Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04207/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04207-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Allen Hoke,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-05-4207-PHX-MHM (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

on May 15, 2006 (#12), a Memorandum in Support on June 6, 2006 (#20), and a

supplemental exhibit on June 9, 2006 (#21). On July 5, 2006, Respondents filed their

Answer (#23), and have filed supplements (#39, 43). Petitioner filed a Reply on July 20,

2006 (#27), and has filed supplements (# 21, 34, 40, 41, 44, and 45).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April, 1993 Mesa, Arizona police officers conducted an investigation based on

various personal advertisements placed by Petitioner in the magazine, Bachelor Beat, seeking

various sexual contacts with young girls and boys. Two undercover officers posed as underCase 2:05-cv-04207-MHM Document 47 Filed 05/21/08 Page 1 of 31
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aged girls responding to the ads, and arranged separately to meet Petitioner. Petitioner

propositioned the officers to engage in sex with him and to allow themselves to be

photographed nude, and offered to help them sell the photographs. At the conclusion of the

second meeting, Petitioner was arrested. Upon execution of a search warrant, police

discovered sexually oriented photographs of Petitioner’s minor daughter taken by Petitioner,

and discovered that Petitioner had placed an ad pretending to be a young girl “Aliceson.”

Petitioner replied to responses to the ads by sending photocopies of the nude pictures of his

daughter and an offer for nude modeling by her at a rate of $250 per hour. (Exhibit F,

Memorandum Decision at 2-6.) (Exhibits to the Answer, #23 are referenced herein as

“Exhibit ___.”) 

On April 29, 1993, Petitioner was indicted by the Maricopa County Grand Jury in case

number CR93-91155 with: (Count 1) attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age

of 14; (Count 2) attempted sexual conduct with a minor over the age of 14; (Counts 3-8) six

counts of taking photographs of a minor engaged in sexual conduct, (Counts 9-14) six counts

of possession of the photographs in Counts 3-8; (Counts 15-20) six counts of possession of

photocopies of photographs of a minor engaged in sexual conduct; and (Count 21) production

of a photograph depicting minors engaged in sexual conduct. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Then, on November 18, 1993, Petitioner was indicted by the Maricopa County Grand

Jury in case number CR93-93266 with an additional six counts of possession of photographs

of a minor engaged in sexual conduct, based upon his responses to inquiries on the

“Aliceson” ads. (Exhibit B.) The state amended the indictment in case number CR93-9115

to allege prior convictions pursuant to the former Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604(H) and State v.

Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 617 P.2d 527 (1980). (Exhibit F, Memorandum Decision at 7.) In

addition, amendments were made to the indictment to change the date of the offenses.

(Exhibit N, Opening Brief at 2, n. 2 and 4.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

The state filed an Allegation of Priors in case CR93-91155, arguing that Counts 2

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through 21 of the indictment were priors to the allegations in Count 1. (Exhibit W.) The

state then filed an Amended Allegation of Priors, arguing that Count 1 was a prior to Counts

9 through 21, and Counts 3 through 8 were priors to Counts 1 and 9 through 21.

(Memorandum to Petition, #20, Appendix 5.) 

The two indictments were consolidated for trial and Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial

wherein he represented himself with the assistance of appointed counsel. (Exhibit F,

Memorandum Decision at 7.) 

During the course of the trial, the court permitted amendments to the indictment as to

the year of the offense with respect to nine of the counts in Case CR93-91155. (Petition

Memorandum, #20 at Appendix 6, M.E. 6/30/94.) Subsequently, the Court permitted a

further amendment, again revising the dates of the offenses. (Id. at Appendix 7, M.E.

7/5/94.)

Petitioner was found guilty on all counts in both cases, with the exception of one

count, Count VII, in Case Number 93-93266. (Exhibit C, M.E. 7/13/94.) Petitioner was

sentenced on September 2, 1994 in Case Number 93-91155, as follows: On Count 1, 5 years’

imprisonment, concurrent to all other counts; on Count 2, 6 months’ jail time, concurrent to

all other counts; on Counts 3–8, and 21, probation for 7 years to begin following Petitioner’s

release from prison on the other counts; and on Counts 9–20, 14 years’ imprisonment,

concurrent to each other count. (Exhibit D, Sentence.) On the same date, the court

suspended sentencing in Case Number 93-93266, on all but the one count for which he was

acquitted, and place Petitioner on concurrent terms of probation for 7 years following his

release from prison on the sentence on the other indictment. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising the following eleven claims:

1. Insufficient evidence to establish intent to commit sexual conduct with a minor

under Counts 1 and 2.

2. The trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the basis that

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his arrest was illegal.

3. There was not probable cause to support the warrant authorizing the search of

Petitioner’s residence, and the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to issue

the warrant.

4. Defendant’s advisory counsel was ineffective.

5. Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Petitioner of a fair trial.

6. The trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for mistrial based upon

testimony by a police officer.

7. The term “lewd” in the state statute was unconstitutionally vague.

8. The First Amendment protected Petitioner from prosecution for taking

photographs of his daughter.

9. The trial court erred in excluding various graphic publications on nudism.

10. The trial court lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner is not a “human being”

or “person.”

11. The sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

(Exhibit F, Memorandum Decision at 8-9.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

convictions and sentences. (Id. at 1.) 

