Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02630/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02630-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332pr Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIZABETH ROWLAND,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:13-cv-02630-GPC-DHB

ORDER:

1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Dkt. No. 11.]

2) VACATING MOTION HEARING

vs.

PARIS LAS VEGAS, CAESARS

ENTERTAINMENT OPERATING

COMPANY, INC., and DOES 1 to 25,

inclusive,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Elizabeth Rowland’s

(“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by

Specially Appearing Defendants Caesars Entertainment Corporation and Paris Las

Vegas Operating Company, LLC . (Dkt. No. 11.) The parties have fully briefed the

1

The motion states that it is filed by Paris Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC, 1

(erroneously named herein as Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC). As discussed below, the

Court addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in

relation to the Defendants named in the FAC.

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motion. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.) The Court findsthe motion suitable for disposition without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Upon review of the moving

papers, admissible evidence, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendants’

Motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This action arises out of Plaintiff’s May 2013 visit to the Paris Las Vegas Hotel

and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada (“Paris Las Vegas Hotel”). (Dkt. No. 8, “FAC” ¶¶

10, 15.) Plaintiff alleges slipping upon a “clear filmy substance” substance on the tile

flooring at the Paris Las Vegas Hotel on May 16, 2013, causing her to fall and sustain

personal injuriesincluding a broken hip. (FAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges her injuries “will

result in some permanent disability to her,” and that the injuries “have caused, and will

continue to cause, Plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.”

(FAC ¶ 20.) 

II. Procedural History

On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff Elizabeth Rowland (“Plaintiff”) filed a

complaint against Paris Las Vegas and Caesars Entertainment Operating Company,Inc.

in California Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 3 “Compl.”) On March 26, 2014,

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging one cause of action for

negligence. (Dkt. No. 8, FAC.) The FAC identifies Defendant “Paris Las Vegas,” upon

information and belief, as “Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC.” (FAC ¶ 4.) On June

26, 2014, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss or transfer venue pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3). (Dkt. No. 11.)

III. Jurisdictional Allegations

Plaintiff is a resident of the County of San Diego, California. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation operates the Harrah’s Rincon

Hotel and Casino in Valley Center, California and is the 100% direct owner of

Defendant Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant

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Caesars Entertainment Corporation started an “industry revolutionizing” Total Rewards

loyalty program in 1997 designed to market cross-property play to a “large and

recurring customer base in California” between the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel and Casino

in Valley Center, California and the Paris Las Vegas Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.

(FAC ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff further alleges frequenting the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel and Casino “at

all times herein mentioned, and particularly for the last few calendar years.” (FAC ¶

13.) According to Plaintiff, she was and is a member of the Total Rewards loyalty

program, earning “points” toward the program by staying and/or gambling at the

Harrah’s Rincon Hotel and Casino. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges receiving frequent

announcements, advertisements, and offers to redeem Total Reward loyalty program

points at Caesars hotel and casino properties, including the Paris Las Vegas Hotel and

Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the room she stayed at in the Paris

Las Vegas Hotel and Casino on May 16, 2013 was given to her on a complimentary

basis, arranged for by Joseph Izidoro, Executive Casino Host at Harrah’s Rincon Hotel

and Casino in Valley Center, California. (FAC ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 13-3, Holcombe Decl.

¶ 5; Dkt. No. 13-4, Holcombe Decl. ¶ 5.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must be

authorized under both state and federal law. St. Ventures, LLC v. KBA Assets &

Acquisitions, LLC, 1:12-CV-01058-LJO, 2013 WL 1749901 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23,

2013). California’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of due process set

by the United States Constitution. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. Thus, “the

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” Mavrix

Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132

S. Ct. 1101 (2012).

Due process requires that a defendant “must have ‘certain minimum contacts’

with the relevant forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

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‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at

1223 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

The type of minimum contacts required to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant may be “specific” or “general” in nature. A court may have

general jurisdiction over a defendant where “the defendant’s contacts with the forum

state are so pervasive as to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the person in all

matters.” St. Ventures, 2013 WL 1749901 at *3. Specific jurisdiction, on the other

hand, “arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum giving rise to the subject

of the litigation” and only applies to the case at issue. Id.

