Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00297/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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Case No. 19-CV-00297-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADLIFE MARKETING & 

COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

POPSUGAR, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-CV-00297-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 

PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 45

Before the Court is Plaintiff Adlife Marketing & Communications Company, Inc.’s 

(“Plaintiff”) motion to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s own complaint alleging copyright 

infringement against Defendant Popsugar, Inc. (“Defendant”). ECF No. 45-1 (“Mot.”); see also

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to 

dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of New York and alleged that Defendant infringed Plaintiff’s copyright to a 

“photograph of fish tacos.” Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff allegedly acquired this photograph in a “large 

portfolio” of photographs from Mr. Malcolm Bedell. Mot. at 2. 

Case 5:19-cv-00297-LHK Document 58 Filed 03/26/20 Page 1 of 4
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Case No. 19-CV-00297-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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On January 17, 2019, the instant case was transferred to the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of California. ECF No. 13. On February 19, 2019, Defendant answered 

the complaint, but did not assert a license defense. ECF No. 23. In a May 22, 2019 Joint Case 

Management Statement, Defendant also did not assert a license defense. ECF No. 31.

However, some time during discovery, Defendant learned that it was licensed and amended 

its answer on July 31, 2019 to assert a license defense. ECF No. 35. In the parties’ August 21, 

2019 Joint Case Management Statement, Defendant raised a license defense, but Plaintiff noted 

that it “d[id] not believe there [was] any merit to any of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, 

including its newly-added ‘license’ defense.” ECF No. 36 at 2. 

However, according to Plaintiff, during discovery, Plaintiff learned that “Mr. Bedell had 

granted a license to Defendant to use the [photograph of fish tacos] prior to Mr. Bedell’s sale of 

his portfolio to Plaintiff.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff determined that Defendant had a complete 

defense to copyright infringement and that “there was no point in continuing to litigate this case.” 

Id. at 5-6; see also Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 

1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The existence of a license creates an affirmative defense to a claim of 

copyright infringement.”).

As a result, Plaintiff requested that Defendant “agree to a stipulation to dismiss this case 

with prejudice, and even offered to allow Defendant to reserve its right to seek an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs.” Mot. at 5. However, Defendant did not agree to a stipulation because 

Defendant sought to obtain prevailing party status in order to pursue an award of fees and costs. 

ECF No. 46 at 3 (“Opp.”).

Therefore, on November 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting that the 

Court dismiss the instant case pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

further requesting that the dismissal be with prejudice. Mot. at 1, 5-6. On December 4, 2019, 

Defendant filed an opposition “for the limited purpose of requesting that any dismissal order 

preserves [Defendant’s] right to seek attorney’s fees.” Opp. at 2. On December 12, 2019, 

Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 52 (“Reply”).

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Case No. 19-CV-00297-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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United States District Court

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II. DISCUSSION

“A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless 

a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 

263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, both parties’ briefing requests the same result—that the 

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. See Opp. at 3 (“[Defendant] respectfully

requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice and thereby confer prevailing party 

status on [Defendant] . . . .”); Mot. at 1 (“Plaintiff seeks dismissal of this Complaint with 

prejudice.”). Thus, because the matter is undisputed, the Court concludes that Defendant will not 

suffer any prejudice from a dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Indeed, the only issues that the parties dispute are (1) the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s 

discovery of Defendant’s license to the disputed photograph; and (2) whether a stipulation could 

have granted Defendant “prevailing party status” and preserved Defendant’s ability to pursue 

attorney’s fees and costs and rendering this entire motion unnecessary. Compare Opp. at 2-3 with

Reply at 2-4. These two disputes, however, have no bearing on whether this Court should grant 

Plaintiff’s current motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. 

Specifically, the facts leading up to Plaintiff’s discovery of Defendant’s license to the 

photograph does not change Defendant’s defense to copyright infringement. Furthermore, 

whether the parties could have stipulated to grant Defendant “prevailing party status” is likewise 

irrelevant now that Plaintiff has filed the instant motion to dismiss with prejudice, as granting such 

a motion with prejudice would undoubtedly confer prevailing party status on Defendant. See

Cadkin v. Loose, 569 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] defendant is a prevailing party 

following dismissal of a claim if the plaintiff is judicially precluded from refiling the claim against 

the defendant in federal court.”); Phillips v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 15-CV-00344-

RMW, 2016 WL 3136925, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with 

prejudice [under Rule 41(a)(2)] . . . confers prevailing party status upon defendant because it 

operates as a judgment upon the merits and materially alters the parties’ legal relationship by 

barring plaintiff from re-filing the claim against defendant in federal court.” (collecting cases)).

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Case No. 19-CV-00297-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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In fact, both issues speak more to the parties’ conduct during the course of litigation rather 

than to any issue at hand. Accordingly, the Court need not address these two issues further, and 

thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with 

prejudice.

The Court would like to refer the parties to a telephonic settlement conference with United 

States Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins to resolve the attorney’s fees issue. The parties shall 

file a joint statement by April 2, 2020 as to whether they are willing to engage in such a settlement 

conference. If the parties are not amenable to such a settlement conference, then the Court orders 

the parties to engage in direct settlement negotiations at least 21 days before the filing of a motion 

for attorney’s fees and to file a declaration, specifying when and how long they engaged in 

settlement negotiations, with the motion for attorney’s fees.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2020

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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If the parties litigate attorney’s fees, counsel for both parties must file declarations as to what due 

diligence they conducted to determine whether Defendant was licensed, when and how they 

discovered Defendant was licensed, and why Defendant’s license was not discovered sooner. In 

addition, Defendant should address why it is entitled to attorney’s fees before July 31, 2019, when 

Defendant first asserted a license defense. Plaintiff should address why Plaintiff continued to 

litigate this non-meritorious case after Defendant asserted a license defense. See, e.g., ECF No. 36 

at 2 (“Plaintiff d[id] not believe there [was] any merit to any of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, 

including its newly-added ‘license’ defense.”).

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