Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35800/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35800-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLIANCE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS

AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY; BRYON

REED; CARL TAYLOR; LINDA

TAYLOR; HAROLD CARLSON; RITA

CARLSON; JEFF WALBOM; JACKIE

WALBOM; TED WHITEHEAD; CAROL

WHITEHEAD; ROBERT JOHNSON; JIM

DIXON; PENNY DIXON; PAMELA

LYON; WAYNE JENSEN; ANN

JENSEN; ELMER CHERRY; SANDRA

CHERRY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CITY OF IDAHO FALLS; IDAHO FALLS

POWER,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-35800

D.C. No.

4:12-cv-00146-

BLW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 1, 2013—University of Idaho Law School

Filed December 31, 2013

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 1 of 20
2 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Sidney R. Thomas,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights/Eminent Domain

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in an action brought by property owners who had objected to

the City of Idaho Falls’ efforts to condemn easements over

their property, located outside of the City’s limits, for the

purpose of constructing electric transmission lines.

The panel held that municipalities in Idaho do not have

the power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially for

the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines. The

panel held that as a creature of the state, the City has only

those powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it. 

Because the power to exercise eminent domain

extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing electric

transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted to the

City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the powers

that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not

essential to accomplishing the City’s objects and purposes,

the City does not have that power. The panel therefore

affirmed the district court’s decision denying Idaho Falls

extraterritorial eminent domain power.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 2 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 3

COUNSEL

Joshua Evett (argued) and Matthew C. Parks, Elam & Burke,

Boise, Idaho, for Defendants-Appellants.

Brent L. Whiting (argued), Richard A. Hearn, and Eric Lynn

Olsen, Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Idaho Falls, Idaho,

for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Municipalities in Idaho do not have the power to exercise

eminent domain extraterritorially for the purpose of

constructing electric transmission lines. Neither the Idaho

Constitution nor the Idaho Legislature has expressly or

impliedly given Idaho’s cities that power. Because cities in

Idaho are “creature[s] of the state,” they cannot receive that

power from any other source. Caesar v. State, 610 P.2d 517,

519 (Idaho 1980). Because the City of Idaho Falls need only

provide electric power at its lowest possible cost (whatever

that cost may be), it cannot claim the extraterritorial use of

eminent domain is necessary to accomplish its “declared

objects and purposes.” Black v. Young, 834 P.2d 304, 310

(Idaho 1992). We therefore affirm the district court’s

decision denying Idaho Falls extraterritorial eminent domain

power.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 3 of 20
4 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

UNDISPUTED FACTS & PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

The City of Idaho Falls (the “City”) owns and operates

Idaho Falls Power (“IFP”), an electrical utility supplying

power to approximately 22,350 residential and 3,680

commercial customers within the City. IFP’s generation,

transmission, and distribution systems are currently located

both inside and outside the City’s geographical boundary.

This litigation arose from the City’s recent efforts to

complete its power system expansion plan first conceived in

1972 and re-affirmed in 2007. IFP seeks to finalize the plan

by (1) constructing a new substation to be located north of the

City and (2) constructing transmission lines outside the City’s

limits to connect two existing substations. This appeal

concerns only the construction of the transmission lines. The

proposed route for the new lines forms a semicircle, running

from the Westside Substation (located southwest of the City)

around the City’s north end then down to the Sugarmill

Substation (located on the City’s east side). The entire

transmission line route travels outside the City’s limits.

To construct the transmission lines along the proposed

route, IFP must obtain easements for power lines over the real

property of individuals residing outside of the City’s limits.

IFP first sought to obtain these easements by offering to

purchase them from the owners of the property over which

the proposed lines would travel. Some of those owners

(members of the Alliance for Property Rights and Fiscal

Responsibility (the “Alliance”)) rejected those offers.

On March 12, 2012, the Alliance sought declaratory and

injunctive relief in Idaho state court. Essentially, the Alliance

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 4 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 5

alleged that the City had threatened to condemn the

easements if the members of the Alliance would not sell

them. The Alliance sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

arguing that the City lacked the power to condemn property

outside its boundaries for the purpose of building electric

transmission lines. The Alliance also alleged that, because

the City lacked the condemnation power, any taking pursuant

to that power would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause.

