Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01819/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01819-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA S. WILLS and CARMEL 

RESORT SUPPLY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HANSON BRIDGETT, LLP, and FIRST 

REPUBLIC BANK,

 Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01819-NC 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS; DISMISSING CASE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 48, 49

Pro se plaintiff Cynthia Wills brings claims for breach of contract, negligent infliction 

of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants 

Hanson Bridgett LLP and First Republic Bank arising out of two checks that she alleges 

were not delivered on time. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1. Because Wills fails to allege sufficient 

facts to state any claims against Hanson Bridgett or First Republic Bank, all claims against 

both defendants are DISMISSED. No claims remain, so the case is hereby DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Cynthia Wills filed this case pro se in state court against defendants United Postal 

Service, Hanson Bridgett LLP, and First Republic Bank. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1 (Complaint). 

Defendants removed the case to federal court. Dkt. No. 1. This Court denied Wills’s 

motion to remand. Dkt. No. 39. Defendants filed motions to dismiss all claims. Dkt. Nos. 

7, 10, 14. The Court held a hearing on the motions. Dkt. No. 40. The Court granted the 

motions to dismiss, dismissing former defendant UPS from the case. Dkt. No. 42. The 

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Court dismissed all of Ms. Wills’s claims against Hanson Bridgett and First Republic 

Bank, and granted Ms. Wills leave to amend. Dkt. No. 42. 

The amended complaint lists “Cynthia S. Wills” and “Carmel Resort Supply” as 

plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 42 at 1. She explains that she is “an individual and sole proprietor, 

d/b/a Carmel Resort Supply.” Id. Wills’s amended complaint alleges that she entered into 

“partly written . . . oral and implied in fact contract/s” with First Republic Bank on May 

10, 2018, that obligated the bank “to secure timely delivery of a $10,000 check to 

American Express” for payment on her account. FAC ¶ 9. She alleges that the check was 

not received by American Express on time, causing her to miss a payment.1 Id. She 

alleges that she requested another check from FRB on July 13, 2018, this time for $800 

and for delivery directly to her. FAC ¶ 10. 

Wills alleges that sometime between July 13 and July 19, 2018, she received a call 

from an attorney at Hanson Bridgett, a law firm representing FRB. FAC ¶ 11. She 

expressed concern in that phone call about the issues with the $10,000 check. Id. On July 

19, 2018, Wills received a letter from Hanson Bridgett stating that FRB had retained their 

firm “to review [her] accusations and address [her] harassment of various personnel in 

offices in San Francisco and other bank branches,” and informing her that her FRB 

account was being closed. Id. The $800 check was not enclosed with the letter. Id. Wills 

found herself “in banking hell.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Wills attaches to her complaint a letter from Hanson Bridgett dated July 20, 2018, 

which states that two checks were awaiting pick-up at the United States Post Office (one 

for $800, and one for $3,571.84). Dkt. No. 43, Ex. 3. The letter states that “[a]n employee 

of the United States Postal Service telephonically confirmed that the check is there waiting 

1 The amended complaint is not clear as to when the $10,000 check was eventually 

delivered. Wills states that “[later] AE then informed Wills that the $10,000 check 

received bounced,” which appears to indicate that the check was delivered at some point. 

FAC ¶ 9. She sent a letter to FRB concerning the $10,000 check on July 10, 2018, so the 

amended complaint seems to suggest that it was delivered before that date. FAC ¶ 10. She 

later states that she “worked extensively with American Express to resolve the nightmare 

involving the $10,000.00 check, which lasted until the third week in September and wasn’t 

fully resolved until late October,” though that resolution is not detailed. FAC ¶ 11.

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for you to pick it up.” Id. Wills also attaches a letter that she wrote to Hanson Bridgett on 

July 24, 2018, stating that she would not cash the checks and requesting that they be sent 

to a different location. Dkt. No. 43, Ex. 4. She received the checks at that new location on 

July 26, 2018. FAC ¶ 11. Timing was so tight that she had to hand deliver her next 

payment to her creditor. Id. Wills states that her business suffered and that she was forced 

to vacate her office space as a result of defendants’ actions. Id.

