Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01554/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01554-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos Adrian Morley, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Yolanda Elliot, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-1554-PHX-NVW (LOA)

ORDER

This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the Honorable Neil V. Wake

for consideration of Petitioner’s Petition for Recusal of Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 91, 93) 

After the undersigned recommended that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be denied, Petitioner filed the pending motion, arguing that the undersigned should

recuse, or be disqualified, from this matter. In support of his motion, Petitioner notes that

the undersigned’s spouse, Aimee Anderson - Superior Court Judge, Maricopa County

Superior Court since 2007, presided over a May 20, 2004 initial pre-trial conference in the

underlying criminal matter when she was a Commissioner in the Superior Court. Petitioner

asserts that his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleges numerous instances of ineffective

assistance of counsel by defense counsel, Bruce Blumberg, including his failure to appear at

the May 20, 2004 pretrial conference. Petitioner also argues that the undersigned displayed

bias against him during an October 6, 2010 hearing based on several comments made during

that proceeding. To put Petitioner’s motion in context, the undersigned will briefly discuss

the background of this case.

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I. Background 

On July 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) Petitioner challenges his judgment of conviction,

pursuant to two plea agreements, on July 2, 2004, in the Maricopa County Superior Court,

for Solicitation to Commit First Degree Murder and for Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices in

CR 2003-021342-001 DT, and for Trafficking in Stolen Goods in CR 2002-014160. 

Defense counsel Shelly Davis represented Petitioner in CR2003-021342, and defense

counsel Bruce Blumberg represented Petitioner CR 2002-014160. On September 17, 2004,

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 7.5-years imprisonment for Solicitation to

Commit First Degree Murder in CR2003-021342. (Respondents’ Exhs. Q, S) During the

same proceeding, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Petitioner on

concurrent 7-year terms of probation for his convictions of Fraudulent Schemes and

Artifices and Trafficking in Stolen Goods in CR2002-014160 to commence after he

completed his prison sentence in CR2003-021342. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 22-23; Exh. R) 

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner raises the following grounds for

relief:

Ground One: Ineffective assistance of counsel/invalid sentence.

Ground Two: Illegal sentence, the court improperly relied on a

contemporaneous conviction to enhance his sentence pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13-604.

Ground Three: Petitioner’s sentence in CR2002-014160 was excessive

in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment.

Ground Four: The trial court breached the terms of the plea agreement.

Ground Five: The trial court failed to establish that subject matter jurisdiction

and venue were proper.

Ground Six: At all stages of the criminal proceedings, Petitioner was under 

such duress that his mental capacity was diminished. 

Ground Seven: Petitioner’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were

violated.

Ground Eight: The trial court did not establish a sufficient factual basis

to support Petitioner’s conviction in CR2003-021342.

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Ground Nine: Petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 

Sixth Amendment rights articulated in Blakely. 

(Docs. 1, 4) After several extensions of time, Respondents filed an Answer in opposition to

the Petition on February 8, 2010. (Doc. 21) Also after several extensions of time, Petitioner

filed a Reply on April 30, 2010. (Doc. 36) 

On July 7, 2010, the undersigned set this matter for a September 22, 2010 evidentiary

hearing to consider “Petitioner’s claim in Ground One that counsel [Shelly Davis] in

CR2003-021342 was ineffective because she advised and permitted him to enter into a plea

agreement that includes an admission to a historical prior conviction and exposed him to an

enhanced sentence under A.R.S. § 13-604. . . .” (Doc. 38) Pursuant to Rule 8(c), Rules

Governing Section 2254 proceedings, the undersigned appointed counsel, Joy Bertrand, to

represent Petitioner for purposes of the evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 38) On the motion of

Petitioner’s counsel, the hearing was reset to November 9, 2010. (Doc. 42) On September

17, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion to remove counsel, and appoint new counsel asserting

that Joy Bertrand had not been forthcoming that the person assisting her with his case,

Jameson Johnson, was a paralegal and not a licensed attorney. Petitioner was concerned that

his attorney/client privilege had been violated. (Doc. 44) On the motion of Joy Betrand, the

briefing on the motion for new counsel was sealed to protect litigation strategy and attorneyclient communications. (Doc. 44-48, 51) On October 6, 2010, the Court conducted a

hearing to consider Petitioner’s motion for new counsel. (Doc. 56) Petitioner, Joy Bertrand,

and paralegal Jameson Johnson were present. (Doc. 56)

