Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02217/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY BUTLER,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Acting Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2217 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") August 29, 2002 

decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on October 3, 2005, the court found that petitioner's claim

that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not comport with

due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally construed, and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

California inmates do not have a liberty interest in early release on parole that is

protected by federal due process because the Supreme Court of California held in

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of California Penal

Code section 3041, setting forth California's parole scheme, is not mandatory.

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Per order filed on September 6, 2006, the court denied respondent's

motion on the ground that the "Ninth Circuit recently rejected respondent's

argument and made clear that 'California inmates continue to have a liberty

interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005).' Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2006)." Sept. 6, 2006 Order at 2. The court reinstated its previous

order and again ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has now filed an answer to the order to show

cause and petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

In 1983, petitioner was convicted by a Contra Costa County superior court

jury of second degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15

years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each time he has appeared

before the BPT. On August 29, 2002, petitioner appeared before the BPT for the

sixth time. The BPT again found him not suitable for parole and denied him a

subsequent hearing for three years. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal,

which was denied on June 10, 2003. 

Petitioner then challenged the BPT's August 29, 2002 decision in the state

superior, appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California

denied his final state habeas petition on February 23, 2005, the instant federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

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petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's August 29,

2002 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

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hearing for three years, on the ground that the decision does not comport with

due process. Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record and instead is improperly based on the unchanging facts of

his offense and two prison disciplinary violations which are more than ten years

old. Petitioner also claims that the BPT failed to apply California's sentencing

matrices and that its denial of his parole was "in the further advancement of it[]s

illegal no-parole-for-murderers policy and practices."

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

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(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT afforded petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel explained

that it found that the crime was carried out "in an especially cruel manner"

demonstrating "an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering"and that

the "motive for the crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the crime." 

Hr’g Tr at 53 (Resp’t Ex. 3). Petitioner argued with his girlfriend and, during the

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argument, struck her numerous times and killer her. The panel also found that

petitioner had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and a record of violence,

including arrests for petty theft, assault with a deadly weapon, transportation and

sale of a controlled substance, and charges for kidnaping, rape, robbery and false

imprisonment, of which he was convicted of the latter; had an unstable social

history and had failed to profit from society's previous attempts to correct his

criminality; had failed to demonstrate a positive change in his behavior while

incarcerated, noting various misconduct and disciplinary infractions and failure to

sufficiently participate in substance abuse self-help; and had no realistic parole

plans. Id. at 54, 55. The panel noted that petitioner's psychological evaluation

estimated his violence potential within a controlled setting as average, but if

released his violence potential would be slightly higher than the average citizen

and, if he abused illegal drugs, much higher than the average citizen. Id. at 54-

55. The panel commended petitioner for completing a vocational program and an

"impact" self-help program and remaining disciplinary-free since 1990, but

concluded that "[t]hese positive aspects of his behavior do not outweigh the

factors of unsuitability." Id. at 56. 

The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPT and the state

appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The superior court found that

"there is some evidence supporting the BPT's Decision denying parole." In re

Terry Butler, No. 032254-5, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2003) (Resp't

Ex. 5). Just as the BPT did, the court noted that the commitment offense had

been carried out in a especially cruel manner demonstrating a callous disregard

for human life in that the victim had been abused during the offense; petitioner

had an extensive criminal background which included arrests for petty theft,

assault with a deadly weapon, transportation and sale of a controlled substance,

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charges for kidnaping, rape, robbery and false imprisonment, and a conviction for

the latter; petitioner received four disciplinary reports in prison and 11 more

recent counseling memoranda, with the last one being for selling pornographic

material; and that the psychological evaluation was not entirely supportive of

release because the evaluator wrote that, if released to the community, petitioner's

violence potential would be slightly higher than the average citizen and, if he

abused illegal drugs, much higher than the average citizen. Id. at 2-3. The court

also made two observations of its own:

. . . [P]etitioner presents a serious potential threat of violence

to the community in that he affirmatively finds substance abuse a

way of obtaining "help." Given the increase in petitioner's potential

dangerousness and violence potential when abusing drugs, there is

no doubt that the BPT's Decision was fully justified on the public

safety issue alone.

Further, the evidence from the hearing was clear, petitioner

denied that there had been prior reports of domestic violence and

physical abuse in his apartment. Yet the facts were established as

early as 1991 that there was a pattern of domestic abuse at

petitioner's the present apartment and that he had the same violent

pattern with two prior girlfriends. Petitioner's denial of the

historical facts of his behavior leads this court to conclude that he

lacks insight into his inability to control his violent tendencies

toward women. There was no evidence presented that petitioner

presented any less of a danger to women today than what he has

displayed in the past. There is no evidence that petitioner's pattern

of violence toward women has changed or would change upon his

release.

Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).

The state court's rejection of petitioner's due process claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, or was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s

August 29, 2002 decision to deny petitioner parole after his sixth parole

consideration hearing is supported by some evidence in the record and that

evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33

(upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and psychiatric reports);

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1

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release

date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that, over time, denying a prisoner parole strictly

because of the nature of his offense and his prior conduct “would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole . . . and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

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Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding

denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature of offense, and need for

further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is simply "whether there is

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

[BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). There is – the facts

surrounding the crime reasonably suggest that it was carried out in a cruel and

callous fashion; petitioner has a pre-commitment record of escalating criminal

activity; petitioner did not complete a substance abuse self-help program;

petitioner did not have firm parole plans; and petitioner's psychiatric evaluation

was not completely satisfactory. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) & (d)

(listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and circumstances

tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh the evidence." 

Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner argues that the superior court improperly determined that he

considers substance abuse a way of obtaining help and improperly considered his

counseling memoranda the equivalent of disciplinary write-ups. He also argues

that the continued reliance on the immutable circumstances of his murder offense

and pre-commitment conduct conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Biggs.

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None of these arguments compel federal habeas relief because ample other

evidence in the record (e.g., lack of firm parole plans, insufficient substance

abuse self-help programming and a less-than-favorable psychiatric evaluation)

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constitutes some evidence under Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hill, 474 U.S. at

455-56 (inquiry under Hill is simply whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by the BPT).

Petitioner also claims that the BPT failed to apply California's sentencing

matrices and that its systematic denial of his parole was "in the further

advancement of it[]s illegal no-parole-for-murderers policy and practices." Both

claims are without merit.

The Supreme Court of California has held that the BPT need not evaluate

an inmate's crime against the sentencing matrices because unless and until the

prisoner is found suitable for parole a date for the inmate's release need not be

set. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-01 (2005). This court is bound by

the Supreme Court of California's interpretation of California law. See Bradshaw

v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (state court’s interpretation of state law binds a

federal court sitting in habeas corpus); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988)

(same). 

Petitioner has set forth no evidentiary support for his systematic bias

claim. But even if he had, there is no evidence in the record indicating that this

alleged bias affected the BPT’s decision or served as the basis for denying parole. 

To the contrary, the transcript from petitioner’s August 29, 2002 parole hearing

demonstrates that he received an individualized assessment of his potential parole

suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the high percentage of parole denials for life

inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s alleged systematic bias against parole. 

Cf. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1995)

(citing that 90 percent of all California inmates are found unsuitable for parole as

evidence that deferring annual parole suitability hearings was lawful and

reasonable) . 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Sept. 19, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\HC.05\Butler1.or3.wpd

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