Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02471/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GARY W. SETTLE, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIV 05-2471 PCT MEA

)

PRESCOTT UNIFIED SCHOOL ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

DISTRICT, )

) 

 Defendant. )

_____________________________ )

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 32).

I. Procedural background

On August 15, 2005, Plaintiff, who is pro se in this

matter, filed a complaint alleging Defendant denied him

employment based on his disability. The complaint alleges

Defendant is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act and seeks

injunctive and monetary relief. 

On December 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion to

amend his complaint to add a claim Defendant also violated the

Case 3:05-cv-02471-MEA Document 38 Filed 11/01/06 Page 1 of 20
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1

 The Court denied the motion to amend because Plaintiff had

never presented an age discrimination claim to the EEOC, a

jurisdictional prerequisite to asserting the claim in the District

Court. 

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Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which motion was denied

without prejudice. See Docket No. 20.1 The parties engaged in

discovery, including the submission of disclosures and

interrogatories. Plaintiff was deposed by Defendant. On August

22, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a

separate statement of facts in support of the motion for summary

judgment. See Docket No. 32 & Docket No. 33. Defendant asserts

judgment as a matter of law is appropriate because there are no

disputed issues of material fact and there is no evidence to

support the allegation that Defendant knew Plaintiff was

disabled or to support the allegation Defendant did not hire

Plaintiff because he was disabled.

On September 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a pro se

response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Docket

No. 35. Defendant filed a reply to the response on October 10,

2006, and also filed an objection to Plaintiff’s Separate

Statement of Facts. See Docket No. 36 & Docket No. 37.

II. Standard for granting judgment as a matter of law

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment shall be entered if the

pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute

regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10

(1986). 

For purposes of deciding a motion for

summary judgment, “genuine” means that the

evidence about the fact is such that a

reasonable jury could resolve the point in

favor of the non-moving party, and

“material” means that the fact is one that

might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law. 

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., 960 F.2d

200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). See also Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri

Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553

(1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with

a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,

but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct.

at 2510.

When a party moving for summary judgment has carried

its burden under Rule 56(c), “its opponent must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

Case 3:05-cv-02471-MEA Document 38 Filed 11/01/06 Page 3 of 20
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475 U.S. 574, 586, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). (“[I]f

the factual context renders respondents’ claim implausible ...

respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to

support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.”). The

party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations

or denials of his pleadings, but instead must produce some

significant, probative evidence tending to contradict the moving

party’s allegations, thereby creating a genuine question of fact

for resolution at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256-57; 106

S. Ct. at 2510, 2513-14 (holding the plaintiff must present

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment). 

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). Because plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial,

defendants have no burden to negate plaintiffs’ claims to

prevail on their motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53. A defendant moving for

summary judgment does not have the burden to produce any

evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Id., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. Instead,

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the defendant’s burden, as the party seeking summary judgment,

may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of

evidence to support the elements of plaintiff’s claims. See id.

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512.

Additionally, the evidence presented in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment must be both probative and properly

supported. See Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d

1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693

F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The Court must consider a defendant’s motion for

summary judgment construing all alleged facts with all

reasonable inferences favoring the plaintiff. See, e.g.,

Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 749 (2005). Additionally, because Plaintiff

is pro se in this matter, the Court must liberally construe his

pleadings. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d

890, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiff’s pro se status

does not excuse his obligation to comply with the fundamental

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,

e.g., Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.

1994).

When determining if a plaintiff has met his burden of

producing evidence regarding an element on which he will bear

the burden of proof at trial, the Court may only consider

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2 Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made

on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts

as would be admissible in evidence, and shall

show affirmatively that the affiant is competent

to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn

or certified copies of all papers or parts

thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be

attached thereto or served therewith. The court

may permit affidavits to be supplemented or

opposed by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a

motion for summary judgment is made and supported

as provided in this rule, an adverse party may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of

the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse

party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise

provided in this rule, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. If the adverse party does not so respond,

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be

entered against the adverse party.

