Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity )

Commission, )

) 

Petitioner, ) No. CIV 09-0209-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Bashas’, Inc., )

)

Respondent. ) )

The court’s September 2, 2010 order (Doc. 67) is hereby

withdrawn, and replaced with this order, which omits footnote

four. 

Pending before the court is a “Motion to Compel Discovery

Responses and Motion for Confidentiality Order” by

respondent, Bashas’, Inc. (Doc. 59), which petitioner, the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), opposes

(Doc. 62). Also pending is EEOC’s recently filed “Motion to

Strike” (Doc. 66) Bashas’ reply memorandum. 

Background

Assuming familiarity with the fairly lengthy and 

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contentious history of the present dispute, there is no need

to repeat that entire history herein. This is especially so

considering the relatively narrow scope of Bashas’ motion to

compel. In its motion, Bashas’ requests that this court

order the EEOC to: “(1) produce all responsive telephone

records, including incoming calls; and (2) produce a complete

privilege log for its discovery responses.” Mot. (doc. 59). 

Additionally, because it believes that EEOC

“‘representatives’” have impermissibly (1) contacted Bashas’

employees, including management, and (2) made public

information about the EEOC’s investigation, Bashas’ seeks a

confidentiality order. See id. at 7:23; and at 8:20.

I. Telephone Records

As to Bashas’ request for production of telephone

records, initially the EEOC provided only records for

“Outward Call[s][.]” Mot., exh. 9 thereto (Doc. 59-9) at

EEOC-Bl-00025 - EEOC-Bl-00027 (emphasis added). In

responding to this motion to compel, the EEOC submitted the

declaration of Everett Barnes, its “Director of

Telecommunications and Networking in the Office of

Information Technology at EEOC Headquarters in Washington[,]

D.C.” Resp., exh. 1 thereto (Doc. 62-1) at 1, ¶ 1:24-27. 

Mr. Barnes declares that “[b]ecause the EEOC’s telephone

records are a byproduct of [its long distance telephone

provider’s] . . . billing system[,] and there is no charge to

receive an incoming telephone call, there are no telephone

records generated for incoming telephone calls.” Id. at 2, 

¶ 7. Consequently, according to Mr. Barnes, “[t]he EEOC does

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not have any records of incoming telephone calls for the

Phoenix District Office.” Id. at 3, ¶ 8. Based upon the

foregoing, the EEOC responds that the court should deny as

moot Bashas’ motion to compel as to the EEOC’s telephone

records. 

In its reply, Bashas’ notes that “[i]t was not until

Bashas’ filed [its] Motion to Compel that the EEOC provided a

detailed explanation of its production of telephone records

in its Response.” Reply (Doc. 65) at 5:27 - 6:1. Bashas’ is

not, however, seeking any specific relief as to the produced

telephone records. Almost as an afterthought, in the last

sentence of its motion, Bashas’ generically “requests an

award of its reasonable costs and fees incurred in making

this Motion[.]” Id. at 9:21-22. 

II. Privilege Log

Turning to the second aspect of Bashas’ motion to compel,

the privilege log, Bashas’ claims despite “assert[ing] that

much of the information requested is protected from

disclosure by privilege, including the attorney-client and

governmental deliberative privilege,” the EEOC is “ignor[ing]

Bashas’ request for a privilege log.” Mot. (Doc. 59) at

9:24-26. Bashas’ stresses that it is not “suggest[ing] that

the EEOC should produce privileged documents or provide

detailed information in a privilege log that would disclose

the [EEOC’s] work product.” Id. at 10:8-10 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Instead, Bashas’ “requests that

the EEOC produce a privilege log with as much specificity as

possible, that includes all responsive documents identified

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1 See, e.g., Resp., exh. 3 thereto (Doc. 62-1) at 1-2; id., exh. 4

thereto (Doc. 62-1) at 8:24-9:2. 

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as privileged.” Id. at 10:11-13. 

Bashas’ rationale is that the governmental deliberative

process privilege, which it claims the EEOC has “repeatedly

asserted[,] . . . has limited applicabilty. Id. at 10:12-13. 

Further, Bashas’ reasons that it “cannot debate the

applicability of th[at] limited privilege if the [EEOC]

refuses to identify privileged documents in a privileged

[sic] log.” Id. at 10:23-24. Accordingly, Bashas’ is

seeking a court order requiring the EEOC to “produce a

complete privilege log for its discovery responses.” Id. at

10:27-28. 

Basically it is the EEOC’s position that because, as the

record reflects, it has “informed [Bashas’] on more than one

occasion that it has produced all responsive documents that

it possessed[,]”1 and because “[t]here is nothing to document

in a privilege log[,]” the court should deny this aspect of

Bashas’ motion to compel. Resp. (Doc. 62) at 7:14-16. 

