Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02059/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT .. 11990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL.iOBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

NANCY L. DUGAN, Personal Representative ) 

of the Estate of Timothy Ray Brosch, ) 

Deceased, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

VERA R. DEVINE, Individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate 

of Sharon Devine, Deceased, 

v. 

Plaintiff-IntervenorAppellee, 

EMS HELICOPTERS, INC., a California 

corporation; EDWARD M. ZIMMER, JR. 

Trust; and EDWARD M. ZIMMER, JR., 

as Trustee of the Edward M. Zimmer, Jr. 

Trust and in his Individual Capacity, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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No. 89-2059 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 86-255-JP) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Susan L. Snyder, Paul R. Koller, and Bruce Hall of Rodey, 

Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Jerrald J. Roehl, Esq., Corbin P. Hildebrandt, Esq., and Mark E. 

Komer of The Roehl Law Firm, P.C., Ray Tabet, Esq., Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Intervenor-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

This appeal results from the entry of jury verdicts against 

defendants EMS Helicopters, Inc. (EMS) and Edward M. Zimmer, Jr., 

as trustee of the Edward M. Zimmer trust (Zimmer) in this wrongful 

death action. 1 Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of 

decedents Timothy R. Brosch and Sharon R. Devine. Following a 

two-week trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of each 

plaintiff and against the defendants for both compensatory and 

punitive damages. 

On appeal, defendants assert: 1) that there was insufficient 

evidence to submit the issue of Zimmer's liability to the jury; 2) 

that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issue of 

punitive damages against EMS to the jury; and 3) that the court 

erred in not admitting into evidence a complaint plaintiffs filed 

against different defendants for the same injuries. We address 

each of these issues in turn. 

Facts 

This action arises out of the crash of a helicopter near 

Taos, New Mexico, on January 20, 1985. Although Zimmer owned the 

1 After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 2 
helicopter, it was operated and maintained by EMS. At the time of 

the crash, the helicopter was being used in the University of New 

Mexico Hospital's (UNMH) patient transport program. Plaintiffs' 

decedents were nurses working in the program. The accident 

occurred while the helicopter was en route to Taos to pick up a 

patient. The two nurses on board, as well as the pilot, were 

killed in the crash. 

In October, 1984, some three months before this incident took 

place, this helicopter ("Lifeguard I") was damaged when it hit 

high power lines during lift off following a passenger pick up 

near Moriarity, New Mexico. 

the pilot continued the 

Rather than grounding the helicopter, 

forty-five mile return flight to 

Albuquerque. After examining Lifeguard I upon its return, EMS 

maintenance personnel determined it 

necessitating a tear down of the engine. 

determine if there was internal damage. 

was severely damaged, 

This procedure would 

At trial, Larry Tucker, the then maintenance director of EMS, 

testified he called Zimmer to obtain authorization for the 

expensive procedure. 

would not pay for it. 

and EMS, all repair 

According to Tucker, Zimmer told him he 

Under the lease agreement between Zimmer 

expenditures over five hundred dollars 

required authorization from Zimmer. The blades on Lifeguard I 

were subsequently repaired but the engine was not torn down. 

Expert witnesses testified the failure to identify damage to an 

internal turbine-to-pinion coupling resulted in a loss of power to 

the engine which contributed to the crash. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 3 
Plaintiffs also introduced extensive testimony indicating 

pilot error contributed to the crash and asserted EMS put undue 

pressure on their pilots to fly long and irregular hours. There 

was testimony that EMS wanted to complete as many missions as 

possible so that its contract with UNMH would be renewed. With 

regard to Zimmer, there was evidence introduced showing he had 

declined to provide for other helicopter equipment in the past, 

despite repeated requests from EMS personnel. In particular, 

former maintenance employees testified they requested "snow 

baffles" for the helicopter which were designed to prevent ice 

build up in the engine. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the 

weather conditions on the night in question were such that snow 

baffles were needed and could have prevented the crash. EMS 

employees also requested a "chadwick," which is an instrument used 

to detect engine malfunctions. This request was also denied. 

The jury found both defendants negligent and awarded 

compensatory damages to Nancy L. Dugan in the amount of $500,000 

and Vera Devine in the amount of $80,000. The jury also awarded 

punitive damages to Dugan in the amount of $900,000 against EMS 

and $600,000 against Zimmer and to Devine in the amount of 

$144,000 against EMS and $96,000 against Zimmer. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

As an appellate court, our review of the evidence in a civil 

case based on diversity jurisdiction is "limited to the inquiry as 

to whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the 

jury's or court's conclusion, viewing the evidence in the light 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 4 
most favorable to the prevailing party." Kitchens v. Bryan County 

Nat'l Bank, 825 F.2d 248, 251 (lOth Cir. 1987). Moreover, it is 

the sole province of the jury to 

inferences, determine the weight to be 

resolve conflicts in the facts. Id. 

finding based on sharply conflicting 

appraise credibility, draw 

given testimony and to 

We have noted that a jury 

evidence is binding on 

appeal. Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 

F.2d 1144, 1149 (lOth Cir)., cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). 

