Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01088/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHARLES VINCENT WAGNER,

Petitioner, 

vs.

 ROBERT STEWART, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1088-PHX-JWS (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On April 29, 2006, Petitioner, an inmate confined by the State of Arizona, filed

a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to

Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Doc. No. 1.) Named as Respondents in the

Petition are Robert Stewart and the Attorney General of the State of Arizona.

Respondents filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on November 6, 2006, with

exhibits A through X attached. (Doc No's. 21,22.) No Reply was filed. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

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1 The first three paragraphs of this portion of the factual

background were obtained from the published Arizona Supreme

Court summary in this case, and included in this section for

contextual purposes only.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

First and Second Trial, Conviction and Sentence1

In June 1994, Petitioner and three other teenagers went to a Smitty's grocery

store in Gilbert with the intent to steal a purse or an automobile. Petitioner, armed with

a .380 semi-automatic pistol, noticed the victim unloading groceries into her car. As the

victim pushed her shopping cart to the cart return area, Petitioner signaled to his cohorts

that he was going to rob her. Petitioner then approached the victim's car as she sat

inside, pulled the driver's door open, and struck her. When the victim screamed,

Petitioner shot her several times. The victim exited her car, called for help, then

collapsed and died in the parking lot. State v. Wagner 194 Ariz. 310, 311 (Ariz.,1999).

Petitioner was later apprehended and charged as a juvenile. The juvenile court

transferred Petitioner for trial in adult court on charges of first degree murder and

attempted armed robbery. Petitioner's first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury

deadlocked. Id. 

At Petitioner's second trial, the jury convicted Petitioner on both counts. The

state sought the death penalty on the first degree murder charge, and the trial court held

a sentencing hearing during which the court made findings regarding aggravating and

mitigating factors. After weighing those factors, the trial court declined to impose the

death penalty. Id. The trial court instead sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole on the first degree murder charge, and to a consecutive

seven and one-half year term on the attempted armed robbery charge. (Answer, Ex. A.)

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Appeal

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on January 28, 1997. (Id., Ex. B) Petitioner,

represented by counsel, raised the following two claims on appeal:

1. The trial court erred by admitting the autopsy photographs

over appellant’s objection that they were unduly

prejudicial and did not have any real probative value. 

2. The statute pursuant to which appellant’s natural life

sentence was imposed fails to satisfy the due process and

equal protection clauses of the federal and state

constitutions. 

(Id., Ex. B)

The State filed a responsive brief, (Id., Ex. D) and, on August 13, 1998, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (Petition,

pp. 11-33) On May 26, 1999, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the judgment of

the trial court. (Answer, Ex. E) On June 21, 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court issued

its mandate, vacating in part, and approving in part the opinion of the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Id., Ex. E, Petition, pp. 34-43) 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On June 21, 1999, Petitioner filed a Notice of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

in the trial court. (Answer, Ex. F) Defense counsel was appointed to represent counsel

in his state collateral proceedings, (Id., Ex. G) however, after reviewing the record,

counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review in which no claims

were raised. (Id., Ex. H) On May 24, 2001, Petitioner filed his Petition for PostConviction Relief, raising the following claims:

1. Trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness 1) when he failed to use

witness’s prior testimony under oath to impeach State’s

witnesses; 2) when he failed to impeach critical State’s

witnesses with their own prior testimony under oath; 3)

when his lack of pretrial investigation deprived defendant

of a potential defense; 4) when he failed to interview,

subpoena, or persuade material fact witnesses to testify. 

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2. The State engaged in the unconstitutional use of perjured

testimony when prosecutors allowed witness Jason

Miller’s testimony to go to jurors. 

3. Although “without some book or someone to explain [his]

rights and the law” in regard to jury strikes by the State,

“since I don’t know exactly what my rights are concerning

jury impanelment, or what the law says in Batson v.

Washington...” Petitioner could not “with any clarity

present this reasonable claim.” Although he knew “an

error was made.” 

