Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01215/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01215-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ann Vogel, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maricopa County, et al., 

Defendants. 

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CIV-04-1215-PHX-RGS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #43).

Defendants initiated removal proceedings in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),

anticipating that Plaintiffs would file an amended complaint asserting a violation of federal

law. Specifically, when Defendants received Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Disclosure

Statement Re: Experts, Defendants identified language in one expert's opinion suggesting a

civil rights violation. Fearing the possibility of losing their chance for removal, Defendants

acted to remove in anticipation of Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint asserting a civil

rights claim. However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have never amended their Complaint

to state any additional cause of action.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) reads in pertinent part: "Any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the

Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the

citizenship or residence of the parties." The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on

the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal

Case 2:04-cv-01215-RGS Document 59 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 3
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jurisdiction. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). There

is a strong presumption against removal, see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992), and if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, federal

jurisdiction must be rejected. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996);

Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

In determining the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction, we apply the

"'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint."

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see California ex rel. Lockyer v.

Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to the "well-pleaded complaint

rule," courts look to what "necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim

in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of

defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose." California ex rel. Sacramento

Metropolitan Air Quality Management Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (9th

Cir. 2000). "A defense is not part of a plaintiff's properly pleaded statement of his or her

claim." Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d at 838. Accordingly, "a case may not be removed to federal

court on the basis of a federal defense ... even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's

complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly

at issue." Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (emphasis original). Rather, "a right or immunity

created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential

one, of the plaintiff's cause of action." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109,

112 (1936). The federal issue "must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by

the answer or by the petition for removal." Id. at 113.

"If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). It is well established

that lack of federal jurisdiction cannot be waived or be overcome by an agreement of the

parties. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966-67

(9th Cir. 2004). A district court has "a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the

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removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not." Id. at 967. "If there

exists a jurisdictional defect in the removal, sua sponte remand is not only permissible, but

the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction." Knutson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 358

F.Supp.2d 983, 990 (D. Nev. 2005).

The Court's review of Plaintiffs' Complaint reveals the following Claims for Relief:

Count One – Negligence and/or Gross Negligence; Count Two – Assault and Battery; Count

Three – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count Four – Wrongful Death. (See

Compl. at 10-16.) On its face, the Complaint fails to allege a violation of federal law. (See

id. at 1-16.)

Accordingly, since the Court fails to have subject matter jurisdiction over this case,

remand of this action to state court is required.

IT IS ORDERED remanding this action to the Maricopa County Superior Court for

the State of Arizona for further proceedings;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #43) as moot

DATED this 18th day of January, 2007.

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