Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01800/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01800-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Noel Velasco Felix has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner’s complaint regarding the use of warrantless GPS tracking devices in 

2005 and 2006 is meritless. Warrantless GPS tracking was authorized under thenexisting Ninth Circuit precedent. The mandate of United States v. Jones is not 

retroactive, and also would not merit suppression because law enforcement reasonably 

relied on existing law. Petitioner’s claim that Arizona courts violated an Arizona rule of 

procedure is not cognizable on habeas review. Petitioner’s supplemental arguments do 

not merit relief. Therefore, the Court will recommend the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Noel Velasco Felix, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-14-1800-PCT-DLR (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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II. BACKGROUND 

a. Facts and Pretrial Proceedings 

In 2005, law enforcement began an investigation of a drug-trafficking organization 

operating in Arizona. (Doc. 19-9, Ex. N at 61.)1

 In 2006, detectives obtained permission 

from Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Brian Ishikawa to intercept communications 

between members of the organization. (Id.) Detectives also placed, without court 

authorization, GPS locating devices on vehicles associated with the organization. (Doc. 

12-3 at 25-29; Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG at 55-56.) As a result of surveillance, seizures, and 

interceptions, detectives determined the organization was transporting more than 100 

pounds of methamphetamine and substantial quantities of cash. (Doc. 19-9, Ex. N at 61-

67.) Petitioner was identified as a significant member of the conspiracy. (Id.) 

 On June 2, 2006, Petitioner was arrested on drug-related charges. On June 6, 2006, 

the State filed a direct complaint, in CR 2006-8353, charging Petitioner with six offenses. 

(Doc. 17-4, Ex. C at 93.) On June 7, 2006, an indictment issued charging Petitioner with 

the same six offenses. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. D at 106.) 

 On August 17, 2006, Petitioner was charged in a separate, 417-count indictment 

(CR 2006-8681). (Doc. 17-1, Ex. A at 12-139.) Petitioner’s indictment in the previous 

case (CR 2006-8353) was subsequently dismissed on August 31, 2006. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. F 

at 124.) On July 16, 2007, the trial court denied a joint motion to suppress the wiretaps 

obtained during the investigation. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. K at 226.) 

b. Procedural History 

i. Trial and Sentencing

 On February 1, 2008, Petitioner and two codefendants jointly waived their rights 

to a jury trial. (Doc. 17-4, Ex. L at 230-43.) The “trial court convicted Felix of 

conspiracy, illegally conducting an enterprise, use of wire communication in a drug 

related transaction, misconduct involving weapons, two counts of possession of drug 

 

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 For ease of reference, the Court’s citations to page numbers of docketed items are to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system. 

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paraphernalia, two counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale, four counts of 

money laundering and five counts of transportation for sale, sale or transfer of 

methamphetamine.” State v. Velasco-Felix, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0408 PRPC, 2014 WL 

1232425, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). Petitioner was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 20 years’ imprisonment. (Id.) 

ii. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 19-

10, Ex. R at 121.) Petitioner alleged that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant a 

Franks (v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) hearing on a motion to suppress the wiretap 

(Doc. 19-10, Ex. R at 141), and (2) the trial court erred in finding necessity for the 

wiretap (Doc. 19-10, Ex. R at 152). On August 5, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a 17-page memorandum decision. 

(Doc. 19-11, Ex. U at 108.) Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decisions by the Arizona Supreme Court. The order and mandate issued on 

October 19, 2010. (Doc. 19-11, Ex. V at 126.) 

c. Petition for State Post-Conviction Relief 

 In September 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 20-5, Ex. X.) On or before 

October 31, 2011, Petitioner’s attorney filed a notice of completion of post-conviction 

review of the record and requested an extension of time to allow Petitioner to file a pro se

post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. (Doc. 20-5, Ex. Y.) On or about December 19, 

2011, Petitioner filed a PCR petition. (Doc. 20-5, Ex. Z.) Petitioner alleged that (1) the 

evidence against Petitioner should have been suppressed because law enforcement 

violated the Fourth Amendment when they placed warrantless GPS tracking devices on 

vehicles, (2) the State violated Rule 4.1(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

and the Fourth Amendment by failing to file a direct complaint within 48 hours of 

