Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02694/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 28:0157(c)(1) Findings, Concl. &amp; Proposed Judgment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JERRY MCGUIRE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-02694-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court are Plaintiff’s (“McGuire”) claims against the federal

government (“Government”). The parties presented evidence on April 14 and 15, 2005

before a bankruptcy judge who issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Because this is a non-core proceeding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2005) and Rule

9033 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law were filed with this Court. Both parties filed objections. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), this Court will consider the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and

findings of fact and review de novo those matters to which the parties timely and specifically

objected. This Court finds as follows.

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1

 For example, the bankruptcy court characterized Anspach’s letter of December 24,

1998 as stating the bridge was unauthorized under 25 C.F.R. 171.9 “because there was no

construction specifications submitted to the [Bureau of Indian affairs] for [] approval.” Doc.

No. 1, Attach. No. 1. The Government argued that the bridge was unauthorized not only

because it lacked pre-approval by BIA but also because “no crossing permit has been

obtained.” Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 3. Plaintiff agreed that later Anspach testified that

“unauthorized” meant the bridge was “‘there without a permit from the irrigation project.’”

Doc. No. 7. However, the bankruptcy court accurately described the contents of Anspach’s

letter. See Ex. 20. Moreover, FOF 11 already describes the Government’s clarification.

2

 The letters are dated February 5, 1999 (Ex. 21), August 25, 1999 (Ex. 22), and

November 19, 1999 (Ex. 24). 

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II. FINDINGS OF FACT

McGuire and the Government made no objections to the Findings of Fact (“FOF”) set

forth in Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 1, ¶¶ 1–9, 11, 13–17,19–20, and 22–26. These FOF are

hereby accepted and adopted. 

The Government objected to FOF 10, 18, and 21 based not on error in the bankruptcy

court’s version of the events but on the defendant’s disagreement with the bankruptcy court’s

characterization of the facts.1

 The Government’s objections are overruled and these FOF are

hereby accepted and adopted.

The Government objected to FOF 12. While its objection concerns the bankruptcy

court’s characterization of the facts, additional pertinent facts should be added. Allen

Anspach, the Superintendent of the Colorado River Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,

(“Anspach”) did not respond to the phone calls made to him by McGuire in 1999. But, he

sent three letters throughout the year urging McGuire to submit documentation and apply for

a permit to build a new bridge.2

 FOF 12 is hereby amended and adopted as amended.

The Government objected to FOF 27, regarding the bankruptcy court’s recitation of

jurisdiction. This Court already settled the jurisdictional issue in McGuire v. Department of

Interior, CV-03-254-PHX-JAT, Order, July 11, 2003 (Doc. No. 9) so FOF 27 is hereby

accepted and adopted.

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II. ISSUES OF LAW

McGuire and the Government made no objections to Legal Issues set forth in Doc.

No. 1, Attach. No. 1. These Legal Issues are hereby accepted and adopted. 

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Conclusion of Law No. I.B.2. Regulatory Taking

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property cannot “be

taken for the public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. A taking often

involves direct seizing or physical invasion of private property. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.

Inc., --- U.S. ---, ---, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2005). However, the government can also

appropriate private property through regulation. A regulatory taking occurs when a

regulatory action: (1) causes the property owner to suffer permanent physical invasion, (2)

deprives the owner of all economically feasible use of the land, or (3) causes the land owner

sufficient economic injury, which is determined by a factual inquiry where the court looks

at the regulation’s economic impact, its interference with distinct investment-backed

expectations, and the character of the governmental action. Id. at ---, 125 S. Ct. at 2081–82

(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (the Penn

Central test).

In this case, McGuire sued the Government on the theory that when the Bureau of

Indian Affairs (“BIA”) destroyed a bridge spanning a government easement, such destruction

caused McGuire to no longer have access to his property. Importantly, the property at issue

in the case is divided into two sections by a canal running east-west across the property.

These sections are the Northern Portion and the Southern Portion. A public

highway—Mohave Road—runs parallel to and just south of the canal. The bridge spanned

the canal providing McGuire access from Mohave Road to the property north of the canal.

