Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01336/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01336-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THETA CHI FRATERNITY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR 

UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01336-RMW 

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS AND STRIKE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 31

Before the court are motions to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Theta Chi 

Fraternity, Inc. (“Theta Chi” or “plaintiff”) against Leland Stanford Junior University, The Board 

of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House, 

The Board of Directors of Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House, and Thomas Abel Allison, 

Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Defendants Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House and Thomas Abel 

Allison (collectively, the “Alumni Association defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss and strike on 

May 13, 2016. Dkt. No. 14. Defendant The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior 

University (“Stanford”) filed a motion to dismiss on June 23, 2016. Dkt. No. 31. Plaintiff filed 

oppositions, defendants filed replies, and the court held a hearing on August 26, 2016.1For the 

reasons set forth below, the court grants both motions to dismiss with leave to amend and grants in 

 

1

See Dkt. Nos. 25, 33, 41, 42.

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part and denies in part the Alumni Association defendants’ motion to strike. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Theta Chi brings this action against the defendants for alleged trademark 

infringement and related state law claims. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). At issue here are two of 

plaintiff’s federally-registered trademarks: the phrase THETA CHI2and the identifying Greek 

letters ΘΧ

3

(collectively, the “Theta Chi marks”). Id. ¶ 1. 

As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff, a national fraternity founded in 1856 and based in 

New York, comprises a Grand Chapter, 114 active chapters, and seven “colonies.” Id. ¶ 12. 

Stanford University is a research and teaching institution in California that is governed by its

Board of Trustees. Id. ¶ 13. From 1920 to 1988, plaintiff maintained an active chapter at the 

university called the Alpha Epsilon Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity. Id. ¶ 45. In 1928, members of 

the chapter created the Alpha Epsilon Alumni Association, a California tax-exempt corporation, to 

facilitate the chapter’s operations. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Following its formation, the Alumni Association 

purchased the structure at 576 Alvarado Row, Stanford, California (the “house”) from the 

university and entered into a lease that identified the Alumni Association as owner of the house 

and the university as owner of the parcel of land on which the house is built. Id. ¶¶ 2, 48, 51. As

membership declined in the 1970s, the chapter began allowing students unaffiliated with Theta 

Chi to live in the house. Id. ¶ 54. In 1988, the Grand Chapter declared the Alpha Epsilon Chapter 

inactive due to lack of membership and allegedly improper conduct by house residents. Id. ¶ 57.

Plaintiff asserts that in the mid-1980s, one or more members of the Alpha Epsilon Chapter 

disaffiliated with Theta Chi and formed a competing group called the “Ex-Theta Chi’s” or “XTheta Chi’s”—denoted symbolically as “Χ-ΘΧ” and by name as “Chi Theta Chi.” Id. ¶ 55.

According to plaintiff, Chi Theta Chi holds itself out as having “evolved” from, “split apart” from, 

“broke away” from, or “succeeded” the Theta Chi Fraternity. Id. ¶ 65. Plaintiff states that in 

reality, Chi Theta Chi has no relation to or affiliation with Theta Chi Fraternity. Id. ¶ 66. 

 

2 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,240,699 (registered on May 13, 1983). Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 2.

3 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,231,512 (registered on Mar. 15, 1983). Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 1.

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The complaint alleges that after the Alpha Epsilon Chapter was declared inactive in 1988,

members of Chi Theta Chi continued living in the house and using the Theta Chi marks in various 

deceptive ways. Id. ¶¶ 62, 67. The complaint alleges that, unbeknownst to plaintiff at the time, Chi 

Theta Chi used its name interchangeably with “Theta Chi” and infringed on plaintiff’s trademarks.

See id. ¶¶ 68-69. Plaintiff alleges that by falsely holding itself out to be the legitimate successor 

entity to the Alpha Epsilon Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Chi Theta Chi capitalized on 

plaintiff’s goodwill, reputation, and historical legacy to attract new residents and benefit 

financially. Id. Chi Theta Chi allegedly continued conducting operations under the name of the 

Alpha Epsilon Alumni Association, including availing itself of all rights under the lease, filing 

false tax forms, and using the Alumni Association’s name and federal tax ID number—thus

usurping the Alumni Association’s corporate identity. Id. Plaintiff states that on March 21, 2012, 

without plaintiff’s knowledge, Chi Theta Chi filed Amended Articles of Incorporation with the 

California Secretary of State to change the Alumni Association’s name from “Alpha Epsilon 

Alumni Association of Theta Chi Fraternity” to “Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House.” Id. 

