Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01638/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01638-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDDIE WANSLEY, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM HALL, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 05-1638-IEG(LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

DENYING FIRST AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

I. Introduction

Eddie Wansley, Jr., (hereinafter “Petitioner”) a prisoner

proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his San Diego

Superior Court conviction for two counts of robbery in the first

degree and a 10-year sentencing enhancement for using a gun in the

commission of the robbery. 

Petitioner claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of

counsel and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. 

After considering the Petition and the Respondent’s Answer, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

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DENIED.

II. Procedural Background

On March 17, 2003, after a jury trial, Petitioner was found

guilty of two counts of residential robbery. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211,

212.5(a)) (Resp’t Answer at 1.) The jury also found Petitioner

guilty of personally using a firearm during the commission of those

robberies. [Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b)] (Id.) In a bifurcated

hearing, the trial court found true that Petitioner had two prior

strike convictions, [Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(I), 11780.12, 668], a

prior serious felony conviction [Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)(1)] and that

he had served a prior prison term. [Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5(b), 668] 

(Id. at 1-2.)

On May 15, 2003, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 40 years

to life in state prison after denying a Motion to Dismiss the strike

prior. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 2.) He is imprisoned for the two

charges concurrently. Petitioner’s sentence includes 25 years to life

for conviction of residential robbery with two strike priors, enhanced

10 years for personal use of a firearm, plus 5 years for conviction of

a prior serious felony. (Id.)

On May 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal to

the California Court of Appeal. (Resp’t Lodgment 1 at 3.) On April

13, 2004, the Court of Appeal issued a written, reasoned decision that

affirmed the judgment of the trial court. (Resp’t Lodgment 2.) 

On July 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment 3.) On August 11, 2004,

the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review without

comment. (Resp’t Lodgment 4.) 

On October 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition

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for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 25 at 1.) On January 18, 2006,

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that one of the claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel was unexhausted. (Id.) On 

May 15, 2006, this Court stayed the case to give Petitioner the

opportunity to exhaust his claim. (Id.) On April 1, 2008, the

District Judge assigned to this case lifted the stay because

Petitioner was not diligently seeking exhaustion of his claim and

dismissed that unexhausted claim from his Petition. On May 15, 2008,

Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. Petitioner did not file a

Traverse to Respondent’s Answer.

III. Factual Background

The following statement of facts is substantially taken from the

California Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Wansley, No. SCD171136,

slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. April 13, 2004). (Resp’t Lodgment 2.) This

Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes

them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of

correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(e)(1); See also, Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992)

(holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly

drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as

follows:

Eric Charkins and Jeremy Espeleta shared an apartment located in

San Diego near the La Mesa city limits. A friend and coworker of

Charkins, Natasha Pasko, also lived in the apartment complex. 

Charkins and Espeleta ran a small recording studio from their

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1 Charkins testified at trial the equipment was worth $4000. (Resp’t Lodgment

6, Volume 2 at 101.) However, the California Court of Appeal, in its Statement of

Facts, stated the value as $3000. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 2.)

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apartment, with equipment valued at $4,0001. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at

2.) Charkins kept his recording equipment in a locked, walk-in closet

in his bedroom. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at 157.) The apartment

had one bedroom. (Id. At 27.) Espeleta had moved in and been

sleeping in the living room for about two months prior to Petitioner’s

crimes. (Id. at 35-36.)

During the summer of 2003, Charkins and Pasko attended car races

held in Kearney Mesa. There, Pasko introduced Charkins to Petitioner. 

(Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 2.) Charkins dated Pasko for a short time

during the summer, but he had not communicated with her for about a

month when she called him in early September 2003. (Resp’t Lodgment

6, Volume 2 at 106-07.) On September 7, 2003, Pasko and Petitioner

visited Charkins at Charkins’ apartment. The three talked about

music, recordings and similar topics for 20 minutes. (Resp’t Lodgment

2 at 2.)

Two days later, Petitioner and a companion returned to Charkins’

apartment. Petitioner knocked on the apartment door and when asked

who was knocking, he replied, “Eddie, Natasha’s friends (sic).” 

Charkins let them inside. Shortly afterwards, Espeleta came home from

work and introduced himself to the two men. At trial, Espeleta

identified Petitioner as being “Eddie.” (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 2-3.)

