Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02664/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02664-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KHALIFAH E.D. SAIF’ULLAH,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2664 MCE DAD P

vs.

TOM CAREY, et. al., ORDER AND

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this habeas corpus action. 

Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a 1980 Los Angeles County conviction for kidnaping. He has

served approximately twenty-five years on his sentence of seven years to life in state prison. In

the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this action on December 12, 2002, petitioner attacks

a decision of the California Board of Prison Terms rendered on July 12, 2000, finding him not

suitable for parole. Respondents filed their answer to the petition on April 7, 2003, and

petitioner filed a traverse on April 15, 2003. Pursuant to the court’s order filed May 15, 2003,

respondents filed a supplemental answer on June 10, 2003, and petitioner filed a supplemental

traverse on June 17, 2003.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be granted.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 2000, the Board of Prison Terms held petitioner’s eighth subsequent

parole consideration hearing and again found petitioner not suitable for parole. (Pet. at 5.) 

Petitioner appealed the denial of a parole date in an administrative appeal dated August 22, 2000. 

(Supplemental Traverse, Ex. A.) The California Department of Corrections received the appeal

on August 28, 2000, and the Board of Prison Terms Office of Policy and Appeals received it on

September 6, 2000. (Id.)

Petitioner did not receive a response to the appeal within 120 days after August

22, 2000, and therefore filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No. FCR 188305, in the

Solano County Superior Court on January 4, 2001. (Supplemental Traverse at 2 & Ex. B.) In a

decision dated February 9, 2001, that court denied the petition without prejudice for failure to

exhaust available administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief. (Id., Ex. C.)

On January 9, 2001, five days after petitioner’s first state habeas petition was

filed, the Office of Policy and Appeals issued a decision denying petitioner’s appeal on its merits. 

(Id., Ex. D.) Petitioner then filed a second habeas petition, case No. FCR 190271, in the Solano

County Superior Court. (Id. at 2 & Ex. E.) The court denied the petition on its merits in a

written decision dated May 4, 2001. (Id.)

On May 18, 2001, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (Id., Ex. F.) On June 7, 2001, the petition was denied

without prejudice to the filing of a petition in the First Appellate District. (Id., Ex. G.) Petitioner

filed a petition in the First Appellate District on June 20, 2001. (Id., Ex. H.) The petition was

summarily denied on July 10, 2001, and the appellate court subsequently advised petitioner that it

lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion for judicial notice it received from petitioner on July 11,

2001. (Id., Ex. I.) A habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court was summarily

denied on November 20, 2002, exhausting petitioner’s state court remedies. (Pet., unlettered

exhibit following Ex. I.) Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on December 12, 2002.

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PETITIONER’S GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner seeks relief from this court on the following grounds:

Ground one: The California Board of Prison Terms are religiously

persecuting petitioner and holding him as a political prisoner from

denying parole to him based upon petitioner adhering to the

mandates of the Holy Qur’an from growing his mandated beard in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the state and

federal constitution.

Ground two: Petitioners’ [sic] constitutional rights are being

violated by the California BPT from its use of illegal “policies,”

“practices” and “regulations” used against petitioner which have

not been approved by the Office of Administrative Law and are

therefore “underground regulations” which are unenforceable in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eight[h] and Fourteenth Amendments

to the state and federal constitution.

Ground three: Petitioner contends that he is being denied due

process and equal protection of the law from being denied a fair

and impartial body of Board of Prison Terms members according

to the mandate of California Penal Code Section 5075.

(Pet. at 5 & 41.)

In support of his claims, petitioner has provided copies of the transcript of his July

12, 2000 parole hearing (Exhibit A); a memorandum and exhibits submitted to the Board prior to

the hearing (Exhibit B); an excerpt from Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik ibn Anas, The First

Formulation of Islamic Law (Exhibit C); the determination of the California Office of

Administrative Law on November 30, 1999, that “general policies or regulations, if they exist,

allegedly used by the Board of Prison Terms to deny parole to life inmates are ‘regulations’

which are invalid because they should have been, but were not, adopted pursuant to the

Administrative Procedure Act” (Exhibit D, Part 1); the determination of the California Office of

Administrative Law on December 9, 1998, that, if the Board has a policy that results in the

rescission of parole dates for all life prisoners granted parole dates under the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, the policy constitutes an underground regulation that is without legal effect

(Exhibit D, Part 2); the Board’s matrix for the crime of kidnaping for robbery or ransom (Exhibit

E); articles and legislative analysis concerning the parole policies of former governors Davis and

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1

 Despite their assertion that petitioner’s 2002 parole hearing is relevant to this case,

respondents have neither described the alleged admissions nor cited any pages of the transcript of

that hearing.

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Wilson (Exhibit F); an excerpt from a deposition taken March 7, 2001, of a former member of

the Board of Prison Terms (Exhibit G); a document titled “Evidence Concerning Illegal Actions

of the California Board of Prison Terms, an Independent Study,” dated May 20, 2000 (Exhibit

H); and records concerning petitioner’s sentencing (Exhibit I). Petitioner’s Exhibits A through I

are followed by copies of documents demonstrating exhaustion of state administrative and

judicial remedies.

On January 21, 2003, petitioner submitted a copy of a document dated January 13,

2002, and titled “Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Khalifah E.D. Saif’ullah.” It

appears that the brief was submitted to the California Supreme Court on September 23, 2002, in

support of petitioner’s final state habeas petition.

RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER

Respondents state that petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison

term of seven years to life for his conviction of multiple crimes, including kidnap for ransom

with use of a firearm. Respondents advise the court that a subsequent parole suitability hearing

was conducted on November 14, 2002, and that petitioner was again denied parole. Respondents

offer a copy of the transcript of the 2002 hearing and assert that the transcript is relevant to this

case because it contains admissions by petitioner and because petitioner received an additional

prison disciplinary action prior to his hearing in 2002.1 Respondents concede that petitioner

exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the claims raised in this action.

Respondents deny that petitioner has been subjected to religious discrimination in

violation of the First Amendment and further deny that the denial of parole in 2000 lacked an

evidentiary basis and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents contend that the record

shows that petitioner’s federally protected rights were not violated, that the Board found

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petitioner’s religion a very positive influence on his life, and that there was more than “some

evidence” to support denial of parole. Citing recent Ninth Circuit authority, respondents concede

that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in a determination of parole eligibility but argue

that a denial of parole should not be set aside on constitutional grounds so long as the denial is

supported by some evidence bearing indicia of reliability. Respondents contend that, in applying

the “some evidence” standard, the court must not weigh the evidence or second-guess the state’s

findings but must limit itself to examining the record and granting relief only when prison

officials act with no evidence whatsoever to support their decision.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s claim that he was denied parole as a result

of religious discrimination should be summarily dismissed because petitioner has offered no

evidence in support of his conclusory allegation and because the record clearly indicates that

petitioner’s religion was considered a positive factor in his life and none of the panel members

had anything but praise for petitioner’s religious pursuits. Respondents argue that petitioner’s

contention that the Board violated state law by adopting, in effect, a no-parole policy is not

germane to a federal habeas petition, but, if it were, the contention was rejected by the California

Supreme Court in In re Rosenkrantz.

Respondents assert that state regulations require the Board to consider all relevant,

reliable information related to parole suitability, including the circumstances of the prisoner’s

social history, past and present mental state, past criminal history, involvement in other criminal

misconduct that is reliably documented, the base and other commitment offenses, behavior

before, during and after the crime, past and present attitude toward the crime, any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community, and any other information that bears on the prisoner’s suitability

for release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Respondents note that the regulations set forth

circumstances favoring and disfavoring suitability but provide that the importance attached to

any circumstance or any combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment

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of the panel. Id. at § 2402(c) and (d). Respondents state that, while the regulations require the

Board to consider all circumstances, they do not require the Board to give equal attention to each

circumstance during its review or to give equal weight to each circumstance during its analysis. 

Id. Respondents assert that the regulations further provide that circumstances which taken alone

may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may nevertheless contribute to a pattern that

results in a finding of unsuitability. Id. at § 2402(b).

Applying the applicable regulations to the present case, respondents contend that

the Board considered all of the suitability circumstances and all relevant, reliable information, as

required, and that petitioner has not alleged otherwise. Respondents’ view is that petitioner

merely disagrees with the Board’s conclusions and disputes the relative weight the Board

attached to the circumstances considered. Respondents argue that the record shows that the

Board gave individualized consideration to all factors and circumstances favoring and

disfavoring suitability and that the Board supported its findings with ample evidence, thereby

meeting the requirements of due process. Respondents contend that the Board acted within its

discretion under § 2402(c)(1)(B) when it cited petitioner’s commitment offense as one factor

tending to show unsuitability for parole, because there were multiple additional factors

supporting denial of parole: petitioner’s own admission to a long and violent criminal record

prior to his commitment offense, petitioner’s violation of numerous previous grants of parole, the

fact that petitioner committed the kidnaping while on parole for other offenses, petitioner’s

accumulation of disciplinary infractions while in prison, the fact that petitioner’s committing

offense was callous, i.e., kidnaping a young man at gun point and holding him for ransom, and

the fact that petitioner did not disclose the identity of his accomplice until recently after the

alleged accomplice died. (Answer at 7, citing Ex. B at 9-11, 25, 28.)

Respondents concede that there are many positive aspects of petitioner’s conduct

in prison, including his apparently sincere religious conversion, but argue that it is for the Board

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of Prison Terms to determine at what point the positive factors outweigh the documented

negative factors.

PETITIONER’S TRAVERSE

Petitioner disputes virtually all of respondents’ contentions. While he admits that

all of the panel members praised his religious pursuits, he argues that each panel member

specifically relied on the grooming standards disciplinary violation to deny parole. Petitioner

asserts that respondents failed to address all of his contentions and should be deemed to have

conceded all issues not addressed. Petitioner agrees with respondents’ assertion that the

subsequent parole hearing held in 2002 contains relevant facts. (Traverse at 1-2.)

Petitioner reiterates his view that his positive conduct in prison outweighed any

negative factors. He asserts that, although the Board appeared to give individualized

consideration to the positive factors of his conduct, the panel members did not give those factors

adequate consideration because, had they done so, they would have found that the positive

factors outweighed the one disciplinary report petitioner received for following the commands of

his religion. Petitioner dismisses the facts concerning his crime and his past history as facts that

will never change and that cannot be used as the sole basis for denying parole.

Petitioner acknowledges that his 2002 parole denial is “a separate cause of action”

but suggests that respondents have “opened the door” to new claims in this action. Petitioner

offers extensive argument concerning his 2002 parole denial, the new disciplinary conviction that

was considered at the November 14, 2002 hearing, and various civil rights actions filed by

petitioner against members of the Board of Prison Terms. (See id. at 3-14.)

Petitioner denies that the California Supreme Court approved of a no-parole

policy in Rosenkrantz. He discusses no-parole policies at length and argues that respondents’

failure to address the issues presented in his amicus brief requires this court to deem those issues

to have been conceded and to find that petitioner has been deprived of his rights. Petitioner asks

the court to order his immediate release. (Id. at 14-29.)

