Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00549/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00549-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN RICHARD CARRITHERS, )

AIS #256015, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-CV-549-WKW

) [WO]

)

KIM TOBIAS THOMAS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint

filed by John Richard Carrithers (“Carrithers”) challenging conditions of confinement and

actions taken against him at the Easterling Correctional Facility (“Easterling”). The

defendants in this cause of action are Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama

Department of Corrections, Gary Hetzel, Louis Boyd and Kenneth Sconyers, wardens at

Easterling, and Gwendolyn Babers, Fredrick Grubbs, Larry Peavy, Shawn Logan, and

Darrel Gettis, correctional officers at Easterling. Carrithers seeks declaratory relief and

monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Amended

Complaint - Doc. No. 10 at 4.

The defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

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Carrithers’ claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems

it appropriate to treat the special report as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

September 30, 2011 - Doc. No. 27. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiary

materials filed in support thereof, and the plaintiff’s response, including his affidavits, the

court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, the

substance of Rule 56 remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule. 

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the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593 (11 Cir. 1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine

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dispute of material fact for trial). The movant maymeet this burden by presenting evidence

indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has

failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it

bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate

evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v.

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record

including affidavits,relevant documents or other materials]the court may... grantsummary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meetsits burden, “the non-moving party

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must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” demonstrate that there is

a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in

a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment.

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11 Cir. 2014). A genuine

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dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would

allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in itsfavor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263;

Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11 Cir. 2007).

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In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Carrithers is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence”

which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely

colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing

party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact]

could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11

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Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to

create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion

for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (A

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plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence,

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916

(11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing

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beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman

v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own

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conclusoryallegationsis notsufficient to oppose summaryjudgment....”); Evers v. General

Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11 Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without

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specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set

forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

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case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case

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the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d

1012, 1023 (11 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine

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dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider

all evidence in the record .... [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits,

etc. -- and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that

no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,

692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11 Cir. 2012).

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Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputes involving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

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(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party

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must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his

favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se

litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute

of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this

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court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. The

court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the

record. After such review, the court finds that Carrithers has failed to demonstrate a

genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment.

Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

In this civil action, Carrithers challenges the constitutionality of (a) the protection

afforded him from verbal requests for sexual favors made by another inmate, (b) the

conditions to which he was subjected while in segregation at Easterling, (c) a haircut he

received in June of 2011, and (d) a disciplinary lodged against him for possession of

contraband.

A. Absolute Immunity

With respect to the alleged constitutional violations Carrithers lodges against the

defendants in their official capacities, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity

from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name,

... treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985).

“A state official may not be sued in his[or her] official capacity unlessthe state has waived

its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated

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the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114,

1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations

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omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’simmunity. Therefore, Alabama state

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.”

Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11 Cir. 1997).

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In light of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under

the Eleventh Amendment for claimsseeking monetary damages from them in their official

capacities for asserted violations of Carrithers’ constitutional rights. Lancaster, 116 F.3d

at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir.

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1994).

B. Respondeat Superior

Carrithers names Commissioner Kim Thomas as a defendant in this case. Carrithers

merely assertsthat he notified Commissioner Thomas by letter of the alleged matters made

the basis of the instant complaint. The claims against defendant Thomas entitle Carrithers

to no relief.

The law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or

vicarious liability].... Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed.

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203 (1888) (‘A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position

wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or

servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his

official duties’). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1948 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory

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officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on

the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d

1014, 1035 (11 Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official “can have no respondeat superior

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liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11 Cir.2003)

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(concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or

vicariousliability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11 Cir. 1999), citing Belcher

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v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11 Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a

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plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under

either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). “Absent vicarious liability,

each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for actions of

correctional officials at Easterling could attach to defendant Thomas only if he “personally

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participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection

between [his] actions ... and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360.

