Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01520/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01520-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jonathon Alan Farnham, Sr. and David 

Lewis, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Jan Brewer, Governor of Arizona; Will 

Humble, Department of Health Services; 

John Cooper, Former CEO of State 

Hospital; Anne Froio, Current CEO of State 

Hospital; Vicki Davis, Current Director of 

ACPTC; Stephen Forster, Chief of Security 

at ACPTC; Michelle Burlin, Therapist; 

Daren Tutek, Therapist; Steven Gray, Civil 

Commitment Evaluator; and Thomas C. 

Horne, Asst. Attorney Gen. for 

Defendant(s); et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-01520-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs Jonathon Alan Farnham, Sr. and David Lewis are residents of the 

Arizona State Hospital and have been committed to the Arizona Community Protection 

and Treatment Center (“ACPTC”), a facility for the housing and treatment of sexually 

violent persons. On August 8, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint pro se, alleging that a 

number of restrictions placed on them by Defendants in the ACPTC violate their 

constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 1. 

Plaintiffs make twelve claims (Id. at 4-15) and request relief of $5,000 in compensatory 

and punitive damages and an injunction that Defendants cease enacting and enforcing 

punitive policies in violation of less restrictive alternative laws. Id. at 16. 

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 The Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Steven Grey, Civil 

Commitment Evaluator, (claim eight) and Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, (claim 

eleven) pursuant to previously-filed motions to dismiss. Doc. 28; see Docs. 20 & 24. 

Defendants Jan Brewer, Governor of Arizona; Will Humble, Department of Health 

Services; John Cooper, Former CEO of State Hospital; Anne Froio, Current CEO of State 

Hospital; Vicki Davis, Current Director of ACPTC; Stephen Forster, Chief of Security at 

ACPTC; Michelle Burlin, Therapist; and Daren Tutek, Therapist, have filed a motion to 

dismiss the remaining claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Doc. 34. The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 35, 38) 

and no party has requested oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court will 

grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice.1

I. Legal Standard. 

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the 

well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and therefore are 

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. 

Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal, the complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility 

standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

 

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Plaintiffs have also filed “Plaintiff’s Request to the Court, that Defendant’s 

Provide Copies of Their Case Law Citations” (Doc. 36) and “Plaintiff’s Response and Rebuttal to Defendants Brewer, Humble, Cooper, Froio, Davis Forster, Burlin, and 

Tutek’s Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 38) which the Court 

construes as an attempt to file a sur-reply. Neither the request for copies of case law citations nor the unauthorized sur-reply are permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court's Local Rules. The Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request and will not consider Plaintiffs’ sur-reply arguments. 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has 

not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). 

 “In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look

beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. . . . The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). As the Ninth Circuit 

has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.2010). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant must be 

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. (quoting 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ( per curiam )). 

II. Discussion. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a 

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 34 at 2, 3-4. In addition, they argue that 

Defendants are protected by qualified immunity, that the Eleventh Amendment bars 

claims against them in their official capacities as well as the injunctive relief sought, and 

that any claims for monetary damages are time-barred under Arizona’s notice of claim 

statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Id. at 2. 

A. Plaintiffs’§ 1983 Claims. 

 Plaintiffs assert that they have not filed suit under § 1983, but under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Doc. 35 at 1, 2, 9. Section 1983 

pertains to actions that deprive an individual of “some right, privilege or immunity 

protected by the Constitution of the United States” that are taken “under color of state 

law.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. An action brought under Bivens, is the equivalent of a § 1983 action, but against 

federal officials. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675-76 (2009) (stating that a Bivens

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action “is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ complaint pertains 

only to state officials or those performing official duties within the state hospital. The 

Court will therefore construe Plaintiffs’ claims as § 1983 claims. 

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1163-64 (quoting Shoshone-Bannock 

Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir.1994). “Section 

1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for 

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 

(1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)). It is well settled 

that section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, 

not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Johnson v. Barker, 799 F.2d 

1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986); Baker, 443 U.S. at 146. Mere negligence is not sufficient to 

support a § 1983 claim. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986). 