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FURTHER PLEADINGS AND OTHER FILINGS

On May 15, 2003, the undersigned found that the record was unclear with regard

to the state courts’ adjudication of petitioner’s federal claims. The record before the court at that

time did not include copies of any state court decisions addressing the July 12, 2000 denial of

parole. Respondents were directed to file a supplemental answer stating whether any reasoned

state court judgment had been issued and, if so, to provide copies of all such judgments.

In a supplemental answer, respondents provided extensive information concerning

petitioner’s state court filings but found no reasoned state court judgment on the parole denial at

issue. In a supplemental traverse, petitioner advised the court that respondents failed to provide

information concerning the second habeas petition he filed in the Solano County Superior Court. 

Petitioner provided documentation of his administrative appeal and all state habeas petitions filed

regarding the 2000 parole denial. The undersigned has relied on petitioner’s documentation in

setting forth the procedural history of the case. The record reflects that petitioner exhausted all

claims alleged in his federal habeas petition and that the claims are not procedurally barred.

The court’s file contains a series of requests for judicial notice filed by petitioner. 

In response to the first such request, the undersigned informed petitioner of the standards that

govern judicial notice and denied the request in an order filed May 21, 2003. By order filed

September 5, 2003, the court denied petitioner’s second request for judicial notice. Three

additional requests for judicial notice are before the court.

By a request filed on July 9, 2004, petitioner seeks judicial notice of two

documents: (1) an order filed June 25, 2004, in a civil rights case, Mayweathers, et al. v. Sutton,

et al., case No. CIV S-96-1582 LKK GGH P (E.D. Cal.), granting summary judgment and

permanent injunctive relief for a class of Muslim prisoners seeking relief from prison disciplinary

action taken against them for wearing beards for religious reasons, and (2) a letter dated June 18,

2004, to petitioner from an attorney. Petitioner asks the court to take notice of the Mayweathers

order, set an evidentiary hearing, appoint counsel for him, and order his immediate release.

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By a request filed January 11, 2005, petitioner seeks judicial notice of four

documents: (1) an order for evidentiary hearing filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court on

November 18, 2004, in a habeas case brought by state prisoner Morris Bragg, (2) documents filed

by the respondents in the Bragg case, (3) an order filed June 6, 2002, relating petitioner’s civil

rights case, Saif’ullah v. Terhune, et al., case No. CIV S-98-0570 WBS PAN P (E.D. Cal.), to the

Mayweathers class action; and (4) a class action notice issued pursuant to the Mayweathers order

previously offered by petitioner. Petitioner asserts that the Mayweathers civil rights action is

“identical to the present case” and that he is a member of the Mayweathers class. Petitioner also

asserts that the Bragg case concerns the same contentions raised in this case regarding

widespread abuse by the Board of Prison Terms and the Board’s denial of parole based on a

prisoner’s exercise of religious rights and the labeling of the prisoner’s crime as exceptional. 

Petitioner requests final judgment in his favor and release from confinement.

On March 1, 2005, petitioner filed a request for judicial notice that includes a

request to expedite this case. Petitioner seeks judicial notice of (1) findings and

recommendations filed December 22, 2004, in Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, et al., case

No. CIV S-96-0783 LKK PAN P (E.D. Cal.), a habeas case in which the magistrate judge found

that the prisoner “presents a convincing case that a blanket policy against parole for murderers

prevented him from obtaining a parole suitability determination made after a fair hearing” and

recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted; (2) an order and findings and

recommendations filed on August 20, 2003, in Yellen v. Butler, case No. CIV S-01-2398 MCE

GGH P (E.D. Cal.), a habeas case in which the magistrate judge found that there was not

sufficient evidence to support the 1999 decision denying parole and recommended that the

habeas petition be granted on that ground and denied on all other grounds; and (3) the Bragg

order and documents previously offered by petitioner.

On June 6, 2005, petitioner filed a request for judicial notice of the entire record,

including transcripts and exhibits, in Coleman, case No. CIV S-96-0783 LKK PAN P.

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Petitioner’s pending requests for judicial notice of court documents will be

granted. The requests for judicial notice of other documents will be denied.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to § 2254 Actions

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts.” Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). Federal habeas

relief is not available for errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.

1986).

Section 2254 as amended in 1996 sets forth the following standards of review to

be applied by federal courts to state court decisions:

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim– 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. The State Courts’ Decisions

In the present case, both the California Supreme Court and the California Court of

Appeal for the First Appellate District summarily denied petitioner’s state habeas petitions

challenging the Board’s July 12, 2000 decision. The order issued by each of these courts is “an

unexplained order,” i.e., “an order whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the

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reason for the judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991). When confronted

with a state court’s unexplained order, the federal court applies the following presumption: 

“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained

orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Id. at

803. In applying the look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Id. at

804. See also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that

where the highest state court to reach the merits of a habeas petition issued a summary opinion

that does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the

last explained state court opinion to reach the merits). 

Here, the Solano County Superior Court issued an order that discloses reasons for

denying habeas relief. This court will look through the unexplained orders of the California

Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal to the decision of the Solano County Superior

Court in order to determine whether the state courts’ adjudication of petitioner’s federal claims

satisfies the standards set forth in § 2254.

The Solano County Superior Court explained the rationale of its decision to deny

habeas relief as follows:

The court finds that the decision of the Board of Prison

Terms panel at Petitioner’s 7/12/00 Parole Consideration Hearing

was based upon “some evidence” other than the evidence of the

9/19/98 CDC 115 for violation of grooming standards. See In re

Rosenkrantz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 409, 423-434, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d

279, citing In re Powell (1988) 45 Cal.3d 894, 902-904, 248

Cal.Rptr. 431. Thus the court does not address the question of

whether the 9/19/98 CDC 115 was constitutionally valid. The

court also finds that the Board of Prison Terms panel based its

decision upon the criteria of 15 CCR, section 2281, a regulation

which has been properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative

Procedures Act. The court further finds that Petitioner has not

alleged facts sufficient to show that the Board of Prison Terms

panel denied him a fair hearing. Thus, Petitioner has not stated a

prima facie case for relief as to any of the issues presented here. 

