Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03906/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03906-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

N.Y.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03906-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AFFORDING 

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 48, 49

Before the Court are the following two motions to dismiss the operative complaint

in the above-titled action: (1) "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint," 

filed March 2, 2018, by defendants San Ramon Valley Unified School District, Rick 

Schmitt, Jason Reitman, Ruth Steele, Jamie Keith, Dearborn Ramos, Bernie Phelan, and 

Jason Krolikowski (collectively, "Administration Defendants"); and (2) "Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint," filed February 28, 2018, by defendants Kerri 

Christman Gilbert and Janet Willford. The motions have been fully briefed. Having read 

and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court

rules as follows.1

BACKGROUND

In his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), plaintiff N.Y., who presently is a senior 

attending San Ramon Valley High School ("SRVHS"), alleges he was deprived of his 

constitutional rights in connection with a student election.

Plaintiff alleges that, in February 2017, when he was Junior Class President, he 

 

1By order filed April 10, 2018, the Court took the matters under submission.

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ran for Associated Student Body ("ASB") President. (See FAC ¶¶ 1-2, 32.) The rules 

applicable to the election included the following provision: "Please have discretion when

creating campaign signs and slogans, as any inappropriate material will be removed and 

the candidate is subject to be pulled from the election." (See FAC ¶ 34.)

Plaintiff alleges that, "[i]n conjunction with running for office," he and other 

students created a "short parody video" in which plaintiff "rescues a fellow student who 

had been captured by a radical group with the intention of forcing him to participate in an 

international video gaming competition." (See FAC ¶ 36.) According to plaintiff, two 

students, "both of whom are practicing Muslim Afghan-Americans, volunteered to play the 

antagonists." (See FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges "the school administration found [the 

video] 'inappropriate'," and, in light of such determination, "stripped [plaintiff] of his title as 

Junior Class President" and "permanently expelled" him from the school's "Leadership 

Class" (see FAC ¶ 60); additionally, plaintiff alleges, defendants "suppressed [plaintiff's] 

election to ASB President," even though he had won "the most votes" (see FAC ¶¶ 60, 

64).

Plaintiff alleges that, thereafter, he "filed an ex parte petition for writ of mandamus" 

in state court, which was denied (see FAC ¶¶ 27-28), and that his counsel then 

"informed" defendants that plaintiff "intended to file a lawsuit based on [d]efendants' 

unconstitutional acts" (see FAC ¶ 63). According to plaintiff, although defendant San 

Ramon Valley Unified School District ("the District") thereafter "reinstated" plaintiff as 

Junior Class President, allowed him to "return[ ] to the Leadership [C]lass," and 

"confirmed" that plaintiff would serve as ASB President for the 2017-2018 school year 

(see FAC ¶ 64), "the District, its employees, and its teachers engaged in and continue to 

engage in retaliatory conduct" (see FAC ¶ 114).

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff alleges six causes of action. The First 

through Fifth Causes of Action are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Sixth Cause 

of Action is brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In particular, the First 

Cause of Action alleges defendants violated the First Amendment by promulgating and 

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enforcing the above-quoted campaign rule prohibiting "inappropriate material" (see FAC 

¶¶ 92-93); the Second Cause of Action alleges defendants violated the First Amendment 

by imposing disciplinary sanctions on plaintiff (see FAC ¶ 102); the Third Cause of Action 

alleges defendants violated the First Amendment by retaliating against plaintiff after he 

sought, and stated an intent to further seek, relief in court (see FAC ¶¶ 112, 118); the 

Fourth Cause of Action alleges defendants deprived plaintiff of due process by not 

providing him "adequate notice of what [the District] considered to be inappropriate 

speech that would subject students to disciplinary action" (see FAC ¶ 124); the Fifth 

Cause of Action alleges defendants imposed disciplinary sanctions on plaintiff based on 

his "religion, political beliefs, and race" (see FAC ¶¶ 139, 144-45); and, lastly, the Sixth 

Cause of Action alleges defendants, in violation of Title VI, discriminated against him on 

the basis of his religion and race. (See FAC ¶¶ 152-53, 157-58.)

