Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-36025/USCOURTS-ca9-13-36025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD G. STACY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security

Administration,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-36025

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-00655-AC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 6, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed June 7, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Richard C. Tallman,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

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2 STACY V. COLVIN

SUMMARY*

Social Security

The panel affirmed the district court’s decision affirming

the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of a claimant’s

application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of

the Social Security Act.

The panel held that the law of the case doctrine and the

rule of mandate apply to social security administrative

remands from federal court in the same way they would apply

to any other case. The panel further held that neither doctrine

barred the administrative law judge from reexamining

claimant’s ability to perform his past work at step four of the

sequential evaluation process under the mandate in this case. 

The panel also held that the ALJ properly categorized

claimant’s past work, and the ALJ’s step four findings were

supported by substantial evidence because the claimant could

perform his past work as it was generally performed in the

national economy.

COUNSEL

James S. Coon (argued), Swanson, Thomas, Coon &Newton,

Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard A. Morris (argued), Special Assistant United States

Attorney; David Morado, Regional Chief Counsel; Social

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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STACY V. COLVIN 3

Security Administration Office of General Counsel, Seattle,

Washington; S. Amanda Marshall, United States Attorney;

KellyA.Zusman,Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate

Chief; United States Attorney’s Office, Portland, Oregon; for

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Donald Stacy appeals the denial of his social security

benefits, contending that the ALJ violated the law of the case

doctrine and the rule of mandate by revisiting his ability to do

his past work on remand. Stacy also argues the ALJ erred by

characterizing his past work according to the least demanding

aspect of his former job (as a stationary engineer supervisor). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and hold in this

case of first impression that the law of the case doctrine and

the rule of mandate apply to social security administrative

remands from federal court in the same way they would apply

to any other case. But, in this case, we hold no violation of

either doctrine occurred. We also hold that the ALJ properly

categorized Stacy’s past work and correctly found that he was

still able to perform that work as it is generally performed in

the national economy. We therefore affirm the judgment of

the district court.

I

Stacy originally filed for social security benefits in July

2001. Since then, his case has been reviewed by two

different administrative law judges, a magistrate judge, and

two district judges. Stacy claims that his fatigue, gout, chest

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4 STACY V. COLVIN

pains, heart, and vision problems rendered him disabled as of

June 30, 1994. Prior to that date, Stacy worked for seventeen

years as a stationary engineer for the Oregon Department of

Corrections, supervising other engineers operating the boiler

room of the Oregon State Penitentiary in Salem.

Stacy’s application has gone through a seemingly endless

cycle of appeals and remands. After Stacy’s application for

benefits was denied initially and upon reconsideration, his

first hearing in front of an ALJ occurred in September 2002. 

At that hearing, a Vocational Expert (VE) testified that Stacy

was a “working supervisor” who performed heavy work, and

therefore he could not perform his past relevant work as a

“stationary engineer.” The VE went on to testify that Stacy

could perform medium work, including that of a dispatcher of

maintenance services and supervisor of janitorial services. 

The ALJ agreed with the VE and found Stacy not disabled at

step 5 because he retained the capacity to do other work in the

national economy. The Appeals Council denied review, and

Stacy sought relief in federal court.

By stipulation of the parties, the case was remanded. 

Magistrate Judge John Jelderks issued the following remand

order which reopened the record:

The ALJ will recontact Plaintiff’s treating

physicians regarding his visual acuity for the

period at issue, and will further evaluate

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ

will obtain additional evidence from medical

and vocational experts, as needed. The ALJ

will further evaluate and document Plaintiff’s

work activity after the alleged onset date. The

ALJ will take any other actions necessary to

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STACY V. COLVIN 5

develop the record and issue a new decision. 

Plaintiff will be afforded the opportunity to

submit additional evidence and argument.

On remand, a second hearing was held in front of the

same ALJ. No VE testified. After the hearing, the ALJ again

denied benefits, and Stacy again appealed. District Judge

Michael Mosman reversed, holding that the ALJ omitted

certain lifting restrictions from Stacy’s Residual Functional

Capacity (RFC) determination, and that the VE’s testimony

conflicted with information in the Dictionaryof Occupational

Titles (DOT). Judge Mosman remanded the case for the

second time with instructions to “formulate a correct RFC,

further evaluate step five of the disability analysis, and

otherwise comply with [Judge Jelderks’s] remand order.”

