Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01470/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NATIONAL COMMODITY AND BARTER 

ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL COMMODITY 

EXCHANGE; MEMBERS & SUBSCRIBERS 

OF THE NATIONAL COMMODITY & BARTER 

ASSOCIATION/NATIONAL COMMODITY 

EXCHANGE; JOHN VOSS; MITCHELL BEALS, 

individually and as representative 

of the National Commodity & Barter 

Association/National Commodity 

Exchange; JOHN s. PLEASANT, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cim1it 

SEP 2 ·5 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 88-1470 

LAWRENCE B. GIBBS, Individually and as ) 

Commissioner of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; ROSCOE EGGER, JR., ) 

Individually and as Former Commissioner ) 

of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

LARRY D. BERGSGAARD, Individually and ) 

as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; JAMES MOLNAR, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of ) 

the Internal Revenue Service; GREGORY ) 

MYRE, Individually and as Special Agent ) 

of the Internal Revenue Service; THOMAS) 

McANDREWS, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

PATRICK HENRY, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; JERRY BANDY, Individually and ) 

as Group Manager of the Internal Revenue) 

Service; DONNA BECKMAN, Individually ) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; DARRYL WATKINS, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of ) 

the Internal Revenue Service; MIKE ) 

NELSON, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

RONALD J. WOOD, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; MICHAEL MANEY, Individually ) 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 1 
and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; MARVIN KOEL, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of ) 

the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

A.R. DEMETER, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; ALVIN C. JAMES, Individually ) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; ROGER L. WIRTH, ) 

Individually and ·as Special Agent of ) 

the Internal Revenue Service; PHIL ) 

HOPKINS, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

MICHAEL MALLEY, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; HOWARD MULHOLLAND, Individually) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; ROBERT STELLMACHER, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; RICHARD CARL, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; DENNIS ) 

GRUHLKE, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

BILLY WATERS, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; LORA SCHILLING, Individually ) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; LESTER FURR, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of ) 

the Internal Revenue Service; NATHAN ) 

WOODARD, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

FRANK LaVIA, Individually and as Special) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

DAN NYE, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

C.D. SWITZER, Individually and as ) 

District Director of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; GLENN L. ARCHER, ) 

Individually and as Assistant Attorney ) 

General, U.S. Department of Justice; ) 

GERALD w. LELAND, Individually and as ) 

Assistant District Counsel of the ) 

Internal Revenue Service; GARY A. PACEY,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; THOMAS ABEL, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; DAVID ) 

PETERSON, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

ALBERT J. MONICA, Individually and as ) 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 2 
Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; CHARLES YOUNG, Individually and) 

as Special Agent of the Internal Revenue) 

Service; JOSEPH A. BROUSSEAU, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; JOHN E. ) 

KELLER, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

CHARLES HOLDEN, Individually and as ) 

Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; PAULETTE G. JOHNSON, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; KEITH MUELLER,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; LYNN M. ROSE, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; RONALD ) 

URBANSKI, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

KEVIN WHALEN, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; ROBERT GALBRAITH, Individually) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; GREG BERENT, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; BEN BAKER, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; CEIL CLARO, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; GARY RENVILLE,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; PATRICIA ) 

REESE, Individually and as Special Agent) 

of the Internal Revenue Service; ED ) 

DAVIS, Individually and as Special Agent) 

of the Internal Revenue Service; FRANK ) 

CONTOS, JR., Individually and as Special) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

DONALD LEWIS, Individually and as ) 

Assistant United States Attorney; ) 

WILLIAM SWARTZ, Individually and as ) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; LINDA DUNLAP, Individually and) 

as Special Agent of the Internal Revenue) 

Service; MOLLY MOTT, Individually and as) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; WILLIAM KENNEDAY, Individually) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; JERRY BAKER, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; DENIS VOSSLER,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 3 
Internal Revenue Service; TIMOTHY ) 

FORTUNE, Individually and as Special ) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

JIM WHALEN, Individually and as Special) 

Agent of the Internal Revenue Service; ) 

DENNIS KLEINVACHTER, Individually and as) 

Special Agent of the Internal Revenue ) 

Service; PAULA SIMMONS, Individually and) 

as Special Agent of the Internal Revenue) 

Service; WAYNE JACKSON, Individually and) 

as Special Agent of the Internal Revenue) 

Service; CHRISTINE JACKSON, Individually) 

and as Special Agent of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service; KATHLEEN RYAN, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; ROSANNE ODDO, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; THOMAS LAVIN, ) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; ALAN ANDERSON,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; HENRY BRUMMER,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; RALPH JOHNSON,) 

