Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_15-cv-00824/USCOURTS-alnd-7_15-cv-00824-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

KENNETH D. MCCORKLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Acting Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 7:15-CV-824-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), plaintiff Kenneth McCorkle seeks 

judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.1

The Commissioner denied Mr. McCorkle’s claim for supplemental security 

income. After careful review, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.2

 1 Mr. McCorkle was born on December 15, 1995. (Doc. 7-7, p. 2). Mr. McCorkle was 15 years 

old when his mother, Vanetta Horn, filed an application for supplemental security income on his 

behalf. (Doc. 7-6, p. 2). For purposes of this opinion, because the legal standards apply to Mr. 

McCorkle and his impairments, the Court will refer to Mr. McCorkle, rather than Ms. Horn, as 

the plaintiff.

2 Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017. 

(See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html). Therefore, the Court asks the Clerk to 

please substitute Ms. Berryhill for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this action. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official 

capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. Later 

opinions should be in the substituted party’s name, but any misnomer not affecting the parties’ 

substantial rights must be disregarded.”).

FILED

 2017 Mar-17 PM 12:46

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 1 of 22
2

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. McCorkle applied for supplemental security income on December 20,

2010. (Doc. 7-6, p. 2). Mr. McCorkle alleges that his disability began on January 

22, 2009. (Doc. 7-6, p. 2). The Commissioner denied Mr. McCorkle’s claim on 

April 7, 2011. (Doc. 7-5, pp. 2-5). Mr. McCorkle requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Doc. 7-5, p. 8). The ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision on August 20, 2013. (Doc. 7-3, pp. 20-40). On March 23, 2015, the 

Appeals Council declined Mr. McCorkle’s request for review (Doc. 7-3, pp. 2-4),

making the Commissioner’s decision final and a proper candidate for this Court’s 

judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, the 

ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court “review[s] 

the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and [his] ‘legal conclusions with close 

scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 (11th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record 

to support the ALJ’s factual findings. “Substantial evidence is more than a 

scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 2 of 22
3

1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). In making this evaluation, the Court may not “decide 

the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,” or substitute its judgment for that of the 

ALJ. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If the ALJ’s factual findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, then the Court “must affirm even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.” Costigan v. Comm’r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 603 Fed. Appx. 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Crawford, 363 F.3d 

at 1158).

With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine 

whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in 

the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide 

sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis,

then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

III. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S DECISION

For a claimant under age 18 to qualify for supplemental security income

benefits, he must have “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,

which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 3 of 22
4

ALJ follows a three-step, sequential evaluation process to make this determination. 

The ALJ considers: (1) whether the child is engaged in substantial and gainful 

activity; (2) whether the child has an impairment or combination of impairments 

that is severe; and (3) whether the child’s impairment meets, medically equals, or 

functionally equals the severity of an impairment in the listings. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.924(a)–(d). In doing so, the ALJ considers “all relevant evidence” in a 

claimant’s case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). 

To determine if a severe impairment functionally equals a listing, the ALJ 

must assess the claimant’s functioning in six domains: (1) acquiring and using 

information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with 

others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) 

health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). An 

impairment “is of listing level severity if [the claimant has] ‘marked’ limitations in 

two of the domains . . . or an ‘extreme’ limitation in one domain.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(d).

A child’s impairment or combination of impairments constitutes a “marked” 

limitation when it interferes “seriously” with his ability to “independently initiate,

sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A child’s 

impairment or combination of impairments constitutes an “extreme” limitation 

when it interferes “very seriously” with his ability to “independently initiate,

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 4 of 22
5

sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). “[N]o single piece 

of information taken in isolation can establish whether [a claimant has] a ‘marked’ 

or ‘extreme’ limitation in a domain.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a)(e)(4). 

In this case, the ALJ found that Mr. McCorkle has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since December 17, 2010, the benefits application date. (Doc. 7-3,

p. 26).3

 The ALJ determined that Mr. McCorkle suffers from the following severe 

impairments: learning disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, mood 

disorder NOS, oppositional defiant disorder/conduct disorder, and 

migraine/headaches. (Doc. 7-3, p. 26). Based on a review of the medical 

evidence, the ALJ concluded that Mr. McCorkle’s severe impairments, singly or in 

combination, neither meet nor medically equal the severity of any of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart A, Appendix 1. (Doc. 7-3, p. 26). 

