Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01359/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO et al.,

Respondent. 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 14-CV-1359-GPC (WVG)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 3, 2014, Petitioner Christopher Gonzalez (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for attempted murder, assault with a

deadly weapon, first degree burglary, and aggravated mayhem.1/

 (Doc. No. 1.) 

Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated by ineffective

assistance of counsel, cumulative error, and the erroneous admission of his confession. 

1/

 Petitioner was also convicted of simple mayhem. However, on direct appeal,

the California Court of Appeal found Petitioner’s conviction for simple mayhem to be

a lesser included offense of aggravated mayhem and vacated the conviction for simple

mayhem. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 5, 20-23.)

14CV1359

 1

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 1 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On July 29, 2014, Respondents Daniel Paramo and Kamala D. Harris (“Respondents”)

filed an Answer to the Petition (“Answer”). (Doc. No. 4.) Respondents

contemporaneously lodged relevant state court records with their Answer. (Doc. No.

4.) On October 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 10.) 

This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ.

R. 72.1(d)(4) for Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition. For

the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED

without prejudice.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006);see also Parke v.Raley,

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are substantially taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal, affirming in part and reversing in part the

judgment of the trial court. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6)2/

. 

In mid-August 2009, Maria Gonzalez (Maria) and her teenage daughter

Selina G. were awakened at approximately 4:00 a.m. by knocking at their

front door. It was [Petitioner] Christopher [Gonzalez], the son of Maria’s

former boyfriend Raymond Gonzalez (Ray). [Petitioner] was upset after

fighting with hisfather. Maria invited [Petitioner] inside. About a half an

hour later, Maria’s son Robert Gonzalez (Robert) came home with victim

Daniel Castillo (Daniel).FN4 

FN4. Maria, Selina, and Robert are not related to [Petitioner]. 

2/

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (the state court’s determination of the facts is presumed

to be correct); see e.g. Dillard v. Roe, 204 F.3d 758, n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the facts are

taken from the opinion by the California Court of Appeal”); DePetris v. Kuykendall,

239 F. 3d 1057, 1059-61 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting the California Court of Appeal’s

“recitation of facts”).

14CV1359

 2

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 2 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Maria decided to walk [Petitioner] back to his father’s house, which

was only a few blocks away. Once back at his father’s house, [Petitioner]

and Ray had another fight. [Petitioner] then left with Maria to return to

Maria’s house. On the way back to Maria’s house, they saw some tools

on the ground, including a hammer and a crowbar. Maria recalled

commenting to [Petitioner] about the tools as they walked. After Maria

and [Petitioner] returned to Maria’s house, Robert, Selina, and Daniel left

to get something to eat. [Petitioner] stayed behind with Maria. Sometime

after 6:00 a.m., [Petitioner] and Daniel went to a convenience store to buy

alcohol. Robert, Daniel, Selina, and [Petitioner] then watched a movie. 

At 6:30 a.m., Maria left for work. When she left everyone appeared to

be enjoying the movie.

Five minutes after Maria left, Selina went to her bedroom to sleep,

leaving the three men alone in the living room. [Petitioner] asked Daniel

for a cigarette, then went outside.FN5 Robert went to his room and fell

asleep, leaving Daniel alone in the living room. 

FN5. Robert was uncertain whether [Petitioner] left at 6:38 or 7:38

a.m., but he was certain it was 38 minutes past the hour. 

A few minutes later, Selina returned to the living room after she heard

noises outside. Recognizing that [Petitioner] was gone, Selina unlocked

the front door for [Petitioner] and then returned to her bedroom. Inside

her room, Selina heard someone outside opening the latch of the front

gate. She went back to the living room and found Daniel looking out the

window. Daniel told her that [Petitioner] had just returned. As she

returned to her room, Selina heard the sound of the front door opening. 

About five minutes later, from inside her room Selina heard sounds in

the living room that she described as similar to the noise her dogs make

when they jump off the ouch. When the noise continued, Selina went to

the living room and found [Petitioner] standing behind the couch with his

arm behind his back. [Petitioner] told Selina that Daniel was sleeping. 

Frightened, Selina returned to her room and locked the door. Selina first

called her mother and then she called 9-1-1.

As Selina was speaking to the 9-1-1 operator, [Petitioner] knocked on

the door and asked if he could use the telephone. Selina told 9-1-1 that

[Petitioner] was banging on the door, then he began shaking the doorknob. 

When the banging stopped, Selina opened her door slightly and saw

Daniel in the living room. His face was covered in blood. When asked,

14CV1359

 3

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 3 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Selina explained to the 9-1-1 operator that she thought Daniel had been hit

by a weapon because “his head [was] all smashed,” his eye was

“completely cut,” and his temple looked as if it was “falling off.” 

A witness saw [Petitioner] dispose of a hammer while [Petitioner] was

running in a drainage ditch. Sheriff’s deputies recovered the hammer,

which Maria later identified as the same hammer she and [Petitioner] saw

when out walking early in the morning. When the deputies arrested

[Petitioner], he was sweating, breathing heavily, and wearing only boxer

shorts. Deputies transported [Petitioner] to the sheriff’s substation and

placed a parole hold on him.

Daniel suffered a fractured jaw, cheekbone, skull, and nose. He

underwent multiple surgeries on his face. At trial, his upper lip remained

a little numb, his right eyelid did not feel right, and he had facial scars and

a tracheotomy scar on his neck.

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 3-5.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. BENCH TRIAL AND DIRECT APPEAL IN STATE COURT

On September 21, 2010, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed

a Third Amended Information charging Petitioner with one count of attempted murder

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 664/187(a)), assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code §

245(a)(1)), first degree burglary (Cal. Penal Code §§ 459 & 460), aggravated mayhem

(Cal. Penal Code § 205), and simple mayhem (Cal. Penal Code § 203). (Respondents’

Lodgment No.. 1 at 45-47.) The Third Amended Information also alleged that

Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a)),

and that Petitioner personally used a deadly weapon, a hammer. (Cal. Penal Code

§ 12022(b)(1)). (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 1 at 46.)

