Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00317/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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1 Both movants have requested oral argument. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.3, the

Court in its discretion may rule on any motion without oral argument. After careful

consideration of the parties’ detailed written submissions, the undersigned is of the opinion that

oral argument would not be of substantial assistance in resolving the issues presented. 

Accordingly, the movants’ requests for oral argument are denied.

2 The Court’s review of the Motions has been hampered by nonmovant’s disregard

of Section 13(c) of the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 28), which provides in pertinent part

as follows: “If a party’s exhibits in support of or in opposition to a motion exceed 50 pages in

the aggregate, then that party must deliver a courtesy hard copy of those exhibits to the Judge’s

chambers by mail or hand delivery.” (Doc. 28, at 6.) Movants complied with this requirement;

however, nonmovant did not, even though it submitted more than 350 pages of exhibits in

connection with the Rule 56 issues. Holcim’s noncompliance has rendered it more difficult and

time-consuming for the Court to examine Holcim’s evidentiary submissions than to examine

those of the movants.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0317-WS-M

 )

HOLCIM (US) INC., et al., )

Defendants, )

 )

v. )

 )

THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE )

COMPANY, et al., )

Counterclaim Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Counter Defendant Industrial Services of Mobile,

Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 69) and Plaintiff / Counter Defendant Ohio

Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 73).1

 The Motions have been briefed and are

ripe for disposition at this time.2

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 1 of 23
3 The Whites were nominally listed as defendants in this action until Ohio Casualty

voluntarily dismissed all claims against them on August 11, 2006. (See docs. 21, 22.)

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I. Nature of this Action.

On February 23, 2003, defendant Ronald White (“White”) was injured while working as

an employee of counterdefendant Industrial Services of Mobile, Inc. (“ISOM”), at a cement

manufacturing plant operated by defendant Holcim (US) Inc. (“Holcim”) in Theodore, Alabama,

when he stepped into a hole and fell 24 feet. This declaratory judgment action marks the second

lawsuit filed to allocate financial responsibility for White’s injuries among Holcim, ISOM and

their respective layers of insurance coverage. The first lawsuit (the “White Action”), filed in

state court by White and his wife, Patricia White (“Mrs. White”), resulted in a $5 million

settlement being paid to the Whites by Holcim and two insurance companies. The present

declaratory judgment action arises from efforts by Holcim to recover some $4 million in

settlement proceeds from ISOM or one of ISOM’s insurers, plaintiff The Ohio Casualty

Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).

Ohio Casualty initiated this action on May 18, 2006 by filing a Complaint (doc. 1)

against Holcim and two Holcim employees, Edward Thierry, Jr. (“Thierry”) and Dennis Odom

(“Odom”).3

 Ohio Casualty’s Complaint maintained that Holcim, Thierry and Odom were not

entitled to coverage under a commercial umbrella policy that Ohio Casualty had issued to ISOM

for the time period encompassing White’s accident. On that basis, Ohio Casualty sought a

declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Holcim, Thierry and Odom in the White

Action, and no duty to satisfy any settlement or judgment therein. (Complaint, at 4.)

Holcim brought a counterclaim against Ohio Casualty, and joined ISOM in that

counterclaim pursuant to Rules 13(h), 19 and 20, Fed.R.Civ.P. (See doc. 9.) In particular,

Holcim alleged that ISOM had breached an agreement to indemnify and hold Holcim harmless

by failing to fund the settlement of the White Action. Holcim further alleged that Ohio Casualty

had breached its contractual obligation by failing to recognize Holcim, Thierry and Odom as

additional insureds under the Ohio Casualty umbrella policy issued to ISOM, and by failing to

bankroll the settlement of the White Action pursuant to that umbrella policy. In an Amended

Counterclaim (doc. 42), Holcim added a third cause of action against ISOM for common law

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 2 of 23
4 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record,

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, Holcim’s evidence

is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in its favor with respect to both Motions.

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indemnity, alleging that Holcim was either not at fault or only technically or constructively at

fault for White’s accident, and that ISOM’s negligent conduct was the efficient cause of that

accident.

Ohio Casualty and ISOM have now moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted

by Holcim, with Ohio Casualty also seeking summary judgment on the declaratory judgment

cause of action set forth in the Complaint.

II. Background Facts.4

The relevant facts necessary to resolve these Motions for Summary Judgment are largely

undisputed.

A. The Agreements Between ISOM and Holcim.

ISOM is a general contractor in the industrial sector that has performed substantial work

for Holcim’s facility in Theodore, Alabama, over the last several years. (Holsonback Dep., at

11-12; Thierry Aff., at 2.) Before a contractor is permitted to perform work at Holcim’s

Theodore plant, that contractor must submit a series of documents collectively referred to as a

“Contractor Pre-Qualification Package,” and including an indemnity and hold harmless

agreement in Holcim’s favor. (Thierry Aff., at 2.) The indemnity and hold harmless agreement

is a pre-printed form prepared by Holcim. (Earle Dep., at 28.) In connection with its work for

Holcim, ISOM has submitted multiple contractor pre-qualification packages to Holcim over the

years. (Thierry Aff., at 2.)

On March 25, 2002, ISOM signed an “Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement” as part

of a Holcim contractor pre-qualification package. (Id. at 2-3.) In relevant part, the March 2002

Agreement stated ISOM’s promise to defend, indemnify and hold Holcim harmless “from any

and all loss, liability, claims, damages, judgments, expenses, costs or attorney’s fees whether for

property damage, personal injuries or death (herein, ‘Losses’), arising from or in connection with

... the undersigned’s entry upon Holcim’s premises for the purpose and in consideration of

performing various construction activities.” (Doc. 71, Exh. E.) The March 2002 Agreement

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 3 of 23
5 The March 2002 Agreement was executed only by ISOM; therefore, the reference

to the “undersigned” in that document means ISOM and ISOM only.

6 Holcim’s evidence is that in soliciting bids for the Raw Silo project, the company

sent a “Raw Silo Contractor Package” consisting of some 178 pages of documentation to all

contractors making bids on the project. (Harris Dep., at 15-17.) One page in those voluminous

materials was a blank “Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement” of the same form that ISOM

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specified that ISOM’s indemnification responsibility included, without limitation, “Losses

attributable to the undersigned’s negligence, acts or omissions, or the negligence, acts or

omissions of any of the undersigned’s agents, servants, contractors, employees or assigns.” 