(Id., Ex. H) The State filed a response, (Id., Ex. I), and, on April 30, 2001, the trial

court dismissed the petition. (Answer, Ex. J, Petition p. 44-47) 

On May 29, 2001, Petitioner moved for a rehearing on his Rule 32 motion, to

“clarify what he wanted to say.” (Id., Ex. K) Petitioner raised the following issues:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for 1) waiving a probable

cause hearing and having Petitioner consent to proceeding

as an adult. 

2. Defendant was denied his 6th and 14th Amendment rights

when the entire jury panel was not struck on September 26,

1995. 3. Defendant was denied his 6th ad 14th Amendment rights by

the admission of the letter defendant was said to have

authored.

4. Defendant was denied his 6th and 14th Amendment by the

“Derek Nance evidence.” 5. Defendant was denied his 6th and 14th Amendment rights

by the denial of a directed verdict.

6. Defendant was denied 6th and 14th Amendment rights by

the amendment of the indictment.

7. The refusal to grant the objections to jury instructions was

a violation of the 6th and 14th amendments.

8. Defendant’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance of

counsel on appeal under the 6th and 14th amendments by

not raising these issues on appeal. 

(Id., Ex. K) 

On March 31, 2002, the trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s Motion for

Rehearing (Reconsideration). (Id., Ex. L, Petition p. 48-49) 

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On May 30, 2003, Petitioner, represented by counsel, filed a petition for review

in the Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. M) Petitioner presented the following issues for

review: 

1. The Trial Court erred in not granting an evidentiary

hearing on the issues presented in the defendant’s pro per

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

2. The Trial Court erred in not considering and granting an

evidentiary hearing on the Batson claim in the defendant’s

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

(Id., Ex. M) The State filed a response, (Id., Ex. N), and the Court of Appeals

summarily denied review on June 29, 2004. (Id., Ex. O) 

Petitioner was granted an extension of time (Id., Ex’s. P, Q) to file a Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court (Id., Ex. R) The Petition for Review, filed on

August 30, 2004, presented the following issues for review:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in not reviewing the trial

court’s denial of the defendant’s Batson claim where the

purportedly race neutral criteria used to strike the only

African-American from the jury panel could also have

been used to remove eleven of the fifteen jurors

empaneled?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in not reviewing the trial

court’s denial of the defendant’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on the failure of the

defendant’s trial lawyer to probe a major inconsistency in

the testimony of two State’s witnesses regarding a critical

piece of evidence?

(Id., Ex. R) The State filed a response, (Id., Ex. S), and the Arizona Supreme Court

summarily denied review on April 20, 2005. (Id., Ex. O) 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

April 19, 2006. The Petition raises the following four grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel a) Appellate

counsel failed to raise the issue regarding the Batson

challenge which had been raised and preserved by trial

counsel; and, b) Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue

of perjured testimony in the direct appeal which precluded

the issue from being raised in post-conviction relief

petitions. 

3. Petitioner was denied equal protection under the 6th and

14th Amendments by a conviction obtained by a petit jury

which was unconstitutionally selected or impaneled, as the

prosecutors reasons for striking the only African-American

on the jury panel was pre-textual.

4. The trial court allowed prejudiced and perjured testimony.

(Petition) Respondents filed an answer to the Petition on November 6, 2006. (Doc. No.

15) No reply was filed.

DISCUSSION

Exhaustion

An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, there is an absence of

available State corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion

inquiry focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838

(1999). Exhaustion generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts an

opportunity to act on his or her claims those claims are presented to a federal court. Id.

A petitioner has not exhausted a claim for relief so long as the petitioner has a right

under state law to raise the claim by available procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

To properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his

claims to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S

at 848. Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner, convicted of a non-capital

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offense, either fairly present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes

v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1088, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), or show that no state remedies remain

available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp,

693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th cir. 1982)). This requirement of exhaustion is designed to give

the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners' federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). 

