Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07184/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07184-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRI J. VITT,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-7184 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Michael J. Astrue, in his capacity as Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, moves pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint

as time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Defendant argues that

part of the complaint must also be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiff opposes the

motion. Having considered all the papers filed by the parties, the

Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed an application for Social

Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security

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1 SSR 91-5p provides: "If a claimant presents evidence that

mental incapacity prevented him from requesting a timely review of

an administrative action by the Commissioner, and the claimant had

no one legally responsible for prosecuting the claim on his or her

behalf at the time of the prior adverse action, the SSA will

determine whether or not good cause exists for extending the time

to request review. . . . The claimant will have established mental

incapacity for the purpose of establishing good cause when the

evidence establishes that he or she lacked the mental capacity to

understand the procedures for requesting review." 

2

Act (SSA), alleging inability to work beginning July 7, 1993. 

(Administrative Law Judge Decision, December 15, 2004 at 20.) She

claimed that she suffered from multiple medical disorders, including

debilitating mental stress, beginning in 1997 and continuing to the

time of her application for disability benefits. (Id.) As part of

her 2002 application, Plaintiff attempted to revive, pursuant to

Social Security Ruling (SSR) 91-5p,1 a 1994 Title II disability

benefits claim that had been denied in 1995. Plaintiff's 2002 claim

for SSI benefits was denied on May 1, 2003. It was denied again

upon reconsideration on August 15, 2003. (Docket no. 13,

Declaration of Dennis V. Ford (Ford Decl.), Exh. 1.) 

In a letter dated March 3, 2004, from her non-attorney

representative Andrew Ragnes, a law clerk for her attorney Ian

Sammis, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge. (Docket no. 17, Declaration of Andrew Ragnes (Ragnes Decl.) 

¶ 1.) The ALJ deemed this to be also a protective filing of an

application for supplemental security income benefits under Title

XVI of the SSA. (ALJ Decision, December 15, 2004 at 1.) On March

9, 2004, a hearing was held before ALJ Catherine R. Lazuran. The

ALJ consolidated Plaintiff's 2002 Title II disability benefits claim

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2

 Bivens actions are suits against federal actors in their

individual capacities for violations of constitutional rights. 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971); see also Janicki Logging Coy. v.

Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1994). In her complaint,

Plaintiff alleged that ALJ Lazuran was personally biased against

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with her protectively filed Title XVI claim. Plaintiff, represented

by Mr. Ragnes, testified at the hearing. (Id.)

On December 15, 2004, the ALJ issued a partially favorable

decision regarding Plaintiff's 2002 application. The ALJ found

that, beginning on November 1, 2003, Plaintiff was disabled under

the SSA due to a variety of physical and psychological impairments.

(ALJ Decision, December 15, 2004 at 38-39) The ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff was eligible for supplemental security income benefits

under Title XVI, but denied her application for Title II benefits. 

The ALJ found that, although Plaintiff had been disabled under Title

XVI, within the meaning of the SSA, since November 1, 2003, she was

not disabled under Title II as of the date she was last insured,

December 31, 1998. (Id. at 38.) The ALJ also rebuffed Plaintiff's

attempt to renew her earlier 1994 proceedings, finding no basis on

which to reopen the adverse determination of October 2, 1995. (Id.) 

On December 27, 2004, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the

unfavorable portion of the ALJ's December 15, 2004 decision.

On September 29, 2005, while her request for review was still

pending before the Appeals Council, Plaintiff, represented by

attorney Ian Sammis, filed a Bivens action against the Commissioner

and ALJ Lazuran in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California, entitled Vitt v. Barnhart, No. C 05-3957

MJJ.2

 The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

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her because of her race. 

4

subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a), Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case, citing

economic reasons. On February 2, 2006, the Honorable Martin J.

Jenkins dismissed the case without prejudice. 

