Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04583/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04583-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALLY WETTER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF NAPA, OFFICER B. BANDY,

OFFICER J. THOMPSON, OFFICER A.

ORTIZ, and DOES 1–10, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-04583 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this Section 1983 action alleging violations of civil rights for excessive force and

unlawful arrest, defendants move to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Inasmuch as the claim

for wrongful arrest is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), it must be dismissed. 

The excessive-force claim, however, is not barred.

STATEMENT 

The complaint arises out of an incident that occurred on March 9, 2006. According to

the complaint, plaintiff was at home in Napa when defendants Officer B. Bandy, Officer J.

Thompson, and Officer A. Ortiz rang his doorbell (Compl. at ¶ 12). After plaintiff inquired

why the defendants were there, they responded that it involved his wife (id. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff

allowed the officers to enter his home (ibid.). Officer Bandy then informed plaintiff that his

wife had alleged that he had threatened to kill her, had choked her for ten minutes, and had

shoved her against a countertop, causing her to fracture her ribs (id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff denied

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

these allegations. Officer Bandy then told plaintiff that he had to go “downtown” with the

officers (id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff asked whether he was under arrest and Officer Bandy replied

“no” (ibid.). Not wanting to leave his five-year old son behind, plaintiff said “let me get my

son,” and subsequently turned to walk towards his son at the other end of the hallway (id. at ¶

19). Officer Bandy then grabbed plaintiff’s left wrist and threw him face-first to the floor (id. at

¶ 20). Plaintiff requested that Officer Bandy release his arm because his shoulder was hurting,

but the latter responded “you’re resisting arrest, you’re resisting arrest” (id. at ¶ 21). With the

assistance of the two others, Officer Bandy knocked plaintiff’s head against the floor (ibid.). 

Up until this moment, none of the officers had told plaintiff that he was under arrest (ibid.). 

Subsequently, plaintiff was arrested, booked, and taken to the hospital for treatment (id. at

27–37).

The Court takes judicial notice that a few days later, plaintiff was charged in Napa

County Superior Court with four counts of spousal abuse, alleged to have occurred on March 9,

2006. The superior court later granted a motion to amend the complaint to add a charge of

resisting arrest under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1), accepted plaintiff’s nolo

contendre plea to the Section 148(a)(1) charge, and dismissed all spousal-abuse charges. 

Simultaneously, plaintiff executed a plea agreement stipulating that “there was a factual basis

for my plea in the police report.” Plaintiff pled nolo contendre to a charge of violating Section

148(a)(1).

In the instant case, plaintiff alleges a violation of civil rights against the individual

officers for excessive force and unlawful arrest. Defendants move to dismiss both claims

pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).

ANALYSIS

On a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept all well-pled allegations of the

complaint as true, but the district “court may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of

public record.” Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint should not be

dismissed unless it is clear that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief. Even if the chance of recovery is remote, a court must allow

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

plaintiff the opportunity to develop a case. Dismissal is only proper if there is either a "lack of a

cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

1. THE HECK DOCTRINE.

Defendants’ sole argument in support of their motion to dismiss is that both of plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994),

which held:

[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that

has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,

the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if

the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even

if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the

action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of

some other bar to the suit.

Thus, a claim based on a violation of Section 1983 must be barred if it "would necessarily imply

the invalidity" of an underlying criminal conviction or sentence.

A. Guilty Plea vs. Nolo Contendre Plea.

Under California law, a plea of nolo contendre equates to a conviction. California Penal

Code Section 1016, paragraph 3, states:

The court shall ascertain whether the defendant completely

understands that a plea of nolo contendere shall be

considered the same as a plea of guilty and that, upon a

plea of nolo contendere, the court shall find the defendant

guilty. The legal effect of such a plea, to a crime punishable

as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty for

all purposes. In cases other than those punishable as

felonies, the plea and any admissions required by the court

during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, and

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

factual basis for, the plea may not be used against the

defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or

growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution

is based. (emphasis added)

Relying on the italicized passage, plaintiff argues that defendants may not now seek to use the

nolo contendre plea against plaintiff in this action (Opp. n.1).

