Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_16-cv-00128/USCOURTS-alsd-2_16-cv-00128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MARKUS JAMAAL RUDOLPH, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

 : CIVIL ACTION 16-0128-WS-M

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Social Security Commissioner, :

 :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RCOMMENDATION

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), Plaintiff 

seeks judicial review of an adverse social security ruling 

denying a claim for Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter 

SSI) (Docs. 1, 16). The action was referred for report and 

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, and S.D.Ala. Gen.L.R. 72. Oral argument was 

heard on November 14, 2016. After considering the 

administrative record, the memoranda of the parties, and oral 

argument, it is recommended that the decision of the 

Commissioner be affirmed and that this action be dismissed.

This Court is not free to reweigh the evidence or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th

Cir. 1983), which must be supported by substantial evidence. 

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Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial 

evidence requires “that the decision under review be supported 

by evidence sufficient to justify a reasoning mind in accepting 

it; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 

Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting 

Jones v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1982).

At the time of the most recent administrative hearing, 

Rudolph was twenty-nine years old, had completed a high school 

education, though he never passed the exit exam (Tr. 58-59), and 

had no previous work experience (Tr. 59). Plaintiff alleges 

disability due to obsessive compulsive disorder (hereinafter 

OCD) and borderline intellectual functioning (Doc. 18).

Rudolph applied for SSI on September 28, 1992; the Social 

Security Administration (hereinafter SSA) determined that he was 

disabled, “due to borderline intellectual functioning and 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” and awarded benefits 

as of September 1, 1992 (Tr. 114). On July 16, 1999, the SSA 

notified Plaintiff that it considered him no longer disabled and 

that his benefits would cease in September 1999 (see id.). On 

August 21, 2000, that decision was upheld by an Administrative 

Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ). 

On January 31, 2008, Plaintiff reapplied for SSI, asserting 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 28
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he was disabled as of September 1, 2005 (Tr. 127, 372-74).1 On 

December 11, 2009, an ALJ denied benefits, determining that 

Rudolph could do medium, unskilled work (Tr. 127-35). On 

February 11, 2011, the Appeals Council ordered the ALJ to 

reconsider the evidence (Tr. 139-42).

On September 21, 2012, an ALJ determined that Plaintiff was 

not disabled as he could perform specific light and medium

unskilled jobs (Tr. 146-54, 160-76). On December 13, 2013, the 

Appeals Council remanded the action, deciding that the ALJ had 

not properly considered all of the evidence (Tr. 177-80).

On August 7, 2014, a new ALJ, following an evidentiary 

hearing, determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing 

specific, medium-exertion jobs (Tr. 28-40). Rudolph requested 

review of the hearing decision (Tr. 23-24), but the Appeals 

Council denied it (Tr. 1-6).

Plaintiff claims the opinion of the ALJ is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Specifically, Rudolph alleges that: (1) 

The ALJ improperly determined that he did not meet the 

requirements of Listing 12.05C; (2) the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity (hereinafter RFC) assessment is unsupported 

by the evidence; (3) the ALJ did not use the correct standard in 

evaluating the evidence; (4) the ALJ did not properly explain 

the weight he gave the evidence; (5) the ALJ improperly found 

																																																							 1At the most recent evidentiary hearing, the onset date was 

amended to be January 31, 2008 (Tr. 50-51).

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 28
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his testimony, and that of his mother, non-credible; (6) the ALJ 

did not develop a full and fair record; (7) the ALJ demonstrated 

bias in his determination; and (8) the Appeals Council did not 

properly consider newly-submitted evidence (Doc. 16). Defendant 

has responded to—and denied—these claims (Doc. 20). The Court 

will now summarize the relevant evidence of record.2

Educational records show that Rudolph was initially placed 

into special education classes in 1995 while in the fourth grade 

(Tr. 478); further records show he received supplemental teacher 

assistance with his studies, though he was educated in regular 

academic classes (Tr. 445, 447, 452). Reported grades 

demonstrate that Plaintiff did not fail to receive credit in any 

of his classes taken from seventh through twelfth grades; his 

grades in high school reflect a solid C average3 (Tr. 475-77). 

Rudolph did not pass the high school graduation exam, falling 

short in his reading, language, and science sections; he did 

pass in math (Tr. 477, 479). 