 On September 23, 2010, the Honorable Patricia Cookson held a bench trial. 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 2.) The trial court found Petitioner guilty of all charges

and found all special allegations to be true. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 5.) On

January 11, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate sentence of 9

years, followed by an indeterminate term of 14 years to life. (Id.) 

14CV1359

 4

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 4 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On January 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Respondents’

Lodgment No. 3 at 12.) Petitioner claimed erroneous admission of his confession,

multiplicious convictions, and sentencing error. Id. On October 29, 2012, the state

appellate court held that Petitioner’s confession was improperly admitted, but that the

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6.) 

Specifically, the state appellate court determined that, while the trial court erred in

admitting Petitioner’s post-arrest confession into evidence because his confession was

involuntary under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 64

(1996), the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based in part on the

determination that there was substantial evidence other than his confession to the police

to support his conviction. (Respondents’ Lodgment No.6, Doc. No. 4-16 at 8-19.) The

state appellate court also found Petitioner’s conviction for simple mayhem to be a lesser

included offense of aggravated mayhem, and therefore vacated the simple mayhem

conviction and ordered the trial court to correct the errors on the abstract of judgment.3/

(Id. at 20, 23.) In all other respects, the state appellate court affirmed the judgment. 

(Id. at 24). 

On November 29, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, and the petition was denied on February 14, 2013. (Respondents’

Lodgment Nos. 7, 8.)

B. HABEAS PETITIONS IN STATE COURT

On June 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to

investigate the “hammer evidence” and object to its admission, and ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise those issues on appeal. (Respondents’

Lodgment No. 9.) Petitioner also alleged that the cumulative effect of the errors during

3/ The state appellate court directed the trial court “to amend the abstract of

judgment accordingly.” (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 23.) 

14CV1359

 5

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 5 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trial denied him due process. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 9.) On July 22, 2013, the

San Diego Superior Court denied the habeas petition on the merits. (Respondents’

Lodgment No. 10.) 

On August 22, 2013, Petitioner filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Case No. D064437, asserting the same claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel and cumulative error. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 11.) On

January 23, 2014, the appellate court denied the habeas petition on the merits. 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 14.) 

On January 9, 2014, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal, Case No. D065205, challenging the trial court’s

imposition of a fine. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 15.) The state appellate court

denied the petition, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 783, 797-798 (1993). 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 16.) The court determined that the petition was untimely

and did not set forth an exception to the procedural bar or allege good cause for the

delay. Id. The court also noted that the petition completely lacked in evidentiary

support. Id.

On February 26, 2014, Petitioner filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Lodgment Nos. 17, 19.) One petition

challenged the imposition of a fine, Case No. S216774 (Respondents’ Lodgment No.

17), the other petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error,

Case No. S216775 (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 19). On April 30, 2014, the California

Supreme Court denied both habeas petitions. (Respondents’ Lodgment Nos. 18, 20.) 

The petition challenging the imposition of a fine was denied with pinpoint citations to

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759

(1953). (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 18.) The petition alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel and cumulative error was denied with a pinpoint citation to In re Clark, 5

Cal.4th 750, 767-69 (1993). (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 20).

14CV1359

 6

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 6 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. HABEAS PETITION IN FEDERAL COURT

On June 3, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner asserts the same

claims that he raised in one of his state habeas petitions, ineffective assistance of

counsel and cumulative error.4/

 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“the AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.

Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon

to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies

an extraordinary deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003);

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the

state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court

cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may

grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly

identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

4/ Petitioner does not challenge the imposition of a fine in his instant Petition. 

Therefore, all further references to Petitioner’s state habeas petition are to the petition

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error.

14CV1359

 7

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 7 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than

incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the higheststate court the claim was

presented to, the Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and

presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order

does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds

by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established

federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the

governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state

court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises four claims in his instant Petition. First, he argues that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move to exclude the hammer as

evidence, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring that claim

on direct appeal. Second, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to subpoena a witness to testify, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to bring that claim on direct appeal. Third, Petitioner argues that the cumulative

14CV1359

 8

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 8 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

effect of the errors during trial denied him due process. Fourth, Petitioner contends that

his constitutional rights were violated by the erroneous admission of his confession. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner is procedurally barred from receiving relief

for grounds one through three because the California Supreme Court denied the habeas

petition by citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-69 (1993). (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11.) They

assert that this citation represents a procedural bar that is based upon adequate and

independentstate law grounds. Id. They also argue that the appellate court reasonably

applied Strickland v. Washington in rejecting Petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, that Petitioner’s cumulative error claim fails to present a federal

question, and that the California Court of Appeal found the erroneous admission of

Petitioner’s confession to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 13, 16-18. 

A. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS ARE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition based

on a pinpoint reference to Clark.

5/ Respondents contend that the citation “represents a

procedural bar that is based upon adequate and independent state law grounds.” (Doc.

No. 4-1 at 11.) They argue the Clark court observed that “[i]t has long been the rule

that absent a change in the applicable law or the facts, the court will not consider

repeated applications for habeas corpus presenting claims previously rejected,” or

“newly presented grounds for relief which were known to the petitioner at the time of

a prior collateral attack on the judgment.” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11; citing Clark, 5 Cal.4th

at 767. In response, Petitioner argues that “regardless of just how many times a state

court may deny a petition which contain [sic] a constitutional claim, the federal Court

still have [sic] jurisdiction sufficient to review it.” (Doc. No. 10 at 5.) 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error

were previously denied on the merits in the state appellate court, and were denied by

the state supreme court with an order which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas

corpus is denied. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769.)” (Respondents’

5/

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993).

