Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00512/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00512-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terry Lyn McCutcheon,

Petitioner,

v. 

State of Arizona et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0512-PHX-PGR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Terry Lyn McCutcheon’s (“Petitioner”) Amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended Petition”) 

(Doc. 6). Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 14), to which Petitioner has replied 

(Doc. 20). The matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises one ground for habeas relief in the Amended Petition. The 

undersigned finds that the Amended Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of 

limitations set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.1

 It is therefore recommended that the Amended Petition be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND 

In December 1986, a jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of armed burglary, 

seven counts of armed robbery, and nine counts of kidnapping.2

 (Doc. 14-1 at 75, 100). 

Petitioner committed the offenses on May 1, 1984. (Id. at 78). At the January 14, 1987 

sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Plaintiff was on parole when he 

committed the offenses and was therefore subject to enhanced sentences under Arizona 

law. (Id. at 71). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to terms of life imprisonment on 

each of the seven armed robbery convictions and to lesser terms on the remaining ten 

counts. (Id. at 80-87, 113-14). All sentences run concurrently with each other. (Id. at 

87). 

On September 15, 1988, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Id. at 10-13). 

On November 16, 2011, Petitioner, through the Arizona Justice Project, filed a 

Notice of and Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Id. at 116-19, 121-46). The 

PCR Petition challenged Petitioner’s enhanced sentences by arguing that Petitioner’s 

parole had expired before he committed the May 1984 offenses. (Id. at 127-34). On 

March 13, 2012, the trial court dismissed the PCR Petition, finding that although certain 

claims were timely raised, they were without merit. (Id. at 148-50). On October 3, 2013, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for review. (Id. at 152-66, 168). 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on 

April 22, 2014. (Id. at 170-78, 180). 

On March 20, 2015, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1). 

On June 22, 2015, pursuant to the Court’s Order (Doc. 5), Petitioner filed the Amended 

Petition (Doc. 6). 

2 These convictions followed a retrial ordered by the Arizona Supreme Court in its 

July 18, 1986 decision reversing Petitioner’s convictions following a trial held in 1984. 

The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge’s comments and questions to the 

jury were so coercive that it was error for the trial judge not to declare a mistrial or grant a new trial. (Doc. 14-1 at 2-8). 

- 2 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations set forth in 

AEDPA. The limitations period commences on the latest of one of the following four 

dates:

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 3

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). For habeas petitions containing multiple claims, the appropriate triggering date of 

the limitations period is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 

F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012) (“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 

2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a habeas application on an individual basis.”).

In determining the expiration date of the limitations period, the Court analyzes 

whether tolling applies. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, the limitations 

period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

3 Where a defendant’s convictions and sentences became final before AEDPA’s 

April 24, 1996 effective date, the limitations period commenced on April 25, 1996 unless a later commencement date applies pursuant to one of the three other triggering dates set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F. 3d 1243, 1246 

(9th Cir. 2001) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and holding that the day of AEDPA’s 

enactment, April 24, 1996, is excluded from the limitations period). 

- 3 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 

968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state prisoner is exhausting his 

or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies are pending) (citation 

omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. ANALYSIS 

Petitioner raises five grounds for habeas relief in the Amended Petition. All five 

grounds relate to the sentencing enhancement Petitioner received based on the trial 

court’s determination that Petitioner was on parole when he committed the May 1, 1984 

offenses. For the reasons discussed below, all five grounds are barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations.

A. The One-Year Statute of Limitations Commenced on April 25, 1996

It is undisputed that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final before 

AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 effective date. Therefore, the limitations period commenced on 

April 25, 1996 unless one of the triggering events in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) 

provides a later commencement date. Patterson, 251 F. 3d at 1246. Petitioner appears to 

argue that the limitations period did not commence until he discovered the alleged 

sentencing errors. In the section of the Amended Petition regarding the timeliness of the 

petition, Petitioner wrote “The sentence errors were newly discover [sic], exhaustion of 

- 4 -

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the State Court Remedies became final in 2014.” (Doc. 6 at 13). The undersigned 

liberally construes this statement as contending that the applicable triggering date for the 

limitations period is “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim presented could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence” as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner does not assert the precise limitations commencement date that 

the Court should use. However, Petitioner states that the Arizona Justice Project 

“recognized the sentencing errors.” As the Arizona Justice Project filed the PCR Petition 

on November 16, 2011, the undersigned presumes that Petitioner is asserting that the 

Court should use a date near November 2011 as the limitations commencement date.4

 

The term “factual predicate” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) refers to the facts 

underlying the claim, not the legal significance of those facts. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 

1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (petitioner need not “understand the legal significance” of 

the facts, rather than “simply the facts themselves,” before the “due diligence (and hence 

the limitations) clock start[s] ticking”). As detailed below, because Petitioner knew or 

through due diligence could discover the facts underlying his habeas claims before April 

25, 1996, he is not entitled to a delayed limitations accrual date under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(D). 

