Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RIADON JOHNSON; MARK 

JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FCA US LLC, A Delaware Limited 

Liability Company; DOES 1 through 10, 

Inclusive, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-CV-0536-AJB-BGS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND

(Doc. No. 11)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Riadon and Mark Johnson’s (“Johnson”) 

motion to remand.1(Doc. No. 11.) Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”) opposes the motion. 

(Doc. No. 16.) Having reviewed the parties’ moving papers and controlling legal authority, 

and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matter suitable for decision 

on the papers and without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing currently set for July 6, 

2017, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 4A is hereby VACATED. For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court DENIES Johnson’s motion.

 

1 While there are two plaintiffs, the Court refers to them in the singular throughout this 

order.

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BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from FCA’s alleged breach of warranty obligations owed to 

Johnson for a new 2012 Dodge Durango (“Dodge”) he purchased from FCA. Johnson

asserts FCA concealed a known defect from him, specifically, a defect with the totally 

integrated power module (“TIPM”), which is responsible for controlling and distributing 

electrical power to the entire vehicle. (Doc. No. 1 at 11–12 ¶¶ 9, 12, 14.) Based on this 

concealment, Johnson instituted this action in San Diego Superior Court on August 3, 2016, 

bringing causes of action for breaches of express and implied warranties in violation of 

California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act” or “Act”), as 

well as a cause of action for fraudulent inducement/concealment under California state 

common law. (Doc. No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1.)

FCA removed the action to this Court on March 17, 2017, asserting the Court has 

diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) On April 18, 2017, Johnson filed the instant motion 

to remand, arguing FCA has failed to carry its burden of establishing that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000 and that the parties are completely diverse. (Doc. No. 11.) 

FCA filed an opposition, (Doc. No. 16), and Johnson replied, (Doc. No. 20). This order 

follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

The right to remove a case to federal court is entirely a creature of statute. See

Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). The removal 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove an action when a case originally 

filed in state court presents a federal question, or is between citizens of different states and 

involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b); 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Only state court actions that could originally have been filed in 

federal court can be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.

1988).

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“[J]urisdiction founded on [diversity] requires that parties be in complete diversity 

and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. 

Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

Complete diversity requires that the plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from that of each 

named defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1332(c)(1); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 

61, 68 n.3 (1996). Whether or not complete diversity is present is determined at the time 

of removal. See Am. Dental Indus., Inc. v. EAX Worldwide, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 

1157 (D. Or. 2002) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 

(1938)).

The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal 

jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right 

of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 

curiam) (citations omitted). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means 

that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id.; see 

also McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (finding that 

the removing party must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence). The 

Court takes this proof from the notice of removal and may, if it chooses, construe the 

opposition to the motion to remand as an amendment to the notice of removal. See Cohn v. 

Petsmart Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Johnson argues three points that he contends require remand of this action to 

California state court: (1) FCA’s amount-in-controversy calculation ignores California 

state law; (2) FCA, as a limited liability company (“LLC”), has not established the 

citizenship of its foreign member, nor has it established Johnson’s citizenship; and (3) 

comity dictates that this case be remanded to state court. (Doc. Nos. 11, 20.) 

I. Amount in Controversy

In his complaint, Johnson seeks, inter alia, “reimbursement of the price paid for the 

[Dodge] less that amount directly attributable to use by the Plaintiff[] prior to discovery of 

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the nonconformities” and “a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages 

in that FCA [] has willfully failed to comply with its responsibilities under the [SongBeverly] Act.” (Doc. No. 1 at 31–32 ¶¶ 142, 145.) Johnson asserts that FCA has not proven 

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 7–9; Doc. No. 20 at 7–8.)

Johnson contends FCA’s notice of removal improperly relies on the amount 

financed, but offers no explanation as to why this number is the proper figure to base the 

amount-in-controversy calculation on. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 8–9.) In response, FCA points to 

the retail installment sale contract (“RISC”), attached to the complaint, as well as FCA 

warranty claim reports, documents upon which it bases its calculation that the actual 

damages at issue are at least $36, 368.18. (Doc. No. 16 at 16–17.)

