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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIR CU IT . 

DENNIS ENGLAND and STANLEY ) 

NIELSEN, individuallv and ) 

d/b/a VIDEO AMERICA, Logan ) 

Utah, and their wives ) 

MARLENE ENGLAND and ) 

JAN NIELSEN, and VIDEO USA, ) 

INC., a Utah corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs- ) 

Appel lees, ) 

v. ) 

) 

) 

) 

RICHARD HENDRICKS and ) 

FERR IS GROLL, ) 

Defendants- ) 

Appellants. ) 

) 

DENNIS ENGLAND and STANLEY ) 

NI ELSEN, individually and ) 

d/b/a VIDEO AMERICA, Logan ) 

Utah, ) 

Plaintiffs- ) 

Appellants, ) 

v. ) 

) 

) 

FRANKLIN LANNY GUNNELL, ) 

RICHARD HENDRICKS and ) 

FERR IS GR 0 LL, ) 

Defendants- ) 

Appel lees. ) 

) 

FI LED 

United States Cour:t of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 211989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

NOS. 86-2905 

87-1720 

NO. 87-1069 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 85-NC-0066W) 

Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 1 
David R. Daines, Logan, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellees-CrossAppellants. 

Denton M. Hatch (Wesley M. Lang with him on the brief) of 

Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C., Salt Lake Citv, Utah, for 

Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees Hendricks and Groll. 

Jody K. Burnette, of Snow, Chris ten sen & Martineau, Salt Lake 

City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee Gunnell. 

Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, SETH, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

SAFFELS, District Judge*. 

SAFFELS, District Judge 

*Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 2 
After a videotape rental store in Logan City, Utah 

rented an allegedly pornographic tape to a minor, the Logan City 

police began an investigation of the store's owners, Stan 

Nielsen ("Nielsen") and Dennis England ("England"). Utah Code 

§ 76-10-1206 made it a criminal offense to distribute harmful 

materials to minors. The county attorney, Franklin Lannv 

Gunnell ("Gunnell") and Officer Richard Wright ("Wright") of the 

Logan City Police Department met with England and Nielsen 

regarding the tape rental and advised Nielsen of their dutv to 

comply with Utah Code § 76-10-1206. The Logan City police continued monitoring the video rental store, and on April 23, 1983, 

two minors, acting as police informants, rented allegedly pornographic tapes from an employee of the store. The parties appear 

to dispute whether the investigating officer on April 23, Officer Richard Hendricks ("Hendricks"), witnessed the transactions. It does appear, though, that based on information 

given by Hendricks on April 25, the county attornev prepared an 

Information charging England with a violation of Utah Code 

§ 76-10-1206. 

Hendricks called England to the police station where he 

planned to serve England with a summons. When England arrived 

at the police station, Hendricks determined that he was not the 

person who had actually rented the movies to the informant. 

Because of this mistake, Hendricks went to talk to the county 

attorney, Gunnell, before he served England with the summons. 

Hendricks told Gunnell that England had been misidentified. 

Gunnell determined that both owners could be charged as aiders 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 3 
and abettors, pursuant to Utah Code § 76-10-1201( 4). Gunne 11 

prepared an amended Information and both England and Nielsen 

were served with a summons. At the preliminary hearing in the 

case, the judge dismissed the charges, determining that the two 

had not been charged properly under Utah's aiding and abetting 

statute. 

England and Nielsen filed suit against Hendricks, 

Gunnell and Ferris Groll, Logan City Chief of Police. They 

brought the suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, contending that 

defendants violated their constitutional rights to due process 

and equal protection by improperly charging them with aiding and 

abetting the distribution of harmful materials to minors. 

The· court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunnell 

on the grounds that he was absolutely immune from liability for 

his actions taken in his capacity as prosecuting attorney. 

Hendricks and Groll contended in a motion for summary judgment 

that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the court 

rejected their argument. Instead, the case proceeded to trial 

and the trial court also rejected the qualified immunity argument in a timely motion for directed verdict. The judge sent 

the question of qualified immunity to the jury, and the jury 

returned with a verdict in favor of England and Nielsen. The 

court subsequently awarded plaintiffs their attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1988. 