FRB and Hanson Bridgett moved to dismiss the entire complaint. Dkt. Nos. 48, 49. 

Wills filed an opposition to the motions. Dkt. No. 52. All parties consented to the 

jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkt. Nos. 11, 15, 16, 30.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend 

should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Contract

To plead a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a 

contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; 

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and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 

811, 821 (2011). A contract can be created orally, in writing, or through conduct. Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 1620–1622. An implied-in-fact contract can be inferred from the parties’ 

conduct. Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transportation Co., 69 Cal. 

App. 3d 268, 275 (1977). 

1. First Republic Bank

Wills alleges that she entered into written, oral, and implied in fact contract(s) with 

First Republic Bank in May and July, 2018, for the bank to send a $10,000 check to 

American Express and then for the bank to send an $800 check to her. FAC ¶¶ 9–10. In 

its previous order granting FRB’s motion to dismiss the original complaint, the Court 

found that Wills had not pleaded facts to establish that a contract existed between herself 

and FRB in the first place. Dkt. No. 42 at 3. The Court stated that “Wills must describe 

what the offer was, how it was accepted, and what consideration was exchanged” in order 

to allege that a contract existed to state a claim for breach. Id. 

Wills has not cured this deficiency in the amended complaint. She calls the contract 

between herself and FRB “a valid a binding contract,” “valid and enforceable,” and “in full 

force and effect.” FAC ¶ 13, 15. But the Court cannot determine what contract ever 

existed. As the Court pointed out in its previous order, Wills does not attach copies of ay 

alleged written contracts, nor does she describe their terms. Wills alleges that she spoke 

on the phone with an FRB employee but not that any contract was formed on any call. 

FAC ¶ 9. In a section of the amended complaint titled “Contract Overview and Breach,” 

Wills states that she sent an Unfair Trade Practices Act letter to FRB’s corporate office but 

again describes no contract between her and any FRB representative. 

Instead of facts, Wills’s breach of contract claim consists of legal conclusions. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Wills has not cured the deficiencies identified in its prior 

order. Wills’s amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a facially 

plausible claim for breach of contract against FRB. The breach of contract claim against 

FRB is DISMISSED. Having already had an opportunity to allege additional facts and 

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having failed to do so, the Court finds that further amendment would be futile. 

2. Hanson Bridgett, LLP

Wills alleges “the 2018 Agreement/s between Wills and Hanson Bridgett LLP was a 

valid and binding contract.” FAC ¶ 26. It is unclear what agreement(s) this refers to, 

except possibly a 2018 IRA Withdrawal Authorization form that Wills attaches to the 

complaint. Dkt. No. 43, Ex. 2. This form is not a contract between Wills and Hanson 

Bridgett. Hanson Bridgett did not sign the form, is not mentioned on the form, and Wills 

does not allege that anyone from Hanson Bridgett ever saw, read, or had knowledge of the 

form. Wills does not allege the existence of any other “2018 Agreement/s” between 

herself and the law firm. Wills alleges vaguely that Hanson Bridgett was obligated to 

“honor” any contract between herself and FRB. FAC ¶ 2. However, as the Court found 

above, Wills has not alleged the existence of any contract between herself and FRB and, 

further, has not shown why any such contract would obligate Hanson Bridgett.

The Court’s order granting the defendants’ previous motion to dismiss stated: 

“[b]ecause Hanson Bridgett is the Bank’s legal counsel and otherwise had no relationship 

with Wills, the Court is skeptical that Wills will be able to state any claim against Hanson 

Bridgett for breach of contract.” Dkt. No. 42. Indeed, the Court finds that Wills has not 

alleged sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim for breach of contract against 

Hanson Bridgett. The breach of contract claim against Hanson Bridgett is DISMISSED. 

Having already had an opportunity to allege additional facts and having failed to do so, the 

Court finds that further amendment would be futile. 