 Suits under § 1983 may be brought against state officials in their personal or 

official capacities. “[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to 

show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal 

right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (emphasis in original). Thus, “a 

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1948. An officialcapacity suit, by contrast, requires that the entity itself be a “moving force” behind the 

deprivation – the entity’s “policy or custom” must have played a part in the violation of 

federal law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. A suit against a public official in his official 

capacity makes the public entity liable to the extent it has received notice and an 

opportunity to respond. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). 

 Plaintiffs have identified each Defendant in the caption of the complaint by his or 

her name and official position. Plaintiffs repeat the relevant names and official 

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designations throughout the body of the complaint. This suggests that Plaintiffs seek to 

bring claims against Defendants in both their personal and official capacities. Plaintiffs 

filed a motion requesting that the Court modify their complaint to sue Defendants “in 

their individual capacity, and the relief they seek, to comply with the court’s and Judge 

Wake’s guidance and instructions.” Doc. 32 at 1. This is an apparent reference to the 

fact that Judge Wake dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against individuals in a related suit 

titled “Resident Farnham’s Complaint Against Arizona State Hospital Mr. Cooper and 

ACPT Security Chief” because no individuals were named as parties in the caption of the 

complaint and the complaint lacked any factual details related to specific individuals. See

Case No. 2:11-CV-00192-PHX-NVW, Doc. 6. Plaintiffs have not failed to name 

individuals in the caption of the complaint in this case, and the Court therefore will deny 

Plaintiffs’ motion as moot, treat the complaint as an attempt to assert claims against 

Defendants in both their personal and official capacities, and evaluate whether Plaintiffs 

have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. 

 1. Claim One. 

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Cooper, Froio, Davis, and non-party Lee Guyco 

violated their First Amendment rights by not permitting them to exchange letters with 

“surrogate sons and other close friends because they are in prison.” Doc. 1 at 4. They 

also allege that they must get phone numbers cleared before making personal calls, some 

of their calls to a business or organization have been denied, and mail does not go out or 

get delivered daily. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Cooper and other staff have 

referred to them as “inmates,” which violates the double-jeopardy clause because it 

shows that the ACPTC treatment program is punitive in nature. Id. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a First 

Amendment claim against any Defendant. Doc. 34 at 5-6. The Court agrees. The only 

action tied to a specific defendant is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant Cooper refers to 

residents as “inmates.” As Defendants argue, however, this is not a violation of 

Plaintiffs’ first amendment rights because it involves the speech of others, not that of 

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Plaintiffs. It also does not show that the ACPTC treatment program is punitive and that 

Plaintiffs’ confinement therefore constitutes double jeopardy. The Supreme Court has 

stated that “the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the 

conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.” United States v. Salerno, 481 

U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Neither does it follow that because a person is called an inmate for 

purposes of civil confinement that the confinement is punitive. Even if the term “inmate” 

is consistent with the term used in penal institutions, Plaintiffs have alleged no specific 

punitive actions on the part of Defendant Froio or others who allegedly refer to them this 

way. Without more, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Plaintiffs have suffered 

punitive treatment and are entitled to relief. 

 The restriction on Plaintiffs’ ability to communicate with friends and family in 

prison may constitute a First Amendment or due process violation, but Plaintiffs have 

failed to allege facts connecting any Defendant to the creation or implementation of this 

alleged restriction or to describe specific incidents from which the Court could plausibly 

infer an intentional constitutional violation or implementation of an unconstitutional 

policy. It is not clear from the facts presented that the restriction Plaintiffs allege is even 

the result of a particular ACPTC policy and not that of the prisons where Plaintiffs seek 

to send correspondence. 

