Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02575/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

 The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2575

___________

Bennie Wenzel, *

*

Appellant, *

*

 v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Missouri-American *

Water Company, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2005

Filed: April 20, 2005 (Corrected: 04/22/05) 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MCMILLIAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Missouri-American Water Company placed Bennie R. Wenzel, Jr., on medical

leave. He sued, claiming disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act and the Missouri Human Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101, et seq; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010, et seq. The district court1

 granted

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summary judgment to Missouri-American, concluding Wenzel did not show he was

"regarded as" having a disability, or was retaliated against. Jurisdiction being proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, giving the

nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Griffith v. City

of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 734 (8th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party may not

rest on "mere allegations or denials," but must show a genuine issue of material fact

(or that the movant is not entitled to judgment). American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM

Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Wenzel suffered two injuries while employed as a Utility Person III (backhoe

operator) at Missouri-American. This position regularly required lifting 60 to 70

pounds and operating a backhoe, shovel, and 75-pound jackhammer. Wenzel was

first injured in 1999 while prying a 600-pound water valve. After surgery, he was on

temporary light duty, resuming full employment within months. 

After a second injury in May 2001, Wenzel returned to light duty. Initially, the

doctor restricted him to lifting 10 to 15 pounds, with no bending or stooping. As his

condition improved, the restriction increased to 20 to 25 pounds, with occasional

bending and stooping. The restriction was raised to 35 pounds, where it remained,

based on three medical assessments, for three months. Missouri-American

mistakenly believed the condition permanent, preventing Wenzel from ever

performing the essentials of his job. Because Missouri-American did not have any

permanent light-duty jobs, it placed him on medical leave. Wenzel filed a grievance

with his union. During the leave, Wenzel worked demolishing buildings, removing

snow, hauling refuse, mowing, and doing other manual labor. 

In May 2002, Wenzel and Missouri-American began the first of three

arbitrations. The arbitrator concluded that Missouri-American improperly ordered

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medical leave, but that Wenzel needed a doctor's full release in order to return to

work. The arbitrator also allowed Missouri-American to demand a "second opinion"

if not satisfied with the release Wenzel provided. 

In November 2002, Wenzel submitted a release, which Missouri-American

refused because the doctor had not seen Wenzel in more than one year. In December,

Wenzel sued for disability discrimination. Independently, the arbitrator ruled the

release insufficient, and put the burden on Wenzel to secure a full release.

In January 2003, Wenzel submitted a second release from another doctor he

chose. Missouri-American was still not satisfied, stating that he did not tell the

doctor his job required heavy lifting. For a third time the parties went to arbitration.

In March, the arbitrator found the release sufficient, but also that Missouri-American

was still entitled to a second opinion. After Wenzel passed a function capacity

evaluation in April 2003, he returned to work without restriction. 

I.

Absent direct evidence, this court applies the McDonnell Douglas analysis to

disability discrimination claims. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 364 (8th Cir.

1996), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). A

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case: a disability within the meaning of the

ADA; qualifications to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without

reasonable accommodation; and an adverse employment action due to a disability.

SeeAucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1996).

If the prima facie case is met, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Price, 75 F.3d at 365. Once the

employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is an

illegal pretext. Id.

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The threshold issue is whether Wenzel had a disability within the meaning of

the ADA. Though all parties agree that Wenzel did not have an actual disability, he

argues that Missouri-American "regarded" him as having a disability. 42 U.S.C. §

1210(C). 

Individuals who are regarded as having a disability, although not actually

disabled, are protected by the ADA. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,

489 (1999). "Regarded as" disability can occur in two ways: (1) the employer

mistakenly believes that the employee has an impairment (which would substantially

limit one or more major life activity), or (2) the employer mistakenly believes that an

actual impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity. Brunko v.

Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001). The term "substantially limited"

means "unable to perform" or "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or

duration under which" of performing a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Major life activities include caring for oneself, performing

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Genthe v. Lincoln, 383 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Wenzel argues that Missouri-American misinterpreted his doctor's restrictions,

thus regarding his ability to work as substantially limited. Missouri-American admits

it misjudged the doctor's restrictions (as to permanency), but claims that the mistake

related only to Wenzel's ability to perform one specific job. 

Missouri-American may not, however, regard Wenzel as substantially limited

in the life activity of working, that is unable to work a wide range of jobs. See

Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005). If MissouriAmerican regarded Wenzel as unable to perform "one particular job," there is no

violation of the ADA. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir.

1995). "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. §

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1630.2(j)(3)(i). To demonstrate that Missouri-American regarded him as unable to

perform a class of jobs, Wenzel emphasizes that there was no lifting requirement in

the written job description for a Utility III, and that a Missouri-American manager

testified that his injury substantially impaired a major life activity. 

