Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03324/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03324-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANET D. CONNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-03324-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

ALTER JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 35

On September 10, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff Janet D. Conner's motion for summary 

judgment, denied Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin's cross-motion for summary judgment, and 

remanded the case for further proceedings. Judgment was entered consistent with that order. 

Plaintiff moved to alter that judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), seeking a 

remand for immediate payment of disability insurance benefits. On December 12, 2014, the Court 

granted the motion.

It is now the Commissioner who moves to alter judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

1

 Plaintiff

opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's applications

Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 

("DIB") on January 22, 2010 and a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income 

 

1

The parties are advised that Civil Local Rule 7-9 governs motions for reconsideration and 

requires that parties obtain leave of court prior to filing such motions. The parties shall ensure that 

they comply with this requirement in the future.

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("SSI") on January 27, 2010. (Administrative Record ("AR") at 78-79, 136-37, 139-43.) She 

alleged that she became disabled on June 30, 2007, due to right knee pain, hand pain, back pain, 

and high blood pressure. (Id. at 82, 91, 136, 140.) The Social Security Administration ("SSA") 

denied Plaintiff's applications initially and on reconsideration. (Id. at 82-86, 91-95.)

B. The administrative hearing

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 96.) 

ALJ Mary P. Parnow held the hearing on August 29, 2011. (AR at 96-97). Plaintiff, who was 

represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as did Malcolm J. Brodzinsky, a vocational expert 

("VE").

1. Plaintiff's testimony

Plaintiff testified that she was 53 years old at the time of the hearing, possessed a high 

school diploma, and had last worked in July 2008, doing part-time office work at a warehouse. 

(Id. at 52.) She stated that she stopped doing that work because sitting bothered her, she was 

taking breaks and "they didn't like that." (Id. at 53.) She indicated that every 30 minutes, she 

would elevate her leg for about 10 minutes and that she could not work while doing so because of 

the pain. (Id.) At home, she elevates her leg on two pillows for at least five or six hours because 

she's in bed most of the time. (Id. at 64.) She does this because of the pain and to take some 

pressure off her knee. (Id. at 65.)

Prior to her office work, Plaintiff was employed as a catering cook and pastry chef for 

about three years. (Id. at 53-54). In that position, she would cook, cater, and serve food at 

different events. (Id. at 54.) She would also lift chaffing dishes weighing approximately 20 to 25 

pounds. (Id. at 54-55.) Before her work as a cook and pastry chef, Plaintiff worked as a floor 

supervisor at a telephone call center, supervising 60 operators, walking the floor, taking over 

phone calls, and troubleshooting. (Id. at 55.) She held that job for three years. (Id. at 56.) She 

testified that she would not be able to return to that type of work because of "the sitting for periods 

of time and the walking and [her] hands are messed up and [her] back." (Id.) She also indicated 

that she worked as a dishwasher and a cook at a soul food restaurant, and did some work at a 

bakery at one point. (Id. at 58.)

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Plaintiff further testified that she had been receiving worker's compensation as a result of a 

knee injury she sustained while lifting a chaffing dish during a catering event. (Id. at 60.) She 

indicated that the claim had been settled, and a portion of the settlement was intended to cover a 

knee replacement. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, she experiences a "dull throbbing pain all the 

time," her knee is stiff in the morning, and it's worse during cold weather. (Id.) She stated that it 

takes her "a minute to get around, to unwind a little bit," and sometimes she has to ice her knee 

before she bathes. (Id.)

Plaintiff indicated that she had two surgeries and went to therapy twice. (Id. at 61.) After 

the first surgery,2she felt "a little relief at first, [and she] even tried to go back to work" but then 

she went back to the doctor and needed another surgery. (Id.) She stated that she experienced no 

relief after the second surgery. (Id.) Her pain is about a seven or eight in the morning when she 

first wakes up, and she can get the pain down to a five or six after she ices her knee and takes her 

pain pills. (Id. at 61-62.) At the time of her second surgery,3her doctor advised her that she 

needed a knee replacement. (Id. at 61.)

