Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00033/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00033-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AURORA HICKMAN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 18-cv-00033-LAB (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 13, 15) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry Alan Burns, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On January 5, 2018, plaintiff Aurora Hickman filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 

and supplemental security income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability 

beginning June 21, 2010. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 166-67.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for SSI, alleging disability 

beginning on the same date. (AR 168-73.) After her claims were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 105-09, 113-17), plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 118-19.) An administrative hearing was held 

on May 12, 2016. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken 

from her and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 35-67.) At the hearing, plaintiff amended 

her onset date to January 31, 2016. (AR 37-38.) 

As reflected in his August 11, 2016 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 21, 2010 

through the date of the decision. (AR 17-29.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner on November 3, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-3.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that 

plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 21, 2010, her original 

alleged onset date. (AR 19.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of the cervical 

spines, and right shoulder bursitis. (AR 19.) 

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At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 25.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform a range of light work, including sit, stand, or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour day; 

lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; occasionally use both lower 

extremities for pushing, pulling, and operating foot pedals; and occasionally climb stairs, 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and reach overhead. The ALJ found plaintiff could never 

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or crawl or reach overhead with the left upper extremity. 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff could frequently use both upper extremities for gross 

and fine manipulation, but never be exposed to unprotected heights, dangerous or fast 

moving equipment, or vibrating tools. (AR 25.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would be unable to 

perform any of her past relevant work. (AR 27-28.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile could 

perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy (i.e., hostess; small parts assembler; counter clerk; and rental clerk), the ALJ 

found that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 28-29.) 

DISPUTED ISSUES

As reflected in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the disputed issues that 

plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

1) Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in assessing 

plaintiff’s RFC, and specifically the May 25, 2016 opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, 

Marcela Delgado; and 

2) Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

A. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to properly 

evaluate the May 26, 2016 opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician. 

The medical evidence of record included a 2-page Summary Impairment 

Questionnaire form completed on May 25, 2016 by Dr. Marcela Delgado. (AR 827-28.) 

Although Dr. Delgado indicated that she had been treating plaintiff on a monthly basis 

since March 15, 2015 (AR 827), the administrative record does not include any of her 

treatment notes. Dr. Delgado diagnosed lumbosacral disc disease, large disc herniation at 

L4-5, multiple level cervical degenerative disc disease from C2-3 to C5-6, and 

subacromial/subdeltoid bursal effusion, citing a 2013 MRI and x-rays and an MRI from 

2011 in support of these diagnoses. (Id.) In the section of the form asking for the patient’s 

primary symptoms, Dr. Delgado wrote: “She is unable to sit, walk, or stand for long period 

of time, due to moderate to severe pain [in the] neck, shoulder, [and] low back.” (Id.) Dr. 

Delgado opined that, in an 8-hour workday, plaintiff could sit for 2 hours total, stand/walk 

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for less than 1 hour, and must elevate both legs six inches or less while sitting for 2 hours 

at a time. (AR 828.) Dr. Delgado further opined that plaintiff could “never/rarely” 

lift/carry even 0-5 pounds and that she had significant limitations reaching, handling, or 

fingering. Specifically, plaintiff could never/rarely use the left arm and only occasionally 

use the right arm to (a) grasp, turn and twist objects, (b) use the hands/fingers for fine 

manipulations, and (c) use the arm for reaching, including overhead. Dr. Delgado also 

opined that plaintiff was likely to be absent from work more than 3 times per month as a 

result of her impairments or treatment. (Id.) 

The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinion is 

entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 

888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, 

necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). The weight given a treating 

physician’s opinion depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is 

consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 

416.927(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it 

may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where, 

as here, a treating physician’s opinion is controverted,1

 it may be rejected only if the ALJ 

makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial 

evidence of record. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A 

treating physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with 

                                               

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 Dr. Delgado’s opinion was controverted by the opinion of Dr. Thomas Sabourin, a 

consultative examiner, who opined that plaintiff could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally 

and 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk 6 hours and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; push 

and pull equal to the lift and carry limitations; and occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, and 

crouch; and that plaintiff had no manipulative limitations. (See AR 633-37.) 

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specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.”); 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Here, the ALJ stated the following with respect to Dr. Delgado’s opinion: 

“The undersigned ALJ finds Dr. Delgado’s assessment extreme. While 

the claimant does have some back issues including a large herniated disc, 

degenerative disc disease, and narrowed disc spaces, there is no consistent 

evidence that the claimant would be unable to lift 0-5 pounds. In fact, at the 

hearing, she admitted that she could lift a gallon of milk, which is 8 pounds. 

Additionally, there is no evidence to undergird her assertion that the claimant 

is required to elevate her feet two hours at a time. Furthermore, Dr. Delgado 

indicated that the claimant is able to sit, stand or walk less than 3 hours in an 

8 hour workday. There is no persuasive evidence to suggest that the claimant 

is essentially bedfast. Because of these internal inconsistencies, lack of 

documentation and the unreasonable nature of the limitations, the undersigned 

ALJ gives Dr. Delgado’s assessment very little weight.” (AR 24.) 

