Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06417/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SUTTON, GAIL SUTTON and

DANIELLE SUTTON,

Plaintiffs,

 v

ROBERTA SOKOTOWSKI, LESLIE FOOTE,

WALTER HOLZ, JR, VICTORIAN CARE

HOMES OF THE MONTEREY PENINSULA,

INC, RICHARD BISHOP, ANN SYDES

d/b/a A & A AUCTION, 

Defendants. /

No C 06-6417 VRW

ORDER

The court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 USC § 1332. It is brought by Gail Sutton, the adult

daughter of Letitia Breng Rose, Gail’s husband John Sutton and

Gail’s daughter, Danielle Sutton. Doc #1 ¶ 1. Defendants move to

dismiss.

Dr Leslie Foote has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1), insufficient

service of process under FRCP 12(b)(5) and failure to state a claim

under FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc #17-1. Dr Walter Holz, Jr has filed a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). 

Doc #24. Defendants Roberta Sokotowski and Richard Bishop have

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filed joint motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under

FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc #13. Defendant Ann Sydes d/b/a A & A Auction,

in addition to moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1), insufficient service of process

under FRCP 12(b)(5) and failure to state a claim under FRCP

12(b)(6), has requested sanctions against plaintiffs. Doc ##8, 20. 

The court has received and reviewed memoranda from the parties and

finds it appropriate for decision without oral argument. 

For the reasons stated herein, Holz’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. Foote’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Sokotowski and

Bishop’s joint motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Sydes’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and her motion for sanctions is DENIED. 

I

The instant action, filed October 13, 2006, is one of

four cases filed in this court that have arisen, in one respect or

another, from conservatorship proceedings opened in 2003 in

Monterey County concerning the now-deceased Letitia Breng Rose. 

See CAND C-04-4176 (Rose v Hogan); CAND No C-05-4469 (Sutton v

Teets); CAND No C-06-0472 (Sutton v Llewellyn). 

Defendants’ roles in this case are alleged to be as

follows: Victorian is a residential care facility in Monterey

County where Rose lived until her death; Sokotowski and Bishop are

public guardians who acted as conservators over Rose’s estate and

person; Foote and Holz are doctors who cared for Rose while she was

at Victorian; Sydes is a public auctioneer who auctioned off assets

from Rose’s estate. Doc #1 ¶¶ 3-6. 

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Plaintiffs’ first two causes of action allege that

defendants Victorian, Sokotowski, Bishop, Foote and Holz caused

Rose’s wrongful death (claim #1) and that they committed elder

abuse while caring for Rose (claim #2). Doc #1 ¶¶ 22-35; see Cal

Civ Proc Code § 377.60; Cal Welf & Inst Code § 15657. Both claims

arise out of essentially the same factual allegations. In

particular, plaintiffs allege that those defendants drugged Rose

because she objected to the conservatorship, prescribed medications

that weakened her physical condition, gave her morphine and ativan

to shorten her life, failed to refer her to proper specialists when

she fell in January 2005 and provided inadequate care to her in

general. Id ¶¶ 25-35. 

Plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action allege that

Sokotowski and Bishop (claim #3) and Sydes (claim #4) “wrongfully

dissipated Rose’s estate.” Doc #1 ¶¶ 40-44. In particular,

plaintiffs allege that Sokotowski and Bishop “wrongfully increased

Rose’s insurance costs,” sold her stocks and bonds at a loss, paid

exorbitant attorney’s fees and failed to notify plaintiffs of the

sale of Rose’s assets. Id. Plaintiffs’ cause of action against

Sydes alleges she sold estate assets that actually belonged to

plaintiffs and that Sydes improperly published notice of the sale

of Rose’s estate, denying them the opportunity to purchase her

assets. Doc #1 ¶¶ 45-50. 

II

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) is proper only

where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable theory.” 

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William W Schwarzer, A Wallace Tashima and James M Wagstaffe,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 9:187 (Rutter Group 2006);

Balistreri v Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F2d 696, 699 (9th Cir 1990). 

