Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01494/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01494-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hydentra HLP Int. Limited and Hydentra LP HLP General Partner Incorporated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sagan Limited, MXN Limited, Netmedia 

Services Incorporated, and David Koonar, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-16-01494-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs Hydentra HLP Int. Ltd. and Hydentra LP HLP General Partner 

Incorporated (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are companies organized under the laws of the 

Republic of Cyprus and the producers of pornographic material. In this case they assert 

claims for copyright infringement against several foreign entities and one individual 

associated with the website Porn.com. Defendants Sagan Limited; MXN Limited 

(“Cyberweb”); Netmedia Services, Inc.; and David Koonar are residents of Seychelles, 

Barbados, Canada, and Canada respectively. Defendants have filed three independent 

motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Docs. 35, 36, 

37. Additionally, Defendants Netmedia and Koonar move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims 

under Rule 12(b)(6). Docs. 36, 37. The motions are fully briefed. Docs. 35, 36, 37, 38, 

44, 45, 53, 60, 61. Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied because the issues 

have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid in the Court’s decision. See Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). For the reasons 

that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 

I. Background. 

 The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint and are assumed true for 

the purposes of this motion. 

 The website Porn.com is a video streaming website that generates revenue through 

premium memberships and advertising. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 39-40. Defendants Sagan, Cyberweb, 

Netmedia, and David Koonar are each owners and/or operators of Porn.com. Id., ¶ 38.1

 

 Porn.com receives a significant portion of its web traffic from the United States. 

Id., ¶ 47 (Plaintiffs allege 63.1 million visits per month, 21.43% of which are from the 

United States). Defendants sell advertising space on Porn.com in several forms, 

including banners and links in close proximity to videos, often targeted to the user’s 

location. Id. ¶ 48. Defendants advertise that “HD Premium members receive ‘Stunning 

High Definition Video,’ ‘Browse 100% Ad-Free,’ and can ‘Download videos, DVDs, and 

pictures to keep.’ In addition, Defendants advertise that Premium Members get access to 

the ‘best sites and studios in HD.’” Id., ¶ 52. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants engage in a practice called “scraping,” by which 

entities “aggregate on their own, user information and videos from other websites, then 

create a façade that those users exist on their own website and upload[] the videos to 

[their] websites directly.” Id., ¶¶ 58-59, 69. Scraping “allows a site to provide more high 

quality video content to their end users while maintaining the appearance that an army of 

third parties uploaded a vast library of professionally shot content in a concentrated 

period.” Id., ¶ 59. 

 In November 2015, Porn.com displayed four of Plaintiffs’ copyright registered 

works over four separate Porn.com URLs. Id., ¶ 65. The infringing videos were 

purported by Defendants to have been uploaded by third party internet users. Id. “Three 

 

1

 Defendants concede that Cyberweb and Sagan are owners/operators of Porn.com, but argue that Netmedia and David Koonar are unrelated entities with whom Cyberweb and Sagan merely happen to have a subcontractor relationship. Docs. 35 at 4-5. 

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of Plaintiffs’ videos posted on Porn.com are accompanied by a user name represented to 

be the uploader” of the video, but a search on Porn.com for these user names resulted in a 

report that “there is ‘No Such Member’ or user on Porn.com.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that 

this report supports the allegation that Defendants engage in “scraping” and that 

Defendants, not a purported third party, are liable for the infringing acts. Id., ¶¶ 60-74, 

90-92. Plaintiffs allege four counts: (1) copyright infringement, (2) contributory 

copyright infringement, (3) vicarious copyright infringement, and (4) inducement of 

copyright infringement. Id., ¶¶ 75-128. 

II. Personal jurisdiction. 

 “When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” 

Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). “Where, as here, the 

defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the 

motion to dismiss.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th 

Cir. 2011). “The plaintiff cannot ‘simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,’ 

but uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.” Id. (quoting 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

Court may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading that are contradicted by an 

affidavit, but factual disputes are resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. Id.

 Plaintiffs assert that each Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to 

Rule 4(k)(2). Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1-24; Docs. 38 at 5, 44 at 6, 45 at 11. Rule 4(k)(2) provides that 

a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) the claim arises under 

federal law, (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state court of general 

jurisdiction, and (3) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States 

Constitution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 

 Defendants concede that the first and second factors are satisfied. See, e.g., Doc. 

