Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56060/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56060-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

T.B., a minor, by and through his

Guardian ad Litem; ALLISON

BRENNEISE; ROBERT BRENNEISE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

STEVEN WYNER;

WYNER AND TIFFANY,

Appellants,

v.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-56060

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-00028-

MMA-WMC

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 9, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 31, 2015

Amended November 19, 2015

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2 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

Before: Raymond C. Fisher and Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judges, and Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge.

*

Order;

Opinion by Judge Clifton

SUMMARY**

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act / Americans

with Disabilities Act / Rehabilitation Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment on claims under the Americans

with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act and vacated the district court’s determination of

attorneys’ fees and costs under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act in an action brought against a

school district by a disabled student and his parents.

The district court upheld an administrative law judge’s

ruling that the school district denied the student a free

appropriate public education in the least restrictive

environment, as he was guaranteed under the IDEA, by

failing to provide him with a legally adequate way to receive

gastrostomy-tube feedings.

* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 3

The plaintiffs argued that the school district was

automatically deliberately indifferent to the student’s rights,

and therefore also liable for damages under Section 504 and

the ADA, by failing to abide by California law on g-tube

feedings. The panel agreed that California law established

federally enforceable rights governing g-tube feeding in

schools, but it held that the plaintiffs also must show

intentional discrimination. The panel affirmed the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the school district on

Count IV, which concerned a 2006-07 individualized

education program. The panel reversed on Count V, which

concerned a 2007-08 IEP, and remanded for further

proceedings, because there was a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether the school district was deliberately

indifferent to the student’s right to be assisted by a person

qualified under California law.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the school district on a claim that the

district retaliated against the student and his mother, in

violation of the ADA, for her “aggressive advocacy” on his

behalf. Following other circuits, the panel applied the but-for

causation test of Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.v. Nassar, 133

S. Ct. 2517 (2013), and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to

make out a prima facie case of retaliation.

Vacating the district court’s award of substantially less

than the amount of attorneys’ fees requested by the plaintiffs

under the IDEA, the panel concluded that the student’s

parents were substantially justified in rejecting a settlement

offer because the relief obtained through the ALJ’s decision

was more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement. 

In addition, the district court abused its discretion in

concluding that the fee claim was unreasonable. For these

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4 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

and other reasons, the panel vacated the district court’s

determination of fees and costs and remanded for

reconsideration.

COUNSEL

Steven Wyner, Wyner Law Group, PC, Torrance, California;

Marcy J.K. Tiffany (argued), Tiffany Law Group, PC,

Torrance, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Amy R. Levine, Sarah L.W. Sutherland (argued), William B.

Tunick, Dannis Woliver Kelley, San Francisco, California,

for Defendant-Appellee.

Maureen R. Graves, Daniel R. Shaw, Irvine, California, as

and for Amicus Curiae California Association for ParentChild Advocacy.

Harvey Saferstein, Nada I. Shamonki, Abigail V. O’Brient,

Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., Los

Angeles, California; Paula D. Pearlman, Los Angeles,

California, for Amici Curiae Disability Rights Legal Center

and Learning Rights Law Center.

Jonathan P. Read, Tiffany M. Santos, Susan B. Winkelman,

Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, LLP, San Marcos, California, for

Amicus Curiae California School Boards Association’s

Educational Legal Alliance.

Donald Davis, Damara Moore, San Francisco, California, as

and for Amicus Curiae San Francisco Unified SchoolDistrict.

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 5

ORDER

The opinion filed on July 31, 2015, appearing at 795 F.3d

1067, is hereby amended as follows:

1. On page 33 of the slip opinion, in the first paragraph

(795 F.3d 1086, first paragraph), the citation to “Cal. Educ.

Code. § 49423.5(C)” should be changed to “Cal. Educ. Code.

§ 49423.5(c)”.

2. On pages 35–36 of the slip opinion, in the second full

paragraph beginning on page 35 (795 F.3d 1087, second full

paragraph), the final two sentences (beginning with

“Furthermore, a jurymight consider . . .”) should be removed.

These sentences should be replaced with

The ALJ’s opinion also suggests that the

District might rely on the BSAs to carry out

the feedings, but only if the evidence showed

that theymet the California-law requirements.

Although the ALJ’s ruling put the District on

notice that the proposed accommodation of

using BSAs was insufficient without this

evidence, the District’s evidence shows only

that the BSAs received training, not that the

training complied, or was adjusted to comply,

with California law. A reasonable jury might

find deliberate indifference on this ground as

well.

3. On page 36 of the slip opinion, in the first full

paragraph (795 F.3d 1087, third full paragraph), the sentence

“Alternatively, it may have had a good-faith belief that the

ALJ was wrong in her construction of California law and

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6 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

sincerely believed that it was not violating T.B.’s rights by

failing to provide a nurse, SEHT, or SET to provide g-tube

feedings.” should be removed.

4. On page 38 of the slip opinion, in the first paragraph

(795 F.3d 1088, second full paragraph), the following

sentence should be added after the sentence ending with

“Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d.

1380, 1390–91 (S.D. Cal. 2014).”

Although each of these cases involved

retaliation relating to employment

discrimination under Title I rather than

discrimination in public services under Title

II, the ADA’s retaliation provision applies to

both titles. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203. The but-for

causation standard therefore applies equallyto

retaliation under Titles I and II.

5. On page 43 of the slip opinion, in the second full

paragraph (795 F.3d 1090, final paragraph), the second

sentence (beginning with “We have not yet clearly

established . . .”) should be changed to

We have not yet clearly established the

standard that a reviewing court should apply

when determining whether the relief obtained

in a due process hearing under the IDEA is

more favorable than that offered under a

settlement or whether a parent was

substantially justified in rejecting a settlement

offer.

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 7

6. On page 45 of the slip opinion, in the first paragraph

(795 F.3d 1091, second full paragraph), the final sentence

(beginning with “In this case, then . . .) should be changed to

In this case, then, we will review the questions

of relative favorability and substantial

justification de novo, while reviewing the

factual findings supporting the district court’s

decision for clear error. See Anchorage Sch.

Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir.

2012) (holding that mixed questions of law

and fact are reviewed de novo unless the

mixed question is primarily factual); Gregory

K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307,

1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the

petitions for panel rehearing.

The petitions for panel rehearing are DENIED. No

further petition for panel rehearing may be filed.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

This is the latest round in an unfortunate dispute that has

endured for almost a decade regarding the education of a

child with disabilities. The child is now 21 years old and has

since graduated from high school, but the litigation has

continued. T.B. and his parents, the Brenneises, used to be

residents of the San Diego Unified School District. T.B. has

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8 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

learning and motor disabilities and feeds himself in part

through a gastrostomy tube (“g-tube”). In 2006, the

Brenneises and the district began working on an

individualized education plan (“IEP”) that would allow T.B.,

who was then being educated outside the public school

system, to reenter school for the 2006–07 academic year. The

two sides could not agree, however, and both filed for a due

process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Act (“IDEA”).

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who presided over

that hearing ruled in favor of the school district on most

issues but held that the district’s proposed IEP was

inadequate because it did not provide a legally adequate way

for T.B. to receive g-tube feedings. That ruling was upheld

on appeal to the district court. Neither side has further

pursued that subject on appeal to this court.

The Brenneises also brought in district court a claim that

the school district had violated T.B.’s civil rights under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12131, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 794. The district court granted summary judgment to the

school district on those civil rights claims. We affirm that

summary judgment as to two counts but reverse it as to a third

count. We remand that claim for further proceedings.

In addition, the Brenneises and their attorneys sought

attorneys’ fees and costs for their partial victory before the

ALJ. The district court awarded them approximately $50,000

for attorneys’ fees, substantially less than the $1.4 million

that was requested. The principal basis for denying most of

the fee request was a determination by the district court that

the Brenneises had unreasonably rejected a settlement offer

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 9

made by the school district shortly before the start of the due

process hearing. The IDEA provides that attorneys’ fees

should not be awarded if the parents do not accept a timely

settlement offer, “the relief finally obtained by the parents is

not more favorable to the parents than the offer of

settlement,” and the parents’ rejection of the settlement offer

was not “substantially justified.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III), (E). We conclude, contrary to the

district court, that the relief obtained through the ALJ’s

decision was more favorable to the parents than the offer of

settlement and that the parents were substantially justified in

rejecting the offer, so the district court’s denial of fees on that

basis must be set aside. For that and other reasons, we vacate

the district court’s determination of fees and costs and

remand that matter for further consideration as well.

I. Background

T.B. was born in January 1994. He suffers from

phenylketonuria, which prevents him from processing

phenylalanine, an amino acid. Infants are screened for

phenylketonuria at birth, but because of a lab error, T.B. was

not correctly diagnosed until he was three. As a result, he

suffered brain damage and physical problems. Children with

phenylketonuria are given a phenylalanine-free drink based

on formula; in 1997, T.B. was fitted with a g-tube through

which the drink could be poured directly into his stomach.

A. T.B.’s home education

In 2003, a dispute arose between T.B.’s mother, Alison

Brenneise, and the school district about his education, and she

withdrew him from school. From 2003 to 2006, T.B. was

educated by external service providers, funded by the school

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district, and by Mrs. Brenneise herself, who was not paid. 

This program sometimes took place in the Brenneises’ garage

and was informally called “garage school,” a term which we

will also use. Under the terms of a settlement agreement, the

school district funded 40 hours of services per week for T.B.

That settlement did not prevent further disputes. In May

2006, the Brenneises filed for a due process hearing,

contending that the district had failed to provide T.B. with a

free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the years

2003–06, as required under the IDEA.1

 See generally Bd. of

Educ. of Hendrick HudsonCent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty.

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (discussing the requirements

of a FAPE under the Education for All Handicapped Children

Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773, the

predecessor of the IDEA). This case eventually settled.

Under the IDEA, the school district was required to

evaluate T.B.’s educational needs at least once every three

years. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii). In July 2006, the

district produced an assessment report, and a few days later

the parties agreed on an “extended school year” IEP that

would cover the summer period. This IEP placed T.B. in

1 There are two mechanisms for resolving special education disputes. 

The first is to seek a due process hearing before a hearing officer. The

hearing officer’s decision may be appealed, directly or indirectly, to a

federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Porter v. Bd. of Trs. of

Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (9th Cir.

2002). Second, either side may use a state’s complaint resolution

procedure. Each state is required, under regulations promulgated pursuant

to the IDEA, to provide a formal means for resolving disputes outside of

a due process hearing. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.151; Porter, 307 F.3d at

1066–67. Filing a compliance complaint is the way to activate

California’s complaint resolution procedure.

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 11

Coronado Academy, a public school outside the district, for

eleven half-days, which was all that remained of the school

year. At that point, the IEP provided that T.B. would return

to garage school. Garage school also represented the “stayput” schooling arrangement—how T.B. would be educated if

the parties were unable to agree on an IEP for the 2006–07

school year. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.

305, 312 (1988). After T.B. had attended Coronado for only

five days, however, Coronado asked him to leave, so T.B.

returned to garage school early.

