Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04796/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04796-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIGNATURE NETWORKS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GLORIA ESTEFAN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-4796 SBA

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' “Motion for De Novo Reconsideration of the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and

Costs, and Objections Thereto” and “Plaintiff's Objection to Report and Recommendation on Defendants’

Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs.” After reviewing the papers filed by the parties and

conducting a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court DENIES

the relief Defendants request, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the relief Plaintiff requests. 

The Court therefore modifies the Report and Recommendation as detailed below.

BACKGROUND

On July 30, 2004, the Court granted Defendants' Gloria Estefan ("Estefan") and Estefan

Enterprises, Inc. ("EEI") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 45]. 

(8/02/04 Order at 8.) Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees on August 16, 2004 [Docket No.

70]. On August 27, 2004, the Court granted the parties' stipulated request to extend the time to file an

amended motion for attorneys' fees to August 26, 2004 [Docket No. 82]. (8/30/04 Order at 2.) On

August 26, 2004, Defendants filed an amended Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs [Docket No. 76]. 

The Court referred Defendants' Amended Motion for Attorneys' Fees to a Magistrate Judge for a Report

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1Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees following the disposition of the Florida action. (R&R at

2.) Judge Ungaro-Benages denied the motion because under Florida law, Plaintiff was not a "prevailing

party" because the action had been dismissed on procedural grounds. (Id.)

2

and Recommendation. (10/25/04 Order, 1.)

Magistrate Judge Bernard Zimmerman ("the Magistrate") issued a Report and Recommendation on

Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("R&R") [Docket No. 95]. Both Plaintiff

Signatures Network, Inc. ("Plaintiff") and Defendants filed objections to the R&R [Docket Nos. 96, 97]

and responses to the objections [Docket Nos. 100, 101]. Defendants also filed a motion for de novo

determination of the Magistrate's R&R with its objections [Docket No. 97] and a Reply in support of the

motion [Docket No. 102]. 

A. Underlying Dispute

The underlying dispute arose out of a "Merchandising Licensing Agreement" entered into by

Defendants and Plaintiff's predecessor, Sony Signatures, Inc., and the amendments to the agreement. 

(R&R at 1.) On October 20, 2003, Defendants filed an action in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida ("Florida action") seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not obligated

to repay un-recouped advances under the agreement, or in the alternative, for rescission of the contract. 

(Id. at 1-2.) Four days later, Signatures filed the present action ("California action"), seeking recovery of

un-recouped advances under the agreement. (Id. at 2.) Signatures also moved to dismiss, stay, or in the

alternative, transfer the Florida action. (Id.) Defendants filed a similar motion in this Court. (Id.)

The Honorable Ursula Ungaro-Benages, the district judge presiding over the Florida action,

dismissed the Florida action on January 15, 2004. (Id.) Judge Ungaro-Benages found that Defendants had

filed the Florida action improperly, as a "preemptive litigation strike used as a means of forum shopping."

(Id. at 8.)1

Defendants subsequently withdrew their motion to dismiss in the California action and proceeded

with litigation in this Court. (Id. at 2.) Ultimately, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants. (8/02/04 Order.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 54(d)(2)(D), the Court may refer a motion for

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attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as a dispositive pretrial matter. Rule 72(b) allows a

magistrate judge to "hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense of a party." Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b). It also governs the procedure for objecting to a magistrate judge's determination of a dispositive

pretrial matter:

A party objecting to the recommended disposition of the matter shall promptly arrange for

the transcription of the record, or portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the

magistrate judge deems sufficient, unless the district judge otherwise directs. Within 10

days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve

and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A

party may respond to another party's objections within 10 days after being served with a

copy thereof. The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo

determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate

judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with

this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision,

receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). "The district court cannot simply 'concur' in the magistrate's findings, but it must

conduct its own review in order to adopt the recommendations." McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d

346, 360 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Massey v. City of Ferndale , 7 F. 3d 506, 510-11 (6th Cir. 1993)).

