Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07279/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07279-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 10, 2009 

No. 00-7279 

ELENA STURDZA, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 06-7061, 06-7069 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 98cv02051) 

John A. King and Patrick James Attridge were on the 

briefs for appellants Angelos Demetriou & Associates, et al. 

Elena Sturdza, pro se, was on the brief for appellant 

Elena Sturdza. Martin R. Baach entered an appearance. 

Nathan Lewin and Alyza D. Lewin were on the brief for 

appellee Nathan Lewin. 

USCA Case #00-7279 Document #1175247 Filed: 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 8
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Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

PER CURIAM: During the course of an ongoing copyright 

lawsuit, appellant Elena Sturdza behaved in a manner that led 

her attorney to move for the appointment of a guardian ad 

litem. Ms. Sturdza refused to submit to psychiatric 

examination, and the district court appointed a guardian. 

While we appreciate the difficulty Ms. Sturdza has caused by 

failing to cooperate, we are compelled to remand for the 

district court to give her clear notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. 

I. 

As a result of a dispute over the design of the embassy 

for the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Elena Sturdza, an 

architect, sued the UAE for conspiracy to commit sex 

discrimination, rival architect Angelos Demetriou and his firm 

for several torts, and both sets of defendants for copyright 

infringement and breach of contract. In 2002, we affirmed the 

district court’s dismissal of Ms. Sturdza’s sex discrimination 

claim, reversed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment as to her copyright claim and its dismissal of all her 

other claims, and certified to the District of Columbia Court 

of Appeals a licensing law question relevant to her breach of 

contract claim. Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287, 1307 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002). We retained jurisdiction pending the Court of 

Appeals’ resolution of the certified question. Id. at 1308. 

Even though our decision was largely favorable, Ms. 

Sturdza, acting pro se and against her lawyer Nathan Lewin’s 

advice, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 

Sturdza v. U.A.E., 537 U.S. 810 (2002) (denying in forma 

pauperis status); see also Sturdza v. U.A.E., 537 U.S. 1026 

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(2002) (denying reconsideration). Ms. Sturdza also accused 

Mr. Lewin of participating in a conspiracy to sabotage her 

case and mislead the court, and she refused to permit Mr. 

Lewin’s former law firm to transfer the case file to him so he 

could prepare her appellate brief on the certified question. 

Citing this behavior, as well as his own interactions with Ms. 

Sturdza and a series of pro se filings she had insisted on 

making in this court, Mr. Lewin asked us to appoint a 

guardian ad litem. Instead of resolving that issue ourselves, 

we remanded the record for the district court to address the 

question in the first instance. 

After an initial status conference on July 10, 2002, the 

district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who on 

October 9 held a status conference at which Ms. Sturdza 

refused to consent to psychiatric examination. The magistrate 

judge then issued a report and recommendation that, relying 

on the fact that Ms. Sturdza did not appear incompetent and 

had never been found to be so, recommended denying the 

motion for appointment of a guardian. 

On April 24, 2003, the district court declined to adopt the 

report and recommendation, instead ordering Ms. Sturdza to 

show cause at a hearing why she should not be ordered to 

submit to psychiatric examination. Ms. Sturdza refused to 

appear at the hearing on June 4 or the rescheduled hearing on 

June 23. On August 26 the district court ordered Ms. Sturdza 

to submit to psychiatric examination and ordered both Ms. 

Sturdza and Mr. Lewin to propose two licensed psychiatrists 

by September 2. Mr. Lewin responded with two names; Ms. 

Sturdza offered none. 

Two years later, the district court appointed a guardian, 

relying on litigation documents provided by Mr. Lewin, Ms. 

Sturdza’s conduct at the status conferences, her pro se filings, 

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and her failure to appear at the June 4 and June 23, 2003 

hearings or to submit the names of two psychiatrists as 

ordered. From this evidence, the district court concluded that 

Ms. Sturdza was “incapable of rational decision-making with 

respect to the instant case,” Sturdza v. U.A.E., No. 98-2051 

(HHK), slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2005), and noted that in 

light of Ms. Sturdza’s refusal to submit to psychiatric 

examination, it could “think of no additional procedural 

safeguards that would assist in its decision to appoint a 

guardian ad litem,” id. at 6. Although acknowledging some 

authority permitting dismissal without prejudice when a 

plaintiff refuses to submit to court-ordered psychiatric 

examination, the district court declined to exercise this option, 

instead interpreting Ms. Sturdza’s refusal as “yet another 

indici[um] of her inability to make reasoned decisions 

concerning this litigation.” Id. at 6 n.6. 

Seeking to undo the appointment, Ms. Sturdza and 

defendants Mr. Demetriou and his firm appeal the district 

court’s ruling. We have appellate jurisdiction because Ms. 

Sturdza’s initial appeal remains before us pending the D.C. 

Court of Appeals’ resolution of the certified question. For its 

part, the Court of Appeals has stayed its proceedings, 

awaiting resolution of the question whether Ms. Sturdza may 

represent herself. 

II. 

Mr. Lewin argues that Mr. Demetriou and his firm lack 

standing to appeal the appointment of a guardian for Ms. 

Sturdza. We disagree. Given that the fees of any guardian ad 

litem can be taxed as costs, Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft 

Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 854–55 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Mr. Demetriou 

and his firm have shown “an adverse effect” sufficient to give 

standing to appeal, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. 

