Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01644/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01644-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOBIAS BECK,

Plaintiff,

v.

PENINSULA FIRE DISTRICT; 

ROBERT PHILLIPS; GARY PINI; 

and DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

No. 13-cv-01644 JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Peninsula Fire 

District, Robert Phillips, and Gary Pini’s (“Defendants”) Motion 

to Dismiss (Doc. #13) Plaintiff Tobias Beck’s (“Plaintiff”) 

Complaint (Doc. #2) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). 

Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. #16) and Defendants have filed 

a reply (Doc. #17). For the following reasons, Defendants’ 

motion is GRANTED.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for December 11, 2013.

Case 2:13-cv-01644-JAM-AC Document 19 Filed 12/30/13 Page 1 of 9
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of Tehama County, California, and 

was hired by Defendant Peninsula Fire District in 2008 as a 

firefighter-paramedic. Compl. ¶¶ 3,7. Defendant Robert Phillips 

was, at all relevant times, the Chairman of the Board and the 

Acting Fire Chief of the Peninsula Fire District. Compl. ¶ 5. 

Defendant Gary Pini was, at all relevant times, the dulyappointed Fire Chief of the Peninsula Fire District. Compl. ¶ 5.

On May 13, 2011, Plaintiff suffered an on-the job injury to 

his ankle. Compl. ¶ 7. From May 13, 2011 until June 3, 2012, 

Plaintiff was on temporary total disability under California 

workers’ compensation. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that, upon 

returning to active duty, he was “singled out for a freeze of 

contractual salary increase.” Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff further 

alleges that, on October 25, 2012, “a part-time, less qualified 

employee was assigned to be shift supervisor over Plaintiff.” 

Compl. ¶ 8. On November 8, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he was 

“denied financial reimbursement for an educational class 

Defendants agreed to pay for.” Compl. ¶ 8. Despite the fact 

that Plaintiff was “placed on light duty by his physician” on 

November 20, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he was “assigned to be 

on his feet sweeping, mopping, cleaning and moving heavy objects 

across an icy parking lot.” Compl. ¶ 8. On December 12, 2012, 

Plaintiff “received a letter of disciplinary action against him.” 

Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that these actions were taken by 

Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff for suffering a 

workplace injury and for having a disability. Compl. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants retaliated against 

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Plaintiff for his union membership by “sabotaging contract 

negotiations” and by “questioning other employees . . . about 

possible wrong-doing” by Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 10. Finally, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to improper 

disciplinary action in retaliation for Plaintiff’s signature on 

another employee’s paramedic license renewal application, despite 

the fact that “paramedics were authorized to sign for such 

renewal applications.” Compl. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination with 

the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and 

subsequently received a right-to-sue notice. Compl. ¶ 9. On 

August 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Complaint (Doc. #2) in this 

Court. Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: 

(1) “Disability Discrimination and Retaliation;” (2) “Breach of 

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;” (3) “Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress;” and (4) “Disability 

Discrimination.” The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 

federal ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Plaintiff’s

related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss a 

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

556 U.S. 662, 570 (2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a 

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district court must accept all the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). “First, to be 

entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 

action, but must sufficiently allege underlying facts to give 

fair notice and enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 

2012). “Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true 

must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is 

not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 

expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. Assertions 

that are mere “legal conclusions” are therefore not entitled to 

the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal is 

appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable 

by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, a court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

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B. Discussion

1. First and Fourth Causes of Action – Individual 

Capacity

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first and fourth causes of 

action for disability discrimination must be dismissed, insofar 

as they are brought against individual Defendants Robert Phillips 

and Gary Pini. Mot. at 4. Defendants argue that supervisors are 

not individually liable under the ADA or FEHA. Mot. at 4 (citing 

Walsh v. Nevada Department of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 

1037-38 (9th Cir. 2006); Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 645 

(1998)). Plaintiff “concurs with Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

the individual defendants in their individual capacities.” Opp. 

at 1. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and 

fourth causes of action, in so far as they are brought against 

individual Defendants Robert Phillips and Gary Pini, is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Second Cause of Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

must be dismissed because, in California, “public employees are 

not entitled to contract remedies for . . . discipline from an 

employer.” Mot. at 5. Defendants note that “[i]t is well 

settled in California that public employment is not held by 

contract but by statute[.]” Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff concedes 

that this cause of action “should be dismissed under the 

authorities cited by Defendants’ motion.” Opp. at 1. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second 

cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

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3. Third Cause of Action

a. Workers’ Compensation

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s third cause of action for 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) is barred 

by the exclusive remedy doctrine set forth in California’s 

workers’ compensation scheme. Mot. at 8. Defendants cite Cole 

v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148 (1987) for the 

proposition that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy 

for any misconduct by an employer involving “a normal part of the 

employment relationship, such as demotions, promotions, criticism 

of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as to 

grievances[.]” Mot. at 8. Plaintiff responds that the exclusive 

remedy claim does not bar an IIED claim against an employer whose 

conduct violated public policy. Opp. at 3.

