Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00350/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward C. Sierra, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CIV 06-350-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Edward C. Sierra, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in

Tucson, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (Doc. #7) in which he challenges his state court convictions. Respondents filed an

Answer (Doc. #18) on January 10, 2007, and Petitioner filed a Traverse (Doc. #27) on May

29, 2007.

In October of 2001, special investigators at the Arizona Department of Corrections,

Lewis Prison Complex, in Buckeye, Arizona, received information from a confidential

informant that Petitioner, an inmate at the Lewis Complex, “had drugs on him.” (Doc. #18,

Exh. C at 96-99.) When confronted with these allegations, Petitioner admitted to hiding

drugs on his person, and told correctional officers that he would “produce” them. (Doc. #18,

Exh. C at 108, 120-22.) Petitioner then voluntarily excreted a 1-inch by 1-inch plastic

package containing four balloons filled with heroin and methamphetamine. (Doc. #18, Exh.

C at 111, 141-49.) The State subsequently indicted Petitioner in Maricopa County Superior

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Court, charging him with two counts of promoting prison contraband, Class 2 Felonies.

(Doc. #18, Exh. G.) Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted as charged, and

sentenced to mitigated terms of 14 years’ imprisonment on both counts, to be served

concurrently. (Doc. #18, Exh. F at 11; Exhs. H-I.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised two issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its

discretion in finding that his statements to correctional officers were voluntary and in

compliance with Miranda; and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his

convictions. (Doc. #18, Exh. J.) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected these claims, and

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. #18, Exh. K.) Petitioner failed to file

a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, and, on July 14, 2004, the Order and

Mandate issued, effectively terminating Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Doc. #18, Exh. L.)

On July 7, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. #18, Exh. M.) In his subsequent

petition for post-conviction relief, filed on September 17, 2004, Petitioner raised two claims.

(Doc. #18, Exh. N.) First, he argued that his trial counsel, Michael Scanlan, provided

ineffective assistance when he failed to notify Petitioner of a scheduled competency hearing

and instead waived his appearance, and stipulated to the submission of the competency issue

to the trial court based on the court ordered mental health evaluations, without first reviewing

the results of those evaluations with him. (Doc. #18, Exh. N at 4-6.) Second, Petitioner

argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the appointment of a

guardian to assist him in “the decision making process.” (Doc. #18, Exh. N at 6-7.) On

March 3, 2005, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, finding, “Nothing

has been presented to show that, but for the claimed errors of counsel, the result would have

been different.” (Doc. #18, Exh. O.) On April 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely petition for

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals; review was subsequently denied on December 8,

2005. (Doc. #18, Exhs. P-Q.) Petitioner did not thereafter file a petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court. On August 21, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant timely Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. #7.)

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In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. First, in Ground I, he

argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution when he failed to “notify” him of a scheduled competency

hearing, and, without “consulting” him, he “waived his presence and signed a stipulation

regarding [] Petitioner’s competency.” (Doc. #7 at 5.) Second, in Ground II(a), Petitioner

argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment when

he failed to request the appointment of a “guardian ad litem” to assist Petitioner in the

“decision making process.” (Doc. #7 at 6.) Third, in Ground II(b), Petitioner argues that the

trial court’s failure to sua sponte appoint a “guardian” for Petitioner violated “the precepts

of (fair opportunity) trial rights,” and denied him his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. #7 at 6.)

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his

claims in state court. Although Grounds I and II(a) were presented to the Maricopa County

Superior Court and to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Respondents assert that they were never

presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents further contend that Petitioner never

raised the claim alleged in Ground II(b) in any state court. Moreover, Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted because he would no longer have a remedy if

he returned to the state court. In the alternative, if the Court finds that Grounds I and II(a)

are not procedurally defaulted, Respondents claim that Petitioner cannot prevail on the

merits.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

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Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly

presented if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which the claim is based. See Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001);

Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The exhaustion

requirement will not be met where the petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. See

Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 519-20 (1982). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. See id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. See Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-05 (9th Cir. 1989). The

federal court will not consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

Initially, the record reflects that Grounds I and II(a) were presented to the Maricopa

County Superior Court and to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. #18, Exhs. N, P.) As

such, the Court finds that Petitioner has fairly presented his claims in a procedurally

appropriate manner. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the

state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate post-conviction relief.). Accordingly, the

Court will address the merits of Petitioner’s claims as alleged in Grounds I and II(a).

