Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02223/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02223-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELVIN LANCE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2223 RRB KJM P

vs.

DIANE K. BUTLER, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The November 29, 2006 motion for summary judgment

filed by defendants Dunne and Chapman is now before the court.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

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judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

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judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On May 25, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his January 17, 2003 amended complaint, which is signed under the penalty of

perjury, plaintiff alleges as follows with respect to defendants Dunne and Chapman. 

During the relevant period of time, defendant Dunne worked as a registered nurse

at Folsom State Prison (FSP). Am. Compl. at 2:22-26. Dunne was responsible for the

transportation of prisoners to medical appointments. Id. Also during this time, defendant

Chapman worked as a correctional officer at FSP. Id. at 3:1-3.

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When plaintiff arrived at FSP in January 2000 he had Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

(CTS). Id. at 3:10-19. 

On August 6, 2001, a doctor at FSP ordered that plaintiff be scheduled for a visit

to the orthopedic clinic at the California Medical Facility (CMF) after plaintiff complained of

pain associated with CTS. Id. at 4:12-15. On September 4, 2001, plaintiff again complained

about pain to the same doctor. Id. at 4:16-19. The same doctor ordered again that plaintiff be

scheduled for a visit to the orthopedic clinic at CMF. Id. Plaintiff claims that he submitted

letters to defendant Dunne between August 2001 and December 2001 regarding the scheduling of

his visit to CMF. Id. at 5:15-20. Plaintiff was finally examined at CMF on January 14, 2002 and

was scheduled for surgery. Id. at 6:5-7. Plaintiff received surgery on his right wrist on March

19, 2002. Id. at 7:1-2. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dunne’s delay in transferring plaintiff to

CMF for his orthopedic clinic visit delayed plaintiff’s surgery and reflected deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 5:15-20. 

On March 22, 2002, plaintiff went to the hospital at FSP. Plaintiff informed

defendant Chapman, who was manning the door of the hospital, that he required pain medication. 

Id. at 7:3-10. Plaintiff had been prescribed Vicodin three times a day following his surgery. Id.

at 10:12-21. Chapman denied plaintiff access to pain medication for a period of two hours

because a staff meeting was occurring in the hospital. Id. 

Plaintiff received surgery on his left hand on July 2, 2002. Id. at 8:1-2.

Plaintiff asserts that defendants Dunne and Chapman deprived plaintiff of his

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by failing to

provide him with adequate medical care.

III. Eighth Amendment Standard For Medical Care 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment extends to

medical care of prison inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). In order to state

a section 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, a

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prison inmate must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. In the Ninth Circuit, 

the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. First, the

plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that

failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.’ Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant's response to

the need was deliberately indifferent. This second prongdefendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent-is

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the

indifference. Indifference may appear when prison officials deny,

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations & quotations omitted); see

also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). 

There is no Eighth Amendment violation if any delay in treatment is not harmful. 

Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Com’rs., 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). However,

unnecessary continuation of pain may constitute the “harm” necessary to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation from delay in providing medical care. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. The

duty to provide medical care applies “to medical conditions that may result in pain and suffering

which serve no legitimate penological purpose.” Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F.Supp. 1382, 1393

(D. Or. 1993), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A medical need is serious if failure to treat

the condition could cause further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would

find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are

examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for

medical treatment. 

Id. at 1060. 

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IV. Defendants’ Arguments and Analysis

A. Defendant Dunne

Defendants have included a declaration from defendant Dunne with their motion

for summary judgment. Defendant Dunne does not contradict, in any material respect, any of the

allegations set forth above. Dunne does not indicate when she first contacted CMF about

scheduling an orthopedic clinic visit. It appears that Dunne agrees that plaintiff was authorized

for an orthopedic clinic visit in early August 2001. Def’ts’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(DSUF), Ex. B, Decl. of Nancy Dunne (Dunne Decl.) ¶ 12. Dunne does not indicate whether she

ever received the letters plaintiff claims he sent.

Based on the evidence before the court, there is a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whether defendant Dunne failed to promptly request that plaintiff be examined in

the orthopedic clinic at CMF, and thus delayed plaintiff’s CTS surgery. A delay in surgery,

specifically, can constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs if the delay causes

significant harm and if the defendant should have known such harm would result from the delay. 

