Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02235/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02235-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRICE SIGHTLER,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 15cv2235-LAB (DHB)

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

When Demetrice Sightler walked out onto his balcony on a September afternoon, he

expected to find his girlfriend. Instead, he found himself surrounded by San Diego police 

officers with guns drawn. When Sightler asked why police had a machine gun pointed at 

him, the police said: “That’s how we do business, okay?” A jury, not a judge, needs to decide 

whether that’s an okay way to conduct business under the Fourth Amendment.

Background

Three years ago, the San Diego Police received a 911 call from a mother who said 

her son was threatening to shoot his girlfriend. She identified her son as Benjamin Harmon: 

a 26-year-old black man living at 3659 Lemona Avenue in Apartment 5. An hour later, 

Demetrice Sightler, a 33-year-old black man, walked onto his balcony at Apartment 3. 

More than ten officers surrounded Sightler and a helicopter hovered overhead. At

least four officers had guns pointed at him. Sightler complied with commands to put his 

hands up. He told police he had no weapons. For the next ten minutes, an officer trained an 

AR-15 with a red-lit optic on Sightler. The police told Sightler to walk through his apartment

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and surrender to them at his front door. Sightler refused. He didn’t want to turn his back with 

a gun aimed at him. Sightler repeatedly told the officers his name, and explained they had 

the wrong apartment. Eventually, the police located a picture of their suspect, Benjamin 

Harmon, and confirmed he wasn’t Demetrice Sightler. They lowered their guns and told 

Sightler he could go back into his apartment.

Sightler sued the four officers who aimed guns at him, the two commanding officers 

on scene, and the City of San Diego under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourth 

Amendment rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment.

Analysis

The court must grant summary judgment if Defendants show there’s no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Sightler, a jury could find the police violated his rights by holding him at 

gunpoint. The Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for the six officers 

on Sightler’s claims for (i) unreasonable seizure and (ii) excessive force. The Court grants 

summary judgment for the City on Sightler’s claims alleging (i) a policy of excessive force in 

arresting black citizens, (ii) failure to train, and (iii) failure to supervise.

I. The Officers

Defendants failed to meet their burden because they didn’t explain why each 

individual officer was entitled to judgment for their particular actions. But even if they had 

analyzed each officer individually, the Court would still find they all need to stand trial. “An

officer's liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the alleged 

violation.” That doesn’t require that “each officer's actions themselves rise to the level of a 

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constitutional violation”; rather, it “require[s] some fundamental involvement in the conduct 

that allegedly caused the violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 

(9th Cir. 2007) (alterations omitted). A jury may find some officers liable and others not, but 

the Court finds they were all integral participants. That’s because the core conduct that 

restricted Sightler’s liberty in an unreasonable way was pointing guns at him. The parties 

agree Longen, Levin, Johnson, and Hupp all pointed loaded guns at Sightler. Nislet and 

McClain didn’t point guns, but as the commanding officers on scene, they failed to order the 

four officers to lower their guns. There’s also sufficient evidence to find them liable for their 

inaction in the supervision and control of their subordinates. Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. 

Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007).

1

1. Unreasonable Seizure

The Fourth Amendment bans unreasonable seizures. Both sides agree a seizure 

occurred. But Defendants maintain they performed a Terry stop based on reasonable 

suspicion. Sightler argues the police arrested him without probable cause. The Court finds 

the police arrested Sightler, but it’s a question for the jury whether they had probable cause.

A. Arrest

The Court finds an arrest occurred based on Kraus v. Pierce Cty., 793 F.2d 1105 (9th 

Cir. 1986). In Kraus, a witness reported a license plate to police after he witnessed an armed

man commit an ATM robbery, and then saw a car speed away. The police located the 

address that matched the plate. When the officers arrived at the suspect’s address, they 

“decided to surround the front of the house, draw their weapons, bring the occupants out of 

the house, shine floodlights on them, and then interrogate them.” Id. at 1107. At least five 

officers aimed guns at the two occupants who came out of the house. After “some period of 

observation” the police realized they had the wrong people, questioned them, and left. The 

 

1 The police video suggests Hupp and Johnson only pointed guns at Sightler initially. But 

the video starts at some unknown time, and Defendants admit Hupp and Johnson 

periodically pointed guns at Sightler. Also, McClain was in charge, but Nisleit agreed he was 

the ranking officer and “gave direction to McClain,” Longen, and Harbin. So he’s in as well. 

