Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-00618/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-00618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

RICKY WAYNE BRUNER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ARP PRODUCTION COMPANY,

L . L . C . ; E P E N E R G Y

MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 6:14-CV-0618-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is currently before the court on defendant ARP Production Company’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 19.) PlaintiffRickyWayne Bruner has sued 1

defendants – ARP and EP EnergyManagement – alleging trespass, nuisance, and negligence

claims arising out of defendants’ drilling operations on certain real properties. Upon

consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the

relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the ARP’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint, (doc. 19), is due to be denied in part and granted in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of a motion authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure is to evaluate the facial sufficiency of a pleading. Rule 12(b)(6) must be read

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each 1

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2014 Aug-11 PM 03:32

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:14-cv-00618-SLB Document 28 Filed 08/11/14 Page 1 of 12
together with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “requires that a

pleading contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

the court accepts the allegations in the pleading as true and construes such allegations in the

light most favorable to the pleader. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP,

634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1288). The

pleading “does not need detailed factual allegations” to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion;

however, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] [pleading] must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A

claim for relief has “facial plausibility” if it “allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

Res judicata, a doctrine under which ARP seeks dismissal, “is not a defense under

12(b); it is an affirmative defense that should be raised under Rule 8(c).” Concordia v.

Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1982)(citations omitted). “Generally, the

existence of an affirmative defense will not support a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, a

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[pleading] may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when its own allegations indicate the

existence of an affirmative defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the

[pleading].” Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984)

(citations omitted), vacated on petition for reh’g, reinstated by 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir.

1985). If a district court considers matters outside the pleadings, the court must convert the

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a district court may take judicial notice of

public records, such as filings in other judicial proceedings, without converting a 12(b)(6)

motion into a motion for summary judgment. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d

1066, 1075 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013)(“Although this [res judicata defense] is before the court on

a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of the court documents from the state

eviction action.”); Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed. Appx. 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010)(per curiam)

(finding that the district court properly took judicial notice of documents from a prior lawsuit

“which were public records that were ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’” (quoting Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b))); Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. S.E.C., 177 Fed. Appx. 52, 54 (11th Cir.

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2006)(per curiam)(finding that the district court’s consideration of a complaint filed in a

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be 2

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

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Case 6:14-cv-00618-SLB Document 28 Filed 08/11/14 Page 3 of 12
separate case did not require converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about December 30, 2011, plaintiff Ricky Wayne Bruner filed a quiet-title

action against, inter alia, El Paso E&P Company seeking a determination of the ownership

of the mineral rights as to certain real properties in Walker County, Alabama. The Complaint

and Amended Complaint in that action sought only a determination of the ownership of

mineral rights and interests in the real property. Bruner and “EP Energy E&P Company

(formerlyEl Paso E&P Company)” filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal on August 29, 2013;

the Joint Stipulation stated, “Plaintiff dismisses his claims against EP Energy, with

prejudice.” (Doc. 20 at 49.)

Bruner filed the instant action on April 3, 2014, in which he alleges that he is the

owner of surface rights in certain real property in Walker County. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-20.) He

alleges that defendants, ARP and EP Energy, “conduct drilling operations on and around [his

properties] . . . for the purpose of extracting natural gas.” (Id. ¶ 22.) He does not allege that

he is the owner of the mineral rights on these properties.

The Complaint contains four Causes of Action: (1) Trespass to Lands, (id. ¶¶ 25-44);

(2) Private Nuisance, (id. ¶¶ 45-51); (3) Negligence Per Se, (id. ¶¶ 52-59); and (4) 3

“Cause of Action III” of plaintiff’s Complaint is entitled, “Negligence Per Se,” but 3

seeks statutory relief under the Clean Water Act. (See doc. 1 at 13-14.)

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Negligence, (id. ¶¶ 60-66). These claims are based on allegations that defendants

“unlawfullyenter[er], allow[ed], or caus[ed] hazardous foreign substances to enter [Bruner’s

properties],” including “hydrocarbons, methane, volatile organic compounds . . ., benzene,

xylene, 1,3-butadiene,” (id. ¶¶ 30, 37, 46, 57, 62, 65); unlawfully erected electrical power

poles and cables on the properties, (id. ¶ 31); “haphazardly dug ditches and installed drainage

pipes that cause runoff from the wells to land onto [Bruner’s properties], (id. ¶ 34); “erected

earthen berms that physically block [Bruner’s] egress and ingress onto and from . . . his . .

. [p]roperties, (id. ¶ 35); and damaged Bruner’s ground waster wells, (id. ¶ 49, 64).

