Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00694/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maryanne Chisholm, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-694-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc. 9) and

Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 10). 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report & Recommendation. (Doc. 11). For the following

reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the merits.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction

On September 25, 2001, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on 58 counts with regard to

charges that Petitioner illegally: conducted an enterprise (Count 1); engaged in super

fraudulent and fraudulent schemes and artifices (Counts 2, 3, 4); and sold unregistered

securities (Counts 5-58). (See Petition, p.2; Petition, Appendix (hereinafter “App.”) (Doc.1-

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Page numbers refer to the page numbers appearing at the bottom right of each page

of Petitioner’s Appendix.

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1), pp. 1-131)). Specifically, Count 1 alleges that Petitioner “knowingly committed illegally

conducting an enterprise by being employed or associated with Safari Media, Inc.

[(hereinafter “SMI”)] and conducting or participating in the conduct of the affairs of such

enterprise through racketeering as set fort in Counts 2-58. In violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-

2312(B) and (D) 13-603, 13-701, 13-702, 13-801, 13-804 and 13-811, 13-2313, 13-2314.”

(Petition, App., p.1). Counts 2 through 4, respectively, charge that pursuant to a scheme or

artifice to defraud, Petitioner, by means of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises

or material omissions, knowingly obtained the following benefits: (1) $24,000,000 from

investors in SMI; (2) insurance for Directors and Officers of SMI from Fireman’s Fund

Insurance; and (3) Insurance for Directors and Officers of SMI from Philadelphia Indemnity

Insurance. (Id. at pp. 1-2). Counts 5 through 58 charge that Petitioner intentionally or

recklessly offered for sale and/or offered for sale and/or sold an unregistered security to wit:

stock in SMI to several designated alleged victims. (Id. at pp. 2-13). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:

In 1996, Chisholm incorporated as a Delaware corporation. Soon

thereafter, she began to sell shares of SMI stock, telling investors that SMI

designed and marketed CD-ROM titles and provided consulting services for

website design. In 1999, she provided investors with a series of forged

documents she had created on her computer, which purported to have come

from a large Japanese technology company and from a well-known accounting

firm. The documents stated that the Japanese company intended to purchase

SMI as part of a merger and SMI had been audited in anticipation of the

merger. Chisholm told investors that SMI stock, which she offered at one

dollar per share, would be worth thirty-three dollars per share after the merger.

Several hundred new investors purchased SMI stock after Chisholm’s

announcement.

In 1999, the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) ordered

Chisholm to stop selling SMI stock in Arizona on the ground she had been

selling unregistered securities. Chisholm continued, however, until June 2000,

when the ACC filed a civil racketeering action against her and SMI was placed

into receivership...[That lawsuit eventually resulted in entry of summary

judgment in favor of the ACC for $24 million.] From 1997 to 2000,

approximately one thousand investors had purchased more than $24 million

in shares of SMI stock. SMI, however, was a sham corporation; it had never

conducted legitimate business or had any significant business income, and

nearly 100% of its revenues had come from shareholder investments. Of

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course, Chisholm had never been contacted by any Japanese company about

a merger with SMI.

The evidence also showed that, in 1999, Chisholm had applied to

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia Indemnity) and

Fireman’s Fund Insurance (Fireman’s Fund) for insurance coverage for SMI’s

officers and directors. In the applications submitted to both companies,

Chisholm included financial statements she represented as independently

audited financial records showing SMI was earning millions of dollars. In

fact, SMI had not been independently audited. Moreover. Chisholm failed to

disclose that in 1997 the State of Washington Securities Division had ordered

her to stop selling unregistered securities to Washington residents and that the

ACC had started an investigation into her activities the same year.

Philadelphia Indemnity issued a policy that provided $3 million in coverage,

and Fireman’s Fund issued a policy that provided $2 million in excess

coverage.

(Petition, App., pp. 30-31) (footnote omitted).

On October 21, 2005, a jury convicted Petitioner on all 58 counts charged in the

indictment. (Petition, p.4). On November 23, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 27.25 years of imprisonment. (Id.; Answer,

p. 2). 

B. Direct Appeal

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following issues: 

1. The multiple charging of fraudulent schemes and artifice was improper and

deprived Petitioner of due process under the United States and Arizona

Constitutions.

2. There was an insufficient basis for the fraudulent schemes and artifice charges

in Counts 3 and 4. Alternatively, the fraudulent schemes and artifice charges

in Counts 3 and 4 were multiplicitous.

3. Petitioner was denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

of the United States Constitution, and Article 2, Section 4 of the Arizona

Constitution, when she was charged with fraudulent schemes and artifice and

sale of unregistered security in addition to illegally conducting an enterprise

all in violation of her Fifth Amendment right not to twice be placed in

jeopardy for the same offense.

4. Petitioner’s consecutive sentences constitute double punishment in violation

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The trial court resentenced Petitioner as follows:

Count 1: Illegally Conducting an Enterprise 3.5 years

Count 2: Super Fraudulent Scheme and Artifice 5 years

(concurrent with Count 1)

Count 3: Fraudulent Scheme and Artifice 5 years

(consecutive with Count 2)

Count 4: Fraudulent Scheme and Artifice 9.25 years

(consecutive with Count 3)

Count 5-58: Sale of Unregistered Security 4.5 years each

(concurrent with each other and Count 2)

(Petition, App., pp. 24-28, 141).

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of A.R.S. § 13-116.

(Answer, Exh. B). In May 2008, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, but

remanded for resentencing because the trial court erred by requiring the sentence imposed

on Count 1 to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed on Counts 2 through 4.

