Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07012/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 2014 Decided July 7, 2015 

No. 13-7012 

GREGORY BOWYER AND GERALD PENNINGTON, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cv-00319) 

Donald M. Temple argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. 

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellees. With her on the briefs were Irvin B. 

Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and 

Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General. 

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH, and MILLETT, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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 GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: 

 Appellants Gregory Bowyer and Gerald Pennington sued 

the District of Columbia under the D.C. Whistleblower 

Protection Act, alleging that they were unlawfully reassigned 

to a less desirable position in retaliation for disclosures they 

allegedly made accusing their superiors of gross 

mismanagement and racial discrimination in the workplace. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the District, 

and we affirm, concluding that Bowyer and Pennington have 

failed to point to any evidence countering the District’s 

legitimate, independent reason for reassigning them. 

I 

A 

 Bowyer and Pennington were investigators with the Fire 

Investigations Unit of the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical 

Services Department (the Department) in 2001. In 2007, they 

locked horns with new Fire Chief Dennis Rubin and his 

Deputy Chief Gary Palmer over plans to diversify the entirely 

African-American Fire Investigations Unit. According to 

Bowyer and Pennington (the investigators), Rubin and Palmer 

put in place a race-based promotion policy that advanced 

unqualified white firefighters. Bowyer and Pennington filed 

complaints with the Department and with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission in the summer of 2008, 

alleging racial discrimination. 

During this same period, the investigators also found 

themselves at odds with the District’s Office of the Attorney 

General over the way prosecutors handled two criminal cases. 

The first concerned the prosecution of Timothy Bridgewater 

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for possession of illegal fireworks and a firearm following a 

sting operation the investigators ran in July 2007. According to 

the investigators, the fireworks they collected from 

Bridgewater at the time of his arrest went missing while in the 

Fire Investigations Unit’s custody. They also allege that the 

case file included staged photographs showing Bridgewater’s 

firearm in the front seat of his car, differing from photographs 

that Bowyer had taken at the scene of the arrest with his own 

camera showing the firearm in the backseat. The investigators 

assert that they told the federal prosecutor handling the case of 

these irregularities in November 2007 and that Pennington 

requested off the case as a result. 

Though the federal government soon dropped its case 

against Bridgewater, the District pursued its own. The 

investigators allege that their superiors ordered them, on threat 

of discipline, to meet with the District prosecutor handling the 

case. While nothing in the record suggests that they did not 

meet with the prosecutor, the investigators allege that Deputy 

Chief Palmer nonetheless stripped them of various work 

privileges and placed them in an office space with K-9 dogs in 

November 2007. The investigators aver that those penalties 

took place soon after they had told the federal prosecutor of the 

problems they had seen with the case against Bridgewater. 

The investigators allege that they informed the District 

prosecutor of the missing fireworks and staged photos but that 

she pressed forward anyway. Bowyer eventually testified on 

behalf of Bridgewater’s defense at a pretrial hearing, telling the 

same story of misconduct. The prosecutor, for her part, denied 

that either Bowyer or Pennington had ever shared their 

concerns with her, and she told her supervisors that Bowyer 

had perjured himself at the hearing. 

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The investigators again butted heads with District 

prosecutors after they arrested a juvenile called K.A. in June 

2008 for arson following a house fire. The prosecution suffered 

a setback when a court quashed a confession K.A. gave during 

questioning by the investigators that continued, according to 

the District, despite the youth’s request for counsel. 

Prosecutors were also incensed that Bowyer testified at trial 

that because a new colleague had bungled the initial 

investigation, he could not determine the cause of the fire even 

though he had signed an arrest warrant stating that it was 

arson.1

 On August 21, 2008, D.C. Assistant Attorney General 

Robert Hildum told Fire Chief Rubin that District prosecutors 

would no longer prosecute cases that Bowyer or Pennington 

had investigated or call them to testify as witnesses. Soon after, 

Rubin ordered the investigators reassigned from the Fire 

Investigations Unit to the Community Services Unit, where 

their duties would involve menial tasks such as checking fire 

hydrants and installing batteries in smoke detectors.

The investigators sued Chief Rubin, Deputy Chief Palmer, 

and the District of Columbia in federal district court on 

February 19, 2009, claiming that this reassignment and their 

earlier loss of privileges in November 2007 were illegal acts of 

retaliation under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. 

Code § 1-615.51 et seq. (DCWPA).2

 1 On cross-examination, Bowyer claimed he signed this form 

only on direct order from Deputy Chief Palmer after the officer who 

was supposed to sign refused.

