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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH .FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United STtat.es Co~rt ?f Appeals enth C1rcmt 

MA¥ 171989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ALBERTO LOPEZ, JR., 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

O. L. McCOTTER, 

Respondent-Appellant. 

88-2185 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of New Mexico 

(D.C. Civil No. 87-0560-M) 

Charles H. Rennick, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Stratton, 

Attorney General, and Gail MacQue~ten, Assistant Attorney General, 

on the brief), Santa Fe, New· Mexico, for Respondent-Appellant. 

Edward L. Hand of John F. Schaber, P.A., Deming, New Mexico, 

for Petitioner-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2185 Document: 01019963530 Date Filed: 05/17/1989 Page: 1 
( The Secretary of Corrections for the State of New Mexico, the 

respondent, appeals the district court's order granting petitioner 

Alberto Lopez's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because 

_Mr. Lopez was entitled to have the .jury consider his defense of 

bail bondsman's privilege with respect to the charges against him 

for attempted aggravated burglary and aggravated assault on 

Antonio Ojinaga, we affirm the district court's grant of habeas 

corpus with respect to those charges. We reverse the district 

court's grant 'of habeas corpus insofar as it concerns Mr. Lopez's 

conviction for aggravated assault on Deputy Sheriff Henderson 

because the bail bondsman's privilege cannot serve as a defense to 

the offense of aggravated assault upon a peace officer. 

Though the parties vigorously dispute the particulars of the 

events.which gave rise to the incidents herein concerned, the 

basic outline of what happened is not in doubt. See generally 

State v. Lopez, 734 P.2d 778, 780-81 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. 

quashed, 734 P.2d 761 (N.M.). A bail bond company operated by 

Mr. Lopez, the petitioner, posted a bond to secure the release of 

Rudy Ojinaga, who had been arrested in El Paso, Texas for 

possession of marijuana and for driving while intoxicated. 

Because Mr. Ojinaga failed to satisfy the conditions of his 

release on bond, Mr. Lopez determined to retake him and commenced 

proceedings in El Paso County Court aimed at surrendering 

Mr. Ojinaga to the authorities in exchange for relief from the 

bond. The court issued a bench warrant for Mr. Ojinaga's arrest, 

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directed to Texas peace officers, but this was not of particular 

significance as things turned out. 

Mr. Lopez also sent an employee, George Sandoval, to 

Mr. Ojinaga's home in Central, New Mexico to physically retake 

Mr. Ojinaga. Mr. Sandoval went to the house of Mr. Ojinaga's 

parents in Central and told them of his purpose. The Ojinagas in 

turn telephoned a friend, Capt. Daniel Garcia, a Grant County 

undersheriff. When Capt. Garcia arrived, Mr. Sandoval informed 

him that he was a "bounty hunter" from El Paso, that he was 

seeking custody of Rudy Ojinaga, and he showed Capt. Garcia the 

Texas bench warrant for Rudy Ojinaga's arrest. Capt. Garcia asked 

Mr. Sandoval to return the following Tuesday, when Capt. Garcia 

would assist with Mr. Ojinaga's arrest if the district attorney's 

office determined.that the Tex~s bench warrant was valid for that 

purpose. Mr. Sandoval returned to El Paso. 

Things went awry a day or so later when Mr. Lopez and four of 

his men arrived at the Ojinaga house in Central. Mr. Lopez armed 

his men and had them surround the Ojinaga residence. Rudy 

Ojinaga's father, Antonio, answered the door when Mr. Lopez 

knocked. Mr. Lopez told him that he and his men intended to take 

custody of Rudy Ojinaga, by force if necessary. Antonio Ojinaga 

shut and locked the door; ·his wife phoned Capt. Garcia. At 

Mr. Lopez's direction, one of his men kicked in the door to the 

Ojinaga residence. Antonio Ojinaga brandished a knife. One of 

the bounty hunters pointed a shotgun or rifle at him, and told him 

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to drop the knife. Observing other people inside, Mr. Lopez 

ordered his men not to enter the house. 

With the bounty hunters and the Ojinagas at a standoff, Capt. 

Garcia arrived in an unmarked car. Mr. Lopez disarmed him. Capt. 

Garcia was in plain clothes but claimed at trial that a badge was 

pinned to his sport coat. Mr. Lopez denied seeing a badge. After 

Mr. Sandoval informed Mr. Lopez that Capt. Garcia was a peace 

officer, Mr. Lopez allowed Capt. Garcia to enter the Ojinaga house 

to retrieve Rudy Ojinaga and hand him over to the bounty hunters. 

Capt. Garcia instead called for support. Deputy Carl Henderson 

arrived first, but after an armed standoff, during which he stated 

his authority, he withdrew. When state policemen arrived, Lopez 

and his men surrendered. 