(Petition, App., p. 45). On October 29, 2008, Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Arizona

Supreme Court was denied. (Answer, Exh. F.). On remand, Petitioner was sentenced to a

total of 19.25 years in prison.2

 (Answer, p. 2). 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On October 27, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

(hereinafter “PCR Petition”) wherein she raised several instances of ineffective assistance

of counsel, including that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to petition that trial

commence prior to the trial of Petitioner and her husband in a different criminal matter. (See

Petition, App., pp. 47-65). On February 23, 2009, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR

Petition. (Petition, p. 3 & App., pp. 66-74). Petitioner sought appellate court review, and the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on August 6, 2009. (Petition, p. 3 & App., pp. 75-

100). On December 15, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Petition, p. 3 &

App., p. 101).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION

On November 24, 2010, Petitioner file the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. She raises the following grounds for relief:

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1. Petitioner’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

were violated because: (a) Counts 2 through 58 are predicate offenses to

Count 1; and (b) the three separate counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices

constituted only one single offense. (Ground I).

2. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request that trials of Petitioner

proceed in chronological order (Ground II).

(Petition). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s Petition is timely filed. (Answer, pp. 3-4).

Respondents also concede that Petitioner has exhausted her claims and that her claims are

cognizable on habeas review. (Id. at p. 4). Respondents contend that the Petition is without

merit and should be denied and dismissed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary to” test and the

“unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court’s “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

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“[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999), only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000)). Additionally, a state court’s

decision is “‘contrary to’ Supreme Court case law if the state court ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in’ Supreme Court cases.”3 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “Whether a

state court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a

question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state

courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)(distinguishing deference owed

under the “contrary to” test of section (d)(1) with that owed under the “unreasonable

application” test). 

Under the second test, “‘[a] state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Van

Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the “unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly....Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.’” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable

application of federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court

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Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). In such circumstances, the petitioner

can satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that

‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the...” state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Harrington v.

Richter,___ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011)).

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interpretations of federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929.4

 

Further, a federal habeas court can only look to the record before the state court in

reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1). Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas

petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that

state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have

made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light

of the record the court had before it.”)(citations omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978: see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 543 U.S. 1038 (2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all....” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s

findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

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Under the AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct” and the presumption of correctness may be overcome only by clear

and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). The “AEDPA spells out what this

presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and

convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of

correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once...” it

is found that the state court reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state proceeding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

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holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert. 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

court.”5 Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Factual and credibility

determinations by either state trial or appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of

correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

2001).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

B. Discussion

1. Ground I Double Jeopardy Claims

a. Sub-Claim (a): multiple convictions on Counts 2-58

As to sub-claim (a), Petitioner claims that “[b]ecause Counts 2-58 are each predicate

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offenses to Illegally Conducting an Enterprise charged in Count 1, the Court of Appeals erred

in finding that the multiple convictions in Counts 2-58, which resulted in consecutive

sentences, did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (Petition,

p. 12). 

 (1.) The state court proceeding

Petitioner was convicted of all charges. Petitioner argued on direct appeal that

charging her with fraudulent schemes and artifices under A.R.S. §13-2310 (Counts 2-4),

selling unregistered securities in violation of A.R.S. §44-1841 (Counts 5-58), and illegally

conducting an enterprise in violation of §13-2312(B) (Count 1) violated her double jeopardy

rights because §§ 13-2310 (Counts 2-4) and 44-1841 (Counts 5-58) constitute the same

offense as § 13-2312(B) (Count 1) for purposes of double jeopardy. (See Petition, App., p.

38). In rejecting this argument, the appellate court cited Blockburger v. United States, 284

U.S. 299 (1932) among other federal and state cases. (See Petition, App., p. 39). In

Petitioner’s case, the appellate court “treat[ed] a fraudulent scheme or artifice in violation of

§13-2310 as a lesser-included offense of illegally conducting an enterprise based on a scheme

or artifice to defraud[]” and concluded that “for present purposes, the two constitute the

‘same offense’ under the double jeopardy clauses.” (Id. at p. 41). The court also treated

the offense of selling unregistered securities in violation of §44-1841 as the same offense as

illegally conducting an enterprise based on the sale of unregistered securities. (Id. at p. 40

(citing State v. Cook, 185 Ariz. 358, 364, 916 P.2d 1074, 1080 (App. 1994)). However, the

court recognized “‘even if statutory provisions do constitute the same offense, we will not

conclude that multiple punishments are prohibited if we can discern that the legislature

clearly intended otherwise.’” (Id. at p. 41 (quoting State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, ¶13, 47

P.3d 1150, 1155 (App., 2002)). The court further stated:

To commit illegally conducting an enterprise, a person must conduct an

enterprise “through racketeering.” §13-2312(B). Racketeering, by definition,

requires the commission of an offense that would constitute a felony in

Arizona §13-2301(D)(4). Thus, “[b]y enacting § [13-2312(B)], which by its

express terms requires the commission of another felony offense, the

legislature clearly intended to permit multiple punishments.” Siddle, 202 Ariz.

512, ¶ 14, 47 P.3d at 1155.

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(Id. at p. 41). The court also pointed out that the offense of illegally conducting an enterprise

normally constituted a class three felony, and several of the thirty acts listed in the

racketeering statute constituted more serious offenses. (Id. at p. 42). Thus, if a charge of

illegally conducting an enterprise was based on underlying offenses that were classified as

more serious than a class three felony, then “to treat the underlying offenses as lesserincluded offenses of illegally conducting an enterprise ‘would actually reduce the penalties

for the [underlying] offenses. We presume the legislature did not intend this.’” (Id. (quoting

Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, ¶14, 47 P.3d at 1155)). Consequently, the appellate court held “that,

in the context of a single trial, double jeopardy does not preclude separate convictions and

sentences for violations of §13-2310, §44-1481 and §13-2312(B). Therefore, Chisholm’s

convictions for those offenses were proper.” (Id. (footnote omitted)).