Individually and as Special Agent of the) 

Internal Revenue Service; and NUMEROUS ) 

JOHN DOES and MARY ROES, Individually ) 

and as Special Agents of the Internal ) 

Revenue Service/United States Postal ) 

Service and/or Department of Justice, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 87-Z-500) 

William A. Cohan (Jennifer A. Greene, Cohan & Greene, Denver, 

Colorado and John S. Pleasant, prose, with him on the brief), of 

Cohan & Greene, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Ann Belanger Durney, Attorney (William S. Rose, Jr., Assistant 

Attorney General, Gary R. Allen, Regina S. Moriarty, Attorneys, 

Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and 

Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, of 

counsel, with her on the brief), Tax Division, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 4 
Before LOGAN, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

The National Commodity and Barter Association, the National 

Commodity Exchange, and certain individual members of these 

organizations (collectively referred to as the NCBA) instituted 

this action in federal court, naming several federal agencies and 

numerous federal employees as defendants. The NCBA alleged direct 

violations of its first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights 

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). It additionally claimed that 

the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy and pattern of 

racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961, 1962 (1982 & 

Supp. IV 1986), by their continued, unwarranted investigation and 

harassment of the organization pursuant to the IRS' "Illegal Tax 

Protester Project" and by their collection of unlawful penalties 

under the Internal Revenue Code. It requested injunctive relief 

and damages for these alleged violations. In addition, the NCBA 

requested the district court declare unconstitutional the statute 

authorizing the collection of the above penalties, 26 u.s.c. 

§ 6700(a)(l982 & Supp. IV 1986). 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 5 
The defendants thereafter moved for dismissal of the 

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After a hearing on the 

motion, the district court ruled for the defendants, issuing its 

findings orally from the bench. The court held that the 

plaintiffs' cause of action against the defendants in their 

official capacities was barred by the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity and that there had been no waiver of that immunity under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act. It further held that the NCBA's 

damages claim against the defendants in their individual 

capacities was barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity and 

that its claim for injunctive relief was precluded by the 

Anti-Injunction Act, 26 u.s.c. § 7421 (1982). Finally, the court 

ruled that the NCBA had not overcome the presumption that 26 

u.s.c. § 6700 was constitutional. The NCBA now appeals to this 

court, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the 

district court for additional proceedings. 

I. Procedural Matters 

The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) presents a question of law which we review de novo, and 

we apply the same standard as did the district court below. 

Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Under this rule, the dismissal of a complaint is proper if, taking 

all well-pleaded facts as true and construing them in the light 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 6 
most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff 

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 

entitle him to relief. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Co., 868 F.2d 

1147, 1148 (10th Cir. 1989). We conclude that, except for the 

NCBA's Bivens claims for violations of the first and fourth 

amendments, dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was 

appropriate in this case. 

At the outset, we note that the NCBA's second amended 

complaint consists of some thirty-five single-spaced pages, over 

twenty-five of which are comprised of "general allegations" 

describing events spanning a period of approximately eight years. 

These allegations catalogue various policies and activities which 

the NCBA characterizes as designed to "demoralize, paralyze, and 

ultimately destroy a 

association 

noncommercial, voluntary, 

political/educational of individuals advocating 

dissident views as to the tax, monetary and fiscal law and 

policies of the government." Many of the allegations purport to 

detail these activities by listing the partlcular federal agents 

involved in them; however, there is little identification, if any, 

of the persons targeted by these activities, the specific dates of 

the events, or the particular property seized. 

In addition, the narrative indicates that, in a number of 

instances, the NCBA has already commenced, if not pursued 

successfully, actions challenging many of the above events. 1 The 

1 In this circuit alone, see, for example, Pleasant v. Lovell, 

876 F.2d 787 (10th 

1463 (10th Cir. 1987); 

1985}; In re First 

Cir. 1989); Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 

Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 

Nat'l Bank, Englewood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115 

(continued on next page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 7 
complaint does not indicate how the claims raised in this case are 

distinguishable from those raised in earlier actions; indeed, it 

would appear that the prior resolution of several issues, 

particularly with respect to the jeopardy assessments challenged 

herein, would preclude their relitigation in this forum. It is 

likewise nearly impossible to discern how the fifty-seven general 

allegations in the complaint can be structured to support the 

required elements of each of the six separate claims for relief in 

this case, and the NCBA's briefs on appeal do little to resolve 

this dilemma. 