 Similarly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer that 

the alleged phone call restrictions constitute First Amendment or other constitutional 

violations. Plaintiffs have alleged no actions on the part of any Defendant, and have cited 

no specific incidents or policies from which the Court can infer that Plaintiffs’ phone 

access was denied improperly rather than for legitimate, non-punitive purposes. See 

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (“The State may take measures to restrict 

the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive 

governmental objective and has been historically so regarded”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 

F.3d 918, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that under Ninth Circuit precedent, “a 

restriction is ‘punitive’ where it is intended to punish, or where it is ‘excessive in relation 

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to [its non-punitive] purpose.’”) (internal citation omitted). Absent facts showing the 

circumstances under which specific phone calls were denied, Plaintiffs have raised no 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct – they have not plausibly shown that they 

are entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

 Finally, the allegation that mail does not go out or get delivered to residents on a 

daily basis is not a sufficient ground for a constitutional claim. Plaintiffs have not alleged 

that mail service is denied them or that mail is being withheld, and a temporary delay in 

mail service does not violate a detainee’s First Amendment rights. See Crofton v. Roe, 

170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 2. Claim Two. 

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Brewer, Cooper, Froio, Davis, and Forster have 

violated their Eight Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment because 

their building and grounds are surrounded by razor wire, they are unable to go outside 

without a staff member, and their movements within grounds are more regimented than 

those of prisoners in a prison setting. Doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiffs also allege that mold in the 

showers, walls, and ceilings have caused Plaintiff Farnham to have “a persistent cough, 

trouble swallowing, chest paints to center of chest, and coughs up mucus/flem?” Id. 

 Plaintiffs again fail to link any of the allegations with specific actions or inactions 

by any Defendant. With regard to mold, Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant was 

made aware of these conditions and failed to take action. Nor do they allege that Plaintiff 

Farnham sought or received a medical diagnosis for his alleged mold-related physical 

ailments. Thus, even if Plaintiffs had linked their allegations to individual defendants, 

the connection between the mold and Plaintiff Farnham’s alleged injury is speculative 

and therefore insufficient to show that he is entitled to relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

545 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.”). 

 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding ACPTC’s security measures fail more 

fundamentally because the Supreme Court has held that placing restraints on sexually 

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violent persons is not unconstitutional. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363; c.f. 

Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although an involuntarily 

committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to 

the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner”); Allison v. Snyder, 332 F. 3d 

1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003) (“detainees [under the Illinois Sexually Violent Person’s Act] 

may be subjected to conditions that advance goals such as preventing escape and assuring 

the safety of others, even though they may not be punished.”). The Court cannot 

plausibly infer that the use of razor wire and staff attendants is improper in light of the 

ACPTC’s legitimate safety and security concerns. 

 3. Claim Three. 

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights because 

they seized Plaintiffs’ television and gaming systems and destroyed other personal 

property without due process of law. Doc. 1 at 7. Plaintiffs once again provide no 

connection between these allegations and the actions of any Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiffs 

provide no detail about what happened to deprive them of their possessions. Plaintiffs 

allege generally that “state officials . . . told him directly that he was burnt and they did 

not want to discuss the issue with him.” Id. They also allege that they complained in 

writing to Defendant Froio and received no response or attempt to address the issue. Id. 

Absent any details showing who took or destroyed their property and under what 

circumstances, Plaintiffs fail to provide a basis from which the Court can plausibly infer 

either that Plaintiffs’ property loss or Defendant Froio’s lack of response constitute a 

constitutional violation. 

 4. Claim Four. 

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated their Fourteenth, Eighth, and Fourth 

Amendment rights because they have failed to adhere to Arizona’s Less Restrictive 

Alternative (“LRA”) Laws. Doc. 1 at 8. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

have placed “several restrictions” on Plaintiffs, including “restricting Community 

Activities” and “forcing them to live in buildings that are more restrictive than some 

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prisons.” Id. Plaintiffs also allege that only one man has been released from the program 

in the last three years, and the program was revamped “so [Plaintiffs] had to restart 

everything after [they] had already done a year of treatment.” Id. 