E. FIRST FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDING

Following his original conviction, Petitioner filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, case number CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS. In that Petition, Petitioner challenged his

conviction and sentences in both prosecutions, noting, however, that his sentence in case 93-

93266 was a seven year term of probation. (CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS, Petition, #1 at 2, and

Order 12/19/00, #73.) In the Report & Recommendation on the Petition, which was

ultimately adopted by the Court, the Court summarized the claims in the original petition as

follows:

1) The Mesa Police Department lacked authority to “organize or

maintain an armed body of men,” and therefore, lacked jurisdiction to

arrest petitioner;

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2) West Mesa Justice Court lacked authority to issue a search warrant,

therefore evidence obtained was illegal;

3) The West Mesa Justice Court lacked authority to initiate a felony

proceeding against Petitioner;

4) The Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner, therefore, his

conviction violates the due process clause;

5) The Arizona legislature unlawfully abolished common-law remedies

in passing A.R.S. § 13-103 and Petitioner did not commit a crime in

common law;

6) The trial judge had a “duty to sua sponte dismiss the search warrant

on the fact the (sic) the MPD lacked probable cause to seek search

warrant”’

7) A.R.S. § 13-3551(2)(f) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad;

8) Petitioner’s sentence on the “sexual exploitation” charge was

disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime in violation of the

Eighth Amendment;

9) Petitioner is not a “person/human being” subject to the State Court’s

jurisdiction;

10) Petitioner has been denied access to the court in pursuing the

pending habeas petition.

(CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS, R&R, #49 at 6.) 

Petitioner also filed, with the Court’s permission, a Supplemental Petition (CV-98-

0341-PHX-RGS, #67), which asserted the following thirteen new grounds for relief:

1. Denial of counsel at his initial appearance and his arraignment.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel regarding failure: to file motion to suppress,

to challenge constitutionality of statute, and to investigate Petitioner’s

computer for evidence.

3. Waiver of counsel was involuntary because based on denial of counsel.

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel based upon defects in the indigent defense

system.

5. Speedy trial violation.

6. and 7. Various constitutional violations from lack of Justice Court jurisdiction.

8. Denial of a fair trial because the trial judge paid taxes, and the trial court

operated under a foreign jurisdiction.

9. and 10. Waiver of counsel was involuntary because of ineffectiveness of advisory

counsel.

11. Retroactively applied amendment to criminal statute precluded guilt.

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12. Denial of access to the courts. 

13. Conditions in the prison amounted to “punishment” when only “custody” was

authorized.

(See CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS, Order 9/30/03, #119.) 

Each of Petitioner’s grounds for relief were rejected, and the petition was denied.

(Id.) Judgement was entered on October 1, 2003. (CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS, Judgment,

#120.)

E. PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner was released from prison, on probation, in August, 2002. He was

immediately re-incarcerated under allegations that he was a sexually violent person subject

to civil commitment. Those commitment proceedings were subsequently dismissed, and

Petitioner was released to the community on October 29, 2002. (Exhibit N, Opening Brief

at 6.) 

On June 11, 2003, Petitioner filed a “Motion to be Sent Back to Prison,” noting his

expectation that he was about to have probation violation charges filed against him, and

seeking to be returned to prison on the basis that he was unable to earn a living, pay his

probation fees and counseling fees, etc. given the restrictions of his probation and his medical

disabilities. (Exhibit G.) That motion was summarily denied. (Exhibit H, M.E. 6/24/03.)

However, on June 16, 2003, a Petition to Revoke Probation was filed, seeking to

revoke Petitioner’s probation for failing to report, failing to participate in counseling, and

viewing sexually oriented material on a school computer. (Exhibits I and J.) Petitioner’s

probation was revoked for failure to report. (Exhibit K, M.E. 9/15/03 at 2.) 

In the course of revoking Petitioner’s probation, the trial court rejected his motions

attacking the constitutionality of his conviction. (Exhibit K, M.E. 9/15/03 at 2.)

Petitioner subsequently moved to correct a mistake at his original sentencing. That

motion was denied, and on September 29, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to seven years

imprisonment in Case Number CR93-93266, and a consecutive term of probation in Case

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Number CR93-91155. (Exhibit L, M.E. 9/29/03.)

F. DIRECT APPEAL OF PROBATION REVOCATION

On October 6, 2003, Petitioner filed through counsel an appeal from the revocation

of his probation. (Exhibit M.) Eventually, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state authorities, certifying an inability to find

a basis for appeal. (Exhibit N.) Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Opening Brief,

arguing:

1. The Arizona Court of Appeals was obligated to search the record for

“fundamental error.” (Exhibit O at 5.)

2. The trial court had not obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the prosecution

because the indictments failed to allege all of the elements of the offenses and

were duplicitous. (Id. at 6-18.)

3. Petitioner’s sentences should have all been concurrent because they all

occurred “on the same occasion.” (Id. at 19-27.)

4. Petitioner could not be accommodated in the Maricopa County Jail and the

Arizona State Prison System without being subjected to various risks, and

therefore alternative punishment was required. (Id. at 28-34.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal, concluding that: (1) Petitioner had

waived any challenge to the indictment by failing to raise it at trial, and that the indictments

were not, in any event, duplicitous; (2) Petitioner had waived any challenge to his original

sentences by failing to raise the claim in his original appeal; (3) any challenges to conditions

of confinement were subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) a review for

fundamental error was conducted with respect to the revocation proceedings, and no error

was found. (Exhibit P.)

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that: (1) his challenge to

the indictment should not be deemed waived; (2) his challenge to the original sentences and

the form of the indictments should not be deemed waived; (3) he should not be sentenced to

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a prison where felonious acts would be committed against him; and (4) an additional

argument should have been considered because it was timely submitted under the prisoner

mailbox rule. (Exhibit Q.) The Motion for Reconsideration was summarily denied. (Exhibit

R.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court, again

arguing his second (improper indictments), third (improper concurrent sentences) and fourth

(prison conditions) arguments before the Arizona Court of Appeals, as well as arguing a

violation of due process under Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1969). (Exhibit S.)

The petition was summarily denied. (Exhibit T.) The Arizona Court of Appeals issued its

mandate on March 17, 2005 (Exhibit U.)