Suddenly, Petitioner pulled out a gun, pointed it at Espeleta and

ordered Espeleta and Charkins to lie “face on the ground.” Petitioner

and his companion ransacked the apartment and took the recording

equipment. Petitioner also went through Espeleta’s wallet and took

his money. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 3.) At one point during the

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robbery, when Charkins lifted his head, Petitioner put the gun to the

back of his head and said, “We’ll bust caps.” (Resp’t Lodgment 6,

Volume 2 at 114.) Before leaving, Petitioner and his companion told

the victims, “We know everything about you. Don’t try anything

funny.” (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at 119.)

After the Petitioner and his companion left, Charkins and

Espeleta went to a neighbors’ apartment and told them what had

occurred. Charkins said “Eddie,” a man who had been with Pasko at

Charkins’s apartment a few days earlier, had robbed him. (Resp’t

Lodgment 2 at 3.) Charkins appeared “out of breath,” was “ghostwhite, and freaking out.” (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at 153.) 

Espeleta “couldn’t stand still,” “double-check[ed] the locks,” and

“was walking around in circles.” (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at

154.) Charkins and Espeleta appeared terrified. The neighbors urged

Charkins to call the police. He declined, stating that he feared for

his life. Charkins and Espeleta spent the rest of the night at a

friend’s house. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 3.)

The day after the robbery, Charkins called the police and

reported the incident as a burglary. The next day, at the urging of a

friend, Tiffany McDuffie, Charkins told the police that the incident

was a robbery. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 3.)

San Diego Police Detective Melvin Allen was assigned to

investigate. Allen spoke with various possible witnesses, including

the victims, who had moved to northern California within weeks after

the incident. Allen assembled a photographic lineup that included a

photograph of Petitioner. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 3.) Allen initially

asked McDuffie to identify Petitioner. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 3

at 235.) She identified him as picture #3. (Id.) A few weeks later,

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There is no evidence to support that Allen ever sent the photographic lineup

to Espeleta. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at 55-56 and Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 3

at 237.)

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Allen sent another photographic lineup to Charkins in northern

California. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 3 at 235.) Charkins2

identified photograph #3, Petitioner, as one of the robbers. (Id. at

235.) In between the two photographic lineups, Charkins and McDuffie

spoke several times by phone about the case. (Id. at 222.) Allen

spoke with Charkins. Charkins told Allen about the robbery and said he

did not initially tell the truth about the nature of the crime because

he was afraid. In November 2003, Allen arrested Petitioner. (Resp’t

Lodgment 2 at 3.) When the police searched Petitioner’s car, home and

workplace, they did not find a gun or any of the stolen electronic

equipment. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 3 at 241-44.)

At trial, Petitioner presented his wife and father as alibi

witnesses. Petitioner’s wife testified he was home on the night of

the robbery. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 4.) He left only for a short time

to pick up a battery for his son’s birthday present at a nearby toy

store. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 3 at 274.) Petitioner’s father

testified that he spoke with his son by telephone about midnight on

the night of the robbery. (Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 4.)

IV. Standard of Review

The Court reviews federal habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) modified the statute by creating more stringent standards, and

those standards apply to this claim since it was filed after AEDPA was

enacted in 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added).

As modified by the AEDPA, the appropriate standard contained in 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2008) (emphasis added).

A petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2) for

the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The “contrary to” clause

of § 2254(d)(1) must be interpreted to mean that a federal habeas

court may grant relief if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

404-05 (2000). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a

federal habeas court may grant relief in two scenarios. The first

scenario occurs when the state court identifies the correct governing

principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 529 U.S. at 407. A

second scenario occurs where a state court decision either

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unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to

a new context where it should not apply, or where the state court

refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a

new context where it should apply. Id. at 407. 

To define what qualifies as an “unreasonable application of . . .

clearly established Federal law . . . ” the federal court should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal

law was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409. An unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application

of federal law. Id. at 410.

The phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” refers to the holdings, as opposed

to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state court decision. Id. at 412. When the state’s highest court

does not give a reasoned decision, federal habeas courts should “look

through” to the last reasoned state court decision on the issue and

presume that the unexplained denial rests on the same grounds. Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).

