Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01779/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01779-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Daniel Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Deputy Necoechea, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-01779-TUC-RM (EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff Daniel Patterson alleges Defendant Necoechea 

violated his civil rights when he served Patterson with two protective orders while he was 

serving as an active member of the Arizona legislature. Patterson claims he was immune 

from civil process under Arizona’s legislative immunity statute, Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 

2, § 6. 

 Before the Court is Defendant Rudy Necoechea’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30). 

Defendant Necoechea argues dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) is warranted because 

his actions are protected by qualified immunity. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 15). 

 The motion has been fully briefed by the parties. For the reasons stated below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be granted. First, Count One under 28 

U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed because it fails to allege violation of a specific 

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constitutional right. Second, Count Two under the Fifth Amendment should be dismissed 

because Defendant is alleged to be a state and not a federal actor. Finally, Count Two 

under the Fourteenth Amendment should also be dismissed because the Defendant is 

protected by qualified immunity. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

Plaintiff Daniel Patterson filed this action on November 14, 2013, alleging claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 

States Constitution. (Doc. 1). Patterson is a former member of the Arizona Legislature. 

 On February 28, 2014 Defendants Clarence Dupnik and Pima County Sheriff’s 

Department filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8). On March 19, 2014 Defendants Michael 

Ranking and City of Tucson also filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 9). On November 6, 

2014, District Judge Rosemary Marquez entered an order adopting a Report and 

Recommendation by the undersigned and granting both motions. Plaintiff then filed an 

amended complaint against Defendant Necoechea on January 12, 2015 (“FAC”). (Doc. 

27). 

Patterson’s claims concern an alleged domestic violence incident that took place 

on February 24, 2012. (Doc. 27 at 2, ¶ 8). Patterson states that after he called Tucson 

Police Department officers to his home, no arrests were made, and the officers informed 

the media that no charges would be filed. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 9–10. However, Patterson was later 

served with two orders of protection. Id. at ¶ 18. Patterson claims that because he was a 

member of the legislature at the time these events transpired, he was granted immunity 

from civil process while the legislature was in session. Id. at ¶¶ 11–16. Thus, Patterson 

alleges Defendant Necoechea violated his civil rights by serving Patterson with the 

protective orders while he was serving as an active member of the Arizona Legislature. 

 On March 17, 2015, Defendant Necoechea filed his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 30). 

II. Legal Standard 

 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court may grant a motion to dismiss when 

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the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction,” a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” and “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). While Rule 8 

does not demand factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

“Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 

not suffice.” Id. 

 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must allege facts 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim must be plausible, allowing the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

 The Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, with every doubt resolved on his behalf, and with that party’s allegations taken as 

true. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, the 

court only considers the face of the complaint when deciding a motion under Rule 

12(b)(6). See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

III. Discussion

Defendant Necoechea requests the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 30). Defendant Necoechea argues Plaintiff’s complaint fails 

to state a claim for relief because a) “Count One fails because Patterson did not allege a 

specific constitutional violation,” b) “the Fifth Amendment claim in Count Two fails 

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because the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal actors,” and c) Patterson’s 

Fourteenth Amendment dup process claim is barred by qualified immunity. Id. at 3. 

A. Count One: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 In Count One, Plaintiff claims damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant 

Necoechea for violating his civil rights under color of state law. (Doc. 27 at 4). Plaintiff 

also restates and incorporates by reference all allegations in his complaint. Id. Defendant 

argues Count One fails because Plaintiff fails to allege violation of a specific federal 

right. (Doc. 30 at 3). Plaintiff counters that he “is using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a vessel for 

alleging a constitutional violation of failure to receive due process.” (Doc. 33 at 4). 

 Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for parties deprived of constitutional rights 

by officials acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to state a 

valid § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must show that he or she has been deprived of a right 

secured by the Constitution and ... laws of the United States and that the deprivation was 

under color of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Id. (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 based on an alleged violation 

of the Arizona Constitution—the right of members of the legislature to be exempt from 

civil process while the legislature is in session—this claim fails. Section 1983 only 

applies to rights secured by the United States Constitution; thus, Plaintiff cannot seek 

relief for violation of an Arizona Constitution provision. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks 

relief for a violation of due process pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, 

Count One would thereby be duplicative of Count Two. Further, the bare and conclusory 

allegations in Count One fail to comply with the Rule 8 pleading standard set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

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‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions”). 

 In sum, Count One should be dismissed because it fails to allege violation of a 

specific constitutional right. Count One should also be dismissed as duplicative of Count 

Two to the extent that Count One states a due process claim pursuant to the Fifth or 

Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the dismissal of 

Count One. 

B. Count Two: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims damages under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution for failure to receive due process. (Doc. 

