Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01413/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01413-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH JANULEWICZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1413-H

(WMC)

ORDER GRANTING WITH

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

MOOTING ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE

vs.

BECHTEL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

On July 10, 2007, plaintiff Joseph Janulewicz (“Plaintiff”) filed a first amended

complaint (“FAC”) against defendant Bechtel Corporation (“Defendant”) alleging a

claim for violation of section 6310 of California’s Labor Code. (Doc. No. 33.) On July

27, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC and a motion to strike

Plaintiff’s jury demand and his request for certain damages. (Doc. No. 34.) On August

14, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motions. (Doc. No. 36.) On

August 17, 2007, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 37.) 

On August 20, 2007, the Court filed an order to show cause why this suit should

not be dismissed for failure of either party to appear at, or request a continuance of, the

previously scheduled pretrial conference on August 20, 2007. (Doc. No. 38.)

On August 27, 2007, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s motions. Attorney

Marcus Jackson appeared for Plaintiff and attorney Thomas M. McInerney appeared

Case 3:06-cv-01413-H-WMC Document 43 Filed 08/27/07 Page 1 of 10
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telephonically for Defendant at the hearing. For the following reasons, the Court

GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

pursuant to § 6310 of California’s Labor Code and concludes the order to show cause

is moot. 

Background

Plaintiff began working for Defendant at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating

Station (“SONGS”) in June 2000 as a journeyman ironworker, and worked there

intermittently until October 2004 pursuant to rotating jobs and hiring practices. (FAC

¶¶ 7, 10.) Defendant performs services at SONGS pursuant to a contract it has with

Southern California Edison (“SCE”). (Id. ¶ 7.) 

In June 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior Court for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, violations of California’s Labor

Code, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl.

¶¶ 1-38 (Doc. No. 1).) Defendant removed the suit to federal court. (Notice Removal,

at 1-4 (Doc. No. 1).) On June 11, 2007, the Court granted with prejudice Defendant’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violations of sections 6402, 6403,

and 6404 of California’s Labor Code, and negligent supervision. (Doc. No. 28.) The

Court also granted without prejudice Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

for violations of sections 98.6, 1102.5, 6310, and 6311 of California’s Labor Code.

(Id.) On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a FAC against Defendant alleging a claim for

violation of section 6310 of California’s Labor Code. 

Discussion

I. Judicial Notice

Judicial notice may be taken of facts not subject to reasonable dispute in that

they are “generally known” in the community or “capable of accurate and ready

determination by reference to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court has previously taken judicial notice

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of the fact that SONGS is located within the federal enclave of Camp Pendleton, which

was acquired by the United States no later than December 31, 1942 (Doc. No. 28), and

does so again for purposes of this motion. Although Plaintiff asks the Court to

consider minutes from California’s State Land Commission that discuss the

retrocession of property from the federal government to California that borders the

property on which SONGS is located, as he did in association with Defendant’s motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint, the Court again concludes that these

documents support the conclusion that SONGS is located on a federal enclave. (See

Req. Judicial Notice Opp. Motion Dismiss (Doc. No. 24-2), Ex. A, at 7 (defining land

retroceded as “extending southeasterly a distance of eighteen thousand, two hundred

twenty feet (18,220) from the southeast boundary of an easement for construction and

operation of a nuclear generating station, granted to Southern California Edison

Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company . . . .”).) 

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standards For Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to section 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the

complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule 12(b)(6) permits

dismissal of a claim either where that claim lacks a cognizable legal theory, or where

insufficient facts are alleged to support plaintiff’s theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). While a complaint does not need

detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. See Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). Rather, to survive a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), factual allegations must be sufficient to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact. See id. at 1965. 

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Dismissal is proper if a complaint is vague, conclusory, and fails to set forth any

material facts in support of the allegation. See North Star Intern. v. Arizona Corp.

Com’n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, a court may not “supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). If a complaint is found to fail

to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Doe v.

United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As a general matter, a court may only consider the pleadings and judicially

noticed facts in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly attached

to the complaint may properly be considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See id. at 1555 n.19.

Also, a court may consider documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and

whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

plaintiff’s pleading. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). This

doctrine extends to situations in which the plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of

a document and the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, even

though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the

complaint. See id.

B. Federal Enclave Doctrine

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to section 6310 of California’s

Labor Code is barred by the federal enclave doctrine. 

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution provides that

Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation over all places

purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be. This

constitutional provision grants federal courts federal question jurisdiction over tort

claims that arise on federal enclaves. See Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d

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1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Schwarzer et al., supra,¶ 2:89.10, p. 2B-30.

