Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(LASSEN COUNTY et al.)

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

JAMES CHAPMAN, BOB PYLE, LLOYD

KEIFER, BRIAN DAHLE and JACK

HANSON, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

MARGARET CROSBY, DIRECTOR OF

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

LASSEN COUNTY, TERRY CHAPMAN,

LOEL GRIFFITH and DIRECTOR OF

CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 

This matter comes before the court on defendants Lassen

County, Loel Griffith, and Terry Chapman’s motion to dismiss

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff Amy McConnell brings this action on her own

behalf and on the behalf of her four minor children. 

2 On June 10, 2005, plaintiff filed the first amended

complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend the pleading

once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served . . . . [o]therwise a party may amend the

party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of

the adverse party.” (emphasis added). On August 22, 2005,

plaintiff filed a second amended complaint without leave of

court. The second amended complaint is stricken, but will be

viewed as a proposed complaint for the purpose of assessing

plaintiff’s ability to allege sufficient and definite facts

against defendants should leave be granted. Therefore, the

ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for a more

definite statement addresses the sufficiency of the allegations

in plaintiff’s first amended complaint only. 

3 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(n).

5 The background facts are taken primarily from plaintiff’s

complaint, which is at times inconsistent and incomplete. 

2

plaintiff’s1 first amended complaint2 (“complaint”) pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 and motion

for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). For the

reasons set forth below,4 defendants’ motions are denied in part

and granted in part. 

BACKGROUND5

Plaintiff Amy McConnell and her husband James McConnell

lived in Susanville, California with her four minor children. 

(Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 3.) On May 5, 2003, plaintiff left her

four children at the home with her husband while she went to pay

a bill at the gas company. (Id.) Plaintiff’s engine died while

she was at the gas company. (Id.) While plaintiff was still

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 It is unclear from the allegations in the complaint when

plaintiff’s eldest child left the home and went to school.

3

away, James McConnell left the home to use the phone of a

neighbor. (Id.) During the time of James McConnell’s absence,

three of the children were left alone in the home. Plaintiff’s

oldest child was at school.6 (Id.) 

The maternal grandfather of the children came to the home

and demanded that the children let him in the door. They did so.

He thereupon physically removed the children from the home and

took them to Lassen County Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

without authorization by the parents. (Id.) A CPS social

worker, defendant Terry Chapman, took custody of the oldest child

of plaintiff. (Id.) James McConnell returned home and found

that the children were missing. (Id.) Later that afternoon,

after searching the neighborhood, James and Amy McConnell heard

on a police scanner that the children were at CPS. (Id.)

At CPS, James McConnell accepted responsibility for the

children being left home alone, and, stated that he would leave

the home if the children would be returned to plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff took the childrens’ clothing and food to CPS. (Id.) 

She was not given the opportunity to return home with her

children or remove her husband from the home. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff alleges that there was no claim against her for leaving

the children without supervision. (Id.)

The children were taken into custody by CPS and placed in

the Environmental Alternatives Foster Family Agency. (Id. at 3-

4.) Subsequently, the children were placed in the foster home by

Lassen County CPS, where they were repeatedly sexually molested

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

and abused. (Id. at 6.) Defendants failed to provide medical or

psychological care to either the plaintiff or the children after

these events. (Id.) Defendants also failed and refused to give

any regular visitation with the children to plaintiff. (Id.) 

 No investigation or analysis of alternatives was made, such

as in-family placement of the children. (Id. at 4.) Lassen

County CPS did not prepare a case plan; did not notify the

parents of the court hearing regarding the petition for custody

of the children; and did not record one visitation to the foster

home after the children were placed in the home. (Id. at 4, 6.) 

The children were subsequently returned to plaintiff without

reunification services. (Id. at 6,8.)

Plaintiff’s complaint, based upon the above allegations,

alleges three claims for relief: (1) violation of civil rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional

distress under state law; and (3) negligence under state law. 