See In re Visciotti (1997) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801. 

See also People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474, 37

Cal.Rptr.2d 259.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is denied.

(Supplemental Traverse, Ex. E (Order of the Solano County Superior Court filed May 4, 2001).)

III. Discussion

As set forth above, petitioner claims (1) the Board violated his rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments when it denied him a parole date due to his adherence to

religious mandates; (2) the Board violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments when it applied policies, practices, and regulations not approved by the

state’s Office of Administrative Law; and (3) his rights to due process and equal protection were

violated because he was denied a fair and impartial panel of Board members. (Pet. at 5 & 41.)

A. Petitioner’s First and Third Grounds for Relief

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A person alleging due

process violations must first demonstrate that he or she was deprived of a liberty or property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon

the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan (McQuillion I), 306 F.3d 895,

900 (9th Cir. 2002).

In the parole context, a prisoner alleging due process claims must demonstrate the

existence of a protected liberty interest in parole and the denial of one or more of the procedural

protections that must be afforded when a prisoner has a liberty interest in parole. The Supreme

Court held in 1979 and reiterated in 1987 that “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory

language, creates a presumption that parole release will be granted when or unless certain

designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” 

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7

(1979), and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987)). California’s parole scheme

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gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole because Penal Code § 3041 uses

mandatory language and is largely parallel to the Nebraska and Montana statutes addressed in

Greenholtz and Allen. 306 F.3d at 901-02. “Section 3041 of the California Penal Code creates

in every inmate a cognizable liberty interest in parole which is protected by the procedural

safeguards of the Due Process Clause,” and the interest arises, “not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir.

2003). 

Because parole-related decisions are not part of the criminal prosecution, the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in criminal proceedings is not constitutionally mandated. 

Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). In general, due process is

satisfied in the context of a hearing to set a parole date where the prisoner is provided with notice

of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and, if parole is denied, a statement of the reasons for

the denial. Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972) (describing the procedural process due in cases involving parole issues). Violation of

state mandated procedures constitute a federal due process violation only if the violation causes a

fundamentally unfair result. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 65 (1991).

In California, the setting of a parole date for a state prisoner is conditioned on a

finding of suitability for parole. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2401 &

2402. If the state’s decision regarding the parole suitability of a state prisoner is supported by

“some evidence,” the requirements of due process are satisfied. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; Jancsek,

833 F.2d 1389 (adopting the “some evidence” standard set forth by the Supreme Court in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985)). To meet the “some evidence” standard, the

evidence relied upon must bear indicia of reliability. Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390; Perveler v.

Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The some evidence” standard is

minimally stringent and is met if there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Superintendent

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v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985), and Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987));

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). Determining whether the “some

evidence” standard was met does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. 801 F.2d at 1105.

In the July 12, 2000 decision at issue, the Board stated that petitioner was not

suitable for parole because “he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if released from prison.” (Answer, Ex. B at 47.) The presiding commissioner

stated the reasons for the panel’s decision as follows:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: . . . . The

number one reason, of course, was the commitment offense. It was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. It was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering. These conclusions are drawn from

the Statement of Facts wherein the prisoner and his crime partners

planned to kidnap the victim and to solicit 60 thousand dollars

from his family and, as a result of that, the victim was kidnapped,

taken to the apartment, which belonged to the inmate. He was held

there overnight. The next day, he was able to escape. There was

an indication, Mr. Jackson, and I didn’t get into it and I don’t know

if you want to make a comment to it, you can, if you don’t want to,

you don’t have to. There was an indication in the record that he

was injected with something. Do you recall that?

INMATE JACKSON: I do recall that, I do recall it.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: Was he

injected with something?

INMATE JACKSON: I don’t know, I wasn’t, I wasn’t

there. I know during the course of the trial, he made mention of

that. I wasn’t there.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: Okay, I

wanted to mention that there was an indication of that which,

again, raises [sic] to the level of not telling what he was injected

with. It could very well have been something that could have

killed him. So there’s no way of knowing that. Anyway, the

previous record, the prisoner had a record of violence or assaultive

behavior and he had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct or

violence. He failed to profit from society’s previous attempts to

correct his criminality. Those attempts did include juvenile camp,

CYA commitment, prior prison terms, juvenile probation, adult

probation. His unstable social history and prior criminality

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included approximately six to seven pages of prior arrests. Of

significance are the convictions. He had a conviction for robbery

as a youth and served a term in CYA. He also had a conviction for

burglary, for which he served a prison term prior to this

commitment offense. And after committing this offense, he then

had also, I believe it was afterwards, he had some robberies in

Santa Clara County for which he again went to trial and was

convicted on those as well. Institutionally, he, don’t know what to

say here, you’ve done just about everything we could ask you to

do. The only problem that we have is that 115, and I’ll go into

more into depth in that, but his misconduct while incarcerated has

included fourteen 115s, and the most recent one was September the

19th, 1998. That was for grooming standards. In the area of 3042

responses, the District Attorney’s Office of Los Angeles is not

supportive, totally supportive of release at this particular time. 

Under remarks, again, it’s difficult to say. I just want to say that

we want to commend you for all the fine work that you’ve done,

although you haven’t completed a vocation, you have completed a

vocational, at least a paralegal, so you are a certified paralegal. 

