Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01116/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Davey L. Davis,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-06-1116-PHX-FJM (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Buckeye,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April

21, 2006 (#1). On January 26, 2007 Respondents filed their Response (#12) and

Supplements on March 6, 2008 (#38) and March 27, 2008 (#42). Petitioner filed a Reply

on February 5, 2007 (#13), a supplement to the record on February 9, 2007 (#14) and again

on March 15, 2007 (#18), and a Supplemental Reply on April 9, 2008 (#43). In addition,

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 14, 2007 (#15), to which Defendants

responded on February 26, 2007 (#16).

The Petitioner's Petition (#1) and Motion to Dismiss (#14) are now ripe for

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact,

report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,

Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

/ /

/ /

/ /

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1

 Exhibits to the Answer, #12 (A-D) and Supplemental Response, #38 (E-Q), which

are sequentially lettered, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to Petitioner’s

motions to expand the record (#14 & 18), which are sequentially numbered, are referenced

herein as “Petitioner’s Exhibit ___.”

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II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the course of denying Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals

described the factual background as follows:

On 11 April 1984, defendant was arrested for two armed

robberies of an El Rancho Market in Yuma, Arizona. The car in which

defendant was a passenger, a yellow Cadillac with Colorado license

plates, was stopped by police pursuant to a description given by the

store manager. Defendant ran from the vehicle but was soon

apprehended. Inside the car, police found money and a gun. Defendant

also was in possession of marijuana when he was arrested.

Approximately one hour after the robbery, defendant was shown to the

store manager who identified him as the man who had committed both

the April 2nd and April 11th robberies.

Defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery, two

counts of aggravated assault, two counts of theft and one count of

possession of marijuana. Defendant pled not guilty on all counts. The

state subsequently alleged two prior felony convictions and that

defendant was currently on parole from prison in Colorado.

(Exhibit J, Mem. Dec. at 2. See also Exhibit E, Complaint; Exhibit F, Addendum to

Indictment.)1

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In the course of denying Petitioner’s third petition for post-conviction relief, the trial

court summarized the proceedings at trial as follows:

The defendant entered a plea of guilty in early July 1985 to the

offense of Armed Robbery involving the use of a deadly weapon and

while he was on parole. On July 19, 1985, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

604.01(a) in effect at that time and the terms of the plea agreement, the

defendant was required to and was sentenced to life imprisonment with

parole eligibility at 25 years.

(Exhibit A, Order 10/1/04 at 1; Exhibit G, M.E. 7/12/85; Exhibit H, Plea Agreement; Exhibit

I, Sentence.) In determining Petitioner’s sentence, the court relied on Petitioner’s use of a

deadly weapon and having committed the offenses while on parole, both of which Petitioner

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2

 The Petition alleges that Petitioner sought review by the “state supreme court.”

(Petition, #1 at 2.) However, he indicates that the “petition for review” was filed October 1,

1985, which was prior to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision, and he indicates that it was

decide May 27, 1986, which was the date of the Court of Appeals’ decision. (See Exhibit J,

Order and Mem. Dec.) There is no indication in the record of any petition for a writ of

certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.

3

 The Petition alleges that Petitioner’s first PCR petition was filed July 1, 1996, and

denied October 1, 1996, and asserts that his third PCR petition, filed July 15,2004, was his

second PCR petition. (Petition #1 at 2.) The parties have produced no records to reflect the

filing of a proceeding in 1996. The undersigned presumes that this is an error in dates, and

that Petitioner is referencing his 1998 petition.

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admitted as part of his plea. (Exhibit A, Order 9/30/04.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal which was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on

May 27, 1986. (Exhibit J, Order & Mem. Dec. 5/27/86.) Petitioner did not seek review by

the Arizona Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court.2

D. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On July 1, 1992, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit

K).3

 Counsel was appointed who was unable to find an issue for review beyond the

“draconian nature” of the sentence. (Exhibit L, Not. Re Amended Petition.) That petition

was denied by the trial court by an Order (Exhibit M) entered January 13, 1993. Petitioner

did not seek further review on this petition. 

