Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00633/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00633-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GILBERT SALDANA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv0633-LAB (WMc)

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANT BOREM

FOR FAILURE TO SERVE AND

TO PROSECUTE

vs.

T. BOREM, et al.,

Defendants.

On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff Gilbert Saldaña, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed his first complaint in this action, alleging, among other things, that

Defendant Borem, a correctional sergeant at Calipatria State Prison, violated his federal

constitutional rights a year earlier, in March, 2010. Saldaña moved for appointment of

counsel, but Magistrate Judge William McCurine denied the motion and Saldaña didn’t seek

reconsideration or object to the denial. After mandatory screening, the original complaint 1

Had he sought reconsideration, it would have been denied unless Saldaña came

1

forward with better reasons than were set forth in his motion. There is no right to counsel in

civil cases, and district courts may appoint counsel only under exceptional circumstances.

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9 Cir. 1991). At the time Saldaña filed his motion th

for appointment of counsel, he didn’t meet the standard, and he still doesn’t meet it. A finding

of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the

merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. The key to the second factor is Saldaña’s ability

to articulate his claims successfully, not whether he has actually done so. As the Court has

noted in several previous rulings, it appears Saldaña has not been diligent in litigating this

- 1 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was then served by U.S. Marshals on most Defendants as directed by Saldaña on U.S.

Marshals form USM-285. On June 28, 2011, however, the summons was returned

unexecuted as to Defendant Borem, with the annotation “Returned unexecuted per litigation

coordinator. Defendant has retired.” 

Saldaña then completed a second USM-285, with the instruction:

This Defendant is retired. Per prison litigation coordinator if process

service/U.S. Marshals contacts their office, they will provide to U.S. Marshals

a last known address. Prison address is: 7018 Blair Road, Calipatria, CA

92233.

(Docket no. 19.) This was also returned unexecuted, with three annotations indicating two

attempts to deliver the summons and complaint had been made, on August 10 and 11

respectively. The second annotation indicates that Borem no longer lived at the address on

file. A third annotation, dated August 30, says “Returned unexecuted. Defendant no longer

lives at confidential address.” (Id.)

Saldaña says he next wrote to the U.S. Marshals service to tell them he thought the

litigation coordinator at the prison was supposed to accept service on Borem’s behalf.

(Docket no. 57 at 2.) He also says he asked the civil clerk at the U.S. Marshals service for

legal advice, and was told to ask the Court. 

Saldaña then wrote a letter addressed to the Court Clerk, which Magistrate Judge

McCurine accepted by discrepancy order (Docket nos. 24, 25.) The letter mentions that

Saldaña has “attended [the] prison law library and asked around in attempts to acquire

information on how to proceed with service on Defendant T. Borem, all with negative results.”

(Docket no. 25.) Saldaña then asked the Clerk for advice about what kind of motion to file.

The discrepancy order (a copy of which was sent to Saldaña) states that the Clerk could not

grant Saldaña’s request. The letter also goes on to ask for legal advice about whether two

other Defendants, Wilkins and Foston, were adequately served and whether he should seek

entry of default against them.

case, but has either waited for others to move the case forward, or has invested time,

resources, and effort on projects of his own devising, without regard for the Court’s

instructions. 

- 2 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Judge McCurine did not provide Saldaña with legal advice directly, but did address

the default issue in his report and recommendation. (Docket no. 27.)

Saldaña says he next received a letter from Deputy Attorney General John Walters,

who said he was representingDefendants Hurtado, Madden, Builteman, Ochoa, Foston, and

Hodges. (Docket no. 57 at 3.) Based on this, Saldaña says he assumed that Walters was

going to waive service on Borem. (Id.) To confirm his assumption, he says he wrote to

Walters, but Walters never replied. (Id.)

On February 29, 2012, the Court dismissed the complaint, and directed Saldaña to

file an amended complaint, if he thought he could do so successfully. Instead of doing that,

Saldaña let the deadline for amendment pass, then filed a late notice saying he intended to

“stand on” his complaint. The Court then ordered him to either amend or abandon his claims.

