Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01115/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01115-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W. MOORE, JR., a minor, )

by and through his Guardian ad)

litem, ALICIA MOORE, )

individually and as successor )

in interest of James W. Moore,)

deceased, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF KERN, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

 ) 

 )

AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED )

CASE AND CROSS-CLAIMS )

 )

1:05-cv-1115-AWI-SMS

Consolidated with:

1:06-cv-0120-OWW-SMS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF

PLAINTIFF BRYCE J. MOORE FOR

LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT (DOC. 125)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF

PLAINTIFF JAMES W. MOORE, JR.,

FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT (DOC. 128)

ORDER DIRECTING THE FILING AND

SERVICE OF AMENDED COMPLAINTS

ORDER RESCHEDULING DATES

Pretrial Conference:

June 20, 2008

8:30 a.m.

Hon. Anthony W. Ishii

Courtroom 2

Jury Trial: August 12, 2008 

 (25 days)

The minor Plaintiffs are proceeding with consolidated civil

actions in this Court. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules

72-302(c)(3) and 72-303. Pending before the Court are separate

motions of the Plaintiffs for leave to file amended complaints (a

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third amended complaint in the lead case, a first amended

complaint in the member case).

I. Background

In these consolidated actions, minor Plaintiffs James W.

Moore, Jr. (1:05-cv-1115-AWI-SMS) and Bryce J. Moore (1:06-cv120-AWI-LJO) are proceeding individually and as successors in

interest of the decedent against Kern County and numerous Kern

County law enforcement officers for allegedly using excessive

force upon decedent James W. Moore, father of the Plaintiffs,

while he was in custody at the Kern County Jail and during

transit to a hospital, and causing his death. The two minors are

represented by separate guardians ad litem. 

In the action of Plaintiff James W. Moore, Jr., the case is

proceeding upon the second amended complaint filed on April 4,

2006, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, in which Plaintiff

alleged federal civil rights claims (violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due

process, and federal conspiracy) and state claims (assault and

battery, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional

distress, invasion of privacy/publication of private facts, and

conspiracy under California law). On August 1, 2006, the Court

granted in part the motion to dismiss of Defendant Randall Holtz,

ruling that with respect to the sixth and seventh claims for

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under

California law, the Plaintiffs could not recover damages for the

emotional distress experienced by the decedent before his death.

The Court reasoned that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.34 barred the

recovery of such damages by a successor in interest to the

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decedent. (Order at pp. 10-11.)

In the action of Plaintiff Bryce J. Moore, the action

proceeded on the original complaint filed on January 2, 2006,

alleging the same claims as those stated in the action of

Plaintiff James W. Moore, Jr. 

On May 22, 2006, in both actions pursuant to the parties’

stipulation, the Court ordered that the two actions, including a

cross-complaint of Daniel Thomas Lindini, “be consolidated into

one action for all purposes....” It was further agreed and

ordered that the cases “will be managed by the Honorable Anthony

W. Ishii and that the master file in the consolidated case”

should carry the title of action 1:05-cv-1115-AWI-LJO. (Stip. and

Orders p. 2.) The minutes accompanying the docket entries reveal

that the member case (1:06-cv-120-AWI-SMS) was closed and all

future filings were to be made in the lead case.

On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff Bryce J. Moore filed a motion

for leave to file an amended complaint, including a notice and

memorandum, declaration of Charles R. Chapman, and exhibits A

through C (alternative forms of proposed pleadings). On August

31, 2007, Jeff Colbert and Marcus Hudgins, who were defendants in

Plaintiff James’s action, filed opposition, including a

memorandum of law and a declaration of Karen A. Newcomb. On

September 4, 2007, Defendant Randall Holtz filed opposition, in

which Defendant Ralph Contreras joined on September 4, 2007. On

September 4, 2007, Defendants County of Kern, Kern County

Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Mack Wimbish, Mark Jimenez, Moses

Adame, and Gregory Cossel, and Cross-Defendant County of Kern,

filed opposition including a memorandum, declaration of Mark L.

