Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00860/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00860-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH GIBBS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CARSON, et. al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-0860-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Doc. No. 168 

Plaintiff Kenneth Gibbs, a state prisoner, filed this pro se 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeds against 

Defendant Anthony for a claim that he violated Plaintiff’s due 

process rights by denying a witness at a 2009 disciplinary 

hearing.1 Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff has opposed the motion and Defendant filed a reply. 

For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

I 

 Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pelican Bay Stay Prison 

(“PBSP”) during the relevant time.2

 Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”), Docket No. 89 at 25 of 50.3 Plaintiff is serving a 

prison term of life without the possibility of parole. Motion 

 

1

 Many other Defendants and claims were previously dismissed from 

this case. 

2

 The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed. 

3

 The Court refers to all page numbers in the SAC as they appear 

in the Court’s electronic docket. 

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for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”), Request for Judicial Notice 

(“RJA”), Ex. A.4 Defendant Anthony was a correctional lieutenant 

during the relevant time. H served as the senior hearing officer 

for Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. MSJ, Van Loh Decl., Ex. G 

at 1. 

 On October 9, 2008, prison staff searched Plaintiff’s cell 

and discovered an inmate-manufactured weapon. Id., Ex. C at 2. 

The weapon was a ten-inch-long tightly rolled cylinder of paper 

topped with a sharpened metal tip. Id. at 2-5.5 The weapon was 

confiscated and Plaintiff was found guilty at a hearing on the 

Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) by another correctional officer. 

Id., Ex. E. 

 Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal challenging the RVR 

on the grounds that he had not been allowed to call witnesses 

during the RVR hearing. Id., Ex. F at 1-3. Plaintiff stated 

that he wanted to call medical witnesses to demonstrate that the 

confiscated weapon was in fact a medical device he made to pop 

herpes blisters in his mouth. Id. at 3-6. The warden reviewed 

the appeal and issued a modification requiring the RVR to be 

reheard because the senior hearing officer should have contacted 

the medical witnesses as part of the investigation. Id. at 4-5. 

 The RVR was reissued on March 24, 2009. MSJ, Van Loh Decl., 

Ex. G at 1. Defendant Anthony served as the senior hearing 

officer for the new RVR hearing. Id. at 4-5. Defendant Anthony 

assigned Officer Basnett to help Plaintiff gather information for 

 

4

 The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 

5

 A photocopy of the weapon was provided. MSJ, Van Loh Decl., Ex. 

G at 5. 

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his defense. Id. at 2. Plaintiff told Officer Basnett that the 

confiscated weapon was a medical device he used to pop blisters 

and that Nurse Carson verbally authorized Plaintiff to use it. 

Id. at 2. 

 Officer Basnett spoke to Nurse Carson who stated that no 

medical device was authorized for Plaintiff because the 

medication provided to him was sufficient to treat the blisters. 

Id. at 3. After being shown a picture of the weapon, Nurse 

Carson stated that medical staff would not have authorized such a 

device for Plaintiff. Id. 

 Plaintiff disputes this and states that Nurse Carson 

authorized him to use the device. Opposition at 8-9. Plaintiff 

includes an affidavit from Nurse Carson to support his assertion. 

Opposition, Ex. B. However, the affidavit states, “I saw the 

numerous blisters in [inmate/patient] Gibbs mouth, 

[inmate/patient] was not being seen after 1 reported problem, 

[inmate/patient] Gibbs was using instrument to pop blisters.” 

Id. 

 Nurse Carson did state that Plaintiff showed her a sharpened 

paper clip he had been using to pop blisters. MSJ, Van Loh 

Decl., Ex. G at 5. It was only about two inches long and did not 

have a handle. Id. 

 Defendant Anthony conducted the hearing for the reissued RVR 

on May 3, 2009. Id. at 4. Plaintiff requested five witnesses: 

Officer Clemons and Lieutenant Diggle to discuss their 

conversation with Nurse Carson about the alleged weapon; 

psychologist Archambault to describe his findings; Officer Night 

to relay a conversation that Plaintiff had with a dental 

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assistant; and Nurse Carson to state that she approved the 

alleged weapon. Id. at 4-5. 

Defendant Anthony granted the requests for witnesses Clemons 

and Diggle. Id. at 4. Defendant Anthony denied the request for 

Archambault because he was not involved in the investigation and 

had no knowledge of relevant issues. Id. at 4. Defendant 

Anthony denied the request for Night, because Plaintiff could 

describe the conversation with the dental assistant and because 

Night’s testimony would be cumulative. Id. Defendant Anthony 

denied the request for Nurse Carson because her testimony was in 

Officer Basnett’s report; Clemons and Diggle could testify about 

their conversations with her about the alleged weapon; and Nurse 

Carson was not on duty at the time of the hearing. Id. at 5. 