According to ARP, it is “the successor in interest to EP Energy by acquisition,

assignment and bill of sale of EP Energy’s assets and operations in Alabama.” (Doc. 20 at

3 n.2.) Also, “EP Energy is the lone shareholder of what is now called EP Energy

Management, LLC, which is the successor in name to El Paso Exploration & Production

Management, Inc. and El Paso Production Oil & Gas Co.” (Id.)

On June 9, 2014, defendant ARP filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 19.) In its Motion to Dismiss, ARP contends:

1. Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata because: (a) there was a

prior judgment on the merits; (b) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(c) with substantial identity of the parties; and (d) with the same cause of

action presented in both suits.

2. To the extent Count III of the Complaint alleges violations of the

Clean Water Act, Count III should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot state

a valid claim for failure to satisfy the Clean Water Act's procedural

requirements.

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Case 6:14-cv-00618-SLB Document 28 Filed 08/11/14 Page 5 of 12
(Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. EVIDENCE SUBMITTED WITH DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF

ARP filed additional evidence with its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See doc. 25-1 to doc. 25-6.) The moving party may not submit

evidence with its reply submission without leave of the court. The reason for this rule is

obvious – the non-moving party must be allowed a “reasonable opportunity” to oppose the

moving party’s Motion to Dismiss, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), and evidence and arguments raised

for the first time after the non-moving party has filed its opposition effectively denies the

non-moving party such reasonable opportunity, see Burns v. Gadsden State Community

College, 908 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990). When faced with additional evidence

submitted by the moving party after the time set for the non-moving party to file all his

opposition to the motion, the court has two options: “it [can] strike the [evidence] or grant

. . . the nonmoving party the opportunity to respond to it.” Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v.

Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Beaird v. Seagate

Technology, Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 1998). In this case, the court chooses to

strike the evidence.

Therefore, the documents attached to defendant’s reply submission will be stricken

and have not been considered in deciding its Motion to Dismiss.

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B. RES JUDICATA

“The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, originally enacted in 1790, ch. 11, 4

1 Stat. 122, requires the federal court to ‘give the same preclusive effect to a state-court

judgment as another court of that State would give.’” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)(citing, inter alia, Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First

Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986))(footnote added). Therefore, whether the prior

Alabama state-court judgment bars the present action is determined with reference to

Alabama law.

In Alabama – 

Two causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes when the

following four elements are satisfied: “(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2)

rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of

the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both actions.” 

Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998). “If those

Section 1738 states, in pertinent part: 4

The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,

Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other

courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the

attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together

with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper

form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so

authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the

United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage

in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.

28 U.S.C. § 1738.

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four elements are present, then any claim that was, or that could have been,

adjudicated in the prior action is barred from further litigation.” Id. (citing

Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 725-26 (Ala. 1990)).

Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald, 985 So. 2d 914, 919 (Ala. 2007). “The

touchstone of whether a particular claim presents the same cause of action that was presented

and litigated to a final judgment in a previous civil action is ‘whether the claims in both

actions arise out of, and are subject to proof by, the same evidence.’” Kaufmann &

Associates, Inc. v. Davis, 908 So. 2d 246, 252 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)(quoting Vinson, 723 So.

2d at 637). “[W]hether the second action presents the same cause of action depends on

whether the issues in the two actions are the same and on whether substantially the same

evidence would support a recovery in both actions.” Vinson, 723 So. 2d at 637 citations

omitted).

Bruner’s prior action against APR’s predecessor in interest asserted a single claim to

quiet title to the mineral rights on certain real properties. According to Alabama law – 

When any person is in peaceable possession of lands, whether actual or

constructive, claiming to own the same, in his own right . . . , and his title

thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed or any other person claims or

is reputed to own the same, any part thereof, or any interest therein . . . and no

action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim, or

encumbrance, such person . . . , so in possession, may commence an action to

settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts or disputes concerning

the same.

Ala. Code § 6-6-540. When a plaintiffseeking to quiet title establishes peaceable possession,

the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate valid legal title. Upon that

demonstration the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show superior title by adverse

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possession or a better deed. Ex parte Cottrell, Nos. 1111006 and 1111011, 2014 WL

803306, *3 (Ala. Feb. 28, 2014)(citing Wiggins v. Stapleton Baptist Church, 210 So. 2d 814,

816-17 (Ala. 1968)). Therefore, proof in a quiet-title action requires evidence of the parties’

conveyances of the subject property or any part of the subject property, such as mineral

rights.

In the prior action, Bruner sued ARP’s predecessor to settle his right, as against that

predecessor, to the mineral rights on the subject properties. Evidence of ARP’s conduct in

extracting natural gas pursuant to the mineral rights was not relevant to any proof of its or

its predecessor’s valid title to those mineral rights and/or Bruner’s superior title. However,

evidence of ARP’s conduct is material and relevant to Bruner claims in the instant action

based on claims of trespass, nuisance, and negligence. Therefore, Bruner’s claims in this

action are not the same cause of action as presented in the prior quiet title action.

