Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01323/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01323-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER ELLIOTT,

Plaintiff,

v. 

M. CAMPOSE, 

Defendant.

No. 2:22-CV-1323-KJM-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 Plaintiff Christopher Elliott, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

arguing: (1) Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to sustain his Eighth Amendment claim; and (2) 

Defendant Campos is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 27. Plaintiff filed an opposition, 

Defendant filed a reply, and Plaintiff filed a response to the reply. ECF Nos. 29, 32, 33. 

 As explained below, because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant knew that 

Defendant’s actions would lead to substantial risk of serious harm, the complaint is insufficient.1

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1

 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, the Court does not address Defendant’s 

qualified immunity argument. 

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 1 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 

material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 

Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). All ambiguities or doubts 

must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 

(1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need 

not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 

outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 

documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 

party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 

and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 

of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant Campose and other employees at 

California State Prison – Sacramento (CSP-Sac.). ECF No. 1. The Court found service 

appropriate only for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment safety claim against Defendant Campose. 

ECF No. 9. Plaintiff chose to voluntarily dismiss all other defendants and claims and proceed 

solely on his claim against Defendant Campose. See ECF No. 12. The Court ordered service on 

Defendant Campose on January 19, 2023. See ECF No. 13. This case has been related to Elliott 

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 2 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

v. Campose, 2:22-cv-1236-KJM-DMC, in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Campose denied 

him food, retaliated against him, and harassed him. ECF No. 24 (related case order). 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Campose tried to have Plaintiff killed. ECF No 1 

at 4. Defendant allegedly did so to try to cover up the theft of the money Plaintiff’s deceased 

grandfather left to Plaintiff. Id. Defendant allegedly wrote up Plaintiff an “IEX,” or rules 

violation report, which included that Plaintiff was a sex offender. Id. at 5. According to 

Plaintiff, Defendant then passed out copies of the IEX to other inmates, including gang 

members. Id. Plaintiff claims that he had to walk to video court with the inmates after the IEX 

was shared. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to present a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

safety claim because: (1) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant labeled him as a sex offender; 

and (2) Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm. ECF 

No. 27 at 6. 

 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 

two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 

that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 3 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to 

protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 

1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) 

objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious 

harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. 

See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, 

however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials 

know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a 

mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the 

plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually 

knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, 

even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the IEX, also referred to as a

Rules Violation Report, which is a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

official record, and which is referenced in but not attached to the complaint. ECF No. 28, Exhibit 

C. This request should be granted.2 The IEX lists the specific act as: “Indecent Exposure 

Without Prior Convictions for PC 314.” Id. It lists the classification level as “Serious” and notes 

that felony prosecution is likely. Id. The IEX describes that Plaintiff was seen by a correctional 

officer on February 25, 2021, lying nude on his bed and masturbating. Id. 

2

 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of court 

records and other matters of public record. See, e.g., Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 

442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Sherman v. Reisig, No. 2:10–cv–02939, 2010 WL 5169067,*2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Dec.14, 2010). The 

court may also take judicial notice of documents referenced in, but not attached to, the complaint. 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 

699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial notice is also appropriately taken of the official records of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 931 

n.7 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 4 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

 Defendant argues that because the IEX does not explicitly label Plaintiff as a sex

offender, but merely suggests he was doing an offensive sexual act, Plaintiff cannot allege he was 

in fact labeled a sex offender. As support, Defendant cites an unpublished district court decision 

that states “[b]eing charged with indecent exposure, of itself, fails to state a claim for failing to 

protect plaintiff or deliberate indifference.” Sharihorne v. Adams, 2006 WL 2085268, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. July 25, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, 2006 WL 2666066 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2006). Defendant also relies on Morris v. Yavari, 2022 WL 18494649, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 

2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1071989 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2023). 

According to Defendant: 

 . . . In [Morris v.] Yavari, the Court determined that “simply 

identif[ying] [an inmate] as having been accused of, and possibly guilty 

of, indecent exposure” does not equate to branding an inmate as “a known 

sexual predator.” [Morris v.] Yavari, 2022 WL 18494649, at *6. Similarly 

here, the Court should not accept Plaintiff’s false and contradictory 

allegation that his IEX paperwork labeled him as a sex offender. To the 

contrary, based on the documents that Plaintiff himself provides, Officer 

Campos did not label him as a sex offender and there is no reason for the 

Court to find that Plaintiff’s IEX charges are akin to identifying him as a 

known sexual predator. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

based on allegations that Officer Campos labeled him as a sex offender 

should be dismissed. 

ECF No. 27, pg. 8. 

 Defendant’s argument is persuasive. This case is similar to both Sharihorne and 

Morris in that Plaintiff was charged with indecent exposure which is not the same as labeling 

Plaintiff a sex offender. Amending the complaint will not cure this fundamental defect in 

Plaintiff’s claim.

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 5 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

III. CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends as follows: 

 1. Defendant’s request for judicial notice, ECF No. 28, be GRANTED. 

 2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 27, be GRANTED and that this 

action be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 

with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 

Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 16, 2024 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:22-cv-01323-KJM-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/20/24 Page 6 of 6