Carrithers, however, has presented no evidence and the court cannot envision the

existence of any evidence which would create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect

to the claims lodged against Commissioner Thomas. It is undisputed that Thomas did not

personally participate in or have any involvement, direct or otherwise, with the claims

made the basis of the complaint. In light of the foregoing, Thomas can be held liable for

actions of correctional officials at Easterling only if his actions bear a causal relationship

to the purported violations of Carrithers’ constitutional rights. To establish the requisite

causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant

Thomas, Carrithers must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of

either “a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to

correct the alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed] to do so ...” or “a ... custom or policy [that]

result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or ... facts [that] support an

inference that [Hetzel] directed the [facility’s staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the

staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and

evidentiary materials submitted in this case demonstrates that Carrithers has failed to meet

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this burden.

The record before the court contains no evidence to support an inference that

Thomas directed correctional officials to act unlawfully or knew that they would act

unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Carrithers has presented no evidence

of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which Thomas

failed to take corrective action. Finally, it is clear that the challenged actions/conditions

did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by Thomas. Thus, the requisite causal

connection does not exist between the actions of correctional officials at Easterling and

Commissioner Thomas and liability under the custom or policy standard is not warranted.

Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of this defendant.

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

Only actions which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities” are grave enough to establish constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Eighth Amendment proscribes those conditions of

confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Id. at 346.

Specifically, it is concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or

sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Id. at 348 (citation

omitted). “‘[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.’ Id. at 349, 101

S.Ct. at 2400. If prison conditions are merely ‘restrictive and even harsh, they are part of

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the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ Id. at 347, 101

S.Ct. at 2399. Generally speaking, prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation only when they ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of

pain.’ Id.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11 Cir. 2004). Although, “the

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Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons’ ... neither does it permit inhumane

ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal citation omitted); Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 345-346 (Conditions may not be “barbarous” nor may they contravene society’s

“evolving standards of decency.”). Consequently, the conditions under which a prisoner

is confined are subject to constitutionalscrutiny. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).

A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmatesreceive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 526-527 (1984)); Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32. For liability to attach, the challenged

prison condition must be “extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable risk ofserious damage

to [the inmate’s] future health.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289-1290. To demonstrate an

Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy

both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In Farmer, the Court

identified the objective and subjective elements necessary to establish an Eighth

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Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite objective elements, an inmate must

first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm ... exist[ed]. Second, once it is

established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official must react to this

risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-1029. As to the

subjective elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.... The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it

outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’ ... [A]n official’s failure to alleviate a

significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned asthe infliction of punishment.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (emphasis added); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364

(11 Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof that the defendant should have

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perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491

(11 Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue “must involve more than ordinary lack of due

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care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.... It is obduracy and wantonness, not

inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official

control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)

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(emphasis added).

The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual

punishment when the conditions involve or result in “wanton and unnecessary infliction

of pain, [or] ... [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting

imprisonment.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. “Conditions ... alone or in combination, may

deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions

could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency.... But conditions

that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not

unconstitutional.” Id. at 347. To determine whether conditions of confinement constitute

cruel and unusual punishment, the court must look to the effect the condition has upon the

inmate. Id. at 366. In a case involving conditions of confinement generally or several

different conditions, the court should consider whether the claims together amount to

conditions which fall below constitutional standards. Hamm v. De Kalb County, 774 F.2d

1567 (11 Cir. 1985), cert. denied Hamm v. De Kalb County, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct.

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1492, 89 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1986); see also Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11 Cir. 1991).

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The court’s consideration of whether the totality of a plaintiff’s claims amount to

conditions which fall below applicable constitutional standards is limited by the Supreme

Court’s admonishment that “[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth

Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when

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they have a mutually enforcing effect that producesthe deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need.... To say that some prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry

from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes.

Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual

punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.” Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 304-305 (1991) (emphasis in original).

A prison official may likewise be held liable underthe Eighth Amendmentfor acting

with “‘deliberate indifference’” to an inmate’s health orsafetywhen the official knowsthat

the inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and disregards that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct.

1970, 1974 (1994).

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been

“subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have

had a ‘“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38,

114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321,

2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).... Even assuming the existence of a

serious risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of

specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists - and the prison official must also “draw that

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir. 2003). “The known risk of injury must

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be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official’s]

failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,

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1537 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As the foregoing makes

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clear, “[m]erely negligent failure to protect an inmate ... does not justify liability under

section 1983....” Id.