On May 7, 2007, Rudolph went to Cahaba Center for Mental

Health with complaints of anxiety, being nervous, a fear of 

germs, and washing his hands constantly; he had been diagnosed 

																																																							 2The Court will not review records that pre-date Rudolph’s 

initial asserted disability date of September 1, 2005 and will focus 

on mental—as opposed to physical—health records. Furthermore, the 

Court will not summarize all of the individual therapy session records 

from Cahaba Center for Mental Health as they provide little useful 

medical information for the claims brought herein.

3

GPA’s for each term were totaled and divided by the number of 

terms (19.75/8 equals 2.47 where C equals 2 and B equals 3) (Tr. 502). 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 28
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with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (hereinafter ADHD) 

as a child (Tr. 51). On May 23, 2007, Plaintiff was noted to be 

euthymic with normal concentration, though sometimes sad; 

insight and judgment were poor (Tr. 556-60). He was taking 

Paxil4 and Klonopin5 though he could not always afford them; the 

Social Worker said he had depression. Rudolph participated in 

individual therapy once every three months over the next nine 

months; there was a note during this period that Plaintiff had 

not filled a three-month-old prescription (Tr. 553-55). On 

February 12, 2008, a Doctor noted some improvement in depressive 

and OCD symptoms overall, though he continued with compulsive 

hand-washing (Tr. 551). 

On April 12, Psychologist Lee Stutts examined Plaintiff who 

was fully oriented, calm, and cooperative; affect was normal 

though he described intermittent sadness and being worried (Tr. 

565-67). Rudolph exhibited mild anxiety; thoughts were logical 

and coherent. Memory, judgment, and insight were intact. 

Stutts estimated Plaintiff’s IQ to be average-to-low average, 

though he had some problems with concentration. The 

Psychologist went on to state that Rudolph’s “ability to 

understand and to carry out and remember instructions is 

moderately impaired. The claimant’s ability to respond 

																																																							 4

Error! Main Document Only.Paxil is used to treat depression. 

Physician's Desk Reference 2851-56 (52nd ed. 1998). 5

Klonopin is a class-four narcotic used for the treatment of 

panic disorder. Error! Main Document Only.Physician's Desk Reference

2732-33 (62nd ed. 2008). 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 28
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appropriately to supervision, coworkers and the public is 

moderately impaired” (Tr. 567). 

On April 29, 2008, Dr. Aileen McAlister, an SSA evaluator 

rendering opinions based on medical records without the benefit 

of an examination, completed a Psychiatric Review Technique

Form, indicating that Rudolph had an affective disorder as 

demonstrated by depression with anhedonia or pervasive loss of 

interest in almost all activities, appetite disturbance with 

change in weight, sleep disturbance, decreased energy, or 

difficulty concentrating or thinking (Tr. 571; see generally, 

Tr. 568-81). Plaintiff also had a personality disorder as 

evidenced by persistent disturbance of mood or affect (Tr. 575). 

The Doctor indicated that Rudolph had moderate restrictions in 

his activities of daily living, social functioning, and in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. McAlister also 

completed a mental RFC assessment in which she indicated that 

Plaintiff would have moderate limitations in the following: his 

ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed 

instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended 

periods; complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform 

at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length 

of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public; 

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

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supervisors; get along with coworkers or peers without 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and respond 

appropriately to changes in the work setting (Tr. 582-85).

Rudolph attended individual therapy counseling sessions at 

Cahaba in May and July 2008; nothing significant was noted (Tr. 

592-93). On February 12, 2009, “rule out mental retardation, 

unspecified,” was added to the diagnosis (Tr. 595). 

On March 4, Patrice Donahue, Psychiatrist at Cahaba Center, 

denied an Ambien6 prescription request from Rudolph who was 

having difficulty sleeping; the note further indicated that 

Plaintiff was not consistent with taking his Klonopin because of 

the expense (Tr. 613). Rudolph had an individual therapy 

session on June 5 (Tr. 598). On September 10, Donohue noted 

that Rudolph stated his obsessive rituals decreased while taking 

his drugs as instructed; he reported isolating himself and 

feeling somewhat schizoid, but she noted nothing out of the 

ordinary (Tr. 612). On September 29, the Doctor completed a 

mental RFC form indicating that Rudolph was moderately limited 

in the following: ability to respond to customers, other 

members of the general public, or customary work pressures; and 

his ability to use judgment, understand, remember, and carry out 

complex instructions (Tr. 601-02). Plaintiff was markedly 

																																																							 6

AmbienError! Main Document Only. is a class four narcotic used 

for the short-term treatment of insomnia. Physician's Desk Reference

2799 (62nd ed. 2008).

