Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00028/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT POON, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S, DEPUTY

JOHN DOE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 1:10-cv-0028-AWI-JLT

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(Document 2)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On

January 6, 2010, plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. (Doc # 2)

1. IFP Motion

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s IFP motion, wherein he reports that he is unemployed and

receives limited Government Financial Aid from the authorities in Hong Kong and has no

income or assets, satisfies the indigency requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court finds

further that Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of commencing this action. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s IFP motion is granted. 

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Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 1 of 7
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II. Complaint

A. Screening

The Court is required to review a case filed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a); 28

U.S.C. 1915(e). The Court must review the complaint and dismiss the action if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B); see Noll v. Carlson, 809

F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987 (citing Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F. 2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.

1984)). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be

granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

1. Section 1983 complaint

Plaintiff's complaint seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in pertinent

part that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

To plead a § 1983 violation, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be inferred

that (1) plaintiff was deprived of a federal right, and (2) the person who deprived plaintiff of that

right acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Collins v.

Womancare, 878 F. 2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989). To warrant relief under § 1983, the plaintiff

must allege and show that the defendants’ acts or omissions caused the deprivation of the

plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 2 of 7
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Id. There must be an actual causal connection or link between the actions of each defendant and

the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-692 (1978)(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362, 370-371, 96

S. Ct. 598 (1976)). 

(2) Rule 8(a)

Section 1983 complaints are governed by the notice pleading standard in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a), which provides in relevant part that:

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new

jurisdictional support; 

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief; and 

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy. 

Nevertheless, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s

claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In other words, the plaintiff is required to give the defendants

fair notice of what constitutes the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests.

Although a complaint need not outline all of the elements of a claim, it must be possible

to infer from the allegations that all of the elements exist and that the plaintiff is entitled

to relief under a viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d

275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by facts are

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th

Cir. 1977). 

B. Analysis

i. Summary of the Allegations

Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on all of the defendants under 42 U.S.C.

Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 3 of 7
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1983. Toward that end, Plaintiff alleges that on April 14, 2009, he was transferred by the

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“ICE”) to the Kern

County Lerdo Jail Facility. He asserts that after he arrived at Lerdo, he was pushed by a

Sheriff’s deputy, whom he describes as a “rogue deputy”, fell and suffered an injury to his

arm, bruising to his hips and aggravation of his preexisting neck and lower back

conditions. Plaintiff alleges that the deputy pushed him in response to his request to have

his hand unshackeld to allow him to use the toilet facilities. Plaintiff asserts that after the

incident he complained to Agent Martinez of ICE and that Agent Martinez took no action

except to intimidate plaintiff by telling him that the jailers would further abuse him after

Martinez left the jail.

ii. The Alleged Defendants

In the caption of his complaint, Plaintiff names “Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy”

and John Doe “et al.” In the body of his complaint, Plaintiff outlines that he is suing the

Kern County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Donny Youngblood, and Sheriff Deputy John Doe,

the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Janet Napolitano, the Immigration

and Customs Enforcement Agency and Assistant Secretary John T. Morton and an

employee of ICE who he refers to as “Agent Martinez.”

iii. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the Federal

defendants

Plaintiff asserts that defendants Napolitano and Morton may be held liable

because they continue to use the Lerdo Jail Facility to house detainees despite a previous

alleged incident of excessive force that occurred in 2005. He names these defendants both

in their individual and official capacities and purports to bring this action under 42 USC §

1983. However, federal officials do not ordinarily act under color of state law so that

constitutional violations by federal officials are generally beyond the reach of § 1983.

To the extent that these defendants are sued in their official capacity, such claims

are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Gilbert v. DaCrossa, 756 F.2d 1455,

Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 4 of 7
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27 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 1

(1971).

1458 (9 Cir. 1985). Although sovereign immunity does not bar damages actions against

th

federal officials in their individual capacities, an individual may not be held liable in a

Bivens action on the theory of respondeat superior. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1

101 (9th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). Here, plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any

actual participation by defendants Napolitano or Morton. Therefore, the claims against

these defendants both in their individual and official capacities are dismissed.

Similarly, plaintiff seeks to name the Department of Homeland Security and the

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“ICE”). However, under the doctrine of

sovereign immunity, a Bivens action will not lie against the United States, agencies of the

United States, or federal agents in their official capacity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.

471, 486 (1994); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1110-1111 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Therefore, the complaint against these defendants is dismissed.

Likewise, although plaintiff names ICE employee, Agent Martinez, this federal

employee may not be held liable under 42 USC § 1983 because there is no showing that

he acted under color of state law. Moreover, as noted above, Agent Martinez may not be

held liable in his official capacity according to sovereign immunity. Gilbert v. DaCrossa,

756 F.2d at 1458. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to state a cause of action against

this defendant.

iv. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the

Youngblood or the County of Kern

Plaintiff has named the Kern County Sheriff, Donny Youngblood, in his

individual and official capacity. However, he fails to describe any actions taken by

defendant Youngblood in his individual capacity. Notably, nNeither Youngblood nor the

County of Kern may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983

action. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Moreover, naming an official in his official capacity is

Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 5 of 7
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tantamount to naming the public entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166

(1985). Finally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his alleged constitutional injury

occurred through the enforcement of an official policy or custom. City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). In fact, Plaintiff refers to the Sheriff Deputy John Doe

as a “rogue” officer. Therefore, plaintiff is granted leave to amend to address these

deficiencies.

v. As a detainee, Plaintiff’s claims are properly addressed under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather

than the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that the events of April 14, 2009 occurred while he was a detainee

in the custody of ICE. Therefore, constitutional questions regarding the conditions and

circumstances of their confinement must be raised under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, rather than under the Eighth Amendment's protection against

cruel and unusual punishment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 77

(1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322

F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). In Revere, the Supreme Court observed that the due

process rights of pretrial detainees are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment

protections available to a convicted prisoner" Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. Therefore,

although the Eighth Amendment provides a minimum standard of care for detainees,

determining Plaintiff’s rights while detained in custody are determined under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment’s

protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d

1175, 1197. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims brought under the Eighth Amendment are dismissed.

C. Conclusion 

In summary, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint as to all defendants

except Sheriff’s Deputy John Doe because he has failed to state a cognizable claim

against these defendants. Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims brought under the Eighth

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Amendment are dismissed because he was not a convicted prisoner at the time of the

alleged incident. 

The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to address

the above deficiencies. Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior

pleading in order to make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220

requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supercedes the

original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff

files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the

case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and

the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and

4. Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty days from the date of service of this order to

file an amended complaint. The amended complaint must reference the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First Amended

Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:10-cv-00028-JLT Document 3 Filed 01/19/10 Page 7 of 7