On March 22, 2012, the City removed the case to federal

court. The Alliance’s Fourteenth Amendment claim provided

the federal district court with subject matter jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). On September 7, 2012, the

district court entered summary judgment in favor of the

Alliance, finding that Idaho law did not grant the City (or, by

extension, IFP) the power to condemn property outside its

corporate limits for the purpose of constructing electric

transmission lines. The City appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856,

859 (9th Cir. 2011). We also review a district court’s

interpretation of Idaho law de novo. See Arizona Elec. Power

Co-op., Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1995). In

doing so, we are bound by the decisions of the Idaho Supreme

Court. Id. “When the state’s highest court has not squarely

addressed an issue, we must predict how the highest state

court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate

court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes,

treatises and restatements for guidance.” Glendale Assocs,

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 5 of 20
6 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Eminent Domain

In this appeal, we must determine whether the City (and,

by extension, IFP) may exercise the right of eminent domain

to condemn easements located outside of its boundaries for

the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines. 

“Idaho has long recognized the proposition that a municipal

corporation, as a creature of the state, possesses and exercises

only those powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it.” 

Caesar, 610 P.2d at 519. Accordingly, we must review Idaho

law1 to determine whether the City has that power.

 

1 The City argues that Article 1 § 14 of the Idaho Constitution grants it

extraterritorial eminent domain power because this provision is selfexecuting. However, Idaho Supreme Court precedent does not support

this argument. Article 1 § 14 requires that there be a “public use” for

private land to be condemned. The Alliance does not dispute that Article

1 § 14 “to the extent of establishing the nature of the use required has been

held to be self-executing.” Bassett v. Swenson, 5 P.2d 722, 725 (Idaho

1931). Thus, when a court must determine whether a prospective use of

land can be considered a “public use,” “the nature ofsuch use is not in any

wise affected by an affirmative or negative declaration of the Legislature,

or by its silence.” Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 155 P. 680,

684 (Idaho 1916). The Alliance does not dispute the general proposition

that the construction of electric transmission lines is a public use.

Instead, the Alliance contends that municipalities do not have the

power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially. Article 1 § 14 is

silent on this point. Therefore, we must look to Idaho statutes. See Cohen

v. Larson, 867 P.2d 956, 958 (Idaho 1993) (finding Article 1 § 14

“leav[es] to the legislature . . . the task of providing the procedure for

implementation”); Blackwell Lumber, 155 P. at 686 (“After the people in

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 6 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 7

“When interpreting state law, federal courts are bound by

decisions of the state’s highest court.” Berkeley, 59 F.3d at

991. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has not specifically

addressed this question in the context of the relevant statutory

provisions. But it has articulated principles that guide the

construction of these relevant statutes. The Idaho Supreme

Court mandates that “municipal corporations have three

sources of power and no others: [(1)] [p]owers granted in

express words; [(2)] [p]owers fairly implied in or incident to

those powers expressly granted; and [(3)] [p]owers essential

to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes

of the corporation.” Black, 834 P.2d at 310. Reviewing each

of these sources of power in turn, not one confers upon the

City the power of extraterritorial eminent domain for the

purpose of constructing electric transmission lines.

A. Express Words

The City argues that two statutes expressly grant it the

power of extraterritorial eminent domain: (1) Idaho’s general

eminent domain statutes, and (2) Idaho’s Revenue Bond Act.

1. Idaho’s General Eminent Domain Statutes

Idaho’s general eminent domain statutes do not expressly

grant the City the power to exercise eminent domain

extraterritorially for any purpose. Instead, under those

statutes, “[a]ny municipality at its option may exercise the

their Constitution had declared what are public uses, it then devolved upon

the Legislature to provide a procedure for exercising the right of eminent

domain or subjecting lands to such public uses.”); Potlatch Lumber Co. v.

Peterson, 88 P. 426, 432 (Idaho 1906) (“Thus by legislative enactment

[Article 1 § 14] of the Constitution is made effective.”).

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 7 of 20
8 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

right of eminent domain . . . for any of the uses and purposes

mentioned in section 7-701.” Idaho Code § 7-720.2 Section

7-701, in turn, specifies eleven different “public uses.” See

§ 7-701(1)–(11). Relevant here, paragraph (11) authorizes

the use of eminent domain for “[e]lectric distribution and

transmission lines for the delivery, furnishing, distribution,

and transmission of electric current for power, lighting,

heating or other purposes; and structures, facilities and

equipment for the production, generation, and manufacture of

electric current for power, lighting, heating or other

purposes.” § 7-701(11). Significantly, neither § 7-720 nor

§ 7-701(11) outlines where municipalities may use their

eminent domain power.

