Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01348/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD ANTHONY RODGERS, Civil No. 06cv1348-L (POR)

Plaintiff, PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND

RECOMMENDATION THAT

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

BE GRANTED

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden,

Defendant.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Floyd Anthony Rodgers (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in San

Diego County Superior Court, in Case No. SCS 163874. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss

the petition. In accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court issues the following Proposed

Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

respectfully recommends that the Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

granted.

Petitioner is currently serving a sixteen-year sentence for an assault and battery. His Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed with the Southern District of California on June 3, 2006. 

Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss the petition on August 23, 2006. Petitioner was entitled to

file an Opposition to Defendant’s motion. On September 11, 2006, Petitioner requested more time

to file his Opposition due to the fact that he was expecting to temporarily lose access to his prison’s

law library. The Court granted Petitioner’s request by extending the deadline for his Opposition

Case 3:06-cv-01348-L-POR Document 17 Filed 01/30/07 Page 1 of 11
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until October 20, 2006. As of the date of the filing of this Report and Recommendation, the Court

has not received an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, nor has the Court received any

further communications from Petitioner. The Court proceeds to file this Report and

Recommendation in the absence of an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner will

continue to have the opportunity to present any objections that he may have to Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss, however he shall bring those as objections to this Report and Recommendation, rather

than to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, the Court finds that Petitioner could have filed

an Opposition even without access to his facility’s law library. 

II. Background

A. State Court Proceedings

On September 10, 2002, Petitioner was found guilty at a jury trial of assault by means of

force likely to produce great bodily injury and battery inflicting great bodily injury, in violation of

California Penal Code §§ 245(a)(1) and 243(d). Lodgment 1. The convictions arose out of an

incident during which Petitioner spoke to a woman, the woman’s boyfriend took offense, and

Petitioner twice punched the boyfriend in the face, fracturing the man’s cheekbone. Lodgment 3 at

96; Lodgment 5 at 45. A bifurcated sentencing hearing followed Petitioner’s conviction, and

Petitioner was found guilty of one prior violent felony constituting a “strike”, and was found to have

served three prior prison commitments for which his sentence was enhanced pursuant to California

Penal Code § 667.5. Lodgment 5 at 8. On November 22, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to serve

sixteen years in prison for the assault and battery. Lodgment 1 at 2. 

On June 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Superior

Court for San Diego County. Lodgment 2. That petition claimed violations of Petitioner’s rights

stemming from his defense counsel’s failure to file a Notice of Appeal in his case. Id. The petition

states that it was defense counsel’s duty to file the Notice of Appeal, even if she did not intend to

represent Petitioner on his appeal. Id. at 10. Though the petition did not raise the issue, the

Superior Court inquired whether Petitioner was properly sentenced and requested that the District

Attorney issue an Informal Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on that issue. Lodgment

3 at 1-2. Thereafter, the Superior Court issued an order denying the petition on December 22, 2004. 

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Lodgment 4. The Superior Court held that the trial court properly enhanced Petitioner’s sentence. 

Id. at 4. As for Petitioner’s claims regarding his trial counsel’s failure to file an appeal, the Superior

Court held that “[t]he Petition identified no substantive issues or other errors occurring during

Petitioner’s trial that might warrant relief.” Id. at 2.

Petitioner’s next attempt at post-conviction relief was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed with the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Division, on January 7, 2005. Lodgment 5. That

petition also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial lawyer’s failure to file a

Notice of Appeal on Petitioner’s behalf. Id. On February 24, 2005, the Court of Appeal denied the

petition based on a showing that Petitioner had been advised of his appeal rights by the trial judge at

his sentencing hearing. Lodgment 6. The decision of the Court of Appeal quotes the judge’s

statements at the sentencing hearing, informing Petitioner that a notice of appeal would need to be

filed within sixty days and that it could be signed either by himself or his attorney. Lodgment 6. 