 In this case, Petitioner claims his constitutional rights to

effective assistance of counsel and due process were violated. Thus,

this Court may only grant habeas relief where the state court arrived

at a decision with regard to the claims that were “contrary to” or

involved an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal

law.

V. Discussion

Petitioner asserts two claims for habeas relief: (1) his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when

trial counsel failed to investigate, and object to, the photographic

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lineup; and (2) his due process rights were violated because there was

insufficient evidence to support his convictions. [Doc. No. 5 at

22(a)-(b)]

Respondent argues that both claims should be denied because the

state court properly determined them on the merits. (Doc. No. 45 at

4-9) Respondent further argues the state court’s decision was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, and did not involve an unreasonable determination of facts. 

(Doc. No. 45 at 4-9) 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate and object to

the photographic lineup used as evidence at his trial. Respondent

argues that the state courts reasonably determined that there is no

evidence in the record to prove Petitioner’s attorney deficiently

investigated the photographic lineup or that an objection to the

lineup would have resulted in a more favorable verdict. (Doc. No. 45

at 5)

The threshold question under AEDPA is whether Petitioner seeks to

apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state

court conviction became final. The merits of his claim are squarely

governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984). Williams,

529 U.S. at 390. The Williams court stated it is past question that

the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as clearly established

federal law. Id. at 391.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel Petitioner must

prove: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced

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the defense, which requires a showing that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. Williams, 529 U.S. at

390-91 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 and 694). 

The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the

prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of

either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. The Ninth Circuit has

rejected the notion that, in addition to Strickland’s prejudice

requirement, habeas courts must conduct a standard harmless-error

review of any Strickland violations under Brecht v. Anderson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2000). “The Strickland prejudice analysis is complete in itself;

there is no place for an additional harmless-error review.” Id.

(citing Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Petitioner raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

in the Court of Appeal on direct review and it was denied in a

reasoned opinion. (Resp’t Lodgment 2.) He raised it again in his

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court and it was denied

without comment. (Resp’t Lodgment 4.) Thus, this Court must look

through to the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

806; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. In denying Petitioner’s appeal,

the California Court of Appeal stated:

With the exception of not objecting to the photographic

lineup, the record before this counsel does not include any

information regarding the investigation taken by Wansley’s

counsel. Nor does it shed light on the performance of

Wansley’s counsel. Regarding failure to object to the

photographic lineup, “[i]f the record on appeal sheds no

light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner

challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an

explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could

be no satisfactory explanation. [Citation.] Otherwise, the

claim is more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of

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habeas corpus. [Citation.]” (People v. Carter (2003) 30

Cal.4th 1166,1211) (citing People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15

Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

(Resp’t Lodgment 2 at 6-7.)

1. Deficiency Prong

The decision by Petitioner’s trial counsel to neither investigate

nor object to the photographic lineup does not amount to an

unprofessional error of judgment. It is well established that a

federal habeas court must apply a “heavy measure of deference” in

scrutinizing counsel’s tactical decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. 

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his attorney committed

an unprofessional error of judgment when he did not object to the

photographic lineup. In support of his contention, Petitioner alleges

that McDuffie could have told Charkins that she identified Petitioner

as photograph #3 in the photographic lineup array. Further,

Petitioner states that Detective Allen kept his picture in the same

spot for the photographic lineup that he sent to Charkins two weeks

after McDuffie identified Petitioner. Petitioner states that there is

evidence showing McDuffie and Charkins spoke several times a week over

that period of time, that Charkins’ identification of Petitioner was

made because McDuffie gave him advance knowledge of his number

position in the photographic lineup. 

However, Petitioner has not produced any evidence to show his

allegation to be anything but mere speculation. Petitioner’s

attorney’s decision not to investigate and object to the photographic

lineup was reasonable because Espeleta identified Petitioner in court

at the preliminary hearing without previously viewing the photograph

lineup. (Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 2 at 53-56.) At trial, Espeleta’s

in-court identification of Petitioner served as independent evidence

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of Petitioner’s identity.

