Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00766/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00766-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The complaint on which Defendants based removal was the First

Amended Complaint in the state court proceedings.

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISOLINA PICON,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, ROBERT

FOUCRAULT, individual and as

Coroner, SAN MATEO COUNTY, 

Defendants.

 

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No. C-08-766 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S

FOURTH CAUSE OF

ACTION; REMANDING

CASE TO SAN MATEO

SUPERIOR COURT

I. INTRODUCTION

Isolina Picon ("Plaintiff" or "Picon") sued the County of San

Mateo and County Coroner, Robert Foucrault ("Coroner,"

collectively "Defendants"), in San Mateo County Superior Court,

alleging that after her son died of natural causes, the Coroner's

office returned the body to her without informing her that they

had retained her son's heart. Picon brought causes of action for

breach of the right to control the disposition of the remains of a

deceased person, breach of a mandatory duty, negligent infliction

of emotional distress, and denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. See Supp. Notice of Removal, Docket No. 3, Ex. A-9

("FAC").1 Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the grounds that the section 1983 claim is

within the Court's original jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal,

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Docket No. 1. 

Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

("Motion"). Docket No. 9. Picon filed an Opposition and

Defendants filed a Reply. Docket Nos. 14, 15. Having considered

the parties' arguments in full, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants' Motion with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action. 

The Court REMANDS the matter to the San Mateo County Superior

Court for consideration of the remaining causes of action.

II. BACKGROUND

According to the FAC, Plaintiff's son Nicholas Picon died of

natural causes on October 25, 2006. He was 23 years old. The 

Coroner conducted an autopsy on October 26, 2006. After the

autopsy, the Coroner retained Nicholas Picon's heart and released

the remainder of Nicholas's body to the funeral home. According

to the autopsy report, the Coroner conducted an additional

examination of the heart on October 29. See FAC Ex. A at 3, 5

("Report"). 

Plaintiff had a funeral for her son on October 30, 2006. 

Following the funeral, Plaintiff learned for the first time that

the Coroner had retained the heart. On November 13, Plaintiff

requested a copy of the Report. After reviewing the Report,

Plaintiff contacted the district attorney and the Coroner. 

Plaintiff repeatedly requested that her son's heart be returned. 

On November 21, the Coroner returned the heart to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that by retaining her son's heart for the

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period between October 26 and November 21, 2006, the Coroner

denied her a quasi-property right to control the disposition of

the remains of her son, breached a mandatory duty, negligently

inflicted emotional distress, and deprived her of her property

interest in the remains of her son without due process.

III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Before addressing the merits of Defendants' Motion, the Court

must consider procedural concerns raised in Plaintiff's

Opposition. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' Motion should be

denied because Defendants failed to attach a proposed order, in

violation of Civil Local Rule 7-2(c), and because Defendants did

not provide a supporting declaration, in violation of Civil Local

Rule 7-5(a). Failure to comply with the Civil Local Rules may be

grounds for the imposition of any authorized sanction. See Civ.

L.R. 1-4.

An affidavit or declaration is only required where the moving

party makes factual contentions or offers documentary evidence in

support of its motion. Civ. L.R. 7-5(a). Defendants brought

their Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)6),

arguing that, even if the allegations of the FAC are true,

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be

granted. The Court resolves the Motion on the face of the

pleadings; as such, no affidavit or declaration was necessary.

Unless excused by the Court, a motion must be accompanied by

a proposed order. Civ. L.R. 7-2(c). Defendants did not provide a

proposed order until they submitted their reply brief. See Docket

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2The Court notes that Plaintiff's entire Opposition was

submitted with formatting in violation of Civil Local Rule 3-

4(c)(2). Were the Court to require the strict adherence to the

Civil Local Rules that Plaintiff advocates, Plaintiff's brief would

be stricken.