When a defendant movesto dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff

has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z

Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671-72 (9th Cir. 2012). Each defendant’s contacts

with the forum state must be considered individually, unless the plaintiff establishes

the defendant’s actions are reasonably attributable to the other defendants. SDS Korea

Co., Ltd. v. SDS USA, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (citing

Indiana Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Standard of Lynn, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 743, 750-51

(C.D. Cal. 1995)). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only

make a “‘prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to

dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006)). 

Under this prima facie burden of proof, the plaintiff need only establish facts,

through admissible evidence, that if true would support personal jurisdiction over the

defendant. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9thCir. 1995) (citing Data Disc,

Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). Uncontroverted

allegations in the complaint must be taken astrue. AT & T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles

Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the court may not assume the

truth of such allegations if they are contradicted by affidavit. Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d

at 1284. All disputed facts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Washington Shoe,

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704 F.3d at 671-72; see also AT & T Co., 94 F.3d at 588 (“[C]onflicts between the

facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.”)

(quoting WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989)).

DISCUSSION

I. Proper Defendants

The Court first notes that although the FAC includes allegations against

“Caesars Entertainment Corporation” and “Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC,” the

caption lists Defendants as “Paris Las Vegas” and “Caesars Entertainment

Operating Company, Inc.” (Dkt. No. 8.) Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

10(a), every pleading must have a caption that names all the parties to the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the question of

whether a defendant is properly named in a case is not resolved by merely reading

the caption of a complaint. Rather, a party may be properly in a case if the

allegations in the body of the complaint make it plain that the party is intended as a

defendant.” Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1085

(9th Cir. 1983) (citing Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959)).

Accordingly, the Court considers the present motion to dismiss or transfer venue in

relation to Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Caesars Entertainment

Corporation (“Caesars”), and Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC (“Paris Las Vegas

Propco”). 

In addition, Defendants’ counsel submits a declaration acknowledging that,

subsequent to Plaintiff’s filing of the FAC, “Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC” has

been dissolved and has transferred ownership of the Paris Las Vegas Hotel to an

entity named “Paris Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC.” (Dkt. No. 11-3, Roberts

Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendants’ counsel declares that she provided this information to

Plaintiff’s counsel on April 29, 2014, but that “ROWLAND’s counsel took no

action to name the correct owner of Paris Las Vegas.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).

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Accordingly, Defendants’ motion indicates that it is filed by “Paris Las Vegas

Operating Company, LLC (erroneously named herein as Paris Las Vegas Propco,

LLC). (Dkt. No. 11.) 

However, the Parties have not, by motion or joint motion, moved to amend

the FAC or the case caption or to substitute Paris Las Vegas Operating Company

into the present action as a successor-in-interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). Unless and

until a proper motion is made by any Party to substitute Paris Las Vegas Operating

Company, LLC into the present action, the Court addresses the present motion in

relation to Defendant Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC as the owner/operator of the

Paris Las Vegas Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada at the time in question as

named and alleged in Plaintiff’s TAC. (See Dkt. No. 8, FAC ¶ 4.)

II. Requests for Judicial Notice and Objections to Evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that judicial notice may be taken of

adjudicative facts. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). A judicially noticed fact must be one

not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the

territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.

See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “Since the effect of taking judicial notice under Rule 201

is to preclude a party from introducing contrary evidence and in effect, directing a

verdict against him as to the fact noticed, the fact must be one that only an

unreasonable person would insist on disputing.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d

1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice &

Procedure: Evidence § 5104 at 485 (1977 & Supp. 1994)).

A. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of seven documents: various filings with the

Securities and Exchange Commission; California Gambling Control Commission

licensing documents; the U.S. District Court opinion in Day v. Harrah’s Hotel &

Casino Las Vegas, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116817; the declaration of Duane D.

