Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00612/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00612-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES H. SHORTZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:14cv612-MHT

) (WO)

RAY SMITH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the pro se plaintiff James H. Shortz (“Shortz”)

complains in his amended complaint that defendants Phenix City Police Chief and Assistant

City Manager Ray Smith (“Smith”) and Phenix City-Russell County Library Director

Michele Kilday (“Kilday”) violated his First Amendment rights when they denied him the

use of a meeting room in the Phenix City-Russell County Public Library. According to

Shortz, he wanted to use the meeting room to explain the differences between Dr. Martin

Luther King, Jr. and Robert E. Lee, but Smith and Kilday prevented himfromusing the space

based on their perceptions of his proposed speech. Shortz seeks monetary damages, and

injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. # 31 at 13). The court has jurisdiction of these

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction. 

Now pending before the court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc.

# 62) filed on September 4, 2015. On September 28, 2015, the plaintiff filed a response in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment (doc. # 65). After careful review of the

motion, the briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the supporting and

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opposing evidentiarymaterials, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED, and this case is due to be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 1

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) (Summary judgment “should

be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and

affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence which would be admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324. 

Effective December 1, 2010, the language of Rule 56(a) was amended. The word “dispute”

1

replaced the word “issue” to “betterreflect[]the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” FED.R.CIV.P.

56(a), Advisory Committee Notes, 2010 Amendments. 

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Once the defendants meet their evidentiary burden and demonstrate the absence of a

genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may

. . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”). A genuine dispute of material

fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in his favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

To survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” establishing a violation of

his constitutional rights. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the

evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly

probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of

a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911

F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990) quoting Anderson, supra. Hence, when a plaintiff

fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden

of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the

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nonmoving party’s case necessarilyrenders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest

Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case

the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children &

Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are material

under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.”). 

“The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that

factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City

of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate

a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd., v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is

admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled

to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324

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(summaryjudgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiarymaterials and affidavits before

the court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, see

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980), a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of

establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548

U.S. 521, 529 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, 

the court does not have “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain a cause of action.” GJR Inv., Inc. v. County

of Escambia, Fl., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status

alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and

proof in a civil case. 

III. FACTS2

On January 10, 2014, Kilday posted a sign on the door of the Phenix City-Russell

County library notifying patrons that the library would be closed on January 20, 2014, “in

At this stage of the proceedings, this court takes the facts alleged by Shortz as the non-movant as

2

true and construes them in the light most favorable to him. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d

844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“In assessing whether there is any ‘genuine issue’ for trial, the

court ‘must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party” and ‘resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the

nonmovant.”). 

However, the court accepts the defendants’ factual assertions when they are based on undisputed

evidence and have not been contradicted by Plaintiff. See Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1176 n. 2

(11th Cir. 2015); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007) (“[F]acts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” (quoting FED.R.CIV.

P. 56(c))). 

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observance of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert E. Lee’s birthday.” (Doc. # 63, Ex. A). 

Shortz saw the sign, became agitated and left the library. (Id. at ¶ 2). According to Kilday,

Shortz returned to the library on January 13, 2014. After a conversation with Kilday about

Robert E. Lee in which Shortz became visibly upset, Shortz asked if he could use a meeting

room at the library “to tell all the patrons . . . “what the real history was,” and “how evil

Robert E. Lee was.”” (Id. at ¶ 3). Kilday informed Shortz that he would have to complete

a “meeting room use request form” and she would check with the City. (Id.). Shortz

completed the form and requested the use of a meeting room on January 19, 2014 at 3:00

p.m. (Doc. # 63, Ex. A-1). 