Co., 78 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 

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marks omitted). Ms. Sturdza, who fired Mr. Lewin after he 

filed the motion seeking a guardian, challenges his standing to 

contest her appeal. We have no need to address that 

challenge. Even were we to find that Mr. Lewin lacked 

standing, we could accept his brief as a friend of the court. 

Cf. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 

1024, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting appointment of amicus 

curiae “to present arguments in support of the District Court’s 

judgment” when district court dismissed case sua sponte and 

defendants never appeared), superseded by statute on other 

grounds, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008). 

 “Because a litigant possesses liberty interests in avoiding 

the stigma of being found incompetent, and in retaining 

personal control over the litigation, the Due Process Clause of 

the Fifth Amendment limits the district court’s discretion with 

respect to the procedures used before appointing a guardian 

ad litem.” Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 

651 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). When the party for 

whom the guardian is sought claims to be competent, at least 

“some hearing” is required. Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 

1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1990). Although this need not always 

take the form of a “full adversary hearing,” at a minimum it 

entails “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 1034. 

In this case, Ms. Sturdza never received notice and an 

opportunity to be heard on the question whether a guardian 

should be appointed. Neither proceeding she attended 

addressed that question. The July 10, 2002 district court 

status conference revolved only around the question whether 

to set a hearing at a later date. See Tr. at 29 (July 10, 2002) 

(“[T]his is simply not the time to address the merits of the 

motion . . . .”). The magistrate judge’s October 9, 2002 

conference concerned the question whether to schedule a full 

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hearing on the motion. See Tr. at 26 (Oct. 9, 2002) (“[W]e 

will not go forward with the evidentiary hearing today.”). 

The magistrate judge never scheduled a hearing, instead 

concluding that Ms. Sturdza was not incompetent and 

recommending against appointing a guardian. 

Nor did Ms. Sturdza receive a hearing at any time after 

the district court declined to adopt the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation. Though Ms. Sturdza failed to comply with 

the district court’s directions, none of the orders she 

disobeyed addressed the question whether to appoint a 

guardian. The district court scheduled the June 4 and June 23, 

2003 proceedings, both of which Ms. Sturdza refused to 

attend, to determine “why she should not be ordered to 

undergo a mental examination by a licensed psychiatrist,” not 

to answer the ultimate question whether to appoint a guardian. 

Sturdza v. U.A.E., No. 98-2051 (HHK), slip op. at 4–5 

(D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2003). Although in advance of these 

proceedings Ms. Sturdza did file a written submission 

claiming that she was competent, it seems quite clear from the 

record that she never received notice that her failure to 

comply would or could result in the appointment of a 

guardian. As for her failure to undergo a mental evaluation, 

the court’s order stated generally that Ms. Sturdza was to 

meet with a psychiatrist, but it imposed no deadline for such 

an examination. Indeed, in soliciting two names each from 

Mr. Lewin and Ms. Sturdza, the order appears to have 

contemplated a further order selecting a psychiatrist and 

setting a deadline. Sturdza v. U.A.E., No. 98-2051 (HHK), 

slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2003) (“[B]y September 2, 

2003, Mr. Lewin and Ms. Sturdza shall each submit to the 

court the names of two psychiatrists who they would propose 

to perform the examination that is the subject of this order 

. . . .”). But instead of issuing such an order, holding 

additional proceedings, or making any other contact with the 

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parties, the district court simply appointed a guardian ad 

litem. Thus, Ms. Sturdza never received a hearing, as there 

was no proceeding that she was told would be her opportunity 

to convince the court that appointment of a guardian was 

unnecessary. 

We appreciate that Ms. Sturdza’s refusal to comply made 

it difficult for the district court to adjudicate Mr. Lewin’s 

motion. Also, based on the evidence of Ms. Sturdza’s 

behavior, including her disregard of the district court’s April 

24, 2003 order to show cause why she should not be subject 

to mental evaluation, we think the court acted within its 

discretion when it concluded that doubts as to her competency 

justified compelled psychiatric examination. See Cyntje v. 

Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 95 F.R.D. 430, 432 (D. V.I. 1982). 

And because no per se rule requires that a determination of 

incompetency rest on medical evidence alone, cf. Hudnall v. 

Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that 

incompetence justifying a guardian ad litem need not be 

“accompanied by other forms of personality disorder”), the 

district court permissibly treated Ms. Sturdza’s failure to 

comply with its entirely proper order directing psychiatric 

evaluation as a factor that, in combination with the other 

evidence of her conduct, supported the appointment of a 

guardian. That said, before adjudicating Ms. Sturdza 

incompetent and appointing a guardian, the district court 

should have ordered her to show cause why a guardian should 

not be appointed and informed her that in determining 

whether to appoint one, it would consider any failure on her 

part to comply or to submit to psychiatric evaluation. So long 

as the district court also made clear to Ms. Sturdza that she 

could seek to dismiss her case without prejudice if she wished 

to avoid either a psychiatric evaluation or the loss of control 

over her litigation, such notice would have been 

constitutionally adequate to allow the district court to rule on 

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the motion if she had persisted in noncompliance. Cf. Krain 

v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 

that a court may dismiss without prejudice when a party 

refuses to cooperate with a competency assessment). 

III. 

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the district 

court’s September 28 and November 8, 2005 orders and its 

March 27, 2006 order, and remand the record for the district 

court to give Ms. Sturdza notice and an opportunity to be 

heard on the question whether it should appoint a guardian ad 

litem. The case remains in abeyance pending further order of 

the court. 

So ordered. 

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