G. FIRST STATE HABEAS PETITION

On June 2, 2003, during the pendency of his probation revocation proceedings,

Petitioner filed in the state court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, arguing that his

conviction was obtained by fraud and was unconstitutional because the caption in the

indictment referenced “STATE OF ARIZONA” as the plaintiff, rather than “the State of

Arizona.” (Reply, #27, Attachment 1.) The Arizona Supreme Court determined that the

matter should be resolved first in the trial court, and summarily dismissed the petition.

(Reply, #27, Attachment 2, Order 8/22/03.) The trial court then treated this petition as a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, and found that it was without merit, and did not qualify for

any of the exceptions to the timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a). Accordingly, the

petition was summarily denied on September 18, 2003. (Exhibit X, Order 9/18/03.)

H. SECOND STATE HABEAS PETITION

Petitioner again filed a state Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raised in his earlier

petition concerning the name of the Plaintiff. The trial court again treated it as a Notice of

Post-Conviction relief, and again found that it was without merit and untimely. The petition

was summarily dismissed on January 13, 2004. (Exhibit Y, Order 1/13/04.) 

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I. SIXTH POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PROCEEDINGS

On December 21, 2005, Petitioner filed his sixth Notice of Post-Conviction Relief,

which identified no specific claims, but included a recitation of events surrounding

Petitioner’s conviction. (Response to Order, # 39, Exhibit, 6th PCR Notice.) The trial court

construed this filing as asserting claims of ineffective assistance, lack of personal and subject

matter jurisdiction, and unlawful sentences. This PCR proceeding was summarily dismissed

as precluded by Rule 32.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exhibit V, Order

2/1/06.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner filed his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1) in this

proceeding on December 22, 2005. That Petition was ordered (#6) served, but before a

responsive pleading was filed, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (#12). Petitioner’s Amended Petition and

Memorandum in Support asserts the following grounds for relief:

1. In Ground 1, Petitioner alleges that he was denied due process of law because

the indictment against him alleged in each count a series of disjunctive

elements to the offenses, denying him fair notice of the charges against him.

(Amended Petition, #12 at 5; Memorandum, #20 at 2-9.)

2. In Ground 2, Petitioner alleges that he was denied due process when the

indictment was repeatedly amended during the course of the prosecution, and

the prosecutor included her name and signature on the indictment. (Amended

Petition, #12 at 6; Memorandum, #20 at 10-16.)

3. In Ground 3, Petitioner alleges that he was denied due process by the

application of consecutive sentences between counts of indictments

consolidated for trial which occurred on the same occasion. (Amended

Petition, #12 at 7; Memorandum, #20 at 17-20.)

4. In Ground 4, Petitioner alleges that his rights under Blakely v. Washington,

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542 U.S. 296 (2004) were violated when his sentence was enhanced based

upon factors not determined by the jury. (Amended Petition, #12 at 8;

Memorandum, #20 at 21-22.)

5. In Ground 5, Petitioner alleges he was denied due process since the

prosecutions were conducted in the name of “STATE OF ARIZONA” and not

“The State of Arizona,” as required by the Arizona Constitution. (Amended

Petition, #12 at 8.1; Memorandum, #20 at 23.)

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Sanctions (#21), noting that his Exhibit 11 had

been omitted by prison officials during the copying of his Memorandum (#20) and attached

Exhibits. Accordingly, Exhibit A-3 to the Motion was ordered to be considered as Exhibit

11 to the Memorandum. (Order 3/12/07, #36.) 

Answer - Respondents filed their Answer (#23) on July 5, 2006, arguing:

1. Grounds 1 and 2 argue that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction

which is a matter of state law and is thus not cognizable on habeas review.

(Answer, #23 at 7-8.)

2. Grounds 3 and 4 are not cognizable on habeas review to the extent that they

simply allege that state law did not authorize consecutive sentences. Further,

Blakely has no application because the only factors used to increase

Petitioner’s sentences were his prior convictions, which Blakeley does not

require be found by a jury. (Answer, #23 at 8-9.)

3. Ground 5 is not cognizable on habeas review because the claim that the

description of the prosecuting entity, e.g. the State of Arizona, is a matter of

state law. (Answer, #23 at 12.)

4. Petitioner has not properly exhausted Grounds 2, 3, and 5, and has now

procedurally defaulted on them. (Answer, #23 at 17-19.) 

Reply - Petitioner filed a Reply (#27) on July 20, 2006, arguing that: his grounds were

fairly presented to the state courts; that he has been denied adequate access to legal research,

showing cause for any failure to exhaust; that any error of state law is a violation of due

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process; that some of his grounds were not presented during his initial appeals, but were

presented upon revocation of his probation; that Petitioner had no “prior convictions” that

could be used to enhance his sentences; that attempts to present his Ground 4 to the state

courts would be futile; and that his improper sentences constitute a fundamental miscarriage

of justice.

Supplementation of Record - On May 4, 2007, the undersigned ordered (#38)

Respondents to supplement the record with Petitioner’s Sixth PCR Notice to allow the Court

to ascertain whether the allegations of ineffective assistance in this filing extended to a

failure to raise the claims in Grounds 2, 3, and 5. Respondents responded on May 17, 2007

(#39). 

Petitioner filed a “Reply to Respondent’s Response to Court Order to Supplement the

Record” on June 7, 2007 (#41). This filing is a recitation of various claims that Petitioner’s

convictions were improperly obtained, and includes a variety of exhibits intended to support

Petitioner’s arguments. As such, it is not responsive to the Court’s Order (#38), and will not

be considered herein.

Supplementation of Briefs re Successive Petition - On July 26, 2007, the Court

noted concerns about whether the instant petition was a second or successive petition, and

ordered (#42)the parties to supplement their pleadings to address whether any of Petitioner’s

claims were presented in his first Federal habeas petition, and whether they are successive.