B. The compliance complaint and due process filings

Mrs. Brenneise then filed a compliance complaint against

the school district. The California Department of Education

upheld the complaint and ordered compensatory education as

a remedy. The amount of fees due to T.B.’s lawyers in

connection with this compliance complaint is one of the

issues in this appeal.

Immediately after T.B. returned to garage school, the

school district attempted to create a new IEP for the 2006–07

school year. At the end of August, the district provided a new

draft IEP and a transition plan to facilitate his return to

school. The district proposed that T.B. would be placed at

Sierra Academy, which served only disabled students. Mrs.

Brenneise did not want T.B. to attend Sierra, in part because

it did not have a nurse’s office where he could lie down after

g-tube feedings. She did not agree to the August 2006 IEP

and objected to “all areas” of the assessments on which the

IEP was based.

Between September and December, the district worked on

revising the IEP. Because Mrs. Brenneise disagreed with

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assessments of T.B. that the district had made in June and

July, she requested independent educational evaluations. The

district denied some of those requests and, in November

2006, filed for a due process hearing to defend its

assessments.

In December 2006, the district prepared a new IEP under

which T.B. would be placed at Wangenheim Middle School. 

In accordance with Mrs. Brenneise’s request, this was a

comprehensive school within and operated by the school

district. Unlike Sierra, Wangenheim had a nurse’s office. 

The December IEP was otherwise largely similar to the

August IEP. Mrs. Brenneise did not consent to the December

IEP. In December 2006, the school district again filed for a

due process hearing, arguing that the IEP “offer[ed] Student

a FAPE designed to meet his unique needs and allow him to

benefit from his education.” In January 2007, the Brenneises

also filed for a due process hearing, contending that the

school district had denied T.B. a FAPE. This case was

consolidated with the previously pending cases.

C. Settlement proposals

From February to May 2007, the parties engaged in

settlement discussions. The Brenneises were represented by

Steven Wyner and his law firm, Wyner and Tiffany. 

Although some of the discussions were oral and the parties

have not stipulated as to their content, it is undisputed that the

two sides discussed the possibility of an arrangement under

which the school district might pay the Brenneises an annual

sum in return for the Brenneises’ commitment to take over

responsibility for T.B.’s education from the district and to

have T.B. educated outside the public school system.

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 13

According to the district, the Brenneises requested

$200,000 per year to have T.B. educated privately. The

Brenneises and Wyner have not denied this. In March 2007,

the school district offered to pay the Brenneises $75,000 per

year to have T.B. educated privately until he reached the age

of 18, in the 2011–12 school year. According to the district,

this was considerably more than the $30,000 to $55,000 that

it would cost to educate T.B. in private school, but far less

than the cost of the existing garage school program, which

was approximately $157,000. The district also stated that it

was rejecting the Brenneises’ demand of $200,000 per year

to educate T.B. privately. The Brenneises rejected the

$75,000 offer.

In April 2007, the school district offered the Brenneises

a one-time payment of $50,000 to settle all of the due process

claims T.B. had brought relating to the August and December

IEPs. The school district stated that the prior $75,000 offer

was “supersede[d].” The record does not contain any

evidence of a response to this offer.

In May 2007, the district sent Wyner a new long-term

settlement proposal. This offer, described in more detail

below, was for $150,000 per year. It permitted the

Brenneises to reenroll T.B. in public school beginning with

the 2009–10 school year. The agreement was to be effective

immediately; the Brenneises would receive a pro-rated share

of the $150,000 for the 2006–07 school year. If T.B. was

subsequently enrolled in public school, and the Brenneises

were unhappy with that program, the stay-put arrangement

while the dispute was resolved would be the public school

program.

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Wyner, the attorney for the Brenneises, rejected the offer

later the same day on the ground that it was “still far short of

the demand that I communicated to you.” As a counteroffer,

he requested an annual payment of $250,000, a larger figure

than previously sought. The counteroffer provided that T.B.

would remain in garage school for the rest of the 2006–07

school year, be educated privately for the 2007–08 school

year, and have the right to reenroll in public school any year

thereafter. The stay-put arrangement under the counteroffer

was garage school. The district did not accept that offer; the

record does not contain any response to the district’s

rejection.

D. The due process hearing and decision

The case proceeded to the due process hearing, which

began on May 14, 2007. The administrative law judge

addressed eighteen issues, two raised by the district in its

filings and sixteen raised by the Brenneises. There was

overlap in some of the issues raised by the parties.

After a 27-day hearing and written closing arguments, the

ALJ in October 2007 handed down a careful and thorough

75-page written decision that found in favor of the school

district on 15 issues. The Brenneises won on the remaining

three: Issues 10, 14, and 15. Issue 10, raised by the district,

was whether the district’s education would provide T.B. “a

FAPE designed to meet his unique needs and allow him to

benefit from his education.” The other two issues were raised

by the Brenneises: Issue 14 was whether the district had

denied T.B. a FAPE by failing to develop a health care plan

that would “enable [T.B.] to attend school safely,” and Issue

15 was whether the district had denied T.B. a FAPE by

failing to develop an appropriate transition plan. Issue 10

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overlapped with Issues 14 and 15, so we do not discuss it

separately.

1. Issue 14: the g-tube feeding

The first of the two discrete issues on which T.B. won

centered around his g-tube feeding. The IDEA sets out

minimum federal standards for school districts that receive

federal funding. States may choose to supplement the federal

standards with their own, and “[s]tate standards that are not

inconsistent with federal standards are also enforceable in

federal court.” W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch.

Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the

ALJ ruled that the school district had failed to show that its

plan met the minimum standards that California had set

relating to g-tube feeding to complement the federal

standards.

To understand the basis for the ALJ’s decision, it is

necessary to review in some detail the relevant federal and

state requirements. The IDEA provides that an IEP shall

contain a “statement of the special education and related

services” that will be provided to a child. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). These related services are defined at

§ 1401(26) as a range of items including “school nurse

services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive

a free appropriate public education.” California has adopted

a similar definition of related services, called “designated

instruction and services.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a). 

Designated instruction and services include “[h]ealth and

nursing services,” id. § 56363(b)(12). These may in turn

include “specialized physical health care services,” 5 Cal.

Code Regs. § 3051.12(b), which are defined as “those health

services prescribed by the child’s licensed physician and

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surgeon requiringmedicallyrelated training for the individual

who performs the services and which are necessaryduring the

school day to enable the child to attend school.” Under the

Code of Regulations, “[s]pecific continuing specialized

physical health care services required in order for the

individual to benefit from special education will be included

in the [IEP].” Id. § 3051.12(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

The ALJ held that T.B.’s g-tube feeding, “if required to

be performed during the school day by District personnel,”

was a specialized physical health care service. Therefore, it

had to be described in the IEP. But the August 2006 IEP did

not “describe general procedures for G-Tube feeding, where

that procedure would take place on the Sierra campus, or

identify the category of employee who would assist [T.B.]

with the feedings.” Rather, the IEP simply recited that T.B.

would receive three hours of nursing services in September

2006 and “5 hours consultation per year as needed,” and

contained a “School Health Management Plan,” which

required adult supervision of T.B.’s g-tube feedings. The

transition plan section of the IEP stated that the nurse would

train Sierra staff in g-tube feeding before T.B. started school,

but provided no further details. Therefore, the ALJ

concluded, the August 2006 IEP did not provide a FAPE.

The December 2006 IEP also failed to provide a FAPE. 

Like the August IEP, this plan provided for a total of eight

hours of nursing services throughout the school year and also

contained the health management plan. Unlike the August

IEP, the December IEP contained two extra pages explaining

how food was to be prepared at school and stating that

“[T.B.] requires an Individualized School Healthcare Plan.” 

These pages also referred to the transition plan, which was

more detailed than the August version. The transition plan

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provided that all school staff would be trained in T.B.’s

dietary requirements, and that g-tube feeding would take

place in the nurse’s office, with the staff member assisting

T.B. “[t]o be determined in collaboration with the school

nurse and parent.”

The ALJ ruled that this was insufficient. The district was

not permitted to rely on the creation of an Individualized

School Healthcare Plan after the event: the IEP itself had to

be sufficiently clear. And the December IEP “did not specify

which category of District staff would be responsible for the

G-Tube feeding.”

This failure to specify was important under California

law. Under Education Code § 49423.5(a), only two types of

persons were allowed to perform specialized physical

education services such as g-tube feeding: “(1) Qualified

persons who possess an appropriate credential . . . [and]

(2) [q]ualified designated school personnel trained in the

administration of specialized physical health care if they

perform those services under the supervision . . . of a

credentialed school nurse, public health nurse, or licensed

physician . . . .” The ALJ found that a school nurse would be

considered in the former category. But a person could be

considered “qualified designated school personnel” only if he

or she had received “[m]edically related training” in

“standardized procedures provided by a qualified school

nurse, qualified public health nurse, qualified licensed

physician and surgeon, or other approved programs.” 5 Cal.

Code Regs. § 3051.12(b)(1)(E)(2).

The ALJfound that the district had two job categories that

were intended to cover qualified designated school personnel:

Special Education Technician (“SET”) and Special Education

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Health Technician (“SEHT”). The district’s job classification

prescribed a wide range of duties for SETs, including

“[p]erform[ing] specialized health care procedures under

[the] direction of [a] school nurse.” An SEHT’s duties were

more narrowly focused on health care, and specifically

included g-tube feedings. An SEHT was more experienced

than an SET: according to the job classification, an SEHT

required “[a]ny combination of training, experience, and/or

education equivalent to one year of experience in the district

job class of . . . Special Education Technician.” By contrast,

the ALJ determined that the district provided insufficient

evidence that a third job categorization, Behavioral Support

Assistant (“BSA”), was qualified to provide g-tube feedings

under California law. The district’s job classification stated

that BSAs should “[p]rovide individual or small group

support to pupils according to established Individualized

Education Programs” but did not specify any medical duties.

As the ALJ stated, the IEP was silent about who would

be performing the g-tube feeding. There was evidence at the

hearing that the feeding would, in fact, be done by a BSA,

who would be assigned to assist T.B. throughout the school

day. That was the problem. The district had not shown that

the BSA would be qualified to perform g-tube feedings, so

“[T.B.’s] parents had no way to be sure that an appropriate

employee would be assisting their child.” As a result, the

ALJ concluded, the Brenneises prevailed on Issue 14.

2. Issue 15: the transition plans

The second discrete issue on which the Brenneises

prevailed related to the transition plans. Under California

law, an IEP had to contain “[p]rovision for the transition into

the regular class program if the pupil is to be transferred from

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a special class or nonpublic, nonsectarian school into a

regular class in a public school . . . .” Cal. Educ. Code

§ 56345(b)(4). This included “[a] description of activities

provided to integrate the pupil into the regular education

program” and “[a] description of the activities provided to

support the transition of pupils from the special education

program into the regular education program.” Id.

§ 56345(b)(4)(A), (B). The ALJ concluded that the transition

plans in both the August and December IEPs were defective.

The August IEP transition plan purported to provide a

three-week transition into school. At the hearing, however,

the district’s expert testified that the transition might take

more than three weeks, depending on T.B.’s progress. 

