Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00718/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00718-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 Petitioner initially filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of

Louisiana. Because Petitioner challenges the execution of his sentence and is incarcerated at

the FCI Phoenix, Arizona, the Western District of Louisiana transferred the petition to this

Court on April 4, 2012. (Docs. 12, 13.) This Court dismissed the petition with leave to amend,

and Petitioner filed the pending Amended Petition on May 24, 2012. (Docs. 15, 16.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfonso Bobbie Rhone,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dennis Smith, 

Respondent.

 

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 No. CV-12-718-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Alfonso Bobbie Rhone (Petitioner) has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1

 (Doc. 16.) Petitioner is an inmate at the Federal

Correctional Institution (FCI) in Phoenix, Arizona. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

inadvertently released Petitioner on October 27, 2010. After BOP discovered its error, Petitioner

was arrested and remanded to BOP custody. Petitioner now challenges his incarceration

following his inadvertent release. He also argues that he should be released because of errors

in the calculation and execution of his federal and state sentences. Respondent has filed an

answer opposing the Petition (Doc. 23), and Petitioner has filed a reply. (Docs. 24, 25). The

Amended Petition is fully briefed and should be denied for the reasons set forth below. 

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 Citations to “Respondent’s Ex.” are to exhibits attached to Respondent’s Response to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 23.)

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I. Federal and State Convictions, Sentences, and Release From Federal Custody

Petitioner has several federal and state court convictions from California and Louisiana,

which the Court sets forth below to provide context for Petitioner’s pending claims. 

A. Federal Sentence and Supervised Release Violation Petition in California

On May 29, 1990, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the

Central District of California, case number CR-89-479-R, to sixteen months’ imprisonment for

possession of stolen properly in interstate shipment, to be followed by three years of supervised

release. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 1; Doc. 23-5 at 10-12.)2

 On April 2, 1991, Petitioner

was released pursuant to a Good Conduct Time Release and began serving the three-year

supervised release term. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 2; doc. 23-5 at 13-15.) 

On December 6, 1991, the United States Probation Office, Central District of California,

filed a supervised release violation petition based on Petitioner’s alleged violation of his release

conditions. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 3; Doc. 23-5 at 16-17.) On December 10, 1991,

the United States District Court, Central District of California, issued a warrant for Petitioner’s

arrest based on that petition. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 4; Doc. 23-5 at 19.) Petitioner

was not arrested on that warrant for several years due to intervening charges, convictions, and

sentences.

B. State and Federal Charges and Convictions in Louisiana

1. State Charges 

On January 23, 1992, Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Officers arrested Petitioner in Ouachita

Parish, Louisiana on state charges of aggravated kidnaping, aggravated assault, and simple

battery. (Doc. 23-5 at 25.) Pursuant to a search warrant, Sheriff’s Officers searched Petitioner’s

residence and, based on items discovered during that search, the State charged Petitioner with

one count of possession of cocaine and two counts of possession of stolen things. (Doc. 23-5

at 26.) The charges for aggravated assault, simple battery, and illegal possession of stolen things

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were later dismissed, and Petitioner remained in state custody pending trial on the remaining

counts in Docket No. 92F0231. (Doc. 23-5 at 30.) 

2. Federal Charges and Convictions

While Petitioner was awaiting trial on the charges in Louisiana state court, on January 19,

1993, the United States filed a two-count Bill of Information in the United States District Court,

Western District of Louisiana, No. CR-93-3009, charging Petitioner as a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and making a false written statement in

connection with acquiring a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). (Respondent’s Ex. 2,

attachments 4 and 5; Doc. 23-5 at 37-42.) 

On January 25, 1993, while Petitioner was in the custody of the State of Louisiana, the

Western District of Louisiana issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for Petitioner’s

“appearance and guilty plea.” (Doc. 23-5 at 19, 37.) Pursuant to the writ, on January 29, 1993,

Petitioner was transferred to federal custody. (Id. at 44.) On February 2, 1993, Petitioner pled

guilty to both counts and, on April 28, 1993, the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana sentenced him to forty-six months’ imprisonment on each count of

conviction to run concurrently. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachments 5 and 7, doc. 23-5 at 38-47.)