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Nations, and exhibits; Defendants Julian Revino, Larry Gene

Johnson, and Shannon Haiungs joined in the opposition on

September 5, 2007. On September 14, 2007, Plaintiff Bryce J.

Moore filed a reply brief and declaration of Charles R. Chapman

with attached exhibits. 

On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff James W. Moore, Jr., filed a

motion for leave to file an amended complaint, including a notice

and memorandum, declaration of David K. Cohn, and exhibits A

through C (alternative forms of proposed pleadings). On September

4, 2007, Defendant Randall Holtz filed opposition in which

Defendant Ralph Contreras jointed on Spetember 4, 2007. On

September 4, 2007, Defendants County of Kern, Kern County

Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Mack Wimbish, Mark Jimenez, Moses

Adame, and Gregory Cossel, and Cross-Defendant County of Kern,

filed opposition including a memorandum, declaration of Mark L.

Nations, and exhibits; Defendants Julian Trevino, Larry Gene

Johnson, and Shannon Haiungs joined in the opposition on

September 5, 2007. On September 15, 2007, Defendants Roxanne

Fowler and Angel Bravo filed notice of non-opposition to

Plaintiff James’s motion for leave to file a third amended

complaint. On September 14, 2007, Plaintiff James filed a reply

to the opposition.

The motions came on regularly for hearing on September 21,

2007, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M.

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Charles Chapman appeared

on behalf of Plaintiff Bryce J. Moore; Matthew Clark appeared on

behalf of Plaintiff James W. Moore, Jr.; Michael Linden appeared

on behalf of Defndant Randall Holtz; and appearing telephonically

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were Mark Nations on behalf of the County of Kern, Kern County

Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Mack Wimbish; Louis D. Silver

on behalf of Defendant Daniel T. Lindini; William A. Bruce on

behalf of Defendants Angel L. Bravo and Roxanne Fowler; Karen

Newcomb on behalf of Defendants Jeff Colbert and Marcus Hudgins;

Nicholas Miller on behalf of Defendant Ralph Contreras; Oliver

Robinson on behalf of Defendants Shannon Haiungs, Larry Gene

Johnson, and Julian Trevino; Larry Peake on behalf of Defendants

Gregory Morgan, Clinton Minor, and Jaime Tellez. After argument

the matter was submitted to the Court.

II. Plaintiff Bryce’s Request to Consolidate New Action

In the reply, Plaintiff Bryce notes that he has filed a

separate but related action against Defendants Jeff Colbert,

Marcus Hudgins, Marc Haiungs, County of Kern, and Kern County

Sheriff’s Department, Bryce J. Moore etc. v. County of Kern, et

al., 1:07-cv-1196-AWI-SMS. In that action Plaintiff Bryce seeks

to have Michelle Tripp be appointed guardian ad litem for

Plaintiff Bryce; the complaints states federal claims concerning

the August 15, 2005, incident that is the subject of the other

two pending actions, against the additional defendants on the

basis of their having been aware of the wrongful conduct of

others, failing to intervene to stop it, to report it, and

further because they conspired to assault the decedent and

conceal and cover up the wrongful conduct of others. 

In the reply to the motion, Plaintiff Bryce sought to have

the new action consolidated with the present case. 

This complaint was filed as Plaintiff Bryce to avoid the

running of the two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s

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federal claims against newly named Defendants Colbert, Hudgins,

and Marc Haiungs.

The request to consolidate is not properly before the Court

and thus will not be considered, without prejudice to any future

formal application for consolidation.

III. Scheduling Pretrial, Trial, and Other Dates

Because state criminal trials of three of the Defendants are

pending and are anticipated to begin no sooner than and no later

than February, it is necessary to set new trial and pretrial

dates; the parties have stipulated to other dates by order dated

September 23, 2007.

The pretrial conference is set for June 20, 2008, at 8:30

a.m., before the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, in Courtroom 2.

The jury trial is set for August 12, 2008.

