Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04196/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD RAYE RANDOLPH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 02-4196 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State Prison, Corcoran, filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. On December 12, 2002, Judge Vaughn

R. Walker issued an order to show cause as to all claims except the Fourth Amendment claims

involving illegal searches (Claims Fourteen and Fifteen). See Docket No. 4 (dismissing Fourth

Amendment claims as not cognizable). On January 14, 2003, the case was reassigned to this Court. 

On May 12, 2003, Respondent filed an answer and memorandum of points and authorities in support

thereof (docket nos. 14, 15.) On November 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a traverse to Respondent’s

answer (docket no. 42). For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 3, 1997, a jury in Alameda County Superior Court convicted Petitioner of two

counts of burglary and receiving stolen property, possession of an assault weapon, and two counts of

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being a felon in possession of a firearm. Answer, Ex. 1D at 735-742. The jury also found true

allegations that Petitioner was on bail when committing one of the burglaries and one of the

receiving stolen property counts. Id. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true the allegation

that Petitioner suffered a prior conviction for a federal felony, which the Superior Court determined

to be “serious and violent” under the three strikes law. Id. at 820-824. On or about March 27, 1998,

Petitioner was sentenced to 21 years and 8 months in state prison. Id. at 917-918; Ex. 2E at 1233-

1244.

Petitioner appealed his conviction which the Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished

opinion dated August 9, 2000. Id., Ex. 10. Petitioner filed a petition for review which the California

Supreme Court denied on November 29, 2000. Id., Ex. 12. Petitioner filed petitions for writs of

habeas corpus in Alameda Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court,

which denied his last petition for state habeas corpus relief on August 14, 2002. Pet. at 4-5; Answer,

Exs. 13 and 14.

Petitioner filed the instant petition on September 4, 2002.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses, as found by the Court of Appeal of the State of

California, First Appellate District, Division One, are summarized below:

Handleman/Andersen Burglary and Receiving Stolen Property

In the evening of July 17, 1994, Scott Handleman and Laura Andersen

called the police to report a burglary. Officer Babka was dispatched at 1:30 a.m.

on July 18, 1994, to take the report. The victims reported that they shared a room,

and after a meeting with their housemates, they discovered that property was

missing. The missing items included Scott’s backpack, containing a Stanford

notebook, and his wallet, which held his driver’s license, a credit card, an ATM

card, and a Stanford dining card. Laura reported that she was missing her portable

stereo, 60 CD’s stored in three wine crates, and her wallet, which held, among

other things, credit cards, ATM cards, driver’s license, and student identification.

Meanwhile, at approximately 2 a.m. on July 18, 1994, Officers Sarna and

Mathison observed appellant drive a silver Cadillac through a stop sign. As the

Cadillac turned and accelerated onto the freeway, the officers followed, and

activated the red lights and siren. Sarna, over the car’s public address system,

instructed appellant to pull over. Appellant continued to drive at approximately 40

miles an hour. Sarna observed that he repeatedly reached under the seat. After

travelling approximately a mile, appellant pulled over, briefly stopped, and then

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resumed driving. The officers continued their pursuit, while appellant changed

freeways and passed an exit before finally stopping. The officers ordered

appellant to lie on the ground, and handcuffed him. They found Scott

Handleman’s credit card, and a receipt for gas bought with the card, on the ground

next to appellant’s waist. They also found latex gloves in his jacket pocket. Sarna

observed Laura Andersen’s driver’s license and social security card on the

floorboard, and her credit card and ATM card under the passenger seat. In

addition, they found Scott Handleman’s drivers’ license and meal card, along with

other people’s cards, a black ski mask and more latex gloves. When Sarna

broadcast an inquiry about the property, Babka responded with the information

that it had been stolen in the recently reported burglary.

Appellant called a San Quentin inmate, David Stocker, [footnote omitted]

who testified that in March 1994, around 3:00 a.m., Sarna pulled him over for no

reason. Sarna then searched his vehicle and found a handgun and rock cocaine. 

Sarna made some racist comments, and beat Stocker with a flashlight. Sarna

claimed that Stocker resisted arrest, but he had not.

Sarna testified that he stopped Stocker for driving without a seat belt, and

when he approached the car, he observed an open beer between Stocker’s legs. 

Stocker had no license or identification, and ran when asked to exit the car. A

handgun fell to the ground when Sarna tackled Stocker, and Sarna hit him with the

flashlight when Stocker attempted to move towards the gun. Sarna denied making

any racist comments.

Possession of an Assault Weapon and Felon in Possession of a Firearm on

July 19, 1994

Sergeant Krupp and his partner, pursuant to a search warrant, went to the

residence where appellant lived with his mother, Ella Randolph, and his

grandmother, Maxine Lyons. Ella Randolph showed them the second and third

bedrooms. The second bedroom was dusty and many items were stored on chairs

and on the floor. The third bedroom looked lived in, with men’s clothes strewn all

over. In an armoire in the second bedroom, behind some men’s clothing, the

police found a Norinco 56S semiautomatic rifle, which an expert testified, is an

assault weapon. They also found some letters to various people, including

appellant, on a nearby desk.

In the third bedroom, they found a case containing a pistol and unloaded

ammunition magazines, and a Norinco pistol with two unloaded magazine clips. 

These pistols were registered to Yvonne James, at a different address. In a dresser

they found two magazines with banana clips that fit the rifle, and a letter addressed

to appellant.

In an adjoining laundry room the police found two stereos; one of which

belonged to Laura Andersen; and in the music room they found Scott’s backpack

and three wine crates, one of which still held a few CD’s.

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Felon in Possession of a Firearm on August 2, 1994

On August 2, 1994, pursuant to a second search warrant, Sergeant Krupp

returned and found, under the mattress, a handgun. He also found another

magazine for the Norinco Rifle in a desk drawer, and ammunition in the night

table. He found an envelope addressed to Yvonne James at that address, a letter to

appellant from the municipal court, and the car registration for the Cadillac

appellant had been driving when arrested.

Owens Burglary and Receiving Stolen Property

On September 17, 1995, at about five in the morning, a neighbor of Victor

Owens heard noises, and saw a light on and a silhouette of a person carrying a

bulky object toward the stairs. She called the police to report the activity. The

person reappeared, entered the house again, and emerged in a few minutes carrying

more items. When the police arrived, they saw a keyboard on the ground, and

heard rummaging noises from inside. When appellant stepped out, carrying the

keyboard, the officers confronted him and ultimately handcuffed him. They found

a tire iron and pry marks inside the residence, and in a nearby white Cadillac

registered to appellant’s grandmother, they found a keyboard, a bass guitar, and

other music-related items.

Officer Mesones testified that while he was transporting appellant to the

police station, appellant, without having been asked any question, told Mesones

that he and some friends had paid Victor Owens gave the tape to one of appellant’s

friends. Appellant was unable to get the tape from the friend, and demanded a

refund from Owens. Owens refused a refund, but offered him three free hours of

recording time. Appellant stated he went to the residence/recording studio “to

break in, to steal the equipment, and to sell the equipment, so that he could get his

money back and get even with” Owens.

Victor Owens testified that appellant, in April of 1995, had paid him $320

for a 10-hour block of recording time. Owens kept the tape because appellant

planned to return to finish the project. A few months later, one of appellant’s

friends who had participated in the recording session asked for the tape, and

eventually Owens gave it to him. Appellant was angry that Owens released the

tape to his friend, and asserted that Owens owed him something. Ultimately,

Owens offered some recording time, and appellant seemed to accept this offer. 

One of the stolen keyboards was worth $1,000, and the other $1,800. The bass

was worth $2,000.

Answer, Ex. 10 (People v. Randolph, A084842, Aug. 9, 2000 Slip Op.) (hereinafter, “Slip Op.”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), so the provisions of that Act apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

327 (1997); Gratzer v. Mahoney, 397 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Under the AEDPA, a district court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or

sentence on the basis of a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The

first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry)

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at

412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, i.e.,

falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not altered by the fact

that the finding was made by a state court of appeal, rather than by a state trial court. Sumner v.

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Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), as amended,

253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence to

overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223

F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). It also looks to any lower court decision examined and/or

adopted by the highest state court to address the merits. See Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101,

1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because state appellate court examined and adopted some of the trial court’s

reasoning, the trial court’s ruling is also relevant). If the state court only considered state law, the

federal court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly

established governing federal law. See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where the state court reviews a Petitioner's federal claim on the merits but gives no reasoned

explanation of its decision and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, the district

court applies the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the state court's determination but

must review the record independently to decide whether the state court's decision was objectively

reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any claim

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

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adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. The

right to effective assistance counsel applies to the performance of both retained and appointed

counsel without distinction. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

B. Analysis

In the absence of a reasoned decision by a state court addressing Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim, the Court must conduct an independent review of the record to

ascertain whether the state court denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853.

1. Handling of Motion to Suppress

On September 3, 1996, private attorney Thomas Broome was discharged as trial counsel. 

