Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06140/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06140-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAVE SAN FRANCISCO BAY

ASSOCIATION, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants.

CIV-F-97-6140 OWW/DLB

CIV-F-98-5261 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS’

APPLICATION FOR FEES AND COSTS

UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO

JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C.

2412(d)(1)(A) (DOC. 573)

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER

AUTHORITY AND WESTLANDS WATER

DISTRICT

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR, et al.

 Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Bay Institute of San Francisco, Environmental Defense,

and Save San Francisco Bay Association (“Environmental

Plaintiffs”) move for an award of “attorney’s fees and litigation

expenses for merits work in the amount of $975,135,” pursuant to

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Doc. 573 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), filed May 24,

2004. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 1 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs provided notice of its intention to move for

attorneys’ fees and costs at the same time as they filed their

memorandum in support of its motion. Doc. 573. Plaintiff

initially filed five declarations in support of its motion. Doc.

574, Declaration of Antonio Rossmann; Doc. 575, Declaration of

Trent Orr; Doc. 576, Declaration of Philip Atkins-Pattenson; Doc.

577, Declaration of Linda M Dardarian; Doc. 578 Declaration of

Cynthia Koehler; Doc 579, Declaration of Jeremy L Friedman, all

filed May 24, 2004. The Federal Defendants filed an opposition

to this motion, see Defendants’ Opposition, while San Luis &

Delta-Mendota Water Authority and Westlands Water District filed

a limited opposition to the Environmental Plaintiff’s fee

request, Doc. 595, filed August 9, 2004. Plaintiff replied to

Defendants’ opposition, Doc. 602, filed November 4, 2004,

attaching the supplemental declaration of Jeremy L. Friedman,

Doc. 603.

In an effort to clarify the parties positions on these

issues, environmental plaintiffs were asked at the hearing on the

instant fee petition to submit a supplemental brief summarizing

the record on this question. See Doc. 610. The federal

defendants and the water authority plaintiffs filed responsive

documents. See Docs. 611 & 613.

On October 24, 2005, the water authority plaintiffs moved

for leave to file a supplemental complaint concerning the

Interior’s accounting of the 2004 water year. (Doc. 623, Motion;

Doc. 634, Joinder.) The federal defendants and environmental

plaintiffs opposed. (Docs. 629 and 630.) In their opposition,

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 2 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680-83 (9th Cir. 1

1995); see also United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.

Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

3

the federal defendants suggested that it might be inappropriate

to rule on this fee petition if the court granted leave to file a

supplemental complaint. However, at oral argument on the motion

to supplement, all parties agreed that it is appropriate to

resolve the instant fee petition, in part because it concerns

claims that have reached final judgment. 

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case has a long and complicated history. The

underlying action involves the United States Department of

Interior (“Interior”) Bureau of Reclamation's (“Bureau”)

administration of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”), “the

country's largest federal water reclamation project,” and 1

Interior's 1999 water year implementation of section 3406(b)(2)

of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (“CVPIA”) in such a

way as to allegedly misinterpret and misapply the definition of

“CVP yield” to cause an incorrect amount of CVP water to be

diverted from the water-districts and the environment.

The CVPIA took effect October 30, 1992, with the express

primary purposes to: (1) protect, restore, and enhance fish,

wildlife, and associated habitats in the Central Valley and

Trinity River Basins; and (2) address the impact of the CVP on

fish, wildlife, and their associated habitats. See Pub. L. No.

102-575, Title 34, §§ 3402, 3406(b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4706,

4715-16 (1992). Section 3406(b)(2) requires the Bureau to

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 3 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

dedicate and manage annually 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield for

fish and wildlife purposes. See id. at § 3406(b)(2).

On November 20, 1997, Interior issued its final

administrative proposal (“AP”), “CVPIA Administrative Proposal,

Management Section 3406(b)(2) Water (800,000 acre feet),” which

adopted a plan to simultaneously implement CVPIA Sections

3406(b)(1)-(3).

The next day, on November 21, 1997, San Luis-Delta Mendota

Water Authority filed this case in the Eastern District of

California to challenge the method adopted by Interior in its

1997 AP to implement Section 3406(b)(2). San Luis argued that

Interior adopted the AP without considering whether its

environmental actions (in Appendix A) would result in dedication

of more than 800 TAF for (b)(2) purposes, in direct violation of

Section 3602(b)(2). See Doc. 1.

The environmental plaintiffs separately challenged the same

1997 Interior AP in a February 4, 1998 suit filed in the Northern

District of California, arguing insufficient water was to be

dedicated to (b)(2) purposes. On May 7, 1998, the environmental

plaintiffs' case was consolidated with this, the lead case. See

Doc. 36. 

All parties moved for partial summary judgment in early

1999. The environmental plaintiffs specifically sought a finding

that interior violated the statute by treating (b)(2) water as a

discretionary allocation, arguing that the AP (1) failed to

annually set aside the requisite 800 TAF of CVP yield exclusively

for environmental purposes; (2) wrongfully implements 

§§ 3406(b)(1),(2) and (3) adopted measures that ignore express

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 4 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

statutory management duties; (3) improperly permitted reuse of

(b)(2) water; and (4) failed to adopt the (b)(1) fish program

within three years. 

A March 19, 1999, decision found in favor of the

environmental plaintiffs on some issues. The district court held

that Interior abused its discretion by: (1) “rewriting the water

dedication provision of § 3406(b)(2) in merging (b)(1), (2) and

(3) compliance and in failing to account for and dedicate

annually 800,000 AF of CVP yield;” (2) “failing to comply with

the (b)(1) three[-]year time limit for developing and

implementing the anadromous fish doubling program;” (3) “making

an unauthorized [and unjustified] five year <no need' finding

under 3406(b)(2)(D);” (4) “failing to comply with NEPA, for

(b)(1) compliance, which reduces annual CVP contractor deliveries

by more than 800,000 AF of CVP yield;” and (5) “relying on an

Interior Solicitor's legal opinion that is a post hoc

rationalization that rewrites section 3406(b)(2) and justifies

agency action that ignores express water dedication

requirements.” Doc. 156 at 51. The issue of (b)(2) compliance

was remanded to Interior to formulate and adopt a proper method

to calculate CVP yield. See id. at 28.

On April 9, 1999, the AP was found contrary to the CVPIA,

and the issue was remanded to Interior to complete a proper

(b)(2) accounting. See Doc. 159. A preliminary injunction

issued May 14, 1999, to enjoin Interior from implementing the AP. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 5 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Interior had been temporarily enjoined since April 16, 2

1999. See Doc. 174 (TRO).

On August 16, 1999, San Luis submitted its comments on 3

the Interim Decision to the Bureau. See Doc. 376 ex. 1 at ex. B.

6

See Doc. 209.2

In response, on July 14, 1999, Interior issued an “Interim

Decision of Implementation of Section 3406(b)(2) of the Central

Valley Project Improvement Act.” See Doc. 376 ex. 1 at ex. A

(“July, 1999, Interim Decision”). Interior also issued an 3

“Accounting” of CVP yield that was, pursuant to CVPIA

§ 3406(b)(2), to be dedicated and used from March 1, 1999,

through February 28, 2000. See Doc. 431 at ex. A. Interior's

July, 1999, Interim Decision provided that “Interior will

continue to credit up to 450,000 AF of CVP water used to meet the

[Water Quality Control Plan] obligations toward the (b)(2)

requirements.” Doc. 376, Ex. 1, Ex. A at 8.

On October 5, 1999, Interior issued its Final Decision,

“Decision on Implementation of Section 3406(b)(2) of the Central

Valley Improvement Act,” which defines the method Interior

intended to employ to calculate CVP yield, to account for the use

of the dedicated yield, and the procedures to manage the

dedicated (b)(2) yield. See Doc. 376 ex. 1 at ex. C. The Final

Decision provides that: (1) Interior will credit water used to

meet 1995 WQCP requirements against the 800 TAF (b)(2) mandate,

up to a 450 TAF cap; and (2) Interior is not required to, but

may, credit water used to meet post CVPIA-enacted ESA

requirements against the 800 TAF (b)(2) mandate.

After evidentiary hearings on January 31, and February 3,

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 6 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 04, 2000, San Luis filed an interlocutory appeal 4

of the order that vacated the preliminary injunction. See Doc.

324. On September 21, 2000, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

propriety of dissolving the preliminary injunction, but declined

to rule on the underlying merits of the appeal. See Doc. 359;

San Luis Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. United States, 238 F.3d

430, 2000 WL 1367912 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished memorandum).

On November 27, 2000, a scheduling conference was held. See

Doc. 363. The federal defendants were ordered to submit a

statement to the court and all parties concerning their intent to

comply with the court order to implement the AFRP requirement of

the CVPIA. See id. at 3. Any party was given leave to object to

the government's position. See id. The government was also

ordered to provide by December 11, 2000, its accounting for the

1999 water year, showing the various uses of the CVP yield in

compliance with CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) and related laws. See id.

Last, the parties were directed to file their motions for final

judgment and interlocutory appeal. See id. at 3-4.

7

2001, see Docs. 310-11 (hearings); Doc. 284 (order maintaining

preliminary injunction in effect), a memorandum and order issued

March 13, 2000 addressing: (1) the challenge to the Interim

Decision's definition of “CVP yield;” and (2) the motion for a

preliminary injunction. See Doc. 320. That order upheld

“Interior's interpretation of the definition of CVP yield, except

for the deduction for the modified D-1400 flows in calculating

CVP yield, []as lawful, not arbitrary or capricious,” id. at 31,

but found Interior erred by using modified D-1400 flows to

calculate CVP yield, because D-893 flows should have been used,

see id. For the 1999 water year, the calculation of the Clear

Creek (b)(2) action below Whiskeytown Dam was ordered reduced by

39,000 acre-feet, for a net use of 13,000, rather than 52,000,

acre-feet. See id. at 32. The preliminary injunction was

dissolved. See id. Interior was ordered to recalculate the CVP 4

yield by substituting the D-893 flows for the improperly-utilized

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 7 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

modified D-1400 flows, and to submit such recalculation within

ten (10) days following date of service of the decision. See id.

at 32-33.

On March 17, 2000, the Bureau submitted its re-calculated

figure for annual CVP “yield,” 5,990,000 acre-feet of CVP water. 

See Doc. 424 at ¶34 (federal defendants' statement of undisputed

facts in support of summary judgment).

On March 21, 2000, the Bureau submitted the declaration of

Ann Lubas-Williams, which confirmed that Interior rectified the

only error in the CVP yield calculation by revising the CVP yield

study's PROSIM input files to use the D-893 flows, not the

modified D-1400 flows. See Doc. 322 at 3. 

On December 11, 2000, the government filed the declaration

of Alan Candlish, which it claimed complied with the order

requiring the 1999 water year CVP accounting. See Doc. 364. Mr.

Candlish represented that "[t]he signing of the [Record of

Decision] and finalization of the Anadromous Fish Restoration

Program will occur no later than January 19, 2001." Id. at 2.

On December 22, 2000, San Luis objected to the 1999 water

year accounting, claiming that Mr. Bowling's declaration was

"incomplete," because "one cannot tell: (1) the acre[-]foot cost

of each individual action, nor (2) the annual acre[-]foot

contribution of each individual CVP facility." Doc. 367 at 2-3.

On December 22, 2000, the government responded, noting that

at an informational meeting held on December 20, 2000, printed

materials that contained the allegedly “missing” information were

distributed. See Doc. 368 at 3-4 (citing ¶8 of its attached

declaration of Derek Hilts: "The Printed Materials contain

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 8 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

information pertaining to (a) the acre[-]foot cost of each

individual action taken in compliance with section 3406(b)(2) of

the Central Valley Project Improvement Act and (b) the annual

acre[-]foot contribution of each individual Central Valley

Project Facility.”). This aspect of the challenge to the 1999

water year accounting was mooted.

On January 16, 2001, San Luis filed a motion seeking leave

to file a second amended complaint ("SAC") and to require the

government to supplement the administrative record. See Doc.

