Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01507/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01507-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

** E-filed May 26, 2010 ** 

NOT FOR CITATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

MONICA STEMPLEWSKI, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC. and DOES 

1–10, 

 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________/

No. C 10-01507 HRL 

ORDER (1) GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND (2) CONTINUING 

INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 

CONFERENCE 

[Re: Docket No. 5] 

Plaintiff Monica Stemplewski sought to modify her home mortgage with defendant SunTrust 

Mortgage, Inc. (“SunTrust”). When that effort failed and SunTrust instigated foreclosure 

proceedings, she sued SunTrust in state court, alleging five claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, 

(3) negligence, (4) intentional tort, and (5) violation of the California Foreclosure Prevention Act 

(“CFPA”). SunTrust, a Virginia citizen, timely removed the case to federal court on the basis of 

diversity jurisdiction. SunTrust now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Upon consideration of the motion papers and the arguments 

presented at the hearing, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion.1

LEGAL STANDARD

On motion, a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). The federal rules require that a complaint include a “short and plain statement” showing 

 

1

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have expressly consented that all 

proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the undersigned. 

Case 5:10-cv-01507-HRL Document 13 Filed 05/26/10 Page 1 of 5
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United States District Court

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the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must “raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). As such, only 

plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. 

Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). A claim is plausible if its factual content “allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Requests for Judicial Notice 

As an initial matter, both parties request that this court take judicial notice of various 

documents. A court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. 

R. Evid. 201. Such facts include matters of public record, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

689 (9th Cir. 2001), and legislative history, Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 

1157, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

The court grants SunTrust’s request for judicial notice of documents recorded in the Office 

of the Santa Clara County Recorder. (Def. Req. for Judicial Notice Exs. 1–4.) The court also takes 

judicial notice of the legislative history of California Senate Bill 1137. (Pl. Req. for Judicial Notice 

Exs. 7–8.) However, the court declines to take judicial notice of communications between plaintiff 

and SunTrust because these documents are subject to reasonable dispute. (Id. at Exs. 1–6.) 

B. Motion to Dismiss 

SunTrust’s primary argument in favor of dismissal is that plaintiff’s complaint utterly fails to 

meet federal pleading standards. It further asserts that even in absence of this critical error, each of 

plaintiff’s claims suffer from other defects that cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. Stemplewski 

counters that she has properly stated each of her claims, and provides additional information about 

each claim in her opposing brief. 

A review of plaintiff’s complaint supports SunTrust’s assertion. Certainly, one would not 

expect a plaintiff filing in state court to meet federal pleading standards. Nonetheless, plaintiff’s 

form complaint fails to allege sufficient facts that would allow this court to reasonably infer that 

SunTrust is liable to plaintiff as alleged. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. For instance, Stemplewski’s 

breach of contract claim asserts that the parties had an implied contract that required SunTrust to 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

make a good faith effort to modify her mortgage. Yet she fails to allege the conduct that allegedly 

created such a contract. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1621 (“An implied contract is one, the existence and 

terms of which are manifested by conduct.”). Her fraud claim asserts that SunTrust made false 

statements to her, but fails to allege what was said, when it was said, and how she was mislead. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring fraud to be pled with particularity). Her claims for negligence and 

intentional tort similarly lack facts that would give SunTrust sufficient notice of her allegations, and 

her claim of a violation of the CFPA cuts off mid-sentence without providing any facts whatsoever. 

(Compl.) Indeed, plaintiff’s complaint does no more than include “unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (2009). 

Plaintiff tries to cure these deficiencies by providing more information about her claims in 

her opposition brief. A court cannot, however, look to a plaintiff’s opposition when determining the 

propriety of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, at times her opposition contradicts the claims in her complaint. For 

example, plaintiff’s complaint alleges a violation of the CFPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.52(a), but 

repeatedly refers to section 2923.5 in her opposition. As defendants correctly note, section 

2923.5—which was enacted through Senate Bill 1137—is not part of the CFPA. See Cal Civ. Code 

§ 2923.5 (showing that section 2923.5 was enacted a year before the CFPA). Accordingly, the court 

finds that plaintiff’s complaint, as filed in state court, fails to state claims upon which relief may be 

granted in federal court. 

While the court cannot consider Stemplewski’s opposition to determine whether her 

complaint states a claim, it may consider it for purposes of determining whether to grant plaintiff 

leave to amend. Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Complaints may not be dismissed with prejudice unless the allegations of the 

complaint make clear that plaintiff cannot state a claim.” Id. at 1137. The court finds that with one 

exception, plaintiff’s opposition does not foreclose the possibility that she may be able to state a 

claim upon amendment of her complaint.2

/// 

 

2

 The court observes, however, that several of the defendant’s other grounds for dismissal appear 

sound. Stemplewski would need to address those issues to have success in any amended complaint. 

Case 5:10-cv-01507-HRL Document 13 Filed 05/26/10 Page 3 of 5
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United States District Court

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The exception lies with plaintiff’s intentional tort claim. Plaintiff’s complaint and 

opposition brief allege conversion on the basis that SunTrust could not conduct foreclosure 

proceedings without possession of the original note. (See Compl.; Opp’n 9.) Yet in California, “[i]t 

is well-established that non-judicial foreclosures can be commenced without producing the original 

promissory note.” Nool v. HomeQ Servicing, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also 

Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

“California law does not require possession of the note as a precondition to non-judicial foreclosure 

under a deed of trust . . . . Pursuant to section 2924(a)(1) of the California Civil Code, the trustee of 

a Deed of Trust has the right to initiate the foreclosure process. Production of the original note is 

not required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure.” Pagtalunan v. Reunion Mortgage Inc., No. 

09-00162, 2009 WL 961995, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Stemplewski 

provides no other basis for her intentional tort claim. Thus, the court finds that any attempt to 

amend this claim would be futile. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to 

plaintiff’s intentional tort claim. 

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to 

plaintiff’s breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and violation of the California 

Foreclosure Prevention Act claims. 

3. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint within fourteen days of this order. 

4. The Initial Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to July 20, 2010 at 1:30 p.m. 

The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Statement by July 13, 2010. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 26, 2010 

HOWARD R. LLOYD 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

C 10-01507 HRL Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Erik Wayne Kemp ek@severson.com, ano@severson.com, klm@severson.com 

John B. Sullivan jbs@severson.com 

Jonathan Fried jon.fried@yahoo.com 

Mary Kate Sullivan mks@severson.com, adt@severson.com, klm@severson.com, 

 vhn@severson.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not 

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program. 

 

Case 5:10-cv-01507-HRL Document 13 Filed 05/26/10 Page 5 of 5