Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05926/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05926-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1/

 Petitioner was sentenced to 30 years to life on Count 1. The court also imposed additional 25

years to life sentences on each of Counts 2 and 3 but stayed those sentences under CAL. PEN. CODE § 654.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTURO ARMENDARIZ-CARMONA,

Petitioner,

vs.

DERRAL ADAMS (Warden),

Respondent.

No. 1:02-cv-05926-JKS(HC)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Arturo Armendariz-Carmona has filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a term of 30 years to life; 25 years to life, plus five

one-year enhancements under CAL. PEN. CODE § 667.5(b). Petitioner was charged with three

counts: Count 1, driving under the influence causing injury to another person (CAL. VEH. CODE §

23153(a)); Count 2, driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level greater than .08% causing

injury to another person (CAL VEH. CODE § 23153(b)); and (3) felony “hit and run” (CAL. VEH.

CODE § 20001(a). Petitioner was also charged with two prior “strikes” and six prior prison term

enhancements. After jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty on all three counts and five of the

prison term enhancements found true.1/

 Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California

Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction on December 14, 2000 in an unpublished written

opinion. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review on February 21, 2001. 

Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court and his conviction

became final 90 days later, May 22, 2001. See Wixom v Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th

Cir.2001). Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme

Court on November 26, 2001, which was summarily denied without opinion or citation to

authority on May 15, 2002. Petitioner timely filed his petition in this Court on July 29, 2002.

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 2

The history of this case and the facts are well known to the parties and are set forth in

detail in the opinion of the California Court of Appeals. In the interests of brevity they are not

repeated here.

Petitioner raises five claims in his petition. (1) The California “three-strikes” law is

unconstitutional and his sentence was disproportionate and constituted cruel and unusual

punishment. (2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (3) Illegal conviction of multiple crimes

out of a single act or occurrence. (4) Prosecutorial misconduct. (5) Ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Petitioner raised his first (disproportionate sentence) and second (ineffective

assistance of trial counsel) on direct appeal. All five claims presented in the petition before this

Court were also presented to the California Supreme Court in his petition for habeas corpus filed

in that court.

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of

review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the

California Court of Appeal was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” at the time

the state court renders its decision or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003)

(explaining this standard). In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned

decision by the state court, Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004), which in

this case was that of the California Court of Appeal. In addition, the state court's findings of fact

are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). When there

is no reasoned state court decision denying an issue presented to the state court and raised in a

federal habeas petition, this Court must assume that the state court decided all the issues

presented to it and perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state

court decision was objectively unreasonable. Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th

Cir.2006); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam).

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 2 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 3

Claim 1 (Disproportionate Sentence).

First, the United States Supreme Court has upheld California’s “three-strikes” law as

constitutional. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 

Thus, on that issue, Petitioner’s argument is foreclosed. To the extent Petitioner alleges a

violation of the California Constitution, it is beyond the purview of this Court’s jurisdiction to

review the interpretation of state law. This Court may only address violations of federal law. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“We have stated many times

that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. Today, we reemphasize that

it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on statelaw questions.”) (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Although Petitioner received a severe sentence and the Eighth Amendment prohibits

sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime, “outside the context of capital

punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be

exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (internal alternations and

emphasis omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime’ violate the Eighth Amendment.” Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992).

To determine proportionality, a court must examine: “(1) ‘the gravity of the offense and the

harshness of the penalty’; (2) ‘the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction’;

and may include (3) ‘the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other

jurisdictions.’” Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92). Balanced

against the proportionality principle is the corollary principle that the determination of prison

sentences is a legislative prerogative not within the province of the courts. Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980). Also, as noted in 1991, the decisions of the Supreme Court

regarding proportionality to that time had not always been clear or consistent in all respects and

its precise contours unclear. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J.

concurring). It is against this backdrop of the law as it existed at the time the California courts

rendered their decisions that those decisions must be examined.