Furthermore, the enclave clause permits the continuance of those state laws existing

at the time of the surrender of sovereignty, except insofar as they are inconsistent with

the laws of the United States or with the governmental use for which the property was

acquired, unless they are abrogated by Congress, so that no area may be left without

a developed legal system for private rights. See Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of

Agriculture of Cal., 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309

U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940). Because the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction,

such laws become federal laws, although having their origin in the laws of the state.

See James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100;Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir.

1952); see also 91 C.J.S. United States § 15 (2006). 

Only state laws in effect at the time of cession or transfer of jurisdiction,

however, can continue in operation. See James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100. Laws

subsequently enacted by the state are inapplicable in the federal enclave unless they

come within a reservation of jurisdiction or are adopted by Congress. See id.; Paul v.

United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963); 91 C.J.S. United States § 15.

The Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that SONGS is located within the

federal enclave of Camp Pendleton, which was acquired by the federal government no

later than December 31, 1942. Section 6310 of California’s Labor Code was enacted

as part of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (“Cal/OSHA”).

See Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 993, § 59, p. 1930; see also Division of Labor Law

Enforcement v. Sampson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 893, 895 (1976) (“Labor Code section 6310

is a part of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973.”) Therefore,

since § 6310 was enacted after SONGS became a federal enclave, it is inapplicable

within SONGS unless it comes within a reservation of jurisdiction by California or was

adopted by Congress. See Paul, 371 U.S. at 268; see also Goodyear Atomic Corp. v.

Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“The activities of federal installations are shielded

by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless Congress provides ‘clear

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1

 Section 6310 provides in part that:

(a) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee

because the employee has done any of the following: [¶] (1) Made any oral or written

complaint to the [Division of Occupational Safety and Health], other governmental

agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to

employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his or her representative, . . . . 

(b) Any employee who is discharged, threatened with discharge, demoted, suspended,

or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of

employment by his or her employer because such employee has made a bona fide oral

or written complaint to the [Division of Occupational Safety and Health], other

governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with

reference to employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his or her representative,

of unsafe working conditions, or work practices, in his or her employment or place of

employment . . . shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages

and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer. 

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and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation.”); id. at 181 n.1 (“Direct state

regulation of federal facilities is allowed only to the extent that Congress has clearly

authorized such regulation.”). 

Plaintiff, relying on Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472

(2000), argues that Congress has authorized the enforcement of § 6310 in federal

enclaves. In Taylor, the state appellate court held that a plaintiff was able to bring a

claim for alleged violations of the whistleblower provisions of subsections (a) and (b)

of § 63101 occurring on an Air Force base. See Taylor, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 483-85.

The Taylor court reasoned that the U.S. Secretary of Labor’s approval of the California

Occupational Safety and Health Act (“Cal/OSHA”), which provided for a private right

of action against employers, “is the equivalent of congressional action” for the purpose

of permitting a plaintiff to assert a claim for relief under Cal/OSHA against a federal

enclave contractor, and allows state safety regulation of federal enclaves when the

responsible federal agency does not claim “exclusive jurisdiction.” See id. at 483-85

(citing Cal. Labor Code § 6303 (defining “place of employment” within California as

“any place, and the premises appurtenant thereto, where employment is carried on,

except a place the health and safety jurisdiction over which is vested by law in, and

actively exercised by, any state or federal agency . . . .”); 29 C.F.R. § 1952.172(b)(4)

(providing “[t]he U.S. Department of Labor will continue to exercise authority, among

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other things, with regard to: [] . . . . (4) Private contractors on Federal installations

where the Federal agency claims exclusive Federal jurisdiction, challenges State

jurisdiction and/or refuses entry to the State . . . .”). Since the federal agency

responsible for the federal enclave, the United States Air Force, allowed inspectors

from California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health to investigate the

plaintiff’s complaint that his termination from a civilian contractor operating on the Air

Force base was racially motivated and was in retaliation for a previous complaint

regarding safety equipment, the Taylor court concluded that the federal agency did not

claim exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore California’s occupational safety laws

applied since the federal agency was not actively exercising its jurisdiction. See id.

Plaintiff argues that this Court should similarly conclude that 29 U.S.C. § 667(b),

which creates a process whereby states may enact laws regarding occupational safety

or health issues to preempt federal standards, and 29 C.F.R. 1952.172(4), permit

Plaintiff to bring his claims pursuant to § 6310 because no federal agency is actively

exercising exclusive jurisdiction over SONGS. Plaintiff also argues that the fact that

California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health has issued a citation to

Bechtel Power Corporation regarding violations of asbestos regulations at SONGS in

January 2003 demonstrates that Congress has authorized general state regulation at

SONGS.

