Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00771/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00771-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 1 Because some claims are asserted on behalf of the

children, the court refers to Fisher and her children,

collectively, as “plaintiffs.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KIRSTEN FISHER, ON BEHALF OF

HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD

LITEM FOR HER MINOR CHILDREN,

HALEY FISHER, MCKENSEY FISHERMATHIS,

Plaintiff, NO. CIV. S-05-771 FCD/DAD

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, TRACY MAE

ALVAREZ, ANTOINETTE FABELA,

KEVIN HENDERSON, DIANE ROSE,

GREG GEISLER,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Kirsten Fisher (“Fisher”), on behalf of herself

and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, Haley Fisher and

McKensey Fisher-Mathis (“children”)1, has filed claims for

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).

3 The court GRANTS defendant Alvarez’s motion to join in

the motion to dismiss given that plaintiffs’ opposition has

addressed defendant Alvarez’s conduct in their papers. 

4 Unless otherwise stated, further references to a “Rule”

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5 Unless otherwise noted all background facts are based

upon the complaint. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all

factual allegations from the complaint are taken as true.

2

violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

state tort claims based on the removal of her children.2

Plaintiffs seek both monetary and injunctive relief. Defendants

Placer County, Tracy Mae Alvarez3, Antoinette Fabela, Kevin

Henderson, Diane Rose, and Greg Geisler (collectively

“defendants”) now move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).4 Specifically, defendants contend that individual

defendants are entitled to absolute and/or qualified immunity

from liability for plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims and

statutory immunity from liability for the state law claims. For

the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND 

On December 2, 2003, Dr. Mark Knoble, plaintiffs’ family

doctor, contacted the Placer County Child Protective Services

Agency, Placer County ACCESS (“ACCESS”), to report that Fisher

was projecting mold-related health symptoms upon her children.5

Dr. Knoble requested that ACCESS investigate based on his concern

for Fisher and her children. 

On January 15, 2004, defendant Tracy Mae Alvarez

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6 Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Nielsen has a history of

mental health problems. There are no allegations, though, that

defendants had any knowledge of this.

7 5150 hold is short for California Welfare and

Institutions Code section 5150, titled the “Detention of Mentally

Disordered Persons for Evaluation and Treatment,” which provides

for a 72-hour evaluation and treatment period for persons alleged

to meet the legal criteria of being a danger to themselves or

others or gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. 

3

(“Alvarez”), a social worker for ACCESS, visited and interviewed

the children at school. On January 19, 2004, Ms. Jacklyn

Nielsen, Fisher’s mother, called ACCESS to report that her

daughter was delusional.6 A few days later, ACCESS personnel

received an anonymous call indicating that Fisher was suicidal. 

On January 23, 2004, Alvarez filed a petition with the

Placer County Superior Court, Case No. JV 2625, requesting that

Fisher be detained and held for psychiatric evaluation pursuant

to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, (“5150

Hold”)7 and that her minor children be removed from her custody. 

The petition stated that Fisher was “unable to protect” her

children and unable to provide a “stable home environment” due to

her “delusional belief that she and the minors are suffering

toxic mold poisoning.” (Compl. at ¶ 17.) Defendants believed

that the children were suffering “serious emotional damage”

because of Fisher’s “delusions.” (Id.) That day, the Superior

Court granted the 5150 Hold and issued orders allowing ACCESS

personnel to remove the children from the house. 

Defendant Diane Rose (“Rose”), a social worker for ACCESS,

arrived at the home with police to remove the children and place

them in the care of ACCESS staff until placement with their

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8 The complaint states that Geisler and Fabela work for

“Placer County CSOC.” While the complaint does not specify, the

court presumes that CSOC is a Placer County agency. 

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grandfather. At that time, Rose told the children and other

family members present that the children would be with their

grandfather for “a long time.” (Compl. at ¶ 10.) 

Also on January 23, 2004, Fisher was detained and taken to

Heritage Oaks Hospital. While there, she was evaluated by Dr.

Leslie Hirschaut and diagnosed with “panic disorder without

agoraphobia” and “generalized anxiety disorder” without suicidal

tendencies. (Compl. at ¶ 19.) Dr. Hirschaut found that Fisher’s

thoughts about mold “seem to [have] some appropriateness to it,

as well as some anxiety around it simultaneously,” but she was

not “overtly delusional.” (Id.) 

