Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01630/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01630-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIFFANY FENTERS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

YOSEMITE CHEVRON, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1630 OWW/DLB

ORDER DENYING THE CASSABON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE FIRST, THIRD AND

FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION IN

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 75) AND DENYING THE

ABBATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS THE FIRST, THIRD AND

FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION IN

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Docs. 78) 

By Order filed on July 14, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as

the July 14 Order), plaintiff Tiffany Fenters (Tiffany) was

ordered to file a First Amended Complaint. 

In the First Amended Complaint (FAC), Tiffany names as

defendants Yosemite Chevron, Abbco Investments, LLC, and Robert

Abbate (the Abbate Defendants); Gordon Spencer, former District

Attorney for the County of Merced, Merle Wayne Hutton,

Supervising Investigator for the District Attorney’s Office for

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Merced County, and Merced County (the Merced County Defendants);

and Victor K. Fung, CPA, Erin M. McIlhatton, CPA, and Cassabon &

Associates (the Cassabon Defendants). The FAC alleges that the

Abbate Defendants and the Cassabon Defendants are “liable under

federal law based on the joint activity and/or conspiracy [they]

engaged in ... with individuals action under color of law and

within the course and scope of their duties.” 

The Cassabon Defendants and the Abbate Defendants move to

dismiss the First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A. Relevant Allegations in FAC.

The FAC alleges that Tiffany was hired by Yosemite Chevron

on June 6, 2002 as a cashier/stock clerk; that Tiffany was

instructed to balance the cash register and clear the register of

any cash in excess of $150 at the end of her shift; that, shortly

after beginning her employment, she and other employees were

required, as a condition of continued employment, to reimburse

Yosemite Chevron for funds lost as a result of “drive-offs” where

customers did not pay in advance and drove off without payment;

that Tiffany was not being paid extra for overtime worked; that

another Yosemite Chevron employee expressed inappropriate and

unwelcome sexual interest in Tiffany; that when Tiffany brought

this to Abbate’s and Yosemite Chevron’s management, no effective

remedial action was taken; that other inappropriate conduct

occurred at Yosemite Chevron, including theft and drug dealing;

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that Tiffany complained about being required to reimburse

Yosemite Chevron for “drive-offs” and other defalcations, not

being paid overtime, being forced to work overtime against her

will, being sexually harassed, workplace theft, and working in a

place where drugs were being used; that Tiffany left her

employment with Yosemite Chevron on March 26, 2003 because of

this ongoing pattern of illegal activity and misconduct; that

Tiffany was forced to return to Yosemite Chevron without

compensation to put her decision to quit in writing; and that

Tiffany was not paid all of the compensation to which she was

then legally entitled. The FAC then alleges:

23. In connection with Tiffany’s separation

from employment in March 2003, Abbate went to

the Office of the District Attorney for the

County of Merced and met with Spencer and

Hutton in an effort to get false and

fabricated charges of embezzlement filed

against Tiffany. Indeed, neither Abbate nor

anyone else at Yosemite Chevron had even

suspected or accused Tiffany of any dishonest

activity during her employment, and Abbate

never reported any loss based on Tiffany’s

activities to his insurance, because,

plaintiff is informed and believes, such

losses did not occur and could not be

credibly documented. Tiffany is informed and

believes that Abbate took this step as a

‘preemptive strike’ against her as an exemployee he anticipated might take legal

action. Tiffany is further informed and

believes that during the period of April, May

and June 2003, Hutton headed a resultoriented investigation into Abbate’s and

Yosemite Chevron’s false and fabricated

allegations at their behest and at Spencer’s

and Abbate’s direction. Plaintiff is further

informed and believes that Hutton, Spencer

and Abbate participated in this

‘investigation.’

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24. The following facts are now apparent

concerning the specifics of the false and

fabricated investigation undertaken by the

defendants. Abbate, with the assistance and

advice of Hutton, Spencer, and other

defendants, fabricated and manipulated

Yosemite Chevron business records to support

his baseless allegations. Abbate, Hutton,

Spencer, and other defendants also downplayed

and distorted the fact that Yosemite Chevron

at all times had a video surveillance system

that would have depicted an employee taking

cash from the store register and, indeed, had

in the past provided the evidence that led to

Wilson’s ultimate firing for stealing a

lottery ticket. Nor surprisingly, no

videotapes depicting Tiffany engaging in any

dishonest activity were ever disclosed. 

Abbate also acted as an investigator on his

own case, and, on or about June 4, 2003

interviewed another Yosemite Chevron

employee, Alejandro Aceves ..., with Hutton

initially surreptitiously observing. During

that interview, Abbate and Hutton, at

Spencer’s direction, coerced Aceves into

saying that Tiffany had taught him how to

steal from Yosemite Chevron, a fact not

disclosed by any of the defendants until

Aceves admitted it in open court during

Tiffany’s criminal trial. Even further,

Abbate and Hutton, at Spencer’s direction,

promised Aceves consideration for falsely

implicating Tiffany. Overall, it took

Abbate, Hutton, Spencer and other defendants

approximately three months to ‘make’ a case

against Tiffany that could be filed.

25. Abbate directed his false and fabricated

allegations to the Office of the District

Attorney, instead of the Merced Police

Department, the law enforcement agency with

primary jurisdiction, because Abbate had a

prior personal relationship with Spencer. 

Indeed, Spencer recently resigned his

position in disgrace because of numerous

scandals involving his misusing his official

position for his personal interest and gain. 

Records indicate that Spencer directed and

routed Abbate’s and Yosemite Chevron’s

complaint not to the local law enforcement

agency with primary jurisdiction, as would

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typically be the case, but instead to Hutton,

a supervising investigator from his office. 

Moreover, in conducting, along with Abbate,

the false and fabricated investigation,

Hutton acted at all times at Spencer’s

direction.

26. On June 23, 2003, Tiffany was charged

with embezzlement in violation of California

Penal Code § 503. Tiffany was booked on

these charges on August 7, 2003. The

allegations underlying this baseless and

fabricated criminal proceeding were that

Tiffany embezzled sums herself and also

instructed and advised Aceves on how to

embezzle funds from Yosemite Avenue Chevron. 

Indeed, it was alleged that Tiffany was

personally responsible for embezzling in

excess of $12,000 and that Aceves was

responsible for embezzling in excess of

$19,000. In Merced County, it is not

uncommon for those convicted of embezzlement

to be incarcerated upon conviction, and

Tiffany was apprized of this fact at the

outset of the criminal proceedings.

27. The allegations against Tiffany in this

regard are completely without any reliable

evidentiary support and are contrary to the

truth. Over the period of time where this

embezzlement activity is alleged to have

occurred, there is no corresponding drop in

income or inventory at Yosemite Chevron. 

Also, there were regular, if not daily,

checks of the register and inventory for the

purposes of determining if employees were

obligated to reimburse Yosemite Chevron, and

none of these checks indicated losses

consistent with the embezzlement allegations,

which would have required Tiffany to have

made away with hundreds of dollars per shift. 

Moreover, contrary to what was alleged, there

was no indication that Tiffany was

responsible for any of the alleged suspicious

activity, since several employees work any

given shift and are each able to tend the

register at various times. Additionally,

Yosemite Chevron’s systems of controls make

its records and the allegations of

embezzlement highly suspect. Even further,

there was absolutely no indication that

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Tiffany was ever reported during the subject

time period as having any unexplained amounts

of cash or suspicious property.

