Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00592/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00592-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAITH NA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

SIMMONS et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 16-CV-592-WQH(WVG) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[ECF Nos. 37, 38 & 44.] 

 Saith Na, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, California, filed 

the instant lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of the 

Eighth Amendment based on the alleged inhumane conditions of his confinement. (ECF 

No. 21.) Defendants Simmons, Hvizdzak, Aliyev, B.I. Myers, Talamante, Garcia, 

McHenry and Maul now seek summary judgment on this claim. (ECF No. 38.) Having 

considered the Motion on the papers submitted, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. 

 Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel. 

(ECF Nos. 37, 44.) Given the Court’s recommendation above, the Court also 

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motions be GRANTED and pro bono counsel be 

appointed to represent him. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts1

In 2015, Plaintiff was housed at the George Bailey Detention Facility in San Diego, 

California. (See FAC at 1.)2

 On April 5, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was escorted to “Cell 

#110” by San Diego Sheriff Deputies.3

 (ECF No. 45, Na Decl. at ¶ 4.) One of those 

Deputies, Defendant Aliyev, went inside the cell, “dragged out a wet mattress filled with 

water along with wet linen” and placed the items outside of the cell. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants Garcia, Aliyev, Hvizdzak, and other Deputies “observed that the 

cell was flooded” and “in inhumane condition.” (Id. at ¶ 2, 4-7.) Despite the cell’s 

condition, Plaintiff claims Defendant Garcia ordered him to go inside the cell. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff protested but alleges Garcia told him to “get the fuck inside the cell” while holding 

out his taser. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that there was “food splattered all over the cell wall,” the “water 

from the toilet bowl was empty,” and there was urine and feces near the toilet. (Id. at ¶ 2.) 

Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly asked Defendants Aliyev and Hvizdzak for cleaning supplies 

when they came by his cell, but they failed to provide any. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

That evening, Plaintiff alleges that he “slipped and fell injuring [his] head and lower 

back.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that there was “filth all over [his] back and back of [his] 

head]” and that he was left lying in “the same wet clothing with filth.” (Id. at ¶ 7-8.) 

Plaintiff claims that he notified Defendants Myers, Talementes, and McHenry of his 

injuries but they ignored him and left him “to suffer in pain.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) 

                                                                

1

 In a prior Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s medical-needs deliberate indifference and 

excessive force claims. (ECF No. 30.) The sole remaining claim in this matter is now the 

conditions of confinement claim. The allegations recounted herein relate only to that claim. 

2

 Pinpoint citations to pages in documents filed on the Court’s docket refer to the page 

numbers electronically-generated by the CM/ECF system. 

3

 All Defendants are alleged to be San Diego County Sheriff Deputies. 

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Later on that night, Corporal Rodriguez4

 conducted a cell check. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he stopped Corporal Rodriguez, showed him his injuries, the condition 

of the cell, and the “wet clothes with filth [he] was wearing.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 

Corporal Rodriguez told Plaintiff that he would have Plaintiff taken to medical. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to medical later that night. (Id. at ¶ 13.) 

When Plaintiff was escorted back from medical, he alleges that he again asked for 

cleaning supplies but was not provided any. (Id. at ¶ 15.) From April 5, 2015 to April 11, 

2015, Plaintiff alleges that he requested cleaning supplies every day, but Defendants failed 

to provide them. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

Plaintiff claims that as a result of conditions in his cell, “insects started coming into 

the cell” and crawling on him while he “was asleep on top bunk.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff 

alleges that he showed these insects to Defendant Simmons, and Simmons told Plaintiff 

that he would have his Deputies bring cleaning supplies. (Id.) Plaintiff claims this was 

never done and “wrote a grievance on Defendant Simmons.” (Id. at ¶ 21-22.) 

The next day, Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Kania5

 regarding the condition of the 

cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Kania had his celled cleaned and no insects returned. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

B. Defendants’ Statement of the Facts

Defendants’ Motion and attached Declarations provide an explanation of the 

incidents from April 5, 2015 to April 11, 2015, which is contrary to Plaintiff’s account. 

