Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00854/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00854-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE W. CHENNAULT,

CDCR #D-93021,

Civil No. 13cv0854 BTM (KSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS

CAMPBELL, RIDGE, NEWTON,

SEELY, GLYNN AND LOWE’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); 

(3) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT

MORRIS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

AND

(4) DENYING DEFENDANT

LOWE’S MOTION TO STRIKE AS

MOOT

(ECF Doc. Nos. 12, 13, 37)

vs.

MORRIS; R. CAMPBELL; N. RIDGE;

LOWE; P. NEWTON; K. SEELY; 

M. GLYNN,

Defendants.

In this prisoner civil rights case, Steve Chennault (“Plaintiff”), is proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Defendants

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Morris, Campbell, Ridge, Newton, Seely and Glynn have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF Doc. No. 12). Defendant Lowe filed a

separate Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, or in the alternative, Motion to Strike (ECF

Doc. No. 13.) After requesting, and receiving, extensions of time to file his Opposition, Plaintiff

filed his Opposition to both motions (ECF Doc. No. 25.) All Defendants filed a Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition and the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a Sur-Reply (ECF Doc. Nos. 26,

27, 30.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF Doc. No. 37.)

I. Factual Background1

Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility(“RJD”) in 2011 and

2012. (See Compl. at 1.) On February 16, 2012, Plaintiff was transported to an outside medical

facility for a tonsillectomy surgery. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that medical personnel from this

hospital recommended a “soft diet for 10 days” following the surgery. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was returned to RJD on the same day as his surgery and he was issued a soft diet

“chrono” by Nurse Practitioner Seifulla for fourteen (14) days. (Id.) The next day, on February

17, 2012, Plaintiff “notified staff that he did not receive the soft diet.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims an

RJD licensed vocational nurse (“LVN”) contacted Defendant Morris, the RJD dietician, and

“inquired about the soft diet” for Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) Defendant Morris allegedly informed the

LVN that RJD does not “have specific soft food diets” and Plaintiff should “pick and choose”

from the general population menu. (Id.) 

Plaintiff informed Sergeant Davy of the position stated by Defendant Morris and told

Sergeant Davy that he “was in pain and wasn’t returning to his cell.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that

he was in pain because of the “humiliating condition [Defendant Morris] placed Plaintiff” and

Defendant Morris “refused to issue Ensures as a protein supplement.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

Sergeant Davy was “disturbed by all that the Plaintiff told him” and went to speak to Defendant

Campbell at “Facility A clinic” regarding the diet. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Campbell issued

Plaintiff a chrono for Ensure for thirty (30) days on February 17, 2012. (Id.) However, Plaintiff

claims he was not “immediately provided the Ensures” and had to choose food “off the general

 These factual allegations are summarized from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1) 1

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population menu trays” for seven days. (Id.) When Plaintiff did receive the Ensures, he claims

that Defendant Campbell only prescribed three (3) Ensures a day which falls far below the

minimum standard for proper nutrition as required by prison guidelines. (Id. at 8.) On February

26, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he developed a “throat infection” due to having to “force down

hard foods” for which he was prescribed antibiotics. (Id.) 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from “chronic destructive pulmonary disease

(COPD).” (Id. at 10.) Defendant Ridge prescribed Plaintiff “salmeterol” which is an inhalant

to treat his COPD. (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges he began to suffer from “constant coughing,

choking and shortness of breath,” when he started using this medication. (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that he filed a grievance notifying prison officials that this medication “poses a serious health

risk to African Americans including untimely death.” (Id.) The use of the medication was

discontinued by Nurse Practitioner Seifulla “due to the serious adverse effects Plaintiff was

experiencing.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff further claims that “Defendants Ridge and Lowe never took

the initiative to discontinue” this medication. (Id.) As a result of the discontinuation of the

medication, Plaintiff’s “medical problems decreased.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Ridge

and Lowe knew Plaintiff suffered from “hypertension and prostate disease.” (Id. at 12.) He

further claims these Defendants should have known “caution was to be used when Plaintiff was

on medication for other medical problems.” (Id.) 

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist himin prosecuting this civil action. 

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion maybe exercised only

under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

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viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request without prejudice because neither the interests of

justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v.

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendants Morris, Campbell, Ridge, Newton, Seely and Glynn seek dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) State officials 

are immune from monetary damages in their official capacities; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against any of them. (See Defs. Morris, Campbell, Ridge,

Newton, Seely and Glynn’s Notice of Mot. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF Doc. No. 12) at

1-2.) Defendant Lowe seeks dismissal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on the same grounds,

along with seeking to strike Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(f). (See Lowe’s Notice of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF Doc. No. 13) at1-2.)

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence ofsufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside

Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s complaint must

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id.

(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give

the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal

conclusions, unwarranted deductions offact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

In addition, claims asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held

“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519-20 (1972); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts] continue

to construe pro se filings liberallywhen evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)

(noting that courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights

cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”)).

A. Official capacity

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint to the extent he seeks moneydamages

against them based on actions taken in their “official” capacity. While the Eleventh Amendment

bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, Will,

491 U.S. at 66, it does not bar damage actions against state officials sued in their personal or

individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,

472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). When a state actor is alleged to have violated both federal and state law

and is sued for damages under section 1983 in his individual or personal capacity, there is no

Eleventh Amendment bar, even if state law provides for indemnification. Ashker v. California

Dep’t of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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The Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff can establish personal liability in a

section 1983 action simply by showing that each official acted under color of state law in

deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. Consequently, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds onlyto the extent that Plaintiff

seeks damages against them in their official capacity. 