The judgment was silent regarding any relationship between the federal sentence and any

sentence that the Louisiana state court might impose on the pending state charges in Docket No.

92F0231. (Doc. 23-5 at 47-48.) 

3. State Convictions and Sentences 

On April 30, 1993, Petitioner was returned to the custody of Louisiana state authorities.

(Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 6; Doc. 23-5 at 44.) Petitioner was subsequently convicted of

the state charges of aggravated kidnaping and possession of cocaine in Docket No. 92F0231.

On November 16, 1993, the state court sentenced Petitioner to thirty-three years’ imprisonment

and committed him to the Louisiana Department of Corrections to serve that sentence.

(Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachments 8 and 9; Doc. 23-5 at 69.) 

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4. Request for Credit for Federal Sentence

On May 27, 2008, while serving his state court sentence in Louisiana, Petitioner filed a

letter requesting that the BOP consider a retroactive designation allowing him to receive credit

on his federal sentence while serving his state sentence. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 11.)

The BOP conveyed that request to the sentencing judge in the federal case (Doc. 23-5 at 70-72),

and the judge responded that he intended for Petitioner’s federal sentence to run consecutively

to his state sentence. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 13; doc. 23-5 at 72.) The BOP denied

Petitioner’s request for a retroactive designation. (Doc. 23-5 at 75-76.) 

C. Supervised Release Violation in California 

In the meantime, on May 23, 2005, the United States District Court, Central District of

California, issued a bench warrant for Petitioner’s arrest based on his alleged violation of

supervised release in 1991 in case number CR89-479-R. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 10.)

After Petitioner was paroled from his Louisiana state sentence and released from the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections (Louisiana Department of Corrections), he

appeared in the Western District of Louisiana for an initial appearance on the petition to revoke

supervised release on June 16, 2010. (Doc. 23-5 at 78, 85) Petitioner was detained and

subsequently transferred to the Central District of California for a final revocation hearing.

(Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 16.) On August 2, 2010, the Central District of California

found that Petitioner had violated his supervised release and sentenced him to four months’

imprisonment. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 17.) 

The BOP prepared a sentence computation based on August 2, 2010, the date Petitioner’s

supervised release was revoked. (Respondent’s Ex. 2.) The BOP gave Petitioner prior-custody

credit for the period from June 16, 2010, the date Petitioner was paroled from his Louisiana state

sentence, through August 1, 2010, the day before the Central District of California sentenced

Petitioner for the supervised release violation. The BOP calculated Petitioner’s release date as

October 15, 2010. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 18.) 

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 As Petitioner notes in his Reply (Doc. 24 at 6), although his scheduled release date was

October 15, 2010, the BOP did not release him until October 27, 2010 because it was awaiting

confirmation that Petitioner had been fully released from custody of the State of Louisiana.

(Doc. 23-5 at 100.) The BOP noted that Petitioner may be eligible for twelve days of overserved time credit against another federal sentence. (Id.) To the extent Petitioner raises a claim

regarding receiving credit for those twelve days, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant credit

toward his sentence. Rather, it is the BOP’s administrative duty “to compute sentences and

apply credit.” United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Reynolds

v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the BOP’s authority to calculate a

defendant’s sentence and to designate a facility for service of that sentence). 

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D. Release from Federal Custody

After Petitioner served his sentence on the revocation of supervised release, the BOP

mistakenly released him from custody on October 27, 2010.3

 (Doc. 16 at 20; Doc. 23-5 at 99.)

BOP then realized that Petitioner had not served his forty-six-month term of imprisonment

imposed on April 28, 1993 by the Western District of Louisiana in case number CR-93-30009

for Petitioner’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and for making a false written

statement in acquiring a firearm. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 19; doc. 23-5 at 101.) On

November 2, 2010, the court issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest. (Respondent’s Ex. 2,

attachment 23.) United States Marshals arrested Petitioner in the Central District of California

on November 15, 2010, and he was remanded to the custody of the BOP to serve his forty-sixmonth federal sentence. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachments 19 and 20.) 

