Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00412/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00412-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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`

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

B.M., a minor child by and through R.M.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ENCINITAS UNION SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 08cv412-L(JMA)

ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION

and DIRECTING ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT

I. Background1

This is an appeal from an Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) decision under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq. 

The Encinitas Union School District (“District”) initially assessed B.M. (“plaintiff” or

“Student”) in June 2006, and found he was eligible for special education and related services

because of autistic-like behaviors. Plaintiff’s parents then sought independent educational

evaluations (“IEE”) at public expense because they disagreed with the District’s assessment.

1 The facts are taken from the administrative record. The Court also notes that this

appeal has been pending a particularly long time based in part on a significant record that did not

include a table of contents and the lack of a motion initiating review of the appeal. “Though not

a ‘true motion for summary judgment, the appeal of an IDEA-based due process hearing

decision is properly styled and presented by the parties in a summary judgment format.’”

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the

Court recognizes and appreciates the patience of the parties associated with this case.

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IEEs were conducted and were paid for by the District in the areas of speech and language,

occupational therapy (“OT”), neuropsychological and behavior. On September 22, 2006,

plaintiff’s parents filed a due process hearing request because they disagreed with the District’s

initial individual education plan (“IEP”). The parties agreed to mediate their disagreements.

Based on the mediation, the District agreed to continue the in-home applied behavior analysis

(“ABA”) services plaintiff was receiving from a nonpublic agency before he became eligible for

special education and related services from the District. The Settlement Agreement between the

parents and District also required the District to conduct a comprehensive transdisciplinary

reevaluation (“TRR”) assessment of plaintiff by April 2007, and to convene an IEP in May

2007.

The District conducted the required assessment and issued the TRR which addressed the

areas of psychoeducational, speech and language, occupational therapy (“OT”), and adaptive

physical education (“APE”). Plaintiff’s parents disagreed with the TRR and requested additional

IEEs at public expense. The District filed a request for a due process hearing in June 2007 to

defend the appropriateness of its TRR.

On May 30, 2007, plaintiff’s annual IEP meeting took place in which the parents actively 

participated. Thirty-five goals and objectives were developed. After the May 30, 2007 IEP

meeting, the District convened additional meetings on June 14, and June 21, 2007. Because the

parents continued to disagree with aspects of the IEP, the District agreed to conduct additional

assessments for visual processing and auditory processing. The additional assessment did not

occur because the parents did not consent to them.

The IEP developed for the 2007-2008 school year offered plaintiff placement in a

preschool special day class (SDC) located at Flora Vista. The SDC is a regional preschool class

program for severely handicapped 3-4 year old students with significant delays and includes

children with autism. Additionally, the District offered a 31 hour-per-week program that

included two-and-a-half hours of speech therapy a week, one and one-half hours of OT, eight

hours per week of school-based ABA, six hours per week of in-home ABA, and one-on-one

adult support throughout the school day. Plaintiff’s parents did not consent to the May 2007 IEP

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contending the District’s offer of placement and services represented a dramatic decrease from

the services agreed to in the January 2007 Settlement Agreement that resolved the prior dispute

and was insufficient to meet the unique needs of the Student, specifically his apraxia of speech.

As previously noted, the District was unable to assess plaintiff’s visual processing and the

implementation of the IEP because the parents would not consent.

In August 2007, the District requested a due process hearing to determine the

appropriateness of the District’s IEP offer for the 2007-2008 school year. Plaintiff’s parents then

removed plaintiff from the District’s program and indicated that they would obtain private

related services and would seek reimbursement from the District. Nevertheless, the District

continued providing plaintiff with 20 hours of in-home ABA therapy. During that same time, the

parents obtained additional assessments from the same assessors who had conducted IEEs in

2006: Abby Rozenberg, Dr. Mitchel Perlman, Dr. Susan Daniel, Susanne Smith Roley, and Dr.

Denise Eckman. 

The two due process hearing requests were consolidated with the administrative hearing

held on November 26-30, and December 3-5, 2007. On January 30, 2008, the ALJ entered her

decision which found that the District had prevailed on all issues, determined the District’s TRR

was appropriate, and its IEP program offer for the 2007-2008 school year provided plaintiff with

a FAPE. Plaintiff now appeals the consolidated decision.