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Hollaway filed in Case No. 11cv2567 JLS (POR) in this district ; and the complaint 2

filed in Case No. 11-90003-LA in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District

of California. (Dkt. Nos. 13-1, 13-2.) The content of records of administrative

bodies are proper subjects for judicial notice under Rule 201(d), Interstate Natural

Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953), as are court filings

and other matters of public record, Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442

F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Since Defendant does not dispute judicial notice

of Plaintiff’s documents, and the documents are properly subject to judicial notice,

the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice.

However, although the Court takes notice of the filing of the respective

documents, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the declaration, court

filings, or public records for the truth of the matters asserted therein. See In re Bare

Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Lit., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 

B. Defendant’s objections to evidence

Defendant raises numerous objections to Plaintiff’s declarations and

supporting exhibits, and moves to strike the declarations and exhibits in their

entirety. (Dkt. Nos. 14-1, 14-2, 14-3.) The Court has reviewed Defendant’s

evidentiary objections and declines to discuss each objection individually. See Doe

v. Starbucks, Inc., No. 08-0582 AG (Cwx), 2009 WL 5183773 at *1 (“[I]t is often

unnecessary and impractical for a court to methodically scrutinize each objection

and give a full analysis of each argument raised. This is especially true when many

of the objections are boilerplate recitations of evidentiary principles or blanket

objections without analysis applied to specific items of evidence.”); see also

Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033 (C.D. Cal.

Although the request for judicial notice states that the declaration was filed in 2

this case, (see Dkt. No. 13-1, Request for Judicial Notice at 2), the Court notes that the

declaration footer indicatesthe declaration wasfiled inCase No. 11-cv-2567. (Dkt. No.

13-2, Ex. 6.) In any case, the declaration is a duplicate of the judicially noticed

declaration submitted by Defendant Caesars in support of its motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. (Dkt. No. 3-4.)

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2013) (same); Capitol Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200

n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (same). Except as specifically discussed below, the Court

overrules the objections and DENIES Defendant’s motions to strike. (Dkt. Nos. 14-

1, 14-2, 14-3.) 

III. Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff asserts the Court may exercise both general and specific jurisdiction

over each Defendant, whereas Defendants contend personal jurisdiction does not

exist under either standard. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has met her burden of making a prima facie showing of this Court’s

personal jurisdiction over Defendants Paris Las Vegas Propco, LLC and Defendant

Caesars Entertainment Company. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. 

A. General Jurisdiction

General personal jurisdiction enables a court to hear cases unrelated to the

defendant’s forum activities if the defendant has “substantial” or “continuous and

systematic” contacts with the forum state. Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks,

Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1986); see also CollegeSource, Inc. v.

AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A court may assert

general jurisdiction over foreign [sister-state or foreign-country] corporations to

hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum

state.”) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,

2851 (2011)). The standard is an “exacting” one, considering the “[l]ongevity,

continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence, and integration into the

state’s regulatory or economic markets.” CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1074

(citing Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).

Ordinarily, “[t]he existence of a relationship between a parent company and

its subsidiaries is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent on

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the basis of the subsidiaries’ minimum contacts with the forum.” Doe v. Unocal

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a subsidiary’s contacts may be

imputed to the parent where the subsidiary acts as either the “alter ego” or “general

agent” of the parent. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th

Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 926-28. 

The alter ego test is predicated upon a showing of parental control over the

subsidiary, and is satisfied when (1) “there is such a unity of interest and ownership

that the separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist,” and (2) “failure to

disregard their separate identities would result in fraud or injustice.” Bauman, 644

F.3d at 920. The agency test, on the other hand, is predicated upon the subsidiary’s

special importance to the parent corporation. Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928. “Our

starting point for the sufficient importance prong is that a subsidiary acts as an agent

if the parent would undertake to perform the services itself if it had no

representative at all to perform them.” Bauman, 644 F.3d at at 921 (emphasis in

original). The agency test also requires the parent corporation to maintain a level of

control over its subsidiary. Id. at 922-23. However, the parent corporation need not

actually exercise control over its subsidiary, as long as the parent corporation has

the right to do so. Id.

