Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02682/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02682-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LARAINE FLEMING, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-02682-H-MDD 

ORDER: 

(1)DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and 

(2)GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 [Doc. Nos. 16-1, 17-1] 

On October 29, 2016, Laraine Fleming (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting judicial review of the Social Security Administration 

Commissioner’s (“Defendant”) final decision denying her disability benefits. (Doc. No. 

1.) On February 13, 2017, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and the 

administrative record. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12.) On April 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for 

summary judgment, requesting that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s final decision 

and order the payment of benefits, or alternatively, remand the case for further 

administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 16.) On May 16, 2017, Defendant filed a crossCase 3:16-cv-02682-H-MDD Document 19 Filed 07/25/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 13
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motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, 

requesting that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18.) 

For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grants 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and affirms the Commissioner’s final 

decision. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, claiming a 

disability onset date of April 14, 2012. (AR50-51.) The Social Security Administration 

denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on September 27, 2013, and again upon 

reconsideration on December 3, 2013. (AR82, 89.) On December 19, 2013, Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR95-96.) 

On March 25, 2015, an ALJ held a hearing where Plaintiff appeared with counsel 

and testified. (AR31-41, 43-46.) At the hearing, the ALJ also heard testimony from a 

vocational expert. (AR42-43, 46-48.) On May 7, 2015, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

had the following severe impairments: history of stroke, hypertension and related 

encephalopathy, and morbid obesity; but concluded that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment. 

(AR18-20.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform medium work, including the ability to stand, walk, and sit for a 

minimum of six hours in an eight hour day, without the need to shift positions at will or 

take unscheduled breaks during that workday. (AR21.) The ALJ further determined that 

Plaintiff could engage in frequent stooping and crouching, occasional climbing of stairs, 

and no climbing of ladders. (Id.) Based on this RFC assessment and Plaintiff’s age, 

education, and work experience, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, specifically the 

occupations of administrative clerk and mortgage loan processor. (AR26.) As a result of 

these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled from April 14, 2012, 

the alleged onset date, through May 7, 2015, the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. (AR10-

12.) On August 23, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, 

rendering the ALJ’s decision final. (AR1-3.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Legal Standard for Determining Disability 

“A claimant is disabled under Title II of the Social Security Act if he is unable to 

‘engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or ... can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Parra v. Astrue, 

481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(12)(A)). “To determine 

whether a claimant meets this definition, the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential 

evaluation.” Id.; see C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Ninth Circuit has summarized 

this process as follows: 

The burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four. As to step five, the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner. If a claimant is found to be “disabled” or “not 

disabled” at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. 

The five steps are: 

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, 

then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act 

and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in 

a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step 

one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

Step 2. Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not 

disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant's 

impairment is severe, then the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step two and 

the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments 

described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled 

to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant's impairment neither meets nor 

equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant's case 

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cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If 

so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance 

benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the 

claimant's case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the 

fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is 

“disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner 

must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy 

that claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden 

of showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national 

economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) 

by reference to the Medical–Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and 

therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the 

claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. As part of step four, the ALJ must determine the 

claimant’s RFC, i.e., the most a claimant can do despite her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545; Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). “In determining 

a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including, 

inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, 

that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins v. 

Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Standards of Review for Social Security Determinations 

Unsuccessful applicants for social security disability benefits may seek judicial 

review of a Commissioner’s final decision in a federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). “As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security 

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determinations is limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 

1098 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless it contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th 

Cir. 2014). “‘Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995)). The district court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 

conclusions. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009. “‘Where the evidence as a whole can support 

either a grant or a denial, we may not substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s.’” Bray, 554 

F.3d at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)). “‘The 

ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, 

and for resolving ambiguities.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Shalala, 53 F.3d at 

1039). 