Petitioner’s initial appearance, and (3) the trial court violated Rule 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) of 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, by 

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failing to appoint Petitioner counsel within 48 hours of his initial appearance. (Id.) On 

June 19, 2012, the trial court denied relief on every ground. (Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG.) 

d. PCR Appeal 

On August 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 20-8, Ex. HH.) Petitioner asserted that (1) the trial court erred when it 

precluded his “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument (Doc. 20-8, Ex. HH at 65), (2) 

counsel were ineffective in failing to raise his “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument (Id. 

at 66), (3) the trial judge erred by failing to grant relief under his “fruit of the poisonous 

tree argument” (Id.), (4) the trial judge erred regarding Petitioner’s GPS tracking 

argument (Id. at 67), and (5) the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled against 

these four arguments (Id.). Petitioner did not appeal on the ground of a Rule 4.1 

violation. On March 25, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, finding the 

following: 

 Felix argues his trial, appellate, and post-conviction relief counsel were all ineffective when they failed to raise any issue regarding the State’s warrantless use of Global-Positioning-System (“GPS”) devices to track vehicles operated by Felix’s accomplices. He further argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in State 

v. Jones constitutes a significant change in the law that not only entitles him to relief in and of itself, but further supports his claims of ineffective assistance. In Jones, the Supreme Court held the government installation of a GPS device on a vehicle for the purpose of monitoring the vehicle’s movements constitutes a “search” that ordinarily requires a 

warrant. See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) . . . . 

 We deny relief. First, Felix failed to present a colorable claim that counsels’ representation fell below an objectively reasonable standard, or that any action or inaction on the part of counsel prejudiced him. Felix committed the offenses in 2005 and 2006. His trial took place in 2008, and we affirmed his convictions in 2010. His post-conviction relief counsel reviewed his case in 2011. The Supreme Court decided 

Jones in 2012. Felix cites no authority prior to the Jones decision that 

would have required the trial court to suppress evidence obtained 

through the warrantless use of GPS tracking. Therefore, counsel had no basis to raise any issue regarding the use of GPS devices. Counsels’ 

failure to predict that the Supreme Court would subsequently hold that GPS tracking could only be obtained through a warrant did not fall below objectively reasonable standards. 

Velasco-Felix, 2014 WL 1232425, at *1. Petitioner did not seek review of this opinion. 

On May 12, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its order and mandate. (Doc. 1 at 

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12.) 

III. PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION 

On August 13, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant, timely habeas petition. Petitioner 

submits three grounds in the petition. 

a. Standard of Review 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 

2244. 

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. 

And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. 

Rather, as a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show 

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 

S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—

and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 S.Ct., at 786. We 

will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief 

is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 

S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an 

incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief 

simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a 

certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also 

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Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

AEDPA otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not 

harmless: “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not 

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

b. Grounds One and Two 

Petitioner presents the same arguments in Grounds One and Two. He asserts that 

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law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by placing warrantless GPS tracking 

devices on codefendants’ vehicles in violation of United States v. Jones. (Doc. 12 at 21.) 

Due to that violation, he alleges all the evidence obtained in the case should have been 

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” (Doc. 12 at 15) and outrageous government 

conduct (Doc. 12 at 24). He argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance when 

they failed to argue these claims in the trial court, on appeal, and on post-conviction 

review. (Doc. 12 at 16.) 

The Court begins with the merits of this argument in the interest of judicial 

economy. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997) (explaining that the 

court may bypass the procedural default issue in the interest of judicial economy when 

the merits are clear but the procedural default issues are not); Jones v. Davis, No. 14-

56373, 2015 WL 6994287, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2015) (“we ordinarily consider 

exhaustion first, but we have discretion in some circumstances to deny a claim on the 

ground that it is barred by Teague, without considering exhaustion”). 

i. GPS tracking was authorized by then-existing precedent.

 Petitioner argues that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

when officers placed GPS tracking devices on vehicles without a warrant. Petitioner 

committed these offenses in 2005 and 2006. Velasco-Felix, 2014 WL 1232425, at *2. 