Following Fisher’s release from the 5150 Hold, defendants

Antoinette Fabela (“Fabela”) and Greg Geisler (“Geisler”), a

social worker and an investigator, respectively, with Placer

County, investigated the facts and circumstances of the

separation to determine how to continue with the dependency

proceedings.8

On April 14, 2004, Fabela requested and received from a

“judge in the county counsel” a “change in placement return home”

order allowing the children to return to the custody of Fisher,

contingent on Fisher signing a voluntary Unified Services Plan

(“USP”). The USP required, in relevant part, Fisher to: 1)

report to her landlord any signs of mold; 2) discontinue any

discussion of “mold issues” with the children; and 3) refrain

from discussing mold issues with adults in front of the children. 

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9 Paragraph Eight of the complaint is ambiguous as to

when Fabela made the comments alleged therein. In ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the court must give the plaintiff the benefit

of every reasonable inference. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). For the purposes of

this motion, the court infers that Fabela’s comments were made

after the USP was approved by the court and signed by plaintiff.

5

Fisher signed the USP and the children were returned to her

custody on April 14, 2004, two months and twenty-two days after

their removal. (Compl. at ¶¶ 20-21.)

Additionally, at some unspecified time, Fabela told Fisher

to review her mold sickness issue with a suitable medical doctor,

and if the doctor told her she had no mold-related sickness that

she must “drop the subject.”9 (Compl. at ¶ 8.) 

On April 23, 2004, Fisher met with Douglas R. Haney, an

environmental health consultant regarding the USP, believing it

restricted her free speech, especially in light of the mold found

in her dwelling. Mr. Haney called Fabela to discuss the

conditions of the USP, but she would not speak with him without

Fisher’s permission. Fabela then told Fisher that “[i]f you

choose to pursue this any further, you know what this will mean.” 

(Compl. at ¶¶ 21-22.)

On April 20, 2005, plaintiffs filed a complaint against

defendants for alleging federal civil rights violations and

asserting pendant state tort claims. On May 23, 2005, defendants

filed the instant motion to dismiss.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

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every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs assert claims under the Federal Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. § 1983, “based on violations of their rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

procedural and substantive due process clause, their rights under

the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, and their right of

privacy and right of familial relationship as a mother and

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10 Because Fisher challenges conduct by state officials,

only the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies here. 

Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Brown v. New Jersey, 175

U.S. 172 (1899).

7

children, all of which are rights protected under the Federal

Constitution.”10 (Compl. at ¶ 23.) Defendants contend that the

actions related to the removal of the children are shielded from

liability based on either absolute or qualified immunity.

A. Absolute Immunity 

It is well established that courts grant absolute immunity

from liability to those individuals whose functions are necessary

to the judicial process. At early common law, this included such

individuals as judges, grand jurors, and prosecutors. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419, 424 (1976). This doctrine has been

extended to the actions of other state actors when they engage in

functions that are quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial. Kalina

v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 127 (1997) (citing Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). Specific to this case, the Ninth Circuit

has extended absolute immunity to social workers when they

perform functions similar to those of a prosecutor: 

Although child services workers do not initiate criminal

proceedings, their responsibility for bringing dependency

proceedings, and their responsibility to exercise

independent judgment in determining when to bring such

proceedings, is not very different from the responsibility

of a criminal prosecutor. The social worker must make a

quick decision based on perhaps incomplete information as to

whether to commence investigations and initiate proceedings

against parents who may have abused their children. The

social worker's independence, like that of a prosecutor,

would be compromised were the social worker constantly in

fear that a mistake could result in a time-consuming and

financially devastating civil suit. 

Meyer v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 812 F.2d 1154,

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1157 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the touchstone of the absolute immunity analysis is

the function performed, not the title of the actor. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kalina, 522

U.S. at 127. Thus, social workers are entitled to absolute

immunity only where they are performing functions “connected with

the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.” 

Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157; Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896

(9th Cir. 2003). By contrast, when social workers’ actions are

“neither . . . advocatory [nor] quasi-judicial [and do] not aid

[them] in the preparation or presentation of [the] case to the

juvenile court,” they are not entitled to absolute immunity. 

Meyer, 812 F.2d at 1157. Courts applying this “functional”

approach have shielded activities including: preparing and filing

of the paperwork to obtain an order removing the children (Id. at

1156); presenting evidence or giving testimony at the custody

hearing (Id.; Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2003)); and

investigating allegations of abuse or neglect to aid in the

preparation for the proceedings (Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 825).

