Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00674/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00674-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS P. COOK

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-CV-00674-LJO-SAB

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND AND DISMISSING 

GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 12)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this 

Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. Given the 

shortage of district judges and staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters 

necessary to reach the decision in this order. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the 

offices of United States Senators Feinstein and Boxer to address this Court’s inability to 

accommodate the parties and this action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to conduct all 

further proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and 

accommodating to parties than that of U.S. Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, who must 

prioritize criminal and older civil cases.

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Civil trials set before Chief Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to 

suspension mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date 

if Chief Judge O'Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover, this Court's Fresno 

Division randomly and without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges 

throughout the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this 

action is subject to reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from inside or outside the Eastern District 

of California.

I. Background 

At the time he filed the original complaint in this case, Plaintiff Thomas P. Cook 

(“Plaintiff”) was a California state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis1in this civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed his original complaint (ECF 

No. 1) on December 31, 2014, and the first amended complaint (ECF No. 7) on March 24, 2015. 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”), filed on December 30, 2015 (ECF No. 12) is 

currently before the Court2for screening. According to the SAC, Plaintiff was paroled on 

September 20, 2015. ECF No. 12 at 1. 

II. Screening Requirement and Standard 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In this 

case, Plaintiff is no longer a prisoner in state custody, as he was paroled on September 20, 2015. 

See ECF No. 12 at 1. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff continues to proceed pro se, the Court will apply the 

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which is substantially similar to the standard set forth 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) for prisoner complaints. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court reviews 

a pro se complaint to determine whether the complaint is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Thus, the critical inquiry is whether a constitutional 

 

1

See ECF No. 20. 

2

Plaintiff declined the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge previously assigned to his case. 

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claim, however unartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 

885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 

As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is entitled to have his pleadings liberally construed and to have 

any doubt resolved in his favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted). Nevertheless, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that his

complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Thus, to survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court reasonably to infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of 

satisfying the plausibility standard. Id.

If the Court determines that the complaint may be cured by amendment, the Court will grant 

Plaintiff leave to amend and provide him with notice of the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United 

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court will deny leave to amend if “it is absolutely 

clear” that amendment of a claim would be futile. See id.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff has asserted claims against the following Defendants: the State of California; the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Edmund G. Brown; M.D.

Stainer, director of the CDCR; Support System Homes, a substance-abuse treatment center; and 

Scott Grinnell, a parole agent, employed by CDCR (“Agent Grinnell) (collectively, “Defendants”).

See generally ECF No. 12. 

The SAC contains two main claims, both of which arose out of events that occurred after 

Plaintiff was released on parole. First, Plaintiff alleges general discrimination against him by the 

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State of California and the CDCR on account of his status as a registered sex offender under section 

290 of the California Penal Code (“CPC”). Id. at 1-2.3Plaintiff alleges that after he was paroled 

from Valley State Prison on September 20, 2015, he was taken to Support Systems Homes 

Treatment Center for thirty days of substance abuse treatment. Id. at 1. Plaintiff had already 

completed nine months of substance abuse treatment while he was in prison. Id. Plaintiff alleges 

that “[b]y completing these substance abuse programs in prison, [he] was promised many things 

such as assistance with getting ID/license, [a] social security card, employment placement, clothing, 

transportation[,] and so on,” and that he has received no help on his re-entry into society from 

Support Systems Homes. Id. Furthermore, he alleges that his treatment is paid for by “the Stop 

Fund,” such funding is being misused and his account is being charged for services that he has not 

received, and asks that the Court “look into these accounts and the use of discrimination” against 

persons who have registered as sex offenders under CPC § 290. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff states that “if 

you register 290[,] you have nothing coming, no help with reentry into society,” and that “no matter 

what a 290 does, he/she will do the max parole, [and] be treat[ed] as if their crime just happen[ed].”

Id. In connection with this allegation, Plaintiff requests that the Court review his parole conditions 

from 1998 to 2015, alleging that each time he has paroled, his conditions have worsened. Id.

Plaintiff has also attached various documents “concerning [his] civil rights,” which include 

information and records relating to the State’s funding of substance abuse programs for inmates and 

parolees, id. at 5-10, an administrative complaint he previously filed, id. at 11-16, the CDCR 602 

complaint form he attempted to file against Agent Grinnell, id. at 17-18, correspondence which 

relates to the STOP program, id. at 19-27, and copies of recent state court rulings concerning CPC

§ 290, id. at 29-32. 

