Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00001/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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1 There has been some confusion surrounding the spelling of Ms. Wang’s

name. Plaintiff refers to “Cin Yi[,]” Resp. (doc. 53) at 1, but the court opts for

the spelling from Ms. Wang’s own affidavit -- “Cinyi.” Plaintiff’s Separate

Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) (doc. 47), exh. 7 (doc. 47-3) thereto (Wang Aff.) at

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Toni Huynh, an individual, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-0001-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Plaintiff Toni Huynh, an Asian woman, alleges that she was

discriminated against on the basis of her race and gender by her

former employer, defendant J.P. Morgan Chase & Company (“JPMC”), 

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. Pending before the court is a

motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by

defendant JPMC (doc. 43). Also pending are related motions by JPMC

seeking to strike: (1) allegedly “inadmissible evidence” which

plaintiff offers in response to this summary judgment motion (doc.

50); and (2) the affidavit of Cinyi1

 Wang, a former JPMC employee

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19. 

2 Defendant seeks oral argument with respect to its summary judgment

motion and its “motion to strike inadmissible evidence[,]” but not as to its motion

to strike the Wang affidavit. Compare Docs. 43 at 1; and 50 at 1 with Doc. 48.

Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies these requests. 

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(doc. 48).2 

Background 

Plaintiff Huynh’s discrimination claims arose in the context

of a corporate merger between JPMC and Bank One, which occurred in

late 2004. For now the court will limit its recitation of the

facts to the general undisputed background of those claims. More

detailed facts will be set forth herein as necessary to resolve the

myriad of issues which these motions raise.

Plaintiff began working for JPMC’s predecessor in June 1998. 

Sometime in 2004, she was promoted to the position of Vice

President/Global Product Manager. In that position plaintiff was

responsible for product and project management with respect to

audio and video conferencing products. Plaintiff would research

products and contract with outside vendors to install and support

those products. Given her admitted lack of technical or

engineering experience, plaintiff would “delegate” matters

pertaining, for example, to “diagnostics.” See Defendant’s

Separate Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) (doc. 44), exh. 1 (doc. 44-2)

thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 47:18-20.

Because both JPMC and Bank One had departments which formed

the same function as the Technology and Operations Group in which

plaintiff worked prior to the merger, “[t]he newly formed JPMC

merged th[o]se two departments by assessing the departments, job

descriptions, officer titles, salary grade, job functions, and

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3 Hereinafter all references to “Network Engineer” shall be read as

including the designation “II.” 

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employees and then restructuring the groups to form one

department.” Id., exh. 6 (doc. 44-5) thereto (McClung Decl’n) at

30, ¶ 4. “The new [JPMC] department adopted the structure of the

model previously used by Bank One.” Id. Unlike the model under

which plaintiff had previously worked, under the Bank One model,

there was no “routine[] contract[ing] with [outside] vendors to

perform installations or support – these functions were performed

primarily” in-house by Bank One employees. DSOF (doc. 44) at 4, ¶

15 (citations omitted). 

According to Penne McClung, a JPMC Senior Vice President and

the Managing Director of Global Voice, and Shannon Morton, a JPMC

Vice President, “[a]s part of the merger, some employees were let

go and other were reclassified or ‘re-mapped’ into [other]

positions[.]” Id., exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 7,

¶ 9; and exh. 6 (doc. 44-5) thereto (McClung Decl’n) at 30, ¶ 5. 

As part of the reclassification, employees had to complete

comprehensive “Employee Biography Forms[]” detailing such things as

their educational background, professional experience, and a

description of their “most recent job held and preferred role”

within the newly merged company. Id. at 4, ¶ 16 (citation

omitted). 

“After the merger, Plaintiff was placed in the position of

Network Engineer II3

[.]” Id. at 4, ¶ 18 (citation omitted)

(footnote added). She no longer held the title Vice President. 

Plaintiff was not alone in losing her title as part of the merger

and subsequent reclassification. “Nine employees who reported to”

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Ms. Morton, “including [plaintiff], lost their ‘vice president’ or

‘assistant vice president’ titles as a result of the” merger. Id.,

exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 11, ¶ 26; and exh. D

thereto at 35. 

Plaintiff was reclassified as Network Engineer because from

JPMC’s perspective, this was the position “most closely aligned

with” plaintiff’s role pre-merger, and “the available position that

required the least technical and engineering skills.” Id. at 4, ¶

19 (citations omitted). As a Network Engineer, plaintiff’s salary

and benefits remained the same as when she had been a Vice

President. Id. at 4, ¶ 20 (citation omitted). Because plaintiff’s

position prior to the merger did not exist in the JPMC merged

organization, the only option, short of termination, was to

reclassify her. Id. at 5, ¶ 22 (citations omitted). 

In the spring of 2005 a presentation was made to plaintiff’s

department. Among the items discussed at that presentation were

reclassification, training opportunities and the reporting

structure were explained. Id., exh. 3 (doc.44-4) thereto (Morton

Decl’n) at 6, ¶ 28. Shortly after that presentation, plaintiff

informed Ms. McClung, that plaintiff did not think that she had the

qualifications to be a Network Engineer. Id., exh. 1 (44-3) thereto

(Huynh Dep’n) at 208:10-14. Plaintiff voiced that concern to

others at JPMC, including her immediate supervisor, Gerard Bauer. 

Id. at 208:15-209:6; and DSOF, exh. 5 (doc.44-5) thereto (Bauer

Decl’n) at 14, ¶ 13. 

In an April 15, 2005, e-mail to Ms. McClung, plaintiff

explained that she was “extremely stressed out” because she was

being torn between two priority projects. DSOF (doc. 44), exh. 1

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(doc. 44-3) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 185:9-186:25. This prompted a

review of how plaintiff was spending her workdays. Id. at 7, ¶ 32

(citations omitted). Through its time tracking system, JPMC

discovered that plaintiff “reported only 73 hours of work related

to her audio and video conferencing activities.” Id. at 7, ¶¶ 33

and 34 (citations omitted). The remainder of her reported time was

devoted to “volunteer human resources activities that were not

disclosed to her management team.” Id. at 7, ¶ 32 (citations

omitted). As a result of that e-mail, plaintiff believes that “her

managers were unhappy with her[,]” and in fact, that e-mail is the

reason “she received a rating of below satisfaction” for “technical

competence on her April 29, 2005 performance evaluation.” Id. at

7, ¶¶ 37-38 (citations omitted). 

In the aftermath of the merger, there have been several

reductions in force. Consequently, “[b]etween January 2005 and the

end of December 2006, 85 employees (not including contractors)

within [plaintiff’s] Department were lost . . . , including

[plaintiff] Huynh.” Id., exh. 6 (doc. 44-5) thereto (McClung

Decl’n) at 35-26, ¶ 50. 

Discussion

I. “Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence”

Before turning to JPMC’s summary judgment motion and before

further development of the factual record, it is necessary to

clarify the state of the record by addressing JPMC’s “motion to

strike inadmissible evidence.” The court will then turn to JPMC’s

summary judgment motion. More narrowly, the court will determine

whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of race/gender

discrimination. Only if plaintiff satisfies that burden will the

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court consider JPMC’s motion to strike the affidavit of Cinyi Wang. 

There is no need to address that motion to strike at the outset

because plaintiff is offering Ms. Wang’s affidavit solely on the

issue of pretext. And, as will be seen, if plaintiff cannot make

out a prima facie case, pretext does not become an issue.

A. Plaintiff’s Affidavits

In opposing JPMC’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff is

relying, inter alia, upon her own affidavit (doc. 47-3), dated June

14, 2007 - more than a year afer her deposition. JPMC is moving to

strike certain parts of that affidavit due to lack of foundation

and lack of personal knowledge. JPMC further contends that parts

of plaintiff’s affidavit should be stricken as variously

speculative, conclusory, irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay or

because she is stating “an ultimate legal conclusion.” See, e.g.,

id. at 7, ¶ 3. JPMC also objects to some of plaintiff’s averments

because supposedly they “are based upon opinion rather than fact.” 

See, e.g., Mot. (doc. 50) at 6, ¶ 3. Lastly, JPMC objects to

plaintiff’s affidavit to the extent she references matters which

are not included in her Charge of Discrimination which she filed

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Civil Rights Division on July

20, 2005 (“EEOC Charge”). This argument is more properly made and

considered in the context of exhaustion. Hence, the court will

defer consideration of this argument for the moment.

Plaintiff responded to these objections by filing a 

supplemental affidavit wherein she greatly expands upon each of the

challenged portions of her original affidavit. See, e.g., Resp.

(doc. 54) at 5-6, ¶ 2. Tellingly, plaintiff does not directly

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confront any of JPMC’s objections to her original affidavit. 

Instead, without distinguishing between her original and her

supplemental affidavits, plaintiff simply asserts that the

“[a]verments in [h]er [a]ffidavit [a]re [a]dmissible[.]” Id. at 4. 

JPMC counters that plaintiff’s supplemental affidavit, filed

almost two months after the filing of her response to JPMC’s

summary judgment motion, and without leave of court, is untimely. 

JPMC reasons that “[a] motion to strike inadmissible evidence does

not re-open the briefing or record on a summary judgment motion[.]” 

Reply (doc. 57) at 3. Nor does such a motion “extend Plaintiff’s

time to submit the evidence that she claims mandates a trial of

this matter.” Id. JPMC thus maintains that the court should

strike this supplemental affidavit in its “entirety.” Id.