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 3 of 16
2/

 The record indicates this conviction was for an offense that occurred while Petitioner was a

juvenile. The record also shows that Petitioner also already had a problem with alcohol. Petitioner was

committed to the custody of the California Youth Authority for a period of three years. Two other

burglary charges were dismissed in exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea.

3/

 Sentenced to three years imprisonment after revocation of probation.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 4

In disposing of his argument that his sentence was unduly harsh and constituted a

disproportionate sentence constituting cruel and unusual punishment, the Court of Appeal held:

Imposing a Sentence of 30 Years to Life Did Not Represent Cruel and

Unusual Punishment

Finally, Carmona argues imposing a sentence of 30 years to life under the three

strikes law for violating section 23153 constituted cruel and unusual punishment,

particularly since “only extremely minor injuries” resulted from the present

crime. He contends the three strikes law is unconstitutional on its face and as

applied to him.

As noted above, the purpose of the three strikes law is not to subject a criminal

defendant to a long sentence merely on the basis of the latest offense. Rather, the

purpose is to punish recidivist behavior. In People v. Cooper (1996) 43

Cal.App.4th 815, 820-830, this court rejected attacks on the constitutionality of

the three strikes law similar to those made by Carmona. We find our holding in

Cooper controlling in this case.

And when we survey the length of Carmona's criminal record, we cannot say his

present sentence is grossly disproportionate to his criminality, which has gone

unabated for over 20 years, despite five previous prison terms. Nor do we accept

Carmona's assertion he currently stands convicted of “relatively minor offenses.”

As the trial court noted, the drunken driving here resulted in a serious crime, one

that had potential for grave, even fatal, consequences. That the victim was not

hurt worse can be attributed to his youthful alertness and agility, and good

fortune, not to any inherent lack of danger in the unheeding actions of Carmona.

Under these circumstances, imposition of a sentence of 30 years to life is neither

cruel nor unusual punishment under either the state or federal Constitutions.

Petitioner had an extensive prior criminal history of felony convictions spanning nearly

20 years. The record shows seven felony convictions with sentences totaling 17 years and four

months: (1) May 1979 – Residential Burglary (CAL. PEN. CODE § 459);2/

 (2) January 1981 –

Grand Theft (CAL. PEN. CODE § 487.2);3/

 (3) September 1984 – Residential Burglary (CAL. PEN

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 4 of 16
4/

 Sentenced to four years imprisonment.

5/

 Sentenced to two years imprisonment.

6/

 Sentenced to two years imprisonment.

7/

 Sentenced to 16 months imprisonment.

8/

 Sentenced to three years imprisonment with a one year enhancement for a total of four years.

9/

 The Information charges a prior violation of CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (“straight” driving under

the influence), however the jury found that to be untrue.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 5

CODE § 459);4/ (4) March 1986 – Possession of a Deadly Weapon (CAL. PEN. CODE § 4502);5/ (5)

October 1988 – Burglary (CAL. PEN. CODE § 460.2);6/

 (6) January 1992 – Petty Theft with prior

convictions (CAL. PEN. CODE § 666);7/ and (7) March 1994 – Petty Theft with prior conviction

(CAL. PEN. CODE § 666).8/ The record also shows that during the 10-year period preceding the

offense in the case at bar Petitioner’s parole was revoked at least three times: April 1990;

January 1994; and July 1998. Indeed, Petitioner was on parole at the time he committed the

offense for which he was convicted in this case.

Although a violation of CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 may not be considered a crime of

violence, see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2004) and United States v. TrinidadAcquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (construing the statutory definition of a crime of

violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16), drunk driving is a nationwide problem, Leocal, 543 U.S. at 13. For

a first offense, absent application of California’s “three strikes” law, Petitioner would have been

sentenced to not less than 90 days and not more than one year.9/ CAL VEH. CODE § 23554. For

his conviction for felony hit and run, Petitioner would have received a sentence of not more than

one year. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20001(b). Thus, the issue becomes whether a sentence 25 times as

long is, under all the facts and circumstances, sufficiently disproportionate to constitute one of

those rare and an unusual cases falling within the proscription of the Eighth Amendment.

