Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01924/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01924-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 EARL WARNER,

CDCR #J-19886,

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01924-BEN-DHB

12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

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1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2]

vs. 14

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P. VELARDI; DR. COOK; K. SELLY; R.

WALKER; M. GLYNN; L.D. ZAMORA;

A. CASTRILLION; P. VAUGHN; S.

OSBORNE

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2) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

AND § 1915A(b)

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Defendants.

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2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE UPON NAMED

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

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Earl Warner (“Plaintiff’), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se,

has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), together

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with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. No. 4). Plaintiff claims

medical and inmate appeals officials at RJD violated his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Plaintiffseeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as general,

compensatory and punitive damages.

I. Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe

United States, except an application for writ ofhabeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to

prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1 111 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,”

Bruce v. Samuels,__U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless ofwhether his action is ultimately dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

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Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a

“certified copy ofthe trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the

6-month period immediately preceding the filing ofthe complaint.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of(a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having

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i In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule ofFees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed

IFP. Id.

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custody ofthe prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% ofthe

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 915(b)(2);

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support ofhis IFP motion, Plaintiffhas submitted certified copies ofhis prison

trust account statements at RJD pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR

3.2.; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiffhas an available

balance of zero in his inmate trust account at the time offiling. Therefore, the Court

assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) because it appears

Plaintiffis unable to pay any initial fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n

no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means

by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d

at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack offunds

available to him when payment is ordered.”).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 4),

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his prison certificate shows he “has no

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary ofthe CDCR, or his

designee, to collect the entire $350 balance ofthe filing fees required by 28 U.S.C.

§1914 and to forward them to the Clerk ofthe Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Initial Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

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conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint,

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this plausibility standard.

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations ofmaterial fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

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“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Iveyv. Bd. ofRegents

ofthe University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiffs factual allegations

On July 26, 2012, Plaintiff“accidentally caused a serious injury to his right hand

when he hit a cement wall” in his cell. (Compl. at 102.) The following day, Plaintiff

submitted a “request for medical treatment.” (Id.) Plaintiffwas seen by a registered

nurse on July 28, 2012 who referred him to Defendant Velardi, a nurse practitioner. (Id.)

Velardi examined Plaintiffs hand on July 30, 2012 and ordered that an x-ray be taken of

his hand. (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff claims that “despite the extremely swollen condition ofPlaintiffs hand,”

and Plaintiffs complaints ofpain, Velardi “refused to proscribe any pain management

medication for Plaintiff.” (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges Velardi became “openly hostile

and arrogant” and told Plaintiffthat he was “not telling her the truth about how he had

sustained his injury.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff claims that because ofVelardi’s “personal

beliefthat Plaintiffwas dishonest with her,” Velardi refused to “cause Plaintiffto be

escorted to the Emergency Treatment Center.” (Id. at 12.)

On August 1, 2012, Plaintiffreceived the x-ray ofhis hand. (Id. at 11-12.)

Immediately following the procedure, Plaintiff “inquired ofthe radiologist, the extent of

his injury.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that the radiologist informed him “you’ll have to

wait until you have seen a doctor and ask the doctor.” (Id.)

Plaintiffwaited ten (10) days before “submitting another request for emergent

follow-up treatment.” (Id.) On August 14, 2012, Plaintiff “was seen by another nurse.”

(Id.) This unnamed nurse reviewed Plaintiffs medical file including the “extent ofthe

injury reflected” in the x-ray taken on August 1, 2012 and informed Plaintiff “I don’t

understand why there was nothing done about this then.” (Id. at 13.) This nurse had

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Plaintiff “taken to the emergency treatment area” where he was examined by Defendant

Cook. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Cook placed a “soft cast” on Plaintiffs hand. (Id.)

However, Plaintiff claims Cook “refused to proscribe Plaintiff any pain medication

despite Plaintiffs complaints of extreme pain and suffering.” (Id.)

On August 15, 2012, Plaintiffwas again seen by Velardi. (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that after “pleading with” Velardi, she prescribed “Tylenol #3” for fourteen (14) days.

(Id.) On August 29, 2012, Plaintiffwas “transported to the private office ofthe

Orthopedic Specialist.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff claims this specialist “informed Plaintiffthat

the institution had allowed for too much time to have expired” and that “as a consequence

the bone had already begun to mend itselfto the other end ofthe bone from which it had

been severed.” (Id.) Plaintiffwas told the only options were “to re-break the bone, and

properly cast it” or have surgery. (Id.). Plaintiff claims he was told that neither option

“would provide him normal formal use ofthe hand again.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff

was told that he would “develop arthritis in his right hand,” as well as “suffer a

diminished capacity ofuse ofit for the remainder ofhis life.” (Id.)

On August 29, 2012, Plaintiffs prescription ofpain medication had run out and he

claims Defendants refused to renew the prescription. (Id.) Plaintiffthen submitted an

administrative grievance relating to the claims in this matter. He claims Velardi

responded to the initial level ofreview denying most ofPlaintiffs reliefthat he sought.