(Id.)

5

 That agreement did not expressly exclude indemnity from losses attributable to Holcim’s

negligence.

Almost 11 months later, on February 21, 2003, Holcim and ISOM entered into a contract

entitled “Supply Agreement” and pertaining to a project known as the “Raw Silos project” for

Holcim’s Theodore facility. (Doc. 71, Exh. C.) It is undisputed that this Supply Agreement was

drafted by Holcim’s corporate counsel and was a “standard legal form utilized by Holcim as a

Supply Agreement with vendors throughout the country for different products.” (Earle Dep., at

26-27.) The Supply Agreement provided that its terms were exclusive, and included certain

terms and conditions appended as Exhibit A. (Doc. 71, Exh. C, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Paragraph 9 of that

Exhibit A was an indemnification provision in which ISOM agreed to indemnify and hold

Holcim harmless “from any and all claims, demands, actions, penalties, fines, losses, costs or

other liabilities ... arising out of or resulting from [ISOM’s] breach of warranty or performance

of this agreement or any act or omission of [ISOM], whether occurring on [Holcim]’s premises

or elsewhere. However, [ISOM] shall have no obligation to [Holcim] to the extent such losses

are attributable to the negligence or willful misconduct of [Holcim].” (Doc. 71, Exh. C, at Exh

A, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).)

Three other provisions of the Supply Agreement are potentially germane to the issues

presented on summary judgment. First, in Paragraph 2(B) of that document, the parties “agree

that the specifications for the Goods in the Raw Silos bid package, dated 1/21/03 (the

“Specifications”), are incorporated by reference into the Agreement.” (Doc. 71, Exh. C, ¶

2(B).)6

 “Goods” is a defined term in the Supply Agreement, meaning the “service and material

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 4 of 23
had executed in March 2002, but with numerous blanks for the indemnitor, the consideration, the

date of the relevant agreement or purchase order, the governing law, and supplemental terms. 

(Harris Dep., at 16; Doc. 87, Exh. H.) There is no record evidence that Holcim ever requested or

required ISOM to execute that form of “Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement” in

connection with the Raw Silo project, or that ISOM ever executed such a form at any time

following March 2002. There is also no evidence as to what the context of this blank form was

and what verbiage (if any) the bid package might have included concerning the need for ISOM

to execute this particular form in connection with the project. In any event, that Indemnity and

Hold Harmless Agreement in the bid package was never completed and executed in connection

with the Raw Silo project. According to the Supply Agreement, the Raw Silo project bid

package was dated January 21, 2003, some 10 months after ISOM had signed the previous

Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement.

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as described in Raw Silos bid package, dated 1/21/03.” (Id., ¶ 1.) Second, in Paragraph 3(A),

the Supply Agreement states that “[i]n the event of any conflict between the terms of this

Agreement (other than Exhibit A) and the terms and conditions of Exhibit A, the terms of this

document shall control.” (Id., ¶ 3(A).) Third, Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement includes a

paragraph in which ISOM “agrees to carry comprehensive general and products liability

insurance in the amounts and of the type acceptable to” Holcim; promises to carry worker’s

compensation, employers liability insurance, commercial general liability insurance, and the

like; and agrees to furnish Holcim with certificates “evidencing the existence of the

aforementioned insurance naming [Holcim] as additional insured.” (Id., Exh. C, at Exh. A, ¶

10.) That same paragraph reflects that ISOM’s obligation to carry this insurance “shall not limit

in any way [ISOM]’s liability and its obligation to indemnify [Holcim] as provided for in this

contract.” (Id.)

B. The Commercial Umbrella Policy.

Ohio Casualty issued a Commercial Umbrella policy, bearing number BXO (03) 52 51 23

91, to ISOM covering the period of October 31, 2002 through October 31, 2003. (Doc. 75, at

Exh. A.) The Ohio Casualty Policy provided for a per-occurrence limit of $10 million, and was

excess coverage to an underlying general liability insurance policy issued to ISOM by nonparty

Clarendon American Insurance Co., which provided for coverage limits of $1 million per

occurrence. (Id.)

The Ohio Casualty Policy set forth a definition of “Insured” that included “[a]ny person

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 5 of 23
7 The Certificate actually does not mention Ohio Casualty by name, but instead

attributes that excess policy to American National Fire Ins. Co. There appears to be no dispute,

however, that Ohio Casualty has purchased American National and that the excess policy recited

on the Certificate was in fact the Ohio Casualty Policy.

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or organization, other than the Named Insured, included as an additional ‘Insured’ by virtue of

an ‘insured contract,’ and to which coverage is provided by the ‘underlying insurance’ and for no

broader coverage than is provided by the ‘underlying insurance’ to such additional ‘Insured.’”

(Doc. 75, at Exh. A, at 11.) The term “Insured Contract” is likewise a defined term in the policy,

meaning “any oral or written contract or agreement entered into by you and pertaining to your

business under which you assume the ‘tort liability’ of another party to pay for ‘bodily injury’ or

‘property damage’ to a third person or organization ....” (Id.)

Also of potential relevance to the pending motions, the Ohio Casualty Policy includes a

“Cross Suits Exclusion,” which excludes from coverage “Any liability of any ‘Insured’ covered

under this policy to any other ‘Insured’ covered under this policy.” (Id.)

No endorsement to the Ohio Casualty Policy lists Holcim as an additional insured. 

ISOM’s insurance agent furnished Holcim with a “Certificate of Liability Insurance” dated

October 31, 2002. (Doc. 75, at Exh. I.) That Certificate recites ISOM’s various insurance

policies, including underlying commercial general liability insurance with Clarendon in the

amount of $1 million per occurrence and excess insurance with Ohio Casualty in the amount of

$10 million per occurrence. (Id.)

7

 The Certificate lists Holcim as the “Certificate Holder” but

states “N” in a box beside the words “Additional Insured.” (Id.) The back of the Certificate

includes the following language immediately under the headline “IMPORTANT”: “If the

certificate holder is an ADDITIONAL INSURED, the policy(ies) must be endorsed. A

statement on this certificate does not confer rights to the certificate holder in lieu of such

endorsement(s).” (Id.) Also, the back of the Certificate includes the word “DISCLAIMER” in

bold type, under which the following is written: “The Certificate of Insurance on the reverse side

of this form does not constitute a contract between the issuing insurer(s), authorized

representative or producer, and the certificate holder, nor does it affirmatively or negatively

amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by the policies listed thereon.” (Id.)