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On April 21, 1998, Petitioner filed his second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(Exhibit N) and Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit O). That petition was denied

by an Order (Exhibit P) entered November 10, 1998. Petitioner did not seek further review

on this petition.

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F. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On July 15, 2004, Petitioner filed a third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with the

trial court, seeking relief under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Petition, #1

at 2; Exhibit A, Order 9/30/04 at 1.) That petition was denied by the trial court on September

30, 2004. (Id.) (Petition, #1 at 2.) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was denied on

August 10, 2005. (Exhibit B, Order 8/10/5.) Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which was denied on March 9, 2006. (Exhibit C, Order 3/9/06.)

G. PROCEEDINGS ON FOURTH POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, again

asserting claims under Blakely and related state and federal authorities. That Petition was

denied on March 16, 2005, and Petitioner sought no further review on this petition. (Exhibit

D, Order 3/16/05; Answer, #12 at 3, n. 3 (asserting petition abandoned after trial court’s

denial); Reply, #13 at 2 (adopting Respondents’ chronology).) 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - On April 21, 2006, Petitioner commenced the instant federal habeas

proceeding by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts

two grounds for relief, both arising out of the trial judge’s determination of facts used to

aggravate Petitioner’s sentence: (1) a denial of his Sixth Amendment jury right; and (2) a

denial of his Fifth Amendment right of confrontation.

Answer - On January 26, 2007, Respondents filed their Answer (#12) asserting that

Petitioner’s petition is untimely, and should be dismissed with prejudice. Respondents argue

that neither Apprendi nor Blakely represent a significant change in the law to justify a

delayed commencement of the limitations period for Petitioner’s claims under those

decisions.

Reply - On February 5, 2007, Petitioner filed his Reply (“Traverse”) (#13) arguing

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4

 Petitioner identifies this as his “first PCR.” (Reply, #13 at 4.) However, he

references it as relating to his challenge based on State v. Tarango,185 Ariz. 208, 914 P.2d

1300 (1996), which occurred in Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding.

5

 In his Reply, Petitioner takes exception to Respondents’ election to raise only a

procedural defense, while reserving a response on the merits. Petitioner asserts that he has

been denied his right under the rules to have the final response. (Reply, #13 at 3.) The

Service Order authorized Respondents to “file an answer limited to relevant affirmative

defenses, including but not limited to, statute of limitations, procedural bar, or

non-retroactivity.” (Order 8/18/06 at 2.) Because the Court does not reach the merits of

Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner has not been prejudiced by the lack of a response on the merits.

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that Petitioner’s failure to present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal and in his

second4

 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel

in those proceedings, and that Petitioner has only recently become aware of that ineffective

assistance. (#13 at 1-3.)5

 Petitioner contends that PCR counsel failed to follow his direction

to seek review from the denial of his first PCR petition, and failed to include claims similar

to his Blakely claims, but based on earlier federal precedent. Petitioner further argues that

he only recently became aware of the claims raised in his petition, and the ineffective

assistance of counsel, and failure of the state courts to identify his claims when reviewing his

case after the filing of an Anders brief. Finally, Petitioner argues that he has no access to

legal research materials, and is only able to obtain legal materials from other inmates. As a

result, Petitioner argues that he has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances which would

justify equitable tolling. (Id. at 2-6.)

Petitioner further argues that Blakely and Booker were a significant change in the law,

justifying Petitioner’s failure to seek relief in his state PCR proceedings. (Id. at 6-7.) And,

Petitioner argues that he has been prejudiced by the Blakely and Booker errors. (Id. at 7-9.)

Petitioner’s First Supplement to Record - On February 9, 2007, Petitioner filed his

Motion to Expand the Record (#14), arguing that a response to Petitioner’s first PCR petition

was not filed until October 28, 1998. The motion to supplement was granted (Order 3/9/07,

#17). However, based upon the record above, the undersigned finds that the referenced

briefs related to Petitioner’s second PCR Petition (Exhibit N), filed April 21, 1998, and not

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to Petitioner’s first PCR petition which had been decided long before. This is confirmed by

the substance of the Reply brief attached to Petitioner’s Motion, which referenced an

argument based on “State v. Tarango,” 185 Ariz. 208, 914 P.2d 1300 (1996). (Motion, #14,

Exhibit I, Reply Brief at 1.) Petitioner’s Petition filed April 21, 1998 references “a

significant change in the law, relative to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tarango, 914 P.2d

1300.” (Exhibit O at 1.) 

