Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02531/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02531-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONTAYE CRAIG, 

Petitioner,

v.

C.E. DUCART, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02531-GPC-KSC

ORDER 

(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS;

(2) GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

[DKT. NO. 14.]

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 6, 2016, Petitioner Dontaye Craig (“Craig”), a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging his conviction in San Diego Superior Court Consolidated Case No. SCD 

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225297.1 Dkt. No. 1, at 1.2 The Petition raises a single issue—whether the state trial court 

violated Craig’s constitutional right to Due Process when it denied his request for access 

to recorded jail telephone conversations of a key witness for the prosecution that Craig

subpoenaed. Dkt. No. 1, at 6-7. On February 16, 2017, respondent filed a Response and 

supporting Lodgments. Dkt. Nos. 11, 12. On March 20, 2017, Craig filed a Traverse3 as to 

the matters raised in the Response, arguing that access to the recorded jail telephone 

conversations would have resulted in a different outcome at trial because of the overall 

“closeness” of the case. Dkt. No. 13.

On November 22, 2017, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Magistrate 

Judge Karen S. Crawford filed a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending 

that this Court deny the Petition. Dkt. No. 14. On May 9, 2018, Craig filed objections 

(“Objections”) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. Dkt. No. 19.4

 On August 1, 2018, this 

Court directed Respondent to supplement the record regarding three sealed documents

referenced during state court trial proceedings. Dkt. No. 20. As a result of this directive, 

two packages—issued under seal—were received by this Court. One package, from the 

trial judge, the Honorable Charles G. Rogers, contained Craig’s February 29, 2012 motion 

 1 Craig was initially charged in Case No. SCD 234772. Lodgment 5-7 at 2-7. Later, the 

prosecutor’s Motion to Consolidate was granted and SCD 225297 was designated as the lead case. 

Lodgment 5-7 at 78. A Consolidated Information was then filed against Craig and his co-defendants on 

February 12, 2012 under Case No. SCD 225297. Lodgment 19 at 63-70.

2 Dkt page citations reference the CM/ECF pagination system. Page citations to Lodgments 

reference the lodgment’s pagination; the Lodgment is located at Dkt No. 12. 

3 Petitioner’s Traverse includes a copy of a portion of his opening brief in the California Supreme 

Court arguing that his conviction is not supported by substantial evidence; however, nowhere in the 

Traverse does Craig address federal habeas standards. See Dkt. No. 13. 

4 This Court twice granted extensions for Petition to file Objections to the Report. See Dkt. Nos. 

16-18. 

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to disclose subpoena duces tecum of informant, Dkt. No. 31-1, at 14, and the trial court’s 

March 7, 2012 order denying that motion, Dkt. No. 31-3. The other package, from the 

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, contained a 

declaration of Investigator Jon Lane, which had been filed as an exhibit to Craig’s motion 

for reconsideration of a motion to disclose. Dkt. No. 31-2, at 5. After receipt of the 

aforementioned, the Court caused the documents to be filed under seal to the docket. Dkt. 

No. 30.

After a thorough review of the issues, supporting documents, and applicable law, the 

Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report, OVERRULES Craig’s objections, and 

DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but will GRANT a certificate of 

appealability.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND5

On the evening of May 23, 2009, Craig and his friends, Marlon Johnson, Frederick 

Roberson, and Rashad Scott, all active members of the Emerald Hills street gang, went to 

the Gaslamp Quarter in downtown San Diego. Lodgment 14 at 2, 4. After Johnson, the 

driver, parked the car near the intersection of E Street and Fifth Avenue, the group 

walked west together on E Street. Lodgment 14 at 5. In the early morning of May 24, 

2009, Craig and his friends encountered rival gang members and a fight began on the 

crowded street, during which multiple shots were fired. Lodgment 14 at 5-7. A rival gang 

member, Richard Turner, was shot multiple times and seriously injured. Lodgment 14 at 

 5 After conducting its own full review of the record, this Court recites the facts presented in the 

Report. The Report draws the facts set forth in this section from the California Court of Appeals’ 

decision on direct appeal. Lodgment 14 at 4-12. Such factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (state court factual findings are presumed correct, unless rebutted by clear and 

convincing evidence). In this case, a lengthy recitation of “the evidence most favorable to the judgment” 

is included in the California Court of Appeal’s decision on direct appeal, which affirmed petitioner’s 

judgment and conviction, but reversed with directions on certain matters related to sentencing. 

Lodgment 14, at 4 n.3, 4-12. This lengthy recitation of facts will not be repeated here in full, because 

only some facts are significant to the single issue raised in the Petition.

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5, 7. Two bystanders were also shot, including Lakeisha Mason, who was killed. 

Lodgment 14 at 7. Craig and his friends ran back to Johnson’s car and drove away. 

Lodgment 14 at 7.

In March 2010, Johnson was arrested, and after being in jail for more than a year, 

agreed to cooperate with the investigation and to testify against his friends and fellow 

gang members in exchange for a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter and an admission 

to a gang allegation with a potential prison term of three to eleven years. Lodgment 1-6 at 

25; Lodgment 14 at 7-8 n.4. 

Although there was other evidence connecting Craig, Roberson, and Scott to the 

shooting, Johnson was the prosecution’s key witness. In video and photographs taken 

around the time of the shooting, Johnson identified himself, Roberson, and Scott. He also 

testified that Craig was standing to his left and slightly behind him when the photographs 

were taken, and in one of the photographs, it appeared that Craig’s arm was extended. 

Lodgment 14 at 8. Johnson also testified that when they were all inside of his car after the 

incident, he asked who did the shooting. According to Johnson, “Craig, who was in the 

front seat, was holding a gun and admitted he was the shooter.” Lodgment 14 at 8. 

There was also some evidence indicating that Roberson was the shooter. Lodgment 

14 at 2. Roberson was the first member of the group to initiate the physical fight when he 

“threw off his hoodie and sucker punched a member of Turner’s group.” Lodgment 14 at 

7. Craig, Roberson, and Scott wore black hoodies. Lodgment 14 at 5. Roberson also wore 

a gray baseball cap with an "SD” insignia on it. Lodgment 14 at 5. A black hoodie, a gray 

baseball cap with an "SD" insignia with Roberson’s DNA, and four .38-special-caliber 

bullet fragments were found at the scene. Lodgment 14 at 7. Gunshot residue was found 

on the hoodie. Lodgment 14 at 7. When Roberson was arrested in August 2010, he had a 

baseball cap with an “SD” insignia that was nearly identical to the one found at the scene.

Lodgment 14 at 7.

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY6

A. Pre-Trial Proceedings

On August 27, 2010, a grand jury returned an indictment against Johnson and 

Roberson for the murder of Lakeisha Mason; the attempted murder of Richard Turner; and 

assault with a firearm on James Aldridge under Case No. SCD 225297. Lodgment 5-7 at 

26. On June 7, 2011, Johnson signed an agreement to testify for the prosecution against 

Craig, Roberson, and Scott. Lodgment 3-1 at 74-79. On June 17, 2011, Craig and Scott 

were arraigned on the same charges under Case No. SCD 234772. Lodgment 5-7 at 27. 

The case was later consolidated under Case No. SCD 225297.7

A preliminary hearing commenced on September 29, 2011, and Johnson, who had 

been placed in protective custody, testified for the prosecution as agreed. Lodgment 3-1 at 

6-7, 12-23, 80-102. His testimony at the preliminary hearing was consistent with his later 

testimony at trial. Johnson implicated Craig, Roberson, and Scott in the incident and 

testified that Craig admitted he was the shooter. Lodgment 3-1 at 74 et seq. 

On November 14, 2011, two investigators for the prosecution went to the jail and 

advised the facility commander they wanted to search cells occupied by Roberson and 

Craig. They were then given access to the cells and were able to “tag and bag” all pieces 

of mail, letters, envelopes, correspondence, writings, and legal mail belonging to Craig and 

Roberson in the presence of the facility commander. Lodgment 5-1 at 62-65, 71-72 (Exhibit 

A). The bag of evidence was then turned over to the prosecution unit for processing. 

 6 After conducting its own full review of the record, this Court presents in significant part the 

procedural background as taken from the Report.

7 A Consolidated Information was filed later on February 12, 2012 charging Craig, Roberson, and 

Scott with the first-degree murder of Lakeisha Mason (count 1); the attempted murder of Richard Turner 

(count 2); and assault with a firearm on James Aldridge (count 3). Lodgment 19 at 63-70. As to all codefendants, the Consolidated Information further alleged that all counts were committed for the benefit 

of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang and with the specific intent to 

promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members. Other allegations in the Consolidated 

Information included personal use of a handgun causing great bodily injury and/or death to a person 

other than an accomplice. Lodgment 19 at 63-70. 