And I think I saw kind of a, if you can call it a major in paralegal

and a minor in civil litigation.

INMATE JACKSON: Yes.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: It appears

that that’s where you focused much of your attention on that civil

litigation.

INMATE JACKSON: Yes. 

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: And you

also had an outstanding grade in that area. And also for your

positive work reports. It seems like you have done very well since

your last hearing, you’ve worked as a distribution clerk, also as an

academic clerk and, of course, as the (inaudible) clerk.

INMATE JACKSON: Yes.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: So you’ve

done very well in those places. This will be a one year denial. 

And during the next 12 months, keep doing what you’re doing.

(Id. at 47-50.)

The presiding commissioner then observed that petitioner is “truly an impressive

man” and continued:

You have done everything that we’ve asked. I made the comment

earlier to my fellow Commissioners that it seems that almost

without exception, when I look at somebody that has done his

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program as well as you have, the thing that normally really causes

them the conflicts is that prior arrest record. It seems that always

they have real long arrest records and that is something we have to,

of course, be mindful of. In your case, I think you’ve overcome

that. The problem, of course, was that 115. It wouldn’t have taken

me much to vote for a date, I can tell you that, and I think my

fellow Commissioners would probably have felt much the same

way. But when you get the 115 and, quite frankly, I’m concerned,

and I probably shouldn’t worry about this, but I’m concerned what

would happen once it left us. I don’t want to disappoint you. I

think with another year disciplinary-free behavior, and what I liked

about your responses was that you admitted, yeah, I probably

should have shaved and it would have saved me a lot of heartache. 

Some come in here headstrong and say, no, not for any reason. 

Well, the reality is, sometimes we got to do things we don’t like to

do.

INMATE JACKSON: Yes, I understand.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER ORTEGA: And you

owned up to that, I admire you for that. You should be proud of

your accomplishments and I think the time is very close for you.

(Id. at 50-51.)

Commissioner Bordanaro concurred:

You’re very close, coming down the home stretch. That 115

definitely hurt you. Get some clean time. Don’t take this as a

disappointment. The next Panel will see that. You come back in a

year and your parole plans are still real solid, come back with clean

time, come back with a good attitude and hopefully it will have

enough time between you and that 115 when the next Panel will

see, see to it and give you a date. But I think you’re real close.

(Id. at 51-52.) Commissioner Cater agreed and reiterated his appreciation of petitioner’s “being

forthcoming.” (Id. at 52.)

The Solano County Superior Court found that the Board’s decision “was based

upon ‘some evidence’ other than the evidence of the 9/19/98 CDC 115 for violation of grooming

standards” and therefore declined to address “the question of whether the 9/19/98 CDC 115 was

constitutionally valid.” That court also found that the Board had based its decision on the criteria

contained in § 2281, a regulation properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act. On

the basis of these findings, the court ruled that petitioner had not alleged facts sufficient to show

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that the Board denied him a fair hearing. (Supplemental Traverse, Ex. E.) However, the

Superior Court’s order does not discuss, or even identify, any evidence relied upon by the Board

other than that relating to the grooming standard violation. Nor does the court’s order address

the reliability of the other evidence relied upon.

The Board commenced its decision by stating that the panel had reviewed “all the

information received from the public” and had concluded that “the prisoner is not suitable for

parole, that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

released from prison.” (Answer, Ex. B at 47.) The phrases “unreasonable risk of danger to

society” and “a threat to public safety” are derived from § 3041(b) of the California Penal Code

and § 2281(a) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Pursuant to this statute,

[t]he panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole

date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b).

The state regulation that governs parole suitability for life prisoners casts the

statutory requirement of § 3041(b) in the negative: “Regardless of the length of time served, a

life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(a). The same regulation requires the Board to consider all relevant, reliable

information available regarding

the circumstances of the prisoner’s: social history; past and present

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release.

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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(b).

The regulation identifies circumstances that tend to show suitability or

unsuitability for release. Id., § 2281(c) & (d). The following circumstances tend to show that a

prisoner is suitable for release: the prisoner has no juvenile record of assaulting others or

committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims; the prisoner has experienced

reasonably stable relationships with others; the prisoner has performed acts that tend to indicate

the presence of remorse or has given indications that he understands the nature and magnitude of

his offense; the prisoner committed his crime as the result of significant stress in his life; the

prisoner’s criminal behavior resulted from having been victimized by battered women syndrome;

the prisoner lacks a significant history of violent crime; the prisoner’s present age reduces the

probability of recidivism; the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has developed

marketable skills that can be put to use upon release; institutional activities indicate an enhanced

ability to function within the law upon release. Id., § 2281(d).

The following circumstances tend to indicate unsuitability for release: the

prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; the prisoner

had a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an unstable social history; the prisoner’s

crime was a sadistic sexual offense; the prisoner had a lengthy history of severe mental problems

related to the offense; the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison. Id., § 2281(c). 

Factors to consider in deciding whether the prisoner’s offense was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner include these: multiple victims were attacked, injured, or

killed in the same or separate incidents; the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; the victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense; the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrated

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; the motive for the crime is inexplicable

or very trivial in relation to the offense. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(1)(A) - (E). Under

current California law, the Board is apparently not required to refer to sentencing matrixes or

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compare the prisoner’s crime to other crimes of the same type in deciding whether the crime was

especially cruel or exceptionally callous but may find the crime especially cruel or exceptionally

callous if there was violence or viciousness beyond what was “minimally necessary” for a

conviction. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1095 (2005).

