Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02394/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02394-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

KAYLEIGH SLUSHER, Deceased, 

THROUGH HER SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST JASON SLUSHER; JASON 

SLUSHER, Individually; ROBIN SLUSHER,

Individually; and BENNY SLUSHER, 

Individually, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

CITY OF NAPA, a public entity; NAPA 

POLICE OFFICER GARRETT WADE, 

Individually; NAPA POLICE OFFICER 

DEGUILIO, Individually; NAPA CHIEF OF 

POLICE RICHARD MELTON, Individually 

and in his Official Capacity; COUNTY OF 

NAPA, a public entity; NAPA COUNTY 

CHILD WELFARE SERVICES SOCIAL 

WORKER NANCY LEFLER, Individually; 

NAPA COUNTY CHILD WELFARE 

SERVICES WORKER ROCIO DIAZ-LARA,

Individually; and DOES 1-50, Jointly and 

Severally, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 15-2394 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS AND ORDER OF 

REFERENCE FOR EARLY 

SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 

Dkt. 22, 23 

On January 30, 2014, three year-old Kayleigh Slusher (“Kayleigh”) was viciously 

murdered by her mother, Sara Krueger (“Sara”) and her mother’s boyfriend, Ryan Warner 

(“Ryan”).1

 Kayleigh’s biological father, Jason Slusher (“Jason”), individually and on 

behalf of Kaleigh, and Kayleigh’s paternal grandparents, Robin Slusher (“Robin”) and 

Benny Slusher (“Benny”), in their individual capacities, bring the instant action against: 

 1 For clarity, Plaintiffs and related individuals will be referred to by their first names. 

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the City of Napa (“City”); the County of Napa (“County”); the Napa Police Department 

(“NPD”) Chief Richard Melton; NPD officer Garrett Wade; NPD officer Dominic Deguilo; 

Child Welfare Services (“CWS”) worker Rocio Diaz-Lara; and CWS worker Nancy LeflerPanela. The operative pleading is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which alleges 

federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658 (1978), along with state law causes of action for violation of California’s Bane 

Act and negligence/negligence per se. 

The parties are presently before the Court on the City Defendants and the County 

Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).2

 Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with these matters 

and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

both motions, with leave to amend. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable 

for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On May 3, 2010, Kaleigh was born to Sara and Jason. FAC ¶ 26. For over a year, 

Kaleigh and her mother lived with Jason’s parents, Robin and Benny. Id. ¶ 27.3

 Sara 

eventually moved to her own apartment with Kayleigh. Id. Though no longer living with 

her grandparents, Kayleigh saw them regularly and often had weekend sleepovers at their 

home. Id. ¶ 29. 

Around October 2013, Sara’s boyfriend, Ryan, a “crank” (methamphetamine) addict 

with an outstanding arrest warrant, moved into Sara’s apartment and began preventing the 

grandparents from seeing Kaleigh. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. The grandparents suspected that Sara and 

Ryan were engaging in illegal drug activity and placing Kayleigh at serious risk of harm. 

 2 The City, Chief Melton and Officers Wade and Deguilo are referred to collectively 

as the “City Defendants,” while the County and CWS workers Diaz-Lara and Lefler-Panela 

are collectively referred to as the “County Defendants.” 

3 During this time, Jason was in prison for a crime unrelated to his relationship with 

Kaleigh. Id. 

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Id. NPD police officers were summoned to Sara’s apartment in October 2013 and January 

2014 regarding disturbances there, but took no action. Id. ¶ 32. 

By January 2014, the grandparents had become increasingly concerned about 

Kayleigh, whom they had not seen or had contact with since Thanksgiving. Id. ¶¶ 33, 50. 

On January 23, 2014, Robin called the NPD to request a welfare check on Kayleigh. Id. 

¶ 33. She expressed concern that Kayleigh was under the care of drug addicts, that Ryan 

had an outstanding warrant and was armed, and that Kayleigh was being mistreated and 

abused. Id. Officer Wade responded to the call, but concluded that the situation was 

unsafe for him and his partner. Id. He did not to call for back up or investigate the report 

of suspected child abuse and neglect, and simply cleared the call. Id.4 

Also on January 23, 2014, Robin made numerous attempts to contact CWS social 

workers Diaz-Lara and Lefler-Panela to report her concerns regarding Kayleigh’s safety 

and well-being. Id. ¶ 40. Lefler-Panela later returned Robin’s call, informing her that there 

was nothing CWS could do and to call the police instead. Id. ¶ 41. 

