Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00610/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00610-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE PEREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00610-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE DUE

PROCESS AND RETALIATION CLAIMS,

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 18)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Jesse Perez (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April 4, 2006,

in the Northern District of California. The action was transferred to this court on April 24, 2006.

On December 13, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure

to state a claim. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 2, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s claims in this action arise from his validation as a Mexican Mafia gang associate

and the assessment against him of an indeterminate Security Housing Unit term. Plaintiff names

Chief Deputy Warden D. L. Winett, Associate Warden M. K. Witcher, Captain T. Meadors, V.

McLaughlin, Brian Parry, Jimi De La Torre, James Moreno, C. Fortson, R. Parrilla, and E. Donnolly

as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking both monetary and equitable relief, and alleges that his due

process rights and equal protection rights were violated by defendants.

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1. Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause

itself does not confer on plaintiff a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of

confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221, 125 S.Ct. at 2393 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976)). Understate law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison

regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 481-84 (1995). Such interests are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.

The assignment of validated gang members and associates to the SHU is an administrative

measure rather than a disciplinarymeasure, and is “essentially a matter of administrative discretion.”

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096,

1098 (9th Cir. 1997)). Assuch, prisoners are entitled to theminimal procedural protections set forth

in Toussaint, namely adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review. Bruce, 351

F.3d at 1287 (citing to Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition

to these minimal protections, there must be “some evidence” supporting the decision. Id. (citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). 

As set forth in his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was validated and assessed

an indeterminate SHU term without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and without sufficient

evidence. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against all named defendants based on the deprivation of a protected liberty interest in remaining free

from the SHU without due process of law.

2. Equal Protection Claim

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing

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Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination

means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v.

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396,

1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). 

Although plaintiff alleges defendants discriminated against him, plaintiff’s amended

complaint is devoid of facts supporting a claim that in validating him and assessing an indeterminate

SHU term, defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a

protected class. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim.

3. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Although plaintiff does not specifically plead a retaliation claim, plaintiff’s allegations

provide more than ample notice that plaintiff is claiming defendants validated him and assessed him

an indeterminate SHU term in retaliation against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Therefore, despite plaintiff’s failure to specifically plead it, the court finds that the amended

complaint contains a cognizable retaliation claim.

///

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C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims for relief against

defendants Winett, Witcher, Meadors, McLaughlin, Parry, De La Torre, Moreno, Fortson, Parrilla,

and Donnolly for denial of due process and retaliation. However, the court finds that plaintiff’s

complaint does not state a cognizable equal protection claim. The court will provide plaintiff with

the opportunity to file a second amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file a second amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding

only against defendants Winett, Witcher, Meadors, McLaughlin, Parry, De La Torre, Moreno,

Fortson, Parrilla, and Donnolly on his cognizable due process and retaliation claims, plaintiff may

so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue Findings and Recommendations

recommending that the remaining claim be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff ten

summonses and ten USM-285 forms to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these

documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on

defendants Winett, Witcher, Meadors, McLaughlin, Parry, De La Torre, Moreno, Fortson, Parrilla,

and Donnolly.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

court in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file a second amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendants Winett, Witcher,

Meadors, McLaughlin, Parry, De La Torre, Moreno, Fortson, Parrilla, and

Donnolly on his cognizable due process and retaliation claims; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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