2

 The complaint also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on 

these claims, see Bowyer v. District of Columbia, 910 F. Supp. 2d 

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B 

A plaintiff asserting a claim under the DCWPA must 

establish a prima facie case that (1) he made a “protected 

disclosure”; (2) his supervisor took or threatened to take a 

“prohibited personnel action” against him; and (3) the 

protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” to the 

prohibited personnel action. See D.C. Code §§ 1-615.53(a), 

1-615.54(b); see also Crawford v. District of Columbia, 891 

A.2d 216, 218-19 (D.C. 2006); Tabb v. District of Columbia, 

605 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D.D.C. 2009). The Act’s definition of a 

“protected disclosure” includes “any disclosure of 

information . . . that the employee reasonably believes 

evidences . . . [g]ross mismanagement . . . [or] [a] violation of 

a federal, state, or local law.” D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6). 

 The DCWPA adopts a burden-shifting scheme that in 

some ways parallels federal Title VII jurisprudence. Once a 

plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case by a preponderance of 

the evidence, the burden shifts to the defendant “to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the alleged [prohibited 

personnel] action would have occurred for legitimate, 

independent reasons even if the employee had not” made the 

protected disclosure. D.C. Code § 1-615.54(b); see also

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 935 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C. 

2007). If the defendant shows at summary judgment that there 

is no genuine issue of disputed fact as to its asserted legitimate, 

independent reason, the plaintiff must “counter[] the defense 

evidence” by “proffering contrary, admissible evidence that a 

jury might credit.” Johnson, 935 A.2d at 1118 n.2. The plaintiff 

thus must come forward with credible evidence showing that 

 

173, 199-213 (D.D.C. 2012), and the investigators do not challenge 

that part of the court’s ruling. 

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the legitimate, independent reason the defendant offered was 

pretext for an actual, discriminatory motive or did not actually 

motivate the challenged personnel action. See id. at 1118. 

C 

Before the district court, the investigators conceded that 

the DCWPA did not create a private right of action against 

individuals. Bowyer v. District of Columbia, 2009 WL 

3299815 at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2009).3 The district court thus 

dismissed Rubin and Palmer from the suit, leaving the District 

as the only remaining defendant. Id.

4

After extensive discovery, the District moved for summary 

judgment. Three of the arguments the investigators made in 

response are relevant to this appeal. First, they argued that in 

November 2007, Deputy Chief Palmer stripped them of 

privileges and moved their workstations to a room that housed 

K-9 dogs in retaliation for their disclosures to prosecutors of 

anomalies in the Bridgewater investigation. Next, they argued 

 3

 The amended statute now authorizes such a cause of action, 

see D.C. Code § 1-615.54(a), but Bowyer and Pennington do not 

appeal the dismissal of Rubin and Palmer. In any event, we have 

previously held that the amendment did not have retroactive effect. 

See Payne v. District of Columbia, 722 F.3d 345, 351-53 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). 

4

 The court also dismissed any part of the complaint that arose 

from actions that occurred more than six months before the 

investigators filed their suit because they did not comply with the 

DCWPA’s requirement that the mayor be provided with notice of the 

time, place, cause, and circumstances of their injury within six 

months of that injury. See Bowyer, 2009 WL 3299815 at *2. The 

court later reinstated those parts of the complaint, however, after the 

District repealed the statute’s notice provision. Bowyer v. District of 

Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165-66 (D.D.C. 2011). 

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that they were reassigned to the Community Services Unit in 

August 2008 in retaliation for their testimony during the trial of 

K.A. And finally, they argued that their reassignment was also 

retaliation for the complaints they filed with the Department 

and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 

alleging racial discrimination in the Fire Investigations Unit. 

 The district court granted the District’s motion for 

summary judgment, concluding that Bowyer and Pennington 

failed to show that they had made protected disclosures in 

either the Bridgewater matter or the K.A. case. And even 

though the district court found that the complaints of racial 

discrimination filed with the EEOC were indeed protected 

disclosures, it held that the investigators had failed to show that 

those who reassigned them knew anything about the 

complaints. The court did not consider the similar complaints 

that Bowyer and Pennington filed with the Department. 

 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 

II 

The investigators charge the district court with making 

two material errors. First, they argue the court erred by holding 

that they had not introduced evidence sufficient to show that 

they had made protected disclosures during the Bridgewater 

investigation. Second, they argue that the district court erred by 

failing to consider whether complaints they filed with the 

Department alleging racial discrimination caused their 

reassignment. We review the entry of summary judgment de 

novo, drawing all inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

nonmoving party. See McCormick v. District of Columbia, 752 

F.3d 980, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2014). On de novo review, we may 

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affirm the district court’s judgment on a different theory than 

used by the district court. Id. at 986. 

 The investigators argued in the district court that they 

made protected disclosures under the DCWPA when they told 

the federal and local prosecutors about alleged improprieties 

related to the Bridgewater investigation. The district court 

found their evidence insufficient to withstand the District’s 

motion for summary judgment because they had not introduced 

anything beyond their own “self-serving and uncorroborated 

deposition testimony” showing that they had in fact made any 

disclosures. Bowyer, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Before this court, 

the investigators challenge the district court’s conclusion, 

arguing that the court misapplied the standard for summary 

judgment by not construing the facts in their favor. Cf. Adickes 

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that 

courts should view facts “in the light most favorable to” the 

party opposing summary judgment). Curiously, the 

investigators now argue that their Bridgewater disclosures led 

to a different form of retaliation than the one they asserted 

below. No longer do they maintain those disclosures triggered 

their 2007 loss of privileges and move to a room shared by 

dogs. Instead, they argue for the first time that the Bridgewater 

disclosures were the reason for their 2008 reassignment to the 

Community Services Unit, and they doubled down on this 

position at oral argument, see Oral Arg. Tr. 5:23-6:15. In the 

district court, however, they had argued only that this 

reassignment was retaliation for their testimony during the trial 

of K.A. and for their complaints alleging racial discrimination. 

