Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01176/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01176-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWIN ELMER COVENTRY, V, )

AIS #209975, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-CV-1176-ID

) [WO]

)

SHERIFF WILLIAM E. FRANKLIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Edwin Elmer Coventry ["Coventry"], a county

inmate, challenges actions taken against him in April and May of 2009 during his

confinement at the Elmore County Jail. Specifically, Coventry complains the defendants

reviewed and copied his outgoing personal mail. Coventry further argues the defendants

denied him access to the courts. 

The defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing

Coventry's claims for relief in which they adamantly deny his allegations. Specifically, the

defendants assert that Coventry has not been denied any of his constitutional rights. They

further maintain Coventry concedes that the instant civil action is a frivolous matter which

he no longer seeks to pursue. Defendants' Exhibit I (January 26, 2010 Letter of Edwin

Coventry) - Court Doc. No. 14-12 at 2-3 ("I am sorry I filed a bogus lawsuit.... I can not

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accuse [you all] of something you did not do. Please tell your lawyers to do what is needed

to do to drop [this] lawsuit...."). In addition, the defendants maintain the complaint is due

to be dismissed because Coventry failed to exhaust the administrative remedy available to

him at the Elmore County Jail with respect to the claims presented in this cause of action.

Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems

it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

April 26, 2010 - Court Doc. No. 15; Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008)

(Although an exhaustion defense "is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary

judgment[,]" the defense is appropriate for summary judgment when the evidence

demonstrates administrative remedies "are absolutely time barred or otherwise clearly

infeasible."). Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Upon consideration of this motion and the evidentiary materials filed in support

thereof, the court concludes that the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect

to the exhaustion defense is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c) (Summary judgment "should

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be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").1

 The party moving for summary judgment

"always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery

materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet

this burden by presenting evidence which would be admissible at trial indicating there is

no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present

evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of

proof. Id. at 322-324. 

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his exhaustion

of the jail's grievance procedure exists. Clark v. Coats and Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608

(11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) ("When a motion for

1

Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] more

easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes ... are

stylistic only.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic

changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule. 

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summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely

on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial."). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

To survive the defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment,

Coventry is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" establishing proper

exhaustion of the requisite administrative remedy. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely

colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted." Id. at

249-250. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not

suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for

that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory

allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Waddell v. Valley Forge Medical Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001);

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's "conclusory

assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant

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of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own

conclusory allegations...."); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("mere

verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary

judgment...."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by

appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case

and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due

to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th

Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence

to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is

appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami,

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

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of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the

evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to

admissible form indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party

moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is

proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine issue as to

a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine issue of

material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of

fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165

L.Ed.2d 697 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the

plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary

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principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Coventry fails to

demonstrate a requisite genuine issue of material fact in order to preclude summary

judgment based on his failure to exhaust a previously available administrative remedy. 

Matsushita, supra. 

III. DISCUSSION

Coventry challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his

confinement in the Elmore County Jail. In response to the complaint, the defendants

maintain this case is subject to dismissal because Coventry failed to exhaust the

administrative remedy provided at the Elmore County Jail prior to filing this complaint as

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available administrative

remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983 complaint. 

Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted." "Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate

must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative

remedies." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other

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wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

(11th Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006). Moreover, "the

PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93,

126 S.Ct. at 2387 (emphasis added). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an

agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in

federal court] because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the courts of its proceedings.... Construing § 1997e(a) to require

proper exhaustion ... fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary]

interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative

remedies are no longer available] would turn that provision into a largely useless

appendage." 548 U.S. at 90-91, 93, 126 S.Ct. at 2386-2387. The Court reasoned that

because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary an inmate cannot

"satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement ... by filing an untimely

or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]" or by effectively

bypassing the administrative process simply by waiting until the grievance procedure is no

longer available to her. 548 U.S. at 83-84, 126 S.Ct. at 2382; Johnson v. Meadows, 418

F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns

the administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion

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requirement of the PLRA). 

The record in this case is undisputed that the Elmore County Jail provides a

grievance procedure for inmate complaints. The court has thoroughly reviewed the

evidentiary materials filed by the defendants. These materials demonstrate that Coventry

failed to file any grievances regarding the actions about which he complains in the instant

complaint. Coventry does not dispute his failure to exhaust the administrative remedy

available to inmates confined in the Elmore County Jail prior to filing this case. The court

therefore concludes that the claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal

as the plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedy available to him properly, which

is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94, 126

S.Ct. at 2384-2388.

The time limitations applicable to filing grievances with respect to the claims made

the basis of this complaint have long since expired. Defendants' Exhibit A (Affidavit of Jail

Administrator Jeff Fox) - Court Doc. No. 14-1 at 4 ("The inmate handbook [provided to

Coventry upon his entry into the Elmore County Jail] states that an inmate may report a

grievance ... within fourteen (14) days of the incident complained of."). Thus, the

administrative remedy provided by the defendants with respect to the claims made the basis

of the instant complaint are no longer available to Coventry. Under such circumstances,

dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.1; Johnson, 418 F.3d

at 1157; Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Without the prospect of a

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dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no

administrative grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing

administrative remedies and gaining access to a federal forum without exhausting

administrative remedies."); Berry v. Keirk, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 2004) (footnotes

omitted) (Inmate's "federal lawsuits ... properly dismissed with prejudice" where previously

available administrative remedies had become unavailable and no circumstances justified

the failure to exhaust.). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED to the extent the

defendants seek dismissal of this case due to the plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust

administrative remedies previously available to him at the Elmore County Jail.

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for the plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies

previously available to him at the Elmore County Jail. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before June 30, 2010 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

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that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal those factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done, this 16th day of June, 2010.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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