Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-06443/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-06443-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARTHA RIVERA, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

NIBCO, Inc., 

 Defendant. 

1:99-CV-06443 OWW SMS 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND RE 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

REVIEW OF CLERK’S TAXATION 

OF COSTS (DOC. 741) 

I. INTRODUCTION

 This Title VII and FEHA employment discrimination case was 

tried before a jury starting in October 2008. On November 26, 

2008, the Jury returned verdicts in favor of Defendant on all 

causes of action submitted to them. Doc. 696. On October 7, 

2009, the Clerk of Court taxed costs in the amount of $84,434.40. 

Doc. 739. Plaintiffs, who timely objected to the bill of costs, 

Doc. 706, now move for review of the Clerk’s taxation of costs. 

Doc. 741. 

 Plaintiffs first argue that, under Association of MexicanAmerican Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 592 (9th 

Cir. 2000)(“AMAE”), the district court should exercise its 

discretion to refuse to award costs here, because the case 

involved issues of substantial importance, the losing parties 

have limited financial resources, there is great economic 

disparity between Plaintiffs and Defendant, the issues in the 

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case are close and difficult, and the imposition of high costs 

may cause a “chilling effect” on future civil rights litigants. 

In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that the “majority” of the 

specific costs taxed are not compensable under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 54(d). 

 Defendant opposes the motion for review, Doc. 744, and 

raises a number of evidentiary objections, Docs. 746 & 759. 

Plaintiffs replied. Doc. 749. The motion was heard March 1, 

2010. 

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

 A district court reviews the clerk’s taxation of costs de 

novo. Lopez v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 385 F. Supp. 2d 

981, 1000-1001 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Objections.

Defendant raises objections to: 

(1) Paragraph 6 of the Declaration of Carole Vigne, 

Doc. 705, filed December 22, 2008 along with 

Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendant’s cost bill, Doc. 

706; and 

(2) The Declarations of William R. Tamayo and John T. 

Affeldt, Docs. 750-756, filed December 7, 2009 along 

with Plaintiffs’ Reply Re: the Motion for Review, Doc. 

749. 

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1. Objections to Paragraph 6 of the Vigne Declaration.

Defendant objects to paragraph 6 of the Declaration of 

Carole Vigne, one of several attorneys who represented 

Plaintiffs, which states: 

Plaintiffs have limited financial resources. As evidenced by 

Plaintiffs’ discovery responses related to the mitigation of 

damages and declarations in support of Plaintiffs’ 

Oppositions, Plaintiffs have either been unemployed, held 

low-wage jobs, or retired since their layoffs from Defendant 

NIBCO, Inc. in 1998. 

Doc. 705 at ¶6. Nibco first objects that counsel lacks personal 

knowledge of the matters stated therein under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 601, asserting that “Plaintiffs have not submitted any 

evidence concerning their financial resources independent of 

their claimed historical wages.” Doc. 746 at 2. 

Defendant ignores that Vigne’s Declaration references a wide 

range of information, including: 

... information from plaintiffs’ sworn discovery 

responses concerning []: 

1) the plaintiffs’ current wages [], 

2) their annual income from all sources for every year 

from 1999 through 2007; 

3) detailed information about their employment after 

they were fired by Nibco, including: 

a) a specification of each subsequent employer, 

b) their dates of subsequent employment, 

c) their rates of pay, and 

d) the total wages paid them by each subsequent 

employer; and 

4) plaintiffs’ mitigation efforts subsequent to their 

termination by Nibco. 

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Doc. 760 at 1. Counsel had personal knowledge of the content of 

those discovery responses, which were all verified. Even if, 

arguendo, Vigne’s statement itself is inadmissible hearsay, the 

evidence attached to her declaration speaks for itself and could 

have been challenged on its merits by Defendant. No contrary 

evidence was submitted. 

Defendant further objects that this paragraph constitutes 

improper opinion testimony by a lay witness prohibited by Federal 

Rule of Evidence 701. Defendant overreaches. In summarizing the 

content of the sworn discovery responses, Vigne is serving a 

proper role as a fact witness. As attorney for plaintiffs, it is 

her job to research and present facts underlying the financial 

condition of plaintiffs. The remainder of the declaration lays 

the foundation for the discovery responses, which were verified 

by each plaintiff, to which Defendant raises no objections. 

Defendant objections to Paragraph 6 of the Vigne Declaration 

are OVERRULED. 