27 at 5). Plaintiff also restates and incorporates by reference all allegations in his 

complaint. Id. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim under the Fifth Amendment fails 

because Plaintiff does not allege Defendant is a federal actor. (Doc. 30 at 3). Defendant 

also argues Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment fails because Defendant is 

entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s response focuses only on the issue of 

Defendant’s immunity for the Fourteenth Amendment claim,1

 arguing that Defendant is 

not protected by qualified immunity because Plaintiff made it clear to Defendant that 

Defendant’s actions were in violation of the Arizona Constitution but that Defendant 

served Plaintiff with civil process anyway. (Doc. 33 at 5). 

i. Fifth Amendment 

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states as follows: 

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 

public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 

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 Plaintiff’s conclusion specifically states that “Defendant cannot claim qualified immunity and Count Two under the Fourteenth Amendment should not be dismissed,” 

suggesting Plaintiff concedes to dismissal of his claims in Count Two based on the Fifth 

Amendment. (Doc. 33 at 5). 

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U.S. Const. amend V. Plaintiff’s claim under the Fifth Amendment “is plainly foreclosed 

by the Constitution” because Defendant Necoechea “is a local law enforcement official, 

and the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause only applies to the federal government. 

Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 

455, 462 (1942)). Thus, because Defendant is alleged to be a state and not a federal actor, 

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim must fail. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Two be granted. 

ii. Fourteenth Amendment 

 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects 

individuals from state action that either ‘shocks the conscience,’ or interferes with rights 

‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 

1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 

 Here, Plaintiff contends his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

were violated when Defendant served him with the protection orders while Plaintiff was 

an active member of the Arizona legislature. Defendant contends that he is protected by 

qualified immunity. 

 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability 

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). “Under qualified immunity, an officer is protected from suit when he makes a 

reasonable mistake of law or fact.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 

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2012). “Only when an officer’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional 

right—when the officer should have known he was violating the Constitution—does he 

forfeit qualified immunity.” 

Determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified 

immunity involves a two-pronged analysis. First, we ask, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right? Second, we must ask whether 

the right was clearly established. A right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Pearson, the Supreme Court held that 

judges may exercise their discretion in determining which prong of the two-step qualified 

immunity analysis to address first. 555 U.S. at 236. For example, “[t]here are cases in 

which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious 

whether in fact there is such a right.” Id. at 237. Thus, “[c]ourts should think carefully 

before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of 

constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the 

case.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37). 

 Here, the issue is whether an Arizona legislator has a right protected by the federal 

constitution to be free from personally receiving an order of protection while the 

legislature is in session. The Court need not determine whether Plaintiff has such a right. 

The Court may proceed directly to the second prong of the analysis to determine whether, 

if such a right exists, the right was clearly established at the time of the events in 

question. See James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the 

time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that 

every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.’” Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 

(1987)). The Court “do[es] not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent 

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must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. Thus, 

“qualified immunity is lost when plaintiffs point either to ‘cases of controlling authority 

in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident’ or to ‘a consensus of cases of persuasive 

authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were 

lawful.’” Id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 

617 (1999)). “These standards ensure the officer has ‘fair and clear warning’ of what the 

Constitution requires.” Id. at 2086–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). Further, the clearly established right must be 

specifically defined. See Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (courts should not “define clearly 

established law at a high level of generality”). Finally, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of 

showing that the right at issue was clearly established.” Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 

969 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Article IV, Part 2, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution 

prohibited Defendant from serving Plaintiff with the protection orders while Plaintiff was 

an active member of the Arizona legislature. In his response to the Motion to Dismiss, 

Plaintiff contends that he informed Defendant that he was a member of the Arizona 

legislature and that the legislature was in session and thus he could not be served with 

civil process pursuant to the Arizona Constitution. (Doc. 33 at 2). However, this bare 

allegation is insufficient to show that the Arizona Constitution creates a federallyprotected right, and that ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every 

‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” 

Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). Plaintiff has not 

produced either “cases of controlling authority . . . at the time of the incident,” or “a 

consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have 

believed that his actions were lawful.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617. Plaintiff’s Response 

contains no case law from the Ninth Circuit, or any other jurisdiction, showing that “a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [due process rights].” 

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Plaintiff simply alleges that because he “made it very clear to 

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Defendant that Defendant’s actions were in violation of the Arizona Constitution” but 

Defendant “served Plaintiff with civil process anyways,” “Defendant cannot claim 

qualified immunity.” (Doc. 33 at 5). This is insufficient for Plaintiff to meet his burden to 

show violation of a clearly established right. See Mason v. Arizona, 260 F. Supp. 2d 807, 

823 (D. Ariz. 2003); Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 969. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Two be granted. 

IV. Recommendation 

 The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT 

Necoechea’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 30). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 10th day of December, 2015. 

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