Moreover, the ALJ found that Mr. McCorkle has “less than marked” limitations in 

each of the six domains, except Mr. McCorkle has “no limitation” in the domain of 

moving and manipulating objects. (Doc. 7-3, pp. 33–40). Accordingly, the ALJ 

determined that Mr. McCorkle is not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. (Doc. 7-3, p. 40).

 3 The application contained in the administrative record is dated December 20, 2010. (Doc. 7-6, 

p. 2). The discrepancy between the application date contained in the ALJ’s decision and in the 

administrative record is immaterial to the Court’s analysis. 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 5 of 22
6

IV. ANALYSIS 

Mr. McCorkle argues that he is entitled to relief from the ALJ’s decision 

because (1) the ALJ failed to find at Step Two that Mr. McCorkle does not suffer 

from mild intellectual disability; and (2) the ALJ erred in finding that Mr. 

McCorkle does not meet the intellectual disability listing in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P,

Appendix 1, §112.05 (Listing 112.05).

4

 The Court examines both issues in turn.

A. The ALJ’s determination that Mr. McCorkle does not suffer from 

mild intellectual disability at Step Two constitutes harmless error.

Mr. McCorkle contends that the ALJ erred at Step Two by failing to find 

that Mr. McCorkle suffers from mild intellectual disability. (Doc. 9, pp. 2–10). A 

claimant bears the burden of proving “at step two that he has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146

n.5 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[n]othing requires that the ALJ 

must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe.” 

Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 Fed. Appx. 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 

 4 In their memoranda and evidence, the parties use the term “mental retardation” instead of 

“intellectual disability.” When the ALJ issued his decision in August 2013, Listing 112.05 was 

the listing for childhood mental retardation. Effective September 3, 2013, the Commissioner 

amended Listing 112.05 by replacing the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability.” 

See Change in Terminology: “Mental Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability,” 78 Fed. Reg. 

46499–01 (Aug. 1, 2013). The change “does not affect the actual medical definition of the 

disorder or available programs or service.” Id. at 46,500. The Court discusses the listing using 

the terminology that the Commissioner adopted in September 2013, rather than the terminology 

in effect when the ALJ issued his decision. The Social Security Administration has since 

amended Listing 112.05 and now refers to “intellectual disability” as “intellectual disorder.” As 

explained below, the most recent amendments to Listing 112.05 do not apply to the Court’s 

analysis. See infra footnote 6. 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 6 of 22
7

Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying the harmless error 

doctrine to social security cases)); see also Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 

(11th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he finding of any severe impairment whether or not it 

qualifies as a disability and whether or not it results from a single severe 

impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is 

enough to satisfy the requirement at step two.”); Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 572 Fed. Appx. 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[S]tep two requires only a 

finding of ‘at least one’ severe impairment to continue on to the later steps.”)

(quoting Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588); Packer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 542 Fed. 

Appx. 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ALJ determined at step two that at least 

one severe impairment existed; the threshold inquiry at step two therefore was 

satisfied. Indeed, since the ALJ proceeded beyond step two, any error in failing to 

find that [the claimant] suffers from the additional severe impairments of 

degenerative joint disease of the right knee or varicose veins would be rendered 

harmless.”).5

 5 The Court recognizes that the cases on which it relies involve Step Two in adult disability 

cases, and this is a childhood disability case. At Step Two in both adult disability and childhood 

disability cases, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant has a severe impairment. Compare 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) (adult) (“At the second step, we consider the 

medical severity of your impairment(s).”), with 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (child) (“[W]e will 

consider your physical or mental impairment(s) first to see if you have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that is severe.”). The definitions for severity are different in 

childhood and adult disability cases. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a) (adult) 

(“An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit 

your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”), with 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c) (child) 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 7 of 22
8

Here, even if the ALJ erred at Step Two by failing to find that Mr. McCorkle 

suffers from the severe impairment of mild intellectual disability, the error is 

harmless because (1) the ALJ found that Mr. McCorkle has several severe 

impairments, namely a “learning disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

mood disorder NOS, oppositional defiant disorder/conduct disorder, and 

migraine[]headaches”; (2) the ALJ continued the sequential evaluation process; 

and (3) the ALJ considered mild intellectual disability at later steps in the 

sequential analysis. (Doc. 7-3, p. 26; see generally Doc. 7-3, pp. 26-40). 

Accordingly, any error at Step Two relating to a failure to classify mild intellectual 

disability as a severe impairment is harmless. 

B. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. 

