Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03202/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 

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FILLD 

U 'ted States Co~ (?f Appea1s 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ni 'l'enth C1rcu1t 

APR 15 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

DARRELL LAMONT BAILEY, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

BUREAU OF PRISONS; J . MICHAEL 

QUINLAN; and GARY L . HENMAN, 

Warden, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

DARRELL LAMONT BAILEY, } 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

} 

vs. } 

} 

UNITED STATES SENTENCING } 

COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF } 

AMERICA; JAMES B. PARSONS, } 

United States District Court ) 

Judge; VAUGHN R. WALKER, United) 

States District Court Judge; } 

UNITED STATES ATI'ORNEY GENERAL, ) 

} 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

No. 92-3232 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-3184 ) 

(D . Kan.) 

No. 92-3202 

(D.C. No. 92-3185-B) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges . ** 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

(footnote continued to next page ) 

Appellate Case: 92-3202 Document: 010110201732 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant Darrell Lamont Walker seeks leave to 

proceed in f o rma pauperis to appeal the district court 's order 

denying his prose complaints. Plaintiff is currently 

incarcerated at the federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas, serving 

a seventy-two year prison term for various bank robbery and 

weapons convictions . 

In case number 92-3232, Plaintiff sought injunctive relief 

and monetary damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ( 11 FTCA" ) , 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, and/or for violation of his federal 

constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 

4 03 U.S. 388 (1971), based on the prison's policies concerning 

inmate access to telephones and collection of court ordered 

special assessments. The district court sua sponte dismissed the 

complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S . C. § 1915 (d ) f o r 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We review for an 

abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 

(1 992) . 

Exhaustion o f administrative remedies is a statutory 

prerequisite to recover monetary damages under the FTCA. See 28 

U.S . C. § 2675 (a ) . 11Where Congress specifically mandates, 

exhaustion is required. 11 McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 

1 086 (1992 ) (citations omitted). The Bureau of Prisons has set 

(footnote continued from previous page ) 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 1 0 th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3202 Document: 010110201732 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 2 
forth the administrative procedure for claims under the FTCA, s ee 

28 C.F.R. §§ 543 . 30-543.32 (1992 } , and it is clear from the record 

that Plaintiff has not pursued this avenue of relief. Thus, to 

the extent that Plaintiff stated a claim under the FTCA, dismissal 

without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative 

remedies was proper. 

Plaintiff also sought relief by way of a Bivens cause of 

action. The Bureau of Prisons has set forth a grievance procedure 

for inmates with complaints relating to any aspect of their 

imprisonment. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542 . 16. We have held that 

exhaustion of this administrative remedy is a prerequisite for an 

inmate to file a Bivens claim in federal court as it may provide a 

possible solution to the problem, reduce the intrusion of the 

courts into prison administration, and provide preliminary fact 

finding. See Brice v. Day. 604 F.2d 664, 667-68 (10th Cir. 1979} 

(per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980). 

In McCarthy. the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of the 

Bureau of Prisons' administrative procedure is not required before 

a federal prisoner can initiate a Bivens action solely for money 

damages. 112 S. Ct. at 1092. Weighing heavily in the Court's 

analysis was the absence of any monetary remedy in the grievance 

procedure. Id. at 1091. See also id. at 1092 (Rehnquist, C.J., 

concurring} (agreeing that federal prisoner need not exhaust 

administrative remedy due solely to the fact that administrative 

remedy does not provide for award of any monetary damages) . Given 

the filing d e adlines that create the risk of claim f orfeiture, 

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Appellate Case: 92-3202 Document: 010110201732 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 3 
"the priso ner seeking only money damages has everything to lose 

and nothing to gain from being required to exhaust his c l aim under 

the internal grievance procedure . " Id. at 1 09 0 . 