Because the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Review (see Answer, Exh. F), the appellate court opinion is the last-reasoned state court

opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991); Plascencia v. Alameida,

467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006).

(2.) Analysis

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against: (1) a second prosecution for

the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after

conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.

493, 498 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Plascencia, 467 F.3d at 1204. “The applicable

rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory

provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is

whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). However, the United States Supreme Court has

made clear that even if two statutes proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test,

the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative

punishments if the state legislature clearly intends to impose them. See Missouri v. Hunter,

459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); see also Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir.

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Although “on rare occasions the [Supreme] Court has re-examined a state-court

interpretation of state law when it appears to be an ‘obvious subterfuge to evade

consideration of a federal issue[]’” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n.11 (1975)

(quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945) (other citations

omitted)), Petitioner makes no such showing that Mullaney applies here.

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1986) (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-369; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-341

(1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690-692 (1980)). Therefore, “[w]ith respect

to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more

than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature

intended.” Hunter, 459 U.S. at 365; see also id. at 368 (“Legislatures, not the courts,

prescribe the scope of punishments.”)(footnote omitted). Accordingly, “[w]here...a

legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of

whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of

statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may

impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” Hunter, 459 U.S. at

368-369. In considering this issue, the court is “bound to accept the [State]...court’s

construction of that State’s statutes.” Id. at 368 (citing O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531

(1974)); see also Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 & n.3 (1988)

(recognizing that the federal habeas court is “not at liberty to depart from state appellate

court’s resolution of...issues of state law...” where the state supreme court denied review of

the underlying state case at bar.).6

 However, the habeas court is not bound by the state

court’s ultimate conclusion concerning whether such punishments violate the Double

Jeopardy clause. Brimmage, 793 F.2d at 1015; Branham v. Gay, 2011 WL 5882558, *5 (D.

Ariz. Nov. 23, 2011).

Although the appellate court in Petitioner’s case did not specifically cite Hunter, the

court did cite State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, 47 P.3d 1150 (App. 2002), which cited and

applied the Hunter test when analyzing a double jeopardy argument. (Petition, App., p. 41).

Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state courts are not required to cite U.S.

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Supreme Court cases nor are they required to have an “awareness of our cases so long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537

U.S. at 8 (emphasis in original). Consistent with Hunter, the Arizona appellate court in

Petitioner’s case considered legislative intent. (See Petition, App., p. 41 (“To determine

legislative intent ‘we examine the language of the statute at issue, []‘the context of the

statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and

consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’[] Greenwood v. State, 217 Ariz. 438, ¶16, 175 P.3d

687, 691 (App. 2008)”). In doing so, the court pointed out that because “racketeering”

requires the commission of an offense that would constitute a felony in Arizona, “‘by

enacting §[13-2312(B)], which by its express term requires the commission of another felony

offense, the legislature clearly intended to permit multiple punishments.’”(Id. at p. 41

(quoting Siddle, 202 Ariz. at 515, 47 P.3d at 1155)). The court also reasoned that “to treat the

underlying offenses as lesser-included offenses of illegally conducting an enterprise ‘would

actually reduce the penalties for the [underlying] offenses. We presume the legislature did

not intend this.”’ (Id. at p.42 (quoting Siddle, 202 Ariz. at 517, 47 P.3d at 1155)).

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Siddle on the ground that the primary offense in that

case was distinct from the predicate felony. (Reply, p. 5). However, in Siddle, which

involved whether the defendant’s conviction for drug offenses and for possession of a deadly

weapon during a felony drug offense violated double jeopardy, the court pointed out that

even if the statutes at issue constituted the same offense, by enacting the statute for the

primary offense, 

which by its express terms requires the commission of another felony offense,

the legislature clearly intended to permit multiple punishments....And, if the

drug offenses were to be regarded as a lesser-included offense of [the primary

offense], as [defendant] suggests, it would actually reduce the penalties for the

drug offense. We presume the legislature did not intend this. We conclude that

by enacting [the statute prohibiting the primary offense], the legislature

intended to increase, not decrease, the penalties for drug offenses when a

deadly weapon is involved.

Siddle, 202 Ariz. at 517, 47 P.3d 1150, 1155. It was not unreasonable for the appellate court

deciding Petitioner’s case to apply the same rationale to Petitioner.

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“Racketeering” means in pertinent part:

any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is chargeable or

indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred and,

if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be

chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in

this state, and that would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one

year under the laws of this state and, if the act occurred in a state or country

other than this state, under the laws of the state or country in which the act

occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted,....

A.R.S. §13-2301(D)(4).

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Petitioner also points out that the racketeering statute requires commission of one the

enumerated felonies “regardless whether the [predicate felony] is charged or indicted.”7

(Reply, p. 5). According to Petitioner, the fact that the predicate felony does not have to be

charged indicates that the legislature did not intend multiple punishments to be imposed for

illegally conducting an enterprise by committing one of the enumerated acts of racketeering

and the racketeering offense itself. (Id. at p. 6). Petitioner cites Arizona Supreme Court cases

which she contends show the state supreme court would come to a different conclusion from

that reached by the appellate court in this case. (See Petition, pp. 6-7 (citing State v. Wiley,

144 Ariz. 525, 541, 698 P.2d 1244 (1985), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel.

Criminal Div. Of Attorney Gen’s Office v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541

(1988); State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 654 P.2d 800 (1982); State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz.

599, 522 P.2d 25 (1974)). According to Petitioner, “[t]he common thread for permitting

multiple punishments in Arizona for the primary offense and the predicate felony, is that the

predicate felony and the primary are each independent crimes.” 

In Petitioner’s case, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the appellate court’s

decision on this issue. A determination of state law by a state appellate court is binding in a

federal habeas action. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 629-630 & n.3. This is especially true where the

highest court in the state has denied review of the lower court’s decision. Id. (citing West v.

