Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05023/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2008 Decided June 27, 2008 

No. 07-5023 

CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, 

APPELLANT

v. 

JOHN I. PRAY, JR., DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 05cv00682) 

 Jules Zacher argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

 Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were 

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, Jonathan F. Cohn, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney. R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit 

Judges. 

USCA Case #07-5023 Document #1124160 Filed: 06/27/2008 Page 1 of 15
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The Center for Arms Control 

and Non-Proliferation claims the Commission on the 

Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction violated the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 

(1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app.), by refusing to make certain 

records publicly available. The district court dismissed the 

case on the ground that the Commission is exempt from the 

FACA. We agree and therefore affirm the judgment. 

I. Background 

President George W. Bush established the Commission 

in 2004 “for the purpose of advising the President ... in order 

to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities 

of the United States and response to the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks and the ongoing threat of terrorist activity.” 

Exec. Order No. 13,328 §§ 1, 2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. 6901, 6901 

(Feb. 6, 2004). Chaired by Judge Laurence Silberman and 

former Senator Charles Robb, the Commission comprised a 

number of experts from the public and private sectors. 

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, Commissioners, 

at http://www.wmd.gov/commissioners.html. After 

conducting a study, the Commission was to “submit to the 

President ... a report of [its] findings ... and its specific 

recommendations.” Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 2(d), 69 Fed. 

Reg. at 6902. The President also instructed the Central 

Intelligence Agency and “other components of the 

Intelligence Community” to “utilize the Commission and its 

resulting report.” Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 2(d), 69 Fed. 

Reg. at 6902. 

Concerned about disclosing sensitive information, the 

Commission closed its meetings to the public, see, e.g., 

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Notice of Meeting of the Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,820 (June 7, 2004), but made 

some efforts to inform the public of its activities. For 

example, after a meeting the Commission would release a 

public statement identifying some of the participants in the 

meeting and summarizing the issues discussed. See, e.g., 

Joint Statement of the Co-Chairmen of the Commission on 

the Intelligence Capabilities, at

http://www.wmd.gov/20040716.html (July 15, 2004). The 

Commission also maintained a public reading room, where it 

made available meeting agendas and summaries. On March 

31, 2005 the Commission duly submitted to the President its 

report, the bulk of which was made publicly available. See

Comm’n on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the 

President of the United States, xi (2005), available at

http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf. 

Dissatisfied with the extent of the Commission’s 

disclosures, the Center asked the Commission for the minutes 

of its meetings and for other records. Then, having received 

no response, the Center sued the Commission and its 

Executive Director, Vice Admiral (Ret.) John Scott Redd. 

The Center sought a declaration that the Commission and 

Redd had violated §§ 10(b), 10(c) and 11(a) of the FACA and 

a writ of mandamus compelling them to “publicly releas[e] ... 

all unclassified materials which are covered by” those 

sections of the Act. 

While the case was pending, the Commission wound up 

its business, transferred legal custody of its records to the 

National Security Council (NSC), transferred physical 

custody of those records to the National Archives and 

Records Administration, and dissolved. Because the 

Commission no longer existed and Redd “no longer ha[d] 

authority or control over Commission documents,” the district 

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court dismissed as moot the Center’s claims against the 

Commission and Redd. 

Shortly before that ruling, however, the Center, 

presumably in order to avert its looming mootness problem, 

joined as a defendant Stephen Hadley, the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to 

as the National Security Advisor. The Government moved to 

dismiss the claims against Hadley (for whom John I. Pray, Jr., 

Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, has since been 

substituted) on various grounds, two of which are relevant 

here. First, the Government contended the Commission came 

within the exemption from the FACA as provided in 

§ 4(b)(1), for advisory committees “utilized by the Central 

Intelligence Agency.” Second, the Government argued that, 

even if the Commission were not exempt, mandamus relief 

would not lie because “neither ... [Pray] nor the NSC has a 

duty to plaintiff under any of the three provisions of FACA 

on which plaintiff relies – let alone a ‘clear and indisputable’ 

and ‘clear and compelling’ duty that is ‘free from doubt’ – to 

make publicly available the former Commission’s 

documents.” See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 

(1984) (writ of mandamus available “only if the defendant 

owes [plaintiff] a clear nondiscretionary duty”). 

