Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRL, a California General

Partnership, ROLAND WOMACK, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUSSELL MOORE, et al.,

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-99-2437 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Plaintiffs are KRL, a California general partnership, and

members of the Womack family. Their principal claim is that

defendants Russell Moore, David J. Irey, Todd D. Riebe, and Ron

Hall violated the Fourth Amendment during a criminal

investigation into the removal and alleged concealment of an

underground gasoline storage tank. Plaintiffs contend that

defendants: (1) obtained overbroad warrants to search for KRL

documents without probable cause; (2) intentionally made false

statements to obtain the search warrants; and (3) conducted

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 Robert Womack is not a party to this action. 1

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overbroad and unreasonable searches of plaintiffs’ property. 

In 2001, Riebe, Irey, and Hall brought separate motions for

summary judgment on various grounds, including absolute and

qualified immunity. The motions were granted in part and denied

in part. Following defendants’ interlocutory appeal of certain

of the court’s decisions on immunity, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further

proceedings. Although the Ninth Circuit decision eliminated some

of the claims, all defendants remain in the case. In the

interest of judicial efficiency, and because of the potential

effect of the Ninth Circuit opinion on the remainder of the case,

the court permitted an additional round of dispositive motions by

defendants.

I. Facts

A. Initiation of the Investigation

Plaintiffs Roland Womack, Nadine Womack, and Larry Womack

are general partners of KRL. (Compl. at 3.) In April 1998, KRL

purchased a defunct gas station to convert it into a parking lot

for Roland Womack’s dental practice. (Riebe & Hall (“R&H”) Mot.

at 5.) Robert Womack -- Larry, Luke, and Roland’s father --

supervised the removal of the gas station’s underground gasoline

storage tank (“UST”). (Pls.’ Additional Facts (“PAF”) ¶ 2.) 1

Amador County officials eventually became concerned about

possible environmental contamination stemming from the tank

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removal. (Moore Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 12.)

Robert Womack was asked to locate the UST. (Id.) His allegedly

conflicting stories caused County officials to refer the case to

the District Attorney’s Office for possible criminal prosecution. 

(Id. at 13-14, 16.)

In June 1998, defendant Ron Hall (“Hall”), an investigator

with the District Attorney’s Office, began the DA’s

investigation. (PAF ¶ 13.) Shortly afterwards, the County

appointed defendant David J. Irey (“Irey”), a San Joaquin County

deputy district attorney who specialized in environmental

prosecutions, to assist with the investigation. (Id. at 15.) In

September 1998, Hall and Irey found the missing UST and a KRL

check that was used to pay for the UST disposal. (Moore SUF ¶

22.) The address on the check was 15864 Ridge Road in Sutter

Creek, California (“Ridge Road”), a KRL property and Robert

Womack’s home address. (Id. at 24-27.)

In October 1998, defendant California Highway Patrol Officer

Russell Moore (“Moore”) joined the UST investigation team. (Id.

at 30.) Moore and Hall’s investigation led to a series of three

searches of plaintiffs’ property in the period from October 30,

1998 to January 21, 1999. These searches form the basis of this

lawsuit. 

B. October 30, 1998 Ridge Road Search

On October 30, 1998, an Amador County Superior Court Judge,

relying upon defendant Moore’s affidavit, issued a search warrant

for KRL documents located at Ridge Road. (Id. at 34-37.) On

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December 1, 1998, a grand jury indicted Robert Womack and others

on twenty-one counts, including illegal transportation of

hazardous waste. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiffs in this action were

not named as defendants in any of the counts. 

C. January 11-13, 1999 Searches

On January 11, 1999, Moore submitted another affidavit

seeking an expanded search of Ridge Road, as well as search

warrants for KRL accountant Dennis Olmstead’s office, and

plaintiffs’ telephone and bank records. (Id. at 40.) Moore’s

affidavit sought to gather evidence for the pending prosecution

as well as to investigate additional charges. (Moore Mot. Ex.

22.) Before Moore submitted the affidavit, Irey reviewed it, as

did Todd D. Riebe (“Riebe”), who had been sworn in that very day

as the new Amador County District Attorney. (PAF ¶ 57.)

The January 11 warrant for the Ridge Road search authorized

seizure of all:

[p]artnership reports, paid outs, check books,

registers, accounting paperwork, any and all

insurance, memos, correspondence, or other

documents related to the control and operations of

the KRL Corporation and/or K.R.L. partnership, and

articles of personal property tending to establish

and identify the persons in control of the

premises, and other containers that may house

aforementioned records, video tapes and/or

audiotapes since January 1, 1995 to the present.

(Moore Mot. Ex. 22.) When Moore and Irey executed this warrant

on January 11, 1999, they discovered additional items that

exceeded the scope of the warrant. (R&H SUF ¶ 41.) Therefore,

they interrupted the search and returned to court to seek a

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broader warrant allowing them to seize documents dating back to

1990. (Moore Mot. Ex. 22.) Plaintiffs allege that when the

officers executed this broader warrant on January 13, 1999, they

seized thousands of documents dating as far back as 1977. (PAF ¶

82.) 

D. January 26, 1999 Bosse Ranch Search

On January 21, 1999, Moore submitted another affidavit to

obtain a warrant to search for hazardous waste at 17650 Bosse

Road in Jackson, California (“Bosse Ranch”), a KRL property where

plaintiffs Luke and Renee Womack reside. (Moore Mot. at 8.) 

Moore’s affidavit relied, in part, on accusations by John

Malmquist (“Malmquist”) that the Womacks were burying hazardous

waste on the property. (Opp’n to Moore at 12.) Plaintiffs

allege that defendants knew, but did not disclose in the

affidavit, that Malmquist was an unreliable witness who was

biased against Robert Womack for evicting him from Bosse Ranch. 

(Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs also allege that defendants

“embellished” the affidavit by using the language “permeated with

fraud,” and “criminal enterprise,” to describe KRL and “career

criminal” to describe Robert Womack. (Id. at 24.) 

Moore and other officers executed the search on January 26,

1999. (Moore SUF ¶ 67.) Irey was also present for part of the

search, but the parties dispute his level of participation. 

(Irey Mot. at 7.) Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ extensive

excavations damaged water mains, electrical lines, driveways,

drainage systems, and the foundations of numerous structures. 

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 Against Moore, Irey, and Hall only. 2

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(Opp’n to Moore at 14.) Plaintiffs also allege that defendants

failed to replace the excavated soil, leaving their property in

an unstable condition prone to erosion. (Id.) Finally,

plaintiffs contend that the executing officers exceeded the

express terms of the warrant by searching Luke and Renee Womack’s

barn and seizing weapons from their mobile home. (Id.) The

warrant specifically stated that, “NO outbuildings including the

doublewide mobile home are to be searched.” (Moore Mot. Ex. 28.)

(emphasis in original). 

E. Conclusion of Criminal Investigation

In September 2000, the District Attorney’s Office turned

over Robert Womack’s criminal prosecution to the California

Attorney General’s Office which eventually dropped all criminal

charges. (Opp’n at 14-15.)

II. Procedural History

The case has had a lengthy history in this court further

complicated by the decision of the Ninth Circuit. See KRL v.

Moore, 384 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A. Plaintiffs’ Original Claims

In the original complaint, plaintiffs asserted that

defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining

and executing warrants for: (1) the October 30, 1998 Ridge Road

search; (2) the January 11, 1999 search of Olmstead’s office; 2

(3) the January 11, 1999 search of plaintiffs’ bank and telephone

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 Against Irey and Hall only. 3

 Against Riebe only. 4

 Defendants did not move for summary judgment on: (1) the 5

claims regarding the bank, phone, and accountant records; or (2)

the facial invalidity claim for the Bosse Ranch search. Also,

plaintiffs stated at oral argument that they were not asserting a

judicial deception claim for the January Ridge Road warrants.

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records; (4) the January 11 and January 13, 1999 Ridge Road

searches; and (5) the January 26, 1999 Bosse Ranch search.

Plaintiffs alleged that the warrants were facially invalid,

executed beyond their legal scope, and obtained through judicial

deception. 

Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants violated their

substantive due process rights for: (1) destroying the UST; (2) 3

seizing personal property and excavating at Bosse Ranch; (3)

seizing firearms during the January 11 and 13 Ridge Road

searches; (4) publicly releasing plaintiffs’ confidential

records; and (5) authorizing and approving the misconduct of

subordinates. 

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B. 2001 Summary Judgment Motions

Defendants Riebe, Irey, and Hall moved for summary judgment

in 2001 seeking absolute or qualified immunity on: (1) the

October 30, 1998 search; (2) the facial invalidity and overbroad

execution claims for the January 11 and January 13, 1999 Ridge

Road warrants; (3) the overbroad execution and judicial deception

claims for the January 26, 2001 Bosse Ranch warrant; and (4) all

of plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims. (1/17/2002 Order 5

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at 10.) 

The court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment on

the following claims: (1) reliance by Riebe, Hall, and Irey on a

facially invalid search warrant for the January 11 and 13

searches of Ridge Road; (2) Hall’s alleged overbroad execution of

the January 13 Ridge Road warrant; (3) Irey’s alleged overbroad

execution of the Bosse Road warrant; and (4) Riebe, Hall, and

Irey’s alleged judicial deception relating to the Bosse Ranch

warrant. (Id. at 25.)

C. Ninth Circuit Appeal

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded for further proceedings. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1118. The

court held that Riebe, Hall, and Irey were protected by absolute

immunity for the January 11 and 13 Ridge Road searches to the

extent that they were seeking evidence to support the prosecution

of the pending indictment against Womack. Id. at 1112-13. 

However, they were not protected by absolute immunity for those

searches to the extent that they sought evidence to uncover new

crimes before probable cause was established. Id. at 1114.

The Ninth Circuit also held that Riebe was protected by

qualified immunity for his role in approving the January 11

warrant. Id. at 1116-17. However, the court found that Hall did

not have qualified immunity because: (1) in the court’s

understanding, Hall was the lead investigator; and (2) Hall

unreasonably sought to broaden the warrant’s scope back to 1990

in the January 13 search. Id. at 1117. Finally, the court held

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 In the initial round of summary judgment motions, 6

defendant Moore neither made nor joined any motion. He died

after the appeal was filed, and his estate has been substituted

and now moves for summary judgment. 

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that Riebe and Hall were protected by qualified immunity for the

judicial deception claim. Id. at 1118. 

D. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims

The following claim are still pending and are the subject of

the defendants’ renewed motions for summary judgment: (1) the 6

Fourth Amendment claims against all defendants for the searches

of plaintiffs’ bank and telephone records, and the records of

their accountant Dennis Olmstead; (2) the Fourth Amendment claims

against Hall, Irey, and Moore for the January 11 and January 13,

1999 Ridge Road searches to the extent that the searches sought

evidence of new offenses; (3) the Fourth Amendment claims against

Irey and Moore for the January 26, 2001 Bosse Ranch search; and

(4) the substantive due process claims against Moore relating

primarily to his alleged seizure of personal property. 

III. Bank, Telephone, and Accountant Records

Summary judgment is granted to all defendants on these

claims because plaintiffs have no reasonable expectation of

privacy in bank and telephone records or in their accountant’s

records.

