Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07079/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2004 Decided November 26, 2004

No. 03-7079

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. RICHARD WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

v.

MARTIN-BAKER AIRCRAFT COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02699)

Dean F. Pace argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant United States of America.

Harvey G. Sherzer argued the cause for appellee Teledyne

Ryan Aeronautical. With him on the brief was Scott Arnold.

Matthew H. Kirtland argued the cause for appellee MartinBaker Aircraft Company, Ltd. With him on the brief was

Stephen M. McNabb.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-7079 Document #861923 Filed: 11/26/2004 Page 1 of 16
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Before: SENTELLE, TATEL, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this case, a qui tam relator

alleges that his former employer and one of its subcontractors

violated the False Claims Act. The relator also alleges that

by suspending and ultimately firing him, the employer violated the statute’s protections for whistleblowers. The district

court dismissed both claims—the false claims count for failure

(among other things) to plead fraud with the particularity

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and the

whistleblower count pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim. We affirm the dismissal of the false claims

allegations, but because the relator has stated a claim under

the more liberal pleading rules that govern whistleblower

allegations, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of that

claim and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A plaintiff, either an individual or the United States, may

state a claim under the False Claims Act (‘‘FCA’’) by alleging

that a defendant ‘‘knowingly ma[de], use[d], or cause[d] to be

made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or

fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.’’ 31

U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). FCA violators are liable for civil penalties and treble damages, id. § 3729(a), and private individuals, known as ‘‘relators,’’ may bring civil actions in the United

States government’s name, id. § 3730(b)(1). The government

may opt to take over the suit, but if (as here) it declines to do

so, the relator may elect to proceed and collect a significant

percentage of any recovery. Id. §§ 3730(b)(4), (d). Cases

brought under the FCA are known as qui tam actions, an

abbreviation of the Latin phrase, ‘‘qui tam pro domino rege

quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur’’—or, ‘‘who pursues

this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’’

Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,

529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).

The False Claims Act contains a ‘‘whistleblower’’ provision

to protect qui tam relators, who are often either current or

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former employees of FCA defendants. See 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(h). In particular, the statute protects those who

suffer retaliation because of their conduct ‘‘in furtherance of

an action under [the FCA].’’ Id.

Appellee Martin-Baker Aircraft manufactures Naval Aircrew Ejection System (‘‘NACES’’) seats for U.S. Navy aircraft. Appellee Teledyne Technologies, a Martin-Baker subcontractor, produces the ‘‘NACES sequencer,’’ an electronic

component of the ejection seat. Martin-Baker sells the seats

to the Navy in production batches known as ‘‘lots.’’ For each

lot, Martin-Baker negotiates the price of the sequencer with

Teledyne and then negotiates the price of the entire ejection

seat with the Navy. Pursuant to the Federal Acquisition

Regulations (‘‘FAR’’), which require government contractors

to certify that ‘‘to the best of [their] knowledge and belief, the

cost or pricing data [are] accurate, complete, and current as

of the date of agreement on price,’’ Teledyne had to certify to

Martin-Baker the accuracy of the data for the sequencer, and

Martin-Baker had to certify the same to the Navy for the

ejection seat lots. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-4 (2002).

Appellant Richard Williams served as Martin-Baker’s Chief

Contract Negotiator from 1991 until the company fired him in

July 1996. Williams’s responsibilities included assessing the

reasonableness of Martin-Baker’s prime contracts with the

Navy, which entailed analyzing Teledyne’s cost and pricing

data. Williams also participated in prime contract negotiations with the Naval Air Systems Command (‘‘NAVAIR’’)

contracting team.

In 1997, Williams filed a qui tam action against MartinBaker, Teledyne, and another defendant not involved in this

appeal. Twice amending his complaint, Williams served only

the third version, i.e., the Second Amended Complaint

(throughout this opinion, we shall refer to it as ‘‘the complaint’’), on Martin-Baker and Teledyne. After five years and

numerous extensions of time, the government chose not to

intervene.