JPMC’s position is well-taken. Plaintiff’s filing of a

supplemental affidavit well after the filing of her affidavit

opposing summary judgment is a transparent attempt to circumvent

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 which the court will not allow. “Parties are

not permitted to file late affidavits in support of their

opposition to a motion for summary judgment without invoking

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(f) and indicating why they cannot timely file

the required affidavits.” Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29

F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Plaintiff did

not invoke Rule 56(f). Nor did she “suggest[] any reason for [her]

failure to file timely, acceptable affidavits.” See id. Indeed,

it is hard to conceive of any such reason given that the

supplemental affidavit is from plaintiff herself. This is not a

situation, for example, of newly discovered evidence, or where

plaintiff had to obtain an affidavit from someone outside of her

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control. Thus, the court grants JPMC’s motion to the extent it is

seeking to strike the supplemental affidavit of plaintiff. The

court will not consider that affidavit in ruling on this summary

judgment motion.

Turning to JPMC’s challenges to plaintiff’s initial affidavit,

there is no need to separately address each one of those numerous

challenges because many are unnecessary. The court is keenly aware

that it “may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.” Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d

736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The court is equally

cognizant of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has long recognized

that “[d]efects in evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for

... summary judgment are waived ‘absent a motion to strike or other

objection.’” FDIC v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir.

1991) (quoting Scharf v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th

Cir. 1979)). By the same token, objections such as JPMC is making

that “evidence ... [as] irrelevant, speculative, and/or

argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion

are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself[.]” 

Burch v. Regents of University of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110,

1119 (E.D.Cal. 2006). 

“A court can award summary judgment only when there is no

genuine dispute of material fact. It cannot rely on irrelevant

facts, and thus relevance objections are redundant.” Id.

Similarly, JPMC’s objections that certain averments are speculative

or constitute improper legal conclusions, are “superfluous in this

context[ ]” because such averments “are not facts and likewise will

not be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation

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omitted). As the court accurately observed in Burch, “[i]nstead of

objecting[,] parties should simply argue that the facts are not

material.” Id. In light of the foregoing, suffice it to say that

the court will only take into account those parts of plaintiff’s

original affidavit which are properly considered on this summary

judgment motion. The court will disregard the rest of that

affidavit.

B. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts

JPMC is seeking to strike 26 of the 61 paragraphs in the PSOF,

as well as portions of three other paragraphs. Much like it did

with respect to plaintiff’s affidavit, this aspect of JPMC’s motion

to strike is based upon a host of claimed deficiencies, which

include: (1) lack of foundation; (2) irrelevancy; (3) inadmissible

hearsay; (4) argumentative; and (5) speculative. Once again,

insofar as these objections are duplicative of the summary judgment

standard, the court sees no need to expressly rule on each of them. 

Of course, to the extent that the PSOF contains conclusory or

otherwise inadmissible “facts” under the summary judgment standard,

the court will not consider any of those claimed “facts.”

C. LRCiv 56.1(b)

LRCiv 56.1(b) requires a party opposing summary judgment such

as plaintiff Huynh to provide, among other things:

a statement, . . . , setting forth . . . for 

each paragraph of the moving party’s separate

statement of facts, a correspondingly numbered 

paragraph indicating whether the party disputes 

the statement of fact set forth in that paragraph

and a reference to the specific admissible portion 

of the record supporting the party’s position if

the fact is disputed[.] 

LRCiv 56.1(b)(1). That Rule further provides that “[e]ach numbered

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paragraph of the statement of facts set forth in the moving party’s

separate statement of facts shall, unless otherwise ordered, be

deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment if

not specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered

paragraph in the opposing party’s separate statement of facts.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff Huynh did not comply with that Rule. Thus, the

court could deem admitted JPMC’s entire 128 paragraph Statement of

Facts. However, given the phrase, “unless otherwise ordered,” the

court finds that it “has the discretion, but is not required, to

deem the uncontroverted facts admitted.” See Baker v. D.A.R.A. II,

Inc., 2008 WL 80350, at *3 (D.Ariz. 2008). Even without a specific

statement of controverting facts from plaintiff, for the most part,

the court is able to discern the disputed facts. Where it could

not easily do so, however, the court did invoke LRCiv. 56.1(b)(1)

and deem those facts admitted. Proceeding in this way is

consistent with the well accepted view that “a district court does

not have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual

dispute.” See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that it would be “unfair” to the

district court to require it “to search the entire record” if a

party fails to “disclose where in the record the evidence for [the

factual claims] can be found”)). 

II. Title VII Discrimination Claims

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), a party is entitled to

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving party

bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine

issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d

1029, 1035 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). “Once the moving

party meets its initial burden, . . . , the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided

in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This

“[e]vidence must be concrete and cannot rely on mere speculation,

conjecture, or fantasy.” Bates v. Clark County, 2006 WL 3308214,

at * 2 (D.Nev. Nov. 13, 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Similarly, a mere scintilla of evidence is not

sufficient “to defeat a properly supported motion for summary

judgment; instead, the nonmoving party must introduce some

‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” 

Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 252). Thus, in

opposing a summary judgment motion it is not enough to simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986) (citations omitted).

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a “genuine issue for trial,” the court

must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in h[er] favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). “Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn.” Yang v. Peoples Benefit Ins. Co., 2007 WL

1555749, at *7 (E.D.Cal. May 25, 2007) (citations omitted).

On a summary judgment motion, the court may not make

credibility determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting evidence.

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the Supreme

Court, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion is

whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

In the employment discrimination context, the Ninth Circuit

has stressed that “[a] plaintiff . . . need produce very little

evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary

judgment.” Team Electric, 520 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

B. Disparate Treatment

Under Title VII it is “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(West 2003) (emphasis added). In her complaint plaintiff Huynh

alleges two counts of discrimination - one based upon her race -

Asian - and the other based upon her gender - female. Because

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these claims mirror each other, the court will jointly analyze

them.

What is implicit in her complaint, that plaintiff is claiming

disparate treatment, she makes explicit in her response. See Resp.

(doc. 46) at 7. “A person suffers disparate treatment in h[er]

employment when . . . she is singled out and treated less favorably

than others similarly situated on account of a protected

characteristic.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d

1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff

must ‘prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to

discriminate.’” Rutenschroer v. Starr Seigle Communications, Inc.,

484 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1151 (D.Hawai’i 2006) (quoting Costa v. Desert

Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (other citation

omitted). 

Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment claims are subject

to the by now familiar three step burden shifting analysis of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “Under this

framework, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination[.]” Surrell v. California Waterservice Co., 518 F.3d

1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008)(citation omitted). Alternatively, “[a]

plaintiff may . . . proceed by simply producing direct or

circumstantial evidence that a discriminatory reason more likely

than not motivated the employer.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). In the present case, plaintiff declares

that she “has direct evidence of discrimination[,]” but nowhere

does she identify that evidence. Resp. (doc. 46) at 7. Instead,

as did JPMC, she employs the McDonnell Douglas framework. 

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Consequently, in its analysis the court, too, will apply that

burden shifting framework. 

C. Prima Facie Case

As the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated, to establish a prima

facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she belongs to a protected class; 

(2) she was qualified for her position; 

(3) she was subject to an adverse employment 

action; and 

(4) similarly situated individuals

outside her protected class were treated more

favorably.

Davis. v. Team Electric Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). JPMC expressly concedes that plaintiff, an

Asian female, is a member of a “protected class[.]” Mot. (doc. 43)

at 9. JPMC does not, however, mention the second prima facie

element - whether plaintiff is qualified. For purposes of this

motion only, the court will assume that JPMC is conceding that

plaintiff has met this element as well. In contrast, JPMC

unequivocally asserts that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case of discrimination because she cannot satisfy the third element

– that she was subjected to an adverse employment action. Nor,

JPMC contends, can plaintiff show that there were other similarly

situated individuals, outside her protected class, i.e. who were

not female and Asian, who were treated more favorably than her. 

Accordingly, the court will confine its analysis of a prima facie

case to these two challenged elements. 

1. Scope of Claims

Before doing so, for two reasons, it is necessary to clarify

the scope of plaintiff’s claims. First, JPMC interprets

plaintiff’s response as attempting to impermissibly expand the

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scope of her recovery to include claims for her termination and for

her unsuccessful attempts to transfer to other positions within

JPMC. Second, plaintiff mentions retaliation and includes an EEOC

Charge, filed on February 8, 2006, wherein she expressly states her

“belie[f] that she was “retaliated against for filing a prior

charge of discrimination with the [EEOC].” PSOF (doc. 47), exh. 9

(doc. 47-3) thereto at 24. It is therefore possible to construe

plaintiff’s response as seeking to recover for unlawful retaliation

as well. The court will consider seriatim whether these additional

claims are properly before it. 

a. Termination and Transfer

JPMC’s argument that plaintiff is impermissibly seeking to

expand the scope of her claims is two-fold. First, JPMC asserts

that plaintiff did not file an EEOC Charge pertaining to either her

termination or her attempts at internal transfers. Second, JPMC

argues that those “alleged events occurred on or before July

2006[,]” and thus are time barred. Resp. (doc. 49) at 2.

 An extremely generous reading of plaintiff’s response could

lead to the conclusion, as did JPMC, that she is seeking to recover

for her termination. See Resp. (doc. 46) at 6 (citations omitted). 

The same does not hold true, however, concerning alleged transfer

denials. 

As support for its view that plaintiff is trying to proceed on

the theory that “she sought a transfer to other positions for which

less qualified white male[s] . . . were hired[,]” JPMC cites to a

portion of its letter in response to the February 8, 2006, EEOC

Charge. See Reply (doc. 49) at 2 (citation omitted). What the

quoted part of that letter actually states, though, is that during

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the 60 day notice period, plaintiff “may apply for other positions

within JPMC.” PSOF (doc. 47) at 12, ¶ 59 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). There is no mention in the cited reference

of plaintiff seeking a transfer “to other positions for which less

qualified white male[s] . . . were hired.” See id. Thus, although

it is possible to construe plaintiff’s Response as seeking to

recover for her termination, that Response does not encompass a

“transfer” claim. That, combined with the fact that the complaint

does not allege any transfer denials compels a finding that

transfers are beyond the scope of this action. 