On August 15, 2007, Respondents filed a Supplement (#43), arguing that with the

exception of Grounds 3 and 4 of Petitioner’s current petition, his claims constitute a second

and successive petition, to the extent that they attack Petitioner’s original conviction, and not

his probation violation. 

On August 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a supplemental reply (#44), arguing that because

he is serving a new sentence on re-consolidated cases, his claims are not successive.

Morever, Petitioner argues that his lack of access to legal resources precluded him from

asserting his claims in his earlier federal habeas proceeding. Finally, Petitioner asserts that

rather than dismissing the petition as successive, the Court should transfer it to the Circuit

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Court of Appeals. Petitioner attaches to his Supplement copies of his Petition in his earlier

habeas proceeding, and a draft of a felony criminal complaint to be filed in state court,

alleging inter alia tampering with grand jury records. Petitioner filed Attachments (#45) to

his Supplemental Reply on August 28, 2007.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITION

This is Petitioner’s second federal habeas proceeding arising out of his 1994

convictions. This Court must dismiss any claim which was presented in a prior habeas

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Moreover, a claim in a second or successive petition must

be dismissed even if not presented in a prior habeas petition, unless the claim rests on new

law, new evidence, or Petitioner’s actual innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244b(2). Even in the latter

circumstance, leave of the Court of Appeals is required to maintain the successive petition.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Petitioner’s original Petition (#1) herein acknowledged that

Petitioner had not sought or obtained such permission.

These requirements are jurisdictional, and may not be waived by Respondents. See

U.S. v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1998) (successive petition limitation on § 2255

petitions jurisdictional); and Torres v. Senkowski, 316 F.3d 147, 151 (2nd Cir. 2003)

(successive petition limitation not waivable by failure to object).

Previously Asserted Claims - Respondents argue that none of the claims raised in

the current petition were raised in Petitioner’s previous habeas petition. (Supplement to

Answer, #43.) A review of the claims raised in the Petition and Supplemental Petition in

Petitioner’s first federal habeas reflects that this is correct.

Second Petition - This Petition is, however, undeniably a second or successive

petition. However, Petitioner challenges not only the validity of his original convictions and

sentences, but his intervening sentence on the violation of his probation.

In Hill v. State of Alaska, the Ninth Circuit noted that the terms “second or successive”

was not defined but was a term of art derivative from the “abuse-of-the-writ” doctrine

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1

 It is true that Petitioner’s sentence was entered on September 29, 2003 (Exhibit L,

M.E. 9/29/03), and the judgment in his first federal habeas was not entered until two days

later, on October 1, 2003 (CV-98-0341-PHX-RGS, #120). However, it is unreasonable to

assume that Petitioner could have sought, in the intervening two days, to have expanded the

original habeas to include claims arising from that sentence. Moreover, Petitioner was

obligated to first exhaust his state remedies. 

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developed in pre-AEDPA cases. 297 F.3d 895, 897-898 (9th Cir. 2002). The Petitioner in

Hill had filed a habeas petition attacking his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, he was

denied parole, and sought to challenge that denial in a second habeas petition. The court

drew on the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to find that just because “a prisoner has previously

filed a federal habeas petition does not necessarily render a subsequent petition “second or

successive.” Id. at 898. Thus the court adopted the Eighth and Fifth Circuit’s rulings that

a petition should not be deemed successive “if the prisoner did not have an opportunity to

challenge the state's conduct in a prior petition.” Id. For such petitions, the petitioner “is not

obliged to secure [the Court of Appeals’]permission prior to filing his habeas petition in the

district court.” Id. at 899. 

Here, Petitioner could not, at the time of his 1998 habeas petition, have challenged the

sentence issued upon the revocation of his probation in 2003.1

 Thus, to the extent that

Petitioner’s current petition challenges only his 2003 sentence, it is not a “second or

successive” petition, and is not subject to the constraints of § 2244. Petitioner’s Grounds 3

could not have been raised previously because it challenges the imposition of consecutive

sentences in his 2003 sentence. Similarly, Ground 4 could not have been because it asserts

that the 2003 sentence was a violation of his rights under Blakely. 

On the other hand, in Grounds 1 and 2, Petitioner attacks the indictment in the original

prosecution. In Ground 5, he attacks the nomenclature of the prosecuting party. Thus,

Petitioner’s Grounds 1, 2 and 5 attack matters arising in the original prosecution, and thus

could have been raised in Petitioner’s original habeas petition. 

Accordingly, the Petition is “second or successive” with respect to all but Grounds 3

and 4.

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Effect of Lack of Legal Resources - Petitioner argues that he should be able to avoid

dismissal because he lacked adequate legal resources to present his claims. The statute

affords no exceptions for “cause.” Prior to the AEDPA, the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine was

subject to exceptions under the “cause and prejudice” standard. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.

467, 494 (1991). Now, however, those standards have been replaced by the narrow

exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). See Hertz & Liebman, Fed. Habeas Corpus Pract. &

Proc. 5th ed. § 28.3(e) (“provision replaces the pre-existing standards”). Those exceptions

do not include a wide ranging exception for “cause” but are limited to new rules of

constitutional law, § 2244(b)(2)(A), or newly discovered facts that establish actual

innocence, § 2244(b)(2)(B). A mere lack of legal resources satisfies neither.

Moreover, the exceptions in § 2244(b)(2) may not be asserted for the first time before

the district court. Rather, Petitioner is required to assert his grounds for making a second or

successive petition before the Ninth Circuit, in a motion for leave to file a second or

successive petition. “Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is

filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an

order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

Thus, this Court is without jurisdiction to make the initial determination whether Petitioner

qualifies to proceed with his successive petition.