374; Doc. 376 at ex. 1 (proposed SAC). San Luis argued this

amendment was necessary, due to additions related to events that

occurred after the November 16, 1999, filing of its first amended

complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 263). The SAC included six specific

changes: (1) added Westlands as a plaintiff (SAC ¶4); (2) alleged

that the August 28, 2000, programmatic ROD modified the October

6, 1999 decision to implement CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) (SAC ¶19); (3)

added two assertions to the first claim for relief, i.e., that

all CVP yield that is used to meet the requirements of the 1995

Delta Water Quality Control Plan (“WQCP”) and the ESA must be

counted against the 800,000 acre-foot maximum (SAC ¶¶ 25(d)-(e));

(4) amended the second claim for relief to be retrospective,

rather than prospective, because the 1999-2000 water year had

passed (SAC ¶¶ 28-31); (5) added a third claim for relief, which

alleged that the government will dedicate and manage more than

800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) during

the 2000-2001 water year (SAC ¶¶ 32-34); and (6) added a fourth

claim for relief, which alleged that since October, 1999, the

government implemented its final decision CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) in a

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 9 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

manner that was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of

discretion, because it created substantial uncertainty concerning

the extent and timing of water releases for particular (b)(2)

actions, did not count all water being dedicated and managed for

(b)(2) purposes against the statutory limit, and allowed Interior

to carry-over stored (b)(2) water from one year to the next,

which contravenes § 3406(b)(2)'s 800,000 acre-foot limit for

(b)(2) purposes (SAC ¶¶ 35-40). 

In order to “satisfy the concerns of the federal defendants

and environmental plaintiffs,” San Luis and Westlands agreed to:

(1) “file joint briefs for all aspects of the case, including any

appeals;” and (2) “to the extent that th[e] Court or any

appellate court imposes time limits for oral argument, trial or

other proceedings, the Authority and Westlands will be deemed to

be a single party for time-allocation purposes and will share the

time allocated to them.” See Doc. 375 at 3.

On March 26, 2001, the parties appeared for oral argument on

San Luis' motion to file its SAC and to require Interior to

supplement the administrative record. See Doc. 393. The motions

were granted orally during the hearing, and a confirming written

order issued April 10, 2000. See Doc. 396.

On April 05, 2001, San Luis filed its SAC, see Doc. 395,

which the federal defendants answered on April 17, 2001, see Doc.

409.

On April 10, 2001, San Luis and Westlands moved for a

preliminary injunction to prevent Interior from releasing in

excess of the statutorily-capped 800,000 acre-feet of water under

CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). See Doc. 397.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 10 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because of the time urgency of the availability of CVP 5

water for fish restoration and the irrevocable loss of such water

use once it is released, on April 19, 2001, the parties were

ordered to submit declaration(s) to explain why it was

impossible, not merely inconvenient, to produce any of their

expert witness(es) by April 25, 2001, the scheduled preliminary

injunction hearing date. See Doc. 411. No party submitted a

declaration.

11

On April 16, 2001, oral argument was held on the motion for

preliminary injunction. The parties agreed an evidentiary

hearing was needed to determine how much (b)(2) water, if any,

Interior had released in violation of the 800,000 acre-foot

floor/cap. See Doc. 406.5

A hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held

on April 25, 2001, and evidence taken. See Doc. 419. On April

26, 2001, the parties appeared telephonically to determine what

further action should be taken on plaintiffs' motion for a

preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs withdrew their preliminary

injunction motion, which defendants did not oppose. On May 14,

2001, plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction was vacated

and ordered off calendar without prejudice. See Doc. 436.

On May 03, 2001, the environmental plaintiffs moved: (1) to

sever under Rules 42(b) and 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and (2) to enter judgment and certify under Rule

54(b), as to: (a) paragraphs 55(a), (d)-(e) of their second cause

of action; and (b) the first and second causes of action filed by

San Luis, the Pixley Irrigation District (“Pixley”), and the

Stockton East Water District (“SEWD”). See Doc. 422 at 2. Oral

argument was held Monday, June 18, 2001, where the parties agreed

the ruling on that motion should await disposition of the pending

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 11 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On August 1, 2001, federal defendants moved to continue 6

the scheduled August 13, 2001, hearing for sixty (60) days due to

the change in federal administration, e.g., a new Commissioner of

Reclamation and new Secretary for Water and Science. See Doc.

457 at 2. Westlands and San Luis joined in that motion on August

2, 2001. See Doc. 460. The environmental plaintiffs refused to

join the other parties, and argued that because the new water

year began in two months, the hearing should proceed as

scheduled. See Doc. 462. On August 8, 2001, federal defendants'

motion to continue this hearing was denied. See Doc. 461.

12

cross-motions for summary judgment.

On May 4, 2001, the federal defendants moved for summary

judgment against the environmental plaintiffs and water-district

plaintiffs on all claims. See Doc. 423 at 2.

On May 7, 2001, the water-district plaintiffs moved for

partial summary judgment that:

(1) Interior's calculation of CVP yield is not in

accordance with law because it calculates the

baseline using modified D-1400 flows instead of D893 flows;

(2) the Final Decision is contrary to law because it

does not calculate the amount of CVP yield, as

defined by the statute, that is dedicated to

(b)(2) purposes;

(3) the Final Decision is not in accordance with law

because Interior does not count all water used to

meet the requirements of the 1995 WQCP and other

legal obligations imposed after enactment against

the 800,000 acre-foot limit; and

(4) to the extent Interior uses “reset” and “offset”

to avoid counting yield dedicated and managed

pursuant to (b)(2), it is acting contrary to law.

Doc. 426 at 2.

On May 7, 2001, the environmental plaintiffs moved for

partial summary judgment against the federal defendants on

paragraphs 55(a), (c)-(e) of their second claim for relief. See

Doc. 430 at 2. The environmental plaintiffs sought judgment on 6

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 12 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The district court rulings are set forth in Doc. 484, 7

Supplemental Memorandum and Order: Re Summary Judgment Motion on

Offset and Reset, filed February 2, 2002; Doc. 486, Amended

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Sever Claims: to

Enter Final Judgment; and to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal,

filed February 22, 2003; Doc. 487, Memorandum Decision and Order

Re: Federal Defendants’ Motion to Amend ‘Memorandum Decision and

Order Re: Motions to Sever Claims; to Enter Final Judgment; and

to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal, filed February 28, 2002.

13

their allegations that the “Final Decision and DOI's

implementation of the CVPIA misinterpret[] the requirements of

Section 3406(b)(2) of the CVPIA in several important respects,”

including:

(1) DOI improperly elevates the secondary purposes of

the (b)(2) water over and above the primary

purposes for which Congress directed the water to

be dedicated and managed;

(2) DOI improperly appropriates to itself unlimited

discretion in charging the water used to fulfill

obligations under the Endangered Species Act, 16

U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., (“ESA”) against the 800,000

acre-feet of water that is to be dedicated under

Section 3406(b)(2);

(3) the Final Decision fails to properly implement the

banking provisions of Section 3408(d);

(4) the Final Decision improperly purports to provide

Interior with discretion to provide (b)(2) water

for other CVP purposes, including irrigated

agriculture, in the absence of the required

finding that the (b)(2) water is not necessary for

the fish, wildlife and habitat restoration

purposes of the CVPIA, and

(5) the Final Decision contains several errors in

technical methodology that are likely to result in

a dedication of less then [sic] the full 800,000

acre-feet of water required to be dedicated to the

CVPIA's fish, wildlife and habitat restoration

purposes and measures.

Doc. 431 at 2:12-3:4.

A series of final orders were issued in response to the

parties’ cross motions. The environmental plaintiffs achieved 7

essentially no success at the district court level on this round

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 13 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

of cross motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled

in favor of the federal defendants against the environmental

plaintiffs on all issues presented. 

First, the environmental plaintiffs argued that using up to

450 TAF of (b)(2) water to satisfy ESA and WQCP requirements is

contrary to the plain language of CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) and

contravenes the CVPIA as a whole. See Doc. 431 at 13-22. The

district court ruled that:

Section 3406(b)(2) unambiguously directs Interior to

“dedicate and manage annually eight hundred thousand

acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the

primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and

habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by

this title.” Interior has no discretion whether to

annually provide more or less than 800 TAF of CVP yield

(approximately 5.99 MAF) for (b)(2) purposes, unless it

makes certain findings under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)(C)...

Interior is also directed to annually dedicate and

manage the mandatory 800 TAF of CVP yield “to assist

the State of California in its efforts to protect the

waters of the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin

Delta Estuary [i.e., the WQCP]; and to help to meet

such obligations as may be legally imposed upon the

[CVP] under State or Federal law following the date of

enactment of this title, including but not limited to

additional obligations under the Federal Endangered

Species Act.” Id. at 4715-16. As a matter of law,

this language is not ambiguous -- water used to meet

WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA requirements is an additional

(b)(2) purpose and must be charged against the 800 TAF

(b)(2) mandate if so used.

The CVPIA is not silent on what amount of water used

for these so-called “secondary” purposes is to be

credited against the 800 TAF (b)(2) mandate. (E.g.,

could all 800 TAF of (b)(2) water be used to meet postCVPIA-enactment ESA requirements?). Congress mandates

that exactly 800 TAF of CVP yield (. 5.99 MAF) be

dedicated for (b)(2) purposes, whether “primary” or

“secondary.” To hold otherwise would render the 800

TAF figure superfluous. This leaves to Interior, the

discretion to annually determine how much CVP yield to

devote to WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA requirements. 

However, if it were left to Interior’s “discretion” 

whether or not to count CVP yield used for such (b)(2)

purposes, the annual 800 TAF cap would be illusory. 

The 800,000 TAF is intended by Congress as an immutable

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 14 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

floor and ceiling on annual reallocation of water from

CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes. If Interior uses more

than 800 TAF for (b)(2) purposes in any year, but does

not count all CVP yield used for such purposes, it

violates CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). Water-districts’ motion

for summary judgment on whether Interior has the

discretion to limit credits against (b)(2) for water

used for WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA purposes to 450 TAF is

GRANTED, Interior has no such discretion. Any amount

of CVP yield water annually used for a (b)(2) purpose

must be counted as part of the 800 TAF. The

environmental plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

on this issue is denied. 

Doc. 466 at 32-33 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

The bottom line of this ruling was that although Interior had

full discretion to determine how much CVPIA yield should annually

be dedicated to each of the enumerated (b)(2) purposes, whether

primary or secondary, all CVPIA yield annually dedicated for

(b)(2) purposes had to be “counted.” 

Second, the environmental plaintiffs argued that the Final

Decision’s system of “banking” water for fish and wildlife

purposes violates the CVPIA because it proscribes banking if it

interferes with other CVP purposes and relegates banking to the

lowest priority in the (b)(2) system. The district court held: 

This is not the case, but even assuming, arguendo, the

truth of this statement, the CVPIA is not violated,

because CVPIA § 3408(d) does not prioritize (b)(2)

water for banking. Cf. CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) (deducting

800 TAF before water for other uses, such as meeting

existing water-service contracts with various waterdistricts). Rather, this section simply extends

discretion to, but does not require, Interior to bank

(b)(2) water, consistent with State law, if CVP project

facilities are not otherwise committed or needed to

meet CVP project purposes or other federal obligations. 

It is for Interior, in its reasonable discretion, to

annually determine what “priority” water-banking for

fish or wildlife purposes shall have, if project

facilities are available. 

Id. at 37. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 15 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Third, environmental plaintiffs challenged the Final

Decision’s conclusion on “reuse” of CVPIA yield devoted to (b)(2)

purposes that “[a]fter water released for upstream [(b)(2)

purposes] has served the purpose for which its release was

prescribed, it is available for recapture and reuse by the [CVP],

including for export south of the Delta.” The district court

confirmed that such reuse is permissible under California law:

Fish and wildlife measures under the CVPIA must conform

to non-conflicting California law, 3411(a), which

permits re-use of water to achieve its most beneficial

use. The COA between the United States and the

California DWR for coordinated operation of the CVP

with the State Water Project recognizes the State's

right to divert water from the CVP that cannot be used

or diverted after it fulfills (b)(2) purposes. AR 4193. 

