Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03144/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03144-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3144

___________

Walter Huggins, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.; *

Teton Transportation, Inc.; Swanston *

Equipment Company, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: November 10, 2009

Filed: January 19, 2010

___________

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Esteban Gutierrez was driving a tractor-trailer bearing the insignia of FedEx

Ground Package System, while Walter Huggins slept in the back of the truck;

Mr. Huggins was injured when Mr. Gutierrez collided with the tractor-trailer in front

of him, which Tony Johnston, an employee of Teton Transportation, was driving.

Shortly before the collision, as he topped a hill, Mr. Johnston saw a Swanston

Equipment pickup truck traveling slowly down the left shoulder of the highway and

displaying a sign that read, "Left Lane Closed Ahead." Mr. Johnston slowed his truck,

and, when the vehicle immediately in front of him came to a sudden stop, he applied

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his brakes and stopped about ten feet behind it. The Gutierrez tractor-trailer then

collided with the back of the Teton vehicle. Mr. Huggins brought an action in

Missouri state court for damages arising out of the collision and Teton removed it to

federal district court.

The district court granted summary judgment to Teton and FedEx but denied

summary judgment to Swanston. After obtaining an order designating the rulings in

favor of Teton and FedEx as final judgments, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Mr. Huggins

appealed. We dismissed his appeal sua sponte for lack of appellate jurisdiction

because of the unresolved claims against Swanston. Huggins v. FedEx Ground

Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2009). On remand, the district court

granted Mr. Huggins's motion to dismiss his claims against Swanston without

prejudice and Mr. Huggins again appealed, challenging the orders granting summary

judgment to Teton and FedEx on his negligence claims. We conclude that we have

jurisdiction and we affirm the judgment in favor of Teton. But we reverse the

judgment in favor of FedEx and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

In its motion for summary judgment, Teton contended that Mr. Huggins could

not make out a negligence claim because he could not show that Teton's alleged

negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. See Teichman v. Potashnick

Constr., Inc., 446 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Mo. 1969). (The parties agree that Missouri

substantive law applies in this case.) In support of its motion, Teton relied on the part

of Mr. Johnston's deposition testimony that described a straightforward rear-end

collision: he drove over the hill in the right westbound lane, saw the left-lane closure

sign, eventually stopped in that lane, and was hit from behind. Mr. Huggins filed a

timely response, relying on another part of Mr. Johnston's account to argue that the

Teton driver contributed to the collision by engaging in a "cat-and-mouse game" with

Mr. Gutierrez. Mr. Johnston had attested that the two trucks had traveled together for

some time before the collision occurred. He had further declared that, during this

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period, Mr. Gutierrez had tried to pass Mr. Johnston's tractor-trailer about five times

and attempted to engage another driver to assist him, but Mr. Johnston did not allow

him to pass and once slightly exceeded the speed limit to prevent Mr. Gutierrez from

passing him. The district court concluded, however, that under Missouri law these

earlier activities could not be a proximate cause of the rear-end collision, and Mr.

Huggins does not challenge that determination on appeal.

Mr. Huggins maintains instead that the district court erred by denying his

untimely motion to supplement his response to Teton's summary judgment motion.

The court, after conferring with the parties, had previously extended its deadline for

dispositive motions, including motions for summary judgment, and had ordered the

opposing party to file any desired response to a dispositive motion within thirty days

after such a motion was filed (thus providing ten more days for filing a response than

did the local rules, see E.D. Mo. R. 7-4.01(B) (2006)). After Mr. Huggins filed his

timely response to Teton's motion for summary judgment, FedEx filed its response to

a summary judgment motion that Mr. Huggins later filed and it attached

Mr. Gutierrez's affidavit. In the affidavit, Mr. Gutierrez attested that the Teton truck

"cut in front of" him "[i]mmediately prior to the accident," thereby preventing him

"from having sufficient stopping distance to avoid the collision." About a week after

FedEx filed the affidavit and two weeks after the time ran for responding to Teton's

motion, Mr. Huggins moved to supplement the record relevant to Teton's motion by

incorporating Mr. Gutierrez's affidavit into his response. Teton, in turn, asked the

court either to deny Mr. Huggins's request to supplement the record or to allow Teton

additional time to depose Mr. Gutierrez pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f): Under that

rule, a district court may grant time for a party opposing summary judgment to take

a deposition if that party "shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot

present facts essential to justify its opposition."