¶ 84.

According to plaintiff, the university assumed full control of the house after the lease 

ended on or about April 2, 2012, and residents began paying rent directly to the university by 

September 2012. Id. ¶¶ 86, 96. The university allegedly permitted Chi Theta Chi members to 

remain in the house. Id. ¶ 89.

Plaintiff maintains that Chi Theta Chi continued its infringement of the Theta Chi marks 

despite repeated demands by plaintiff to cease and desist. Id. ¶ 90. On October 30, 2012, plaintiff

filed a lawsuit against the Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House for trademark infringement

(Theta Chi I).

4

Id. ¶ 91. Stanford was not a party to that lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 3. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges that it coordinated with the university throughout the litigation 

“given [the university’s] role in supervising and managing the activities of such groups as Chi 

 

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The Theta Chi I complaint was originally filed on October 30, 2012, in the Santa Clara County 

Superior Court before the case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California on November 20, 2012 (Case No. 3:12-cv-05942-JSC). Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 91-92.

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Theta Chi on campus.” Id. ¶ 93. Theta Chi and the Alumni Association executed a settlement 

agreement and mutual release on January 11, 2013, and the matter was dismissed with prejudice. 

Id. ¶¶ 5, 94; Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release). The agreement was 

signed by defendant Allison in his capacity as president of the Alumni Association of Chi Theta 

Chi House. Among other things, the agreement directed the Alumni Association to:

 Permanently cease all use in commerce of the Theta Chi and Chi 

Theta Chi Marks in whole or in part as a trade name, trademark, 

service mark, or domain name,” Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 1.a.i;

 Initiate its dissolution by filing its Certificate of Election to 

Wind Up and Dissolve with the California Secretary of State

within 20 days after the date of the agreement, id. ¶ 1.c; and

 Complete its dissolution and terminate its existence by filing a 

Certificate of Dissolution with the California Secretary of State 

by no later than August 1, 2013, id.

The settlement agreement also provided:

Theta Chi also agrees that the Association may use the name 

“Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House” in connection with 

filing the Certificate of Election to Wind Up and Dissolve 

Association . . . and the name “Alpha Epsilon Alumni Association 

of Theta Chi Fraternity” and/or “Alumni Association of Chi Theta 

Chi House” as may be reasonably required in the Association’s state 

or federal income and other tax returns of the Association for tax 

year 2012 and their related correspondence and any final returns 

relating to the Association’s dissolution in 2013. 

Id. ¶ 1.a.iii. The parties released their existing claims against each other. Id. ¶ 5.a.

Plaintiff alleges that in November 2015, plaintiff observed new infringements by the 

Alumni Association and house residents in violation of the settlement agreement. Compl. ¶ 121.

The alleged infringements include: continued use of the Theta Chi and Chi Theta Chi marks at the 

house, on social media, and on university-affiliated websites; multiple events hosted at “Chi Theta 

Chi” house such as “Theta Chi Thursday Anal Flora Collective Presentations;” continued filing of 

tax returns in the name of Theta Chi or Chi Theta Chi; and failure to dissolve by August 1, 2013.

Id. ¶¶ 123-32.

Plaintiff commenced the instant litigation against the Alumni Association defendants and 

Stanford on March 18, 2016. Plaintiff claims that “certain members of Chi Theta Chi reside and 

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from January 2013 to present, have resided, in the House and/or served as management or 

leadership for the [Alumni] Association.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff also contends that the university “was 

aware of and permitted, and/or failed and refused to take action to prohibit” Chi Theta Chi’s

infringing activities. Id. ¶ 136. Plaintiff asserts that the Alumni Association defendants and 

Stanford are liable for federal trademark infringement and false designation of origin or unfair 

competition, federal and state trademark dilution, state unfair competition, breach of settlement 

agreement (in the case by the Alumni Association), and aiding/abetting breach of settlement 

agreement (in the case by Stanford).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Whether the Nonmoving Defendants are Properly Before the Court

1. Alumni Association’s Board of Directors

The Alumni Association and Allison move to strike the complaint’s allegations against 

named defendant “The Board of Directors of Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House.” Dkt. 