 “It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate 

court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” 

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). See also

10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 2716 at 282-85 & nn.12-13 (3d ed. 1998). 

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Because the investigators did not argue before the district court 

that their disclosures related to the Bridgewater case led to their 

reassignment to the Community Services Unit, we decline to 

consider this argument on appeal.5

 

 This leaves only the question of whether the district court 

erred in overlooking the investigators’ argument that the 

complaints they filed with the Department alleging racial 

discrimination triggered their allegedly retaliatory 

reassignment. 

 The district court recognized that the complaints filed with 

the EEOC were protected disclosures under the DCWPA. 

Bowyer, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 196. After all, those complaints 

alleged violations of local law prohibiting discrimination in the 

workplace. Id.; see also D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6)(D). But 

the court correctly concluded that these complaints could not 

have contributed to the investigators’ August 21, 2008, 

reassignment because they were filed after their transfer to the 

Community Services Unit had already taken place. Bowyer, 

910 F. Supp. 2d at 198-99. Indeed, as the district court noted, 

the EEOC complaints even mention the reassignment. Id. 

 The district court, however, completely overlooked the 

complaints alleging racial discrimination in the Fire 

Investigations Unit that the investigators filed with the 

Department in June 2008, two months before they were 

reassigned. That was a mistake, to be sure. But it is an error that 

does not help the investigators rebut the District’s explanation 

for the reassignments. There is no disputed question of material 

 5

 We need not address the district court’s conclusion that the 

investigators failed to come forward at summary judgment with 

evidence sufficient to show that they made protected disclosures 

during the Bridgewater investigation. 

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fact in the record that the actual cause of the investigators’ 

reassignment was the refusal of the Office of the Attorney 

General to take future cases involving them, not the complaints 

they filed with the Department. On August 21, 2008, District 

Deputy Attorney General Hildum informed Chief Rubin that 

District prosecutors would no longer allow Bowyer and 

Pennington to participate in court proceedings and would never 

again call them as witnesses due to objections from prosecutors 

concerning the roles they played in both the Bridgewater and 

K.A. cases. The investigators do not dispute that this 

conversation took place. 

 Later that same day, Rubin ordered an assistant fire chief 

to transfer Bowyer and Pennington out of the Fire 

Investigations Unit. Rubin explained in a declaration that 

“[w]orking with [District] prosecutors was the essential part of 

[the investigators’] job duties . . . [and] they could no[] longer 

perform this function” following the decision by the District’s 

Office of the Attorney General. Hence the reassignment. 

 The District has made a showing that any reasonable juror 

would have to find by clear and convincing evidence that the 

refusal of the Office of the Attorney General to work with 

either Bowyer or Pennington was a “legitimate, independent 

reason[]” for their reassignment to the Community Services 

Unit. See D.C. Code § 1-615.54(b). Hildum informed Rubin 

that the investigators could no longer perform a core function 

of their jobs, and Rubin immediately ordered the reassignment. 

Just as a close temporal proximity between a protected 

disclosure and an act of retaliation suggests a causal 

connection, see Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 

2000), we see a clear link between Hildum informing Rubin 

that prosecutors would no longer work with the investigators 

and Rubin’s near-simultaneous decision to reassign them. 

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 Significantly, the investigators never assert that the reason 

the District proffered for their reassignment was pretext. Cf.

Johnson, 935 A.2d at 1118. Their only gesture in that direction 

is a footnote in their reply brief that Bowyer successfully 

defended disciplinary charges related to the K.A. investigation 

before an administrative trial board. But that is irrelevant to the 

question at hand. What matters under the DCWPA is the 

reason the District reassigned Bowyer and Pennington to the 

Community Services Unit. See, e.g., McCormick v. District of 

Columbia, 752 F.3d 980, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (disregarding an 

attempt by a plaintiff to show pretext by addressing a “wholly 

different factual question” than the defendant’s legitimate, 

independent reason for taking an adverse action). The 

unrebutted explanation the District has offered is that the 

Department reassigned the investigators because District 

prosecutors refused to work with either of them and not 

because they had filed Equal Employment Opportunity 

complaints with the Department alleging racial discrimination. 

Because the investigators failed to rebut this explanation, we 

hold they have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of 

disputed fact sufficient to survive summary judgment on their 

DCWPA claim. 

III 

 We affirm the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to the defendant District of Columbia. 

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