Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01339/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01339-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON CHAPMAN,

NO. CIV. S-04-1339 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

PIER 1 IMPORTS, INC., et al

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an award

of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $70,608.80. The

court decides the matter based upon the parties’ papers without

oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court awards

$47,912.04 in fees and costs.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Byron Chapman brought suit against defendants

Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) d/b/a Pier 1 Imports #1132 and R/M

Vacaville Ltd. pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act

and various state laws. Plaintiff alleged that he encountered a

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number of architectural barriers at the Pier 1 store. 

On September 14, 2005, defendant R/M Vacaville Ltd. was

dismissed. On June 19, 2007, the parties stipulated to entry of

judgment. The court agreed to this stipulation and granted an

entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on

June 25, 2007. The court also granted injunctive relief and

monetary damages in the amount of $8,000. 

Plaintiff now seeks attorneys’ fees under the ADA and state

law. Because the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to

attorneys’ fees and costs under the ADA, the court does not

address the standards for an award under California law.

II. Standard

The ADA provides that “the court . . . in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s

fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. §

12205. The propriety of awarding attorneys’ fees turns on three

elements: (1) whether the party who seeks attorneys’ fees is the

prevailing party; (2) whether the court should exercise its

discretion to award the fees; and (3) what constitutes a

reasonable award.

A prevailing party is one who has “succeed[ed] on any

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). A party achieves prevailing party

status by establishing a “clear, causal relationship between the

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litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.” 

Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the attorneys’ fees provision is stated in

discretionary terms, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily

recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would

render such an award unjust. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic

Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hensley, 461

U.S. at 429).

The starting point for calculating the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Fischer v. SJB-P.D.

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433). This lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable

and should only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional

cases.” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)). The court

may, however, adjust the lodestar figure if various factors

overcome the presumption of reasonableness. Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433-34. The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the

basis of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

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 Before the lodestar method developed, Kerr’s twelve factors

constituted the test for setting attorneys’ fee awards in the Ninth

Circuit. See Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. At present, the court uses

some of the Kerr factors in deciding the reasonableness of the

hours billed and the hourly rate. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 & n.3;

see also Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.9 (listing the Kerr factors

subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation). 

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of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the

case, (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases. 

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67,

70 (9th Cir. 1975))1; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292

F.3d 1139, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The court need not consider

all . . . factors, but only those called into question by the

case at hand and necessary to support the reasonableness of the

fee award.”).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff requests $70,608.80 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the court awards $47,912.04.

A. Prevailing Party

It is undisputed that plaintiff is the prevailing party in

this action, given that judgment was stipulated and consequently

entered in his favor. 

B. Discretion

A prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorneys’

fees unless special circumstances would render such an award

unjust. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. Here, defendant argues that

because plaintiff prevailed on less than a third of the

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violations initially raised, the request for attorneys’ fees

should accordingly be reduced by two-thirds. 

Where a plaintiff only succeeds on some of the claims

brought, the district court must engage in a two-part analysis. 

See Schwartz v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895,

901-02 (9th Cir. 1995). First, the court must determine if the

unsuccessful claims were related to the successful claims. Id.

at 901. If the successful and unsuccessful claims involve

“distinctly different claims for relief that are based on

different facts and legal theories,” fees may not be awarded for

time spent on the unsuccessful claims. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

If the successful and unsuccessful claims “involve a common

core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories,”

however, the court must proceed to the second part of the

analysis. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this

second step, the court must “focus on the significance of the

overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the

hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff obtained ‘excellent

results,’ full compensation may be appropriate, but if only

‘partial or limited success’ was obtained, full compensation may

be excessive.” Id. at 902. 

Here, plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims were

related, as they all pertained to alleged accessibility

violations and therefore shared “related legal theories.” 

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Schwartz, 73 F.3d at 901; see also Hubbard v. Twin Oaks Health

and Rehabilitation Ctr., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (E.D. Cal.

