Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06234/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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FIL~D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appe:lb Tenth Cir~i4; 

FEB 2 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

BARBARA SAPCUTT JONES, THE COMANCHE Clerk 

INDIAN COUNSEL OF THE COMANCHE INDIAN 

TRIBE OF AUGUST 4, 1990, and A.A. 

HOPKINS, and all persons similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MANUEL LUJAN, as the U.S. Secretary of ) 

the Interior and his subordinates who ) 

are: JOE WALKER, Anadarko BIA Area ) 

Director; MITCHEL CHOUTEAU, ) 

Superintendent for the Anadarko Indian ) 

Agency; PHIL LUJAN, Chief Magistrate of) 

the BIA CFR Court of Indian Offenses for) 

the Anadarko, Oklahoma Area; KENNETH ) 

SAUPPITY; MARY JO WARDESKI; JACK ) 

CODOPONY, JR.; ROLAND MASON; EDGAR ) 

MONETATCHI; VINCENT WALLACE; The ) 

Secretary of the U.S. Department of ) 

Housing and Urban Development, JACK ) 

KEMP; HUGH JOHNSON, HUD employee in ) 

charge of Oklahoma Indian Housing ) 

Authorities; SAMUEL DOC PEWEWARDY; ) 

GENEVA FAUBUSH; JEANETT JENKINS; LONNIE) 

TENEQUER; MICHAEL POAHWAY; NON-INDIAN ) 

HYMAN COPELAND, Attorney representing ) 

HUD; COMANCHE HOUSING AUTHORITY, a HUD ) 

funded entity organized pursuant to ) 

Federal Law and Oklahoma Housing ) 

Authorities Act, 61 Okla. Stat. Ann. ) 

1057 et seq.; GLEN FELDMAN, who alleges ) 

to be the Comanche Tribal Attorney; and) 

ALL PERSONS, acting in participation and) 

in consort with said above named ) 

defendants having actual notice thereof,) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

No. 91-6234 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-2009-C) 

( W. D. Okla . ) 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 1 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitt,ed without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Pro se Plaintiffs-appellants Barbara Sapcutt Jones, The 

Comanche Indian Counsel of The Comanche Indian Tribe of August 4, 

1990, as represented by Roderick Whitewolf, and A.A. Hopkins, 

brought 

authority 

suit in federal court challenging the actions and 

of the Defendants-appellees in organizing, 

administering, and, ultimately, enforcing, the policies and 

provisions of a HUD-funded Mutual Help Home OWnership Program on 

allotted Indian lands. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the 

eviction policies and practices of the Comanche Housing Authority 

and the enforcement of such evictions by the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs' Court of Indian Offenses. 

injunctive and declaratory relief. 

* 

The Complaint sought 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 2 
The district court initially denied Plaintiffs' request for a 

temporary restraining order and ultimately denied their request 

for preliminary injunction. Subsequently, joint motions to 

dismiss were filed by the various federal Defendants and by the 

Comanche Business Committee and its attorney, Glen Feldman. The 

district court, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l), dismissed the 

case for lack of jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs' failure to 

exhaust their administrative remedies. 

Plaintiffs appeal, essentially rearguing the substance of 

their Complaint. Their brief challenges: 1) the district court's 

alleged determination that Plaintiffs may be evicted from allotted 

Indian lands by order of the Court of Indian Offenses, 2) the 

Secretary of the Interior's acts in allowing federal lease of 

allotted Indian lands and in setting up the Court of Indian 

Offenses "as a vehicle" to evict Plaintiffs, 3) the evictions as 

an unlawful encumbrance of allotted Indian lands and as an 

abrogation of the federal government's fiduciary responsibility, 

4) the collection of attorney's fees in connection with the 

evictions, 5) the failure of the district court to reach the 

merits of the case in light of Plaintiffs' allegations of 

discrimination, 6) the district court's determination that this 

case involves primarily an intra-tribal struggle for political 

control, and 7) the district court's requirement that Plaintiffs 

exhaust their remedies in the Court of Indian Offenses, in light 

of their constitutional claims. 