The statute does not prevent Interior from exercising

its discretion to manage (b)(2) water for multiple

uses, so long as the environmental requirements of

(b)(2) are achieved.

Id. at 37. 

Finally, the district court found Environmental plaintiffs

argument that “Interior has no discretion to employ modeling

methodologies or assumptions in the accounting for the (b)(2)

dedicated yield that are likely to result in an under-allocation

of the (b)(2) water in any given year,” Doc. 431 at 24, was a

request for an advisory opinion and denied it. 

An evidentiary hearing was ordered “to address the sole,

discrete issue whether under the reset and offset methods,

Interior releases more than 800 TAF CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes

and actually resulted in the dedication and use of more than

800,000 AF of CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes in 1999-2000 water

year. The water district plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was

granted; federal defendants were prohibited from using its

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 16 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

“reset” or “offset methods.” The ruling required every use of

CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes in any water year to be counted and

not reversed or ignored. Doc. 484. 

All parties filed timely notices of appeal to the Ninth

Circuit and briefing was scheduled to begin September 5, 2002. 

See Doc. 527 at 3, ex. A. On August 20, 2002, federal defendants

voluntarily dismissed their appeal. See Doc. 520 at 2. 

On October 24, 2002 environmental plaintiffs filed an

expedited motion to stay the March 20, 2002 Final Partial

Judgment, pending their appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Doc. 527 at

2. Environmental plaintiffs also moved to enjoin federal

defendants from “issuing any new agency policy which would alter

existing [CVIPA] 3406(b)(2) water allocation and accounting

procedures pursuant to the March 20, 2002 Final partial

Judgment.” Id. at 2 & 5.

The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments May 12, 2003. The

Circuit Court’s amended decision addresses five issues. See Bay

Inst. of San Francisco v. U.S., 66 Fed. Appx. at 735, as amended

on, January 23, 2004. 

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s rejection

of the water authority plaintiffs’ principal contention that 

§ 3406(b)(2) requires Interior to calculate the costs of

3406(b)(2) actions against a hypothetical model of Project

operations during the 1928-34 drought period. Id. at 735. 

Interior and the environmental plaintiffs both opposed this

contention. The second finding affirmed that “the Improvement

Act does not prohibit Interior from reusing water initially

released for (b)(2) purposes. Because the CVPIA does not

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 17 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

specifically address reuse, Interior's reasonable interpretation

of the statute is entitled to deference.” Id. (citing Wilderness

Soc’y, 316 F.3d at 921-22). This ruling was against the

environmental plaintiffs. Third, the Ninth Circuit found: 

The district court erred in concluding that Interior

lacks discretion to refrain from crediting the amount

of Project yield actually used for any (b)(2) purpose

against the designated 800,000 acre feet of Project

yield. To hold otherwise would defeat the primary

purpose for which the 800,000 acre feet were

designated-fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration. 

Section 3406(b)(2) provides that the “primary purpose”

to which the 800,000 acre feet should be dedicated is

the implementation of “fish, wildlife, and habitat

restoration purposes authorized by this title....”

Section 3406(b)(2) also provides that the 800,000 acre

feet may be used to “help” meet obligations under the

Endangered Species Act and to “assist” in meeting

water quality standards. If Interior were required to

deduct some or all the water it uses for water quality

and Endangered Species Act purposes from the (b)(2)

dedication, the water needed for implementation of the

Improvement Act's restoration mandate could be

relegated to a secondary role, or perhaps no role at

all. Such a scenario would directly conflict with the

Interior’s mandate to give effect to the hierarchy of

purposes established in Section 3406(b)(2). 

Bay Inst., 87 Fed. Appx. 637. The parties dispute who prevailed

on appeal of this issue and to what extent.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s decisions on

another of the environmental plaintiffs’ claims:

Interior may not exclude from its calculation of CVPIA

yield certain water flows implemented in connection

with the Auburn Dam. Section 3406(b)(2) requires

Interior to exclude from its Project yield calculation

only those "flow and operational requirements imposed

by terms and conditions existing in licenses, permits,

and other agreements...” The record reflects no such

license, permit or other agreement concerning the

Auburn Dam flows. 

Id. The water authority plaintiffs’ allegation that Interior

should be “prohibited [] from using offset/reset matrices in

accounting for use of water under § 3406(b)(2), to impermissibly

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 18 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

alter the 800,000 acre feet designated by Congress” was also

affirmed. Id. This was contrary to the environmental plaintiffs’

position, which was the same as Interior’s.

The district court’s decision on these two issues

found: Interior’s decision to credit a maximum 450,000

AF...against (b)(2) 800,000 AF mandate is not provided

for by statute, is arbitrary, and violates

(b)(2);...The use of reset is unlawful, arbitrary, and

capricious;...Offset is unlawful arbitrary, and

capricious...[.]

Doc. 491, The District Court’s Final Partial Judgement on

Accounting Issues, at 3, ¶¶ e, h & I, filed March 20, 2002.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Threshold Requirements.

1. The Statute of Limitations. 

The EAJA provides that an application for fees under the Act

must be filed within thirty days of final judgment. Final

judgment means “final and not appealable.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(2)(G). In this case, the Ninth Circuit issued its

decision on June 3, 2003. See Bay Institute, 66 Fed. Appx. at

734. The parties had ninety days after the Court of Appeals’

judgment in which to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of

certiorari, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c); they did not. On

September 1, 2003, the ninety-day period expired, and the

decision of the appellate court became final. The Appeals Court

decision was thereafter amended, and a new ninety day period

began to run on January 23, 2004. This period technically

expired on May 23, 2004, a Sunday. Plaintiffs timely filed their

petition the following day, Monday, May 24, 2004. The statute of

limitations is not a bar.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 19 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

2. Financial Eligibility.

As an additional threshold matter, a party must show that it

is either:

(I) an individual whose net worth did not

exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil

action was filed, or 

(ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or

any partnership, corporation, association,

unit of local government, or organization,

the net worth of which did not exceed

$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was

filed, and which had not more than 500

employees at the time the civil action was

filed; except... 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). However, an organization that

operates as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization “may be a party

regardless of the net worth of such an organization.” Id.

Environmental plaintiff’s initial declarations contained no

information as to the financial or tax-exempt status of the

plaintiff organizations. Defendants argue in their opposition

that the environmental plaintiffs bear the burden of proving

eligibility to seek fees and failed to do so within the 30-day

statute of limitations. (Environmental plaintiffs did file a

supplemental declaration setting forth their tax-exempt status,

but this declaration was not filed within the 30-day window.)

Environmental plaintiffs point out that the statute provides that

an organization operating as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization

“may be a party regardless of the net worth of such an

organization,” and maintain that this provision releases them

from the burden of proving their party status within the statute

of limitations. Environmental plaintiffs also point out that

their tax-exempt status is clearly set forth in the complaint and

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 20 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

amended complaint. 

Defendants cite several cases in which fee petitions were

deemed untimely for failure to set forth all elements of

eligibility. SAI Industries, Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl.

1 (2004); Favret v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D. La.

2004). In SAI Industries, plaintiff filed a “bill of costs”

within the statutory window, but filed its application for fees

and expenses under the EAJA after the deadline. The fee

petitioner in that case argued that the EAJA application should

relate back to the filing of the bill of costs, but the Court of

Federal Claims rejected that argument because the initial bill of

costs did not give the government any notice that an EAJA

application would be forthcoming. Favret simply does not address

the issue at hand. In that case, the fee petitioner initially

failed to include a showing that she had a net worth of less than

$2 million, a requirement of the applicable fee statute. 

However, Favret cured this defect within the statutory time

limit, so her petition was allowed to proceed. Environmental

plaintiffs stand in a very different position from the plaintiffs

in either Favret or SAI Industries. Environmental plaintiffs

timely filed their fee petition without providing any proof of

financial eligibility because the statute deems them eligible

parties by virtue of their nature as 502(c)(3) tax exempt

organizations, a fact they specifically alleged in many pleadings

filed during the course of this litigation, including the first

page of the fee petition itself. See Doc. 573 at 1. Moreover,

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 21 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, Title VI, § 617, 8

111 Stat. 2440, codified at 18 U.S.C. 3006A, specifically

incorporates the filing requirements of the EAJA. See Hristov,

396 F.3d at 1046. 

22

the Ninth Circuit recently permitted a Hyde Amendment fee 8

petitioner to amend his defective fee petition out of time to

include required information concerning his net worth and an

itemized statement of attorney’s fees: 

When the government can show no prejudice from allowing

an amendment to a fee application, it is unduly harsh

not to allow an amendment to bring the application in

conformity with a technical pleading requirement. 

United States v. Hristov, 396 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005).

The government does not allege prejudice. Environmental

plaintiffs are exempt from the net worth requirements. They

refer to their tax exempt organization status in the fee

petition. This unambiguously informed the government of the

basis for environmental plaintiffs’ claimed eligibility for EAJA

fees. No authority has been provided to require an affirmative

assertion of eligibility in the petition. An amendment of the

petition will serve the interests of justice. 

3. Threshold Eligibility Requirements Under the EAJA.

“The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) directs a court to

award fees and other expenses to private parties who prevail in

litigation against the United States if, inter alia, the

Government’s position was not ‘substantially justified.’” INS v.

Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A)). “The clearly stated objective of the EAJA is

to eliminate financial disincentives for those who would defend

against unjustified governmental action and thereby to deter the

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 22 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

unreasonable exercise of Government authority.” Ardestani v.

INS, 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991) (citations omitted).

Eligibility for fees under the EAJA is established by

meeting the remaining conditions set out by the statute: 

(1) that the claimant be a “prevailing party”; 

(2) that the Government's position was not

“substantially justified”; and

(3) that no “special circumstances make an award

unjust”.

Jean, 496 U.S. at 158; Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302

(1993); see also Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th

Cir. 2002)(“For the court to award attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to EAJA, it must be shown that (1) the plaintiff is the

prevailing party; (2) the government has not met its burden of

showing that its positions were substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested

attorney's fees and costs are reasonable.”).

But, “no award of fees is automatic.” Jean, 496 U.S. at

163. A district court retains substantial discretion in fixing

the amount of any EAJA award. Exorbitant, unfounded, or

procedurally defective fee applications –- like any other

improper position that may unreasonably protract proceedings –-

are matters that the district court can recognize and discount. 

“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second

major litigation.” Id. at 163. 

//

//

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 23 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

a. Prevailing Party.

“The Supreme Court identified two judicial outcomes under

which a party may be considered a ‘prevailing party’ for the

purpose of awarding attorney’s fees: (1) an enforceable judgment

on the merits; or (2) a settlement agreement enforceable through

a court-ordered consent decree.” Perez-Arellano, 279 F.3d at

793-94 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of

Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001)). An

enforceable judgment “provides the necessary foundation for a

plaintiff’s status as a prevailing party because the plaintiff

has received at least some relief based on the merits of the

claim.” Id. 

While the EAJA contains no applicable definition of

“prevailing party,” claimants are classified as “prevailing

parties” for attorney’s fees purposes if they “succeed on any

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 870 F.2d 542, 544 (9th

Cir. 1989); see also Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 1393

(9th Cir. 1995). “A prevailing party is one who succeeds on any

significant issue even though other issues are unreached,

remanded, or prove unsuccessful.” Id.

In this case, the environmental plaintiffs experienced

substantial success in the early stages of litigation. The

district court’s March 19, 1999, decision found Interior abused

its discretion in adopting the November 20, 1997 final

administrative proposal, finding for environmental plaintiffs on

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 24 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 While environmental plaintiffs’ success on at least one 9

significant issue is enough to qualify them as a prevailing

party, the degree of their success (or lack thereof) is otherwise

relevant to the amount of fees awarded. The parties do not agree

on the degree of success experienced by the environmental

plaintiffs at various stages of the litigation. This issue is

discussed at length in Part IV.B.5. 

