Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05141/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05141-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7403 Suit to Enforce Federal Tax Lien

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

JAMES LITTLE, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-02-5141 REC/DLB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO VACATE (Doc. 133)

AND SCHEDULING FURTHER

STATUS CONFERENCE FOR

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2006

AT 10:00 A.M. IN COURTROOM 9

On September 23, 2005, the “Order Denying Defendants James

and Lorna Little’s Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 102, 103, 104, 105,

106 & 116)” and the “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 100)” were filed. (Docs. 129 &

130). 

Defendants James and Lorna Little, then proceeding in pro

per, filed a “NOTICE OF AND: WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO & MOTION TO

VACATE THE 9/23/2005 ORDERS OF JUDGE ROBERT E. COYLE, FOR

RECONSIDERATION, REARGUMENT, ENTRY OF ANOTHER ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS F.R.C.P. RULE 56(f) REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE 

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PLAINTIFFS’ [sic] MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COMPLETE

DISCOVERY OR GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS”

(hereinafter referred to as the Motion to Vacate). (Doc. 133). 

At the hearing scheduled for these motions on February 13, 2006,

attorney James R. Butterworth was substituted as counsel for the

Littles. (Doc. 145). Mr. Butterworth and counsel for the United

States orally stipulated that the hearing on these motions be

continued to May 8, 2006, that Mr. Butterworth would file

additional briefing by April 3, 2006, and that the United States

would file additional opposition by April 24, 2006. The minute

order ordered the parties to submit a stipulation and order with

these new dates. No such stipulation was filed and no additional

briefing was filed by Mr. Butterworth on behalf of the Littles. 

This action was assigned from the docket of Judge Coyle to the

docket of Judge Wanger by Order filed on June 2, 2006. (Doc.

147). On July 11, 2006, the parties were ordered to file a joint

status report within 20 days. On July 31, 2006, the United

States filed a status report in which the United States

represents that “[a]lthough repeated efforts were made to obtain

the participation of the sole remaining active counsel, James

Butterworth, representing James and Lorna Little, he has left his

former firm with no forwarding address, and has not responded to

telephone messages.” (Doc. 151). No status report has been

filed by or on behalf of the Littles in compliance with the July

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A check of the State Bar of California’s website indicates 1

that the address of Mr. Butterworth’s law practice in Visalia,

California has not been changed from the address filed in this

action when Mr. Butterworth substituted as counsel for the Littles.

Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 2

“[a]ny motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later

than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” 

Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the

court may relieve a party ... from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence

could not have been discovered in time to move

for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud

(whether heretofore denominated as intrinsic

or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior

judgment upon which it is based has been

reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective application; or (6) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of

the judgment. 

3

31, 2006 Order.1

Based on review of the Littles’ motions, the United States’

oppositions, and applicable law, these motions are suitable for

decision without oral argument. See Rule 78-230(h), Local Rules

of Practice. 

In opposing the Motion to Vacate, the United States contends

there is no such motion as a motion to vacate and that resolution

of this motion is governed by the standards governing motions

filed pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.2

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Neither Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) apply to defendants’ motion

because no judgment has been entered in favor of the United

States. As explained in Wright, Miller & Kane, 11 Federal

Practice and Procedure, § 2852, p. 233 (1995):

Rule 60(b) ... applies only to ‘a final

judgment, order, or proceeding.’ Thus, the

power of a court to modify an interlocutory

judgment or order at any time prior to final

judgment remains unchanged and is not limited

by the provisions of Rule 60(b).

Defendants’ motion is construed to be a motion for

reconsideration. Rule 78-230(k), Local Rules of Practice,

governs motions for reconsideration of non-final orders. Rule

78-230(k) provides:

Whenever any motion has been granted or

denied in whole or in part, and a subsequent

motion for reconsideration is made upon the

same or any alleged different set of facts,

it shall be the duty of counsel to present to

the Judge ... to whom subsequent motion is

made an affidavit, or brief, as appropriate,

setting forth each motion for which

reconsideration is sought, including:

1) when and to what Judge ... the prior

motion was made;

2) what ruling, decision or order was made

thereon;

3) what new or different facts or

circumstances are claimed to exist or were

not shown upon such prior motion, or what

other grounds exist for the motion; and

4) why the facts or circumstances were not

shown at the time of the prior motion.