After extensions of time, Saldaña finally filed his amended complaint on August 1, 2012. 

On August 10, the Court ordered him to show cause why his claims against

Defendant Borem should not be dismissed both for failure to serve and for failure to

prosecute. Saldaña filed a response, reciting the facts mentioned above and concluding that

someone else—the U.S. Marshals, prison personnel, the Court, or the Deputy Attorney

General—ought to have helped him find Borem’s address. (Docket no. 57 at 4.) He

theorizes that prison authorities must have Borem’s current address, and says he intended

to find out what it was during discovery. (Id.)

Saldaña also argues that he was busy with other aspects of the case. He points out

that the Court has previously noted he filed many other documents. (Docket no. 57 at 4.)

This may be an explanation, but it does not show good cause. The Court did note that

Saldaña filed several documents, but took care to point out they were unnecessary

documents, and that Saldaña was wasting time. (See, e.g., Docket no. 49, 4:13–17 (pointing

out that Saldaña’s delays in filing an amended complaint were not reasonably explained by

limited access to writing materials,or supplies, because he managed to file three pleadings

the Court didn’t ask him for).) In the same order, it is worth noting, the Court pointed out to

Saldaña that Borem hadn’t been served. (Id., 3:3–9.) 

- 3 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Saldaña’s expectation that either the Court or opposing counsel would provide him

with legal advice was unreasonable. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District

judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”) If he thought

Judge McCurine erred by merely issuing the report and recommendation without also

providing legal advice was error, he could have objected to that. Had he done so, the Court

would have pointed out to him what he already knows: that he is representing himself; that

the Court is an impartial arbiter of the law and not his attorney; and that opposing counsel

or third parties are not required to give him any legal advice or do research for him. It is plain

Saldaña knows this, not only because he said so in his motion for appointment of counsel

(Docket no. 3), but also because he has repeatedly mentioned it in motions for extensions

of time. 

It does not appear any of the people or offices he sought help from threw up

unnecessary obstacles, misled him, or interfered with his serving Borem. Some appropriately

offered him assistance, although he still ultimately wasn’t successful. For example, the

prison litigation coordinator provided the U.S. Marshals with Borem’s last known address,

although as it turned out Borem didn’t live there any more. (See Docket no. 57 at 2.) 

Although he now professes the belief that someone else was going to conduct an

investigation for him or tell him how to arrange for it, this belief is also unreasonable, since 

everyone he tried to enlist in this task declined his invitation either expressly or implicitly. For

example, in his response to the Court’s order to show cause, Saldaña construes Walters’

letter saying he represented other Defendants but not Borem as holding out some promise

that Walters would waive service on behalf of Borem. (Docket no. 57 at 3.) And with regard

to the letter Saldaña sent to the Court Clerk, although he was sent a copy of the discrepancy

order, stating the request was “not grantable by the Clerk,” he neverthless says he “never

received a response to this letter/request.” (Id.; see also Docket nos. 24, 25 (noting that

Saldaña was served with a copy of the discrepancy order and letter by U.S. mail).) 

It is also worth pointing out the large span of time at issue here. Although the statute

of limitations gives Saldaña some time in which to file suit, the statute of limitations is not

- 4 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

intended to encourage delays in filing or serving defendants with process. With the passage

of time comes the increasing risk that a defendant—or any other party or witness, for that

matter—will be more difficult to locate, as is the case here. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S.

110, 117 (2000) (recognizing that delay increases the risk that witnesses will move out of the

jurisdiction). Saldaña, knowing he had yet to serve Borem, repeatedly allowed weeks or

months to pass before taking another step, resulting in substantial delays and, in the

aggregate, a very lengthy delay. All told, Saldaña allowed over two and a half years to pass

after Borem’s alleged involvement in depriving him of his rights, and well over a year and a

half since filing suit. Borem still hasn’t been served, and no date by which service might be

accomplished is in sight.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the Court is required to dismiss the action without

prejudice against a defendant not timely served, unless the plaintiff shows good cause for

the failure. Here, Saldaña has not shown good cause, and the delay in service therefore

warrants dismissal.