2. Objections to the Tamayo and Affeldt Declarations.

a. Motion to Strike the Declarations in their 

Entirety as Untimely.

Local Rule 78-230 provides: 

The moving party shall file a notice of motion, motion, 

accompanying briefs, affidavits, if appropriate, and 

copies of all documentary evidence that the moving 

party intends to submit in support of the motion. 

Defendant suggests that the Tamayo and Affeldt declarations, 

filed with Plaintiffs’ reply brief, were untimely under Local 

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Rule 78-230 because they were not filed with Plaintiffs’ opening 

brief requesting review of the cost bill. 

Defendant’s reading of 78-230 is far-fetched, particularly 

in light of the fact that Plaintiffs filed the Tamayo and Affeldt 

declarations in response to Defendant’s arguments, raised for the 

first time in opposition, that a cost award would have no 

chilling effect, that this case had no public importance, and 

that AMAE, 231 F.3d 572 requires detailed and exhaustive 

evidentiary proof of plaintiffs’ “indigency” or inability to pay 

costs. Defendant has made no request to file a surreply 

addressing these declarations. 

b. Remaining Objections to the Tamayo and Affeldt 

Declarations.

(1) Relevance Objections.

Defendant also objects on relevance grounds to paragraphs 4-

14 of the Tamayo Declaration and 3-16 of the Affeldt Declaration. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that “[r]elevant evidence” 

means “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.” The relevance standard is a “liberal one.” Dukes v. 

Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Paragraphs 4-8 of the Tamayo Declaration express counsel’s 

opinions regarding the vulnerability of low-wage workers to 

discrimination and the potential deterrence that would be caused 

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by imposing costs upon unsuccessful low-wage litigants in civil 

rights cases. Paragraphs 9-12 explain the nature of this 

litigation in the broader context of similar language-based 

discrimination cases. These statements arguably address the 

question of whether this case was of “substantial public 

importance.” 

Likewise, Paragraphs 3-13 of the Affeldt Declaration offer 

for the district court’s consideration various judicially 

noticeable documents from the AMAE litigation. Paragraphs 14-16 

offer Mr. Affeldt’s opinions as to the interpretation of those 

documents, e.g., that the AMAE court did not require specific 

evidence that the plaintiffs in those cases were unable to pay 

costs. 

Defendant’s relevance objections are OVERRULED. 

(2) 702 Objections. 

Defendant also objects to Paragraphs 4-14 of the Tamayo 

Declaration under Federal rule of Evidence 702, for “lack of 

foundation” and as “improper opinion evidence.” Tamayo declares, 

among other things, that in the course of his extensive practice 

experience, he has become familiar with the “challenges of 

bringing private litigation on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs, 

notably including those who are low-wage workers or other persons 

of modest or limited financial means.” Doc. 750 at ¶4. Tamayo 

opines that “the possibility of being held liable for defendants’ 

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costs of suit, in the event they do not prevail, has served to 

deter many potential plaintiffs from bringing suit on their 

discrimination claims, even where those claims appear to be 

supported by evidence....” Id. at ¶5. Tamayo has personal 

experience sufficient to support these assertions. He is an 

attorney with considerable experience as counsel for civil rights 

plaintiffs. Although his statements arguably offer legal 

opinions, they are also factual in nature. There is no other 

mechanism by which such evidence may be presented. Defendant’s 

objections are OVERRULED. 

B. Would an Award of Costs in This Case be Inequitable Under 

AMAE? 

1. Legal Standard.

 The starting point for any analysis of a challenge to the 

taxation of costs is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), 

which provides that “costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be 

allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 

otherwise directs.” “By its terms, the rule creates a 

presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, but 

vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.” 

AMAE, 231 F.3d at 591. “That discretion is not unlimited. A 

district court must ‘specify reasons’ for its refusal to award 

costs.” Id. 

 In AMAE, minority educators alleged that the use of a 

particular employment test (“CBEST”) as a prerequisite to 

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employment in California public schools, violated Title VI and 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the test had a 

disproportionate, adverse impact on minority candidates. Id. at 

578. Following a bench trial, the district court entered 

judgment in Defendant’s favor. Id. at 578-79. Defendant 

subsequently presented the district court with a costs bill in 

the amount of $216,443.67. 

