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Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 19, 2007 Decided May 25, 2007

No. 06-7004

ROSE RUMBER, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND

NATIONAL CAPITAL REVITALIZATION CORPORATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01170)

Elaine J. Mittleman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Paul J. Kiernan argued the cause for appellees the District

of Columbia and National Capital Revitalization Corporation.

With him on the brief were Linda Singer, Attorney General,

Office of Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd

S. Kim, Solicitor General, Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Solicitor

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General, and Donna M. Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney

General.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises out of the

District of Columbia’s decision to renovate the Skyland

Shopping Center area in Southeast Washington, D.C. Following

the enactment of the National Capital Revitalization Corporation

(“NCRC”) Eminent Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent

Domain Approval Amendment Act of 2004 (“2004 Skyland

Act”), 52 D.C. Reg. 859 (Dec. 29, 2004), several property

owners, tenants, and an employee of the Skyland Shopping

Center sued to enjoin the commencement of eminent domain

proceedings. They also sought a declaratory judgment that the

2004 Skyland Act violated the takings, due process, and equal

protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and that the

District of Columbia had exceeded its authority in enacting the

statute. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground

that the just compensation challenge was not ripe. Rumber v.

District of Columbia, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2005).

Because the district court did not address the public use claim,

we reverse that part of the dismissal and remand the case to the

district court.

I.

In 2004 and 2005, the Council of the District of Columbia

enacted a series of laws pertaining to the eminent domain power

of NCRC with regard to the Skyland Shopping Center area (“the

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1 See National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent

Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval

Emergency Amendment Act of 2004, 51 D.C. Reg. 5967 (May 21,

2004); National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent Domain

Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval Congressional

Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2004, 51 D.C. Reg. 8983

(Aug. 2, 2004); National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent

Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval

Temporary Amendment Act of 2004, 51 D.C. Reg. 6743 (June 23,

2004).

Skyland Acts”).1 The 2004 Skyland Act, which authorized

NCRC to exercise eminent domain power to acquire the Skyland

Shopping Center, took effect on April 5, 2005. 

On July 13, 2004, several property owners, tenants, and an

employee of the Skyland Shopping center (“appellants”) filed a

complaint in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia against the District of Columbia and NCRC

(hereinafter collectively “the District”). Attempting to prevent

the exercise of eminent domain at the Skyland Shopping Center,

they alleged, in their third amended complaint, that the

enactment and execution of the Skyland laws violated the

takings, due process, and equal protection provisions of the Fifth

Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 105, 114, 121, 130, 135. Although

the complaint included a just compensation challenge, a central

allegation in the complaint, similar to that in Kelo v. City of New

London, 545 U.S. 469, 476-77 (2005), was that the taking would

not serve a public purpose. See Compl. ¶¶ 106, 114.

The district court granted the District’s motion to dismiss

the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Relying on Williamson County Reg’l

Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87, 194

(1985), in which the Supreme Court held that a just

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compensation claim is not ripe until a government entity has

made a final decision with regard to the property at issue and the

plaintiff has sought compensation through State procedures, the

district court held that its review of Fifth Amendment challenges

was premature “until [] a taking occurs, and [] [the District of

Columbia] provides, or fails to provide, compensation.”

Rumber, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 5. If just compensation was

provided, the district court concluded that there would be no real

controversy among the parties. Id. at 5-6. The district court

noted, in dismissing the complaint as unripe, that if

condemnation proceedings were commenced, appellants would

have an opportunity to raise their constitutional challenges in the

District of Columbia courts. Id. at 5. 

Appellants appeal on the ground that Williamson County is

inapplicable to their physical takings claim.

II.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides, in

relevant part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment thus prohibits

takings without just compensation and takings for a private

purpose. A taking for a private purpose is unconstitutional even

if the government provides just compensation. See Haw. Hous.

Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 

In treating appellants’ claims under the Fifth Amendment

as just compensation claims, the district court overlooked their

public use claim. The first claim in appellants’ third amended

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complaint alleged, in relevant part, that “[t]he Skyland Acts

violate the Fifth Amendment by permitting the taking of

plaintiffs’ property without a valid identified public use” and

that “[b]ecause of their speculative nature, the projected

purposes of economic benefit, alleviating unemployment, and

revitalizing the economic base of the community do not

constitute [a] public use.” Id. ¶¶ 106, 108. The second claim

alleged that “[t]he planned taking is for a private use and not for

a public use.” Id. ¶ 114. The complaint also alleged that the

Skyland Acts authorize the taking of property “for the advantage

of other private interests” and the taking of more property than

is “needed to accomplish the claimed public use.” Id. ¶¶ 109,

110.