Petitioner’s trial took place in 2010, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his 

convictions in 2010. (Doc. 19-11, Ex. V at 126-28.) At the time of the investigation in 

this case, Ninth Circuit precedent held that attaching a GPS tracking device to the 

undercarriage of a vehicle was not a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. See United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 

there was no Fourth Amendment violation and “that no seizure occurred because the 

officers did not meaningfully interfere with McIver’s possessory interest in the Toyota 

4Runner” when they installed a GPS tracker on a vehicle). 

 In 2005 and 2006, officers did not engage in outrageous government conduct 

because they were authorized to install warrantless GPS tracking devices under appellate 

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precedent. The outrageous conduct doctrine permits a court to dismiss an indictment 

when a defendant can demonstrate the government’s conduct “‘violates fundamental 

fairness’ and is ‘so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of 

justice.’” United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 302 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 

v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011)). The officers’ conduct in this case was 

not outrageous, and would not have merited suppression (as explained below). 

ii. Jones does not retroactively apply to Petitioner’s case. 

 In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Jones that attaching a GPS tracking device to a 

vehicle and the subsequent monitoring of the vehicle’s movements on public streets was 

a search because the government obtained information by physically intruding on an area 

protected by the Fourth Amendment. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 

Jones, however, does not apply retroactively. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 

(1989), the Supreme Court held that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will 

not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are 

announced.” Id. at 310. There are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) if the new rule 

places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 

criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” and (2) if the new rule “alter[s] our 

understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the 

fairness of a particular conviction.” Id. at 311 (internal quotations omitted). “Bedrock 

procedural elements” are those rules that are “central to an accurate determination of 

innocence or guilt.” Id. at 313. 

 Here, the first exception is factually inapplicable because there is no 

criminalization of private conduct in this case. The Jones rule—requiring police to have 

a warrant prior to attaching a GPS unit to a suspect’s vehicle—does not render any 

primary, private conduct outside the scope of the police power. The second exception 

does not apply because requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant is not “central to an 

accurate determination of innocence or guilt.” Id. Because Jones is not retroactively 

applied, Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. See Jones v. Rider, No. CV-14-01775-PHXCase 2:14-cv-01800-DLR Document 26 Filed 12/02/15 Page 9 of 19
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GMS, No. CV–14–01775–PHX–GMS, 2015 WL 4481426, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 22, 2015) 

(Jones does not have retroactive application); Judkins v. United States, No. 12–C–0759, 

2013 WL 1130484, at *4 (E.D.Wis. Mar. 18, 2013) (collecting cases with similar 

holdings). Despite assertions to the contrary, Petitioner is not entitled to the retroactive 

application of Jones to his case. 

iii. Petitioner’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument is meritless. 

 Petitioner asserts that the failure of law enforcement to obtain a warrant must 

result in the suppression of evidence derived from that search. Because officers 

reasonably relied on binding appellate precedent in 2005 and 2006, the exclusionary rule 

does not apply to their conduct. See Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) 

(“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding 

precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 

F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding post-Jones “that suppression is not 

warranted here because the agents objectively relied on then-existing binding precedent” 

when they attached tracking devices to a vehicle). Petitioner’s argument regarding “fruit 

of the poisonous tree” is meritless. 

iv. Counsel was not ineffective. 

 Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective when counsel failed “brief this 

issue.” (Doc. 12 at 29.) To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must 

establish that his counsel’s performance, at the time of counsel’s decisions, in fact fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (holding that the court should 

evaluate performance from counsel’s perspective “as of the time of counsel’s conduct”). 

Courts should generally recognize that counsel “is strongly presumed to have rendered 

adequate assistance and made all significant decision in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment.” Id. at 690. Reasonable tactical decisions, regardless of outcome, 

do not constitute a failure to meet the adequate performance prong. Hensley v. Crist, 67 

F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Here, the failure to predict the change in then-established Ninth Circuit law was 

not objectively unreasonable. See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(finding counsel was not ineffective because a “lawyer cannot be required to anticipate 

our decision” in a later case); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon counsel’s failure to predict future 

changes in the law and stating that “clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective 

representation”); Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding no 

ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to raise Apprendi-type issue prior to 

that decision because such issue was “unsupported by then-existing precedent . . .”). 

