Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02479/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRK DOUG CRAMER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2479 LKK DAD P

vs.

MATTHEW KRAMER, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the revocation of his parole

by the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) and his 1999 conviction on charges of driving under the

influence with three or more prior convictions within a seven year period. He seeks relief on the

grounds that: (1) his return to prison for a parole violation is illegal because he was not on parole

at the time he was arrested; and (2) he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Upon careful

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 15, 1998, petitioner was arrested in Nevada County for driving under

the influence, use of alcohol, driving with a suspended license, possession of a knife with a blade

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 Petitioner has filed numerous exhibits with his petition in this court. Although the 1

exhibits are not separately marked or numbered, petitioner has included an index which specifies

the order in which the exhibits appear. This court will identify petitioner’s exhibits according to

the numbers reflected on petitioner’s index.

 Although not necessary to the conclusions reached in these findings and 2

recommendations, the undersigned notes that petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction in the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, arguing that there was insufficient

evidence to conclude he had committed three prior violations of Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(a)

within seven years of the instant offense. (Pet., exhibit after No. 26 (decision of the California

Court of Appeal.)) The appeal was granted in part. Petitioner’s sentence remained the same, but

the judgment was amended to reflect the correct California statute (that providing for the same

enhancement for three prior violations of the statute within ten years of the instant offense) under

which that sentence was imposed. (Id.)

2

over two inches in length and driving with a suspended license. (Answer, Ex. B.) Because of

this arrest, a parole revocation hearing was held on November 16, 1998. (Id.) At the revocation

hearing, petitioner admitted to violating his parole by engaging in the use of alcohol and driving

with a suspended license. (Id.) Petitioner’s parole was revoked and he was returned to state

custody for a twelve month term. (Id.)

On October 20, 1998, a felony complaint was filed in the Nevada County Superior

Court charging petitioner with: (1) driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage with

three prior convictions for the same offense within a seven year period, in violation of Cal. Veh.

Code §§ 23152(a) and 23175; (2) refusing to submit to a blood/alcohol test; and (3) misdemeanor

driving with a suspended license. (Pet., Ex. No. 2.) On May 4, 1999, petitioner was convicted 1

of driving under the influence with three prior convictions within a seven year period. (Answer,

Ex. C.) On June 28, 1999, petitioner was sentenced to five years in prison. (Id.) 

2

On November 29, 1999, petitioner filed an appeal with the BPT challenging the

November 16, 1998, revocation of his parole, arguing that he was not on parole when he was

arrested on October 15, 1998. (Pet., Ex. 13.) The appeal was dismissed as moot on the grounds

that petitioner’s previous grants of parole had not been discharged until May 17, 1999. (Pet., Ex.

18.) Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Nevada County

Superior Court, in which he raised the same claims that he raises in the instant petition. (Pet.,

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Ex. 19.) That petition was denied in a reasoned decision dated November 20, 2001. (Pet., Ex.

20.) Petitioner subsequently filed two habeas petitions in the California Court of Appeal for the

Third Appellate District, raising the same claims. (Pet., Ex. 19.) One of those petitions was

denied by order dated January 10, 2002, with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293

(1962). (Pet., Ex. 21.) The other petition was summarily denied by order dated April 12, 2002. 

(Pet., Ex. 23.) On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, raising the same claims. (Pet., Ex. 25.) That petition was summarily

denied by order dated October 16, 2002. (Pet., Ex. 26.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

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 Petitioner ostensibly raises five separate claims in his petition pending before this court. 3

However, his allegations give rise to only two federal constitutional claims, both of which will be

analyzed below. 

4

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Petitioner’s Claims3

A. Parole Violation

Petitioner claims that his conviction on charges of violating parole was “illegal”

because he was not on parole when he was arrested on October 15, 1998. (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner

states that on June 1, 1998, “the parole field administrator of the Board of Prison Terms”

recommended that he be discharged from parole supervision. (Id.) Petitioner argues that this

recommendation took effect “by law” on July 1, 1998, which was prior to his arrest on October

15, 1998. (Id.) He alleges that the Board of Prison Terms therefore “lacked any legal

jurisdiction” over him after July 1, 1998. (Id.) Petitioner also contends that he was never

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 This court analyzes the Superior Court’s decision as the relevant state-court 4

determination because the California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s

petitions for writ of habeas corpus without opinion. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

2002) (the habeas court must review the “last reasoned decision” by a state court); Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

 Respondent takes the position that this use of “RX” means “recommend.” (Answer at

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6.) Petitioner states that “RX” means a “symbol for a medical prescription.” (Traverse at 6.)

