Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01997/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTOPHER LIPSEY, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:18-cv-1997 AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. 

ECF Nos. 1, 2, 8.1

 This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 

 For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s earlier filed application to proceed in forma 

pauperis will be denied as incomplete, and plaintiff’s later filed in forma pauperis application will 

be granted. In addition, it will be recommended that: (1) this action be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and (2) plaintiff’s motion for the 

appointment of counsel be denied as moot. 

//// 

1

 Plaintiff has also filed an unsolicited and untimely first amended complaint with the court. See 

ECF No. 10. Because the amended complaint was untimely filed and because plaintiff was not 

granted permission from the court to file it, the court does not consider it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(1)(A), (2) (timeliness and court leave requirements needed to file amended pleading). 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 

 Plaintiff’s first application to proceed in forma pauperis was incomplete because it was 

not accompanied by a certified trust account statement as required by law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(2); see also ECF No. 2. As a result, it will be denied. 

 Plaintiff’s second application to proceed in forma pauperis contains a declaration that 

makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). See ECF No. 8. Accordingly, this 

request will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 

twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

//// 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

III. PLEADING STANDARD 

 A. Generally 

 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source 

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 3 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78. 

 B. Linkage Requirement 

 Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in 

Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious 

liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has 

violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant 

with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

 A. Relevant Facts 

 Plaintiff names Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Gavin Newsom, the former Governor and 

Lieutenant Governor of the State of California respectively, as defendants in this action. See ECF 

No. 1 at 1, 4. He sues each defendant in his official capacity. See id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that 

Brown and Newsom violated his federal constitutional rights by enacting Proposition 57,2 which 

provides for parole consideration after primary term completion for some inmates but not for 

others. See id. at 5. The rights plaintiff mentions initially are his rights to rights to equal 

protection, due process, access to the courts, to petition the government, and to be free from cruel 

//// 

2

 See Cal. Const., art. I, § 32. 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 4 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

and unusual punishment. Id. The body of the complaint, however, addresses only the claim that 

Proposition 57 violates the guarantee of equal protection. See id. at 5-11. 

 B. Relief Sought 

 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring the Governor of the State of California to add 

attempted murder3 to the list of violent felonies eligible for Proposition 57 relief. See ECF No. 1 

at 12. 

V. APPLICABLE LAW 

 A. Proposition 57 

 Proposition 57 added Article 1, Section 32 to the California Constitution. It states in 

relevant part: “Parole consideration: Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and 

sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full 

term of his or her primary offense,” defined for these purposes as “the longest term of 

imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an 

enhancement, consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence.” Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subds. 

(a)(1), (a)(1)(A). 

 B. Equal Protection Clause 

 The Equal Protection Clause broadly requires the government to treat similarly situated 

people equally. Hartman v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 

(9th Cir. 2013). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must typically allege that 

“‘defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon 

membership in a protected class,’” such as a particular race or religion. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1998)). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a 

plaintiff's protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. 

3

 Based upon the content of the complaint, the court presumes throughout this order that plaintiff 

was convicted of attempted murder. If this is not the case, should this matter proceed, plaintiff 

should inform the court. 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 5 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009) (to state an equal protection claim, plaintiff 

“must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an 

inference of discriminatory intent”). 

 Where the governmental classification does not involve a suspect or protected class, or 

impinge upon a fundamental right, the classification will not “‘run afoul of the Equal Protection 

Clause if there is a rational relationship between disparity of treatment and some legitimate 

governmental purpose.’” Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1067, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 119 S. Ct. 1162, 1163 (1999)). 

VI. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights have been violated because (1) Governor 

Brown signed Proposition 57 – which is only applicable to some prisoners – into law, and (2) 

Lieutenant Governor Newsom failed to warn Governor Brown of the biases in the proposition. 

See ECF No. 1 at 5-12. Implicit in these claims are underlying equal protection arguments based 

on plaintiff’s race and the nature of his commitment offense. These claims are not actionable, for 

several reasons. 

 A. Improper Defendants 

A claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his official capacity is 

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment provided the official has authority to implement the 

requested relief. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state 

official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 

1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the 

State.’”) (citations omitted). To be a proper defendant for purposes of injunctive relief, the state 

official “must have some connection with the enforcement of the act.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 

123, 157 (1908). That connection “must be fairly direct.” Coalition to Defend Affirmative 

Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). A generalized duty to enforce state law or 

general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision 

will not subject an official to suit. Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 

1992). 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 6 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

 Here, plaintiff alleges that Governor Brown signed an unconstitutional proposition into 

law, and that Lieutenant Governor Newsom failed to inform Governor Brown of the proposition’s 

shortcomings. See generally ECF No. 1 at 5-11. Though the Governor may be generally 

responsible for executing and enforcing the laws of the State of California, this does not establish 

the “requisite connection to enforcement” needed to overcome sovereign immunity. Ex parte 

Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (1908). The same can be said for the Lieutenant Governor and any 

purported obligation he may have had to “warn” the Governor of the alleged deficiencies in 

Proposition 57. 

In any event, neither the Governor nor the Lieutenant Governor has the authority to 

unilaterally amend the substantive terms of legislation or of a state constitutional amendment 

passed by the electorate as a ballot proposition. This means that the named officials lack 

authority to implement the requested injunctive relief. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against 

Governor Brown and Lieutenant Governor Newsom are not cognizable. 

 B. Absence of Claims Upon Which Relief May Be Granted 

 1. No Constitutional Right to Parole 

 Plaintiff challenges the content and application of Proposition 57 as it relates to parole. 