Although difficult to decipher, Count I of the complaint

generally alleges that Martin-Baker and Teledyne violated

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the FCA by failing to comply with certification requirements

under the Truth in Negotiations Act and the accompanying

FAR, which together regulate government contracts. Teledyne ‘‘acted in knowing deliberate ignorance and reckless

disregard’’ of both the historical actual cost of the sequencer

and the updated ‘‘accurate, complete and current cost and

pricing data’’ for ‘‘at least NACES Sequencer Lots IV

through XIII.’’ See Compl. ¶ 9. Because Teledyne certified

the data’s accuracy to Martin-Baker, which then submitted

the data to the Navy, Teledyne made ‘‘false statements and

lies to the United States Government.’’ Id. Teledyne also

employed six ‘‘false methods to falsely support’’ the certificates, culminating in ‘‘coverup, deception and lies to the

United States Government.’’ Id. ¶ 11. According to Count I,

Williams informed Martin-Baker of the sequencers’ historical

cost, but the company refused to use historical cost in negotiations with the Navy for at least Lots IX through XIII. Id.

¶¶ 14-15. Finally, ‘‘[e]ach and every Teledyne TTT false Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data and false invoice to MartinBaker’’ is a false claim in violation of the FCA, resulting in a

cost to the government of ‘‘at least $10 million.’’ Id. ¶¶ 17-19.

In Count III (Count II is not at issue in this appeal),

Williams alleges that in February 1996, he reported to his

superior, Peter Hogg, that he had recommended to NAVAIR

that it ‘‘continue to challenge’’ the cost or pricing data for Lot

XI of the sequencer. Id. ¶ 40. Martin-Baker, Williams alleges, then ‘‘abruptly concluded’’ his mission with NAVAIR and

‘‘ordered [him] to return to Martin-Baker whereupon

Williams was immediately suspended.’’ Id. Williams claims

that Martin-Baker then ‘‘forced’’ him to see ‘‘a company

doctor TTT and then a specialist for a contrived mental illness,’’ despite his personal physician’s certification that he

was fit to work. Id. ¶ 41. The company eventually fired

Williams ‘‘in retaliation TTT on the contrived and false ground

of indeterminate mental illness and mental incapacity.’’ Id.

¶ 43. According to the complaint, Martin-Baker later ‘‘retracted its mental incapacity reason for the employment

termination,’’ writing a letter to his insurance company ‘‘conUSCA Case #03-7079 Document #861923 Filed: 11/26/2004 Page 4 of 16
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firming that its mental incapacity reason for the employment

termination of Williams was false.’’ Id. ¶ 44.

Following a hearing, the district court granted the companies’ motion to dismiss, doing so with prejudice. Finding

Count I’s allegations ‘‘simultaneously excessively prolix and

equally abstruse,’’ the district court ruled the count violated

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. United States ex rel.

Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., No. 97-2699 at 4

(D.D.C. May 15, 2003). The court found that Count I also

failed Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement for fraud

because it ‘‘alleges no specifics as to the time, place, or

content of any deceptive submissions actually made to the

government by either defendant, nor does [the plaintiff]

identify any ostensibly culpable officials.’’ Id. at 5. The

district court dismissed Count III under Rule 12(b)(6), finding

that it failed to state a claim for retaliation because MartinBaker fired Williams in July 1996, eighteen months before he

filed suit. Id. at 7.

Williams appeals the district court’s dismissal of Counts I

and III. We consider each in turn.

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a pleading ‘‘shall contain TTT a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’’ Rule 8(e)(1)

requires that ‘‘[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct.’’ When a plaintiff alleges fraud, as when

stating a claim under the FCA, see United States ex rel.

Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52 (D.C. Cir.

2002), Rule 9(b) requires that ‘‘the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake TTT be stated with particularity.’’ We review Rule 8(a) and 9(b) dismissals de novo. See Kowal v.

MCI Communications, Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (reviewing de novo a dismissal based jointly on Rule 8

and Rule 9(b)); see also In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d 1502, 1508

& n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing de novo a finding of failure to

comply with Rule 8). ‘‘[A]ll the allegations of material fact

are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

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the non-moving party TTT [and] it must appear to a certainty

that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set

of facts that could be proved.’’ Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278

(quoting Wool v. Tandem, 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987))

(alterations in original).

At the outset, we reject Williams’s argument that Rule

8(a)’s requirement of a ‘‘short and plain statement’’ is the

‘‘antithesis’’ of Rule 9(b). As we have explained,

Rule 9(b) is not TTT to be read in isolation from

other procedural canons. As Professor Moore notes,

‘‘[t]he requirement of particularity does not abrogate

Rule 8, and it should be harmonized with the general

directives in subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8 that

the pleadings should contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim or defense’ and that each averment should be ‘simple concise and direct.’ ’’

United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1386

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice

¶ 9.03, at 9-28 (2d ed. 1980)) (footnote omitted). Combining

Rules 8 and 9(b), we require that ‘‘the pleader TTT state the

time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the

fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a

consequence of the fraud.’’ Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278 (quoting

Joseph, 642 F.2d at 1385); see also Totten, 286 F.3d at 552.