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provided written notice of his July 1, 1998, discharge from parole, as required under California

law. (Id. at 5-6.) 

The California Superior Court rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard,

reasoning as follows: 

Petitioner was arrested in Nevada County for driving under the

influence of alcohol on October 15, 1998. Petitioner had numerous

prior convictions for driving while intoxicated. On October 15,

1998, defendant was subject to terms and conditions of parole as

administered by the Board of Prison Terms.

* * *

Petitioner now claims that he was not on parole on October 15,

1998, the date of his arrest for the within conviction for driving

under the influence of alcohol. Petitioner primarily relies on a

recommendation by his parole officer dated June 1, 1998 that he be

discharged from parole as proof that he was discharged on October

15, 1998. There is no record that the Board of Prison Terms

accepted the recommendation of the parole officer. Indeed the

record discloses that the Board did not discharge petitioner from

the parole he was subject to on October 15, 1998 until May 17,

1999, per the Boards notice to petitioner dated November 30, 1999

attached to the petition herein.

(Pet., Ex. 20.)4

Petitioner has provided documentation which reflects that on May 27, 1998,

petitioner’s parole agent recommended that he be discharged from parole. (Traverse, Ex. B.) 

This recommendation was forwarded to a parole field administrator, who made the following

notation on June 1, 1998: “Subject has effected a very successful parole adjustment during this

parole period. RX discharge from parole supervision.” (Id.) Petitioner contends that the parole 5

field administrator’s recommendation that he be discharged from parole was adopted by the

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 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2535 provides for annual review of a parolee to determine 6

whether he/she should be discharged. Pursuant to § 2535(d), the factors tending to indicate there

is good cause to retain a parolee on parole include: (1) the nature of the commitment offense; (2)

institutional adjustment; (3) parole adjustment; (4) whether the parolee has been returned to

custody for controlled substance or psychiatric treatment; and (5) the need for supervision. 

According to Exhibit E, petitioner was retained on parole on June 5, 1998, because of the nature

of his commitment offense (driving under the influence with prior convictions for the same

offense) and the need for supervision. (Answer, Ex. E at 2.)

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parole board by operation of law one month later, thereby releasing him from parole on July 1,

1998. In support of this contention, petitioner cites Cal. Penal Code § 3001, which provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when any person

referred to in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 3000 who

was not imprisoned for committing a violent felony, as defined in

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, has been released on parole from

the state prison, and has been on parole continuously for one year

since release from confinement, within 30 days, that person shall

be discharged from parole, unless the Department of Corrections

recommends to the Board of Prison Terms that the person be

retained on parole and the board, for good cause, determines that

the person will be retained.

Petitioner argues that he comes within the ambit of Cal. Penal Code § 3001

because: (1) he was not imprisoned for committing a violent felony; (2) he had been on parole

from state prison for at least one year; and (3) the parole board took no action to retain him on

parole after the field administrator recommended that he be discharged from parole supervision. 

In response to petitioner’s arguments in this regard, respondent has lodged a document entitled

“Central Office Calendar Decision” (hereinafter “Decision”) which reflects that on June 5, 1998,

the BPT acted to retain petitioner on parole supervision for the safety of the public, pursuant to

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2535(d). (Answer, Ex. E (Exhibit E).) Respondent argues that the 6

record, including the Decision, confirms the conclusion reached by the Superior Court that

petitioner was still on parole when he was arrested on October 15, 1998. 

Petitioner challenges the authenticity of the BPT Decision on several grounds. 

First, petitioner states that the Decision was not in his case file when he looked through it on

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November 29, 1999, and June 2001, and was not produced by the Department of Corrections or

the Board of Prison Terms in the course of petitioner’s numerous appeals. (Traverse at 6.) 

Second, petitioner notes that while the Decision states he has a history with weapons, the October

20, 1998, complaint against him alleged that his prior convictions were for “D.U.I.s only.” (Id.) 

Third, petitioner contends that his only weapons offense was committed on October 15, 1998,

several months after the Decision was purportedly issued. (Id.) Finally, petitioner states that

“even IF this document is authentic, the period of 5 years in producing this document would have

been a clear violation of the petitioner’s rights to due process, and a violation of penal code

section 3001.” (Id.) 

Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s claim – that the BPT unlawfully returned him

to prison for a parole violation when he was not on parole – is cognizable in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding, petitioner is not entitled to relief. The California Superior Court found that

petitioner was still on parole when he was arrested on October 15, 1998. This finding apparently

did not take into consideration the BPT’s June 5, 1998 Decision submitted by respondent as

Exhibit E, which was filed for the first time in connection with the instant habeas corpus

proceeding. Instead, the Superior Court relied upon: (1) the lack of evidence that the Board of

Prison Terms accepted the recommendation of petitioner’s parole officer that he be discharged

from parole; and (2) evidence in the record that the Board did not discharge petitioner from

parole until May 17, 1999. (See Pet., Ex. 18.) 

Under the AEDPA, "[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a Decision adjudicated on

the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See also Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 

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Superior Court’s factual determination that he was still on parole on October 15, 1998 is

objectively unreasonable and should be overturned under these standards. 

Even without considering the BPT’s June 5, 1998 Decision, the Screening Notice

attached to the petition for writ of habeas corpus before this court reflects that petitioner’s parole

was not discharged until May 17, 1999. (Pet., Ex. 18.) Other than petitioner’s own interpretation

of the California Penal Code, there is no evidence that he was discharged from parole by

operation of law earlier than that date. Indeed, petitioner complains that he did not receive notice

of his July 1, 1998 discharge. Presumably, he did not receive such notice because he was not

discharged. 

Alternatively, the addition of Exhibit E to the court record lends further support to

the California Superior Court’s conclusion that petitioner was not discharged from parole until

May 17, 1999, and explains why petitioner was not notified of any earlier discharge date. Based

on the record before this court, the conclusion of the Nevada County Superior Court that

petitioner was still on parole when he was arrested on October 15, 1998, is not an unreasonable

determination of the facts and has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 

Petitioner’s first two claims are: (1) “the parole violation the petitioner suffered

was illegal, as his parole had terminated by operation of law on July 01, 1998;” and (2) the parole

violation the petitioner suffered was illegal as the Board of Prison Terms had no jurisdiction.” 

(Pet. at 5.) Both of these claims are premised on petitioner’s contention that he was discharged

from parole on July 1, 1998. Because the record establishes that petitioner was still on parole

when he was arrested on October 15, 1998, petitioner’s first two claims lack a factual basis. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Speedy Trial

Petitioner next claims that the failures of state authorities to: arraign him within

48 hours of his October 15, 1998 arrest; serve him with the October 20, 1998 felony complaint in

a timely manner; and bring him to trial within a reasonable time, violated his due process and

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speedy trial rights pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §§ 825 and 849 and the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. (Pet. at 6 (claims three, four and five); Motion for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Motion) at 7, 14; Traverse at 7.) 

The Nevada County Superior Court described the relevant background to this

claim as follows:

A felony driving under the influence criminal complaint was filed

by Nevada County on October 20, 1998 and a felony arrest warrant

was issued on October 21, 1998. The court assumes that petitioner

had been returned to the Department of Corrections before he

could be arraigned on the felony complaint. In any event, the

defendant would have been required to have been released by

Nevada County authorities by October 20, 1998 because of the

provisions of Penal Code Section 825, which requires arraignment

on a felony complaint without unnecessary delay and in any event

within 48 hours of arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays.

Since petitioner was in the custody of the Department of

Corrections, he was entitled to invoke the provisions of Penal

Code Section 1381 to require that upon notice to the Nevada

County District Attorney that he be brought to trial on the felony

complaint within 90 days of their receiving notice from the

petitioner. Petitioner apparently made such a demand and was

returned to Nevada County and arraigned on the felony complaint

on March 26, 1999. He entered a plea of not guilty on April 1,

1999 at which time he waived his right to a preliminary hearing

within 10 court days. A preliminary hearing was conducted on

April 8, 1999 and defendant was held to answer on the felony

complaint. An information was filed on April 13, 1999 and

petitioner was arraigned on April 19, 1999. Petitioner filed a

motion to dismiss the information per Penal Code Section 1381,

which motion was denied by the trial court on May 3, 1999. 

Petitioner was convicted by jury trial on May 4, 1999 of a felony

driving under the influence.

(Pet., Ex. 20 at 1-2.) (emphasis in original.)

Petitioner argues that “a delay of 162 days in the petitioner’s case from his date of

arrest to his arraignment was excessive and in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and his

status as a parolee (albeit questionable as it has been demonstrated in this petition) did not alter

his right to have the provisions of Penal Code section 825 fulfilled and satisfied by bring (sic) his

case to trial within 60 days of his arrest.” (Traverse at 8.) Petitioner also argues: “[b]ased on the

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facts that Cramer was not arraigned for 162 days after his arrest and not brought to trial for 202

days after his arrest, Cramer’s constitutional rights were violated under the 6th Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution.” (Motion at 15.) 

