Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00171/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00171-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID HANS MORALES,

Plaintiff,

v.

KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00171-CDB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS ALLISON 

AND DOE DEFENDANT SECRETARY 

AND TO ALLOW ACTION TO PROCEED 

ON PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING CLAIMS

(Doc. 13)

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

Plaintiff David Hans Morales is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action.

On February 3, 2023, the Court issued its First Screening Order. (Doc. 12.) The Court 

found Plaintiff failed to state a claim against any named defendant and Plaintiff was given leave 

to file a first amended complaint. (Id. at 4-12.) 

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. (Doc. 13.) 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, and his complaint is therefore subject to 

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion 

thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to 

allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 

any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 

theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 

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B. Linkage and Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

C. Supervisory Liability

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 

their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g., 

Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff required to 

adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act 

unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. 

C’nty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 

1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is 

no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”).

Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 

‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 

inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 

implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 

rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 

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F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations & quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 

grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).

To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his 

deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed 

with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 

707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 

such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 

involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. 

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

D. Doe Defendants

Although the use of Doe defendants is generally disfavored, “‘the plaintiff should be 

given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that 

discovery would not uncover the identities ...’” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 E.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants in this action:

Kathleen Allison, Director, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

John Doe, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

John Doe, Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP)

John Doe, Facility B Captain at PVSP

John Doe, Facility B Lieutenant at PVSP

John Doe, Facility C Captain at PVSP

John Doe, Facility C Lieutenant at PVSP

John Doe, Facility C Sergeant at PVSP

John Doe, Facility B Sergeant at PVSP

Mr. Phillips, Correctional Officer, Facility B, Bldg. 3, PVSP

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Ms. Rodriguez, Correctional Officer, Facility B, Bldg. 3, PVSP

Ms. Hernandez, Correctional Officer, Facility B, Bldg. 3, Tower, PVSP

O. Onyehe, Chief Medical Executive, PVSP

Ifeoma Oghuehi, Nurse Practitioner, Facility B, PVSP

(Doc. 13 at 1, 3-4.) Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against all named 

defendants. (Id. at 4.) He seeks $100,000 in damages. (Id. at 10.) 

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff contends Defendants Allison, Doe CDCR Secretary, Doe PVSP Warden and 

Onyehe failed to have protocols in place at PVSP at the start of the COVID-10 pandemic “on 

March 11, 2020, that follow recommendations for quarantines set forth by the California 

Department of Public Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.” (Doc. 13 at 4.) 

Plaintiff alleges such protocols would have “slowed down the spread” of COVID-19 at PVSP in 

Building 3 of Facility B, and “triggered baseline testing of all staff at PVSP, in turn would have 

prevented Plaintiff from contracting the deadly virus.” (Id. at 4-5.) 

Plaintiff asserts Defendants Phillips, Rodriguez and Hernandez entered Facility B in 

October and November 2020 and spread the COVID-19 virus “throughout the whole building B3, 

and not informing Medical and Supervisory staff at the institution entrance, that they were 

infected,” as required. (Doc. 13 at 5.) Plaintiff contends Phillips and Rodriguez were floor 

officers and “had verbal conversations with Plaintiff and many other inmates in the building 

office and dayroom floor, knowing they were infected and spreading the virus, as they clearly had 

symptoms of the virus, with dry coughing and difficulty breathing while talking.” (Id. at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff maintains “many officers were stating that all these officers infected Building 3.” (Id. at 

6.) 

Plaintiff contends he asked Hernandez to turn off three fans attached to the observation 

tower, “blowing in each section of the building dayroom, because he is spreading the virus.” 

(Doc. 13 at 6.) Hernandez replied he could not do so, but Plaintiff asserts Hernandez “had control 

of the on and off switch in the tower, because the building fans are only supposed to go on 

automatically when the exterior temperature excess 90o in the summer months.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

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contends Hernandez knew “he, Mr. Phillips and Ms. Rodriguez had contracted” the virus and 

“exposed the building to the virus and that the building fans would further spread the virus in the 

building and expose Plaintiff and other housed” there. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts there were no contact 

visits permitted at that time “and it had already been predicted that staff would carry the virus into 

the prison setting.” (Id.) He contends Hernandez “announced over the Observation Tower, Public 

Address (PA) system that he had contracted” the virus. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts Defendants Doe Facility B Captain, Lieutenant and Sergeant, as well as 

Onyehe and Oghuehi, were aware that Defendants Phillips, Rodriguez and Hernandez had tested 

positive but failed to “lockdown/quarantine” the building and “instead let the virus spread 

further.” (Doc. 13 at 7.) He also contends “no contact tracing protocol was implemented” in that 

building or any other building in the facility. (Id.) 

