Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-55286/USCOURTS-ca9-18-55286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOMAS RODRIGUEZ INFANTE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden; 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 18-55286

D.C. No.

2:17-cv-02596-

SJO-AFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 15, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed March 13, 2020

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Paul J. Watford, Circuit 

Judges, and Robert H. Whaley,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 1 of 13
2 INFANTE V. MARTEL

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of 

California state prisoner Tomas Rodriguez Infante’s habeas 

corpus petition in which Infante maintained that a trial judge 

struck an impaneled juror for race-related reasons, running 

afoul of the prohibition on racial discrimination in jury 

selection.

The panel held that because Infante challenges a judge’s 

jury strike for cause, and not an attorney’s peremptory 

challenge, Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(holding that a petitioner may not raise a Batson claim in a 

habeas petition if the petitioner failed to object under Batson

to the peremptory strike at trial), does not bar consideration 

of the merits of Infante’s equal protection claim.

On the merits, the panel held that because the judge’s 

concerns reflected the juror’s own statements that the juror 

would be biased, not discriminatory reliance by the judge on 

the juror’s race, the judge’s strike did not violate Infante’s 

rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The panel 

concluded that Infante’s due process and Sixth Amendment 

arguments fail for the same reason.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 2 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 3

COUNSEL

Mark Raymond Drozdowski (argued), Deputy Federal 

Public Defender; Hilary Potashner, Federal Public Defender; 

Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, 

California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

 

Herbert S. Tetef (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; 

Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Xavier 

Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, 

Los Angeles, California; for Respondent-Appellee Michael 

Martel.

No appearance for Respondent-Appellee California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

The longstanding prohibition against racial 

discrimination in jury selection is a critical safeguard for the 

criminally accused and for the integrity of the judicial 

system. This case, a habeas petition, centers on a California

trial judge’s decision to strike an impaneled juror at Tomas 

Rodriguez Infante’s trial. Infante, the petitioner, maintains 

that the trial judge dismissed the juror for race-related 

reasons and so ran afoul of the prohibition on racial 

discrimination in jury selection. We conclude that the state 

courts correctly determined that the judge’s concerns 

reflected the juror’s own statements of race-related bias, not 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 3 of 13
4 INFANTE V. MARTEL

discriminatory reliance by the judge on the juror’s race, and 

so we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief. 

I

In 2014, a jury in a California court convicted Infante of 

the premeditated murder of his wife. This appeal concerns 

the trial court’s removal for cause of one of the impaneled 

jurors, Juror 8. 

During voir dire, the juror told the court that jury service 

would be difficult because he was a caretaker for his sick and 

elderly mother. He was selected nonetheless. 

After jury selection had been completed and the jury 

impaneled but before opening statements, Juror 8 

approached the bench. The juror expressed a concern that 

because Infante “looks like my uncle[,] [i]t’s going to be 

harder for me.” The juror’s statement prompted a colloquy 

between the judge and the juror. The judge told Juror 8 that 

he needed to know if the juror could be impartial. Juror 8 

replied that “[i]t’s really hard for me to say especially when 

it comes to the bottom of the line.” Despite further prodding 

by the judge, the juror continued to express hesitation, 

explaining that “like I said, it’s kind of hard for me. I know 

he’s Filipino. I’m Filipino. It doesn’t have nothing to do with 

that, but it just reflects [to] me that he looks like my uncle. I 

hope that there would be no problem when it comes to 

mak[ing] my own decision.” 

After telling Juror 8 that he could not allow his uncle’s 

resemblance to Infante or any race-based considerations to 

influence him, the judge asked once more if the juror could 

make an unbiased decision. This time, Juror 8 replied “Yes, 

I will.”

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 4 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 5

Juror 8 left the courtroom, and the judge discussed the 

exchange with the attorneys for both parties. Infante’s 

defense counsel objected to Juror 8’s dismissal, noting that 

he suspected the juror raised his concern about Infante’s 

resemblance to his uncle to avoid jury service. The judge 

agreed that Juror 8 might have had ulterior motives but 

decided to excuse him. As he explained:

[The juror] has expressed some troubling 

concerns to the court with respect to his 

ability to be impartial. He mentioned that he 

is Filipino. He mentioned that he knows Mr. 