14CV1359

 9

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 9 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Lodgment No. No. 20.) Clark discusses several procedural bars used by California

courts. Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750. The citation to pages 767-69 of the Clark opinion is a

reference to a California state rule against repetitious and piecemeal litigation of claims. 

See Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 767-69.

Respondents are correct that the pages of the Clark decision cited by the

California Supreme Court here, pages 767-69, refer to the bar on piecemeal and

successive petitions. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11.) They contend that California’s rule against

repetitious and piecemeal litigation constitutes an adequate and independent state

procedural ground which precludes federal habeas review. Id. The case citations

provided by Respondents in support of that argument, however, involve the

untimeliness bar of Clark, not the successive bar. Id. at 11-12, citing Walker v. Martin,

562 U.S. 307, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011)(involves the untimeliness bar of Clark), and

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 2001)(“We are now presented with

the issue of whether the 1996 application of California’s untimeliness bar to a habeas

petition alleging constitutional error can bar federal habeas corpus review).6/

 Because

Respondents have not shown that the specific Clark bar cited by the California Supreme

Court is an adequate and independent bar, Respondents have not met their initial

burden. See Thomas v. Hubbard, 2013 WL 144904, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013)

(Respondent did not satisfy burden of demonstrating that In re Clark is an adequate

state bar because the California Supreme Court’s pin cite was not to a procedural bar

on the basis of untimeliness, but instead was based on California’s procedural rule on

repetitious and piecemeal claims). Accordingly, because Respondents have failed to

satisfy their burden, Petitioner is not barred from bringing claims one through three in

his instant federal habeas petition.

6/

Respondents cite to page 704 of La Crosse v. Kernan, asserting “[f]or a state

procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not be

interwoven with federal.” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11-12; citing La Crosse, 244 F.3d at 704.)

14CV1359

 10

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 10 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Before we can apply AEDPA’s standards, we must identify the state court

decision that is appropriate for our review. When more than one state court has

adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04 (“Since a laterstate

decision based upon ineligibility for further state review neither rests upon procedural

default nor lifts a pre-existing procedural default, its effect upon the availability of

federal habeas is nil-which is precisely the effect accorded by the ‘look-through’

presumption.”); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2003)(“A claim

cannot be both previously litigated and procedurally defaulted; . . . When either ground

is a possibility, the choice between them is wholly arbitrary. It is not our role to make

such a choice.”) 

Here, the last reasoned decision involving claims one through three is the

appellate court order on Petitioner’s state habeas petition, which denied the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims on the basis that Petitioner had shown neither deficient

performance nor prejudice under the standards announced in Strickland v. Washington. 

Although the appellate court did not specifically address Petitioner’s cumulative error

claim, it concluded that there was no merit to Petitioner’s claim of alleged errors. 

Therefore, the Court finds the appellate court opinion to be an adjudication on the

merits of claims one through three for AEDPA purposes, and not a denial of the claims

on procedural grounds. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091-92; Koerner, 328 F.3d at 1049-53. 

B. CLAIM ONE: NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

 RELATED TO THE ADMISSION OF THE HAMMER

In his first claim, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation, in violation of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that

trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of the hammer as evidence during his

bench trial. Id. Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was also ineffective in

failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. Id. at 8.

14CV1359

 11

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 11 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the

introduction of the hammer as evidence in his habeas petition before the California

Supreme Court. That court denied the petition with a pinpoint citation to Clark, as

discussed above. Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate

court’s decision denying the claim as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

The state appellate court agreed with the trial court’s rulings in its order denying the

habeas petition, stating,

In his petition, Gonzalez contends his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object at trial to the admission of a hammer into evidence and by failing to object to the admission of the hearsay statements of the witness

that saw him throw the hammer into a backyard. Petitioner further contends his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these same issues on direct appeal.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Gonzalez must

demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice under an objective standard of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome.

(People v. Waldla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718.) He does not meet this burden.

Gonzalez in his petition does not specify why the hammer should have

been excluded from evidence, nor do we perceive any basis to exclude it.

As discussed in the direct appeal, the hammer was clearly relevant in this

case, as witness Maria Gonzalez (no relation to petitioner) testified she

and petitioner saw the hammer along with other tools as they were

walking to her house in the early morning on the day petitioner viciously attacked victim Daniel Castillo. Daniel’s injuries were consistent with

blunt force trauma, and Maria’s teenage daughter, Selina, testified that Gonzalez went outside shortly before the attack and after he returned, she

heard noises, investigated and found Gonzalez standing behind the couch where Daniel had been laying, with Gonzalez’s hand behind his back.

Gonzalez told Selina that Daniel was sleeping. Shortly thereafter, after calling 9-1-1, Selina saw Daniel on the couch, his face covered in blood

and his head “smashed.”

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

14CV1359

 12

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 12 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thus, even if trial counsel had objected to the admission of the hammer

into evidence, the trial court would have overruled that objection, as the hammer was clearly relevant and admissible under Evidence Code section

352.7/

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. No. 14 at 2-3.)

Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have objected to and moved to exclude

the hammer as the alleged weapon that Petitioner used to commit the crime. (Doc. No.