In the present case, the Board indicated reliance on three circumstances in finding

petitioner not suitable for parole on July 12, 2000: (1) petitioner’s commitment offense, (2)

petitioner’s criminal and social history, and (3) the CDC-115 issued to petitioner on September

19, 1998. Because the state court declined to address the constitutionality of the CDC-115 and

found that the Board’s decision was supported by other evidence, the undersigned has carefully

examined the record for reliable evidence concerning petitioner’s commitment offense and his

conduct prior to imprisonment.

Citing petitioner’s commitment offense as “[t]he number one reason” for finding

him not suitable for parole, the presiding commissioner stated that the offense was “carried out in

a dispassionate and calculated manner” that “demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” (Answer, Ex. B at 47.) In support of this characterization of the offense as

one carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, the presiding commissioner merely

recited the bare facts of the crime: “the prisoner and his crime partners planned to kidnap the

victim and to solicit 60 thousand dollars from his family and, as a result of that, the victim was

kidnaped, taken to the apartment, which belonged to the inmate,” and held there overnight before

he succeeded in escaping. (Id.) In support of the characterization of the offense as

demonstrating “an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” the presiding

commissioner offered only speculation regarding “an indication in the record that [the victim]

was injected with something.” (Id.) The injection issue was not raised during the hearing, and

apparently that omission prompted the presiding commissioner to permit petitioner to respond. 

Petitioner, who was under oath, recalled the victim’s trial testimony regarding an injection but

testified that he “wasn’t there.” (Id. at 48.) On the basis of that response, the presiding

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commissioner appeared to abandon the belated attempt to find the offense exceptionally callous,

commenting that there was “no telling what [the victim] was injected with” and whether it was

“something that could have killed him.” (Id. at 47-48.) The undersigned has examined the entire

discussion of petitioner’s commitment offense during the hearing and finds no additional

evidence that supports the characterization of petitioner’s offense as one that was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner or a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering. (See id. at 8-15.) The record also does not support a conclusion

that the offense was committed with violence or viciousness beyond what was minimally

necessary to convict petitioner of kidnaping.

The Board’s second reason for finding petitioner unsuitable for parole was his

pre-conviction criminal record and an unstable social history. The presiding commissioner cited

“a record of violence or assaultive behavior,” “an escalating pattern of criminal conduct or

violence,” failure to profit from attempts to correct criminality through juvenile probation,

juvenile camp, a CYA commitment, adult probation, and prior prison terms, “six to seven pages

of prior arrests,” convictions for robbery and burglary, and an unstable social history. (Id. at 48-

49.) The Board’s discussion of petitioner’s criminal and social history during the pronouncement

of the decision and during the hearing itself was vague and conclusory. (See id. at 11-22.) 

Petitioner did not dispute that his prior arrest record was extensive, and he and his attorney

agreed to the incorporation of his arrest record into the proceeding, although the attorney

objected that mere arrests were irrelevant. (Id. at 11-12). The transcript of the hearing reveals no

details of the asserted record of violence or assaultive behavior, or the escalating pattern of

criminal conduct or violence. It appears that petitioner’s unstable social history commenced

when petitioner was 11 years old and his father died of cancer. Petitioner stated that he was

devastated by his father’s death and that he “took to the streets.” (Id. at 19.) When he was 23

years old, he committed the offense that resulted in his current incarceration. (Id. at 16-19.) 

However, petitioner married and had children prior to his incarceration. (Id. at 17.) Petitioner

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maintained strong family ties with his mother, his siblings, and his children despite his

incarceration, and his parole plans in 2000 included residing with his mother upon release. (Id. at

20-22, 29-30, 34.) The record does not reflect any post-conviction record of violence or

instability.

The Board’s third reason for denying parole was “misconduct while incarcerated.” 

The presiding commissioner cited fourteen rule violation reports received by petitioner over the

course of twenty years in state prison but discussed only the rule violation report issued on

September 19, 1998, related to grooming standards. In connection with this reason for denying

parole, the presiding commissioner also noted that the District Attorney’s Office of Los Angeles

County was not “totally supportive of release at this particular time.” (Id. at 49.) During the

hearing, the Board had considered extensive post-conviction evidence, including the following:

petitioner’s classification score was zero; in a November 1999 report, petitioner’s correctional

counselor had written that petitioner had complied with the Board’s previous recommendations

to remain disciplinary-free, upgrade vocationally, and participate in self-help and therapy groups

but believed petitioner posed a moderate degree of threat to the public if released from prison and

might benefit from continuing to participate in his religion and in self-help programs while

remaining disciplinary-free; in a psychological evaluation prepared for the hearing, Dr. Clair

stated that petitioner had no need for any kind of treatment, had no major disorders, had his

emotions and behaviors under tight control, had not actually caused physical injury to any other

person, including the victim of his commitment offense, and would not be dangerous in any way

if granted parole; petitioner received rule violation reports for conduct ranging from possession

of inmate manufactured alcohol and trafficking of narcotics to failure to report to job

assignments and resisting staff; petitioner received eighteen custodial counseling memos prior to

July 1996; petitioner received certification as a legal assistant in 1986 from California State

University, Long Beach; petitioner completed paralegal studies in 1994 with a certificate in civil

litigation; petitioner had solid parole plans for residence with his mother, a job as a consultant for

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the African-American Business Association, continued practice of his religion, and volunteer

work with youth; letters of support were submitted by petitioner’s mother and two non-relatives. 

(Id. at 24-35.)

