Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00353/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jason Ray Tyler, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et. al, 

Respondents. 

No. CV 10-353-TUC-RCC (BPV)

(Lead) 

No. CV 10-543-TUC-RCC (BPV) 

(Consolidated) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On June 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For A Writ 

Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody (Non-Death Penalty). (Doc. 1, in CV 

10-353-TUC-RCC (BPV), lead case). On September 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a second 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State 

Custody (Non-Death Penalty). (Doc. 1, in CV 10-543-TUC-RCC (BPV), consolidated 

case). The two cases were consolidated on December 22, 2010 and thereafter, on 

December 27, 2010, Respondents filed one answer (Doc. 17) in the lead case with 

Exhibits A through JJ attached (Docs. 17-18). Petitioner filed a consolidated reply on 

January 26, 2011. (Doc. 19) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, these matters were referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

a. Trial Court Proceedings: 2005 cases 

i. Indictment 

Four indictments were filed by the grand jurors of Pima County in Arizona 

Superior Court, between March and November of 2005, charging Petitioner with four 

counts of drug related offenses, one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, two counts 

of aggravated assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of possession of a 

deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor.1

 (Answer, Ex. A-D) 

ii. Plea agreement and sentencing 

On February 2, 2006, Petitioner signed a plea agreement, and entered a plea to 

possession and transportation of a dangerous drug for sale, prohibited possession of a 

deadly weapon, and an amended charge of facilitation to a fraudulent scheme and artifice, 

a class six felony. (Answer, Ex. D, Reporter’s Transcript (RT) 2/6/06; Ex. E) On March 

6, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced for the charges above to concurrent prison terms of 

twenty, ten, three and one years, respectively. (Answer, Ex. F) 

b. Trial Court Proceedings: 2006 case 

i. Indictment 

On April 17, 2006, an indictment was filed by the grand jurors of Pima County in 

Arizona Superior Court charging Petitioner with conspiracy to commit the offenses of 

fraudulent scheme and artifice, theft, taking the identify of another, trafficking in the 

identify of another, trafficking in stolen property, and forgery.2

 (Answer, Ex. T) The 

indictment alleged that Petitioner was provided with identification and financial 

information which he used to create false identification such as driver’s licenses and 

forged checks. (Id.) In addition to the conspiracy charge, Petitioner was also charged with 

 

1

 The four state cases are captioned CR 20051017, CR 20051760, 

CR 20053687, and CR 20054669. These cases will be referred to 

collectively in this Report and Recommendation as the “2005 cases.” 

2

 This state case is captioned CR 20061380, but will be referred to in 

this Report and Recommendation as the “2006 case.” 

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twenty-two counts of forgery for forged checks. (Id.) 

c. Motion to Dismiss 

Petitioner moved to dismiss the 2006 case, pursuant to the double jeopardy and 

due process clauses of both the State and Federal constitutions. (Answer, Ex. EE) 

Petitioner argued that the 2006 case involved the same subject matter as the 2005 case 

CR 200536873

. (Id., p.2) After the State apparently conditioned its offer of a plea 

agreement in the case on Petitioner’s withdrawal of his motion to dismiss (Answer, Ex. 

Q, n. 1), Petitioner withdrew the motion to dismiss. (Answer, Ex. FF.) 

d. Plea Agreement 

On February 23, 2007, Petitioner signed a plea agreement, and entered a plea in 

the 2006 case to the charge of conspiracy. (Answer, Exs. U,V) On June 27, 2007, the 

trial court sentenced Petitioner to the aggravated term of 12 years imprisonment, to be 

served concurrent to the sentences imposed for the 2005 cases. (Answer, Ex. W) 

e. Petition for Post-conviction Relief: 2005 Cases 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 2005 cases on March 5, 

2007. (Answer, Ex. G) The petition was based on three grounds: (1) The State breached a 

material term of the plea agreement; (2) Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective at 

sentencing; and (3) Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective during the course of the 

proceedings. (Id.) Following an evidentiary hearing, (Answer, Exs. J, K), Superior Court 

Judge Nichols issued a ruling, denying post-conviction relief. (Id., Ex. O) Judge Nichols 

found that the Petitioner had received assurances from the State that no other charges 

arising from the course of conduct which led to the cases in which the Petitioner was 

pleading would be filed against him, and that the State had breached this material term of 

the plea agreement by filing new charges arising from the same course of conduct to 

which the defendant had entered a plea of guilty. (Answer, Ex. O, at 2) Judge Nichols 

denied the petition, however, ruling that because Petitioner did not pursue his cause of 

 

3

 This case was dismissed pursuant to the terms of the 2005 plea agreement. 

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action concerning the breach, choosing instead to accept a plea bargain to one of the 

counts in the 2006 case, Petitioner accepted and validated the 2006 case into the 2005 

plea agreement. (Answer, Ex. O, at 3). Judge Nichols also found that Petitioner’s plea 

agreement in the 2006 case waived any claim that the new case was a breach of a 

material term of his plea agreement in both the new case and the old case. (Id.) 

f. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 2006 Case 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 2006 case on May 28, 

2008. (Answer, Ex. X) The petition was based on two grounds: (1) Petitioner was denied 

due process because the State violated a material term of the plea agreement in the 2005 

cases; and (2) Petitioner’s conviction was obtained in violation of the Double Jeopardy 

clause. (Id.) Superior Court Judge Warner concluded that the State did not breach the plea 

agreement in the 2005 cases by bringing the charges in the 2006 cases because “there are 

no promises or assurances in the written plea agreement nor were any promises made in 

open court on which the Petitioner relied in entering into the plea.” (Answer, Ex. AA, at 

