Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-08-06240/USCOURTS-ca6-08-06240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 690
Nature of Suit: Other Forfeiture and Penalty Suits
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0131p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

RAYMOND SAVOY,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 08-6240

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.

No. 07-01025—James D. Todd, District Judge.

Submitted: April 28, 2010

Decided and Filed: May 12, 2010 

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: R. Leigh Grinalds, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Jackson,

Tennessee, for Appellee. Raymond Savoy, Fort Worth, Texas, pro se.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Raymond Savoy appeals the district

court’s partial denial of his motion for return of property. This matter arises as a proceeding

ancillary to Savoy’s criminal prosecution for child-pornography related charges in the United

States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. United States v. Savoy, 280 F.

App’x 504, 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 742 (2008). This court has previously

affirmed Savoy’s convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B) for using

minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce videotapes and for possessing those

videotapes, which stemmed from evidence seized at the Rocky Top Tavern, Savoy’s place

1

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of business. While executing a search warrant at the Rocky Top Tavern for “‘intoxicating

liquors and all records, papers, ledgers, pictures, or devices used in the storage, sale,

transportation, distribution or manufacture of [said liquors] . . . contrary to the Laws of the

State of Tennessee,’” officers discovered videotapes in Savoy’s locked office that Savoy

indicated were used for his video-surveillance system in the Tavern. Id. at 506 (alteration

in original). The officers seized “[s]ixty VHS tapes . . . , two hundred ninety-one

photographs, the components of the surveillance system, and a television.” Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct.

Order at 1 n.2). The government used four of the videotapes depicting minors as evidence

in Savoy’s criminal prosecution.

After his conviction, Savoy, now a federal prisoner, filed a Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 41(g) motion for return of property, seeking the return of all of the seized property

not admitted into evidence in his trial, with the exception of the surveillance system. The

district court engaged in an in camera review of the photographs and videotapes and granted

Savoy’s motion with regard to all items except those videos and photographs whose subjects

were minors and those videos whose subjects were adults who were not aware that they were

being recorded. The district court found that Savoy was not entitled to lawful possession of

those adult videotapes under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605. Savoy appeals the

district court’s judgment with regard to the adult videos only.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Partial Denial of Savoy’s Motion to Return Property

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 41 motion for return of

property, which involves “essentially a civil equitable proceeding.” United States v.

Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted),

cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991); United States v. Headley, 111 F. App’x 808, 809 (6th Cir.

2004) (unpublished order). “What we are concerned with is whether the district court

properly balanced the competing equities in deciding whether return was in order.” Duncan,

918 F.2d at 654. “‘The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should

be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated.’” United

States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. LaFatch, 565

F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977)). Under Rule 41, “‘[a] district court has both the jurisdiction and

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the duty to return the contested property once the government’s need for it has ended.’”

United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 387 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 187),

vacated on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1182, reinstated by 125 F. App’x 701 (2005).

“However, the person seeking return of property must show that they are lawfully entitled

to possess it.” United States v. Headley, 50 F. App’x 266, 267 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished

order); accord Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 262 (6th Cir.) (holding

that Rule 41 places the burden on the claimant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).

Rule 41 provides, in relevant part:

(g) Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful

search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may

move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed in the

district where the property was seized. The court must receive

evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it

grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant,

but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the

property and its use in later proceedings.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g). We have held “that Rule 41(g) ‘clearly contemplates a hearing “on

any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.”’” Bowker, 372 F.3d at 387

(quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 186). Here, the district court looked to state law to determine

whether Savoy was entitled to lawful possession of the adult videotapes. Under Tennessee

Code Annotated § 39-13-605,

(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be

photographed an individual, when the individual is in a place where

there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior

effective consent of the individual . . . if the photograph:

(1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if

such person appeared in the photograph; and

(2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or

gratification of the defendant.

(b) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires,

“photograph” means . . . any videotape or live television

transmission of any individual so that the individual is readily

identifiable.