The Court finds that these were legally sufficient reasons on which the ALJ could 

properly rely to accord “very little weight” to Dr. Delgado’s opinion. See, e.g., Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (Commissioner under no obligation to accept 

treating physician’s opinion that was “brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by 

clinical findings”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly 

rejected treating physician’s opinion of disability because it was inconsistent with 

claimant’s level of activity); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2001) (stating that a physician’s opinion may be “entitled to little if any weight” where the 

physician “presents no support for her or his opinion”); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ could properly reject medical report by 

citing its inconsistency with the claimant’s own testimony); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751, 

754 (same); see also Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an 

ALJ may reject check-off forms that do not contain an explanation of the bases for their 

conclusions).

Finally, the Court rejects plaintiff’s contention that, if the ALJ felt Dr. Delgado’s 

treatment notes were necessary, he should have requested them. (See ECF No. 13 at 14.) 

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It is the plaintiff’s duty to prove that she is disabled. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 

453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990). As noted in 

Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459-60, an ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only 

when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper 

evaluation of the evidence. 

Here, plaintiff appears to confuse an ALJ’s duty to develop an inadequate or 

ambiguous record with one of the reasons cited by ALJ for rejecting Dr. Delgado’s opinion, 

i.e., it lacked documentation to support her “extreme assessment.” The ALJ had no duty 

to develop the record simply because the ALJ found Dr. Delgado’s opinion lacked support. 

See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Rejection of the treating

physician’s opinion . . . does not by itself trigger a duty to contact the physician for more 

explanation”). 

 The Court is mindful of Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that the ALJ has 

a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s 

interests are considered, and that this special duty exists even when the claimant is 

represented by counsel. See Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). 

However, the Court concurs with the Commissioner that, even if this duty applied to the 

records of Dr. Delgado, who was one of plaintiff’s treatment providers in Tijuana, the ALJ 

fulfilled this duty when he sent plaintiff pre-hearing notices instructing her to submit 

probative evidence (AR 120-24, 129-41) and when he acceded to plaintiff’s counsel’s 

request to hold the record open for 30 days following the administrative hearing to allow 

plaintiff to submit additional medical records from her Tijuana treatment providers. (AR 

38-39.) See Conner v. Colvin, 674 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding the ALJ 

satisfied the duty to develop the record where the ALJ sent notices prior to the hearing 

instructing the claimant to submit probative evidence and left the record open for 30-days 

post-hearing to give the claimant a chance to supplement the record); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 

242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ may discharge his duty to develop the 

record in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians, submitting 

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questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open 

after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.”); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 

602 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that ALJ satisfied any duty to develop record by requesting 

additional records from claimant and her counsel, and by keeping post-hearing record open 

for supplemental medical evidence). 

B. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that she was unable to work because 

of constant back pain. (See AR 41, 43.) She also testified to having limited use of her left 

arm and hand due to pain resulting from a fall. (AR 48, 56.) She estimated that she could 

sit approximately 2 hours at a time, stand 20 minutes, and walk 15-20 minutes. (AR 44, 

53.) She testified that she kept a cane in her car which she used when she had muscle 

spasms. (AR 44.) At the time of the hearing, she was working a 3-month temporary job 

as a laboratory “stationer,” preparing specimens to be put into machines. (AR 40-41.) 

However, almost every week, she calls in sick on Wednesday to give herself a day off to 

rest. (AR 55.) She also needed to take a break to stretch and move around for 5 minutes 

after sitting for 2 hours and stand for 10-15 minutes 4-5 times during an 8-hour workday. 

(AR 54-55.) She also testified that she has difficulty focusing sometimes. (AR 59.) 

Plaintiff also testified that her adult children live with her to help take care of her. 

(AR 46, 55-56.) She can manage her own personal care with additional time, but has 

difficulty dressing and bathing. (AR 46-47.) She relies on her children to perform most 

household chores and her daughter must help her go to the bathroom. (Id.) Her children 

drive her to Tijuana for medical treatment because she does not have insurance. (AR 47, 

51.) She eats out with her family at times, but it is difficult for her. (AR 50.) She does go 

to church on Sundays, and alternates between sitting and standing during the hour long 

service, but sometimes has difficulty concentrating. (AR 50-51.) 

It is well established in this Circuit that, if the claimant has produced objective 

medical evidence of an impairment or impairments that could reasonably be expected to 

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produce some degree of pain and/or other symptoms and the record is devoid of any 

affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of the claimant’s pain and/or other symptoms only if the ALJ makes 

specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so. See Smolen v. Chater, 

80 F.3d 1273, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1996); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 

1407 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, it is incumbent on the ALJ to specify which statements by 

plaintiff concerning his or her symptoms and functional limitations were not credible 

and/or in what respect(s) plaintiff’s statements were not credible. See Reddick, 157 F.3d 

at 722; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

 Here, the ALJ did not specifically summarize plaintiff’s administrative hearing 

testimony in his decision. He did state that plaintiff “has alleged that she is unable to work 

due to constant back pain, neck and shoulder pain.” (AR 26.) The ALJ then stated: 

 “After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that 

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id.) 