Northern District Civil Local Rule 72-3 requires that an objection filed pursuant to Rule 72(b)

“must be accompanied by a motion for de novo determination, specifically identify the portions of the

Magistrate Judge's findings, recommendation or report to which objection is made and the reasons and

authority therefor." N.D. Civil L.R. 72-3(a). In addition, the Court's review and determination of

objections filed pursuant to Civil Local Rule 72-3(a) shall be upon the record of the proceedings before the

Magistrate, except when the Court grants a motion for expansion or addition to the record or for an

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 72-3(c).

The party requesting fees "bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in the

litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked." Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439,

1449 (9th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a fee award "has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission

of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the

facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Fee Award

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2Three law firms worked on Defendants' case: (1) Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass (the "Coblentz

firm"), San Francisco; (2) O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles; and (3) Broad & Cassel, Florida.

4

California contract law governs this case. (8/02/04 Order at 6.) Where the Court sits in diversity

jurisdiction, "state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right thereto . . . should be followed." 

MRO Communs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999). Under California law, where

a contract provides for attorneys' fees and costs, the prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys'

fees and costs incurred in an action on that contract. PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084,

1099 (2000). In the instant case, the parties’ Agreement, at Paragraph 15.14, contains such an attorneys’

fees clause:

15.14 Attorneys' Fees. If any legal action or any other proceeding is brought for the

enforcement of this Agreement, or if a dispute arises under this Agreement, the successful

or prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs

incurred in that action or proceeding, in addition to any other relief to which it may be

entitled.

(October 12, 2004 Declaration of David M. Given in support of Opposition to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

(“Given Decl.”), at Exh. A, "Merchandising License Agreement" p.19.) Because the Court entered

judgment in favor of Defendants, Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.2 See Cal.

Civ. Code § 1717(a).

B. Validity and Timeliness of the Parties' Objections

Plaintiff filed its Objection to the R&R [Docket No. 96] on February 3, 2005. However, Plaintiff

failed to: (1) file a motion for de novo determination; and (2) arrange for a transcript of the record. 

Defendants thus argue that Plaintiff's objections should not be considered due to these deficiencies. (Defs’

Response to Plf's Objection at 2.) A failure to arrange for a transcript should not be fatal to a party's

objections. Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (party's "failure to [provide a copy of the

transcript] did not relieve the district court of its statutory and constitutional obligation to make a de novo

determination of the magistrate's findings"). Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's objections should be

rejected in toto because Plaintiff's ten-day time limit to file a motion for de novo determination has passed. 

(Defs’ Response to Plf's Objection at 2.) Pursuant to Rules 72(b) and 6(a), both Plaintiff and Defendants

had ten days, not including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to file a motion for de

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3When Rules 6(a) and (e) are both used to compute time, Rule 6(a) must be applied first, in order

to "carry out Rule 6(e)'s function of adding time to compensate for delays in mail delivery." Lerro v. The

Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1996).

4Thirteen days after January 24, 2005, not including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.

5

novo determination from the date of the Magistrate's R&R. Also, pursuant to Rules 6(e) and 5(b)(2)(D), a

party who receives an order by electronic means has an additional three days to submit its objections.3

Because the Magistrate's R&R was filed January 24, 2005, the parties had until February 10,

20054 to file a motion for de novo determination. Defendants filed a timely motion for de novo

determination [Docket No. 97] on February 10, 2005. Plaintiff, however, has failed to file a motion for de

novo determination, in violation of Civil Local Rule 72-3, which states that "[a]ny objection filed pursuant

to [Rule] 72(b) . . . must be accompanied by a motion for de novo determination." N.D. Civil L.R.

72-3(a)(emphasis added). Plaintiff acknowledges its failure to file a motion for de novo determination, but

requests that the Court nonetheless consider its objections to the R&R. (Plf's Response to Defs’

Objections at 2 n.1.) 

Plaintiff claims its failure to file a motion for de novo determination was based on a mistaken

presumption that the R&R on attorneys’ fees was on a non-dispositive matter. Id. A non-dispositive

matter is governed by Civil Local Rule 72-2, which does not require a party's objections to be

accompanied by a motion for de novo determination. N.D. Civil L.R. 72-2. However, had Plaintiff

referred to Rule 54(d)(2)(D), it would have been aware that if the district court chooses to refer a motion

for attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge, it is done so "under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial

matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff should have known that Civil Local

Rule 72-3, and not 72-2, applied to Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees. Because Plaintiff failed to file a

motion for de novo determination pursuant to Civil Local Rule 72-3, the Court need not consider Plaintiff's

Objection to the R&R. However, this procedural error did not prejudice Defendants, who filed a fullybriefed response. In addition, Plaintiff did provide the bases for his objections in his submission to the

Court. Thus, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiff's Objection.