The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts that would entitle him to relief. Id at 9:213. Although

courts may be particularly lenient with pro se plaintiffs, liberal

interpretation of the complaint does not extend to supplying

plaintiffs with essential elements not initially pled. Pena v

Gardner, 976 F2d 469, 471 (9th Cir 1992). 

III

The court turns first to the motion to dismiss filed by

Foote. Doc #17-1. Although Foote makes a number of arguments,

because the court GRANTS her motion to dismiss based on

insufficient service of process, it does not reach the substantive

issues raised by her motion. 

Foote argues that the complaint has not been properly

served because the process server left the complaint and summons

with a person at Foote’s place of business, not at her “dwelling

house or usual place of abode” as required by FRCP 4(e)(2). Doc

#17-1 at 8:23-9:7. Although the Ninth Circuit requires

“substantial compliance” with Rule 4, it is well-established that

service of process at a defendant’s business is not sufficient

under that rule. Daly-Murphy v Winston, 837 F2d 348, 355-56 (9th

Cir 1987); see also Wright & Miller, 4A Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil 3d § 1096 at 522 (West 2002). In Gerritsen v

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Consulado General de Mexico, 989 F2d 340, 344-45 (9th Cir 1993),

the Ninth Circuit held that where a plaintiff left a summons and

complaint with a co-worker at the defendant’s place of employment,

the trial court properly dismissed the defendant for insufficient

service of process. In Daly-Murphy, the Ninth Circuit dismissed

the defendants in their individual capacities, even though leaving

the summons and complaint at their place of employment properly

served them in their official capacities. 837 F2d at 355-56. 

Plaintiffs’ only position to the contrary is that Foote

“waived [service of process] in light of her response to the

substantive arguments.” Doc #37 at 10:4-6. Yet FRCP 12(h)(1)

makes it clear that the defense of insufficiency of process would

be waived in the event that it is omitted from a motion raising

other Rule 12 defenses. Not only is Foote permitted to argue

insufficient process in the present motion, she is, for all intents

and purposes, required to or she risks forfeiting it as a defense. 

In sum, the complaint and summons were left by a process

server with an employee at Foote’s place of business. The proof of

service does not reveal any additional measures taken to ensure

that service was effected. Plaintiffs are afforded only 120 days

after a complaint is filed to perfect service of process. FRCP

4(m). Because plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 13, 2006,

that 120 day period has long elapsed. Given that Foote gave ample

notice to plaintiffs of their defect in service, the court finds no

good cause for extending the amount of time available for properly

serving her. Accordingly, Foote is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

//

//

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IV

The court next turns to Holz’s motion to dismiss. Doc

#24. The court addresses the procedural matters raised by Holz’s

motion and then proceeds to the substantive merits of his motion.

A

First, Holz objects to the timeliness of plaintiffs’

opposition. Doc #50 at 1:24-2:5. On that issue, Local Rule 7-3(a)

is unambiguous: “Any opposition to a motion must be served and

filed not less than 21 days before the hearing date.” Plaintiffs

violated this rule by filing their opposition papers on March 7,

2007, only fifteen days before the scheduled hearing. See Doc #38

at 1. Although Holz has requested that the court not consider

these late-filed oppositions, that sanction would be unduly harsh,

especially in light of plaintiffs’ pro se status. Furthermore,

Holz is not prejudiced by plaintiffs’ late opposition because

Holz’s motion succeeds on its merits. Accordingly, Holz’s

objection is OVERRULED; plaintiffs are admonished, however, that

their pro se status does not excuse them from adherence to both the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the

Northern District of California and that such lapses will not be

excused if they cause prejudice to any other party.

Second, the court agrees with Holz that the declaration

filed by plaintiffs in opposition to Holz’s motion (Doc #45) must

not be considered by the court in its ruling on this motion. Under

FRCP 12(b), the court may not consider matters outside the

pleadings on a motion to dismiss without converting it to one for

summary judgment and declines to do so here. Moreover, the

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declaration, a statement containing opinion regarding the adequacy

of Rose’s medical care, made by a Los Angeles area emergency

physician with no apparent connection to Rose, is entirely

irrelevant to the standing issues upon which Holz has moved for

dismissal. Holz’s objection is SUSTAINED.