Initially the Court looks to Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin for guidance. In Rummel, the

Supreme Court rejected the argument that a life sentence with possibility of parole upon

conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses violated the Eighth Amendment where the

defendant’s criminal history consisted solely of the fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80

worth of goods and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. In Solem the Supreme

Court found a sentence of life without possibility of parole upon conviction of uttering a no

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 5 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 6

account check for $100 based on a criminal history of seven nonviolent felonies violated the

Eighth Amendment. In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld against an Eighth Amendment

challenge a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole upon conviction for possession

of more than 650 grams of cocaine without consideration of mitigating factors, such as fact the

defendant had no prior felony convictions.

The Court has also compared this case to three decisions of the Ninth Circuit: Reyes v.

Brown, 399 F.3d 964 (9th Cir.2005); Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.2004); and Ramirez

v. Castro, 365 F.3d 964 (9th Cir.2004).

In Rios the Ninth Circuit upheld a sentence of 25 years to life under California’s “three

strikes” law where the defendant was convicted of felony petty theft where he struggled with the

loss prevention officer and tried to avoid apprehension for the petty theft and in light of the fact

that because his cohort used a knife his two prior robbery “strikes” involved the threat of

violence.

In Ramirez the defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life under California’s “three

strikes” law for his third shoplifting offense. The Ninth Circuit, in a 2 –1 decision, found that his

sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. The core conduct of petitioner's

third offense, his nonviolent shoplift of a $199 VCR, was a misdemeanor petty theft punishable

by up to six months in county jail and petitioner's prior criminal history was comprised solely of

two convictions for second-degree robbery obtained through a single guilty plea, for which his

total sentence was one year in county jail and three years probation.

In Reyes the defendant was convicted for perjury for filing a false driver’s license

application and sentenced to 26 years to life under California’s “three strikes” law. The Ninth

Circuit in a 2 – 1 decision remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant’s

prior armed robbery offense was a crime against a person or involved violence, and thus justified

his extreme sentence for perjury; neither perjury offense of falsifying driver's license application

nor petitioner's other prior conviction as juvenile for an apparently nonviolent residential

burglary threatened grave harm to society for purposes of justifying extreme sentence. The

Reyes majority also noted that although Reyes was convicted for perjury, a felony, the fact that

the California Legislature also provided that the specific act of which Reyes was convicted, a

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 6 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 7

false statement on a driver’s license, was a misdemeanor indicated his offense “is viewed by

society as among the less serious offenses.” 399 F.3d at 967 n. 4.

When measured against the facts of this case, Reyes–Rameriz–Rios are not particularly

illuminating or helpful. Although not technically a crime of violence, it is beyond cavil that the

offense for which Petitioner was convicted and sentenced, driving under the influence, posed a

significant risk of causing serious bodily injury or death to a third person. Also, although not

crimes of violence, Petitioner’s criminal history shows that he is a hard-core career criminal, a

recidivist whose prior incarcerations, which, together with his periods on parole, consumed his

entire adult life, clearly shows that Petitioner is “incapable of conforming to the norms of society

as established by its criminal law,” a legitimate penological goal the Court must take into

consideration. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (plurality), Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276.

The California Court of Appeals clearly considered the appropriate factors in determining

that Petitioner’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In light of the

Supreme Court decisions in Rummel and Harmelin, this Court can not say, based upon the facts

presented to it, that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor can this

Court find that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the correct legal principle to

the facts of the prisoner's case as required by Lockyer–Williams; i.e., the state court decision was

more than incorrect or erroneous, its application of clearly established law was objectively

unreasonable. Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Claim 1.

Claim 2 (Ineffective Trial Counsel).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both that his

counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one in which

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment. Id. Petitioner must show that defense counsel's representation was not within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and that there is a reasonable

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 7 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 8

probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result would have been different. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).

