Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00342/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00342-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Consuelo Hurtado,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-24-00342-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration’s (“Defendant,” or “Commissioner”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), 

Plaintiff Consuelo Hurtado’s (“Plaintiff”) “Motion to Dismiss Current Motion to Dismiss 

from Defendant” (Doc. 13), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 14). The Court now rules. 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the 

provisions of the Social Security Act, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Doc. 12 at 2). 

Plaintiff counters that Defendant has no merit to move for dismissal because Plaintiff 

timely filed her complaint. (Doc. 13 at 1). 

A. Legal Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement 

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 1 of 6
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Further, the complaint must 

assert “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Through its factual content, the complaint must permit 

the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In its review of a complaint for failure to state a claim, a court “must accept all wellpleaded facts as true.” Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, “[c]onclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences ... are insufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court 

may also consider documents not physically attached to the pleading, provided that their 

“contents are alleged in a complaint” and no party questions their authenticity. Tunac v. 

United States, 897 F.3d 1197, 1207 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 

449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

When “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of [a] complaint,” a court 

may dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as barred by a statute of limitations. Von 

Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, dismissal is appropriate only when a complaint’s assertions, “read with the 

required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” 

Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting TwoRivers 

v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). The equitable tolling doctrine “is not generally 

amenable to resolution by a 12(b)(6) motion,” because its applicability “often depends on 

matters outside the pleadings.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 

(9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

B. Timeliness

An individual wishing to obtain a review of any final decision of the Commissioner 

must commence a civil action “within sixty days after the mailing to [her] of notice of such 

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.” 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). This statute of limitations “must be strictly 

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 2 of 6
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

construed” because it “is a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Bowen v. City 

of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986). Hence, in general, a court must dismiss a claimant’s 

untimely complaint because it falls outside Congress’s express consent to suit. See Kaiser 

v. Blue Cross, 347 F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Sherwood, 

312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“the terms of [Congress’s] consent to be sued in any court define 

that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit”). 

There are circumstances, however, by which a court may allow an untimely 

complaint to proceed. First, under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, the 

statute of limitations starts on the date a claimant receives notice of the Commissioner’s 

decision. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). “[U]nless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary,” 

the presumed date of receipt of notice is “5 days after the date” on the notice. Id. As such, 

courts have permitted filing past the final date of the statute of limitations when claimants 

can show that another party’s actions prevented the notice from arriving within five days’

time. A claimant, for example, may show that the SSA delayed more than five days before 

mailing the notice. See, e.g., Matsibekker v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 79, 81 (2d. Cir. 1984). 

However, unsupported allegations of “non-receipt within five days” are insufficient to 

rebut the presumption. McLaughlin v. Astrue, 443 F.App’x 571, 574 (1st Cir. 2011) (per 

curium). 

Second, equitable estoppel and equitable tolling may halt the running of the statute 

of limitations. Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1987) (equitable estoppel); 

Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480 (equitable tolling). Equitable estoppel “focuses on the actions of 

the defendant,” whereas equitable tolling “focuses on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance 

of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant.” Socop-Gonzalez v. 

I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Equitable estoppel applies only when the party to be estopped committed 

“affirmative misconduct.” Id. Equitable tolling requires that a plaintiff show “(1) that [s]he 

has been pursuing [her] right diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood 

in [her] way.” Okafor v. United States, 846 F.3d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pace v. 

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 3 of 6
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Extraordinary circumstances generally occur 

when a plaintiff was deceived into letting a deadline pass—either by a defendant’s 

affirmative misconduct or a court’s provision of misleading information. See Baldwin Cty. 

Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).

