Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02113/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02113-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIEL L. JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. ESPINOZA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02113-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTION;

DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO FILE 

DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL; REFERRING 

MATTER FOR SETTLEMENT 

PROCEEDINGS; AND SETTING CASE 

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

In this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Gabriel L. Jordan 

complains that he was subjected to unconstitutionally excessive force by officers from the San 

Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) in the course of 

his arrest on May 24, 2012 after he and his brother led police on a high speed pursuit in a stolen 

van.

1

The operative complaint is his amended complaint, in which he names the following 

Defendants from the San Francisco Police Department: Lt. Scott F. Ryan2; Sergeants Joshua 

Espinoza, Thomas J. Maguire, Matthew T. Mason, Stephen D. Jonas, Ronald T. Liberta, and 

Joshua D. Hinds; and Officers Yaroslav V. Shablinskiy, Marvin N. Cabuntala, Rolly G. Junio, 

John P. Cunnie, and Victor Hui.

3

 Dkt. 9 at 2. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Before the Court 

is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 59. Plaintiff filed his opposition, and 

Defendants filed their reply. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion For Judicial 

Assistance to Subpoena Discovery Documents.” Dkt. 67. For the reasons discussed below, the

 

1

Plaintiff later pleaded guilty to robbery under California Penal Code § 211. Oldfather 

Decl., Ex. I (Plea. Hrng. Transcript) at 4:7-11:8. His brother pleaded guilty to related charges. Id.

2 Defendant Ryan was a Sergeant at the time of the incident in 2012. Ryan Decl. ¶ 2.

3 All claims against the six unnamed CHP Officers on his amended complaint were 

dismissed because the use of Doe Defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. 14 at 3. To 

date, Plaintiff has not moved to identify them or to add them as named defendants.

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Court DENIES both Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s pending motion.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Version

In his verified amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive 

force during the course of his May 24, 2012 arrest by the aforementioned Defendants. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was pulled over around 11:00 pm on May 24, 2012, and was 

told to “lay face down in a surrendering position with [his] arms and legs spread apart.” Dkt. 9 at 

3. Plaintiff claims that he complied and that “about 6 CHP Officers surrounded [his] right side 

and the 12 SFPD Officers surrounded [his] left side.” Id. Plaintiff claims that as he “lay[] there 

motionless,” one of the officers shouted, “Stop resisting!” Id. One of the CHP officers hit 

Plaintiff in the back of his head with a shotgun, the other SFPD officers held him down by 

standing on his hands and arms, and two other officers held him by his legs while “other officers 

kicked, punched, and slammed [his] head into the ground.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he “went in 

and out of consciousness twice” and suffered a “seizure for the first time in [his] life.” Id. He 

adds that the beating did not stop “until [his] heart and breathing stopped from the abuse.” Id. 

Paramedics had to revive Plaintiff afterwards, and they took him to the hospital. Id. Plaintiff 

claims that Defendants’ actions caused him to sustain injuries, including “numerous seizures, 

migraines, [and] back, right hip, right knee [and] right ankle pains.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that 

he has a permanent limp and that he has to walk with a cane. Id.

B. Defendants’ Version

1. The Car Pursuit

On May 24, 2012, Plaintiff was chased at high speed by SFPD officers for being a suspect 

in an armed robbery and for driving the vehicle that was stolen at gunpoint. Junio Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6. 

Defendant Junio was on duty in his marked police car, patrolling the SOMA/Embarcadero 

Area of San Francisco when he heard dispatch: “Elderly woman was forced out of her vehicle by 

force . . . . A[t] 211 Washington Street/Battery Street . . . 1990 Ford Van With Idaho Plates . . .

Subjects did have a gun . . . they broke her window to get the keys from her.” Id. ¶ 2; Oldfather 

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Decl., Ex. E (Computer Aided Dispatch [“CAD”]) at 1.

Defendant Junio drove west on Harrison Street and stopped his patrol car facing the 

onramp for Highway 80 and the Bay Bridge. Junio Decl. ¶ 3. After about five minutes, 

Defendant Junio noticed a vehicle in his rear view mirror turning onto Harrison Street. Id. ¶ 4. 

The vehicle was headed west, towards Defendant Junio, but it was on the wrong side of the road, 

driving into oncoming traffic. Id. ¶ 5. Defendant Junio watched as the vehicle, which was a white 

van, veered back into its proper lane of travel and kept approaching. Id. As the van passed him, 

Defendant Junio “looked at the passenger4and saw who [he] would identify at the preliminary 

hearing as [Plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 6 (brackets and footnote added); Oldfather Decl., Ex. H (Prelim. 

Hrng. Transcript) at 85:24-86:7. When Defendant Junio saw the rear Idaho license plates, he 

advised dispatch that he may have seen the stolen van and was going to follow it. Junio Decl. ¶ 6;

CAD at 1.

Defendant Junio followed the van up the onramp and onto the Bay Bridge towards 

Oakland. Junio Decl. ¶ 7. Another officer, Defendant Espinoza, arrived as back up and pulled 

onto the Bay Bridge to join Defendant Junio. Id. After about 300 yards, Defendant Junio

activated his lights and sirens. Id. However, the van took off. Id.

The van sped up to 70 miles per hour, headed towards Treasure Island and then Oakland.

Id. ¶ 8. Two more patrol cars, driven by San Francisco Police Officers Cotter and Parra (both nonparties), joined the pursuit. Id. at ¶ 9. Halfway across the bridge, at Treasure Island, the van 

slowed to 30 miles per hour but did not exit. Id. It instead immediately sped back up. Id. The 

van entered the steep S-curve after Treasure Island at 80 to 85 miles per hour, swerving from lane 

to lane. Id. Out of the turn, the van accelerated to 90 miles per hour as it wandered across three 

lanes. Id. at ¶ 10. The pursuing officers described over their radios that the van was changing 

lanes recklessly and driving at unsafe speeds. CAD at 2. Multiple police cars pursued the van, 

and near the end of the bridge, it began smoking and slowing down. Junio Decl. ¶ 11; Oldfather 

Decl., Exs. C&D (DashCam Video 1) at 01:13-01:30, (DashCam Video 2) at 00:30-00:50.