In his direct appeal Petitioner addressed but a single lapse of trial counsel, i.e., that

during argument to the jury trial counsel referred to the driver of the car as “him” (the defense

being that Petitioner’s girl friend, not Petitioner, was the driver). In disposing of that argument

the Court of Appeal held:

Carmona Did Not Suffer Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Carmona's defense at trial was that his girlfriend, Benay, was driving the Cadillac,

not he. However, during closing argument, Carmona's attorney offered the

following:

“[Grimley] sees the car, and he sees him go through. He saw the car. He comes

back on the street, still in a cloud of dust. [¶I He's three hundred forty feet away

.... That's not where he can see him, but he's three hundred forty feet away when

he's getting out of the cloud of dust and getting back on the street.

“He follows him. And he can't be following them as closely as he said.. . .

“He can't be following all that close, ... So he was a little ways behind him.”

In this way, Carmona contends, his counsel argued-against him at trial, placing

him, rather than Benay, behind the wheel. By thus undermining his defense, the

statement violated his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and

due process of law. We are not persuaded.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must "establish not

only deficient performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard of

reasonableness, but also resultant prejudice. [Citation.].” (People v. Bolin (1998)

18 Cal.4th 297, 333 .) “[Plrejudice must be affirmatively proved; the record must

demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” (Ibid., citing

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,694, and People v. Ledesma

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)

We have difficulty finding ineffective assistance in the juxtaposition of pronouns

in five or six lines of a thoroughgoing argument filling almost 20 pages of record. 

Carmona himself characterizes the words as “a lapse,” and we think it likely the

jury considered it similarly, if they considered it at all.

However, we need not belabor the significance of a few phrases, since Carmona

cannot show resulting prejudice on this record. Given the evidence against

Carrnona, a different outcome was not reasonably likely in this matter. One

eyewitness decidedly placed Carmona in the driver's seat. This witness just as

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 8 of 16
10/

 Interestingly, in both his habeas petition to the California Supreme Court and before this Court

Petitioner in one breath claims his defense was two-fold: he was not driving and the brakes malfunctioned

and in another that he was not the driver was his “entire defense.” How the condition of the brakes is

relevant to his defense of the charges of which stood accused is unexplained and inexplicable. If he was

not driving, whether the brakes malfunctioned or not was irrelevant. On the other hand, if he was driving,

whether the brakes failed or not Petitioner was driving while intoxicated, which resulted in bodily injury.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 9

decidedly placed a female matching Benay's description in the passenger seat, and

not in the driver's seat. On finally stopping, Carmona was observed to be crawling

across the front seat to exit the passenger door, a journey that would seem

necessary only had he been in the driver's seat. The Cadillac was registered to

Carmona, and police found the keys to the vehicle in his front pants pocket.

Balanced against the evidence detrimental to Carmona was very little. Benay and

Connie premised their story upon Carmona's entering the moving car through the

sunroof, which was open only approximately four to five inches. The record

reflects, and the jurors would have been able to observe for themselves, that

Carmona was approximately 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 170 pounds.

Carmona's entire defense thus rested on the jury's accepting an assertion so

unlikely physically as to be inherently incredible.

Given the state of the evidence, a differing outcome in this matter was not

reasonably probable. Absent prejudice, then, Carmona cannot be said to have

suffered ineffective assistance of counsel.

This Court can not say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor

can this Court find that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the correct legal

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case as required by Lockyer–Williams; i.e., the state court

decision was more than incorrect or erroneous, its application of clearly established law was

objectively unreasonable.

However, inquiry does not end here. In his petition to this Court as well as his habeas

petition to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner recites a whole litany of items he alleges trial

counsel failed to do. In particular Petitioner complains about the lack of investigation into and

cross-examination of witness with respect to the issue of whether the brakes malfunctioned.10/

 He

also complains that trial counsel did not interview the principal defense witness, Benay

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 9 of 16
11/

 Mr. Grumling testified that he observed the car before the accident and that, although he could

not see their faces, the person sitting in the passenger seat was a female. He further testified that when he

first observed Petitioner’s vehicle after it stopped, he observed the female passenger outside the vehicle

with the passenger door open and Petitioner crawling out through the passenger side door.