Though motions to reconsider are generally disfavored, a motion

to reconsider is appropriate if the court committed clear error

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or the initial decision was manifestly unjust. School District

No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). A party seeking reconsideration must set forth facts

or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce a court to

reverse its prior decision. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1997). th

Motions for reconsideration, however, are not the place for

parties to make new arguments not raised in their original

briefs. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 no. 5 (9th

Cir. 1999); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc.,

841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A. MOTION TO VACATE DIRECTED TO ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS.

Defendants pose three objections to the Order denying their

motion to dismiss. 

Their first objection is that defendants were denied due

process and access to the court when Judge Coyle refused to allow

Mrs. Little to read into the record at oral argument an 18-page

“STATEMENT FOR THE COURT”. 

When Mrs. Little started to read from the Statement, Judge

Coyle stopped her and told her to file the Statement, advising

that Judge Coyle would consider the positions taken therein in

resolving the motions before the court. The Statement was filed

by the court on August 29, 2005 (Doc. 124) and was reviewed

before issuing the Order denying the motion to dismiss. To the

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extent defendants contend they were denied due process and access

to the court because they were not allowed to read a document

into the record during oral argument but, rather, were required

to file it, defendants’ position is without merit. 

Defendants further contend that the court failed to consider

matters set forth in the Statement because the court failed to

rule on their contention that the Supreme Court’s decision in

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) is an “unsubstantiated

Ruling and is invalid under the Stare Decisis Doctrine because it

did not overrule the previous United States Supreme Court

Rulings” cited in defendants’ memorandum in support of their

“Motion to Compel Answers to Discovery Requests and Production of

Documents or To Dismiss” (Docs. 65-68), which motion was denied

by Order filed on April 12, 2004 (Doc. 78). 

This objection also is without merit. In the Order denying

their motion to dismiss, Judge Coyle expressly stated:

“Defendants’ arguments that the Supreme Court in Butler wrongly

decided the law is not a position upon which this court can rely

because this court is bound by Supreme Court authority.” That

Judge Coyle did not address defendants’ arguments in detail does

not require vacation of the Order denying the motion to dismiss

or reconsidering the motion to dismiss. Any objection

defendants have to the ruling conclusion is one for appeal.

Defendants further object to the conclusion in the Order

denying their motion to dismiss that this action was validly

commenced pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7401 and that the United States

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District Court for the Eastern District of California has

jurisdiction. In these objections, defendants complain that the

evidence relied upon in denying this aspect of their motion to

dismiss did not suffice to withstand dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction. Defendants further complain that, because their

contention in opposition to the motion for partial summary

judgment that the motion for partial summary judgment should be

continued pursuant to Rule 56(f), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, was not addressed, their right to due process has been

denied.

In the Order denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Coyle

ruled in pertinent part as follows:

Section 7401 provides that “[n]o civil action

for the collection or recovery of taxes, or

of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be

commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or

sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney

General or his delegate directs that the

action be commenced.” 

The Littles’ contention that this action has

not been authorized as required by Section

7401 is belied by the exhibits submitted by

the Littles in support of the “Amendment”. 

Attached as an exhibit to the “Amendment” is

a copy of a letter dated August 17, 2001 from

the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue

Service, to Assistant Attorney General

O’Connor of the Tax Division of the

Department of Justice authorizing the

Department of Justice to commence a suit to

reduce the tax assessments to judgment and to

foreclose on tax liens on real property

located at 23009 Avenue 230, Lemon Cove,

California. Also attached as an exhibit to

the “Amendment” is a copy a letter dated

January 31, 2002 from the Chief, Civil Trial

Section, Western Region, of the Tax Division

of the Department of Justice to United States

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Attorney John K. Vincent authorizing the

filing of this action. Although portions of

these letters are redacted, the two letters,

taken together, show that the United States

has complied with Section 7401. 

