Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01361/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01361-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

Petitioner has filed numerous documents relating to his motion for stay and abeyance and his

request to amend his petition. This order addresses the following two Docket entries:

1. Docket. no. 6: Petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance, filed on September

29, 2006.

2. Docket no. 18: Petitioner’s second motion for leave to amend, filed nunc pro

tunc on January 25, 2007 (“Second Motion to Amend”). This motion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. BAUMER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06 CV 1361 JM (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION AS

MODIFIED HEREIN

(Docket Nos. 6 and 18)

vs.

JAMES TILTON, Warden,

Defendant.

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 2254 habeas petition on July 3, 2006. He challenges

his conviction for possession and manufacture of a deadly weapon by a state inmate and battery upon

a state correctional officer. Petitioner now moves (1) to stay and abey the petition so he can exhaust

two additional claims, and (2) to amend the petition by adding one of these claims and making other

changes to a preexisting claim. Respondent opposes the motion for stay and abeyance but filed no

opposition to the motion to amend. 

On August 1, 2007, Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the court deny the motion to amend as futile and find

the motion to stay and abey moot or, in the alternative, deny the motion to stay and abey.1

 Petitioner

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superseded Petitioner’s initial motion to amend (Docket no. 9), filed nunc pro

tunc on October 17, 2006 and terminated on April 26, 2007. 

The R&R addresses Docket nos. 6, 9, and 18. Because the January 25, 2007 motion to amend

superseded the initial motion to amend, this order addresses Docket nos. 6 and 18. 

Docket no. 21 contains Petitioner’s proposed first amended petition, incorporating changes

requested in Petitioner’s second motion for leave to amend. This proposed first amended petition was

included in Petitioner’s second status report regarding his motion for stay and abeyance, filed nunc

pro tunc on January 25, 2007. To the extent that Docket no. 21 was characterized as a motion, that

characterization was inaccurate. 

2

The court hereby incorporates by reference the R&R’s Background section.

3

As a result of this procedural background, Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey involves two

claims, whereas his motion to amend – in its final form – involves only the claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel. Any difference between the R&R’s references to ineffective assistance “claims”

and this order’s references to a single ineffective assistance “claim” is only linguistic. Both refer to

the same proposed amendment.

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filed timely objections to which Respondent did not reply. For the reasons set forth below, the court

hereby adopts in part the conclusions of the R&R and (1) denies Petitioner’s motion to amend to add

his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) grants Petitioner’s motion to amend insofar as the

motion seeks changes related to his preexisting claim of denial of the right to self-representation; and

(3) denies Petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance. 

BACKGROUND2

Petitioner moves to stay and abey his petition to exhaust two additional claims. Each of the

new claims relates to his allegation that his prior criminal convictions were unconstitutional.

Specifically, he alleges that his sentence violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

because the sentence was enhanced by his prior convictions. He also alleges that he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because

his attorney failed to challenge the constitutionality of these convictions and, as a result, they were

impermissibly used to enhance his sentence and to impeach his testimony. 

Petitioner exhausted these claims in state court. He now seeks to add only the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim to his petition.3

 He also seeks to make several other changes to his

preexisting self-representation claim. In this regard, he wishes first to modify his explanation of why

his requests to represent himself were timely. (Second Mtn. to Amend at 4-5 (seeking to change ¶¶

171, 186, and 244 of original petition).) He believes that his original explanation reflected an

incorrect understanding of the law, and he seeks to change his explanation accordingly. Second, he

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Petitioner does not address the related due process claim, which he no longer seeks to add to

his petition.

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seeks to correct an inaccuracy regarding the date for which the trial court set his case for trial.

(Second Mtn. to Amend at 5 (seeking to change ¶ 64 of original petition).) Finally, he wishes to add

the allegation that the California Court of Appeals “made an unreasonable determination of the facts

by failing to considering the trial court’s denial of [Petitioner’s] August 23, 2000 request to represent

[himself] separately from the court’s earlier denials of [Petitioner’s] August 21 & 22, 2000, motions

to proceed pro se.” (Second Mtn. to Amend at 5.)

DISCUSSION

The court reviews a magistrate judge’s R&R according to the standards set forth in Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. The court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made. A judge of the court may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1980).

Petitioner objects to the R&R on a number of grounds. Regarding the motion to amend, he

disputes the finding that he must receive leave to amend, arguing that he properly exercised his FRCP

Rule 15(a) right to amend as a matter of course. He also disputes the conclusion that the statute of

limitations established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 22 U.S.C.

