Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08047/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08047-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Paul Eddy, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-08047-PCT-NVW (BSB)

ORDER AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On March 25, 2014, Petitioner Dennis Paul Eddy filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed an amended 

petition on April 4, 2014 (Doc. 7), which the Court dismissed with leave to file another 

amended petition. (Doc. 8.) In accordance with Court orders, Petitioner filed a Second 

Amended Petition on December 8, 2014. (Docs. 8, 22, 23.) 

 On May 13, 2015, Respondents filed a notice of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

asserting the Court does not have jurisdiction over the pending Second Amended Petition 

because it is a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 33.) The assigned 

magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation regarding that notice. (Doc. 47.) 

On September 9, 2015, the district judge adopted the report and recommendation and 

dismissed Grounds One, Two, and Three of the Second Amended Petition as successive. 

(Doc. 53 at 2.) The district judge directed Respondents to respond to the claims asserted 

in Grounds Four, Five, and Six. (Id.) The district judge also directed Respondents to 

respond to the claim raised in Petitioner’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 39), 

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which was construed as a supplement to the Second Amended Petition (the supplemental 

claim). (Doc. 53 at 2.) 

 After receiving an extension of time, on December 7, 2015, Respondents filed a 

limited answer to the Second Amended Petition and the supplemental claim. (Docs. 56, 

71.) Petitioner also received several extensions of time, and filed a reply on March 7, 

2016.1

 (Docs. 78, 91, 100.) As set forth below, the Court recommends that the Second 

Amended Petition and the supplement be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Trial and Sentencing 

 In June 1986, following a jury trial in Coconino County Superior Court, in case 

CR85-11929, Petitioner was convicted of armed burglary, aggravated assault, and theft of 

property. (Doc. 71, Ex. A.) The court imposed concurrent sentences for the three counts 

of conviction. The longest of the concurrent sentences was life imprisonment without the 

possibility of release on parole until Petitioner served twenty-five calendar years. 

(Doc. 71, Ex. C.) 

B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding and Other Filings 

 On January 16, 1996, Petitioner filed in the trial court a notice of post-conviction 

relief and an “undated” petition. (Doc. 71, Exs. E, F.) The court appointed counsel, who 

subsequently notified that court that he was unable to find any issues to raise on postconviction review. (Doc. 71, Ex. F.) The court granted Petitioner additional time to file 

“another or supplemental petition for post-conviction relief.” (Id.) Petitioner did not file 

a supplemental petition and the deadline to do so expired. (Id.) The trial court dismissed 

the proceeding because Petitioner had not presented any claims that entitled him to relief. 

 

1

 On March 7, 2016, the Court granted Petitioner an extension until March 18, 

2016 to file a reply. (Doc. 99.) Petitioner’s reply was signed and electronically filed that same day. (Doc. 100.) Although it is unclear whether Petitioner received the March 7, 

2016 order before he filed his reply, that order only extended the deadline for Petitioner 

to file a reply and did not authorize Petitioner to file more than one reply. On March 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to supplement his reply. (Doc. 101.) Petitioner argues that he was ill on March 7, 2016, the day he filed his reply, and failed to present all of his arguments. In an abundance of caution, the Court will grant Petitioner’s motion and consider the arguments contained in that filing. 

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(Id.) On May 17, 1996, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.2 (Doc. 71, Ex. G.) 

The trial court denied the motion as untimely under the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. (Doc. 71, Ex. H.) 

 On July 2, 1996, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Special Action for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus” in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 71, Ex. I.) On July 19, 1996, the 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily dismissed the petition, ruling that it “present[ed] 

nothing upon which relief [could] be obtained.” (Doc. 71, Ex. J.) The Arizona Supreme 

Court later denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 71, Ex. K.) On 

November 8, 1996, Petitioner filed a second “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (En 

Banc)” in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 71, Ex. L.) On November 29, 1996, the 

Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the petition. (Doc. 71, Ex. M.) The court held that a 

state habeas petition could “not be used in Arizona as a substitute for following the 

orderly process of appeal and/or review provided in the Rules of Court[.]” (Id.) 

 On March 7, 1997, Petitioner filed in the trial court a “Petition to Vacate 

Unconstitutional Sentence Defendant is Serving (By Treating this as a Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus if Necessary).” (Doc. 71, Ex. N.) Petitioner asserted that, in August 

1996, he sought clarification about his parole status and was told he would not be eligible 

for parole consideration until “04/05/2266,” some “269 years away.” (Id. at 2-3.) 