(Id. at 7-15.) As to the first claim, plaintiff alleges that

defendants deprived plaintiff of due process of law, and the

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. (Id. at

7-9.) 

STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A motion for a more definite statement should not be granted

unless a pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). This liberal standard is consistent with Fed. R.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which allows pleadings that contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim.” The Rules anticipate that the

parties will familiarize themselves with the claims and ultimate

facts through the discovery process. See Famolare, Inc. v.

Edison Brothers Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal.

1981). Indeed, “where the information sought by the moving party

is available and/or properly sought through discovery, the motion

should be denied.” Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Compliance with the California Torts Claim Act

Defendants allege that plaintiff’s state tort claims should

be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead compliance with

the California Tort Claims Act. In order to state a tort claim

against a public entity, the California Torts Claim Act requires

“the timely presentation of a written claim and the rejection of

the claim in whole or in part.” Mabe v. San Bernardino County,

237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mangold v. Cal. Pub.

Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff must

present claims to the government entity for money or damages with

few exceptions. Cal. Code § 905 (West 2005). Tort claims such

as the instant claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress and negligence are not listed among the exceptions to §

905. Moreover, under Government Code § 945.4, 

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board. 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Cal. Code § 945.4 (West 2005). Finally, under Government Code §

950.2, any suit against a public employee is barred in cases

where a plaintiff’s action against the agency is barred for

failure to present a claim. The 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 makes

it clear the “the presentation of a claim to the employing public

entity is a prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in her complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

compliance with the California claims statutes is mandatory. 

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). 

Federal courts have recognized these requirements. See Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other

grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987) (failure to comply with claimfiling requirements imposed by California Tort Claims Act bars

pendent state claims). Finally, where employees of the agency in

question act within their express or implied authority, despite

the wrongful nature of their actions, a complaint based on the

employees’ actions may be properly dismissed for failing to

allege proper filing of the claim with the employing government

entity. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1973).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege compliance with the

California Tort Claim Act procedures. As such, and given that

plaintiff has not alleged that defendants acted outside of their

express or implied authority, defendants’ motion to dismiss as to

plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress and negligence is GRANTED.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

B. State Law Claims Against Defendant Griffith

Defendant Griffith also asserts that the complaint fails to

allege facts sufficient to state a claim against her for

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Griffith are so vague

that defendant cannot reasonably be required to frame a

responsive pleading. Plaintiff asserts that all defendants both

intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon plaintiff

and her children, Pl’s Compl., filed June 10, 2005, at 10-12, and

were negligent in their duties owed to plaintiff and her

children, id. at 12-14. Throughout the complaint, plaintiff

refers to the named defendants collectively. The only specific

allegation that plaintiff offers against defendant Griffith

states that “Loel Griffith knew or had reason to know that the

foster home and the succession of foster homes chosen for the

Plaintiff’s minor children were inadequate and not safe.” Id. at

5. Due to the collective designation of all defendants in the

allegations of the complaint, it is impossible to identify the

acts, omissions, duties, or causation elements necessary to

allege a tort claim against defendant Griffith. See Vance v.

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996-97 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

(finding that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was “sorely lacking in

specificity” where complaint failed “to spell out any factual

allegations as to specific incidents . . . chargeable to any of

the individual defendants”); Rice v. Comtek Mfg. of Oregon, Inc.,

766 F. Supp. 1539, 1541-42 (D. Or. 1990) (dismissing plaintiff’s

tort claim where complaint did not allege actions by specific

defendants). Due to the vagueness of the allegations in the

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

complaint, defendant Griffith’s motion with respect to

plaintiff’s state law claims is GRANTED.

Defendant Griffith alleges that even if the complaint had

alleged that she had a duty to inspect the foster home in which

the minor children were placed, she would be immune under

California Government Code § 821.4. This section of the code

does not shield defendant from liability in these circumstances. 