No. 14 at 17-18. They argue that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), an entity’s capacity 

to be sued is governed by “the law of the state where the court is located” and that the California 

Corporations Code identifies only a “corporation” and an “association” as entities with the 

capacity to be sued. Cal. Corp. Code § 105. Defendants cite authority from other jurisdictions for 

the proposition that a corporation’s board is not a separate legal entity that can be sued

independently of the corporation itself. See, e.g., Heslep v. Americans for African Adoption, Inc., 

890 F.Supp.2d 671, 678 (N.D. W. Va. 2012); Team Sys. Int’l LLC v. Haozous, No. 

14-cv-01018-D, 2015 WL 2131479, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 7, 2015). While defendants do not cite 

any California authority describing whether a corporate board of directors has the capacity to be 

sued, the court finds the reasoning of the cases above persuasive. Plaintiff’s allegations against 

“The Board of Directors of Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House” are STRICKEN. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that “The Defendant Board is comprised of seven identifiable 

individuals.” Dkt. No. 25 at 16. To the extent that plaintiff can allege facts that would give rise to 

individual board members’ liability, plaintiff can place those allegations in an amended complaint. 

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2. Does 51-100

Next, the Alumni Association defendants move to strike the complaint’s allegations 

against “Does 51 Through 100” on the grounds that fictitious, or “Doe” pleading, is disfavored in 

federal court. Dkt. No. 14 at 18 (citing Perez v. Banana Republic, LLC, No. 14-cv-01132-JCS, 

2014 WL 2918421, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2014)). However, the Ninth Circuit has allowed 

claims to proceed against “Doe” defendants where “the identity of alleged defendants [was not] 

known prior to the filing of a complaint.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 

In this case, the complaint alleges that plaintiff is unaware of the true names and capacities of 

some defendants who may have infringed its trademarks. See Compl. ¶ 18. Accordingly, the court 

finds it premature to strike plaintiff’s “Doe” allegations at this time.

3. Leland Stanford Junior University

In its opposition to the motion to dismiss by defendant The Board of Trustees of Leland 

Stanford Junior University, plaintiff argues that the court should construe the motion as having 

been filed by both Stanford’s Board of Trustees and the separate, named defendant Leland 

Stanford Junior University. Dkt. No. 41 at 3-5. Defendant The Board of Trustees of Leland 

Stanford Junior University argues that it is the same legal entity as “Leland Stanford Junior 

University.” This issue has not been properly brought before the court, and so the court declines to 

rule on it at this time. 

B. Request for Judicial Notice

In connection with their motion to dismiss, the Alumni Association defendants request that 

the court take judicial notice of four documents: (1) e-mail correspondence from defense counsel 

to plaintiff’s counsel on January 11, 2016 in response to plaintiff’s letter dated January 4, 2016, 

Dkt. No. 15-1; (2) Domestic Nonprofit Corporation Certificate of Election to Wind Up and 

Dissolve filed with the California Secretary of State on February 11, 2013, Dkt. No. 15-2; (3) email correspondence from defense counsel to plaintiff’s counsel on January 21, 2016 confirming 

filing of the Certificate of Dissolution for the Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House with 

the California Secretary of State, Dkt. No. 15-3; and (4) a Domestic Nonprofit Corporation 

Certificate of Dissolution for the Association filed with the California Secretary of State on 

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January 21, 2016, Dkt. No. 15-4. Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff opposes the request. Dkt. No. 25 at 19-22.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, “courts may take into account documents whose contents 

are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically 

attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of “undisputed 

matters of public record.” Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012).

The court finds that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the email communications 

between counsel—items (1) and (3) above—because the complaint alleges the contents of these 

documents and because plaintiff does not dispute the emails’ authenticity. See Compl. ¶ 148 

(referencing the January 11, 2016 email); ¶ 149 (referencing the January 21, 2016 email). 

Plaintiff’s argument that the emails are irrelevant is unpersuasive. The emails relate to whether 

plaintiff complied with the notice and cure provision in the settlement agreement that plaintiff 

claims the Alumni Association breached.5See Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 3 § 4. While the court takes 

judicial notice of the fact that counsel made particular statements in these emails, the court does 

not take judicial notice of the truth of counsel’s factual assertions in the emails to the extent that 

the emails are inconsistent with the allegations in the complaint. 