 

4 At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was the driver of the van. Jordan Depo. at 

102:5-103:2.

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The van took the first exit, towards Maritime Street and the Oakland docks. Junio Decl.

¶ 11. The van stopped halfway down the West Grand exit ramp just long enough for the door to 

open and Plaintiff to jump out. Oldfather Decl., Ex. L (Jordan Depo.) at 103:1-15. Plaintiff 

jumped over the retaining wall and kept running through a “grassy field area.” DashCam Video 1 

at 02:40-2:55; Cabuntala Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Jordan Depo. at 103:6-105:9. The van accelerated again, 

driving down the onramp and onto Maritime Street, where it eventually stopped. DashCam Video 

1 at 02:55-4:15. At that point, officers had the van surrounded. Id. Finally, Flloyd Jordan, 

Plaintiff’s brother, exited the van with his hands up and surrendered to police. Id. at 4:15-4:35.

2. Plaintiff Flees on Foot and Hides

Defendant Espinoza was one of the officers following the van when Plaintiff jumped out. 

Espinoza Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant Espinoza learned over his radio that some of the officers had 

started to chase Plaintiff into the wooded area. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff had climbed up a fence with 

barbed wire on top and was running into a wooded area. Cabuntala Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. To prevent 

officers accidentally targeting each other, Defendant Espinoza ordered all the officers to set up a 

perimeter. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 3. 

With the perimeter set up around Plaintiff’s hiding area, Defendant Espinoza ordered 

Plaintiff over the loudspeaker to come out with his hands up multiple times. Id. ¶ 6. When 

Plaintiff did not comply, Defendant Espinoza ordered a helicopter to fly over the area with an 

infrared camera. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The infrared camera located Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. Unable to obtain a K9 unit from Oakland, Defendant Espinoza ordered specialist officers, a group of highly trained 

officers, to enter the perimeter and apprehend Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. 

3. Plaintiff’s Arrest

The specialist officers—Defendants Hui, Hinds, Cabuntala, and Liberta—prepared to enter 

the perimeter area where Plaintiff was hiding. Cabuntala Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. From the radio traffic, they 

knew they were looking for a black male, approximately six feet tall, wearing a light gray hoodie. 

CAD at 4. They knew the suspect had robbed a couple at gunpoint, led officers on a high speed 

chase across the Bay Bridge, and refused to surrender peacefully. Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 3; Hui Decl. 

¶ 3; Hinds Decl. ¶ 3; Liberta Decl. ¶ 3.

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The officers had been listening to their radios as they approached the scene. Cabuntala 

Decl. ¶ 4; Hui Decl. ¶ 4; Hinds Decl. ¶ 4; Liberta Decl. ¶ 4. The following is a transcript of what

was stated on the radio:

1:40:28 SUPP TX: ELDERLY X [WOMAN] WAS FORCED OUT 

OF HER VEH BY FORCE.

. . .

1:41:04 DP03 SUPP TX: SUBJS DID HAVE A GUN . . . . THEY 

BROKE HER WIMDOW [SIC] TO GET THE KEYS FROM HER.

. . . 

1:45:21 SU04 CODE-4 C33 1ST/HARRISON BEHIND VEH

. . . 

1:45:40 DP12 MISC 3B13E, BEHIND THE VEHICLE, RIGHT 

BEHIND HIM, DID NOT LIGHT HIM UP YET.

. . . 

1:46:36 DP 16 MISC 3B13E, #4 LANE GOING 70 MPH.

. . . 

1:47:30 SU04 MISC 3B12E, CONTINUING BENEATH TUNNEL, 

VEH GOING 80-85 MPH AT THE TURN

1:47:30 DP12 MISC 3B13E, GOING 80-85 MPH AT S CURVE

. . . 

1:48:45 DP12 MISC 3B13E, VEHICLE NOW IN #3 LANE, 

SWERVING BETWEEN 1 & 3, APPROACHING EXIT OFF 

EAST END OF BAY BRIDGE

. . . 

1:50:57 SU03 MISC ONE BAILED OUT

1:51:05 DP12 MISC 3B13E, SET UP FOOT PURSUIT, 1 

SUSPECT BAILED OUT, STAY W/ THE DRIVER

. . . 

1:55:15 DP16 MISC 3B16E, SUSP CLIMBED OVER BARBED 

WIRE FENCE

. . .

2:04:52 DP12 MISC 3B13E, OUTSTANDING SUSPECT BM 

[BLACK MALE], HAS LIGHT GREY HOODIE MIGHT BE 

OVER HIS HEAD, MIGHT BE 6 FT

. . . 

2:07:57 DP16 MISC 3A13E, GUN SIMULATED . . . NEVER 

SEEN.

. . . 

2:11:49 SU03 MISC ONE SUSP IN CUSTODY. DRIVER IS 

STILL OUTSTANDING

2:12:16 DP16 MISC 3B16E OUTSTANDING SUSP: BMA 

[BLACK MALE] STOCKY BUILD SHORT BLK HAIR, LSW 

[LAST SEEN WEARING] GRY JKT OR SWEATSHIRT 

CAD at 1-4 (brackets added). Gathering from their radios that the suspect robbed a woman at 

gunpoint, led officers on a high speed chase, and was hiding a dark brushy area, the officers put on 

raid jackets with SFPD patches on both sides, and entered the perimeter area through a hole in the 

fence. Cabuntala Decl. ¶¶ 7-9; Hui Decl. ¶¶ 7-9; Hinds Decl. ¶¶ 7-9; Liberta Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.

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It was a “dark and wooded” area, and it was “very difficult to see.” Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 8. 

