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Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-20290

Summary Calendar

DAVID K. BROYLES; SHELLIE GALIK BROYLES; MICHAEL S. COOPER;

BERNICE F. GILMORE; FREDERICK B. HOWDEN, IV; ERIC JONES;

STACEY JONES; BRIAN C. KIMMELL; BRIAN E. KOONS; JAMES R.

MCKEAN; CHARLES D. MCWILLIAMS; JERRY MOSBACHER; FAYE

JESSIE OLIVER; WILLIE IRVIN; MARTIN G. PARR; JAMES E. RITTER;

CHERYL STALINSKY; LISA H. THEUT; JAMES A. WINNE, III,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

STATE OF TEXAS, Ex rel Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General and Ex rel

Phil Wilson, Texas Secretary of State; FORT BEND COUNTY, Ex rel Robert

E. Hebert County Judge and Ex rel Dianne Wilson County Clerk; WESTON

LAKES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and its Board of

Trustees; HERBERT S. YATES; PATRICK A. HARRIS; CHARLES V.

FLOWERS; RHONDA ZACHARIAS, Personally and Individually; WESTON

LAKES COMMUNITY INCORPORATION PROJECT COMMITTEE, Ex rel

Clifton H. Aldrich, its chairman; CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR

INCORPORATION OF WESTON LAKES, Ex rel Clifton H. Aldrich, its

chairman,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:08-CV-2320

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 11, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 09-20290 Document: 00511140063 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/11/2010
No. 09-20290

PER CURIAM:

*

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Appellants are residents and property owners who challenge a municipal

incorporation election held in May 2008, in which Weston Lakes, a private gated

community in Fort Bend County, Texas and adjacent land were incorporated as

the City of Weston Lakes. The neighborhood is a 1,400-acre continuous tract

with a guardhouse, security gates, swimming pool, country club, and golf course,

with common areas, easements, and roads maintained by a nonprofit corporation

under a lengthy set of covenants and by-laws. The community has about 800

residences and 427 vacant lots. Some residents receive water and sewage

services from a private provider while others receive such services from the local

Municipal Utility District. Owners of lots in Weston Lakes pay annual dues and

maintenance fees to the nonprofit that administers the common areas. The

incorporated area also includes some adjoining landowners who do not pay dues.

In January 2008, residents gathered enough signatures to place an

incorporation vote on the ballot. Pursuant to Texas Local Government Code

§ 7.006, the vote was open only to residents of the proposed incorporation area,

while non-resident landowners were not permitted to vote. The vote was 58 to

42 percent in favor of incorporation, with nearly three-quarters of eligible voters

coming to the polls. Appellants alleged that the process leading up to the

incorporation vote was rushed, secretive, and tilted in favor of incorporation;

that the notice required by the Texas incorporation law was not given; that

meeting attendees were not told that a vote was imminent; and that there was

improper bullying of anti-incorporation voters at the polling place. They sought

a declaratory judgment that § 7.006 is unconstitutional because it discriminates

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 09-20290

against non-resident landowners. They also alleged that the State of Texas and

Fort Bend County violated the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq., and the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 15302 et seq., through various failures in the voting process. Appellants also

brought various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against

state and county officials for constitutional violations caused by “fatal errors” at

the polls. They also brought additional state law claims. In a lengthy order, the

district court granted Appellees’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the federal law

claims and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. See Broyles v.

Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. Tex. 2009). After additional briefing, the

district court denied Appellants’ motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing

and then awarded attorney’s fees of less than $12,000 to Fort Bend County and

various individual plaintiffs. See Broyles v. Texas, 2009 WL 2215781 (S.D. Tex.

July 23, 2009). This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim

under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.

2007). In considering whether dismissal was appropriate, we must accept as true

all well-pleaded facts. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). “To

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed

factual allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to

relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier, 503 F.3d at 401 (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

We review a district court’s award of attorney’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

for abuse of discretion. See Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 595 (5th Cir. 2009).

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DISCUSSION

Appellants raise three issues on appeal. First, they argue that the district

court committed error when it granted the motion to dismiss as to the

unconstitutionality of Texas Local Government Code § 7.006. Second, they argue

that the district court applied the wrong standard in resolving the Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Third, they argue that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Appellants’

motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing prior to awarding attorney’s

fees.

Texas Local Government Code § 7.006 permits only qualified voters “who

reside[] within the boundaries of the proposed municipality” to vote on

incorporation. Appellants allege that the exclusion of non-resident landowners

is an equal protection violation. This claim is not supported by case law. “[A]

government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political

processes to those who reside within its borders” and such a restriction does not

violate the Equal Protection Clause. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439

U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978). The fact that non-residents may be affected by a

municipality’s actions does not mean that non-residents “have a constitutional

right to participate in the political processes bringing it about.” Id. at 69.

Appellants’ attempt to distinguish the facts of the instant case from Holt fail.

Appellants also challenge the standard of review employed by the district

court in ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) motions before it. The district court cited and

applied the standard drawn from Twombly, which requires that a complaint

must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

550 U.S. at 570. Twombly abrogated the “no set of facts” standard first

articulated in Conley v. Gibson. Id. at 546 (“Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language .

. . is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading

standard.”). Appellants dismiss this language from Twombly as dicta, but in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court confirmed that this pleading standard applied

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broadly to all civil complaints. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). The district court

correctly applied this standard and, in a lengthy order, dismissed the Appellants’

federal claims because the complaint did not contain enough facts to state a

plausible constitutional or statutory claim for relief, and denied leave to amend

as futile. We affirm this finding.

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Finally, we find no error in the award of attorney’s fees. A prevailing party

in a § 1983 suit may obtain reasonable attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1998(b);

see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 410 (1978)

(prevailing defendant may obtain reasonable attorney’s fees). A prevailing

defendant, however, must prove that a suit was frivolous or groundless to

recover such fees. See No Barriers, Inc v. Brinker Chili’s Tex., Inc., 262 F.3d 498,

498 (5th Cir. 2001). A party has no due process right to an evidentiary hearing

if the district court has before it all the information upon which the decision to

award fees would be based. See Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234,

236 (5th Cir. 1990). The district found that even when all allegations in the

complaint were taken as true, they “fell far short of what is necessary to state

a claim under § 1983.” Broyles, 2009 WL 2215781 at *5. The district court then

reviewed briefs from the parties and extensive submissions of billing documents,

denied some fee requests, reduced others, and determined reasonable attorney’s

fees. Id. at *9-18. This was not an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. All outstanding motions are

denied as moot.

The district court dismissed the NVRAand HAVA claims because those statutes apply 1

only to federal, not local, elections; dismissed the § 1983 claims because there was no

constitutional or federal statutory violation caused by these “garden variety” election

irregularities; and dismissed the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims because there was no plausible

allegation of racial discrimination. These findings were not in error.

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