In these consolidated appeals, Hendricks and Groll 

appeal the court's denial of their motions for summary judgment 

and for directed verdict on the grounds that they were entitled 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 4 
to qualified immunity. Engl and and Nie 1 sen appeal the court's 

dismissal of Gunnell as a party defendant. Finally, Hendricks 

and Groll appeal the award of attorney's fees. 

L 

The issue of whether Hendricks and Groll were entitled 

to qualified immunity is a question of law. Thus, our standard 

of review on appeal is de novo. Eastwood v. Department of 

Corrections of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). 

A government official may plead the affirmative defense 

of qualified immunity in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The affirmative defense of qualified immunity is available to all government officials, including police officers. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 s: Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987). The government 

official will be immune from liability if the conduct alleged in 

the complaint did not violate "clearly established, statutorv or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known • " Har 1 ow v • Fi t z g er a 1 d , 4 5 7 U. S • 8 0 0 , 8 1 8 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . The 

Supreme Court in Harlow rejected the former subjective inquiry 

into the governmental official's motives, as previously set out 

in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Harlow, 457 

U.S. at 815. Under the rule announced in Harlow, the courts are 

now limited to inquiring into the objective reasonableness of 

the of f i c i a 1 ' s act i on s • Id . a t 81 6 • The q u e s t i on of w he the r 

the official acted in an objectively reasonable manner is one to 

be resolved by the court. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

528 (1985). The court is to determine what the current 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 5 
applicable law is and whether that law was clearly established 

at the time the official's action occurred. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 

818. 

On the facts before us, then, Hendricks and Groll would 

be entitled to qualified immunity if it was not clearly established under Utah law at the time of their actions that a store 

owner could not be charged under the aiding and abetting statute 

for distributing materials harmful to minors. Utah Code 

§ 76-10-1206 provides that: 

A person is guilty of dealing in harmful 

material when, knowing that a person is a minor 

or having failed to exercise reasonable care in 

ascertaining the proper age of a minor he: (a) 

knowingly distributes or offers to distribute, 

exhibits or offers to exhibit any harmful 

materials to a minor. 

At the time of the officer's actions, there were no relevant 

Utah Supreme Court cases interpreting this statute. Utah Code 

76-2-202 provides that a person may be convicted as an aider and 

abettor if that person acts "with the mental state required for 

the commission of an offense" and "solicits, requests, commands, 

encourages, or intent i ona 11 y a ids another person to engage in 

conduct which constitutes an offense." After Hendricks consulted with Gunnell, Gunnell determined that at least under his 

interpretation, they could prosecute the owners of a video store 

under the Utah aiding and abetting statute for distributing 

harmful material to minors, even if they were not sure whether 

the owners were the persons who had actually rented the tapes to 

the minors. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 6 
The court need not dee ide whether Utah law al lows a 

video store owner to be charged as an aider and abettor for 

violating Utah Code § 76-10-1206. There is no case law in Utah 

which would have given the county attorney or the officers any 

guidance as to whether the aiding and abetting statute could 

have been used in this ins ta nee. Nor is it readily apparent 

from the statutory language that section 76-2-202 could not have 

been used here; in fact, a reasonable argument could be made 

that the sect ion could have been used. Since the decision to 

charge did not violate clearly established law at the time of 

the officers' actions, they are immune from suit. Further, in 

an instance such as the one presented, where the law is unclear, 

a police officer is immune if the officer consulted with and 

relied upon the advice of a county attorney. Lavickv v. 

Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 1985L Thus, the officers 

were entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court's 

decision to deny Hendricks and Groll's motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict and to send the issue to the jury 

. 1 

was 1n error. This case will be remanded with directions to 

enter judgment in favor of defendants Hendricks and Groll. 

I I. 

England and Nielsen filed a cross-appeal contending 

that the court's order granting Gunnell summary judgment on the 

grounds he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity was 

1 I In any ins ta nee, the <let ermina ti on of whether a def end ant is 

entitled to qualified immunity is to be made by the court. 