We review prose pleadings liberally, as required by Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The standard of review applicable 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 3 
to a district court's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. Redmon ex rel. 

Redmon v. United States, 934 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Our jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Following our 

review of the record on appeal, we affirm the district court's 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because we conclude that 

Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this action. See FW/PBS, Inc. 

v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 607 (1990)(federal courts have 

an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, "and 

standing 'is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] 

doctrines,'" quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); 

Bath v. National Ass'n of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 

1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1988)(appellate court can affirm on any 

grounds that find support in the record). 

First, we note that Plaintiffs' brief on appeal was signed by 

Vida Woommavovah, Helen Cable, Burt Cable, and Lucille Mcclung. 

These individuals were not parties before the district court and 

have not moved to intervene. "A nonparty does not have standing 

to appeal in the absence of most extraordinary circumstances." 

Coffey v. Whirlpool Corp., 591 F.2d 618, 619 (10th Cir. 1979). 

The record reflects no extraordinary circumstances; therefore, 

these individuals are not proper party appellants. 

We also note that, while Plaintiffs' complaint purported to 

sue on behalf of "all persons similarly situated," Plaintiffs did 

not request class certification, and the district court did not 

certify this suit as a class action . Therefore, we treat this 

matter as an appeal by the named Plaintiff-appellants only. See 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 4 
Clift v. UAW, 818 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other 

grounds, 488 U.S. 1025 (1989); see also Zepeda v. United States 

INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 (9th Cir. 1983). 

"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant 

is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or 

of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 

"It is well established that before a federal court can 

consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke 

the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite 

standing to sue. Article III [of the United States Constitution] 

••. gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only 'cases and 

controversies.'" Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1722 

(1990) . 

. Art. III requires the party who invokes the 

court's authority to 'show that he personally has 

suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of 

the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' and 

that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged 

action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

decision.' 

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 

of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)(citations and 

footnote omitted). To satisfy the "case or controversy" 

requirement, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have suffered 

an "injury in fact," which is actual and concrete. Whitmore, 110 

S. Ct. at 1723. 

"The litigant must clearly and specifically set forth facts 

sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing requirements. A 

federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by 

embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing. " Id. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 5 
(citations omitted). Where a plaintiff fails in his burden to 

allege facts essential to a determination of jurisdiction, he has 

no standing. FW/PBS, Inc., 110 S. Ct. at 608. 

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged no facts which would support 

the standing of either The Comanche Tribal Indian Council of 

August 4, 1990 or A.A. Hopkins to bring suit challenging the 

alleged evictions. Additionally, the record on appeal reflects 

that the eviction action previously pending in the Court of Indian 

Offenses against Barbara Sapcutt Jones has been dismissed. 

Finally, lacking injury resulting from the pending eviction of 

Plaintiff Jones, Plaintiffs fail on appeal to allege additional 

facts which would give them standing to complain about the 

evictions. 

Plaintiffs alleged generally that other Indians are being or 

have been evicted as a result of the HUD-funded housing program. 

However, Plaintiffs must assert their own rights and cannot rest 

their claims on the rights of others. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan 

Aluminum Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661, 665 (1990). Plaintiffs 

must allege and show that they personally have been 

injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, 

unidentified members of the class to which they belong 

and which they purport to represent. Unless 

[Plaintiffs] can thus demonstrate the requisite case or 

controversy between themselves personally and 

[Defendants], "none may seek relief on behalf of himself 

or any other member of the class." 

Warth, 422 U.S. at 502 (citations omitted). Additionally, their 

allegations of other evictions are too vague to raise a claim of 

constitutional magnitude. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1198 

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990). 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 6 
Given the dismissal of the eviction suit formerly pending 

against Plaintiff Jones, and the absence of any allegations which 

would indicate current or threatened injury in fact by any of the 

named Plaintiffs resulting from the HUD-funded housing program or 

the evictions about which they complain, we conclude Plaintiffs 

lack standing in this case. The district court's dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction was correct . FW/PBS, Inc. 110 S. Ct. at 610. 

Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs' request 

for en bane consideration is denied. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-6234 Document: 010110226167 Date Filed: 02/28/1992 Page: 7