 

B

The court now turns to the merits of Holz’s motion to

dismiss. Holz first requests that John and Danielle Sutton be

dismissed as plaintiffs from the wrongful death claim (claim #1),

arguing that under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(a),

if there is a surviving child of the decedent, that child’s

successors-in-interest may not maintain such a claim. Doc #24,

3:20-4:13. Plaintiffs do not present any clear opposition to

Holz’s contention other than the misplaced argument that as

successors-in-interest, they have a right to maintain such an

action under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30 —— a

statute that governs standing for survivor actions, not wrongful

death claims. Doc #38, 3:10-12.

As an initial matter, plaintiffs contend that Holz’s

argument based on § 377.60 lacks merit under Erie Railroad Co v

Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), because “Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure trump state rules.” Doc # 38 at 7:8-9. The so-called

“Erie doctrine” provides that while federal courts exercising

diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state

in which they are located, procedural issues are governed by

federal law. William W Schwarzer, A Wallace Tashima and James M

Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 1:36 (Rutter Group

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2006); Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc, 518 US 415, 427

(1996). Because § 377.60 governs a plaintiff’s right to bring an

action, it is considered substantive for Erie purposes and must be

applied by the court here. FRCP 17(b); Schwarzer, Tashima &

Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 1:53.1 (Rutter

Group 2006); Firestone v Galbreath, 976 F2d 279, 283 (6th Cir

1992). 

Additionally, plaintiffs confuse § 377.30 and § 377.60. 

The former governs standing for survivor actions, i e the ability

of plaintiffs to bring or maintain a cause of action that belonged

to Rose prior to her death. The latter governs standing to bring a

wrongful death action, a cause of action that belongs to certain

individuals who survive the decedent; a wrongful death claim never

belonged, nor could have belonged, to Rose. Accordingly, § 377.30

does not apply here. 

By contrast, § 377.60 is controlling and is strictly

construed under California law. Phraner v Cote Mark, Inc, 55 Cal

App 4th 166, 169 (Cal App 4th Dist 1997) (internal citations

omitted). The relevant language of § 377.60(a) reads that a

wrongful death cause of action may be maintained by:

The decedent's surviving spouse, domestic

partner, children, and issue of deceased

children, or, if there is no surviving issue of

the decedent, the persons, including the

surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would

be entitled to the property of the decedent by

intestate succession.

Here, Gail Sutton is the child of the decedent and is still alive. 

As such, the statutory language makes it clear that she is the only

party to this action who may sue for the wrongful death of Rose;

the alleged potential for John and Danielle Sutton to inherit

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Rose’s estate does not change this fact. Chavez v Carpenter, 91

Cal App 4th 1433, 1439, 1444 (Cal App 6th Dist 2001) (parents of

decedent unable to maintain wrongful death action as heirs where

decedent’s daughter survived him). Accordingly, they lack standing

to pursue a cause of action for the wrongful death of Rose. Their

first cause of action is therefore DISMISSED without leave to

amend. Only Gail Sutton may proceed on the wrongful death claim. 

C

Additionally, Holz argues that John and Danielle Sutton

lack standing to bring a cause of action for elder abuse under

California Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.3. Doc #24, 4:14-

5:11. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because they are

successors-in-interest to Rose’s estate. Doc #38 at 3:9-6:13. 

The initial requirement for standing to bring an elder

abuse claim is governed by § 15657.3(d) which provides:

Upon petition, after the death of the elder

or dependent adult, the right to maintain an

action shall be transferred to the personal

representative of the decedent, or if none,

to the person or persons entitled to succeed

to the decedent's estate.

Holz contends that the phrase “persons entitled to succeed to the

decedent’s estate” should be construed narrowly to mean that as

long as there is a living issue of the decedent, only that issue

may maintain a survivor cause of action for elder abuse. Doc #50

at 3:25-4:20. 

Yet the California court of appeal rejected that argument

in Estate of Lowrie v Lowrie, 118 Cal App 4th 220, 228, 231 (2d

Dist 2004), when it allowed the decedent’s granddaughter to

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maintain an elder abuse cause of action against the decedent’s son,

even though the decedent still had other living children. Because

the granddaughter’s success on the elder abuse claim would have

entitled her to succeed the defendant as trustee under the

decedent’s estate plan, she had a sufficient interest in the estate

to maintain the cause of action. Id at 229-30. Although Holz

argues that Lowrie is limited to situations where the elder abuse

defendant is the issue of the decedent, that argument fails in

light of the fact that the decedent in Lowrie had other living

children who were not accused of elder abuse. Id at 228. 

