Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02070/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02070-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEANNE BARRAGAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF EUREKA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02070-WHO 

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

At the pretrial conference on October 11, 2016, I heard argument on the parties’ motions in 

limine. My rulings follow.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Plaintiffs’ Motions In Limine

1. MIL 1 – Exclude Reference to Decedent’s Consumption of Alcohol and 

Toxicology Report

As both parties acknowledge under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), whether an 

officer’s use of force was “reasonable” depends up the facts and circumstances known to the 

officer at the time of the use of force. Id. at 396. Facts unknown to an officer, for example here

that McClain was intoxicated, are not relevant to the question of reasonableness. See, e.g., Hayes 

v. Cty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) (fact that decedent was intoxicated was

not known or suspected by responding officers and, therefore, irrelevant under Graham). 

However, where the conduct of the decedent is in dispute, facts regarding the decedent that are 

unknown to the officers may support the credibility of a witness’s testimony or strengthen that 

testimony. See Boyd v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (“police 

assertions that [decedent] was acting erratically, taunting police and goading them to shoot him 

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instead of following police commands, is made more probable by [decedent’s] earlier statements 

to Oakland police, as well as evidence that he was on drugs at the time.”). 

The defense argues that because McClain’s conduct is in dispute (whether he reached for 

the gun, despite being told that if he did he would be shot), evidence that defendant may have been 

intoxicated supports the officers’ version of the events (only someone intoxicated or otherwise 

impaired would reach for a replica gun despite having been warned that he would be shot if he did 

so).

Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that because Officer Linfoot did not have an understanding that 

McClain was intoxicated, the evidence is irrelevant. Plaintiffs also argue that evidence regarding 

consumption of alcohol is highly prejudicial under Rule 403, and the defense cannot utilize the 

toxicology report because they have failed to designate an expert to speak to the impact of alcohol 

on McClain’s (or anyone else’s) actions.1 

However, because the actions of McClain are in dispute and because evidence of his 

consumption of alcohol could corroborate the officers’ version of events, the motion in limine is 

DENIED. See, e.g., Boyd v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“where what the officer perceived just prior to the use of force is in dispute, evidence that may 

support one version of events over another is relevant and admissible.”); Castro v. Cty. of Los 

Angeles, No. 213CV06631CASSSX, 2015 WL 4694070, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2015) 

(“evidence of decedent’s intoxication may be admissible to corroborate Sergeant Partida’s version 

of events, since decedent’s pre-shooting conduct is disputed.”); Turner v. Cty. of Kern, No. 1:11-

CV-1366 AWI SKO, 2014 WL 560834, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (same). 

The permissible evidence, however, is limited to percipient witness testimony regarding 

the amount and types of drinks McClain consumed that night and introduction of, but no 

testimony about, the toxicology report. Moreover, a limiting instruction will be given instructing 

that this evidence is not relevant to the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force under the 

 

1

Plaintiffs agree that if I am inclined to allow in toxicology evidence, then evidence of McClain’s 

hearing impairment – discussed in defendant’s MIL 12 below – should likewise come in because 

that evidence corroborates plaintiffs’ theory about McClain’s actions prior to the shooting. 

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totality of the circumstances inquiry, and may only be considered as supporting or undermining 

testimony regarding McClain’s actions immediately prior to the shooting. 

2. MIL 2 – Exclude Reference to Criminal History of Plaintiff Lance McClain

GRANTED. There is limited, if any relevance, to the criminal history of McClain’s father 

as grounds for impeachment and that evidence would be highly prejudicial.

3. MIL 3- Exclude Reference to Information Not Known by Officer Linfoot

a. Other Officers’ Observations of McClain Handling the Replica Gun and 

McClain’s Interaction with the Driver of the Pickup Truck

DENIED. Information regarding other officers’ observations is relevant to the

reasonableness of the tactics employed to detain McClain at the scene and explain why other 

officers responded the way they did. When Linfoot arrived on the scene, he observed these tactics 

and employed some of them himself. These facts are also relevant to the negligence and wrongful 

death claims under California law.

b. McClain’s Tattoos

GRANTED, except for tattoos shown in otherwise admissible autopsy photographs.

c. Items Found on McClain and in His Home After the Shooting

GRANTED. The brass knuckles and glass pipe found in McClain’s pocket (as well as the 

drug paraphernalia found in McClain’s room) are not relevant to the reasonableness of or the 

circumstances surrounding the shooting. Additionally, the limited relevance (if any) is 

outweighed by the prejudice under Rule 403.