Some three weeks later, Teton and the other defendants moved to continue the

trial and to amend the court's case management order, asserting, among other things,

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that the case had been delayed because of disputes about diversity jurisdiction, that

Mr. Huggins had only recently completed his medical treatment, and that the parties

were trying to "coordinate a date" for deposing Mr. Gutierrez. The court granted the

motion in part, extending discovery and setting a later trial date, but it did not change

the deadlines for dispositive motions or for responses to those motions. None of the

parties deposed Mr. Gutierrez before the new discovery deadline passed. About a

month later, the court denied Mr. Huggins's motion to supplement the record and

granted Teton's summary judgment motion. Huggins v. Federal Express Corp.,

No. 06-CV-01283, 2008 WL 1777438 (E.D. Mo. April 16, 2008). Though the court

acknowledged the "potential significance of Gutierrez's testimony," it declined to

consider the affidavit because Mr. Huggins obtained it after what was then the

deadline for discovery, as well as the deadline for filing dispositive motions, had

passed. The court explained that it "appear[ed] that Plaintiff opted against timely

interviewing, deposing, and/or securing the affidavit of, Gutierrez," and that

Mr. Huggins should "not be permitted to take unfair advantage of the presumably

accessible, subject evidence – presented by FedEx after the close of discovery." In

support of its conclusion that the evidence had been accessible, the court cited

Rule 56(f), on which Mr. Huggins could have relied if the evidence had been

unavailable to him. Huggins, 2008 WL 1777438 at *3 n.2.

Although Rule 56 provides deadlines for filing summary judgment materials,

the district courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets and address particular

circumstances by enforcing local rules and by setting enforceable time limits. See

Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 579 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Sipe

v. Workhorse Custom Chassis, LLC, 572 F.3d 525, 531-32 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, Mr.

Huggins does not dispute that he moved to supplement the summary judgment record

two weeks after his response to Teton's summary judgment motion was due, and after

he had already filed a timely response without indicating any need for additional time.

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Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1), "[w]hen an act may or must be done within a

specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... on motion made after

the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect." The

district court has discretion to admit or exclude materials under this rule, and its

"refusal to accept untimely filed materials will not be reversed for an abuse of

discretion unless the proponent of the materials has made an affirmative showing of

excusable neglect." African American Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa,

54 F.3d 1345, 1350 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.

871, 894-98 (1990)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1113 (1996); see also DG&G, Inc. v.

FlexSol Packaging Corp. of Pompano Beach, 576 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2009). We

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion here because Mr. Huggins

failed to make an "affirmative showing of excusable neglect."

Interpreting the term "excusable neglect" in a bankruptcy rule derived from

Rule 6(b), the Supreme Court has held that "neglect" does not require a showing that

the party was without fault but encompasses "inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness,"

though the neglect will not necessarily be "excusable." Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v.

Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 391 (1993); see Noah v.

Bond Cold Storage, 408 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005). But the untimeliness here

was not the result of mistake or carelessness. As Mr. Huggins's counsel confirmed at

oral argument, he consciously elected not to depose Mr. Gutierrez for strategic

reasons: On hearing Mr. Johnston attest that Mr. Gutierrez, after repeatedly trying to

pass him, had been angrily cursing at Mr. Johnston over his CB radio shortly before

he slammed into the back of the Mr. Johnston's truck, Mr. Huggins's attorney decided

not to preserve Mr. Gutierrez's testimony. Since Mr. Gutierrez had relocated to

Hawaii, Mr. Huggins's counsel reasoned that FedEx might have difficulty producing

him at trial to counter Mr. Johnston's negative characterization of Mr. Gutierrez's

behavior. The district court thus did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Huggins

consciously "opted against" timely obtaining Mr. Gutierrez's testimony.

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We reject Mr. Huggins's contention that the district court's order granting

additional time for discovery should alter the outcome. As we have explained, the

court did not change the date for filing and responding to dispositive motions, it

merely gave the parties additional time to conduct discovery before trial in a case that

had been pending for over two years. We do not believe that the court's order

distinguishes our case from Villa and others holding that a district court does not

abuse its discretion by denying leave to file supplementary matter out of time where

the proponent fails to show excusable neglect.

II.

A.