California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B) defines “restitution” in relevant part 

as “an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, . . . including any 

collateral charges such as sales or use tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official 

fees[.]” Section 1793.2(d)(2)(C) goes on to permit the defendant to reduce the amount 

payable to the buyer “by that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the 

time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized 

service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to the 

nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).

The complaint does not allege the total amount sought with respect to these damages. 

However, as noted, the RISC is attached to the complaint. (Doc. No. 1 at 38–40.) The RISC 

lists the cash price of the vehicle as $34,062.00 and finance charge as $2306.18. (Id. at 38.) 

FCA predicates its actual damages analysis on these figures combined. (Doc. No. 16 at 17; 

see Doc. No. 1 at 4–5 ¶ 19.)2 Given that the statute permits Johnson to also recover, among 

other things,sales tax and official fees, which FCA did not use in its amount-in-controversy 

 

2

In the notice of removal, FCA predicated its analysis on the lower purchase price of the 

vehicle, which it listed as $35,118.82. (Doc. No. 1 at 4–5 ¶ 19.) That figure is also supported 

by the RISC. (Id. at 38.)

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calculation, the Court finds FCA’s use of the cash price and finance charge conservatively 

estimates “the actual price paid or payable by” Johnson.

3

As noted above, however, this figure does not end the inquiry. Rather, the restitution

awardable under section 1793.2(d)(2)(B) must be reduced by the amount directly 

attributable to Johnson’s use of the Dodge prior to the first repair or attempted repair. This 

set-off amount is determined by multiplying the “actual price of the new motor vehicle 

paid or payable by the buyer . . . by a fraction having as its denominator 120,000 and having 

as its numerator the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time 

the buyer delivered the vehicle” for correction of the problem. Cal. Civ. Code § 

1793.2(d)(2)(C).

The complaint does not include the Dodge’s mileage when Johnson took it to the 

dealership for the first relevant repair. Rather, the complaint lists December 23, 2013, as 

the date he “delivered the [Dodge] to an authorized FCA [] repair facility for repair.” (Doc. 

No. 1 at 24 ¶ 95.) On December 24, 2013, the Dodge had 18,797 miles on it. (Doc. No. 16-

10 at 3.) When Johnson purchased the Dodge, it had 25 miles on its odometer. (Doc. No. 

1 at 38.) Accordingly, the Court finds FCA has presented sufficient evidence to establish 

it is more likely than not that the mileage attributable to Johnson’s use, for purposes of the 

instant motion, is 18,772. Utilizing the formula provided by section 1793.2(d)(2)(C), this 

 

3

Johnson argues the inclusion of finance charges in the amount-in-controversy calculation 

is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (Doc. No. 20 at 7–8.) First, the Song-Beverly 

Act makes finance charges recoverable; as such, their inclusion in the amount-incontroversy calculation is appropriate. See Alvarado v. FCA US, LLC, No. EDCV 17-505 

JGB (DTBx), 2017 WL 2495495, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2017) (“Plaintiff argues that it 

is improper to consider interest when considering the amount-in-controversy. [] Plaintiff, 

however, seeks restitution, incidental, consequential, and general damages, costs and 

expenses for alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Act claims. Under the Song-Beverly 

Act, the actual price paid or payable by the buyer includes any paid finance charges.”). 

Second, use of the vehicle’s cash price alone, when trebled, would exceed the jurisdictional 

threshold.

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results in a mileage offset of $5689.20, which reduces the actual damages at issue to 

$30,678.98.

This does not end the inquiry either. In the complaint, Johnson also seeks civil 

penalties. (Doc. No. 1 at 32 ¶ 145.) California Civil Code section 1794(c) and (e) permits 

a buyer to recover a civil penalty not to exceed two times the amount of actual damages 

where the buyer establishes the defendant’s failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act 

is willful. “Courts[,] as a matter of law, calculate the amount in controversy based upon the 

maximum amount of civil penalties available to plaintiff.” Garcia v. FCA US, LLC, No. 

