Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02548/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02548-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL DWAYNE MAU, JR., AG1410, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CLARK E. DUCART, et al., 

Defendant(s). 

Case No. 17-cv-02548-CRB (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF No. 36) 

Plaintiff Michael Dwayne Mau, Jr., a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), filed a 

pro se complaint for declaratory and monetary relief alleging that various PBSP and California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) officials violated Title II of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against him based on his learning disability. 

Plaintiff specifically alleges that he cannot read or write due to a learning disability and that PBSP 

and CDCR officials discriminated against him based on this disability by not providing him with 

an ADA worker who can help him with daily life activities that require reading and writing. Per 

the order filed on August 4, 2017, the court found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations 

appear to state a cognizable claim for relief under Title II of the ADA and ordered the United 

States Marshal to serve the named PBSP and CDCR officials (defendants). 

Defendants move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the 

ground that there are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on plaintiff’s claim that they violated Title II of the ADA. After several extensions of time, 

plaintiff has filed an opposition and defendants have filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at California’s Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI) before he was 

transferred to PBSP. Compl. at 7. At DVI, he requested an accommodation for his learning 

disability and was placed in an ADA program where he was assisted with pertinent daily life 

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activities. Id. Ex. G. But although DVI provided the accommodation, it noted that plaintiff has 

“no listed disability.” Id. Ex. M. 

Upon transfer to PBSP, plaintiff submitted a CDCR Form 1824 (Reasonable Modification 

or Accommodation Request) requesting a similar accommodation as the one he received at DVI—

an ADA worker to assist him with pertinent daily life activities such as reading, writing, and 

conducting legal work—or to be transferred back to DVI where he could be placed back into their 

ADA program. Id. at 9 & Ex. A. As evidence of his disability, plaintiff submitted his high school 

transcripts, which indicate that all of plaintiff’s classes (except physical education) were 

designated “SDC” classes. Id. at 9–10 & Ex. B.1

 Plaintiff also pointed to his low Test of Adult 

Basic Education (TABE) scores. Id. at 10 & Ex. G. 

Plaintiff’s accommodation request was denied by the Reasonable Accommodation Panel 

(RAP) at PBSP because plaintiff did not have an identified learning disability pursuant to the 

Education Disability Verification Process. Id. Exs. C, I. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, plaintiff’s 

request to be assigned an ADA worker or be transferred back to DVI was denied, but he was 

granted one-on-one assistance during his assigned classes at PBSP. Id. Exs. G, I. Plaintiff 

unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the final level of administrative review. Id. Ex. I. 

Plaintiff then filed the instant action alleging that defendants violated Title II of the ADA 

by discriminating against him based on his learning disability. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that 

he is being “excluded from Vocation Courses and other rehabilit[ation] courses . . . because he 

does not have a qualified interpreter or qualified reader.” Id. at 11. He argues that he was 

“unassigned” from the Computer Literacy Vocation Class “because of his low TABE score” and 

because he required a qualified reader and interpreter, and that “many, if not all” of the 

rehabilitation classes/programs at PBSP “maintain this standard.” Id. Plaintiff concedes that he 

has received one-on-one assistance by a qualified reader and interpreter during classroom time but 

argues that such assistance is insufficient and does not address other pertinent daily life activities 

such as communicating with his family. Id. 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff has some difficulty reading and writing, but argue 

that they are entitled to summary judgment on his claim that they violated Title II of the ADA 

because plaintiff has not set forth sufficient probative evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he 

 

1

 Plaintiff suggests that “SDC” stands for “Severely Developmentally Challenged,” but it is well 

established that in California’s education system “SDC” stands for “Special Day Classes.” See 

Overview of Special Education in California, https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/edu/special-edprimer/special-ed-primer-010313.aspx (last visited March 5, 2019). 

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has a disability under the ADA and that defendants precluded him from participating in any 

service or program for which he is otherwise qualified by reason of his disability. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that 

there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome 

of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id. 