IV. Timeliness and Sufficiency of the Motions to Amend

A. Amendment Date set by Judge Goldner in December 2005

 

With respect to both motions, Defendants Kern County, Kern

County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Mack Wimbish, Mark Jimenez,

Moses Adame, Gregory Cossel, Julian Trevino, Larry Gene Johnson,

and Shannon Haiungs argue that because of the limit on filing

amended pleadings stated in a scheduling order issued by the

Magistrate Judge on December 20, 2005, Plaintiffs are required to

show good cause for modifying the scheduling order in connection

with their motions to amend.

The Court has reviewed the dockets and pertinent scheduling

orders. Although Judge Goldner once issued a scheduling order

that required the filing of a particular amended complaint, no

date was set generally for amendment of pleadings. The parties

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have freely stipulated to amendments in the course of the

actions, and it is clear that any specific direction of Judge

Goldner has been superseded. Because no express amendment

deadline was scheduled, there is no necessity to amend the

scheduling order.

B. Timeliness of Motion of Plaintiff James

Further, because no party has objected, and because the two

motions are so closely related and raise parallel issues, the

Court exercises its discretion to consider the motion to amend

filed by Plaintiff James, which was actually filed a few days

after the deadline for filing non-dispositive motions.

V. Motions to Amend 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides in pertinent part:

A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which

no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has 

not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party

may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it

is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent

of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires. . . .

Although the rule is to be construed liberally, leave to amend is

not automatically granted. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d

1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1990). In determining whether the Court

should exercise its discretion to allow amendments, the following

factors should be considered: (1) whether the movant unduly

delayed seeking leave to amend, or acted in bad faith or with

dilatory motive; (2) whether the party opposing amendment would

be unduly prejudiced by the amendment; 3) whether there have been

repeated failures to cure, and (4) whether amendment would be

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futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230

(1962). However, in the absence of any apparent or declared

reasons, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the

part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party, futility of agreement, and so forth, leave should be

freely given. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

1048, 1052 (9 Cir. 2003). th

The two motions pending before the Court are similar in most

respects. Both Plaintiffs seek to add a tenth claim for violation

of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, the Bane Civil Rights Act; convert the

prior sixth claim for negligence and negligent infliction of

emotional distress under California law to a simple sixth claim

for negligence only; and add as a Defendant Mark Haiungs, who has

not previously been named as a defendant in either of the

consolidated actions. 

In addition, in his motion, Plaintiff Bryce J. Moore seeks

to add as defendants Jeff Colbert and Marcus Hudgins, who have

previously been named only in Plaintiff James W. Moore Jr.’s

action (lead action).

There is no opposition to the proposal to convert the sixth

claim to a simple negligence claim. The other aspects of the

motions are opposed.

VI. Analysis

The Court has considered the chronological development of

this case. Although Plaintiffs had some notice of the identity

and presence of the proposed additional defendants around the

time of the initial disclosures, information concerning the

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nature and extent of their involvement that was largely in the

control of the Defendants was revealed later in the discovery

process. Plaintiffs’ subsequent delay of several months in moving

to amend has not been shown to be prejudicial. 

With respect to futility, the Court rejects the arguments of

Defendants Randall Holtz and Ralph Contreras, who oppose both

motions (Docs. 133, 134) insofar as they seek to add a claim

pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 on the grounds that the

amendment would be futile because governing authority provides

that Plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain a § 52.1 claim

either on a wrongful death theory, as acknowledged by Plaintiffs,

or on a survival action theory, which Plaintiffs now seek to

allege. 

Leave to amend may be denied where it would be futile, as

where it would not be possible for the amending party to prevail

on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, (1962); Smith v.

Commanding Officer, Air Force Accounting 555 F.2d 234, 235 (9th

Cir. 1977). 

Reference to the proposed complaints reveals that Plaintiffs

seek to allege that Defendants’ conduct constituted interference

by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempted interference,

with the exercise of enjoyment by Decedent of rights secured by

the Constitution of laws of the United States, or secured by the

Constitution or laws of the State of California, including

interference with decedent’s rights to be secure in his person

and free from the use of excessive force under the Fourth

Amendment and Cal. Const. Art. 1 sec. 13 as well as Cal. Civ.