American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)); see also Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d

1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “federal courts must defer to an intermediate state

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court’s interpretation of state law, made in the very case under consideration, when the state

supreme court has denied review[]”). Moreover, the cases Petitioner relies upon are

inapposite. Unlike Petitioner’s case, they do not involve consideration of the double jeopardy

issue under Hunter where the two statutes at issue proscribe the same conduct under

Blockburger. Instead, the state court concluded that separate offenses were at issue. Thus,

the cases cited by Petitioner did not place the court in the position to address a Hunter-type

issue.

 The “[Supreme] Court has never held or intimated that the constitutional bar against

double jeopardy circumscribes the legislative prerogative to define crimes and prescribe

punishments in the context of a single prosecution....The Supreme Court has repeatedly

described the third aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause–the protection against multiple

punishments for the same offense imposed in a single proceeding–as protecting only against

the imposition of punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature.” White v. Howes,

586 F.3d 1025, 1032 (6th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted). Further, “[t]he current jurisprudence

allows for multiple punishment for the same offense provided the legislature has clearly

indicated its intent to so provide, and recognizes no exception for necessarily included, or

overlapping offenses.” Id. at 1033 (denying habeas relief to petitioner charged under both

felon in possession statute and felony firearm statute). In compliance with clearly established

federal law, the Arizona court considered the legislative intent of the statute at issue to

determine that the legislature intended multiple punishments. Although this Court, on habeas

review, is not bound by the state court’s ultimate conclusion whether such punishment

violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, this Court “must accept the state court’s interpretation

of the legislative intent for the imposition of multiple punishments....” Brimmage, 793 F.2d

at 1015 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368). Clearly established Federal law allows for multiple

punishments as long as the punishment imposed is no greater than the legislature intended.

See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; White, 586 F.3d at 1035; Brimmage, 793 F.2d at 1015-16. On

the instant record, the state court’s determination was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state court’s determination based

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Petitioner points out that “any claims arising from errors or omissions in the

Philadelphia Indemnity application were excluded from the proposed insurance.” (Petition,

p. 13).

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on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. Petitioner’s claim fails.

b. Sub-claim (b) Counts 1-4

In sub-claim (b) Petitioner points out that, in addition to charging her in Count 1 with

Illegally Conducting an Enterprise and alleging the acts committed in Counts 2-58 as

predicate offenses, the State also charged “three separate fraudulent schemes (Counts 2-4) that

were, as alleged in Count 1, all part of illegally conducting an Enterprise-[SMI].” (Petition,

p. 12). Petitioner was convicted of defrauding SMI investors (Count 2), Fireman’s Fund

(Count 3), and Philadelphia Indemnity (Count 4). Petitioner contends that she did not attempt

to defraud the insurance companies and that the insurance companies were not victims.8

Instead, as “the State acknowledged[,]...the purpose for obtaining these insurance policies

was to tell the Directors and Officers of [SMI] they were insured, which is a perpetuation of

the entire fraudulent scheme.” (Id. at p.15; see also id. at p.14 (“the applicant would have

knowingly paid premiums for [sic] policy that could not be enforced so as to provide an

illusion that the Directors and Officers were insured.” (footnote omitted); id. at p. 15 (“that

the Petitioner was alleged to have used the insurance companies to create an illusion that the

Directors and Officers of [SMI] were insured, does not constitute separate fraudulent

schemes.”)). Therefore, Petitioner claims that the Arizona appellate court “erred in finding

the applications for Directors and Officers insurance constituted separate fraudulent schemes

apart from the overall scheme alleged in Count 2 to defraud [SMI] investors...” and, therefore,

Counts 3 and 4 were multiplicitous in violation of Petitioner’s right against twice being placed

in jeopardy for the same offense. (Id. at p.16). 

(1.) The state court proceeding

Petitioner argued on direct appeal that “[t]he charging of three counts of fraudulent

schemes and artifice [i.e., Counts 2-4] for one continuous scheme was improper and,

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Petitioner also received consecutive sentences for Counts 2 through 4.

10“...i.e., some ‘plan, device, or trick’ to perpetrate a fraud.” (Petition, App., p. 34

citing State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 423, 675 P.2d 673, 683 (1983)). 

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therefore, two of the counts of fraudulent scheme and artifice must be vacated.” (Answer,

Exh. B, p. 16).9

 Petitioner contended that although she may have defrauded SMI, Fireman’s

Fund, and Philadelphia Indemnity, “it was part of only one scheme.” (Id. (emphasis in

original)). Petitioner maintained that “the frauds perpetrated against Fireman’s Fund and

Philadelphia Indemnity should not have been charged as separate offenses because she

obtained the insurance policies to maintain the status quo relating to the fraudulent scheme

perpetrated upon SMI investors.” (Petition, App., p. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The appellate court’s analysis on this issue is multi-layered, first addressing

multiplicity and sufficiency of the evidence before reaching the issue of consecutive

sentences. 

The appellate court acknowledged that Petitioner’s claim of multiplicity increased the

potential of multiple punishments and, thus, implicated double jeopardy. The court first

turned to A.R.S. §13-2310(A), “which prohibits a person from, ‘pursuant to a scheme or

artifice to defraud, knowingly obtain[ing] any benefit by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions.’” State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229,

232, 68 P.3d 455, 459 (App., 2003). The court noted that to establish a violation of §13-2310,

the state must first prove the existence of a scheme to defraud10 and that the defendant,

knowing the purpose of the scheme, obtained a benefit pursuant to the scheme by means of

false or fraudulent pretenses. (Petition, App., p. 34 (citations omitted)). “If the state alleges

more than one scheme to defraud, each scheme requires evidence of a ‘specific intent’ to

defraud a ‘specific and separate victim.’ State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 116, 704 P.2d 238, 246

(1985)).” (Id.).