2005). Accordingly, the court must determine the overall relief

obtained in relation to the hours reasonably expended. On

summary judgment, the court ruled on a total of twenty-two

alleged violations. Plaintiff prevailed on seven of the alleged

violations, whereas defendant prevailed on twelve of the alleged

violations (with the remainder of the violations involving

factual disputes inappropriate for summary judgment). Plaintiff

notes, however, that (1) he succeeded in forcing defendant to

eradicate existing architectural barriers, (2) defendant

ultimately chose to settle rather than proceed to trial, and (3)

Mr. Chapman received damages in the amount of $8,000.

In light of the plaintiff’s mixed success, the court finds

that some reduction in the award is appropriate. While the

defendant has urged that the court essentially pro rate the

award by the number of successful claims to total claims, this

approach is only appropriate when the successful and

unsuccessful claims are unrelated, which is not the case here. 

Otherwise, the two-part test would be rendered superfluous. 

Rather, the court finds that it is appropriate to reduce the

final attorneys’ fees award by 15 percent, given plaintiff’s

partial success.

C. Reasonable Fee

The starting point for calculating the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

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multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433.

1. Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees for a total of

278.95 hours expended in this litigation. Of those total hours,

153.10 are attributed to Lynn Hubbard, the individual with the

highest billing rate. Defendant argues that this latter figure

should be reduced (or the billing rate adjusted) because some of

his time “could have -- and should have been -- managed more

efficiently by having less senior associates handle a

substantial portion of the work.” Doran v. Vicorp Restaurants,

Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 2005). For

example, defendant argues that time spent on discovery,

“boilerplate” motions, and site inspections could have been

delegated to less senior associates.

The staffing and division of labor undertaken by

plaintiff’s lawyers, however, appears reasonable. As an initial

matter, some of the tasks that defendant argues could have been

delegated to a more junior associate involve fairly significant

duties, such as drafting an opposition to a motion for summary

judgment. Furthermore, even if Lynn Hubbard were to delegate

less substantive assignments, such as those involving discovery,

to more junior associates, he would presumably need to

nevertheless review their work. It is not clear that the

savings of cheaper junior associates would outweigh the cost

involved in reviewing and supervising the junior associates’

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labor. Finally, plaintiff is represented by a small law firm. 

With a limited number of lawyers, it may simply be impractical

to staff tasks with perfect efficiency.

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The court determines the reasonable hourly rate “according

to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,” Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), which is typically the one

in which the district court sits, Davis v. Mason County, 927

F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir.

1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.

1993). The party moving for attorneys’ fees “has the burden of

producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits

of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Jordan v.

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-97 & n.11).

Plaintiff seeks a raise in the hourly rate awarded to ADA

attorneys in the Eastern District of California. Plaintiff asks

the court award fees of $300 per hour for lead counsel Lynn

Hubbard, $225 per hour for attorney Steven Wedel, $175 per hour

for attorney Scottlynn Hubbard, $150 per hour for attorney Mark

Emmett, and $90 per hour for paralegals. As recently as June

20, 2007 in a separate ADA case, the court awarded fees at the

rate of $250 per hour for Lynn Hubbard, $150 per hour for

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Scottlynn Hubbard, $150 per hour for Mark Emmett, and $75 per

hour for paralegals. Wilson v. Haria and Gogri Corp., No. Civ.

S-05-1239 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2007). Plaintiff has renewed the

same arguments made in that case here.

To support his request for an increase in the hourly rates,

plaintiff cites (in his reply) a statistic from the United

States Department of Labor that inflation has increased 25%

nationwide since 1998. Apart from the fact that defendant has

not had a fair opportunity to respond to this information, the

statistic is insufficient to show that in this district -- the

relevant location for determining reasonable hourly rates --

there was a similar increase in inflation and a corresponding

increase in the prevailing market rates for ADA attorneys. 

Prevailing rates for ADA litigation in Sacramento are $250

per hour for an experienced attorney, $150 for an associate, and

$75 for a paralegal. See, e.g., Martinez v. G. Maroni Co., No.

Civ. S-06-1399, 2007 WL 1302739, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2,

2007)(awarding Lynn Hubbard $250 per hour and his associate

$150); Martinez v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-0745, 2006

WL 279309, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006) (awarding Lynn Hubbard

$250 per hour and Scott Hubbard $150). Accordingly, the court

will apply the hourly rates of $250 for Lynn Hubbard, $150 for

Scott Hubbard, Mark Emmett, and Steven Wedel, and $75 for

paralegals. 