To support her claim that Defendants are subject to the Court’s general

jurisdiction, Plaintiff argues Defendants advertise and directly solicit California

residents via the Caesars “Total Rewards” loyalty program. (Dkt. No. 13 at 3.)

Plaintiff further argues Caesars earns fees through management of Harrah’s Rincon

in California, and that Caesars has 100% unity of interest and singular personality

with its California subsidiary, HCAL, LLC, which holds a management agreement

with the Rincon Tribe in California to manage the Rincon Hotel and Casino. (Id. at

5-6.)

As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff’s response treats Caesars

Entertainment Corporation, Paris Las Vegas Propco, and Paris Las Vegas Operating

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Company as one entity for the purposes of arguing that Defendants are subject to

this Court’s general personal jurisdiction. Absent sufficient evidence that the

corporate entities are agents or alter egos of each other, the Court declines to do the

same.

As to Paris Las Vegas Propco, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a basis for

general personal jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff alleges Paris Las Vegas Propco

participated in the Caesars Total Rewards program and advertised in California,

evidence of marketing to forum residents, without more, is insufficient to support

general jurisdiction. See CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1075 (“Marketing to

forum residents, at least where such marketing does not result in substantial and

continuous commerce with the forum, does not support general jurisdiction.”);

Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381-82 (no general jurisdiction

despite advertising in the local media, brochure mailings, payment of commission to

forum travel agents, and the conducting of promotional seminars in the forum state). 

As to Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation, Plaintiff’s argument for

general personal jurisdiction relies on imputing the actions of Caesars’ subsidiaries

onto the parent corporation. Plaintiff argues HCAL, LLC is a subsidiary of Caesars

Entertainment Corporation, and that HCAL, LLC has a management contract with

the Rincon Tribe to operate the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel and Casino in California.

Plaintiff further argues that Caesars has published, in marketing and public outreach

materials, statements regarding Caesars Entertainment Corporation’s substantial

business and investment in California. (Dkt. No. 13 at 4-6.) 

In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants proffer the declaration of

Richard Appel, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel, Labor and Employment

for Caesars Entertainment Corporation, stating that Caesars Entertainment

Corporation “does not have offices in California; does not own property in

California; does not have employees in California; does not conduct business in

California; and, does not have an agent for service of process in California.” (Dkt.

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No. 11-2, Appel Decl. ¶ 2.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to introduce sufficient evidence

linking Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation to the actions of its

subsidiaries in California under either an alter ego or agency theory. Plaintiff has

introduced no evidence that Caesars Entertainment Corporation controls its

subsidiaries that do business in California, or that a unity of interests or ownership

exists between Caesars Entertainment Corporation and its subsidiaries.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing

that Defendants Paris Las Vegas Propco or Caesars Entertainment Corporation are

subject to general personal jurisdiction in California.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiff also claims this Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction

over Defendants. (Dkt. No. 13 at 6.) The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to

determine whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to

specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must [a] purposefully direct his

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident

thereof; or [b] perform some act by which he purposefully avails

himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Washington Shoe, 704 F.3d at 672; see also Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th

Cir. 1987). In analyzing whether the assertion of specific jurisdiction over a given

defendant would be justified, the plaintiff has the burden of satisfying the first two

prongs of the test. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th

Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff does so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present

a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id.

//

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1. Purposeful Direction

The Supreme Court has held that due process permits the exercise of jurisdiction

over a defendant, even in the absence of physical contacts with the forum, so long as

the defendant “purposefully direct[s]” its activities atresidents of a forum. Burger King

Corp. v. Rudezewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). A “purposeful direction” analysis,

most often used in casessounding in tort, requires “evidence of the defendant’s actions

outside the forum state that are directed at the forum.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit applies an

“effects” test to determine whether there has been purposeful direction, analyzing

whether the defendant has been alleged to have: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2)

expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely

to be suffered in the forum state.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d

1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010)). The “express aiming” requirement “issatisfied when

‘the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff

whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.’” Id. (citing Dole Food

Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In support of a finding that Defendants purposefully directed activity toward

California, Plaintiff argues Defendants purposefully “bombard California residents

with advertisements and solicitations to visit the Paris Las Vegas Casino & Resort,

Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort, and Defendant Casears other properties.” (Dkt. No.