 Following the hearing, the bankruptcy court found the Government had effected a

regulatory taking of some but not all of the economically beneficial use of McGuire’s

property interest. The bankruptcy court based its conclusion on the bankruptcy court’s

finding that McGuire still had access to and full use of the Southern Portion of his property.

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Applying the Penn Central test, the bankruptcy court found removal of the bridge imposed

severe financial hardship on McGuire since he was forced to stop farming the Northern

Portion in which he had made substantial investments. Though the Government had cited

safety and liability concerns, the bankruptcy court determined that the Government severed

McGuire's access to his property without first pursuing less onerous alternatives. 

McGuire objected to the bankruptcy court’s conclusion by arguing that the

Government’s action amounts to a wholesale taking of the land because, without the ability

to farm the Northern Portion, McGuire was unable to make his lease payment. McGuire

further argued that his inability to pay rendered his property interest—the leasehold—of no

value. 

McGuire raised the question of how to determine the “‘property interest’ against

which the loss of value is measured.” See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001). In other words,

if the property interest is the combined value of the Northern and Southern Portions,

McGuire suffered only a partial regulatory taking. If the property interest is the value only

of the Northern Portion, he suffered a complete abrogation. 

The Supreme Court settled this denominator question in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330–31 (2002). The

analysis hinges on “whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel.” Id. at 331.

Otherwise, Penn Central applies. Id. The Court explained that in order to define the property

interest, a court must look at both the geographic extent of the interest and time span of

ownership. Id. Thus, a land owner only sustains a total taking when permanently deprived

of the use of the entire area. Id. at 332.

Here, McGuire only lost access to half of his leasehold so he did not experience a total

taking. McGuire did not need to cross the bridge in order to farm the Southern Portion so he

was still able to farm it. While the yield of the Southern Portion was insufficient to generate

the revenue necessary to make the annual lease payment, McGuire still retained access to

some of his land. The analysis ends there because the Tahoe-Sierra standard looks at

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depravation of use, not profit. As a result, the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the

Penn Central factors applied rather than finding a total regulatory taking.

B. Conclusion of Law No. I.B.3. Arbitrary Taking

The bankruptcy court identified an additional type of taking as an “arbitrary taking.”

This taking, the court wrote, occurs where a government's regulatory action is arbitrary and

unreasonable compared to the loss sustained by the property owner. The court cited Goldblatt

v. Town of Helpstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) for support. There, the Supreme Court upheld a

city ordinance regulating mining activity. Id. at 591. The Court stated a rule that, where there

was not a complete regulatory taking of property, a regulation reducing the value or use of

land is not an unconstitutional taking if it is “a valid exercise of the town's police power.” Id.

at 594. An ordinance is valid if it serves the public interest, the means employed are

“reasonably necessary” to meet the interest, and the means are not “unduly oppressive upon

individuals.” Id. at 594–95. 

The Goldblatt rule from 1962 is inconsistent with modern rule articulated in Penn

Central in 1978 and most recently affirmed in Lingle in 2005. Where a regulatory action only

results in a partial taking, the Supreme Court held a takings claim is “governed by the

standards set forth in [Penn Central].” Lingle, --- U.S. at ---, 125 S. Ct. at 2081. This modern

takings doctrine does not question the validity of the government's regulatory power or how

it is exercised. The power is uncontested. Rather, the doctrine focuses on the Constitutional

condition to wielding that power: government must compensate where the regulation

amounts to a taking. Id. at ---, 125 S. Ct. at 2080. As a result, a reviewing court does not look

at whether the means employed were arbitrary or unreasonable but instead ensures the

government compensates the property-owner where a taking has occurred. 

There is no “arbitrary taking” doctrine under which McGuire can raise a claim

because the modern takings doctrine focuses on the sufficiency of compensation rather than

the means used to take the property. Thus, this Court rejects the bankruptcy court's

conclusion of law on this point. Nor will this Court address McGuire's objection to the

conclusion of law.

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C. Conclusion of Law No. I.A.2. Access

Access between a public road and the abutting property is an incident of ownership.

Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1338, 1390–91 (Ct. Cl. 1973); State ex rel. Herman v.