Therefore, the language of the plan was “directly

contradictory” to the school district’s evidence. Furthermore,

the plan did not state that designated instruction and services

would continue until transition was complete, nor who would

decide when T.B. was to move to the next phase. That made

the plan inadequate.

The December IEP transition plan, by contrast, explicitly

provided for four flexible phases. But this plan was also

flawed: T.B. could, in theory, remain in one phase of the plan

for the entire year, and so the plan needed to state what T.B.’s

services were in each phase. Like the August plan, it did not

specify the designated instruction and services that T.B.

would receive during the transition plan.

In addition, the parents were not included in the

collaboration team that decided when T.B. would move from

one phase to the next, a problem that affected both plans. The

ALJ concluded this was a violation of federal law, which

required that the child’s parents must be involved in decisions

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20 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

relating to his education placement. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.327. Therefore, the Brenneises prevailed on Issue 15.

3. The relief

As relief, the ALJ modified the December IEP by

including language to state that a school nurse would

“personally assist” T.B. with his g-tube feeding, and that the

feeding would occur “at the time(s) and in the manner

designated in a doctor’s order from the [T.B.’s] current

physician.” But the ALJ also said that

nothing in this Decision is intended to prevent

the District from proposing, in a future IEP,

that another classification of employee assist

[T.B.] with the feedings, provided that the

assistant meets the requirements of Education

Code section 49423.5. In addition, nothing in

this Decision is intended to limit the

classification of employee that may be

designated pursuant to that code section. This

Decision is simply based on the finding that,

at the present time and in the present case, the

District failed to make an evidentiary showing

that the three hours of training provided for

District staff in the December 4 IEP would

qualify [T.B.’s] one-to-one behavioral aide to

perform specialized physical health care

services.

The December IEP was also modified to include Mrs.

Brenneise as a participant in the collaboration meetings in the

transition plan, and to clarify that “until [T.B.] reaches phase

four of the transition plan, [T.B.’s] District-funded

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[designated instruction and] services will continue with his

current . . . providers and at his current levels of service.”

E. The district prepares new IEPs

The district sent Mrs. Brenneise a modified IEP in

October 2007. Like the December 2006 IEP, this IEP

provided for eight hours of “health nursing.” It also spelled

out how g-tube feeding would take place: “G-tube feeding

will be scheduled to occur daily in the nurse’s office. A

school nurse will be present and will personally assist the

student with the student’s G-tube feeding.” The district also

added language stating that health training would be critical

throughout the year, although it provided no more hours of

training. And the IEP identified T.B.’s then-current provider

of occupational therapy as a service provider until T.B.

transitioned into spending the full day at school.

Mrs. Brenneise rejected this IEP, apparently because it

provided that T.B. would receive occupational therapy from

the school T.B. was to attend, Wangenheim, not from the

current provider, which she preferred. The district moved to

clarify the ALJ’s decision on the ground that Mrs.

Brenneise’s preferred provider was not certified with the

California Department of Education. The ALJ denied that

request, in part because all the parties had agreed to fund

T.B.’s current providers.

Nevertheless, the Brenneises and the district slowlybegan

implementing the transition plan. The district also began

creating an IEP for the 2007–08 school year. On November

29, 2007, the district held a meeting to adopt a new IEP. As

relevant to this appeal, the IEP provided for health nursing

services as follows:

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3 hours consultation/training to be provided

prior to [T.B.’s] starting school. 5 hours

consultation per year as needed.

G-tube feeding will be scheduled to occur as

prescribed by MD twice daily in nurse’s

office—one time daily during Phases I–III of

transition plan, then two times dailybeginning

in Phase IV when [T.B.] attends school full

day. During first week of [T.B.’s] school

attendance, a school nurse will be present and

personally assist him with G-tube feeding. 

Following training by the school nurse, BSA

staff will replace the school nurse as staff

designated to be present and personally assist

[T.B.] with G-tube feeding. School nurse will

supervise BSAs, as well as train and supervise

SEHT and SET to be designated back-up staff

in case of BSA absence or emergency.

Mrs. Brenneise refused to agree to this IEP because it

provided that a BSA, not a nurse, would be responsible for

T.B.’s feedings. At a December 21, 2007 meeting to discuss

the IEP, the district responded by offering to raise the nursing

services from eight hours per year to twelve.

F. Both sides appeal to district court

On January 4, 2008, the Brenneises filed a complaint in

district court to appeal the ALJ’s determinations on the

fifteen issues on which they lost. The district filed its own

district court appeal on the same day to challenge the ALJ’s

determinations on the three issues on which it lost. The

district also sued Steven Wyner and his law firm personally

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to recover the district’s fees for responding to frivolous

claims. It also sought a declaration that it was not liable to

pay the Brenneises’ fees for their successful July 2006

compliance complaint.

At the end of January 2008, the district filed for another

due process hearing, seeking a determination that the district

had offered a FAPE for the 2007–08 school year. On

February 22, 2008, MarySue Glynn, the district’s Director of

Special Education, wrote to Mrs. Brenneise that the district

remained eager for T.B. to begin school and would start him

immediately “if you would consent.” Glynn asked Mrs.

Brenneise to contact her if she was “interested in

modifications to [T.B.’s] IEP which would allow him to

transition more quickly.” A week later, Mrs. Brenneise gave

the district notice that T.B. and his family were moving out

of state. The Brenneises did not pursue the due process

hearing for the 2007–08 school year, but the litigation over

the prior year lived on.

The Brenneises amended their district court complaint in

March 2008, seeking, among other things, attorneys’ fees

relating to the July 2006 compliance complaint. In April, the

court consolidated the cases filed by the Brenneises and the

district. It denied Wyner’s motion to dismiss the district’s

claim against Wyner and his law firm and denied the

district’s motion to dismiss the Brenneises’ claim for fees for

the compliance complaint. The school district appealed the

denial of its motion to dismiss, but this court dismissed the

appeal because there was no final judgment and the district

had not been granted permission to appeal from the

interlocutory ruling.

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The Brenneises filed a Second Amended Complaint, the

currently operative pleading, in May 2009. It contained the

three surviving claims from the first amended

complaint—appealing the ALJ’s adverse rulings, and seeking

attorneys’ fees under the IDEA and in connection with the

compliance complaint—and also four new civil rights claims

under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,

and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132.

The school district moved for summary judgment on its

first cause of action. In June 2010, the court denied this

motion and upheld the ALJ’s rulings in favor of the

Brenneises on Issues 10, 14, and 15, praising the quality of

the ALJ’s analysis. The school district did not appeal this

judgment, and it later abandoned its other two causes of

action.

The Brenneises abandoned their claim challenging the

ALJ’s adverse rulings on the IEP. The court then invited the

Brenneises to file their motion for attorneys’ fees relating to

their victory in upholding the ALJ’s three rulings in their

favor. The parties stipulated to judgment in favor of the

Brenneises on their claim for recovery for fees related to the

July 2006 compliance complaint. (As we discuss below, this

stipulation is still a source of dispute.)

In November 2011, the parties moved jointly to dismiss

one of the Brenneises’ civil rights claims. The Brenneises

moved for summary judgment on one of the other claims,

Count 4 of the complaint, in which they alleged that the

district was deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s safety by failing

to provide a qualified person to do the g-tube feedings. The

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district moved for summary judgment on all three of the

remaining civil rights claims (Counts 4, 5, and 7).

G. The district court awards the Brenneises reduced

attorneys’ fees

In March 2012, the district court ruled on the Brenneises’

motion for attorneys’ fees. The motion sought

$1,398,048.70. The court held that the Brenneises were a

“prevailing party” on the IDEA claims, because they had

secured more than “merely technical” relief. In particular, the

ALJ had found that the August and December 2006 IEPs

failed to specify a “qualified person” to assist T.B. with his gtube feedings, and the district court had upheld this finding. 

This was “an important issue of health and safety.”

Having found that the Brenneises were entitled to fees,

the court then moved to the amount. The IDEA prohibits

attorneys’ fees for services performed after a written

settlement offer is made to the parents if (i) the offer is made

more than ten days before the start of the due process hearing,

(ii) the parents reject it, and (iii) the offer is at least as good

as the relief the parents secure in the hearing. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(D). However, as an exception to the foregoing

rule, fees are available if the parents are “substantially

justified” in rejecting the offer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E).

Based on that provision, the district court ruled that the

Brenneises were not entitled to any fees and costs incurred on

and after May 4, 2007, when they rejected an offer made by

the district in a letter from its attorney, dated May 3, 2007. 

The district court concluded that the Brenneises did not

secure more favorable relief before the ALJ and were not

substantially justified in rejecting the offer. The court went

on to rule that “[e]ven if the IDEA’s provision did not strictly

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apply to the facts, the Court, in its discretion, would not

award the Brenneises any fees incurred after they

unreasonably rejected the May 3, 2007, settlement offer.”

The court ruled, however, that the Brenneises could

recover reasonable fees and costs incurred before May 4,

2007, the date they rejected the district’s offer. The court

conducted a lodestar analysis and awarded attorneys’ fees of

$50,260.50, plus nontaxable costs of $5,173.41.

H. The district court grants summary judgment to the

school district

In May 2012, the court granted the school district

summary judgment on the Brenneises’ three outstanding civil

rights claims. To establish a claim for damages under the

Rehabilitation Act and ADA, a plaintiff must prove that the

defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of his or her

disability, or was deliberately indifferent to the disability. 

Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir.

2001). First, the court rejected the Brenneises’ claim that the

school district had been deliberatelyindifferent to T.B.’s need

for a qualified person to provide his g-tube feedings. It

concluded that the district never ignored the Brenneises’

concerns; it acted in good faith, and simply read the relevant

California law differently from the Brenneises. Next, the

court ruled that the school district had not violated T.B.’s

civil rights by failing to implement the ALJ’s decision. The

ALJ had required that the 2006–07 IEP be amended to

provide that a nurse do the g-tube feedings, but the decision

had explicitly stated that the ALJ was not ruling on future

IEPs, such as the December 2007 IEP. The district seemed to

be acting in good faith by offering to increase nursing hours. 

Relatedly, there was no evidence to support the allegation that

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the school district had discriminated against T.B. by failing

to provide him with occupational therapy from his preferred

provider. Finally, the district court concluded, no reasonable

jury could infer that the school district retaliated against the

Brenneises. The district’s IEP team wanted T.B. to return to

school and “took great pains” to respond to Mrs. Brenneise’s

concerns.

The Brenneises and Wyner appealed both the summary

judgment on the civil rights claims and the limited grant of

attorneys’ fees.2 The school district has not filed a crossappeal.

II. Standard of Review

“This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de

novo.” Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.

 

2

In April 2012, the Brenneises filed a Rule 54(b) motion for the court

to reconsider its ruling on attorneys’ fees. They noticed their appeal in

June 2012, after the court had issued its ruling on the motion for attorneys’

fees and summary judgment, but while the motion for reconsideration was

still pending. In July 2012, the court denied the Brenneises’ motion under

Rule 54(b) to reconsider the denial of the request for $1.4 million in

attorneys’ fees and costs.

