Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01228/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01228-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, 

et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BMW of North America LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01228-PHX-JZB

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant BMW of North America, LLC’s Motion 

to Exclude Testimony of Willie Nelson (Doc. 92), Motion to Exclude Testimony of 

George Hogge (Doc. 91), and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 93). For the reasons 

below, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Mr. Nelson, 

grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Mr. Hogge, 

grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and 

deny Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiffs’ strict products liability claim.1

I. Background 

 This case arises from a fire that occurred in Plaintiff Michelle Brown’s garage in 

 

1

 None of the parties requested oral argument. Further, because the parties submitted memoranda discussing the law and evidence in support of their positions and oral argument would not have aided the Court’s decisional process, the Court did not hold oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See, e.g., Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific. Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court likewise finds 

that it has “an adequate record before it to make its ruling” without holding a Daubert

evidentiary hearing. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 1 of 29
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Gilbert, Arizona. Ms. Brown, her insurer Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and 

her condominium association’s insurer Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company assert 

claims against Defendant for strict products liability and negligence. (Doc. 66.) More 

specifically, Plaintiffs assert that a defect in the Mini Cooper parked in Ms. Brown’s 

garage, and Defendant’s negligence, caused the fire. (Id.) 

a. The Fire 

 On September 13, 2012, a fire began in the garage of Ms. Brown’s home. (Doc. 

92-1, Ex. A at 2-3).2

 Her son, Terrance Harris, was the only one home at the time of the 

fire. (Id. at 31.) According to the Gilbert Fire Department Report, Mr. Harris stated that 

he awoke from a nap to a “loud ‘thud,’” went down stairs, opened the interior door to the 

garage, and saw dense, white smoke. (Id. at 33.) He then opened the automatic garage 

door with a remote opener and called 911. (Id.) Mr. Harris stated that after he walked 

around the outside of the house to see what was on fire in the garage, “he heard an 

explosion and witnessed heavy smoke and active flame rolling out from underneath the 

front, driver’s side of the vehicle parked in the garage.”3

 (Id.) 

 Mr. Harris also told the Fire Department that there was nothing plugged into the 

electrical outlets in the garage. (Id.) Mr. Harris further stated that his mother parks the 

Mini Cooper over a rug that had started to deteriorate, and it’s possible the carpet came in 

contact with the bottom of the car. (Id.) Mr. Harris reported that the only issues with the 

vehicle are that it occasionally would not start right away and the headlight had flickered 

during a rainstorm. (Id.) Mr. Harris also stated that there had been no other repairs to the 

car, “just routine maintenance.” 

 “Based on the heat damage and the burn patterns in the garage,” the Gilbert Fire 

Department eliminated the water heater as “the possible source of the fire.” (Id. at 32.) 

 

2

 For consistency and ease of reference, the Court’s citations to page numbers throughout this Order refer to CM/ECF page numbers. 

3

 911 records indicate that Mr. Harris reported “foam padding on [the] floor is on fire,” subsequently heard a “popping from inside [the] garage,” and stated that the vehicle in the garage “has already caught fire.” (Id. at 4.) 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 2 of 29
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Further, “[b]ased on the fire burn patter[n]s and fire movement in the garage, the area of 

origin was determined to be by the front driver’s side of the Mini Cooper.” (Id.) The 

Fire Department ultimately concluded the following: 

After eliminating all other ignition sources in the area of origin, I found two possibilities of the cause [of] this fire: First, an electrical or mechanical 

malfunction inside the engine compartment of the Mini Cooper. Second, when Terrence pulled the car into the garage; it is possible that the carpet came in contact with the Mini Cooper[’]s exhaust or engine, causing the carpet to smolder before igniting. 

(Id.) 

 Ms. Brown reported several items lost in the fire, including a 32-inch television 

next to a work bench in the southwest corner of the garage, a Ryobi cordless drill, two 

Ryobi chargers, one of which she believed was plugged in at the time of the fire, a 21-

inch computer monitor, two vacuum cleaners, a circular saw, and extension cords. (Doc. 

92-1, Ex. E at 57-66.) The workbench in the southwest corner also suffered damage 

from the fire. 

 On September 19, 2013, Thomas Kane, an investigator retained by Liberty 

Mutual, issued a Report regarding his preliminary findings. (Doc. 92-2, Ex. H at 11.) 

Mr. Kane stated that he followed the scientific method as set forth in the NFPA 921: 

Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921), a publication issued by the 

National Fire Protection Association. (Id.) Based on his personal inspection of the fire 

scene, Mr. Kane stated that although the water softener and garage door opener were 

plugged in at the time of the fire, “[t]here were no signs of unusual electrical activity at 

these outlets and switches. Burn patterns and fire damage indicate that the fire moved 

towards these items as opposed to coming from them.” (Id. at 12.) Additionally, Mr. 

Kane noted that: 

[E]xamination of the 2006 Mini Cooper showed no obvious signs of body damage and showed heavy burn and oxidation patterns on the left front 

quadrant of the hood and left front fender. The left front tire also sustained 

the heaviest fire damage of all four tires. Upon opening the hood, I observed the heaviest fire damage in the front left quadrant of the engine compartment. This area contained the battery, fuse panel, and a xenon 

headlight. The observed fire damage in the location of major electrical components suggests that this fire may have been caused by an electrical 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 3 of 29
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

problem in this area. 

(Id.) 

 Before issuing his Report, Mr. Kane also spoke with Ms. Brown and Mr. Harris. 

(Id.) Ms. Brown stated that she is the original owner of the house and car and she 

provided Mr. Kane with the maintenance and repair history of the car, which includes a 

new battery, cooling system maintenance, power steering system repairs, and regular oil 

changes. (Id.) Mr. Harris provided a description of the events on the day of the fire, 

including his observation that after he opened the exterior garage door, he “saw flames 

coming from underneath the left front fender and engine compartment.” (Id.) 

 Based on his observations and his discussions with Ms. Brown and Mr. Harris, 

Mr. Kane concluded that “it appears that there was an electrical failure in the engine 

compartment of the insured’s 2006 Mini Cooper. Further evaluation by an electrical 

engineer is needed to analyze the electrical system in the vehicle.” (Id. at 13.) 