McCorkle does not meet a Listing.

Mr. McCorkle argues that his IQ score of 56 is valid and that his IQ score,

standing alone, satisfies Listing 112.05(C). (Doc. 9, p. 10). Mr. McCorkle 

contends that the ALJ committed reversible error because the ALJ failed to state 

the weight of the IQ score of 56. (Doc. 9, pp. 9–10). Mr. McCorkle asserts that he 

also satisfies Listing 112.05(D), which, as he points out, the ALJ failed to examine. 

 

(An impairment is not severe if the “impairment(s) is a slight abnormality or a combination of 

slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal functional limitations”). The distinction 

does not affect the analysis. Because the Court is determining, not whether Mr. McCorkle 

suffers from mild intellectual disability for purposes of Social Security benefits, but rather

whether the ALJ erred in failing to classify mild intellectual disability as a severe impairment at 

Step Two, the difference is irrelevant for determining whether an error is harmless. Therefore,

the Court may rely on adult disability cases to guide the Court’s analysis of harmless error.

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 8 of 22
9

(Doc. 9, pp. 9–16). The Commissioner counters that “it is clear that the ALJ found 

[Mr. McCorkle’s IQ score of 56] invalid.” (Doc. 10, p. 13). The Commissioner 

contends that, because Mr. McCorkle’s IQ score of 56 is invalid, and because Mr. 

McCorkle does not have another qualifying IQ score in the record, he cannot 

satisfy Listing 112.05(C) or 112.05(D). (Doc. 10, pp. 11–13). The Court 

addresses each issue in turn.

A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his condition satisfies a listed 

impairment. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). The 

Social Security regulations at the time of the ALJ’s decision provided:

Intellectual disability: Characterized by significantly subaverage 

general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning.

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the 

requirements in A, B, C, D, E, or F are satisfied.

. . . . 

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 59 or less; or

D. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70,

and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an 

additional and significant limitation of function.

. . . .

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 9 of 22
10

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 112.05 (effective through January 16, 

2017).

6

 

 6 On September 26, 2016, the Social Security Administration revised Listing 112.05 effective 

January 17, 2017. The Listing now provides:

Intellectual disorder (see 112.00B4), for children age 3 to attainment of age 18, 

satisfied by A or B:

A. Satisfied by 1 and 2 (see 112.00H):

1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evident in your 

cognitive inability to function at a level required to participate in 

standardized testing of intellectual functioning; and

2. Significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by your 

dependence upon others for personal needs (for example, toileting, eating, 

dressing, or bathing) in excess of age-appropriate dependence.

OR

B. Satisfied by 1 and 2 (see 112.00H):

1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evidenced by a 

or b:

a. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 70 or below on an 

individually administered standardized test of general 

intelligence; or

b. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 71–75 accompanied by 

a verbal or performance IQ score (or comparable part score) of 70 

or below on an individually administered standardized test of 

general intelligence; and

2. Significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by 

extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following 

areas of mental functioning:

a. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 112.00E1); or

b. Interact with others (see 112.00E2); or

c. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 112.00E3); or

d. Adapt or manage oneself (see 112.00E4).

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 10 of 22
11

As a preliminary matter, Mr. McCorkle argues that his IQ score of 56 

establishes conclusively that he is disabled for Social Security purposes. (Doc. 9,

p. 10). Under the law in this circuit when Mr. McCorkle applied for benefits and 

when the Commissioner rendered her decision, to meet Listing 112.05(C), Mr. 

McCorkle must have had (1) “significantly subaverage general intellectual 

functioning;” (2) “deficits in adaptive functioning;” and (3) a “valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 59 or less.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart. P, App. 1,

§ 112.05; see also Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997)

(considering, under the adult version of Listing 112.05, “significantly subaverage 

general intellectual functioning” to be a separate requirement from “deficits in 

adaptive behavior”); Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 470 Fed. Appx. 766, 

768 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Crayton and explaining that under the Listings, “a 

claimant must demonstrate both subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in 

adaptive functioning, as well as satisfying one of the additional criteria, to prove 

 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 112.05 (effective January 17, 2017). Like the 

Commissioner, the Court analyzes Mr. McCorkle’s claim for benefits under the regulations (and 

applicable case law interpreting and applying those regulations) that were in effect when the ALJ 

issued his decision. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental 

Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138–1 n.1, 2016 WL 5341732 (Sept. 26, 2016) (“[W]e will use these 

final rules on and after their effective date. . . . We expect that Federal courts will review our 

final decisions using the rules that were in effect at the time we issued the decisions.”). 

