Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02089/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02089-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Robert Wong is substituted for 1

his predecessor. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect the above

caption.

To the extent the court’s orders issued on March 15, 2006 (Doc. 11), March 28, 2

2006 (Doc. 12), March 30, 2006 (Doc. 13), and April 14, 2006 (Doc. 17), imply that a petition

has been filed by stating that petitioner “brings this petition,” the court now clarifies that no

petition has yet been filed.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUANE HOLLOWAY, No. CIV S-05-2089-FCD-CMK

Petitioner, DEATH PENALTY CASE

vs. ORDER

ROBERT WONG, Acting Warden, 1

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s motion for 2

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations (Doc. 10), filed on March 14, 2006. Respondent

filed an opposition (Doc. 14) on April 12, 2006, and petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 18) on April

19, 2006. The matter came on for hearing before the undersigned. Both parties appeared

Case 2:05-cv-02089-DJC-JDP Document 23 Filed 06/13/06 Page 1 of 7
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through their respective counsel and, after hearing argument, the matter was submitted. 

Petitioner’s budget requests will be addressed by separate order filed under seal.

The parties agree on the relevant procedural facts. In particular, the parties agree

that the statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expires on July 27, 2006. The

parties also agree that the statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling under Calderon v.

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The parties, however, disagree on the following issues: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction to

enter an order equitably tolling the statute of limitations given that no petition under § 2254 has

been filed; and (2) assuming this court has jurisdiction, whether petitioner has demonstrated that

equitable tolling is warranted in this case. 

The threshold question is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the

instant motion. Respondent cites Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003), and Beeler for the

proposition that there is no justiciable case or controversy until a § 2254 petition has been filed

and concludes that, because no petition has been filed in this case, petitioner’s motion seeks an

improper advisory opinion. The court finds that respondent’s argument reads Beeler and

Garceau too broadly. 

In Beeler, the Ninth Circuit declined to issue a writ of mandamus directing the

district court to reverse an order granting pre-petition equitable tolling. The court first observed

that, under Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), the limitation period imposed by § 2244(d)(1)

is inapplicable to cases that were not pending in federal court as of April 24, 1996 – the date the

statute became effective. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1287. In deciding whether § 2244(d)(1)

applied, the Ninth Circuit held that a federal habeas case is not pending until a petition is

actually filed. See id. A year later, the Ninth Circuit changed course and held in Kelly that, in a

capital case, the filing of an application for appointment of counsel and stay of execution is

sufficient to commence a case in the district court. See Kelly, 163 F.3d at 540. The Supreme

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The rule advanced by respondent – that the district court lacks jurisdiction until a 3

petition is filed – would lead to the result that every order this court has issued to date in this

case is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. Yet, despite raising the argument in opposition to this

motion, respondent has not raised the argument as to any other instance where the court has

exercised jurisdiction in this case. Respondent’s rule would also require – in every capital case –

that the petitioner file a pro se petition just to be able to ask for in forma pauperis status,

appointment of counsel, and a stay of execution. This would only serve to confuse and draw out

already complicated and lengthy litigation. 

3

Court settled the issue in Garceau, holding that a case is pending for purposes of the Lindh rule

only upon the filing of a § 2254 petition in district court. See Garceau, 538 U.S. at 210.

Neither Kelly nor Garceau affected the remainder of the Beeler decision, in which

the Ninth Circuit declined to reverse a pre-petition order granting equitable tolling in a capital

case. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted that the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and

was, therefore, subject to traditional equitable tolling principles. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. 

It is important to remember that Beeler was presented to the Ninth Circuit as a mandamus

petition. Mandamus relief would have been appropriate had the district court acted outside its

jurisdiction in granting equitable tolling. See Bauman v. United States Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650

(9th Cir 1977). If the Ninth Circuit in Beeler had not accepted the district court’s jurisdiction to

grant pre-petition equitable tolling, it would have granted mandamus relief. Because it did not,

the court is satisfied that the law in this circuit allows the district court to entertain a pre-petition

motion for equitable tolling. 

3

Finally, the language used by the court in Beeler reveals that the Ninth Circuit

approved of pre-petition equitable tolling. In stating the rule for equitable tolling, the court

noted that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only

be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file

a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). Contrary to the argument advanced by

respondent, the use of the word “make” indicates that the inquiry can take place before the

petition is late. 

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Having concluded that this court may entertain a pre-petition motion for equitable

tolling, the question is whether petitioner has demonstrated that such relief is warranted in this

case. The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled where the petitioner demonstrates that he

cannot file the petition on time because of the existence of extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control. See id. 