The district court first determined that, unless the 

Commission was exempt from the FACA, mandamus relief 

would be appropriate because “[t]he issue is not the continued 

existence of the Commission; it is the continued existence of 

the documents.” The court then granted the Government’s 

motion to dismiss on the ground that the Commission was 

exempt from the FACA because it was “utilized by” the CIA. 

The court “read[] the word ‘utilize’ in FACA § 4(b) in 

accordance with its ordinary meaning: ‘to put to use.’” 

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II. Analysis 

The Center contends the Commission is not exempt from 

the FACA. The Government, defending the district court’s 

ruling, argues the Commission was exempt because it was 

“utilized by” the CIA. In the alternative, the Government 

argues, much as it did before the district court, that the Center 

is not entitled to mandamus relief because “the NSC had no ... 

specific and nondiscretionary duty to revisit the 

Commission’s determinations as to which materials could 

properly be released.” 

We hold the Commission was exempt from the FACA. 

Accordingly, we do not address whether mandamus relief 

would otherwise be available.* 

A. The FACA 

The Congress enacted the FACA in order “to control the 

establishment of advisory committees to the federal 

government and to allow the public to monitor their existence, 

 *

 The Government also asserts that the case is moot because 

the Center is not entitled to a writ of mandamus and “there is no 

proper defendant against whom declaratory relief can be awarded.” 

We must, of course, determine the case is not moot and we have 

Article III jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Even if the 

Center’s claims against the Commission and its executive director 

became moot when the Commission relinquished custody of its 

records and ceased to exist, this case is not moot because, 

regardless whether mandamus relief is available, a declaration of 

the Center’s legal right to the materials could form the basis of an 

injunction against the NSC, which would redress the Center’s 

claimed injury. See Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282, 289-90, 292 

(D.C. Cir. 1999); Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 243-45 (D.C. Cir. 

1999). 

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activities, and cost.” Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Shalala, 

104 F.3d 424, 426 (1997); see FACA § 2. To those ends, the 

FACA requires the President, the relevant standing 

committees of the Congress, the relevant agency heads, and 

the Administrator of General Services to review the activities 

and finances of each advisory committee, and requires that 

the membership of each advisory committee “be fairly 

balanced in terms of point of view represented.” FACA §§ 5-

8; see In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc); Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the 

President’s Private Sector Survey of Cost Control, 711 F.2d 

1071, 1073 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“reject[ing] the ... 

contention that the ‘fairly balanced’ requirement ... is not 

binding on the President”). 

The FACA also imposes upon advisory committees a 

number of disclosure obligations, three of which the Center 

claims the Commission violated. Every advisory committee 

is required, under § 10(c) of the Act, to keep “[d]etailed 

minutes of each meeting,” and, under § 11(a), to “make 

available to any person ... copies of transcripts of [its] 

meetings.” In addition, § 10(b) provides 

the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, 

working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other 

documents which were made available to or prepared for 

or by each advisory committee shall be available for 

public inspection. 

Pursuant to § 3(2) of the FACA, “any committee, board, 

commission,” etc., qualifies as an “advisory committee” if it 

was 

(A) established by statute ..., (B) established or utilized 

by the President, or (C) established or utilized by one or 

more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or 

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recommendations for the President or one or more 

agencies or officers of the Federal Government. 

We have on several occasions addressed the meaning of the 

term “utilized” in § 3(2) to determine whether a committee 

was subject to the requirements of the FACA. Although this 

case concerns the meaning of “utilized” in the provision of 

§ 4 exempting from the FACA advisory committees “utilized 

by” the CIA, prior judicial interpretations of that term as used 

in § 3 bear upon our analysis of the exemption in § 4. 