Therefore, the citations to the regulations in this opinion are to those that were in effect at the 

time that the ALJ issued his decision. 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 11 of 22
12

entitlement to disability under Listing 12.05 or 112.05”); Gray ex rel. Whymss v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 Fed. Appx. 748, 750 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o be entitled 

to benefits, [the plaintiff] must prove that her son meets both the requirements in 

the diagnostic description of the introductory paragraph and the listed severity 

criteria in 112.05(D).”).

Regarding the validity of Mr. McCorkle’s IQ scores, the record contains 

evidence of three IQ examinations that produced three different scores. The ALJ

found that Mr. McCorkle did not have a valid IQ score for purposes of Listing

112.05(C). On May 8, 2008, the Sumter County Board of Education administered

to Mr. McCorkle the Universal Nonverbal Intelligence Test (UNIT). (Doc. 7-9, p. 

12). At the time, Mr. McCorkle was 12 years-old and in the sixth grade. (Doc. 7-

9, p. 12). Mr. McCorkle achieved a full scale IQ score of 90 on the UNIT, ranking 

his overall intelligence in the 25th percentile of the general population. (Doc. 7-9,

p. 12). Mr. McCorkle’s IQ score of 90 placed him “in the average range of 

cognitive abilities.” (Doc. 7-9, p. 12). 

The ALJ gave Mr. McCorkle’s UNIT score “little weight” because Amy 

Cooper, Ph.D., a consultative psychological examiner, reported that “the test was 

administered more than two years ago and is outdated per DDS standards” and 

because the UNIT is “often known to artificially inflate scores.” (Doc. 7-3, p. 27; 

Doc. 7-10, p. 23). The ALJ should have assigned no weight to Mr. McCorkle’s 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 12 of 22
13

UNIT score. Pursuant to Social Security regulations that were in effect at the time 

that the ALJ issued his decision, “IQ test results obtained between ages 7 and 16 

should be considered current . . . for 2 years when the IQ is 40 or above.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 112.00(D)(10) (effective through January 16, 

2017). Mr. McCorkle’s UNIT score of 90 expired in May 2010, and he applied for 

supplemental security income in December 2010. (Doc. 7-6, pp. 2–7). Because 

Mr. McCorkle’s UNIT IQ score of 90 expired before he applied for supplemental 

security income, the ALJ should have assigned no weight to the UNIT score, but 

the difference between little and no weight is insignificant for purposes of this 

analysis.

Donald W. Blanton, Ph.D., a consultative psychological examiner, evaluated 

Mr. McCorkle’s mental functioning on March 9, 2010 and again on March 6, 2013. 

(Doc. 7-10, pp. 3–5; Doc. 7-16, pp. 31–33). On March 9, 2010, Dr. Blanton was 

unable to assess Mr. McCorkle’s IQ score because of malingering. (Doc. 7-10, p. 

5). According to Dr. Blanton, Mr. McCorkle “gave no effort at all” on the 

examination and he “appeared to deliberately do poorly.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 4).7

 

Therefore, like the UNIT score, the March 2010 IQ exam results are invalid and 

are entitled to no weight. 

 7 Dr. Blanton stated that Mr. McCorkle never answered a question correctly and provided 

obviously wrong answers (such as defining a bicycle as “you talk to it” and referring to the shape 

of ball as “square”). (Doc. 7-10, pp. 4-5). 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 13 of 22
14

On March 6, 2013, Dr. Blanton again evaluated Mr. McCorkle’s IQ. (Doc. 

7-16, pp. 31–33). Dr. Blanton administered Mr. McCorkle the Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition. (Doc. 7-16, pp. 32–33). This time, Mr. 

McCorkle obtained the following scores: Verbal Comprehension 62, Perceptual 

Reasoning 52, Working Memory 63, Processing Speed 68 and Full Scale IQ score 

56. (Doc. 7-16, p. 32–33). Dr. Blanton stated that Mr. McCorkle’s score 

constituted a valid assessment of his level of intellectual functioning at the time of 

testing. (Doc. 7-16, p. 32). Dr. Blanton indicated that Mr. McCorkle’s IQ score of 

56 positioned him in the mild range of intellectual disability, but Dr. Blanton gave 

Mr. McCorkle only a “provisional” diagnosis of mild intellectual disability. (Doc. 