With respect to other impairments, Plaintiff testified that she's been diagnosed with sciatic 

nerve, arthritis, and depression. (Id. at 62.) She also testified that she can sit and stand for about 

15-20 minutes, walk for about a half block before stopping to take a break, and lift "maybe five 

pounds." (Id. at 62, 63.) She stated that she cannot lift her one-year old grandchild. (Id. at 64.) 

She also indicated that she has problems with concentration and focus as a result of her pain 

medication. (Id. at 65.) On one occasion, she forgot she was boiling eggs and woke up to the 

sound of her smoke detector, and on another, she left some water running. (Id.) Plaintiff also 

stated that some of her medications give her bad headaches, sweats, and trouble sleeping. (Id. at 

65, 66.) She takes hydrocodone once every eight hours or once every four hours if the pain is bad. 

(Id. at 66.)

 

2

Plaintiff underwent her first surgery to repair a right knee medial meniscus tear on February 6, 

2008. AR at 284.

3

Plaintiff's second surgery occurred on June 8, 2009. Id. at 289.

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Plaintiff also testified that she lives alone in an apartment and that her daughter, who was 

28 at the time of the hearing, visits about four times a week. (Id. at 67, 68.) She helps with the 

cleaning, does the grocery shopping, and prepares her mother's meals for the week, which Plaintiff 

reheats in the microwave. (Id. at 67, 68.) As for common day-to-day activities, Plaintiff stated 

that she can wash her hair on her own, which she keeps short because it's easier to manage, she 

does not drive because it causes her too much pain, and she does not go out or socialize too much 

but goes to church when she can, where she sits in the back so that she does not interrupt everyone 

when she has to get up and go outside. (Id. at 69, 70.)

2. The VE's testimony

The VE testified that Plaintiff's past work as a catering cook was semi-skilled work with a 

light physical demand. (Id. at 72.) He classified her work as a customer service clerk as skilled 

work with sedentary physical demands. (Id.) Plaintiff's work as a dishwasher was unskilled 

medium work, while her work as a cook was skilled work with medium physical demands. (Id. at 

73.) Her work as a floor supervisor at a call center qualified as skilled work with sedentary 

physical demands. (Id.)

The VE considered various hypotheticals posed by the ALJ and by Plaintiff's counsel. 

(Id.) The ALJ asked the VE to first consider an individual who was 48 at onset, 53 at the time of 

the hearing, with a high school education, and with the past relevant work he had described. (Id.) 

This individual could (1) stand and walk for four hours in an eight hour day, with breaks, (2) sit 

for six hours in an eight hour day, also with breaks, (2) carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds 

occasionally, (3) push and pull devices up to 20 pounds, (4) occasionally bend, squat, kneel, 

crouch, climb, and crawl, and (5) would need a cane for ambulation over three to four blocks. 

(Id.) When asked whether such an individual could perform Plaintiff's past relevant work, the VE 

stated that the individual could be a customer service clerk and a floor supervisor in a call center. 

(Id. at 74.)

The ALJ then asked the VE to consider an individual with the same age, education, and 

work experience, but with different limitations. (Id.) This individual could not crawl, kneel, 

climb, push or pull "in regards to the right knee" and would be restricted to light work as defined 

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in the worker's compensation context (i.e., work that involves standing or walking with minimal 

demands for physical effort). (Id.) In considering this second hypothetical, the VE gave the same 

response. (Id.)

Plaintiff's attorney asked the VE to revisit the first hypothetical, with the additional 

limitation that the individual would require a cane for all standing and walking. (Id. at 75.) When 

asked whether that would alter his previous response, the VE stated that it would remain 

unchanged. (Id.)

Plaintiff's counsel also asked the VE to reconsider the second hypothetical as if it 

concerned an individual who needed to sit and stand at will. (Id.) In response to that modified 

hypothetical, the VE testified that the additional limitation would preclude both positions absent 

an accommodation. (Id.)

The VE, also in response to additional hypotheticals posed by Plaintiff's attorney, testified 

that an individual who needed to elevate one leg between six to 12 inches 10 to 20 percent of the 

workday would be precluded from performing that work. (Id.) When considering an individual 

who would need to take a 15-minute unscheduled break once every hour, the VE testified that 

such a limitation would preclude all work. (Id. at 76.) He further testified that if someone who 

was performing the work mentioned in either of the ALJ's two hypotheticals was going to be 

absent four days per month, that would "preclude that work and all other work." (Id. at 76.)