Plaintiff was brought to Cell #110 by Defendants at about 3:00 p.m. (Exhibit A – 

Aliyev Decl. at ¶ 2.) An inmate had “clogged the sink, and perhaps the toilet,” earlier that 

day, causing “water to overflow.” (Aliyev Decl. at ¶ 2; Exhibit C – Hvizdzak Decl. at ¶ 2.) 

The water in the cell had been shut off, and the inmate had been placed in another holding 

area. (Hvizdzak Decl. at ¶ 2.) Defendants have submitted declarations stating that they “do 

                                                                

4

 Corporal Rodriguez is not a Defendant in this case. 

5

 Lieutenant Kania is not a Defendant in this case. 

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not recall,” “do not remember,” or had “no memory” of seeing “standing puddles,” seeing 

or smelling “filth,” or perceiving any physical safety issues in the cell. (Aliyev Decl. at ¶ 2; 

Exhibit B – Garcia Decl. at ¶ 2; Hvizdzak Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 5; Exhibit D – Myers Decl. at ¶ 2; 

Exhibit E – Talamantes Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 4; Exhibit G – Maul Decl. at ¶ 2; Exhibit H – 

Simmons Decl. at ¶ 2.) Defendants further allege the same with respect to denying Plaintiff 

cleaning supplies. (Aliyev Decl. at ¶ 7; Garcia Decl. at ¶ 3; Hvizdzak Decl. at ¶ 8; Maul 

Decl. at ¶ 3; Simmons Decl. at ¶ 3.) Nor do they recall denying Plaintiff medical assistance. 

(Myers Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4; Talamantes Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3; Exhibit F – McHenry Decl. at ¶ 3.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard: Motion for Summary Judgment 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of summary judgment “if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a motion for summary 

judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of a directed verdict. Judgment must 

be entered “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to 

the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). But “[i]f 

reasonable minds could differ,” judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving 

party. Id. at 251; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party, summary 

judgment must be denied.”) (alteration omitted). 

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as would apply at a trial on 

the merits, including plaintiff’s burden to establish any element essential to their case. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Lack of 

genuine issues of material fact on a single element of a claim for relief is sufficient to 

warrant summary judgment on that claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim in 

the pleadings, or other evidence, and “‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court 

— that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325; 

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see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of 

the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” 

S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish beyond the pleadings, 

that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully 

rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must 

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with 

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiffs’ favor, could convince a reasonable jury to 

find for the plaintiff.” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Rule 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). 

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly 

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not 

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 

B. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment Claim 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). To prevail on a 

conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must establish that prison officials were 

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 

1. Objective Prong: Substantial Risk of Harm

Prison officials must ensure that prisoners have adequate shelter, food, clothing, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. To determine 

whether a particular deprivation violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court must examine 

the “circumstances, nature, and duration of [the] deprivation.” Id. Such a determination is 

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highly fact-specific. Lamb v. Howe, 677 Fed. Appx. 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017); see also 

Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731.

The Ninth Circuit proscribes the subjection of a prisoner to a lack of sanitation that 

is “severe and prolonged.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The failure to provide adequate cleaning supplies to inmates may amount to a violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985). In 

Hoptowit, the court found that, in light of a failing plumbing system, vermin infestation, 

and inadequate ventilation, the “failure to provide adequate cell cleaning supplies” 

deprived “inmates of tools necessary to maintain minimally sanitary cells” which “amounts 

to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

In Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000), inmates were confined to a yard

for four days in 94-degree heat, with insufficient access to toilets, inedible food, and 

insufficient amounts of water. Id. at 729-32. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment 

because the inmates’ evidence, if believed, sufficed to create a triable issue as to whether 

the inmates’ deprivations were “sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of 

an Eighth Amendment claim.” Id. at 732. 