 On October 17, 2012, Mr. Kane and Principal Electrical Engineer George Hogge 

conducted a joint examination of the scene. Mr. Hogge testified and included in his 

Report that he and Mr. Kane completed a “layered excavation” of the garage. (Doc. 91-

2, Ex. E at 8; Doc. 92-2, Ex. F. at 3-4.) Mr. Hogge also took photographs of the scene 

during their excavation and examination that day. (Doc. 91-2, Ex. E at 2.) 

b. Mr. Nelson’s Report 

 On July 7, 2014, one of Plaintiffs’ disclosed experts, Fire Investigator Mr. Nelson 

(employed by the same company as Mr. Kane), issued a Report regarding the origin and 

cause of the fire. (Doc. 92-2, Ex. P at 38-37.) Prior to issuing his Report, Mr. Nelson 

reviewed or examined: (1) Mr. Kane’s Report, including photographs Mr. Kane took of 

the scene; (2) the Gilbert Fire Department Report; (3) deposition testimony of Ms. Brown 

and Mr. Harris; (4) Mr. Hogge’s scene photographs; (5) observations by Mr. Hogge; (6) 

the Mini Cooper; and (7) reference materials, including the NFPA 921 and Mini Cooper 

recall information. (Doc. 92-2 at 39.) Based on his review of the evidence, Mr. Nelson 

concluded the following: 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 4 of 29
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Based on the evaluation of the available data, my education, 

training, and experience, and utilizing the recognized 

investigation methods, including the Scientific Method as defined in NFPA 921, the area of fire origin was determined to be low, on the driver side of the engine compartment, near the bulkhead. 

The analyses of the available data, including the evaluation of all reasonable ignition sources, the probable ignition scenario was an electrical event involving the main battery cable igniting ordinary combustibles in this area. The fire spread up and out from this area through the vehicle and 

subsequently spread to the garage contents and structure. 

Refer to Electrical Engineer George Hogge’s report for a more detailed analysis of the likely mechanism of failure that led to this fire event. 

(Id. at 47.) In his analysis, Mr. Nelson specifically excluded other possible ignition 

sources of the fire, including ignition by the catalytic converter and a failure of the power 

steering hose. (Id. at 45-46.) 

c. Mr. Hogge’s Report 

 Plaintiffs also disclosed Mr. Hogge, an Electrical Engineer, as an expert. Mr. 

Hogge examined: (1) the fire scene and Ms. Brown’s home; (2) statements made by Ms. 

Brown and Mr. Harris; (3) the deposition testimony of Mark Yeldham of BMW; (4) 

Technical Service Bulletins from BMW for certain Mini Coopers; (5) Invoices from 

Tempe Mini for work done to the Mini Cooper; and (6) wiring diagrams supplied by 

BMW. (Doc. 91-3, Ex. L at 2-5.) Mr. Hogge also relied on Mr. Nelson’s finding 

regarding the cause and origin of the fire. (Id. at 4.) 

 Ms. Brown reported to Mr. Hogge that she was “a stickler” for keeping up to date 

on the maintenance of her car, and with the exception of a friend who replaced the battery 

six months prior, Ms. Brown only used dealerships for any work on the car. (Id. at 4-5.) 

Ms. Brown also reported that steering the vehicle had become difficult a number of times, 

and the dealership subsequently replaced the power steering hose, which it found to be 

leaking. (Id. at 5.) 

 During his electrical examination of Ms. Brown’s home, Mr. Hogge noted that 

there was arcing found on the circuits associated with all of the tripped circuit breakers in 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 5 of 29
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the vicinity of the west wall of the garage near the front of the car. (Id. at 6.) Mr. Hogge 

opined that the arcing found “was consistent with arcing through char, which is always a 

result of fire attack.” (Id.) Mr. Hogge also collected and examined all of the receptacles 

and switches within the garage walls, and he found that the damage on the water heater 

and related receptacle was consistent with an external fire attack. (Id.) Mr. Hogge did 

not find evidence of any items being plugged into a power source in the garage other than 

the small, low voltage transformer for the water softener. (Id.) 

 Mr. Hogge also examined the Mini Cooper, including x-rays of the Engine 

Management System computer and the fuse/relay center, which he found did not yield 

any evidence of internal heating or anomalous electrical activity within the components. 

(Id. at 7.) Mr. Hogge states that an x-ray of the fuse/relay center was not conclusive 

because the area was too complex for a useful image. (Id. at 7.) Upon examination, the 

wiring harnesses that were accessible within the engine compartment were examined and 

no evidence of arcing was found on those accessible conductors. (Id.) Many of the 

wiring harnesses were embedded into melted and hardened debris, which was located at 

the same place in the car where BMW, in a service bulletin, indicated chafing had caused 

“various electrical problems.” (Id.) Mr. Hogge also x-rayed a melted mass, which 

contained the radiator and AC condenser, and he did not find evidence of any internal 

heating or other electrical anomaly. (Id. at 8.) 

 Mr. Hogge’s examination found the battery “basically undamaged.” (Id.) He 

noted that the large gauge positive battery cable that extended to the front of the vehicle 

and along the left frame rail was dangling from the bottom of the vehicle. He also stated 

that the cable previously had been routed such that it extended upwards along the front of 

the left fender just behind the front tire and into the engine compartment. (Id.) 

According to Mr. Hogge, “the only anomalous electrical activity found during the 

examination was arcing on the main battery cable as it extended upward into the engine 

compartment along the front of the fender well just behind the left front tire.” (Id. at 11.) 

Citing to NFPA 921, Mr. Hogge concluded that the “arcing found on the main battery 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 6 of 29
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

cable clearly would have created sufficient heat to ignite the plastic encasement that it 

had been routed within.” (Id.) 

 Mr. Hogge also examined an exemplar Mini Cooper,4

 and found that mounting 

tabs for the plastic encasement of the cable were no longer under the securement nut, 

which he opined would allow for movement and chafing of the battery cable at the 

location where the arcing event was observed in the subject Mini Cooper. (Id. at 7.) 

Additionally, during his examination of Ms. Brown’s Mini Cooper, Mr. Hogge found 

little fire-related damage to the power cable conductors at the power steering pump, 

which he opined “would serve to eliminate a fire from below the engine.” (Id. at 11.) 

 Mr. Hogge states in his Report that he followed the Scientific Method in NFPA 

921 and examined each possible cause of the fire within the area of origin as defined by 

Mr. Nelson. (Id.) Mr. Hogge excluded the building electrical systems and any 

appliances or fixtures within the garage area as possible causes of the fire. (Id.) Mr. 

Hogge further determined that the “competent ignition causes within the area of origin as 

defined within the left side engine compartment include electrical and mechanical 

components of the vehicle.” (Id. at 11.) In addition to an insulation failure of the battery 

cable, Mr. Hogge considered the catalytic converter igniting the liquid or fumes from the 

power steering fluid as a possible cause of the fire. (Id. at 11-12.) Mr. Hogge was able to 

exclude the possibility that the fire developed from below the vehicle based on the 

amount of damage to conductors and a lack of arcing. (Id. at 12.) Mr. Hogge ultimately 

concluded the following: 

Utilizing the Scientific Method, all of the possible causes of the fire in the area of origin as defined by Willie Nelson CFI were evaluated and many were eliminated. Of those that 

were not eliminated, the most likely cause of this fire is 

4

 There appears to be confusion as to whether the exemplar vehicle Mr. Hogge evaluated was a 2005 or 2006 Mini Cooper, and whether there are any substantive, relevant differences between the two models. (Doc. 91 at 6; Doc. 96-6, Ex. F ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs submitted a Declaration from Mr. Hogge with their Response stating that “there are no substantial design differences between a 2005 Mini Cooper and a 2006 Mini Cooper” that would impact Mr. Hogge’s analysis or conclusions. (Doc. 96-6, Ex. F ¶ 9.) In response, Defendant does not identify for the Court any relevant differences between the designs of the two models. 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 7 of 29
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

chafing of positive conductors that resulted in arcing and ignition of the thermoplastic insulation and components in the vicinity. The fact that the engine wiring harness and also apparently the main battery cable are not sufficiently secured to prevent chafing and insulation failure would be considered 

design defects. 