On January 29, 2014, at around 5:58 p.m., Robin, fearing that Kayleigh was in grave 

danger, again contacted NPD for assistance. Id. ¶ 50. At around 8:47 p.m., Officers Wade 

and Deguilio went to Sara’s residence. Id. ¶ 51. Sara “actively tried to conceal the inside 

of her home from [them] by closing the front door against her body and peeking her head 

out to talk to them.” Id. Sara brought Kayleigh to the front door. Id. The officers 

observed that Kayleigh had bruises on her face, appeared gaunt, sick, malnourished and 

distressed. Id. The officers also encountered Sara’s boyfriend, Ryan, who falsely 

identified himself as “Ryan Howard.” Id. Ryan appeared malnourished, with sunken 

cheekbones, and to be under the influence of narcotics. Id. After the officers entered the 

apartment, Kayleigh vomited in front of them, and was quickly taken to the bathroom by 

Sara. Id. They also saw a male whom they knew was on probation attempt to depart from 

 4 A few days later on the morning of January 27, 2014, unspecified NPD officers 

were again dispatched to Kaleigh’s home due to a neighbor’s report of a domestic 

disturbance. Id. ¶ 38. The officers never made any report of child abuse and/or neglect to 

CWS or any other authority. Id. ¶ 38. 

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the premises. Id. Sara asked the officers to leave. Id. The officers complied, without 

making any effort to speak with Kayleigh or physically examine her. Id. 

After the visit, Officers Wade and Deguillo determined that the person who 

identified himself in the apartment as “Ryan Howard” had lied about his identity and, in 

fact, was Ryan Warner. Id. ¶ 51. They also confirmed that Ryan had an active, outstanding 

arrest warrant. Id. Despite this realization and their observations at the apartment, the 

officers made no effort to obtain a warrant to re-enter the apartment or arrest him. Instead, 

Officer Wade called Robin and told her that Kayleigh had food and that everything 

appeared normal at the home. Id. Defendant Wade also reassured Robin that he would 

“keep an eye on the apartment.” Id. ¶ 55. Had Defendants investigated further, they would 

have discovered that Ryan had an extensive criminal history, which included, without 

limitation, assault and possession of drugs. Id. ¶ 52. Ryan also had a restraining order 

entered against him for threatening to kill his pregnant ex-girlfriend, among making other 

extremely sadistic and violent threats. Id. ¶ 56. 

On or about February 1, 2014, NPD police officers responded to a call to perform 

another welfare check on Kayleigh. Id. ¶ 57. When the officers arrived at Sara’s 

apartment, they discovered Kaleigh lying deceased in her bed, with evidence of having 

suffered severe physical abuse. Id. The Napa County District Attorney later reported that 

Kaleigh died from multiple blunt force trauma with impact injuries to her head, torso and 

extremities. Id. ¶ 57. Sara and Ryan have been charged with Kaleigh’s murder. Id. 

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court and subsequently 

filed a FAC on July 1, 2015. The FAC alleges the following claims: (1) violation of due 

process, mandatory reporting requirements, and interference with familial relations, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Monell liability; (3) violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code § 52.1; and (4) negligence/negligence per se. The County Defendants and City 

Defendants have separately filed motions to dismiss all claims alleged in the FAC. The 

motions are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege 

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 

959 (9th Cir. 2013). “Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires 

not only ‘fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.’” 

Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting in part Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’ “ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570 (2007)). 

In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in 

its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 

and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 

2007). Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, 

unless further amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 

656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief under § 1983 for denial of due process and 

interference with familial relations is directed against Officers Wade and Deguilo and CWS 

workers Diaz-Lara and Lefler Panela. Section 1983 provides that individuals may sue 

government officials who violate their civil rights while acting “under color of any statute, 

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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To maintain a 

claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law, (2) by a person acting 

under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, defendant’s actions must 

both actually and proximately cause the deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire 

v. Caifornia Dep’t of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a jurisdictional vehicle for 

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 

F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

1. Due Process 

“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from ‘depriv[ing] any person of life, 

liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 

786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). The Due Process Clause 

encompasses two types of protections: procedural fairness (procedural due process) and 

substantive rights (substantive due process). Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-28 

