Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02026/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY BOS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 

CARPENTERS HEALTH AND 

WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR 

CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Appellees. 

No. 2:12-cv-02026-MCE 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Appellant Gregory Bos (“Bos”) appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment in favor 

of Appellees Carpenters Trust Funds (“Appellees”). The Bankruptcy Court held that 

Bos’s debt to Appellees, in the amount of $504,282.59, was nondischargeable under 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), but not subsections (a)(2) or (a)(6). For the reasons set forth 

below, this Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.1

/// 

/// 

/// 

 1

 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 1 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

BACKGROUND2

Bos owned and operated Bos Enterprises, Inc. (“BEI”), an office moving business. 

BEI was a member, and Bos was an officer, of the Modular Installers Association 

(“MIA”), an employer association. When Bos joined the MIA, he agreed to be bound by 

the Carpenters’ Master Agreement (“CBA”) and the Trust Agreements. (Appellee’s 

Opening Br., Oct. 17, 2012, ECF No. 6 at 8.) The CBA and the Trust Agreements 

required Bos to remit monthly contributions to Appellees for the purpose of providing 

employee benefits. (Id. at 8-9.) A dispute arose over, among other things, Bos’s failure 

to remit amounts to Appellees in accordance with the CBA and Trust Agreements. 

On March 9, 2009, Bos signed a promissory note personally guaranteeing to 

Appellees $359,592.09, the amount then due and owing for unpaid benefit contributions 

since August 2008. (Pls.’ Trial Ex. No. 43, EOR/Tab 11, 1279-81.) Bos, however, failed 

to comply with the payment plan detailed in the promissory note. (ECF No. 6 at 9.) 

Arbitration over Bos’s default on the promissory note and subsequent unpaid 

contributions resulted in an award of $504,282.59 against Bos. (Id.) 

On February 28, 2011, Bos and his spouse filed a joint Chapter 7 petition in the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California. On May 27, 2011, 

Appellees filed a complaint against Bos and his spouse to determine the dischargeability 

of the $504,282.59 debt pursuant to § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6).3

 On January 12, 

2012, the Bankruptcy Court denied Bos’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Trial first 

began on April 13, 2012, but Bankruptcy Court Judge David E. Russell continued the 

matter to allow the parties to conduct additional legal research and briefing. 

/// 

/// 

 2

 Unless otherwise specified, the factual assertions in this section are based on the allegations in 

Bos’s Opening Brief. (See Appellant’s Opening Br., Oct. 3, 2012, ECF No. 4 at 3-6.) 

3

 On July 8, 2011, Appellees amended the complaint to dismiss Bos’s spouse. 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 2 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

On June 14, 2012, after supplemental briefing and oral argument, the Bankruptcy Court 

found that the arbitrator’s award was based on sums due from, but never paid by, Bos to 

Appellees under the CBA. The Bankruptcy Court also found that by failing to make the 

payments, Bos committed defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The 

Bankruptcy Court entered judgment that Bos’s debt to Appellees, in the amount of 

$504,282.59, was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

An appellant may petition the district court for review of a bankruptcy court’s 

decision. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. The applicable standard of review is identical to that 

which circuit courts of appeal apply when reviewing district court decisions. See In re 

Baroff, 105 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, this Court reviews the 

Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error but reviews conclusions of law and 

mixed questions of law and fact de novo. In re Hamada, 291 F.3d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 

2002). The question of whether a claim is nondischargeable presents mixed issues of 

law and fact and is reviewed de novo. Id. A de novo review is an independent review in 

which the reviewing court does not give any deference to the decision of the lower court. 

Preblich v. Battley, 181 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). 

ANALYSIS 

Bos appeals a single issue: Did the Bankruptcy Court err in determining that 

Bos’s debt to Appellees was nondischargeable because Bos satisfied the fiduciary 

capacity requirement of § 524(a)(4)? 

An individual debtor petitioning for bankruptcy does so to obtain a discharge of 

debts owed at the time of the filing. 

/// 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 3 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

For bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the discharge voids any judgment against the debtor to 

the extent that it is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to 

the debt; the discharge also bars any effort on the part of creditors to collect the debt. 

11 U.S.C. § 524(a). Though a discharge encompasses most pre-petition debts, there 

are several exceptions to the general discharge of such debts. One exception provides 

that a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding “does not discharge an individual debtor 

from any debt . . . for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity . . . .” 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 

The Bankruptcy Court concluded that § 523(a)(4) bars Bos from discharging the 

$504,282.59 debt owed to Appellees. Appellees urge this Court to affirm the Bankruptcy 

Court’s decision. Bos maintains that the debt is dischargeable and § 523(a)(4) is not 

applicable because the unpaid contributions were not plan assets to which he owed a 

fiduciary obligation. On review, this Court analyzes de novo the applicability of 

§ 523(a)(4). 

