Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02820/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02820-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Although the California Department of Corrections is now the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), the Court, for the sake of consistency, will

continue to refer to the defendant in this action as the CDC. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES CHATMAN, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

RICHARD EARLY, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________

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No. C 03-2820 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT

CHEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS;

DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 

(Docket Nos. 48 & 61) 

Plaintiff Charles Chatman, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In an order dated October 16, 2006, the

Court found plaintiff had stated cognizable claims for relief based on his allegations of food

deprivation, retaliation and interference with his mail. (Docket No. 26.) The Court ordered

the complaint served on numerous prison officials at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”),

supervisory officials employed by the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”)1

, and

John Chen, Chief Deputy Inspector General for the California Office of the Inspector General

Case 3:03-cv-02820-MMC Document 79 Filed 07/27/07 Page 1 of 9
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The Court ruled on many procedural matters in this case before ordering the

complaint served. That procedural history is not relevant to the matters now before the Court

and is not repeated here. 

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(“OIG”).2 

Now before the Court is defendant Chen’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 48.) Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion,

defendant Chen has filed a reply, and plaintiff has filed a sur-reply. 

Also before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. (Docket No. 61.)

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim “if as a matter of law it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In considering a motion to

dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and

accept all factual allegations as true. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38

(9th Cir. 1996). Federal courts are particularly liberal in construing allegations made in pro

se civil rights complaints. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). In ruling

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may not consider any material outside the complaint, but

may consider exhibits attached thereto. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency,

261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (holding exhibits attached to

complaint may be treated as part of complaint for purposes of ruling on 12(b)(6) motion). In

addition, the court may consider facts of which it may take judicial notice pursuant to Rule

201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688

(9th Cir. 2001). 

2. Factual Background

In connection with the instant motion to dismiss, the Court limits itself to

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On the days that SVSP was not in lock-down, September 3-4, 11-14, and 19-26,

plaintiff received breakfast, lunch and dinner in the mess hall. 

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consideration of the following facts, which either are alleged in the complaint and the

attachments thereto or are judicially noticeable. 

On July 29, 2001, plaintiff was transferred from Corcoran State Prison to SVSP. 

Approximately one and one-half weeks later, he and his cellmate complained to SVSP

custody staff that the food service employees were not wearing hats or gloves while

distributing food, and that the food was being served on “unsanitary bread racks.” For forty

one days during the period between August 16 and October 9, 2001, SVSP was on “lockdown” and the inmates were served food in their cells.3

 During the lock-down, twenty-eight

different SVSP employees brought food to plaintiff’s cell but refused to give plaintiff and his

cellmate breakfast and lunch because they had not turned on the “bright lights,” as opposed

to the “regular lights,” in their cell. Plaintiff and his cellmate did receive dinner, from the

third watch staff, when the regular lights were on. As a result of being deprived of adequate

food, plaintiff suffered dizziness, vomiting, headaches, back pain, hypertension and leg

numbness, and he lost twenty pounds. 

Plaintiff filed administrative appeals and wrote complaint letters to SVSP and CDC

officials and a prisoner rights organization about the food deprivation. On August 19, 2001,

he also wrote a complaint letter to the OIG requesting an investigation into the matter. On

September 21, 2001, defendant Chen, the Chief Deputy Inspector General, responded to the

letter, encouraging plaintiff to first use the administrative appeals process or to file a citizens’

complaint against a peace officer pursuant to California Penal Code section 148.6. (Compl.

Ex. B at 2.) Chen informed plaintiff that if he was not satisfied with the director’s level

response to his administrative appeals, he could contact Chen’s office again. (Id.) On

January 31, 2002, Chen wrote to plaintiff telling him that the OIG had completed its review

of plaintiff’s allegations of food deprivation and had “concluded that this matter requires no

further action by this office.” (Compl. Ex. B at 3.) 

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Plaintiff was transferred to CCI on December 19, 2001.