Appropriateness of Transfer to Court of Appeals - The statute directs that a claim

in a second or successive petition “shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

Nonetheless, Petitioner asks that instead the matter be transferred to the Ninth Circuit for a

determination on his right to file a successive petition. 

The Ninth Circuit’s Rule 22-3(a) provides: “If a second or successive petition or

motion, or an application for leave to file such a petition or motion is mistakenly submitted

to the district court, the district court shall refer it to the court of appeals.”

Partial Transfer - However, this is a “mixed” petition to the extent that only some of

the claims asserted are “second or successive.” Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3 does not explicitly

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2

 In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 675 (9th Cir. 1994), the court held that a “judge

may also dismiss a single successive claim within a particular petition.” However, that

holding relied on prior Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings, which,

like the Campbell decision, predated the AEDPA and its provision for circuit court approval

of successive petitions. Current Rule 9, Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings simply

references the requirement for that approval.

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address such circumstances.2

It might be presumed that Rule 22-3 is the codification of other circuits’ jurisprudence

based upon the statute authorizing transfer to a court of proper jurisdiction by a court lacking

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Several circuits have held that when improperly presented

with a motion to file a successive petition, or such petition itself, the district court should not

dismiss but should transfer jurisdiction to the circuit court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1631. See In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997) (“ Thus, we hold that when a prisoner

has sought § 2244(b)(3) permission from the district court, or when a second or successive

petition for habeas corpus relief or § 2255 motion is filed in the district court without §

2244(b)(3) authorization from this court, the district court shall transfer the document to this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.”); Liriano v. United States, 95 F.3d 119, 122 (2d

Cir.1996) (same but weighing the litigant's good faith); Coleman v. U.S., 106 F.3d 339, 341

(10th Cir. 1997) (same). See also, Pratt v. U.S., 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997) (district court

may either dismiss or transfer); Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1999)

(declining to decide if transfer or stay is appropriate). Although the Ninth Circuit has cited

Liriano approvingly, that was in the context of a transfer of an immigration habeas petition,

not a successive petition. Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). The

Ninth Circuit has not otherwise approved of transfers under § 1631 or identified that section

as the genesis of its Rule 22-3. Moreover, Rule 22-3 does not speak of a “transfer” but

mandates that the district court “refer” the petition to the court of appeals.

If it is assumed that Rule 22-3 is simply an implementation of § 1631, then arguably

it would be possible to transfer only the successive claims. Although § 1631 speaks in terms

of the transfer of an “action,” the circuits to directly address the issue have concluded that

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 The undersigned does not conclude that Petitioner will be able to obtain leave under

§ 2244(b)(2) from the Ninth Circuit, or that such ability will be impacted by an immediate

decision on the remaining claims. Given the nature of Petitioner’s successive claims, a grant

of leave seems unlikely. Nonetheless, it is not this Court’s role to make that determination,

at least initially. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4) (requiring district court to revisit the

applicability of the exceptions upon grant of leave to file by the circuit court).

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the statute authorizes transfer of a portion of an action. See e.g. U.S. v. County of Cook, Ill.,

170 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Other courts have found that the same result could be

effected by a severance under Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, followed by

transfer of the portion where jurisdiction was lacking. See e.g. FDIC v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d

218 (10th Cir. 1996). But see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,

1519-1520 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and declining to

find implicit severance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 from partial transfer, where transferring

order did not refer to rule or imply severance). Rule 21 provides that “The court may also

sever any claim against a party.”

However, in the context of second and successive petitions, severance raises a unique

dilemma. Petitioner’s ability to proceed under § 2244(b)(2) will be based upon his ability

to establish that his claims were not “previously” available or discoverable. At present, this

refers to his first federal habeas in CV98-0341-PHX-RGS. If this Court severs the claims,

and proceeds to resolve the balance of the petition prior to the Ninth Circuit’s consideration,

then arguably a new “previously” will exist, namely the present habeas proceeding.3

 It could

be argued that, to avoid altering the landscape presented to the Ninth Circuit, this Court could

sever, and stay the retained portion. However, severance does not simply bifurcate a single

action into tandem parts. “When a single claim is severed from a lawsuit, it proceeds as a

discrete, independent action.” E.S. v. Independent School Dist., No. 196 Rosemount-Apple

Valley, 135 F.3d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Wright & Miller, 7 Fed. Pract. & Proc.

Civ. 3d §1689 (2008). Thus severance would automatically result in a new “previously”,

with the portion retained by this Court constituting a new habeas petition which must be

considered when determining the propriety of the transferred portion which Petitioner will

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be seeking leave to “file.” 

Conversely, if it is assumed that Rule 22-3 is based on a transfer under § 1631, then

it is unclear whether this Court can simply transfer the petition in toto. To the extent that the

petition contains non-successive claims, arguably this court, rather than the Ninth Circuit,

has proper jurisdiction. Therefore, transfer would not be authorized under § 1631. The

Ninth Circuit arguably can employ the fiction that upon transfer the petition isn’t a petition

at all, but a motion for leave to file a petition. But see e.g. Thornton v. Pachulke, 2007 WL

3407047, 1 (E.D.Wash.,2007) (advising petitioner on referral under Rule 22-3 that transfer

does not of itself constitute compliance with § 2244(b)(3) and Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3, and

petitioner must file an application for leave to proceed in the Court of Appeals). See also

Liriano, 95 F.3d at 123 (Second Circuit mandate that upon transfer the circuit court clerk is

to notice the petitioner that a separate motion for leave must be filed with the circuit court).

But that is a determination the Ninth Circuit has yet to make. 

On the other hand, this court could employ the approach of the “total exhaustion”

standard for “mixed petitions” including both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Under this

standard, the petition is treated as a unitary filing, and the lack of exhaustion of a portion is

applied to the whole. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). In the context of successive

petitions, a mixed petition would still be submitted first to the Circuit Court for approval to

proceed. If granted, the entire petition could proceed. If denied, the Petitioner would then

be free to file a petition containing only his non-successive claims. 

