Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05378/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05378-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEYTON SHOTWELL, )

)

)

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Plaintiff, )

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vs. )

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OFFICER STEVENSON, et al., )

)

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Defendant. )

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)

No. CV-F-04-5378 OWW/WMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS STATE LAW

CLAIMS FOR LACK OF

PROSECUTION (Doc. 45) AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

TO COMPEL, TO DEEM REQUESTS

FOR ADMISSION ADMITTED, AND

FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS (Doc.

46)

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff

was subjected to excessive force by Bakersfield Police Officers

Stevenson and Ferguson on December 11, 2003 in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. On May 30, 2006, the United States Magistrate

Judge recommended that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint be

dismissed with leave to amend to allege compliance with the

California Government Tort Claims Act to the extent that the

Second Amended Complaint alleges state law claims. By Order

filed on August 21, 2006, the recommendation was adopted and 

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Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with leave to

amend. Plaintiff was ordered to file a Third Amended Complaint

within 20 days of the filing date of the Order. 

By motion filed on October 10, 2006, defendants move to

dismiss this action for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule

41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on Plaintiff's

failure to file a Third Amended Complaint as ordered. 

Alternatively, defendants move to dismiss the state law claims

alleged in the Second Amended Complaint because of Plaintiff's

failure to comply with the August 21, 2006 Order.

On November 7, 2006, defendants filed a motion to compel

Plaintiff's responses to special interrogatories and a request

for production of documents, to deem admitted requests for

admission, and to impose a monetary sanction in the amount of

$600 on Plaintiff for his failure to timely comply with these

discovery requests.

Plaintiff, who is proceeding in pro per, did not file a

written opposition to either motion and did not appear at the

hearing of the motions.

A. Motion to Dismiss.

Before imposing dismissal as a sanction under Rule 41(b) the

court must weigh (1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4)the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; (5)

and the availability of less drastic sanctions. Thompson v.

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Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986). Dismissal as a sanction should be

imposed only in extreme circumstances. Id. Resolution of a Rule

41(b) motion to dismiss usually depends on the third and fifth

factors, as the first two usually favor dismissal for violation

of a court order, while the fourth factor usually weighs against

dismissal, Computer Task Group, Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112,

1115 (9 Cir.2004). The Ninth Circuit holds that it “may affirm th

a dismissal where at least four factors support dismissal ... or

where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” 

Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9 Cir. 1998). th

Dismissal of this entire action because of Plaintiff’s

failure to file a Third Amended Complaint in accordance with the

August 21, 2006 Order is unwarranted under these factors. 

Defendants have filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint

to the extent that it alleges a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The only basis for further amendment was to allege

compliance with the claim requirements of the California

Government Tort Claims Act to the extent that the Second Amended

Complaint could be construed as alleging claims for relief under

state law. As evidenced by Defendants’ motion to compel,

Defendants have proceeded to propound discovery notwithstanding

the August 21, 2006 Order and, therefore, cannot credibly claim

that their ability to proceed with this litigation is hindered or

prejudiced by the failure to file the Third Amended Complaint. 

Therefore, the factors set forth above do not weigh in favor of

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dismissal of this entire action.

However, to the extent that the Second Amended Complaint

purports to allege state law claims against Defendants, dismissal

under Rule 41(b) is appropriate. 

California Government Code § 945.4 provides in pertinent

part:

[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought

against a public entity on a cause of action

for which a claim is required to be presented

in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with

Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with

Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until

a written claim therefor has been presented

to the public entity and has been acted upon

by the board, or has been deemed to have been

rejected by the board, in accordance with

Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division. 

Section 950.2 provides in pertinent part:

[A] cause of action against a public employee

or former public employee for injury

resulting from an act or omission in the

scope of his employment as a public employee

is barred under Part I (commencing with

Section 900) of this division or under

Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 945) of

Part 4 of this division. This section is

applicable even though the public entity is

immune from liability for the injury.

California Government Code § 910 sets forth the contents of a

claim. The failure to allege and prove compliance with state

imposed procedural conditions to sue bars the maintenance of a

cause of action based upon those pendant State claims. City of

San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974); Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 707 (9 Cir. 1985), rev’d in part on th

other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Jacobsen v. Marin General

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Hospital, 963 F.Supp. 866, 870-871 (N.D.Cal. 1997).