I. Exhaustion

As previously noted, JPMC is taking the position that

plaintiff cannot pursue a termination claim because she did not

file an EEOC Charge in that regard. Blurring the distinction

between subject matter jurisdiction and the statute of limitations,

JPMC does not explicitly mention exhaustion. Implicit in JPMC’s

argument, however, is that because plaintiff did not file such a

charge, she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. 

Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any

termination claim.

“To establish subject matter jurisdiction over h[er] Title VII

. . . claim[s], [plaintiff] must have exhausted h[er]

administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC.” 

See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.

2003) (footnote omitted). “Subject matter jurisdiction extends to

all claims of discrimination that fall within the scope of the

EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Id. (footnote

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and citation omitted). “In determining whether the exhaustion

requirement has been satisfied, the court may consider such factors

as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of discriminatory

acts specified within the charge, and any locations at which

discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Oshilaja v.

Watterson, 2007 WL 2903029, at *5 (D.Ariz. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “When examining these

factors, the Ninth Circuit deems ‘[t]he crucial element of a charge

of discrimination’ to be ‘the factual statement contained

therein.’” Id. (quoting Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District,

291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In the present case, plaintiff filed her first EEOC Charge on

July 20, 2005. DSOF, exh. 7 (doc. 44-5) thereto at 38; and PSOF,

exh. 8 (doc. 47-3) thereto at 22. Termination is not mentioned

anywhere in that Charge. Indeed, because the date of that Charge

is July 20, 2005, and plaintiff’s termination was not until almost

a year later, on July 9, 2006, it would have been impossible for

that termination to have been within the purview of the first EEOC

Charge. Put differently, an EEOC investigation of plaintiff’s

first Charge could not “reasonably be expected” to include her

termination. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 645 (“The EEOC could not

have investigated that incident because it had not yet happened at

the time the EEOC was conducting its investigation.”) Thus,

“[b]ecause [plaintiff] did not present the legal theory of unlawful

[termination], and the operative facts regarding this part of h[er]

claim were not related to the facts in the [first] EEOC charge,

[s]he did not exhaust h[er] administrative remedies.” Id.

(footnote and citation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent she

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4 Plaintiff did not even allege in a conclusory form that she exhausted

her administrative remedies in terms of this particular EEOC Charge. Instead, she

alleges that she filed an EEOC Charge on July 20, 2005, and that she “received a

Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue on or about October 7, 2005.” See Co. (Doc.

1) at 5, ¶ 17. Plaintiff did not attach to her complaint either that Charge or the

resultant Right to Sue Notice, which would have been preferable. Regardless,

partially because in its answer JPMC explicitly “states that the EEOC issued a

Dismissal and Right to Sue dated October 5, 2005[,]” Answer (doc. 9) at 3, ¶ 17,

and because JPMC is not asserting failure to exhaust with respect to claims arising

from the first EEOC charge, the court will overlook plaintiff’s manner of pleading

exhaustion in terms of the first EEOC Charge.

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now is attempting to recover for unlawful termination, plaintiff

Huynh did not exhaust her administrative remedies. The court is

thus without subject matter jurisdiction to consider such a claim. 

See id. Given the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, there is no

need to address JPMC’s further contention that this termination

claim is time barred. 

For slightly different reasons, the court also lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim that she was

retaliated against for filing her first EEOC Charge. The complaint

references only the July 20, 2005, EEOC Charge.4 Co. (doc. 1) at

5, ¶ 17. Significantly, in that Charge, in the box entitled

“DISCRIMINATION BASED ON[,]” which instructs “Check appropriate

box(es)[,]” plaintiff only checked the “RACE” and “SEX” boxes. 

DOSF (doc. 44), exh. 7 thereto (doc. 44-5) at 38. Despite the fact

that there is a box specifically labeled, “RETALIATION,” plaintiff

did not check that box, although she did in her second EEOC Charge. 

Compare id. with PSOF (doc. 47), exh. 9 thereto (doc. 47-3) at 24. 

For that reason, among others, the court must decide whether this

retaliation claim is reasonably related to plaintiff’s first EEOC

Charge. 

Two reasons compel a finding that plaintiff did not exhaust

her administrative remedies with respect to retaliation, and hence

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the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider

this particular claim. First, as just noted, in the first EEOC

Charge, which is the only one plaintiff mentions in her complaint,

she did not check the box marked “RETALIATION[.]” Likewise, the

factual statement in that first Charge does not mention

retaliation; nor does it include any operative facts which would

alert the EEOC that plaintiff is arguing retaliation in violation

of Title VII. See Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.

1981) (an EEOC charge must alert the agency to the legal theory

being pursued and the operative facts in relation thereto). 

Second, based upon the statement of “PARTICULARS” in the

second EEOC Charge, it appears that the alleged retaliation took

the form of plaintiff receiving a less than favorable job

performance rating. That rating was not issued until February 1,

2006, however – well after the July 20, 2005, filing date of the

first EEOC Charge. See PSOF, exh. 9 (doc. 47-3) thereto at 24. 

Therefore, this purported retaliation “did not occur within the

time frame of the events alleged in the [first] EEOC charge.” See

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 645. As a result, “[a] reasonable

investigation by the EEOC” of plaintiff Huynh’s first Charge “would

not have encompassed these allegedly retaliatory acts.” See id.

Similarly, as with plaintiff’s termination claim, the EEOC could

not have investigated this alleged retaliation when it was

conducting its investigation of the first Charge because that

“retaliation” had not yet occurred when the EEOC was conducting its

first investigation. See id. For these reasons, the court also

finds that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies

insofar as she is claiming that JPMC retaliated against her for

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filing her first EEOC Charge. In sum, the court finds that

plaintiff’s claims for termination and retaliation arising from the

filing of her first EEOC Charge are not properly before it due to

her failure to exhaust. With that clarification, the court will

next examine whether plaintiff has shown an adverse employment

action – the third element of a prima facie disparate treatment

claim. 

2. “Adverse Employment Action”

 In her complaint plaintiff alleges that she was “the only

female and only minority amongst her immediate peers [who] was

demoted” from a Vice President to a Network Engineer as a result of

the merger. Co. (doc. 1) at 3, ¶ 12. Further, plaintiff alleges

that she was not qualified to be a Network Engineer; and when she

sought training for that position, it was denied, even though

others were provided with that same training. See id. at 4, ¶ 13. 

Additionally, plaintiff claims that she was “denied . . . tangible

employments benefits that were provided to her peers,” such as a

corporate credit card and tuition reimbursement. See id. at 6, ¶

24. In a similar vein, plaintiff alleges that she “observed that

her peers . . . were not required to pay for business travel

expenses out of their own pocket[s][,]” yet she was. Id. at 4, ¶

14. Plaintiff also alleges that she was “denied access to

management[.]” Id. at 4, ¶ 15. JPMC contends that none of those

acts “adversely effect[ed] the terms, conditions, or benefits of

Plaintiff’s employment.” Mot. (doc. 43) at 10. Hence, plaintiff

cannot make out a prima face case of disparate treatment. 

Plaintiff counters that the acts enumerated above all easily

fit with the Ninth Circuit’s “expansive view of . . . ‘adverse

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employment action[s][.]’” Resp. (doc. 46) at 9 (citations omitted). 

Additionally, plaintiff recites a litany of other acts, most of

which are not in her complaint, which she also believes constitute

“adverse employment actions” because they were “changes in the

terms, conditions and privileges of [her] employment” post-merger. 

See id. at 10-11. Therefore, from plaintiff’s standpoint, she

easily satisfies the “adverse employment action” element.

JPMC retorts that in arguing for an “expansive definition” of

“adverse employment action,” plaintiff is “confus[ing] the

prerequisites of a prima facie case of retaliation with those [of]

a prima facie case of discrimination.” Reply (doc. 49) at 3

(footnote omitted). Comparatively, the definition of adverse

employment action is broader under Title VII’s anti-retaliation

provision than it is under the substantive (status-based) antidiscrimination provision of that statute. See Burlington N. &

S.F.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (a plaintiff invoking Title VII’s

anti-retaliation provision “must show that a reasonable employee

would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in

this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination[]”). Despite

that, as will be seen, it does not necessarily follow, as JPMC

urges, that none of JPMC’s alleged conduct amounts to an adverse

employment action.

In Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d

840 (9th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff alleged discrimination in

violation of Title VII based on his race and ethnicity; he did not

rely on the anti-retaliation provision of that Act. Nonetheless,

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Ninth Circuit reiterated that it “define[s] ‘adverse employment

action’ broadly.” Id. at 847 (citations omitted). “[A]n adverse

employment action is one that ‘materially affect[s] the

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of . . .

employment.” Team Electric, 520 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The broad scope of that definition

is evidenced by the fact that adverse employment actions can take

many and varied forms. Representative examples, as identified by

the Fonseca Court, are “where an employer’s action negatively

affects its employee’s compensation.” Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 847

(citations omitted). “A warning letter or negative review also can

be considered an adverse employment action.” Id. (citation

omitted). Similarly, the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), explained that an adverse,

“tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in

employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a

decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 761

(citing cases). Keeping these principles firmly in mind, the court

will separately consider whether any of the acts of which plaintiff

complains can be deemed adverse employment actions. 

a. “Demotion”

JPMC readily acknowledges that plaintiff’s “job title and

officer title changed as a result of [the] corporate merger.” Mot.

