Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00694/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00694-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maryanne Chisholm,

Petitioner,

v.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

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CV 10-694-TUC-DCB

ORDER

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada on February 24, 2012,

pursuant to Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, District of Arizona (Local

Rules), Rule (Civil) 72.1(a). On April 9, 2013, Magistrate Judge Estrada issued a Report

and Recommendation (R&R) that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

the merits. The Court agrees and denies the Petition.

Petitioner, Maryanne Chisholm was convicted by a jury on October 21, 2005, of 58

counts of illegally conducting an enterprise (Count 1) Safari Media, Inc. through

racketeering by engaging in super fraudulent and fraudulent schemes and artifices (Counts

2-4) and selling unregistered securities (Counts 5-58). Counts 2 through 4 charged a

scheme or artifice to defraud by false pretenses, representations, promises or material

omissions to obtain benefits as follows: Count 2) $24,000,000 from SMI investors; Count 3)

insurance for SMI directors and officers purchased from Fireman’s Fund Insurance, and

Count 4) same from Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance. Counts 5 through 58 alleged sales of

unregistered securities to several designated victims. The trial court imposed consecutive

sentences on all counts for a total of 27.25 years.

Case 4:10-cv-00694-DCB Document 14 Filed 12/24/13 Page 1 of 9
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On direct appeal, the Defendant challenged the indictment for multiplicity and

challenged the consecutive sentences under the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth

Amendment. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the consecutive sentence imposed in

respect to Count 1 (racketeering) and affirmed the remaining consecutive sentences. On

remand, Petitioner was resentenced to 19.25 years as follows: Count 1) the racketeering

charge of illegally conducting an enterprise for 3.5 years; the fraudulent scheme and artifice

counts (Count 2 concurrent with Count 1 for 5 years; Count 3 consecutive with Count 2 for

5 years; Count 4 consecutive with Count 3 for 9.25 years), and Counts 5-58 for selling

unregistered securities for 4.5 years concurrent with each other. 

Subsequently, Chisholm filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, raising several

charges of ineffective assistance of counsel, including trial counsel’s failure to petition for

her trial to commence prior to her joint trial with her husband in a different criminal matter. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

In her direct appeal and her post-conviction petition for relief, the Arizona Supreme

Court refused review, therefore, the appellate court opinions are the last-reasoned state court

opinions subject to review by this Court. (R&R (Doc. 12) at 10 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.

2006)).

On habeas, Petitioner raises the following grounds: 1) the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment was violated because Counts 2 through 58 are predicate offenses to

Count 1; 2) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated because the

three separate counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices constituted only on single offense;

and 3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that trials of Petitioner proceed in

chronological order. The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R as the

findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court that the Petitioner was neither charged

nor sentenced in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and that trial counsel was not

ineffective.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R by a Magistrate Judge are set

forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Where the parties object to a Report and Recommendation, “‘[a] judge of the [district] court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is

made.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the R&R to which

there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13

(9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003) (en

banc). To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the contrary have been

waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they are not

filed within fourteen days of service of the Report and Recommendation), see also McCall

v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to object to Magistrate's report

waives right to do so on appeal); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing

Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely

objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of

the record in order to accept the recommendation)).

The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (party

objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days to file specific, written

objections). The Court has considered the objections filed by the Petitioner, her Petition and

the Answer filed by the State of Arizona. The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court that the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated because the state legislature

intended the imposition of multiple punishments for the predicate offenses to Illegally

Conducting an Enterprise. Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

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Amendment was not violated because Chisholm was charged with three separate and distinct

counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices; Counts 2 through 4 did not constitute one single

offense. Finally, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request that Chisholm’s trials

proceed in chronological order to protect her right to testify in her own defense. 

OBJECTIONS

Double Jeopardy

In Petitioner’s Objection to the R&R, she charges that the magistrate Judge improperly

relied on the state court of appeal’s decision in this case, wherein it followed State v. Siddle,

47 P.3d 1150 (Ariz. App. 2002). In Siddle, the state appellate court reasoned that the

Arizona legislature “intended the imposition of multiple punishments for the predicate

offenses to Illegally Conducting an Enterprise because A.R.S § 13-2312(B) requires the

commission of “‘another felony offense,’ and several of the predicate offenses listed in the

racketeering statute constitute more serious offenses than Illegally Conducting an

Enterprise.” (R&R (Doc. 12) at 2.) Following Siddle the state appellate court reasoned that,

therefore, “if a charge of Illegally Conducting an Enterprise was based on one of the more

serious predicate offenses, to treat the underlying offenses as lesser-included offenses would

actually reduce the penalties for the underlying offenses, which the court found the

legislature did not intend.” Id. (citation to Memorandum Decision omitted). 

In her Objection, Petitioner argues that Siddle is in conflict with Arizona Supreme Court

precedent, State v Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482 (1983), which held that crimes of arson and felony

murder were separate and distinct offenses and therefore, could be punished separately.” 

(Objection (Doc. 13) at 3) (emphasis in original ). According to Petitioner, this Court is not

bound by the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination regarding legislative intent where it

conflicts with decisions of the higher state court, McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1052 n.

2 (9th Cir. 1989), or where there is no decision of the highest state court, which is the case,

here. Then, “‘a federal court must predict how the highest state court would decide the

issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions,

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statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.’” (Objection (Doc. 13) at 3) (quoting Lewis

v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)). Petitioner

argues that following Girdler, the Arizona Supreme Court would find against consecutive

sentences because the predicate offenses are not separate and distinct from the racketeering

offense.