////

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3. Travel Time

Defendant also argues that plaintiff should not be allowed

to recover 18 hours of travel time because plaintiff’s counsel

chose to base their law offices out of Chico, rather than

Sacramento. “Other judges of this court have held that the

defendant is not required to shoulder [Hubbard's] travel

expenses to and from Sacramento because Hubbard has filed

hundreds of cases in Sacramento and it appears that he maintains

his office in Chico for his own convenience.” Martinez, 2005 WL

3287233, *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Taken to its

logical extreme, however, travel time would never be compensable

under this reasoning, because an attorney could simply move into

office space adjacent to the courthouse to minimize travel

costs. While the Hubbards may have an expansive ADA practice in

this court, the court should avoid questioning the propriety of

where attorneys choose to set up office. Accordingly, the court

awards attorneys’ fees attributable to travel time. 

4. Lodestar adjustment

The lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable and should

only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional cases.” 

Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119. The parties have not argued that

this is a rare or exceptional case. Accordingly, the court

awards plaintiff’s counsel the lodestar amount.

5. Litigation Expenses and Costs

The ADA provides that the prevailing party may recover

litigation expenses and costs in addition to attorneys’ fees. 

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42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiff requests a total of $8,334.30 in

costs and other expenses, which includes filing and service of

process fees, site reports, and overnight and courier services,

among other litigation expenses. 

a. Expert Fees

Defendant argues that costs pertaining to expert fees

should be denied. In addition to attorneys’ fees, the ADA

authorizes “litigation expenses and costs”. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 

“Expert witness fees are to be included in the term ‘litigation

expenses’ in ADA cases.” Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping

Centre, L.P., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1329 (E.D. Okla. 2007). 

Here, plaintiff seeks $4,066.25 for an expert report and $454.10

for a preliminary site report.

First, with regard to the preliminary report, defendant

argues that it was superceded by the subsequent expert report

and that the cost of the preliminary report should not be

permitted. See Martinez v. Long Drug Stores, Inc., 2005 WL

3287233, *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005) (declining to award fees

for preliminary report that was superceded by subsequent

report). Second, defendant argues that $2,328.75 of the cost of

the expert report should be rejected because it was related to

architectural drawings that were unnecessary to the litigation. 

Because plaintiff has wholly failed to respond to either of

these points, the court declines to award fees for the

preliminary report and the portion of the expert report

described above. 

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26 2 This figure reflects the rate that counsel chose to bill for

travel.

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b. Overnight Mail

Defendant argues that plaintiff should not be entitled to

$150.79 attributable to overnight mail expenses and instead

maintains that regular U.S. mail would have been sufficient. 

Given the relatively small sum of money expended on overnight

mail, however, it does not appear that plaintiff abused this

practice. Accordingly, the court finds that costs attributable

to overnight mail may be properly awarded.

c. Duplicative Fees

Defendant argues, and plaintiff concedes, that $2,438.66 in

costs are duplicative and may be discounted from the initial

estimate for litigation costs and expenses.

In sum, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to

recover $3,112.79 in litigation expenses and costs.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court awards plaintiff’s

attorneys’ fees and costs in the following amounts: 

Lynn Hubbard: 145.10 hours @ $250/hr = $36,275.00

Lynn Hubbard: 8 hours @ $175/hr2 = $ 1,400.00

Steven Wedel: 4.50 hours @ $150/hr = $ 675.00

Scottlynn Hubbard: 48.30 hours @ $150/hr = $ 7,245.00

Mark Emmett: 21.75 hours @ $150/hr = $ 3,262.50

Paralegals: 51.30 hours @ $75/hr = $ 3,847.50

Subtotal attorneys’ fees: = $52,705.00

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Court reduction (by 15%): = $44,799.25

Litigation expenses and costs: = $ 3,112.79 

Total attorneys’ fees and costs: = $47,912.04

It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED in the total sum of

$47,912.04.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 24, 2007.

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