Petitioner’s Second Supplement to Record - On March 15, 2007, Petitioner filed

his second Motion to Expand the Record (#18), which was granted (Order 7/26/7, #33). The

exhibits to the motion are intended to reflect Petitioner’s difficulties in obtaining copies of

legal precedents (see Reply, #32), and include correspondence to various courts in 2006 and

2007.

Order for Respondents to Supplement. On January 17, 2008, the Court entered an

Order (#34) noting that the record made available by the parties was inadequate to determine

the timeliness of Petitioner’s Petition, and directed an expansion of the record. The Court

also noted Petitioner’s arguments in his Reply concerning equitable tolling and invited

Respondents to address those assertions.

Respondents filed a Supplemental Response on March 6, 2008 (#38), arguing that

even if timely, Petitioner’s claims are based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

which is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Respondents then filed

a Supplemental Response on March 27, 2008 (#42), providing additional records, and noting

that they clarify the procedural background, i.e. that Petitioner filed three PCR petitions, not

just two as indicated in the Petition. Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling, and that his Blakely claims are without merit because his sentence was not

aggravated because he received the sentence to which he had agreed in his plea agreement.

On April 9, 2008, Petitioner filed his Opposition to Supplemental Response (#43),

acknowledging the inaccuracy of the procedural history in his Petition, which was based on

his memory because of his lack of records. Petitioner argues that upon the denial of his

second PCR petition, he instructed counsel to file a petition for review, and waited six years

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6

 The parties have provided no evidence of a petition for review challenging

Petitioner’s second PCR petition. Petitioner provides no evidence or details of his purported

request to counsel to file such a petition.

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for a result in a special action brought by the state challenging the Tarango decision, and on

his petition for review.6

 In the meantime, he asserts he sought a re-computation of his prison

term by prison officials.

Motion to Dismiss - On February 14, 2007, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss

Unbriefed Claim of Ineffective Assistance (#15), arguing that Petitioner does not assert a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning counsel from his direct appeal

and first PCR proceeding. Although, Petitioner expresses an intent to exhaust his state

remedies on those claims, he clarifies that he “wishes the court to proceed with the remaining

claims.” (#15 at 2.)

Respondents oppose (#16) the motion, arguing: (1) the petition is untimely; (2) any

claim of ineffective assistance is now procedurally barred; and (3) Petitioner is not entitled

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) because Respondents have answered and have not

stipulated to a dismissal. (Respondents do not explain why a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)

(dismissal by court order) is not possible.)

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioner has filed a Motion to Dismiss Unbriefed Claim of Ineffective Assistance

(#15), arguing that Petitioner does not assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

claims concerning counsel from his direct appeal and first PCR proceeding. In his Reply,

petitioner referenced an “unbriefed claim of ineffective assistance” as a basis for his untimely

petition (#13 at 4) . Although, Petitioner expresses an intent to exhaust his state remedies on

those claims, he clarifies that he “wishes the court to proceed with the remaining claims.”

(#15 at 2.)

In essence then, Petitioner seeks to dismiss a claim that he has not made in his

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7

 To the extent that Petitioner may be seeking a “dismiss and stay” procedure to allow

him to exhaust his state remedies on a new ineffective assistance claim, that procedure is not

available here. The Supreme Court has mandated that any such request to stay should

establish that "petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims

are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

Petitioner has offered no cause to explain a timely exhaustion of his ineffective assistance

claim, and in light of the statute of limitations bar, the claim would ultimately be without

merit before this court.