After the hearing, Defendant Anthony found Plaintiff guilty 

of possession of a weapon. Id. at 6. He found that the device 

was a deadly weapon capable of inflicting serious or lethal 

injury. Id. Defendant Anthony rejected Plaintiff’s testimony 

that medical staff instructed him to make the device for medical 

reasons. Id. Defendant Anthony found that even if Plaintiff 

used the device to pop blisters, it could also have been used as 

a deadly weapon. Id. 

 Plaintiff was assessed a 360-day forfeiture of good-time 

credits and a twelve-month Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) term. 

Id. at 7. Yet, the SHU term was not imposed because on June 9, 

2009, the Institutional Classification Committee suspended it and 

released Plaintiff to general population. MSJ, Van Loh Decl., 

Exs. H, I. 

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II 

A 

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine 

disputes of material fact remain and when, viewing the evidence 

most favorably to the nonmoving party, the movant is clearly 

entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Celotex v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. 

Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The 

moving party bears the burden of showing there is no material 

factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. Therefore, the Court 

must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported 

by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Id. at 324; 

Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is 

sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 

Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its burden 

of production, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible 

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. 

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 

502 U.S. 994 (1991); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 

210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Material facts that would preclude entry of summary judgment 

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are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which 

facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). Questions of fact regarding immaterial issues 

cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Reynolds v. County 

of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on 

other grounds by Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 

(9th Cir. 1997). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if 

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

B 

 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from 

two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the 

states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 

Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed 

in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, 

whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations authorized by 

state law that are less severe or more closely related to the 

expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of 

a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) 

state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of 

prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate 

a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is 

one of "real substance." See id. at 477-87. 

Allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in 

conjunction with a disciplinary proceeding do not present a 

constitutionally cognizable claim, however, unless the 

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deprivation suffered is one of "real substance" as defined in 

Sandin. "Real substance" will generally be limited to freedom 

from (1) restraint that imposes "atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life," id. at 484 or (2) state action that "will 

inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence," id. at 487. In 

determining whether a restraint is an “atypical and significant 

hardship,” Sandin suggests that courts should consider whether 

the challenged condition mirrored the conditions imposed on 

inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, and 

thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; the 

duration of the condition; the degree of restraint imposed; and 

whether the discipline will invariably affect the duration of the 

prisoner's sentence. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the 

restrictions imposed by the nature of the penal system. See 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Thus although 

prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 

prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in 

such proceedings does not apply, where serious rules violations 

are alleged and the sanctions to be applied implicate state 

statutes or regulations which narrowly restrict the power of 

prison officials to impose the sanctions and the sanctions are 

severe, the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum 

procedural protections. See id. at 556-57, 571-72 n.19. 

Wolff established five procedural requirements. First, 

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action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to 

enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 

418 U.S. at 564. Second, "[a]t least a brief period of time 

after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the 

inmate to prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary 

committee]." Id. Third, "there must be a 'written statement by 

the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the 

disciplinary action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the inmate facing disciplinary 

proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so 

will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals." Id. at 566; Fifth, "[w]here an illiterate 

inmate is involved . . . or [where] the complexity of the issue 

makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and 

present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of 

the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, 

or . . . to have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or 

from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff." Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 570. 

The Court specifically held that the Due Process Clause does 

not require that prisons allow inmates to cross-examine their 

accusers, see id. at 567-68, and does not give rise to a right to 

counsel in the proceedings, see id. at 569-70. 

III 

Plaintiff contends there was a violation of the fourth Wolff 

protection because he was not allowed to call Nurse Carson as a 

witness in his defense. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff 

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was not deprived of a protected liberty interest. 

Defendant asserts that there was no deprivation under Sandin 

because Plaintiff did not suffer an atypical and significant 

hardship and because the duration of his sentence was not 

affected. An inmate whose lost good-time credits are restored 

has failed to identify a protected liberty interest because the 

length of the sentence was not affected. See Womack v. Grannis, 

453 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In this case, Plaintiff was assessed a 360-day forfeiture of 

good-time credits and a twelve-month SHU term. While the goodtime credits were not restored, it is undisputed that Plaintiff 

is serving a prison term of life without the possibility of 

parole; therefore, the forfeiture of credits does not affect 

Plaintiff’s sentence because there is no possibility of parole. 