Cardon, 544 P.2d 657, 660 (Ariz. 1976); State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson, 438 P.2d 760, 762

(Ariz. 1968); State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 350 P.2d 988, 991 (Ariz. 1960). Loss of the

right of access is compensable. Thelberg, 350 P.2d at 992; see also Winn v. United States,

272 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1959).

The bankruptcy court concluded that because the bridge was the means of access from

the Northern Portion to Mohave Road, McGuire had lost a part of his leasehold interest when

the bridge was destroyed. The Government disagreed. It argued that destroying the bridge

did not deprive McGuire of incident-of-ownership access because the Northern Portion does

not abut the public road; it abuts the canal, which is a nonpublic right-of-way. In response,

McGuire asserted his land does abut the public road because his lease included the land

between the highway and the canal, the easement runs over the leased property, and the

bridge was a “present existing road” secured by the lease. 

The bankruptcy court erred in its conclusion of law regarding access. The rule is not

that “[a]ccess to property from a public road is an incident of ownership,” Doc. No. 1,

Attach. No. 1 at 12, but rather that access to abutting property from a public road is an

incident of ownership. Cardon, 544 P.2d at 660 (“‘Access may be defined as the right vested

in the owner of land which adjoins a road or other highway to go and return from his own

land to the road or highway without obstruction.’”) (quoting Stoner Mfg. Corp. v. Young

Men's Christian Ass'n of Aurora, 148 N.E.2d 441 (Ill. 1958)). “Abutting” is defined as

“[p]rojecting towards; terminating upon or against; coming into contact, touching.” Oxford

English Dictionary (2d. 1989).

Undoubtedly, McGuire has a right in ingress and egress from the Southern Portion to

Mohave Road. His leased property touches the public road. Similarly, McGuire has a right

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of access to Mohave Road from the sliver of land between the road and the canal. The more

difficult issue is whether the existence of a non-public right-of-way, the canal, between the

Northern Portion and Mohave Road severs the property and the road such that the two cannot

be described as “abutting.” 

The Government offered a colorable objection to the bankruptcy court’s conclusion.

Specifically, the Government noted that the surface of the Northern Portion does not touch

Mohave Road; therefore, the Government argued, the Northern Portion does not abut

Mohave Road. All of the cases relied upon by the bankruptcy court concern property

touching a public road or highway. 

Having considered the bankruptcy court’s conclusion, and reviewing the history of

the canals de novo because of the Government’s objection, the Court concludes that the

property does abut Mohave Road. The United States constructed the canal pursuant to its

authority under 43 U.S.C. § 945 (2005) to create “right[s] of way thereon for ditches or

canals.” The purpose of the statute is to permit the government to improve arid lands though

canal systems. United States v. Van Horn, 197 F. 611, 615 (D.C. Colo. 1912). The statute

only allows reservation of an easement or surface right, but does not extend to other rights

in the land. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1960) (limiting the

reservation of land to a surface right and excluding title to subsurface oil and gas). The

reservation is an “inseparable incident and burden of ownership of such land.” Dopps v.

Alderman, 121 P.2d 388, 391 (Wash. 1942) (holding in part that the existence of a right-ofway for a canal did not amount to a breach of a covenant against encumbrances). Because

mere reservation of the surface rights of land for a canal does not sever other rights in the

land, the other rights in the land remain continuous. Thus, the canal does not stop the

Northern Portion from abutting Mohave Road. 

As a result, removal of the bridge severed McGuire’s right of access. Specifically, the

Colorado River Indian Tribe (“CRIT”) still had title to the land underlying the canal. CRIT

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3

 The Government pointed to McGuire’s assumption of ownership in his Notice of

Appeal dated August 18, 2000. However, McGuire’s assumption is based on direction from

a BIA official that the bridge was McGuire's and “does not belong to the Tribe or to BIA.”

Ex. 28. McGuire went on to illustrate the confusion regarding ownership of the bridge

including Anspach’s application of law that applies only if the bridge was McGuire’s and

other law that only applies if the bridge was federally-owned. Indeed, one of Anspach’s

subordinates wrote that the ownership of the bridge needed to be determined. Ex. 28 and Ex.

