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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3182

___________

Walter E. Weyrauch, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Cigna Life Insurance Company *

of New York, *

*

 Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 23, 2005

Filed: August 2, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Walter E. Weyrauch appeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary

judgment on his suit seeking recovery of long-term disability benefits from Cigna

Life Insurance Company (Cigna). For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and

remand.

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1

The record reveals that Weyrauch received short-term disability benefits some

time during the period of October 26, 1996 to December 31, 1998. (J.A. at 118.) The

amount of benefits and the time period to which the payments related are not stated.

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BACKGROUND

Weyrauch spent much of his life as a stockbroker. In August of 1996, he

accepted a position as an investment banker with Salomon Smith Barney. He

immediately became eligible for long-term disability benefits under a long-term

disability income policy (Policy) issued by Cigna.

Unfortunately, on October 26, 1996, Weyrauch suffered a stroke. He was

released from the hospital nine days later. Despite the lingering effects of the stroke,

Weyrauch returned to work shortly after his release and was working six hours a day

by January of 1997. By April, Weyrauch apparently was working full time for

Salomon Smith Barney even though his speech was somewhat slurred and he had

weakness in his hand and left leg.

For the remainder of 1997 and 1998, Weyrauch was able to perform the duties

of his job, earning $56,562.12 in 1997 and $82,911.47 in 1998.1

 Although it is

unclear when Weyrauch’s condition degenerated, he was diagnosed with a permanent,

partial disability after a neuropsychological evaluation on March 13, 1999. The

report recommended vocational counseling because return to unrestricted

employment at professional levels was doubtful.

Salomon Smith Barney terminated Weyrauch on July 8, 1999. The cause for

termination is not reported in the record, but it appears that Weyrauch was continually

absent from work after April 10, 1999. In addition to being fired, Weyrauch suffered

numerous personal setbacks related to his condition, including a divorce and eviction

from his home that year. 

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In July of 2000, Weyrauch sought the assistance of counsel, who promptly filed

a claim on his behalf on July 7, 2000. The claim was as follows:

Mr. Weyrauch was employed at SalomanSmithBarney [sic] October 31, 1996

when he suffered an onset of total disability that began with a stroke. Enclosed

you will find a letter describing his neuropsychological evaluation done

March 13, 1999 that clearly indicates he is totally disabled . . . .

. . . . 

. . . I believe he is eligible for benefits for the time period beginning

October 26, 1996 down to the present.

(J.A. at 180-181.)

After requesting and obtaining medical records, Cigna denied Weyrauch’s

claim on September 19, 2000, and in the letter of denial stated a number of reasons,

including late submission of the claim, failure to provide an excuse for late

submission, lack of cooperation, and prejudice to its ability to determine contractual

conditions resulting from the late submission. Weyrauch then filed several appeals

with Cigna’s Appeals Team, resulting in subsequent denials on November 11, 2000

and May 1, 2001. 

In response to the denial of his claim for disability benefits, Weyrauch filed suit

in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on June 25, 2001,

seeking recovery of benefits under a policy governed by the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The court referred the case to a magistrate.

Cigna asked the magistrate to uphold the denial of benefits because Weyrauch failed

to comply with the terms and conditions of the Policy. Both parties moved for

summary judgment; the magistrate recommended granting Cigna’s motion based on

the finding that Weyrauch violated three different contractual limitations periods: the

30-day period to file notice of claim, the 90-day period to file proof of loss, and the

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three-year period to bring suit–any one of which would have been a sufficient basis

to deny the claim. The court accepted this recommendation, and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Torres v. UNUM Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 405 F.3d 670, 677 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if

"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When making this determination, we view the record in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving “that party the benefit of all

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts.” United States v.

Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2005).

Further, we review de novo the district court’s determination of the appropriate

standard of review of a benefit plan decision under ERISA. Ortleib v. United

HealthCare Choice Plans, 387 F.3d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 2004). Under ERISA, the court

should apply a deferential standard of review if “the benefit plan gives the

administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits

or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.

101, 115 (1989). In the court below, Weyrauch argued that a de novo standard of

review was appropriate because the Policy did not contain a term giving Cigna

discretionary authority. Cigna did not dispute this. Thus, the district court

determined that a de novo standard of review was appropriate. Finding nothing in the

record persuading us to the contrary, we agree with the district court’s determination.

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2

The magistrate’s opinion suggests that the contractual limitations period is

relevant to determine if Weyrauch’s claim is barred. We note that a contractual

limitations period shorter than that provided by state law may be effective in some

cases. Wilkins v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir.