 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiffs’ repeated allegations that 

the ACPTC is more restrictive than most prisons are conclusory and thus insufficient to 

state a claim. Plaintiffs generally allege prison-like security measures – such as secured 

buildings and restrictions on activities – that courts have recognized as constitutionally 

legitimate restraints for the civil confinement of sexually violent persons. In addition, 

Plaintiffs fail to identify the particular restraints that they claim violate Arizona’s LRA 

laws. Finally, violations of state law that do not amount to constitutional violations are 

insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiffs’ allegations of having to restart their treatment program are also lacking 

in any factual detail. Like the previous claims, the allegations do not identify specific 

actions or inactions taken by any Defendant, and thus fail to state a claim. 

 5. Claim Five. 

 Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action merely reasserts Plaintiffs’ general allegations 

regarding their treatment as “inmates” and having to restart their treatment program. 

Doc. 1 at 6. The Court has dealt with these allegations above. 

 Plaintiffs also allege that the therapists who run classes in the ACPTC are not 

properly licensed and do not hold degrees or licenses as Psychologists or Psychiatrists. 

Id. Defendants argue that Arizona law requires a person running classes to be a 

“competent professional” approved by the superior court according to approved 

guidelines. Doc. 34 at 9; see A.R.S. § 36-3701(2). Even if true, this claim fails to allege 

a violation of the Constitution or federal law as required to state a valid claim under 

§ 1983. Plaintiffs have alleged no facts showing that the therapists employed by ACPTC 

have rendered improper treatment or otherwise violated Plaintiffs’ federally-protected 

rights. 

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 6. Claim Six. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their First Amendment rights 

because they are not permitted to voice opinions contrary to those of Defendant therapists 

Burlin and Tutek in group settings. Doc. 1 at 9. Plaintiffs allege that if they disagree 

with the therapists they are labeled “anti-social,” punished for voicing disagreement, and 

held back in therapy, causing them to be “incarcerated” longer. Id. They also allege that 

Defendants Burlin and Tutek show favoritism to some residents, and that Burlin, Tutek, 

and non-party therapists Eric Pearson and Dr. Mitchell lack proper licensing and 

accreditation. Id. 

 Plaintiffs’ claims that they are punished for voicing disagreement and that 

therapists show favoritism are completely unsupported by specific factual allegations. 

The allegation that therapists are not properly licensed or accredited fail for the reasons 

already stated above with regard to claim five. 

 7. Claim Seven. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their Eighth Amendment rights 

because they are not permitted food visits with family members, and visits are terminated 

if anyone during the visit needs to use the restroom. Doc. 1 at 10. Plaintiffs assert that 

these restrictions are more restrictive than those placed on prison inmates. Id. 

Again, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts concerning any specific incidents or to connect 

the allegations with specific Defendants. Plaintiffs attempt to remedy these deficiencies 

in their response (Doc. 35 at 6), but the Court may only look to what is stated in the 

complaint. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n. 1. 

 8. Claim Nine. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their Eighth Amendment rights 

because they hold Plaintiff Lewis’s lifetime probation status against him. Defendants 

argue, and the Court agrees, that this claim does not rise above the speculative level 

because it is completely devoid of any factual or legal basis. 

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 9. Claim Ten. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their Eighth Amendment rights 

because they knowingly hire Department of Correction (“DOC”) staff who implement 

DOC policies and rules, and that working conditions in the ACPTC result in a higher 

turn-over of staff with therapeutic backgrounds. Doc. 1 at 13. Plaintiffs also allege that 

they face daily threats to their safety and health due to hostile residents who “snap” 

without warning and “talk about killing,” and residents who have bad hygiene. Id. 

 Plaintiffs allege no facts showing how those hired with DOC backgrounds have 

acted in violation of their constitutional or federally-protected rights, and they have 

alleged no incidents in which they were harmed by other residents’ threats or bad hygiene 

or in which Defendants observed or knew of potential harms but failed to take action. 

More fundamentally, Plaintiffs have failed to connect any alleged violations with any 

specific Defendant. 