On August 3, 2006, Plaintiff, still represented by attorney

Sammis, sought to renew her Bivens claim by filing a "notice of

permissive joinder" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 in a

case entitled Coleman v. Barnhart, No. C-06-01912, presided over by

Judge Susan Illston. The plaintiff in Coleman alleged that ALJ

Lazuran had discriminated against him. Plaintiff's notice of

joinder alleged that she was subject to the same discrimination as

Coleman and, thus, her claims should be brought in the same case as

Coleman's. On January 7, 2007, Judge Illston found that joinder was

inappropriate and granted the Commissioner's motion to sever and

dismiss Plaintiff from the Coleman case. The dismissal was without

prejudice to Plaintiff filing a separate action. 

Meanwhile, on September 11, 2006, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request for a review of the ALJ's decision and adopted

that decision as the final determination of the Commissioner. (Ford

Decl., ¶ 3(b) at 3-4.) In its denial, the Appeals Council notified

Plaintiff that she had the right to commence a civil action

requesting district court review of the Commissioner's ruling within

sixty days of that ruling. (Id. at 4.) The Appeals Council also

informed Plaintiff that she did not have a right to seek judicial

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review of the denial of her request to reopen the prior claim for

benefits. (Id. at 4.)

On November 20, 2006, Plaintiff, still represented by attorney

Sammis, filed the present complaint requesting judicial review of

the ALJ's denial of her claim on the grounds that (1) the

Commissioner's actions, findings and conclusions were not supported

by substantial evidence and (2) the Commissioner applied incorrect

legal standards in the determination of the ultimate issues that 

(a) Plaintiff's eligibility for Title II benefits expired before she

became disabled in November, 2003 and (b) Plaintiff's 1994 case

should not be reopened. On June 1, 2007, Defendant filed a motion

to dismiss on the ground that it was filed beyond the sixty-day

statute of limitations provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405. Plaintiff did

not file an opposition. Instead, on June 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed

her first amended complaint (FAC). (Docket no. 10). On June 29,

2007, Defendant filed this motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. 

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The Commissioner moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for

failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted,

contending that her claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all

material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus.,

Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the

court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in

the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached

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documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint and may

be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

The statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion to

dismiss, but only where "the running of the statute is apparent from

the face of the complaint," and the motion should be granted "only

if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required

liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute

was tolled." Id. at 1278. The issue of equitable tolling must be

addressed when "the complaint, liberally construed in light of our

'notice pleading' system, adequately alleges facts showing the

potential applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine." 

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993)

(emphasis added). 

When granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

a court is generally required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend,

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment

would be futile. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection

Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining

whether amendment would be futile, a court examines whether the

complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal

"without contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original

complaint." Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th

Cir. 1990). Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an

amended complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the

challenged pleading. Id. at 296-97.

The Commissioner asserts two arguments in support of his

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28 7

contention that all of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). First, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff's

action is untimely because the Appeals Council's decision became

final on September 11, 2006 and Plaintiff filed her case in this

Court on November 20, 2006, missing the filing deadline by five

days. Second, the Commissioner contends that there is no basis for

equitably tolling Plaintiff's claim. 

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations on her claim

for Title II benefits should be equitably tolled under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) because, on August 3, 2006, she attempted to join the

plaintiff in Coleman challenging the final decision of the

Commissioner on Bivens grounds. (FAC, citing Exhs. A-C.) Plaintiff

alleges that on August 30, 2006, the Commissioner acknowledged her

attempt to join by filing a motion to sever her claims from

Coleman's complaint and to stay Coleman's and Plaintiff's Rule 34

requests for production of documents. The Commissioner responds

that Plaintiff has not alleged any justification for equitable

tolling and that her joinder in Coleman has no effect on the

timeliness of the filing of the instant complaint. 

Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes judicial review of "any

final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the

plaintiff] was a party." The judicial review provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) apply to claims under Title II and Title XVI. 

Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Section

405(g) operates as a statute of limitations setting the time period

in which a claimant may appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. 

