Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01297/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:2707 Civil Action: Stored Communications

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARSTEN ROSENOW,

Plaintiff,

v.

FACEBOOK, INC.; and YAHOO, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-1297-WQH-MDD

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed 

by Defendants Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) (ECF No. 7), and Yahoo, Inc. (“Yahoo”)1

(ECF No. 8).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2017, Carsten Rosenow was arrested at the San Diego airport and placed 

in federal custody. On July 19, 2017, an information was filed charging Rosenow with one 

 

1 Oath Holdings, Inc., asserts that Plaintiff Rosenow erroneously named Yahoo, Inc., as a Defendant. Oath 

Holdings, Inc., states:

Effective June 12, 2017, Defendant Yahoo! Inc. transferred to Yahoo Holdings, Inc. all 

liabilities relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Yahoo Holdings Inc. thereafter changed its name 

to Oath Holdings Inc. Defendant Yahoo! Inc. no longer owns any interest in the past, 

present, or future liabilities relevant to this lawsuit.

(ECF No. 9 at 2).

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count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2423(b). (USA v. Rosenow, 3:17-cr-01937-WQH, ECF No. 20). On October 19, 2017, a 

three-count indictment was filed charging Rosenow with one count of attempted sexual 

exploitation of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c); one count of travel with intent 

to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); and one count of 

possession of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). (USA v. Rosenow, 3:17-cr-03430-WQH, ECF No. 1). 

On March 19, 2018, Rosenow filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence in his criminal 

case. (Id., ECF No. 29). Rosenow moved the Court to suppress all of the evidence against 

him pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, contending that 

“[u]ltimately, all of the evidence against Mr. Rosenow is the result of warrantless searches 

of his private communications [by Facebook and Yahoo]—searches that were ‘government 

action’ on these facts.” (Id., ECF No. 29-1 at 9). On July 27, 2018, and August 8, 2018, the 

Court held an evidentiary hearing on Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Id., ECF 

Nos. 72, 73). On September 10, 2018, Rosenow filed Supplemental Briefing in support of 

his Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Id., ECF No. 76). On November 20, 2018, the Court 

issued an Order denying Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Id., ECF No. 87). The 

Court found that Yahoo and Facebook were not government actors and that Yahoo and 

Facebook conducted investigations in their own interest, in accordance with their internal 

policies and procedures. The Court found that law enforcement conducted an investigation 

independent of Yahoo and Facebook and utilized the information provided by Yahoo and 

Facebook in compliance with all applicable laws. The Court further found that “Yahoo and 

Facebook reported information to NCMEC pursuant to applicable law based upon facts 

and circumstances supporting an apparent violation of child pornography laws.” (Id., ECF 

No. 87 at 23). 

The Court held a jury trial in August 2019. On August 30, 2019, a jury returned a 

verdict finding Rosenow guilty on counts one and three of the indictment, for attempted 

sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) and (e) and possession of 

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images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2252(a)(4)(B). (Id., ECF No. 198). On March 3, 2020, the Court sentenced Rosenow to 

300 months imprisonment. (Id., ECF No. 247). On February 27, 2020, Rosenow filed a 

Notice of Appeal. (Id., ECF No. 239).

On July 12, 2019, Rosenow, proceeding pro se, filed the civil Complaint against 

Defendants Facebook and Yahoo. (ECF No. 1). Rosenow brings claims against Defendants 

for negligence and for violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702; the 

Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520; and the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 631. Rosenow seeks general and compensatory damages, civil penalties, and attorneys’ 

fees and costs.

On November 15, 2019, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

and Requests for Judicial Notice. (ECF Nos. 7-9). On December 9, 2019, Rosenow filed 

an Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12). On December 16, 2019, 

Defendants filed Replies. (ECF No. 13, 14).

II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

In September 2014, internet company “Xoom” advised Defendant Yahoo “that 

certain Yahoo accounts were potentially involved in illegal activity involving minors.” 