(doc. 43) at 10 (citation omitted). However, JPMC maintains that 

plaintiff’s “salary, benefits, and job function remained

essentially the same[,]” accordingly, her reclassification was not

an adverse employment action. See id. (citations omitted). 

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Plaintiff counters that because her “new position was a nonmanagerial, non-officer position for which [she] had no knowledge,

experience, or training, and for which she was not qualified[,]”

she has shown an “adverse employment action.” Resp. (doc. 46) at

8-9 (citations omitted). 

Based upon the record as presently constituted, there is no

dispute that plaintiff’s salary and benefits did not change, even

after her title did. A JPMC Vice President expressly declared that

after plaintiff’s reclassification, her “salary and benefits

remained the same.” DSOF, exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton

Decl’n) at 4, ¶ 19. Plaintiff is silent as to whether or not her

salary and benefits remained the same. Presumably then, plaintiff

is not disputing this point. In any event, she has not

“designate[d] specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial[]” in terms of her compensation and benefits. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added). Consequently, plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment on

this basis. 

Plaintiff thus is left with her argument, albeit implicit,

that due to changed job responsibilities, she has shown an adverse

employment action because the “terms and conditions of her

employment” were “materially affected” upon her reclassification. 

As noted above, JPMC asserts that there was no such change and that

her “job function remained essentially the same[.]” Mot. (doc. 43)

at 10 (citing DSOF (doc. 44) at ¶ 20). Significantly, the cited

reference does not mention plaintiff’s job functions. This is a

critical omission. 

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JPMC, as the party seeking summary judgment always bears the

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party

fails to discharge that initial burden, summary judgment must be

denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s

evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60, 90

S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). JPMC has not met its initial

burden in terms of whether plaintiff’s job reclassification

amounted to an adverse employment action. In contrast to salary

and benefits, JPMC has not pointed to any record proof to support

its view that plaintiff’s job responsibilities “remained

essentially the same” upon her reclassification. See Mot. (doc.

43) at 10 (citation omitted). This statement of counsel,

unsupported by record proof, is not a sufficient basis upon which

to grant summary judgment. See Smith v. Mack Trucks, 505 F.2d

1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Statements of counsel, whether in

legal memoranda or elsewhere, are not evidence and may not be

relied on to either support or defeat a motion for summary

judgment.”) 

“[R]eassignment with significantly different responsibilities”

can constitute an adverse employment action. Tudor Delcey v. ADec, Inc., 2008 WL 123855, at *8 (D.Or. 2008) (quoting, inter alia,

Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761). Accordingly, because JPMC did

not meet its initial burden of showing that plaintiff’s job

responsibilities “remained essentially the same,” summary judgment

is not proper as to this alleged form of adverse employment action. 

Further, at this juncture plaintiff can also rely upon the loss of

her Vice President title to bolster her argument that her

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reclassification is tantamount to an adverse employment action. 

See Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th

Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (“A materially adverse change might be

indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a

decrease in wage or salary, less distinguished title, a material

loss of benefits, significantly diminished material

responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a

particular situation.”); see also Acosta, 2006 WL 3499963, at *9

(“[a]lthough he apparently continued to receive the same salary[,]”

plaintiff made a prima facie showing, defeating summary judgment,

that his transfer was an adverse employment action where he was

“demoted from his status as a trades helper[]”). On the other

hand, as will soon become evident, there is merit to JPMC’s

argument that the remaining acts are not adverse employment actions

for purposes of imposing Title VII liability.

b. Training

Plaintiff declares that she “requested technical training for

her new position and was nearly entirely denied any training while

her colleagues in the same position were consistently provided

training.” Resp. (doc. 46) at 10. This argument is deficient in

two ways. First, it is wholly unsubstantiated. Second, the

undisputed facts belie plaintiff’s version of events. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that on July 21, 2005, several months

after being informed of her new job title, she was notified of six

upcoming training sessions. DSOF (doc. 44) at 11, ¶ 63 (citing

exh. 1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 258:19-259:8). 

Somewhat inconsistently, plaintiff testified that she did not

recall attending five of those sessions, but that she “was trying

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5 JPMC further contends that nine other training classes were “made

available to Plaintiff.” DSOF (doc. 44) at 12, ¶ 64 (citation omitted). The court

is disregarding this contention, however, because the cited excerpt from

plaintiff’s deposition is not supportive.

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to attend as many as [she] could.” Id., exh. 1 (doc. 44-2) thereto

(Huynh Dep’n) at 259:23-24. Plaintiff candidly offered that

“sometimes” she had “scheduling conflicts” so she could not always

attend these offered training sessions. Id. at 259:24-25.

Plaintiff also requested and received approval to attend

another training session. DSOF (doc. 44) at 12, ¶ 65 (citing exh.

1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 286:6-287:20). She decided

not to attend that particular session, however, because at the time

she was not working on any projects using the technology which was

to be the subject of that training.5 Id. (citing exh. 1 (doc. 44-

2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 286:12-287:4). 

Besides those formal training sessions, Huynh’s immediate

supervisor “attempt[ed] to assign [her] projects to . . . help her

learn the engineering and technical aspects of her new role[]” as

Network Engineer. Id., exh. 5 (doc. 44-5) thereto (Bauer Decl’n)

at 16, ¶ 24. Plaintiff “did not perform th[o]se tasks[]” though

and so did not avail herself of the learning opportunities which

they presented. Id. at 16, ¶ 26. Consistent with the foregoing 

plaintiff readily agreed that she probably mentioned to her

supervisor and to her mentor that she had “no desire to be a

technician[,]” and that she had “no desire to learn to succeed as a

technician or to acquire those skill sets[.]” Id., exh. 1 (doc.

44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 159:12-17; and at 160:5-11. Indeed,

plaintiff opined to her supervisor that it did not “make sense”

financially for JPMC to “basically educate a nontechnical person

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[such as her] to become technical[.]” Id., exh. 1 (doc. 44-2)

thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 254:17-20. 

Given these undisputed facts, plaintiff cannot survive summary

judgment by relying upon the conclusory statement that she was

“nearly entirely denied any training[.]” See Resp. (doc. 46) at

10. Plaintiff’s response does not include any cites to the record

to support this bald assertion. And while her SOF does include

cites, close scrutiny of the cited portions of the record reveal

that those cites do not corroborate that plaintiff was denied

training. The thrust of the cited testimony is that plaintiff had

to ask for training, not that she was denied training. See, e.g.,

DSOF, exh. 1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 290:19-23; and

217:15-17. Even construing the record cites in a light most

favorable to plaintiff, she has not created a genuine issue of

material fact in terms of whether she was denied training. 

Therefore, plaintiff cannot establish an adverse employment action 

based on her unsubstantiated allegation that she was denied

training.

Furthermore, plaintiff has not pointed to any record evidence 

even hinting that “colleagues in the same position were

consistently provided training[]” while she was not. See Resp.

(doc. 46) at 10. The record cites in PSOF do not mention

colleagues. This omission is significant. See Herr v. Airborne

Freight Corp., 130 F.3d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff

alleging, inter alia, inadequate training did not make out prima

facie case of gender discrimination where she “presented no

evidence that any other probationary driver received more

training[]”). The court is thus left with the facts outlined above

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showing that plaintiff was offered training opportunities, many of

which she did not avail herself. Plainly this does not amount to

an adverse employment action, regardless of how broadly defined. 

See Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 979 (7th Cir.

2004) (“insufficient evidence” that female supervisor employee was

subjected to an adverse employment action due to inadequate

training where although another supervisor “received eleven more

hours of formal training” than did plaintiff, she “received at

least three-to-four weeks of informal training[,]” and was

“introduced” to an “experienced supervisor” with whom she could

consult with “problems”). 

c. Corporate Credit Card & Travel Expense

Reimbursement

Plaintiff alleges that JPMC was “unwilling[] to provide her

with a corporate credit card[]” while she “observed that her peers

had” one. Co. (doc. 1) at 4, ¶ 14. This is not an “adverse

employment action,” JPMC contends, because in the first instance

plaintiff was not denied a credit card. Rather, there was some

delay, which plaintiff rectified, in having her card reinstated

after the credit card company had deemed it inactive. Thus, it is

JPMC’s position that “[n]either the terms nor conditions of

Plaintiff’s employment were adversely affected by the delay in her

receipt of a corporate credit card.” Mot. (doc. 43) at 11. JPMC’s

position is well-taken. 

In July 2005, when plaintiff filed her first EEOC charge, JPMC

first became aware that she was having difficulty obtaining a

corporate credit card. DSOF, exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton

Decl’n) at 10, ¶¶ 53-54. That difficulty “stemmed from the fact

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that [plaintiff] had previously been issued [such] a credit card

that was cancelled due to non-use.” Id. (doc. 44-4) at 15, ¶ 55;

see also DSOF, exh. 1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 135: 12-

18. Plaintiff resolved that difficulty by directly contacting the

credit card company which reinstated her card. DSOF, exh. 1 (doc.

44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 135:15-136:l. 25; see also id., exh.

1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 135:19-21. 

In the meantime, when plaintiff’s immediate supervisor learned

of this, he “obtained permission to place [plaintiff’s] business

travel expenses on [his] corporate credit card so that [she] would

not have to pay out of pocket for her business travel expenses.” 

Id., exh. 5 (doc. 44-5) thereto (Bauer Decl’n) at 18, ¶ 36. 

According to plaintiff, still, she had to pay out-of-pocket for

business travel expenses other than her airfare and accommodations. 

