Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-02147/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-02147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1When Petitioner filed his petition he was incarcerated. In a letter dated January 1, 2006 he

informed the Court that he has been released from custody.

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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 **Original filed 8/8/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARTH EGAN POWELSON, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

WILLIAM SULLIVAN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 02-2147 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO

EXPAND THE RECORD AND

GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS THE

PETITION AS UNTIMELY

(Docket nos. 30, 32)

Petitioner, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The Court initially dismissed the petition with leave to

amend because some of the claims presented failed to allege any violation of Petitioner's

federal constitutional rights and thus were not cognizable under § 2254. Petitioner filed

an amended petition, which the Court directed Respondent to answer. In lieu of an

answer Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. See Rules

Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases, Rule 4. Petitioner has opposed the motion,

Respondent has filed a reply, and Petitioner has filed a sur-reply and a motion to expand

the record. Because the Court finds the petition is untimely, Respondent's motion is

GRANTED and the petition is dismissed. 

BACKGROUND

The following procedural history is undisputed. On February 23, 1998 Petitioner

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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pleaded guilty in Humboldt County Superior Court to one count of second degree

robbery. He also admitted a prior strike conviction under California Penal Code sections

667(d), (e) and 1170.12(b), (e) for a 1997 robbery conviction obtained in Los Angeles

County Superior Court. The state court sentenced petitioner to ten years in state prison.

Petitioner appealed the judgment and filed a habeas corpus petition in the

California Court of Appeal. The appellate court consolidated the two and in an order

dated February 24, 1999 affirmed the judgment and denied the petition. The remittitur

issued on April 27, 1999. Petitioner did not petition for review to the California Supreme

Court.

On December 1, 2000 Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in Humboldt

County Superior Court. It was denied on May 2, 2001. On June 4, 2001 he filed a habeas

corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal. It was denied on June 21, 2001. On

September 18, 2001 petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

It was denied on March 27, 2002.

Petitioner also filed a second round of state habeas corpus petitions, starting with a

habeas corpus petition filed in the California Court of Appeal on September 4, 2001. 

That petition was denied on September 14, 2001. On April 23, 2002 petitioner filed a

habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court. It was denied on September 18,

2002.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition on May 5, 2002 and filed a first

amended petition on September 10, 2004.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became 

law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Under AEDPA, prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences must file petitions for relief within one year

from the date on which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

the petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A. Finality of Judgment

The one-year period generally will run from "the date on which the judgment

became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In California, if a petitioner could have sought

discretionary review of a decision by the California Court of Appeal in the California

Supreme Court but did not do so, the judgment becomes final forty days after the Court of

Appeal filed its opinion. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Cal. Rules of Court 24(a), 28(b), 45(a); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 12a). The federal statute

of limitations begins to run the day after the date on which the time to seek such review

expired. See id.

Here, Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

after the California Court of Appeal denied his consolidated direct appeal and habeas

corpus petition on February 23, 1999. Accordingly, the judgment became final forty days

later – on April 5, 1999 – and the federal statute of limitations started to run the next day

– on April 6, 1999. Thus, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas corpus

petition by April 6, 2000. Because he did not file his petition until May 5, 2002, it is

untimely unless he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, or to the delayed

commencement of the statute of limitations. 

B. Statutory Tolling

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

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2Petitioner argues that his petition should not be found untimely because the state courts

which denied his collateral petitions for habeas corpus relief did not dismiss those petitions as

untimely. However, whether the state petitions were or were not untimely under state procedural

rules has no effect on when the federal statute of limitations began to run. Because Petitioner did

not file any of his state habeas corpus petitions until after the federal statute of limitations had

expired none of those petitions can serve to toll the statute of limitations.

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state

habeas petition filed before AEDPA's statute of limitations begins to run tolls the

limitation period. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Tillema v. Long,

253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a state habeas petition filed after AEDPA's

statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitation period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of

the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed," even if the state

petition was timely filed); Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482 (same). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot

"revive" the limitation period once it has run (that is, restart the clock to zero); it can only

serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run "Once the limitations period is expired,

collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations." Rashid v.

Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Because Petitioner did not file a

habeas petition in the state courts until after the statutory period for filing a federal

petition had expired, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the time during

which he sought state collateral review.2

C. Delayed Commencement of the Statute

Petitioner argues that commencement of the statute of limitations should be

delayed until October 5, 2000 because that is the date on which he first reviewed his

prison files and found an original abstract of judgment from a conviction he obtained in

Los Angeles County Superior Court in 1997. This document supported his previously

raised claim on appeal that the prior serious felony conviction for robbery did not include

the use of a weapon and therefore his sentence should be modified. Here, he contends

that "suppression" of the abstract of judgment impeded his defense and his right to the

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3Petitioner's motion to expand the record to include exhibits in support of his claim is

GRANTED. (Docket no. 32.)

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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effective assistance of counsel, and deterred his appellate counsel from raising the claim

in post-conviction proceedings.3

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), commencement of the one-year limitation period can be

delayed to start on the date on which "the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." The time

begins "'when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important

facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.'" Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.

2000)). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) accordingly allows the limitation period to start running at

a later date "when the facts on which a federal habeas claim is based would not have been

discovered by a duly diligent petitioner." Ybanez v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir.

