Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02770/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02770-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS GORDON,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN STAINER, et al.,

Respondents. 

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Civil No. 11-CV-2770 DMS (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

ORDER DENYING THE

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Dkt. Nos. 5 and 9)

Jose Luis Gordon (“Petitioner” or “Gordon”), a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. No. 1.) This petition was dismissed

on December 5, 2011, for failure to name a proper Respondent. (Dkt. No. 3.) Petitioner filed a first

amended petition (“FAP”) on December 27, 2011. (Dkt. No. 5.)

Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of fourteen years and four months. Id. at 1.1

 In the

FAP, he claims that the trial court abused its discretion by incorporating a prior “strike” when

calculating his sentence.2

 Id. at 5. He also argues his sentence is disproportionate, based upon the fact

that the victim of his assault was not injured. Id.

Respondents filed a response and lodged the state court record on March 5, 2012. (Dkt. Nos. 7

and 8.) Respondents argue the following: (1) Petitioner has not presented a federal claim; (2) to the

1

Citations to the FAP refer to the page numbers assigned by the ECF system.

2

Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with California’s “Three Strikes” law. Briefly, the

Three Strikes law is a combination of Cal. Penal Code §§ 667 and 1170.12, and is designed to increase

the prison sentences of repeat felons. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (1996).

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extent that a federal claim is asserted, Petitioner has not exhausted it; and (3) Petitioner has not shown

that his sentence violates any federal right. (Dkt. No. 7-1.) Petitioner filed a traverse, asserting that his

claims were exhausted, and that he is entitled to relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 10.) 

He also filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Dkt. No. 9.)

This Court has reviewed the FAP, answer, traverse, and the complete record in this case, as well

as Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel. After a thorough review, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

Petition be DENIED. As discussed below, this Court also ORDERS that the motion to appoint counsel

is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

A. Case No. SCD211150

In January 2008, the day after an assault and robbery, police officers saw a trail of blood leading

to a house in the area of the crime. A car was double-parked in front of the house. The officers saw

Gordon leave the house and get into the passenger side of the car. He fit the description of the suspect

in the assault and robbery. After the car drove away and ran a stop sign, the officers conducted a traffic

stop. When the car pulled over, Gordon got out and ran away. After a foot chase, one of the officers

tackled Gordon, who struggled and tried to escape. The other officer jumped on Gordon and the officers

eventually brought him under control. One of the officers suffered a severe laceration on his elbow,

resulting in stitches and five missed days of work.

B. Case No. SCD220246

In March 2009, while Gordon was on parole, a police officer searched him and found a canister

of tear gas on his person.

In April 2009 a police officer saw Gordon driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) the wrong way

on a one-way street. The officer pursued the SUV and it eventually stopped. As the officer was about

to get out of his patrol car, Gordon put the SUV in reverse and rammed the patrol car, moving it four or

five feet and jolting the officer back in his seat. The bumper of the patrol car was pushed back and

3

This Court quotes verbatim the factual background of the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. 

(Lodgment 6 at 3-4.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct”); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (deference is

owed to factual findings of state trial and appellate courts); Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 952 (9th

Cir. 2001) (paraphrasing facts from the state court opinion). 

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broken, although it was designed to push disabled vehicles and withstand substantial pressure. The

officer had never seen such a bumper sustain that degree of damage.

Gordon sped off in the SUV with the officer in pursuit. During the chase Gordon ran stop signs

and turned without signaling. He drove the wrong way on another one-way street and collided with a

pickup truck in an intersection. Gordon did not stop after the collision. He continued driving the wrong

way, then got out of the SUV and let it crash into a wall. Gordon ran away. Another officer arrived and

captured him. At trial, Gordon stipulated the SUV was stolen. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Conviction and Sentencing4

In case No. SCD211150 [Petitioner] was found guilty in a bench trial of resisting an executive

officer (Pen. Code5

 § 69). In case No. SCD220246, Gordon was found guilty in a bench trial of assault

with a deadly weapon on a police officer (§ 245, subd. (c)) (count 1), evading an officer with reckless

driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) (count 2), unlawful driving and taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 

§ 10851, subd, (a)) (count 3) and three misdemeanors: hit and run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd.

(a)) (count 4), resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 5) and possession of tear gas by a felon 

(§§ 12403.7, subd. (a), 12420) (count 6). The court found that Gordon committed the offenses in counts

1, 2, and 3 while he was out of custody on bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (c)) and personally used a deadly

weapon on a peace officer in the commission of the count 1 crime. In both cases, Gordon admitted a

strike (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), a serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior prison

term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court denied Gordon’s request to dismiss the strike and sentenced him to

14 years 4 months in prison: eight years (twice the middle term) for assault with a deadly weapon on a

peace officer, concurrent four-year terms (twice the middle term) for evading an officer and unlawful

driving and taking a vehicle, stayed terms for the bail enhancement, a consecutive term of one year four

months (one-third the middle term, doubled) for resisting an executive officer, five years for the serious

4

This account of Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing is also quoted verbatim from the Court of

Appeal decision. (Lodgment 6 at 1-2.)

