Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-06-05028/USCOURTS-ca10-06-05028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and

(continued...)

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 28, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

STEVE CUMMISKY,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

JOHN MINES, in his individual and

official capacities; PAUL

WHITMIRE, Captain of the Catoosa

Police Department, in his individual

and official capacities; RAYMOND

ROGERS, Chief of Police of the City

of Catoosa, in his individual

and official capacities; CURTIS

CONLEY, Mayor of the City of

Catoosa, in his individual and official

capacities; CITY OF CATOOSA,

political entity in the State of

Oklahoma,

 Defendants-Appellees,

 and

CATOOSA POLICE DEPARTMENT,

 Defendant.

No. 06-5028

(D.C. No. 04-CV-44-TCK-SAJ)

(N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

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(...continued) *

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, District of Kansas, **

sitting by designation.

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Before O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

BROWN, District Judge. **

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, plaintiff Steve Cummisky alleges that

defendant John Mines, a police officer, filed a false affidavit in support of an

arrest warrant, subjecting Cummisky to a false arrest and malicious prosecution. 

He also alleges that Officer Mines stalked and harassed him in violation of his

constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I.

Cummisky and Mines have a history of animosity, including a physical

altercation arising out of a traffic stop in September 2000. Cummisky filed an

unreasonable-force lawsuit after that altercation, and while it was pending, in

November 2001 Mines and Cummisky encountered each other at the restaurant

area of a truck stop. Mines alleges that, on this occasion, Cummisky challenged

Mines to a fight by saying “why don’t you come outside with me and we will

settle this like men.” Aplt. App. at 102. Cummisky denies even speaking to

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Mines that evening, instead contending that he waved in Mines’ direction. After

the incident, Mines consulted an assistant district attorney, who advised him to

file a report about the incident for her evaluation. After Mines filed his report,

including an affidavit in support of a warrant, an unsworn report by his partner,

and the statements of two dispatchers who arrived at the restaurant shortly after

the alleged “settle this like men” comment, the assistant DA filed charges of

assault on a police officer against Cummisky. She filed her own affidavit and

Mines’ affidavit in support of an arrest warrant. A magistrate signed the bottom

of Mines’ affidavit, indicating the arrest warrant was approved. Cummisky

learned of the arrest warrant some time later, and he surrendered at the police

station, was photographed and fingerprinted, and was allowed to leave after he

posted bond. Ultimately the charges were dismissed, with court costs allocated to

the state.

Cummisky sued under § 1983. The district court found that Mines had not

violated any of Cummisky’s clearly established constitutional rights and held that

Mines was entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. It also held

that Cummisky could not pursue a malicious prosecution claim because the

charges had been dismissed. Finally, it held that Cummisky could not pursue a

§ 1983 “stalking” and “harassment” claim because Mines had not violated

Cummisky’s constitutional rights by driving past his house on multiple occasions

and by videotaping Cummisky in public places, and that Mines’ supervisors and

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the city could not be liable under § 1983 where there had been no constitutional

violation by Mines. Cummisky appeals. 

II.

“We review the district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using

the same standard as the district court, and may affirm the district court’s order

on any grounds adequately presented below.” Novitsky v. City of Aurora,

491 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

Given the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, we require a

plaintiff to satisfy a heavy two-part burden to overcome a

defendant’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. 

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant’s actions violated

a constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff must show that the right

alleged to be violated was clearly established at the time of the

conduct at issue.

Id. (quotation and citations omitted).

A. False Arrest

The basis for Cummisky’s false arrest claim is that Mines allegedly filed an

affidavit containing false statements that resulted in his arrest on unfounded

charges. The constitutional right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable seizures. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 919

(10th Cir. 2007). The district court found, with regard to this claim, that

Cummisky had not shown a violation of any of his clearly established

constitutional rights. It offered three bases to support its conclusion:

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Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment based on the existence 1

of other evidence supporting a finding of probable cause, we need not examine

the district court’s other reasons in detail. We note, however, that a plurality of

the Supreme Court has indicated, in dicta, that a person’s “surrender to the State’s

show of authority” by reporting to police after learning of an outstanding warrant

“constitute[s] a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In Petersen v. Farnsworth, 371 F.3d 1219,

1221-22 (10th Cir. 2004), this court concluded that a plaintiff was seized when he

reported to the police station in response to a summons, was escorted into a

secure area, was handcuffed to a bar, and was placed in a holding cell. Petersen’s

circumstances were more harsh than the facts of this case, but several other courts

have held that a self-surrender in circumstances more akin to Cummisky’s

constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Whiting v. Traylor,

85 F.3d 581, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1996); Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood,

438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512 (D. N.J. 2006); Freeman v. Murray, 163 F. Supp. 2d

478, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d, 37 F. App’x 49 (3d Cir. 2002); Groom v. Fickes,

966 F. Supp. 1466, 1474-75 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 129 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1997);

Niemann v. Whalen, 911 F. Supp. 656, 663, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Thus, it

appears that Cummisky was “seized” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment

analysis. Further, as for whether the seizure was too insubstantial to constitute a

constitutional violation, we note that the question of whether a “de minimis”

unreasonable seizure of a person is actionable appears to be unsettled in this

circuit. See Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1206 n.5

(10th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether “whether de minimis injuries

resulting from unreasonable seizures are compensable under § 1983”).