After considering the evidence and arguments presented during the hearing, the Court

granted Petitioner’s motion for new counsel, terminated Joy Bertrand as counsel and

appointed David Eisenberg to represent Petitioner for the evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 57) 

On the motion of David Eisenberg, the evidentiary hearing was continued to January 21,

2011. (Doc. 59) 

On December 21, 2010, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s challenge

to his sentence in CR2003 asserted in Grounds One and Two on the Petition. (Doc. 66) 

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 1 Title 28 U.S.C. § 144 reads:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely

and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,

such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned

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Because the Motion to Dismiss was directed to the only issue to be considered at the

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner’s counsel filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 70)

Counsel also filed a memorandum pertaining to the evidentiary hearing, in accordance with

the Court’s orders. (Doc. 68) After the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, on January 14,

2011, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss be granted. (Doc. 76) In view of the recommendation on

the Motion to Dismiss, the undersigned vacated the evidentiary hearing and permitted

Petitioner’s counsel - who had been appointed solely for purposes of that hearing - to

withdraw. (Doc. 77) 

Less then two weeks later, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation,

recommending that the remaining claims in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

denied. (Doc. 79) 

II. Motion to Recuse or Disqualify

On March 1, 2011, Petitioner filed the pending motion arguing that the undersigned

should recuse, or be disqualified, from this case and that the Reports and Recommendations,

docs. 76 and 79, prepared by the undersigned should be stricken. 

A. Relevant Law

A party may move to disqualify, or recuse, a judge from presiding in a given case.

Motions to disqualify fall under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. §

455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a timely and sufficient affidavit

averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice

either against the party or in favor of an adverse party. The affidavit must state the facts and

reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144.1

 A judge finding the motion timely and the

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to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of

the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for

failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any

case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it

is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). 

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affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no further and another judge must be assigned to

hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980).

On the other hand, § 455 provides broader grounds for disqualification and is

self-enforcing on the part of the judge. In particular, § 455 requires a judge to disqualify

himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28

U.S.C. § 455(a), including where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a

party,” or when his spouse “is known by the judge to have an interest that could be

substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), (3). 

The test for personal bias or prejudice is the same under §§ 144 and 455. Sibla, 624

F.2d at 868. Specifically, under both statutes recusal is appropriate where “a reasonable

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.1997)). Consequently,

recusal will be justified either by actual bias or the appearance of bias. Id. The source of any

alleged bias must be extrajudicial. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544-56 (1994). 

Judicial bias or prejudice formed during current or prior proceedings is insufficient for

recusal unless the judge’s actions “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 541; Pesnell, 543 F.3d at 1044. Judicial rulings will

support a motion for recusal only “in the rarest of circumstances.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555;

United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1994); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d

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 2 From 2001 to 2007, Aimee Anderson was a Commissioner in the Arizona Superior Court,

Maricopa County. She has been an Arizona Superior Court Judge, Maricopa County, since

2007. 

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605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the alleged prejudice must result from an extrajudicial

source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal).

B. Analysis

1. Role of the undersigned’s spouse in underlying matter

Petitioner first argues that the undersigned should recuse or be disqualified because

his spouse, Aimee Anderson - a Superior Court Judge, Maricopa County, since 2007 - may

be affected by this proceeding because, when she was a Superior Court Commissioner, she

presided over a May 20, 2004 initial pretrial conference in Petitioner’s underlying criminal

matter.2

 

At the time the undersigned prepared the Reports and Recommendations on the

Petition, he was not personally aware this his spouse had presided over any proceedings

pertaining to the underlying criminal action in the Maricopa County Superior Court. Neither

Petitioner nor Respondents specifically brought to the undersigned’s attention the fact that

Judge Aimee Anderson had presided over any proceedings related to this matter. In support

of his Motion for recusal, Petitioner has submitted a document entitled “Initial Pretrial

Conference” dated May 20, 2004 in State of Arizona v. Carlos Adrian Morley, CR 2002-