Id., exh. 1 (doc. 44-2) thereto (Huynh Dep’n) at 131:6-9. 

Plaintiff readily concedes, however, that she was reimbursed for

those out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 131:9-12. 

Further, plaintiff is only speculating that her “peers” did

not have to pay out-of-pocket for any of their business travel

expenses. See Co. (doc. 1) at 4, ¶ 14. She has not, for example,

identified even one “peer” who meets this criteria. “At this

summary judgment stage, plaintiff[] cannot rely upon mere

conclusory allegations in [her] complaint.” Mann v. GTCR Golder

Rauner, L.L.C., 483 F.Supp.2d 864, 869 n.5 (D.Ariz. 2007) (citation

omitted). Given these undisputed facts, the court finds that any

difficulties which plaintiff may have encountered in terms of her

corporate credit card did not, as a matter of law, “materially

affect” the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment. It

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necessarily follows, then, that plaintiff has not shown an adverse

employment action based upon her alleged denial of a corporate

credit card.

d. Tuition Reimbursement

Similarly unavailing is plaintiff’s assertion that she was

denied tuition reimbursement, which she “observed that her peers”

received, and this constitutes an adverse employment action. See

Co. (doc. 1) at 4, ¶ 14; and at 6, ¶ 24. After learning of this

supposed denial, JPMC investigated, discovering that “some of

[plaintiff’s] requests for tuition reimbursement had been forwarded

to a manager who was no longer with JPMC, thus, the requests went

unanswered.” DSOF, exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at

15, ¶ 56. Evidently those requests went unanswered because the

“new [JPMC] manager” was “not familiar with the [tuition

reimbursement] approval processes.” Id., exh. 5 (doc. 44-5)

thereto (Bauer Decl’n) at 18, ¶ 35. Ultimately, in accordance with

JPMC policy, plaintiff did receive tuition reimbursement however. 

Id., exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 16, ¶ 57. Based

upon this more fully developed record, plaintiff’s unsubstantiated

assertion that she was “denied . . . tuition reimbursement” simply

is unfounded. See PSOF (doc. 47), exh. 2 (doc. 47-3) thereto

(Huynh Aff.) at 3, ¶ 7 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, as with her credit card allegations, plaintiff

has not come forth with any evidence to corroborate her view that

“male colleagues were provided tuition reimbursement[]” while she

was not. Id. at 5, ¶ 21 (citing exh 1. (doc. 47-2) thereto (Huynh

Dep’n) at 243:20-244:6; and exh. 2 (doc. 47-3) thereto (Huynh Aff.)

at 2, ¶ 7). The cited portions of the record do not support that

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assertion. Without record support, this is nothing more than

counsel’s unsupported statement, which cannot defeat an otherwise

properly supported summary judgment motion. See Smith, 505 F.2d at

1249. Under these circumstances the court finds that to the extent

plaintiff’s tuition reimbursement was delayed, once again, it did

not “materially affect” the terms, conditions or privileges of her

employment. At most, this claimed delay was an administrative

mistake which JPMC rectified once it became aware of it. See Tudor

Delcey, 2008 WL 123855, at *9 (failure to implement a merit raise

is a change in benefits, but it was not an adverse employment

action given the evidence “show[ing] that it was an administrative

mistake that was rectified once [plaintiff] complained to her

manager[]”). 

e. Access to Senior Management

Apparently JPMC is moving for summary judgment based upon

plaintiff’s inability to show that a denial of access to management

is an adverse employment action. Originally JPMC did not analyze

that issue, however; instead, it simply listed that claimed denial

in summarizing plaintiff’s allegations. See Mot. (doc. 43) at 10. 

Plaintiff’s response does nothing more than repeat the unsupported

allegation that she “was denied access to senior management while

her male colleagues were given direct access[.]” Resp. (doc. 46) at

10; and at 4. Given the manner in which the parties have presented

this “denial of access” issue, the court is tempted to disregard

altogether this adverse employment action theory. But, to be

thorough, the court will briefly address this issue.

Obviously, JPMC did not meet its initial burden of showing an

absence of genuine issue of material fact as to this “denial of

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access” issue. Nonetheless, there is merit to JPMC’s contention in

its reply that “[p]laintiff’s vague allegations of exclusion are

insufficient to create an issue of fact for trial.” Reply (doc.

49) at 5. Again, plaintiff did not provide any cites to the

record, much less a cite showing a genuine issue of material fact. 

As in James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371 (4th Cir.

2004), plaintiff’s claim that she was denied access to senior

management “lacks specificity, and [s]he fails . . . to

substantiate how th[at] alleged [denial], . . . , adversely

affected h[er].” See id. at 377. Therefore, the court finds that

this alleged denial of access to management cannot support a

finding of an adverse employment action. 

f. Miscellaneous Acts

Understandably, initially JPMC confined its adverse employment

action argument to the conduct which plaintiff alleges in her first

EEOC Charge and echoes in her complaint. When plaintiff attempted

to defeat summary judgment by listing a host of other supposedly

adverse employment actions, JPMC replied by explaining the numerous

weaknesses in her contentions. It is unnecessary to address each

of JPMC’s numerous objections because whether framed in terms of

being “told by management to keep her ‘mouth shut[,]’” or in terms

of “not provid[ing] Plaintiff with a job description for her new

position,” plaintiff has not created a factual issue sufficient to

overcome summary judgment as to any of these acts. Adopting JPMC’s

reasoning, the court finds that whether viewed individually or

collectively, none of the acts which plaintiff found objectionable

rise to the level of an adverse employment action. See Reply (doc.

49) at 5-8. 

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Garity v. Potter, 2008 WL 872992 (D.Nev. 2008) is particularly

instructive in this regard. Similar to plaintiff Huynh, among

other things, the plaintiff in Garity alleged that she was

“‘berated’ in front of her fellow employees, that her supervisor

was rude to her, that she was deprived of receiving clear and

logical instructions” and that she was put in “no-win

situations[.]” Id. at *3. Based upon those allegations the court

found that “[w]hile Plaintiff’s . . . subjective experience [w]as 

. . . painful and difficult, allegations of unfriendly or rude

behavior and/or that she experienced a non-ideal work environment

[we]re insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial

discrimination under Title VII.” Id. at *4 (citing, inter alia,

Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747 (4th Cir. 2006)). The same is

true here. The conduct which plaintiff Huynh may find subjectively

offensive does not suffice to show an adverse employment action. 

Further, plaintiff is overlooking the fact that to come within the

ambit of an adverse employment action, the conduct must “materially

affect” such things as the terms and conditions of employment. It

is not enough that the challenged actions merely affect employment

in some relatively inconsequential way. Without in any way

intending to diminish plaintiff’s subjective experience, the court

agrees with the astute observation of several circuit courts that 

“not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable

adverse action.” See, e.g., Buboltz v. Residential Advantages,

Inc., 523 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437,

441 (7th Cir. 1996). 

In sum, although the definition of an adverse employment

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action is relatively broad, there must be some outer limits. Here,

with one exception, plaintiff has exceeded the scope of what can be

considered an adverse employment action. That exception is

plaintiff’s reclassification from a Vice President to a Network

Engineer. Because plaintiff is able to defeat summary judgment as

to this one form of adverse employment action (reclassification),

the court will shift its focus to whether plaintiff can show that

similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were

treated more favorably. If she cannot, as JPMC maintains, then

JPMC would be entitled to summary judgment.

3. Similarly Situated Individuals

Even if plaintiff is able to show, as she has, at least one

adverse employment action, JPMC contends that she cannot make out a

prima facie case because she “cannot identify similarly situated

individuals who received more favorable treatment.” Mot. (doc. 43)

at 12 (emphasis omitted). To satisfy this element, plaintiff Huynh

must prove that employees “‘with qualifications similar to [hers]

were treated more favorably[]’” than she was. See Oshilaja, 2007

WL 2903029, at *11 (citing Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)). This showing “does not require that

the employees be identically situated.” Bowden v. Potter, 308

F.Supp.2d 1108, 1117 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (emphasis in original). 

Rather, what must be shown is that an employee is “‘similarly

situated in all material respects – not in all respects.’” Id. at

1116 (quoting McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall 263 F.3d 34, 53 (2d

 Cir.

2000))(emphasis in original). Thus, despite JPMC’s contrary

assertion, “[t]he employees need not necessarily have the same

supervisor, be subject to the same standards, and engage in the

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same conduct.” Id. at 1117. “The relevance of such factors

depends on the circumstances and nature of the case.” Id. As the

foregoing makes clear, “[t]he issue of similarly situated status is

. . . fact specific and defies a mechanical or formulaic approach.” 

Id. 

JPMC notes that in her deposition plaintiff identified three,

sometimes four, individuals whom she claims were similarly

situated, but were treated more favorably then she. Mot. (doc. 43)

at 12 (citing DSOF (doc. 44) at ¶¶ 3 and 4 (citations omitted)). 

In opposing JPMC’s motion, however, plaintiff explicitly asserts

that “[i]n all material respects,” she was only “similarly situated

to Peterson and Hillman [two of her colleagues] prior to the

[m]erger[.]” Resp. (doc. 46) at 12. Accordingly, the court will

confine its similarly situated inquiry to those two individuals. 

JPMC maintains that prior to the merger neither Peterson nor

Hillman were similarly situated to plaintiff because they had

skills, knowledge, training, and experience which plaintiff did not

have. It is those differences, JPMC maintains, which resulted in

Peterson and Hillman retaining their Vice President titles after

the merger while plaintiff did not. 

As noted earlier, one result of the merger was that the

department in which plaintiff had been working pre-merger was

subsumed in another department. Ms. McClung had an integral role

in the reclassification of personnel which took place as part of

that department merger. She “had final approval of job titles and

assignments and [she] had input over who was assigned to various

positions and roles within [her] department.” DSOF, exh. 6 (doc.

