Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02140/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States c~urr of Appeals 

Tenth Circcit 

J 1JN 2 5 1991 

R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

AUDREY Cle!"k SUMMA, personal representative ) 

of the Estate of Richard Lee Summa, Jr.,) 

deceased; RICHARD LEE SUMMA, SR. and ) 

AUDREY SUMMA, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MESCALERO 

APACHE TRIBE; ANGELITA BOB, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-2140 

(D.C. No. 89-822-SC) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs appeal the 

The case is therefore ordered 

district court's order of 

June 15, 1990, dismissing their claims against the Mescalero 

Apache Tribe arid Angelita Bob (collectively, tribal defendants) 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2140 Document: 010110128168 Date Filed: 06/25/1991 Page: 1 
and the district court's order of June 25, 1990, dismissing their 

claims against the United States. In the summer of 1988, 

plaintiffs' fifteen-year-old son, Richard, was a paid participant 

in the Mescalero Apache Tribe Summer Youth Program, a federally 

funded program. As part of the program, he cleared debris from 

the roadside. On June 20, 1988, Richard was thrown from the top 

of a pile of branches on which he was sitting in the back of a 

pickup truck driven by Bob. He died as a result of the head 

injuries he received. 

Plaintiffs brought suit against the United States and tribal 

defendants under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 u.s.c. 

§§ 1346, 2671-2680. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that 

the district court had jurisdiction over the action under the FTCA 

"because the United States of America and the Mescalero Tribe are 

a party. Angelita Bob is named as an individual defendant and the 

United States District Court has jurisdiction, because she is a 

co-defendant along with the United States of America and the 

Mescalero Apache Tribe." Rec., vol. I, doc. 1, Complaint at 1. 

Plaintiffs also alleged that the United States has a trust 

relationship with Indians, and in particular "has a special 

relationship as educators for Indian children and to administer 

programs for Indian children of which the Job Training Partnership 

Act is one." Id. at 4. 

The tribal defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims 

against them on the ground that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy lay 

under the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 52-1-1 through 52-1-70. The United States also moved to 

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Appellate Case: 90-2140 Document: 010110128168 Date Filed: 06/25/1991 Page: 2 
dismiss the action on the ground that the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. The United 

States contended that because no federal employee or federal 

agency was involved in the incident, the FTCA did not confer 

jurisdiction on the court to consider the claims against the 

United States. The government also argued that the district court 

could not exercise pendent-party jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 

claims against the tribal defendants. 

Although the district court ruled on the merits of the tribal 

defendants' motion without considering the government's argument 

that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 

against the tribal defendants, we must address the jurisdictional 

issues first. "[T]he court's first duty is to determine its 

jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case on its merits." 

Thompson v. United States, 291 F.2d 67, 68 (10th Cir. 1961). Even 

if the parties do not raise the issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the court has a duty to do so sua sponte. See Tuck 

v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989). For the reasons set forth 

below, we conclude that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over all plaintiffs' claims. 

The FTCA constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, 

see United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976), and "[t]he 

terms of the government's consent to be sued define the court's 

jurisdiction," Ewell v. United States, 776 F.2d 246, 248 (10th 

Cir. 1985). The government's consent to be sued under the FTCA 

extends only to 

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claims against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury 

or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his office or employment, under 

circumstances where the United States, if a private 

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 

with the law of the place where the act or omission 

occurred. 

28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) (emphasis added). The consent to be sued does 

not extend to acts of independent contractors or their employees. 

See id. at§§ 1346, 2671; Lurch v. United States, 719 F.2d 333, 

336-37 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984). 

The principal issue in this appeal is whether Richard's death 

was caused by the negligence or wrongful act of any government 

agency or employee, as those terms are defined in the FTCA. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2671. The government contends that the tribe was 

merely an independent contractor; the tribe was not a federal 

agency, nor was Bob a federal employee. Plaintiffs argue that the 

regulations with which the tribe had to comply to qualify for the 

federal funds were so pervasive as to render the tribal defendants 

federal agents or employees. 

"[T]he question whether one is an employee of the United 

States is to be determined by federal law." Lurch v. United 

States, 719 F.2d at 337. "The critical determination in 

distinguishing a federal employee from an independent contractor 

is the power of the federal government 'to control the detailed 

physical performance of the contractor.'" Lilly v. Fieldstone, 

876 F.2d 857, 858 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Logue v. United States, 

412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973)). The key inquiry "is not whether the 

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[entity] receives federal money and must comply with federal 

standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations 

are supervised by the Federal Government." 

Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815. 

United States v. 

The tribal program in which Richard participated was a Summer 

Youth Employment Training Program funded under the Job Training 

Partnership Act (JTPA), 29 u.s.c. §§ 1501-1781. To qualify as a 

grantee for the program, the tribe had to comply with all the 

criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 632, subpts. B-H, which 

concern Indian and Native .American employment and training 

programs. 

Pursuant to the regulations, the tribe was responsible for 

the design and management of the program. Id. at§§ 632.75-.89. 

Herbert Fellman, the chief of the Division of Indian and Native 

.American Programs (DINAP) for the Department of Labor averred in 

an affidavit that the federal government was not involved in 

supervising the daily activities of grantees of Indian and Native 

.American programs. Specifically, he stated: 

6. The day-to-day activities of the grantees in 

operating their programs such as hiring staff, managing 

and operating the program, recruiting and supervising 

participants are the sole responsibility of the 

grantees. They exercise self-determination in designing 

their programs to meet the local needs of the community. 