The parties dispute whether the ruling on the Rule 54(b) motion is

before the court. It is not. The motion did not toll the time for filing an

appeal because the district court did not extend the time to appeal under

Rule 58. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii). Therefore, the Brenneises

were required to file a separate appeal relating to this motion, which they

did not. See id. R. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 403 (1995)

(“[M]otions that do not toll the time for taking an appeal give rise to two

separate appellate proceedings . . . .”). Nevertheless, our disposition of

this case is not affected by the Brenneises’ failure to appeal the decision

on the Rule 54(b) motion.

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2010). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to . . . the non-moving party, whether

there are any genuine [disputes] of material fact and whether

the district court correctly applied the substantive law.” 

Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 495 (9th Cir.

2015) (quoting Olsen v. Idaho Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922

(9th Cir. 2004)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual [dispute]

is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

We review an award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of

discretion. Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified

Sch. Dist. No. 69, 374 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2004). “The

district court’s underlying factual determinations are

reviewed for clear error and its legal analysis relevant to the

fee determination is reviewed de novo.” Id. We discuss

below in more detail the standard for reviewing the district

court’s decision to limit attorneys’ fees under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(D).

III. The Civil Rights Claims

We affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of

summary judgment on the three civil rights claims. In

particular, we affirm the summary judgments in favor of the

school district on Counts IV and VII of the Second Amended

Complaint, but reverse the summary judgment on Count V

and remand for further proceedings on that count.

A. Counts IV and V: the g-tube feeding

In Counts IV and V of the Second Amended Complaint,

the Brenneises alleged that the school district violated the

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ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to

offer and implement a g-tube feeding regime that would

enable T.B. to attend school safely. Section 504 provides that

“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .

shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 

The language of the ADA is almost identical, and courts

typically analyze the two provisions together.3See Vinson v.

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002).

“Plaintiffs may establish that an organization [that

receives federal funds, such as the district,] violated § 504 by

showing that the public entity discriminated against,

excluded, or denied the benefits of a public program to a

qualified person with a disability. This includes showing that

the public entity denied the plaintiff a reasonable

accommodation.” Mark H., 620 F.3d at 1096 (citation

omitted). If a plaintiff seeks monetary damages for a

violation of Section 504 or the ADA, he must show that the

defendant acted with intent to deny him the benefits of the

public program or a reasonable accommodation. Duvall,

260 F.3d at 1138.

3

42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.”

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1. Statutory accommodations

Before we pass on the Brenneises’ claims, we must

address a threshold issue: whether a district’s failure to abide

by a statutorily mandated accommodation may give rise to a

civil rights claim. In the typical civil rights case arising out

of an IDEA suit, the plaintiff alleges that the district failed to

provide a “reasonable accommodation” to allow him to take

advantage of the district’s educational program. See, e.g.,

Mark H., 620 F.3d at 1097–98. When a court determines

whether an accommodation is reasonable or not, each side

may be required to produce evidence, and the ultimate

question of reasonableness may have to be decided by a jury. 

Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 816–17 (9th

Cir. 1999).

This case is different, however. The Brenneises allege

that the school district denied T.B. a free appropriate public

education in the “least restrictive environment,” as he was

guaranteed under the IDEA, by failing to provide him with a

reasonable accommodation for his g-tube feeding. See

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 et seq. The only

reasonable accommodation, according to the Brenneises, is

not one that may be determined by a court, but the one

prescribed by the California statute and regulations. They go

on to argue that the school district was automatically

deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s rights, and therefore liable

for damages under Section 504 and the ADA, by failing to

abide by California law.4 The school district responds that

4 Although the Brenneises consistently claim that they only sought for

T.B. to be able to attend school safely, they do not assert that, in the

absence of the California regulations, the district’s plans for T.B.’s g-tube

feeding were unreasonable.

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there is no “per se” reasonable accommodation for g-tube

feeding under California law and denies that it was

deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s rights.

We agree with the Brenneises that California law

establishes federally enforceable rights governing g-tube

feeding in schools. In the absence of any specific regulations,

the district would be required to make a reasonable

accommodation to allow T.B. to receive g-tube feedings in

school so that he could receive a free appropriate public

education. The form of this accommodation would depend

on the “individual circumstances of [the] case.” Vinson,

288 F.3d at 1154. But when the State has specified the form

that the accommodation must take, that specification

establishes minimum standards to which the district must

adhere.5

The service or program that T.B. claims he was prevented

from receiving is a safe public education, not simply g-tube

feedings from a nurse, SEHT, or SET. Even though T.B.’s

failure to obtain an IEP that unambiguously provided for gtube feedings in accordance with California law is the hook

on which his civil rights claims depend (and the parties

disagree as to how concerned the Brenneises were about this

issue before they prevailed on it in the due process hearing),

his fundamental complaint is that he has been prevented from

attending public school safely. In California, g-tube feeding

 

5

 We say “minimum” advisedly. Of course, a state’s law prescribing a

mandatory reasonable accommodation may not be reasonable in all

circumstances. It is possible that there could be situations where a student

is so disabled that a statutory accommodation would be inadequate. In

such a case, the district would not avoid its duties by pointing to the

minimum statutory requirement. See, e.g., Quinones v. City of Evanston,

Ill., 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995).

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provisions are part of the overall educational program that the

state provides to students; they are not a separate service. 

T.B.’s claim, then, is that he was deprived of his right to

attend public school, in the manner required by California

law, on account of his disability.

T.B.’s right to attend public school in a manner permitted

by California law is enforceable in district court. As we

observed earlier, state standards for a free appropriate public

education “not inconsistent with federal standards are . . .

enforceable in federal court.” Target Range, 960 F.2d at

1483. “While a state may not depart downward from the

minimum level of appropriateness mandated under federal

law, a state is free to exceed, both substantively and

procedurally, the protection and services to be provided to its

disabled children.” Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.,

910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In setting forth who shall provide g-tube feedings,

California appears to have gone beyond what a federal court

might require in other circumstances, but that is a choice the

legislature has made, and, like other choices regarding public

education for disabled children, it is enforceable in court.6

6 Amici supporting the school district make other arguments why we

should not rule that the state’s statutory accommodation is enforceable. 

Amicus California School Boards Association submits that the ALJ

misinterpreted Education Code § 49423.5(a), which provides that g-tube

feeding “may” be provided by qualified individuals. This argument (if it

was made at all) evidently failed to persuade the district court in its denial

of the school district’s appeal from the ALJ’sruling, and the district chose

not to appeal that decision to this court. In any case, it is unconvincing. 

Amicus ignores the opening words of § 49423.5(a), “[n]otwithstanding

Section 49422,” which references a section that delineates stricter

requirements for which health professionals may administer health

services in the schools. In that context, the use of the term “may” in

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We therefore agree with the only other court that, so far as we

are aware, has analyzed this issue, and hold that where the

State has defined an accommodation by law, that

accommodation is enforceable in court. See Sullivan ex rel.

Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947,

959 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that a reasonable

accommodation is defined “at the minimum” by state law that

prescribes mandatoryaccommodations for disabled persons). 

The reasonable accommodation that the school district was

required to provide was the designation of a qualified

employee to administer g-tube feedings: either an employee

“possess[ing] an appropriate credential . . . [or a] [q]ualified

designated school personnel trained in the administration of

specialized physical health care if they perform those services

under the supervision . . . of a credentialed school nurse,

public health nurse, or licensed physician.” Cal. Educ. Code 

§ 49423.5(a).

Although we agree with the Brenneises that a school

district’s failure to abide by California’s minimum standards

on g-tube feeding may give rise to a civil rights claim, we

reject their argument that a district’s failure to provide these

services means that they automatically prevail on such a

claim. To succeed on a civil rights claim in this context, the

plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination. Duvall,

260 F.3d at 1139. Deliberate indifference qualifies as intent,

and the Brenneises attempt to meet this easier standard rather

than showing animus on the part of the school district. 

Deliberate indifference is defined as “knowledge that a harm

to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a

failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id.

§ 49423.5 appears to be intended to carve out a permissive exception to

these more rigorous requirements.

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The Brenneises meet the first part of the test, but not the

second. “When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to

his need for accommodation (or where the need for

accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or

regulation), the public entity is on notice that an

accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the

first element of the deliberate indifference test.” Duvall,

260 F.3d at 1139. In this case, the school district was on

notice that the personnel selected to administer g-tube

feedings had to meet the requirements of California

Education Code § 49423.5. The Duvall court went on to

hold, however, that “in order to meet the second element of

the deliberate indifference test, a failure to act must be more

than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” 

Id. This defeats the Brenneises’ argument that any failure to

meet the state standard is per se deliberate indifference,

which rests solely on the maxim “everyone is presumed to

know the law.” The Brenneises’ approach would

impermissibly convert the deliberate indifference standard

into a strict liability standard. See Ferguson v. City of

Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 673–75 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore,

the Brenneises must still prove that the school district was

deliberately indifferent to the need to meet state standards for

feeding T.B. at school.

2. Count IV: the 2006–07 IEP

With this in mind, we turn to Count IV of the Second

Amended Complaint. The Brenneises, citing the language of

Education Code § 49423.5(a), alleged that “[t]he District

failed and refused to offer to provide either a qualified person

or qualified designated trained school personnel to provide

[T.B.’s] G-Tube feedings.” The district court upheld the

determination of the ALJ that the IEP did not specify that a

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qualified person, as defined by statute, would perform the gtube feedings. But the district court also concluded that there

was no evidence that the district had been deliberately

indifferent to T.B.’s g-tube feeding. The school district, the

court held, “never ignored the Brenneises’ concerns,” but

engaged in detailed discussions about how to provide adult

supervision for the g-tube feedings. “[T]he School district

offered accommodations based upon its knowledge of T.B.’s

abilities, which allowed any trained adult to assist him with

the procedure.”

We agree that no reasonable jury could find that the

district was deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s right to be

assisted by a person qualified under California law. The

school district was on constructive notice about the g-tube

feeding requirements, as they were laid down in the

California statute. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. But there is no

evidence that the school district was deliberately indifferent

to this standard. The district believed that it could specify

who would assist T.B. in an Individualized School Healthcare

Plan. California’s requirements are not spelled out with

precision: the most objective requirement is that the assistant

should demonstrate “competence in basic cardiopulmonary

resuscitation.” Cal. Educ. Code § 49423.5(c); 5 Cal. Code

Regs. § 3051.12(b)(1)(C). About the time of the IEP

meetings in this case, at least one other student in the school

district was being assisted by a BSA in his g-tube feeding. A

reasonable jury would be able to find, at most, that the district

was wrong about the state’s g-tube feeding requirements, not

that it was deliberately indifferent.

The Brenneises try, and fail, to show that the school

district was on notice that its plan to have a behavioral aide

assist in g-tube feedings would not meet California’s

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36 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

requirements by pointing to an unpublished Office of

Administrative Hearings case involving the district, Student

v. San Diego Unified School District, OAH No. 04-209 (May

25, 2004). In that case, the ALJ was required to decide

whether a severely disabled child, who was fed through a gtube, could be assisted by a SET or SEHT at school, or

whether he had to be assisted by a full-time nurse. The

Brenneises are correct that this case involves some of the

same statutes and regulations as that one and that the student

had some of the same medical needs. But, at most, that case

would put the district on notice as to the regulations, which

under the first prong of the deliberate indifference test is

already assumed. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. The case does

not shed light on how much training a BSA would require to

be able to provide nursing services under California law and

whether the district was in compliance with that law under the

facts of this case. We therefore affirm the summary judgment

entered in favor of the school district on Count IV.