The court went on to state:

In this case, Chisholm may have been motivated by an overarching

intent to defraud SMI’s investors generally, but she devised three distinct

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schemes to defraud separate victims. The first was the scheme to induce

investors to purchase shares of SMI stock by misrepresenting material facts

about SMI’s business; the second, the scheme to fraudulently obtain an

insurance policy from Philadelphia Indemnity by filing an application for

insurance that contained false information and omitted material facts about

SMI; the third, a scheme to fraudulently obtain a secondary insurance policy

from Fireman’s Fund, again by submitting an application for insurance that

contained misrepresentations and material omissions. Chisholm knowingly

obtained a benefit from each of these schemes, and she had a specific, separate

intent to defraud each of these victims, or in the case of SMI, shareholders, this

group of victims. Therefore, these fraudulent acts were not, as Chisholm

suggests, merely acts committed in furtherance of a single scheme but were

three separate schemes. See Via, 146 Ariz. at 116, 704 P.2d at 246.

(Id. at pp. 34-35 (footnote omitted)). The court noted:

that “scheme” is an imprecise word. The United States Supreme Court has

observed “‘scheme’ is hardly a self-defining term. A ‘scheme’ is in the eye of

the beholder, since whether a scheme exists depends on the level of generality

at which criminal activity is viewed.’ See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tele. Co., 492

U.S. 229, 241 n.3 (1989). Viewing Chisholm’s criminal conduct at the most

general level, we agree that her three fraudulent plans may arguably be

characterized as parts of one “overall scheme.” For purposes of §13-2310,

however, Chisholm devised and carried out three schemes to defraud.

(Id. at p. 35 n.2). While the court agreed with Petitioner that a scheme to defraud implies a

plan and numerous acts committed in furtherance of that plan, the court pointed out that

Petitioner “committed multiple acts in furtherance of each of the three schemes to

defraud....Chisholm devised three separate schemes, tailored for three separate purposes, and

we therefore find no basis for vacating any of Chisholm’s convictions for violating §13-2310.

See Via, 146 Ariz. at 116, 704 P.2d at 246.” (Id. at pp. 35-36).

The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to

show that she intended to defraud the insurance companies. Petitioner based her argument

on the fact that although she omitted material information about SMI in the applications filed

with both insurance companies, no fraud occurred because the policies excluded coverage for

errors and omissions. Because no claims could be made which related to the omissions,

Petitioner contended that the insurance companies were not victims. Concluding otherwise,

the court held:

Chisholm’s argument is based on the mistaken premise that, to be

convicted under §13-2310, a defendant must have sought or successfully

obtained a financial gain from the scheme to defraud. Although §13-2310

requires proof that the defendant “knowingly obtains a benefit,” we have

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11See infra, at III.B.1.b.(2.) (setting out test).

12Henley was subsequently overruled on other grounds by State v. Soliz, 223 Ariz. 116,

219 P.3d 1045 (2009).

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previously determined that the benefit need not be pecuniary, but can be

“‘anything of value or advantage.’” State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229, ¶15, 68 P.3d

455, 459 (App. 2003) quoting A.R.S. §13-105. Testimony at trial showed that

Chisholm obtained the insurance policies only after being questioned about

SMI’s lack of insurance by a member of SMI’s board of directors, who had a

professional background in insurance. The insurance policies were therefore

a benefit to Chisholm, even if she were unable to receive compensation under

them, because they allowed her to inform members of SMI’s board of directors

and SMI’s investors that she had obtained the necessary insurance, which in

turn enabled her to perpetuate the scheme to defraud its investors. We therefore

conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Chisholm’s convictions for

knowingly obtaining benefits by false or fraudulent pretenses pursuant to her

schemes to defraud Philadelphia Indemnity and Fireman’s Fund.

(Id. at pp. 37-38).

Next, the court turned to the issue of consecutive sentences for Counts 2 through 4.

The court acknowledged that under A.R.S. §13-116 “‘[a]n act or omission which is made

punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both,

but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.’” (Id. at p. 43 (quoting A.R.S. §13-

116)). The court evaluated Petitioner’s claim by applying the “identical elements test” set

forth in State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 315, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211.11 (Id. at pp. 43-44). In

applying the “identical elements test” the court held:

Chisholm contends that illegally conducting an enterprise was the

“ultimate crime” in this case. However, there were three victims of Chisholm’s

criminal activities: the investors of SMI, Philadelphia Indemnity, and Fireman’s

Fund. When there are multiple victims, “our definition of the ‘ultimate crime’

varies by victim.” State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, ¶ 103, 107 P.3d 900, 920

(2005). The “ultimate crimes” against Philadelphia Indemnity and Fireman’s

Fund were Chisholm’s schemes to fraudulently obtain insurance policies from

those companies. And the “ultimate crime” against SMI’s investors was

Chisholm’s fraudulent scheme to obtain $24 million. Therefore, consecutive

sentences were permissible under §13-116 for counts two through four. See

State v. Henley, 141 Ariz. 465, 467, 687 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1984) (consecutive

sentences permissible for counts punishable under same section of law).[12]

(Id. at p. 44).

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(2.) Analysis

Petitioner stresses that her only purpose for obtaining the policies was to inform SMI

directors and officers that they were insured, “which is a perpetuation of the entire fraudulent

scheme” and, thus, did not constitute separate fraudulent schemes. (Petition, p. 15).

According to Petitioner, there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the insurance

companies were each victims and, thus, Counts 3 and 4 were multiplicitous violating her right

against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Id. at pp. 15-16). 

Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2), a petitioner may challenge the state court’s findings

based entirely on the state record on the basis that the finding is unsupported by sufficient

evidence. See Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). On such a challenge, the habeas

court “may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the

state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually

unreasonable.” Id.