13 at 7) (citing Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. Ex. A). According to Plaintiff, after

California residents stay at Paris Las Vegas Hotel, a Caesars casino host personally

contacts the guest to invite them back for another stay. (Id.) (citing Dkt. No. 13-4,

Holcombe Decl. Ex. C). Furthermore, Plaintiff and her travel companion Carol

Holcombe declare that Defendants maintain and participate in a “Total Rewards”

program, under which Plaintiff and Holcombe accumulated “Total Rewards” points at

the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel and Casino in California and redeemed those points for

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complimentary accommodations at the Paris Las Vegas Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.

(See Dkt. Nos. 13-3, 13-4.) 

As to Defendant Paris Las Vegas Propco, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met

her burden of establishing facts that, if true, would support personal jurisdiction over

the Defendant. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has

introduced evidence that the Paris Las Vegas Hotel participates in the “Total Rewards”

program and advertisements, which encourage customers to accumulate “Total

Rewards” points by visiting participating establishments in California and to redeem

them at other participating hotels and casinos, including the Paris Las Vegas Hotel and

Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Plaintiff’s

uncontroverted allegations establish that Paris Las Vegas Propco “benefitted from the

Total Rewards loyalty program’s marketing and technological capabilities relating to

Defendant Caesars’ nationwide casino network, including the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel

& Casino in Valley Center, California.” (Dkt. No. 8, FAC ¶ 6.) As alleged in the FAC,

Paris Las Vegas Propco’s involvement in the “Total Rewards” program enabled it to

“efficiently market its products to a large and recurring customer base in California,

and successfully drive cross-property play from the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel & Casino

to Defendant Paris Las Vegas.” (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges she frequently

received incentives to seek out the Paris Las Vegas Hotel & Casino and other Casears

properties as a California resident who accumulated “Total Rewards” points by

frequenting the Harrah’s Rincon Hotel & Casino in California. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s

uncontroverted allegations and declarations therefore establish that Defendant Paris

Las Vegas Propco participated in the Caesars “Total Rewards” program, “expressly

aiming” to solicit business from California residents such as Plaintiff who frequent

California hotels and casinos. 

In addition, Plaintiff has introduced evidence that the Paris Las Vegas Hotel

granted complimentary accommodation to Plaintiff and Carol Holcombe for the hotel

stay at issue in this case. (Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Dkt. No. 13-4,

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Holcombe Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) According to Plaintiff, a Casino Host at the Harrah’s Rincon

Hotel and Casino in Valley Center, California arranged for the complimentary room at

the Paris Las Vegas Hotel for the visit at issue in this case. (Dkt. No. 8, FAC ¶ 14.)

Combined with Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the frequent offers Plaintiff received

to redeem Total Reward loyalty program “points” at Paris Las Vegas Hotel & Casino

and other Caesars hotel and casino properties, (id. ¶ 13), the Court findsthat Plaintiff’s

evidence and uncontroverted allegations are sufficient to make a prima facie showing

that Defendant Paris Las Vegas Propco purposefully directed its activities toCalifornia

and California residents who, like Plaintiff and Ms. Holcombe, patronize Harrah’s

Rincon and participate in the Total Rewards Program. See Day v. Harrah’s Hotel &

Casino Las Vegas, No. 10cv1746-WQH-JMA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116817 at *14-

15 (S.D. Cal. 2010).

As to Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation, Plaintiff’s uncontroverted

allegations in her First Amended Complaint state that Caesars started and continues to

operate the Total Rewardsloyalty program. (Dkt. No. 8, FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has further

submitted a declaration stating that she received and continues to receive

advertisements and solicitations fromCaesars Entertainment Corporation encouraging

Plaintiff to use the Total Rewards points she accumulated in California at other hotels

within the Total Rewards program, including the Paris Las Vegas Hotel and Casino.