2002). But the Policy here includes a clause stating that “[i]f any time limit set forth

in the policy . . . is less than that permitted by the law of the state in which the

Employee lives when the policy is issued, then the time limit provided by the policy

is extended to agree with the minimum permitted by the law of that state.” (J.A. at

65.)

Here, the Minnesota statute mandates a minimum limitations period allowing

the insurer to substitute alternate provisions only if they are “not less favorable in any

respect to the insured or the beneficiary.” Minn. Stat. § 62A.04, subd. 2. By its own

terms, the Policy automatically extends its limitations period to meet the state law

requirement. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider whether we would reach a

different result if we applied the contractual limitations period. 

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II. Discussion

We initially discuss the magistrate’s finding that Weyrauch’s action, filed on

June 25, 2001, should have been filed by July 23, 2000 and was barred for failure to

file suit within the statute of limitations period. In our view, the magistrate was in

error. Under ERISA, the statute of limitations provided by Minnesota Statute

62A.04, subdivision 2(11) controls,2

 and we think it clear that the suit is timely under

that statute of limitations. 

A. Timeliness of Suit

Because ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for actions to recover

benefits, we look first to the most analogous state statute of limitations. Johnson v.

State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 942 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 1991) (en

banc). In the context of long-term disability policies, this court has held that the most

analogous Minnesota statute is Minnesota Statute section 62A.04, subdivison 2.

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3

In Ryan v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 450 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1990), the Minnesota

Supreme Court addressed the proof of loss provision of section 62A.04, concluding

“[w]hen an insured claims total disability benefits under a policy governed by section

62A.04, subd. 2(7) and (11), the limitations period will not begin to run until 90 days

after termination of the continuous period of disability.” Ryan, 450 N.W.2d at 129.

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Blaske v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 131 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1997). This

statute’s limitations period runs three years from the date proof of loss is required.

Minn. Stat. § 62A.04, subd. 2(11). The subsection concerning proof of loss provides:

Written proof of loss must be furnished to the insurer at its said office

in case of claim for loss for which this policy provides any periodic

payment contingent upon continuing loss within 90 days after the

termination of the period for which the insurer is liable and in case of

claim for any other loss within 90 days after the date of such loss.

Minn. Stat. §62A.04, subd. 2(7) (emphasis added). 

Thus, under the statute, the type of claim determines the date proof of loss is

due. For claims involving continuing loss, such as the long-term disability claim

here, proof of loss is due 90 days after the termination of the period of disability;3

 for

claims with a discrete loss date, proof of loss is due 90 days from that date. Id. The

net effect of these provisions is that an action must be filed within three years and 90

days of the date the insured ceases to be totally disabled.

It follows, therefore, that Weyrauch had three years and 90 days from the date

his disability ended to file suit. Viewed in the light most favorable to Weyrauch, the

record establishes that he was diagnosed with a permanent disability on March 13,

1999, which rendered him totally disabled on that date under the terms of the Policy.

The Policy was in effect on this date, and he was still employed by Salomon Smith

Barney. Weyrauch filed suit June 25, 2001–well within the three years and ninety

days he was permitted under the statute of limitations. Thus, his suit is clearly timely.

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Cigna insists that Weyrauch’s claim relates only to the discrete occurrence of

his stroke, and thus, proof of loss was due, at the latest, by July 27, 1997, and the time

to file suit expired on July 27, 2000. We disagree. To the extent that Weyrauch

believes he is eligible for benefits dating back to October 26, 1996, he is incorrect.

The stroke occurred on October 26, 1996, but the record reflects Weyrauch returned

to full-time work by April 1997 and earned significant wages in both 1997 and 1998.

The fact that he requested benefits dating back to October 26, 1996, however, is

irrelevant to the question of whether he is entitled to any benefits resulting from a

disability occurring while he was covered by the Policy. 

Weyrauch may survive summary judgment on the question of whether his suit

was timely filed by showing onset of a disability while he was covered by the Policy

and by filing suit within three years and ninety days after his disability ceased.

Weyrauch has done so by introducing the neuropsychologist’s report, which declared

him permanently disabled as of March 13, 1999, and we conclude that the district

court erred by granting summary judgment on this ground. 

B. Proof of Loss and Notice of Claim Requirements

Having decided that Weyrauch’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitations,

we must address the magistrate’s finding that Weyrauch did not timely file notice of

claim or proof of loss and that Cigna was prejudiced as a result. The magistrate erred

when he found that Weyrauch should have filed notice of his claim by May 23, 1997

and proof of loss by July 23, 1997. 