(Id. at 13.) 

II. Defendant’s Motions to Exclude 

 Defendant moves to exclude the testimony of both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Hogge on 

the basis that their opinions are inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. (Docs. 91, 92.) Plaintiff contends that both experts meet the qualification and 

reliability requirements of Rule 702 and, therefore, the Court should not exclude their 

testimony. For the reasons below, the Court finds that testimony by Mr. Nelson is 

admissible under Rule 702. However, the Court will exclude Mr. Hogge’s testimony that 

a failure to secure the wiring harness and battery cable are design defects, and those 

defects were present in Ms. Brown’s Mini Cooper, because those opinions are not 

reliable. The Court will allow Mr. Hogge to testify regarding his other conclusions. 

a. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the following: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 

an opinion or otherwise if: 

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 

methods; and 

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 

Under Rule 702, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper and ensures that the proffered 

scientific testimony meets certain standards of both relevance and reliability before it is 

admitted. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (“Daubert I”), 509 U.S. 579, 590, 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 8 of 29
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(1993). The party proffering expert testimony has the burden of showing the 

admissibility of the testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. Daubert I, 509 U.S. 

at 592 n.10. “[J]udges are entitled to broad discretion when discharging their 

gatekeeping function” related to the admission of expert testimony. United States v. 

Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 

U.S. 137, 150-53, (1999)). The court considers four factors to determine if expert 

testimony will assist the trier of fact: “(i) whether the expert is qualified; (ii) whether the 

subject matter of the testimony is proper for the jury’s consideration; (iii) whether the 

testimony conforms to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (iv) whether the 

probative value of the testimony outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 

1275, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Because the Rule “contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications,” only 

a “minimal foundation of knowledge, skill, and experience” is required. Hangarter v. 

Provident Life & Accident Ins. CO., 373 F.3d 998, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

A “lack of particularized expertise goes to the weight of [the] testimony, not its 

admissibility.” United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United 

States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984.)); Daubert II., 43 F.3d at 1315. 

The trial court must also ensure that the proffered expert testimony is reliable. 

Generally, to satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirement, “the party presenting the expert 

must show that the expert’s findings are based on sound science, and this will require 

some objective, independent validation of the expert’s methodology.” Daubert II, 43 

F.3d at 1316. Toward this end, the Supreme Court in Daubert I set forth the following 

factors for the trial court to consider when assessing the reliability of proffered expert 

testimony: (1) whether the expert’s method, theory, or technique is generally accepted 

within the relevant scientific community; (2) whether the method, theory, or technique 

can be (and has been) tested; (3) whether the method, theory, or technique has been 

subjected to peer review and publication; and (4) the known or potential rate of error of 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 9 of 29
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the method, theory, or technique. Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 

An expert opinion is reliable if it is based on proper methods and procedures rather 

than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Id. at 590. The test for reliability 

“‘is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his 

methodology.’” Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (“Daubert II”), 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th 

Cir. 1995)). Alternative or opposing opinions or tests do not “preclude the admission of 

the expert’s testimony—they go to the weight, not the admissibility.” Kennedy v. 

Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, “‘[d]isputes as to 

the strength of [an expert’s] credentials, faults in his use of [a particular] methodology, or 

lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his 

testimony.’” Id. (quoting McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 

1995)). In engaging in this analysis, the trial court should be mindful that: 

The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one. Its 

overarching subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability – of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must 

be solely on principles and methodology, not on the 

conclusions that they generate. 

Id. at 594–95 (footnotes omitted). 

 Importantly, “‘the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a 

replacement for the adversary system.’” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note on 

2000 amendments (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore 

County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)). “‘Vigorous cross-examination, 

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 

traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” Id.

(citing Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 595). 

b. NFPA 921 

Both of Plaintiffs’ experts assert that they complied with the standards set forth in 

NFPA 921. The parties agree that NFPA 921 delineates a recognized and reliable 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 10 of 29
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

method of determining the origin and cause of the fire. (See Docs. 91, 92, 95, 96); 

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Therefore, Mr. Nelson’s and Mr. Hogge’s testimony is reliable to the extent they 

complied with NFPA 921 in forming their opinions. 

The NFPA sets forth the scientific method that must be used in fire investigations, 

which includes developing a hypothesis and testing the hypothesis before reaching a final 

conclusion. (Doc. 95-3, Ex. C at 3.) More specifically, NFPA 921 provides the 

following: 

4.3.5* Develop a Hypothesis (Inductive Reasoning). Based 

on the data analysis, the investigator produces a hypothesis, or hypotheses, to explain the phenomena, whether it be the 

nature of the fire patterns, fire spread, identification of the origin, the ignition sequence, the fire cause, or the cause of 

damage or responsibilities for the fire or explosions incident. This process is referred to as inductive reasoning. These hypotheses should be based solely on the empirical data that the investigator has collected through observation and then 

developed into explanations for the event, which are based 

upon the investigator’s knowledge, training, experience, and expertise. 

4.3.6* Test the Hypothesis (Deductive Reasoning). The 

investigator does not have a valid or reliable conclusion 

unless the hypothesis can stand the test of careful and serious 

challenge. Testing of the hypothesis is done by the principle of deductive reasoning, in which the investigator compares the hypothesis to all known facts as well as the body of scientific knowledge associated with the phenomena relevant to the specific incident. A hypothesis can be tested physically by conducting experiments, analytically by applying accepted scientific principles, or by referring to scientific research. . . . . The testing process needs to be continued until all feasible 

hypotheses have been tested and one is determined to be 

uniquely consistent with the facts and with the principles of science. If no hypothesis can withstand an examination by deductive reasoning, the issue should be considered 

undetermined. 

4.3.6.1* Any hypothesis that is incapable of being tested either physically or analytically, is an invalid hypothesis. A hypothesis developed based on the absence of data is an 

example of a hypothesis that is incapable of being tested. The inability to refute a hypothesis does not mean that the 

hypothesis is true. 

. . . . 

4.5.1 The investigator should know the level of certainty that 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 11 of 29
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is required for providing expert opinions. Two levels of certainty commonly used are probable and possible: 

(1) Probable. This level of certainty corresponds to being more likely true than not. At this level of certainty, the 

likelihood of the hypothesis being true is greater than 50 

percent. 

(2) Possible. At this level of certainty, the hypothesis can be demonstrated to be feasible but cannot be declared probable. If two or more hypotheses are equally likely, then the level of certainty must be “possible.” 