In sum, this complaint does not present a "short and plain" 

statement of the claims raised by the NCBA, as required by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Nor do the NCBA's briefs in this appeal 

meet the requirement of Fed. R. A~p. P. 28 to demonstrate to this 

court the basis for the alleged error. While we have a duty to 

determine in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion whether the complaint states a 

conceivable cause of action, we are not required to manufacture a 

party's argument on appeal when it has failed in its burden to 

draw our attention to the error below. See United States v. 

Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 493 (10th Cir. 1985); cf. 9 J. Moore, B. 

Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, 11 228.02[4] at 28-10 to 

-11 (2d ed. 1989). Despite the vague, disorganized, and rambling 

nature of the complaint, however, it is possible to conclude that 

(continued from previous page) 

(10th Cir. 1983); Heinold Hog Market, Inc. v. McCoy, 700 F.2d 611 

(10th Cir. 1983); National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. United 

States, 625 F. Supp. 920 (D. Colo. 1986). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 8 
a number of the NCBA's claims must be dismissed. As to those 

remaining claims, we remand to the district court with directions 

to permit an amended complaint which outlines in clear, direct and 

understandable terms the precise factual allegations to support 

each essential element of these claims. 

We additionally note that the complaint identifies as 

plaintiffs not only the NCBA and several named individuals, but 

also the "members & subscribers of the National Commodity & Barter 

Association/National Commodity Exchange." In detailing the 

allegations against the defendants, the complaint does not further 

specify the names of the individual members of the NCBA whose 

rights were allegedly violated, and counsel for the NCBA stated 

during oral argument that this was to protect the anonymity and 

first amendment freedom of association of these individuals 

allegedly recognized by this court in In re First National Bank of 

Englewood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983). 2 

2 The NCBA's reliance on In re First National Bank is 

misplaced. In that case, this court held that the NCBA and 

certain named individuals had standing to challenge the federal 

government's seizure of certain bank records of the accounts of 

the NCBA, some of which identified individual members of the NCBA, 

701 F.2d at 117-18, and that these parties had made a sufficient 

showing of a potential first amendment violation to warrant an 

evidentiary hearing whether the government's interest in seizing 

these documents was sufficient to overcome the parties' first 

amendment associational rights, id. at 118-19. The issue of 

whether members of the NCBA could bring a civil action in an 

anonymous capacity was not raised or considered. Moreover, unlike 

In re First National Bank, the parties in this case seek to invoke 

the power of the federal court in an action raising serious claims 

and requesting substantial damages against the defendants, yet 

they desire to remain anonymous not only to the general public but 

to the defendants as well. To permit this case to progress in 

this manner would deny the defendants any ability to defend 

against the claims against them, as it is virtually impossible to 

determine the precise activities of which the plaintiffs complain. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 9 
Rule lO(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 

that "[e]very pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the 

name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and a 

designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint, the title of the 

action shall include the names of all the parties II The 

Federal Rules thus make no provision for suits by persons using 

fictitious names or for anonymous plaintiffs. Coe v. United 

States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411, 415 (10th Cir. 1982). In 

certain limited circumstances, however, courts have permitted a 

plaintiff to proceed using a fictitious name where there are 

significant privacy interests or threats of physical harm 

implicated by the disclosure of the plaintiff's name. See, e.g., 

id. at 415-17 (collecting cases); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 

(5th Cir. 1981); Doe v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 

437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). This procedure has not been permitted when 

only the plaintiff's economic or professional concerns are 

involved, see, e.g., Coe, 676 F.2d at 417; Southern Methodist 

Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 

713 (5th Cir. 1979); Free Market Com:eensation v. Commodity 

Exchange, Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), or when there is 

the threat of criminal or civil prosecution, see, e.g., Doe v. 

Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 161-62 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 

In this case, the unnamed plaintiffs have made no request to 

the district court for permission to proceed anonymously, nor have 

they otherwise disclosed their identities to the court or to the 

defendants. Absent permission by the district court to proceed 

anonymously, and under such other conditions as the court may 

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Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 10 
impose (such as requiring disclosure of their true identity under 

seal), the federal courts lack jurisdiction over the unnamed 

parties, as a case has not been commenced with respect to them. 3 

See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 183; Doe v. United States Dept. 

of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982). We therefore 

dismiss the complaint as to the unnamed members of the NCBA, and 

consider the remainder of the claims in this appeal solely with 

respect to NCBA as an associational entity. 4 

II. Sovereign Immunity 

NCBA has raised a number of claims against each of the 

defendants in their official capacities as officers or employees 

of the federal government. Addressing these claims, the district 

court correctly noted that they are barred by the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity. It is well-settled that the United States 

retains its sovereign immunity from suit unless it has expressly 

waived such immunity and that the application of this doctrine 

cannot be avoided simply by naming agencies of the federal 

government or their individual officers and employees. See 

Atkinson v. O'Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir. 1989). The NCBA 

3 Although the defendants did not raise this issue in their 

brief, it is jurisdictional and the court may consider it sua 

sponte. Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 

(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1534 (1989). 