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528. The district court erred in sending 

that issue to the jury. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 7 
in error. The order of summary judgment was entered on Sept emher 26, 1985. Judgment on that order was entered on the same 

day. The cross-appellants did not file their notice of appeal, 

however, until January 5, 1987, after the trial on the remaining 

claims was completed. This panel subsequently issued an order 

requiring the cross-appellants to show cause why the appeal 

should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it 

appeared the judgment entered on September 26, 1985, was a judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro2 cedure. If that were the case, the not ice of appeal filed 

January 5, 1987, would have been untimely. See Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(l) (A notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of 

the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 

judgment or order appealed from.")~ It appears after closer 

examination, however, that the September 26, 1985 judgment was 

not a Rule 54(b) judgment, since the district court did not make 

the express findings necessary for Rule 54(b) certification. 

See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 3 

(1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackev, 351 U.S. 427, 435 

(1956). Thus, this court does have jurisdiction and we will 

proceed to address the merits of the cross-appeal. 

2/Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 

that: 

When more than one claim for relief is 

presented in an action, whether as a claim, 

counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 

or when multiple parties are involved, the 

court may direct the entry of a final judgment 

as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

claims and parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay 

and upon an express direction for the entry of 

judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 8 
The question of whether Gunnell was entitled to prosecutorial immunity is one of law, and again our standard of 

review is de novo. Eastwood v. Department of Corrections of 

Okla., 846 F. 2d 627, 629 (10th Cir~ 1988). 

Cross-appellants contend that the lower court erred in 

finding Gunnell was entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the 

Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was absolutely immune from 

liability under section 1983 for actions taken within the scope 

of "prosecutorial duties." Id. at 420. Absolute prosecutorial 

i mm u n i t y at ta ch e s on 1 y t o tho s e a c t i v i t i e s "int i mat e 1 y a s so -

ciated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 

430. This includes the decision to initiate a prosecution. Id. 

at 431. 

Cross-appellants contended in their complaint that 

Gunnell violated their rights under section 1983 by initiating 

the prosecution against them. Under the plain language of the 

law as set out by the Supreme Court in Imbler, the district 

court in this case was correct in holding that Gunnell was 

ab so 1 u t e 1 y immune from 1 i ab i 1 i t y for in i t i at in g the pro sec u t i on 

against cross-appellants, and we affirm that portion of the 

lower court's decision. 

However, cross-appe 1 lants al so contended in their complaint that Gunnell violated their rights under section 1983 by 

making certain statements to the media. The court in Imbler 

left open the question of whether action taken outside the 

prosecutor's capacity as an advocate is protected by absolute 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 9 
prosecutorial immunity. This circuit has held that a prosecutor 

is only entitled to qualified immunity when acting in an administrative or investigative capacitv. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 

1512, 1532 (10th Cir. 1988); Rex v. Teeples, 753 F. 2d 840, 843 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985). In those circuits which have directly addressed the question, a prosecutor's 

statements to the press have been consistently considered as a 

part of the prosecutor's administrative function, only entitling 

the prosecutor to qualified immunity. See Gobel v. Maricopa 

County, 867 F. 2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989); Rose v. Bartle, 871 

F.2d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 1989); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 

( 2d Cir. 1984); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F. 2d 499, 506 

(5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981); Hampton v. 

Hanrahan, 600 F. 2d 600, 633 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 

grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). See also Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 

F. 2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing rules set out by 

fifth circuit in Marrero). 

We adopt the approach of the other courts of appeal 

which have addressed the issue now before us. Since the statements Gunnell allegedly made to the press were not made in his 

role as advocate, absolute prosecutorial immunity did not attach 

to him. Rather, he would at the most be entitled to qualified 

immunity. It does not appear on the record before us whether 

the trial judge considered the issue of qualified immunity, and 

the issue is not presently before us. We will remand to the 

district court for a determination of qualified immunity and 

further proceedings consistent with this order. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 10 
I I I. 

Finally, Hendricks and Groll have appealed the award of 

attorney's fees. Since the court is reversing the judgment 

below and remanding the case with directions to enter judgment 

in favor of defendants, attorney's fees were not justified in 

this case. The decision of the court below awarding attornev's 

fees in favor of plaintiffs will be vacated~ 

The judgment bel~w in favor of plaintiffs-appellees is 

reversed and the case is remanded with directions to the court 

below to enter judgment in favor of defendants-appellants. The 

judgment below in favor of defendant-appellee Gunnell is 

affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this order. The award 

of attorney's fees entered below is vacated. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1720 Document: 01019568420 Date Filed: 07/21/1989 Page: 11