Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06685/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06685-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA RIVER

WATCH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CARL WILCOX, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-06685 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is an Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) case involving a plant, the Sebastopol

meadowfoam. Now pending before the Court are the motions for summary judgment of the

Schellinger defendants and the individual California Department of Fish and Game

defendants, Carl Wilcox and Gene Cooley, as well as plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary

judgment. The parties’ motions present a question of first impression: whether “areas under

Federal jurisdiction” in ESA section 9(a)(2)(B) encompasses wetlands adjacent to navigable

waterways and therefore subject to the requirements of the Clean Water Act.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Schellinger defendants (collectively “Schellinger”) propose to develop

approximately 21 acres of land in Sebastopol, California (“the Site”). The Site includes

grasslands containing seasonal vernal pools, wetlands, seasonal creeks, vernal pools and

vernal swales. The Sebastopol meadowfoam, an endangered plant species under the ESA,

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has been found at the Site. 

In 2003 the Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”) certified 1.84 acres of the Site as

wetlands subject to the permitting requirements of the Clean Water Act. The designation

was based upon the ACOE’s findings that the designated area met all the requirements to be

classified as wetlands and the wetlands are adjacent to navigable waters of the United States,

namely, the Laguna de Santa Rosa, the largest tributary of the Russian River. As a result of

the designation, Schellinger must obtain an ACOE permit before he can fill and dredge the

wetlands. Plaintiffs offer evidence that the Sebastopol meadowfoam grows within the ACOE

designated wetlands.

On May 9, 2005, defendant Carl Wilcox, a Habitat Conservation Manager with the

California Department of Fish and Game (“Fish and Game”), and defendant Gene Cooley, a

Fish and Game botanist, visited the Site with Schellinger to examine the Sebastopol

meadowfoam. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants damaged the meadowfoam during their

examination. On May 23, 2005, Cooley and Wilcox returned to the Site and removed the

wetlands meadowfoam, placed them in plastic bags, and transported them to the local Fish

and Game Office. Cooley and Wilcox assert that they confiscated the meadowfoam because

they believed that it was not naturally occurring on the Site and had been intentionally placed

there from another location. Whether the meadowfoam are naturally occurring at the Site is

disputed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Northern California River Watch and several individuals filed this action

against Cooley and Wilcox and the Schellinger defendants under ESA section 9(a)(2)(B). 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ conduct harmed the endangered Sebastopol meadowfoam.

Defendants made an early summary judgment motion. They argued that their conduct

did not violate ESA section 9(a)(2)(B) as a matter of law as to the Sebastopol meadowfoam. 

First, they argued that the meadowfoam were removed from private land and therefore the

Act does not apply. Second, they argued that no claim could be stated against them because

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Cooley and Wilcox removed the meadowfoam in accordance with California law as part of

their official management and law enforcement duties.

The Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. With respect to the

jurisdictional issue, the Court held that defendants’ cursory argument had not persuaded the

Court that “areas under Federal jurisdiction” is limited to lands owned by the federal

government. The Court also held that it was premature to conclude that no reasonable trier

of fact could find that Cooley and Wilcox did not remove the meadowfoam as part of their

official management and law enforcement duties.

Now that discovery is complete, defendants renew their summary judgment motions.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the non-moving party, and

a dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986) (citation omitted). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure “is

to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323-24 (1986).

A party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial has the initial burden of either producing evidence that negates an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party does not

have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

Where the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it

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bears the initial burden of producing evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if

the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden

Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party does not satisfy its initial

burden, the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything and summary judgment

must be denied. If, however, the moving party satisfies its initial burden of production, then

the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations, or denials of the adverse party’s

evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence to show there exists a genuine issue

of material fact. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1102.

DISCUSSION

Under ESA section 7 a federal agency is required to consult with the Fish and Wildlife

Service to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not

likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). This section 7 consultation requirement applies equally to

endangered fish, wildlife and plants. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (defining “species” as used

in the ESA to “include[] any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants”). 

ESA sections 9 and 10, in contrast, treat plants differently from fish and wildlife. 

Pursuant to ESA section 9, it is unlawful to “take,” that is, “harm,” endangered fish or

wildlife “within the United States or the territorial seas of the United States.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the fish and wildlife protections apply anywhere in the United

States. Under ESA section 10 a private party may apply to the Fish and Wildlife Service for

an “incidental take permit” that allows the landowner to harm a given number of endangered

fish or wildlife under certain conditions. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(B); Oregon Natural Resources

Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1032 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 

With respect to plants, section 9 makes it is unlawful to

remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal

jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area;

or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area

in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, the prohibition on removing and

reducing to possession and maliciously damaging or destroying endangered plant species

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only applies in “areas under Federal jurisdiction.” However, a person may not “remove, cut,

dig up, or damage or destroy” endangered plant species on any other area, that is, an area not

under Federal jurisdiction, provided the act was done in knowing violation of state law. 