(1990). A procedural due process claim challenges the procedures used in effecting a 

deprivation, whereas a substantive due process claim challenges the governmental action 

itself. See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the gist of Plaintiffs’ due process claim is that Defendants violated their 

mandatory duties to investigate and report child abuse, which, in turn, led to Kayleigh’s 

murder. FAC ¶¶ 64-66. Although the pleadings do not specify whether the due process 

claim is based on substantive or procedural due process, Plaintiffs state in their opposition 

that they are proceeding on both legal theories. 

a) Substantive Due Process 

Generally, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply 

does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (holding that a social services agency and 

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social workers did not violate a child victim’s substantive due process rights by failing to 

protect him from his abusive father, notwithstanding significant evidence establishing that 

the child was subjected to beatings). “There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when a 

‘special relationship’ exists between the plaintiff and the state (the special-relationship 

exception) . . . ; and (2) when the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting 

with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or obvious danger’ (the state-created danger 

exception) . . . .” Patel v. Kent School Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citations omitted). Plaintiffs rely on the state-created danger exception, sometimes simply 

referred to as the “danger creation” exception. Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 

1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197). 

“[A] police officer’s conduct that affirmatively places a plaintiff in a position of 

danger deprives him or her of a substantive due process right.” Johnson v. City of Seattle, 

474 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th 

Cir. 1989)). “To determine whether an official affirmatively placed an individual in 

danger, we ask: (1) whether any affirmative actions of the official placed the individual in 

danger he otherwise would not have faced; (2) whether the danger was known or obvious; 

and (3) whether the officer acted with deliberate indifference to that danger.” Henry A. v. 

Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). 

For example, in Wood, a trooper stopped a car in which the plaintiff was a 

passenger, arrested the driver for drunk driving, and left the plaintiff in a high crime area at 

2:30 a.m. The plaintiff later accepted a ride from a stranger and was raped. The Ninth 

Circuit reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the trooper, finding that there was 

“a factual dispute regarding whether [the trooper] deprived her of a liberty interest 

protected by the Constitution by affirmatively placing her in danger and then abandoning 

her.” Id. at 596. Similarly, in Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 

2013), the court found that the police officers affirmatively increased the danger to an 

individual who had been shot and later died by preventing her ambulance from leaving the 

scene. Id. at 1082. The court explained that the delay left the victim “worse off than if the 

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ambulance had been allowed to bring her to an air ambulance that had advanced medical 

capabilities and was ready to fly her to a trauma center.” Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kennedy, in particular, supports 

the application of the danger creation exception. In Kennedy, the plaintiff, the mother of a 

nine year-old girl, reported to the police that a thirteen year-old neighbor had molested her 

daughter. In response to the mother’s concern regarding the neighbor’s history of violence, 

the officer told her that she would be given notice prior to any police contact with the 

neighbor’s family regarding her allegations. Kennedy, 439 F.2d at 1058. Despite those 

assurances, the police officer, without first notifying the mother, informed the neighbor and 

his mother of the plaintiff’s claim of molestation. When the plaintiff learned of this, she 

asked the officer why he had contacted the neighbor without first notifying her, and 

expressed serious concerns for her safety. In response, the officer “assured [the plaintiff] 

that the police would patrol the area around both her house and the [neighbor’s] house that 

night to keep an eye on [him].” Id. Due to the late hour and the officer’s promise to patrol 

the neighborhood, the plaintiff and her husband decided to stay at their house. Id. The 

following morning, the neighbor broke into the plaintiff’s home and shot her and her 

husband, killing him, as they slept. Id. In upholding the denial of qualified immunity for 

the officer, the Ninth Circuit held that the officer “affirmatively created a danger to [the 

plaintiff] she otherwise would not have faced, i.e., that [the neighbor] would be notified of 

the allegations before the [parents] had the opportunity to protect themselves from his 

violent response to the news.” Id. 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ failure to investigate and report on the suspected 

abuse of Kayleigh, in tandem with Officer Wade’s “false” assurance that “everything 

appeared normal” at Kayleigh’s home and that he would “keep an eye on the apartment, 

affirmatively increased the risk of harm to Kayleigh. Pls.’ Opp’n at City Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss at 9-10. The Court disagrees. In Kennedy, the affirmative danger created by the 

officer was his informing the neighbor of the plaintiff’s accusations before she and her 

husband could protect themselves against the neighbor’s violent response—coupled with 

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his assurance to monitor the defendant. 439 F.3d at 1058. Here, the risk to Kayleigh was 

the fact that she lived with adults who were abusive. While Defendants were allegedly 

derelict in their failure to extricate Kayleigh from that situation, no facts are alleged that 

suggest that they placed her in danger or affirmatively increased the risk of harm to her 

through their inaction. Despite Plaintiffs’ intimations to the contrary, Kennedy does not 

support the proposition that false assurances by a law enforcement officer, standing alone, 

can affirmatively create a danger. 439 F.3d at 1063. To the contrary, the court simply 

explained that such misrepresentations can constitute “an additional and aggravating factor, 

making [the plaintiff] more vulnerable to the danger he had already created.” Id. 

Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the pleadings, at most, 

demonstrate that Defendants knew or had reason to know that Kayleigh was at serious risk 

of harm. Absent from the pleadings are any facts demonstrating that Defendants 

affirmatively placed Kayleigh in a position that increased such risk. See DeShaney, 489 

U.S. at 201 (“While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the 

free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more 

vulnerable to them.”). As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

based on the denial of the right to substantive due process. The foregoing notwithstanding, 

it is possible that Plaintiffs will be able to rectify these deficiencies through the presentation 

of additional facts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their substantive due 

process claim. 

b) Procedural Due Process 

The procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 

individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property by the government without due 

process. Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). “State law 

can create a right that the Due Process Clause will protect only if the state law contains 

‘(1) substantive predicates governing official decisionmaking, and (2) explicitly mandatory 

language specifying the outcome that must be reached if the substantive predicates have 

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been met.’” James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bonin v. 

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

According to the FAC, Plaintiffs’ protected property interest arises principally from 

the mandatory child abuse reporting requirements set forth in the California Child Abuse 

and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA”), Cal. Pen. Code §§ 11164-11174.4. FAC ¶ 64. 

Among other things, CANRA provides that specified “mandated reporters,” which include 

social workers and police officers, “shall make a report to an agency specified in Section 

11165.9 whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the 

scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated 

reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.” Cal. 

Pen. Code § 11166(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 11165.7(a) (list of “mandated 

reporters”). California courts have construed this provision as imposing “two mandatory 

duties” on a mandated reporter who receives an account of child abuse: (1) the duty to 

investigate; and (2) the duty to file a report of child abuse when an objectively reasonable 

person in the same situation would suspect abuse. Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 75 

Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186 (1999).5 A violation of section 11166’s duties constitutes a 

misdemeanor offense. Cal. Pen. Code § 11166(c). 

The County Defendants contend that CANRA only creates a discretionary as 

opposed to a mandatory duty and therefore fails to provide any “substantive predicates to 

decision-making.” County Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6. They posit that since the reporting 

obligation is triggered only upon a “reasonable suspicion” of child abuse, a mandated 

reporter inherently must use discretion in determining whether to make a report of 

suspected child abuse in the first instance. Id. These contentions are uncompelling. The 

plain language of the statute clearly states that a “mandated reporter shall make a report” to 

CPS, police, or other law enforcement agency upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse or 

 5 The Alejo court noted that while the duty to investigate is not express, it is clearly 

envisioned by the statute so the officer can determine whether there is a reasonable 

suspicion of child abuse. 75 Cal.App.4th at 1186. 

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neglect. Cal. Pen. Code § 11166(a) (emphasis added). As noted, California courts have 

construed this obligation as a “mandatory” one. Alejo, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1185-86; see also 

Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 (2011) (noting that the 

Legislature’s use of the word “shall” denotes a mandatory act). Defendants’ assertion that 

no mandatory duty is imposed under CANRA also is undermined by the fact that the statute 

explicitly requires that a mandated reporter apply an objective standard in determining 

whether there is reasonable suspicion a child has been abused or neglected. Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 11166(a)(1); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (“If the decisionmaker is 

not ‘required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,’ but instead ‘can deny 

the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,’ the 

State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.”) (citations omitted). 

Having concluded above that CANRA provides “substantive predicates” to guide the 

decisionmaker, the question becomes whether it also contains “‘explicitly mandatory 

language,’ i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive 

predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow . . . .” Kentucky Dept. of 

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989). In Thompson, the Supreme Court 

considered whether prison regulations governing visitation could give rise to a protected 

liberty interest. The Court found that while the regulations “do provide certain ‘substantive 

predicates’ to guide the decisionmaker,” they “lack the requisite relevant mandatory 

language” because “[t]hey stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached 

upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met.” Id. at 463-64. In particular, the 

procedures at issue granted administrative staff discretion whether to allow or disallow 

visits, such that the “overall effect of the regulations is not such that an inmate can 

reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent 

the occurrence of one of the listed conditions.” Id. 