In addition, even when the ALJ commits legal error, a reviewing court will uphold 

the decision where that error is harmless. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099; see also Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have long recognized that harmless 

error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.”). “[A]n ALJ’s error is 

harmless where it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. “‘[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally 

falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Shinseki 

v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

III. Analysis 

In denying Plaintiff’s disability application, the ALJ’s analysis proceeded through 

each of the five steps. At step one, the ALJ determined that as a threshold matter 

Plaintiff was not working, and thus Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful 

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activity. (AR18.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had three severe impairments: 

history of stroke, hypertension and related encephalopathy, and morbid obesity. (Id.) At 

step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, independently or in 

combination, met one of the listed impairments. (AR20.) Next, in order to complete step 

four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC allowed her to perform medium work, with 

occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, frequent stooping and bending, and no climbing 

of ladders. (AR21.) The ALJ based his RFC determination on Plaintiff’s symptoms to 

the extent the symptoms were consistent with the objective medical record. (Id.) Using 

this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work 

as a mortgage loan processor and administrative clerk. (AR25.) In so finding, the ALJ 

rejected Plaintiff’s alleged disability. 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the ALJ failed to 

articulate specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Thomas Harless’ medical 

opinions.1

 (Doc. No. 16-1 at 8-9.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 

erroneously discredited Dr. Harless’ opinions regarding the limitation on using her hands, 

the need for a sit-stand option, and her trouble speaking. (Id.) Dr. Harless was Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, and at the time of rendering the opinions, had been treating Plaintiff 

every three months for 18 months. (AR319.) Defendant cross-moves for summary 

judgment on the grounds that the ALJ’s opinion contains no legal error, as he reasonably 

rejected Dr. Thomas Harless’ opinion in areas where it was not supported by the 

objective medical record or where the opinion was contradicted by another physician. 

(Doc. No. 17-1 at 12.) 

Whether an ALJ properly discredited a treating physician’s opinion is a question of 

law. Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); Meschino v. Apfel, 1998 WL 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s brief also refers to the opinion of a Rita Hyman, PH.D. (Doc. No. 16-1, at 3.) This name is 

only mentioned once and the brief subsequently only refers to the medical opinions of Dr. Harless. The 

Court believes the mention of Rita Hyman was a mistake, and interprets Plaintiff’s argument as referring 

to the opinion of Dr. Harless. 

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513969, *7 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“The opinion of Dr. Grotz, as that of a treating physician, is 

entitled to special weight. The ALJ did not provide legitimate reasons for disregarding it. 

Thus, she committed legal error.”). The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among three types of 

physicians: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine 

but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine 

nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining 

treating, examining, and nonexamining sources). Generally, the opinions of treating 

physicians are given more weight than the opinions of examining physicians, which are 

in turn given more weight than the opinions of nonexamining physicians. See Benton ex 

rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003). Treating physicians’ 

opinions, in particular, are given “special weight” and the ALJ must justify a decision to 

disregard them. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). 

If a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may 

only disregard the opinion if he justifies that decision with “clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 

(9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a treating physician’s opinion 

is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may still only disregard it by providing 

“‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. 

(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). “The ALJ may meet his 

burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, an “ALJ may discredit treating 

physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, 

or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 

1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The ALJ discredited the portions of Dr. Harless’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s (1) 

hand limitation, (2) need for a sit-stand option, and (3) speaking limitation. The Court 

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addresses each opinion in turn and concludes that the ALJ provided legally sufficient 

justifications for discrediting a treating physician. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. Thus, the 

Court grants summary judgment for Defendant. 

A. Hand Limitation 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion that 

Plaintiff had significant limitations to the use of her hands. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 5.) 

Defendant disagrees, arguing that the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion 

because it was not supported by the record and was contradicted by the findings of Dr. 

Stover. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 15.) The Court agrees with Defendant; the ALJ properly 

discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion by providing specific and legitimate reasons for so 

doing. 

