Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00060/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 This Court granted Petitioner’s March 24, 2005 motion to stay the instant petition to allow

Petitioner to return to state court to exhaust a previously unexhausted claim. Petitioner filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court containing the unexhausted claim on

January 12, 2006 and it was denied on September 20, 2006. (Lodgment Nos. 13 and 14.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS DEGADILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ADAMS, Warden

Defendants. 

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Civil No.05cv0060 IEG (AJB)

Report and Recommendation 

Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

[Doc. Nos. 1 and 15]

Petitioner, Jesus Degadillo, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 5, 2005. (Docket No. 1.) Petitioner is challenging his

April 24, 2002 conviction in San Diego Superior Court, alleging: (1) that the trial court violated

petitioner’s Eighth Amendment right by sentencing petitioner to imprisonment for 150 years to life plus

five years at the age of seventy four; (2) that the trial court’s use of California Jury Instruction 17.41.1

was a structural defect in the trial compelling reversal of Petitioner’s conviction; and (3) that the state

court violated Petitioner’s Constitutional Due Process rights by failing to utilize federal laws in making

the decisions that denied Petitioner relief.1

 Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus

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Petition in accordance with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing section 2254 cases in the United States

District Court (Docket No. 15.) Petitioner filed a Traverse (Docket No. 19.) 

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to any

claim presented in the Petition, and recommends the Petition be DENIED. 

Background

I. Underlying Facts

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion affirming Petitioner's

conviction on direct review. This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes

them to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981)

(stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts).

In 2000, appellant, while living in San Diego, repeatedly had sexual

intercourse with his six-year-old daughter. A year later the family moved

to San Ysidro. While in San Ysidro, appellant had sexual intercourse with

his daughter at least once or twice a week and had anal intercourse with

her at least once. Appellant also rubbed against his daughter in a sexual

manner in the family van. (Lodgment No. 10, People v. Degadillo, No.

D040872, at 2.) 

II. State Proceedings

Petitioner was convicted of three counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a female

child under the age of fourteen in violation of California Penal Code section 288(a) and the jury found

that these acts involved substantial sexual conduct within the meaning of California Penal Code section

1203.066(a)(8). The jury also found that Petitioner: 1) had been previously convicted of the felony of

committing a lewd act upon a child within the meaning of California Penal Code section 667.71(a); 2)

was a habitual sexual offender within the meaning of California Penal Code section 667.71; and 3) had

one prior strike and one serious prior within the meaning of California Penal Code sections 667, 668,

1170.12 and 1192.7. (Lodgement No. 1 at CT 30-31.)

On September 13, 2002, the court denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the strike prior and

sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison plus five years. The Court held Petitioner would not be

eligible for parole for 150 years. (CT 324-26.) The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence and

in an unpublished decision on September 12, 2003, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One, affirmed the judgment and sentence. (Lodgement No. 10.) On November 6,

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2003, the Petitioner filed a combined habeas corpus petition and petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on August 18, 2004. (Lodgment No. 11.) 

Discussion

The Petitioner alleges: (1) that the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment right by sentencing

petitioner to imprisonment for 150 years to life plus five years at the age of seventy four; (2) that the

trial court’s use of California Jury Instruction 17.41.1 was a structural defect in the trial compelling

reversal of his conviction; and (3) that the state court violated his Constitutional Due Process rights by

failing to utilize federal laws in making the decisions that denied Petitioner relief. Respondent contends:

1) that Petitioner’s claim that the California Court of Appeal decision upholding the 150 years to life

sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the state court evidence given the severity

and scope of Petitioner’s crimes; 2) that the Ninth Circuit has already rejected the argument that the use

of CALJIC 17.41.1 violates a Petitioner’s due process rights; and 3) that Petitioner’s third ground for

relief fails to state a claim and is unsupported by argument or authority.

I. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006)

(emphasis added).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006).

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A state court's decision may be "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent: (1)

"if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases" or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the]

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent." Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision may involve an "unreasonable application" of

clearly established federal law, "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this

Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 407. 