1:16-cv-00730-DAD-BAM, 2016 WL 4445337, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016) (quoting

Saulic v. Symantec Corp., No. SA 07-cv-00610-AHS-PLAx, 2007 WL 5074883, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007)); see also Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 

1042, 1046 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting district courts can consider treble damages where 

authorized by statute). Here, the Act permits recovery of up to two times actual damages. 

Because Johnson “is seeking recovery from a pot that [FCA] has shown could exceed 

[$75,000] and [Johnson] has neither acknowledged nor sought to establish that the [] 

recovery is potentially any less,” the Court finds inclusion of a full civil penalty award is 

appropriate. Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 401 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 

id. at 401 (“Once the proponent of federal jurisdiction has explained plausibly how the 

stakes exceed [the amount in controversy], . . . then the case belongs in federal court unless 

it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover that much.” (quoting Spivey v. Vertrue, 

Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 2008))).

As determined above, the actual damages figure at issue is $30,678.98. When 

trebled, the amount in controversy, exclusive of incidental and consequential damages, 

finance charges, and attorney’s fees and costs, is $92,036.94. Because this figure exceeds 

the jurisdictional threshold, the Court finds FCA has carried its burden as to the amount in 

controversy. Garcia, 2016 WL 4445337, at *4.

//

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II. Diversity of Citizenship

Johnson next argues that FCA, as an LLC, has failed to establish the citizenship of 

its foreign member. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 9–13; Doc. No. 20 at 4–6.) Johnson also asserts FCA 

has failed to establish Johnson’s citizenship. (Doc. No. 20 at 3–4.) In opposition, FCA asks 

the Court to consider Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, Article 2:64-1, which states that 

“[a]n Open Corporation (‘naamloze vennootschap’) is a legal person . . . .” (Doc. No. 16 at 

10–14.) FCA argues that its ultimate owner is a naamloze vennotschap (“N.V.”); 

accordingly, FCA is a citizen of the Netherlands and thus diverse from Johnson. (Id.)

Removal based on diversity requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be diverse 

from the citizenship of each defendant (e.g., complete diversity). Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. 

at 68. For purposes of diversity, an LLC is a citizen of every state in which its 

“owners/members” are citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 

894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts are to treat LLCs like partnerships, which 

have the citizenships of all of their members). “Section 1332(a)(2) applies to foreign legal 

entities of all kinds, so long as the entity is considered a juridical person under the law that 

created it.” Cohn v. Rosenfeld, 733 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1984). A “juridical person” is 

an “entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties 

of a human being[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 979, 1324–25 (10th ed. 2014). Factors 

relevant to whether an entity is a juridical person include the entity’s ability to sue and be 

sued in its own name, whether any recovery in such litigation becomes an asset of the 

entity, and whether the laws of the foreign country recognize the entity as a legally 

independent organized enterprise. Cohn, 733 F.2d at 629.

In the notice of removal and accompanying declaration, FCA explained it is an LLC 

organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. (Doc. No. 1 at 3 ¶ 11; Doc. No. 1 at 58

¶ 2.) Its sole member is FCA North American Holding LLC, also a limited liability 

company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. (Doc. No. 1 at 3 ¶ 11; Doc. 

No. 1 at 58 ¶ 3.) In turn, FCA North American Holding LLC’s sole member is Fiat Chrysler 

Automobiles, N.V. (“Fiat N.V.”), which is a publicly traded company incorporated under 

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the laws of the Netherlands with its principal place of business in London, England. (Doc. 

No. 1 at 3 ¶ 11; Doc. No. 1 at 58 ¶ 4.)

It is Fiat N.V.’s citizenship that Johnson contends FCA has failed to establish by a 

preponderance of evidence. Specifically, Johnson asserts Kris Krueger’s declaration fails 

to establish that Fiat N.V. is a juridical person under the laws of the Netherlands because 

the Krueger declaration is conclusory, contains improper legal conclusions, lacks 

foundation, and lacks any documentary evidence. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 10–11.)