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9thCir. 2002). There is nothing in the record suggesting

plaintiff suffered any permanent injuries as a result of delayed CTS surgery. There is evidence,

however, in the form of a letter plaintiff sent to Dunne on December 3, 2001, suggesting

defendant Dunne was aware that plaintiff was in pain while he awaited surgery. Opp’n, Ex. B at

6. In that letter plaintiff states he was in “constant pain.” Id.; see also Am. Compl. at 5:15-20. 

Similarly, the complaint avers that plaintiff was in pain for at least seven months before he had

surgery in March 2002. Am. Compl. at 11:11-12. 

 In light of the above, the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whether defendant Dunne was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constant pain

by failing to promptly seek an appointment in the orthopedic clinic at CMF for plaintiff. 

Defendant Dunne’s motion for summary judgment should be denied.

/////

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B. Defendant Chapman

Defendants present evidence indicating that defendant Chapman did not observe

plaintiff to be in pain while plaintiff was waiting for medication in defendant Chapman’s

presence on March 22, 2007. DSUF, Ex. C, Decl. of E. Chapman (Chapman Decl.) at 3:3-17. 

Defendants also present evidence indicating that, when plaintiff approached defendant Chapman

at the entrance of the hospital on March 22, 2007, Chapman understood that no inmates were to

be permitted into the hospital until after the meeting that was occurring ended, unless there was

an emergency. Id. at 2:10-13. 

In his verified declaration attached to his opposition, plaintiff indicates that he

informed defendant Chapman three times while the meeting was occurring that he was in fact in

“acute” pain. Opp’n at 23:8-10. Chapman does not remember whether plaintiff approached

Chapman after being told he would have to wait until the end of the meeting to obtain his

medication. Chapman Decl. at 2:9-10. Chapman does believe he would have remembered if

plaintiff had made a “big deal” about his need for medication. Id.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court accepts that

plaintiff repeatedly informed defendant Chapman that he was experiencing acute pain in his

hand, and that defendant Chapman did not provide access to plaintiff’s pain medication for

approximately two hours. Nothing in the record, however, suggests plaintiff exhibited any

symptoms of his condition or otherwise showed that he was in distress in any way during the two

hour period at issue. Nothing indicates plaintiff experienced permanent injury as a result of

being deprived pain medication for these two hours.

In sum, there are no facts before the court suggesting that defendant Chapman was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s pain. It is not disputed that Chapman was authorized to

allow inmates into the medical unit during the two hours at issue only in the case of an

emergency. There are no facts suggesting plaintiff’s condition was life threatening, that he was

experiencing any other emergency, or that plaintiff was in danger of suffering or in fact suffered

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permanent injury from this limited period of pain. Under these circumstances, defendant was not

indifferent to plaintiff, he simply was not authorized to give plaintiff the help plaintiff sought. 

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Dunne and Chapman are immune from suit with respect to

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. Government officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To

survive a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show

that there are facts in the record sufficient to establish that defendants’ conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (1985). If no constitutional violation occurred, defendants are immune from liability. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional violation occurred, the court must further inquire

“whether the right was clearly established.” Id. “If the law did not put the [defendants] on notice

that [their] conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity

is appropriate.” Id. at 202. 

As indicated above, there are facts in the record sufficient to establish that

defendant Dunne violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. There are no facts to establish

that Chapman violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

As indicated above, plaintiff’s right to not be subjected to deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs by prison officials is clearly established, and has been since well

before the time of the actions and inactions alleged in the complaint. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. The facts in the record before the court could show that defendant

Dunne was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constant pain by delaying plaintiff’s CTS surgery

by up to six weeks. Dunne should not be granted immunity.

/////

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V. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted with respect to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant

Chapman, but denied as to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant Dunne.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The November 29, 2006 motion for summary judgement filed by defendants

Dunne and Chapman be granted with respect to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant

Chapman, but denied as to plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendant Dunne;

2. Defendant Chapman be dismissed from this action; 

3. Plaintiff be ordered to file an amended pretrial statement within thirty days of

any order adopting the foregoing findings and recommendations; and

4. Defendant Dunne be ordered to file her pretrial statement within fourteen days

of service of plaintiff’s pretrial statement.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 15, 2007.

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will2223.57

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