The shield of absolute immunity protects even when

allegations against state actors include negligence, falsifying

evidence, abuse of discretion or bad faith during the initiation

and pursuit of dependency proceedings. Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826

(failure to investigate possible exculpatory evidence and

fabricated evidence); Mabe, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001)

(social worker alleged to have improperly conducted the

investigation and falsified evidence in juvenile court

proceedings); Hennessey v. State of Wash., Dep't of Soc. & Health

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11 Specifically the complaint alleges:

Between 12-2003 and late 01-04, defendants took calls from

Fisher’s doctor, Fisher’s mother, and an anonymous call each

indicating an increasing degree of mental health

instability. (Compl. at ¶¶ 12, 15-16.) 

On 01-15-2004, Ms. Tracy Mae Alvarez of Placer County ACCESS

visited Ms. Fisher’s children’s school unannounced and

commenced to question the children about their mother’s

alleged behavior. (Compl. at ¶ 13.)

On 01-23-04, a petition filed with the Placer County

Superior Court as Case No. JC2625 by ACCESS case worker, Ms.

Tracy Alvarez, stated that Ms. Kirsten Fisher as “Unable to

protect” her children and unable to provide a “stable home

environment” due to her “delusional belief that she and the

minors are suffering toxic mold poisoning. (Compl. at ¶

17.)

Kevin Henderson orchestrated the entire W&I Code section

5150 72 hour hold and was aware of and ratify [sic] all of

the related conduct of his subordinate Alvarez. (Compl. at

¶ 9.)

9

Serv., 627 F. Supp. 137, 140 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (caseworker

allegedly divulged false and misleading information to county

prosecutor, prompting initiation of child dependency

proceedings); Pepper v. Alexander, 599 F. Supp. 523, 526-27

(D.N.M. 1984) (employees allegedly acted in bad faith in

instituting proceeding to deprive plaintiff of parental rights).

In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that various actions by

defendants violated their civil rights. The court reviews the

alleged conduct by function to determine whether absolute

immunity applies.

1. Investigation and Initiation of Removal Proceedings 

Plaintiffs allege that actions taken by defendants Alvarez

and Henderson in the investigation and initiation of removal

proceedings violated their civil rights.11 It is well

established that actions taken in initiation and pursuit of child

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12 Specifically the complaint alleges: Defendant Diane

Rose, who arrived with police and detained Ms. Fisher’s children,

telling Mr. Norman Fisher that the children would be with the

county for a long time . . . [and] told co-plaintiffs that they

would have to be with their grandfather, Kirsten Fisher [sic]

father, for a long time. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

10

dependency proceedings is absolutely immune. Meyers, 812 F.2d at

1157. Thus, all of defendants actions surrounding the

investigation into and initiation of the court’s dependency

proceedings are shielded by absolute immunity. Lebbos, 348 F.3d

at 826; Meyer, 812 F.2d at 1157. This includes Alvarez’s

activities requiring “independent judgment [necessary] in

determining when to bring about the proceedings.” Meyers, 812

F.2d at 1157. Similarly, Henderson’s approval and oversight of

Alvarez’s conduct in initiating the court proceedings are

absolutely immune. Id. at 1158. 

2. Removal of the Children

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Rose’s removal of the

children from Fisher’s custody violated their civil rights. 

Additionally, plaintiffs allege that Rose’s comments regarding

the length of time the children would be away from their home

violated their rights.12 Defendants contend that Rose’s removal

of the Fisher children, based on a court order, and conduct

related to the removal is absolutely immune from liability.

There is case law which supports granting absolute immunity

for the execution of a court order. Coverdell v. Dep’t. of Soc.

& Health Serv., 834 F. 2d 758 (9th Cir. 1987) (social worker

enjoys quasi-judicial immunity for executing a court’s order);

See also Caldwell v. LaFaver, 928 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1991);

Taylor v. Multnomah County Sheriff's Office, 2004 U.S. Dist.

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13 One post-Miller case extended absolute immunity to

activities surrounding court dependency proceedings, such as

investigation. Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826. 

11

LEXIS 18219 (D. Or. 2004) (sheriff entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity for faithfully executing a valid court order). 

However, the Ninth Circuit recently narrowed the absolute

immunity doctrine, moving away from the test which immunized

actions taken in “connection with” or “incident to” ongoing child

dependency proceedings, and holding all immunity must derive from

a common law source. Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. Even actions

taken with court approval or under court’s direction are not in

and of themselves entitled to quasi-judicial, absolute immunity. 