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No. 16. As the Motion makes clear that the relief Defendants seek

is dismissal of all claims, Plaintiff suffered no prejudice by the

delayed submission of a proposed order. The purpose of the Civil

Local Rules is to "promote the just, efficient, speedy and

economical determination of every action and proceeding." Civ.

L.R. 1-2(b). The delayed submission did not interfere with this

purpose, so the Court sees no reason to impose the severe sanction

of denying the Motion solely on this basis.2

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to

articulate "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court

accepts the facts as stated by the nonmoving party and draws all

reasonable inferences in its favor. See Everest & Jennings, Inc.

v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Furthermore, the court must assume that all general allegations

"embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support

them." Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521

(9th Cir. 1994). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff "need only

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show that the facts alleged, if proved, would confer standing upon

him." Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1140

(9th Cir. 2003).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

limited to the allegations in the complaint, without extrinsic

evidence. See, e.g., Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &

Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). However, where

another document is attached to the complaint, as it was here, the

court may treat that document as part of the complaint and

consider it when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See id.; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an

exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."). The

Court therefore considers the contents of the Report, attached to

the FAC as an exhibit, part of Plaintiff's factual allegations.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action is for deprivation of a

property right without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Section 1983 of Title 42 creates a cause of action for

such deprivation: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on an action brought under section

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1983, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) a property

interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the

interest by the government; and (3) lack of required process. See

Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir.

1993). The existence of a protected property interest is a

question of state law. Id. 

Plaintiff's attempts to identify the protected property

interest at issue are unsuccessful. In the FAC, Plaintiff states:

Here, the San Mateo County Coroner deprived

plaintiff Isolina Picon of the heart of her

deceased son for nearly thirty days. The

actions of the County Coroner caused a

deprivation of plaintiffs' property without

due process of law in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. The heart was retained

without the knowledge of the plaintiff and

without an attempt to notify her and request

consent to retain the organ for scientific

purposes.

FAC at 14-15. Plaintiff barely even addresses the section 1983

claim in her Opposition, other than this brief discussion:

Here, the entire heart organ of the plaintiffs

[sic] deceased son was removed and retained by

the Coroner of the County of San Mateo which

resulted in her being deprived of the right to

determine the disposition of his remains at

burial. Since, the law recognizes the quasi

property right of the remains of a deceased

person the second prong has been sufficiently

plead.

Opp'n at 9-10.

Regardless of whether the alleged property interest in

question is the right to possess the deceased son's heart or the

right to determine the disposition of the deceased son's remains,

Plaintiff's claim fails. Plaintiff relies on the Ninth Circuit

decision in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir.

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2002). See FAC at 13; Opp'n at 6. In Newman, the coroner had

removed a deceased child's corneas without the parents' consent. 

Newman, 287 F.3d at 788. The parents brought suit under section

1983, claiming that their right to possess the body of a deceased

family member was a property interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. The court held that the "parents had property

interests in the corneas of their deceased children protected by"

the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 796. 

To the extent Plaintiff's claim is based on a property

interest in the heart itself, Newman is distinguishable. The

court's conclusion in that case cannot be extended to body parts

other than corneas, as the court based its decision on California

Government Code section 27491.47(a), which at the relevant time,

authorized coroners to "remove and release or authorize the

removal and release of corneal eye tissue from a body within the

coroner's custody, if . . . the coroner has no knowledge of

objection to the removal . . . ." See id. at 788 n.1 (quoting

Cal. Gov't Code § 27491.47(a))(omission in original), 795. The

court acknowledged more than once that the provisions governing

the disposition of corneas were different from those governing the

disposition of other body parts. See id. at 795 n.11, 796, 798

n.15 (distinguishing Cal. Gov't Code § 24791 and Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 7151.5). The court found that the statute conferred

a property interest in the corneas by requiring the coroner to

seek consent, and then simultaneously deprived the plaintiffs of

that interest without adequate process, by allowing the coroner to

proceed if he is unaware of objections when he has not actually

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sought consent. See id. at 799. Here, contrary to Plaintiff's

assertion, nothing in the statute creates a property interest in

decedent's heart. California Government Code section 27491.4(a),

which authorizes coroners to perform autopsies, provides in part:

The coroner shall have the right to retain

only those tissues of the body removed at the

time of the autopsy as may, in his or her

opinion, be necessary or advisable to the

inquiry into the case, or for the verification

of his or her findings. No person may be

present during the performance of a coroner's

autopsy without the express consent of the

coroner.