The appellate court determined that as a matter of state law, Petitioner engaged in three

separate and specific plans to defraud. Under §13-2310:

“The scheme need not be fraudulent on its face but ‘must involve some sort of

fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated to deceive

persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’ ” [State v.] Haas, 138 Ariz.

[413, 418, 675 P.2d 673, 678 (1983)], quoting United States v. Pearlstein, 576

F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir.1978) (emphasis omitted). The term “defraud” as used

in the statute is not measured by any technical standard but, rather, by a “broad

view.” Haas, 138 Ariz. at 424, 675 P.2d at 684. A “benefit” under the statute

is “anything of value or advantage, present or prospective.” A.R.S. §§

13-105(2), 13-2301.

Henry, 205 Ariz. at 232, 68 P.3d at 458 (emphasis added); see also Via, 146 Ariz. at 116, 704

P. 2d at 246 (although theft of victim’s credit cards may have constituted one act, and

defendant may have had the same general intent in each count to defraud banks using stolen

credit cards, “[t]here was, however, a specific and separate victim, as well as a specific and

separate credit card, in each count.”). The state record was clear that Petitioner knowingly

provided false information to both Philadelphia Indemnity and Fireman’s Fund to obtain

insurance coverage in the amount of $3 million and $2 million, respectively, for officers and

directors. The state court acknowledged Petitioner’s argument that there was no way she

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could collect on the policies, however, the court was clear that Petitioner knowingly provided

the false information to obtain the policies in order to gain the benefit of representing to the

SMI board of directors, when perpetuating the SMI scheme, that she obtained the necessary

insurance. Here, although Petitioner may have had the overarching scheme to defraud the

SMI directors and investors with the fact that she had obtained insurance, the court

determined that Plaintiff had submitted applications containing false and misleading

information to two separate insurance companies to obtain insurance from each company and

as a result, Petitioner derived a benefit, i.e. advantage, of representing that she was insured

so as to satisfy and encourage investors. Arizona law is clear that for purposes of A.R.S.

§13-2310, the “benefit” can be “‘anything of value or advantage,’ not merely pecuniary gain.”

 Henry, 205 Ariz 229, 68 P.3d 455, 459 (App., 2003) (quoting A.R.S. §13-105) (holding that

“benefit” as used in A.R.S. §13-2310 applies not only to property and pecuniary gains, but

to “anything of value or advantage” including intangible gains such as sexual gratification).

Upon consideration of the facts in evidence, the Arizona court in Petitioner’s case determined

as a matter of state law that Counts 3 and 4 involved separate and distinct victims. Although

Petitioner disagrees with the state court’s conclusion, this is not a case where the state court

failed “to take into account and reconcile key parts of the record....” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1008.

Moreover, as to the court’s application of A.R.S. §13-2310 and reliance on Henry, the “state

court has the last word on the interpretation of state law.” Mendez v. Small, 298 F.3d 1154,

1158 (9th Cir. 2002). The record is clear that the state court considered and weighed the

relevant evidence in applying the applicable state law to rendering its decision that each

insurance company qualified as a separate victim under state law. On such a record, the statecourt decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state proceeding. 

After the court determined that different victims were at issue in Counts 2, 3 and 4, the

court upheld Petitioner’s consecutive sentences for Counts 2 through 4 pursuant to A.R.S.

§13-116, which provides in pertinent part:

An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different

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sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences

be other than concurrent.

A.R.S. §13-116. As the appellate court in Petitioner’s case noted, “[e]ssentially, §13-116

prohibits consecutive sentences for a ‘single act.’ State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, ¶64, 140

P.3d 950, 965 (2006).” (Petition, App., p.43). Petitioner argues that the state court’s decision

upholding imposition of consecutive sentences for Counts 2 through 4 under A.R.S. §13-116

violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Petition, pp. 11-16).

With regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, the “‘double jeopardy

guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains

free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments....’” Gentry v.

MacDougall, 685 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause did not

prohibit Arizona court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for single act of drunk driving

which resulted in multiple deaths) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)); see

also Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 “[w]here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal

trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not

exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.”).

Thus, “‘even if multiple offenses constitute the ‘same offence’ under [the Blockburger] test,

the imposition of cumulative punishments does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the

state legislature authorizes cumulative punishments.” Clem v. Schriro, 2007 WL 3231957 (D.

Ariz. Nov. 1, 2007) (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-369; Johnson, 467 U.S. at 599 n.8).

Therefore, “[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double

Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater

punishment than the legislature intended.” Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366. 

A.R.S. § 13-116 demonstrates the intent of the Arizona legislature to authorize multiple

convictions where the statute is satisfied. The appellate court’s conclusion in Petitioner’s case

“was based on its determination that the Arizona legislature intended that consecutive

sentences be imposed for the conduct at issue...On habeas corpus review, this Court must

defer to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination regarding the state legislature’s

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intent....” Branham v. Gay, 2011 WL 5882590, *25 (D.Ariz. May 2, 2011) (citations

omitted), adopted by Branham, 2011 WL 5882558. However, this Court is not bound by the

Arizona court’s conclusion whether the punishment imposed violates the Double Jeopardy

Clause. Id.; see also Brimmage, 792 F.3d at 1015.

Even though Petitioner is charged in Counts 2, 3, and 4 with violating the same statute,

there is a distinction among the Counts in that: Count 2 charges Petitioner with “pursuant to

a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtain[ing] a benefit, $24,000,000 from...” SMI

investors “by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material

omissions”; Count 3 charges Petitioner with “pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud,

knowingly obtain[ing] a benefit, insurance for Directors and Officers of [SMI], from

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Policy #CXD 600-02-025, by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions; and Count 4 charges Petitioner

with “pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtain[ing] a benefit, insurance

for Directors and Officers of [SMI], from Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company

#HFP003193, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material

omissions.” (Petition, App., pp. 1-2). The Arizona court determined as a matter of state law

that Petitioner received a distinct and separate benefit under A.R.S. §13-2310 from the victims

alleged in each count: the investors of SMI; Fireman’s Fund; and Philadelphia Indemnity.