DISCUSSION

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "can be 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 

under a cognizable legal theory." See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, "requires only 'a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Consequently, "a 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

allegations." See id. Nonetheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do." See id. (internal quotation, citation, and 

alteration omitted).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). "To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material, accepted 

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as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Administration Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. All Causes of Action: Standing To Seek Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief. The 

Administration Defendants argue plaintiff lacks standing to seek such relief.

To establish standing to seek injunctive relief or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must 

show "he is under threat of suffering 'injury in fact' that is concrete and particularized [and 

that] the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." See

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (setting forth elements 

necessary to establish standing to seek injunctive relief); Coral Construction Co. v. King 

County, 941 F.2d 910, 929 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding plaintiff seeking declaratory relief 

must establish "an injury to himself that is distinct and palpable" and "not conjectural or 

hypothetical"). "Standing is determined by the facts that exist at the time the complaint is 

filed." Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). At the pleading 

stage, a plaintiff, to avoid dismissal, must allege sufficient facts to support "the elements 

of standing." See Center for Biological Diversity v. Mattis, 868 F.3d 803, 816 (9th Cir. 

2017).

a. First Cause of Action

In the First Cause of Action, plaintiff alleges the campaign rule prohibiting 

"inappropriate material" is unconstitutional. (See FAC ¶¶ 92-93.) The sole forms of relief 

plaintiff seeks as to this claim are "declaratory and injunctive relief." (See FAC at 24:8-

13.)

At the pleading stage, to establish standing to seek equitable relief with respect to 

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the challenged campaign rule, plaintiff, at a minimum, would have to allege facts from 

which one could find defendants might again enforce the rule against him, e.g., an 

alleged intention to run as a candidate in a future student election in which the rule might 

be applicable. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding 

plaintiff's "standing to seek [an] injunction" depends on whether he is "likely to suffer 

future injury" from conduct sought to be enjoined). Plaintiff, however, alleges no such 

facts. Indeed, it does not appear plaintiff could do so, as, on July 11, 2017, the date on 

which he filed his initial complaint, the school's election for the 2017-2018 school year 

already had occurred and he was about to begin his final year of high school.

Accordingly, there being no allegations to support a finding plaintiff will be 

subjected to the challenged campaign rule in the future, and the sole relief plaintiff seeks 

in connection with the First Cause of Action being injunctive and declaratory relief 

pertaining to the challenged rule, the First Cause of Action is subject to dismissal.

b. Second through Sixth Causes of Action

As to the Second through Sixth Causes of Action, plaintiff seeks both monetary 

and equitable relief. In particular, as to the latter, plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring 

defendants "to cease any form of retaliation against [plaintiff] based on the video in 

question" (see FAC, prayer ¶ A) and "to cease any form of retaliation against [plaintiff] for 

filing any complaint or for seeking to vindicate his constitutional rights" (see FAC, prayer 

¶ B), as well as a declaration that such retaliation is unconstitutional (see FAC, prayer

¶ C).

Plaintiff, who, as noted, is presently in his final year at SRVHS, alleges defendants 

have retaliated against him, and continue to do so, by, for example, "operating a shadow 

government that takes on responsibilities that would normally be the purview of the 

president" and "failing to protect [plaintiff] against harassment from other students 

including incidents of vandalism and hate speech on [his] assigned parking space." (See

FAC ¶ 114(j-k).) In light of such allegations, the Court finds plaintiff has sufficiently 

//

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alleged he has standing to seek the requested injunctive and declaratory relief.2

Accordingly, plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief asserted in 

connection with the Second through Sixth Causes of Action are not subject to dismissal 

for lack of standing.

2. Second through Fifth Causes of Action: "Person"

Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Administration Defendants contend plaintiff's § 1983 claims are subject to 

dismissal for the asserted reason that neither the District nor the individual Administration 

Defendants, to the extent they are sued in their respective official capacities, are 

"persons" within the meaning of § 1983.3

As to the District, the Court agrees. A California school district is a state agency. 

See Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). "State 

agencies . . . are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not 

amenable to suit under that statute." See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against the District, the Second through Fifth 

Causes of Action are subject to dismissal on the above-described ground.

As to the individual Administration Defendants, however, the Court finds

otherwise. In support of their argument, the Administration Defendants cite to Will v. 

 

2Although such claims for injunctive and declaratory relief may well be moot after 

plaintiff's graduation, the Administration Defendants have not sought dismissal on such 

grounds, and, consequently, the Court does not further address the issue at this time.

3Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the individual Administration Defendants in 

their respective official capacities and an award of damages against them in their 

respective individual capacities.

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Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), in which the Supreme Court held that 

that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under

§ 1983." See id. at 71. As further explained in Will, however, an exception exists when 

"a state official in his or her official capacity [is] sued for injunctive relief." See id. at 71 

n.10.4

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against the individual Administration 

Defendants, the Second through Fifth Causes of Action are not subject to dismissal on 

the asserted ground that said defendants are not "persons" under § 1983.

3. Second Cause of Action: Merits/Qualified Immunity

In the Second Cause of Action, plaintiff alleges defendants violated the First 

Amendment by imposing on him disciplinary sanctions because of his campaign video. 

The Administration Defendants argue that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on 

plaintiff did not violate the First Amendment, or, alternatively, that the individual 

Administration Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In support thereof, the Administration Defendants rely on Bethel School Dist. No. 

403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) ("Fraser"), in which the Supreme Court held a school 

district did not violate the First Amendment by imposing disciplinary sanctions on a 

student who delivered a campaign speech containing "pervasive sexual innuendo" that 

"glorif[ied] male sexuality" and was "acutely insulting to teenage girl students," see id. at 

683, as well as Ninth Circuit cases that have found school districts do not violate the First 

Amendment by imposing disciplinary sanctions on students who threaten violence, see

Wynar v. Douglas County School Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding First 

Amendment not violated by expulsion of student who sent to other students "instant 

messages" in which he threatened to shoot specific students); LaVine v. Blaine School 

Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding First Amendment not violated by 

 

4

The Administration Defendants do not contend they are not "persons" for 

purposes of plaintiff's claims for damages.

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expulsion of student who gave teacher "poem" in which he made references to bringing 

gun to school and killing classmates).

The Administration Defendants argue the holdings in the above-referenced cases 

are applicable to the instant case, for the asserted reason that the subject campaign 

video "was potentially racially and culturally insensitive," and, along with "depict[ing] guns 

and violence," contained "inappropriate sexual overtones." (See Administration Defs.' 

Mot. at 2:11-14.) At this stage of the proceedings, however, the Administration 

Defendants' argument is premature, for the reason that the Administration Defendants' 

characterization of the video is not based on the face of the FAC. As set forth above, 

plaintiff alleges the video was a "James Bond" parody in which he portrayed a character 

who "rescues" a student who was "captured" by "a radical group" that sought to force 

persons to participate in "an international video gaming competition" (See FAC ¶ 36.) 

Any finding that the video, as a matter of law, contained, or reasonably could be 

determined by the Administration Defendants to contain, racially and culturally 

inappropriate material and/or violent and sexual imagery cannot be made from the FAC's 

description of its content. See NL Industries, 792 F.2d at 898 (holding, for purposes of 

determining motion to dismiss, court must "accept all material allegations in the complaint 

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]")

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against the individual Administration 

Defendants, the Second Cause of Action is not subject to dismissal.

4. Fourth Cause of Action: Merits/Qualified Immunity

In the Fourth Cause of Action, plaintiff alleges that defendants, prior to imposing 

disciplinary sanctions on him, failed to give him adequate notice of the type of campaign 

activities that could subject him to discipline.

As noted, the rules applicable to the election included the following provision: 

"Please have discretion when creating campaign signs and slogans, as any inappropriate 

material will be removed and the candidate is subject to be pulled from the election." 

(See FAC ¶ 34.) According to plaintiff, defendants imposed "sanctions" on him after 

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concluding plaintiff violated the above-quoted rule. (See FAC ¶¶ 92, 120.)

"A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or 

regulation under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 

notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 

seriously discriminatory enforcement." F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 

239, 253 (2012) ("Fox") (internal quotation and citation omitted). In the school context, 

however, the Supreme Court has clarified that, "[g]iven [a] school's need to be able to 

impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the 

educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal 

code which imposes criminal sanctions." See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.