Code § 43, and the right of protection from bodily restraint and

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harm. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a) provides that specified public

officers may bring actions in the name of the people for

injunctive and equitable relief, as well as civil penalties, with

respect to specified conduct:

(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting

under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation,

or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or

enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws

of this state.... 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). Section 52.1(b) provides for a remedy

for individuals:

(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment

of rights secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States, or of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered

with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described

in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in

his or her own name and on his or her own behalf

a civil action for damages, including, but not

limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive

relief, and other appropriate equitable relief

to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment

of the right or rights secured.

The statute further provides:

(g) An action brought pursuant to this section

is independent of any other action, remedy,

or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved

individual under any other provision of law,

including, but not limited to, an action, remedy,

or procedure brought pursuant to Section 51.7.

The statute provides remedies for misconduct that interferes with

federal or state laws and that is accompanied by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, whether or not state action is

involved. Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 843

(2004).

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Both parties rely on Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v.

Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.4th 141, 144-5 (1995), where the court

held that the parents of a man shot and killed by a police

officer, who sought to recover damages for their son’s wrongful

death and civil rights violations made actionable by Cal. Civ.

Code § 52.1, could not recover under the statute with respect to

the fourth cause of action, a claim brought pursuant to § 52.1 by

the parents seeking damages on their own behalf for violation of

their constitutional right to parent caused by the loss of

society and companionship occasioned by the Defendants’ shooting

their son. The Court reasoned that because the statute provides a

remedy or personal claim only for the victim of the abusive

conduct, i.e., the persons who have themselves been the subject

of violence or threats, it does not provide for derivative

liability for the parents of a victim of a hate crime, or for any

other persons not present and not witnessing the actionable

conduct. 

Plaintiff Bryce appears to be correct in interpreting the

published part of the case as rejecting the parents’ attempt to

premise an action pursuant to § 52.1 (Bane Act) on the parents’

own constitutional rights (right to parent), as distinct from a

constitutional right of the decedent. The case does not appear to 

hold that a parent may never recover pursuant to the Bane Act on

behalf of the decedent; indeed, two such claims (based on the

police officer’s violating the decedent’s rights to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure, discrimination on the basis of

race, and deprivation of life without due process) were held not

to be fairly reflected in the plaintiff’s government tort claims,

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and thus were not precluded by the decision as a potential basis

of liability. See, Bay Area Rapid Transit District et al., 38

Cal.App.4th 141, 142-43. See also City of Simi Valley v.

Supserior Court, 111 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1085 (2003) (holding that

parents, whose son had committed “suicide by cop” by provoking

police to use deadly force which caused his death, and who had

asked to be able to speak with him before his death but were not

allowed, could not proceed on a wrongful death claim pursuant to

§ 52.1 with an action based on their Fourth Amendment or

substantive due process right involving the constitutionally

protected interest of companionship with one’s child; a finding

in a federal suit that the officers’ conduct was reasonable

barred further actions premised on the decedent’s Fourth

Amendment rights, and the wrongful death/§ 52.1 action was

precluded because § 52.1 was not a wrongful death provision, but

only a statute that permitted an individual to sue where his or

her rights are violated). Cases only suggesting an approach, such

as Gaston v. Colio, 883 F.Supp. 508, 510 (S.D.Cal. 1995) and Rose

v. City of Los Angeles, 814 F.Supp. 878, 883 (C.D.Cal. 1993), are

not authoritative.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.20(a) provides that except as

otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for or against a

person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but survives

subject to the applicable limitations period. See, Chavez v.

Carpenter, 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438 (2001). Cal. Civ. Proc. §

377.30 provides that a cause of action that survives the death of

the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to

the decedent’s successor in interest, subject to provisions in

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the Probate Code, and may be commenced by the decedent’s personal

representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in

interest. See, Estate of Lowrie, 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 228 n.8

(2004). At hearing, Defendants agreed that there are no pertinent

Probate Code provisions, and Defendants have not cited any

contrary statutory provisions that would preclude the claim.