We also require pleaders to identify individuals allegedly

involved in the fraud. See Joseph, 642 F.2d at 1385-86.

Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement serves several purposes. It ‘‘discourage[s] the initiation of suits brought solely

for their nuisance value, and safeguards potential defendants

from frivolous accusations of moral turpitudeTTTT And because ‘fraud’ encompasses a wide variety of activities, the

requirements of Rule 9(b) guarantee all defendants sufficient

information to allow for preparation of a response.’’ Joseph,

642 F.2d at 1385 (footnotes omitted).

We agree with the district court that Count I fails Rule

9(b)’s particularity requirement. To begin with, the allegations regarding the ‘‘time TTT of the false misrepresentations’’

USCA Case #03-7079 Document #861923 Filed: 11/26/2004 Page 6 of 16
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are entirely inadequate. See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278. Several paragraphs nebulously allege that the period in question is

‘‘at least through 2002,’’ but nowhere does the complaint

allege a start date. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 5, 16, 17, 19-22. Not

until his brief in this court did Williams tell us that Teledyne

and Martin-Baker began their allegedly fraudulent activities

in 1992 and 1995, respectively. This comes too late. See

EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,

624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (‘‘In determining whether a complaint

fails to state a claim, we may consider only the facts alleged

in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated

in the complaint and matters of which we may take judicial

notice.’’). Williams insists that requiring him to allege the

dates ‘‘of all Martin-Baker and Teledyne vouchers [would

require him] to plead evidence far beyond particularity.’’

Williams Br. at 22. We need not address that contention,

however, for the open-ended time span alleged in the complaint failed to give the two companies ‘‘sufficient information

to allow for preparation of a response.’’ See Joseph, 642 F.2d

at 1385.

The complaint also fails to identify with specificity who

precisely was involved in the fraudulent activity. See id. at

1385-86. The complaint repeatedly refers generally to ‘‘management’’ and provides a long list of names without ever

explaining the role these individuals played in the alleged

fraud—an especially surprising deficiency given that Williams

worked for Martin-Baker and with Teledyne for five years.

See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11-13, 16, 21. This imprecision not only

failed to give the companies sufficient information to answer

the complaint, but it also subjected the named individuals to

vague, potentially damaging accusations of fraud. See United

States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d

1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that an FCA claim

lacked the requisite particularity under Rule 9(b) where,

among other things, the plaintiff failed to identify the employees involved in the fraud).

Equally obscure is the ‘‘fact misrepresented.’’ See Kowal,

16 F.3d at 1278. In some places, such as in paragraph 15, the

complaint seems to allege that Martin-Baker’s certificates of

cost or pricing data were false because the company failed to

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use historical actual costs during negotiations with the government. Yet we have found no case or regulation—nor has

Williams pointed to any—requiring the use of such data

during negotiations. Instead, aiming to put negotiating parties on equal footing by mandating disclosure of cost data, the

FAR and TINA only require that contractors identify and

make the information available to the government. See, e.g.,

Hughes Aircraft Co., ASBCA No. 30144, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,847,

1990 WL 42047 (1990) (stating that a contractor is not obligated to use cost data so long as the government has the option

of analyzing the data). Having done so, negotiating parties

need not reach agreement based on the disclosed data. Id.

Elsewhere, such as in paragraph 9, Williams appears to

allege that Teledyne engaged in misrepresentation by failing

to update the costs it did disclose. But when asked by the

district court, ‘‘Are you alleging that they misrepresented

what historical actual cost per sequencer was?,’’ Williams’s

counsel answered ‘‘no.’’ Counsel’s response also undermines

paragraph 11’s allegation that Teledyne’s failure to use historical cost data meant the company had employed fraudulent

methods as a cover-up. Given counsel’s admission that Teledyne did not misrepresent the data, what exactly did Teledyne need to ‘‘cover up’’? Paragraph 11 provides no answer.

Paragraph 11 suffers from other significant gaps: Only one of

its six allegations includes a date and none names any involved individuals or mentions what was ‘‘retained or given

up’’ as a result of the fraud. Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278.

According to Williams, paragraph 10 alleges precise ‘‘false

claims calculations.’’ That paragraph states,

The NACES Sequencer proposed and negotiated

Certificates of Cost and Pricing Data by Defendants

Teledyne TTT and Martin-Baker were false in violation of the False Claims Act, TTT inter alia false

certification of the difference between the contract

unit prices and the historical actual cost for the

NACES Sequencer Lots IV through XIII without

limitation thereof.