II. Standard of Review

 “When a party challenges the outcome of an IDEA due process hearing, the reviewing

court receives the administrative record, hears any additional evidence, and ‘bas[es] its decision

on the preponderance of the evidence.’” R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932,

937 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)). Based on this standard, “complete de

novo review of the administrative proceeding is inappropriate.” Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J,

502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007). The party challenging an administrative decision in district

court bears the burden of proof that the decision should be reversed. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch.

Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) superceded by statute on other grounds; Hood v.

Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007).

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The statutory requirement “that a reviewing court base its decision on the ‘preponderance

of the evidence’ is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of

sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Bd. of Educ. v.

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Rather, “due weight” must be given to the findings in the

administrative proceedings. Id.

As a threshold matter, deference should generally be given to the state hearing officer's

findings when they are “thorough and careful.” K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Department of Educ.,

Hawaii, 665 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the ALJ’s decision was thorough and

careful, and intensive and comprehensive. On the basis of the eight-day hearing, the parties’

submission of a large number of exhibits, and the testimony from numerous educators and

professionals affiliated with plaintiff and the District, the ALJ provided a thirty-five page,

single-spaced decision. The decision provided a extensive and full discussion of the application

of the facts of this matter to the relevant legal contentions made by the parties. The ALJ

thoughtfully articulated the basis of her opinions, the inferences she drew from the testimony

and the documentary record, and her rationale for affording greater weight to certain evidence

and testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision will be given substantial deference.

III. IDEA

“The IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme, conferring on disabled students a

substantive right to public education.” Hoeft v. Tuscon Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300

(1992) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988)). The IDEA ensures that “all children

with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that

emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and

prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. §

1400(d)(1)(A). Under the IDEA, a FAPE is special education and services that “(A) have been

provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet

the school standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,

elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in

conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this

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title.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). To provide a FAPE in compliance with the IDEA, a state educational

agency receiving federal funds must evaluate a student, determine whether that student is

eligible for special education and services, conduct and implement an individualized education

program (“IEP”), and determine an appropriate educational placement of the student. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414. More than a “simple funding statute,” the IDEA “confers upon disabled students an

enforceable substantive right to public education in participating States, and conditions federal

financial assistance upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the

Act.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 310.

The Supreme Court held in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-01 (1982),

that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the

best education available, or to provide instruction that maximizes the student's abilities. See also

 Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (1987). Instead, school districts are

required only to provide a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized

instruction and related services individually designed to provide educational benefits to the

student, and the choice of methodology in providing special education and related services is the

prerogative of the school district. Id.; see also C.P. v. Prescott Unified School District, 631 F.3d

1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that IDEA allows educators the discretion to select from

various methods in order to meet the individualized needs of a student if those practices are

reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit). But “Congress did not intend that a school

system could discharge its duty under the IDEA by providing a program that produces some

minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivial.” Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark

County School Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2011).

Under Rowley, the applicable federal and state statutes, and case law, the standard for

determining if a school district's provision of services substantively and procedurally provides a

FAPE involves consideration of four factors: (1) are the services designed to meet the student's

unique needs; (2) are the services reasonably designed to provide some educational benefit; (3)

do the services conform to the IEP as written; and (4) is the program offered designed to provide

the student with the foregoing in the least restrictive environment. Capistrano Unified School

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Dist. v. Wartenberg By and Through Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188–89); see also Katherine G. v. Kentfield School District, 261 F. Supp.2d

1159, 1171–72 and n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

A student's FAPE must be “tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by

means of an ‘individualized educational program’ (IEP).” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 (citing 20

U.S.C. § 1401(18)). The IEP, which is prepared at a meeting between a qualified representative

of the local educational agency, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, and, where

appropriate, the child, consists of a written document containing (A) a statement of the present

levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including

short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be

provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular

educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such

services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for

determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.20. Local or regional educational

agencies must review, and where appropriate revise, each child's IEP at least annually. 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1414(a)(5), 1413(a)(11). In addition, “[p]arental involvement is a central feature of the

IDEA.” Hoeft, 967 F.3d at 1300. “Parents participate along with teachers and school district

representatives in the process of determining what constitutes a ‘free appropriate education’ for

each disabled child.” Id. Although the IDEA guarantees parents the opportunity to participate

meaningfully, as one participant in a group, the parents' opinions may be overridden. See Ms. S.