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 6 of 23
8 Holcim did not avail itself of this opportunity to bring third-party claims for

indemnity or breach of contract against ISOM or Ohio Casualty in the White Action, thereby

necessitating this litigation to resolve these additional matters allocating financial responsibility

for White’s accident. Had Holcim brought third-party claims against Ohio Casualty and ISOM

in the White Action, all factual issues and theories of liability could have been aired in a single

proceeding, without the need for the piecemeal approach adopted here.

9 In particular, that complaint ascribed wrongdoing to Holcim, Thierry and Odom

in the following respects: (1) exposing White to the hazard of falling on the job site, (2) failing to

secure and/or install boards on the floor from which he fell, (3) improperly maintaining the

boards from which White fell, (4) failing to secure, install or maintain guard/safety rails, (5)

failing to install or maintain other safety guards/devices, (6) failing to install or maintain a

proper walkway, (7) failing to discover and eliminate hazardous or unsafe conditions of which

they knew or should have known, (8) failing to post warning signs and/or barricades to alert

employees to the danger, (9) failing to provide White with a reasonably safe place to work, (10)

failing to institute effective safety procedures at the job site, (11) failing to conduct adequate

safety inspections at the job site, (12) failing to furnish a place of employment for White that was

free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious harm, and (13) failing to comply

with various rules, regulations and regulatory standards. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 9.)

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C. The State Court Lawsuit.

White sustained injuries on February 23, 2003, when he fell through a hole at Holcim’s

Theodore facility while working on the Raw Silo project as an employee of ISOM. On October

2, 2003, White initiated the White Action by filing suit against Holcim, Thierry, Odom, and 120

fictitious defendants in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. The complaint in the

White Action reflected that White brought claims against Holcim, Thierry and Odom for

negligence and willfulness/ wantonness, and that Mrs. White brought claims for loss of

consortium. (Doc. 75, Exh. K.)8

 The White Action complaint asserted that Holcim was

negligent, willful or wanton in 13 different respects, and that its negligent, willful and/or wanton

acts proximately caused White’s injuries. (Id.)

9

 An amended complaint filed nearly two years

later added as new causes of action that Holcim, Thierry and Odom had been negligent or

wanton in performing duties that they had voluntarily undertaken on the job site, and that White

was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between ISOM and Holcim in which Holcim was

responsible for maintaining and operating the job site in a safe manner. (Doc. 75, Exh. L at 7-

13.)

ISOM was not named as a defendant in the White Action. Neither the original nor the

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 7 of 23
10 Ohio Casualty and ISOM were invited to attend the mediation session, and Ohio

Casualty in fact attended. (Doc. 42, ¶ 16.) Neither ISOM nor Ohio Casualty contributed any

funds to the White Action settlement, however. (Id., ¶ 17.)

11 In bringing its counterclaims against Ohio Casualty and ISOM in this action

seeking to recover $4 million in settlement proceeds, Holcim alleges that Great American has

authorized it to seek recovery of the full amounts paid by both Great American and Holcim in

that settlement. (Id., ¶ 18.)

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amended complaints set forth any causes of action against ISOM or alleged that Holcim should

be held liable for the acts or omissions of ISOM. (Doc. 75, Exhs. K & L.) However, ISOM and

its workers’ compensation insurance carrier petitioned and were permitted to intervene in the

White Action to assert claims for reimbursement and subrogation of workers’ compensation

benefits and medical expenses paid to White. (Doc. 71, Exh. I.) Additionally, in response to a

demand for a defense, ISOM’s primary insurance carrier, Clarendon, appointed defense counsel

and otherwise undertook to defend Holcim, Thierry and Odom. (Doc. 42, ¶ 14.)

The White Action never made it to trial. Instead, on May 24, 2006, pursuant to a courtordered mediation, the parties entered into a settlement under which Holcim, Thierry and Odom

agreed to pay the Whites $5 million in exchange for a full release and dismissal of the White

Action with prejudice. (Doc. 71, Exh. J.)10 The settlement documentation reflected that this $5

million payment was being made “entirely for the purpose of compromise and settlement of a

disputed claim” and that it was not to “be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the

RELEASEES, by whom liability is expressly denied.” (Doc. 71, Exh. K, at ¶ 2.5.) Payment of

these funds was allocated as follows: (a) ISOM’s primary insurance carrier, Clarendon, paid its

policy limits of $1 million; (b) Holcim itself paid $1 million; and (c) one of Holcim’s excess

carriers, nonparty Great American Alliance Insurance Company, paid $3 million. (Doc. 42, ¶

17.)11

In this action, Holcim maintains that Ohio Casualty and ISOM are legally obligated to

reimburse Holcim and Great American for the entire $4 million they “advanced” to settle the

White Action. Ohio Casualty and ISOM have now moved for summary judgment, seeking a

ruling that, as a matter of law, neither of them is obligated to contribute any funds to the White

Action settlement. Holcim has opposed both motions. Because Ohio Casualty and ISOM’s Rule

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 8 of 23
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56 Motions rest on different grounds, each will be analyzed separately.

III. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only

for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon

Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

In the insurance context, Alabama law provides that “[t]he issue whether a contract is

ambiguous or unambiguous is a question of law for a court to decide. ... If the terms within a

contract are plain and unambiguous, the construction of the contract and its legal effect become

questions of law for the court.” Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 870 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Ala.

2003) (citation omitted); see also B.D.B. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 814 So.2d 877, 879

(Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (“The interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of law.”). 

IV. Analysis of ISOM’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

As discussed supra, Holcim has brought counterclaims against ISOM for both

contractual and common law indemnity, contending that ISOM is responsible to pay $4 million

of the White Action settlement. ISOM’s Rule 56 Motion is predicated on the following

reasoning: (a) the indemnification provision in Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement supersedes

the earlier agreement and is controlling; (b) the Supply Agreement’s indemnity provision states

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 9 of 23
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that ISOM will not indemnify Holcim for Holcim’s own negligence or willful misconduct; (c)

the claims asserted against Holcim in the White Action were confined to allegations of

negligence or willful misconduct by Holcim, so ISOM owes no contractual indemnity obligation

to Holcim for the settlement of those claims; and (d) common law indemnity is negated by the

existence of a written indemnity contract. By contrast, Holcim’s position is that there are

genuine issues of material fact as to which indemnity agreement governs, that White’s injuries

were actually caused by the negligence of ISOM (not that of Holcim) so ISOM’s indemnity

obligation attaches under either indemnity agreement, and that common law indemnity applies

because Holcim was only technically or constructively at fault.