(Dkt. No. 13-3 ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A.) 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s submitted email solicitations “clearly show the

advertisements were unrelated to California and the alleged injuries in this case”

because the emails “do not reference California [or] provide any facts indicating that

they were targeted at California residents. (Dkt. No. 14 at 6) (citing Circle Click Media

LLC v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 12-04000 SC, 2013 WL 57861 *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,

2013)). InCircle Click Media LLC, the court found that an general advertisement email

sent generically to “award@circleclick.com” which made no reference to California

and was sent after the plaintiff’s injury could not demonstrate that the defendant had

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expressly aimed activities at California. 2013 WL 57861 at *4. The Court finds the

present case distinguishable. 

First, the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s submitted emailsshowsthat at least some

of the emails Plaintiff received were directed “EXCLUSIVELY FOR: ELIZABETH

ROWLAND,” stating her total rewards number. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland

Decl. Ex. A at 2, 5, 8, 10, 15) (emphasis in original). In addition, the emails were

addressed to Plaintiff at her personal email address. (Id. ¶ 4.) Unlike the general

advertisement email at issue in Circle Click Media LLC, the emails at issue here were

“expressly aimed” at Plaintiff, a California resident. 

Furthermore, the Court notes that Defendants argue Plaintiff’s submitted emails

could not have enticed Plaintiff to visit the Paris Las Vegas Hotel for the visit at issue

because “the solicitations relate to events dated one year after her fall in May 2013.”

(Dkt. No. 14 at 6) (emphasis in original). However, Plaintiff’s declaration states in the

present tense that she constantly receives said advertisements as a Total Rewards

member, (Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. ¶ 4), and indicates that the submitted

advertisements and solicitations attached to her declaration are illustrative rather than

exclusive. (Id. ¶ 4) (“Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of some

of the advertisements and solicitations I received via email from Caesars.”) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, given: (1) Plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations regarding

Caesars’ operation of the Total Rewards Program; and (2) Plaintiff’s declaration

evidence regarding the advertisements Plaintiff received at her personal email address

directed “exclusively” to her as a California resident, the Court finds that, as with

Defendant Paris LasVegas Propco, Plaintiff’s evidence and uncontroverted allegations

are sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Defendant Caesars Entertainment

Corporation purposefully directed activities to California and California residents. See

Day, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116817 at *14-15.

2. Arising out of Forum-related Activities

To be sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction, Defendants’ “purposefully

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directed” forum-related activity must have caused Plaintiff’s alleged injury. Omeluk

v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] claim arises

out of the forum-related activities if it would not have happened but for the forumrelated activities.”). Plaintiff submits a declaration stating that she and her friends

“selected Paris Las Vegas for [their] accommodations in May 2013 because we are

members of Total Rewards, and because of the advertisements and solicitations we

constantly receive from Caesars.” (Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. ¶ 4.) Furthermore,

Plaintiff’s submitted declarationsstate that Plaintiff wasinjured when she stayed at the

complimentary room provided to her by Paris Las Vegas Hotel due to her and Ms.

Holcombe’s membership in the Total Rewards program. (Dkt. Nos. 13-3, 13-4.)

Defendants arguePlaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of case-related

contacts because Rowland admits she “went to Las Vegas to attend a wedding and

happened to stay while there at Paris Las Vegas.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 7) (citing Dkt. No.

5-1 ¶ 5). As an initial matter, Defendants’ cited Declaration of Elizabeth Rowland does

not appear to support Defendants’ characterization. Furthermore, for the purposes of

deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists, conflicts between

the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the Plaintiff’s favor.

AT & T Co., 94 F.3d at 588. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s declarations

present a sufficient prima facie showing that Plaintiff would not have stayed at Paris

Las Vegas Hotel and Casino for the visit at issue in this case but for Defendants’

forum-related activities. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th

Cir. 1990); see also Day, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116817 at *15. 

3. Reasonableness

As Plaintiff has made a prima facie case for specific personal jurisdiction, the

burden shifts to Defendants to present a “compelling case” that this Court’s exercise

of jurisdiction over Defendants would not be reasonable. CollegeSource, Inc. v.

AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). “For jurisdiction to be

reasonable, it must comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Bancroft & Masters,

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Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burger King,

471 U.S. at 476). In making this determination, courts consider:

[1] the extent of purposeful interjection, [2] the burden on the defendant

to defend the suit in the chosen forum, [3] the extent of conflict with the

sovereignty of the defendant’s state, [4] the forum state’s interest in the

dispute, [5] the most efficient forum for judicial resolution of the dispute,

[6] the importance of the chosen forum to the plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief, and [7] the existence of an alternative

forum.” 

Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th Cir. 1988) (numbers added)

(citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442

(9th Cir. 1987)). 

Defendants argue thisCourt’s exercise ofjurisdiction over Defendants would not

be reasonable because Defendants do not have offices, have employees, own property,

conduct business, or have an agent for service of process in California. (Dkt. No. 14

at 8.) Defendants further argue the injuries sustained by Plaintiff are unrelated to

California and “occurred exclusively in the State of Nevada.” (Id.) 

TheCourt findsthat these argumentsfall short of presenting a “compelling case”

that this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants would not be reasonable.

First, the Court has found that Defendants purposefully directed activities toward the

forum state. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that once a Plaintiff shows purposeful

direction, the “extent of purposeful interjection” is no longer given any weight. Shute,

897 F.2d at 386 (citing Corporate Inv. Business Brokers v. Melcher, 824 F.2d 786, 790

(9th Cir. 1987)). Second, although Defendants would prefer to litigate in Nevada,

Defendants have not made a showing that the burden of defending this suit in

California would be overwhelming. The Court finds that it would be at least as

burdensome for Plaintiff to pursue this action in Nevada as it would for Defendants to

defend it in California; accordingly, this factor does not strongly favor dismissal. See

Shute, 897 F.2d at 386-87. 

Third, conflict with the sovereignty of Nevada does not weigh strongly in favor

of dismissal, because choice-of-law rules may accommodate any concerns regarding

possible conflict with Nevada’s sovereignty. Shute, 897 F.2d at 387 (“[T]his circuit has

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stated that choice-of-law rules, rather than jurisdictional rules, are more appropriate to

accommodate conflicting sovereignty interests.”) (citing Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue

Shield, 800 F.2d 1474, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986)). Fourth, on the other hand, California has

a strong interest in protecting its citizens against the tortious acts of others. See

Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 1984) (“California obviously has an

interest in protecting its citizens against the tortious conduct of others.”). 

Fifth, on the record before the Court, consideration of the “most efficient forum

for judicial resolution of the dispute” favors the exercise of jurisdiction over

Defendants. Plaintiff’s counsel declares that Plaintiff has at least six health care

providers and at least five separate additional witnesses who reside in California. (Dkt.

No. 13-5 ¶¶ 13-17.) On the other hand, Defendants indicate five Paris Las Vegas

employees may be necessary witnessesin this case. (Dkt. No. 14 at 9) (citing Dkt. Nos.

11-5, 11-6, Roberts Decl. Exs. 1, 2.) Defendants argue these witnesses “are located in

Nevada” and that “this Court will be unable to compel their appearance at trial or for

deposition in the Southern District.” (Id.) The Court finds that as between Nevada and

California, the two states capable of exercising jurisdiction in this case, California is

the more efficient forum. In particular, some if not all of Defendants’ witnesses may

be employees of Defendant Paris Las Vegas Propco and thus may be compelled to

testify as party witnesses, while Plaintiff declaresthat litigating in Nevada would force 3

her to “pay the travel expenses, lodging, and travel time feesfor each of my health care

providers to testify at trial” and that many of her additional witnesses “do not have the

time and/or financial resourcesto travel to Las Vegas, Nevada, during the work week.”

(Dkt. No. 13-3, Rowland Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) This factor therefore weighs in favor of

jurisdiction.

Sixth, Plaintiff has declared that litigating her claims in Las Vegas, Nevada

The Court notes that Defendants have not specifically stated that each of the

3

persons listed on the “Incident File Full Report” and “Accident Scene Check”

submitted by Defendants will be witnesses in this case; neither have Defendants

affirmed whether the individuals are all employees of Defendant Paris Las Vegas

Propco. 