ex rel. G. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that,

although a school district must develop an IEP with “meaningful parental participation,” a

school district “has no obligation to grant [a parent] a veto over any individual IEP provision”),

superseded by statute on other grounds, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

IV. Discussion 

Plaintiff argues that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the ALJ: (1)

applied the Rowley standard of “some benefit” rather than the applicable higher “meaningful

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benefit” standard; (2) discounted all of the testimony of the student’s witnesses without legal

justification; (3) applied an erroneous legal standard concerning the least restrictive environment

(LRE); and (4) was not impartial. Plaintiff points to the elimination of vision services in the IEP

without an assessment, the reduction of speech and language assistance, the use of nonstandard

testing with respect to the TRR, and the lack of a written plan for actual implementation for

plaintiff’s transition to a school site.

A. Some Benefit Standard

As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Rowley that school districts are not required to

provide special education students with the best education available, or to provide instruction

that maximizes the student's abilities. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-01. But plaintiff argues that the

Rowley standard is inappropriately applied to the IDEA, and this case in particular, because

Rowley interpreted the IDEA’s predecessor statute, the EAHCA. (Opening Brief at 3.) As a

result, plaintiff contends that “[w]hether a child obtained a ‘meaningful benefit’ rather than

merely ‘some’ benefit is the appropriate standard in this case.” (Id.) The “meaningful benefit”

language is found in Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999)(To provide a FAPE,

an IEP must meet the student's needs and be reasonably calculated to provide the student with a

“meaningful” benefit.).

But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, after Adams, that Rowley has not been

superseded. J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010). “The proper

standard to determine whether a disabled child has received a free appropriate public education

is the ‘educational benefit’ standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Rowley. Id.

The J.L. court further explained:

Some confusion exists in this circuit regarding whether the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act requires school districts to provide disabled students

with “educational benefit,” “some educational benefit” or a “meaningful”

educational benefit. [citation omitted]. As we read the Supreme Court’s decision in

Rowley, all three phrases refer to the same standard. School districts must, to

“make access meaningful,” confer at least “some educational benefit” on disabled

students.

Id., n. 10.

Plaintiff’s argument that Rowley is inapplicable in the present case and a new, higher

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standard based on “meaningful educational benefit” is incorrect. Instead, in order to offer a

FAPE, defendant was required to provide a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to

specialized instruction and related services individually designed to provide educational benefits

to plaintiff, and the choice of methodology in providing special education and related services is

the prerogative of the school district. The ALJ properly applied the appropriate legal standard for

the education of children with disabilities under the IDEA throughout her decision. 

B. Discounting of Student’s Witnesses

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ systematically discounted the testimony of all of the

Student’s expert witnesses as “irrelevant” by interpreting the “snapshot rule” too narrowly.

(Plaintiff’s Opening Brief at 7-8.) 

The Ninth Circuit uses a “snapshot” rule in evaluating IEPs: 

Actions of the school systems cannot be judged exclusively in hindsight.... [A]n

individualized education program is a snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for

‘appropriateness,’ an IEP must take into account what was, and was not,

objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the time the IEP

was drafted.” 

Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Fuhrman v. East Hanover

Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993). (Opening Brief at 4.) In the present case, the

relevant “snapshot” was of plaintiff’s abilities in May 2007, the time of the IEP. 

Here, the ALJ used the term “irrelevant” to describe the newly presented assessments and

testimony of plaintiff’s experts, made a few months after the IEP was developed. While

acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit follows the “snapshot rule,” plaintiff contends that the

assessments and testimony provided by plaintiff’s experts after the IEP was drafted nevertheless

should have been taken into account to find that the IEP was not appropriate for Student.

Plaintiff states, with no reference to legal authority, that “Adams does not instruct courts to

simply disregard the testimony of qualified experts if they did not happen to provide input

during the IEP meeting.” (Opening Brief at 9.) 

It is worth noting that the plaintiff’s experts, who were acknowledged to be well-qualified

to offer their opinions and conducted assessments prior to the May 2007 IEP team meeting, were

the same experts who evaluated plaintiff after the IEP offer and testified at the hearing.