However, the McCarthy Court expressly limited its hol ding t o 

claims seeking only money damages. When a plaintiff also seeks 

injunctive relief, the principles underlying the Court's decisio n 

mitigate in favor of requiring exhaustion of administrative 

remedies. See McCarthy, 112 S. Ct. at 1091 n . 5 ( 11Were injunctive 

relief sought, the grievance procedure probably would be capable 

of producing the type of corrective action desired." ) . Clearly, 

the Bureau of Prisons has the authority to change its practices 

regarding access to telephones and collection of special 

assessments . Plaintiff has not made any showing that requiring 

him t o exhaust his administrative remedy would prejudice his 

claim, that the remedy is inadequate, or that the administrative 

body is biased. 1 See McCarthy, 112 S. Ct. at 1087-88. 

Accordingly, we cannot say that the District Court abused its 

discretion by requiring Plaintiff to pursue his administrative 

1 Plaintiff contends that he is not required to exhaust his 

administrative remedy because such a remedy is futile. See 

Terre l l v. Brewe r , 935 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1991 ) ; Lyons v . 

United St ates Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 1988 ). On 

appeal, Plaintiff claims that the prison grievance procedure i s 

n o t working because the prison does not respond within the 

required time and prisoners are permitted to file only one 

administrative grievance at a time. Notwithstanding that 

Plaintiff failed t o challenge the administrative procedure in the 

distric t court, we do not view Plaintiff's allegations of del ay 

a nd his inability to file more than one administrative grievance 

a t a time as a serious impedi ment to rel ief under the prison 

g riev ance pro cedure. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3202 Document: 010110201732 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 4 
remedy before seeking relief in federal court. See Young v. 

Quinlan, 960 F . 2d 351, 356 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) ("If ... a 

prisoner's suit seeks both injunctive relief and damages, the 

exhaustion requirement ordinarily must still be met."). 

In case number 92-3202, Plaintiff sought damages, under the 

FTCA and what appears to be a Bivens claim, against the United 

States Sentencing Commission, the two federal district court 

judges who sentenced him, and the United States Attorney General, 

claiming discrimination against African Americans based on 

disparate sentencing under the United Sentencing Guidelines, and a 

failure to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 20(b) when he was 

transferred from the Northern District of Illinois to the Northern 

District of California. The district court dismissed the FTCA 

claim finding that Plaintiff failed to allege conduct by federal 

government employees within the scope of the FTCA. Furthermore, 

the district court found that Plaintiff's conclusory Bivens claim 

lacked an arguable basis either in law or fact, and therefore 

dismissed the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Again, we review 

for an abuse of discretion. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734 . 

First, Plaintiff's claims for money damages against two 

federal district court judges for judicial actions wi thin their 

jurisdiction is barred by absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles 

v . Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 287-88 (1991). Second, to the extent 

that Plaintiff stated a claim under the FTCA, it is clear that any 

a c tions of the Attorney General or the Sentencing Commission would 

b e barred by the discretionary function exception. See 28 U.S . C. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3202 Document: 010110201732 Date Filed: 04/15/1993 Page: 5 
§ 2680(a). Thus, the claims against the district judges and the 

FTCA claims are based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory" 

making dismissal under§ 1915 (d ) proper. Neitzke v . Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 327 (1989 ). 

As to the Bivens claim, even if the Attorney General was not 

absolutely immune from liability based on prosecutorial immunity, 

see Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1938-39 (1991) , and the 

Sentencing Commission was not absolutely immune from liability for 

acts taken in its legislative capacity, see Tenney v. Brandhove, 

341 U.S. 367, 372-79 (1951), we believe that Plaintiff's 

allegations of discriminatory intent against African-Americans by 

the Sentencing Commission and the Attorney General are clearly 

baseless making dismissal under§ 1915(d) appropriate. See 

Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 327-28. 

In both cases, Plaintiff has failed to present "a rational 

argument on the law or the facts," see Coppedge v. United States, 

369 U.S. 438, 448 (1962); therefore, Plaintiff's request s to 

proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED, and the appeals are 

DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) . 

SO ORDERED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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