4.5.2 If the level of certainty of an opinion is merely “suspected,” the opinion does not qualify as an expert 

opinion. If the level of certainty is only “possible,” the 

opinion should be specifically expressed as “possible.” Only when the level of certainty is considered “probable” should an opinion be expressed with reasonable certainty. 

. . . . 

19.6 Testing the Cause Hypothesis. Each of the alternate 

hypotheses that were developed must then be tested using the Scientific Method. If one remaining hypothesis is tested using the “scientific method” and is determined to be 

probable, then the cause of the fire is identified. 

(Doc. 95-3, Ex. C at 2-4; Doc. 92-1, Ex. C at 50.) 

 With regard to the basic method of fire investigations under NFPA 921: 

4.4.3.2 The actual investigation may include different steps and procedures, which will be determined by the purpose of the assignment. These steps and procedures are described in 

detail elsewhere in the document. A fire or explosion 

investigation may include all or some of the following tasks: a scene inspection or review of previous scene documentation done by others; scene documentation through photography and diagramming; evidence recognition, documentation, and preservation; witness interviews; review and analysis of the 

investigations of others; and identification and collection of 

data from other appropriate sources. 

4.4.3.3 In any incident scene investigation, it is necessary for at least one individual/organization to conduct an examination 

of the incident scene for the purpose of data collection and 

documentation. While it is preferable that all subsequent investigators have the opportunity to conduct an independent examination of the incident scene, in practice, not every scene 

is available at the time of the assignment. The use of previously collected data from a properly documented scene can be used successfully in an analysis of the incident to reach valid conclusions through the appropriate use of the scientific method. Thus, the reliance on previously collected data and scene documentation should not be inherently 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 12 of 29
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

considered a limitation in the ability to successfully investigate the incident. 

(Doc. 95-3, Ex. C at 3-4.) 

c. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Mr. Nelson

 Defendant argues that Mr. Nelson’s opinions are not reliable because: (1) he 

“examined evidence from an altered and incompletely preserved fire scene”; (2) he did 

not test and rule out credible alternate causation theories as required by NFPA 921; and 

(3) his criticism of Defendant’s expert’s burn pattern analysis is not supported by any 

scientific analysis. (Doc. 91 at 8-10.) As detailed below, the Court disagrees. 

i. Excavation of the Fire Site 

 Defendant first argues, citing to NFPA 921 § 18.3.2.3.2 regarding layered 

excavations, that the excavation by Mr. Kane and Mr. Hogge was not properly 

documented and, therefore, Mr. Nelson improperly relied on the data collected by Mr. 

Kane and Mr. Hogge in forming his opinions. (Doc. 97 at 3-5.) NFPA 921 § 18.3.2.3.2 

provides that “[d]ebris removal should be performed in a planned and systematic fashion. 

This means that debris should be removed in layers, with adequate documentation as the 

process continues. . . . Each layer should be examined for significant artifacts as the 

debris is being removed.” Defendant has not provided the Court with any authority as to 

type and amount of documentation NFPA 921 requires. However, Defendant asserts that 

“[n]otwithstanding Mr. Hogge’s insistence that he and Mr. Kane performed a full layered 

excavation of the fire scene ‘mostly after the vehicle had been removed,’ . . . there are no 

photographs or other documentation suggesting that this actually occurred.” (Id.) 

Further, Defendant contends, photographs date stamped between 12:50 P.M. and 1:02 

P.M. do not show that excavation occurred, but “rather show undifferentiated piles of 

debris.” (Id. at 8-9.) 

 Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Kane and Mr. Hogge took photographs of items 

relevant to the investigation that they removed and, “[w]hile other electrical items were 

recovered, such as batteries and a Ryobi cordless drill, none of those items were 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 13 of 29
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

potentially plugged in, or otherwise energized” and, therefore, neither Mr. Kane nor Mr. 

Hogge found them to be “plausible ignition source[s]” and did not remove them. (Doc. 

95 at 10.) Plaintiffs also cite to a photograph showing Mr. Kane digging debris out of the 

garage with the shovel, and argue that there is no requirement under NFPA 921 that every 

item of debris removed during the excavation process be separately photographed and 

documented. (Doc. 95 at 14, 95-7, Ex. G.) Finally, Plaintiffs cite to NFPA 921 § 

12.3.5.6, which provides that “movement of physical evidence or alteration of the scene 

should not be considered spoliation of evidence. Physical evidence may need to be 

moved prior to the discovery of the cause of the fire.” (Doc. 95 at 15-16.) 

 Here, there is no dispute that Mr. Hogge took several photographs of the fire 

scene, depicting the scene before and after the car was removed, as well as specific areas 

of debris. (Doc. 92-2, Ex. M at 29-32.) Mr. Hogge also testified that all of the items 

removed from the scene were documented. (Doc. 91-3, Ex. L at 4.) Defendant does not 

appear to dispute this assertion, but rather complains that Mr. Kane and Mr. Hogge failed 

to take enough photographs depicting Mr. Kane and Mr. Hogge digging through the 

scene. The Court does not find this argument persuasive. There is evidence that Mr. 

Kane and Mr. Hogge documented their inspection and excavation of the scene, and those 

photographs were available to and reviewed by Mr. Nelson in forming his opinions. 

Pursuant to NFPA 921 § 4.4.3.2: 

[a] fire or explosion investigation may include . . . review of previous scene documentation done by others; scene 

documentation through photography preservation; witness interviews; review and analysis of the investigation of others; and identification and collection of data from other 

appropriate sources. 

Therefore, the Court does not find that Mr. Nelson’s opinions are unreliable because they 

were formed after review of Mr. Kane’s and Mr. Hogge’s photographs of the scene. 

 Importantly, even if Mr. Kane and Mr. Hogge failed to “adequately document” the 

actual excavation, Mr. Nelson examined the Mini Cooper at length once it was removed 

from the garage and, based on the burn patterns, oxidation, and damage to the car, 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 14 of 29
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

independently determined that the area of origin of the fire was near the driver side 

engine compartment. (Doc. 92-2, Ex, P at 40.) Likewise, Mr. Nelson reviewed the Fire 

Department’s Report, which detailed burn patterns, initial scene inspection, fire 

movement, resulting damage, and witness statements. (Id. at 39.) 

 The Court also does not find Defendant’s argument regarding Mr. Kane’s and Mr. 

Hogge’s failure to remove certain items from the scene—including a Ryobi drill and the 

cordless drill charger, and some debris near the wall—sufficient to exclude Mr. Nelson’s 

opinions. In support of this argument, Defendant cites to deposition testimony from Ms. 

Brown that she lost a 32-inch television set, a 21-inch computer monitor, and two 

bicycles. Defendant contends that Ms. Brown testified the television was near the 

workbench, which Defendant asserts is a possible cause of the fire. (Doc. 92 at 9.) 