Here, the Administration Defendants argue, plaintiff's due process deprivation 

claim should be dismissed or, alternatively, that the individual Administration Defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity, for the asserted reason that the campaign rule plaintiff 

was found to have violated did not, contrary to plaintiff's characterization thereof, fail to 

provide adequate notice of the school's disciplinary rules. In support of such argument, 

the Administration Defendants rely on Fraser, in which the Supreme Court held that a 

student who gave a campaign speech containing "pervasive sexual innuendo" had 

sufficient notice such conduct "would subject him to disciplinary sanctions," in light of a 

school rule prohibiting "obscene" language and "prespeech admonitions" by two teachers 

who had advised him it was "inappropriate" and that his delivery thereof might have 

"severe consequences." See id. at 678, 686.

Although not clearly expressed, the Administration Defendants, in their opening 

motion, appear to argue that the stated prohibition of "inappropriate material" constituted 

sufficient notice to plaintiff of the type of material not allowed, and, in their reply, clarify 

that said prohibition provided plaintiff with an "adequate warning" that he could not 

"produc[e] a culturally insensitive campaign video." (See Administration Defs.' Reply at 

6:9-11.)

Once again, however, the Administration Defendants' argument is premature at 

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the pleading stage, as, assuming a "[student] of ordinary intelligence," see Fox, 567 U.S. 

at 253, would be on notice that "inappropriate material" includes "culturally insensitive"

campaign materials, the FAC, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not 

support a finding that the video here at issue was, as a matter of law, culturally 

insensitive.

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against the individual Administration 

Defendants, the Fourth Cause of Action is not subject to dismissal.

5. Fifth Cause of Action: Merits/Qualified Immunity

In the Fifth Cause of Action, plaintiff alleges that defendant Janet Willford deprived 

plaintiff of equal protection by imposing disciplinary sanctions on the basis of his religion 

and race (see FAC ¶ 145), namely, "Catholic" and "Asian" (see FAC ¶ 84), as well as on

the basis of his "political beliefs" (see FAC ¶ 145).

5

 Plaintiff also alleges that the other 

individual Administration Defendants "knew or should have known" said defendant was 

"motivated by animus towards [plaintiff] based on his religion, political beliefs, and race,"

but nonetheless "ratified" her actions. (See FAC ¶¶ 143-45).

As discussed below, plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege an equal protection claim 

against Janet Willford. Further, irrespective of such deficiency, plaintiff fails to allege 

facts to support his conclusory allegation that the individual Administration Defendants 

"ratified" her alleged decision to impose disciplinary sanctions based on plaintiff's religion, 

race and/or political beliefs. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding courts "are not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation") (internal quotation and 

citation omitted).

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against the individual Administration 

Defendants, the Fifth Cause of Action is subject to dismissal. 

6. Sixth Cause of Action: Merits

In the Sixth Cause of Action, plaintiff alleges that Janet Willford, by assertedly

 

5Plaintiff's political beliefs are not further identified in the FAC.

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imposing disciplinary sanctions on the basis of "religion" and "race," violated Title VI, and 

that the individual Administration Defendants "knew or should have known" that she was 

"motivated by animus towards [plaintiff] based on his religion, and race," but nonetheless 

"ratified" her actions (See FAC ¶¶ 157-158).

Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 

color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

As the Administration Defendants correctly observe, Title VI does not include 

protection against discrimination on the basis of religion. See id. With respect to 

discrimination on the basis of race, Title VI "proscribes only those racial classifications 

that would violate the Equal Protection Clause," and, consequently, where, as here, a 

plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of equal protection on account of his race fails, a 

Title VI claim based on the same facts likewise fails. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 

306, 343 (2003) (internal quotation, citation and alteration omitted).

Accordingly, the Sixth Cause of Action is subject to dismissal.

B. Gilbert/Willford Motion to Dismiss

The Court next considers the motion filed jointly by defendants Kerri Christman 

Gilbert ("Gilbert"), a "Resident Substitute Teacher of [SRVHS]" (see FAC ¶ 26), and 

Janet Willford ("Willford"), the "Leadership Instructor of [SRVHS]" (see FAC ¶ 25).

1. Gilbert

As against Gilbert, plaintiff alleges a single cause of action, specifically, the Third 

Cause of Action, by which plaintiff, as noted, alleges a claim for retaliation under § 1983.

