Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02405/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02405-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IAN ANTHONY BULANDR,

Plaintiff,

v.

PELICAN BAY STATE PRISON,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-2405-TEH 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this 

pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original 

complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and Plaintiff has 

filed an amended complaint.

I

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of 

cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity 

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss 

the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint 

“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

Pleadings filed by pro se litigants, however, must be liberally 

construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

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1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

II

Plaintiff states that he has received inadequate medical 

care.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates 

the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate 

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the 

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the 

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a 

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury 

or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would 

find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence 

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's 

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial 

pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious" 

need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she 

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United States District Court

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knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm 

and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to 

abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The 

prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison 

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then 

the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how 

severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 

(9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisonerpatient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does 

not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Supervisor defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

where the allegations against them are simply “bald” or 

“conclusory” because such allegations do not “plausibly” 

establish the supervisors’ personal involvement in their 

subordinates’ constitutional wrong, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-84 

(noting no vicarious liability under Section 1983 or Bivens

actions), and unfairly subject the supervisor defendants to the 

expense of discovery and continued litigation, Henry A. v. 

Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (general allegations 

about supervisors’ oversight responsibilities and knowledge of 

independent reports documenting the challenged conduct failed to 

state a claim for supervisor liability). So it is insufficient 

for a plaintiff only to allege that supervisors knew about the 

constitutional violation and that they generally created policies 

and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a 

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United States District Court

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specific policy” or “a specific event” instigated by them that 

led to the constitutional violations. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 

F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). Under no circumstances is there 

respondeat superior liability under section 1983, which means 

there is no liability under section 1983 solely because one is 

purportedly responsible for the actions or omissions of another. 

See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff states that he has been denied medical care for 

his chronic psoriasis and eczema. He states that Nurse 

Risenhoover denied treatment by refusing creams and ointments 

that has been working well for Plaintiff. As a result he suffers 

from bleeding, scabbing, and pain. He also alleges that Dr. Bal

denied his requests to see a skin specialist or receive adequate 

care. Liberally construed these allegations are sufficient to 

proceed against Risenhoover and Bal.

Plaintiff also alleges that Chief Executive Officer McClean 

failed to properly train and supervise staff. Plaintiff has 

failed to link McClean to any of his specific treatment and seeks 

to hold her liable as a supervisor. However, there is no 

respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Because 

Plaintiff was already provided an opportunity to amend to address 

this claim and allowing further amendment would be futile, this 

claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

III

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as 

follows:

1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the 

United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a 

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United States District Court

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copy of the amended complaint (Docket No. 10), and a copy of this 

order upon the following Defendants at Pelican Bay State Prison: 

Nurse Sue Risenhoover and Dr. J. Bal. The remaining Defendants 

are dismissed with prejudice.

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the 

Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date of service, 

Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other 

dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate 

factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits 

all records and incident reports stemming from the events at 

issue. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be 

resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior 

to the date his summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed 

with the Court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.

b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, 

Defendants shall also serve, on a separate paper, the appropriate 

notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-

954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 

934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be 

given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to 

dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand at 960 

(separate paper requirement). 

c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, 

if any, shall be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants 

no later than thirty days from the date the motion was served 

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upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -

- WARNING," which is provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 

154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. 

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative 

remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should 

take note of the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING 

(EXHAUSTION)," which is provided to him as required by Wyatt v. 

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).

d. If Defendant wishes to file a reply brief, he shall 

do so no later than fifteen days after the opposition is served 

upon him. 

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date 

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion 

unless the court so orders at a later date. 

3. All communications by Plaintiff with the court must be 

served on defendant, or defendant’s counsel once counsel has been 

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants 

or defendants' counsel.

4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. No further court order under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the parties 

may conduct discovery.

5. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address 

by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address.” He also must comply with the court's orders 

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in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/28/2016

________________________

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\CR.16\Bulandr2405.serve.docx

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to 

have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under 

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, 

end your case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a 

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, 

if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the 

result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary 

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other 

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint 

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 

shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do 

not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is 

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION)

If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure 

to exhaust, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. If the 

motion is granted it will end your case.

You have the right to present any evidence you may have 

which tends to show that you did exhaust your administrative 

remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations 

(statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated 

documents, that is, documents accompanied by a declaration 

showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other 

sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. 

If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to 

exhaust and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there 

will be no trial.

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