Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00659/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332fr Diversity-Fraud

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE BROWN, on Behalf of

Herself and All Others Similarly

Situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

ORDER

vs.

DYNAMIC PET PRODUCTS and

FRICK’S MEAT PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 10) filed by Defendants Dynamic Pet Products and

Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. 

I. Background

On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff Stephanie Brown commenced this action on behalf

of herself and others similarly situated by filing the Class Action Complaint in this

Court. (ECF No. 1). On May 25, 2017, Defendants Dynamic Pet Products

(“Dynamic”) and Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. (“Frick’s”) filed the Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 10). On June 19, 2017,

Brown filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11). On June 26, 2017,

Defendants filed a Reply to Brown’s Response. (ECF No. 12). 

- 1 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Allegations of the Complaint

This is a consumer protection class action arising out of

misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendants Dynamic Pet

Products, LLC and Frick’s Meat Products, Inc. regarding the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs. Frick’s is a meat product manufacturer. In an effort to

profit from the waste produced by slaughterhouses and meat

manufacturers, Frick’s or its principals created Dynamic to sell waste ham

bones to pet owners. Through Dynamic, a wholly owned subsidiary of

Frick’s, Defendants manufacture, market, and sell the Real Ham Bone For

Dogs as an appropriate and safe chew toy for dogs. Indeed, on each

product label and as the name suggests, Defendants explicitly market the

Dynamic Real Ham Bone For Dogs as a chew toy for dogs.

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1) (emphasis omitted). 

Dynamic and Frick’s are the alter egos of one another and operate

as a single business enterprise for the production, marketing, and sale of

the Real Ham Bone For Dogs. Dynamic and Frick’s share the same

ownership, management and headquarters. . . . Frick’s and Dynamic work

in concert with each other to profit off the sale of waste ham bones,

marketing them to pet owners as safe and appropriate chew toys for dogs,

when they are not. 

Id. at ¶ 13. 

On each label, Defendants state that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs

is “meant to be chewed” and is “for dogs.” In reality, the Real Ham Bone

For Dogs is not appropriate for dogs and is not safe for its intended

purpose, despite Defendants’ contrary representations. When chewed, the

Real Ham Bone For Dogs is prone to splintering into shards and braking

into small pieces. When swallowed, these shards slice through dogs’

digestive systems and cause severe internal injuries. Thousands of dogs

have suffered a terrible array of illnesses, including stomach, intestinal and

rectal bleeding, vomiting, diarrhea, constipation, and seizures, and have

died gruesome, bloody deaths as a result of chewing Defendants’ Real

Ham Bone For Dogs.

Id. at ¶ 15. 

Despite having knowledge that [the] Real Ham Bones For Dogs is

inherently dangerous for dogs, Defendants represent the opposite.

Defendants advertised the Real Ham Bone For Dogs as a safe product for

dogs and failed to warn consumers that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs may

cause serious bodily harm or death to their dogs.

None of the instructions on the product’s packaging or in other

- 2 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

marketing informed Plaintiff or other consumers that allowing dogs to

chew on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs as instructed on the labeling would

pose a significant risk of serious illness or death. Nowhere do Defendants

state the truth—that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs is a dangerous product

that should not be given to dogs. 

Id. at ¶ 25-26. 

“On or about December 24, 2014, Plaintiff Brown purchased the Dynamic

Real Ham Bones For Dogs from Walmart in Washington, Missouri.” Id. at ¶ 17. 

“She purchased two of the bones, one for each of her dogs . . . .” Id. 

