Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01190/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01190-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOEMI DEL CARMEN ACOSTA,

Petitioner,

v.

RICK HILL, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 19-cv-01190-H-KSC

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION AND 

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. Nos. 6 and 11.]

Noemi Del Carmen Acosta, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 24, 2019. (Doc. No. 1.) The 

Petition raises two claims: (1) that she was provided ineffective assistance of counsel 

because her trial attorney did not adequately investigate the relevant facts and law; and 

(2) her guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because it was coerced by trial counsel and 

was not entered into intelligently, knowingly, or voluntarily. (Doc. No. 7-3, Lodgment 

No. 3, pp. 12-16.)

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On September 6, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. (Doc. No.

6.) Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice because

Petitioner’s claims are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set out in the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

(Doc. No. 6.) Petitioner did not file an opposition but did file a First Amended Petition, in 

which she raises the same claims made to the state court and requests this Court stay her 

federal claims while she pursues exhaustion with the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 

9, pp. 7, 17-22.) On November 15, 2019, Respondent filed a reply. (Doc. No. 10.) 

On November 21, 2019, Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford issued a report and 

recommendation (the “Report” or “R&R”) recommending that this Court grant

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 11.) Judge Crawford’s order instructed that 

objections to the Report must be filed by December 6, 2019. Neither party filed any 

objections. 

After careful consideration of the pleadings and for the reasons set forth below, this 

Court ADOPTS the Report and GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

ANALYSIS1

A. The R&R’s Conclusion are Proper

The Court reviews de novo those portions of an R&R to which objections are made. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. “The statute makes it 

clear,” however, “that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations de novo if an objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see

also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (concluding that 

where no objections were filed, the district court had no obligation to review the magistrate 

 

1 The Court adopts and incorporates the procedural and factual background set forth in the R&R 

and does not recount it here. (Doc. No. 11.)

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judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, 

de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. This legal rule is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and 

this District. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, 

de novo review of a[n] R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); 

Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting report 

in its entirety without review because neither party filed objections to the report despite the 

opportunity to do so); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 

2004) (Benitez, J.)

In this case, the deadline to file written objections to the R&R was December 6,

2019. (Doc. No. 11.) However, no objections have been filed and neither party has

requested additional time to do so. Consequently, the Court may adopt the R&R on that 

basis alone. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Nonetheless, having conducted a de novo 

review of the Petition (Doc. No. 1), Respondent Hill’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 10), 

and the R&R (Doc. No. 11), the Court concludes that Judge Crawford’s recommendations 

are proper.

B. The Statute of Limitations Bars the Petition

Judge Crawford properly concluded that dismissal is warranted based on the statute 

of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. No. 11 at 4-5.) A federal habeas petition may be dismissed with 

prejudice if it is not filed within the appropriate time period pursuant to the AEDPA. 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2001). AEDPA establishes a one-year 

statute of limitation to file a federal habeas petition for “a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court,” which begins to run, in relevant part, from “the date on which 

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 

for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Although the one-year statute of 

limitations can be calculated based on the “latest” of several other grounds in addition to 

the ground identified in Section 2244(d)(1)(A), see 28 U.S.C. § 2224(d)(1)(B)–(D), the 

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Petition does not set forth any facts or arguments that suggest any of these other grounds 

are applicable. (Doc. No. 1.) Therefore, Acosta’s Petition is subject to the 1-year statute of

limitations calculated from the date on which the judgment she challenges became final.

Judge Crawford correctly applied the statute of limitations in this case. As Judge 

Crawford determined, the relevant date for computation of the statute of limitations was 

one year from the date that the state court conviction became final – March 26, 2016. (Doc. 

No. 11. at 4.) Absent any applicable tolling, Petitioner then had 365 days, until March 26, 

2017, to timely initiate a federal habeas petition. Judge Crawford correctly determined that 

Acosta was not entitled to any statutory tolling because none of her subsequent filings had 

any effect on the AEDPA statute of limitations as they were each filed after the statute of 

limitations had expired on March 26, 2017. Because Petitioner did not initiate this action 

until June 19, 2019, over three years after her conviction became final, the Petition is barred 

by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

Next, Judge Crawford soundly reasoned that Acosta is not entitled to equitable 

tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations because the Petition does not allege any facts that 

would explain the delay in bringing a timely Petition. (Doc. No. 11 at 5-6.); Luu v. Beard,

2014 WL 2616878, at *2, 13 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2014). Accordingly, the Court adopts the 

R&R and grants Respondent Hill’s motion to dismiss the Petition as time-barred by the 

AEDPA. 

C. The Court Declines to Issue a Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court “must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner “has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). 

To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) the issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or 

(3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Maciel v. 

Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2013). Based on a review of the Petition, the record, and 

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the R&R, the Court cannot find that any of these grounds applies. Reasonable jurists would 

not find debatable or wrong that the Petition is time-barred by AEDPA or that Petitioner 

has not met her burden to show that equitable tolling is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court 

declines to issue Petitioner a certificate of appealability

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby: (1) APPROVES and ADOPTS the 

R&R in its entirety (Doc. No. 11); (2) GRANTS Respondent Hill’s motion to dismiss 

(Doc. No. 6); (3) DISMISSES the Petition WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. No. 1); and (4) 

DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2020

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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