1 at 6.) He argues that, while the prosecution contended that Petitioner beat the victim

in the face with a hammer that a Sheriff’s Deputy later found in a yard close to the

scene of the crime, the deputy confiscated the hammer into evidence without asking if

the hammer belonged to the property owner. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Further, Petitioner

argues, the hammer did not contain any DNA or fingerprints, and the prosecution failed

to submit any physical evidence showing that the hammer was the weapon used in the

attack. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) Petitioner contends the prosecution instead used the deputy’s

testimony that a witness named Ikaika Santossaw a subject running through a drainage

ditch and drop a hammer. Id.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution relied heavily upon the hammer during

closing argument, stating, “I’m bringing this up because I get to the specific intent of

aggravated mayhem. In this case I think one blow with the size of the weapon we have

would likely be enough. [Petitioner] took what is an extremely large hammer 15 inches

in length, very large heavy hammer.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7; citing RT 240.) Petitioner notes

the prosecution also argued that it “takes a very large hammer to a laying-down victim,

what else could it be other than with the intent to disfigure and the intent to kill.” Id;

citing RT 241. Petitioner claims that if trial counsel had objected or made a motion to

exclude the hammer, it is reasonably probable that the court would have excluded it as

7/

 California Evidence Code Section 352 states, “The court in its discretion may

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the

jury.”

14CV1359

 13

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 13 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

being prejudicial. Id. He argues that trial counsel’s deficient performance was

prejudicial, resulting in a life sentence conviction for premeditation and aggravation,

and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. 

Id. at 7-8.

Respondents simply argue that the state court correctly concluded that counsel’s

performance fell within the wide range of constitutionally acceptable professional

assistance. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 16.) They argue that the state court correctly determined

that Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by any assumed deficiency. Id. 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). In

a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court

must consider two factors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, Petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. Deficient performance requires a showing

that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Petitioner must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify

counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional

judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza,

78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is

highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court indulges a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

Id. at 687.

The second prong of Strickland requires Petitioner to show that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Strickland

court stated that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim

14CV1359

 14

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 14 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to approach the inquiry in the same order or to even address both components of the

inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

However, in 2005, the United States Supreme Court stated in Rompilla v.

Beard that in a situation where the state courts address one prong of the two-prong

Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, but not the other, federal courts

apply AEDPA deference to the prong the state courts reached, but review the

unaddressed prong de novo. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 625 (7th Cir. 2012);

citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (de novo review where state courts did

not reach prejudice prong). In 2011, the United States Supreme Court explained in

Harrington v. Richter that it does not matter “whether or not the state court reveals

which one of the elements in a multipart claim it found insufficient” because the

relevant question is whether a “‘claim,’ not a component of one, has been adjudicated.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). This

language appears to directly conflict with that of Rompilla. See, e.g., Childers v. Floyd,

642 F.3d 953, 969 n.18 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Language in [Richter], however,

suggests that this portion of Rompilla may no longer be good law.”). The Ninth Circuit

has not yet resolved this issue. The Seventh Circuit has addressed the conflict by

construing Richter to apply only where the state court decision is “unaccompanied by

an explanation.” Sussman v. Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011).

“In a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state court

conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on

the federal court. . .” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. Instead, “it is a mixed question of

law and fact.” Id, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980). Federal habeas

courts must defer to “state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an

ineffectiveness claim.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. The Strickland standard also

applies to challenges to counsel’s effectiveness on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.

259, 285, (2000); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

14CV1359

 15

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 15 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The first prong of the Strickland test, deficient performance, requires a

showing that counsel’s performance was “outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The relevant inquiry under

Strickland is not what defense counsel could have done, but whether counsel’s choices

were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential,” and the court

must guard against the distorting effects of hindsight and evaluate the challenged

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time in issue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;

see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“The Sixth Amendment

guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of

hindsight.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (the first Strickland prong is

a “context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s

perspective at the time of that conduct.”); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1130 (9th

Cir. 2002) (court may “neither second-guess counsel’s decisions nor apply the fabled

twenty-twenty vision of hindsight”). A petitioner bears the heavy burden of

demonstrating that counsel’s assistance was neither reasonable nor the result of sound

strategy. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 935 (2002); see also Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.) (en

banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1009 (2007). A habeas petitioner bears the burden to

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

constituted competent representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

In applying the prejudice prong of Strickland, the court must consider whether

the defendant has shown that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Here, in the last reasoned state court decision, the California Court of Appeal

denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, reasoning that it did not

14CV1359

 16

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 16 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

perceive any basis to exclude the hammer as evidence at trial. The court also stated,

“...even if trial counsel had objected to the admission of the hammer into evidence, the

trial court would have overruled that objection, as the hammer was clearly relevant and

admissible under Evidence Code 352.” (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 14) (Doc. No. 4-

24 at 3.) Petitioner argues that it was reasonably probable that, had trial counsel

objected to or made a motion to exclude the hammer, the court would have excluded

it as being prejudical. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal. 

Petitioner provides no reason to exclude the hammer other than arguing that the deputy

did not ask the owner of the property where the hammer was found if he owned the

hammer. Possession and use, not ownership, was the relevant fact. Even if the deputy

had established and testified about ownership, it would have done nothing to help

Petitioner. 

As noted by the state appellate court, the hammer was clearly relevant to this

case for several reasons. First, Maria identified the hammer as the same tool that she

and Petitioner saw on the ground the morning of the attack, and Maria recalled

commenting to Petitioner about the tools as they walked. Second, the victim’s injuries

were consistent with trauma resulting from blunt force. Third, Selina testified that

when she emerged from her bedroom to investigate the strange noises coming from the

living room, she saw Petitioner standing with his arm behind his back near the victim

as if he were hiding something. Fourth, Maria testified that shortly thereafter, she saw

the victim on the couch, his face covered in blood and his head “smashed.” Fifth, the

deputy testified to statements made by a witness who saw a suspect running in a

drainage ditch and throw a hammer into a backyard abutting the ditch, which police

recovered. Although Petitioner also disputes the admissibility of the deputy’s

testimony, as discussed below, the appellate court noted that testimony by the witness

who made those statements could have led to even more incriminating evidence against

Petitioner, given that Petitioner was wearing only boxer shorts when police found him

14CV1359

 17

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 17 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because he had discarded his clothes, was breathing heavily as if he had been running,

and a helicopter found him hiding behind a dresser in a backyard near the location of

the hammer. 

