Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02126/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

---

U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 PacifiCare of California d.b.a. Secure Horizons was erroneously sued as Secure

Horizons an HMO.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARNEST DARDEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SECURE HORIZONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-02126 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

Now before the Court are the motions of defendants the California Department of Health

Services (“California DHS”), Dr. Richard Unger, and PacifiCare of California d.b.a. Secure

Horizons1 (“Secure Horizons”) (collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss the amended complaint of

plaintiff Earnest Darden (“Plaintiff”). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and

considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court

hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 28, 2004, alleging that Defendants had

violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e(a)(1) and 300e(b)(1) of the HMO Act, 42 C.F.R. § 417.101, and

state medical malpractice laws. The California DHS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

based on Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Dr. Unger filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 1 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Because Secure Horizons already filed an answer in this case, the Court will

construe the motion to dismiss filed by Secure Horizons as a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). 

2

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Secure Horizons joined in Dr. Unger’s motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim. The Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss but granted

Plaintiff leave to amend to plead a claim that would establish federal jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”) on April 29, 2005. In his FAC,

Plaintiff alleges violations of federal statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, 2000d-7, and

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157. (FAC at p. 4.) Plaintiff also asserts claims for medical malpractice and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at pp. 6-7, 9.) The California DHS filed a

motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dr. Unger filed a

separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Secure Horizons joined in Dr. Unger’s

motion to dismiss.2 

Plaintiff alleges that sometime in 2001 his primary care physician, Dr. Unger,

negligently performed a prostate examination, causing Plaintiff to suffer erectile dysfunction. 

(Id. at p. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Unger failed to warn him of the potential risks associated

with a prostate examination, and failed to present him with the less intrusive alternative of a

blood test. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) Dr. Unger referred Plaintiff to Dr. Pinckney, a urologist, for

treatment of his erectile dysfunction. (Id. at p. 2.) Dr. Pinckney prescribed medications which,

according to Plaintiff, Secure Horizons denied him, and Medi-Cal provided only in small

monthly allotments. (Id.) Plaintiff contends the alleged denial of medication is what caused his

continuing erectile problems. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that “he is being discriminated

against because of his invidious racial group Black African Americans.” (Id. at p. 7.) 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss.

Rule 12(b)(6) motions challenge the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the

complaint. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a

plaintiff can show no set of facts supporting his claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Under this liberal standard, motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 2 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

granted. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1986). The complaint is

viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all factual allegations therein are

taken as true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. Defendants’ Motions.

1. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the California DHS.

Ordinarily, the California DHS, as a state agency, is immune from citizen suits in federal

court based on the Eleventh Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1967) (states are immune from suit); Brooks v. Sulphur

Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (state agencies and

departments are immune from suit). However, waiver of this immunity will be found where: 

“(1) the state expressly consents, (2) a state statute or constitution so provides, or (3) Congress

clearly intended to condition the state’s participation in a program or activity on the state’s

waiver of immunity.” Collins v. Alaska, 823 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1987). 

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 waives Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court

for violation of certain federal statutes, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (“Title VI”). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,

280 (2001). Title VI prohibits a denial of benefits or exclusion from a federally assisted

program on grounds of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. In other words,

any entity receiving federal financial assistance may not discriminate against citizens on one of

these impermissible grounds. To state a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

state program discriminated against him on the basis of race, color, or national origin, and (2)

that the state program receives federal funding. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d

1439, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA

Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges both. He alleges that 

that the California DHS discriminated against him because of his race, and that the California

DHS accepts federal funds to help support the administration of its Medi-Cal programs. (FAC

at pp. 7-8). Plaintiff, therefore, sufficiently alleges a claim under Title VI. 

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 3 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Prior to January 1, 2003, California’s statute of limitations for personal injury

actions was one year. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3) (West Supp. 2002). In 2002, the

California Legislature deleted the one-year limitations period of personal injury actions and

added a provision setting a two-year limitations period, effective January 1, 2003. Krupnick

v. Duke Energy Morro Bay, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1028 (2004); see also Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 335.1. However, the new two-year limitations period does not apply retroactively. 

Krupnick, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 1028-29. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations period

applies to Plaintiff’s claims.

4

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Title VI claim suffers from another defect; it is time-barred. A

statute of limitations defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss where, as here, the running

of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d

677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions

governs claims brought pursuant to Title VI. Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710,

711-12 (9th Cir. 1993).3 Although state law determines the length of the limitations period,

federal law determines when the claim accrues. Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151,

1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). “[U]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. 