 The district court denied the costs bill in its entirety, 

giving the following four reasons: 

(1) the case “involve[s] issues of substantial public 

importance,” specifically “educational quality, 

interracial disparities in economic opportunity, and 

access to positions of social influence”; 

(2) there is great economic disparity between 

Plaintiffs, who are individuals and “small nonprofit 

educational organizations,” and the State of 

California; 

(3) the issues in the case are close and difficult; and 

(4) Plaintiffs’ case, although unsuccessful, had some 

merit, as evidenced by the [later] modification of the 

[employment qualification test] to eliminate “higher 

order” mathematics questions. 

Id. at 592 (footnote omitted). 

 Rejecting defendants’ argument that the only proper reason 

for denying costs to a prevailing party is to punish misconduct 

by that party, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Circuit 

“previously ... held that district courts may consider other, 

nonpunitive reasons for denying costs to a prevailing party.” 

Id. (citing National Org. for Women v. Bank of Cal., 680 F.2d 

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1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Ninth Circuit also saw “no 

basis for limiting district courts’ discretion in the manner that 

Defendants suggest.” Id. 

The rule itself contains no such limitation; it 

provides simply that costs shall be allowed to the 

prevailing party unless the district court “otherwise 

directs.” The requirement that district courts give 

reasons for denying costs flows logically from the 

presumption in favor of costs that is embodied in the 

text of the rule; if a district court wishes to depart 

from that presumption, it must explain why so that the 

appellate court will be able to determine whether or 

not the trial court abused its discretion.... 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) establishes 

that costs are to be awarded as a matter of course in 

the ordinary case. Our requirement that a district 

court give reasons for denying costs is, in essence, a 

requirement that the court explain why a case is not 

“ordinary” and why, in the circumstances, it would be 

inappropriate or inequitable to award costs. Misconduct 

on the part of the prevailing party is one factor that 

might render a case “extraordinary.” But it is not the 

only such factor. Here, the reasons that the district 

court gave for denying costs reflect what is clear at a 

glance: This is an extraordinary, and extraordinarily 

important, case. Plaintiffs are a group of individuals 

and nonprofit organizations. The record demonstrates 

that their resources are limited. They have brought an 

action that presents issues of the gravest public 

importance, and the action affects tens of thousands of 

Californians and the state’s public school system as a 

whole. The issues in the case are close and complex. 

Although Plaintiffs have not prevailed in this action, 

their claims are not without merit. Indeed, as the 

district court pointed out, Defendants substantially 

altered the [employment test] during the pendency of 

this litigation. Finally, costs in this case are 

extraordinarily high. ...[W]e note that divesting 

district courts of discretion to limit or to refuse 

such overwhelming costs in important, close, but 

ultimately unsuccessful civil rights cases like this 

one might have the regrettable effect of discouraging 

potential plaintiffs from bringing such cases at all. 

We do not mean to suggest that the presumption in favor 

of awarding costs to prevailing parties does not apply 

to defendants in civil rights actions. Nor are we 

attempting to create an exhaustive list of “good 

reasons” for declining to award costs. We simply hold 

that the reasons that the district court gave for 

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refusing to award costs in this case were appropriate 

under Rule 54(d)(1) and that, considering those 

reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to award costs to Defendants. 

Id. at 592-93. The reasons given in AMAE do not constitute an 

exhaustive list. Id. at 593. 

2. Were the Issues In the Case of Substantial Public 

Importance?

 One permissible consideration in evaluating whether a cost 

bill should be denied outright is whether the issues in the case 

were of substantial public importance. Id. at 592. In AMEA, 

the Ninth Circuit explained: 

[Plaintiffs] have brought an action that presents 

issues of gravest public importance, and the action 

affects tens of thousands of Californians and the 

state’s public school system as a whole. 

Id. at 593. In addition, AMEA resulted in the defendant making 

substantial changes to the teacher qualification examination 

given statewide to thousands of people. Id. 

 Defendant attempts to distinguish AMAE, arguing that this 

case is not as important because its impact was limited to “23 

Plaintiffs who took a test at a single manufacturing plant in 

Fresno.” Doc. 744 at 5. This description of the case is overly 

myopic. 