§ 2244, expired before he sought to amend his petition. Furthermore, he claims that the R&R

incorrectly determined that California Penal Code § 1004 acts as an “adequate and independent” statelaw basis for denying relief, such that amendment would be futile. Finally, Petitioner argues that the

R&R should have addressed his request to amend his preexisting self-representation claim. 

Regarding the motion for stay and abeyance, he claims that the R&R erred in two ways. He

disputes its conclusion that he did not show good cause for failing to exhaust his proposed ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim earlier.4

 He also claims that the R&R erroneously stated that he did not

show this claim has merit. 

A. Motion to Amend Denied in Part and Granted in Part

The court agrees with the R&R’s recommendation to deny Petitioner’s motion for leave to

amend to add the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. However, the court finds leave to amend

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appropriate in regard to the proposed changes to Petitioner’s preexisting self-representation claim.

The R&R did not address the latter changes.

1. Petitioner Cannot Amend without Leave from the Court

Petitioner argues that he did not need leave to amend because he officially moved to amend

in his September 21, 2006 motion to stay and abey. He states that the timing of this motion, which

he filed one day before Respondent’s answer, entitles him to amendment as a matter of course under

FRCP Rule 15(a). This argument is incorrect. 

A § 2254 petitioner may amend his petition as provided in the FRCP. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. The

FRCP allow amendment of a pleading once as a matter of right “at any time before a responsive

pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or

by written consent of the adverse party . . . .” FRCP R. 15(a). Where a party unnecessarily moves for

leave to amend despite being able to amend as a matter of course, the court should not deny the

motion. See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Nolen v. Fitzharris,

450 F.2d 958, 959 (9th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, “Rule 15(a) applies where plaintiffs ‘expressly

requested’ to amend even though their request ‘was not contained in a properly captioned motion

paper.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Scott v.

Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116 n.8 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Edwards v. Occidental Chem.

Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1446 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (court should have granted leave to amend where

plaintiff did not bring formal motion but requested amendment in opposition to summary judgment

motion). The court likewise may “ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and

recharacterize the motion . . . within a different legal category.” Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375,

381 (recharacterization appropriate to “avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling

requirements . . . or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim

and its underlying legal basis” (citation omitted)).

 In this case, however, even if the court liberally construed Petitioner’s original motion to stay

and abey as a motion for leave to amend, Petitioner’s request to amend was not ripe on September 21,

2006. “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur

as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Tex. v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Petitioner sought to “amend said claims into

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5

The California Court of Appeals ultimately denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on

November 6, 2006, and Petitioner then sought relief in the California Supreme Court. The California

Supreme Court denied his petition on December 20, 2006.

6

Neither the R&R nor Petitioner’s objections addressed the timeliness of the proposed

amendments to Petitioner’s preexisting claims.

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his stayed federal petition after they have been exhausted in California courts.” (Petitioner’s Mot. for

Stay and Abeyance at 1 (emphasis added).) Amendment thus depended on whether a California court

granted relief. On September 21, 2006, Petitioner was still in the process of exhausting his new claims

in California state courts.5 

Petitioner’s motion became fit for adjudication only on December 20, 2006, when the

California Supreme Court denied his petition. The prospective, conditional nature of Petitioner’s

request thus prevented this court from properly considering the motion to amend before the exhaustion

process concluded. Accordingly, Petitioner did not exercise his right to amend as a matter of course

before Respondent served the answer. He can only amend with leave from the court.

2. Regardless of the AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend

Is Timely Because It Relates Back to His Original Petition 

Petitioner disputes the R&R’s conclusion that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired

before his request to amend. He argues that the R&R incorrectly calculated the statutory tolling

period. (See Obj. at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 11 (2000); Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2000); Gatson v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)).) He also

argues that he deserves equitable tolling beginning on the date he mailed his amended § 2254 petition

and continuing through the pendency of his motions to stay and abey and to amend. (See Obj. at 4

(citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1997)).)

The court need not reach these objections because the court finds that the amendments relate

back to the original petition. Based on the relation-back doctrine, the R&R ultimately deemed the

amendment adding a new claim timely. Petitioner ignored this issue in his objections.6

FRCP 15(c) governs the relation back of amendments to a pleading. Under this rule, in

pertinent part, an amendment relates back to the original pleading’s date when “the claim or defense

asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . . . .” In habeas cases, a new claim cannot relate

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back unless it is supported by facts similar “in both time and type” to facts in the original petition.

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005).

The court agrees with and wholly adopts the R&R’s analysis and conclusion that the

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim relates back to Petitioner’s original habeas petition.

Furthermore, the court finds that the requested changes to Petitioner’s preexisting self-representation

claim also relate back to the original petition. These amendments propose no new claims. They

inherently arise out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences alleged in Petitioner’s first petition.