34.

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conveyed the entire property subject to the reservation of the surface rights of the canal to

McGuire including the right of access to Mohave Road from the Northern Portion. Removal

of the bridge interfered with his right because the bridge was the only means of access to the

Northern Portion from Mohave Road to fulfill the farming purpose of his lease. 

D. Conclusion of Law No. I.A.3. Bridge

Ownership of property can occur in a number of ways: by purchase, through descent,

by transfer or conveyance, by accretion (real property), by the increase of animals (personal

property), and by its incorporation into or union with other property. 63C Am. Jur. 2d

Property § 24 (2005). Ownership of the bridge in this case is disputed. 

The bankruptcy judge first held that ownership of the bridge was not important

because, regardless of the owner, McGuire was entitled to just compensation under a theory

of loss of access or regulatory taking. In an alternative holding, however, the bankruptcy

judge concluded that CRIT owned the bridge because the bridge was built on CRIT land and

did not interfere with the purpose of the canal. 

The Government argued this holding lacked factual support. While all parties seemed

to believe the bridge was built in the 1960s, no evidence of the history of ownership nor a

claim by CRIT of current ownership was presented at trial. In response, McGuire made two

arguments. First, he argued that since neither he3

 nor the Government claimed ownership of

the bridge, CRIT must own the bridge. Second, he argued that a previous tenant erected the

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4 See 41 Am. Jur. 2d Improvements § 1 (2005) and 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fixtures § 2 (2005)

for an explanation of the difference between a fixture and an improvement. The bridge most

likely qualifies as a fixture because it has been connected to the underlying land for over

twenty years. 35A Am. Jur. 2d. Fixtures § 3 (2005) (“[A] ‘fixture’ is an article of personal

property which has been so annexed to realty that it is regarded as a part and parcel of the

land.”)

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bridge and then abandoned it so CRIT took possession by incorporation of the improvement

or fixture.4

The record is insufficient to support a definitive conclusion of ownership. McGuire

presented a plausible theory of ownership in his fixture argument. CRIT appears to have

possessed the bridge for over two dozen years, which is a reasonable time for incorporating

the bridge into the property. Yet possession of personal property, while prima facie evidence

of title, can be trumped by actual title. 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 28 (2005). Actual title has

not been shown nor does it appear from the record the parties attempted to determine title.

However, this Court agrees with the bankruptcy court that McGuire would be entitled to just

compensation under a theory of loss of access from a regulatory taking regardless of

ownership of the bridge.

E. Conclusion of Law No. I.C.1. Permit Defense

The Court has analyzed, based on the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law, whether the Government’s actions in this case could qualify as a taking;

however, before reaching the issue of damages, the Court must consider certain defenses

available to the Government. For example, a permit application process is a defense to a

regulatory taking. Specifically, a regulatory action does not effect a taking if an available

permit process leaves the door open to the landowner to use the property as desired. Tabb

Lakes, LTD v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, “‘[o]nly when a

permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the

land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.’” Id. at 801 (quoting United States

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126–27 (1985)); see also Adams v. United

States, 255 F.3d 787, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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5

 The developers counter argued that because the city had no policy articulating how

it would adopt a specific plan and they were told they could not apply, applying was futile.

The court found, however, that prior to the district court entering its order, the city had

adopted application procedures so the futility exception did not apply. Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at

1232.

6

 “Project” refers to the government’s efforts under 43 U.S.C. § 945 to improve arid

lands by creating irrigation systems. 

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There is a futility exception to the rule requiring a property owner to use the available

permit process before claiming a taking where a party has already filed an initial meaningful

application. The exception provides that a takings claim is ripe where it would be idle or

futile for a property owner to resubmit an application. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande,

17 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. Monterey, 920 F.2d

1496, 1501 (9th Cir.1990)). In Kawaoka, the court held the land developers’ regulatory

taking claim against the city unripe for review because the developers had never filed

specific, formal development plans. Id. at 1325;5 see also Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d

1090, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no valid property interest for a takings claim where the

plaintiff voluntarily relinquished her leasehold interest based on the belief that pursuing the

permit process would have been futile). 