Here, after mistakenly mailing her complaint to the wrong address (Doc. 12-1 at 

31), Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file a civil action on November 7, 2023. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 27). In a letter dated January 12, 2024, Defendant notified Plaintiff of its 

decision to grant her an additional 30 days to file a civil action, stating, “[w] assume that 

you received this letter 5 days after the date on it unless you show us that you did not 

receive it within the 5-day period.” (Doc. 13 at 5–6). Thus, the Court presumes Plaintiff 

received the notice on January 17, 2024, at the latest. Plaintiff sent her complaint to the 

Arizona District Court via certified mail on February 16, 2024. (Doc. 13 at 1, 3). The Clerk 

of Court filed Plaintiff’s complaint and stamped it with the date of February 20, 2024, four 

days after the end date of the 30-day limitations period. (Doc. 1). In effect, without rebuttal 

of the presumption or proof of entitlement to equitable relief, the statute of limitations bars 

Plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff asserts that her complaint was timely because it was mailed on February 

16, 2024, “which was legally the last day of submission.” (Doc. 13 at 1). Further, Plaintiff 

states, “Documentations are not to go by date of receiving them but by date of submitting 

them.” (Id.) However, this Court and other courts in this circuit have rejected this argument. 

Squalls v. Brennan, No. CV-19-05540-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 4260526, *2 (D. Ariz. July 

24, 2020) (“The complaint is ...considered to be filed as of ... the date stamped on the 

complaint as received (as opposed to when it may have been docketed), and not the mailing 

date.”) (emphasis in original); Cooper v. City of Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“When papers are mailed to the clerks office, filing is complete when the papers are 

received by the clerk.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Godfrey, 102 B.R 769, 771 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“In a case where it is disputed exactly when the petition was placed in the 

possession of the clerk the file stamp gives rise to the presumption that the petition was 

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 4 of 6
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

filed when it was date and time stamped by the clerk.”) Therefore, the Court finds 

Plaintiff’s argument to be unavailing. Squalls, 2020 WL 4260526, at *2 (finding the same 

when a pro se plaintiff mailed her complaint on the final day of the statute of limitations 

because she believed the mailing date equated to the filing date); see also Kyle v. Campbell 

Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Excusable neglect is a flexible, equitable 

concept, [however,] inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules 

do not constitute excusable neglect.”).

Moreover, regarding entitlement to estoppel or tolling, Plaintiff has neither provided 

evidence of misconduct on the part of Defendant, nor evidence that any “extraordinary 

circumstances” occurred. (See generally Doc. 13). Plaintiff had notice of the course of 

action required to preserve her rights. Indeed, the letter that Defendant sent to Plaintiff 

granting her request for an extension of time notified her of the 30-day time limit, instructed 

her how to file a civil action, listed pertinent statutory authority, and provided her with a 

phone number, website, and mailing address she could contact if she had any questions or 

required further assistance. (Doc. 12-1 at 31–32).1 Thus, rather than acting affirmatively to 

deceive Plaintiff, Defendant acted affirmatively to ensure that Plaintiff was aware of her 

rights and of the 30-day time limit in which she had to exercise them. 

Therefore, there is no factual basis to support Plaintiff’s entitlement to equitable 

relief. Furthermore, the running of the statute of limitations is clear from the face of the 

complaint. Hence, the Court must dismiss the complaint as untimely. See Squalls, 2020 

WL 4260526, at *3 (quoting Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2000))

(“[M]ere ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of filing deadlines does not justify 

equitable tolling or other exceptions to a law’s requirements.”).

II. PLAINTIFF’s MOTION TO DISMISS

In the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss Current Motion to Dismiss from 

Defendant” (Doc. 13) serves as a Response Brief to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

1 Claimant physically attached the January 12 letter to her complaint (Doc. 1 at 5–6). 

Because neither party questions its authenticity, the Court can consider it in ruling on this 

motion.

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 5 of 6
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12). 

III. CONCLUSION

Considering the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE as untimely. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss Current Motion 

to Dismiss from Defendant” (Doc. 13) is DENIED as unnecessary. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly and terminate this action. 

Dated this 12th day of December, 2024.

Case 2:24-cv-00342-JAT Document 15 Filed 12/12/24 Page 6 of 6