A. Which Indemnity Agreement Controls?

The threshold question for evaluating Holcim’s claims of contractual indemnity is

whether the March 2002 “Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement,” or the indemnification

provision set forth in the February 2003 Supply Agreement is applicable here. This inquiry is

not merely of academic interest, given the material difference between the two documents. In

particular, the February 2003 indemnity clause expressly excuses ISOM from any indemnity

obligation to Holcim for losses “to the extent such losses are attributable to the negligence or

willful misconduct of” Holcim. (Doc. 71, Exh. C, at Exh A, ¶ 9.) By contrast, the March 2002

agreement provides that ISOM will indemnify Holcim from “any and all loss ... arising from or

in connection with ... the undersigned’s entry upon Holcim’s premises for the purpose and in

consideration of performing various construction activities,” with no carve-out for losses

attributable to Holcim’s own negligence. (Doc. 71, Exh. E.)

If an earlier-executed indemnity agreement has no exclusion for losses attributable to

Holcim’s negligence, but a later-executed indemnity agreement has such an exclusion, wellsettled Alabama law provides that the later-executed agreement controls. Indeed, the Alabama

Supreme Court has explained that “parties are free to modify agreements, and if the terms of a

subsequent agreement contradict the earlier agreement, the terms of the later agreement prevail.” 

Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So.2d 634, 641 (Ala. 2003). “When parties execute

successive agreements and the two agreements cover the same subject matter and include

inconsistent terms, the later agreement supersedes the earlier agreement.” Hunter v. Wilshire

Credit Corp., 927 So.2d 810, 814 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Cavalier, 862 So.2d at 641); see

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12 Although Holcim repeatedly alleges that a fact question exists, it does not identify

what disputed fact or facts must be decided to resolve the question of which indemnity

agreement governs, nor does it indicate what evidence would be needed to resolve any such fact

question.

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generally Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 408 (“A contract containing a term inconsistent

with a term of an earlier contract between the same parties is interpreted as including an

agreement to rescind the inconsistent term in the earlier contract.”). Thus, a plain reading of

Cavalier and Hunter establishes that, as a matter of law, the indemnity provision in the February

2003 Supply Agreement trumps that set forth in the March 2002 Agreement.

Notwithstanding these clear precedents, Holcim maintains that genuine issues of fact

remain as to which indemnity provision (both of which were drafted by Holcim) controls.12 To

reach this conclusion, Holcim embarks on a tortured interpretation of the Supply Agreement. 

Holcim focuses on Section 2(B) of that Agreement, which provides that “the specifications for

the Goods in the Raw Silos bid package, dated 1/21/03 ... are incorporated by reference into the

Agreement.” One page of that 178-page bid package was an unsigned “Indemnity and Hold

Harmless Agreement” form riddled with blanks, but otherwise quite similar to the March 2002

Agreement. The bid package form (like the March 2002 Agreement, but unlike the indemnity

provision found in Exhibit A of the Supply Agreement) lacked a statement that no indemnity

obligation would attach to losses attributable to Holcim’s negligence or willful misconduct. 

Comparing the form in the bid package to the indemnity clause in Exhibit A to the Supply

Agreement, Holcim finds a conflict. Because Section 3(A) of the Supply Agreement provides

that in the event of any conflict between the terms of the Supply Agreement (other than Exhibit

A) and the terms of Exhibit A, the Supply Agreement controls, Holcim argues that the blank,

unsigned, and incomplete Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement in the bid package must

constitute the governing indemnity agreement between the parties, nullifying the indemnity

provision in Exhibit A.

This strained logic cannot withstand scrutiny and it cannot create a genuine issue of fact. 

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Holcim, there is no basis for concluding

that the blank indemnity form in the bid package amounts to “specifications for the Goods in the

Raw Silos bid package.” How could an indemnity agreement be deemed a “specification” for

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“Goods,” which is defined as the service and material that ISOM was supplying to Holcim in the

Raw Silos project? It couldn’t, unless one ignores the common, everyday definition of the term

“specifications,” as “a statement prescribing materials, dimensions, and quality of work for

something to be built, installed, or manufactured.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language (4th ed.). Under the ordinary meaning of the term, then, “specifications” is not a

comprehensive enumeration of all terms and conditions of a parties’ contractual relationship. 

The Court cannot construe the contract in a manner that ignores the term’s plain meaning. See H

& S Homes, L.L.C. v. Shaner, 940 So.2d 981, 988 (Ala. 2006) (“When a court construes a

contract, the clear and plain meaning of the terms of the contract are to be given effect, and the

parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state.”) (citations omitted); Homes

of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So.2d 741, 746 (Ala. 2000) (“Where there is no indication

that the terms of the contract are used in a special or technical sense, they will be given their

ordinary, plain, and natural meaning.”). The fallacy of Holcim’s construction is underscored by

the Supply Agreement’s use of the term “specifications” in the following context: “Buyer shall

reserve the right at any time to change any Order (whether by adjustment order or otherwise) as

to Specifications, delivery, packaging, or means of shipment.” (Doc. 71, Exh. C, ¶ 3(D).) Surely

Holcim was not intending by this clause to reserve the right to change the indemnity provision at

any time, but was instead referring to the materials, dimensions and quality of work to be

performed by ISOM. In short, then, “the specifications for the Goods” incorporated into the

Supply Agreement have nothing to do with an indemnity provision.

Furthermore, it would be absurd to assign primacy to an unsigned, incomplete indemnity

agreement that Holcim had secreted within a 178-page bid package, over a completed indemnity

provision set forth in a Supply Agreement executed by the parties just days before the accident. 

Nor has Holcim pointed to any evidence tending to show that Holcim ever communicated to

ISOM, much less that ISOM ever agreed, that this blank indemnity form contained in the bid

package (missing such critical terms as consideration, the agreement or purchase order to which

it applied, the choice of law, and supplemental terms) would eclipse the very clear indemnity

provision set forth in Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement.

