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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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., 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unitw Statn Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

· y 4 1990 

JOSEPH C. WOOD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary 

of the Department of Health & Human 

Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-3116 

) (D.C. No. 88-2341-0) 

) ( D. Kan. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, JONES,** and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

**Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States Court 

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's order of 

April 24, 1989, affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services (Secretary) denying plaintiff's application for 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 406-433. 

Plaintiff applied for disability 

October 22, 1986. 

unable to work 

The application stated 

due to his disability 

insurance benefits on 

that plaintiff became 

on May 12, 1982. At a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on June 15, 1987, 

however, plaintiff testified that the date of disability given on 

the application was erroneous. Plaintiff further testified that 

he became unable to work because of his disabling condition in the 

month of December, 1985. 

The ALJ held two hearings concerning plaintiff's application 

for benefits, one on June 15, 1987, and one on March 16, 1988. On 

March 30, 1988, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's 

application for benefits. The ALJ found that plaintiff was not 

disabled as of December 31, 1985, the date on which he was last 

insured for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423. 

Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request 

ALJ's decision became the final decision 

On June 10, 1988, the 

for review, so the 

of the Secretary. 

Plaintiff then filed a petition for review of the Secretary's 

decision in the district court, below. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 

failing to enter a scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16, that it incorrectly decided the facts, and that it incorrectly 

applied the law. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 2 
r 

As to plaintiff's first argument, the record shows that the 

Secretary complied with the local rules in filing his answer and 

dispositive motion and that the district court ruled on the motion 

before it entered a scheduling order under Rule 16. Plaintiff has 

not shown how the court's failure to enter a scheduling order 

prejudiced the merits o f his case. Under the circumstances, the 

failure to enter a scheduli ng order was not reversible error. 

We turn now to plaintiff's second and third arguments. The 

Secretary's decision must be upheld if it is supported by 

substantial evidence and if the correct legal standards were 

applied. See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). To determine 

whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary's decision, 

the reviewing court must "meticulously examine the record." 

Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Based upon its review of the record, the district court 

determined that "plaintiff failed to prove his disability." R. 

Vol. I, Doc. 25 at 3. We agree. The issue before the ALJ was 

whether plaintiff had a disability as of December 31, 1985. The 

term "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable or mental impairment which can be expected to result 

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months." 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d )(l)(A). Therefore, the primary focus must be on 

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Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 3 
plaintiff's medical condition as of December 31, 1985; his medical 

condition in the subsequent twelve-month period is relevant only 

as it relates to conditions plaintiff already had as of 

December 31 , 1985. 

The record shows that plaintiff began having problems with 

his knees in the 1960's. On December 5, 1980, Dr. Seale reported 

that x-rays of plaintiff's knees showed osteoarthritis which was 

worse in the left than the right knee. Thereafter, plaintiff was 

given a brace for his left knee. In April of 1982, he received a 

brace for his right knee. The record reflects that between 1980 

and 1987, plaintiff was able to relieve the pain in his knees by 

taking Motrin or Ecotrin on a daily basis. 

On or about December 18, 1985, plaintiff developed a pain in 

his lower back that was not relieved by medication. As a result, 

he was admitted to t he hospital on December 25, 1985. Dr. 

Wohler's report o f plaintiff's stay at the hospital reflects that 

with treatment consisting of bed rest, anti-inflammatory 

medication, heat applications, and exercises, plaintiff's back 

pain wa s resolved and did not reoccur. Plaintiff was discharged 

from the hospital on January 3, 1986, "to return to full work." 

R. Vol . II at 370 . 

Dr. Wohler recorded the following discharge diagnosis: "#1 

Osteoarthritis spine #2 Hamstring tendonitis #3 NIDDM #4 

Obesity #5 Micr o cytosis probable iron deficiency.'' R. Vol. II at 

371 . Upon discharge, plaintiff was instructed to follow a diet of 

1800 calories per day, to continue his hamstring stretching 

exercises, and to engage in physical activity "as tolerated." Id. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 4 
at 37 0-71. Plaintiff also received prescriptions for Norgesic, a 