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 28
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limited in his ability to maintain attention, concentration, or 

pace for periods of at least two hours. On January 12, 2010, 

the Psychiatrist noted no changes from the exam three months 

earlier (Tr. 611, 621). On June 30, Rudolph noted increased 

ritual behavior when stressed; Donohue noted no changes (Tr. 

610, 620; see also Tr. 624). On February 24, 2011, Plaintiff 

noted decreased frequency in hand-washing and checking, but they 

still interfered with functioning; Dr. Donohue noted that 

although a prescription for Ambien had been written three months 

earlier, it had not been filled (Tr. 609, 619; see also Tr. 615-

16, 623, 626). Ambien and Geodon7 were prescribed. On April 27,

in an individual therapy session, Rudolph stated that 

medications helped him with his OCD and hand-washing (Tr. 614, 

622). 

On July 19, Psychologist Stutts examined Rudolph who 

reported being on no prescribed medications; he was oriented in 

four spheres (Tr. 641-43). Affect was normal, though Plaintiff 

seemed immature and dependent on his mother; thoughts were 

logical and coherent. Memory, judgment, and insight were intact 

for his IQ range and developmental level. Rudolph underwent the 

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (hereinafter 

WAIS-IV) on which he scored a Full Scale IQ of 70 and a verbal 

comprehension score of 68, placing him in the borderline 

																																																							 7

Geodon is used in the treatment of schizophrenia. Error! Main 

Document Only.Physician's Desk Reference 2507-09 (62nd ed. 2008).

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 28
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mentally deficient range and at the 2.0 percentile. Stutts 

thought the test results were valid and Plaintiff’s prognosis 

fair-to-poor. The Psychologist diagnosed Plaintiff with the 

following: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Depressive Disorder, 

NOS (Provisional), Rule Out Dysthymic Disorder, Rule Out 

Asperger’s Disorder, Rule Out Social Anxiety Disorder, ParentChild Relationship Problem (Father), Rule Out Schizoid 

Personality Traits, and Borderline Range of Intellectual 

Functioning. Stutts indicated that Rudolph would not be able to 

manage funds, should he be awarded any, and that his “ability to 

understand and to carry out and remember instructions [was]

moderately impaired. The claimant’s ability to respond 

appropriately to supervision, coworkers and the public [was]

moderately impaired” (Tr. 643). The Psychologist also completed 

a mental RFC evaluation in which he indicated that Plaintiff 

would have moderate limitations in his ability to do the 

following: understand, remember, and carry out complex 

instructions and interact appropriately with supervisors and coworkers (Tr. 656-58). Stutts found Rudolph would be moderatelyto-markedly limited in his ability to make judgment on complex 

work-related decisions and respond appropriately to usual work 

situations and to changes in a routine work setting.

On August 24, 2011, Psychiatrist Donahue noted that Rudolph 

was somewhat guarded and appeared to have difficulty organizing 

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his thinking; his mother reported that he seemed overmedicated, 

was becoming more disorganized, and his compulsive rituals were 

not controlled with the medications (Tr. 662). Remeron8 and 

Haldol9 were added to his medical regimen. On October 27 and 

November 16, Cahaba medical records note that Plaintiff was out 

of his medications (Tr. 663-64). Dr. Donahue, on November 16,

noted that Rudolph was still somewhat guarded and disorganized, 

though less than before he started the Haldol (Tr. 661). On 

April 11, 2012, the Psychiatrist noted nothing different from 

previous examinations, but increased his Haldol (Tr. 667, 691). 

On August 28, Plaintiff reported that his symptoms were reduced 

with the medication change (Tr. 670, 690). On January 16, 2013, 

Rudolph reported being compliant with his medications, though he 

had stopped taking the Remerol because it made him feel “out of 

it;” symptoms, otherwise, were reduced with the medications (Tr. 

688). On July 30, Psychiatrist Donahue’s records note nothing 

in particular (Tr. 686).

