Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06953/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06953-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER A. GREEN, et al,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

CALIFORNIA,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-6953 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENSES

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike three affirmative defenses. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and

VACATES the hearing currently scheduled for February 16, 2007. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part plaintiffs’ motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

On November 6, 2006, plaintiffs Peter Green and Berglioth Matthews, on behalf of themselves

and others similarly situated, filed this action for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor

Standards Act , 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (“FLSA”). Plaintiffs are employed by San Francisco and describe

themselves as paramedics. Complaint ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that San Francisco improperly classified

them as employees engaged in fire protection activities who are partially exempt from overtime

compensation. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that their FLSA rights were violated, an

accounting, back pay compensation, liquidated damages, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs.

Defendant answered the complaint and admitted that it compensated plaintiffs according to the

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United States District Court

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FLSA partial exemption for employees engaged in fire protection activities, and denied that plaintiffs

were employed as dual-function firefighter/paramedics. Defendant also initially asserted sixteen

affirmative defenses, and later filed an amended answer asserting eleven affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs

now move to strike the seventh, eighth, and ninth defenses of unclean hands, laches, and waiver and/or

estoppel.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may order stricken from any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The

function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that arises from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing of those issues before trial. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984

F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robbins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). A motion to strike may be appropriate where it will

streamline the ultimate resolution of the action. See Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1528. If the defense asserted

is invalid as a matter of law, the Court should determine the issue prior to a needless expenditure of time

and money. Hart v. Baca, 204 F.R.D. 456, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2001). However, motions to strike are

generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible

bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. See LeDuc v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820,

830 (N.D.Cal. 1992). 

DISCUSSION

1. Seventh Affirmative Defense: Unclean Hands

Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, a party may be denied recovery where the party

engaged in “reprehensible conduct in the course of the transaction at issue.” McKennon v. Nashville

Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Part Corp., 392

U.S. 134, 138 (1968)). In McKennon, the Supreme Court held that an employee’s unclean hands did

not completely bar recovery in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, but that an employee’s

misconduct could affect the remedies available. Id. at 360-61; see also id. at 362-63 (stating

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 Miller involved the ADEA, not the FLSA. At the time of the Miller case, the Portal-to-Portal

Pay Act also governed the statute of limitations for the ADEA. See Miller, 991 F.2d at 586. In 1991

Congress amended the ADEA and the Portal-to-Portal Act no longer applies to that statute. Pub. L. No.

102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079. This does not affect the Miller court’s analysis, and thus the

Court finds Miller controlling here.

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reinstatement and front pay not available to employee based on unclean hands, and instructing trial court

to consider employee’s unclean hands when awarding back pay). The Court noted that the ADEA is

a hybrid statute in that its substantive, antidiscrimination provisions were modeled after Title VII, and

its remedial provisions incorporated by reference the FLSA’s remedial scheme. Id. at 357. 

Here, defendant generally asserts that plaintiffs’ conduct may have contributed to defendant’s

understanding of its duties under the FLSA. At this early stage of the proceedings, the Court is unable

to conclude that unclean hands is wholly inapplicable to this action. Plaintiffs do not cite any published

cases holding that unclean hands may not be asserted in a FLSA case as a matter of law. McKennon

suggests that a plaintiff’s unclean hands would be relevant to the remedies available under FLSA.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s seventh affirmative defense.

2. Eighth Affirmative Defense: Laches

“[T]he doctrine of laches is inapplicable where Congress has provided a statute of limitations

to govern the action.” Miller v. Maxwell’s Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs move

to strike the laches defense because Congress has created a statute of limitations governing FLSA claims

through the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 255. Defendant responds that it may still assert

laches because the Portal-to Portal Pay Act provides for different time limitations in FLSA cases

depending on whether the employer’s conduct was willful or not. 

Defendants’ contention lacks merit. Miller also involved the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, which

at that time also provided for different statutes of limitations depending on the willfulness of the

employer’s conduct.1

 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 586. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion

to strike defendant’s eighth affirmative defense. 

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3. Ninth Affirmative Defense: Waiver and/or Estoppel 

Defendant’s answer asserts, “the plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by the doctrine of waiver and/or

estoppel.” Plaintiffs move to strike this defense as invalid as a matter of law. The Court agrees that

defendant may not assert waiver. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728

(1981), the Supreme Court emphasized that “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise

waived because this would nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was

designed to effectuate.” Id. at 740. Defendant does not cite any authority for the proposition that,

notwithstanding Barrentine’s broad language, it may nevertheless pursue a waiver defense. 

Defendant’s opposition suggests that the estoppel defense is based on Lawrence v. Philadelphia,

2006 WL 2847330 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2006). That case is inapposite, however. Lawrence addresses

the partial exemption for employees engaged in fire protection activities under § 207(k). In Lawrence,

the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff employees

were engaged in fire protection activities based on, inter alia, the fact that the plaintiffs had signed

statements acknowledging their “responsibility to engage in fire suppression.” See id. at * 4. Lawrence

did not hold that the plaintiffs were estopped from claiming that they were not engaged in fire

suppression; instead, Lawrence simply examined the statements, along with all of the parties’ evidence,

to determine whether the plaintiffs were engaged in fire suppression.

To the extent defendant wishes to argue that plaintiffs are engaged in fire suppression because

they signed statements similar to those in Lawrence, or otherwise demonstrating that they knew or

believed they were responsible for fire suppression, defendant is free to do so on a motion for summary

judgment. However, these arguments do not fall under an estoppel defense. See United States v.

Hemmen, 51 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The traditional elements of equitable estoppel are that: (1)

the party to be estopped knows the facts, (2) he or she intends that his or her conduct will be acted on

or must so act that the party invoking estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended, (3) the party

invoking estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts, and (4) he or she must detrimentally rely on the

former’s conduct.”).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to strike the ninth affirmative defense.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES

in part plaintiffs’ motion to strike. (Docket No. 15). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2007 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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