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Lodgment 5-1 at 72. 

On December 6, 2011, about three months after Johnson testified for the prosecution 

at the preliminary hearing, Craig served the San Diego County Sheriff with a Subpoena 

Duces Tecum requesting production of the following documents and information: (1) a list 

of Johnson’s visitors; (2) copies of Johnson’s mail and e-mails; (3) a list of Johnson’s phone 

calls; (4) copies of Johnson’s recorded phone calls; (5) Johnson’s housing records, 

including names of all cell mates; and (6) all of Johnson’s movement records. Lodgment 

5-1, part 1 at 30-32. The San Diego County Sheriff complied with the subpoena by 

delivering the requested materials to the trial court. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 24.

The portion of Craig’s subpoena that sought access to Johnson’s recorded jail calls 

was extensively litigated in the trial court starting on January 13, 2012 with an “informal 

conference to address records subpoenaed pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued . . . 

on behalf of [Craig].” Lodgment 1-1 at 9; Lodgment 5-6 at 62. During this initial 

conference, the trial court asked whether anyone objected to the release of the subpoenaed 

records to Craig’s counsel. The prosecutor said, “I don’t object.” Lodgment 1-1 at 11. 

However, the prosecutor and Johnson’s counsel indicated it would be necessary for the 

trial court to conduct an in camera review of the records to avoid the release of any private, 

sensitive, or attorney-client privileged information. Lodgment 1-1 at 11-12. The trial court 

indicated it would complete a “quick review” of the records, remove any privileged 

materials, and release “everything else” to Craig’s counsel. Lodgment 1-1 at 13. The trial 

court added as follows: “My thought is that the record is clear, I don’t see what’s happening 

here to be a fishing expedition, and I think that, frankly, the Sixth Amendment right to have 

counsel be able to function effectively and to confront and cross-examine effectively are 

implicated here, and I think that unless there is some really strong privilege that would 

outweigh that, [Craig’s counsel] gets them. But I think it would be a good idea if I looked 

through them in camera.” Lodgment 1-1 at 13. In addition, the trial court stated that its 

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“Sixth Amendment comments” were based on the fact that Johnson testified for the 

prosecution and was cooperating in the case. Lodgment 1-1 at 14.

On January 26, 2012, at the next pre-trial conference, the trial court requested 

briefing from the parties on the subpoena matter and set the matter for hearing on February 

15, 2012. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 37. On February 7, 2012, Craig filed a Motion for Order 

to Disclose. In the Motion, Craig argued that Johnson’s recorded jail telephone 

conversations should be transcribed for an in camera review by the trial court. To the extent 

the conversations included impeachment or exculpatory evidence, Craig argued they 

should be released to counsel, because they were important to the defense. Craig and his 

co-defendants were facing life sentences, and Johnson testified as the primary witness for 

the prosecution at the preliminary hearing and was allowed to enter a plea for 

approximately 11 years of incarceration. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 21-29. 

The prosecutor filed an Opposition to the Motion to Disclose on February 8, 2012. 

Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 36. The Opposition states that the prosecutor was “surprise[d]” 

that the Sheriff’s Department complied with the subpoena and did not file a motion to 

quash. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 37. In general, the prosecutor argued that the subpoenaed 

materials should not be released to any of the defendants without a showing of “good cause 

and materiality.” Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 37. With respect to housing and movement 

records, the prosecutor did not object to disclosure of this information to defense counsel 

as long as it was not given to the defendants directly in order to protect Johnson’s safety 

and security. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 37-38. The prosecutor did oppose the release of the 

names of Johnson’s visitors and cell mates. In the prosecutor’s view, this request was a 

“fishing expedition” so that the defendants could contact visitors and cell mates hoping 

they might provide relevant evidence. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 38. The prosecutor opposed 

release of electronic recordings of Johnson’s phone calls absent a showing of good cause, 

because it would require the trial court to conduct an extensive in camera review to redact 

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confidential or privileged matters. The prosecutor estimated there was about 60 hours of 

recorded conversations and transcribing them “would take at least a month.” Lodgment 5-

1, part 1 at 38-39. On the other hand, the prosecutor conceded that the trial court should 

release the records to defense counsel to the extent they were relevant and did not contain 

confidential, constitutionally protected, or privileged information. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 

42.

Johnson also filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Order to Disclose. He argued 

that the subpoenaed materials should not be disclosed because there was no showing of 

good cause and because some of the materials might be privileged. Lodgment 7 at 15-18.

On February 15, 2012, the trial court heard oral argument on the Motion for Order 

to Disclose. Lodgment 2-2 at 10 et seq.; Lodgment 5-6 at 64. The trial court told the parties 

that the Sheriff’s Department complied with the subpoena by delivering all of the materials 

requested to the trial court except for e-mails. Lodgment 2-2 at 11-13. The trial court said 

it had “started listening” to some of Johnson’s recorded jail telephone calls to screen out 

any privileged materials but indicated they were “not easy to hear” and included “a great 

deal of . . . ethnic speech . . . that I don’t . . . fully understand.” Lodgment 2-2 at 13. Because 

of this difficulty and the volume of materials that were produced, the trial court decided to 

request briefing from the parties to ensure that the defendants were not on a “fishing 

expedition.” Lodgment 2-2 at 14. The trial court explained as follows: 

One can imagine, if the defense were to hit a gold mine in this case, finding 

a telephone call from a cooperating individual to the effect of, ‘you know, 

I’ll say anything I have to say to get out from under my beef and to shorten 

my sentence, and so go find out anything you can so I can tell the police I 

know this.’ [¶]One can imagine a cooperating individual making a similar 

statement to anybody he’s housed with or sitting on the bus next to: ‘Do you 

know anything about this case that I can say to tell the cops so I can testify 

and throw somebody else down and get off of this?’ [¶]Maybe less dramatic 

might be a situation where the witness just says something factually, which 

defense counsel from their review of the discovery might know is 

inconsistent with what he’s told the police or the investigators, and that 

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might be admissible evidence. 

Please let me emphasize, I have zero reason, zero cause to believe that any 

of these things have happened in this case. I [am just] imagining these kinds 

of scenarios as reasons why the defense would want to get access to 

everybody he’s talked to and everybody he’s been housed with, so that they 

can go talk to them and try to find out. [¶]And, of course, that adds another 

layer of complexity, because some of those people are no less – are subject 

to all the credibility concerns that the cooperating individual is. So the 

bottom line is I’m asking counsel for guidance on these points. [¶I]s there 

some showing of good cause that has to be made to gain access to these 

materials that were produced by the sheriff pursuant to the subpoena duces 

tecum?

* * * *

But my question is: Is there some showing of good cause before the court is 

required to give access to these materials to the defense?

* * * *

The second question: If something more is required, what is it? Is it akin to 

probable cause? What kind of showing, if a showing needs to be made, is 

there to – that some nugget that the defense might use or that might lead to 

discoverable evidence is likely to be in this voluminous material?

* * * *

Thirdly, . . ., if the court’s already said he’s got no expectation of privacy in 

a jail cell, how is there an expectation of privacy that will attach to these 

telephone records?

* * * *

I don’t say this lightly. I acknowledge the concerns that we all have, both 

conscientious prosecutors and conscientious defense attorneys and courts, of 

the problems that are inherent with cooperating individuals who are 

testifying. And every one of us, no matter what side of the coin, has a horror 

story or more than one that we can point to. 

On the other hand, I mean, where do we draw the line? I mean, if there are 

200 phone numbers here, do we turn over 200 phone numbers of people that 

Mr. Johnson has called on the, what, speculation, perhaps or reasonable 

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possibility, depending on how you frame it, that he might have said 

something? Is that a fishing expedition? 

Same with respect to his cellmates. Same with respect to his phone calls. 

Where does the line get drawn here in terms of just saying, ‘access to the 

whole world or what?’

Lodgment 2-2 at 14-18. 

During oral argument, defense counsel focused on several points. First, defense 

counsel argued that it was likely Johnson’s jail calls would include additional and 

perhaps more relevant impeachment evidence, because Johnson initially denied any 

connection to the shooting incident and told different stories when interviewed before he 

implicated Craig and agreed to testify for the prosecution. Lodgment 2-2 at 19-20. 

Second, defense counsel indicated there was a witness who would say that Johnson 

indicated he was going to make up a story in order to get a deal. As a result, the defense 

should be permitted to discover calls Johnson made before he agreed to testify when he 

was talking to friends or close associates about his situation, particularly because this 

could be a “close case” that could turn on “one phone call by Mr. Johnson that impeaches 

him. . . .” Lodgment 2-2 at 26-27, 41-42. 