Petitioner claimed that his parole eligibility should begin on “12-2-2010.” (Id. at 3.) On 

April 4, 1997, the trial court denied the petition, but forwarded a copy of the sentencing 

minute entry to the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) to review Petitioner’s 

claims. (Doc. 71, Ex. O.) The court emphasized that it was not ordering any relief, but 

sending the minute entry to DOC “only for D.O.C. information.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner subsequently filed numerous documents in the trial court, including: 

(1) a petition for an evidentiary hearing to convert his imprisonment to a mental health 

 

2

 Petitioner argued that he was unable to file a petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied access to the law library in March 1996, he was ill after a TB test 

in April 1996, he was ill for three weeks in May 1996, and his legal materials were taken from him. (Doc. 71, Ex. G.) 

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commitment,3 (2) another petition for writ of habeas corpus, (3) a request for 

resentencing in light of his mental health, (4) two petitions for review, and (5) various 

other documents and motions. (Doc. 71, Exs P-V.) The trial court denied relief on these 

various filings. (Doc. 71, Ex. Q-V.) The court also found that Petitioner’s claims that his 

sentences were unconstitutional and his petitions for review related to his mental health 

were untimely. (Id.) In an October 30, 1997 minute entry, the trial court stated that it 

had conducted an in camera review of Petitioner’s DOC medical records. (Doc. 71, 

Ex. U.) The court found nothing in those records that warranted resentencing Petitioner. 

(Id.) 

 On September 27, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for review from the trial court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argued that his sentences were 

unconstitutional.4

 (Doc. 71, Ex. W.) On October 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for 

review from the denial of a “petition for an evidentiary hearing for mental health 

commitment.” (Doc. 71, Ex. X.) The court of appeals consolidated the petitions for 

review, which it identified as petitions for review form the denial of post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 71, Exs. Y, Z.) On April 23, 1999, the court of appeals denied review. 

(Doc. 71, Ex. Z.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 71, 

Exs. AA, BB.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on September 2, 

1999. (Doc. 71, Ex. CC.) 

2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 Nearly five years later, on July 30, 2004, Petitioner filed another petition for postconviction relief in the trial court. (Doc. 71, Exs. DD, EE.) On November 29, 2004, the 

trial court denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 71, Ex. GG.) On December 16, 2004, 

 

3

 In his April 21, 1997 filing, Petitioner stated that he had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), experienced side effects from psychiatric medication, and had tried to commit suicide in the past, including in 1986 at the Coconino County Jail. (Doc. 71, Ex. P.) 

4

 Petitioner specifically sought review of the trial court’s denial of his “Petition to 

Vacate Unconstitutional Sentence.” (Doc. 71, Ex. EE; Doc. 71, Exs. N, O.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals referred to this filing as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 71, Exs.Y, Z.) 

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Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 71, Exs. HH, 

II.) On September 1, 2005, the court of appeals denied review. (Doc. 71, Ex. JJ.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on 

January 23, 2006. (Doc. 71, Exs. KK, LL.) 

3. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On August 22, 2005, while Petitioner’s second post-conviction proceeding was 

pending, he filed a third petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 71, Ex. MM.) The trial 

court stayed that proceeding pending the conclusion of Petitioner’s second postconviction proceeding. (Doc. 71, Ex. OO.) After the conclusion of the second postconviction proceeding, the trial court denied relief on the third petition for postconviction relief on May 25, 2006. (Doc. 71, Ex. OO.) Petitioner filed a petition for 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, to which he attached a lengthy appendix.5

 

(Doc. 71, Exs. PP, QQ (Petition).) The trial court notified Petitioner that his petition for 

review did not comply with the filing rules. (Doc. 71, Ex. PP.) Petitioner subsequently 

filed a rule-compliant petition for review. (Doc. 71, Exs PP, RR, SS, TT.) On July 12, 

2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review. (Doc. 71, Ex. UU.)

4. Fourth Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On December 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a fourth notice and petition for postconviction relief, claiming that changes in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-701(A), effective on 

January 1, 2009, provided a basis for the court to revisit his original sentence. (Doc. 71, 

Ex. VV.) On January 13, 2010, the trial court dismissed the petition. (Doc. 71, 

Ex. WW.) The court noted that Petitioner acknowledged the statute was not applicable 

retroactively, and therefore did not apply to him. (Id.) The court also found that 

Petitioner’s remaining claims were precluded from post-conviction review because 

Petitioner had raised them in previous petitions. (Id.) Petitioner did not file a petition for 

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 71, Exs. W, X, HH, PP, GGG.) 