It is with these principles in mind that we examine the arguments 

presented here. 

A. Sufficiency of the evidence with regard to Zimmer 

EMS and Zimmer contend the evidence was insufficient to send 

the issue of Zimmer's liability to the jury. They argue the trial 

court erred in failing to direct a verdict in their favor. We 

disagree. Defendants base their argument on what they describe as 

the incredible testimony of maintenance director Larry Tucker. 

During trial, Zimmer testified he never received the phone call 

from Tucker regarding the tear down and would have authorized it 

if he had known about it. Zimmer's testimony and the exhibits 

accompanying it indicated he was overseas at the time the alleged 

phone call to his office was made and therefore could not have 

received it. Further, Zimmer disputed the testimony regarding 

requests to add other equipment to the helicopter. In particular, 

he stated no one ever made a request to put snow baffles on 

Lifeguard I. Zimmer testified he had never heard of them prior to 

commencement of this lawsuit. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 5 
This situation presents a classic example of a jury 

determination based on sharply disputed evidence, and we will not 

disturb the jury's conclusions on appeal. The jury was presented 

with conflicting evidence and made a determination based on the 

collective credibility and reliability of that evidence. This 

falls squarely within its factfinding role. See Rasmussen, 571 

F.2d at 1149. 

Likewise, we uphold the court's decision to send the issue of 

punitive damages to the jury. In New Mexico, a jury may assess 

punitive damages if the conduct in question is willful, wanton, or 

grossly negligent. Gonzales v. Sansoy, 703 P.2d 904, 906 (N.M. 

Ct. App. 1984). There was sufficient evidence of gross misconduct 

on Zimmer's part to make this a jury question. Witnesses 

testified that he denied requests for maintenance and equipment 

due to cost despite knowing the items were safety related. 

Further, Zimmer was a pilot himself and recognized the need to 

properly maintain the helicopter. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was sufficient 

evidence to support submission of this issue to the jury. 

B. Sufficiency of the evidence with regard to EMS 

Likewise, we hold there was sufficient evidence under the 

standard enunciated above to send the issue of punitive damages 

against EMS to the jury. The evidence indicated EMS put undue 

pressure on its pilots to complete missions and put pressure on 

this pilot in particular to lose weight. Plaintiffs' witnesses 

testified the contract with the hospital was nearing expiration, 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 6 
and EMS urged pilots to complete missions so that the contract 

would be renewed. The pilot flight records introduced at trial 

showed irregular and long hours. Finally, there was evidence 

indicating EMS dismissed concerns from the flight nurses regarding 

the condition of the helicopters and failed to attend meetings 

designed to discuss those concerns. Based on these facts, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the 

punitive damages issue to the jury. 

Admissibility of Pleadings 

We now turn to defendants' final argument regarding the 

admissibility of the complaint which plaintiffs filed just prior 

to commencement of trial in this matter. On January 19, 1988, 

plaintiffs filed a complaint in the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico naming Bell Helicopter, Detroit 

Diesel Allison, and Lone Star Helicopter as defendants ("Ancillary 

complaint"). 

helicopter. 2 

Bell Helicopter is the manufacturer of this 

Detroit Diesel Allison manufactured the engine and 

Lone Star Helicopter is a maintenance facility which worked on the 

helicopter following the October, 1984 wire strike. The specific 

issue we must address is whether this "ancillary" complaint can be 

introduced as an evidentiary admission or inconsistent statement 

in this action. 

2 Textron, Inc. is the parent corporation of Bell Helicopter. 

General Motors Corporation is the parent of Detroit Diesel 

Allison. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 7 
During trial, defendants attempted to introduce the ancillary 

complaint for impeachment purposes and as an evidentiary 

admission. Rec. Vol. IX at 29, 37. The district court ruled the 

complaint was not admissible because the allegations in it were 

not inconsistent with the position plaintiffs pursued in this 

case. Rec. Vol. IX at 127. Instead, it allowed submission of a 

comparative fault jury instruction which included the secondary 

defendants. The court stated: 

Well, in view of those positions of the Plaintiffs to 

the effect that they will not object to the fault of 

Bell, Allison and Lone Star being compared by the jury 

in this case, I'm not going to admit as an exhibit the 

complaint in the other lawsuit and will not permit 

inquiry about it because I think, in that instance, then 

it's not an inconsistent position. 