The County Defendants assert that CANRA and the other statutes and regulations 

cited by Plaintiffs contain no mandatory language specifying the particular outcome that 

must be reached if the substantive predicates have been met. More specifically, they assert 

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that “the statutes [cited by Plaintiffs] articulate the procedure for evaluation, reporting and 

investigation; [however,] the substantive outcome as the report of Robin Slusher or other 

report is left open to the discretionary decisions of CWS personnel.” County Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss at 6-7. For their part, Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’ argument or 

otherwise address that contention. As for the pleadings, they do not allege that any of the 

cited authority mandates a particular outcome—or what that outcome would be. See FAC 

¶ 64. In the absence of such allegations, coupled with Plaintiffs failure to address this issue 

in their opposition, the Court cannot conclude at this juncture that Plaintiffs have alleged a 

plausible claim for procedural due process. Since Plaintiffs may be able to rectify this 

deficiency, the Court dismisses this claim with leave to amend. 

2. Familial Association 

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty interest in familial companionship 

and association against unwarranted governmental interference. See Wilkinson v. 

Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 

& n. 23 (9th Cir. 2010). The liberty interest in familial companionship encompasses the 

familial relationship between parents and children. Curnow By and Through Curnow v. 

Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991). “Moreover, the First Amendment 

protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose deep 

attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one 

shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 

distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ familial association claim must be dismissed 

because the pleadings fail to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation. Though it 

has not addressed this issue directly, the Ninth Circuit has intimated that an underlying due 

process violation is a prerequisite to a claim for denial of familial association claim based 

on the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 685 (“[T]he state’s interference 

with [the right of familial association] without due process of law is remediable under 42 

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U.S.C. § 1983.”) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis added); accord McClurg v. 

Maricopa Cnty., No. CIV-09-1684-PHX-MHB, 2012 WL 3655318, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 

27, 2012) (“[T]he right to familial association can only be violated if there is an underlying 

due process violation.”). 

Plaintiffs fail to respond directly to Defendants’ argument, and instead points out 

that in Lee the Ninth Circuit recognized that a familial association claim may also be 

predicated on the First Amendment. Neither of the moving or reply memoranda filed by 

either set of Defendants addresses Plaintiffs’ familial association claim in that context. The 

Court notes that there appears to be no controlling case law regarding the legal standard for 

stating a familial association claim under the First Amendment. See Schwartz v. Lassen 

Cnty., No. 2:10-CV-03048-MCE), 2013 WL 5375588, at *10 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 2013) 

(“[T]he contours of a First Amendment familial association claim are unclear, and indeed 

the Court is aware of no Ninth Circuit case setting out specifically the conduct or elements 

that constitute violation of familial association under the First Amendment.”). Given the 

paucity of authority, along with Defendants’ failure to meaningfully address this issue, the 

Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s familial association claim insofar as it is predicated on 

the First Amendment. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Wash., 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“It is [the movant’s] burden . . . to present the court with legal arguments to support 

its claims.”).6

3. Monell Liability 

Plaintiffs’ second claim for municipal and supervisorial liability is alleged against 

the County, the City and Chief Melton. “In order to establish liability for governmental 

entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a 

constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 

(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; 

 6 In view of the Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ due process claims, Plaintiffs ability to 

proceed on a familial association claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment is dependent 

upon their ability to rectify the deficiencies discussed above in connection with those 

claims. 

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and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Dougherty 

v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original). 

A Monell claim may take one of three forms: (1) “when implementation of its 

official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury”; (2) when 

omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy of “deliberate 

indifference” to constitutional rights7

; or (3) when a local government official with final 

policy-making authority ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Clouthier v. 

Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010). To state a claim, the 

pleadings need only “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 

and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 

Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (addressing the pleading requirements 

applicable to a Monell claim). In addition, the facts alleged must “plausibly suggest an 

entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected 

to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs seek to state a 

claim under each of three aforementioned theories of liability; to wit, the existence of a 

policy or custom, ratification and failure to train. 

a) Policy or Custom 

Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the existence of a 

policy or custom are too vague and non-specific to state a claim. The Court partially agrees 

with Defendants’ assertion. Although the pleadings specifically identify the various 

policies or customs allegedly implicated in the constitutional injury alleged suffered by 

Plaintiffs, see FAC ¶ 70(a)-(f), they fail to distinguish between the acts or omissions of the 

County, City and Chief Melton. Instead, Plaintiffs inappropriately allege a variety of 

policies which they attribute generally to these Defendants. See Connick v. Thompson, – 

U.S. –, –, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“[U]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible 

 7 An actionable policy can “be one of action or inaction.” Waggy v. Spokane 

County Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 388 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). “[A] municipality’s failure to train its 

employees is one such claim of omission or inaction by the municipality.” Id. 