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Petition. Although Petitioner made one attempt to amend his Petition (see Motion, #19) to

assert a claim that the AEDPA was unconstitutional, and one attempt to add two Equal

Protection claims (see Motion, #24) he has not attempted to add a claim of ineffective

assistance. (See Order 6/25/07, #30.) Petitioner has certainly argued ineffective assistance

as a basis for equitable tolling, but the Court has not construed this as raising such

ineffectiveness as a ground for relief.7

Consequently, there is no ineffective assistance claim to be dismissed, and the Court

has proceeded with addressing the claims actually raised in the Petition. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss should be denied as moot.

B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert, inter alia, that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Prior to the AEDPA’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and that "delays of more than

a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief." Calderon v. U.S. District

Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th

Cir. 1998) (real party-in-interest was Rodney Gene Beeler)(hereinafter "Beeler"). Now,

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8

 Conversely, Petitioner argues that his claims are not dependent upon the changes

in the law wrought by Apprendi and Blakely, but find their genesis in earlier decisions, i.e.

Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.

79 (1986). However, neither of these cases supports Petitioner’s claims. Duncan held only

that the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right extended to the states. Thus, it would not support

Petitioner’s attempts in the present petition to assert a Sixth and Fifth Amendment challenge

to judicial fact finding at sentencing. 

McMillan held that a state could designate a factual predicate to a given minimum

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however, petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Direct Review/AEDPA Effective Date - The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, however, allowing for the 30 days Petitioner had to file a petition for

review by the Arizona Supreme Court, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a), after the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision on May 27, 1986 (Exhibit J, Order & Mem. Dec. 5/27/86), Petitioner’s

conviction became final on June 26, 1986. This was almost a decade before the AEDPA

instituted a statute of limitations. 

The Beeler court, following other circuits, held that the period of limitations "did not

begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the statute's date of enactment" of April 24,

1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed by April 23, 1997, or they

were barred by the statute of limitations absent a showing that the circumstances surrounding

the filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s “normal” one year began running on April 24, 1996.

New Claims - While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date

for the habeas limitations period, the statute does provide an exception for changes in the

law. Petitioner’s grounds for relief assert a “significant change in the law”8

 based upon the

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sentence as a sentencing factor and commit its finding to the judge rather than the jury, so

long as the sentence imposed didn’t exceed the maximum for the offense under the facts

established by the jury. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487, n. 13. Thus, the statute in McMillan,

“‘does not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for [the underlying]

offense,’” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-305 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82), and is thus

factually distinguishable from the arguments made by Petitioner in this case. In hindsight,

the jury trial right discussions in McMillan presage the decision in Blakely, but McMillan

did not prohibit judicial fact finding to aggravate sentences. Apprendi and Blakely both

established “new rules” which did so. Because the challenges in Petitioner’s Grounds for

Relief 1 and 2 relate to the judicial fact finding on aggravating factors, Petitioner cannot

obtain relief solely on the basis of McMillan, without benefit of Apprendi and Blakely.

9

 Petitioner also argues in his Reply that his claims derive from U.S. v. Booker, 542

U.S. 220 (2005). (#13 at 6-7.) However, Booker was the extension of Blakely to the United

States Sentencing Guidelines, and thus would be inapplicable to Petitioner’s state conviction.

Moreover, Booker, like Apprendi and Blakely, has been held to be barred from retroactive

application on collateral review. See U.S. v. Cruz, 423 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).

10 The Ninth Circuit has held that both Apprendi and Blakely are not retroactively

applicable. See Rees v. Hill, 286 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi); and Cook v. U.S.,

386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (Blakely).

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decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000).9

 Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the period can run from “the date on

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review.” 

Petitioner is not entitled to this delayed start because neither Blakely nor Apprendi

have been made retroactively applicable by the Supreme Court. "[A] new rule is not 'made

retroactive to cases on collateral review' unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive."