Infante is Filipino. He mentioned Mr. Infante 

resembles a family member. He insisted this 

would make it difficult for him to perform his 

obligation as a juror. Now, the court pressed 

him on those issues, ultimately convinced 

him to at least perhaps say what the court 

would want him to say, that is, that he could 

still perform his obligations . . . He may have 

ulterior reasons to request being excused 

from this trial, but the most recent is the one 

that I think brings his suitability into 

question. You know, the parties need a fair 

trial on this case. I can’t see that the 

prosecution would get a fair trial with this 

particular juror given the representations that 

he has made, especially based upon race, 

racial identity. That is my concern regardless 

of whether or not he resembles a family 

member. I don’t want any allegiance to one 

party over the other based upon racial 

identification. Granted, the People’s 

witnesses, perhaps victim are of the same 

race; but I think it would be best to substitute

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 5 of 13
6 INFANTE V. MARTEL

[the juror] in for an alternate . . .This will be 

done over the defense objection. 

The judge dismissed Juror 8 and replaced him with an 

alternate. After a trial, the jury found Infante guilty of firstdegree murder, and the court sentenced him to prison for 

twenty-five years to life. 

Infante appealed his conviction to the California Court 

of Appeal. He argued principally that the trial judge removed 

Juror 8 on the basis of his Filipino ethnicity and national 

origin, in violation of his rights to due process and equal 

protection under Batson and its progeny. The California 

Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in an unpublished 

decision that focused on Penal Code Section 1089, which 

permits a trial court to discharge a juror for good cause.

Without specifically addressing either of Infante’s 

constitutional claims, the court concluded:

Juror No. 8 raised the point that he and 

defendant were Filipino and that defendant 

looked like the juror’s uncle. When 

questioned about his ability to be impartial, 

he replied that it would be “hard for me to say 

especially when it comes to the bottom of the 

line.” The juror said on several occasions it 

would be hard for him to be impartial because 

defendant looked like the juror’s uncle. These 

statements suggested that Juror No. 8 was 

unable to perform the function of a juror 

because of his inability to be impartial. 

Removing Juror No. 8 was not an abuse of 

discretion or a statutory or constitutional

violation.

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 6 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 7

The California Supreme Court denied review in a summary 

decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Infante’s 

petition for a writ of certiorari. 

In 2017, Infante filed a habeas petition in the Central 

District of California. He again argued that the trial judge’s 

dismissal of Juror 8 violated his equal protection and due 

process rights. 

The district court denied relief. The court concluded that 

Infante’s equal protection claim was procedurally barred 

under Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011),

because his defense counsel failed to raise a Batson

objection when the juror was struck. Were his claim not 

barred, the court determined, Infante’s challenge did not 

present a cognizable Batson challenge. The court also 

rejected Infante’s due process claim on the ground that the 

state court reasonably concluded that there was good cause 

to dismiss Juror 8. 

This appeal followed.

II

A

The district court held that Haney bars Infante’s equal 

protection challenge. See Haney, 641 F.3d at 1168. It does 

not. 

A Batson claim typically concerns the allegation that a 

criminal defendant has been “denied equal protection 

through the [prosecutor’s] use of peremptory challenges to 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 7 of 13
8 INFANTE V. MARTEL

exclude members of his race from the [] jury.”1 Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). Courts enforce Batson

through a three-step framework: First, the defendant must 

show “that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 

inference of discriminatory purpose. Second . . . the state 

must offer permissible race-neutral justifications for the 

strike. Third, the trial court must decide whether, given all 

of the relevant facts, the defendant has proven purposeful 

discrimination.” Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 605 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Haney held that a petitioner may not raise a Batson claim 

in a habeas petition if the petitioner failed to object under 

Batson to the peremptory strike at trial. Haney, 641 F.3d at 

1169. Haney’s timely objection requirement ensures that 

Batson’s three steps are recorded on the trial record. Id. at 

1172. A juror’s removal would be “difficult, if not 

impossible, to evaluate for the first time in post-conviction 

proceedings when no record is preserved . . . long after the 

prosecutor may have forgotten the reasons for his 

challenges.” Id. at 1172–73. 