 A. Accountant’s Records

As a general matter, a person does not possess a reasonable

expectation of privacy in information revealed to a third party,

even if the person believes that: the third party’s use is

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limited, the information is provided in confidence, and the

confidence will not be betrayed. United States v. Miller, 425

U.S. 435, 443 (1976). It is well established that a person has

no expectation of privacy in business and tax records turned over

to an accountant. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36

(1973). 

In Couch, a taxpayer hired an independent accountant to whom

she had delivered various business and tax records over several

years. The accountant maintained an office separate from the

taxpayer’s and held the taxpayer’s records there. The taxpayer

claimed a Fourth Amendment violation when a law enforcement agent

subpoenaed the accountant’s records in connection with a tax

investigation. The Court rejected the claim, reasoning that

Couch had little expectation of privacy when she handed records

to her accountant knowing that the accountant must disclose at

least some of the information in those records in her income tax

return. Id. The accountant has the discretion to determine what

information to disclose, not the client. Id. Moreover, “no

confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal

law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in

federal cases.” Id.

The facts here are analogous to those in Couch. The warrant

sought business and tax records that KRL turned over to its

independent accountant, Dennis Olmstead. (Moore Ex. 22.) These

records include partnership business reports and statements,

check books, check registers, accounting paperwork, and state and

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federal income tax returns. Id. Olmstead maintained those

records in his office. Id. Plaintiffs do not negate the

reasonable inference that Olmstead would use these records in his

discretion to file income tax returns and calculate partnership

pay-outs on behalf of KRL. In these circumstances, plaintiffs do

not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their

accountant’s records and may not assert a claim resting on the

Fourth Amendment concerning these records. 

B. Bank Records

Similarly, bank depositors have no protectible Fourth

Amendment interest in bank records when they voluntarily convey

financial and other information to the bank and its employees in

the ordinary course of business. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440, 442-

43. Bank records are the business records of a bank, not the

private papers of the depositor. Id. Congress responded to

Miller by enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978

(the “Act”), which provides a right to financial privacy and sets

forth monetary remedies for violation of that right. United

States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). However,

plaintiffs’ claim is not based on the statute, and the statute

does not alter the analysis in Miller by creating a legitimate

expectation of privacy in bank records. United States v.

Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1986)(citing United States

v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). 

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Miller by pointing out

that, in Miller, only original checks and deposit slips were at

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issue. (Opp’n to Moore at 19.) In contrast, plaintiffs claim

that defendants here “sought every document that the bank might

maintain under [p]laintiffs’ names.” Id. However, plaintiffs

misread Miller. The subpoenas there required the banks to

produce “all records of accounts, i.e. savings, checking, loan or

otherwise” in defendant’s name, not merely checks and deposit

slips. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437. Thus, the facts in Miller

parallel the facts here. Even if the scope of the subpoena in

Miller were narrower, the rationale would still apply. When

depositors voluntarily convey information to the bank and its

employees, they lose any expectation of privacy in that

information that may be asserted under the Constitution. Id. at

442-43. 

Plaintiffs alternatively argue that “on the basis of the

Right to Financial Privacy Act alone, plaintiffs had a legitimate

expectation of privacy in their bank records.” (Opp’n to Moore

at 19.) However, as the cases cited above have held, the Act

provides for specific remedies and does not create broader

constitutional remedies or establish a constitutionally protected

expectation of privacy. For these reasons, plaintiffs do not

have a Fourth Amendment claim based on the allegedly illegal

search of their bank records. 

C. Telephone Records

A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

content of phone conversations, but not in the fact that the

conversations took place. United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d

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505, 506 (9th Cir. 1971). Here, the warrants sought “[c]ertified

copies of subscriber information, billing statements, customer

service records, toll records, credit card and bill file records

from January 1, 1995 . . . .” (Moore Mot. Ex. 22.) These

records belong to the phone company. Therefore, plaintiffs do

not enjoy any reasonable expectation of privacy in the

information sought in the warrants. 

In sum, because plaintiffs do not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in bank and telephone company records, or

in their accountant’s records, summary judgment is granted to

defendants on this claim.

 IV. Plaintiffs’ Request for Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend the complaint to “conform

to proof” in order to maintain a federal claim based upon the

search of their bank, telephone, and accounting records. Id. 

They also seek to add a state law claim for violation of privacy

concerning these searches. Id. 

When a plaintiff requests leave to amend after the court

issues the scheduling order, the plaintiff must show good cause

for the amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Rule 16(b) standard focuses on the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment rather than prejudice to the other party,

as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Id. at 609 (“[T]he focus of the

[Rule 16] inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking

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modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should

end.”). The court first issued a scheduling order in July 2000. 

(Docket #20.) Therefore, plaintiffs must show good cause to

amend at this late date. 

Plaintiffs have not met this burden. Plaintiffs filed their

complaint nearly six years ago. They learned at the hearing on

the original motions in 2001 that the court doubted that any

Fourth Amendment claim could be made based on the search of these

records. (12/14/2001 Tr. of Summ. J. Mot. at 15-16). The court

then noted that a state claim might be possible. (Id. at 16.) 

Plaintiffs had four years to seek leave to add a Right to

Financial Privacy Act claim or a state law claim, and yet never

sought to do so until now. Plaintiffs were not diligent. 

Therefore, their request for leave to amend is denied.

V. Ridge Road Searches

Plaintiffs bring two claims based on the January 11 and

January 13, 1999 Ridge Road searches: (1) facial invalidity of

the warrant; and (2) overbroad execution. When the Ninth Circuit

reviewed these claims on appeal, it first analyzed whether

defendants were protected by absolute immunity. KRL, 384 F.3d at

1110. In making this determination, the court distinguished

between defendants’ search for evidence to prosecute the existing

indictment against Womack and their search for evidence of new

crimes by KRL. Id. at 1110-15. The court recognized that “[a]

prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when he or she

performs a function that is ‘intimately associated with the

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26 The Ninth Circuit did not examine the issue as to Irey 7

because Irey did not appeal the court’s qualified immunity

decision.