(c) All photographs taken in violation of this section shall be

confiscated and, after their use as evidence, destroyed.

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1

The government, noting the dearth of case law related to § 39-13-605, attempts to utilize an

analogy to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’s treatment of a “similar” Wisconsin statute, Wisconsin Statute

§ 942.09. Appellee Br. at 7–8 (citing State v. Jahnke, 762 N.W.2d 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)). However,

the relevant language of the Wisconsin statute—“‘while that person is nude in a circumstance in which

he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy’”—justified the court of appeals’s inquiry into the

viewpoint of the individual subject to the recording at issue. Jahnke, 762 N.W.2d at 698 & n.4 (quoting

Wis. Stat. § 942.09(2)(am)1) (emphasis added). This language in Wisconsin differs from the language at

issue in Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605 in a materially significant way. Even so, we note that the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals distinguished the reasonable expectation of privacy held by a private person

recorded in the defendant’s private bedroom from the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy that an

exotic dancer “who dance[s] nude before multiple patrons in a club open to the public” would enjoy. Id.

at 700 (emphasis added).

2

The district court also did not make an explicit finding that the videos, if made in violation of

§ 39-13-605, constituted “contraband,” but instead seemed to assume that if it was a crime to make the

videos then it was a crime to possess the videos. See Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 2–3). Although Savoy does

not raise this issue on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in treating the

videotapes as contraband. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) defines contraband in part as

“[g]oods that are unlawful to possess” and “derivative contraband” as “[p]roperty whose possession

becomes unlawful when it is used in committing an illegal act.” Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-

13-605(c), “[a]ll photographs taken in violation of this section shall be confiscated and, after their use as

evidence, destroyed.” We read this provision to imply that it is also unlawful to possess such items and

that they are contraband. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1965)

(distinguishing between “per se contraband” and “derivative contraband”).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605. The district court found that “the tapes were made using a

hidden camera, and the females were not aware that they were being taped in various stages

of nudity and/or performing sex acts.” Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3). But the court did not

make an explicit finding as to whether the females were “‘in a place where there is a

reasonable expectation of privacy’” as required under § 39-13-605. Savoy argues “that the

individual’s [sic] in the video’s [sic] did not have an expectancy of privacy in a public tavern

that was equipped with video surveillance.” Appellant Br. at 3. The government responds

that “while it is not reasonable to expect that one’s nude body would not be viewable by

those present, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy from recording.”1

 Appellee Br.

at 7. Savoy thus argues that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry requires a

single analysis of the circumstances presented by the “place,” and the government

counters that the inquiry requires a separate analysis of the circumstances of each

“individual” recorded in the “place.”

We conclude that Savoy’s approach is closer to the plain language of the statute

and that under the plain language of the statute we must decide what is “a place where

there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” under § 39-13-605 and whether the Rocky

Top Tavern would meet that standard.2

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3

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-607 utilizes the same language—“in a place where there is

a reasonable expectation of privacy”—to codify the offense of observation without consent. Unfortunately

the Tennessee courts have not interpreted the phrase under this statute, either.

4

The Tennessee Legislature has proposed an amendment that replaces “is in a place where there

is” with “has” such that the provision would read “when the individual has a reasonable expectation of

privacy.” S.B. 3219, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2009); H.B. 3277, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2009).

This amendment, if it passes, would support the government’s position that we must analyze the reasonable

expectation of privacy held by each individual on the videotapes. However, we are bound to interpret the

statute as it was written at the time applicable to Savoy’s claim, i.e., in 2005 when the videos were seized

and Savoy was prosecuted.

1. Statutory Language: “when the individual is in a place where

there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”

Our research uncovered only four Tennessee cases that even mention § 39-13-

605,3

 and only two that state the facts of conviction. In State v. Castrejon, No. M2005-

01886-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1097486 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (unpublished

opinion), the court upheld the defendant’s consecutive sentence for conviction under

§ 39-13-605 for videotaping himself touching a minor while she slept. Id. at *1. In State

v. Dickens, No. M2003-00783-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 735025 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.