 

5

 Respondents did not file the appendix with this Court, and the Court does not 

require a copy. 

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5. Fifth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

 On January 11, 2010, while his fourth post-conviction proceeding was pending, 

Petitioner commenced another post-conviction proceeding, claiming a “significant 

change in the law” applied to his case “via [Ariz. Rev. Stat.] § 13-701(A) effective 

January 1st, 2009, that encompass [Ariz. Rev. Stat. §] 13-604(I) and the statutes that 

requires restitution to be paid to the victim.” (Doc. 71, Ex. XX.) On January 28, 2010, 

the trial court denied relief, noting that Petitioner had raised those same claims in his 

fourth petition. (Doc. 71, Ex. YY.) The court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding 

for the “same reasons” set forth in its January 13, 2010 order. (Doc. 71, Ex. YY.) 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 71, 

Exs. W, X, HH, PP, and GGG.) 

6. Sixth and Seventh Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On March 31, 2011, Petitioner filed a sixth petition for post-conviction relief, 

claiming that a new rule of constitutional law — State v. Gross, 31 P.3d 815 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2001) — invalidated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604. (Doc. 71, Ex. ZZ.) On June 7, 

2011, before the court ruled on the petition, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus and a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 71, Exs. AAA, BBB.) 

 On November 28, 2011, Petitioner filed another document in the trial court 

entitled “Petition for Re–Sentencing via a Disproportionality Review Hearing to Impose 

Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona.” (Doc. 71, Ex. CCC.) 

On December 8, 2011, the trial court considered the filing as Petitioner’s seventh petition 

for post-conviction relief, concluded that it was successive, and found that it “fail[ed] to 

set forth any colorable claim for relief under Rule 32.” (Doc. 71, Ex. DDD.) The trial 

court held that “[f]or all the reasons set forth in the previous order dated January 7, 2010, 

and for failure to raise a claim that is not precluded, the Court dismisses the Petition 

without hearing.” (Id.) 

 However, before the trial court ruled on Petitioner’s sixth petition for postconviction relief, Petitioner filed two notices of appeal in the trial court. (Doc. 71, 

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Exs. EEE, FFF.) The trial court found that the notices of appeal divested it of 

jurisdiction. The court noted that, due to an apparent error, it had not received the sixth 

petition for post-conviction relief until December 20, 2011, and therefore it “did not rule 

on these motions before [Petitioner] filed his Notice of Appeal.” (Doc. 71, Ex. FFF.) 

 On December 16, 2011, Petitioner filed the same “Notice of Appeal” from his 

sixth petition for post-conviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 71, 

Ex. GGG, HHH.) Petitioner filed a petition for review on January 20, 2012. (Doc. 71, 

Ex. III.) The State subsequently responded to the petition for review related to the sixth 

petition for post-conviction relief, which had not been ruled upon by the trial court, and 

argued that Petitioner was not entitled to the retroactive application of the Gross decision. 

(Doc. 71, Ex. JJJ.) Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. 71, Ex. KKK.) On October 3, 2013, 

the court of appeals denied review. (Doc. 71, Ex. LLL.) On October 24, 2013, Petitioner 

filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on March 4, 

2014. (Doc. 71, Exs. MMM, NNN.) 

7. Special Action Petition 

 On October 9, 2012, while Petitioner’s sixth and seventh petitions for postconviction relief were pending, he filed a “petition for review” in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, which the court construed as a petition for special action. (Doc. 71, Ex. OOO.) 

The court of appeals denied the petition on October 22, 2012. (Doc. 71, Ex. PPP.) 

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on 

February 15, 2013. (Doc. 71, Ex. QQQ.) 

D. Federal Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On April 25, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, captioned Dennis Paul Eddy v. Terry L. Stewart, CV-00-

750-PCT-ROS (LOA), in which he challenged his convictions and sentences in Coconino 

County Superior Court case CR85-11929, the same case at issue in his pending Second 

Amended Petition. (Doc. 33, Ex. A at 3; Eddy, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 1.) 