Third, defense counsel argued that case law requiring a showing of “good cause” 

or “plausible justification” are typically based on a third party’s privacy interests, but as 

the trial court previously held in connection with the cell searches, Johnson did not have 

any privacy interest in his recorded jail telephone calls. Lodgment 2-2 at 28-30. 

Fourth, based on prior experiences in criminal cases, defense counsel indicated it is 

fairly common for incarcerated individuals to make admissions or confessions in 

recorded jail calls. As a result, defense counsel argued that it is certainly plausible under 

the circumstances that Johnson’s calls would be helpful to the defense. In addition, it was 

defense counsel’s understanding that the recorded jail calls are easily accessed by the 

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prosecution with “no judicial oversight” and then used as evidence as needed. Lodgment 

2-2 at 30-32. 

Fifth, based on the policies and procedures followed by the Sheriff’s Department at 

the jail, it was defense counsel’s understanding that Johnson’s recorded calls would not 

include privileged conversations with counsel unless there was some problem with the 

system. Lodgment 2-2 at 33-34, 38-39. 

At the close of the hearing, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that there 

must be some showing of good cause and specific facts justifying the need for the 

disclosure of the subpoenaed materials, but said, “[W]hat isn’t clear is what is sufficient.” 

Lodgment 2-2 at 53-54. The trial court invited defense counsel to submit under seal 

“specific factual averments” believed to establish “good cause” by February 29, 2012. 

Lodgment 2-2 at 55, 58. To assist counsel, the trial court said, “[F]or instance, if you did 

have the name of a particular person that you wanted to see if there was verification that 

that person had shared a cell with Mr. Johnson, that might be a good place to include that, 

along with at least a thumbnail synopsis of what that person might say. . . .” Lodgment 2-

2 at 55-56.

On February 29, 2012, Craig filed a sealed motion responsive to the trial court’s 

solicitation for “specific factual averments.” Dkt. No. 31-1, at 14. In that motion, Craig

argued that an analysis of the subpoenaed materials might reveal additional statements 

made by Johnson which would contradict statements previously given to law 

enforcement officers, since previous interviews already demonstrate that Johnson “has 

told inconsistent stories.” Id. at 16.

8 (“There can be no doubt that in prior phone 

 8 As previously discussed, this motion was supplied under seal to the Court by the trial court judge 

after Respondent made him aware of this Court’s order for supplemental records. Although this Court 

has ordered all records received in response to the Court’s order for supplemental records filed under 

seal, Dkt. No. 30, the Court does not find that its present, limited quotations from those records will 

encroach on any of the rationales for confidentiality that might have prompted the sealing of the 

materials by the state courts in the first place. 

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conversations Mr. Johnson made statements contrary to his present version of events.”).) 

Craig also asked for discovery of a phone call believed to be made by Craig to Johnson 

while Johnson was in jail; “[i]t is believed that the conversation will show that Mr. Craig 

was not involved” in the shooting. Id. at 7. Craig further stated that “[i]t is also believed 

that informant had similar phone conversations with others which may have been 

recorded.” Id.

On March 7, 2012, the trial court issued a written Order ruling on the request for 

release of the subpoenaed materials. Lodgment 5-6 at 65-66; Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 58-

59. By this time, co-defendants Roberson and Scott had joined in Craig’s request for the 

subpoenaed materials and each of the defendants had an opportunity to submit arguments 

“under seal” explaining why they believed there was “good cause for the release of the 

materials to them.” Lodgment 5-6 at 65-66. The trial court then conducted an in camera

review of some but not all of the materials. Lodgment 5-6 at 65. Specifically, the trial 

court’s March 7, 2012 Order states that the following were reviewed in camera: 

Johnson’s visitor lists, housing records, and list of outgoing phone numbers. The trial 

court did not attempt to listen to all of the recorded telephone calls. In this regard, the 

trial court’s Order states as follows: “These calls are not transcribed, are not always easy 

to hear, and frequently involve colloquial and ‘street talk’ speech patterns and words that 

are difficult to understand. The court finds that there has been no showing of good cause 

to conclude that any of the calls are relevant.” Lodgment 5-6 at 66.

The trial court’s March 7, 2012 Order rejected Craig’s argument that the 

subpoenaed materials—as a whole—were discoverable pursuant to the constitutional 

principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

Lodgment 5-6 at 65-66. Citing People v. Superior Court (Barrett), 80 Cal. App. 4th 1305 

(2000), the trial court’s view was that Brady did not apply, because the Sheriff’s 

Department was not part of the prosecution team. In other words, the prosecutor did not 

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have possession of the subpoenaed materials. Instead, the Sheriff’s Department possessed 

the subpoenaed materials only because it was custodian of the jail where Johnson was 

housed. Lodgment 5-6 at 65.

Because the trial court concluded Brady did not apply, it found that Craig could 

only obtain access to the materials by way of a third-party subpoena based on the 

standards set forth in California statutory law governing discovery in criminal cases (i.e., 

California Penal Code Section 1054 et seq.). Under the applicable California statutory 

law, the Sheriff’s Department was required to produce the subpoenaed materials to the 

trial court for an in camera review. The trial court was then charged with determining 

whether Craig made the required “showing of good cause—that is, specific facts 

justifying discovery.” Lodgment 5-6 at 65-66 (quoting Barrett, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1318).

According to the trial court, “good cause” for the wholesale release of the 

subpoenaed materials was not established based on Johnson’s cooperation with the 

prosecution and his receipt of a sentencing benefit for his cooperation. Nor was good 

cause established by the fact that Johnson had previously made inconsistent statements to 

investigating detectives. The trial court’s view was that something more was required, 

such as specific facts indicating there was more than speculation that Johnson made 

statements to a particular individual that would be helpful to the defense. Lodgment 5-6 

at 66. 

However, the trial court found that a limited set of requested materials could be 

released. Based on the parties’ submissions and the in camera review of Johnson’s 

visitor lists, housing records, movement records, and a list of phone numbers to which 

outgoing phone calls had been placed, the trial court’s March 7, 2012 Order further stated

that it intended to release “specific items” described in separate orders “under seal” to 

Craig and Roberson only. Lodgment 5-6 at 66. As to these specific items, the trial court 

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concluded Craig and Roberson had established “good cause” for disclosure. Lodgment 5-

6 at 66. 

One of these “separate orders” stated that Roberson was provided with records of 

outgoing calls from Johnson to certain telephone numbers. Lodgment 5-6 at 66-67. 

Another separate order was issued under seal, addressing Craig’s February 29, 2012 

motion. Dkt. No. 31-3.

9 There, the trial court enumerated several categories of materials 

for which defense counsel had demonstrated good cause for in camera review. It found 

good cause only as to “materials that might show a telephone call placed by Johnson to 

Craig.” Id. The trial court then advised that its in camera review of jail call logs did not 

reveal any telephone calls to Craig from Johnson. Id. Notably, the court did not find good 

cause to scour Johnson’s jail telephone recordings in search of (1) statements made over 

the jail telephone that may be contrary to Johnson’s current testimony, or (2) any “similar 

phone conversations with others (besides Craig) which may have been recorded,” tending 

to prove that Craig had not been involved in the shooting. 

On March 16, 2012, Craig filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Lodgment 5-1, part 

1 at 51-57. In the Motion, Craig argued that counsel should be allowed to transcribe and 

review Johnson’s recorded jail conversations, because it would be ineffective assistance 

of counsel if someone was not allowed to review this evidence. Craig argued that the jail 

conversations were discoverable, because “the veracity of this witness is crucial,” “no 

one objected to the production of the tapes,” and Craig was facing a life sentence without 

parole “based on the testimony of primarily one witness.” Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 54, 56. 

It was further argued there would be Brady material in the recordings even though the 

prosecutor chose not to obtain or review the conversations of the cooperating witness. 

Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 55. In this regard, Craig argued that Brady did apply despite the 

 9 This filing was supplied to the Court by the trial court judge after Respondent made him aware 

of this Court’s order for supplemental records. 

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trial court’s contrary conclusion. According to Craig, Brady applied because the Sheriff’s 

Department took part in a “cell search” related to the case; it is generally understood that 

the Sheriff’s Department took part in “gang” enforcement in “gang” cases; and the 

prosecutor had the ability to access the records “with just a telephone call.” Lodgment 5-

1, part 1 at 55.