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).10

Newly Discovered Claims - Petitioner argues that he only recently became aware

of the claims raised in his petition. (Reply #13 at 5.) Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an

commencement alternative of "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Thus, where

despite the exercise of due diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate

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of his claim, the statute does not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such

discovery or the elimination of the disability which prevented discovery. However,

Petitioner conflates the factual predicate for a claim and the legal basis for it. Petitioner does

not argue that some new facts only recently came to light. Petitioner does not, for example,

allege that he did not know what sentence had been assigned, or the nature of the analysis

that went into assigning him that sentence. Rather, the recent discovery was simply his

having become aware of recent decisions which, if retroactively applied, may have provided

a basis for a claim. Accordingly, the provisions of § 2244(d)(1)(D) have no application to

Petitioner’s petition.

Expiration of Year - Accordingly, Petitioner’s limitations period began running upon

the effective date of the AEDPA, and absent any tolling would have expired one year later

on April 23, 1997. 

2. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statutory tolling applies during

the entire time during which the application is pending, including interludes between various

stages of appeal on the application. The “AEDPA statute of limitations [is] tolled for ‘all of

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’ “ Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)).

No Tolling for First PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s first PCR petition was filed July

1, 1992 (Exhibit K), and concluded January 13, 1993 (Exhibit M). Because Petitioner’s one

year did not commence running until April, 1996, this PCR proceeding does not affect the

running of Petitioner’s limitations period

No Post-Expiration PCR Proceedings - Petitioner’s one year expired on April 23,

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1997. Once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does

not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Petitioner

is not entitled to any statutory tolling for his second PCR proceeding which did not

commence until the filing of his PCR notice (Exhibit N) on April 21, 1998, almost a year

after his limitations period expired. Similarly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory toling for

his third PCR petition filed July 15, 2004. (Petition, #1 at 2; Exhibit A, Order 10/1/04 at 1.)

Nor for his fourth PCR petition filed January 3, 2005. (Exhibit D, Order 3/16/05.)

3. Present Petition Untimely

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s one year expired

April 23, 1997, and that his Federal habeas petition, filed on April 21, 2006 (#1), was

delinquent by almost nine years.

4. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held that § 2244(d) established a customary statute of

limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. “Generally,

a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). An “extraordinary

circumstance” sufficient for equitable tolling is something beyond a prisoner’s or his

attorney’s control which made it impossible to file a petition on time. Lott v. Mueller, 304

F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because: (1) his failure

to present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal and in his second Petition for PostConviction Relief was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel in those proceedings

(Reply, #13 at 1-5); (2) he has no access to legal research materials, and is only able to obtain

legal materials from other inmates (id. at 5-6); (3) he was awaiting a decision on his second

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11 Moreover, n the absence of a right to counsel, negligence of a petitioner's attorney

in failing to file a timely petition is not an extraordinary circumstance. Frye v. Hickman, 273

F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner had no right to counsel in his second PCR proceeding.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 

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PCR petition for review and on the Tanagro special action (Supp. Reply, #43 at 3); and (4)

he was seeking a re-computation of his prison term by prison officials (Id. at 3-4). None of

these establishes grounds for equitable tolling.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Petitioner assigns blame for his delay to his

counsel on direct appeal, and his second PCR counsel. The latter’s ineffectiveness is

irrelevant. Petitioner’s one year had already expired when this representation occurred.11

Petitioner argues that counsel should have challenged his sentence as a violation of

his right to a jury, under then applicable precedent. (Reply, #13 at 4.) In essence, Petitioner

argues that counsel should have anticipated the holdings in Apprendi and Blakely, and

challenged the enhancement of his sentence based upon the judicially found facts. This

argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s finding that Apprendi and Blakely constituted

new rules. See U.S. v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 973-974 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Blakely court

worked a sea change in the body of sentencing law”). A federal habeas petitioner cannot

attack counsel’s performance based on some later favorable ruling which counsel failed to

anticipate. Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 671 (3rd Cir. 1996). 

Further, grounds for equitable tolling must be external to the defense, i.e. “beyond a

prisoner’s or his attorney’s control.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Ninth Circuit has recognized circumstances where counsel’s ineffectiveness was so egregious

that it constituted a cognizable impediment to filing. Compare Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(erroneous advice by counsel as to the deadline is not an

extraordinary circumstance) with Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003)

(counsel failed to file appeal and despite a request that he return file, retained it for the

duration of the limitations period). Here, Petitioner offers nothing more than appellate

counsel’s failure to raise a novel claim which would have gone against the widespread

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precedent of the time.. 