Haney does not apply to the circumstances of Infante’s

habeas petition. There was no need for a contemporaneous 

objection to create a record for appellate review. The judge 

explained his reason for striking Juror 8 at length and on the 

record. The justification for the judge’s dismissal was not 

“forgotten” or “difficult . . . to evaluate.” Id. at 1172–73.

1 Batson also applies to defense counsels’ alleged race-based 

peremptory strikes, see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and 

to civil cases, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 

(1991). 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 8 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 9

More importantly, Infante’s challenge involves judicial

conduct. Unlike Haney, Infante’s claim is not a traditional 

Batson challenge to a prosecutor’s peremptory strike. Id. at

1170. Batson’s three-step framework was never intended to 

assess a judge’s decision to remove a juror for cause. If 

Infante’s defense counsel had raised a Batson objection, it 

would have compelled the judge to perform the 

impracticable task of ruling on whether his own jury strike 

was racially discriminatory. 

Because Infante challenges a judge’s jury strike for 

cause, and not an attorney’s peremptory challenge, Haney

does not bar consideration of the merits of his equal 

protection claim.2

B

The parties dispute whether we should review the merits 

of Infante’s equal protection claim de novo or under the more 

deferential standard of review established by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). But Infante’s claim fails no matter which 

standard we apply, so we assume without deciding that the 

more stringent de novo review standard is appropriate here.3

2 Because we conclude that Haney does not preclude Infante’s equal 

protection claim, we do not address the district court’s denial of Infante’s 

request for leave to amend to add and exhaust an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim for failure to raise a Batson objection at trial.

3 Infante argues that the trial judge’s strike of Juror 8 violated the 

Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by 

impartial jurors. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976). But, 

as Infante recognizes, these claims rise, and fall, alongside his equal 

protection claim, because they involve the same set of facts and the same 

ultimate question surrounding the juror’s removal. If the trial judge did 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 9 of 13
10 INFANTE V. MARTEL

The Equal Protection Clause guards against the intrusion 

of racial bias into the jury selection process. 

“[D]iscriminating in the selection of jurors . . . amounts to a 

denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Strauder v. West

Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). Batson added that the 

Equal Protection Clause prohibits excluding jury members 

even on the “assumption—or []intuitive judgment—that 

they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared 

race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Together, Batson and its 

progeny “firmly . . . rejected the view that assumptions of 

partiality based on race provide a legitimate basis for 

disqualifying a person as an impartial juror.” Georgia v. 

McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).

Infante contends that the trial judge’s dismissal of Juror 

8 represented the very assumption of partiality grounded in 

racial identity that the Batson line of cases seeks to root out.

When dismissing the juror, the judge explained that he did 

not “want any allegiance to one party over the other based 

upon racial identification.” But, according to Infante, there 

was no indication that Juror 8 harbored racial bias. The juror 

never explicitly said jury service would be difficult because

Infante was Filipino. And after Juror 8 invoked his shared 

Filipino background with Infante, the juror retreated, saying 

“it doesn’t have nothing to do with that.” So, Infante argues, 

the judge’s inference that Juror 8 would be biased 

not impermissibly strike Juror 8, these claims fail, regardless of whether 

they arise from the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or 

the Sixth Amendment.

Infante also suggests in passing that Juror 8’s removal violated his 

separate Sixth Amendment “right to [a trial by] the particular tribunal 

that [was] sworn and selected.” But Infante has waived that argument, 

because he failed altogether to develop it in his briefing. See Koerner v. 

Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2003).