28. The false, fabricated and baseless

allegations of embezzlement against Tiffany

were supported by the accountant firm

retained on behalf of the prosecution,

Cassabon, and the accountants from Cassabon

specifically assisting the prosecution, Fung

and McIlhatton. These defendants were

brought into this criminal prosecution after

the judge who presided over the preliminary

examination had expressed doubt and criticism

regarding the lack of any objective financial

evidence that Tiffany had committed a crime. 

Even further, it was represented that the

Office of the District Attorney was not ready

for trial and required a substantial

continuance in order to consult with these

defendants, so that it might continue

proceeding with its case against Tiffany. 

However, instead of making a serious,

objective inquiry into the issues they were

retained to examine, these defendants

disregarded all of the above-outlined facts

showing the embezzlement allegations to be

baseless and incredible, as well as the

professional standards that are supposed to

be followed by accountants engaged to provide

litigation services. As a result, these

defendants produced misleading, resultoriented reports that served to add a false

air of legitimacy to the embezzlement charges

and which permitted said charges to proceed

to trial.

29. As a result of the defendants’ wrongful

acts, Tiffany was forced to defend herself

against these baseless allegations for an

extended period of time, all the way up to

trial. Spencer attended a hearing in this

criminal proceeding on January 5, 2004 and

acknowledged on that date that he had a

personal relationship with Abbate. Moreover,

despite Tiffany’s lack of a criminal history

and the relatively small amount of alleged

loss, this criminal proceeding received

‘special attention’ and a felony resolution

was always demanded at Spencer’s insistence. 

Also, despite any credible incriminating

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facts or evidence, the prosecution persisted

in pursuing a felony conviction at Spencer’s

instruction.

30. Trial commenced on September 27, 2005. 

On October 13, 2005, plaintiff was acquitted

by a Merced County jury. From the time that

the case was submitted to the jury until the

verdict, only two and one-half hours elapsed.

The FAC alleges a First Cause of Action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants, alleging in pertinent part:

34. The defendants’ intentional and reckless

acts, as described above, constitute a

deprivation of Tiffany’s ... rights under the

Fourth Amendment not to have her liberty

restricted without legal basis, to be

arrested without probable cause, and not to

be prosecuted maliciously without probable

cause. With respect to these constitutional

violations, as alleged hereinabove,

defendants Yosemite Chevron, Abbco, Abbate,

Fung, McIlhatton, and Cassabon were acting in

joint activity with and/or conspiring with

Spencer and Hutton.

The Third Cause of Action is pursuant to California Civil

Code § 52.1 against the Abbate Defendants and the Cassabon

Defendants and alleges in pertinent part:

45. The defendants’ intentional and reckless

acts, as described above, constitute a

deprivation of plaintiff[‘s] ... rights,

privileges and immunities under both article

I of the California Constitution and the

Fourth Amendment, specifically, her rights

not to have her liberty restricted without

legal basis, to be arrested without probable

cause, and to be prosecuted maliciously

without probable cause. The defendants’

interference with these constitutional rights

was accomplished by means of force, coercion,

and intimidation, and/or the threat thereof. 

Plaintiff clarifies that the defendants’

liability under this cause of action is not

based on the privileged acts of reporting

criminal activity and/or testifying in court,

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but, rather, fabricating evidence used to

justify the filing and continuation of

baseless criminal charges, as set forth

hereinabove.

The Fourth Cause of Action is for malicious prosecution

under California common law against the Abbate Defendants and the

Cassabon Defendants and alleges in pertinent part:

49. The defendants’ intentional and reckless

acts, as described above, caused plaintiff

... to be maliciously prosecuted without

probable cause or other legal basis. 

Plaintiff was acquitted at trial. Plaintiff

clarifies that the defendants’ liability

under this cause of action is not based on

the privileged acts of reporting criminal

activity and/or testifying in court, but,

rather, fabricating evidence used to justify

the filing and continuation of baseless

criminal charges, as set forth hereinabove.

B. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

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them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities and other th

affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only

when they are established on the face of the complaint. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9 Cir.1999); Jablon v. th

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980) When ruling th

on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial

notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th

Cir.1988).

C. Motion to Dismiss by Cassabon Defendants. 

1. First Cause of Action.

a. Absolute Witness Immunity.

The Cassabon Defendants argue that the First Cause of Action

must be dismissed against them because of absolute witness

immunity. 

In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983), the Supreme

Court held that a witness has absolute immunity from liability

for civil damages under Section 1983 for giving perjured

testimony at trial. In Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098 (9th

Cir.2000), the Ninth Circuit applied Briscoe’s immunity to Terr,

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a psychiatrist called by the prosecution who testified in

Franklin’s criminal trial based on charges by his daughter,

Franklin-Lipsker, that Franklin had murdered a childhood friend

twenty years earlier, and who was later sued by Franklin under

Section 1983. Franklin alleged that Terr had conspired with

others to present perjured testimony at the criminal trial. The

Ninth Circuit held:

In the instant case, Franklin is attempting

to circumvent Terr’s absolute witness

immunity by alleging that Terr conspired with

others to present false testimony. We are

persuaded that allowing a plaintiff to

circumvent the Briscoe rule by alleging a

conspiracy to present false testimony would

undermine the purposes served by granting

witnesses absolute immunity from liability

for damages under § 1983. Absolute witness

immunity is based on the policy of protecting

the judicial process and is ‘necessary to

assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses

can perform their respective functions

without harassment or intimidation.’ ... As

the Court stated in Briscoe, ‘[a] witness’s

apprehension of subsequent damages liability

might induce two forms of self censorship. 

First, witnesses might be reluctant to come

forward to testify. And once a witness is on

the stand, his testimony might be distorted

by the fear of subsequent liability.’ ...

Moreover, as the district court correctly

observed, ‘[a]ny other holding would

eviscerate absolute immunity since a witness

rarely prepares her testimony on her own.’

Franklin alleges that Terr conspired with

Franklin-Lipsker by interviewing her before

Franklin’s trial and by then incorporating

information obtained from those interviews

into her own testimony. Franklin also

alleges that Terr provided Franklin-Lipsker

‘with a description of the sort of details

that would make her testimony more

persuasive, which Franklin-Lipsker then

incorporated into her continually evolving

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“recollection” of the Nason murder.’ The

ostensible purpose of this conspiracy was to

ensure that one person’s testimony did not

contradict the other’s testimony. But

because Terr’s alleged conspiratorial

behavior is inextricably tied to her

testimony, we find that she is immune from

damages. We are not presented with, and do

not decide, the question whether § 1983

provides a cause of action against a

defendant who conspired to present the

perjured testimony of another but did not

testify as a witness herself.

201 F.3d at 1101-1102. 

In Grey v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113 (D.C.Cir. 2002), cited with

approval in the July 14 Order, a social worker submitted a

statement to the court in connection with a child neglect action. 

The District of Columbia Circuit held that Poole was entitled to

absolute witness immunity, concluding that “[i]t does not matter

whether Poole’s sworn statement was given in oral or written

form; what matters is that her statement was the equivalent of

sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding.” 275 F.3d at 1118. 