Here, by order of the Monterey County superior court, the

assets of Rose’s estate are to be divided equally between Gail and

Danielle Sutton; Danielle Sutton’s half is to be held in trust

until she reaches the age of 22. Doc #38, Ex B (April 28, 2006

Order of Superior Court of California, County of Monterey, Case No

MP 16886) at 3:3-6. John Sutton received no portion of the estate

under that order. Id. Only Gail and Danielle Sutton may pursue a

cause of action alleging the elder abuse of Rose under § 15657.3.

Additionally, standing to bring a survivor action is

governed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32. That

statute requires a plaintiff to file a declaration with the court,

under penalty of perjury, demonstrating a survivor’s interest in

pursuing a claim. Although this requirement is procedural in

nature, it has been interpreted to establish the minimum

requirements for asserting standing to pursue a survivor cause of

action, even when a federal court is sitting in diversity. Dillard

v Curtis, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 22926, *20 (ND Cal 2004) (Hamilton, J)

(finding that plaintiffs’ failure to file declaration under §

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377.32 rendered standing an “open question”). Although plaintiffs

have not employed the exact technical language required by

§ 377.32, given that the superior court has adjudicated that Gail

and Danielle Sutton are the only heirs to the Rose estate, coupled

with the fact that they have filed declarations that substantially

comply with § 377.32, the court perceives no benefit to dismissing

their claim on such technical grounds. See Doc #38-1 (Plaintiffs’

Decl in Opp to Holz’s Mot to Dismiss). 

Accordingly, Gail and Danielle Sutton have effectively

established standing to pursue their elder abuse cause of action

and the motions to dismiss as to those plaintiffs are DENIED. 

John Sutton, by contrast, has failed to allege any facts

demonstrating that he is a successor-in-interest to Rose’s estate. 

Given that the superior court has ordered that the entire estate be

divided equally between Gail and Danielle Sutton, the court

perceives no way for John Sutton effectively to plead standing

under the requirements of § 15657.3 and § 377.32. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss John Sutton from plaintiffs’ second cause of

action is GRANTED without leave to amend.

V

Sokotowski and Bishop have moved to dismiss all of

plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that because their actions were

approved by order of the Monterey County superior court, plaintiffs

are barred by res judicata from pursuing their claims in this

court. Doc #13 at 5:22-7:22. In support of their motion,

Sokotowski and Bishop have filed a declaration attaching records

from the superior court conservatorship proceedings over Rose’s

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estate. Doc #14 (Rentz Decl). The court may take judicial notice

of official records without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into

a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Schwarzer, Tashima &

Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 9:212.15; In re

Colonial Mortg Bankers Corp, 324 F3d 12, 16, 19 (1st Cir 2003). 

Accordingly, Sokotowski and Bishop’s request for judicial notice

(Doc #15) is GRANTED. As presently explained, it is plain that the

Monterey County proceedings preclude plaintiffs’ “wrongful

dissipation of the estate” claim. The court does not reach

Sokotowski and Bishop’s alternative theories for dismissal. 

A

Sokotowski and Bishop’s primary argument for res judicata

is that the issue of “wrongful dissipation of Rose’s estate” (claim

#3) is precluded by the Monterey superior court’s final judgment on

the disposition of Rose’s estate through her conservatorship

proceedings. Doc #13 at 5:24-7:22. California conservatorship

statutes provide a direct means for interested parties, including

those with only an expectancy or prospective interest in the

estate, to investigate wrongdoing by a person holding a

conservatee’s property. Cal Probate Code § 2616 et seq; Johnson v

Kotyck, 76 Cal App 4th 83, 90 (Cal App 2d Dist 1999). Sokotowski

and Bishop correctly argue that because plaintiffs availed

themselves of these remedies in the conservatorship proceedings in

the superior court, they are precluded from raising their claim in

federal court. 