Defendants Liberta and Hui drew their firearms while Defendants Cabuntala and Hinds were 

designated runners. Liberta Decl. ¶ 10. The officers yelled at Plaintiff numerous times, 

identifying themselves as police and telling Plaintiff to surrender, to no avail. Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 9; 

Hinds Decl. ¶ 9; Hui Decl. ¶ 9; Liberta Decl. ¶ 9. Each officer believed he was about to encounter 

a suspect who was dangerous, desperate, and armed. Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 10; Hinds Decl. ¶ 11; Hui 

Decl. ¶ 12; Liberta Decl. ¶ 11. 

Defendant Hui spotted Plaintiff in the bushes. Hui Decl. ¶ 10. Defendant Hui pointed his 

firearm at Plaintiff and yelled, “Hey, let me see your hands.” Id. Plaintiff crawled, jumped up and 

started running again. Id. ¶ 11; Hinds Decl. ¶ 10; Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 11. Defendant Hui and the 

other officers started running after Plaintiff, again telling him to stop. Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 12; Hui 

Decl. ¶13; Hinds Decl. ¶ 10; Liberta Decl. ¶ 12.

Defendant Cabuntala was the fastest officer and reached Plaintiff first. Cabuntala Decl.

¶ 13. Defendant Cabuntala yelled, “Stop, police!” Id. ¶ 12. He grabbed the back of Plaintiff’s 

jacket while they were both running. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff spun around and swung his fist at 

Defendant Cabuntala’s face. Id. ¶ 14. Defendant Cabuntala could not avoid Plaintiff’s fist and 

instead tried to absorb its blow. Id. Plaintiff struck Defendant Cabuntala in the chin. Id. As 

Defendant Cabuntala tried to move with the punch, it threw him off balance and he fell to the 

ground, pulling Plaintiff with him. Id. Plaintiff landed on top of Defendant Cabuntala. Id. 

Concerned that a potentially armed suspect “was on top of [him] in a position of advantage,”

Defendant Cabuntala quickly pushed himself away to create distance and tried to gain control of 

Plaintiff’s left arm. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff pulled his arms under his body, refused to show his 

hands, and tried to get back up. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Cabuntala identified himself as a police 

officer and ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting. Id. Fearing that Plaintiff was reaching for a 

weapon, Defendant Cabuntala delivered multiple “distractionary strikes”

5 with his fist to 

 

5 Defendant Cabuntala claims that the “distractionary strikes” he used against Plaintiff are 

“not designed to cause injury.” Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 16, 26. Instead, Defendant Cabuntala claims 

that they are moderately forced strikes that are designed to shock a Plaintiff into compliance. Id. 

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Plaintiff’s Zone 1 (torso) while trying to gain control of Plaintiff’s left arm. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff “continued to resist even after the strikes.” Id. ¶ 17.

Defendant Hinds was chasing Plaintiff about 5 to 10 feet behind Defendant Cabuntala 

when he saw Plaintiff punch Defendant Cabuntala. Hinds Decl. ¶ 12. Defendant Hinds assisted 

Defendant Cabuntala in tackling Plaintiff to the ground. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant Hinds saw the 

Plaintiff roll onto his stomach and shove his hands underneath him. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant Hinds

tried to gain control of Plaintiff’s hands, but Plaintiff resisted, tensing his muscles to fight against 

Defendant Hinds. Id. ¶ 14. Because of the radio traffic and initial call of a robbery with a firearm, 

Defendant Hinds suspected that Plaintiff had a firearm. Id. Defendant Hinds delivered multiple 

elbow and knee strikes to Plaintiff’s torso area. Id. The strikes were conducted with “moderate 

force.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 18. Even after the strikes, Defendant Hinds claims that Plaintiff kept 

resisting, trying to pull his arms back under his body, trying to stand up and tensing his muscles. 

Id. ¶¶ 15,16. 

By the time Defendant Hui caught up, Plaintiff was already on the ground with his hands 

under his body, struggling with Defendants Cabuntala and Hinds. Hui Decl. ¶ 13. Defendant Hui 

yelled, “Hey, give me your hand. Give me your hand.” Defendant Hui was concerned that 

Plaintiff had a firearm. Id. ¶ 13. Despite Defendants Hui, Cabuntala, and Hinds trying to gain 

control of Plaintiff’s hands and arms, Plaintiff kept tucking his hands under him and thrashing 

around. Id. ¶ 14. He also kept trying to pull his arms under his body to stand up. Id. ¶ 15. To 

gain control of Plaintiff’s hands, Defendant Hui delivered several knee strikes to Plaintiff’s rib 

area. Id. ¶ 14. Finally, Defendant Hui was able to help pry Plaintiff’s arms out from underneath 

him. Id. ¶ 16. 

Defendant Liberta also arrived while Plaintiff was “fighting aggressively” with Defendants 

Cabuntala and Hinds. Liberta Decl. ¶ 12. Defendant Liberta was immediately concerned because 

Plaintiff still had his hands under his body and the original call indicated that Plaintiff was armed. 

Id. ¶ 12. Defendant Liberta described the struggle as a “wild, violent grappling match.” Id. ¶ 13. 

Plaintiff was kicking his legs, pulling his arms under his body, pushing up, and fighting with the 

officers. Id. Defendant Liberta was unable to control Plaintiff’s hands and body. Id. Defendant 

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Liberta delivered several closed fist strikes to Plaintiff’s torso and leg area, and he also used knee 

strikes to pin Plaintiff’s legs down. Id. Defendant Liberta claims that the strikes were not hard 

enough to injure Plaintiff, but just enough to shock him. Id. ¶ 13. During the entire encounter, the 

officers were yelling at Plaintiff to give up his hands. Id. ¶ 14. 

Finally, after a long struggle, which “seemed like a minute” to Defendant Hinds, officers 

were able to get a hold of Plaintiff’s hands and handcuff him. Liberta Decl. ¶ 14; Cabuntala Decl.

¶ 21; Hinds Decl. ¶ 16. 