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Plaintiff’s experts provided the results of their initial evaluations to the IEP team prior to the

May IEP meeting although they did not attend the IEP meeting. Thus, plaintiff’s experts had

input into the development of the May 2007 IEP based on their earlier assessments of plaintiff. 

Based on the “snapshot” rule, it was not error for the ALJ, to find the post- IEP assessments and

testimony of plaintiff’s experts to be irrelevant in determining whether the IEP offer of services

and placement for plaintiff at Flora Vista SDC was appropriate.

C. Least Restrictive Environment

A special education student must be educated in the “least restrictive environment”

(“LRE”) available to meet a student's unique needs, and should be mainstreamed with

non-disabled peers to the maximum extent possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) requires:

To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with

children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other

removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment

occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that

education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot

be achieved satisfactorily.

“The language of the IDEA ... clearly indicates a strong preference for ‘mainstreaming,’

i.e., educating handicapped children alongside non-handicapped children in a regular educational

environment.” Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,

188–89). “In carrying out this directive, the state educational agency must develop and

implement an IEP aimed at providing each disabled child with a [FAPE] in the least restrictive

environment.” Id.; see also Seattle Sch. Dist. v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Disabled children, to the maximum extent appropriate, should be educated with children who

are not disabled, i.e., they should be mainstreamed. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B) ...”).

What constitutes an LRE is necessarily an individualized, fact-specific inquiry. In each

case, the apparent tension between the IDEA's clear preference for mainstreaming and its

requirements that schools provide individualized programs tailored to the specific needs of each

disabled child must be balanced. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1414(a)(5); see also, J.W. v. Fresno Uni.

Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 448 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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In considering whether the District proposed an appropriate placement for Student, the

Court balances four factors: “(1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular

class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect Student had on the teacher

and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming Student.” Sacramento City

Uni. Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). “This analysis

directly addresses the issue of the appropriate placement for a child with disabilities under the

requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).” Id.

Here, plaintiff contends that although the ALJ set forth the appropriate legal standard (AR

Vol. XII, 1079), she relied on the District’s witness, Dr. Erin Ring to “dictate” an incorrect

standard, i,e., a “natural environment”. (See Opening Brief at 5-6.) As a result, plaintiff asserts

that the ALJ committed legal error and her decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id.

Plaintiff’s reading of the ALJ’s discussion of LRE is premised on a single paragraph

which notes that:

Dr. Ring testified that under the LRE mandate, children have to be educated in a

natural environment with typical peers unless the severity of a child’s disability

precludes it. Dr. Ring’s opinion is that Student belonged in a setting that allowed

him to play with typical peers from whom he would derive great educational

benefit, and that placing Student exclusively in an in-home ABA [Applied

Behavior Analysis] program would be too restrictive.

(AR Vol. XII, at 1080) 

This single paragraph does not adopt Dr. Ring’s description of a “natural environment” as

the appropriate legal standard but merely sets out Dr. Ring’s opinion concerning the LRE for

plaintiff. As such, it does not support plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ applied an improper

legal standard.

Plaintiff also argues that the evidence consistently demonstrated that plaintiff was

severely distractable and had a short attention span and therefore, a special education classroom

placement with numerous distractions, i.e., toys, other children, was an inappropriate placement.

Accordingly, Student needed a one-on-one teaching experience in a quiet environment without

distraction. Because of his distractability, plaintiff’s parents sought a total in-home ABA

program. 

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The May 2007 IEP, intended for the 2007-08 school year, offered B.M. placement in its

preschool SDC at Flora Vista which also included a 31-hour per week program, speech therapy,

OT, pull out ABA, one-on-one adult support throughout the school day, and six hours of inhome ABA per week. 

Without substituting the Court’s thoughts on the matter, “[e]ven if the services requested

by parents would better serve the student's needs than the services offered in an IEP, this does

not mean that the services offered are inappropriate, as long as the IEP is reasonably calculated

to provide the student with educational benefits.” See D.H. v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 2011

WL 883003 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (affirming conclusion of ALJ that deaf student was

not entitled to CART under IDEA). If the IEP confers “some educational benefit” upon plaintiff,

it will satisfy the IDEA. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d at 947; K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch.