The degree to which a state court judgment will be given

preclusive effect in federal court depends upon the preclusive

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effect such judgment would have in state court. Manufactured Home

Communities, Inc v City of San Jose, 420 F3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir

2005). California has a statute specifically governing the

preclusive effect of the final judgment of a conservatorship

proceeding. California Probate Code § 2103(a) provides as follows:

When a judgment or order made pursuant to this

division becomes final, it releases the

guardian or conservator and the sureties from

all claims of the ward or conservatee and of

any persons affected thereby based upon any act

or omission directly authorized, approved, or

confirmed in the judgment or order. For

purposes of this section, ‘order’ includes an

order settling an account of the guardian or

conservator, whether an intermediate or final

account. 

Yet the preclusive effect of such judgments is not

absolute and there is an exception to the rule where the

conservator has obtained the judgment by fraud, conspiracy or

misrepresentation. In re Conservatorship of Harvey, 3 Cal 3d 646,

651-52 (1970); Cal Probate Code § 2103(b). The fraud exception to

the preclusive effect of a final order under § 2103 is limited,

however, to claims of “extrinsic fraud.” Bank of America v

Superior Court, 181 Cal App 3d 705, 714-15 (Cal App 3d Dist 1986). 

Extrinsic fraud occurs “[w]here the unsuccessful party has been

prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception

practised on him by his opponent” or where “fiduciaries have

concealed information they have a duty to disclose.” Lazzarone v

Bank of America, 181 Cal App 3d 581, 596 (Cal App 3d Dist 1986)

(citing United States v Throckmorton, 98 US 61, 65-66 (1878)). 

Thus, in Lazzarone, plaintiffs’ claims that a conservator

mismanaged funds were insufficient to circumvent the res judicata

effect of § 2103. Id at 597-98. 

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Here, plaintiffs simply have not demonstrated why they

should be permitted to pursue their claims arising out of the

management of Rose’s estate. After Rose was appointed a

conservator, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Dismiss/Strike the

Petition for Conservatorship” with the superior court. Doc #14 at

4:3-5, Ex F. In that document, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,

that the county entered Rose’s home and took her money and personal

property. Id at 5:11-13, Ex F ¶ 10. On January 23, 2004, the

court heard the conservatorship petition and granted it, revoking

Gail Sutton’s power of attorney. Id at 7:9-16, Ex I at 1-4. On

January 24 and January 31, 2004, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to

Terminate the Order for Conservatorship” with the superior court,

once again alleging that an agent had taken all of Rose’s property

and that the county was executing the conservatorship in bad faith. 

Id at 7:17-19, 9:4-13, Ex J ¶¶ 10-13. On February 27, 2004, the

superior court, after a hearing on the issue, ruled in favor of

retaining the conservatorship. Id, Ex R. 

Over the next year, plaintiffs continued to file various

motions with the superior court relating to Rose’s conservatorship. 

Id 11:11-6. On March 6, 2005, plaintiffs filed a petition to halt

the sale of Rose’s personal property. Id at 17:7-12, Ex JJ. This

document alleged that all of Rose’s property, with the exception of

some furniture, belonged to plaintiffs. Id, Ex JJ ¶¶ 1-6. 

On March 25, 2005, the public guardian filed its first

“account current” of Rose’s estate, which covered the period from

December 12, 2003 through December 12, 2004, and on April 4, 2005

it filed a petition to sell Rose’s property. Id at 17:18-23, Ex LL

at 18:1-5, Ex MM. Plaintiffs opposed the accounting and the sale

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of Rose’s property in two separate documents filed with the court

on April 17, 2005. Id at 18:6-15, Ex NN, Ex OO. Plaintiffs did

not appear at the hearing and the court granted the conservators

permission to sell the property, specifically stating that it had

considered plaintiffs’ filed petitions. Id at 18:16-20, Ex PP. 