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 7). Yahoo searched the electronic communications of the accounts identified 

by Xoom. As a result of these searches, Yahoo “discovered various account holders who 

allegedly either bought or sold child pornography.” (Id. ¶ 11). In October 2014, Yahoo 

created a report that identified the account holders Yahoo suspected bought or sold child 

pornography. The report included the contents of private communications, contact lists, IP 

information, and metadata. Yahoo provided this report to the National Center for Missing 

and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”). Rosenow was not identified in the October 2014 

report. 

While the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) was serving subpoenas related to 

the Yahoo accounts identified in the October 2014 report, Yahoo searched Rosenow’s 

accounts, emails, and chat messages. During this process, Sean Zadig—a Yahoo employee 

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in the E-Crimes Investigation Team and former law enforcement officer—“communicated 

and worked closely” with the FBI in San Diego. (Id. ¶ 17). After Yahoo and Zadig reviewed 

Rosenow’s electronic communications, Yahoo submitted a supplemental report to 

NCMEC that contained “the contents of Plaintiff’s electronic communications and record 

information, and implicated Plaintiff in traveling internationally for the purpose of 

soliciting minors.” (Id. ¶ 20). In July 2015, Yahoo gave the FBI notice that it would be 

performing more account searches. Yahoo “gathered Plaintiff’s entire chat history, and 

yielded more evidence that allegedly incriminated Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 29).

In December 2015, Yahoo provided NCMEC with more of Rosenow’s chat 

messages. The FBI relied on the information Yahoo provided to “attempt to obtain a search 

warrant for Plaintiff’s Yahoo accounts.” (Id. ¶ 42). The U.S. Attorney’s Office refused to 

authorize a search warrant. Rosenow’s “Yahoo accounts never contained any evidence of 

solicitation, receipt, or exchange of child pornography.” (Id. ¶ 36).

In early 2017, the FBI sent Defendant Facebook a request to preserve Rosenow’s 

private Facebook profile. In March 2017, “the FBI in San Diego served an administrative 

subpoena on Facebook requesting the details of Plaintiff’s Facebook accounts.” (Id. ¶ 45). 

Facebook searched Rosenow’s Facebook accounts, messages, and communications, even 

though the FBI did not have a warrant for the search. After this search, Facebook reported 

to NCMEC that it “had allegedly discovered evidence of child exploitation on Plaintiff’s 

accounts.” (Id. ¶ 49). The report included Rosenow’s messages and communications. 

Rosenow’s Facebook accounts “never contained any evidence of solicitation, receipt, or 

exchange of child pornography.” (Id. ¶ 52). 

The information that Facebook provided “led the government to obtain a search 

warrant against Plaintiff’s property and personal effects.” (Id. ¶ 58). After Rosenow was 

arrested in June 2017, government agents searched Rosenow’s cellular phone and home. 

These searches led to Rosenow’s criminal indictment. 

///

///

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III. CONTENTIONS

Defendants contend that Rosenow’s claims arise from Defendants’ legal obligations 

to report apparent violations of child exploitation laws to NCMEC. Defendants contend 

that Rosenow’s Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) and Wiretap Act claimsfails because 

Defendants’ disclosed information pursuant to their legal obligations to report apparent or 

imminent violations of child sexual exploitation laws involving child pornography to 

NCMEC. Defendants contend that Rosenow’s Wiretap Act claim fails because Rosenow 

does not plead facts that show Defendants intercepted Rosenow’s communications. 

Rosenow contends that Defendants’ disclosed information that exceeded the scope 

of Defendants’ authority under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A. Rosenow contends that he adequately 

states claims for violations of the SCA and Wiretap Act.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for “failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In order to state a claim for relief, a 

pleading “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is proper only 

where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A court is not “required to accept 

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as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 

2001). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual 

content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quotation omitted).

V. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of facts and filings from 

Rosenow’s criminal case. (See ECF No. 8 at 5-7; ECF No. 9-2 at 2-4). Yahoo requests that 

the Court take judicial notice of the facts of Rosenow’s arrest, indictment, and conviction. 

Yahoo further requests that the Court take judicial notice of Rosenow’s March 19, 2018, 

Motion to Suppress Evidence; the United States’ April 27, 2018, Opposition to Rosenow’s 

Motion to Suppress Evidence; Rosenow’s May 11, 2018, Reply in Support of Rosenow’s 

Motion to Suppress Evidence; and the Jury Verdict Form in Rosenow’s criminal case. 

Facebook requests that the Court take judicial notice of Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress 

Evidence; the Court’s Order denying Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress Evidence; 

Facebook’s April 28, 2017, CyberTipline Report; and the FBI Form 302 filed by the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office in Rosenow’s criminal case. Facebook further requests that the Court 

consider the following documents incorporated by reference in Rosenow’s Complaint: 

Facebook’s Terms of Service; Facebook’s data policy; and the FBI administrative 

subpoena served on Facebook.

Rosenow objects to the Court taking judicial notice of the requested documents. 

Rosenow contends that the Court “should only consider the documents from Plaintiff’s 

criminal case for the limited purpose of their filing and existence, not for the truth of any 

of the allegations contained therein.” (ECF No. 12 at 5). Rosenow contends that the Court 

should deny Facebook’s request that the Court incorporate by reference Facebook’s Terms 

of Service and data policy and the FBI subpoena, because the “attempt to provide extrinsic 

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evidence in support of its motion to dismiss . . . [is] improper at this pleading stage of the 

proceedings.” (Id.). 

“As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th 

Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 

(9th Cir. 2002)). “There are, however, two exceptions to the requirement that consideration 

of extrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion.” Id.

“First, a court may consider ‘material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint’ 

on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment.” Id. (quoting Branch, 14 F.3d at 453). Under this “incorporation by reference” 

doctrine, the court may consider “documents ‘whose contents are alleged in a complaint 

and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the 

[plaintiff’s] pleading.’” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration 

in original) (quoting In re Silicon Graphic Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 

2002)). The court may also consider documents incorporated by reference where “the 

plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the 

document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the 

document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document 

in the complaint.” Id. (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Second, the court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record” pursuant to Rule 

201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quotation omitted). Rule 201 

allows courts to take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute 

because” the facts “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

The date of Rosenow’s arrest, the date of Rosenow’s indictment, the charges on 

which Rosenow was indicted, the date of Rosenow’s conviction, and the charges of which 

the jury found Rosenow guilty are facts that “can be accurately and readily determined . . 

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. .” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Rosenow does not oppose Yahoo’s request that the Court take 

judicial notice of these facts, and these facts are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Id.

The Court takes judicial notice of the requested facts regarding Rosenow’s arrest, 

indictment, and conviction. The Court further takes judicial notice of the entire record in

Rosenow’s criminal case. See Reyna Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 

746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of court 

filings and other matters of public record, such as pleadings in related litigation).

The Court further finds that the contents of Yahoo’s December 2, 2015, 

CyberTipline Report and Facebook’s April 28, 2017, CyberTipline Report are incorporated 

by reference in Rosenow’s Complaint. Rosenow alleges facts regarding the contents of the

CyberTipline Reports in the Complaint, and no party has questioned the authenticity of the 

reports. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36, 52 (alleging that Rosenow’s communications disclosed by 

Defendants as part of the CyberTipline Reports “never contained any evidence of the 

solicitation, receipt, or exchange of child pornography”)). The Court does not consider 

Facebook’s Terms of Service, Facebook’s data policy, or the FBI administrative subpoena 

in this Order.

VI. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CLAIM

Rosenow brings his first cause of action against Defendants for violations of the 

SCA, part of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). Rosenow 

alleges that Defendants wrongfully disclosed the contents of his private communications 

to NCMEC in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702.