Although it does not appear the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed this issue, it has on

at least one occasion assumed that a nolo contendre plea is the equivalent of a guilty plea for

Heck analysis under California law. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). In

addition, Judge Timlin in the Central District of California has expressly found that a California

nolo contendre plea is the equivalent of a guilty plea for purposes of applying the Heck doctrine

to bar a Section 1983 claim. See Nuno v. County of Riverside, 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1137–39

(C.D. Cal. 1999). Other circuits have also indicated a willingness to treat a nolo contendre plea

as a guilty plea for purposes of applying the Heck doctrine, despite similar state law restrictions

on the use of nolo contendre pleas in subsequent civil actions. In Hernandez v. Boles, 184 F.3d

819 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit held:

Whether the conviction was obtained at trial, by a guilty

plea, or by a nolo plea is irrelevant to this inquiry. A court

considering a defense under Heck has no need to consider

the plea as evidence; the court instead looks merely to

whether an implicated conviction has been overturned. The

fact that Hernandez’s conviction was obtained after he

pleaded no contest is of no importance under Heck.

See also Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 69 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the policy animated behind

Heck’s adoption of a favorable termination requirement counsels against allowing a Section

1983 claim to impugn the validity of a former nolo contendre plea).

This order agrees. The purpose of the Heck doctrine is to ensure that valid state criminal

convictions and sentences are not, in effect, retroactively contradicted by subsequent federal

civil actions. That purpose applies to any conviction whether by guilty plea or nolo contendre

plea. Once the conviction is reduced to judgment, we do not look behind the judgment to

identify the avenue lending to the judgment of conviction. The distinction between a plea and

conviction has also been recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Brewer v. City of

Napa, 210 F.3d. 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held:

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

The issue presented in this appeal is whether evidence of a

conviction based on a no contest plea can be admitted for

impeachment purposes under Rule 609. We conclude that

such evidence is admissible. Rule 410 by its terms prohibits

only evidence of pleas (including no contest pleas), insofar

as pleas constitute statements or admissions. Rule 609, by

contrast, permits admission for impeachment purposes of

evidence of convictions. The plain language of the Federal

Rules of Evidence thus supports the decision of the district

court in this case. (no emphasis added)

It is true that Section 1016 of the state penal code provides that misdemeanor pleas

cannot be used against an accused in a subsequent civil action. This means that the plea (and

presumably the judgment) cannot be used to establish civil liability against the accused. But

when an accused sues and seeks to impose civil liability on someone else, it is not so clear that

Section 1016 was intended to let the accused have it both ways, even as a matter of California

law. However that issue may come out under state law, the federal law is clear. Heck places

definitive weight on the judgment of conviction. End of federal story. State law cannot undo

federal law. The fact of judgment is conclusive and dispositive.

2. WRONGFUL-ARREST CLAIM.

The elements for a violation of California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1) include: “(a)

the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (b) when the officer was

engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (c) the defendant knew or reasonably

should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his

or her duties.” In Re Muhammed C., 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 (2002). For a Section

148(a)(1) conviction to be valid, a criminal defendant must have resisted or obstructed a police

officer in the lawful exercise of his duties. Under California law, a conviction under Section

148(a)(1) implies that the police officer was acting lawfully. “If the officer was not performing

his or her duties at the time of the arrest, the arrest is unlawful and the arrestee cannot be

convicted under Penal Code Section 148, subdivision (a).” Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94

Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409 (2002). 

Plaintiff’s wrongful-arrest claim is barred by Heck. A conviction under Section

148(a)(1) necessarily implies that the conduct constituting an obstruction to the officer’s duties

occurred while the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, including

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

that any arrest the officer made was supported by probable cause. See People v. Simons, 42

Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110 (1996). In Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth

Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a Section 1983 claim for false arrest. Smithart

drove his car at the defendants, several state officers, after the officers effected a traffic stop of

Smithart’s son. Smithart alleged that he then exited the vehicle and the officers unnecessarily

beat him with their batons, feet, and fists, causing Smithart to sustain significant injuries. 

Smithart entered a plea to assault with a deadly weapon and subsequently brought an action for

violation of Section 1983 for excessive force and wrongful arrest. Before determining that

Smithart’s Section 1983 claim for excessive force would not necessarily imply the invalidity of

Smithart’s arrest or conviction for Heck purposes, the Ninth Circuit held, “[t]here is no question

that Heck bars Smithart’s claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and

brought unfounded criminal charges against him.” Thus, though Smithart’s excessive-force

claim was permitted to go forward, his wrongful-arrest claim was dismissed because his guilty

conviction necessarily implied the officer’s had probable cause at the time of arrest.

