Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01805/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01805-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles A. Gulden, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Pete Geren, Secretary, United States

Army, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 08-1805-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Defendant Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army (“United States”) moves to dismiss

Plaintiff Charles A. Gulden’s (“Gulden”) complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). (Doc # 7.) Gulden appears pro se. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally

construed . . . .’” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam)). This order addresses only the

arguments and issues briefed by the parties. For the following reasons, the motion will be

denied in part and granted in part.

I. The Settlement Agreement

The United States and Gulden signed a Negotiated Settlement Agreement (“NSA”)

on August 17, 2005, to resolve certain discrimination claims alleged in Gulden’s March 1,

2005 Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Complaint. The United States moves to

dismiss all claims in this case predicated on allegations settled by that agreement. Gulden

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concedes that the claims of discrimination in his complaint relating to events before

August 17, 2005 were settled by the NSA. Accordingly, any such claims will be

dismissed with prejudice, but Gulden may continue to include the underlying events in his

complaint as relevant background information. 

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Section 2000e-3(a) of Title 42 makes it an unlawful employment practice “for an

employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . .

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17].” A court

does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit brought under this section unless the

plaintiff has exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To establish subject matter jurisdiction over

his Title VII retaliation claim, [a plaintiff] must have exhausted his administrative

remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC.” (citations omitted)). As part of the

exhaustion process, “a federal employee must notify an EEO counselor of discriminatory

conduct within 45 days of the alleged conduct, and then, if the matter is not resolved, the

employee may submit a formal administrative complaint.” Sommatino v. United States,

255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105, 1614.106); see also 29

C.F.R. § 1614.103(a) (making part 1614 applicable to complaints alleging retaliation). 

A. Hostile Work Environment

A claim for hostile working environment is timely so long as an act “contributing

to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period.” AMTRAK v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). However, the act that falls within the statutory time

period must be a “non-discrete” act. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 893 (9th

Cir. 2005). Non-discrete acts are those that occur “over a series of days or perhaps years

and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act . . . may not be actionable on its own.” 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 

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The complaint’s First Cause of Action alleges retaliation in the form of a hostile

work environment. The United States moves to dismiss that claim for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Gulden contacted an EEO counselor on September 26, 2006. 

For his claim to be timely, he must have alleged a non-discrete act that took place within

45 days of that date and that contributed to the alleged hostile work environment. Three

of the acts that Gulden alleges took place before September 26, 2006, are easily classified

as discrete: (1) an arbitrary performance review in October 2005; (2) failure to promote

him to a GS-14 position in October 2005; and (3) an arbitrary performance review in

August 2006. Because they are discrete, those acts cannot support the timeliness of his

hostile work environment claim. 

Gulden alleges that in January 2006 his new supervisor “began treating him in a

disrespectful and demeaning manner.” In March 2006, he made a written request to

discuss his employment conditions, which “resulted in attempts to discourage, ignore or

summarily dismiss his concerns, and in numerous ‘gotcha’ attempts by his immediate

supervisors.” One of his supervisors eventually dismissed his complaints “by written (email) memorandum.” The dismissal allegedly contained a fabricated recitation of facts. 

Although the timing of the dismissal is not clear from the complaint, it appears to have

been sent in May 2006. These allegations are too broad. For his harassment claim to be

timely, Gulden must allege at least one specific instance of disrespectful or demeaning

treatment, or at least one “gotcha attempt,” or at least one instance of fabricated evidence

that took place within 45 days of September 26, 2006. He has not done so.

The Court appreciates the confusion that a pro se litigant seeking to satisfy Porter

and Morgan may encounter when attempting to plead a hostile work environment claim. 

Porter requires the plaintiff to plead a “non-discrete act” that took place within the

statutory period and, by definition, the discriminatory act of harassment occurs not on any

given date but rather over “a series of days or perhaps years,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 

Understandably, a plaintiff may be tempted by these precedents to plead that disrespectful

or demeaning treatment occurred over a long period of time that includes the statutory

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“In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the court may consider affidavits or any other evidence

properly before the court.” Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 710 n.3 (citing American Medical

Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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time period. But a “non-discrete act” is a specific component act of harassment that “may

not be actionable on its own.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. Such an act does take place at

an ascertainable time and place. See Porter, 419 F.3d at 893 (holding that eating and

spitting in an employee’s food or hurling an epithet at an employee are “non-discrete

acts”). The plaintiff must allege one of those specific component acts that took place

within the time statutory time period. 