36 at 6. The first factor is satisfied because Plaintiffs assert claims of copyright 

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infringement under federal law. The second factor is satisfied because no Defendant 

“concede[s] to jurisdiction in another state.” Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., 

Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court need only 

assess the third factor. Id. at 462. 

 Analysis under the third factor – the due process analysis – “is nearly identical to 

traditional personal jurisdiction analysis with one significant difference: rather than 

considering contacts between the [defendant] and the forum state, we consider contacts 

with the nation as a whole.” Id. at 462. The question, then, is whether Defendants have 

sufficient minimum contacts with the United States so that maintenance of the suit here 

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A court must consider whether (1) the defendant 

purposely directed conduct at the forum, (2) the claim arises out of the defendant’s

forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and 

substantial justice. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1227-28. 

 In a previous case before this Court, involving the same plaintiffs’ counsel and 

Defendants, the Court conducted this Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdictional analysis as to Defendant 

Sagan. AMA Multimedia LLC v. Sagan Ltd., No. CV-16-01269-PHX-DGC, 2016 WL 

5946051, at *3-8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 13, 2016) (“AMA”). The Court found that Sagan engaged 

in purposeful direction at the United States, and that the Court’s exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Sagan was reasonable. Id. In their motion, Defendants directly address 

the AMA decision, and contend that in this instance, “different facts, additional facts, and 

a different Plaintiff compel a different result.” Doc. 35 at 14. Plaintiffs argue that 

“Defendants’ Motion is in bad faith, as this very Court already asserted personal 

jurisdiction over Porn.com owners/operators in [the AMA decision].” Doc. 38 at 2. 

 A. Purposeful Direction. 

 The first required element of specific jurisdiction, “purposeful direction,” is 

satisfied when a defendant (1) commits an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 

forum, (3) which causes foreseeable harm in the forum. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1227-28. 

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This test is sometimes referred to as the “effects test.” Id. The effects test does not 

“stand for the broad proposition that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum 

state always gives rise to specific jurisdiction.” Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods 

Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nor does 

the effects test mean that specific jurisdiction may be based solely on a defendant’s 

knowledge that the subject of his tortious activity resides in a particular state. See 

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). The Court must always focus on the 

“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation [which] is the essential 

foundation of in personam jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (citation omitted). “The proper question is not where the 

plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct 

connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. 

 1. Intentional Act. 

 Plaintiffs must show that Defendants committed an intentional act. Plaintiffs 

allege that the operators of Porn.com engaged in the “improper collection and distribution 

of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works” and “actively uploaded and/or distributed pirated 

copyrighted files and/or embedded code, enabling users of Porn.com to view copyrighted 

videos and images for free.” Doc. 1, ¶¶ 84, 86. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged 

in the process of “scraping” to conceal their nefarious acts. Id., ¶¶ 58-70. Plaintiffs cite 

the following specific instance in support of their claims: 

One of Plaintiff’s videos posted on Porn.com displays a user name that appears to be a member of Porn.com, complete with a dedicated profile 

page that includes a date of birth, and date the user joined Porn.com. Curiously, the Porn.com User has identical information found on a dedicated profile page on the website Xvideos.com. This information includes the same signup date to each site, and identical geographic location, and videos in identical order of presentation. Attached hereto as 

Exhibit C is a summary list of the Porn.com member and the comparative on Xvideos.com. 

Id., ¶ 70 (emphasis in original). 

 Unlike in AMA, where Sagan made no express argument denying that it engaged 

in the act of uploading of AMA’s pirated videos, Defendants categorically deny 

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Plaintiffs’ allegations and insist that no such conduct has occurred. See, e.g., Docs. 35 at 

7, 36 at 4, 37 at 4. Defendants attempt to show that the instance Plaintiffs describe – 

where the same user seemingly posted the same video on multiple sites on the same day – 

is not suspicious at all, asserting that “there exist services on the internet that create 

profiles on many tube sites at once and upload the same video to all those websites at the 

same time, which would explain Plaintiffs’ allegations.” Doc. 35 at 10. Defendants may 

well be correct, but that is a factual question premature for a decision. 