See Ans., Exs. 1A, 1B (“Cl. Tr.”) at 98, 257-258; Ex. 4A (9/3/96 Tr.) at 5. On October 24, 1996,

Petitioner’s Faretta motion to represent himself was granted on all three dockets. See Cl. Tr. 272-

273; Ans., Ex. 4B (10/24/96 Tr.) at 14. On January 2, 1997, private attorney Daniel Horowitz was

appointed to represent Petitioner on all three dockets. Cl. Tr. 297-299.

Petitioner challenges Horowitz’s handling of the May 13, 1997 motion to suppress evidence. 

Pet., Attachment at 1-6. First, Petitioner argues that his attorney cited a case which referred to facts

about the reputation of an area for criminal activity, which the prosecution then argued in opposition

to the motion to suppress. Id. at 3-4. An attorney’s citation to legal authority does not, however, fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness and does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance.

Second, Petitioner claims that his attorney erred by proceeding on the suppression hearing

without having received the material requested in his Pitchess motion for police background

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discovery. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531 (1974). The trial court granted Petitioner’s

motion to discover information relating to police misconduct in the personnel and Internal Affairs

files of Officers Sarna and Mathison, who conducted the traffic stop on July 18, 1994. See CT 473. 

Petitioner argues that the Pitchess material was essential for impeachment purposes, where

Petitioner claimed that “he was the subject of racial profiling - Driving While Black (DWB), and

that the alleged traffic infraction was merely a pretext used to justify the warrantless search of

petitioner’s vehicle.” Pet., Attachment at 6. On his decision not to re-open the suppression motion

upon receiving the police personnel files, defense counsel explained during a Marsden hearing to

substitute counsel that “there was nothing relevant uncovered in Pitches [sic]. And, in fact, having

heard the 1538.5 [suppression motion], [the judge was in a better position to do an in-camera review

[of the Pitchess material] favorable to us because we knew what we were getting at.” Ans., Ex. 5B

(11/4/97 Tr.) at 19-20.

The Court of Appeal found that defense counsel “apparently made a strategic choice not to

pursue his charge of fabrication” against the police officer who conducted the traffic stop in a

suppression hearing. Slip Op. at 16. The Court of Appeal also found that Petitioner “did introduce

evidence of David Stocker’s complaints about Officer Sarna at trial,” which was discovered after the

trial court granted the motion to discover Pitchess material. Slip Op. at 15. Stocker testified at trial

that Officer Sarna pulled him over under the pretense of a traffic stop, and made racist remarks and

beat Stocker with a flashlight. Ans., Ex. 2D (Trial Transcript, hereinafter, “Rep. Tr.”) at 879-889. 

A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance,

see United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981), and

tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are known

to have been available. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

838 (1984). Here, where defense counsel introduced evidence at trial of past complaints about racial

profiling against Officer Sarna for impeachment purposes, Rep. Tr. 917-920, Petitioner has not

demonstrated any prejudice from trial counsel’s decision not to reopen the suppression motion, i.e.,

that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, as the evidence

supported the state court's conclusion that the police had probable cause to believe Petitioner had

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evaded a police vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code § 2800.1. Slip Op. at 7-8. See

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, habeas relief is not

warranted on this claim.

2. Failure to Investigate Destruction of Dispatch Tape

Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to conduct an independent investigation of the

destruction of the dispatch tape relating to Petitioner’s stop and arrest. Pet., Attachment at 7-16.

Petitioner denied running a stop sign, evading the police officers, or leading them on a high speed

chase. He claims that he wanted to use the dispatch tape to impeach the credibility of Officer Sarna. 

The Superior Court issued an order to preserve the dispatch tape on October 18, 1994, Cl. Tr. 450,

but in February 1995, after a private attorney was substituted in for the public defender’s office, the

police destroyed the tape by recording over it, and the transcript was routinely destroyed. Slip Op.

at 11. According to the government, the tape was recycled after the public defender’s investigator, J.

Thurman, notified the police that it was not needed. Id.

The defense was notified in early 1997 that the tape had been destroyed. Pet., Attachment at

7 and n.1. Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss due to the failure to preserve and produce the

dispatch tapes. Cl. Tr. 309-313. The Superior Court heard the matter on November 6, 1997, and

denied the motion. Ans., Ex. 2A (11/6/97 Rep. Tr.) at 49-60. At the hearing on the motion to

dismiss, the government argued that “[t]he officers who made the stop are going to be hearing

subject to I’m sure extensive cross-examination their memory recall veracity can be tested in that

regard. The tape otherwise has no evidentiary value whatsoever in assisting Mr. Randolph

presenting a defense.” Id. at 59.

Petitioner contends that his attorney did not follow his leads or investigate the status of the

dispatch tape prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Pet., Attachment at 10-13. The record

indicates, however, that defense counsel did speak to Thurman, who did not recall telling the police

that the tape could be destroyed. 11/6/97 Rep. Tr. 49. The record thus indicates that defense

counsel interviewed the public defender’s investigator about the destruction of the tape. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

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691. Strickland directs that “‘a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.’” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691). Where there are indicia of counsel’s tactical reflection on the issue, judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance is deferential, with a presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance. See United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1466 (9th

Cir. 1994).

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for defense counsel’s

failure to investigate, the result of the proceeding would have been different. As the Court of

Appeal held, “[t]he destruction of the tape did not preclude appellant from impeaching Sarna in a

similar manner through the testimony of David Stocker, another alleged victim of Officer Sarna’s

misconduct.” Slip Op. at 12. In addressing Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of his motion to

dismiss as a sanction for destruction of the dispatch tape, the Court of Appeal held that “[t]he mere

‘possibility that the tape could have exculpated appellant if preserved is not enough’ to establish that

its exculpatory value was apparent when it was destroyed [citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

51, 56 (1988)]. The exculpatory value of the tape would not have been apparent, because appellant

was prosecuted for burglary and weapons offenses, not the traffic violation or evasion of a police

officer. His theory of how the dispatch tape might even be relevant to the prosecution for burglaries

and other offenses, unrelated to the circumstances of the stop, is based upon a series of speculative

assumptions and inferences that the court reasonably concluded would not have been apparent when

it was destroyed. The court correctly concluded that the dispatch tape ‘was simply an avenue of

investigation that might have led in any number of directions.’” Slip Op. at 12.

As Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice from defense counsel’s alleged failure to

investigate the destruction of the dispatch tape, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim

of ineffective assistance, nor the related claim, Claim XVII, which asserts the same grounds for

habeas relief.

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3. Misrepresentation of Plea Bargain Offer

Petitioner contends that his attorney misrepresented the government’s plea offer by stating on

August 14, 1997, that the offer was for “time served,” and that the maximum sentence was fourteen

years, when in fact the plea offer was seven years. Pet., Attachment at 16-18 and Appendix D,

Randolph Decl., ¶¶ 6, 11. Petitioner claims that attorney Horowitz misrepresented and misadvised

Petitioner about the plea offer and the maximum and minimum periods of confinement if the case

proceeds to trial. He complains that he was willing to accept a plea agreement as to one of the cases,

Indictment No. 125811, but was not willing to plead guilty to charged crimes which he did not

commit. Pet., Attachment at 18. 

The decision whether or not to accept a plea offer is a critical stage of the prosecution at

which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th

Cir. 2002). Therefore, the two-part test of Strickland applies to counsel’s ineffective assistance in

advising a defendant to accept or reject a plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58

(1985); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1051-53 (9th Cir. 2003). Erroneous advice regarding the

consequences of a guilty plea is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; petitioner must

establish a “‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . .

erroneous advice on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d

859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004). Failure to accurately convey the terms of a plea offer, coupled with

evidence that the offer would have been accepted if accurately conveyed, is sufficient to show

prejudice. Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1054. 

Here, the record indicates that upon addressing Petitioner’s Marsden motion to substitute Mr.

Horowitz as counsel, the Superior Court informed Petitioner “I appoint him to represent you because

you are looking at a life sentence and you need a good lawyer.” Answer, Ex. 5A (5/9/97 Tr.) at 4. 

At the time, Mr. Horowitz informed the court that Petitioner “was offered a great deal, doesn’t want

to take it and has a fantasy that his motions are going to get him out of this case.” Id. At the

November 4, 1997 Marsden hearing, Mr. Horowitz informed the court that “there was a four-year

offer in Municipal Court in this case turned down. That there was a seven-year offer in Superior

Court that was kept open for ages. . . . Given the amount of time he has in custody, a reasonable

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offer should be explored.” Ans., Ex. 5B (11/7/97 Tr.) at 20-21. Mr. Horowitz also filed a

declaration stating that Petitioner “turned down an offer (2 years I believe) which would have

allowed him to be released with credit for time served.” Pet., App. E (Horowitz Decl.), ¶ 8.