Also cited with approval in the July 14 Order was Morstad v.

Dept. of Corrections & Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th

Cir.1998)(“Because the court directed Veenestra to evaluate

Morstad and to testify at Morstad’s probation revocation hearing,

we conclude that Veenstra was performing functions essential to

the judicial process ... and affirm the district court’s

determination that Veenstra was entitled to absolute immunity.” 

In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230 (7 Cir.1990), reversed th

on other grounds, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), the Seventh Circuit

addressed whether three expert witnesses had absolute immunity

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for their pretrial activities of evaluating the bootprint,

writing reports, discussing the case with prosecutors, and

preparing to testify. 509 U.S. at 1244-1245. The Seventh

Circuit held:

... We agree with the district court that

they do. Briscoe holds that the presentation

of testimony may not be the basis of

liability, even if the witness deliberately

misleads the court. It would be a hollow

immunity if the aggrieved party could turn

around and say, in effect: ‘True, your

delivery of bad testimony is immunized, but

preparing to deliver that testimony is not,

so I can litigate the substance of your

testimony.’ Substance is exactly what

Briscoe puts off limits.

As expert could violate a suspect’s rights

independently of the litigation. The expert

might, for example, break into the suspect’s

home to obtain samples for analysis. 

Absolute immunity would not apply to that

theft, for the same reason it does not apply

to prosecutorial infliction of punishment

without trial. A non-testimonial expert

could violate a suspect’s rights by ‘cooking’

a laboratory report in a way that misleads

the testimonial experts. Experts, like the

police, ‘cannot hide behind [the immunity of]

the officials whom they have defrauded.’ ...

But nothing in the complaint suggests that

the three experts hid evidence, as opposed to

misinterpreting it.

Discussions between the prosecutors and the

experts violated none of Buckley’s rights. 

Preparing to commit slander or perjury is not

actionable. The testimony itself is covered

by immunity. Buckley makes it clear that the

testimony is the real gravamen of his

complaint. Olsen, he submits, ‘wrongfully

changed his initial opinion’; Robbins was an

‘utterly disreputable witness-for-hire.’ 

Maybe so, but cross-examination rather than a

suit for damages is the right way to

establish these things. Junk science is a

plague of contemporary litigation, but the

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peddlers of poorly supported theories do not

expose themselves to liability by doing

research out of court or appearing in more

than one case. 

White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2 Cir.1988) nd

holds that Briscoe does not apply to

‘complaining witnesses’. Buckley contends

that the three experts are in this category,

because but for their opinions the State’s

Attorney would not have obtained an

indictment. The parallel is not apt. None

of the experts invented the report of a crime

or brought the fable to the state’s

attention. Jeanine Nicarico is dead. Each

expert was brought into the case by the

prosecutors, who sought to evaluate the

strength of the evidence against Buckley. We

therefore need not decide whether to follow

White.

919 F.2d at 1245. 

The Complaint the subject of the July 14 Order alleged in

pertinent part:

29. The false and baseless allegations of

embezzlement against Tiffany were supported

by the accountant firm retained on behalf of

the prosecution, [defendant Cassabon &

Associates] and the accountants from Cassabon

specifically assisting the prosecution,

[defendants Victor K. Fung and Erin M.

McIlhatton]. These defendants disregarded

all of the above-outlined facts showing the

embezzlement allegations to be baseless and

incredible, as well as the professional

standards that are supposed to be followed by

accountants engaged to provide litigation

services. As a result, these defendants

produced misleading, result-oriented reports

that served to add a false air of legitimacy

to the embezzlement allegations.

The July 14 Order dismissed the Section 1983 claim against the

Cassabon Defendants: 

The allegations in paragraph 29 fit with the

holding of the Seventh Circuit in Buckley. 

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There is no allegation in the Complaint

against the Cassabon Defendants or any other

defendants that they fabricated evidence or

conspired to do so. Absent such allegations

against the Cassabon Defendants, they are

entitled to absolute witness immunity.

The Cassabon Defendants argue that Tiffany has not provided

any additional material allegations as to them and that,

therefore, they are entitled to dismissal of the First Cause of

Action because of absolute witness immunity.

Tiffany responds that, pursuant to paragraph 28 of the FAC,

the Cassabon Defendants are not being sued for their testimony at

the criminal trial. Rather, they are being sued for “the

fabrication of evidence that permitted the continuation of the

prosecution against the plaintiff, which was developed by

conspiring with and engaging in joint activity with the other

defendants.” 

There is no allegation in the FAC that the Cassabon

Defendants specifically fabricated evidence presented at the

criminal trial. The FAC alleges that the evidence was fabricated

by Abbate, Hutton and Spencer before the criminal action was

filed against Tiffany. Paragraph 28 alleges that the Cassabon

Defendants “were brought into this criminal prosecution after the

judge who presided over the preliminary examination had expressed

doubt and criticism regarding the lack of any objective financial

evidence that Tiffany had committed a crime”. Paragraph 28

further alleges:

[I]nstead of making a serious, objective

inquiry into the issues they were retained to

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examine, these defendants disregarded all of

the above-outlined facts showing the

embezzlement allegations baseless and

incredible, as well as the professional

standards that are supposed to be followed by

accountants engaged to provide litigation

services. As a result, these defendants

produced misleading, result-oriented reports

that served to add a false air of legitimacy

to the embezzlement charges and which

permitted said charges to proceed to trial.

Although this is a very close question, the allegations in

Paragraph 28 permit an inference that the Cassabon Defendants

fabricated the evidence they presented as a witness at the

criminal trial by “produc[ing] misleading, result-oriented

reports ....” This is sufficient to withstand the motion to

dismiss under the standards set forth above; it provides

Defendants fair notice of the claims against which they must

defend. Whether the Cassabon Defendants are entitled to absolute

witness immunity pursuant to Briscoe is a question of fact to be

resolved at summary judgment or trial. Therefore, the motion to

dismiss on this ground is DENIED

b. Conspiracy Allegations.

The Cassabon Defendants further argue that Tiffany cannot

circumvent absolute witness immunity by alleging that the

Cassabon Defendants conspired with the other defendants. The

July 14 Order ruled that absolute witness immunity cannot be

circumvented by alleging that the witness conspired to present

perjured testimony. The July 14 Order ruled in pertinent part:

The Abbate Defendants further argue that the

First Cause of Action fails to allege

sufficient specific facts to support a claim

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of conspiracy which “must survive the

application of the heightened pleading

standard.” In so arguing, the Abbate

Defendants cite Coverdell v. Dept. of Social

& Health Services, 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th

Cir.1987).

Coverdell is not valid authority for this

claim. Coverdell involved the appellate

review of a summary judgment order and not

the standards to be applied in determining

whether allegations of conspiracy state a

claim within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6). 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected

the requirement of a heightened pleading

standard in civil rights cases, ruling that

the sufficiency of the allegations must be

governed by application of Rules 8 and 9,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998);

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.

163 (1993); see also Galbraith v. County of

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9 Cir.2002); th

Empress LLC v. City and County of San

Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052 (9 Cir.2005). th

The Abbate Defendants object that there are

no allegations in the Complaint from which it

may be inferred that John Abbate did anything

whatsoever to further the alleged conspiracy. 

