Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00082/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Deniz Bolbol, et al.,

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

Ringling Brothers Barnum and Bailey

Circus, et al.,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 04-00082 JW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS'

APPLICATION TO FILE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 3, 2003, the Ringling Brothers Barnum and Bailey Circus ("the Circus")

traveled to the HP Pavilion in San Jose. On that same day, Plaintiffs, a group of animal rights

activists, also traveled to the HP Pavilion to publicly protest the Circus's alleged mistreatment of

animals. Plaintiffs' protest resulted in their arrests. Defendants City of San Jose ("City") and HP

Pavilion Management ("HPPM"), the remaining defendants in this lawsuit, allegedly contributed to

Plaintiffs' arrests. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against them, alleging Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Violation of U.S. CONST. amend. I), Violation of CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (Violation of CAL. CONST.

art. I, § 2(a)), and Violation of CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 602.1, 837, 847. Presently before this Court is

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2

Plaintiffs' Application to File Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Motion," Docket

Item No. 93). On June 6, 2005, this Court entertained oral argument regarding Plaintiffs' Motion. For

the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion in part and DENIES it in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant City owns the HP Pavilion, a large indoor arena that serves as a venue for sporting

events, musical concerts, and other forms of entertainment. (First Amended Complaint, hereinafter

"FAC," Docket Item No. 15, ¶ 14, 15.) Defendant HPPM manages the HP Pavilion pursuant to a

contract with City. (FAC ¶¶ 12, 16.) 

The HP Pavilion first opened its doors in September 1993, and the Circus was the first event it

ever hosted. (FAC ¶¶ 17-18.) As early as that first Circus in September 1993, animal rights activists

gathered at the HP Pavilion to protest the Circus's alleged mistreatment of animals, to distribute

informational flyers, and to videotape the animals. (FAC ¶ 19.) Since 1993, the Circus has returned

to the HP Pavilion annually--and animal rights activists have returned to the HP Pavilion to protest the

Circus annually. For the most part, these encounters have been relatively peaceful. Notably, from

September 1993 to September 2002, "activists freely communicated with thousands of patrons without

a single incident or complaint filed against them by any patron." (Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of

Plaintiffs' Motion, hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Reply," Docket Item No. 104, at 3:12-13; see also FAC ¶ 23

("For 9 years, Defendants allowed activists to pass out leaflets and engage in free speech activities at

the HP Pavilion during the annual RINGLING event").)

However, in September 2003, things went awry. On September 3, 2003, the Circus returned to

the HP Pavilion in San Jose--and Plaintiffs returned to protest the Circus. (FAC ¶ 28.) In particular,

Plaintiffs conducted their activities near the entrance to the Animal Open House, a makeshift viewing

pavilion wherein the Circus's animals are displayed to patrons before show time, which was

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

3

constructed within the HP Pavilion's parking lot. (FAC ¶¶ 29-32.) Defendants arrested or otherwise

harassed Plaintiffs while they protested, distributed flyers, and/or videotaped. (FAC ¶¶ 34-39.)

Through discovery, Plaintiffs allegedly have learned more details about the incident on

September 3, 2003. Plaintiffs now seek to amend the First Amended Complaint to conform with the

newly discovered evidence. (Plaintiffs' Reply at 1:1-2 ("Plaintiffs . . . seek to amend their pleadings

to conform with the evidence that has been developed in discovery").) In particular, Plaintiffs

allegedly have learned that Carl Mitchell, City's Senior Deputy Attorney, officials from HPPM, and

officials from the San Jose Police Department met a few days before the Circus's September 3, 2003

performance. (Plaintiffs' Reply at 5:23-6:1.) At that meeting, Defendants allegedly conspired to

concoct an arbitrary "trespassing policy" to arrest Plaintiffs while they protested the Circus. 

(Plaintiffs' Reply at 6:1-4.) According to Plaintiffs, 

As a way to circumvent free speech policies at HP Pavilion that permitted the animal activists'

activities, Senior Deputy City Attorney Carl Mitchell along with representatives from . . .

[HPPM] established a new policy, arbitrarily ascribing the parking lost as 'private property.' 

As such, Mitchell counseled that representatives from [HPPM] could make citizens' arrests of

the animal rights activists so long as they treated the parking lots as 'private property.'

(Declaration of G. Whitney Leigh in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion, hereinafter "Leigh Decl.," Docket

Item No. 94, Ex. D at 4:19-24; see also Leigh Decl. Ex. A at 48:2-7, 52:16-24; Leigh Decl. Ex. B at

28:5-18.)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to join two additional defendants to this lawsuit: Kenneth

Sweezey ("Sweezey") and Steven Kirsner ("Kirsner"). Sweezey and Kirsner allegedly are the

employees of HPPM who actually placed Plaintiffs under citizens' arrest. (Leigh Decl. Ex. D ¶¶ 13-

14, 32-33, 39-40, 43, 47-18.) Lastly, Plaintiffs seek to add a claim against HPPM, Sweezey, and

Kirsner for Violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. (See Leigh Decl. Ex. D ¶¶ 61-66.) 