Charges were filed against Mr. Lopez for aggravated assault 

on Capt. Garcia and Deputy Henderson, battery on Capt. Garcia, 

attempted aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault on Antonio 

Ojinaga. From the outset, Mr. Lopez relied on the common-law bail 

bondsman's privilege as his principal defense, arguing that his 

conduct was authorized by law and by private contract. Mr. Lopez 

twice moved for dismissal of the charges on this basis before 

trial. The trial court allowed Mr. Lopez to introduce evidence 

concerning the traditionally broad authority enjoyed by bondsmen 

and the procedures they customarily follow, including testimony by 

an El Paso County Attorney. However, the court denied Mr. Lopez's 

requested instructions on the bondsman's privilege to rearrest his 

principal, though the court did define "bail bond" for the jury. 

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( Twice during deliberations the jury requested instructions on the 

bail bondsmanis privilege under the common law, and in particular 

whether a bail bondsman must have a "legal warrant in [his] 

possession to make an arrest." In both instances the trial court 

refused to instruct the jury. The jury ultimately found Mr. Lopez 

guilty of aggravated assault upon a peace officer for his actions 

toward Deputy Henderson, and of aggravated assault upon Antonio 

Ojinaga, of attempted burglary of the Ojinaga home, and of 

committing these crimes with the use of a firearm. 

The trial court entered judgment against Mr. Lopez and the 

New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The 

New Mexico courts construed the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 

(UCEA), N.M. Stat. Ann. S 31-4-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), enacted in 

1937, to apply to the acts of petitioner. Thus the holding in 

substance was that the common-law authority of bondsmen had been 

eliminated as to these circumstances and extradition was required. 

The holding also included a conclusion that N.M. Stat. Ann. 

S 31-3-4(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984) which provided that bondsmen could 

arrest the principal and deliver him to the sheriff was not 

applicable by reason of the requirement that extradition be sought 

in these circumstances under the Uniform Act. 

Mr. Lopez petitioned the United States District Court for 

habeas corpus relief. The magistrate to whom the matter was 

referred found that the trial court's erroneous refusal to 

recognize the bail bondsman's common-law arrest powers "denied 

Petitioner the opportunity to present possibly his strongest 

-sAppellate Case: 88-2185 Document: 01019963530 Date Filed: 05/17/1989 Page: 5 
defense," and recommended that the petition be granted. The 

district court adopted the magistrate's findings and 

recommendation. 

The state courts used the following section of the Uniform 

Act in reaching their conclusions that in substance the common law 

as to bondsmen had been eliminated as had the applicability of 

S 31-3-4(B) under these circumstances: 

"31-4-14. Arrest without a warrant. 

"The arrest of a person may be lawfully 

made also by any peace officer or a private 

person without a warrant upon reasonable 

information that the accused stands charged in 

the courts of a state with a crime punishable 

by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 

one year, but when so arrested the accused 

must be taken before a judge or magistrate 

with all practicable speed and complaint must 

be made against him under oath setting forth 

the ground for the arrest as in the preceding 

section [31-4-13 NMSA 1978); and thereafter 

his answer shall be heard as if he had been 

arrested on a warrant." 

The Act provides this important provision in permissive terms 

that "any credible person" may petition a magistrate or judge for 

an arrest warrant for the apprehension of an individual alleged to 

have violated the terms of his bail. Id. § 31-4-13. 

At the time the incidents took place and now the New Mexico 

statute at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-3-4(B) relating to bail bondsmen, 

but not limited to New Mexico bondsmen, provides: 

"When a paid surety desires to be discharged 

from the obligation of its bond, it may arrest 

the accused and deliver him to the sheriff of 

the county in which the action against the 

accused is pending." 

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( Under this provision, upon surrendering the accused to the 

sheriff, the surety is required to deliver to the sheriff a copy 

of the order admitting the accused to bail and a certified copy of 

the bail bond. Id. § 31-3-4(C). The statute is not limited byits terms to sheriffs in New Mexico. 

In an application of Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 

and Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339 

(10th Cir.), we conclude that the wording of the pertinent 

provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was not so 

vague so as to give a "potential defendant" some notice by the 

vagueness that a question may arise, and perhaps it would be held 

to cover the "contemplated conduct." Instead the provisions are 

narrow and the coverage, in view of the particular statute as to 

bondsmen and the common law, gave no adequate notice to petitioner 

of the state court's construction. 

Our inquiry in this case is not into what the law of 

New Mexico now is with respect to the recapture by a foreign bail 

bondsman of his principal in New Mexico. The New Mexico courts 

have spoken to this issue: henceforth, a foreign bondsman must 

comply with the UCEA in seeking the rearrest of his principal. 

