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Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

No. 14-2070

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRAD VAMPLEW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF 

GOVERNORS, dba Wayne State University, a 

public university, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

KATHERINE ZIMNICKI, et al.,

Defendants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

 O R D E R

Before: GUY, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

Brad Vamplew, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants in his action challenging his dismissal from the nursing 

program at Wayne State University (“WSU”). This case has been referred to a panel of the court 

that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a). 

Brad Vamplew is a former student in WSU’s College of Nursing. During the 2012 

winter term, Vamplew was enrolled in NUR 3020, a course taught by Mary Zugcic. In order to 

pass NUR 3020, students needed to pass both the classroom and the clinical portions of the 

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course. The syllabus for the class stated, “Satisfactory completion of the clinical component of 

this course is dependent upon passing all the identified critical behaviors,” which included, inter 

alia, “[p]rovid[ing] safe physical care for patients with chronic illness.” The College of Nursing 

Handbook advised that “[a] student may be excluded from the College of Nursing for unsafe 

practice and/or unethical conduct in the program without having been previously warned.” 

Vamplew’s NUR 3020 clinical group was assigned to the Rehabilitation Institute of 

Michigan (“RIM”). On April 5, 2012, Vamplew was assigned to “Patient G,” who had been 

admitted to RIM with a traumatic brain injury. On that day, Patient G was post-surgery for 

repair to a leg fracture and was taking morphine. He was also using a full-leg knee immobilizer, 

which prevented him from bending his knee, and a wheelchair and was on non-weight bearing 

restrictions. Hospital records for Patient G indicate that he had a history of depression, 

schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and drug abuse; was at risk for falls and injury; and suffered 

from cognitive impairment. According to Katie McSween May, a physical therapist at RIM, 

Patient G had “safety awareness issues” and “needed reminders of some of the precautions he 

needed to take for himself such as non-weight[]bearing on his left leg.” 

On April 12, 2012, May reported to Zugcic that, on April 5, 2012, Vamplew had left the 

unit with Patient G and taken him to the vehicle in the lobby that was used by patients and their 

therapists to practice car transfers. May believed that this presented a “serious safety issue” 

because Vamplew had not been trained to assist patients with such transfers. Zugcic discussed 

the incident with Vamplew, advised him that it was very serious, and told him to submit a 

written statement to her. Vamplew submitted a statement that day, but Zugcic gave it back to 

him and told him that he should submit a more formal statement. Vamplew submitted a new 

statement the following day. 

After several days, Zugcic made the decision that Vamplew would fail NUR 3020 

because he had engaged in an unsafe patient practice. According to Zugcic, “Vamplew failed to 

adequately assess the patient to take information that he should have gained in his assessments in 

order to come up with a plan of care for the patient, and he performed interventions that were 

inappropriate.” She stated that she decided to fail him for unsafe behavior rather than for failure 

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to meet a critical course objective because “the incidents . . . were significant enough, and were 

blatantly unsafe, and indicated that his practice was not safe.” She stated, “My judgment was 

that I had no reason to believe that he had the insight or ability to apply his assessments in a safe 

manner to planned nursing care.” Pursuant to the College of Nursing’s policy, Vamplew’s 

failure of NUR 3020 for an unsafe practice resulted in his exclusion from the nursing program.

After unsuccessfully challenging his exclusion through WSU’s internal appeals process, 

Vamplew commenced this action in the district court. In his complaint, Vamplew alleged that, in 

July 2011, he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type, by 

WSU and granted the following accommodations: (1) extended time for taking tests; 

(2) examinations in a distraction-free environment; (3) use of a digital voice recorder in class; 

(4) copies of overheads; and (5) a volunteer note-taker. He stated that, in NUR 3020, Zugcic 

initially granted the accommodations but, after he scored a 100% on his first test, she told 

Vamplew that he did not need copies of the slides used in class and told him that he should be 

able to take notes in class. Vamplew further alleged that Zugcic frequently referred to him as 

“special,” told him that he gave the impression that he was not paying attention, and demanded 

that he turn in his assignments at the end of the clinical day while allowing other students to email them later in the day from home. Vamplew stated that he complained to Zugcic that she 

was denying him his required accommodations and later complained to the Student Disability 

Liaison, a Dean of the College of Nursing, and other officials at the university. Vamplew 

alleged that, shortly after complaining about the lack of accommodations, he was given a failing 

grade in NUR 3020 for an unsafe practice and excluded from the nursing program. 