II. Analysis

Petitioner presents the following four grounds for relief: (1) he is entitled to credit against

his federal sentence because he was returned to Louisiana state custody and not immediately

remanded to the BOP after the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana

sentenced him in 1993; (2) the BOP is estopped from asserting, or has waived, any right to

incarcerate him after his inadvertent release; (3) the delay in executing his 1993 federal sentence

in Louisiana violates his rights to due process; and (4) his incarceration after his release from

federal custody is a breach of BOP’s “release agreement.” (Doc. 16.) As set forth below, these

grounds lack merit and the Petition should be denied.

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 Respondents also argue that Petitioner is not entitled to credit on his federal sentence

for the period from January 29, 1993, when he was brought into federal custody in Case No.

CR-93-30009-01, until he was returned to the custody of the State of Louisiana on April 30,

1993. (Doc. 23 at 9.) The Court need not consider this issue because Petitioner did not raise

this claim. However, the Court agrees that Plaintiff was “transferred pursuant to a writ of

habeas corpus ad prosequendum [and was] considered to be on loan to the federal authorities

so that the [State of Louisiana’s] jurisdiction over [Petitioner] continue[d] uninterruptedly.” See

Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). 

5 The State of Louisiana took primary custody of Petitioner when it arrested him and

took custody of him on state charges before federal charges were filed. See Taylor v. Reno, 164

F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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A. Ground One — Credit for Time Spent Serving State Sentence

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to credit on his forty-six-month

federal sentence for the period from April 28, 1993, the date on which the Western District of

Louisiana imposed that sentence, until June 16, 2010, the date on which the Louisiana

Department of Corrections released him from custody. (Doc. 16 at 5-6.) Respondent argues that

Petitioner is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for that period because his federal

sentence was not running at that time.4

 (Doc. 23.) In his Reply, Petitioner “concedes as to this

issue . . . [a]s binding precedence of law . . . and statutory authority (18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)) [are]

controlling.” (Doc. 24 at 3.) Although Petitioner concedes that he is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief on Ground One, he has not withdrawn that claim and the Court will consider it.

Respondent is correct that Petitioner’s federal sentence was not running during the time

he was serving his Louisiana state sentence. A federal sentence begins to run when the service

of that sentence commences, not when it is imposed. Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir.

1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585). On April 28, 1993, the District of Louisiana sentenced

Petitioner to forty-six months’ imprisonment, however, that sentence did not commence on that

date. Rather, Petitioner was returned to the primary custody of the State of Louisiana,5

 was

subsequently convicted on state charges and, on November 16, 1993, was sentenced to thirtyCase 2:12-cv-00718-GMS Document 27 Filed 01/30/13 Page 6 of 15
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three years’ imprisonment and remanded to the Louisiana Department of Corrections to serve

that sentence. 

Additionally, Petitioner’s federal sentence presumptively runs consecutively to his state

sentence. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) provides that, “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed

at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run

concurrently.” Id. However, when the court imposes multiple terms on a defendant at the same

time, or sentences a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,

the court has the discretion to order that multiple terms of imprisonment run concurrently. Id.

That discretion is limited in two ways. First, “concurrent sentences imposed by state judges are

nothing more than recommendations to federal officials.” Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143,

1150 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the word “courts” in § 3584(a) refers only to federal courts. Second,

the Ninth Circuit has held that federal courts “cannot order a sentence to run either concurrently

or consecutively to a non-existent term.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). “In other words, a federal

court cannot order a sentence to be served concurrently with a sentence, including a state

sentence, that has not yet been imposed.” Reynolds, 603 F.3d at 1149. 

Here, because the State of Louisiana had not yet tried, convicted, or sentenced Petitioner

on the state charges, the Western District of Louisiana could not have ordered that Petitioner’s

federal sentence run concurrently with any sentence imposed in the state case. Accordingly, the

District Court’s judgment did not specify whether Petitioner’s forty-six-month term of

imprisonment should run consecutively or concurrently to any sentence that the Louisiana state

court might later impose. Thus, Petitioner’s 1993 federal sentence runs consecutively to

Petitioner’s later-imposed state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Indeed, consistent with

§ 3584(a), the judge who imposed the federal sentence later clarified that he intended for

Petitioner’s federal sentence to run consecutively to his state sentence. Therefore, Petitioner is

not entitled to credit on his forty-six-month federal sentence for the period from April 28, 1993

until June 16, 2010. 

