Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00144/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00144-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Solomon Matthew Madrid, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; Attorney General of the

State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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CV 11-00144-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc.

6), respondent's response (doc. 13), petitioner's reply (doc. 14), and petitioner's errata (doc.

16). We also have before us two motions to compel an order of judgment filed by petitioner

(doc. 17, doc. 19). Finally, we have a report and recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge (doc. 18), and petitioner's objections to the report and recommendation

(doc. 20). Respondents did not reply to petitioner's objections. 

I

Following a jury trial in 1994, petitioner was convicted in Arizona state court of three

counts of aggravated assault and one count of threatening and intimidating. The jury found

that these offenses were dangerous under Arizona law. Because petitioner was on probation

for a prior felony conviction when he committed the new offenses, under A.R.S.§ 13-604.02

the trial court was required to impose a sentence of four concurrent terms of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Petitioner directly

appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and sentence on

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1

 It is unclear from the record whether this petition, which was signed by petitioner

in September 2005, was ever addressed separately by the state trial court. Resolution of this

point is not necessary to analyze the instant petition.

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February 8, 1996. Petitioner did not seek further review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

In the following years, petitioner filed several state petitions for post-conviction relief.

His first petition, filed November 13, 2001, was dismissed as untimely. His September 13,

2002 petition, which challenged his sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), was dismissed because the court held that Apprendi did not apply

retroactively to his case. Petitioner's next petition was filed on June 1, 2005 and alleged that

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) entitled him to relief. This

petition was dismissed, reasoning that Blakely did not apply to convictions that were already

final. Petitioner filed another post-conviction relief petition on December 13, 2005, which

contained the same claims raised in prior petitions.1

 Finally, petitioner filed a state petition

for habeas corpus on April 14, 2009, which was denied on the basis that it raised the same

arguments already considered and rejected in his post-conviction relief petitions. The appeal

of this dismissal was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals as untimely.

The instant petition for habeas corpus was filed on January 21, 2011 (doc. 1). We

dismissed with leave to amend (doc. 5), and petitioner filed his amended petition on February

24, 2011 (doc. 6). The amended petition raises one ground for relief. Petitioner alleges that

his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when his

sentence was increased beyond the statutory maximum based on a factual determination of

his probation status that was made by the trial court rather than the jury. In petitioner's reply,

he acknowledges that Apprendi and Blakely do not apply to his case. Apparently

abandoning his original claim, petitioner presents a new claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel in his reply and errata. According to petitioner, his appellate counsel's failure to

challenge petitioner's sentencing as the result of a 1994 amendment to A.R.S. § 13-604.02

amounted to ineffective assistance. Petitioner argues in an errata filed with his reply that he

is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he just learned of the facts

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2

 Petitioner's second motion to compel was filed by the clerk of court on September

26, 2011 (doc. 19). This motion was docketed three days after the magistrate judge's order

and was not considered in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation.

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underlying his ineffective assistance claim. The magistrate judge found that petitioner's

federal habeas petition is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and recommends that the petition be denied. In addition, the

magistrate judge recommends that the motion to compel (doc. 17) be denied as moot.2

II

Petitioner raises several objections to the report and recommendation. In essence,

petitioner argues that the magistrate judge committed error by failing to recommend that we

grant habeas relief based on petitioner's new ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Petitioner objects to the magistrate's conclusion that he did not rebut the statute of limitations

argument raised by the respondents, pointing to the equitable tolling argument for his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim made in his reply and errata. Petitioner contends that

he adequately pled that procedural default does not preclude his ineffective assistance claim.

He also argues that dismissal of his motion to compel as moot is incorrect. Finally, petitioner

asserts that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim overcomes any statute of limitations

bar under AEDPA via retroactive application of watershed federal law.

A reply "is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief" in a habeas

proceeding. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner's

objections are grounded in his belief that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

cognizable and equitably tolls AEDPA's statute of limitations. But because petitioner first

asserted his ineffective assistance of counsel argument in his reply and his errata, we need

not consider this claim. See id. However, even if we were to consider petitioner's new claim,

petitioner's habeas petition remains time-barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations. 