C. The ALJ's decision

On September 23, 2011, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 15-22). In 

reaching her decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process that governs Social 

Security disability determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a); 416.920(a). At step one, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2007, the 

alleged onset date. (Id. at 17.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from two 

severe impairments: right knee injury status post two partial right knee meniscectomies and 

obesity. (Id.) She based that determination on "[t]he evidence of record, including the testimony 

of the claimant[,]" which supported a finding that these "medical impairments significantly limit 

her ability to perform basic work activities." (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

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does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1. (Id. at 18.) She found that the 

medical evidence did not support a finding to the contrary. (Id.)

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual 

functional capacity to carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk for 

four hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and push and pull 

devices up to 20 pounds. (Id.at 18-21.) She also determined that Plaintiff can occasionally bend, 

squat, kneel, crouch, climb, and crawl, though "a cane is required for ambulation over 3 to 4 

blocks." (Id.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that her statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were "not credible to the extent they 

[we]re inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment." (Id. at 20.) To 

support this finding, the ALJ stated:

The objective evidence does not support the claimant's allegations. Claimant was 

released to work, and it appears only did not work because there was no work 

available. Further, despite the claimant's complaints of hand problems, there were 

no sensory or motor deficits noted in hands at consultative examination. In 

addition, in regard to the claimant's cane, Dr. Krinsky advised claimant to use the 

cane as needed, not all the time, and notes from Dr. Krinsky indicated that she only 

occasionally used a cane. Claimant testified to very limited activities of daily 

living, stating that her daughter helps with cooking, cleaning and shopping, which 

seems at odds with her report to the consultative examiner that she can do light 

chores around the house but not vacuuming, cleaning tubs or kneeling and bending. 

Despite her complaints of back pain, objective evidence only revealed mild 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Finally, contrary to claimant's 

testimony, all of the treatment notes document that claimant's knee problem 

improved following her second surgery. 

(Id. at 20-21.)

In determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ placed great weight on the

opinion of Dr. Rana "based on h[er] examining relationship and because his conclusions are the 

most consistent with the objective findings in the medical records." (Id. at 20.) Dr. Rana, a 

consultative examiner, completed an internal medicine evaluation on April 9, 2010. (Id. at 362.) 

In her report, she noted that none of Plaintiff's previous medical records were available for review 

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and that Plaintiff was providing her medical history herself. (Id.) Dr. Rana indicated that 

Plaintiff's chief complaints were pain in the knees, carpal tunnel syndrome, lower back pain, high 

blood pressure, hypercholesterolemia, and heartburn. (Id.) The physical examination Dr. Rana 

conducted revealed mild lower back tenderness and mild tenderness in both knees. (Id. at 363, 

364.) Dr. Rana diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic pain in her knees, probable mild carpal tunnel 

syndrome in both hands, lower back pain most probably secondary to mild degenerative 

disc/degenerative joint disease, a history of hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and probable 

gastroesophageal reflux disease. (Id. at 364.) She opined that Plaintiff can (1) stand and walk for 

four hours in an eight-hour day with breaks, (2) sit for six hours in an eight-hour day with breaks, 

(3) carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, (4) push and pull devices up to 20 

pounds, (5) occasionally bend, squat, kneel, crouch, climb, and crawl, and (5) ambulate over three 

to four blocks with use of a cane. (Id.)

The ALJ gave some weight to the Dr. Charles' assessment, "to the extent consistent with 

Dr. Rana's." (Id. at 20.) Dr. Charles examined Plaintiff on two occasions, first on October 30, 

2008 and a second time on January 13, 2010. (Id. at 488-497, 506-509.) In his first report, Dr. 