3. Count V: the 2007–08 IEP

The implementation of the ALJ’s decision in the IEP for

the following year is potentially a different matter. In Count

V of the Second Amended Complaint, the Brenneises alleged

that the school district failed to comply with the ALJ’s

decision and “knew that it was substantially likely that [T.B.]

would not able to safely attend public school or be able to

obtain educational benefit from his educational program.”7

7

In the Second Amended Complaint, the Brenneises also alleged that

the district was deliberately indifferent by failing to provide transition

services, and in particular occupational therapy, at the same level as

before. The Brenneises have not pressed this claim on appeal, and it is

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In the Brenneises’ view, the district illegally “fail[ed] and

refus[ed] to ensure the presence of a school nurse to

personally assist with [T.B.’s] G-Tube feedings.”

The district responds that the ALJ’s decision covered the

2006–07 year. As described above, in October 2006 the

district amended the December 2006 IEP in the way that the

ALJ ordered: it provided that “[a]school nurse will be present

and will personally assist the student with the student’s Gtube feeding.” But by the time the ALJ ordered relief, the

2007–08 school year had already begun. The language

ordered by the ALJ did not appear in the draft November

2007 IEP, which covered the 2007–08 school year. The

November IEP provided that a nurse would personally assist

T.B. with g-tube feeding in his first week at school, at which

point a BSA would take over. The November IEP also

provided for a total of three hours training for the BSA before

he or she took over.

The school district argues that its proposed 2007-08 IEP

did not violate T.B.’s civil rights. It observes that the ALJ

held specifically that the district was permitted to propose a

different classification of employee to assist T.B. with his

feedings, “provided that the assistant meets the requirements

of Education Code section 49423.5,” and that “nothing in this

Decision is intended to limit the classification of employee

that may be designated pursuant to that code section.” The

district’s position, in effect, is that the due process hearing for

the previous school year was irrelevant once the new school

year had begun.

therefore waived. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth.,

261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001).

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We disagree. It is true that an IEP is only valid for the

school year to which it applies. But the pertinent issue here

is whether a reasonable jury could find that the district

violated T.B.’s civil rights by failing to accommodate his

need for g-tube feedings. We believe that it could. After the

ALJ handed down her decision, the district knew how a judge

might interpret California’s rules on g-tube feeding and what

the district would likely have to do to comply with the rules. 

A reasonable jury might find that the district was being

deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s rights under California

law—as opposed to merely negligent or wrong—by refusing

to specify that a nurse, SEHT, or SET should carry out the gtube feedings when the ALJ had suggested strongly that this

was the only way in which the district could fulfill its legal

duties. The ALJ’s opinion also suggests that the District

might rely on the BSAs to carry out the feedings, but only if

the evidence showed that they met the California-law

requirements. Although the ALJ’s ruling put the District on

notice that the proposed accommodation of using BSAs was

insufficient without this evidence, the District’s evidence

shows only that the BSAs received training, not that the

training complied, or was adjusted to comply, with California

law. A reasonable jury might find deliberate indifference on

this ground as well.

A factfinder could also conclude, to the contrary, that the

district was simply negligent, not deliberately indifferent, in

interpreting the ALJ’s instructions. The ALJ held that

“[n]othing in this Decision is intended to prevent the District

from proposing, in a future IEP, that another classification of

employee assist [T.B.] with the feedings, provided that the

assistant meets the requirements of Education Code section

49423.5.” The district may simply have failed to pay enough

attention to the final clause. Or perhaps the district could

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have provided sufficient evidence under its 2007–08 school

year IEP showing that its proposed supervision and training

of a BSA would meet the requirements for providing g-tube

feedings.

Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact,

summary judgment is not appropriate in favor of either party

on this claim. We reverse the summary judgment granted in

favor of the school district on this claim and remand for

further proceedings.8

8 The school district argues that the Brenneises failed to exhaust their

civil rights claims, including the claim asserted in Count V. In particular,

it objects that the Brenneises never alleged in a due process hearing that

the district discriminated and retaliated against them by failing to provide

staff to perform the g-tube feedings, and that they should have filed for a

due process hearing relating to the December 2007 IEP. The g-tube issue

was pursued through a due process hearing for the 2006–07 school year,

as discussed above, but there was no due process hearing for the 2007–08

school year, as the family moved to Minnesota. Claim V presents a claim

for the 2007–08 school year. The district court did not discuss the

exhaustion issue and did not base the summary judgment on any failure

to exhaust.

We held in Payne ex rel. D.P. v. Peninsula School District, 653 F.3d

863, 874 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), that “[t]he IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement applies to claims only to the extent that the relief actually

sought by the plaintiff could have been provided by the IDEA.” Count V

of the Second Amended Complaint asserts a non-IDEA claim for

discrimination under Section 504 and the ADA. We note that the damages

sought in Count V have not been precisely set forth. Although the relief

sought, in part, appears to be beyond what could be obtained through the

IDEA, including damages for lost educational opportunities for the

mother, lost wages and costs incurred in moving to Minnesota, and

emotional distress, other requested relief, such as costs the parents

allegedly incurred to educate T.B. at home, appears to duplicate the

potential IDEA remedy and thus may be subject to the exhaustion

requirement. Additionally, neither party has briefed the issues of

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40 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

B. Count VII: the retaliation claim

The Brenneises also alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint that the district retaliated against T.B. and Mrs.

Brenneise for her “aggressive advocacy” on T.B.’s behalf. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court that a reasonable

jury would not be able to find that the district retaliated

against the Brenneises.

We apply the Title VII burden-shifting framework, as

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), to retaliation claims under the ADA. See Brown

v. Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (“[W]e join our sister circuits in adopting the Title

VII retaliation framework for ADA retaliation claims.”),

vacated on other grounds, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391 (2002). Under the Title VIIretaliation standard,

a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case “(a) that he or

she was engaged in protected activity, (b) that he or she

suffered an adverse action, and (c) that there was a causal link

between the two.” Emeldi v. Univ. of Ore., 673 F.3d 1218,

1223 (9th Cir. 2012). In University of Texas Southwestern

Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013), the

Court held that the standard for the “causal link” is but-for

causation, a more stringent test. Other circuit and district

courts have applied Nassar to ADA retaliation claims, and we

exceptions to the exhaustion requirement or the effect of the family’s

move to Minnesota on the viability of the 2007–08 due process hearing. 

In light of the lack of clarity regarding the types of damages at issue in

Count V and the other issues affecting the exhaustion analysis that have

not been fully briefed on appeal, we leave the exhaustion issue open on

remand for the district court to consider in the first instance.

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do as well. See, e.g., Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of

Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013); E.E.O.C. v.

Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc);

Staley v. Gruenberg, 575 F. App’x 153, 155 (4th Cir. 2014);

Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d.

1380, 1390–91 (S.D. Cal. 2014). Although each of these

cases involved retaliation relating to employment

discrimination under Title I rather than discrimination in

public services under Title II, the ADA’s retaliation provision

applies to both titles. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203. The but-for

causation standard therefore applies equally to retaliation

under Titles I and II. Making out a prima facie case is a

necessary, but not sufficient, condition for surviving a motion

for summary judgment in the McDonnell Douglas

framework. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890

(9th Cir. 1994).

No reasonable jury could find that the Brenneises made

out a prima facie case of retaliation. The Brenneises claim

that the district retaliated against them by providing for a

BSA to perform IEP feedings in the 2007–08 IEP.9 But no

jury could find that the school district would have provided

a nurse, SEHT, or SET in the 2007–08 IEP but for Mrs.

Brenneise’s aggressive advocacy. There was no evidence

that the district’s actions were connected to Mrs. Brenneise’s

advocacy. As discussed above, there were many plausible

explanations why the district may have failed to provide a

nurse, SEHT or SET. Retaliation was not one of them.

9

In the Second Amended Complaint, the Brenneises also alleged that

the district had retaliated by failing to provide a qualified home teacher. 

Like the Brenneises’ claim relating to transition services, this claim has

not been pressed on appeal and is waived.

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42 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

Mrs. Brenneise also claims that the school district

required her to “consent” to the IEP before enrolling T.B. in

school. The source of this claim is Glynn’s letter to

Brenneise that the district remained eager for T.B. to begin

school at Wangenheim and would start him immediately “if

you would consent.” The Brenneises claim that, in this

context, “consent” means “consent to the IEP” and that Glynn

was thus trying to force Mrs. Brenneise to agree to the IEP. 

But there is no evidence that Glynn was refusing to consider

further changes to the IEP to satisfy Mrs. Brenneise. The

letter itself stated that if Mrs. Brenneise was “interested in

modifications to [T.B.’s] IEP which would allow him to

transition more quickly, please contact my office and we will

arrange.” Furthermore, even if Glynn was not prepared to

modify the IEP further to allay Mrs. Brenneise’s concerns, a

jury would not be able to conclude that Mrs. Brenneise’s

advocacy was a but-for cause of Glynn’s letter. We affirm

the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation

claim.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

The district court granted fees and costs to the Brenneises

and their attorneys but awarded only a small fraction of the

amount requested.10 They submitted a request for

10 The district court’s decision on fees was originally filed under seal. 

It was also filed under seal as part of the record in this court, but the

Brenneises moved to unseal it. The motion was denied because the

district court had ruled that “[b]ecause this memorandum contains

confidential settlement discussions, the Court files this memorandum

under seal until further order of the Court or upon stipulation of the

parties.” The parties later jointly moved to unseal the decision in the

district court, and the motion was granted. The parties have not renewed

their motion to unseal the decision in this court. Nevertheless, because the

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$1,398,048.70 in fees and costs for their success in the due

process hearing and on appeal to the district court. The

district court awarded only $55,433.91.

When reviewing a court’s award of fees for abuse of

discretion, we “review the underlying factual determinations

for clear error and review de novo any legal analysis relevant

to the fee determination.” Fischel v. Equitable Life

Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002).

The IDEA permits a court “in its discretion [to] award

reasonable attorneys’ fees” to a prevailing party. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). The ALJ ruled that the Brenneises had

prevailed on Issues 10, 14, and 15 in the due process hearing. 

The district court held that the Brenneises were a prevailing

party under the IDEA. It rejected the district’s claim that the

Brenneises had secured only technical or de minimis relief

and held: “[T]he ALJ found, and this Court agreed, that the

proposed August and December IEPs failed to specify a

qualified person to assist T.B. with his G-tube feedings. This

is an important issue of health and safety.”

The limited amount of the award was primarily the result

of the court’s decision to deny all fees and costs for work

performed on and after May 4, 2007, the date the Brenneises

rejected the district’s settlement offer of $150,000 per year.

