Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00053/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00053-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

JIMMY DEWAYNE MAY, PETITIONER 

ADC #163080 

V. NO. 5:18-CV-00053-BSM-JTR 

DEXTER PAYNE,1

 Director, 

Arkansas Division of Correction RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent 

to United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to 

all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of 

fact. 

I. Introduction 

On February 22, 2018, Petitioner Jimmy Dewayne May (“May”) initiated this 

§ 2254 habeas action. In his Petition, he alleges five ineffective assistance of counsel 

 1

 In a habeas action, the “Respondent” is “the person who has custody over [the 

petitioner].” § 2254 Rule 2(a). Thus, Dexter Payne, the current Director of the Arkansas 

Department of Correction’s Division of Correction, should be substituted as the Respondent 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect this change.

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 1 of 41
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claims; one claim of error by the trial court; and one claim of error by the Arkansas 

Court of Appeals. Docs. 2 and 3. 

On April 1, 2019, Respondent filed a Response, arguing that May’s habeas 

claims are procedurally defaulted, fail on the merits, or are not cognizable under § 

2254. Doc. 35. On May 21, 2019, May filed a Reply. Doc. 34. 

Before addressing any of the parties’ arguments, it is important to understand 

the facts giving rise to May’s habeas claims.2

 

On the afternoon of June 13, 2015, Fort Smith Police Officer Jeffrey Taylor, 

Jr. (“Officer Taylor”) was dispatched to The Tackle Box, a sporting goods store, to 

investigate a call that a male and female “had been [in the store] for approximately 

two hours[,] . . . had tried to sell a gun[,] . . . were acting very strange[,]” but had 

recently left the store and were now outside sitting in a black Ford pickup truck. 

Suppression Hearing Testimony of Officer Taylor, May v. State, Ark. Ct. App. No. 

CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 122-123. 

Officer Taylor located the truck and pulled his patrol car behind it, effectively 

stopping the driver from leaving. Officer Taylor walked up to the driver’s window 

and observed the driver and the female passenger acting “very nervous.” Id. at 122-

 2

 In addition to the records provided by May and the Respondent, the Court also has 

reviewed the two-volume record of the trial court proceedings, which is available to the public at 

the Arkansas Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. See May v. State, Ark. Ct. App. Case No. CR-16-241 

(filed March 21, 2016). 

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125. The driver was “sweating a lot[,] shaking violently, really shaking. And his 

voice was really shaking.” Id. at 125. Officer Taylor asked both the driver and 

passenger “what they were doing in there [The Tackle Box] and why would we get 

a call . . . that they were acting strangely.” Id. He requested the driver and passenger 

to provide identification and then returned to his patrol car to check for arrest 

warrants. Id. at 125-126. 

The driver of the truck, May, had an active warrant for failing to appear on a 

state district court summons. Id. at 126. After Officer Taylor arrested May on the 

active warrant, he testified that May consented to the search of his truck: 

I asked him if he had anything illegal in the vehicle after I had taken him into 

custody. He said he did not. I asked him if he had a problem with me 

searching the vehicle. He said he did not. 

Id. at 127, 213. 

 Inside the truck, Officer Taylor and two other officers found two and a half 

grams of methamphetamine, a glass smoking pipe, several unused syringes, a scale, 

a 9mm pistol, and a roll of twenty-six $100 bills. Id. at 128. May later admitted that 

all of the items seized from the truck belonged to him. Id. at 230. 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 3 of 41
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May was charged in Sebastian County Circuit Court with simultaneous 

possession of drugs and firearms, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of 

methamphetamine, and felon in possession of a firearm.3

 

May’s trial counsel, Rita Watkins (“Ms. Watkins”) filed a Motion to Suppress 

all of the evidence found during the search of May’s truck. Id. at 21-22. On January 

13, 2016, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing. Id. at 93-146. Ms. 

Watkins argued that, based on Officer Taylor’s testimony during the suppression 

hearing, he had neither a reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop of May’s vehicle 

nor probable cause to conduct the search. Id. at 142. According to Ms. Watkins, 

this made the search “unlawful and all items seized should be suppressed under the 

‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.’” Id. at 21-22. 

During and after the suppression hearing, Ms. Watkins made no arguments

challenging: (1) the constitutionality of May’s arrest on the outstanding arrest 

warrant; or (2) the truthfulness of Officer Taylor’s testimony that, after May’s arrest, 

he consented to the search of the truck. On January 19, 2016, the trial court 

summarily denied the motion to suppress. Id. at 28. 

On January 29, 2016, Ms. Watkins filed a Motion to Reconsider. She 

reiterated her argument that, because “Officer Taylor failed to provide a specific, 

 3

 The felon in possession of firearm charge was severed prior to May’s trial. May, Ark. Ct. 

App. Case No. CR-16-241, Tr. Trans. at 39. 

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particularized, and articulable reason indicating that Mr. May may be involved in 

criminal activity,” he did not have probable cause to search May’s truck. Id. at 34. 

On February 1, 2016, the trial court denied the Motion, but made a new 

alternative finding to uphold the constitutionality of the search: 

Assuming, arguendo, Defendant is correct in arguing his original detention 

was not authorized, his motion must nevertheless fail. The Court notes the 

search took place only after officers were advised of an active warrant for 

Defendant’s arrest. There is nothing in the record which suggests the search 

would have occurred absent this discovery. 

Id. at 48. Under this new theory, the constitutionality of Officer Taylor’s search no 

longer turned on whether he had “reasonable suspicion” to stop May or whether his 

questioning of him created “probable cause”: 

[T]here was an independent and intervening factor [the discovery of the 

arrest warrant] which led to Defendant’s arrest and the subsequent 

[consensual] search, thereby removing any [constitutional] taint that may 

have existed [from the arguably improper Terry stop and Officer Taylor’s 

suggestion that May’s “demeanor” and “body language” created probable 

cause]. 

Id. 

May proceeded to trial, and, on February 3, 2016, the jury convicted him of 

Simultaneous Possession of Drugs and Firearms, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 

and Possession of Methamphetamine. Doc. 13-1 at 1-2. As a habitual offender, 

May was sentenced to seventeen years for Simultaneous Possession of Drugs and 

Firearms, seven years for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and six years for 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 5 of 41
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Possession of Methamphetamine. Id. All of those sentences were imposed 

consecutively. 

On direct appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, May’s appellate counsel, 

David Dunagin (“Mr. Dunagin”), argued that the trial court erred in denying May’s 

Motion to Suppress because Officer Taylor lacked probable cause to search May’s 

truck. May v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 605, 4-5, 509 S.W.3d 14, 16-17. Mr. Dunagin 

did not challenge the trial court’s alternative finding that it ultimately relied on to 

uphold the constitutionality of the search. 

On December 14, 2016, the Court affirmed May’s convictions based on the 

trial court’s finding that Officer Taylor’s “discovery of the arrest warrant [on May] 

was an independent and intervening factor that led to his arrest and the subsequent 

[consensual] search [of May’s vehicle], thereby removing any [constitutional] taint 

that may have existed.” May, 2016 Ark. App. 605, at 4-5, 509 S.W.3d at 17 

(citations omitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen an appellant [like May] fails to 

attack a circuit court’s independent, alternative basis for its ruling, we will not 

reverse.” Id. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued its Mandate affirming May’s 

conviction on January 4, 2017. May had sixty days to file his Rule 37 Petition. See

Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(ii); Ark. R. Crim. P. 1.4. 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 6 of 41
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On February 16, 2017, well before the March 6, 2017 filing deadline, May 

mailed his pro se Rule 37 Petition to the Sebastian County Circuit Court.4

 Doc. 13-

3. In that pleading, May asserted ineffective assistance of counsel claims against 

both Ms. Watkins and Mr. Dunagin. Doc. 13-3 at 8-9; Doc. 20 at 3. As to Ms. 