Defendants assert that they are required or permitted by federal law to report 

apparent or imminent violations of child sexual exploitation laws to NCMEC pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 2258A. Defendants contend that § 2702(b)(6) of the SCA exempts from 

liability Defendants’ disclosures of stored communications to NCMEC pursuant to § 

2258A. Defendants contend that the Court has determined that Defendants lawfully 

reported Rosenow’s communications to NCMEC pursuant to § 2258A in the Order denying 

Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress Evidence in Rosenow’s criminal case. 

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Rosenow contends that he sufficiently states a claim against Defendants for 

violations of the SCA. Rosenow contends that § 2258A only permits the reporting of 

complete communications that contain an image of apparent child pornography; § 2258A 

does not permit the disclosure of the private messages provided by Defendants. Rosenow 

contends that the motions in his criminal case did not involve the SCA or Wiretap Act. 

The SCA prohibits providers of electronic communication services and remote 

computing services from “divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents” of electronic 

communications, records, and other information, except under certain circumstances. 18 

U.S.C. § 2702(a).2 Under the exceptions to § 2702(a), “[a] provider . . . may divulge the 

contents of a communication . . . to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 

in connection with a report submitted thereto under section 2258A.” 18 U.S.C. § 

2702(b)(6). 

 

2

18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) provides:

(a) Prohibitions.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)--

(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public 

shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication 

while in electronic storage by that service; and

(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not 

knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication 

which is carried or maintained on that service--

(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or 

created by means of computer processing of communications received by 

means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such 

service;

(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing 

services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to 

access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing 

any services other than storage or computer processing; and

(3) a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to 

the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to 

a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 

communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2)) to any governmental entity.

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18 U.S.C. § 2258A provides that electronic communication service providers must 

or may disclose electronic communications, records, and other information in certain 

circumstances to “reduce the proliferation of online child sexual exploitation and to prevent 

the online sexual exploitation of children.” 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1)(A). Section 2258A 

requires that a provider that “obtain[s] actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances” 

from which there is “an apparent violation” of a federal child sexual exploitation law “that 

involves child pornography” shall

(i) provid[e] to the CyberTipline of NCMEC, or any successor to the 

CyberTipline operated by NCMEC, the mailing address, telephone number, 

facsimile number, electronic mailing address of, and individual point of 

contact for, such provider; and

(ii) mak[e] a report of such facts or circumstances to the CyberTipline, or any 

successor to the CyberTipline operated by NCMEC.

18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A). Section 2258A also permits the 

reporting of any “facts or circumstances which indicate a violation of [the federal child 

sexual exploitation laws] involving child pornography may be planned or imminent.” 18 

U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(B). The report “may, at the sole discretion of the 

provider,” include: 

(1) Information about the involved individual. Information relating to the

identity of any individual who appears to have violated or plans to violate a 

Federal [child exploitation law], which may, to the extent reasonably 

practicable, include the electronic mail address, Internet Protocol address, 

uniform resource locator, payment information (excluding personally 

identifiable information), or any other identifying information, including selfreported identifying information.

(2) Historical reference. Information relating to when and how a customer or 

subscriber of a provider uploaded, transmitted, or received content relating to 

the report or when and how content relating to the report was reported to, or 

discovered by the provider or remote computing service provider, including a 

date and time stamp and time zone.

(3) Geographic location information. Information relating to the geographic 

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location of the involved individual or website, which may include the Internet 

Protocol address or verified address, or, if not reasonably available, at least 

one form of geographic identifying information, including area code or zip 

code, provided by the customer or subscriber, or stored or obtained by the 

provider.

(4) Visual depictions of apparent child pornography. Any visual depiction of 

apparent child pornography or other content relating to the incident such 

report is regarding.