The court identified two independent grounds to support that

decision. First, it concluded that the IDEA barred an award

for work performed after that date because the relief that the

Brenneises won in the due process hearing was “not more

parties have cited to and quoted from the fee decision liberally in their

unsealed briefs, and because the decision is unsealed in district court, we

order that it be unsealed in this court and treat it that way.

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favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement,” and the

parents were not “substantially justified” in rejecting the

settlement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D), (E). Second, and

independently, the district court exercised its discretion to cut

off fees on the ground that any fees and costs incurred after

that date were not “reasonable.”

We reject both of these grounds. In addition, we conclude

that the district court was mistaken about another element

affecting the fee award, specifically the nature of the

settlement agreement governing the attorneys’ fees for the

compliance complaint. Moreover, the district court did not

sufficiently explain the basis of its calculations for the portion

of fees that were awarded. Our decision does not mean that

the Brenneises’ attorneys are necessarily entitled to a

substantially larger award, but the reasoning behind the

previous determination cannot be sustained. We therefore

vacate the fee award and remand for further proceedings.

A. The IDEA statutory bar

The critical statutory provisions are 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(D) and (E). They provide, in relevant part:

(D) Prohibition of attorneys’ fees and related

costs for certain services

(i) In general

Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded and

related costs may not be reimbursed in

any action or proceeding under this

section for services performed subsequent

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to the time of a written offer of settlement

to a parent if—

(I) the offer is made within the time

prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the

case of an administrative proceeding,

at any time more than 10 days before

the proceeding begins;

(II) the offer is not accepted within 10

days; and

(III) the court or administrative

hearing officer finds that the relief

finally obtained by the parents is not

more favorable to the parents than the

offer of settlement.

. . . .

(E) Exception to prohibition on attorneys’ fees

and related costs

Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an

award of attorneys’ fees and related costs

may be made to a parent who is the

prevailing party and who was

substantially justified in rejecting the

settlement offer.

Our primary focus is on subsections (D)(i)(III) and (E). 

In denying fees incurred for work on and after May 4, 2007,

the district court concluded that “the relief finally obtained by

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46 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

the parents [wa]s not more favorable to the parents than the

offer of settlement” and that the parents were not

“substantially justified” in rejecting the offer.

As an initial matter, we must set out our standard of

review. We have not yet clearly established the standard that

a reviewing court should applywhen determining whether the

relief obtained in a due process hearing under the IDEA is

more favorable than that offered under a settlement or

whether a parent was substantially justified in rejecting a

settlement offer. See, e.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v.

Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir.

1995) (analyzing whether the forerunner of § 1415(i)(3)(D)

applied in an attorneys’ fee dispute, and holding simply that

“[the parents] won a more favorable decision”). But we can

draw guidance from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,

which is specificallymentioned in § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I). Rule

68 provides that

At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a

party defending against a claim may serve on

an opposing party an offer to allow judgment

on specified terms, with the costs then

accrued. . . . If the judgment that the offeree

finally obtains is not more favorable than the

unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the

costs incurred after the offer was made.11

11 Rule 68 was originally even more similar to § 1415(i)(3)(D), as the

period in which an offer could be made before trial was ten days, not

fourteen. This was changed in the 2009 amendment to reflect the change

in the Rule 6(a) method for computing periods less than eleven days. See

Mark R. Kravitz, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure,

Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 33–34 (May 9, 2008); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee’s note (2009 Amendments).

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Rule 68 is thus clearly animated by the same principles as

§ 1415(i)(3)(D): if the offeree protracts the litigation by

rejecting a favorable offer, he risks suffering a financial

penalty. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (“The

plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid

litigation.”). Although the language of the IDEA is broader

than that of Rule 68—the IDEA cuts off “attorneys’ fees and

related costs,” while Rule 68 speaks of cutting off

“costs”—the Supreme Court has held that costs for Rule 68

purposes may include attorneys’ fees. Marek, 473 U.S. at

9–10. As a district court has noted, the provisions of

§ 1415(i)(3)(D) “essentially incorporate most of the elements

of Rule 68 and expand their application to all offers of

settlement in IDEA cases.” B.L. ex rel. Lax v. District of

Columbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2007).

We therefore think that our jurisprudence concerning

Rule 68 provides the correct standard for reviewing a district

court’s decision on the comparative favorability of a

settlement offer and a final award under the IDEA. “We

review a district court’s interpretation of Rule 68 de novo. To

the extent the district court’s Rule 68 analysis turns on

disputed factual findings, we review for clear error.” 

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d

1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Simon v. Intercontinental

Transp. (ICT) B.V., 882 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“[W]e review de novo whether Simon’s offer of judgment,

MTC’s rejection of the offer, and the judgment following the

trial satisfied the requirements of Rule 68.”)). In this case,

then, we will review the questions of relative favorability and

substantial justification de novo, while reviewing the factual

findings supporting the district court’s decision for clear

error. See Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1053

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that mixed questions of law and fact

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are reviewed de novo unless the mixed question is primarily

factual); Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307,

1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).

Turning to the merits, it should be recognized that the

statute specifies that the comparison of the settlement offer

versus the result of litigation must be made from the

perspective of the parents. To deny attorneys’ fees under this

provision, the court must find that the relief obtained from the

ALJ was “not more favorable to the parents than the offer of

settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III) (emphasis

added). From the perspective of the school district in this

case, it is fair to infer that the ALJ’s decision was perceived

as a big victory, not just because the district prevailed on

most issues, but because the IEP as modified by the ALJ’s

decision would have cost the district substantially less money

than the offer made to the Brenneises. But that does not

necessarily mean that the settlement offer was as good as the

ALJ’s decision from the point of view of the parents, which

is the perspective that counts under the statute.

Similarly, for this purpose the comparison is between the

result obtained from the litigation (in this instance, the ALJ’s

decision) and the settlement offer made by the district. The

settlement offer relied upon by the district court in denying

attorneys’ fees was the offer to pay $150,000 per year in

exchange for the parents taking responsibility for T.B.’s

education themselves and relieving the district of that

responsibility. It does not matter that the district may have

been willing to provide, and likely would have preferred, the

arrangement offered in the IEP. The denial of fees by the

district court based on the parents’ refusal to accept a

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settlement offer must be based on the terms of that offer, not

on some other offer that could have been made.12

The school district’s proposal would have required the

parents to arrange, on their own, a complete education

schedule for T.B. Paragraph 2 stated that “[p]arents take full

and complete responsibility for [T.B.’s] education and entire

educational program.” Paragraph 3 provided that “[p]arents,

and each of them, agree to enroll [T.B.] in an educational

program or programs that are in full compliance with, and

completelysatisfy, California compulsoryeducation laws and

requirements.” Paragraph 8 provided that “[p]arents

represent and warrant that they can provide educational

services through nonpublic schools, nonpublic agencies

and/or other service providers that are appropriate for [T.B.’s]

educational needs within the meaning of the IDEA for the

amount of money that the District has agreed to provide for

the time period covered by this Agreement and that they do

not foresee that [T.B.’s] educational needs will change as to

warrant any modification of this Agreement, including

termination, during that period of time.” Paragraph 20

provided that any dispute under the Agreement was to be

resolved by binding arbitration, with each party to bear its

own fees and costs.

12 A comparison of the terms of the proposed IEP with the outcome of

the litigation expressed in the ALJ’s decision would presumably be

relevant in determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded as a

reflection of what the Brenneises achieved through the litigation. The

district court did not make such assessment in this case, however, instead

denying all fees after the rejection of the settlement offer. Our decision

does not preclude consideration on remand of the degree of success as a

relevant factor in determining the amount to be awarded.

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The district court gave five reasons for the conclusion that

the settlement offer was more favorable than the ultimate

relief the Brenneises obtained. First, it stated that the

Brenneises’ asserted preference for a public school setting

was “an after-the-fact rationalization.” In the view of the

district court, they were willing to accept money even if it

meant T.B. would have remained in garage school, but they

simply wanted more money than the district offered. Second,

“Mrs. Brenneise preferred to keep T.B. at home unless she

obtained every item on her long list of demands.” Third, the

district’s monetary offer was “exceptionally generous.” 

Fourth, the offer covered the next five years, the remainder of

T.B.’s status as a minor, and would have “put to rest all

disputes for the next five years.” Fifth, each of the district’s

offers included reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

We disagree with the district court’s conclusion. For a

number of reasons, we conclude that the settlement offer

made by the district was not more favorable from the

perspective of the parents, such that the statutory bar should

not have applied.

1. Attorneys’ fees and costs up to the settlement

We start with the final reason cited by the district court

for reaching the opposite conclusion, the payment of the

Brenneises’ attorneys’ fees and costs up to that point. The

offer made by the district did not provide for the payment by

the district of those fees and costs. The district court’s finding

to the contrary was clearly erroneous.

The settlement agreement proposed by the district in May

2007 explicitly provided in Paragraph 18 that “[a]t no time

shall this Agreement be construed to confer prevailing party

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status on either party. Except as otherwise provided herein,

each party to this Agreement shall bear his/her/its own costs,

expenses, and attorneys’ fees, whether taxable or otherwise,

connected with the disputes resolved by this Agreement.”

The cover letter from the district’s attorney, dated March

13, 2007, that accompanied an earlier version of the proposed

settlement agreement said that it was understood that the

parties had agreed that the district would pay reasonable

attorneys’ fees and that the district was “open to including”

payment of the fees. However, that letter did not state either

how much would be paid or how that amount would be

determined. Moreover, the proposed settlement agreement

enclosed with that letter contained language identical to the

language quoted in the preceding paragraph from the May

settlement agreement, and that language did not provide for

the payment of those fees. Obviously, an agreement could

have been drafted to provide for the payment of fees and

costs, but the document sent to the Brenneises said something

very different. The cover letter that accompanied the May

settlement agreement made no mention of attorneys’ fees.

In its brief to us, the district contended that its offer “also

included reasonable attorneys’ fees assuming the parties

could agree upon an amount.” It is always true, of course,

that parties could agree to something different, but that is not

what the proposed agreement itself actually said. Instead, the

agreement proposed by the district explicitly stated that each

party would bear its own fees and costs. The agreement

contained an integration clause stating that it contained the

entire agreement. The Brenneises should not have been

required to assume differently in evaluating the offer. Nor

should we assume something different in evaluating whether

the district’s offer was more favorable than the relief

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52 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

obtained. See Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501, 504 (9th Cir.

1994) (“[W]e have held that courts should apply the usual

rules of contract interpretation to offers of judgment, and

these rules dictate that ambiguities be construed against the

drafter.” (citation omitted)); Erdman v. Cochise Cnty., Ariz.,

926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Webb v. James,

147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Because Rule 68 puts

plaintiffs at their peril whether or not they accept the offer,

the defendant must make clear whether the offer is inclusive

of fees when the underlying statute provides fees for the

prevailing party. As with costs, the plaintiff should not be left

in the position of guessing what a court will later hold the

offer means.”).

By the terms of the proposed agreement, the Brenneises

would not have been able to seek an award for fees and costs

already incurred, including the activity for which the district

court later awarded $55,433.91. By declining the offer, the

Brenneises retained the right to seek an award of fees and

costs. In that way, the offer was less favorable than the relief

obtained.