 As stated in his Report, Mr. Kane determined the area of origin of the fire to be the 

left front quadrant of the Mini Cooper in the garage, based on “heavy burn and oxidation 

patterns” in that area. (Doc. 92-2, Ex. H at 12.) Further, he found burn patterns indicate 

that the flames moved towards the southwest corner, not from that area towards the car. 

(Id.) The Gilbert Fire Department and Mr. Nelson came to the same conclusion based on 

a similar analysis. Although Defendant contends that the items not collected were 

“potential ignition sources in the area,” Mr. Hogge testified that these items were not 

collected because they were outside the area of origin and not possibly plugged into 

power sources. (Doc. 96-7, Ex. G at 6.) Defendant fails to cite to any authority that 

proper excavation includes collecting items outside the area of origin. It is not for the 

Court to determine at this juncture which expert’s conclusions regarding the area of 

origin are entitled to more weight—such a determination is for the fact-finder at trial. 

 Finally, Defendant contends that large portions of debris were moved from the 

southwest to the southeast corner of the garage before the joint scene examination and 

excavation occurred and, therefore, Mr. Nelson’s reliance on the data collected by Mr. 

Kane and Mr. Hogge was improper. (Doc. 92 at 9.) To support this contention, 

Defendant cites to two photographs inserted in its Motion on pages 5 and 6. While the 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 15 of 29
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

pictures appear to demonstrate that some debris (and portions of the garage door) were 

moved between the time the two photos were taken, pursuant to NFPA 921 § 12.3.5.6, 

movement of debris, alone, is insufficient to establish that the scene was improperly 

altered. See NFPA 921 § 12.3.5.6. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Mr. 

Nelson’s opinions are unreliable because he reviewed data collected by Mr. Kane and 

Mr. Hogge. 

ii. Mr. Nelson sufficiently ruled out credible alternate causation 

theories as required by NFPA 921. 

 Defendant also argues that Mr. Nelson failed to comply with NFPA 921 because: 

(1) physical evidence cannot support Mr. Nelson’s determination to rule out a fire cause 

in the southwest corner of the garage; (2) Mr. Nelson improperly relied on the opinions of 

the Gilbert Fire Department, Mr. Kane, and Mr. Hogge; and (3) Mr. Nelson improperly 

relied on burn patterns, witness testimony, fire dynamics, and arc mapping to rule out the 

origin of the fire being in the southwest corner of the garage. (Doc. 92 at 10-16.) As 

detailed below, each of these arguments goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of Mr. 

Nelson’s opinions. 

1. Physical Evidence 

Defendant argues that Mr. Nelson improperly failed to consider “electrical items” 

from the southwest corner of the garage, including the Ryobi drill and charger, for which 

recalls had been issued regarding fire hazards. (Doc. 92 at 10.) Defendant contends this 

area was near the area of origin and Mr. Nelson cannot justify excluding electrical items 

in the southwest corner as “credible alternate fire sources” because the items were not 

preserved. (Id. at 10-11.) Defendant also argues that because debris was moved, Mr. 

Nelson could not rule out the southwest corner as the area of origin of the fire. (Id. at 

11.) In support of this argument, Defendant cites to NFPA 921 § 18.3.1.7, which 

provides that post-fire alterations “may impact the investigator’s interpretation of the 

physical evidence,” and the investigator should attempt to contact the individual who 

altered the scene. (Id.) 

Defendant’s argument, again, goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of Mr. 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 16 of 29
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Nelson’s opinions. As detailed above, Mr. Nelson determined the area of origin was the 

front left quadrant of the car, and not the southwest corner of the garage based on all of 

the data he reviewed, including photographs of the scene, his examination of the car, 

witness statements, and previous reports by the Fire Department and Mr. Kane. Mr. 

Nelson further testified that he reviewed with Mr. Hogge his observations and the scene. 

(Docs. 95-8, Ex. H at 7, 95-9, Ex. I at 3.) NFPA 921 § 18.3.1.7 does not prohibit the 

methodology that Mr. Nelson used in determining the area of origin of the fire. 

2. Reliance on Previous Reports and Opinions 

 Defendant also argues that Mr. Nelson improperly relied on/adopted the Gilbert 

Fire Department’s, Mr. Kane’s, and Mr. Hogge’s determinations that the fire started in 

the Mini Cooper. (Doc. 92 at 11-13.) Defendant asserts that each of the determinations 

is flawed because there is no evidence that proper excavation occurred and not all of the 

electrical items in the garage were collected. As stated above, pursuant to NFPA 921 §§ 

4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3, Mr. Nelson may properly review and rely on scene data collected by 

others in forming his conclusions. Further, in addition to reviewing the previous reports, 

Mr. Nelson also personally examined the car to determine the area of origin of the fire. 

(See Docs. 92-2, Ex. P at 40; Doc. 95-9, Ex. I at 4.) 

 Defendant argues that Mr. Nelson’s opinions ruling out other potential causes of 

the fire are invalid because he “took no part in identifying or ruling out any evidence that 

was not preserved or documented. . . . To the extent that anyone else decided to rule out 

any potential fire cause, but did not document the evidence or analysis, Mr. Nelson can 

form no separate opinions about it.” (Doc. 92 at 12.) As is already addressed above, Mr. 

Nelson did not only evaluate or rely on the reports of others in forming his opinion that 

the fire started in the Mini Cooper. Mr. Nelson ruled out the power steering hose and 

ignition by the catalytic converter underneath the car as possible causes of the fire based 

in part on his observations of the car and his review of witness statements and 

photographs of the scene. The Court does not find this methodology unreliable. 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 17 of 29
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3. Burn Patterns 

Defendant next argues that Mr. Nelson’s opinions are unreliable because he does 

not support his conclusion stated in his rebuttal Report that burn patterns indicate the fire 

started in the driver side engine compartment. (Doc. 92 at 13.) However, in his rebuttal 

Report, Mr. Nelson states his opinion that the area of origin was not near or on the 

workbench based on oxidation and fire patterns in the car and witness statements. (Doc. 

92-3, Ex. R at 13-14.) Mr. Nelson specifically analyzed the data with citations to NFPA 

921 sections and provided a picture with notations to show the pattern of fire damage he 

believes supports his conclusions. (Id.; Doc. 92-2, Ex. P at 38-46.) Additionally, Mr. 

Nelson’s rebuttal cited to NFPA 921 § 18.1.1 regarding the four areas of information 

from which an investigator determines the area of origin: (1) witness information; (2) fire 

patterns; (3) arc mapping; (4) and fire dynamics, with descriptions of the information he 

reviewed and analyzed as it applies to this case. (Doc. 92-3, Ex. R at 19.) 

