Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01921/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01921-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE THOMAS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15-cv-01921-H-MDD 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 15] 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND 

[Doc. No. 23] 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

 On August 31, 2015, Petitioner Bruce Thomas, proceeding pro se, filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from a California 

misdemeanor conviction for obstructing a peace officer. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 19, 

2016, Petitioner filed a first amended habeas petition, alleging a single claim that the state 

appellate proceedings violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. (Doc. 

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No. 15.) On March 30, 2016, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (Doc. No. 19.) 

On April 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 21.) On August 1, 2016, the 

magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the Court deny 

the petition. (Doc. No. 23.) On August 18, 2016, Petitioner filed an objection to the report 

and recommendation. (Doc. No. 24.) After careful consideration, the Court denies 

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. 

Background 

I. State Procedural History 

 On May 22, 2014, a California jury convicted Petitioner of one misdemeanor offense 

of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in violation of California Penal Code 

§ 148(a)(1).1

 (Doc. No. 20-2, Lodgment No. 11-1 at CT 176.) Following state appellate 

procedures for misdemeanor convictions, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, appealed to the 

appellate division of the Superior Court of California. (Doc. No. 20-1, Lodgment No. 10 

at 15–20, 48–56.) After oral argument, on March 5, 2015, a three-judge panel rejected all 

of Petitioner’s claims on the merits and unanimously affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

(Id. at 7–8.) 

On March 23, 2015, the appellate division of the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for rehearing and on June 8, 2015, denied Petitioner’s motion to call the remittitur. 

(Id. at 2–3, 5.) On May 8, 2015, the appellate division denied Petitioner’s motion to certify 

the case to the California Court of Appeal as untimely. (Id. at 3.) 

On June 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California 

Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 22-2, Lodgment No. 2 at 1–2.) On June 30, 2015, the 

                                                                

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 Because the claim in the petition rests on the procedural circumstances of Petitioner’s state 

appellate proceedings, the Court omits the factual background of Petitioner’s trial. But a description of 

the facts can be found in the respondent’s brief filed in the appellate division of the Superior Court of 

California. (See Doc. No. 20-1, Lodgment No. 10 at 31–33.) 

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California Court of Appeal summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandate. 

(Doc. No. 22-3, Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 22-4, Lodgment No. 4.) On August 12, 2015, the 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Doc. No. 22-6, Lodgment 

No. 6.) 

II. Federal Procedural History 

On August 31, 2015, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition before this Court, 

alleging that the state appellate proceedings violated his due process rights.2

 (Doc. No. 15 

at 3–4.) On March 30, 2016, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (Doc. No. 19.) 

On April 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 21.) On August 1, 2016, the 

magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the Court deny 

the petition. (Doc. No. 23.) On August 18, 2016, Petitioner filed an objection to the report 

and recommendation. (Doc. No. 24.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for 35 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does 

not lie for errors of state law.” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ available 

only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged . . . .’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633–34 

                                                                

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 In his original petition, Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 

object to the prosecutor’s introduction of non-victim witness testimony at trial. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

However, Petitioner subsequently abandoned this claim when he amended the petition to allege only the 

due process claim. (Doc. Nos. 13, 15.) 

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(1993)). Because Petitioner filed the present petition after April 24, 1996, the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. See 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322–23 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Under AEDPA, a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to a state court judgment “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim”: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). “This is a ‘difficult 

to meet,’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 

(citations omitted). “Section 2254(d) thus demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner’s 

‘claim’ has been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court; if it has, AEDPA’s highly 

deferential standards kick in.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). “The 

petitioner carries the burden of proof.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision was “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The 

Supreme Court has explained that “§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable 

application’ clauses have independent meaning.’” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); 

see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–05 (2000) (distinguishing the “contrary to” and 

the “unreasonable application” standards). “A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ [the 

Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 

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governing law set forth in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from our precedent.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 405–06). A state court decision is “an unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedent if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule 

from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular 

state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle 

from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Under the “unreasonable application” prong, “the state court’s 

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 520 (2003). The state court’s application of the relevant precedent must have been 

objectively unreasonable. Id.; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003); see also 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.”). 

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Under this provision, 

“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 

U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (“[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ 

about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial 

court’s . . . determination.’”). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that [the federal habeas court] 

accord the state trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 

(2015). 