The Board did not discuss the details of petitioner’s disciplinary history during the

hearing or in the statement of decision. Toward the end of the hearing, one of the commissioners

asked petitioner a general question about the 1998 grooming violation, and petitioner responded

that when the grooming standards were implemented he had been growing his beard since he

became a Muslim. He stated that he explained to the hearing officer that growing a beard is a

requirement for Muslims and that the grooming standards were being litigated. Petitioner told

the Board there had been a settlement in the class action and CDC-115’s issued concerning the

grooming standards would be rescinded. (Id. at 40-41.) The presiding commissioner remarked

that “the 115 still stands” and suggested that it would have been wiser for petitioner to do as

requested. (Id. at 41-42.)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office asserted that petitioner had

“not demonstrated he would not pose a risk to the community if he was released.” (Id. at 42.)

The deputy district attorney cited petitioner’s “record of noncompliance with departmental rules

and regulations” and argued that continuing to re-offend in the institution showed that petitioner

would re-offend if released in the community. (Id. at 41-42.) He urged the Board to require “a

significant period of time in [petitioner’s] record that demonstrates that he can avoid violating the

rules and regulations.” (Id. at 42-43.) However, the psychological evaluation by Dr. Clair places

petitioner’s noncompliance with rules and regulations in perspective.

The inmate now regrets and repudiates his actions [at the time of

his offense] together with the series of criminal behaviors that he

was involved [in] during this part of his life. He continued to

behave rebelliously during his first years in prison, but underwent a

sort of sea-change and maturation with his conversion to Islam in

1988. He has always been a “feisty” person, a quality which has

regularly brought him into conflict with correctional officers.

/////

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(Pet., Ex. E at 3.) Dr. Clair believed that petitioner would not be “in any sense ‘dangerous’” if

granted parole. (Id.)

With regard to petitioner’s institutional behavior, the presiding commissioner

began by saying petitioner had “done just about everything we could ask you to do” and then

noted that “[t]he only problem that we have is that 115.” (Answer, Ex. B at 49.) The presiding

commissioner also commended petitioner “for all the fine work” he had done and for his

outstanding grades and positive work reports; he advised petitioner that the denial of a parole

date was a one-year denial and urged petitioner to “keep doing what you’re doing.” (Id. at 49-

50.) After describing petitioner as “truly an impressive man” who had “done everything that

we’ve asked” and who had “overcome” his arrest record and criminal history, the presiding

commissioner advised petitioner a second time that “[t]he problem, of course, was that 115.” (Id.

at 50-51.) He continued, “[i]t wouldn’t have taken me much to vote for a date, I can tell you that,

and I think my fellow Commissioners would probably have felt much the same way.” (Id. at 51.) 

He then cited the 115 a third time and advised petitioner that he needed “another year

disciplinary-free behavior.” (Id.) The presiding commissioner reiterated that petitioner should

be proud of his accomplishments and stated his belief that “the time is very close for you.” (Id.)

Commissioner Bordonaro concurred with the presiding commissioner, advising

petitioner that he was “very close, coming down the home stretch,” but that “[t]hat 115 definitely

hurt you.” (Id. at 51.) He assured petitioner that another year would be “enough time between

you and that 115” for the next panel to give him a parole date. (Id. at 51-52.) Deputy

Commissioner Cater agreed. (Id. at 52.)

The undersigned finds that the Board’s decision to deny parole on July 12, 2000,

was grounded on petitioner’s commitment offense, his pre-conviction record, and his 1998

disciplinary conviction for refusing to shave his beard. Notably absent from the record is a

finding, either during the hearing or in the Board’s statement of decision, that the refusal to shave

as a matter of religious conviction comprised “serious misconduct in prison” that tended to

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indicate unsuitability for release. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(c) (describing serious

misconduct in prison or jail as a circumstance that tends to indicate unsuitability for release). 

Also absent is any showing that petitioner’s refusal to comply with a grooming regulation on

religious grounds is reliable evidence indicating that he would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released. As the Supreme Court has observed with

regard to parole decisions, “[t]he behavior record of an inmate during confinement is critical in

the sense that it reflects the degree to which the inmate is prepared to adjust to parole release.”

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15. Here, there is no evidence that petitioner’s commitment to his

religion demonstrates inability to adjust to parole release.

Aside from the 1998 disciplinary conviction, the Board denied parole solely on

the basis of petitioner’s commitment offense and pre-conviction record. While state law

authorizes the Board to determine that the gravity or timing of the prisoner’s offense “requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual,” the Board made no such determination

in the present case. See Penal Code § 3041(b). Moreover, the Board expressly found that

petitioner has overcome his prior record, and the record of proceedings before the Board does not

show that petitioner’s offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner or in a

manner that demonstrated exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

Where a prisoner has demonstrated exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation over a period of time, as petitioner had done at the time of the hearing on July 12,

2000, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of his offense and his prior conduct

raises serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (affirming

the denial of habeas relief to a prisoner found not suitable for parole after serving only fourteen

years of a sentence of twenty-five years to life for participating in the murder of a witness who

was tricked into believing he was being taken out of state). At the time of his eighth subsequent

parole consideration hearing, the petitioner in this case had served twenty years on a sentence of

seven years to life for a kidnaping that did not result in a death or any injury. The record before

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2

 In Mayweathers, et al. v. Terhune, et al., case No. CIV S-96-1582 LKK GGH P, the court

granted plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunctive relief. The California Department of Corrections

is permanently enjoined from imposing any form of discipline on prisoners for wearing half-inch

beards for religious purposes. (Order filed June 25, 2004, at 23-27 & 34.) All documents reflecting

disciplinary action taken on or after November 19,1 998, against prisoners who wore such beards

must be expunged from their custody files. (Order filed Sept. 17, 2004, at 2.) The docket for the

Mayweathers case reflects that the final judgment is on appeal.