25

most of the issues presented. The federal defendants appear to

concede that this ruling was at least a partial victory for the

environmental plaintiffs. See Doc. 583 Opp. at 8. 

The environmental plaintiffs experienced more limited

success, however, in later stages of the litigation, prevailing

on appeal with respect to a single (and perhaps partially a

second) of the five discrete issues appealed to the Ninth

Circuit. Environmental plaintiffs acknowledge that they “lost

some of the issues and arguments raised in the litigation” but

insist that this “does not rob them of prevailing party status.” 

Doc. 573, Mot. at 8. Environmental plaintiffs are absolutely

correct that “[w]hile limited success may become a factor in the

calculation of the amount of reasonable fees... there can be no

doubt that plaintiffs are entitled to an award.” Id. 

Environmental plaintiffs did succeed on at least one significant

issue, rendering them sufficiently successful to qualify as a

prevailing party for purposes of eligibility for EAJA fees.9

b. Substantial Justification. 

“The EAJA mandates the award of attorney’s fees and expenses

to the prevailing party unless the court finds that the position

of the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” See Or. Natural Res.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 25 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992). “The

government has the burden of demonstrating substantial

justification.” Id. In order to demonstrate that its position

was substantially justified, the government must show that its

position has a reasonable basis in law and fact. Id. (citing

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-65 (1988)). The

Government’s underlying action must be justified to a degree that

would satisfy a reasonable person. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563-64.

“Put another way, substantially justified means there is a

dispute over which reasonable minds could differ.” Gonzales v.

Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In evaluating whether a position is “substantially

justified,” objective indicia “such as the terms of a settlement

agreement, the stage in the proceedings at which the merits were

decided, and the views of other courts on the merits can be

relevant, but not necessarily dispositive.” Gonzales, 408 F.3d

at 618 (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 568). “A string of losses can

be indicative; and even more so a string of successes.” Id. 

Where objective indicia are not available or do not provide a

conclusive answer, the court will examine the “merits of the

government's litigating position.” Id.

 In this case, the district court’s March 19, 1999, decision

found in favor of the environmental plaintiffs on several issues,

holding that Interior abused its discretion by: (1) “rewriting

the water dedication provision of § 3406(b)(2) in merging (b)(1),

(2) and (3) compliance and in failing to account for and dedicate

annually 800,000 AF of CVP yield;” (2) “failing to comply with

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 26 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

the (b)(1) three[-]year time limit for developing and

implementing the anadromous fish doubling program;” (3) “making

an unauthorized [and unjustified] five year <no need' finding

under 3406(b)(2)(D);” (4) “failing to comply with NEPA, for

(b)(1) compliance, which reduces annual CVP contractor deliveries

by more than 800,000 AF of CVP yield;” and (5) “relying on an

Interior Solicitor's legal opinion that is a post hoc

rationalization that rewrites section 3406(b)(2) and justifies

agency action that ignores express water dedication

requirements.” Doc. 156 at 51. The issue of (b)(2) compliance

was remanded to Interior to formulate and adopt a proper method

to calculate CVP yield. See id. at 28. The court denied the

environmental plaintiff’s motions on (1) the “reuse” issue and

(2) whether Interior was required to dedicate (b)(2) water to

address other adverse environmental issues.

The district court’s conclusion in the March 19, 1999

opinion states: 

The CVPIA is a complex and ambiguous statutory

construct that reflects a legislative choice to reorder

the priorities of the CVP to make environmental

protection a co-equal statutory objective. The CVPIA

invests Interior with broad discretion to implement the

management and operations changes that will drive the

reallocation of CVP water, subject to finite limits. 

The court and parties must defer to the expertise and

good faith of Interior to manage the CVP to comply with

the CVPIA. Interior has gone beyond the legislative

grant of discretion: 1) by rewriting the water

dedication provisions of §3406(b)(2) in merging (b)(1),

(2) and (3) compliance and in failing to account for

and dedicate annually 800,000 AF of CVP yield; 2) by

failing to comply with the (b)(1) three year time limit

for developing and implementing the anadromous fish

doubling program; 3) by making an unauthorized five

year “no need” finding under §3406(b)(2)(D); 4) by

failing to comply with NEPA, for (b)(1) compliance,

which reduces annual CVP contractor deliveries by more

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 27 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

than 800,000 AF of CVP yield; and 5) by relying on an

Interior Solicitor’s legal opinion that is a post hoc

rationalization that rewrites section 3406(b)(2) and

justifies agency action that ignores express water

dedication requirements. Interior has the legal

authority within its broad grant of CVPIA water. It

does not have the discretion to fail to annually make

any section 3406(b)(2)(D) finding of “no need.”

Doc. 156 at 50-51 (emphasis added). This finding -- that

Defendants actions exceeded the broad discretion afforded it

under the statute and was based on a post hoc solicitor’s opinion 

-- is equivalent to a finding that the government’s position was

not substantially justified. 

Defendants concede the March 19, 1999 opinion rejected

Interior’s initial attempt to interpret and implement §

3406(b)(2). Opp. at 13. Defendants insist, however, that their

initial interpretation was substantially justified because the

question was one of first impression and because they argued

their position “forcefully and well.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit rejects the argument that a position is

substantially justified simply because it concerns a matter of

first impression. 

There is no per se rule that EAJA fees cannot be

awarded where the government’s position contains an

issue of first impression...we have never held that the

government is automatically shielded from a fee award

because its argument involves any issue on which this

court has not ruled.

United States v. Real Prop. At 2659 Roundhill Drive, 283 F.3d

1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002). The federal defendants cite Bay Area

Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990)

for the proposition that substantial justification may be shown

where the “government has argued its position forcefully and

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 28 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

well.” But, when read in context, the forcefulness of the

government’s argument was only part of the Ninth Circuit’s basis

for a “substantial justification” finding in Bay Area Peace Navy: 

It was [] not unreasonable for the government to try to

uphold the [] regulation when confronted with

litigation. In other words, “substantial justification”

is shown in this case because the government has argued

its position “forcefully and well,” [citations],

“difficult questions” were raised and there is an

absence of adverse precedent on point. [citations] The

disagreement within this panel regarding the merits of

the government's appeal further suggests that a finding

of substantial justification is appropriate.

Id. (emphasis added)(internal citations omitted). Mere forceful

argument alone does not necessarily reflect a position that has a

reasonable basis in law and fact. Here, none of the other

factors considered in Bay Area Peace Navy are present. The

government’s position on most issues in the initial round of

summary judgment motions was essentially untenable and was based

on erroneous analysis by a government lawyer. There was little

room for disagreement on that matter. 

The federal defendants also cite Gonzales v. Free Speech

Coalition, 480 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth

Circuit found that the United States’ defense of a congressional

statute against a constitutional challenge was substantially

justified. In Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit based its finding of

substantial justification on several factors. First, the

government made “appropriate arguments” in defense of the

statute. Second, the government had a string of successes

defending the statute against attack in four other circuits and

the district court. Finally, the Ninth Circuit panel issued a

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 29 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The district court in Gonzales had dismissed these 10

factors as inconclusive, relying instead on the Supreme Court’s

subsequent decision on the merits, which held that the statute

was unconstitutional, to find that the government’s position was

not substantially justified. The Ninth Circuit found that the

district court put “undue weight on the Supreme Court’s holding

on the merits” and criticized the district court’s reliance “on

hindsight, rather than an assessment of the reasonableness of the

government’s position at the time of the litigation.” Id. at

620.

30

split decision on the merits of the case. Here, the government 10

cannot boast a prior “string of successes” on any of the issues

raised in the first round of summary judgment motions. Nor can

the government find post-hoc support for the positions it took in

the form of a split panel decision on those issues. Gonzales is

distinguishable. 

The absence of substantial justification for the position

taken by the government prior to March 1999 is all that is

required for environmental plaintiffs’ fee petition to proceed. 

The analysis of “substantial justification” is a one time

threshold determination.

The single finding that the Government's position lacks

substantial justification, like the determination that

a claimant is a “prevailing party,” thus operates as a

one-time threshold for fee eligibility. In EAJA cases,

the court first must determine if the applicant is a

“prevailing party” by evaluating the degree of success

obtained. If the Government then asserts an exception

for substantial justification or for circumstances that

render an award unjust, the court must make a second

finding regarding these additional threshold

conditions. As we held in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 40 (1983), the “prevailing party” requirement

is “a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff

only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the

district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’”

Id., at 433.

Jean, 496 U.S. at 160. Here, although the federal defendants and

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 30 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

water authority plaintiffs raise serious questions as to the

extent of the environmental plaintiffs’ success in later stages

of the litigation, such challenges are more appropriately

considered in calculating the amount of the fee award.

c. Special Circumstances.

“Where the position of the government as a whole is not

substantially justified, an award of attorney fees to the

prevailing party is required unless ‘special circumstances make

an award unjust.’” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1261

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). “This

provision, however, should only be invoked with caution” and

“should be narrowly construed.” Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d

1046, 1056 (N.D. Cal 1999) (citing J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town

of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Heckler,

773 F.2d 1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 1985)). Such a narrow reading of

this provision is in accord with the purpose of the EAJA, a

“clearly stated objective of [which] is to eliminate financial

disincentives for those who would defend against unjustified

governmental action and thereby to deter the unreasonable

exercise of Government authority.” Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 138.

“It is the government’s burden to show that its position was

substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to

make an award unjust.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. Defendants

have not identified any special circumstances that would make an

award of fees or costs unjust. The rule initially adopted did

not conform to the requirements of 

§ 3406(b)(2) et seq. and required court intervention to order

Interior to formulate a rule that complied with the CVPIA. The

federal defendants have not met their burden of proof. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 31 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

d. Conclusion Re: Eligibility for EAJA fees

Environmental plaintiffs timely filed a complete fee

application. They were prevailing parties on at least one

important claim in which the federal defendants’ position was not

substantially justified. Finally, the government has not shown

that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

B. Reasonable Costs and Fees.

1. Legal Framework.

Once threshold eligibility under the EAJA is established,

the court must then determine an appropriate award. The EAJA

provides that, in non-tort civil actions against the United

States, a district court “shall award...fees and other expenses”

to a prevailing plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the

terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) fees and other expenses

include: 

(1) the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, 

(2) the reasonable cost of any study, analysis,

engineering report, test, or project which is

found by the court to be necessary for the

preparation of the party's case, and 

(3) reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees

awarded under this subsection shall be based

upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished, except that

(I) no expert witness shall be compensated at a

rate in excess of the highest rate of

compensation for expert witnesses paid by the

United States; and (ii) attorney fees shall not

be awarded in excess of $ 125 per hour unless

the court determines that an increase in the

cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for

the proceedings involved, justifies a higher

fee.)

The phrase “fees and other expenses” is defined to include

“reasonable attorney fees.” 24 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “In

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 32 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although “Hensley was an attorney-fee proceeding under 11

§ 1988; however, it also is applicable to awards of fees under

the EAJA.” Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990) (stating that, when

a plaintiff has demonstrated eligibility for attorney fees under

the EAJA, “the district court’s task of determining what fee is

reasonable is essentially the same as that described in

Hensley”)); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1998)

(finding Hensley governs the award of attorney fees under EAJA). 

33

determining what a reasonable attorney’s fee entails, the

district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 [] (1983).” United States v.

$12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).11

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is [1] the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation [2] multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” 

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001)(relying

upon Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The resulting figure is known as

the “Lodestar.” 

To determine what qualifies as reasonable attorney’s fees,

the Ninth Circuit has adopted the twelve Lodestar Factors as

“guidelines [and] as appropriate factors to be considered in the

balancing process required in a determination of reasonable

attorney’s fees:” 

(1) the time and labor required, 

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly,

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, 

(5) the customary fee, 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 33 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances,

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, 

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, 

(10) the “undesirability” of the case, 

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client, and 

(12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 71 (9th Cir.