Next, Plaintiff alleges that after he was released on parole, Agent Grinnell interfered with 

his medical care. Id. at 3. He states that on December 17, 2015, “after being sick for weeks,” he was 

able to get a day off training and go to the ER at the Santa Clara Hospital, and Agent Grinnell 

called him and ordered him to leave the hospital while knowing that Plaintiff was sick and in need 

of medical attention. Id. Plaintiff did not want to violate his parole, so he left the ER. Id. Plaintiff 

 

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Pincites refer to CM/ECF pagination located at the top of each page. 

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asks this Court to issue a protective order against Agent Grinnell. Id. at 4. In support of this 

allegation, Plaintiff has included documentary evidence of his ER visit and a photograph of his 

injuries. Id. at 34-35. 

IV. Analysis 

a. Government Defendants

Plaintiff has sought to bring claims against the following government defendants: the state 

of California, California Governor Edmund G. Brown, the CDCR, CDCR Director M.D. Stainer, 

and Agent Grinnell. However, insofar as Plaintiff seeks damages against these defendants in their 

official capacities, he may not do so. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in 

federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. 

Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Therefore, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff may not state claims against the State of California and the CDCR. See id.; 

see also Holt v. California Dept. of Corrections Medical Dept., No. 1:10-cv-00496-SKO PC, 2010 

WL 4716761, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (dismissing a claim against the CDCR Medical 

Department because “[t]he [CDCR] is an agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; any 

claims against it are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Furthermore, Plaintiff may not state 

claims against Defendants Brown, Stainer, and Grinnell in their official capacities. Aholelei, 488 

F.3d at 1147. 

b. Alleged Discrimination on Account of CPC § 290 Sex Offender Status

Plaintiff’s discrimination allegation was filed under the Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil Rights Act provides, in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. As described above, Plaintiff has alleged discrimination against him on account 

of his status as a registered sex offender pursuant to CPC § 290. The Court finds that these 

allegations attempt to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, which “commands that no States shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 

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equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982)).

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The first step in determining whether Plaintiff’s 

Equal Protection rights have been violated is to “identify the relevant class to which he belonged.” 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the relevant class is individuals 

who are registered sex offenders under CPC § 290, which “requires certain convicted sex offenders 

to register with law enforcement officials in the communities in which they reside.” Thorton v. 

Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The Court finds that this allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In 

United States v. Juvenile Male, the Ninth Circuit noted that sex offenders are not a suspect or 

protected class for Equal Protection purposes. 670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United 

States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Hill v. Rowley, No. 3:15-cv00038-RCJ-VPC, 2015 WL 3887188, at *3 (D. Nev. June 24, 2016) (citing Juvenile Male for the 

proposition that “[s]tate discrimination based on prior sex offenses is not subject to heightened 

scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”). Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to prove membership in 

a protected class, he has failed to state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause, and the Court will therefore dismiss this allegation. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194; see also 

Gunter v. Meeks, No. 3:11-cv-0041-MMD-WGC, 2013 WL 5493270, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 

2013) (dismissing the allegation that defendants conspired to violated the plaintiff’s Equal 

Protection rights on account of his status as a sex offender). 

Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to assist him with reentry by providing assistance with obtaining employment, housing, identification documents, and 

clothing, Plaintiff fails to state a claim (whether under the Equal Protection Clause or otherwise) 

because parole officers have “no obligation to ensure that parolees obtain public assistance, 

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housing, or medical care.” See Wallace v. Jones, No. 2:12-cv-02018 TLN DAD P, 2013 WL 

2190174 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (citing De Shaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social 

Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) for the proposition that parole officers have no duty to provide 

housing, mental health, and medical care). 

Additionally, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Brown and Stainer liable for their 

supervisory roles in relation to this claim, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to show how 

Brown and Stainer were personally involved in his re-entry process. A supervisor may be liable 

under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or 

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citation 

omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 

128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Thus, supervisory officials “cannot be held liable unless they themselves” 

violated a constitutional right. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to 

amend this claim, as described in more detail below, the Court advises Plaintiff that any amended 

complaint cannot be premised on his sex offender status or Defendants’ failure to assist him with 

re-entry. 

c. Alleged Interference With Medical Care by Agent Grinnell 

Like the discrimination allegation discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegation against Agent 

Grinnell was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Agent Grinnell interfered with his 

visit to the ER on December 17, 2015. ECF No. 12 at 3. The Court perceives this allegation as a 

claim invoking the Eighth Amendment, which mandates that the government “provide medical care 

for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “In 

order to state a cognizable claim [under the Eighth Amendment], a prisoner must allege acts or 

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 

106. Specifically, the prisoner must allege that defendant “kn[ew] that the prisoner face[d] a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 

