Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02415/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tracy Crane, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:14-cv-2415 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

AHC of Glendale, LLC, dba )

Advanced Healthcare of Glendale; )

and John Doe 1-10, ) [Re: Motion at Docket 26]

)

Defendants. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 26, Defendant AHC of Glendale, LLC (“AHC”) moves for summary

judgment on all claims brought by Plaintiff Tracy Crane (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff responds at

docket 33. AHC replies at docket 34. The parties filed statements of supporting facts

and responses to those statements at dockets 28-1, 32, 35, and 36. Oral argument

was not requested and would not be of additional assistance to the court.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for AHC on October 11, 2011, as a Certified Physical

Therapist Assistant (“CPTA”). On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff was involved in an

incident at work. Based on the incident, Plaintiff pursued a workers’ compensation

claim for an injury to her back and right shoulder. While the claim was pending, a

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doctor placed Plaintiff on restricted work status. The restrictions prevented her from

lifting, pushing, or pulling more than thirty pounds without assistance, and prevented

her from reaching overhead with her right arm.

1

 During her recovery, AHC provided

additional staff members to assist Plaintiff with her duties. AHC also allowed her to

audit charts and do paperwork. Her work limitations became more restrictive over time:

her thirty-pound weight limitation was lowered to ten pounds, and she was also told to

avoid repetitive stooping and bending and to avoid any twisting, turning or awkward

positioning.

2

 In mid-May of 2013, Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation case was closed

based in part on an independent medical exam that concluded Plaintiff did not show

signs of permanent impairment or the need for ongoing pain management or work

restrictions in relation to the work-place incident. In light of the workers’ compensation

decision, AHC concluded that Plaintiff’s physical injuries were not a result of the work

incident and that it would no longer accommodate her work restrictions. AHC

administrators told Plaintiff that in order to be placed back on the schedule, she would

need to provide a doctor’s clearance to work without restrictions. She did not obtain the

clearance. Instead, her work restrictions became more prohibitive: her weight limitation

for activities that involved lifting, pushing, or pulling was reduced again from ten pounds

to five pounds, and she was not allowed to engage in any repetitive stooping, bending,

or kneeling or to use her right upper arm.

3

 She has not been placed back on the

schedule and her insurance was terminated.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against AHC. Her complaint alleges that AHC violated

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when it refused to continue to accommodate

her disability because it believed that her physical limitations were not a result of a

1Doc. 32-1 at p. 15 (Plaintiff’s Ex. C).

2Doc. 32-1 at p. 17 (Plaintiff’s Ex. C).

3Doc. 32-1 at p. 19 (Plaintiff’s Ex. C).

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work-related injury but, rather, just a personal medical condition.4 She seeks damages

for emotional distress, pain, suffering, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, and lost wages. 

She also seeks punitive damages. Her complaint also alleges that AHC violated the

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). She alleges that she was eligible for and

entitled to take leave under FMLA and that AHC knew as much, but nonetheless failed

to advise her of her rights and terminated her employment without allowing her to take

FMLA leave. She states that the AHC’s actions constitute unlawful interference with

her rights under FMLA. AHC moves for summary judgment on both the ADA and the

FMLA claim.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5 The

materiality requirement ensures that “only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.”6 Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”7 However, summary

judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”8

442 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).

5Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

6Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

7

Id.

8Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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 The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact.9 Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial

on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show that

summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute

as to material fact.10

 Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party

must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for

trial.11 All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of

summary judgment and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the

non-movant.12 However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or

denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual

dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.13

IV. DISCUSSION

A. ADA

An ADA claim is subject to the familiar burden-shifting framework derived from

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.

14

 A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination on account of disability. A prima facie case in context of the ADA

requires a plaintiff to put forth evidence to show that she: (1) is “disabled” within the

meaning of the ADA; (2) is a “qualified individual” able to perform the essential

functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an

9

Id. at 323.

10

Id. at 323-25.

11Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

12

Id. at 255.

13

Id. at 248-49.

14411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49-50 (2003)

(applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to an ADA disability claim).

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adverse employment action because of her disability.