Kilday spoke with city manager Wallace Hunter about her interactions with Shortz

and his request to use a meeting room. (Doc. # 63, Ex. A at ¶ 4). Kilday described her

concern about an interaction with Shortz on January 10, 2014. “I became concerned about

Mr. Shortz because he seemed to lose control and the angry and aggressive way that he

approached me and questioned me.” (Id. at ¶ 2). On January 13, 2014, Shortz again

approached Kilday, who described him as loud and aggressive, shouting and screaming at

her. (Id. at ¶ 3). Because Kilday expressed concern about Shortz’s behavior, Hunter referred

the matter to Smith as the chief of police and assistant city manager. (Id. ¶ 4). 

Hunter telephoned Smith and explained Kilday’s concerns about Shortz. (Doc. # 63,

Ex. B at ¶ 8). Smith then went to the library to discuss with Kilday her concerns and Shortz’s

request to use the meeting room. (Id. at ¶ 5). After Kilday informed Smith that she felt

threatened by Shortz and that she considered his behavior to be irrational, Smith made the

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decision to deny Shortz’s request to use the meeting room. (Id. at ¶ 9). According to Smith,

he “believed . . . as the chief of police and as the assistant city manager, that any meeting,

speech, rally, or seminar that was conducted by Mr. Shortz, judging by his recent loud,

disruptive, and aggressive outbursts in the library, . . . would be contentious and could

possibly pose a threat to public safety.” (Id. at ¶ 10). Because a meeting room in a library 3

was not an appropriate place for “a potentially raucous debate or loud speech,” Smith denied

Shortz’s request to use a meeting room. (Id.) In addition, Smith denied Shortz’s request

because there was insufficient time to secure sufficient security for the event. (Id. at ¶ 10-11). 

This lawsuit followed. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Shortz alleges that Smith and Kilday denied his request to use the library meeting

room in violation of his First Amendment freedom ofspeech rights because they deemed the

“subject was too controversial.” (Amended Compl. at ¶ 16 & ¶ 19). According to Shortz,

he requested to use the meeting room “for the purpose of explaining the differences between

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert E. Lee.” (Id.) Shortz contends that the defendants

violated his First Amendment rights when, acting under color of state law, they denied his

request to use the room solely based on their perception of the content of his proposed

speech. (Doc. # 31 at 7 and 9). The defendants assert that they are entitled to summary

judgment because the library is a limited public forum and the restrictions on its use were

Shortz has a long history with Phenix City. He has repeatedly complained about perceived 3

injustices against him by city officials.

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reasonable. The court pretermits discussion of the defendants’ specific arguments because

the court concludes that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is made applicable to state and local

government by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). 

While Shortz does not leave his First Amendment rights at the door of the Phenix CityRussell County library, his rights are not limitless. “[T]he First Amendment does not

guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). See also

Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2011). “The validity of restrictions on

protected First Amendment expression depends upon the type of speech and the type of

forumbeing regulated.” Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v.Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th

Cir. 1994). “[T]he degree of scrutiny we place on a government’s restraint of speech is

largely governed by the kind of forum the government is attempting to regulate.” Bloedorn,

631 F.3d at 1230. Thus, the first step in the court’s analysis is to determine the nature of the

Phenix City-Russell County library as the forum at issue. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal

Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).

The defendants assert that the Phenix City-Russell County library is a limited public

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forum, and thus, the restrictions placed on Shortz’s access to the library were reasonable and

not in violation of the First Amendment. Public libraries have been held to be designated or

limited public forums for the purpose of the First Amendment. See Kreimer v. Bureau of

Police for the Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1992); Doe v. City of

Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012); Neinast v. Bd. of Trustees of the Columbus

Metropolitan Library, 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003). “A designated public forum is

government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum but that has

been intentionallyopened up for that purpose.” Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1231 quoting Christian

Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,

679, n.11 (internal quotations omitted). “When the [government] establishes a limited public

forum, the [government] is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every

type of speech.” Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). And,

while a public entitymay not restrict speech based on a speaker’s point of view, “it has broad

discretion to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully

dedicated.” Id. at 130-131 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (STEVENS, J.,

dissenting). However, any “restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of

viewpoint, . . . and the restriction must be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the

forum,” Id. at 106-07. See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.