Dist., 426 Fed. Appx. 536, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying “some educational benefit”

standard).

Plaintiff acknowledges that all of Student’s experts had assessed Student in 2006, and the

2006 assessments had been provided to the District prior to the May 30, 2007 IEP meeting.

Thus, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ rejected all of plaintiff’s experts’ assessments is flawed.

Although as discussed above, the post-IEP assessments and testimony of plaintiff’s experts were

not relevant to the inquiry concerning whether the IEP offered Student a FAPE; however, the

experts’ prior assessments were available for consideration by the District in developing the IEP

and the ALJ at the hearing. 

The ALJ reviewed and remarked upon the following information concerning Student’s

placement at Flora Vista SPC. Patty Tran, a District Speech and Language Pathologist

participated in the May 30, 2007 IEP and conducted B.M.’s speech and language assessments

between March and April 2007. Ms. Tran testified that based on progress made since his June

2006 assessment and after receiving speech and language therapy services, plaintiff

demonstrated readiness to attend preschool with typically developing peers. The ALJ also stated

that Ms. Tran “credibly testified that the recommendation was based on her observation that

Student had an inability to attend for more than 30 minutes at a time and could be distracted.”

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Abbey Rozenberg, a licensed speech and language pathologist, offered testimony for

Student. She conducted a clinical assessment at plaintiff’s parent’s request on October 28, 2006

and again on August 3, 2007 – after the May 30, 2007 IEP team meeting. Even though Ms.

Rozenberg did not consult with the District or observe plaintiff receiving services at Flora Vista,

she noted that “given Student’s strong non verbal skills and an interest in social experiences, that

a preschool setting with typical peers, who may serve as appropriate language models will allow

for generalization of speech and language skills.” Ms. Rozenberg also agreed that plaintiff had

strong pre-readiness skills warranting placement in a preschool setting.

The District’s school psychologist, Melissa Dawson, was familiar with plaintiff and knew

of his disability. Prior to the May 30, 2007 IEP, Ms. Dawson administered the Behavior

Assessment System for Children II (BASC-2 Parent and Teacher Rating Scales), a standardized

rating scale designed to look at a child’s behavior, and the Psychoeducational Profile-Third

Edition (“PEP-3") that is intended to assess a student’s developmental functioning. She noted

that the BASC II scale indicated plaintiff was easily distracted and had difficulty sustaining his

attention to adult directed tasks. Ms. Dawson testified before the ALJ that she consulted with the

assessment team members, considered prior IEEs, and plaintiff’s parents’ input. And as a

member of the May 30, 2007 IEP team, she recommended B.M.’s placement at Flora Vista

preschool SDC. 

Dr. Denise Eckman offered expert testimony on behalf of plaintiff and his autism. She did

not provide services to plaintiff. In November 2006, she conducted a behavioral assessment of

plaintiff and also observed plaintiff at Flora Vista for approximately 30 minutes. Her report was

available to the IEP team prior to the IEP meeting. At the due process hearing, Dr. Eckman

testified that the IEP offer of placement in the SDC program was inadequate and recommended a

40-hour, intensive one-to-one in-home ABA program with formal behavioral intervention.

In September 2007, a few months after the May 30, 2007 IEP, Dr. Eckman conducted a

second assessment of Student. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Eckman’s post-IEP opinion

concerning the District’s offer of placement was not relevant under the snapshot rule, i.e., it was

based on an assessment conducted months after the IEP. 

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Plaintiff’s parents also offered the testimony of Dr. Mitchell Perlman. He reviewed the

results of a 2006 assessment, and without treating plaintiff, consulting with District staff, or

observing the proposed placement at Flora Vista SDC, he concluded that plaintiff was not ready

for preschool placement. He concurred with Dr. Eckman’s recommendation of an in-home ABA

program. In assessing plaintiff again in September 2007, he observed the proposed placement at

Flora Vista and again recommended the in-home, one-to-one ABA provided to plaintiff by a

private provider. The ALJ found Dr. Perlman’s September 2007 opinion irrelevant because it

was offered after the development of the IEP. 