Watkins, he made only a conclusory allegation that she was constitutionally 

ineffective, without explaining how or providing any facts to support that claim. As 

to Mr. Dunagin, May specifically alleged that he provided ineffective assistance by 

failing to challenge the trial court’s “alternative finding,” which the Arkansas Court 

of Appeals relied on to affirm May’s conviction. Doc. 13-3 at 6.

5

 

In a letter, dated February 28, 2017, a Sebastian County Clerk wrote May and 

advised him that she was rejecting and returning his timely Rule 37 Petition, because 

 4

 Under Arkansas law, “a [Rule 37] petition filed pro se by a person confined in a 

correctional or detention facility that is not timely . . . shall be deemed filed on the date of its 

deposit in the facility’s legal mail system” if several conditions are satisfied. Ark. R. Crim. P. 

37.2(g). This rule, patterned after the federal “prison mailbox rule,” allows a Rule 37 Petition to 

be deemed filed on the date the prisoner deposits it into the prison’s “legal mail system” with firstclass postage prepaid, provided that the petition contains a notarized or attested statement 

indicating the petition complied with all of the steps necessary to claim the benefit of the prison 

mailbox rule. Id. 

In a Recommended Disposition entered on December 28, 2018, I explained why May was 

entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, under which his Rule 37 Petition was deemed 

filed on February 16, 2017, well before the March 6, 2017 filing deadline. Doc. 24. However, 

even if he were not entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, the Circuit Clerk 

unquestionably received his Rule 37 Petition on or before March 6, 2017, because her transmittal 

letter to May, returning his Rule 37 Petition (on the legal unsustainable ground it lacked a “Cover 

Sheet”) is dated February 28, 2017. 

5

 May also made the conclusory allegation that Ms. Watkins, Mr. Dunagin, and the trial 

court failed to explain to him why he lost at the suppression hearing. Doc. 13-3 at 6. 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 7 of 41
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it lacked a “Cover Sheet.” Doc. 20 at 8. Her letter stated that she was providing “a 

copy [of the Cover Sheet] for your convenience.” Id. By the time May received this 

letter, it was impossible for him to complete the Cover Sheet and return it with his 

Rule 37 Petition before the March 6, 2017 filing deadline. 

The Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure mention nothing about a “Cover 

Sheet” requirement for a Rule 37 Petition, much less that it is a filing requirement 

that can be used by a Circuit Court Clerk to reject a timely Rule 37 Petition. 

Similarly, no reported Arkansas case has ever recognized that a Circuit Clerk can 

impose additional filing requirements (such as a “Cover Sheet”) that go beyond what 

is specifically required in Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Finally, the so-called “Cover Sheet” requirement that the Sebastian County Circuit 

Clerk sought to impose on May was in direct conflict with the prison mailbox 

provision of Rule 37.2(g). Thus, as a matter of law, May’s timely Rule 37 Petition 

should have been accepted and filed on the date it was received in the Clerk’s 

Office.6

 

 6

 On June 5, 2018, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that May’s § 2254 action 

was not initiated within one year of the date on which the state “judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). On December 28, 2018, I entered a Recommended Disposition explaining in some 

detail why May’s federal habeas action was initiated within AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations, which expired on March 6, 2017. Doc. 24. 

On January 25, 2019, Respondent filed Objections to my Recommended Disposition and 

advanced a new argument, which relied on Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (a case not cited 

in Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and supporting Brief), to contend that May’s federal habeas 

Petition was untimely. Doc. 31. 

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On March 10, 2017, May filed a “Request to Consider the Timeliness of Rule 

37 Postconviction Petition.” Id. at 11-12. In this document, May correctly explained 

all of the reasons why it was error for the Circuit Clerk to reject his timely Rule 37 

Petition, which met all of the filing requirements contained in Rule 37:7

 

I am enclosing my Petition for Post-Conviction Relief under Rule 37 and 

Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that was 

returned to me by you in reason of it did not contain the “required Cover 

Sheet.” I have enclosed the cover sheet, but am afraid that I have exceeded 

the (60) day deadline since you sent my paperwork back to me. 

...Under [Rule 37.2(g)][,] [a petition that is not timely] shall be deemed filed 

on the date of its deposit in the facility’s legal mail system if the following 

conditions are satisfied . . . [T]he conditions were met when I sent you the 

original paperwork. 

* * * 

I am keeping the letter you sent me about the required Cover Sheet and the 

two (2) pages you stamped: (filed Ft. Smith DI 2017 FEB 28 AM 11[:]51) 

for my records to prove that I did send them to you in the timely manner 

required; but replaced the stamped papers with completed ones. 

* * * 

 

On February 22, 2019, United States District Judge Brian S. Miller adopted the RD, denied 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and ordered Respondent to file a Response. Doc. 32. See Streu 

v. Dormire, 557 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing equitable grounds that were less compelling than 

the one involved in this case, the Court concluded that, even though the habeas petitioner had not 

filed a timely Notice of Appeal, he was entitled to tolling during the pendency of his motion to 

reopen his post-conviction proceedings, based on “abandonment by [his] post-conviction 

counsel”); see also Smith v. Hobbs, No. 5:11-CV-00091-KGB, 2012 WL 3595989 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 

20, 2012). 

7

 Under Arkansas law, pro se litigants are entitled to have the allegations in their pleadings 

liberally construed. State v. West, 2014 Ark. 174, 5 (2014) (citing Dodge v. Lee, 352 Ark. 235, 

100 S.W.3d 107 (2003). However, they are held to the “same standard as licensed attorneys with 

respect to complying with the rules [of procedure].” Lucas v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 365, 8, 423 S.W.3d 

580, 585 (2012); see also Breckenridge v. Lowery, 2015 Ark. App. 157, 8 (2015) (“Pro se litigants 

. . . are not given special or relaxed treatment [with regard to the timeliness of their court filings].”). 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 9 of 41
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I will continue to seek legal matters concerning if my rights of timely filing 

has been violated and if my filing the Rule 37 still stands under the grounds 

that it was sent in due time the first time I sent you the Rule 37 filing forms. 

Id. at 11-12. 

On April 17, 2017, the Sebastian County Court Administrator mailed May a 

letter containing good and bad news. Id. at 13. The good news was that the trial 

court had overruled the Circuit Clerk’s legally unsupportable position that May was 

required to submit a “Cover Sheet” before she would file his otherwise timely and 

proper Rule 37 Petition. The bad news was that the trial court had entered “an order 

. . . on March 27, 2017, denying said [Rule 37] petition. A copy is enclosed for your 

review.” Id. 

The trial court’s order gave the following reasons for denying Rule 37 relief: 

(1) “[May] failed to meet his burden in establishing [either deficient performance or 

prejudice]” by his trial counsel; (2) “the bulk of [May’s] complaints do not involve 

trial counsel [Ms. Watkins] at all, but rather express disappointment with appellate 

counsel [Mr. Dunagin] and disagreement with the decisions of the trial and appellate 

courts”; and (3) “the files and record of the case . . . conclusively show [May] is 

entitled to no relief, thereby eliminating the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Doc. 