Dr. Harless is an Internal Medicine doctor who treated Plaintiff in 2013 following 

her stroke. (AR318-323.) During this time, Dr. Harless completed a “Stroke Residual 

Functional Capacity Questionnaire” that indicated Plaintiff had limitations in reaching, 

handling, and fingering. (AR322.) Specifically, Dr. Harless opined that Plaintiff was 

limited to grasping, turning, or twisting objects for only 75% of an 8-hour work day, 

could only use her left hand for finger manipulation for 75% of a work day, and could 

only use her right hand for finger manipulation for 10% of a work day. (Id.) 

 The ALJ discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion about Plaintiff’s hand limitations 

because the record contained no evidence of these limitations on account of neurological 

or musculoskeletal impairments.2

 (AR24.) For example, the ALJ noted that Dr. Stover, 

an examining neurologist, found no manipulative limitations as to reaching, handling, 

fingering or feeling. (AR24; AR329.) Similarly, the ALJ reviewed a February 10, 2014 

neurological exam that returned normal findings, with full muscle strength in all 

extremities. (AR23; AR343-346.) 

 

2

 The ALJ’s opinion refers to Dr. Harless as Dr. Thomas. 

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 The ALJ’s reasons for discrediting Dr. Harless are sufficient. Because Dr. Harless’ 

opinion was contradicted by another doctor, Dr. Stover, the ALJ need only provide 

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 725 

(9th Cir. 1998). And the ALJ can do this by “setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, 

and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bown, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). That is 

what the ALJ did here. The ALJ thoroughly reviewed the available medical evidence, 

identified the conflicting medical opinions of Dr. Harless and Dr. Stover, and made 

findings as to which information was more credible by comparing it to the objective 

medical record. As such, the ALJ’s ultimate determination was proper. See Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1010 (“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility [and] resolving 

conflicts in medical testimony”). Consequently, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument 

that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion about Plaintiff’s hand 

limitations. 

B. Sit-Stand Option 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion that Plaintiff 

was limited in the amount of sustained sitting and standing she could do. (Doc. No. 16-1 

at 8.) In particular, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not grant enough weight to Dr. 

Harless’ opinion concerning Plaintiff being able to sit for one hour at a time and stand for 

15 minutes at one time, and argues that the ALJ should have assessed a “sit-stand” option 

when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id.) Defendant disagrees, arguing that Plaintiff 

failed to prove a reversible error with respect to the ALJ’s decision to discredit Dr. 

Harless. (Doc. 17-1, at 12.) The Court finds that the ALJ properly discredited Dr. 

Harless by pointing to Dr. Stover’s contradicting opinion and to a lack of support in the 

record. 

 Dr. Harless indicated in his “Stroke Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire” 

that Plaintiff was limited in the amount of sustained sitting and standing she could do. 

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(AR320.) Specifically, he opined that Plaintiff could only sit for one hour before needing 

to get up, and could only stand for 15 minutes before needing to sit down. (Id.) 

The ALJ discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion concerning Plaintiff’s sitting and 

standing limitations because the record contained no evidence of these limitations. 

(AR24.) For example, the ALJ pointed to an August 21, 2013 examination done by Dr. 

Stover showing normal gait and station, and to February 2014 progress reports showing 

full muscle strength in all extremities. (Id.; AR328, 345.) In addition, the ALJ reviewed 

other progress reports done shortly after Plaintiff’s stroke in 2012 that do not show 

abnormal gait or poor strength in extremities. (AR24; see, e.g., AR274 (noting that gait 

was “not abnormal”); AR290 (noting that Plaintiff’s son was not needed to help her to the 

doctor’s office); AR345 (noting extremities at full strength.)) 

 The ALJ’s reasons for discrediting Dr. Harless are sufficient. As the ALJ 

observed, Dr. Harless’ opinion was generally not consistent with the objective medical 

record. (AR24.) Because of this, the ALJ need not accept Dr. Harless’ opinion. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 

340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating doctor's questionnaire properly discredited 

when it failed to “provide [a] basis for the functional restrictions he opined should be 

imposed on [claimant]”). Furthermore, Dr. Harless’ opinion was directly contradicted by 

that of Dr. Stover (AR328), and the ALJ could permissibly rely on Dr. Stover’s findings 

and opinion when discrediting Dr. Harless. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (nonexamining physician opinion may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent 

with other independent evidence in the record). Here, the ALJ reviewed the medical 

record and made findings as to whether Dr. Stover’s or Dr. Harless’ opinion better 

comported with the available medical evidence. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (“The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility [and] resolving conflicts in medical testimony”). 