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 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court pursuant to Rule

32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Any attempt to return to state court to

properly exhaust his claim would be futile. 

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However, the Court finds that Ground II(b) was never presented in state court. (Doc. #18,

Exhs. J, N, P.) Rather, Petitioner raises this claim for the first time in his habeas petition.

By failing to fairly present this claim in state court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to state

court.1

 As a result, this claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has also failed to show “cause and prejudice” for his procedural default, or

that the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental “miscarriage of justice.”

Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that

prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his

claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government

interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance

of the State’s procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training

and the Petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for

Petitioner’s failure to fairly present his claim.

Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

Petitioner has not established cause for his failure to raise this claim in state court, nor

has he shown actual prejudice. Petitioner has also not demonstrated that a miscarriage of

justice would result if this issue is not addressed. Thus, Petitioner’s claim alleging that the

trial court’s failure to sua sponte appoint a “guardian” violated “the precepts of (fair

opportunity) trial rights,” and denied him his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Amendments is procedurally defaulted and the Court will recommend that this claim be

denied.

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Pursuant to the AEDPA2

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055.

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing

rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground I, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

under the Sixth Amendment when he failed to “notify” him of a scheduled competency

hearing, and, without “consulting” him, he “waived his presence and signed a stipulation

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regarding [] Petitioner’s competency.” (Doc. #7 at 5.) In Ground II(a), Petitioner argues that

his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment when he failed

to request the appointment of a “guardian ad litem” to assist Petitioner in the “decision

making process.” (Doc. #7 at 6.)

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), judgment rev’d

on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of

counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of

counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

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proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286. “If

it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

a. Ground I

Petitioner first argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he

failed to “notify” Petitioner of a scheduled competency hearing, and, without “consulting”

Petitioner, trial counsel “waived his presence and signed a stipulation regarding []

Petitioner’s competency.” (Doc. #7 at 5.)

Prior to trial, Petitioner’s trial counsel, Mr. Scanlan, filed a “Motion for Pre-Rule 11

Screening,” asserting that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that Petitioner “may

not be competent to assist in his defense, or enter a plea,” and requesting that the trial court

order a preliminary examination to determine whether further examination was required.

(Doc. #18, Exh. R.) In support of this motion, Mr. Scanlan asserted that Petitioner had been

found “incompetent” in 1996, and that his “DOC psychiatric records show that [he] is mildly

retarded with an IQ of 62.” (Doc. #18, Exh. R.) Mr. Scanlan further cited to a 1997 report

prepared by “DOC Psychological Resources,” which documented that Petitioner had reported

“physical symptoms so substantial as to imply somatic delusions, vague frustration, some

depressive flavor, moderate agitation, obsessive compulsive features, grossly disturbed

perceptions and thoughts, and clear paranoid ideation,” and further documented that test

results indicated that Petitioner was “severely schizophrenic.” (Doc. #18, Exh. R.)

In accordance with Rule 11, the trial court ordered a “competency screening

evaluation report” to be prepared, and further ordered a competency hearing for October 24,

2002. (Doc. #18, Exh. A at 15-16; Exh. S.) On October 24, the trial court indicated that it

had received the “Prescreening Report,” which recommended that a complete evaluation be

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conducted, pursuant to Rule 11, and found that reasonable grounds existed for further

examination. (Doc. #18, Exh. T.) Accordingly, two mental health experts – Eugene Almer,

MD and H. Daniel Blackwood, PhD – were ordered to evaluate Petitioner, and to submit

their reports to the court prior to the competency hearing, which was scheduled for February

6, 2003. (Doc. #18, Exh. U.) On February 6, however, one of the experts had not submitted

his report, and the hearing was continued to March 11, 2003. (Doc. #18, Exh. V.) The court

also notified the parties that the hearing scheduled for March 11 was a “non-evidentiary

hearing,” and that if the parties “wish[ed] an evidentiary hearing,” they were to contact the

court and request one. (Doc. #18, Exh. V.) Petitioner was present during this proceeding.