2. The duration of the agreement and the “stay put”

provision

The fourth reason cited by the district court in support of

its conclusion was that the proposed settlement would “put to

rest all disputes for the next five years.” Unfortunately, that

was not necessarily true. The agreement explicitly provided

that, after a specified period, perhaps as short as one more

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academic year, T.B.’s parents could re-enroll him into a

district school.13

That was a provision added to the May settlement offer by

the school district to make the offer more attractive to the

parents. To the extent that the agreement limited the options

available to T.B. for a longer period, that did not necessarily

make it more favorable than the ALJ’s decision from the

parents’ perspective.

There were many reasons why the parents may have

wanted the option to re-enroll T.B. in a district school at some

point in the future. Over time, his condition and needs could

change, for better or worse. Recognizing that the needs of a

student with disabilities change over time, an IEP is

customarily prepared on an annual basis. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). If T.B.’s condition worsened or if the

parents determined that they were not able to provide T.B.

with a sufficient program, even with an annual $150,000

payment from the school district, it is understandable that

they would want to retain the option to return responsibility

for T.B.’s education back to the school district, where that

responsibilitycustomarilyrests.The IDEA and California law

both impose responsibility on local school districts to provide

a free appropriate public education for children with

disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code

13 At what point T.B. could be reenrolled was not entirely clear. The

offer itself appears to preclude T.B.’s return to the district until the

2009–10 school year. The cover letter that accompanied the settlement

offer suggested that the parents could reenroll T.B. in the district any year

after the upcoming 2007–08 school year, or as early as the 2008–09 school

year. This confusion regarding a material term of the offer may alone

have substantially justified the parents’ rejection of the offer. See

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E).

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§ 56000 et seq. From the perspective of the parents,

therefore, it would not have been an advantage for the

agreement to extend as long as the district court presumed

that it would.

Moreover, under the proposed settlement agreement, the

proposed terms for any return to school by T.B. would have

been unfavorable for the Brenneises. If the parents elected to

return T.B. to a district school, an IEP would have to be

prepared and an effort made to reach agreement about the

program to be provided to T.B. The potential for

disagreement at that point is obvious.

The offer provided that “[s]hould Parent dispute the

District’s offered program, the Parties also agree [T.B.’s]stay

put placement will be the District’s offered program pending

resolution of the dispute.” In other words, if T.B. proposed

to return to a district school, but he or his parents were

unhappywith the program offered by the district, he would be

forced to accept whatever program the school district

proposed while the parties agreed on how to settle the issue

or went to arbitration. T.B. would not have the option of

continuing his prior placement in the meantime, no matter

how unsuitable the district’s program was or how much better

his previous educational program was.

Stay-put provisions “direct[] that a disabled child ‘shall

remain in [his or her] then current educational placement’

pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the

parents and state or local educational agencies otherwise

agree.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 308 (second alteration in original)

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), the predecessor of the current

stay-put provision, § 1415(j)). This is an important right for

parents and students: the school district cannot change a

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placement over the parents’ objection until review

proceedings are completed. Id. at 324. Under the so-called

stay-put provision in the settlement offer, however, T.B.

could not continue his prior program if he objected to what

the district proposed for him. It would not, in fact, have

allowed T.B. to “stay put” in what he already had.

The Brenneises were justified in being wary of such a

provision. Their dissatisfaction with T.B.’s education had led

them to withdraw him from school in 2003, and in 2006 he

had lasted only five days at Coronado Academy before that

school asked him to leave. The Brenneises had recently

prevailed against the district in a compliance complaint

related to his brief attendance at Coronado. The stay-put

provision contained in the district’s settlement offer gave the

district leverage it would not have had otherwise. If T.B.

asked to return to a district school, he would have been

required to accept whatever the district offered, for at least

some period of time. That fact alone might well have

deterred T.B. and his family from ever seeking to return to

public school, meaning that the district’s offer of the option

to permit the re-enrollment of T.B. after a year or two may

not, in real terms, have been much of an option at all.

In light of the term allowing T.B. to enroll in a district

school after one or two years, it does not appear that the

district court’s finding that the settlement agreement would

have put to rest all disputes for the next five years was

entirely correct. To the extent that the agreement might have

made it difficult for the parents to return T.B. to public

school, the duration of the agreement and the stay put

provision were not more favorable from the parents’

perspective.

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3. The cash settlement amount

The first three reasons identified by the district court to

support its conclusion that the settlement offer was more

favorable for the parents than the ultimate relief they obtained

do not appear to us to amount in fact to three separate

reasons. Indeed, the first two—that the parents’ expressed

preference for a public school was an “after-the-fact

rationalization” and that Mrs. Brenneise actually preferred to

keep T.B. at home—amount to the same observation. The

district court reasoned, in essence, that because the parents

had no genuine interest in a district placement, certain

unfavorable terms of the offer—such as requiring the parents

to assume sole responsibility for T.B.’s education and

correspondingly absolving the district of responsibility—did

not in fact make the offer unfavorable. Under that view, if

the parents actually desired complete separation from the

district, then these terms should not be considered

unfavorable aspects of the offer.

We do not accept this line of reasoning. The record does

not support the proposition that the parents were interested

only in a cash-out alternative and not also in a

district-administered placement in a district school. Nor does

it support the proposition that the parents pursued their IDEA

complaint solely to obtain leverage over the district in an

attempt to exact a larger cash settlement. The record shows

the parents pursued a district-administered FAPE through the

ALJ proceedings because they were genuinely interested in

a district placement. We do not discount the evidence that the

parents were also interested in a cash-out option, and in fact

may at some time have preferred it, at least in light of the

drawn out disagreements with the district. However, they

clearly continued to value the alternative of placing T.B. in a

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district school. Indeed, although the parents proposed a

cash-out settlement, their settlement offer also would have

given them the annual option to re-enroll in the district

schools. Furthermore, when the parents moved the family to

Minnesota, they placed T.B. in a public school, where he

appears to have thrived. Accordingly, we conclude that the

district court erroneously assumed that the cash settlement

offer was more favorable because the Brenneises preferred to

educate T.B. privately as opposed to sending him to public

school.

The remaining reason given by the district court to

support its conclusion was the proposition that the school

district’s offer of $150,000 per year was “exceptionally

generous.” On closer examination, though, that

characterization seems exaggerated. The annual payment of

$150,000 would not have covered the cost of the existing

home school arrangement, which was both what the district

court found that the parents wanted and what T.B. was

entitled to, as the “stay put” arrangement, during the

pendency of the dispute. That program was calculated to cost

the school district $157,000 per year. If the parents elected

to continue the arrangement that was then in place, they

would have had to reach into their own pockets to make it

happen.

The additional costs imposed on them might actuallyhave

exceeded the difference between $157,000 and $150,000. A

case manager from the school district was involved in

arranging garage school for T.B., for example. Under the

settlement offer, the Brenneises would have taken full

responsibility for arranging services for T.B., requiring

additional time or additional expense to hire someone else to

do it. Furthermore, T.B. was an individual customer in the

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special education market, while the district was a repeat

player and had more bargaining power. It might have cost

more for the Brenneises to arrange to have T.B. educated

privately or to have obtained assistance from external service

providers than it cost the district.

From this perspective, the school district’s offer of an

annual cash payment was not so generous. It would not have

covered the expenses of T.B.’s then-current program. The

IDEA “was intended to give handicapped children both an

appropriate education and a free one; it should not be

interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives.” 

Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ.

of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985). T.B.’s education would

not necessarily have been free.

We are unable to conclude, as the district court did, that

the settlement offer was more favorable to the parents than

the result of the hearing. Although the ALJ ruled in favor of

the school district on most of the issues, the ultimate

conclusion of the due process hearing was that the program

offered by the district would not have provided T.B. with a

FAPE. Both the August 2006 IEP and the December 2006

IEP had fatal shortcomings. The district court affirmed that

determination, and the school district did not appeal. Had the

parents accepted the settlement offer, they would not have

obtained that result; they would have waived their claim for

attorneys’ fees and costs; they would have been precluded

from re-enrolling T.B. in public school for at least some

period of time, even if his condition changed; in the event of

re-enrollment, if there was a disagreement over the

appropriate program for T.B., during the pendency of that

dispute they would have agreed to forego the right to

maintain his then-current program as the stay put

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arrangement and instead would have been required to accept

whatever the school district offered; and if they chose to

continue the garage school program, they would have been

required to pay for part of it with their own funds. Based

upon the facts of this case we conclude, contrary to the

district court, that the settlement offer was not as favorable to

the parents as the ALJ’s decision.

In addition, we conclude that the parents were

“substantially justified” in rejecting the May 4 settlement

offer, under the exception provided in 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(E). Even if we agreed that the result obtained

through the ALJ hearing was not “more favorable to the

parents” than the terms of the May 4 offer, perhaps because

the parents did in fact prefer to educate T.B. at home, that

does not end the question. Subsection (E) establishes an

exception to the statutory bar that applies even if a

determination were made under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)

that the settlement offer was more favorable:

“Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an award of attorneys'

fees and related costs may be made to a parent who is the

prevailing party and who was substantially justified in

rejecting the settlement offer.” As discussed above, the

parents qualified as a prevailing party. Even if the May 4

offer could be considered more favorable from the parents’

perspective in the aggregate, it was clearly less favorable to

the parents in several material respects, as described in the

preceding paragraph. These inferior aspects of the district’s

offer establish that the parents were “substantially justified in

rejecting [it].” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E). Fees for services on and

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after May 4, 2007 should not have been denied based on the

IDEA’s statutory bar.14

B. Reasonableness

The district court’s second rationale for reducing the fee

award was based on the perceived unreasonableness of the

claim for fees. The court held that “[e]ven if the IDEA’s

provision did not strictly apply to the facts, the Court, in its

discretion, would not award the Brenneises fees after they

14 We make clear that we do not hold as a matter of law that there is

anything improper about an arrangement along the lines of the settlement

proposal here, under which the school district would pay a certain amount

for a given period and the parents would take responsibility for the child’s

education program. The IDEA favors settlement of disputes between

parents and school districts. See, e.g., D.R. ex rel. M.R. v. E. Brunswick

Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[P]ublic policy plainly

favors upholding the settlement agreement entered betweenD.R.’s parents

and the Board.”); cf. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 215

(1994) (noting in another context that “[p]ublic policy wisely encourages

settlements”). A cash settlement would not provide for education of the

child in the public school, the approach preferred under the IDEA, but in

some circumstances it may be the best course for the child, consistent with

the IDEA.

However, we also caution that a district should not be able to threaten

parents that they might be denied attorneys’ fees and costs and be forced

to bear the expense of litigation themselves thereafter by declining to

accept an offer that absolves the district of responsibility, even if the

monetary settlement offered would cover the costs for the parents to

personally oversee or provide for their children’s education. The IDEA

and California law impose responsibilities on local school districts for the

education of children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see,

e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 56000 et seq. For parents who express a

preference for the school district to assume those obligations, failure to

settle for a cash payout should not trigger the statutory bar.

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unreasonably rejected the May 3, 2007, favorable settlement

offer.”

