Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06659/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PREET M. SINGH,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS 

UNION OAKLAND LOCAL 78, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06659-VC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 7

The federal defendants’ motion to dismiss the third amended complaint is granted. The 

Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the claims against the union, the only remaining 

defendant. See Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Clerk is 

directed to remand the case to Alameda County Superior Court. 

For all claims that Singh pursues against the federal employee defendants, the Postal 

Service has certified that those employees were acting within the scope of their employment. See

Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), Dkt. No. 7-1, at 88-89. The determination is made 

according to principles of California law, because the underlying events took place in California.

Clamor v. United States, 240 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001). Singh alleges that the employees

acted maliciously, and he contends that their conduct was therefore beyond the scope of their 

employment. But the alleged tortious conduct arose out of a workplace dispute, and in 

California, “willful and malicious torts of an employee may still be within the scope of . . . 

employment” if they arise out of or relate to work. See Report and Recommendation by 

Magistrate Judge Ryu, Dkt. No. 7-1, at 37-38 (adopted in full, see Dkt. No. 7-1, at 62);

McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that acts “can be within the 

Case 3:19-cv-06659-VC Document 25 Filed 01/17/20 Page 1 of 2
2

scope of his employment . . . even where the employee's torts violate the employer's express 

rules and confer no benefit on the employer.”). Therefore, although the Postal Service’s 

certification can be rebutted by allegations that, if true, would establish by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the employees’ actions exceeded the scope of their employment, Singh has 

presented no such allegations. Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the 

United States is substituted as the defendant for the remaining claims against the federal 

employees. Clamor, 240 F.3d at 1219 (9th Cir. 2001).

And the Court has already determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

Singh’s claims against the United States for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and libel. See Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 7-1, at 51-53. The remaining 

claims all relate to proceedings arising out of the alleged battery and smear campaign underlying 

Singh’s complaint. Because the Federal Tort Claims Act bars claims arising from “assault, 

battery, . . . libel, slander, misrepresentation, [or] deceit,” these claims must be dismissed. 28 

U.S.C. § 2680(h); see United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (“Section 2680(h) does 

not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising 

out of assault or battery. We read this provision to cover claims like respondent’s that sound in 

negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Government employee.”).

In sum, Singh is simply not permitted to pursue these claims against either the Postal 

Service or the federal employees named in this lawsuit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-06659-VC Document 25 Filed 01/17/20 Page 2 of 2