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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United Sta~c C.,· m of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 'rm,+}1 d !"1'1l it 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT STAFFORD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

FIBREBOARD CORPORATION; JOHNS- ) 

MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION; OWENS- ) 

CORNING FIBERGLASS CORPORATION; ) 

EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES, INC.; ) 

UNARCO INDUSTRIES, INC.; CELOTEX ) 

CORPORATION; RUBEROID CORPORATION, ) 

a Division of GAF Corporation; ) 

ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY; STANDARD ) 

ASBESTOS MANUFACTURING AND ) 

INSULATION COMPANY; KEENE CORPORA- ) 

TION; and FORTY-EIGHT INSULATION, ) 

INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

f1i. '( 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 82-1079 

(D.C. No. 80-97-BT) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT! 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

1 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 82-1079 Document: 010110106507 Date Filed: 05/13/1991 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

I. ABATEMENT OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BANKRUPT 

APPELLEES 

On March 4, 1991, defendant-appellee Eagle-Picher Industries, 

Inc. filed a chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy 

Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Under section 362 of the 

Bankruptcy Code, this action is automatically stayed as to EaglePicher during the pendency of that bankruptcy. 11 u.s.c. § 362 

(1988). Accordingly, we order abatement of all proceedings in 

this appeal as to defendant-appellee Eagle-Picher Industries, 

Inc., and orders and judgments of the court in this appeal shall 

not bind Eagle-Picher. 

The court previously abated this appeal as to defendantsappellees Celotex Corp. and Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc. We are 

not stayed, however, from adjudicating Mr. Stafford's claims 

against the remaining defendants-appellees. Dillon v. Fibreboard 

Corp., 919 F.2d 1488, 1499 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 2 

2 The current status of defendant Standard Asbestos is unclear. 

However, because we are affirming the district court, this order 

will not affect the substantial rights of any creditors. We 

therefore will proceed to issue our order and dispose of this 

matter. 

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Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Forty-Eight Insulation shall 

notify this court immediately if their bankruptcy stays are lifted 

or shall file status reports by May 28, 1991. 

Defendant Unarco has been discharged in bankruptcy, and an 

injunction has been issued against any further judgments by the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. 

We therefore order that this action be dismissed as to defendant 

Unarco. 

II. FACTS 

Robert Stafford, the appellant, brought this diversity action 

claiming he had developed asbestosis after exposure to the 

asbestos-containing insulation products manufactured and sold by 

the appellees. Mr. Stafford worked as an insulator from 1946 

until 1979. In 1979, Mr. Stafford suffered a stroke, which caused 

him to leave his employment. Sometime after the stroke, 

Mr. Stafford was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis. 

Mr. Stafford's medical expert testified that the asbestosis had 

caused a 40 percent disability. Presumably, any further disability suffered by Mr. Stafford is due to the stroke or other conditions. Mr. Stafford claims that the appellees are strictly liable 

for his damages from asbestosis because they failed to warn him 

that their products were unreasonably dangerous. 

The jury returned a verdict for the appellees. Mr. Stafford 

now appeals, arguing (1) that the court improperly limited the 

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testimony of one of his expert witnesses and (2) that the court 

misled the jury by giving instructions as to the "state of the 

art" with respect to medical and scientific knowledge about the 

hazards of asbestos because the "state of the art" is irrelevant 

in a strict liability failure-to-warn case. We address each of 

those arguments in turn. 

III. LIMITATION OF TESTIMONY 

We will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding admission or exclusion of evidence, including testimony by expert 

witnesses, unless the trial court has abused its discretion. 

Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Mr. Stafford called Benjamin Taylor, Ph.D., an expert in 

labor economics, to testify as to Mr. Stafford's loss of earning 

capacity. The court granted the appellee's motion in limine to 

limit Dr. Taylor's testimony to the fact that Mr. Stafford had 

suffered a 40 percent loss of earnings from sedentary employment 

because of his asbestosis. The court would not allow Dr. Taylor 

to testify that Mr. Stafford had suffered a 100 percent loss of 

earnings as an insulation worker. The court so ruled because 

Mr. Stafford's own medical witnesses had already testified that he 

had ceased insulation work because of his stroke, not because of 

asbestosis. See record, vol. 12, at 5. The court offered to 

allow Mr. Stafford to recall his medical witnesses in order to 

establish that, but for the asbestosis, he would have recovered 

enough from the stroke the return to insulation work. 

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Mr. Stafford declined to do so, and Dr. Taylor proceeded to give 

his limited testimony. Id. at 6-7. 

