Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01666/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01666-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CATALINA BUTTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

DARIUS MOHSENIN, an individual; 

REDBOOK RESIDENTIAL, an entity of 

unknown type; NURI N. MOHSENIN, 

individually and as trustee of the 

MOHSENIN FAMILY TRUST; and DOES 

1 to 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-01666-HRL

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTERCLAIM1

Re: Dkt. No. 51

According to her complaint, plaintiff Catalina Buttz previously leased residential property 

from defendants and subsequently fell behind on the rent. She sues for alleged violation of the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and the Rosenthal Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA), California Civil Code §§ 1788-1788.32. She also 

claims that defendants harassed her and invaded her privacy. Defendants answered the complaint, 

denying the allegations of wrongdoing. Defendant Darius Mohsenin, doing business as Redbook 

Residential, also asserted a counterclaim for breach of the rental agreement, seeking payment of 

 

1 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by the undersigned. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

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rent and fees allegedly owed.2

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Buttz now moves to dismiss the counterclaim for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction,

3

arguing that the counterclaim is not compulsory with respect to her 

claims and also does not fall within this court’s supplemental jurisdiction. She argues, in passing, 

that the counterclaim also violates public policy and amounts to a Strategic Lawsuit Against 

Public Participation (SLAPP), saying that the counterclaim was filed to punish her for pursuing 

her debt collection claims. Mohsenin does not contend that the counterclaim is compulsory. He

agrees that the counterclaim is a permissive one and argues that this court properly may exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The matter is deemed suitable for 

determination without oral argument, and the April 26, 2016 hearing is vacated. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

Upon consideration of the moving papers and opposition,4this court denies the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may be made either on the face of the

pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 

1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, 

Buttz raises a facial attack, asserting that the counterclaim allegations, even if true, are insufficient 

on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Thus, all material allegations of the counterclaim are 

presumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears 

from the face of the pleading itself.5 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) 

 

2 Defendants say that Nuri Mohsenin is the trustee of the Mohsenin Trust and had nothing to do 

with the events forming the basis for this lawsuit. Because Nuri Mohsenin is not before the court 

on this motion, and to avoid confusion, all further references to “Mohsenin” in this order means 

Darius Mohsenin.

3

Inasmuch as the present motion is Buttz’s response to defendants’ amended answer (Dkt. 39), it 

should have been filed no later than February 1, 2016. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3) and 6(a)(1)(C). 

Indeed, the court told plaintiff so during the initial case management conference. However, the 

motion was not filed until over a month later on March 3, 2016 and only after defendants moved 

for entry of Buttz’s default. Although the court has accepted and considered plaintiff’s motion, it 

does not condone the untimeliness of the filing and warns plaintiff against future noncompliance 

with deadlines.

4

Plaintiff did not file a reply.

5 Because plaintiff raises a facial attack on jurisdiction, evidence beyond the pleadings cannot be 

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(quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

DISCUSSION

As discussed above, Mohsenin does not contend that the counterclaim is compulsory.6 So, 

the only apparent dispute is whether this court properly may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over defendant’s permissive counterclaim. A permissive counterclaim is one that does not arise 

out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).

The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, was enacted in 1990 and provides, 

in relevant part:

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, 

the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 

that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).7 Permissive counterclaims traditionally were required to have an 

independent basis for jurisdiction. However, where a counterclaim meets the requirements of 

§ 1367(a), “a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claim, even if no 

independent basis for jurisdiction exists.” Koumarian v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. C08-4033 

MMC, 2008 WL 5120053 at *2 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2008) (citing Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 358 

F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) and Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs. Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 

1996)); see also Woodrow v. Satake Family Trust, No. C06-2155 WDB, 2006 WL 2092630 at *2 

(N.D. Cal., July 27, 2006) (“Where no such independent basis exists, courts routinely exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) where the federal and state claims form part 

 

considered without converting the instant motion to one for summary judgment. See Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The court therefore has not considered the Declaration of John C. 

Brown or any of the appended exhibits submitted in support of Mohsenin’s opposition brief.

6 A compulsory counterclaim is one that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 

subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and does not require adding another party over whom 

the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A), (B).

7 Although plaintiff argues at length about the jurisdictional test set out in United Mine Workers v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), she acknowledges that Congress codified Gibbs as 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

(Dkt. 51 at ECF p. 9 n.31).

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of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution and arise from a 

common nucleus of operative facts.”).

Because defendant’s counterclaim bears a logical and factual relationship to plaintiff's 

claims in that it is related to a debt allegedly incurred by plaintiff, supplemental jurisdiction exists 

over the counterclaim under § 1367(a). See, e.g., Koumarian, 2008 WL 5120053 at *2-3 

(concluding, in an FDCPA case, that supplemental jurisdiction existed over defendant’s 

counterclaim for breach of contract because they both related to the debt plaintiff allegedly owed). 

Indeed, Koumarian observed that “[i]n numerous cases brought under the FDCPA, district courts 

have held supplemental jurisdiction to exist over the defendant’s counterclaim for the underlying 

debt.” Id. at *3 (citing cases).

Even where supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, district courts may decline to 

exercise such jurisdiction where:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which

the district court has original jurisdiction;

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Defendant’s breach of contract counterclaim does not raise a novel or 

complex issue of state law. There is no indication that the counterclaim substantially 

predominates over plaintiff’s FDCPA claim. And, plaintiff’s FDCPA claim has not yet been 

dismissed.

Nor does this court find exceptional circumstances that might present compelling reasons 

to decline jurisdiction. Buttz says that Mohsenin is a vexatious litigant who sued to recover the 

rent allegedly owed in order to retaliate against her for pursuing her debt collection claims and to 

“stifle” her efforts to challenge the alleged debt collection abuses. At the moment, however, those 

are simply her contentions---and disputed ones at that. Assuming that Buttz did breach her rental 

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agreement and that she does owe rent and fees,8then this court finds no basis on the present record 

to conclude that Mohsenin harbored some nefarious motive in suing to recoup those sums. For the 

same reasons, this court finds no basis to credit plaintiff’s cursory argument that the counterclaim 

is a SLAPP.

In any event, Mohsenin claims that the rent and fees sought by the counterclaim comprise 

only 20% of the sums plaintiff reportedly has said she might seek in damages. So, the 

counterclaim appears unlikely to have a “chilling effect” on Buttz’s debt collection claims. See

Koumarian, 2008 WL 5120053 at *4 (rejecting plaintiffs’ “chilling effect” argument, in view of 

the relatively small amount of the alleged debt in question).

Buttz argues that “the issue of the underlying debt would confuse or prejudice the trier of 

fact,” (Dkt. 51, Mot. at ECF p. 11:10-11), but fails explain why that is so. She also argues that the 

counterclaim would be best handled in state court, but does not say why. And, considerations of 

judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants weighs in favor of keeping the 

counterclaim here. See, e.g., Woodrow, 2006 WL 2092630 at *2 (“[I]t is not at all clear that 

individual plaintiffs (not part of a class), including Plaintiffs here, would be better off having a 

separate action filed in state court or small claims court, rather than defending a counterclaim in an 

action they brought in a forum they chose.”).

Accordingly, the court finds no reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction over 

Mohsenin’s counterclaim.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

 

8 As discussed above, for purposes of resolving this motion, the court is obliged to accept the 

counterclaim allegations as true.

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United States District Court

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5:15-cv-01666-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Elliott H Stone ehstone@stonelawpc.com, ecf@stonelawpc.com

John Calvin Brown , III jbrown@cornerlaw.com

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