1. Deliberate Indifference to Safety. Carrithers alleges that the defendants

“jeopardized [his] safety” because they failed to protect him from unwanted sexual

innuendos made by his cell mate, Terry Benford, during a 3-day period of confinement in

disciplinary segregation. In support of this claim, Carrithers maintains that the defendants

had knowledge of the other inmate’s requests for sexual favors but failed to immediately

separate the inmates and did not provide him access to the Investigative Division of the

Alabama Department of Corrections (“I &I”). Carrithers does not dispute that no sexual

act transpired as a result of the other inmate’s advances. In addition, although he had

access to the Segregation Review Board every Wednesday, Carrithers concedes that he

only spoke to the Board on one occasion -- May 25, 2011. Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Response

to the Special Report - Doc. No. 32-1 at 8. Since Carrithers had not yet been housed with

Benford, it is clear that any communication made at this time did not relate to the issues

arising from his confinement with Benford. Carrithersfurther contendsthat afterspeaking

with the SegregationReview Board, which includedWarden Sconyers, he began “writ[ing]

everyone else asking for help....” in obtaining placement in protective custody. Id. Again,

any correspondence submitted to correctional officials by Carrithers prior to June 9, 2011

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and after June 11, 2011 would have had no bearing on the defendants’ alleged failure to

protect him from Benford as he was not confined with Benford during these periods of

time.

In their affidavits, the defendants adamantly deny they acted with either callous

disregard or deliberate indifference to Carrithers’ safety with respect to alleged threats

from Benford. Exhibits A-H to the Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-1 through

26-8. Specifically, the defendants maintain that during the time Carrithers was in the cell

with Benford they had no knowledge of any specific risk of danger to Carrithers nor any

reason to believe Carrithers faced a substantial risk of harm from Benford. Id. The

defendants further maintain and Carrithers acknowledges that upon his request to contact

I & I submitted on June 23, 2011 he was provided the address for this entity. Exhibit A to

the Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-1 at 8. In addition, officials at Easterling

provided Carrithers the contact information for Sgt. Brian Gordon, Coordinator of the

Division of PrisonRape Elimination, and Sgt. Gordon conducted an interview ofCarrithers

regarding his allegations. Exhibit A to the Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-1 at

9-10. During this interview, “Carrithers advised that he did not submit[] to” the sexual

advances of inmate Benford but that he was “scared” while in the cell with this inmate. Id.

Sgt. Gordon recommended that Carrithers receive mental health counseling and requested

an I & I investigation. The record further demonstrates that Carrithers was visited by

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mental health personnel on June 13, 2011 and June 17, 2011 and underwent a mental health

evaluation on July 21, 2011 at which time he was diagnosed with heightened anxiety and

paranoia. Id. at 11.

As previously referenced, correctional officials may be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for acting with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s safety when the

official knows that the inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and with such

knowledge disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer,

511 U.S. 828 (1994). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one inmate at the hands

of another [or every threat issued by another] that translates into a constitutional liability

for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. A constitutional

violation occurs only “when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is

subjectively aware, exists and the official does not ‘respond[] reasonably to the risk.’ 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1982-83, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). A

plaintiff must also show that the constitutional violation caused his injuries.” Marsh v.

Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11 Cir. 2001) (en banc).

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At thisjuncture, Carrithersisrequired to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating

(1) an objectively substantial risk of serious harm; (2) subjective awareness of this risk on

the part of the defendants; (3) the defendants responded to such risk in an objectively

unreasonable manner; and (4) the actions/omissions of the defendants caused him to suffer

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injuries. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838; Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-1029; Hale v. Tallapoosa

County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11 Cir. 1995). “The known risk of injury must be a strong

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likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [an official’s] failure to act can constitute

deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations

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and internal quotations omitted); Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 339-340 (4 Cir. 1997)

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(Unless a prison official actuallymakesthe inference that a substantial risk ofserious harm

exists and then disregards that risk, he does not act with deliberate indifference even

though his actions violate prison regulations or can be described as stupid and lazy.). As

the foregoing makes clear, mere negligence in providing protection to an inmate “does not

justify liability under section 1983....” Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537.