44-5) thereto (McClung Decl’n) at 30, ¶ 6. Given those

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responsibilities, Ms. McClung had “personal knowledge of the

reasons why” Ms. Peterson and Mr. Hillman, among others, “were

assigned to the job titles and functions which they were . . . 

following the merger.” Id. at 32, ¶ 17. 

Like plaintiff, Ms. Peterson was “a project/product manager”

prior to the merger; but after the merger, unlike plaintiff, she

“kept her former title of Vice President[.]” Id. at 33, ¶¶ 34 and

35. From Ms. McClung’s perspective, “[t]he employees in [her]

department are required to have technical and engineering

knowledge[.]” Id. at 30, ¶ 10. Someone who does not “know how

products work, how they can be supported, or how they are

installed[,]” is not, in Ms. McClung’s opinion, “qualified to make

decisions about what equipment and products are best for the

organization.” Id. at 31, ¶ 10. 

Elaborating upon Ms. Peterson’s technical knowledge, Ms.

McClung explained that unlike plaintiff, prior to the merger Ms.

Peterson took “it upon herself to learn the technical and

engineering aspects of audio and video equipment.” Id. at 34, ¶ 36. 

Therefore, although both Ms. Peterson and plaintiff worked with

vendors prior to the merger, in contrast to plaintiff, Ms. Peterson

actually “knew how the products worked.” See id. Ms. Peterson’s

knowledge of “technical fundamentals of the equipment[]” became

evident to Ms. McClung from conversations she had with Ms.

Peterson. See id. at 34, ¶ 37. In sharp contrast, plaintiff “made

it very clear to” Ms. McClung that plaintiff “was not familiar with

the technical or engineering aspects of the equipment that she

worked with in her . . . role” prior to the merger. Id. at 30, ¶

9. 

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Ms. McClung’s assessment of Ms. Peterson technical knowledge

was confirmed by speaking with an outside vendor’s employees who

“spoke highly of Peterson and [her] knowledge and skills.” Id. at

34, ¶ 37. Ms. Peterson had what Ms. McClung describes as “strong

technical skills and she was rated a higher level engineer than

[plaintiff] because Peterson had multiple levels of technical

competency.” Id. at 34, ¶ 38. Therefore, because “technical and

engineering skills are very important within the Global Voice

Department,” Ms. McClung explains that Ms. Peterson “was given a

job tile that carried with it the officer title of Vice President.” 

Id. Succinctly put, as the foregoing shows, Ms. Peterson retained

her Vice President title because she had technical knowledge which

plaintiff did not. 

Likewise, according to Ms. McClung, Mr. Hillman, who works in

the United Kingdom, “was given the title of Infrastructure

Director, which had an officer title of Vice President, because of

his experience and superior technical skills[.]” Id. at 35, ¶ 46. 

Ms. McClung describes Mr. Hillman as a “highly technical

individual[.]” Id. at 34, ¶ 41. Indeed, Mr. Hillman “is regarded

as a driving force in the technology industry, especially within

the Polycom users group in the United States and in Europe, the

Middle East, and Africa.” Id. This can be seen from the fact that

Hillman “is a former President and current Vice President of a

Polycom User’s Group in the United Kingdom.” Id. at 35, ¶ 43. 

Additionally, Ms. McClung had “heard good feedback about Hillman

from his peers, and he was known at the executive level” of the

JPMC entity as it existed prior to the merger.” Id. at 35, ¶ 44. 

Plaintiff had none of these attributes. She was “not well-known”

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to those executives, “and she [wa]s not a well-known figure within

the Polycom industry.” Id. at 35, ¶ 45. Nor, as previously

discussed, did plaintiff have technical experience, much less being

considered “a driving force in the technology industry[.]” See id.

at 34, ¶ 41. 

Despite the foregoing, plaintiff steadfastly maintains that

she, Ms. Peterson and Mr. Hillman were similarly situated prior to

the merger. From plaintiff’s viewpoint, those similarities are as

follows. She, Ms. Peterson, and Mr. Hillman all had the same

title, Vice President, and were all “Officers of the Company[.]” 

Resp. (doc. 46) at 12. Purportedly all three also “managed other

employees;” and “were paid base salaries plus year-ending

bonuses[.]” Id. Other similarities, according to plaintiff, are

that “all three oversaw Defendants’ audio - and videoconferencing

functions throughout the world; and all . . . had been promoted to

their respective Vice President positions based on prior employment

with the Defendant.” Id. 

There are several flaws in plaintiff’s argument. The first

and perhaps most fundamental flaw is that plaintiff did not provide

cites to the record to support these claimed similarities. This

“absence of cites to the record is fatal to plaintiff[’s]

opposition.” See Mann, 483 F.Supp.2d at 872-873. “At the very

least, as the party opposing summary judgment, plaintiff[] must

‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 873 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct.

2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265) (emphasis added by Mann court). 

“Plaintiff[] cannot defeat this summary judgment motion by relying

upon blanket, unsupported assertions or declarations in their

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opposing memorandum of law.” Id. (citing Mack Trucks, 505 F.2d at 

1249 (“[A] [l]egal memorand[um] . . . , in the summary-judgment

context, [is] not evidence, and do[es] not create issues of fact

capable of defeating an otherwise valid motion for summary

judgment.”)) “That is so in part because ‘the arguments and

statements of counsel are not evidence and do not create issues of

material fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid motion for

summary judgment.’” Id. (quoting Barcamerica Intern. v. Tyfield

Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 593 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, it is the

nonmoving party’s obligation, not the court’s, “‘to identify with

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary

judgment.’” Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 483 F.Supp.2d 884,

891 (D.Ariz. 2007) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279

(9th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff Huynh has not fulfilled that

obligation. 

Assuming arguendo that the record evidence supports these

claimed similarities, nevertheless, plaintiff cannot defeat JPMC’s

motion because she has not made out a prima facie case of disparate

treatment. JPMC has submitted undisputed evidence that Hillman and

Peterson were not similarly situated to plaintiff Huynh in that

they both had technical skills, knowledge and experience which she

did not. Plaintiff did not even attempt to show that she was

similarly situated in that critical “material respect.” Indeed,

plaintiff would be hard pressed to do so given her stance all along

that she was not qualified for her reclassified position as a

Network Engineer because of her lack of technical and engineering

experience.

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Another flaw in plaintiff’s opposition is that she has not

shown that either Peterson or Hillman were “outside her protected

class,” i.e. Asian, in terms of race. According to JPMC, Ms.

Peterson is a “United States immigrant[,]” but it is impossible to

discern her race from that statement. DSOF (doc. 44), exh. 6 (doc.

44-5) thereto (McClung Decl’n) at 31, ¶ 15. Admittedly, neither

Hillman nor Peterson are Asian surnames, but that is not

necessarily determinative of their race. They could be adoptees;

and if so, they could be of Asian race, but have non-Asian

surnames. They also could be Asian and have taken non-Asian

surnames through marriage. Plainly the court is speculating, but

that is the point. Because the record is silent as to the race of

Hillman and Peterson, the court cannot engage in any meaningful

analysis in this regard. See Rutenschroer v. Starr Seigle

Communications, Inc., 484 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1156 (D.Hawai’i 2006)

(court could not “compare the treatment of similarly-situated nonblack employees” to African-American plaintiff because she did not

“present[] . . . specific evidence regarding the race or color of

the other employees[]”). What is more, the fact that Ms. Hillman,

who retained her Vice President title, is a female severely

undermines plaintiff’s assertion that plaintiff was reclassified to

a non-Vice President position because of her gender.

The court is cognizant that “whether two employees are

similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact.” Beck v.

United Food and Commercial Workers Union 506 F.3d 874, 885 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Where, as here, however, plaintiff

has not come forth with any evidence that similarly situated

individuals, i.e. persons with a similar lack of technical

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knowledge, skills and experience, were treated more favorably than

her, plaintiff cannot meet her minimum burden of establishing a

prima facie case of disparate treatment. See Leong v. Potter, 347

F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff failed to establish prima

facie case of Title VII discrimination because he did not provide

evidence that similarly situated individuals were treated more

favorably).

Until now the court has deliberately focused on plaintiff’s 

primary argument that she was similarly situated to Hillman and

Peterson prior to the merger, yet she was treated less favorably to

them after the merger. Plaintiff is also suggesting, though, that

after the merger she was treated less favorably than similarly

situated individuals. This argument fails as well. Plaintiff

states that JPMC “has conspicuously not stated . . . that Peterson

and Hillman were denied corporate credit cards, or tuition

reimbursement, or any other indicia of the Vice President and

officer positions[.]” Resp. (doc. 46) at 13). Plaintiff has it

backwards. It is her burden to show that after the merger there

were other similarly situated individuals, i.e. those in the

Network Engineer position, or who were otherwise similarly situated

to her in all material respects, who received those benefits. 

Clearly after the merger neither Hillman nor Peterson were

similarly situated to plaintiff in that they held different

positions than did plaintiff, and in the post-merger hierarchy,

they were at a managerial level, whereas plaintiff was not. See

Vasqez, 349 F.3d at 641 (footnote omitted) (“Employees in

supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be similarly

situated to lower level employees.”) Hence, whether or not Hillman

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and Peterson, who clearly were not similarly situated to plaintiff

after the merger, received benefits such as tuition reimbursement,

is irrelevant.