Id. On appeal, defendants argue this ruling constitutes an abuse 

of discretion. Fox v. Mazda Corp. of Am., 868 F.2d 1190, 1194 

(lOth Cir. 1989). 

In this circuit, inconsistent allegations contained in prior 

pleadings are admissible in subsequent litigation. Glaesman v. 

Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., 438 F.2d 341, 342 (lOth Cir. 1971); Rapid 

Transit Lines, Inc. v. Wichita Developers, Inc., 435 F.2d 850, 852 

(lOth Cir. 1970); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 

(lOth Cir. 1956). Historically, where a plaintiff files a lawsuit 

against different defendants for the same injuries, allegations 

from that prior complaint are considered evidentiary admissions 

against interest. Glaesman, 438 F.2d at 342. 

In Parkinson, the plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in state 

and federal court. In the state court action, they alleged 

various defendants were negligent and contributed to their 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 8 
injuries. 233 F.2d at 435. In the federal action, however, they 

alleged that only one of the defendants was at fault. Id. 

Although the court rejected the argument that the prior 

allegations constituted absolute admissions, it did allow for 

their introduction, stating: "The inconsistent statements may be 

evidentiary as admissions--convincing, persuasive or of little 

weight, according to the particular circumstances .... " Id. at 

438. Thus, the court held the trial court properly considered the 

prior pleadings. Id. 

Likewise, in Glaesman, this court affirmed a district court 

ruling which allowed plaintiffs to read into the record pleadings 

containing inconsistent allegations. 438 F.2d at 342. In that 

case, Shop-Rite denied it was liable for injuries the plaintiff 

sustained when she slipped in the grocery store's parking lot. 

Id. at 341-42. However, prior pleadings from a state court action 

indicated Shop-Rite had already sued its landlord for leasing 

those exact premises in an unreasonably dangerous condition. Id. 

This court held the prior pleadings constituted an "indisputable 

admission against interest on a material issue." Id. at 342. 

In more recent cases, other circuits have allowed 

introduction of prior inconsistent pleadings as substantive 

evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2). See Williams v. 

Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 992 (1986); Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., 874 F.2d 36, 

38-40 (1st Cir. 1989); Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 542, 544 

(D. Kan. 1989). In addition, prior pleadings may be introduced on 

cross examination for use as an impeachment tool under 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 9 
Fed. R. Evid. 613. Williams, 790 F.2d at 556; see also Parkinson, 

233 F.2d at 438 (acknowledging that former pleadings normally come 

into case as admissions or by way of impeachment). 

In order to make a determination whether the ancillary 

complaint in this case is admissible, we must address whether its 

allegations are inconsistent with the position plaintiffs took at 

trial. See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438 (although prior statements 

will not absolutely foreclose a party from asserting a contrary 

position, they may be used as evidentiary admissions); see also 

Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 952 (1st Cir. 1989)(allowing 

introduction of inconsistent ancillary appellate brief where 

evidence is highly relevant and directly "contrary to 

[plaintiff's] position at trial")(quoting United States v. Palow, 

777 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052 

(1986)). This inquiry requires careful review of the evidence, 

pleadings, and statements of counsel in this action. 

The pertinent allegations from the two complaints filed in 

this case state Zimmer and EMS caused the wrongful deaths of 

plaintiffs' decedents. For example, paragraph nineteen of 

plaintiff Dugan's amended complaint states: 

The helicopter was improperly maintained by defendants, 

causing it to be in a defective and unreasonably 

dangerous condition on January 20, 1985, which directly 

and proximately caused the death of plaintiff's 

decedent, as a result of which defendants are strictly 

liable in tort to plaintiff for damages. 

Rec. Vol. I doc. 27 at ,r 19. Plaintiff Devine alleged similar 

conduct in her complaint in intervention. See Rec. Vol. I doc. 88 

at 8 ,r,r 1, 2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 10 
At trial, counsel for both plaintiffs reiterated this 

position. In opening statements, counsel for plaintiff Devine 

stated: "I believe the defendants will claim that there were 

other parties responsible who are not parties to this particular 

action and that they will try to blame other entities. We don't 

feel that there was improper conduct on the part of any of these 

other parties." (Emphasis added.) Rec. Vol. III at 64. 