This Court disagrees. The finding in Girdler is limited by its facts, which involved,

undisputably, the separate and distinct crimes of arson and felony murder. The Magistrate

Judge correctly noted that the Court in Girdler did not consider the question of when two

statues proscribe the same conduct and the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative

punishments. The Supreme Court has addressed such circumstance, and in Missouri v.

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) concluded that cumulative punishments do not violate

the Double Jeopardy Clause if the state legislature clearly intends to impose them. (R&R

(Doc. 12) at 10-11.) 

The Court finds that State v. Siddle, correctly applied Hunter, and, here, the state

appellate court correctly applied Siddle. This is not a case where the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ determination regarding legislative intent conflicts with a decision of the higher

Arizona Supreme Court. The Petitioner misapplies Lewis to argue that because there is no

decision of the highest state court, this Court “‘must predict how the highest state court

would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other

jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.’” (Objection (Doc. 13) at 3)

(quoting Lewis, 87 F.3d at 1545). In a federal habeas action, a determination of state law by

a state appellate court is binding, especially where the highest court in the state has denied

review of the lower court’s decision. (R&R (Doc. 12) at 13 (citing Hicks on Behalf of

Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-630 & n. 3 (1988)). Then, this Court’s deference is

directed to the state appellate court’s decision. 

For the same reason, the Petitioner misapplies State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1155

(Ariz. 2011) to argue that there is no precedential value to an appellate decision. 

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On habeas review, the Supreme Court explained in Hicks, that an intermediate appellate

court’s announcement of a state law is a “datum” for ascertaining state law, especially when

the highest court refused review in the very litigation being reviewed by the federal court; it

may be arguable that the supreme court of the state will at some later time modify the rule of

the case, until that happens– the state law applicable to these parties in this case has been

authoritatively declared by the highest state court in which a decision was had. Hicks, 485

U.S. at 630 n. 3. The federal court is not free to apply a different rule even though it may

think that the state supreme court may someday establish a different rule in some future

litigation. Id. The Magistrate Judge properly deferred to the Arizona Court of Appeals’

determination that the Arizona legislature “intended the imposition of multiple punishments

for the predicate offenses to Illegally Conducting an Enterprise because A.R.S 13-2312(B). 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the state court’s determination, here,

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law clearly established in

Hunter. The state court’s determination was not an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he failed to timely

object to the State’s decision to proceed with separate trials, out of their chronological order,

for the sole purpose of obtaining convictions for lesser offenses of theft, perjury, and fraud

in insolvency, which it could use to impeach the Petitioner should she elect to testify at trial

in this case. Petitioner asserts that “but for” counsel’s deficient performance, she would

have elected to testify at trial. “The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial . . .

is one of the rights that ‘are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.’” 

(Objection (Doc. 13) at 8 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas., 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987), quoting

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15 (1975)).

“Counsel’s deficient performance resulted in Petitioner having to waive her right to

testify which, although she submits would have changed the outcome of the jury’s verdict,

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counsel’s actions clearly affected Petitioner’s decision whether to testify and, but for

counsel’s deficient performance, the Petitioner would have testified. Based on the clearly

established law at the time of the Petitioner’s trial, whether she was prejudiced by counsel’s

ineffectiveness, should have been determined by deciding whether Petitioner would have

exercised her right to testify but for counsel’s errors.” (Objection (Doc. 13) at 8-9.) 

Petitioner relies on Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), which framed the question

of prejudice in the context of the choice to plead guilty or proceed to trial. Petitioner argues

that Hill applies to her choice to testify at trial or not. Like the state courts and the

Magistrate Judge, this Court finds that Hill does not apply because Petitioner did not forgo a

judicial proceeding, instead she challenges the reliability of the proceeding because she was

forced to forgo testifying.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny apply to assess the

fairness of the trial. “Therefore, ‘[a]bsent some effect of challenged conduct on the

reliability of the . . . process the [effective counsel] guarantee is generally not implicated.’” 

(R&R (Doc. 12) at 27 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000), quoting

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). “Thus, to establish ineffective assistance

of counsel, the Supreme Court requires that the defendant not only show that counsel's

representation fell below the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases,

but also that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of counsel's incompetence.” 

(R&R (Doc. 12) at 27.) 

“To establish prejudice under Strickland, the defendant ‘must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “Further,

‘[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside

the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” Id.

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).

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Like the state courts and the Magistrate Judge, this Court rejects the Petitioner’s

argument that she need only show that she would have testified but for counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. She must show that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different but for counsel’s alleged errors. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

“the state court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue.” (R&R (Doc.

12) at 28.) The state court’s ruling was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established law. Given the finding by the state court that there was overwhelming

evidence of her guilt, id. at 25, the state court ruling was not an unreasonable application of

the facts in light of the evidence presented, id. at 28-29.

CONCLUSION 

After de novo review of the issues raised in Petitioner's objections, this Court agrees

with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Magistrate Judge in his R&R

for determining the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court adopts the R&R, and for

the reasons stated in it, the Court denies the Petition.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that after a full and independent review of the record, in respect to

the objections, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12) is accepted

and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment

accordingly.

/ / /

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/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court

declines to issue a certificate of appealability, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 cases, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2013.

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