By contrast, the short-term deprivation of bathroom facilities, without more, is 

insufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g.,

Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1314. In Anderson, prison officials routinely confined violent and 

suicidal inmates to a “safety cell” for short periods of time which had a “pit toilet . . . 

encrusted with excrement and urine.” Id. at 1313. The court in Anderson indicated that lack 

of a sanitary toilet for a night, combined with nothing else, does not support a conditions 

of confinement claim. Id. at 1313-14. 

Similarly, the plaintiff in Oubichon v. Carey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75378 (E.D. 

Cal. May 16, 2017) (unpublished) alleged a lack of access to a sanitary toilet for one night 

due to a riot. Id. at *17. The court granted summary judgment because the plaintiff did not 

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submit evidence of serious health hazards, such as prolonged duration, pest infestations or 

extreme heat. Id. at *20. Rather, the crux was that he slipped and fell. Id. 

Other cases have held that inoperable toilets causing flooding may violate the Eighth 

Amendment if the unsanitary condition persists for several days. In Despain v. Uphoff, 264 

F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001), 36 hours without working toilets and concomitant exposure 

to other inmates’ urine and feces was sufficiently serious to state a conditions of 

confinement claim. Id. at 974-75. In Arellano v. Ojeda, 660 Fed. Appx. 552 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(unpublished), the court found a cognizable claim where the plaintiff alleged the toilet in 

solitary confinement overflowed for several days and defendants failed to address it. Id.

Defendants minimize the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations and argue that, just as in 

Oubichon, this case is nothing more than a simple slip-and-fall case and that, without more, 

Plaintiff cannot establish the “objective” prong of a conditions of confinement claim at 

trial. However, the glaring problem with Defendants’ motion is this misguided starting 

point. The logical fallacy in their argument begins when they characterize Plaintiff’s case 

as a simple slip-and-fall case and then proceed to attack that incorrect characterization. 

Thus, all of the simple slip-and-fall cases they rely on are distinguishable from this case. 

Plaintiff complains about prolonged exposure to standing water that contained urine, feces, 

and food debris while his multiple requests for cleaning supplies and complaints about the 

cell’s conditions went ignored. Plaintiff’s slip-and-fall is just one additional consequence 

of the apparent unsanitary and unsafe conditions of his confinement. He further contends 

he fell and became covered by some or all of these substances and continued to be covered 

by them. Plaintiff’s allegations are of serious health hazards and substandard living 

conditions that, if believed, could lead a reasonable jury to find in Plaintiff’s favor.6

                                                                

6

 The distinction between simple slip-and-fall cases and this case is prudent, but as 

indicated misses the mark in this case. It would indeed seem improper and unjust to hold 

prison officials liable for serious constitutional violations based on momentary or 

temporary conditions about which they did not have knowledge or no realistic opportunity 

to remediate. Such inequity, however, diminishes when prison officials place an inmate 

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Moreover, Defendants have not presented evidence that conclusively—or even 

minimally—vitiates the evidence contained in Plaintiff’s declaration. By only presenting 

equivocal testimonial evidence, all Defendants have done is create a dispute of material 

fact. The evidence is not so one sided that the trier of fact would have no choice but to 

decide one way or the other. Inconclusive and noncommittal statements made by 

Defendants, such as “I can’t recall,” do not necessitate the conclusion that the unsanitary 

conditions did not exist. Such qualified language is not forceful or particularly confidenceinspiring, and it is wholly possible a jury would not give it much, or any, weight. A jury, 

hearing Plaintiff’s unqualified version of events describing a filth-filled cell, would then 

hear Defendants’ “I can’t recall,” “I do not remember,” “I have no memory”7

 testimony 

and determine which version of events to believe. That analysis requires precisely the type 

of witness credibility determination that is within the ambit of the jury—not this Court on 

summary judgment. 

                                                                

inside a cell that had been recently flooded and was still wet—as several Defendants admit 

was the case here—and then proceed to ignore the inmate’s pleas and complaints about 

unsanitary conditions for a prolonged period of time—as Plaintiff’s declaration evidences. 