Defendant argues that Taylor incorrectly concluded that approval of Cal/OSHA

by the U.S. Secretary of Labor permits, under certain circumstances, enforcement of

Cal/OSHAwithina federal enclave, because such approval does not constitute the clear

and unambiguous congressional approval required to permit state regulation within a

federal enclave. See Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 180; Hancock, 426 U.S. at

179. Rather, Defendant argues, the Court should adopt the reasoning of Department

of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt & Aggregrate, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 49 (1992), in which the

Washington Supreme Court concluded that a status agreement between the state and

the Secretary of Labor did “not constitute a specific and unambiguous grant of

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authority” to the state to enforce state laws in a federal enclave. See Department of

Labor & Indus., 120 Wash. 2d at 54 (“Absent a specific provision, [an] attempt to

imply a grant of authority from general language in OSHA is simply not sufficient to

support state regulation.”). The Department of Labor & Indus. court added that “[i]t

is highly questionable that the [U.S.] Secretary of Labor has the power to

independently allow states to enforce workers’ safety laws within a federal enclave.”

Id. at 55 n.4. Additionally, the court concluded that even if a state intends its safety

and health statutes to apply to federal enclaves, under the supremacy clause, federal

law preempts conflicting state legislation. See id. at 56.

It appears to the Court that the Department of Labor & Indus. court’s conclusion

that the approval of the U.S. Secretary of Labor of a state occupational safety and

health statute is not the equivalent of the clear and unambiguous congressional

approval required to permit a plaintiff to bring a claim pursuant to a state law for

actions occurring at a federal enclave is correct. See Association of Public Agency

Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[S]tates do not have the power, absent absolutely clear congressional direction to the

contrary, to regulate transmission lines owned by . . . a federal agency.”); Parola v.

Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 960-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that federal installation

was required to comply with local exclusive garbage collection arrangement for solid

waste collection and disposal because 42 U.S.C. § 6961 “unambiguously subjects

federal instrumentalities to state and local regulation”); see also Goodyear Atomic

Corp., 486 U.S. at 181-83 (clear congressional authorization for application of state

statute was provided by 40 U.S.C. § 290 to allow states to apply workmen’s

compensation laws to federal premises to same extent as such laws are applied to

private facilities). 

It is not necessary, however, for this Court to decide whether a federal agencies’

failure to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over an occupational safety and health issue

in California could ever permit a plaintiff to bring suit pursuant to Cal/OSHA at a

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federal enclave. Rather, the Court concludes that even under Taylor’s permissive

standard, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support his theory that the

federal agency responsible for SONGS has failed to exercise exclusive jurisdiction

such that Plaintiff may bring a § 6310 claim for actions occurring at SONGS. The

Taylor court relied on the fact that it was undisputed that Air Force officials allowed

California Division of Occupational Safety and Health inspectors to come onto the base

to investigate the plaintiff’s complaints in concluding that the Air Force was not

actively exercising exclusive jurisdiction such that plaintiff could pursue his § 6310

claim regarding activities on the federal enclave. See Taylor, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 484.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s general allegations that no federal agency with responsibility for

health and safety concerns exercises exclusive jurisdiction over SONGS and that the

California Division of Occupational Safety and Health has authority over private sector

employers and employees at SONGS and has issued citations and conducted

investigation as SONGS (FAC ¶ 9) fails to allege a failure by the federal agency

responsible for SONGS to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaints

of retaliation to allow Plaintiff’s § 6310 claim to escape being barred by the federal

enclave doctrine. Furthermore, the Court concludesthat Plaintiff has demonstrated that

he is unable to cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the Court grants with prejudice

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 6310 of California’s

Labor Code as it is barred by the federal enclave doctrine. 

III. Motion to Strike

Since the Court has already granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

sole claim pursuant to § 6310 with prejudice, it denies Defendant’s motion to strike

Plaintiff’s jury demand and demand for certain types of damages as moot.

IV. Order to Show Cause

Since the Court has already granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

sole claim pursuant to § 6310 with prejudice, it concludes the order to show cause is

moot.

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Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to § 6310 of California’s

Labor Code and concludes the order to show cause is moot. Since Plaintiff has no

further claims before the Court at this time, the Clerk of Court should close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 27, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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