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff . . . must show that the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Although, "generally, a public employee acts under color 

of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities 

pursuant to state law," see id. at 50, "acts of state officials in the ambit of their personal 

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pursuits are not state action, see Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th 

Cir. 1996 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Plaintiff bases his claim against Gilbert on the following allegations, which the 

Court assumes true for purposes of the instant motion. On May 18, 2017, a person 

plaintiff "believe[s] to be" defendant Jason Reitman "spoke with the Leadership class 

about [plaintiff]" and advised those present, including Gilbert, that the District had 

"reversed the punitive actions taken against [plaintiff]" because plaintiff "was suing the 

District." (See FAC ¶ 66.) Five days later, Gilbert posted on "the Facebook page for the 

parents of SRVHS" the following comment:

Then we will agree to disagree. It is not about content it's about breaking 

the rules of the contract. What message does it send to the rest of the kids 

who followed the rules. How about the kids who have been working toward 

becoming asb president their senior year. It sends the message that they 

can skirt the rules and get away with it. What kind of kids are we raising 

that look for a way to get around what is stated. I was there when the kids 

were informed and they were outraged and rightfully so. When he takes 

over he's going to have a heck of time earning their respect. And respect is 

not granted it's earned. Next school year ought to be interesting.

(See FAC ¶ 67.)

Gilbert argues that her Facebook posting does not constitute action taken under 

color of state law. The Court agrees.

The FAC includes no factual allegations from which it could be inferred that 

Gilbert's official responsibilities included posting comments on the "Facebook page for 

the parents of SRVHS." Indeed, nothing in the FAC suggests that Gilbert's alleged 

comments reflected anything other than her personal opinion that the District's decision 

was unwise. Under such circumstances, plaintiff fails to allege Gilbert's comments 

constituted state action. See Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 838 (holding defendant employed by 

government agency does not act under color of state law when "pursuing his own goals 

and [is] not in any way subject to control by his public employer") (internal quotation, 

citation and alteration omitted).

According, to the extent alleged against Gilbert, the Third Cause of Action is 

subject to dismissal.

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2. Willford

Plaintiff asserts each of his six causes of action against Willford.

a. First Cause of Action: Standing

As discussed above, the First Cause of Action is subject to dismissal for lack of 

standing.

b. Second Through Sixth Causes of Action: 11th Amendment

Willford argues that, to the extent plaintiff's claims are brought against her in her 

"official capacity" (see FAC ¶ 25), she is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment. The Court disagrees.

The Eleventh Amendment "prohibits a private party from suing a nonconsenting 

state or its agencies in federal court," see Hason v. Medical Board, 279 F.3d 1167, 1170 

(9th Cir. 2002), and, as noted above, a California school district is a state agency, see

Belanger, 963 F.2d at 251. Nonetheless, "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits 

for prospective injunctive relief brought against state officers in their official capacities, to 

enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law." See Hason, 279 F.3d at 1171. Here, 

to the extent plaintiff's claims are brought against Willford in her official capacity, the relief 

plaintiff seeks is solely injunctive in nature, and, consequently, the Eleventh Amendment 

is not a bar to such claims.

c. Second Through Fifth Causes of Action: "Person"

Willford argues that, to the extent plaintiff's § 1983 claims are brought against her

in her official capacity, she is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983. The Court, for the 

reasons stated above with respect to the Administration Defendants, disagrees. See

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10.

d. Second Cause of Action: Qualified Immunity

Willford argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity as to the Second Cause of 

Action, by which, as noted, plaintiff alleges he was sanctioned because of his campaign 

video. In support of such argument, Willford asserts that "there is no clearly established 

right for a student to make a racially insensitive and violent video for a school student 

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government election, which in no way addressed the student's qualifications, ideas or 

positions regarding anything." (See Gilbert/Willford Mot. at 7:11-13.)

Whatever merit Willford's argument may have at a later stage of the proceedings, 

it is, at the pleading stage, premature, as any finding that, as a matter of law, the video 

either contained or was reasonably determined by Willford to contain racially insensitive 

and violent images, and/or lacked any relevance to campaign issues, cannot be made

from the limited description of the video as set forth in the FAC.

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against Willford, the Second Cause of Action is 

not subject to dismissal.

e. Fourth Cause of Action: Merits/Qualified Immunity

Willford argues that plaintiff has failed to state a due process deprivation claim 

against her, or, alternatively, that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Although, much 

like the Administration Defendants, Willford's opening motion does no more than note the 

existence of the campaign rule prohibiting "inappropriate material," she does, in her reply, 

clarify that her argument is based on a theory that such rule provided plaintiff with 

adequate notice that he could not distribute a "racially insensitive and violent campaign 

video." (See id. at 7:18-19.)

