject Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff makes the following argument:

Judge Dembin states that the ALJ properly relied on a lack of hospitalization

and conservative, routine maintenance to reject Leonard’s testimony. Report

and Recommendation at 16:1-3. In doing so, Judge Dembin ignored the fact

that Leonard underwent numerous ablation treatments. AR 47. Even Dr.

Weilepp stated that these procedures could be construed as invasive procedures. AR 111. The fact that Carol Leonard underwent a series of these

ablation procedures actually supports her testimony regarding her functional

limitations.

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s objection, however, inaccurately portrays the Magistrate Judge’s

consideration of her ablation treatment. Plaintiff only cites to three lines of the R&R in

support of her objection, in which the Magistrate Judge states: “Plaintiff’s lack of

hospitalization and significant active care beyond conservative routine maintenance

insufficient to find that her cervical or lumbar complaints are disabling.” (Doc. No. 24 at

16.) While ablation is not specifically mentioned in this sentence, there are references to

the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s ablation treatment throughout the R&R. 

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For example, on page 11 of the R&R, the Magistrate Judge cites to page 47 of the

A.R. where the ALJ states:

“J. Yee, M.D., reported on December 13, 2004, that the claimant sciatic nerve

ablations helped 80%. (Exhibit 1F page 60). On February 9, 2005, Dr. Phillips

reported that the claimant had undergonemultiple radio frequency ablations for

her low back pain that had provided her with 50%-60% pain relief . . . . Lisa

A. Phillip, M.D. reported on March 28, 2006, that the claimant reported that

her pain was much more manageable and thatshe had benefit fromthe cervical

radiofrequency ablation. It wasfound that the claimant’s chronic neck and low

back pain had been responsive to radiofrequency ablation . . . These findings

are indicative that the claimant’s complaints are not fully substantiated by the

objectivemedical conclusions and her symptoms may not have been aslimiting

as the claimant has alleged in connection with this application.”

(A.R. at 47.)

Immediately following this discussion of Plaintiff’s ablation treatment, the ALJ

makes the statement to which the Plaintiff now objects. (See A.R. at 47; Doc. No. 25 at 2

4-5; Doc. No. 24 at 16.) In light of the fact that the ALJ made the statement at issue

immediately after discussing Plaintiff’s ablation treatments, Plaintiff’s assertion that

“Judge Dembin ignored the fact that Leonard underwent numerous ablation treatments”

is without merit. (Doc. No. 25 at 4-5.) Plaintiff improperly looks at the Magistrate

Judge’s statement in isolation, instead of looking at the context in which it was made,

citations to the administrative record upon which it relies, as well as other portions of the

R&R addressing similar subjects. 

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s objection to the extent it implies the Magistrate

Judge failed to consider the “invasiveness” of Plaintiff’s ablation treatment. Plaintiff’s

objection states: “[e]ven Dr. Weilepp stated that these procedures could be construed as

invasive procedures. A.R. 111.” (Doc. No. 25 at 5.) Plaintiff’s objection, however,

misconstrues Dr. Weilepp’s testimony. In response to being asked whether electrical

ablation is as invasive as a different surgery, Dr. Weilepp stated:

Well, it depends upon how you define invasive. It’s specific, it is ablative,

which means you can actually electrically cut it essentially, or impact its

 The ALJ states: “The record fails to document that the claimant has been hospitalized for her 2

impairment or indicate that the claimant has received significant active care other than for her

conservative routine maintenance.” (A.R. at 47) The Magistrate Judge uses the same language in the

R&R. (Doc. No. 24 at 16.) 

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normal function with use of a knife blade. But you in fact, and pretty

successfully in this case, see improvement with it. And it’s not something you

can recover from in terms of that particular nerve loss. But it blocks the

pain...It’s much more permanent than an injection, than therapy. Some people

feel it’s much – depending on what the circumstances are and what’s more

helpful. And it’s less dangerous than a surgical procedure with a knife. And its

more selective.

(A.R. at 111.)

Dr. Weilepp was responding to a question asking him to compare the invasiveness

of ablation when compared to a different surgery. (Id.) His comments do not directly

address whether he believes ablation treatment to be invasive in and of itself. Instead, Dr

Weilepp describes “invasiveness” as a relative concept, noting that ablation could be

considered invasive in the sense that it is permanent and not something you can recover

from. However, in the same breath, he states that ablation is specific, targeted, less

dangerous than surgery with a knife, and that it was successful in this case. As such,

Plaintiff’s reference to Dr. Weilepp’s testimony was misleading to the extent Plaintiff

relied on it to prove the invasiveness of ablation treatment.

b. Lack of Objective Evidence

Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s approval of the ALJ’s reliance on

lack of objective evidence in his credibility assessment. Plaintiff’s objection states:

Judge Dembin also cited the ALJ’s reliance on the alleged lack of objective

evidence. Report and Recommendation at 15:26-28 and 16:13-24. However,

in Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9thCir. 1991) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit

rejected the “Bates standard” from Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1072 (9th

Cir. 1990), which required a claimant to produce evidence that corroborated

the degree of pain symptoms alleged. Instead, the Court in Bunnell affirmed the

“Cotton standard” from Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986),

that a claimant is merely required to produce evidence of an underlying

impairment that is reasonably likely to cause some of the symptoms alleged.

