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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2008 Decided March 28, 2008

No. 07-5182

J. B. FLOYD, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

ROY D. NEDROW,

APPELLANT

v.

HENRY M. PAULSON, JR. AND

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv00670)

John V. Berry argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Cristina Bull Wallace.

Robert D. Kamenshine, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee Henry M. Paulson, Jr.

With him on the brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, and William Kanter, Deputy Director. 

USCA Case #07-5182 Document #1108103 Filed: 03/28/2008 Page 1 of 5
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1

The District of Columbia is a conduit for the retirement benefits,

which the federal government funds. Because the District has no stake

in the matter, it took no position on the issues raised in this appeal.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Roy D. Nedrow, a former

criminal investigator with the United States Secret Service,

receives retirement benefits under the District of Columbia

Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act

(“Retirement Act”), D.C.CODE § 5-701 et seq. The Retirement

Act adjusts a retiree’s annuity by any “increase in salary . . . to

which he would be entitled if he were in active service” when

the increase took effect. Id. § 5-745(c). After Nedrow retired,

Congress enacted the Law Enforcement Availability Pay

(LEAP) Act of 1994, 5 U.S.C. § 5545a, which provided

“availability pay” to criminal investigators. Availability pay

increases a criminal investigator’s basic pay by twenty-five

percent. Id. § 5545a(h)(1). When the Department of the

Treasury denied that availability pay constituted an “increase in

salary” under the Retirement Act, approximately 550 former

Secret Service criminal investigators (including Nedrow) sought

review in the district court under the Administrative Procedure

Act. Judge Sporkin found for the plaintiffs and ordered the

Treasury Department and the District of Columbia1 to

“incorporate availability pay under the [LEAP Act] in

calculation of plaintiffs’ annuity payments in accordance with

the [Retirement Act].” Floyd v. Rubin, 46 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13

(D.D.C. 1999) (“Floyd I”). Neither the Treasury Department

nor the District appealed. When Nedrow’s annuity did not

increase, he filed a motion to enforce the judgment. Judge

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2

Nedrow does not rely on the pleadings. One paragraph of the

complaint alleged that “[a]ll plaintiff ‘members’ were employed by the

United States Secret Service . . . as criminal investigators at the time

of their retirement.” The Treasury Department answered: “This

paragraph contains plaintiffs’ legal conclusions, to which no response

is required; if a response is required, admitted.” But in response to

another paragraph alleging that “[e]ach plaintiff, at the time of his/her

Robertson, to whom the case had been transferred, denied the

motion. We affirm.

Seven months before he retired, Nedrow joined the Senior

Executive Service. For that reason he was not entitled to an

increased annuity. Only those who, at the time of their

retirement, were criminal investigators are eligible under the

LEAP Act. As Judge Robertson concluded, “a criminal

investigator is a ‘law enforcement officer as defined under [5

U.S.C.] § 5541(3),’ § 5545a(2); a ‘law enforcement officer’ is

an ‘employee’, § 5541(3); and ‘employee’ is defined to exclude

members of the Senior Executive Service. § 5541(2)(C)(xvi).”

Floyd v. Rubin, No. 98-0670, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 17,

2007) (order denying motion to enforce judgment) (“Floyd II”).

Nedrow thinks he is nevertheless entitled to availability pay

because he was a named plaintiff in the case. As he puts it, the

“defendants had the option to appeal the Floyd decision but

chose not to challenge it. Thus, the defendants waived their

right to challenge the Floyd decision with respect to any of the

plaintiffs.” Nedrow points out that Judge Sporkin, in his

memorandum opinion, stated that availability pay “is an acrossthe-board increase in hours and pay for all Secret Service

criminal investigators to which all plaintiffs would be entitled,”

Floyd I, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12, and that “[p]laintiffs . . . clearly

merit the inclusion of LEAP pay in the calculation of their

retirement annuities,” id. at 13.2

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retirement, met the conditions set forth in [the LEAP Act] for payment

of [availability] pay,” the Treasury Department answered: “This

paragraph contains plaintiffs’ legal conclusions, to which no response

is required; if a response is required, denied.”

3

It is an open question whether we should review de novo or for

abuse of discretion one district court judge’s interpretation of another

district court judge’s order. Nix v. Billington, 448 F.3d 411, 414-15

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Because Judge Robertson’s order survives review

under either standard, we do not reach the issue.

In denying Nedrow’s motion to enforce the judgment, Judge

Robertson relied upon the order’s direction that defendants

“incorporate availability pay under the [LEAP Act] in

calculation of plaintiffs’ annuity payments in accordance with

the [Retirement Act].” Floyd II at 2 (quoting Floyd I, 46 F.

Supp. 2d at 13). Judge Robertson held that in light of this

language, the order did not entitle Nedrow to availability pay:

“The [Retirement Act] turns upon what a retired individual

would be entitled to ‘if he were in active service.’ When

Nedrow was in active service, as of the date of his retirement, he

was a member of the [Senior Executive Service] and ineligible

for [availability pay].” Id. at 2-3.

We agree with Judge Robertson’s interpretation of the

order.3

 Judge Sporkin did not find Nedrow to be eligible for

availability pay. There were no evidentiary findings to this

effect. Plaintiffs brought the case pursuant to the Administrative

Procedure Act, seeking judicial review of informal agency

action – the Treasury Department’s decision that retired Secret

Service criminal investigators were not entitled to availability

pay. Judge Sporkin did not purport to decide the factual

question whether each of the 550 plaintiffs met the requirements

of the LEAP Act. His “focal point for judicial review” was “the

administrative record already in existence, not some new record

made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.

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138, 142 (1973). We may assume that Judge Sporkin found at

least one of the 550 plaintiffs to be eligible under the LEAP Act.

But that implicit finding, along with the allegations in the

complaint, went only to the question of Article III standing.

Given the language of his order and the nature of the case, Judge

Sporkin did not decide that Nedrow was entitled to an increase

in his annuity. Enforcing that order therefore would have

booted Nedrow nothing. See Heartland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.

Leavitt, 415 F.3d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Affirmed.

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