4 We likewise dismiss the complaint as those individual members 

of the NCBA who were specifically named--John Voss, Mitchell 

Beals, and John Pleasants-- since the complaint is devoid of any 

direct allegations of unlawful acts against the property or rights 

of these persons. 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 11 
attempts to avoid this bar by arguing that sovereign immunity has 

been waived by virtue of the NCBA's compliance with the 

jurisdictional requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982). We disagree. 

While the FTCA contains a limited waiver of the federal 

government's sovereign immunity, it expressly excludes from its 

coverage "any claim arising in respect of the assessment or 

collection of any tax •.•• " 28 u.s.c. § 2680(c). The NCBA 

argues that the actions of the defendants alleged to be illegal in 

this case do not arise out of the assessment or collection of a 

tax. However, the central theme of the NCBA's complaint relates 

to the defendants' assessment of penalties for the promotion of an 

abusive tax shelter, activities which clearly relate to the 

federal government's tax assessment and collection functions. We 

therefore conclude that the NCBA's complaint is governed by the 

§ 2680(c) exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. 

See Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 845 

F.2d 113, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1988)(IRS agents' actions in denying 

organization tax exempt status held to be within the exemption for 

conduct connected with the assessment or collection of taxes); 

Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 

198l)("Congress intended to insulate the IRS from tort liability 

stemming from any of its revenue-raising activities," including 

the taking· of photographs alleged to be a tortious invasion of 

privacy); Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 

1975)(IRS agents' actions in informing creditors of taxpayer's 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 12 
purported tax liability leading them to deny the taxpayer further 

credit fell squarely within the§ 2680(c) exception). 5 

The NCBA also attempts to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity 

by arguing that 28 u.s.c. § 2410(a) (1982) affords it a remedy 

against the defendants' actions in this case. This section waives 

the United States' sovereign immunity in a civil action to quiet 

title, foreclose a mortgage or lien, partition, condemn, or 

interplead with respect to property upon which the United States 

has or claims a lien. Id. Again, a fair reading of the complaint 

indicates that this is an action for damages and injunctive relief 

based on constitutional and RICO claims relating to the alleged 

improprieties of federal agents in their assessment and collection 

of penalties against the NCBA, despite the NCBA's attempt on 

appeal to color it as a quiet title action under § 2410. In 

addition, because the NCBA clearly seeks to attack the validity of 

the underlying penalty assessments, Laino v. United States, 633 

F.2d 626, 633 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980), and seeks monetary damages, 

~inger v. Basile, 645 F. Supp. 1517, 1526 (D. Colo. 1986), we 

5 The NCBA argues, however, that the § 2680(c) exception is 

inapplicable in this case because it has alleged that the tax 

assessments in question were not made according to statutory 

procedures requiring notice and demand. We disagree. A similar 

argument was raised in Murray v. United States, 686 F.2d 1320 (8th 

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983), in which the court 

rejected the plaintiff's contention that a waiver of sovereign 

immunity must be implied when it is alleged that the IRS has 

failed to comply with its own procedures. We concur with the 

court's reasoning that "a waiver of immunity 'cannot be implied 

but must be unequivocally expressed,'" id. at 1325 (citation 

omitted), especially when it appears that existing tax appeal 

procedures are adequate to address its concerns with respect to 

the collection of the penalties in this case. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 13 
cannot construe this as a quiet title action under§ 2410. 6 Thus, 

lacking a waiver of sovereign immunity under either the FTCA or 

§ 2410, the NCBA cannot maintain its claims against the defendants 

in their official capacities. 

III. Bivens Claims 

Although we have concluded that the claims against the 

defendants in their official capacities are barred by the doctrine 

of sovereign immunity, the claims against the defendants in their 

individual capacities are not. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 

228, 245-48 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 

at 395-97; Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to these claims, the district court ruled that they 

were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity, as the 

defendants were simply carrying out their jobs and had not 

violated any clearly established laws in doing so. While we agree 

with the district court's reasoning that the defendants were 

entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' Bivens 

claims, we do not reach this issue. Rather, we first address 

6 While it is true that § 2410 provides jurisdiction for 

challenges to federal tax liens when procedural irregularities are 

alleged, the NCBA's allegations to this effect are without merit. 