With regard to the other Abbate Defendants,

it is argued that there are no allegations

“as to how the Abbate defendants allegedly

conspired with each other, the District

Attorneys office and the Cassabon defendants

to provide false testimony.”

Plaintiffs rejoin that the allegations of the

Complaint suffice to alert defendants to the

sequence of events and the relationship

between the various defendants that are “more

than sufficient to plead a conspiracy through

circumstantial facts” and demonstrate the

“requisite ‘who, what, where, and when’

information regarding the conspiracy.”

With the exception of defendant John Abbate,

the conspiracy allegations arguably are

sufficient to permit defendants to frame a

response. The Complaint does not make clear

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whether multiple conspiracies are alleged

and, if so, who are the members, what actions

were allegedly taken by those members in

furtherance of the conspiracies, and at what

times. Furthermore, plaintiffs concede that

more specific allegations with regard to the

participation of the Abbate Defendants can be

made. The conspiracy claim is DISMISSED with

LEAVE TO AMEND to allow plaintiffs to allege

more specifically the factual basis of the

conspiracy or conspiracies, particularly with

respect to the Abbate Defendants.

The Cassabon Defendants argue that dismissal of the First

Cause of Action based on the allegations of conspiracy is

required because the allegations are conclusory and without

factual specificity. 

As a general rule, plaintiffs in federal court are not

required to plead the elements of a prima facie civil rights

case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 503 U.S. 506 (2002); see

also Empress LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d

1052, 1056 (9 Cir.2005)(“[A] heightened pleading standard th

should only be applied when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

so require.”). Plaintiffs are simply required to provide a

“short and plain statement of the claim” to give the defendant

fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it is

based. Swierkiewicz, id. With respect to allegations of

conspiracy, heightened pleading is required by Rule 9, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, when the object of the alleged

conspiracy is fraudulent. See Wasco Products v. Southwall

Technologies, 435 F.3d 989, 991 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, ___

th

U.S. ___, 2006 WL 1522609 (2006)(“Based on these precedents and

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In Wasco Products, the Ninth Circuit specifically expressed 1

no opinion as to pleading requirements if the object of the

conspiracy is non-fraudulent. 435 F.3d at 992. In Olsen v. Idaho

State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9 Cir.2004), the Ninth th

Circuit applied a heightened pleading standard to a claim for

conspiracy to violate civil rights. However, Olsen relied on

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9 Cir.1994). Branch v. Tunnell th

was effectively overruled by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

307 F.3d 1119 (9 Cir.2002) and Empress LLC, supra. Although the th

case law in the Ninth Circuit since the Supreme Court cases

rejecting heightened pleading is not consistent, the better view,

in line with Supreme Court authority, is that notice pleading

suffices to allege a conspiracy to violate civil rights unless the

object of that conspiracy is fraudulent. 

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the plain language of Rule 9(b), we hold that under federal law a

plaintiff must plead, at a minimum, the basis elements of a civil

conspiracy if the object of the conspiracy is fraudulent.”). 

1

“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support his

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that

recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” 

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9 Cir.2004). Discovery th

and summary judgment motions, not motions to dismiss, “define

disputed facts” and “dispose of unmeritorious claims.” 

Swierkiewicz, id. at 512. 

While the allegations that defendants “conspired” is

conclusory, the FAC does allege the factual basis upon which the

conspiracy is based. The allegations are that Spencer and the

Abbate Defendants agreed to falsely prosecute Tiffany based on

fabricated evidence to forestall any claims against the Abbate

Defendants by Tiffany based on employment and that Spencer

retained the Cassabon Defendants to give credence to the

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Denial of the Cassabon Defendants’ motion on this ground is 2

not intended to express any opinion with respect to the

applicability of the absolute witness privilege. Clearly, there is

a fine line between participating in a conspiracy to fabricate

evidence and participating in a conspiracy to present perjured

testimony. 

California Civil Code § 52.1(b) provides that “[a]ny 3

individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by

the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with,

or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision

(b), may institute and prosecute ... a civil action for damages,

including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive

relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the

peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.”

Section 52.1(a) provides for an action by the Attorney General,

district attorney or city attorney “[i]f a person or persons,

whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any

individual ... of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of

19

fabricated evidence as part of that conspiracy. The FAC alleges

that the Cassabon Defendants were retained by Spencer after

Tiffany’s arrest. The Cassabon Defendants cannot be responsible

for her allegedly false arrest unless the Cassabon Defendants

agreed and joined the existing conspiracy with knowledge of that

wrongful act and thereby adopted the prior acts of the alleged

co-conspirators. Nonetheless, the allegations of conspiracy are

sufficient under notice pleading standards to withstand dismissal

for failure to state a claim notwithstanding the absolute witness

privilege. The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.2

 2. Third Cause of Action.

The Cassabon Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of

Action for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 on several

grounds.3

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26 this state ....”

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a. Sufficiency of Allegations of Threats,

Intimidation, or Coercion.

The Cassabon Defendants seek dismissal of the Third Cause

of Action, contending that there are no allegations in the FAC of

any specific threats, intimidation or coercion by the Cassabon

Defendants within the meaning of Section 52.1. 

In Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998), the

California Supreme Court explained that “section 52.1 does

require an attempted or completed act of interference with a

legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” See also

Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 843 (2004)(“the

language of section 52.1 provides remedies for ‘certain

misconduct that interferes with’ federal or state laws, if

accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion, and whether or

not state action is involved.”)

Tiffany argues that Section 52.1 “does not require conduct

that ‘interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion’ with a

claimant’s exercise or enjoyment of her constitutional rights

occur simultaneously with the resultant constitutional violation”

and that Section 52.1 does not “require that this conduct play a

direct role in bringing about the constitutional violation.” 

Tiffany concedes that no case law addresses these issues

specifically in the context of Section 52.1. However, she refers

to McCalden v. California Library Association, 955 F.2d 1214 (9th

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Cir.1989), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992) as “finding a claim

for a violation of California Civil Code § 51.7 sufficient,

although it alleged non-contemporaneous intimidating conduct that

was not even conveyed directly to the victim”. 

In McCalden, the Ninth Circuit addressed the district

court’s dismissal with prejudice of the claim by McCalden, a

self-described “Holocaust revisionist”, under California Civil

Code § 51.7 on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently

allege intimidation by threat of violence committed to

plaintiff’s person or property as required by Section 51.7.

Section 51.7(a), as amended in 1984, provided in relevant part:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this

state have the right to be free from any

violence, or intimidation by threat of

violence, committed against their persons or

property because of their race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin,

political affiliation, sex, sexual

orientation, age, disability, or position in

a labor dispute. The identification in this

subdivision of particular bases of

discrimination is illustrative only rather

than restrictive.

The Ninth Circuit ruled:

Liberally construed, the complaint contains

one allegation of a specific threat - the

AJC’s alleged statement to the CLA, ‘at the

urging and request and with the knowledge,

approval and cooperation of Defendants Marvin

Hier ... and Simon Wiesenthal Center’ that if

the contract with appellants were not

canceled, “[d]efendant CLA’s 1984 Annual

Conference would be disrupted, there would be

damage to property and the CLA would be

‘wiped out.’” ... Appellees claim that this

language can be construed only as a threat

against the CLA, not against the person or

property of appellant. They cite Coon v.