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judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Id. at 1110. 

Therefore, the court held that when Riebe, Hall, and Irey “sought

evidence to prosecute the crimes charged in the indictment,” they

were protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 1112-13. The court

found that the Ridge Road warrants were at least partially within

absolute prosecutorial immunity because the grand jury indictment

established probable cause and Riebe, Hall, and Irey directed at

least some of their actions at the upcoming trial. Id. at 1112.

In contrast, Riebe, Hall, and Irey’s collateral investigation to

uncover new crimes was not protected by absolute immunity. Id.

at 1114. 

Although Hall was not a prosecutor, the court observed that,

“we focus on ‘the nature of the function performed, not the

identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. at 1113 (citing

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). The court

therefore concluded that an investigator like Hall was entitled

to the same absolute immunity as a prosecutor when he gathered

evidence to prepare the prosecution case for trial. KRL, 384

F.3d at 1113. 

The Ninth Circuit then examined whether Riebe and Hall had

qualified immunity for their collateral search of evidence to

uncover new crimes involving KRL. On the facial invalidity 7

claim, the Ninth Circuit held that Riebe deserved qualified

immunity because his approval of the January 11 warrant was

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 The issue of qualified immunity still remains for Hall 8

because, on the basis of what he contends is additional evidence,

he asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s decision is not controlling

and that: (1) he was not a lead investigator; and (2) he did not

seize documents predating 1990.

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reasonable. Id. at 1116. However, it held that Hall’s conduct

was not covered by qualified immunity because if he were the lead

investigator, he should have known that it was unreasonable to

broaden the warrant’s scope back to 1990. Id. at 1117. On the

overbroad execution claim, the court held that Hall did not have

qualified immunity to the extent that he seized pre-1990

documents. Id. 

As to Moore, Irey, and Hall, the following issues remain:

(1) whether Moore is entitled to absolute immunity for any part

of the claim concerning the January 11 and 13 searches; (2)

whether qualified immunity protects Moore, Irey, and Hall for

their reliance on the facially invalid Ridge Road warrant; and

(3) whether qualified immunity protects Hall and Moore for the

overbroad execution claim. 

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A. Absolute Immunity for Moore for the Ridge Road Warrants

Moore is in the same legal posture as Hall. And, like Hall,

Moore also is protected by absolute immunity to the extent he

gathered evidence to support the prosecution’s case on the

existing indictment. Accordingly, Moore’s motion for summary

judgment on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity is

granted to the extent that he sought such evidence. 

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B. Qualified Immunity for Facial Invalidity of the Ridge

Road Warrants

The qualified immunity test has two parts. First, the

facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, must

demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. See

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting

test from Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151

(2001)). If they do, the court must then ask whether “the

defendant could have nonetheless reasonably but erroneously

believed that his or her conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s

rights.” Id. In answering this question, the court must

determine “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. 

“Qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d

931, 934 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Ninth Circuit held that the Ridge Road warrants lacked

probable cause and therefore the execution of the search violated

the Fourth Amendment. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1116. The court then

evaluated the second part of the Saucier test regarding the

reasonableness of defendants’ actions. It rejected Riebe’s

argument that “a lower standard for reasonableness [was]

necessary [for him] because he was pressed into service on his

first day in office.” Id. at 1117. The court held that “[a]

state official’s conduct is not made more reasonable because the

official is less experienced at making the decisions required by

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the position.” Id. 

However, the court still found that Riebe’s approval of the

first Ridge Road warrant was reasonable. Id. The court noted

that the warrant Riebe approved on January 4, 1999 had “a more

reasonable temporal limit” because it only dated back to 1995. 

Id. Moreover, at the time Riebe approved the warrant, the

affidavit in support alleged: (1) fraud and tax evasion dating to

1997; (2) hazardous waste violations in 1995 and 1996 at Bosse

Road and other locations; and (3) Womack’s withdrawal of KRL

funds for personal expenses and illegal activities. Id. Given

these facts, the court concluded that, when Riebe reviewed it,

the warrant “was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as

to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.’” Id.

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)). 

1. Hall

The Ninth Circuit distinguished Hall from Riebe and denied

Hall qualified immunity. The court held that, “[a]ssuming he was

the lead investigator, Hall had a greater responsibility for

ensuring that the warrant was not defective.” KRL, 384 F.3d at

1117 (citing Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022,

1028 (9th Cir. 2002)). Moreover, the court held that no

reasonable officer could have found probable cause to justify the

broader January 13 search in which Hall participated. Id. Hall

challenges the Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding qualified

immunity, arguing that its assumption that he was a “lead

investigator” is now negated by overwhelming evidence. (R&H Mot.

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at 29.) Instead, Hall claims that he was merely a “line officer”

and only “assisted” the lead investigator in the execution of the

search. (Id.) He contends that he is covered by qualified

immunity for the January 11 warrant for the same reasons as

Riebe. (Id.) 

Hall’s argument is unpersuasive. Viewing the facts in a

light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could infer

that Hall was a lead investigator at the January 11 search. The

term “lead investigator” is a legal term of art that refers to

the officer “who lead[s] the team that executes a warrant.” 

Ramirez, 298 F.3d at 1027. In Ramirez, the court found that an

officer who “received two reports of illegal weapons, obtained

and served the warrant, conducted the pre-search briefing and

supervised the search itself” was a lead investigator. Ramirez,

298 F.3d at 1028. In contrast, a line officer is of “the rank

and file” and follows directions given to him. Id.