The court also finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of the filings with the California 

Secretary of State—items (2) and (4) above—because they are public records. While plaintiff 

asserts that these filings “do not appear to be authentic,” Dkt. No. 25 at 21 n.10, plaintiff gives no 

reason why the documents appear inauthentic. The court notes that the California Secretary of 

State’s website, on which plaintiff relies for the proposition that the “Alumni Association of Chi 

Theta Chi House” was still active as of January 4, 2016, now indicates that this organization has 

“dissolved.”6In any event, the court merely takes judicial notice of the existence of the February 

11, 2013 and January 21, 2016 filings and the fact that the Alumni Association formally dissolved. 

 

5 Moreover, plaintiff agrees that plaintiff’s performance of contractual obligations is an element of 

plaintiff’s contract claims. Dkt. No. 25 at 14.

6 Compare Dkt. No. 1-1 at ECF p. 48 with Cal. Sec. of State, Business Search – Results, 

http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/ (search in search bar for Entity No. C0131837) (last visited Aug. 25, 

2016).

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The court does not take judicial notice of the truth of other facts contained in these filings.

C. Motions to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering 

whether the complaint is sufficient, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the court need 

not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by 

exhibit” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citation omitted). “A pleading 

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Counts 1 & 2: Federal Trademark Infringement and False Designation 

of Origin / Unfair Competition

To state a claim for federal trademark infringement, a plaintiff must allege that (1) it has a 

valid, protectable trademark, and (2) that defendants’ use of the mark in commerce is likely to 

cause confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d

966, 969. (9th Cir. 2007). The parties agree that the claim for false designation of origin or unfair 

competition has the same elements and follows an identical analysis in this case. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a). Defendants proffer several reasons why plaintiff’s allegations of trademark infringement 

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and unfair competition fail to state a claim. The court examines each below.

a. Likelihood of Confusion

The Alumni Association defendants and Stanford both argue that plaintiff cannot show 

likelihood of confusion. A likelihood of confusion exists “when a consumer viewing a service 

mark is likely to purchase the services under a mistaken belief that the services are, or [are]

associated with, the services of another provider.” Murray v. Cable Nat’l Broad. Co., 86 F.3d 858, 

861 (9th Cir. 1996). The confusion must “be probable, not simply a possibility.” Id. Furthermore, 

to constitute trademark infringement, use of a mark must be likely to confuse an “appreciable 

number” of “reasonably prudent” consumers. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 

1151 (9th Cir. 2002). In assessing likelihood of confusion, courts consider:

1. The strength of the plaintiff’s trademark;

2. The similarity of the marks;

3. The proximity or relatedness of the goods or services;

4. The defendants’ intent in selecting the marks;

5. Evidence of actual confusion;

6. The marketing channels used;

7. The likelihood of expansion of product lines; and,

8. The degree of care consumers are likely to exercise.

Id. at 1140 (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)). 

“Although some factors—such as the similarity of the marks and whether the two companies are 

direct competitors—will always be important, it is often possible to reach a conclusion with 

respect to likelihood of confusion after considering only a subset of the factors.” Brookfield 

Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to make a likelihood of confusion plausible. The 

Theta Chi Marks cover common Greek letters that are hardly fanciful. The Theta Chi marks were 

registered to indicate “membership in applicant fraternal organization.” Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 1-2. 

Defendant Stanford is not a fraternal organization and is thus not a direct competitor with plaintiff. 

While defendant Alumni Association was arguably a fraternal organization, as noted above, the 

Alumni Association formally dissolved in January 2016 before plaintiff filed this suit.7 Dkt. No. 

 

7 At the hearing on the instant motions, however, counsel for the Alumni Association indicated 

that an entity known as the “Alumni Association of 576 Alvarado Row” now exists.

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15-4. One might infer that the group calling itself the “Ex-Theta Chi’s” in the mid-1980s intended 

to evoke the name of the Theta Chi fraternity. See Compl. ¶¶ 55, 65. However, plaintiff’s 

allegations regarding confusion are undermined by the fact that plaintiff voluntarily left Stanford’s 

campus in 1988, id. ¶ 57, and plaintiff does not allege that it complained about this “imposter” 

organization until 2011, id. ¶ 71.

Moreover, the complaint does not plead any facts demonstrating that any member of the 

public has been under the mistaken impression that a co-ed housing cooperative at Stanford (id.