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition within one

year from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

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review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). State prisoners whose convictions were final prior to AEDPA's

effective date of April 24, 1996 were given a one year grace period to file their petitions.

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). This grace period expired April

24, 1997. Id. at 1246. In this case, a decision denying petitioner's direct appeal was issued

by the Arizona Court of Appeals on February 8, 1996. Because petitioner did not seek

further review of this decision in the Arizona Supreme Court, his judgment of conviction and

sentence became final when his thirty-day period for seeking review expired. See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 31.19(a). As petitioner's judgment became final prior to AEDPA's effective date,

petitioner's filing deadline for his federal habeas petition was April 24, 1997. His petition

was not filed until January 21, 2011 - more than thirteen years after the deadline.

Although the time during which a "properly filed" state post-conviction review

application or habeas petition is pending is not counted towards the limitations period, 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), petitioner's first state post-conviction filing was not until November 13,

2001. Because his federal filing deadline had already expired in April 1997, however,

petitioner's state post-conviction petitions and state habeas petition did not toll the federal

statute of limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(§ 2244(d) "does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before

the state petition was filed"). Similarly, to the extent that petitioner has argued that Apprendi

and Blakely entitled him to a statute of limitations date that began to ran from the date "on

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court" under

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(C), this argument fails because neither Apprendi nor Blakely are

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retroactively applicable on collateral review. United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d

664, 671 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on initial collateral

review."); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (Blakely "does not apply

retroactively to a conviction that was final before that decision was announced"). Finally,

petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, if properly asserted, also would be timebarred, because the "watershed case" cited by petitioner that he claims is retroactively

applicable on collateral review is Gideon v. Wainwright. Gideon was decided in 1963, more

than thirty years before petitioner's conviction. See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792

(1963). 

Thus, petitioner's amended habeas petition is time-barred under AEDPA unless he can

show that equitable tolling should apply. To establish equitable tolling, a petitioner must

show "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way" to prevent him from filing a timely petition. Holland v.

Florida, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). The

magistrate judge concluded that petitioner did not assert any basis to apply equitable tolling

to his Apprendi/Blakely claim. We agree, and petitioner acknowledges that his

Apprendi/Blakely claim "is not cognizable." Objection to Report & Recommendation at 5.

Nevertheless, petitioner argues that he established equitable tolling through his

discussion in his reply and errata. He contends that he recently learned that his appellate

counsel's failure to address the amendment of A.R.S. § 13-604.02 on direct appeal constituted

ineffective assistance. As we have already discussed, petitioner's assertion of a brand new

ineffective assistance claim in his reply was untimely. Even if we could consider this new

claim, however, petitioner has not established that extraordinary circumstances prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Both Gideon and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), cases cited by petitioner as supporting his ineffective assistance

claim, were decided decades before his conviction. And as petitioner notes in his amended

habeas petition, his trial counsel argued during sentencing proceedings that A.R.S. § 13-

604.02 was unconstitutional. This would have placed petitioner on notice that appellate

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counsel's failure to address the propriety of sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-604.02 could have

been problematic. And to the extent that petitioner might be arguing that his alleged recent

discovery of the factual predicate of his ineffective assistance claim tolls the AEDPA statute

of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), we conclude that argument is without merit

for the reasons discussed above. 

We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the instant petition is time-barred

under AEDPA. Because we hold that petitioner's habeas petition was untimely and equitable

tolling does not apply, we do not reach petitioner's objections that the magistrate failed to

consider petitioner's procedural default arguments on his ineffective assistance claim.

Petitioner's motions to compel reiterate his arguments concerning ineffective assistance of

counsel. For all of the reasons discussed above, we agree with the magistrate judge that these

motions should be denied as moot.

III

Accordingly, we accept the recommended disposition of the magistrate judge (doc.

18). 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING the petition for a writ of habeas corpus (doc. 6). 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING petitioner's motion to compel an order of judgment

as moot (doc. 17).

IT IS ORDERED DENYING petitioner's motion to compel as moot (doc. 19). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the dismissal of the petition is justified by

a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2011.

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