Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02864/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02864-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HENDON,

Plaintiff, No. 2:10-cv-2864 EFB P

vs.

RIGG, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is before the undersigned pursuant to plaintiff’s consent. See E.D. Cal.

Local Rules, Appx. A, at (k)(4). After a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, plaintiff has

filed an amended complaint.

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

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In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.

Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

A pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant

fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rigg waited three weeks to

refer plaintiff to an ear, nose and throat specialist after documenting plaintiff’s sudden hearing

loss. Dckt. No. 17. In its initial screening order the court informed plaintiff that his allegations

failed to state a cognizable claim. Specifically, the court informed plaintiff of the following:

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel

and unusual punishment where he or she deprives a prisoner of the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To prevail, plaintiff must show

both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendant possessed

a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99

(1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992). A serious

medical need is one that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, an

injury or condition a reasonable doctor or patient would find worthy of comment

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or treatment, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by

WMX Techs. v. Miller, 104 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). Deliberate

indifference may be shown by the denial, delay or intentional interference with

medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is provided. Hutchinson

v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). Mere delay in medical

treatment must lead to further injury to amount to deliberate indifference. 

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. “[I]t is enough that the official acted

or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at

842. 

Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that . . . Rigg . . . was deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. A prison inmate has no independent

constitutional right to outside medical care supplemental or additional to the

medical care provided by the prison staff within the institution. See Roberts v.

Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04. Plaintiff

does not allege that Rigg denied or interfered with plaintiff’s medical care, or

intentionally exposed plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm. . . . . 

Plaintiff’s claims against Rigg . . . must therefore be dismissed with leave to

amend. 

Dckt. No. 16 at 3-4. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies identified in

the court’s initial screening order, as it does not include facts demonstrating that defendant Rigg

denied or interfered with plaintiff's medical care, or intentionally exposed plaintiff to a

substantial risk of serious harm. 

Despite notice of the deficiencies of his claim and an opportunity to amend, plaintiff

appears to be unable to state a cognizable claim for relief, and further leave to amend appears

futile. Accordingly, the court will dismiss the amended complaint without leave to amend. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district

courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are

not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”)

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim; and 

2. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

Dated: August 2, 2012.

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