The Court agrees that any objection to the admission of the hammer would have

been futile because it was clearly relevant under California Evidence Code 352. 

California Evidence Code Section 352 states, “The court in its discretion may exclude

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” The

Court concludes that the hammer evidence did not necessitate undue consumption of

time, or create substantial danger of undue prejudice or confusion of the issues. 

Moreover, due to the substantial evidence presented at trial other than the

hammer, Petitioner has not established that counsel’s failure to object or move to

exclude the hammer resulted in prejudice under Strickland such that there is reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different, or that the Court’s confidence in the outcome is undermined. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. 

Finally, an “appellant’s counsel’s failure to raise an issue on direct appeal does

not constitute ineffective assistance when the appeal would not have provided grounds

for reversal.” Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court has

explained that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and that Petitioner was not

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to admission of the hammer. More

importantly, the hammer evidence was clearly relevant and its probative value was not

substantially outweighed by any of the Section 352 factors. It was rightfully admitted

as evidence in trial. Thus, raising this issue on direct appeal would not have provided

grounds for reversal. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the Court cannot

conclude that Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s choice not to raise this claim on direct

appeal was deficient or unreasonable.

14CV1359

 18

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 18 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner has failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice. The state

appellate court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120

S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Petitioner is not entitled

to relief as to claim one. 

C. CLAIM TWO: NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

 COUNSEL RELATED TO THE DEPUTY’S TESTIMONY

In claim two, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct a reasonable defense, in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 10.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that his trial

counsel failed to subpoena Santos, a witness whose statements were introduced without

affording Petitioner the opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination. Id.

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was also ineffective in failing to raise this

claim on direct appeal. Id. at 11.

Petitioner raised his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the

deputy’stestimony asto Santos’statementsin his habeas petition before the California

Supreme Court. That court denied the petition with a pinpoint citation to Clark, as

discussed above. Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate

court’s decision denying the claim asthe basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

The state appellate court agreed with the trial court’s rulings in its order denying the

habeas petition, stating,

Gonzalez also did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s failure to object to the statements testified to by police

made by a witness who saw a suspect running in a drainage ditch and throw a hammer into a backyard abutting the ditch, which police recovered. A court reviewing defense counsel’s actions must be “highly deferential” and engage in a presumption that the challenged actions of counsel constitute sound trial strategy. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698

(2002). 

As noted, Gonzalez waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a bench trial. If defense counsel had objected to the statements by the witness, the prosecution likely would have called the witness who made

the statements, which perhaps may have led to even more incriminating evidence against Gonzalez, given that when police found Gonzalez he was

14CV1359

 19

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 19 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

wearing only boxer shorts after discarding his clothes. He was breathing

heavy as if he had been running and a helicopter found him hiding behind a dresser in a backyard near the location of the hammer.

Assuming arguendo defense counsel had no tactical reason not to object to the statements made by the witness as testified to by police and the trial court would have ruled such statements inadmissible, the officer that

testified at trial still could have testified he found a hammer in a yard near the location where Gonzalez was apprehended. In addition, once the

hammer was found Maria later identified it as the same one she had seen

earlier that morning near her house while walking with Gonzalez. Thus, it is not reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if

defense counsel had objected to, and the trial court sustained that

objection, the admission of the hearsay statement by the witness as

testified to by police regarding seeing a suspect throw the hammer into the yard.

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. No. 14 at 3-4.)

Petitioner claims that Defense counsel failed to object to statements made by

the deputy that were prejudicially introduced in his testimony, and also failed to

subpoena Santos, the witness that made the statements, for purposes of confrontation

and cross-examination. (Doc. No. 1 at 10.) Petitioner argues that, had trial counsel

subpoenaed Santos for confrontation, it is reasonably probable that his testimony would

have been unreliable, as Santos never identified Petitioner as the individual that he saw

throw the hammer. Id. at 11. Petitioner asserts that Santos would not have identified

Petitioner as the person he saw because the subject was 50 yards away, running in the

opposite direction, with his back to Santos the entire time. Id; citing RT 179-81. 

Instead of calling Santos to testify, Petitioner claims that the prosecution called on the

deputy to testify as to what Santos saw. Id. He argues that Santos told the deputy he

“saw a subject running through a drainage ditch and drop a hammer,” and at no time

after Petitioner’s arrest did the deputy ask Santos to positively identify Petitioner. Id;

citing RT 178. Petitioner argues that the prosecution used Santos’ statements to

conclude Petitioner’s guilt, inferring that Petitioner was the individual that Santos had

seen, and linking it to Maria’s testimony that the hammer in court was the same one she

and Petitioner had seen earlier that day. Id. Petitioner claims that, other than his

involuntary confession, the prosecution’s link from Santos’ statements to Maria’s

testimony was their only claim to Petitioner’s guilt of premeditation. Id.

14CV1359

 20

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 20 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Again, Respondents simply argue that the state court correctly concluded that

counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of constitutionally acceptable

professional assistance. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 16.) They argue that the state court also

correctly determined that Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by any assumed

deficiency. Id. 

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal. If trial

counsel had objected to the deputy testifying as to Santos’ statements, the prosecution

likely would have called Santos to testify at trial. Santos would have been able to

testify as to his statements made to the deputy, and there is a likelihood that his

testimony could have led to even more incriminating evidence against Petitioner. 