Applying this standard here, it is apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s FAC that his Title

VI claim against California DHS is time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that the California DHS failed

to administer the Medi-Cal program through which Plaintiff is insured, and through which Dr.

Unger was assigned as his primary care physician, in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner,

thereby violating Title VI. Plaintiff alleges that he first met with Dr. Unger sometime in 1998 or

1999. (FAC at p. 1.) Plaintiff’s prostate examination took place “after a couple of years.” (Id.) 

Following the prostate examination, Plaintiff met with Dr. Pinckney who prescribed medication

for Plaintiff’s erectile dysfunction. (Id. at p. 2.) Only after Plaintiff was denied these

medications, did he seek help from California DHS. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter

to California DHS, which he attached as exhibit 1 to his FAC. (Id. at p. 2.) The letter is dated

March 15, 2001. (Id, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has not heard a word from

California DHS since 2001. (Id. at p. 2.) Therefore, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the

injury which was the basis for this action by March 2001, and thus Plaintiff’s claim began to

accrue by March 2001 at the latest. Yet, Plaintiff did not file his initial complaint until over

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 4 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 As the Court explained in its order dismissing Plaintiff’s initial complaint,

California DHS is immunized from being sued as to the remainder of Plaintiff’s federal

claims. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is bringing any of his other claims in his FAC

against California DHS, such claims are also dismissed.

5

three years later, on May 28, 2004, after the one-year statute of limitations period had expired. 

Accordingly, based on the facts alleged in his FAC, Plaintiff’s Title VI claim against California

DHS is time-barred. The Court grants California DHS’s motion to dismiss on this basis.4

2. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim against Dr. Unger and Secure Horizons

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) provides a means of redress to individuals who have

been deprived of federal constitutional or federal statutory rights by persons acting under color

of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim under

Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a person acting under color of state law (2)

deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal statute. 

Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Unger and Secure Horizons violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

right to equal protection by discriminating against him on the basis of race. Plaintiff has failed

to sufficiently allege, however, that either defendant acted under color of state law. Therefore,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983.

Generally, private parties do not act under color of state law. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). The complaint, therefore, must allege facts tending to show that

the private parties’ conduct has caused a deprivation of federal rights that may be fairly

attributable to the State. Id. at 708 (quoting Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that conclusionary allegations of action under color of

state law, “unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a claim.”)). A twopart test exists to determine whether private-party action causes a deprivation that occurs under

color of state law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). First, the deprivation

must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State; by a rule of

conduct imposed by the state; or by a person for whom the State is responsible. Id. Second, the

party charged with the deprivation must be a state actor. Id. A person may become a state actor

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 5 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

by performing a public function or being regulated to the point that the conduct in question is

practically compelled by the State. Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563,

569 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Unger is a state actor because he is a doctor “authorized by 

. . . the State of California” to treat Plaintiff, and that Secure Horizons is a state actor because it

acts “in place of Mdei-Care [sic] part A Federal program” and therefore performs a public

function. (FAC at p. 6.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants acted under color of state law

by “administer[ing] the Medi-Cal Program within the state of California.” (FAC at p. 8.) 

To support his contentions, Plaintiff cites West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), Ancata v.

Prison Services, 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), and Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (11th Cir.

1986). Those cases, however, dealt with private physicians hired by the state to provide health

care to prisoners. West, 487 U.S. at 50-51; Ancata, 769 F.2d at 703; Ort, 786 F.2d at 1107. The

physicians in West, Ancata, and Ort would not have been considered state actors had they not

contracted with the state to work for state prisons, performing a function traditionally within the

purview of the state. West, 487 U.S. at 50-51; Ancata, 769 F.2d at 703; Ort, 786 F.2d at 1107.

In Plaintiff’s case, Dr. Unger and Secure Horizons are not employees of the State of

California, hired to perform a function traditionally within the purview of the state, i.e.

providing medical care in state prisons. The cases that Plaintiff cites, therefore, are inapposite. 

Moreover, the fact that the State of California administers the Medi-Cal program in which

Secure Horizons is a participating HMO and Dr. Unger is a participating physician does not

create a sufficient nexus between Secure Horizons, Dr. Unger, and the State to establish state

action. The mere fact that a business or person is regulated by state law does not put the acts

under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Freier v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege

sufficient facts to show that Dr. Unger and/or Secure Horizons acted under color of law. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 6 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

3. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim against Dr. Unger and Secure Horizons

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (“Section 1985(3)”) a plaintiff must allege:

(1) a conspiracy between defendants; (2) for the purpose of directly or indirectly depriving

plaintiff of equal protection of the law or of equal privileges and immunities under the law; (3)

an act done in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) that the act or acts were the cause of an

injury to plaintiff’s person or property, or a deprivation of a right or privilege of citizenship. 