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 In conducting an analysis under AEDPA, the federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state-court decision. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Where there is an unexplained 

decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas court “looks through” to the last 

reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained opinion rests upon the 

same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801–06 (1991); see, e.g., Brumfield, 135 

S. Ct. at 2276. Where no state-court decision furnishes a basis for the state court’s 

underlying reasoning, the court must engage in an independent review of the record and 

ascertain whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Castellanos, 766 

F.3d at 1145; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is 

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). 

 In addition, even if a federal habeas petitioner has established that a constitutional 

error occurred, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on a trial error unless the 

petitioner can establish that the error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637; accord Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197. “Under that standard, an error is harmless unless it 

had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Fry v. 

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, 

“[t]here must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error was harmful.” Ayala, 

135 S. Ct. at 2198. 

 A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). If a party objects to any portion of the magistrate’s report, the district court 

reviews de novo those portions of the report. Id.; see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The statute makes it clear that the district 

judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if 

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objection is made, but not otherwise.” (emphasis in original)). 

II. Petitioner’s Procedural Due Process Claim 

 As his sole ground for habeas relief, Petitioner alleges that the California appellate 

proceedings violated his due process rights by limiting his oral arguments at the appellate 

division of the Superior Court. (Doc. No. 15 at 4.) Since the California Court of Appeal 

and the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s due process claim, this 

Court engages in an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court 

decision was objectively unreasonable. See Castellanos, 766 F.3d at 1145; Richter, 562 

U.S. at 98. 

Clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides that there is no constitutional 

right to an appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Further, “a prisoner has no 

absolute right to argue his own appeal or even to be present at the proceedings in an 

appellate court.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). “Oral argument on appeal 

is not an essential ingredient of due process and it may be circumscribed as to prisoners 

where reasonable necessity so dictates.” Id. at 286; see Martinez v. Court of Appeal of 

California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (“[A] lay appellant’s rights to 

participate in appellate proceedings have long been limited by the well-established 

conclusions that he has no right to be present during appellate proceedings, or to present 

oral argument.” (internal citations omitted)). Although not required by the Constitution, a 

state has great discretion and may nonetheless provide defendants with certain appellate 

rights, so long as the appellate procedures comport with due process. See Martinez, 528 

U.S. at 163–64; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–18 (1956). 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s decision denying his claim 

involved an unreasonable interpretation of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 

or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Petitioner’s oral 

argument at the appellate division of the Superior Court did not violate his due process 

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rights. In California, a criminal defendant has a right to oral argument on appeal. People 

v. Brigham, 25 Cal. 3d 283, 285–88. However, the California Rules of Court imposes time 

limitations on oral arguments. For appeals of misdemeanor convictions in the appellate 

division of the Superior Court, each party is allowed ten minutes for oral argument. Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.885(e)(2); see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 (1983) (noting that 

“oral argument is strictly limited in most courts”). Under Price, a pro se litigant has no 

constitutional right to present oral argument during appellate proceedings. 334 U.S. at 286. 

In exercising state discretion, California has provided a right to oral argument, subject to 

time limitations. Here, the appellate division gave Petitioner ten minutes, consistent with 

California Rule of Court 8.885(e)(2). Accordingly, in limiting Petitioner’s oral argument 

to ten minutes, the California courts did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights. 

Petitioner also contends that in another case that same day the appellate division 

allowed the defense counsel approximately thirty five minutes to present oral argument, 

but limited his oral argument to ten minutes. (Doc. No. 24 at 2.) However, a court may 

exercise its discretion to grant a party more time for oral argument. It is not a due process 

violation when the court did not give Petitioner more than ten minutes for oral argument. 

See Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163–64. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that he was not able to present certain photographic 

evidence during his oral argument before time expired. (Doc. No. 15 at 4.) Again, the 

right to self-representation is not absolute, and the defendant must intelligently conduct his 

own defense in a timely manner. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 161–62. It was Petitioner’s 

responsibility to present whatever evidence he deemed important during the time allotted. 

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show a due process violation in his state appellate 

proceedings. Because the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable interpretation of 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

the Court denies Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief. 

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III. Certificate of Appealability 

 A certificate of appealability may issue only if the petitioner “has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district 

court has denied the petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner satisfies 

the above requirement by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the 

Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, the Court 

declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 15, 23.) 

Additionally, the Court denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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