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the 

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need 

only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact by “citing to specific 

parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A triable dispute of material fact exists 

only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party to allow a jury to return a verdict 

for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

There is no genuine issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the 

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the 

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 

Id. at 249—50. 

B. Analysis 

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12132. 

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a 

qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was excluded from participation in or otherwise 

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such 

exclusion or discrimination was by reason of her disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, 

a plaintiff must show that the exclusion or discrimination was intentional. Duvall v. Cnty. of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that they 

violated Title II of the ADA because plaintiff has not set forth sufficient probative evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that he has a disability under the ADA and that defendants precluded him 

from participating in any service or program for which he is otherwise qualified by reason of his 

disability. The court agrees. 

A. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has a disability under the ADA 

To qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that 

he has an impairment that substantially limits at least one of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C §

12102(2). Here, plaintiff alleges that he has a disability under the ADA because he has a learning 

disability that prevents him from learning how to read and write. But although it is undisputed 

that reading and writing are major life activities under the ADA, see id., it remains plaintiff’s 

burden to set forth evidence demonstrating that he in fact has a learning disability and that this 

disability substantially limits his ability to learn how to read and write. 

Plaintiff points to his high school transcripts and TABE scores in support of his claim that 

he has a learning disability. But plaintiff’s transcripts showing that he was in SDC classes in high 

school do not demonstrate that he has a learning disability. SDC classes accommodate students 

“who are unable to participate in general-education classes because they may have behavior 

problems, or because they have other educational needs that prevent them from participating in a 

general-education program.” Cummings Decl. ¶ 5. All students who receive special education 

services from their school due to a learning disability have an Individualized Education Plan 

(IEP)2

 and are placed in SDC classes pursuant to their IEP. Id. ¶ 4. There is no indication in 

 

2

 An IEP is an education plan prepared by a student’s educators and tailored to meet a student’s 

specific educational needs. Cummings Decl. ¶ 4. 

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plaintiff’s transcripts, or anywhere else in the record, that plaintiff was provided an IEP due to a 

learning disability and/or placed in SDC classes pursuant to an IEP for a learning disability. 

Plaintiff’s TABE scores do not demonstrate that he has a learning disability either. 

Although plaintiff’s TABE scores suggest that he has difficulty reading and writing, they also 

suggest that he can improve his reading and writing. For example, on May 10, 2011, plaintiff 

scored a 3.4 on his TABE reading examination, indicating a third-grade reading level, but on 

December 15, 2011, after “outstanding progress” in his classes, he scored a 5.3, indicating a fifthgrade reading level. Id. ¶ 7 & Ex. B. And plaintiff’s more recent Comprehensive Adult Student 

Assessment Systems (CASAS) math scores from 2016 and 2018, based on a test that consists 

solely of word problems, suggest that his reading and comprehension has improved to a ninthgrade or tenth-grade level. Id. ¶ 8. 

 Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient probative evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he 

has a disability under the ADA. Plaintiff has presented no evidence whatsoever that he has been 

diagnosed with a learning disability. And for the reasons set forth above, his high school 

transcripts showing that he was enrolled in SDC classes and/or his TABE scores are not enough to 

compel a different conclusion. Cf. Aguilar v. Marinello Schools of Beauty, No. CV 09-00854 

DMG (AJWx), 2010 WL 11582978, at **8-9 (C.D. Cal Mar. 29, 2010) (mere placement in special 

education classes insufficient proof that plaintiff is disabled under ADA). Nor are they enough for 

a reasonable jury to find that plaintiff’s proffered learning disability substantially limits his ability 

to learn how to read and write. Someone who has a learning disability is not automatically 

considered disabled under the ADA; he must demonstrate that his learning disability substantially 

limits his ability to perform a major life activity. See Wong v. Regents of University of 

California, 410 F.3d 1052, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has set forth no evidence or 

explanation of how his proffered learning disability limits his ability to learn how to read and 

write. His improvement in his TABE and CASAS scores, and comments from his instructors, 

instead indicate that his reading and writing can improve through coursework, contradicting his 

assertion that his learning disability prevents him from learning how to read and write. Cf. id. at 

1065 (“Regarding the activity of learning, Wong’s claim to be ‘disabled’ was contradicted by his 

ability to achieve academic success, and to do so without special accommodations.”). 