(Doc. #18, Exh. V.)

Sometime thereafter, the second report was submitted. (Doc. #18, Exh. B at 6.) Both

mental health experts concluded that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Doc. #18, Exh.

B at 6.) Because both reports were submitted prior to the scheduled competency hearing,

“the Court accelerated the hearing date up to [February] 27th.” (Doc. #18, Exh. B at 6.) The

parties did not request an evidentiary hearing: instead, on February 27, 2003, the prosecutor

and Mr. Scanlan filed a joint stipulation to submit the determination of Petitioner’s

competency to the trial court based upon the reports of the mental health experts. (Doc. #18,

Exh. W.) At the competency hearing, the court was informed that Petitioner did not receive

notice of the hearing. (Doc. #18, Exh. X.) However, since Petitioner had been found

competent by both mental health experts, Mr. Scanlan requested that Petitioner’s appearance

be waived. (Doc. #18, Exh. B at 6; Exh. X.) The court granted Mr. Scanlan’s request,

accepted the parties’ stipulation, and, having considered the written reports, found that

Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Doc. #18, Exh. X.)

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a defendant has a due

process right to be present at a proceeding only when “his presence has a relation, reasonably

substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) and United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). The Supreme Court has

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emphasized that the “privilege of presence is not guaranteed ‘when presence would be

useless, or the benefit but a shadow.’” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S.

at 106-07). Rather, a defendant has the right to be present only “to the extent that a fair and

just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 and Gagnon, 470

U.S. at 526 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08.)

Although the Circuit Courts have not uniformly agreed as to whether a defendant has

a constitutional right to be present at a competency hearing, the Ninth Circuit held in Sturgis

v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986), that a defendant has a constitutional

right to be present at his competency hearing – a “critical stage” of his trial. In Sturgis, the

defendant was present at three of five hearings held to determine whether he was competent

to stand trial. After each of those three hearings, the court concluded that the defendant was

not competent. At two subsequent competency hearings held in the defendant’s absence, the

court revised its initial conclusion after hearing testimony from additional expert witnesses.

The court determined on both occasions that the defendant was, in fact, competent to stand

trial. On review of the district court’s denial of the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, the

Ninth Circuit agreed with Sturgis that the trial court’s determination of his competency at a

hearing that he did not attend violated his “constitutional right to be present at every stage

of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” 796 F.2d at

1108. The court in Sturgis, however, stated that the doctrine of harmless error would

preclude reversal if the defendant’s absence from the competency hearing was not

prejudicial.

Even assuming that the facts of the instant case are not distinguishable from Sturgis

and Petitioner had a right to be present at his competency hearing, in an ineffective assistance

of counsel analysis Petitioner must ultimately demonstrate prejudice. In an attempt to

establish prejudice, Petitioner states: “This prejudiced Mr. Sierra by permitting him to be

ruled competent, when Petitioner had previously been found incompetent by state agencies;

this allowed Petitioner to be found responsible for the actions which brought about the

conviction.” (Doc. #7 at 5.) However, beyond mere speculation and conjecture as to what

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 Contrary to Petitioner’s representation, his trial counsel did not stipulate that

Petitioner was competent to stand trial. Rather, he stipulated to submit the issue of

Petitioner’s competency to the court based on the mental health experts’ reports. (Doc. #18,

Exh. W.) The trial court found that Petitioner was competent to stand trial after considering

these reports. (Doc. #18, Exh. X.)

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might have been, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the result of the proceeding would have

been different had he been notified of the competency hearing and personally appeared.

Indeed, it was a non-evidentiary hearing – no evidence was presented and no testimony was

heard. The Court simply considered the experts’ written reports – both concluding that

Petitioner was competent – and found that Petitioner was competent to stand trial.

Furthermore, in Arizona, “[a] trial judge is under a continuing duty to inquire into a

defendant’s competency, and to order a rule 11 examination sua sponte if reasonable grounds

exist.” State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Ariz. 1990). “This continuing ability to

reconsider the issue de novo substantially mitigates any possibility that a defendant would

be significantly prejudiced by a pre-trial competency hearing in his absence.” Sturgis, 796

F.2d at 1112 (Wallace, J., dissenting).

