Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06002/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06002-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION 

JACQUELINE HOLLOWAY;

JUSTIN HOLLOWAY;

JASMINE HOLLOWAY;

CANDICE DODSON, individually and on

behalf of SHYLAH LEE, JAMEA GRAVES

and STARR DODSON PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 06-6002

CITY OF HOT SPRINGS, ARKANSAS;

BRIAN KECK; and RICHARD NORRIS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOW on this 14th day of March, 2007, the above referenced

matter comes on for this Court’s consideration of the Motion for

Summary Judgment (document #36) of separate defendants Brian Keck

and Richard Norris. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings of

the parties, and all other matters of relevance before it, and

being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows:

1. The plaintiffs, Jacqueline Holloway, Justin Holloway,

Jasmine Holloway, and Candice Dodson, individually and on behalf

of Shylah Lee, Jamea Graves, and Starr Dodson, commenced this

action on January 31, 2006. The plaintiffs then filed an amended

complaint on March 10, 2006, and a second amended complaint on

July 12, 2006 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the

“complaint”). According to the complaint, the plaintiffs claim

that their constitutional rights were violated when the defendants

searched a residence, located at 421 South Street, Hot Springs,

Arkansas, “in violation of plaintiffs’ collective rights to be

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free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the 4 Amendment th

to the U.S. Constitution.” (Document # 1, ¶ 4). 

Separate defendants Brian Keck (“Keck”) and Richard Norris

(“Norris”) filed their motion for summary judgment with this Court

on February 2, 2007. The plaintiffs responded to the motion for

summary judgment on February 16, 2007; and, the separate

defendants filed a reply brief with respect to the plaintiffs’

response on February 21, 2007. 

2. The standard to be applied to a motion for summary

judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and provides for the entry of summary judgment on a

claim

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847 (8th

Cir. 2001); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256 (8 Cir. th

1996). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence

is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Accordingly, all evidence must be viewed in the light

“most favorable to the non-moving party.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106

F.3d 258, 263 (8 Cir. 1997); see also Bailey v. United States th

Postal Service, 208 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2000). 

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Where a movant makes and properly supports a motion for

summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, the non-movant

must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving

party must "make a sufficient showing on every essential element

of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial."

Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.

1995). 

3. For the purpose of considering the motion for summary

judgment and based upon the pleadings submitted by the parties,

the Court believes the following material undisputed facts appear:

* During all times relevant, separate defendants Keck and

Norris were employed as police officers with the Hot Springs

Police Department. 

* On July 2, 2003, Keck and Norris were assigned to the

18 East Judicial District Drug Task Force. th

* On July 2, 2003, Keck prepared and signed an affidavit

in support of an application for a search warrant for the premises

described in the affidavit and subsequently in the warrant as the

“ . . . property known as 621 South Street Hot Springs, Arkansas,

described as a white single dwelling with a grey shingled roof and

red brick base with a partial screened in porch facing north on

the south east corner of the intersection of Fifth and South

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Street.” 

* Upon arriving at the location described in the warrant,

Keck and Norris discovered that the numeric street address of the

premises was 421 rather than 621. 

* Norris contacted the Garland County prosecuting attorney

with that information and was advised to proceed with the search.

* Keck and Norris then proceeded to carry out a search of

the interior of the premises and an automobile in the rear

thereof.

* Preparatory to and throughout the conduct of the search,

all of the occupants of the premises had been secured on its

screened front porch by other members of the search team without

participation by Keck or Norris. 

* During the search, neither Keck nor Norris had any

contact with any plaintiff. 

4. Separate defendants Keck and Norris have asserted the

defense of qualified immunity. The Court will address this issue

first.

According to the United States Supreme Court in Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, “government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where a defendant

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seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made

so that the cost and expenses of trial are avoided where the

defense is dispositive, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),

because qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial

or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute

immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously

permitted to go to trial.” Id. According to the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals, qualified immunity triggers a three-prong

inquiry:

(1) whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of

a constitutional or statutory right; (2) if so, whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the

violation; and (3) whether, given the facts most

favorable to the plaintiffs, there are no genuine issues

of material fact as to whether a reasonable official

would have known that the alleged action violated that

right.

Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673 -674 (8 Cir. 1997)(en banc). th

The plaintiffs have asserted that their constitutionally

protected rights were violated when the defendants conducted a

search of a residence located at 421 South Street in Hot Springs,

Arkansas. The plaintiffs argue that the search was performed

without a valid search warrant because the search warrant listed

the property address as 621 South Street, rather than 421 South

Street. However, despite plaintiffs’ claims, from the undisputed

facts presented by the pleadings of the parties, separate

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defendants Keck and Norris are clearly entitled to qualified

immunity.

According to controlling case law from the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals, 

[t]o be sufficiently particular, a search warrant must

include enough description so that an officer executing

the search can reasonably ascertain and identify the

target of the search with no reasonable probability of

searching another premises in error. . . . Mere

technical errors in particularity are not enough to

invalidate a search warrant.

U.S. v. Valentine, 984 F.2d 906, 909 (8 Cir. 1993). th

The warrant in question identified the location of the search

as “the property known as 621 South St., Hot Springs, Arkansas,

described as a white single dwelling with a grey shingled roof and

red brick base with a partial screened in porch, facing north on

the south east corner of the intersection of Fifth and South

street.” (Exhibit B to document #36) Although just prior to

executing the warrant, Keck and Norris noticed that the correct

numerical address of the property was 421 rather than 621, the

search warrant certainly included “enough description so that an

officer executing the search [could] reasonably ascertain and

identify the target of the search with no reasonable probability

of searching another premises in error.” Id. 

Because the Court finds that the search was conducted

pursuant to a valid warrant, it follows that the plaintiffs cannot

satisfy the first prong of the test mentioned in Burnham, supra,

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because, they have failed to assert a constitutional violation.

For that reason, Keck and Norris are entitled to qualified

immunity and their motion for summary judgment should be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Summary

Judgment (document #36) should be, and it hereby is, granted for

reasons stated herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the foregoing ruling,

plaintiffs’ complaint against Brian Keck and Richard Norris should

be, and it hereby is, dismissed. By separate order of even date

herewith, judgment will be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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