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would “be incredibly inconvenient and expensive” for her. (Id. ¶ 11.) As the Ninth

Circuit found to be the case in Shute, dismissal of the present suit from Plaintiff’s

choice of forum may prevent Plaintiff from obtaining relief, making the sixth

“reasonableness” factor weigh heavily in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. 897 F.2d

at 387.

Seventh, the finalfactor, the “existence of an alternative forum,” does not dictate

a contrary result. On balance, the seven “reasonableness” factors courts consider for

the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction weigh in favor of the exercise of this

Court’s jurisdiction over Defendants. Defendants have not presented “compelling

reasons” why the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has established this Court’s personal jurisdiction over

Defendants in California and DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC

for lack of personal jurisdiction.

IV. Transfer of Venue

In the alternative, Defendants move this Court to transfer this action to Nevada

under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 14.) “For the convenience of parties and

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer a civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U .S.C. § 1404. Under

§ 1404(a), the district court has discretion “to adjudicate motions to transfer according

to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Jones

v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Stewart Org. v.

Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1998)). In adjudicating such motions, the court weighs

multiple factors to determine whether transfer is appropriate, including “(1) the

location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that

is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the

respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s

cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the

two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of

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unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.” Jones,

211 F.3d at 498-99. “The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to

warrant upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth

Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 1986).

Defendants argue “every act and every alleged breach of duty are all tied to

Nevada,” and that Defendants and Plaintiff’s cause of action “have no case-related

contacts” with California. (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 15.) Furthermore, Defendants argue “most

of the witnesses are no doubt located in Nevada” and that “compulsory process will be

available in Nevada, and the parties will be able to best secure witness attendance in

that state.” (Id. at 17.) 

The Court disagrees. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s alleged injury

occurred in Nevada, and that Nevada law governs this action, Defendants have not

made a strong showing as to the difference in cost of litigation in the two forums, the

availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of non-party witnesses, or ease

of access to sources of proof. See Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99. Defendants’ motion

assumes without demonstrating that witnesses to the incident at issue are located

primarily in Nevada. Although Defendants have introduced an “Incident File Full

Report” and “Accident Scene Check,” (Dkt. No. 11-5, 11-6), showing what Defendants

claim to be evidence of “numerous Nevada residents were involved in assisting and

investigating ROWLAND’s claims,” (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 17), Defendants have not

specified whether any of the individuals mentioned in those documents are witnesses,

what they would testify to, or whether they are employees of either Defendant in this

case. As other courts have found, the inconvenience caused by out-of-forum witnesses

must be discounted where the witnesses are current employees of the defendant and

may be compelled by the defendant to testify in the forum. See Tamashiro v. Harvey,

487 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (D. Haw. 2006); Day, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116817 at

*21. While it appears that many, if not all, of Defendants’ identified witnesses are

employees of Paris Las Vegas, Plaintiff on the other hand has submitted declarations

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detailing the California-based witnesses she requires as well as the inconvenience,

expense, and unavailability of witnesses that affect her ability to litigate in Nevada.

Furthermore, although Defendants state “at trial it may become necessary for the jury

to view the place of the alleged negligence,” Defendants do not explain why a jury

would need to view the physical location at issue and point to no other physical

evidence located in Nevada that makes Nevada a more convenient forum than

California. 

Given: (1) the Court’s finding that Defendants purposefully directed activities

toward California and toward Plaintiff as a California resident; (2) Plaintiff’s choice

to litigate in California; and (3) Plaintiff’s showing that her numerous non-party

witnessesreside in California and that litigating in Nevada would be both inconvenient

and expensive, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden

of demonstrating that Nevada is a more convenient forum such that transfer to Nevada

would serve the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court therefore DENIES

Defendants’ motion in the alternative for transfer of venue pursuant to section 1404(a). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 11) is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ alternative Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED. (Dkt. No. 11.)

3. The hearing date for this motion scheduled for Friday, August 8, 2014 is

VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 6, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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