1. Grounds One and Two 

In Ground One, Petitioner states that he “was illegally sentenced due to the trial 

court ignoring the plain language of the parole statutes of the State of Arizona.” (Doc. 6 

at 6). Ground Two alleges that Petitioner’s sentences violated the “Due Process Clauses 

of the Arizona and the United States Constitution, because no reasonable finder of fact 

could have found that he was on parole at the time of the offenses . . . .” (Id. at 8). 

4 To the extent Petitioner may be arguing that the Court should use April 22, 2014 (the date the PCR proceeding was exhausted in state court) as the triggering date, the 

argument fails. The date a federal habeas claim is exhausted in state court is immaterial 

in determining the precise date the limitations period is triggered under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(D). See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he date 

of the ‘factual predicate’ for Redd’s claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is not dependent on when Redd complied with AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement. Rather, it is determined 

independently of the exhaustion requirement by inquiring when Redd could have learned 

of the factual basis for his claim through the exercise of due diligence.”). 

- 5 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The record shows that Petitioner was present during the January 14, 1987 

sentencing hearing during which the facts underlying Petitioner’s claims became 

apparent. See United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Surely due 

diligence requires that [defendant] at least consult his own memory of the . . . 

proceedings. His decision not to do so does not bespeak due diligence.”). At the hearing, 

a supervisor in the time computation unit at the Arizona Department of Corrections 

testified that Petitioner (i) earned release credits for certain portions of the time that 

Petitioner was incarcerated and (ii) was released on parole on September 6, 1983. (Doc. 

14-1 at 19). Based on the amount of release credits earned while incarcerated, Petitioner 

had eight months and eighteen days remaining on his sentences at the time of his release 

on parole.5

 Petitioner does not challenge these facts. Nor does Petitioner offer newly 

discovered facts. Instead, Petitioner argues that under the relevant version of ARIZ. REV.

STAT. § 41-1604.07(A) and Mileham v. Ariz. Bd of Pardons and Paroles, 520 P.2d 840 

(1974),6 he was entitled to one day of earned release credit for every two days he was on 

5 The supervisor testified that Petitioner’s parole was to expire on May 24, 1984. (Doc. 14-1 at 48). As Petitioner correctly notes (Doc. 20 at 5), eight months and eighteen days is the length of time between September 6, 1983 and May 24, 1984. 

6 Petitioner was sentenced for the prior offenses in 1982. (Doc. 14-1 at 23). The 

version of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(A) in effect at that time provided that “[e]ach prisoner classified as parole eligible, class one . . . shall be allowed” certain release 

credits. Petitioner relies on Mileham for the proposition that parole is “in legal effect imprisonment.” (Doc. 20 at 7). Petitioner argues Mileham makes clear that while he was 

on parole, he was a “‘prisoner’ who was ‘serving’ his sentence and who therefore was entitled to earned release credits under the plain language of § 41-1604.07(A).” (Id.). 

The 1974 Mileham decision, however, predated the enactment of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41- 1604.07. See State v. Valenzuela, 695 P.2d 732, 735 (Ariz. 1985) (explaining that a new Arizona criminal code went to effect in 1978 and that the “system of release credits was 

substantially changed under the new code”). In discussing the version of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07 at issue in this case, 

the Arizona Supreme Court has stated that “[a] class one inmate earns release credits

according to the nature of the crime for which he was convicted. . . . Inmates may remain in class one only if they are ‘continually willing to volunteer for or successfully participate in a work, treatment or training program.’ Ariz.Admin.Comp. R5–1– 402(C)(1). Inmates who are not willing to volunteer or who do not successfully participate are reclassified and are ineligible for release credits. Id.” Valenzuela, 695 

P.2d at 735 (emphasis added). “[A] parolee is not on inmate status.” Cienfuegos v. Superior Court, 837 P.2d 

1196, 1999 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Petitioner’s claims in Ground One and Two may alternatively be dismissed on the basis that Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s 

application of state law was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due 

- 6 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parole. (Doc. 20 at 8). Under this theory, Petitioner’s parole would have expired 

approximately two months before he committed the May 1984 offenses. Petitioner 

implicitly acknowledges that this is a legal, not a factual, argument where he states that 

the “manner in which the [ADOC supervisor] accounted for the time period during which 

Petitioner was on parole was legally, and significantly, incorrect.” (Id. at 5-6). Indeed, 

Petitioner’s argument merely applies a different interpretation of Arizona law to the same

vital facts (i.e. date of release on parole, amount of release credits earned while 

incarcerated) used by the trial court in determining Petitioner’s parole expiration date. 

