Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05701/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05701-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RAY TILLEY, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

MARK TRACY, Santa Cruz County

Sheriff; SANTA CRUZ COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH;

DR. STEIN, Chief Medical Officer, Santa

Cruz County Jail; DOE number 1,

Director, Department of Mental Health,

Santa Cruz County; ROXANN HUNT,

Correctional Officer; ANDREW LERIOS,

Correctional Sergeant; DOE, Badge

Number S-35, Correctional Sergeant;

Correctional Lieutenant HARTNESS;

DOE, Detention Nurse Manager; DOE

OFFICERS; DOES NURSES; and DR.

NOORONIE MULAHA, Psychiatrist at

Santa Cruz County Jail,

Defendants. /

No. C 03-5701 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

RECONSIDER AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a person hospitalized as a Sexually Violent

Predator (“SVP”). In the initial review order the court identified four categories of claims: 

Overcharging, medication, medical attention, and misdiagnosis. The court concluded that

plaintiff had stated a claim against defendant Nooronie Mulaha as to the misdiagnosis

claim, and dismissed the other claims with leave to amend. Plaintiff abandoned the

overcharging claim in the amendment. On its review of the amended complaint, the court

concluded that plaintiff had stated a claim against Roxann Hunt and Doe officers and

nurses for consistently bringing his diabetic medication, which is to be taken with meals,

Case 4:03-cv-05701-PJH Document 66 Filed 03/27/07 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 He alleges that instead of a full meal he was given a banana, an energy bar, or a

nutritional drink.

2 The doctor’s correct name is "Mollah."

2

one and half hours to two hours before meals,1

 and against defendants Lerios and

Hartness for threatening to retaliate against him for writing grievances. At that point the

remaining named defendants were Mollah, Hunt, Lerios and Hartness. 

A motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Mollah,2 Hunt, Lerios and

Hartness was denied in part and granted in part. It was granted in its entirety as to Dr.

Mollah, granted as to all claims against Hunt, and denied as to the retaliation claims against

Lerios and Hartness. The remaining claims after the ruling on the motion for summary

judgment, therefore, were the retaliation claims against Lerios and Hartness. 

Plaintiff has moved to reconsider the grants of summary judgment for Hunt and

Mollah, and Lerios and Hartness have moved for summary judgment on the remaining

claim. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to reconsider

Plaintiff refers to his motion to reconsider as being pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9,

which is appropriate. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 473 F.3d 915,

926 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Motions for Reconsideration" are creatures of local rules or practice). 

He also refers to it as being brought pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, but as those rules apply only to judgments, and no judgment has been

entered here, they are inapplicable. Oddly, although plaintiff clearly is aware of Rule 7-

9, since he cites it several times, he has not moved for nor been granted leave to file

a motion to reconsider, as required by Rule 7-9(a). The motion will be denied for

that reason, as well as for the reasons discussed below.

Even if the court were to excuse plaintiff's failure to obtain leave, the motion

would be denied. Motions to reconsider must be based only on the grounds set out in

Local Rule 7-9(b). L.R. Civ. 7-9(a). The moving party must specifically show: (1) that at

Case 4:03-cv-05701-PJH Document 66 Filed 03/27/07 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which

was presented to the court before entry of the interlocutory order for which the

reconsideration is sought, and that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party

applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory

order; or (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the

time of such order; or (3) a manifest failure by the court to consider material facts which

were presented to the court before such interlocutory order. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b). Plaintiff

has failed to make a sufficient showing as to any of the three grounds.

The motion to reconsider will be denied. 

B. Motion for summary judgment 

Lerios and Hartness move for summary judgment on the remaining claim against

them, which is that they retaliated against plaintiff for his grievances. The motion is not

opposed.

1. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

Case 4:03-cv-05701-PJH Document 66 Filed 03/27/07 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

2. Analysis 

The motion for summary judgment is unopposed. A district court may not grant a

motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party has failed to file an

opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (unopposed

motion may be granted only after court determines that there are no material issues of

fact). The court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the

movant's papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face

reveal a genuine issue of material fact. United States v. Real Property at Incline Village, 47

F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (local rule cannot mandate automatic entry of judgment for

moving party without consideration of whether motion and supporting papers satisfy Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820

(1996); Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).

"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). A prisoner must at least allege that he suffered harm, since

harm that is more than minimal will almost always have a chilling effect. Id. at 567-68 n.11.

In this sole remaining claim, plaintiff alleges that Lerios and Hartness came to his

cell and threatened him with transfer to an undesirable cell in the medical department if he

did not stop grieving the issue of the late meals on weekends and holidays. The previous

motion for summary judgment of Lerios and Hartness was denied because, although they

may have been correct that there was a legitimate penological goal in their suggestion that

plaintiff should be moved to the medical unit if his health were so at risk, there could be

none in their suggestion that a move could be avoided by stopping the grievances. 

In the renewed motion for summary judgment Lerios and Hartness contend that

plaintiff suffered no harm from their threat. The papers in support of the motion for

Case 4:03-cv-05701-PJH Document 66 Filed 03/27/07 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

summary judgment support defendants contention that plaintiff suffered no harm, in that he

continued with a blizzard of complaints and it is undisputed that he was not in fact moved to

the medical department. The moving papers also do not on their face reveal a genuine

issue of material fact. The motion for summary judgment will be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to reconsider (document number 60 on

the docket) is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment of the last remaining

defendants, Lerios and Hartness, is GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.03\TILLEY701.SJ2

Case 4:03-cv-05701-PJH Document 66 Filed 03/27/07 Page 5 of 5