In a Response to Craig’s Motion for Reconsideration, Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 61-

69, the prosecutor argued Craig was not entitled to discover Johnson’s recorded jail calls 

for several reasons. First, the prosecutor argued the recorded calls were not in the 

possession of the prosecutor. The prosecutor did not request disclosure of the calls as part 

of its investigation and the Sheriff’s Department was not part of the prosecution team 

simply because it facilitated a cell search related to the investigation of the case. In 

support of this argument, the prosecutor attached a copy of a report about the cell 

searches completed at the jail on November 14, 2011. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 62-65, 71-

72 (Exhibit A).

Second, the prosecutor argued there was no duty to disclose the recorded calls to 

Craig under Brady, because the duty to disclose only arises under Brady as to evidence 

possessed by the prosecution that is both material and favorable to the defense, and Craig

had not been able to establish either of these factors. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 62-68. 

Third, the prosecutor agreed with the trial court that Craig was not entitled to review the 

recorded calls, because he did not establish good cause. Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 68.

On March 29, 2012, the trial court held a status conference and heard oral 

arguments on Craig’s Motion for Reconsideration. Lodgment 5-2 at 255-270. The trial 

court noted that it had previously ordered release of certain discovery materials to Craig

and Roberson, because they made a showing of good cause; however, the trial court also 

indicated that the materials released to them represented only “a fraction of the overall 

material that was produced by the sheriff in response to [petitioner’s] subpoena.” 

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Lodgment 5-2 at 258. During oral argument, counsel essentially repeated the arguments 

made previously in their moving and opposing papers. Lodgment 5-2 at 259-264. 

Although it considered additional materials10 Craig submitted “under seal” to support the 

Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court said, “This is a fishing expedition.” Lodgment 

5-2 at 268. In other words, Craig did not provide anything specific enough to justify the 

release of additional materials. Lodgment 5-2 at 268. The trial court did acknowledge that 

in “60 hours of conversation” it was likely there would be something helpful to the 

defense, but said the cost of transcription would be “enormous” unless the defendants 

could “narrow it down.” Lodgment 5-2 at 268. In other words, the trial court decided not 

to alter its prior findings and conclusions. Lodgment 5-2 at 258-59, 264-69. On the other 

hand, the trial court stated it would maintain custody of the subpoenaed materials in case 

“good cause” develops as the case proceeds. Lodgment 5-2 at 269. 

After the trial court stated it was unwilling to alter its prior ruling, Roberson’s 

counsel indicated defense counsel could seek approval to “fund the transcription” in order 

to relieve some of the burden on the trial court. Lodgment 5-2 at 270. The trial court 

responded as follows: “I think that ultimately those extraordinary orders [for funding] are 

subject to court approval, so what we would basically be doing is passing the buck one 

more step down the line. But if somebody comes in here with an order that says that your 

office is going to pay for it, I’ll reconsider it. Absent that, I won’t.” Lodgment 5-2 at 270. 

Next, on April 17, 2012, Roberson’s counsel filed a Motion for Transcription of 

Subpoenaed Jail Calls and a Declaration indicating Roberson and Craig “received 

funding to pay for that transcription.” Lodgment 5-1, part 1 at 74-75. According to 

 10 It would appear that these materials would include the sealed declaration of Investigator Jon 

Lane, which was dispatched to this Court by the California Court of Appeals after it was made aware of 

this Court’s order for supplemental records. No. 31-2, at 5. The declaration includes Mr. Lane’s 

account of interviews conducted with Jacquett and Wiggins, and relates information substantially similar 

to what the two men would go on to testify at trial. 

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counsel’s Declaration, $5,000 had been approved to pay for the costs of transcribing 

Johnson’s recorded jail calls. The Motion essentially requested that the trial court have 

the recorded jail calls transcribed and then conduct an in camera review to determine 

whether all or some of the calls should be released to defense counsel. Lodgment 5-1, 

part 1 at 74. 

On May 2, 2012, the trial court issued an Order Denying Motion for Transcription 

of Subpoenaed Jail Calls. Lodgment 5-2 at 47. The Order referred to and incorporated the 

previous Order filed on March 7, 2012 and essentially concluded that the request to have 

Johnson’s jail calls transcribed remained a “fishing expedition,” even though the parties 

expressed a willingness to pay the transcription costs. Lodgment 5-2 at 47-48. 

Specifically, the trial court held that “[a] fishing expedition is no less so simply because 

one of the parties is willing to pay for the boat.” Id. at 48. Since the parties had not 

shown “good cause,” it was the trial court’s view that the parties had no legal right “to 

roam through these materials.” Lodgment 5-2 at 48. 

B. Trial Proceedings

Trial commenced on August 1, 2012. Lodgment 5-6 at 96. On August 24, 2012, 

Johnson’s girlfriend, Carmen Torres, testified for the prosecution. Lodgment 1-10 at 40 et 

seq. Following her testimony, defense counsel argued there was good cause for the trial 

court to release Johnson’s recorded jail conversations to telephone numbers associated 

with Torres, because her trial testimony indicated she “gave two very different 

statements” during the time period January 25, 2011 to May 18, 2011. Lodgment 1-10 at 

62-65. After several discussions on the record with all counsel outside the presence of the 

jury, including a substantial discussion on the logistics of locating the particular jail 

recordings related to Torres, the trial court concluded there was good cause for the 

release of this limited set of Johnson’s recorded jail telephone calls to all counsel. 

Lodgment 1-10 at 62-65, 95-98; Lodgment 1-11 at 15, 47-50, 100-06, 112-14. The trial 

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court then provided all counsel with disks containing digital files of Johnson’s recorded 

jail calls to Torres from January 25, 2011 to May 28, 2011. Lodgment 1-11 at 112-14. 

Torres was then recalled for additional testimony. At that time, defense counsel were able 

to use this portion of Johnson’s recorded jail calls to cross-examine Torres. Lodgment 1-

14 at 81 et seq.

The prosecution’s other key witness against Craig was Tony Mallard. Mallard was 

subpoenaed and transferred from prison to testify against his will. Lodgment 1-8 at 249. 

Mallard testified that he told a police detective he had a conversation with Craig at a 

birthday party in October 2010, before Craig was arrested for his involvement in the 

shooting. Lodgment 1-8 at 252. According to Mallard, Craig said he was trying to shoot a 

member of a rival gang but accidentally hit a female. Mallard also said he asked Craig

why he parties every day, and Craig responded that “he partied like it might be the last 

time or something like that.” Lodgment 1-8 at 259-261. Mallard testified he was 

approached in a threatening manner by other gang members on Craig’s behalf while in 

jail waiting to testify. As a result, he knew he was in danger and had to be placed in 

protective custody. Lodgment 1-8 at 254-257.

During trial, the defendants presented at least two witnesses to impeach Johnson’s 

testimony. First, Kevin Wiggins testified he has known Johnson for several years and 

shared a cell with him before he settled the charges against him in this case. During this 

time, Wiggins testified that Johnson expressed fear of going to prison and even 

considered suicide. He denied involvement in the shooting and said he was going to make 

up a story so he could get a deal and go home. Lodgment 1-11 at 134-39. 

Second, Tommy Jacquett testified he was “locked up” in the same block as 

Johnson and Wiggins for several months before Johnson agreed to testify for the 

prosecution in this case. He was present a number of times when Johnson talked about his 

case. According to Jacquett, Johnson said he heard some shots on the night in question 

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but did not know who fired the shots. Johnson also said his girlfriend was pressuring him 

to make a deal so their child would not grow up without a father. Lodgment 1-11 at 168-

75. Jacquett further testified that Johnson was depressed and considered suicide because 

“he couldn’t do that kind of time.” Lodgment 1-11 at 174.

On September 17, 2012, a jury found Craig guilty of first degree murder, attempted 

murder, and assault with a firearm. The jury also found that Craig personally used a 

handgun in the commission of these offenses; was a principal in the offenses; and 

committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 

criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal 

conduct by gang members. Lodgment 5-5 at 148-65. 

On October 26, 2012, Craig filed a Motion for a New Trial, Lodgment 5-5 at 172, 

arguing once again that he should be permitted access to all of Johnson’s recorded 

telephone calls, not just those he made to Torres, and be able to use them at a new trial. 

According to Craig, access to the remainder of the undisclosed tapes of Johnson’s 

recorded jail telephone calls would have revealed more inconsistencies and would 

therefore have allowed counsel to conduct “a more thorough examination of Mr. 

Johnson.” Lodgment 5-5 at 175. Craig also argued there was insufficient evidence to 

support the verdicts and the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the 

law regarding accomplices. Lodgment 5-5 at 175. The People opposed the Motion on 

various grounds, and the trial court denied the Motion following oral arguments. 