Erin Chin, a licensed occupational therapist, conducted the OT assessment of plaintiff and

participated in the preparation of the TRR for the District. In reviewing the Sensory Profile

assessment that obtained input from plaintiff’s parents, she noted that plaintiff was easily

distracted and had difficulty attending to tasks. Nevertheless, she opined that plaintiff would

benefit from a small classroom environment with minimal distractions and minimal visual

stimulation. 

Plaintiff’s OT expert, Susanne Rolley, testified that plaintiff was easily distracted, had

difficulty regulating his attention and activity level, desired engagement with adults and peers,

but found social interactions difficult. She did not offer an opinion concerning plaintiff’s

placement at Flora Vista SDC. After the May 30, 2007 IEP, Ms. Rolley conducted a second

assessment on July 6, 2007 but she did not offer an opinion on the placement of plaintiff at Flora

Vista SDC. Again, the ALJ noted that Ms. Rolley’s 2007 assessment was not relevant.

The ALJ heard the testimony of plaintiff’s experts at the hearing and correctly relied on

assessments and information available to the IEP team. After considering all the relevant

evidence, the ALJ concluded that the testimony of District personnel, who had daily or regularly

scheduled time with plaintiff, was more persuasive than that of plaintiff’s witnesses, whose

opinions were largely based on file reviews. The ALJ supplied a careful and reasoned basis for

her determination that the IEP offering plaintiff placement at Flora Vista SDC provided plaintiff

with a FAPE.

/ / /

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/ / /

D. Failure to Assess in the Area of Vision and Reduction in Speech and

Language Services

In his opening brief, plaintiff asserts that Student was receiving vision therapy prior to the

May 30, 2007 IEP meeting. This therapy was an agreed upon service in the Settlement

Agreement. Dr. Susan Daniel, a Doctor of Optometry, conducted a visual processing evaluation

of Student on November 6, 2006, at the parents’ request. Dr. Daniel recommended

individualized optometric vision therapy for Student. The April 2007 TRR addressed auditory

and visual processing. The District did not offer continuing vision services in the IEP. At the IEP

meeting, plaintiff’s parents raised the issue of vision therapy.

The District offered the annual vision and hearing tests to all students. Plaintiff’s parents

notified the District that Student was receiving vision therapy from an independent source and

the parents declined to consent to the District’s vision assessment offer. The ALJ noted that the

District had addressed the areas of plaintiff’s suspected disability under the Settlement

Agreement but even if the District failed to assess all areas of suspected disability, plaintiff was

not deprived of a FAPE for a procedural violation. 

At the hearing, the District’s speech pathologist, Ms. Tran, recognized that Student

suffered from apraxia based on Ms. Rozenberg’s October 2006 assessment. Ms. Rozenberg

testified that peer reviewed research showed that treatment of apraxia requires individual therapy

of three to five hours per week. Ms. Rozenberg recommended five hours of individual speech

therapy for Student. The IEP offered five half-hour sessions per week.

Plaintiff contends that because the District was aware of the peer reviewed research

indicating three to five hours was optimal for progress and the District offered only two and a

half hours, the reduction in speech therapy failed to confer a “meaningful educational benefit”

on Student as required under Adams.

2

 (Opening Brief at 20.) But the ALJ carefully discussed

that while the IEP services and aids should be based on peer-reviewed research to the extent

2 As discussed above, the Rowley standard of “some benefit” is properly applied. 

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practicable, a District may provide a program or service where it is impracticable to provide

such a program. (Decision at 30 (emphasis in original).) The ALJ properly noted that “Courts

have determined that the most important issue is whether the proposed instructional method

meets the student’s needs and whether the student may make adequate educational progress.”

(Decision at 31.) 

The ALJ also noted that Ms. Rozenberg’s August 2007 assessment – although not

relevant to the IEP development – indicated that “given Student’s strong non-verbal skills and an

interest in social experiences, that a preschool setting with typical peers, who may serve as

appropriate language models will allow for generalization of speech and language skills.” 

(Decision at 9.) Ms. Tran’s ongoing observational assessments of Student and hours providing

him with speech and language therapy supported a basis for finding that Student had deficits in

the form of apraxia and further speech and language therapy. 

Given the hearing officer’s careful articulation of the facts and law, her finding that the

reduction of language services by half an hour per week did not deny Student a FAPE because

the District properly identified apraxia as a suspected area of disability and assessed Student’s

need in an appropriate manner.