 In this case Plaintiffs’ central claim was that Nibco’s 

administration of certain tests in English only, and subsequent 

termination of employees based on the results of those tests, 

intentionally caused an adverse, disproportionate impact on 

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persons of Hispanic and Asian national origins. Language-based 

discrimination is often closely aligned with national origin 

discrimination, and has been recognized as being worthy of close 

scrutiny by the courts. See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizonans for 

Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 948 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on 

other grounds, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (“Since language is a close and 

meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of 

languages may mask discrimination against specific national 

origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist sentiment”); 

Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“Accent and national origin are obviously 

inextricably intertwined in many cases. It would therefore be an 

easy refuge in this context for an employer unlawfully 

discriminating against someone based on national origin to state 

falsely that it was not the person's national origin that caused 

the employment or promotion problem, but the candidate's 

inability to measure up to the communications skills demanded by 

the job. We encourage a very searching look by the district 

courts at such a claim.”).1

 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency 

charged by Congress with interpreting and enforcing Title VII, 

 

1

 Defendant’s argument that “English-Only” cases typically involve bans on the 

speaking of languages other than English at all or at certain times in the 

workplace is unavailing. Plaintiffs never claimed this was such an “EnglishOnly” case. Moreover, just because the claims in this case do not exactly 

mirror the majority of language-discrimination cases does not make this case 

insignificant. In fact, a strong argument exists for the contrary 

proposition. 

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recognizes that language discrimination in the workplace is a 

serious problem by, among other things, prioritizing efforts 

against workplace “speak-English only” policies, a form of 

language discrimination. See, e.g., Doc. 710, Ho Declaration, 

Exhs. A-C (Sept. 1, 2000 EEOC press release announcing settlement 

of English-only case against a manufacturing plant (stating that 

“[c]ases involving language issues, accent discrimination, and 

restrictive language policies or practices are a strategic 

enforcement priority for the Commission”); Sept. 19, 2000 EEOC 

press release announcing settlement of English-only case against 

a telephone operator service (“Cases involving English-only 

rules, restrictive language policies, and language or accent 

discrimination are litigation priorities for the Commission. 

Employers must refrain from targeting workers for discrimination 

based on myths, fears, and stereotypes regarding their primary 

language and country of origin.”); April 20, 2001 EEOC press 

release announcing settlement of class action against a private 

university concerning workplace English-only rule (“For more than 

15 years, the EEOC has taken the firm position that English-only 

rules run afoul of Title VII ... This settlement should put other 

employers on notice that the EEOC is committed to rooting out 

discrimination against low-wage earners, language minorities, and 

other groups most vulnerable to civil rights abuses”, and also 

noting a nearly 500% increase in English-only charges during 

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1996-2000 period.”)). The EEOC has followed the progress of this 

litigation since its inception, and sent its attorneys to observe 

trial proceedings. See id. at ¶5.2 This was a significant case 

involving the disparate impact of English-only proficiency tests 

in the workplace on employees who the employer knew to have 

limited English language skills. The use of such potentially 

national origin discriminatory tests had the potential to cause 

the termination of foreign language-speaking employees. 

 Defendant’s other arguments to the contrary are not 

persuasive. Defendant’s floodgates argument manifestly 

overstates the risk that in denying its cost bill, every losing 

plaintiff could conceivably seek to avoid payment of costs in 

every employment discrimination case. This will not happen, as 

AMAE expressly permits challenges by civil rights litigants to 

the imposition of costs and, correspondingly, grants district 

courts broad discretion to deny costs on a case by case basis. 

 

2

 Plaintiffs place great weight on the fact that, in addition to bringing the 

case to combat workplace language discrimination, substantial party and 

judicial resources were devoted to litigating Defendant’s vigorous efforts to 

discover Plaintiffs’ immigration status. In 2004, on appeal from the district 

courts’ discovery rulings, the Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument 

that discovery of Plaintiffs’ immigration status was necessary to its defense, 

becoming the first Court of Appeals to interpret Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), a decision that called into question 

whether undocumented workers could assert statutory protections against 

workplace discrimination. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 

2004). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion has been cited in numerous federal court 

decisions, law review articles, practice guides, and casebooks. 

 However significant this discovery decision became, Plaintiffs concede 

that whether or not immigration status was discoverable was not among the 

reasons this case was initially brought. Doc. 741 at 5. Moreover, none of 

the costs being sought by Defendant relate to that discovery dispute, on which 

Defendants did not prevail. It is not necessary to decide here whether a 

finding of substantial public importance can be based upon a collateral issue 

raised as a defense to discovery, as the underlying claims are of substantial 

public importance on their own. 

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 Defendant also emphasizes that, unlike AMEA, this case was 

not a class action. But, class action status is not a 

prerequisite to denial of costs outright. See, e.g., Washburn v. 

Fagan, 2008 WL 361048 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Denying costs under AMEA

in case brought by a single Plaintiff in an excessive force case 

against the San Francisco Police Department). 