Plaintiffs next made a motion to “open and strike” the

order to sell possessions, arguing that they did not know that the

hearing date for their previous petitions had been changed. Id, Ex

RR. The court once again held a hearing on July 8, 2005, and

plaintiffs appeared by telephone. Id, Ex UU at 1. The judge found

that Rose was afforded every protection under California law,

declined to open and strike the order to sell possessions and

approved the accounting. Id, Ex UU at 23-30, Ex WW. Plaintiffs

have filed three state court appeals and one writ in the California

court of appeal, but have never paid the appropriate filing fee to

perfect those proceedings. Id at 24:10-14; Doc #21 (Connolly

Decl), Ex I.

In short, plaintiffs have participated in or have aired

their grievances about the handling of Rose’s estate at various

stages of the state conservatorship proceedings. Plaintiffs’

allegations in the present case all allege that Sokotowski and

Bishop mishandled property of the estate during the

conservatorship. Specifically, the complaint alleges that they:

inflated insurance costs, failed to rent Rose’s empty house to

generate income, sold stocks and bonds at a loss, failed to collect

a security deposit from Victorian, charged the estate excessive

attorneys fees and sold property without giving proper notice. 

Doc #1 ¶¶ 40-45. None of these allegations come even close to

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alleging the extrinsic fraud required to circumvent the preclusive

effect of § 2103. Plaintiffs in no way allege that they were

prevented from participating in the state conservatorship

proceedings or that Sokotowski and Bishop concealed transactions

from the superior court.

The final accounting of the estate has been approved by

the superior court in Monterey County and plaintiffs have evidently

chosen not to pursue their appeals from the adverse state court

rulings. The court will not disturb the final disposition of that

state case by allowing plaintiffs to revive those claims in federal

court. Given that plaintiffs have filed multiple petitions in

state court and that this is the fourth federal lawsuit arising out

of the handling of Rose’s estate, the court sees no avenue for

plaintiffs to amend their complaint so as to circumvent the res

judicata effect of the final state order. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

claim against Sokotowski and Bishop for “wrongful dissipation of

the estate” (claim #3) is DISMISSED without leave to amend. 

 

B

From the face of plaintiffs’ complaint, the court finds

no legally cognizable theory upon which Sokotowski and Bishop could

be held liable for the wrongful death or elder abuse of Rose; these

causes of action rest entirely on allegations that Rose received

improper medical care from Victorian and from her physicians. The

only allegation made specifically against Sokotowski and Bishop is

that they “deprived Rose from visiting privately with

[plaintiffs].” Doc #1 ¶ 34. In no way could this lone allegation

be construed to support a cause of action for wrongful death or

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elder abuse. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ first two claims against

Sokotowski and Bishop are GRANTED without leave to amend. 

VI

Plaintiffs’ claim against Sydes, although styled as a

single cause of action, actually offers two theories against her:

(1) it alleges Sydes auctioned off the property of Rose’s estate,

including property in which plaintiffs claim an ownership interest

and (2) it alleges Sydes failed to give proper notice of the sale

under California Civil Code § 1812.601. Doc #1 ¶¶ 45-50. Sydes

has moved to dismiss these claims for “wrongful dissipation of the

estate and failure to notice” (claim #4) and moved for sanctions

against plaintiffs. For the following reasons, Sydes’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and her motion for sanctions is DENIED. 

A

Sydes, like Foote, moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims

for insufficient service of process under FRCP 12(b)(5). Doc #7 at

8:15-26. The court, however, finds that a crucial distinction from

Foote’s situation causes her argument to fail. Because plaintiffs

served Sydes in accordance with California law, service of process

was proper pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) which provides that service is

effective if made “pursuant to the law of the state in which the

district court is located * * *.” 

Under California law, a plaintiff may be served by

leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the individual’s

place of business and thereafter mailing those documents to the

business and addressing them to the person to be served. Cal Civ

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Proc Code § 415.20. Plaintiffs’ proof of service for Sydes, unlike

that for Foote, indicates that not only did the process server

leave a copy of the summons and complaint at her place of business,

but it also indicates that she “thereafter mailed * * * copies” to

Sydes. Doc #25, Ex F. This is consistent with California law.

Accordingly, Sydes’s motion to dismiss based on

insufficient service of process is DENIED and the court proceeds to

the merits of her motion. 

B

 Plaintiffs’ claim for “wrongful dissipation of the

estate” must be dismissed for reasons similar to those underlying

the dismissal of the claims against Sokotowski and Bishop. 