The record belies Petitioner’s claim that his attorney misrepresented plea offers. Even after

the November 4, 1997 hearing where the history of plea offers and defense counsel’s advice to enter

a plea agreement were made known to the court, Petitioner was offered a seven year plea on

November 5, 1997, which he rejected. See Pet., App. D (Randolph Decl.), ¶ 12. Petitioner has not

shown that his attorney grossly mischaracterized the likely outcome of the plea or of trial, and is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

4. Failure to Interview Witnesses

Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate and interview

witnesses, such as Ms. Cagler, the woman with whom Petitioner resided, and Ms. James, the woman

to whom two of the confiscated weapons were registered. Pet., Attachment at 18-22. The Superior

Court, Judge Carl Morris, reheard Petitioner’s Marsden motion on November 5, 1997, after Judge

Joseph Jay set aside his November 4, 1997, denial of the motion and recused himself upon

Petitioner’s objection that Judge Jay’s son, John Jay, had been the prosecutor in the case. See

Answer, Ex. 5C (11/5/97 Tr.) at 13. At the November 5 hearing, Mr. Horowitz explained his efforts

to follow Petitioner’s leads: “The information he gave me regarding what his mother would say

turned out not to be accurate. His mother does not support his defense in the ways that he said. He

gave me the names of two women, ways to locate them, who might help him out. None of that

checked out. However, Bob Cross, my investigator, did continue to pursue these women, did

continue to contact Mr. Randolph and he probably has one of the witnesses, a women whose name to

whom two of the guns that were found in the premise which Mr. Randolph’s mother says was

occupied by Mr. Randolph, she is registered to those guns, and try to locate her and see if she’ll back

Mr. Randolph in that respect.” Id. at 28-29.

As discussed earlier in Section I.B.2, supra at 10, defense counsel has a general duty to make

reasonable investigations. Here, the record belies Petitioner’s contention that defense counsel failed

to adequately investigate defense witnesses. 

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Furthermore, although Petitioner argues that defense counsel failed to interview the

governments’ witnesses before trial, he offers no evidence of what counsel may have discovered or

how the failure to interview these witnesses caused prejudice. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486

(9th Cir. 2000). The duty to investigate and prepare a defense does not require that every

conceivable witness be interviewed. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). A

claim of failure to interview a witness cannot establish ineffective assistance when the person's

account is otherwise fairly known to defense counsel. Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376

(9th Cir. 1986). Here, several prosecution witnesses had testified in pretrial proceedings. At the

grand jury proceedings on November 1, 1995, Victor Owens, Officer William Cocke, Officer

Christine Knowlton and Leigh Ann Lombardo testified as to the Owens burglary and possession of

stolen property charges, and later testified at trial. Cl. Tr. 150-176. See Rep. Tr. 689-742, 767-784,

785-795, 639-672. Furthermore, on July 17, 1997, Officer Sarna testified as to the traffic stop at the

hearing on Petitioner’s motion to suppress, and also testified at trial. Cl. Tr. 475-494. See Rep. Tr.

217-243. The general content of at least these witnesses’ testimony was already available to defense

counsel ahead of trial. Petitioner has not presented evidence that any of the prosecution witnesses

would have provided helpful testimony for the defense, or otherwise shown how defense counsel’s

failure to interview the prosecution witnesses would have affected the outcome of his trial. Habeas

relief is therefore not warranted on this claim.

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable interpretation of, established Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s

claim is therefore denied.

II. Irreconcilable Conflict

A. Legal Standard

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right

to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20

F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel comprises two

correlative rights: the right to counsel of reasonable competence, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.

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 1 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), requires the trial court to permit a criminal defendant

requesting substitution of counsel to specify the reasons for his request and generally to hold a hearing.

This California rule substantially parallels the one prescribed by the Ninth Circuit in Hudson v. Rushen.

See Chavez v. Pulley, 623 F. Supp. 672, 687 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

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759, 770-71 (1970), and the right to counsel's undivided loyalty, Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,

271-72 (1981). A criminal defendant accordingly is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to an

effective attorney who can represent him competently and without conflicting interests. Garcia v.

Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes a conflict that can cause a Sixth Amendment violation when the

attorney-client relationship has broken down beyond repair due to the defendant's objectively

reasonable belief that his counsel has betrayed him, counsel ceases to "function in the active role of

an advocate." Plumlee v. Sue del Papa, 426 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Entsminger v.

Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967)).

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint

about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons for the defendant's

dissatisfaction. Id. at 1475-76; United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990);

Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).1

 The inquiry need only be as comprehensive

as the circumstances reasonably would permit, however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th

Cir. 1992) (record may demonstrate that extensive inquiry was not necessary). 

B. Analysis

Petitioner complains that defense counsel Horowitz was not acting in the best interest of his

client, and that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel. Pet., Attachment at 23-39. 

Petitioner cites as evidence of irreconcilable conflict the fact that Mr. Horowitz did not oppose the

assignment of the consolidated cases to Judge Joseph Jay, who was the father of the former

prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney John Jay. Id. at 27. Petitioner suspected that Mr. Horowitz

was colluding with the government to deprive him of a fair trial, and amended his second Marsden

motion to raise this issue after Judge Jay recused himself and set aside his November 4, 1997 ruling

on the Marsden motion. Id. at 34. See Ans., Ex. 5C (11/5/97 Tr.) at 22. 

At the November 5, 1997 hearing on Petitioner’s Marsden motion, Mr. Horowitz addressed

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his non-opposition to Judge Jay’s assignment: “In terms of Judge Jay hearing this case, I don’t see

any conflict with what John Jay did and Judge Jay hearing the case, but I will say this: I know Judge

Jay. I know his judicial philosophy and how he runs his courtroom. I have done two trials in front

of him in the last few years. I think that one thing you can say about Judge Jay is that he lets the

defense try their case. And I think he gives more leeway in terms of what defense evidence can

come in than most judges do. The Victor Owens case, particularly, . . . [t]here are cases that indicate

that a liquidated debt can be resolved by self-help to the extent not that it’s permissible to do it, but it

could defeat specific intent. However, as to an unliquidated debt it’s very unlikely. I thought that

Judge Jay would be a very good judge for letting this defense in as opposed to many other judges. 

And in fact, in chambers when we discussed this issue. Judge Jay did indicate that he was going to

let us put on our defense which is, I thought, quite remarkably good. So I thought there was – I as

[sic] very happy to have Judge Jay in that respect.” Id. at 29-30.

Petitioner’s conflict with his attorney over Judge Jay’s assignment to the case arose out of a

dispute over counsel’s tactical choices, and does not amount to an “obvious and extreme conflict that

constructively deprived” Petitioner of meaningful representation. Plumlee, 426 F.3d at 1107. See

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 & n.8 (attorney may make tactical trial decisions despite client’s

disapproval). Petitioner had an opportunity to raise his ineffective assistance arguments before the

trial court, which held that “I have listened carefully, and I must tell you that I am satisfied with Mr.

Horowitz, his statements of his activity. And I don’t see any basis at this time to declare that he has

rendered ineffective assistance, to order his removal, to substitute other counsel.” Ans., Ex. 5C at

37-38.

Petitioner has not shown that the conflict between himself and Mr. Horowitz prevented

effective assistance of counsel. The trial court was satisfied with Mr. Horowitz’s explanations as to

discovery, various pretrial motions and other trial strategies. See id. at 25-33. The state court’s

denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

interpretation of, established Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s claim is therefore denied.

//

//

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III. Due Process: Failure to Transcribe Hearing

A. Legal Standard

A trial court’s failure to make a record of portions of the trial, for instance voir dire, opening

statements and closing arguments, bench conferences, the jury charge, or the jury poll, may violate

due process if the record is such that the defendant cannot effectively appeal. Madera v. Risley, 885

F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1989). In Madera, the court adopted two criteria as relevant to determination

of the need for the missing record: (1) the value of the transcript to the defendant; and (2) the

availability of alternative devices which would fulfill the same function. Madera, 885 F.2d at 648

(quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). A habeas petitioner also must establish

prejudice from the lack of recordation to be entitled to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 649.

B. Analysis

Petitioner claims that the court reporter failed to transcribe a February 11, 1997 hearing on

Mr. Horowitz’s motion to withdraw, and also failed to provide a transcript for the May 9, 1997

hearing on his Marsden motion. Pet., Attachment at 40-47. The government, however, explains that

defense counsel’s motion to withdraw was continued until May 9, 1997, when Petitioner’s motion to

substitute counsel was heard. Ans. at 14-15. The transcript of the May 9, 1997 hearing has been

lodged and marked as Exhibit 5A. 

Petitioner does not further address this failure to transcribe claim in his traverse. He does,

however, refer to a November 5 and/or 6, 1997 settlement conference in chambers which was not

transcribed. 2/8/05 Pet. Decl. in Resp. to Answer, ¶ 2, 9-12. Petitioner complains that the court

reporter failed to record the settlement conference. Id., ¶ 13. As no plea agreement was reached,

however, there was no settlement or agreement to be entered on the record. As other evidence of the

seven-year plea offer has been submitted, see Answer, Ex. 5B at 20-21 (11/7/97 Tr.), Petitioner has

not been prejudiced in his ability to raise this issue on appeal or in habeas proceedings in violation

of his due process rights. Madera, 885 F.2d at 648.

