Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05211/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 1997 Decided March 7, 1997

No. 96-5211

NORTHWEST FOREST RESOURCE COUNCIL, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS 

v.

MICHAEL DOMBECK,

ACTING DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, AND 

BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEES 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01031)

Mark C. Rutzick argued the cause for appellants, with whom Kevin Q. Davis was on the briefs.

Thomas R. Lundquist entered an appearance.

David C. Shilton, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellees, with whom

Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Peter D. Coppelman, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Albert M. Ferlo, Jr., Martin W. Matzen, and Wells D. Burgess, Attorneys, were on the brief.

Stephen M. Truitt and Charles H. Carpenter were on the brief for amicus curiae Native Forest

Council.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellantsthe Northwest Forest Resource Council ("NFRC")

et al., an industry/labor/citizen coalitionappeal the District Court's decision dismissing their claims

arising out of the 1994 President's Forest Plan. Northwest Forest v. Secretary of Agriculture, Civ.

No. 93-1621 (D.D.C. May 22, 1996) (trans.),reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 241. The District

Court found that appellants' claims were barred by the stare decisis effect of a decision by Judge

Dwyer in the Western District of Washington, Seattle Aubudon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291

(W.D.Wash. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 1 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Because stare decisis does not compel a district court to follow the decision of a district court in

another circuit, we find that the doctrine cannot be applied here to deprive appellants of their right

to be heard on the merits of their claims. The alternative rationale suggested by the Government,

comity, is also inapplicable to this case, given that the appellants in the instant case include parties

who did not participate in the Western District ofWashington litigation. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the District Court and remand the case to allow the trial judge to consider whether

appellants' claims are barred by issue or claim preclusion and, if not, for a disposition on the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The President's Forest Plan

This case arises out ofthe latest round oflitigation surrounding environmental protectionsfor

the spotted owl and the management of the forests in the Pacific Northwest. In response to prior

litigation ordering the government to comply with various environmental statutes, see Seattle

Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.Wash. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon

Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489

(D.Or.1992), aff'd sub nom. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993), on

April 13, 1994, the Secretary of the Interior adopted a new plan for the lands managed by the Bureau

of Land Management ("BLM") in western Oregon. (This plan is hereinafter referred to as "the

Plan.") The Plan was entered into jointly with the Secretary of Agriculture, who adopted a new plan

applicable to some 20 million acres of Forest Service land throughout western Oregon and

Washington.

Anticipating that the issuance of the new 1994 management Plan would engender a host of

claims, the agencies requested a status conference before Judge Dwyer, who wasstill presiding over

part of the earlier litigation, in the Western District of Washington. The Government urged that all

challenges to the Plan be decided in one court, and that the Western District of Washington was the

logical forum. In a scheduling order issued shortly after the conference, Judge Dwyer expressed his

view that "it is clear that all legal challenges to the [Plan] should be decided in the same district and

reviewed by the same court of appeals," but he said that no order could be entered to this effect.

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 2 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, No. C92-479WD (W.D.Wash. Apr. 21, 1994), reprinted in J.A.

105-06.

Following the announcement of the 1994 Plan, environmental groups did indeed file several

challengesin theWesternDistrict ofWashington. These cases were consolidated as Seattle Audubon

Soc'y v. Lyons and assigned to Judge Dwyer. One of the challenges to the Plan was a continuation

of one of the earlier cases that had given rise to the Plan, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F.

Supp. at 1484. In that case, NFRC, one of the appellants here, had intervened as a defendant on

behalf of a previous management plan.

B. The District of Columbia Litigation

In May 1994, NFRC brought suit against the BLM challenging the new Plan in the District

Court for the District ofColumbia. See NFRC v. Dombeck, Civ. No. 94-1031 (D.D.C. filed May 11,

1994), reprinted in J.A. 42. NFRC asserted 11 claims under various federal statutes. NFRC also

filed a companion case, NFRC v. Thomas, Civ. No. 94-1032 (D.D.C. filed May 11, 1994),

challenging the application of the Plan to the Forest Service lands in Oregon and Washington.

