Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00544/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00544-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COREY BURGESS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

HECTOR ALFONSO RIOS, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—00544-AWI-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS IN THE FIRST

AMENDED PETITION CONCERNING

CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND

VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE SIXTH,

EIGHTH, NINTH, AND THIRTEENTH

AMENDMENTS (DOC. 7)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DENY PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (DOC.

10) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

REFER THE PROCEEDING BACK TO THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO DIRECT THE

FILING OF A RESPONSE TO THE

REMAINING CLAIMS IN THE PETITION

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the first

amended petition (FAP), which was filed on May 3, 2012, after

1

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner’s original petition was dismissed with leave to amend.

I. Screening the Petition 

The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts (Habeas Rules) are appropriately applied to

proceedings undertaken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas Rule

1(b). Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court

must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from

the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court....” Habeas Rule 4;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is

not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point

to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at

420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

The requirement that the petitioner allege specific facts and

show the relationship of the facts to the claim is consistent

with the purpose of the Habeas Rules, which is to assist the

district court in determining whether the respondent should be

ordered to show cause why the writ should not be granted and to

permit the filing of an answer that satisfies the requirement

that it address the allegations in the petition. Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). Allegations in a petition that are

vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

2

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the United States

Penitentiary at Atwater, California (USPA) serving a seventyseven-month sentence imposed in September 2008 in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for

being a felon in possession of a firearm. (FAP, 1-2.) 

Petitioner complains of a finding, made by a disciplinary hearing

officer (DHO) at the Federal Correctional Institution at Memphis

(FCIM), that Petitioner had committed an assault upon a fellow

inmate on September 7, 2009, in connection with incident report

number 19443315. The finding resulted in a loss of forty days of

good time credit, placement in the secured housing unit for five

months, and limitations of various privileges.

Petitioner raises the following claims in the FAP: 1) his

rights under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause,

Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and various program statements

of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were violated by the delay in his

receipt of the report of the DHO, which resulted in obstruction

or extinction of Petitioner’s right to appeal the finding; 2) his

3

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, and his rights under the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the

Ninth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth

Amendment, as well as “CONSPIRACY, DOUBLE PUNISHMENT, SLANDER,

MALFEASANCE, FALSE DECLARATION, DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, GROSS

NEGLIGENCE, AND DISCRIMINATION” (FAP 6) were violated by the

hearing officer’s finding that Petitioner committed the assault

because a) there was evidence contrary to the findings, and the

DHO should base a decision on the greater weight of the evidence,

b) the findings were “prejudice, bias, and impartial” (id. at 6),

which appears to constitute a claim of a biased DHO or

disciplinary tribunal, c) Petitioner was not permitted to present

any evidence, d) Petitioner was not permitted to amend his notice

to request staff representation when it was made clear to him

that his full statement was not submitted with a “515" or “SIS”

report (id. at 7), e) his request for “camera review” was not

admissible, and f) his statement to Lieutenant J. Phillips, an

investigator, that Petitioner had been in a struggle with inmate

Young, was coerced; 3) Petitioner’s rights to due process under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protection from cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and protection

from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment were

violated by the failure to follow various program statements of

the BOP which require full review of the findings, keeping of

records of the hearing and supporting documents in central files,

4

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and hearing by three staff members instead of two; 4) 1

Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth,

Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as “CONSPIRACY”

(id. at 9) were violated by a conspiracy among the investigating

officer, Lieutenant J. Phillips, and the warden, associate

warden, Captain Phil Roberts, and Lieutenant J. Elam at FCIM,

when a) Petitioner was deceived by Lt. Phillips’ statement that

Petitioner was not being referred for prosecution or being

charged with an assault, b) Petitioner’s statement was not

included in a report, nor was there any mention of how Young’s

injuries were inflicted, how Petitioner incurred a scratch on his

face, or of the use of any weapon, c) various program statements

concerning the qualifications and certifications of the

investigating officer and the duty of an investigating officer to

provide a report, read charges, and state the reason for any

delay were disregarded, and d) Lieutenant S. Plunkett undertook a

second investigation but refused to record Petitioner’s

statement, and unspecified evidence was overlooked. 