Unlike a wrongful death cause of action, a survival cause of

action is not a new cause of action that vests in heirs on the

death of the decedent, but rather is a separate and distinct

cause of action which belonged to the decedent before death but,

by statute, survives that event; the survival statutes do not

create a cause of action, but merely prevent abatement of a cause

of the injured person and provide for its enforcement by or

against the personal representative of the deceased. Grant v.

McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 (1953); Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

Cernter, 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264-65 (2006). Although an heir

in a wrongful death action may recover damages in the nature of

compensation for personal injury to the heir, the damages

recoverable in wrongful death are expressly limited to those not

recoverable in a survival action under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

337.34. Quiroz, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1264. In a survival action,

damages recoverable by the personal representative or successor

in interest to the decedent are limited by statute to losses or

damage sustained by the decedent before death, but generally do

not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement. Id. At

hearing, counsel explained that damages sought in this connection

would include the decedent’s loss of wages during a short period

after the allegedly wrongful conduct of Defendants and before

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decedent’s death. 

In summary, it is concluded that Defendants’ opposition to

amendment to add an action under § 52.1 based on the lack of a

cause of action in the nature of a survival action is not well

taken, and that Plaintiffs, who sue as the decedent’s successors

in interest, are merely continuing with the action that arose in

the decedent before his death, and are not seeking damages based

on their own constitutional rights. Accordingly, Defendants have

not established that the amendment would be futile.

Finally, with respect to prejudice, the possibility that

Defendants Jeff Colbert and Marcus Hudgins, who are already

Defendants in the action brought by Plaintiff James W. Moore,

Jr., but who are not named in Bryce’s action, would be exposed to

greater, and potentially double, damages, is not the form of

prejudice material to the Court’s determination. Prejudice may be

found where significant or extensive discovery is necessitated by

amendment under circumstances where the factual issue has already

been litigated or the litigation is radically shifted by the

amendment. Missouri Housing Development Commission v. Brice, 919

F.2d 1306, 1316 (8 Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 th

F.2d 1385, 1387 (9 Cir. 1990). However, the mere fact of some th

additional discovery does not necessarily amount to the

substantial prejudice required for denying leave to amend where

no substantial delay would result. See, Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (acknowledging the need for

an analysis of multiple factors); Owens v. Kaiser Foundation

Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9 Cir. 2001). th

The Court finds that any additional discovery caused by the

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amendment will be slight and will not cause any substantial delay

in view of the rescheduling of the case. Accordingly, there is no

prejudice that requires denial of the motion.

Finally, the Court reiterates that there is no active

opposition to Plaintiffs’ attempt to convert the prior sixth

claim for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional

distress into a sixth claim for negligence only.

Thus, the Court will permit amendments to add a tenth cause

of action for violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act, California

Civ. Code § 52.1, in both actions; to add Defendants Jeff Colbert

and Marcus Hudgins to Plaintiff Bryce’s action; to add Defendant

Marc Haiungs in both actions; and to convert the prior sixth

claim to a simple negligence claim in both actions. 

VII. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) The trial and pretrial dates in this action are

rescheduled as follows: pretrial conference, June 20, 2008, 8:30

a.m.; jury trial, August 12, 2008; and 

2) The motion of Plaintiff Bryce J. Moore for leave to file

a first amended complaint IS GRANTED; and

3) The motion of Plaintiff James W. Moore for leave to file

a third amended complaint IS GRANTED; and

4) Plaintiffs SHALL FILE the amended complaints no later

than ten days after the date of this order; and

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Case 1:05-cv-01115-AWI -SMS Document 147 Filed 09/23/07 Page 15 of 16
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5) Plaintiffs ARE DIRECTED to proceed diligently to serve

the newly added Defendants.

Dated: September 23, 2007

By: /s/ Sandra M. Snyder

Sandra M. Snyder

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01115-AWI -SMS Document 147 Filed 09/23/07 Page 16 of 16