(Id. at 15-16.) He further alleges that Velardi’s “decisions were supported by Defendants

Walker, Seely, Glynn, Zamora when they each had responsibility ofreviewing the

appeal, and the decisions rendered on the merits ofPlaintiffs claims.”

Defendants Castrillion, Vaughn, Osborne

Plaintifflists A. Castrillion, P. Vaughn or S. Osborne as Defendants but the only

reference to these individuals are the claims that they are Radiologists at RJD with the

responsibility of “providing radiological services to inmate patients at RJD.” (Compl. at

9-10.) The body ofPlaintiffs Complaint does not provide any specific factual allegation

linking any ofthese three named individuals to Plaintiffs medical treatment.

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Prison officials are liable only ifthey are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). However,

nothing in Plaintiffs Complaint supports a “reasonable inference” that Defendants

Castrillion, Vaughn or Osborne acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege

sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state ofmind.”

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must

be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does

not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”)

(citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). A difference of opinion between a prisoner and his

doctors as to the appropriate course or type ofmedical attention does not amount to

deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), and delays do not by themselves

show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged to be harmful. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. ofState Prison Comm ’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407

(9th Cir. 1985).

Here, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations that any ofthese named Defendants

were involved in his care or that they had any duty, outside ofproviding an x-ray and

report, to implement any medical care on his behalf. Plaintiff admits he received the xray and he acknowledges that the report ofthe findings were placed in his medical record.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas failed to allege facts to show that

Defendants A. Castrillion, P. Vaughn or S. Osborne actually knew of, yet disregarded his

serious medical needs, see Gibson v. Cnty. ofWashoe, Nev., 290 F.3dll75, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“[Deliberate indifference requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that

serious harm is likely to result from a failure to provide medical care.”).

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas failed to state a plausible claim

for relief against Defendants A. Castrillion, P. Vaughn or S. Osborne subject to suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

Claims against Defendants Seely, Walker, Glynn, Zamora

Plaintiffseeks to bring Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Seely,

Walker, Glynn, Zamora based on their response to his administrative grievances.

(Compl. at 16-17.) Plaintiff does not allege that any ofthese Defendants were personally

involved in his medical care. While the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state

shall.. . deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw,” U.S.

Const, amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he requirements ofprocedural due process apply only to the

deprivation ofinterests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

liberty and property.” Board ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes

and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to

invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).

However, to state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiffmust allege: “(1) a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation ofthe interest by the

government; [and] (3) lack ofprocess.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir.

2000).

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The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates have no protected property interest in an

inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process clause ofthe Fourteenth

Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance

procedure”)). Even the non-existence of, or the failure ofprison officials to properly

implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise

constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. See also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d

494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

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In addition, Plaintiffhas failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Defendants

deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to any

particular prison grievance in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise

from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process

protections are implicated only ifPlaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1)

restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d]

atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents ofprison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, Plaintiffpleads no facts to

suggest how Defendants’ allegedly inadequate review or failure to consider inmate

grievances restrained his freedom in any way, or subjected him to any “atypical” and

“significant hardship.” Id. at 483-84.

Therefore, Plaintiffs Complaint also fails to state a claim against Defendants

Seely, Walker, Glynn and Zamora upon which relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

Named Defendants

As to the remaining Defendants, Velardi and Cook, both ofwhom are alleged to

have personally violated Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights by failing to providing him

with inadequate medical care, the Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint contains claims

sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening

required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the

remaining Defendants on Plaintiffs behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of

the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States

marshal or deputy marshal... ifthe plaintiffis authorized to proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

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1 III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

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2. DIRECTS the Secretary ofthe CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiffs prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) ofthe

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk ofthe Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk ofthe Court to serve a copy ofthis Order on Scott

Keman, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Defendants Seely, Walker, Glynn, Zamora, Castrillion,

Vaughn, and Osborne as parties to this case based on Plaintiffs failure to state a claim

against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b);

5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc.

No. 1) upon the named Defendants P. VELARDI and COOK and forward it to Plaintiff

along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each ofthese named Defendants. In

addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiffwith a certified copy ofthis Order, a certified

copy ofhis Complaint and the summons so that he may serve these Defendants. Upon

receipt ofthis “IFP Package,” Plaintiffmust complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package;

6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy ofthe Complaint and summons

upon the named Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to

him. All costs ofthat service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3);

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7. ORDERS the named and served Defendants to reply to Plaintiffs

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions ofFederal Rule ofCivil

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b),

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone

that Plaintiffhas a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is

required to respond); and

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ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to

serve upon the named Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon

Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document

submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiffmust

include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk ofthe Court, a

certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy ofthat document has been

was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date ofthat service. See S.D. Cal.

CrvLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with

the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be

disregarded.

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20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

N

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22 Dated: Novembe;

Hon. ROGfiRT: BENITEZ

United States District Judge

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