To be sure, “[t]he requisite degree of proof necessary to

establish a prima facie case for Title VII . . . claims on summary

judgment is minimal[.]” Team Electric, 520 F.3d at 1089 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Nonetheless, at the end of

the day plaintiff cannot overcome JPMC’s summary judgment motion on

the similarly situated element because the record is devoid of any

evidence that non-Asian, male employees with a similar lack of

technical experience received more favorable treatment than did

plaintiff. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1113 (9th Cir.

2002) (“A plaintiff’s failure to offer evidence establishing a

necessary element of his prima facie case will ordinarily be fatal

to his claim.”) What is more, as will be seen, even if plaintiff

established a prima facie case, she is unable to rebut JPMC’s

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not placing her in a Vice

President position post-merger.

D. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden

. . . shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory 

. . . conduct.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted). 

This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it involves no 

credibility assessment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citation omitted). 

Having found that plaintiff’s reclassification is the only

viable adverse employment action here, the court’s inquiry is

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narrow – can JPMC articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for reclassifying her from a Vice President to a Network

Engineer. See Chuang v. University of California Davis, 225 F.3d

1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)

(“Because the [plaintiffs] established a prima facie case for the

first two claims, the burden of production shifts to [defendant] to

articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for each adverse employment

action.”) As fully detailed in the declarations of several JPMC

employees, JPMC readily satisfies this burden. Namely, plaintiff’s

former position did not exist in the newly merged corporation; so,

she was reclassified to the position which most closely aligned

with her former job responsibilities – that of Network Engineer. 

DSOF, exh. 3 (doc. 44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 2-4, ¶¶ 8-18;

exh. 5 (doc. 44-5) thereto (Bauer Decl’n) at 1, ¶ 4; at 2, ¶¶ 5;

10-11; and at 3, ¶ 14; exh. 6 (doc. 44-5) thereto (McClung Decl’n)

at 30-31, ¶¶ 4-10; and at 35, ¶¶ 48-49. Indeed, the alternative to

reclassifying plaintiff was terminating her. Id., exh. 3 (doc. 44-

4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 9, ¶ 16; exh. 6 thereto (doc. 44-5)

(McClung Decl’n) at 35, ¶ 49.

An additional reason for plaintiff’s reclassification was her

“lack of technical training and experience[.]” Id., exh. 3 (doc.

44-4) thereto (Morton Decl’n) at 9, ¶ 17. Ms. Morton, who was part

of a team of managers who assessed plaintiff’s “Biography Form and

the job requirements of the available positions” within the merged

organization, opines that “it would not have been in the best

interest of the firm to assign [plaintiff] the job of managing

technical engineers when she did not personally have technical or

engineering experience.” Id. at 8, ¶ 14; and at 9, ¶ 17. Not only

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did plaintiff lack the requisite technical background, but she also

lacked the necessary management skills. Ms. Morton explains that

although in her “Biography Form, [plaintiff] indicated that she had

over 10 years of management experience[,] [u]pon closer

examination, [plaintiff] had not even been in the workforce for 10

years at that time[.]” Id. at 9, ¶ 18. Her “actual ‘management’

experience was limited to less than 5 years, and she primarily

managed outside vendors, not employees.” Id. Based upon the

foregoing, JPMC has met its burden of production. 

E. Pretext

“If the employer articulates a legitimate reason for its

action,” as JPMC has, “the presumption of discrimination drops out

of the picture, and the plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by

satisfying the usual standard of proof required . . . under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c).” See Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1106 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff proceeding on a

disparate treatment theory satisfies that burden by showing “that

the reason is pretextual either directly by persuading the court

that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence.” Team Electric, 520 F.3d at 1089 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). As to the

latter, an “employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of

credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not

believable[.]” Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

This Circuit has not yet “clearly resolved” the issue of

whether a plaintiff “must offer ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’

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6 Compare Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“[I]n the context of summary judgment, Title VII does not require a

disparate treatment plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to produce more,

or better, evidence than a plaintiff who relies on direct evidence.”) with

Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)

(circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive must “be both specific and

substantial”). 

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circumstantial evidence of pretext, or whether a lesser amount

should suffice.”6 Team Electric, 520 F.3d at 1091 (footnote

omitted). What is clear, however, is that a plaintiff “must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason asserted by the

defendant[]s is a mere pretext.” Community House, Inc. v. City of

Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). 

As part of plaintiff’s burden, JPMC indicates that she must

also show by a preponderance of the evidence that its reasons for

reclassifying her “are not true.” Mot. (doc. 43) at 16 (citation

omitted). The Ninth Circuit in Noyes expressly rejected this

“enhanced burden to show pretext[,]” however. Noyes, 488 F.3d at

1170. In so doing, it “reiterate[d] that at the summary judgment

stage, a plaintiff may raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

pretext via (1) direct evidence of the employer’s discriminatory

motive or (2) indirect evidence that undermines the credibility of

the employer’s articulated reasons.” Id. at 1170-71 (citations

omitted). Plaintiff Huynh has done neither. 

In the absence of any direct evidence of racial or gender

animus, plaintiff is attempting to establish pretext indirectly. 

Many of the incidents which plaintiff believes were adverse

employment actions also, from her viewpoint, are indirect evidence

of pretext. Plaintiff harkens back to her belief that she (1) was 

placed in a position for which she was not qualified; (2) not given

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a job description; (3) not trained; (4) told to “keep her mouth

shut[;]” and (4) “‘black list[ed]’” when she complain[ed][.]” Resp.

(doc. 46) at 15. After listing those purported actions by JPMC,

plaintiff declares that its “actions are internally inconsistent

with its proffered explanation and unworthy of credence.” Id. at

16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Assuming arguendo that all of the foregoing is properly

considered on this motion, nevertheless, plaintiff utterly fails to

explain how this proof is “internally inconsistent and unworthy of

credence.” See id. Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing

“mere pretext” simply by reciting the phrase “internally

inconsistent and unworthy of credence.” She must do more. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate how that conduct is “internally

inconsistent” with JPMC’s proffered reasons for reclassifying her,

or why it is “unworthy of credence.” Plaintiff has not done that. 

Indeed, plaintiff would be hard pressed to argue that JPMC’s

reasons for reclassifying her are “unworthy of credence” given that

she did not depose any of the JPMC employees whose declarations are

part of this record. Without some explanation from plaintiff, the

court is at a loss to see how the listed acts create a genuine

issue of fact as to pretext. 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s own subjective belief that she was

unqualified to be a Network Engineer does not create a factual

issue as to pretext. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104

F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n employee’s subject personal

judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of

material fact.”). This is all the more so given the ample

undisputed evidence discussed earlier showing that plaintiff was

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reclassified as a Network Engineer because that position was most

closely aligned with her job junctions prior to the merger. 

Plaintiff seems to suggest that the “revo[cation]” of her

“credit card privileges, which were enjoyed by [her] peers in her

new position,” and the “further revo[cation] [of] her tuition

reimbursement[]” also were “internally inconsistent” with JPMC’s

reasons for reclassifying her. See id. at 16 (citation omitted). 

Again, the court fails to see the asserted “internal

inconsistency.” 

In any event, this is a blatant misstatement of the facts. As

previously discussed, plaintiff’s credit card was not revoked; it

was placed on inactive status due to lack of use. No reasonable

trier of fact could draw an inference of discriminatory motive on

this record as it pertains to plaintiff’s access to a corporate

credit card. Additionally, plaintiff has not shown that her

“peers” had a credit card while she did not. This lack of proof

further undermines plaintiff’s theory that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her race and gender. 

Further, on the record as developed there is absolutely no

basis for plaintiff’s statement that her tuition was revoked. 

Rather, as already explained, plaintiff’s request for tuition

reimbursement was not timely processed due to the new manager’s

unfamiliarity with the approval process. As with the corporate

credit card, no reasonable inference of discriminatory motive can

be drawn from this record with respect to tuition reimbursement. 

While “the burden on [a] plaintiff[] to raise a triable issue

of fact as to pretext is hardly an onerous one[,]” plaintiff Huynh

has not met even that relatively minimal burden. See Noyes, 488

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F.3d at 1170 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). She

has pointed to nothing indicating that her reclassification

improperly stems from her race or her gender, as opposed to her

lack of qualifications. The inferential leap which plaintiff urges

this court to make is simply too great. At best, plaintiff is left

with her own “uncorroborated and self-serving” statements as to

JPMC’s discriminatory motive; “without more,” those statements

“will not create a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment.” See Mann, 483 F.Supp.2d at 890. Simply put,

plaintiff has not satisfied her ultimate burden of persuasion; no 

reasonable trier of fact could draw an inference of racial or

gender discrimination on this record. 

III. Motion to Strike Affidavit of Cinyi Wang

In a last ditch effort to create a fact issue regarding

pretext, plaintiff is attempting to rely upon what is colloquially

referred to as “me too” evidence. More specifically, plaintiff is

relying upon the affidavit of Cinyi Wang another Asian female who

prior to the merger also held a Vice President position. Ms. Wang,

in language strikingly similar to that in plaintiff’s affidavit,

avers that post-merger she was “stripped” of her Vice President

title; not provided with a job description for her new position;

“received no direction from [her] manager about her job duties and

responsibilities, and was not provided . . . performance reviews

that were provided to other employees[.]” PSOF (doc. 47), exh. 7

(doc. 47-3) thereto (Wang Aff.) at 20, ¶ 7. Ms. Wang further avers

that her training requests were denied, and that she sought intracompany transfers for positions where she believed her “skills

could be better utilized[,]” but was informed “that there were no

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7 That Rule provides that “if known,” the address and telephone number

of an individual identified thereunder must be provided. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(1)(A). 

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other positions available for [her] at [JPMC].” Id. at 20, ¶ 8. 

Ms. Wang was terminated on August 1, 2005. Id. at 20, ¶ 11. 