It is true that the “total exhaustion” rule arose from the policy of encouraging state

prisoners to first seek relief from state courts. Id. at 518-519. That rationale would not apply

here. However, a “total approval” rule would encourage a habeas petitioner to seek leave in

the circuit court with regard to an entire petition, rather than simultaneously proceeding on

a portion of his claims in the district court. It would further avoid the problems discussed

above in determining what petitions should be considered in making the “previously”

analysis. 

Moreover, this unitary approach would not attempt to graft into Rule 22-3 some

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procedure for partial referrals. 

Finally, in Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648, 650 (9th Cir. 1997), the court of

appeals held that when faced with a successive petition they could grant an application to file

upon “a prima facie showing as to one of the claims,” allowing the petitioner to proceed upon

his entire application in the district court. This decision reflects a treatment of the petition

as a unit to be passed upon by each court in succession, and not to be parceled out based

upon each claim’s successiveness. A “total approval” rule would further that approach.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned will recommend that the entire petition be

referred, and that this case be administratively closed. However, because the matter is not

subject to clear precedent, the undersigned will in the interest of efficiency address the merits

of the non-successive Grounds 3 and 4.

B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT OF GROUND 3 (“SAME OCCASION”)

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies as to Grounds 2, 3, and 5, because he never fairly presented the claims to the state

appellate courts. They argue that the claims are now either procedurally defaulted or

procedurally barred, and thus must be dismissed with prejudice. (Answer, #23 at 17-19.) 

Because the undersigned has concluded that Grounds 2 and 5 (as well as 1) are

successive and must be referred to the Ninth Circuit, only the exhaustion of Ground 3 will

be addressed.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

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Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 

4. Exhaustion of Ground 3

Respondents argue that Petitioner presented his claims in Ground 3 in his direct appeal

and petition for review therefrom, but that they were only presented as state law claims, and

therefore his federal claims are not properly exhausted. (Answer, #23 at 17-18.) The

Petition alleges that this claim was raised on direct appeal. (Amended Petition, #12 at 7.)

Petitioner argues in his Reply that he raised his claims in Ground 3 in pages 19-27 of his

Supplemental Brief on direct appeal (Exhibit O), pages 10-12 of his Motion for

Reconsideration on direct appeal (Exhibit Q), and pages 8-10 of his Petition for Review on

direct appeal of his porbation revocation (Exhibit S). (Reply, #27 at 14, ¶ 6.) 

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4

 The authority cited to by Petitioner, “State v. Brown, WL 529657 (Ariz. App. Div.

2 1999)” is an invalid citation. The Westlaw reference, interpreted as 1999 WL 529657,

resolves to Tyger v. Magarino, 182 F.3d 904 (3rd Cir. 1999). Petitioner’s Reply in support of

his habeas petition identifies the real citation as State v. Brown, 191 Ariz. 102, 952 P.2d 746

(1997). (Reply, #27 at 16.) 

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In his Ground 3, Petitioner argues he was denied due process of law because his

various sentences imposed on revocation of his probation were required by state law to be

run concurrently because they were consolidated for trial and all occurred on the “same

occasion”. (Amended Petition, #12 at 7; Petition Memorandum, #20 at 17-20.) 

Petitioner did argue in his Supplemental Brief on direct appeal that the various counts

all occurred on the “same occasion,” therefore the sentencing should have been concurrent,

and failure to make it so constituted “fundamental error.” (Exhibit O, Supp. Brief at 19-27.)

However, Petitioner did not cite any Federal authority in support of this claim, nor assert that

any violation of due process had occurred. 

In pages 10-12 of his Motion for Reconsideration on direct appeal (Exhibit Q),

Petitioner attacked the application of the waiver principle to his challenge on the “same

occasion” issue, arguing that he could not “waive a constitutional right.” (Id. at 11.)

However, Petitioner did not identify this as a reference to the federal constitution, nor did he

identify it as a due process claim.

In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal, he argued

that the Arizona Court of Appeals had ruled that the Arizona sentencing enhancement statute

“was in essence [un]constitutional,” citing State v. Brown, 191 Ariz. 102, 952 P.2d 746

(1997). (Exhibit S, PFR at 8 (insertion in original).) (Exhibit S at 8.) .4

 Although that case

does address the “same occasion” sentencing statute, it does not do so on any constitutional

basis, let alone on the basis of federal due process. Petitioner also cited to State v. Williams,

169 Ariz. 376, 819 P.2d 962 (Ariz. App. 1991). (Exhibit S at 8.) That case also discusses

the “same occasion” sentencing statutes, but does not address any constitutional attacks on

the statute. 169 Ariz. at 380-381, 819 P.2d at 966-967. The undersigned has located no

authority cited by Petitioner which would have alerted the state court to a federal due process

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claim.

Finally, in disposing of Petitioner’s sixth Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Response

to Order, # 39, Exhibit, 6th PCR Notice), the trial court construed this filing as asserting inter

alia a claim of unlawful sentences. (Exhibit V, Order 2/1/06.) However, the court did not

identify a due process or other constitutional challenge to the sentences, and no such claim

is apparent from a review of the PCR petition.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not fairly present his Ground

3 as a federal claim, and has not properly exhausted his state remedies on this claim.

2. Procedural Default

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are now either procedurally

defaulted or procedurally barred, and thus must be dismissed with prejudice. (Answer, #23

at 17-19.) Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v.

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984). 

Respondents do not, however, identify the nature of the procedural bar now applicable

to Petitioner’s claims. It appears, however, that Petitioner’s Ground 2 is barred by the

applicable time limitations.

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. 