An unreasonable application may also be found, "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly

established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme]

Court's decisions." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Habeas relief is also available if the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state

court." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) (West 2006). In order to satisfy this provision, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court's adjudication of his claims rest,

assuming they rest on a factual determination, are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

II. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment Claim

The Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment right by sentencing

petitioner to imprisonment for 150 years to life plus five years at the age of seventy four. Alternatively,

Respondent argues that given the scope and severity of Petitioner’s crimes, the California Court of

Appeals decision upholding the 150 years to life sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable

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determination of the state court evidence. The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's Eighth

Amendment claim, noting that the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life on each of the three

separate section 288, subdivision (a) counts in accordance with section 667.71, subdivision (a), and the

term on each count was doubled as a result of Petitioner's prior strike. (Lodgment No. 10, at 2.) This

Court concludes that the state court's decision was neither "contrary to, [n]or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Supreme Court has clarified that one governing legal principle emerges as "clearly

established Federal law" to be applied in determining whether a particular sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments -- the "gross proportionality principle" set

forth in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and Rummel

v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). The "precise contours" of

this "gross proportionality principle" are "unclear," and are "applicable only in the 'exceedingly rare' and

'extreme' case." Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001).

In rejecting Petitioner's claim that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under

the Eighth Amendment, the California Court of Appeal specifically cited Rummel and Harmelin

(Lodgment No. 10, pp. 3-7.) The appellate court also applied the three-pronged approach set forth by

the California Supreme Court in In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410 (1972), which requires a review of (1) the

"nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to

society"; (2) the length of the challenged sentenced as compared to the punishment prescribed for more

serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the length of the challenged punishment as compared to

punishments for the same offense in other jurisdictions (Lodgment No. 10, p. 4 (citing Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d

at 424-27).) 

In its analysis, the appellate court noted that the nature of the offense was "the ultimate violation

of self." (Lodgment 10, p.5 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, (1977) (which states that

"[s]hort of homicide, [sexual assault] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'").) The appellate court also found

that Petitioner's recidivist behavior of praying upon his youngest daughter repeatedly after previously

having intercourse on several occasion with his two older daughters demonstrated his unwillingness to

"conform his behavior to California law." (Lodgment 10, at 5.) The appellate court went on to stress

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2

 The Supreme Court states in Rummel that "The purpose of a recidivist statute . . . is . . .to deter

repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious

enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended

period of time. This segregation and its duration are based not merely on that person's most recent

offense but also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been

convicted of and sentenced for other crimes. Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the

point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the

amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion

of the punishing jurisdiction." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980).

3 Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1173 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1101); see also Ewing, 538 at 28

(holding that sentence of 25 years to life imposed under California's three strikes law upon a defendant

who stole three golf clubs did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even though the charge could have

been brought as a misdemeanor under California law); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (upholding sentence

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that Petitioner's sentence was not a result merely of his current conviction, but also of his recidivist

behavior, such that his sentence was not dissimilar to sentences which would be imposed for more

serious crimes taking into account his recidivism.2

 (Id., p. 6.)

Upon review, this Court cannot say that result reached by the state court was "contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Lynch test

applied by the California Supreme Court is identical to the inquiry set forth by the United States

Supreme Court in Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. The California Court of Appeal provided an extensive

explanation of why it is that Petitioner's sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

when viewed in light of his recidivist criminal behavior. As explained by that court, "[t]he punishment

for a habitual offender is more severe than the punishment for other crimes. Simply because California

recidivist statutes are among the most extreme does not compel the conclusion that they warrant

unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant is being punished severely for being a

repeat offender, and this method of punishment does not 'shock[] the conscience [or] offend[]

fundamental notions of human dignity.'" (citations omitted) The Supreme Court in Ewing stated that

"[i]t is enough that the state of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced

sentences for habitual felons 'advance the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial way.'" 

Ewing v. California, 583 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).