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B. Ground Two — Estoppel and Waiver

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that requiring him to serve his forty-six-month prison

sentence after he was mistakenly released from federal custody violates the Due Process Clause

based on theories of waiver or estoppel. Respondent opposes this assertion. “[U]nder common

law, a convicted person erroneously at liberty must, when the error is discovered, serve the full

sentence imposed.” United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1988). However,

courts now “consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the delay in execution of the

sentence” to determine if a due process violation has occurred. Id. If due process has been

violated, “the convicted person is not required to serve the entire sentence imposed.” Id. “[I]n

cases involving delay in execution of sentence, federal courts have examined an alleged due

process violation under the theories of waiver or estoppel.” Id. (citing Green v. Christiansen,

732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Court will consider whether estoppel or waiver

precludes the government from requiring Petitioner to serve the forty-six-month term of

imprisonment imposed by the Western District of Louisiana in 1993. 

1. Equitable Estoppel

Generally, equitable estoppel is not an available defense against the government.

Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788-89 (1981). The Supreme Court has not explicitly

endorsed estoppel against the government and has not set forth the circumstances under which

estoppel might succeed against the government. Id. (“This Court has never decided what type

of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon

compliance with valid regulations . . . .”). The Supreme Court has, however, suggested that

“[a]ffirmative misconduct” may be sufficient for an estoppel claim. Id. Additionally, the Ninth

Circuit has recognized that “estoppel is available as a defense against the government if the

government’s wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public’s interest

would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel.” United States v. Lazy FC Ranch,

481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted). 

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Estoppel requires that: “(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must

intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or must act so that the party asserting the estoppel has

a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the

facts; and (4) that party must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.” Martinez, 837 F.3d at

865; see also Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v.

Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970)). As discussed below, even assuming that

Petitioner established the threshold requirement for estoppel against the government, Petitioner

does not satisfy the criteria for imposing estoppel in this case. 

Here, Petitioner knew that he had not served his forty-six-month prison sentence that the

Western District of Louisiana imposed in 1993. Indeed, while serving his state court sentence,

Petitioner requested that the BOP consider a retroactive designation so that he could receive

credit on his federal sentence. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, attachment 11.) After receiving

confirmation that the sentencing judge intended for Petitioner’s federal sentence to run

consecutively to his state sentence, the BOP denied Petitioner’s request. See Reynolds v.

Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding BOP’s authority to deny prisoner’s

request that his federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentence, when no federal court

order designated that the sentences should run concurrently.) Thus, Petitioner knew that his

federal sentence was not running while he was serving his state sentence. 

Petitioner alleges that during his June 16, 2010 initial appearance in the Western District

of Louisiana on the petition to revoke supervised release, which had been filed in the Central

District of California, the judge stated that Petitioner “was through with all of his time in

Louisiana,” in reference to Petitioner’s forty-six-month federal sentence. (Doc. 24 at 4-5.) In

support of his assertion, Petitioner cites the June 16, 2010 minute entry. (Id., Ex. A.) That

minute entry does not include any statements from the court, and only indicates that Petitioner

was before the court for an initial appearance on an allegation that he violated his supervised

release in the Central District of California. (Id.; doc. 23-5 at 85.) The record does not contain

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any evidence indicating that the judge suggested that Petitioner was released from federal

custody or that he had served his forty-six-month sentence.

After the June 16, 2010 initial appearance, Petitioner was transferred to the Central

District of California for a revocation hearing. The Central District of California found that

Petitioner had violated his supervised release and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment.

After Petitioner served that sentence, BOP released him from custody on October 27, 2010.

Shortly thereafter, BOP realized Petitioner had an outstanding federal sentence from the Western

District of Louisiana, and that court issued a warrant for his arrest on November 2, 2010. (Doc.

23-5 at 120.) Petitioner was arrested on November 15, 2010 and was remanded to the BOP to

serve his forty-six-month sentence imposed by the Western District of Louisiana. (Doc. 23-5

at 121.) 