A. Binding Ninth Circuit Precedent Firmly Establishes that Fiduciary 

Status Under ERISA Satisfies the Fiduciary Capacity Requirement of 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 

“Fiduciary relationships imposed by statute may cause the debtor to be 

considered a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4).” In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “statutory ERISA 

fiduciaries qualify as fiduciaries under § 523(a)(4) . . . .” Id. at 1190. See also In re 

Glogower, 320 F. App’x 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In In re Hemmeter . . . we held that a 

fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) is a fiduciary 

under § 523(a)(4).”); In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 694 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (citing In re 

Hemmeter for the proposition that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that ERISA plan 

fiduciaries are always fiduciaries for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”). 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 4 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

However, Bos urges this Court to rule as the District Court for Northern District of 

California did in Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for Northern California v. Moxley, 

C 10-0756 RS, 2011 WL 1225572 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011). This Court refuses to do 

so for two reasons. First, unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Hemmeter, Moxley is 

not controlling authority. “A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding 

precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the 

same judge in a different case.” Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) 

(citation omitted). Second, Moxley is an anomaly in its deviation from established Ninth 

Circuit precedent, as the following excerpt demonstrates: “[T]he Fund must 

demonstrate, not just that Moxley acted as a fiduciary according to the requirements of 

ERISA, but that he was a fiduciary within the specific meaning of [§] 523(a)(4).” 2011 

WL 1225572, at *3. Despite citing to the Ninth Circuit opinion, the court in Moxley did 

not apply or even acknowledge the central holding of In re Hemmeter that “statutory 

ERISA fiduciaries qualify as fiduciaries under § 523(a)(4).” In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 

1190. Accordingly, this Court will adhere to established Ninth Circuit precedent and 

decline Bos’s invitation to adopt the analysis in Moxley. Thus, if Bos is a fiduciary under 

ERISA, he is a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4). 

B. Bos is a Fiduciary Under ERISA. 

ERISA confers fiduciary status on individuals who exercise “any authority or 

control respecting management or disposition of” the assets of an employee benefit 

plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). Before analyzing “authority or control,” the Court must 

determine whether Bos’s unpaid contributions are assets of the Trusts Funds. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 5 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

1. Under the Trust Agreements, Bos’s Unpaid Contributions are 

Assets of the Trusts Funds. 

The CBA and Trust Agreements, which Bos agreed to be bound by, required Bos 

to remit monthly contributions to Appellees for the purpose of providing employee 

benefits. Each of the Trust Agreements defines the respective Trust Fund as consisting 

of “all Contributions required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement or Subscriber’s 

Agreement to be made for the establishment and maintenance of the [Fund].” (Pls.’ Trial 

Ex. No. 3, EOR/Tab 11, 291 [Health & Welfare Fund], 303 [Pension Fund], 315 [Vacation 

and Holiday Fund], 329 [Training Fund], 341 [Annuity Fund].) 

Bos argues that the contributions he failed to make are not assets of the Trust 

Funds. In support of his argument, Bos cites to Cline v. Industrial Maintenance 

Engineering & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). In Cline, the Ninth Circuit 

stated: “Until the employer pays the employer contributions over to the plan, the 

contributions do not become plan assets over which fiduciaries of the plan have a 

fiduciary obligation[.]” Id. at 1234 (citations omitted). However, “Cline merely stated the 

general rule regarding unpaid employer contributions” and did not address “a commonly 

applied exception when the plan document itself identifies unpaid employer contributions 

as a plan asset.” Trs. of S. Cal. Pipe Trades Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. 

Temecula Mech., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

Bos urges this Court to disregard the plan document exception because the Ninth 

Circuit has not yet recognized it. (Appellant’s Reply Br., Oct. 31, 2012, ECF No. 7 at 5.) 

Bos’s argument fails to persuade this Court. While Bos is correct in asserting that “the 

Ninth Circuit [h]as [n]ever [r]ecognized” the exception, (id.), the Ninth Circuit also has 

never rejected it.4 

/// 

 4

 Temecula Mechanical explains the Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the exception in Cline: 

“As the parties in Cline did not press for the exception, it is unremarkable that the Ninth Circuit failed to 

note or address it, leaving instead for it to apply the general rule to the issue before it.” 438 F. Supp. 2d at 

1165. 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 6 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

See Trs. of the Const. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Vasquez, 

2:09-CV-02231-LRH, 2011 WL 4549228 (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2011) (“the Ninth Circuit has 

not addressed the issue”). Moreover, numerous courts within and outside of the Ninth 

Circuit have recognized and applied the “commonly applied exception.”5 This Court 

therefore recognizes the exception and finds that it is applicable in the present case.6 

Temecula Mechanical is instructive on application of the plan document 

exception. In Temecula Mechanical, trustees for employee benefit funds filed a 

complaint against an employer over delinquent contributions and union dues. 