Because Petitioner’s argument does not rest on a newly discovered factual predicate, the 

November 2011 “discovery” of a new legal theory does not entitle Petitioner to a delayed 

commencement of the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). See 

Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 n.3; Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting 

prisoner’s assertion that the one-year period begins when he “actually understands

what legal theories are available”) (emphasis in original)); Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 

51, 59 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We have interpreted § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s reference to the phrase 

‘factual predicate’ to mean ‘evidentiary facts or events[,] and not court rulings 

or legal consequences of the facts.”). The undersigned finds that the limitations period 

commenced on April 25, 1996 as to Grounds One and Two.7

 

2. Ground Three

At the sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel argued that the Arizona 

Department of Corrections improperly denied Petitioner release credits for certain 

portions of time that Petitioner was incarcerated. Based on trial counsel’s calculation, 

process or Eighth Amendment violation. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 941 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (“A federal court is limited on habeas review to determining ‘whether the state 

court's [application of state law] was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an 

independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.’”) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)).

7 As Respondents note (Doc. 14 at 14), Grounds One and Two may be construed as presenting a claim of actual innocence. If so construed, the claims are subject to 

dismissal for the same reasons as the actual innocence claim presented in Ground Five, 

which is discussed in Section III(A)(4) below. 

- 7 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner’s parole expired before he committed the May 1, 1984 offenses. (Doc. 14-1 at 

24-31, 38). In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to argue at the sentencing hearing that Petitioner was entitled to 

earn release credits while on parole. (Doc. 6 at 9). An ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim requires a petitioner to show that his or her counsel’s performance was (i) 

objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). For habeas claims alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the limitations period commences on the date that the “facts suggesting both 

unreasonable performance and resulting prejudice” were discovered or with the exercise 

of due diligence could have been discovered. Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 (9th Cir. 

2001) (emphasis in original).

Here, because Petitioner was present at the January 14, 1987 sentencing hearing, 

the undersigned finds that January 14, 1987 is the date that the facts suggesting that the 

allegedly unreasonable performance and resulting prejudice of Petitioner’s trial counsel 

were discovered or with the exercise of due diligence could have been discovered. See

Owens, 235 F.3d at 359 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) did not provide a 

delayed limitations accrual date for claim alleging the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel as the “principal fact setting the stage” for the claim was known at trial) 

(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply and April 

25, 1996 is deemed the date the limitations period commenced as to Ground Three.

3. Ground Four 

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that the trial court erroneously determined that 

Petitioner was on parole when he committed the offenses on May 1, 1984. (Doc. 6 at 

10). Petitioner discovered or with the exercise of due diligence could have discovered his 

appellate counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in July 1987. That is when 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel submitted his Opening Brief on direct appeal, which did 

- 8 -

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not challenge Petitioner’s enhanced sentence.8 See Owens, 235 F.3d at 359 (holding that 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) did not provide a delayed limitations accrual date for claim 

that appellate counsel submitted a deficient appellate brief because the deficiency “was 

readily available to [the petitioner] before the appellate decision. All he had to do was 

read the brief filed on his behalf.”). Petitioner discovered or with the exercise of due 

diligence could have discovered that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s 

performance when the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences in 

September 1988. The undersigned finds that the limitations period commenced as to 

Ground Four on April 25, 1996. 

4. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent of the “‘offense’ of 

committing a felony while on parole.” (Doc. 6 at 11). It is unclear whether a federal 

habeas petitioner in a non-capital case may raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence. 

See Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have not resolved whether 

a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus 

proceedings in the non-capital context . . . .”). It is also unclear whether a freestanding 

innocence claim, if cognizable, may challenge non-capital sentencing errors rather the 

underlying convictions.9

 

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s substantive actual innocence claim is 

cognizable, the undersigned finds that the limitations period commenced on April 25, 

1996 as to the claim for the reasons discussed in the preceding sections. Further, Section 

8 The Certificate of Service attached to the brief states that a copy of the Opening Brief was mailed to Petitioner on July 16, 1987. (Doc. 14-1 at 109). Petitioner does not 

allege that he did not receive a copy of the brief.

9 In Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), the Supreme Court extended the actual innocence exception to procedurally defaulted claims challenging capital sentences. It has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit 

whether the actual innocence exception extends to procedurally defaulted or time-barred 

habeas claims challenging noncapital sentencing errors. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 

386, 393 (2004) (declining to decide whether to “extend the actual innocence exception to procedural default of constitutional claims challenging noncapital sentencing error”). 