Gulden also bases his hostile work environment claim in part on his supervisors’

noncompliance with the terms of the NSA. He alleges that, at some unspecified time, one

of his supervisors told him that she was “not obligated to apply the job description that

had been developed as stipulated in the NSA, nor was she obligated to make his

permanent promotion to his job as stipulated in the NSA.” Gulden’s complaint does not

provide any example of how his day-to-day working conditions departed from the job

description in the NSA. He points to no event within 45 days of September 26, 2006

where he was denied some task or responsibility falling within the job description. Even

if he did, it is not clear whether such noncompliance with the NSA can be litigated before

this Court as part of a hostile work environment claim because the NSA provides its own

remedies for noncompliance. (See Doc. # 7, Ex. 1 at ¶ 7.)1

 

Respecting Gulden’s promotion, the terms of the NSA provide that it was to “be

converted to a permanent promotion effective on September 10, 2006.” (Id. ¶ 4(a).) 

Gulden’s complaint does not allege whether his promotion was made permanent at the

specified time. But even assuming that the complaint stated that his supervisors failed to

make his promotion permanent, that would obviously be a discrete act. See Morgan, 536

U.S. at 114. (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or

refusal to hire are easy to identify.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Gulden’s

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 The United States argues that notice of a proposed action is sufficient to begin the

45-day clock. It cites Erbel v. Johanns, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *34–36, 2007 WL

1387331 at *11 (E.D. Tenn. May 8, 2007), and Kincade v. O’Neill, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

20758 at *39–42, 2003 WL 22244943 at *13–14 (D.Conn. Sept. 29, 2003) vacated in part

by 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20758, 2003 WL 22735064. However, the relevant regulation

clearly states that in the case of a personnel action the 45 day clock begins running from the

“effective date of the action.” Erbel and Kincade do not explicitly discuss whether a

proposed action can begin the 45-day clock. In light of the plain language of the regulation,

the Court is not persuaded by that authority. In any event, since Gulden does not contest that

the evaluation was officially executed on the same day that it was proposed to him, this issue

does not seem to matter. As with all other issues discussed in this section of this order, the

Court is open to further briefing on this issue should Gulden amend his complaint and the

United States again move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action under Rule 12(b)(1).

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allegations of noncompliance with the NSA do not support the timeliness of his hostile

work environment claim. 

Gulden has not alleged a non-discrete act contributing to the allegedly hostile

environment that took place within the statutory time period. Accordingly, the First

Cause of Action in his complaint will be dismissed. 

B. 2007 Performance Evaluation

Skipping to the complaint’s Third Cause of Action, Gulden alleges retaliation in

the form of an arbitrary performance evaluation in 2007. Gulden contacted an EEO

counselor on October 4, 2007. The 2007 performance evaluation is a discrete act and

therefore must have become effective on August 21, 2007, or later for his claim to be

timely under the applicable regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (“An aggrieved person

must initiate contact with a Counselor . . . in the case of personnel action, within 45 days

of the effective date of the action.” (emphasis added)).2

 

The complaint does not specify the effective date of the 2007 performance

evaluation. The evidence shows that Gulden and his supervisors signed this evaluation on

July 31, 2007. (Doc. # 7, Ex. 7.) Gulden does not contest that all of the relevant parties

signed the evaluation on that date, making it effective. (Doc. # 7, Ex. 6 at 5) (“I have no

knowledge or information about when the Senior Rater actually executed this document,

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nor do I challenge the date that is shown . . . .”) If July 31, 2007, is the effective date of

the evaluation, his request for counseling was technically untimely because he contacted

an EEO counselor more than 45 days later. However, for a number of reasons, the Court

is not confident that Gulden’s counseling request was untimely.

When Gulden contacted the EEO counselor on October 4, 2007, he explained that

the Senior Rater’s signature was not affixed at the time he signed the evaluation. He also

explained that he was not notified of the evaluation’s full execution until August 28,

2007. (Doc. # 7, Ex. 6 at 5.) Gulden appears to be arguing that even if the evaluation

was executed and became effective on July 31, 2007, his time to contact an EEO

counselor should have been extended because, for reasons beyond his control, he did not

know that it had become effective until August 28, 2007. The applicable regulation

allows extension of the 45-day time limit for counseling when the individual shows “that

he or she did not know and reasonably should not have been known that the

discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2). 