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(1) there was no arrest or seizure of Plaintiff; (2) the circumstances

surrounding Plaintiff’s self-surrender are insufficient to give rise to

any Fourth Amendment seizure; and (3) there was independent

evidence, other than the Affidavit by Officer Mines complained of in

this lawsuit, that supported a finding of probable cause.

Aplt. App. at 313. Although we do not necessarily agree with the district court’s

first and second reasons, its third reason is sufficient to establish that Cummisky

suffered no violation of his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable

seizure.1

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The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation . . . .” Consequently, “an arrest warrant must be supported

by probable cause to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause for an

arrest warrant is established by demonstrating a substantial probability that a

crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the crime.”

Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1562 (10th Cir. 1996). “It is a violation of the

Fourth Amendment for an arrest warrant affiant to ‘knowingly, or with reckless

disregard for the truth,’ include false statements in the affidavit.” Id. “If an

arrest warrant affidavit contains false statements, the existence of probable cause

is determined by setting aside the false information and reviewing the remaining

contents of the affidavit.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Cummisky asserts that Mines falsely stated that Cummisky said to him,

“why don’t you come outside with me and we will settle this like men.” Aplt.

App. at 102. Even disregarding this portion of the affidavit, however, the arrest

warrant was supported by probable cause. While it appears that the remainder of

Mines’ affidavit would not establish probable cause for the offense of assault on a

police officer, that affidavit was not the only affidavit before the judge who

issued the warrant. The assistant district attorney also filed an affidavit in

support of the arrest warrant. Her affidavit was based not solely on Mines’

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Cummisky also argues that, even assuming the facts recited by Mines were 2

true, the allegations do not establish the elements of assault under Oklahoma law. 

This argument was not raised in the district court. This court generally does not

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Tele-Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1997).

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affidavit, but on all the evidence in front of her, including an unsworn statement

by another officer, who is not a party to this case, confirming that the disputed

comment was made, and the statements of two dispatchers who arrived at the

restaurant shortly after the altercation. Because the warrant was supported by

evidence other than Mines’ statement that established probable cause,

Cummisky’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. See also DeLoach v.

Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 621-22 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting a Fourth Amendment

violation where “the judicial finding of probable cause is based solely on

information the officer knew to be false or would have known to be false had he

not recklessly disregarded the truth”) (emphasis added, quotation omitted). The

grant of summary judgment to Mines on this claim is affirmed.2

B. Malicious Prosecution

Cummisky also argues in passing that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment on his malicious prosecution claim on the ground that the

charges were dropped, so he could not show that the proceeding terminated in his

favor. See Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1258 (listing the elements of a malicious

prosecution § 1983 claim). 

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The grant of summary judgment to Mines was not improper. “In this

circuit, when addressing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, we use the

common law elements of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ of our

analysis; however, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven the

deprivation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 1257. This court recently held that

“where criminal charges were brought but dismissed before trial, [the plaintiff]

must allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to proceed on a theory

of § 1983 malicious prosecution.” Becker, 494 F.3d at 919. As discussed above,

Cummisky did not show a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the

grant of summary judgment to Mines on this claim is affirmed.

C. Stalking and Harassment

Cummisky also asserted a claim against Mines, Mines’ supervisors, and the

city for alleged stalking and harassment by Mines. The claim primarily was

based on Mines’ driving slowly by Cummisky’s house several times and Mines’

videotaping Cummisky on at least two (and possibly more) occasions. The

district court granted summary judgment for all defendants on this claim, holding

that Mines’ activities did not give rise to any constitutional violations.

On appeal, Cummisky does not argue that Mines’ activities actually did

violate his constitutional rights. See Aplt. Br. at 18-21. Instead, he focuses on

various reasons why Mines’ superiors and the city should be held liable for

Mines’ conduct. Id. Because Cummisky does not assert or support any

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arguments regarding the constitutionality of Mines’ conduct, he has waived any

challenge to the district court’s decision that Mines’ activities did not violate his

constitutional rights. See Trackwell v. United States Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1247

(10th Cir. 2007). And as the district court concluded, because Mines did not

violate Cummisky’s constitutional rights, then the supervisors and the city cannot

be liable under § 1983. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 783

(10th Cir. 1993).

III.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien

Circuit Judge

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