On November 17, 2020, Plaintiff tested negative for the virus while housed in “B3-103 

low.” (Doc. 13 at 8.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on November 19, 2020, when “Facility B3 inmates tested positive” 

for the virus and were authorized to be moved to “Facility D5 or any other facility at PVSP” by 

Defendants Doe Facility B Captain, Lieutenant and Sergeant, and Onyehe and Oghuehi, there 

were no designated quarantine buildings “so inmates were being moved anywhere there was 

empty cells and the virus was being spread throughout the PVSP facilities.” (Doc. 13 at 7.) 

On November 21, 2020, Plaintiff contends several Facility C inmates were authorized to 

move to Facility B3 by Defendants Doe Warden, Doe Facility C Captain, Lieutenant and 

Sergeant, and Onyehe. (Doc. 13 at 7.) However, the Facility C inmates were COVID-19 positive 

rather than negative, and infected inmates in Facility B3, including Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states that all inmates housed in his building showered in the same stalls with 

Facility C inmates “with no disinfecting after each use, and were able to move freely in the 

building dayroom on showers days on Monday, Wednesdays and Fridays while fans were 

blowing in the building B3.” (Doc. 13 at 7-8.) 

On November 30, 2020, Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19, as did several of the 

Facility C inmates moved on November 21. (Doc. 13 at 8.) Plaintiff contends he was “rehoused in 

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C4 after being forcefully marched to the off-facility quarantine building in C4, in which the PVSP 

Administration barely designated on 12/3/2020.” (Id.) He asserts no medical transportation was 

provided on December 3, 2020 and he was exhausted by the “[f]orced march.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

maintains “[p]ractically all the inmates that came from C4 to B3 on 11/21/2020 went back to C4 

due to positive” COVID-19 tests. (Id.) 

On December 10, 2020, Plaintiff was returned to B3 when “the same defendants from 

Facility B & C as well as the Warden approved B3 as a Quarantine building.” (Doc. 13 at 8.) 

Plaintiff still suffered from virus symptoms like “coughing and short of breath with no medical 

staff present.” (Id.) An x-ray on December 15, 2020, ordered by Defendant Oghuehi, showed 

COVID-19 pneumonia. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he was “constantly stating he wanted an x-ray on 

his lungs and chest since he was having complications with breathing properly.” (Id.) He asserts 

he ”would never have been exposed if [he] would not have been persistent in getting them done.” 

(Id.) 

On December 23, 2020, Defendant Oghuehi wanted to release Plaintiff from quarantine 

despite Plaintiff still having COVID-19 symptoms and “no swab test was going to be given upon 

release.” (Doc. 13 at 8-9.) Further, Plaintiff contends other inmates were “still having

symptoms ... and testing positive for the virus on a daily basis, so Plaintiff refused to be removed 

from quarantine ....” (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff asserts it is “as if Facility B Medical and Custody wanted the virus to conceive 

more deadly variants throughout the facility without regards for Plaintiff’s health.” (Doc. 13 at 9.) 

He contends he could die prematurely from the damage caused by COVID-19 “mixed with his 

underlying health condition (high blood pressure).” (Id.) He states his exposure to COVID-19 

“was not part of the sentence that the judge handed down to Plaintiff at his sentencing hearing for 

his committment [sic] offense.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends the virus is “still being brought in by staff 

and is floating around the CDCR system in California and there is no telling when Plaintiff could 

be exposed against and lose his breathing for good.” (Id.) 

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C. Plaintiff’s Claims

The Court construes Plaintiff’s first amended complaint to assert Eighth Amendment 

failure to protect claims against all named defendants. 