C. Defendants' Motion for De Novo Determination

1. Florida Fees

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5The Court defers to Judge Ungaro-Benages' finding that the Defendants' Florida action was

improperly filed. Hill v. City of Pontotac, Miss., 993 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that judges of

coordinate jurisdiction generally defer to another's ruling). 

6

In Cabrales, the prevailing party had unsuccessfully opposed a request for certiorari to the United

States Supreme Court, but ultimately prevailed on remand. Id. at 1051-52. 

6

Defendants seek de novo review of the R&R only with regard to the section covering the Florida

action, on pages 7-8 of the R&R. (Defs’ Mot. for De Novo Reconsideration at 1 n.1.) The Magistrate

recommended denying Defendants’ recovery of fees for the Florida action. (Magistrate's R&R at 8.) This

recommendation was based on the fact that Judge Ungaro-Benages found that Defendants improperly filed

the Florida action as a means of forum shopping. (Id.) Defendants now request that this Court grant them

fees and costs incurred in the Florida action.

Prior to the filing of the Florida action, and after months of negotiation, Signatures notified Estefan

and EEI that it would initiate litigation if its October 9, 2003 settlement offer was rejected. (Given Decl. at

Exh. B, p. 7 (January 16, 2004 Order of Florida Court).) Rather than responding, Estefan and EEI filed

for declaratory relief on October 20, 2003 seeking a declaration or ruling that Estefan and EEI were not

liable for repayment of un-recouped advances or, in the alternative, for rescission of the contract. (Id.) A

few days later, Signatures filed the instant action seeking damages for breach of contract in this Court. (Id.) 

Judge Ungaro-Benages found that, although the first-to-file rule would normally suggest that the Florida

action should proceed in lieu of the California action, extraordinary circumstances existed for departing

from the rule. (Id. at 8.) Judge Ungaro-Benages determined that Estefan and EEI had filed the action

“improperly” in anticipation of litigation and despite Signatures’ good-faith attempts at settlement. (Id.) 

The Court therefore dismissed the Florida action.5

The Magistrate’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees for the Florida action was correct. In support of

their position, Defendants cite Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991),

in which the Ninth Circuit held that "a plaintiff who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a

necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful stage." The

Ninth Circuit determined that a prevailing party is entitled to all attorneys’ fees reasonably expended in

pursuit of a claim, even if the party suffers some adverse rulings. Id.6 Cabrales, however, does not hold

that an “improper” step can be considered a “necessary step” to victory. Indeed, such an extension of

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Cabrales would be illogical – allowing recovery of attorneys’ fees for improper actions taken by a

prevailing party would reward improperly multiplying the proceedings. Defendants cite to no authority

suggesting that Cabrales can be extended in this way, and the Magistrate appropriately did not do so. 

Accordingly, the Court denies the relief Defendants request. 

D. Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate's recommendation of: (1) pre-litigation fees; (2) fees for

O'Melveny & Myers' work on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; (3) fees for vague entries and duplicative

work; and (4) fees for the Coblentz firm in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. 

1. Pre-litigation Fees

The Magistrate recommended an award of $13,110.75 in attorneys’ fees. (R&R at 7.) Plaintiff

argues that the pre-litigation attorneys’ fees awarded for Broad & Cassel's work should be reduced. (Plf's

Objection at 1-2.) Defendants, the parties seeking the award of fees, submitted evidence to the Magistrate

supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Plaintiff asserts, and the Magistrate recognized, that many

of Defendants’ pre-litigation entries were too vague to determine whether they merited an award of

attorneys’ fees. (R&R at 7.) The Magistrate’s solution was to reduce the $14,567.50 loadstar amount