12/

 Every lawyer who has ever tried a case has looked back at some later time and wondered what

other questions might or even, perhaps, should have been asked.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 10

Tiscareno, who the defense asserted was the driver. What this might have accomplished, given

the inherent implausibility of her testimony, is left to surmise and speculation.

Petitioner also criticizes trial counsel’s cross-examination of a principal prosecution

witness, Dennis Grumling, asserting that he should have asked whether he wore glasses, had

been drinking, or was coming from work and was, perhaps, exhausted.11/

 Petitioner also points

to the fact that Mr. Grumling had difficulty in seeing a chart in the court room, therefore,

according to Petitioner, trial counsel should have questioned his ability to see who was in the

vehicle from a greater distance. How, given the difference in the settings and the obvious

difference in the size of chart in a courtroom and a person in a vehicle, this raises a question as to

the witnesses sight is a mystery Petitioner leaves unsolved. A review of Mr. Grumling’s

testimony, including cross-examination, reveals that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined

him on every inconsistency between his testimony at the preliminary hearing and that at the trial. 

Even assuming that it might have been productive to have asked the witness those questions,12/ it

was, at best, tangential to the credibility of the testimony.

Petitioner also complains that trial counsel was demeaning of defense witnesses, e.g.,

referring to them in closing argument as being “dumber than rocks.” A review of the comments

made, taken in context, clearly indicates they were made to convince the jury that the two

witnesses were too unsophisticated or unintelligent to fabricate their testimony. Given, as the

California Court of Appeal noted, the inherent implausibility of their testimony concerning how

Petitioner entered the vehicle, trial counsel obviously made a tactical decision in an attempt to

make them credible. Strickland and its progeny do not mandate this court act as a “Monday

morning quarterback” in reviewing tactical decisions. Indeed, the Supreme Court admonished in

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted):

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too

tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 10 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 11

adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense

after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of

counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties

inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. 

There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even

the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the

same way.

Petitioner also complains that trial counsel did not object to an admonition to the jury

concerning the testimony of a defense witness that corrected her testimony that she had been in

court in which there had been an earlier acquittal in the case. The trial judge informed the jury:

I do want to clear up one thing, though, that one witness testified to

yesterday, get it cleared up now while we think about it, that is that Ms. Garcia

had testified that she had been in court previously when the defendant was

acquitted. That is not correct. I don’t know where she was or what she was

doing, because this case has never gone to trial. She was not in court at any time

the defendant was acquitted. This is the first trial on this particular case with this

defendant.

Petitioner does not elaborate on the nature of the objection that trial counsel could have made to

the admonition. Even if it had the effect of making the witness appear to be a liar, as Petitioner

contends, the witness was unmistakably mistaken and the truth was evident from the record, of

which the court properly took judicial notice.

Finally, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine the eightyear old child whose injury formed the basis for the CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 charge of causing

“bodily injury to another person.” Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have

delved deeper into whether the child suffered earlier injuries or fell while skateboarding, which,

instead of being struck by the vehicle, might have caused his injuries. The record indicates that

there was no cross-examination. The Court has reviewed the testimony of the child. Distilled to

its essence, his testimony was that: (1) he was sitting on a bench when he saw the car coming

towards him; (2) he got up and attempted to get out of the way, slipped on the wood and fell on

his back; and (3) suffered a scape on his elbow and his back. He also testified that he thought he

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 11 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 12

had fallen on some stuff from the bench and, further, that he fallen and hurt himself before from

skateboarding. Petitioner fails to make any significant showing of what cross-examination might

have established. As any experienced trial counsel knows, cross-examination of a young child

is, at best, a sensitive endeavor and must be approached with extreme caution lest one antagonize

a jury. No evidence in the record even remotely suggests that the testimony of the child was

other than truthful. Of particular import is the testimony that the child fell while attempting to

get away from the car that was not only coming down on him but did, in fact, hit the bench upon

which he had been sitting. It is more likely than not that trial counsel decided the best tactic was

to leave well enough alone.

