Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35336/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LANCE CONWAY WOOD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KEITH YORDY, Ex-Deputy Warden

at Idaho State Correctional

Institution (ISCI); STEVE NELSON,

Ex-Deputy Warden at ISCI; JAY

CHRISTENSEN, Deputy Warden at

ISCI; ERIC MACEACHERN, Deputy

Warden at Idaho Correctional

Institution of Orofino (ICIO); TODD

MARTIN, Deputy Warden of ICIO;

BILL FINELY, Sergeant of ISCI;

SANDRA MARTIN, Ex-Correctional

Officer CIO of ICIO; LAWANDA

THOMASON, Ex-Lieutenant at ICIO;

MIKE LUDLOW, C/O at ISCI; LESLIE

PETERSEN, Coordinator at ISCI,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-35336

D.C. No.

1:07-cv-00350-

EJL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 1, 2013—University of Idaho Law School

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 1 of 12
2 WOOD V. YORDY

Filed June 3, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Sidney R. Thomas,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by

an Idaho state prisoner under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act.

The panel held that plaintiff could not seek damages

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act against prison officials in their individual capacities. The

panel held that the Act does not authorize suits against a

person in anything other than an official or governmental

capacity because it was enacted pursuant to Congress’s

constitutional powers under the Spending Clause, and the

individual defendants were not recipients of any federal

funds.

The panel also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiff’s claims alleging he was retaliated against in

violation of his First Amendment rights. The panel

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 2 of 12
WOOD V. YORDY 3

determined that there was insufficient evidence to create a

material issue of fact as to a retaliatory motive. 

COUNSEL

Warren Postman (argued) and Shay Dvoretzky, Jones Day,

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Elia (argued) and Brady J. Hall, Moore & Elia,

LLP, Boise, Idaho, for Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Lance Wood is an Idaho state prisoner with an

apparent penchant for romantic (but, as all parties stress, not

sexual) relationships with prison guards. When prison

authorities found that he was utilizing chapel facilities for

such purposes, they curtailed his opportunities for chapel

access. He filed this action against individual prison officials

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (“RLUIPA”), claiming they had imposed an unwarranted

burden on his exercise of religion. The issue of first

impression in this circuit is whether he may seek damages

against prison officials in their individual capacities. We

agree with the unanimous conclusion of all of the other

circuits that have addressed the issue that such a claim may

not be maintained. This is principally because RLUIPA was

enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional powers under

the Spending Clause, and the individual defendants are not

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 3 of 12
4 WOOD V. YORDY

recipients of any federal funds. See, e.g., Stewart v. Beach,

701 F.3d 1322, 1335 (10th Cir. 2012).

Wood also claims a violation of his First Amendment

rights, alleging the defendants acted in retaliation for an

earlier suit, in which he prevailed on appeal in a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 due process claim arising out of one of his prison

guard relationships. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th

Cir. 2012). There is, however, insufficient evidence to create

a material issue of fact as to a retaliatory motive.

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants.

BACKGROUND

Wood is currently serving a life sentence in Idaho prisons. 

The relationship that led to Wood v. Beauclair began in 2003

in the Idaho Correctional Institute-Orofino (“ICIO”). He was

later transferred to the Idaho State Correctional Institution

(“ISCI”) where he is currently housed.

Wood, who characterizes himself as a very religious

person, began soon after his transfer to engage in many

activities in the prison chapel. These included working as a

janitor, attending services, and volunteering in various

capacities. In the course of investigating the relationship with

Correction Officer Taylor-Martin underlying the Wood v.

Beauclair litigation, the Deputy Warden of ISCI, Keith

Yordy, discovered that Wood may also have been involved in

an improper relationship with an ISCI officer, Cheryl Davis,

and that Wood was using the prison chaplain, Les Petersen,

as a go-between to communicate with Davis. According to

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 4 of 12
WOOD V. YORDY 5

Yordy, in 2006 he limited Wood’s chapel access in order to

curtail his contacts with Petersen pending an investigation.

In early 2007, the Deputy Warden of Operations at ISCI,

defendant Steve Nelson, directed one of the chaplains to

further restrict Wood’s access to the chapel to two hours a

week, to consist of private counseling. According to Nelson,

this action was taken because Wood’s activities had created

tension between chaplains and with other inmates who

complained Wood was monopolizing the chapel.

In addition to the chapel restrictions, Wood alleges there

was a pattern of harassment conducted by another

correctional officer, Mike Ludlow. As part of this alleged

pattern, Ludlow falsely reported that he had seen Wood stash

contraband prescription medication in a windowsill. The

charge against Wood was later dismissed on appeal.