The Littles nonetheless argue that these two

letters, produced to the Littles in

discovery, “do not prove under the rules of

evidence that the plaintiff has fully

complied with ... Section 7401 [underling and

capitalization omitted].” The Littles

assert:

Though there is a letter with

letterhead stating Department of

the Treasury Internal Revenue

Service, Office of the Chief

Counsel, Small Business/SelfEmployment Division Counsel, it

bares an address from San Jose,

California, not from the actual

office of the Chief Counsel, which

is in Washington, D.C., and it is

signed by two attorneys, who are

not identified as employees,

officers or even employees of the

Treasury Department of the United

States of America, which does not

comply with the express requirement

that the action be authorized by

the Secretary of the Treasury or a

delegate of the Secretary of

Treasury, nor is there any

documentation of any actual written

request from the Attorney General

or his delegate ... Although there

is a heresay [sic] letter by

Assistant Attorney General Eileen

J. O’Connor, signed by Jerome H.

Fridkin, Chief Civil Trial Section,

Western Region, that letter is from

the Department of Justice Tax

Division, not the Attorney General,

and there is no evidence produced

that shows or establishes the

person who signed the document is

actually a delegate of the Attorney

General of the United States of

America. 

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The Littles contend that the exhibits

attached to the “Amendment” “violate the

best evidence rule, as they are heresay [sic]

documents” and further argue:

there is no authentication,

affidavit, or certification of

authenticity, no foundation to

establish that the persons

plaintiff is purporting to have

signed the letters in question are

actually ‘officers, employees, or

agencies of the Treasury Department

duly authorized by the Secretary of

the Treasury directly, or

indirectly by one or more

redelegations of authority to

perform the function mentioned or

described in the context’ of

Section 7401 of U.S. Code ... as is

expressly required under federal

law under ... Section 7701.

There is a presumption of regularity that

attaches to the actions of public officials. 

See Palmer v. I.R.S., 116 F.3d 1309, 1311

(9 Cir. 1997). The Littles have presented th

nothing to this court from which it may be

inferred that this presumption of regularity

does not apply. There is no requirement that

delegation orders be published, United States

v. Holm, 2001 WL 669279 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11)(B) and

(a)(12)(A), the term “Secretary” shall

include “the Secretary of the Treasury of his

delegate” and the term “delegate” includes

“any officer, employee, or agency of the

Treasury Department”. A United States

Attorney is authorized to commence an action

to convert an IRS assessment into judgment. 

28 U.S.C. § 547(2). Furthermore, a United

States Attorney may delegate an assistant

United States attorney to commence such an

action on his behalf. 28 U.S.C. § 542. 

Consequently, the court concludes from the

record that this action was validly commenced

pursuant to Section 7401 and that this court

has jurisdiction.

Judge Coyle further noted in footnote one: 

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Furthermore, both the Complaint and the First

Amended Complaint allege: “In accordance with

26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403, this action is

commenced at the request and with the

authorization of the Chief Counsel of the

Internal Revenue Service, a delegate of the

Secretary of the Treasury, and at the

direction of the Attorney General of the

United States.”

Defendants argue that the court failed to address the

sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the United States in

discovery in response to defendants’ Request for Production of

Records & Documents, Set No. 5, dated November 11, 2004,

concerning evidence of compliance with Section 7401. Defendants

contend that “[t]his court failed to Address the Fact that the

Case in which the Plaintiffs relied upon for their Authority that

all that they needed to Establish Authority under Section 7401

... was a letter from some Office in SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, FROM

THE SMALL BUSINESS/SELF EMPLOYED DIVISION COUNSEL AT: 55 Market

Street, Suite 505, San Jose, California 95113, rather than the

actual OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, which is in

Washington, D.C.” [Underlining and italics omitted]. Defendants

complain that Palmer v. I.R.S., 116 F.3d 1309 (9 Cir. 1997) th

“did not Adjudicate the Legal and Factual Issue Raised her in

this Case by Defendants: WHETHER OR NOT THE REQUIRED

REDELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY MANDATED UNDER TITLE 26, §

7701(a)(11)(A) & (B), & (a)(12)(i), WERE EVER EXECUTED BY THE

PROPER EMPLOYEE OR OFFICER, WHICH THE DEFENDANTS HEREIN HAD A

CLEAR ‘DUE PROCESS RIGHT’ TO ESTABLISH THROUGH DISCOVERY

PROCEEDINGS PRIOR TO THE RULING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ....” 