819, 829 (1995). The government may restrict access to a limited or designated public forum

provided that the restriction is “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at

1231. 

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“In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the [government] may reserve the

forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on

speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials

oppose the speaker's view.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. The government has a

legitimate interest in avoiding disruption and protection ofthat interest does not require proof

of actual disruption. Anderson v. Burke Cnty., Ga., 239 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Reasonable possibility of adverse harm is all that is required. Id. at 1221.

It is undisputed that Kilday required Shortz to submit a request to use the meeting

room. On his application to use of a meeting room, Shortz was not required to state his

4

intended purpose or use of the room. (Doc.# 63, Ex. A-1). Upon receipt of Shortz’ request,

Kilday discussed his request with city manager Wallace Hunter and defendant Ray Smith. 

(Doc. # 63, Ex. A at 2-3). Kilday

. . . told Mr. Hunter that I wasn’t comfortable with Mr. Shortz acting the way

he was and I thought that he was dangerous. Mr. Hunter told me it seemed to

be a question of public safety and that he would leave the final decision to Ray

Smith, the chief of police and assistant city manager. . . .[O]n January 13,

2015, Ray Smith [c]ame to the library and I told him about my encounters with

Mr. Shortz on Friday, January 10 and earlier that day, January 13 and that I

was concerned about my safety, the safety of my staff, and the safety of the

library patrons. . . . Mr. Smith then advised me that Mr. Shortz’s application

would be denied. . . 

(Id. at ¶ 4-5).

After expressing her concerns about Shortz’ aggressive behavior, Smith made to

The defendants assert, and Shortz does not dispute, that Kilday did not deny Shortz the use of the 4

library room. She merely required that he complete an application for use of a meeting room. 

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decision to deny Shortz the use of a meeting room. Although Kilday told Smith that Shortz

wanted to use the room “to tell patrons about the real Robert E. Lee and how evil he was,”

Smith made the decision to deny Shortz the use of the room due to Shortz’ prior irrational

behavior in the library. (Doc. # 63, Ex. B. at 3, ¶ 10).

I denied Mr. Shortz meeting room application because I believed, in my best

judgment as the chief of police and as the assistant city manager, that any

meeting, speech, rally, or seminar conducted by Mr. Shortz, judging by his

recent loud, disruptive, and aggressive outbursts in the library, and his history

of aggressive behavior and written threats, would be contentious and could

possibly pose a threat to public safety.

(Id.).

It is well established, “that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to

communicate one’s views at all times and places and in any manner that may be desired.” 

Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). In this case,

the defendants had ample reason for concern about Shortz’s ability to conduct himself in a

way which would not disrupt the orderly operation of the library. Denying Shortz’s use of

the library meeting room was fully consistent with the defendants’ obligation to preserve the

library for its intended purpose. Thus, and in light of Shortz’s failure to adduce any

evidence that the denial was based on the content of his proposed speech or his viewpoint,

the court concludes that summary judgment in favor of the defendants should be granted.

It is important to note that Shortz is not challenging the library’s policies regarding 

use of the meeting room. Rather, he is asserting that he was denied the use of the meeting

room due solely to the perceived nature of his proposed speech. Beyond his own conclusory

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allegations, the plaintiff points to no facts from which the court could conclude that the

denial of his request to use the library meeting room was based on the content of his

proposed speech. Shortz does not dispute that he was aggressive, loud, and disruptive in the

library. In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff engages

in ad hominian attacks on the defendants and others, but he does not dispute the defendants’

facts, nor does he present any competent evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that his treatment by the defendants was due to the proposed content of his speech. 

His unsworn reply is simply insufficient to defeat the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. 

V. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment beGRANTEDand this case be DISMISSED with

prejudice. It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before December 29, 2015. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate

Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge

on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions

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accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein

v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Done this 14th day of December, 2015.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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