Wood filed this action in 2007 under RLUIPA against

defendants Yordy and Nelson claiming damages from them

in their individual capacities, and under § 1983 against

Ludlow, as well as Yordy and Nelson, for First Amendment

retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment on

all of the claims, and Wood appeals.

DISCUSSION

RLUIPA, in relevant part, prohibits any “government”

from burdening the religious exercise of a person residing in

a correctional institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. RLUIPA

was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), limiting

congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to

restrict governmental interference with the exercise of

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 5 of 12
6 WOOD V. YORDY

religion. RLUIPA was then enacted pursuant to Congress’s

spending and commerce powers. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.

Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011). RLUIPA affects only prisons and

land use.

With respect to prisons, RLUIPA’s reach is limited to

prohibiting a “government” from burdening religious exercise

in correctional institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The Act

goes on to define “government” as any governmental entity

created under the authority of the State, and “any other person

acting under the color of State law.” § 2000cc-5(4). The Act

authorizes private citizens to assert a violation as a claim or

defense in a judicial proceeding and to “obtain appropriate

relief against a government.” § 2000cc-2(a).1

 

1

 The statute reads in relevant part:

(a) General rule

No government shall impose a substantial burden on

the religious exercise of a person residing in or

confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of

this title, even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.

(b) Scope of application

This section applies in any case in which–

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 6 of 12
WOOD V. YORDY 7

In Sossamon v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered the

phrase “appropriate relief.” Sossamon concerned an action

for damages against state officers in their official capacity. 

131 S. Ct. at 1656. The Court held the statutory language

was not sufficiently specific to abrogate state sovereign

immunity with respect to money damages. Id. at 1660. 

Wood correctly points out that his suit against state officers

as individuals would not implicate sovereign immunity. 

Immunity, however, is not the issue before us. The question

before us, and that has been decided adversely to plaintiffs by

(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program

or activity that receives Federal financial

assistance; or

(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of

that substantial burden would affect, commerce

with foreign nations, among the several States, or

with Indian tribes.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The cause of action provision states:

[a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a

claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain

appropriate relief against a government.

Id. § 2000cc-2(a). “Government” is then defined as

(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental

entity created under the authority of a State;

(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or

official of an entity listed in clause (i); and

(iii) any other person acting under color of State law

. . . .

Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 7 of 12
8 WOOD V. YORDY

all of the other circuit courts to consider a suit like this one,

is whether allowing such an action against individuals who do

not receive any federal money would reach beyond the scope

of Congress’s constitutional authority. All of the circuits

have refused to allow such an action to go forward. The

principal underlying reason is the limitations of Congress’s

power under the Spending Clause.

In the leading Spending Clause decision, Pennhurst State

School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court

recognized that, pursuant to its spending powers, Congress

may place conditions on the disbursement of federal funds. 

451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The Court explained that such

legislation functions like a contract. In return for funds,

states agree to adhere to any attached conditions. Id. These

conditions, however, must be clearlystated. Otherwise, states

cannot be said to have knowingly accepted them. Id.

In reliance on Pennhurst, the Seventh Circuit in Nelson v.

Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009), held that legislation

enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause cannot subject state

officers to individual suits, because the individual officers are

not the recipients of any federal funds. The individuals thus

cannot be bound by contractual conditions which would

attach to receipt of the funds. Id. at 888–89. The Third and

Tenth Circuits are now in accord. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d

144 (3d Cir. 2012); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322 (10th

Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit had earlier rejected such suits

on the related ground that the statute itself does not give

sufficient notice that the receipt of funds for prisons would be

conditioned on the “creation of an individual capacity

damages action.” See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182,

188 (4th Cir. 2009).

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 8 of 12
WOOD V. YORDY 9

Wood, while acknowledging the force of these holdings,

contends they are undermined by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 

Sabri was a prosecution under the federal bribery statute,

enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, to criminalize

bribes to recipients of federal funds. Id. at 602. In Sabri, the

question was whether the bribe had to directly affect the

expenditure of federal funds, and the Supreme Court

answered in the negative. It held that because funds are

fungible, if the entity receiving the federal funds was the

object of the bribe, the statute was violated. Id. at 606.

Focusing on the fact that the criminal defendant in Sabri

was not the recipient of federal funds, Wood attempts to

argue that the Supreme Court opinion means defendants in a

civil damage action under RLUIPA need not be recipients of

federal funds. This is not a sensible conclusion. The point in

Sabri was to protect the financial integrity of the

governmental entity that did receive the federal funds. Thus

paying a bribe to that entity violated the statute, even if the

bribe did not directly affect the federal funds. In this case,

Wood’s suit against the defendants in their individual

capacities seeks to hold them liable for their personal

conduct. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66

(1985). By definition, in suing these defendants in their

individual capacities, Wood is not targeting assets of the

entities that receive federal funds, i.e., the prison or the State. 