Bashas’ replies, as it did regarding the telephone

records, that “it was not until [it] filed this Motion that

the EEOC finally clarified that it does not have any

additional responsive documents to these discovery requests

privileged or otherwise[.]” Reply (Doc. 65) at 6:1-3. In its

reply, however, Bashas’ does not seek any further relief

pertaining to a privilege log other than the generic request

for attorneys’ fees and costs noted earlier. 

Indeed, Bashas’ devotes the bulk of its reply to arguing,

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for the first time, that it “has evidence that suggests the

EEOC’s response omitted hundreds of pages of documents

provided to the agency by Elizabeth Lawrence, attorney for

the plaintiffs in the Parra litigation, shortly after this

Court denied the plaintiffs’ second attempt to certify their

pay claim.” Reply (Doc. 65) at 1:19-22. Bashas’ further

claims that “[t]he documents provided by Ms. Lawrence suggest

that other EEOC discovery responses are incomplete.” Id. at

1:23. Thus, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 27, “Bashas’

requests that the Court order the EEOC to supplement

incomplete responses to its requests.” Id. at 1:23-24. 

Bashas’ attaches to its reply sixteen supporting exhibits,

including eight declarations from Bashas’ employees. All

eight claim to have been approached outside Bashas’ stores by

people purporting to be investigating wage and treatment

discrimination at Bashas’.

III. Confidentiality Order

Bashas’ motion for a confidentiality order arises from

activities outside several of its stores on June 23, 2010. 

Bashas’ asserts that immediately following the bankruptcy

court’s denial of discovery to the Parra plaintiffs, EEOC

“‘representatives[,]’” who “identified themselves as

representing ‘Pat Miner, EEOC Investigator[,]’” appeared

outside several of Bashas’ stores. Mot. (Doc. 59) at 7:23-26. 

According to Bashas’, those individuals approached Bashas’

employees, including managers, “advis[ing] them of a ‘case’

against Bashas’ and ‘discrimination’ by Bashas’.” Id. at

7:20-21 (emphasis omitted). 

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2 Bashas’ mistakenly relies upon Title 28 of the United States Code, when

the language which it is quoting is from Title 42 of that Code. In fact, Title 28

does not contain a section 2000e. 

3 Again, Bashas’ mistakenly relies upon Title 28 of the United States

Code, when obviously it intended to rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e). The court

is proceeding upon the assumption that Bashas’ intended to rely upon §§ 2000e-5(b)

and 2000e-8(e) as found in Title 42 of the United States Code. 

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When Bashas’ attorney learned of this conduct, she

contacted Ms. Miner right away, demanding that the EEOC

discontinue such contact with Bashas’ employees. See Mot.,

exh. 17 thereto (Doc. 59-17) at 2-4. At that time, Bashas’

advised the EEOC of its position that such conduct “seemed to

run afoul of 28 U.S.C. §[] 2000e-5(b)’s2 requirement that

‘Charges shall not be made public by the Commission.’” Id. at

8:21-22 (footnote added); see also id., exh. 17 thereto (Doc.

59-17) at 2-4. Bashas’ further advised the EEOC that it

deemed that conduct to be “contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 2000e8(e)[.]”3 Id. at 8:23; see also id., exh. 17 thereto (Doc. 59-

17) at 2-3. The primary thrust of that statute is to make

strictly confidential any information the EEOC obtains as part

of its investigation “prior to the institution of any

proceeding [there]under[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (West

2003). 

Claiming that the EEOC is in “blatant disregard [of] its

own internal confidentiality rules,” Bashas’ is requesting

that the court enter a confidentiality order as follows:

No officer or employee of the [EEOC] shall 

make public in any manner whatever any 

information obtained by the [EEOC] pursuant 

to its authority prior to the institution 

of any proceeding involving such information. 

Any officer or employee of the [EEOC] who 

shall make public in any manner whatever any 

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information in violation of this subsection shall 

be guilty of contempt of Court.

Id. at 11:3-6 (emphasis added). 

Succinctly put, the EEOC responds that Bashas’ is

impermissibly seeking “to involve the Court in the [this] 

administrative investigation without any legal authority to

support its position.” Resp. (Doc. 62) at 13:21-22. The EEOC

also sharply disputes Bashas’ depiction of the encounters

between Bashas’ employees and EEOC investigators. The EEOC is

adamant; its investigators are simply following their

statutory and regulatory mandate to interview witnesses. In

carrying out that mandate, the EEOC is equally adamant that

its investigators are complying with all applicable statutes,

rules, regulations, and the EEOC’s own Compliance Manual. 

Therefore, the EEOC asserts that this court should deny

Bashas’ motion for a confidentiality order.

