Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02095/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02095-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 33:1319 Clean Water Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DUARTE NURSERY, INC., a California 

Corporation; and JOHN DUARTE, an 

individual, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS, et al., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Counterclaim-Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DUARTE NURSERY, INC., a California 

Corporation; and JOHN DUARTE, an 

individual, 

 Counterclaim-Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-02095-KJM-DAD 

ORDER 

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///// 

///// 

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The United States moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ First Supplemental1 Complaint, 

ECF No. 41 (“FSC”), filed August 20, 2014. Mot., ECF 46; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Plaintiffs 

oppose the motion (Opp’n, ECF No. 51) and the government has replied (ECF No. 52). This 

matter is decided without a hearing. As explained below, the court GRANTS the motion in part 

and DENIES it in part. 

I. ALLEGED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The court previously has reviewed the facts of this case in detail, in its order 

addressing the government’s motion to dismiss the original complaint. ECF No. 27. The court 

briefly revisits the relevant facts in light of the operative complaint, and the procedural history 

below. 

 A. Operative Complaint 

 Plaintiffs Duarte Nursery, Inc. and John Duarte own the property that is the subject 

of this action. FSC ¶ 44. Duarte Nursery is a California corporation headquartered in Modesto, 

California, that owns approximately 445 acres of property (“Property”) located on Paskenta Road 

in rural Tehama County, roughly 8 miles south of the City of Red Bluff and 3 miles west of 

Interstate 5. Id. The Property is zoned A2, for agricultural use, by the County. Id. 

 Defendant U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) is a branch of the United 

States Army and an agency of the United States. The Corps is authorized under Section 404 of 

the Clean Water Act to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill material into “navigable 

waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). In exercising this authority, the Corps is able to investigate 

unauthorized activities that require permits, to confirm whether such actions have occurred in 

violation of Section 404, to notify responsible parties of violations, and to determine a course of 

action in resolving the violation. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3. 

 Defendants Karl E. Longley, Jennifer Lester Moffitt, Jon Costantino, Sandra O. 

Meraz, Carmen Ramirez, Robert Schneider, and Pamela C. Creedon are individuals sued in their 

official capacities as board members of the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board 

 

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 The judge previously assigned to this case directed the filing of a “First Supplemental Complaint.” See ECF No. 

38. 

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(RWQCB), an agency of the State of California authorized to issue (1) State Water Quality 

Certifications in connection with dredged and fill permits issued by the Corps, under the PorterCologne Act, California Water Code sections 13160, 13376 and 13377, and (2) cease and desist 

orders under California Water Code section 13301. FSC at 3 & ¶¶ 14-18. 

 On February 25, 2013, defendant issued a Cease and Desist Order (“CDO”) to 

plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 50. The CDO “determines that [plaintiffs] have discharged dredged or fill 

material into seasonal wetlands, vernal pools, vernal swales, and intermittent and ephemeral 

drainages, which are waters of the United States, without a . . . permit. . . . Since a DA 

[Department of Army] permit has not been issued authorizing this discharge, the work is in 

violation of the Clean Water Act.” Id. The CDO directs plaintiffs “to cease and desist all work in 

waters of the United States.” Id. The CDO does not identify the Property by legal description, 

street address, or assessor’s parcel number, identifying the location only by latitude and 

longitude. Id. ¶ 51. 

 On April 23, 2013, the RWQCB issued a Notice of Violation (“NoV”) to 

plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 56. The NoV states RWQCB staff inspected the Property on December 6, 2012, 

and determined “you have discharged dredged or fill material into wetlands and other waters 

associated with Coyote Creek, a water of the U.S., without a permit.” Id. The NoV states 

plaintiffs are in violation of the Clean Water Act for failing to obtain a permit from the Corps and 

a State Water Quality Certification under Section 401 of the Act, and directs plaintiffs to submit a 

plan for mitigating the impacts of the unauthorized fill. The NoV also threatens plaintiffs with 

additional enforcement action, including daily fines of up to $10,000.00. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. 