Following the Court of Appeal’s denial, Petitioner applied to the California Supreme Court

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, on April 12, 2005. Lodgment 7. That petition states that Petitioner

lacks access to his prison’s law library and that the prison mail system had caused him to default on

seeking a review of the Court of Appeal’s denial of his prior petition. Id. at 3-4. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition on March 15, 2006, with citations to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300

(1949) and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464 (1995). Lodgment 8. The citation to Swain indicates

that Petitioner did not make his claims with enough particularity to satisfy the Supreme Court. See

Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Swain is cited by the California Supreme

Court to indicate that claims have not been alleged with sufficient particularity.”). The citation to

Duvall points specifically to the portion of that decision which describes a habeas petitioner’s

“heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them.” People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474 (emphasis in original).

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a second petition for state habeas relief which was transferred

to the San Diego County Superior Court on May 20, 2005. Lodgment 9; Lodgment 10 at 2. In that

petition, Petitioner claimed violations of both federal and California constitutional rights stemming

from prison staff’s failure to properly inventory property of Petitioner’s which was removed from

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his cell when he was transferred to segregated housing at the facility. Lodgment 9. The Superior

Court denied that petition, holding that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

within the prison, made conclusory allegations without stating a prima facie case for relief, and

requested monetary relief which is not available via a habeas petition. Lodgment 10. That denial

was filed on August 1, 2005. Id.

In the instant petition, Petitioner represents that he filed a second habeas petition with the

California Supreme Court on November 21, 2005 which remains pending. Petition at 2. According

to Petitioner’s representation, that petition complains that his defense attorney failed to appeal his

conviction, and makes other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

Lastly, Petitioner filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the San Diego County

Superior Court on May 11, 2006. Lodgment 11. That petition repeated the earlier claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure of his defense attorney to file an appeal on his

behalf. Id. That petition was denied on June 12, 2006. Lodgment 12. The reasoning for the

Superior Court’s denial was that the claims raised by Petitioner had been considered and rejected

when Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition, and that the new petition presented “no new facts

or law to warrant reconsideration.” Id. at 2 

B. Federal Petition

The petition for writ of habeas corpus that is before this Court claims three grounds for relief. 

The first ground alleges that Petitioner is being held in violation of his federal constitutional right to

due process because he was denied an appeal of his conviction when his attorney failed to file a

Notice of Appeal on his behalf. Petition at 6. The second ground for relief claimed by Petitioner is

that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel when his attorney neither appealed his

conviction nor withdrew from representing him. Petition at 7. Petitioner’s third ground for relief

claims that he was deprived of his right to due process when the mail system at Folsom State Prison

caused him to make untimely legal filings. Petition at 8.

The petition also requests tolling of the statute of limitations which is applied to federal

habeas petitions. Petition at 13-15. Petitioner first requests tolling on the basis that he was waiting

for his conviction to be appealed while the limitations period ran against him, and after he had

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waited for his appeal to be heard he learned that his attorney had not filed an appeal on his behalf. 

Petition at 13-14. Second, Petitioner requests tolling due to “the failure in the legal mail system” at

Folsom State Prison. Petition at 14. Lastly, he requests tolling because he waited for the California

Supreme Court to decide his state habeas petition before filing the instant federal petition. Petition

at 15. 

Following the filing of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner twice made a

Motion Requesting Appointment of Counsel. The first of these motions, filed on July 24, 2006, was

denied by this Court’s Order dated August 7, 2006. Petitioner’s second Motion Requesting

Appointment of Counsel, filed on August 21, 2006, was denied by the Court on August 22, 2006. 

On August 23, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, posing two arguments

in support of dismissal. Defendant’s motion first claims that the petition is barred by the period of

limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Defendant’s Motion at 3. Defendant also contends that

Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies for the claims raised in the instant petition,

as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Defendant’s Motion at 7.

III. Statute of Limitations

A. Standard

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) reads:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2007).