5

[Footnote in original] Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

specified.

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felony prior and credit for time served on the misdemeanors.6

B. Appeals

Petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial court to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment

3.) He contended that the court abused its discretion and denied him due process by denying his motion

to dismiss a previous conviction that had been deemed a “strike.” Id. at 8-12. In a written opinion, the

Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss the

strike. (Lodgment 6 at 6.)

On April 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment 7.) This appeal was summarily denied, without comment. (Lodgment 8.) This habeas

proceeding was commenced on November 28, 2011. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. AEDPA Governs this Petition

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this Petition. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas

relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was (1)

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). “Clearly established federal law,” for purposes of § 2254(d), means

“the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court

renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). 

B. Decisions that Contradict or Unreasonably Apply Federal Law

A federal habeas court may grant relief where the state court (1) decides a case “contrary to”

federal law by applying a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (2)

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court may also grant habeas relief where a state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, such as where the state court correctly identifies the

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[Footnote in original] At sentencing the court did not mention the prior prison term. [The Court

of Appeal remanded] so that the [trial] court [could] exercise its discretion to impose sentence on or

strike the prison prior. [The court chose to strike the prison prior. (Lodgment 9.)]

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governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies those decisions to the

facts at issue. Id.

The state court decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief the

state court’s application of “clearly established law” must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 75. “Objectively unreasonable” differs from “clear error” in that a federal court cannot grant

habeas relief only because it believes the state court erroneously or incorrectly applied “clearly

established federal law;” the application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 75-76 (internal

citation omitted). 

C. Decisions Based on an Unreasonable Determination of Facts

Section 2254(e)(1) provides: “[a] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. 

D. Review of State Court Decision

If the State Supreme Court silently denies a Petitioner’s appeal with a summary dismissal, the

reviewing federal habeas court must look through to the last reasoned state court opinion in making a

decision. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Where no reasoned state court

decision addresses a petitioner’s claim, the reviewing federal court must conduct “an independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable. Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the decision from the California Court of Appeal

is the last reasoned state court decision addressing Petitioner’s claims. (Lodgment 6.)

IV. ANALYSIS

Respondents argue that Petitioner has not presented a federal claim, and, to the extent that he

has, it is unexhausted. (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 5-7.7

) This Court will initially address the question of

exhaustion before moving on to a discussion on the merits.

A. Exhaustion

Habeas relief is only available to a petitioner seeking review of a claim “adjudicated on the

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Citations to Respondents’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities refer to the internal page

numbers of the document.

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merits in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before filing a federal habeas petition, a prisoner

in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment must first exhaust state judicial remedies through

either a direct appeal or collateral proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The prisoner must provide

the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every issue he

or she seeks to raise in federal court. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). The

petitioner has the burden of establishing exhaustion in his or her habeas petition.8 See Cartwright v.

Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.1981) (citations omitted).

 A petitioner must alert the state courts to the fact that he is asserting a federal claim in order to

fairly present the legal basis of the claim. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per

curiam); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.

2001). In this circuit, a petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by referencing

specific provisions of the federal constitution or statutes, or citing to federal case law. See Lyons, 232

F.3d at 668, 670. Mere similarity of claims between a state law claim and a federal law claim is

insufficient for exhaustion purposes. See Henry, 513 U.S. at 366; see also Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting former Ninth Circuit standard that allowed petitioner to exhaust

federal claim by raising essentially the same claim in state court). The required level of explicitness is

the same for pro se petitioners and petitioners who are represented by counsel. See Lyons, 232 F.3d at

669.

In Petitioner’s petition for review to the Supreme Court of California, he mentions his “right to

due process” in an argument heading. (Lodgment 7 at 7.) Additionally, the petition for review included 

the following paragraph: 

...a determination that the sentencing court abused its discretion under the Three Strikes law

and its choosing the upper term also requires reversal as a violation of the defendant’s right

to due process and has implications relating to cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const.

8th and 14th Amends; Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346; Trop v. Dulles, (1958)

356 U.S. 86, 100.)

(Lodgment 7 at 10.) This paragraph specifically identifies the federal rights involved, and federal case

8

The FAP is missing its second page, which is the page where Petitioner would ordinarily

indicate whether he pursued appeals through the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme

Court. This Court has chosen to overlook this deficiency because it is clear from the record that

Petitioner appealed to both courts. (Lodgments 3, 6-8.)

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law was cited in support of the assertion. 

Although the discussion was brief, Petitioner clearly presented his claims to the highest state

court available. These claims were summarily dismissed, and there is no indication that this dismissal

was not based on the merits. (Lodgment 8.) “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court,

and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are sufficiently exhausted, and

this Court may now address their merit.

