Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02242/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steven Nemeth, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-02242-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Steven Nemeth seeks judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income in January 2008, alleging disability due to multiple conditions beginning in 

January 2007. Doc. 23 at 2. After a hearing on February 1, 2011, an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) issued an opinion finding Plaintiff was not disabled as of December 31, 

2010. Id. at 13. That decision was ratified by the Appeals Council and became the 

Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

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880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence to 

support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own. See 

Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is: 

the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2012). Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a 

sequential five-step evaluation process. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently 

engaged in substantial gainful employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental 

impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from performing his past work. If at 

any step the Commissioner determines that the claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis 

ends; otherwise it proceeds to step five. If the claimant establishes his burden through 

step four, the Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant 

has the RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national 

economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) (2012). 

 Plaintiff argues that the decision of the ALJ is incorrect on three grounds. First, 

the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective testimony. Second, the ALJ failed to 

properly weigh medical opinions. Finally, the ALJ failed to resolve inconsistencies 

between testimony of a vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and 

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thus failed to meet her burden at step five of the analysis. 

 A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony. 

 The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a 

claimant’s subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no 

evidence of malingering, then the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may consider 

at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility: the claimant’s 

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between 

his testimony and his conduct, the claimant’s daily activities, his work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of 

the symptoms of which claimant complains. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

 At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” AR. at 27.1

 

The ALJ concluded at step two, however, that “claimant’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible[.]” Id. 

 In support of her determination, the ALJ cited evidence from medical reports 

showing that between 2007 and 2010, Plaintiff had surgery on each shoulder and his 

range of motion improved as a result, with improvement in his level of pain. Id. The 

ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported that he “was not taking any medication for his shoulder 

pain” despite having insurance to pay for medications. Id. As to Plaintiff’s ankle 

injuries, the ALJ cited medical reports showing that Plaintiff improved over time as well 

 

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 “AR” refers to the Administrative Record. 

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as the doctor’s recommendation to proceed with a “conservative” treatment plan. Id. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s heart medication was “relatively effective” at controlling 

his symptoms. Id. She also noted that an x-ray of Plaintiff’s back in 2008 showed no 

evidence of any significant abnormalities and that Plaintiff was not prescribed any 

medications for his back. Id. 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff made inconsistent statements, such as alleging that he 

could not stand or walk for long periods and could spend “a couple of hours” on his feet 

before feeling any discomfort. AR. 30. Finally, the ALJ cited a 2009 treatment report 

where Plaintiff listed “foundry worker” as his occupation and stated that he needed 

disability paperwork because he was unable to perform his current job duties. Id. The 

ALJ found that this evidence suggested Plaintiff may have performed some work in 2009, 

even though his earnings report listed no income. Id. 

 Plaintiff’s brief contains a litany of cites to the record in support of his claim that 

he is disabled. See Doc. 16 at 8-9, 11-12, 13-14. Although Plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ is required to “discuss the evidence that both supports and detracts” from her 

conclusion (Doc. 16. at 1), this is a misstatement of the law. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 

720 (stating that the reviewing court must weigh the evidence that supports and detracts 

from the Commissioner’s conclusion). The ALJ must provide specific, clear and 

convincing reasons to support her conclusion. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff cites many places in the record that suggest disability, but the ALJ paid equal 

attention to the record. She cited medical records from May 2007, August, September, 

and October 2008, April, May, and December 2009, and March, June, and November of 

2010. AR. 27-28. She noted reports of stable or improved conditions, and that Plaintiff 

takes no pain medication despite having insurance to pay for it. Id. She noted 

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claim and the record, and considered the opinions of 

relevant physicians. Id. at 27-30. Having considered the record evidence cited by 

Plaintiff and the ALJ, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

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substantial evidence – such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. The Court also finds that 

the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. 

 B. Physician Opinions. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Armas. Doc. 16 at 15. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Armas’ opinion should be considered that 

of a treating physician entitled to controlling weight. Id. 

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than a 

non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 

1995); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1)-(2) (2012). The opinion of a treating or examining 

physician “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 

1043). 

 Although there is no test for determining whether a doctor should be considered a 

“treating physician,” based on the guidelines found in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the ALJ’s 

determination that Dr. Armas is not a treating physician is appropriate. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (2012) (noting that “length of the treatment relationship” and 

“frequency of examination” are factors taken into account when determining the weight 

to be given to a medical opinion). The ALJ noted that Dr. Armas saw the Plaintiff twice 

for the purpose of completing disability paperwork and that she “ha[d] not actually 

treated the claimant for any of his impairments or his complaints of pain.” AR. 29. 

 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for giving Dr. Armas’ opinion 

little weight. In addition to the fact that Dr. Armas did not treat Plaintiff, the ALJ noted 

that Dr. Armas first saw Plaintiff in the summer of 2010 for purposes of completing a 

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disability form, Dr. Armas incorrectly assumed Plaintiff was already receiving Social 

Security disability benefits, Dr. Armas’ opinion “was not consistent with treatment 

records” the ALJ had already discussed at length in connection with Plaintiff’s 

credibility, Dr. Armas opined that Plaintiff could not use his feet when in fact he can 

drive, and Dr. Armas “relied heavily upon claimant’s subjective complaints.” Id.; see 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating opinion 

evidence, including consistency with the record and support from objective evidence). 

The Court finds these conclusions to be supported by substantial evidence and to 

constitute specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Armas’ opinion. 