The defendants deny they were aware of any facts during the 3-day period made the

basis of the claims relating to confinement with Benford from which an inference could be

drawn that Carrithers was under a substantial risk of serious harm. In addition, it is

undisputed that Carrithers suffered no injuries during the relevant period of time. Thus,

the difficulty for Carrithers is that he has submitted no evidence to show the defendants’

subjective awareness of a significant risk of harm and does not dispute that he suffered no

physical harm while confined with Benford.

The undisputed facts of this case show that any risk of physical harm to Carrithers

that existed was only “a mere possibility” which precludes relief with respect to a claim of

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deliberate indifference. Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537. Carrithers “has [therefore] failed to

establish that [any] Defendant had a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious

physical threat to Plaintiff[,] ... a required element of this claim. When viewing the

evidence most favorably toward Plaintiff, a claim for deliberate indifference has not been

established.” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350. Finally, the record is devoid of any evidence

showing that the defendants drew the necessary inference and thereafter ignored the risk

to Carrithers’ safety. Under the circumstances of this case, “to find the Defendants

sufficiently culpable would unduly reduce awareness to a more objective standard, rather

than the required subjective standard set by the Supreme Court.” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the

failure to protect claim.

2. Conditions Claims. The defendants deny that the conditions made the basis of

the instant complaintrise to the level of constitutional violations. Warden Hetzel addresses

these claims as follows:

Plaintiff states he was forced to stay in a cell with bright lights on

constantly and that the light in his cell could not be turned off. Equipment

malfunctions may be reported and then will be assigned to maintenance

workers who repair any deficiencies....

Plaintiff claims that he was not given any exercise or recreation.

Plaintiff was given several opportunities to exercise and frequently refused

those opportunities.

Exhibit A to the Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-1 at 2-3 (citationsto attachments

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omitted). In addition, the evidentiary materials submitted by the defendants indicate that

routine cell inspections are undertaken bycorrectional officials and inmates are responsible

for “maintain[ing] their cell in a clean and sanitary manner.” Id. at 12. Each of the

defendants deny any knowledge of Carrithers’ claim regarding the haircut he received on

June 16, 2011.

(i) Bright Cell Lights, No Light Switch in Cells, Lack of Adequate Exercise, 2-Man

Cells, Exposure to Heat and Denial of Cleaning Supplies. Carrithers alleges that while in

segregation cell number 7 he was subjected to constant bright lights and the cell did not

contain a lightswitch so that he could turn off the lights. Carrithers also assertsthat during

his confinement in segregation he was denied adequate exercise,subjected to confinement

in a 2-man cell, exposed to heat and denied cleaning supplies.

The Constitution does not mandate that prisons be comfortable, Rhodes, 452 U.S.

at 349, and “a prisoner’s mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth

Amendment.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1296; Alfred v. Bryant, 378 Fed.Appx. 977, 980 (11

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Cir. 2010) (“‘Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good

hotel.’” (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7 Cir. 1988)). Carrithers does

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not establish that the conditions about which he complains denied him the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities or subjected him to a wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-299; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. It is likewise

clear that these conditions do not present severe or extreme conditions that posed an

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unreasonable risk of serious harm to Carrithers’ health or safety. Furthermore, Carrithers

fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference or reckless disregard by the named defendants

with respect to his health orsafety regarding these issues. Specifically, Carrithers does not

identify any particular condition of which any of the defendants were aware from which

an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. The record is

also devoid of evidence showing that any of the defendants drew the requisite inference.

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the

aforementioned conditions claims. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11 Cir.

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1999); see also Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-1350.

(ii) Shaving of Head. Carrithers alleges that on June 16, 2011 defendant Gettis

ordered the barber to “shave my head” and this constituted cruel and unusual punishment

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 10 at 3. Carrithers

further asserts that shaving his head put him “at risk of infection and disease [as] clippers

are not cleaned from one person to the next.” Id. Carrithers acknowledges that despite

access to the Segregation Review Board he did not address this haircut with the Board.

