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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~nited Stat~ (',o:J.ttf?! Ap~b TG1t~ C!reut J 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 2 7 i992 

B & W GLASS, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WEATHER SHIELD MFG., INC., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ROBE~T L. HOECKEE 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 90-8061 

) (D.C. No. 88-0295J) 

) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc. appeals from a 

judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff B & W Glass, Inc. In 

findings of fact and conclusions of law entered following a 

mistrial, the district court ruled in favor of B & Won a contract 

claim it asserted under a promissory estoppel theory. 1 Upon our 

initial review of this appeal, we certified the following question 

to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 11.01: 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 1
Under the law of the State of Wyoming, may an oral 

promise otherwise within the statute of frauds as 

pronounced in Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201 (1991) and the 

Uniform Commercial Code, nevertheless be enforceable on 

the basis of promissory estoppel? See Restatement 

(Second) of Contracts§ 90 (1981). 

The Wyoming Supreme Court has now answered that question in the 

affirmative. B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., No. 

91-123, slip op. at 1, 1992 WL 70136 (Wyo. Apr. 10, 1992). With 

the aid of this decision, we consider this appeal. See id. slip 

op. at 4 (federal appellate court retains jurisdiction to consider 

appeal following certification to state court). 

Weather Shield's appeal raises four points of error. They 

are: 1) that the district court erred in ruling that Wyoming 

would recognize promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute 

of frauds, 2) that the court erred in its consideration of 

evidence on the reasonable reliance aspect of the promissory 

estoppel claim, 3) that the court erred in failing to direct a 

verdict in favor of Weather Shield, and 4) that the court erred in 

granting damages on the promissory estoppel claim. Because the 

facts of this case were set out in some detail in our 

certification order, and are contained in the Wyoming Supreme 

Court's decision, we will not outline them here. 

immediately to Weather Shield's arguments. 

Thus we turn 

Weather Shield's first point of error was addressed in the 

Wyoming Supreme Court's decision. The court held, 

Consistently with the majority rule and the law in 

Wyoming relating to general statutes of frauds, we 

conclude that promissory estoppel can and does justify 

the enforcement of an oral promise otherwise within the 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 2
statute of frauds in the UCC, as articulated in Wyo. 

Stat. § 34.1-2-201 (1991). Under the foregoing 

analysis, our answer to the certified question is "yes". 

B & W Glass, Inc., No. 91-123, slip op. at 13. In light of this 

decision, we affirm the district court on Weather Shield's first 

point of error. 

The remainder of Weather Shield's arguments are concerned 

with whether, assuming the ability to bring the promissory 

estoppel claim, B & W proved all the necessary elements. To the 

extent Weather Shield's arguments are based on alleged fault in 

the court's factual findings, those findings are reviewed under a 

clearly erroneous standard. Willner v. University of Kan., 848 

F.2d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 

(1989). Any legal determinations are reviewed de novo. In re 

Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). 

In order to prove a promissory estoppel claim in Wyoming, a 

party must prove 1) the existence of a definite agreement; 2) that 

the party asserting the estoppel acted to its detriment in 

reasonable reliance on the agreement; and 3) that the equities 

support enforcing the agreement . Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. 

v. Baker Hughes Tubular Servs, Inc., 812 P.2d 555, 559 (Wyo. 

1991). For purposes of evaluating this doctrine, a "definite 

agreement" is defined as "a promise which the promisor should 

reasonably expect to induce action ... on the part of the 

promisee." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 90 

(1981)). We focus on these elements in discerning whether the 

district court's order should be affirmed. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 3
Weather Shield first argues that "the District Court erred as 

a matter of law in considering the conduct of the parties after 

B & W used Whether Shield's oral quote as a factor in determining 

whether B & W reasonably relied on the oral quotation." 

Appellant's Opening Br. at 26. In support of this proposition, 

Weather Shield relies on Roth v. First Security Bank, 684 P.2d 93 

( Wyo . 19 8 4 ) . 

In Roth, the plaintiff alleged he relied on statements a bank 

director made at a dinner party to begin certain construction 

projects. Id. at 96. Specifically, the director lead him to 

believe he would obtain a loan to finance his endeavors. The 

undisputed evidence showed, however, that the plaintiff entered 

into all but one contract prior to the date of the dinner party. 

Id. at 96-7. The court ruled there could be no estoppel claim 

because the sequence of events showed the plaintiff could not have 

relied on the director's statements to begin construction. See 

id. at 97. 