[Dkt. 69-7 at 27 and Dkt. 62-19.]

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Ninth Circuit found this conduct amounted to an arrest because “[a] reasonable person in 

this situation would have believed that he was not free to leave and was effectively under 

arrest.” Id. at 1109. Since this case turns on the same salient facts as Kraus, the Court finds 

the police arrested Sightler.

This conclusion is confirmed by the analysis laid out in Washington v. Lambert, 98 

F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996). To decide if stops have turned into arrests, courts consider “how 

intrusive the stop was” with the justification for the intrusiveness “given the specific 

circumstances.” Id. Both sides agree the police held Sightler for ten minutes at gunpoint. 

Thirteen officers surrounded the building, along with a canine unit, and a helicopter. This 

type of intrusion on an innocent citizen who unknowingly walks out onto their home’s balcony 

is extreme.

To decide if the police deployed justifiable tactics, the Court considers “whether the 

officer had sufficient basis to fear for his safety to warrant the intrusiveness of the action 

taken.” Id. at 1185. Specific factors include whether the suspect is uncooperative, if he’s 

currently armed, and if the stop follows a violent crime. It’s true that from the officers’

perspectives, someone who stepped onto the balcony might be a violent person with a gun. 

But in Kraus, police also believed the resident who stepped out of the house might be a 

violet person with a gun. That fact didn’t alter the Ninth Circuit’s finding of an arrest. 

Defendants raise two points. First, they maintain Sightler’s responsible for extending 

the stop because he refused “to comply with the officers’ instructions to go through the 

apartment and surrender to the officers near his front door.” [Dkt. 62-1 at 13.] That’s 

unpersuasive. Sightler did what you’d expect: he refused to move because he was afraid 

he might get shot. The cops also say they pointed guns at Sightler because they feared he 

might have a weapon inside his apartment. If true, then it wouldn’t make sense to order 

Sightler to walk into his apartment. Second, Defendants argue Sightler wasn’t handcuffed 

or physically restricted: “there was nothing the officers could do to prevent [Sightler] from 

going back into his apartment.” [Dkt. 71 at 3.] They had an AR-15 aimed at Sightler for ten 

minutes. Imminent death is a more powerful deterrent to movement than handcuffs.

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B. Probable Cause

Police have probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant where, “under the 

totality of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer, a prudent person would 

have concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.” 

United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010). There’s two related 

questions here: Did the cops reasonably misidentify the balcony? And did the cops 

reasonably misidentify Sightler? Because both answers are close calls that require 

evaluating if the officer’s acted reasonably, a jury should decide if they had probable cause.

On the one hand, it’s understandable why the police thought Sightler was their guy. 

They were looking for a young black man who had his girlfriend at gunpoint. When a young 

black man walked onto the balcony the officers believed was attached to Apartment 5, they 

thought he might be Harmon. That’s especially true because the mother who called only 

offered a general description of Harmon as a 26-year-old black man with black hair. And 

while she provided the right apartment number, she also provided the wrong birthdate, which 

delayed efforts to identify Harmon. Sightler explained who he was, but police don’t need to 

take someone’s word when they’re trying to stop someone else from getting killed.

On the other hand, a jury could find the police didn’t have enough information to 

connect the balcony to Apartment 5. For example, Defendants say they believed they had 

the right balcony because Officer Mendez and Cooper told them so. But Mendez “advised 

over the radio it was ‘unknown’ whether the apartment had access to the balcony.” [Dkt. 82

at 7.] The officers also had the phone number for the victim—Harmon’s girlfriend—about 20 

minutes before Sightler stepped onto his balcony. Yet, they didn’t obtain information about 

the balcony or suspect. Worse, Sightler’s girlfriend came home during the encounter. She

explained the mistake, but the police continued to hold Sightler at gunpoint. Finally, Officer 

Longen says he pulled up Harmon’s photo on his ride over. Longen had the same 

information as the other officers. If he could find Harmon with the wrong birthdate, why 

couldn’t they? A jury could find it was unreasonable the police failed to obtain more 

information about the apartment layout, Harmon, and Sightler.

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Defendants argue they reasonably relied on other officers who identified the balcony. 