B. Petitioner’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion

The primary claim set out in the FAP is Petitioner’s assertion that the trial court abused its

discretion when it declined to dismiss a prior conviction when sentencing Petitioner under the California

Three Strikes Law. (FAP at 5-8.) He asserts that the conviction should have been struck because it was

“more than a decade old.” Id. at 5. In support of this claim, he cites People v. Superior Court (Romero),

where the California Supreme Court held that a trial court has the discretion to strike prior felony

conviction allegations in the furtherance of justice, and that these decisions are subject to review for

abuse. 13 Cal.4th at 529-530.

Claims of alleged errors made by a state trial court in the application of state law are not proper

subjects for habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Indeed, “it is not the province of

a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting

habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at 67-68. 

Additionally, federal courts must defer to a state court’s interpretation of state sentencing laws,

and the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that California’s sentence enhancement provisions involve

state sentencing law, and, as such, are not subject to federal habeas relief. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d

1116, 1118-1119 (9th Cir. 1989). Even if a trial court misapplies state sentencing laws, habeas relief is

not warranted in the absence of a showing of fundamental unfairness. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461,

469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

It is not the opinion of this Court that the trial court misapplied any state sentencing laws. 

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However, in any event, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate fundamental unfairness. The trial court,

when Petitioner requested that the prior strike be dismissed, noted that Petitioner had a long criminal

history beginning in 1992 when he was a juvenile, and that the criminal behavior continued into his

adult years. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 5 at 211:21-212:14.) This was despite extensive intervention by the

courts. Id. at 211:23-24. The Court of Appeal added: “Gordon did not live a legally blameless life in

the fewer than [ten] years between the strike offense and the offense in case No. SCD220246. During

that time he accumulated three parole violations, a misdemeanor conviction and the felony conviction in

case No. SCD211150, which constituted a fourth parole violation.” (Lodgment 6 at 5.) 

Petitioner’s criminal history led the state courts to reject his request to dismiss the strike, and this

Court defers to this decision. Petitioner has not demonstrated misapplication of California’s state

sentencing laws and subsequent fundamental unfairness; therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that

this claim for habeas relief be DENIED.

C. Petitioner’s claim that his sentence is disproportionate

Petitioner also claims that his sentence is disproportionate because the peace officer who was the

victim of the assault with a deadly weapon was uninjured. (Dkt. No. 5 at 5 and 7.) 

“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. 

Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring). In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, “a court must

begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” Graham v. Florida, 130

S.Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). “‘In the rare case in which this threshold comparison...leads to an inference of

gross disproportionality,’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences

received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime

in other jurisdictions.” Id., quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005.

Petitioner cannot meet the initial threshold of demonstrating a grossly disproportionate sentence. 

Petitioner’s previous strike in 1999 also involved the assault of a peace officer. (Lodgment 1 at 37.) 

With respect to the 1999 offense, Petitioner stated that he did not believe the officer suffered any

permanent damage because he did not appear to be injured when he testified at trial. Id. The Court of

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Appeal found this explanation unavailing, as does this Court. The gravity of Petitioner’s current

offenses, his history of assaulting peace officers, and the deference given to state sentencing laws, all

lead to the conclusion that Petitioner’s current sentence is not grossly disproportionate. Therefore, there

is no need to branch into a comparative analysis of sentences received by other offenders.

Due to the fact that Petitioner has not demonstrated the gross disproportionality necessary to

invoke federal habeas review, this Court RECOMMENDS that this claim for habeas relief be

DENIED.

V. REQUEST TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Petitioner also moves for the appointment of counsel to represent him on his habeas petition. 

(Dkt. No. 9.) He argues that counsel should be appointed because Petitioner is (1) incarcerated; and (2)

unable to afford the legal services of an attorney. Id. at 1. Petitioner claims that the appointment of an

attorney “will allow for a full and fair litigation of this matter.” Id.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions by state

prisoners. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). However, financially eligible habeas

petitioners may obtain counsel whenever the court “determines that the interests of justice so require.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990).

The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary

hearing on the petition. Id. at 1181; Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). When

no evidentiary hearing is necessary, appointment of counsel is discretionary. Id. In the Ninth Circuit,

indigent prisoners are not entitled to appointed counsel unless counsel is “necessary to prevent due

process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29.

Here, Petitioner has sufficiently represented himself to date. He has adequately pleaded his

claims, and has already filed his traverse in reply to Respondents’ response. It appears that he is able to

express himself, and has a good grasp of this case and the legal issues involved. At this point the issues

do not appear so complex such that Petitioner cannot litigate them. Also, it is not evident at this time

that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Under these circumstances, a district court does not abuse its

discretion in denying a state prisoner’s request for appointment of counsel. See LaMere v. Risley, 827

F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987). This Court finds that Petitioner, at this point, is capable to litigate the

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claims in his habeas petition.

Here, the “interests of justice” do not compel the appointment of counsel. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED, without prejudice.

VI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to federal habeas relief. ACCORDINGLY, it

is hereby

RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt.

No. 5) be DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 9) is DENIED. 

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 11, 2012, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than May 18, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2012

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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