014160. The Honorable Aimee Anderson, then a Superior Court Commissioner, presided

over the initial pretrial conference, but at that time, the case was assigned to Superior Court

Judge Schneider. During the initial pretrial conference, Judge Anderson scheduled a final

management conference and jury trial before Judge Barry Schneider. She indicated that the

estimated length of the trial was eight days, and that the trials would proceed in the following

order: “CR2003-021342-001 DT, first” “CR2002-014160, Second.” (Doc. 91, Exh. A) 

Judge Anderson also confirmed a settlement conference for June 11, 2004 before Judge

Ronald Reinstein, and set forth the requirements for the final trial management conference

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and the joint pretrial statement. Finally, Judge Anderson affirmed prior custody orders. 

(Doc. 91, Exh. A) 

Although Petitioner did not refer to Judge Aimee Anderson or to the May 20, 2004

initial pretrial conference in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or in his Memorandum in

Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, docs. 1, 4, in his Reply, he mentions that

proceeding - but does not refer to Judge Aimee Anderson. (Doc. 36 at 3) Petitioner states:

Please draw your attention to (Exhibit 6) INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

file dated 5-20-2004[.] On page two line 3 says ‘The trials for this Defendant

shall proceed in the following order:

CR2003-021342-001 DT, First;

CR2002-014160, Second.

The so-called prior felony conviction was to be tried Second. If Petitioner

Morley was going to be pleading guilty to CR2003-021342-001 DT with 

one prior felony conviction, don’t you think the INITIAL PRETRIAL 

CONFERENCE memorandum filed on 5-26-2004 would indicate so?

(Doc. 36 at 3, Exh. 6) (emphasis in original) Although Petitioner refers to Initial Pretrial

Conference, he does not assert a claim directed to the manner in which Judge Aimee

Anderson conducted that proceeding or otherwise challenge her conduct. When reviewing

Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus Petition, the undersigned deemed Petitioner’s argument regarding

the sequence of the trials set forth in the Initial Pretrial Conference insignificant. Petitioner

did not enter his guilty pleas until several months later, on July 2, 2004. And between the

May 20, 2004 Initial Pretrial Conference and Petitioner’s July 2, 2004 pleas, a settlement

conference was scheduled for June 11, 2004 before Judge Reinstein. In view of the lack of

significance assigned to the May 20, 2004 pretrial conference, the undersigned relied on the

review of the minute entry of that proceeding, Exhibit 6 to Petitioner’s Reply, conducted by

his law clerk, and had no occasion to notice Aimee Anderson’s name which appears only in

the upper left corner of that document. Moreover, even if the undersigned had been

personally aware that his spouse had presided over the May 20, 2004 proceeding - or if his

law clerk’s awareness of that information could be imputed to him - Judge Aimee

Anderson’s role in the underlying criminal proceeding would not provide a basis for the

undersigned’s recusal or disqualification. Judge Aimee Anderson’s role in the underlying

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 3 Petitioner argues that Judge Aimee Anderson’s role in his criminal case was tantamount to

the undersigned himself having presided over the May 20, 2004 pretrial conference. This

argument does not warrant recusal. In United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir.

1986), the Ninth Circuit affirmed refusal to recuse where the trial judge stated that he had no

recollection of 15-year-old prior proceeding in which defendant had appeared before him and

the record contained no evidence of bias or prejudice. 

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criminal matter was minor. She did not issue any substantive rulings in those proceedings. 

Rather, her participation was administrative in nature. Although evidence of the May 20,

2004 initial pretrial conference was in the record when the undersigned prepared the Reports

and Recommendations in this case, the May 20, 2004 proceeding was not relevant to the

undersigned’s resolution of issues in this case. Moreover, the recommendations in this case

will have no impact - positive or negative - on the undersigned’s spouse. See 28 U.S.C. §

455(b)(1), (3) (stating that a judge should disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including where the judge’s spouse “is known

by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

proceeding.”) In short, “a reasonable person” with knowledge that the undersigned’s spouse

played a minor, administrative role in this case when, as a Superior Court Commissioner, she

presided over an initial pretrial conference on May 20, 2004, could not conclude that the

undersigned’s impartiality nearly seven years later might reasonably be questioned. Pesnell,

543 F.3d at 1044. Accordingly, the undersigned declines to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. §

455 based on his spouse’s limited role in the underlying criminal matter.3

The undersigned must also assess the sufficiency of Petitioner’s Affidavit and Motion

for recusal/disqualification under Title 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Grimes v. U. S., 396 F.2d 331

(9th Cir. 1968). Section 144 provides:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely

and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,

such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned

to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning

of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be

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shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such

affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of

record stating that it is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). Section 144 “must be given the utmost of strict

construction to safeguard the judiciary from frivolous attacks upon its dignity and integrity . .