B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence

To plead a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 

allege an underlying tort—NIED is not a standalone cause of action. Ragland v. U.S. Bank 

Nat’l Assn., 209 Cal. App. 4th 182, 205 (2012). In the event that Wills intends to plead a 

claim for negligence to underly her claim of NIED, the Court analyzes the complaint for a

claim of negligence. A claim of negligence requires a duty of care owed by the defendant 

to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, and damages. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 

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Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993). The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging that a duty is owed. 

Laico v. Chevron USA, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 649 (2004). The plaintiff may allege facts 

to show that a special relationship or other circumstances create an affirmative duty of 

care. Douri v. Spring Val. Water Co., 8 Cal. App. 588 (1908). 

In its previous order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim, the 

Court found that Wills had not alleged the first element of negligence: that FRB or Hanson 

Bridgett owed her a duty of care. Dkt. No. 42 at 6. Neither did Wills allege that a special 

relationship existed between herself and either defendant to create an affirmative duty of 

care. Id. Again, Wills’s amended complaint fails on these grounds. The amended 

complaint states the legal conclusion that “[t]he Defendant engaged in negligent conduct 

and had a legal duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing the Plaintiff harm and owed a 

duty of care to protect Wills from reasonably foreseeable negative consequences.” FAC ¶ 

35. But Wills states no factual grounds for this alleged “duty” as to either defendant. As 

with the original complaint, without establishing that the Bank or Hanson Bridgett owed 

her a duty of care, Wills cannot plead a negligence claim based on a breach of that duty. 

The Court finds that Wills has not alleged sufficient facts to state a facially 

plausible claim for negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress against FRB or 

Hanson Bridgett. The NIED claim as to both defendants is DISMISSED. Having already 

had an opportunity to allege additional facts and having failed to do so, the Court finds that

further amendment would be futile.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 

allege (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) severe emotional 

suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Hughes v. 

Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009). Conduct is “outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 1050–1051. 

The emotional distress endured must be of “such substantial quality or enduring quality 

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that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Potter, 6 

Cal. 4th at 1004. 

The Court previously found that Wills’s original complaint failed to state a claim 

for IIED because she did not allege extreme or outrageous conduct. Dkt. No. 42 at 7. The 

conduct alleged in the amended complaint is the same as in the first, with minor additional 

details. The amended complaint is still based on two checks that did not arrive in the mail 

on time. As the Court previously stated, “not only is this conduct not outrageous, it is 

rather ordinary.” Id. Wills further fails to allege that any defendant caused her distress 

intentionally or with reckless disregard. She only states legal conclusions, such as 

“Hanson Bridgett LLPs’ [sic] intentional and reckless failure and refusal to secure timely 

delivery” of her check “was extreme and outrageous.” FAC ¶ 40. This conclusory 

language does not include facts that go toward stating a claim. 

Moreover, Wills still fails to allege that she endured substantial or enduring 

emotional distress. Wills states that her business suffered and that she was forced to vacate 

her office space as a result of defendants’ actions. FAC ¶ 11. The Court still appreciates 

Wills’s suffering, but, as alleged, it does not rise to the level of distress beyond what a 

person in a civilized society should be expected to ever endure. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004. 

Wills has not alleged sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress against FRB or Hanson Bridgett. The IIED 

claim against both defendants is DISMISSED. Having already had an opportunity to 

allege additional facts and having failed to do so, the Court finds that further amendment 

would be futile.

D. Claims by Carmel Resort Supply

Finally, the Court considers whether plaintiff “Carmel Resort Supply” has any 

claims that are independent of Wills. The amended complaint alleges on page one that 

Wills is a “sole proprietor, d/b/a Carmel Resort Supply.” She does not allege that Carmel 

Resort Supply entered into any contract or suffered any damages separate and apart from 

her own. The Court concludes that any claim by Carmel Resort Supply should be 

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dismissed for the same reasons as the claims asserted by Wills. As a consequence, the

defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted as to Carmel Resort Supply.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress 

(and underlying negligence), and intentional infliction of emotional distress against

defendants First Republic Bank and Hanson Bridgett LLP are DISMISSED. The Court 

finds that further opportunity to amend would be futile. Accordingly, this case is hereby 

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2019 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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