The NCBA alleges that the defendants violated IRS procedures by 

filing liens and executing a levy by collection before giving the 

NCBA the required notice and demand under 26 u.s.c. §§ 6321, 

633l(a). However, § 633l(d)(3) permits the IRS to proceed 

immediately with the collection of a jeopardy assessment without 

the required notice and demand. A taxpayer seeking administrative 

review of the jeopardy assessment may then proceed under§ 7429 if 

he feels that the assessment was in error. 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 14 
whether the NCBA is entitled to raise a Bivens claim in the first 

instance. 

In Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 s. Ct. 2460 (1988), the Supreme 

Court outlined the considerations involved in determining whether 

a Bivens claim should be recognized. It noted the admonition, 

following from Bivens, that a court-created damages remedy may not 

be appropriate when ''special factors counsel[] hesitation": 

Our more recent decisions have responded cautiously 

to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new 

contexts. The absence of statutory relief for a 

constitutional violation, for example, does not by any 

means necessarily imply that courts should award money 

damages against the officers responsible for the 

violation. Thus, in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 

103 S. Ct. 2362, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983), we 

refused -- unanimously -- to create a Bivens action for 

enlisted military personnel who alleged that they had 

been injured by the unconstitutional actions of their 

superior officers and who had no remedy against the 

Government itself •••• 

Similarly, we refused again unanimously -- to 

create a Bivens remedy for a First Amendment violation 

"aris[ing] out of an employment relationship that is 

governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive 

provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United 

States." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S. Ct. 

2404, 2406, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983). In that case, a 

federal employee was demoted, allegedly in violation of 

the First Amendment, for making public statements 

critical of the agency for which he worked. He was 

reinstated through the administrative process, with 

retroactive seniority and full backpay, but he was not 

permitted to recover for any loss due to emotional 

distress or mental anguish, or for attorney's 

fees •• 

In sum, the concept of "special factors counselling 

hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 

Congress" has proved to include an appropriate judicial 

deference to indications that congressional inaction has 

not been inadvertent. When the design of a government 

program suggests that Congress has provided what it 

considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 

constitutional violations that may occur in the course 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-1470 Document: 01019937006 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 15 
of its administration, we have not created additional 

Bivens remedies. 

Id. at 2467-68. 

The Court then noted that the social security system in 

Chilicky, like the military justice system in Chappell v. Wallace 

and the civil service system in Bush v. Lucas, contains elaborate 

mechanisms for the resolution of claims, and that Congress had 

given frequent attention to problems arising under the system. 

Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2468-69. It therefore declined to create 

a Bivens remedy, notwithstanding that the social security system 

makes no provision for the award of monetary damages for the 

constitutional violations at issue, concluding that "'Congress is 

in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest 

would be served by creating [a Bivens remedy]."' Id. at 2469 

(quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390). 

The same considerations which led the Supreme Court in 

Chilicky to conclude that the recognition of a Bivens claim would 

be inappropriate are applicable here with respect to the NCBA's 

allegations of violations of the fifth amendment due process 

clause and of various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 7 

7 In a conclusory way, the NCBA also attempts to set forth an 

equal protection claim under the fifth amendment. Assuming this 

to be essentially a selective prosecution claim, we are unable to 

locate even the barest reference to the essential facts necessary 

to support such a claim. See C.E. Carlson v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 

1437 (10th Cir. 1988)(plaintiff must show that others similarly 

situated and committing same acts have not been prosecuted); 

Taylor v. United States, 798 F.2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1986)(same), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); United States v. Amon, 669 

F.2d 1351, 1356 n.l (10th Cir. 198l)(same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

1071 (1980); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 

1979)(same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982)·. It is therefore 

dismissed. 