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evidence which would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Ballen

v. City of Redmond, ___ F. 3d. ___, 2006 WL 2988177, at *6 (9th

Cir.); Orr v. Bank of Amer., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th

Cir. 2002) (requiring documents offered as evidence of asserted

facts to be authenticated, stating “We have repeatedly held that

unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for

summary judgment.”); Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.

Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2006), quoting Beyene v. Coleman

Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“documents which have not had a proper foundation laid to

authenticate them cannot support [or defend against] a motion

for summary judgment.”).2

Defendant asserts Plaintiff presents no evidence he

is “disabled” as that term is defined by the ADA, or that

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Defendant regarded Plaintiff as disabled. Defendant further

contends there is no disputed issue of material fact regarding

whether Defendant considered Plaintiff to be disabled and,

therefore, that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law because Plaintiff cannot establish this element of his

claim. Defendant further asserts Plaintiff has admitted under

oath he can present no evidence to support his allegation

Defendant failed to hire him because he is disabled.

Additionally, Defendant asserts it has articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff.

Plaintiff responds he is clearly disabled and that

Defendant must have regarded him as disabled based on the

apparent nature of his impairments. Plaintiff contends he has

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant

regarded him as disabled and, therefore, that summary judgment

is not properly granted. Plaintiff further argues that

Defendant hired less-experienced and less-qualified individuals

than Plaintiff and, therefore, that Defendant’s motive in

failing to hire Plaintiff was discriminatory. 

III. Statement of facts

The following facts are not genuinely disputed, and

are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

It is the policy of Defendant Prescott Unified School

District (“Defendant” or “the District”) to give preference to

job applicants for a particular job position to employees who

would be transferring to that position from another position

within the District. Docket No. 33 at para. 7 & Exh. H. The

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3

 Defendant states Plaintiff applied for “14-17

instructional aid positions” in 2004. Docket No. 33 at para. 5. The

record indicates Plaintiff applied for a total of 14 positions at

Miller Valley Elementary School, Abia Judd Elementary School, Taylor

Hicks Elementary School, Lincoln Elementary School, and Granite

Mountain Middle School. Id., Exhs. B-G.

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District also prefers to hire as teacher’s aids individuals who

are “previously well known to its teachers.” Id. at para. 7.

Each District school principal may recommend to the District

governing board whom the principal would like to hire to fill

any open teacher’s aid position at their school. Id. at para.

6 & Exh. H.

Plaintiff has a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in

Plant Science and Agricultural Biology. Id.; Docket No. 35 at

4. Plaintiff’s course work included advanced math, literature,

human relations, music, and Spanish. See Docket No. 35 at 4.

Plaintiff worked as a substitute teacher’s aid and as an inclassroom tutor in California for ten years prior to moving to

Prescott, Arizona, in 2002 or 2003. Id. at 4 & Attach.

(Plaintiff’s affidavit); Docket No. 33 at paras. 3-4. Plaintiff

worked three to four days per week, including at many long-term,

same-classroom assignments, during his employment in California.

Docket No. 35 at 4.

In 2004, Plaintiff applied for at least 14 positions

of employment at the Prescott Unified School District. Id. at

5; Docket No. 33 at para. 5. Plaintiff also applied for two

positions with the District in late 2003. Docket No. 35, Exh.

B. Plaintiff also applied for four jobs with the District in

2005. Id., Exh. B.3 Plaintiff was interviewed for three

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positions in 2004, but not selected for employment in these

positions. Id., Exh. B; Docket No. 33 at para. 5. Plaintiff

was not interviewed for any of the other positions for which he

submitted a job application to Defendant, in 2003, 2004, or

2005. Docket No. 33 at para. 5. 

Plaintiff allows that, in May of 2005, a District

principal left a message asking him if he would like to apply

for a job “diapering kids,” for which job Plaintiff did not

apply. Docket No. 35, Exh. B at 2.