Mr. Huggins contends that the district court erred in entering summary

judgment for FedEx based on its conclusion that the evidence could not support a

finding that Mr. Gutierrez was a FedEx employee and so his negligence could not be

imputed to FedEx. Reviewing the evidence and inferences from it favorably to

Mr. Huggins, as we must, Ridpath v. Pederson, 407 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2005), we

conclude that Mr. Huggins presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment.

Because Mr. Huggins based his negligence claim against FedEx on the doctrine

of respondeat superior, he had to establish that the driver, Mr. Gutierrez, was a FedEx

employee. Under Missouri law, the resolution of this issue depends upon the

particular facts of each case and is usually a question for the jury, although it may be

decided as a matter of law when the material facts are undisputed and "only one

reasonable conclusion can be drawn" from those facts. Johnson v. Bi-State

Development Agency, 793 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Mo. 1990), superseded on other grounds,

State ex rel. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. Sanders, 807 S.W.2d 87 (Mo.

1991); Ascoli v. Hinck, 256 S.W.3d 592, 594-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 

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The "principal factors" that Missouri courts routinely consider in determining

whether one acting for another is an employee or an independent contractor for

purposes of respondeat superior liability are set out in § 220(2) of the Restatement

(Second) of Agency. Lee v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 81 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Mo. Ct. App.

2002); see Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 242 n.9

(Mo. 1983); Dean v. Young, 396 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Mo.1965). The very first of these

considerations is "the extent of control which, by the [relevant] agreement, the master

may exercise over the details of the work," Restatement (Second) of Agency

§ 220(2)(a), and the Missouri Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the

importance of the "right to control the conduct of another in the performance of an

act," describing it as the "touchstone" for determining whether a master-servant

relationship exists, see e.g., J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1996).

In support of its summary judgment motion, FedEx relied on a "Linehaul

Contractor Operating Agreement" under which Jon Ireland (who did business as ANI

Logistics) agreed to provide certain shipping and tractor leasing services to FedEx.

(Although RPS, Inc., originally contracted with ANI, FedEx later acquired RPS and

the relevant contract, and thus we refer to FedEx as the contracting party.) The parties

agree that Mr. Gutierrez drove an ANI tractor and was an ANI operator as that term

is used in the agreement, and although Mr. Gutierrez was not a party to the agreement,

some of the contract's provisions address the role of ANI's drivers.

Based on the agreement, the district court concluded that the parties intended

to disclaim any employment relationship between ANI's employees and FedEx, that

FedEx did not have the right to control Mr. Gutierrez's work, and that the contract

supported the conclusion that Mr. Gutierrez was an independent contractor with

respect to FedEx. After determining that Mr. Huggins had not offered admissible

evidence to the contrary, the court granted summary judgment to FedEx because

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Mr Huggins failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that

Mr. Gutierrez was a FedEx employee.

In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily on specific provisions in the

agreement stating that the parties "intend" that ANI "will provide [its] services strictly

as an independent contractor, and not as an employee of [FedEx] for any purpose" and

will "direct the operation of the Equipment and ... determine the methods, manner and

means of performing the obligations specified in the Agreement." Although the

district court acknowledged that the contract "defined certain requirements regarding

standards of service/performance; operator appearance; customer service;

safety/conduct," it concluded that ANI had discretion as to how to "carry out" these

"objectives." The court relied on provisions giving ANI "sole discretion in

determining the means and methods [by] which to carry out the foregoing objectives."

The Restatement notes the "important distinction" that exists "between service in

which the actor's physical activities and his time are surrendered to the control of the

master, and service under an agreement to ... use care and skill in accomplishing

results." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, comment (e); see also Skidmore v.

Haggard, 341 Mo. 837, 845, 110 S.W.2d 726, 730 (Mo. 1937). In the former case,

the actor is an employee or servant, in the latter an independent contractor.

Of course, general contract provisions that confer on a party the discretion to

determine the "means and methods" for carrying out "objectives" (language often used

to describe the role of an independent contractor) will not trump provisions that

actually reserve the right to control the details of that party's performance. Having

carefully reviewed the agreement in this case, we conclude that it did not simply

require ANI and its drivers to use skill and care in their work; under the agreement,

FedEx retained the right to control at least some of the "means and methods" used by

ANI and its drivers to achieve the contract's stated objectives.

