Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00734/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00734-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 11cv734 JAH (PCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN K. LOCKE,

CDCR #T-74574,

Civil No. 11-0734 JAH (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[ECF No. 4]; and

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

& 1915A(b)

vs.

JANE DOE 1; JANE DOE 2

GEORGE A. NEOTTI; MATTHEW

CATE,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Marvin K. Locke, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, has filed

a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 civil filing

fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.4].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No.4]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has a current balance of zero and therefore insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees

at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the

reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing

fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack

of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No.4] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

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balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A

A. Standard

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

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28 1

 Plaintiff does not indicate what “T.T.A” stands for but it appears it may refer to the prison’s

medical clinic. 

-4- 11cv734 JAH (PCL)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was “suffering from intense stomach pain” on May 22, 2010.

(Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that “Jane Doe #1,” a registered nurse, came to his cell, took his

vital signs and told him he would be placed on a list to see a doctor. (Id.) It appears that later

that day Plaintiff was “awoken to intense pain” and another registered nurse, Jane Doe #2, came

to his cell. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff was told that his vitals were “good” and Jane Doe #2 told him

it was “something he ate.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Jane Doe #2 indicated there was no need

to take Plaintiff to the “T.T.A.”1

 (Id.) Plaintiff went to the medical clinic the following morning

where he received an examination by a physician, along with blood tests and xrays. (Id.) On

April 25, 2010 Plaintiff “was sent to the hospital” to have kidney stones removed. (Id.) 

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under color

of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A

violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to

a prisoner’s medical needs. Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

To allege an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must “satisfy both the objective

and subjective components of a two-part test.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). First, he must allege that prison officials deprived him of the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, he must allege the prison

official “acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

/ / /

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A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference ... only if [he is alleged to] know[] of

and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard, the official must be alleged to “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” and must also be alleged to

also have drawn that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation

omitted). This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude

actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059 (alteration and citation omitted).

Here, it appears that Plaintiff was examined by a physician less than twenty four hours

after he was initially examined by Jane Doe #1. (See Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not allege

any deliberate indifference on the part of the Doctor yet it was another two days before he

underwent the surgery. (Id.) Thus, it is not clear to the Court whether Plaintiff suffered any

injury in the first twenty four hours of the three day period described in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

If Plaintiff is attempting to allege that there was a delay in treatment, there are no facts in the

Complaint from which the Court can determine whether he has suffered any injury as a result

of the Defendants alleged delay in providing treatment. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (a prisoner can make “no claim for

deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.”) Plaintiff has failed to allege any

facts from which the Court could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs.

C. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff also names RJD Warden Neotti and the Secretary of the CDCR, Matthew Cate,

as Defendants in this matter; but Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations with regard to

these Defendants in the body of his Complaint. Thus, without more, it appears Plaintiff seeks

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to hold these Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir.

1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff

must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection

to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir.

1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to support an

individualized constitutional claim against Defendants Cate or Neotti.

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for all the reasons set forth

above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.4] is

GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or

his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount

equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and

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forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed in

which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

previous pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987).

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 12, 2011 _________________________________________

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

 United States District Judge 

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