In addition, the court held plaintiff's reliance on the 

dinner party statements to enter into the one remaining contract 

was unreasonable. The court found the reliance unreasonable 

because the person making the statements had no authority to 

approve the loan which plaintiff sought. See id. at 97. The 

court stated, "Mr. Roth should have known that he did not have a 

loan or even a commitment for a loan from the bank until he [was] 

informed by the loan officer or bank official with whom he was 

dealing that the loan was approved." Id. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 4
In contrast, the record in this case supports a finding of 

reasonable reliance. This is the case even if the testimony which 

Weather Shield finds objectionable is disregarded. The court 

found the following facts relevant to the estoppel claim: 

The evidence showed that Doug Ludtke of B & W Glass 

contacted the defendant's agent, Robert Schwalbe, and 

discussed with him the possibility of purchasing custom 

windows for use on a courthouse project on which the 

plaintiff was planning to submit a bid. The defendant's 

agent advised Doug Ludtke that the defendant Weather 

Shield manufactured custom windows and that it could 

supply custom windows for the project but they would 

cost more. Schwalbe was aware of the plans and 

specifications because he reviewed them with Doug 

Ludtke. On April 14, 1988, Schwalbe provided an oral 

quote to the plaintiff in the amount of $101,725. 

The quote was "without any exceptions," which under 

the trade usage meant that the quote was for products 

meeting plans and specifications . ... On the stand, 

Schwalbe testified that he made this quote but 

incredulously stated that it was not for windows meeting 

plans and specifications. He also testified that the 

defendant's policy was to produce shop drawings only 

when a contract existed. Schwalbe, however, did not 

inform the plaintiff of this requirement and throughout 

the summer and fall of 1988 assured the plaintiff that 

the shop drawings would be produced. 

Based on this quote and understanding, the 

plaintiff entered into a subcontract to install these 

windows at a courthouse project in Casper, Wyoming. 

Using the quote from the defendant, the plaintiff agreed 

to perform the work for $246,000. The evidence clearly 

showed that the parties contemplated a contract for the 

sale and purchase of custom windows meeting plans and 

specifications. It was not until December 1988, on the 

virtual eve of performance of the courthouse window 

project that the plaintiff was informed by another 

employee of the defendant that it would not and could 

not perform the agreement ente red into by Schwalbe. 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 78 at 3-4. Unlike the situation in Roth, Robert 

Schwalbe had full authority to make quotes binding Weather Shield. 

R. Supplemental Vol. II at 447. He agreed it was a normal 

business practice for subcontractors to use the quotes he gave 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 5
them in bidding for larger projects with a general contractor. 

Id. at 439. 

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Robert Schwalbe gave the 

Ludtkes a quote of $101,725 for this project without including any 

exceptions, or modifications, in the quote. R. Vol. I, Doc. T3 at 

452. Given these facts, it was reasonable for the Ludtkes to rely 

on the quote. Any assumptions which the Ludtkes made were induced 

by the actions which Mr. Schwalbe took. Thus, even if we assume, 

arguendo, that the court erred in allowing testimony regarding 

post-bid conduct, the error is harmless. 

In its third argument, Weather Shield contends the district 

court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the 

promissory estoppel claim. Our review is de nova. Bouie v. 

Autozone, Inc., No. 90-2194, 1992 WL 54008 at *3 (10th Cir. 

Mar. 24, 1992). "The trial court will be overturned only if 'the 

evidence taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom point but one 

way, in favor of the moving party.'" Blair v. Eagle-Picher Indus. 

Inc., Nos. 90-5133, et al., 1992 WL 88809 at *2 (10th Cir. May 5, 

1992)(quoting Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 

905 F.2d 1413, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990)). 

Weather Shield maintains B & W failed to prove the elements 

necessary to sustain either an oral contract or promissory 

estoppel claim. In particular, the company argues that there was 

no definite agreement between these parties. Viewing the record 

evidence in a light most favorable to B & w, however, there is 

sufficient evidence in the record to prove both these claims. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 6
Evidence introduced at trial showed that the Ludtkes and 

Robert Schwalbe knew this project called for custom windows. See 

R. Supplemental Vol. II at 174-75. Mr Schwalbe told the Ludtkes 

that Weather Shield had no problem making custom windows, but 

noted they would cost more. Id. at 108-9. Both Ludtkes requested 

a revised bid for custom windows. Id. at 113, 174-77. The final 

quote which Mr . Schwalbe made after these conversations contained 

no "exceptions." R. Vol. I, Doc. T3 at 452 . Mr. Schwalbe 

acknowledged that in the trade, this meant the bid met plans and 

specifications. R. Supplemental Vol. II at 441. He also 

acknowledged that it was a normal business practice within the 

trade to use a quote in submitting a bid to a contractor. Id. at 

439 . These facts, which are not clearly erroneous, support denial 

of the directed verdict motion. 

Finally, Weather Shield argues the district court's findings 

of fact are clearly erroneous because B & W did not, on all the 

evidence submitted, make sufficient showing of an oral contract or 

promissory estoppel. As a corollary, the company urges that the 

damage award was inappropriate. We disagree. After carefully 

reviewing the record, we are not "left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made . " Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil 

& Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 511 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 816 (1986) . Consequently, we reject this argument . 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 7
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-8061 Document: 010110254303 Date Filed: 05/27/1992 Page: 8