This argument, as discussed above with regard to the Administration Defendants' 

motion, is premature at the pleading stage, as, assuming a "[student] of ordinary

intelligence," see Fox, 567 U.S. at 253, would be on notice that "inappropriate material" 

includes "racially insensitive and violent" campaign materials, the FAC's allegations, 

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, cannot be read to support a finding that, 

as a matter of law, the video was in fact racially insensitive and violent.

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against Willford, the Fourth Cause of Action is 

not subject to dismissal.

f. Fifth Cause of Action: Merits

As noted, plaintiff, in support of the Fifth Cause of Action, alleges Willford

discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, by imposing 

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disciplinary sanctions on the basis of his religion, race, and political beliefs. (See FAC

¶ 145.)

"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 

State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' 

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Equal 

Protection Clause). An equal protection claim is cognizable where a defendant's 

enforcement of a rule "results in members of a certain group being treated differently from 

other persons based on membership in that group," unless "the distinction made between 

the groups is justified." See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 

1995).

Willford contends plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a finding that 

she afforded more favorable treatment to similarly situated persons who were not 

members of the groups in which plaintiff states he is a member. The Court agrees.

In support of his claim, plaintiff alleges Willford has not imposed any sanctions on 

students who produced "similar videos." (See FAC ¶ 139.) In particular, according to 

plaintiff, videos created by other students contained, respectively, "sexual assault and 

harassment, torture and . . . an inference that . . . a rival Catholic school is a terrorist 

organization," as well as "drug use," and "explicit sexual imagery of rubbing nipples and 

performing a striptease while money is thrown." (See FAC ¶ 139.) Additionally, plaintiff 

alleges, a previous ASB President sent a "tweet" that "mock[ed] Catholics," and another 

student created and posted a "Pepe the Frog" poster in connection with a sporting event.

6

 

(See id.) Plaintiff does not allege, however, facts to support a finding that any of those 

students were not members of the groups in which plaintiff states he is a member.

//

 

6Plaintiff alleges that "Pepe the Frog . . . typically connotes racist, anti-Semitic or 

other bigoted theme[s]." (See id.)

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Accordingly, to the extent alleged against Willford, the Fifth Cause of Action is 

subject to dismissal.7

g. Sixth Cause of Action: Merits

In the Sixth Cause of Action, plaintiff, as noted, alleges Willford violated Title VI by 

imposing disciplinary sanctions on the basis of his religion and race. (See FAC ¶¶ 156, 

158). As also noted, Title VI proscribes only "classifications that would violate the Equal 

Protection Clause," and, consequently, where, as here, a plaintiff's claim that he was 

deprived of equal protection is not sufficiently pleaded, a Title VI claim based on the 

same facts likewise fails. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (internal quotation, citation and 

alteration omitted).

Accordingly, to the extent alleged against Willford, the Sixth Cause of Action is 

subject to dismissal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants' motions to dismiss are hereby 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:

1. The First, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action are DISMISSED as to all 

defendants.

2. To the extent alleged against the District, the Second and Fourth Causes of 

Action are DISMISSED.

3. To the extent alleged against the District and Gilbert, the Third Cause of Action 

is DISMISSED.

4. In all other respects, the motions are DENIED.

 

7At least some of the alleged speech by other students occurred in connection with 

school-sponsored events other than elections. To the extent defendants contend plaintiff 

is, as a matter of law, unable to establish that students whose speech is made in 

connection with non-election activities are similarly situated to students who engage in 

campaign speech, the Court is not necessarily persuaded. Nevertheless, should plaintiff 

amend his equal protection claim, plaintiff may wish to clarify how students whose 

speech is made in connection with non-election activities are, for purposes of the Equal 

Protection Clause, similarly situated to students whose speech is made in connection 

with student elections.

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If plaintiff wishes to file a Second Amended Complaint for purposes of curing any 

of the deficiencies identified above, such pleading shall be filed no later than June 20, 

2016. Plaintiff may not, however, add any new claims or new defendants without first 

obtaining leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2018

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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