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After plaintiff began filing administrative appeals and writing complaint letters,

officials at SVSP and at the California Correctional Institute at Tehachapi (“CCI”)4

 started 

interfering with, confiscating and censoring his legal mail. Plaintiff also filed administrative

appeals and wrote complaint letters about these matters. On October 17, 2001, plaintiff

wrote a complaint letter to the OIG regarding censorship of his legal correspondence. On

December 23, 2001, defendant Chen wrote plaintiff that the OIG had initiated an inquiry into

his allegations (Compl. Ex. D at 33), and on January 17, 2002, Chen informed plaintiff that

the inquiry was completed and that the OIG had “concluded that the matter requires no

further action by this office.” (Compl. Ex. D at 34.)

Plaintiff alleges that Chen’s failure to intervene on his behalf and to require prison

officials to provide him with adequate food and to stop interfering with his legal mail

violated his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, as well as various provisions of California law. He seeks monetary damages.

3. Legal Analysis

a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Arguing that plaintiff’s allegations state a claim against him only in his official

capacity, defendant Chen moves to dismiss the complaint on grounds of Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Plaintiff responds that the complaint makes clear that the claims are

being brought against Chen in his personal capacity, and that Ninth Circuit case law requires

the allegations to be so construed. 

The Court agrees with defendant Chen that, to the extent the complaint can be

construed to allege claims for damages against him in his official capacity as Chief Deputy

Inspector General, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985) (holding Eleventh Amendment bar on damages in

federal court action against state remains in effect when state officials are sued for damages

in their official capacity). 

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This ruling includes dismissal of plaintiff’s state law claims against defendant Chen. 

See Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, et al., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002)

(holding Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to claims brought against state in federal

court under supplemental jurisdiction statute).

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Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED with respect to any and all

claims seeking damages against Chen in his official capacity.5

The Court agrees with plaintiff, however, that the complaint adequately raises claims

against Chen in his individual capacity. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits that

seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of

state law. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991). On the merits, to establish personal

liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state

law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Id. Thus, when a state official is sued in his

individual capacity, the plaintiff need not establish a connection to a governmental policy or

custom, see Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, and state officials may be held liable in their individual

capacities for actions they take in their official capacities, see id. at 27. Where state officials

are named in a complaint that is silent as to capacity and seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their individual capacities. ShoshoneBannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Com'n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing

Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991)). “Any

other construction would be illogical . . . since a claim for damages against state officials in

their official capacities is plainly barred.” Id.

Here, as noted, plaintiff alleges that Chen, acting under color of state law, deliberately

deprived him of his federal constitutional rights by failing to prevent ongoing constitutional

violations against him. In that regard, plaintiff’s complaint seeks only damages by way of

relief, and nowhere in either the caption or body of the complaint does he state the capacity

in which Chen has been sued. Given the above-referenced Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

authority, these allegations, taken together, are sufficient to allow plaintiff to proceed against

Chen in his individual capacity. 

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Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint against Chen in its entirety on

Eleventh Amendment grounds is hereby DENIED. 

b. Failure to Allege a Constitutional Deprivation

Defendant Chen argues that plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim against him

under § 1983 because he had no authority to provide the relief plaintiff sought and, even if he

did, any such authority is wholly discretionary and does not create a constitutionally

enforceable right. Plaintiff responds that the applicable statute did enable Chen to act, that

Chen in fact encouraged inmates to file complaints against prison officials, and that Chen’s

authority, even if discretionary, cannot insulate him from suit if his actions were

unconstitutional. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). As set forth below, the Court finds plaintiff’s allegations

meet both of these requirements. 

First, the Court, based on its initial review of plaintiff’s complaint, already has found

plaintiff’s allegations as to food deprivation and mail interference suffice to state claims for

the violation of his federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that Chen’s failure to

prevent these constitutional violations violated his constitutional rights. The first element

thus is satisfied.

The second element also is satisfied. Plaintiff has alleged that Chen’s affirmative

refusal to take action was an exercise of the power he possessed by virtue of state law, which,

plaintiff alleges, was made possible only because Chen was clothed with the authority of the

OIG. 