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Joseph, 192 Cal.App.3d 1269 ... (1987), in

which the court held that the plaintiff, a

gay man, could not state a § 51.7 claim

against a bus driver by alleging that his

lover was verbally abused and struck in his

presence. The court stated:

The complaint establishes that no

violence or intimidation was

committed or threatened against

[plaintiff’s] person and thus no

cause of action exists in his own

right. Following [plaintiff’s]

argument, any person would have the

right to recover damages for

himself or herself whenever the

rights of any other human being of

similar ... sexual orientation were

threatened.

Id. at 1277-78 ....

On a motion to dismiss, all reasonable

inferences are to be drawn in favor of the

non-moving party ... Appellant alleges that

the appellees intended to disrupt his

presentation by creating a demonstration that

appellees knew and intended ‘would create a

reasonable probability of property damage and

of violence against Plaintiff and members of

Defendant CLA.’ ... In view of all the facts

pled, it is reasonable to infer that any

property damage or injury threatened could be

directed against appellant, because the

allegations clearly link the alleged threat

to an intent to disrupt appellant’s exhibit

and program. This case must therefore be

distinguished from Coon, because it can be

reasonably inferred from the complaint that

the threatened violence was directed against

appellant.

Although appellees suggest that the statute

must be read as requiring the threat to be

conveyed directly to the person threatened,

the statute only requires that the plaintiff

be intimidated by threat of violence

committed against his person or property. In

construing a remedial statute, on a motion to

dismiss, in the absence of clear state court

direction, this court is reluctant to read

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any unnecessary restrictions into § 51.7.

955 F.2d at 1221-1222.

Tiffany argues that, because Section 52.1 does not require

proof of animus against the plaintiff, “[i]t would therefore make

little sense that the more general Bane Act would require a

closer nexus between the perpetrator’s threatening acts and the

constitutional violation than does the Unruh Act.” Contending

that Section 52.1 is a more general statute that should be

construed more broadly, Tiffany argues:

[The] allegations that she was for the

duration of the prosecution against her,

subject to a legitimate threat of

prosecution, i.e., a loss of liberty, her

allegations under section 52.1 are

sufficient. Indeed, the defendants by

causing plaintiff’s prosecution and raising

the prospect of her imprisonment, committed

acts that were inherently coercive and

threatening.

Although the Cassabon Defendants have the better of this

argument, whether Tiffany’s position that general “possibility of

incarceration” is ultimately sustainable against them presents a

mixed issue of fact and law that will benefit from factual

development. Given the standards governing resolution of a

motion to dismiss, the FAC marginally alleges a claim for

violation of Section 52.1 to require the Cassabon Defendants’

response. The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED. 

b. Speech.

The Cassabon Defendants further move for dismissal of the

Third Cause of Action, referring to Civil Code § 52.1(j):

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Speech alone is not sufficient to support an

action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or

(b), except upon a showing that the speech

itself threatens violence against a specific

person or group of persons; and the person or

group of persons against whom the threat is

directed reasonably fears that, because of

the speech, violence will be committed

against them or their property and that the

person threatening violence has the apparent

ability to carry out the threat.

The Cassabon Defendants contend that the allegations of the FAC

are that their speech caused the violation of Section 52.1, not

that they threatened or intimidated Tiffany to forestall her from

exercising her rights.

This claim is arguably marginal. After factual development

the court will be able to evaluate the substance of this claim. 

The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED. 

c. Immunity Pursuant to California Civil Code §

47(b).

The Cassabon Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of

Action because the allegations against them relate to reports and

testimony in a legal proceeding, contending that the litigation

privilege set forth in California Civil Code § 47(b) bars

Tiffany’s claim for violation of Section 52.1

Section 47(b) bars a civil action for damages based on

statements made in any judicial proceeding, in any official

proceeding authorized by law, or in the initiation or course of

any mandate-reviewable proceedings authorized by law. The

litigation privilege provided in Section 47(b) applies to any

communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;

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Tiffany argues that Section 47(b) only applies to tort claims 4

other than malicious prosecution and, to the extent that she

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(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to

achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some

connection or logical relation to the action. A.F. Brown Elec.

Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec., 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126

(2006). Section 47(b) establishes an absolute privilege for such

statements and bars all tort causes of action based on them

except a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Hagberg v.

California Federal Bank, 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 (2004). Section

47(b) protects false or fraudulent statements or representations

made in the course of litigation, see Rodas v. Spiegel, 87

Cal.App.4th 513, 519-520 (2001), or in contemplation of

litigation, see Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal.App.3d 907, 912-916

(1987), the filing of a false declaration, see Cantu v.

Resolution Trust Corp., 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 886 (1992), and the

filing of forged documents. See Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal.App.3d

484, 488-489 (1972).

Dismissal on this ground is not appropriate. Although the

allegations of the FAC suggest that the allegations against the

Cassabon Defendants will be subject to Section 47(b), ultimate

resolution of this issue presents a mixed question of law and

fact, including whether the Cassabon Defendants’ actions had

collateral purposes which went beyond the litigation, to be

resolved at summary judgment or trial. The motion to dismiss on

this ground is DENIED.4

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alleges an unconstitutional malicious prosecution claim under

Section 52.1, it is not barred by Section 47(b). However, in the

July 14 Order, Tiffany’s argument that the Section 47(b) privilege

did not apply to actions pursuant to Section 52.1 was rejected.

She provides no new authority.

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d. Immunity Pursuant to California Civil Code §

47(c).

The Cassabon Defendants argue that the Third Cause of Action

is barred by the “interested person” privilege set forth in

California Civil Code § 47(c). 

Section 47(c) provides in pertinent part:

A privileged publication or broadcast is one

made:

...

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a

person interested therein, (1) by one who is

also interested, or (2) by one who stands in

such a relation to the person interested as

to afford a reasonable ground for supposing

the motive for the communication to be

innocent, or (3) who is requested by the

person interested to give the information.

“California’s common interest privilege, Cal.Civ.Code § 47(c),

immunizes a person’s statement to others on matters of common

interest from liability in tort, provided that the person did not

act with malice.” Kelly v. General Telephone Co., 136 Cal.App.3d

278, 285 (1982).

The Cassabon Defendant assert that the “elements of the

interested person privilege are clearly satisfied by the Cassabon

Defendants as to its alleged communications to the District

Attorney and Court.” 

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Tiffany responds that the FAC adequately alleges malice,

citing Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43, 66

(1974), as authority that “malice can be alleged

circumstantially”. 

Bertero does not so hold. The discussion cited by Tiffany

involved the manner of proof of malice for punitive damages under

Civil Code § 3294 and has nothing to do with pleading

requirements. 

The only allegation of malice against the Cassabon

Defendants in the FAC is found in paragraph 38 of the First Cause

of Action: “The non-municipal defendants’ conduct set forth above

was intentional, wanton, malicious, oppressive, and undertaken

with reckless disregard for Tiffany’s rights, thus entitling her

to an award of punitive damages under federal law.” There is no

allegation that the Cassabon Defendants’ acted with malice in the

Third Cause of Action. Although malice may be averred generally,

see Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it nonetheless

must be alleged. However, paragraph 38 is incorporated by

reference in the Third Cause of Action. Because paragraph 38

alleges that the Cassabon Defendants acted maliciously, dismissal

on this ground is DENIED. 