Petitioner seeks monetary relief for settlement of his claim

on each level of appeal; an injunction or declaration that

detention in the United States Prison system is arbitrary,

unlawful, and unconstitutional; injunctive relief against

transfer, detention, destruction of files, and staff interference

and retaliation; surrender of all evidence related to the

incident report, including the full names of all staff involved;

In his third claim, Petitioner repeats some of the allegations of the

1

previous two claims; in the interest of economy, the repetitive allegations

are not repeated in the Court’s summary of the claims.

5

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expungement of the incident report and all subsequent incident

reports; restoration of Petitioner’s good conduct credits, all

points, and his former custody classification; dismissal of close

supervision; and transfer or release to a residential drug abuse

program. (FAP at 11.)

II. Conditions of Confinement 

A federal court may not entertain an action over which it

has no jurisdiction. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a person

in custody under the authority of the United States if the

petitioner can show that he is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) & (3). Specifically, a habeas corpus action

is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the fact or

duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

485 (1973); Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991);

Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1990). However,

to the extent that the prisoner seeks damages or injunctive

relief for civil rights violations, the prisoner’s claim or

claims are properly brought in an action pursuant to Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See,

Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d at 332.

Here, Petitioner’s complaints concerning conspiracy,

retaliation, slander, deliberate indifference, gross negligence,

discrimination, deceptive statements concerning the authorities’

intentions concerning prosecution or charges, and limitations on

various privileges in prison relate not to the legality or

6

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

duration of Petitioner’s confinement, but rather to the

conditions of Petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner is seeking

relief related to the conditions of confinement to the extent

that he seeks monetary and injunctive relief concerning staff

interference and retaliation, orders concerning the possession of

evidence relating to the incident report, changes in Petitioner’s

classification points and custody classification, termination of

close supervision, and transfer or release to a residential drug

abuse program.

As Petitioner is challenging his conditions of confinement,

and not matters relating to the legality or duration of his

confinement, these claims are not cognizable in this proceeding

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It will, therefore, be recommended

that these claims be dismissed without leave to amend and without

prejudice to bringing them in a civil rights action pursuant to

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). 

III. Violations of Program Statements 

Petitioner alleges that various program statements of the

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were violated by actions of BOP staff. 

For example, Petitioner complains of the failure to include

Petitioner’s statement in a report, a delay in Petitioner’s

receipt of the DHO’s report, the extent of the BOP’s review of

the findings, the manner in which records of the disciplinary

hearing were stored in the central files, the identity and

qualifications of the staff members who heard the violation, the

reading of charges, and a statement of the reasons for delay.

///

7

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The BOP’s purported noncompliance with a program statement

has been held not to be a violation of federal law because a

program statement is an internal agency guideline that may be

altered by the BOP at will; it is not subject to the

Administrative Procedure Act’s procedures of public notice and

comment. Thus, such noncompliance does not state a claim

cognizable in a 2241 proceeding. Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224,

1227-29 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over such a claim. Id. 

Thus, to the extent that Petitioner is challenging mere

violations of program statements, as distinct from violations of

the Constitution, federal statute, or other established federal

law, it will be recommended that his claims be dismissed without

leave to amend.

IV. Equal Protection 

Petitioner alleges generally that the delay in his receipt

of the DHO’s report violated his rights under the Equal

Protection Clause. (Pet. 3.)

Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on

race, religion, or membership in a protected class subject to

restrictions and limitations necessitated by legitimate

penological interests. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

(1974); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979). The Equal

Protection Clause essentially directs that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Texas v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Violations of

equal protection are shown when a respondent intentionally

8

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discriminates against a petitioner based on membership in a

protected class, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686

(9th Cir. 2001), or when a respondent intentionally treats a

member of an identifiable class differently from other similarly

situated individuals without a rational basis, or a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose, for the difference in

treatment, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000); Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S.