E. Transition Plan

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by overlooking the absence of a transition plan for

Student in the District’s IEP. 

 An IEP is a “formal, written offer [that] creates a clear record that will do much to

eliminate troublesome factual disputes.” JL, 592 F.3d at 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Union Sch.

Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994)). In an IEP, a school district must specify “the

anticipated frequency, location, and duration of [special education] services.” 20 U.S.C. §

1414(d)(1)(A)(vi) (1998). “The amount of time to be committed to each of the various services

to be provided must be (1) appropriate to the specific service, and (2) stated in a manner that is

clear to all who are involved.” 64 Fed. Reg. 12,479. “[A] state must comply both procedurally

and substantively with the IDEA.” M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07).

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Although the IEP should offer some guidance if a transition is anticipated, “not every

procedural violation results in the denial of a free appropriate public education.” Mercer Island,

592 F.3d at 953. “A procedural violation denies a free appropriate public education if it results in

the loss of an educational opportunity, seriously infringes the parents' opportunity to participate

in the IEP formulation process or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.” N.B. v. Hellgate

Elementary School Dist., ex rel. Bd. of Directors, Missoula County, Mont., 541 F.3d 1202, 1208

(9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Amanda J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892 (9th Cir.

2001)(Technical deviations, for example, will not render an IEP invalid.). 

Here, the details for plaintiff’s transition from a largely in-home program to a public

school special education classroom were not specified in the IEP. However, the Record supports

that plaintiff had been attending Flora Vista for some services and was familiar with the campus

and staff. For example, during the hearing, Melissa Dawson, a school psychologist with the

District, testified that starting in January of 2007, after the Settlement Agreement, plaintiff came

to Flora Vista for some services. As a result, plaintiff was familiar with the location of the

campus and the staff who would provide him services. (Vol. III, 115-117.)

Further, the Record demonstrates that the District staff, along with plaintiff’s parents, had

discussed and considered what would be of value in transitioning plaintiff to the campus. A more

specific and detailed transition plan could be added to the IEP without violating the requirement

of a formal, written offer. See, e.g., G.D. ex rel. Dien Do v. Torrance Unified School Dist., 2012

WL 751014 *(C.D. Cal. 2012)(citing Schaffer v. Weast, 554 F.3d 470, 477 (4th Cir.2009) (“And

more importantly, if services added to a later IEP were always used to cast doubt on an earlier

one, school districts would develop a strong disincentive against updating their IEPs based on

new information. This scenario is the exact opposite of what Congress intended when it provided

for regular review and revision of IEPs, ..., and it would do little to help the interest of disabled

children.”). 

Plaintiff has not shown that the student was in any manner prejudiced by the failure to

specify the exact transition plan for his attendance at Flora Vista or that he was denied an

educational benefit or that the student’s parents were not involved in the discussion concerning

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the transition to on-campus services. 

Accordingly, even if the lack of a written transition plan for student was a procedural

violation, in this case, the ALJ correctly concluded that Student was not denied a FAPE. 

Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision in this matter as

careful, reasoned, and supported by the preponderance of the evidence. As noted above, the

IDEA does not require that a district “maximize the potential of each handicapped child

commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at

200. Here, the District offered “a basic floor of opportunity, [that is,] access to specialized

instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to

the handicapped child.” Id. at 201. The April 2007 TRR was appropriate in that the District

conducted an extensive reevaluation of Student by using a variety of assessment tools, with the

assessors trained and well-qualified to administer tests and make observations. The TRR, by

including psychoeducational, speech and language, occupational therapy and adaptive physical

education evaluations, assessed Student in all areas of suspected disability. The IEP contained an

adequate statement of B.M.’s levels of academic achievement and functional performance,

articulated measurable goals, and was reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit in

the least restrictive environment which is what is required under the IDEA. See J.W. ex re.

K.K.W. v. Governing Bd. of East Whittier City School Dist., 473 Fed. Appx. 531, 533 (9th Cir.

2012). 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED affirming the decision of the hearing officer

and directing entry of judgment in defendant’s favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2013

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. JAN M. ADLER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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ALL PARTIES COUNSEL

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