Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-04117/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-04117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

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//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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1Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger also have joined with the other

Alameda County Defendants in a motion to dismiss the complaint as a

sanction for Plaintiff's prior failure to appear and answer questions at

his deposition and to comply with discovery. Because the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot

as to Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger. (Docket no. 340.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SLOAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 00-4117 CW(PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

GOODSPEED AND KRIEGER'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS

MOOT THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket no. 340, 356)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny L. Sloan, Jr., a State prisoner incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff's suit

includes numerous claims for relief. The claims addressed in this

Order are those against Defendants Lisa Goodspeed and Cathy

Krieger, nurses at Alameda County's Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs when he was incarcerated at SRJ.1 Plaintiff has opposed the

motion and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 

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2Dave Fife also is a Defendant in this action but he never responded

to the Court's March 16, 2005, request for waiver of service and has not

otherwise appeared in this matter. Accordingly, this Order does not

address the claims against Fife. 

2

DISCUSSION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is based on the allegations

in Plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints and declarations,

and the declarations and evidence (including the transcript of

Plaintiff's deposition) submitted by Defendants. The facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was taken to Highland Hospital following his arrest

on June 20, 1999, because of various injuries sustained from a

fifty foot fall. After receiving treatment, he was incarcerated at

SRJ. On October 19, 1999, he was transported from SRJ to the North

County Jail (NCJ) in Oakland for a court appearance. Plaintiff was

in a wheelchair and had a cast on his left arm. At about 9:00 p.m.

Deputies Jensen, Hoos and Martinez rolled Plaintiff's wheelchair to

the transportation port for the return trip to SRJ. 

The parties dispute what occurred next. Plaintiff claims that

the deputies used force against him for no reason, resulting in

serious physical injury. He alleges further that Dave Fife2, a

nurse practitioner at NCJ who had administered seizure medications

to Plaintiff before the alleged assault, observed his obvious

injuries following the assault but provided no medical care. 

Defendants claim that the use of force was necessary to control

Plaintiff, who would not cooperate with their attempts to move him,

and that he did not suffer serious injury. 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff was placed in restraints and returned to

SRJ. He alleges that when he arrived Defendants Goodspeed and

Krieger, nurse practitioners on duty in the SRJ infirmary, and

Deputy Shephard, who was also on duty in the infirmary at that

time, observed his injuries but offered no assistance, even after

he asked to see a doctor. Plaintiff describes his injuries as

follows: his arm cast was broken in two parts, his shirt was torn,

his head was bruised, he was bleeding, and parts of his body were

swollen. See Am'd Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶(e)-(g). 

Defendants' description of the course of events is somewhat

different. Relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, they

maintain that just as he was being wheeled into his room by Deputy

Shephard, Plaintiff turned around, glanced down a corridor, and saw

a little, short Caucasian nurse practitioner with glasses and white

hair. Plaintiff said nothing to her. Once inside the room,

Plaintiff asked Deputy Shephard to see a doctor, but he saw no

doctor that night. Other than that request, Plaintiff made no

requests for medical attention that night. According to the

declaration of SRJ nurse Moore, who checked on Plaintiff some time

during her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he denied discomfort. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

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1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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III. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate

indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he suffered the

following injuries after being assaulted by NCJ deputies: 

(1) He had a knot or big lump about the size of a silver

dollar on his head. 

(2) He had blood on his feet (which were bare) from being

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dragged by the deputies, and blood was trickling from his head. 

(3) His arm was hurting and his long arm cast was broken in

two at the forearm. 

(4) His wrist was swollen from the handcuffs.

(5) His face hurt from being hit in the jaw. Def. Ex. G at

50-54.

Defendants contest the serious nature of Plaintiff's medical

needs by relying on Plaintiff's deposition testimony and other

evidence as follows: 

(1) The knot on his head was small, only the size of silver

dollar. Plaintiff could only speculate whether the knot bled, and

the bleeding stopped of its own accord, which indicates that it was

not a serious injury.