6, 2004), the court upheld, against a sufficiency challenge, the defendant’s conviction

for criminal attempt to commit unlawful photographing in violation of § 39-13-605 for

attempting to take a picture of a naked woman over the top of the wall in a closed,

locked tanning-booth stall that was “designed to ensure privacy.” Id. at *1–2, *4.

Neither court engaged in any analysis of whether the offense occurred in “a place where

there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” However, the Dickens court’s sufficiency

analysis focused not on the woman’s expectation of privacy within the tanning booth but

rather on the place itself, stating “that each tanning room is designed to ensure privacy.

The doors lock from the inside and, although the walls do not extend all the way to the

ceiling, it would be difficult to see over them without standing on something.” Id. at *4.

The court thus focused on whether the place itself—the tanning room—could give rise

to a reasonable expectation of privacy and not whether the individual then in the place

had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the statute seems designed to protect

the privacy interests of the individual subject to the photograph, the statute considers that

privacy interest with reference to the individual’s presence “in a place where there is a

reasonable expectation of privacy.”4

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The Tennessee courts have produced a wealth of case law on places where a

person may or may not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Most recently, the

Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision “rejecting

the Sixth Circuit bright-line rule that a resident always has a reasonable expectation of

privacy in a secured common area” in favor of “the totality of the circumstances test . . .

for determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.” State v. Talley, —

S.W.3d —, 2010 WL 987072, at *6–7 (Tenn. Mar. 19, 2010). Applying this test, the

court held that “the Defendant [resident] did not have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the commonly shared, interior hallway of a condominium complex” because

no resident “could unilaterally exclude others rightfully within the hallway,” residents

had collectively allowed non-residents to have intermittent access to the common areas,

and there was “no evidence that the defendant had taken any precautions to maintain his

privacy in the common areas of the building.” Id. at *7–8. The court noted that “[a]s

a general rule, unlocked or unsecured common areas of apartment buildings do not

qualify for any reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at *6 n.4.

Based on the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of § 39-13-605

and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s approach to the privacy inquiry, we conclude that

a totality-of-the-circumstances test should apply for determining whether a place may

give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under § 39-13-605, recognizing that

“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and provides sanctuary for citizens

wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.

91, 96 n.5 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But the extent to which the

Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). Therefore we must determine whether,

under the totality of the circumstances at issue in each videotape, an individual in the

Rocky Top Tavern would be justified in asserting that he or she is “in a place where

there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 

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2. The Rocky Top Tavern

Although the district court did not make findings with respect to the contents of

the videos aside from their unsuspecting adult female subjects, this court has previously

stated the facts related to the videotapes as follows:

During the search, officers discovered a locked room, which Defendant

Savoy opened for them. Mr. Savoy described this room as his office.

The room contained a single bed, a desk, a television (TV), a video

cassette recorder (VCR), and several videotapes. Defendant advised

officers that the TV and VCR were used in relation to his

video-surveillance system. According to the officers, Mr. Savoy

consented to the officers viewing the videotapes on his TV and VCR.

Agents played the tapes to determine whether they contained illegal

liquor or beer sales. However, the tapes actually depicted sex acts

between Mr. Savoy and unknown females, what appeared to be minor

females removing their clothing and dancing, and sexual acts between a

male and what appeared to be a minor female. Officers then found a

camera and microphone hidden in a hollowed-out two-by-four (2 x 4)

stud behind the bar. The camera and microphone were not readily visible

to persons inside the bar, and were recovered only after Defendant Savoy

advised agents of their respective location. The officers seized all of the

videotapes for further review.