In June of 1994, the Government moved to transfer these two cases, along with another case

challenging the Plan filed by the O & C Counties, Association of O &C Counties v. Babbitt, Civ. No.

94-1044 (D.D.C. filed May 11, 1994), reprinted in J.A. 14, to the Western District of Washington,

or in the alternative, to stay the cases pending resolution of the related litigation in the State of

Washington. The District Court refused to transfer Dombeck or the counties' case, finding that

transfers were not permitted because these cases could not have been brought initially in the Western

District of Washington. See NFRC v. Dombeck, Civ. No. 94-1031 (D.D.C. June 30, 1994) (order),

reprinted in J.A. 142; Association of O & C Counties v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 94-1044 (D.D.C. June

30, 1994) (order),reprinted in J.A. 140. The District Court stayed both cases pending the conclusion

of the Western District of Washington litigation. However, the District Court transferred NFRC v.

Thomas, the case challenging the application of the Plan to the Forest Service lands in Oregon and

Washington. See NFRC v. Thomas, Civ. No. 94-1032 (D.D.C. June 30, 1994) (order), reprinted in

J.A. 144. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs in that case dismissed it without prejudice under FED. R.

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 3 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

CIV. P. 41(a)(1). See J.A. 146.

In related litigation also brought by NFRC in the District Court for the District of Columbia,

the Court found that the Forest Ecosytem Management Assessment Team("FEMAT"), which wrote

the report that provided the basis for the 1994 Plan, violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act

("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. app. (1994). See NFRC v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D.D.C. 1994). But the

District Court refused to issue an injunction preventing the government from using the FEMAT's

report.

C. The Government's Cross-Claims in the Western District of Washington Litigation

NFRC's presence as a defendant-intervenorin the ongoing 1992 SeattleAudubon Society case

in the Western District of Washington enabled the Government to file cross-claims against NFRC

asking Judge Dwyer to enter a declaratory judgment ruling on all 11 of the original claims in NFRC

v. Dombeck in the District of Columbia, as well as on the claims in the dismissed NFRC v. Thomas

case. Judge Dwyer permitted the cross-claims against NFRC. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons,

871 F. Supp. at 1290. But, he denied the Government's motion to join the other plaintiffs in the

Dombeck and Thomas suits. See id. at 1290-91. In December 1994, Judge Dwyer issued a

declaratory judgment against NFRC on 9 of the original 11 claims in NFRC v. Dombeck, declaring

the Plan valid as against those claims. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1325.

At the Government'srequest, he declined to rule on the other two original pending claimsin this case.

D. The Dismissal of NFRC's Claims in the District of Columbia

In February 1995, following Judge Dwyer's decision, NFRC filed an amended complaint in

NFRC v. Dombeck in the District Court of the District of Columbia, adding 2 new plaintiffs and 14

new claims, including anotherrequest for an injunction based on the FACAviolations bythe FEMAT.

See NFRC v. Dombeck, Civ. No. 94-1031 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1995),reprinted in J.A. 153. NFRC also

moved to lift the stay in the NFRC v. Dombeck case. On May 22, 1996, after the Ninth Circuit had

affirmed Judge Dwyer's decision upholding the new Plan, see Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80

F.3d at 1406, the District Court held a status conference in Dombeck and O & C Counties. At the

status conference, the District Court declined to rule on whether the Lyons litigation in the Western

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 4 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

District of Washington barred NFRC's claims by virtue of claimpreclusion and issue preclusion. The

District Court instead found that "on the basis of stare decisis ... the issues [raised by NFRC et al.]

have been resolved by the decisions of Judge Dwyer in the Ninth Circuit." Northwest Forest v.

Secretary of Agriculture, Civ. No. 93-1621 (D.D.C. May 22, 1996) (trans.), reprinted in J.A. 247.

The District Court then dismissed NFRC's and the counties' claims with prejudice. The counties

settled their claims, leaving this court to decide only whether the District Court correctly dismissed

NFRC's claims.

II. ANALYSIS

We find that the District Court erred as a matter of law in deciding that it was bound by the

stare decisis effect of a decision from the Western District of Washington. Stare decisis does not

mandate that a district court in this circuit follow the decision of a district court in another circuit.

