Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00956/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00956-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

KATHLEEN FREEMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:15-cv-956-MHT

)

RUSSELL COUNTY SHERIFF )

HEATH TAYLOR )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this case was referred to the undersigned United States 

Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and 

conclusions of law (Doc. 3, entered January 4, 2016). Now pending before the Court is 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 15, filed 5/24/16). The motion is

fully submitted and ripe for review. For good cause shown, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the motion to dismiss be DENIED as discussed within this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2015, Plaintiff Kathleen Freeman (“Plaintiff” or “Freeman”) filed the 

complaint in this case wherein she alleges various Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims 

against Defendant Heath Taylor (“Defendant” or “Sheriff Taylor”) in his official capacity at 

Russell County Sheriff’s Department. In response to the complaint, Defendant filed its first 

Motion to Dismiss. See Doc. 6. Plaintiff timely filed her response, but attached a considerable 

amount of evidence and asserted more specific claims. See Doc. 9. As she raised new 

arguments and factual assertions, the Court granted the Defendant’s motion to strike, but also 

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provided the pro se plaintiff with the opportunity to amend her complaint. See Doc. 13. Plaintiff 

filed her amended complaint on May 11, 2016. See Doc. 14. 

Plaintiff alleges race and gender discrimination from her time as an employee of the 

Russel County Sheriff’s Department. See Doc. 14. Specifically, she asserts retaliatory actions in 

the form of undermining her authority by reversing disciplinary decisions related to inmates, 

losing paperwork, cancelling lockdown decisions and moving inmates. Plaintiff asserts inmates 

learned that they would not have to obey her because her supervisors would override her. In 

January and February 2015, the work environment was a sexually charged workplace which 

permitted inappropriate sexual innuendo, advances, and gestures. Plaintiff complained about the 

behavior and indicated it created a hostile work environment and permitted sexual harassment. 

Freeman claims she told her superiors that employees should have a right to be free from the 

inappropriate behavior in the workplace. She was also written up by the very same people whom 

she complained for alleged infractions which she indicates were retaliation. Plaintiff avers she 

felt unsafe because of the toxic atmosphere of sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, 

and management by retaliation and intimidation. As a result, she was left with no choice but to 

leave her job at the Russell County Sheriff’s Office after almost nine years of employment. 

Plaintiff indicates that prior to filing her complaints regarding the work environment, she had an 

exemplary record of employment with Russell County. Plaintiff attaches several exhibits to the 

amended complaint in support of her allegations.

Defendant files its motion to dismiss the amended complaint on May 24, 2016. See Doc. 

15. First, Defendant claims that she fails to state a claim for sexual harassment / hostile work 

environment. In this section, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims amount to mere complaints of 

sexual connotations (not gender discrimination) and she failed to establish her prima facie case

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of sexual harassment. Defendant next argues that unprofessional and abusive behavior is not 

protected under Title VII and does not rise to the level of retaliation. Further, Defendant asserts 

undermining authority cannot meet the burden of establishing adverse employment action or 

constructive discharge. Finally, Defendant asserts being scolded by a supervisor is not 

retaliation and that Plaintiff’s complaints all related to a general civility workplace dispute. Id. 

Plaintiff filed a timely response to the motion to dismiss. See Doc. 18. She cites to the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s website and its definition of sexual harassment / 

hostile work environment as well as its guidance on retaliation and related issues. She describes 

numerous incidents where she officially complained about the work environment, discrimination, 

and retaliation. Together, she argues, the information present “a mosaic of circumstantial 

evidence” of the history of discrimination and adverse actions against her. Id. 

Defendant filed his reply where he reiterates his prior arguments and asserts “the law on 

this issue is clear.” See Doc. 19. Defendant states plaintiff has not alleged conduct that is severe 

or pervasive enough to reach the threshold for a viable claim of sexual harassment or retaliation. 

Id. 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Freeman asserts claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) as she 

brings claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). She also asserts venue is 

proper as the alleged discrimination occurred in Phenix City, Alabama which is located in the 

Middle District of Alabama. 

Defendant challenges jurisdiction in his motion to dismiss. However, the only place a 

Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is referenced is in the first sentence of the motion to dismiss the 

amended complaint. See Doc. 15 at p. 1. The Court will address the appropriate standard of 

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review in further detail below. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

All litigants, pro se or not, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Generally, complaints by pro se plaintiffs are read more liberally than those drafted by attorneys. 

Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 Fed. Appx 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the court is 

required to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings, the court does not have “license to 

serve as de facto counsel for a party. . .or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to 

sustain an action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 

(11th Cir. 2010)); see also Giles v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., 359 Fed. Appx. 91, 93 (11th Cir. 

2009) (internal citations and quotation omitted) (“Although pro se pleadings are held to a less 

strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally, this liberal 

construction does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”).

As Defendant asserts its motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the 

Court must first determine the appropriate standard of review. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion directly 

challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of 

Augusta-Richmond Cnty, 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007); Gilmore v. Day, 125 F.Supp.2d 

468, 470 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Whereas, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. Gilmore, 125 F. Supp.2d at 471. Defendant acknowledges that this 

suit is brought pursuant to Title VII. In a detailed review of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

and reply, the Court finds no basis for a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge. Rather, all 

Defendant’s arguments are rooted in a “failure to state a claim” argument. Thus, scrutiny under 

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Rule 12(b)(1) is not appropriate and the proper standard of review is Rule 12(b)(6). 