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); Vernon v.

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Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, a plaintiff may be

permitted to file a claim after the sixty-day period has expired in

those rare cases where fairness requires it, such as when the

defendant fraudulently conceals the cause of action, or when there

is excusable delay by the plaintiff. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479;

Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1278. Equitable tolling focuses on the

plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and is

"not available to avoid the consequences of one's own negligence." 

Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998). "Once

a claimant retains counsel, tolling ceases because she has gained

the means of knowledge of her rights and can be charged with

constructive knowledge of the law's requirements." Leorna v. United

States Department of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997).

It is uncontested that Plaintiff's complaint was filed after

the sixty-day time limit requirement contained in section 405(g). 

Plaintiff concedes that the Appeals Council denied review of her

claim on September 11, 2006. (FAC ¶ 8, at 2.) Therefore, the

deadline for Plaintiff to file her complaint in this Court was

November 15, 2006 (sixty days plus five days added for mailing). 

Plaintiff, represented by attorney Sammis, filed her civil action in

this Court on November 20, 2006, five days after the statutory

period had run. Therefore, the complaint is time-barred under Title

42 U. S. C. § 405(g). 

In arguing that the statute of limitations is tolled by her

attempts to seek permissive joinder in Coleman v. Barnhart,

Plaintiff relies on Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th

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28 9

Cir. 2000). She contends that the complaint she tried to make in

Coleman should have been continued as a separate suit, instead of

being dismissed. In that way, the argument goes, her new Bivens

claim would have served to toll the statute of limitations for her

appeal of the Appeals Counsel's ruling.

In Elmore, the plaintiff filed a suit with several other

plaintiffs. The district court dismissed Elmore's claim on the

ground of misjoinder. Id. at 1011. Elmore did not appeal this

dismissal, but refiled his claim as a separate action. Id. The

district court dismissed the refiled suit with prejudice because, by

the time he filed it, the statute of limitations had run. Id.

Elmore appealed to the Seventh Circuit. He argued that because the

original suit was timely, his second suit should have been treated

as a continuation of the original suit and the statute of

limitations on the second filing should be equitably tolled. Id. 

In affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit

held that, for statute of limitations purposes, if "[a] suit is

dismissed without prejudice, meaning that it can be refiled, then

the tolling effect of the filing of the suit is wiped out and the

statute of limitations is deemed to have continued running from

whenever the cause of action accrued, without interruption by that

filing." Id. at 1011. The court went on to note in dicta that, "in

formulating a remedy for a misjoinder the judge is required to avoid

gratuitous harm to the parties," and is therefore duty-bound to

prevent a dismissal that would have adverse "statute of limitations

consequences." Id. at 1012. However, the court concluded that

equitable tolling did not apply to Elmore's claim because he waited

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four months to file it; rather than seeking equitable tolling, he

should have appealed the district court's ruling. Id. 

Elmore is inapplicable. The claim Plaintiff alleges here does

not include a Bivens claim against the ALJ, but addresses the merits

of the Appeals Counsel's decision to uphold the ALJ's denial of

benefits. 

Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, had enough

information to file her social security disability appeal on time. 

However, she and her attorney did not do so. Equitable tolling is

not available to avoid the consequences of Plaintiff's negligence or

that of her counsel. Plaintiff's opposition proffers no grounds on

which she could amend her complaint successfully to allege equitable

tolling. The Court must dismiss the instant action. 

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

In the alternative, the Commissioner moves to dismiss one of

Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist at

the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians

v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.

1988). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the sufficiency of

the pleadings to establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an actual

lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency of

the complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp.,

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

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A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction

until the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v.

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). An action

should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend unless it is

clear that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be cured by

amendment. May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211,

1216 (9th Cir. 1980).