As Petitioner has not shown that the trial court failed to make a record of the hearings and

other pretrial proceedings, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

//

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IV. Failure to Conduct Marsden Hearing on Motion to Substitute Attorney Broome

A. Legal Standard

As set forth in Section II.A, supra at 13-14, the denial of a motion to substitute counsel

implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475. 

B. Analysis

Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to review the record of attorney Thomas Broome’s

representation and to inquire into counsel’s appointed status in order to entitle Petitioner to

substitution of appointed counsel. Pet., Attachment at 48-55. Petitioner claims that when the court

failed to conduct a hearing on his Marsden motion, and discharged Broome as counsel without

appointing a new attorney, Petitioner was left without representation. Id. at 51. 

The record, however, indicates that the trial court heard Petitioner on his motion to fire Mr.

Broome on September 3, 1996, and made him aware of the resulting self-representation. Ans., Ex.

4A (9/3/96 Tr.) at 1-5. At the hearing, the court clarified that if Mr. Broome was retained, rather

than appointed, “it is not a Marsden motion. If he wants to fire you, he can fire you.” Id. at 3. The

court also told Petitioner “you don’t have to have a reason to fire somebody you are paying.” Id.

Petitioner then asked the court, “That means I can go pro per?” To which the court replied, “You

can do that or I can refer you to the Public Defender’s Office.” Id. 

Petitioner presented his argument to the trial court that Mr. Broome was appointed, and that

he was properly the subject of a Marsden motion to substitute counsel:

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. In regards to the Marsden motion, even though I did retain Mr.

Broome, Mr. Broome was appointed by this court.

THE COURT: No. Mr. Broome says he wasn’t. Doesn’t make any difference. If you

want to fire him, as far as I am concerned he says he was retained, and

if you want to fire him he is fired. You paid money and he is sitting

here nodding his head yes, and he is of the opinion he was retained on

both of these cases, one officially and the second one out of the

kindness of his heart, I guess, and he doesn’t represent you on the

other one so you have the right to fire whoever you hire.

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THE DEFENDANT: So what about the Ferrata [sic] motion, I have to file that to go pro

per?

THE COURT: I will notice it for a different date and time, but if you want to litigate a

Ferrata [sic] motion I will let you do that.

. . . Show Mr. Broome is no longer the attorney of record. And I

assume, Mr. Randolph, by filing the Marsden motion that it was your

intention to not have Mr. Broome represent you anymore; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Exactly.

Id. at 4-5.

The record demonstrates that Petitioner’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, and that he

willingly proceeded pro se. On October 24, 1996, his Faretta motion was granted on all three

dockets. Cl. Tr. 272-273. Petitioner was not forced into a situation of choosing between

incompetent counsel and no counsel at all. Cf. Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213, 1215-18 (9th

Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Rather, he chose to fire his attorney, Broome, and proceed pro se after obtaining leave from the trial

court to file a Faretta motion for self-representation. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

these grounds.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

A. Legal Standard

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. The appropriate standard of

review is the narrow one of due process and not the broad exercise of supervisory power. See

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant's due process rights are violated

when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." See id.; Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor"). The appropriate

standard on federal habeas corpus review of a state conviction for determining whether a

constitutional error of the trial type is harmless is whether the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38

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(1993). 

B. Analysis

1. Suppression of Evidence: Dispatch Tape

In Claims V and XVI, Petitioner suggests that the prosecutor withheld or concealed the

dispatch tape which was subject to an October 18, 1994 court order for the preservation of dispatch

cards and recordings by the Oakland Police Department relating to Petitioner’s traffic stop and arrest

on July 18, 1994. Pet., Attachment at 56-70 and 181-189. See Cl. Tr. 450. At a December 27, 1996

hearing, Petitioner asked for the results of the dispatch preservation order, which the prosecutor did

not have. Ans., Ex. 2A (12/27/96 Tr.) at 4-7. It was later disclosed to Petitioner that the dispatch

tape had been destroyed, which was the subject of a motion to dismiss.

If a defendant so requests, the government has an obligation to surrender favorable evidence

that is "material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See

United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992). "[E]vidence is material only if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality

opinion); accord id. at 685 (White, J., concurring). 

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to dismiss for the

destruction of the dispatch tape. Slip Op. at 11-12. Citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479

(1984), the appellate court held that Petitioner had not demonstrated that the tape possessed

“‘exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed,’” or that it was “‘of such a

nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably

available means.’” Slip Op. at 11. “‘Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to

preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant

role in the suspect’s defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both

possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a

nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably

available means.’ [Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489.] More recently, the high court held that ‘unless a

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criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful

evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,

58 (1988).” Slip Op. at 11 (citing People v. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th 494, 519 (1993)).

Petitioner has presented no evidence that the prosecution lied to the trial court about the

preservation order, which was part of the record, or about the dispatch tape, a copy of which he did

not have. See Ans., Ex. 2A (12/27/96 Tr.) at 4-7. Having presented no evidence of the content of

the tape, Petitioner suggests that the tape “was material evidence to the extent that it goes directly to

the crucial point of probable cause, where arresting officers Pete Sarna and Mathison falsely alleged

and fabricated numerous traffic infractions as a pretext in justifying the warrantless and unlawful

search of petitioner’s vehicle.” Pet., Attachment at 60. Even if the destroyed tape did contain such

evidence, Petitioner did not suffer prejudice because he had the opportunity at trial to present

impeachment evidence through Stocker’s testimony about racial profiling and to cross-examine

Officers Sarna and Mathison. 

The Court of Appeal further noted that the exculpatory value of the tape would not have been

apparent when it was destroyed because Petitioner was prosecuted for burglary and weapons

offenses, not for traffic violation or evasion of a police officer. Slip Op. at 12. See Section I.B.2,

supra at 9-10. Finally, Petitioner has not shown how the destruction of the tape “had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s due process claim for suppression of evidence was

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. 

Habeas relief is not warranted here.

2. Attempt to Have Father of Prior Prosecutor Preside Over Trial

Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed misconduct in attempting to have Judge Jay

preside over his trial, though Judge Jay’s son had been the prosecutor. Pet., Attachment at 70-74. 

After Petitioner objected to Judge Jay’s hearing the case, Ans., Ex. 5B (11/4/97 Tr.) at 33-34, Judge

Jay recused himself and set aside his ruling on Petitioner’s Marsden motion, which was heard and

denied the following day by a different judge. Ans., Ex. 5C at 37-38. As Judge Jay immediately

recused himself, his brief assignment to Petitioner’s case did not render his trial “fundamentally

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unfair.” As even Judge Jay’s Marsden ruling was withdrawn, Petitioner did not suffer any

substantial or injurious effect on his trial, and suffered no due process violation. This claim

therefore does not merit habeas relief.

3. Filing Unsustainable Weapon Charges

Petitioner also claims that the prosecution filed weapons charges under Penal Code section

12021 that were not sustainable by the evidence. Pet., Attachment at 75-81. He claims that the

prosecutor used the weapons charge to elicit evidence about assault weapons and drum up the jury’s

fears. The prosecutor, however, has broad discretion in making charging decisions, unless Petitioner

can show that the charging decision rested on an impermissible basis such as gender, race, or denial

of a constitutional right. United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, Petitioner’s

alleged conduct violated the Penal Code prohibiting possession of assault weapons. See Section

VI.B.2, infra at 23-24. Petitioner has failed to show that the decision to prosecute him for weapon

possession was based on a constitutionally impermissible factor. Palmer, 3 F.3d at 305. Habeas

relief is therefore not warranted here.

VI. Insufficiency of Evidence

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his

state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief, id. at 324. See also

Wigglesworth v. Oregon, 49 F.3d 578, 582 (9th Cir. 1995) (writ granted where Oregon procedure of

allowing lab reports regarding drug analyses to be admitted into evidence without authenticating

testimony relieved state of its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt all elements of crime

charged); Martineau v. Angelone, 25 F.3d 734, 739-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (writ granted where evidence

found insufficient to convict defendants of child abuse based on delay in seeking medical care for

child). 

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A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it

is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d

335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 US 843 (1993). The federal court "determines only

whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See id.

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must

presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear on the record – that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at

326. A jury’s credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total deference. Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Except in the most exceptional of circumstances,

Jackson does not permit a federal habeas court to revisit credibility determinations. See id.

(credibility contest between victim alleging sexual molestation and defendant vehemently denying

allegations of wrong doing not a basis for revisiting jury’s obvious credibility determination); see

also People of the Territory of Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1994)

(upholding conviction for sexual molestation based entirely on uncorroborated testimony of victim). 

The prosecution need not affirmatively rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt. Wright

v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); see, e.g., Davis v.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 639-41 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient evidence of premeditation). The

existence of some small doubt based on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence

therefore is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer, 31

F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (three hypotheses regarding petitioner's fingerprints which government

failed to rebut unsupported by evidence and therefore insufficient to invalidate conviction).