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only for ‘their own illegal acts.”). Because the pleadings fail to give each of the Defendants 

particular fair notice of the particular policies attributed to them, Plaintiffs’ policy and 

custom claim is dismissed with leave to amend.8

b) Ratification 

“A municipality . . . can be liable for an isolated constitutional violation if the final 

policymaker ‘ratified’ a subordinate’s actions.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th 

Cir. 1999); see also Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting 

than an “official with final policy-making authority” may be liable for ratifying a 

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct). “To show ratification, a plaintiff must show that 

the ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.’” Lytle 

v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must establish 

that the ratification was a “conscious, affirmative choice.” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1250. A 

mere failure to overrule a subordinate’s actions, without more, is insufficient to support a 

§ 1983 claim. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987. 

The FAC alleges that the County, City and Chief Melton “approved, tolerated and/or 

ratified” the acts and omissions of officers with the NPD and CWS, notwithstanding their 

“direct knowledge of the facts of this incident.” FAC ¶ 72. However, no facts are alleged 

to support this conclusory assertion. There are no allegations specifying the particular 

actions at issue or how and by whom they were ratified. Since it is possible that these 

deficiencies can be cured with additional factual allegations, the Court dismisses the claim 

with leave to amend. 

c) Failure to Train 

“[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only 

where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 

 8 The City Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ Monell claim must be dismissed based on 

their failure to allege an underlying constitutional violation. It is true that there can be no 

Monell liability without an underlying constitutional violation. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 

912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ ability to proceed on a Monell claim 

based on an underlying due process violation is contingent on whether they are able to state 

a plausible due process violation. 

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whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 

To state a claim for insufficient training, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that 

the County, City and Chief Melton “disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a 

particular omission in their training program would cause [the individual defendants] to 

violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 

1159 (9th Cir. 2014). 

With respect to the failure to train, the pleadings allege that the City, County and 

Chief Melton “failed to properly hire, train, instruct, monitor, supervise, evaluate, 

investigate, and discipline Defendants, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights, which were thereby violated as described above.” FAC ¶ 71. This 

conclusory allegation, without more, is insufficient to state a claim for failure to train. See 

Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159. Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 

d) Chief Melton 

Chief Melton is named as a party-defendant in both his official and individual 

capacities. Official capacity claims against an individual are the functional equivalent of a 

suit against the entity of which he is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). 

Since Chief Melton is alleged to be an agent of the City, the official capacity claims alleged 

against him are dismissed as duplicative. See Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los 

Angeles Cnty Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a county 

sheriff sued in “official capacity” is a redundant defendant and should be dismissed when 

the county is also named). 

To state an individual capacity claim against Chief Melton, Plaintiffs must allege 

facts showing that he “was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a 

sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.” Edgerly v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 961 

(9th Cir. 2010); e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

to state an individual capacity claim, the complaint must identify the specific conduct that 

forms the basis of the claim against the individual defendant). Because such facts are not 

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pled, the individual capacity claims against Chief Melton are dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

4. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants contend, in the alternative, that they are entitled to qualified immunity 

with respect to Plaintiffs’ federal claims. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When presented with a qualified immunity defense, 

the court considers: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional 

right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

In view of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ due process claims with leave to amend, it is 

unnecessary at this juncture to determine whether those claims are precluded by the 

doctrine of qualified immunity. As for Plaintiffs’ remaining First Amendment-based 

familial association claim, Defendants fail to discuss that claim specifically. Accordingly, 

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied at this time. 