Defendant Gettis denies any knowledge of this incident. The remaining defendants

adamantly deny that they ordered or required the barber to shave Carrithers’ head. Instead,

the defendants assert that inmates are not required to shave their heads but must only

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maintain their hair in accordance with the inmate grooming policy. It is likewise clear,

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however, that an inmate may choose to shave his head or maintain a haircut shorter than

that required by the grooming policy. In fact, the evidentiary materials submitted by the

defendants demonstrate that prior to this particular haircut Carrithers opted to keep his hair

closely shaven to his head. Exhibit A to the Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-1

at 4. Finally, it is well settled that inmate barbers are instructed to sanitize their barber

tools utilizing appropriate sterilization procedures and materials before each and every use.

Carrithers has failed to establish that the haircut he received in June of 2011 or the

manner in which barberssanitized their clippers denied him the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities or subjected him to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-299; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Moreover, these allegations do not

rise to the level of a severe or extreme condition which posed an unreasonable risk of

serious harm to Carrithers’ health or safety. See Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (holding that

a prisoner must prove that the prison condition he complains of is sufficiently serious and

“extreme” to violate the Eighth Amendment). Consequently, the court concludes that the

actions associated with the challenged haircut did not constitute cruel and unusual

The record makes clear that Easterling enforces a standard operating procedure for grooming which requires 2

that “[i]nmates ... keep their hair clean and neatly trimmed. Their hair cannot extend over their ears or shirt collar. Their

hair cannot be packed or plaited, and fades are not allowed. Their sideburns cannot extend beyond the middle of their

ear; and designer, pencil-thin, pencil-drawn, or thinned sideburns are not allowed.” Truss v. Thomas, et al., 2:09-CV984-MHT-WC, 2012 WL 4478775, 3 (M.D.Ala. 2012).

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punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

To the extent these allegations can be construed to assert a claim of deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff’s health or safety arising under the Eighth Amendment, the

court concludes that this claim likewise entitles Carrithersto no relief. Carrithers presents

no evidence that the defendants had knowledge ofspecific factsregarding the haircut from

which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Carter,

352 F.3d at 1350 (“Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant[s] had a subjective

awareness of a substantial risk of serious physical [harm] to Plaintiff; thus, Plaintiff has

failed to establish a required element of this claim. When viewing the evidence most

favorably toward Plaintiff, a claimfor deliberate indifference has not been established....”).

Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence showing that the defendants drew the

necessary inference and thereafter ignored the risk. Carrithers has therefore failed to

establish each of the requisite elements of deliberate indifference. Thus, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

(iii) Totality of Conditions. The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive

review of the claims presented by Carrithers and the response to these claims by the

defendants. After such review, the court finds that the challenged conditions though

uncomfortable, inconvenient, unpleasant and/or objectionable were not so extreme as to

violate the Eighth Amendment. Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d at 1289 (11 Cir. 1991).

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Specifically, the totality of the claims before this court do not amount to conditions which

fall below applicable constitutional standards as Carrithers failed to demonstrate that the

challenged conditions had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of

a single, identifiable human need....” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. “To say that some prison

conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are

a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes.” Id. While the allegations made by

Carrithers are somewhat troubling, the evidence regarding the conditions at Easterling fails

to identify with requisite specificity the precise nature of the conditions and their impact

on Carrithers’ heath or safety.

Furthermore, even had Carrithers demonstrated “an excessive risk to [his] health or

safety,” correctional officials cannot be held liable “solely because of the presence of

objectively inhumane prison conditions.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Carrithers has

presented no specific facts nor produced any evidence indicating that the defendants

subjectively knew of a substantial risk of harm and disregarded this risk so as to establish

a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.; Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. Consequently,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on these claims. See

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11 Cir. 1999); see also Carter, 352 F.3d at

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1349-1350.

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D. The Disciplinary Action

To the extent the complaint can be construed to challenge the due process afforded

for a disciplinary imposed upon Carrithers for possession of contraband in May of 2011,

this claim entitles Carrithers to no relief.