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Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review of his due

process issues by way of a subsequent PCR Petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within

ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance

of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett,

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That

time has also long since passed.

While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any

of these exceptions are applicable to him. Nor does it appears that such exceptions in Rule

32.1 would apply to Petitioner. The rule defines the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Petitioner has

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5

 While in Ground 4 Petitioner relies on post sentencing changes in the law from

Blakely, that would not avoid the time limits on his due process claim in Ground 3. Further,

he has previously asserted his Blakely arguments to the state courts and therefore they were

obviously available to him previously. 

6

 Moreover, it is likely that Petitioner’s claims are barred under Arizona’s rules of

preclusion. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Because of the limited development of Arizona law

on the exception for claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude,” see Stewart v. Smith,

536 U.S. 856 (2002), and the applicability of other clear procedural bars, the undersigned

does not reach Respondents’ argument on the preclusion bar.

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asserted no"newly discovered evidence" and therefore paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and the

notice of post-conviction relief of-right applies only to petitions filed following a guilty or

nolo contendre plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (defining when petition of-right). See also

Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998) (on certified question holding that

“notice of appeal” in 32.1(f) is direct appeal only, and not appeal from denial of postconviction relief). Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a

change in the law occurring since his last state PCR petition.5

 Finally, paragraph (h) has no

application because Petitioner’s claims do not assert his actual innocence. Accordingly, the

undersigned must conclude that review through Arizona’s post-conviction relief process is

no longer possible.6

3. Procedural Bar - Independent and Adequate State Grounds

To the extent that Petitioner may have raised his due process claim in his Sixth Notice

of Post-Conviction relief, because the claim was disposed of on the basis of Arizona’s

preclusion bar, Rule 32.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (see Exhibit V, Order

2/1/06), that bar precludes this Court from now addressing the merits of the claim. Federal

habeas review of a federal claim is also precluded for procedurally barred claims, i.e. those

which have actually been presented to the state court, but were disposed of on a procedural

ground "that is both 'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis

for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Bennett v. Mueller, 322

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7

 The concepts of “procedural default” and “procedural bar” have distinct but related

natures, grounded in the concepts of exhaustion on the one hand, and the "adequate and

independent state procedural grounds" doctrine on the other. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-732 (1991). In the procedural bar context, it is a "state judgment" that is being

treated with comity, id. at 730, while the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of treating the state

courts themselves with comity by allowing them "the first opportunity" to address the federal

claim, id. at 731.

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F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). But

see, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (“assum[ing]” independence standard applies

on habeas).7

 

“Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state

procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts

to the petitioner.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.2003). Petitioner makes

no argument that Rule 32.2(a) is not an “independent and adequate” state ground.

4. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Petitioner argues in his Reply that his

failure to exhaust should be attributed to the limited legal research materials, and lack of

other legal assistance in the Arizona prisons. He argues that he is unable to conduct research,

read case law, etc. 

A pro se petitioner may be able to establish “cause” if he can establish a lack of access

to the law, as opposed to a lack of knowledge of the law. See e.g. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d

758 (10th Cir. 1992) (remanding for a determination of cause where a pro se petitioner’s

incarceration in Nevada precluded access to Utah legal materials required to challenge a Utah

conviction). Cf. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding lack of

library materials may establish an “impediment” which would toll the statute of limitations

applicable to habeas petitions). The petitioner must establish, however, that the lack of

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access resulted in an inability to assert his claims. See e.g. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119

(9th Cir. 1991) (finding no “cause” where despite lack of resources generally, pro se prisoner

had not shown personal deprivation, and had managed to file other adequate petitions.) 

Here, Petitioner fails to offer any showing that any inadequacies in those resources

made it impossible for him to present his claims in Ground 3. Petitioner had resources

sufficient to raise as an issue for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals the propriety and

the application of the “same occasion” statutes. Although, as discussed herein above, he did

not extend that claim to a federal due process claim, Petitioner offers nothing to show that

a deficiency in resources precluded him from identifying a due process claim from the same

facts. Petitioner had sufficient resources to include in his direct appeal from the 2003

sentencing a variety of state and federal claims, and to cite a variety of state and federal legal

authorities. (See Exhibit O, Supplemental Brief; and Exhibit Q, Motion for Reconsideration.)

Moreover, for Petitioner’s Ground 3, lack of legal resources in the prison would not

constitute cause, because Petitioner was represented by appellate counsel at the time

necessary to the exhaustion of that claim, i.e. upon direct appeal from his 2003 sentence.

Because Petitioner had the benefit of counsel, he was not dependent upon the prison’s legal

library, paralegals, or other prison resources. See Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988) (lack of legal assistance not cause where petitioner represented at critical

stages). 

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds no “cause” to excuse Petitioner’s

procedural default or the effect of the state’s procedural bar.

5. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800

F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in

an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis

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added). It is not sufficient that the petitioner point to some legal insufficiency. Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623(1998) (“‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence , not

mere legal insufficiency”). Rather, a petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the

underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him in the light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the

new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show a probability that no

reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. 

Petitioner proffers no such showing of actual innocence.

Petitioner does argue that any procedurally defaulted claims should be heard to avoid

a “miscarriage of justice.” (Reply, #27 at 22.) The courts have recognized that procedural

defaults may be avoided where the petitioner can show “that failure to consider the claims

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750 (1991). To date, however, the only instance identified by the Supreme Court of such a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” has been the actual innocence exception. Indeed, a

majority of the Supreme Court appears to be of the opinion that only the latter can establish

the former. Hertz & Lieberman, Fed. Habeas Pract. & Proc.6th § 26.4 at n. 6. But see House

v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) (identifying actual innocence as “a specific rule to

implement this general principle” of the miscarriage-of-justice exception).