In spite of this analysis, Defendant argues that Mr. Nelson’s opinions are not 

reliable because he did not evaluate the burn patterns on the southwest corner of the 

garage, including the workbench, which Defendant asserts is a “highly significant burn 

pattern.” (Doc. 92 at 13.) However, again, Mr. Nelson reviewed photographs of the 

scene and other data, including the car itself, in concluding that the fire originated within 

the car. Defendant’s argument that the area of origin was at a different location goes to 

the weight of the evidence and is for the jury to evaluate. It is not an appropriate basis on 

which to preclude Mr. Nelson’s testimony. 

Defendant’s argument that Mr. Nelson has no basis to testify regarding burn 

patterns on the Mini Cooper’s engine compartment is likewise without merit. (Doc. 92 at 

17.) Defendant argues that the only basis for Mr. Nelson’s “conclusions is his beliefs 

about how the plastic components of the Mini Cooper would react in a fire,” and Mr. 

Nelson’s opinions are not reliable because he did not conduct burn tests on a Mini 

Cooper or a similar vehicle. (Id.) As detailed above, Mr. Nelson based his analysis on 

several different sources of data and adequately tested his theory that the fire began in the 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 18 of 29
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

engine compartment of the Mini Cooper. In his rebuttal Report, Mr. Nelson provided an 

analysis of how the specific components of the Mini Cooper engine compartment would 

be impacted by the fire. (Doc. 92-3, Ex. R at 13-16.) Given his extensive experience as a 

Fire Investigator, which Defendant does not dispute, Mr. Nelson may opine on these 

subjects without having conducted burn tests on a Mini Cooper. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d 

at 1231. (Alternative or opposing opinions or tests do not “preclude the admission of the 

expert’s testimony—they go to the weight, not the admissibility.”) 

4. Witness Testimony 

Defendant also argues that Mr. Nelson improperly relied on statements by Mr. 

Harris regarding the location of the fire, because (1) NFPA 921 § 18.3.3.15 requires fire 

investigators to rely on more than just witness statements, and (2) Mr. Harris’ statements 

during his deposition are “not consistent with” statements Mr. Harris made during his 911 

call. (Doc. 92 at 13-14.) The Court does not find Defendant’s arguments persuasive. 

First, as discussed at length above, Mr. Nelson reviewed and evaluated other data in 

addition to witness statements in forming his opinions regarding the cause and origin of 

the fire. Second, Defendant claims that Mr. Harris’ statement during his deposition that 

he first observed flames coming from the car is inconsistent with statements he made 

during the 911 call, records of which indicate that Mr. Harris first mentioned that the 

foam flooring in the garage was on fire and then later said the car was “already” on fire. 

(Doc. 92 at 14.) The Court does not find these statements necessarily inconsistent. 

Further, Mr. Nelson’s Report considered and eliminated the possibility that the fire 

originated underneath the car. (See Doc. 92-2, Ex. P at 44-45.) Therefore, Mr. Nelson’s 

reliance on Mr. Harris’ statements does not render his opinions unreliable. 

5. Fire Dynamics and Arc Mapping 

Defendant next argues that Mr. Nelson’s reliance on “fire dynamics” to support 

his opinions regarding the cause and origin of the fire was improper because Mr. Nelson 

based his conclusion exclusively on Mr. Harris’ testimony. (Doc. 92 at 15.) To support 

this argument, Defendant cites to Mr. Nelson’s rebuttal Report, which explains his 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 19 of 29
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

opinion that Defendant’s theory regarding the origin of the fire is not plausible based on 

Mr. Harris’ statements. However, Mr. Nelson took into consideration the statements by 

Mr. Harris that Defendant identifies in its Motion by considering whether the fire began 

underneath the vehicle. (See Doc. 92-2, Ex. P at 44-45; Doc. 92-3, Ex. R at 15-16.) 

Defendant appears to disagree with how Mr. Harris’ statements should be interpreted, 

which is a question for the jury. Further, Mr. Nelson also relied on other data to support 

his conclusion regarding the origin and cause of the fire. (Id.; Doc. 92-3, Ex. R at 15-16.) 

Therefore, the Court will not exclude Mr. Nelson’s testimony because he reviewed and 

analyzed fire dynamics in forming his opinions. 

Finally, Defendant contends that Mr. Nelson cannot rely on arc mapping to rule 

out the southwest corner as a possible origin of the fire because “the existence of an arc 

does not prove that a fire started in any one location.” (Doc. 92 at 16.) However, 

Defendant fails to cite to any authority in the NFPA 921 that prohibits the use of arc 

mapping to exclude possible alternate causes and origins of the fire. Further, as detailed 

above, Mr. Nelson relied on several other forms of data and analysis to support his 

conclusions regarding the cause and origin of the fire. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

argument is without merit. 

d. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Mr. Hogge

Defendant moves to exclude testimony by Mr. Hogge that the most likely cause of 

the fire is a design defect allowing chafing of the battery cable in the Mini Cooper. (Doc. 

91 at 5-6.) More specifically, Defendant argues that Mr. Hogge’s opinions should be 

excluded because: (1) Mr. Nelson’s opinions regarding the origin of the fire, on which 

Mr. Hogge relies, are unreliable; (2) Mr. Hogge is not qualified to testify regarding 

vehicle battery cable design; and (3) Mr. Hogge’s methodology in ruling out other fire 

causes is unreliable. As detailed below, the Court will exclude portions of Mr. Hogge’s 

testimony. (Id. at 7-17.) 

i. Mr. Hogge’s Qualifications 

 Defendant argues that the Court should exclude Mr. Hogge’s testimony because he 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 20 of 29
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

does not have experience in vehicle design or with Mini Coopers with similar battery 

cable designs sufficient to testify regarding design defects, particularly those related to 

chafing. (Doc. 91 at 10-11.) In support, Defendant cites to Allstate Ins. v. Ford Motor 

Co., No. CV–08–2276–PHX–NVW, 2010 WL 1654145 *4 (D. Ariz. 2010), and Mr. 

Hogge’s deposition testimony that he had not previously seen similar chafing in a Mini 

Cooper or in a vehicle with a battery cable that was secured in the same way as the one in 

the at-issue Mini Cooper. (Id.) 

 Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Hogge has “substantial experience investigating vehicle 

fires and has significant knowledge with respect to the systems of passenger vehicles” 

and, therefore, is sufficiently qualified to opine regarding defects in the battery system of 

the Mini Cooper. (Doc. 96 at 13.) In support, Plaintiffs provide a Declaration from Mr. 

Hogge avering that he has “extensive experience with the fundamentals of the Mini 

Cooper’s power battery and power systems.” (Doc. 96-6, Ex. F ¶ 7.) Additionally, Mr. 

Hogge obtained a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, and has been a 

Journeyman Electrician since 1979. (Id. ¶ 4.) He is a Certified Professional Electrical 

Engineer and has investigated over 2,000 fires. (Id. ¶ 5.) Mr. Hogge testified that he has 

observed other cases where chafing against the metal underbody caused fires in trucks 

and farm equipment. (96-7, Ex. G at 3.) 