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The statute goes on to provide a tolling of the one-year period of limitation for “[t]he time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2007). 

In addition to the statutory tolling provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the Ninth Circuit has

held that the AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. U.S. Dist.

Court for C.D. Cal. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (1997) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 

107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998). A court may equitably toll the statute of limitations if

“extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-9. 

Petitioner “bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to

him.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). He may meet his burden by

“establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

The one-year period of limitation for Petitioner’s federal habeas petition began to run on “the

date on which the judgment [against Petitioner] became final by . . . the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2007). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final

sixty days after he was sentenced, when no notice of appeal was filed in his criminal case. 

California Rule of Court 8.308 (West 2007) (“a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after

the rendition of the judgment”). Petitioner was sentenced on November 22, 2002. Lodgment 1 at 2. 

Therefore, the period of limitation for Petitioner’s federal habeas petition began on January 22, 2003

and ended on January 22, 2004. Cf. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-3 (9th Cir. 2002)

(calculating start of AEDPA’s limitation period from day after the expiration of time for seeking

direct review as prescribed by California Rules of Court).

B. Statutory tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the [AEDPA] statute of limitations is tolled from the time

the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner's final

collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (1999). However, “AEDPA’s statute of

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limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the

first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Id. 

By the same reasoning, Petitioner had no case pending during the time between his sentencing

hearing and his first application for post-conviction relief. This is because no direct state appeal was

filed in Petitioner’s case. Petitioner’s first application for State collateral review was filed on June

17, 2004 with the Superior Court for San Diego County, by which time the period of limitation on

his federal habeas petition had already run. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to the benefit of

AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has

ended before the state petition was filed”). Thus Petitioner’s request for tolling during the time that

he waited for a decision from the California Supreme Court on his state habeas petition would not

result in his federal habeas petition being timely filed. Petition at 14. 

C. Equitable tolling

As previously stated, Petitioner may be entitled to an equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute

of limitations upon a showing that “extraordinary circumstances” beyond his control made it

“impossible” for him to file his federal habeas petition on time. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. Petitioner

may meet his burden by “establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a "fact-specific

inquiry." Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233

F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is “a discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts

and circumstances of a particular case.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), as

quoted by Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F. 3d 796, 801 (2003). Petitioner bears the burden of presenting

sufficient facts to persuade the Court that his claims can proceed despite the “very high”“threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 10005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)).

The petition before the Court provides two grounds on which Petitioner claims that he is

entitled to equitable tolling. Petition at 13-15. First, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to equitable

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tolling because he relied on counsel and received ineffective assistance from his counsel, thus

causing him to miss the deadline for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner’s other

claim for equitable tolling is that the mail system at Folsom State Prison caused Petitioner to miss

his federal habeas deadline and that the mail system is a circumstance beyond Petitioner’s control. 

1. Reliance on counsel

Petitioner’s federal petition for habeas relief, as well as prior state petitions, complains that

his trial attorney failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf while also failing to communicate with

Petitioner that she would not pursue an appeal on his behalf. Petition at 13-14. Petitioner contends

that this ought to entitle him to equitable tolling, and that such equitable tolling should extend from

the time of his sentencing hearing until the present. Petition at 15. Equitable tolling of the deadline

for filing a federal habeas petition is only available “if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. 

Petitioner must demonstrate that he was prevented him from filing his petition despite pursuing his

rights diligently. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 418.

Petitioner offers no explanation of how a timely filing of his federal petition for a writ of

habeas corpus was made impossible by his trial attorney’s representation that she would file a direct

appeal of his state conviction on his behalf. In his second state habeas petition to the Superior Court

of San Diego, Petitioner claimed that he “made several attempts to file [a] Notice of Appeal” when

he realized that his attorney had not filed one. Lodgment 5 at 38. The petition before this Court,

however, contains no similar claim alleging facts to indicate that Petitioner pursued the filing of a

petition for federal habeas relief within the period allowed but was prevented from doing so. Unless

extraordinary circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file the

instant petition on time, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the period of limitations. 