8.) Judge Warner further concluded that even if there was a promise not to charge for 

other crimes arising out of the same conduct, the 2006 case did not breach that promise 

because the only conduct which overlapped between the 2005 cases and the 2006 case 

was one count which appeared to be identical but which was dismissed from the 2006 

case. (Id., at 9) Judge Warner further ruled that the charges in 2006 did not constitute 

double jeopardy, and even if Petitioner did have a valid double jeopardy claim, by 

pleading guilty, he waived that claim. (Id., at 10-11) 

g. Petitions for Review: 2005/2006 Cases 

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals from Judge 

Nichols’ decision denying relief in the 2005 cases, raising two claims: (1) The trial court 

failed to follow the guidelines outlined in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), 

regarding relief once a breach by the state has been established; and (2) Petitioner did not 

expressly waive his Double Jeopardy rights on the record or in the plea agreement, as 

required under Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). (Answer, Ex. P) Petitioner filed 

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a separate petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals from Judge Warner’s 

decision denying relief in the 2006 case, raising two additional claims: (1) Without an 

evidentiary hearing the trial court denied his claim with respect to the requirements 

outlined in Santobello, once a breach by the state has been established; and (2) The 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution prevents the State from bringing the charges 

against him initially, citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). (Answer, Ex. BB) 

The court of appeals consolidated the two “of-right” petitions for post-conviction 

relief (Answer, Ex. CC), and granted review but denied relief. (Answer, Ex. P) The 

appellate court did not find it necessary to decide whether the state’s bringing the 2006 

charges violated a term of the 2005 plea agreement because it agreed with both lower 

court judges’ determination that Petitioner “waived both the first plea agreement’s 

provisions and his double jeopardy rights.” (Id. at 7, n.2) 

Petitioner filed a consolidated petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court 

raising three claims: (1) The court of appeals failed to consider whether or not the plea 

agreement in the 2005 cases applied to the protections outlined in Blackledge; (2) The 

court of appeals erred by ruling that Petitioner waived the breach under contract 

principles; and (3) The court of appeals erred in finding that facilitation and conspiracy 

are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. (Answer, Ex. R) The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on September 22, 2009. (Answer, Ex. S) 

II. FEDERAL HABEAS PETITIONS

a. CV 10-353-TUC-RCC (BPV) 

On June 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in CV 10-

353. (CV 10-353, Doc. 1) Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in the petition: (1) 

“Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the State breached the plea agreement 

entered into between the State and Petitioner”; and (2) “[B]ased on the plea agreement 

signed by the parties in [the 2005 cases] the State lacked the power to indict Petitioner 

and the very initiation of the proceedings against him in [the 2006 case] thus operated to 

deny him due process of law.” 

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b. CV 10-543-TUC-RCC (BPV) 

On September 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in CV 

10-543. (CV 10-543, Doc. 1) Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the petition4

: (1) 

“Petitioner’s Due Process rights were violated when the State indicted him in [the 2006 

case] because the State did not have the power to hale him into court by indicting him in 

[the 2006 case] for the same subject matter and course of conduct as the 2005 cases”; (2) 

“[T]he conviction obtained by the [S]tate against Petitioner in [the 2006 case] is in 

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause”; and (3) “[T]he state courts erred in finding that 

contract principles apply to Petitioner’s circumstances.” 

The two cases were consolidated on December 22, 2010 and thereafter, on 

December 27, 2010, Respondents filed one answer (Doc. 17) in the lead case with 

Exhibits A through JJ attached (Docs. 17-18). Petitioner filed a consolidated reply on 

January 26, 2011. (Doc. 19) 

III. DISCUSSION

a. Standard of Review 

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

("AEDPA"). 

b. Statute of Limitations 

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). 

c. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

Before a federal court may review a petitioner's claims on the merits, a petitioner 

must exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court every 

claim raised in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. 

 

4

 Because these three grounds were consolidated for a single report and recommendation, Grounds One, Two and Three of CV 10-543 will be referred to in this 

Report and Recommendation as Grounds Three, Four and Five. 

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Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must 

exhaust his federal claims in the state courts "by invoking one complete round of the 

State's established appellate review process" before he may submit those claims in a 

federal habeas petition). Exhaustion occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented 

to the highest state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing 

that a claim has been procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to 

give the state the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' 

federal rights." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

 “To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the 

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 

1994), and then present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. 

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must "fairly present” his claim 

in each appropriate state court by describing the factual or legal bases for that claim and 

by alerting the state court "to the fact that the ... [petitioner is] asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-366 (1995); Baldwin, 

541 U.S. at 29; see also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Mere 

similarity between a claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is 

insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. A petitioner must present both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based, see Kelly v. Small, 315 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 

1143 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)), “broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial” in state court pleadings are not sufficient to 

establish that a federal constitutional claim was fairly presented to the state courts. 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal citations omitted). A 

petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific 

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provisions of federal law or case, Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000) as 

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001), or by citing state cases that plainly analyze the 

federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2003) (en 

banc).

i. Procedural Default 

A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two 

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually 

raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). This situation is referred to as 

"procedural bar" or "procedural default." See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 ("A habeas 

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical 

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him."). 

A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the 

merits for procedural reasons such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 802-805 (1991); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, 

the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present 

the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; Smith v. Baldwin, 

510 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) This is often referred to as "technical" 

exhaustion, because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the 

petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

ii. Cause and Prejudice/ Fundamental Miscarriage 

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court 

unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state court, 

or demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). 

Cause is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined 

as "actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 

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945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a 

showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule"). Prejudice 

need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner "must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence," Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when "a petitioner ‘presents 

evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

d. Standard of Review : Merits 

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas 

relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state 

and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt .” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party's 

claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other 

non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker 

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04); 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a 

rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state 

court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2003). Habeas relief 

cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a 

constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have 

decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court 

authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law 

is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 

F.3d at 1069. 