These facts do not warrant estopping the government from requiring Petitioner to serve

his forty-six-month term of imprisonment. The BOP overlooked Petitioner’s unserved federal

sentence and mistakenly released him from custody. The BOP quickly discovered its mistake

and federal authorities arrested Petitioner less than three weeks after his mistaken release. The

government did not take any affirmative action that was so misleading that it should be estopped

from requiring Petitioner to serve his federal sentence. See Green, 732 F.2d at 1399 (finding that

a “ministerial mistake does not necessarily excuse [petitioner] from serving the rest of his

sentence.”); cf. Johnson, 682 F.2d at 872-73 (holding that the government was estopped from

enforcing non-parolability provision of a statute when prisoner had been led to believe, through

eight successive administrative reviews, that he would be eligible for parole when he was

released). While the government’s actions in this case may have been negligent, they do not

amount to affirmative misconduct. See Jaa v. United States I.N.S., 779 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir.

1986) (“Affirmative misconduct must be more than negligence . . . .”).

Additionally, although Petitioner relied on the government’s conduct in releasing him,

reunited with his family, and obtained work as a mechanic and motel clerk while he was

released, he has not shown that he suffered the requisite injury considering the short duration of

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his release and the nature of the work he obtained. See Green, 732 F.2d at 1398-99 (finding that

estoppel was not warranted when petitioner had been released for two-and-one-half-years based

on the inadvertent failure of U.S. Marshals to place a detainer on him while he was incarcerated

in the California Department of Corrections.); cf. Johnson, 682 F.2d at 873 (finding estoppel

appropriate when, during fifteen months of parole release petitioner had “reunited with his

family and left the safe haven of steady employment as a fruit packer in order to start and operate

his own fruit business. By the time of his arrest, he had hired five employees, was solely

responsible for the business banking accounts, and had been extended credit by local

businesses.”). Here, the government’s inadvertent release of Petitioner “did not so mislead [him]

that it would be improper to charge him with constructive knowledge that he still had time to

serve.” See Id. Petitioner, therefore, has not established the elements of estoppel. 

2. Waiver

Petitioner also argues that the government has waived its right to require him to serve his

forty-six-month term of imprisonment. Waiver can only be found when the government’s

“actions are so affirmatively improper or grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally

inconsistent with ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice’ to require a legal sentence to be

served in its aftermath.” Green, 732 F.2d at 1399. Here, Petitioner’s mistaken release was based

on a ministerial mistake — the BOP’s miscalculation of Petitioner’s release date based on its

failure to consider Petitioner’s unserved federal sentence imposed by the Western District of

Louisiana. In similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that this sort of mistake does not rise

to the level of misconduct and does not constitute a waiver. See Green, 732 F.2d at 1298. Like

this case, the petitioner in Green sought habeas corpus relief arguing that the government had

waived, or was estopped from, asserting any right to incarcerate him after his mistaken release.

The district court rejected Green’s claim finding “that the inadvertence of a marshal in failing

to place a detainer on [petitioner] [does not] meet[] the requisite standard of misconduct; the

omission amounts to mere negligence at worst.” Green, 732 F.2d at 1399. “It therefore does not

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constitute a waiver.” Id. Similarly, in this case, the government’s actions in releasing Petitioner

may have been negligent, but were not misconduct resulting in a waiver.

C. Ground Three — Delay in Executing Federal Sentence

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the delay in executing his 1993 federal sentence

from the Western District of Louisiana violates the Due Process Clause. Petitioner asserts that

the “government’s lack of interest in the execution of petitioner[’s] sentence for 19 years was

essentially a pardon or commutation of [that] sentence.” (Doc. 16 at 10.) As discussed below,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

During the sentencing hearing, the Louisiana District Court stated that Petitioner was

“now in federal custody.” Petitioner argues from this statement that his federal sentence should

have commenced immediately. That statement, however, did not commence Petitioner’s federal

sentence. A federal sentence does not commence on the date it is imposed, but rather it

commences “on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or

arrives . . . at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3585. Any statement by the court prescribing “when a sentence shall begin to run, [] is

surplusage and has no effect; it cannot displace an action of Congress.” Scott v. United States,