According to Moore's Federal Practice,

Stare decisis, briefly stated, makes each judgment a statement of the law, or

precedent, binding in future cases before the same court or another court owing

obedience to its decisions.

1BJAMESWM.MOOREETAL.,MOORE'SFEDERALPRACTICE ¶ 0.401 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasis added).

Moore goes on to explain how stare decisis operates in the federal system:

The court of appeals in one circuit owes no obedience to decisions of a court of

appeals in another circuit, though of course it may find the reasons given for such a

decision persuasive, or may be influenced by the accumulation of authority. This

freedom of the circuits to come each to its own conclusion is not only tolerated, but

is an important feature in the operation of the Supreme Court's certiorari practice.

The district courts, like the courts of appeals, owe no obedience to the decisions of

their counterparts in other districts, nor to the decisions of the courts of appeals in

other circuits.

Id. ¶ 0.402 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Circuit precedent is consistent with this rule. See,

e.g., City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Simply

stated, there was absolutely no basis for the trial court to conclude that it was bound by the decision

of the Western District of Washington on stare decisis grounds.

In an apparent effort to avoid an obviousreversal, the Government now claimsthat, actually,

principles of comity rather than stare decisis motivated the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g.,

Brieffor Appellees at 19-20. However, our review of the District Court's order does not support this

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 5 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

contention. In point of fact, the trial court judge repeatedly referred to the doctrine of stare decisis,

and never once mentioned comity. See, e.g., Northwest Forest v. Secretary of Agriculture, Civ. No.

93-1621 (D.D.C. May 22, 1996) (trans.) ("[I]f I am to make a ruling today ... it will be on the basis

of stare decisis only."), reprinted in J.A. 247.

Furthermore, the doctrine of comity would not support the dismissal of this case. The case

law of this circuit makes it clear that "comity" is rarely employed to justify the dismissal of viable

claimsthat are otherwise properly before the court. Rather, in strictly limited circumstances, we have

sometimes held that comity may warrant dismissal of an action where there is a case pending in

another jurisdiction involving the same parties, issues, and subject matter:

Created to assure judicial efficiency and to reflect abiding respect for other courts, the

doctrine [of comity] surely does not contemplate that fundamental rights of citizens

will be adjudicated in forums from which they are absent.

In fact, though perhaps subconsciously at times, the courts have not allowed

comity to be debased in such a fashion. The decisions invoking the principle involve

circumstances in which the plaintiff in the later federal suit was a party to the earlier

action involving the same issues and subject matter.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1219 (D.C. Cir.

1978) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other groundssub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union

of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 384-87 (1980); see also Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v.

Ragonese, 617 F.2d 828, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (The court permitted dismissal on grounds of

comity where the plaintiff was not a party to the other law suit only because plaintiff was a surety and

as such was bound by any action against its principal of which it had notice.); Hilton Hotels Corp.

v. Weaver, 325 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (The court upheld a dismissal based on grounds of comity

where the case involved the same issues of law and fact and the same plaintiffs but different

defendants as a prior adjudication in a different circuit); cf. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440

(1977) (In the context of federal comity to state proceedings, the Court has recognized that federal

court abstention in favor of a state proceeding is appropriate only when the state litigation is

"between the same parties and raising the same issues" as the federal litigation.). Comity, thus,

cannot be used to explain the District Court's dismissal of this case. For one thing, this case involves

at least some parties not before the court in the Western District of Washington. For another, the

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 6 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

proceedings in the Western District of Washington were no longer pending when the dismissal was

ordered. Accordingly, the District Court must be reversed.

Given the alleged overlap between the issues raised in the District Court and the issues

decided by the Western District of Washington, there is a possibility that some of appellants'

challenges may be barred by issue or claim preclusion. We will leave these matters for decision by

the District Court on remand of the case.

III. CONCLUSION 

We reverse the judgment of the District Court. The case is hereby remanded with instructions

to the District Court to consider whether appellants' challenges are barred byissue or claimpreclusion

and, if not, to dispose of the case on the merits.

USCA Case #96-5211 Document #257276 Filed: 03/07/1997 Page 7 of 7