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to

sustain a conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). Mere suspicion and

speculation cannot support logical inferences, however. Id.; see, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting writ where, after resolving all conflicting factual inferences

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in favor of prosecution, only speculation supported petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder

under a theory of aiding and abetting). 

B. Analysis

In the absence of a reasoned decision by a state court addressing Petitioner’s insufficiency of

evidence claim, the Court must conduct an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the

state court denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

1. Sufficiency of Evidence on First Degree Burglary

Petitioner raises challenges to the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his conviction of first

degree burglary of the Handelman/Anderson residence. Pet., Attachment at 85-89. Petitioner claims

that the prosecution failed to produce any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony to prove that

Petitioner entered the residence in violation of California Penal Code section 459. 

The record shows that several hours after the victims reported the burglary, Petitioner was

stopped for a traffic violation and that the police officers found in his car many of the items reported

missing, such as Andersen’s driver’s license, social security card, and ATM card, as well as a fullface ski mask and latex rubber gloves. Rep. Tr. 218-222, 233-234, 236-237, 240, 284-285, 295-296,

302-303. Furthermore, Petitioner’s residence was searched the next day, where additional items

such as CDs and portable stereo, were found. Rep. Tr. 169, 423-425.

Drawing logical inferences from this evidence, “any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Habeas

relief is therefore denied on this claim.

2. Weapon Possession

Petitioner also claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possessing an

assault weapon pursuant to Penal Code § 12280(b) and being a felon in possession of weapons

charges pursuant to Penal Code § 12021. Pet., Attachment at 90-98. Specifically, Petitioner claims

that two of the guns were registered to his girlfriend, Ms. James, who recently lived with him. Rep.

Tr. 434-35, 455, 599. Petitioner argues that he should not have been charged with constructive

possession of firearms that were in the actual possession of the legally registered owner. Pet.,

Attachment at 91. 

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The trial court instructed the jury that it could find either actual or constructive possession of

the firearms in violation of Section 12021: "The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual

possession and constructive possession. Actual possession requires that a person exercise direct

physical control over a thing. Constructive possession does not require actual possession but does

require that a person knowingly exercise control or the right to control a thing, either directly or

through another person or persons." Rep. Tr. 1121. The court similarly instructed the jury as to

possession of an assault weapon in violation of Section 12280. Rep. Tr. 1121-1122.

"Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often

necessary for the trier or fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime – that is, an

'ultimate' or 'elemental' fact – from the existence of one or more 'evidentiary' or 'basic' facts." 

County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). In light of the evidence that the

semiautomatic rifle was found in one of the bedrooms used by Petitioner, the jury could reasonably

conclude that he was in constructive possession of the assault weapon in violation of Section

12280(b). See Rep. Tr. 385, 390-404, 484-499, 583-590. The jury could also reasonably find that

Petitioner was in constructive possession of firearms from the evidence that the police found a pistol

and semiautomatic handgun in the other bedroom used by Petitioner. See Rep. Tr. 404-414, 416-

420, 505-510, 587-588, 910-912. 

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational juror to infer that Petitioner

knowingly exercised control or the right to control the weapons, either directly or through another

person. The Supreme Court has recognized the reasonableness of the connection between

possession of a weapon and the occupancy of the room where it is kept: "'Persons who occupy a

room, who either reside in it or use it in the conduct and operation of a business . . . normally know

what is in it; and, certainly, when the object is as large and uncommon as a machine gun, it is neither

unreasonable nor unfair to presume that the room's occupants are aware of its presence.'" Ulster

County, 442 U.S. at 165 n.27 (quoting People v. Terra, 303 N.Y. 332, 335-336 (1951)) (addressing

statutory presumption under state law that occupants of room where firearm was located possessed

the weapon).

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of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Habeas relief is therefore denied on this claim.

VII. Motion to Disqualify Judge Morris

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process by the denial of his motion to disqualify

Judge Morris. This claim does not merit habeas relief.

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and impartial

judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). In some cases, the proceedings and

surrounding circumstances may demonstrate actual bias on the part of the judge, i.e., improper

conduct. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-04 (1974). In other cases, the judge's pecuniary or

personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings may create an appearance of partiality that

violates due process, i.e., improper influences. See Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir.

1995). "Of course, most questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not

constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a

constitutional floor [viz., a fair trial in a fair tribunal], not a minimum standard." Bracy v. Gramley,

520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). “Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law,

statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar. [Citations omitted.] But the floor

established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ before a judge

with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Id. at

904-905 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)).

B. Analysis

Petitioner claims that Judge Morris should not have presided over his trial because Judge

Morris had previously presided over pretrial proceedings and had not been appointed and assigned

to the case "for all purpose." Pet., Attachment at 99-115. The technicality of designating a trial

judge as “all purpose” is not determinative of Petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair, unbiased trial. 

The fact that Judge Morris had presided over pretrial proceedings does not establish that he was

biased against Petitioner or had an interest in the outcome of the case. Judges do not demonstrate

“bias” or “prejudice” by forming opinions as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings. “It

has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and

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to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551

(1994). 

Petitioner also argues that Judge Morris demonstrated partiality for the prosecution by

allowing it to present extensive testimony about the destruction of missing evidence, but denying the

defense the opportunity to elicit testimony about the destruction of the dispatch tape. Pet.,

Attachment at 106-107. Sergeant Ronald Gunar testified at trial as to the procedures of the police

department’s property and evidence division, and as to specific evidence that was seized in

connection with Petitioner’s arrest and then submitted to the property room. See Rep. Tr. 318-354. 

Sergeant Gunar also testified as to evidence that was inadvertently destroyed, including ATM or

bank cards, a black ski mask, three pairs of white latex rubber gloves, two magazine clips. Id. at

342-354. Defense counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Sergeant Gunar on the

destruction of evidence. Id. at 354-373. The trial judge’s decision to allow testimony about the

destruction of evidence neither demonstrates actual bias nor reflects improper influences so as to

render the trial fundamentally unfair. See Liteky, supra, 510 U.S. at 555 (“Judicial rulings alone

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). 

Petitioner contends that Judge Morris should have been automatically disqualified for failing

to respond timely to Petitioner’s challenge for cause pursuant to section 170.1 of the California Code

of Civil Procedure. See Cl. Tr. 852-863. The record reflects, however, that Judge Morris transferred

the motion to disqualify to Department One (id. at 915), and that Judge Sarkisian denied Petitioner’s

motion. Id. at 915, 916. See also Rep. Tr. 1238-1239. Furthermore, on a petition for federal habeas

relief, Petitioner must demonstrate constitutional grounds for disqualification. See Bracy v.

Gramley, supra, 520 U.S. at 904. Failing to do so, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

VIII. Failure to Conduct Hearing on Final Marsden Motion

A. Legal Standard

As set forth in Section II.A, supra at 13-14, the denial of a motion to substitute counsel

implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475. 

B. Analysis

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Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by failing to hear his motion to substitute counsel

at sentencing on March 27, 1998. Pet., Attachment at 116-119. See Cl. Tr. 929-958. The record

reflects that Petitioner refused to have Judge Morris hear the Marsden motion, arguing that Judge

Morris had been disqualified by failing to respond to Petitioner’s motion to disqualify, discussed in

Section VII, supra at 25-26. See Rep. Tr. 1241-1242. In the motion to substitute counsel, Petitioner

argued, among other things, that Mr. Horowitz failed to produce Ms. James and Ms. Cagler as

witnesses. See Cl. Tr. 929-946. As discussed in Section I.B.4, supra at 12-13, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of Mr. Horowitz’ alleged

failure to investigate defense witnesses. No error resulted, therefore, from the trial court’s failure to

hear Petitioner’s Marsden motion, which, at any rate, was due to Petitioner’s own waiver of the

hearing. Habeas relief on this claim is therefore denied.

IX. Destruction of Dispatch Tape

Petitioner raises several claims related to the government’s destruction of the police dispatch

tape: error in excluding evidence and failing to instruct the jury (Claims IX and XVIII); denial of

due process (Claims V and XVI, discussed in Section V.B.1, supra at 18-20); ineffective assistance

of counsel (Claims I and XVII, discussed in Section I.B.2, supra at 9-10).

A. Failure to Instruct on Defense Theory of Case: Legal Standard

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in

a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon

the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67

F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). After all, due process does not require that an instruction be given

unless the evidence supports it. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Menendez v.

Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir.),

amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).

An examination of the record is required to see precisely what was given and what was

refused and whether the given instructions adequately embodied the defendant's theory. See United

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States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1979). In other words, it allows a determination

of whether what was given was so prejudicial as to infect the entire trial and so deny due process. 

Id.

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. 

See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 155 (1977)). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular

instruction bears an "'especially heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). The significance of the omission of such an instruction

may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255

F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156). 