Under these circumstances, we do not believe the court abused 

its discretion. However, even if the court had erred, the jury 

never reached the question of Mr. Stafford's alleged damages 

because the jury found the appellees were not liable. Thus, any 

error would have been harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 

IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

"When examining a challenge to jury instructions, we review 

the record as a whole to determine whether the instructions 'state 

the law which governs and provided the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and the standards applicable.'" Big Horn 

Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1098 (10th 

Cir. 1984)). "[A]n error in jury instructions will mandate 

reversal of a judgment only if the error is determined to have 

been prejudicial ... " Id. at 1271 n.19. 

Mr. Stafford objects to instructions regarding the "state of 

the art" of medical and scientific knowledge about the dangers of 

asbestos. Mr. Stafford has not specified which instruction or 

instructions he challenges. However, the instructions contain the 

following references to the "state of the art" and related topics: 

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Fault Not At Issue----Manufacturer Not Guarantor 

If you find that the essential elements of the 

plaintiff's claim have been established by a preponderance of the evidence, defendants are liable even though 

you may find and believe that defendants exercised all 

possible care in the manufacture and sale of the 

product. 

However, the manufacturer of a product such as the 

one involved in this case is not a guarantor that no one 

will get hurt in using the product or that it will 

incorporate the ultimate in safety. The law requires 

the manufacturer to make a product in keeping with the 

state of the art which is free of defects making it 

unreasonably dangerous. 

Record, vol. 4, at 1141. 

State of the Art 

You are instructed that the term "state of the art" 

means to conform with an acceptable industry standard at 

the time the product was actually manufactured. It is 

for you as the jury, from all the evidence in this case, 

to determine what the industry "state of the art" was 

concerning health hazards to users and the adequacy of 

the instructions and warning of the defendants to users 

of asbestos products. 

Id. at 1144. 

Notice 

You are instructed in considering the question 

of the adequacy or inadequacy of instructions and 

warning from the evidence, you should determine at 

what point in time there was a sufficient body of 

medical knowledge concerning potential respiratory 

or pulmonary problems of potential users available 

to a defendant that it as an industry manufacturer 

should have been able to foresee the hazards of its 

asbestos products and given proper and adequate 

instructions and warnings. Likewise, you should 

determine at what point in time there was sufficient information available to the plaintiff as an 

insulator-laborer or mechanic so that he knew or 

reasonably should have known of the health hazards 

of asbestos products which would make further 

instruction or warnings to him unnecessary. 

Id . at 1145. 

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Manufacturer--Knowledge and Skill 

You are instructed a manufacturer is held to the 

knowledge and skill of an expert in the industry. This 

should be considered by you in determining whether the 

manufacturer knew or should have known from available 

medical and scientific information of health hazards 

associated with the use of the manufactured product. 

Id. at 1146. 

Mr. Stafford timely objected to the "state of the art" 

instructions. He now argues that "state of the art" instructions 

are irrelevant in a strict liability action. He further argues 

that these instructions misled the jury by requiring them to find 

that the appellees were negligent, rather than strictly liable. 

In strict liability failure-to-warn cases, the jurisdictions 

are split on the issue of whether a manufacturer must warn of all 

dangers, or only of "knowable" dangers. See Annotation, Strict 

Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn As Dependent on 

Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 369 (1984). In 

jurisdictions requiring warnings only of "knowable" dangers, 

"state of the art" evidence is relevant to the issue of whether a 

danger is "knowable." 

Oklahoma has followed the majority of jurisdictions in adopting a rule that a manufacturer is strictly liable if he fails "to 

warn of all potential danger, which it knew, or should have known, 

in the exercise of reasonable care to exist." McKee v. Moore, 648 

P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982). Furthermore, the Oklahoma courts have 

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. r ' 

approved the definition of strict liability found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A. See Kirkland v. General Motors 

Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). Comment j to§ 402A conditions 

a manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers on whether "he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill 

and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger." Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A 

comment j (1965). Thus, the "state of the art" instructions given 

to the jury in this case, when read in context, accurately 

reflect the law of Oklahoma and do not constitute error. 

Finally, Mr. Stafford argues cursorily that the instructions 

failed to inform the jury that the appellees had the burden of 

proof to show that it complied with the "state of the art" and 

that this failure constitutes reversible error. Mr. Stafford 

cites no authority for this assertion, and we can locate none. 

Furthermore, he did not raise this objection at trial and we do 

not find the alleged omission to be plain error. 

Because we hold that the trial court did not err in limiting 

the testimony of Mr. Stafford's expert witness or in instructing 

the jury, we AFFIRM the order of the district court except as to 

defendant Unarco Industries, Inc. As to Unarco we REMAND to the 

district court for dismissal. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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