Similarly, the mental health experts’ conclusions also undermine any allegation of

prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s decision to submit the issue of Petitioner’s

competency to the court on their reports.3

 Even if the hearing would have been an

evidentiary hearing, there would have been no benefit in calling the mental health experts to

testify simply to recite their conclusions that Petitioner was competent. Petitioner’s

speculations or predictions to the contrary is not persuasive. See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745-

47(court could not say that defendant’s due process rights were violated by his exclusion

from witness competency hearing where he gave “no indication that his presence at the

competency hearing [] would have been useful in ensuring a more reliable determination as

to whether the witnesses were competent to testify,” and he presented “no evidence” that

would have “assisted either his counsel or the judge in asking questions that would have

resulted in a more assured determination of competency.”); Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526-27

(defendants’ due process rights were not violated by ex parte discussion between trial judge

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and juror because defendants’ “could have done nothing had they been at the conference, nor

would they have gained anything by attending.”); United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554,

1556 (4th Cir. 1992) (“If the government can prove that [the defendant] was, in fact,

competent at the time of the trial,” his absence at the competency hearing “will not require

reversal of the conviction.”) (quoting Sturgis, 796 F.2d at 1109). 

Furthermore, Petitioner testified in his own defense at trial, and articulated coherently

his defense that he never possessed the drugs in question and was therefore not guilty of the

offense. (Doc. #18, Exh. D.) He also invoked his right of allocution at sentencing, and

proclaimed his factual innocense as the only reason why judgment should not be imposed.

(Doc. #18, Exh. F at 10.) Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice as a result of his

involuntary absence at the competency hearing and, as such, the Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to Ground I be denied.

b. Ground II(a)

Petitioner next argues in Ground II(a) that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel when he failed to request the appointment of a “guardian ad litem” to

assist Petitioner in the “decision making process.” (Doc. #7 at 6.) However, Arizona law

does not provide for the appointment of a “guardian ad litem” to an adult defendant in a

criminal proceeding. See A.R.S. §§ 13-101 et seq. Petitioner’s citations to Title 14 – the

Arizona Probate Code – is misplaced. Those sections apply to protective and guardianship

proceedings, and do not apply to criminal proceedings, which are governed by Title 13 – the

Arizona Criminal Code. See A.R.S. §§ 14-5101 et seq. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to

cite any authority for the proposition that he had a constitutional right to the appointment of

a “guardian ad litem.” Thus, if the appointment of a “guardian ad litem” to assist him in his

criminal trial was not available under Arizona law, or otherwise constitutionally mandated,

his trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to request the same. Furthermore,

assuming that Petitioner was entitled to a “guardian ad litem,” he has failed to establish

prejudice.

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It appears that Petitioner is alleging that, if he had been appointed a guardian, he

would have been able to better explain the State’s favorable plea offer, and Petitioner would

have accepted it. However, whether an appointed guardian would have been able to better

explain the plea offer and convince Petitioner to accept the plea is purely speculative. Once

again, prejudice based on speculation, is insufficient to establish an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim under Strickland.

Nonetheless, before trial, the trial court thoroughly explained to Petitioner, in clear,

simple terms, the benefits of the State’s plea offer and the consequences he would face if he

chose to go to trial. (Doc. #18, Exh. C at 51-53.) Following its explanation, the trial court

stated, “I just want you to make sure you’re aware of what could be in store for you if you’re

found guilty.” (Doc. #18, Exh. C at 51-53.) Petitioner responded: “I mean, I understand the

difference between the time what they’re offering me, you know, what I mean?” (Doc. #18,

Exh. C at 51-53.) To now claim that he did not understand the State’s offer, and that he

needed further explanation, is unpersuasive. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish

prejudice. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim as to Ground II(a) be denied.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s decision regarding Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not contrary to clearly established federal law

or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court’s decision is

consistent with Strickland.

Having determined that Petitioner’s claims alleged in Grounds I and II(a) should be

denied on the merits and that his claim asserted in Ground II(b) is procedurally defaulted, the

Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #7)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 28th day of December, 2007.

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