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We observe initially that the agreement makes plain that the ANI drivers

performed work that was "part of the regular business" of FedEx, a fact that the

Restatement lists as supporting the existence of a master/servant relationship.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(h). For instance, the contract begins by

stating that FedEx "is a duly licensed motor carrier engaged in providing ...

transportation and delivery service" and that FedEx "wants to provide for package

pick-up and delivery services through a network of nationwide terminals served by"

what it terms "independent contractors." Unlike truck drivers engaged by other types

of businesses, however, ANI and Mr. Gutierrez performed work that was the essence

of FedEx's business, namely, "transportation and delivery service." Cf. Brister v.

Ikenberry, No. ED 92993, 2009 WL 4927436, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009).

We note, moreover, that the agreement required ANI and its drivers to look and

act like FedEx employees while they performed FedEx services, and we believe that

these provisions show the extent of FedEx's control over some details of

Mr. Gutierrez's work, see Restatement (Second) of Agency,§ 220(2)(a). The

agreement states that ANI will conduct its "business so that it can be identified as

being part of the [FedEx] system" and that its operators will "[f]oster" FedEx's

"professional image and good reputation." More specifically, "each person having

contact with the public ... will wear a [FedEx]-approved uniform, maintained in good

condition, and ... will otherwise keep his/her personal appearance consistent with

reasonable standards of good order as maintained by competitors and promulgated

from time to time" by FedEx. The agreement also required ANI's trucks to have

FedEx insignia or "identify the Equipment as part of the [FedEx] system" and to be

maintained "in a clean and presentable fashion free of body damage and extraneous

markings."

In addition, in a section addressing customer service, the agreement states that

FedEx will "familiarize" ANI "with various quality service and safety procedures

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developed by [FedEx]," supporting an inference that ANI and its drivers were required

to follow FedEx's procedures. FedEx also reserved the right to monitor ANI safety

practices; FedEx terminal personnel, "at their option," were permitted to "take a ...

safety ride with contractor [or presumably the contractor's driver] to verify"

compliance with standards in the agreement. Furthermore, drivers had to submit daily

fuel receipts and daily shipping documents to FedEx. They also organized and

returned undeliverable packages to FedEx, and ANI agreed to provide FedEx with

"advance notice of routes to be taken for each linehaul movement" and "a state by

state mileage report" for interstate package and delivery movement.

The agreement also lists certain bases for "driver disqualification." The "acts

and omissions" for which a driver will be disqualified include failure to pass or submit

to a drug or alcohol test that FedEx may administer "at such time and place and in

such manner as determined by [FedEx] or its designees," as well as failing to obtain

a federally-required physical certification issued by a FedEx-approved medical

examiner. If an alleged act or omission would constitute a criminal offense, FedEx,

"in its sole discretion," "may make a preliminary determination of the probability that

[ANI or a driver] is guilty of [an] offense whether charged or not." 

Relying on workers' compensation cases, see, e.g., Nunn v. C.C. Midwest,

151 S.W.3d 388, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), Mr. Huggins contends that the labels used

by the parties in an agreement such as "independent contractor," as opposed to

"servant" or some similar appellation, are not dispositive on the question of the parties'

actual relationship to each other. Although workers' compensation cases are not

directly relevant because they are governed by statutes not applicable here and by

presumptions that favor finding an employment relationship, see id. at 403, we agree

that the parties' characterization of the relationship is not controlling. See Brister,

2009 WL 4927436, at *4. The applicable considerations set out in §220(2) of the

Restatement (Second) of Agency are far broader in scope, and list as only one factor

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out of many, "whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of

master and servant." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(i).

The Restatement also lists as a relevant question "whether the employer or the

workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person

doing the work." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(e). Here ANI provided

the tractor, but the contract provided that "any trailers and dollies used in connection

with the [e]quipment will be provided by [FedEx] and at [FedEx's] expense." In

addition, Mr. Huggins relies on his own sworn declaration for the statement in his

brief that "FedEx provided the terminal and package processing facilities from which

Gutierrez was required to obtain his itineraries, depart and return from trips, and to

drop and hook the FedEx owned trailers." Although Mr. Huggins's declaration

primarily addresses his own relationship with FedEx, he traveled with Mr. Gutierrez

on the day of the accident and FedEx admits that the two were a driving "team." We

do not think that the court should have disregarded Mr. Huggins's statement that he

"saw Gutierrez obtain his itineraries from the FedEx ground dispatch office," cf.

Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

725 (2008), and we believe that it provides some evidence that the "place of work"

included FedEx's offices and that FedEx exercised some control over Mr. Gutierrez's

driving, though Mr. Huggins failed to establish the exact contents of the itineraries.

As we have said, moreover, the agreement expressed FedEx's intention to have ANI

and other contractors provide pick-up and delivery services through a network of

nationwide terminals, which may be some evidence that Mr. Gutierrez traveled from

one FedEx terminal to another, so that the terminals were essentially part of his "place

of employment."

We note too that the Restatement directs courts to consider the "length of time

for which the person is employed" in determining whether a person is an independent

contractor. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(f). " '[I]f the time of

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employment is short, the worker is less apt to subject himself to control as to details

and the job is more likely to be considered his job than the job of the one employing

him.' Likewise, a longer term of employment denotes an employer-employee

relationship as being more likely." Jones v. Brashears, 107 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220, comment j).

Mr. Huggins relies on a "Separation Form" that indicates that Mr. Gutierrez was

employed from April, 2001, and voluntarily resigned in May, 2004, but the form does

not list an employer. It lists his "Supervisor" as "Alysha Singleton," who was never

associated with FedEx in the record and may well have been an ANI employee. But

FedEx admits that Mr. Gutierrez was employed by Mr. Ireland during this time, and

the evidence may support an inference that Mr. Gutierrez drove FedEx trucks for three

years.

We observe, finally, that in addition to the documents that we have already

discussed, Mr. Huggins attached several other items to his response to the summary

judgment motion that provide some support for a finding that FedEx employed

Mr. Gutierrez. For instance, Mr. Huggins filed a document with the "FedEx Ground"

logo at the top that reflects a "Record of Strength Test" for Mr. Gutierrez. The form

is dated shortly before he was hired. Mr. Huggins also proffered an undated "Fair

Credit Reporting Act Disclosure Statement," which authorizes credit agencies and

others to release information about Mr. Gutierrez to "FedEx Ground" and their agents

and appears to be signed by Mr. Gutierrez. Mr. Huggins submitted a drug testing

form, moreover, that listed FedEx as his employer. We believe that these forms

support an inference that FedEx participated in deciding whether Mr. Gutierrez would

be hired to drive a truck to pull its trailers and provide some support for a finding that

he was a FedEx employee.

As we have said, the court may decide the question of whether a master-servant

relationship exists as a matter of law only if "no material fact[] giving rise to the

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determination is genuinely in dispute and when only one conclusion is reasonable."

Ascoli, 256 S.W.3d at 595. There is certainly record evidence tending to show that

Mr. Gutierrez was an independent contractor. For instance, as the district court

pointed out, the contract between FedEx and ANI provided that ANI would

compensate the drivers, pay their taxes, and provide workers' compensation for them.

But we believe that the evidence – including the terms of the written agreement,

Mr. Huggins's declaration, and the documents showing that FedEx tested

Mr. Gutierrez and checked into his background before he was hired – would support

a reasonable inference and thus a jury finding that FedEx had a right to control his

performance and was his employer for respondeat superior purposes. See Shell Oil

Co., 922 S.W.2d at 764. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in holding

that Mr. Huggins could not make out a claim against FedEx based on respondeat

superior.

B.

We reject what Mr. Huggins calls his alternative argument, namely, that FedEx

is vicariously liable for Mr. Gutierrez's negligence under the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations (FMCSR), see 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1). Mr. Huggins cites the

FMCSR and related case law in support of his contention that FedEx is liable as a

matter of law for Mr. Gutierrez's negligent operation of the leased vehicle. In

response, FedEx states that Mr. Huggins failed to include this claim in his complaint.

FedEx also argues that Mr. Huggins could not prevail in any event, because he is a

co-driver, not a member of the public, and thus is not an intended beneficiary of the

FMCSR and its enabling statute, 49 U.S.C. § 14102, and because the governing

agency (now the Department of Transportation) has clarified by regulation and

commentary that prior cases holding carriers liable under the FMCSR were wrongly

decided. Because we conclude that Mr. Huggins did not plead a claim under the

FMCSR, we do not reach FedEx's other arguments.

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A complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although we must liberally

construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff, a complaint must "give the defendant

fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To assess whether Mr. Huggins made out a claim under the FMCSR, we must

therefore determine the "grounds upon which" his claim rests. Section 376.12(c)(1)

requires a lease between a federally authorized carrier and an owner-operator to state

that the carrier has "exclusive possession, control, and use of the [lessor's] equipment"

and "shall assume complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment" during

the term of the lease. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a)(4).

