Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01369/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01369-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

PEDRO OROPEZA, in his 

individual and representative 

capacity as Trustee--Pedro & 

Angela Oropeza 2008 Trust; 

ANGELA OROPEZA, in her 

individual and representative 

capacity as Trustee--Pedro & 

Angela Oropeza 2008 Trust; 

and ROSA HAS,

Defendants.

NO. CIV. 2:14-1369 WBS DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Scott Johnson, a wheelchair-bound 

quadriplegic, brought this action against defendants Pedro 

Oropeza, Angela Oropeza, and Rosa Has, who own and operate the 

Kinnaree Thai Cuisine restaurant. Plaintiff alleges he visited 

the restaurant and encountered barriers to access that violate 

the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

(“ADA”), and related California laws. Plaintiff now moves for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

(Docket No. 12.) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff uses a wheelchair for mobility and owns a 

specially equipped van with a lift that deploys from the 

passenger side to accommodate his wheelchair. (Decl. of Scott 

Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Docket No. 12-3).) On February 

19, 2014, plaintiff visited Kinnaree Thai Cuisine, a restaurant

owned and operated by defendants in Manteca, California. (Id. ¶ 

4.) Plaintiff found that the entrance doorway was an outwardswinging door with a wide decorative lattice framed around it 

that blocked both sides of the door. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) 

Plaintiff requires at least eighteen inches of clear floor space 

in order to maneuver his wheelchair while opening the door. (Id.

¶ 5.) In addition, a horizontal grab bar handle was mounted on 

the door that required plaintiff to use a tight grasp and twist 

his wrist to operate it. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff found it hard to 

make his way inside the restaurant due to these impediments. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff returned to the restaurant at least one more 

time on March 11, 2014. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff took a photo of 

the entrance during that visit. (See id. Ex. 3.) 

More than a year after filing this lawsuit, plaintiff 

hired an architectural consultant to inspect the restaurant. 

(See Decl. of Paul Bishop (“Bishop Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-7 (Docket No. 19-

6).) The consultant conducted his inspection on July 16, 2015, 

and found that all the impediments listed in plaintiff’s First 

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) had been remedied. (Id. ¶ 8.) The

entrance lattice had been removed and the door handle had been

changed to one that did not require grasping.1 (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit asserts four claims: (1) violations 

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) violations of 

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”), Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 51 et seq.; (3) violations of the California Disabled Persons 

Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-54.8; and (4) common-law negligence. 

(First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 18-34 (Docket No. 7).) Plaintiff

moves for summary judgment as to his first two claims and states 

in his motion that he will stipulate to dismiss his California 

Disabled Persons Act and negligence claims if the court grants 

summary judgment as to his claims under the ADA and UCRA.2 

(Pl.’s Mem. at 1.) 

Plaintiff acknowledges that, because all barriers have 

been fixed, he no longer requires injunctive relief. (Pl.’s Mem. 

at 1.) He seeks only an award of $4,000 in damages. (See Pl.’s 

 

1 Plaintiff’s FAC also identifies several barriers 

associated with the restaurant’s restroom that were also remedied 

by the time of inspection. (See FAC ¶¶ 11-14; Bishop Decl. ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiff never encountered these barriers personally and 

therefore cannot sustain his claim for damages upon them. (See

Pl.’s Mem. at 1); Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b). 

2 Plaintiff has not yet presented the court with a 

stipulation to this effect signed by both parties. As the court 

has previously explained in another case involving the same 

plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the

unilateral withdrawal of claims. See Johnson v. Wayside Prop., 

Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 975 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Hells 

Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 

687 (9th Cir. 2005)). If plaintiff intends to withdraw his third 

and fourth claims, he must either explain why dismissal is 

appropriate under Rule 15 or submit a stipulation signed by both 

parties. 

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Mem. at 1, 10.) 

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. 

Defendants do not dispute liability based on the fact 

that their restaurant was not fully ADA compliant. (Defs.’ Opp’n 

at 1 (Docket No. 24-1).) Accordingly, because there is no 

genuine dispute regarding the existence of barriers to access, 

the court will enter summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue 

of liability under the ADA and the UCRA.3 

Defendants contest only the amount of monetary damages 

due to plaintiff under the UCRA. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 1-2.) Unlike 

the ADA, the UCRA permits plaintiffs aggrieved by barriers to 

access to recover monetary damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); 

Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 669 (2009). Even if a 

defendant has removed barriers to access and thereby mooted the 

plaintiff’s ADA claim, those remedial measures will not moot a 

UCRA claim for damages. Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 439 

 

3 The UCRA “incorporates the substantive standards of the 

ADA and creates a private right of action as a matter of state 

law.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Law School Admission 

Council Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The law 

provides that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under 

the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall 

also constitute a violation of [the UCRA].” Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 51(f).

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Karlton, J.) (citing 

Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (C.D. Cal.

2005)). 

The UCRA generally provides for a minimum of $4,000 in 

statutory damages for each offense. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52(a), 

55.56(e). However, defendants argue they have presented evidence 

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they are

entitled to a reduction of the statutory damages from $4,000 to 

$1,000 pursuant to California Civil Code section 55.56(f)(1)(A). 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 2.)

Section 55.56(f)(1)(A) reduces the available statutory 

damages for each offense “if the defendant demonstrates that it 

has corrected all construction-related violations that are the 

basis of a claim within 60 days of being served with the 

complaint” in addition to demonstrating that:

The structure or area of the alleged violation was 

determined to be “CASp-inspected” or “meets applicable 

standards” and, to the best of the defendant’s 

knowledge, there were no modifications or alterations 

that impacted compliance with construction-related 

accessibility standards with respect to the 

plaintiff’s claim that were completed or commenced 

between the date of that determination and the 

particular occasion on which the plaintiff was 

allegedly denied full and equal access.

Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(f)(1)(A). Although defendants have 

submitted evidence that the deficiencies were corrected within 

sixty days of service on Rosa Has, (see Decl. of Rosa Has (“Has 

Decl.”) ¶ 2 (Docket No. 24-2)), they have not provided evidence 

addressing the other requirements of section 55.56(f)(1)(A). 

Specifically, defendants have not submitted evidence to establish

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

whether the “structure or area of the alleged violation was 

determined to be ‘CASp-inspected’ or ‘meets applicable 

standards,’” nor have they presented any evidence regarding 

alterations or modifications between the date of such a 

determination and the occasion on which plaintiff visited their 

restaurant. Defendants therefore fail to demonstrate a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding the applicability of section 

55.56(f)(1)(A). See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Moreover, the record indicates that the deficiencies 

were corrected within sixty days of service on only one of the 

defendants, Rosa Has. Defendants Peter Oropeza and Angela 

Oropeza were served with plaintiff’s initial complaint on June 9, 

2015. (See Docket Nos. 4, 6.) Rosa Has was served later, on 

July 10, 2014, after plaintiff amended his complaint to add her 

as a party. (See Docket No. 10.) Defendants use the date of 

service on Has to calculate the sixty-day window provided by 

section 55.56(f)(1)(A), but they offer no evidence demonstrating 

that subsection’s potential applicability to Peter and Angela 

Oropeza. 

Accordingly, because defendants conceded liability and 

fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

amount of statutory damages owed to plaintiff, the court will 

grant plaintiff’s motion with respect to both liability and 

damages. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. The court 

awards plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $4,000.

///

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Dated: September 8, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-01369-WBS-DB Document 27 Filed 09/09/15 Page 8 of 8