 Plaintiffs claim the government and individual defendants deprived them of 

property or property rights protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Id. ¶ 61. First, faced with the CDO and NoV, plaintiffs left their wheat crop 

unattended, losing $50,000 in planting costs. Id. ¶ 62. Second, with the CDO and NoV still in 

effect, plaintiffs have to disclose them to potential buyers, and thus defendants have effectively 

placed a lien on plaintiffs’ property. Id. Plaintiffs claim specifically that defendants acted in 

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contravention of plaintiffs’ due process rights by issuing the CDO and the NoV without affording 

plaintiffs a hearing before or after issuance. Id. ¶ 61. 

 Plaintiffs also claim a violation of their First Amendment rights, alleging their 

protected actions of filing their original complaint in October 2013 (ECF No. 1) and making 

public statements in the news media, on the internet, and in radio/television, were substantial or 

motivating factors in the United States’ decision to file its counterclaim. Id. ¶¶ 116-117. 

Plaintiffs seek (1) declaratory judgment that the failure to provide hearings is unconstitutional, 

(2) an injunction against further enforcement proceedings based upon the CDO and NoV, (3) an 

injunction requiring defendants to notify those to whom the CDO and NoV were sent that they 

are invalid, (4) a declaratory judgment that the regulations at 33 C.F.R. Part 326 are 

unconstitutional, (5) a declaration the Corps violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by 

engaging in retaliatory prosecution against them, and (6) an injunction enjoining the Corps from 

prosecuting the counterclaim, and from engaging in further enforcement actions against plaintiffs 

in violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 4:3-16 & ¶ 85. 

 B. Counterclaim 

 The United States’ counterclaim alleges plaintiffs violated the Clean Water Act by 

farming the Property and seeks civil penalties. ECF No. 28. In their June 2014 answer to the 

government’s counterclaim, plaintiffs asserted the following defenses: collateral estoppel, res 

judicata, lack of ripeness, statute of limitations, equitable preclusion including by way of unclean 

hands, estoppel, waiver, release, or laches, and exemption from regulation under section 404(f) of 

the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)). ECF No. 33 at 5. 

 C. Motion 

 In the instant motion, the government seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ due process 

claims, claims one, two and five, on mootness grounds based on Rule 12(b)(1). The government 

argues the claims are mooted by its counterclaim for enforcement of the CWA. ECF No. 28. The 

government argues the sixth claim, retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment, is 

barred by sovereign immunity and so also should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Alternately, 

the government argues the retaliatory prosecution allegations do not state a claim, and so the sixth 

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claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. at 10-15. Because the court resolves the 

motion as to the sixth claim through application of Rule 12(b)(6), it does not reach the Rule 

12(b)(1) argument as to that claim at this time. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. 12(b)(1) 

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests the 

subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 

1036, 1039– 40 (9th Cir. 2003). Mootness pertains to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction 

under Article III and is properly raised as here in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). White 

v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 732 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 1996). In the context of an action for declaratory judgment, the “test for mootness . . . is 

‘whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial 

controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 

warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 

1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation, quotations omitted). “The party asserting mootness bears a 

‘heavy burden’ in meeting this standard.” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citations omitted). 

B. 12(b)(6) 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss all 

or part of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may 

dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 

under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to dismiss this 

short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “’labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay 

between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. 

See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

 In making this context-specific evaluation, the court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict 

matters properly subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference 

into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. First, Second, and Fifth Claims: Violation of Due Process 

 The government contends its counterclaim for enforcement of the Clean Water 

Act, filed in May 2014, is an intervening event that renders plaintiffs’ due process claims moot. 

Mot. at 8. It says the counterclaim arises from the same alleged violation underlying plaintiffs’ 

claims, and the court will adjudicate the same issues of due process in considering the 

counterclaim. The government argues the counterclaim proceedings will give plaintiffs a full 

opportunity to be heard on their due process claims. Id. 

 Plaintiffs argue the government has not met its burden of demonstrating mootness. 

Opp’n at 13. Plaintiffs say no facts or circumstances have changed that prevent the court’s 

granting relief in the form of a declaratory judgment. Id. Further, plaintiffs disagree the 

counterclaim gives them a full opportunity to be heard on their due process claims. While the 

counterclaim seeks enforcement of the Clean Water Act, plaintiffs say it will not allow the court 

to address whether plaintiffs were deprived of the Property or were given an adequate hearing on 

the issue as required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 14. Resolution of the counterclaim would 

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not allow for the possibility of withdrawal of the CDO, which remains in place and continues to 

cause plaintiffs’ alleged harms. Id. 