Here the FedEx lease includes a provision to that effect. Relying, in part, on the same

regulatory language, courts have held carriers liable for injuries to the public caused

by the negligent operation of leased vehicles; these courts have sometimes imposed

so-called logo liability by holding that a carrier was liable whenever its logo or other

identification appeared on the leased truck at the time of the accident, see, e.g., Mellon

Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 475-78 (3d Cir. 1961).

Though we have not addressed the issue in an accident case, in two cases involving

insurance disputes we cited Mellon and stated that carriers are liable for injuries to the

public resulting from the negligent operation of leased vehicles that identify the

carriers by federal permit number or logo. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.

Empire Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1400, 1404 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951

(1984); Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 496 F.2d 131, 136 (8th

Cir.1974); see also Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Canter, 927 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.

1991).

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In his complaint, Mr. Huggins did not mention any federal or state law

governing authorized motor carriers, nor did he even allege that FedEx was a carrier.

Over two years after he filed his complaint, and almost eight months after the deadline

passed for seeking leave to amend pleadings, Mr. Huggins maintained for the first

time in response to FedEx's summary judgment motion that FedEx was liable based

on the FMCSR. Perhaps because this argument had not been previously advanced,

the district court did not address the matter in its order granting summary judgment

to FedEx.

Mr. Huggins contends on appeal, however, that he was not required to plead the

FMCSR specifically to be entitled to relief under it. He contends that by alleging in

his complaint that FedEx was "vicariously liable" for Mr. Gutierrez's negligence

because Mr. Gutierrez was an "employee/agent/servant" of FedEx and "acting in the

course and scope of his agency/employment" at the time of the accident (allegations

supporting his common-law negligence claim), he sufficiently preserved the argument

that FedEx was "vicariously liable" for Mr. Gutierrez's liability because of the federal

regulations. We reject the contention because unlike Mr. Huggins's claim based on

respondeat superior, liability under § 376.12(c)(1) (the so-called "control regulation")

is not bottomed on any alleged "employee/agent/servant" relationship between a

carrier and the vehicle's driver.

In 1992, the Interstate Commerce Commission (the predecessor governing

agency) made it plain that § 376.12(c)(1) had no effect on the legal relationship

between a carrier and the driver of its leased vehicle:

Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this

section is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the

lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized

carrier lessee. An independent contractor relationship may exist when a

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carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. § 14102 and attendant

administrative requirements.

49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4). In related comments, the ICC explained that although "most

courts" had "correctly interpreted the appropriate scope of the control regulation," the

agency had added this subsection "to clear up confusion in some courts and state

agencies." The ICC further noted that the regulations had always been "silent on the

agency status of lessors," and that the agency's decisions were "clear that the [ICC]

has taken no position on the issue of independence of lessors." Thus we conclude that

Mr. Huggins's allegations that FedEx was liable for Mr. Gutierrez's negligence

because Mr. Gutierrez was an employee, servant, or agent of FedEx are precisely what

they appear to be and no more: allegations that support a common-law theory of

respondeat superior. Mr. Huggins himself acknowledged this distinction in a postjudgment motion by describing his contention that FedEx was liable under the

FMCSR as an "alternative basis of liability" that he had asserted "in addition to his

agency theory."

We note, moreover, that to state a claim under the FMCSR Mr. Huggins was

required to do more than merely refer in an obscure way to some aspect of it (such as

vicarious liability) in his complaint. Although a party is "not necessarily required to

identify a specific statute in its complaint," we concluded in Eckert v. Titan Tire

Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806-07 (8th Cir. 2008), that a party's reference to ERISA in the

jurisdictional section of her third-party complaint, absent any other indication that she

intended to pursue an ERISA claim, did not give the opposing party fair notice of such

a claim. Here, Mr. Huggins's complaint not only fails to mention the FMCSR or its

enabling statute, it does not even allege that FedEx is a carrier, a vital aspect of the

duty he now seeks to impose on FedEx. 

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We conclude that Mr. Huggins's complaint did not state a claim under the

FMCSR because it did not give FedEx fair notice that he was making such a claim.

We therefore need not address the claim's merits.

III.

We affirm the judgment entered in favor of Teton, and we reverse the judgment

in favor of FedEx and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion.

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