 There is no dispute that Mr. Hogge has extensive experience with electrical fires, 

and more specifically with electrical fires in vehicles. Rather, the parties dispute whether 

Mr. Hogge’s lack of specific experience with Mini Cooper battery cables renders him 

unqualified to testify regarding his opinions in this case. The Court finds that Mr. Hogge 

is qualified to testify that an insulation failure due to chafing in the battery cable caused 

the fire. However, Mr. Hogge’s “lack of experience and expertise with respect to the 

design and manufacture” of the battery cable and wiring harnesses “raises serious doubt 

as to whether he is qualified to testify” that the mechanisms used to secure the wiring 

harness and main battery cable are defectively designed. See Allstate, 2010 WL 

1654145 *4 (“[Mr. Hogge’s] lack of experience and expertise with respect to the design 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 21 of 29
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and manufacture of an ABS control module raises serious doubt as to whether he is 

qualified to testify that the ABS control module was defective.”). However, regardless, 

as detailed below, because Mr. Hogge failed to sufficiently test his hypothesis that the 

chafing was caused by a defect in the way in which the battery cable and/or wiring 

harnesses were designed, the Court will exclude that portion of Mr. Hogge’s testimony. 

ii. Reliability of Mr. Hogge’s Opinions 

Defendant first argues that Mr. Hogge’s testimony should be excluded because 

Mr. Nelson’s opinions, on which Mr. Hogge relied, are unreliable. For the reasons 

above, the Court finds that Mr. Nelson’s opinions regarding the origin and cause of the 

fire are admissible. Therefore, the Court will not exclude Mr. Hogge’s testimony because 

he reviewed and relied on Mr. Nelson’s analysis in reaching his own opinions. 

Defendant also reiterates its argument that there is not sufficient evidence that a proper 

scene excavation occurred. The Court rejected this argument above and, therefore, it will 

not exclude Mr. Hogge’s opinions as unreliable on this basis. 

 Defendant next argues that Mr. Hogge’s opinions regarding the cause of the fire 

are not reliable because Mr. Hogge does not have sufficient evidence that a design defect 

caused the fire, and he has not adequately tested his hypothesis and ruled out other 

possible causes of the fire. (Doc. 91 at 11-17.) In his Report, Mr. Hogge first opines that 

the building electrical systems and appliances or fixtures within the garage area are 

eliminated as possible causes of the fire. (Doc. 91-3, Ex. L at 11.) Mr. Hogge conducted 

an electrical examination and excavation of the scene and was able to test this hypothesis. 

Therefore, the Court finds that this opinion is reliable. Mr. Hogge further concluded that 

“the competent ignition causes within the area of origin as defined within the left side 

engine compartment include electrical and mechanical components of the vehicle.” (Id.) 

The Court will likewise permit Mr. Hogge to testify regarding this conclusion. 

 Mr. Hogge also opined that the fire did not develop from below the engine based 

on the amount of damage and location of arcing he observed during his examination. (Id.

at 11-12.) Defendant asserts that this opinion is not reliable because Mr. Hogge 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 22 of 29
- 23 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“misapplied the science of arc mapping.” (Doc. 91 at 12.) However, Mr. Hogge details 

in his Report his analysis of the location of the damage and arc and, therefore, was able to 

test this hypothesis. (Doc. 91-3, Ex. L at 11-12.) NFPA 921 allows for the use of arc 

mapping as a tool to determine the cause of the fire. (See Doc. 91-3, Ex. M at 17-18; 

Doc. 96-3, Ex. C at 5.) Defendant’s challenge to Mr. Hogge’s interpretation of the arcing 

he observed goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. 

 Further, the Court finds that Mr. Hogge may testify that “the most likely cause of 

this fire is chafing of positive conductors that resulted in arcing and ignition of the 

thermoplastic insulation and components in the vicinity.” (Doc. 91-3, Ex. L at 13.) In 

accordance with NFPA 921, Mr. Hogge formulated hypotheses for the cause of the fire, 

including chafing of the cable, and surface heat from the catalytic converter igniting the 

liquid or fumes from the power steering fluid. (Id. at 12.) Mr. Hogge then tested these 

hypotheses based on the data he had collected, including witness statements, examination 

of the Mini Cooper, and examination of an exemplar Mini Cooper. Based on the amount 

and location of damage and arcing on the Mini Cooper, Mr. Hogge determined that 

chafing is the most likely cause of the fire. See NFPA 921 § 4.3.6. Defendant challenges 

Mr. Hogge’s methodology because the exemplar Mini Cooper was a 2005 edition, the 

Service Bulletin on which Mr. Hogge in part relied relates to improper routing and not 

securing the battery cable, and although Mr. Hogge has seen cases of chafing in vehicles, 

he testified that he has never seen chafing cause a fire in a Mini Cooper. However, as 

detailed above, the Court finds that Mr. Hogge sufficiently tested his hypothesis 

regarding the cause of the fire in accordance with NFPA 921. Defendant’s arguments go 

to the weight, not the admissibility, of Mr. Hogge’s opinion. 

Finally, Defendant argues Mr. Hogge’s opinion that “[t]he fact that the engine 

wiring harness and also apparently the main battery cable are not sufficiently secured to 

prevent chafing and insulation failure would be considered design defects” is unreliable 

and should be excluded. (Doc. 91 at 11.) The Court agrees. Notwithstanding Mr. 

Hogge’s lack of expertise in the design of battery cables and engine harnesses, Mr. 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 23 of 29
- 24 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hogge’s opinion is merely an untested hypothesis. His evaluation of the exemplar 

vehicle and the arcing found on the cable, although producing evidence consistent with 

his hypothesis, are an insufficient basis upon which to conclude with reasonable certainty 

that the battery cable and engine harnesses on 2006 Mini Coopers were defectively 

designed. Further, there is no dispute that the subject Mini Cooper’s battery cable 

insulation was destroyed in the fire and, therefore, could not be examined. Although Mr. 

Hogge has sufficiently tested and may testify regarding his conclusion that chafing of 

positive conductors caused the fire, he cannot opine that the chafing was caused by a 

defect in the way in which the battery cable and/or wiring harnesses are secured. 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment 

Defendant asserts that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate because: (1) 

Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions are inadmissible; (2) there is no evidence that the alleged 

defect was the proximate cause of the fire; and (3) additionally, Plaintiffs have not 

disclosed any evidence in support of their negligence claim. (Doc. 93.) Below, the Court 

addresses these arguments 

a. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a party who “fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying 

those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome 

of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must 

be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 24 of 29
- 25 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

b. Strict Products Liability Claim 

i. Legal Standard 

To establish a prima facie case of strict products liability under Arizona law, 

Plaintiffs must demonstrate the following: (1) that the product had an unreasonably 

dangerous defect; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left Defendant’s control; 

and (3) the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Gosewisch v. Am. 

Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1987). Arizona courts have adopted two 

alternate tests to establish the existence of an unreasonably dangerous design defect—the 

consumer expectations test and the risk/benefit test. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 709 

P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985). 