438 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. The trustees argued that the employer was a plan fiduciary; 

the employer countered that “unpaid employer contributions are not plan assets, a 

prerequisite for the existence of a fiduciary duty or a claim based on prohibited 

transactions under ERISA.” Id. at 1161. The court examined the trust agreements and 

found that the “language in the Trust Agreements makes clear that the monies 

composing the Fund include those that are ‘due and owing’ from ‘Employers’ . . . .” Id. 

Thus, “[g]iven that the parties themselves defined unpaid employer contributions as plan 

assets under the terms of the Trust Agreements they negotiated, the Court will hold them 

to the same.” Id. at 1167. 

/// 

 5

 See, e.g., Vasquez, 2011 WL 4549228, at *4-5; Bd. of Trs. of Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Am., San Diego Chapter, Inc. Ret. Trust Fund v. Votolato, 07CV1283WQHNLS, 2008 WL 3925735 (S.D. 

Cal. Aug. 22, 2008); Cent. Ill. Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. S & S Fashion Floors, Inc., 

516 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936-37 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (collecting cases that “relied on specific language from plan 

documents, collective bargaining agreements, or other governing trust documents to override these 

general principles”); Bd. of Trs. of Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Atoll Topui Island, 

Inc., C 06-3059, 2007 WL 174409 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007); Temecula Mechanical 438 F. Supp. 2d at 

1163 (citing Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension v. Lutyk, 140 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2001), 

NYSA-ILA Med/ & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Catucci, 60 F. Supp. 2d 194, 200-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), 

Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D. W.V. 1992), and Galgay v. Gangloff,

677 F.Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 

6

 According to Bos, recognition of the exception is “in violation of the rule that debt alleged to be 

non-dischargeable must arise from a breach of trust obligations imposed by law, separate and distinct 

from any breach of contract, and that the trust relationship must exist prior to and without reference to an 

act of wrongdoing.” (ECF No. 7 at 5.) As with the reliance on Moxley, Bos overlooks controlling Ninth 

Circuit precedent that directly addresses and resolves this issue: “ERISA imposes obligations on the 

fiduciary prior to the alleged wrongdoing. Thus, ERISA satisfies the traditional requirements for a statutory 

fiduciary to qualify as a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4).” In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1190 (citation omitted). 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 7 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

Temecula Mechanical is on point. Here Appellees, the trustees for employee 

benefit funds, filed a complaint against Bos over unpaid contributions. Appellees allege 

that Bos was a plan fiduciary; Bos counters that the unpaid employer contributions are 

not plan assets, a prerequisite for the existence of a fiduciary duty under ERISA. In 

Temecula Mechanical, the court found that the “language in the Trust Agreements 

ma[de] clear that the monies composing the Fund include those that are ‘due and owing’ 

from ‘Employers’ . . . .” Id. at 1165. Here too, review of the Trust Agreements makes 

clear that the monies composing the fund include “all Contributions required by the 

Collective Bargaining Agreement or Subscriber’s Agreement to be made for the 

establishment and maintenance of the [Fund].” (EOR/Tab 11, 291, 303, 315, 329 and 

341.)7

Examination of the Trust Agreements between Bos and Appellees leads this 

Court to the same conclusion of Temecula Mechanical: Given that the parties 

themselves defined unpaid employer contributions as plan assets under the terms of the 

Trust Agreements they negotiated, the Court will hold them to the same. Thus, under 

the Trust Agreements, Bos’s unpaid contributions to the Trust Funds are the assets of 

the Trust Funds. 

2. Under ERISA, Bos is a Fiduciary with Respect to the Unpaid 

Contributions. 

Having concluded that the unpaid contributions are assets of the Trust Funds, the 

Court must now determine whether Bos is a fiduciary under ERISA with respect to those 

unpaid contributions. 

/// 

 7

 There is no reason for this Court to distinguish between contributions that are “due and owing” 

and those that are “to be made.” See Trs. of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 13 Defined 

Contribution Pension Trust for S. Nev. v. Granite Works, Inc., 2:10-CV-00767-HDM, 2011 WL 3159099, at 

*3 (D. Nev. July 26, 2011) (“Language deemed sufficient has included: (1) sums “due and owing”; 

(2) sums that “shall be paid” or are “required to be made”; or (3) sums that “become Trust assets on the 

Due Date.”) (citations omitted). 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 8 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

Under ERISA, “a person is a fiduciary with respect to [an employee benefit] plan 

to the extent he exercises . . . any authority or control respecting management or 

disposition of its assets . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). The Ninth Circuit has 

observed that § 1002(21)(A) differentiates between “control over the cash” and “control 

over administration.” IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 

1997). As to the control over the cash, “[a]ny control over disposition of plan money 

makes the person who has the control a fiduciary[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, the “right to write checks on plan funds” is sufficient to confer fiduciary 

status under ERISA. Id. 