It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on the

defense theory of the case. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny

defendant's request for instruction on simple kidnaping where such instruction was supported by the

evidence). Failure to instruct on the theory of defense violates due process if “‘the theory is legally

sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.’” Clark v. Brown, 442 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004)), amended by --- F.3d. ---,

2006 WL 1462274 (9th Cir., May 30, 2006). However, the defendant is not entitled to have jury

instructions raised in his or her precise terms where the given instructions adequately embody the

defense theory, United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996); Tsinnijinnie, 601

F.2d at 1040, nor to an instruction embodying the defense theory if the evidence does not support it,

Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1029. 

B. Analysis

In Claims IX and XVIII, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not instructing the

jury about the destruction of the dispatch tape to support his theory of racial profiling. Pet.,

Attachment at 120-123 and 192-197. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly excluded

evidence of the tape destruction, and properly refused to instruct the jury as to the tape destruction:

Appellant argues that, even if the tape were accidentally destroyed, the testimony

regarding defense efforts to obtain the tape would have helped avoid the adverse inference the

jury might draw if it believed the defense had made no such effort. The court did not abuse its

discretion, under Evidence Code section 352, by excluding this evidence on the grounds that it

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was collateral and not “particularly probative of anything.” The possibility that the jury would

draw an adverse inference from the failure of the defense to introduce the tape was remote,

especially in light of Officer Krupp’s testimony that such tapes are routinely destroyed within

four months. Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, in the absence of some evidence that the

contents of the dispatch tape would have supported appellant’s contention that Sarna had no

basis for stopping him, the offered testimony was not valuable as impeachment of Sarna.

Instead, at best, it was relevant only to a purely collateral issue, i.e., that the defense did try to

obtain the tape, but it was accidentally destroyed. The court reasonably concluded that it was

too time consuming to allow two witnesses to testify on this subject in light of its marginal

probative value on a collateral issue. (Evid. Code § 352.)

Appellant’s contention that the court erred by refusing to fashion an instruction based

upon Evidence Code section 413 and CALJIC No. 2.06 fails for the simple reason that no

evidence had been submitted to the jury that the police had willfully destroyed the tape. It is not

error to refuse an instruction not supported by the evidence. [Citation omitted.]

Slip Op. at 13-14.

Looking to the record, defense counsel was permitted to argue that physical evidence, such

as the latex gloves and the ski mask, had been conveniently and selectively destroyed to get rid of

potentially exculpatory evidence. Rep. Tr. 1037-1038. Defense counsel also suggested in closing

argument that Officer Sarna did not see Petitioner run the stop sign before pulling him over in the

traffic stop. Id. at 1039-1040. Although the jury was not given an instruction on racial profiling,

Petitioner was able to present his theory to the jury. Furthermore, Petitioner did not propose a

specific jury instruction as to racial profiling, or as to the absence of a dispatch tape. See Cl. Tr.

682-694 (Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions) and 722-726 (Defendant’s Additional Requested

CALJIC & Special Instructions)).

Thus, the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the dispatch tape did not infect the entire trial

so as to deny due process; as the Court of Appeal found, the destruction of the tape was, at most, a

collateral issue, with no evidence to suggest that the contents of the dispatch tape would support

Petitioner’s contention that Officer Sarna had no basis for stopping him. At trial, Petitioner took the

opportunity to impeach Officer Sarna and argue police misconduct to the jury. As no prejudicial

error resulted from the absence of Petitioner’s proposed jury instruction, habeas relief is denied.

X. Newly Discovered Evidence Re: Racial Profiling and Prosecutorial Misconduct

A. Legal Standard

The mere existence of newly discovered evidence relevant to guilt is not grounds for federal

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habeas relief. Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir.1990). "Claims of actual innocence

based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief

absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal

proceeding." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). Petitioner must show that the newly

discovered evidence probably would have resulted in his acquittal. Gordon, 895 F.2d at 614-615;

Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1980); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th

Cir. 1993). 

B. Analysis

In Claim X, Petitioner refers to studies and reports about accusations of racial profiling

against the Oakland Police Department. Apart from such “newly discovered evidence,” however,

Petitioner offers no independent constitutional basis for seeking federal habeas relief. Petitioner

does not show, for example, how the Oakland Police data would probably produce an acquittal. 

Petitioner already had the opportunity to present impeachment evidence against Officer Sarna and

argued police misconduct in closing argument. 

In Claim XI, Petitioner offers newly discovered evidence that Deputy District Attorney John

Jay procured false testimony in an unrelated capital murder trial. Pet., Attachment at 136-145. 

Petitioner does not demonstrate, however, that such evidence would probably result in his own

acquittal. 

Habeas relief is therefore denied as to these claims.

XI. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the

effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-

405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the

standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428,

1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A defendant

therefore must show that counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have

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prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Birtle,

792 F.2d at 849).

It is important to note that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983);

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The

weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate

advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (footnote and citations omitted). Appellate counsel

therefore will frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and have caused his

client no prejudice for the same reason--because he declined to raise a weak issue. See id. 

B. Analysis

In Claim XII, Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel, Carol Strickman, failed to raise

challenges based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel and to obtain transcripts of hearings held

on February 11, 1997 and May 9, 1997. Pet., Attachment at 146-163. As to the transcripts,

Petitioner admits that Ms. Strickman filed an application to augment the record, but the court

reporter certified that no hearings were held that day. Id. at 147-148. Though unsuccessful in

obtaining transcripts, Ms. Strickman’s efforts to obtain them, as alleged by Petitioner, do not

demonstrate unprofessional errors. As to the failure to raise issues on appeal, the only ineffective

assistance claim raised on appeal was based on trial counsel’s failure to obtain the police dispatch

tape. Ans., Ex. 8 (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 46-48). Although Ms. Strickman did not raise on

appeal several ineffective assistance claims raised here by Petitioner, such as trial counsel’s failure

to call defense witnesses, failure to investigate and prepare for trial, and misrepresentation of the

proffered plea bargain, those claims are without merit, as discussed in Section I, supra at 7-13. An

appellate lawyer's failure to raise a meritless claim is neither unreasonable nor prejudicial. See

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d at 1434. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel nor was he prejudiced by the manner in which his appeal was conducted. Habeas

relief is therefore denied as to this claim.

XII. Consolidation of Charges and Denial of Motion to Sever

A. Legal Standard

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A joinder, or denial of severance, of counts may prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render

his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370

(9th Cir. 1997); Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A federal court reviewing a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not concern itself

with state law governing severance or joinder in state trials. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. Nor is it

concerned with procedural right to severance afforded in federal trials. Id. Its inquiry is limited to

the petitioner's right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. To prevail, therefore, the

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court's joinder or denial of his severance motion resulted in

prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id. In addition, the impermissible

joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. 

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).

There is a "high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows evidence of

other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible." United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). This risk

is especially great when the prosecutor encourages the jury to consider the two sets of charges in

concert, e.g., as reflecting a modus operandi even though the evidence is not cross admissible, and

when the evidence of one crime is substantially weaker than the evidence of the other crime. Bean

v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1998). But joinder generally does not result in

prejudice if the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct (even if the evidence is not cross

admissible), and the jury is properly instructed so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at

1085-86; see, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2004) (denial of motion to

sever trial of capital and noncapital charges based on separate incidents not a violation of due

process because evidence was cross-admissible, the weight of evidence with respect to each incident

was roughly equal, the evidence as to each incident was distinct, and the jury was properly

instructed); Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 773 (given the strength of the State's case against petitioner on

both sets of murders and the cross-admissibility of the evidence on each set, petitioner's trial was not

actually prejudiced by the joinder). Similarly, joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the

jury did not convict on all counts because it presumably was able to compartmentalize the evidence. 

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Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Analysis

In Claim XIII, Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion

to consolidate the Owens burglary counts with the Handleman/Anderson burglary and firearm

possession charges (Cl. Tr. 248-250), and in denying his motion to sever the charges (Rep. Tr. 67).

Rejecting Petitioner’s claim on appeal, the California Court of Appeal found as follows:

We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the court’s decision to permit

consolidation, or with its refusal to sever the charges. Consolidation was proper because the

indictment charged appellant with burglary and receiving stolen property, which is the “same

class of crimes or offenses” alleged in the first information relating to the Handleman/Andersen

burglary. (Pen. Code, sec. 954.) Consolidation is favored because it promotes judicial

efficiency and avoids needless harassment of the defendant. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.

4th 353, 408-409.)

When the requirements for joinder are satisfied, appellant must make a “clear showing

of potential prejudice.” (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172.) Appellant did not meet

that burden. Cross-admissibility of evidence is no longer the “sine qua non of joint trials.” We

therefore need not decide whether the evidence was cross-admissible, because no other factors

suggesting prejudice are present. Neither the evidence of possession of multiple weapons, nor

the evidence of prior felony convictions was “unusually likely to inflame the jury.” (Id. at p.