1975) (suits brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 412 and 529)

(citing Johnson, 488 F.2d 714); see also $12,248 U.S. Currency,

957 F.2d at 1520 (applying the twelve factors outlined in Kerr to

the EAJA). “[Although] the lodestar determination has emerged as

the predominate element of the analysis....the court [can still]

make adjustments to the lodestar figure based on the ‘riskiness’

of the lawsuit and the quality of the attorney’s work.” Jordan

v. Multnomah Co., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986). In

addition, the court may reduce the fee award “if the relief,

however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the

litigation as a whole.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. 

2. Summary of the Government’s Objections to the Fee

Request.

Here, the government raises a number of threshold objections

to the fee petition. First, the government argues that the

environmental plaintiffs “have failed to exercise billing

discretion” by “failing to exclude excessive, redundant or

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 34 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

otherwise unnecessary fees,” and by using “block billing.” Doc.

583, Opp. at 20-21. Second, the government objects to

environmental plaintiffs’ request that their lead attorney be

reimbursed at $400.00 per hour. These objections are not well

founded.

The government’s primary objection is that environmental

plaintiffs’ success was “limited in comparison to the scope of

the litigation as a whole.” The government and the water

authority plaintiffs also question whether plaintiff is entitled

to fees for work performed in opposition to motions filed by the

water authority plaintiffs. These objections are discussed at

length below.

Finally, the government disputes environmental plaintiffs’

entitlement to requested costs and expert fees. 

3. Alleged Billing Inadequacies.

“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the

district court may reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours

that were not ‘reasonably expended.’” Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1146

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). If the court finds that

“portions of the fee request are documented inadequately and

reflect duplicative efforts and excessive staffing,” it may lower

the fee award. Id. Although “[a] district court has wide

latitude in determining the number of hours that were reasonably

expended by the prevailing lawyers,...it must provide enough of

an explanation to allow for meaningful review of the fee

award....[it must] explain how or why the unspecified reduction

in hourly rate fairly balanced the unspecified number of

improperly billed hours.” Id. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 35 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

a. Excessive billing.

Defendants offer several examples of excessive billing.

First, the government suggests that it was excessive for an

experienced attorney such as Save San Francisco Bay’s Koehler to

take 66 hours to draft the complaint in this case. Environmental

plaintiffs responds that in order to understand the complex

claims against the federal defendant, Koehler had to “meet with

her client organizations, confer with co-counsel, familiarize

herself with the available administrative records, research the

law of CVPIA and federal judicial review of administrative

actions, and draft, revise and edit the pleading which would

commence a long-running lawsuit against the federal government.” 

Doc. 602, Reply, at 12. The government’s objection is not

persuasive. Sixty-six hours is not an unreasonable amount of

time to spend drafting the complaint in this case which is

legally and technically complex. 

Second, the government protests the 155 hours spent by Ms.

Koehler and Mr. Friedman preparing their fee application,

especially in light of the fact that Friedman states in his

declaration that fee litigation “has been one of the principal

focuses of my 17 years of practice.” The environmental

plaintiffs respond that the time spent (75 hours by Friedman, who

served as retained fee counsel, and 81 by Koehler) was actually

an exercise in efficiency. Environmental plaintiffs attempted to

settle the fee dispute but point out that, when not settled, such

disputes, by reason of the meticulous detail and volume of

information required, absorb enormous amounts of time. The

environmental plaintiffs’ position is supported by the caselaw

which recognizes that fee litigation can become a “case within a

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 36 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

case” and a burden on the parties and the court. Jean, 497 U.S.

at 163 (cautioning that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should

not result in a second major litigation”). It has taken the

court far more than 155 hours to evaluate and analyze this fee

petition. The hours spent by environmental plaintiffs on the fee

petition are not unreasonable. 

b. Block Billing.

Federal defendants also protest that environmental

plaintiffs employ the “block billing” format. In block billing,

an attorney groups several functions within one block for a

specific date and a total figure is provided for all of the

services performed in that block. With block billing it is

impossible to determine what time was spent on a specific task. 

The “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours

expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “The

applicant should exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to

hours worked...and should maintain billing time records in a

manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct

claims.” Id. Though “there is no certain method of determining

when claims are related or unrelated[,] [and] Plaintiff’s

counsel...is not required to record in great detail how each

minute of his time was expended[,]...counsel should [still]

identify the general subject matter of [] time expenditures.” 

Id. at 437 n.12.

Here, it does not appear that block billing was used. The

lengthy detailed billing records submitted by environmental

plaintiffs identify particular tasks, the dates they were

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 37 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

performed, and the amount of time taken to complete the

particular tasks. This documentation provides sufficient detail

to allow the parties and the court to evaluate the amount of time

billed and its relationship to the work performed. 

4. Hourly Rates.

Environmental plaintiffs request that their lead counsel,

Ms. Koehler, be compensated at an hourly rate of $400. They

request that all other lawyers be compensated at $150 (the

statutory maximum of $125 plus an allowable adjustment for cost

of living). 

Under the EAJA, though attorney’s fees are generally set at

the market rate, they are nevertheless capped at $125 per hour. 

Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986. 987 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the

EAJA sets a ceiling of $125 per hour, the court may determine

“that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such

as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the

proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). 

With respect to the unopposed request to adjust the $125 cap

to $150 for all attorneys other than Ms. Koehler, to adjust for

the cost of living, the Ninth Circuit applies the consumer price

index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d

690, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, such a CPI adjustment is

necessary to raise the $125 cap to the $150 level requested for

all attorneys other than Ms. Koehler. The environmental

plaintiffs submit their own calculation based on a CPI calculator

available online through the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 38 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The calculator is available at 12

http://minneapolisfed.org/research/data/us/calc/

39

See Friedman Decl., Doc. 579. This calculation indicates that 12

an hourly rate of $125 in 1996 (the year the cap was set by

Congress) equates to more than $150 in today’s dollars. The

requested $150 per hour figure is appropriate. 

The federal defendants vehemently object, however, to

awarding Ms. Koehler fees at $400 per hour. To determine whether

$400 per hour is appropriate, the court must determine whether

the statutory exception for limited availability of qualified

attorneys applies here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). This

provision “refers to attorneys having some distinctive knowledge

or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question.”

Rueda-Menicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1997)

(permitting an exceeding of the $125 cap because immigration law

is a specialty); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 552 (recognizing patent law

as a specialty whose attorneys may be entitled to extra fees);

Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding lawyers who

specialize in social security may be entitled to extra fees);

Animal Lovers Volunteer Assoc. v. Carlucci, 867 F.2d 1224, 1226

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding environmental litigation an identifiable

practice specialty that requires distinctive knowledge). 

Three conditions must be met for an award in excess of the

$125 cap to be awarded: 

(1) The attorney must possess distinctive knowledge and

skills developed through a practice specialty. 

(2) Those distinctive skills must be needed in the

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 39 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The federal defendants cite Select Milk Producers, Inc. 13

v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the

D.C. Circuit applied its long-standing rule that “an attorney

cannot be awarded enhanced fees under the special factor

exception based solely on expertise the lawyer acquired through

practice in a specific area of administrative law.” Critically,

however, the Ninth Circuit applies a contrary rule. See Love,

924 F.2d 1492 (environmental expertise may constitute a special

factor). The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged this split in

Truckers United for Safety v. Mead, 329 F.3d 891, 895 n.6 (D.C.

Cir. 2003)(noting contrary rule from Love). Love controls here.

40

litigation. 

(3) Those skills must not be available elsewhere at the

statutory rate.

Pirus, 869 F.2d at 541-42; United States v. 22249 Dolorosa St.,

190 F.3d 977, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1999). “Environmental litigation

is an identifiable practice specialty that requires distinctive

knowledge.” Love, 924 F.2d at 1496 (citing Animal Lovers, 867

F.2d at 1226).13

The parties do not seriously dispute that environmental

plaintiffs have satisfied the first two Love requirements. Ms.

Koehler has extensive experience in the field of environmental

litigation, with particular emphasis on water law and aquatic

species protection. Among other credentials, she served as Legal

Director for Save San Francisco Bay Association for approximately

five years, where she litigated numerous federal and state water

policy cases. From 1995 through 2000, she served on the CALFED

Ecosystem Roundtable. Other distinguished attorneys in the field

have described her as “one of the top water law attorneys in

California.” Rossman Decl., at ¶6. Such expertise is absolutely

necessary for effective litigation of cases involving CVIPA water

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 40 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Ms. Koehler’s qualifications served to justify an 14

enhanced fee award in another case in this District. Koehler

Decl., Doc. 578, at ¶28; NRDC v. Patterson, Case No. 2:88-CV-1658

LKK GGH.

41

issues. Ms. Koehler’s performance as lead counsel demonstrates 14

she is a highly competent and effective advocate in a very

complex sub-specialty of environmental law, water resource

preservation and management.

The government’s objections primarily concern the third Love

requirement: that the specialized skills of the attorney must not

be available elsewhere at the statutory rate. Specifically, the

Federal defendants argue that (1) environmental plaintiffs have

failed to demonstrate that few attorneys would have been

available to take this case at $150 per hour; (2) the requested

hourly rate of $400 is based upon fees charged by attorneys in

San Francisco, not Fresno; and (3) it is improper to award fees

for Ms. Koehler’s work because she received a salary from Save

San Francisco Bay during the course of this litigation

With respect to the first objection, the federal defendants

rely upon the district court’s prior ruling in this case on the

water authority plaintiffs’ fee petition. In that ruling, an

enhanced rate was not awarded because the water authority

plaintiffs failed to “provide evidence that the specialized

skills required for this case were not available elsewhere at the

statutory rate.” Doc. 567 at 49-50. Here, however, evidence has

been submitted on the general unavailability of public interest

specialty lawyers for this type of complex and extended

litigation. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 41 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

Environmental plaintiffs have established that no other

attorney with Ms. Koehler’s distinctive skills would have been

available at the statutory rate (adjusted for inflation) of $150

per hour. For example, environmental plaintiffs provide the

declaration of Antonio Rossman, Esq., a well-known and highly

experienced natural resource attorney, who states that “there are

only a few individuals anywhere in the state who could have

effectively served as a lead counsel in [this] case, and I

believe none of them would have been willing to work on the case

with a capped fee rate.” Rossman Decl., at ¶8. 

The government’s second objection is that the requested rate

of $400 is based upon the San Francisco market, not the local,

Fresno market. As a general rule, a court should base a fee

award on “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,

which typically is the community in which the district court

sits.” Schwartz v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 73 F.3d

895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). However, in Gates v. Deukmejian, 987

F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit articulated a narrow

exception to this rule. In Gates, the Ninth Circuit permitted an

award of fees to San Francisco lawyers at San Francisco market

rates-even though the forum district was Sacramento, because

plaintiff proved that “Sacramento firms could not successfully

have provided the expert representation required to effectively

represent the litigants in [that] matter.” Id. at 1405. Mr.

Rossman’s declaration that “there are only a few individuals

anywhere in the state who could have effectively served as a lead

counsel in [this] case, and I believe none of them would have

been willing to work on the case with a capped fee rate” is

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 42 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The government does cite Curran v. Department of 15

Treasury, 805 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the Ninth

Circuit considered the ethical implications of an award of fees

to a non-profit organization. Curran held that fee-splitting is

appropriate where the non-profit maintains a “separate operating

account for legal services.” Although Curran suggests that there

may be ethical consequences to an EAJA award under certain

circumstances, Curran does not bar an attorney salaried by a nonprofit organization from seeking EAJA attorneys fees in the

amount of the reasonable value of the services performed.

43

sufficient to justify application of the Gates exception here.

The district court, as an expert in attorney’s fees, see

Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 561

(5th Cir. 2004), Env’tl Defense Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d

1254, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1993), recognizes that although water

attorneys are available in the Fresno Division at the $250.00 to

$300.00 hourly rate, these attorneys generally represent water

districts and water users. The court is unaware of any Fresno

Division lawyers practicing public interest water law who

actively try comparable cases in federal or state court. Nor is

the court aware of any private water law attorneys in the Fresno

Division representing plaintiffs with the level of expertise

exhibited by Ms. Koehler. 