Wood’s argument, while novel, does not further the purpose

of the statute. It also lacks support in any of the circuit

decisions that have been decided before or after Sabri.

Wood additionally argues that our circuit’s decision in

Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Neuvas v. City of Yuma,

651 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011), supports a holding that he may

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 9 of 12
10 WOOD V. YORDY

maintain a cause of action against the individual defendants. 

This argument is even more of a stretch than the Sabri

argument, because in Yuma we held only that the City of

Yuma, as a municipality, did not share the sovereign

immunity of the State. Id. at 1168–69. Wood’s theory is that

since our court in Yuma did not expressly say the City’s

liability depended on its receipt of federal funds, the case

stands for the proposition that any entity lacking immunity

may be held liable under RLUIPA, regardless of whether it

receives federal funds. This flies in the face of the history of

the statute, the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s

decision in Pennhurst regarding the Spending Clause, and

even the underlying facts in Yuma. Yuma concerned whether

the city had violated a different section of RLUIPA, the

“equal terms” provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). Id. at

1169. That provision is on its face not limited to entities that

receive federal financial assistance. § 2000cc(b)(1). The

issues before this court, however, did not concern whether the

City had to be a recipient of federal funds to be liable under

RLUIPA. The issue concerned immunity and the merits of

the violation. Moreover, as the district court in Yuma

recognized, federal funds were involved since the entire case

was about the City’s establishment of the federally funded

Yuma Crossing National Heritage Area, (“YCNHA”). 

Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma,

615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (D. Ariz. 2009); YUMA CROSSING

NATIONAL HERITAGE AREA ACT OF 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-

319, October 19, 2000, 114 Stat 1280 (authorizing the

YCNHA to grant funds to state municipalities). Yuma does

not support allowing a prisoner to pursue a RLUIPA claim

against individuals who do not receive federal funds.

Finally, there is nothing in the language or structure of

RLUIPA to suggest that Congress contemplated liability of

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 10 of 12
WOOD V. YORDY 11

government employees in an individual capacity. The statute

is aimed at burdens on religious exercise by a “government.” 

The statute defines the term “government” to mean “(i) a

State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity

created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch,

department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity

listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under

color of State law . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).

Individuals acting under color of state law are thus

brought within the purview of the Act only as a part of the

definition of “government.” If an individual acts under color

of state law to burden a plaintiff’s rights to religious exercise,

the plaintiff can sue the government. The statute does not

authorize suits against a person in anything other than an

official or governmental capacity, for it is only in that

capacity that the funds are received. That is the only reading

of the statute that is consistent with the decisions of our sister

circuits and the constitutional limitations on the Spending

Clause that the Supreme Court has recognized. The district

court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants under RLUIPA.

The remaining claim to be discussed is the First

Amendment retaliation claim. Here, Wood points to isolated

fragments of statements by prison officials, as overheard by

other inmates, expressing dislike for Wood. In addition, he

claims he read a memo in 2007 by defendant Nelson, the ISCI

Deputy Warden, to the ISCI chaplain that “we cannot make

it appear that an inmate can win.” Wood contends that these

statements suggest a link between restrictions on his ISCI

chapel usage and the earlier Beauclair lawsuit, involving

incidents that occurred in ICIO, Wood’s former prison.

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 11 of 12
12 WOOD V. YORDY

The statements, however, contain no indication that they

were made in reference to the prior lawsuit, as opposed to

Wood’s contemporaneous conduct in ISCI. We have

repeatedly held that mere speculation that defendants acted

out of retaliation is not sufficient. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel.

v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.

2011); see also McCollum v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (specific evidence of

retaliation required). There is nothing in the record to

indicate Nelson even knew about the earlier suit. There is

similarly no evidence to show that Ludlow knew about the

earlier suit or other evidence suggesting that the claimed

harassment by Ludlow was in retaliation for the earlier suit. 

The district court correctly granted summary judgment

against Wood on the retaliation claim.

The district court also dismissed Wood’s claims against

two other prison officials, Thomason and MacEachern,

finding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

as required by the Prison Litigation and Reform Act. 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To the extent that Wood is seeking to

resurrect claims other than First Amendment Retaliation

against these defendants, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal. While Wood contends that prison officials

prevented him from completing the grievance process, the

district court found that he had failed to follow through with

his complaints. Nothing in the record indicates that this

conclusion was clearly erroneous. Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d

942, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In reviewing a dismissal for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies, we review the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for

clear error.”).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 12-35336, 06/03/2014, ID: 9117236, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 12 of 12