Cal. Gov't Code § 27491.4(a). Unlike the provision governing

corneas in Newman, this statute vests sole discretion with the

coroner, with no allowance for objection. Newman only found a

property interest because of the allowance for objection; as such

allowance is not present here, this statute cannot be said to

confer a property right. See Newman, 287 F.3d at 799. 

Plaintiff also invokes California Government Code section

27491.45(a). That statute vests the coroner with the right to

retain body parts for scientific investigation and training:

The coroner shall have the right to retain

parts of the body, as defined in subdivision

(g) of Section 7150.1 of the Health and Safety

Code, removed at the time of autopsy or

acquired during a coroner's investigation as

may, in the opinion of the coroner, be

necessary or advisable for scientific

investigation and training. The coroner may

employ or use outside laboratories, hospitals,

or research institutions in the conduct of the

coroner's scientific investigation or

training.

Cal. Gov't Code § 24791.45(a)(1). Like section 27491.4(a), this

statute gives the coroner full discretion without the requirement

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of notice or opportunity to object, and therefore does not create

a property interest. See Newman, 287 F.3d at 799. Consent is

only necessary if the coroner releases retained body parts to

"hospitals, medical educational research institutions, [or] law

enforcement agencies for noncoroner training, educational, and

research purposes . . . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 24791.45(a)(2). At

most, this creates a limited property interest in the disposition

of tissues released to third-parties. It does not, however,

create the property interest Plaintiff claims.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has established a

property interest, she has not alleged facts showing a deprivation

of that interest. If the claimed interest is in the heart itself,

Plaintiff's reliance on Newman is misplaced. In that case, the

corneas were donated to non-profit eye banks for transplant.

 Newman, 287 F.3d at 795. By contrast, Plaintiff here recovered

the heart after asking Defendants for it. To the extent the

property interest is in disposition of Plaintiff's son's remains,

the facts alleged demonstrate that the Coroner acted within his

statutory authority, so Plaintiff had no property interest. If

the Coroner retained the heart for either further investigation of

the cause of death or for verification of his findings, he was

authorized to do so by California Government Code section

24791.4(a). The Report shows that after reaching the initial

conclusion regarding the cause of death on October 26, the Coroner

continued to investigate the matter on October 29. Even

Plaintiff's allegation that the Coroner had transferred the heart

to Stanford for study does not trigger a notice obligation, as

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California Government Code section 27491.45(a)(1) authorizes him

to "employ or use outside laboratories, hospitals, or research

institutions in the conduct of the coroner's scientific

investigation or training."

Because Plaintiff has failed to identify a property interest

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, she has failed to satisfy

the first element of a section 1983 claim. Even if the property

interests Plaintiff claims were protected, however, she has failed

to allege facts sufficient to show that she was deprived of those

interests. Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is therefore dismissed.

VI. JURISDICTION

Of the four causes of action in the FAC, the only one

providing a basis for this Court's jurisdiction on removal was the

section 1983 claim. See Notice of Removal; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 

Because that claim has been dismissed, the Court declines to

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,

246 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3), a district court has discretion to elect not to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if it has

dismissed the federal claims over which it had original

jurisdiction."). 

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants'

Motion with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action and ORDERS as

follows:

1. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for unconstitutional

deprivation of property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. This matter is REMANDED to the San Mateo County Superior

Court for further action on the remaining claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 10, 2008

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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