Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02578/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 15:77 Securities Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN J. DONELL, Permanent Receiver

for Learn Waterhouse, Inc., and its

subsidiaries and affiliates,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10-CV-2578 JLS (JMA)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF

TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEFING

vs.

CASEY GRIFFIS, 

 Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s application for default judgment as to Defendant

Casey Griffis. (Motion, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed this action on December 15, 2010, asserting

three claims under California’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), Cal. Civ. Code § 3429

et seq., along with a common law claim for unjust enrichment. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

As an initial matter, similar cases filed by Plaintiff Donell against other defendants in this

District cause the Court to examine whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Griffis. 

See, e.g., Donell v. Keppers, No. 10-CV-2613 (S.D. Cal., filed Dec. 20, 2010) (Gonzalez, J.);

Donnell v. Kozlowski, No. 11-CV-1199 (S.D. Cal., filed June 1, 2011) (Sammartino, J.) “When

entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district

court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the

parties.” Tuli v. Republic of Iraq (In re Tuli), 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the

Case 3:10-cv-02578-JLS-JMA Document 9 Filed 12/15/11 Page 1 of 3
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1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court may take judicial notice of the docket

in SEC v. Learn Waterhouse, Inc., 04-mc-0037 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 18, 2004) because it is a “matter

of public record.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.

2001).

2

 The Court initially appointed Thomas F. Lennon as receiver, who was later succeeded by

Plaintiff Stephen Donell. See SEC v. Learn Waterhouse, Inc., No. 04cv2037 (S.D.Cal., Order filed

Oct. 12, 2004, ECF No. 9); id. (Order filed Nov. 4, 2009, ECF No. 566).

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Court may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction, where there are questions

about personal jurisdiction the Court should allow the plaintiff an opportunity to establish that

jurisdiction is proper. See id. at 712–13.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(D) and 28 U.S.C. § 1692, a court may

have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a receivership action so long as the court-appointed

receiver complies with the filing requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 754. Section 754 sets forth the

following filing requirements:

Such receiver shall, within ten days after the entry of his order of appointment,

file copies of the complaint and such order of appointment in the district court for

each district in which property is located. The failure to file such copies in any

district shall divest the receiver of jurisdiction and control over all such property

in that district.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Griffis resides in MacClenny, Florida. 

(Compl. ¶ 15.) Neither the complaint nor the motion for default judgment indicates

whether copies of the complaint and order of appointment were filed in the Middle District

of Florida. However, the Court finds that the requirements of § 754 have been met in SEC

v. Learn Waterhouse, Inc., 04-mc-0037 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 18, 2004)1

. On October 18,

2004, six days after Lennon was appointed as receiver2

, Lennon filed both a copy of the

complaint and the order appointing him in the Middle District of Florida. See SEC v.

Learn Waterhouse, Inc., 04-mc-0037 (M.D. Fla. [Doc. Nos. 1, 2]). 

However, the UFTA creates a backstop of seven years within which a cause of

action for a fraudulent transfer must be filed. Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(c). Here, exhibits

supplied in support of Plaintiff’s motion indicate the transfers at issue occurred between

January 31, 2003, and January 1, 2004. (Schaefer Decl. ISO Motion Ex. 5, ECF No. 7-4.)

//

Case 3:10-cv-02578-JLS-JMA Document 9 Filed 12/15/11 Page 2 of 3
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3

See Donell v. Keppers, No.10-CV-2613, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140564, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec.

6, 2011) (describing previous order to show cause for this reason, and denying Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment as barred by the statute of limitations).

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Because approximately seven years passed between the fraudulent transfers and the filling

of Plaintiff’s complaint on December, the statue of limitations is implicated. 

Thus, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to provide supplemental briefing explaining

why each claim should not be dismissed, in whole or in part, as barred by the relevant

statute of limitations as to some or all of the transfers.3 Plaintiff SHALL FILE this

supplemental brief within FOURTEEN DAYS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02578-JLS-JMA Document 9 Filed 12/15/11 Page 3 of 3