With the Court’s permission, on January 29, 2001, Petitioner filed an amended petition in 

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that case. (Eddy, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 29.) On March 12, 2003, the Court 

dismissed the amended petition with prejudice as untimely under the applicable statute of 

limitations. (Doc. 33, Ex. A; Eddy, CV-00-750-PCT-ROS (LOA), Doc. 120); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d) (setting forth a one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a 

petition for writ of habeas in federal court). 

 Over ten years later, on March 28, 2014, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, again challenging his 

convictions and sentences in Coconino County Superior Court case CR85-11929. 

(Doc. 1.) Pursuant to court orders, Petitioner amended his petition and later filed the 

pending Second Amended Petition on December 8, 2014. (Doc. 22.) The Second 

Amended Petition includes six grounds for relief challenging Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences in Coconino County Superior Court case CR85-11929. (Doc. 22 at 1.) 

 In Ground One, Petitioner claims that his sentence for first-degree burglary was 

illegally enhanced. (Doc. 22 at 6.) In Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner argues that he 

was sentenced under a statute that has since been held unconstitutional. (Doc. 22 at 7-8.) 

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that Respondents are “subjecting [him] to cruel and 

unusual punishment by making it appear to other inmates that Petitioner is being held on 

a sex crimes statute.” (Id. at 9.) In Grounds Five and Six, Petitioner argues that the trial 

court’s handling of his petition for post-conviction relief and his state petition for writ of 

habeas corpus violated his due process rights. (Id. at 10-13.) In his supplemental claim, 

Petitioner argues that Respondents violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-1604.10(A) by 

extending his incarceration. (Doc. 39.) 

 The Court previously dismissed Grounds One, Two, and Three without prejudice 

to Petitioner seeking authorization from the Ninth Circuit to bring those claims in a 

successive § 2254 petition. (Doc. 53.) The Court directed Respondents to respond to 

Grounds Four, Five, Six, and the supplemental claim. (Id.) In their response, 

Respondents argue that Ground Four is untimely, Grounds Four, Five, and Six are not 

cognizable on habeas corpus review, and Grounds Five and Six are procedurally barred 

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from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 71.) Respondents further argue that the 

supplemental claim is unexhausted. (Id.) As discussed below, the Court concludes that 

Grounds Four, Five, and Six are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and, 

therefore, does not consider Respondents’ alternative arguments, including the timeliness 

arguments, related to those claims. The Court also finds that the supplemental claim is 

unexhausted, but that it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Discussion 

A. Ground Four is not Cognizable on § 2254 Review

 Respondents assert that Ground Four is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review.6

 (Doc. 71 at 23-25.) Petitioner does not respond to this argument in his reply or 

in his supplemental reply. (Docs. 100, 101.) As discussed below, the Court concludes 

that Ground Four does not assert a cognizable claim. 

 A federal court may only consider a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the 

petitioner alleges that “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 68 

(1991); see also Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A habeas 

petition must allege the petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or 

a treaty.”). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 67 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)); see also Gilmore v. 

Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 349 (1993) (stating that “mere error of state law, one that does not 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.”). 

Moreover, a habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state law issue into a federal one by 

merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment and 

asserts a violation of his due process rights. (Doc. 22 at 9.) To support his claim, 

 

6

 Respondents state that it appears that Petitioner exhausted this claim by presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his sixth post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 71 at 12.) 

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Petitioner asserts that the Arizona legislature abolished Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, the 

statute of conviction, as unconstitutional, and subsequently enacted a new statute using 

that same number, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604. Petitioner asserts that the new statute 

pertains to sex crimes. (Doc. 22 at 9.) Petitioner alleges that because he was convicted 

under a statute that was identified by the same number as a statute that currently pertains 

to sex crimes, it appears that he is being held for violating a sex crimes statute and that he 

is a sex offender, which places his life in jeopardy. (Id.) Petitioner does not specify 

when Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604 was amended. However, the current version of Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-604 was amended effective January 1, 2009. It is entitled “Class 6 felony; 

designation,” and does not appear to be limited to sex crimes. Because Petitioner alleges 

that he is currently in danger, the Court assumes that Ground Four is based on the most 

recent version of Ariz. Stat. § 13-604, which was amended in 2009.7

 

 Although Ground Four alleges a violation of the “cruel and unusual punishment 

clause of the Eighth Amendment” and “a violation of Due Process of Law” (Doc. 22 at 