Limited Research Materials - Petitioner also argues that his lack of legal research

materials precluded him from filing a timely habeas petition. Petitioner goes to some lengths

to document his effort to obtain various court opinions. However, even assuming a complete

law library were available to Petitioner, the claims raised in Petitioner’s petition would not

have been apparent to Petitioner at the time his statute of limitations period was running. It

is the lack of legal precedent, not Petitioner’s access to such precedent, that precluded from

raising his present claims prior to 1997, when his limitations period expired.

Delay re Second PCR Proceeding - Petitioner argues that he waited six years for a

decision on a petition for review in his second PCR proceeding, which petition was never

filed, and for a decision in the special action concerning State v. Tarango. 185 Ariz. 208, 914

P.2d 1300 (1996). (Supp. Reply #43 at 3.) However, Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding

was not instituted until long after his one year had expired. Accordingly, any delay in that

proceeding would have had no impact on his delinquency in bringing a timely federal habeas

petition.

Moreover, Petitioner makes no explanation how the lack of a decision on Tarango

kept him from filing a timely federal habeas. Perhaps Petitioner made a decision to delay his

state filings until the Tarango matter was resolved. However the special action to which

Petitioner apparently refers was resolved on December 5, 1996. See State v. Arizona Dept.

Of Corrections, 187 Ariz. 211, 928 P.2d 635 (1996) (referencing special action brought by

state to clarify Tarango). Petitioner would have had over four months thereafter to file this

action.

Petitioner argues he was unable to obtain a copy of the court’s decision in that case.

However, Tarango did not involve a jury trial right issue, but rather a construction of the

Arizona sentencing statutes with particular regard to the parole eligibility of dangerous or

repeat offenders. Resolution of that type of claim would not have been necessary to the

exhaustion of a Blakely challenge to the judicial fact finding at sentencing as challenged by

Petitioner in the present petition. Thus, any delay in obtaining copies of that decision may

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have been a distraction, but it was not an impediment to filing a federal habeas.

Further, Petitioner concedes that he obtained a copy of that opinion by the time he

renewed his request for review of his sentence by prison officials. (Supp. Reply, #43 at 3.)

That renewed request was made on June 7, 2004. (See Id. at Exhibit II.) Petitioner offers no

explanation for the ensuing delay of two years before filing the present federal habeas

proceeding. Again, perhaps it was to exhaust his state remedies on his Tarango claim. That

would not, however, have been caused a delay in pursuing the instant Blakely claims.

Petitioner has shown, at best, that he was diligently pursuing his state remedies on his

unrelated Tarango claims, then attempted to tack on newly developed claims based on

Blakely, and now wants to raise the Blakely claims belatedly in this federal proceeding with

the excuse that he would have done it sooner but for the delays related to Tarango. While

that may explain Petitioner’s delay, equitable tolling is not based upon the provision of an

explanation, but upon a showing that filing a timely federal petition was not possible.

Efforts at Administrative Remedies - Finally, Petitioner argues that he has

attempted to have his sentence adjusted by prison officials. However, the records submitted

by Petitioner reflect that these efforts were undertaken in 2004, and were based on Tarango.

Petitioner offers no explanation for the delay prior to that time in pursuing his federal

remedies on a Blakely type of claim, nor any explanation for the almost two year delay

thereafter in filing the instant petition.

Summary re Equitable Tolling - Petitioner offers a myriad of explanations for his

failure to file a timely federal habeas petition raising his current claims under Blakely.

Petitioner fails to show, however, that any of the circumstances precluded him from filing

a timely petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any equitable tolling, and his

Petition is therefore untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss

Unbriefed Claim of Ineffective Assistance, filed February 14, 2007 (#15) be DENIED as

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moot. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed April 21, 2006 (#1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: May 2, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\06-1116-001r RR 08 01 11 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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