Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00766/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00766-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have

submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court concludes

that oral argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer

County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Finn MacCool, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 03-0766-PHX-DGC (MS)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendants’

motion to dismiss, and Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment. Docs. ##126,

105, 148. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ second motion for summary

judgment will be granted, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be denied, and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.1

Background

In 1997, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in Arizona, the Arizona Department of

Corrections (“ADOC”) validated him as a member of a Security Threat Group (“STG”)

based on ADOC’s determination that Plaintiff was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood.

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Plaintiff was transferred to SMUII, a maximum security prison designed to isolate STG

members from the general prison population for security reasons. Plaintiff was transferred

from SMUII to the New Jersey prison system in 1999 pursuant to Arizona’s Interstate

Compact Agreement with New Jersey (“ICA”).

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on January 29, 2004, alleging three counts:

(1) violation of due process, (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, and (3) retaliation for failure to debrief and excess force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Doc. #11. On March 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendants’ motion

to dismiss, construed as a motion for summary judgment, on Count I of the complaint. Doc.

#86. The Court also granted partial summary judgment on Counts II and III insofar as they

stated time-barred claims based on Defendants’ acts prior to April 23, 2001. Id. The Court

denied summary judgment on Counts II and III for claims arising after April 23, 2001. Id.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims. Id. Both parties filed

motions for reconsideration, which the Court denied. Docs. #87, 89, 94. 

Discussion

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union,

24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). The initial burden is on the moving party to show an

absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at, 325. Substantive law

determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Similarly,

to preclude summary judgment the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248.

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

A. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. #148. Qualified

immunity, however, bars only a suit for damages. “Qualified immunity . . . does not bar

actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.” Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates,

955 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v.

Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks only injunctive

relief. Doc. #6 at 2. Accordingly, Defendants cannot be granted summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity.

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Count II.

Count II alleges that Plaintiff’s transfer to New Jersey amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment because his “isolat[ion] from his family and friends” constitutes “punitive

isolation” and Defendants are responsible for him being there. Doc. #11. Plaintiff further

asserts that Defendants transferred him to the New Jersey prison, with its “predominantly

Black population,” with the intent of causing Plaintiff harm in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Doc. #11. 

Where conditions of confinement are at issue, a prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met. “First, the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, “a prison official must have a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). “In prisoncondition cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or

safety.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). 

Plaintiff has failed to show that his transfer to New Jersey is sufficiently serious to

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable

prisons, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measures of life’s

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Plaintiff admits that he is allowed in-person visits from family and

friends, has regular phone privileges, and can correspond via mail with his mother, brother,

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Plaintiff provides the Court with a research article written by Dr. Stuart Grassian,

M.D. that discusses the negative psychiatric effects of solitary confinement. Doc. #126, Ex.

7. Plaintiff, however, provides no proof that Defendants’ knew about this article or its

contents, or that they acted in utter disregard of his health and safety. 

- 4 -

grandparents, aunts, uncles, and friends. Doc. #142, Ex. A, MacCool Affidavit. Moreover,

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendants knew of any risk to his health or

safety as a result of his STG classification or his transfer to New Jersey.2

 

As the Supreme Court has noted, “it is neither unreasonable nor unusual for an inmate

to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was

convicted and sentenced . . . . Confinement in another State . . . is ‘within the normal limits

or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.’” Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983). Because Plaintiff has not shown that his deprivation

was sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, summary judgment will

be granted. See Overturf v. Massie, 385 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004) (transfer of

prisoners from Hawaii to Oklahoma did not violate the Eighth Amendment).

Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of an Eighth Amendment

violation, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff has satisfied the second element.

C. Retaliation – Count III.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional

rights. Although Plaintiff does not address this claim directly in his response to Defendants’

motion, his memoranda and other filings make clear that the constitutional right at issue is

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination – Plaintiff claims that Defendants

have retaliated against him for refusing to debrief. Doc. #11. 