Certainly, § 7-720 does not contain any language limiting

the exercise of the eminent domain power to within the

geographic limits of a municipality. But in the eminent

domain context, the absence of such a limitation in a general

grant of eminent domain power normally is not construed as

an authorization to exercise the power extraterritorially. See

11 McQuillin The Law of Municipal Corporations § 32:76

(3d ed. 2013) (“[A] municipality cannot condemn lands

within the state but outside its own corporate limits unless the

power has been delegated by the legislature or granted by the

state constitution. The legislature may delegate such power,

as frequently has been done in express terms.” (footnotes

omitted) (emphasis added)); see also 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent

Domain § 27 (2013) (“It may be provided for by statute that

municipalities may condemn land beyond their limits. 

However, it has been held that a grant of power to municipal

corporations to condemn ‘any’ land for ‘any’ municipal or

2 Except where otherwise noted, all citations and references to “section”

or “§” are citations or references to provisions of the Idaho Code.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 8 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 9

public purpose does not include land outside the city limits.”

(footnotes omitted)). Consistent with these authorities, the

Idaho Supreme Court requires that “statutes conferring the

power [of eminent domain] must be strictly construed.”

McKenney v. Anselmo, 416 P.2d 509, 514 (Idaho 1966).

Moreover, the Idaho Legislature has expressly granted

cities extraterritorial eminent domain power for purposes

other than constructing electric transmission lines. For

example, § 50-320(A) grants cities the power to “exercise the

right of eminent domain under the provisions of [Chapter 7]”

to acquire “lands not exceeding [80] acres in [1] body outside

of the corporate limits” for the purpose of constructing a

cemetery. (emphasis added). Likewise, § 21-401 authorizes

municipalities to “acquire by . . . condemnation . . . lands

either wholly or partly within or without the boundaries or

corporate limits of” the municipality “for the purpose of

constructing and maintaining aviation fields, airports, hangars

and other air navigation facilities.” (emphasis added). These

express grants of extraterritorial eminent domain power

evidence that (1) the Idaho Legislature knows how to grant

extraterritorial eminent domain power to the cities of Idaho

and (2) does so expressly and for a specific purpose when it

intends that the cities have that power. Therefore, the

absence of an express grant of extraterritorial eminent domain

power in §§ 7-720 and 7-701(11) evidences that the Idaho

legislature did not grant such power in the general eminent

domain statutes.

2. Idaho’s Revenue Bond Act

Next, the City argues that Idaho’s Revenue Bond Act

(“RBA”) grants it extraterritorial eminent domain power for

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 9 of 20
10 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines.3

According to the City, because § 50-1030(a) (“paragraph

(a)”) authorizes it to acquire land to construct transmission

lines outside the City,

4

and § 50-1030(c) (“paragraph (c)”)

authorizes it to employ eminent domain “for any of the

works, purposes or uses provided by this act,” it may use

eminent domain to acquire the property rights it seeks in this

case.

The text of the statute forecloses this argument. 

Paragraph (c) only permits cities to exercise the power of

eminent domain “in like manner and to the same extent as

provided in section 7-720.” (emphasis added). These words

of limitation indicate that the legislature did not intend

paragraph (c) to augment the scope of the eminent domain

power beyond what § 7-720 already permitted. As discussed,

§ 7-720 does not grant cities extraterritorial eminent domain

power, so the language in paragraph (c) precludes the RBA

from granting the City that power.

Additional statutory text also forecloses the argument. 

Paragraph (a) lists specific means of acquiring property rights

3 The RBA includes §§ 50-1027 to -1042. See § 50-1027. The City may

exercise the powers granted in the RBA, even if the City is not issuing

bonds. See Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 233 P.3d 118,

123 (Idaho 2010) (concluding, based on similar language, that analogous

revenue bond act is “not limited to a district issuing bonds”), abrogated

on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d

502, 508–09 (Idaho 2011). 

4 Paragraph (a) grants cities the power to “acquire by gift or purchase . . .

rights in lands . . . in connection [with]” the construction of “works within

or without the city.” These “works” include electric transmission lines. 

See § 50-1029(a) (defining “works” as including “electric systems”);

§ 50-1029(h) (defining “electric system” to include “transmission lines”).

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 10 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 11

related to the works it describes. Namely, it authorizes cities

to “acquire by gift or purchase lands or rights in lands.” 