. and to prevent abuse and to insure orderly functioning of the judicial system . . . .”

Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Ariz. 1977) (internal citations

omitted). Plaintiff’s Motion and Affidavit for Disqualification is untimely under section 144. 

Although Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus did not refer to the May 20, 2004

initial pretrial conference, over which Judge Aimee Anderson presided, he refers to that

proceeding in his Reply filed on April 30, 2010. (Doc. 36 at 3) Thus, no later than April 30,

2010, Petitioner was aware that Judge Aimee Anderson had some involvement in his state

criminal proceedings. Despite being aware of Judge Aimee Anderson’s involvement in his

case no later than April 2010, Petitioner waited until March 1, 2011, eleven months later, 

and after the undersigned recommended denying his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, to

bring the present Motion for Recusal or Disqualification. A “litigant cannot take his chances

with a Judge and then, if dissatisfied, secured a disqualification of that Judge and try again in

front of another Judge.” Rademacher, 442 F.Supp. at 29 (citing Taylor v. U. S., 179 F.2d 640

(9th Cir. 1950)). “If the alleged information upon which the Motion for Disqualification is

based was known or knowable to the movant a considerable period of time prior to the

Motion, then such a Motion is untimely.” Id. Petitioner’s motion for disqualification

pursuant to § 144 based on Judge Aimee Anderson’s involvement in the underlying criminal

case should be denied as untimely. 

Moreover, section 144 indicates that when, the “judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,”

a party seeking to disqualify that judge shall file an affidavit “not less than ten days before

the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be

shown for failure to file it within such time.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Here, the undersigned issued

Reports and Recommendations on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 14 and

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24, 2011. (Docs. 76, 79) Because this matter was only referred to the undersigned to issue

such a Report and Recommendation, after that action was taken, this matter was no longer

pending before the undersigned and no further proceedings on this matter were set before the

undersigned. 

2. October 16, 2010 hearing

Petitioner further argues that the undersigned should recuse or be disqualified because

his comments during the October 6, 2010 hearing on Petitioner’s Motion to Remove Counsel

evidence his bias against Petitioner. 

To the extent that Petitioner requests recusal based on the undersigned’s remarks

made during the October 6, 2010 hearing, Petitioner fails to establish cause for recusal under

section 455(a) which requires the source of the bias be extra judicial. Liteky, 510 U.S. at

544-56.

Likewise, “[a]n affidavit filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 144] is not legally sufficient

unless it specifically alleges facts that fairly support the contention that the judge exhibits

bias or prejudice directed toward a party that stems from an extrajudicial source.” U.S. v.

Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to present

sufficient facts to support his assertion under section 144 that the undersigned judge

exhibited bias or prejudice toward Petitioner stemming from any extrajudicial source. 

Rather, Petitioner’s arguments regarding the October 6, 2010 hearing are based solely on the

undersigned’s comments. Judicial bias or prejudice formed during current or prior

proceedings is insufficient for recusal unless the judge’s actions “display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”Liteky, 510 U.S. 540 at

541. Even “judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of or

even hostile to counsel, the parties or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality

challenge,” and will do so only where “they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555; see e.g., Berger v. United

States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921) (finding disqualification proper where district judge presiding

over case against German-American defendants stated: “One must have a very judicial mind,

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 4 A state prisoner who brings a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has no constitutional

right to counsel. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.1991). 

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indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this country[;] their hearts are

reeking with disloyalty.”). 