Once Plaintiff was handcuffed and sitting up, Defendant Cabuntala asked Plaintiff his 

name. Cabuntala Decl. ¶ 22. Plaintiff did not respond. Id. Plaintiff just looked of Defendant

Cabuntala and then looked away. Id. Defendant Cabuntala searched Plaintiff’s pockets and found 

a wallet with a I.D. inside that belonged to William Willoughby, the other victim who was in the 

car with the elderly woman. Id. ¶ 23. 

As Plaintiff was sitting there, Defendant Hinds noticed that Plaintiff looked like he had lost 

consciousness but his eyes were open, and he did not appear to be breathing. Hinds Decl. ¶ 17. 

Defendant Liberta immediately laid Plaintiff on his back and began chest compressions. Liberta 

Decl. ¶ 15. Defendant Hui tipped Plaintiff’s head to open his airway. Id. After about 5-10 

compressions, Plaintiff seemed to recover. Id. Defendant Liberta lay Plaintiff on his side and 

waited for paramedics. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. 

4. Plaintiff’s Injuries

When the paramedics arrive, they noted that Plaintiff initially appeared to be unconscious. 

Oldfather Decl., Ex. J, (Summit Medical Records) at 25. Officers had informed the paramedics 

that after Plaintiff’s arrest, he appeared to have seizure “for about a minute.” Id. When 

paramedics told Plaintiff that they were going to give him an “NPA”

6

if he did not wake up, he 

suddenly woke up. The paramedics completed a head to toe assessment and found no injuries

except for slight reddening on his forehead and complaints of “face/jaw pain.” Id. Plaintiff told 

 

6 According to the internet encyclopedia, Wikipedia, “NPA” stands for nasopharyngeal 

airway, which is a tube that is designed to be inserted into the nasal passageway to secure an open 

airway. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasopharyngeal_airway (last accessed on November 13, 

2015).

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the paramedics that he had recently been diagnosed with seizures and did not take any medication 

for them. Id. The paramedics then took Plaintiff to the Alta Bates Summit Medical Center to be 

medically cleared. Liberta Decl. ¶ 16. 

At the hospital, because of the claimed seizure and strange unconsciousness symptoms, the 

hospital tested Plaintiff for drugs and alcohol. Summit Medical Records at 17, 19. Plaintiff tested 

positive for THC and alcohol. Id. Doctors also performed a CT scan, which came back negative. 

Id. at 22. There was no internal bruising or signs of trauma to the brain. Id. Plaintiff did not have 

any facial or skull fractures. Id. A complete physical exam found that Plaintiff had sustained a 

“minor head injury” and suffered “multiple abrasions” around both eyes and “numerous abrasions 

to forehead and face.” Id. at 2, 4. In addition, Plaintiff was “unable to fully open [his] jaw.” Id.

The medical staff noted that Plaintiff had “[n]o fever, chest pain, difficulty breathing, cough or 

abdominal pain [and] . . . [n]o nausea or vomiting.” Id. There was no “edema” or swelling in his 

“extremities.” Id. Plaintiff was discharged to the jail in “stable condition” after his clinical report 

was electronically signed at 5:55 a.m. Id. at 4, 5. 

When he arrived at the San Francisco County Jail, Plaintiff told jail medical staff that he

was being “seen for seizures” at San Francisco General Hospital, and that he has a history of 

“blacking out.” Oldfather Decl., Ex. K (San Francisco County Jail Medical Record). 

During his deposition, Plaintiff confirmed that photos taken that night of his face 

accurately depicted the injuries that he received that night. Jordan Depo. at 148:2-149:23. These 

photos show minor abrasions to his face. Oldfather Decl., Exs. F, G (Photos). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, 

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answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file that establish the absence of a triable 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in the record”). If the moving party 

meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 

557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting in part Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). “Only 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will 

not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if it “properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” 

Id. at 250. Accordingly, a genuine issue for trial exists if the non-movant presents evidence from 

which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could 

resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Id. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (internal citations 

omitted). Only admissible evidence may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder 

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir.1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint 

as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 

plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 

not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). 

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint and opposition were verified, and therefore will be 

considered as evidence for purposes of deciding the motion. Dkts. 9, 69. Plaintiff’s deposition 

testimony, as submitted by Defendants, will also be considered. 

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B. Fourth Amendment Claim

1. Applicable Law 

The constitutional right at issue when it is alleged that a law enforcement officer used 

excessive force in the course of an arrest or other seizure is the Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

394 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on 

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake .” Id. at 396 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the force applied

by officers must be balanced against the need for that force. See Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 

343 F.3d 1052, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In Graham, the United States Supreme Court listed several factors to determine the 

reasonableness of the use of force under the Fourth Amendment: (1) severity of the crime at issue, 

(2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, 

(3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and 

(4) whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of seizure. 490 U.S. at 396. 

These factors are not exclusive, however, and the totality of the particular circumstances of each 

case must be considered. Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the 

reasonableness of a “particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Police officers are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible; they are 

required only to act within a reasonable range of conduct. See Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 

F.3d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152 (1995) (using minimal and 

controlled force in manner designed to limit injuries reasonable); see also Scott v. Henrich, 39 

F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring officers to find and choose least intrusive alternative 

would require them to exercise superhuman judgment), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). “The 

‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the 

officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

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them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citation omitted). “The calculus of reasonableness must 

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of 

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. 

Police officers may be held liable if they have an opportunity to intercede but fail to do so 

when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff. Cunningham v. Gates, 

229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000); Motley v. Parks, 383 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The passive defendant violates a constitutional right that “is analytically the same as the right 

violated by the person who strikes the blows.” United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 

(9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). On the other hand, if an officer is not 

present during a constitutional violation, or if a violation happens so quickly that an officer had no 

“realistic opportunity” to intercede, then the officer is not liable for failing to intercede. 

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1290. 