Plaintiff has been given ample notice and opportunity to

amend to allege compliance with the claim requirements. His

failure to timely comply with the August 21, 2006 Order, coupled

with the absence of any opposition to this motion, compels the

conclusion that Plaintiff cannot make the required allegations. 

Here, the factors set forth above weigh in favor of dismissing

any such state law claims as a sanction for the failure to comply

with the court order. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED to the

extent the Second Amended Complaint alleges claims for relief

based on state law.

B. Motion to Compel.

On September 13, 2006, Defendants served on Plaintiff

“Special Interrogatories, Set One”, “Request for Admissions, Set

One”, and “Request for Production of Documents, Set One”. 

Pursuant to Rules 33(b)(3), 34(b) and 36(b), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s responses to these discovery

requests were due within 30 days after service. When no

responses were filed, Defendants’ counsel sent a letter to

Plaintiff dated October 30, 2006 advising Plaintiff that a motion

to compel the responses and seeking appropriate sanctions would

be filed if the responses to the requested discovery was not

received by November 6, 2006. No responses to discovery have

been made. 

Defendants move the court for an order compelling Plaintiff

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to respond to the “Special Interrogatories, Set One” and the

“Request for Production of Documents, Set One”, without

objections, within 10 days of “the notice of the order on this

motion”.

Rule 37(a)(2)(B), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers

a propounding party to bring a motion to compel discovery

responses. “It is well established that a failure to object to

discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver

of any objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,

959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9 Cir.1992) The failure to respond to th

interrogatories or document requests “may not be excused on the

ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the

party failing to act has a pending motion for protective order.” 

Rule 37(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Consequently, Defendants’ motion to compel responses without

objection within 10 days of the Order is GRANTED. 

Defendants also move to deem the “Request for Admissions,

Set One” admitted. 

Rule 36(a) provides that the “matter is deemed admitted

unless, within 30 days after service of the request ... the party

to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting

the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the

matter, signed by the party ....” “Failure to respond to

requests for admission results in automatic admission of the

matters requested ... No motion to establish the admissions is

needed because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) is selfCase 1:04-cv-05378-LJO -WMW Document 48 Filed 12/14/06 Page 6 of 9
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executing.” Federal Trade Commission v. Medicor LLC, 217

F.Supp.2d 1048, 1053 (C.D.Cal.2002). 

Because Plaintiff failed to respond to the “Request for

Admissions, Set One,” the matters are deemed admitted as a matter

of law. Therefore, although Defendants’ motion is superfluous,

the motion is GRANTED. 

Finally, Defendants move for imposition of a monetary

sanction against Plaintiff in the amount of $600. In support of

this request is filed the Declaration of William J. Terrence,

counsel for Defendants:

9. I have spent a total of one and a half

hours preparing this motion and I anticipate

spending an additional one and a half hours

traveling to and from this hearing and

attending this hearing. My hourly rate for

this client is $200 per hour. Thus, the

total attorneys’ fees incurred and

anticipated to be incurred as a result of

plaintiff’s failure to respond to discovery

requests is $600.

If a motion to compel discovery responses is granted, “the

court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require

the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay to

the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the

motion, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that

the motion was filed without the movant’s first making a good

faith effort to obtain the ... discovery without court action ...

or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 

Rule 37(a)(4)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff’s responses to Defendants’ discovery requests were

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due on October 13, 2006. Defendants’ counsel sent a letter to

Plaintiff on October 30, 2006 requesting that Plaintiff serve his

responses to the discovery requests by November 6, 2006 and 

advising Plaintiff that a motion to compel the responses and for

sanctions would be filed if Plaintiff did not comply. Although

Plaintiff is proceeding in this action in forma pauperis,

Plaintiff makes no showing that he is currently unable to pay the

request monetary sanction. 

Under the lodestar factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424 (1983), the amount of attorneys’ fees sought is

reasonable as is the hourly rate.

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action for lack of

prosecution is DENIED;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss any state law claims

alleged in the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED;

3. Defendants’ motion to compel is GRANTED. Plaintiff

shall respond to the “Special Interrogatories, Set One” and the

“Request for Production of Documents, Set One”, without

objections, within 10 days of the filing date of this Order. 

Failure to timely comply will result in dismissal of this action.

4. Defendants’ motion to deem admitted the “Request for

Admissions, Set One” is GRANTED.

5. Defendants’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $600.00 is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay this award

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to counsel for defendants within 10 days of the filing date of

this Order. Failure to timely comply will result in the

dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 13, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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