7-16, p. 32). The ALJ concluded that the validity of Dr. Blanton’s assessed IQ 

score of 56 was “highly questionable” because Dr. Blanton found that Mr. 

McCorkle’s depression could have affected his score and because Dr. Blanton 

determined that Mr. McCorkle was malingering when Dr. Blanton administered 

the IQ tests the first time in 2010. (Doc. 7-3, p. 26; see also Doc. 7-16, pp. 31–32). 

Mr. McCorkle argues that his IQ score of 56 is a valid score and the only 

valid IQ score in the record. (Doc. 9, pp. 9–12). Therefore, Mr. McCorkle argues, 

the ALJ had to rely on the IQ score of 56 in determining whether Mr. McCorkle

met a Listing. (Doc. 9, p. 9–12). Dr. Blanton’s full scale IQ score of 56 created “a 

rebuttable presumption that [Mr. McCorkle] satisfie[d] the diagnostic criteria for 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 14 of 22
15

intellectual disability.” Frame v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 596 Fed. Appx. 908, 911 

(11th Cir. 2015) (citing Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 

2001)). Nevertheless, remand is not warranted because Dr. Blanton’s assessed IQ 

score of 56 “does not change the conclusion that the denial of benefits [] [i]s 

supported by substantial evidence.” McCants v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 Fed. 

Appx. 788, 791 (11th Cir. 2015). 

As explained above, Mr. McCorkle’s qualifying IQ score alone is not 

sufficient to establish intellectual disability. See Harris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

505 Fed. Appx. 874, 876 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A valid IQ score need not be 

conclusive of [intellectual disability] where the IQ score is inconsistent with the 

other evidence regarding the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.”) (citing 

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Popp v. Heckler, 

779 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“[T]he ALJ was not required to 

find that [the claimant had an intellectual disability] based on the results of the IQ 

test. The ALJ is required to examine the results in conjunction with other medical 

evidence and the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.”). Here, the ALJ 

properly examined other evidence in the record, and substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. McCorkle does not have significantly subaverage 

intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning as required by Listing

112.05(C). Consequently, the Court does not need to decide whether the ALJ 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 15 of 22
16

properly determined that the validity of the IQ score of 56 was “highly 

questionable.” (See Doc. 7-3, p. 26).8

 

The ALJ found that Mr. McCorkle has a learning disorder, not an 

intellectual disability. (Doc. 7-3, pp. 27). The ALJ’s determination that Mr. 

McCorkle does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is 

supported by evidence in the administrative record. While Mr. McCorkle received 

special modifications and accommodations on his schoolwork and tests, he 

attended general education classes. (Doc. 7-3, p. 34; Doc. 7-8, p. 25). He attended 

school daily and was enrolled in history, math, reading, fine arts, English, science, 

and other courses. (Doc. 7-8, pp. 3–10). Mr. McCorkle never repeated a grade,

and his high school grades varied widely. (Doc. 7-3, p. 34; Doc. 7-8, pp. 3–9, 25). 

 8 If Mr. McCorkle had shown that a valid, qualifying IQ score could have saved his claim, then 

there may have been a basis for remand. An ALJ has “a basic duty to develop a full and fair 

record,” even though “the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled,” and despite 

the claimant’s “responsib[ility] [to] produc[e] evidence in support of his claim.” Ellison v. 

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). In the Eleventh Circuit, if additional tests are 

needed to make an informed decision, then it is error for the ALJ to fail to secure that additional 

medical evidence. See Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007). 

But based on the record in this case and the applicable law, an additional IQ score, no matter 

how low, would not have saved Mr. McCorkle’s claim. Accordingly, any error in not obtaining 

another IQ score is harmless. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) 

(classifying certain errors as harmless in the context of the substantial evidence standard); see,

e.g., Prunty v. Acting Com’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 Fed. Appx. 757, 760 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“Although an ALJ is responsible for developing a full and fair record, the burden is still on the 

claimant to prove she is disabled. See Barnhart, 355 F.3d at 1276. Here, the record contained the 

multiple IQ tests that [the claimant] had taken. Even if another medical expert had been called 

upon to evaluate her potential disability, [the claimant] would not have qualified for SSI benefits 

based on her failure to show deficits in her adaptive functioning.”).

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 16 of 22
17

He was scheduled to take the Alabama High School Graduation Exam during the 

2011–2012 school year. (Doc. 7-8, p. 25). 