On Christmas Day, Ms. Brown gave a Real Ham Bone For Dogs to each

of her pit bulls: one to Harley and one to Kya. Plaintiff watched her dogs

chew on the Real Ham Bone For Dogs for approximately an hour after

which she took the bones away because she noticed they were starting to

splinter. That evening, both of her dogs became ill. They were vomiting,

had blood in their mouths and in the vomit, and in Harley’s vomit, she also

saw bone shards. Plaintiff Brown called her veterinarian who

recommended she bring the dogs in immediately, which she did. A

veterinarian treated both dogs on an emergency basis, and fortunately both

dogs survived and recovered. Had Plaintiff known the truth about the Real

Ham Bone For Dogs, Plaintiff would not have purchased the product and

would not have given it to her dogs.

Id. at ¶ 18.

The Complaint defines the proposed class as “[a]ll persons who purchased one

or more Real Ham Bone For Dogs other than for purpose of resale.” Id. at ¶ 29.

Complaint asserts the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the Missouri

Merchandising Practice Act; (2) fraud; and (3) negligent misrepresentation. 

III. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of the product label for the Real Ham Bone

For Dogs as a document whose contents are discussed in the complaint. (ECF No. 10-

3). The docket reflects that Brown has not responded to Defendants’ request for

judicial notice. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a

fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . is generally known within

- 3 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or . . . can be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 210(b). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider “materials incorporated into the

complaint by reference. . . .” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d

1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts may take judicial notice of documents discussed

in but not attached to a complaint when the documents’ authenticity is not subject to

dispute. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Real Ham Bone For Dogs label is discussed in the Complaint. Brown’s

claims are based on representations made on the label and communications omitted

from the label. Brown does not dispute the authenticity of the Real Ham Bone For

Dogs label. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. The Court takes judicial

notice of the Real Ham Bone For Dogs label for the purposes of this motion to dismiss: 

IV. Motion to Dismiss

- 4 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. 12(b)(6) Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “A district

court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v.

Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 

Claims sounding in fraud or mistake must additionally comply with the

heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

requires that a complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) “requires . . . an account of the

time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of

the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th

Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,

- 5 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (averments of fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what,

when, where, and how of the misconduct charged”) (quotation omitted). “To comply

with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice

of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they

can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations

omitted).

In a suit involving multiple defendants, “there is no absolute requirement that .

. . the complaint must identify false statements made by each and every defendant.” 

Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original). “On the other hand, Rule 9(b) does not

allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but requires plaintiffs

to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant and inform each

defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the

fraud.” Id. at 764-65 (alterations, citations, internal quotations omitted). “[A] plaintiff

must, at a minimum, identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent

scheme.” Id. at 765 (alterations, citations, internal quotations omitted). 

B. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims

Defendants contend that Brown’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims

must be dismissed because Brown has failed to comply with Rule 9(b). (ECF No. 10-1

at 7). Defendants contend that Brown fails to “specify which Defendant made any

alleged misrepresentations” and “does not allege that Frick’s has made any

misrepresentation at all.” Id.1

 Brown contends that she has adequately alleged the role

of each defendant in the fraudulent scheme and does not need to identify false

statements made by each defendant. (ECF No. 11 at 6). Brown contends that Frick’s

may be liable for Dynamic’s misrepresentations under an alter ego theory. Id. 

The Complaint alleges that Dynamic and Frick’s worked in concert as parent and

1

 Defendants made similar contentions in their Motion to Dismiss Reed v. Dynamic Pet

Products, et al, No. 3:15-cv-00987-WQH-DHB (S.D. Cal.), which this Court denied.

- 6 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

subsidiary entities in the marketing and selling of the Real Ham Bone For Dogs. (ECF

No. 1 at 13). Brown has adequately “identif[ied] the role of each defendant in the

alleged fraudulent scheme[,]” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007),

and the Court is able to draw the reasonable inference that “Defendants” means

Defendants Dynamic and Frick’s working in concert. The Court concludes that the

allegations of each defendant’s involvement are “specific enough to give defendants

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so

that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything

wrong.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).