(reasonable number of billed hours multiplied by reasonable fees) by 10%, or $1,456.75, resulting in the

award of $13,110.75. Plaintiff asserts that this reduction is insufficient, and requests a $6,180 reduction

from the amount requested by Defendants ($15,474.00), or a total pre-litigation award of $9,294 in

attorneys’ fees. (Plf's Objection at 2.) Plaintiff supports its requested deduction by asserting that the

entries for work performed on the following days failed to identify the subject matter of the work:

2/27/03, 3/7/03, 3/8/03, 3/12/03 (2 entries), 3/13/03, 3/19/03, 3/20/03, 3/25/03, 5/7/03,

5/8/03 (2 entries), 5/9/03, 5/12/03 (2 entries), 5/14/03, 5/16/03, 5/19/03 (2 entries),

6/4/03 (2 entries), 6/6/03, 6/12/03, 6/13/03, 6/25/03, 7/8/03 (2 entries), 7/14/03, 7/16/03,

7/18/03 (2 entries), 7/21/03, 7/22/03, 7/25/03, 7/28/03, 7/29/03, 7/30/03, 8/4/03, 8/5/03,

8/7/03 (2 entries), 8/11/03 (2 entries), 8/12/03 and 8/14/03. 

(Declaration of Jennifer Marone in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees

and Costs, (“Marone Decl.”) at ¶ 14.) Marone apparently refers to time entries attached to the declaration

of Karen Stetson filed in Support of Defendants’ Amended Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

(“Stetson Decl.”). At Exhibit “A” of Stetson’s declaration is a spreadsheet of costs incurred from 2/27/03

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7Plaintiff appears to use these rates in calculating its requested reduction.

8These entries total 13.2 hours. 

8

through 8/23/04. In her declaration, Stetson (who is a partner at Broad & Cassel) asserts that she billed

out at $335 per hour, and that her associate Meredith Frank billed out at $210 per hour. Stetson is a

graduate of the University of Miami School of Law and has practiced primarily in the areas of commercial

and intellectual property litigation in federal and state courts in Florida. (Stetson Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. A at 9.)7

On the following dates, Stetson made time entries that merely refer to telephone conferences she

had and/or e-mails or letters she reviewed, without providing any identification of the subject matter of

those communications: 

2/27/03 (0.4 hrs), 3/13/03 (0.2 hrs) 3/19/03 (0.7 hrs), 3/25/03 (0.4 hrs), 5/7/03 (0.3 hrs),

5/9/03 (0.3 hrs), 5/12/03 (1.1 hrs (total for 2 entries)), 5/14/03 (0.1 hrs), 5/16/03 (0.5

hrs), 5/19/03 (0.6 (total for 2 entries)), 6/4/03 (0.5 (total for 2 entries)), 6/6/03 (0.3 hrs),

6/12/03 (0.3 hrs), 6/13/03 (0.8), 6/25/03 (0.2 hrs), 7/8/03 (0.4 hrs (total for 2 entries)),

7/14/03 (0.3 hrs), 7/16/03 (0.6 hrs), 7/18/03 (0.9 hrs (total for 2 entries)), 7/21/03 (0.4

hrs), 7/22/03 (0.1 hrs), 7/25/03 (0.3 hrs), 7/28/03 (0.4 hrs), 7/29/03 (0.1 hrs), 7/30/03

(0.1 hrs), 8/4/03 (0.3 hrs), 8/5/03 (0.8 hrs), 8/7/03 (0.3 hrs (total for 2 entries)), 8/11/03

(0.3 hrs (total for two entries)), 8/12/03 (0.2 hrs), and 8/14/03 (1.0 hrs). 