IV. ANALYSIS

a. Timeliness 

Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. Based on a 

review of the record, the Court finds that the petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

b. Merits 

i. Ground One (CV 10-353): The State Breached Petitioner’s Plea 

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Agreement 

Petitioner asserts that the State induced Petitioner to plead guilty by promising that 

no further charges would be brought against him regarding the subject matter contained 

in the plea agreement, yet, one month after being sentenced, the State brought identical 

charges against Petitioner. Consequently, Petitioner submits that the State breached the 

material term not to bring additional charges against Petitioner. Petitioner argues that 

when a prosecutor extends a promise to a defendant in order to induce the defendant to 

plead guilty, that prosecutor must satisfy that promise, and failure to do so violates 

constitutional due process. (CV 10-353, at 26)(citing Santobello,404 U.S. at 261-62; 

Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, (1984); State v. Georgeoff, 163 Ariz. 434 (1990)). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a 

federal court must deny a habeas petition where the state court has resolved the claim on 

the merits, unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

A state court's decision is contrary to clearly established law when it either 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] 

cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of 

this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-406. A state court unreasonably applies clearly established law 

when it “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, the state court decision must be more 

than incorrect or erroneous. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75; Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 

1862 (2010). Rather, the state court’s decision “must be objectively unreasonable,” not 

just incorrect or erroneous. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 75-76. Habeas relief is warranted for 

an unreasonable application of law, where the state court decision is “based on the 

application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case 

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in which the principle was announced,” Id. at 76, accord Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930 (2007), but only when the principle “clearly extend[s]” to the new set of facts, 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 

Under either clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this Court must determine whether 

at the time the state court rendered its decision on the merits, there existed clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The 

Supreme Court has defined “clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) to be 

“‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the] Court's decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.’” Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

412). 

A review of the Supreme Court's recent case law suggests that when a state court 

may have found a principled distinction between the case, sub judice, and Supreme Court 

case law, then the law is not clearly established for the state-court case. Murdoch v. 

Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010). “[] Under the highly deferential standard 

established by AEDPA and the Supreme Court, as long as the state court could have 

found a principled reason not to apply the Court's precedents to the current case, [the 

federal courts] may not grant habeas relief.” Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 995. Against this 

highly deferential backdrop, the Court considers the Petition. 

Petitioner raised his claim in his petition for post-conviction relief in the lower 

court. (Answer, Ex. G.) Judge Nichols held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim 

and made the following findings. 

The Court finds that the statements made by the prosecutor in the first 

change of plea hearing, as well as statements made by Mr. Cochran and the 

judge, which were acquiesced to by the prosecutor, and considering the 

context in which they were made, constituted an assurance to the defendant 

that no other charges arising from the course of conduct which led to the 

cases in which the defendant was pleading guilty would be filed against 

him. Further, the Court finds that the charges filed by the Attorney General 

did arise from the same course of conduct to which the defendant entered a 

plea of guilty in [the 2005 cases], involving the same, victims, time, codefendants etc. The assurances sought by Mr. Cochran and given by Mr. 

Brandes were concerned with just this eventuality. The Court further finds 

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that even though the County Attorney’s office was not involved in filing the 

new charges, their cases were filed on behalf of the State and thus could be 

affected by actions taken by another representative of the State. At the risk 

of stating the obvious, there is only one “State.” Therefore, the Court finds 

that the defendant’s claim of a breach of a material term of the plea 

agreement is well taken. 

The defendant did not continue to pursue his cause of action concerning the 

breach, however. He chose instead to accept a plea bargain to one of the 

counts in the new case. A major term of this second plea agreement was 

that this sentence was to be concurrent with the sentences in the cases 

which the defendant now seeks to set aside. This, in the Court’s view, 

incorporates the cases into the agreement and accepts and validates them. 

Moreover [,,,] the defendant agrees to give up any motions defenses or 

other matters he has asserted or could assert in this (the new) case. This 

language covers his assertion that the filing of this (the new) case was a 

breach of a material term of his previous case. Once that assertion is waived 

in the new case, it is waived in the previous cases as well. 

(Answer, Ex. O, at 2-3) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals from Judge 

Nichols’ decision denying relief in the 2005 cases, arguing that the trial court failed to 

follow the guidelines outlined in Santobello regarding relief once a breach by the state 

has been established. (Answer, Ex. BB) Petitioner argued that, pursuant to Santobello, 

“where the ‘plea bargain’ is not kept by the prosecutor, the sentence must be vacated and 

the state court will decide in light of the circumstances of each case whether due process 

requires (a) that there be specific performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the 

defendant be given the option to go to trial on the original charges.” (Answer, Ex. BB, at 

12)(citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267.) 

The appellate court did not find it necessary to decide whether the State breached 

the plea agreement, because it found that Petitioner’s case presented a “far different 

scenario” than Santobello. (Answer, Ex. Q, at 7) The court of appeals found that 

Petitioner, when responding to the 2006 charge, was aware of his rights under the plea 

agreement and had in fact filed a motion to dismiss the 2006 charge arguing the state had 

violated those rights. The court further found that his conduct in pleading guilty to the 

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2006 charge alleged despite the existence of the 2005 plea agreement that arguably could 

bar his being charged with that crime, was clearly inconsistent with an intent to enforce 

that agreement. Additionally, the court of appeals found that the 2006 plea agreement 

provided that Petitioner “gives up any motions, defenses or other matters which he[] has 

asserted or could assert in this case,” which plainly encompassed any defense based on 

the 2005 plea agreement’s terms. (Id., at 8) 

The court of appeals further held that Petitioner’s reliance on Carnley to support 

his argument that his waiver of his rights under the 2005 plea agreement was insufficient 

was misplaced because Carnley was readily distinguishable. The court of appeals 

distinguished Carnley because in Carnley, the issue was waiver of the right to counsel, 

which raises special concerns that are not present when a defendant waives other 

constitutional, or contractual, rights. As the Court in Carnley observed, presuming a 

defendant has waived the right to counsel is improper, in part, because the defendant 

would “ha[ve] no way of protecting against [that presumption] except by requesting 

counsel” (Answer, Ex. Q, at 9)(citing Carnley, 369 U.S. at 514.) Additionally, the court 

of appeals observed that the record in the instant case, unlike Carnley, was not “silent” on 

the question of waiver; “not only did Tyler take affirmative steps wholly inconsistent 

with an intent to enforce any rights under the 2005 plea agreement, he expressly waived 

any such rights or defenses by entering into the 2006 plea agreement. 