Charles opined that Plaintiff had suffered a probable medial meniscus tear. (Id.) He ordered an 

MRI, the results of which were "consistent with a recurrent flap tear of the medial meniscus and 

free edge lateral meniscal tear." (Id. at 498.) In his second report, Dr. Charles noted that Plaintiff 

underwent a second surgery on June 8, 2009, at which time Dr. Krinsky, who performed the 

surgery, noted a new tear in the anterior horn of the medial meniscus. (Id. at 492.) Dr. Charles 

also noted that there was marked swelling in Plaintiff's right knee. (Id. at 489, 491.) He 

considered Plaintiff to be a candidate for a total knee replacement in the future. (Id. at 496.)

The ALJ placed little weight on the opinions of Dr. Young, one of Plaintiff's treating 

physicians, and Dr. Krinsky, who performed Plaintiff's knee surgeries. (Id. at 20.) Dr. Krinsky 

completed a medical source statement on August 12, 2011. (Id. at 571-75.) According to Dr. 

Krinsky, Plaintiff's first visit to his office occurred on February 12, 2008 and continued on a 

monthly basis. (Id.) Dr. Krinsky opined that Plaintiff can sit for less than two hours in an eighthour workday and stand/walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 574.) He 

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also opined that plaintiff would have to walk every 15 minutes for five minutes at a time, would 

need a job that allowed her to shift positions at will because of pain, muscle weakness, and chronic 

fatigue, would need to take 15-minute unscheduled breaks every 30 minutes, and would have to 

elevate her leg to chair width. (Id.) He also indicated that Plaintiff must use a cane or other 

assistive device and that she would be absent from work more than four days per month due to her 

impairments or treatment. (Id. at 574, 575.)

The ALJ considered Dr. Krinsky's progress notes "completely inconsistent with his 

assessment of [sic] that claimant could sit/stand/walk less than 2 hours." (Id. at 20.) She noted 

that Dr. Krinsky returned Plaintiff to full duty as of November 11, 2009, but indicated that there 

was no work available. (Id.) She also noted that (1) treatment notes from January 2010 indicated 

that claimant only occasionally uses a cane, (2) notes from March and May 2010 indicated that 

there was still no work available, (3) notes from September 2010 indicated that claimant was 

getting better by the week but that no work was available, and (4) opinions from July 2010 and 

August 2011 were primarily based on claimant's subjective complaints. (Id.) The ALJ stated that 

treatment records clearly showed that Plaintiff improved following the second knee procedure. 

(Id.) 

The ALJ did not give any reasons for placing little weight on Dr. Young's opinion other 

than stating that his opinion "appear[ed] to be primarily based on the claimant's subjective 

complaints." (See id.) Dr. Young had completed a physician's medical source statement on July 

14, 2010, in which he indicated that he had seen Plaintiff on a monthly basis since March 4, 2009. 

(Id. 439-42.) He noted that Plaintiff's prognosis was "guarded," that Plaintiff complained of 

throbbing pain in her right knee that is worse when standing and sitting for prolonged periods of 

time. (Id.) He stated that Plaintiff is a candidate for total knee replacement in the future. (Id.) He 

opined that Plaintiff would need to take a 15-minute unscheduled break at least every hour, that 

Plaintiff would need to elevate her leg between 6-12 inches with prolonged sitting for 

approximately 10-20% of the workday, and that Plaintiff must use a cane or other assistive device. 

(Id.) He also opined that Plaintiff would likely be absent from work for more than four days per 

month as a result of her impairments or treatment. (Id. at 442.)

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At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's medical impairments did not preclude her 

from performing her past relevant work as a customer service clerk or as a floor supervisor at a 

call center. (Id. at 21.) She relied on the VE's testimony that an individual with Plaintiff's 

limitations, as the ALJ determined them, could perform that type of work. (Id.) The ALJ found 

that Plaintiff "is able to perform these jobs as actually and generally performed," and concluded 

that Plaintiff has not been under a disability from June 30, 2007, the alleged onset date, through 

September 23, 2011, the date of her decision. (Id.)

Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ's unfavorable decision. (Id. at 

10.) The Appeals Council denied review on May 17, 2013, and the ALJ's decision became the 

final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) 

D. District court proceedings

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this Court on July 17, 2013, seeking judicial review of the 

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) The parties 

filed their cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Court entered judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff on September 10, 2014. The case was remanded to the SSA for further proceedings so

that the ALJ could give proper consideration to Dr. Young's opinion and revisit her adverse 

credibility determination as well as the hypotheticals she posed to the VE. (Sept. 10, 2014 Order

at 10-11, Dkt. No. 23.) On October 6, 2014, Plaintiff moved to alter or amend judgment pursuant 

to Rule 59(e). (Pl.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 26.) The Commissioner filed her opposition to the motion on 

October 27, 2014, and Plaintiff filed her reply on November 14, 2014. (Def.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 29; 

Pl.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 32.) The Court granted that motion on December 12, 2014 and remanded the 

case for immediate payment of benefits. (Dec. 12, 2014 Order, Dkt. No. 33.)

On January 9, 2015, the Commissioner filed her own motion to alter or amend judgment 

pursuant to Rule 59(e). (Def.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion on 

January 16, 2015. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 36.) The Commissioner's reply followed on January 23, 

2015.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is 

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necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the 

moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is 

necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law. 

Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe. R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). Rule 59(e) "offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in 

the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of 

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). A district court has 

considerable discretion when deciding a Rule 59(e) motion. Turner, 338 F.3d at 1063.

III. DISCUSSION

The Commissioner brings the instant motion on the ground that it is necessary to correct a 

manifest error of law. (Def.'s Mot. at 2.) She argues that this Court should remand the case for 

further proceedings, as on this record, there is serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff is actually 

disabled. (Id. at 4.) According to the Commissioner, this serious doubt stems from the differing 

opinions of Dr. Young and Dr. Rana and evidence in the record showing that Plaintiff's condition 

improved following her second surgery. (Id. at 5, 6.) She further argues that the Court erred when 

it remanded the case for payment of benefits because the ALJ may be able to provide the specific 

and legitimate reasons for disregarding Dr. Young's opinion, which the Commissioner considers 

"isolated evidence" that should not support an award of benefits. (Id. at 9.) In advancing these 

arguments, the Commissioner relies on two recent Ninth Circuit opinions, Treichler v. 

Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2014) and Burrell v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner merely rehashes arguments this Court has 

previously considered and rejected. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3.) Had Defendant not cited recent Ninth 

Circuit authorities that squarely address the issues contested in this case, the Court may have 

agreed. These cases, however, caution courts from too freely applying the credit-as-true rule in 

cases where, as here, the record contains conflicts that cast doubt on whether a claimant is actually 

disabled.

The Ninth Circuit has articulated "a three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of which 

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must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award 

benefits." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). The standard is met where "(1) 

the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 

whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence 

were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand." Id. 

(footnote and citations omitted). If, however, "an evaluation of the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled" a remand for further proceedings is appropriate, 

"even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied." Id. at 1021.

The claimant in Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration complained 

of lower back pain, right knee pain, ankle pain, difficulty emptying his bladder, and fecal 

incontinence after suffering a work-related injury. 775 F.3d at 1094. Following an unfavorable 

decision by the Commissioner, the claimant sought judicial review, and the district court affirmed 

in part and reversed and remanded in part. Id. at 1093. The claimant appealed, seeking a remand 

for payment of benefits based on the ALJ's improper adverse credibility finding. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit determined that the ALJ erred in failing to identify what portions of the 

claimant's testimony were not credible and in failing to explain how the ALJ arrived at that 

conclusion. Id. But, it rejected the argument that claimant's testimony regarding his urinary 

incontinence, fecal incontinence, and disabling pain, combined with the vocal expert's testimony 

that a person with such issues would not be able to maintain employment, warranted a remand for 

payment of benefits. Id. at 1103. The Ninth Circuit determined that the record contained

"significant factual conflicts" between the claimant's testimony and the objective medical 

evidence. Id. at 1104. Specifically, the claimant testified that he would lose control of his bladder 

during the day, though treatment notes showed that the urinary incontinence issue occurred at 

night. Id. He also testified that he experienced fecal incontinence, but the one medical report on 

the issue stated that the claimant complained of constipation and denied problems with fecal 

incontinence. Id. The claimant further testified that he had debilitating pain twice a week, though 

he reported to a physician that his pain medication made life tolerable and stated, during the 

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hearing, that the medication alleviates a lot of the pain. Id. Based on these conflicts, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that a remand for further proceedings, not payment of benefits, was the 

appropriate remedy. Id. at 1107.