The law is clear that there is no right under the U.S. Constitution to be conditionally released 

before the expiration of a valid sentence. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011); see 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (there is no federal 

constitutional right to parole). It follows that there is no constitutional right to parole 

consideration. See Fernandez v. Nevada, No. 3:06-CV-00628 LRH-RA, 2009 WL 700662, at *10 

(D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2009). And where there is no liberty interest in parole eligibility or parole, 

there can be no due process violation. See id. 

 2. State Law Claims Are Not Reviewable 

 The questions whether Proposition 57 is being improperly construed, and whether it 

should be amended to permit those convicted of attempted murder to be eligible for early parole 

consideration, are questions of California law. Accordingly, they are not reviewable by this court. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (only deprivation of rights secured by federal law is actionable under 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 7 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

Section 1983); see also Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (state law issue 

cannot be transformed into federal law issue by merely invoking due process). Thus, to the extent 

the complaint challenges the construction and/or need for amendment of Proposition 57, the 

claims are not cognizable. 

 3. Proposition 57 Is Rationally Related to Legitimate Government Purpose 

 Plaintiff argues substantively that his rights to equal protection and due process are being 

violated because (1) the particular crime of which he was convicted – attempted murder – is not 

one of the enumerated crimes that are eligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57, 

and (2) some crimes that are eligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57 are more 

likely to be committed by Whites, whereas some that are not eligible are more likely to be 

committed by Blacks and Latinos. These contentions fail to state claims upon which relief may 

be granted. 

 a. Relevant Law 

 As stated earlier, to state a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 

discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected class. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). With respect to legislative classifications, the 

Supreme Court has also stated that “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid 

and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 

state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 

 “While most laws classify individuals in one way or another, legislative classifications 

typically survive judicial scrutiny so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate 

governmental interest.” Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, when 

social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide 

latitude. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. In the same vein, the Ninth Circuit has specifically 

rejected equal protection claims that are premised on statutory differences reflecting the alleged 

“seriousness” of the crimes. See Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 8 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9 

 b. Analysis 

 Plaintiff’s status as someone who has been convicted of attempted murder does not make 

him part of a suspect class for equal protection purposes. The rational basis test applies to 

Proposition 57’s distinction among offenses. To prevail, plaintiff must show that the state’s 

decision not to accord early parole consideration to attempted murders is not rationally related to 

legitimate legislative goals. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 687. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts 

that could plausibly meet this standard. 

 States have legitimate interests in not extending consideration for early release to 

prisoners who have been convicted of violent crimes such as attempted murder. Such laws serve 

public safety and engender societal confidence in the correctional system’s punitive measures. 

Thus, Proposition 57’s failure to include prisoners convicted of attempted murder among those 

who are eligible for early parole consideration is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 

interest and does not violate plaintiff’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause. To the extent 

plaintiff mounts a facial challenge to the classification of eligible offenses, he fails to state a claim 

as a matter of law. 

 4. Disproportionate Impact of a Statute Is Not Dispositive 

 Plaintiff also forwards a race-based equal protection argument, namely that Black and 

Latino inmates are disproportionately denied early parole consideration under Proposition 57 in 

comparison to white inmates, given the types of crimes that are eligible for consideration under 

the statute. See ECF No. 1 at 5-17. This argument also fails. 

 a. Relevant Law 

 “The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 

U.S. 229, 239 (1976). An equal protection claim may lie when a policy that is neutral on its face 

has a disproportionate or disparate impact on an identifiable group. Village of Arlington Heights 

v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977). However, the disparate impact of a 

policy is not dispositive. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court 

stated: 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 9 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10 

We have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends 

otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 

under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a 

greater proportion of one race than another. Disproportionate 

impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an 

invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 

Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that rule racial 

classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are 

justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations. 

Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (citation omitted). 

 Following these principles, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the disproportionate 

impact of a prison’s facially neutral policies on an identifiable group does not mean that the 

policies violated the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 686-87 (citing Navarro 

v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995)). Proof of discriminatory intent or motive must 

also be present. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Mass v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979) 

(finding no evidence state intended to discriminate against women by granting lifetime preference 

to veterans for civil service positions, even though over ninety-eight percent of veterans in state 

were male). 

 b. Analysis 

 Plaintiff has provided exhibits in support of his claim that Proposition 57 

disproportionately impacts Black and Latino inmates, see ECF No. 1 at 14-15, 17, but these 

documents do not actually contain support for plaintiff’s empirical assertions. Exhibit A is a 2-

page summary of national hate crimes statistics from 2015, including the race of offenders. 

Exhibit B is a single page from an undated article regarding hate crimes, also including some 

demographic information regarding offenders. This showing has no obvious relevance to the 

question whether Proposition 57 disproportionately benefits certain racial groups. 

 Plaintiff’s unsupported and purely conclusory allegations of disparate impact are 

insufficient to state a claim. The complaint contains no allegations that would support an 

inference of discriminatory intent or motive behind Proposition 57. Accordingly, plaintiff’s racebased disparate impact claim fails as a matter of law. 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 10 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For all the reasons explained above, the undersigned finds that the complaint fails to state 

cognizable civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that any amendment of the complaint 

would be futile. “A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” 

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit 

entirely.”). Therefore, instead of granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, the undersigned 

recommends that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a District Court Judge to this action; 

2. Plaintiff’s earlier filed motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED 

as incomplete; 

3. Plaintiff’s later filed motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED, 

and 

4. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED without 

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1). 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 11 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 18, 2020 

Case 2:18-cv-01997-JAM-AC Document 12 Filed 05/19/20 Page 12 of 12