The Court has considered Petitioner’s other points and finds them to be either de minimis

or unsupported by the record. Having reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding the adequacy

of his defense counsel at trial, the Court must conclude that, even if they constituted errors in

judgment, they do not rise to the level of incompetence or have the prejudicial effect, either

individually or cumulatively, of sufficient magnitude to satisfy the Strickland-Hill test. 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Claim 2.

Claim 3 (Multiple convictions and punishments from a single act).

In his habeas petition filed in this Court as well as his petition to the California Supreme

Court, Petitioner argues that his conviction of on Counts 1 (CAL VEH. CODE § 23153(a) – driving

under the influence and causing injury to another person) and 2 (CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153(b) –

driving with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08% and causing injury to another person) of

the information constituted an impermissible conviction and punishment of two crimes arising

out of the same act under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Under California law, a person may be convicted under both 23153(a) and (b). However,

he or she may not receive multiple punishments when there is a single act or an indivisible

course of conduct. CAL. PEN. CODE § 654; People v. Oates, 88 P.3d 56, 64 (Cal.2004). In the

case where, as here, the defendant is convicted of both § 23153(a) and (b), the proper procedure

is to stay execution of the sentence on the conviction for violation of § 23153(b). See People v.

Duarte, 207 Cal.Rptr. 615, 621 (Cal.App.1984). That is the procedure followed by the

California courts in the case at bar, i.e., the sentencing court stayed the sentence imposed on

Count 2. 

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 12 of 16
13/

 The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit held that application of § 654, as amended in 2000,

could not be applied to an offense committed prior to the effective date of that amendment as it would

violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. Williams v. Roe, 421 F.3d 883, 886-87 (9th

Cir.2005). That infirmity is not present in this case.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 13

Petitioner does not cite and independent research by the Court did not discover any

federal law, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 as applied in

this case, violated.13/ There being no federal question presented, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

under Claim 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Estelle v. McGuire, supra.

Claim 4 (Prosecutorial misconduct)

On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the standard of review for a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of

supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). Thus, to succeed, Petitioner must demonstrate that it

“so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Under “the narrow [standard] of due process,” in contrast to the

“broad exercise of supervisory power,” relief is not appropriate in situations where, for example,

the prosecutor's conduct “did not manipulate or misstate the evidence” or “implicate other

specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.” Darden,

477 U.S. at 181–82. It is axiomatic that in a criminal trial both counsel have a duty and

obligation to refrain from (1) interjecting their personal beliefs in the presentation of their

respective cases and (2) making unfounded and inflammatory remarks on the opposing advocate.

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985). However, as the Supreme Court also noted in

Young, “[t]he line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily drawn; there is

often a gray zone.” 470 U.S. at 7.

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by references to

the differences in the age of Petitioner (38) and a principal witness (17) and attempts to establish

the existence of a relationship between them. Petitioner also complains that the prosecutor

impermissibly vouched for its witnesses and implied that the defense witnesses were liars. For

the reasons that follow, the Court finds Petitioner’s arguments to be without merit.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 14

First, Petitioner does not clearly articulate just how the references to the age difference

between Petitioner and the principal defense witness inflamed the jury or caused it to be

prejudiced against him. Certainly, the prosecution attempted to establish the existence of a

relationship and the nature of that relationship as a means to undermine her credibility. That the

prosecutor attempts to establish a motive for the witness to be less than truthful is not

prosecutorial misconduct.