591, 601-02 (2008).

Petitioner has not alleged that membership in a protected

class was the basis of any alleged discrimination, or that there

was any intentional treatment of Petitioner that was different

from the treatment of any similarly situated individuals. 

Further, neither Petitioner’s allegations of fact nor his 

documentation in support of the FAP suggests that a tenable equal

protection claim could be stated if leave to amend were granted. 

In sum, Petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error based on

the Equal Protection Clause. It does not appear that Petitioner

could state a tenable equal protection claim if leave to amend

were granted. Accordingly, it will be recommended that

Petitioner’s equal protection claim be dismissed without leave to

amend. 

V. Sixth Amendment Claims 

Petitioner alleges generally that his rights under the Sixth

Amendment were violated by the delay in his receipt of the DHO’s

report, the finding that he had committed the assault, and the

procedures used in connection with the hearing and post-hearing

9

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

process, which Petitioner alleged were in violation of various

program statements. (Pet. 3, 9-10.)

Other than a general reference to the Sixth Amendment,

Petitioner does not set forth or suggest a legal theory or basis

for his claims. Petitioner does not allege specific facts that

tend to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

Petitioner has failed to set forth facts that point to a

real possibility of constitutional error. Because the Sixth

Amendment relates to rights an accused enjoys in the course of

criminal prosecutions, and because Petitioner’s claim relates to 2

the conduct of the BOP in connection with a disciplinary

violation, it does not appear that Petitioner could plead a

tenable claim for relief if leave to amend were granted. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment claims be dismissed without leave to amend.

VI. Ninth Amendment Claim

Petitioner alleges generally that his rights under the Ninth

Amendment were violated by the delay in his receipt of the DHO’s

report. (Pet. 3-5.) 

The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the

Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny

or disparage others retained by the people. U.S. Const. amend.

IX. Other than a general reference to the Ninth Amendment,

Petitioner does not set forth or suggest a legal theory or basis

for his claim. Petitioner does not allege specific facts that

tend to show a violation of the Ninth Amendment. 

The Sixth Amendment expressly provides in pertinent part, “In all

2

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to....”

10

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner has failed to set forth facts that point to a

real possibility of constitutional error. Because the Ninth

Amendment relates to rights retained by the people, whereas

Petitioner’s claim relates to the conduct of the BOP in

connection with a disciplinary violation, it does not appear that

Petitioner could plead a tenable claim for relief if leave to

amend were granted. Accordingly, it will be recommended that

Petitioner’s Ninth Amendment claim be dismissed without leave to

amend.

VII. Thirteenth Amendment Claim 

Petitioner alleges generally that the delay in receipt of

the DHO’s report violated his rights under the Thirteenth

Amendment (pet. 3-5), which proscribes slavery and involuntary

servitude “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party

shall have been duly convicted,” and empowers Congress to enforce

the article. U.S. Const. amend. 13.

Where a person is duly tried, convicted, sentenced, and

imprisoned for crime in accordance with law, no issue of peonage

or involuntary servitude arises. Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193,

197 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 982 (1964). Even if

Petitioner had been required to work as a penalty for the

disciplinary violation, such a work requirement would have been

imposed in accordance with prison rules, and thus the Thirteenth

Amendment would be inapplicable. Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056,

1057 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the documentation of the

disciplinary proceedings in the present case does not indicate

that any work was imposed as a penalty in connection with

Petitioner’s assault of his fellow inmate. 

11

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner has failed to allege facts that point to a real

possibility of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, it will

be recommended that Petitioner’s Thirteenth Amendment claim be

dismissed without leave to amend.

VIII. Eighth Amendment Claims 

Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Eighth

Amendment were violated by the delay in his receipt of the report

of the DHO, the finding of guilt, and the pre-hearing and posthearing processes used by the prison authorities that were

allegedly in violation of program statements. (Pet. 3-4, 8-10.)