- 9 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III(C) below explains that to the extent Ground Five argues that the untimeliness of this 

proceeding should be excused pursuant to the Schlup/actual innocence gateway, the 

claim fails. Petitioner’s freestanding innocence claim therefore fails as well. See House 

v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (a freestanding innocence claim requires even “more 

convincing proof of innocence than Schlup.”). 

B. The Statute of Limitations Expired on April 24, 1997 

The undersigned finds that in this case, the limitations period commenced on April 

25, 1996 as to all of Petitioner’s habeas claims. Consequently, unless statutory or 

equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition expired 

on April 24, 1997. 

1. Statutory Tolling Does Not Apply

In November 2011, Petitioner filed his PCR Notice and Petition. (Doc. 14-1 at 

116-46). The statute of limitations, however, had expired on April 24, 1997. Once the 

statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do not “restart” the 

clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

2. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply

It is a petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our 

precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.”). As mentioned, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that: 

(i) he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and (ii) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his or her way. A petitioner must also show that the 

“extraordinary circumstances” were the “but-for and proximate cause of his [or her] 

untimeliness.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see also 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner’s pro se status, on its 

own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 544 

- 10 -

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or 

procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute's clear policy 

calls for promptness.”). Petitioner does not allege that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Nor does the Amended Petition set forth grounds that would justify equitable tolling. As 

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible for him to file a timely federal petition, equitable tolling is therefore 

unavailable.

C. Actual Innocence

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway” 

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.” 

It is well-settled that “actual innocence means factual innocence, and not mere 

legal insufficiency.” See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)); Calderon v. 

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (“[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is 

concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.”).

10 “To be credible, such a claim 

10 Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned has assumed arguendo

that the actual innocence exception applies to time-barred claims challenging noncapital sentences. As mentioned previously, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit 

have decided whether the actual innocence exception extends to procedurally defaulted or 

time-barred habeas claims. 

Circuits that have addressed the issue are split. See, e.g., Smith v. Collins, 977 

F.2d 951, 958–59 (5th Cir.1992) (assuming without deciding actual innocence exception extends to noncapital sentencing procedures); United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 

284 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the actual innocence of sentence exception “applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of 

the predicate crimes”) (emphasis added); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow 

Correctional Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Because the harshness of the 

sentence does not affect the habeas analysis and the ultimate issue, the justice of the 

incarceration, is the same, there is no reason why the actual innocence exception should not apply to noncapital sentencing procedures.”); Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 

740 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e think that Sawyer, in terms, applies only to the sentencing 

phase of death cases”); Hope v. U.S., 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997) (“we do not think 

- 11 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 

929, 945 (9th Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “‘must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.’” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

As discussed, Petitioner argues in Ground Five that the trial court erroneously 

found that he was on parole when he committed the offenses on May 1, 1984. (Doc. 6 at 

11). The undersigned liberally construes Ground Five as presenting a Schlup gateway 

claim. 

Petitioner’s Schlup gateway claim is premised on his interpretation of ARIZ. REV.

STAT. § 41-1604.07 that he “only had to actually serve two thirds” of his sentence that 

remained at the time he was released on parole. (Doc. 20 at 8) (emphasis omitted). This 

interpretation would result in a finding that Petitioner’s parole expired before he 

committed the May 1, 1984 crimes, rendering him ineligible for the enhanced sentences 

he received. (Id.). Petitioner’s innocence claim does not involve new reliable evidence, 

but is based solely on a novel legal theory. The undersigned therefore finds that 

Petitioner has not presented a claim of factual innocence, but one of legal insufficiency. 

See Marrero, 682 F.3d at 1194 (petitioner raised actual innocence claim in 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 petition asserting that he was incorrectly sentenced as a career offender because two 

the [actual innocence] exception survives the [AEDPA] amendment”); Reid v. State of 

Okl., 101 F.3d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A person cannot be actually innocent of a 

noncapital sentence.”).

- 12 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of his prior offenses should no longer be considered “related”; Ninth Circuit rejected the 

claim because it was “clear” that petitioner’s argument was “a purely legal claim that has 

nothing to do with factual innocence”); see also Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-

82 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a claim of actual innocence based on the argument that 

defendant’s three convictions should have been treated as a single conviction because he 

was sentenced for all three convictions on the same date because such an argument 

is legal, not factual).

For the above reasons, the undersigned finds that the untimely Amended Petition 

cannot pass through the Schlup gateway. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition (Doc. 6) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Amended 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

- 13 -

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 13 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 29th day of September, 2016. 

- 14 - 

Case 2:15-cv-00512-PGR Document 21 Filed 09/30/16 Page 14 of 14