Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01024/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01024-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN BLANKENSHIP, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:16-cv-01024 AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits under Title II AND Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). On October 25, 

2016 the signed the parties’ stipulation to remand the matter for further proceedings, entering 

judgment in favor of plaintiff. ECF Nos. 15, 16. 

 Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s January 31, 2020 motion for an award of 

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 20. On February 6, 2020, defendant 

filed a response asserting that defendant “is not in a position to either assent or 

object” to the fee request. ECF No. 22 at 2. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be 

granted. 

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I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 

 At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingent-fee 

agreement. ECF No. 20-1. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $7,250.00, to accompany the $1,750.00 in previously awarded Equal Access 

to Justice Act fees,1 which represents less than 25% of the $106,990.00 in retroactive disability 

benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for 11.05 hours of attorney time expended on this 

matter. ECF Nos. 20 at 3, 20-2. 

 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 

security claimants: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 

the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a 

reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 

the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 

reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 

may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney 

out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 

U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 

party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 

§ 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 

attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 

Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht,

535 U.S. at 805). 

 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 

ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 

displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 

to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 

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 The parties previously stipulated to an award of $1,750 in EAJA fees. ECF Nos. 18, 19. 

Plaintiff’s total award request amounts to $9,000. 

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boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 

for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 

fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 

arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 

 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 

of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 

(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted, 

the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the 

case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. Finally, 

the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing 

charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and 

labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee 

requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 

 Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 

plaintiff. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 

performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 

dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $7,250.00 fee (or $9,000 

inclusive of awarded EAJA fees), which represents less than 25% of the $106,990.00 in past-due 

benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In making this 

determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s 

assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on such terms. 

See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in accepting these 

cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long court or 

administrative delay in resolving the cases”). Finally, counsel has submitted a detailed billing 

statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 39 at 1-3. 

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 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 

counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 

II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 

 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 

Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded EAJA fees. Counsel attempts to subvert the 

usual process in which §406(b) fees are awarded and EAJA fees are refunded to the plaintiff by 

reducing her pending fee request to a net award of $7,250.00, so there is no excess fee recovery. 

See ECF No. 20 at 5. The Commissioner opposes this route, and asks the court to award total § 

406(b) fees and require plaintiff’s counsel to remit to plaintiff the previously awarded EAJA fees. 

ECF No. 22 at 4-5. The court agrees with the Commissioner that these fees must be addressed 

separately. “The EAJA ‘savings provision’ provides that counsel must refund to the claimant the 

amount of the smaller fee when a court approves both an EAJA fee and a § 406(b) fee for the 

‘same work,’ . . .” Pub. L. No. 99–80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).” Franz v. Colvin, 672 F. App’x 

765, 766 (9th Cir. 2017)(unpublished). Plaintiff’s counsel cites the desire for her client to receive 

the EAJA fees more efficiently, and while the court sees the appeal of this, she cites no case law 

indicating that this court can consider §406(b) fees and EAJA fees together without resorting to 

the savings provision. Plaintiff did not reply to plaintiff’s response. Thus, the court agrees with 

the Commissioner that the total requested fees should be awarded, and the EAJA fees should be 

remitted to plaintiff. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 20), is 

GRANTED; 

 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $9,000.00 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 

Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 

for the payment of such fees; and 

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 3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $1,750.00 for EAJA 

fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 

DATED: March 13, 2020 

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