Plaintiff was interviewed for a position at Prescott

High School by a panel of individuals. Id. at para. 21. The

individual selected for the position had worked at Prescott High

School for a number of years and was known to the teachers at

the high school. Id. Plaintiff was interviewed for a position

as an English Language Learner teacher’s aid at Miller Valley

Elementary School. Id. at para. 8 & Exh. B. Plaintiff was not

chosen for that position; Defendant asserts the only other

applicant for the position was selected because she was

bilingual. Id. at para. 8 & Exh. B. Plaintiff was interviewed

for a position as a one-on-one instructional aid at Abia Judd

Elementary School. Id. at para. 18 & Exh. C. The individual

chosen to fill this position “was a long time volunteer in the

school’s side-by-side reading program which was the exact type

of work that was to be done in this position.” Docket No. 32 at

3.

Defendant asserts Plaintiff was not interviewed or

selected for the other positions for which he applied “because

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4

 Defendant asserts it became aware of Plaintiff’s diagnosis

from Plaintiff’s counsel. Docket No. 32 at 2. The Court notes

Plaintiff is pro se in this matter.

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the principals at each of those schools selected either more

highly qualified candidates or hired internal candidates with

whom they had worked and who were very familiar with the school,

teachers, and students.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends some of

the individuals hired by the District for positions for which he

applied were less-qualified, i.e., did not possess bachelor’s or

master’s degrees, or they had fewer years of classroom

experience than Plaintiff. Docket No. 35, Attach.

Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff was born with

cerebral palsy. Docket No. 35. Plaintiff walks with a limp and

the clarity of his speech is noticeably impaired. Id.; Docket

No. 32 at 2. Plaintiff asserts his cerebral palsy substantially

limits his ability to acquire a job and to walk normally.

Docket No. 35 at 2. Plaintiff states his disability is

“abundantly obvious to anyone upon meeting or speaking with

him,” and that his gait is “quite awkward and unsteady.” Id.

 Defendant asserts the District was unaware Plaintiff

had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy prior to February 28,

2005. Docket No. 32 at 2.4 As support for this assertion

Defendant produces the affidavit of an Assistant Superintendent,

Dr. Reynolds, who “spoke with Mr. Settle on occasion regarding

the current job openings and Mr. Settle’s qualifications and

found that they could communicate.” Id. at 5 & Exh. H. 

Plaintiff contends “Dr. Reynolds knew from our first meeting

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that I had a disability or severe physical impairment and also

did Personnel Specialist, Maria Reed.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff

alleges Ms. Reed regularly communicated with District principals

regarding open positions and applicants and, therefore, Ms.

Reed’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s disability may be imputed to the

principals recommending job applicants to the District. Id.

Defendant further alleges Plaintiff has been employed

as an instructional aid at Glassford Hill Middle School, which

school is within a different Arizona school district, since the

beginning of the 2004-2005 school year. Docket No. 33 at para.

29. Defendant alleges Plaintiff is currently employed as a

teacher’s aide for a fifth and sixth grade special education

class, working approximately 32 hours per week at this position.

Id.

Plaintiff asserts that, in June of 2004, when he

inquired as to why he was not getting more interviews by the

District, given his years of classroom experience and his

master’s degree, he was told by Dr. Reynolds that “the school

principals get many applications and they are allowed to choose

which applicant[s] they wish to call in for an interview. The

principals and committee choose who they think will be the

better ‘fit’ for the position.” Docket No. 35, Exh. D. When

Plaintiff stated he thought he was being discriminated against

because he is disabled, the Assistant Superintendent’s response

was “they are both objective and subjective. They are allowed

to be subjective in who they want and they are objective in

judging other matters.” Id., Exh. D.

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IV. Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable to him for

discrimination based on his disability, i.e., Plaintiff has

cerebral palsy. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s failure to

hire him was improperly based on this disability.

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) bars job

discrimination which is based on an otherwise-qualified

individual’s disability. To survive a motion for summary

judgment on his ADA claim, the plaintiff must meet his burden of

producing admissible evidence in support of each element of his

prima facie case. See Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the plaintiff

must produce some evidence showing: (1) that he was “disabled”

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he was “qualified,” for

the job positions for which he applied, i.e., he was able to

perform the essential functions of the job at issue, with or

without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the defendant

knew of his disability and did not hire him at least in part

because of his disability. See Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d

1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); Snead v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001); Nunes v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999); Dyke v.

O’Neal Steel, Inc., 327 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2003).