Id. (quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 435-436

(1993)). Since Miller, no published decision has addressed

whether a social worker’s execution of a court order is entitled

to absolute immunity.13 

Fortunately, the court need not resolve this open question

because the court finds, see infra, section II. B., that Rose is

entitled to qualified immunity for her conduct in removing the

children from their home. See e.g, Gabbert v. Conn., 131 F. 3d

793 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed on other grounds, 526 U.S. 286

(1999) (not addressing absolute immunity where qualified immunity

exists). 

3. Investigation and Preparation of Unified Services Plan

Plaintiffs further allege that defendants Fabela and Geisler

violated their civil rights during their investigation into the

propriety of returning the children to Fisher’s custody and their

preparation of the USP, by creating an unnecessarily lengthy

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14 Specifically, the complaint alleges:

Antoinette Fabela investigated the facts and circumstances

of the separation of plaintiff Kirsten Fisher from her

children and concluded that Fisher was not delusional, and

yet still delayed in joining together Kirsten with her

children. (Compl. at ¶ 8.)

Greg Geisler investigated of the circumstances regarding the

separation of Kirsten Fisher and her children, and

improperly without supporting evidence and in the face of

highly contradictory evidence, including medical reports,

concluded that Kirsten Fisher was delusional, thus causing

and prolonging the period of separation between plaintiff

and her children. (Compl. at ¶ 11.) 

On 04-14-04, social worker Antoinette Fabela requested a

“change in placement return home” if Kirsten Fisher would

sign a voluntary agreement. (Compl. at ¶ 20.)

Two restrictions of the plan authored by Ms. Antoinette

Fabela on April 13, 2004, stated: 1) mother will maintain a

permanent residence, 2) Mother will report to the landlord

immediately for signs of mold, 3) Mother will discontinue

any topics of “mold issues” with minors. And 4) “Mother

will refrain from any discussions of mold to other adults in

front of minors. (Compl. at ¶ 21.)

12

separation from her children.14 Actions taken while in pursuit

of an outcome in dependency proceedings are shielded by absolute

immunity. Meyer, 812 F.2d at 1157. Further, investigations

aiding in the preparation of the court proceedings are absolutely

immune. Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826. 

After the initial removal of the children, Fabela and

Geisler continued to investigate Fisher’s mental health status in

order to determine whether, and under what conditions, to reunite

her with her children. Defendants evaluated the information

provided by the 5150 Hold report and drafted the USP with

parameters under which the court would approve the children being

returned to Fisher’s custody. Because these actions were taken

while in pursuit of an outcome to the dependency proceedings,

here return of the children, they are entitled to absolute

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15 Specifically the complaint alleges:

Antoinette Fabela . . . told Kirsten Fisher to review her

mold sickness issued [sic] with a medical doctor, and told

her that if a medical doctor says she has no mold related

sickness, she must drop the subject of mold related

sickness. (Compl. at ¶ 8.)

[Plaintiff Fisher consulted an environmental consultant who

disapproved of the terms of the USP. With Ms. Fisher in the

room, he telephoned Ms. Fabela to discuss the plan. Ms

Fabela refused to speak to Mr. Haney and, when Ms. Fisher

was handed the phone,] Ms. Fabela clearly stated to Ms.

Fisher “If you choose to pursue this any further, you know

what this will mean!” (Compl. at ¶ 22.)

13

immunity.

4. Post Dependency Proceedings Activity

Finally, plaintiffs allege that, following completion of the

dependency proceedings, Fabela violated Fisher’s First Amendment

right to free speech by making threatening comments regarding

enforcement of the USP.15

As previously determined, the actions of preparing, gaining

court approval, and executing the USP are shielded under absolute

immunity because they occurred during the initiation and pursuit

of the court’s dependancy proceedings. See supra, section I. A.

3. Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826. However, the conduct plaintiffs

challenge, namely Fabela’s allegedly threatening comments to

Fisher, occurred, after completion of the court proceedings and

return of the children. Defendants have not identified a common

law basis for immunizing alleged threatening statements after the

conclusion of dependency proceedings. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 432

(official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing

that such immunity is justified for the function in question).

/ / /

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B. Qualified Immunity

The only allegations not shielded by absolute immunity are

Rose’s activities surrounding the physical removal of Fisher’s

children from her custody and all post-dependency proceeding

conduct by Fabela. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

from suit government officers who do not knowingly violate the

law. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Qualified immunity is a generous standard designed to protect

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 (1991) (citation omitted). 