As previously stated, on October 6, 2010, the undersigned conducted a hearing

regarding Petitioner’s Motion to Remove Counsel and Appoint New Counsel. Petitioner

sought to remove his counsel at the time, Joy Bertrand. There is no right to have counsel

appointed in cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 unless an evidentiary hearing is required,

because the action is civil, not criminal, in nature. See Terravona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424,

429 (9th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1992); and Rule 8(c)

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Because an evidentiary hearing was scheduled,

the undersigned had appointed Petitioner pursuant to Rule 8(c). In the motion to substitute

counsel, Petitioner argued that his case was being handled by Jameson Johnson, a paralegal,

and that he was not initially informed that Mr. Johnson was a paralegal and not a licensed

attorney. Petitioner was concerned that his attorney-client privilege had been breached.

Unable to find controlling authority articulating the factors to consider when ruling on

a motion to substitute counsel appointed for an evidentiary hearing in a § 2254 case, a civil 

proceeding in which petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel,4

 the undersigned

relied on case law pertaining to the substitution on counsel in other contexts. In the context

of a criminal prosecution, the Ninth Circuit has stated that when considering a motion to

substitute counsel due to an irreconcilable conflict, the court must conduct “such necessary

inquiry as might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” United States v.

Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, during the October 6, 2010 hearing, the

undersigned tried to determine whether the relationship between Petitioner and Ms. Bertrand

had deteriorated to the point where she should be removed and Petitioner assigned a different

attorney for purposes of the evidentiary hearing that was still scheduled at that time.

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Petitioner argues that the undersigned prevented him from speaking a few times,

“alluded to . . .Petitioner Morley . . . being a Racist,” accused Petitioner of being a “difficult

client,” and used the hearing “to reprimand Petitioner.” (Doc. 91 at 4) The record reflects

that a few times when Petitioner’s comments strayed from the point, the undersigned

redirected the Petitioner. (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 3, 14) Additionally, when delving into

Petitioner’s concerns regarding Mr. Johnson’s participation in his representation, the

undersigned raised the issue of Mr. Johnson’s race, but quickly moved on from that issue

when Petitioner assured the Court that race was not an issue. (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 11-12)

Such inquiry was appropriate to understand the source of Petitioner’s “dissatisfaction” and

“distrust” of counsel. Garcia, 924 F.2d at 926; see also United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez,

268 F.3d 772, (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “in most circumstances a court can only ascertain

the extent of a breakdown in communication by asking specific and targeted questions.”). 

During the hearing, Petitioner indicated that he wanted Ms. Bertrand to raise issues

during the scheduled evidentiary hearing in addition to the single issue that had been

identified for the hearing. (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 13) It became apparent that counsel and

Petitioner had opposing views regarding the scope of her representation and they could not

communicate effectively. (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 8-9, 13, 15, 18) In that context, the

undersigned stated “[h]ave I hit the nail on the head or have I missed it that Mr. Morley is a

difficult, challenging client.” (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 15) Because “‘a serious breakdown in

communication can result in . . . inadequate’” representation, the undersigned fully explored

the state of the relationship between Petitioner and Ms. Bertrand. See United States v.

Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 778 (quoting United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Whether Petitioner was a difficult or challenging client was relevant to that

assessment, and the undersigned’s comment to that effect does not indicate bias but, rather,

the undersigned’s efforts to fully explore the “depth of any conflict between [Petitioner] and

counsel, [and] the extent of any breakdown in communication. . . .” Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268

F.3d at 777 (citing United States v. D’Amore, 56 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled

on other grounds by United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).

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Additionally, “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” are not

grounds for establishing bias or impartiality, nor are a judge’s efforts at courtroom

administration. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56.

After hearing from Petitioner, Jameson Johnson, and Joy Bertrand, the Court granted

Petitioner’s motion to remove Joy Bertrand as counsel. (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 20) The Court

then “[r]eluctantly” gave Petitioner a new attorney for purposes of the evidentiary hearing. 

(Id.) The undersigned told Petitioner that “[y]ou need to follow your lawyer’s advice,” and

warned him that “[t]here won’t be a third lawyer.” (Doc. 91, Exh. B at 21) Petitioner argues

that those comments reflect bias. Rather than reflecting bias, the undersigned was merely

trying to encourage Petitioner to cooperate with the next attorney who was appointed to assist

him with the evidentiary hearing. The undersigned wanted to underscore the importance of

Petitioner collaborating with counsel, rather than challenging counsel and insisting that

counsel expand his or her role beyond the parameters set by the Court’s order regarding the

evidentiary hearing - as he had done with Ms. Bertrand. The undersigned’s comments during

the October 6, 2010 hearing do not “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 541; Pesnell, 543 F.3d at 1044. 