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is 

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual 

punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. The 

Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement 

may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 

Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, 

medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), 

abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). A prison official 

violates the Eighth Amendment only when objectively, the official’s act or omission is so serious 

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and 

subjectively, the prison official acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting 

harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable 

mind.” Id.

Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect 

inmate’ safety. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982). Liability exists only 

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions 

presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and 

disregarded the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to 

establish the knowledge element. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison 

officials are not liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety 

risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove 

that prison officials know for a certainty that the inmate's safety is in danger, but it requires proof 

of more than a mere suspicion of danger. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison 

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officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to 

respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

First, liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Phillips, Rodriguez and 

Hernandez. This is so because Plaintiff alleges that he was incarcerated during the COVID-19 

pandemic in October and November 2020 when these individuals knew they were COVID-19 

positive yet disregarded the risk presented by failing to report themselves or to quarantine. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077. 

Second, liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Doe Facility B Captain, 

Lieutenant and Sergeant, as well as Onyehe and Oghuehi. This is so because Plaintiff specifically 

asserts these individuals were aware that Defendants Phillips, Rodriguez and Hernandez had 

tested positive for COVID-19 but failed to take action by locking down or quarantining the 

building, allowing the virus to continue to spread. 

Third, liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Doe Warden, Doe Facility C 

Captain, Lieutenant and Sergeant, and Onyehe. This is so because Plaintiff contends these 

individuals authorized a move of Facility C inmates, with knowledge that the Facility C inmates 

had tested positive for COVID-19, into the B facility where Plaintiff was housed, resulting in 

Plaintiff contracting COVID-19 about nine days later. 

However, even liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to 

plausibly allege Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Allison or Doe 

CDCR Secretary. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory assertions that these individuals “failed to have 

protocols in place” that would have slowed the spread of the virus and triggered “baseline testing” 

are insufficient to state a claim. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Nor has Plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated 

the constitutional deprivation he suffered “resulted from an official policy or custom established 

by a ... policymaker possessed with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy, 594 F.3d at 

713. He offers no facts indicating Defendants Allison or Doe CDCR Secretary “participated in or 

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directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 

F.2d at 1045. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (the “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully” is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with 

a defendant’s liability” fall short). 

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Eighth Amendment failure to 

protect claims against the following: 

John Doe, Warden

John Doe, Facility B Captain 

John Doe, Facility B Lieutenant 

John Doe, Facility B Sergeant 

John Doe, Facility C Captain 

John Doe, Facility C Lieutenant 

John Doe, Facility C Sergeant 

Correctional Officer Phillips 

Correctional Officer Rodriguez

Correctional Officer Hernandez

O. Onyehe 

Ifeoma Oghuehi

However, Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim against Defendants Allison and Doe 

CDCR Secretary. Because Plaintiff has previously been afforded an opportunity to correct the 

deficiencies regarding his claims against these officials (see Doc. 12 at 7) and because it appears

granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court will recommend these individuals be 

dismissed from the action. See Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Finally, Plaintiff is reminded that although the use of Doe defendants is generally 

disfavored, “‘the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 

unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities ...’” 

Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163. However, even where the Court may allow limited discovery in this 

action to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to discover the identities of the unknown defendants—

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because the United States Marshal cannot serve Doe defendants and it is Plaintiff’s responsibility 

to provide sufficient information to allow for service of process—Plaintiff is encouraged to 

ascertain the names or other identifying information concerning the Doe defendants to the best of 

his ability prior to any future order from the Court. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a district judge to this action. Further, for 

the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. That Plaintiff’s first amended complaint PROCEED only on the Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claims against the following individuals 

employed at PVSP: 

John Doe, Warden

John Doe, Facility B Captain 

John Doe, Facility B Lieutenant 

John Doe, Facility B Sergeant 

John Doe, Facility C Captain 

John Doe, Facility C Lieutenant 

John Doe, Facility C Sergeant 

Correctional Officer Phillips 

Correctional Officer Rodriguez

Correctional Officer Hernandez

O. Onyehe 

Ifeoma Oghuehi; 

2. That any remaining claims in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be 

DISMISSED; and 

3. That named Defendants Allison and Doe CDCR Secretary be DISMISSED. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of 

service of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the 

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Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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