Petitioner argues that Santos’ testimony would have been unreliable,

especially considering that he never identified Petitioner as the individual he saw throw

the hammer. However, in its order denying Petitioner’s state habeas petition, the trial

court stated, “...it appears the witness, who Petitioner identified as ‘Santos,’ did identify

Petitioner as the person who dropped the hammer in the drainage ditch...” 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 10 at 3)(emphasis in original). Moreover, there is a

possibility that Santos would have been able to identify Petitioner in court as the

individual he saw throw the hammer into the yard, thereby enhancing the damning

nature of Santos’ observations.

Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to call

Santos as a witness. As noted by the appellate court, the outcome of Petitioner’s trial

would have been unaffected if Santos had testified. The deputy would still have been

able to testify that the hammer was found in a location close to where Petitioner was

apprehended. Maria would still have identified the hammer as the one she and

Petitioner saw on the morning of the attack. Selina would still have testified about

Petitioner’s behavior at her house immediately before and after the attack. 

Finally, as discussed in claim one, an “appellant’s counsel’s failure to raise an

issue on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when the appeal would

not have provided grounds for reversal.” Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th

14CV1359

 21

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 21 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2001). The Court has explained that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient

and that Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to subpoena Santos or

object to the deputy’s testimony as to Santos’ statements. Thus, raising this issue on

direct appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal. Under the circumstances

presented in this case, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s

choice not to raise this claim on direct appeal was deficient or unreasonable.

The Court concludes that Petitioner has not established that counsel’s failure

to subpoena Santos or move to exclude the deputy’s testimony as to Santos’ statements

prejudiced him under Strickland such that there is reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,

or that the Court’s “confidence in the outcome” is undermined. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694; Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. Petitioner has failed to show either deficient

performance or prejudice. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim is neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law,

and Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

D. CLAIM THREE: NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner contends that he was denied due process by the combined effect of

individually harmless errors which rendered the defense far less persuasive than it

otherwise would have been. He asserts that this is a violation of his rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. No. 1 at 13.) Respondents argue that the

United States Supreme Court has not established the doctrine of cumulative error as a

basis for habeas relief,8/

 yet concede that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Chambers v.

8/

 To support this argument, Respondents cite Gillard v. Mitchell, a Sixth Circuit

case that states, “While we have recognized that ‘[e]rrors that might not be so

prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process when considered alone, may

cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair,’ Walker v. Engle, 703

F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir.1983), the ‘Supreme Court has not held that distinct

constitutional claims can be cumulated to grant habeas relief,’ Lorraine v. Coyle, 291

F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir.2002) (italics added).” Gillard v. Mitchell, 445 F.3d 883, 898

(continued...)

14CV1359

 22

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 22 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), as clearly establishing the doctrine of cumulative

error. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 16; citing Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007).) 

Further, Respondents argue that because there were no errors at Petitioner’s trial other

than one harmless error, there can be no cumulative error. Id.

Petitioner raised his claim of cumulative error in his habeas petition before the

California Supreme Court. That court denied the petition with a pinpoint citation to

Clark, as discussed above. Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The

California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal both denied Petitioner’s

state habeas petition asserting cumulative error. (Respondents’ Lodgment Nos. 10, 14.) 

The California Superior Court stated,

Finally, Petitioner argues the cumulative effect of the errors in his case

(i.e., erroneous admission of his confession and the two errors alleged above) warrants reversal. The court disagrees because Petitioner has not actually shown any error in the admission of the “hammer evidence” or

Santos’ statements. As for the erroneous admission of his confession, the

Court of Appeal found the error harmless.

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 10 at 4.)

The Ninth Circuit has stated “[t]he Supreme Court has clearly established that

the combined effect of multiple trial court errors violates due process where it renders

the resulting trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (citing Chambers, 410

U.S. at 298); see also Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no single

error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently warrant

reversal.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927; see also United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370,

1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that where no single trial error in isolation is sufficiently

8/

(...continued)

(6th Cir. 2002). Respondents also cite Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir.

2006), an Eighth Circuit case that states, “We repeatedly have recognized ‘a habeas

petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on a series of errors, none of which

would by itself meet the prejudice test.’ Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir.).” 

 

14CV1359

 23

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 23 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prejudicial to warrant habeas relief, “the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still

prejudice a defendant”). Where “there are a number of errors at trial, ‘a balkanized,

issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less effective than analyzing the overall

effect of all the errors in the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the

defendant.” Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d

1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). Cumulative error warrants habeas relief only where the

combined effect of the errors had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the

jury’s verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

“Cumulative error applies where, although no single trial error examined in

isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple

errors has still prejudiced a defendant.” Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1085 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, there cannot be cumulative error where fewer than two

constitutional errors exist. Hayes v Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011); United

States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012). 

As the California Superior Court correctly noted, there is no merit to any of

Petitioner’s claims of error. While the state appellate court determined on direct appeal 

that the trial court erred in admitting Petitioner’s post-arrest confession into evidence

because his confession was involuntary under Miranda, the state appellate court

concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based in part on the

determination that there was substantial evidence other than his confession to the police

to support his conviction. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. No. 14.) The only other errors

asserted by Petitioner are the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because he

failed to object to the admission of the hammer into evidence and to the deputy’s

testimony as to Santos’ statement. (Respondents’ Lodgment No.. No. 21). Petitioner

also contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring these claims

on direct appeal. As discussed above, the Court has determined that neither trial

counsel, nor appellate counsel, were ineffective in their representation of Petitioner. 

The state appellate court correctly concluded that even if counsel had objected to the

14CV1359

 24

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 24 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

admission of the hammer into evidence, the trial court would have likely overruled the

objection due to the hammer’s relevance and admissibility under California Evidence

Code Section 352. Further, the state appellate court correctly concluded that if trial

counsel made a successful objection to the deputy’s testimony as to Santos’ statements,

the prosecution likely would have called Santos to testify and Santos’ testimony would

not have changed the outcome of the trial. 