A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a Fourth Amendment use of force claim 

where there is no genuine issue for trial because the record taken as a whole would not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the plaintiff. See Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 

1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment in favor of defendant proper where evidence in the 

record in support of plaintiff’s excessive force claim was “woefully sparse”). Similarly, summary 

judgment will be available if the district court concludes, after resolving all factual disputes in 

favor of the plaintiff, that the officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(officer’s actions dragging suspect out of a vehicle were reasonable where suspect was stuck and 

officer was afraid suspect had weapon). 

On the other hand, if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence set 

forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 

1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court may not resolve disputed issues of material fact by 

crediting one party’s version of events and ignoring another. Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 

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1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004) (“By deciding to rely on the defendants’ statement of fact [in deciding 

a summary judgment motion], the district court became a jury.”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the record shows that Defendants Hinds, Cabuntala, Hui and 

Liberta (“Primary Defendants”) used excessive force in arresting him after he had already been 

subdued. The Primary Defendants acknowledge that they did use force on Plaintiff, but assert that 

the force used was reasonable to effect Plaintiff’s arrest. Meanwhile, the Court construes 

Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants—Defendants Junio, Espinoza, Jonas, Ryan, 

Mason, and Shablinskiy (“Secondary Defendants”)—as a claim that they failed to intervene to 

prevent the assault. Moreover, while Defendants deny that the Secondary Defendants were 

involved in the use of force, Plaintiff claims otherwise as to six of them.

2. Analysis of Merits of Claim Against Primary Defendants

The Primary Defendants acknowledge that they did use force on Plaintiff, but assert that 

they “used minimally invasive strikes to control a suspect who they reasonably believed was 

armed, who had refused to show his hands and who had just assaulted a police officer.” Dkt. 59 at 

16. However, considering the various factors identified by Graham, the Court concludes that

whether the force used was unconstitutionally excessive cannot be resolved at this juncture.

a. Severity of the crime

Plaintiff’s offense was serious. He was arrested for carjacking an elderly woman and her 

male companion at gunpoint. The situation escalated when Plaintiff attempted to flee officers in 

the stolen van and led them in a high speed pursuit across the Bay Bridge. However, material 

issues of fact are in dispute as to what happened after the pursuit ended. 

Defendants claim that when Plaintiff was forced to flee on foot, he hid from the officers 

and ignored their orders to surrender. The Primary Defendants made contact with Plaintiff, but he 

ran away and forced the officers to chase him. When Defendant Cabuntala caught up with 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff refused to obey Defendant Cabuntala’s order to stop and Plaintiff punched the 

officer. The Primary Defendants claim that Plaintiff continued to resist and struggle with them. 

The Primary Defendants were only able to successfully arrest Plaintiff after delivering multiple 

strikes to his torso, rib area, and legs.

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By contrast, Plaintiff denies in his verified amended complaint that he resisted the officers’ 

attempts to arrest him. Dkt. 9 at 3. In his verified opposition, Plaintiff specifically claims that the 

Primary Defendants used the aforementioned force after he was “lying face down in a 

surrendering position, subdued and handcuffed.” Dkt. 69 at 17.

b. Immediacy of threat to the safety of officers or others 

No genuine dispute exists that Plaintiff posed a threat to himself, to the officers, and to 

others on the road during the high speed pursuit because he was changing lanes recklessly and 

driving at unsafe speeds. However, after the pursuit ended, material issues of fact remain in 

dispute as to whether Plaintiff was still a threat.

According to Defendants, after Plaintiff abandoned the van, he climbed up a fence with 

barbed wire on top and ran into a wooded area. When officers finally made contact with Plaintiff, 

he punched an officer and refused to follow the officers’ orders to surrender, and the threat to 

officers increased as Plaintiff (whom officers believed was armed with a gun) continued to 

disregard commands to surrender his hands.

By contrast, Plaintiff claims that he was no longer a threat to the officers after he 

abandoned the van because he had surrendered and was lying face down on the ground.

c. Active resistance to arrest

The undisputed evidence also shows that Plaintiff actively resisted arrest by taking flight in 

the van and leading offices in a high speed pursuit. Thereafter, Defendants and Plaintiff dispute 

whether Plaintiff continued to resist arrest. Defendants claim that after Plaintiff abandoned the 

van, he climbed up a fence with barbed wire on top and ran into a wooded area. They add that 

Plaintiff ignored the Primary Defendants’ commands to surrender, punched an officer, and then 

physically struggled while the officers’ attempted to restrain him. By contrast, Plaintiff claims 

that he surrendered and did not resist when the Primary Defendants handcuffed him. 

d. Quantum of force used

The force used by the Primary Defendants consisted of Plaintiff being struck multiple 

times to the torso, rib area, and legs by either the hand-strikes or knee-strikes from these four 

officers. This force persisted for a period of a few minutes. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff 

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resisted during the use of force. Defendants claim that each time Plaintiff was struck by one of the 

Primary Defendants, he continued resisting the officers’ efforts to get him to show his hands or 

struggling against their efforts to put restraining devices on him. Plaintiff, on the other hand, 

claims that he had already surrendered and was lying face down prior to the Primary Defendants’ 

use of force against him.

e. Injuries

Plaintiff claims that after the Primary Defendants’ use of force, he suffered a “seizure for 

the first time in his life.” Dkt. 9 at 3. Plaintiff also claims that he “went in and out of 

consciousness twice.” Id. 

Defendants disagree and argue that the evidence of any of the aforementioned injuries is 

weak. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to provide any medical records in support of his 

assertions or any evidence that the injuries stemmed from any particular Defendant’s actions as 

opposed to his efforts to resist the officers. Dkt. 59 at 15-16 (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports 

Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding allegations of injury without medical 

records or other evidence of injury insufficient to establish excessive force)).

f. Efforts to temper use of force

Finally, the Primary Defendants claim they attempted to temper the severity of their 

response by giving Plaintiff numerous oral commands to surrender and, later, to comply with their 

orders to show his hands before using force on him. They stress that the force used was preceded 

by and responsive to Plaintiff’s resistant behavior. 

