Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01262/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01262-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHUE YANG,

Petitioner,

v.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden, et.al.,

Respondents.

 /

CV F 05-1262 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS AN D MOTION FOR

MODIFICATION OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE

[Docs. 16, 17]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND HISTORY

Petitioner is in state custody pursuant to a judgment rendered in the Superior Court of the

State of California, County of Fresno, following a jury trial conviction for first degree murder

(Cal. Penal Code § 187); eleven counts of attempted murder (§§ 187/664); auto theft (Cal. Veh. 1

Code § 10851, subd. (a)); and street terrorism (§ 186.22). The jury also found true numerous

criminal street gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), various firearm enhancements (§§

12022.55; 12022.5, subd (a)); that Petitioner intended to either inflict great bodily injury or death

pursuant to (§§ 190, subd. (c); and 190.2, subd. (a)); and that he personally inflicted great bodily

injury (§ 12022.7). Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of twenty-five

years to life, plus nine consecutive life terms, and an aggregate determinate term of fifty-nine

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years on the enhancements. (Lodged Docs. 1-2.) 

Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. On March 2, 2001, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, issued its opinion in case number F030545 wherein it reversed

one of the attempted murder convictions for insufficient evidence and, due to finding that the

trial court failed to independently re-weigh the evidence, vacated the trial court’s ruling denying

Petitioner’s motion for a new trial and remanded the matter for a limited rehearing on the motion

in accordance with the opinion. (Lodged Doc. 2.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc.

3.) The petition was denied on June 20, 2001. (Lodged Doc. 4.)

On July 13, 2001, the Fresno County Superior Court, in compliance with the Court of

Appeal’s opinion, reversed one of the attempted murder convictions, denied the motion for a new

trial, and reinstated the judgment imposed on March 20, 1998. (Lodged Doc. 5.)

Petitioner did not file any state post-conviction collateral challenges to his conviction. 

On August 22, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

On March 8, 2006, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss. Respondent

simultaneously filed a motion for modification of the briefing schedule. Petitioner filed an

opposition to both Respondent’s motion to dismiss and motion for modification of the briefing

schedule on April 5, 2006. 

In his motion for modification of the briefing schedule, Respondent states that in the

beginning of February 2006, counsel began preparation of a motion to dismiss based on

untimeliness and the failure to exhaust state remedies. “However, when setting forth the

background information of the motion to dismiss, [he] became aware of the fact that the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District had remanded the matter for reconsideration

of Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. Not knowing whether the remand would have an effect on

the date finality of direct review occurred, [he] immediately began efforts to obtain from the

Fresno County Superior Court a copy of documentation indicating what occurred upon remand. 

With follow-up, [he] did not receive the last documentation [he] had requested from the Fresno

County Superior Court until this date.” (Motion, at 1-2.) 

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Petitioner opposes the modification of the scheduling order on the ground that it is

untimely pursuant to the Court’s December 9, 2005, order. 

Petitioner is correct that Respondent’s motion to dismiss was untimely filed. Although

Respondent has sought an extension of the deadline for filing the motion to dismiss, Respondent

did so after the deadline had expired and simultaneously to filing the untimely motion. 

Nonetheless, the Court finds that Respondent has established good cause for the extension;

however, Respondent is advised and cautioned that future extensions of time should be filed

prior the deadlines expiration, as the procedure utilized by Respondent in this case is viewed

unfavorably by the Court. See Local Rule 6-144(d). Based on the foregoing, Respondent’s

request to extend the deadline for filing a motion to dismiss is granted, and the instant motion is

deemed timely filed pursuant to the Court’s December 9, 2005, order. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that "an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground." The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

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 Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 2

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

 See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) 3

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corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on March 20, 1998. The California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on June 20, 2001. Thus, direct review 2

became final on September 18, 2001, when the ninety (90) day period for seeking review in the

United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. 3

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) (concluding period of "direct review" includes the

th

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 4

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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period within which one can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year

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from September 18, 2001, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ

of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that

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Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling

applicable to the one year limitations period.) Therefore, the statute was set to expire on

September 18, 2002. Petitioner did not file the instant petition until August 22, 2005.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 4

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner’s direct review became final on September 18, 2001, and Petitioner did not file

any collateral state habeas corpus petitions. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired on

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September 18, 2002, and absent grounds for equitable tolling, the instant petition is time-barred. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60

(1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most

cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time”). “When external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

 In his opposition to the instant motion, Petitioner contends that when the California

Supreme Court denied his petition for review on June 20, 2001, further review would have been

futile because the court failed to consider the issues on the merits. It appears that Petitioner

further contends that when the state court reversed one count of attempted murder and failed to

correct the sentence, he waited for the state court to modify his sentence and was not informed

and did not know how to pursue further avenues. Petitioner further contends that there is no time

limitation on an action to vacate an unauthorized sentence. 