ESA plant protections differ from fish and wildlife in another respect: section

10–allowing a private party to apply for an incidental take permit–applies only to fish and

wildlife; there is no section 10 incidental take permit provision for endangered plants. See16

U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)(providing that the Fish and Wildlife Service may permit “any taking

otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) [prohibiting the harming of fish and wildlife]

. . . if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise

lawful activity”).

Plaintiffs have filed this action under the plant protections of section 9. They allege

that Wilcox and Cooley “removed and reduced to possession” endangered meadowfoam

from “an area under Federal jurisdiction” and that even if the Site is not under Federal

jurisdiction within the meaning of the ESA, Wilcox and Cooley (with assistance from the

Schellinger defendants) harmed the meadowfoam in knowing violation of California law. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the Site is not an “area under

Federal jurisdiction” and plaintiffs cannot prove a knowing violation of California law. 

A. Areas under Federal jurisdiction

It is undisputed that the United States does not have any title to the land on which the

meadowfoam was found. Plaintiffs’ theory is that the Site is an area “under Federal

jurisdiction” because it is covered by the Clean Water Act. In particular, plaintiffs argue that

the ACOE’s certification of 1.84 acres of the Site as wetlands subject to the permitting

requirements of the Clean Water Act means that it is an “area under Federal jurisdiction.” 

See Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.

2007) (confirming that wetlands adjacent to navigable water are covered by the Clean Water

Act). Plaintiffs also argue that because the wetlands are covered by the Clean Water Act, the

Schellinger defendants require a permit from the ACOE to fill and dredge the wetlands. See

33 U.S.C. § 1344. This federal action–considering the permit application–triggers the ESA

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section 7 consultation process. See Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118

(9th Cir. 2005). According to plaintiffs, this is a second, related reason the Site, or at least

the 1.84 acres of ACOE designated wetlands, is an area “under Federal jurisdiction.” 

1. Law of the case

Plaintiffs first contend that the Court has already ruled on the jurisdictional question

and therefore defendants are “judicially estopped” from rearguing the issue. This Court’s

ruling on defendants’ early motion for summary judgment was narrow. Plaintiffs had not

cross-moved for summary judgment; thus, the Court did not rule that the Site is “under

Federal jurisdiction” within the meaning of the ESA. Indeed, the Court did not define “areas

under Federal jurisdiction.” The Court merely ruled that in light of defendants’ unsupported

argument, defendants had not persuaded the Court that “areas under Federal jurisdiction”

means only “owned by the federal government”–the only argument made by defendants at

that time. 

On the parties’ pending cross-motions for summary judgment, which are made after

the parties have had the opportunity to develop a factual record, the jurisdictional issue is

presented in context. The Court has not finally resolved this question and must do so now.

2. Regulatory jurisdiction

When the ESA was enacted in 1973 it merely prohibited the importation or sale of

endangered plant species. Pub. L. No. 93-205,1973 S.1983. Congress amended the ESA in

1982 by making it unlawful to “remove and reduce to possession any . . . [plant] species from

areas under Federal jurisdiction.” Pub. L. No. 97-304,1982 H.R. 6133. Congress again

amended the Act in 1988 to include the current language. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2). Congress

did not explain what it meant by “areas under Federal jurisdiction.” 

The Court concludes that, whatever “areas under Federal jurisdiction means,” it is not

so broad as to encompass wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters and therefore subject

to the requirements of the Clean Water Act. There is nothing in the language or structure of

the Act that suggests Congress had such “regulatory” jurisdiction in mind when it used the

words “areas under Federal jurisdiction.” To the contrary, an examination of the statute as a

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A party may apply for a permit to import, remove, transport, etc. a plant in violation of

section 9(a)(2) provided the conduct is for scientific purposes or for enhancing the propagation

or survival of endangered plants. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.62. Such exception is much narrower than

a section 10 incidental take permit.

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whole reveals that Congress did not intend the “removal and reduce to possession” portion of

section 9(a)(2)(B) to apply to private property that is merely regulated by the federal

government. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (to determine

statutory meaning a court must look at the statute’s “language itself, [but also to] the specific

context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”).

As plaintiffs emphasized at oral argument, the ESA provides greater protections for

fish and wildlife than for plants. Yet, under plaintiffs’ interpretation of “areas under Federal

jurisdiction,” plants found on private property that is regulated by the federal government

under a federal law, such as the Clean Water Act, are entitled to more protections than fish

and wildlife found on the same property. As is explained above, under ESA section 10 a

private party may apply for an incidental take permit for fish and wildlife. These permits

allow a landowner to “take” an endangered fish or wildlife if the “taking is incidental to, and

not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1539(a)(1)(B). The ESA, however, includes no such concomitant authorization for the

removal of endangered plants. This omission is consistent with an interpretation of “areas

under Federal jurisdiction” that does not include regulatory jurisdiction; there is no need for

incidental take, or, in the case of plants, incidental removal permits for endangered plants if

ESA section 9(a)(2)(B) does not cover private property. To accept plaintiffs’ interpretation

would mean that the removal of endangered plants on private property that is regulated by

the federal government under some statute is nearly absolutely prohibited, but that exceptions

(incidental takes) can be made for fish and wildlife on the same property.1

 Such an

interpretation is inconsistent with the ESA’s greater protections for fish and wildlife.