A medical record entry, on July 29, 2013 from Dr. Roseanne 

Cook’s office, had Plaintiff reporting that he could not afford 

all of his medications (Tr. 675). On November 6, Dr. Cook noted 

Rudolph was oriented in four spheres and had normal judgment, 

but poor insight; the physical exam was recorded as normal (Tr. 

																																																							 8

Remeron is used to treat major depressive disorders. 

http://www.drugs.com/remeron.html

9

Haldol is an antipsychotic medication used to treat mood 

disorders such as schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders. 

http://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-5419/haldol-oral/details

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 28
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679-81). On December 18, the Doctor noted a normal exam (Tr. 

676-78).

On February 18, 2014, Psychiatrist Donahue noted no changes 

in Rudolph’s exam or treatment (Tr. 696-99).

On February 17 and March 14, Dr. Cook noted normal 

examinations (Tr. 705-09).

On February 9, 2016, Ann Dominick, Ed.D., wrote a “To Whom 

It May Concern” letter, stating that Rudolph had taken a test 

that did not truly measure his IQ but the scores placed him in 

the borderline range of intelligence and in the lowest two 

percentile of the population, intelligence-wise (Tr. 710; see 

also Doc. 17, pp. 5-8).

At the most recent evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff testified 

that he lived with his mother and had for a long time (Tr. 53-

56). He had a learner’s driver’s permit that was about to 

expire and had graduated from high school, though he had not 

passed the exit exam (Tr. 57-59). Rudolph had never worked and 

did not think that he could because of his OCD and depression; 

he admitted that he had never applied for a job and had never 

sought training through Vocational Rehabilitation (Tr. 59-61). 

Plaintiff testified that his daily activities included 

exercising, running, cleaning, and vacuuming; he indicated that 

he did not have physical limitations that would prohibit his 

working (Tr. 61-62). Medications helped with his depression and 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 28
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caused no side effects; he did not have memory problems (Tr. 62-

63). Sometimes, Rudolph had problems understanding and staying 

focused; washing his hands constantly was a problem (Tr. 63). 

Plaintiff’s Mother testified that Rudolph had lived with 

her his whole life, though the two of them had lived with her 

mother when he was a baby (Tr. 64-65). She stated that her son 

bathed five or six times a day and washed his hands constantly; 

this behavior embarrassed him, causing him to keep to himself, 

even at places like church (Tr. 66-67). The Mother said that 

Rudolph had sought vocational services, but he had been rejected 

from the program; he played games a lot (Tr. 68-69). Plaintiff 

could go to the grocery store and shop with a list and could do 

things around the house though it was a struggle to get him to 

do them (Tr. 70).

This concludes the Court’s summary of the record evidence.

Rudolph first claims that the ALJ improperly determined 

that he did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C (Doc. 

16, pp. 6-10). The introductory notes to Section 12.05 state 

that “[i]ntellectual disability refers to a significantly 

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in 

adaptive functioning initially manifested during the development 

period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the 

impairment before age 22.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1, Listing 12.05 (2016). Subsection C requires "[a] 

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valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and 

a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.05C. 

The Court notes that although the regulations require that 

Plaintiff demonstrate he suffered “deficits in adaptive 

behavior” before he turned twenty-two, the Eleventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals, in Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1266 

(11th Cir. 2001), held “that there is a presumption that mental 

retardation is a condition that remains constant throughout 

life.” The Hodges Court further held “that a claimant need not 

present evidence that []he manifested deficits in adaptive 

functioning prior to the age of twenty-two, when []he presented 

evidence of low IQ test results after the age of twenty-two.” 

Hodges, 276 F.3d at 1266. However, the presumption is 

rebuttable. Hodges, 276 F.3d at 1267. 

Rudolph first argues that the ALJ did not even consider the 

possibility of Listing 12.05C, though later acknowledging that 

the ALJ considered—but rejected—12.05C factors; Plaintiff 

disagreed with his reasons, arguing that he had been specially 

educated through high school and had not received a diploma

(Doc. 16, pp. 6-9). Rudolph points to the WAIS-IV results on 

which he scored a Full Scale IQ of 70 and a Verbal IQ score of 

68, placing him in the borderline mentally deficient range and 

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at the 2.0 percentile (Tr. 642). 