A qualified immunity analysis must begin with the “threshold

question: taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [government

official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If no constitutional violation

is shown, the inquiry ends. Id.

Where the facts in the complaint allege a violation of a

constitutional right, an officer can establish a shield of

qualified immunity if: 1) the law governing the officer’s conduct

was not clearly established at the time of the challenged actions

or 2) under the clearly established law, an officer could

reasonably have believed that the alleged conduct was lawful. 

Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982) (observing that police officers “are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.”)

Immunity exists even if a state actor’s decision was

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constitutionally deficient, so long as a defendant reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances confronted. 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 599 (U.S. 2004). 

Reasonableness is judged in “in light of the specific context of

the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. “If the law

at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct

would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject

to liability or . . . the burdens of litigation.” Id. 

1. Removal of the Children 

Plaintiffs allege that Rose’s statements and actual physical

removal of the children from Fisher’s custody violated their

civil rights. 

As to the actual removal of the children, the court first

must determine whether, construed liberally in favor of

plaintiffs, the facts allege a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right. Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated

their due process rights by removing the children from Fisher’s

custody. There is a broad liberty interest in keeping the family

intact, which absent other circumstances would demonstrate a

constitutional violation. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

(1982). But this interest is not absolute. Caldwell, 928 F.2d

at 333. “The parental interest in keeping the family unit intact

is not a clearly established right in the context of a reasonable

suspicion that the parents may be abusing children.” Baker v.

Racansky, 887 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 

Rose had reasonable suspicion: she removed the children pursuant

to a valid court order, which “commanded” the children’s removal

from Fisher’s custody. (Huskey Decl., Ex. A.) The court order

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contained a finding that, pursuant to California Welfare and

Institutions Code section 340, circumstances indicated that the

“[minors’] home environment endanger[ed] the health, person or

welfare of this minor and that continuance of the minor[s] in the

home of the parent(s) is contrary to the welfare of the

minor[s].” (Id.) As Rose’s removal of the children violated no

clearly established right, such, her conduct is shielded by

qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs also claim that Rose’s comments during removal of

the children regarding the length of time they would be away from

their home constitute a violation of § 1983. Even if taken in

the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court cannot

ascertain, nor have plaintiffs identified, what constitutional

right Rose’s statements violated. As a result, Rose is entitled

to qualified immunity for making such statements during the

removal of the children. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

2. Post Dependency Proceeding Activity

Plaintiffs allege that Fabela made threatening statements

following the completion of the court proceedings that violated

her First Amendment rights to free speech. While defendants

ostensibly move to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment claim,

they provide no substantive argument to support their motion as

to this claim. Their entire argument addresses qualified

immunity with respect to violations of plaintiffs’ due process

rights and ignores plaintiffs’ First Amendment allegation. As a

result, the court must deny defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims based on violation of Fisher’s First

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16 Nothing in this order prevents defendants from filing a

subsequent motion on this issue.

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Amendment rights.16

C. Injunctive Relief Claims under § 1983 

Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief “undoing these

unreasonable and illegal conditions, and protecting them from

further such conditions.” (Compl. at ¶ 32.)

Absolute and qualified immunity are defenses to liability

for damages only and do not bar actions for declaratory or

injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 539-40

(1984); American Fire, Theft & Collision Managers v. Gillespie,

932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133.

134 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Supreme Ct of Va v. Consumer

Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980).

D. Claims against the County 

In addition to claims against individual defendants who are

county employees, plaintiffs assert Monell claims against the

County. Defendants’ sole argument for dismissal of plaintiffs’

Monell claims is that the individual defendants are immune from

liability. Defendant is correct that Monell claims must be

predicated on conduct by an employee which has not been shielded

by immunity. Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir.

1999). However, this court has determined that some of the

individual defendants’ conduct is not entitled to immunity. See

supra, sections I. A. and I. B. Additionally, the immunity

defenses do not apply to plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims. 

Chaloux v. Kileen, 886 F.2d 247, 250-251 (9th Cir. 1989) (Monell

does not apply to prospective relief claims.) As a result,

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defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell claims against

the County can be granted only to the extent the claims are based

on conduct by defendants which is entitled to immunity.

II. State Law Claims 

A. Tort Claims

Plaintiffs also bring pendant state claims for negligence

and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on

defendants’ actions surrounding the children’s removal. 

Defendants contend that they are entitled to statutory and

discretionary immunity from liability for all state claims. 