(emphasis added). However, acquisition by “condemnation”

is not listed in paragraph (a). Therefore, Idaho precedent

suggests that we must assume that the legislature excluded

“condemnation” from this list deliberately. Idaho PressClub,

Inc. v. State Legislature of Idaho, 132 P.3d 397, 399 (Idaho

2006) (“[W]here a constitution or statute specifies certain

things, the designation of such things excludes all others.”)

(quoting Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of

Coeur d’Alene, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (Idaho 1978)). 

Supporting this determination, in previous versions of the

RBA, paragraph (a) did expressly list “eminent domain” as a

means bywhichmunicipalities could acquire propertyoutside

of its boundaries. See 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 795. The

legislature’s subsequent deletion of the term from the list

forecloses the conclusion that § 50-1030 expands the scope

of cities’ eminent domain power.

Lastly, finding a grant of extraterritorial eminent domain

power in the RBA would render redundant the (clearer) grant

of such power in at least one other statutory section. Section

21-401 expressly grants Idaho municipalities the power to

acquire “lands either wholly or partly within or without

[their] boundaries” by “condemnation” “for the purpose of

constructing and maintaining aviation fields, airports, hangars

and other air navigation facilities.” Similarly, the RBA

identifies “airport facilities and air navigation facilities” as

“works” for which paragraph (c) authorizes the use of

eminent domain. See § 50-1029(a). If paragraph (c) grants

extraterritorial eminent domain power to acquire air

navigation facilities, then § 21-401 becomes a redundant

grant of the same power. Idaho courts avoid such

constructions. See Verska, 265 P.3d at 510 (“When

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 11 of 20
12 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

determining the plain meaning of a statute, effect must be

given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none

will be void, superfluous, or redundant.” (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Appellants argue that paragraph (c) itself is superfluous

if it does not add to the eminent domain powers that § 7-720

already grants. However, this argument incorrectly assumes

that paragraph (c) could serve no purpose except for

expanding the scope of the eminent domain power. Instead,

paragraph (c) makes clear that eminent domain is one means

of acquiring “works,” and that cities may finance such

acquisitions by issuing revenue bonds. See § 50-1030(c), (e). 

Without that specific authorization and with the explicit

grants of power to acquire by other means in paragraph (a)

(namely, by gift or purchase), there would be ambiguity as to

whether the RBA authorized cities to finance eminent domain

acquisitions by issuing revenue bonds. Thus, paragraph (c)

is not superfluous.5

B. Powers Fairly Implied or Incident to Express

Powers

Even though Idaho statutes do not grant the City the

express power of extraterritorial eminent domain to construct

transmission lines, that power may be “fairly implied in or

incident to those powers expressly granted.” Black, 834 P.2d

5 We also reject the City’s reliance on the “in pari materia” canon of

construction. See GoodingCnty. v. Wybenga, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (Idaho 2002)

(“Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject. Such

statutes are construed together to effect legislative intent.” (citation

omitted)). Given the foregoing analysis, construing these three statutes

“together” does not produce a construction favorable to the City.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 12 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 13

at 310. In determining whether statutes imply this power,

“fair, reasonable, substantial doubt[s] as to the existence of a

[municipal] power” must be resolved against the City. City

of Grangeville v. Haskin, 777 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Idaho 1989).

The City argues that its extraterritorial power of eminent

domain arises by implication from (1) its general power to

own property outside city limits, and (2) the powers expressly

granted to it under the RBA to acquire property rights for the

purpose of constructing electric utilities outside city limits.6

We disagree.

1. General Power to Acquire and Use Land

The City’s general power to acquire and use “lands

outside [its] corporate limits” does not fairly imply that the

City can use the power of eminent domain to acquire

easements there. § 50-220. The City cites no authority to

support the proposition that the power to acquire and use real

property through voluntary means implies the power of

eminent domain. The absence of any authority for the City’s

position gives rise to a “fair, reasonable, substantial doubt”

that this power can be implied from § 50-220. City of

Grangeville, 777 P.2d at 1211. Thus, we must conclude that

6 The City also argues that the extraterritorial eminent domain power can

be traced to statutes authorizing the City to buy and sell excess electrical

power. However, there is, at best, a tangential connection between (1) the

authorization to sell excess electrical power and (2) the authority to

exercise the power of eminent domain to construct power lines to facilitate

the transmission of that power within the City’s system for the purpose of

supplying its customers. The former does not “fairly impl[y]” the latter. 

Black, 834 P.2d at 310. Moreover, the City does not argue that it seeks to

build the North Loop lines for the purpose of buying and selling power

from other sources.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 13 of 20
14 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

§ 50-220 does not grant extraterritorial eminent domain

power to the City.