The consumer expectations test provides for strict liability when a product “fails to 

perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect.” Dart, 709 P.2d at 877. The 

risk/benefit test allows for strict liability “if, in light of the relevant factors . . . , the 

benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 

design.”5

 Id. at 879 (quoting Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 

1978)). 

The consumer expectation test works well in manufacturing defect cases because consumers have developed safety expectations from using properly manufactured products of the same general design. In design defect cases, however, the consumer expectation test has limited utility as “the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe 

the product could be made.” Consequently, when application of the consumer expectation test is unfeasible or uncertain in design defect cases, courts additionally or alternatively employ the risk/benefit analysis to determine whether a design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245, 247, 709 P.2d at 879, 881. 

5

 The Arizona Supreme Court in Dart approved of the following non-exhaustive list of factors: “(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.” Dart, 709 P.2d at 879-80. 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 25 of 29
- 26 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Golonka v. GMC, 65 P.3d 956, 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). See also 

Brethauer v. GMC, 211 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Dart, 709 P.2d at 

878) (“while the consumer expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect 

cases, it provides no resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know 

what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.’”). 

Plaintiffs assert that the consumer expectation test should apply in this case to 

establish a design defect because the average juror has substantial experience with 

automobiles, and no ordinary and reasonable consumer would expect an automobile to 

catch on fire when it is parked in a garage and the engine is not running. (Doc. 99 at 10.) 

Defendant asserts that the risk/benefit test is the proper test because the subject matter is 

“beyond the average juror’s knowledge and experience.” (Doc. 93 at 3.) As detailed 

below, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

strict liability claim under either test. 

ii. Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on their strict products liability claim. 

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ strict 

liability claim if the Court excludes the testimony of one or both of Plaintiffs’ experts. 

(Doc. 93 at 4-5.) Defendant further claims that even if the Court allows Plaintiffs’ 

experts to testify, it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim 

because Plaintiffs have no evidence to show that the fire was caused by a defect that 

existed at the time the Mini Cooper left Defendant’s control. (Doc. 93 at 5.) Defendant 

further contends that Plaintiffs cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to establish their 

claim because there must be some evidence of the defect other than the fire itself and, 

here, there is no such evidence. (Id. at 6-7.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to defeat summary 

judgment on their strict liability claim. Arizona courts have allowed plaintiffs to rely on 

circumstantial evidence to establish a defect that existed at the time the product left the 

defendant’s control caused the injuries. See Reader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 P.2d 

1388, 1393-94 (Ariz. 1971); Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744, 747-48 (Ariz. 1984) 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 26 of 29
- 27 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(“Plaintiffs, we have held, must be permitted to rely upon circumstantial evidence alone 

in strict liability cases, because it is unrealistic to expect them to otherwise be able to 

prove that a particular product was sold in a defective condition.”). However, Arizona 

courts limit reliance on such evidence to situations where the product is unavailable or 

otherwise incapable of inspection. Dietz, 685 P.2d at 747-48; Rocky Mountain Fire & 

Cas. Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 640 P.2d 851 (Ariz. 1982). Here, although the vehicle 

was available for inspection, there is no dispute that the at-issue insulation was destroyed 

in the fire. Accordingly, Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish their 

claim. 

To prevail on their claim, Plaintiffs must produce sufficient circumstantial 

evidence to permit “an inference that the accident was caused by a defect.” Dietz, 685 

P.2d at 748. In so doing, Plaintiffs are not required to “eliminate with certainty all other 

possible causes of an accident . . .” 685 P.2d at 748. Rather, Plaintiffs must only 

“present evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to reasonably infer that it was more 

probable than not that the product was defective.” Id. 

Here, assuming, in Plaintiffs’ favor, that the fire originated from the left engine 

compartment and “the most likely cause of th[e] fire is chafing of positive conductors that 

resulted in arcing and ignition of the thermoplastic insulation and components in the 

vicinity,” the Court finds that Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence to permit a 

reasonable inference that the fire was caused by a design defect. Notably, Mr. Hogge (1) 

eliminated several different causes of the fire within the area of origin, and (2) observed a 

significant arcing event on the battery cable in the area where the cable stretched over the 

frame of the vehicle. 

Further, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to reach a jury on whether the 

defect existed when the vehicle left Defendant’s control. Although the subject vehicle 

was several years old at the time of the fire, witness testimony and other evidence 

indicate that there has not been any service or repairs on the battery cable or accidents 

that may cause damage to the cable. A reasonable juror, relying on the evidence 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 27 of 29
- 28 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

discussed above, could find that a defect caused the fire, and that the defect existed when 

the vehicle left Defendant’s factory. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim. See Allstate, 2010 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48485 at *48-53 (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

when plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding the area of origin and that certain 

anomalies and damage are consistent with pre-fire electrical activity and localized 

heating, even though Plaintiffs were unable to eliminate with certainty all other potential 

causes of the fire or to identify the specific defect in the ABS control module). 

c. Summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is appropriate. 

 In order to succeed on a negligent design claim, “a plaintiff must prove that the 

manufacturer acted unreasonably at the time of design or manufacture in light of the 

foreseeable risk of injury from use of the product.” Golonka, 65 P.3d at 962. “[T]he 

central focus of inquiry in strict liability design cases is whether the product was 

unreasonably dangerous, while the focus in negligent design cases is whether the 

manufacturer’s conduct was unreasonable in light of the foreseeable risk of injury.” Id. at 

963. In analyzing negligent design cases, courts use the risk/benefit analysis factors to 

“assess the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s choice of design in light of the 

knowledge available at the time of the design or manufacture.” Id. 

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claim 

because Plaintiffs have not disclosed any evidence regarding the design process of the 

2006 Mini Cooper or the process of designing battery cables or their insulation. (Doc. 93 

at 7.) The Court agrees. In their Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Plaintiffs assert that they “cite a multitude of evidence including the BMW 

Technical services bulletin (Ex. A) and the opinions of George Hogge (Ex. B; C) to 

demonstrate that the ultimate result of Defendant’s design was a defective product.” 

(Doc. 99 at 14.) However, in evaluating a negligence claim, evidence of defect is not 

sufficient; there must be evidence of unreasonable conduct on the part of Defendant. 

There is no evidence in the record before the Court from which a juror could conclude 

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 28 of 29
- 29 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Defendant “failed to take reasonable precautions in designing a safe product or 

otherwise failed to act unreasonably at the time of design or manufacture in light of the 

foreseeable risk of injury from use of the product.” Golonka, 65 P.3d at 962. Thus, 

summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is appropriate. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Willie 

Nelson (Doc. 92) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of 

George Hogge (Doc. 91) is granted in part and denied in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 93) is granted as to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim and denied as to Plaintiffs’ strict 

products liability claim. The Court will set a Final Pretrial Conference by separate order. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:13-cv-01228-JZB Document 103 Filed 09/29/15 Page 29 of 29