pain-blocking drug, and Disalcid, a nonsteroid anti-inflammatory 

drug, which he was to take as necessary. 1 

After his discharge, plaintiff saw Dr. Ledbetter on 

January 10, 1986, at which time he complained of pain in his left 

great toe and his left leg. When Dr. Ledbetter spoke to plaintiff 

on January 15 , 1986, plaintiff reported that he had much less pain 

in his toe and his back. Plaintiff did not seek medical attention 

for the remainder of 1986 except once in February for pain in his 

left thigh and calf, and once in August for a mild sprain of his 

ankle. In September of 1986, Dr. Sealby saw plaintiff in his 

office for the purpose of reviewing his medical records and wrote 

a letter "To whom it may concern" stating: "At this time he is 

totally resolved from his back problems and physical examination 

is not helpful." R. Vol. II at 491. 

At the hearing before the ALJ on March 16, 1988, plaintiff 

testified that ot her than Ecotrin, which he took three times a 

day, he did not take the other pain relief medications prescribed 

for him unless his back was giving him a problem. 2 Plaintiff 

submitted a record he had kept of each day, since 

January 10, 1986, that he took the prescription pain relievers. 

In the twelve-month period following plaintiff's discharge from 

1 In addition, plaintiff received prescriptions for Micronase, 

a drug to lower glucose levels in the blood, and for FeSO4 and 

multivitamins. 

2 In addition to Norgesic and Disalcid, plaintiff testified 

took Flexeril, a muscle relaxer. 

5 

he 

Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 5 
the hosp ita l in January of 1986, plaintiff took the medication 

only five times: once in January, once in July, twice in August, 

and once in November. 

In Williams v . Bowen, 844 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1988), we 

discussed the five steps that should be followed in determining 

whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ here followed the 

Williams analysis to a point, but faltered when he reached the 

fifth step which, inter alia, required him to consider plaintiff's 

allegations of pain. See id. at 751-52. 

In evaluating a claim of disability based on pain, an ALJ 

must follow three steps: first, he must determine whether the 

medical evidence demonstrates that the claimant has a 

pain-producing impairment; next, he must determine whether a nexus 

exists between the impairment and the allegations of pain, i.e., 

whether the impairment is one which reasonably could be expected 

to produce the pain alleged; and finally, he must determine, 

considering all the evidence including the claimant's credibility, 

whether the pain is disabling. Id. at 753. 

The medical evidence in the record clearly demonstrated that 

plaintiff had pain-producing impairments, i.e., osteoarthritis in 

the knees and spine. Therefore, the ALJ's statement in his order 

that "cl aimant ' s subject ive complaints of pain, and associated 

functional limitation are not well-supported by the objective 

evidence s e t f o rth [in the medical records]" was erroneous. R. 

Vo l. II at 14 . Furthermore, plaintiff's impairments were ones 

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Appellate Case: 89-3116 Document: 01019969821 Date Filed: 05/04/1990 Page: 6 
which r easonably c o uld be expected to produce the pain of which 

plaint i ff comp la ined, i.e., pain in his lower back, legs, and 

feet. 

The final quest i o n t hen, is whether, considering all the 

e v idence, plaintiff ' s pain wa s disabling. The ALJ found that 

plainti ff's pain was no t disabling. As support for his finding, 

the ALJ cited the fact t hat plai n t iff's back pain was reported to 

be totally r e solved aft er he was discharged from the hospital and 

that p lainti f f only took the prescribed pain killers six to eight 

times in the two years following his hospitalization. Although 

the ALJ did not fol low the Williams analysis precisely, his 

ultimate finding that pla i ntiff did not have disabling pain is 

suppor ted by substantia l e vi dence in the record and, therefore, is 

not erroneous. 

The ALJ determine d , based on plaintiff's medical history and 

the testimony of a vocationa l rehabilitation expert, Timothy 

Johnson, that plaintiff was capable of performing certain 

sedentar y wo rk with a sit/stand option during the relevant period. 

Therefore, he c o nc l uded , plai n t iff was not entitled to disability 

insurance benefits. Th i s conclusion, which became the final 

decision of the Secr etary, is supported by substantial evidence in 

the rec ord and must be uphe l d. 

The judgment of t he Un ited States Distri ct Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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