In his determination, the ALJ specifically noted that 

Plaintiff did not meet or equal the requirements of Listing 

12.05C or any other Listing (Tr. 31-33). The ALJ noted the low 

IQ scores, but wrongly stated that Psychologist Stutts was the 

only evaluator to find Rudolph to function with borderline 

intelligence (Tr. 33; cf. 642); Plaintiff correctly notes that

Non-Examining Medical Expert Doug McCann10 and Educator Dominick11

reached the same conclusion (Tr. 104, 710).

Borderline intelligence, however, is not mental 

retardation. As noted by one of our sister district courts, 

“[a] borderline intelligence level generally means that the IQ 

exceeds 70.” Geier v. Astrue, 2008 WL 553611, *3 (N.D. Florida 

February 28, 2008) (citing Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1276 

n. 21 (11th Cir.2003) (IQ of 72 indicates borderline

intelligence), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034, 124 S.Ct. 2104, 158 

L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). 

In this action, no examining—or non-examining source—

diagnosed Rudolph to be mentally retarded,12 the focus of Section 

																																																							 10McCann testified at the first of three evidentiary hearings at 

the administrative level; the Court has not summarized that evidence. 

The Court notes, though, that McCann did not find mental retardation 

and did not discuss Listing 12.05C in his testimony (Tr. 103-06). 11The Court notes, however, that the ALJ did not have Dominick’s 

opinion as it came eighteen months after his decision was entered. 12On September 3, 2013, the SSA “replaced the term ‘mental 

retardation’ with ‘intellectual disability’ in Listing 12.05, but the 

change did not affect the substance or requirements of the Listing.” 

McClung v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4943070, *10 n.8 (N.D. Ala. September 16, 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 14 of 28
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12.05C. Stutts’s first exam did not include testing, but the 

Psychologist found Plaintiff to have average-to-low average 

intelligence (Tr. 566); he changed the diagnosis following 

testing (Tr. 642). However, in all of the treatment records 

from Cahaba, no one, including Psychiatrist Donahue, indicated 

that Rudolph was disabled because of mental infirmity; in fact, 

one record note ruled out mental retardation (Tr. 595). 

Nevertheless, the failure of a diagnosis is only one point of 

consideration here.

The ALJ also rejected a Listing finding because of 

Rudolph’s activities of daily living as he had indicated that he 

could independently perform household chores and care for his 

personal needs (Tr. 31-32, 38). Plaintiff testified that daily 

activities included exercising, running, cleaning and vacuuming; 

he indicated he did not have physical limitations that would 

prohibit his working (Tr. 61-62). The record also shows that 

Rudolph sat with—and cared for—an ill grandfather who was 

dependent upon him (Tr. 443, 566). He liked playing basketball, 

could go to entertainment venues and church, and play video 

games (Tr. 443). The ALJ noted that some activities showed

Rudolph was not bound by his germ-avoidance concerns and found 

that he was not as limited, socially, as asserted (Tr. 32). 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Rudolph 

																																																																																																																																																																				

2016) (citing Change in Terminology: “Mental Retardation” to 

“Intellectual Disability,” 78 Fed.Reg. 46,499, 46,501 (Aug. 1, 2013)).

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 15 of 28
16

did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C is supported by 

substantial evidence. Though IQ scores required consideration 

of Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning, examiners found that he 

functioned with borderline intelligence. The ALJ found

Plaintiff’s daily activities, social functioning, and 

educational records demonstrated that he was not mentally 

retarded and did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C. 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s rebuttal of Hodges is supported 

by substantial evidence. Rudolph’s claim otherwise is without 

merit.

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is 

unsupported by the evidence. Rudolph has more specifically 

challenged his RFC finding that he could concentrate for an 

extended period of time (Doc. 16, pp. 12-13). 

“The RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment 

based upon all of the relevant evidence of an individual’s 

ability to do work-related activities.” Social Security Ruling 

96-8p, Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional 

Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184, *3. The Court notes 

that the ALJ is responsible for determining a claimant’s RFC. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.946 (2015). That decision cannot be based on 

“sit and squirm” jurisprudence. Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 

513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984). However, the Court also notes that 

the social security regulations state that Plaintiff is 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 16 of 28
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responsible for providing evidence from which the ALJ can make 

an RFC determination. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). 