Petitioner’s contentions are meritless and do not support a basis for equitable tolling. A

court’s prior decisions adverse to Petitioner’s position is not sufficient grounds for excusing

exhaustion. Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 130, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1573 (1981) (he may not bypass

the state courts simply because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim); Nolte v.

Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 805 (9 Cir. 1993) (finding that futility may no longer be a viable defense

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to exhaustion). Accordingly, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the Court to

ignore the United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and

find that California’s corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. 

Petitioner’s contention that he was ignorant of the law and of his requirement to exhaust the state

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court remedies, is too without merit. The Ninth Circuit has held that claims of ignorance of the

law and illiteracy are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See e.g. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of th

knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause); Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d

1151, 1153 (9 Cir. 2000) (lack of knowledge of state law not cause); See also Marsh v. Soares, th

223 F.2d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. th th

Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). The Court notes that four years past, after the trial

court issued its decision, on remand, before Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court. 

Nothing but Petitioner’s lack of diligence can account for this prolonged period of time. 

Certainly, Petitioner was not prevented in some extraordinary way from diligently pursuing his

claims. Lastly, Petitioner’s contention that there is no time limitation to correct an unauthorized

sentence, is without merit, as the statute of limitations to filing a federal habeas corpus petition is

not claim specific. Because Petitioner has failed to present any viable grounds for equitable

tolling, nor has Petitioner offered facts which would give rise to one of the conditions that would

establish a later start of the statute - - removal of state impediments, retroactive new rules, or

newly discovered factual predicate, the instant petition is untimely and must be dismissed, with

prejudice.

E. Exhaustion

Respondent argues, in the alternative, that Petitioner has failed to exhaust all of the

claims raised in the instant petition, resulting in the instant petition being a “mixed” petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge her conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d

1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

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with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest th

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis);

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that she was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

As Respondent correctly submits, Petitioner raises the following claims in the instant

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federal petition: 1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain several attempted murder

convictions; 2) instructional error concerning California Jury Instruction, Criminal 8.65; 3) the

sentence on count 13 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654; 4) the prosecutor

wrongfully admitted Petitioner’s statements and prior bad acts evidence and failed to show he

harbored a specific intent to kill persons in the home other than Chang Her and Touhar Fang; 5)

the trial court erred when it refused to bifurcate the trial of the gang allegations from the murder

and attempted murder charges; 6) cumulative effect of errors were prejudicial; 7) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the trial court’s imposition of the aggravated

term and during closing argument; and 8) the sentence of 89 years to life is a violation of state

and federal law and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. With respect to the first claim,

Petitioner also contends that inadmissible evidence tainted the jury. With respect to the other

claims, Petitioner also raises sub-arguments, which the Court does not reiterate, as Respondent

does not contend that they are unexhausted. 

Turning to the only filing in the California Supreme Court - the petition for review filed

in case number S096715, Petitioner has not sufficiently exhausted all of the claims raised in the

instant petition. More specifically, the petition for review sufficiently exhausted, in part, grounds

one and seven, and grounds two through six in their entirety. It did not, however, raise ground

eight of the instant petition or the sub-argument contained in ground one, that inadmissible

evidence tainted the jury. Further, with regard to ground seven, Petitioner argued in the petition

for review that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to the trial court’s

imposition of the aggravated term, the first basis of the seventh federal ground. As Respondent

correctly argues, although the petition filed with the California Supreme Court raises, inter alia,

ineffective assistance of trial counsel it does not specifically do so on the basis that counsel failed

to object to the prosecution’s uncontrollable and excessive force during closing arguments nor

did it claim that trial counsel lessened the prosecutor’s burden and floundered in explaining the

presumption of innocence. Therefore, these two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

are unexhausted as they were never raised to the highest state court. Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 (9 Cir. 1982). th

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Petitioner cannot fault appellate counsel for failing to raise the instant claims in the

petition for review filed before the California Supreme Court. Petitioner, himself, was able to

file a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, and beyond his mere ignorance of the law, there is

no indication that he was unable to do so; therefore, Petitioner’s failure to do so has resulted in

the instant petition being a “mixed” petition, subject to dismissal. That Petitioner was ignorant

of the law and of his requirement to exhaust all claims prior to raising them before this Court, is

not grounds for excusing the exhaustion requirement. 

Based on the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus currently before this Court

is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Ordinarily, the Court would

provide Petitioner the opportunity to amend the federal petition to delete the unexhausted claims

or face dismissal of the entire petition. Because the instant petition must be dismissed for

violation of the limitations period, the dismissal will be with prejudice. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED;

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this action in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 27, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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