9), Petitioner’s claim challenges the Arizona legislature’s numbering of a statute, and 

alleges that the statute’s designation makes it appear that he is being held as a sex 

offender. Petitioner’s challenge to the Arizona legislature’s designation of a state statute 

does not state a federal constitutional claim and, therefore, is not cognizable on federal 

habeas corpus review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 62, 67-68 (recognizing that federal courts 

conducting habeas review are limited to “deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States”). Because Petitioner’s argument with 

respect to the state legislature’s designation of a statute, which is not the statute under 

which he was convicted, does not attack the constitutionality of Petitioner’s detention, 

that alleged error is not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

 

7

 Petitioner appears to concede that his Second Amended Petition is untimely. (Doc. 22 at 15.) In a discussion attempting to excuse his untimely filing, Petitioner states that the sentencing statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, was held unconstitutional under 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). (Id.) However, none of the grounds for relief that are before the Court assert an Apprendi violation. Accordingly, the Court does not consider whether Petitioner’s sentence violates Apprendi. 

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§ 2254. See Estelle, 502 U.S.at 67 68 (federal habeas corpus review is not available for 

violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Four. 

C. Grounds Five and Six are not Cognizable on § 2254 Review

 Respondents argue that Grounds Five and Six are not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review. (Doc. 71 at 25-27.) Petitioner’s reply and supplemental reply do not 

address this argument. (Docs. 100, 101.) The Court agrees that Grounds Five and Six do 

not present cognizable claims.8

 As previously stated, to be eligible for federal habeas 

corpus relief, a state prisoner must establish that he is “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). On habeas 

corpus review, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court applications of state 

procedural rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 

“[f]ederal habeas courts lack jurisdiction . . . to review state court applications of state 

procedural rules.” 

 Ground Five pertains to post-conviction proceedings that Petitioner filed in the 

state court on March 31, 2011, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. (Doc. 22 at 10.) Petitioner argues that the State did not file a timely response 

to his petition for post-conviction relief as Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4236(A) requires. 

(Doc. 22 at 10.) He also argues that the trial court violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4236(C) 

by failing to issue a ruling on the petition within the required time frame. (Id. at 11.) In 

Ground Six, Petitioner asserts a violation of his due process rights because the State did 

not comply with the time frames for processing a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

which he allegedly filed on June 7, 2011. (Doc. 22 at 12.) Petitioner specifically argues 

that the trial court did not comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4124(A). (Id. at 12-13.) 

 

8

 Respondents also argue that Grounds Five and Six are technically exhausted and procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 71 at 27.) The Court need 

not resolve this issue because Grounds Five and Six are not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review regardless of whether those claims were fairly presented to the state courts. 

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 The Ninth Circuit has clarified that procedural errors arising during postconviction relief proceedings are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 because they do not challenge a petitioner’s detention. Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 

F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the post-convictions court’s failure to appoint 

petitioner counsel in his second post-conviction proceedings did not constitute a basis for 

a federal habeas claim); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(stating that errors in the post-conviction proceeding were not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus proceedings). Accordingly, whether the State or the state court complied 

with Arizona statutes governing state post-conviction proceedings is a matter of state law 

that is not “addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.” Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26. 

 Therefore, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Five and Six, which challenge the 

application of Arizona law related to post-conviction proceedings, are not cognizable on 

federal habeas review. Additionally, Petitioner cannot transform his state law claims into 

federal claims by citing the Due Process Clause. See Poland, 169 F.3d at 584. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Grounds Five and Six. 

D. Supplemental Claim

 As previously stated, Petitioner filed a motion for declaratory judgment, which the 

Court construed as a supplement to the Second Amended Petition (the supplemental 

claim). (Docs. 39, 53.) The supplemental claim asserts that the State has detained 

Petitioner beyond his mandatory twenty-five year sentence without determining whether 

he is eligible for parole. (Doc. 39.) Respondents assert that this claim is unexhausted 

because Petitioner has not presented it to the state court. (Doc. 71 at 33.) Therefore, the 

Second Amended Petition is a mixed petition because it contains exhausted and 

unexhausted claims.9

 

 

9

 Respondents state that Ground Four is exhausted (Doc. 71 at 12), and that 

Grounds Five and Six are technically exhausted because Petitioner did not present those claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona law would bar him from attempting to present those claims now. (Doc. 71 at 32.) 

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 Habeas corpus relief is unavailable “unless the applicant has exhausted the 

remedies available in the courts of the State.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The 

Supreme Court has held that “a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing 

both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). 