All of the discovery requests attached as exhibits to the

Amendment to the motion to dismiss, (Doc. 116), have been

reviewed. None of these discovery requests seek production of

redelegations of authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7701. Furthermore,

defendants did not move to compel production of such discovery

within the time limits set forth in the Scheduling Order filed on

October 15, 2004. Pursuant to that Scheduling Order, nonexpert

discovery closed on January 28, 2005 and the time to file

nondispositive motions expired on February 18, 2005. 

Finally, defendants are essentially rearguing Judge Coyle’s 

resolution of this issue, contending that Judge Coyle’s

conclusion is wrong. Defendants must raise these arguments on

appeal. 

Furthermore, defendants are contending that, because the

United States did not respond to their requests for production,

sets nos. 6 and 7, they are entitled to vacation of the Order

denying the motion to dismiss. Defendants refer to their request

for continuance of the motion for partial summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

discussion infra. 

However, the Request for Production of Records & Documents,

Set No. 6 is dated February 16, 2005. The Request for Production

of Records & Documents, Set No. 7 is dated March 27, 2005.

Pursuant to the Scheduling Order filed on October 15, 2004,

nonexpert discovery closed on January 28, 2005. Therefore, these

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discovery requests were not timely made. The filing date for

nondispositive motions was February 18, 2005. The motion for

partial summary judgment was filed on March 8, 2005. Defendants

did not file a motion to compel the discovery at issue prior to

the filing of the motion for partial summary judgment and, even

then, their contention that they are entitled to the requested

discovery was made in the course of opposing the motion for

partial summary judgment. Finally, defendants’ Request for

Production of Records & Documents, Sets Nos. 6 and 7, do not

specifically request any documentation pertaining to either

Section 7701 or 7401. 

Defendants object to the court’s conclusion in the Order

denying the motion to dismiss that defendants “have presented

nothing to this Court from which it may be inferred that this

presumption of regularity does not apply.” Defendants contend:

[T]he Court Fails to Consider that the Denial

of an Opportunity to Obtain Discovery on the

3 Undisclosed Key Witnesses: Pobre,

Washington, and Rodriguez whom the Plaintiff

Relied on to Prove the Alleged Tax Liability

Allegedly Owed by Defendants has Denied

Defendants their Right to Obtain any Such

Available Evidence which would Rebut the

‘presumption of regularity ....” [Underlining

and italics omitted]

Again, however, defendants did not file a motion to compel

this discovery within the time limits set forth in the Scheduling

Order. Furthermore, it is not clear when these discovery

requests were made by defendants, i.e., before or after the time

discovery closed. Finally, Alan Pobre is the IRS Technical

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Services Advisor who filed a declaration in support of the motion

for partial summary judgment who averred the outstanding balances

of defendants’ respective tax liabilities shown on the IRS

computer records. E.M. Washington is the Chief,

Accounting/Control Services Operations, Internal Revenue Service,

who executed the “Certificate of Official Record” dated November

22, 2004, attached to the Forms 4030, Certificates of Assessment

submitted in support of the motion for partial summary judgment. 

However, Judge Coyle discussed the admissibility of the evidence

submitted by these witnesses and rejected defendants’ arguments

concerning it. Therefore, defendants’ must look to an appeal of

Judge Coyle’s rulrulings, express or implied.

B. Motion to Vacate Directed to Order Granting Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment.

Defendants move for reconsideration of the Order granting

the motion for partial summary judgment on various grounds.

First, defendants object to the finding as undisputed fact

that

James and Lorna Little have been married

since at least 1981. The Littles filed joint

federal income tax returns (Forms 1040) for

the years 1989 and 1990.

The Littles contend that they are entitled to

reconsideration of this finding of undisputed fact because:

Defendants have Rebutted the Plaintiffs’

claim that they are married under the Laws of

the State of California, and have stated it

is a Common Law Marriage, and there is no

State of California Statutory Marriage, and

that the State of California Community

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Property Laws do NOT apply; which is in the

Answers to Plaintiffs’ Requests for

Admissions, provided by Defendants, and which

Answers were actually filed by the Plaintiffs

as an ‘EXHIBIT’ to their Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment; and Defendants clearly

stated in their concise Statement of Disputed

Facts, at page 47, lines 12-22 that Community

Property Laws do NOT apply in this case, and

referred to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit SUF, DK # 36,

attached EX XPP 380 & 38l stating that: ‘It

is only a Common Law Marriage not recognized

by the State of California, thus the

Community Property Laws do not apply’ ....

