Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00909-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY TAYLOR, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

W. A. DUNCAN, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

1:05-cv-00909-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER TO FILE RESPONSE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

July 14, 2005. On March 19, 2007, the Court ordered Petitioner to file an amended petition because

the original petition, as filed, was incomprehensible. (Doc. 10). On May 17, 2007, Petitioner,

instead of complying with the Court and filing an amended petition, filed a motion to hold

proceedings in abeyance. (Doc. 12). On November 2, 2007, the Court denied the latter motion and

ordered Petitioner to file the amended petition. (Doc. 13). On December 11, 2007, Petitioner filed

the instant amended petition. (Doc. 14). A preliminary review of the amended petition, however,

reveals that the original petition may be untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-1042. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed on July

14, 2005, and thus, this action is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on February 11, 1999. (Doc. 1, p. 1). In this

case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on December 8, 2000. 

Thus, direct review would conclude on March 8, 2001, when the ninety day period for seeking

review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983);

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th

Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from March 8, 2001, or until March 8, 2002, absent

applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned the instant petition was filed on July 14, 2005, over four years after the

limitations period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 1

(2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

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1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. However, the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001). 

Petitioner does not explain with any clarity when he filed various state habeas proceedings

related to the claims in the instant case. The amended petition contains only references to the most

recent habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was filed on May 23, 2007 and denied

on October 10, 2007, well after the original petition was filed in this case. Accordingly, it is not

relevant to any determination whether the original petition was timely. 

The Court’s own independent survey of the California court system’s electronic database

indicates that a petitioner with Petitioner’s name filed habeas petitions in the California Court of

Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”) on three occasions: (1) filed September 29, 2003 and

denied on October 9, 2003; (2) filed April 5, 2004 and denied April 16, 2004; and (3) filed April 25,

2005 and denied April 28, 2005. This would entitled Petitioner to a total of twenty-five days of

statutory tolling during the pendency of these three petition in the 5th DCA. 

In addition to the state habeas petitions mentioned above, it appears that a petitioner with

Petitioner’s name filed a petition in the California Supreme Court on June 9, 2005 that was denied

on June 22, 2005, thus entitling Petitioner to an additional thirteen days of statutory tolling, for a

total of thirty-eight days. 

However, it appears that the one-year limitations period expired on March 8, 2002, eighteen

months before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the 5th DCA on September 29, 2003. 

A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period, as is apparently the case here, has

already expired prior to filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.

2000); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180

F.3d 919, 920 (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of

the one-year limitations period). 

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The Court concludes that the original petition is untimely and must be dismissed. However,

in an excess of caution, the Court will permit Petitioner to file any further evidence he has that would

entitle him to AEDPA tolling such that the petition would be timely. Petitioner will be afforded the

opportunity, in his response to this Order to Show Cause, to provide additional information regarding

when and where he filed his state habeas petitions if he believes that the instant petition is timely and

that he is entitled to statutory tolling under the AEDPA. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In his response, Petitioner should

provide the dates on which he filed any state habeas petitions, the names of the

courts in which he filed those petitions, the results, if any, of those petitions, and the

dates the results were issued. Petitioner should provide, where possible, copies of all

petitions filed as well as copies of the rulings by the state courts.

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order will result in Findings and

Recommendations recommending that the Petition be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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