B. “Utilized” in § 3 

The seminal decision on the meaning of “utilized” in § 3 

is Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, in 

which the Supreme Court held the Standing Committee on the 

Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association was not 

“utilized” by the Department of Justice or by the President in 

the course of screening potential nominees for federal 

judgeships. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). The Court acknowledged 

that the Executive “utilized” the ABA Committee in the 

“common sense” meaning of the word, that is, to “make[] use 

of.” Id. at 452. The Court was nonetheless reluctant to adopt 

the “unqualified[]” meaning of such a “woolly verb” as 

“utilized” because even a 

nodding acquaintance with FACA’s purposes, as 

manifested by its legislative history and as recited in § 2 

of the Act, reveals that it cannot have been Congress’ 

intention ... to cover every formal and informal 

consultation between the President or an Executive 

agency and a group rendering advice. 

Id. at 452-53. “Tip[ping] the balance decisively against” 

applying the FACA to the ABA Committee was the concern 

that doing so “would present formidable constitutional 

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difficulties,” not the least of which would be “infring[ing] 

unduly on the President’s Article II power to nominate federal 

judges and [thus] violat[ing] the doctrine of separation of 

powers.” Id. at 465-66; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 

The Court’s opinion was itself somewhat fuzzy when it 

came to the exact meaning of “utilized” in § 3 of the FACA. 

Subsequently, in Animal Legal Defense Fund, we determined, 

after examining Public Citizen and several of our own 

decisions made in such light as it shed, that a committee is 

“utilized” by the Executive for purposes of § 3 only if it is 

“amenable to ... strict management by” the Executive. Public 

Citizen, 491 U.S. at 457-58; see Animal Legal Defense Fund, 

104 F.3d at 430-31 (discussing Food Chem. News v. Young, 

900 F.2d 328, 333 (1990), and Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. 

Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (D.C. Cir. 

1994)). We stressed that “the utilized test is a stringent 

standard, denoting something along the lines of actual 

management or control.” Animal Legal Defense Fund, 104 

F.3d at 430-31. (quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see 

also Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 245-48 (1999) 

(“participation by an agency or even an agency’s significant 

influence over a committee’s deliberations does not qualify as 

management and control such that the committee is utilized 

by the agency under FACA”) (quotation marks omitted). 

C. “Utilized” in § 4 

Section 4 of the FACA exempts from the Act “any 

advisory committee established or utilized ... by the Central 

Intelligence Agency.” FACA § 4(b)(1). When it comes to 

this exemptive provision, the interpretive shoe is on the other 

foot: The broader the meaning of “utilized,” the fewer the 

committees subject to the FACA. In reading § 4, therefore, 

the Government contends we should give “utilized” its 

“plain,” that is, its broad meaning – “put to use” or, as the 

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Court put it in Public Citizen, “made use of.” For its part, the 

Center contends “utilized” in § 4 must have a narrow 

meaning, along the lines of that adopted in Public Citizen

(and elaborated in our subsequent decisions) for purposes of 

§ 3. The Center, however, never proposes a specific 

definition or standard for determining whether a committee 

was “utilized,” leaving it open for the Government to suggest 

the Center is claiming an advisory committee is exempt under 

§ 4 only if it is under the “actual management or control” of 

the CIA. 

In our view, neither the Government’s broad 

interpretation of “utilized” nor the narrow interpretation it 

attributes to the Center is quite right for purposes of § 4. In 

the end, however, we agree with the Government that the 

Commission was “utilized by” the CIA and hence was 

exempt from the FACA. 

Our analysis begins but cannot end with competing 

canons of statutory interpretation. In the Government’s 

corner is the rule that “where ... the words of the statute are 

unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete.” Desert 

Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (quotation 

marks omitted). That can hardly be dispositive in view of the 

Supreme Court’s having told us the term “utilized” in § 3 is 

not unambiguous but “woolly” and means something less 

encompassing than “made use of.” Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 

at 452. 