Meanwhile, as mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that he did not resist during the use of 

force. Further, he claims that “[o]ne of the officers shouted ‘stop resisting!’ as [he] lay[] there 

motionless.” Dkt. 9 at 3. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that there was no need for any such warnings 

against resisting arrest because he had already surrendered prior to the Primary Defendants’ use of 

force.

In sum, the parties relay distinctly different versions of what occurred. Given Plaintiff’s 

injuries, resolution cannot occur by way of summary judgment on the current state of the record. 

Plaintiff attests that the Primary Defendants struck him multiple times, inflicting blows to his 

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torso, rib area, and legs. Dkt. 9 at 3. Even if the Primary Defendants believed that Plaintiff posed 

an immediate threat to their safety, this threat must be evaluated within the totality of the 

circumstances and balanced against the amount of force Defendants applied. Graham, 490 U.S. at 

396; Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60. Plaintiff alleges that he was not actively resisting arrest, 

and that he was lying face down prior to the Primary Defendants’ use of force. Dkt. 9 at 3. 

Without more, these disputes of material fact remain unresolved. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 

1058-60 (officers used excessive force in kneeling and pressing their weight against the torso and 

neck of a suspect who was handcuffed and lying on the ground without offering resistance); 

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (officers used excessive force 

when they punched plaintiff and used a gang tackle and hobble restraints to take him into 

custody). Therefore, the Court finds that the Primary Defendants are not entitled to summary 

judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

3. Analysis of Merits of Claim Against Secondary Defendants

In his verified opposition, Plaintiff claims that the Secondary Defendants are liable because 

they all were “on the scene when [he] endured excessive force.” Dkt. 69 at 17; see id. at 8

(Cunnie), 9 (Junio), 10 (Shablinskiy), 11 (Mason), 12 (Ryan), 13-14 (Jonas), 14 (Maguire), 15-16

(Espinoza). It seems that Plaintiff is arguing that the Secondary Defendants were all present at the 

scene of the arrest and witnessed the use of excessive force by the Primary Defendants, therefore 

they are all liable for failing to intervene. If the force used against Plaintiff by the Primary 

Defendants did amount to a Fourth Amendment violation, the Secondary Defendants are

potentially liable for failing to intervene to prevent the constitutional violation. In addition, as 

further explained below, Plaintiff claims that six of the eight Secondary Defendants were actually 

involved in the use of force against Plaintiff, and their denials of doing so are “p[e]rjured 

statements in the form of Declarations [in Support] of Summary Judgment by all officers.” Id. at 

17; see id. at 10 (Shablinskiy), 11 (Mason), 13 (Ryan), 14 (Jonas), 15 (Maguire), 16 (Espinoza).

However, in their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that the Secondary 

Defendants did not participate in the use of force against Plaintiff and that they could not be liable 

for failing to intervene because they had no opportunity to intervene to prevent the alleged acts of 

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excessive force. The Court considers each Secondary Defendant in turn.

a. Defendant Junio

Defendants point out that Defendant Junio pursued Plaintiff across the Bay Bridge but did 

not participate in the arrest. Junio Decl. ¶¶ 2-12. Defendant Junio claims that he did not use any 

force against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Junio “assisted the several officers 

that entered the perimeter when appl[y]ing excessive force by kicking and stomping the plaintiff.” 

Dkt. 69 at 9. Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Junio 

had an opportunity to intervene to prevent the use excessive force against Plaintiff by the Primary 

Defendants. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25 (finding liability for failure to intervene where one 

officer witnesses another striking blows). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Junio is not 

entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

b. Defendant Espinoza

Defendants point out that Defendant Espinoza pursued Plaintiff across the Bay Bridge, but 

did not participate in the arrest. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 9. Defendant Espinoza attests to the fact that he 

“ordered a group of specialist officers [i.e., the Primary Defendants] to enter the area and 

apprehend Plaintiff.” Id. at 8. However, Defendant Espinoza claims that he neither used force 

against Plaintiff nor was present for the arrest or use of force by the Primary Defendants. Id. at 9. 

In contrast, Plaintiff claims that after he was “in custody and lying face down on the ground,”

Defendant Espinoza entered the perimeter and “participated in the excessive force by stomp[]ing 

on Plaintiff’s head and [when he] held Plaintiff’s head down by keeping his foot in place on the 

side of Plaintiff’s head, yelling profane verbiage while other officers continued to apply excessive 

force.” Dkt. 69 at 16. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Espinoza “did not stop or prevent the officers 

from applying excessive force to the plaintiff who was clearly not resisting.” Id.

Here, not only has Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Defendant Espinoza was involved in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a 

subdued suspect multiple times, see Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60, but also as to whether 

Defendant Espinoza had an opportunity to intervene to prevent the use excessive force against 

Plaintiff by the Primary Defendants, see Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25. Therefore, the Court finds 

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that Defendant Espinoza is not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a 

matter of law.

c. Defendants Ryan and Jonas

Defendants claim that Defendants Ryan and Jonas responded to the call of the armed 

carjacking, and provided back up at the scene. Ryan Decl. ¶ 2; Jonas Decl. ¶ 2. Defendants Ryan 

and Jonas claim they did not take partake in the arrest or use any force. Id.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ryan “participated in the excessive force by 

stomp[]ing and kicking Plaintiff in the right side of [his] ribs, leg and right hip area.” Dkt. 69 at 

13. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Ryan “held . . . his foot down on Plaintiff’s right hip area, while 

other officers continued to apply excessive force.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Jonas 

“participated in the excessive force by kicking, stomp[]ing and hitting Plaintiff while other officers 

continued to apply excessive force.” Id. at 14.

Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants Ryan and 

Jonas were involved in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued suspect 

multiple times. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60. And Plaintiff has also created a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether Defendants Ryan and Jonas had an opportunity to intervene to 

prevent the use excessive force against Plaintiff by the Primary Defendants. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 

1447 n.25. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants Ryan and Jonas are not entitled to summary 

judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

d. Defendant Maguire

Defendants point out that Defendant Maguire was the investigating officer who 

interviewed Plaintiff after the arrest and wrote the investigatory chronology. Maguire Decl. ¶ 2. 

Defendant Maguire claims he did not take part in the arrest or use any force against Plaintiff. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Maguire “participated in the excessive force by kicking and 

stomp[]ing the back and right side of Plaintiff’s head repeatedly while yelling racial [epithets].” 

Dkt. 69 at 15. Plaintiff claims that the other officers “held Plaintiff down and continued the 

excessive force [against him].”

Once again, Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant

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Maguire was involved in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued 

suspect multiple times. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60. Plaintiff has also created a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Maguire had an opportunity to intervene to prevent 

the use excessive force against Plaintiff by the Primary Defendants. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 

n.25. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Maguire is not entitled to summary judgment on 

the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

e. Defendant Mason

Defendants contend that Defendant Mason was involved in being part of the perimeter that 

prevented Plaintiff from escaping after he abandoned the van. Mason Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant 

Mason also helped coordinate the medical response team after the specialist officers alerted him 

that Plaintiff had a medical issue, and he accompanied Plaintiff to the hospital. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant 

Mason claims that he did not participate in the arrest or use any force against Plaintiff. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Mason “participated in the excessive force when he 

stomp[]ped [on] Plaintiff on the back of his head and delivered kicks to the face, yelling racial 

epithets while other officers held Plaintiff down and other officer[s] applied excessive force when 

Plaintiff was handcuffed.” Dkt. 69 at 11.

Here, again, Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant 

Mason was involved in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued suspect 

multiple times, see Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60, and also as to whether Defendant Mason had 

an opportunity to intervene to prevent the use excessive force against Plaintiff by the Primary 

Defendants, see Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Mason is 

not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

f. Defendant Cunnie

Defendants point out that Defendant Cunnie’s main role was that he rode in the ambulance 

with Plaintiff to the hospital. Cunnie Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant Cunnie also searched Plaintiff in the 

ambulance and found a small yellow tool. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Cunnie’s experience led him to 

identify it as a tool used to break windows. Id. After Plaintiff was medically cleared, Defendant 

Cunnie transported him to Central Station for booking. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Cunnie claims he did

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not take part in the arrest or use any force on Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cunnie was “on the scene and was a part of several other 

SFPD and CHP officers that entered the perimeter and assisted in the excessive force by kicking 

and stomp[]ing [on] Plaintiff.” Dkt. 69 at 8. Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Defendant Cunnie had an opportunity to intervene to prevent the use excessive force 

against Plaintiff by other officers. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25. Therefore, the Court finds that 

Defendant Cunnie is not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a matter of 

law.

g. Defendant Shablinskiy

Defendants point that Defendant Shablinskiy’s main role was that after officers 

apprehended Plaintiff, he “went to the hospital where plaintiff was medically cleared.” 

Shablinskiy Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant Shablinskiy claims that he did not take part in the arrest or use 

any force against Plaintiff. Id.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Shablinskiy “participated in the excessive force when he 

stomp[]ed and kicked Plaintiff’s back and left side of rib area . . . , [t]hen crossed over Plaintiff’s 

body while lying face down handcuffed . . . [and] went to his knees, grabbed two hand[]ful[] of 

hair and began to slam Plaintiff’s face into the ground while yelling racial epithets.” Dkt. 69 at 10. 

Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Shablinskiy 

was involved in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued suspect 

multiple times. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058-60. Because the Court construes Plaintiff’s 

allegations to mean that Defendant Shablinskiy participated in the use of force and was present 

while the Primary Defendants engaged in their use of force, Plaintiff has also created a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Shablinskiy had an opportunity to intervene to 

prevent the use excessive force against Plaintiff by the Primary Defendants. See Koon, 34 F.3d at 

1447 n.25.

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Shablinskiy is not entitled to summary judgment 

on the excessive force claim as a matter of law.

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4. Summary

In sum, Plaintiff’s verified allegations that he was lying face down on the ground show that 

he was effectively under police control and no longer a danger when the officers used force 

against him. Therefore, Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether those 

officers (the four Primary Defendants and six of the Secondary Defendants) were involved in the 

use of unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued suspect multiple times. Plaintiff 

has also created a genuine issue of material fact that all eight of the Secondary Defendants had an 

opportunity to intervene to prevent the use excessive force against Plaintiff by other officers. 

Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the Fourth 

Amendment claim.

C. Qualified Immunity

Having concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Primary and 

Secondary Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff or failed to intervene to prevent such 

use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court next addresses whether these 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether 

the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right 

was clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 

unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 

Regarding the first prong, the threshold question must be, taken in the light most favorable to the 

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The inquiry of whether a constitutional right 

was clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 

broad general proposition. Id. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a 

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 

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unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. Although Saucier required courts to address the 

questions in the particular sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to decide which 

prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. See Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

The Court finds granting summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is 

improper in this case. Here, Defendants do not argue that the constitutional rights at issue were

not clearly established during Plaintiff’s arrest in 2012, and, specifically, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s right to be free from the use of excessive force at arrest—specifically, the use of 

unconstitutionally excessive force in striking a subdued suspect multiple times—was clearly 

established at that time. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1061-61 (using police department training 

bulletin warning officers that kneeling on a subject’s back or neck could result in compression 

asphyxia and death as evidence that the force used was unreasonable and that a reasonable officer 

would have known it); Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 (law was clearly established at time of 

defendant’s arrest giving arresting officers sufficiently fair notice that their conduct in punching, 

gang tackling, and using hobble restraints to take defendant into custody could have been 

unconstitutional); Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2007) (As of July 10, 

1998, “[n]o reasonable officer would believe he could constitutionally force a harmless motorist 

against the hood of a car and cause him unnecessary pain.”). Granting summary judgment on the 

ground of qualified immunity is “improper if, under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, and in light 

of the clearly established law, a reasonable officer could not have believed his conduct was 

lawful.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, under Plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe that the 

Primary and Secondary Defendants’ actions were permitted under the Fourth Amendment. In 

addition, where, as here, “the material, historical facts are in dispute,” the availability of qualified 

immunity does not turn solely on a question of law, and the district court is precluded from 

granting summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 

548 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the existence of issues of material fact precludes 

a court from granting judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds, and observing 

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that “sending factual issues to the jury but reserving to the judge the ultimate ‘reasonable officer’ 

determination leads to serious logistical difficulties”).