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 10 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 11

represented the sort of race-based assumption forbidden by 

the Equal Protection Clause.

Viewed more closely, however, the trial judge’s jury 

strike was not “motivated in substantial part by 

discriminatory intent,” Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 

2228, 2235 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted), nor was it based on attributing racial bias to a juror 

because of the juror’s racial background. Instead, the judge 

had a valid reason to dismiss Juror 8: The juror himself came 

forward with doubts about his ability to be fair and impartial.

Juror 8’s repeated insistence that being objective in the trial 

would be “hard” for him, and his express connection of that 

difficulty to the defendant’s appearance and ethnic origin, 

suggested that he was “predisposed to favor the defendant.” 

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).

United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007), 

and Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 81 (9th Cir. 2010), both 

support our conclusion that the trial judge responded 

appropriately to Juror 8’s statements. Mitchell similarly 

involved a habeas petitioner’s challenge to a judge’s forcause strike of two jurors. One of those jurors stated that 

“having to sit in judgment of another Navajo would ‘have a 

long-term affect on [him] . . . emotionally and to a certain 

extent spiritually.’” Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 953. In so 

declaring, the juror “himself injected race into the voir dire.”

Id. Mitchell held that striking that juror for cause did not 

violate equal protection because the district court was not 

“impermissibly drawing inferences from [the juror’s] race, 

but permissibly from his own responses about his beliefs.” 

Id. Cook likewise concluded that a state court appropriately 

determined that a prosecutor’s peremptory strike of an 

African American juror was not discriminatory. 593 F.3d at 

821. Although the peremptory strike “present[ed] a close 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 11 of 13
12 INFANTE V. MARTEL

case because of the prosecutor’s reference to race,” the juror 

had answered “yes” when asked whether he thought his 

experiences with racism might cause him to be unfair in the 

case. Id. at 820–21. 

As in Mitchell and Cook, Juror 8 himself raised concerns 

over his potential for bias. And he suggested that his shared 

Filipino heritage with Infante might cloud his ability to be 

impartial. Although he then stated “[i]t doesn’t have nothing 

to do with that,” what he appeared to be saying is that the 

defendant looked Filipino, as does Juror 8’s uncle and as 

does Juror 8 himself. Given Juror 8’s statements, to 

paraphrase Mitchell, the judge did not “impermissibly 

draw[] inferences from [Juror 8’s] race, but permissibly from 

[Juror 8’s] own responses.” Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 953.

Moreover, the trial judge was not required to accept Juror 

8’s eventual pledge to be impartial. “A juror’s assurance that 

he or she can render a fair and impartial verdict is not 

dispositive.” United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 812 

(9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). And such a statement alone does not necessarily 

overcome a reasonable inference, drawn from other 

statements, that a juror will be unable to perform his duties. 

See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 18 (2007). Although it is 

rare that a juror’s assertion that he could be impartial would 

not be given credence, here, Juror 8 initially repeated three 

times that it would be difficult for him to be unbiased, and, 

as the trial judge specifically noted, he appeared to reverse 

course only because the judge had “convinced him to at least 

perhaps say what the court would want him to say.”

“[D]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all 

aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of 

justice.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 

(2017). Here, however, we cannot say that the state court 

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 12 of 13
INFANTE V. MARTEL 13

erred when it concluded that there was no racial 

discrimination or unsubstantiated attribution of bias based 

on racial identity, only the dismissal of a juror who had come 

forward because he was concerned that he could not fairly 

consider Infante’s case.

III

In sum, we hold that Haney does not bar Infante from 

challenging the judge’s strike of Juror 8 on equal protection 

grounds. On the merits of Infante’s equal protection claim, 

we conclude that, because the juror stated and reiterated that 

he would be biased, the strike did not violate Infante’s rights 

under the Equal Protection Clause. Infante’s due process and 

Sixth Amendment arguments fail for the same reason. We 

affirm the district court’s denial of Infante’s habeas petition.

Case: 18-55286, 03/13/2020, ID: 11628711, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 13 of 13