In addition, Petitioner’s attorney may have also reasonably

believed that even if the photographic lineup was unnecessarily

suggestive, there was not a substantial likelihood of

misidentification. Charkins met Petitioner on at least two prior

occasions before the robbery. Charkins testified that Petitioner used

his own name to gain entrance to the apartment before committing the

robbery. Under these circumstances, Petitioner’s attorney could

reasonably have decided that Charkins could and did validly identify

Petitioner in the photographic lineup. Charkins initially saw

Petitioner through his apartment door’s peephole, and for several

minutes while they spoke and relaxed in his living room just prior to

the robbery’s commencement. Thus, it is reasonable that Charkins had

an ample opportunity to view and observe Petitioner in a setting

devoid of any stress or trauma to cloud his focus or memory.

2. Prejudice Prong

Even assuming that counsel made a professionally unreasonable

error in not investigating the photographic lineup, or objecting to it

at trial, Petitioner still fails to satisfy the “prejudice” prong of

the Strickland test. “To show ‘prejudice,’ [Petitioner] must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Here, Petitioner was not prejudiced because the evidence produced

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at trial was adequate for a jury to find that he did in fact commit

two counts of residential robbery. This is so because even if the

photographic lineup and Charkins’ identification of Petitioner were

excluded from evidence, the jury still had sufficient evidence to

believe the victims’ account. Specifically, Charkins knew Petitioner

from at least two previous encounters with him, had an ample

opportunity immediately before the robbery to view him, and testified

that he only let the assailants in because one of them explicitly

identified himself as, “Eddie, Natasha’s friend.” Additionally, the

victims’ neighbors provided credible, unbiased testimony that both

victims were extremely “freaked out” and appeared to be in shock just

after the robbery occurred. Further, the neighbors testified they

specifically remembered Charkins stating that “Eddie” had just robbed

him. 

Considering such evidence, the jury reasonably concluded that

Petitioner did in fact rob the victims. Accordingly, this Court finds

that Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the

failure to investigate and object to the photographic lineup

prejudiced the trial to such a degree that the result would have been

different. This Court finds that the state court’s denial of the

claim was neither contrary to, not an unreasonable application of

clearly established law. See, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this

regard be DENIED. 

B. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner alleges that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for residential robbery. Petitioner raised

this claim in the Court of Appeal on direct review, and it was denied

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in a reasoned opinion. (Resp’t Lodgment 2.) He raised it again in

his Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court, and it was

denied without comment or citation. (Resp’t Lodgment 4.) Thus, this

Court must through look to the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 801-806; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

In denying Petitioner’s appeal, the California Court of Appeal

stated:

Wansley argues that substantial evidence does not

support the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Wansley

states the People’s case fails because it is not supported

by forensic evidence, such as fingerprints and recovery of

the stolen property; there was “extremely suspect testimony”

from the victims about the incident; Wansley’s wife and

father provided alibi testimony; and questions remain

regarding the delay in arresting Wansley. He argues there

is no solid, credible evidence to support his convictions

beyond a reasonable doubt.

We are required to affirm a judgment that is supported

by substantial evidence. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26

Cal.3d at p. 576.) Substantial evidence is evidence of

legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of

solid value. (People v. Samuel (1981) 21 Cal.3d 489, 505.) 

We review the entire record in the light most favorable to

the judgment below and presume in support of the judgment

the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce

from the evidence. If the evidence permits a reasonable

trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed,

the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may

also be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant

reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307,

318-19.)

Here, Wansley’s convictions are supported by the

eyewitness identification of the victims. Wansley claims

the record contains “no solid credible evidence of an

indisputable nature” supporting the convictions. He

essentially claims Charkins did not tell the truth to the

police when initially reporting the crime, and Charkins

identification testimony conflicts with the alibi testimony

of Wansley’s wife and father. In determining whether a

conviction is supported by substantial evidence, we do not

usurp the trier of fact’s assessment of credibility: 

“‘Although an appellate court will not uphold a

judgment or verdict based upon evidence inherently

improbable, testimony which merely discloses unusual

circumstances does not come within that category. 

[Citation.] To warrant the rejection of the statements given

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by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there

must exist either a physical impossibility that they are

true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to

inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even

testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not

justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive

province of the trial judge or jury to determine the

credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the

facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]’

[Citations.]” (People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 754,

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25

Cal.3d 668, 684.)