However, after the Supreme Court decided Rose, Congress enacted the AEDPA, which 

imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court then recognized that if a petitioner filed a 

mixed petition (a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) in federal 

court, the combined effect of Rose and the AEDPA could result in the loss of all claims, 

including those already exhausted, because the limitations period could expire while a 

petitioner returned to state court to present his unexhausted claims. Pliler v. Ford, 542 

U.S. 225, 230-31 (2004). Thus, in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276-77 (2005), the 

Supreme Court held that the district court has limited discretion to hold in abeyance a 

habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims to permit a petitioner 

to return to state court to exhaust additional claims while the federal proceedings are 

stayed. 

 The stay-and-abeyance procedure is only appropriate when the district court 

determines that (1) there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims 

in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless,” and (3) there is no 

indication that the petitioner has engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. In Rhines, the Court cautioned that the stay-and-abeyance 

procedure “should be available only in limited circumstances,” and should be applied 

consistently with the AEDPA’s twin purposes of “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of 

state and federal criminal sentences” and encouraging “petitioners to seek relief from 

state courts in the first instance.” Id. at 277. 

 The stay-and-abeyance procedure is not appropriate in this case because the 

supplemental claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Petitioner refers 

to the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 39 at 2.) However, his supplemental claim is based on 

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the application of state law. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Respondents are 

improperly “taking imaginary earned release credits” from him to enhance his sentence in 

violation of Arizona law. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner argues that the Arizona statute pursuant to 

which he was sentenced does not allow for earned release credits and therefore, 

Respondents are improperly extending his sentence by allegedly taking from Petitioner 

earned release credits that he could not have earned. (Id.) 

 To support his claim, Petitioner refers to an inmate letter in which he inquired 

about the computation of his parole eligibility date, and argued that he was eligible for 

parole on December 1, 2010. (Doc. 39 at 7.) Petitioner also submits a response to that 

letter from the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) which states that, pursuant to 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604.09(F), Petitioner’s parole eligibility date was “increase[d] by 

the number of days [he was] in a noneligible parole class.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner was in a 

noneligible parole class III based on disciplinary violations. (Id.) Based on this 

evidence, Petitioner also may be challenging the application of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-

1604.09(F) to his sentence. 

 The application of state statutes to Petitioner’s sentence is a matter of state law and 

is not subject to federal habeas corpus review. See Estelle, 502 U.S.at 67 68 (federal 

habeas corpus review is not available for violations of state law or for alleged error in the 

interpretation or application of state law). Although Petitioner generally cites to the Due 

Process Clause, he does make an argument applying the Due Process Clause. Rather, he 

bases his argument on the applicable state statutes. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief on the supplemental claim and, therefore, the stay and abeyance 

procedure is not appropriate. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. 

III. Conclusion 

 Because Grounds Four, Five, Six, and the supplemental claim are not cognizable 

on federal habeas corpus review, the Court recommends that the Second Amended 

Petition, including the supplemental claim, be denied. 

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 Petitioner’s reply and supplemental reply do not raise any arguments indicating 

that Petitioner is entitled to relief. (Docs. 100, 101.) The reply and supplemental reply 

do not directly address the arguments in Respondents’ answer. Rather, they appear to 

assert new claims based on Petitioner’s post-traumatic stress disorder, prison transfers, 

limited access to legal resources at various times, the DOC’s disciplinary process, and 

based on state criminal proceedings that were not raised in the Second Amended Petition. 

(Id.) “The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 

328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, the Court will not consider Petitioner’s 

new claims that are presented in the Reply.10 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to file a supplemental reply (Doc. 101) 

is GRANTED and that the Court considers that filing a supplemental reply. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 22), including 

the supplemental claim (Doc. 39), be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

 

10 Some of the issues discussed in the reply and the supplemental reply — such as Petitioner’s mental ability, prison transfers, and his access to his own legal materials or to other legal resources — may be an attempt to explain Petitioner’s failure to file a supplemental petition for post-conviction relief in first post-conviction action. (See

Doc. 71, Ex. F.) Such arguments could be relevant as a response to Respondents’ assertion of the defense of procedural default and procedural bar. However, because the 

Court does not resolve the Second Amended Petition on that basis, it does not consider 

those issues. 

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judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 28th day of March, 2016. 

 

 

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