It’s true that officers aren’t required “to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by [ ] 

fellow officers.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). But reliance on other officers “is 

only allowed when it is objectively reasonable.” Green, 751 F.3d at 1045. A jury could find 

the reliance here wasn’t reasonable. Cooper never confirmed the balcony belonged to 

Apartment 5, Mendez explicitly stated it was “unknown,” and McClain admitted he expected 

his subordinates “to use their own judgment” to decide if the balcony belonged to Apartment 

5. [Dkt. 82 at ¶¶ 11, 19, 21.]2 A jury should decide if the reliance here was reasonable. See 

Green, 751 F.3d at 1046 (reversing for jury to decide because officers “have an ongoing 

duty to make appropriate inquiries regarding the facts” “if insufficient details are relayed”).

The Court understands the police’s point of view. They believed the person who 

stepped onto the balcony was likely their guy. But you can only take that logic so far. If a 

child stepped onto the balcony, Defendants would agree they couldn’t train their guns on 

him. Not because of age, but because he wouldn’t match the suspect’s description. 

Underlying this case is the more invidious problem that officers were looking for a black 

man, saw a black man, then pointed their guns at a black man. Targeting someone based 

on their race alone isn’t good enough. Because there’s a triable issue whether the police 

had probable cause, and ultimately whether this seizure was unreasonable, summary 

judgment on this claim is DENIED.

3

2. Excessive Force

The Court asks “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 

the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The issue here is straightforward:

 

2 McClain implies Cooper identified the balcony as belonging to Apartment 5, but Cooper’s 

testimony, and the undisputed facts, are silent on this point. [Dkt. 62-5. and Dkt. 62-18.]

3 Even if this was a Terry stop, the Court would still find a jury needed to decide if (i) the 

officers had reasonable suspicion; and (ii) whether the length and scope of the stop was 

reasonable. See Green, 751 F.3d at 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).

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could a jury find that pointing guns at Sightler was objectively unreasonable? To answer the 

question, courts consider: (1) the force used; (2) the severity of the reported crime, if the 

suspect posed an immediate threat, if the suspect resisted; and (3) the Court balances the 

intrusion on the suspect with the government’s need for the intrusion. Miller v. Clark County, 

340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). The analysis here overlaps with the issues above.

First, the police used extreme force. Having a gun pointed at you, especially for ten 

minutes, is as serious as it gets. Sightler testified he was afraid that “if he made any 

movements at all, the officers would fire at him.” [Dkt. 62-12 at 21.] Defendants argue 

Sightler failed to show “the risk of injury was high” because there’s no evidence “Longen 

had his finger on the trigger or anything that made the risk high such as pointing the weapon 

directly at Plaintiff’s head.” [Dkt. 71 at 6.] That’s a distinction without a difference. Whether 

Longen aimed his gun at Sightler’s head or heart doesn’t reduce the risk of death.

Second, it’s true the reported crime was severe. But Sightler held his hands up, and 

repeatedly provided exonerating information. The video also captures Hupp yell, “He’s 

cooperating.” Defendants argue the officers didn’t know if Sightler was armed because he 

was on an elevated balcony—they couldn’t rule out other guns on the balcony, on him, or 

stashed inside. Defendants can argue those points to the jury. The cops presumably have 

binoculars and scopes, and it’s undisputed a helicopter was overhead. Viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Sightler, a jury could conclude he wasn’t a threat.

Third, on balance, a jury could find the force here was too great an intrusion, even 

given Defendants’ interest in stopping a serious crime. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “at 

the very least, [the officers] could have held their weapons at a ‘low ready’ position rather 

than pointing them directly” at the suspect. Green, 751 F.3d at 1050. Defendants haven’t 

shown this is the rare case where the undisputed facts show no reasonable jury could find 

for Sightler. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir.1994). The motion for summary 

judgment on the excessive force claim is DENIED.

II. Qualified Immunity

“In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we consider (1) 

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whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was 

clearly established at the time of the officer's alleged misconduct.” S.B. v. Cty. of San Diego, 

864 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017). Since a jury could find Defendants violated Sightler’s 

Fourth Amendment rights, the only question is whether reasonable officers would have 

known the law clearly prohibited their conduct. That doesn’t require a “case directly on 

point,” but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question 

beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (alterations omitted).

1. Unlawful Arrest

Kraus provides sufficient precedent “where an officer acting under similar 

circumstances” “was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 552. In Kraus, 

police held the wrong person at gunpoint based on unverified information that associated 

Kraus’s car with the armed robber. Here, the police held the wrong person at gunpoint based 

on unverified information that associated Sightler’s balcony with the armed neighbor. In

Kraus, the Ninth Circuit reversed an order granting qualified immunity because a reasonable 

officer should have known that holding cooperative suspects at gunpoint based on 

incomplete and unverified information linking them to property associated with the crime

was an unreasonable seizure. Kraus, 793 F.2d at 1110 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Green, 751 

F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity for the unlawful arrest claim is DENIED.