Thus, under Arizona law, Petitioner committed three separate offenses of fraudulent scheme

and artifice. In Petitioner’s case, the state court recognized that “[w]hen there are multiple

victims, ‘our definition of []ultimate crime[] varies by victim.’” (Petition, App., p. 44 (quoting

Carreon, 210 Ariz. at ¶103, 107 P.3d at 920)).

“In Blockburger, the [C]ourt concluded that ‘the test to be applied to determine

whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an

additional fact which the other does not.’” Faulkner v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2949053 at *15

(D.Ariz. Oct. 9, 2007) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). “[T]he requirement of proof

of the disparate victims avoids any double jeopardy concerns.” Id. (citations omitted)

(rejecting double jeopardy claim where Arizona court imposed consecutive sentences for two

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13To any extent that Petitioner’s argument can be read as challenging the state court’s

application of A.R.S. §13-116 as a matter of state law, such claim is not cognizable on

federal habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”).

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counts of aggravated assault on police officers arising out of the same incident). See also

United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (an indictment is not

multiplicitous where each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does

not); Riley v. Stewart, 2005 WL 3434710 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2005) (denying habeas relief

where Arizona court imposed consecutive sentences for each victim present during the course

of one armed robbery) (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 344, 368-369). Consistent with

Blockburger, the Arizona court determines whether a defendant’s conduct is a single act by

applying the identical elements test, which requires the court to consider

the facts of each crime separately, subtracting from the factual transaction the

evidence necessary to convict on the ultimate charge–the one that is at the

essence of the factual nexus and that will often be the most serious of the

charges. If the remaining evidence satisfies the elements of the other crime,

then consecutive sentences may be permissible under A.R.S. § 13-116. In

applying this analytical framework, however, we will then consider whether,

given the entire “transaction,” it was factually impossible to commit the

ultimate crime without also committing the secondary crime. If so, then the

likelihood will increase that the defendant committed a single act under A.R.S.

§ 13-116. We will then consider whether the defendant's conduct in committing

the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond

that inherent in the ultimate crime. If so, then ordinarily the court should find

that the defendant committed multiple acts and should receive consecutive

sentences.

State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211; see also Carreon, 210 Ariz. at 74,

107 P.3d 900, 920 (when there is more than one victim, “our definition of ‘ultimate crime’

varies by victim.”).13

In Petitioner’s case, the Arizona court applied the test set out in Gordon. In

Petitioner’s case, each crime alleged in Counts 2 through 4 was committed against a separate

victim and, thus, each crime required proof of a fact that other did not. As the state court

pointed out, the “ultimate crime” against each insurance company was to obtain an insurance

policy from each specific insurance company; while, the “ultimate crime” against SMI

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investors was Petitioner’s scheme to obtain $24 million. Thus, Petitioner stands convicted of

three different crimes. In light of the distinction between Counts 2, 3, and 4, Petitioner’s

convictions survive the Blockburger test and, thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause has not been

violated. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (double jeopardy not implicated due to factual

distinction between the transactions).

The state court’s decision upholding Petitioner’s sentences was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States

Supreme Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding result in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the evidence presented. Petitioner’s claim fails on the

merits.

2. Ground II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

On September 25, 2001, Petitioner was indicted, in CR2001-3189 (hereinafter “Case

No. 3819"), on 58 counts which is discussed above with regard to Petitioner’s Double

Jeopardy claims. (Petition, p.6). Thereafter, on April 24, 2002, Petitioner and her husband

were indicted, in CR 2002-1306 (hereinafter “Case No. 1306"), on: one count of Conspiracy

to commit the offenses of theft, perjury, and fraud in insolvency; two counts of Fraud in

Insolvency; and one count of Perjury. (Petition, App., pp. 102-04). Petitioner asserts that on

October 7, 2002, the State, through Mr. John Evans, an Assistant Attorney General, informed

defense counsel, Mr. Andrew Diodati, that the State intended to proceed with trial in Case No.

1306 prior to trial commencing in Case No. 3819. (Petition, p. 7). On August 29, 2003, the

State advised the court that Case No. 1306 should be the first of the two cases to proceed to

trial. (Id.). Additionally, on October 10, 2002, Mr. Evans further told defense counsel that the

State was pursuing Case No. 1306 first in order to obtain a perjury conviction against

Petitioner with which the State could impeach Petitioner in the latter trial in Case No. 3189.

(Id.).

On December 22, 2004, defense counsel moved to dismiss Case No. 1306 on grounds

of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at pp. 7-8). The trial court denied the motion as untimely

filed. (Id. at p.8). Defense counsel did not object in Case No. 3189 “to the trials being tried

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14Petitioner submitted her affidavit statement that: “Had it not been for the State’s

intended use of the convictions in CR2002-1306, to impeach my credibility if I elected to

testify in CR2001-3189, I would have testified in CR2001-3189.” (Petition, App., p. 131).

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out of their chronological order.” (Id.). 

Case No. 1306 proceeded to bench trial in February 2005, and Petitioner was convicted

of: Conspiracy to commit theft, perjury, and fraud in insolvency; and two counts of Fraud in

Insolvency. (Id.;Petition, App., pp. 125-26). Thereafter, the State filed in Case No. 3189 a

Motion In Limine Re: Prior Conviction of Maryanne Chisholm As Impeachment. (Petition,

App., pp. 127-30). Petitioner contends that “[h]ad it not been for the State’s intended use of

her convictions in [Case No. 1306]...to impeach her trial testimony in [Case No. 3189]..., the

Petitioner would have testified.”14 (Petition, p. 8). Petitioner argues that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to request that the trials proceed in their chronological order, this failure

deprived her of her right to testify in Case No. 3189, and in denying her claim, the state court

applied the wrong standard for establishing prejudice. (Id. at pp. 17-21).

a. The state court proceeding

Petitioner raised her ineffective assistance of counsel claim in her PCR Petition.