Under California law, public employees generally are not

liable for injuries caused while instituting or prosecuting

judicial or administrative proceedings within the scope of their

employment, even if they act maliciously and without probable

cause. Cal. Govt. Code § 821.6. Additionally, public employees

generally are not liable for acts or omissions that occur as a

result of their exercise of discretion, whether or not the

discretion was abused. Cal Govt. Code § 820.2.

California courts have found that social workers are

absolutely immune from suits alleging the improper investigation

of child abuse, removal of a minor from the parental home based

upon suspicions of abuse, and the initiation and pursuit of

dependency proceedings. Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222

Cal. App. 3d 869, 881 (1990); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212

Cal. App. 3d 278, 284 (1989)(immunity exists for claims of

negligence occurring within the scope of defendant’s duty under §

821.6). “[T]o allow charges of prosecutorial [or investigative]

malfeasance to survive the pleading stage would frustrate the

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17 California Government Code section 820.21 states, in

relevant part: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the civil

immunity of juvenile court social workers, child protection

workers, and other public employees authorized to initiate

or conduct investigations or proceedings pursuant to Chapter

2 ... shall not extend to any of the following, if committed

with malice: ... (3) Failure to disclose known exculpatory

evidence ... (b) As used in this section, "malice" means

conduct that is intended by the person described in

subdivision (a) to cause injury to the plaintiff or

despicable conduct that is carried on by the person

described in subdivision (a) with a willful and conscious

disregard of the rights or safety of others.

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compelling public need for . . . protection of endangered

children.” Jenkins, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 288 (citation 

omitted).

California has limited the immunity available to social

workers provided under California Government Code section 821.6,

where, inter alia, the social worker maliciously fails to

disclose exculpatory evidence. Cal. Govt. Code § 820.21.17

Defendants’ investigation, removal of a minor from the

parental home based upon suspicions of abuse, and the initiation

and pursuit of dependency proceedings are all entitled to

immunity under California law. Alicia T., 222 Cal. App. 3d at

518. However, the complaint also alleges that defendants failed

to immediately disclose to the court that Fisher was not

delusional, thus delaying her reunification with her children. 

The complaint further alleges that the defendants’ conduct was

“wanton, malicious, intentional and oppressive.” (Compl. at 12:2-

3 [emphasis added].) This alleged conduct, which the court

accepts as true for purposes of this motion, falls within the

exception to immunity for malicious failure to disclose

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18 Cal. Govt Code Section § 814 states: “Nothing in this

part affects liability on contract or the right to obtain relief

other than money or damages against a public entity or public

employee.” 

19 Cal. Govt Code § 815.2(a) states that: A public entity

is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of

an employee of the public entity within the scope of his

employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section,

have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his

personal representative 

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exculpatory evidence. Cal. Govt. Code § 820.21. As a result,

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims on the

basis of statutory immunity must be denied, but only to the

extent said claims are based on defendants’ alleged malicious

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. 

B. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs also seek “appropriate injunctive relief undoing

these unreasonable and illegal conditions and protecting them

from further such conditions.” (Compl. at ¶ 32.) Under

California law, immunity only shields public entities and

employees from claims for monetary damages.18 Cal. Govt Code §

814; Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District v. Armstrong, 49

Cal. App. 3d 992, 999-1000(5th Dist. 1975). 

C. State Claims against Defendant County

California law imposes liability on public entities for acts

of their employees. Cal. Govt Code § 815.2.19 However, a public

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee

is immune from liability. Cal. Govt Code § 815.2(b). Thus, to

the extent individual defendants are entitled to statutory

immunity, plaintiffs cannot impose liability on the County. 

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20 Plaintiffs request leave to amend in the event the

court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss and include a list of

“further allegations” they would add to the complaint. The court

has reviewed the request and concludes that the additional

allegations would not alter the court’s finding where it has

determined that defendants’ conduct is entitled to immunity. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court finds as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal and

state claims for injunctive relief is DENIED. 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DENIED only as to the claim

based on allegedly threatening comments by defendant Fabela

following completion of the court proceedings, and GRANTED with

prejudice20 in all other respects. 

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for monetary

relief is DENIED to the extent said claims are predicated on

defendants’ alleged malicious failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence and GRANTED with prejudice in all other respects. 

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal and

state law claims against defendant County is GRANTED with

prejudice to the extent such claims are based on conduct by

county employees which this court found was entitled to immunity

and DENIED in all other respects. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 22, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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