“General contract law requires a court to enforce, as it is written, an unambiguous and

lawful contract.” Drummond Co. v. Walter Industries, Inc., --- So.2d ----, 2006 WL 3462146,

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 12 of 23
13 In determining that the indemnity provision set forth in Exhibit A to the Supply

Agreement is controlling, the Court declines ISOM’s invitation to examine parol evidence

concerning what the parties subjectively thought or believed the controlling indemnity provision

was. After all, “[i]t is well-settled ... that absent some evidence of fraud, mistake, or illegality,

parties to a contract may not, by parol evidence, vary the terms of an unambiguous instrument. ...

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.” Lloyd Noland Foundation,

Inc. v. City of Fairfield Healthcare Authority, 837 So.2d 253, 266 (Ala. 2002) (internal

quotations and citations omitted); see also Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. deCelle, 722 So.2d 760, 762

(Ala. 1998) (describing general rule that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, add

to or subtract from terms of written contract, except that such evidence will be allowed to clarify

an ambiguous contract); Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d

932, 942 (Ala. 1983) (“Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to interpret a contract only if the trial

judge finds as a matter of law that the contract is ambiguous.”) (citation omitted). There being

no ambiguity in the Supply Agreement with respect to the indemnity provision, parol evidence is

not admissible to clarify its meaning.

-13-

*24 (Ala. Dec. 1, 2006). The Court finds that the Supply Agreement unambiguously includes a

written indemnification provision in paragraph 9 of Exhibit A. The Court further finds that the

blank indemnity form in the bid package does not fall within the plain meaning of the phrase

“specifications for the Goods” and therefore was not incorporated in the Supply Agreement. 

Holcim has identified no basis for its labored, overreaching definition of the term “specifications

for the Goods.” As such, there is no conflict between the terms of the Supply Agreement and the

terms of the indemnification provision in Exhibit A thereto, so paragraph 3(A) of the Supply

Agreement is inapplicable. Simply put, the unambiguous terms of the Supply Agreement

include one and only one indemnification provision, namely, that found in Exhibit A. By

operation of law, and pursuant to Cavalier and Hunter, the indemnification provision in the

February 2003 Supply Agreement rescinds and supersedes the “Indemnity and Hold Harmless

Agreement” executed by ISOM some 11 months earlier. Accordingly, it is the finding of this

Court, as a matter of law, that the indemnification provision set forth in Paragraph 9 of Exhibit A

to the Supply Agreement fixes ISOM’s indemnification obligations to Holcim arising from

White’s accident, which occurred just days after execution of that Supply Agreement.13

B. Do the Allegations of the White Action Complaint Preclude Indemnity?

The focal point of ISOM’s Motion for Summary Judgment is its contention that the $4

million in settlement proceeds from the White Action for which Holcim seeks indemnity is

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 13 of 23
-14-

beyond the scope of Supply Agreement’s indemnity provision. The Court agrees.

Alabama courts subject agreements by which one party agrees to indemnify another for

the other’s acts or omissions to careful scrutiny. See Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Whitaker

Contracting Corp., 824 So.2d 747, 752 (Ala. 2002). Indeed, in Brown Mechanical Contractors,

Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 932 (Ala. 1983), the Alabama Supreme Court recognized

that under Alabama law, indemnification is available for one’s own negligence “only where the

parties knowingly ... enter into an agreement whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other,

including indemnity against the indemnitee’s own wrongs, if expressed in clear and unequivocal

language.” Id. at 945 (citation omitted); Royal Ins. Co., 824 So.2d at 752 (“An agreement by

one person to indemnify another for the other’s negligent conduct is enforceable only if the

indemnity provisions are unambiguous and unequivocal.”) (citation omitted); see also Crigler v.

Salac, 438 So.2d 1375, 1386 (Ala. 1983) (no right to indemnification where agreement lacked

clear indication of intention to indemnify against negligence of indemnitee). Thus, the general

rule in Alabama is “that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the

indemnitee against losses resulting from his own negligent acts unless such intention is

expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, or unless no other meaning can be ascribed to it.” 

Royal Ins. Co., 824 So.2d at 752 (citation omitted). “[T]he burden of proof is on the indemnitee

to establish the requirements set forth above before the indemnitee is entitled to indemnification

under such an agreement.” Id. at 753.

Far from containing clear and unequivocal language extending an indemnity obligation to

Holcim’s own wrongdoing, the Supply Agreement’s indemnity provision unequivocally states

that ISOM shall have no obligation to indemnify Holcim against any losses “to the extent such

losses are attributable to the negligence or willful misconduct of [Holcim].” Thus, if the

settlement proceeds in the White Action represent losses attributable to Holcim’s negligence or

willful misconduct, then ISOM owes no indemnity obligation to Holcim for those amounts. By

contrast, if those settlement proceeds are not losses attributable to Holcim’s negligence or willful

misconduct, then they do fall within the scope of that indemnity provision.

Inspection of the complaint in the White Action reveals that the Whites were suing

Holcim and two of its managers (Odom and Thierry) for negligence, willfulness and wantonness

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 14 of 23
14 Holcim is quick to point out that the White Action complaint also purports to

assert claims against some 120 fictitious defendants. That fact is irrelevant to the Court’s

analysis. To the extent that Holcim means to imply that the specific allegations of negligence,

willfulness and wantonness directed at “defendants” in the White Action could also have

encompassed ISOM because ISOM might have been one of those fictitious defendants, such an

argument must fail. Alabama law is clear that a defendant may be listed as a fictitious party only

“[w]hen a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in the party’s

pleading.” Rule 9(h), Ala.R.Civ.P.; see also Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916

So.2d 594, 597-98 (Ala. 2005) (fictitious party pleading contemplates that “the plaintiff must

have been ignorant of the true identity of the defendant and must have used due diligence in

attempting to discover it”). Obviously, White was fully aware of ISOM’s identity when he filed

the state-court complaint because he was an employee of ISOM; therefore, ISOM could not

logically have been included amidst the fictitious parties. Besides, any claims White might have

wished to assert against ISOM would have been barred by the exclusivity of the workers’

compensation remedy.