The Court overrules Johnson’s objections. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1

provides, “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or 

source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence.” As such, FCA’s evidence need not pass muster under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence to be considered on the instant motion.4 Having considered

Krueger’s declaration, along with Scott Shepardson’s declaration and the accompanying 

translation of the Dutch Civil Code provided, the Court is satisfied that FCA has proven it 

is more likely than not a citizen of the Netherlands.5 The Dutch Civil Code provides that 

an N.V. is a “legal person” that can, inter alia, be held jointly and severally liable for its 

directors’ juridical acts. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 2, 5.) The Court’s conclusion is in keeping with 

those of other courts, finding N.V.s to be foreign entities. See Garcia, 2016 WL 4445337, 

at *3 (finding FCA “adequately asserted and established that [Fiat N.V.] is a juridical 

person under the laws of Netherlands and that [FCA] is not a citizen of California”); 

Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing foreign 

plaintiffs’ claims against defendant N.V. because 28 U.S.C. § 1332 “does not confer 

 

4 For this reason, the Court DENIES Johnson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 

No. 11-1 at 11.)

5

Johnson also raises evidentiary objections to the Shepardson declaration. (Doc. No. 20-

4.) First, Johnson’s filing violates the undersigned’s Civil Case Procedures, which require 

that objections relating to the motion be set forth in the party’s opposition or reply. Second, 

the Court OVERRULES the objections based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1.

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jurisdiction over suits by a group consisting of only foreign persons against another foreign 

person”).

Johnson further asserts that remand is appropriate because FCA has failed to 

establish that Johnson is a citizen of California. (Doc. No. 20 at 3–4.) In the notice of 

removal, FCA stated Johnson is a citizen and resident of California. (Doc. No. 1 at 3 ¶ 10.) 

That statement references the complaint, which simply states that Johnson is “an 

individual[] residing in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, and State of 

California.” (Doc. No. 1 at 10 ¶ 1.) Johnson argues that because the complaint does not 

allege that he is a citizen of California, and because the notice of removal relies on the 

complaint, FCA has failed to prove Johnson’s citizenship for purposes of removal. (Doc. 

No. 20 at 3–4.)

If the record contained only the information Johnson asserts it does, the Court would 

agree. “The natural person’s state citizenship is [] determined by her state of domicile, not 

her state of residence. A person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with 

the intention to remain or to which she intends to return. A person residing in a given state 

is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a citizen of that state.” Kanter 

v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). However, 

while Johnson stated in the complaint that he is a resident of California, the civil cover 

sheet clarifies that Johnson is also a California citizen. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.) In Item III, 

Johnson indicated he is a citizen of this (e.g., California) state. (Id.) In the absence of any 

evidence or argument to the contrary, the record supports finding it is more likely than not 

that Johnson is a citizen of California. See Lastra v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 10cv2573–

LAB (BLM), 2011 WL 768135, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (noting that defendant 

intended to allege plaintiff is a citizen of California given that the civil cover sheet 

identifies plaintiff as such). In sum, the Court finds FCA has carried its burden of 

establishing diversity jurisdiction.

//

//

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III. Comity

Johnson lastly asserts that the Court should decline jurisdiction on comity principles

because this case involves “consideration of numerous state-specific issues on sensitive, 

uniquely state-law issues of regulation and statutory interpretation.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 3–

5.) As a federal district court located within the State of California, this is not the Court’s 

first case dealing with claims predicated on the Song-Beverly Act or similar California 

state consumer protection laws. As such, the Court is confident in its ability to faithfully 

interpret and apply California state law to the issues of this case. While the Court is 

cognizant that Johnson has litigated this case for several months in state court, Johnson

should rest assured that this district seeks to move cases quickly in keeping with the spirit 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. The Court therefore declines to remand this case 

based upon principles of comity.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Johnson’s motion to remand is DENIED. (Doc. No. 11.)

Because the Court denies his motion, Johnson’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is also 

DENIED. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 11.) The parties’ requests for jurisdictional discovery are

DENIED. (Id.; Doc. No. 16 at 20–21.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2017

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