Likewise, plaintiff Dugan's closing argument to the jury contained 

the following statement: 

[W]ith regard to item number 6, comparing the fault, 

this has to do with whether anyone else is at fault. We 

feel that this should be fairly easy for you to go 

through. Textron, Bell Helicopters, General Motors, 

Allison. The only conceivable involvement they would 

have would have to do with the repair manuals. You'll 

recall Dr. Kadlec said, and I believe Mr. Tucker as 

well, what you're talking about there are the minimum 

standards. ~ repair manual cannot give every possible 

reason to do an engine tear down. We don't feel that 

there is any evidence, really, that would mean that Bell 

Helicopters or General Motors are at fault. So we feel 

this should be zero. 

As to Lone Star Helicopters, zero as well. And the 

reason is that Mr. Noland and Lone Star did everything 

they could. They recommended the engine tear down. 

You'll recall they were not the company that would even 

have done it. They would have sent the engine out. 

They said, "Do the engine tear down." The owner says, 

"don't do it. I'm not going to pay for it." 

We do not believe there should be any fault 

attributable to them. 

(Emphasis added.) Rec. Vol. XIII at 9-10. Throughout the trial, 

plaintiffs consistently maintained that only EMS and Zimmer caused 

this accident. In fact, they presented no evidence at all against 

any of the ancillary defendants. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 11 
In contrast, the complaint filed against the ancillary 

defendants states they were, in fact, proximate contributors to 

the accident. For example, paragraph eighteen of that complaint 

states: 

Lone Star Helicopter was negligent, grossly negligent, 

reckless and acted with a conscious disregard for the 

safety of plaintiffs' decedents and others and 

proximately contributed to plaintiffs' decedents' 

wrongful deaths when its employee or employees, after 

having first recommended a tear down and visual 

inspection of the helicopter's engine based upon the 

damage the employee or employees found, certified the 

helicopter to be in an airworthy condition when, in 

fact, it was not, without first conducting such an 

engine tear down and visual inspection. 

See Addendum to Appellants' Brief. The allegations against the 

other defendants are similar. They are directly contrary to the 

position plaintiffs took at trial, as evidenced by the statements 

recited above. The totality of the position taken in the 

immediate case is inconsistent with the allegations contained in 

the ancillary complaint. 

Plaintiffs, however, argue that the ancillary complaint is 

not inconsistent with the position taken at this trial because the 

theories of recovery in the two actions are not mutually 

exclusive. In support, they rely on cases from the First and 

Fifth Circuits where the courts refused introduction of prior 

pleadings upon a finding that the allegations in the lawsuits were 

not inconsistent. See Estate of Spinosa v. International 

Harvester, 621 F.2d 1154, 1157 (1st Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. 

Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1978); see also 

Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (8th Cir. 

1981)(Arnold, J., dissenting)(amended complaint not admissible 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 12 
where use of pleadings would interfere with recognized principles 

of alternative pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)). 

The Spinosa decision provides a good example of plaintiffs' 

argument. There, the defendants sought introduction of pleadings 

to show the jury inconsistencies between plaintiffs' state and 

federal court actions. 621 F.2d at 1157. Specifically, the state 

court action alleged the wrongful deaths involved resulted from 

the failure to maintain a vehicle, while the federal court lawsuit 

claimed defects in the vehicle itself caused the deaths. Id. The 

Fifth Circuit held the two allegations were not inconsistent and 

thus the state pleadings were not admissible, stating: 

Plaintiffs-appellees respond that it is not inconsistent 

for suit to be brought successfully against [Spinosa] 

and the manufacturer of the motor vehicle, since the 

pleadings in the prior suit claimed that Spinosa's 

actions were ~ cause, not the sole cause of the 

accident. Since there is no inconsistency, plaintiffsappellees argue, the pl~adings are inadmissible .... We agree with plaintiffs-appellees. 

(Citations omitted.) Likewise, in Mitchell, the court 

determined the two positions were not inconsistent. There, the 

prior suit was based on a negligence theory while the Mitchell 

case asserted strict product liability claims. 568 F.2d at 1147. 

The court distinguished the two theories involved, stating, "The 

prior suit was based on negligence, which is not inconsistent with 

recovery in this case, as unforeseeable misuse rather than 

negligence is the defense to a claim based on product liability." 

In Garman, the issue was the admissibility of an amended, 

rather than prior, complaint. There, plaintiffs made alternative 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 13 
and inconsistent claims against two defendants. Specifically, 

plaintiffs' wrongful death action asserted product liability 

claims against a school bus seller, as well as negligence claims 

against the bus driver. The seller was dismissed prior to trial. 

Therefore, plaintiffs went forward only on the negligence claims. 