See Pena v. Spearman, No. C 13-3983 SBA (PR), 2015 WL 435062, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015) (disciplinary finding resulting in 

loss of time credits did not affect duration of sentence because 

plaintiff is serving a life sentence). 

Nor was there an atypical and significant hardship as a 

result of the RVR. The twelve-month SHU term was suspended 

approximately one month after Defendant found Plaintiff guilty, 

and Plaintiff was returned to general population. Typically, 

placement in segregated housing in and of itself does not 

implicate a protected liberty interest. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 

1078; see, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86 (inmate's thirty-day 

placement in disciplinary segregation, where conditions mirrored 

conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and 

protective custody, did not result in type of atypical, 

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significant deprivation). While Plaintiff may have been in 

segregated housing prior to the reissued RVR, there are no 

allegations that Defendant Anthony was involved in that 

placement. Defendant Anthony’s sole involvement in this case was 

serving as hearing officer for the second disciplinary hearing. 

Because Defendant Anthony did not affect the duration of 

Plaintiff’s sentence when he imposed a punishment that did not 

cause atypical and significant hardship, summary judgment is 

granted for Defendant. 

Even if there was a deprivation of a protected liberty 

interest, Plaintiff still received all the procedural protections 

required. His only allegation is that Defendant Anthony denied 

one witness, Nurse Carson. It is undisputed that Plaintiff 

requested five witnesses and that two of the five were provided. 

Prison officials are not required to place in the 

"administrative record" their reasons for refusing to allow 

witnesses to testify, but may wait to provide the explanation in 

court if the refusal is challenged. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 

491, 497 (1985). But see Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1079-80 (finding a 

due process violation where hearing officer failed to offer a 

convincing explanation for why he did not allow witnesses and 

failed to follow state regulation requiring him to document his 

reasons for refusing to grant inmate's request for a witness). 

Prison officials can note that the reason for denying a witness 

may be for “irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards 

presented in individual cases.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. 

In this case, Defendant Anthony described the reasons for 

denying Nurse Carson. He denied the request because her 

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testimony was in Officer Basnett’s report; witnesses Clemons and 

Diggle would be available to testify about their conversations 

with her about the alleged weapon; and Nurse Carson was not on 

duty at the time of the hearing. Plaintiff’s rights were not 

violated because Nurse Carson’s testimony was presented through 

other witnesses and reports. There is no indication that Nurse 

Carson’s testimony would have differed from what was conveyed by 

the reports and other witnesses. The testimony indicated that 

she did not give Plaintiff permission for any type of medical 

device, let alone some sharpened metal at the end of a ten-inch 

handle. The testimony also reflected that she was aware that he 

was using another device, a two-inch paper clip, to pop his 

blisters. 

 Plaintiff contends that she would have testified that she 

gave him permission to have the confiscated device in order to 

pop his blisters. However, this contention is contradicted by 

Plaintiff’s own evidence. Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit 

from Nurse Carson stating that she was aware he was using another 

instrument to pop his blisters. She does not state that she gave 

him permission or authorization for the confiscated device. 

Even if Nurse Carson gave permission for the use of a paper 

clip, she did not approve a ten-inch handle with a metal point. 

Regardless, even if such a device had a medical use, Defendant 

Anthony found that it was still a deadly weapon. 

Summary judgment is granted to Defendant Anthony because the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that there was no due process 

violation. While Nurse Carson did not testify, her statements 

that she was aware of Plaintiff using a two-inch paper clip to 

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pop his blisters were presented and considered by Defendant 

Anthony. Regardless of her not testifying, there was no 

deprivation of a protected liberty interest because Plaintiff’s 

sentence was not affected and there was no atypical and 

significant hardship because the SHU-term was suspended and 

Plaintiff was released to general population.6

Even if Defendant Anthony violated Plaintiff’s due process 

rights, Anthony is still entitled to qualified immunity. It 

would not be clear to a reasonable official that denying an 

inmate’s request to have a witness testify at a disciplinary 

hearing would be unlawful when the substance of the witness’ 

testimony was presented through other witnesses and reports. For 

all these reasons the motion for summary judgment is granted. 

IV 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as 

follows: 

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 168) 

is GRANTED. 

2. The Clerk shall close the file. This order terminates 

Docket No. 168. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 02/17/2016 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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6

 This action does not concern the sufficiency of the evidence to 

find Plaintiff guilty of the RVR, just the denial of the witness 

at the RVR hearing. 

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