Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04392/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04392-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 Michael J. Astrue became Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on 1

February 1, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J.

Astrue is substituted for Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this matter.

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 2

Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 8/2/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN J. MENDOZA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,1

Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 2

MOTION FOR REMAND AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[re: docket no. 17, 18]

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John. J. Mendoza filed the complaint in this action on July 18, 2006, seeking to

reverse a decision by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying

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 The challenged decision was rendered on March 3, 2005 by Administrative Law Judge 3

Brenton L. Rogozen (“ALJ”) after a hearing on January 11, 2005. The ALJ’s decision became

final on May 15, 2006, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 

 Defendant states that it attempted to stipulate to a remand with Plaintiff prior to the 4

filing of Defendant’s motion to remand, but that Plaintiff refused.

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

him disability insurance benefits. On December 26, 2006, Defendant answered the complaint. 3

On February 14, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 16, 2007,

Defendant moved for remand and filed opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.4

Plaintiff replied on March 20, 2007. The matter was submitted without oral argument. 

The following facts are taken from the March 3, 2005 administrative hearing and the

accompanying administrative record (“AR”). At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was fifty-seven

years-old, possessed a twelfth-grade education, and had past employment experience as a

journeyman carpenter and facilities maintenance repairman. AR 16. He alleges that he became

disabled on December 18, 2002 due to a heart condition, hypertension, stress, and a shoulder

condition. Id. at 17.

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “is not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act” and therefore is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. Id. at 16. To

determine whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ implemented the five-step evaluation process

required by 20 CFR § 404.1520. Id. at 17. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “had

not engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged onset date.” Id. at 17. At step

two, the ALJ concluded that the right shoulder pain suffered by Plaintiff should be categorized as

a “non-severe impairment which does not cause any functional limitations.” Id. Regarding

mental health, the ALJ concluded that “there is no medical evidence that the claimant has ever

complained of anxiety or depression to his physicians and no evidence of any mental diagnosis.” 

Id. at 18. The ALJ found Plaintiff to “have a non-severe impairment of depression which does

not result in any functional mental limitations.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff was not disabled by the pain he suffered in his right shoulder or by his mental health.

With respect to the coronary artery disease suffered by Plaintiff, the ALJ made the

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

following findings at steps two and three : 

The medical evidence indicates that the claimant has coronary artery disease, an

impairment that is ‘severe’ within the meaning of the Regulations but not ‘severe’

enough to meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. In particular, the undersigned has considered the

impairment listings under Section 4.00, but the claimant’s condition does not

satisfy the criteria for any of these listings.

Id at 17. Accordingly, the ALJ did not apply the presumption of disability to the coronary artery

disease.

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been able to perform any of his

past relevant work at any time since the alleged onset date.” Id. at 20. The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) such that he could “frequently lift/carry

10 pounds; occasionally lift/carry 20 pounds; stand/walk for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday; and sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday (i.e., light work).” Id. at 19. 

Additionally, the ALJ found “no basis to support any additional restrictions related to the

claimant’s right shoulder.” Id. At step five, the ALJ found that, based upon the testimony of the

vocational expert, “claimant has transferable skills from his carpentry and maintenance work to

hardware sales” and that the “conservatively-speaking, 200-250 hardware sales jobs in the local

economy . . . translates to a significant number of jobs in the national economy.” Id. at 20. The

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education and work experience, and the availability of a

“significant number of jobs in the national economy,” led to a “finding that the claimant can

perform the demands of the full range of light work” and was “not under a disability as defined in

the Social Security Act at any time through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id. at 20-21. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits. The Commissioner’s decision (here the

decision of the ALJ) will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is

based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

(9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the

term “substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it

is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court examines the administrative

record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support

more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the ALJ. Moncada,

60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

2. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th

Cir. 1984). Social Security disability cases are evaluated using a five-step, sequential evaluation

process. In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently is

engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 

Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step

requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities; if not, a finding of “not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant

has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or

equals an impairment in the Listing; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are

awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine

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 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he or she can still do despite existing 5

exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

 There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is 6

other work in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).