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering a 

defendant’s motion to dismiss, the “court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff and accept all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true.” Am. United Life Ins. v. 

Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of 

Am., 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986)). In other words, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the court will accept the petitioner’s allegations as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L. Ed.2d 59 (1984); Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance 

Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998); Roberts v. Florida Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 

1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Lopez v. First Union National Bank of Florida, 129 F.3d 

1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of 

facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Jackson v. 

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. 

v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama 

Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions 

of fact are not admitted as true).1

Thus, a complaint should be dismissed “when the allegations in a complaint, however 

true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S. Ct. at 

1966. Further, “this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure 

of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. (citations omitted). “While a complaint 

 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), the Eleventh Circuit 

adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the 

close of business on September 30, 1981.

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attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (citations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. Thus, it does not require a heightened fact 

pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 

Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. It is not enough that the pleadings merely “le[ave] open the 

possibility that the plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support 

recovery.” Id. at 561, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). 

Consequently, the threshold for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is “exceedingly low.” 

Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985).

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Title VII “prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, . . . sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish sexual harassment in “violation of 

Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work 

environment.” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 

2d 49 (1986). Discriminatory conduct that is “so severe or pervasive that it create[s] a work 

environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin 

offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 

22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 371, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).

Retaliation under Title VII occurs when an employee engages in protected activity, and 

suffers an adverse employment action that is causally related to that activity. See Harper v. 

Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998). “A constructive discharge 

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occurs when a discriminatory employer imposes working conditions that are ‘so intolerable that 

a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would have been compelled to resign.’” Fitz v. 

Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 348 F.3d 974, 977 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)

A plaintiff need not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework at the pleading stage in 

order to state a claim for disparate treatment, but the “ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency 

of a complaint [still] apply.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S. Ct. 992, 

997, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002); see also Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 

974 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Although a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make 

out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must provide enough factual matter (taken 

as true) to suggest intentional race discrimination.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see 

also Uppal v. Hosp. Corps. Of Am., 482 Fed. Appx. 394, 396 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Swierkiewicz and Davis).

Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to establish her claims of a hostile environment or 

retaliation in violation of Title VII. Defendant cites a number of cases to support his argument. 

However, every case Defendant cites was when the courts decided a pending motion for 

summary judgment – which utilizes a very different standard. As such, Defendant’s supporting 

case law provides little to no value to this Court’s analysis as it utilizes a different standard of 

review. For example, Defendant cites Nettles v. LSG Sky Chefs, 211 Fed. Appx. 837 (11th Cir. 

2006) and argues that the Eleventh Circuit determined that undermining an employee’s authority 

is not an adverse job action. See Doc. 15 at p. 6. However, when reviewing the totality of that 

case, the Eleventh Circuit found that the facts as alleged by the Nettles plaintiff – “considered 

separately or collectively, meet the threshold of substantiality needed to show an adverse 

employment action or a constructive discharge” as plaintiff did not establish “any of these 

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actions were motived by race.” Id. at 839. In short, the Eleventh Circuit’s finding is not that 

undermining an employee’s authority could never be considered an adverse job action. But 

rather, when considering the facts in the Nettles case and applying the summary judgment 

standard, Plaintiff failed to establish the link to a protected status and therefore the undermining 

did not rise to the level of an adverse job action. This is the basis for the Eleventh Circuit’s 

conclusion, not a bright line rule for this court to follow. 

In this instant suit, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, view them in the 

light most favorable, and consider that plaintiff need not plead every possible detail in support of 

her claims. Rather, the Court merely determines whether Plaintiff alleges “enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

The Court considers that a pro se party is not held the same artful pleading standard and 

are read more liberally than a complaint drafted by an attorney. Moreover, the Court finds that 

Defendant’s arguments about the “weakness of plaintiff’s claim[s]” are more appropriate for 

review under summary judgment when one fully analyzes the Title VII framework and considers

evidence in support or against summary judgment. The Court does not find that Plaintiff is 

required to plead every single detail as it pertains to her claims, but rather enough factual matter 

to suggest hostile work environment and/or retaliation. 

In viewing the facts most favorably towards plaintiff as the non-movant, Freeman has 

alleged facts which could – through the discovery process – establish a prima facie case of 

hostile work environment and retaliation for reporting such an environment. Specifically, that 

Plaintiff (who refused to participate in the sexually charged innuendo, gestures, and actions) was 

subjected to such behavior in that it altered the conditions of her employment and created an 

abusive working environment especially as she could not leave her post without permission. 

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Moreover, after reporting such behavior, she then experienced retaliation in the form of write ups 

and undermining authority which ultimately resulted in a constructive discharge. Moreover, one 

claim is not tied exclusively to the other. Even if after the discovery process, Plaintiff ultimately 

fails on her hostile work environment claim, it does not necessitate that the retaliation claims also 

fails. 

The Court acknowledges that the facts as pled for Plaintiff’s claims are not extensive, but 

at this stage they are not required to be. The Court makes no judgment here on whether or not 

Plaintiff’s claims can survive a motion for summary judgment. Rather, the Court merely states 

that Defendant has not established in its motion to dismiss that Plaintiff could not do so and the 

threshold for surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is exceedingly low. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) be DENIED and this case be 

referred back for additional proceedings. 

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before November 23, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. 

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The 

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is 

not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court 

of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in 

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the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or 

manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); Stein v. Reynolds 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 

(11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth 

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

DONE this 8th day of November, 2016.

/s/ Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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