Plaintiffs cite to the following undisputed facts to support

their claim that Hall was a leader of the January 11 search team:

(1) Moore considered Hall to be a lead investigator from October

1998 to March 1999; (2) Irey also considered Hall to be a lead

investigator and Moore’s peer; (3) Hall conducted at least 50

interviews to investigate charges against Womack; (4) Hall gave

Moore the reports and materials he gathered while investigating

Womack; (5) Moore used the information provided by Hall to

prepare his affidavits for the January 11 search warrant; (6)

Hall read Moore’s affidavits and the January 11 warrant before

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the search and “found them to be accurate and complete to the

best of [his] knowledge;” and (7) Hall participated in the

search. (R&H Mot. at 25.) 

Given Hall’s integral role in the overall investigation and

his review of the affidavits and the warrant, a reasonable jury

could find that Hall held a leadership role in the execution of

the search. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could equally

conclude that, while Hall lead the overall investigation, he did

not lead the January 11 search. Because Hall’s role is a

disputed issue of material fact, the court denies summary

judgment to Hall on the basis of qualified immunity for the

January 11 warrant. 

Hall is also not entitled to qualified immunity for the

January 13 warrant. The Ninth Circuit held that no reasonable

officer could have believed that there was probable cause to

justify a search of documents going back to 1990. KRL, 384 F.3d

at 1117. Therefore, the court denies summary judgment to Hall

for the January 13 warrant.

2. Irey

Irey asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity for

the January 11 warrant for the same reasons Riebe was. 

Plaintiffs disagree and assert that “[t]he nature and extent of

Irey’s participation [and knowledge] was significantly different

in nature and far more extensive than that of Riebe.” (Opp’n to

Irey Mot. at 16.) Therefore, plaintiffs claim that Irey is not

entitled to qualified immunity like Riebe. 

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Plaintiffs point out that Irey supervised and participated

in the Womack investigation before obtaining the January 11

warrant. (PAF ¶ 16.) He specialized in environmental

prosecution (Id. ¶ 15), and helped write the warrants that the

state court judge ultimately approved. (Id. ¶ 69.) Like Hall,

Irey had an integral part in the investigation, and a reasonable

jury could find that he held a leadership role in the decision to

obtain a warrant, the contents of the affidavit, the scope of the

warrant, and the execution of the January 11 search. 

Alternatively, as with Hall, a reasonable jury could conclude

that, while Irey lead the overall investigation, he did not lead

the January 11 search. Because Irey’s role is a disputed issue

of material fact, the court denies summary judgment to Irey on

the basis of qualified immunity for the January 11 warrant. 

Irey is also not entitled to qualified immunity for the

January 13 warrant. As stated above for Hall, the Ninth Circuit

held that no reasonable officer could have found probable cause

to justify that search. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1117. Therefore, the

court denies summary judgment to Irey for the January 13 warrant.

 3. Moore 

Moore is not entitled to qualified immunity because the

facts demonstrate that he was a lead investigator. Therefore, he

“would have greater responsibility for ensuring that the warrant

was not defective.” KRL, 384 F.3d at 1117 (citing Ramirez, 298

F.3d at 1028). 

The facts here are similar to those in Ramirez. Moore (1)

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prepared the cover affidavit; (2) presented it with the warrants

to Riebe for review and to the state court judge; (3) conducted

the pre-search briefing; (4) went to court with Irey to broaden

the scope of the warrants; (5) took possession of gathered

evidence; and (6) prepared and filed the search warrant return

regarding the seized evidence. (R&H SUF ¶¶ 31, 36, 38-42, 47.) 

On these facts, Moore cannot argue that he reasonably relied

on the defective January 11 warrant. In addition, like Hall and

Irey, Moore is not protected by qualified immunity for the

January 13 warrant in light of the Ninth Circuit decision. 

Therefore, the court denies Moore’s summary judgment motion on

both the January 11 and January 13 warrants. 

C. Qualified Immunity for Overbroad Execution of the Ridge

Road Warrants

1. Hall

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the scope of a search is

limited to the terms of the warrant and the items described

therein.” See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1985) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents for the

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 n.7 (1971)). The

Ninth Circuit concluded that “Hall is not entitled to qualified

immunity on [p]laintiffs’ claim that he seized documents

predating 1990.” KRL, 384 F.3d at 1117. However, on this

motion, plaintiffs fail to cite to any evidence that Hall

actually seized documents predating 1990. At best, the evidence

cited by plaintiffs demonstrates that defendants removed a tax

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return from 1989. However, that return was dated April 15, 1990,

making its seizure valid under the terms of the warrant. Thus,

the court grants Hall’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ overbroad execution claim. 

2. Moore

Like Hall, Moore claims that he did not seize documents

predating 1990. Because plaintiffs cite the same evidence for

Moore as they do for Hall, the court also grants Moore’s motion

for summary judgment on the overbroad execution claim.

VI. Bosse Ranch Search

Plaintiffs bring the following claims based on the Bosse

Ranch search: (1) facial invalidity of the warrant; (2) overbroad

execution of the warrant; and (3) judicial deception. When the

Ninth Circuit reviewed these claims on appeal, it held that none

of the defendants were protected by absolute immunity for this

warrant because it furthered a “stand alone investigation.” KRL,

384 F.3d at 1115. 

The Ninth Circuit did not address qualified immunity on the

facial invalidity claim because the parties did not address the

issue during the original round of dispositive motions in 2001. 

Therefore, the facial invalidity claim remains as to all

defendants. 

On overbroad execution, this court found that Hall and Riebe

had immunity because they were not present at the search. The

court found that Irey did not have immunity because the record

was not yet developed. None of the parties appealed these

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findings. Consequently, Irey and Moore remain in this claim.