Petitioner presents no facts in support of his claim that his attorney’s failure to file a timely state

appeal was a circumstance making it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition. 

Furthermore, in his petition, Petitioner states that while the AEDPA period of limitations was

running against him he had been “patiently waiting for [the state] appeal process to begin.” Petition

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at 14-5. The United States Supreme Court instructs that prisoners seeking equitable tolling of the

time to seek federal habeas relief must demonstrate a diligent pursuit of their rights. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner’s patience in waiting for his conviction to be appealed is

opposite to what the Supreme Court expects from prisoners who seek equitable relief from the

AEDPA statue of limitations. 

2. Prison mail system

Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling because the mail system at

Folsom State Prison caused him to miss deadlines for legal filings. Petition at 8. The United States

Supreme Court has recognized that a prisoner who files his notice of appeal pro se, “has no choice

but to hand his notice over to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk”. Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988). Thus the Supreme Court recognizes a special ‘mailbox rule’ for

prisoners, whereby filing dates are determined from the date of delivery to prison authorities rather

than from the date of receipt by a court clerk. Id. at 275-6. The burden, however, remains with

Petitioner to prove that equitable tolling is warranted. Cf. Dennis v. Woodford, 65 F. Supp. 2d

1093, 1097 n. 5 (N.D.Cal. 1999) (denying habeas petitioner’s motion which “suffer[ed] not from a

faulty premise that tolling might be available but from a lack of specific, particularized facts which

would make tolling appropriate in this case”) (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner has submitted a copy of his prison mail log from Folsom State Prison as evidence

of this claim. See Petition at “Exhibit D”. This log of petitioner’s outgoing legal mail begins on

April 8, 2004, with a letter to Judge Jesus Rodriguez, Superior Court of San Diego. Id. If indeed

this was the first instance of Petitioner attempting to file a notice of appeal pro se, then the lateness

of Petitioner’s legal filings were not due to the Folsom State Prison mail system. For purposes of

equitable tolling on his federal habeas petition, this evidence does not demonstrate that Petitioner’s

lateness in filing was due to circumstances beyond his control. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. 

Rather, the evidence provided by Petitioner demonstrates that he was not “pursuing his rights

diligently” as the AEDPA period of limitation was running against him. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. at 418. The prison mail log suggests that Petitioner took no action on his conviction until the

AEDPA period of limitation had already expired. 

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Alternatively, if Petitioner means to request a tolling of the AEDPA period of limitations

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) and is suggesting that his alleged, yet unspecified, problems with

the prison mail system represent a state action that prevented him from making a timely filing, then

the evidence of the outgoing mail log remains unavailing. Courts are instructed by the AEDPA to

begin the one-year limitation period from “the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed”

when such date is later than the date that judgment against a petitioner became final. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B). Petitioner does not demonstrate that problems with the Folsom State Prison mail

system prior to April 8, 2004 prevented him from filing the instant petition, but evidently he was

able to send outgoing legal mail on that date because on April 8, 2004 he sent a letter to the Superior

Court of San Diego. Even if Petitioner’s one-year period of limitation had begun on April 8, 2004,

his federal habeas petition was nonetheless untimely when it was filed on June 3, 2006. 

D. Conclusion

Because the Court finds that Petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the

statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the Court does not here reach

Defendant’s claim that the instant petition ought to be dismissed on the basis that Petitioner’s

grounds for habeas relief have not been exhausted in the courts of California. However, the Court

does note that while previous habeas petitions to the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals both

alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not appeal Petitioner’s conviction,

the habeas petition filed with the California Supreme Court on April 12, 2005 stated different

grounds for relief.

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Proposed Findings of Fact

and Recommendation for Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable M. James Lorenz, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than March 2, 2007, any party may file and serve

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written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 30, 2007

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Honorable M. James Lorenz

 

 all parties 

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