¶¶ 63, 152; Dkt. No. 1-1 at ECF p. 51) is actually an all-male fraternity that left campus in 1988 

(Compl. ¶¶ 30, 45). The court finds persuasive defendants’ argument that a reasonably prudent 

Stanford student seeking to join an all-male fraternity would not visit a webpage for a co-ed 

cooperative house and believe that he has found what he is looking for. The complaint does not 

even allege facts suggesting a single instance of initial interest confusion. Moreover, to the extent 

that non-consumer confusion is relevant to this analysis, the complaint does not allege a single 

instance of non-consumer confusion, even though the complaint alleges that the Chi Theta Chi 

organization has existed at Stanford since the mid-1980s.

Because the complaint fails to set forth sufficient allegations to support a likelihood of 

confusion, counts 1 and 2 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. 

b. Indirect Infringement

Stanford also argues that it cannot be indirectly liable for the actions or speech of the 

Alumni Association defendants or Stanford students. Plaintiff’s theory of secondary liability is not 

clear from the face of the complaint, but in opposition to Stanford’s motion, plaintiff clarifies that 

it is pursuing direct and contributory infringement claims against Stanford. Dkt. No. 41 at 7. In the 

instant case, it appears that plaintiff alleges that Stanford has contributed to two categories of 

predicate acts of asserted direct infringement: (1) conduct on the premises of the house itself, such 

as hosting events, using the Theta Chi marks; and (2) allowing such activities to be promoted 

using Stanford online and print media.

“Contributory infringement occurs when the defendant either intentionally induces a third 

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party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplies a product to a third party with actual or 

constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe the service mark.” Lockheed 

Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. 

Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982)). When a defendant supplies a service, rather than an 

infringing “product,” courts “consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the 

third party’s means of infringement.” Id. at 984. Allegations of “[d]irect control and monitoring of 

the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark” could suggest 

contributory infringement. Id. Plaintiff has pointed to no factual allegations that Stanford 

intentionally induced any infringement, so the court considers whether Stanford knew of acts of 

direct infringement and exercised the requisite level of control over the means of infringement.

Two Ninth Circuit cases are particularly instructive in light of plaintiff’s allegations. In 

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996), a trademark owner sued 

the landlord of a swap meet at which individual booth operators allegedly rented space and sold 

infringing items. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the 

landlord and held that “a swap meet can not disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements 

with impunity.” Id. at 265. The Ninth Circuit cited Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession 

Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) for the proposition that direct knowledge of 

infringement was not required; rather, a landlord’s willful blindness to direct infringement was 

sufficient to impose secondary liability. Id. In another example, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. 

Akanoc Sols., Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury’s verdict 

finding the defendant website operators liable for contributory infringement for hosting websites 

that directly infringed Louis Vuitton’s trademarks. The Ninth Circuit explained: “Appellants had 

control over the services and servers provided to the websites. Stated another way, Appellants had 

direct control over the ‘master switch’ that kept the websites online and available.” Id. at 943. The 

court applies these holdings to the instant case.

With respect to plaintiff’s claims about activities at the house itself, under Fonovisa, as 

landlord of 576 Alvarado Row, Stanford could be liable for the infringing acts of the residents of 

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the house if Stanford actually or constructively knew about those acts. A landlord has the power to 

take actions including, for example, evicting known torfeasors from the landlord’s property. The 

problem with plaintiff’s complaint is that it does not clearly allege when or suggest how Stanford 

officials became aware of the allegedly infringing conduct. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 145 (“After

learning of the foregoing violations, Theta Chi’s Executive Director immediately notified the 

University’s OGC.”) (emphasis added). Unless plaintiff can allege facts to suggest that Stanford 

officials were aware of direct infringement at the time it happened, plaintiff cannot state a claim 

for contributory infringement. The court also notes that Fonovisa does not suggest that a landlord 

can be secondarily liable for direct infringement by individuals who are not renting a space. Theta 

Chi has presented neither any authority nor any analysis to suggest that Stanford should be liable 

for non-residents’ conduct at the house.

With respect to plaintiff’s claims that Stanford allowed infringing activities to be promoted 

using Stanford’s online and print media, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. In Louis Vuitton, the 

Ninth Circuit found the defendant website operators liable because they directly controlled the 

servers and services that hosted infringing websites. 658 F.3d at 943. In contrast, in the instant 

case, plaintiff has stopped short of alleging that Stanford actually controls any of the media 

allegedly used to promote infringement. For example, plaintiff describes the alleged relationship 

between Stanford and The Stanford Arts Review, a publication allegedly used to promote 

infringing events, as follows:

141. The Stanford Arts Review is believed to be affiliated with the 

University and with The Stanford Daily, is believed to be a 

University sponsored or funded media project, and is believed to 

have actual or apparent authority to print content for or on behalf of 

the University, using the University's name, reputation and goodwill 

to increase readership and viewership within and among the 

University student population and beyond.