In sum, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, there are genuine issues of fact as to 

whether the Primary and Secondary Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on the merits or based on qualified 

immunity. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTION

On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion entitled, “Motion for Judicial Assistance 

to Subpoena Discovery Documents.” Dkt. 67. In that motion, Plaintiff points out that Defendants 

produced a copy of the CAD Transcript from the police radio traffic during the May 24, 2012 

pursuit and eventual arrest of Plaintiff, but that it includes “18 redacted lines of information that 

could possibly incriminate the officers.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff asks the Court to “intervene and 

subpoena the documents from the Department of Emergency Management [of the] City and 

County of San Francisco [“DEM”] . . . [a]nd have the documents unredacted directly to the 

plaintiff.” Id. at 2-3.

Meanwhile, Defendants have responded to Plaintiff’s motion stating as follows:

Certain portions of the transcript are redacted because it shows

CLETS information. CLETS stands for California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System, and it can include a person’s criminal 

history, warrants, restraining orders, victim information, sex

offender registrations, DMV information, gang affiliation, or other 

identifying information such as tattoos or scars. California Penal 

Code § 1142 makes it a misdemeanor to produce CLETS

information to non-law enforcement.

Dkt. 68 at 2. Defendants have also attached a declaration from the DEM’s custodian of records, 

Suzanne Borg, attesting that all the redacted portions of the CAD are CLETS information. Id.; 

Dkt. 68-1 at 2-3. Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has “not put forth competent evidence to 

dispute this declaration, the Court should deny any request for assistance.” Dkt. 68 at 1.

At this time, the Court notes that since Plaintiff filed the aforementioned motion, he has 

filed his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 93. Further, Plaintiff has 

neither expressed difficulty filing his opposition due to the redacted portions of the CAD transcript 

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nor indicated that he had insufficient opportunity to discover affirmative evidence necessary to 

oppose Defendants’ motion. Moreover, the Court need not construe his motion as a request for a 

continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) 

(Rule 56(d) provides that a court may deny a summary judgment motion and permit the opposing 

party to conduct discovery where it appears that the opposing party, in the absence of such 

discovery, is unable to present facts essential to opposing the motion.). Therefore, at this time, the 

Court will resolve the pending motion for summary judgment even though this discovery dispute 

exists.

Because this case may proceed to trial if settlement proceedings are unsuccessful, the 

Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion to the extent that it finds that an in camera review of the 

CAD transcript is warranted to verify the basis for Defendants’ redaction. If confirmed that the 

redacted portions of the CAD transcript are “CLETS information,” then an unredacted version will 

not issue. Therefore, until the Court reviews the unredacted version, it DENIES in part Plaintiff’s 

motion to the extent that he seeks an order to subpoena a copy of the unredacted version. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s “Motion for 

Judicial Assistance to Subpoena Discovery Documents.” Dkt. 67. The Court directs Defendant to 

provide it with a copy of the unredacted CAD transcript. Said document shall be filed under seal 

and not available for inspection by the public or Plaintiff absent a court order permitting such 

inspection, as directed below.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt. 59.

2. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Judicial Assistance to Subpoena Discovery Documents” is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dkt. 67. No later than March 14, 2016, Defense 

counsel must e-file the unredacted CAD transcript under seal in accordance with the instructions 

in Northern District Civil Local Rule 79-5. 

3. The Northern District of California has established a Pro Se Prisoner Settlement 

Program. Certain prisoner civil rights cases may be referred to a Magistrate Judge for a settlement 

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conference. The Court finds that a referral is in order as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim. 

Thus, this case is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas for a settlement conference. 

The conference shall take place within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, or as soon 

thereafter as is convenient to the Magistrate Judge’s calendar. Magistrate Judge Vadas shall 

coordinate a time and date for the conference with all interested parties and/or their representatives 

and, within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the Court a report of the 

result of the conference. The Clerk of the Court shall provide a copy of this Order to Magistrate 

Judge Vadas. 

4. If this matter does not settle, then this case will proceed to trial.

5. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and Civil L. R. 16-10, a Case Management 

Conference shall be held in this case on Monday, June 6, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., at the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of California, Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building, 

Oakland in Courtroom 1, 4th Floor. Because Plaintiff is incarcerated, he may appear 

telephonically.

Each party must file and serve a case management statement no later than seven (7) 

calendar days prior to the Case Management Conference, indicating what discovery remains to 

be done, the amount of time needed for discovery, whether any further motions will be filed, when 

they will be ready for trial, and an estimate of the number of days needed for trial. The case 

management conference statements need not be jointly prepared. 

The Deputy Attorney General representing Defendants in this action will be responsible 

for making sure Plaintiff appears telephonically. The Deputy Attorney General should call the 

courtroom deputy in advance to obtain the phone number. 

As set forth in the Court’s Standing Order in Civil Cases, these conferences are intended to 

be substantive and productive. Accordingly, each party shall be present at the Case Management 

Conference with authority to enter into stipulations and make admissions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16(a) and (c), as well as fully prepared to address all of the matters referred to in the CAND 

CMC Order and Civil L.R. 16-10(b). 

Failure to do so shall be considered grounds for sanctions.

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6. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 59 and 67.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

February 29, 2016

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