 See AR 417-34. 7

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity” to perform his or her past 5

work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The plaintiff has the burden

of proving that he or she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If

the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner

then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

work; the determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 6

20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as

amended April 9, 1996; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

1. Weight Given to Declaration of Dr. Khoa Nguyen

The ALJ made the following finding regarding the declaration submitted after the 7

hearing by Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Khoa Nguyen:

It is noted that after the hearing, the claimant submitted a “Declaration” of Dr.

Khoa Nguyen, the claimant’s primary care physician, consisting of questions

asked by the claimant’s attorney and Dr. Nguyen’s answers during a conference

call. The doctor acknowledged that he primarily treats the claimant’s

hypertension and high cholesterol, both of which are under control. Dr. Nguyen

opined that the claimant’s shoulder condition precludes him from lifting more

than 12 pounds or lifting anything above shoulder height with his right arm and

that he would need a 5-10 minute break from standing once an hour. . . .

The undersigned gives little weight to Dr. Nguyen’s Declaration as it is limited to

questions from the claimant’s attorney and does not constitute a report issued by

the doctor in which he describes a full examination. In response to a direct

question, Dr. Nguyen was unable to cite any objective signs or findings from his

examination of the claimant’s shoulder. With respect to the doctor’s opinion

regarding the claimant’s overall condition and ability to stand during a workday,

that opinion is rejected as Dr. Nguyen provided no medical findings to support

that assessment and he admitted that he does not manage the claimant’s cardiac

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

condition. (It is also noted that the claimant’s treating cardiologist opined he

could return to work without any limitations as long as it was not as strenuous as

carpentry and similar work). Based upon the cardiologist, and the lack of any

objective findings to support his opinions, Dr. Nguyen’s assessment of the

claimant’s limitations is not found credible.

AR 19.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not giving more weight to Dr. Nguyen’s assessment. 

However, even assuming that Dr. Nguyen should be considered a treating physician with respect

to all of Plaintiff’s medical problems, the lack of any supporting objective findings and the

contrary opinion of a treating physician with respect to Plaintiff’s cardiological health constitute

clear and convincing reasons for not accepting Dr. Nguyen’s opinion. See Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ . . . must present clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting the uncontroverted opinion of a claimant’s physician. . . . Although the treating

physician’s opinion is given deference, the ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician in

favor of a conflicting opinion of an examining physician if the ALJ makes findings setting forth

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record. . . . 

The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that

opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

2. Testimony of the Vocational Expert

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform light work, but could not return to the

medium work he had performed prior to the beginning of his medical problems. Accordingly,

the ALJ stated that “the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to show that there are

other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform,

consistent with his residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience.” AR 20. 

Based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has skills that are transferable

to hardware sales, which is categorized as light, semi-skilled work. Id. The VE testified that at

least 200 to 250 such jobs exist in the local area, which led the ALJ to the conclusion that a

significant number of such jobs exist in the national economy. Id.

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied improperly upon the VE’s testimony. The VE gave

extensive testimony about the availability of hardware sales jobs and endured a contentious

cross-examination. See AR 453-81. In light of the thorough probing and consideration of his

analysis and conclusions, it appears likely that the ALJ’s reliance upon the VE’s testimony was

proper. However, the Court need not decide that question, as it concludes that even if the VE’s

testimony was not sufficiently supported, the appropriate remedy is remand for further

development of the record. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that remand for entry of benefits was appropriate on facts distinguishable from those

of the instant case: “Even without extensive VE testimony, Benecke’s entitlement to disability

benefits is clear. The VE testimony establishes that Benecke would be unable to perform her past

work as a telemarketer, a sedentary job with limited physical demands.”); see also Massachi v.

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding in light of ALJ’s failure to inquire

sufficiently into VE’s testimony). As discussed below, the Court will grant the Government’s

motion to remand on another basis. On remand, the ALJ’s decision will be vacated and a new

hearing will be held. Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by any error by the ALJ in

accepting the VE’s testimony.

3. Plaintiff’s Subjective Reporting of Symptoms

The parties agree that the ALJ did not address adequately Plaintiff’s subjective reporting

of his symptoms. Plaintiff testified that he was physically limited by chest pain, trouble

breathing, and leg pain. AR 448-49. In response to this testimony, the ALJ found that “the

claimant’s allegations regarding his limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set forth in

the body of the decision.” Id. at 21. However, the body of the ALJ’s decision does not identify

any such reasons. Social Security Rule 96-7p prohibits conclusory findings about a lack of

credibility. Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to give specific reasons for the conclusion that

Plaintiff’s testimony lacked credibility was error. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59

(9th Cir. 2002) (“If the ALJ finds that the claimant’s testimony as to the severity of her pain and

impairments is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings

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 The Court notes that while Plaintiff initially testified that he thought he could stand for 8

half an hour at a time, provided he had a ten to fifteen minute rest thereafter, Plaintiff withdrew

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit

claimant’s testimony.”). 