3. Fourth Cause of Action.

The Cassabon Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of

Action for malicious prosecution on the ground that they did not

commence the criminal action against Tiffany.

In Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958 (2004), the California

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Supreme Court ruled that “[c]onfining the tort of malicious

prosecution to the initiation of a suit without probable cause

would be ... without support in authority or in principle”, 32

Cal.4th at 966, and that “an attorney may be held liable for

malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit

discovered to lack probable cause.” Id. at 970. 

Tiffany relies on Zamos in contending that “[o]ne who

contributes to the continuation of an action instituted without

probable cause and acts with malice may be liable for malicious

prosecution.” Tiffany further asserts that witnesses may be held

liable for malicious prosecution under California law, citing

Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal.3d 202, 209 (1990) and Gootee v.

Lightner, 224 Cal.App.3d 587, 591-592 (1990). 

Neither Kimmel nor Gootee involved a claim for malicious

prosecution. However, Jacques Interiors v. Petrak, 188 Cal.App.3d

1363 (1987), is a malicious prosecution case against an insurance

adjuster (Petrak), by a commercial tenant (Jacques), who was sued

for subrogation by the insurer (Sentry) of a building damaged by

fire, who was also Petrak’s employer. In rejecting Petrak’s

argument that he could not be liable for malicious prosecution

because the suit was filed after Sentry’s attorney, McCaskey, had

conducted his own investigation, the Court of Appeal noted:

‘One may be civilly liable for malicious

prosecution without personally signing the

complaint initiating the ... proceeding. If

a person, without probable cause and with

malice, instigates or procures the [action],

he is liable.’ ... ‘”[I]t is enough if [the

defendant] was instrumental in setting the

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In addition, the Cassabon Defendants argue, Tiffany does not 5

allege malice against them. However, as discussed above, the

incorporation by reference of paragraph 38 satisfies this pleading

requirement.

Although plaintiff includes a very lengthy footnote 6

concerning the issue of “state action”, “state action” is not the

basis upon which the Abbate Defendants seek dismissal. There is a

difference between “state action” and “proximate cause”. 

29

law in motion and caused the [action] to

proceed.” ...’ ... ‘[T]he test of liability

in an action for malicious prosecution is:

Was defendant actively instrumental ... [or]

the proximate and efficient cause of

maliciously putting the law in motion[?] .... 

188 Cal.App.3d at 1371-1372. See also Lujan v. Gordon, 70

Cal.App.3d 260, 264 (1977)(“There does not appear to be any good

reason not to impose liability upon a person who inflicts harm by

aiding or abetting a malicious prosecution which someone else has

prosecuted.”).

Based on this authority, the FAC alleges a facially

sufficient claim against the Cassabon Defendants. Dismissal on

this ground is DENIED.5

D. Motion to Dismiss by Abbate Defendants.

1. First Cause of Action.

a. Failure to Allege that Conduct of Abbate

Defendants Was Proximate Cause of District Attorney Spencer’s

Decision to Prosecute.

The Abbate Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of

Action on the ground that the allegations of the FAC do not

establish that their actions proximately caused the decision by

defendant Spencer to prosecute Tiffany for embezzlement.6

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Most of the cases relied upon by the Abbate Defendants did 7

not involve motions to dismiss but involved evidentiary rulings

following summary judgment or trial.

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In so moving, the Abbate Defendants rely on Ninth Circuit

authority discussing the presumption of the exercise of the

prosecutor’s independent judgment. Thus, in Smiddy v. Varney,

7

665 F.2d 261, 266-267 (9 Cir.1981), the Ninth Circuit held: th

Filing of a criminal complaint immunizes

investigating officers such as the appellants

from damages suffered thereafter because it

is presumed that the prosecutor filing the

complaint exercised independent judgment in

determining that probable cause for an

accused’s arrest exists at that time. This

presumption may be rebutted, however. For

example, a showing that the district attorney

was pressured or caused by the investigating

officers to act contrary to his independent

judgment will rebut the presumption and

remove the immunity. Also the presentation

by the officers to the district attorney’s

office of information known to them to be

false will rebut the presumption. These

examples are not intended to be exclusive. 

Perhaps the presumption may be rebutted in

other ways.

The Abbate Defendants cite Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384,

1390 (9 Cir. 1988), Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132 (9 th th

Cir.1991), and Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474 (9th

Cir.1994) as other examples of the presumption of independent

prosecutorial judgment either breaking or not breaking the chain

of causation.

Tiffany argues that the Smiddy presumption does not apply in

the context of a private citizen and asserts that she has found

no cases applying the presumption in that context. Tiffany notes

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that Arnold v. Intern. Business Machines, 637 F.2d 1350 (9th

Cir.1981), relied upon by the Abbate Defendants in this aspect of

their motion to dismiss, see discussion infra, does not mention

the Smiddy presumption.

In reply, the Abbate Defendants cite Awabdy v. City of

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9 Cir.2004), a case applying the th

independent prosecutor presumption to “non-law enforcement

personnel”. 

However, while the defendants in Awabdy were not police

officers, they were officials of the City of Adelanto, not

private citizens. 

The Abbate Defendants further note that Smiddy was not

decided when the decision in Arnold was issued. This point is

irrelevant because subsequent cases discussing the liability of

private citizens also do not discuss the Smiddy presumption. 

The Abbate Defendants also cite Arnold v. Intern. Business

Machines, 637 F.2d 1350 (9 Cir.1981). There, Arnold brought an th

action against IBM and various of its employees for alleged

violations of Arnold’s civil rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed

the grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that in the

absence of evidence that IBM and its employees controlled the

police investigation, which led to Arnold’s arrest on charges of

stealing corporate documents and trade secrets and the search of

Arnold’s residence, the involvement of IBM and the employees in

the investigation was not the proximate cause of Arnold’s

injuries and Arnold could not recover under statutes authorizing

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civil actions for deprivation of rights under color of law and

conspiracy to defraud persons of their civil rights. In so

holding, the Ninth Circuit stated:

... It is clear that ‘but for’ IBM’s

involvement, there would have been no

investigation, and Arnold never would have

been arrested or indicted or had his

residence searched.

There is nothing in the record, however, to

indicate that defendants exerted any control

over the decision making of the Task Force. 

Deputy District Attorney Bender testified

that the Task Force used the information

supplied by IBM to determine which companies

might be in possession of IBM documents, but

that the Task Force conducted a full and

independent investigation. Bender and

Sergeant Frechette both testified that

neither Callahan nor IBM controlled the

investigation. Arnold has pointed to no

facts that indicate that IBM in any way

controlled the police investigation or that

the Task Force was in any sense a mere

conduit for carrying out IBM’s will. 

637 F.2d at 1357. The Abbate Defendants also cite Mann v. City

of Tucson Dept. of Police, 782 F.2d 790, 793 (9 Cir.1986), a th

case involving dismissal, wherein the Ninth Circuit held in

pertinent part:

[D]ismissal of these claims against

defendants other than the Tucson police

defendants was proper for other reasons. The

substantive constitutional violation charged

consisted of two unlawful searches of Mann’s

apartment. The search was performed by the

Tucson police officers. All but two of the

other defendants are private persons who

allegedly instigated, aided, or participated

in the searches. Under Arnold v. IBM Corp.,

... in order to establish the requisite

proximate cause between the conduct of

private persons and searches in violation of

section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the

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private individuals exercised control over

the decisionmaking in a police investigation. 