15

 If she does so, then the burden

shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment action.16

 If the employer does so, the presumption of discrimination

disappears, but the plaintiff can prove discrimination by offering evidence to

demonstrate that the employer’s explanation is pretexual.17

 

The issues raised in AHC’s motion deal only with Plaintiff’s prima facie case. It

argues that Plaintiff does not have evidence to show she is “disabled” under the ADA

nor the evidence to show she can perform the essential functions of her job with

reasonable accommodations. The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

impairment.”18 AHC argues that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged an impairment that

limits a major life activity nor has she provided evidence sufficient to defeat a summary

judgment motion. In response, Plaintiff points to her EEOC intake questionnaire where

she asserts that her condition limits her ability to walk, stand, or sit for long periods of

time and her ability to lift, carry, push, pull, or bend.19 In her follow-up EEOC

questionnaire she states that her injury prevents her from being able to be a CPTA and

that she has a hard time sleeping and breathing in addition to her other physical

restrictions.20 She also testified in her deposition that she is unable to walk or stand for

15Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012).

16Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49 n.3.

17

Id.

1842 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

19Doc. 32-1 at p. 41.

20Doc. 32-1 at p. 47.

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extended periods of time and has difficulty holding things.21 Her supporting

documentation also includes some medical records to detail her injuries.22 In reply,

AHC asserts that the medical records were not previously produced and should be

excluded. However, rather than move to exclude the evidence, AHC concedes that

these records likely create an issue of fact as to Plaintiff’s disability status. The court

agrees that Plaintiff’s testimony and medical records are sufficient to raise a question of

fact on the issue of her disability status.23

AHC argues that even assuming Plaintiff is disabled in accordance with the

terms of the ADA; she nonetheless has no evidence to show she is qualified for the

position. An individual is qualified if she can perform the essential functions of the job

with or without accommodations. Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the

employment position . . . not includ[ing] the marginal functions of the position.”24 “If a

disabled person cannot perform a job’s ‘essential functions’ (even with a reasonable

accommodation), then the ADA’s employment protections do not apply.”25 “If, on the

other hand, a person can perform a job’s essential functions, and therefore is a

qualified individual, then the ADA prohibits discrimination” with respect to employment

21Doc. 27-1 at p. 23 (Tracy Crane depo. at p. 71). 

22Doc. 32-1 at pp. 11-14 (Plaintiff’s Ex. C).

23See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that

medical evidence is not required to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the

impairment of a major life activity and that a declaration alone can suffice), abrogated on other

grounds in Univ. Of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Scott v. Mabus,

618 Fed. Appx. 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a plaintiff’s testimony can be sufficient to

establish a disputed fact so long as the testimony consists of more than conclusory

declarations.)

24Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 989 (9th cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).

25Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2001).

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actions.26 While the plaintiff retains the “ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder

that [she] can perform the job’s essential functions,” the employer has the initial burden

of production to come forward with evidence of what duties are essential to the position

at issue.27 

AHC contends that the essential functions of the job include “[using] push and

pull equipment,. . . lifting 10-290 pounds with one, two or more assistants or assistance

of hydraulic equipment as indicated, . . . walking, reaching, bending, lifting, grasping,

find hand coordination, pushing, [and] pulling . . . .”28 In support, AHC cites to the job

description for the position of rehabilitation therapist.29 Plaintiff argues that the job

description has not been properly authenticated and is therefore not admissible

evidence. However, an inquiry into authenticity concerns the genuineness of an item of

evidence, and documents may be authenticated by review of their contents if they

appear to be sufficiently genuine.30 Indeed, the authenticity of the document does not

appear to be genuinely in dispute. That is, Plaintiff concedes that the document

properly sets forth the physical requirements of the job,31 and she does not otherwise

suggest that Exhibit 1 is not an official job description from AHC or that her signature

and date on the document have been falsified. The characteristics of the document

itself, in terms of its appearance, contents, and substance lead the court to conclude

26

Id. at 884-85.

27Bates, 511 F.3d at 991.

28Doc. 28-1 at p. 1, ¶ 2.

29Doc. 27-1 at pp. 2-7 (AHC’s Ex. 1).

30Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Orr v.

Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 778 n. 24 (9th Cir. 2002)) (quotation marks omitted).

31See doc. 32 at p. 1, ¶ 2.