As such, this Court cannot say that this is the type of "exceedingly rare" and "extreme" case

where the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, and therefore recommends that Petitioner's

Eighth Amendment claim be DENIED.3

 

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of life in prison without possibility of parole for first-time offender in possession of 672 grams of

cocaine); Cf Solem, 463 U.S. at 281 (holding that a life sentence without possibility of parole for a

seventh nonviolent felony violated the Eighth Amendment where the triggering offense was "uttering a

'no account' check for $100"). 

7 05cv0060

II. Petitioner’s CALJIC 17.41.1 Claim

Petitioner challenges the Court of Appeals determination that the trial court did not err by

instructing the jury as to CALJIC 17.41.1. CALJIC 17.41.1 reads: 

The integrity of the trial requires that jurors at all times during their

deliberations to conduct themselves as required by those instructions. 

Accordingly should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on

penalty or punishment or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of

other jurors to immediately advise the court of the situation. 

Petitioner claims that CALJIC 17.41.1 unconstitutionally intrudes upon his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial by violating the secrecy and privacy of jury deliberations and violates the California

Constitution. (Petition at 7.) Petitioner further contends that CALJIC 17.41.1 acts as an improper antinullification instruction. Id. Petitioner contends that the California Supreme Court decision in People v.

Engelman, states that the instruction should not be used in future case because it created a risk to the

proper functioning of the jury that was serious enough to render a trial unfair. Id; 28 Cal.4th 436, 440

(2002). Alternatively, Respondent argues that Petitioner's claim is without merit since the Ninth Circuit

has already rejected similar claims of such grounds. 

The appellate court found while People v. Engelman does guarantee the privacy and secrecy of

jury deliberations and this instruction does have the potential to intrude unnecessarily on the deliberative

process, CALJIC 17.41.1 was not in violation of California law. 28 Cal.4th 436, 440 (2002). There is no

authority to suggest that the federal constitutional right to trial by jury requires that there be "[an]

absolute and impenetrable secrecy for jury deliberations in the face of an allegation of jury misconduct,

or that the constitutional right constitutes an absolute bar to jury instructions that might induce jurors to

reveal some element of their deliberations." Id. at 443. Additionally, the Petitioner has shown no

prejudice, because nothing in the record indicates any juror intended to act contrary to the law or that

CALJIC 17.41.1 had any affect on this issue. (Lodgment 10, at 9 (citing People v. Molina, 82 Cal. App.

4th 1329, 1335-36 (2000).) 

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The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate or cite any case law to support his contention that the

instruction is an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Under

AEDPA, a federal habeas court may only grant review if the dispositive state court decision is contrary

to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1262.

As the Respondent correctly indicates, the United States Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion

directly on CALJIC 17.41.1 or a similar instruction. Consequently, as “neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent]”, the Court is constrained by the

strictures of AEDPA, and therefore, powerless to grant relief. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

The Court recommends that Petitioner’s CALJIC claim be DENIED. 

III. Petitioner's Due Process Claim

In the final ground of the Petition, Petitioner argues that the state court violated his

Constitutional Due Process rights by “failing to utilize federal laws in making the decisions that denied

Petitioner relief." Petitioner never explains or elaborates on this claim, and it is unsupported by

argument or authority. Petitioner’s generalized complaint that his constitutional rights were violated is

insufficient to comply with Rule 2(c). Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that

the petition "shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds . . . specified [in

the petition]." Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th

Cir.1970) (trial court's dismissal of federal habeas proceeding affirmed where petitioner made

conclusory allegations instead of factual allegations showing that he was entitled to relief). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court's denial of his claim was contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly establish federal law, as determined by the United States

Supreme Court or was based on an unreasonable determination of the state court evidence. As such, this

Court recommends Petitioner's claim be DENIED.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that judgement

be entered denying the Petition.

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K:\COMMON\BATTAGLI\CASES\2 Orders to be filed\05cv60.Degadillo.v.Adams.R&R.Deny.pet.wpd 9 05cv0060

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). Any written objections to this

Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Court and a copy served on all parties on or before

December 31, 2007. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before January 15, 2008. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of this Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 13, 2007

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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