Interpreted liberally, Plaintiff's FAC alleges that the ALJ's

December 15, 2004 refusal to reopen her 1994 case violated her due

process rights because (1) she was unrepresented by counsel in her

1994 case and she was mentally unable to understand the review

process, and (2) the administrative notice of her right to appeal

the denial of that earlier application was constitutionally

deficient under SSR 91-5p and Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197

(9th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner moves to dismiss this claim on

the ground that judicial review of the Commissioner's discretionary

decision not to reopen Plaintiff's 1994 application is barred by 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) "cannot be

read to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency

discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security

benefits." See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.

99, 107-09 (1977). However, there is an exception to this general

jurisdictional bar if a plaintiff alleges a colorable constitutional

claim. Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997). A

colorable constitutional claim is stated if a plaintiff shows that

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28 12

he or she did not have counsel or other suitable representation and

disability prevented him or her from understanding and pursuing

administrative remedies. Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1098-99

(9th Cir. 2001)(citing Califano, 430 U.S. at 107-09).

A claim is not colorable if it is clearly immaterial and made

only for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction, or "is wholly

insubstantial or frivolous." Boettcher v. Sec'y of Health & Human

Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1985); Hoye v. Sullivan, 985

F.2d 990, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1993). The mere allegation of a due

process claim does not assure that the claim is colorable. Id. at

992. In the context of mental disability, the claimant is required

to make a "particularized allegation" of mental impairment plausibly

of sufficient severity to impair both comprehension and the ability

to act upon notice of procedural mandates. Byam v. Barnhart, 336

F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2003). 

On September 11, 2006, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's

decision not to reopen the 1994 application, concluding that

Plaintiff had not met her burden of proving a mental impairment

severe enough to preclude her from understanding her "rights with

respect to the Reconsideration Determination." (Appeals Council

Decision, September 11, 2006 at 3.) Plaintiff does not allege in

her complaint, nor argue in her opposition to the Commissioner's

motion, that she was mentally unable to understand how to obtain

review of the 1994 decision at that time. And in fact she did seek

reconsideration of that decision, evidencing that she understood how

to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not made a colorable claim of

a constitutional violation and the Court lacks jurisdiction to

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review the ALJ's decision not to reopen her 1994 claim. 

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to the relief afforded in

Gonzalez v. Sullivan. There, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the

sufficiency of a notice form used at that time by the Secretary of

Health and Human Services (HHS) concerning the denial of

applications for social security disability benefits. 914 F.2d

1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1990). The notice stated, in part: "If you do

not request reconsideration of your case within the prescribed time

period, you still have the right to file another application at any

time." Id. The Ninth Circuit held that this notice violated a

claimant's due process right because it did not "clearly indicate

that if no request for reconsideration is made, the determination is

final." Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that to satisfy due

process, the notice accompanying a denial of a social security

benefits application "must be reasonably calculated to afford

parties their right to present objections." Id. Moreover, the

notice must not be so "misleading that it introduces a high risk of

error into the disability decisionmaking process." Id.

Unlike the plaintiff in Gonzalez, Plaintiff does not argue that

the administrative notice she received was misleading or that it

failed to notify her of the proper procedure for appealing the

denial of social security benefits. Nor has Plaintiff indicated

that her notice contained language similar to that in Gonzalez. As

noted, the ALJ and the Appeals Council found that because Plaintiff

made a request for reconsideration, the notice was reasonably

calculated to inform Plaintiff of her right to present objections. 

Therefore, because Plaintiff's 1994 application was denied upon

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reconsideration, it cannot be said that the notice was

constitutionally deficient. See Rolen v. Barnhart, 273 F.3d 1189,

1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "Gonzalez does not require that a

notice provide strategic legal advice, or inform claimants about all

possible responses to a dismissal. Gonzalez merely requires that

notices inform claimants of what they must do if they wish to

present objections to a dismissal.")

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's complaint (Docket No. 12) is GRANTED. This dismissal is

without leave to amend because Plaintiff has already amended her

complaint after Defendant's first motion to dismiss and she does not

proffer any grounds on which she could amend further to allege

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/14/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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