7

 The salient point is that these phrases could be interpreted in different ways. They could 

mean that the declarant has no present memory of the conditions of the cell. Or they could 

mean that the declarant remembers the conditions of the cell, but the conditions were not 

as Plaintiff describes. The Court is simply not equipped to resolve this ambiguity on a cold 

record. This ambiguity, of course, is the result of the declarations’ drafter’s poor use of 

imprecise language that could be interpreted in materially divergent ways. The drafter 

simply could have used definitive language such as, for example, “The cell did not contain 

any large puddles,” (cf. Aliyev Decl. at ¶ 3 (“I do not recall any large puddles in the cell.”)) 

or “There was no standing water in the cell at the time Na was placed there,” (cf. Hvizdzak 

Decl. at ¶ 5 (“I do not remember seeing any standing water in the cell at the time Na was 

placed there”)). A jury—based on the witnesses’ demeanor, tone of voice, or clarifying 

follow-up questions—could find that Defendants do not presently remember the condition 

of the cell. Or the jury could find that Defendants remember that the cell contained no 

standing water. Given the state of evidence before the Court, it would be most appropriate 

for a jury to resolve the ambiguity that pervades Defendants’ declarations. 

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Because finding in Defendants’ favor would require a credibility determination and 

disregarding competent evidence presented by Plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the conditions of Cell #110 exists. Accordingly, judgment should not be entered 

in favor of Defendants. 

2. Subjective Prong: Deliberate Indifference

 To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that “the official knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Whether an official possessed such knowledge “is a question of fact 

subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial 

evidence.” Id. at 842. 

 While the failure to give advance notice is not dispositive, if the trier of fact believes 

the plaintiff informed officers of the conditions and interprets their response as reflecting 

a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s needs and rights, an Eighth Amendment violation 

could be found. See id. at 848. In Torres v. Arellano, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43555 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 24, 2017), the plaintiff alleged that he told the defendant officer about his urine 

and bloodstained bed while the defendant claimed he could not recall learning of the 

knowledge. Id. at *17. The court found a trier of fact might believe the plaintiff, the 

defendant’s lack of action might be interpreted as conscious disregard, and thus summary 

judgment could not be granted. Id. 

 Prison officials who know of a substantial risk to inmate health may be free from 

liability if they respond to the risk in a reasonable manner, even if the harm is not averted. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. In Oubichon, while the plaintiff alleged he told the defendants 

about the unsanitary toilet, the condition arose in the midst of two riots. Oubichon v. Carey, 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75378, at *18 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2017). The court concluded the 

one day exposure to an unsanitary toilet did not amount to deliberate indifference because 

it was necessary for prison officials to focus on inmate safety in the face of riots and lasted 

only as long as was needed to restore order. Id. at *20. 

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 Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff can show objectively inhumane prison 

conditions existed, he cannot show that Defendants knew of and disregarded any excessive 

risks to health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. Specifically, Defendants argue 

that because they have alleged that they do not recall any threats to Plaintiff’s safety other 

than a wet floor, Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to an 

excessive health risk. (See Def’s Mot. at 8-9.) This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff has 

submitted his own testimony that each of the Defendants were made aware of the 

conditions of the cell, they were aware of the urine and feces near the toilet and insect 

infestation of his cell, that they were aware that he asked for cleaning supplies, they either 

denied or ignored the requests, and that they were aware that his clothes were wet and 

soiled. A reasonable jury, crediting Plaintiff’s testimony, could find in his favor. And for 

the same reasons explained above, Defendants’ declarations simply highlight the existence 

of genuine issues of material fact. Given that the only evidence is testimony presented by 

both sides, a credibility determination is required. A reasonable jury could find an Eighth 

Amendment violation if it believes Defendants knew about the conditions of Plaintiff’s cell 

and interprets their responses (or the lack thereof) as demonstrating a conscious disregard 

of Plaintiff’s needs and rights. At this stage in the proceedings, with all reasonable 

inferences made in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable jury 

could not find for Plaintiff. 