 Petitioner also fails to establish prejudice. Even if counsel had filed a motion to 

suppress based upon a prediction of the change in the law, the motion would not have 

been granted. As noted above, the Court in Pineda-Moreno determined “that suppression 

is not warranted” because officers relied on established law. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d at 

1091. Counsel’s conduct was not unreasonable and Petitioner did not suffer prejudice. 

Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective. 

v. Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable under Stone v. Powell. 

 Petitioner also claims that the trial court erroneously denied his PCR motion 

regarding a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This is not a cognizable claim for 

federal habeas relief. Under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), “where the State has 

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” federal 

habeas corpus relief will not lie for a claim that evidence recovered through an illegal 

search or seizure was introduced at trial. See also Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1328 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“We read Stone as a categorical limitation on the applicability of fourth 

amendment exclusionary rules in habeas corpus proceedings” (citations omitted)). The 

only question before the Court is whether Petitioner had a fair opportunity to litigate his 

claim. See Ortiz–Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The relevant 

inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did, 

in fact, do so, or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”) (citations omitted). 

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 Here, Petitioner had multiple opportunities to litigate this issue in the trial court. 

Petitioner joined a motion to suppress the wiretap (Doc. 17-4, Ex. J at 191), appealed a 

denial of that motion to suppress (Doc. 19-10, Ex. R), filed a PCR motion based on Jones

(Doc. 19-11, Ex. Z), and appealed the denial of that motion (Doc. 20-8, Ex. HH). The 

trial court (Doc. 12-3 at 25-29; Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG) and the Court of Appeals (Doc. 20-9, 

Ex. KK) addressed the merits of Petitioner’s argument. Petitioner had an opportunity for 

a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim. Although this claim fails on its 

merits, it is also barred from consideration. 

c. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that “the executive branch disregarded Rule 

4.1(B) Ariz. R. Crim. Pro. in its entirety by holding the defendant, Mr. Felix, in jail 

without a complaint for over 48 hours.” (Doc. 12 at 27.) Petitioner contends that the 

“executed late complaint was given ‘a’ retroactive application” in violation of the 

Arizona Constitution. (Id.) Petitioner further argues that “the post-conviction court’s 

review of this claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

interpretation of the facts in light of evidence presented in state court proceedings.” (Id. 

at 29.)2

 Petitioner was arrested on Friday, June 2, 2006 and his initial appearance was on 

Saturday, June 3, 2006. (Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG; Doc. 12-3 at 26.) A direct complaint was 

filed on June 6, 2006. (Id.) 

 On post-conviction review, the trial court determined Petitioner’s claims were 

precluded and meritless. (Id.) Here, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable because it 

involves an interpretation of state law, which is not reviewable by this Court. 

i. A violation of Rule 4.1(b) is not cognizable on habeas review. 

 Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or 

application of state laws and procedural rules. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–

 

2

 Within this Petition and the Brief in Support of Petition, Petitioner also refers to 

several previously-filed documents (Doc. 12 at 26) that contain the same argument. See

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 12-2 at 64-66) and Reply to Petition for Post- Conviction Relief (Doc. 12-3 at 23-24). 

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68 (1991) (stating that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”); 

Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992) (the question to be decided by a federal court 

on petition for habeas corpus is not whether the state committed state-law error but 

whether the state court’s action was “so arbitrary or capricious” as to constitute an 

independent violation of the federal constitution); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 

(9th Cir. 1998) (“Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction . . . to review state court 

applications of state procedural rules.”). Here, the trial court ruled on Petitioner’s PCR 

motion as follows: 

 Defendant alleges that he was arrested on June 2, 2006 and given an initial appearance on June 3, 2006. The defendant alleges that, on June 7, 2007, a grand jury indictment was issued. The defendant alleges two claims arising out of those circumstances. First, defendant argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because no counsel was appointed within 48 hours of the initial appearance. Second, defendant claims that the State violated Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 4.1(b) because no complaint was filed within 48 hours of his 

arrest. 

 The Court finds each of these claims to be without merit. As an 

initial matter, each claim is precluded. Under Rule 32.2(a), an issue is 

precluded if it was waived at trial, or on appeal. Defendant’s claims could have been raised in previous proceedings but were not. The issues are precluded. 