The Eight Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive

fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. Const. amend.

VIII. Pursuant to the analysis set forth above in connection

with Bivens claims concerning conditions of confinement,

Petitioner's complaint regarding his prison conditions as

distinct from his loss of good time credits should be dismissed

without leave to amend because it concerns conditions of

confinement and should be raised in a Bivens suit.

Petitioner's complaint regarding his loss of forty days of

conduct credit similarly fails to allege facts that point to a

real possibility of a violation of the Eighth Amendment. There

is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally

released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Swarthout v.

Cooke, 562 U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862 (2011). A criminal

sentence that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime for

which a defendant is convicted may violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan,

501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Rummel v.

12

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). Outside of the capital

punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences

that are extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. 

United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring)). Such instances are “exceedingly

rare” and occur in only “extreme” cases. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. at 72-73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. As long as a sentence

does not exceed statutory maximums, it will not be considered

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See,

United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1998);

United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990).

Petitioner appears to be alleging that adding forty days to

his sentence of seventy-seven months for a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Title 18

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) provides that one who knowingly violates §

922(g) shall be fined, imprisoned not more than ten years, or

both. There is no indication that the loss of forty days of

conduct credit, when added to the seventy-seven months of

Petitioner’s sentence, would exceed the statutory maximum of ten

years of imprisonment. Thus, it would not constitute cruel and

unusual punishment.

To the extent that Petitioner’s cruel and unusual punishment

claim relates to the duration of Petitioner’s confinement, it

does not entitle Petitioner to relief. Further, if leave to

amend were granted, Petitioner could not allege a tenable cruel

and unusual punishment claim relating to the duration of his

confinement.

13

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, it will be recommended that to the extent that

Petitioner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment sounds in

habeas corpus, it be dismissed without leave to amend.

IX. Petititioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

 Order

On June 21, 2012, Petitioner filed in this habeas proceeding

a motion for a temporary restraining order in which he complained

of limitations on his privileges and the use of allegedly

excessive force by prison staff in retaliation for Petitioner’s

having protested various limitations on his privileges. A

reading the motion in its entirety reveals that Petitioner is

challenging the conditions of his confinement, not the fact or

duration of that confinement. 

Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 extends to a prisoner who shows that the custody

violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A habeas corpus petition is the

correct method for a prisoner to challenge the legality or

duration of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485

(1973)); Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (Habeas Rules), 1976 Adoption.

In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the

conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S.

136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at

574; Advisory Committee Note to Habeas Rule 1, 1976 Adoption. 

///

14

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because in the motions Petitioner seeks to challenge the

conditions of his confinement, and not the legality or duration

of his confinement, these particular claims are cognizable in a

civil rights action rather than a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s

motion be denied. 

X. Recommendations

In summary, Petitioner raises various claims in the

petition, including but not limited to denials of due process of

law and violations of federal law in connection with disciplinary

proceedings which resulted in a loss of good time credits and a

disciplinary placement.

Insofar as Petitioner alleges violations of the Equal

Protection Clause, the Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth

Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, various program statements, and

claims concerning the Petitioner’s conditions of confinement,

Petitioner’s claims must be dismissed without leave to amend.

However, with respect to the remainder of claims in the FAP, 

Respondent should be ordered to file a response to the FAP.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Petitioner’s claims in the FAP concerning violations of

the Equal Protection Clause, the Sixth Amendment, Eighth

Amendment, Ninth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, various program

statements, and claims concerning the Petitioner’s conditions of

confinement be DISMISSED without leave to amend; and

2) Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order be

DENIED; and 

3) With respect to the remaining claims in the petition,

15

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the proceeding be REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge to direct

Respondent to file a response to the FAP.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if

served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

Case 1:12-cv-00544-AWI-SKO Document 11 Filed 07/05/12 Page 16 of 16