B. STATE LAW CLAMS

1. Bane Act 

Jason, as Kayleigh’s successor-in-interest, asserts a survival claim under California’s 

Bane Act, which provides that a person “whose exercise or enjoyment” of constitutional 

rights has been interfered with “by threats, intimidation, or coercion” may bring a civil 

action for damages and injunctive relief. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. “The essence of a Bane 

Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation 

or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the 

right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not 

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required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal.App. 4th 

860, 883 (2007) (citing Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998)). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim should be dismissed because such a 

claim is personal to the victim and does not survive her death.9

 As support, Defendants cite 

Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.4th 141 (1995), which held 

that the parents of a child victim could not bring a wrongful death claim under the Bane Act 

because the statute only provides for “a personal cause of action for the victim[.]” Id. at 

144. Notably, the court did not address or preclude a survival claim. Here, Jason does not 

allege a Bane Act claim for injuries he sustained. Rather, Jason seeks to vindicate rights 

personal to Kayleigh in the form of a survival claim under California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 377.20. Courts within this District have concluded that such a claim is 

permissible. See M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(“A survival Bane Act claim, unlike a wrongful death Bane Act claim, is permissible.”); 

accord Medrano v. Kern Cnty. Sheriff’s Officer, 921 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1016 (E.D. Cal. 

2013); Dela Torre v. City of Salinas, No. 09-cv-00626-RMW, 2010 WL 3743762, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010).10 The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ contention that Jason 

lacks standing to bring a Bane Act claim. 

The above notwithstanding, the FAC fails to allege a plausible survival claim under 

the Bane Act. To prevail on a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, 

“intimidation, threats or coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998). The 

 9 A survival action is a personal injury action that survives to permit a decedent’s 

estate to recover damages that would have been personally awarded to the decedent had he 

survived. Cal. Civ. Pro.Code §§ 377.20, 377.30. In contrast, a wrongful death action is an 

independent claim for damages personally suffered by a decedent’s heirs as a result of the 

decedent’s death. Id. § 377.60; see Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 27 F.3d 

426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994). 

10 Defendants cite Tolosko-Parker v. County of Sonoma, No. C 06-06841 CRB, 

2009 WL 498099, at *5 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 26, 2009) which concluded that the parents of the 

decedent could not bring a survival claim under the Bane Act. The court’s opinion offers 

no reasoning or analysis to support that conclusion, and merely cites Bay Area Rapid 

Transit District, which, as discussed, does not stand for that proposition a survival claim 

cannot be brought under the Bane Act. The Court therefore finds Tolosko-Parker to be 

unpersuasive and declines to follow it. 

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FAC fails to allege such facts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief is dismissed 

with leave to amend. 

2. Negligence/Negligence Per Se 

Plaintiffs’ fourth and final claim for relief for negligence/negligence per se is 

brought against all Defendants. “To state a cause of action under the negligence per se 

doctrine, the plaintiff must plead four elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute or 

regulation, (2) the violation caused the plaintiff’s injury, (3) the injury resulted from the 

kind of occurrence the statute or regulation was designed to prevent, and (4) the plaintiff 

was a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was intended to protect.” 

Alejo, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1184-85 (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 669); see Transamerica Title 

Ins. Co. v. Green, 11 Cal.App.3d 693, 702 (1970) (“The breach of statutory duty is 

negligence per se”). At issue here are the duty and causation elements. 

Defendants contend that CANRA and the other statutes and regulations alleged in 

the FAC impose no mandatory duties on them, and by extension, cannot form the basis for 

a negligence per se claim. Defendants further argue that, pursuant to California 

Government Code §§ 815.2 and 820.2, they are entitled to statutory immunity for 

discretionary acts.11 The California Court of Appeal in Alejo rejected virtually identical 

arguments. In that case, the father of three year-old Alec Alejo (“Alec”) had received 

reports from the mother’s friend and neighbor that the mother’s boyfriend was using drugs 

and physically abusing Alec. Alejo, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1183. The father reported the abuse 

to the local police department, which failed to conduct any investigation into Alec’s wellbeing. Id. Six weeks later, the mother’s boyfriend savagely beat Alec, causing him to 

suffer total and permanent disability. Id. The father, on behalf of Alec, filed suit against 

 11 Government Code § 820.2 provides that “a public employee is not liable for an 

injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the 

exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Section 

815.2 provides generally that a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act 

or omission of its employee if the employee himself is immune from liability. 

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the city and two police officers alleging that they were negligent in failing to investigate or 

report a reasonable suspicion of child abuse as mandated by CANRA. Id. at 1183-84. 

The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer on the grounds that its police 

department and officers had no special duty to protect a child from abuse, were immune 

from liability for discretionary conduct, and, in any event, their failure to act was not the 

cause of Alec’s injuries. Id. at 1184. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding 

“the duty to investigate and report child abuse is mandatory under [CANRA].” Id. at 1186. 