Defendants also contend that Brown’s claims for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation “must be dismissed because the alleged misrepresentations were not

likely to have deceived a reasonable consumer.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 6). Defendants

contend that “no reasonable consumer could have been deceived by the label on the

Real Ham Bone For Dogs.” Id.2

 

Brown alleges that the Real Ham Bone For Dogs “is not appropriate for dogs and

is not safe for its intended purpose.” (ECF No. 1 at 15). The label advertises the Real

Ham Bone For Dogs as “Real Ham Bone For Dogs.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). 

The label also contains the following language: “Bone is to be chewed over several

sittings, not eaten . . . . Not recommended for dogs with digestive problems or

aggressive chewers. Remove bone immediately if splintering occurs or small fragments

break off.” (ECF No. 10-2 at 5). Accepting as true the allegation that the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs is “not appropriate for dogs,” (ECF No. 1 at 15), the Court cannot

conclude that “no reasonable consumer could have been deceived by the label on the

Real Ham Bone For Dogs,” (ECF No. 10-1 at 6). Consequently, Brown has stated a

plausible claim for relief. 

C. Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) Claim

2 Defendants made similar contentions in their Motion to Dismiss Reed v. Dynamic Pet

Products, et al, No. 3:15-cv-00987-WQH-DHB (S.D. Cal.), which this Court denied.

- 7 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“To prevail on a claim under the MMPA, a plaintiff must plead and prove he or

she (1) purchased merchandise (which includes services) from defendants; (2) for

personal, family or household purposes; and (3) suffered an ascertainable loss of money

or property; (4) as a result of an act declared unlawful under the [MMPA].” Murphy

v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (citations

omitted). The MMPA declares unlawful “[t]he act, use or employment by any person

of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice

or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the

sale or advertisement of any merchandise.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020(1). 

Defendants contend that Brown’s MMPA claim should be dismissed because

Brown “has not alleged an actual deception.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 8). This contention is

very similar to Defendants’ contention that Brown’s claims for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation “must be dismissed because the alleged misrepresentations were not

likely to have deceived a reasonable consumer.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 6). The Court

declines to dismiss Brown’s MMPA claim for the same reason it declines to dismiss

Brown’s claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation: assuming that the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs is “not appropriate for dogs,” (ECF No. 1 at 15), it is a question of fact

whether a reasonable consumer would be deceived into believing that the Real Ham

Bone For Dogs is appropriate for dogs after reading the label. 

Defendants also contend that Brown’s MMPA claim should be dismissed because

she “has pleaded no acts [showing] that she has suffered an ascertainable loss and that

this loss was caused by the alleged deception.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 12). To bring an

MMPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that he or she “suffered an ascertainable loss of

money or property [] as a result of an act declared unlawful under the [MMPA].” 

Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)

(citations omitted). Under Missouri law, a plaintiff fulfills this requirement when he

or she alleges “an ascertainable loss under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule.” Plubell v.

Merck & Co., 289 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). A plaintiff alleges an

- 8 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ascertainable loss under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule when he or she alleges that the

actual value of the item purchased was less than “the value of the item if it had been as

represented at the time of the transaction.” Id. (“[B]ecause Plaintiffs alleged Vioxx was

worth less than the product as represented, they stated an objectively ascertainable loss

under the MMPA using the benefit-of-the-bargain rule.”). 

Brown alleges that she purchased the Real Ham Bones For Dogs based on

Defendants’ misrepresentations that it was safe for dogs to chew when, in reality, it was

not. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 18.) Accepting these facts as true, the Real Ham Bones For

Dogs that Brown purchased were “worth less than the product[s] as represented”; a dog

chew that is not safe for dogs to chew is worth less than the same dog chew would be

if it were safe for dogs to chew. Plubell, 289 S.W.3d at 715. Consequently, Brown

alleged an ascertainable loss. 

V. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10)

is DENIED.

DATED: October 18, 2017

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

- 9 - 17-cv-0659-WQH-DHB

Case 3:17-cv-00659-WQH-DHB Document 13 Filed 10/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9