 In light of this error, “the Commissioner requests that this Court remand Plaintiff’s case.” 

Motion to Remand 3. Defendant asserts that “[u]pon remand, the Office of Disability

Adjudication and Review (ODAR) will vacate the March 3, 2005, ALJ decision, and remand this

case for a de novo ALJ hearing. The ODAR will direct the ALJ to address Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, allow submission of new evidence, and issue a new decision.” Id. Plaintiff also

requests that the Court remand the action to the Commissioner, but solely for the entry of

benefits.

When an administrative agency determination is reversed “the proper course, except in

rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” 

Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has explained:

Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of

the record would be useful. Conversely, where the record has been developed

fully and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the

district court should remand for an immediate award of benefits. More

specifically, the district court should credit evidence that was rejected during the

administrative process and remand for an immediate award of benefits if (1) the

ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2)

there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of

disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 

Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593. In the instant case, it is not clear that the ALJ would be required to

find Plaintiff disabled if the subjective testimony of the Plaintiff were credited as true. Even

accepting Plaintiff’s testimony, the record does not indicate that Plaintiff could not perform light

work. Plaintiff may need to take medication to remedy his heart problems, but he does not testify

that those medications leave him unable to perform any work. See AR 446-47. Plaintiff also

may be unable to move around for eight hours or do yard work for half a day, but that does not

foreclose a conclusion that he could do light work. See id. at 448.8

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that estimate, indicating that he did not know his capacity to stand. AR at 448-49. 

 See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 9

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX3)/(JFLC1)

Moreover, the Court concludes that even if the three part Harman test discussed in 9

Benecke were met, it would not be appropriate to credit as true Plaintiff’s testimony at the

hearing. While it is generally the case that an action should not be remanded solely to allow an

ALJ to make a credibility finding, see Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593 (“Where the Harman test is met,

we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings regarding excessive pain

testimony. Rather, we take the relevant testimony to be established as true and remand for an

award of benefits.”), the Ninth Circuit has held that a remand for entry of benefits is not always

required as the “crediting as true” doctrine is not mandatory in the Ninth Circuit. Connett v.

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, the Ninth Circuit has recognized “some

flexibility in applying the ‘crediting as true’ theory.” Id. This Court concludes that such

flexibility is appropriate in the instant case. To all appearances, the ALJ undertook the analysis

of this case conscientiously and thoroughly, asked questions intended to develop the record, and

ensured that Plaintiff was able to present his evidence and argument as fully as possible. The

available evidence suggests that a determination of a lack of disability likely was proper. While

the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Commissioner should not be able to claim, “heads we

win, tails we play again,” there is no indication that the ALJ’s failure to detail his reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s credibility was anything more than an oversight. Under such

circumstances, even assuming that the three-part Harman test were met, the flexibility in the

“crediting as true” rule properly would be applied to ensure that Plaintiff receives only those

benefits to which he is entitled. While the Court recognizes the delay caused by remand, it notes

that Plaintiff failed to raise this issue with the Appeals Council, see AR 435-38, and also

declined to enter into a stipulation for remand with Defendant. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that this is not one of the rare situations in which

remand for entry of benefits is appropriate. Instead, the Court will exercise its discretion to

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

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remand the case for further proceedings. As the Government suggests, the Commissioner should

vacate the decision of the ALJ and hold a de novo hearing before an ALJ. Such an approach will

address Plaintiff’s apparent objection to remand on a limited basis. See Reply 2.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to

remand is GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

DATED: August 2, 2007.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 06-04392 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

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This Order has been served upon the following persons:

John C. Cusker john.cusker@ssa.gov 

Harvey Peter Sackett hps@hpspc.com, lucyc@sackettlaw.com; julie@sackettlaw.com;

juanita@sackettlaw.com 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov;

claire.muller@usdoj.gov 

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