In addition, the court found that “[the officers’] failure to investigate was clearly a breach 

of [that] duty,” and therefore, the plaintiff could state a cause of action for negligence per se 

against the police officers. Id. at 1189. The court likewise rejected the city’s claim of 

statutory immunity, concluding the immunity statutes do not bar liability for breach of a 

mandatory law enforcement duty. Id. at 1194. With regard to the issue of causation, the 

court concluded that the question of whether the defendants’ alleged violation of their 

mandatory duty to investigate and report child abuse resulted in harm could not be decided 

at the pleading stage. Id. at 1190-91. 

Despite the fact Alejo is directly on point and discussed extensively in Plaintiffs’ 

opposition briefs, Defendants offer no argument in rebuttal. Instead, they contend that this 

case is controlled by Jacqueline T. v. Alameda County Child Protective Services, 155 

Cal.App.4th 456 (2007), where the court rejected negligence and negligence per se claims 

brought against a county and two of its social workers who allegedly failed to adequately 

investigate reports of sexual abuse against several minors. In that case, the plaintiff alleged 

that the defendants “breached this mandatory duty [i.e., CANRA], not by failing to 

investigate the alleged abuse, but rather by failing to ‘reasonably and diligently’ investigate 

it.” Id. at 470. In the instant case, however, Plaintiffs allege that the individual Defendants 

“failed to investigate and/or report the abuse and neglect” as required by California law. 

FAC ¶ 37, 45, 54. Thus, this case is more analogous to Alejo, which involved a complete 

abdication of their mandatory duty to investigate, as opposed to Jaqueline T., where the 

social workers conducted an investigation that was alleged to be inadequate. See Ortega v. 

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Sacramento Cnty. Dept. of Health & Human Servs, 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 732 (2008) 

(distinguishing between a “failure to investigate,” which is “clearly a breach” of the 

mandatory duty owed under Penal Code § 11166, and “a claim of inadequate

investigation.”) (emphasis added). 

The City Defendants separately argue that, like Jacqueline T., this is “not a situation 

where officers performed no investigation.” City Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 14. They point 

out that in response to the reports of suspected child abuse, Officers Wade and Deguilo 

went to Kayleigh’s home, but observed nothing that would have caused them to know or 

suspect that she was being abused. Id. This argument strains credulity. Consistent with 

the information reported to them, the officers personally observed that Kayleigh had bruises 

on her face, “appeared gaunt, sick, malnourished, and distressed with dark circles under her 

eyes that her neighbors had recently noticed,” and had vomited in front of them. FAC ¶ 51. 

The officers also observed a malnourished man with sunken cheek bones and obviously 

under the influence of drugs along with another suspicious individual known to be on 

probation attempting to flee the premises. Id. Despite these obvious signs of potential 

child abuse and neglect, the officers allegedly conducted no investigation. Id. Construing 

the facts alleged in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that “a reasonable 

person in [the officers’] position would have suspected [child] abuse.” Alejo, 75 

Cal.App.4th at 1186. 

Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot show causation; to wit, that their 

failure to comply with their mandatory reporting and investigation duties resulted in harm. 

In rejecting this argument, the court in Alejo explained that causation is a question for the 

finder of fact that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. 75 Cal.App.4th at 1189 (“The 

complaint in the case before us alleges that despite Hector’s account of Alec’s abuse, 

Officer Doe performed no investigation and made no report and, as a result, Alec suffered 

further abuse. Therefore, the necessary linkage between the mandatory duty and the injury 

is established for pleading purposes.”). Defendants’ reliance on Jacqueline T. is misplaced, 

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as the issue of causation was decided on summary judgment, not at the pleading stage. The 

Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for negligence/negligence per se. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. The motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ first claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of due process, second claim under Monell and third claim for 

violation of the Bane Act, which are dismissed with leave to amend. The motions to 

dismiss are DENIED in all other respects. 

2. Plaintiffs shall file their Second Amended Complaint no later twenty-eight 

(28) days from the date this Order is entered into the docket. Plaintiffs are hereby notified 

that any pleading filed in this Court is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and as 

such, they may amend only to the extent that they have a good faith basis for doing so. 

3. This matter is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Donna Ryu for a mandatory 

settlement conference to take place within ninety (90) days of the date this Order is filed. 

The deadline for Defendants to file their response to the Second Amended Complaint shall 

be held in abeyance pending the settlement conference. In the event the parties are unable 

to reach a settlement, Defendants shall file their responsive pleading or Rule 12(b) motion 

within fourteen (14) days of the conclusion of the settlement conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 12/10/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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