2000) (citation omitted). Courts should be careful not to confuse a petitioner's knowledge

of the factual predicate of his claims with the time permitted for gathering evidence in

support of the claims: "Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not convey a statutory right to an

extended delay . . . while a habeas petitioner gathers every possible scrap of evidence that

might . . . support his claim[s]." Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir.

1998). See, e.g., United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 2255

petition) (even though petitioner did not have access to trial transcripts, the facts

supporting claims which occurred at the time of his conviction could have been

discovered if he "at least consult[ed] his own memory of the trial proceedings;" because

he did not do so, he did not exercise due diligence and was not entitled to a delayed start

of the limitations period under § 2255(4)).

The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to delayed commencement of the

statute of limitations because he knew of the factual predicate of his claim as early as his

sentencing hearing on the present offense, and he did not act with the requisite due

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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diligence to develop and pursue the claim. The record shows that on December 2, 1997

Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of two counts of second

degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211). At Petitioner's January 8, 1998 plea colloquy in

the present case in Humboldt County Superior Court he pleaded guilty to the underlying

robbery charge and admitted that he had previously been convicted of one of the Los

Angeles County Superior Court convictions, described as a "serious or violent felony, to

wit, robbery." Resp. Ex. 1 at 1. At the February 23, 1998 sentencing hearing the court

relied upon a presentence report which stated that Petitioner's prior conviction was for

robbery with possession of a firearm. Petitioner's attorney objected to this depiction,

stating that Petitioner "indicates to me that he was not in possession of a firearm on any

of the previous matters." Resp Ex. 2 at 16. The court did not expressly address the

objection and, upon weighing the mitigating and aggravating factors pertinent to the

underlying offense, sentenced Petitioner to five years and then doubled the sentence

because of the prior conviction. Id. at 19. 

On appeal Petitioner challenged the sentence, relying in part on the argument that

the portion of the presentence report stating that his prior conviction included possession

of a firearm was without factual basis. The court of appeal rejected this argument

because Petitioner had not instituted procedures – for example, called witnesses or

presented documentary evidence – to establish the claimed unreliability of the

information. It held that Petitioner could not merely deny the report's accuracy, and that

other than the denial by his attorney he had offered no evidence to refute the presentence

report's information regarding his prior robberies and firearm possession. Resp. Ex. 4 at

3. 

The record clearly shows that the factual basis of Petitioner's claim was known to

him well before October 2005. In fact, he raised the issue of the discrepancy between the

circumstances of his prior conviction and the information relied upon by the trial court

both at his sentencing hearing and on appeal. Although he did not come across physical

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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evidence which supported his claim until he looked at his prison file in October 2005, this

is a matter of gathering evidentiary support and not one of discovering the factual

predicate for a claim. See Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 198-99. Moreover, the fact that he did

not make efforts to obtain solid evidence to support his claim until more than two years

after he was sentenced and more than one year after the court of appeal expressly told him

that such proof was required reflects a lack of due diligence. This is not a case where the

prior conviction occurred years before or in another state, rather, it was obtained less than

three months before Petitioner was sentenced in the present case. Thus, records or

declarations from counsel or other witnesses to address the noted discrepancy likely

would have been readily available.

Because the factual predicate of Petitioner's claim was known to him even before

the statute of limitations began to run, he is not entitled to delayed commencement of the

limitations period. 

D. Equitable Tolling

In his opposition to Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner claims that the

failure of his trial and appellate attorneys to tell him about the federal statute of 

limitations amounts to the ineffective assistance of counsel, which is cause to excuse the

untimeliness of his petition. The Court liberally construes this argument as one that

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

The one-year limitation period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a

statute of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United States District

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997). But equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases because extensions of time should be granted only if

"extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a

petition on time." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A litigant seeking

equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065,

1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065

(9th Cir. 2002) (the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this "extraordinary

exclusion" should apply to him). The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

under the AEDPA is very high; this high bar is necessary to effectuate the AEDPA's

statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the

federal system from being forced to hear stale claims. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1068

(citations omitted). Equitable tolling determinations are highly fact-dependent. Id.

(citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he received

constitutionally ineffective assistance from trial and appellate counsel who did not advise

him about procedural issues pertinent to filing his federal habeas corpus petition. His

argument is unpersuasive.

Petitioner had no legal right to counsel for his federal habeas petition. "[T]he right

to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further." Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel does not

apply in habeas corpus actions. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986). Where no constitutional right to counsel exists, there

can be no constitutional claim for ineffective assistance. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 757 (1991). Because Petitioner had no right to assistance of counsel in his

federal habeas proceedings, it follows that there could not have been constitutionally

deficient assistance of counsel. See Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (9th Cir.

1996) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceedings does not

present violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel or Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process where no constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings). Moreover,

Petitioner has alleged no facts from which it can be inferred that either of his attorneys

agreed to assist him with preparing and/or filing his federal habeas corpus petition. Cf.

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling appropriate

where attorney was retained to file and prepare petition, failed to do so, and disregarded

requests to return files pertaining to petitioner's case until well after the date the petition

was due).

For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner's motion to expand the record is

GRANTED (docket no. 32), and Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

is GRANTED (docket no. 30). The Clerk shall close the file and enter judgment in this

matter.

This order terminates docket numbers 30 and 32.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 8/8/06 

/s/ 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition as Untimely

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This is to certify that on 8/8/06 , a copy of this ruling was mailed

to the following:

Garth Egan Powelson 

17240 Boswell Place

Granada Hills, CA 91344 

Nancy Hsiao-Hui Tung 

California Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000 

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 

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