Here, Petitioner relies on Santobello to support his due process claims. However, 

as the court of appeals recognized, Santobello did not address the situation in which a 

defendant, aware of his rights, waives any objection to the state’s breach of a plea 

agreement; thus, Petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent supporting his claims. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir.2010) 

(en banc) (“[W]hen a state court may draw a principled distinction between the case 

before it and Supreme Court caselaw, the law is not clearly established for the state-court 

case.”). 

In Santobello, the petitioner’s “counsel immediately objected” to the prosecutor’s 

sentencing recommendation “on the ground that the State had promised . . . that there 

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would be no sentence recommendation by the prosecution.” Id. at 259. In contrast, in the 

2006 proceedings, Petitioner had filed a motion to dismiss, specifically arguing that the 

prosecution was in direct violation of the plea agreement entered in the 2005 cases. (Ex. 

DD at 2) He later withdrew the motion to dismiss, however, and subsequently entered 

into a plea agreement with the State, wherein the parties stipulated that Petitioner would 

receive a sentence concurrent with those already being served in the 2005 cases. (Ex. EE; 

Ex. U, at 3) As part of the plea negotiations in the 2006 case, Petitioner clearly bargained 

for a sentence concurrent with the 2005 cases, and the state court’s ruling related to 

the contractual nature of the agreement, and the resultant waiver by Petitioner 

distinguishes this case from Santobello. 

The Magistrate Judge finds that the court of appeals finding that Petitioner waived 

any claim that the state’s bringing the 2006 charge violated a term of the 2005 plea 

agreement was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court precedent. 

ii. Ground Two (CV 10-353): The State Lacked the Power to Indict 

Petitioner5

Petitioner asserts that the plea agreement in the 2005 case shielded Petitioner from 

any further prosecution for the same subject matter as that plea agreement. (CV 10-353, 

Doc. 1, at 30-31) Petitioner argues that “[t]he manner in which the State courts applied 

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) to 

the facts in Petitioner’s case was patently unreasonable, and that the State courts’ 

5

 Petitioner refers throughout his Petition to the state’s “power to indict” or the 

“power to hale” Petitioner into court. Petitioner argues, alternatively, that the state lacked 

the power to bring the 2006 charges against Petitioner based on both a due process argument, arising from the terms of his 2005 plea agreement, and based on a double 

jeopardy argument. Because either of these arguments could imply a “power to indict” or the “power to hale” a defendant into court, it is not always entirely apparent from a quick reading of the parties briefing or the appellate court ruling what is at issue in each claim 

or how the state courts ultimately disposed of each claim. To further confuse matters, the 

appellate court found Petitioner waived both his due process (Answer, Ex. Q, ¶ 15) and double jeopardy rights (id., ¶ 16), but also found it need not decide whether Petitioner’s 

double jeopardy waiver was ineffective as argued by Petitioner because it found that the 

2006 indictment did not violate double jeopardy (id., ¶ 19). Accordingly, the Court will attempt to make each claim and the state court’s ruling clear as to each case before 

proceeding to dissect each individual claim. 

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decision in Petitioner’s case was ‘contrary to ... clearly established federal law’, ... when 

‘the state court applie[d] a rule that contradict[ed] the governing law set forth’ in 

Santobello, Blackledge and Menna. The State courts ‘confront[ed] facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from [Santobello, Blackledge and Menna’ and arrive[d] at a 

result opposite’ to the holdings. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413 (Justice O’Connor).” (CV 

10-353, Doc. 1, at 34) 

Petitioner relies on Blackledge and Menna, supra, for support for his argument 

that the State “did not have the power to bring the charges against him in the 2006 case in 

any event.” (CV 10-353, Doc. 1, at 31) To be clear, because Menna involved a double 

jeopardy claim, a reading of Petitioner’s arguments in Ground Two make clear that he is 

making a claim only that the State did not have the power to bring the charges against 

him in the 2006 case because to do so would be a due process violation based on the plea 

agreement reached in the 2005 cases, not a double jeopardy violation. (CV 10-353, Doc. 

1, at 31-33) 

Respondents allege that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did 

not properly exhaust this claim in the state courts. (Doc. 17, at 20) Respondents seem to 

concede, however, that Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review to the court 

of appeals, and Petitioner makes this same assertion; that this argument was a response to 

both Judge Warner’s and Judge Nichols’ rulings on the issue of waiver under Blackledge. 