Petitioner argued that to establish prejudice on this issue, she need only show that she would

have testified but for defense counsel’s deficient representation. (See Petition, App., p. 70-

71). The trial court denied the claim finding that defense counsel “was not deficient for failing

to object to the order of the trials. Even if it would have been wise strategy for Petitioner’s

counsel to suggest that the cases be tried in chronological order relative to the indictments,

she was not prejudiced by [defense counsel’s]...failure to embrace and pursue that strategy.”

(Id. at p. 70). In finding lack of prejudice, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s proposed test.

Instead, the trial court required her to show “that she was prejudiced in the sense that there

was a reasonable probability that her trial may have had a different outcome had she testified.”

(Id. at p. 71). The court concluded that Plaintiff’s “claim is purely speculative, and

considering the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, she cannot make a colorable showing in

support of her argument.” (Id.).

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In her Petition for Review to the appellate court, Petitioner argued that the trial court

applied the wrong standard to evaluate prejudice. (Id. at pp. 81-12). Petitioner argued that

her case was akin to cases where a defendant pled guilty based on erroneous legal advice and,

thus, to establish prejudice she need only show that she would have testified had it not been

for defense counsel’s error in allowing the trials to proceed in the order they did. (Id. at pp.

84-86 (citing State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 419, 966 P.2d 1023 (App., 1998)).

The appellate court cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in addition

to state cases, for the standard applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.

at pp. 96-100). In holding that the trial court applied the “correct test” with regard to

prejudice, the appellate court stated:

[Petitioner] contends she was only required to show she was prejudiced by

having decided not to testify as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness, much the

same as the defendant in Bowers was prejudiced by having chosen to waive his

trial rights and enter a guilty plea. See id. ¶7. But the trial court was correct

that the prejudice the defendant had to show in Bowers was necessarily

different, because the alleged deficiency there had occurred in the plea context.

See id. ¶¶ 5-6. That case simply stands for the proposition that, when a guilty

plea has been induced by erroneous legal advice, a defendant claiming counsel

was ineffective need not show that, had the case proceeded to trial, the

defendant would have been acquitted. See id. ¶19. It does not support

Chisholm’s contention the standard applicable in Bowers applies here.

The ineffectiveness alleged here must be evaluated in terms of its effect

on the trial. As the trial court wrote, Chisholm was like any other defendant

who must decide whether to testify in light of impeachment evidence available

to the state. Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

state obtained the impeachment evidence as a result of that deficiency,

Chisholm has not sustained her burden of establishing that the outcome would

have been different had she testified. We have no basis for second-guessing the

trial court or for concluding it abused its discretion in denying Chisholm postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 

(Id. at pp. 99-100).

The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Id.

at p. 101).

b. Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has observed that “‘the right to the effective

assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the

ability of the accused to receive a fair trial....” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, 481

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15The Supreme Court has recognized a very narrow exception to Strickland’s prejudice

standard where prejudice will be presumed “in circumstances that are so likely to prejudice

the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.’” Florida

v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. 658); see also Strickland, 466

U.S. at 692. Petitioner does not argue that her case falls within the narrow exception

discussed in Cronic. 

16Because failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or

prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700.

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(2000) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). Therefore, “[a]bsent

some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the...process the [effective counsel]

guarantee is generally not implicated.’” Id. (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658)).15 Thus, to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court requires that that the defendant

not only show that counsel's representation fell below the range of competence demanded of

counsel in criminal cases, but also that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of

counsel's incompetence.16 See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. To establish prejudice under

Strickland, the defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. at 694. Further, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not

warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the

judgment.” Id. at 691. 

To satisfy the prejudice requirement in cases where “counsel’s alleged deficient

performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the

forfeiture of a proceeding itself...”, the Supreme Court has required the defendant to show that

she would have availed herself of the proceeding that was forfeited due to counsel’s deficient

performance. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 (to satisfy the prejudice requirement where

failure to file notice of appeal results from counsel’s deficient performance, “we require the

defendant to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct, he would have appealed.”);

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see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (to satisfy the prejudice requirement where

defendant’s decision to enter plea instead of proceeding to trial was based on deficient

performance, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.”). 

In Petitioner’s case, the state court rejected Petitioner’s argument that she need only

show that she would have testified but for counsel’s deficient performance. Instead, the state

court required Petitioner to show that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different but for counsel’s errors. Under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state

court’s decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699

(2002). In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing

that the state court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable

application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also Cullen, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1403 (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on ineffective assistance of

counsel claim is “doubly deferential.”); Harrington, ___ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (“Federal

habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland

with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether

counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument

that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”).

The state court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. See Dows

v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (Strickland “is considered in this circuit to be

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review.”). Petitioner’s case is not akin to Hill. The

alleged deficient performance in Petitioner’s case did not prevent Petitioner from proceeding

to trial. Therefore, the state court’s requirement that Petitioner show prejudice by establishing

that the outcome of trial would have been different had she testified is consistent with

Strickland and its progeny. The state court’s ruling was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law. Nor was the state court ruling an unreasonable

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application of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

Consequently, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. 

IV. CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the state court’s decision resolving the issues raised by Petitioner

in her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established Federal law. Nor was the state court’s decision based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Consequently,

Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)

on the merits.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). No replies will be permitted without leave of the District Court. If objections are

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 10-694-TUC-DCB.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 8th day of April, 2013.

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