On judicial deception, the Ninth Circuit held as to Riebe

that the alleged omission in the warrant was not material. As to

Hall, the court held that he had no role in the preparation or

execution of the warrant. The court did not rule on Irey because

he did not appeal the order denying him qualified immunity. 

Therefore, Irey and Moore remain in this claim. 

A. Facial Invalidity of Bosse Ranch Warrant

The court grants summary judgment to all defendants as to

plaintiffs’ facial invalidity claim for the Bosse Ranch search

warrant because the warrant was sufficiently particular and

adequately stated probable cause to search the entire ranch. 

Plaintiffs allege that the Bosse Ranch warrant “did not

describe, with particularity, the areas to be excavated.” 

(Compl. at 36.) To comply with the Fourth Amendment a search

warrant must identify the items to be searched and seized with

particularity. See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d

959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986)(search warrant must provide way of

distinguish[ing] items used lawfully from those the government

had probable cause to search). The particularity requirement

tests whether “the officer with a search warrant can with

reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” 

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); see also

United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1985). To

the extent that the intended search location was Bosse Ranch, the

warrant was sufficiently particular. The warrant listed the

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address, the assessor’s parcel number, and the ranch’s

approximate size. Any reasonable officer could locate the

property based on that information. Therefore, the warrant

sufficiently identified the ranch. 

However, plaintiffs allege that the description of Bosse

Ranch in the warrant was not sufficiently particular because it

included the 5-acre parcel that Luke and Renee Womack rented.

(Opp’n to Moore Mot. at 27-28.) Plaintiffs point out that Bob

Womack was under investigation, not Luke or Renee. (Id. at 28.) 

Therefore, plaintiffs assert that defendants did not have

probable cause to search Luke and Renee Womack’s rented parcel. 

(Id.) Thus, the critical issue is whether the defendants “had a

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to

search” all 86 acres of the ranch, including the 5 acre parcel

that was ultimately excavated in front of Luke and Renee Womack’s

mobile home. United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1301

(9th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is warranted if: (1) probable

cause actually existed to search the entire ranch; or (2) the

entire ranch subject to search was under the common control of

the person being investigated, here, Robert Womack. Id. 

In Alexander, officers suspected that defendant was

illegally manufacturing drugs. While surveying defendant’s ranch

by aircraft, officers saw what they believed to be a cocaine

manufacturing facility. Thereafter, the officers obtained a

search warrant to search defendant’s entire forty-acre ranch. 

When they executed the search, they found defendant in a small

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trailer about 240 yards from the cocaine processing plant. 

Officers also found one of defendant’s conspirators in a mobile

home about 20 yards from defendant’s trailer. 

Alexander argued that the warrant was not sufficiently

particular because it should have only authorized a search of a

smaller portion of the ranch and should not have included his

small trailer. The court disagreed. It held that the warrant

should be upheld if (1) probable cause actually existed to search

the entire ranch, or (2) the entire ranch subject to search was

under the common control of the person being investigated. Id.;

see also United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir.

1983)(holding that “a warrant may authorize a search of an entire

street address while reciting probable cause as to only a portion

of the premises . . . if the defendant was in control of the

entire premises.”). The court ultimately concluded that because

Alexander owned and controlled the entire ranch, the warrant to

search all 40 acres was not overbroad. Alexander, 761 F.2d at

1301. The fact that other people occupied the property did not

affect the court’s analysis. Id.

Moore claims that he had probable cause to search all of

Bosse Ranch because it was “the place [he] reasonably believed

that he would find evidence of environmental crimes.” (Moore

Mot. at 27.) Yet, later, he states that “the officers were

working from eyewitness descriptions, including a rough map of

burial locations, which confined the search on a very limited

part of the ranch’s 86 acres over a two-day period.” Id. at 28. 

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If that were true, then he did not have probable cause to search

the entire ranch, but only the identified burial locations. 

However, the 86-acre search was valid because the property was

under the common control of Robert Womack. Plaintiffs argue that

KRL, not Robert Womack, controlled the property. (Opp’n to Moore

at 27.) But the facts demonstrate that both KRL and Robert

Womack controlled the property and that Robert Womack often acted

on behalf of KRL. He supervised the UST removal and had access

to KRL funds and property. According to eyewitness Baldridge,

Robert Womack had enough control to bury materials and large

objects on the property, including a 25-foot-long propane tank. 

(Moore Mot. Ex. 28.) Because the facts demonstrate that Robert

Womack had common control over the property, summary judgment is

granted to all defendants for the facial invalidity of the Bosse

Ranch warrant.

B. Overbroad Execution of the Bosse Ranch Warrant 

 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants exceeded the scope of the

Bosse Ranch warrant when they: (1) damaged the property when

excavating; (2) entered the mobile home and seized plaintiffs’

weapons; and (3) entered the barn. As noted above, only Moore

and Irey remain on this claim. 

1. Excavation Damage

“[O]fficers executing search warrants on occasion must

damage property in order to perform their duty.” Dalia v. United

States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). However, “destruction of

property that is not reasonably necessary to effectively execute

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 The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard for 9

destruction of property appears to be the same for criminal cases

and civil cases. Compare United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442

(9th Cir. 1991)(criminal case in which defendants seek to

suppress evidence), with Crowe v. County of San Diego, 359

F.Supp.2d 994 (S.D. Cal. 2005)(civil case in which plaintiffs sue

government for damages). 

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a search warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment.” Tarpley v. 9

Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Liston v. County

of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). A court must

look at the particular facts of the case to determine whether

destruction of the property is reasonable. United States v.

Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 446 (9th Cir. 1991)(finding that the

government acted reasonably when it jackhammered a recentlypoured concrete slab to search for drugs); Crowe v. County of San

Diego, 359 F.Supp.2d 994, 1026 (S.D. Cal. 2005)(holding that

officers acted reasonably when they removed extensive sections of

carpet and drywall from murder victim’s home, even when it left

home inhabitable, because such evidence could potentially yield

clues of murder). 

In this case, destruction of plaintiffs’ property was

reasonably necessary to effectively search for the items listed

in the Bosse Ranch warrant. Witness Larry Baldridge told Moore

that Robert Womack had buried engines, car parts, 5-gallon

containers, 55-gallon drums, tires, wheels, and a 25-foot-long

propane tank on the Bosse Ranch property. (Moore Ex. 28). 

Finding these items required using heavy equipment to search the

land. 

Plaintiffs assert that the law required defendants to repair

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 If there is a remedy under the Constitution, it might be 10

found under the Fifth Amendment. However, this is not

plaintiffs’ claim. Moreover, there may be remedies under state

law that would provide for reimbursement. 

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the damage that they caused to Bosse Ranch once they concluded

the search. However, plaintiffs have cited no case, nor could

the court find one, that would accord plaintiffs a Fourth

Amendment right of repair. So long as the officer’s search was 10

reasonable, the officer is not liable under the Constitution for

repair costs for the damaged property. See Liston, 120 F.3d at

979; Crowe, 359 F.Supp.2d at 1026. As such, both Moore and Irey

are granted summary judgment on the overbroad execution claim to

the extent that it is based on property destruction. 

2. Seizing Weapons from the Womack’s Home

a. Irey

Liability under section 1983 only arises upon a showing of

personal participation in the deprivation of constitutional

rights. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir.

1989). Here, plaintiffs present no evidence that Irey was

involved in seizing weapons from the Womack’s home. Therefore,

the court grants summary judgment to Irey on the overbroad

execution claim to the extent that it is based on seizing

weapons. 

b. Moore

As discussed earlier, “the scope of a search is limited to

the terms of the warrant and the items described therein.”

Crozier, 777 F.2d at 1381. The Bosse Ranch search warrant only

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authorized the search of land for: (1) samples of hazardous

waste; (2) receptacles that might hold hazardous waste; (3)

documents regarding the “purchase, sale, transfer or disposal of

any hazardous material;” and (4) “photograph[s], videotape[s], or

tape recording[s] of any pertinent area or subject.” (Moore Ex.

28.) The warrant specifically excluded all outbuildings,

including the Womack’s doublewide mobile home. (Id.) The

warrant also did not include weapons. (Id.) 

Nevertheless, Renee Womack alleges that Moore came to her

door and asked her if she had any weapons on the premises. 

(Renee Womack Dep. at 79:2-3.) After she told Moore that her

husband and children shoot trap, Moore allegedly told her, “Well,

we have to come in and take [the weapons] from you . . . . You

need to show me where they are.” (Id. at 79:4-9.) Renee then

let Moore and other officers inside. (PAF ¶ 108.) Renee asserts

that she “did not at any time voluntarily consent to this entry

into her home.” (Id. ¶ 109.) Renee testified that “the officers

remain[ed] in the residence only long enough to find the guns and

take the guns.” (Renee Womack Dep. at 80:23-24.) She also

testified that there was not a general search of the residence. 

(Id. at 80:21-22.) 

Moore claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity for

the weapons seizure. He argues that the first part of the

Saucier test is not met because “[t]he Bosse Ranch Search was

performed within the scope of the warrant” and was

constitutional. (Moore Mot. at 28.) Moore asserts that the

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officers were entitled to seize the weapons to ensure officer

safety. (Id. (citing Muehler v. Mena, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (2005)).) 

The Fourth Amendment allows police officers who enter a

house with an arrest warrant to conduct a protective sweep of the

house if the officers have “a reasonable belief based on specific

and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an

individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” 

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990). Officers

may also conduct a “protective sweep” in conjunction with a

search warrant. United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 759 (1st

Cir. 1990). In such cases, there must be “an objective basis for

a reasonable suspicion of risk to the safety of the officers.” 

Id. The Daoust court found that officers had “individualized

suspicion” to justify a 30-second protective sweep of a suspect’s

house after they arrived to execute a warrant for seizure of a

handgun officers had observed through the window. Id. The

officers reasonably feared violence because the suspect: (1)

could have been at home sleeping; (2) had prior criminal history

of violent behavior; (3) kept his gun in an unusual place in the

kitchen; and (4) lived in an isolated area, far from the nearest

neighbor. Id. 

Moore takes this case law a step further. In the absence of

any particularized reason to expect an attack from Renee Womack

or anyone else present in the house, and despite the express

exclusion of the house from the warrant, Moore nonetheless argues

that he could insist on entry into the home – where the

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expectation of privacy is at its highest – to search for, and

then seize, weapons simply because he had the right to search the

ranch. This was overreaching and was neither supported by the

terms of the warrant – indeed, all structures were specifically

excluded – or by the conditions as the officers found them. 

Therefore, Moore’s entry into the home and seizure of weapons

violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Moore is also not entitled to qualified immunity under the

second part of the Saucier test. A reasonable officer would have

understood that searching for and seizing the weapons was

unlawful because: (1) weapons were not included in the warrant;

(2) the home was expressly excluded from the warrant; and (3)

nothing had happened to suggest that Luke or Renee posed a

threat. Accordingly, the court denies Moore summary judgment on

the overbroad execution claim for entering the mobile home and

seizing weapons. 