B. Plaintiff has not demonstrated exclusion from any service/program in violation of ADA 

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated Title II of the ADA when they excluded him from 

CDCR’s Inmate Disability Assistance Program (IDAP) by declining to assign him a personal 

ADA worker and when they excluded him from CDCR’s vocational programs by removing him 

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from his computer literacy course. But to survive summary judgment on his claim that defendants 

violated Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must show that defendants excluded him from participating 

in a service or program for which he was otherwise qualified by reason of his disability. See 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Lovell, 303 

F.3d at 1052. Plaintiff does not. 

Plaintiff has not shown that he was excluded from participating in a service or program for 

which he was otherwise qualified. See Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1046 

(9th Cir. 1999) (Title II plaintiff must establish that he meets essential eligibility requirements for 

participation in program at issue, with or without reasonable modifications). Although IDAP 

provides personal assistance to inmates with verified, severe disabilities, Lemons Decl. ¶¶ 4—7, 

there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff has a verified or severe disability entitling him to 

participation in the program, Cummings Decl. ¶¶ 7—8. And although all inmates may sign up for 

open vocational courses, plaintiff does not deny that he was removed from the computer literacy 

class because he could not—or would not—perform essential tasks necessary for success in the 

class. See Roberts Decl. ¶¶ 5—8 (plaintiff was removed from computer literacy class because he 

could not perform tasks essential for success in the class and because he was causing a disruption). 

Nor does plaintiff deny that he may sign up for other vocational courses and currently is on the 

waitlist for the vocational electronic class. See Cummings Decl. ¶ 14. 

Plaintiff has not shown that he was excluded from participating in a service or program by 

reason of his disability. In Simmons, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to make out a 

prima facie case of disability discrimination where plaintiff’s exclusion from recreation “was not 

because of his depression, but due to a jail policy restricting the activities of inmates on suicide 

watch.” 609 F.3d at 1021-22. Plaintiff similarly fails to make out a prima facie case of disability 

discrimination here. The undisputed evidence in the record makes clear that plaintiff was not 

excluded from IDAP or from vocational courses because of his disability; rather, he was not 

assigned a personal ADA worker under IDAP because he does not have a verified, serious 

disability and he was removed from the computer literacy class because he could not—or would 

not—do the work required for the class and was disruptive. See also Weinreich v. Los Angeles 

Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff who failed to update 

certification showing he had a qualifying disability could not establish Title II violation because 

he could not prove he was discriminated against because of his disability). 

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In sum, plaintiff has not set forth sufficient probative evidence for a reasonable jury to find 

that he has a disability under the ADA and that defendants precluded him from participating in a 

service or program for which he was otherwise qualified by reason of his disability. Nor has 

plaintiff set forth any evidence whatsoever in support of his claim for damages by showing that 

defendants “intentionally” discriminated against him because of his disability. Defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that they violated Title II of the ADA. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 36) is 

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 22, 2019 

______________________________________ 

CHARLES R. BREYER 

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL DWAYNE MAU,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CLARK E. DUCART, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:17-cv-02548-CRB 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California. 

That on March 22, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 

Michael Dwayne Mau ID: AG1410

Pelican Bay State Prison B/7/210

5905 Lake Earl Dr. 

Crescent City, CA 95531 

Dated: March 22, 2019 

Susan Y. Soong 

Clerk, United States District Court 

By:________________________ 

Lashanda Scott, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable CHARLES R. BREYER 

Case 3:17-cv-02548-CRB Document 46 Filed 03/22/19 Page 8 of 8