Federal regulation provides two types of permits for structures crossing “project”

canals.6

 First, a private party can apply for a permit relieving the government from liability

or responsibility for a bridge built by and for the project. 25 C.F.R. § 171.9(d) (2005).

Second, a private party can apply for a permit to build a crossing over a project canal for

private use and at its own expense. 25 C.F.R. § 171.9(c) (2005). 

The bankruptcy court found that while a permit process may have existed in theory,

it was not reasonably available to McGuire in fact. The Government countered that the

process was open but McGuire failed to respond because he only formally expressed interest

in repairing not replacing the bridge. McGuire responded by highlighting the factual support

for his frustrated efforts to both preserve the existing bridge and build a new bridge. He

concluded that the government “unreasonably denied him” a permit. 

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 The fact that the permit process was nebulous does not amount to a denial of a

permit. Mistakes in a permit process may give rise to a due process claim but not to a takings

claim. Tabb Lakes, LTD, 10 F.3d at 803.

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Prior to deciding whether McGuire was denied a permit, the Court must first

determine what permit process was available to him. The process provided to a private party

wishing to relieve the government from liability or responsibility for a bridge built by and

for the project was unavailable to McGuire because the BIA did not build the bridge for its

use. The bankruptcy court found that “the Bridge was constructed by a former tenant

sometime in the 1960's[.]” Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 1 at 4. Neither party objected to this FOF.

Thus, the only permit process available to McGuire was the one described in 25 C.F.R. §

171.9(c) for private parties wishing to build a crossing over a project canal for private use.

McGuire never availed himself of this permit process so his claim is unripe. In three

formal three letters to McGuire sent throughout 1999, Anspach specified that McGuire

needed to submit a plan for a new bridge and apply for a crossing permit. McGuire testified

that at one point in 1999 he drew a sketch of a possible bridge design in the presence of a

BIA employee and the employee promised to discuss the drawing with Anspach. At trial, the

employee denied ever seeing a sketch. Even if this qualified as an “application,” BIA never

denied McGuire a permit to build a new bridge. A written denial is not present in the record

nor did McGuire testify that the government ever orally denied his application for a new

bridge. From this sparse and disputed record, the Court cannot conclude that McGuire

submitted a “plan” as contemplated under 25 C.F.R. § 171.9(c) and Anspach “rejected” the

plan solely by his failure to return phone calls. Had McGuire applied for and received the

permit, he would have been able to build a bridge and continue to use his property as he

desired: farming the Northern Portion. Because the government never denied an application

from McGuire for a permit to construct a new bridge, the Northern Portion was not taken and

his takings claim is not ripe for review.7

Because his takings claim is unripe, this Court cannot grant him any monetary or

injunctive relief on his claim. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court’s recommended award of

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8

 In support of its argument, the Government referenced the following evidence from

the record: McGuire financial ability to have made the Jan. 1, 2000 lease payment and

thereby avoid losing his leasehold, McGuire’s procedural ability to have submitted an

application between removal of the bridge and cancellation of his lease, and the low cost of

a replacement bridge.

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damages to McGuire will be rejected based on the permit defense asserted by the

Government. 

F. Conclusion of Law No. I.D Intent and Causation

For a property loss to be compensable as a taking, there must be: (1) proof of

substantial harm to the owner; and, (2) either government intent to invade or harm that is the

direct, natural, or probable consequence of authorized government action and not merely

incidental to it. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2003);

accord Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (under

federal law, a plaintiff in a takings claim must show causation between the government

action and the alleged taking). 

The bankruptcy court found both the requisite intent and causation because BIA

evidenced its intent to remove the bridge in its numerous written and oral communications

and, in fact, removed the bridge, which resulted in McGuire’s inability to access and farm

the Northern Portion. The Government argued McGuire’s failure to submit a meaningful

application that was denied caused the loss of his leasehold.8

 McGuire reiterated support for

the bankruptcy court’s conclusion.