Here, the ALJ found that Rudolph could do the following:

[P]erform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: On a functionby-function basis, the claimant cannot 

tolerate exposure to dangerous machinery or 

unprotected heights. During a regularly 

scheduled workday, or the equivalent 

thereof, individual can understand and 

remember short and simple instructions, but 

is unable to do so with detailed or complex 

instructions. He can [sic] simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks, but is unable to do so 

with detailed or complex tasks. He should 

have no more than occasional, casual contact 

with the general public, and casual contact 

with co-workers. He can accept constructive 

non-confrontational supervisor criticism. 

He can deal with changes in work place, if 

introduced occasionally and gradually, and 

are well-explained. He would need to be 

reminded of tasks two times per shift.

(Tr. 33-340). In further discussion of the RFC, the ALJ found 

that “Claimant’s activities, including playing video games, 

shows the Claimant is capable of performing such tasks and 

concentrating for an extended duration” (Tr. 35).

The Court finds no error in this specific conclusion. 

Though the ALJ only referenced video games, the evidence shows 

that Rudolph saw movies, played basketball, exercised, and went 

to church, activities that require concentrating for extended 

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periods of time. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s claim 

that the ALJ did not properly assess his RFC is without merit.

Rudolph next claims that the ALJ did not use the correct 

standard in evaluating the evidence (Doc. 16, p. 11). More

specifically, he objects to the statement that the ALJ found “no 

credible and convincing indication [that Plaintiff’s abilities 

to perform certain work tasks] have been impaired to a disabling 

degree by his mental impairments” (Tr. 31). 

The undersigned finds no merit in this claim. In the cited 

passage, the ALJ is stating that he rejected the opinions, as 

non-credible, of some examiners who had stated that Plaintiff 

could not perform certain tasks. Later in the determination, 

the ALJ specifically set out what he rejected in those 

examiners’ opinions. The Court will now review those 

credibility conclusions as Rudolph asserts they are incorrect.

As noted, Plaintiff claims the ALJ did not properly explain 

the weight he gave to the evidence (Doc. 16, pp. 10-11). The 

ALJ is required to "state specifically the weight accorded to 

each item of evidence and why he reached that decision." Cowart 

v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, 

social security regulations provide the following instruction:

It is not sufficient for the 

adjudicator to make a single, conclusory 

statement that “the individual's allegations 

have been considered” or that “the 

allegations are (or are not) credible.” It 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 18 of 28
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is also not enough for the adjudicator 

simply to recite the factors that are 

described in the regulations for evaluating 

symptoms. The determination or decision 

must contain specific reasons for the 

finding on credibility, supported by the 

evidence in the case record, and must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the 

individual and to any subsequent reviewers 

the weight the adjudicator gave to the 

individual's statements and the reasons for 

that weight.

SSR 96-7p (Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: 

Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the 

Credibility of an Individual’s Statements).

The Court finds Rudolph correct in noting inconsistent 

findings by the ALJ. The ALJ, in one place gave significant 

weight to the conclusions of Psychologist Stutts (Tr. 35) while 

giving little weight to them later in the decision (Tr. 38). 

While the Court cannot explain the inconsistency, it is 

apparent that the ALJ adopted the Psychologist’s opinion that 

Rudolph could not understand and remember complex instructions 

(Tr. 643; cf. Tr. 34). Stutts further indicated Plaintiff would 

be moderately impaired in interacting appropriately with 

supervisors and co-workers (Tr. 643, 657); the RFC restricts him 

to casual contact with co-workers and constructive nonconfrontational supervisor criticism (Tr. 34). The undersigned 

notes that Plaintiff has not pointed to any finding, about his 

ability to work, by Stutts that has been given short shrift in 

Case 2:16-cv-00128-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/17/16 Page 19 of 28
20

the ALJ’s decision (see Doc. 16, pp. 10-11).

Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ improperly found that 

Non-Examiner McAlister’s opinions were entitled to great weight 

(Doc. 16, pp. 10-11). Rudolph argues that the conclusions by 

McAlister were six years old by the time the ALJ’s decision was 

entered and failed to consider all of the evidence that had come 

into the record during the intervening period.

The Court rejects this argument, noting that it cannot reweigh the evidence. Furthermore, it is not necessary that each 

examining—or non-examining—source have access to all medical 

evidence that pre-dates that particular evaluation; what is 

required is that the ALJ consider all of the evidence and render

a decision that is supported by a substantial amount of it. The 

undersigned finds that Rudolph has not demonstrated that the ALJ 

failed to state the weight given the evidence of record.

