Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01644/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01644-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LONETTA SANDERS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CITY OF PHOENIX, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-06-1644-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 76), filed pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following Reasons, the Court denies the

Motion. 

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied. 

In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant City of Phoenix ( “Defendant”) argues that

Plaintiff Lonetta Sanders (“Plaintiff”) has failed to properly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981. (Dkt. # 76 at 4-8.) Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff only adds conclusory

allegations in her Fifth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that are insufficient to survive a motion

to dismiss. (Id.) The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to assert

her § 1981 claim. 

Under § 1981, liability cannot be premised on a respondeat superior theory. Fed’n of

African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead,

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as with claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendant may be held liable for § 1981 claims only

if Plaintiff alleges and proves that her injury resulted from a municipal policy, practice, or

custom. Id.; see also Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

To determine whether there is a particular custom of practice, the critical inquiry is whether

it is “so well settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can

be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the

practice.” See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989). 

In this case, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts suggesting that widespread policy of

racial animus existed in the Phoenix Police Department and that management was aware and

did nothing to end the improper conduct. (See generally Dkt. # 60.) In her FAC, Plaintiff

contends that there was a “custom, practice, and policy” of racist activity in the Phoenix

Police Department that the Department refused to address. (Id. at ¶ 50.) She also alleges that

she was “unable to perform her usual and customary supervisory duties because of the

actions of employees in the department and the inaction of her supervision.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) She

then alleges that the Department’s “solution to the Plaintiff’s problem [of alleged harassment]

was to ‘yell back.’” (Id. at ¶ 22.) The FAC also alleges that Plaintiff’s inferior and superior

officers made “a concerted effort . . . to discredit” Plaintiff after she complained of

discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Finally, the FAC indicates that Plaintiff’s supervisors

acknowledged the problem but did nothing. (See Id. at ¶ 39.) Taking these facts as true, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the

reasonable inference,” see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), that Defendant

had “actual or constructive knowledge” of a discriminatory practice or policy “yet did

nothing to end the practice.” See Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156.

Furthermore, after Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint, the Court specifically

observed that Plaintiff “include[d] sufficient allegations in her Third Amended Complaint

to plead a § 1981 claim based upon a custom of race-based harassment.” (See Dkt. ## 34 at

¶ 21; 74 at 2.) The Court’s August 2009 Order further noted that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended

Complaint was deficient because it did not “include[] the technical language necessary to

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In the Fourth Amended Complaint, this was paragraph 26. 

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properly allege this claim. . . .” (Dkt. # 74 at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff was given leave to

cure this deficiency, and she has done so in her FAC. 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Strike is Granted. 

Defendant also argues that the FAC fails to comply with the Court’s August 2009

Order because Plaintiff failed to remove allegations from her Fourth Amended Complaint

that were not contained in the Third Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. ## 74 at 4; 76 at 4.) In

its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Paragraph 251

 of the FAC should be stricken

because it contains allegations that were not in the Third Amended Complaint. Defendants

argue that while the “Third Amended Complaint alleged that [Officer] Pinuelas yelled at

[Plaintiff] twice,” the Fourth Amended Complaint and the FAC allege that Officer Pinuelas

“yelled and exercised his inappropriate behavior from January 29, 2002[] to November

2004.” (Dkt. # 75 at ¶ 25.)

In its pervious Order, the Court specifically directed Plaintiff to revise this paragraph

“to eliminate allegations beyond those made in the Third Amended Complaint.” (Dkt. # 74

at 4.) In her Third Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff did not raise the specific

allegations raised here. Additionally, Plaintiff does not contest that she failed to comply with

the August Order by retaining the allegations contained in Paragraph 25. Therefore,

Paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint is stricken from the FAC. 

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend Is Denied. 

In her response, Plaintiff again requests leave to reassert a claim under 28 U.S.C. §

1983. (Dkt. # 77 at 5.) Without citing legal authority, Plaintiff appears to contend that her §

1981 claim necessarily requires an accompanying § 1983 claim. (See id.) While municipal

liability under § 1981 includes many of the same elements required to prove municipal

liability under § 1983, the Court is unaware of any Ninth Circuit authority for Plaintiff’s

assertion that her § 1981 claim requires a concurrent § 1983 claim. See Pittman v. Or.

Employment Dept., 509 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that in the Ninth Circuit,

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The Court in Pittman did observe, however, that “[a]ll of the other circuits to reach

the question have held that . . . there is . . . no cause of action against municipalities” under

§ 1981. 509 F.3d at 1069. Instead, those circuits use § 1983 as a vehicle whereby an

individual can assert their § 1981 rights against municipal actors. See, e.g., Dennis v. County

of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, while the Ninth Circuit’s

approach may differ from that of the other circuits, the practical result is the same since this

circuit still requires a plaintiff to show a policy, custom, or practice to prove § 1981 liability

against a municipal actor. 

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“§ 1981 contains a [private] right of action against municipalities”) (citing Oakland, 96 F.3d

at 1204);2

 cf. Russell v. City of Reno, 289 F. App’x 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing grant

of summary judgment in favor of a municipality with respect to a plaintiff’s § 1981 claim and

allowing the claim to go forward even though a concurrent § 1983 claim had been

dismissed). In addition, Plaintiff, expressly abandoned her § 1983 claim in response to a

previous motion to dismiss filed by Defendant. (See Dkt. # 39 at 12.) Therefore, as the Court

made clear in it’s previous Order (Dkt. # 74 at 3 n. 1), Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim has been

dismissed with prejudice, and she may not amend her complaint to reassert that claim. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 76)

is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Paragraph 25 of the

FAC (Dkt. # 76 at 4) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend (Dkt. # 77

at 5) is DENIED. 

DATED this 8th day of December, 2009.

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