Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02277/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH GILBERT MIRANDA,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-02-2277 MCE KJM P 

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner stands convicted of possession of 

methamphetamine. He is currently serving a sentence of twenty-five years-to-life imprisonment

in the California Department of Corrections. The sentence was imposed under California’s

“Three Strikes Law.” Petitioner challenges his conviction on jury instructional grounds and his

“Three Strikes” sentence.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced in the Superior Court of Sacramento

County. Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal. Am.

Pet., Ex. A. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Answer, Ex. B at 23. Petitioner sought review of the

Court of Appeal’s decision in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. C. Petitioner’s

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

2

request for review was denied without comment. Answer, Ex. D. Both of the claims presented

in this action were presented to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court on

direct appeal.

II. Standards For Granting Habeas Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).1 Courts are not required to

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Arguments and Analysis

A. Jury Instructional Error (CALJIC No. 17.41.1)

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court violated petitioner’s right to a fair trial

by instructing jurors with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 as follows:

The integrity of the trial requires that jurors at all times during

deliberations conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

express [sic] an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on penalty or punishment or any other improper basis, it is

the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court

of the situation.

RT 250:27-251:7; CT 77. Petitioner claims that the mere giving of this instruction 

places an improper chilling effect on juror deliberations by

allowing unacceptable judicial involvement which assists the

majority jurors in imposing their will on the minority;

impermissibly infringes on the power of jury nullification; and

denies a defendant the right to juror unanimity and a fair trial by

jury. 

Am. Pet. at 5 & Ex. A at 5-23.

Claims of error in state jury instructions generally are a matter of state law and do

not invoke a constitutional question unless the error amounts to a deprivation of due process. 

Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). A deprivation of due process occurs if

a jury instruction deprives a criminal defendant of a fair trial. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859

F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Court of Appeal, in a thoroughgoing discourse, found that petitioner’s due

process rights were not violated by the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Answer, Ex. B at 2-12. 

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1037 (2004), the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals found that, where the California Court of Appeal had issued a reasoned

opinion with respect to a due process challenge to CALJIC No. 17.41.1, federal habeas relief was

precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1) because “no Supreme Court case establishes that an

instruction such as CALJIC No. 17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional right.” The Supreme

Court still has not spoken with respect to a jury instruction similar to CALJIC No. 17.41.1. 

Therefore, this court is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and Brewer from granting habeas

relief on petitioner’s first claim. 

B. Sentence

Petitioner claims his sentence of twenty-five years-to-life imprisonment

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim

as follows:

The Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are

grossly disproportionate to the crime.” (People v. Cartwright

(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1135 [internal quotations omitted].) 

In Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277 [77 L.Ed.2d 637], the

United States Supreme Court held that a term of life without

possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony was

unconstitutional because it was “significantly disproportionate to

his crime[.]” (Id. at p.303 [707 L.Ed.2d at pp. 657-658.) Helm’s

crime was passing a $100 no-account check, and his prior

convictions were for three counts of third degree burglary,

obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and thirdoffense driving while intoxicated. (Id. at pp. 279-280 [77 L.Ed.2d

at pp. 642-643].)

Defendant’s prior record is more egregious than Helm’s was

because it includes two convictions of robbery, a violent felony. 

(Pen. Code, §§ 211, 667.5 subd. (c) (9).) And defendant’s sentence

is less severe than Helm’s was because it does not preclude the

possibility of parole.

In Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 [115 L.Ed.2d 836],

decided eight years after Solem v. Helm, supra, 463 U.S. 277 [77

L.Ed.2d 637], the United States Supreme Court held that a

sentence of life without the possibility of parole for possessing 672

grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment. 

(Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 965, 994-996 [115

L.Ed.2d at pp. 846, 864-865] (lead opn. of Scalia, J., in which

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Rehnquist, C.J., joined); id. at pp. 996-997, 1008-1009 [115

L.Ed.2d at pp. 866, 874 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J., in which

O’Connor and Souter, JJ., joined.)

Here, defendant is not being punished merely for possessing .35

grams of methamphetamine; rather he is being punished for

reoffending following three robbery convictions, three forgery

convictions, two burglary convictions and six misdemeanor

convictions during a 38-year life of crime. A term of 25 years to

life is not cruel and unusual punishment under the federal

Constitution for a recidivist with six state prison commitments. 

(See Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263 [63 L.Ed.2d 382]

[upheld life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist convicted of

obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.)

Answer, Ex. B at 19-20.

In Lockyer, the Supreme Court identified the case law and general principles

previously handed down by that court, which guided an analysis of whether a particular sentence

is disproportionate to an offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment at the time petitioner’s

sentence was reviewed by the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-75. The laws identified by the Court of Appeal and the manner in which

those laws were applied by the Court of Appeal are consistent with the Lockyer decision and the

other Supreme Court authority cited therein. 

Additionally, the Court of Appeal’s decision that petitioner’s sentence is not

grossly disproportionate to his offense was not based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Petitioner’s probation report reveals a criminal past more sobering than the one presented

in the Solem v. Helm opinion cited by the Court of Appeal. CT 87-90. Petitioner’s lengthy

criminal history includes the following prior serious felonies: (1) robbing two victims at

gunpoint in 1964, (2) robbing victims with a cap gun at a restaurant in 1971, (3) committing two

separate robberies at a gas station while armed with a gun in 1980, and (4) committing burglary

at a residence in 1988. 

The Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

of the United States. For the foregoing reasons, the court is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) from

granting petitioner relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s application

for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 27, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

mira2277.157

Case 2:02-cv-02277-MCE -KJM Document 15 Filed 01/27/06 Page 7 of 7