The Court’s interpretation is consistent with the legislative history. For example, the

Senate Report on the 1988 amendment explains that under the then current law “it is not

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unlawful to pick, dig up, cut or destroy an endangered plant unless the act is committed on

Federal land; and even on federal land, there is no violation of the Act unless the plant is

removed from the area of Federal jurisdiction.” S. Rep. No. 100-240, 12; 1988 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700, 2711-2712 (1987); see also id. at 2701 (“The bill makes it unlawful to

damage or destroy a plant on federal lands or in violation of a State law or in the course of

any violation of a State criminal trespass law.”). Thus, in this Report Congress equated

“areas under Federal jurisdiction” with “federal land.” Similarly, the 1982 House

Conference Report explains that the amendment prohibits “the removal and reduction to

possession of any endangered plant that is on federal land.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, 35;

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2876 (1982). Wetlands subject to the Clean Water Act because

they are adjacent to navigable waters cannot reasonably be considered “federal land.”

Plaintiffs argue that the Fish and Wildlife Service itself has interpreted “areas under

Federal jurisdiction” as encompassing areas subject to the Clean Water Act. As evidence of

this interpretation plaintiffs point to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s Final Rule classifying the

Sebastopol meadowfoam as an endangered plant. 56 FR 61173. The Court has reviewed the

Final Rule and does not find anything in the discussion that suggests the Service has

interpreted “areas under Federal jurisdiction” as broadly as plaintiffs urge. To the contrary,

the Service emphasizes that the benefit of listing the meadowfoam as an endangered plant is

that the ACOE will be required to consult with the Service pursuant to ESA section 7 before

issuing any fill and dredge Clean Water Act permits for wetlands where the meadowfoam is

found. Id. at 61180. The only mention in the Rule of section 9 is a paragraph at the end

which merely describes what section 9 prohibits, including, making it illegal to “remove and

reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 61181.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the declaration of Peter Baye, a former ACOE and Fish and

Wildlife Service is equally unpersuasive. Baye opines that in his experience “potential

violations of Section 9’s plant protections were always considered when jurisdictional

wetlands were involved as these were always understood by us at the Services as areas under

federal jurisdiction. In all my experience I have never known of any incident . . . in which a

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landowner challenged the Services exercising ESA jurisdiction over federally listed plants in

jurisdictional wetlands on their private lands.” Baye Decl. ¶ 8.

Baye’s testimony, however, is consistent with the Service’s regulation of private

landowners under ESA section 7, as discussed in the Final Rule classifying the meadowfoam

as an endangered species. His declaration is not persuasive evidence that the Fish and

Wildlife Service has enforced section 9's prohibition of removal from areas “under Federal

jurisdiction” against purely private land. The bottom line is that plaintiffs do not identify a

single case or administrative proceeding in which section 9(a)(2)(B) has been applied in a

similar situation. This Court declines to be the first.

Finally, although no case has addressed whether “areas under Federal jurisdiction”

includes areas under federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Clean Water Act, plaintiffs note that

in Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, the Ninth Circuit equated Clean Water Act jurisdiction

with being “under the jurisdiction of the federal government.” 408 F.3d at 1118. The

question, here, however, is not what language courts have used in Clean Water Act cases to

characterize the federal government’s regulation of navigable waters; the issue is the

meaning of “area under Federal jurisdiction” in ESA section 9(a)(2)(B).

In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that

the Site, or any part of the Site, is an area “under Federal jurisdiction” within the meaning of

ESA section 9(a)(2)(B). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

B. Knowing violation of state law

Having determined that the Fish and Game defendants’ removal of the meadowfoam

from the Site was not from “an area under Federal jurisdiction” as that term is used in ESA

section 9(a)(2)(B), the Court must still address whether a reasonable trier of fact could find

that these defendants removed the meadowfoam in knowing violation of state law. See 16

U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B). 

The California Endangered Species Act and Native Plant Protection Act prohibit the

taking of endangered plant species. However, California Department of Fish and Game

regulations provide that “[t]he possession or take of endangered, threatened, or candidate

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species by employees and agents of the Department for scientific, educational and

management purposes, and for law enforcement purposes, is not prohibited.” Cal. Code.