In Beeler, a capital case, the district court appointed two attorneys – Scott Braden

and Karen Schryver – as co-counsel for the petitioner and directed that a petition be filed by

March 25, 1997. See id. at 1285. Before the petition was prepared, Braden was granted leave to

withdraw due to a move to Oklahoma, and Schryver was made lead counsel. See id. A third

attorney – Richard Neuhoff – was appointed as second counsel. See id. On February 3, 1997,

Beeler’s attorneys requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See id. The district

court granted the requested and extended the deadline for filing the petition to October 13, 1997. 

See id. In denying the respondent’s petition for mandamus relief, the Ninth Circuit addressed

the district court’s decision to grant equitable tolling as follows:

Having decided that [the statute of limitations] can be tolled, we

have no basis for upsetting the district court’s decision to allow Beeler

more time to file his petition. The district court found that Beeler’s lead

counsel, Scott Braden, had diligently pursued the preparation of Beeler’s

petition. Braden, however, withdrew after accepting employment in

another state, and much of the work product he left behind was not usable

by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which Beeler had no

control There were thus “extraordinary circumstances” which justified

tolling [the] statute of limitations. Id. at 1289. 

In Kelly, also a capital case, the Ninth Circuit denied mandamus relief and held that equitable

tolling was appropriate because:

[A]s part of its order that Kelly be mentally evaluated, the district court

ordered “that all other aspects of this case be, and hereby are, stayed

pending final determination by this Court of the Petitioner’s mental

capacity to proceed.” The only reasonable reading of this order was that it

prohibited Kelly’s attorney’s from filing a habeas petition, which is how

the district court itself construed it. . . . This stay of the proceedings

prevented Kelly’s counsel from filing a habeas petition and, in itself,

justifies equitable tolling. Id. at 541. 

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In this case, petitioner primarily asserts that difficulty in appointing counsel

constitutes exceptional circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Petitioner states that he

completed the paperwork necessary to request appointment of counsel on August 15, 2005, but

that counsel was not appointed until January 18, 2006. Petitioner states that staffing problems

within the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defender’s Office prevented that office

from accepting the case any earlier. Through the instant motion, petitioner seeks to recapture

these lost five months. 

Petitioner cites a recent decision in Koontz v. Goughnour, No. CIV S-03-1613-

FCD-GGH. In that case, relying on Kelly, the court found that equitable tolling was appropriate

based primarily on concerns over the petitioner’s competency. As an additional reason, the court

noted the delay between the time the petitioner submitted his request for appointment of counsel

and the court’s order appointing counsel. Unlike Koontz, however, this case does not involve a

competency issue. 

As to the delay in appointing counsel, the court notes that petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel was filed on October 19, 2005 – more than two months after petitioner

states he completed the necessary paperwork. Petitioner offers no explanation for this delay. 

Further, this case is unlike Beeler, where the petitioner’s lead counsel had diligently worked

toward preparing a petition, but withdrew without leaving any usable work product. Here, based

on the declarations submitted by petitioner’s counsel, there is no indication that any significant

work has been done toward preparing the petition. In fact, it is clear from the declarations that

no work began until, at the earliest, December 27, 2005.

Petitioner also cites staffing problems within the Capital Habeas Unit as an

exceptional circumstance. In particular, petitioner states that his appointment of counsel papers

were filed on October 19, 2005, but that the Capital Habeas Unit was not able to inform the court

that it would accept the case until December 12, 2005. Petitioner states that the Capital Habeas

Unit could not start working on the case until current counsel – Harry Simon – had joined the

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office on December 27, 2005. However, there is no explanation as to why this problem was not

reported to the court prior to mid-December 2005. Between October 19, 2005, and December

12, 2005, almost two months passed during which the Capital Habeas Unit knew it would not be

able to work on the case, but did not communicate with the court. 

Even assuming that all the circumstances cited by petitioner in his papers are

indeed exceptional and beyond his control, the court is not persuaded that they render it

impossible for him to file a timely petition. At best, they render it difficult, but not impossible,

to file on time. In this regard, the instant case is distinguishable from Beeler, where the

petitioner had demonstrated that diligent petition preparation had occurred before his counsel

withdrew, and Kelly and Koontz, which both involved threshold competency issues. 

At the hearing on this motion, however, petitioner’s second counsel stated that he

had been instructed by the judge considering his budget request not to engage in substantive

work on the case until a budget had been approved, which did not occur until February 27, 2006. 

This alone does not adequately explain why the Federal Public Defender – as petitioner’s lead

counsel appointed on January 18, 2006 – could not have commenced work on the petition before

appointment of second counsel and related budget issues were resolved. The court finds,

however, that it does constitute an exceptional circumstance in this case justifying some amount

of equitable tolling. In reaching this conclusion the court makes clear that, absent the instruction

from the prior judge, the facts of this case would not warrant equitable tolling. 

/ / /

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for equitable tolling is granted, in part;

2. The statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) is equitably

tolled; and

3. Petitioner shall file his petition on or before September 29, 2006.

DATED: June 12, 2006

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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