However, they must comply with the JTPA and the 

implementing regulations. 

7. The DINAP staff is not involved in any aspect of 

the daily operations of the grantees' programs. Since 

the staff of DINAP is about 23 professionals and 

clericals and there are 182 grantees, this would be 

impossible. 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 42, ex. A, Declaration of Herbert Fellman at 3. 

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.J 

Likewise, Corrine Blaylock, who was the director of the 

program for the tribe, testified in her deposition that there was 

no on-site representative of the Department of Labor; the program 

funding came directly from Washington, D.C., and the person to 

whom she reported was in Washington. Id. ex. C, Deposition of 

Corrine Fern H. Blaylock at 35, 53. She explained: "Department 

of Labor didn't run this operation. The Mescalero Apache Tribe 

ran the operation, and we were all tribal employees." Id. at 

61-62. 

Thus, both the regulations and the testimony of the parties 

involved established that the federal government did not supervise 

the day-to-day operations of the tribal program. Furthermore, the 

government's intent that grantees of Indian and Native American 

employment and training programs and their employees not be 

considered federal employees is specifically set forth in 20 

C.F.R. S 632.84, which provides: "Participants shall not be 

deemed Federal employees and shall not be subject to the 

provisions of law relating to Federal employment." See Lurch v. 

United States, 719 F.2d at 338 (holding physician was not federal 

employee based on language of contract that provided he was not to 

be considered federal employee for any purpose, and working 

arrangement under contract). 

Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that the district court 

had subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. See Miller v. 

United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 939 (1983). In response to the government's motion and 

evidence that the tribe was not a federal agency and Bob was not a 

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Appellate Case: 90-2140 Document: 010110128168 Date Filed: 06/25/1991 Page: 6 
federal employee, plaintiffs simply recited the various 

regulations with which the tribe had to comply to qualify for 

federal funding. Plaintiffs noted that "[w]hile the grantee may 

have some responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the 

program, if it does not comply with the numerous requirements of 

the United States, the program may be in jeopardy," and asserted: 

"The Department of Labor, through its numerous requirements, 

exercises a substantial amount of control over the operation of 

the JTPA programs. The grantees are so constrained by the federal 

requirements that it can hardly be said that control of the 

day-to-day operations amounts to any control at all." Rec., vol. 

I, doc. 44, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to United States 

of America's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for 

Summary Judgment at 4, 6. 

Plaintiffs' recitation of the extensive program regulations, 

however, was not sufficient to raise a question of fact with 

respect to whether the tribe was a federal agency or Bob was a 

federal employee. "[T)he Government may fix specific and precise 

conditions to implement federal objectives. Although such 

regulations are aimed at assuring compliance with goals, the 

regulations do not convert the acts of entrepreneurs--or of state 

governmental bodies--into federal governmental acts." United 

States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 816. 

Although the only basis of jurisdiction plaintiffs alleged in 

their complaint was the FTCA, in response to the government's 

motion to dismiss, plaintiffs also argued that "[t]he United 

States' trust relationship with Native Americans raises issues of 

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Appellate Case: 90-2140 Document: 010110128168 Date Filed: 06/25/1991 Page: 7 
fact with respect to its liability for the death of Richard Summa, 

Jr." Rec., vol. I, doc. 44 at 3. In support of their argument 

that such a trust relationship exists and creates liability on the 

part of the government, plaintiffs cited United States v. 

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), and Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 

(1974). 

Plaintiffs did not cite any statutes or regulations that 

impose clear fiduciary duties on the United States like those 

found actionable in United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224. 

We need not decide whether the general trust relationship the 

United States has with Indians would be sufficient to impose an 

actionable duty on the government here, however, because 

plaintiffs did not allege any specific breach of such a duty. 

Because plaintiffs failed to establish that their son's death 

was caused by "the negligent or wrongful act of any employee of 

the Government," 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b), a necessary prerequisite to 

jurisdiction under the FTCA, or to establish any other basis for 

federal jurisdiction over their claims against the United States, 

the district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs' claims against the tribal defendants must be 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well. 1 The 

only basis for jurisdiction plaintiffs asserted below was the 

FTCA. Plaintiffs argued that the district court could assert 

pendent-party jurisdiction over the tribal defendants as joint 

1 Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 

claims against the tribal defendants, we do not address the merits 

of the workmen's compensation issue. 

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.. 

tortfeasors with the United States "if the criteria for 

intervention of right or for compulsory joinder are met." Rec., 

vol. I, doc. 44 at 6. They contended that "[j]oining the 

Mescalero Apache Tribe and Angelita Bob does not deprive the Court 

of jurisdiction. Their presence in this suit is necessary to 

adjudicate complete relief for the Plaintiff[s]." Id. Plaintiffs 

reassert these arguments on appeal. See Appellants' Reply Brief 

at 6. 

Although we held that a court could exercise pendent-party 

jurisdiction under the FTCA in Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 

755, 757-59 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), 

the Supreme Court has since made clear that the exercise of such 

jurisdiction is impermissible, because the FTCA "defines 

jurisdiction in a manner that does not reach defendants other than 

the United States." Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553 

(1989). "[T]he statutory power to decide a case including . a 

claim [against a private party over which the court has no 

independent jurisdiction] simply does not exist, since the FTCA 

provides jurisdiction only for claims against the United States." 

Id. at 553 n.6. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED as to the United States and 

REMANDED as to defendants Mescalero Apache Tribe and Angelita Bob 

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• 

• 

with directions to modify the judgment to reflect a dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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