Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05129/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U<1ited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT J Jl 1 1991 

WILLIAM JOSEPH "Smokey" LEE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

FRANK THURMAN, Sheriff; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-5129 

) (D.C. No. 84-C-546-C) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner appeals from an order of the district court 

entered following a remand from this court. Lee v. Thurman, 

Unpublished No. 86-2333 (10th Cir. filed Oct. 21, 1988). In that 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 1 
order, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's 

recommendation that the use of an uncounseled, hence invalid, 1953 

conviction for the purposes of impeachment and enhancement in 

petitioner's 1969 trial was harmless error. Therefore, the use of 

the 1969 conviction for purposes of enhancement in 1984 was 

without error. Upon review of the entire record, we affirm. 

Petitioner commenced this action in district court pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. He alleged that the sentence he received in 

1984 in Oklahoma for armed robbery was improperly enhanced by a 

1969 Oklahoma conviction of first degree rape after former 

conviction of a felony. Petitioner alleged that that conviction 

was tainted by the use of a 1953 uncounseled Minnesota conviction. 

Petitioner has served the 1969 sentence. He will serve the 

enhanced 1984 sentence following completion of a ninety-nine-year 

sentence he is presently serving in Texas. Petitioner is in 

custody for the purposes of this action. See Lee, slip op. at 2. 

Following the remand from this court, the magistrate judge 

found that petitioner's 1953 conviction was invalid because 

petitioner had not been represented by counsel. See Findings and 

Recommendations of U.S. Magistrate, filed March 8, 1989. However, 

the magistrate judge held that the 1969 conviction was not tainted 

thereby because (1) the jury was properly instructed that the 1953 

conviction was admitted solely for the purpose of testing 

petitioner's credibility; (2) there was no indication the jury 

considered the 1953 conviction to establish guilt; and (3) the 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 2 
1953 conviction "was not the only conviction admitted and used to 

test [petitioner's] credibility." Id. at 7. The court adopted 

the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the petition. 

On appeal, petitioner argues that his constitutional rights 

were violated because the 1969 conviction was invalid and should 

not have been used to enhance his 1984 sentence. 1 We must first 

determine whether the use of the 1953 invalid conviction in 

petitioner's 1969 trial was harmless error before we address the 

use of that conviction in 1984. 2 

The Supreme Court has stated that the use of a conviction 

obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 

(1963), against a person either to support guilt or to enhance 

punishment of a later offense is "inherently prejudicial." 

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). The use of prior 

invalid convictions for impeachment purposes deprives a defendant 

of due process where their use might have influenced the outcome 

of the case. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). The Court left 

open the possibility that the admission of a prior invalid 

conviction might in some cases not constitute reversible error. 

1 In Oklahoma, enhancement may be predicated on only one prior 

conviction. See Carbray v. Champion, 905 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 796 (1991). The record shows that 

the state introduced only the 1969 conviction for enhancement 

purposes in 1984. 

2 We note that the error here "involved 'trial error'--error 

which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, 

and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context 

of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its 

admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 3 
Id. at 483 n.12 (Stewart, J., concurring) and 485 (White, J., 

concurring). However, "before a federal constitutional error can 

be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that 

it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 

In order to make this determination, we look at whether there 

was a "reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might 

have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 

U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963); see Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257 (State 

bears burden of demonstrating constitutional error did not 

contribute to conviction). "We must be convinced, from a review 

of the trial transcript, that the jury would not have found the 

state's case significantly less persuasive had the alleged 

uncounseled ... convictions not been brought to light." Twyman 

v. State, 560 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir. 1977)(citing Bond v. State, 

546 F.2d 1369, 1376 (10th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 

(1978). 

In 1969, petitioner was charged with 

eleven-year-old girl. The undisputed evidence 

the rape of an 

showed that the 

victim and her younger brother lived with their grandmother and 

aunt. Their mother was serving a six-month sentence following a 

conviction for grand larceny at the time of the incident, but was 

released two days before the trial. On the evening in question, 

the two children were picked up by petitioner, a family friend of 

about three years. He took the children to a skating rink where 

he dropped the brother off. When petitioner returned the victim 

to the skating rink several hours later, she was hysterical and 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 4 
.. 

staggering. The security officer had her and her brother 

transported to the police station. She was later taken to a local 

hospital. When petitioner returned to the skating rink at eleven 

p.m. to pick the children up to take them home, he was told to go 

to the police station. 

The prosecution urged the jury to accept the following 

version of the events that transpired before petitioner returned 

the victim to the skating rink: 

Petitioner took the victim to his wife's apartment telling 

her he had some dresses for her to try on. The victim watched 

fifteen minutes of the "Get Smart" television program.

3 

Petitioner gave the victim a total of four ten-milligram tablets 

of Valium while they were at the apartment. The victim testified 

that petitioner received a phone call during the evening. This 

fact was corroborated by the victim's aunt who stated she had made 

the call and the aunt's friend who had overheard the call. After 

administering the Valium and taking the phone call, petitioner 

instructed the victim to undress and assaulted her. When 

petitioner returned to the skating rink to pick the children up, 

he was told there was a problem with the victim, but he was not 

told there had been an assault or that he was a suspect. He was 

allowed to drive to the police station. When he saw the victim's 

brother there, he said: "[F]or all the stuff I've done for you 

and you've got to blame this on me." Tr. 519-20. 