Ms. Nicholson, Mr. McCorkle’s junior high and high school special 

education teacher, worked individually with him to ensure that he received the 

accommodations and modifications necessary to complete his work in his general 

education classes. (Doc. 7-9, p. 13–22). On March 3, 2009, Ms. Nicholson

indicated that Mr. McCorkle had no serious problems attending and completing 

tasks. (Doc. 7-9, p. 6). On March 20, 2013, Ms. Nicholson stated that Mr. 

McCorkle was “able to complete his work with modification[s] and 

accommodations.” (Doc. 7-9, p. 21). For instance, for the 2010–2011 academic 

year, Mr. McCorkle earned a 70 in Biology, a 70 Algebra I, a 72 in English 9, and 

a 93 in Life. (Doc. 7-8, p. 8). 

The West Alabama Mental Health Center, where Mr. McCorkle had 

received counseling since 2009, diagnosed Mr. McCorkle with “learning disorder 

not otherwise specified.” (Doc. 7-16, p. 34; see also Doc. 7-3, p. 27; Doc. 7-10, p. 

32–92). In addition, Robert Heilpern, M.D., Larry Dennis, Ph.D., and Nina Tocci,

Ph.D., consultative reviewing physicians, examined Mr. McCorkle’s records, and 

each found that he had a learning disability, not intellectual disability. (Doc. 7-16,

pp. 25; Doc. 7-17, pp. 15, 17). 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 17 of 22
18

Two physicians, Drs. Blanton and Alexandre B. Todorov, M.D., diagnosed 

Mr. McCorkle with intellectual disability. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

determination that neither opinion was persuasive. On March 6, 2013, Dr. Blanton

provisionally diagnosed Mr. McCorkle with mild intellectual disability,

recognizing that Mr. McCorkle’s low intellectual functioning could be due to 

depression. (Doc. 7-10, p. 10; Doc. 7-16, p. 32; see also Doc. 7-3, p. 27). Mr. 

McCorkle argues that Dr. Blanton’s diagnosis deserves significant weight. (Doc. 

9, pp. 9–10). Because the ALJ offered specific reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence, to reject Dr. Blanton’s provisional intellectual disability diagnosis, under 

the legal standards governing this appeal, the Court must accept the ALJ’s 

analysis. (See supra pp. 16-17; see generally Doc. 7-3, pp. 26-27). Sryock v. 

Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he ALJ is free to reject the 

opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”). 

Mr. McCorkle contends that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of 

Dr. Todorov, Mr. McCorkle’s treating neurologist. (Doc. 9, pp. 7–8). Dr. Todorov

treated Mr. McCorkle for headaches. (Doc. 7-10, pp. 7–14; Doc. 7-12, pp. 10–18). 

During each visit, Dr. Todorov indicated in his treatment notes that Mr. 

McCorkle’s medical history included “[d]iscrete intellectual disability.” (Doc. 7-

10, pp. 7–14; Doc. 7-12, pp. 10–18). And, after each examination, Dr. Todorov

diagnosed Mr. McCorkle with “[d]iscrete intellectual disability.” (Doc. 7-10, pp. 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 18 of 22
19

7–14; Doc. 7-12, pp. 10–18). There is no evidence in the record that demonstrates 

what, if any, intellectual functioning testing Dr. Todorov provided to Mr. 

McCorkle. The ALJ rejected Dr. Todorov’s diagnoses because (1) Dr. Todorov

treated Mr. McCorkle for headaches only; (2) Dr. Todorov never conducted 

intelligence testing; and (3) the ALJ inferred that Mr. McCorkle had malingered on 

some occasions during his visits with Dr. Todorov. (Doc. 7-3, p. 27). 

An ALJ must give considerable weight to the opinion of a treating physician 

like Dr. Todorov if the opinion is supported by the evidence and consistent with 

the doctor’s records. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. An ALJ may refuse to give 

the opinion of a treating physician “substantial or considerable weight . . . [if] 

‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-

41 (11th Cir. 2004). Good cause exists when “(1) [the] treating physician’s 

opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the] evidence supported a contrary 

finding; or (3) [the] treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent 

with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. at 1240-41; see also Crawford, 363 

F.3d at 1159.