Despite the absence of a lifting requirement in his job description, Wenzel

admitted that his position required heavy-lifting and working with a shovel, pickaxe,

and jackhammer. Moreover, the record does not indicate Missouri-American later

added these duties to a Utility III to exclude him from employment. 

The manager's statement that Wenzel's ability to lift was substantially impaired

does not indicate that the manager perceived him as unable to work in a class of jobs.

A lifting restriction, without more, is not a disability. See Brunko, 260 F.3d at 941

(40-pound lifting restriction); Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998)

(45-pound lifting restriction), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 (1999). "It logically

follows then that being regarded as having a limiting but not disabling restriction also

cannot be a disability within the meaning of the ADA." Conant v. City of Hibbing,

271 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2001). An employer may decide that individuals with

some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments are less than ideally suited

for a particular job. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91. Missouri-American placed Wenzel

on light duty believing he would resume working as a Utility III. Relying on the

doctor's three monthly restrictions to lifting 35 pounds, Missouri-American believed

his condition was permanent. See Ollie v. Titan Tire Corp., 336 F.3d 680, 686 (8th

Cir. 2003). The record shows Missouri-American placed Wenzel on medical leave,

believing he was unqualified for his job, not that he was disabled for a broad range

of jobs. 

Employers are free to make decisions based upon mistaken evaluations, "except

to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination." Edmund v.

MidAmerican Energy Co., 299 F.3d 679, 685-86 (8th Cir. 2002). The purpose of the

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ADA was to combat "'archaic attitudes,' erroneous perceptions, and myths" that

disadvantage persons regarded as having a disability. Wooten, 58 F.3d at 386,

quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987). Wenzel

fails to demonstrate that Missouri-American regarded him as having a disability. 

II. 

 Because there is no direct evidence of retaliation, the McDonnell Douglas

framework again applies. Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 127 F.3d

686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). Wenzel must first demonstrate a prima facie case: he

engaged in a protected activity, and suffered an adverse employment action, with a

causal connection between the two. Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622,

632 (8th Cir. 2003). Once the prima facie case is met, Missouri-American must rebut

the presumption of retaliation by advancing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action. See Manning, 127 F.3d at 692. If Missouri-American meets its

burden, Wenzel must show that the proffered reason is an unlawful pretext. See id.

Wenzel argues that after he submitted his second release in January 2003, he

was entitled to return to work immediately, and Missouri-American retaliated by

delaying full duty until April – a four-month delay. As evidence of retaliation, he

states that less than three weeks after Missouri-American was alerted to his disability

discrimination claim, it rejected his second release. 

Finding no causal connection, the district court held that Wenzel failed to

establish a prima facie case. This court holds Wenzel did not make a prima facie

case, but with a different focus, ultimately on the causation element. See Saulsberry

v. St. Mary's University of Minnesota, 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003) (summary

judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record, even if not relied

upon by the district court). 

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All parties agree that Wenzel engaged in the protected activity of filing a

disability claim. Whether he suffered an adverse employment action is not as clear.

A materially adverse action must be "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or

an alteration of job responsibilities." Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37

F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). There must be a material change in employment status

– a reduction in title, salary, or benefits. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142,

1144 (8th Cir. 1997). After Wenzel filed his disability discrimination claim, there

was almost no change in Wenzel's employment status. He held the title of Utility III

throughout. He received the amount of pay (after arbitration and mediation)

appropriate for all 18 months of leave. 

As a change in employment status, Wenzel identifies the four-month delay in

returning to work. Assuming that such a delay can be a change in employment status,

this period of time resulted from the continuing mutual dispute between Wenzel and

Missouri-American. The delay was not the result of retaliation. From the outset

Wenzel had to provide a satisfactory release before returning to work, and MissouriAmerican was entitled to demand a second opinion. See Executive Life Ins. Co. of

New York v. Alexander Ins. Ltd., 999 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1993). An employer's

request that an employee undergo mental and physical examinations, for valid

reasons, does not prove discrimination or an adverse job action. Sullivan v. River

Valley School Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 1999). Likewise, an employer's

request for a second opinion, which an arbitrator specifically granted, does not

constitute a material change in employment. In sum, Wenzel delayed his own return

by not complying with the arbitrator's decision. He did not meet his prima facie

burden.

Wenzel also complains that the district court granted summary judgment on an

issue not raised by the parties. This court will not reverse a grant of summary

judgment if the district court's findings on other properly addressed issues foreclose

the unraised issue. Interco Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th

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Cir. 1990). Because Wenzel did not make a prima facie case, the remaining, burdenshifting issues of McDonnell Douglas are preempted.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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