Chen argues he was not authorized to act on plaintiff’s behalf because the OIG is a

separate and independent entity from the CDC, the OIG is an oversight agency that solely

reviews CDC policies and procedures, and the OIG has no authority to intervene in CDC

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The Court takes judicial notice of the language of the statutes set forth at California

Penal Code Chapter 8.2, Office of the Inspector General, section 6125, et seq.

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affairs. In making this argument, Chen relies solely on the language of the statutes that

describe the duties and responsibilities of the OIG. Standing alone, however, the statutory

language does not necessarily lead to such conclusion.6

 Moreover, plaintiff has alleged that

Chen actively sought complaints from inmates by posting notices telling them they could

contact the OIG about any problems. Further, Chen, after conducting inquiries under the

apparent authority of his office, in fact did respond to plaintiff’s letters and, when informing

plaintiff that no further action on his complaints would be taken, Chen wrote that it was

because no such action was required by his office, not because he had no authority to act. 

Given the record presented at this stage of the proceedings, the Court is unable to conclude

that Chen lacked the authority to take action to remedy the violations of which plaintiff

complained. 

Chen further argues that even if he did have the authority to investigate and take

action against prison officials, the decision whether to do so was wholly discretionary, and

thus he cannot be held liable for failing to act. An individual acting in a supervisorial

capacity may be found liable under § 1983 upon a showing of a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A

supervisor thus can be held liable for failing to act to prevent constitutional violations of

which he was aware. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “It has long

been clearly established that ‘[s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official

in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,

or control of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which

the complaint is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the

rights of others.’” Preschooler II v. Davis, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted).

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As pled, plaintiff’s complaint states a claim against Chen for failing to act in his

statutorily-authorized, supervisory capacity, thus resulting in a constitutional violation. 

Whether Chen may be entitled to absolute immunity because of the discretionary nature of

his authority, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978) (holding agency officials

performing certain discretionary functions should be entitled to absolute immunity), or to

qualified immunity, is not raised in the motion to dismiss, and the Court expresses no opinion

as to the potential merit of either argument. 

Accordingly, to the extent the motion seeks dismissal for failure to allege the violation

of a constitutionally enforceable right, the motion is hereby DENIED, and plaintiff may

proceed on his claims against Chen in said defendant’s individual capacity. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to File an Amended Complaint

On January 25, 2007, after Chen filed his motion to dismiss but before any other

defendant had done so, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint. He seeks to add one

new defendant, SVSP Warden Anthony Lamarque, who, plaintiff alleges, conspired with

other SVSP prison officials to deprive him of food and to interfere with his legal mail. 

A plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A motion to dismiss is not a

responsive pleading and “[n]either the filing nor granting of such a motion before answer

terminates the right to amend . . . .” United States ex rel. Saaf v. Lehman Brothers, 123 F.3d

1307, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997). Consequently, at this juncture, plaintiff is not required to seek

leave of court to amend his complaint. 

Accordingly, the motion to amend is hereby DENIED as moot. 

Plaintiff is informed, however, that if he wants to amend his complaint to include

claims against Warden Lamarque, he must file an amended complaint naming Lamarque as a

defendant and setting out the details of each claim against him. The amended complaint also

must include all claims from the original complaint that plaintiff wants to preserve. An

amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and may not incorporate by reference

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In its order of service, the Court set out in detail the obligations pro se litigants bear

when responding to either an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), see Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied Alameida v. Terhune, 540

U.S. 810 (2003), or a motion for summary judgment, see Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,

963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Those obligations remain applicable to any such motions filed

hereafter in this action.

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any parts of the original complaint. London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir. 1981); see Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992) (holding defendants

not named in amended complaint are no longer defendants). These rules govern actions filed

by pro se litigants as well as litigants represented by counsel. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

CONCLUSION

1. Defendant Chen’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 48) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part, as set forth above. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint (Docket No. 61) is DENIED as

moot. 

3. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendant shall file a

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. 

Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court and served

on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendant’s motion is filed. 

Defendant shall file any reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days from the date

plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.7

This order terminates Docket Nos. 48 and 61.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 27, 2007 ____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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