Because this action and the state-court quiet title action are not the same cause of

action, the prior judgment in the state court action does not preclude this case. Defendant

ARP’s Motion to Dismiss Bruner’s claims based on res judicata will be denied.

C. CAUSE OF ACTION III: NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND THE CLEAN WATER

ACT

ARP asks the court to dismiss Count III of Bruner’s Complaint “because Plaintiff

cannot state a valid claim for failure to satisfy the Clean Water Act’s procedural

requirements.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 2.) In his Complaint, Bruner alleges:

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Case 6:14-cv-00618-SLB Document 28 Filed 08/11/14 Page 9 of 12
CAUSE OF ACTION III

Negligence Per Se

52. Plaintiff Bruner adopts, re-alleges and incorporates each of the

preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff Bruner further

alleges:

53. That the Defendants have violated statutory language meant to

deter, limit, or negate damages to Plaintiff Bruner.

54. That Plaintiff Bruner is a member of those classes of persons for

which the statutes violated by the Defendants are enacted to protect.

55. That as a direct and proximate cause of the state and federal

statutes violated by the Defendants, Plaintiff Bruner has been made to suffer

injuries and damages.

56. That specifically, the Defendants violated the aforementioned

§6-5-124; [§] 6-5-210; and, §6-5-212 of the Code of Alabama.

57. That in addition, the Defendants have caused the release of

dangerous hydrocarbons onto and around the Subject Properties in violation

of the Clean Water Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. §1365.

58. That, the Defendants have violated the provisions of the Clean

Water Act byfailing to complywith effluentstandards and limitations imposed

for the release of hydrocarbons onto the Subject Properties.

59. That, Plaintiff Bruner, because of the Defendants’ violations of the

Clean Water Act has been caused and will be caused permanent, and lasting

damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff Bruner demands

compensatory and punitive damages and judgment against the Defendants for

violations of the codified state statutes and violations of the Clean Water Act,

which give rise to damages sought, to include the penalty of Twenty-Five

Thousand Dollars ($25,000) per day for violation of the Clean Water Act.

(Doc. 1 at 13-14.)

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ARP contends that Bruner cannot pursue a claim under the Clean Water Act because

he has not provided the required written notice before filing suit. In its Memorandum of Law

in Support of Defendant ARP Production Co., L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint, ARP states:

Section 1365(b) of the CWA provides that no action may be

commenced “prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the

alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged

violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation or

order.” [33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).] Compliance with this notice requirement is

mandatory and must be pleaded. National Environmental Foundation v. ABC

Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1096 (11th Cir. 1991). Courts strictly enforce the notice

requirements, and failure to comply with them will result in mandatory

dismissal. Id. at 1097-98.

In National Environmental Foundation, the National Environment

Foundation (“NEF”) sent notice to the appellee ABC Rail Corp. (“ABC”), the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and the Alabama Department of

Environmental Management (“ADEM”) advising them that it would file suit

against ABC for alleged violations of the CWA. 926 F.2d at 1097. NEF then

filed a complaint in the Northern District of Alabama the next day. Id. ABC

moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that NEF had failed to give 60

days’ notice as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Id. The district court granted

the motion, and NEF appealed. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, explaining

that the notice requirement in Section 1365(b) was both clear and mandatory,

and holding that “[i]f a plaintiff fails to comply with this notice requirement

where it is applicable, the district court is required to dismiss the action.” Id.

at 1098.

Here, Mr. Bruner has failed to comply with Section 1365(b)’s notice

requirement. Mr. Bruner has not pled that he notified the EPA or ARP as

required under 28 U.S.C. §1365(a). Count III, therefore, to the extent it relies

upon the CWA, must be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to comply with the

CWA’s notice provisions pursuant to clear Eleventh Circuit precedent.

(Doc. 20 at 12-13 [footnote omitted].)

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Bruner did not respond to portion of ARP’s Motion to Dismiss. (See generally doc.

23.) Therefore, the court finds that Bruner has abandoned his Clean Water Act claim and

such claim will be dismissed. Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Burwell, Civil

Action No. 13-0521-CG-C, 2014 WL 2738546, *2 (S.D. Ala. June 17, 2014)(citing

Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, to the

extent Bruner’s Complaint alleges a state-law cause of action based on negligent violations

of state and federal water quality standards this claim remains pending. See generally

Cooper v. International Paper Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Ala. 2012).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata will be denied and its

Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s Clean Water Act claim will be granted. An Order granting in

part and denying in part defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 19), and dismissing plaintiff’s

Clean Water Act claim will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 11th day of August, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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