Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00834/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00834-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE MARTINEZ-ZAMORA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06-CV-834-H

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

TOM RIDGE, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, et

al.,

Respondent.

On April 10, 2006, Petitioner Jorge Martinez-Zamora, proceeding pro se, filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.)

Respondent filed its initial return on May 24, 2006, (Doc. No. 3.), and it filed an

amended return on June 1, 2006. (Doc. No. 5.) Petitioner filed a traverse on June 6,

2006. (Doc. No. 6.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the petition for

a writ of habeas corpus.

Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet. 5; Return, Ex. 1, 19.) He

became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. (Return, Ex. 1, 4.)

On September 9, 2005, he was detained after attempting to bring an illegal alien into the

United States using his wife’s legal permanent resident card. (Id., Ex. 1, 21.) The

Department of Homeland Security placed Petitioner in removal proceedings, charging

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him with being subject to removal under § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and

Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), for attempted alien smuggling. (Id.,

Ex. 1.) Petitioner admitted the charges and supporting facts before the immigration

judge (“IJ”), but applied for cancellation of removal. (Id., Ex. 5.) On December 1,

2005, the IJ denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal and ordered him

removed to Mexico. (Id., Ex. 3-15.) Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the decision on March 14, 2006. (Id., Ex. 16-24.)

On March 30, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review and requested a stay of

removal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Ex., Id. 24-32.)

Discussion

In his petition, Petitioner asserts that he is being held unlawfully. He argues: (1)

that he is being detained pursuant to an unconstitutional mandatory detention provision;

(2) that the Court must order him released because the IJ should have released him on

bond; and (3) that the Court should order him released because the complex nature of

the litigation demonstrates that Immigration and Customs Enforcement is not likely to

effect Petitioner’s removal in the near future. (Pet. 2, 5.)

Section 106(a) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231,

makes “the circuit courts the ‘sole’ judicial body able to review challenges to final

orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal.” See Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418

F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). The Act specifically states that it applies to challenges

to the merits of removal orders and not to challenges of continued detention. Thus, to

the extent Petitioner challenges his continued detention, this Court has jurisdiction over

his petition.

A. Basis for Petitioner’s Detention 

Petitioner contends that the Court must order his release or grant him bond

because he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which he claims

is unconstitutional. Petitioner’s claim that the mandatory detention provision 

/ / / /

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is unconstitutional fails because he is not being held subject to that provision, but is

being held pursuant to a discretionary decision by the Government. 

Section 1226 governs detention prior to a final order of removal. Mandatory

detention under § 1226(c) only applies to aliens who have committed certain crimes,

none of which apply here. Thus, Petitioner is not being held subject to that provision.

Instead, the Government contends that Petitioner’s detention is controlled by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231, which governs detention after a final order of removal. Under § 1231, the

Attorney General must generally remove the alien within a 90 day period. Id. §

1231(a)(1)(A). When the alien seeks judicial review of the removal order and the court

orders a stay of the removal, however, the 90 day period does not begin until the date

of the court’s final order. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). Here, because Petitioner has

requested a stay from the Ninth Circuit pending resolution of his appeal, the order of

removal is temporarily stayed pending further order of that court. Ninth Circuit General

Order 6.4(c) (“Upon the filing of a motion or request for stay of removal or deportation,

the order of removal or deportation is temporarily stayed until further order of the

court.”). Therefore, the 90 day removal period has not yet begun. Accordingly, until

the Ninth Circuit issues a final order, which begins the removal period, § 1231 does not

apply. See, e.g., Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (W.D. Wash.

2004) (finding that where an alien appealed his removal order to the Ninth Circuit,

which automatically stayed the removal, he was not subject to § 1231 detention because

the removal period had not yet begun, but was still subject to detention under § 1226);

Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]here a court issues a stay

pending its review of an administrative removal order, the alien continues to be detained

under [§ 1226] until the court renders its decision.). Given that § 1226(c) has

never applied to Petitioner and § 1231 does not yet apply to Petitioner, the Court finds

that Petitioner’s detention is governed by the general discretionary detention provisions

set forth in § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) 

states:

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On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and

pending such decision, the Attorney General-- 

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on--

 (A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

 (B) conditional parole

Id. § 1226(a). Thus, because Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under §

1226(c), his claim that the provision is unconstitutional must fail.

B. Government’s Discretionary Decision to Detain Petitioner

In the remainder of his Petition, Petitioner argues that the Court should order his

release because he is not a flight risk and because he is not a danger to the community.

Thus, he asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Government. Under

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), however, such discretionary decisions of whether to release an alien

on bond or on parole are unreviewable:

The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application

of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any

action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the

detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond

or parole.

Id. § 1226(e); see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003) (distinguishing

between challenges to discretionary decisions, which are barred by § 1226(e), and

challenges to the constitutionality of § 1226(c), which courts may hear). Here, because

Petitioner is challenging the Government’s discretionary decision of whether to grant

him bond, § 1226(e) bars his claim.

/ / / /

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Beyond the statutory bar to review in § 1226(e), traditional limits on the use of

habeas corpus would also preclude the Court’s review of the Government’s

discretionary decision: “[H]abeas is not available to claim that the INS simply came

to an unwise, yet lawful, conclusion when it did exercise its discretion. . . . Habeas

petitions that . . . simply seek to change the discretionary result reached by INS are not

within the scope of § 2241 and should be denied.” Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d

824, 828 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that petitioner could not use § 2241 to obtain judicial

review of the equitable balance that the INS arrived at when it denied a waiver of

deportation); see also Denmore, 538 U.S. at 536 (O’Connor, J, concurring) (“[T]here

is no analogous history of routine reliance on habeas jurisdiction to challenge the

detention of aliens without bail pending the conclusion of removal proceedings.”).

Accordingly, this Court may not review the IJ’s decision to detain Petitioner without

bond.

C. Continued Detention

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Court should order his release because the

Government will not be able to effect his removal in the foreseeable future given the

complex nature of the proceedings. As an initial matter, Petitioner has not indicated

why this litigation is complex or why the Government will not be able to effect his

removal to Mexico if the Ninth Circuit dismisses his appeal. In support of his claim,

he cites Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth Circuit

addressed an alien’s mandatory detention for over two and one half years under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) during removal proceedings. As discussed above, Petitioner is not

being detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

Therefore, Tijani does not apply to his current detention. Further, even looking at his

removal proceedings, Petitioner did not suffer any unusual delays. Rather, the

administrative proceedings and appeal lasted less than four months, which is less than

the average length of time for removal proceedings and administrative appeals noted

by the Supreme Court in Denmore. See 538 U.S. at 529 (“removal proceedings are

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completed in an average time of 47 days . . . and appeal takes an average of four

months”). Should the Ninth Circuit dismiss his appeal, Petitioner has not articulated

why the Government could not immediately effectuate his removal, thus ending his

detention.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 13, 2006

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Copies to:

Jorge Martinez-Zamora, pro se

A# 90 076 993 A/S

DHS Detention Facility

1115 North Imperial Ave.

El Centro, CA 92243

United States Attorney’s Office

Samuel W. Bettwy, AUSA

Civil Division

880 Front Street, Room 6293

San Diego, CA 92101-8893

Case 3:06-cv-00834-H-BLM Document 8 Filed 09/13/06 Page 6 of 6