434 F.2d 11, 21 (5th Cir. 1970). Thus, the district court in this case lacked authority to

commence Petitioner’s federal sentence, “regardless of what the court said.” See Taylor, 164

F.3d at 446. Petitioner also asserts that the U.S. Marshal violated the district court’s

commitment order, which he construes as requiring the U.S. Marshal to immediately deliver him

to the BOP to begin serving his federal sentence. This claim also lacks merit because the district

court lacked authority to order the commencement of Petitioner’s sentence. See id.

As previously noted, the judgment entered in the Western District of Louisiana did not,

and could not properly, indicate whether Petitioner’s federal sentence should run concurrently

or consecutively to any sentence that the state court had yet to impose. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).

Additionally, § 3584(a) provides that multiple terms of state and federal imprisonment run

consecutively absent a court order that the sentences run concurrently. Id. Thus, Petitioner’s

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federal sentence properly runs consecutively to his state sentence. By requiring Petitioner to

serve his outstanding federal sentence, BOP is enforcing the plain terms of § 3584(a).

Therefore, the commencement of Petitioner’s federal sentence after the completion of his

state sentence, and after he had spent a few weeks in the community following his mistaken

release from federal custody, does not give rise to a due process violation. See Martinez, 837

F.2d at 864-65 (finding that unexplained seven-and-one-half year delay in ordering execution

of a federal sentence did not violate the due process clause). The execution of Petitioner’s

sentence comports with the applicable federal law and the delay in the commencement of his

1993 federal sentence from the Western District of Louisiana is not so fundamentally unfair as

to give rise to a due process violation. See Taylor, 164 F.3d at 446 (rejecting petitioner’s claim

that district court’s statements that petitioner should get credit against his federal sentence for

time spent in state custody gave rise to a due process violation when district court acknowledged

that it lacked authority to commence federal sentence “as long as [petitioner was] in state

custody.”); Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding that “official

conduct that merely evidences a lack of eager pursuit or even arguable lack of interest” is not

sufficient to violate due process). But cf. United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 807-08

(D.D.C. 1979) (finding that “fundamental principles of liberty and justice” would be violated if

a petitioner were required to serve the remainder of his sentence after he had been released

prematurely from custody despite having inquired about the status of an outstanding detainer

and, during his three years on release, had successfully adjusted to society, including getting

married and having one child and adopting another, becoming an active member of a church, and

becoming a part-owner and vice-president of a construction company).

D. Ground Four — Breach of Contract

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that BOP’s act of incarcerating him after his release

from custody pursuant to a “Release Authorization” is a breach of contract. (Doc. 16 at 11.) In

support of that assertion, Petitioner cites civil cases construing release agreements. (Doc. 24 at

10 (citing, inter alia, Skilstaf Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1018 n.10 (9th Cir.

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 The Release Authorization provides: “CERTIFICATION. I certify that this release is

in accordance with applicable and controlling rules, regulations and statutory provisions. I have

personally reviewed this inmate’s Judgment and Commitment File and determined that there

is no information that would prevent release by the method stated above . . . All Judgment and

Commitment Orders, U.S. Parole Commission Warrants, Notice of Actions, Good Time

Documents, and all detainer information have been personally reviewed by me [Art Moore,

SCSS].” (Doc. 16 at 20.)

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2011); Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing provision in settlement

agreement releasing parties from civil liability); Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 449 (9th Cir.

2006) (interpreting a “general release” discharging movie company from claims arising out of

creation of a film based on a dancer’s life))). The agreements at issue in those cases, however,

released certain parties from possible civil liability. In contrast, the document that the BOP

issued in this case, a Release Authorization, physically released Petitioner from BOP’s custody.6

Petitioner has not cited any authority suggesting that the Release Authorization should be

construed as a contract. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be

denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

Doc. 16, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. 4(a)(1), should not be filed

until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties have fourteen days from the date of

service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file specific written

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objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of

a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant

to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 72. 

DATED this 30th day of January, 2013.

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