On the Center’s side is the “natural presumption that 

identical words used in different parts of the same act are 

intended to have the same meaning,” Envtl. Def. v. Duke 

Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2007) (quotation marks 

omitted), so that “utilized” in § 4 is no broader than the same 

term in § 3. That presumption, however, “readily yields 

whenever there is such variation in the connection in which 

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the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion 

that they were employed in different parts of the act with 

different intent.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This is just 

such a case: The Court’s reasons for interpreting “utilized” 

narrowly in Public Citizen have no bearing upon the purpose 

of the CIA exemption in § 4. The Court interpreted “utilized” 

as it did in order to keep the FACA from interfering with the 

President’s constitutional power to nominate federal judges. 

491 U.S. at 465-67. There is simply no evident risk that 

interpreting “utilized” broadly for purposes of the CIA 

exemption in § 4 would interfere with the exercise of any 

power constitutionally assigned to the President; indeed, the 

Center suggests none. 

The Congress obviously intended the exemption for 

advisory committees utilized by the CIA to ensure the FACA 

would not threaten the continued secrecy of the CIA’s 

intelligence sources and methods, organization, or personnel, 

all of which the CIA is charged by law with protecting from 

disclosure. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-1(i), 403g. But for the 

exemption, the CIA’s need for and statutory duty to ensure 

secrecy could preclude its using advisory committees 

altogether. The Congress obviously did not intend that result. 

The meaning of “utilized” propounded by the 

Government is somewhat broader than necessary to fulfill the 

purpose of the exemption, so understood. As we said in 

Sofamor Danek Group v. Gaus, the Supreme Court in Public 

Citizen “made clear that mere subsequent and optional use of 

the work product of a committee by a federal entity does not 

involve utilization under [§ 3 of the] FACA,” 61 F.3d 929, 

933-37 (D.C. Cir. 1995); neither should it cloak that 

committee with the secrecy afforded by the exemption in 

§ 4(b)(1). On the other hand, we agree with the Government 

that “the concerns that animated the CIA exemption” will not 

be adequately addressed if that exemption reaches only those 

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advisory committees over which “the CIA exercises actual 

management and control.” Being under the CIA’s 

management or control is surely a sufficient condition, but 

just as surely not a necessary condition, to bring an advisory 

committee within the exemption. 

In fact, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 

well illustrates why the exemption must reach some advisory 

committees that are not under the management or control of 

the CIA. The President charged the Commission with 

assessing whether the Intelligence Community, including the 

CIA, see Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 6(h), 69 Fed. Reg. at 

6903; 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4)(B), is ready and able to identify 

and respond to the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. at 

6901. To that end, the Commission was to “examine the 

capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to 

collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate 

information concerning” the proliferation and use of weapons 

of mass destruction. Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 2(a), 69 Fed. 

Reg. at 6901. The President “specifically” instructed the 

Commission to examine “intelligence” relating to Iraq, Libya, 

and Afghanistan, and to “evaluate the challenges of obtaining 

information” about the proliferation and use of weapons of 

mass destruction “in closed societies.” Exec. Order No. 

13,328 § 2(b)-(c), 69 Fed. Reg. at 6901-02. Not surprisingly, 

the Director of Central Intelligence was ordered to ensure 

Commission members obtained the necessary security 

clearances and the Commission adopted “security rules and 

procedures ... [that are] consistent with the national security 

and [that] protect against unauthorized disclosure of 

information.” Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 5, 69 Fed. Reg. at 

6902. In sum, the Commission’s charge included reviewing 

the CIA’s intelligence methods and organization, and possibly 

also its sources and personnel. The Commission, therefore, is 

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exactly the kind of advisory committee the Congress intended 

to exempt from the FACA. 