In re Fahey is instructive on application of § 1002(21)(A)(i). 482 B.R. 678 (B.A.P. 

1st Cir. 2012). In In re Fahey, an employer filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee of 

employee benefit plans filed a nondischargeability complaint over the employer’s unpaid 

contributions to the plans. Id. at 682. The court first determined that, under the trust 

agreements, the delinquent contributions were assets of the trust funds.8 Id. at 691. In 

its analysis of authority and control under § 1002(21)(A)(i), the court reasoned that the 

employer, “as the president and sole owner of a corporation whose debt to an ERISA 

plan was a plan asset, had assumed unfettered authority in all matters directly and 

indirectly related to . . . payment of contributions to the Funds.” Id. at 692. Thus, the 

debtor’s “dominant, pervasive role . . . establishes, at a minimum, that he exercised 

actual authority or control respecting management or disposition of the Funds’ assets, 

sufficient to qualify as a fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).” Id. at 693 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).9 

 8

 The trust agreements stated: “[A]ll contributions shall be considered and defined as plan assets 

including contributions that are properly due and owing but not yet paid to the Fund by Contributing 

Employers.” In re Fahey, 482 B.R. at 682. Both the bankruptcy and appellate courts found that such 

language made the employer’s delinquent contributions the assets of the trust funds. Id. at 691. 

9

 Accord Temecula Mechanical, 438 F. Supp. 2d. at 1169 (“In essence, the complaint provides 

that [the employer] had the primary (if not sole) responsibility in determining whether to pay contributions, 

when those payments were made, and if not what to do with those unpaid contributions. Such allegations 

are more than sufficient to demonstrate that [the employer] exercised authority or control over plan assets, 

and hence is a fiduciary for purposes of imposing personal liability under ERISA.”) (citations omitted). 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 9 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

In re Fahey is on point. Here too, Bos, as the president and sole owner of a 

corporation whose debt to an ERISA plan was a plan asset, had assumed unfettered 

authority in all matters directly and indirectly related to payment of contributions to the 

Trust Funds. Bos testified at trial that, instead of paying contributions to Appellees, he 

made payments on company vehicles, electricity and water bills, employee wages, and 

his own salary. (Trial Tr., Apr. 13, 2012, EOR/Tab 4, 84:15-86:13.) As the Bankruptcy 

Court stated, Bos “alone had the authority to determine whether those contributions 

would be paid. He had authority over those contributions.” (Id. at 118:17-20.) Bos’s 

dominant and pervasive role establishes, at a minimum, that he exercised actual 

authority or control respecting management or disposition of plan assets, sufficient to 

qualify as a fiduciary under ERISA. 

C. Bos Defalcated While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity. 

A debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) only if the debtor, while acting in a 

fiduciary capacity, commits a fraud or defalcation. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). “[T]he 

essence of defalcation in the context of § 523(a)(4) is a failure to produce funds . . . .” 

In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1191 (citation omitted). “An individual may be liable for 

defalcation without having the intent to defraud.” In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th 

Cir. 1996). In In re Glogower, the Ninth Circuit found that an ERISA fiduciary committed 

defalcation by paying himself despite being “fully aware that the entities . . . he controlled 

could not pay the claims due the plan beneficiaries.” In re Glogower, 320 F. App’x 809, 

812 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Bos committed the essence of defalcation in the context of § 523(a)(4) 

when he failed to produce the contributions in accordance with the CBA and Trust 

Agreements. While he may not have had the intent to defraud, such intent is not 

required for defalcation under § 523(a)(4). 

/// 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 10 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

As in In re Gloglower, Bos committed defalcation by paying himself and other obligations 

despite being fully aware that the entities he controlled could not pay the contributions 

due to the Trust Funds. (See EOR/Tab 4, 87:24-88:2.) 

Thus, this Court’s de novo review demonstrates the Bankruptcy Court did not err 

in determining that: (1) fiduciary status under ERISA satisfies the fiduciary capacity 

requirement of § 523(a)(4); (2) under the Trust Agreements, Bos’s unpaid contributions 

are assets of the Trust Funds; (3) under ERISA, Bos is a fiduciary with respect to the 

unpaid contributions; (4) Bos defalcated while acting in a fiduciary capacity; and (5) 

Bos’s debt of $504,282.59 is nondischargeable.10

CONCLUSION 

Based on all of the foregoing, the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is hereby 

AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 10 The Court has reviewed Appellees’ Cross-Appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling on 

§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(6) (Case Number 2:12-CV-02079-MCE). Because Appellees secure their requested 

relief under § 523(a)(4), this Court summarily affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s decision with respect to 

§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(6) in full. 

Case 2:12-cv-02026-MCE Document 10 Filed 03/11/13 Page 11 of 11