Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07254/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07254-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed March 26, 1999

No. 95-7254

Eleanor T. Johnson, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 86cv03110)

Following Certification of Question of Law to the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Before: Wald, Williams, and Ginsburg, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

PER CURIAM.

In 1986, of her own volition and intending to commit

suicide, Devora Johnson jumped from a subway station platform into the path of an oncoming WMATA train and was

killed. Her parents brought a wrongful death action against

the WMATA and ultimately obtained a jury verdict in their

favor. The jury found that the WMATA had the last clear

chance to save Ms. Johnson and that the train operator acted

willfully or wantonly in his operation of the train. See

Johnson v. WMATA, 98 F.3d 1423, 1424-25 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The WMATA moved for judgment as a matter of law,

which the district court denied, and then filed this appeal,

arguing that the Johnsons are barred from recovering under

the doctrine of "last clear chance" because Ms. Johnson had

assumed the risk of death by jumping onto the tracks.

Because we were unable to find a controlling District of

Columbia precedent on this point, we certified the following

question to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals:

Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts

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described below, may a plaintiff who has voluntarily

assumed an unreasonable risk of incurring a particular

injury recover from a defendant who failed to take the

last clear chance to prevent that injury?

Johnson, 98 F.3d at 1424.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has answered

the question in the negative. See WMATA v. Johnson, No.

96-SP-1784 (Mar. 3. 1999). The court held that Ms. Johnson

"purposely invited the harm .... [and] thereby relieved

WMATA of any duty it otherwise owed her, including a duty

to grasp the final opportunity--the last clear chance--to

avert a harm brought about by her own intentional act." Id.

at slip op. 6; see also id. at slip op. 8 ("Plaintiff has cited no

authority, and we have found none, that would apply last

clear chance to a plaintiff's conduct deliberately intended to

bring about the harm another inflicts, either negligently or

recklessly. Violenti non fit injuria ('to the willing no injury

is done')"). The court concluded that the doctrine of "last

clear chance may not be employed to restore liability in

another for a plaintiff's suicidal act." Id. at slip op. 11.

Because D.C. law does not allow the Johnsons to recover

under the doctrine of last clear chance, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the

district court from which this appeal has been taken be

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REVERSED and that judgment as a matter of law be

entered for the appellant. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court's own motion, that

the Clerk shall withhold issuance of the mandate herein until

seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1). This instruction to the clerk

is without prejudice to the right of any party at any time to

move for expedited issuance of the mandate for good cause

shown.

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