We previously noted that under Minnesota Statute section 62A.04, proof of

loss is due 90 days after the termination of the period of disability. Viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Weyrauch for purposes of Cigna’s summary judgment

motion on the issue of timely filing of proof of loss, Weyrauch’s disability continued

at least until August 23, 2000, when proof of loss was filed. Although Cigna may

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4

Although ERISA preempts many state statutes, it is settled law that ERISA

preemption does not apply to notice-prejudice rules that regulate insurance. UNUM

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argue to the contrary, this would present a disputed fact issue for resolution on

remand as to whether Weyrauch is entitled to disability benefits under the Policy.

We next turn to the timeliness of Weyrauch’s notice of claim. Minnesota law

and the Policy both require filing of notice at the onset of the disability. Minn. Stat.

§ 62A.04, subd. 2(5); (J.A. at 65). At the latest, Weyrauch should have filed notice

of his claim 30 days from the date he was declared permanently disabled, March 13,

1999, which he did not do. However, the Policy’s notice of claim provision states

that a “claim will not be invalidated or reduced if it is shown that written notice was

given as soon as was reasonably possible.” (J.A. at 65.) Accordingly, we must

determine whether, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Weyrauch, he

filed notice as soon as was reasonably possible.

Weyrauch argues that his delay in filing was reasonable, given his mental

impairments. The magistrate, believing that the notice was due by May 23, 1997,

found this unpersuasive. He noted that Weyrauch passed his driver’s test and

returned to work as a stock broker in 1997. This misses the mark. Although these

facts are relevant to Weyrauch’s condition in 1997, the real question is whether his

impairments affected his ability to give notice at the onset of his disability, which the

record reflects began in 1999. In addition to the diagnosis of permanent mental

disability, Weyrauch was divorced, evicted from his home, and fired during 1999.

Under these circumstances, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Weyrauch’s

mental condition prevented him from filing a claim until he enlisted the aid of counsel

to do so the following year. 

Even if the fact-finder determines that Weyrauch did not file the notice of his

claim as soon as was reasonably possible, under Minnesota law,4

 an insurer may not

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Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 369 (1999).

5

Moreover, we doubt the validity of any arguments that may be advanced

attempting to relate Weyrauch’s 1999 disability back to his stroke in 1996 for the

purpose of establishing prejudice. The Policy specifically addresses this situation,

stating that “[s]eparate periods of Total Disability resulting from the same or related

causes will be considered one period of Total Disability unless separated by the

Employee’s return to Active Service for at least 6 consecutive months.” (J.A. at 56.)

Mr. Weyrauch returned to active service in April of 1997 and continued through

1998. Under the Policy’s terms, even related disabilities are treated as separate

periods of total disability when separated by a return to active service for six months,

as they were here. 

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invalidate the claim on this basis absent a showing of prejudice due to insured’s late

filing. Ryan v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 450 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Minn. 1990). Cigna

argued below that it suffered prejudice because Weyrauch’s late filing prevented it

from investigating whether his disability was caused by a pre-existing condition. The

Policy provides that the pre-existing condition “limitation will not apply to a period

of total disability which begins more than 12 months after the most recent Effective

Date of the Employee’s Insurance.” (J.A. at 55.) The record shows that the effective

date of Weyrauch’s insurance is August 9, 1996. Thus, the pre-existing condition

limitation only applies to disabilities occurring on or before August 9, 1997. As

previously noted, during 1997 and 1998, Weyrauch returned to work full-time for

Salomon Smith Barney. His disability, diagnosed March 13, 1999, occurred

subsequent to those dates, and thus, is outside the period for which the pre-existing

condition limitation applies. Therefore, Cigna’s inability to obtain records relating

to a pre-existing condition is irrelevant to the question of prejudice here.5

CONCLUSION

The district court erred by granting Cigna’s motion for summary judgment.

Weyrauch’s action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and his

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6

On remand, Cigna may advance other defenses that may be available under the

provisions of its disability Policy.

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proof of loss was timely filed. Although Weyrauch filed notice of his claim more

than 30 days after the onset of disability, whether he filed notice as soon as

reasonably possible given his mental impairments is a disputed issue to be resolved

by the fact-finder on remand, as is the question of whether Cigna has been actually

prejudiced by the late filing.6

 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. 

______________________________

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