Lodgment 1-17 at 1, 10-18; Lodgment 5-5 at 215-23. 

On November 30, 2012, the trial court sentenced Craig to 50 years to life on count 

one (murder). Lodgment 1-17 at 49. On count two (attempted murder), the trial court 

imposed a consecutive term of nine years plus a 25-year-to-life term because the offense 

resulted in great bodily injury. Lodgment 1-17 at 49-50. On count three (assault with a 

firearm), the trial court imposed a consecutive term of one year plus one year and eight 

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months. Lodgment 1-17 at 50-51. In sum, Craig was sentenced to 11 years, 8 months, 

plus 75 years to life in state prison. Lodgment 1-17 at 51; Lodgment 14 at 3 n.2. 

C. Direct Appeal

On January 16, 2014, Craig filed his Opening Brief on appeal. One of Craig’s 

arguments was that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional 

rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when it refused to review and/or to release 

Johnson’s recorded jail calls and other jail records that Craig subpoenaed from the San 

Diego County Sheriff. Lodgment 11 at 3, 51-59. 

In an unpublished decision filed on June 5, 2015, the California Court of Appeal 

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court with directions 

for further proceedings. Based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. 

Chiu, 325 P.3d 972, 974 (Cal. 2014), which was issued while Craig’s appeal was 

pending, the California Court of Appeal’s opinion states as follows: “[A]s a matter of law 

there is no aider and abettor culpability for first degree premeditated murder under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People conceded that the judgment 

needed to be reversed insofar as defendants’ first-degree murder convictions are 

concerned because the jury was instructed guilt could be based on the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, and the record does not show beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the jury did not rely on the doctrine.” Lodgment 14 at 3. The Court of Appeal 

directed the trial court to “give the People the option of accepting a reduction of the firstdegree murder convictions to second-degree murder or retrying them on the greater 

offense.” Lodgment 14 at 3. If the People accepted a reduction of the judgment to

second-degree murder, the trial court was directed to re-sentence the defendants 

accordingly. Lodgment 14 at 55. 

The California Court of Appeal also rejected Craig’s other claims, including his 

argument that he was denied his right to Due Process when the trial court denied his 

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request for an in camera review of Johnson’s recorded jail calls. Lodgment 14 at 39. The 

California Court of Appeal did not specifically address Craig’s constitutional claims. 

Lodgment 14 at 39-40. Among other issues, such as the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the verdicts, the California Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying Craig’s request for an in camera review of Johnson’s 

recorded jail calls. Lodgment 14 at 39. Citing California case law, the Court of Appeal 

indicated there was a policy favoring “liberal” discovery in criminal cases, but said trial 

courts could properly refuse to grant discovery if it appeared to be a “fishing expedition.” 

Lodgment 14 at 39. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court imposed a “good 

cause” requirement but did not find “good cause” except for “eight to 10 hours of 

Johnson’s calls with his former girlfriend, Torres, based on inconsistencies in her 

statements before and after he implicated defendants.” Lodgment 14 at 39 n.12. As to the 

remainder of Johnson’s recorded jail telephone calls, the California Court of Appeal’s 

decision states as follows: “Craig asserts the court should not have imposed a good cause 

requirement, because he could not determine the impeachment value of the calls without 

their disclosure. Any abuse of discretion, however, was harmless because defendants 

thoroughly attacked Johnson’s credibility through other evidence, such as his own 

admission of lying, and the testimony of fellow inmates Wiggins and Jacquett that 

Johnson was terrified of a life sentence and would do anything to cut a deal with the 

prosecution.” Lodgment 14 at 40. 

On a related issue, the Court of Appeal stated that it had independently completed 

an in camera review of “Johnson’s remaining jail records.” Lodgment 14 at 40. 

According to the Court of Appeal, these records included “lists of visitors and lists of 

numbers he called; the court’s synopsis of 18 letters Johnson wrote to his former 

girlfriend, Torres; and the court’s notes from a proceeding in which it decided to exclude 

the testimony of former Belo employee, who was a paid informant as to gang members 

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frequenting the club.” After reviewing “all sealed records provided [to] us” the Court of 

Appeal found “no exculpatory or impeachment material.”11 Lodgment 14 at 40. 

Next, Craig filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court on or 

about July 15, 2015 to exhaust his state court remedies.

12 Lodgment 15 at 1-18. Once 

again, Craig argued that the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by 

refusing to conduct an in camera review or release Johnson’s recorded jail telephone 

conversations. Lodgment 15 at 13-15. On September 9, 2015, the California Supreme 

Court summarily denied the Petition for Review. Lodgment 16 at 1.

On December 4, 2015, Craig appeared before the trial court for re-sentencing. 

Lodgment 18 at 9, 11-20. As permitted by the Court of Appeal’s June 5, 2015 decision, 

the prosecutor accepted a reduction of the first-degree murder conviction on count 1 to 

second-degree murder. Lodgment 18 at 10. The trial court therefore re-sentenced Craig 

on count one to 15 years to life plus a consecutive 25-year-to-life term on the gangrelated firearm enhancement. Lodgment 18 at 15. On count two (attempted murder), the 

trial court re-sentenced Craig to the upper term of nine years plus a consecutive 25-yearto-life term on the firearm enhancement. Lodgment 18 at 16-17. On count three (assault 

with a firearm), the trial court re-sentenced Craig to a consecutive term of one year plus 

one year and eight months for the gang enhancement. Lodgment 18 at 17-18. 

 11 Given the Court of Appeal’s phrasing as including only materials “provided us,” it does not 

appear that the Court of Appeal reviewed the jail recordings. 

12 If a petitioner fails to “properly” present his claim to the state court—by exhausting his claims 

and complying with the applicable state procedure—prior to bringing his federal habeas claim, then 

AEDPA typically bars us from reviewing the claim. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). 

Exhaustion requires that “state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any 

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review 

process.” Id. Here, Craig properly exhausted his claim by “‘fairly present[ing]’ every issue raised in his 

federal petition to the state’s highest court” on direct appeal. Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

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Although Craig appealed following his re-sentencing, Lodgment 21, the California 

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments in an unpublished opinion filed on September 

12, 2016. Lodgment 22 at 1-5. 

D. Instant Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

On October 6, 2016, Craig filed the instant federal habeas Petition. Dkt. No. 1. On 

February 16, 2017, respondent filed a Response, arguing that the Petition be denied 

because discovery of the subpoenaed jail telephone records was not a federal 

constitutional issue, there was no federal constitutional right to an in camera review, and 

the California Court of Appeal found no exculpatory or impeachment material during 

their in camera review of documents provided to them. Dkt. No. 11. On March 20, 2017, 

Craig filed his Traverse as an Answer to the Response. Dkt. No. 13.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions 

of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings of recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(c); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. 

Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to the portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. District Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); 

Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such 

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections only relieves the 

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trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must 

still be reviewed de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

After Magistrate Judge Crawford issued her Report, Craig filed an objection on May 

9, 2018. Dkt. No. 19. In his objections, Craig largely reiterates legal arguments previously 

made, and raises one challenge to the magistrate judge’s factual findings. He argues that 

the magistrate judge “incorrectly made statements on line [18. Pg. 3] of R and R about a 

‘photo’ where petitioner was identified by Johnson & his arm appeared to be extended.” 

Id. at 2. Craig does not specify what was incorrect about this finding, and this Court cannot 

discern any error, since this portion of the magistrate judge’s recitation of facts derives 

directly from the California Court of Appeal’s summary of the underlying trial court 

proceedings. Lodgment 14, at 8. Because Craig fails to rebut the state court’s factual 

findings with clear and convincing evidence, his objection fails. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1) (state court factual findings are presumed correct, unless rebutted by clear and 

convincing evidence).

B. Review of Habeas Petitions

Federal habeas corpusrelief is available only to those who are in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “A federal court may 

not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 

37, 41 (1984). “[A] mere error of state law is not a denial of due process.” Engle v. Isaac, 

456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that “[i]f it plainly 

appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. . . the 

judge shall make an order for summary dismissal.” See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 

490 (9th Cir. 1990). A petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “is expected to state facts that 

point to a real possibility of a constitutional error.” Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st 

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Cir. 1970). In addition, the facts alleged in the petition must be sufficiently specific to allow 

the Court to understand the claim. See Hendricks, 908 F.2d at 491–92.

C. AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA imposes a “highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Under AEDPA, a federal court must not grant 

habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the 

decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 

(2002). 