[Underlining and italics omitted]

In defendants’ joint declaration in opposition to the motion

for partial summary judgment defendants affirm “[w]e have been

married since at least 1981". Doc. 112. In addition, the Forms

1040 filed by James Little for the taxable years 1989 and 1990

are marked “married filing joint return”. However, both

defendants denied the United States’ request for admission no. 11

that “James and Lorna Little are married and have been since at

least 1981", both defendants asserting that “# 11 is admitted

with the following qualification; THE MARRIAGE WAS THROUGH THE

CHURCH OF KAWEAH BY COMMON LAW.” Defendants contend that the

United States has provided no evidence negating the contention

that their marriage was by common law. Defendants assert:

The fact they may have been married in the

past in 1989-1990 does not prove that is the

case at present or since the said filings of

1989-1990. The court’s failure to credit

Defendants answers to plaintiffs admission

requests that the marriage is now and has

long been a common law marriage since they

rescinded their California state statutory

marriage license ... requires the court to

vacate its order .... [Underlining and

capitalization omitted].

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While defendants are correct that common law marriages have

been abolished in California, see Witkin, 11 Summary of

California Law, Husband and Wife, § 37 (1990), and that,

therefore, there is no community property in such a marriage, 

defendants have presented no documentary evidence establishing

that they rescinded their “California state statutory marriage

license”, when it was rescinded or how it was rescinded. 

Furthermore, the fact that the alleged common law marriage was

solemnized in a church and that defendants held themselves out to

be married may raise a presumption of a valid marriage, which

presumption has not been rebutted by any evidence submitted by

defendants. See Witkin, id., §§ 41-42, 45, 50-51. Consequently,

defendants’ motion on this ground is DENIED because of the

absence of any credible evidence establishing the alleged common

law marriage. 

Defendants argue that the record raises a genuine issue of

material fact concerning the correctness of Judge Coyle’s

conclusion in the Order granting partial summary judgment that

“the forms 886-A submitted by the United States as Exhibit L

establish that Lorna Little is assessed James Little’s income

from Montgomery Ward has [sic] community property.” 

Defendants further object to the following statement of

undisputed fact set forth in the Order:

On October 20, 1994, the IRS sent James and

Lorna Little separate notices of deficiency

for the years 1991 through 1993, notifying

them of the IRS’s determination that the

Littles owed additional taxes, interest and

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statutory additions, and that they had ninety

days to petition the United States Tax Court

to redetermine the deficiencies.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to reconsideration

of this statement of undisputed fact. Defendants refer the court

to Exhibit 2 to their motion to vacate, which exhibit is a copy

of a document dated May 20, 2003 and addressed “To Whom it may

concern” and states:

This is a letter regarding a telephone

conversation with Allen David. He requested

information concerning the Lemon Cove Post

Office. In 1992 construction of the new

Lemon Cove Post Office was completed. At

this time all the P.O. Boxes from the old

site were dismantled and all P.O. Box

customers were issued new numbers.

Any customers who currently receive mail at

any of the old P.O. Box numbers will have

their mail returned because the numbers no

longer exist.

I hope this answers your questions regarding

this issue.

Exhibit 2 is signed by Janet King, Postmaster, Lemon Cove,

California. Defendants contend that the notices of deficiency

were sent to them at P.O. Box 239, Lemon Cove, California “which

establishes there were no notices of deficiencies or tax liens

timely received by these defendants which renders the alleged

deficiency assessments against both defendants void under Federal

case law rulings and Federal statutes.” 