3. Entering the Barn

a. Irey

Again, plaintiffs present no evidence that Irey was involved

in entering the barn. Therefore, the court grants summary

judgment to Irey on the overbroad execution claim to the extent

it is based on the barn entry. 

b. Moore

Renee Womack testified that she saw Moore go inside the barn

twice without her permission. (Opp’n to Moore at 28-29.) Moore

asserts that he merely entered the barn to check for any live

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underground wiring that might endanger the searchers while they

excavated. (Moore Mot. at 29.) Unlike the protective sweep of

the mobile home, this sweep of the barn was reasonable. 

Defendants had “an objective basis for a reasonable suspicion of

risk to the safety of the officers.” Daoust, 916 F.2d at 759. 

The search authorized by the search warrant required digging that

could interfere with electrical wires. Defendants could have

chosen not to check the barn for live wires, but to do so would

place the officers at risk and could have affected the Womacks’

supply of electricity to their home. Moore’s search for live

wires was directed at mitigating any potential damage or danger

to the officers. Plaintiffs cannot argue that defendants did not

take the proper precautions to prevent damage while

simultaneously arguing that defendants should not have entered

the barn to prevent damage.

Even if Moore’s actions were unconstitutional, he would be

entitled to qualified immunity under the second part of the

Saucier test. A reasonable officer could conclude that entering

the barn solely to check for live wires to mitigate damage was

lawful. Little case law addresses this particular issue, and had

Moore gone back to the judge to extend the warrant, the judge

likely would have granted the request. Defendants present no

evidence that Moore’s stated reasons for entering the barn were

pretextual. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment to

Moore on the overbroad execution claim to the extent he entered

the barn to check on possible hazards from live wires. 

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C. Judicial Deception

 “To support a § 1983 claim of judicial deception, a

plaintiff must show that the defendant deliberately or recklessly

made false statements or omissions that were material to the

finding of probable cause.” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). The court determines the

materiality of alleged false statements or omissions. Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiffs contend that defendants “embellished” the

affidavit by using the language “permeated with fraud,” “lifetime

of crime,” and “criminal enterprise,” and that Moore

misrepresented the nature of Robert Womack’s “rap” sheet by

calling him a “career criminal.” (Opp’n to Moore at 24.) 

However, none of these terms were material to the finding of

probable cause. The term “permeated with fraud” only appears on

the first page of the 24-page affidavit. In context, it is used

as an abstract term of art that summarizes the material facts

found on the other 23 pages. A judge’s finding of probable cause

would not turn on this one characterization. 

Also, the terms “lifetime of crime,” “criminal enterprise,”

and “career criminal” do not appear in the affidavit. Instead,

on page 1, as an introduction to the rest of the affidavit, Moore

states that Womack “has been committing crimes off and on for at

least 40 years.” On page 4, Moore mentions Womack’s rap sheet

and states, 

I am aware from a FBI rap sheet that Robert R. Womack

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was first charged with Conspiracy in 1961, to date I am

not sure whether he was convicted of a felony or a

misdemeanor for that offense, but my investigation

continues. The second time Robert R. Womack was

charged with Conspiracy was in 1975. It appears from

the rap sheet that he pled to a misdemeanor in that

case. 

(Moore Mot. Ex. 22.) Moore does not misrepresent Womack’s

criminal past. Plaintiffs admit that “Womack’s record revealed

approximately six misdemeanors dating from 1975 and earlier.”

(PAF ¶ 125.) On pages 4 and 5 of the affidavit, Moore lists

several other instances of Womack’s criminal activity. (Moore

Mot. Ex. 22.) Overall, plaintiffs fail to show any false

statements or omissions that were material to the finding of

probable cause. Therefore, the court grants Irey and Moore

summary judgment on the judicial deception claim for the Bosse

Ranch warrant.

VII. Substantive Due Process Claims Against Moore

Claims seven, eight, and nine of plaintiffs’ complaint

allege substantive due process violations. The seventh claim

addresses the excavation and seizure of personal property at

Bosse Ranch. The eighth claim addresses the seizure and

detention of firearms at Ridge Road. The ninth claim addresses

the release of plaintiffs’ confidential records to the public. 

In the original round of dispositive motions, the court

granted summary judgment on claims seven and eight to Irey, Hall,

and Riebe on the basis that substantive due process does not

apply. “Injuries arising from allegedly illegal searches and

seizures are addressed by the Fourth Amendment, a more specific

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Constitutional provision.” (1/17/2002 Order at 10-11.) On the

ninth claim, the court found that plaintiffs failed to show any

invasion of privacy. “Although Riebe issued a press release

urging the public to examine the grand jury exhibits which

included copies of plaintiffs’ documents and plaintiffs allege

that Irey subsequently took possession of the exhibits, there are

no facts indicating that any members of the public ever read the

exhibits.” (Id. at 11-12). 

Plaintiffs offer no reason why the court’s earlier

conclusions do not also apply to Moore. Therefore, the court

grants Moore summary judgment on plaintiffs’ substantive due

process claims.

VIII.

In conclusion, summary judgment is GRANTED to all defendants

as to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims for the search of their

accountant, bank, and telephone records. Plaintiffs’ request for

leave to amend their complaint in light of this decision is

DENIED. 

On the Ridge Road searches, summary judgment is: (1) GRANTED

to Moore for the facial invalidity claim to the extent that his

actions were prosecutorial; and (2) GRANTED to Hall and Moore on

the overbroad execution claim. 

For the Bosse Ranch search, summary judgment is: (1) GRANTED

to all defendants on the facial invalidity claim; (2) GRANTED to

Irey on the overbroad execution claim; and (3) GRANTED to all

defendants on the judicial deception claim. 

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Finally, summary judgment is GRANTED to Moore on the

substantive due process claims.

Thus, the following claims remain: (1) facial invalidity of

the Ridge Road warrants against Hall, Moore and Irey; and (2)

overbroad execution of the Bosse Ranch search against Moore to

the extent he seized weapons from the Womacks’ home. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 2, 2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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