-15-

based on a panoply of acts and omissions by those defendants.14 By way of illustration, the statecourt complaint alleged that Holcim, Odom and Thierry had proximately caused White’s injuries

by negligently exposing him to a hazardous job site, failing to secure the boards covering the

hole in the floor, failing to install or maintain safety rails, failing to discover and eliminate

hazardous conditions on their job site, failing to institute effective safety procedures on the job

site, failing to conduct adequate safety inspections, and failing to post warning signs or

barricades around the hole in the floor. Nothing in the state-court complaint states or can

reasonably be read as suggesting that the Whites sought to hold Holcim liable through some sort

of pass-through or vicarious liability for ISOM’s negligence or wrongdoing; rather, the statecourt pleadings are quite clear that the Whites sought relief from Holcim for the negligent,

willful, and wanton acts and omissions of Holcim itself.

Notwithstanding the plain language of the White Action complaint, Holcim urges this

Court to recast the state-court lawsuit as something else because “there is no evidence in the

record of negligence or willful misconduct by Holcim, [and] the record is replete with evidence

of negligent conduct by ISOM which caused or contributed to the injury suffered by White.” 

(Opposition Brief (doc. 86), at 8.) Holcim identifies substantial record evidence that it contends

supports its characterization that ISOM is to blame for the accident that befell White on February

23, 2003. The defect with this argument is that it ignores the undeniable and irrefutable fact that

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 15 of 23
15 The only authority cited by Holcim on this issue is Tobias v. FirstEnergy Nuclear

Operating Co., 2004 WL 4910146, (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2004). Aside from being unpublished and

-16-

the White Action sounded exclusively in alleged negligence, willfulness and wantonness by

Holcim, not by ISOM. “[A]n indemnitee cannot transform the underlying claim by the injured

party into a different lawsuit by making allegations of negligence against the indemnitor in a

subsequent action for indemnity.” McNally & Nimergood v. Neumann-Kiewit Constructors,

Inc., 648 N.W.2d 564, 578 (Iowa 2002). 

Holcim argues that the Court must look behind the state-court complaint in determining

whether the settlement payment falls within the scope of the indemnity provision, while ISOM

insists that the Court is limited to the face of the state-court pleadings. Unfortunately, the

parties’ briefs on this question are largely unhelpful, as neither side has cited a single published

authority from any jurisdiction to support their respective positions on this crucial question. 

That said, the Court’s research has disclosed a number of decisions (albeit none from Alabama)

in which courts have held that amounts paid by an indemnitee in settlement of a suit sounding in

negligence by that indemnitee are necessarily the result of the indemnitee’s own negligence,

such that the indemnitee cannot recover those settlement proceeds under an indemnity provision

that excludes indemnification for the indemnitee’s negligent conduct. See, e.g., McNally, 648

N.W.2d at 578 (“When the underlying litigation settled by a potential indemnitee was limited to

allegations of the indemnitee’s own negligence not covered under the indemnification

agreement, there can be no claim for indemnity because the amount paid in the settlement could

only have been the result of the indemnitee’s own noncovered negligence.”); Fifield v. South Hill

Ltd. Partnership, 20 F. Supp.2d 366, (D. Conn. 1998) (in indemnity action brought by premises

owner where contractor’s employee was injured on job site, any liability by premises owner to

employee was necessarily based on premises owner’s own negligence, thereby precluding

premises owner from receiving indemnity from contractor given that indemnity clauses excluded

recovery for premises owner’s negligence); Gray v. Cleaning Systems and Suppliers, Inc., 834 F.

Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (opining that indemnity clause is inapplicable where it provided

that employer could only be liable to shipper if shipper’s liability was not based on negligence,

but shipper could only be liable to plaintiff if its conduct were negligent).15

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 16 of 23
from a different jurisdiction, Tobias is readily distinguishable on its face. The Tobias court did

not purport to declare a blanket rule that courts must always look behind the allegations of the

underlying complaint to determine whether the indemnitee was or was not negligent. Rather,

Tobias involved a scenario in which the indemnitee had been granted summary judgment in the

underlying claims based on a judicial determination that the indemnitee had not been negligent. 

In the subsequent indemnity proceedings brought by the indemnitee to recover its costs of

defending the underlying suit, the Tobias court found that the indemnitee was not barred from

such recovery by the mere allegations of negligence in the underlying suit given the prior

judicial determination that the indemnitee was not, in fact, negligent. Here, by contrast, there

was no such judicial determination in the underlying state-court litigation; instead, the Whites

sued Holcim for Holcim’s own negligence, willfulness and wantonness, and Holcim and its

insurer paid $4 million to settle those claims of Holcim’s wrongdoing.

16 The deposition excerpt at issue includes statements that counsel was concerned

that Holcim could be held liable “if there was evidence of control [by Holcim] in the method and

manner in which the work was done.” (Stott Dep., at 76.) That control, and the negligent

exercise of same, would still be negligence attributable to Holcim, rather than mere vicarious

-17-

These authorities hew to eminently sensible reasoning. After all, if an indemnitee is sued

by a third party for claims sounding exclusively in wrongdoing by that indemnitee, and the

indemnitee settles the claims, it would defy logic and common sense to find that those “losses”

(i.e., the settlement payments) are attributable to anything other than the indemnitee’s own

wrongdoing. At the very least, it would appear incumbent on the indemnitee to show that those

payments were actually made to avoid exposure to pass-through or vicarious liability, rather than

to avoid a reasonable possibility of liability for its own misdeeds. Holcim alludes to this

motivation, in an off-handed manner, by stating in conclusory terms that it settled the White

Action because of “a concern that, under Alabama law, Holcim would be held liable for the

actions of ISOM.” (Opposition Brief, at 13.) Holcim does not expound on this assertion, much

less offer a cogent recitation of the principles of Alabama law that it felt would expose it to

liability in the White Action for ISOM’s misconduct, even in the absence of any negligence by

Holcim and notwithstanding the unequivocal allegations in the state-court complaint that the

Whites were accusing Holcim of negligence, wantonness and willfulness and not simply

attempting to hold it liable vicariously for ISOM’s conduct. The Court will not endeavor to

construct Holcim’s argument for it, or to piece it together from a fragmentary deposition excerpt

taken from Holcim’s counsel in the White Action.16 If Holcim believes that the White Action

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 17 of 23
liability in the absence of any negligent acts or omissions by Holcim; therefore, even if the Court

were to try to erect Holcim’s argument for it from the deposition excerpts provided, that

argument would still land well shy of establishing that Holcim settled the White Action for some

reason other than to avoid liability for claims that it had negligently exercised control over the

job site.