All of the voluminous pleadings filed by defendants in

opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment have been

reviewed. Postmaster King’s letter was not submitted by

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defendants, nor do they contend that the notices of deficiency

were invalid because they were sent to defunct post office box, 

nor did defendants argue that the notices of deficiency were

invalid for this reason. In defendants “Reproduction of

Plaintiffs’ Itemized Facts in Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed

Facts; Amendment to Defendants Rebuttal of Plaintiffs Statement

of Undisputed Facts in Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Defendants Concise Statement of Disputed Facts” (Doc. 122),

defendants’ rebuttal of the fact at issue is as follows:

The alleged Notices of Deficiency are not the

Equivalent of the Actual Title 26, Section

6020(b) Returns, or the Forms 1099's which

the Alleged Assessments are Supposed to be

Based Upon, and in the absence of those

Actual Documents Notices of Deficiency are

Insufficient to Prove an Actual Assessment

for the Alleged Taxes was ever carried out by

Plaintiff, and the Courts have Ruled that

without an Assessment there can be no

Liability for the Tax. Until Assessment

under 26, 6020(b) are shown by the Plaintiff

all other Facts and Issues are Irrelevant to

prove Assessment, and no Liability is

Established by Plaintiff, & THE Alleged

Notices of Deficiency are also irrelevant. 

Furthermore, according to Exhibits E and F attached to the United

States’ Statement of Undisputed Facts filed on December 30, 2002,

the Notices of Deficiency were also mailed to each defendant at

P.O. Box 44288, Lemon Cove, California. Exhibit H to the United

States’ Statement of Undisputed Facts filed on December 30, 2002,

establishes that each defendant received the respective Notice of

Deficiency on October 24, 1994, because each defendant signed the

return receipt on that date. 

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Defendants belated effort to withstand partial summary

judgment on this ground is without merit. A notice of deficiency

is valid if it is mailed to the taxpayer’s last known address,

even if it is not received by the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a);

Williams v. Commissioner, 935 F.3d 1066, 1067 (9 Cir. 1991). A th

taxpayer’s last known address is that on his or her most recent

return, unless the taxpayer communicates to the IRS clear and

concise notice of a change of address. Id. Furthermore, a

notice of deficiency is valid if it is actually received in

sufficient time for the taxpayer to file a timely petition in tax

court, regardless of the address to which it was sent. King v.

Commissioner, 857 F.2d 676, 679 n.4 (9 Cir. 1988). Therefore, th

defendants are not entitled to reconsideration on this ground.

Defendants further move to vacate the Order granting partial

summary judgment on the ground that Judge Coyle id not address

and should have granted defendants’ request for a continuance of

the motion pursuant to Rule 56(f), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Rule 56(f) provides in pertinent part:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the

party’s opposition, the court may refuse the

application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or depositions to be taken or

discovery to be had or may make such other

order as is just.

As explained in Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers Limited Partnership,

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940 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9 Cir. 1991): th

Ordinarily, summary judgment should not be

granted when there are relevant facts

remaining to be discovered, but the party

seeking discovery bears the burden of showing

what specific facts it hopes to discover that

will raise an issue of material fact.

Defendants made no such showing. Defendants are complaining that

the United States did not respond to their Requests for

Production of Documents & Records, Sets Nos. 6 and 7. However,

as discussed supra, these requests for production were made after

discovery had closed pursuant to the Scheduling Order and

defendants did not move to amend the Scheduling Order or to

compel this discovery prior to filing their opposition to the

Motion for Partial Discovery. Defendants also complain that they

were not allowed to depose United States’ witnesses E.M.

Washington, Alan Pobre, Martha Rodriguez. Defendants have not

demonstrated the specific facts that this discovery would reveal

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Their

positions are conclusory and speculative.

The balance of defendants’ motion to vacate consists of

arguments that Judge Coyle’s conclusions set forth in the Order

are wrongly decided and constitutes a rehash of defendants’

various positions discussed in the Order. Defendants present no

basis for reconsideration and must present their disagreement

with the rulings to the Ninth Circuit on appeal. 

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Defendants James and Lorna Little’s motion to vacate On

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“Order Denying Defendants James and Lorna Little’s Motion to

Dismiss (Docs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 & 116)” and the “Order

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.

100)” is DENIED.

2. The parties are ordered to appear for further status

conference before Magistrate Judge Beck on Monday, September 11,

2006 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 9. The parties are ordered to

file a joint status report no later than Tuesday, September 5,

2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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