On remand, a different ALJ held a third evidentiary

hearing where Stacy and a new VE testified. Stacy testified

that “probably 70 to 75 percent” of his work at the

Department of Corrections “was supervisory.” The ALJ

seemed surprised by this information, noting “my estimation

of how quickly this can be resolved has just changed based on

the Claimant’s testimony about his supervisory functions.” 

Based on this new evidence, the ALJ asked the VE if Stacy

could perform his past relevant work. The VE replied: “As

he performed the stationary engineer, no. As a stationary

engineer supervisor, yes.” The ALJ then denied Stacy

benefits at step 4, holding that Stacy could perform his past

relevant work of “stationary engineer supervisor” as that job

is generally performed in the national economy.

Stacy again appealed. The case was assigned to District

Judge Anna Brown who held that the ALJ’s step 4 finding

was correct and found that neither the law of the case doctrine

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6 STACY V. COLVIN

nor the rule of mandate were violated. The denial of benefits

was affirmed. This timely third appeal followed.

II

Stacy first argues that the ALJ violated both the law of the

case doctrine and the rule of mandate in the third

administrative hearing by reevaluating his ability to do his

past relevant work. We disagree. As a matter of first

impression, we hold that both the law of the case doctrine and

the rule of mandate apply in the social security context. But

we also hold that neither was violated in this case. We

discuss each principle in turn.

A

The law of the case doctrine generally prohibits a court

from considering an issue that has already been decided by

that same court or a higher court in the same case. Hall v.

City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The doctrine is concerned primarily with efficiency, and

should not be applied when the evidence on remand is

substantially different, when the controlling law has changed,

or when applying the doctrine would be unjust. See Merritt

v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991). A district

court’s discretionary decision to apply the law of the case

doctrine is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hall, 697 F.3d

at 1067.

Here, there were two prior step 4 findings by ALJs that

Stacy could not perform his past work. Although these

findings were never affirmed by the district court on review,

this is typically the type of determination that should not be

reconsidered under the law of the case doctrine.

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STACY V. COLVIN 7

But this is not the typical case. On remand, the second

ALJ was surprised to hear new evidence that Stacy mostly

performed supervisory tasks in his past job. This new

testimony led a VE to conclude, for the first time, that Stacy

could still perform the job of stationary engineer supervisor

as that job is generally performed. The ALJ properly

considered this new, highlyprobative testimonyabout Stacy’s

ability to perform his past work and made a new finding

supported by that testimony. Given the new evidence on

remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to apply the law of the case doctrine.

B

“The rule of mandate is similar to, but broader than, the

law of the case doctrine.” United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178,

181 (9th Cir. 1995). The rule provides that any “district court

that has received the mandate of an appellate court cannot

vary or examine that mandate for any purpose other than

executing it.”1 Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067. The district court

may, however, “decide anything not foreclosed by the

mandate.” Id. But the district court commits “jurisdictional

error” if it takes actions that contradict the mandate. See id. 

Whether an ALJ has obeyed the remand order of an appellate

court is a question of law that we review de novo. See

Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886 (1989).

1 We decline the Commissioner’s invitation to fashion a special, more

flexible rule ofmandate doctrine specially tailored to social security cases. 

Because we find the traditional doctrine is flexible enough to

accommodate the Commissioner’s concerns while still preserving the

integrity of the mandate, we apply traditional rule of mandate principles

in this case as we would in any other case.

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8 STACY V. COLVIN

We have previously allowed district courts to reexamine

any issue on remand that is not inconsistent with the mandate. 

See Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th

Cir. 1995). To illustrate, in Odima we remanded with

instructions to make specific findings concerning an

employer’s reasons for not promoting the plaintiff. Id. On

remand, the district court did as we directed but also

reevaluated and expanded upon the remedies available to the

plaintiff. Id. We held the district court was free to revisit the

issue of remedies on remand because “any issue not expressly

or impliedly disposed of on appeal [is] available for

consideration by the trial court on remand.” Id. (quoting

Firth v. United States, 554 F.2d 990, 993–94 (9th Cir. 1977)).

Given the expansive remand orders in this case, the ALJ

did not violate the rule of mandate. Judge Mosman’s remand

order did not preclude the ALJ from taking new evidence

relevant to the step 4 determination. While that order focused

on step 5 of the process, it also held that the ALJ used an

incorrect RFC, a determination that is made before reaching

step 4 and which significantly affects the analysis at steps 4

and 5. See Evaluation of Disability in General, 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e)–(f) (2012). A correct RFC is necessary to

understand the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace

and therefore his ability to return to past work. Id. By asking

the ALJ to correct Stacy’s RFC, Judge Mosman also

impliedly instructed the ALJ to reconsider step 4 and

determine whether someone with that corrected RFC could

perform Stacy’s past work.

Moreover, Judge Mosman’s order incorporated Judge

Jelderks’s prior remand order. Judge Jelderks’s order

essentially remanded on an open record, directing the ALJ to

start again at step 1 and “document Plaintiff’s work activity

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STACY V. COLVIN 9

after the alleged onset date.” That order also instructed the

ALJ to “obtain additional evidence from . . . vocational

experts, as needed.” Although Judge Jelderks’s order did not

expressly authorize the ALJ to reinvestigate step 4, it did

direct the ALJto “take any other actions necessary to develop

the record and issue a new decision.”

Stacy argues that Judge Mosman’s order was violated

because it directed the ALJ to “further evaluate step five of

the disability analysis,” yet the ALJ did not reach step 5 on

remand. We reject this argument because the remand order

must be read holistically. Looking at the full text of Judge

Mosman’s order, combined with the court’s opinion, it is

clear that the mandate was not intended to restrict the ALJ to

only engage in the step 5 analysis. Because Judge Mosman

also ordered the ALJ to “formulate a correct RFC” and to

“otherwise complywith [Judge Jelderks’s]remand order,” the

ALJ would have violated the mandate by performing only a

step 5 analysis.

The ALJ at the third hearing properly began by taking

testimony. Because the ALJ was told to formulate a correct

RFC, it was logical to ask Stacy to describe his past work,

and she was surprised to learn that it was mostly supervisory. 

At that point she did something that the mandate neither

required nor prevented her from doing—she revisited the

categorization of Stacy’s former job and his ability to perform

it as it is performed in the national economy. The ALJ did

not exceed her authority under Judge Mosman’s broad

remand order by doing so; therefore, the ALJ did not violate

the rule of mandate.

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III

Stacy next argues that the ALJ erred in classifying his

former work based on the least demanding aspect of the job:

supervising. We disagree. “We may overturn the ALJ’s

decision ‘only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or

if it is based on legal error.’” Carillo-Yeras v. Astrue,

671 F.3d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)). The ALJ’s

decision correctly determined Stacy could perform the job of

stationary engineer supervisor as that position is generally

performed in the national economy.

At step four, a claimant has the burden to prove that he

cannot perform his past relevant work “either as actually

performed or as generally performed in the national

economy.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.

2002). ALJs may use either the “actually performed test” or

the “generally performed test” when evaluating a claimant’s

ability to perform past work. SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387

(1982). Social security rulings explain how to apply the

“generally performed test”:

A former job performed in by the claimant

may have involved functional demands and

job duties significantly in excess of those

generally required for the job by other

employers throughout the national economy. 

Under this test, if the claimant cannot perform

the excessive functional demands and/or job

duties actually required in the former job but

can perform the functional demands and job

duties as generally required by employers

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STACY V. COLVIN 11

throughout the economy, the claimant should

be found to be “not disabled.”

Id.

Thus, the “generally performed test” is designed for

situations where a claimant’s past job was especially

demanding when compared with industry standards. See,

e.g., Jack v. Colvin, No. CV 14-08464 RAO, 2015 WL

5567748 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015) (past work was properly

categorized as “athletic director” at a sedentary level of

exertion even though the claimant actually performed the job

at a heavy level of exertion).