In order to exhaust his or her claims, a petitioner must fairly present the federal

claims to the state courts; this means that a petitioner is required to present the state

courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. Id., 404 U.S. at 275-276,

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal

theories on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982);

Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. A state court must be alerted to the fact that a petitioner is

asserting a claim under the United States Constitution. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365-66 (1995). Following Duncan, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) federal claims in state

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that the claims were based on federal

law. See, e.g., Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as amended by 247

F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency of evidence, right to be tried

by impartial jury and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked the specificity and

explicitness required to present federal claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-

88 (9th Cir. 2000) (broad reference to “due process” insufficient to present federal

claim). It is not enough to present the state court with only the facts necessary to state

a claim for relief, nor to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad

as due process. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). Mere similarity

between claims of state and federal error is also insufficient to establish exhaustion.

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d

1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). In proceedings before the state courts, petitioner must have

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either referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or cited to federal or

state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim. Peterson v.

Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Castillo v. McFadden, 399

F.3d 993, 999 (9th cir. 2005). 

A claim may be exhausted if the state’s highest court expressly addresses the

claim, whether or not it was fairly presented. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989). 

Procedural Default

 A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of

two ways: by showing either that a state court found a claim defaulted on procedural

grounds, or, if the claim was never presented in any forum, that no state remedies

remain available to the petitioner. Coleman, 501 U.S. 729-30, 735. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has explained the distinction between exhaustion and procedural

default as follows:

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule.

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner's claims and that

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal

claim applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal

claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is

clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Thus,

in some circumstances, a petitioner's failure to exhaust a federal claim in

state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

‘available’ to him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court

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pursuant to an adequate and independent procedural bar may not be

considered in federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and

prejudice for the default, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would result if the federal court refused to consider the claim.

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The procedural bar which gives rise to exhaustion provides an

independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence, and thus

prevents federal habeas corpus review of the claim, unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claims in earlier proceedings.

Gray, 518 U.S. at 162, 116 S.Ct. at 2080 (citations omitted). 

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

269-70 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99. In Arizona, such a

determination often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure governing post-conviction relief proceedings. 

For example, Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a

defendant to seek post-conviction relief on the ground that his conviction was in

violation of the Constitution of the United States. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

32, however, governs when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings

and raise federal constitutional challenges to their convictions or sentences in state

court. Under Rule 32.2(a), relief is barred on any claim which could have been raised

in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

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2 Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in

custody after his sentence has expired; (2) certain circumstances

where newly discovered material facts probably exist and such

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3)

the petitioner’s failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction

relief was without fault on his part; (4) there has been a

significant change in the law that would probably overturn

petitioner’s conviction if applied to his case; and (5) the

petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

that no reasonable fact-finder would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b) (citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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claims which fall under sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.12

, and which were

justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Furthermore, Rule 32.4 (a) requires that a petition for post-conviction relief must

be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or 30 days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Again, the exceptions to this requirement are claims asserted under

subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

Thus, in situations where a petitioner might otherwise attempt to revive an

unexhausted federal claim in state court, and the state court might invoke the procedural

bars of Rule 32.2(a) and 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in rejecting such

an attempt, there is an adequate and independent state ground barring Petitioner from

raising these claims in state court proceedings thereby creating a procedural default for

purposes of federal habeas review. See eg. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, (holding

that Rule 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar). 

A procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim, however,

unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case "clearly and expressly" states

that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, quoting

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Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985). In cases where the last state court

order does not disclose the reason for its judgment, the Supreme Court has instructed

that, where “the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural

default [the courts are to] presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not

silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802 (1991). 

Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state

remedies currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently

available, petitioner’s claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly

presented in state court but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims

also will be found procedurally defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural

bar was independent of federal law and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal

review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). A state procedural default is not

independent if, for example, it depends upon an antecedent federal constitutional ruling.

See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. at 860. A state bar is not adequate unless it was firmly

established and regularly followed at the time of application by the state court. Ford

v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991). 

Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause

and prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). “[T]he existence of

cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply

with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2)

a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

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constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner

must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner fails

to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. To establish a

"fundamental miscarriage of justice" resulting in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence.

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

Standard of Review: Merits

The writ of habeas corpus is available to “a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The District

Courts’s standard of review is described as follows:

An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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ANALYSIS

Ground One

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he: (a) failed to

dispute conflicting testimony of two State witnesses; (b) failed to impeach witness

Timmons when he gave different testimony in Petitioner’s second trial from what he

had given in the first trial; (c) failed to subpoena Sheila Gibson to testify as to

Petitioner’s alibi, (d) failed to impeach state witness Bobby Wagner regarding the

alleged murder weapon; (e) failed to thoroughly investigate the matter concerning the

testimony of James Timmons; (f) failed to adequately investigate the defendant’s

contention and potential defense argument that he had no reason to be at Bobby

Wagner’s house the night of the incident; and, (g) failed to interview, persuade or

subpoena Bobby Wagner’s mother to give a statement or testify regarding whether she

actually drove Charles Wagner to his residence as Bobby Wagner testified. (Petition,

p. 5)

Respondents argue that, while Petitioner properly exhausted some of these

subclaims, that not all of these subclaims were raised in state post-conviction

proceedings, and that doing so now would only result in their preclusion, and thus these

subclaims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review.

Procedural Default

Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to raise some of the ineffective

assistance of trial counsel subclaims that he now raises, namely, that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to: (c) subpoena an alleged alibi witness, Sheila Gibson; (e)

investigate James Timmons’ testimony; and (f) adequately investigate Petitioner’s

argument that he had no reason to be at Bobby Wagner’s house. 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, however, Petitioner raised issue (e), the

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conviction relief (Answer, Ex. H, p.5), and in his petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals (Id., Ex. M, p.14-15, n.1).

As to issues (c) and (F), Respondents are correct that these issues were not raised

in a procedurally appropriate manner before the state appellate court. Although

Petitioner raised the issue (issue (f)) of trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate

that Petitioner “was without reasons to ever be at Bobby Wagner’s house” in his

petition for post-conviction relief (Answer, Ex. H, p.5-6), he did not raise this issue

before the court of appeals, other than to request that the appellate court review the

decision of the trial court on his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.9

(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Ex. M, p.11) 

This court concludes that Petitioner failed to raise the claims that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to (c) subpoena an alleged alibi witness, Sheila Gibson,

because he did not raise this claim at any level of post-conviction proceeding; and (f)

adequately investigate Petitioner’s argument, because he did not raise this claim to the

court of appeals outside of a general appeal requesting that the appellate court review

the decision of the trial court. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32 (Holding that ordinarily a

state prisoner does not “fairly present” a claim to a state court if that court must read

beyond a petition or a brief that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so). 

However, as to all claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised by

Petitioner in his appellate court filings, (issues (a) through (g)), none were presented as

federal claims nor did he reference or call attention to any federal basis for such claims.

Petitioner cited the standard for review for an ineffective assistance claim and cited to

the Arizona Supreme Court case, State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 414 (Ariz. 1992)

(Defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and the deficient performance resulted in prejudice, pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).. Although citation to a state case

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analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a cite to a federal

case analyzing such an issue, see Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1158, without signal in the text

of his petition for review that Petitioner is raising a federal issue or relying on state law

cases that resolve federal issues, the federal claim is not fairly presented. Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912, n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (For a federal issue to be presented by

the citation of a state decision dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the

claim, the citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case involves

federal issues). 