In Burrell v. Colvin, the Ninth Circuit similarly declined to remand for payment of 

benefits, opting instead to remand for further proceedings. There, the claimant alleged that she 

was disabled based on debilitating headaches resulting from back and neck conditions. 775 F.3d 

at 1135. After an unfavorable decision by the Commissioner, the claimant sought judicial review

of the decision, and the district court affirmed. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 

substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's rejection of the claimant's testimony or his rejection 

of the medical assessment of the claimant's treating physician. Id. 

It did not, however, require the ALJ to credit either as true. Id. at 1142. It remanded the 

case to the Commissioner for further proceeding on an open record because the record as a whole 

raised serious doubt as to whether the claimant was actually disabled. Id. This serious doubt 

stemmed from portions of the record that the ALJ had not discussed, i.e., (1) the claimant's 

testimony that she could no longer knit, which was contradicted by medical records regarding her 

hand function, and (2) the fact that the record suggested that the claimant's headaches were 

secondary to her neck problems, which had improved, "both objectively and subjectively after 

surgery." Id. at 1142, 1143.

As the Commissioner points out, this record does document Plaintiff's medical 

improvement after her second surgery.

4

 She cites to a November 11, 2009 progress note that 

reads, in part: "She ambulates with a normal gait. There still is some definite discomfort noted 

but she is indeed doing much better. We have therefore released her to return to work full duty . . . 

." (Def.'s Mot. at 6 (citing AR at 300).) 

She also cites to a March 11, 2010 treatment note in which Dr. Krinsky noted "good 

mobility with some tenderness" and "no swelling." (Def.'s Mot. at 6 (citing AR at 468).) He 

indicated that Plaintiff "still has not had any work" and that she "will continue with her 

 

4 Because this argument has merit, the Court need not address the remaining arguments in the 

Commissioner's motion.

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independent exercising." (Def.'s Mot. at 6 (citing AR at 468).) Dr. Krinsky's May 4, 2010 

comprehensive report noted similar findings: "On examination there was slight tenderness 

medically, no swelling, good motion, and no instability. . . . " (Def.'s Mot. at 6 (citing AR at 

466).) A treatment note from April 14, 2011 also indicated that Plaintiff was "once again dealing 

quite well with her knee" and that the anti-inflammatory lotion had been "very beneficial." (Def.'s 

Mot. at 7 (citing AR at 529).)

Plaintiff does not address her medical improvement in her opposition. Instead, she asserts:

Conner agrees with Defendant that in the conventional adjudication of a Social 

Security disability case the presence of unresolved issues warrants remand. This is 

not what this Court has determined here. This is not an ordinary care. [sic] It is a 

case where disability has indeed been established.

(Pl.'s Opp'n at 3.) Here, it may be that the medical source statements in the record took this 

medical improvement into account, and it may be that notwithstanding this medical improvement, 

Plaintiff suffers from limitations that render her disabled. The Court, however, cannot make these 

assumptions. It cannot ignore that Dr. Krinsky released Plaintiff to full duty in November 2009, 

and it cannot ignore that several of his treatment notes show that Plaintiff improved after her 

second surgery, even if the elements of the credit-as-true rule would otherwise be met in this case.

Had there been medical expert testimony in the record indicating that Plaintiff's knee 

condition could have improved but nonetheless resulted in the limitations indicated in the medical 

source statements provided, then the record would be free from any ambiguity as to the severity of 

her knee condition, and the Court could properly exercise its discretion to remand for payment of 

benefits instead of for further proceedings. The ALJ shall obtain such medical expert testimony 

on remand as well as any additional information that would explain why Dr. Krinsky could release 

Plaintiff to full duty but nonetheless determine that she suffered from the severe limitations 

described in his medical source statement.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's motion is GRANTED. This case is 

remanded for further proceedings as set forth in this Court's order on the parties' cross-motions for 

summary judgment. After assigning proper weight to Dr. Young's opinion as set out in that order, 

and after obtaining the additional information discussed above, the ALJ shall revisit her disability 

determination, including step five, if necessary.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/24/15

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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