The conservators, as a matter of state law, were required

to file a petition with the superior court in order to sell assets

of Rose’s estate and they complied with that statute. See Cal

Probate Code § 1300(a); Doc #8 (Decl of Connolly), Ex E. 

Plaintiffs, prior to the court order, filed two documents with the

court: one styled “Petition to Halt Sale and Contest Sale and

Strike Off Any Order to Sell Property” and one styled “Objections

to County Petition to Sell Property and Furniture Located in Mrs[]

Rose’s Home.” See Doc #14, Exs JJ, NN. In these documents,

plaintiffs alleged an ownership interest in the property being

sold. The court, over plaintiffs’ objections, ordered the assets

of the estate sold. Doc #14, Ex F. Plaintiffs have not pursued an

appeal from that superior court order. 

The superior court, in issuing its order, necessarily

found that plaintiffs had no legal interest in the property it

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ordered sold. Possession, or an immediate right to possess the

property sold, would be necessary for plaintiffs to support any

claim for conversion. See Neil M Levy, 3-40 California Torts §

40.42 (Matthew Bender 2006). Accordingly, allowing plaintiffs to

proceed with their claim against Sydes would require the court to

violate the preclusive effect of § 2103, as discussed in Sokotowski

and Bishop’s motion to dismiss. 

Furthermore, given that the superior court proceedings

preclude plaintiffs from suing the conservators who authorized the

sale in the first place, it obviously follows that they cannot

maintain a claim against the auctioneer acting at the express

direction of those conservators and in compliance with a court

order authorizing the sale of that property. Bernard Witkin, 5

Summary of California Law, § 126 (10th Ed 2006) (“consent is a

complete defense to tort liability”). Accordingly, plaintiffs’

claim for “wrongful dissipation of the estate” is DISMISSED without

leave to amend. 

C

Additionally, plaintiffs claim that Sydes, by failing to

place her bond number on the advertisement for the auction of

Rose’s estate, failed to give proper notice of the sale as required

by California Civil Code § 1812.607(a). Doc #25 at 5:10. Even

accepting that allegation as true, plaintiffs have directed the

court to no cognizable legal theory making the omission of a bond

number from an auction advertisement the foundation of a claim for

conversion or the like. 

//

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While it is true that under California Civil Code

§ 1812.603 any person may petition a superior court to enforce the

provisions governing auctioneers, the statute under which

plaintiffs complain, § 1812.607(a), states that the maximum fine to

be paid in the event an auctioneer fails properly to advertise a

sale is $100. Given that this regulatory issue is wholly unrelated

to the remaining two causes of action in this case, and that the

maximum recovery falls far below the $75,000 minimum required by 28

USC § 1332, the claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. 

For the above-stated reasons, Sydes’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claim for “wrongful dissipation of the estate and

failure to notice” (claim #4) is DISMISSED without leave to amend. 

D

Sydes has also moved for sanctions against plaintiffs

arguing that their claim is legally baseless because plaintiffs are

pursuing these claims on behalf of Rose’s estate and prior court

orders have made it clear that they do not have standing to do so. 

Doc #20 3:13-28, 4:17-28. Sydes’s arguments are misplaced. 

Plaintiffs are not attempting, as they did in Sutton v Llewellyn,

to sue on behalf of Rose’s estate. Rather, they are asserting

standing based on their status as successors-in-interest to her

estate, standing conferred upon plaintiffs by Cal Code Civ Proc § 

377.30. Accordingly, although the court has dismissed plaintiffs’ 

claims against Sydes, it declines to order sanctions against

plaintiffs. 

//

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VI

The only causes of action that remain in this lawsuit are

those for wrongful death (claim #1) and elder abuse (claim #2) and

the only remaining defendants are Holz and Victorian. 

John Sutton is no longer a plaintiff in this action as he

has been dismissed from the remaining claims for wrongful death and

elder abuse. Danielle Sutton remains only as a plaintiff to the

second cause of action for elder abuse. 

The case management conference now scheduled for April 17

at 9:00 am will take place as scheduled. Plaintiffs’ request to

appear by telephone is GRANTED. Dismissed parties are excused from

attending the conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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