The government points out that Ms. Koehler’s may have

received a salary from Save San Francisco Bay during the course

of this litigation. The government suggests that it may be

improper to award Ms. Koehler fees at an hourly rate beyond the

hourly-rate equivalent of her salary. But, the government points

to no authority that is on point. In fact, the actual expense 15

incurred by the client (in this case the salary paid by the nonprofit) is irrelevant to the amount of an EAJA award. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 43 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

The computation of attorney fees should be based on

prevailing market rates without reference to the fee

arrangements between attorney and client.... The fact

that attorneys may be providing services at salaries or

hourly rates below the standard commercial rates which

attorneys might normally receive for services rendered

is not relevant to the computation of compensation

under the [EAJA].

 

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (11th Cir. 1984)(citing

H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15, reprinted in

1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 4953, 4994). 

Environmental plaintiffs’ evidence justifies a higher rate

for Ms. Koehler. Her time shall be compensated at the rate of

$400.00 per hour. 

5. Extent of Environmental Plaintiffs’ Success.

The crux of the dispute in this case is whether the

environmental plaintiffs’ fee award should be reduced to account

for the extent (or lack thereof) of their success. “[A] court

may reduce the fee award in cases where the plaintiff only

received partial or limited success.” Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37). A prevailing plaintiff is

“not entitled to compensation for attorney’s fees for time

expended unsuccessfully pursuing claims unrelated to those on

which plaintiff ultimately prevailed.” Id. at 434-35. However,

“where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has

won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced

simply because the district court did not adopt each contention

raised.” Id. at 440. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this

holding “as establishing the general rule that plaintiffs are to

be compensated for attorney’s fees incurred for services that

contribute to the ultimate victory in the lawsuit.” Cabrales v.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 44 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

45

Co. of L.A., 935 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two part test to determine

which legal services contributed to the ultimate victory in the

lawsuit and whose fees were deserving of restitution.

Part I

The first step is to consider whether “the

plaintiff failed to prevail on claims that were

unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded.” 

Id. [Hensley, 461 U.S.] at 434. Claims are

“unrelated” if they are “entirely distinct and

separate” from the claims on which the plaintiff

prevailed. Odima [v. Westin Tucson Hotel], 53

F.3d 1484, 1499 [(9th Cir. 1995)]. Hours

expended on unrelated, unsuccessful claims

should not be included in an award of fees.

Part II

The second step of the Hensley analysis is to

consider whether “the plaintiff achieved a level

of success that makes the hours reasonably

expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee

award.” Id. [Hensley, 461 U.S.] at 434. In

answering that question, a district court

“should focus on the significance of the overall

relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to

the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Id. at 435. “Where a plaintiff

has obtained excellent results, his attorney

should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. 

A plaintiff may obtain excellent results without

receiving all the relief requested. Id. at 435

n.11.

Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147.

Under the EAJA, recovery may only be awarded “to the

prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the

United States or any agency or any official of the United States

acting in his or her official capacity.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1). 

The EAJA allows for the recovery of “[f]ees and other expenses”

but only from “an agency over which the party prevails.” Id. at

(d)(4). As a result, the prevailing party may not use the EAJA

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 45 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

46

to recover from a private party or non federal agency against

whom it prevailed. As a general rule, “attorney's fees are only

appropriate for portions of the litigation made necessary by

government opposition to legitimate claims of the party seeking

the award.” Love, 924 F.2d at 1496 (citing Avoyelles Sportsmen’s

League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986)). “[A]n award is

not appropriate for a phase of the litigation in which the party

seeking an award was opposed only by other, non-governmental

parties....” Id. The burden is on a plaintiff to show that

“their claimed expenses were incurred in opposing improper

government resistance to their rightful demands.” Id. at 636

(emphasis added). 

Environmental plaintiffs urge the application of a more

flexible rule relied upon by several courts in other

jurisdictions, including American Lung Ass’n v. Reilly, 144

F.R.D. 622, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri,

967 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1992), and Environmental Defense

Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), all of which found

time expended on issues raised by a non-governmental interest to

be compensable. Although American Lung does articulate a rule

favorable to environmental plaintiffs, it is contrary to Ninth

Circuit precedent. The American Lung court specifically

disregards the Ninth Circuit rule from Love, choosing another

approach:

The Love/Avoyelles test is overly formalistic because

it turns exclusively on whether or not the government

participates in a phase of a lawsuit. [The D.C. Circuit

case] EDF v. EPA [672 F.2d 42] recognizes that

alignment of interests between government and a private

intervenor-defendant might exist even when the

government takes no position on a matter. The EDF v.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 46 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The water authority plaintiffs suggest breaking down 16

the litigation differently, into the following three phases: (1)

the initial summary judgment motions and injunctive relief

requests regarding the AP, (2) the second round of summary

judgment motions regarding the Interim Decision, and (3) the

appeals before the Ninth Circuit. But, the appeals before the

Ninth Circuit are directly relevant to a determination of the

environmental plaintiffs’ success on the second round of summary

judgment motions. If a party is successful on appeal, time spent

litigating that issue in the trial court is also compensable. 

See Larez v. city of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 649 (9 Cir. th

1991). Therefore, it is more helpful to analyze these two phases

together. 

47

EPA approach is preferable because it instructs

district courts to examine the facts and circumstances

surrounding the government's abstention.

Applying the EDF v. EPA test to the instant motion, it

is clear that an alignment of interests existed between

the EPA and Alabama Power. Alabama Power filed a

provisional answer to plaintiffs' complaint raising

defenses almost identical to the EPA's answer.

144 F.R.D. 629. In this circuit, however, Love controls. The

environmental plaintiffs do not point to any cases from this

circuit adopting the American Lung approach over the rule

enunciated in Love. Fees cannot be recovered for litigating

discrete issues that were raised by non-governmental parties.

The parties do not agree on the degree of success

experienced by the environmental plaintiffs in this case. The

parties also dispute the environmental plaintiffs’ entitlement to

fees for time spent opposing certain motions filed by the water

authority plaintiffs. In order to evaluate the fee request in

light of these concerns, it is helpful to break the litigation

into three phases: (1) challenges to the initial Administrative

Proposal; (2) requests for injunctive relief following the

decision on the Administrative Proposal; and (3) subsequent

litigation concerning the Interim Decision and related appeals.16

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 47 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48

The extent of the environmental plaintiffs’ success at each of

these stages is discussed below, as is the propriety of awarding

fees claimed for time spent opposing motions filed by the water

authority plaintiffs. 

a. Litigation Concerning the Administrative

Proposal.

The environmental plaintiffs experienced considerable

success in the early stages of litigation, leading up to the

issuance of a decision on the initial round of summary judgment

motions concerning Interior’s final administrative proposal. The

environmental plaintiffs break this early stage of litigation

into five central issues/arguments, each of which is discussed

below. 

(1) Dedicate and Manage. 

Environmental plaintiffs’ assert that their “bedrock” claim

during the first round of summary judgment motions was that the

final AP was an abuse of discretion because it treated (b)(2)

water as a discretionary allocation, thereby failing to satisfy

the statutory requirement that Interior “dedicate and manage” the

800 TAF dedicated yield. The district court found that the AP

was contrary to (b)(2)’s requirement that Interior calculate,

dedicate, and manage 800 TAF for (b)(2) purposes. Doc. 156 at

28-33.

(2) Five Year “No Need” Finding.

The environmental plaintiffs successfully argued that

Interior’s inclusion in the AP of a five-year ‘no-need’ finding

to justify rededication of any unused portion of (b)(2) water was

a misapplication of the statute. Doc. 159 at 7. 

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 48 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Section 3406(b)(1) requires the Secretary of the 17

Interior to:

develop within three years of enactment and implement a

program which makes all reasonable efforts to ensure that,

by the year 2002, natural production of anadromous fish in

49

(3) Plan for Anadromous Fish.

Environmental plaintiffs obtained summary adjudication on

their claim that Interior’s failure to timely develop a plan for

doubling anadromous fish populations violated section 3406(b)(1). 

Doc. 159 at 7.

(4) Reuse of (b)(2) Water.

Environmental plaintiffs also unsuccessfully argued that it

was an abuse of discretion for Interior to allow the recapture

and/or reuse of (b)(2) water for other consumptive uses. The

district court rejected this contention, finding instead that

Interior had “discretion to manage (b)(2) water for multiple

uses, so long as the environmental requirements of (b)(2) are

achieved.” Doc. 156 at 38. Environmental plaintiffs concede

that they were not successful on this ground, but maintain that

this claim shared a common core of facts and law and are

therefore compensable under Hensley/Sorenson. Nevertheless, to

account for their lack of success on this issue, the

environmental plaintiffs have reduced the fees claimed on the

initial round of summary judgment motions by 10%, or 21 hours. 

(5) Other Identified Adverse Impacts. 

Finally, environmental plaintiffs argued that Interior

failed to address “other adverse environmental impacts” as

required by 3406(b)(1). Environmental plaintiffs acknowledge 17

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 49 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Central Valley rivers and streams will be sustainable, on a

long-term basis, at levels not less than twice the average

levels attained during the period of 1967-1991...And

provided further, That in the course of developing and

implementing this program the Secretary shall make all

reasonable efforts consistent with the requirements of this

section to address other identified adverse environmental

impacts of the Central Valley Project not specifically

enumerated in this section.

(emphasis added).

50

that they did not prevail on this issue, but explain that most of

the work on this issue was performed by counsel for NRDC, for

whom no fees are requested. Environmental plaintiffs make no

claim for work performed by Ms. Koehler on this issue.

The federal defendants appear to concede that the ruling on

this initial round of summary judgment motions was at least a

partial victory for the environmental plaintiffs. See Doc. 583,

Opp. at 8. However, the federal defendants insist that the

environmental plaintiffs’ success was “modest, and any award of

fees should reflect that fact.” Specifically, the federal

defendants take issue with the characterization of the “dedicate

and manage” argument as a “bedrock” claim. The federal

defendants point to language from this court’s decision on the

water authorities’ application for fees and costs, which

characterized the “bedrock claim” as whether “the 1928-34 drought

regime should be the measuring criterion for [the] yield

calculation.” Doc. 567 at 30. This is true in part. The water

authority plaintiffs’ main claim concerned the standard that

should be applied to (b)(2). However, the dedicate and manage

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 50 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

51

claim was equally important to cause Interior to rewrite the

Final Decision to comply with the law.

The environmental plaintiffs have already accounted in part

for those issues on which they did not prevail at this initial

stage of the litigation. They voluntarily deducted 10% of the

time spent on the initial round of summary judgment motions to

account for their lack of success on the “reuse of b(2) water”

issue and they are essentially not claiming fees for time spent

on the “other identified adverse impacts” issue. An additional

10% must be deducted for time spent opposing the water authority

plaintiffs’ claims. The environmental plaintiffs should reduce

their fee request by an additional 10% of the hours spent on the

first phase of the litigation, up to and including the issuance

of the district court’s decision on the first round of summary

judgment motions.

b. Requests for Injunctive Relief Following the

Ruling on the Administrative Proposal.

Immediately following the decision on the initial round of

summary judgment motions concerning the Administrative Proposal,

the water agency plaintiffs applied for a temporary restraining

order, seeking to enjoin (b)(2) operations for the 1999 water

year and alleging that Interior’s then-operative accounting

methods would exceed the 800 TAF dedication cap. On April 16,

1999, the court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining

Interior from implementing certain “Delta Actions” described in

the “Final Administrative Proposal on the Management of

3406(b)(2) Water.” See Doc. 174. A preliminary injunction

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 51 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

52

eventually issued, which precluded Interior from “implementing

Section 3406(b)(2) of the [CVPIA] in the 1999 water year...in a

manner that results in the dedication and management of more than

or less than 800,000 acre-feet of CVPIA yield for 3406(b)(2)

purposes.” Doc. 209, filed May 14, 1999. 