(Stetson Decl., Exh. A at 1-2.) 8 While in her declaration Stetson asserts that “the substance of some of

the time entries has been redacted to protect against undue disclosure of work product or attorney-client

communications,” Stetson fails to include even general descriptions of the subject matter of these

communications. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

In addition on 3/7/03 (0.2 hrs) Stetson “[r]eview[ed] memorandum from R. Dopico; Memorandum

to Meredith Frank re: same.” (Id., Exh. A at 1.) On 3/12/03 (0.3 hrs.) Stetson “[r]eview[ed]

memorandum from M. Frank; Telephone conference with R. Dopico re: same.” (Id.) Stetson does not

identify the subject matter of either memoranda, and the topic of the telephone conference merely refers to

one of the unidentified memoranda. On 5/8/03 (0.5 hrs), Stetson had an “inter-office conference with

Meredith Frank; Review cases.” (Id.) Again, the subject matter of the conference or the cases reviewed

are not identified. On 3/20/03 (0.8 hrs), Stetson had a “[t]elephone conference with R. Dopico; Review

Contract.” Stetson fails to identify which contract she is referring to, and fails to identify the subject matter

of the telephone conference. 

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On 3/8/03 (1.2 hrs) and on 3/12/03 (0.8 hrs) Meredith Frank conducted legal research and

prepared a memorandum on that research, but does not identify, even in general terms, the subject matter

of that research. (Id.) On 5/8/03 (3.5 hrs), Frank “[r]eview[ed] demand letter and Merchandising License

Agreements; Legal research; analysis of case law on same.” While reviewing the demand letter and

merchandising license agreements are compensable, Frank does not identify the subject matter of her legal

research and analysis. 

The total time billed by Stetson for these vague entries is 15.0 hours. Multiplying 15.0 by Stetson’s

billing rate of $335/hour totals $5,025. The total time for vague entries by Frank is 5.5 hours. However,

the Court deducts 1.75 hours from this total for Frank’s review of the demand letter and merchandising

license agreements on 5/8/03 (or half the 3.50 hours spent for completion of two of the four tasks listed that

day). Thus, multiplying Frank’s billing rate of $210/hour by 3.75 hours totals $787.50. Fees incurred by

Stetson and Frank based on these vague entries total $5,812.50. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, this

amount will be deducted from the $15,474.00 requested by Defendants for pre-litigation fees, resulting in a

pre-litigation fee award of $9,661.50. 

2. Fees incurred by O'Melveny & Myers on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Magistrate awarded Defendants fees for time spent on their withdrawn Motion to Dismiss. 

(Magistrate's R&R at 9-10.) Plaintiff objects to a fee award for O'Melveny & Myers' (“OMM”) efforts on

the Motion to Dismiss because it claims it was not a necessary step to Defendants' ultimate victory. (Plf's

Objection at 2-4.) 

Although the Ninth Circuit has held that a court is empowered to grant attorneys’ fees for a motion

even if it is denied (see Cabrales, 935 F.2d 1053), here, the Court was not provided an opportunity to

evaluate the merits of Defendants’ motion. Compensating a party for filing and withdrawing motions would

encourage frivolous filings. The Court is particularly wary of granting fees for Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss given that it relied in part on the argument that the “first to file rule” favored transfer to Florida,

despite the fact that Judge Ungaro-Benages found that Defendants' Florida action was improperly filed as

an attempt to forum shop. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to a fee award for

OMM’s efforts on the Motion to Dismiss. 

Where calculation of the precise reduction is difficult or cumbersome, the district court may use a

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reasonable fixed reduction rather than perform an item-by-item accounting. See Role Models America,

Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973-974 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Although it is difficult to ascertain precisely

how much was spent by OMM on the Motion to Dismiss, based on the Court’s review, it appears that

approximately 1/3 of the time spent by OMM was in connection with the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore,

the Court reduces OMM’s award of attorneys’ fees by 33%. 

3. Attorneys’ Fees for Work in the California Action

The Magistrate recommended that Defendants recover: (1) $54,181.50 for OMM’s work on the

California action; (2) $19,844.75 in attorneys’ fees for Broad & Cassel's work on the California action;

and (3) $84,719.50 in attorneys’ fees for the Coblentz firm's work on the California action. (R&R at 14,

16, & 18.)

Plaintiff requests a 20% reduction of these amounts for each of Defendants' three firms. (Plf's

Objection at 4-8.) Plaintiff requests the reduction because entries relating to Defendants’ attorneys’ interoffice and intra-office conferences were “redacted, vague, or consisted of block billing” thus making it

“impossible to tell from the bills what the nature of the work was.” (Plf’s Objections, 4.) Plaintiff is correct

that many of the entries for these inter-office and intra-office conferences are too vague to support an

award of attorneys’ fees. Defendants, as the party requesting fees, "bear[] the burden of documenting the

appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked." 