The problem with this argument, however, is that a Blackledge/Menna issue was raised, 

not in the 2005 petition for review (See Answer, Ex. P), but in the 2006 petition for 

review, and not as an as an error in the trial court’s ruling of waiver of the due process 

violation, but as an error in the trial court’s ruling of waiver of the double jeopardy 

violation. (Answer, Exs. BB, at 13-14) Despite their similarities, these are not the same 

issues. As Petitioner noted in his petition for review to the Supreme Court, the court of 

appeals did not discuss or decide whether or not the plea agreement in the 2005 case, and 

Petitioner’s due process rights stemming from that plea agreement, were protected by 

Blackledge. (Answer, Ex. R, at 6) The most likely reason the court of appeals did not 

discuss or decide the issue is that, although the Petitioner raised this issue before the 

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Arizona Supreme Court, he had not raised it before the Arizona Court of Appeals. To 

provide the state with the necessary “opportunity,” a petitioner “must ‘fairly present’ his 

claim in each appropriate state court ... thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of 

the claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Because Petitioner raised his claim for the first time 

in a discretionary petition for review to the state’s highest court, Petitioner has failed to 

exhaust this claim. See Casey, 386 F.3d at 918 (because petitioner “raised his federal 

constitutional claims for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review, he did not fairly present them”). Petitioner has failed to establish 

cause for failing to raise the claim in the court of appeals in the first instance. Petitioner’s 

argument that he could not have raised this claim until Judges Nichols and Warner first 

raised the issue of waiver in their rulings to deny relief might have been grounds to 

establish cause if Petitioner had raised a Blackledge claim, as it applied to Petitioner’s 

due process claim, in either of his petitions for review to the appellate court. 

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust Ground 

Two in the state courts. The Magistrate Judge further concludes that if Petitioner returned 

to state court and attempted to litigate Ground One, it would be found waived and 

untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(b); 

32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Ground One is “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted 

because Petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

732, 735 n. 1; Smith, 510 F.3d at 1138. Petitioner’s right to direct review having been 

completed, he would have to present this claim to the state courts in a petition for postconviction relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under Arizona law, notice of postconviction relief must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the 

appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding. Rule 

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner were to present this issue in another petition for 

post-conviction relief, such presentation would be untimely, Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), and 

precluded, Rule 32.2. Such a new petition, therefore, would be subject to summary 

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dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 

(App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) (timeliness is a separate 

inquiry from preclusion). These claims, therefore, are procedurally defaulted. Park v. 

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded 

where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has 

expired). 

Petitioner “can no longer raise[his claim] through any state procedure, state 

remedies are no longer available, and are thus exhausted” by virtue of a procedural bar. 

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. If raised by the State, such a procedural bar provides an 

independent and adequate state ground for denying the claim in federal court, absent a 

showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman,

501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Because Petitioner 

presents no cause for the default nor has he demonstrated that a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice would occur if federal review of this claim is barred, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, dismiss this claim. 

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge finds that Blackledge does not preclude a 

finding of waiver of Petitioner’s due process claim. Petitioner argues that he does not 

waive a Constitutional violation as the one in his case merely by entering into a plea 

agreement. (Doc. 19, at 8)(citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)). In Blackledge, the 

Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty did not foreclose a subsequent challenge because 

in Blackledge, unlike the Court’s decisions in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 

(1970) and Tollett v Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the defendant's right was “the right 

not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation of proceedings 

against him ... thus operated to deny him due process of law.” Blackledge, 417 U.S., at 

30-31. “Where the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a 

defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be 

set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” 

Menna, 423 U.S. at 62(citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30). The Supreme Court has 

explained, however, that counseled guilty pleas neither inevitably “waive” all antecedent 

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constitutional violations, nor do they hold that all constitutional violations such as double 

jeopardy claims may never be waived. Menna, 423 U.S. at 63, n.2. The Supreme Court 

“simply hold[s] that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its 

face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Id. 

In United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the 

exceptions to the rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea established by Blackledge

and Menna. Id. at 574. The Court observed that “[b]oth Blackledge and Menna could be 

(and ultimately were) resolved without any need to venture beyond that record. In 

Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant’s guilty plea were simply irrelevant, 

because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in the State’s power to bring 

any indictment at all. In Menna, the indictment was facially duplicative of the earlier 

offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced so that the admissions 

made by Menna’s guilty plea could not conceivably be construed to extend beyond a 

redundant confession to the earlier offense.” 488 U.S. at 575-76. 

Unlike the claims at issue in Menna (double jeopardy) and Blackledge (vindictive 

prosecution), a breach of a plea agreement does not reach the power of the state to bring 

an indictment in the first instance. The language in Mabry, relied upon by Petitioner 

“when the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, 

the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand” 

467 U.S. at 509, has been recognized as dictum by the Supreme Court and only as 

“sometimes true.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 138, n.1 (2009). 

Petitioner argues that the State courts have formulated an “outcome determinative 

test” sua sponte, which was not contained in the holdings or dicta of any of the United 

States Supreme Court cases cited by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the State court 

looked to future conduct of Petitioner, in a totally separate case than the 2005 case, to 

determine if Petitioner cured the State’s breach of the plea agreement, and to do so was 

objectively unreasonable. (CV 10-353, Doc. 1, at 35) The Supreme Court, however, has 

specifically contemplated that a defendant may waive objections to a claim of breach of a 

plea agreement absent a contemporaneous objection, see Puckett, 556 U.S. at 140, except 

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in instances where the State may not constitutionally prosecute, such as an indictment 

which is facially duplicative of the earlier offense (Menna) or where the guilty plea is 

irrelevant because the indictment itself was constitutionally infirm (Blackledge), see 

Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76. This case is distinguishable from both Menna and Blackledge, 

because the lower court must look beyond the face of the indictment to determine if the 

new charges were a violation of the 2005 plea agreement, and, even if they were, this 

would not render the 2006 indictment “constitutionally infirm..” Because the Petitioner 

withdrew his motion to dismiss at the time the alleged breach occurred, and entered a 

plea of guilty, waiving all objections and defenses, Petitioner waived any claim that the 

2006 charges were a breach of the terms of the 2005 plea agreement. 

