Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a 

limited liability company,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE 

TRIAL AND FINAL PRETRIAL 

CONFERENCE DATES

On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed an ex parte 

application seeking to continue the trial, which is currently 

scheduled to commence on December 1, 2015, until the “end of 

March 2016,” or later. (Pl.’s Appl. 1:17-19, ECF No. 89.) 

Plaintiff asserts good cause exists under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 16(b)(4) to permit the requested continuance, 

arguing as follows:

In the case at hand, Plaintiff’s counsel 

was available for trial at the time that 

trial in this matter was scheduled. . . . 

[H]owever, on or about August 14, 2015, 

Plaintiff’s counsel was rescheduled for trial 

in another matter with that trial scheduled 

to begin on December 7, 2015. The case that 

was rescheduled is a consolidated matter 

involving two wrongful foreclosure sales, 

attorney misconduct, and the testimony of 

several expert witnesses. Because that case 

has been ongoing since August 2011 and 

rescheduled several times in the interim, it 

is extremely unlikely to be rescheduled in 

the face of California law requiring civil 

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lawsuits to be tried within five years of 

case initiation. Furthermore, due to the 

complexity of that matter, Plaintiff’s trial 

counsel, that is trial counsel in this 

matter, is the only attorney competent to try 

that matter. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel 

that is now unavailable for trial is best 

suited to try this matter and prepare and 

represent Plaintiff adequately. Given the 

fact that this scheduling conflict only 

recently arose and that Plaintiff’s has been 

diligent in his efforts in both cases, 

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 

instant application be granted ad trial be 

continued accordingly.

(Id. at 2:1-13.)

Defendant opposes the requested continuance, rejoining:

Here, the sole basis for Plaintiff’s 

request is a scheduling conflict for 

Plaintiff’s lead trial counsel, Matthew 

Mellen. However, as explained by counsel for 

Nationstar when counsel for Plaintiff raised 

the request informally, Nationstar’s lead 

trial counsel also has scheduling conflicts 

after the current trial date. Hence, 

Plaintiff’s request for a continuance is 

prejudicial to Nationstar. Plaintiff is 

essentially asking the Court to favor the 

schedule of Mr. Mellen over Mr. Wraight. 

Similarly, Nationstar would need to inquire 

with its anticipated witness to determine his 

availability (if any).

Plaintiff also does not demonstrate 

diligence in requesting the continuance. Mr. 

Mellen’s declaration indicates he knew of 

this scheduling conflict sometime on August 

14, 2015. However, Plaintiff did not identify 

this scheduling issue until September 29, 

2015[,] and did not file this motion until 

October 2, 2015. Plaintiff offers no 

explanation for the month and a half delay. 

Further, Plaintiff offers no explanation for 

what role, if any Mr. Mellen had in 

scheduling his San Luis Obispo trial for 

December 7, 2015. Trial dates are typically 

continued pursuant to stipulation and/or 

Courts will typically inquire with the 

parties regarding their availability when 

scheduling a trial to avoid conflicts such as 

the one identified here. Here, Mr. Mellen 

does not indicate under what circumstances 

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the Court in San Luis Obispo continued his 

trial. In the absence of such information, 

the Court is left to infer that Mr. Mellen 

had an opportunity to interject, but did not.

This is a simple trial that involves 

minimal witnesses and issues that should be 

tried in one to two days. Nationstar 

anticipates that the only witnesses will be 

Plaintiff and Nationstar’s Rule 30(b)(6) 

witness.

(Def.’s Opp’n 2:5-25.)

Rule 16 prescribes: “[a] schedule may be modified only 

for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers 

the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

“The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it 

cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party 

seeking the extension.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory 

committee’s notes (1983 amendment)). “Moreover, carelessness is 

not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason 

for a grant of relief.” Id. “Although the existence or degree of 

prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply 

additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 

upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that 

party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that his lead counsel is 

unable to try this case, which is scheduled to commence on 

December 1, 2015, and the referenced state law case, which is 

scheduled to begin on December 7, 2015. Further, to the extent 

Plaintiff’s lead counsel is unable to try both cases, Plaintiff

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has not shown his diligence under the circumstances. As stated in 

Plaintiff’s ex parte application, “Plaintiff’s counsel was 

available for trial at the time that trial in this matter was 

scheduled.” (Pl.’s Appl. 2:1-2.) And Plaintiff provides no 

information concerning the circumstances surrounding the state 

law case being rescheduled for trial; it is unknown whether 

Plaintiff’s counsel provided any input concerning that case’s 

trial commencement date or whether he was given an opportunity to 

object.

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s ex parte 

application to continue the trial commencement date is DENIED. 

Dated: October 15, 2015

Case 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK Document 91 Filed 10/15/15 Page 4 of 4