Mann has failed to allege that these other

defendants controlled the investigation or

directed that the searches be conducted, and

the facts alleged would not support such a

claim. For this reason, the section 1983

claims against these private defendants were

properly dismissed.

782 F.2d at 793.

In contrast to Arnold and Mann, the Abbate Defendants argue,

the FAC makes no allegations of control by the Abbate Defendants

over the decisions made by the District Attorney and the Cassabon

Defendants. The FAC describes the ultimate control of the

prosecution by defendant Spencer, i.e., that Spencer gave

Tiffany’s matter “special attention” and demanded a “felony

resolution” and “despite any credible incriminating facts or

evidence, the prosecution persisted in pursuing a felony

conviction at Spencer’s instruction.” The Abbate Defendants also

point to the allegations that Spencer “directed and routed”

Abbate’s complaint from the Merced Police Department, that

“Hutton acted at all times at Spencer’s direction”, that Hutton

and Abbate at Spencer’s direction, coerced and bribed a witness

to testify against Tiffany, that the Cassabon Defendants were

hired by the prosecutor “to add a false air of legitimacy to the

embezzlement charges”. 

The Abbate Defendants argue that no facts are alleged in the

FAC that overcome the presumption that the prosecutor exercised

independent judgment to prosecute Tiffany. They further argue

that the absence of alleged facts to establish proximate cause is

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demonstrated by the allegations that the prosecutor hired the

Cassabon Defendants who allegedly “provided misleading, resultoriented reports that served to add a false air of legitimacy to

the embezzlement charges and which permitted said charges to

proceed to trial”. The Abbate Defendants assert that, by

claiming the Cassabon Defendants were key prosecution witnesses,

the FAC attenuates the alleged proximate causation between the

Abbate Defendants’ alleged conduct and the damages sustained by

Tiffany. Therefore, the Abbate Defendants contend, the FAC does

not allege the requisite proximate cause between the conduct of

Robert Abbate and the ultimate prosecution of Tiffany. 

Tiffany responds that the Abbate Defendants ignore the

allegations that they procured her criminal prosecution with

false and fabricated evidence, that the Abbate Defendants

participated in and influenced the investigation and

prosecutorial process, acting jointly and conspiratorially with

other defendants, in part based on an alleged special

relationship with Spencer. Tiffany further contends that Ninth

Circuit authority holds that a showing that a private party had

“some control” over a prosecutorial decision would be sufficient

to allege proximate causation. This is a theory of concurrent

cause. 

In so arguing, Tiffany cites King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825

(9 Cir.1986), Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423 (9 Cir.2002), and th th

Crowe v. County of San Diego, 303 F.Supp.2d 1050 (S.D.Cal.2004).

In King v. Massarweh, the district court’s dismissal of a

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Section 1983 claim against the defendant landlord was affirmed. 

Citing Arnold, the Ninth Circuit affirmed:

... Massarweh’s involvement with the police

is even more attenuated [than the involvement

of IBM in Arnold]. Massarweh’s sole act was

to call the police. Nothing in the record

indicates that Massarweh exerted any control

over the officers’ decision to search

appellants’ apartments or to arrest the

appellants. On the facts alleged by the

appellants, Massarweh sought the appellants’

removal as trespassers, but the police

conduct that allegedly violated the

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights took

place on the officers’ own initiative.

782 F.2d at 829. In Franklin v. Fox, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Franklin-Lipsker, the daughter of plaintiff, who plaintiff

alleged conspired with state prosecutors in violation of his

civil rights:

Furthermore, to the extent that Franking aims

to hold his daughter responsible for

[District Attorney] Murray’s facilitation of

the visit or trial prosecutor Tipton’s use of

his jailhouse silence against him at trial,

his claim fails. In order for a private

individual to be liable for a § 1983

violation when a state actor commits the

challenged conduct, the plaintiff must

establish that the private individual was the

proximate cause of the violation ....

Arnold ... is instructive. There a task

force including law enforcement officials,

the district attorney, and an IBM security

manager investigated trade secret leaks from

within IBM. After his arrest and indictment

and the search of his home, the plaintiff

sued IBM under § 1983 based on his

involvement with the investigation. We held

that, although IBM provided the task force

with its security manager, information,

funding, and grand jury witnesses, the

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company was not the proximate cause of the

plaintiff’s injuries because it did not

direct the task force to take action against

him ....

Here, there is no evidence that Murray and

Tipton were under Franklin-Lipsker’s control

or that they failed to exercise their own

independent judgment when they violated

Franklin’s rights. Murray’s response to

Franklin-Lipsker’s request for help to visit

her father and to offer her advise as to the

advisability of a visit did not turn

Franklin-Lipsker into a facilitator or a

cause of the state’s violation. With respect

to the violation at trial, one of the bases

upon which Franklin’s conviction was

overturned, there is no evidence that

Franklin-Lipsker was even aware of Tipton’s

decision to allude to Franklin’s silence

during the jail visit as evidence of guilt. 

312 F.3d at 445-446. In Crowe v. County of San Diego, the

district court granted summary judgment for defendant Blum, a

psychologist in private practice who consulted with the Escondido

Police Department during the murder investigation because Blum

did not participate in the arrests of the boys or the searches of

their residences and “there is absolutely no evidence that

defendant Blum had any control over the other defendants’

decision to conduct the challenged searches and arrests.” 303

F.Supp.2d at 1063-1064.

Resolution of the issue of proximate causation on the part

of the Abbate Defendants is wholly factual - what actually

happened is not known. Although the Abbate Defendants discuss at

length the facts of the cases cited by them and by Tiffany, those

facts were known and the facts in this case are not. The

allegations in the FAC are not simply that the Abbate Defendants

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made a complaint to the District Attorney that Tiffany had

embezzled. The allegations are that the Abbate Defendants had

influence with the District Attorney and with his and Hutton’s

connivance, fabricated evidence, including coercing a witness,

resulting in Tiffany’s prosecution for the purpose of

forestalling any attempt by Tiffany to make claims against the

Abbate Defendants based on her employment. Tiffany will have to

prove that facts exists to establish that the Abbate Defendants

proximately caused the alleged constitutional violations, but

that is an issue for summary judgment or trial. The motion to

dismiss on this ground is DENIED. 

b. Absolute Witness Immunity.

The Abbate Defendants also move for dismissal of the First

Cause of Action on the basis of absolute witness immunity. See

discussion infra.

The July 14 Order ruled in pertinent part:

Plaintiffs respond that the Abbate Defendants

are not entitled to dismissal of the First

Cause of Action on the ground of absolute

witness immunity because the Complaint does

not allege a conspiracy to concoct false

testimony but the “wholesale fabrication of

criminal charges.” Plaintiffs refer to

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1291 (9th

Cir.2000), wherein the Ninth Circuit, while

recognizing that defendants, as witnesses,

are entitled to absolute immunity based on

their testimony notwithstanding allegations

of conspiracy to commit perjury, held:

“Obviously, testimonial immunity does not

encompass non-testimonial acts such as

fabricating evidence.”