State v. Lopez, 734 P.2d 778, 782-83 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. 

quashed, 734 P.2d 761 (N.M.). We must however determine whether 

the statutory construction announced in State v. Lopez was 

"unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had 

been expressed prior to the conduct in issue" as the phrase is 

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( used in Bouie so that it should not be applied retroactively. See 

Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354. 

Bouie concerned individuals convicted of criminal trespass 

because they remained in the dining area of a drugstore after they 

had been asked to leave. The individuals were black, and were 

asked to leave solely because the drugstore refused to serve 

blacks in its dining area. The Supreme Court held that the state 

supreme court, in affirming the convictions, had construed the 

trespassing statute in an unforeseeable way that deprived the 

defendants of a fair warning that the acts for which they stood 

convicted were criminal at the time they committed them, thus 

violating the due process clause. The Court in Bouie 

distinguished other cases in which uncertainty as to a statute's 

prohibition resulted from vague or overbroad language in the 

statute itself, rendering the statute void for vagueness, and 

stated: 

"When a statute on its face is vague or 

overbroad, it at least gives a potential 

defendant some notice, by virtue of this very 

characteristic, that a question may arise as 

to its coverage, and that it may be held to 

cover his contemplated conduct. When a 

statute on its face is narrow and precise, 

however, it lulls the potential defendant into 

a false sense of security, giving him no 

reason even to suspect that conduct clearly 

outside the scope of the statute as written 

will be retroactively brought within it by an 

act of judicial construction." 

The Court concluded that a judicial construction of a criminal 

statute must not be given retroactive effect if that construction 

is "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had 

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been expressed prior to the conduct at issue." Id. at 354 

(quoting Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) at 

58-59). 

As we recently said in Devine, applying the Bouie rule to 

actual cases is complicated by the paucity of authority 

illustrating what constitutes an unforeseeable judicial 

construction of a criminal statute such that it should not be 

given retroactive effect. We there determined that, ''if a 

criminal statute is 'narrow and precise' on its face, any judicial 

expansion of that statute beyond its own terms will be considered 

unforeseeable." Also, that the legal authority upon which the 

court construing the statute relies must also be reasonably 

accessible in light of the penalty imposed under the construction 

of the statute. We concluded in Devine: 

"E~en if its decision were fully supported by 

rules of statutory interpretation, we cannot 

agree that a state court may employ relatively 

obscure legal techniques to add twenty years 

of prison time to the minimum penalty set down 

in every widely disseminated and published 

official source of law. Allowing such an 

action would sap the 'fair warning' 

requirement of all substance." 

The consideration of the statutes and the state court's 

construction of the Uniform Act must be made as above, but also in 

the context of the common law as it then pertained generally and 

in New Mexico, this to follow Bouie and Devine. In New Mexico, 

criminal cases are governed by the common law "as recognized by 

the United States and the several states of the Union," unless a 

statutory provision displaces the common law in a particular area. 

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State v. Valdez, 495 P.2d 1079, 1084 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd, 497 

P.2d 231 (N.M.): State v. Hartzler, 433 P.2d 231, 232 (N.M. Ct. 

App.): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984): see also State 

v. Willis, 652 P.2d 1222, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App.) (Wood, J., 

specially concurring). The New Mexico Court of Appeals described 

the common-law powers of a bondsman in its opinion.- The 

New Mexico Court of Appeals has upheld a conviction for the 

common-law misdemeanor of "indecent handling of a dead body." 

Hartzler, 433 P.2d at 233-35. The court determined that four such 

cases decided in three states over a period of 146 y~ars 

established the offense in the common law. Common-law defenses 

and privileges have been incorporated into New Mexico law in the 

same manner as common-law offenses. See Downs v. Garay, 742 P.2d 

533 (N.M. Ct. App.) (considering the common-law citizen's arrest 

privilege as a defense to arrest and battery in the context of a 

civil suit). 

No one disputes that at common law bail bondsmen had very 

broad arrest powers. Courts frequently cite the Supreme Court 

opinion in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72, 

wherein the Court said: 

"When bail is given, the principal is regarded 

as delivered to the custody of his sureties. 

Their dominion is a continuance of the 

original imprisonment. Whenever they choose 

to do so, they may seize him and deliver him 

up in their discharge: and if that cannot be 

done at once, they may imprison him until it 

can be done. They may exercise their rights 

in person or by agent. They may pursue him 

into another State; may arrest him on the 

Sabbath: and, if necessary, may break and 

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enter his house for that purpose. The 

is not made by virtue of new process. 

needed. It is likened to the rearrest 

sheriff of an escaping prisoner." 

seizure 

None is 

by the 

See also Ex Parte Salinger, 288 F. 752, 755 (2d Cir.); State v. 