Environmental plaintiffs request 50% of the time counsel

spent responding to the application for a temporary restraining

order. The water authority plaintiffs and the federal defendants

object to any award of fees for this work on the ground that the

environmental plaintiffs were not aligned against the government

when addressing the TRO request. See Doc. 314 at 8 (Fed. Deft’s

Suppl. Opp’n) & Doc. 611 at 3 (Water Auth. Suppl. Opp’n). 

As discussed above, the applicable rule is set forth in

Love: 

[A]ttorney's fees are only appropriate for portions of

the litigation made necessary by government opposition

to legitimate claims of the party seeking the

award....[A]n award is not appropriate for a phase of

the litigation in which the party seeking an award was

opposed only by other, non-governmental parties...[T]he

burden on the plaintiffs to show that “their claimed

expenses were incurred in opposing improper government 

resistance to their rightful demands.” 

924 F.2d 1495-96 (citing Avoyelles, 786 F.2d at 632, 636).

Both the water authority plaintiffs and the federal

defendants insist that the federal defendants and environmental

plaintiffs were aligned with one another throughout the temporary

restraining order proceedings. Environmental plaintiffs

correctly point out, however, that they consistently highlighted

one issue not advanced by the federal defendants -- the

possibility that Interior’s implementation of 3406(b)(2) in the

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 52 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

53

1999 water year might result in the dedication of less than

800,000 acre-feet of CVPIA yield for 3406(b)(2) purposes. This

concern was embodied in the injunctive relief issued by the

court. Doc. 174 at 3 (“...this order shall not be construed to

modify this Court’s earlier ruling that I must provide the full

and entire 800,000 acre-feet dedication to the 3406(b)(2)

purposes enumerated in this statute.”). To a certain extent,

environmental plaintiffs hijacked the injunctive relief

proceedings to effectuate their own purposes. 

The standard from Love is not easily applied under these

circumstances. In a technical sense, environmental plaintiff’s

participation in the injunctive relief proceedings does not

constitute an expense “incurred in opposing improper government

resistance to their rightful demands.” On the other hand,

environmental plaintiffs’ efforts to interject their concerns

into the injunctive relief process represents a natural extension

of otherwise compensable (successful) efforts to obtain relief

during the initial round of motions for summary judgment. The

environmental plaintiffs’ work related to the issuance of

injunctive relief arose out of a three-sided debate over

accounting that began well before the water authority plaintiff’s

request for injunctive relief. 

In this light, the work done by environmental plaintiffs to

shape the form of injunctive relief was made necessary by

positions taken by the government on accounting issues in related

proceedings. The environmental plaintiffs were protecting past

victories from erosion. However, given the Ninth Circuit’s

expressed reluctance to compensate parties for time spent in

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 53 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The environmental plaintiffs also volunteer to deduct 18

an additional 10% from the time spent on the preliminary

injunction proceedings to reflect their lack of success on the

“change of storage metric” issue. (See infra at p. 61.)

Environmental plaintiffs should increase this to a total

deduction of 80% of the time spent on the temporary and

preliminary injunctive relief proceedings.

54

proceedings opposed only by non-governmental parties,

environmental plaintiff’s request for 50% of the time spent on

the injunctive relief proceedings is excessive. The 18

environmental plaintiffs ultimately sought the inclusion of a

provision in the injunction that the annual (b)(2) dedication not

be less than 800,000 acre-feet. Plaintiffs are entitled to 20%

of the time spent responding to the temporary restraining order

and participating in related injunctive relief proceedings. This

figure accounts for the extent to which the form of injunctive

relief that eventually issued successfully protected

environmental plaintiffs’ previous victories against the

government. Environmental plaintiffs are directed to adjust

their fee request accordingly.

c. Challenges after the Issuance of the Interim

Decision. 

The final stage of the litigation breaks down into eight

separate challenges/issues. The environmental plaintiffs raised

three main challenges to the interim decision: (1) that the

“primary purpose” of restoration was not being adequately

advanced; (2) that the Interim Decision made several modeling

errors resulting in an overstatement of water dedicated to (b)(2)

purposes; and (3) that the Interim Decision used an inappropriate

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 54 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In their opening appellate brief, the environmental 19

plaintiffs summarized the parties positions on summary judgment

of this issue: 

Environmental Appellants moved for summary judgment on the

ground that the Final Decision fails to allocate most of the

800,000 AF dedication to the "primary purpose" of

implementing the ecosystem restoration measures authorized

by the CVPIA. The Water Agencies sought the opposite ruling:

that Interior must use the (b)(2) water to cover all of the

CVP's water quality and endangered species obligations as a

first priority. The Court granted to the Water Agencies'

motion and denied Environmental Appellants' motion.

Envt’l Pltf’s Opening Appellate Brief, 200 WL 32123196, at 28. 

55

cut-off date for use of the upstream action “change of storage

metric.” The environmental plaintiffs raised four other legal

challenges concerning: (4) American River Flows; (5) Banking

Issues; (6) Section 3406(b)(2)(D) Findings; and (7) Offset/Reset. 

Finally, (8) environmental plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a

stay pending appeal.

(1) Primary Purpose.

The environmental plaintiffs alleged that using up to 450

TAF of (b)(2) water to satisfy ESA and WQCP requirements is

contrary to the plain language of CVPIA § 3406(b)(2) and

contravenes the CVPIA as a whole. See Doc. 431 at 13-22. The 19

district court ruled that:

Section 3406(b)(2) unambiguously directs Interior to

“dedicate and manage annually eight hundred thousand

acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the

primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and

habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by

this title.” Interior has no discretion whether to

annually provide more or less than 800 TAF of CVP yield

(approximately 5.99 MAF) for (b)(2) purposes, unless it

makes certain findings under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)(C)...

Interior is also directed to annually dedicate and

manage the mandatory 800 TAF of CVP yield “to assist

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 55 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

56

the State of California in its efforts to protect the

waters of the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin

Delta Estuary [i.e., the WQCP]; and to help to meet

such obligations as may be legally imposed upon the

[CVP] under State or Federal law following the date of

enactment of this title, including but not limited to

additional obligations under the Federal Endangered

Species Act.” Id. at 4715-16. As a matter of law,

this language is not ambiguous -- water used to meet

WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA requirements is an additional

(b)(2) purpose and must be charged against the 800 TAF

(b)(2) mandate if so used.

The CVPIA is not silent on what amount of water used

for these so-called “secondary” purposes is to be

credited against the 800 TAF (b)(2) mandate. (E.g.,

could all 800 TAF of (b)(2) water be used to meet postCVPIA-enactment ESA requirements?). Congress mandates

that exactly 800 TAF of CVP yield (. 5.99 MAF) be

dedicated for (b)(2) purposes, whether “primary” or

“secondary.” To hold otherwise would render the 800

TAF figure superfluous. This leaves to Interior, the

discretion to annually determine how much CVP yield to

devote to WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA requirements. 

However, if it were left to Interior’s “discretion” 

whether or not to count CVP yield used for such (b)(2)

purposes, the annual 800 TAF cap would be illusory. 

The 800,000 TAF is intended by Congress as an immutable

floor and ceiling on annual reallocation of water from

CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes. If Interior uses more

than 800 TAF for (b)(2) purposes in any year, but does

not count all CVP yield used for such purposes, it

violates CVPIA § 3406(b)(2). Water-districts’ motion

for summary judgment on whether Interior has the

discretion to limit credits against (b)(2) for water

used for WQCP or post-CVPIA ESA purposes to 450 TAF is

GRANTED, Interior has no such discretion. Any amount

of CVP yield water annually used for a (b)(2) purpose

must be counted as part of the 800 TAF. The

environmental plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

on this issue is denied. 

This ruling recognized that interior had the discretion to decide

how much CVPIA yield to use annually for each of the enumerated

CVPIA purposes, but if Interior used such yield for any (b)(2)

purpose it had to be counted as a (b)(2) use and subtracted from

the 800,000 acre-feet supply. 

Initially, both the environmental plaintiffs and the federal

defendants appealed on this issue. Their positions were similar,

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 56 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

57

but not identical. 

The environmental plaintiffs argued extensively in their

opening appellate brief that the district court erred “in

relegating the primary purpose of the §3406(b)(2) dedication to

the lowest priority of use.” Specifically, the environmental

plaintiffs first argued that “the plain language of the statute

establishes that most of the 800,000 acre-feet must be reserved

for the ‘primary purpose’ of the dedication,” because “when

Congress uses the term ‘primary,’ its ordinary meaning of

predominant, ‘first importance’ or ‘principally must be given

effect.” Id. at 33-34. 

Second, the environmental plaintiffs argued that “the

district court improperly elevated the subordinate purpose of the

(b)(2) dedication over the primary purpose” by holding that “all

CVP water used for endangered species or water quality

obligations must be subtracted from the 800,000 AF, even if this

means that little, or no, water remains for the primary purpose

of the (b)(2) dedication.” Id. at 36. Specifically, the

environmental plaintiffs insisted that “[t]he 800 TAF is intended

by Congress as an immutable floor and ceiling on annual

reallocation of water-from CVP yield for (b)(2) purposes. If

Interior uses more than 800 TAF for (b)(2) purposes in any year,

but does not count all CVP yield used for such purposes, it

violates CVPIA §3406(b)(2).” Id. at 37. This interpretation,

according to the environmental plaintiffs, rendered the therm

“primary” meaningless. 

Finally, the environmental plaintiffs argued that the

district court's ruling “cannot be reconciled with the CVPIA as a

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 57 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

58

whole.” Specifically, the environmental plaintiffs pointed to

interior’s “non-discretionary duty to use water from the (b)(2)

account to ‘achieve’ the salmon doubling mandate.” Id. at 39-40. 

The environmental plaintiff’s acknowledge that “Section

3406(b)(1)(C) directs Interior to ‘avoid duplicative obligations’

which may be imposed on the CVP and to credit CVP contributions

to water quality standards against the (b)(2) account ‘to the

greatest extent practicable.’” But, the environmental plaintiffs

insisted that

this practicability limitation establishes that

Congress was aware that it would not be practicable to

deduct all of the CVP's water quality obligations from

the (b)(2) account. Congress intended to authorize

Interior to deduct the CVP's water quality obligations

from the (b)(2) account only where these actions would

be duplicative with the CVPIA's restoration mandate.

Id.

The federal defendants initially filed a cross-appeal, but

later abandoned their appeal. The federal defendants insist,

however, that their position on “primary purpose” was markedly

similar to the position taken by the environmental plaintiffs

(which was eventually adopted by the Ninth Circuit). For

evidence of its position on this issue, federal defendants point

only to a brief filed in an earlier stage of the litigation on

May 31, 2000 (well before the appeal was taken), in which the

government argued: 

[T]he Secretary correctly reads 3406(b)(2) which first

mandates that the Secretary “dedicate and manage

annually eight hundred thousand acre-feet of Central

Valley Project yield for the primary purpose [emphasis

in original brief] of implementing the fish, wildlife

and habitat restoration purposes and measures

authorized by this title.” Then the Secretary has the

discretion “to assist” the State of California in its

efforts to protect the water of the San Francisco

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 58 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

59

Bay/Sacramento San Joaquin Delta Estuary.” Finally, the

Secretary also has the discretion to use (b)(2) water

“to help meet such obligations as may be legally

imposed upon the Central Valley Project***.

(emphasis in original brief). The government further argued that

“the language of 3406(b)(2)...prioritizes how (b)(2) water shall

be used....” Id. at 15. 

On this issue, the Ninth Circuit’s reversed the district

court’s judgment, reasoning that: 

The district court erred in concluding that Interior

lacks discretion to refrain from crediting the amount

of Project yield actually used for any (b)(2) purpose

against the designated 800,000 acre feet of Project

yield. To hold otherwise would defeat the primary

purpose for which the 800,000 acre feet were

designated-fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration. 

Section 3406(b)(2) provides that the “primary purpose”

to which the 800,000 acre feet should be dedicated is

the implementation of “fish, wildlife, and habitat

restoration purposes authorized by this title....”