2. Power Granted under the RBA

The City also argues that its extraterritorial eminent

domain power can be “fairly implied” from the power the

RBA grants it to acquire “by gift or purchase lands or rights

in lands” outside the City’s boundaries “in connection with”

the construction of transmission lines and other parts of the

municipal electrical system. See § 50-1030(a). The City’s

argument appears to be that, if the City has the express power

to acquire and own property outside its borders for the

purpose of constructing components of its municipal

electrical system, then it must also be able to use the power

of eminent domain (when necessary) to make use of those

extraterritorially located components. However, in context,

extraterritorial eminent domain power cannot be fairly

implied from this grant of power.

As discussed, the plain text of the statute reflects a

deliberate choice by the legislature not to expand the power

of eminent domain beyond the borders of a municipality in

the RBA. It would contradict this intent to permit the City to

make an end-run around the statutory text by acquiring

property outside of its boundaries, then implying the power

to use eminent domain to facilitate the City’s desired use of

that property. Implication of such power under these

circumstances could not be considered “fair[].” Black,

834 P.2d at 310.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 14 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 15

3. Policy Reasons Not to Imply Extraterritorial

Eminent Domain Power

The Idaho Supreme Court adheres to the policy that all

“fair, reasonable, substantial doubt[s] as to the existence of a

[municipal] power” must be resolved against the City. City

of Grangeville, 777 P.2d at 1211. Even if the foregoing

analysis does not compel the conclusion that Idaho statutes do

not grant the City the power it seeks, it at least raises such a

doubt. And, under City of Grangeville, the existence of that

doubt compels the conclusion that the Citymust be denied the

power.

If the City has no other option for providing sufficient

electricity to its growing population, then it should ask the

legislature—not the courts—to expand its eminent domain

power to accommodate that growth. See Farber v. Idaho

State Ins. Fund, 208 P.3d 289, 295 (Idaho 2009) (“The

arguments . . . provided to this Court would be better targeted

at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing

law.”), abrogated on other grounds by Verska, 265 P.3d 502.

C. Powers Essential to Corporation’s Declared

Objects & Purposes

Finally, the City’s extraterritorial power of eminent

domain may be implied if having that power is “essential to

the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of

the [City].” Black, 834 P.2d at 310. The City argues that

power to condemn easements outside of city limits is

essential to accomplishing the statutory mandate to provide

electrical power at the “lowest possible cost.” See § 50-1028.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 15 of 20
16 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

There is no basis for the City’s implicit argument that the

legislature intended this “lowest possible cost” mandate to

effect an expansion of municipal power. In fact, the opposite

is true. Use of the term “possible” implies that the City

should do all within the powers it has been granted elsewhere

to accomplish the objective of providing low-cost power. See

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1771 (1993)

(defining “possible” as “falling or lying within the powers (as

of performance, attainment, or conception) of an agent or

activity expressed or implied”). It does not imply that the

City may exceed its powers already granted in order to

provide power at lower cost, or that new powers may be

generated in pursuit of that objective.

The City relies on Big Sky Paramedics, LLC v. Sagle Fire

District, 95 P.3d 53 (Idaho 2004), to support its argument;

Big Sky is distinguishable. In Big Sky, the court started with

the premise that § 31-1401 “grants fire districts power for

‘[t]he protection of property against fire and the preservation

of life . . . .’” Id. at 54. Relying on the trial court’s finding

that the Sagle Fire Protection District (“SFPD”) provided a

quicker ambulance response to emergencies than a private

competitor, the court concluded that SFPD’s provision of its

own ambulance services was “indispensable” to its purpose

of providing for “the preservation of life.” See id. at 55.

By contrast here, the district court did not find, as a matter

of fact, that completion of the North Loop in its current

configuration will enable IFP to provide power at the “lowest

possible cost.” Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to

support that proposition. Thus, unlike in Big Sky, there is no

factual basis for concluding that the exercise of eminent

domain is “essential” to accomplishing the City’s objective.

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 16 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 17

Additionally, the City relies on § 50-1028’s broad

mandate to provide electricity at the “lowest possible cost” to

circumvent other statutory provisions that would deny the

City the power it seeks. In Big Sky, granting the SFPD the

power to operate an ambulance service did not create such

tension with other statutes. Ultimately, we must reject the

City’s attempt to find in this broad mandate additional powers

the legislature has not granted it elsewhere.