“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) [refers to] the governing 

legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court 

renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). As a result, a lack 

of controlling Supreme Court precedent can preclude habeas corpus relief. Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (concluding that the state court’s decision did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court law, because the relevant cases 

provided “no clear answer to the question presented”). However, where the law is clearly 

established, a state court’s judgment need not cite Supreme Court cases or display 

“awareness of [the Supreme Court’s] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result 

of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (emphasis removed); 

see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In other words, 

mistakes in reasoning or in predicate decisions of the type in question here—use of a wrong 

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legal rule or framework—do constitute error under the ‘contrary to’ prong of § 

2254(d)(1).”)

The court “may issue the [habeas] writ under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state 

court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or 

if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “The court may grant 

relief under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly identifies the 

governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to 

the facts of the particular case.” Id. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, the state 

court decision must be “more than incorrect or erroneous” to warrant habeas relief. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. The standard under AEDPA is not met unless the state court’s 

application of the law is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. Habeas relief is only available 

under Section 2254(d)(1) “where there is no possibility fair minded jurists could disagree 

that the state court’s decision conflicts” with Supreme Court precedent. Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). In addition, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, Federal Courts 

“look through” to the “last reasoned state-court opinion” and presume it provides the basis 

for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-

06 (1991). If the state court does not provide a reason for its decision, the Federal Court 

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s 

decision is objectively unreasonable. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

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V. DISCUSSION

Craig contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to confrontation

and due process under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when it declined to complete an 

in camera review and/or to release Johnson’s recorded jail telephone conversations to his 

trial counsel. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7. According to Craig, Johnson’s recorded jail telephone 

conversations should have been disclosed because they were relevant as a source of 

potential impeachment evidence in light of Johnson’s decision to testify and identify him 

as the shooter. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7.

A. Confrontation Clause 

Craig argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant him access to Johnson’s recorded 

jail telephone recordings violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation 

Clause.

“The Confrontation Clause [in the Sixth Amendment] provides two types of 

protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against 

him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 

(1987). Here, Craig’s claim does not involve the first type of protection provided under the 

Confrontation Clause, as he does not allege he was denied the right to face Johnson as his 

accuser. Rather, Craig’s claim falls under the right to conduct cross-examination. Craig 

believes that access to all of Johnson’s recorded jail telephone calls was necessary for him 

to effectively cross-examine Johnson, because he believes the calls would have included 

impeachment evidence. Craig argues in his Objections that Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 

683, 690 (1986) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)), establishes a 

Constitutional guarantee under the Confrontation Clause to an opportunity for a complete 

defense, which includes an effective cross-examination. Respondent contends that the 

Confrontation Clause was not violated because Craig was afforded an opportunity to crossexamine Johnson, despite his inability to access the recordings.

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Craig’s allegations do not state a viable claim under the Confrontation Clause. 

Affording Craig an “opportunity for a complete defense” does not require an in camera

review by the trial court or access to the subpoenaed recordings. 

The Confrontation Clause is not a “constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial 

discovery.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52. “Normally the right to confront one’s accusers is 

satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses.” Id. at 53. 

“The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to require 

the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting 

unfavorable testimony.” Id. “In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an 

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ [Citation omitted.]” Id.

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, the right of confrontation “is not implicated ‘[where] 

the trial court did not limit the scope or nature of defense counsel’s cross-examination in 

any way.’” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 294 (1985)). In Ritchie, the 

petitioner argued that the lower court’s decision to deny him access to Children and Youth 

Services (CYS) files documenting his daughter’s statements to her CYS counselor hindered 

his ability to conduct an effective cross-examination and thus violated the Confrontation 

Clause. Id. at 51-52. He believed that the CYS record could potentially show that his 

daughter made statements that were inconsistent with her trial statements or that she acted 

with an improper motive. However, the Supreme Court found that, because the court did 

not limit the petitioner’s cross-examination of his daughter in any way, his right to 

confrontation was not violated. Id. at 51, 54.

Here, Craig does not in any way allege that the trial court improperly restricted his 

ability to cross-examine Johnson by preventing him from asking Johnson certain types of 

questions. As a result, he does not have a viable constitutional claim under the 

Confrontation Clause and cannot establish an unreasonable application of clearly 

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established Supreme Court law. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987) (holding 

that respondent’s rights under Confrontation Clause were not violated where respondent 

had “opportunity for full and effective cross-examination of [ ] witnesses during trial”); 

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant’s right 

to confront witnesses was not violated where he exercised right to confront and crossexamine the witness at trial), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998); Newsome v. 

Ryan, No. 05CV1534IEG(RBB), 2007 WL 433282, at *11-17 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007) 

(finding no Confrontation Clause violation where Petitioner had an opportunity to crossexamine forgetful witnesses, Petitioner impeached their forgetfulness by calling 

investigators who interviewed each witness, and jury was able to assess the witnesses and 

the testifying officers’ demeanor and credibility). Accordingly, this Court ADOPTS the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to DENY habeas relief on Craig’s Confrontation 

Clause claim.

B. Due Process: Brady

Craig identifies two violations of his due process rights under Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-

88. In state court, he argued that there was a duty on the part of the prosecution under Brady

to provide access to the phone calls recorded by the Sheriff’s Department at the jail where 

Johnson was held. Craig also argues that the trial court’s refusal to disclose Johnson’s 

recorded jail calls constituted a due process violation. Respondent contends that both 

arguments involve recordings in the possession of parties who were not part of the 

prosecution—the Sheriff’s Department and the trial court—and that, therefore, Brady does 

not apply. 

Brady is the primary source of a criminal defendant’s Due Process right to pre-trial 

discovery. Under Brady, due process is violated where 1) the prosecution suppresses 

evidence that is 2) favorable to the defendant and 3) material either to guilt or to 

punishment. Id. at 87. Evidence is favorable where it is exculpatory or impeaching. 

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Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 769 (2012) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281-82 (1999)). Evidence is material “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.’ [Citation omitted.]” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280. “The mere possibility that an 

item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the 

outcome of the trial does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” United 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). The prosecutor’s duty to disclose 

“encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence” and extends even 

to evidence “known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor. [Citation 

omitted.]” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280.

More recent cases have stated the Brady rule in broader terms. In Kyles v. Whitley, 

514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995), for example, the Supreme Court stated as follows: “[T]he 

individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others 

acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Id. at 437. See also 

Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 

410, 447 (2006); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. In Kyles, the Supreme Court held that a 

prosecutor had a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to other prosecutorial and 

investigative agencies acting on the prosecution’s behalf, including police agencies. See 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-48.

This Court agrees that the trial court’s refusal to grant Craig access to the subpoenaed 

recordings does not constitute a Brady violation because the first prong, suppression by the 

prosecution, is not met. The state court held that the “sheriff is not part of the prosecution 

team with respect to these materials, but instead possesses them merely as a result of his 

status as the operator of the custodial facility where Johnson is housed.” Lodgment 5-6 at 

65. In finding that Brady did not apply, the state court necessarily concluded that the 

Sheriff’s Department was not acting on the “prosecution’s behalf.” See id; Lodgment 5-6 

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at 65. See United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Kyles cannot be 

read as imposing a duty on the prosecutor’s office to learn of information possessed by 

other government agencies that have no involvement in the investigation or prosecution at 

issue.”). This Court has not located, nor has Petitioner identified, any clearly established 

law to establish that a third party Sheriff’s Department would be subjected to Brady’s 

requirements. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination that Brady did apply was not 

contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Moreover, neither the second nor the third prong under Brady, favorability and 

materiality, are met. To state a Brady claim, the defendant must do more than “merely 

speculate” about what information the suppressed evidence would reveal. Runningeagle, 

686 F.3d at 769. See also Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (reversing the Ninth 

Circuit’s grant of habeas for a Brady violation because the Ninth Circuit “grant[ed] habeas 

relief on the basis of little more than speculation with slight support”). In Runningeagle, a 

capital defendant claimed that his co-defendant’s former cellmate may have told 

prosecutors that the co-defendant committed the murders in question alone. Id. at 771. The 

court found this statement insufficient to demonstrate that the cellmate’s statements were 

material and favorable to the defendant. Id. In other words, the defendant’s Brady claim 

was unsupported because he only speculated as to the cellmate’s statements to prosecutors 

and there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial or sentencing would 

have been different had the statements been disclosed. Id.

Here, Craig’s claim parallels that of the defendant’s in Runningeagle in that he too 

only speculates regarding the content of the undisclosed recordings. No evidence exists 

suggesting there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Craig’s case would have 

been different had Johnson’s recordings been disclosed. Craig’s allegations do not 

demonstrate that the subpoenaed recordings were favorable to him or material. 