Carol Leonard fulfilled that burden as the ALJ conceded that point.

(Doc. No. 25 at 5) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991)).

It is undisputed that the Plaintiff in this case met her burden under Cotton. (A.R. at

47; R&R at 15:8-14.) The Cotton test, however, is only the first step in the ALJ’s twostep credibility analysis. Plaintiff’s objection suggests the ALJ’s reliance on lack of

objective evidence was improper because Plaintiff had already satisfied the Cotton test,

and under Bunnell, she was not required to produce evidence corroborating subjective

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pain testimony. In other words, Plaintiff argues the ALJ cannot on the one hand find

Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence under Cotton, then on the other hand discredit her

testimony based on a lack of objective evidence. 

Plaintiff’s argument is inconsistent with the second step of the ALJ’s credibility

analysis. Ninth Circuit case law is clear that after a claimant satisfies the Cotton test, the

ALJ can still reject the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms if the

ALJ makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Smolen,

80 F.3d at 1283-84 (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993)). 

Were the Court to accept Plaintiff’s argument, a finding that a claimant satisfied

the Cotton test would prevent an ALJ from considering a lack of objective medical

evidence in the second step of the credibility analysis. Such an interpretation is

inconsistent with the case law which provides that “[a]lthough the inconsistency of

objective findings with subjective claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting

subjective complaints of pain, it is one factor which may be considered with others.”

Khounesavatdy v. Astrue, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (internal citations

omitted); see also Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-47. Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s 3

objection to the extent it suggests satisfaction of the Cotton test precludes an ALJ from

using lack of objective evidence to discredit a claimant’s testimony.

c. The Effectiveness of the Medications and Treatment

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s consideration of the effectiveness of

Plaintiff’s medications and treatment. (Doc. No. 25 at 5.) Plaintiff’s objection states:

 Moreover, Plaintiff’s objection cites to pages 15 and 16 of the R&R. (Doc. No. 25 at 5.) The 3

cited portions of the R&R deal with the ALJ’s finding that there was a lack of objective clinical findings

establishing Plaintiff’s inability to perform work. This is separate and distinct from the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence of an underlying impairment that is reasonably likely to cause

some of the alleged symptoms, as required by Cotton. The Court notes that the two findings are not

necessarily inconsistent with one another - i.e. an ALJ may find the claimant produced sufficient

evidence to satisfy Cotton, yet still might find the evidence on record insufficient to show the claimant is

unable to work. Such is the case here.

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“[t]he first argument that Carol Leonard addresses this point, to wit, the reduction in pain

symptoms did not correspond to a greater functioning capacity.” (Id. at 5.)4

However, the ALJ’s conclusion regarding this issue was supported by substantial

evidence and was rational. (See Part (B)(1), supra, at p. 5-8.) “If the ALJ's credibility

finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we may not engage in secondguessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. As such, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection

to the Magistrate Judge’s consideration of the effectiveness of Plaintiff’s medications

and treatment.

d. Plaintiff’s Ability to Perform Certain Activities of Daily Living

Plaintiff’s final objection involves the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s ability to

perform certain activities of daily living. Plaintiff asserts:

[T]he mere performance of certain activities of daily living is not enough.

Plaintiff specifically cited Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007),

that the ALJ must cite evidence that a claimant performs those activities

sufficiently enough to meet the threshold for transferable capabilities.

Plaintiff’s MSJ at 8:1-12. Judge Dembin does not explain, and neither did the

ALJ, how the performance of those sporadic activities of daily living translate

to Carol Leonard’s ability to perform regular and continuing activities, i.e.,

eight hours of work for five days per week.

(Doc. No. 25 at 5-6.)

Plaintiff cites to Orn v. Astrue, a case where an ALJ discredited the claimant’s

subjective testimony after considering, among other things, the claimant’s daily

activities. 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ concluded that Orn's testimony

describing his “fatigue, shortness of breath and dysfunction” was “not totally credible.”

Id. at 635. In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ explained that Orn’s “reading,

watching television and coloring in coloring books indicate that he is more functional

than alleged.” Id. at 639. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found the ALJ erred in

 Plaintiff cites to a portion of the R&R which states: “Additionally, the ALJ stated he took into 4

consideration “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; other

treatment, other than medication for relief of pain” and found that her pain allegations were out of

proportion with the record.” (R&R at 16.) 

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discrediting the claimant’s testimony because the reasons provided were not clear and

convincing. Id. at 628. The Court in Orn explained:

Neither of the two grounds for using daily activities to form the basis of an

adverse credibility determination are present in Orn's case. First, as he

described them, Orn's activities do not contradict his other testimony. Second,

Orn's activities do not meet the threshold for transferable work skills, the

second ground for using daily activities in credibility determinations.

Id. at 639 (internal citation omitted).