Compl. ¶ 141. Plaintiff does not allege that university officials control what The Stanford Arts 

Review prints, and, indeed, Stanford asserts that The Stanford Daily is “circulated on campus by a 

legal entity separate from Stanford,” Dkt. No. 31 at 3. Nor does plaintiff allege that Stanford 

controls social media outlets such as Twitter or Facebook, which plaintiff alleges were used for 

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infringement. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for contributory infringement.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims against Stanford are 

dismissed with leave to amend.

c. Alternate Grounds for Dismissal

In addition to their arguments regarding failure to allege likelihood of confusion, 

defendants raise several alternative grounds for dismissal including: (1) failure to allege use in 

commerce by the Alumni Association defendants; (2) failure to allege that Allison was a “moving 

force” behind any infringement; and (3) fair use by Stanford. Defendants’ arguments are 

persuasive and merit careful consideration. A central problem with plaintiff’s complaint is that it 

does not clearly point out which defendant that plaintiff is accusing of particular, allegedly 

wrongful acts. For example, to the extent that plaintiff claims infringement from the use of its 

marks in a Stanford Arts Review article, see Compl. ¶¶ 133-34, the complaint does not allow the 

court to determine which defendant is being accused because it uses the passive voice to note that 

“on information and belief,” the article’s author “was invited to attend the Theta Chi Thursday” 

presentations by some unidentified individual or entity, id. ¶ 134. Plaintiff’s vague allegations 

against “the Chi Theta Chi Defendants,” which do not distinguish between the Alumni 

Association, Allison, or other Chi Theta Chi board members, see id. ¶¶ 168-69, are similarly 

deficient. If plaintiff believes that Allison is individually responsible for infringement, plaintiff 

should make allegations that are specific to Allison. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint that did not allow the judge or opposing 

counsel “to determine who is being sued for what.”).

In light of the court’s ruling on likelihood of confusion, the court need not rule on these 

other grounds for dismissal at this time. However, plaintiff will be allowed to amend its complaint, 

and the court strongly encourages plaintiff to address defendants’ alternate grounds for dismissal 

to the extent possible. 

3. Count 3: Trademark Dilution Under the Lanham Act

Defendants next move to dismiss plaintiff’s trademark dilution claims on the grounds that 

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plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that its marks are famous. To state a claim for trademark 

dilution, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defendant is 

making use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became 

famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution 

by tarnishment.” Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 15 

U.S.C. § 1125(c)). The analysis is the same under state law. Id. “[A] mark is famous if it is widely 

recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 

goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). In determining whether a 

mark is sufficiently famous, courts may consider:

(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and 

publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner 

or third parties.

(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or 

services offered under the mark.

(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.

(iv) Whether the mark was registered.

Id.

Dilution “is a cause of action ‘reserved for a select class of marks—those marks with such 

powerful consumer associations that even non-competing uses can impinge on their value.’” 

Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Avery 

Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999)). Federal law “extends dilution 

protection only to those whose mark is a ‘household name.’” Id. “Household name” status is 

difficult to achieve. For example, in Arcsoft, Inc. v. Cyberlink Corp., 153 F.Supp.3d 1057, 1066-

67 (N.D. Cal. 2015), another court in this district dismissed a dilution claim despite the plaintiff’s 

allegation that 20 million U.S. users had downloaded the plaintiff’s software application. 

In an example analogous to the instant case, Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Sethscot Collection, 

No. 98-cv-02102, 2000 WL 34414961, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2000), a Florida district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of a defendant accused of diluting a fraternity’s trademark. 

The court found that the name “Sigma Chi” and the Greek letters denoting Sigma Chi were not 

sufficiently famous to warrant protection despite the fact that Sigma Chi was “the second largest 

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collegiate social fraternal group,” with “226 undergraduate chapters, . . . approximately 120 

alumni chapters (more than any other Greek social organization), approximately 196,000 alumni 

members, and approximately 12,000 undergraduate members.” Id. at *1, *10. Notably, Sigma Chi

was decided under the pre-2006 version of Section 1125(c), which allowed fame to be evaluated in 

a particular market “niche” rather in the eyes of the “general consuming public of the United 

States.”