The ALJ’s ultimate determination to discredit Dr. Harless and accept Dr. Stover is 

proper. Consequently, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly 

discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion concerning Plaintiff’s need for a sit-stand option. 

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C. Speaking Limitation 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion that 

Plaintiff had a significant speaking limitation. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 6.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not provide a reason for rejecting Dr. Harless’ opinion 

concerning Plaintiff’s speaking limitations. (Id.) Defendant disagrees, pointing to Dr. 

Stover’s contrary opinion and to lack of support in the record as a whole. (Doc. No. 17-1 

at 11.) The Court finds that the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Harless by accepting Dr. 

Stover’s contrary opinion and by noting conflicting evidence in the record. 

 In his “Stroke Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire,” Dr. Harless marked 

that one of Plaintiff’s symptoms was that she exhibited “speech/communication 

difficulties.” (AR319.) In addition, there are treatment notes that report Plaintiff would 

speak one word at a time with periodic pauses during routine check-ups. (AR359.) 

 The ALJ discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion and the treatment notes because there 

was conflicting evidence in the medical record. (AR22.) For example, the ALJ noted 

that Dr. Stover opined during his examination that Plaintiff exhibited normal speech and 

mental status. (Id.; AR327.) The ALJ also found that Dr. Stover’s opinion was entitled 

to great weight as it was based on a personal examination, and because it was consistent 

with the rest of the record. (AR24; See, e.g., AR290 (noting speech was “fluent”); 

AR293 (noting speech was slow and deliberate, but fluent.)) 

 The ALJ’s reasons for discrediting Dr. Harless’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s 

speaking limitations are sufficient. Because Dr. Harless’ opinion conflicted with the 

opinion of Dr. Stover, the ALJ is responsible for “determining credibility, resolving 

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 

1010. And when “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a 

decision, [the Court] may not substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Id. Here, 

the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the available medical evidence, made findings as to 

credibility, permissibly relied on the opinion of Dr. Stover, and rejected Dr. Harless’ 

questionnaire. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149; see also Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

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Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are 

“conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole”); Carranza v. Colvin, 2014 

WL 2889639 (finding proper the rejection of a treating physician questionnaire where its 

conclusions were not supported by clinical or diagnostic testing). As such, the ALJ’s 

ultimate determination is proper. Consequently, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument 

that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Harless’ opinion concerning her speaking 

limitations. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Harless’ opinion is nonetheless 

improper because the ALJ did not explicitly assign a weight to the opinion, nor did he 

explicitly provide a reason at all for rejecting it. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 6.) However, by 

explicitly accepting Dr. Stover’s opinion, the ALJ implicitly rejected Dr. Harless’ opinion 

and thus assigned it little to no weight. (AR22.) See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 755 (ALJ does not have to recite “magic words” when discrediting evidence; the 

reviewing court is allowed to draw specific and legitimate inferences from ALJ’s 

opinion); c.f. Elmore v. Colvin, 617 Fed.Appx. 755, 758 (finding ALJ implicitly rejected 

opinions of physicians by explicitly rejecting a similar opinion from a different 

physician). Even if the ALJ did err in not explicitly providing reasons or assigning a 

weight to Dr. Harless’ opinion, the error is harmless because he “would have reached the 

same result absent the error.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115. Because the ALJ 

permissibly relied on the findings of Dr. Stover indicating that Plaintiff had no trouble 

speaking, the ALJ’s decision to discredit Dr. Harless would have been reached whether 

or not he made this decision explicit. 

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CONCLUSION 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 

and was based on proper legal standards. Therefore, the ALJ’s disability determination 

must be upheld. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, and denies the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

DATED: July 24, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

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