Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00383/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00383-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Lee Tindall, 

Petitioner, 

v.

Dora B. Schiriro, et. al,

Respondents.

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No. CV-06-0383-PHX-DGC (JI)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Christopher Lee Tindall’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus and United States Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin’s Report and

Recommendation (R&R). Docs. ##1, 13. The R&R recommends that the Court deny the

petition. Doc. #13 at 15. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. Doc. #14. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition.

I. Background.

On April 20, 2002, Petitioner stole several boxes of Sudafed from a K-mart store and

assaulted two of the store’s security personnel during his attempted escape. He was convicted

of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of shoplifting. The court found that he had

two prior felonies, and sentenced Petitioner to two concurrent ten-year sentences for the

aggravated assault charges and time served for the shoplifting charge. Doc. #13. Petitioner

is currently confined at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence.

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Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. #1. Identified by the numbering in the petition,

Petitioner asserts three claims for relief: (1)(a) defense counsel’s refusal to call Petitioner

to testify resulted in the denial of Petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to testify on

his own behalf and confront his accusers, (1)(b) there was not sufficient evidence to convict

Petitioner, (2) Petitioner’s sentence was improperly enhanced, and (3) Petitioner was

improperly denied an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Id.

Petitioner has withdrawn claim (3). Doc. #8 at 5. Respondents have filed an answer to the

petition arguing that Petitioner’s grounds for relief are exhausted and procedurally defaulted.

Doc. #7.

II. Standard of Review.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court may

not grant habeas relief unless Petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1); see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996). If Petitioner has exhausted

his claims, the Court may not grant habeas relief unless the state’s adjudication of the claims

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law as decided by the Supreme Court, or resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27

(2004); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). “The Supreme Court has said that

§ 2254(d)(1) imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and

‘demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Clark v. Murphy,

331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7

(1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

III. Discussion.

The R&R recommends claim (3) be dismissed with prejudice as it has been withdrawn

by Petitioner, and that claims 1(a) and 2 be dismissed with prejudice because they were not

properly exhausted and are now procedurally defaulted. Doc. #13. It asserts that Petitioner

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has failed to show either cause to excuse his procedural default, or actual innocence. Id.

Consequently, there is no basis upon which the Court might consider his claims

notwithstanding the procedural default. Finally, the R&R finds that claim 1(b) lacks merit

and should be denied. Id.

Petitioner’s objection simply reiterates the claims raised in his petition and traverse.

Docs. ##1, 8, 14. He restates that he did not choose to proceed pro per and that he was

denied access to legal resources by the Arizona Department of Corrections’ Legal Access

Policy. He argues that without these impediments he would not have procedurally defaulted.

Doc. #14. The Court finds these generalized objections to be ineffective.

Rule 72(b) provides that “a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations” of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)

(emphasis added). The rule further provides that the district judge “shall make a de novo

determination . . . of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific

written objection has been made[.]” Id. (emphasis added). 

Petitioner in this case has only reiterated objections already addressed by the detailed

R&R. His non-specific reiteration fails to offer new arguments and is devoid of supporting

authority. The Court deems Petitioner’s objections ineffective. This ruling comports with

the clear language of Rule 72(b) that a district judge “shall make a de novo determination .

. . of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection has

been made[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Because Petitioner has made no effective objection,

the Court is relieved of any obligation to review the R&R. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149

(Section 636(b)(1) “does not . . . require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the

subject of an objection.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(same). 

Petitioner’s failure to provide specific objections notwithstanding, the Court has

reviewed the R&R and finds it to be correct. This is true for the R&R as a whole and

specifically with respect to the one argument restated in Petitioner’s objection – that he was

denied effective access to legal resources, resulting in his failure to exhaust arguments in

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state court. The R&R correctly rejects this argument. See R&R at 10-11. Petitioner has not

shown that a lack of access to legal resources resulted in an inability to assert his claims, nor

that a lack of resources prevented him from filing a petition for review in state court. Id. 

Because Petitioner has failed to provide specific objections to the R&R, and because

the R&R is, in any event, correct, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the Petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)

(same).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. #13)

is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2006.

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