Section 821.4 grants immunity to public employees who fail to

inspect or negligently inspect private property. The public

employee is immune from suits subsequently brought by plaintiffs

injured by the property. See Clayton v. City of Sunnyvale, 62

Cal. App. 3d 666 (1976) (holding that city and city employees

were immune from liability for injury caused by defective flight

of stairs that had been inspected by public employees). 

Plaintiff does not allege that any injury to her or her children

was caused by the physical property of the foster home. 

Therefore, § 821.4 does not grant defendant Griffith immunity

from plaintiff’s negligence claim. 

C. Negligence Claim Against Defendant Lassen County

To bring a tort claim against a government entity in

California, liability must be based on statute. County of Los

Angeles v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th 627, 637 (2002). 

California Government Code § 815 provides: “Except as otherwise

provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an

injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of

the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” 

Therefore, “in the absence of some constitutional requirement,

public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

be liable.” County of Los Angeles, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 637

(quoting Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1450,

1457 (1998)).

A public entity may be directly liable for failure to

discharge a mandatory duty. Gov. Code § 815.6. 

Government Code § 815.6 contains a three-pronged test

for determining whether liability may be imposed on a

public entity: (1) an enactment must impose a

mandatory, not a discretionary duty; (2) the enactment

must intend to protect against the kind of risk of

injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as

a basis for liability; and (3) breach of the mandatory

duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered.

 

County of Los Angeles, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 638-39 (quoting

Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 1458). At

the pleading stage, it is essential that plaintiff plead the

existence of a specific statutory duty, identifying the statute

or enactment claimed to establish the duty. Id.

The determination of whether a statute or enactment imposes

a mandatory duty is a matter of interpretation for the court. 

Nunn v. State of California, 35 Cal. 3d 616, 624 (1984) (citing

Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 906, 911 (1977)). 

“The legislative intent can usually be determined from the

statutory language.” Id. Where the specific language does not

clearly indicate the intent of the Legislature, the court may

determine the intent of the Legislature through other factors. 

Id. 

It is well established that statutes must be given a

reasonable construction that conforms to the apparent

purpose and intention of the law makers and the various

parts of the statutory enactment must be harmonized by

considering the particular clause in the context of the

whole statute.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

 

Id. at 624-25 (internal citations omitted). 

1. Section 300 et seq.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges generally that defendant

failed to follow the mandatory requirements of §§ 300 et seq. of

the California Welfare and Institutions Code. This citation to

numerous sections of the code is insufficient to satisfy the

pleading requirements when alleging negligence by a government

entity. See id. 

Unless the applicable enactment is alleged in specific

terms, a court cannot determine whether the

enactmentrelied upon was intended to impose an

obligatory duty to take official action to prevent

foreseeable injuries or whether it was merely advisory

in character.

 

Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 1458

(emphasis added). Therefore, defendant Lassen County’s motion as

to plaintiff’s claims for negligence under §§ 300 et. seq. is

GRANTED. 

2. Section 16500.5

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that defendants had

mandatory duties under specific provisions of the California

Welfare and Institutions Code. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

Lassen County had a duty under § 16500.5. Section 16500.5

provides that the Legislature “declare its intent to encourage

the continuity of the family unit” by providing family

preservation services, supportive services for children, and

counseling and family support services. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 16500.5 (West 2005). This declaration of legislative intent

does not impose a mandatory duty upon defendant Lassen County. 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

“An enactment does not create a mandatory duty if it merely

recites legislative goals and policies that must be implemented

through a public agency’s exercise of discretion.” County of Los

Angeles, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 639 (citing Wilson v. County of San

Diego, 91 Cal. App. 4th 974, 980 (2001)). Section 16500.5 merely

sets out the intent of the legislature to encourage the

continuity of the family unit by providing support services that

the agency must implement through its discretion. Cal. Welf. &

Inst. Code § 16500.5. As such, this section does not impose a

mandatory duty upon defendant Lassen County. Defendant Lassen

County’s motion as to plaintiff’s claims for negligence under §

16500.5 is GRANTED.