Because the Court concludes above that McGuire never filed a formal application that

the government rejected, removal of the bridge cannot be said to have caused an

unconstitutional taking of his property. The BIA’s regulatory action did not effect a taking

since a permit process existed for McGuire to build a bridge and continue to use the property

as he desired. McGuire had opportunity to submit an application but did not. Loss of access

to the Northern Portion of his leasehold, then, was incidental to the removal of the bridge.

G. Conclusion of Law No. I.E Damages

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9

 The Court of Federal Claims has recognized circumstances where measures other

than fair market value may be more appropriate such as when finding the market value is too

difficult or when application of the fair market value measure “‘would result in manifest

injustice to owner or public.’” Kraft, 30 Fed. Cl. at 761 (quoting United States v.

Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)). The primary consideration is justice.

Id. 

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“Just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment is traditionally measured as the fair

market value of the property taken. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78

(1946). In other words, a property owner should be placed in as good a position as if the

property had not been taken. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835,

862 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979)).

Fair market value is determined by “‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing

seller’ at the time of the taking.” Kraft, Inc. v. United States., 30 Fed. Cl. 739, 760 (Fed. Cl.

1994) (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).9

 However, damages are

not limited to the value of the part appropriated, but also can include depreciation of the

remaining property. United States v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 293 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1961).

Computing damages for loss of a right of access differs from the calculation for

physical takings. An owner who losses a right of access through condemnation is entitled to

compensation to the extent of the decrease in the value of the land served by the easement.

United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Skamania County, State of

Wash., 706 F.2d 280, 281 (9th Cir. 1983).

Finally, incidental losses resulting from a taking are not compensable. Wash. Legal

Found., 271 F.3d at 862 (citing Winn, 272 F.2d at 286 (9th Cir.1959)). In Winn, landowners

sought damages above the fair market value of the small portion of land annexed for an

interstate highway based on loss of business. 272 F.2d at 283–85. The new interstate would

divert people away from the smaller highway upon which their souvenir business perched.

Id. The court declined the landowners’ request for severance damages because the business

portion of the land did not share a “unitary or integrated use” with the small grazing portion

taken. Id. at 286. The court also rejected a request for damages for loss of access not because

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such a loss is not compensable but rather because the landowners had not lost their rights of

access. Id. at 287.

In this case, the bankruptcy court held McGuire was only entitled to damages

reflecting the fair market value of the lost property but not for speculated business losses.

Thus, the bankruptcy court concluded that the appropriate damages amounted to the fair

market value of the entire leasehold interest, which includes both the Northern Portion and

the Southern Portion. The bankruptcy court calculated this amount as $226,411.92 for each

year left on the lease, which, for five years, amounted to $1,132,059.60. McGuire objected

and argued that he was entitled to recover not the fair market value of the leasehold but rather

the lost profits from the crop on the Northern Portion. The Government asserted that based

on its legal arguments, the bankruptcy court’s damages conclusion is unsupportable.

Because this Court concludes that McGuire’s takings claim is not ripe for review, the Court

need not review the calculation of damages as no damages will be awarded.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court accepts the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact subject to the Court’s

amendment of FOF 12. The Court accepts the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that removal

of the bridge severed McGuire’s right of access to Mohave Road, rejects the bankruptcy

court’s conclusion that ownership of the bridge could be determined, rejects the bankruptcy

court’s conclusions that an “arbitrary takings” rule exists, and finds that a partial regulatory

taking was possible because the property abuts a public road. Nonetheless, the Court

concludes that the permit process defense causes any consideration of damages to be unripe

for review at this time because the Government did not receive and reject an application from

McGuire to build a bridge so he still had an avenue open to continue to farm the property.

Thus, based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact, issues of law,

and conclusions of law (Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 1) are hereby accepted or rejected as

indicated above, and the objections of McGuire (Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 2) and the

Government (Doc. No. 1, Attach. No. 3) are sustained or overruled as indicated above;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the bankruptcy court’s recommendation that this

Court award damages to McGuire in the amount of $1,132,059.60 is rejected; and for the

reasons stated above, this Court finds in favor of the Government, Plaintiff shall take nothing,

and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall serve as the mandate in this case.

DATED this 4th day of April, 2006.

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