The jury obviously found Charkins’s testimony credible. 

Even if his testimony is to be viewed with “justifiable

suspicion” because “he wasn’t thinking right” and initially

reported the robbery as a burglary, the testimony is not

physically impossible nor is its falsity apparent. We

determine substantial evidence supports the convictions.

(Resp’t Lodgement 2 at 4-6.)

In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held

that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects a criminal

defendant against conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. Clearly established law from

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), states that sufficient

evidence supports a conviction if “after viewing the evidence in light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 319. In determining whether sufficient evidence exists

to support a conviction, the reviewing court must presume that the

trier of fact resolved conflicting inferences of fact in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. Wright v. West, 505

U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992). 

Under Jackson, this Court must look to the state criminal law in

determining whether a factfinder could have found Wansley guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 324.

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California Penal Code § 211 requires proof that:

Every person who takes personal property in the possession

of another, against the will and from the person or

immediate presence of that person, accomplished by means of

force or fear and with the specific intent permanently to

deprive that person of the property, is guilty of the crime

of robbery, in violation of penal code section 211.

(Resp’t Lodgment 6, Volume 4 at 340.) (emphasis added)

Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to

the verdict, a reasonable juror could have found Petitioner guilty of

violating § 211 beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the possession

element, Charkins testified that he possessed music recording

equipment in his apartment worth around $4000. (Resp’t Lodgment 6,

Volume 2 at 101.) Espeleta testified that he possessed five or six

dollars in his wallet just before the robbery occurred. (Id. at 42.) 

There was no dispute at trial about the property Charkins and Espeleta

possessed or the property that was taken. Therefore, this testimony

was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that both Charkins and

Espeleta possessed property of some value. Additional testimony

supports that Charkins’ music equipment was kept within a locked

closet in his bedroom, and that Espeleta kept the wallet in his back

pocket. (Id. at 157 and 42.) Since the music equipment was kept in a

locked, private residence and the wallet was securely carried on the

victim’s body, a reasonable juror could have found that the victims

possessed their property within their immediate control in a way that

they could retain possession.

Further, testimonial evidence presented at trial allowed a

reasonable juror to conclude that the property at issue was taken

against the victims’ wills. At trial, evidence was presented that

showed both victims explicitly stated that they never freely consented

to give up their property. 

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Moreover, evidence presented at trial showed that the assailants

used the threat of physical violence, injury, and possible death

because the property was given up only after the Petitioner and an

accomplice pulled out a gun and pointed it at the victims. (Id. at

113-14 and 41.) In support of this contention, both Charkins and

Espeleta testified they were scared and fearful that they would be

shot or killed. (Id. at 115 and 43.) Charkins testified that at some

point during the robbery, he was told to keep his head down or else,

“We’ll bust caps.” (Id. at 114.) Testimony given by the victims’

neighbor further supports the victims’ account of the robbery. The

victims’ neighbor testified that after the robbery, both victims

appeared to be in shock and were shaken up to the point that they both

refused to call police to report the crime. (Id. at 156.) In

addition, evidence was also presented that both victims moved to

northern California within weeks of the robbery. (Id. at 186.) In

summary, the totality of the evidence gave a reasonable juror

sufficient evidence to conclude that the property was taken either by

force or fear.

Regarding the final element of Cal. Penal Code § 211, a

reasonable juror would be able to find that the property was taken

with the specific intent to permanently deprive the victims. The

record indicates that the music equipment and money was knowingly

taken by threat of physical violence with the desire to never be

returned to the victims because the robbers threatened to come back

and kill the victims if they called the police and reported the

robbery. (Id. at 156.) Thus, the jury had sufficient evidence to

reasonably conclude that Petitioner intended to permanently deprive

the victims of their property before or during the robbery. 

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 In summary, this Court finds there was sufficient evidence

presented in the trial record to convict Petitioner of the two counts

of residential robbery. See, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The state

court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, not an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See, Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Wansley’s claim in this regard be DENIED. 

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court, having reviewed Wansley’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

the documents lodged therewith, and the pertinent authorities

pertaining to Petitioner’s claims, hereby RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 29, 2008, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

September 15, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

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those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 28, 2008

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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