Because each of Petitioner’s proposed amendments relates back to the original petition date, the

motion to amend is timely.

3. Amendment Adding the Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim Would Be Futile

Petitioner further argues that the R&R erred in finding that the proposed ineffective-assistanceof-counsel amendment is futile. He asserts that California Penal Code § 1004 does not procedurally

bar his new claim. His objections argue that California Penal Code § 1004 is not an “independent and

adequate” state law ground preventing a federal court from reviewing his habeas claim; that California

law allows a criminal defendant to challenge his prior convictions; and that a motion to strike – rather

than a § 1004 demurrer – is the proper way to attack the criminal information.

In general, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” FRCP R. 15(a).

“[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose,

893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). FRCP Rule 15(a) consequently permits denial of leave to amend

only in limited circumstances. The court may deny leave where at least one of four factors exists:

“bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Group,

Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Leave to add a proposed habeas claim would be futile if the federal court ultimately cannot

review the claim. Where an adequate and independent state ground supports a state court judgment

also deciding a federal legal issue, federal review of the judgment is prohibited. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). This doctrine rests on principles of comity and applies

equally in § 2254 habeas cases. Id. at 730-32; see also id. at 735 n.* (doctrine applies during

exhaustion process where state court finds claim procedurally barred (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 269-70 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). As the R&R also explained, a state rule is

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7

No federal court in the Ninth Circuit has yet addressed whether § 1004 is adequate for the

purposes of the adequate-and-independent analysis.

8

The court notes that Petitioner does not allege that this adequate and independent state ground

implicates an identifiable federal constitutional right. He did not challenge the constitutionality of §

1004 in this case. Nor did he assert that the prior convictions were not his own. Instead, he relies

largely on California law to argue that he had a right to attack the validity of his prior convictions.

(See Obj. at 14 (citing People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 3d 204 (1967), People v. Sumstine, 36 Cal. 3d 909

(1984), People v. Allen, 21 Cal. 4th 424 (1999)).) While he also asserts a Fourteenth Amendment

“liberty interest” in the state right established by these cases, he fails to cite any authority identifying

a liberty interest arising out of similar state law. This argument does not demonstrate a constitutional

violation. 

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“adequate” if it is a “firmly established and regularly followed state practice” and “further[s] a

legitimate state interest.” Smith v. Texas, 127 S.Ct. 1686, 1704 (2007)(citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). 

The court agrees with and adopts the R&R’s conclusion that California Penal Code § 1004

provides an adequate and independent state ground preventing federal review of the state courts’

denial of Petitioner’s proposed new claim. Petitioner objects that § 1004 is not “adequate” because

California does not consistently and regularly apply the § 1004 procedural bar in similar cases. (Obj.

at 6.)7 In support of this argument, however, he cites only one case. (See id. (citing In re Bartlett, 15

Cal. App. 3d 176, 180-81 (1971)).) The cited case addresses neither § 1004 nor the procedure for

demurring to a criminal complaint. It thus provides no indication of the frequency with which

California courts have applied the statute. Because Petitioner fails to furnish any convincing support,

the court rejects his objection.8

The court also finds that leave to add the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim would be

futile because the claim lacks merit. To prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,

Petitioner must show that (1) trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 477 U.S.

668, 685-86 (1994). Failure to make the showing required under either prong of the two-part

Strickland test defeats the claim of ineffective assistance. United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 665-

66 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700). In evaluating counsel’s performance, “there

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is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905, 919 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 981 (2003)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “the failure to take a futile action can

never be deficient performance . . . .” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In this case, Petitioner does not present a claim of deficient performance rising to the level

required by Strickland. His argument targets a strategic move: counsel’s decision not to raise an issue.

Because California Penal Code § 1004 barred counsel from demurring to the information as requested

by Petitioner, the failure to attack the prior convictions was a “failure to take a futile action.” See

Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445. Counsel had no duty to prevent the use of Petitioner’s own convictions. This

conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” See Payton, 258 F.3d at

919. Counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Based on the futility of amendment, the court hereby denies leave to add the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim.

4. Leave to Amend the Preexisting Claim Regarding Denial of the Right to SelfRepresentation Is Appropriate

As Petitioner notes, the R&R failed to address Petitioner’s request to amend his preexisting

self-representation claim. The nature of the proposed amendments to Petitioner’s preexisting claims

warrants leave to amend. No signs exist that Petitioner seeks the amendments in bad faith. See

Griggs, 170 F.3d at 880. Furthermore, the requested changes do not alter the nature of the underlying

claim. As such, they cause no undue delay or prejudice to Respondent. See id. Respondent’s lack

of opposition to the motion to amend bolsters the conclusion that these amendments will cause

Respondent no undue harm.