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that the document has been authenticated by its distinctive characteristics and that it is

what it appears to be: an official job description.32

A job description prepared before hiring is relevant to determine what the

position’s essential functions are. A job description alone does not automatically

establish that the listed duties on that description are essential when the evidence

conflicts over what is truly an essential function of a position.33 Here, however, Plaintiff

does not point to evidence to show a conflict over what the truly essential functions of

the position are. She disputes the accuracy of the job description by pointing to the fact

that it lists duties she was not allowed to perform as only an assistant to a rehabilitation

therapist, but she does not otherwise dispute that her job as a CPTA is physical in

nature and has physical requirements such as lifting, pushing, pulling, bending, walking,

and reaching. In her EEOC questionnaire that she submitted in support of her

opposition, she admitted that the “manual skills” were “necessary to perform [her] job.”34

She stated: “As a Physical Therapist Assistant at [AHC] my job requires frequent

bending, stooping, walking, carrying oxygen tanks, pushing heavy objects or people,

lifting heavy patients several times from various positions . . . throughout the day, every

Monday through Friday.”35 Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that physical

duties were not merely a marginal part of her CPTA position, and Plaintiff does not

point to any evidence showing a dispute as to whether the essential duties of Plaintiff’s

job at AHC required physical activities. 

It is also undisputed that Plaintiff could not perform these physical activities

unassisted. She acknowledges that she could not continue her career as CPTA

32Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4); Las Vegas Sands, LLC, v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir.

2011).

33Cripe, 261 F.3d at 888-89.

34Doc. 32-1 at p. 47, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

35Doc. 32-1 at p. 54, ¶ 12d (emphasis added).

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because her injuries prevented her from “perform[ing] the manual skills necessary to

perform [her] job.”36 

The remaining question as to Plaintiff’s prima facie case is whether she could

nonetheless perform her essential job duties with reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff

sets forth two accommodations that she believes reasonably allow her to perform her

job: (a) assigning an additional employee to perform the physical duties associated with

her job; or (2) assigning her lighter, non-physical duties such as auditing charts and

doing intake forms.37

Neither of Plaintiff’s proposed accommodations can be deemed reasonable.

Reasonable accommodations can include some job restructuring, but does not require

elimination of any of the job’s essential duties. That is, the ADA does not require an

employer “to reallocate job duties in order to change the essential function of a job.”38 

Plaintiff’s request to perform only non-physical tasks such as chart auditing is clearly a

request to eliminate the physical tasks, which were admittedly not marginal aspects of

her job, and to reallocate those duties to someone else. The suggestion that other

employees could do or assist with Plaintiff’s essential tasks effectively eliminates those

tasks from her job description and reallocates those duties to another employee. 

Indeed, courts have consistently held that it is not reasonable to require an employer to

allocate other employees to complete the essential duties of another employee’s

work.39 

36Doc. 32-1 at p. 47, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); doc. 27-1 at p. 19 (Tracy Crane depo. at p.

56).

37Doc. 32-1 at p. 53, ¶12c.

38Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Milton v.

Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995)).

39Soto-Ocasio, 150 F.3d at 20 (holding that it was not a reasonable accommodation to

require the employer to allocate other employees to complete the work); Cochrum v. Old Ben

Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that hiring a helper to do an essential duty

of a job would was not a reasonable proposed accommodation because “hiring a helper to

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She stresses that the job description recognizes the potential for assistance from

others or from hydraulic equipment when lifting and therefore suggests that the

description itself acknowledges the reasonableness of using assistance. However, as

noted by AHC, even if the job description acknowledges that an employee may need

assistance in lifting patients, it also states that the position requires being able to use

push and pull equipment, walk, reach, bend, push, and pull. There is no mention of

using a team of people to perform all physical tasks. Plaintiff also argues that the fact

that AHC had provided such an arrangement during the pending workers’

compensation claim provides an inference of reasonableness, but, as discussed above,

that arrangement clearly “exceeded what the law requires.” Its decision to cease

providing an accommodation that exceeded what the law requires does not somehow

make that decision a violation of the ADA.40

B. FMLA

AHC argues that it should be granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA

claim. The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, retain, or deny

the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,” the rights conferred to employees under the

act.41 AHC argues that Plaintiff’s FMLA claim is misplaced to the extent it seeks to

enforce her right to a work-place accommodation. Indeed, the FMLA does not address

the right to accommodation for disabled employees but, rather, protects an employee’s

right to use a certain amount of unpaid leave for his or her own serious illness or to care

for family members and to return to the same or an equivalent job after using protected

leave.42

 However, Plaintiff’s FMLA claim is not focused on accommodations but, rather,

does in fact address Plaintiff’s right to take leave. She alleges that she was eligible for

perform the overhead work would mean the helper would de facto perform [the plaintiff’s] job”).