The undersigned must also determine whether Petitioner’s Affidavit and Motion for

recusal/disqualification is timely under § 144. See Grimes v. U. S., 396 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.

1968). Section 144 “must be given the utmost of strict construction to safeguard the

judiciary from frivolous attacks upon its dignity and integrity . . . and to prevent abuse and to

insure orderly functioning of the judicial system . . . .” Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442

F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Ariz. 1977) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner’s allegation that the

undersigned was biased based on the October 6, 2010 hearing is also untimely. Although

Petitioner did not receive a transcript of that proceeding until January 21, 2011, Petitioner

was present during that proceeding and could have described the undersigned’s comments

from memory. Petitioner, however, waited until after the undersigned issued Reports and

Recommendations recommending denying habeas corpus relief to raise the issue of bias. A

“litigant cannot take his chances with a Judge and then, if dissatisfied, secured a

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disqualification of that Judge and try again in front of another Judge.” Rademacher, 442

F.Supp. at 29 (citing Taylor v. U. S., 179 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1950)). “If the alleged

information upon which the Motion for Disqualification is based was known or knowable to

the movant a considerable period of time prior to the Motion, then such a Motion is

untimely.” Id. 

III. “Rule 25” and “U.S.C. §§ 8093”

In the caption of his Motion, Petitioner refers to “Rule 25” and “U.S.C. §§ 8093.” 

Although Petitioner neither specifically identifies the Rule and statute to which he refers, nor

discusses them in the body of his motion, the undersigned - in an abundance of caution - will

consider whether recusal or disqualification is required by under either “Rule 25” or “U.S.C.

§§ 8093.”

With respect to “Rule 25,” Petitioner may be referring to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 25(b) which allows for the recusal and replacement of a district judge presiding

over a criminal proceeding. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, do not apply

to this civil proceeding. 

Petitioner may also be referring to Rule 25 of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and

Judicial- Disability Proceedings, adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States on

March 11, 2008. “These rules govern proceedings under The Judicial Conduct and Disability

Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (the Act), to determine whether a covered judge has engaged in

conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the

courts . . . .” Rule 1, Rules of Judicial-Conduct and Judicial Disability Proceedings; 28

U.S.C. § 351. In pertinent part, Rule 25 provides that a judge who is subject of a complaint

filed under the Act, “is disqualified from considering the complaint . . . .” Petitioner may cite

Rule 25 for the proposition that the undersigned should be disqualified from considering

Petitioner’s request that the undersigned recuse or be disqualified from this § 2254 matter. 

Rule 25, however, does not apply to this case. First, Petitioner is not proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. § 351-364. Moreover, because proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351-364

must be “filed with the circuit clerk in the jurisdiction in which the subject judge holds

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office,” in this case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the governing Rules do not apply to

the action pending in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); Rules for Judicial-Conduct and

Judicial-Disability Proceedings, Rule 7(a)(1). 

Finally, Petitioner cites to “U.S.C. §§ 8093” in the caption of his Petition for Recusal. 

(Doc. 91) The undersigned cannot determine the precise portion of the United States Code to

which Petitioner is referring. Regardless, the undersigned has fully considered Petitioner’s

arguments in support of his request that the undersigned recuse, or be disqualified, from this

matter and has found no support for that request. 

III. Summary

In summary, Petitioner appears unhappy with the undersigned’s reports and

recommendations in this case. The undersigned’s recommendations, however, do not

provide a basis for recusal or disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (stating that

judicial rulings will support a motion for recusal only “in the rarest of circumstances.”);

United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, the

undersigned’s relationship to the Honorable Aimee Anderson and comments during the

October 6, 2010 hearing do not require recusal or disqualification on the facts of this case. 

Accordingly, the undersigned declines to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and finds Petitioner’s

motion and affidavit insufficient to warrant forwarding this matter to another judge for

further review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867; 28 U.S.C. § 144. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Recusal of Magistrate Judge, doc. 91,

is DENIED. 

DATED this 14th day of March, 2011.

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