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Following these allegations, paragraph 10 includes calculations of the difference between the contract price per sequencer and historical actual cost per sequencer. See Compl.

¶ 10. Yet paragraph 10 nowhere alleges how these calculations amount to ‘‘false certification of the difference between

the contract unit prices and the historical actual cost.’’ What,

then, did Teledyne misstate in its certification? And what did

the government ‘‘retain[ ] or give[ ] up’’ due to the alleged

fraud? See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278. Paragraph 10 provides

no answer.

Perhaps anticipating difficulties under this circuit’s case

law, Williams relies on United States ex rel. Harris v. Bernad, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2003), a district court

decision that relaxes the particularity requirements for qui

tam plaintiffs. We need not decide whether that decision

comports with circuit law, for Williams’s complaint fails even

its less strict standard. In Harris, the district court found

that the relator pled with sufficient particularity because the

complaint alleged a ‘‘span of time’’ instead of exact dates,

named individual defendants, noted where the fraud took

place, alleged facts that exemplified the fraudulent scheme,

and used a statistical sample to describe the fraudulently

gained benefit. Id. By contrast, Williams’s complaint alleges

no start date, names a laundry list of individuals without

specifying their relation to the fraudulent scheme, see, e.g.,

Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13, alleges a place only twice, id. ¶¶ 12, 14, and

sets forth no facts that exemplify the purportedly fraudulent

scheme, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 15.

Williams contends that his complaint lacks specificity because Martin-Baker and Teledyne have possession of the

critical documents. It is certainly true that qui tam plaintiffs,

frequently former employees of the parties they sue, often

have difficulty getting access to their former employers’

documents. Accordingly, this circuit provides an avenue for

plaintiffs unable to meet the particularity standard because

defendants control the relevant documents—plaintiffs in such

straits may allege lack of access in the complaint. Kowal, 16

F.3d at 1279 n.3. Neither in his complaint nor before the

district court did Williams make any such allegations. He

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advances lack of access for the first time here—far too late

for us to consider such a claim. See United States v. Hylton,

294 F.3d 130, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that an argument

not made in the ‘‘lower tribunal is deemed forfeited’’). Indeed, instead of explaining to the district court that lack of

access to key documents thwarted his compliance with Rule

9(b), Williams told the court that he could replead the complaint with particularity if given leave to amend. Moreover,

Teledyne and Martin-Baker assert, and Williams never denies, that he and the government reviewed ‘‘thousands of

pages of documents’’ produced by the two companies at the

government’s request. Martin-Baker Br. at 3; Teledyne Br.

at 28. Nor did Williams challenge counsel for Teledyne’s

assertion at oral argument that the company provided ‘‘all of

the contract documentation’’ to Williams and the government.

Williams’s offer to replead with particularity together with his

participation in the government’s five-year examination of

reams of documents provided by the companies suggests that

lack of access was not a real barrier for this qui tam relator.

In sum, although Rule 9(b) does not require plaintiffs to

allege every fact pertaining to every instance of fraud when a

scheme spans several years, defendants must be able to

‘‘defend against the charge and not just deny that they have

done anything wrong.’’ Lee, 245 F.3d at 1052 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because Count I failed to provide

Martin-Baker and Teledyne this opportunity, we agree with

the district court that Count I ran afoul of Rule 9(b)’s

particularity requirement. We thus have no need to review

the district court’s separate conclusion that Count I also fails

Rule 8(a).

One last point. The district court dismissed the complaint

with prejudice. Williams asks that should we agree with the

district court that Count I fails Rule 9(b), we remand with

instructions to allow him to amend the complaint. Reviewing

the district court’s dismissal with prejudice for abuse of

discretion, see Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1279, we decline to do so.

After Martin-Baker and Teledyne moved to dismiss,

Williams told the district court that ‘‘if this Honorable Court

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would desire a complaint comprised of hundreds of pages of

evidence and exhibits, Plaintiff will be pleased to obey.’’ At

the hearing, Williams asked for leave to amend ‘‘to write a

massive complaint with the particularity that perhaps might

satisfy all concerned,’’ offering to draft ‘‘a 100-page complaint

if the court pleases.’’ Yet Williams never filed a motion to

amend, nor did he proffer the contents of a potential fourth

version of this count beyond what we have just described.

‘‘While Federal Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend

shall be freely given when justice so requires, a bare request

in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is

sought—does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).’’ Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Confederate Mem’l Ass’n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 285, 299 (D.C. Cir.