Plaintiff claims the ALJ improperly found his testimony, 

and that of his mother, non-credible. Rudolph specifically 

calls out the ALJ for not citing support for finding that 

Plaintiff did not take his medications regularly and takes issue 

with the ALJ’s finding that no objective evidence supported the 

limitations claimed (Doc. 16, p. 13-15).

In his decision, the ALJ found Rudolph’s and his Mother’s 

allegations of limitations were less than credible (Tr. 34, 36). 

The ALJ noted that the Psychiatrist’s records did not support 

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the claims (Tr. 35), that Plaintiff’s own activities belied his 

assertions, (Tr. 35, 37, 38), and that his failure to take his 

medications resulted in a worsening of symptoms (Tr. 37).

The following summary of the evidence relates the following

regarding Rudolph’s medication regimen. On May 23, 2007, a 

medical note from Cahaba states that Plaintiff did not always 

have his medications because of an inability to pay for them 

(Tr. 560); the prescriptions written on that day were not filled 

three months later (Tr. 554). On March 4, 2009, Psychiatrist 

Donahue noted that Plaintiff was not consistent with taking his 

Klonopin because of the expense (Tr. 613). On September 10, 

2009, Donohue noted that Rudolph stated his obsessive rituals 

decreased while taking his drugs as instructed (Tr. 612). On 

February 24, 2011, Plaintiff noted decreased frequency in handwashing and checking, but they still interfered with

functioning; Dr. Donohue noted that although a prescription for 

Ambien had been written three months earlier, it had not been 

filled (Tr. 609, 619; see also Tr. 615-16, 623, 626). On April 

27, 2011, Rudolph stated that medications helped him with his 

OCD and hand-washing (Tr. 614, 622). On July 19, 2011, 

Psychologist Stutts examined Rudolph who reported being on no 

prescribed medications (Tr. 641-43). On October 27 and November 

16, 2011, Cahaba medical records note that Plaintiff was out of 

his medications (Tr. 663-64). On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff 

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reported that his symptoms were reduced with the medication 

change (Tr. 670, 690). On January 16, 2013, Rudolph reported 

being compliant with his medications, though he had stopped 

taking the Remerol because it made him feel “out of it;” 

symptoms, otherwise, were reduced with the medications (Tr. 

688). A medical record entry, on July 29, 2013 from Dr. Cook’s 

office, had Plaintiff reporting that he could not afford all of 

his medications (Tr. 675). 

The undersigned set out the above summary to show that the 

ALJ was correct in stating that Rudolph did not always take his 

medications as prescribed; the record clearly demonstrates that. 

While poverty was one factor in that failure,13 the evidence 

shows that Plaintiff’s ritualistic behavior was diminished when 

he followed a prescribed medicinal regimen. To repeat this in 

different terms: The objective evidence, i.e., the medical 

evidence, shows that Rudolph’s impairments were less severe when 

he took his medications. The Court finds substantial support 

for the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s—and his Mother’s—

testimony was not fully credible.

																																																							 13The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that poverty 

excuses noncompliance with medical treatment. Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 

F.2d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1988). However, as noted by our sister 

Court, “a claim of financial inability to obtain prescribed treatment 

is only a justifiable cause for failure to follow the prescribed 

treatment when free community resources are unavailable.” Bulger v. 

Colvin, 2014 WL 4495220, *10 (M.D. Ala. September 12, 2014).

Herein, Rudolph challenged the ALJ’s finding that he did not take 

his medications regularly rather than acknowledging it and asserting a 

defense of poverty. As such, Plaintiff’s claim lacks merit.

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Rudolph next claims that the ALJ did not develop a full and 

fair record. Plaintiff asserts that because the ALJ did not ask 

him how often he washed his hands or how long he took to do it, 

the record is incomplete (Doc. 16, p. 15). The Eleventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals has required that "a full and fair record" be 

developed by the ALJ even if the claimant is represented by 

counsel. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 

1981). 

At the evidentiary hearing, Rudolph’s Mother testified that 

her son was preoccupied with washing his hands and being germfree, to the point of taking five or six baths a day (Tr. 66). 

Because of this, it took him a very long time to complete any 

chores as he spent so much time cleaning up (Tr. 66-67). The 

evidence Rudolph claims the ALJ should have gathered was already 

in the record. His claim otherwise is without merit.