Furthermore, the “United States Supreme Court has left open the question

whether the invocation of a state constitutional provision is adequate to raise a federal

claim under the corresponding federal constitutional clause when the state courts treat

both claims in an identical manner.” Casey, 386 F.3d at 914 (citing Baldwin, 541 U.S.

at 34 and Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366) The Ninth Circuit has similarly declined to decide

the issue. See Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018,1022 (9th Cir. 2005); and Casey,

386 F.3d at 914. Given such hesitancy, this Court is not inclined to do so, and, even if

it were, under Fields, 401 F.3d at 1022, the burden is on Petitioner to prove that the

state and federal claims are identical. Petitioner was required to raise his federal claims

affirmatively. Petitioner has not done so. As a result, Petitioner failed to fairly present

these federal issues of ineffectiveness to the state court. Since the claim has not been

fairly presented, a federal habeas court may determine whether state remedies remained

available when Petitioner filed his petition.

Arizona law makes available the remedy of post-conviction relief to anyone who

claims his or her conviction violated the United States Constitution. Ariz. R.Crim. P.

32.1(a). Failure to seek post-conviction relief for a claim on ineffective assistance of

trial counsel in previous collateral proceedings, however, precludes relief in any

subsequent Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.2(a)(3). 

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3 This finding applies to all the Grounds asserted in the Petition,

although the Court will discuss the finding in detail only in this

section. 

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In Petitioner's case, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an order denying review

on April 20, 2005. Therefore when he filed his amended federal habeas petition on

January 27, 2005, no state remedies remained available. When, at the time of federal

habeas filing, no state remedies remained available, and a petitioner failed to fairly

present a claim to the state's highest court, the petitioner technically exhausted the claim

by procedural default. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. That is the case here. 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground One is barred absent a showing

of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural default.3

 Petitioner's

status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for his failure

to present any of his grounds for relief to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986)(finding that an illiterate pro se

petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural

default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988)(finding that petitioner's

arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not

constitute cause.)

Petitioner does assert that counsel on direct appeal “neglected to include this

issue in the direct appeal petition.” Although ineffective assistance of counsel may, in

some instances, constitute cause and prejudice, in Arizona, the ability to raise

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in petitions for post-conviction relief was

recognized long before Petitioner’s case was tried, and, shortly thereafter, was, in fact,

mandated. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1 (2002). It is not likely that an appellate

court would have addressed any ineffectiveness issues raised on direct review.

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Petitioner could have raised these issues claims in his petition for post-conviction relief,

and, subsequently, his petition for review, but did not. There was no objective factor

external to the defense which impeded Petitioner’s efforts to comply with the State's

procedural rule, as demonstrated by his ability to file a petition for post-conviction

relief and petition for review - Petitioner merely failed to raise these issues of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard, nor has he attempted to do so. Federal review of his claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel is barred.

Recommendation: Ground One

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural

default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for

relief raised by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this Court

recommends that the District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining

federal habeas relief on this claim. 

Ground Two

Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective and “made serious

mistakes that prejudiced [Petitioner] in the appeals process before state courts.”

(Petitioner, p. 6) Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel (a) did not

consult with Petitioner on the necessity of raising the Batson claim that trial counsel had

preserved; (b) should have included the issue in his direct appeal; and, (c) also failed

to raise the issue of perjured testimony in the direct appeal which precluded the issue

from being raised in post-conviction relief petitions. (Id.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claim presented in Ground Two of the petition because Petitioner never properly

presented this claim in state court, and any attempt to do so now would be futile. 

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Procedural Default

Petitioner asserts in his petition that he raised the issue of ineffective assistance

of counsel in his second post-conviction relief proceeding. (Id.) Petitioner claims he

was represented by Martin Creaven in his second post-conviction petition, (Id., p. 4),

although previously he denied filing a second state post-conviction petition (Id., p.2).

Respondents assert that they cannot locate a second petition for post-conviction

relief in the record. (Answer, p.9) Mr. Creaven did represent Petitioner in both his

petition for review to the appellate court from the denial of his first petition for postconviction relief, and the petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer,

Ex’s. M & R.) Presumably, Petitioner may be referring to the petitions for review as

his “second post-conviction relief proceeding.” Regardless of any presumption, the

Court will analyze the procedural default issue with the papers it has before it.