1993)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). In Confederate Memorial, the plaintiffs requested leave to amend

their complaint, but never tendered a proposed amendment.

995 F.2d at 297. On appeal, plaintiffs said they could prove

facts entitling them to recovery, but provided no specifics.

Since they never indicated ‘‘the particular grounds on which

amendment is sought,’’ we held that they failed properly to

request an opportunity to amend. Id. at 299. As in Confederate Memorial, Williams’s vague offer to add hundreds of

pages and write a ‘‘massive complaint’’ tells us nothing about

how such added verbiage would yield a successfully stated

FCA claim.

Given Williams’s failure to articulate to the district court

anything more than a bare request to amend his complaint,

we affirm the dismissal of Count I with prejudice.

III.

Turning to Count III, we review de novo the district court’s

dismissal of that count for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. Unlike Count I, Count

III is unconstrained by the fraud pleading standard; its

allegations need satisfy only Rule 8’s general pleading requirements. Furthermore, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

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dismiss for failure to state a claim, ‘‘the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ favor, and we grant plaintiffs

the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.’’ Id. Dismissal is inappropriate ‘‘unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’’

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

The FCA’s whistleblower protections entitle

[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because

of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the

employee or others in furtherance of an action under

this section, TTT to all relief necessary to make the

employee whole.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). As we explained in United States ex rel.

Yesudian v. Howard University, to prevail on a whistleblower claim, an employee must demonstrate that:

(1) he engaged in protected activity, that is, ‘‘acts

done TTT in furtherance of an action under this

section’’; and (2) he was discriminated against ‘‘because of’’ that activity. To establish the second

element, the employee must in turn make two further showings. The employee must show that: (a)

‘‘the employer had knowledge the employee was

engaged in protected activity’’; and (b) ‘‘the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s engaging in [that] protected activity.’’

153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-

345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300).

In dismissing Count III, the district court found that

Williams could not have been engaged in ‘‘protected activity’’

because Martin-Baker fired him 18 months before he filed his

FCA complaint. See Williams, No. 97-2699 at 7 (D.D.C. May

15, 2003). Martin-Baker does not seriously defend this disposition, and for good reason. In Yesudian, we reversed the

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district court for ‘‘suggesting that [the relator’s] activity was

unprotected because he had not initiated a private suit by the

time of his termination.’’ 153 F.3d at 741. As Yesudian

points out, Congress intended ‘‘to protect employees while

they are collecting information about a possible fraud.’’ Id. at

740. Thus, ‘‘it is sufficient that a plaintiff be investigating

matters that reasonably could lead to a viable False Claims

Act case.’’ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Martin-Baker argues that Williams has failed to allege that

he engaged in ‘‘protected activity’’ as required by Yesudian.

Because ‘‘Williams has not alleged any actions on his part

beyond his ordinary job requirements in reporting or investigating potential government fraud and non-compliance with

federal contract regulations,’’ the company contends, it could

not have known that he was engaged in ‘‘protected activity.’’

Martin-Baker Br. at 34-35. Although this argument conflates

Yesudian’s first two requirements—that the employee engage

in ‘‘protected activity’’ and that the employer have notice—we

read Martin-Baker’s brief as raising only the latter. Though

entitled ‘‘Williams Fails To Allege That He Engaged In

‘Protected Activity’ While Employed At Martin-Baker,’’ section II.A of the company’s brief deals only with lack of notice.

See Artis v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301, 1302 n.1 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (stating that issues not briefed are waived).

The standard for notice, as Yesudian explains, is flexible:

‘‘the kind of knowledge the defendant must have mirrors the

kind of activity in which the plaintiff must be engaged.’’ 153

F.3d at 742. ‘‘Unless the employer is aware that the employee is investigating fraud, TTT the employer could not possess

the retaliatory intent necessary to establish a violation of

§ 3730(h).’’ Id. at 744 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, as many circuits have held, and

as we ourselves indicated in Yesudian, id. at 744-45, plaintiffs

alleging that performance of their normal job responsibilities

constitutes protected activity must ‘‘overcome the presumption that they are merely acting in accordance with their

employment obligations’’ to put their employers on notice.

Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir.