40See Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).

4129 U.S.C. § 2615(a).

4229 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1), 2614(a)(1).

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FMLA leave, but that AHC failed to advise her of her right to take leave and terminated

her rather than allow her to take the required leave. AHC argues that her claim must

nonetheless fail because she did not actually request to take FMLA leave and because

AHC in fact gave Plaintiff leave until such time as she was able to provide a doctor’s

clearance. The court agrees that Plaintiff has not made a showing of interference. 

Plaintiff does not even allege, much less point to evidence to show, that she provided

notice of her intent to take FMLA leave.43

 Nor is there anything in the record to show

that AHC subsequently denied her FMLA request; rather, it is undisputed that Plaintiff

was told she could be put back on the schedule when she had a doctor’s unrestricted

clearance to work.44

 Indeed, Plaintiff does not necessarily disagree. Rather, Plaintiff

responds that “[t]his case does not present [a] traditional fact pattern” and asserts that

her claim is based on the fact that AHC “essentially forced [her] to take a leave of

absence that she had not requested and that she did not need.” 45 As AHC points out,

however, Plaintiff’s response is directly contrary to the allegations in her complaint. As

noted above, in the complaint she alleges she was denied FMLA leave. “Factual

assertions in pleading and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial

admissions conclusively binding of the party who made them.”46 Plaintiff therefore

cannot now assert that she was forced to take leave. 

Regardless, even removing the pleading issue, Plaintiff has not set forth a viable

interference claim. “Forced or involuntary leave is not, . . . in and of itself, actionable

43See Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting

that a prima facie case of FMLA interference requires an employee to establish that he was

eligible for FMLA leave, his employer was covered by the FMLA, he was entitled to leave under

the FMLA, he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and the employer denied the

leave).

44Doc. 32 at p. 4 ¶ 8; doc. 27-1 at p. 22 (Tracy Crane depo. at p. 63).

45Doc. 33 at p. 13. 

46Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988).

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under the FMLA.”47 An interference claim could arise from an allegation that an

employer forced the employee to take leave that she did not request or need if the

employee can show she was forced to take leave even though she did not have a

serious health condition that precluded her from working.

48

 That is not the situation

alleged here. Moreover, such an interference claim only ripens “when and if the

employee seeks FMLA leave at a later date, and such leave is not available because

the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.”49

 Again, that is not

the situation alleged here. 

C. Objections to AHC’s statement of facts

Plaintiff sets forth various objections to AHC’s statement of facts. Except for

Plaintiff’s objection to AHC’s job description at Exhibit 1, which the court has ruled

admissible, the court does not need to specifically address the objections in detail

because the court did not rely on the allegedly objectionable material in its decision. 

Many of Plaintiff’s objections are based on the fact that AHC’s statement of facts

describes AHC’s past accommodations for Plaintiff as “extraordinary” and conclusively

states that the job duties she could no longer perform were “essential.” The court

agrees that AHC’s counsel’s assertions of legal conclusions as fact are not evidence

and recognizes that Plaintiff disagrees with those legal conclusions. The court did not

take counsel’s statements as fact. The court made its own legal conclusions based

only on the admissible evidence provided by the parties: Plaintiff’s EEOC documents,

Plaintiff’s deposition, and the job description provided by AHC. Plaintiff also objects to

AHC’s inclusion of details about the workers’ compensation claim, arguing that the

results of the independent medical exam in relation to Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation

47Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2006); Heyne v. HGILakeside, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 

48Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007).

49

Id.

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claim are not relevant or material to the determination of whether Plaintiff is disabled. 

The resolution of the workers’ compensation claim, while relevant, is not determinative

of whether Plaintiff suffered from a disability as defined by the ADA, but as noted

above, the court concluded in favor of Plaintiff on that issue, agreeing that Plaintiff

provided sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of disability. The

independent medical exam and the results of Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim

are not relevant to the remainder of the court’s ADA analysis and were not considered.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, AHC’s motion for summary judgment at

docket 26 is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of AHC on all

counts and close the case. 

DATED this 24th day of September, 2016

 /s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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