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

4

III. STANDARDS

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) states that, "[A] party may amend the party's pleading only be leave of

court . . . ; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." "This policy is to be applied

with 'extreme liberality.'" WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, A. WALLACE TASHIMA & JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE,

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 8:414 (2004) (citing Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)). The decision to "grant[] or den[y] . . . leave to amend

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion." Id. §

8:413 (citing Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs May Not Add Sweezey and Kirsner as Defendants

Plaintiffs may not add Sweezey and Kirsner as defendants to this lawsuit. As an initial matter,

in this Court's opinion, that they add little, if nothing, to Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Even if this Court accepts

as true all of the allegations in Plaintiffs' Proposed Second Amended Complaint, at all times relevant

to this lawsuit, Sweezey and Kirsner acted in their capacity as employees of HPPM. (Leigh Decl. Ex.

D ¶¶ 13-14 (alleging that Sweezey and Kirsner "at all time material to this amended and supplemental

complaint worked for the HP Pavilion"); Leigh Decl. Ex. D ¶ 34 (alleging that Plaintiff Bolbol was

placed under citizne's arrest by "KEN SWEEZEY from the PAVILION MANAGEMENT"); Leigh

Decl. Ex. D ¶ 40 (alleging that "KEN SWEEZEY of Pavilion MANAGEMENT" ordered that Plaintiff

Cuviello be arrested); Leigh Decl. Ex. D ¶ 43 (alleging that Sweezey attended a meeting "on behalf of

the HP PAVILION").) HPPM, of course, is already a party to this lawsuit. Furthermore, statute of

limitations issues surround Plaintiffs' claims against Sweezey and Kirsner. (The parties did not brief

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

5

this topic.) As this Court suggested at the hearing, the statute of limitations period for a § 1983 lawsuit

is one year. 

'[T]he length of the limitations period [of § 1983] . . . [is] governed by state law.' The

particular period which is to be used is the one which applies to 'tort actions for the recovery

of damages for personal injuries.' . . . '[C]ourts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the

general or residual statute for personal injury actions.' [¶] . . . [I]n California the general,

residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the one year period set forth in

California Civil Procedure Code section 340(3). 

Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). When this Court raised this

point to Plaintiffs' counsel, he confessed that he had not researched the issue thoroughly. He stated his

belief that the statute of limitations period was two years, but, he represented, if it turned out that the

statute of limitations period was one year, he would be willing to withdraw his motion to add

Sweezey and Kirsner to this lawsuit. For these reasons, this Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to add

Sweezey and Kirsner to this lawsuit. 

B. Plaintiffs May Not Add a Claim Under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200

Plaintiffs may not add a claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. CAL. BUS. & PROF.

CODE § 17200 prohibits five wrongs: (1) unlawful business acts/practices; (2) unfair business

acts/practices; (3) fraudulent business acts/practices; (4) unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading

advertising; and (5) any act prohibited by CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-17577.5. WILLIAM L.

STERN, BUS. & PROF. C. § 17200 PRACTICE § 3:13 (2005). Only the first three wrongs potentially at

issue here. 

The word "unlawful," as used in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, extends "'to anything that

can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.'" People v.

E.W.A.P., Inc., 106 Cal. App. 3d 315, 319 (1980) (citations omitted). Here, HPPM's allegedly

"unlawful" acts are the same acts on which Plaintiffs already are suing HPPM--namely, Violation of

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

6

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of U.S. CONST. amend. I), Violation of CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (Violation

of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a)), and Violation of CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 602.1, 837, 847. (See Leigh

Decl. Ex. D ¶ 61 (wherein Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding claims into their proposed claim under

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200).) Thus, in essence, Plaintiffs' proposed claim under CAL. BUS. &

PROF. CODE § 17200 is identical to their other claims. If HPPM violates one of Plaintiffs' other

claims, HPPM is liable under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Similarly, if HPPM does not violate

any of Plaintiffs' other claims, HPPM is not liable under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Thus,

Plaintiffs' claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 adds little, if anything, to Plaintiffs' lawsuit.

Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs could state a claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, the

remedy available thereunder do not differ greatly from the remedies already being sought. Two

remedies are available under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200: restitution and injunction. See

STERN, supra, § 8:2 ("Two remedies are available to private litigants bringing claims under

§[] 17200 . . . : injunction and restitution"). Plaintiffs do not pray for restitution, and Plaintiffs

already pray for injunctive relief. (See FAC at 10:15-11:3 and Leigh Decl. Ex. D at 22:23-23:17.) 

