Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-03-50890/USCOURTS-ca5-03-50890-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 28, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 03-50624

Summary Calendar

_______________

BLAYNE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MARGO FRASIER,

SHERIFF, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

m A-01-CV-470-JN

_________________________

Before SMITH, DEMOSS, and STEWART,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Blayne Williams sues for alleged violations

of title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1981. The district

court dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Finding no error, we affirm.

Williams asserts the following in the

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and

is not precedent except under the limited cir-

(continued...)

*

(...continued)

cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 03-50890 Document: 0051331550 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/28/2004
2

conclusion to his appellate brief:

Williams hired an attorneyto presecute

his employment discrimination claims.

Williams discovered at the end of the discovery period that his initial attorney had

done virtually nothing to get his claimsfairly adjudicated on the merits. Williams then

hired present counsel to attempt to get his

case properly before the Court. The only

“litigation” of this case occurred between

April 14, 2003 and May 27, 2003, about six

(6) weeks. All Williams [sic] efforts were

thwarted and upon appeal Williamsrequest

[sic] that this Court reverse and remand

this case, with directions to allow Williams

to amend his complaint, to open discovery

for a six (6) month period and for the case

to pursue a normal course, via a revised

scheduling order, to a trial by jury, as the

facts and law may dictate.

The district court, in its order of dismissal,

provides a similarly gloomy assessment:

Plaintifffailed to file a response to Defendant’s motion [to dismiss, and, in the alternative, to compel sanctions]. Pursuant

to Local Rule CV-7(d), Defendant’s

motion for dismissal is granted as

unopposed.

Plaintiff’s failure to respond caps a

demonstrated history of intransigence and

delay. Plaintiff refuses to cooperate in discovery. Plaintiff refuses to respond to discovery requests, answer interrogatories, or

appear for deposition. This case has been

on the docket since July of 2001. To date,

there has been no discovery. 

Dismissal was therefore proper. We

express no opinion on whether plaintiff, his

previous attorney, or both are at fault.

Especially in a civil proceeding, a party who

acts through counsel cannot get a second bite

at the apple because he perceives that counsel

did not do enough. Nor do we express any

view on whatever merits plaintiff might have

attempted to present.

The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 03-50890 Document: 0051331550 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/28/2004