In addition, the Court has authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) as well as pursuant

to its own inherent authority to dismiss claims for failure to prosecute. See Dutra v.

Lattimore, 2012 WL 868995, at *1–2 (E.D.Cal., Mar. 13, 2012). As explained above,

Saldaña has not taken reasonable steps to prosecute his claims against Borem, and there

is no indication he is even ready to begin prosecuting these claims. Rather, Saldaña has

required considerable prodding from the Court simply to keep the case moving against the

Defendants who have been served.

Before dismissing claims for failure to prosecute, the Court considers five factors: 1)

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 2) the court’s need to manage its

docket; 3) the risk of prejudice to defendants; 4) the availability of less drastic alternatives;

and 5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits. See Pagtalunan v.

Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Of these five factors, only the fifth weighs against

dismissal for failure to prosecute. 

/ / /

- 5 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The first factor, the public’s interest in expedition resolution of this case, favors

dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d

983, 990 (9 Cir. 1999) (noting that this factor “always favors dismissal,” and holding that a

th

failure to pursue the case for almost four months weighed in favor of dismissal). 

The Court’s need to manage its docket weighs very heavily in favor of dismissal. This

case has already been held back by several needless delays, and is not amenable to more

delays for the purpose of finding and serving Borem and beginning the litigation process

afresh with him. It is unclear where Borem is, or who might know where he is, but there is

no reason to suppose the U.S. Marshals or the prison are privy to this information as

Saldaña supposes. Assuming he is still living and collecting a pension or other benefits, it

is likely some state agency could probably provide information about where he is. But even

so, it’s unclear how long that would take or if Borem can be served, wherever he may be.

Holding up this case for an indefinite time so that Saldaña can go looking for Borem, serve

him with process, and begin litigating claims against him would severely impair the Court’s

management of its docket.

The needless delaywould unfairly prejudice those Defendants who have been served,

and who have already been defending against Saldaña’s claims. Furthermore, bearing in

mind the nature and relative age of this case, and the fact that Borem has yet to be told

about it, it is unclear how much he would remember of his involvement with it. See

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d 639 (9 Cir. 2002) (“Unnecessary delay inherently increases the risk th

that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become stale.”) This factor, too, weighs

in favor of dismissal.

The fifth factor, the availability of less drastic solutions, does not help Saldaña. He has

been reminded already that Borem remained unserved, and didn’t take promptly take

reasonable steps to try to serve him. The only measure that might help at this point would

be the appointment of counsel who might be able to conduct an investigation for Saldaña.

But, as discussed, appointment of counsel in civil cases is reserved for extraordinary

circumstances only, and isn’t an appropriate way to help out a defendant who has not shown

- 6 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

very much interest or initiative in prosecuting his own claims. Furthermore, there is no way

to know how long it might take to find Borem, if he can even be found and served at all.

The only factor that weighs against dismissal is the fourth, the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on the merits. And even this factor does not weigh very heavily, because

it’s unknown whether Borem would be found and served or, if so, whether an adjudication

on the merits would be possible. It might well be that granting further extensions of time

would be futile.

Having weighed the relevant factors, the Court finds Saldaña’s claims against Borem

should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

For these reasons, Saldaña’s claims against Defendant T. Borem are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, for both failure to serve and

failure to prosecute. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court finds no just reason to delay

entry of judgment on these claims, and therefore ORDERS the entry of final judgment in

favor of Defendant Borem on all claims Saldaña has brought against him in this action. The

Clerk shall enter this judgment in the docket. Bearing in mind the standard of review,

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 640 (dismissal for failure to prosecute is reviewed for abuse of

discretion), the Court certifies that an in forma pauperis appeal from this judgment would not

be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 445 (1962).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

- 7 - 11cv0633

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 59 Filed 09/12/12 Page 7 of 7