Vamplew raised claims alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 794, and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), Mich. Comp. 

Laws §§ 37.1101-37.1607; deprivation of due process and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and the Michigan constitution; and breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Michigan common law. Vamplew named 

as defendants: (1) the Board of Governors of WSU; (2) David J. Strauss, WSU Dean of 

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Students; (3) Barbara K. Redman, Dean of the WSU College of Nursing; (4) Cynthia Redwine, 

Assistant Dean for Student Affairs; (5) Felicia Grace, Academic Services Officer IV; (6) Mary 

Zugcic; and (7) Katherine Zimnicki, instructors in the WSU College of Nursing. Vamplew sued 

all of the individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Vamplew sought 

compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages and injunctive relief. 

 Following discovery, Vamplew agreed to dismiss his disability discrimination claims 

under federal and state law, all of the state law tort claims, and any claim against Zimnicki in her 

official capacity, leaving his claims of disability retaliation under state and federal law and his 

due process and equal protection claims under state and federal law. The defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment, raising 

several grounds for dismissal. The district court granted the defendants’ motion, holding that 

Vamplew failed to allege a valid constitutional claim and failed to establish a claim for disability 

retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or the PWDCRA.

Vamplew then filed a timely Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion, seeking 

reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment on his claims of disability retaliation and 

arguing that there was “a genuine dispute as to whether [Zugcic] was motivated by retaliatory 

intent or by reasoned academic judgment when she cho[]se to fail [Vamplew] rather than engage 

in remediation or failure with the ability to retake the class.” The district court denied the 

motion. 

Vamplew now appeals the district court’s judgment. He challenges only the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment as to the disability retaliation claims under federal and state 

law. He argues that the question of 

what motivated [Zugcic] to choose failure and exclusion from the college over the

other options she admitted that she had[] was a fact question for the jury, where 

the instructor submitted numerous knowingly false statements of fact to the 

university in support of the plaintiff’s failure and exclusion from the college. 

He further contends that the district court made incorrect factual findings, failed to construe the 

facts in the light most favorable to him, and failed to accept his well-pleaded allegations as true. 

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We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 178 (6th 

Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Estate of Smithers ex rel. Norris v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 

2010).

Vamplew’s retaliation claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the PWDCRA 

are all analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386-87 (6th Cir. 

1999) (en banc) (ADA); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rehabilitation 

Act); Aho v. Dep’t of Corr., 688 N.W.2d 104, 108-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (PWDCRA). 

Pursuant to this framework, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; 

(2) the activity was known to the defendant; (3) he was subjected to an adverse action; and (4) a 

causal connection exists between the adverse action and the protected activity. Walborn v. Erie 

Cnty. Care Facility, 150 F.3d 584, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendant must then articulate a 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action, to which the plaintiff must respond with 

evidence of pretext. “To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the [defendant]’s 

proffered reason was not the real reason for its action, and that the . . . real reason was unlawful.” 

EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

Without deciding whether Vamplew set forth a prima facie case of retaliation, the district 

court concluded that he failed to satisfy his ultimate burden of establishing that the defendants’ 

stated reason for excluding him from the nursing program—engaging in an unsafe medical 

practice—was merely a pretext for retaliation. The record supports this conclusion.

In her affidavit, Zugcic stated that her decision to fail Vamplew in NUR 3020 “was based 

on [her] professional clinical judgment and [her] assessment of the seriousness of the conduct 

and the lack of judgment his conduct showed” and “had nothing to do with any complaints he 

may have made regarding alleged discriminatory or other allegedly unfair treatment.” Zugcic 

testified at her deposition that Vamplew engaged in unsafe behavior when he allowed Patient G 

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to leave the unit and participate in activities that placed him at risk and “failed to communicate 

with the rest of the team what had transpired.” Zugcic also explained that her decision was based 

on her assessment that Vamplew gave “no indication that [he] understood the significance or 

indeed took full responsibility for what had failed to happen.” Vamplew has failed to establish 

that there is any dispute that he engaged in an unsafe patient practice. Indeed, Vamplew himself 

admitted in the statement he submitted to Zugcic and again at his deposition that he engaged in 

unsafe conduct. Nor has Vamplew shown that a material issue of fact exists as to the seriousness 

of the unsafe practice. Evidence in the record establishes that other people, including completely 

disinterested parties, believed that the incident presented a serious safety issue. 