A prosecutor improperly vouches for a witness where the prosecutor impresses on the

jury the prosecutor's own belief in the witness's credibility. See United States v. Edwards, 154

F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir.1998). However, it is also recognized that it “is neither unusual nor

improper for the prosecutor to voice doubt about the veracity of a defendant who has taken the

stand,” United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th Cir.1984), and that, in “instances of flatly

contradictory testimony on important issues ... it [is] proper for the government to argue that the

jury ought not to believe the [defendant’s] version,” United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440,

1445 (9th Cir.1991). In Molina, in which an informant’s testimony conflicted directly with the

defendant’s testimony on “important” issues, the Ninth Circuit approved as reasonable a

prosecutorial closing far stronger than the one at issue here because “the inference [was]

unavoidable that ‘somebody is lying.’” Id.

On the claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for his witness, Petitioner points to

the following:

Now, what about Mr. Grumling?

How about Mr. Grumling? I think he’s a prime example of why people

don’t want to get involved in situations like this, because you are going to get

grilled and you’re going to get accused of things.

And:

Why would Mr. Grumling lie about these things? He has no motive. he was

actually doing a good thing that day. That doesn’t change the fact that defendant

was driving.

This hardly constitutes vouching for the veracity of Mr. Grumling by either placing the prestige

of the government behind the witness or indicating that evidence not presented to the jury

supported his testimony. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir.1980). It does

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14/

 The Court notes that Petitioner’s ideas of what the prosecutor was inferring is nothing more

than sheer speculation unsupported by any facts in evidence.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 15

nothing more than provide the jury with a basis upon which to judge for themselves the veracity

of the witness.

Petitioner also complains about the fact that the prosecutor referred to the testimony of

the defense witnesses as being “not credible,” “not reasonable,” “ridiculous,” and “story doesn’t

make sense.” He also complains that the prosecutor impugned the integrity of defense counsel.

“Mr. Lukehart is a good lawyer. He’s [sic] takes what he’s got and works well with it. 

Unfortunately, this is like trying to sell a heater in the Sierra on a hot day.”

What Petitioner fails to grasp is that, although a prosecutor, as the representative of the

government and the people must strive not just for convictions but justice, a criminal trial is still

an adversarial process. Nearly three-quarters of a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court

recognized that the adversary system permitted the prosecutor to “prosecute with earnestness and

vigor, indeed he should do so” and although “he may strike hard blows, he is not a liberty to

strike foul ones.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). In this case, contrary to

Petitioner’s arguments, even if the jury accepted all the inferences that Petitioner asserts the

prosecutor intended flow from his comments,14/

 the prosecutor did not strike any foul blows. His

conduct fell well within the permissible parameters of vigorously prosecuting the case and did

not cross over the line into the area of improper advocacy. Petitioner is not entitled to relief

under Claim 4.

Claim 5 (Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

Petitioner’s claims of inadequate assistance of appellate counsel are essentially his failure

to raise the additional ineffective assistance of counsel issues (Claim 2) and the issues of

multiple punishments for a single act (Claim 3) and prosecutorial misconduct (Claim 4) raised in

the petition before the California Supreme Court and this Court. Inasmuch as the Court has

determined that those issues are without merit, the failure of appellate counsel to raise them did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–52

(holding that appellate counsel does not have an obligation to raise every nonfrivolous

argument); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1428 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that appellate

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 15 of 16
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armendariz-Carmona v. Adams, 1:02-cv-5926-JKS 16

counsel’s failure to raise a weak issue did not constitute ineffective counsel). Petitioner is not

entitled to relief under Claim 5.

Accordingly, because Petitioner is not entitled to relief under any claim asserted,

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the Petition

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“reasonable

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further” (internal quotation marks omitted)). All federal

constitutional issues properly raised in the petition were either addressed by the California Court

of Appeal in its decision or deemed addressed by the California Supreme Court in denying

Petitioner’s petition for habeas relief before that court and no reasonable jurist could find that

those decisions were “objectively unreasonable.”

The Clerk of the Court shall enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: September 20, 2007.

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 1:02-cv-05926-JKS Document 23 Filed 09/21/07 Page 16 of 16