2. Excessive Force

Robinson provides sufficient precedent where officers used excessive force under 

similar circumstances as this case. In Robinson, police responded to a home after a report 

the suspect had shot two dogs. When the police arrived, Robinson walked out of his home,

unarmed, and two officers pointed guns at him. Here, Sightler walked out of his home, 

unarmed, and four officers pointed guns at him. The Ninth Circuit was clear: “pointing a gun 

to the head of an apparently unarmed suspect during an investigation can be a violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, especially where the individual poses no particular danger.” 

Robinson v. Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); See also Green, 751 F.3d at 

1052. Qualified immunity for the excessive force claim is DENIED. 

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Defendants argue the officers believed Sightler may have recently committed a crime 

with a gun. But that belief isn’t sufficient to justify qualified immunity. Because in Kraus and 

Robinson, the police also believed the citizens they held at gunpoint had committed serious 

crimes with a gun: The police believed Kraus had just committed an armed robbery; they 

believed Robinson had just used his shotgun to kill two dogs. The Ninth Circuit clearly 

explained that “earlier use of a weapon” is “insufficient to justify” a pointed gun when the

person is cooperative and unarmed. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. City of San Diego

Sightler’s opposition failed to offer any legal argument for his claims against the City.

Instead, his facts section offers conclusory statements that string cite to evidence; his 

argument section lists general legal principles. He hasn’t explained how the law applies to 

the facts. The Court finds on this basis alone Sightler’s waived these causes of action by 

failing to oppose. The Court parsed through his fact citations nonetheless, but finds these 

causes of action lack any evidentiary support a jury could rely on to find for Sightler. 

1. Practice of Unreasonable Seizures

A city is liable under § 1983 when it has an unconstitutional policy or practice that 

was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Sightler’s theory seems to be that the City 

of San Diego has a practice “of using excessive force to detain and arrest Black and 

Brown citizens without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” [Dkt.69 at 14.] 

The evidence Sightler identifies isn’t on point. He refers to deposition testimony that 

he didn’t live in an affluent area, that people in his neighborhood were “messed with by the 

cops,” and that Nisleit told him: “I hope you don’t run into any of these [officers] again.” [Dkt. 

69-6.] He cites a San Diego State research paper on traffic stops. But he doesn’t provide 

any argument for how the paper applies to his theory. The report isn’t probative anyway. For 

example, it concluded: “No meaningful difference existed in the rate at which drivers from 

each racial/ethnic group were arrested.” [Dkt. 71-1 at 71.] Summary judgment on this claim 

is GRANTED. 

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2. Failure to train

Only where the “failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference” is a city potentially 

liable under § 1983. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Sightler offers 

a conclusory sentence that training was inadequate, and then references testimony by Hupp 

and Johnson where they can’t recall a few training terms on use of force. He also cites his 

police expert’s testimony that “a similarly trained San Diego Police Department officer would 

not have considered Mr. Slighter to be a lethal threat.” [Dkt.69-1 at 322–23.] That suggests

San Diego provides fine training. There’s no evidence here of deliberate indifference. 

Summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED. 

3. Failure to supervise

Sightler’s theory here is unclear. If he’s alleging claims against Nisleit and McClain, 

the Court’s addressed those issues above. But his complaint states this claim is against “the 

City of San Diego and All Doe Policy-makers.” Doe policymakers apparently refers to people 

like “the current SDPD Chief” and the “Assistant Chief” who Sightler said he might name as 

defendants, but never did. [Dkt. 20 at 3.] Summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED. 

Disposition

The Court is reluctant to expose officers to liability when they answer an emergency 

call under the belief that a fellow citizen has a gun held to her head. At the same time, fellow 

citizens shouldn’t have to experience the terror of an AR-15 pointed at them for ten minutes 

on a fall afternoon—especially when they are at home.4 Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is granted in part, and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 28, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

4 Neither party addressed that this encounter happened at Sightler’s home. The Court 

declines to analyze the issue, but highlights it for the parties to consider. See Hopkins v. 

Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 759 (9th Cir. 2009); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). 

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