 The ALJ proceeded to cite a Function Report submitted by plaintiff (AR 213-20) in 

which plaintiff described her activities of daily living, as well as a Third Party Adult 

Function Report submitted by plaintiff’s daughter (AR 249-56). The Ninth Circuit has 

noted that there are “two grounds for using daily activities to form the basis of an adverse 

credibility determination”: Evidence of the daily activities either (1) contradicts the 

claimant’s other testimony, or (2) meets the threshold for transferable work skills. See Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the Commissioner does not contend 

that the ALJ was invoking the second ground. Rather, the Commissioner contends that the 

ALJ appropriately considered inconsistencies in plaintiff’s and her daughter’s statements 

and the evidence that cast doubt on the extent of plaintiff’s symptom allegations. (See ECF 

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No. 15-1 at 21-22.) The ALJ did cite two supposed inconsistencies in his decision. First, 

the ALJ noted that the daughter had stated in the Third Party Function Report that her 

mother had used a cane since 2009 and asserted, “[t]his is contradictory to her mother’s 

statements and the fact she presented to the orthopedic consultative examiner without a 

cane and has been found to have a normal gait in almost all examinations.” (AR 27 citing 

AR 255.) The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s administrative hearing testimony, the 

daughter’s Third Party Function Report, and the consultative examiner’s report and fails to 

see any inconsistency. Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that she kept a cane 

in her car which she used when she had muscle spasms. (AR 44.) Her daughter indicated 

in the Third Party Function Report that, since 2009, plaintiff had used a cane “as needed 

for support.” (AR 255.) Plaintiff told the consultative examiner that she used a cane at 

times. (AR 633.) Moreover, even if the fact that plaintiff was found to have a normal gait 

in almost all examinations qualified as an inconsistency with her testimony about 

sometimes using a cane, the Court finds that this “inconsistency” does not constitute a clear 

and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiff’s excess pain testimony in its entirety. 

 The ALJ also noted that both function reports indicated that plaintiff “generally does 

not have issues paying attention or concentrating unless she is in significant pain.” He 

then asserted, “This is inconsistent with her testimony at the hearing that she sometimes 

has difficulty understanding what is happening during a church service.” (AR 27.) Again, 

the Court fails to see any inconsistency between what plaintiff and her daughter stated in 

the function reports and what plaintiff testified to at the administrative hearing. Plaintiff’s 

pain sometimes was sufficiently severe that it affected her ability to concentrate. 

 The Commissioner has cited other supposed inconsistencies (see ECF No. 15-1 at 

22), but because the ALJ did not rely on these other supposed inconsistencies as a reason 

for not crediting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, the Court is unable to consider 

them as a basis for upholding the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Ceguerra 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A reviewing court 

can evaluate an agency’s decision only on the grounds articulated by the agency.”); see 

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also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). For the same reason, the 

Court is unable to consider the Commissioner’s contention that the ALJ also relied on the 

consultative examiner’s “repeated findings and observations of [p]laintiff exaggerating” in 

support of her adverse credibility determination. (See ECF No. 15-1 at 22.) 

 As for the Commissioner’s contention that the ALJ reasonably discounted plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints based on the lack of objective evidence, since the ALJ’s other 

reasons were legally insufficient to support his adverse credibility determination, this 

remaining reason (i.e., the lack of objective medical support) cannot be legally sufficient 

by itself. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2006) (where 

ALJ’s initial reason for adverse credibility determination was legally insufficient, his sole 

remaining reason premised on lack of medical support for claimant’s testimony was legally 

insufficient); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] finding 

that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on a lack of medical support 

for the severity of his pain.”); cf. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain 

testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”). 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

 The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister, 888 F.2d at 603; Lewin 

v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand for further proceedings is 

warranted where additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the 

decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d 

at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where no useful purpose would 

be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th 

Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 

1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to 

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which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 

1985).

The Court is mindful of Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that, where an 

ALJ failed to properly consider either subjective symptom testimony or medical opinion 

evidence, it is sometimes appropriate to credit the evidence as true and remand the case for 

calculation and award of benefits. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-21 

(9th Cir. 2014). However, in Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014), a 

case decided after Garrison, another Ninth Circuit panel did not apply or even 

acknowledge the “credit as true” rule where substantial evidence did not support an ALJ’s 

rejection of treating medical opinions and his adverse credibility determination; instead, 

the panel simply remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. And, in Marsh 

v. Colvin, 792 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015), the panel did not apply or even 

acknowledge the “credit as true” rule where the ALJ had failed to even mention a treating 

source’s opinion that the claimant was “pretty much nonfunctional”; instead, the panel 

simply remanded the case to afford the ALJ the opportunity to comment on the doctor’s 

opinions. 

Here, although plaintiff contends that “the decision of the Commissioner should be 

reversed for a calculation and award of benefits” (see ECF No. 13 at 18), the Commissioner 

has argued that the appropriate remedy in the event of reversal would be a remand for 

further administrative proceedings (see ECF No. 15-1 at 23-24). The Court deems 

plaintiff’s failure to adequately brief the issue of the appropriate remedy and failure to even 

reply to the Commissioner’s contention in this regard as a concession to the correctness of 

the Commissioner’s position. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant 

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 15, 2018 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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