Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-md-02330/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-md-02330-52/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE

CARRIER IQ, INC., CONSUMER 

PRIVACY LITIGATION.

Case No. 12-md-02330-EMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART OBJECTOR 

SINGER’S MOTION TO ALTER OR 

AMEND JUDGMENT

Docket No. 486

Objector Sandra Singer has filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. More 

specifically, Ms. Singer seeks the following relief: (1) an order awarding her the same relief 

awarded to other class members who submitted valid claims (approximately $140); (2) an order 

striking certain filings made by Plaintiffs‟ counsel (i.e., Docket Nos. 464 and 469, which include 

two declarations from Mr. Warshaw); (3) an order awarding her compensation based on the value 

of her objections; and (4) an order awarding her compensatory and punitive damages based on 

alleged improper conduct by Plaintiffs‟ counsel.1

The Court has reviewed the papers submitted, as well as all other papers previously 

submitted by Ms. Singer and by Plaintiffs with respect to Ms. Singer‟s claim. The Court finds no 

merit to Ms. Singer‟s requests for relief (2)-(4) above, and therefore denies those requests for 

 

1 Ms. Singer also asked the Court to order the Clerk of the Court to file her “second supplemental 

opposition,” a copy of which was faxed and e-mailed to the Court. Contrary to what Ms. Singer 

suggests, filing by fax is not permitted by the Civil Local Rules. Civil Local Rule 5-3(a) simply 

allows a party to file a fax copy of an original document. See also Civ. L.R. 5-3(b) (providing that 

“[t]he fax copy is not transmitted directly to the Clerk by electronic or telephonic means”) 

(emphasis in original). However, as a courtesy, the Court has in the past filed papers submitted by 

Ms. Singer through e-mail, and the Court shall extend this courtesy again for the “second 

supplemental opposition.” The Court notes that it did review the “second supplemental 

opposition” prior to the final approval hearing even though it was not formally docketed at that 

time. Plaintiffs‟ request that Ms. Singer‟s various papers be stricken, see Opp‟n at 10, is denied.

Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC Document 498 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

relief. The only issue remaining is whether Ms. Singer should be given the same relief as other 

class members who submitted valid claims (approximately $140).

In its order, the Court found that Ms. Singer had submitted an invalid claim because she 

did not provide, in her claim form, a genuine cell phone number. See Docket No. 481 (Order at 

7); Docket No. 469 (Warshaw Decl. ¶ 7) (noting that Ms. Singer provided a cell phone number of 

all 1‟s). However, Ms. Singer asserts that, after her objection to the settlement was filed, see

Docket Nos. 453-54 (objections), Plaintiffs contacted her and asked for proof that she was a class 

member with standing to object, including but not limited to her real cell phone number. Ms. 

Singer provided Plaintiffs with her real cell phone number. See Docket No. 467-1 (Obj. at 5-6); 

Docket No. 469 (Warshaw Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). Ms. Singer takes the position that Plaintiffs‟ actions 

gave her the impression that, once she gave her real cell phone number, her claim would be 

considered on the merits. See, e.g., Docket No. 467-1 (Obj. at 6) (claiming that Plaintiffs “implied 

that if she did not provide [her real cell phone number] she would not receive any money”). 

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not entertain this specific request 

for relief (or for that matter, any of Ms. Singer‟s requests for relief) because Ms. Singer does not 

have standing to bring a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e). The Court is not persuaded. On its face, Rule 59(e) simply states: “A motion to 

alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Nothing in the rule provides that such a motion may be brought by a party 

only. Moreover, nothing about Rule 23, which governs class certification, suggests that an 

objector to a proposed class action settlement should not be allowed to ask for reconsideration of a 

ruling on an objection. 