666 F.2d at 1157. 

The trial court allowed defense counsel to read to the jury 

those portions of the complaint which described the product 

liability claims. The eighth circuit held it was error to 

introduce the amended complaint, ruling it could not be used as an 

admission. Id. at 1158. Noting the importance of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(e)(2), which allows alternative pleading, the court stated: 

The use of pleading admissions in situations akin to the 

case under submission seems to us to be contrary to the 

spirit of the Federal Rules. Furthermore, it simply 

does not seem quite fair to these plaintiffs. A pleader 

in the Federal Courts should not have to forego a 

potential claim rather than run the risk of having such 

a claim used as an admission. 

Id. at 1160. 

These cases are inapposite to the situation presented here 

for two reasons. First, the ancillary complaint in this case 

states the defendants "proximately contributed" to this accident. 

This allegation is not hypothetical or alternative in nature. It 

is an affirmative factual statement alleging direct culpability on 

the part of Textron and General Motors Corporation for, inter 

alia, their negligence and gross negligence which proximately 

contributed to the accident. 

Second, the allegations from the ancillary complaint run 

directly counter to plaintiffs' position at trial. The Spinosa 

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Appellate Case: 89-2059 Document: 01019297095 Date Filed: 10/01/1990 Page: 14 
court found there was no inconsistency because the prior suit 

claimed the actions were "a cause, not the sole cause of the 

accident." 621 F.2d at 1157. In contrast, plaintiffs in this 

case did allege that the instant defendants were the sole cause of 

the accident. Through pleadings, evidence and argument, they 

asserted EMS and Zimmer solely caused this accident and should be 

solely responsible. They strenuously maintained the innocence of 

parties against whom they filed the ancillary lawsuit. For these 

reasons the Spinosa, Mitchell, and Garmen cases are 

distinguishable from the case at bar. 

The ancillary complaint is factually inconsistent with the 

position plaintiffs pursued in this case and therefore constitutes 

an admission against interest pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2). 

Further, it directly contradicts plaintiffs' prior statements and 

therefore may be introduced for its impeachment value. The 

district court's ruling to the contrary constitutes an abuse of 

discretion. 

This conclusion does not end our analysis. As with all 

evidence, the ultimate decision whether to admit or exclude the 

ancillary complaint requires balancing under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Vincent, 874 F.2d at 41. However, the trial court in this case 

did not perform this balancing test. 

Normally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 403 balancing is a task best left 

to the trial judge. Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 865 F.2d 1150, 

1152 (lOth Cir. 1988)(quoting Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 

F.2d 288, 293 (lOth Cir. 1977)). In this case, however, the 

complaint is so material, and so obviously relevant, that the 

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failure to allow its introduction is harmful error requiring a new 

trial. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)("nonconstitutional error is harmless unless it had a 

'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave 

doubt' as to whether it had such effect"). We base this 

assessment on several points. 

First, the ancillary complaint is highly relevant to the 

allocation of fault in this case. If the jury knew plaintiffs had 

alleged the secondary defendants were liable for failing strongly 

to advise EMS and Zimmer of the necessity of a tear down, the 

liability of EMS and Zimmer could have been directly reduced. The 

ancillary complaint specifically alleges the secondary defendants 

were negligent for not requiring the tear down. It is impossible 

to determine what effect this important evidence would have on the 

jury's verdict against EMS and Zimmer. 

Second, the complaint is directly relevant to the issue of 

punitive damages. During trial, plaintiffs opined that there was 

no excuse for the failure of EMS and Zimmer to tear down this 

engine. The ancillary complaint, however, appears to explain this 

failure. It alleges, in part, that the ancillary defendants did 

not advise EMS and Zimmer adequately regarding the result of 

failing to perform the tear down. This explanation is directly 

relevant to both the existence and amount of punitive damages. 

Third, the complaint is relevant for impeachment. Although 

we recognize that plaintiffs in this case were not central 

liability witnesses, their credibility was significant because 

they were the beneficiaries of the jury's verdict. Evidence 

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implicating that credibility is clearly relevant. In the Williams 

case, the Sixth Circuit noted that prior pleadings are relevant 

not only to support an intervening cause theory, but also to 

expose the plaintiff's belief that more than one party was at 

fault. 790 F.2d at 556. We agree with this analysis. 

For all these reasons, we hold that the trial judge should 

have introduced this evidence under a Rule 403 balancing test. 

Further, in light of its obvious relevancy, this failure cannot be 

harmless. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for 

a new trial. As part of that trial, the ancillary complaint 

should be admitted. The judgment of the United States District 

for the District of New Mexico is REVERSED and REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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