An individual is considered “disabled” under the ADA

if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such

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5

The Supreme Court has noted that in order to make

out a claim under the “regarded as” prong, “it is

necessary that a covered entity entertain

misperceptions about the individual.” Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. These misperceptions may take

the form of believing “either that one has a

substantially limiting impairment that one does

not have or that one has a substantially limiting

impairment, when, in fact, the impairment is not

so limiting.” Id.

Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 514 (7th Cir. 2000).

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individual,” or if he has “a record of such an impairment,” or

he was “regarded” as having such an impairment by the defendant

employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2005 & Supp. 2006); Dyke,

327 F.3d at 632.5 Arguably, if the plaintiff does not produce

some evidence the defendant was aware the plaintiff was

disabled, or that the defendant “regarded” the plaintiff as

disabled, the plaintiff has not established an element of his

prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the ADA. See

Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir.

1995)(“[A]n employer is not expected to accommodate disabilities

of which it is unaware.”); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47

F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995); Gretillat v. Care Initiatives,

414 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (N.D. Iowa 2006).

If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the

defendant employer must offer a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment decision. If the employer

offers a legitimate reason for its action that is unrelated to

the employee’s disability, the plaintiff will bear the burden of

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establishing that the proffered reason is a pretext for

intentional discrimination. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093-94. The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded “the ADA does

not require that a discriminatory impetus have been the only

motive for an adverse employment action. [] Rather, the ADA

outlaws adverse employment decisions motivated, even in part, by

animus based on a plaintiff’s disability or request for an

accommodation--a motivating factor standard.” Dark v. Curry

County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in

original), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3207 (Oct. 3,

2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Head v.

Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying

a “motivating factor” standard to ADA claims of discrimination).

Compare Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093 (stating the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving his disability influenced the defendant’s

decision not to hire the plaintiff if the defendant “disclaims

any reliance” on the plaintiff’s disability in reaching an

employment decision). The plaintiff bears the burden of

persuading the fact-finder that the defendant’s motive for the

employment decision is a pretext for their intentional

discrimination and of establishing this fact by a preponderance

of the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); Snead, 237 F.3d

at 1093. Cf. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53-54, 124

S. Ct. 513, 519-20 (applying the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting analysis to an ADA claim). If the plaintiff offers

only circumstantial evidence the proffered reason is pretextual,

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6

 A plaintiff’s affidavit stating they are substantially

limited in a major life activity is generally sufficient to create a

disputed issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on this

issue. See Head v. Glacier Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th

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the evidence must be both specific and substantial to withstand

summary judgment. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d

1061, 1066 (9th Cir.2003). 

A plaintiff may meet his burden of establishing the

employer’s discriminatory motive by producing admissible

evidence indicating the defendant’s proffered explanation for

not hiring the plaintiff is unworthy of credence. Hernandez v.

Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004). At

this stage of the analysis, the Court may consider

circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that the plaintiff’s disability actually motivated the

defendant’s adverse employment decision. Id.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff contends he is per se disabled because he

has cerebral palsy. Plaintiff asserts Defendant must have

regarded him as disabled because his speech impediment and

abnormal gait are readily apparent to anyone he meets. Docket

No. 35 at 2. Defendant contends it did not “regard” Plaintiff

as “disabled,” and that the District did not have actual

knowledge Plaintiff suffers from cerebral palsy until February

of 2005. Docket No. 32 at 2.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, Plaintiff has

established a material issue of fact with regard to his prima

facie case of discrimination,6 Defendant is still entitled to

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Cir. 2005). However, to establish he has a substantial limitation,

Plaintiff would have to demonstrate he is “significantly” restricted

in his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities. See Thompson v. Holy

Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (). The inability to perform one

particular job does not constitute such a limitation. See id.

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judgment as a matter of law in this matter. Plaintiff has not

met his burden to produce evidence rebutting Defendant’s alleged

non-discriminatory motive for not hiring Plaintiff.