The Magistrate Judge finds that Blackledge does not preclude a finding of waiver 

of Petitioner’s due process claim. 

iii. Ground Three (CV 10-543): The State Lacked the Power to Hale 

Petitioner Into Court in the 2006 Case 

Petitioner argues that the indictment in the 2006 case was barred by Section K in 

the plea agreement in the 2005 case; the State did not have the power to indict Petitioner 

in the 2006 case. Petitioner further argues that the manner in which the State courts 

applied Santobello, Blackledge and Menna to the facts in Petitioner’s case was patently 

unreasonable. Petitioner asserts that the State courts have formulated and imposed an 

“outcome determinative test” sua sponte, which was not contained in the holdings or 

dicta of any of the United States Supreme Court cases cited by Petitioner. Petitioner 

argues that the State courts looked to future conduct of Petitioner, in a totally separate 

case than the 2005 case, to determine if Petitioner cured the State’s breach of the plea 

agreement, and to do so was objectively unreasonable. (CV 10-543, Doc. 1, at 31) 

This claim is factually and legally identical to Ground Two, raised in Petitioner’s 

first Petition. Ordinarily, a petitioner cannot be granted federal habeas relief unless “the 

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A). “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly 

presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or 

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(2) he demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 

828, 829 (9th Cir.1996) (quotations and citations omitted). As stated above, Tyler did not 

exhaust this claim in a procedurally appropriate manner. As discussed above, it appears 

that Petitioner “can no longer raise[his claim] through any state procedure, state remedies 

are no longer available, and are thus exhausted” by virtue of a procedural bar. Franklin, 

290 F.3d at 1231. If raised by the State, such a procedural bar provides an independent 

and adequate state ground for denying the claim in federal court, absent a showing of 

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

Here the state appears to have waived any claim of procedural default by failing to 

raise it. See Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). Under these 

circumstances, the Court must consider whether to raise the procedural default sua 

sponte. See Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Boyd v. Thompson, 

147 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1998). In Windham, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied 

the procedural bar even though the state failed to raise it. Based on principles of 

federalism and comity, the Circuit Court “decline[d] to permit a defendant, represented 

by counsel at trial, to fail to raise an issue before the trial judge, await the outcome of the 

jury's deliberations, and then seek federal habeas corpus relief, after the state's highest 

court has declined to reach the merits of his federal constitutional claim because it is 

procedurally barred by state law.” Id. Nevertheless, because the petitioner in Windham

did not have an opportunity to argue that he met the criteria for overcoming the state's 

procedural bar, the Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to the district court to give the 

petitioner “an opportunity to present a cause and prejudice justification for his procedural 

default.” Id. 

In this instance, however, because this claim is factually and legally identical to 

Ground Two, and Petitioner, through counsel, has had the opportunity to respond to the 

state’s procedural default argument, the Magistrate Judge finds, for the same reasons 

stated in the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of Ground Two, that Petitioner failed to 

properly exhaust Ground Two in the state courts, and the claim is now procedurally 

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defaulted. Because Petitioner presents no cause for the default nor has he demonstrated 

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if federal review of this claim is 

barred, the Magistrate Judge further recommends that the District Court, after its 

independent review, dismiss this claim. 

Also for the same reasons discussed in the alternative ruling of Ground Two, the 

Magistrate Judge finds that Blackledge does not preclude a finding of waiver of 

Petitioner’s due process claim. 

iv. Ground Four (CV 10-543): The Conviction Obtained by the State 

Against Petitioner in the 2006 Case is in Violation of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause 

Petitioner argues that it was unconstitutional for the State to obtain a conviction 

for Facilitation to Commit Fraudulent Scheme and Artifice in the 2005 case, and then a 

month later indict Petitioner for Conspiracy to commit that same fraudulent scheme, and, 

as such, the Conspiracy charge is in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. (CV 10-

543, at 36) 

Respondents assert that this claim is procedurally defaulted because the state 

superior courts found that Petitioner waived this claim by pleading guilty, in essence, 

applying a procedural bar to Petitioner’s claim. (Answer, at 32-33) Respondents argue 

that this ruling rests on an independent and adequate state ground, and this Court is 

precluded from reviewing Petitioner’s claims because he has failed to argue, much less 

prove, cause and prejudice or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice in 

order to excuse the procedural default. Petitioner argues that the state courts did not use a 

procedural bar to dismiss Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief, and Petitioner 

should not be charged with the responsibility of proving cause and prejudice in this case. 

Whether the state trial courts applied a procedural bar, as Respondent’s argue, is 

irrelevant, however, because the court of appeals directly addressed the merits of 

Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim and found that the indictment brought in the 2006 case 

did not violate double jeopardy. (See Answer, Ex. Q, at 11) Thus, this Court may address 

the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801(“State procedural bars are not 

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immortal, however; they may expire because of later actions by state courts. If the last 

state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes 

any bar to federal-court review that might otherwise have been available.”)(citing Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)). 

Petitioner pled guilty in the 2005 cases to the amended charge of facilitation to a 

fraudulent scheme and artifice. (Answer, Exs. D, E) The Amended Count Ten read that 

“On or about the month of August, 2005, JASON NMN TYLER facilitated pursuant to a 

scheme or artifice to defraud, obtained a benefit from BROWNIE TROOP #1187 and/or 

WELLS FARGO BANK, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 

promises or material omissions...” In establishing the factual basis for that plea, 

Petitioner’s counsel stated that Petitioner “would agree that on ... [August, 2005] there 

were checks in existence that had his personal information on them that did not belong to 

him.” (Answer, Ex. D, R/T 2/6/06, at 15) The Court asked if he wrote out the checks 

improperly, and Petitioner’s counsel responded “He knew that there were checks out 

there, but he did not write them out.” (Id.) The Court asked if somebody else wrote them 

out, if Petitioner facilitated, or helped other people to write them out as part of the 

scheme, and Petitioner’s counsel agreed that was correct. (Id., at 16) 