17 Holcim has not argued that its settlement of the White Action was permissible

under a “purely voluntary” theory or that such settlement was motivated by non-legal reasons;

therefore, the Court has no occasion to consider lines of authority examining the issue from that

angle. To the contrary, Holcim’s evidence is that, while it disclaimed liability in the settlement

papers, it settled the White Action because of concern that the Whites would carry the day

against it at trial. (Stott Dep., at 75-77 (referencing witness testimony that Holcim had done “a

lot of different things” to control the job site where the injury occurred).)

-18-

exposed it to liability for something other than its own negligence and misconduct, then it must

explain to this Court how it could be so. It has not, but has simply asked this Court to accept on

faith that such is the case.17

In short, Holcim cannot prevail on its claims of contractual indemnity against ISOM for

the following reasons: (1) the controlling indemnity provision was drafted by Holcim and has an

exclusion for losses attributable to Holcim’s negligence or willful misconduct, without limiting

that exclusion to “active negligence” or the like; (2) the White Action was predicated exclusively

on the negligence, willfulness or wantonness of Holcim (and its agents, Odom and Thierry); (3)

in settling the White Action, Holcim resolved claims that it had engaged in negligent, wanton

and willful conduct, based on apparent concern that Holcim had in fact exercised control over

the job site in a manner that could be deemed negligent; (4) losses incurred by Holcim in settling

the White Action were necessarily attributable to Holcim’s own negligence or willful misconduct

because those were the only claims brought in the White Action; and (5) Holcim’s post hoc

attempt to transform the White Action into a case about mere vicarious liability for Holcim

resulting from negligent acts by ISOM cannot succeed, as a matter of law, because it conflicts

with the plain language of the pleadings in the White Action and because Holcim has made no

showing that Alabama law would allow Holcim to be held liable in the White Action for

anything other than Holcim’s own negligence or willful misconduct.

C. Is Holcim Entitled to Common Law Indemnity?

In the alternative, Holcim seeks to hold ISOM liable under a theory of common law

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 18 of 23
18 See also Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 101 (Wyo.

1983) (“Implied theories of indemnity are not viable in the face of an express indemnity

agreement.”) (collecting numerous cases); Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales

Corp., 453 F. Supp. 527, 539-40 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (“a written contract of indemnity will govern

the parties’ relationship and make common law indemnity inapplicable”); Southern Pac. Co. v.

Morrison-Knudsen Co., 338 P.2d 665, 670 (Or. 1959) (“When a contractual theory is employed

to effectuate recovery, the common-law tort doctrines of contribution and indemnity are

abrogated or superseded for the purpose of determining liability, although the contractual claim

arises out of a liability flowing from the indemnitee’s negligent conduct.”); Installation Services,

Inc. v. Crown Castle Broadcast USA Corp., 2006 WL 2024220, *9 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2006)

(explaining that a plaintiff cannot recover under a theory of implied indemnity where parties

have entered into a written indemnity agreement).

-19-

indemnity. To be sure, Alabama courts have allowed common law indemnity claims where a

joint wrongdoer “has not been guilty of any fault, except technically or constructively, or where

both parties are fault, but the fault of the party from whom indemnity is claimed was the

proximate or primary cause of the injury.” Crigler, 438 So.2d at 1385; see also SouthTrust Bank

v. Jones, Morrison, Womack & Dearing, P.C., 939 So.2d 885, 902 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). But

there is an insuperable obstacle to Holcim succeeding on a common law indemnity claim here,

inasmuch as a clear majority of courts have found that a party is proscribed from recovering on

an implied indemnity theory where the parties executed an express written indemnity agreement. 

See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wisconsin v. Lutz, 71 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir.

1995) (“We agree that the existence of a separate indemnification agreement dictates that the

rights of the parties will be determined according to that document,” rather than implied

indemnity princples); Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Pacific-Peru Const. Corp., 558 F.2d

948, 953 (9th Cir. 1977) (“resort to implied indemnity principles is improper when an express

indemnification contract exists”).18

Holcim has no answer to this line of authority, and indeed “acknowledges that the

existence of a contractual right of indemnity may preempt its common law rights.” (Opposition

Brief, at 14.) Such an acknowledgment is prudent. This Court joins the myriad authorities cited

above and finds that parties’ rights to common law indemnity are cut off where those parties

enter into an express indemnity agreement, through which they themselves delineate when and

under what circumstances an indemnification obligation will arise. As such, common law

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 19 of 23
19 In particular, although Ohio Casualty’s initial brief raises all of these issues, it is

abundantly clear from Holcim’s response (doc. 84) that Holcim does not contend that the

Certificate of Insurance issued to it renders it an additional insured. Moreover, there is no

evidence that the Ohio Casualty policy required an endorsement as a necessary precondition to

Holcim being deemed an additional insured. Also, Ohio Casualty’s arguments concerning

whether ISOM was contractually bound to procure umbrella coverage for Holcim and whether

Holcim waived any such non-performance by ISOM are red herrings because Holcim has

asserted no such causes of action against ISOM. Stripped to its essence, the question being

litigated in Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment is simply whether Holcim is

rendered an “additional insured” by virtue of the indemnity agreement set forth at Paragraph 9 of

Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement.

-20-

indemnity principles are inapplicable here, and ISOM is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor

as a matter of law on that cause of action.

V. Analysis of Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Also before the Court is Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 73), in

which it seeks judgment in its favor as a matter of law on both Ohio Casualty’s claims against

Holcim for declaratory judgment, and on Holcim’s counterclaim for breach of contract. Ohio

Casualty provided commercial umbrella coverage to ISOM at the time of White’s injury. 

Holcim’s position is that it is an “additional insured” on the Ohio Casualty policy and that Ohio

Casualty is therefore contractually obligated to extend coverage to Holcim for the $4 million that

Holcim and Holcim’s insurer “advanced” to settle the White Action.