25

the Board contained substantial evidence of rehabilitation and exemplary behavior but for a

violation of a grooming rule that conflicted with petitioner’s religion and which the state court

declined to address.2 The Board’s continued reliance on the unchanging factors of petitioner’s

commitment offense and conduct prior to his current imprisonment, in the face of a positive

psychological report and substantial evidence of remorse and rehabilitation, “runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system” and constitutes a due process violation. See

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917. 

The undersigned finds that the Board’s decision to deny parole on July 12, 2000,

is not supported by any evidence bearing indicia of reliability. The state court’s decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

parole hearing. Petitioner is therefore entitled to federal habeas relief under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence of any evidence in the record supporting

the Board’s decision, remanding the case for a new hearing is futile, and the appropriate remedy

is to grant the release of the petitioner. See McQuillion v. Duncan (McQuillion II), 342 F.3d

1012, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Petitioner’s Second Ground for Relief

Petitioner contends that he was denied parole as a result of the Board’s application

of policies, practices, and regulations not approved by the Office of Administrative Law. 

Petitioner has offered evidence that, under state law, any policy or practice of denying parole to

all life prisoners is invalid because no such policy or practice has been adopted in accordance

with state law. (Pet., Ex. D.) Petitioner has also offered newspaper articles and other documents

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to show that invalid parole policies and practices existed under former governors Wilson and

Davis. (Id., Ex. F.)

The parole denial at issue in this case occurred when Gray Davis was governor of

the state. Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates that this governor vetoed parole recommendations

for virtually every prisoner convicted of murder, with rare exceptions. In an undated newspaper

article titled “Davis denies parole hopes to all killers,” a spokesman for Davis is quoted as saying

the governor would be “hard-pressed to find any reason why someone who’s committed murder,

even second-degree murder, should be paroled.” (Id., Ex. F at 6.) The same spokesman

described the governor’s actions as consistent with “his philosophy on murder sentences.” (Id.) 

The article reports that Davis blocked release of five prisoners who killed their victims or

participated in crimes that resulted in murder. (Id.) An article dated April 9, 1999, titled “Davis

Takes Hard Line on Parole for Killers,” reports that Davis had rejected the Board’s unanimous

parole recommendations in all five second-degree murder cases sent to him for review and had

also sent three unanimous parole recommendations in kidnap and attempted murder cases back to

the Board for further review. (Id., Ex. F at 7-9.) Davis himself stated in an interview that all

murderers should serve a life sentence in prison. (Id., Ex. F at 7.) While some of the documents

submitted by petitioner speculate that Davis may have had a broader policy of denying parole to

all prisoners serving life terms, including prisoners convicted of kidnaping, petitioner has not

submitted evidence that proves the existence of such a policy or practice. In fact, in a document

titled “Analysis of the 2000-01 Budget Bill, Board of Prison Terms (5440),” the Legislative

Analyst’s Office reported that there was “[a]n unwritten administration policy that effectively

ensures that no inmate with a life sentence is released on parole has significant legal, policy, and

fiscal ramifications for the state criminal justice system” but was unable to determine “[w]hether

the administration’s no-parole policy applies only to offenders convicted of murder or also

extends to other lifers.” (Id., Ex. F. at 14 & 17.)

/////

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Petitioner has not established that in 2000 the governor had a no-parole policy for

prisoners serving life terms for crimes other than murder. In addition, petitioner was not granted

a parole date, and the governor had no occasion to veto a parole date for petitioner. Petitioner’s

evidence does not establish that the Board of Prison Terms had a no-parole policy for all life

prisoners in 2000 or that the panel of three commissioners who conducted petitioner’s hearing on

July 12, 2000, were applying a no-parole policy when they denied petitioner a parole date. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim.

C. Other Claims

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to govern impartially. McQueary v. Blodgett, 924

F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991). Laws and rules that apply evenhandedly to all persons within a

jurisdiction comply with the fundamental principle of equal protection. See id. (citing Jones v.

Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423 (1981)). To establish an equal protection violation, a prisoner must

show that others similarly situated were treated more favorably and that the disparate treatment

was based on an impermissible motive. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 760 (9th

Cir. 1995). Ultimately, the Equal Protection Clause “‘guarantees equal laws, not equal results.’” 

McQueary, 924 F.2d at 835 (quoting Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). A

petitioner raising an equal protection claim in the parole context must demonstrate that he was

treated differently from similarly situated prisoners and that the Board lacked a rational basis for

its decision. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1973). The petitioner in this case

has not shown that similarly situated prisoners have been granted parole dates. Therefore,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on his equal protection claim.

The First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth

Amendment, bars the state from making laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. U.S.

Const. amends. I and XIV § 1. Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,

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prisoners must be afforded “a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to worship in accordance with their

conscience.” Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). At the same

time, a prisoner’s First Amendment rights are “necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration,

and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison

security.” See McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The

petitioner in this case has not shown that the decision of the Board of Prison Terms on July 12,

2000, served to deny him a reasonable opportunity to worship in accordance with his conscience. 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his First Amendment claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s July 9, 2004 motion requesting judicial notice of court records is

granted;

2. Petitioner’s January 11, 2005 motion requesting judicial notice of court records

is granted;

3. Petitioner’s March 1, 2005 motion to expedite, for final judgment, and for

judicial notice is granted with respect to judicial notice and is otherwise denied; 

4. Petitioner’s June 6, 2005 motion requesting that the court take judicial notice

of court records and related issues is granted with respect to judicial notice and is otherwise

denied; and

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be granted on due process

grounds and denied on all other grounds; and 

2. The Board of Prison Terms be ordered to calculate petitioner’s release date

immediately and release petitioner on parole, unless petitioner has been convicted of a serious

disciplinary infraction of a violent nature since the filing of this action.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

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twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

serve written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections

shall be filed and served within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 28, 2005.

DAD:13

saif2664.157

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