 The language/national origin claims raised in this case, 

although ultimately unsuccessful, were of substantial public 

importance. 

3. Plaintiffs’ Financial Resources.

 A court abuses its discretion when it awards costs against a 

losing plaintiff without considering the plaintiff's limited 

financial resources. AMAE, 231 F.3d at 592; Stanley v. 

University of Southern California, 178 F.3d 1069, 1079-80 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“[d]istrict courts should consider the financial 

resources of the plaintiff and the amount of costs in civil 

rights cases.”). It is not necessary to find that the plaintiffs 

in question are currently indigent; rather, the proper inquiry is 

whether an award of costs might make them so. Stanley, 178 F.3d 

at 1079-80 (referring to the possibility that the plaintiff 

“would be rendered indigent should she be forced to pay” the 

amount assessed against her); see also Mansourian v. Board of 

Regents of the Univ. of California at Davis, 566 F. Supp. 2d 

1168, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to award costs against 

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student plaintiffs, noting their “limited financial resources” 

and that they were barely able to cover their monthly living 

expenses). 

 Defendant points to cases from the Seventh Circuit that 

place the burden on the losing party to provide the district 

court with sufficient documentation to support a specific finding 

that he or she is “incapable of paying the court-imposed costs at 

this time or in the future,” and that this evidence should come 

in the form of an affidavit or other documentary evidence of both 

income and assets. See Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 

635 (7th Cir. 2006). But, in light of AMAE and Mansurian, 

Defendant has failed to demonstrate that such a specific standard 

of proof applies in this circuit. In fact, there was sparse 

evidence supporting the finding that the AMAE plaintiffs had 

limited financial resources. The dissent specifically noted: 

There is no evidence in the record of the exact 

financial condition of any of the plaintiffs. The 

majority opinion's conclusion that Plaintiffs have 

limited resources seems to be inferred from evidence in 

the record which merely indicates what jobs are held by 

the individual plaintiffs and the amount of dues the 

organization plaintiffs receive from their members. The 

district court merely found a disparity of resources 

between the State and the Plaintiffs. Presumably that 

disparity would almost always exist, regardless of who 

litigated against the State. 

AMAE, 231 F.3d at 599 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). Likewise, in Mansurian, the district court 

noted that “plaintiffs have not presented evidence of actual 

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indigence,” relying instead on plaintiffs’ demonstration “that 

they are graduate students and recent college graduates with 

limited financial resources.” 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. 

 Here, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are low 

wage workers, employed in hourly jobs, who do not have 

substantial financial resources. See Vigne Declaration, Doc. 

705, ¶¶ 5-30. Exhibit A to the Vigne declaration summarizes wage 

and earnings information for each Plaintiff for a ten year 

period, produced in discovery; and reveals that most of the 

Plaintiffs earn less than $20,000 per year, with a handful 

earning approximately $25,000 per year. In the Fresno 

metropolitan statistical area, it is probable that the 

Plaintiffs’ average incomes for the past several years would 

place them in the “low income,” if not the “very low income,” 

classifications used by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (“HUD”).3 

 Plaintiffs have limited financial resources. 

4. Economic Disparity.

 The financial disparity between the parties is also a 

relevant consideration. See AMAE, 231 F.3d at 592 (denial of 

costs appropriate where there exists inter alia a great economic 

disparity between the plaintiffs, who were individuals and small 

 

3

 2009 Adjusted Home Income Limits, State: California, U.S. Department of HUD, 

Mar. 2009, available at, 

http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/limits/income/2

009/ca.pdf. 

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nonprofit educational organizations, and the defendants). It is 

undisputed that Nibco is a multinational corporation that 

operates 12 manufacturing plants, and additional “global 

distribution and plant shipping facilities,” in both the United 

States as well as in Mexico and Poland. In 1999, the last year 

for which Nibco’s annual reports were produced in discovery, its 

net income surpassed $22 million. Vigne Decl., ¶¶ 31-32. In 

fiscal year 2008, Nibco reported sales of $590.2 million.4 

 There is significant disparity between the resources of the 

parties in this case. 

5. Were the Issues Close and Difficult?

 The district court denied the parties’ voluminous cross 

motions for summary judgment in a detailed, 96-page memorandum 

decision. Doc. 436. The pretrial proceedings and trial were 

lengthy and complex. Defendant correctly points out that after a 

nearly two-month trial, the jury took less than one day to reject 

Plaintiffs’ claims. However, the jury’s ultimate rejection of 

the Plaintiffs’ claims does not undermine the legal and factual 

complexity of the underlying claims and that summary judgment 

could not be granted. 