2003) (denying whistleblower protection where plaintiff was

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‘‘simply performing his ordinary duties’’ when he told employer that certifications were illegal and that other companies

had incurred FCA liability for similar acts); see also United

States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d

1514, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no notice where plaintiff regularly communicated with her superiors about noncompliance as part of her job responsibilities). Thus, without

‘‘evidence that [the employee] expressed any concerns to his

superiors other than those typically raised as part of a

contract administrator’s job,’’ an employer could not be on

notice that the employee was acting in furtherance of an FCA

action. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d

948, 952 (5th Cir. 1994).

Examining Count III’s allegations under Yesudian’s flexible standard, we generally agree with Martin-Baker that

Williams’s activities fall within his responsibilities as Chief

Contract Negotiator and so could not have placed MartinBaker on notice. As Williams conceded both in his brief and

at oral argument, he ‘‘did his job’’ when he informed MartinBaker management of the results of his audits of Teledyne’s

data. Williams Br. at 10.

By the same logic, however, when an employee acts outside

his normal job responsibilities or alerts a party outside the

usual chain of command, such action may suffice to notify the

employer that the employee is engaging in protected activity.

See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1522-23 (holding that plaintiff failed

to satisfy notice prong where plaintiff communicated information about noncompliance to her superiors, but ‘‘gave no

suggestion that she was going to report such noncompliance

to government officials’’); Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d

860, 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding whistleblower claim

where plaintiff told employer’s legal counsel about fraud and

counsel informed the government). Williams’s advice to NAVAIR ‘‘to continue to challenge’’ Teledyne’s cost or pricing

data—Count III’s sole allegation of protected activity—represents just this type of action. Instead of merely reporting his

concerns about Teledyne up Martin-Baker’s management

chain, Williams went outside the company and alerted the

government—the victim of any FCA violation. Indeed,

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Williams went well beyond Yesudian’s requirements for employees whose normal job functions include auditing responsibilities. Yesudian makes clear that such an employee need

not ‘‘announce he ha[d] gone outside the institution,’’ 153 F.3d

at 743, but Williams did precisely that.

At oral argument, Martin-Baker insisted that Williams’s

statement to NAVAIR was in fact part of his job responsibilities. Martin-Baker might well be able to establish this

proposition either at summary judgment or at trial, but at

this stage of the proceedings—a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss—our job responsibilities require that we limit our

consideration to the allegations in the complaint and resolve

‘‘[a]ll factual doubts TTT and all inferences TTT in favor of the

plaintiff.’’ Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United

States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting

Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1506

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)). Given this, we cannot intuit, as

Martin-Baker would have us, that Williams’s responsibilities

as a contract negotiator for Martin-Baker included telling the

government—the opposing negotiating party—to continue

challenging the pricing data underlying his employer’s contract. Indeed, Martin-Baker’s swift suspension of Williams

following his disclosure could lead a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that management considered Williams’s conversation with NAVAIR well beyond the scope of his responsibilities.

Citing a Fifth Circuit decision, Martin-Baker also argues

that Williams failed to satisfy Yesudian’s notice requirement

because the complaint never characterizes his concerns as

involving ‘‘illegal, unlawful, or false-claims investigations.’’

See Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952. Though Yesudian cites that

decision, 153 F.3d at 744, we did not adopt the Fifth Circuit’s

view that an employee whose job responsibilities coincide with

statutorily protected activity must incant talismanic words to

satisfy the notice element, and joining several other circuits,

we decline to do so here. See McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2000);

Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146

(11th Cir. 1996); Neal, 33 F.3d at 864. Not only does section

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3730(h) nowhere require the use of such words, but as the

Fourth Circuit has explained, ‘‘[N]otice can be accomplished

by expressly stating an intention to bring a qui tam suit, but

it may also be accomplished by any action which a factfinder

reasonably could conclude would put the employer on notice

that litigation is a reasonable possibility.’’ Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 868 (4th Cir.

1999). In this case, giving Williams the benefit of all inferences, we believe that a reasonable factfinder could conclude

that once Williams informed Martin-Baker that he had told

the Navy to continue challenging Teledyne’s cost or pricing

data, the company was ‘‘on notice that litigation [was] a

reasonable possibility.’’ Id.

Finally, we can easily dispose of Martin-Baker’s argument

that Williams fails Yesudian’s causation requirement. By

claiming that his suspension and termination occurred just

after he disclosed the NAVAIR conversation to his superior,

Williams has satisfactorily alleged that his protected activity

caused Martin-Baker’s retaliation.

IV.

Because Williams’s false claims allegations fail to meet the

requirements of Rule 9(b), we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Count I. But because Williams has sufficiently

alleged a violation of the FCA’s whistleblower provision, we

reverse the district court’s dismissal of Count III and remand

for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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