Accordingly, as the only error at trial was determined to be harmless by the

California Court of Appeal, Petitioner is not entitled to relief for his cumulative error

claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Because no errors occurred, no cumulative error

is possible. Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that

“[b]ecause we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no

cumulative prejudice is possible”). 

E. CLAIM FOUR: ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF PETITIONER’S

 CONFESSION WAS HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE

 DOUBT

Petitioner claims his constitutional rights were violated by the erroneous

admission of his confession. (Doc. No. 1 at 20.) Respondents contend that this claim

was presented to the state courts on direct appeal and the state appellate court

determined that the erroneous admission of Petitioner’s confession during the bench

trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. No. 4-1, at 18).

Petitioner raised his claim of erroneous admission of his confession in his

direct appeal before the California Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 7.) 

The state supreme court denied the petition without citation of authority. (Respondents’

Lodgment No. 8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate

court’s decision as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. In its ruling on

Petitioner’s direct appeal, the state appellate court made the following factual findings

regarding the background relevant to this claim:

Once at the sheriff’s substation, Detectives Licudine and Navarro

interviewed [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] initially asked if he could speak with

his parole agent Michael Lum. The detectives stated they needed to speak

14CV1359

 25

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 25 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with [Petitioner] first. They asked him some general intake questions. 

Detective Licudine then read [Petitioner] his Miranda rights. [Petitioner]

stated he understood his rights and told the detectives he and Daniel had

some problems because Daniel was “talking some stuff” to him.

As the detectives continued to question [Petitioner] about the incident,

[Petitioner] unambiguously invoked his right to speak with an attorney. 

Detective Navarro replied, “No worries. No worries.” Detective Navarro

then asked [Petitioner] if he wanted to speak with his parole agent. 

Detective Licudine offered to leave the room if [Petitioner] wanted to

speak with the parole agent. The detective told [Petitioner] that she (the

detective) would not be able to speak with him if he invoked his

constitutional rights. [Petitioner] responded, “Yeah, I, can talk to him

[e.g., the parole agent].”

Agent Lum was at the station because the detectives asked him to

arrange a parole hold on [Petitioner]. He spoke to [Petitioner] for about

10 minutes. During this time the detectives were not in the room. 

The record shows Agent Lum encouraged [Petitioner] to cooperate with

detectives and to tell the truth, and told [Petitioner], “[t]alking about your

side of the story helps me out, [and] helps yourself out.” The record

further shows that when [Petitioner] expressed concern about going back

to prison and getting the maximum punishment, Agent Lum stated, “[s]o

help yourself out for yourself. Help yourself out. I don’t want to write the

report that says subject was uncooperative with the...investigating

detectives. Parole agent recommends maximum in-custody time. I don’t

want to write that.” Immediately after meeting with Agent Lum,

[Petitioner] changed his mind and agreed to speak with the detectives

without counsel present.

The record shows the detectives then returned to the interview room,

re-read [Petitioner] his Miranda rights and he then spoke to the detectives. 

[Petitioner] told the detectives that Daniel provoked the attack because he

called [Petitioner] a “half[-breed].”FN7 [Petitioner] then went outside to

“cool off,” at which point he saw the hammer and decided to take it. When

he returned to Maria’s house, [Petitioner] said he walked up behind

Daniel, who was lying on the couch, and hit him twice in the face with the

hammer. [Petitioner] said that after the attack, he ran from the house and

threw away the hammer and most of his clothes. 

FN7. Daniel’s statement to [Petitioner] ostensibly was based on 

the fact one of [Petitioner’s] parents was Mexican and the other 

was Caucasian.

14CV1359

 26

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 26 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[Petitioner] moved to suppress his post-invocation statements.FN8 The

trial court denied that request, ruling (during the trial, before the recording

of the interview was played) that [Petitioner] voluntarily waived his right

to counsel and to remain silent.

FN8. On this court’s own motion, the record on appeal was 

augmented to include two related motions filed by [Petitioner] 

before trial, which sought in part to exclude the post-invocation 

statements he made to police after he invoked his Miranda rights 

and then changed his mind and spoke to the detectives without 

counsel present. We also invited the parties to submit 

supplemental briefing on whether the trial court ruled on one or 

both motions and if so, on whether the issue was preserved 

on appeal, inasmuch as the augmented record shows the word 

‘vacated’ was written on the first page of each motion. We have 

read the parties’ supplemental briefs, considered the augmented 

record and conclude, as do the parties, that [Petitioner] has 

preserved on appeal the issue of the constitutionality of his postinvocation statements to police. [Petitioner] subsequently 

augmented the record to include the hearing transcript from 

March 18, 2010, which we have considered in this appeal. 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 2-3, 9-11.)

The state appellate court concluded that Petitioner’s confession was

erroneously admitted at trial because he was enticed into cooperating by an implied

promise of leniency and therefore had not validly waived his right to silence. 

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 13.) The court nevertheless concluded that

admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for several

reasons. Id. at 14; citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The state

appellate court stated, 

Here, we conclude the admission of [Petitioner’s] post-invocation statements was harmless under Chapman for the following reasons:

First, during sentencing, the court, in response to a statement by [Petitioner’s] mother regarding her concern over the violation of herson’s

Miranda rights, noted: ‘[I]f it’s any conciliation to Mrs. Gonzalez [Petitioner’s mother], my findings of beyond a reasonable doubt were based upon the defendant’s actions and not so much his statements at all

to the parole officer or any of those statements, but rather his actions.’ 

Thus, as trier of fact the record shows the trial court placed very little, if

any, weight on [Petitioner’s] unlawful confession as the basis for its

findingsin support of his convictionsfor attempted murder (count 1), first

14CV1359

 27

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 27 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

degree burglary (count 3), and aggravated mayhem (discussed post, count

4).