172.) Appellant was charged only with possession of these weapons, which is far less

inflammatory than allegations that they were used in the commission of another offense. The

priors were also alleged with respect to the Owens burglary, and trial of the priors was

bifurcated. Nor were the charges with respect to the Owens burglary significantly weaker than

the Handleman/Andersen burglary charges such that the “aggregate evidence on several charges

might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges.” (Id. at pp. 172-173.) In the Owens

burglary, appellant was caught by the police in the act of carrying away property, and in the

Handleman/Andersen burglary, he was found in possession of the stolen property within hours

of the offense. With respect to the weapon charges, the indicia of possession were reasonably

strong, and because the possession charges were a different type of offense than the burglary,

it is doubtful that the evidence of the Owens burglary would have any “spillover” effect causing

the jury to find appellant guilty of the possession offenses merely because of the relative strength

of the evidence of the burglary charges.

Slip Op. at 5-6.

Here, there was no due process violation caused by the failure to sever the trial of the several

counts against Petitioner. Petitioner does not demonstrate that joinder had a substantial or injurious

effect or influence on the outcome. First, this was not a situation where a weak case was joined with

a strong case in hopes of a spill-over of the stronger case. As the Court of Appeal noted, there was

distinct evidence supporting the Owens burglary and the Handleman/Andersen burglary charges. 

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See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1085-1086 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, there was sufficient

evidence of possession of firearms, which was a separate offense from the burglaries, and there was

no allegation that he used the weapons in committing the burglaries. Second, the jury was given

limiting instructions, which the jury is presumed to have followed, that the charges were to be

considered separately. Rep. Tr. 1123-1124 (“Each count charges a distinct crime. You must decide

each count separately.”). See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). The state court’s denial

of Petitioner’s claim of erroneous joinder was not contrary to, or an unreasonable interpretation of,

established Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s claim is therefore denied.

XIII. Fourth Amendment Claims

In Claims XIV and XV, Petitioner challenges the searches of his car and home. These

Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 493-495 (1976).

XIV. In Camera Review of Discovery Hearing

In his Nineteenth Claim (labeled “Claim XX”), Petitioner requests that the Court review the

sealed records of Oakland Police Officers Sarna and Mathison, reviewed in camera by the trial

court. Pet., Attachment at 198-200. A request for in camera review of state court discovery

proceedings is not cognizable on federal habeas review. The Due Process Clause guarantees

fundamental fairness in a criminal trial, but does not establish the federal courts as a “rulemaking

organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

563-564 (1967). The Court of Appeal addressed Petitioner’s request for appellate review of the trial

court’s in camera hearing, and found no abuse of discretion. Slip Op. at 16. In his federal habeas

petition, Petitioner has not raised a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s discovery ruling, and

does not raise a cognizable habeas claim.

XV. Fair and Impartial Jury: Voir Dire

A. Legal Standard

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right stemming from the Sixth Amendment

to a fair and impartial jury pool composed of a cross section of the community. See Holland v.

Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Duncan v.

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Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-58 (1968). However, “[t]he Constitution does not always entitle a

defendant to have questions posed during Voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably

might prejudice veniremen against him.” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (finding

general inquiry about “any bias or prejudice” sufficient to satisfy due process, and specific

questioning about racial prejudice unnecessary). The trial court is granted wide discretion in

conducting voir dire in areas that might tend to show juror bias. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,

427 (1991). A court’s comment to the jury during voir dire that the case involved “a person who

came back in to the country after previously having been deported,” which was the crime the

defendant was charged with, survived plain error analysis, because the comment would have been

understood in context to describe the charges presented in the case and because the jury received

multiple instructions regarding the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence and the jury’s

duty to decide the facts. United States v. Mendoza-Reyes, 331 F. 3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Analysis

In his Twentieth Claim (the first of two claims labeled “Claim XXI”), Petitioner contends

that a potential juror’s comments during voir dire tainted the entire panel, and that the trial court

erred in its denial of Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial, denial of his request for a new panel, and

failure to further inquire into juror bias. Pet., Attachment at 201-208.

The Court of Appeal summarized the factual basis of Petitioner’s claim as follows:

During voir dire, one of the veniremen expressed doubt that he could be fair and

impartial because he had strong feelings regarding the charge of being a felon in possession of

a firearm. He then asked defense counsel why appellant was being allowed to handle the

confidential juror questionnaires, and objected that it was an invasion of his privacy. Defense

counsel asked if, based upon what the venireman knew about the case, he could be fair to

appellant, and the venireman replied, “No way could I.” At the end of his voir dire, defense

counsel asked if anyone else, with whom he had not spoken, felt he or she could not be fair. No

one responded.

Defense counsel moved to dismiss the panel, arguing that the venireman’s comments,

“injects an element of fear and intimidation. . . .” The court denied the motion because it found

the other jurors were not “in any way affected by him.” During further voir dire, the prosecutor

was able to elicit that the venireman did not have any problem with the attorneys using the

questionnaires, but did have a problem with appellant looking at them. The venireman added,

“I think everyone in this courtroom has that problem.” When asked by the prosecutor if his

concern was privacy, the venireman responded, “It should be for everyone in here.” The

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 venireman was subsequently excused for cause, and after exercising peremptory challenges and

engaging in further voir dire, the jury was sworn.

After the jury was excused, appellant renewed his motion to dismiss the panel and moved

for a mistrial, arguing that the questions by the district attorney had underscored the grounds for

fear and intimidation suggested by the venireman. The court denied the motion, explaining that

it found the venireman in question was a “rather excitable gentleman” who “felt that everybody

ought to be concerned, But there was not manifested as best as I could tell the same concerns.

I don’t think that the jury has been impacted. I don’t see where there is anything that’s come out

with respect to the group that we have which indicates that they would be anything other than

. . . fair and impartial.”

Slip Op. at 17-18.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court had no duty to conduct further voir dire, and found

no abuse of discretion in failing to do so:

Appellant argues that the court’s failure to conduct further voir dire to ascertain whether

the ability of other potential jurors to be impartial had been tainted by hearing one person

express concern about appellant handling the questionnaires, is reversible error. We find no

abuse of discretion with respect to the court’s decision not to conduct further voir dire. [Citation

omitted.] The court reasonably inferred that the other jurors were not influenced by the

venireman’s comments when no one responded to appellant’s counsel’s general inquiry whether

any prospective juror believed he or she could not be impartial. When the venireman, in

response to the prosecutor’s voir dire, asserted that privacy should be the concern of “everyone

here,” the trial court, based upon its immediate perceptions, determined that despite the

venireman’s personal belief that everyone should be concerned, he was an “excitable person,”

and the views he stated were his alone. The court also reasonably concluded that conducting

further voir dire on the subject ran the risk of giving too much credence to the venireman’s

expressed concerns, [Footnote: Appellant had, in fact, objected that the prosecutor, by

questioning the venireman further about the basis for his concern in an apparent attempt to

rehabilitate him, instead reinforced in the other prospective jurors’ minds that they had reason

to be concerned.] and that any taint was eliminated by excusing him for cause.

The cases relied upon by appellant concern the quite different circumstance where the

court precludes any inquiry into certain areas. [Citations omitted.]

Here, appellant’s counsel was not precluded from conducting inquiry on the question

whether other jurors were influenced by the suggestion that appellant’s handling of the juror

questionnaires was grounds for jurors to feel fear or intimidation. He ascertained, at least

generally, during his voir dire that no one else believed they could not be fair and impartial.

Nothing prevented him from specifically asking whether jurors were affected by these

statements. The trial court was in a better position than this court, based upon its immediate

perceptions, to assess whether the prosecution’s subsequent questions revived the issue and

renewed the possibility of taint. We find no abuse of discretion in its determination that the

prosecution’s questions did not revive the issue, and that by excusing the venireman for cause,

appellant’s right to a fair and impartial jury was protected.

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Slip Op. at 18-19.

Petitioner suggests that the venireman’s concerns may have been due to racial prejudice, and

that the trial court should have further inquired into this possible bias or discharged the whole panel. 

Pet., Attachment at 206-207. The record reflects, however, that the trial court allowed both the

prosecution and defense counsel to ask the entire venire of jurors about whether they could not be

fair to Petitioner. See Ans., Ex. 3A (11/13/97 Tr.) at 27, 43, 57-58. This questioning adequately

covers the potential biases that may have been similarly held by the other jurors, and whether they

had “such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.” Mu’Min,

500 U.S. at 430. Under these circumstances, additional questioning was not required and the voir

dire examination was consistent with due process. See id. at 430-432. Furthermore, the trial court

excused the venireman for cause and proceeded with jury selection. See Ans., Ex. 3A (11/13/97 Tr.)

at 82, 85. In denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the panel and for a mistrial after the jury was

impaneled, the trial court found that the other jurors did not share the venireman’s concerns. Id. at

105. In this context, the trial court did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. See Mendoza-Reyes, 331

F.3d at 1121. The state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to the

writ on this claim.

