Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01001/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01001-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan S. MacDonald,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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CIV-04-1001-PHX-SMM (MHB)

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Objection to the Court’s Order denying Plaintiff leave

to amend and supplement the complaint (Doc. #105) and related request for leave to

substitute a typed third amended complaint for the previously lodged handwritten third

amended complaint (Doc. #108). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court issues

this Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff first filed this action on May 18, 2004. On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff

filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #18). Count I of the Second Amended

Complaint asserted claims for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, and Count II asserted claims for medical malpractice,

medical negligence, and negligence. On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave

to amend and supplement the complaint (Doc. #97), and for leave to exceed the page limit

(Doc. #96). Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) which

amends and supplements the Second Amended Complaint. The Magistrate Judge denied

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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and supplement the complaint on the grounds that

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile and the proposed supplement is more properly

the subject of another lawsuit (Doc. #104). Plaintiff filed objections to the order denying

the motion (Doc. #105), and the Court subsequently withdrew the reference to the

Magistrate as to those objections (Doc. #135).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Regarding a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement, the

district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that

has been properly objected to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The term “de novo” signifies

that the magistrate’s findings are not protected by the clearly erroneous doctrine, but does

not indicate that a second evidentiary hearing is required. Id., Advisory Committee

Notes, 1983 Addition. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

After a responsive pleading has been served, a party “may amend its pleading only

with . . . the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Futility of amendment can justify the denial of a motion for

leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). “On motion and

reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental

pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of

the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). While leave to permit

supplement pleading is favored, it cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct, and

new cause of action. Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th

Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a TAC adding seventeen new defendants, a cause of

action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and state tort claims. 

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 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not expand the federal

courts’ ability to hear cases brought against a State. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of

Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002) (“[W]e cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts

to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States . . . we hold that § 1367(a)’s

grant of jurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting States.”). 

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Plaintiff also seeks leave to supplement his Second Amended Complaint to assert claims

for deliberate indifference, a violation of the ADA, and state tort claims arising out of the

Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson, where he has been housed from August 5, 2005 to

the present. The magistrate judge determined the amendment to be futile, and supplement

to be more properly the subject of a separate lawsuit.

The Court agrees that most of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile and that the

proposed supplement is more properly the subject of a separate lawsuit. The Court also

finds that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is not futile insofar as it seeks to add certain

defendants. Therefore the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to amend and supplement the Complaint. 

A. Tort Claims Against the State of Arizona

The proposed amendment alleges state tort claims against the State of Arizona. 

(TAC ¶¶ 27, 47.) Per the Eleventh Amendment, the Court lacks jurisdiction over suits

brought against a State. U.S. Const., amend. XI. This includes actions brought by a

citizen of that State. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). There are only two

circumstances in which a person may sue a State: “[f]irst, Congress may authorize such a

suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment power . . .

[s]econd, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.” College Sav.

Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).1 

The first circumstance is not present here because the State of Arizona is named as

a defendant “regarding only state torts.” (TAC at pg. 1(a) & ¶ 27.) Regarding the second

circumstance, the “test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from

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federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473

U.S. 234, 241 (1985). The State must make a “clear declaration” that it intends to submit

itself to federal court jurisdiction. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676. A State does not

consent to be sued in federal court merely by consenting to suit in courts of its own

creation, nor by stating its intention to “sue or be sued,” nor even by authorizing suits

against it “in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that Arizona consented to be sued in federal court by enacting

A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F). That statute provides that “[a]ny and all causes of action which

may arise out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of the

department, within the scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.” A.R.S.

§ 31-201.01(F). That statute contains no reference to federal courts, let alone a “clear

declaration” that Arizona consents to federal court jurisdiction, and a consent will not be

implied from a willingness to be sued generally. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676. 

Plaintiff’s proposed tort claims against the State of Arizona are therefore futile, justifying

denial of his motion to amend the Complaint.

B. Claims Under Title II of the ADA

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed claims under Title II of the ADA are also

futile. To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege

four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is

otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services,

programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of

benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Thompson v. Davis,

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Although prison administration falls within the ADA,

see id at 897, Plaintiff’s TAC fails to allege, for example, that he was denied benefits by

reason of his disability. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s TAC states that the alleged

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 This also disposes of Plaintiff’s request for leave to add Dr. Hegman as a defendant,

as Plaintiff conceded that Dr. Hegman is properly named only in regard to the Tucson

Complex issues. (Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Amend at 10.)

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constitutional violations were the result of general policies, customs, and practices

unrelated to any disability of Plaintiff. (E.g., TAC ¶¶ 18, 65.) Therefore Plaintiff’s

motion to amend the complaint to add causes of action under Title II of the ADA is

denied.

C. Supplemental Claims

The Court finds Plaintiff’s supplemental claims to be more properly the subject of

separate litigation. Those claims concern the Tucson complex, where Plaintiff has been

housed since August 5, 2005. (TAC ¶ 64.) The claims currently at issue in the litigation

concern the Alhambra, Eyman, and Lewis complexes. (See Dkt. 18, Second Amended

Complaint.) Additionally, the claims currently at issue involve Plaintiff’s knee injury and

liver disease, whereas the supplemental (Tucson) claims include an alleged heart attack. 

(TAC ¶ 67.) The supplemental claims present a separate, distinct, and new cause of

action which supplemental pleading cannot be used to introduce. See Neely, 130 F.3d at

402. Judicial efficiency will be better served by asserting in a separate lawsuit claims

which involve separate defendants at a separate complex.2

D. Request to Add Defendants

Regarding Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint to add as defendants K. 

Schultheis, Tina Muzzy, Nia Maxwell, Gene Greeley, Rod Norrish, Starlet Whitney,

Sharon Malcolm, and Marilyn Wand, the Court finds that leave to amend should be

granted. Plaintiff asserts that he learned of these individuals and their names through

discovery, and seeks to add them to existing claims. The Court cannot say that those

claims are futile on their face, and the TAC does more than “allege that a proposed

Defendant worked in some capacity for ADC while Plaintiff was housed at a facility.” 

(Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. for Leave at 3.) Regarding Plaintiff’s request to amend the

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complaint to add as defendant Carondelet St. Mary’s Hospital, the Court finds that leave

to amend should be granted only for claims related to the Lewis complex. Whether or not

those claims are sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) or other challenge is not for the

Court to decide at this juncture. 

Plaintiff shall have until December 28, 2007 to file the typewritten version of the

TAC. If Plaintiff does not file the typewritten version by that time, the Clerk shall file the

lodged proposed TAC (Doc. #98).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and supplement

the complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED vacating the magistrate judge’s Order denying

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the Complaint (Doc. #104).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and

supplement the Complaint to assert (1) tort claims against the State of Arizona; (2) claims

under the Americans with Disabilities Act; and (3) claims which accrued after Plaintiff’s

transfer to the Tucson complex (Doc. #97).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the

complaint to add as defendants K. Schultheis, Tina Muzzy, Nia Maxwell, Gene Greeley,

Rod Norrish, Starlet Whitney, Sharon Malcolm, Marilyn Wand, and Carondelet St.

Mary’s Hospital (Doc. #97).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until December 28, 2007

to file a typewritten version of the Third Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff has not filed a

typewritten version by that date, the Clerk is directed to file the Lodged Proposed Third

Amended Complaint (Doc. #98).

DATED this 14th day of December, 2007.

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