Accordingly, this Court finds that Craig does not have a viable Due Process claim under 

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Brady. See Marks v. Davis, Case No. 11-CV-02458, 2016 WL 6696126, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 15, 2016) (holding that rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not objectively 

unreasonable where Petitioner offered only speculation in support of it); Carillo v. 

Hernandez, Case No. CV 08-5616-ODW(CW), 2014 WL 103109, at * 11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 

8, 2014) (holding that Petitioner’s failure to show that evidence sought would have been 

favorable to him or material indicates that claim is based on “pure speculation, which is 

manifestly insufficient to warrant habeas corpus relief”); Duy Pham v. Ewen, Civil No. 03-

0462 WQH (JMA), 2013 WL 2475865, at *23 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2013) (finding no Brady

violation where Petitioner’s claims were little more than “conclusory and speculative 

assertions” that failed to support inference that evidence withheld would be favorable to 

him). Accordingly, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to 

DENY habeas relief on Craig’s Brady claim.

C. Due Process: Ritchie

Craig argues that the trial court’s denial of his request for disclosure and for an in 

camera review of Johnson’s phone recordings violated his right to Due Process.

Respondent contends that a constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case does not 

exist. The trial court rejected Craig’s request on the basis that his request was nothing more 

than a “fishing expedition” and that he failed to make the requisite good cause showing 

that Johnson’s recorded jail calls were material to the fairness of the trial.

The Supreme Court has asserted that “there is no general constitutional right to 

discovery in a criminal case.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). In 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, however, the Supreme Court indicated that a criminal defendant 

seeking access to confidential or privileged materials outside the possession of the 

prosecutor has a Due Process right to disclosure and/or an in camera review if “some 

plausible showing” is made to indicate the records include evidence that is both material 

and exculpatory to the defense. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56-61, 58 n.15. 

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The Court must first determine the clearly established “rule” to be derived from

Ritchie. Ritchie addressed the threshold burden to obtain in camera review in a footnote:

The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure 

because he did not make a particularized showing of what information he 

was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 

(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 

2400–01, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (“The mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense ... does not establish 

‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense”)) Ritchie, of course, may not 

require the trial court to search through the CYS file without first 

establishing that it contains material evidence. See United States v. 

Valenzuela–Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 

1193 (1992) [ (1982) ] (“He must at least make some plausible showing of 

how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his 

defense”). Although the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not 

depend on the presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of 

specificity of Ritchie's request may have bearing on the trial court's 

assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure. See United 

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–683, 105 S.Ct. 3375 3383–3384, 87 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.).

Id. at 58 n.15.

While the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have addressed the parameters of Ritchie, 

other circuit have interpreted the Ritchie footnote to establish a plausibility threshold for in 

camera review. The Sixth Circuit has held that the clearly-established Supreme Court 

precedent in Ritchie is that a defendant is entitled to an in camera review of evidence to 

determine whether it contains information that would have changed the outcome of the trial 

if the defendant has “establish[ed] a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence”

by making “some plausible showing of how [the] testimony would have been both material 

and favorable to the defense.” Renusch v. Berghuis, 75 Fed. Appx. 415, 423 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 58 n.15). The Sixth Circuit’s articulation of the Ritchie

standard was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Dietrich v. Smith, which held that a

Wisconsin appellate court reasonably applied Ritchie by finding the defendant’s due 

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process claim insufficient because he failed to make a plausible showing that the evidence 

sought would produce material evidence. Dietrich v. Smith, 701 F.3d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 

2012). See also Moseley v. Kemper, 860 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that it 

was not unreasonable for appellate court to deny in camera review, as Petitioner failed to 

establish why the evidence was relevant, let alone material). 

The Court agrees with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and finds that the clearly 

established “rule” of Ritchie is that a defendant seeking discovery from a third party is 

entitled to in camera review by the trial court only where the defendant has “establish[ed] 

a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence,” by making “some plausible 

showing of how [the] testimony would have been both material and favorable to [the] 

defense.” See Renusch, 75 F. App’x at 424. Under this rule, while “the obligation to 

disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the presence of a specific request,” the 

“degree of specificity” of any request “may [properly] have a bearing on the trial court’s 

assessment . . . of the materiality of the nondisclosure.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15. 

In the underlying proceedings, the trial court insisted that Craig make a showing of 

“good cause,” i.e., “specific facts justifying discovery,” before it would conduct in camera

review and order disclosure of the subpoenaed materials. Craig attempted to meet this 

requirement by submitting under seal his February 29, 2012 motion for discovery of, inter 

alia, (1) the entirety of the recordings, on the grounds that “[t]here can be no doubt that in 

prior phone conversations Mr. Johnson made statements contrary to his present version of 

events,” (2) a phone call between Craig to Johnson, and (3) any “similar phone 

conversations” tending to show that “Mr. Craig was not involved” in the shooting. Dkt. 

No. #31-1, at 14–18. Pursuant to its good cause standard, the trial court conducted an in 

camera review for any recorded calls between Craig and Johnson. Dkt. No. 31-3, at 1.

However, the trial court did not find good cause to release the entirety of the jail phone

recordings or to scour them in camera for statements which would impeach Johnson’s 

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credibility or exculpate Craig of Johnson’s claim that he was involved in the shooting. Id.

After Johnson’s girlfriend, Carmen Torres, gave conflicting testimony at trial, the trial 

court found good cause to release approximately ten hours of recorded calls between 

Johnson and Torres.

For the reasons articulated below, the Court finds that the California Court of 

Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of Ritchie. 

First, that the trial court invoked a “good cause” standard under Barrett, instead of 

the “plausible showing” standard articulated in Ritchie, does not make its holding

“objectively unreasonable” under AEDPA. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98 (explaining 

that a state court “need not cite or even be aware of” the Supreme Court’s cases under § 

2254(d) to pass muster under AEDPA). As the Supreme Court recognized, a disputed 

state-court holding may withstand habeas review “[s]o long as neither the reasoning nor 

the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court] precedent.” Early, 537 

U.S. at 8. Here, the trial court’s analysis comports with the clearly-established rule in 

Ritchie that in camera review requires a threshold, plausible showing of materiality and 

favorability. 

Consistent with Ritchie, the trial court reasonably evaluated the specificity of Craig’s 

requests against the many hours of recordings at hand, and determined that but for the 

particularized requests made with respect to Torres and Craig, no other recordings merited 

disclosure or in camera review. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15 (“Although the obligation 

to disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the presence of a specific request, . . . 

the degree of specificity of Ritchie’s request may have bearing on the trial court’s 

assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure.”). Based on the large volume 

of Johnson’s recorded jail calls during two or so years of incarceration awaiting trial, the 

poor quality of the recordings, and the amount of time it would have taken to examine 

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them, the claims of Craig and his co-defendants could have reasonably been seen as 

speculative. Lodgment 5-2 at 268. As the trial court explained, the cost of transcription and 

the time implicated by in camera review would be “enormous” unless the defendants could 

“narrow it down.” Lodgment 5-2 at 268. In other words, the trial court’s classification of 

Craig’s request for the totality of the recordings as a “fishing expedition” and requirement 

of a narrower scope of request do not contradict Supreme Court precedent, but are rather 

consistent with it. 

Moreover, the California Court of Appeal and the state trial court essentially 

concluded, in an objectively reasonable manner, that Craig did not make a “plausible 

showing” indicating how all sixty hours of Johnson’s recorded jail calls were “material to 

the fairness of the trial.” Renusch, 75 Fed. App’x. at 423. As previously discussed supra 

in Section V.B. with respect to Craig’s Brady claim, it was not unreasonable for the state 

courts to reject Craig’s requests for want of materiality. Indeed, despite Craig’s adamant 

assertion that “[t]here can be no doubt that in prior phone conversations Mr. Johnson made 

statements contrary to his present version of events,” Craig’s argument for discovery rested 

on no more than his speculation that those phone calls existed. See, e.g., Hall v. Scribner, 

619 F.Supp.2d 823, 849–50 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying a habeas petition under Ritchie 

because petitioner’s request for psychiatric records on the basis that they “might contain 

unspecified information bearing on Ryan’s credibility as a witness or might contain some 

evidence of her engaging in prostitution” was insufficient to demonstrate materiality).