Regardless of which test is applied at step 4, the ALJ may

not classify a past occupation “according to the least

demanding function.” Carmickle v. Comm'r, SSA, 533 F.3d

1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Valencia v. Heckler,

751 F.2d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Carmickle, only 20

percent of the claimant’s duties as a construction supervisor

involved supervision; the remainder of his time was spent

performing manual labor. Id. We held that the ALJ erred in

categorizing the claimant’s job as “a purely supervisory

position.” Id. Similarly, in Valencia, the ALJ erred in

classifying the claimant’s prior work as a “tomato sorter”

involving only light exertion because the claimant was

actually an “agricultural laborer” who mostly performed

other, medium exertion tasks. Valencia, 751 F.2d at 1086. 

And, in Vertigan v. Halter, the ALJ erred by categorizing the

claimant’s past work as a “cashier” when she was actually a

“pharmacy clerk” and cashier work was only “a small part of

her job.” 260 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001). In all three

cases “the least demanding aspect” of the claimant’s past job

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12 STACY V. COLVIN

was something the claimant did less than half the time, and

the ALJ erred in equating that one task with a full time job.

Here, the ALJ’s determination that Stacy could perform

his past work is supported by substantial evidence. All

parties agree that Stacy cannot perform his past work as it

was actually performed. There is substantial evidence,

however, that Stacy can still perform his past work as it is

generally performed in the national economy. Stacy argues

this finding is erroneous because he was a working

supervisor, and the VE testified at the first hearing that “most

all” of the stationary engineer supervisor jobs in Oregon

involve manual labor. Stacy argues that this testimony shows

he cannot perform the job of stationary engineer supervisor

as it is generally performed in Oregon.

Stacy is wrong on two accounts. First, Stacymisreads the

transcript. The first VE said that most stationary engineer

supervisors working for the State of Oregon are working

supervisors. The VE did not say, as Stacy claims, that most

of the supervisor positions in the state require manual work. 

Second, even if Stacy’s interpretation of the transcript was

correct, the relevant test is how the job is typically performed

in the national economy, not how the job is performed in the

state economy.

Stacy next argues that the ALJ erred in categorizing his

past work according to its least demanding function, citing

Carmickle and Valencia. Stacy agrees, however, that the ALJ

could validly apply the “generally performed” test in this

case. Reconciling the “generally performed” test with the

Valencia line of cases is difficult but not impossible. We

hold that Valencia and its progeny do not apply in cases such

as this one where (1) the “least demanding function” is a task

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STACY V. COLVIN 13

that the claimant actually performed most of the time; and

(2) the DOT defines the claimant’s past job as requiring only

that least demanding function.

In this case, the DOT classifies Stacy’s past job as purely

supervisoryand he mostly performed supervisorytasks in that

job. Per the DOT, a Stationary-Engineer Supervisor

“supervises and coordinates the activities of Stationary

Engineer[s].” See U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Dictionary of

Occupational Titles at 950.131-014 (4th ed. rev. 1991). 

When Stacy performed that job, he engaged in supervisory

duties 70–75 percent of the time. The fact that his employer

also required him to occasionally do other, non-supervisory

tasks does not change the fundamental nature of his work. 

This case is therefore distinguishable from Carmickle,

Valencia, and Vertigan, where the claimants performed lessdemanding tasks only occasionally. Here, Stacy spent the

vast majority of his time supervising. We therefore hold that

the ALJ did not categorize Stacy’s past work according to its

least demanding function but instead correctly applied the

“generally performed” test.

IV

We affirm the judgment of the district court. In doing so,

we hold that the law of the case doctrine and the rule of

mandate apply with equal force in social security cases, but

that neither doctrine barred the ALJ from reexamining

Stacy’s ability to perform his past work at step 4 under the

mandate in this case. We also hold that the ALJ’s step 4

findings are supported by substantial evidence because Stacy

can perform his past work as it is generally performed in the

national economy.

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14 STACY V. COLVIN

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

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