XVI. Jury Instructions

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated by the trial court’s refusal to

instruct the jury on the claim-of-right defense as to Counts 7 and 8 on the Owens burglary (TwentyFirst Claim, which is the second claim entitled “Claim XXI”); refusal to instruct on the proof of

possession on the firearms charges, Counts 3, 4 and 6 (Claim XXII); and the instruction from

CALJIC 2.15 concerning corroborating evidence of possession of stolen property (Claim XXIII).

As discussed in Section IX.A, supra at 27-28, a criminal defendant has a due process right to

adequate instructions on his theory of the case, and is entitled to an instruction if the evidence

supports it. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d at 739; Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. at 611.

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A. Claim-Of-Right Defense (Twenty-First Claim: Claim XXI)

The trial court refused Petitioner’s proposed instruction on the claim-of-right defense, i.e.,

that “defendant’s honest belief, even if mistakenly held, that he had a right of claim to the property

taken negates the felonious intent necessary to convict him of burglary [or theft].” Cl. Tr. 689. 

Petitioner argues that this instruction was supported by Owens’ testimony acknowledging that he

owed Petitioner under their contract for studio recording services. Pet., Attachment at 214. 

Addressing Petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to his

claim-of-right defense, the Court of Appeal held that “the trial court properly refused the requested

instruction because ‘a trial court is not required to instruct on a claim-of-right defense unless there is

evidence to support an inference that appellant acted with a subjective belief he or she had a lawful

claim on the property.’” Slip Op. at 21-22 (citation omitted).

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not support the inference that Petitioner had a

bona fide belief in a lawful claim to the property he took: “according to Owens, appellant had paid

only $320 for the recording time, yet the items he removed from Owens’s home included two

keyboards worth $1,000 and $1,800, respectively, and a bass worth $2,000. The huge disparity

between the value of the alleged debt, and the property appellant took, undermines any reasonable

inference that appellant had a bona fide belief that he had a legal claim to the property he took.” Id.

at 22 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, Owens admitted that he failed to give Petitioner’s taperecording to him, giving it instead to a third party without Petitioner’s knowledge or consent. Rep.

Tr. at 734-737. However, as the prosecution argued to the trial judge, Petitioner, took items of value

not specifically related to the tape-recording that was allegedly owed to him. See Rep. Tr. 971-973. 

People v. Alvarado, 133 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1022 (1 Dist., 1982). Under these circumstances, the

evidence presented did not support a claim-of right defense, and, consequently, the absence of a

claim-or-right instruction did not deprive Petitioner of due process.

 B. Proof of Possession (Claim XXII)

The trial court also rejected Petitioner’s requested instructions, concerning the possession of

firearms counts, that (1) proof of access to a thing, without more, is insufficient to support a finding

of possession; and (2) when the premises are shared by more than one person, mere proximity to

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contraband, presence on the property, and association with a person or persons having control of it

are all insufficient to establish constructive possession. Pet., Attachment at 218-219; Cl. Tr. 699;

Rep. Tr. 964. 

The state appellate court found that the trial court “properly rejected these pinpoint

instructions as argumentative and potentially misleading because they identified particular evidence

submitted by the prosecution to support the inference that appellant knowingly excised dominion

and control, and could have been understood as telling the jury it could not draw an inference

unfavorable to appellant based upon this specific evidence.” Slip Op. at 24 (citation omitted). The

Court of Appeal also found that any error in excluding these instructions was harmless, “because

appellant could, and did, make his argument that the evidence did not support the inference that he

knowingly exercised dominion and control under the standard instructions.” Id. 

Looking to the evidence presented as well as the overall instructions received by the jury,

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d at 745, the firearms were found at a place where Petitioner shared

access with others, including his mother and grandmother who lived in the apartment, Ms. James

who occasionally stayed there, Petitioner’s mother’s cousin, Mr. Wesley, and his brother, and

Petitioner’s friend, L.A. See Rep. Tr. 390-394, 455, 485, 491-500, 520-529, 532, 599). The Cobray

handgun described in Count 4 was found in the closet of a bedroom allegedly shared with Ms. James

(Rep. Tr. 408-409, 412, 414, 586-588); the assault rifle (Count 3) was found in an armoire behind

men’s clothing belonging to Petitioner’s male relatives (Rep. Tr. 395-403, 432, 496, 526); the loaded

.357 handgun (Count 6) was found during a second search of the home, in the bedroom, hidden

between the mattresses and the bed (Rep. Tr. 445-446). 

The evidence presented at trial supported an instruction as to shared access to the rooms

where the firearms were found, but the instructions given adequately encompassed the theory of the

defense. The trial court gave general instructions on actual and constructive possession, including

the following: “Constructive possession does not require actual possession but does require that a

person knowingly exercise control or the right to control a thing, either directly or through another

person or persons. One person may have possession alone, or two or more persons together may

share actual or constructive possession.” Rep. Tr. 1111; Cl. Tr. 786. These instructions adequately

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encompass the defense theory that Petitioner did not exercise control over the firearms. See Duckett,

67 F.3d at 743-746. 

Even if the omission of Petitioner’s proposed instructions constituted error, however, such

error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

See Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Brecht analysis to claim of

instructional error). The instructions given effectively covered Petitioner’s defense that despite his

access to the home, he did not knowingly exercise control over the firearms. Petitioner presented at

trial evidence that others had access to the rooms where the firearms were kept. Furthermore,

defense counsel argued in closing that the evidence did not support the inference that Petitioner

knowingly exercised dominion and control over the firearms. See Rep. Tr. 1068-1069. As for the

prosecution’s argument that Petitioner need not have exclusive dominion and control over a weapon,

the Court of Appeal correctly noted that the prosecutor did not invite the jury to find Petitioner

guilty without finding that he “knowingly exercised dominion and control,” as the jury was

instructed. Rather, the prosecutor explained that evidence of another person’s dominion and control

over the guns did not preclude the jury from finding that Petitioner also knowingly exercised such

dominion and control. Slip Op. at 24 n.9. Accordingly, the omission of the proposed instructions on

possession did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, and habeas relief is not

warranted on this claim.

C. CALJIC 2.15

As to his conviction on the burglary counts, Petitioner challenges the italicized portion of

CALJIC 2.15 as permitting a conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt:

If you find that a defendant was in conscious possession of recently [stolen] property, the

fact of such possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant Donald

Randolph is guilty of the crime of 459. Before guilt may be inferred, there must be

corroborating evidence tending to prove defendant’s guilt. However, this corroborating

evidence need only be slight, and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.

Pet., Attachment at 224; Rep. Tr. 1114; Cl. Tr. 762.

The Court of Appeal held that Petitioner’s arguments challenging CALJIC 2.15 as lessening

the burden of proof had been considered and rejected in numerous other decisions by the California

Supreme Court and state appellate courts. Slip Op. at 24-25 (citing, inter alia, People v. Holt, 15

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Cal. 4th 619, 676-677 (no reasonable probability that jury would interpret CALJIC No. 2.15 as

meaning it “need not find all of the statutory elements of burglary and robbery had been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt”). 

Considering the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, here, in addition to

the challenged instruction, the trial court also instructed the jury as to the prosecution’s correct

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cl. Tr. 779-780. There was no violation of due

process by reason of use of CALJIC No. 2.15 because, considering the instructions as a whole, the

prosecution was not relieved of its obligation to prove every fact beyond a reasonable doubt. No

habeas relief is warranted on this claim.

XVII. Amendment of Indictment

A. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment guarantees fair notice of all charges. Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d

1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Amendment requires that an information state the “elements

of the offense charged with sufficient clarity to apprise the defendant what to defend against.” Id.;

see also James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24-26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Analysis

In his Twenty-Fourth Claim (entitled “XIV”), Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in

amending the indictment to allege a bail enhancement pursuant to Penal Code Section 12022.1 with

the Owens burglary charge (Count 7), in addition to the Section 12022.1 enhancement already

alleged with respect to the charge of receiving Owens’ stolen property (Count 8). Pet., Attachment

at 230-232 (“at the time of the commission of the above offense had been released from custody on

BAIL pending trial on an earlier felony offense”) (citing Cl. Tr. 191). Petitioner argues that the

court violated Section 1009 of the Penal Code, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n

indictment or accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged, nor an information

so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.”

The Court of Appeal held that the court did not err because Penal Code section 1009 does not

apply to an amendment to add a sentencing enhancement. Slip Op. at 30. “The section 12022.1

enhancement is not an element of either the burglary or the receiving stolen property offenses

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charged in the indictment, and therefore the court did not err in permitting the amendment.” Id. As

the Supreme Court stated in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, “[a]n indictment must set forth

each element of the crime that it charges. [Citation omitted.] But it need not set forth factors relevant

only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.” 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). 

The addition of the enhancement to the Owens burglary charge did not add to the elements of the

charged burglary offense, and did not violate Petitioner’s right to fair notice of all charges,

particularly where the enhancement already had been alleged as to a separate count. The state

court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. All pending

motions are terminated and the clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 18, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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