13-3 at 11-12. 

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May had thirty days from the entry of the March 27, 2017 order to file a timely

Notice of Appeal. Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 4(a). This meant the filing deadline for the 

Notice of Appeal was April 26, 2017.8

On an unknown date before the expiration of the April 26, 2017 filing 

deadline, the Sebastian County Clerk’s Office received May’s timely and proper

Notice of Appeal. In that document, May specifically provided the proper case 

caption and case number for his pending Rule 37 action and stated that he was 

appealing to the Arkansas Supreme Court “from the Final Order of the Circuit Court 

of Sebastian County, entered on April 17, 2017.” Doc. 28 (emphasis added). It 

should have been readily apparent to anyone reviewing May’s Notice of Appeal that 

he had committed a minor scrivener’s error in identifying the “final Order of the 

 8

 To exhaust his Rule 37 ineffective assistance of counsel claims, May was required to raise 

those claims with the trial court in his Rule 37 Petition and then appeal the denial of those claims 

to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Ark. S. Ct. R. 1-2. See Smith v. Kelley, No. 5:19-CV-0002, 2019 

WL 5291384, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CV0002, 2019 WL 5268632 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 17, 2019) (citing Armstrong v. Iowa, 418 F.3d 924, 925-

26 (8th Cir. 2005)) (To exhaust Rule 37 ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner is 

required to raise those claims with the trial court and then appeal the denial of relief to the Arkansas 

Supreme Court); Pigg v. Kelley, No. 5:16-CV-00212, 2018 WL 2435600, at *7 (E.D. Ark. May 

30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:16-CV-00212, 2018 WL 4224846 (E.D. 

Ark. Sept. 5, 2018), certificate of appealability denied, No. 18-3154, 2019 WL 1531850 (8th Cir. 

Feb. 27, 2019) (same). 

Thus, it was procedurally important for May to file a timely and proper Notice of Appeal, 

with the Sebastian County Circuit Clerk, in order to preserve his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims for later review by the Arkansas Supreme Court, and, if those claims were denied, for 

further review by a federal court in a § 2254 habeas action. If May did not appeal those ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims to the Arkansas Supreme Court and he later filed a federal habeas 

action, he would have to overcome the argument that he procedurally defaulted those claims by 

not presenting them to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 11 of 41
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Circuit Court of Sebastian County [as being] entered on April 17, 2017,” the date of 

the Court Administrator’s transmittal letter to May, instead of the correct date the 

trial court entered its final order, March 27, 2017. Under well-established Arkansas 

case law, the Circuit Clerk was required to file May’s timely and proper Notice of 

Appeal, even though it incorrectly identified the date of the final order from which 

he was appealing. Instead, she refused to do so. 

In a letter dated June 1, 2019, the Circuit Clerk cited May’s error in providing 

the wrong date for the final order denying his Rule 37 Petition and used it as the sole 

ground for refusing to file his Notice of Appeal: 

Our office is returning to you the NOTICE OF APPEAL you sent for filing. 

In your filing, you referenced a “FINAL ORDER FILED APRIL 17, 2017,” 

what you are referencing was a letter from the Court Administrator, which is 

not appealable. 

Doc. 28 at 5.

9

 

In Duncan v. Duncan, 2009 Ark. 565 (2009), the Court held that, if an 

attorney completes and files a Notice of Appeal that specifies the incorrect date for 

 9

 Because the Circuit Clerk refused to file May’s Notice of Appeal, nothing in the record 

reflects the date it was received by the Clerk’s Office. However, unlike May’s scrivener’s error, 

an untimely Notice of Appeal is a substantive defect that is a proper basis for a Clerk to reject a 

Notice of Appeal. Jewell v. Fletcher, 2012 Ark. 132, 1 (2012) (citing Stacks v. Marks, 354 Ark. 

594, 127 S.W.3d 483 (2003) (“A timely notice of appeal is essential to this court obtaining 

jurisdiction.”); Jefferson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 356 Ark. 647, 158 S.W.3d 129 (2004) 

(The failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.”). If the 

Clerk had received May’s Notice of Appeal, after the April 26, 2017 filing deadline, she 

unquestionably would have relied on that substantive legal defect – not May’s inconsequential 

mistake in citing the incorrect date for the trial court’s final Order – to reject his Notice of Appeal 

on that ground. Because the Circuit Clerk’s letter mentions nothing about May’s Notice of Appeal 

being untimely, she undoubtedly received it before the April 26, 2017 filing deadline. 

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the final order being appealed, it does not render the Notice of Appeal fatally 

deficient, as long as it otherwise substantially complies with Ark. R. App. Pro.–Civ. 

3(e). See Lovan v. Lovan, 2015 Ark. App. 515, 2 (2015) (“where an appellant 

attempts to designate the order and simply misidentifies the order by date, our courts 

will find substantial compliance”); Callaway v. Abshure, 2013 Ark. App. 21, 2 

(2013) (“where an appellant attempts to designate the order appealed from and 

simply misidentifies the order by date, our courts will find substantial compliance 

despite the inaccuracy”). Accord: Van Buren Cnty. Title Co. v. Bass, 2009 Ark. 406, 

370 S.W.3d 811; Pro-Comp Mgmt., Inc. v. R.K. Enters., LLC, 372 Ark. 190, 272 

S.W.3d 91 (2008); Henley v. Medlock, 97 Ark. App. 45, 244 S.W.3d 16 (2006); 

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sudrick, 49 Ark. App. 84, 896 S.W.2d 452 (1995). 

Under this standard (which was developed to save attorneys who incorrectly 

identify the date of the final order being appealed), May’s Notice of Appeal 

complied with Rule 3(e) in all respects except providing the correct date of the trial 

court’s order denying Rule 37 relief. 10 Thus, under well-established Arkansas law, 

the Circuit Clerk was required to file May’s Notice of Appeal and allow him a clear 

path to appeal the trial court’s denial of Rule 37 relief to the Arkansas Supreme 

Court. 

 10 Because the only order entered by the trial court in May’s Rule 37 case was the final 

order, the identification of that Order should have been readily apparent to the Clerk, with or 

without May’s citation to the correct date it was entered. 

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As May later explained in his habeas Petition, when he received the Circuit 

Clerk’s June 1, 2017 letter refusing to file his timely and proper Notice of Appeal, 

he simply “gave up” on his appeal. According to May, the Rule 37 process, at least 

as administered by the Sebastian County Clerk’s Office, was so complex and 

confusing that it required a law degree to understand: 

Where Petitioner had no counsel to prepare (or) assistance by counsel, and 

was not able to succeed [sic]. Though a notice of appeal were [sic] filed. [sic] 

The ability of Petitioner to satsifi [sic] the required process of the court was 

not there as it would have been had experience counsel been part of the 

process. 

Doc. 3 at 4. 

Rule 37 petitioners in Arkansas, almost all of whom are pro se, must 

successfully navigate a number of complex procedural requirements to properly 

exhaust their state court remedies, something they must accomplish before initiating 

a federal habeas action. Suffice it to say, this already difficult process should not be 

further complicated by circuit clerks who create spurious legal grounds to reject the 

timely and proper Rule 37 papers of pro se petitioners. 