 Because factual disputes are resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor in this Rule 12(b)(2) 

motion, the Court will assume for purposes of this order that Defendants engaged in 

scraping to upload at least one of the infringing videos. This is a sufficient intentional 

act. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223. 

 2. Expressly Aimed at the Forum. 

 Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that the conduct of Defendants, as 

operators of Porn.com, is expressly aimed at the forum. In this instance, under a 

Rule 4(k)(2) analysis, the forum is the United States as a whole. See Holland, 485 F.3d 

at 461. 

Courts “have struggled with the question whether tortious conduct on a nationally 

accessible website is expressly aimed at any, or all, of the forums in which the website 

can be viewed.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229. “[M]aintenance of a passive website alone 

cannot satisfy the express aiming prong.” Id. But “operating a passive website in 

conjunction with ‘something more’ – conduct directly targeting the forum – is sufficient.” 

Id. In determining whether “something more” exists, the Ninth Circuit considers a 

number of factors, including the “interactivity of the defendant’s website,” “the 

geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial ambitions,” and “whether the defendant 

‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” Id. 

 A defendant expressly aims at a forum when he engages in conduct to exploit the 

forum market for commercial gain. See Id. In Mavrix, the Ninth Circuit conducted a 

purposeful direction analysis to evaluate whether the operator of a celebrity website 

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established sufficient contacts with the state of California when it published copyrighted 

celebrity photos online. Id. at 1228-1232. The court found that the website operator had 

engaged in express aiming at California. Id. The court noted that the website sold 

advertising space to third-party advertisers who targeted California and that a substantial 

number of hits to the website came from California. Id. The “most salient” fact in favor 

of express aiming was “that [the website] featured [the plaintiff’s] copyrighted photos as 

part of its exploitation of the California market for its own commercial gain.” Id. at 

1230. 

 Like the website operator in Mavrix, whose expressly-aimed conduct included 

making money based on advertising and website traffic from users in California, 

Defendants earn revenue based on advertising and website traffic in the United States. In 

fact, Plaintiffs allege that between January 2016 and June 2016, United States residents 

were the largest source of Porn.com users, comprising 23.26% of Porn.com’s viewers. 

Doc. 38-1 at 7, 53. German residents made up the second largest source at 7.99%. Id. 

Additionally, at the time of the alleged infringement, Porn.com was hosted by a 

Massachusetts company, Reflected Networks, and utilized a Content Delivery Network 

(“CDN”) comprised of severs located in Arizona and throughout the United States. Id. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Porn.com claims relationships with at least eleven United States 

content producers through its Content Partnership Program, including three Arizonabased companies – Oppenheit, LLC; XFC, Inc.; and Nomad Media, Inc. Id.; Doc. 32-5 at 

6, ¶ 28. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege Porn.com that contracts with United States 

advertisers to reach United States users with geo-targeted advertisements. Id. 

Defendants argue that a number of facts distinguish this case from AMA. 

Defendants assert that (1) maintenance of a website is not sufficient to establish express 

aiming at a forum; (2) Defendants do not engage in contracts with U.S. advertisers or 

advertising brokers and do not engage in “geolocation”; (3) only one Defendant, Sagan, 

contracts with a third party for server space for the Porn.com website, and that contract is 

with a company located in the Netherlands, not the United States; and (4) “to the extent 

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there are ‘content partners’ who provide videos that appear on the Porn.com website, it is 

not as a result of Defendants entering into agreements with such content partners, but 

rather the result of those content providers entering into agreements with [GIM].” 

Doc. 35 at 15-24. Defendants also contend that, to the extent the Court considered the 

fact that Porn.com has a registered agent for the receipt of takedown notices with the 

United States Copyright Office, such consideration was improper. Id. at 24-27. 

 Defendants’ arguments are largely unpersuasive. Defendants’ contentions (2), (3), 

and (4) – which claim that no Defendant contracts directly with United States entities – 

present factual arguments, not legal ones. While the Court “may not assume the truth of 

allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit,” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. 

Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977), factual disputes are resolved in 

the plaintiff’s favor, Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiffs allege that Porn.com’s servers are hosted in the United States (Doc. 38 at 9-10), 

that Porn.com contracts directly and through brokers with United States advertisers who 

tailor their ads to the end user’s geographic location in the United States (Doc. 1, ¶ 15), 

and that the United States market makes up a substantial portion of Porn.com’s traffic 

(Doc. 38 at 9-10; Doc. 38-1 at 7, ¶ 32), and these factual arguments must be settled in 

Plaintiffs favor at this stage. 

 Defendants’ first and fifth contentions, on the other hand, assert legal arguments. 

See Doc. 35 at 15-21, 24-27. Defendants first argue that maintenance of a website is 

insufficient to establish express aiming at a forum. Id. at 15. Defendants are correct. It 

is well settled law that maintenance of a website alone is not sufficient. See, e.g., 

Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); Cybershell, 

Inc. v. Cybershell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997). But the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Mavrix makes clear that “operating a passive website in conjunction with 

‘something more’ – conduct directly targeting the forum – is sufficient.” 647 F.3d at 

1229. Defendants do not address the factors in Mavrix that the Court considers when 

determining if “something more” exists, including the interactivity of the defendant’s 

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website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial ambitions, and whether the 

defendant individually targeted a plaintiff known to be a forum resident. Id. Nor do 

Defendants address how the Court should step around the fact that the “most salient” 

factor is “the fact that [the owner/operators of Porn.com] used [Plaintiffs’] copyrighted 

[content] as part of its exploitation of the [United States] market for its own commercial 

gain.” Id. 

 Instead, Defendants cite to numerous out-of-circuit decisions applying different 

rules and ultimately reach a different conclusion. These decisions are not relevant in 

light of the Ninth Circuit decision in Mavrix. See Doc. 35 at 15-21. 

 Defendants final argument is well taken. The fact a DMCA agent is registered in 

the United States should not be considered when evaluating contacts for personal 

jurisdiction. See Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920) 

(holding that “[u]nless a foreign corporation is engaged in business with the state, it is not 

brought within the state by the presence of its agents.”); King v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 

632 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is the corporate activities of the defendant, not 

just the mere designation of a statutory agent, that is helpful in determining whether the 

court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” and “the degree to which a defendant 

is present in the forum is an important factor in determining personal jurisdiction. The 

simple act of appointing a statutory agent is not, nor has it ever been, a magical litmus 

test.”). Even absent consideration of Porn.com’s DMCA agent in Michigan, however, 

the other contacts with the United States alleged by Plaintiffs are sufficient to establish 

expressing aiming at the forum by the operators of Porn.com. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 

1229. 

 3. Harm in the Forum. 

 This is where Plaintiffs’ personal jurisdiction argument fails. To establish 

purposeful direction, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants knew they were causing harm 

likely to be suffered in the United States. This “element is satisfied when defendant’s 

intentional act has ‘foreseeable effects’ in the forum,” and can even be established if “the 

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bulk of the harm occurs outside of the forum.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & 

Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010). “In order to establish specific 

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must also show that jurisdictionally significant harm was suffered 

in the forum state.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1231. 

 Plaintiffs devote a mere five sentences to this issue: 

While Hydentra is formed as a company in Cyprus, it operates from the U.S., employs U.S. citizens located in the U.S., pays U.S. taxes, and has 

registered its works with the U.S. Copyright Officer. See, Exhibit B at 

¶¶9-13. Hydentra specifically and intentionally markets its paid membership web sites to U.S. viewers. Id. In fact, a majority of Hydentra’s revenue is generated through U.S. members. Id. Hydentra’s videos infringed on Porn.com were displayed in the U.S. for free – which 

obviously deters viewers from paying Hydentra’s membership fees. Id. 

Doc. 38-1 at 15. Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of their argument that such 

contacts are sufficient to show that they, as Cyprus corporations, were harmed in the 

United States, much less that harm to them in this country was foreseeable. Plaintiffs cite 

to a declaration of Jon Krogman, who identifies himself as the president of Plaintiffs, but 

his declaration similarly lacks detail. He asserts without elaboration and without citation 

to any supporting source that Plaintiffs operate predominantly in California, employ 

United States citizens, pay taxes in the United States, actively promote their membership 

in the United States, and generate most of their revenue from this country. Doc. 38-2. 

