Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00055/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH PATTERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RW DIRECT, INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00055-VC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 39

1. The motion to dismiss for lack of standing is denied. Although courts have divided on 

this issue, whether a named plaintiff can represent class members whose claims arise under the 

laws of different states does not appear to be a question of standing. Patterson does not himself

seek to raise a claim under the laws of a different state; rather, he seeks to represent a class 

member who can raise such a claim. See, e.g., In re Hydroxycut Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 

801 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that “[t]he constitutional issue of standing 

should not be conflated with Rule 23 class action requirements”); In re Bayer Corp. 

Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 701 F. Supp. 2d 356, 377 

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Whether the named plaintiffs have standing to bring suit under each of the 

state laws alleged is immaterial because they are not bringing those claims on their own behalf, 

but are only seeking to represent other, similarly situated consumers in those states.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). And because the putative class members all suffered the 

same injury – purchasing a defective lawnmower – Patterson has established that he has the 

“necessary stake” in litigating the class’s claims for purposes of standing. See Camreta v. 

Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011). Accordingly, this issue will be addressed in connection with 

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class certification. That said, it is questionable whether Patterson will be able to pursue a 

nationwide class action, and given the California-centric nature of this case it may be appropriate 

to address adequacy and commonality before allowing Patterson to embark on nationwide class 

discovery. 

2. The defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. Absent 

controlling authority to the contrary, the Court declines to extend Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 

Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), to the class action context. 

3. The motion to dismiss Patterson’s express warranty claims is denied. The complaint is 

best understood as plausibly alleging that the lawnmower itself is defective in a way that causes 

the battery to die. This claim is subject to a two-year warranty period.1 The defendants primarily 

argue that Patterson’s claims are time-barred because he did not notify them of the defect within 

the warranty term. But the warranty does not require a customer to “notify” the company of a 

defect within the warranty period; it promises to repair or replace parts that “become defective” 

during the warranty period. The complaint adequately alleges that the lawnmower became 

defective during the warranty term, and Patterson notified the company of the defect shortly 

thereafter. 

To argue to the contrary, the defendants point to decisions dismissing express warranty 

claims where the relevant repairs were made after the warranty had ended. See Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008); Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor 

Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 830 (2006). But those repairs were made outside the warranty period 

because the defect was discovered outside the warranty period. See Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1023 

(“[W]e can hardly say that the warranty is implicated when the item fails after the warranty 

period expires.”); Daugherty, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 832 (explaining that the warranty did not 

cover “latent defects that lead to a malfunction after the term of the warranty”). Here, by 

 

1 Because Patterson did not register his lawnmower, he cannot take advantage of the three-year 

warranty period. Although Patterson is correct that the Court must accept his factual allegations 

as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, he has not in fact alleged that he registered his 

lawnmower. 

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contrast, Patterson has alleged that the lawnmower malfunctioned the first time he used it, and 

then continued not to work later in the warranty period.

The defendants express concern that if a customer is permitted to bring a claim for breach 

of express warranty even if he has not notified the company within the warranty period, this 

could expose companies to unending liability. However, this is the defendants’ own warranty 

language, and it specifies only that the product is covered if it becomes defective within the 

applicable period. In any event, the concerns the defendants have regarding unending liability are 

addressed by the statute of limitations. See Cal. Com. Code § 2725. This is an affirmative 

defense that the defendants may assert in their answer.

The defendants raise two additional challenges to the express warranty claims, but neither 

is an appropriate basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim. First, the defendants contend that 

Patterson failed to notify them of the defect “within a reasonable time” after its discovery. See 

Cal. Com. Code § 2607(3)(A). But whether Patterson’s alleged delay was “reasonable” cannot 

properly be decided on the pleadings. Second, the defendants argue that, now that Patterson is 

alleging that the defect is in the lawnmower rather than the battery, he is really raising a design 

defect claim, while the warranty only covers manufacturing defects. The defendants may 

ultimately prevail on that point, but Patterson has plausibly alleged the existence of a 

manufacturing defect for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). See Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 272 F. 

Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 

4. Patterson’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is dismissed with prejudice. 

A Magnuson-Moss claim is only cognizable on a class-wide basis where “the number of named 

plaintiffs is less than one hundred.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(C). Because Patterson is the only 

named plaintiff, that requirement is not satisfied here.

2

 

2 The Court disagrees with decisions holding that this requirement can be supplanted by the 

prerequisites for exercising diversity jurisdiction under CAFA. Compare Keegan v. Am. Honda 

Motor Co., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 954-56 (C.D. Cal. 2012), with MacDougall v. Am. Honda 

Motor Co., No. SACV 17-01709 AG (DFMx), 2017 WL 8236359, at * 4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 

2017).

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5. The motion to dismiss Patterson’s implied warranty claims is denied for the claim 

brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The defendants argue that Patterson’s 

claim is time-barred because an implied warranty cannot extend beyond one year of the sale. See 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(c). But Patterson has alleged that the lawnmower failed immediately. 

The defendants’ argument that Patterson “failed to assert an implied-warranty claim during the 

applicable implied-warranty period” again conflates the warranty term with the statute of 

limitations. See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1306 n.6 (2009) (explaining 

that “the duration provision is not a statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations is four 

years”).

However, the motion to dismiss the implied warranty claims brought under section 2314

of the California Commercial Code is granted because Patterson purchased the lawnmower from 

Amazon, and was thus not in vertical privity with the defendants. See Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1023. 

Although Patterson is correct that the California Supreme Court recognized an exception to this 

requirement when a plaintiff relies on a manufacturer’s written representations, it limited that

exception to express warranty claims. See Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 696 

(1954); see also Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., No. C 09-01314 JSW, 2009 WL 2969467, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 14, 2009). This claim is dismissed with prejudice.

6. The motion to dismiss Patterson’s CLRA and UCL claims is granted with leave to 

amend. To state a claim under the CLRA, Patterson must allege that the defendants received a

sufficient volume of complaints to put the defendants on notice of a defect. See Williams v. 

Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Deras v. Volkswagen Grp. 

of Am., Inc., No. 17-cv-05452-JST, 2018 WL 2267448, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2018). 

Patterson’s Second Amended Complaint does not allege that the defendants received an unusual 

number of complaints, nor does it provide enough context to assess whether that might be the 

case. Although some of the information that could provide this context is presumably in the 

defendants’ exclusive possession, Patterson could have provided, for example, the number of 

consumer comments on various sites at the time of his purchase, along with the distribution of 

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topics and ratings. Patterson has one final opportunity to state a claim under the CLRA. Any 

amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of this order. 

With respect to the defendants’ separate argument that Patterson’s CLRA claim fails for 

lack of notice, the Court does not interpret the CLRA to prevent a plaintiff from curing a notice 

defect, as Patterson has done here. See Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1017 (N.D. 

Cal. 2014). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2018

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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