In October 1997, Plaintiff was validated as an Aryan Brotherhood member.

Doc. #148. Once a prisoner receives an STG classification, he can escape this label only by

renouncing his gang membership and successfully completing the debriefing process. 

Doc. #149, Ex B. Plaintiff appears to argue that in retaliation for him invoking his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to renounce his gang

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 ADOC Rule 806.06 provides, “[t]he purpose of a debriefing is not to obtain

incriminating criminal information or evidence against the member. The primary objective

is to learn enough about the member and the STG to: [1] convince the Department that the

inmate has dropped out of the STG; [2] provide additional information regarding the STG’s

structure, activity and membership...; [3] provide sufficient information to determine if the

inmate may require protection from other STG members or suspects.” Doc. #149, Ex. A,

Attachment 1 at 10.

- 5 -

membership and debrief, Defendants continue to punish him by maintaining his STG

classification and keeping him in New Jersey. Doc. #11. 

To establish a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must allege that he was retaliated against

for exercising his constitutional rights and show that the retaliatory action did not advance

legitimate penological goals. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985);

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails

because the debriefing process does not implicate Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. 

The “privilege applies when a defendant is compelled to be a witness against himself

in his own criminal prosecution or when he is called on to testify in any type of proceeding

to answer questions which might serve to incriminate him in any future prosecution.” United

States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1999 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, Plaintiff has not been compelled

to act as a witness against himself. Rather, he has been afforded an opportunity to receive

more lenient treatment from prison officials in exchange for information concerning his gang

affiliation and gang activity in prison.3

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a prospect of more

lenient treatment in exchange for admitting fault and providing information does not violate

the privilege against self incrimination. See United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020-

21 (9th Cir. 1990) (acceptance of responsibility in exchange for sentencing reduction does not

violate the Fifth Amendment). Other courts have applied this analysis to prison debriefing

procedures, holding that offering a prisoner more lenient treatment in exchange for his

renouncing prison gang affiliations and providing information about gang activities does not

violate his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Baptisto v. Ryan, 2005 WL 2416356 (D. Ariz.

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The Ninth Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion that prison debriefing

requirements do not violate an inmate’s privilege against self-incrimination. See Castro v.

Terhune, 29 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2001).

- 6 -

Sept. 30, 2005) (discussing authorities); Galvedon v. Marshall, 1997 WL 765955 (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 12, 1997).4

Moreover, to establish a violation of the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff must show more

than a merely trifling or imaginary risk of incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390

U.S. 39, 53 (1968); Baptisto, 2005 WL 2416356 at 7. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that

information provided by him in debriefing would be used by Defendants in a subsequent

criminal prosecution. Nor does he provide examples where such incrimination has occurred

to other inmates. Because Plaintiff has not established a real threat that debriefing would

result in self-incrimination, he has failed to establish a Fifth Amendment right not to debrief.

 See Griffin v. Gomez, 1995 WL 396857 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995); Medina v. Gomez, 1997

WL 488588 at 7 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 14, 1997); Castrellon v. Gomez, 1997 WL 361199 (N.D.

Cal. June 23, 1997); Garcia v. Gomez, 1996 WL 390320 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 1996); Zarate

v. Bunnell, 1994 WL 374547 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 1994).

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established a Fifth Amendment right to

refuse debriefing, and therefore cannot assert a retaliation claim based on his refusal to

debrief. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815-16. In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address

whether Plaintiff’s transfer to New Jersey advanced legitimate penological goals. 

Plaintiff includes an Eighth Amendment component in his retaliation claim, but that

portion of the claim fails, as discussed above, because Plaintiff’s transfer to New Jersey does

not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment and retaliation

claims. Doc. #126. Because those claims fail for the reasons set forth in this order, the

Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #148) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. #121, 126) is denied.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Party (Doc. #105) is denied as moot. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-00766-DGC-MS Document 162 Filed 02/24/06 Page 7 of 7