(2) They characterize Plaintiff's foot injury as a "scraped

toe," which cannot constitute an urgent medical need.

(3) Although Plaintiff's arm cast was damaged it was not

broken off and Plaintiff did not testify, nor has he alleged, that

his arm was injured.

(4) Although Plaintiff testified that his wrists were swollen

from the handcuffs, in his amended complaint he previously

identified the only wrist-related injury as a cut. He did not

testify or allege that either the cut or swelling was significant. 

(5) The medical progress notes written by Nurse Moore state

that Plaintiff denied discomfort when she checked on him in the

hours after he returned to the SRJ infirmary, as do the notes

recorded by medical staff through October 22, 1999.

The Court finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to

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create a triable issue as to whether his injuries amounted to a

serious medical need.

B. Deliberate Indifference

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for

deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Deliberate indifference may appear when prison officials deny or

delay medical treatment. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. But mere

negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not presented evidence

that they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

They point to following facts taken from Plaintiff's deposition

testimony and other evidence.

Plaintiff's assertion that a short, white-haired Caucasian

nurse practitioner was in the infirmary corridor when he was being

wheeled into his room is not probative of his claim because no

evidence shows that the nurse practitioner saw him, he never spoke

to her and he recalls no nurse coming anywhere near him that night,

and, even if she had seen him from down the corridor, no evidence

suggests she was aware he had any medical needs, let alone serious

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medical needs.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants Goodspeed

or Krieger saw him that night. He testified at his deposition that

he does not know what either of them looks like, he does not know

whether either saw him at all that night, and he does not know

whether they even were on duty when he returned to SRJ. He further

testified that the only reason he named these two nurses as

Defendants is because their names were listed on a sheet of paper

that he received regarding what happened at NCJ. The sheet of

paper in question is a report in which Sgt. Kimmel, who was on duty

as the Watch Sergeant at NCJ on the date of Plaintiff's interaction

with the deputies, states that he spoke to NCJ Nurse Fife about

where Plaintiff should be housed if he could not return to SRJ, and

Fife told him,

that he had contacted Nurse C. Krieger, the duty Nurse at

the Santa Rita Jail booking section. Nurse Krieger had

stated that Sloan's medical condition was such that he

could stand and walk for short distances and set [sic] in

either chairs or vehicle seats with no difficulty.

Def. Ex. C. 

With reference to Nurse Goodspeed, Sgt. Kimmel stated that he

had contacted her five days later, on October 24, 1999, and she

told him that Plaintiff was cleared to walk and sit normally, and

in fact was required to walk daily according to doctor's orders.

Defendants maintain that the statements in the report are

inadmissible hearsay, but even if they are not, they do not support

Plaintiff's theory that Nurse Krieger was the nurse he saw in the

corridor, because the report indicates that Nurse Krieger was

working in the booking section, not in the infirmary. Further, it

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indicates only that she was at SRJ while Plaintiff was still at

NCJ, and is not probative of whether she was still at SRJ when

Plaintiff arrived. Nor does the report shed any light as to

whether Nurse Goodspeed was at SRJ on October 19, 1999, or whether

she saw Plaintiff.

Finally, even if the nurses were in the SRJ infirmary when

Plaintiff arrived, Defendants point to the lack of evidence to

support an inference that he suffered harm from the alleged lack of

care. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence in opposition to the

motion to summary judgment. He renews his ongoing claim that

prison officials at High Desert State Prison are preventing him

from litigating his action and that he has not been afforded

adequate discovery by the Court. The Court rejects these

arguments. The record is replete with examples of Plaintiff's more

than ample ability to prosecute his action and his access to

discovery procedures.

Plaintiff has not borne his burden of producing specific

evidence to show that a material dispute exists regarding whether

Nurses Goodspeed and Krieger acted with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

//

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants Goodspeed and Krieger's motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. (Docket no. 365.) The motion to dismiss the claims

against them is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 340.) The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment in their favor when the case against

the remaining Defendants is concluded. These Defendants shall bear

their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/24/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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