On May 22, 2011, Officer Reginald Kincey entered Carrithers’ cell to conduct a

shakedown ofthisinmate’s property. During thissearch, KinceyobservedCarrithersthrow

a pill,subsequentlyidentified asTrazodone, on the floor. Correctional officials determined

that Carrithers did not have a prescription for Trazodone and, therefore, was not authorized

to have this medication in his possession. Based on the foregoing, Carrithers received

notice of investigative detention and was placed in segregation. Carrithers was also

charged with a violation of Rule #64, possession of contraband. Exhibit D to the

Defendants’ Special Report - Doc. No. 26-4 at 3. Officer Gettis timely served Carrithers

with notice of the disciplinary charge and the scheduled date for the disciplinary hearing

related to this charge. Id. Carrithers signed for receipt of the disciplinary and advised that

he did not wish to call any witnesses. Upon completion of the noticed disciplinary hearing,

during which Carrithers had an opportunity to present evidence, provide testimony and

question the arresting officer, the hearing officer, Kayla Albritton, found Carrithers guilty

of the charged offense. Id. at 4. The sanctions approved for this disciplinary infraction

consisted of the loss of all privileges and placement in segregation for thirty days. Id.

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The Supreme Court has identified two circumstances in which a prisoner, an

individual already deprived of his liberty in the ordinary sense, can be further deprived of

his liberty such that due process is required. “The first is when a change in a prisoner’s

conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by

the court. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d

418 (1995); see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64, 63

L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being

transferred to a mental hospital). The second is when the state has consistently given a

certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the

deprivation of that benefit ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at

2300; see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d

935 (1974) (prisoners may not be deprived of statutory ‘good-time credits’ without due

process); cf. Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (11 Cir.1984) (explaining how

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the state createsliberty interests). In the firstsituation, the liberty interest exists apart from

the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by the state.” Bass v. Perrin,

170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11 Cir. 1999).

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The Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to

more adverse conditions of confinement. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-486 (disciplinary

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confinement of inmate in segregation does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty

interest); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7 Cir. 2005) (“The punishments[inmate]

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suffered because of his disciplinary conviction (demotion in status, segregation, and

transfer) raise no due process concerns.”); see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225

(1976) (No liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to

maximum-securityprison because “[c]onfinement in anyofthe State’sinstitutionsis within

the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to

impose.”). Moreover, an inmate in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally

protected interest in the privileges bestowed upon him or confinement in the least

restrictive prison environment because the resulting restraints are not so severe that they

exceed the sentence imposed upon him. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (“Discipline by prison

officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters

of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”). In addition, a temporary denial of privileges

does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Thus, the deprivationsimposed

uponCarrithers based on the challenged disciplinarydid not “exceed the sentence [imposed

by the trial court] in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due

Process Clause of its own force.” Id. This court must therefore determine whether the

actions about which Carrithers complains involve the deprivation of a state-created liberty

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interest as defined by the standard set forth in Sandin.

As the Supreme Court opined,

Sandin involved prisoners’ claims to procedural due process

protection before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed

as discipline for disruptive behavior. Sandin observed that some of our

earlier cases, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675

(1983), in particular, had employed a methodology for identifying statecreated liberty interests that emphasized “the language of a particular

[prison] regulation” instead of “the nature of the deprivation.” Sandin, 515

U.S., at 481, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Sandin, we criticized this methodology as

creating a disincentive for States to promulgate procedures for prison

management, and as involving the federal courts in the day-to-day

management of prisons. Id., at 482-483, 115 S.Ct. 2293. For these reasons,

we abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular

regulations.

“[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory language in

prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the

liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has come to return to

the due process principles we believe were correctly established in and

applied in Wolff and Meachum. Following Wolff, we recognize that States

may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected

by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an

unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause

of its own force, nonethelessimposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 483-484,

115 S.Ct. 2293 (citations and footnote omitted).

After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the

existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive

conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those

conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves “in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293.

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393-2394 (2005).

Applying the Sandin inquiry, the court concludes that the temporary loss of

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privileges and short-term confinement in segregation “though concededly punitive, do[]

notrepresent a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of the sentence imposed upon

the plaintiff. Id. at 485. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the aforementioned

sanctionsfail to “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Thus, Carrithers’ due process claim fails

under the law as established in Sandin.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before February 23, 2015 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981,

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en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 5th day of February, 2015.

/s/ Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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