Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03020/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LEE THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-03020-JST (PR) 

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; ORDER OF 

SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Valley State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Oakland, the Oakland Police Department, and three of its 

employees. His application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted in a separate order. For the 

reasons explained below, the complaint is ordered served upon certain defendants. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

According to the complaint, on June 1, 2017, plaintiff was extradited from the Milwaukee 

County Jail in Wisconsin and taken into custody by the Oakland Police Department. The 

extradition was performed by defendant Oakland police detectives Herbert Webber and Yucel 

Tatlisu. At the time, plaintiff suffered from chronic urinary retention, i.e., enlarged prostate. 

Defendants Webber and Tatlisu failed to consult with medical staff at the Milwaukee County Jail 

to ascertain plaintiff’s medical condition. During the transport, plaintiff experienced multiple 

episodes of benign prostatic hyperplasia and shock symptoms from oliguria. Plaintiff made 

numerous emotional pleas for emergency medical assistance, which defendants Webber and 

Tatlisu ignored. The transport involved a flight with layovers in Chicago and Los Angeles 

followed by a nonstop four-hour ride in a custody van, after which plaintiff was finally delivered 

to Oakland’s Highland Hospital, where he received a Foley catheter and other emergency care. 

Plaintiff represents that defendants Webber and Tatlisu turned off their video and voice recording 

devices in order to conceal his obvious extreme pain and pleas for help during the transport.

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

When liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim 

against defendants Webber and Tatlisu for deliberate indifference to medical needs. Where the 

inmate-patient is a pretrial detainee rather than a convicted prisoner, his rights derive from the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). That is, deliberate indifference to a 

pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause. Although a deliberate indifference test applies to a pretrial detainee’s claim, it is an 

objective deliberate indifference test, rather than the subjective deliberate indifference test 

applicable to a prisoner’s claim. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 

(9th Cir. 2018). 

Plaintiff also names three other defendants: Oakland’s Chief of Police Anne Kirkpatrick, 

the City of Oakland, and the Oakland Police Department. As to Chief Kirkpatrick, plaintiff 

simply alleges that she failed to “sufficiently supervise and control officers Webber and Tatlisu.” 

ECF No. 1 at 5. Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under Section 1983; 

or, in layman’s terms, under no circumstances is there liability under Section 1983 solely because 

one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may be imposed on an individual defendant only if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected 

right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A supervisor may be liable under 

§ 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. See Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on 

other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Plaintiff has failed to provide factual 

allegations regarding Kirkpatrick’s involvement in the deprivation of his constitutional rights that 

are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 

555. Plaintiff’s claims against Kirkpatrick are therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Similarly, the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department, both municipal entities, 

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

also cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, or on the theory that they are

responsible for the actions of their employees. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978) (holding municipalities cannot be held liable under Section 1983 based upon 

respondeat superior theory). However, local governments, such as Oakland, are “persons” subject 

to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see 

Monell,436 U.S. at 690. To impose municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation of 

constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of 

which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts 

to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the 

moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of 

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has not made any such allegations. 

Accordingly, the claims against the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department will be 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Oakland’s Chief of Police Anne Kirkpatrick, the City of 

Oakland, and the Oakland Police Department are DISMISSED with leave to amend. The 

amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and 

must include the caption and civil case number (18-3020 JST (PR)) used in this order and the 

words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely 

replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See 

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from 

the original complaint by reference. Defendants not named in an amended complaint are 

no longer defendants. See id. Therefore, plaintiff must repeat his allegations against Webber and 

Tatlisu in the amended complaint if he files an amended complaint. Failure to file an amended 

complaint within the designated time and in compliance with this order will result in the Court 

proceeding only on the deliberate indifference claim against Webber and Tatlisu.

2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (ECF No. 1), and a copy of this order upon Herbert 

Webber and Yucel Tatlisu at the Oakland Police Department. 

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the complaint and this order to the City 

Attorney of the City of Oakland.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 

If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

 

1

 If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). 

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponents. Until defendants’

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to defendants. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

10. The Clerk shall include a blank civil rights complaint form with a copy of this order 

to plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 4:18-cv-03020-JST Document 8 Filed 09/11/18 Page 7 of 7