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Although there may be no e~tablished mechanism for the recovery of 

damages against federal authorities for unconstitutional conduct, 

the unavailability of complete relief does not mandate the 

creation of a Bivens remedy when other "meaningful safeguards or 

remedies for the rights of persons situated as [were the 

plaintiffs]" are available. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2468. In 

this case, the NCBA has recourse to challenge the legality of the 

penalty assessments under several provisions of the Internal 

Revenue Code. Section 6703 of the Code sets forth the procedures 

by which a taxpayer may obtain review of the assessment of a 

penalty under § 6700 relating to the promotion of an abusive tax 

shelter. If such penalties are collected by virtue of a jeopardy 

assessment, as authorized under § 6671 and§ 6862 of the Code, 

then the assessment procedures may be challenged pursuant to 

§ 7429 of the Code. This plainly illustrates that the NCBA has 

"all sorts of rights against an overzealous officialdom, 

including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for 

a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the 

collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the 

remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage action 

against [the defendants]." Cameron v. Internal Revenue Serv., 773 

F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Baddour, Inc. v. United 

States, 802 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 1986); Pelak v. United States, 

677 F. Supp. 606, 607-08 (D. Minn. 1988). We therefore conclude 

that it would be inappropriate to recognize a Bivens remedy with 

respect to the NCBA's claims that the defendants violated the 

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fifth amendment and various provisions of the Internal Revenue 

Code. 

The NCBA also raises first and fourth amendment Bivens 

claims. In Pleasant v. Lovell, without directly considering the 

issue, this court permitted individuals to proceed in first and 

fourth amendment Bivens. claims against agents of the Internal 

Revenue Service for certain activities also described in the 

complaint at issue in this case. See 876 F.2d at 793-806. 

Implicit in our holding in Pleasant is the recognition that, while 

the comprehensive scheme of the Internal Revenue Code should not 

be indiscriminately disrupted by the creation of new remedies, 

certain values, such as those protected by the first and fourth 

amendments, may be superior to the need to protect the integrity 

of the internal revenue system. We therefore recognize that the 

NCBA may bring a Bivens action for violations of the first and 

fourth amendments. However, due to the obtuse language of much of 

the complaint, we are unable to discern the precise factual basis 

for each of these claims. We therefore remand to the district 

court with directions that the court permit the NCBA to file an 

amended complaint which clearly outlines the basis for each of 

these claims, consistent with our discussion in Section I above. 

In addition, since we have dismissed the complaint as to all 

parties except the NCBA, it is imperative that the amended 

complaint clearly indicate the property held by the NCBA as an 

entity which has been subject to the allegedly illegal searches 

and seizures. The NCBA can sue only with respect to its own 

property or rights allegedly infringed by identifiable defendants. 

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If the district court determines that the NCBA has set forth 

sufficient facts to state a claim under the first and fourth 

amendments, it should then reconsider whether the defendants are 

entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. 

IV. Remaining Claims 

In addition to its Bivens claims against the individual 

defendants, the NCBA has alleged RICO violations and has requested 

declaratory and injunctive relief. We are unable to discern the 

basis of the NCBA's RICO claim from the complaint, the NCBA has 

made no attempt to further define this claim in this appeal, and 

it has not provided any authority that such a claim will lie 

against a group of federal officials on account of their 

misconduct. Thus, we affirm its dismissal. See Glenn v. First 

Nat'l Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 

1989}(court need not do appellant's work by "connect[ing] 

assertions with elements of all sections of the RICO law."). 

As to the NCBA's argument that it is entitled to injunctive 

relief, the Anti-Injunction Act, with limited exceptions, 

precludes any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment 

or collection of any tax . by any person, whether or not such 

person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." 26 

u.s.c. § 742l(a}. The NCBA seeks to avoid this restriction on the 

court's jurisdiction by asserting that a judicially created 

exception to this statute applies. This exception allows a 

taxpayer to obtain an injunction if "(l} the government cannot 

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prevail under any set of circumstances, and (2) irreparable injury 

would otherwise occur." National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. 

United States, 625 F. Supp. 920, 921 (D. Colo. 1986)(citing Enochs 

v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-8, reh'g 

denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962)). The NCBA has previously attempted 

to obtain. injunctive relief under this exception with respect to 

the same penalties at issue in this case, and such relief was 

denied. See id. at 921-24. It is therefore precluded from 

relitigating this question in this forum. 

Finally, the NCBA requests this court to declare 

unconstitutional the Internal Revenue Code provision authorizing 

the assessment of the above penalties for the promotion of an 

abusive tax shelter, 26 U.S.C. § 6700. Apart from our inability 

to discern any basis for this argument from the complaint or the 

NCBA's briefs, we note that other courts have upheld the 

constitutionality of similar penalty statutes based on the appeal 

procedures provided by§ 6703, a conclusion we would be inclined 

to reach with respect to§ 6700 had the NCBA adequately presented 

this issue on appeal. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 796 

F.2d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1986); Jolly v. United States, 764 F.2d 

642, 645-47 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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