By the same reasoning, plaintiff’s nolo contendre conviction creates an automatic

presumption that the police officers were acting lawfully at the time of arrest. Plaintiff’s

convoluted argument that the lawfulness of the arrest somehow depends on whether it was for

violation of Section 148(a)(1) or for domestic violence misses the point. In either instance, in

order for plaintiff to prevail on his Section 1983 claim for false arrest, plaintiff would have to

show that there was no probable cause to arrest him. Given that plaintiff’s conviction for

violation of Section 148(a)(1) implies the officers had probable cause to arrest, such a showing

is impossible. A finding that there was no probable cause to arrest would necessarily render

plaintiff’s conviction for violation of Section 1983 invalid, leading to a direct contradiction of

Heck.

Plaintiff attempts to divert attention from this salient fact by contending that because the

violation of Section 148(a)(1) was not originally charged, it was “thrown into the police report

by defendant Bandy for the express purpose of depriving plaintiff of his right to seek redress in

civil court” (Opp. 10). Such an argument, however, is of no significance to the present action. 

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Where there is probable cause to arrest for any crime, the arrest does not violate the Fourth

Amendment, whether or not that crime was actually charged. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543

U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004). Ultimately, plaintiff pled nolo contendre to a charge of violation of

Section 148(a)(1). The issue of whether the plea was coerced or breached is not before this

Court. The plea conviction must be taken as valid for Heck purposes and plaintiff’s 

wrongful-arrest claim must fail.

3. EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIM.

In its en banc decision Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005), reversing a

district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed the intersection

between the Heck doctrine and Section 148(a)(1). There, the plaintiff, Smith, refused to take his

hands out of his pockets or put his hands on his head after being instructed to do so twice by

police officers. The police officers then approached Smith and attempted to arrest him, but

Smith once again repeatedly disobeyed their commands. Smith later pled guilty to violating

Section 148(a)(1), and subsequently brought a Section 1983 action for excessive force against

the police officers and city. Smith’s plea agreement and the record gave no indication as to

which conduct Smith’s guilty plea was directed towards. In permitting Smith’s claims to go

forward, the Ninth Circuit held:

A conviction for resisting arrest under § 148(a)(1) may be

lawfully obtained only if the officers do not use excessive

force in the course of making that arrest. A conviction

based on conduct that occurred before the officers

commence the process of arresting the defendant is not

“necessarily” rendered invalid by the officers' subsequent

use of excessive force in making the arrest. For example,

the officers do not act unlawfully when they perform

investigative duties a defendant seeks to obstruct, but only

afterwards when they employ excessive force in making

the arrest. Similarly, excessive force used after a defendant

has been arrested may properly be the subject of a § 1983

action notwithstanding the defendant's conviction on a

charge of resisting an arrest that was itself lawfully

conducted.

Thus, because the violation of Section 148(a)(1) could have occurred before or after the police

approached Smith, his Section 1983 claim was not necessarily barred by Heck. Smith’s

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

allegations of excessive force could have occurred after the conduct that gave rise to the

violation of Section 148(a)(1), the Ninth Circuit held.

Here, the complaint, liberally construed raises an inference that the police brutality

alleged occurred separately from the conduct forming the basis for the Section 148(a)(1) charge. 

It is entirely possible, crediting the complaint, that defendant was told that he was not under

arrest, that he needed to go downtown, that he delayed the officers in their desire to go

downtown, and that, after that occurred, they beat plaintiff up, excessively so in the

circumstances. 

In Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit rejected the

defendant’s Heck argument on facts similar to those presented on the current motion. The

plaintiff, Sanford, arrived at her boyfriend’s house to find her boyfriend fighting with police

officers. Sanford began to yell at the police officers and was placed under arrest. After being

arrested, Sanford continued to yell at the police officers and was struck in the face by the

defendant, Motts. Sanford later pled guilty to a violation of Section 148 and subsequently

brought an excessive-force claim against Motts. The Ninth Circuit held:

[I]f Motts used excessive force subsequent to the time

Sanford interfered with his duty, success in her section

1983 claim will not invalidate her conviction. If Motts had

shot and wounded her instead of punching her while she

stood handcuffed, there would be no doubt that she could

sue him for violation of her civil rights.

Similarly, had Officer Bandy shot plaintiff in his leg instead of throwing him to the ground,

there would be no doubt that plaintiff’s excessive-force claim would be allowed to go forward. 

It makes no difference, as defendants contend, that the incident leading to this case occurred on

a more continuous time-line than the facts presented in Smith. Absent any showing of the

factual basis for plaintiff’s Section 148 conviction, the alleged excessive force could have

occurred after plaintiff interfered with the officers’ duties, and plaintiff’s claim for 

excessive force, thus, cannot be dismissed.

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s false-arrest claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), but plaintiff’s excessive-force claim must be allowed to go forward.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-04583-WHA Document 26 Filed 01/04/08 Page 9 of 9