Savoy, 280 F. App’x at 506 (footnote omitted). Because Savoy was charged with childpornography related offenses, this court discussed only the contents of the videos

admitted into evidence at trial, and those tapes depicted only minors—not the adult

females in the videotapes at issue here. However, this court recounted that the

videotapes admitted into evidence at trial depicted minor females in various states of

nudity and/or engaged in sex acts “behind the bar.” Id. at 507. None of the four

videotapes admitted into evidence contained footage from within the “locked room,” and

it seems that the camera captured events solely in the area “behind the bar” because the

camera was located “behind the bar.” See id. at 506–07.

Our inquiry is therefore confined to the business premises of the Rocky Top

Tavern. “An expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and

indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.” New York v. Burger,

482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987); see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 90–91; Autoworld Specialty Cars,

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Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1987) (“‘[Proprietor] did not have any

reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to

enter and to transact business.’” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469

(1985))). Tennessee courts have recognized that even when a person visits “another’s

[private] home for a short period of time and is essentially at the location to conduct a

business transaction, the [person] possesses no expectation of privacy in the home.”

Kyles v. State, No. W2004-00374-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 645161, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Mar. 16, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 89–91). And the

Tennessee courts abide by the “now-classic principle: ‘What a person knowingly

exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth

Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area

accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’” State v. Medford, No.

W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21,

2003) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967));

see State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843 & n.9 (Tenn. 2001). “Public accessibility, in other

words, does not invariably defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Medford, 2003

WL 22446575, at *8; see State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494–95 (Tenn. 2001) (holding

that defendant who requested to be alone with parent in police-station interview room

and to have the recording equipment turned off had reasonable expectation of privacy

from being recorded by hidden audio and video recording system after police complied

with both requests and closed the door behind them when they left the room); State v.

Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that helicopter surveillance of area of

defendant’s property within public view did not violate reasonable expectation of

privacy). However, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy “in areas of [a

business] where the public was invited to enter and to transact business.” Maryland v.

Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); see State v. Heller, No. W2007-01455-CCA-R3-CD,

2008 WL 2901581, at *7–9 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2008) (unpublished opinion)

(holding that defendant had standing to challenge search of his person at a business but

not to challenge the search of the business itself because present only as casual visitor

without a reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Norton, No. E2001-01903-CCA-

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5

In determining whether a business patron had standing to challenge the search of the business

itself, the Heller court specifically listed “seven factors to be considered when determining if a legitimate

expectation of privacy exists,” including:

(1) ownership of the property; (2) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the

thing seized; (3) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the placed [sic]

searched; (4) whether the defendant has the right to exclude other[s] from the place;

(5) whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free

from intrusion by the state; (6) whether the defendant took normal precautions to

R3-CD, 2002 WL 1585634, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2002) (unpublished

opinion) (noting that owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his tavern

because it was open to the public at the time the search warrant was executed, but

expressly not ruling on privacy interests of customers present).

The district court failed to make findings of fact to support that the “reasonable

expectation of privacy” element of § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the totality of the

circumstances here. Without such findings, we are unable to determine whether the

district court abused its discretion in assuming that the element was satisfied because

each videotape presents a unique set of circumstances that requires a fact-intensive

totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to determine whether the Rocky Top Tavern

qualifies as “a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” under the

circumstances of each recording. The videotapes were entered into the record in the

district court, but neither Savoy nor the government has presented any evidence as to

whether the adult females in the requested videos were present at the Rocky Top Tavern

for anything other than business purposes at the time that the nudity and/or sexual

activity occurred and was recorded. Because findings of fact are the province of the

district court, and the district court has already conducted a review of the twenty

videotapes at issue, we vacate the district court’s judgment with regard to the adult

videotapes and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district

court must determine whether each videotape in question was recorded while the Rocky

Top Tavern was open to the public for business purposes, what specific areas of the bar

premises the hidden camera captured in each video (whether the videos contain only

footage from “behind the bar” or within public view), and whether any steps were taken

in an attempt to maintain the privacy of the activities that occurred in each video. See

Heller, 2008 WL 2901581, at *8;5

 Carter, 525 U.S. at 88–91 (holding that defendant’s

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maintain his privacy; and (7) whether he was legitimately on the premises.