The court finds these circumstances appropriate for application of the policy favoring leave

to amend. The court therefore grants Petitioner’s motion to amend his petition to make only the

proposed changes to his preexisting claims discussed in ¶¶ 8-18 of his second motion for leave to

amend.

B. Motion for Stay and Abeyance

The court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey is moot,

in light of both the order denying leave to add the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and the fact

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9

The court has established the Petitioner first mentioned leave to amend on September 20,

2006, in his motion to stay and abey.

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that Petitioner no longer seeks to add a due process claim. The court further adopts the R&R’s

analysis and conclusion that, even ifleave to add the new claims had been appropriate when Petitioner

first requested it,9 the court should reject the motion to stay and abey on the merits.

A district court has discretion to stay and abey a mixed federal habeas petition – one

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims – if the petitioner had good cause for failing to

exhaust the unexhausted claims earlier. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). The Supreme Court

noted that the stay-and-abeyance procedure “should be available only in limited circumstances” and

is appropriate only upon a finding of good cause for failure to exhaust. Id. at 1535; Jackson v. Roe,

425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court must make this determination consistent with

AEDPA’s twin purposes of (1) “‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences,’” and (2) requiring prisoners to seek state relief first, thereby “streamlining federal habeas

proceedings.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-77 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that

frequent use of the stay-and-abeyance procedure would undermine these purposes. The procedure

therefore should only be available where: (1) the district court finds good cause for failure to exhaust

earlier; (2) the unexhausted claims are not meritless; and (3) the petitioner acts with reasonable

diligence to exhaust the unexhausted claims. Id. at 277-78. Petitioner challenges the first and second

requirements of this analysis.

1. Petitioner Lacked Good Cause for Failing to Exhaust His New Claims Earlier

Petitioner argues that the R&R erred in determining that he lacked good cause for failure to

exhaust his new claims earlier. The heart of his argument is a reassertion of an argument raised in his

motion to stay and abey: Petitioner claims that he lacked the evidence necessary to support his new

claims before he filed his original § 2254 petition. (See Mtn. for Stay and Abeyance at 4; Obj. at 11.)

He further argues that Magistrate Judge Bencivengo “inferred” in a previous ruling that Petitioner had

already demonstrated good cause. (Obj. at 12.)

In regard to Petitioner’s reasserted argument, the R&R thoughtfully and correctly explains why

Petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause. (See R&R at 7.) The court therefore adopts the R&R’s

analysis and rejects the objections related to a lack of evidence to support Petitioner’s claim. 

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Furthermore, the court does not agree with the assertion that the magistrate’s earlier order

suggested that Petitioner had demonstrated good cause. The earlier order explained that “Petitioner

should set forth facts in an attempt to demonstrate good cause for his failure to timely exhaust the state

court remedies with respect to his unexhausted claims.” (Oct. 23, 2006 Order Re: Petitioner’s Mtn.

for Stay and Abeyance (Docket no. 7) at 2.) The order then stated that “Petitioner has already

addressed the good cause requirement in his [motion for stay and abeyance],” and gave Petitioner the

option to file an amended motion “if he wishes, upon reading this Order.” (Id. (emphasis added).)

Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, addressing a legal requirement and demonstrating proof sufficient

to satisfy the requirement are two different concepts. Petitioner did address the good cause issue in

his initial motion to stay and abey, but the magistrate’s order unequivocally indicated that his

treatment of the issue may not have made the necessary showing. The court thus rejects Petitioner’s

objections related to good cause. 

2. Petitioner’s Potential New Claims Lack Merit 

In challenging the conclusion that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim lacks merit,

Petitioner merely cites his argument against the futility of amendment. (Obj. at 12.) He raises no new

arguments. As discussed above, the court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally

barred and also finds the claim unmeritorious. The related due process claim, which Petitioner

initially sought to add to his petition and does not discuss in his objections, fails for the same reasons.

Accordingly, the court rejects the objection related to the merit of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby adopts in part the conclusions of the R&R and orders:

1. Petitioner’s motion to amend the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to add the now-exhausted

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is DENIED.

2. Petitioner’s motion to amend the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to make the proposed

changes to his preexisting claims, discussed in ¶¶ 8-18 of his second motion for leave

to amend, filed nunc pro tunc on January 19, 2007, is GRANTED. Petitioner must file

///

///

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///

 no later than 30 days from the date of this order an amended petition containing only

the amendments allowed herein.

3. Petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

CC: All parties

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