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ demonstrated bias in his 

determination. Rudolph goes on to assert that the ALJ had a 

“plan” to deny benefits because he was less than thirty years 

old; the “plan” was one in which the ALJ ignored the law and 

cherry-picked the evidence so that the result the ALJ wanted 

would be reached (Doc. 16, p. 16-17). In oral argument before 

the Court, when asked what was the basis for alleging bias, 

Plaintiff’s Attorney stated that the ALJ’s bias was demonstrated 

in that the decision was “wholly unfavorable” to his client or, 

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as stated by the Court but agreed to by the Attorney, the “total 

tenor of this decision demonstrated bias” (Doc. 26, Audio File 

at 11:42 – 12:57). 

The Supreme Court has held that Administrative Law Judges 

are presumed to be unbiased, though “[t]his presumption can be 

rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other 

specific reason for disqualification;” the burden of 

disqualification falls on the party making the assertion. 

Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1982).

Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ was biased is based on the 

claims, raised herein, in which Rudolph asserts error. The 

undersigned has examined six claims and found substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions. The undersigned has 

not found any indication of bias in the ALJ’s findings, in his 

methodology, or in his conclusions. Rudolph’s claim of bias is 

without merit.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that the Appeals Council did not 

properly consider newly-submitted evidence (Doc. 16, p. 3; Doc. 

17). Rudolph specifically objects to the Appeals Council’s 

failure to include Dr. Dominick’s resume along with the evidence 

she provided regarding Plaintiff’s mental abilities (see Doc. 

17, pp. 8-12). The Court has already summarized the February 9, 

2016 letter Dominick penned for Rudolph (Tr. 710).

The Court notes that a disability claimant can present new 

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evidence at any stage of the administrative proceedings. 20 

C.F.R. ¶ 416.1400(b); Ingram v. Commissioner of Social Security, 

496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). If the evidence is first 

presented to the Appeals Council, the Council considers it only 

if it relates “to the period on or before the date of the 

[ALJ’s] hearing decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470(b). If the 

Appeals Council determines that the evidence provides no basis 

for changing the ALJ’s decision, no further explanation is 

required. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 771 F.3d 780, 783-85 (11th

Cir. 2014). This rule of law was reinforced in an Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals decision that stated as follows:

“The Appeals Council may deny or dismiss [a] 

request for review. . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.1467. But the Appeals Council is not 

required to make specific findings of fact 

when it denies review. It need only 

“consider the additional evidence” that is 

new, material, and chronologically relevant. 

Id. § 416.1470(b). The Appeals Council 

stated that it considered the new evidence 

that Parks submitted, and the Appeals 

Council added the evidence to the record. 

The Appeals Council was not required to do 

more.

Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, 783 F.3d 847, 853 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Here, the Appeals Council considered the new evidence and 

found that it provided no basis for changing the ALJ’s decision 

(Tr. 2). The Court notes that the evidence not included in the 

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record by the Appeals Council consists of Ann Dominick’s resume, 

including her education, professional experience, work as an 

educational consultant, related experiences, community 

involvement, selected presentations, selected publications, 

honors and awards, and professional organizations (Doc. 17, pp. 

8-12). While this resume would inform the reader of Dominick’s 

qualifications to provide an opinion as to Rudolph’s mental 

abilities, the Court cannot say that its exclusion was anything 

more than harmless error.

The Appeals Council did consider and include in the record 

Dominick’s “To Whom It May Concern” letter (see Tr. 710). 

Though the letter locates Rudolph’s intelligence in the lowest 

two percent of the population, it acknowledges that the test 

used “is not considered a true IQ score” (Tr. 710). It finds 

that Plaintiff has borderline intelligence, but not that he is 

mentally retarded. Plaintiff’s claim that the Appeals Council 

did not properly consider this new evidence is without merit.

Rudolph raised eight different claims in bringing this 

action. All are without merit. Upon consideration of the 

entire record, the Court finds "such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Therefore, it is 

recommended that the Secretary's decision be affirmed, see 

Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1980), that 

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this action be dismissed, and that judgment be entered in favor 

of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin and against Plaintiff Markus 

Jamaal Rudolph.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 7(c). The parties 

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

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specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 17th day of November, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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