Heller, 2008 WL 2901581, at *8 (quoting State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991));

accord Talley, 2010 WL 987072, at *5.

expectation of privacy in premises owned by another depends on the purpose of the

visit); Lowe v. Clift, 2007 WL 2112672, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (unpublished opinion)

(“Moreover, patrons of a venue into which the public is invited do not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy—they necessarily encounter others who observe their presence

and behavior.” (citing Macon, 472 U.S. at 469)). Only after the district court makes

findings of fact that enable it to determine whether the “reasonable expectation of

privacy” element of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the

totality of the circumstances for each videotape individually may the court determine

whether Savoy is or is not entitled to lawfully possess each videotape for purposes of his

Rule 41(g) motion for return of property.

B. Consideration of Search Warrant for Rule 41 Analysis

Savoy argues that the district court in reviewing his Rule 41(g) motion should

have “consider[ed] the validity of the State Search Warrant, and whether it went outside

the scope of ‘things to be searched,[] and/or items to be seized[]’ before deciding to only

return some of the property to Appellant’s designee” because the search warrant was

“obtained because of the sale of liquor in an establishment licensed for the sale of beer

only.” Appellant Br. at 3; see also id. at 4. This argument has no merit because this

court has already decided that the videotapes that were used in Savoy’s prosecution were

properly seized, Savoy, 280 F. App’x at 510–11, and the same rationale applies to the

adult videotapes at issue here. An earlier panel of this court held that the “seizure of

Defendant’s videotapes was valid because the tapes were reasonably related to the

offense that formed the basis of his search warrant,” in accordance with the Supreme

Court’s holding in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), “that a law enforcement

agent in making a valid search may seize property found on the premises being searched

which is the subject matter of a different crime, even though the officer was not aware

that such property was on the premises when the search was initiated.” Savoy, 280

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6

The legality of the initial seizure of the adult videotapes would not alter our analysis under Rule

41(g) because the same analysis applies “where the initial seizure was lawful and where it was unlawful.”

Francis, 646 F.2d at 262 n.7.

7

Although Savoy’s motion did not reference the television, the district court ordered the

television’s return because the government had no objection to its return—this stands in contrast with the

government’s objection in the district court to the return of the surveillance system. See Doc. 7 (Dist. Ct.

Order at 1–2).

F. App’x at 511. The fact that the adult videotapes were not later used in Savoy’s

prosecution for child pornography charges does not impact our analysis.6

C. Additional Request Not Filed with District Court

Savoy acknowledges that he did not include in his Motion for Return of Personal

Property a specific request for the return of his video surveillance equipment, but he

argues that the district court should have addressed its return anyway because “[a] Pro

se litigant should not be required to list every little piece of property that was seized.”

Appellant Br. at 5. Although “we are mindful to construe [pro se] arguments liberally,”

El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008), a claimant may abandon a claim to

seized items by not requesting their return in the request filed for the other items seized,

see McBean v. United States, 43 F. App’x 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished order).

Aside from the liberal construction afforded pro se filings, Savoy presents no arguments

on appeal as to why the district court should have returned his video surveillance

equipment. Savoy’s motion was not a general request for all property seized but rather

made specific requests for the return of the videotapes, photographs, and negatives.7

Savoy’s failure to request the return of his surveillance equipment in the district court

precludes us from considering the propriety of return of that property in the first

instance. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g); El Bey, 530 F.3d at 412. Savoy may present this

request to the district court on remand.

II. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment with regard to the

twenty videotapes at issue in this appeal, and we remand for the district court to make

findings of fact that will enable it to determine whether, consistent with Federal Rule of

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Criminal Procedure 41(g), Savoy is entitled to lawful possession of the videotapes under

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605.

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