The district court relied on two factors in exercising its

discretion. First, it held that T.B. received no benefit from

the due process hearing. Second, the district court found that

“the Brenneises unreasonably rejected the May 3, 2007,

settlement offer.” We disagree on both scores.

1. The benefit that T.B. obtained

The district court reasoned that T.B. never benefitted from

his victory in the due process hearing because “[t]he

Brenneises never implemented the [ALJ]’s Decision on the

three issues that had been decided in their favor. Instead,

they chose to maintain the Stay Put placement through T.B.’s

2006–07 and 2007–08 school years that had kept him in

garage school since the parents had removed him from public

school in 2003.” Even after the district court upheld the

ALJ’s ruling in June 2010, the school district’s conduct did

not change, because T.B. had moved out of the district and

had been living in Minnesota “for two years by the date of

that decision.”

We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the

Brenneises did not obtain any benefit from the court hearing. 

First, this finding is in conflict with its ruling that they were

the “prevailing party.” Indeed, the district court cited

Supreme Court precedent that a “plaintiff ‘prevails’ when

actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the

legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)

(emphasis added by district court); see also Bd. of Educ. of

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Downers Grade Sch. Dist. No. 58 v. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464,

468–69 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the definition of

prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as discussed in

Farrar, is the same as that used in the IDEA). If, as the

district court correctly held, the Brenneises had prevailed,

they also necessarily obtained an actual benefit.

This case is unusual in that the Brenneises did not take

advantage of the benefit they received through the ALJ’s

decision, but that is not automatically fatal to their fee

request. As the district court found in connection with the

prevailing party discussion, the Brenneises changed the legal

relationship between the parties in their favor and secured the

option of relief. The failure to exercise that option does not

render the relief nonexistent. See, e.g., M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch.

Dist., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“An

option need not be exercised in order to be ‘more favorable

[than a settlement offer].’”), vacated on other grounds,

394 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2005); M.C. ex rel. C.M. v. Bd. of

Educ. of Whitesboro Cent. Sch. Dist, No. 97-CV-1533, 1998

WL 951675, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1998) (holding that the

plaintiffs had prevailed because “[t]he availability of this

option for M.C. changed the legal relationship to the

plaintiffs’ benefit . . . .”).

That the Brenneises moved to Minnesota did not render

the relief illusory. It is true that the educational relationship

between T.B. and the district ended in 2008 when the

Brenneises left San Diego. But they had still earned relief

before they left in the form of an enforceable judgment. It is

the relief that they earned “at the time of the judgment or

settlement” that is important. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111.

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Furthermore, it would be perverse to deny plaintiffs fees

for the supposed failure to exercise an option when some of

the blame for that failure may lie with the defendants. By

way of illustration, a defendant should not be able to lose in

court, resist and delay enforcement of the relief awarded, and

then attempt to escape payment of attorneys’ fees on the

ground that the plaintiff never took advantage of the relief. 

As discussed earlier in relation to the summary judgment on

Count V of the Second Amended Complaint, there is

outstanding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

the district was deliberately indifferent to T.B.’s rights by

failing to abide by California’s g-tube feeding standards. It

could be found that the district hampered T.B.’s return to

school, in which case the failure of the Brenneises to take

advantage of the ALJ decision could fairly be attributed to the

district’s own actions.

On remand the district court should take into account the

value of the relief obtained and may consider the reasons why

the Brenneises did not exercise the relief they won. See

Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1117–21

(9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that fees under the IDEA should

reflect the degree of success obtained by the plaintiffs). The

fact that the family moved to Minnesota did not mean that

they could not have obtained any benefit.

2. Unreasonable rejection of the settlement offer

The second factor that the court cited in the exercise of its

discretion was that “the Brenneises unreasonably rejected the

May 3, 2007, settlement offer.” In the court’s view, “the

Brenneises demanded an extremelyhigh payment and took an

all-or-nothing approach. Either they secured every demand

on their lengthy list or T.B. would remain in garage school. 

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Settlement requires both sides to make concessions, but the

parents were unwilling to compromise to reach a fair result.” 

On that basis, the court denied all fees and costs for work

done on and after May 4, 2007. That denial was an abuse of

discretion. For the reasons noted above in support of our

conclusion that the settlement offer was not as favorable for

the parents as the ALJ’s decision, the district court’s finding

that the Brenneises acted unreasonably in rejecting that offer

was clearly erroneous.15

C. The fee calculation

The district court did award a total of $55,433.91 for fees

and costs incurred prior to May 4, 2007. We vacate that

award and remand for further consideration.

1. The compliance complaint

As described above, the Brenneises filed a request for a

Compliance Complaint Investigation with the California

Department of Education in July 2006. They alleged that the

district had failed to implement T.B.’s July 2006 extended

school year IEP. The compliance complaint report, published

in November 2006, provided 24 hours of English language

arts instruction and 80 minutes of adapted physical education

instruction as a remedy.

15 We note in particular that the district court clearly erred in its apparent

belief that the school district had previously offered $200,000 per year to

settle the case, more than it was currently paying for garage school. More

broadly, it is not apparent that the inability to reach agreement was

entirely the responsibility of the Brenneises. As the district court itself

observed in the same order, “[b]oth sides [were] responsible for creating

and fostering the animosity that impaired an efficient resolution to the

case.”

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In October 2007, the Brenneises’ attorneys sent the

district a demand for $7,113.50 in fees and costs in

connection with the compliance complaint. In November

2007, the district offered $3,500 for their work in securing the

compensatory education.

In the district court action filed by the school district in

January 2008, the district sought a declaratory judgment that

it was not liable to pay any fees in relation to the compliance

complaint. The Brenneises then amended their district court

complaint to seek reasonable fees for that activity, relying on

Lucht v. Molalla River School District, 225 F.3d 1023 (9th

Cir. 2000), in which we held that a party who prevails in a

state’s complaint resolution procedure can recover attorneys’

fees.

In May 2011, the Brenneises accepted an offer of

judgment from the school district for “Recovery of

Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees in Connection with a CDE

Compliance Complaint[] in the sum of $7,113.50, plus

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs [in

seeking that sum] prior to the date of this offer in an amount

to be set by the Court.”

The Brenneises sought $48,173.00 in fees and costs for

obtaining the original $7,113.50 fee award. The district court

denied these fees because “the parties previously settled their

dispute as to the amount of attorneys’ fees recoverable in

connection with that 2006 State proceeding.”

It appears that the district court was mistaken about the

parties’ May 2011 agreement. The court did not state that it

viewed the amount of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” for

recovering the $7,113.50 in fees and costs as zero; rather, it

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considered that this dispute was already settled. All that was

settled, however, was the payment of $7,113.50 for fees and

costs previously incurred in connection with the compliance

complaint itself. The May 2011 settlement itself explicitly

provided for additional fees and costs, in an amount to be

determined by the court, incurred by the Brenneises in

seeking that payment. That part of the claim was not settled,

so rejection of that claim on the ground that it had been

settled was incorrect. On remand, the court should determine

what fees are owing for recovering the $7,113.50 for the

compliance complaint.

2. The detail in the fee and costs award

The Brenneises also object that the district court did not

sufficiently explain its fee award. We agree.

The district court ruled that the Brenneises were eligible

to recover the “reasonable fees and related costs that were

incurred before May 4, 2007, when they rejected the School

District’s favorable offer to settle the IDEA issues.” The

court used the lodestar approach. First, it determined the

reasonable billing rates for the attorneys and staff involved in

the case, based on their experience and the location. It then

determined the “reasonable hours” for services rendered

before May 4, 2007. The court went through each of the

different categories of work for which the Brenneises

requested compensation and adjudicated the district’s

objections to the hours billed.

As we held in Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d

1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008), “[w]hen the district court makes

its award, it must explain how it came up with the amount.” 

Here, it is not possible for us to determine how the court

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arrived at the amount of its award. Because there was a large

difference between the fee request and the fee award—the

court only awarded about five-ninths of what the Brenneises

were requesting up to May 4, 2007—some greater

explanation of its adjustments is in order. See id.

There were two main problems with the court’s

explanation. First, the court did not state how it reduced the

billable time for each category of work. For example, the

court “award[ed] reasonable hours to review the School

District’s request for a Due Process hearing, to discuss a

strategy for responding to it, to consult with experts, and to

gather evidence,” but did not state what these reasonable

hours were. As another example, the court “largely

overrule[d] objections to the amount of time the firm spent in

internal conferences,” but did not say to what extent it

sustained the objections. Relatedly, the district court did not

say how it was reducing the fees for each lawyer in each work

category. Cutting an hour off the time claimed by one of the

partners in the case, whom the court decided to compensate

at $425 an hour, had a much larger effect than cutting an hour

off the time billed by the associate, whom the court

compensated at $125 an hour, and the paralegal, who was

compensated at $95 an hour.

Second, the court stated that it “significantly cut” the time

that the Brenneises sought to be compensated for the fifteen

out of the eighteen issues on which they lost in the due

process hearing. But the court did not explain by what

percentage it cut the time or why, nor did it explain which

work it assigned to each losing issue. As we held in Padgett

v. Loventhal, 706 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013), “[f]ailure

on a claim does not automatically reduce the fee award.” 

Rather, “where attorney work proves beneficial to a

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68 T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

successful claim, district courts should generally award these

fees in full, even if the work is also useful to an unsuccessful

claim.” Id. Where work is only useful to an unsuccessful

claim, the fee request should be denied. See id. Because the

court did not explain how it reduced the time “devoted to

losing issues,” or even what time was devoted to losing

issues, the Brenneises are unable to object in any detail to the

court’s determination and we are unable to effectively review

it.

We acknowledge that a precise explanation for each

reduction from the fees counsel sought may be difficult, and

we recognize that the district court may make general,

across-the-board adjustments. However, because the

reduction in this case “passes well beyond the safety zone of

a haircut . . ., the district court’s justification for the cuts must

be weightier and more specific.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1113. 

“The explanation need not be elaborate, but it must be

comprehensible.” Id. at 1111. See also Ferland v. Conrad

Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001)

(remanding the fee award because the district court “did not

explain except at the most general level why it reduced by

more than half the number of attorney hours for which [the

plaintiff] could be compensated, and did not explain at all the

particular level of reduction . . . chosen” (footnote omitted));

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)

(remanding fee award because “the district court . . . failed to

articulate a ‘concise but clear’ explanation for why the ten

percent across-the-board reduction, when coupled with

plaintiffs’ discrete billing judgments, properly compensated

for plaintiffs’ overbilling or duplication”).

The court’s ruling on nontaxable costs suffered from the

same lack of clarity, although the absolute effect is much

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T.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 69

smaller.16 For example, the court reduced the Brenneises’

photocopying request from approximately $8,200 to $4,394

“to reflect the limited degree of success.” On remand, the

court should strive to explain its reductions more precisely.

V. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of the school district as to Counts IV and VII of the

Second Amended Complaint. We reverse the grant of

summary judgment as to Count V. We vacate and remand the

award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Each party shall bear its

own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

16 The court did not rule on taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920,

preferring that these be addressed by the clerk of court at the end of the

litigation.

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