Section 3406(b)(2) also provides that the 800,000 acre

feet may be used to “help” meet obligations under the

Endangered Species Act and to “assist” in meeting

water quality standards. If Interior were required to

deduct some or all the water it uses for water quality

and Endangered Species Act purposes from the (b)(2)

dedication, the water needed for implementation of the

Improvement Act's restoration mandate could be

relegated to a secondary role, or perhaps no role at

all. Such a scenario would directly conflict with the

Interior’s mandate to give effect to the hierarchy of

purposes established in Section 3406(b)(2). 

Bay Inst., 87 Fed. Appx 637. 

The government insists that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning

vindicated its own position that Interior has discretion to use

(b)(2) water to (a) assist the State’s Bay Delta Estuary

protection efforts and (b) help meet other obligations legally

imposed upon the Central Valley Project. From a strictly

theoretical perspective, this is true. Had the government

continued its participation in the appeal, perhaps Love would

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 59 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Under a narrow reading of Love no fees may be recovered 20

for any stage of work unless (a) the government is directly

involved in that stage of the case and (b) the government is

standing in opposition to the party requesting fees. Here,

however, because of the unique circumstances presented –- where

the government abandoned an appeal of an issue on which the

environmental plaintiffs eventually prevailed –- application of

such a narrow reading is not appropriate. 

60

have barred environmental plaintiffs from recovering fees. But,

in practice, the government abandoned this position when it

abandoned the appeal. In effect, this abandonment withdrew

opposition to the water authorities’ position on this issue. The

government’s position on Interior’s primary purpose discretion

would never have been vindicated by the Ninth Circuit were it not

for environmental plaintiffs’ continued pursuit of the appeal. 

The environmental plaintiffs’ appellate work was made necessary

by the government’s abandonment, which is compensable, but not

the work in the district court which was not opposed by the

government and was only adverse to the water authority

plaintiffs.20

Fees on this issue should be limited to the appellate work

by environmental plaintiffs. The environmental plaintiffs should

deduct an additional 10% of the time spent briefing and arguing

the second round of motions for summary judgment before the

district court.

(2) Modeling Errors.

During a series of evidentiary proceedings held in July 1999

and February 2000, environmental plaintiffs argued that the

federal defendants made several modeling errors in the water

distribution plan. See paragraphs 55(a), (c)-(e) of

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 60 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Although the interests of the federal defendants and 21

the environmental plaintiffs were largely aligned with respect to

the American River flows, the proceedings leading up to the

issuance of this particular order concerned other issues (e.g.,

the modeling errors) on which the environmental plaintiffs

61

environmental plaintiffs’ second claim of their amended

complaint, concerning accounting issues. The environmental

plaintiffs obtained a favorable judgment from the district court

on this issue. See Doc. 320, at 25-28.

(3) Change of Storage Metric.

Environmental plaintiffs challenged Interior’s choice of a

cut off date for the use of the upstream action “change of

storage metric,” but this challenge was rejected. Doc. 320 at

30-31. Environmental plaintiffs have volunteered to deduct 10%

of the time expended on the preliminary injunction proceedings

(13 hours) to account for this limited success. As discussed,

supra at 54, environmental plaintiffs should increase this to a

total deduction of 80% of the time spent on the temporary and

preliminary injunctive relief proceedings. 

(4) American River Flows.

Throughout the course of the litigation, the water authority

plaintiffs raised challenges to Interior’s treatment of certain

American River flows. The environmental plaintiffs acknowledged

that they experienced “limited success” on these issues and

accordingly reduced by 20% (38 hours) the number of hours

expended briefing, preparing, and participating in the January

and February 2000 hearings which resulted in the issuance of a

memorandum opinion and order concerning this and other issues. 

Doc. 320. In addition, the environmental plaintiffs deducted 21

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 61 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

eventually prevailed and were opposed by the federal defendants. 

62

25% (65 hours) of the time spent briefing the interlocutory

appeal to the Ninth Circuit and 10% (21 hours) of the time spent

on the Ninth Circuit briefing after entry of Final Partial

Judgment. 

Under Love, the deduction must be increased to 100% of the

time expended on proceedings related to this issue because the

environmental plaintiffs were not opposed by the federal

defendants on this issue. Accordingly, environmental plaintiffs

must recalculate their fee request to deduct a total of 50% of

the time spent briefing, preparing, and participating in the

January and February 2000 hearings. Similarly, they must deduct

a total of 50% of the time spent briefing the interlocutory

appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (The January and February 2000

hearings and the interlocutory appeal covered a number of topics,

including the American River flows issues. Accordingly, the

remainder of the time billed at these stages is not barred by

Love.)

(5) Banking Issues.

Environmental plaintiffs also raised an argument regarding

water banking, which comprised less than one page of their

opening summary judgment brief. Doc. 431 at 23. The district

court ruled against them on this issue. Doc. 466 at 36-38. 

Environmental plaintiffs did not pursue the matter further. They

have reduced billing by 5% (7 hours) of the time spent on

briefing summary judgment motion. No further reduction is

required.

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 62 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

63

(6) Section 3406(b)(2)(D) Findings.

District court also ruled against environmental plaintiffs

on the issue of 3406(b)(2)(D) findings. Specifically, the

district court pointed out that this argument was rejected in the

initial round of summary judgment motions, Doc. 156, and that

environmental plaintiffs raised the same issue in the second

round of summary judgment motions without raising any new

arguments in support of their allegations. See Doc. 466 at 39.

Environmental plaintiffs have deducted 46 hours to account for

their lack of success on this issue (representing 10% of time

spent on the summary judgment motions and, 15% of time spent on

appeal). Having reviewed the documents pertaining to this

renewed allegation, this deduction adequately accounts for any

and all time spent by environmental plaintiff’s on this issue.

(7) Offset/Reset.

The water authority plaintiffs challenged certain metrics

incorporated in Interior’s accounting methodology (the

“offset/reset” metrics). The Environmental plaintiffs

participated in briefing of the matter in mid-2001 and in a

related evidentiary hearing in 2002. The interests of the

federal defendants, however, were aligned with the environmental

plaintiffs on this issue. The district court and the Ninth

Circuit ruled in favor of the water authority plaintiffs on this

issue. Environmental plaintiffs have already reduced their

request by 161 hours (80% of time expended on those trial

proceedings; and 15% expended on briefing before Ninth Circuit). 

Under Love, the deduction must be increased to 100% of the

time expended on the trial proceedings related to this issue

because the environmental plaintiffs were not opposed by the

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 63 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

64

federal defendants on this issue. Environmental plaintiffs must

adjust their fee request to reflect this deductions. No further

deduction for time spent briefing the Ninth Circuit is required,

as the 15% deduction already made is sufficient to account for

the time spent on the appeal of this issue. 

(8) Request for Stay Pending Appeal.

After the district court entered partial final judgment in

March 2002, environmental plaintiffs sought an expedited motion

for a stay pending appeal, which the district court denied. Doc.

544, filed November 13, 2002. The environmental plaintiffs have

already reduced their request by 45 hours, representing 100% of

the time spent pursuing the stay. No further reduction is

warranted. 

6. Costs. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (a)(1) a prevailing party can recover

costs under the following circumstances: 

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute,

a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of

this title, but not including the fees and expenses of

attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in

any civil action brought by or against the United

States or any agency or any official of the United

States acting in his or her official capacity in any

court having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment

for costs when taxed against the United States shall,

in an amount established by statute, court rule, or

order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part

the prevailing party for the costs incurred by such

party in the litigation.

Section 1920, to which § 2412 (a)(1) refers, adds the following

considerations to a prevailing party’s recovery of costs:

//

//

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 64 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

65

A judge or clerk of any court of the United

States may tax as costs the following: 

 (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 

 (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of

the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained

for use in the case; 

 (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and

witnesses; 

 (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case; 

 (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 

 (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,

expenses, and costs of special interpretation

services under section 1828 of this title. 

Environmental plaintiffs do not appear to seek reimbursement

for any expenses specifically listed in § 1920. Rather, they

seek $3979 in travel, telephone, and other associated litigation

expenses not specifically listed in § 1920. Under International

Woodworkers, Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.

1986) an award of costs may include compensation for telephone

calls, postage, courier expenses, travel and other similar costs

that are routine under other fee statutes. 

The Secretary appeals the district court's award of

costs for telephone calls, postage, air courier and

attorney travel expenses on the ground that such costs

are not specifically listed in Section 2412(b).

However, awards of such costs--costs that are

ordinarily billed to a client--are routine under all

other fee statutes. Moreover, in awarding costs, the

district court noted that the expenses enumerated in

Section 2412(d)(2)(A) are set forth as examples, not as

an exclusive list. The district court's award of costs

under Section 2412(b) is proper.

Id. See also Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988);

Kelly v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988); In re

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 65 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

66

Application of Mgndichian, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1266 (C.D. Cal.

2003). The federal defendants cite no binding authority that

contradicts Woodworkers. Under Woodworkers, the $3979 requested

for travel, telephone, and related litigation expenses is

recoverable. Furthermore, having reviewed the relevant records,

this amount is reasonable in the context of this extraordinarily

long-lived and complex case. 

7. Expert Witness Fees.

In addition, environmental plaintiffs seek to recover expert

fees. Section 2412(d)(2)(A) allows for compensation of expert

witness fees and reasonable expenses of those witnesses:

fees and other expenses" includes the reasonable

expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of

any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or

project which is found by the court to be necessary for

the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable

attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates

for the kind and quality of the services furnished,

except that (I) no expert witness shall be compensated

at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation

for expert witnesses paid by the United States....

Environmental plaintiffs seek expert witness fees for A.

Spreck Rosekrans (306 hours at $150 per hour), Christina Swanson

(32 hours at $100 per hour), and Betty Andrews (72.5 hours at

$135 per hour), plus $419 in expert expenses. Federal defendants

object that Rosekrans was never qualified as an expert during

trial and another did not testify at trial. Environmental

plaintiffs correctly point out that, in fact, all three did

testify before the court and that the federal government

stipulated to Rosekrans’ qualifications as an expert. The

federal defendants raise no other objections as to the number of

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 66 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

67

hours billed by these experts. The experts were necessary in

this technical case and the amounts claimed are reasonable. This

request is approved. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, environmental plaintiffs

fee petition is granted in part and denied in part. 

Environmental plaintiffs must modify their fee request as

follows:

(1) Deduct a total of 20% of time spent on the entire first

phase of the litigation, up to the decision on the

first round of summary judgment motions (as opposed to

the voluntary reduction of 10% suggested by

environmental plaintiffs).

(2) Deduct a total of 80% of the time spent responding to

the request for a temporary restraining order and on

proceedings concerning the preliminary injunction (as

opposed to the voluntary reductions of 50% of the time

spent on the TRO and 10% of the time spent on the

preliminary injunction proceedings suggested by

environmental plaintiffs).

(3) Deduct an additional 10% of the time spent briefing and

arguing the second round of summary judgment motions

before the district court to account for the time spent

on the “primary purpose” issue prior to the appeal. 

(Environmental plaintiffs are entitled to fees for the

time spent appealing this issue.)

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 67 of 68
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Unless specifically altered by this memorandum opinion 22

and order, any voluntary reductions previously suggested by

environmental plaintiffs should be incorporated into the revised

fee request.

68

(4) Deduct a total of 50% of the time spent on the January

and February 2000 hearings (as opposed to the voluntary

reduction of 25% suggested by environmental plaintiffs)

to account for non-compensable time spent litigating

American River flows issues.

(5) Deduct a total of 50% of the time spent on the

interlocutory appeal (as opposed to the voluntary

reduction of 25% suggested by environmental plaintiffs)

to account for non-compensable time spent litigating

American River flows issues.

(6) Deduct a total of 100% of the time spent on the

offset/reset trial proceedings (as opposed to the

voluntary reduction of 80% suggested by environmental

plaintiffs). 

No further reductions, beyond those previously volunteered by

environmental plaintiffs, are warranted. Environmental 22

plaintiffs shall submit the requested deductions within 10 days

of service of this order for the court’s approval. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 29, 2006

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER__________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:97-cv-06140-OWW -DLB Document 641 Filed 03/29/06 Page 68 of 68