Gates, 39 F.3d at 1449. 

a. O’Melveny & Myers

OMM employed four attorneys on this case. Robert C. Welsh is a partner of OMM who is a

graduate of UCLA Law School and has practiced primarily in the area of commercial litigation in federal

and state courts in California. (Declaration of Robert C. Welsh (“Welsh Decl.”), ¶ 3.) He supervised

associates Erika Frick, Paul Davies and Pratheepan Gulasekaram. (Id., ¶ 4.) It is unknown, based upon

the information provided, the years of experience for these attorneys, or the relevant experience of the

associates. Welsh billed 35.8 hours, Davies billed 121.85 hours, Gulasekaram billed 71.15 hours, and

Frick billed 0.15 hours to this action, for a total of 228.95 hours. (Id., ¶ 8.) Welsh’s billable rate was

$480/hour in 2003 and $525 in 2004. Frick’s rate was $390/hour. (Id., ¶ 3.) Both Davies and

Gulasekaram’s rate was $280 in 2003 and $345 in 2004. (Id., ¶ 4.)

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Indeed, OMM’s bills were totally devoid of any information identifying the subject matter of many

of the tasks and conferences. (see, e.g., Dopico Errata, Exh. A, entries on 11/10/03, 11/21/03, 11/26/03,

12/2/03, 12/8/03.)

10The qualifications of these attorneys are not provided. 

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OMM’s records contain significant redactions that prevent the Court from ascertaining the basis of

many of the fees. For example, on 11/6/03, Davies billed 4.45 hours to a “[t]elephone conference with B.

Welsh regarding research results; further research regarding [redaction]; research draft letter to K. Stetson

regarding [redaction.]9 (Errata to Declaration of Ricardo J. Dopico in Support of Defendants’ Amended

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Exh. A. (“Dopico errata”).) On 1/7/03, Welsh billed 1.55 hours to “review

and revise letter [redaction]; electronic communication with K. Stetson regarding [redaction.]” While the

Court recognizes that confidentiality is essential, the failure to provide even a general description of the

subject matter renders it impossible to assess the reasonableness of many of OMM’s entries. In addition,

many of these entries consist of “block-billing,” where all of the tasks billed to a case on a particular day are

lumped together and the time spent on each individual task is not delineated. (See, e.g., Dopico Errata,

Exh. A at entry on 11/14/03 by Davies.) Thus, the Court finds that a fixed reduction, rather than an itemby-item accounting, is appropriate. See Role Models America, 353 F.3d at 973-974. Accordingly, in

addition to the reduction of OMM’s fees granted supra, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for an additional

20% reduction of the Magistrate’s recommended award of $54,181.50 for OMM’s attorneys’ fees. 

b. Broad & Cassel

 The Court also reduces the recommended amount of attorneys’ fees for work performed by

Broad & Cassel. As stated supra, Stetson is a graduate of the University of Miami School of Law and has

practiced primarily in the areas of commercial and intellectual property litigation in federal and state courts

in Florida. (Stetson Decl., ¶ 4.) In addition, Patricia Anzalone, Thomas Rebull, and Meredith Frank billed

time to this action. (Id., Exh. A at 9.)10 Plaintiff is correct that many of Broad & Cassel’s entries are too

vague to determine the subject matter of the work. For example, on 10/30/03, attorney Stetson billed time

to “[t]elephone conference with Ric Dopico.” Stetson fails to identify, in even general terms, the subject

matter of the conference. Such entries permeate Broad & Cassel’s entries. (see, e.g., entries on 11/6/03,

11/7/03, 11/10/03, 11/11/03, 11/14/03, 11/14/03, 11/21/03, 12/4/03, 12/18/03, 1/7/04.) Because these

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entries are numerous, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a 20% reduction from the recommended

attorneys’ fees award of $19,844.75 is appropriate. 

c. Coblentz firm

The Court also reduces the recommended attorneys’ fees award for the Coblentz firm. The

Coblentz firm employed two attorneys on this case: Jeffrey Knowles is a partner who has practiced for 16

years. (Declaration of Jeffrey Knowles in Support of Defs’ Amended Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

(“Knowles Decl.”), ¶ 3.) He is a 1987 graduate of Hastings College of Law, where he graduated summa

cum laude, and subsequently served as a law clerk for the Honorable Eugene Lynch. (Id.) His practice

focuses on commercial and intellectual property litigation, with a particular emphasis in the music industry. 