 The government has not met its burden of demonstrating the filing of its 

counterclaim has mooted plaintiffs’ due process claims. Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 971. In 

Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989), 

the court noted that a case or controversy exists justifying declaratory relief only when “the 

challenged government activity . . . is not contingent, has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by 

its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the 

interests of the petitioning parties.” (internal citations omitted) Here, the challenged government 

actions, the CDO and NoV have not “evaporated or disappeared”; the Property remains intact and 

subject to both. Plaintiffs as owners of the Property still have a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome of their claims. Declaratory relief based on plaintiff’s due process claims would be 

available regardless of the outcome of the counterclaim. Adjudication of the counterclaim and 

plaintiffs’ defenses thereto will not offer plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to be heard on their 

assertion that the CDO was issued in violation of their due process right to certain procedures, 

including a prompt hearing. 

 The court denies the motion to dismiss the first, second, and fifth claims for 

mootness. 

B. Sixth Claim: Violation of the First Amendment (Retaliatory Prosecution) 

 Plaintiffs bring their First Amendment claim as a challenge to the government’s 

alleged retaliatory decision to file a counterclaim. FSC at 14-15; Opp’n at 12 n.3. They seek an 

injunction preventing litigation of the counterclaim or any other enforcement action. FSC at 20. 

Defendants move to dismiss arguing in part that plaintiffs fail to state a claim, “retaliatory 

prosecution” is not a claim at all. Mot. at 13-14. Plaintiffs argue their right to bring such a claim 

is well-supported by case law. Opp’n at 17-19. 

 A First Amendment retaliation claim requires that plaintiff ultimately show “three 

elements: ‘(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the 

defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary 

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firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant's adverse action 

was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected 

conduct.” Schneider v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 2014 WL 4187364, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) 

(internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue the court may infer a retaliatory motive because the 

government took no further enforcement action after issuing the CDO until after plaintiffs filed 

the original complaint, spoke publicly about the case, and the court heard oral argument on the 

government’s motion to dismiss. Those facts are confirmed by the court’s review of the docket. 

However, the court cannot infer any retaliatory motive when the CDO and NoV were issued 

before plaintiffs ever spoke on the issue or filed their original complaint. 

 A plaintiff claiming retaliation must show the government acted with retaliatory 

intent “with the purpose of deterring the exercise of First Amendment freedoms” and not “as a 

legitimate response to litigation.” Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Counties of Warren & 

Washington Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, the NoV warned of future 

enforcement action. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2. The counterclaim for enforcement of the previously 

issued CDO and NoV is a mere extension of actions the government took well before the activity 

plaintiffs allege was a substantial factor motivating the filing of the counterclaim. “A plaintiff 

must show not only that the defendant official harbored retaliatory animus and thus sought to 

induce prosecution, but also that the official succeeded—that is, that the ‘prosecutor [ ] would not 

have pressed charges otherwise.’” Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 

2006) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint includes no facts supporting an inference 

the government’s counterclaim was motivated by plaintiffs’ speech. Plaintiffs have not satisfied 

their duty of pleading a link between their speech and the government’s counterclaim, which 

seeks enforcement against the same activity alleged in the previously issued CDO and NoV. 

Even if they did plead such a link, plaintiffs have not pleaded any injury caused by the alleged 

retaliatory conduct. 

 Because plaintiffs represent they are “prepared to amend the [FSC] in the event the 

[c]ourt concludes that the [retaliation claim] is not adequately plead,” Opp’n at 19 n.6, the court 

dismisses this claim with leave to amend one more time. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 

1. The United States’ motion to dismiss the first, second, and fifth claims as moot 

is denied. 

2. The United States’ motion to dismiss the sixth claim for failure to state a claim 

is granted with leave to amend. 

3. Plaintiffs are directed to file any second amended complaint consistent with 

this order within 21 days of the filed date of this order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 23, 2015. 

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