The authority cited by Plaintiffs, see Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., No. CV199-239, 

2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27165 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 19, 2001), is not binding on this Court. Moreover, 

the Pedraza court was confronted with an objector‟s request for a new trial or an amendment of 

the judgment. The court seemed to focus more on the request for a new trial, noting that Rule 59, 

by its terms, specified that a new trial may be granted to a party, not an objector. See id. at *9 

(“Rule 59 states that „[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties . . . .‟”) (emphasis in 

Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC Document 498 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

original). The court failed to address the fact that Rule 59(e), which governs alteration or 

amendment of a judgment, does not contain similar limiting language. Furthermore, the Pedraza

court justified its holding that “unnamed class members lack standing to bring a Rule 59 motion” 

because “unnamed class members, who have not intervened, lack standing to appeal a final 

judgment.” Id. at *10. But, as Plaintiffs themselves concede, it is no longer good law that an 

objector lacks standing to appeal a final judgment. See Opp‟n at 4 n.4.

Plaintiffs argue that, even if Ms. Singer has standing to seek reconsideration, she may do 

so only on limited grounds which are inapplicable here. Again, the Court is not persuaded. The 

Ninth Circuit has noted as follows with respect to Rule 59(e) motions:

“Since specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not listed 

in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable discretion in 

granting or denying the motion.” But amending a judgment after its 

entry remains “an extraordinary remedy which should be used 

sparingly.” In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a 

Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary 

to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment 

rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or 

previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to 

prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an 

intervening change in controlling law. 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

In the instant case, Ms. Singer has provided a sufficient basis to support manifest injustice. 

That is, when Plaintiffs asked for her real cell phone number, this could reasonably have led Ms. 

Singer to believe that providing the real number would cure the deficiency in her original claim 

form and allow her to participate in the settlement. This would be true even if Ms. Singer is, in 

fact, an attorney or former attorney (although the Court notes that Plaintiffs‟ evidence in support 

of their claim that Ms. Singer is an attorney or former attorney is thin).2

Accordingly, the Court grants Ms. Singer limited relief. That is, the Court hereby orders 

Plaintiffs to investigate (either directly or through the settlement administrator) whether, based on 

 

2

See, e.g., Docket No. 464-1 (Warshaw Decl., Ex. A) (appellate brief submitted by Ms. Singer to 

the First Circuit in which she uses the abbreviation “Esq.” after her name). Plaintiffs have not 

pointed the Court to any bar number affiliated with Ms. Singer. Notably, in one of their papers, 

Plaintiffs even stated that Ms. Singer “holds herself out as an attorney,” Docket No. 464 (Resp. at 

2) (emphasis added), in implicit recognition of the fact that she may not be an attorney.

Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC Document 498 Filed 10/19/16 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the real cell phone number provided by Ms. Singer, Ms. Singer is a member of the class. If so, 

then Ms. Singer should be awarded the same relief as all other claiming class members (i.e., 

approximately $140). Plaintiffs shall make this determination within two weeks of the date of this 

order. By the same date, Plaintiffs shall file a supplemental brief reporting back on the results of 

their investigation. 

The Court notes that, if Ms. Singer is entitled to relief, Plaintiffs and/or the settlement 

administrator will likely need to recalculate the exact award for each claiming class member 

(including Ms. Singer). Recalculation, however, is still possible because it appears that no 

distribution has been made to claiming class members as of yet, i.e., because appeals have been 

taken by two other objectors. See Docket No. 419 (Am. Stip. of Sett. ¶¶ 2(s), 26) (providing that 

(1) the effective date of the settlement is, “if an appeal is filed, the latest of (i) the date of final 

affirmance of that Order of Final Approval . . . or (iii) the date of final dismissal of any appeal 

from the Order of Final Approval” and that (2) “[t]he monetary relief . . . shall be made available 

to eligible and qualifying Class Members after the Effective Date of this Agreement”). Because of 

the appeals, no actual distribution shall be made to any class member at this point in the 

proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Ms. Singer‟s motion to alter or 

amend the judgment. Ms. Singer is granted relief only to the extent Plaintiffs are ordered to 

investigate whether she is in fact a member of the class (i.e., based on her real cell phone number); 

if she is, she is entitled to relief as a member of the class.

This order disposes of Docket No. 486.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC Document 498 Filed 10/19/16 Page 4 of 4