Bashas’ retorts that despite how the EEOC depicts its

interviews with Bashas’ employees, those interviews “most

certainly w[ere] not ‘normal’ according [to] the EEOC’s own

guidelines.” Reply (Doc. 65) at 7:19-20. Bashas’ then goes

on to enumerate the ways in which it believes the EEOC failed

to follow its own “guidelines.” See id. at 8:5-15. For

example, Bashas’ points to a sentence in the EEOC’s Compliance

Manual stating, “Interview witnesses under conditions which

assure privacy.” Resp., exh. 5 thereto (Doc. 62-1) at 23-3, 

§ 23.6(b). By contacting Bashas’ employees “in Bashas’

parking lots, . . . where Bashas’ customers and other members

of the public were coming and going[,]” Bashas’ strongly

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suggests that the EEOC violated that privacy provision. See

Reply (Doc. 65) at 8:10-11. Bashas’ further challenges the

EEOC’s failure to address the EEOC’s alleged violations of 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-8(e). 

Somewhat tellingly, Bashas’ acknowledges the possibility

that the court may “choose[] not to address [its] request for

a confidentiality order in this Motion[.]” Id. at 9:12-13. In

that event, Bashas’ adds that “the EEOC’s heavy-handed

approach to its self-initiated charge most certainly questions

the legitimacy of the administrative subpoena and

Commissioner’s Charge, and demonstrates the confidentiality

concerns raised in the subpoena enforcement action.” Id. at

9:13-16. 

Discussion

I. Motion to Compel

Bashas’ has all the telephone records which are available

for production from the EEOC, as the Barnes’ declaration in

particular makes clear. Further, as the EEOC has explained,

there are no documents to include in a privilege log. See

Resp. (Doc. 62) at 6:1 - 9:2. The court therefore denies as

moot Bashas’ motion to compel as to telephone records and a

privilege log. See Dilbert v. Potter, 2009 WL 1517734, at *8

(N.D. Cal. June 1, 2009) (denying as moot plaintiff’s motion

to compel where defendant filed a declaration “stating that

all medical records in existence and responsive to Plaintiff’s

document requests ha[d] been produced”); see also Miller v.

Woodford, 2010 WL 2850776, at *2 (E.D.Cal. July 20, 2010)

(denying motion to compel document production where defense

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counsel verified that there were no responsive documents to

compel).

In its reply, Bashas’ significantly expanded the scope of

its initial discovery motion. Instead of limiting its request

for relief to telephone records and a privilege log, as it did

in its motion, in Bashas’ reply it seeks to compel production

of, inter alia, potentially “hundreds of pages of documents

provided to [the EEOC] by Elizabeth Lawrence, attorney for the

plaintiffs in the Parra litigation[.]” Reply (Doc. 65) at

1:19-21. The court declines to consider this argument made

for the first time in Bashas’ reply. See Dawe v. Corrections

USA, 2010 WL 1689107, at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 26, 2010) (citing

Cross v. Washington, 911 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1990))

(“Because these arguments were not raised in [defendant’s]

initial motion their inclusion in the reply was improper.”);

and Schultz v. Ichimoto, 2010 WL 3210764, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Aug.

10, 2010) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d

208, 209 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“Normally, arguments raised for the

first time in a reply brief or at the hearing on a motion are

disregarded.”) The obvious reason for declining to consider

this belated argument by Bashas’ is prejudice to the EEOC

given its lack of an opportunity to respond. The court,

therefore, abides by its prior rulings herein and denies in

all respects Bashas’ motion 

to compel discovery. 

II. Motion for Confidentiality Order

The court also denies Bashas’ motion for a

confidentiality order, but for different reasons. First,

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Bashas’ has not provided a sufficient legal or factual basis

for such relief. Bashas’ has not cited to any legal authority

to support the entry of such a confidentiality order. 

Further, the supporting declarations contain relatively little

detail about the declarants’ encounters with EEOC

investigators. Without the gloss of counsel, those

declarations show that those encounters were fairly innocuous. 

Second, the EEOC through its counsel, explicitly recognizes

that it “and its employees are bound by, and follow, the

relevant law.” Resp. (Doc. 62) at 14:18-19. Third, Bashas’

proposed confidentiality order borrows language from 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e), and, hence, it is

duplicative. Fourth, as drafted, the proposed confidentiality

order is potentially overbroad especially insofar as it

mandates a finding of contempt without affording any process. 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Bashas’ motion for a

confidentiality order. 

III. Motion to Strike

Disregarding the arguments made for the first time in

Bashas’ reply, renders moot the EEOC’s motion to strike that

reply and its accompanying exhibits. The court, therefore,

DENIES that motion to strike. 

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) this court’s September 2, 2010 order (Doc. 67) is

hereby WITHDRAWN; 

(2) the “Motion to Compel Discovery Response and Motion

for Confidentiality Order” (Doc. 59) is DENIED in its

entirety; and

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(3) the “Motion to Strike” (Doc. 66) is DENIED as moot. 

DATED this 15th day of September, 2010.

Copies to all counsel of record

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