The circuit courts of appeals to address the issue have held

that Williamson County’s ripeness requirements do not apply to

a public use claim. See Theodorou v. Measel, 53 F. App’x 640,

643 (3d Cir. 2002); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d

758, 766-67 (6th Cir. 2000); McKenzie v. City of White Hall,

112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Penman, 75

F.3d 1311, 1320-21 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Samaad v.

City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 936-37 (5th Cir. 1991). But see

Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000).

In Montgomery, the Sixth Circuit explained: 

Because the [plaintiffs’] claim is that their property has

been taken for a strictly private use, state eminent

domain proceedings are unnecessary to determine

whether there has been a constitutional violation.

Private-use takings . . . are unconstitutional regardless

of whether just compensation is paid. . . . Requiring a

plaintiff to wait before suing in federal court, when her

sole claim is that she was dispossessed of property for

a private use, would have only one apparent purpose –-

to force the plaintiff to vet her claims in state

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proceedings . . . before the claims can be aired in

federal court. But forcing the plaintiff to pursue state

“remedial” procedures would be an exhaustion

requirement, a requirement that Williamson County

explicitly does not impose. 

Montgomery, 226 F.3d at 766-67. The one circuit taking a

different view interprets Williamson County very broadly. See

Forseth, 199 F.3d at 369-70 n.8 (citing Covington Court, Ltd. v.

Village of Oak Brook, 77 F.3d 177, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1996)).

This court has not addressed whether Williamson County applies

to public use claims. We find the reasoning of the majority of

the circuits persuasive because the Fifth Amendment Takings

Clause protects two distinct rights and Williamson County does

not explicitly require exhaustion for all Fifth Amendment

claims. We, therefore, hold that the ripeness requirements of

Williamson County do not apply to public use claims under the

Fifth Amendment. Because appellants challenged the Skyland

Acts as a “taking [] for a private use and not for a public use,”

Compl. ¶ 114; see also id. ¶¶ 106, 109, we reverse the dismissal

of the complaint with respect to the public use claim. 

Appellants also raised due process and equal protection

claims. Even the circuit court of appeals interpreting

Williamson County very broadly has recognized that bona fide

equal protection claims arising from land use decisions may be

made independently of a takings claim and not be subject to

Williamson County ripeness requirements. See Forseth, 199

F.3d at 370 (citing Hager v. City of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865,

869-70 (7th Cir. 1996)). That court also has taken the position

that awarding the types of relief appellants have requested — an

order declaring the Skyland Acts unconstitutional and injunctive

relief barring exercise of eminent domain power — “would

render Williamson County’s holding nugatory.” Patel v. City of

Chicago, 383 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2004); see id. at 573.

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Here, the District maintains that appellants’ allegations

regarding the 2004 Skyland Act — claims that it severely

reduced the value of their property and leases, Compl. ¶ 115,

placed their livelihoods at risk, id. ¶ 122, and specifically

targeted and affected plaintiffs and their businesses and

property, id. ¶ 117 — state a takings claim rather than an equal

protection or due process claim. See Patel, 383 F.3d at 573. In

their reply brief, appellants do not explicitly challenge the

District’s characterization of their due process and equal

protection claims. Although appellants maintain that in view of

the commencement of condemnation proceedings in the District

of Columbia courts their claims are ripe, appellants’ focus is on

their public use claim. We therefore remand only their public

use claim to the district court. 

Finally, appellants’ challenge to the authority of the District

of Columbia is without merit. Congress has delegated

legislative powers to the District government. See D.C.CODE §§

1-203.02, 1-204.04(b), 16-1311; District of Columbia v. John R.

Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 110 (1953); Marijuana Policy

Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Consequently, the District government’s delegation of eminent

domain authority to the NCRC does not involve an improper

redelegation, particularly as the statute establishing NCRC, see

D.C. CODE §§ 2-1219.01-1219.29, requires the D.C. Council to

approve any eminent domain action, see id. § 2-1219.19(b); see

generally 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03[4]. 

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of appellants’ public

use claim as unripe and remand that part of the case to the

district court. Upon remand, the district court should address the

District’s other grounds for dismissal of the complaint, including

the standing of individual appellants, res judicata as may arise

from the condemnation proceedings in the District of Columbia

courts, and, in its discretion, abstention.

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