3 The victim's version of the program did not correspond with 

the program actually aired, the script of which was admitted into 

evidence. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 5 
At trial, the examining physician testified that the victim 

had internal injuries consistent with trauma, although no sperm 

were noted. Her hymen was not completely intact. The physician 

also testified that the victim's hysteria was consistent with the 

amount of Valium ingestion alleged because children especially can 

have "adverse" reactions to Valium as a result of which the Valium 

acts as a stimulant. 

The defense urged the jury to accept the following version: 

Petitioner took the victim to Sears to buy her some dresses. 

He saw his name on a list at the cashiers, realized he could not 

charge anything, and took the victim, who was upset and crying 

because she couldn't get the dresses, back to the skating rink. 

She walked over to a car containing two boys and a girl. 

Petitioner left and went to a gas station. A witness friend of 

petitioner's who worked at the station corroborated the stop at 

the gas station, although he did not come forward until shortly 

before trial. When petitioner returned to the skating rink, he 

was arrested for sexual assault, prior to being allowed to drive 

to the police station. The defense theorized that the rape 

charges arose as a result of petitioner's interaction with the 

victim's aunt the previous evening when she had tried to get 

petitioner to give her money so she could get her husband out of 

jail. Petitioner refused, the aunt got mad, and decided to "get 

even" with him. At that time she took his money, checkbook, and 

some of his Valium. 4 Petitioner testified that he "emphatically 

4 The defense speculated that the 

Valium from her aunt. 

6 

victim took one of those 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 6 
and absolutely" did not "rape or have carnal knowledge" of the 

victim at any time. 

The defense also presented testimony from a doctor who 

stated, without examining the victim, that her injuries were 

consistent with scratching herself and a resulting vaginitis. He 

testified that the victim's hysteria was not an expected reaction 

following the ingestion of forty milligrams of Valium. 

The victim's mother testified for the defence that her 

daughter had lied to her "several different times," tr. at 926, 

usually when she did "not get her way," tr. at 927, and was lying 

about the rape. 

that after her 

On cross examination, the prosecution brought out 

return home from prison, the mother called 

petitioner's attorney and asked how much money he would give her 

for testifying for petitioner. She had previously written a 

letter in which she stated that since the damage had already been 

done to her daughter, if she could "get any money out of it," she 

would. Tr. 1443-44. She also testified that the victim's aunt 

wanted petitioner in jail since he would not give her money. 

At trial, petitioner admitted to the following prior 

convictions: 

1. 1953: Armed robbery, Minnesota, seven-year sentence 

(invalid, uncounseled conviction); 

2. 1953: Interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle, 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, three-year sentence, incarcerated nineteen months; 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 7 
3. 1956: Escape from county jail as a parole violator, and 

interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle, Laredo, Texas, 

five-year sentence in federal prison; 

4. 1960: "Pugilistic altercation" with brother-in-law, 

California, ten-day sentence; 

5. 1960: Bogus check, California, eighteen months' 

imprisonment; 

6. 1966: Contempt of court, Oklahoma; 

7. 1969: Bogus check, Oklahoma, sixty days' imprisonment. 

Only the admission of the 1953 conviction was error. Although it 

was one of petitioner's more serious convictions, it was only one 

of several felony convictions. Clearly it was cumulative. 

Moreover, the 1953 conviction was not a crime similar to that with 

which petitioner was then charged. See Zilka v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 

388, 393 (5th Cir.)("Similar crimes would, of course, have a much 

greater impact upon the jury"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976). 

Our usual reluctance to find harmless error has been 

heightened because the jury deadlocked its first evening of 

deliberation. At that point, the jurors had deliberated less than 

five hours after a two-week trial. The court advised the jury to 

cease deliberations and because of the late hour to return the 

following morning. 5 The next morning the jury requested that five 

parts of the transcript be read to it: 

5 No Allen charge was given. See Allen v. United States, 164 

U. S. 492 (1896). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 8 
1. 

2. 

station; 

Testimony of the service station attendant; 

Petitioner's testimony regarding his stop 

3. Testimony of Eunice Lee, petitioner's mother; 

at the 

4. Testimony of the victim regarding the television program 

"Get Smart," which she stated she had watched; and 

5. Testimony of the skating rink's security officer. 

Following the readings, the jury returned its verdict of guilty in 

forty-eight minutes. 

The jury was obviously concerned with its collective 

recollection of the evidence rather than deadlocked as to the jury 

members' conviction regarding 

The fact that the jury returned 

petitioner's 

with its 

guilt or innocence. 

verdict forty-eight 

minutes after the testimony was read suggests that the verdict was 

readily reached without a true deadlock-causing dispute after some 

confusion regarding the testimony was cleared up. 

Finally, unlike in Loper, the credibility determination here 

was not balanced solely between testimony presented by petitioner 

and the victim. See Gibson v. United States, 575 F.2d 556, 560 

(5th Cir. 1978). Twenty-six witnesses were called. Although we 

cannot say the evidence was overwhelming, the victim's story was 

strongly supported by the testimony. Petitioner's story, on the 

other hand, was rather farfetched and the testimony of some of his 

witnesses was questionable. 

Under all of these circumstances, we are persuaded that the 

error in admitting the 1953 conviction in petitioner's 1964 trial 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We are convinced the jury 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 9 
would not have found the state's case significantly less 

persuasive had the invalid 1953 conviction not been admitted. 

Consequently, the use of the 1964 conviction to enhance 

petitioner's sentence in 1984 was also without error. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-5129 Document: 010110128868 Date Filed: 07/10/1991 Page: 10