Petitioner did not respond to the Respondent’s assertion that no second post-conviction

relief proceeding was initiated with any evidence or assertion that a second postconviction petition was actually filed. 

Petitioner did not raise any of these claims in his appeal. (Answer, Ex. C) 

Petitioner raised the claim, in his petition for post-conviction relief, that “the

state engaged in the unconstitutional use of perjured testimony, when prosecution

allowed witness Jason Miller’s testimony to go to jurors.” (Answer, Ex. H, p.8)

Petitioner also raised a claim regarding “Batson v. Washington in regard to jury strikes

by the state.” Although he did not “know what the rules governing this part of the

proceedings are; and cannot state how my rights were abridged. The facts of what

transpired are present.” (Answer, Ex. H., p.9) 

The trial court ruled that Petitioner waived any issue regarding alleged perjury

by failing to raise it on direct appeal, citing Rule 32.2(a)(3). The trial court further

ruled that “the fact that there may be inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness does

not mean that the witness has perjured himself. In any event, the record does not

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support Defendant’s claim that there were major inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr.

Miller in regard to when he told his parents about the guns.” (Answer, Ex. J)

As to the Batson claim, the trial court ruled that Petitioner waived any Batson

issue by failing to raise the claim on direct appeal. The trial court further ruled that

“there was no violation of Batson, as the prosecutor set forth on the record his reasons

for striking the juror in question, and the Court determined that they were race neutral.”

(Answer, Ex. J)

In his petition for review to the appellate court, Petitioner asked that the

appellate court review the substantive argument raised in the second issue of the

petition for post-conviction relief, “notwithstanding the trial court’s ruling that the

defendant waived the use of perjured testimony argument by not raising it on direct

appeal.” Petitioner also asked the appellate court to consider the substantive argument

under Batson notwithstanding the failure of the defendant’s appellate lawyer to raise

the issue on direct appeal, and also arguing that an allegation of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel is properly addressed to the trial court in post-conviction

proceedings. Petitioner asserted that the right involved was “a significant constitutional

right, and the defendant’s appellate lawyer’s failure to raise the issue on appeal shoudl

not constitute a waiver of that claim by the defendant.” (Answer, Ex. M) 

The appellate court denied the petition for review without opinion. (Answer, Ex.

O) 

Petitioner raised the Batson claim again, in his petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate attorney’s failure to raise Batson on appeal

is not sufficient for the State to establish the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waive the claim, as contemplated by Rule 32.2(a)(3), when the claim is of

sufficient constitutional magnitude to require personal waiver. (Answer, Ex. R)

Petitioner also argued that, because the trial court engaged in a substantive analysis of

the Batson claim, its decision is subject to review. (Id.) 

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The Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review without opinion.

(Answer, Ex. T) 

Petitioner did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing

to raise the issue of perjured testimony in the direct appeal in his petition for postconviction relief, or in either petition for review to the appellate court or to the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex’s. H, M & R) 

The state courts have never had an opportunity to address the legal theories

presented by Petitioner as to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to

raise the issue of perjured testimony in the direct appeal because it was not argued in

Petitioner's state petition for post-conviction relief or subsequent petitions for review.

Petitioner has failed to present this claim to the state court to give the State an initial

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' rights. 

Petitioner did not raise any ineffectiveness claim as to the Batson challenge in

the petition for post-conviction relief to the trial court. (Answer, Ex. H) The Batson

issue was summarily dismissed, the trial court finding this issue waived, and further,

lacking merit. (Id., Ex. J) Petitioner filed a petition for review to the court of appeals,

where, for the first time, he presented his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claims. (Id., Ex. M) Having raised this claim for the first time to the appellate court,

he did not properly exhaust the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim he

wishes to raise in this federal habeas. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916-18 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that a state prisoner had not exhausted his claims by presenting

them for the first and only time in a petition for discretionary review with the state’s

highest court); accord Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). 

The state courts have never had an opportunity to address the legal theories

presented in Ground Two of Petitioner's federal habeas in a procedurally appropriate

manner. Petitioner, therefore, has not exhausted his state remedies as to this claim.