 JPMC contends that because plaintiff (1) did not timely

disclose Ms. Wang’s affidavit; (2) did not “properly disclose [h]er

as a witness[;]” and (3) because this affidavit is “confusing and

misleading[,]” the court should strike it. Mot. (doc. 48) at 1. 

Plaintiff maintains that she did properly disclose Ms. Wang and,

what is more, her affidavit “is relevant and non-prejudicial[.]”

Resp. (doc. 53) at 6. Therefore, the court should deny JPMC’s

motion to strike. 

A. Disclosure

JPMC indicates that plaintiff “never disclosed [Ms.] Wang in a

disclosure statement[.]” Mot. (doc. 48) at 2. As it turns out

though, Ms. Wang was disclosed, but not accurately. In her July

14, 2006, Initial Disclosure Statement, due to a “clerical error”

plaintiff identified “Lin Yi Wang[,]” not Cinyi Wang, as one of

several “individual[s] likely to have discoverable information[.]”

Resp. (doc. 53), exh. 1 thereto (doc. 53-2) at 3, ¶ 2. Clerical

errors aside, undeniably, that Statement did not include Ms. Wang’s

address or phone number, as Rule 26(a)(1) contemplates.7 Instead,

plaintiff indicated that Ms. Wang could be contacted “c/o” JPMC’s

law firm, and she provided that firm’s address and telephone

number. See id. 

In addition to plaintiff and Ms. Wang, in her Initial

Disclosure Statement, plaintiff identified seven other

“individual[s] like to have discoverable information.” Id. at 3-5,

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8 Basically that request directed plaintiff to produce all documents

relevant to any of the claims in her complaint, “including . . . all documents

concerning any communication with any other person concerning your claims[.]” Mot.

(doc. 48) at 2.

9 This similarly broad request directed plaintiff to “[p]roduce all

statements, . . . , obtained by you or your agent from any other person that are

in any way related to the allegations in your Complaint.” Mot. (doc. 48) at 2.

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¶¶ 3-9. Plaintiff’s description of their anticipated testimony is

virtually identical. Plaintiff generically stated that Ms. Wang,

like the other identified individuals, would testify regarding

“general working conditions. . . job benefits, . . . knowledge of

Plaintiff[.]” Id. at 3, ¶ 2. Significantly, no mention is made in

that summary that Ms. Wang also claims to have been discriminated

against by JPMC because she is an Asian woman. 

As part of the discovery process, JPMC served plaintiff with

interrogatories and a request for document production. When

plaintiff responded on October 2, 2006, she had not yet had any

contact with Ms. Wang. Nor at that juncture, plaintiff claims, did

she have any documents which were responsive to document requests 38

and 14.9 Therefore, during discovery the only mention of Ms. Wang

was in that Initial Disclosure Statement and at plaintiff’s

deposition. 

In particular, during her February 7, 2007, deposition, which

was continued on March 27, 2007, plaintiff “clarified” Ms. Wang’s

“actual name and identity[.]” Resp. (doc. 53) at 3. When directly

asked about the name “Lin Yi Wang” on her Initial Disclosure

Statement, plaintiff responded, “It should be . . . Cin Yi Wang, Ci-n–y-I.” Id. at 4. Additionally, plaintiff testified that Ms.

Wang was “the other Asian VP at Chase[,]” and that she “was treated

the same way” as plaintiff in that “she was stripped of her VP

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title and assigned clerical work.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 

March 30, 2007, was the court ordered deadline for non-expert

discovery. Doc. 17 at 2, ¶ 4. Two weeks later, on April 13, 2007,

Ms. Wang executed an affidavit “specifically for the purpose of

opposing [JPMC’s] anticipated motion for summary judgment.” Resp.

(doc. 53) at 5. Evidently JPMC was not made aware of that

affidavit, however, until June 18, 2007, when plaintiff filed it in

opposition to this summary judgment motion. 

JPMC claims “severe[] prejudice[]” if the court considers Ms.

Wang’s affidavit because, first, it has “not had the opportunity to

examine [her] regarding the allegations [there]in . . . or to

conduct discovery regarding the reasons for the employment

decisions that affected Wang.” Reply (doc. 56) at 3. Second,

although plaintiff indicated that Ms. Wang could be contacted “c/o”

JPMC’s law firm, JPMC states that “[d]espite the inquiry of [its]

counsel,” it was unable “to locate an employee or former employee

of [defendant] named ‘Lin Yi Wang.’” Id. at 2. Third, JPMC

objects because “plaintiff never disclosed that she intended to

offer any testimony by Wang or anyone else indicating that Wang

experienced race or sex discrimination as a result of conduct by

[JPMC].” Id. Fourth, even though plaintiff became aware at her

February, 2007 deposition (less than two months prior to the close

of non-expert discovery) that her prior disclosure regarding Ms.

Wang was not accurate, JPMC points out that she did not supplement

her prior disclosures “revealing the true substance of Wang’s

intended testimony, nor did she submit a telephone number or

address for Wang (who no longer worked for or was accessible to

[it][.]” Id. at 3. 

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10 This Rules governs “required disclosures[,]” including “[i]nitial

[d]isclosures.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).

11 This Rule pertains to a party’s duty to supplement the disclosures

mandated under subdivision (a). 

12 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended effective December

1, 2007, and “govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just

and practicable, all proceedings then pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Order of April 30,

2007, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). The court finds that it is “just and practicable” to

apply the Federal Rules as they read prior to December 1, 2007, because the pending

motions were filed before that date. 

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Information that “without substantial justification” is not

disclosed as Rule 26(a)10 and 26(e)(1)11 mandates, or amended

pursuant to Rule 26(e)(2), may not, “unless such failure is

harmless,” be used as evidence on a motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(c)(1).12 Because it will be “prejudiced” by consideration of 

Ms. Wang’s affidavit, JPMC is taking the position that the court

“must” exclude that affidavit. Mot. (doc. 48) at 3 (citation

omitted). To support this mandatory exclusion argument, JPMC

relies upon three cases, all of which involved failure to timely

disclose with respect to expert witnesses. See Yeti by Molly, Ltd.

v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001); Continental

Laboratory Products, Inc. v. Medax International, Inc., 195 F.R.D.

675 (S.D.Cal. 2000); and Elgas v. Colorado Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D.

296 (D.Nev. 1998). Plainly Ms. Wang is not an expert witness. 

Therefore, JPMC’s reliance upon those cases is misplaced. 

Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth below, in the exercise of

its discretion the court will exclude Ms. Wang’s affidavit. See

Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted) (district courts have

“particularly wide discretion. . . to issue sanctions under Rule

37(c)(1)[]”).

Based upon Rule 26(e)(2), plaintiff “does not believe” she

“was under any continuing obligation,” especially after the close

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of discovery, to amend her response to JPMC’s document request to

identify Ms. Wang’s affidavit. Resp. (doc. 53) at 5. Moreover,

given plaintiff’s deposition testimony highlighted above, plaintiff

is taking the position that JPMC “can hardly claim . . . unfair[]

surprise[]’” due to Ms. Wang’s affidavit.” Resp. (doc. 53) at 5

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff’s argument that she had no duty to supplement after

the close of discovery is somewhat disingenuous. In Episcopo v.

General Motors Corp., 2004 WL 628243 (N.D.Ill. 2004), upon which

JPMC is relying, responding to a summary judgment motion, plaintiff

moved to strike a document which defendant had not produced during

discovery. Like plaintiff Huynh, the defendant in Episcopo argued

that it was “impossible” to produce the document during discovery

because it was not created until after the close of discovery. See

id. at *6. The Episcopo court soundly reasoned that “[a]lthough

Rule 26 does not explicitly provide for supplementation of

disclosures and responses after the close of discovery, . . . the

language of Rule 26(e)(2) is broad enough to require supplemental

disclosure under certain circumstances, regardless of whether

discovery has closed[.]” Id. 

The court further reasoned that a continuing duty to

supplement under those circumstances was “consistent with the

spirit behind the discovery rules, which is to promote liberal

discovery responses in an effort to narrow the issues for trial and

to prevent unfair surprise.’” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing, inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory

Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments, Subdivision (e)). That reasoning

applies with equal force here. Plaintiff cannot be allowed to

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13 The court’s decision to strike Ms. Wang’s affidavit for failure to

timely disclose obviates the need to address JPMC’s additional argument that the

court should not consider that affidavit because it is irrelevant and prejudicial.

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circumvent the liberal discovery rules by conveniently waiting

until two weeks after the close of discovery to request a

supporting affidavit from a potential witness – a witness she

identified, albeit inaccurately, at the outset of discovery.

Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown “substantial

justification” for not timely disclosing that she intended to rely

upon Ms. Wang’s statement that allegedly JPMC discriminated against

here based upon her race and gender. Nor has plaintiff shown, as

she must, that her failure to timely disclose the existence of Ms.

Wang’s affidavit was “harmless.” See Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1107

(“burden is on the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness[]”

under Rule 37(c)(1)). For the reasons outlined above, the court

grants JPMC’s motion to strike the affidavit of Cinyi Wang (doc.

48); and necessarily plaintiff cannot rely upon this affidavit to

attempt to show pretext.13

To summarize, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) “Defendant’s Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence

Presented by Plaintiff in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment”

(doc. 50)is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; it is GRANTED with

respect to the supplemental affidavit of Toni Huynh (doc. 47-3),

but DENIED in all other respects;

(2) “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (doc. 43) is

GRANTED; and

(3) “Defendant’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Cinyi Wang”

(doc. 48) is GRANTED.

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The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor

of defendant and terminate the case.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2008.

Copies to counsel of record

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