 Even if the Court were to consider the merits, the claims would 

be rejected. First, under Rule 4.1 (b), the remedy for a violation is 

defendant’s release - - not a bar on prosecution of the claim. Second, according to Court records, a direct complaint was filed on June 6, 2006. Since June 2 was a Friday, and since weekends are excluded 

under Rule 1.3(a), the direct complaint was timely filed . . . . Third, the alleged violation did not render his trial unfair . . . . The Court believes 

defendant has not shown - - and cannot show - - any reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different without the 

alleged 4.1 (b) violation. 

 (Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG at 54-55; Doc. 12-3 at 26.) 

 The Arizona courts determined there was no violation of Rule 4.1(b) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court’s conclusions are based on an 

interpretation of state procedural rules. This claim is not cognizable on habeas review. 

IV. PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENTS 

 This Court identified three issues in its November 19, 2014 Order. (Doc. 11 at 2.) 

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Respondent expanded the number of issues in its Answer to the habeas petition, stating 

that “Petitioner ostensibly incorporated by reference the arguments that he previously 

raised in state court by citing to certain pleadings that he filed on direct appeal and during 

his PCR proceeding.” (Doc. 17 at 3.) Petitioner is “given the benefit of liberal 

construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, if 

Petitioner sufficiently incorporated arguments made previously in the record, this Court 

will consider those arguments. “Nonetheless, a federal habeas petitioner adequately 

pleads an otherwise ambiguous claim by making ‘clear and repeated’ references to an 

appended supporting brief that presents the claim with sufficient particularity.” Barnett 

v. Duffey, No. 13–16564, 2015 WL 6654896, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Dye v. 

Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005)). Petitioner’s claim must, however, be adequately pled. 

“Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases . . . instructs the petitioner to 

‘specify all the grounds for relief available to [him]’ and to ‘state the facts supporting 

each ground.’” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649 (2005) (citation omitted). 

a. Petitioner does not argue a violation of his right to counsel. 

 Respondent’s Answer identifies an argument “ostensibly incorporated” by 

Petitioner that the “trial court purportedly violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

and his right to federal due process by failing to appoint him counsel within 48 hours of 

his initial appearance—a proceeding that he characterizes as a ‘critical stage,’ allegedly 

because ‘the lack of a timely filed indictment triggered a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment.’” (Doc. 17 at 3.) The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s argument and the 

attachments identified in his Petition and Brief. See Brief in Support of Petition (Doc. 12 

at 26-30), Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 12-2 at 64-66), and Reply to Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 12-3 at 23-24). 

 Here, Petitioner did not plead this argument. Petitioner did not allege a violation of 

his right to counsel in the Petition, Brief in Support of Petition, or the Reply. The Court 

has reviewed all of these documents and determines this is not an argument that is 

advanced by Petitioner. To the extent Petitioner obliquely refers to a previously-raised 

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argument, such reference is insufficient. Barnett v. Duffey, 2015 WL 6654896, at *1 

(“The petition’s general references to hundreds of pages of attached exhibits are 

insufficient to incorporate the claim.”).3

 

 Even if this claim was advanced, and assuming arguendo a right to counsel was 

violated, Petitioner identifies no prejudice resulting from a violation. The trial court 

entered the following conclusion: 

The alleged violation did not render his trial unfair and there is no showing that the alleged Sixth Amendment violation resulted in 

prejudice. There is no suggestion that the alleged violation prevented the attorney from adequately preparing the case or somehow resulted in evidence being marshalled against defendant that otherwise would 

not have been available. There is no allegation that defendant was interrogated in violation of Miranda. 

(Doc. 20-8, Ex. GG at 55.) Petitioner failed to establish any prejudice resulting from his 

alleged violation of a right to counsel. Petitioner was appointed counsel (Jeffrey 

Kirchler). (Doc. 17-4, Ex. E.) Petitioner does not argue that he was improperly 

interviewed or that evidence was obtained during any gap in representation. Petitioner 

also failed to establish the trial court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

b. Petitioner does not argue a Franks violation in his petition. 

 Petitioner repeatedly argues within the Petition and Brief in Support of Petition 

that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking was a Fourth Amendment violation. (Doc. 12 

at 13-25.) In his Petition and Brief in Support of Petition, Petitioner references Franks 

twice. The first reference is within the Petition, where Petitioner states that he “does not 

waive his Franks v. Delaware claim raised by his trial attorney or his direct appeals 

attorney and incorporates those arguments as proof to support counsel’s failed to press 

the issue about 4 month investigation and illegal use of a G.P.S. tracking device.” (Doc. 