Absolutely no details are provided. 

 Because this motion is decided on the papers, Plaintiffs need make only a prima 

facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Even still, the Ninth Circuit has explained that 

“mere ‘bare bones’ assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions 

unsupported by specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading burden.” 

See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Alperin v. Vatican 

Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 539 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Even though a plaintiff need make only a 

prima facie showing of jurisdiction at this stage in a litigation, the Holocaust Survivors’ 

bare-bones assertions that the Croatian Liberation Movement has been ‘active’ within the 

United States at some point and at least a few members have ties to this country are 

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insufficient for us to conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); 

Butcher’s Union Local No. 498, United Food and Commercial Workers v. SDC Inv., Inc., 

788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (“nonspecific conclusory statement” not enough to 

show minimum contacts). Plaintiffs provide only bare bones assertions of their business 

activities in the United States. Doc. 38-2. 

 The Court may, however, consider facts submitted by Defendants if they are 

uncontroverted. Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2012) (“we may consider 

the defendant’s undisputed factual assertions”); Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., 

Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (“facts put forward by the defendant become part of the 

mix only to the extent that they are uncontradicted”) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Here, Defendants present unrebutted evidence that seriously undermines 

Plaintiffs’ assertions of significant business operations in the United States. The address 

Plaintiffs provide on their United States Copyright Registration – 18034 Ventura Blvd., 

Suite 181, Encino, California – is nothing more than a mail drop belonging to “Encino 

Mail & More.” See Doc. 53 at 11; Doc. 53-3 at 2-9. Further, the California Secretary of 

State does not list any domestic or foreign entity in California operating under the name 

Hydentra. See Doc. 53-3 at 11-17. Nor is Hydentra registered as an entity in Arizona or 

Nevada. Id. And while Plaintiffs claim to pay U.S. taxes, Hydentra has had its 

registrations cancelled at least twice for failure to pay taxes. Its Texas registration was 

cancelled in 2010 for failing to pay taxes, and its Delaware registration was cancelled in 

2011 for the same reason. See Doc. 53-3 at 19-23. 

 What is more, as noted above, “a plaintiff must also show that jurisdictionally 

significant harm was suffered in the forum state.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1231. Plaintiffs 

say nothing of this requirement. They make no attempt to show the significance of the 

harm to them in the United States. This case concerns four of Plaintiffs’ videos shown in 

November 2015. Doc. 1, ¶ 65. The Court cannot conclude, however, that this constitutes 

jurisdictionally significant harm. Porn.com hosts some 500,000 videos. Doc. 35 at 3 n.4. 

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Plaintiffs do not provide a number for the videos they produce regularly, but note that 

they “produce new films monthly.” Doc. 38-2, ¶ 5. Without any further evidence, the 

Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants’ alleged actions 

foreseeably caused them jurisdictionally significant harm. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1231. 

 In short, unlike the plaintiff in AMA, which was a United States corporation based 

in Nevada, Plaintiffs are foreign corporations based in Cyprus. See Doc. 1. Plaintiffs 

have provided no more than bare bones assertions to support of the claim that they have 

operations in the United States or that the foreseeable harm to them in the United States 

was jurisdictionally significant. Accordingly, the Court finds that, even assuming that the 

operators of Porn.com intentionally acted in a manner targeting the United States, 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that foreseeable harm occurred to them in the 

forum. See Brayton, 606 F.3d at 1131. 

 B. Summary. 

 Plaintiffs have failed to show that foreseeable harm occurred in the forum as a 

result of Defendants’ conduct giving rise to this suit, and therefore have failed to satisfy 

the purposeful direction element of personal jurisdiction analysis. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d 

at 1227-28. Accordingly, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants and 

will grant the motions to dismiss. The Court need not address arguments that Netmedia 

and Koonar are not owners or operators of Porn.com, nor that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails 

to state a claim against them. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 35, 36, 37) for lack of personal 

jurisdiction are granted. 

 2. The clerk is directed to terminate this case. 

 Dated this 17th day of July, 2017. 

 

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