Plaintiff maintains the District violated the ADA by

choosing to hire candidates who were personally better known to

the principal and staff “rather than a more qualified (more

educated; more directly experienced) instructional aide who

happens to have a disability.” Docket No. 35 at 5. Plaintiff

argues Defendant’s discriminatory motive is established by

“evidence,” arguably not in admissible form, that the people

hired instead of Plaintiff were less-qualified for these

positions than Plaintiff because they did not have bachelor’s

degrees or as much classroom experience. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C.

Plaintiff argues the ADA requires a disabled person “must be

hired” if he “is the most qualified (educated and experienced)

compared to the other candidates.” Id. at 6.

Defendant asserts Plaintiff has not produced evidence

disputing Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

hiring other candidates for the positions for which Plaintiff

applied. Docket No. 36 at 2. Defendant asserts Plaintiff was

not the “best qualified candidate” for any of the positions for

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which he applied, and that “[t]he District’s choice to not hire

[Plaintiff] has nothing to do with his cerebral palsy.” Id.

Defendant states: “Although the District noticed that

[Plaintiff] limped and that his speech was slow, there is no

evidence that the District considered these physical capacities

when offering the positions to other individuals.” Id.

As noted supra, to defeat Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff’s evidence regarding the pretextual

nature of Defendant’s motive for not hiring him must be both

specific and substantial. Plaintiff has not produced

substantial, admissible evidence establishing Defendant’s reason

for not hiring him is unworthy of credence. See Nidds v.

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasizing the plaintiff must produce enough evidence to allow

a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that a discriminatory

reason likely motivated the defendant or the defendant’s

explanation is unworthy of credence); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace

& Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To avoid summary

judgment, [the plaintiff] “must do more than establish a prima

facie case and deny the credibility of the [defendant’s]

witnesses”), quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot, 26 F.3d 885, 890

(9th Cir. 1994). 

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff does not require the Court to equate Defendant’s

awareness of Plaintiff’s disability with the conclusion any

employment decision was predicated on his disability. Plaintiff

has provided no admissible evidence that Defendant’s hiring

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decision was based in any part on his disability. Plaintiff

admitted in his deposition he could produce no direct evidence

of a discriminatory motive. Docket No. 33, Exh. A. As a matter

of federal law, Defendant was not required to give hiring

preference to a disabled person based on any stated objective

criteria of experience or qualification based on education

level; Defendant is prohibited from denying employment to a

qualified individual based on that individual’s disability. 

The “evidence” offered by Plaintiff that lessqualified individuals were hired for positions for which he

applied is arguably not admissible evidence. See Fonseca v.

Sysco Food Serv. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 846-47 (9th Cir.

2003); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003)

(concluding declarations containing hearsay are admissible for

summary judgment purposes if they “could be presented in an

admissible form at trial.”). However, even if admissible, this

information does not establish Defendant’s proffered motive for

failing to hire Plaintiff is unworthy of credence; Defendant

asserts individuals are hired based, in part, on their previous

experience with the District, an assertion not contradicted by

the evidence offered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not produced

significant, probative evidence tending to contradict

Defendant’s assertion they had a legitimate, non-discriminatory

primary motive for declining to hire Plaintiff. Therefore,

there is no “genuine” question of fact for resolution at trial

regarding the threshhold question at issue in this matter.

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V. Conclusion

Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Plaintiff, i.e., the

District’s preference for hiring candidates who are already

working within the District or otherwise known to the District’s

teachers and staff. Although Plaintiff asserts the District

should be hiring teacher’s aides based on the applicant’s

education level and the number of years the individual has been

employed as an instructional aide, this assertion does not

establish the District’s policy of not doing so is based on an

animus towards disabled individuals generally or Plaintiff

specifically. Plaintiff’s bald assertion the District’s policy

is a pretext for its failure to hire Plaintiff because he is

disabled is not sufficient to rebut the proffered legitimate

reason for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Because

Plaintiff has not met his burden of producing admissible

evidence on an element of his claim for relief on which he will

bear the burden at trial, Defendant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Docket No. 32] is granted. Judgment is hereby

entered in favor of Defendantsand against Plaintiff with regard

to all the claims stated in the Complaint, and Plaintiff is to

take nothing thereby.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a result of the Court’s

determination that judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 1st day of November, 2006.

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