II. Certification to the Idaho Supreme Court

After having lost at the district court level, the City now

asks us to certify the dispositive question in this appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court. We deny the request. See

Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“Use of the certification procedure in any given case rests in

the sound discretion of the federal court.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). “There is a presumption against certifying

a question to a state supreme court after the federal district

court has issued a decision. A party should not be allowed a

second chance at victory through certification by the appeals

court after an adverse district court ruling.” Thompson v.

Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted). To overcome that presumption, the City

must demonstrate “particularly compelling reasons” why it

should “be allowed a second chance at victory.” In re

Complaint of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984).

The City fails to identify such “particularly compelling

reasons” in this case. The City argues that the same reasons

that prompted us to certify a question in Peter-Palican v.

Northern Mariana Islands, 673 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012),

should prompt certification of the question presented in this

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 17 of 20
18 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

case. However, this case differs from Peter-Palican in

meaningful ways.

In Peter-Palican, an ex-government official sued the

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands after she

was discharged from her cabinet-level position as Special

Assistant to the Governor for Women’s Affairs. Id. at 1015. 

The position of Special Assistant was created by the

Commonwealth’s constitution, which specified that the

official holding that position “may be removed only for

cause.” Id. Thus, the case presented the question whether the

“for cause” limit on removal barred the Special Assistant’s

removal indefinitely, i.e., even after the end of the term of the

governor who appointed her. Id. at 1018–19. We certified

that question to the Commonwealth’s Supreme Court, citing

both “the importance of territorial sovereignty in matters of

territorial governance and the lack of clear answers in

Commonwealth law” as compelling reasons warranting

certification. Id. at 1018. Taking these principles in reverse

order, neither presents itself here.

The Peter-Palican court concluded that Commonwealth

law gave unclear answers, because there was more than one

“rational construction” of the disputed constitutional

provision. See id. at 1019. We acknowledge that one might

also argue that there could be more than one possible

construction of the statutes in this case. However, faithful

application of the statutory canons of the Idaho Supreme

Court compels only one conclusion—the City has not been

granted extraterritorial eminent domain power for the purpose

of constructing electric transmission lines.

Further, this case does not implicate Idaho state

sovereignty to the same extent as the constitutional provision

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 18 of 20
ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 19

at issue in Peter-Palican implicated the Commonwealth’s

territorial sovereignty. In Peter-Palican, we were asked to

determine the meaning of a provision in the Commonwealth’s

constitution concerning a high-ranking government office. 

Because the ambiguity of the constitution could not be

resolved by resorting to standard rules of construction, it

would invariably require making a policy choice involving

the operation of the Commonwealth’s government. 

Moreover, whatever construction we adopted would be

ossified in the territory’s founding charter.

The disputed question in this case can be distinguished on

both points. First, the issue involves statutory construction

regarding the power of Idaho’s cities to exercise their power

of eminent domain. Although important, this provision does

not affect the governance structure of the state. Second, we

are interpreting state statutes, not the Idaho Constitution. As

a result, the Idaho Legislature may change the statutes if it

disagrees with our decision. Unlike in Peter-Palican, our

holding here will not be ossified in the state constitution,

requiring amendment to change or avoid. Thus, this case

does not present the same compelling justifications for

certification that were present in Peter-Palican.

Therefore, in our discretion, we deny the City’s request. 

We can decide this case by applying principles of statutory

construction that the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly

enunciated. Thus, the fact that there is no Idaho Supreme

Court decision directly “on point” does not constrain us.

Further, the City moved this case to federal court. There,

the district court gave the City the opportunity to seek

certification and noted that the likely result of the district

court’s decision would be an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 19 of 20
20 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS

City declined the district court’s invitation; it did not request

certification below. Having made the choice to “cast its lot”

in the federal district court, the City—having lost there—is

not entitled to “a second chance at victory” through

certification. Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1065.

CONCLUSION

As a “creature of the state,” the City has only those

powers “either expressly or impliedly granted to it.” Caesar,

610 P.2d at 519. Because the power to exercise eminent

domain extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing

electric transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted

to the City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the

powers that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not

essential to accomplishing the City’s objects and purposes,

the City does not have that power. See Black 834 P.2d at 310. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

7

7 On March 5, 2013, the City filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to

include an appeal from the district court’s order awarding attorney fees. 

However, the City has forfeited that issue by failing to argue the issue in

any of its briefs. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d

925, 930 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the failure to properly brief an issue

waives the argument).

Case: 12-35800 12/31/2013 ID: 8920464 DktEntry: 35-1 Page: 20 of 20