II. Discussion 

On February 19, 2018, May filed his habeas Petition initiating this action. 

Liberally construed, May’s Petition raises the following claims:11 

 11 Federal courts are required to liberally construe the claims of pro se habeas petitioners. 

Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015); Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 471 (8th 

Cir. 2014); Meador v. Branson, 688 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 14 of 41
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1. Mr. Dunagin provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, on 

direct appeal, by failing to challenge the trial court’s alternative 

finding that Officer Taylor’s search of May’s truck was 

constitutional. 

2. Ms. Watkins provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to challenge or object to Officer Taylor’s 

testimony that, after May’s arrest, he consented to the search of his 

truck. 

3. Ms. Watkins provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to investigate May’s case and by conducting 

inadequate discovery prior to the suppression hearing. 

4. Ms. Watkins provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to object to “profiling” at the suppression hearing. 

5. Ms. Watkins provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to object to the introduction of May’s out-of-state 

criminal history during the sentencing phase of his trial. 

6. The trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence that resulted 

from Officer Taylor’s search of May’s truck. 

7. The Arkansas Court of Appeals erred in holding that, because Mr. 

Dunagin did not challenge the trial court’s alternative finding that 

the search of May’s truck was constitutional, it must affirm the 

constitutionality of the search. 

Docs. 2 and 3. 

For the reasons explained below, all of May’s claims should be dismissed, 

with prejudice. 

A. May Procedurally Defaulted His Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Claim Against Mr. Dunagin 

A habeas petitioner must first “fairly present” the substance of his claims in 

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state court before seeking § 2254 relief in federal court. Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 

845, 848-49 (8th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ 

of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State”). To satisfy this 

requirement, a petitioner must raise those claims in “one complete round of the 

State’s established appellate review process.” Murphy, 652 F.3d at 848-49; Grass 

v. Reitz, 643 F.3d 579, 584-85 (8th Cir. 2011). 

By exhausting all available state court remedies, a habeas petitioner gives the 

state that convicted him an “‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations 

of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per 

curiam). When a petitioner fails to fully exhaust his claims in state court and the 

time for doing so has expired, his claims are procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). 

Under Arkansas law, a defendant’s first opportunity to raise an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim is in a Rule 37 Petition filed with the trial court after his 

conviction has been finally adjudicated. Armstrong v. Iowa, 418 F.3d 924, 925-26 

(8th Cir. 2005) (Exhaustion of Rule 37 ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

requires petitioner to raise those claims with the trial court and then appeal its denial 

of relief to the Arkansas Supreme Court.); Ratchford v. State, 357 Ark. 27, 31 (2004) 

(Ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims generally must be raised in a Rule 37 

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17 

petition and may not be considered on direct appeal.). 

On February 16, 2017, May filed a timely pro se Rule 37 Petition raising only 

one specific and properly supported ineffective assistance of counsel claim: Mr. 

Dunagin provided ineffective assistance of counsel, on direct appeal, by failing to 

raise and challenge the trial court’s alternative theory for upholding the 

constitutionality of the search of May’s truck. 

With regard to Ms. Watkins, May made only a vague and conclusory 

allegation that she was “ineffective,” without providing any details describing how

her performance during his trial was constitutionally deficient. Docs. 13-3 at 8-9, 

Doc. 20 at 3. Under Arkansas law, a vague and factually unsupported ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim is procedurally defective, and can be summarily 

dismissed by the trial court on that basis. Johnston v. State, 2015 Ark. 162, 7, 459 

S.W.3d 782, 787 (2015) (neither conclusory statements nor allegations without 

factual substantiation are sufficient to state a claim for relief in a Rule 37.1 petition); 

Stiggers v. State, 2014 Ark. 184, 8, 433 S.W.3d 252, 259 (2014). 

On March 27, 2017, the trial court entered a final order denying all of the 

claims May raised in his Rule 37 Petition. Doc. 13-3 at 11-12. 

May submitted a timely and proper Notice of Appeal, which the Circuit Clerk 

improperly rejected, because he provided an incorrect date for the final order 

denying Rule 37 relief. Doc. 28 at 4-5. While May should not have been subjected 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 17 of 41
18 

to this improper procedural setback from the Circuit Clerk, it remained his 

responsibility, as a pro se litigant, to avail himself of the remedies that were still

available to him to preserve his right to appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 

Townsell v. Kelley, 678 F. App’x 458, 459 (8th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (petitioner 

was not prevented from perfecting his appeal based on the absence of final formal 

order denying Rule 37 relief because he could have sought a formal order or filed a 

petition for writ of mandamus in the Arkansas Supreme Court); Bell v. Attorney Gen. 

of Iowa, 474 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 2007) (generally cause to excuse procedural 

default must be external to the petitioner, and not attributable to the petitioner); 

Stanley v. Lockhart, 941 F.2d 70, 709 (8th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Hobbs, No. 5:13-

CV-209, 2014 WL 7152687, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2014) (pro se status and any 

unfamiliarity with the law or procedural matters, without more, do not excuse the 

failure to perfect Rule 37 appeal); Foley v. Hobbs, No. 5:11CV00065, 2013 WL 

5673526, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 15, 2013) (same); Plunkett v. Norris, No. 

5:08CV00102, 2008 WL 4368908, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 22, 2008) (acknowledging 

that a Rule 37 petitioner bears the burden of obtaining a ruling and perfecting his 

appeal under Arkansas law). 

There were two procedural remedies available to May to overturn the Circuit 

Clerk’s wrongful refusal to file his timely and proper Notice of Appeal: (1) a 

“Motion for Rule on the Clerk”; and (2) a “Motion for a Belated Appeal.” McDonald 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 18 of 41
19 

v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004) (“If there is good reason the appeal 

was not perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion [for a belated 

appeal], and this court will decide whether good reason is present.”); see also 

Halfacre v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 171, 1 (2016) (granting motion for rule on clerk where 

circuit clerk had refused to file-mark a number of pleadings and had not properly 

file-marked the court order from which the petitioner was appealing). If May had 

filed either of those Motions with the Arkansas Supreme Court, and explained the 

Clerk’s spurious ground for refusing to file his timely and proper Notice of Appeal, 

the Court almost certainly would have found this to constitute an adequate ground 

for overturning the Circuit Clerk’s decision and allowing May to proceed with his 

Rule 37 appeal.

By May’s own admission in his habeas Petition, he simply “gave up” on 

pursuing his Rule 37 Appeal after the Circuit Clerk refused to file his Notice of 

Appeal. By doing so, May procedurally defaulted his initially raised and litigated 

Rule 37 ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Dunagin. He cannot rely 

on the Martinez12 exception to excuse the procedural default. Davila v. Davis, 137 

S.Ct. 2058 (2017) (Martinez does not apply to excuse procedural defaulted claims 

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). 

 12 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). See discussion infra. at Section II. B of the 

Martinez exception and its requirements. 

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20 

Finally, even if May had properly pursued his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim against Mr. Dunagin to the Arkansas Supreme Court, he would not have 

prevailed on that claim under controlling federal case law. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 

S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 195 L.Ed. 2d 400 (2016) (where officer’s misconduct is not 

“flagrantly unlawful,”13 evidence was still admissible because the officer’s 

discovery of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the 

unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence ultimately seized incident to 

arrest); United States v. LeBeau, 867 F.3d 960, 972 (8th Cir. 2017) (courts will not 

exclude evidence discovered as a result of an illegal search or seizure “when the 

connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or 

has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance.”); see also United States v. 

Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (discovery of outstanding arrest warrant 

constituted an extraordinary intervening circumstance that purged much of the taint 

associated with the officers’ unconstitutional conduct). 

There was nothing “flagrantly unlawful” about Officer Taylor’s alleged 

misconduct in conducting the Terry stop, and then questioning May about his 

 13 “For the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the mere 

absence of proper cause for the seizure.” United States v. Yorgensen, 845 F.3d 908, 915 (8th Cir. 

2017) (quoting Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2064). Flagrant misconduct has been found where: (1) police 

broke into defendant’s apartment and arrested him without probable cause for the purpose of 

investigating the murder to which he later confessed; and (2) authorities arrested without probable 

cause in the hope that something would turn up, and he confessed shortly thereafter without any 

meaningful intervening event.” Yorgensen, 845 F.3d at 915 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 

590, 603-604 (1975); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982)). 

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21 

behavior inside The Tackle Box. Additionally, his discovery of the outstanding 

arrest warrant for May was an intervening circumstance that “purged” any taint from 

his earlier actions. Thus, based on Strieff and its progeny, the Arkansas Supreme 

Court would have upheld, on the merits, the constitutionality of the search under the 

trial court’s “alternative finding.” 

B. The Martinez Exception Does Not Save May’s Procedurally 

Defaulted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Against 

Ms. Watkins 

Unlike the properly supported ineffective assistance of counsel claim May 

asserted against Mr. Dunagin in his Rule 37 Petition, May’s claim against Ms. 

Watkins was so conclusory and factually unsupported that it was impossible to make 

a meaningful determination of the nature of Ms. Watkins’s alleged ineffectiveness 

or whether it had any prejudicial effect on May. In other words, the vagueness of 

this conclusory ineffective assistance of counsel claim was tantamount to May 

making no ineffective assistance of counsel claim at all against Ms. Watkins. May 

argues that the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

against Ms. Watkins should be excused under the Court’s holding in Martinez v. 

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 

The threshold obligation May must satisfy under Martinez is to demonstrate 

that, at the initial stage of his Rule 37 case, he was proceeding pro se, and, in that 

initial proceeding, he failed to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

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22 

against Ms. Watkins that he is now asserting, for the first time, in this federal habeas 

action. The undisputed facts establish that May has satisfied the first prong of the 

Martinez exception.14

However, to save his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, May must go on to show that each such claim is substantial, i.e., the claim: 

(1) has “some merit;” and (2) is supported by “some facts.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 

14. This “substantiality test” constitutes the second prong of the Martinez exception 

and it is the one habeas petitioners have the most difficulty satisfying.15 

 14 In May’s Rule 37 Petition, he makes the conclusory allegation that Ms. Watkins provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel, with only the following disjointed facts to support that claim: 

My Public Defender, Rita Watkins, came to my dorm in Sebastian County Jail and said 

that we lost the Motion to Suppress hearing. I asked her under what grounds did he deny 

the Motion, and she said that the Judge, Tabor, did not give her a reason why. I then asked 

if I would be called in front of the stand so that he can tell me on record why I was denied 

and she said no. 

Doc. 35-4 at 4. Nothing about those facts can be reasonably construed as sufficient to raise and 

properly support Ms. Watkins’s alleged ineffective representation as May has described in Claims 

2, 3, and 4. Thus, all of those claims qualify for analysis under the Martinez exception: 

[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim 

in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a default of an ineffectiveassistance claim . . . where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review 

collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial[.] 

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 

15 Of course, even if a habeas petitioner satisfies the Martinez “substantiality test,” as to 

each of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he must then face the daunting task of meeting 

the high standard of proof required to demonstrate, on the merits, that his attorney provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel in each of the ways he has alleged. In Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 (1984), the Court held that, for a habeas petitioner to prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must prove: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of the criminal proceeding would have been different. 

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For the reasons explained below, May has failed to show that any of his 

procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Ms. Watkins 

are “substantial.” 

1. Ms. Watkins’s Alleged Ineffectiveness for Not 

Challenging Officer Taylor’s Testimony That, 

After Arresting May, He Consented to the 

Search of His Truck 

May explains his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Ms. 

Watkins as follows: 

Though transcript shows that Petitioner did in fact consent to a search, 

Petitioner repetedly durning [sic] trial asked trial counsel to object to the less 

than truthful statements made by the arresting officer testimony of consent . 

. . At no time did Petitioner give his consent to search . . . It is very common 

nowadays for police officers to alledge [sic] that a person gave consent to 

search, when fact is the officers word wheather [sic] truth or not will carry 

more weight than the citizen being accused[,] even if consent was not given. 

Here Petitioner still holds that consent was not given by him. 

 

Courts generally conduct a Martinez analysis, to determine if the defaulted ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims can be saved, before applying the Strickland test to determine if the 

attorney’s legal representation was “below an objective standard of reasonableness” sufficient to 

create “a reasonable probability that the result of the criminal proceeding would have been 

different.” See, e.g., Camacho v. Kelley, 888 F.3d 389, 394, n. 3 (8th Cir. 2018) (observing that 

the record was unclear whether the district court, which held an evidentiary hearing on the 

petitioner’s procedurally defaulted habeas claim, denied relief based on procedural default or the 

merits, but holding that because “a procedural default analysis [under Martinez] and a merits 

analysis each require application of the Strickland ineffective assistance standard, our conclusion 

here would be the same under either analysis.”); compare Hogan v. Kelley, 826 F.3d 1025 (8th 

Cir. 2016) (concluding that because habeas petitioner suffered no Strickland prejudice, he failed 

to demonstrate a substantial ineffective assistance claim sufficient to excuse his procedural 

default). 

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Doc. 3 at 9-10 (emphasis in original). Because there are no facts in the record which 

support May’s belated contention that he did not consent to the search, he has failed 

to satisfy the Martinez requirement that “at least some facts” support his claim.16 

 May attended the January 13, 2016 suppression hearing and heard Officer 

Taylor unequivocally testify that, after May was arrested on the outstanding warrant, 

he verbally consented to the search of his vehicle. May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-

241, Tr. Rec. at 127. 

 First, if May believed that Officer Taylor had lied during the suppression 

hearing about the crucially important issue of consent, he was obligated to raise that 

issue with Ms. Watkins and offer his own testimony, during the suppression hearing, 

for the limited purpose of making it clear he did not consent to the search of his 

truck. May’s silence, in the face of Officer Taylor allegedly committing perjury 

during the suppression hearing, casts grave doubt on how this claim might have 

“some merit.” 

 Second, on January 27, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on May’s 

request for a continuance to allow him time to hire a new private attorney. Id. at 

143-146. In support of that request, May made the following statement: 

We filed for Motion to Suppress with the Court on the 13th. I just received 

Friday the Motion to Suppress was denied. The Court hearing went excellent. 

 16 The warrantless search of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the law 

enforcement officer first obtains voluntary consent to search. United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 

1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. White, 42 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1994)). 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 24 of 41
25 

Everyone thought we should have won the case. . . I’ve got some serious 

charges and some serious – holds some serious time, and I need other 

representation. 

Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 

Because May attended the suppression hearing on January 12, 2016, he knew

that Ms. Watkins had only challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop and 

Officer Taylor’s lack of probable cause to search the truck, not Officer Taylor’s 

supposedly perjured testimony that May later consented to the search of his vehicle. 

It is preposterous for May to now argue that Officer Taylor lied and perjured himself 

regarding May’s consent to the search, while simultaneously telling the trial court, 

on January 27, 2016, that he thought the “[suppression] hearing went excellent” and 

he “should have won the case.” 

According to May, prior to the suppression hearing, he told Ms. Watkins that 

he did not consent to allow his truck to be searched. If he, in fact, conveyed that 

information to her, this would mean she did nothing to challenge Officer Taylor’s 

perjured testimony during the suppression hearing. May’s unexplained failure to 

raise this matter himself, directly with the trial court during the January 27, 2016 

hearing, and then use it to support his request for a continuance so he could hire a 

new lawyer, makes his argument impossible to believe. 

Because May has failed to demonstrate this ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim is “substantial,” his procedural default of that claim cannot be excused under 

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26 

the second prong of Martinez. Accordingly, the claim should be dismissed, with 

prejudice. 

2. Ms. Watkins’s Alleged Ineffectiveness for 

Failing to Conduct Adequate Discovery Before 

the Suppression Hearing 

The only facts that arguably support this claim come from Billie Knittig (“Ms. 

Knittig”), who was a co-owner of The Tackle Box and who offered testimony during 

the suppression hearing.17 According to her, she called the police department and 

reported the “suspicious behavior” of May and his female companion. May, Ark. 

Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 94-95. She testified that May and his 

companion wandered around the store for a couple of hours before buying anything, 

and she thought the two were “tweaking” and “had the look of somebody on drugs.” 

Id. at 95-96. Finally, Ms. Knittig claimed that she called the police because: (1) she 

thought the couple had either stolen or were about to steal from the store; and (2) if 

they left in the truck, she believed either one of them would be driving under the 

influence of drugs. Id. at 101. 

May claims that Ms. Watkins could have successfully impeached Ms. 

Knittig’s suppression hearing testimony by subpoenaing the surveillance videos 

from The Tackle Box, which would have established that he and his female 

 17 Ms. Knittig did not testify at trial. 

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27 

companion were only in the store for a little over an hour and “no suspicious activity 

was taking place.” Doc. 3 at 10. 

At most, Ms. Knittig’s testimony provided background information that was 

not relevant to the issue of whether the search of May’s truck was constitutional. 

Furthermore, even if Ms. Watkins had completely discredited Ms. Knittig, and got 

her to admit May had been in the store for about one hour, not a couple of hours, 

and that he did not engage in any “suspicious activity,” it would have had no effect

on the trial court’s alternative finding that the search was constitutional because May 

consented to it. 

The trial court concluded that Officer Taylor’s discovery of a valid and 

outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge any 

constitutional deficiencies arising from Officer Taylor’s initial Terry stop or any 

resulting lack of probable cause to search the vehicle arising from his questioning of 

May. Ms. Knittig’s testimony about what she told the Fort Smith Police 

Department’s dispatcher, and her own subjective impression of May and his conduct 

inside her store had nothing to do with the trial court’s reason for concluding the 

search of May’s truck was constitutional. May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. 

Rec. at 48. 

Because May has failed to demonstrate that his second ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim against Ms. Watkins is “substantial,” his procedural default of this 

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claim cannot be excused under the second prong of Martinez. Accordingly, this 

claim should be dismissed with prejudice. 

3. Ms. Watkins’s Alleged Ineffectiveness for Not 

Objecting to “Profiling” During the Suppression 

Hearing. 

May argues that he was the victim of “profiling” based on Ms. Knittig’s 

suppression hearing testimony that he “was picking at his skin, and has bad teeth . . 

. therefore he must be on drugs . . This is profiling.” Doc. 3 at 11. According to 

May, Ms. Knittig’s recitation of those subjective and irrelevant opinions compelled 

Ms. Watkins to raise “profiling” as a ground for striking Ms. Knittig’s testimony. 

Because Ms. Watkins made no objection to that testimony, May claims she provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. This argument fails for the same reasons the Court 

relied on to reject May’s second ineffective assistance of counsel claim, i.e., it is 

factually unsustainable, lacks any legal merit, and does not come close to satisfying 

the Martinez substantiality test. Accordingly this claim should be dismissed, with 

prejudice. 

4. Ms. Watkins’s Alleged Ineffectiveness During 

The Sentencing Phase Of May’s Trial 

On November 19, 2015, shortly after criminal charges were filed against May 

in Sebastian County Circuit Court, the deputy prosecutor filed a Response to 

Defendant’s Motion for Discovery. May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 

14-16. In that Response, the deputy prosecutor affirmatively stated that “Certified 

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29 

copies of Defendant’s prior felony convictions . . . [have been] previously provided 

. . . to defense counsel [Ms. Watkins].” Id. at 16. 

On December 29, 2015, May and Ms. Watkins appeared before the trial judge 

for a hearing on May’s motion to reduce his bond. Id. at 65. May called his mother 

as a witness, and the deputy prosecutor questioned her in considerable detail about 

her son’s prior criminal history. Id. at 65-87. She admitted that she knew about her 

son’s 2014 felony conviction in Roland, Oklahoma,18 for unlawfully possessing a 

firearm. She also admitted she knew about her son’s felony conviction in Louisiana, 

in 2011,19 for possession of methamphetamine.20 Id. at 78, 89. 

The deputy prosecutor introduced into evidence certified copies of May’s 

many criminal convictions (for misdemeanors and felonies), without any objection 

from Ms. Watkins.21 Having been provided with certified copies of those 

 18 Roland is only a short distance from Fort Smith, Arkansas. 

19 During the hearing, the deputy prosecutor erroneously told May’s mother that her son 

was convicted in “2010” of felony possession of methamphetamine in Louisiana. However, the 

certified copies of the court records from Ouachita Parrish, Louisiana, establish that May was 

charged with that offense in 2010 but did not enter his guilty plea until “2011.” May, Ark. Ct. 

App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 365, 403-404. 

20 May’s mother explained that she was her son’s only family member in Fort Smith, but 

he had other family members living in Louisiana. Between 1995 and 2012, she testified May lived 

with family members in Louisiana, but, after 2012, “he has been back and forth between Louisiana 

and Arkansas.” May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 77. 

21 The deputy prosecutor unquestionably introduced a certified copy of the court records 

from Louisiana establishing that defendant, “Jimmy Dewayne May” was convicted of felony 

possession of methamphetamine. May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 365. While 

May’s mother admitted that she knew her son was convicted of felony possession of a gun, in 

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30 

convictions, approximately six weeks earlier, Ms. Watkins had already seen those 

documents, and had ample opportunity, before the hearing, to review and investigate 

those convictions and discuss them with May. She undoubtedly did not object to the 

admissibility of certified copies of those convictions because she had no good faith 

legal basis for doing so. Similarly, May elected not to offer his own testimony 

disputing any of those convictions, something he clearly would have done if he

contested the accuracy or validity of any of those convictions. 

Finally, because May’s own mother had testified that she knew her son had 

been convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine in Louisiana in 2011 and 

felony possession of a firearm in Oklahoma in 2014, Ms. Watkins could not

challenge either of those convictions on the ground her client was not the “Jimmy 

Dewayne May” named in the certified copies of the court records in both of those 

cases. Id. at 399-401, 403-404. 