In their reply brief, the Abbate Defendants

contend that plaintiffs’ reliance on Gates is

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misplaced:

[T]he Fenters’ complaint is notably

bereft of allegations that are not

closely tied to the alleged false

testimony. There are no

allegations that the Abbate

defendants manufactured or procured

false evidence, destroyed evidence

and or coerced witnesses. Rather

beyond the allegations of alleged

false testimony is simply making a

complaint to the district attorneys

office. Nor is there any

allegation that the only source of

any of the disputed evidence was

the Abbates.

The Abbate Defendants are entitled to

dismissal of the First Cause of Action to the

extent that any of the Abbate Defendants

testified at the trial (or preliminary

hearing). The Abbate Defendants are not

entitled to dismissal of the First Cause of

Action on this ground to the extent that the

Complaint can be construed as alleging that

the Abbate Defendants fabricated evidence or

conspired to do so. However, the Complaint

does not specifically allege that the Abbate

Defendants (or any other defendants)

fabricated any evidence or conspired to do

so. The allegations are that the complaint

of embezzlement was false, baseless, and in

retaliation for Tiffany’s complaints to her

employer about wages and sexual harassment

but there is no allegation that the evidence

supporting that complaint of embezzlement was

fabricated.

The First Cause of Action is DISMISSED on

this ground with LEAVE TO AMEND.

Arguing that the cases cited above hold that absolute

witness immunity applies to perjured testimony or to a conspiracy

to provide perjured testimony, the Abbate Defendants complain

that the FAC vaguely alleges that Robert Abbate “fabricated and

manipulated” Yosemite Chevron business records without

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specifically identifying the allegedly fabricated evidence in any

manner, i.e., the FAC does not allege whether Robert Abbate

created false ledgers or receipts with the intent to set up

Tiffany or destroyed exculpatory evidence. The Abbate Defendants

further claim that the allegations in the FAC that Abbate

“downplayed and distorted the fact that Yosemite Chevron at all

times had a video surveillance system that would have depicted an

employee taking cash from the store register” and that “no

videotapes were disclosed” do not allege any facts that the

Abbate Defendants fabricated or destroyed videotapes. The Abbate

Defendants contend:

[W]hile the [FAC] alleges that the Abbate

defendants fabricated evidence in a merely

conclusory fashion, no details whatsoever are

provided of the nature of the evidence, or

the date the fabricated evidence was

presented to the prosecutor. Nor are there

any allegations that the Abbate defendants

destroyed evidence. Rather, there is merely

the allegation that the Abbate defendants

distorted the impact of the videotapes or

lack thereof. This allegation describes

testimonial acts, not the fabrication or

destruction of evidence, which as a matter of

law is insufficient to plead around Briscoe

immunity.

Tiffany responds that the FAC substantially expanded on the

allegations of the Complaint, referring to paragraphs 24-28 of

the FAC. She argues that there is nothing vague about these

allegations and notes that this is a motion to dismiss, not a

motion for a more definite statement. She argues that the Abbate

Defendants “would have this Court unreasonably require the

plaintiff, without even the benefit of discovery, to allege

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matters only the wrongdoers could know, such as the date on which

fabricated evidence was presented to the prosecution, the

ultimate disposition of the videotapes from the Yosemite Chevron

surveillance system, and like matters.”

The Abbate Defendants reply:

The opposition brief does no more than

reiterate the claims in the [FAC] which in it

of itself [sic] describes no more than

testimonial acts. For instance, plaintiff

alleges that the Abbate defendants downplayed

the significance of a video tape. These

allegations are testimonial in nature. What

was fabricated and by whom, when and where

and whether the evidence was used as trial is

not alleged. Therefore, this absolute

witness immunity bars the First Cause of

Action.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

and there is no basis for the specific pleading required by Rule

9, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The allegations of the FAC

are sufficiently specific to allow the Abbate Defendants to

respond. The motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action on this

ground is without merit and is DENIED.

c. Sufficiency of Allegations of Conspiracy.

The Abbate Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of

Action on the ground that the FAC fails to allege sufficient

facts to support a claim of conspiracy.

However, as discussed above, given the pleading standards

reiterated by the Supreme Court, the factual allegations of the

FAC are sufficient to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 

The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

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2. Third Cause of Action.

The Abbate Defendants move for dismissal of the Third Cause

of Action for violation of Civil Code § 52.1 on several grounds.

a. Sufficiency of Allegations of Threats,

Intimidation, or Coercion.

The Abbate Defendants move to dismiss this cause of action,

contending:

[T]he [FAC] makes no factual allegations to

identify or describe what if anything the

Abbate defendants did to interfere with or

attempt to interfere with Plaintiff’s state

or federal constitutional rights by threats,

intimidation or coercion. Instead of

identifying such acts of threats,

intimidation or coercion, the [FAC]

describes, albeit in broad terms, an alleged

conspiracy between the Abbate, Cassabon

defendants, and the Merced County defendants

to subject Plaintiff to a malicious

prosecution. The only alleged threats were

directed to a witness, not to the plaintiff.

As discussed above, Tiffany argues that Section 52.1 “does

not require conduct that ‘interferes by threats, intimidation, or

coercion’ with a claimant’s exercise or enjoyment of her

constitutional rights occur simultaneously with the resultant

constitutional violation” and that Section 52.1 does not “require

that this conduct play a direct role in bringing about the

constitutional violation.” Tiffany concedes that no case law

addresses these issues specifically in the context of Section

52.1. However, she refers to McCalden v. California Library

Association, 955 F.2d 1214 (9 Cir.1989), cert. denied, 504 U.S. th

957 (1992) as “finding a claim for a violation of California

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Civil Code § 51.7 sufficient, although it alleged noncontemporaneous intimidating conduct that was not even conveyed

directly to the victim”.

As discussed above, the analysis is the same. Whether

Tiffany’s position is ultimately sustainable against the Abbate

Defendants presents an issue of fact as well as law. Given the

standards governing resolution of a motion to dismiss, the FAC

sufficiently alleges a claim for violation of Section 52.1 to

allow the Abbate Defendants to respond. The motion to dismiss on

this ground is DENIED.

b. Immunity Pursuant to California Civil Code §

47(b).

The Abbate Defendants further move for dismissal of this

cause of action based on the absolute immunity of Section 47(b). 

See discussion supra.

Dismissal on this ground is unwarranted. The allegations of

the FAC adequately allege that the Abbate Defendants fabricated

the evidence presented at Tiffany’s criminal trial. The motion

to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

3. Fourth Cause of Action.

The Abbate Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of

Action for malicious prosecution, reiterating the arguments made

above in connection with the First Cause of Action concerning

proximate causation. The Abbate Defendants argue: “[T]he [FAC]

alleges substantial intervening acts by the very law enforcement

authority charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes and

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their retained experts, the Cassabon defendants. Therefore, the

[FAC] fails to sufficiently allege proximate cause to support a

malicious prosecution action against the Abbate defendants.”

Causation is inherently a factual inquiry. For the reasons

set forth above, the Abbate Defendants are not entitled to

dismissal of the malicious prosecution cause of action on the

ground of lack of proximate cause as a matter of law. The motion

to dismiss is DENIED.

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. The Cassabon Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First,

Third and Fourth Causes of Action is DENIED.

2. The Abbate Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First,

Third and Fourth Causes of Action is denied DENIED. 

3. Defendants shall file Answers to the First Amended

Complaint within 20 days of the filing date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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