 Even if Defendants’ declarations were not equivocally phrased and they had all 

definitively testified, as they argue in their reply brief, that “all five of the Defendants 

present on the day of Plaintiff’s transfer have stated they did not observe anything leading 

them to believe the cell was in an unsafe condition,” (ECF No. 46 at 2), this still would not 

entitle them to judgment as a matter of law. By relying on their declarations and ignoring 

Plaintiff’s declaration, Defendants ask this Court to make the type of credibility 

determination that it cannot make as this stage without some indication that Plaintiff’s 

declaration is untrustworthy. But they presented no reason to discount the credibility of 

Plaintiff’s declaration. The fact that their version of events conflicts with Plaintiff’s version 

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is not a valid reason to discount credibility as a matter of law and disregard his declaration 

in toto. For example, there is no deposition testimony where Plaintiff contradicts anything 

in this declaration. Such evidence perhaps could have allowed the Court to discount 

Plaintiff’s declaration. However, there is no basis before the Court to do such a thing. 

Ultimately, all Defendants have done here is highlight the fact that this case truly is a matter 

of he-said-they-said, and the jury should determine which version is worthy of belief. 

 Defendants also contend negligence is an insufficient basis for an Eighth 

Amendment violation. (ECF No. 38-2 at 8.) In doing so, they again mischaracterize 

Plaintiff’s allegations and then attack that strawman.8

 Plaintiff’s case is not simply about 

his cell being wet and his fall as a result. He further claims his cell contained urine, feces, 

and food debris. He further contends he fell into these substances and was left in that 

condition. Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot prove they knew about the alleged 

conditions of his cell. However, he certainly can so prove if a jury believes his version of 

events that he made each Defendant aware of the conditions of the cell. Again, what this 

case comes down to is a battle of vastly different testimony—only one of which can be 

true. Given that Defendants have provided the Court no reason to believe Plaintiff’s 

testimony is false (their own self-serving testimony does not prove such falsity), that 

determination is for the jury to make. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motions for Appointment of Counsel

 Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel because he contends the case is complex, 

he has limited knowledge of the law, he is unable to afford an attorney, and he has had 

difficulty obtaining discovery.9

 Based on the Court’s recommendations above, this case 

                                                                

8

 For example, they state: “While it is not ideal to have damp or wet floors . . . .” (ECF No. 

38-2 at 9.) Plaintiff’s complaints begin with these allegations; they do not end there. And 

Plaintiff’s allegations certainly go beyond “damp” floors. 

9

 Plaintiff states he has spoken to CJA panel attorney David Zugman, who agreed to take 

Plaintiff’s case. However, while Plaintiff communicated with Mr. Zugman, counsel made 

no commitment to represent him. Although Mr. Zugman would not mind handling the case, 

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will proceed to trial if the District Judge agrees and the case does not settle. Because pro 

bono counsel would assist Plaintiff with trial-related matters and assist the efficient 

presentation of the case to a jury, this Court recommends appointment of counsel. 

 “There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (partially overruled en banc on other 

grounds). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments 

of counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. 

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 District courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 

1915(e)(1), to request that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of 

exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance 

requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and 

an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of 

the legal issues involved.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 

Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Here, given that Plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that a genuine dispute of 

material fact exists for trial, appointment of counsel is appropriate. Based on the evidence 

submitted to the Court, a jury very well could credit Plaintiff’s account of events and find 

in his favor. Thus, there is a likelihood that Plaintiff could succeed on the merits. 

Additionally, given Plaintiff’s status as a prisoner and the myriad limitations imposed on 

him as a result of that status, appointment of pro bono counsel would significantly assist 

him in the presentation of his case to a jury as well as facilitate the efficient use of the 

Court’s time and resources. The Court should therefore exercise its discretion and appoint 

Plaintiff pro bono counsel. 

                                                                

he does not believe it would be appropriate to circumvent the normal, random attorney 

appointment process and assign the matter directly to him. 

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III. CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, this Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ 

summary judgment motion (ECF No. 38) be DENIED in its entirety.

 This Court further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ motions for appointment of 

counsel (ECF Nos. 37, 44) be GRANTED. 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 3, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the court and served on all parties no later than December 1, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on the appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 17, 2017 

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