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abate it.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The Ninth Circuit, following Estelle, 

has found that “allegations that a prison official has ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating 

physician are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference.” Wakefield v. Thomas, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Upon examination of his allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Generally, the state is not required to 

provide medical care to a parolee, because parolees are no longer incarcerated and unable to 

provide for their own care. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 190-200; see also Sisco v. California, 2007 

WL 1470145, at *20 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2007) (finding no Eighth Amendment liability against a 

parole officer because “[o]bligations under the Eighth Amendment only arise under during 

plaintiff’s incarceration” and the plaintiff “was free to seek medical care while on parole”). The 

Ninth Circuit has outlined a narrow exception to this rule, holding that “the state must provide an 

outgoing prisoner who is receiving and continues to require medication with a supply sufficient to 

ensure that he has that medication available during the period of time reasonably necessary to 

permit him to consult a doctor and obtain a new supply.” Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1164. “A state’s 

failure to provide medication sufficient to cover this transitional period amounts to an abdication of 

its responsibility to provide medical care to those, who by reason of incarceration, are unable to 

provide for their own medical needs.” Id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that “it may take a number 

of days, or possibly even weeks, for a recently released prisoner to find a doctor, schedule an 

examination, obtain a diagnosis and have a prescription filled.” Id. Applying these principles, the 

Ninth Circuit found that a parolee had stated a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth 

Amendment when the parolee’s treating physician had prescribed two-weeks’ worth of 

psychotropic medication to be dispensed by the prison authorities at the time of the parolee’s 

release, and the prison officer handling release failed to provide the parolee with these medication 

or make any effort to help the parolee procure the required medication. Id. at 1165. This finding 

turned upon the fact that the said prison official had contravened the instructions of the plaintiff’s 

treating physician during the parolee’s transitional period. See id.

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The Court finds that the exception outlined in Wakefield is not applicable to Plaintiff’s 

situation. While the window of time between the date of Plaintiff’s parole (September 20, 2015) 

and his visit to the emergency room (December 17, 2015) could plausibly fall within the 

“transitional period” outlined in Wakefield, Plaintiff’s case is ultimately distinguishable from 

Wakefield because he has not alleged that his treating physician had prescribed him required 

medication or treatment, or that Agent Grinnell ignored the instructions of any treating physician.

Rather, he alleges that after he went to the emergency room, Agent Grinnell called and ordered him 

to leave the emergency room, and he obeyed Agent Grinnell’s order because he did not wish to 

violate his parole. ECF No. 12 at 3. A document attached to Plaintiff’s motion, from the Santa 

Clara Valley Health & Hospital System, indicates that Plaintiff was “signed in our emergency 

department on 12/17/2015 today. Evaluation and treatment was not complete because the pt [sic]

needed to leave.” Id. at 34. Although Plaintiff alleges that Agent Grinnell “knew” that he was sick 

and in need of medical attention, it is unclear from the SAC and supporting document that Agent 

Grinnell ignored the direction of Plaintiff’s treating physician in telling him to leave the emergency 

room, and it appears that Plaintiff left because of his own belief that his parole would be violated if 

he disregarded Agent Grinnell’s order. See ECF No. 12 at 3. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 

facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to demonstrate that Agent Grinnell was deliberately 

indifferent within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The Court will therefore dismiss this 

claim, with leave to amend. 

Conclusion and Orders

The Court finds that the SAC does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend these 

allegations to cure the identified deficiencies in the SAC, to the extent he is able to do so in good 

faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is therefore granted leave to file 

an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff elects 

to amend the SAC, he may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

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The Court further advises that Plaintiff’s amended complaint must comply with Rule 8(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and set forth “sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim that 

is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Because he 

seeks relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must state what each defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

his constitutional or other federal rights. See id. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized 

and focused on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions 

are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation,” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th 

Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each 

defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights, as there is no supervisory liability 

under § 1983. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination on account of his sex 

offender status contained in the SAC repeat and refer to similar allegations in the original complaint 

and FAC. The Court now advises Plaintiff that an amended complaint must stand on its own; the 

amended complaint must include all relevant factual allegations and name all defendants against 

whom Plaintiff seeks redress. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. Generally, an amended complaint supersedes 

the original complaint, which no longer serves any function in the case. See Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Absent prior court approval, the amended 

pleading must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

therefore waived. See USS-POSCO Industries v. Contra Costa Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 

AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1994). 

//

//

//

//

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s SAC, filed December 30, 2015, is dismissed for failure to state a claim; 

3. By no later than September 3, 2016, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint or a 

notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court 

will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and to obey a court 

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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