8 Under the current statute, “[f]ame in just one industry or line of business or only to 

professional buyers in one market niche is not sufficient.” 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 

Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:105 (4th ed. Sep. 2016 Update) (collecting cases); see 

Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Texas Sys. ex rel. Univ. of Texas at Austin v. KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 

2d 657, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (granting summary judgment for defendant on dilution claim where 

plaintiff submitted evidence that University of Texas Longhorn logo was famous to college 

football fans but not to general consuming public).

In the instant case, plaintiff relies on the following allegations to show that its marks are 

famous:

 Theta Chi has obtained federal trademark registration for its 

marks, Compl. ¶ 1;

 Theta Chi “is one of the oldest and most widely regarded college 

fraternities in the United States” with “more than 175,000 

initiated members since its founding in 1856, its 144 Active 

Chapters, and 7 Official Colonies,” id. ¶¶ 12, 194;

 “Theta Chi has expended substantial amounts of time, expense 

and energy with its strategic growth and expansion plan,” id.

¶ 194; and 

 “Theta Chi’s many notable philanthropic and community service 

oriented activities have enabled the Theta Chi name and other 

marks to attain a high level of actual recognition among the 

consuming public,” id.

See also Dkt. No. 25 at 12 (citing the above).

These allegations are not sufficient to show that plaintiff’s marks are famous within the 

meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). Of the factors listed in Section 1125(c)(2)(A), only the 

 

8

See id. at *10 (“While the name ‘Sigma Chi’ and the Greek letters denoting Sigma Chi are a 

closer question when looked at in the relevant market niche, they still come up short.”).

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registration of the Theta Chi marks favors plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege that it has advertised 

and/or publicized the Theta Chi marks; it only alleges that it has expended resources “with its 

strategic growth and expansion plan,” which may or may not be related to plaintiff’s marks. 

Moreover, given that courts have ruled against dilution claims by plaintiffs with 20 million users, 

as in Arcsoft, or 196,000 alumni members, as in Sigma Chi, the allegation that Theta Chi has had 

175,000 members over the course of 160 years is insufficient to support a claim that the Theta Chi 

marks are famous. Indeed, the fact that Theta Chi voluntarily left Stanford in 1988 in part due to a 

lack of membership, see Compl. ¶¶ 54, 57, suggests that the Theta Chi marks were not even 

famous on Stanford’s campus. Finally, plaintiff’s allegation regarding “a high level of actual 

recognition among the consuming public” is simply a formulaic recitation of part of the dilution 

statute, and the court need not rely on it. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Because plaintiff has not made more than conclusory allegations of fame, plaintiff’s 

dilution claims are dismissed.9

4. Remaining State Law Claims

Because plaintiff’s federal claims are being dismissed, the court must decide whether to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Original jurisdiction may 

be based on the existence of a federal question or diversity, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 

and 1332. The complaint asserts federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal trademark, 

false designation of origin, and dilution claims (counts 1-3) and supplemental jurisdiction over 

plaintiff’s state law claims (counts 4-7). Compl. ¶¶ 23-24. Plaintiff has not asserted that diversity 

jurisdiction exists, and the court cannot detect any allegation in the complaint to suggest that at 

least $75,000 is in controversy as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, the only potential 

basis for maintaining jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims is supplemental jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

When all of the federal claims are dismissed early in a case, “the district court ‘may,’ under 

 

9 Accordingly, the court need not address Stanford’s argument that plaintiff has not alleged that 

any action by Stanford caused dilution.

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section 1367(c), decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction . . . and ordinarily ‘should’

dismiss the state law claims.” Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Intern. Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 

938 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on other grounds, 350 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[I]n in the usual 

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Plaintiff offers no reason why the 

court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims if the federal 

claims are dismissed. Accordingly, the court, in its discretion, dismisses counts 4-7 of the 

complaint.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED with leave to 

amend. Furthermore, the Alumni Association defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED as to 

“The Board of Directors of Alumni Association of Chi Theta Chi House” and DENIED as to 

“DOES 51-100.” Within 14 days, plaintiff shall submit an amended complaint that corrects the 

deficiencies identified in this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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