The 2006 indictment charged Petitioner with conspiracy to commit the offense of 

fraudulent scheme and artifice, theft, taking the identity of another, trafficking in stolen 

property, and forgery. (Answer, Ex. T) 

Petitioner claimed in his petition for post-conviction relief in the 2006 case that 

the 2006 conviction was obtained in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause. (Answer, 

Ex. X, at 4) Judge Warner ruled that the charges in 2006 did not constitute double 

jeopardy, and even if Petitioner did have a valid double jeopardy claim, by pleading 

guilty, he waived that claim. (Answer, Ex. AA, at 10-11) Judge Warner explained: 

In his affidavit, the Petitioner states that the victim in [the 2005 case] was 

the same. He is mistaken. Only one of the victims as to one check is the 

same. He stated the co-defendants were the same. Again, he is mistaken. 

Some of the co-defendants in both cases are the same. However, some of 

the co-defendants in the 2005 case were not charged in the 2006 case, and 

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some of the co-defendants in the 2006 case were not charged in the 2005 

case. Only one charge appears to be a duplicate. The duplicate charge is 

Count Nineteen in [the 2006 case] and Count Three in [the 2005 case]. 

While the Petitioner and Jacqueline Bee were charged with Forgery of 

check number 27340 in CR 27340 in [the 2006 case], only Jacqueline Bee 

was charged with forgery of the same check in [the 2005 case]. 

As in Blockburger, in Petitioner’s case, although the underlying basis for 

the charged conduct (i.e. forging checks and distributing them to others) 

was the same in the 2005 cases and in [the 2006 case], each individual act 

of forgery is a distinct offense. Forgery is a prohibited offense and 

Petitioner could be charged and punished separately for each and every 

check that he forged. Therefore, based on the test in Blockburger, the 

charged conduct in the 2005 cases and the charged conduct in [the 2006 

cases] do not constitute the same course of action. Thus, Petitioner has not 

been subjected to double jeopardy and, therefore, the State has not violated 

Petitioner’s federal or state constitutional rights. 

(Id., at 10-11) 

 Petitioner did not address this ruling in his petition for review, that the specific 

duplicate charge regarding check number 27340 was the basis for his double jeopardy 

claim, rather, Petitioner submitted to the court of appeals that his plea in the 2005 cases 

was to Facilitation (A.R.S. § 13-1004), and he was then indicted in the 2006 case on 

Conspiracy (A.R.S. § 13-1003), and that each of these crimes requires proof of the same 

elements with respect to the Blockburger test and consequently the State did not possess 

the power to bring the charges in the first place. (Answer, Ex. BB, at 15-17) 

 The court of appeals reviewed Judge Warner’s decision de novo, and held that, 

assuming, arguendo, that the conspiracy charge and facilitation conviction were based on 

the same acts or transactions, there was no double jeopardy violation: 

[B]because the facilitation and conspiracy charges each have an element the 

other lacks. To be guilty of facilitation, a person must “act[ ] with 

knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit an 

offense, [and] . . . knowingly provide[ ] the other person with means or 

opportunity for the commission of the offense.” A.R.S. § 13–1004(A). 

Conspiracy requires proof that a person, “with the intent to promote or aid 

the commission of an offense,” “agrees with one or more persons that 

at least one of them or another person will engage in conduct constituting 

the offense and one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the 

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offense.” A.R.S. § 13–1003(A). Thus, conspiracy, unlike facilitation, 

requires proof of an agreement that the offense would be committed. And 

facilitation requires proof the defendant acted, that is, that he or she 

provided the “means or opportunity for the commission of the offense.” § 

13–1004(A). Conversely, beyond entering an agreement, conspiracy does 

not require any action by the defendant-only an overt act by any one of the 

conspirators. § 13– 1003(A). Thus, for double jeopardy purposes, 

facilitation and conspiracy are not the same offense even if based on the 

same underlying course of conduct. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 

(Answer, Ex. Q, ¶ 21) 

Because the Arizona Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Arizona Court of 

Appeal’s ruling, this court looks to the Arizona Court of Appeal’s reasoning to determine 

whether the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals utilized the “same elements” test promulgated in 

Blockburger to resolve Petitioner’s claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 

Clause had been violated. (Exhibit Q, at 12–13.) “The applicable rule is that where the 

same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test 

to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 

provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. . . . ” Blockburger 

v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Petitioner concedes this is the correct test to 

apply. (See CV 10-543, Doc. 1, at 35) 

Applying the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

stated: 

Indeed, under the rules explicated by the Supreme Court, even when the 

same conduct forms the basis for two charges, the two charges do not 

necessarily entail the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. . . . 

What is determinative under the Court’s double jeopardy doctrine is simply 

whether the statutes involved require satisfaction of the same statutory 

elements, or whether each statute requires proof of an element that the other 

does not. 

United States v. Arlt, 252 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Dixon, 509 U.S. at 703–

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04). 