The Center wonders whether exempting the Commission 

“mean[s] any[]time the CIA is mentioned in a Presidential 

order establishing a Presidential Commission that the FACA 

will not apply.” We need not now fix the outer boundaries of 

the exemption because the Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities so clearly lies at its center: It was created by the 

President, who is primarily responsible for intelligence and 

national security matters, for the explicit purpose of 

examining and furnishing advice to the President, the CIA, 

and others in the Intelligence Community on issues relating to 

intelligence and national security. 

Finally, our conclusion that the Commission was exempt 

from the FACA is supported by the rule that “where a statute 

is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and 

doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of 

which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the 

latter.” Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) 

(quotation marks omitted). The Government contends that if 

the Commission is not exempt, then the FACA may interfere 

with “the President’s prerogatives to receive confidential 

advice.” The Center responds, “It is difficult to see how 

turning over even one ... document [requested pursuant to 

FACA §§ 10(b)-(c) and 11(a)] is such an onerous burden on 

the executive branch as to call into question a separation of 

powers issue.” 

When the Legislature purports to affect the prerogatives 

of the President or his subordinates, we must ask whether it 

“impermissibly undermines the powers of the Executive 

Branch, or disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate 

branches by preventing the Executive Branch from 

accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.” 

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Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988) (quotation 

marks, alterations, and citation omitted). To answer that 

question, we compare the degree of interference in the 

Executive’s function with the Congress’s “need to promote 

objectives within [its] constitutional authority.” Nixon v. 

Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also 

Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton (AAPS), 

997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

We have recognized that the FACA, at least as applied to 

“Presidential advisory committees,” FACA § 3(4), could 

interfere with the President’s need, “[i]n making decisions on 

personnel and policy, and in formulating legislative 

proposals, ... to seek confidential information from many 

sources, both inside the government and outside.” Cheney, 

406 F.3d at 728; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 

683, 705-06 (1974) (“the protection of the confidentiality of 

Presidential communications” “flow[s] from the nature of 

enumerated powers”); AAPS, 997 F.2d at 909. The “FACA 

was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful 

expenditure of public funds for worthless committee meetings 

and biased proposals.” Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 453; see

FACA § 2. Whatever the weight of the Congress’s interest in 

regulating advisory committees generally, however, we 

strongly doubt the FACA could be applied to the Commission 

on the Intelligence Capabilities consistent with the 

constitutional separation of powers. See Cheney, 406 F.3d at 

728 (“In light of the severe separation-of-powers problems in 

applying FACA on the basis that private parties participated 

in, or influenced, or were otherwise involved with a 

committee in the Executive Office of the President, we must 

construe the statute strictly”); AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (“A 

statute interfering with a President’s ability to seek advice 

directly from private citizens as a group, intermixed, or not, 

with government officials, ... raises Article II concerns”). 

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The risk of impermissible interference is sharpened by 

the Commission’s mandate to “advis[e] the President in the 

discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the 

Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national 

security, and command the Armed Forces of the United 

States.” Exec. Order No. 13,328 § 2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. at 6901; 

see also U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 1-2 & § 3, cl.3; Schneider 

v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Am. Ins. 

Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414-15 (2003); Haig v. 

Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981). As the Supreme Court 

has observed, “[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief 

and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available 

intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be 

published to the world.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (quotation 

marks omitted). 

Subjecting the Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities to the requirements of the FACA would certainly 

interfere to some substantial degree with the President’s 

exercise of these specific and important powers, and therefore 

raise grave and doubtful questions about the constitutionality 

of the statute, regardless whether it would require the 

disclosure of one document or many. Accordingly, our duty 

to favor the statutory interpretation that averts a constitutional 

collision between the Legislative and Executive Branches 

“solidifies” our conclusion that the Commission was 

“utilized” by the CIA and was therefore exempt from the 

FACA pursuant to § 4 of that Act. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 

467. 

III. Conclusion 

In sum, we hold the Commission was exempt from the 

FACA because it was “utilized by” the CIA within the 

meaning of that term in § 4(b)(1) of the statute. The 

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judgment of the district court dismissing the Center’s case is 

therefore 

Affirmed. 

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