Consistent with Orn, other courts have found that while “[t]he mere fact of a

claimant's carrying on certain daily activities does not necessarily detract from credibility

as to overall disability,” and ALJ may draw a negative inference “where the activities

contradict the other testimony of the claimant, or where the activities are of a nature and

extent to reflect transferable work skills.” Elizondo v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3432261, at *5

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010); see also Perez v. Astrue, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (C.D.

Cal. 2011) (“An ALJ properly may discount a claimant's credibility if his daily activities

contradict his other testimony or demonstrate the capacity for work.”).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s objection, after reviewing the ALJ’s written opinion and the

relevant portion of the R&R, the Court finds the ALJ properly considered both of the

grounds for using daily activities as the basis of an adverse credibility determination

discussed in Orn. The ALJ specifically found “the performance of the claimants’ daily

activities as described is not inconsistent with the performance of many basic work

activities,” and “cited to specific evidence in the record that contradicted Plaintiff’s

assertions that her disability makes it impossible for her to work.” (A.R. at 49; Doc. No.

24 at 17-18.) After reviewing the record, the Magistrate Judge found:

The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in his

credibility analysis. “[I]f a claimant engages in numerous daily activities

involving skills that could be transferred to the workplace, the ALJ may

discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to

those activities.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Morgan v. Apfel,

169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[C]laimant’s ability to fix meals, do

laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child was

evidence of claimant’s ability to work.”)

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(Doc. No. 24 at 17-18.)

Plaintiff relies on Orn to assert that the ALJ and the Magistrate Judge failed to

specifically state how Plaintiff’s daily activities met the threshold for transferable work

capabilities. (Doc. No. 25 at 5-6.) However, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual

functioning capacity to perform sedentary and light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1567 , and found Plaintiff’s subjective testimony not credible to the extent it 5

conflicted with that assessment. (A.R. at 46-47.) The ALJ specifically referred to

Plaintiff’s daily activities as one of the factors he considered when coming to this

conclusion, ultimately finding that “the performance of the claimants’ daily activities as

described is not inconsistent with the performance of many basic work activities.” (A.R.

at 49; Doc. No. 24 at 17.). 

For example, the ALJ specifically referenced Plaintiff’s August 1, 2006, adult

function report, in which Plaintiff reported she was able to “take care of her cats, take

care of her personal care, cook meals, dust, sweep, vacuum, water plants, clean the

bathroom, deadhead flowers, perform yard work, drive a car, go shopping in stores, pay

bills, count change, handle a savings account, use a checkbook and money orders, use

email, and follow written and spoken instructions.” (A.R. at 48; Doc. No. 24 16-17.)

The Court finds the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s daily activities when

making his credibility determination, and finds Plaintiff’s objection not persuasive when

 The relevant portion of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 states: “(a) Sedentary work. Sedentary work 5

involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a

certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary

if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.

(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little,

a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting

most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of

performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these

activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless

there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of

time.” 

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viewed in conjunction with the ALJ’s direct citation to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. When

6

analyzing this same issue, the Magistrate Judge specifically cited to Morgan v. Apfel

pointing out the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that a “claimant’s ability to fix meals, do

laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child was evidence of

claimant’s ability to work.” 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ in this case

relied upon similar activities. 

Moreover, Orn is distinguishable on the grounds that the daily activities in Orn -

reading, watching television and coloring - clearly failed to meet the threshold for

transferable work skills, whereas the Plaintiff’s daily activities in this case were of such a

nature and scope as to allow the ALJ to rationally infer transferability. See Lemus v.

Astrue, 2010 WL 3768035, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding ALJ’s credibility

determination to be rational, despite ALJ’s failure to explicitly articulate the

transferability of Plaintiff’s daily activities given the nature and scope of those activities,

as well as the numerous other factors cited by the ALJ); see also Macias v. Astrue, 2010

WL 3632807, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (distinguishing claimant’s daily activities

from those of the claimant in Orn, pointing out the Orn court’s statement that daily

activities relied upon by the ALJ in that case were “so undemanding that they cannot be

said to bear a meaningful relationship to the activities of the workplace.”)

Here, as described above, the ALJ made specific findings with respect to

Plaintiff’s daily activities. Those findings were rational, supported by substantial

evidence, and thus were clear and convincing. For these reasons, the Court overrules

Plaintiff’s objection.

 In addition to Plaintiff’s August 1, 2006 adult function report, the Magistrate Judge noted that 6

“[t]he ALJ also cited a report prepared by psychologist, Dr. Whitehead, on August 14, 2006, that

reported claimant stated she is able to cook or prepare simple foods and required no assistance

showering, bathing, toileting, or other personal hygiene activities, but on her own schedule and timing.

(A.R. at 528-529). The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s own testimony wherein she stated she was able to

cook, clean, and grocery shop. (A.R. at 139-141). Further, Plaintiff testified she took care of her

terminally ill sister until she died. (A.R. at 142). Plaintiff further testified that she used a glider machine

without any resistant weights to help try and alleviate ‘really bad pain.’ (A.R. at 148).” (Doc. No. 24 at

17.)

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections,

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s well-reasoned R&R in its entirety, DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case and enter judgment

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2014

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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