In denying petitioner habeas relief, the Superior Court rejected these arguments

stating as follows:

The right to a speedy trial must be asserted, if at all, in the court

where the prosecution is pending, and prior to the commencement

of trial. It is too late to raise this point for the first time on appeal

by a petition for habeas corpus after judgment of conviction, or by

application for writ of coram nobis. People v. Wilson (1963) 60

Cal.2d 139; 32 Cal.Rptr. 44.

Under the United States Constitution the right to a speedy trial

does not attach until the filing of the information. The filing of a

felony complaint or issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger

the speedy trial provisions of the United States Constitution. 

People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 752; 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381.

It is additionally noted that the petitioner did not appeal the ruling

of the trial court denying petitioners motion to dismiss per Penal

Code Section 1381.

For the reasons herein stated, the petition is denied.

(Pet., Ex. 20 at 2-3.) (emphasis in original.)

Petitioner’s claim that California law was violated because he was not arraigned

or tried in a timely manner is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus petition. Middleton,

768 F.2d at 1085. Accordingly, the sole issue before this court is whether petitioner’s federal

constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. 

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. VI. In assessing a

speedy trial claim, the court must weigh four factors: “whether delay before trial was

uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that

delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he

suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992)

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(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). See also McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822,

826 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). No one of

these four factors alone is either a necessary or sufficient to support a finding that there has been

a deprivation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. McNeely, 336 F.3d at 826. Rather, the

various factors are related and must be considered together. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. However,

“no showing of prejudice is required when the delay is great and attributable to the government.” 

United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651

(eight and one-half year delay between indictment and trial, six of which were attributable to the

government's negligence, violated a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial even though

he could not demonstrate the delay impaired his ability to mount a successful defense). 

The Supreme Court has observed:

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.

Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there

is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the

balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to

speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is

necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. In this regard, depending on the nature of the charges, courts have

generally found post-accusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" when it begins to approach

one year. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, n.1; see also McNeely, 336 F.3d at 826 (three-year delay was

presumptively prejudicial); United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003)

(22-month delay between first superseding indictment and trial date was presumptively

prejudicial but did not weigh heavily in defendant's favor because it was not excessively long);

United States v. Aguirre, 994 F.2d 1454, 1457 (1993) (finding that "a five year delay is long

enough to trigger a further look," but concluding that even the five-year delay in that case did not

deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial when all the Barker v. Wingo

factors were balanced). 

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 Petitioner’s parole was revoked and he was returned to state custody shortly after his 7

arrest. It appears likely that these circumstances played more of a role in any delay than any

other factor. 

 The undersigned notes that pretrial incarceration was not a concern for petitioner 8

because he was initially detained pursuant to a no bail parole hold and by November of 1998 had

admitted a violation of his parole and had been returned to state custody for twelve months. 

12

Even assuming arguendo that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was

triggered by petitioner’s arrest and not by the filing of the information, the approximately six and

one-half month delay between arrest and trial that occurred here, although not insignificant, was

not presumptively prejudicial. Moreover, although the reason for the delay is not clear from the

record, there is no allegation in this case that the delay in bringing the case to trial was for any

improper purpose or that the prosecution improperly sought to lengthen the proceedings against

petitioner. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971) (it would be improper for the 7

prosecution to intentionally delay in order “to gain some tactical advantage over [defendants] or

to harass them”); McNeely, 336 F.3d at 827. Further, the record reflects that petitioner’s case

proceeded through the trial court in a timely manner once petitioner filed notice upon the Nevada

County District Attorney that he was invoking the provisions of Cal. Penal Code § 1381. 

As noted above, because any delay in bringing petitioner to trial was not

excessive, there is no presumption of prejudice to petitioner. See McNeely, 336 F.3d at 831-32. 

Thus, it is the fourth factor, actual prejudice to the defendant, that weighs most heavily in the

evaluation of petitioner’s claim. Valentine, 783 F.2d at 1417. Petitioner has completely failed to

establish, or even to allege, that his defense was hindered in any way by the six and one-half

months it took to bring his case to trial. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he 8

suffered prejudice because of any delay in serving him with the complaint, arraigning him on the

charges or bringing him to trial. 

Under the circumstances presented by this case, petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial was not violated. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any pretrial

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delay was “uncommonly long” or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of delay. 

Accordingly, relief as to this claim should be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 17, 2006.

DAD:8:cramer2479.hc

Case 2:02-cv-02479-LKK -DAD Document 14 Filed 03/20/06 Page 13 of 13