 The case consisted of the testimony of twenty three 

Plaintiffs and reviewed their employment history and the testing 

and performance evaluations and policies of the employer, NIBCO, 

 

4

 Nibco Inc. company profile, Hoover’s, Inc., 2008, available online at 

http://www.answers.com/topic/nibco-inc. (last visited February 26, 2010.). 

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for its Fresno, California plant. NIBCO produced all its records 

and policies concerning the evaluation and treatment of each 

Plaintiff and many other employees. The employer offered 

exhaustive testimony from its supervisors and from human 

resources officers to explain and justify its treatment and 

termination Plaintiffs. Extensive expert testimony about 

linguistics, employment standards and practices, and economics 

was offered. Further, the business and financial history of 

NIBCO’s unsuccessful endeavor to acquire and operate the Fresno 

plant, resulting in significant business losses, was presented to 

show that NIBCO’s layoffs of Plaintiffs were caused by business 

necessity. This major causation issue was the primary reason 

Defendant succeeded in persuading the jury that even if language 

discrimination occurred, a supervening cause, the financial 

reverses of NIBCO’s Fresno operations caused Plaintiffs to lose 

their jobs. 

6. Would an Award of Costs have a Serious “Chilling 

Effect” on Future Civil Rights Litigants?

 One district court’s recent review of the available caselaw 

applying AMAE concluded that, while there are cases in which 

courts have awarded costs to prevailing defendants in civil 

rights litigation, 

those cases involved relatively small awards that did 

not pose a risk of chilling future litigation. See 

Save Our Valley v. Sound Trans it, 335 F.3d 932, 945 

(9th Cir. 2003) ($5,310.55); Estate of Le Blanc v. City 

of Lindsay, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76428, at *10, 2007 

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WL 2900515 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) ($8,460.21); 

Sorgen v. City of San Francisco, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

14489, at *8-10, 2007 WL 521235 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 

2007) ($4,987); Ardalan v. Monterey Institute of Int'l 

Studies, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18765, at *12-14, 2004 

WL 2047593 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 14, 2004) ($2,838.35). By 

contrast, larger cost awards ... have been denied to 

prevailing defendants based on a combination of [] 

reasons [cited in AMAE]. See Mexican-American 

Educators, 231 F.3d at 591 ($216,443.67); Bowoto v. 

Chevron Corp., 2009 WL 1081096, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Apr.22, 

2009) ($485,159.49); Washburn v. Fagan, 2008 WL 361048, 

at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb.11, 2008) ($16,268.71). 

Darensberg v. Metro. Transp. Com’n, 2009 WL 2392094, *2 (N.D. 

Cal., Aug, 4. 2009); see also Mansourian, 566 F.Supp.2d at 1171-

72 (cost award “would lead to a harsh result that could chill 

student litigants from vindicating important rights under Title 

IX.”). 

 Defendant argues that there would be no “chilling effect” 

here because the costs taxed, $84,434.40, be divided among the 23 

Plaintiffs in this case, for a total cost of $3,671.06 for each 

Plaintiff. Defendant cites Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048 (9th 

Cir. 2007), in which a group of Hawaiian residents brought a 

civil rights action challenging state programs, which gave 

preferential treatment to persons of Hawaiian ancestry in 

violation of equal protection principles. The Ninth Circuit 

upheld the district court’s imposition of costs, holding that 

plaintiffs had not demonstrated that an award of costs, “divided 

among multiple plaintiffs,” amounted to a chilling effect. Id. 

at 1069. Arakaki is distinguishable. Id. The total cost award 

in Arakaki was $5,300. Divided among the fourteen named 

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Plaintiffs, the plaintiff liability for costs was less than $400. 

Moreover, there is no suggestion in Arkakai, that those 

Plaintiffs demonstrated financial extremis. 

 Here, even imposing the costs bill on a per-plaintiff basis 

risks a chilling effect. For a low wage-worker, the threat of a 

$3,600 cost bill, representing approximately 14% of the annual 

income of Plaintiffs, is a significant disincentive. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Plaintiffs’ motion objecting to the Clerk’s taxation of 

costs is GRANTED. Defendant shall not recover costs in this case 

for the reasons stated above. 

SO ORDERED 

Dated: March 22, 2010 

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger

Oliver W. Wanger 

United States District Judge 

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