Second, we conclude the admission of [Petitioner’s] confession was

harmless because even excluding the unlawful confession we conclude

there is sufficient admissible evidence in the record from a variety of ‘disinterested reliable’ witnesses to support his conviction. (See People

v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 505.) Selina testified that just moments before the attack, she saw [Petitioner] standing behind the same couch

where Daniel was laying. Selina saw [Petitioner’s] arm behind his back.

supporting the inference [Petitioner] was hiding something in his hand. 

Selina further testified she retreated to her room because she was afraid of

[Petitioner], after he claimed Daniel was ‘sleeping’ on the couch. While

on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator, Selina testified she heard additional

noises coming from the living room. While still on the phone with the 9- 1-1 operator, Selina opened her door slightly and saw Daniel bleeding profusely. Selina contemporaneously reported to the 9-1-1 operator that it appeared Daniel had been attacked with a weapon, given the severity of

his injuries.

Moreover, a witness told detectives he saw [Petitioner] dispose of a hammer while [Petitioner] was running in a drainage ditch. Detectives retrieved the hammer and Maria identified the hammer as the same one

she had seen earlier that morning while walking with [Petitioner].

Third, we note from the record that immediately before [Petitioner

invoked his Miranda rights he told the detectives that he and Daniel were

having some problems because Daniel was ‘talking stuff’ to him. This

statement was admissible and could be properly considered by the trier of

fact in determining guilt.

(Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 15-16.)

Federal district courts on Section 2254 habeas review must analyze

harmlessness under the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993). See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) (stating that,

“whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in

Chapman,” a federal habeas court “must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional

error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard

set forth in” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Thus, Fry held that the

Brecht standard is more deferential to state court decisions than AEDPA. The Ninth

Circuit has interpreted Fry as holding that “we need not conduct an analysis under

AEDPA of whether the state court’s harmlessness determination on direct review . . .

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law . . . we

14CV1359

 28

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 28 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

apply the Brecht test without regard for the state court’s harmlessness determination.”9/

Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Merolillo v. Yates,

663 F.3d 444, 454-55 (9th Cir. 2011). Under Brecht, “the standard for determining

whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the . . . error ‘had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623, 637 (quoting and adopting harmless error standard created in Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The Brecht harmless error analysis “protects the

State’s sovereign interest in punishing offenders and its ‘good-faith attempts to honor

constitutional rights.’” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (per curiam)

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635).

This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the erroneous

admission of Petitioner’s confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here,

the admission of Petitioner’s self-incriminating statements did not have a substantial

or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict because of the substantial evidence of

Petitioner’s guilt apart from the statements in question. As the state court noted, the

finder of fact in this case expressly stated that it did not rely so much upon Petitioner’s

confession. At sentencing, Petitioner’s mother expressed her belief that Petitioner’s

Miranda rights had been violated. The court responded: “[I]f it’s any conciliation to

9/

 On June 18, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Davis

v. Ayala, __ U.S. __, No. 13-1428 (June 18, 2015), regarding the application of

harmless error analysis in Section 2254 habeas petitions governed by AEDPA. The

Court held that the proper harmless error analysis for a claim which has been

adjudicated on the merits in state court requires application of both Brecht and AEDPA. 

The Court stated, “When a Chapman decision is reviewed under AEDPA, ‘a federal

court may not award habeas relief under [Section] 2254 unless the harmlessness

determination itself was unreasonable.’ Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)

(emphasis in original). And a state-court decision is not unreasonable if ‘fairminded

jurists could disagree on (its) correctness.’ Richter, supra, at 101 (quoting Yarborough

v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). . . In sum, a prisoner who seeks federal habeas

corpus relief must satisfy Brecht, and if the state court adjudicated his claim on the

merits, the Brecht test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA. Fry, supra, at

119-120.”

14CV1359

 29

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 29 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mrs. Gonzalez, my findings of beyond a reasonable doubt were based upon the

defendant’s actions and not so much his statements at all to the parole officer or any of

those statements, but rather his actions.” (Respondents’ Lodgment No. 6 at 15.)

Moreover, the evidence supporting Petitioner’s conviction was substantial. 

Selina’s testimony itself was sufficient to establish Petitioner’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Selina testified that just moments before the attack she saw Petitioner

standing behind the same couch where the victim waslaying. She saw Petitioner’s arm

behind his back, supporting the inference that Petitioner was hiding something in his

hand. Selina further testified she retreated to her room because she was afraid of

Petitioner, after he claimed the victim was sleeping on the couch. Selina testified she

heard several noises coming from the living room, and while on the phone with the

9–1–1 operator, Selina opened her doorslightly and saw the victim bleeding profusely. 

Selina contemporaneously reported to the 9–1–1 operator that it appeared the victim

had been attacked with a weapon, given the severity of his injuries. (Respondents’

Lodgment No. 6 at 12-13.)

Selina’s testimony, along with the fact that a witness saw Petitioner dispose

of the hammer, a deputy located the hammer near the location where Petitioner was

apprehended, and Maria identified the hammer as the one she and Petitioner saw earlier

that day, as well as Petitioner’s properly admitted statement that he and the victim had

argued, demonstrates that the erroneous admission of Petitioner’s post-invocation

confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief for claim four.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

Forthe aforementioned reasons, theCourt RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED without prejudice. This Report and

Recommendation ofthe undersigned Magistrate Judge issubmitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)(1).

14CV1359

 30

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 30 of 31
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

It is ordered that no later than July 16, 2015, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

It is further ordered that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than July 30, 2015. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS ORDERED. 

DATED: June 19, 2015

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

14CV1359

 31

Case 3:14-cv-01359-GPC-WVG Document 12 Filed 06/19/15 Page 31 of 31