The parties’ briefs address numerous tangentially relevant issues, such as the Certificate

of Insurance issued to Holcim, the lack of an endorsement on the Ohio Casualty policy adding

Holcim as an additional insured, whether ISOM satisfied its contractual duty to procure

commercial umbrella coverage for Holcim, whether Holcim waived any such non-performance

by ISOM, and the like. None of those issues need be addressed to resolve the Motion for

Summary Judgment because they involve claims and allegations that either have not been joined

in this lawsuit, or that are not germane to Holcim’s theory of liability.19

The crux of the parties’ legal dispute with respect to the claims by and against Ohio

Casualty is a single discrete issue. Holcim contends that it is an “additional insured” under the

Ohio Casualty policy because the indemnity agreement(s) between Holcim and ISOM constitute

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 20 of 23
20 This dispute can be resolved by reference to the plain language of the Ohio

Casualty policy; therefore, the Court declines to consider the parol evidence offered by Ohio

Casualty to show that Holcim and Holcim’s insurer believed that Holcim would not qualify as an

additional insured under the Ohio Casualty policy. See, e.g., Brown Mechanical, 431 So.2d at

942 (“Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to interpret a contract only if the trial judge finds as a

matter of law that the contract is ambiguous.”).

21 The previous March 2002 indemnity agreement had been rescinded or superseded

by operation of law when the February 2003 Supply Agreement was executed; therefore, that

earlier agreement is not applicable to this analysis. Likewise, the blank form agreement in the

bid package was neither executed nor incorporated into the Supply Agreement, so it cannot

constitute an “insured contract.”

-21-

“insured contracts” that confer upon it “additional insured” status. Ohio Casualty disagrees.20

The Court has already found, in section IV, supra, that the only operative indemnity agreement

between Holcim and ISOM at the time of White’s injury was the indemnity provision contained

in Paragraph 9 of Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement; therefore, this argument will be evaluated

by reference to that agreement alone.21

The Ohio Casualty policy defines “insured” as including “[a]ny person or organization ...

included as an additional ‘Insured’ by virtue of an ‘insured contract,’ and to which coverage is

provided by the ‘underlying insurance,’ and for no broader coverage than is provided by the

‘underlying insurance’ to such additional ‘Insured’.” (Doc. 75, Exh. A, at 11.) The term

“insured contract” is defined as “any oral or written contract or agreement entered by you and

pertaining to your business under which you assume the ‘tort liability’ of another party to pay for

‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to a third person or organization .... ‘Tort liability’ means a

civil liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement.” (Id.)

Holcim argues, and Ohio Casualty does not contest, that Holcim was covered by the

underlying insurance and that Holcim seeks no broader coverage under the Ohio Casualty policy

than was provided by such underlying insurance. Nor can there be any genuine dispute that the

indemnity provision in Exhibit A to the Supply Agreement was an “insured contract,” as defined

in the Ohio Casualty policy, inasmuch as it plainly is a written agreement entered into by ISOM

and pertaining to its business under which it assumed Holcim’s tort liability to pay for bodily

injury or property damage to a third party.

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 21 of 23
22 In addition to the rationale set forth supra, this interpretation is bolstered by three

points. First, the “Coverage” section of the Ohio Casualty policy states that coverage will be

provided for certain excess amounts “assumed by the ‘Insured’ under an ‘insured contract.’”

(Doc. 75, Exh. A, at 5.) ISOM did not assume the losses claimed by Holcim in the governing

indemnity provision that constitutes the “insured contract” in this case; therefore, there can be no

coverage under the plain language of the policy. Second, the Eleventh Circuit has found in a

similar situation that “Ohio Casualty’s policy covers to the extent of [the indemnitor]’s

obligation pursuant to its contract indemnifying [the indemnitee].” Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007). As determined in Twin City, there is

no coverage to Holcim under the Ohio Casualty policy for losses beyond ISOM’s indemnity

obligation to Holcim. Third, Holcim argued in its brief that “the Ohio Casualty Policy covers

Holcim to the extent of ISOM’s obligation pursuant to its contract indemnifying Holcim.” 

(Opposition Brief (doc. 84), at 21.) Holcim seeks coverage here going beyond ISOM’s

obligation in the indemnity agreement; therefore, there is no coverage under Holcim’s own

formulation of the issue.

-22-

The sole remaining question is whether Holcim is “included as an additional ‘Insured’ by

virtue of an ‘insured contract.’” Of course, in the “insured contract” in this case, ISOM only

assumed Holcim’s tort liability for bodily injury that was not attributable to Holcim’s negligence

or willful misconduct. The Court has already found, supra, that the settlement proceeds paid by

Holcim and its insurer in the White Action are necessarily losses attributable to Holcim’s

negligence or willful misconduct because those were the only claims made by the Whites against

Holcim. Accordingly, Holcim is claiming “additional insured” status under the Ohio Casualty

policy to obtain coverage for a loss that falls outside the scope of the “insured contract” on

which Holcim predicates its “additional insured” status. Holcim does not explain, and the Court

cannot fathom how, Holcim could be deemed an “additional insured” with respect to the White

Action settlement when the “insured contract” on which Holcim relies for such “additional

insured” status did not apply to that settlement. Stated differently, Holcim can be covered under

the Ohio Casualty policy as an additional insured only as to losses within the scope of the

“insured contract” that gives rise to its additional insured status.22 Therefore, the Court finds that

with respect to the losses for which Holcim seeks insurance coverage in these proceedings,

Holcim was not “an additional ‘Insured’ by virtue of an ‘insured contract,’” because the “insured

contract” specifically excluded the types of losses for which Holcim now demands coverage. 

This determination is fatal to Holcim’s attempts to obtain coverage under the Ohio Casualty

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 22 of 23
23 In light of this determination, the Court declines to reach the parties’ arguments

concerning whether Holcim’s claims would be barred by the policy’s “Cross Suits Exclusion”

even if Holcim were an additional insured by virtue of an insured contract with respect to the

losses in question.

-23-

policy, and is dispositive of Holcim’s Motion for Summary Judgment.23

VI. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Counter Defendant Industrial Services of Mobile, Inc.’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. 69) is granted, and the counterclaims brought against it by

Holcim (US) Inc., Edward J. Thierry, Jr. and Dennis R. Odom are dismissed with

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff / Counter Defendant Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 73) is granted. Judgment will be entered in Ohio Casualty’s favor on all

claims in this action. The counterclaims brought against it by Holcim (US) Inc.,

Edward J. Thierry, Jr. and Dennis R. Odom are dismissed with prejudice. 

Additionally, the Court hereby declares that Ohio Casualty is not obligated to

indemnify Holcim (US), Inc., Edward J. Thierry, Jr. or Dennis Odom for the

claims or settlement in the underlying lawsuit from which this action arose.

3. A separate judgment will enter.

DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of September, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00317-WS-M Document 99 Filed 09/25/07 Page 23 of 23