The Arizona appellate court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim 

did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States. The state court found that even if the conspiracy charge and facilitation conviction 

were based on the same acts or transactions, there is no double jeopardy violation 

because the facilitation and conspiracy charges each have an element the other lacks. To 

be guilty of facilitation, a person must “act [ ] with knowledge that another person 

is committing or intends to commit an offense, [and] . . . knowingly provide [ ] the other 

person with means or opportunity for the commission of the offense.” A.R.S. § 13–

1004(A). Conspiracy requires proof that a person, “with the intent to promote or aid the 

commission of an offense,” “agrees with one or more persons that at least one of them or 

another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and one of the parties 

commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense.” A.R.S. § 13–1003(A). Thus, 

conspiracy, unlike facilitation, requires proof of an agreement that the offense would be 

committed. Facilitation requires proof the defendant acted, that is, that he or she provided 

the “means or opportunity for the commission of the offense.” § 13–1004(A). Under the 

“unreasonable application” clause, the state court decision must be more than incorrect or 

erroneous. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75; Renico, 130 S.Ct. at 1862. Rather, the state court’s 

decision “must be objectively unreasonable,” not just incorrect or erroneous. Musladin, 

549 U.S. at 75-76. The state court’s application of the same elements test to the Arizona 

offenses of facilitation and conspiracy was not objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner also argued that, in addition to the “same elements” test, the Supreme 

Court has also stated that a court should consider whether or not there is “a substantial 

overlap in proof offered to establish the crimes.” Brown v. Ohio, 431 U.S. 161, ¶ 33 

(1977) quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1973). (Answer, Ex. 

BB, at 17) Petitioner asserted that in these two cases, there was a substantial overlap. (Id.) 

The court of appeals rejected this contention with little discussion: 

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Despite [Petitioner]'s assertion to the contrary, we do not consider whether 

there is “a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.” 

[Petitioner] misquotes Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 

L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), in which the Supreme Court stated the Blockburger 

test is satisfied if each crime requires proof of a fact the other does 

not, “‘notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish 

the crimes.’” Id. at 166, quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 

785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (emphasis added). 

Prosecution for distinct crimes arising out of the same conduct does not 

violate double jeopardy. See Hernandez v. Superior Court, 179 Ariz. 515, 

520, 880 P.2d 735, 740 (App. 1994). 

 There is no support in the clearly established federal law establishing a bar to 

prosecution when there is a “substantial overlap in proof offered to establish the crimes.” 

See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). As explained by the Supreme Court in 

Dixon, “[t]he holding of Brown, like that of [In re] Nielsen, [131 U.S. 172 (1889)], rests 

squarely upon the existence of a lesser included offense. Id. at 706 (“Quoting that suspect 

dictum multiple times ... cannot convert it into case law.”); see also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 

71 (The Supreme Court has explained that clearly established Federal law “refers to the 

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant 

state-court decision.”)(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) 

The state court’s findings were consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s 

holdings in Blockburger and Dixon, and were not an unreasonable application of or 

contrary to clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on the claim for relief set forth in Ground Four. 

v. Ground Five (CV 10-543): The State Court Incorrectly Held that 

Petitioner Waived his Constitutional Rights Under Contract 

Principles 

Petitioner asserts that the court of appeals acted unreasonably by applying 

contractual principles to find that Petitioner waived any right to enforce the terms of his 

plea agreement in the 2005 case by withdrawing his motion to dismiss the 2006 charge 

because contract principles do not provide sufficient analogy in this case based upon the 

reasoning in Blackledge. (CV 10-543, at 37-38) Alternatively, Petitioner argues that 

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contract principles warrant relief in this case. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner did not present to any of the state courts the 

claim raised in Ground Five. (Doc. 17, at 33) Petitioner responds that he did raise this 

claim at the first opportunity he had to raise it, before the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 

19, at 13) Petitioner asserts that the issue of contract principles was not presented by 

Petitioner to the lower court or court of appeals because he was unaware that those courts 

would use that theory to deny him relief, but once the theory was raised by the court of 

appeals, Petitioner raised the issue with the Arizona Supreme Court in order to give the 

state courts a fair opportunity to review the federal issue. (Id.) Petitioner argues in this 

federal habeas that the Court of Appeals relied on state law to support the contention that 

Petitioner’s plea agreements are controlled by contract principles, but that contract 

principles do not apply to Petitioner’s case based upon the reasoning in Blackledge. (CV 

10-543, Doc. 1, at 37) Petitioner is correct, that in ruling on Petitioner’s Petition for postconviction relief, Judge Warner did not state explicitly that she was applying contract 

principles to find Petitioner waived his double jeopardy rights. 

The Magistrate Judge finds that, by raising the claim at his first opportunity, 

Petitioner did not procedurally default this claim. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit, however. “Although the analogy may not hold 

in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137 (citing 

Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508). Petitioner argues that contract principles do not provide a 

sufficient analogy based upon the reasoning in Blackledge (that the State did not have the 

power to bring the case against Tyler) and that it is clear the parties did not have the 

power to enter into an agreement. Petitioner further argues that because the state lacked 

the authority to bring an indictment against Petitioner, it follows that they also did not 

possess the authority to enter into an agreement regarding that indictment, and therefore 

no contract could be enforced between the parties and contract principles do not apply. 

For the reasons already elaborated upon in Ground Two, the Magistrate Judge 

finds that this case is distinguishable from Blackledge, supra, and the state did have both 

the authority to bring an indictment against Petitioner and to enter into an agreement 

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regarding the indictment, and thus the court of appeals ruling was not contrary to 

clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief 

on the claim for relief set forth in Ground Five. 

Petitioner argues in the alternative, that if the Court is inclined to impose contract 

principles upon this case, then there are three contract principles that warrant relief: 1) 

Bad faith actions by the state, 2) Restatement (Second) of Contracts dictates suspension 

of performance by Petitioner, and 3) any ambiguities must be resolved against the state. 

A violation of state law is not grounds for habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court is limited to deciding 

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). 

This Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). Petitioner argues no set of facts or law that support a federal claim. Such claims 

are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle, supra. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that these claims in Ground FIVE 

be dismissed as failing to present a cognizable federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). 

V. CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court DISMISS Petitioner’s 

Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (CV 10-353-TUC-RCC (BPV) (Doc. 1); CV 10-

543-TUC-RCC (BPV) (Doc. 1)). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

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If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CIV 10-

0353-TUC-RCC (lead). 

Dated this 6th day of March, 2012. 

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