Thus, the Court must determine whether this matter should be stayed to allow Petitioner

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to exhaust his state remedies as to these issues or whether these issues are procedurally

defaulted.

Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to

present these claims in an additional Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Under Arizona

law, a defendant who was convicted at trial must file a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days of the order and

mandate affirming the judgment and sentence on direct appeal, whichever is later. Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Petitioner already completed his Rule 32 proceeding. If

Petitioner were to fairly present these issues in a second Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, such presentation would be untimely. Moreover, these claims do not qualify for

any of the timeliness exceptions:

(d) The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

(e) Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence ...;

(f) The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief

of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault

on the defendant's part; or

(g) There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

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4 Because these claim are procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether

the claims are of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require

a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver such that the claims

are precluded pursuant to Cassett. Moreover, the procedural

timeliness bar of Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear,

consistently applied, and well established. Powell v. Lambert,

357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz.

264, 987 P.2d 226 (App.1999) (where petition did not raise

claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could

be summarily dismissed if untimely); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192

Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998) (timeliness provision of Rule

32.4(a) became effective September 20, 1992); State v. Jones,

182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App.1995) ( Rule 32.4(a) was

amended to “address potential abuse by defendants caused by

the old rule's unlimited filing periods” ). 

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(h) The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the

facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Such a new petition, therefore, would be

subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228

(App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App.1995); Moreno v.

Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate

inquiry from preclusion). Moreover, Petitioner would be precluded from raising these

claims in a second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Rule 32.2(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P.

These claims, therefore, are procedurally defaulted.4

 Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where prisoner has not

raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has expired). 

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Petitioner asserts that this issue was not presented in the direct appeal because

his counsel on direct appeal failed to include the issue in the direct appeal petition and

Petitioner did not waive his right to have this issue raised. Cause is not established by

appellate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to raise the Batson claim, however,

because, under the exhaustion doctrine, a claim of ineffective assistance must generally

be “presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to

establish cause for a procedural default.” Murrav v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986).

Therefore, Petitioner cannot use ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel to

establish cause. Id. Moreover, even had Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel in a procedurally appropriate manner in state court, cause would not

be established by counsel’s failure to raise the Batson challenge. Miller v. Kenney, 882

F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir, 1989) ("[I]n many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise

an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the

weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hall marks of effective

appellate advocacy").

Recommendation: Ground Two

Petitioner failed to raise any of the claims brought in Ground Two in state court

in a procedurally appropriate manner, thereby procedurally defaulting these claims.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural default, and

federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for relief raised by

Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this Court recommends that the

District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief on

this claim. 

Ground Three

Petitioner argues in Ground Three that he was “[d]enied equal protection under

the 6th and 14th Amendments” as his conviction was “obtained by action of a petit jury

which was unconstitutionally selected or impaneled.” (Petition, p.7) 

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 Respondents argue that the trial court correctly determined that Petitioner

“waived any Batson issue by failing to raise the claim on direct appeal” (Answer, Ex.

J) and therefore, Petitioner’s Batson claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from

federal habeas review. 

Procedural Default

Petitioner raised this claim at trial, and at every level of his post-conviction

proceedings. (Answer, Ex. H, M, and R) Petitioner had not raised the claim in his

appeal, (Answer, Ex. C), and for this reason, the trial court found Petitioner waived the

issue for purposes of post-conviction proceedings. (Answer, Ex. J)

This Court may not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if

the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support the judgment. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 728 (1991). Preclusionary findings by the state court pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3)

are independent of federal law and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review.

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002). Under Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, this Court is

directed to presume that the last appellate court which denied the Batson claim, without

a reasoned opinion, did not silently disregard the procedural default imposed by the trial

court and the appellate court and consider the merits of the claim. The Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision in the petition for review in this case would thus serve to bar

federal habeas review absent a demonstration of cause and prejudice, or a showing that

failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id.,

at 750. The trial court’s alternative ruling on the merits does not undermine this

analysis; the claim has been defaulted. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.