The state courts’ adverse determination on materiality is further bolstered by the fact 

that much of the information sought by Craig was cumulative of what the defense already 

had on hand. See United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2011)

(impeachment evidence is not material if it is “merely cumulative” with other forms of 

impeachment evidence (quoting Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 921 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Craig’s discovery request was predicated on his claim that in camera review might unearth 

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other phone conversations in which Johnson “told inconsistent stories.” Dkt. No. 31-1, at 

16. At the time of the request, however, defense counsel had already interviewed two 

witnesses, Wiggins and Jacquett, id. at 17, who were primed to testify that Johnson was 

willing to commit perjury to avoid a life sentence; both men gave impeachment testimony 

as to Johnson at trial. Thus, it was understandable for the state courts to conclude that any 

additional impeachment evidence on this issue would have marginal value. See, e.g., Davis 

v. Litscher, 290 F.3d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying habeas relief under Ritchie because

no plausible showing of materiality was made where the petitioner “failed to demonstrate 

how the sought after records would bolster his defense or add genuinely useful since he 

already possessed facts material to impeaching” the witness whose records were subject to 

privilege). 

Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Craig failed 

to plausibly show with specific information that the calls would contain information that 

was material to the fairness of the trial and thus refuse to conduct an in camera review. See

Dietrich, 701 F.3d at 1198 (denying habeas relief where Petitioner “failed to make a 

plausible showing that the [records sought] contained evidence material to his defense”); 

Brown v. Sheets, No. 2:06-cv-448, 2007 WL 3024456 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2007) 

(dismissing Petitioner’s claim that he was improperly denied an in camera review of 

evidence where petitioner failed to make a plausible showing of how the evidence would 

have been material and favorable to him.13

 13 The Report further supports its recommendation to deny Craig’s petition by asserting that § 

2254(d) “gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor 

has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them. Dkt. No. 14 at 29 (quoting Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). While this may be true, this Court finds this portion of the Report 

irrelevant to the current case. In Lonberger, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reassessment 

of a witness’ credibility, which had already been determined by the state court. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 

434 (holding that Sixth Circuit was “bound to respect. . . . the finding of the Ohio trial court that 

respondent was ‘an intelligent individual, well experienced in the criminal processes and well 

represented in all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel in Illinois’ and had no 

authority to re-assess the effect of respondent’s testimony at the Ohio state trial court hearing”). Here, 

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To be sure, it may have been more prudent for the trial court to have conducted an 

in camera review of all sixty hours of jail phone recordings, especially since defense 

counsel had secured funding for their transcription. Further, it is not surprising to this Court 

that Magistrate Judge Crawford––were she to have considered the issue in the first 

instance––would have found that Craig and his co-defendants made a “plausible showing” 

sufficient to warrant in camera review under Ritchie. However, the question on federal 

habeas review is not whether the state court’s application of clearly established Supreme 

Court law aligns with that of the court sitting in habeas; rather, the focus of inquiry is 

“whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is objectively 

unreasonable.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. As explained above, and as demonstrated by similar 

cases decided by the Sixth and Seventh Circuit, this Court cannot grant habeas relief. See 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (habeas relief is available only “where there is no possibility 

fair minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts” with Supreme 

Court precedent). 

Finally, even assuming arguendo that the state court erred under Ritchie, any error 

was harmless because it did not have “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993); see 

also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 12122 (2007) (even if state court does not have occasion 

to apply the test for assessing prejudice applicable under federal law, the Brecht standard 

applies uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254); Larson v. Palmateer, 

515 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (review for harmless error under Brecht is “more 

forgiving” to state court errors than the harmless error standard the Supreme Court applies 

 

this Court does not seek to re-determine Johnson’s credibility, but to examine whether the state court 

erred in withholding evidence that Craig and his co-defendants intended to use to attack Johnson’s 

credibility, thus denying them the opportunity to further challenge Johnson’s credibility.

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on its direct review of state court convictions).

14 Craig and his co-defendants were already 

able to impeach Johnson’s testimony through Johnson’s own admission of lying and the 

testimony of Wiggins and Jacquett that Johnson intended to make up a story and “was 

terrified of a life sentence and would do anything to cut a deal with the prosecution.” 

Lodgment 14 at 40. Similarly, ten hours of the subpoenaed calls were released to counsel 

and these materials were used to question Johnson’s motivation to lie, including statements 

by Johnson that he’d “take a deal for something he did not do” and “just wants to get out 

of [jail], like now, by any means necessary.” Id. at 17. Certain portions of these were 

even played to the jury. See Lodgment 1-14 at 87-90. As a result, the jury was presented 

with a substantial amount of impeachment material regarding Johnson’s motive to lie about 

the incident. Thus, even assuming Craig had proven a Ritchie error, he is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief because the alleged error would not have had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Based on the foregoing, it was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established 

Supreme Court law for the state court to deny Craig access to Johnson’s recorded jail calls 

 14 AEDPA requires the federal habeas court to defer to any state court determination of harmless 

error unless the holding is in “conflict with the reasoning or the holdings of [Supreme Court] precedent 

or if it applied harmless-error review in an objectively unreasonable manner.” See Inthavong v. 

Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In this case, the California Court of Appeals rendered a harmless error analysis, Lodgment 12-

45, at 40, but did not specify whether it was applying a state-law standard or the harmless error standard 

applicable to federal constitutional violations, i.e., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 

There is no indication that the Court of Appeals applied Chapman, which specifies a “harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard. Id. On the contrary, the discussion as to the jail phone recordings indicates a 

primary focus on state law governing criminal discovery. 

But, regardless of whether the California Court of Appeals conducted the proper harmless error 

analysis, the Supreme Court has held that when a federal habeas court reviews a state-court harmless 

error decision, it is required to determine whether the assumed error was harmless under Brecht, 507 

U.S. 619. See Fry, 551 U.S. at 119–22; see also Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(holding that a federal habeas court “need not conduct an analysis under AEDPA of whether the state 

court’s harmlessness determination on direct review . . . was contrary to or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law . . . because the Brecht test ‘obviously subsumes’ the more 

liberal” AEDPA standard (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-20)).

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and refuse to conduct an in camera review of the entire 60 hours of recorded material. Dkt. 

No. 14 at 29. Accordingly, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation 

to DENY Craig’s Ritchie Due Process claim.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that “[t]he district 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse 

to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability should be issued only where the petition 

presents “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). A certificate of appealability “should issue when the prisoner shows . . . that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000).

The Court concludes that jurists of reason could find it debatable whether Craig has 

stated a valid claim of the denial of Due Process. Craig has made a substantial showing

indicating that the records contained evidence that was material and exculpatory to the 

defense and, thus, the trial court should have conducted an in camera review of the 

recordings. See id. Although the Court has determined that it was objectively reasonable 

for the state court to deny Craig’s request for disclosure and an in camera review of 

Johnson’s phone recordings, such a determination is reached with some hesitation. While 

Craig’s request would have required the disclosure or review of fifty-to-sixty hours of 

phone recordings and lacked specificity with regard to which particular phone calls he was 

interested in examining, a reasonable jurist could believe that the California courts were 

unreasonable because Craig had sufficiently made a plausible showing that the records 

sought contained material and exculpatory evidence. Given the inconsistencies between 

Johnson’s testimony and evidence implicating other parties in the crime, such as clothing 

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matching Roberson’s that was found at the scene and carried traces of gunpowder residue, 

it is possible that a reasonable jurist could find that the “petition should have been resolved 

in a different manner.” Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4); see Dietrich 

v. Smith, No. 11-C-117, 2012 WL 602757 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 23, 2012) (granting certificate 

of appealability regarding “plausible showing” required by Ritchie for in camera review 

and finding that “jurists of reason could disagree with this court's resolution of [Petitioner’s 

claim and] that the due process issue. . . . is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further”).

Furthermore, questions of first impression within a circuit warrant the granting of a 

certificate of appealability. See Melton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1234, 1237-

38 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, B., dissenting) (contending that a certificate of appealability 

should have been granted “because the [issues at hand] are one of first impression, 

debatable, and likely to come up in other cases”) and United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 

F.3d 501, 502 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Because this presents a question of first impression in this 

circuit, we conclude that the issue merits further judicial consideration, and we grant a 

certificate of appealability”).15 Because the particular standard that a defendant must meet 

to justify entitlement to an in camera review under Ritchie is a question of first impression 

in this circuit and is both “debatable” and “likely to come up in other cases,” it is 

appropriate for this Court to grant a certificate of appealability. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

 15 But see S.E.C. v. Richetelli, No. 3:09-cv-361(CFD), 2010 WL 4823237 (D. Conn. Nov. 22, 

2010) (holding that “the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a question of first impression, standing 

alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and, thus, certificate 

of appealability should not be automatically granted to questions of first impression (quoting In re Flor, 

79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996)).

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation, OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections, DENIES Petitioner’s 

Petition, and GRANTS a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2019

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