Regs. tit. 14, § 783.1. The California Fish and Game Code also provides that “an employee

or agent of the department may, in the enforcement of this chapter, . . . confiscate plants or

parts thereof when unlawfully taken, transported, possessed, sold, or otherwise 

. . . .” Cal. Fish & Game Code § 1910.

Wilcox and Cooley offer evidence that they removed the meadowfoam from the Site

on May 23, 2005 because they believed that the meadowfoam had been illegally transferred

to the Site. Whether removal was the most appropriate response is immaterial; if Wilcox and

Cooley removed the meadowfoam based on their belief that it had been transplanted, they

were indisputably acting for a law enforcement purpose or, at least, not in knowing violation

of state law.

Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment must be denied because there is a genuine

dispute of fact. They contend that the evidence supports a finding that “Wilcox assisted

Schellinger’s consultant Marco Waaland in creating the fiction of the transplanted Sebastopol

meadowfoam” and that Cooley cooperated under pressure from his superiors to do

something. Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 16. The evidence plaintiffs identify, however, does not

reasonably support such an inference. 

First, plaintiffs dispute that the plants were in fact transplanted. They note that Liam

Davis, a Fish and Game biologist, observed the meadowfoam on April 26, 2005 and

concluded that they were “extant,” that is, naturally occurring at that location. This dispute

alone does not create a genuine issue as to whether Cooley and Wilcox acted in knowing

violation of state law. Cooley and Wilcox may have been wrong about the transplantation,

but that does mean they were not acting for a management or law enforcement purpose. 

Second, plaintiffs cite evidence that suggests that Waaland attempted to persuade

Davis and Wilcox that the plants had been transplanted. This fact, too, does not support a

finding that Wilcox merely pretended the plants had been transplanted; it merely suggests

that Wilcox reached the same conclusion as Waaland.

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Third, plaintiffs contend that despite Wilcox’s knowledge of Davis’s conclusion, and

before any other official’s visit to the Site, Wilcox tried to convince his colleague Cooley

that the plants were transplanted. The evidence cited by plaintiffs, however, does not refer to

Wilcox trying to convince Cooley of anything. To the contrary, it suggests that Dr. Northern,

a Sonoma State biologist, first contacted Fish and Game to report that had visited the Site at

the request of a local resident and had observed meadowfoam. Shortly thereafter Waaland

contacted Fish and Game to share his opinion that the meadowfoam had been transplanted. 

In response to these contacts Davis visited the Site and thereafter Wilcox and Cooley. 

Nothing in these facts suggests that Wilcox prematurely attempted to persuade Cooley that

the meadowfoam had, in fact, been transplanted.

Fourth, plaintiffs argue that there was no real investigation of the alleged

transplantation. They fail to offer any evidence, however, that Cooley and Wilcox violated

specific protocols or procedures for conducting such an investigation or any other evidence

that would give rise to an inference that the investigation was a sham. There is also no

evidence of any “tampering” as alleged–but not supported–by plaintiffs. The cited evidence

demonstrates that Cooley placed the removed meadowfoam in a Fish and Game evidence

locker and other plants in a tub of water to keep them alive.

Finally, plaintiffs assert that Cooley admits that he removed the meadowfoam from

the Site despite warnings from the ACOE and Fish and Wildlife Service to the contrary. 

Again, the evidence cited–Cooley’s May 13, 2005 report on his investigation–does not come

close to supporting plaintiffs’ characterization. The report merely suggests that after Fish

and Game communicated its belief that the meadowfoam had been transplanted to the ACOE

and Fish and Wildlife Service, the federal agencies responded that it does not matter how the

plants got to the Site, their presence should still be considered during the ESA section 7

consultation process. The Court has reviewed the other evidence cited by plaintiffs and find

it similarly unpersuasive.

In sum, based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable trier of fact could find that

Wilcox or Cooley acted in knowing violation of state law, that is, that they were not acting

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for management or law enforcement purposes when they removed the meadowfoam from the

Site. Defendants are entitled to judgment on this claim too.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that defendants violated the ESA when Cooley

and Wilcox, both Fish and Game employees acting in their capacity as such, removed the

meadowfoam from the Site. As plaintiffs have not proved that the Site is an “area under

Federal jurisdiction” within the meaning of ESA section 9(a)(2), and as they have not

identified evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable trier of fact that Cooley

and Wilcox removed the meadowfoam in knowing violation of state law, defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the meadowfoam claims is GRANTED.

Defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims concerning the

endangered California Tiger Salamander. In response plaintiffs moved to amend their

complaint to omit any allegations as to the Salamander. At oral argument the Court denied

the motion to amend, explaining that if plaintiffs do not wish to pursue such claims at this

late date they should simply dismiss them. Since oral argument plaintiffs have not moved to

dismiss the claims; nonetheless, as plaintiffs have indicated that they do not intend to

prosecute those claims, the Court hereby DISMISSES them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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