4. MIL 4 – Exclude Trajectory Diagrams, Pictures, and Video Created by Alexander 

Jason

DENIED. Plaintiffs’ complaints about Jason’s report are more appropriately the subject of 

cross-examination. However, I am not deciding now whether any particular diagram or pictures

prepared by Jason (which have not be submitted for my review) should be admitted into evidence 

or are more appropriately utilized as demonstratives. That will be addressed at trial.

5. MIL 5 – Exclude Reference to Humboldt DA’s Finding That the Shooting was 

Justified

GRANTED, as long as plaintiffs make no reference to: (i) the DA’s investigation; (ii) that 

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Linfoot was not disciplined; or (iii) that Linfoot was represented when interviewed in connection 

with the investigation into the shooting.

6. MIL 6 – Exclude Reference to Eureka Police Department’s Finding That the 

Shooting was Justified

GRANTED, as long as plaintiffs’ expert does not testify to “out of policy tactics” other

than testimony regarding the commands given to McClain. 

B. Defendant’s Motions In Limine

1. MIL 1 – Exclude Reference to Insurance/Indemnification

GRANTED.

2. MIL 2 – Exclude Reference to Offers to Settle

GRANTED.

3. MIL 3 – Exclude Testimony that Shooting Was Unreasonable Because Gun Was a

Replica

DENIED. Plaintiffs are allowed to introduce evidence that McClain’s gun was a replica.

4. MIL 4 – Exclude Testimony That the Scope and Manner of the Detention and 

Arrest Was Unreasonable.

DENIED. While plaintiffs do not have a stand-alone claim regarding this topic, the facts 

surrounding the manner of detention and arrest are relevant to the negligence and wrongful death 

claims under California law. A limiting instruction can be given that focuses the jury on the 

limited relevance of the testimony.

5. MIL 5 – Exclude References to Other Police Shootings and Notorious Incidents

DENIED. This general topic may be raised in voir dire and in argument, as long as it is 

not a central focus and as long as no specific incidents are identified or mentioned by name.

6. MIL 6 – Exclude Arguments and Inferences for “Political Effect”

GRANTED. 

7. MIL 7 – Exclude Testimony That Shooting Was a “Murder”

DENIED. If a lay witness uses the term “murder,” I will consider a limiting instruction to 

clarify the difference between the colloquial and legal uses of the term.

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8. MIL 8 – Exclude Expert or Other Testimony that the Eureka Police Department

has a Custom and Practice of Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force

GRANTED. 

9. MIL 9 – Exclude Testimony that Officer Linfoot Should Have Issued a Warning 

Before Shooting

DENIED. This is part of the totality of the circumstances to be decided by jury, and the 

jury gets to decide whether a warning from Linfoot was feasible under the circumstances.

10. MIL 10 – Exclude Testimony Regarding the Actual Content of the Audio 

Recording

GRANTED. In general, the jury will decide what is said on the audio recording.

a. Lay Witnesses

However, the audio recording can be used to refresh a lay witness’s recollection and lay 

witnesses may testify whether the recording reflects what they believed they heard at the time.

b. Expert

Plaintiffs’ expert, Roger Clark, cannot testify as to what is heard on the tape. However, 

Clark may testify in response to hypotheticals regarding commands given by officers on the scene.

11. MIL 11 – Exclude Testimony Regarding Post-Shooing Tasing of McClain’s 

Cousin

GRANTED. 

12. MIL 12 – Exclude Testimony that McClain Has a Hearing Impairment

DENIED. Consistent with the discussion regarding evidence of alcohol consumption and 

intoxication, testimony regarding McClain’s hearing impairment is relevant to corroborate 

plaintiffs’ theory of McClain’s actions prior to the shooting. A limiting instruction will be given 

instructing that this evidence is not relevant to the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force 

under the totality of the circumstances inquiry, and may only be considered as supporting or 

undermining testimony regarding McClain’s actions immediately prior to the shooting. 

13. MIL 13 – Exclude References to the Fact that Defendants Were Not Responding 

to a More Serious Crime/Other Situation

DENIED.

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14. MIL 14 - Exclude testimony that Linfoot was Required to Use Least Intrusive 

Alternative to Effectuate Arrest 

GRANTED to extent plaintiffs cannot offer expert testimony that the least intrusive force 

was required as a matter of law, but DENIED to the extent plaintiffs may offer testimony that 

other alternatives were more reasonable under the circumstances.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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