2003)(A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where the state

court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim); accord Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, n.10 (1989). 

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Recommendation: Ground Three

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural

default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for

relief raised by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this Court

recommends that the District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining

federal habeas relief on this claim. 

Ground Four

Petitioner argues in Ground Four that the “Trial court allowed prejudiced and

perjured testimony.” (Petition, p.8.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s allegations of prejudicial and perjured

testimony are precluded from federal habeas review because he failed to raise these

issues on direct appeal and the trial court recognized that Petitioner waived any issue

regarding alleged perjury by failing to raise it on direct appeal, and applied a procedural

bar. 

Jurisdiction

First, Petitioner has not, in Ground Four of this federal habeas, clearly raised a

federal claim at all, and therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), deny the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge finds that the claims raised in Ground Four

are precluded from review. 

Procedural Default

Petitioner did not raise the issue of perjured testimony on direct appellate review.

(See Answer, Ex. C) Petitioner did raise an issue of the “unconstitutional use by the

state of perjured testimony,”in his petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. H)

The trial court found that Petitioner “waived any issue regarding perjury by failing to

raise it on direct appeal.” In his petition for review to the appellate court, Petitioner

asked that the appellate court review the substantive argument raised in the second issue

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of the petition for post-conviction relief, “notwithstanding the trial court’s ruling that

the defendant waived the use of perjured testimony argument by not raising it on direct

appeal.” (Answer, Ex. M) The appellate court summarily denied review. (Answer, Ex.

O) No issues of perjured or prejudicial testimony were raised to the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. R) 

Petitioner’s brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals needed to apprise Arizona that

he was making a claim under the U.S. Constitution. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998-99 (citing

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66.) The state courts have never had an

opportunity to address the legal theories presented in Ground Four of Petitioner's

federal habeas in a procedurally appropriate manner. To the extent that Petitioner

requested that the appellate court review the one claim raised in his petition for postconviction relief, this failed to properly exhaust the claim for several reasons. First,

the appellate court is not required to read outside the appellant’s brief to discover

Petitioner’s federal claim, especially, as in this case, when exercising discretionary

review. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (ordinarily a state prisoner does

not “fairly present” a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or

a brief that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material,

such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.) Second, even if the appellate

court had read the petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner did not relate his claim

to the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, cite the Fourteenth Amendment, or

cite any federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional

violation. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (citing Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-

07). 

Petitioner, therefore, has not exhausted his state remedies as to this claim. Thus,

the Court must determine whether this matter should be stayed to allow Petitioner to

exhaust his state remedies as to these issues or whether these issues are procedurally

defaulted.

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Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to

present these claims in an additional Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Under Arizona

law, a defendant who was convicted at trial must file a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days of the order and

mandate affirming the judgment and sentence on direct appeal, whichever is later. Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Petitioner already completed his Rule 32 proceeding. If

Petitioner were to fairly present these issues in a second Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, such presentation would be untimely. Moreover, these claims do not qualify for

any of the timeliness exceptions. See Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Such a

new petition, therefore, would be subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195

Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d

734 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998)

(timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). Moreover, Petitioner would be

precluded from raising these claims in a second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Rule 32.2(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. These claims, therefore, are procedurally defaulted. Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is

precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for

doing so has expired). 

Recommendation: Ground Four

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss Ground Four

of the Petition for lack of jurisdiction, for failure to raise a claim that Petitioner is in

custody in violation of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Alternatively, Petitioner failed to raise any of the claims brought in Ground Four

in state court in a procedurally appropriate manner, thereby procedurally defaulting

these claims. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this

procedural default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this

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ground for relief raised by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this

Court recommends that the District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from

obtaining federal habeas relief on this claim. 

RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, dismiss this action in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 06-1088-PHX-JWS.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 8th day of November, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-01088-JWS Document 16 Filed 11/08/07 Page 28 of 28