Thus, the remedies available under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 adds little, if anything, to this

lawsuit. 

Given that Plaintiffs' proposed claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 adds little, if

anything, to this lawsuit, that Plaintiffs seek to add this claim extremely late in the proceedings, and

that addition of this claim would delay trial because HPPM would have to be permitted to conduct

some discovery, this Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to add a claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §

17200. See (HPPM's Opposition at 8:13-25 (noting that discovery is closed, that the deadline for

filing dispositive motions has passed, and that the addition of a claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE

§ 17200 would require HPPM to conduct additional discovery); see also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, §

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

7

8:424 (noting that prejudice to an opposing party "is by far the most important and most common

reason for denying leave to amend") (citing Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052 ("Prejudice is

the touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a)")). 

C. Plaintiffs' May Add Conspiracy Allegations Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiffs may add conspiracy allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The prejudice that

Defendants will suffer as a result of such additions is minimal. In this Court's opinion, Plaintiffs'

attempt to add conspiracy allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a good faith attempt to "amend their

pleadings to conform with the evidence that has been developed in discovery." (Plaintiffs' Reply at

1:1-2.) Plaintiffs' newly proposed allegations regarding conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not

that different from the allegations that already exist in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. For

example, in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, "Defendants from the CITY OF

SAN JOSE, the PAVILION MANAGEMENT, and RINGLING CIRCUS worked together to arrest

activists engaging in what Defendants had previously agreed were protected free speech activities." 

(FAC ¶ 24 (emphasis added); see also FAC ¶ 33 ("Officers and employees of all defendants

repeatedly discussed together how to implement arrests to stop the plaintiffs from engaging in free

speech activities") (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs' newly proposed allegations essentially flesh out

these allegations. Through discovery, Plaintiffs claim to have learned that Carl Mitchell, City's Senior

Deputy Attorney, officials from HPPM, and officials from the San Jose Police department conspired to

arrest Plaintiffs by concocting an arbitrary "trespassing policy." (Plaintiffs' Reply at 5:23-6:24.) 

Because Plaintiffs merely seek to conform their Complaint to newly discovered evidence, and because

Plaintiffs' proposed allegations are not dissimilar to Plaintiffs' previous allegations, this Court grants

Plaintiffs' motion to add conspiracy allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

8

D. Plaintiff Kuba May Amend

In its Opposition, HPPM argues that Plaintiff Kuba should not be granted leave to amend the

First Amended Complaint because "Kuba has released any claims he may have against HP Pavilion

Management and its employees . . . , including the claims he would assert in the proposed second

amended complaint." (HPPM's Opposition at 2:11-13.) HPPM devotes only a paragraph or so to this

argument. (See HPPM's Opposition at 5:18-6:2.) It is still unclear as to whether the Settlement

Agreement actually is binding upon Kuba. (See Plaintiffs' Reply at 7:18-9:25 (arguing that Kuba

rescinded the Settlement Agreement).) Given the relatively short shrift that HPPM gives this

argument, and the liberality of amendment rules, this Court permits Kuba to amend the First Amended

Complaint. However, in HPPM's Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, HPPM may

assert Kuba's alleged settlement agreement as a defense against him. Furthermore, notwithstanding

this Court's Scheduling Order, HPPM may, if it so chooses, re-raise this argument more fully and

directly in a Motion for Summary Judgment against Kuba.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion in part and DENIES it

in part. Plaintiffs shall file their Second Amended Complaint, consistent with this Order, on or before

June 17, 2005. Because Defendant City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Item No. 76)

is premised upon Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, this Court deems City's Motion as moot. 

Defendants shall file their Answers to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on or before June 24,

2005.

Dated: June 10, 2005 /s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Christine L. Garcia christine@animalattorney.com

Frank R. Ubhaus fru@berliner.com

G. Whitney Lee wleigh@gonzalezleigh.com

James McManis jmcmanis@mfmlaw.com

Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria jvalenzeulasantamaria@mfmlaw.com

Lizbeth Brown lizbethbrown@aol.com

Marwa Elzankaly melzankaly@mfmlaw.com

Nima Nami nimanami@hotmail.com

Nima Nami nimanami@hotmail.com

Nora Valerie Frimann cao.main@sanjoseca.gov

Rosa Tsongtaatarii Rosa.Tsongtaatarii@ci.sj.ca.us

Thomas P. Murphy tpm@berliner.com

Dated: June 10, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:/s/JWchambers 

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:04-cv-00082-JW Document 117 Filed 06/10/05 Page 9 of 9