Even if this Court could determine that the miscarriage-of-justice exception extends

beyond actual innocence, Petitioner has offered nothing beyond routine challenges to his

prosecution, which is insufficient to place this matter in the realm of the “extraordinary

case,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, which is entitled to be relieved of the normal procedural

default rules.

6. Summary re Procedural Default

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Ground 3 is

procedurally defaulted, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

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8

 Petitioner’s convictions in the same trial proceeding were counted as “prior

convictions” under State v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 617 P.2d 527 (1980). “The Hannah-prior

practice resulted in ‘repeat-offender’ mandatory prison terms under section 13-604 for

defendants who. . . had no felony convictions until being sentenced on several at the same

time. Eventually, the legislature ended this harsh practice by deleting certain language from

section 13-604(H) and by enacting section 13-702.02.” State v. Thompson, 198 Ariz. 142,

145, 7 P.3d 151, 154 (Ariz.App. Div. 1,2000).

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C. GROUND 4: BLAKELY

For his Ground 4, Petitioner alleges that his rights under Blakely v. Washington were

violated when his sentence was enhanced based upon factors not determined by the jury.

(Amended Petition, #12 at 8; Memorandum, #20 at 21-22.) Respondents argue that this

claim is not cognizable on habeas review to the extent that it simply alleges that state law

did not authorize consecutive sentences, and that Blakely has no application because the only

factors used to increase Petitioner’s sentences were his prior convictions, which Blakeley

does not require be found by a jury. (Answer, #23 at 8-9.) Petitioner argues in his Reply

what his Ground 4 really argues is that the trial court could not have found a prior conviction

at the time of his conviction in this case, because all of his convictions arose in this single

prosecution.

State Law Claim Not Cognizable - To the extent that Petitioner’s argument hinges

upon a disagreement over whether convictions occurring in the same proceeding qualify as

priors under Arizona law, it is not cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding.8

 A state

prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in custody in

violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Federal habeas relief is

not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). It has long been understood that a state may violate its own

law without violating the United States Constitution. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731

(1948).

Further, violations of state law, without more, do not deprive a petitioner of due

process. Cooks v. Spalding, 660 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026,

102 S.Ct. 1729 (1982). To qualify for federal habeas relief, an error of state law must be

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“sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 

 To sustain such a due process claim founded on state law error, Petitioner must show that

the state court "error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due

process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v.

Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). 

Petitioner argues that the state court got it wrong when it concluded that his

convictions counted as priors. That simple (alleged) error under state law, albeit one which

had significant consequences, was no more than just that: an error. 

We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial

of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on

state law would come here as a federal constitutional question. 

Gryger, 334 U.S. at 731.

Blakely Claim - The nature of Petitioner’s Blakely claim is obtuse. In Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) the Court broke with longstanding practice in

sentencing procedures and held: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In it’s 2004 Blakely decision,

the Court extended Apprendi by holding that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the

maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he

may impose without any additional findings.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-304

(2004). 

Here, however, as pointed out by Respondents (Answer, #23 at 8-9) and conceded by

Petitioner (Reply, #27 at 17), the only fact used to enhance Petitioner’s sentence was his

prior convictions. Prior convictions are the sole but explicit exception to the

Apprendi/Blakely rule. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

Petitioner insists he is nonetheless entitled to relief. On the one hand, Petitioner

argues that Blakely was nonetheless violated because the jury was not presented in the

indictment with the enhancement statute. (Reply, #27 at 19, ¶ 5.) Blakely does not require

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that the jury find the sentencing statutes. That is the role of the judge: to apply the

sentencing statutes to the facts found by the jury, plus the judge’s findings of prior

convictions. 

On the other hand, it appears that Petitioner argues that: (1) the only basis for

enhancement was the “prior” convictions; (2) under state law, the court should have

recognized that the convictions were not “prior”; (3) therefore, there were no facts found by

the jury which could justify the enhanced sentence; and (4) therefore the trial judge must

have found some other fact to enhance Petitioner’s sentence. This line of reasoning would

relegate Apprendi/Blakely to nothing more than a mandate that state courts get their

sentencing decisions right. That is not the import of Apprendi/Blakely. Rather, those

decisions are intended to give life to the two tenets underlying the right to trial by jury and

right of confrontation: the requirement of proof of every element necessary to punishment,

and the requirement that the veracity of that proof be determined by a jury, except when that

fact is the existence of a prior conviction. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-302. Those decisions

were intended to put a stop to the long developing practice of having judges become the sole

arbiters of various facts, disguised as sentencing factors, required to subject a defendant to

an enhanced sentence. Id. at 305-306. Here, the trial judge made no such factual

determinations, at least beyond his authorized findings on the prior convictions. Any error

he may have made in making the finding on the prior conviction is not somehow morphed

into a factual finding on some other unidentified factor which might have also justified the

sentence rendered.

Thus, whether viewed as a claim of error under state law, or a violation of

Apprendi/Blakely, Petitioner’s Ground 4 is without merit as a basis for federal habeas relief.

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ /

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that:

(1) the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May 15, 2006

(#12) be REFERRED as a whole to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to Ninth

Circuit Rule 22-3 and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for a determination of an application for leave to

file it as a successive petition; and

(2) that this case be administratively CLOSED.

IT IS RECOMMENDED IN THE ALTERNATIVE that:

(1) Ground 3 (“Same Occasion”) of Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed May 15, 2006 (#12) be DISMISSED;

(2) Ground 4(“Blakely”) of Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

filed May 15, 2006 (#12) be DENIED;

(3) Grounds 1, 2 and 5 of the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed May 15, 2006 (#12) be REFERRED to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3 and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for a determination of an

application for leave to file it as a successive petition; and

(4) that the remainder of this case be administratively CLOSED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

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novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: May 21, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\05-4207-012r RR 07 07 11 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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