3. Sections 16501.1, 309, and 387 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants had a duty to prepare a 

case plan within 60 days for the parents of the minor children

pursuant to § 16501.1. This section imposes a duty upon the

County “to evaluate the stated criteria prior to making a

placement selection.” County of Los Angeles, 102 Cal. App. 4th

at 641 (quoting Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal. App. 4th

at 1459-60). This section does not specify the ultimate result

that must be reached, nor does it dictate that any one factor is

controlling. Id. at 640-41. It does however impose a mandatory

duty, requiring the county to evaluate certain criteria. Id. at

641. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants had a mandatory duty

under § 309. This section imposes a duty to “investigate the

circumstances of the child and the facts surrounding the child’s

being taken into custody and attempt to maintain the child with

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the child’s family through the provision of services.” Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 309 (West 2005). Like § 16501.1, this duty

does not specify the ultimate placement that must be made. 

However, it does impose a mandatory duty to investigate the

child’s circumstances, including the existence of other family

members that may be able to take custody of the children. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to comply

with § 387. Section 387 imposes a duty to provide a noticed

hearing before issuing “an order changing or modifying a previous

order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent,

guardian, relative, or friend and directing placement in a foster

home, or commitment to a private or county institution.” Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 387 (West 2005). This section also does not

dictate the ultimate result, but does impose a mandatory duty to

provide a noticed hearing.

Defendant further argues that plaintiff has failed to

sufficiently plead proximate causation between any mandatory

duties owed by Lassen County and any injuries suffered by

plaintiff. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she and her

children “have suffered damages because of the failure of the

defendants . . . to follow the law and regulations.” (Pl’s 1st

Am. Compl. at 14.) The complaint must be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Parks School of Business, Inc.

V. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Courts must

assume that all general allegations “embrace whatever specific

facts might be necessary to support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano

Unified School Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). 

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Plaintiff’s general allegation of causation is therefore

sufficient.

Plaintiff has specifically identified the enactments

creating mandatory duties owed by the county under §§ 16501.1,

309, and 387. (Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 13-14.) Plaintiff has

alleged that she has suffered damages because of defendant Lassen

County’s failure to discharge these mandatory duties. (Id. at

14.) Therefore, defendant Lassen County’s motion with regard to

plaintiff’s claims alleging negligence under §§ 309, 387, and

16501.1 is DENIED. 

D. Conspiracy Theory

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to properly

allege a conspiracy theory against defendants. In order to state

a claim for relief based upon conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiffs

must assert that defendants had an agreement or “meeting of the

minds” to violate their constitutional rights. Ward v. EEOC, 719

F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1983); see Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). While the

existence of a formal agreement between defendants need not be

established, plaintiffs must allege some unity of purpose or

common design in an unlawful arrangement sufficient for a jury to

conclude that a conspiracy existed. See American Tobacco v.

United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946). “A mere allegation

of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” 

Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotations omitted).

Here, plaintiff has not alleged any specific fact to lead to

such an inference. Rather, plaintiffs have merely alleged that

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

defendants “conspired” to do the acts alleged in the complaint. 

(Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 7, 10.) Such a conclusory allegation

amounts to a legal conclusion cast in the form of a factual

allegation. United States ex re. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d

638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). Additionally, plaintiff fails to

allege which particular defendants “conspired” to violate her

constitutional rights. Thus, defendants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are GRANTED. 

E. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint demonstrates her

ability to allege further facts with greater specificity as they

relate to this matter. Therefore, justice requires that

plaintiff be granted leave to amend the first amended complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants Lassen County, Loel

Griffith, and Terry Chapman’s motions are DENIED in part and

GRANTED in part. Because plaintiff has demonstrated the possible

ability to plead sufficient and definite allegations against

defendants in the proposed second amended complaint, plaintiff is

granted fifteen (15) days from the date of this order to file a

second amended complaint in accordance with this order. 

Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of service 

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

of plaintiff’s second amended complaint to file a response

thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2005 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 34 Filed 09/21/05 Page 16 of 16