Although the EEO counselor’s report does not cite this provision, it also does not note

that Gulden’s contact was untimely. (Doc. # 7, Ex. 5.) Gulden did in fact receive

counseling regarding his 2007 performance review and the counselor provided him with

notice of his right to file a formal complaint on November 15, 2007. (Id.) Given these

facts, it is not clear whether the United States can rely on the technical untimeliness of

Gulden’s counseling request. Additionally, Gulden may be making argument for

equitable tolling. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001)

(en banc) (to be entitled to equitable tolling “all one need show is that by the exercise of

reasonable diligence the proponent of tolling could not have discovered essential

information bearing on the claim”). 

The parties have not briefed these issues. As discussed below, Gulden’s Third

Cause of Action will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) in any event. Therefore, at this

time, the Court will deny the United States’ motion to dismiss the Third Cause of Action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States may raise and fully brief the

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issues again if Gulden chooses to amend his complaint. To be clear, the Court is not

prejudging the aforementioned issues. It is merely identifying issues that should be

briefed in the event that Gulden amends his complaint and the United States again moves

to dismiss the Third Cause of Action under Rule 12(b)(1). 

III. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted

“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). Under Rule

12(b)(6), “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). A plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The United States

moves to dismiss the Second Cause of Action and the Third Cause of Action, which

allege retaliation in the form of arbitrary performance evaluations in 2006 and 2007,

because Gulden has not plead sufficient facts to support his legal theory. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1)

involvement in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

link between the two.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). 

For the purposes of this motion only, the United States presumes that Gulden’s original

EEO complaint, which resulted in the NSA, and his subsequent EEO complaint in 2006

constitute protected activity. The United States further presumes that Gulden’s 2006 and

2007 performance reviews constitute adverse employment actions. It argues, however,

that Gulden’s complaint does not contain factual allegations showing a causal nexus

between the protected activity and the adverse performance reviews. 

“[C]ircumstantial evidence of a ‘pattern of antagonism’ following the protected

conduct can . . . give rise to the inference [of causation].” Porter, 419 F.3d at 895

(quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3rd Cir. 1997)). 

Gulden’s complaint attempts to allege such a pattern of antagonism following the NSA. 

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3

 The United States additionally points out that the supervisor named in Gulden’s

EEO complaints, Mr. James Wymer, signed neither the 2006 nor the 2007 evaluation.

Rather, two of Gulden’s other supervisors signed those evaluations. The United States

therefore argues that causation is absent. This argument fails because Gulden’s complaint

alleges that Mr. Wymer directed the other two supervisors’ discriminatory acts. The Court

must assume that fact to be true on the United States’ motion to dismiss. See Zimmerman

v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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However, it lacks the necessary factual support. He does not describe specific instances

where he was treated disrespectfully or in a demeaning manner. He does not describe any

instances of “gotcha attempts.” He does not describe times where he was denied tasks or

responsibilities fitting within his job description. Gulden’s broad allegations of

demeaning and disrespectful treatment do not meet the standard on a motion to dismiss. 

He must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. 

The temporal relationship between Gulden’s protected activities and the allegedly

arbitrary performance reviews does not, by itself, raise an inference of causation under

the facts as alleged. Where a plaintiff relies solely on the temporal proximity of a

protected activity and an adverse employment action to prove causation, “the temporal

proximity must be ‘very close[.]’” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274

(2001). In this case, there was an eighteen month gap between Gulden’s original EEO

complaint and his 2006 performance review. There was a ten month gap between his

2006 EEO complaint and his 2007 performance review. Our circuit has held that a nine

month gap was too long to infer causation from temporal proximity alone. Manatt v.

Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the gap between Gulden’s

protected activities and the alleged adverse employment actions is too long to infer

causation from temporal proximity alone.3

Gulden’s complaint does not show that his negative performance evaluations in

2006 and 2007 were caused by his protected activities. The motion to dismiss the Second

Cause of Action and the Third Cause of Action will therefore be granted.

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IV. Amendment

Gulden’s proposed amendment to his complaint does not address the deficiencies

noted in this order. His motion to amend will therefore be denied. However, Gulden will

be granted further leave to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies noted in this

order. Gulden is reminded that “[w]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss, we may ‘generally

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint,

and matters properly subject to judicial notice.’” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v.

City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)

(defining the pleadings allowed). Gulden’s current complaint in this case makes frequent

reference to his previous EEO complaints, but does not attach them. If Gulden amends

his complaint, he must include his factual allegations in the complaint. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Charles A. Gulden’s motion to

amend his complaint (doc. # 9) is denied.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (doc # 7) is granted and

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint by March 25, 2009.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action will be dismissed with prejudice if

Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by March 25, 2009.

DATED this 4th day of March, 2009.

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