In Cole, the California Supreme Court held that an

employee’s IIED claim against an employer is barred by the 

workers’ compensation statute when (1) the alleged misconduct is 

a normal part of the employment relationship and (2) “the essence 

of the wrong is personal physical injury or death.” 43 Cal.3d at

160. This rule is designed to prevent plaintiffs from seeking 

civil damages for injuries already covered by workers’

compensation.

However, neither of these requirements is met in this case. 

First, the alleged misconduct is discrimination in violation of 

the ADA and FEHA. Discriminatory conduct by an employer is 

contrary to California public policy and is “outside the normal 

part of the employment environment.” Accardi v. Superior Court,

17 Cal.App.4th 341, 352 (1993). “The Legislature . . . did not 

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intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule 

for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory 

practices.” Id. at 352. Furthermore, the “essence of the wrong” 

is not a personal physical injury, compensable under the workers’ 

compensation scheme: Although Plaintiff did break his ankle and 

receive workers’ compensation, the alleged discriminatory conduct

occurred after his injury, and the resulting emotional distress 

did not manifest itself in a compensable physical injury. Compl. 

¶¶ 7-11. Therefore, the exclusive remedy doctrine does not apply 

and Plaintiff’s IIED claim is not barred.

b. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s third cause of action 

for IIED must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege 

“outrageous conduct” by Defendants. Mot. at 5. Plaintiff 

responds indirectly, by citing and summarizing a case in which 

the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment for an employer on an employee’s claim for IIED based on 

the circumstances surrounding the employee’s termination. Opp. 

at 3 (citing Huber v. Standard Insurance Company, 841 F.2d 980, 

987 (9th Cir. 1988)).

“Extreme and outrageous conduct by the Defendant” is a 

necessary element of a cause of action for IIED. Corkill v. 

Preferred Employers Grp., LLC, 2011 WL 5975678 at *13 (S.D. Cal. 

Nov. 28, 2011). To be considered “extreme and outrageous,”

conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 

usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Cervantez v. J.C. 

Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979). “[M]ere insults, 

indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 

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trivialities” do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 

Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122 (1988).

Plaintiff’s apparent argument that the presence of “extreme 

and outrageous conduct” is a question of fact for the jury is 

unavailing. “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be 

found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially 

be determined by the court[.]” Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal.App.4th 

518, 534 (2007). Plaintiff has made no argument that the alleged 

conduct by Defendants was “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of 

that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Cervantez, 24 

Cal.3d at 593. Furthermore, “a claim of discrimination under the 

FEHA is not sufficient by itself to sustain a claim for IIED.” 

Corkill v. Preferred Employers Grp., LLC, 2011 WL 5975678 at *15

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). California courts have held that "

personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim 

of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper 

motivation is alleged.” Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 

Cal.App.4th 55, 80 (1996). As Plaintiff has not alleged anything 

beyond discriminatory personnel management activity, the 

necessary element of “extreme and outrageous conduct” has not 

been met.

c. Severe Emotional Distress

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to 

“adequately plead that he suffered severe emotional distress as a 

result of Defendants’ action.” Mot. at 7. Plaintiff does not 

respond to this argument in his opposition.

Plaintiff’s Complaint only includes a general allegation

that he was “subjected to severe emotional distress and will 

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continue to suffer severe and permanent humiliation, mental pain 

and anguish and will continue to live in a constant state of 

emotional tension and distress.” Compl. ¶ 25. He fails to 

allege any specific details of this distress, or how it was 

caused by Defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action for IIED is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

first and fourth causes of action, insofar as they are brought 

against Defendants in an individual capacity, is GRANTED WITH 

PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s second 

cause of action is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion to 

DISMISS Plaintiff’s third cause of action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be filed within 

twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendants’ 

responsive pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter. 

If Plaintiff elects not to file an Amended Complaint, this action 

will proceed consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2013 

Case 2:13-cv-01644-JAM-AC Document 19 Filed 12/30/13 Page 9 of 9