1 at 7.) In the Brief in Support of Petition, Petitioner states “a hearing should be held 

based on Franks v. Delaware hearing request (counsel failed to fully formulate G.P.S. 

 

3

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claim thereto are ineffective).” (Doc. 12 at 14.) 

 Petitioner’s two references to Franks v. Delaware were made to advance his 

argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a hearing on his GPS 

tracking claim. Perhaps mistakenly, Petitioner believed that he was entitled to a Franks 

v. Delaware hearing on his GPS-tracking issue. Unmistakably, Petitioner never asserts 

that the initial application to intercept wire communications lacked necessity or contained 

false statements. Petitioner does not initially argue a violation of his rights due to courtauthorized wiretaps, nor does he argue necessity or falsity. 

 In his Reply, however, Petitioner responds to arguments presented in 

Respondents’ Answer. For the first time, Petitioner argues necessity and falsity related to 

the wiretap affidavit. (Doc. 25 at 4.) Normally, Petitioner’s attempt to raise a new claim 

in a Reply is improper. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“A Traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.”); see also

Rule 2(c)(1) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (a habeas petition must “specify all 

the grounds for relief available to the petitioner”). However, because Respondent fully 

briefed this issue in the Answer, the Court will address this supplemental argument. 

 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated by the trial court’s failure to suppress the wiretap and resulting evidence. (Doc. 

25 at 4.) Respondent asserts that a Fourth Amendment wiretap claim is not cognizable on 

habeas review under Stone v. Powell if Petitioner had the opportunity to litigate this issue 

in the state courts. (Doc 17 at 39.) Petitioner does not claim he did not have a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in Arizona’s courts nor does the 

record reveal that such is the case. Rather, the record demonstrates that Petitioner 

litigated this issue extensively. See State v. Velasco-Felix, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0208, 2010 

WL 3057246, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (finding that the “trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress” the wiretap in Petitioner’s case). 

Therefore, any Fourth Amendment aspect of this claim is not cognizable. 

 Petitioner’s stated claim in his Reply, a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 

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Amendments (Doc. 25 at 4), does not justify habeas relief. An asserted error of law does 

not necessarily prompt habeas relief. See Lord v. Lambert, 347 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 

2003) (holding that even if “trial testimony was the product of a Title III violation and 

should have been excluded, Lord’s habeas claim fails because the admission of that 

testimony did not deprive Lord of due process or result in a miscarriage of justice”). 

Where the error is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional, the appropriate inquiry is 

whether the error is “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 

miscarriage of justice,” or “an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of 

fair procedure,” and whether the error “present[s] exceptional circumstances where the 

need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Lord, 347 at 

1094, quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (other citations omitted). 

 Here, as in Lord, the record demonstrates that Petitioner had a full and fair hearing 

before the state courts. Petitioner litigated this claim in the trial court4

 and presented the 

issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals.5

 Petitioner was convicted based upon 

overwhelming evidence, which was stipulated into evidence by the parties. (See Doc. 17-

4, Ex. M at 3.) On May 7, 2006, Petitioner stated the price of a quarter-pound of 

methamphetamine was $2750. (Doc. 12-4 at 10.) On May 15, 2006, Petitioner discussed 

the sale of 12 pounds of methamphetamine. (Doc. 12-4 at 12.) On May 20, Petitioner 

told a coconspirator that he lost $100,000 when law enforcement seized his 

methamphetamine. (Doc. 12-4 at 13.) There are dozens of additional examples in the 

record. Petitioner fails to establish “a miscarriage of justice” warranting exceptional 

relief. See Hussong v. Warden, 623 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal 

of habeas petition in a wiretap case because “we have no reason to think that Hussong 

was not convicted on the basis of probative and reliable evidence, even if that evidence 

 

4 See Doc. 12-1 at 66, Ruling of Trial Court regarding Joint Motion to Suppress Wiretap and Request for Franks Hearing. 

5 See Velasco-Felix, 2010 WL 3057246, at *6. 

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was wrongfully admitted”). Petitioner’s claim on this ground must be denied. 

V. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are not 

cognizable or meritless. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

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the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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