 10. Claim Twelve. 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their Eighth Amendment rights by 

having and enforcing a non-smoking policy. Doc. 1 at 15. In response to Defendants’ 

motion, Plaintiffs drop this claim. Doc. 35 at 7. 

B. Qualified Immunity. 

 In determining whether a state actor is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court 

first asks whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the state actor 

violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 

2001); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the facts alleged show a 

constitutional violation, the Court next determines whether the law was clearly 

established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Finally, even if the law was clearly established, 

the state actor is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she made a reasonable mistake 

regarding what the law required. Id. at 205. 

 Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to state a 

constitutional claim, the law regarding conditions of confinement for SVPs is not “clearly 

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established” and that Defendants are therefore protected from personal liability. Doc. 34 

at 13-14. Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and 

Plaintiffs may yet allege sufficient facts and legal theories to state a constitutional claim, 

it is premature for the Court to determine whether the law regarding specific 

constitutional violations is “clearly established.” Plaintiffs are advised that if they seek to 

sue Defendants in their personal capacity in an amended complaint, they must plead 

sufficient facts to show constitutional violations and – to withstand a defense of qualified 

immunity – the law upon which these violations are based must be clearly recognized. 

This is so because government officials “generally are shielded from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

C. Eleventh Amendment. 

 1. Money Damages. 

 The Eleventh Amendment does not permit Plaintiffs to sue the state of Arizona (or 

its agencies, such as the state hospital) for money damages. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 

706 (1999); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Plaintiffs’ complaint is therefore 

dismissed without leave to amend to the extent it seeks money damages from the state. 

 2. Injunctive Relief. 

 Plaintiffs ask the Court to require Defendants to “cease enacting and enforcing 

policies that are punitive and violate established LRA laws.” Doc. 1 at 16. The Court 

interprets this as a request for an injunction. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits 

for injunctions against state officials. See e.g. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908); 

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The Eleventh Amendment does, however, bar federal courts from granting 

injunctive relief against state officials based solely on violations of state law. See

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 (1984). Plaintiffs’ 

complaint is therefore dismissed without leave to amend to the extent it seeks an 

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injunction based solely on violations of Arizona’s LRA laws. To the extent Plaintiffs 

wish to amend their complaint to seek an injunction for specific constitutional violations, 

Plaintiffs are advised that they must (1) allege sufficient facts to establish the specific 

violations against them, and (2) allege sufficient facts to show that future injury to 

Plaintiffs absent an injunction is likely to occur and is not merely a possibility. See, e.g., 

Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 1985) (“the mere possibility of future 

injury is insufficient to enjoin official action.”). 

D. A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

 A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires that claims for damages against a public entity or 

public employee be filed within 180 days of the time the action accrued. A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). The statute defines accrual as “when the damaged party realizes he or she has 

been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, 

instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(B). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as untimely. Doc. 34 

at 16. Plaintiffs argue that their claims were brought in a timely manner because the 

violations are on-going. Doc. 35 at 9. The Court has already dismissed Plaintiffs claims 

for money damages against the state with prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 

To the extent Plaintiffs seek to bring claims against Defendants in their personal 

capacities, the Court is unable to discern from the complaint when the alleged violations 

accrued. Plaintiffs are advised that if they seek to bring damages claims against 

individual defendants in their amended complaint, they must allege sufficient facts to 

state a claim against each defendant, including facts showing when the claimed violations 

occurred or when and under what circumstances Plaintiffs became aware of the actions 

giving rise to their alleged injuries. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants Brewer, Humble, Cooper, Froio, Davis, Forster, Burlin, and 

Tutek’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 34) is granted. 

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 2. Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend as set 

forth in this order. 

 3. Plaintiffs remaining motions (Docs. 32, 36) and attempt to file a sur-reply 

(Doc. 38) are denied. 

 4. If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they must do so on or 

before July 27, 2012. 

 Dated this 3rd day of July, 2012. 

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