Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00602/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00602-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONNIE ARNOLD, )

) 02:05-cv-602-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

SACRAMENTO DOUBLETREE HOTEL; )

DOUBLETREE HOTEL CORPORATION; )

RED LION INNS OPERATING L.P.; )

WESTBOY LLC; THE BOYKIN GROUP, )

INC.; BOYKIN LODGING COMPANY, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On January 4, 2007, the parties filed a “Consent Decree and

Order” (“Decree”). The Decree reveals the parties have settled this

action, and that their settlement includes remedial measures. The

parties assume in the Decree that the federal court will exercise

jurisdiction over the Decree. 

The parties’ agreement that the federal court will exercise

jurisdiction over their Decree “is not binding on the court.” Arata

v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Settlement agreements are contracts, and the “automatic jurisdiction

over such contracts is in no way essential to the conduct of federalCase 2:05-cv-00602-GEB-GGH Document 22 Filed 01/10/07 Page 1 of 5
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court business.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 381 (1994). 

When deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction as the

parties request, “it is helpful briefly to examine the relevant

differences between settlements and consent decrees generally” since

the parties’ characterization of their Decree as a “consent decree”

does not govern how it is ultimately defined. Smyth ex rel. Smyth v.

Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2002).

A consent decree has elements of both judgment and

contract, a dual character that results in

different treatment for different purposes. Thus,

a consent decree embodies an agreement of the

parties and thus in some respects is contractual

in nature. But it is an agreement that the

parties desire and expect will be reflected in,

and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is

subject to the rules generally applicable to other

judgments and decrees.

The parties to a consent decree expect and achieve

a continuing basis of jurisdiction to enforce the

terms of the resolution of their case in the court

entering the order. 

Because it is entered as an order of the court,

the terms of a consent decree must also be

examined by the court. . . . Because the consent

decree does not merely validate a compromise but,

by virtue of its injunctive provisions, reaches

into the future and has continuing effect, its

terms require more careful scrutiny. Even when it

affects only the parties, the court should,

therefore, examine it carefully to ascertain not

only that it is a fair settlement but also that it

does not put the court's sanction on and power

behind a decree that violates Constitution,

statute, or jurisprudence.

***

By contrast, a private settlement, although it may

resolve a dispute before a court, ordinarily does

not receive the approval of the court. Nor is a

private settlement agreement enforceable by a

district court as an order of the court unless the

obligation to comply with its terms is made part

of the order of dismissal-either by separate

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provision (such as a provision ‘retaining

jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by 

incorporating the terms of the settlement

agreement in the order.

Id. at 280-81 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Although the parties characterize their settlement as a

consent decree, their settlement is functionally equivalent to a

private settlement over which exercise of jurisdiction is not

required. 

The remedial portion of the Decree, which the parties

designate as “Description of Injunctive Relief,” includes the

requirement that agreed upon remedial measures be made in accordance

with “the more stringent of the standards and specifications for

disabled access as are set forth in the California Code of

Regulations, Title 24, The Building Standards Code, and the Americans

with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines.” (Decree, Ex. B at

2.) This portion of the Decree is inconsistent with the requirements

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Rule 65(d) requires that

“[e]very order granting an injunction . . . shall be specific in terms

[and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to 

. . . other document[s], the act or acts sought to be restrained.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (emphasis added); William Keeton Enters. v. A

All Am. Strip-O-Rama, Inc., 74 F.3d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The lack of specificity in the standard applicable to this

portion of the Decree is such that the Court’s sanction power should

not be put behind it. This does not mean, however, that the provision

is an insufficient standard for a private settlement. Therefore, the

Decree will not be treated as a consent decree. Rather, it will be

treated as a private settlement. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929

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(7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that a private settlement agreement over

which jurisdiction is not retained could be enforceable in court “in

the usual way, that is, by a fresh suit.”).

Even though the parties’ settlement agreement provides that

an injunction will issue, “a federal judge . . . is not mechanically

obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.” 

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (citing

Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978)). “The

requirements for the issuance of [an] injunction are the likelihood of

substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of

remedies at law.” Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d

1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted);

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (assuming

without deciding that four factors apply to a decision whether to

issue an injunction). The parties have neither shown that a court

order is necessary to enforce any provision of their settlement

agreement, nor that Plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law to

enforce the settlement agreement. Since the parties represent they

have agreed to settlement terms and indicate that Defendants will

comply with them, reason has not been provided for issuance of an

injunction or other order to enforce any aspect of the settlement.

Since the parties have settled this action and have agreed

to dismiss the action with prejudice, this action is dismissed with

prejudice. Cf. Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 194-95 (5th 

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Cir. 1980) (revealing that when a settlement is tantamount to a

stipulated dismissal, a dismissal order should issue). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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