Here, the ALJ’s decision not to credit Dr. Todorov’s opinion meets the 

“good cause” requirement because, as discussed above, substantial evidence in the 

record supports the ALJ’s finding that Mr. McCorkle does not suffer from 

intellectual disability and because Dr. Todorov’s intellectual disability diagnosis is 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 19 of 22
20

conclusory. (Doc. 7-10, pp. 7–14; Doc. 7-12, pp. 10–18). Moreover, “good cause” 

exists because the ALJ articulated several reasons for giving less weight to Dr. 

Todorov’s opinion. (Doc. 7-3, p. 27). Therefore, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s determination that Dr. Todorov’s opinion merits “little weight.” 

 Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Mr. McCorkle’s argument that the 

ALJ should have explicitly considered Listing 112.05(D). (Doc. 9, pp. 10–11). 

“Although [an] ALJ must consider the Listings, there is no requirement that the 

ALJ mechanically recite the evidence leading to his ultimate determination.” Gray 

ex rel. Whymss, 454 Fed. Appx. at 750 (citing Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461,

1463 (11th Cir. 1986)). In addition, “[a] finding that a claimant’s impairments are 

not contained in the Listings may be implied from [an] ALJ’s decision.” Id. 

In Gray, a child intellectual disability case, “the ALJ did not explicitly cite 

Listing 112.05(D), [but, like the ALJ in this case,] found that [the child] did not 

meet one of the Listings.” 454 Fed. Appx. at 750. The ALJ in Gray also “properly

cited the three-step process.” Id. at 750. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 

the ALJ’s decision and explained that “based on evidence in the record, the ALJ 

could have found that [the claimant’s] IQ score of 66 was inconsistent with other 

evidence of his activities and behavior” and that the claimant “did not have deficits 

in adaptive functioning.” Id. at 750; Turberville ex rel. Rowell, 316 Fed. Appx.

891, 893 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that—though the ALJ did not explicitly 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 20 of 22
21

discuss why [the claimant] did not actually meet Listing 112.05—substantial 

record evidence supports that [the claimant’s] condition did not actually or 

functionally meet Listing 112.05 and, therefore, supports the ALJ’s ultimate 

conclusion that [the claimant] was not disabled.”). Thus, while the ALJ did not 

address expressly whether Mr. McCorkle meets Listing 112.05(D), the ALJ 

considered evidence in the record that supports the conclusion that McCorkle did 

not meet Listing 112.05(D). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by failing to consider 

specifically Listing 112.05(D).

In sum, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s determination 

that Mr. McCorkle does not meet a Listing and is not disabled as defined in the 

Social Security Act. 9

 9 Mr. McCorkle turned 18 while his case was pending before the Appeals Council. (See Doc. 7-

3, p. 8 (correspondence from Appeals Council to Mr. McCorkle’s counsel dated December 18, 

2013); Doc. 7-7, p. 2 (Mr. McCorkle was born on December 15, 1995)). Therefore, in addition 

to arguing that he satisfies Listing 112.05(C) and Listing 112.05(D), Mr. McCorkle asserts that 

he meets Listing 12.05C and Listing 12.05D, the parallel intellectual disability provisions for

adults. (Doc. 9, pp. 11–16). “Although the overarching analytical framework for child and adult 

disability claims varies, the elements of Listings 112.05 and 12.05 substantially overlap.” 

Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 470 Fed. Appx 766, 768 (11th Cir. 2012) (examining a 

claimant’s argument that “she was entitled to benefits both before and after she turned 18 

because she satisfied the descriptions in the social security listings for child [intellectual 

disability] and adult [intellectual disability]”); see generally Crayton, 120 F.3d at 1219 (11th Cir.

1997). Under either the child or adult listings, “a claimant must satisfy both ‘the diagnostic 

description in the introductory paragraph and any of’ several additional criteria.” Jordan, 470 

Fed. Appx. at 768 (quoting 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, §§ 12.00, 112.00) 

(emphasis in Jordan). As explained above, a valid IQ score alone is not enough. See supra pp. 

11-12, 15. Also, as discussed above, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. 

McCorkle does not meet Listing 112.05(C) or 112.05(D) because Mr. McCorkle does not have 

significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning as required 

by Listings. See supra pp. 16-20. Thus, for the same reasons that Mr. McCorkle does not meet 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 21 of 22
22

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ applied proper legal standards. 

The Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner. The Court will 

enter a separate final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this March 17, 2017.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Listing 112.05(C) or Listing 112.05(D), Mr. McCorkle does not satisfy Listing 12.05(C) or 

Listing 12.05(D). 

Case 7:15-cv-00824-MHH Document 11 Filed 03/17/17 Page 22 of 22