(5) Complete communication. The complete communication containing any 

visual depiction of apparent child pornography or other content, including—

(A) any data or information regarding the transmission of the 

communication; and

(B) any visual depictions, data, or other digital files contained in, or 

attached to, the communication.

18 U.S.C. § 2258A(b). After NCMEC reviews any report, it is required to provide the 

report to federal or state law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(c). 

In this case, Rosenow alleges that Defendants unlawfully disclosed his record 

information and the contents of his electronic communications, including emails, 

messages, and chats, to NCMEC. Rosenow alleges that his Yahoo and Facebook accounts 

“never contained any evidence of the solicitation, receipt, or exchange of child 

pornography . . . .” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36, 52). The Court considered Rosenow’s argument that 

Yahoo and Facebook exceeded the scope of their reporting responsibilities under § 2258A 

in Rosenow’s criminal case. Aftersubstantial briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the Court 

determined that “Yahoo and Facebook reported information to NCMEC pursuant to 

applicable law based upon facts and circumstances supporting an apparent violation of 

child pornography laws.”3(USA v. Rosenow, 3:17-cr-03430-WQH, ECF No. 87 at 23). 

 

3 Rosenow has appealed his criminal conviction. (USA v. Rosenow, 3:17-cr-03430-WQH, ECF No. 239). 

This civil action would require this Court to reconsider its Order on Rosenow’s Motion to Suppress 

Evidence in his criminal case and would “necessarily require [Rosenow] to prove the unlawfulness of his 

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The contents of the CyberTipline Reports demonstrate that Defendants obtained 

knowledge of facts or circumstances indicating “apparent” or “imminent” violations by 

Rosenow of the federal child sexual exploitation laws involving child pornography. 18 

U.S.C. § 2258A(a). In the December 2, 2015, CyberTipline Report, Yahoo provided 

NCMEC with the contents of Rosenow’s messages in which Rosenow appeared to be

making arrangements to pay young girls ages eight to sixteen in the Phillippines for sex. 

(See generally, USA v. Rosenow, 3:17-cr-03430-WQH, Ex. 8, ECF No. 49-8). In the Yahoo 

messages, Rosenow requested pictures of the young girls. (See id. at 10 (“do you have 

pics”); Id. at 12 (“if you can send pic or show me before I can pick”); Id. at 13 (“can I see 

them now;” “can I see the girls first here in [Yahoo Messenger”)). In the April 28, 2017, 

CyberTipline Report, Facebook provided NCMEC with the contents of Rosenow’s 

messages in which Rosenow appeared to be making arrangements to pay young girls in the 

Philippines for sex. (See generally, Ex. 5, Declaration of Christin J. Hill in Support of 

Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-3). The messages contained three images 

Rosenow described in the message as “naked pic[s].” (Id. at 79).

Defendants, in their discretion, properly disclosed Rosenow’s complete 

communications to NCMEC pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2258(b). Accordingly, Defendants’ 

disclosures fall within the exception to liability under the SCA for divulging “the contents 

of a communication . . . to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in 

connection with a report submitted thereto under section 2258A.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6). 

The Court concludes that Rosenow fails to state a claim for violation of the SCA.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Rosenow’s first cause of action are granted.

VII. WIRETAP ACT CLAIM

Rosenow brings his second cause of action against Defendants for violations of the 

Wiretap Act, part of the federal ECPA. Rosenow alleges that Defendants intercepted 

 

conviction or confinement.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). A civil tort action is “not [an] 

appropriate vehicle[ ] for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . .” Id.

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Rosenow’s private communications and unlawfully disclosed the contents of his 

communications to NCMEC in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.

Defendants contend that Rosenow fails to plead facts sufficient to show that 

Defendants intercepted the contents of Rosenow’s communications. Rosenow contends 

that he sufficiently alleges that Defendants intercepted his communications in transit in 

violation of the Wiretap Act. 

The Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to “intentionally intercept[ ] . . . any wire, oral, 

or electronic communication” or to “use[ ]” or “disclose[ ]” the contents of any 

intentionally intercepted communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). The Wiretap Act defines 

“intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 

communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2510(4). For a communication “to be ‘intercepted’ in violation of the Wiretap Act, it 

must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.” Konop v. 

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). “[A]cquisition occurs ‘when 

the contents of a [ ] communication are captured or redirected in any way.” Noel v. Hall, 

568 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 

(2d Cir. 1992)). 

In this case, Rosenow alleges that Facebook “knowingly and purposefully searched 

Plaintiff’s accounts––including his private messages and communications . . . .” (ECF No. 

1 ¶ 48). Rosenow alleges that Facebook reported the contents of Rosenow’s messages to 

NCMEC. Rosenow fails to state facts that support an inference that Facebook “acquired 

[Rosenow’s communications] during transmission.” Konop, 302 F.3d at 878. Rosenow

fails to state facts that support an inference that Facebook “use[d]” or “disclose[d]” the 

contents of any communication that was “acquired during transmission.” Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 

2511(1)(c)-(d). Rosenow fails to state facts that support an inference that the contents of 

the communications alleged in the Complaint were “intercept[ed]” by Facebook within the 

meaning of the Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).

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Rosenow further alleges that “Yahoo warrantlessly searched Plaintiff’s Yahoo 

account, including emails, chats, and other electronic communications.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 15). 

Rosenow alleges that “Yahoo knowingly used an algorithm to intercept and scan Plaintiff’s 

incoming chat messages for content during transit and before placing them in electronic 

storage.” (Id. ¶ 16). Rosenow alleges that Yahoo “reviewed the contents of Plaintiff’s 

electronic communications––including emails, messages, and chats” and provided the 

contents of Plaintiff’s communications to NCMEC. (Id. ¶ 19). Rosenow’s allegation that 

Yahoo intercepted Rosenow’s communications during transit are conclusory. Rosenow 

fails to allege facts that support an inference that Yahoo “captured or redirected” the 

contents of Rosenow’s communications while in transit. Noel, 568 F.3d at 749. Rosenow 

fails to state facts that support an inference that Yahoo “use[d]” or “disclose[d]” the contents 

of any communication that was “acquired during transmission.” Konop, 302 F.3d at 878;

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d). Rosenow fails to state facts that support an inference that the 

contents of the communications alleged in the Complaint were “intercept[ed]” by Yahoo 

within the meaning of the Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Rosenow’s second cause of action are granted.

VIII. STATE LAW CLAIMS

Rosenow’s remaining claims arise under California state law and include causes of 

action for negligence4and violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act. The federal 

supplemental jurisdiction statute provides, “[I]n any civil action of which the district courts 

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The district courts may decline to exercise 

 

4 Rosenow alleges that Defendants breached a duty owed to Rosenow under the SCA and Wiretap Act. 

However, “[f]ederal question jurisdiction over a state law claim is not created just because a violation of 

federal law is an element of a state law claim.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2002).

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supplemental jurisdiction” for a number of reasons, including if “the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

“Depending on a host of factors, then—including the circumstances of the particular 

case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the 

relationship between the state and federal claims—district courts may decline to exercise 

jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.” Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 

U.S. 156, 173 (1997). “While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it 

is informed by the [United Mine Workers of America v.] Gibbs[,] [383 U.S. 715 (1966),] 

values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 

999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). “‘[I]n the usual case in which federal-law 

claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.’” Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 

F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 

n. 7 (1970)). 

Rosenow’s federal claims have been dismissed. The Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Rosenow’s state law claims. 

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted. Rosenow’s Complaint is dismissed 

without prejudice. 

IX. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint (ECF Nos. 7, 8) are granted. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without 

prejudice. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file a 

motion for leave to amend pursuant to Civil Local Rules 7.1 and 15.1(c).

Dated: April 27, 2020

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