(Id.) Clinton Todd is a 2000 graduate of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. (Id.

at ¶ 6.) 

Knowles spent approximately 174 hours working on the California action, while Todd spent

approximately 162 hours. (Knowles Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff is correct that many of the entries on the

Coblentz firm’s bills are too vague to determine the subject matter of the work. For example, on 3/18/04,

Knowles billed time to “office conference with C. Todd; telephone conference with K. Stetson” but does

not identify the subject matter of the conferences. (Id.) This failure to identify, in even general terms, the

subject matter of inter-office and intra-office conferences permeates Knowles’ entries. (see, e.g., Knowles

Decl., Exh. A, entries 3/26/04, 3/30/04, 4/16/04, 4/22/04, 5/4/04, 5/11/04, 6/9/04, 6/16/04.) Because

these entries are numerous, and because the use of “block billing” makes calculation of a precise reduction

difficult, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a 20% reduction from the recommended attorneys’ fees

award of $84,719.50 is appropriate. 4. Fees on Fees

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation that fees should be awarded for

responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests regarding Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and in filing a

Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the motion. (Plf's Objection at 8-9.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests that

the Court reduce the Magistrate's recommended award of $24,324.11 by $7,672.80, the total amount it

estimates was incurred by Defendants in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (Id.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff states that the award should be reduced by the total amount spent

by Defendants in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Plaintiff argues that the time spent by

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11Plaintiff asserts, without explanation, that Defendants spent 28.1 hours in connection with the

discovery responses. (Plf’s Objections, 8.) 

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Defendants in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests was “excessive.” (Plf’s Objection at 8.) 

However, rather than proposing a reduction in the fees for time spent responding to discovery, Plaintiff’s

solution is to request that fees incurred for responding to discovery be eliminated. (Plf’s Objection, 8-9.) 

Plaintiff provides no legal authority for its position.

The Magistrate was correct in finding that the time spent by Defendants in responding to those

requests was reasonable. Knowles, a partner at the Coblentz firm, spent approximately 12.4 hours

working on the discovery responses, including reviewing the requests, analyzing case law regarding the

availability of fee discovery, conferencing with his client and his associates regarding their preparation,

revising the responses, and conferencing with opposing counsel regarding the discovery. (Supp.

Declaration of Jeffrey Knowles in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees at Exh. K, entries on 9/9/04;

9/10/04; 9/13/04; 9/15/04; 9/17/04; 9/20/04.) Clinton Todd, an associate at the Coblentz firm, spent 11.6

hours on the discovery responses, including reviewing the discovery requests, preparing correspondence to

the client regarding the discovery, preparing the responses, and conferencing with opposing counsel

regarding the discovery. (Id. at entries on 9/10/04; 9/13/04; 9/14/04; 9/23/04; 10/6/04; 10/11/04.) 

Spending approximately 24 hours performing these tasks is reasonable.11 Attorneys preparing discovery

responses must review the requests and are entitled to research whether the discovery is appropriate. In

addition, the attorneys must confer with their client regarding responses, can confer with colleagues

regarding preparation of the responses, and must carefully prepare accurate responses. In addition,

attorneys are required to meet and confer with opposing counsel regarding the responses. Thus, Plaintiff’s

request is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the relief requested by Defendants and GRANTS

IN PART and DENIES IN PART the relief requested by Plaintiff. 

The amount of pre-litigation attorneys’ fees awarded to Defendants is $9,661.50;

The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to OMM for the California action is $25,465.31;

The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to Broad & Cassel for the California action is $15,875.80;

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The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to the Coblentz firm for the California action is $67,775.60.

The Court otherwise concurs with the analyses and determinations of the Magistrate Judge. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5-25-05 /s/ Saundra Brown Armstrong 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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