Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01064/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01064-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY FAIRWELL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-10-1064 FCD GGH P

vs.

M. CATES, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Plaintiff was originally part of a group of prisoners who filed a joint action in case

CIV S-10-0719 GGH. The claims were severed and each plaintiff was instructed to file an

individual complaint. Plaintiff has filed the instant first amended complaint (FAC).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). No initial filing fee will be assessed at this time. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial

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partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 

Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded

by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account

exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

“The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A

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claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct.

1843 (1969). 

Plaintiff names approximately 19 defendants and alleges many instances where

the ability to practice his religion, Asatru/Odinism, was infringed upon. Plaintiff also sets forth

claims of retaliation, violations of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and improper

handling of inmate appeals. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint will be dismissed with leave to

file a second amended complaint within twenty-eight days of service of this order. Failure to file

a second amended complaint will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are based on another prisoner who practices

Asatru/Odinism and filed a staff complaint against several defendants. Plaintiff then alleges that

defendants retaliated against plaintiff. It is not clear what the staff complaint consisted of, or if it

involved plaintiff. Plaintiff has not engaged in any protected conduct, though he says it has

resulted in a ‘chilling’ effect for any future litigation he may file. Plaintiff also has additional

claims of retaliation against other defendants that involve verbal harassment or in other instances

plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts to identify the retaliation. All these claims are

insufficient and dismissed with leave to amend.

With respect to the ADA claims, plaintiff alleges that defendants have not

provided adequate seating with back support for him and other elderly or disabled people. 

Plaintiff states that he is disabled and has trouble walking and sitting for long periods of time. 

However it is difficult to discern what plaintiff requires for his alleged disability as opposed to

what he wants for other practitioners of his religion that are not a party to this action. Plaintiff

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must provide additional information concerning his disability to show that he is a qualified

individual and not discuss other prisoners who may be disabled. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the ability to practice his religion are quite

numerous. In the majority of the individual alleged violations in the complaint, plaintiff

describes an example where his religious practices were infringed, but then attributes the

violation to various defendants without describing how anyone was involved. For example,

plaintiff alleges that defendants Martel, Long, Jackson, Lackner, Minnick, Petersen and Kaplan

using their authority have obstructed plaintiff’s access to religious property. FAP at 15. These

types of allegations against multiple defendants with no specificity are repeated throughout the

complaint. While this claim, with more specific information, may state a viable claim, plaintiff

fails to identify which defendant obstructed his ability to access religious property or how. 

Simply saying that seven defendants prevented him from accessing religious property is

insufficient. The court will not order service on nearly 20 defendants if there may be only

allegations against a few of them. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to identify how the individual

defendants are connected to the alleged constitutional deprivation. Simply listing perceived

violations and numerous defendants will not suffice. In addition, the majority of plaintiff’s

claims involve highlighting discrepancies of how he perceives that other religions are treated

better than his religion.

Plaintiff has brought numerous claims under The Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment right to the free exercise of

religion.

Plaintiff is informed that defendants are not responsible for duplicating every

religious benefit provided to other religions so that all religions are treated exactly the same. As

the Supreme Court stated in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, n.2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263

(1972):

\\\\\

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 Plaintiff also takes issue with Native American religions being given their own grounds 1

that are 2664 sq. ft, which is apparently larger than the grounds for Asatru/Odinism. FAC at 14.

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We do not suggest . . . that every religious sect or group within a prison-however

few in number-must have identical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or

place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must

a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the

demand. But reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to

exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments without fear of penalty.

Application of the standard set forth in Cruz does not require “strict numerical

analysis” or “create a system of ratios or quotas.” Thompson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 712 F.2d

1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding grant of summary judgment on Muslim inmates' request

for access to chapel comparable to Christian inmates). 

Under the Cruz standard, described above, defendants must provide plaintiff a

“reasonable opportunity” to practice his religion in a manner “comparable” to the other inmates.

For example, plaintiff concedes that prison officials have provided him an outdoor

space for religious services. FAC at 13. However, the outdoor space is near the handball court

and at times the handball strays off the court and interferes with plaintiff’s religious services. Id. 

While there is a fence, plaintiff alleges violations of his ability to practice his religion because

defendants have not built a higher fence or provided a different outdoor area. Id.

RLUIPA harassment is a two way street. Just as correctional officials can be

responsible for violating prisoners ability to practice religion, prisoners can use RLUIPA and the

First Amendment to harass correctional officials with frivolous claims. Not every decision by

correctional officials will violate a prisoners ability to practice his or her religion, nor must every

religion be given the exact same resources. If plaintiff files a second amended complaint he 1

should focus on legitimate instances where his ability to practice his religion was burdened and

not provide a lengthy list describing the different resources provided to other religions. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

With respects to claims of retaliation, plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that

retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor

behind the defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th

Cir. 1989). Plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of legitimate correctional

goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.1995). 

Verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d

136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). However, even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim,

because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810

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F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice, a

prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner's

constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1) (10th Cir.1990).

Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.2002). Title II provides that “no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to

discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within

state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955,

141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1997);

Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the

ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of Portland,

386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

A “disability” is defined by the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A). 

Furthermore, prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a

specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003),

citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the nonexistence of, or the

failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the

prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d at 640. See also,

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.

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 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 2

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-1264, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (transfer to mental hospital), and

Washington, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (involuntary

administration of psychotropic drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra.

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1991); Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill.1982) (“[A prison] grievance procedure

is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it

does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned

by the fourteenth amendment”). Specifically, a failure to process a grievance does not state a

constitutional violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to

“freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293,

2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).2

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

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amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is not assessed an initial partial filing fee. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed

above, with leave to file a second amended complaint within twenty-eight days from the date of

service of this Order. Failure to file a second amended complaint will result in a

recommendation that these defendants be dismissed from this action.

DATED: August 2, 2010 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:AB

fair1064.b

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