Portnoy, 718 P.2d 805, 811 (Wash. Ct. App.) (observing that "a 

bail bondsman has certain extraordinary powers under the common 

law"). Subsequent cases, often relying on the "if necessary" 

qualification in Taylor, have decided that the common-law right of 

recapture is limited by the reasonable means necessary to effect 

rearrest. 

Numerous decisions have acknowledged the bail bondsman's 

common-law right to recapture includes the right to remove his 

principal from one state to an~ther, without resort to extradition 

proceedings, in order to return the principal to the forum from 

which he was released and to which he obligated himself to 

surrender. See Taylor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 371-72; Reese v. 

United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 21-22; United States v. 

Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir.); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 

46 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir.). 

We must observe that State v. Lopez is the only case we have 

encountered holding that the long-standing UCEA, by itself, 

modifies the established rule that a bail bondsman need not resort 

to process--particularly extradition--in rearresting his principal 

in another state. As such, we do not believe that Mr. Lopez could 

have anticipated the court's holding. The state courts relied on 

State v. Epps, 585 P.2d 425 (Or. Ct. App.), but in~ the Oregon 

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court in turn relied heavily on the fact that the Oregon 

legislature had effected "a complete abandonment, not a reform, of 

the bail system." 585 P.2d at 429. Consonant with this approach, 

the legislature had there repealed the statute authorizing a bail 

bo_ndsman to arrest his principal, adopted an entirely new 

"security release system," and amended the UCEA to conform with 

these changes. The court there determined that the UCEA was the 

only permissible vehicle for returning a bail-jumper to another 

state because no other statutory means existed, and because the 

court believed that the legislature expressly rejected the commonlaw bail system when it adopted the security release system. 

New Mexico, of course, retains the bail system and provisions 

giving bondsmen the power to arrest. Mr. Lopez could not have 

anticipated that New Mexico would follow the~ decision with 

respect to his conduct. 

The language of the UCEA could not have conveyed to Mr. Lopez 

a fair warning that his conduct would be regarded as criminal. 

The section under which the appeals court concluded that Mr. Lopez 

should have attempted the arrest of Mr. Ojinaga, S 31-4-13, is not 

mandatory by its terms. While the statute commands that the 

"judge or magistrate shall issue a warrant" for the arrest of any 

person who "shall be charged on the oath of any credible person'' 

of one of several offenses, it does not specify that the credible 

person must seek the arrest of the charged person under the UCEA. 

In our consideration of the doctrines in Bouie and Devine we 

must, as mentioned, resolve the issue as to whether the state 

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court construction of the Uniform Act was so "unexpected'' under 

preexisting law as to prevent its application retroactively. This 

again, as mentioned, must be made in the context of other 

statutory authority as we had done above,. and also in reference to 

the then prevailing common law. Neither the UCEA itself nor the 

decisional precedents of other states could have afforded 

Mr. Lopez a fair warning that his attempt to recapture Rudy 

Ojinaga in New Mexico would be governed by the UCEA, and thus not 

be privileged conduct under the common law. 

The respondent asserts on appeal that even the broadest view 

of the bail bondsman's privilege could not shield Mr. Lopez's 

conduct in assaulting Deputy Henderson. Mr. Lopez responds that 

the jury "could very well have found that under the circumstances 

it was reasonable for Mr. Lopez to use force against persons he 

did not know were peace officers." Petitioner-Appellee's Brief at 

15. The trial court's instruction adequately protected 

Mr. Lopez's interest on this point: 

"Evidence has been presented that the 

defendant, Albert Lopez, did not know Carl 

Henderson was a peace officer. If Albert 

Lopez acted under an honest and reasonable 

belief in the existence of those facts, you 

must find him not guilty." 

Instruction Number 10, Record Vol. III, p. 462. Had the jury 

found that Mr. Lopez did not know that Deputy Henderson was a 

peace officer, they would never have had to reach the issue of the 

reasonableness of Mr. Lopez's conduct, as they would have 

acquitted him. Furthermore, we are aware of no case, under the 

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common law or any other law, holding that a bail bondsman is 

privileged to engage in an armed standoff with a peace officer by 

virtue of his right to recapture his principal. 

Because the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was 

unforeseeable and retroactively rendered Mr. Lopez's conduct 

criminal by depriving him of the bail bondsman's privilege, it 

violated the due process clause. Therefore, we affirm the trial 

court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the 

petitioner's convictions for attempted aggravated burglary and 

aggravated assault on Antonio Ojinaga. However, we reverse the 

trial court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to 

the petitioner's conviction for aggravated assault on Deputy 

Henderson. 

It is so ordered and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings. 

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