After denying May’s motion to reduce bond, the trial judge warned May of 

the possibility he could be charged as a habitual offender: 

[A]lthough the defendant [May] has not been alleged to have been a habitual 

criminal, it appears that the information could be amended to reflect that, 

 

Roland, Oklahoma, in 2014, a certified copy of court record establishing that conviction is not 

among the documents introduced into evidence during the bond reduction hearing. However, 

during the sentencing phase of May’s trial, one month later, the deputy prosecutor was careful to 

introduce a certified copy of court records from: (1) Sequoyah County, Oklahoma, proving that 

“Jimmy Dewayne May” was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in 2014; and (2) 

Ouachita Parrish, Louisiana, proving that “Jimmy Dewayne May” was convicted of felony 

possession of methamphetamine in 2011. Id. at 399-401, 403-404. 

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which would make the sentence on all of these offenses be higher than he 

faces now. 

Id. at 92. Of course, the trial judge gave this warning because he was convinced by 

the unrefuted evidence introduced during the hearing that May had two prior out-ofstate felony convictions. Under Arkansas law, this meant May might be charged as 

a “habitual offender” and exposed to an “extended sentence.”22 

Thus, by the time the bond hearing ended, May and Ms. Watkins both knew

that: (1) the trial judge had decided beyond a reasonable doubt that May had two 

prior out-of-state felony convictions; and (2) the uncontroverted sworn testimony of 

May’s mother established beyond a reasonable doubt that May was the “Jimmy 

Dewayne May” who was convicted of both of those felonies. Finally, Ms. Watkins 

and May had been placed on notice that the prosecutor might amend the criminal 

information to charge May as a “habitual offender” and seek an “extended sentence.” 

On January 21, 2016, thirteen days before May’s trial, the prosecutor filed an 

amended criminal information which added, as Count 5, the offense of “habitual 

 22 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-503 provides that, under Arkansas’s Habitual Offender Statute 

(Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501), a felony conviction “in another jurisdiction constitutes a previous 

conviction . . . if a sentence of imprisonment for a term in excess of one year was authorized under 

a law of the other jurisdiction.” Both of May’s out-of-state convictions were punishable by more 

than one year of imprisonment. See La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967 (Louisiana’s possession of 

methamphetamine statute in 2010-11); 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1283(A) (Oklahoma’s felon in 

possession of firearm statute in 2014). 

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-504(a) allows a previous felony conviction to be proved “by any 

evidence that satisfies the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted 

or found guilty.” Subpart (b)(1) specifically recognizes a “certified copy of the record of a 

previous conviction . . . by a court of record” as “sufficient to support a finding [by the trial court] 

of a prior conviction.” 

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32 

offender” based on May “having previously been convicted of more than one (1) 

felony but fewer than four (4) felonies” which made him “subject to an extended 

term of imprisonment . . . .” Id. at 4.

23 This meant, if May was convicted on any of 

the felonies charged in the amended information, he would be sentenced as a habitual 

offender, “with more than one but fewer than four prior felony convictions.”24 Under 

Arkansas law, the sentences imposed on those convictions could be “extended” as 

follows: (1) Simultaneous Possession of Drugs and Firearms, a Class Y felony, 

increased from “not less than 10 nor more than 40 years, or life” to “not less than 10 

 23 The four preceding counts of the Amended Information charged May with: Simultaneous 

Possession of Drugs and Firearms (Count 1); Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 2); 

Possession of Firearm by Certain Persons (Count 3, which was severed prior to the trial); and 

Possession of Methamphetamine (Count 4). All of those offenses were alleged to have been 

committed on June 13, 2015. 

24 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a) provides as follows: 

(a)(1) A defendant meeting the following criteria may be sentenced to pay any fine 

authorized by law for the felony conviction and to an extended term of 

imprisonment as set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this section: 

(A) A defendant who: 

(i) Is convicted of a felony other than [felonies involving violence] after June 30, 

1993; and 

(ii) Has previously been convicted of more than one (1) felony but fewer than four 

(4) felonies . . . [shall be subject to]: 

. . . 

(A) For a conviction of a Class Y felony, a term of imprisonment of not less than 

ten (10) years nor more than sixty (60) years, or life; 

. . . 

(C) For a conviction of a Class B felony, a term of imprisonment of not less than 

five (5) years nor more than thirty (30) years; 

(D) For a conviction of a Class C felony, a term of imprisonment of not less than 

three (3) years nor more than twenty (20) years; 

(E) For a conviction of a Class D felony, a term of imprisonment of not more than 

twelve (12) years[.] 

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33 

nor more than 60 years, or life”; (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 

felony, increased from “not less than 5 nor more than 20 years” to “not less than 5 

nor more than 30 years”; (3) Possession of Firearms by Certain Persons,25 a Class D 

felony, increased from “shall not exceed 6 years” to “not more than 12 years”; and 

(4) Possession of Methamphetamine, a Class C felony, increased from “not less than 

3 nor more than 10 years” to “not less than 3 nor more than 20 years.” 

On February 3, 2016, May went to trial on Count 1 (Possession of 

Methamphetamine and a Firearm), Count 2 (Possession of Drug Paraphernalia), 

Count 4 (Possession of Methamphetamine), and Count 5 (being a habitual offender). 

May, Ark. Ct. App. Case No. CR-16-241, Tr. Trans. at 39. Later that day, the jury 

returned a verdict finding May guilty on Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the amended 

information. 

After the jury returns a guilty verdict against a defendant charged as a habitual 

offender, Arkansas Code Ann. § 5-4-502 sets forth the procedure for sentencing. It 

provides that, “out of the hearing of the jury the trial court shall hear evidence of the 

 25 The “felon in possession of a firearm” charge in Count 3 was severed before trial. 

According to the Sebastian County Court’s online docket, May later pleaded guilty to that charge 

and received a sentence of 72 months. See State v. May, No. 66FCR-15-607, accessible at 

https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/cconnect. Because the ADC website makes it clear that May is only 

currently serving sentences for the three convictions in this case, it is unclear when or if May 

served any sentence on the felon in possession of a firearm charge. See

https://apps.ark.org/inmate_info/search. 

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34 

defendant’s prior felony convictions . . . and shall determine the number of prior 

felony convictions, if any.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-502(2)(A) (emphasis added). 

Of course, during the December 29, 2015 hearing on May’s motion to reduce 

bond, the trial judge had heard testimony, and received evidence (none of which was 

controverted) about May’s prior felony convictions in Louisiana and Oklahoma, and

he had already decided, based on that evidence, May was a “habitual offender.” It 

was that determination which led the trial judge to warn May that the prosecutor 

might amend the information to charge him as a “habitual offender.” 

Thus, after the jury returned its guilty verdicts on each of the three substantive 

courts in the amended information, there was no reason for the trial judge to excuse 

the jury to conduct a hearing on May’s “prior felony convictions.” Instead, he 

simply asked the deputy prosecutor if she had “anything to present on behalf of the 

State.” The following colloquy then took place: 

Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor. . . . first, I would move to introduce . . . .a 

certified copy of defendant’s prior conviction for possession of 

a firearm, a felony; possession of imitation controlled 

dangerous substance, misdemeanor; and possession of drug 

paraphernalia, misdemeanor, out of the State of Oklahoma 

from 2014.26 

Judge: Ms. Watkins[?] 