 Plaintiff also challenges the weight given to the opinion of his orthopedic surgeon, 

Dr. Hatfield. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by concluding that Dr. Hatfield’s 

treatment records indicated a belief that Plaintiff was capable of light work, noting that he 

did not explicitly state that Plaintiff could do light work. Doc. 16 at 20. The ALJ quoted 

Dr. Hatfield’s opinion that Plaintiff “was not able to return to his previous level of 

employment ‘as there is not light duty at his foundry position,’” and concluded that Dr. 

Hatfield’s statements indicated that “he feels the claimant is capable of light work.” Id. 

 The Court does not view the ALJ’s reading of Dr. Hatfield’s opinion as legally 

incorrect or unsupported by substantial evidence. Dr. Hatfield explained Plaintiff’s 

inability to return to work at the foundry by noting that the foundry had no light-work 

positions. If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issues of the nature 

and severity of [a claimant’s] impairments is well supported by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other 

substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record,” the ALJ will give the opinion 

controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Hatfield’s 

opinion, as the ALJ read it, to be “consistent with the greater objective medical evidence 

of record, as well as his own treatment notes.” AR. 29. Because that opinion is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court finds no error with the weight 

afforded to it by the ALJ. 

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 Finally, the Plaintiff challenges the weight given to the opinion of Dr. Maloney, 

one of the State agency physicians that reviewed Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff argues that Dr. 

Maloney’s opinion was not properly supported with medical details and was contrary to 

the limitations assessed by the ALJ. Doc. 16 at 21-22. For example, Plaintiff notes that 

the only shoulder limitations found by Dr. Maloney were “frequent overhead reaching 

with the right shoulder” (Id. at 22), while the ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff “is 

unable to push and pull hand controls with both upper extremities” (AR. 26). 

Additionally, Dr. Maloney “found no sitting, standing or walking limitations, and no need 

for position changes” (Doc. 16 at 22), while the ALJ found that Plaintiff “requires the 

option to alternate between sitting and standing at will, not spending more than 45 

minutes in one position” (AR. 26). 

 “The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may . . . serve as 

substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings 

or other evidence in the record.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. The ALJ noted that although 

such an opinion “does not as a general matter deserve as much weight as those of 

examining or treating physicians, this opinion does deserve some weight[.]” AR. 29. 

The fact that the ALJ ultimately reached different conclusions as to Plaintiff’s limitations 

than those advanced by Dr. Maloney – finding more restrictions than Dr. Maloney – is 

not an indication of error. The ALJ had the responsibility to review all evidence in the 

record and was “not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or 

psychological consultants[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i). The fact that the ALJ chose 

to characterize Plaintiff’s impairments as more limiting than Dr. Maloney shows that she 

did not simply defer to his analysis, but instead made her own review of the record. 

 Citing the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Maloney “had the opportunity to review the 

medical record in its entirety, up to that point” (AR. 29; Doc. 16 at 22), Plaintiff argues 

that Dr. Maloney’s report was not based on an adequate review of the record. Plaintiff’s 

interpretation of “up to that point” is misplaced. The Court interprets this language to 

mean that Dr. Maloney reviewed all medical records available at the time of his report. 

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The fact that the report was rendered at an earlier stage in the administrative process does 

not mean it may not be considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (“[W]e will evaluate 

every medical opinion we receive.”). The Court accordingly finds no error in the ALJ’s 

consideration of this opinion. 

 C. Inconsistency with Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to resolve inconsistencies between the 

vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) during 

her step-five analysis. Doc. 16 at 26. Plaintiff offers no legal support for this argument 

in his opening brief. In his reply brief, Plaintiff cites Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 

1152 (9th Cir. 2007), as support for his claim that “legal error exists.” Doc. 27 at 16. In 

Massachi, the Ninth Circuit held that an ALJ may not “rely on a vocational expert’s 

testimony regarding the requirements of a particular job without first inquiring whether 

the testimony conflicts with the [DOT].” 486 F.3d at 1152. “The ALJ must first 

determine whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must then determine whether the 

vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists 

for relying on the expert rather than the [DOT].” Id. at 1153. 

 A conflict between the DOT and the vocational expert did exist in this case. The 

vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could perform work as a parking lot cashier and 

that, in her opinion, the job was unskilled (SVP 2), although it is listed in the DOT as 

semi-skilled – SVP 3. AR. 31; AR. 76. Plaintiff argues that the DOT’s classification of 

“the parking lot cashier job as requiring a SVP of three” and the ALJ’s classification of 

the job as SVP 2 based on the testimony of the vocational expert is an “unsupported 

conclusion.” AR. 31-32. The ALJ did not explicitly ask the vocational expert whether 

her assessment of the parking lot cashier job conflicted with the DOT, but the conflict 

was apparent from her testimony. AR. 76. The ALJ identified the conflict herself and 

asked the vocational expert for an explanation. Id. The vocational expert stated “I don’t 

believe it’s an SVP 3 though because it just generally takes less than 30 days to train as a 

cashier.” Id. In her opinion, the ALJ noted that she “considered this a minor variation 

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from the D.O.T., and accept[ed] the vocational expert’s testimony.” AR. 32. 

 Other than observing that it was a “minor variation,” the ALJ did not provide a 

basis for relying on the vocational expert’s opinion as required by the Ninth Circuit. The 

“minor variation” comment suggests that the ALJ did not consider the difference between 

the expert’s opinion and the DOT to be substantial enough to warrant close examination, 

but it appears to be a pivotal difference in this case – potentially the difference between 

an award or denial of benefits. The Court will therefore vacate Defendant’s decision and 

remand for further proceedings. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is reversed and this case is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this order. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 16th day of October, 2013. 

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