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A plaintiff must plead specific facts to support the existence of the alleged conspiracy.

See Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere allegation of conspiracy

without factual specificity is insufficient”). Moreover, there must be “some racial, or perhaps

class-based, invidiously discriminatory motivation behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin,

403 U.S. at 102. 

In this case, “Plaintiff alleges and maintains that Secure Horizons and the State Dept. Of

Health Services did in fact conspire to deprive plaintiff of federally protected rights in collusion

with Dr. Unger by authorizing a possibly injurious (injurous) exam which could have been

accomplshed [sic] by a blood test.” (FAC at p. 6.) Plaintiff’s FAC does not allege any other

alleging an agreement between the Defendants to conspire against Plaintiff for a raciallymotivated reason and for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed

rights. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the

complaint “devoid of any discussion of an agreement amongst the appellees to violate

[appellant’s] constitutional rights”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts support the

existence of a conspiracy with sufficient specificity. Accordingly, the Court grants the motions

to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claim.

Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently allege a claim under Section 1985 bars him from

asserting a claim under 42 U.S. C § 1986 (“Section 1986”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986. 

Section 1986 imposes liability on every person who knows of an impending violation of Section

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 7 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

1985 but neglects or refuses to prevent the violation. Loehr v. Ventura County Community

College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). In this case, because Plaintiff fails to

sufficiently allege a violation of Section 1985, his Section 1986 claim fails as well. Id. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1986 claim is granted.

4. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim against Defendants under the National Labor

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157.

Although Plaintiff recites the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§

151-157, in his complaint, it is not clear how this statute is relevant to his claims or what type of

claim Plaintiff seeks to bring under the NLRA. (FAC at pp. 3-9.) The stated purpose of the

NLRA is to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining by protecting

workers’ rights to “freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives

of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their

employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 151. Several of the NLRA

provisions that Plaintiff cites create no enforceable statutory rights. Section 1 of the Act

declares the United States’ policy on collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 151. Section 2 defines

certain terminology used throughout the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152. Sections 3 through 6 create the

National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) and establish the Board’s purposes, location, and

authority to act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156. 

Section 7 of the NLRA creates substantive rights by giving employees the right to

organize, join labor organizations, bargain collectively, and engage in other concerted activities

or refrain from any or all of such activities, but the substantive rights extended by Section 7 are

not private rights. Matthew Bender, National Labor Relations Act: Law & Practice, Vol. 1 §

4.01 (Lexis Nexis 2005) (citing Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309

U.S. 261 (1940)). An individual employee or group of employees may not bring a private action

in state or federal court to enforce them. Id. Instead, enforcement of Section 7 rights is

entrusted exclusively to the Board, a public body. Id. 

Plaintiff’s FAC does not allege that he is an employee protected under the NLRA. Nor

does the FAC contain any allegations related to a labor dispute. Therefore, as Plaintiff’s

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 8 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

complaint is currently stated, he has not alleged a valid claim under the NLRA. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 are dismissed.

5. Plaintiff’s FAC is Dismissed without Leave to Amend.

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, “leave to amend should be

granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). The court should consider factors such as

“the presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the

proposed amendment.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the most important. See Jackson v. Bank of

Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,

Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971). Leave to amend is properly denied where the amendment

would be futile. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Although leave to amend a party’s pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of civil Procedure

15(a) should be liberally granted, a district court need not permit a plaintiff to amend his or her

complaint if it determines that the defects in the pleadings “could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted). It appears from Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, that the essence of

Plaintiff’s complaint is a state-law medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege

sufficient facts to establish that his federal claims were timely filed, or that either of the private

defendants acted under color of state law. Plaintiff has also failed to allege any new, material

facts that would allow the Court to infer any colorable federal claims. Thus, because granting

leave to amend would be futile, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal

claims with prejudice.

6. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Remaining State-Law Claims.

Due to the absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case, it would be

improper for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 9 of 10
U

nite

d

State

s

District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that state claims should be dismissed when the

federal claims have been dismissed before trial). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

remaining state-law claims without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s federal claims WITH PREJUDICE and Plaintiff’s state-law claims

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-02126-JSW Document 56 Filed 01/12/06 Page 10 of 10