Ms. Watkins: No objection. 

 26 A certified copy of this court record established that on May 14, 2014, “Jimmy Dewayne 

May”, appearing with his attorney, entered a guilty plea to “possession of a firearm,” a felony. 

May, Ark. Ct. App. No. CR-16-241, Tr. Rec. at 399-401; 403-404. 

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Judge: It will be received. 

. . . 

Prosecutor: Move to introduce . . . a certified copy of defendant’s prior 

conviction for possession of methamphetamine, felony, out of 

the State of Louisiana in 2011.27

Judge: It will be received. 

Ms. Watkins: No objection. 

Id. at 311-312. 

In May’s habeas Petition, he contends that Ms. Watkins provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel because she failed “to object to introduction of [May’s] outof-state convictions at the sentencing hearing when an in-camera hearing was not 

held to determine whether the alleged prior convictions warranted the habitual 

offender statute to be at play.” Doc. 3 at 12. To support this claim, May provides no 

facts suggesting the possible grounds Ms. Watkins had for objecting to certified 

copies of his prior felony convictions from Louisiana or Oklahoma. 

As May well knows, the trial judge did conduct a hearing, on December 29, 

2015, during which the deputy prosecutor admitted certified copies of May’s 

criminal convictions and testimony from his own mother admitting she knew he 

previously had been convicted of felonies in Louisiana in 2011 and Oklahoma in 

2014. While Ms. Watkins did not object to the admission into evidence of any of 

 27 A certified copy of this court record established that, on March 1, 2011, “Jimmy 

Dewayne May”, appearing with his attorney, entered a guilty plea to “possession of 

methamphetamine,” a felony. 

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those convictions, there is nothing in the record to suggest she had any plausible 

good faith basis for doing so.28 May sat through that entire hearing, heard the 

evidence presented regarding his two out-of-state felony convictions, and offered no 

testimony to challenge or rebut the deputy prosecutor’s evidence that he had been 

convicted of both of those offenses. At the end of that hearing, the trial judge warned 

May that, based on the evidence presented during the hearing, the State might amend 

the information to add a new count charging him as a “habitual offender.” On 

January 21, 2016, an amended information was filed adding Count 5, which charged 

May as a habitual offender who had more than one but fewer than four prior felony 

convictions. 

Having previously heard evidence sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that May was a habitual offender, there was no reason for the trial judge to 

excuse the jury and conduct what would have amounted to a second hearing on that 

issue. Thus, the trial judge was free to take the jury’s verdict and ask the prosecutor 

to introduce evidence of May’s two prior convictions, without conducting the 

hearing described in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-502(2)(A). 

May has come forward with no facts to support any aspect of his claim that 

Ms. Watkins provided ineffective assistance of counsel, either in connection with 

 28 As previously explained, the deputy prosecutor had provided Ms. Watkins with certified 

copies of those convictions six weeks before the bond reduction hearing. 

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37 

her failure to object to the certified copies of the out-of-state court records 

establishing his two prior felony convictions, beyond a reasonable doubt, or 

objecting to the trial court not conducting a second hearing to determine if May was 

a “habitual offender.” Finally, May has failed to demonstrate how this is a 

substantial claim. Accordingly, because his procedural default cannot be excused 

under the second prong of Martinez, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

should be dismissed, with prejudice. 

C. Because May’s Fourth Amendment Claim Was “Fully and 

Fairly Litigated” in the State Courts of Arkansas, This Court 

Is Now Barred From Considering It 

May challenges the now final decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals 

affirming his conviction based on the trial court’s alternative finding upholding the 

constitutionality of the search of May’s truck. 

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that “where the State 

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, 

the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas relief 

on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was 

introduced at his trial.” Id. at 482. Accord: Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1270 

(8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ([A] federal habeas court considering a state prisoner’s 

claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation should abstain from reviewing the 

state court records to determine if the state’s factual findings are fairly supported by 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 37 of 41
38 

the record as a whole . . . Rather, the proper inquiry is whether “the State has 

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of the claim.).

In Chavez v. Weber, 497 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2007), the Court held that, to 

successfully challenge a state court’s final resolution of a Fourth Amendment issue, 

a habeas petitioner must show that the state “provided no corrective procedures at 

all to address the alleged Fourth Amendment violation ... [or] provided a corrective 

mechanism, but was precluded from using that mechanism because of an 

unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process.” 

In this case, the trial court provided May with a full and fair evidentiary 

hearing on his motion to suppress. May attended the hearing with his attorney, and 

the trial court heard evidence from Officer Taylor, who arrested May and later 

searched his truck. Ms. Watkins cross-examined Officer Taylor, and May had the 

opportunity to testify, which he declined. Id. at 93-146. After the hearing, the trial 

court denied May’s motion to suppress. Id. at 28. Later, Ms. Watkins filed a motion 

to reconsider, which the trial court also denied. Id. at 34, 48. May then pursued a 

direct appeal of his conviction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, where he again 

challenged the constitutionality of the search of his truck. The Court rejected that 

claim and affirmed his conviction. May, 2016 Ark. App. 605, 509 S.W.3d. 

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Having been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth 

Amendment claim in the state courts’ of Arkansas, controlling federal case law bars 

this Court from considering that claim, which should be dismissed, with prejudice. 

D. May’s Claim That The Arkansas Court of Appeals Erred, In 

Its Application of State Law 

May argues that the Arkansas Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed his 

conviction, without addressing the merits of the trial court’s unchallenged

alternative finding that the search of May’s truck was constitutional. Respondent 

argues this claim is not cognizable under § 2254 because May is challenging how 

the Arkansas Court of Appeals construed state law. 

 Federal habeas relief is only available to correct violations of “the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

“‘[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law . . . [and] it is not 

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions.’” Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). 

On direct appeal, Mr. Dunagin did not challenge the trial court’s alternative 

finding that, even if Officer Taylor’s conduct in stopping and questioning May 

violated the Fourth Amendment, his subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant for 

May was an independent and intervening factor which led May to consent to the 

search of his truck. 

Case 5:18-cv-00053-BSM Document 41 Filed 03/13/20 Page 39 of 41
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals applied well-established state law to affirm 

May’s conviction, based on his failure to challenge the trial court’s alternative 

finding: “When an appellant fails to attack a circuit court’s independent, alternative 

basis for its ruling, we will not reverse.” May, 2016 Ark. App. 605, 4-5, 509 S.W.3d 

at 17 (citing Barber v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 120, at 5, 2015 WL 831231; Pugh v. 

State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002)). 

Finally, May complains that the Arkansas Court of Appeals erred in raising, 

sua sponte, the trial court’s alternative finding as its basis for affirming May’s 

conviction. Doc. 3 at 12. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Arkansas Court 

of Appeals’ raising that issue and using it as the basis for affirming May’s 

conviction, even though it was not raised by the parties in their Appellate Briefs. 

May’s challenge to the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ application of state law

to affirm his conviction on direct appeal does not state a cognizable claim for relief 

under § 2254. Accordingly, that claim should be dismissed, with prejudice. 

III. Conclusion 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. All of the habeas claims asserted by May in his § 2254 habeas Petition 

be DENIED and this case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. 

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2. A Certificate of Appealability be DENIED. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1)-(2); Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District 

Courts. 

 DATED THIS 13th day of March, 2020. 

 

___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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