Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-08-02774/USCOURTS-ca3-08-02774-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2774

___________

RAHEEM TAYLOR,

Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

HONORABLE EDWIN H. STERN, Presiding Judge for Administrator;

PHILIP S. CARCHMAN, Court Administrator;

JOHN M. CHACKO, Clerk for Appellate Division;

YVONNE SMITH SEGARS, Public Defender

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 08-cv-02308)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 23, 2010

Before: SMITH, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 24, 2010)

___________

OPINION

___________

Case: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/24/2010
2

PER CURIAM

Raheem Taylor, a prisoner in New Jersey proceeding pro se, appeals the District

Court decision dismissing his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for failure to exhaust his

claims in state court. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.

In February 2007, Taylor was convicted in Superior Court, Burlington County, of

second-degree robbery. He received a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Taylor was

represented by a public defender at trial and, after his conviction, requested that his

attorney file a notice of appeal.

Although the notice of appeal was due before the end of April 2007, Taylor’s

attorney failed to comply with his request. Taylor claimed that he made repeated attempts

to contact his public defender, but received no response. In May 2007, Taylor sent

several letters to the Clerk of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, complaining of his

lawyer’s delay and seeking assistance. The Clerk provided Taylor with paperwork to

proceed pro se and to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. Taylor sent the paperwork back, but

the Clerk did not file it, presumably because the court accepted a late notice of appeal

filed at the end of May by the public defender.

Thereafter, Taylor claimed, he continued his attempts to contact the public

defender in furtherance of his appeal, but received no response. In September 2007,

Taylor informed his attorney and the Appellate Division that he wished to proceed pro se. 

Case: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/24/2010
3

He then directed the Public Defender’s Office to order the transcripts he needed for his

appeal. After a series of back-and-forth communications between Taylor, the Appellate

Division Clerk’s Office, and the Public Defender’s Office, his motion was finally granted

on May 28, 2008, pending a hearing.

While the motion to proceed pro se was pending, Taylor filed in the District Court

a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Taylor argued that the delay in his state court

proceedings – which stemmed from allegedly inadequate performance on the part of his

public defender, unnecessary obstacles imposed by the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office,

and a backlog in the Appellate Division that would result in disposition of his appeal

being further prolonged – amounted to a deprivation of his right to due process. The

District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice because Taylor had not first

exhausted available state court remedies. Taylor filed a notice of appeal, and we granted

a certificate of appealability on the question whether the District Court should have

excused exhaustion as a result of inordinate delay.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review

over a District Court’s denial of a § 2254 petition when it did not conduct an evidentiary

hearing. See Thomas v. Carroll, 581 F.3d 118, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally, a

District Court may not entertain a § 2254 petition unless the applicant has exhausted all

available state remedies. See § 2254(b)(1)(A). However, exhaustion may be excused if

Case: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/24/2010
4

state remedies are absent or too ineffective to protect the applicant’s rights. See

§ 2254(b)(1)(B). Thus, although the exhaustion requirement exists as a matter of comity,

see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982), that principle “weighs less heavily [when]

the state has had an ample opportunity to pass upon the matter and has failed to

sufficiently explain its . . . delay,” and exhaustion may be excused. Hankins v. Fulcomer,

941 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d

Cir. 1986).

Whether a delay is sufficiently “inordinate” to excuse exhaustion depends on the

conduct of the appellant, interference by the state in the timely disposition of the matter,

the progress made in state court, and the length of the delay. See Lee v. Stickman, 357

F.3d 338, 341-44 (3d Cir. 2004). It appears that Taylor diligently attempted to have his

public defender pursue his appeal and, when that approach proved unavailing, took it

upon himself to do so. Despite his efforts, however, Taylor encountered some notable

delays: the Clerk of the Appellate Division apparently provided conflicting information

about what Taylor needed to do to proceed with his appeal; the public defender ordered

incorrect transcripts and, when informed about the mistake, failed to promptly order the

correct transcripts; and Taylor’s motion to proceed pro se, followed by a waiver of

counsel hearing, took nearly six months to adjudicate. In total, about fifteen months

elapsed from the time Taylor was sentenced (at which time he presumably decided to

appeal) until he filed his § 2254 petition in the District Court.

Case: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/24/2010
Specifically, the Appellate Division instructed Taylor to file with his brief a 1

certification averring the content of any missing transcript, its relevance, and the impact

of its non-production.

5

We conclude, however, that the fifteen-month delay Taylor endured, although

unfortunate, was not so egregious as to require excusing exhaustion. Much of the delay

in this case was the result of apparent miscommunication and, arguably, a lack of diligent

effort on the part of Taylor’s former attorneys to provide him with the transcripts he

requested. On the other hand, Taylor has also prolonged the duration of his appeal by

requesting several extensions of the briefing schedule – which was first issued in 2008 –

so he could obtain these transcripts. Moreover, it appears that the Appellate Division has

made efforts to further Taylor’s case – in particular, making efforts to ensure that Taylor

receives the transcripts he claims are necessary to prepare his brief. We also take judicial

notice that, as recently as December 2009, the Appellate Division granted yet another

motion by Taylor to extend his time to file a brief and crafted a solution to Taylor’s

allegation that portions of his transcript remain missing. In short, though he has certainly 1

endured a delay, Taylor has not experienced the type of delay that warrants excusing the

§ 2254 exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Lee, 357 F.3d at 341-44 (excusing exhaustion

after 8-year delay caused by administrative mistakes); Moore v. Deputy Comm’r of SCIHuntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1991) (excusing exhaustion after state postconviction petition lingered in state court for 40 months without any progress); Wojtczak,

800 F.2d at 354 (excusing exhaustion after 33-month delay, where multiple courtCase: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/24/2010
We note that the motion to expedite was filed after the Clerk advised Taylor that 2

this matter would be submitted pursuant to Rule 34.1(a) on March 23, 2010. The motion

and the Clerk’s letter apparently crossed in the mail.

6

appointed attorneys failed to prosecute the appeal, and the state court failed to conduct

any hearing).

We are confident that the Appellate Division will continue its efforts to resolve

Taylor’s appeal in a timely manner. Accordingly, we will affirm. Taylor’s motion for

expedited disposition of his appeal is denied.2

Case: 08-2774 Document: 003110071761 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/24/2010