In an effort to establish pretext, Vamplew argues that Zugcic “made knowingly false 

statements to effect the student’s dismissal from the college” and, thus, her stated reason for 

failing him in NUR 3020 was a pretext for retaliation. He contends that certain facts cited by 

Zugcic in the “failure report” as safety concerns were not, in fact, true, including that Patient G 

had received intravenous morphine as opposed to oral morphine before leaving the unit with 

Vamplew, that Patient G had hip precautions in place before leaving the unit, that Vamplew had 

engaged in no planned nursing action other than assistance with Patient G’s morning care, that 

Patient G was anemic, and that Vamplew had made a threatening statement to May. But even 

assuming that there is a dispute as to these facts, the facts are not material because they were not 

determinative factors in Zugcic’s decision to fail Vamplew. See Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson 

Worldwide, Inc., 567 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2009). 

None of the facts cited by Vamplew as false formed the basis for Zugcic’s decision to fail 

Vamplew for an unsafe patient practice. Rather, Zugcic deemed Vamplew’s actions unsafe 

because he allowed a patient to leave the unit and engage in activity without knowing whether 

the patient was authorized to do so, conducted a patient car transfer without having been trained 

to do so, and failed to communicate the patient’s actions to RIM staff or his instructor. The 

specifics of Patient G’s condition were not the driving factor behind Zugcic’s decision. And 

Zugcic said as much at her deposition when she testified that whether Patient G had been on

intravenous morphine and hip precautions was not a factor that she used to determine whether 

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Vamplew would fail NUR 3020. She made clear that the “major factor” in her decision to fail 

Vamplew was his “poor judgment,” not the nuances of Patient G’s condition. Moreover, even if 

these facts about Patient G’s condition did form part of the basis of her decision, Vamplew has 

failed to show that Zugcic did not honestly believe these facts to be true when they were relayed 

to her by RIM staff. See Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2001) (“If there 

is no material dispute that the [defendant] made a ‘reasonably informed and considered decision’ 

that demonstrates an ‘honest belief’ in the proffered reason for the adverse . . . action, the case 

should be dismissed since no reasonable juror could find that the [defendant]’s adverse . . . action 

was pretextual.”). As for Vamplew’s assertion that Zugcic falsely stated that he did not engage 

in any planned nursing action other than assistance with Patient G’s morning care and that he had 

made a threatening statement to May, again, neither of these facts formed the basis for Zugcic’s 

decision to fail him for unsafe patient practice.

Lastly, Vamplew argues that, because Zugcic failed to follow the policy for managing 

unsafe behavior by students as outlined in the course syllabus, the basis for his failure was 

pretextual. The syllabus for NUR 3020 included a section entitled, “Guidelines for Managing 

the Unsafe Undergraduate Student in Clinical Practice.” This section sets forth the steps faculty 

members must take when unsafe behaviors have been identified and states, “The student can be 

excluded, if she/he demonstrates a consistent pattern of unsafe behavior.” Vamplew argues that 

the defendants did not have a legitimate basis for excluding him because he did not demonstrate 

a consistent pattern of unsafe practices. But Zugcic testified at her deposition that, given the 

significance of the incident and that it had occurred late in the semester and in one of the later 

classes in the nursing program, she did not consider Vamplew’s safety issue to be “manageable.” 

And, in fact, the College of Nursing Handbook clearly states that a student can be excluded 

without warning for an unsafe practice. Vamplew’s own subjective belief that the situation was 

manageable does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See Choulagh v. 

Holder, 528 F. App’x 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2013). 

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Vamplew has failed to point to any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 

that the real reason for his exclusion from the nursing program was because he had complained 

about a denial of accommodations for his disability. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

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