B. Eighth Amendment claims

All Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care

claims on the grounds that they were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

Where an inmate’s claim is one of inadequate medical care, the inmate must allege “acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a claim has two elements: “the seriousness

of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). A medical need is serious “if the

failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include “the presence of a medical condition

that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the

existence of a serious medical need, an inmate satisfies the objective requirement for proving

an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Before it can be said that a inmate’s civil rights have been abridged with regard to

medical care, however, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” 

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 105-06). See also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Defendant Morris

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he went to the RJD medical clinic on February 17,

2012 to notify the staff that he did not receive his soft food diet that was supposed to be provided

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to him following his throat surgery. (See Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed nurse

at the clinic “called Defendant Morris (the RJD dietician)” and “inquired about the soft diet

provision.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims this nurse told him Defendant Morris said Plaintiff

“should pick and choose” soft food from the general population diet. (Id.) He further claims

that the nurse told him that Defendant Morris refused to give Plaintiff a chrono for Ensure, a

dietary supplement. (Id.) In Plaintiff’s Opposition, which is verified under penalty of perjury

unlike his Complaint, he alleges additional facts not found in his Complaint that Defendant

Morris informed the nurse that Plaintiff “needed to be educated about what foods to eat off his

tray” and Morris would “fax educational material to Plaintiff.” (Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF Doc. No. 25-

1, at 2.) Plaintiff claims to never have received this material and further maintains that

“Dietician Morris gave the RN on February 17, 2012, erroneous information in regards to there

being soft foods on the food trays.” (Id.)

Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Morris. In general, deliberate indifference

may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with a prescribed

course of medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison medical officials

provide necessary care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Morris was aware ofthe chrono prepared byPlaintiff’s

physician directing prison officials to provide him with a soft diet. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendant Morris deliberately ignored this chrono when she informed the nurse that the prison

had no such provision for a soft diet and she would not provide a liquid supplement. Based on

these factual allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate

that Defendant Morris interfered with a prescribed course of treatment for Plaintiff. Thus,

Defendant Morris’ Motion to Dismiss for failing to state an Eighth Amendment claim is

DENIED. 

2. Defendant Campbell

In Plaintiff’s Complaint he alleges that he informed Sergeant Davy of his visit with the

nurse at the clinic on February 17, 2012. (See Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Davy

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“was disturbed by all that the Plaintiff told him” and went to the medical clinic to “advise

Defendant R. Campbell of the situation.” (Id.) On that same day, Plaintiff claims Defendant

Campbell issued Plaintiff a chrono to receive Ensure three times a day for thirty days. (Id.) 

However, Plaintiff claims he did not receive the Ensure for several days and as a result, he had

to “pick and choose off the general population menu trays.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that while

Defendant Campbell did issue the Ensure chrono, it only amounted to 600 calories “falling way

below the CDCR minimum standard for proper nutrition.” (Id. at 8.)

Again, the facts alleged by Plaintiff contain no plausible allegations that Defendant

Campbell had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical history. There are no facts that

demonstrate that Defendant Campbell would know of other food Plaintiff received at the prison

and there are no facts that Defendant Campbell was responsible for the delay in receiving the

Ensure. Moreover, there are no facts that Defendant Campbell was actually aware there was a

delay in receiving the Ensure. If there is no affirmative link between a defendant’s conduct and

the alleged injury, there is no deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s has failed to state an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Campbell.

3. Defendants Seely and Glynn

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Seely, as the Chief MedicalExecutive, “was aware of post

surgery problems” experienced byPlaintiff because Defendant Seely “signed the chrono for soft

diet issued by Nurse Practitioner Seifulla.” (Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Seely

failed to make sure that Plaintiff received the diet. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Glynn,

Chief Medical Officer, “failed to adequately and properly train subordinate medical staff.” (Id.)

Again, Plaintiff fails to adequately link either of these Defendants to the alleged failure

to receive the soft food diet. Plaintiff is seeking to hold them liable in their supervisory

capacities. “Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks

v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

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F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71). A supervisor is only liable

for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and with deliberate indifference, failed to act to prevent

them. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). There are no facts that Defendant Glynn was

personally aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and there are no facts alleging that Defendant

Seely was informed that Plaintiff did not receive a soft food diet following the issuance of the

chrono. Plaintiff does not allege that he ever sought to bring this to Defendant Seely’s attention. 

Thus, as currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth no facts which

might be liberally construed to support any sort of individualized constitutional claim against

either Defendant Seely or Glynn. 

4. Defendants Ridge, Lowe and Newton

Plaintiff claims that he suffers from“Chronic Obstructive PulmonaryDisease (“COPD”). 

(Compl. at 10.) He alleges that on December 13, 2011, Defendant Ridge prescribed a

medication called “Salmeterol” which Plaintiff later discovered is alleged to pose a “serious

health risk to African Americans including untimely death.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he began to

suffer “constant coughing, choking and shortness of breath.” (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by a nurse

practitioner on March 7, 2012 who discontinued the Salmeterol prescription based on Plaintiff’s

complaints. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the prescription of this medication

on March 23, 2012. He claims that “Defendants Ridge and Lowe never took the initiative to

discontinue the Salmeterol medication after the [administrative grievance] was filed.” (Id.)

First, there are no allegations that Plaintiff ever told any of the named Defendants that he

was experiencing alleged side effects to this medication. The facts demonstrate that he informed

a nurse practitioner, who is not a party to this action, and this person discontinued the

prescription. In addition, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Ridge and Lowe should

have discontinued the prescription after he filed his grievance but Plaintiff alleges that the

prescription had already been discontinued two weeks prior to the time that he filed the

grievance. There are no other allegations as to Defendant Lowe. 

/ / /

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There are no allegations as to Defendant Newton except Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant

Newton “reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records with knowledge that the potentially fatal

medication was prescribed and continued to give it to the Plaintiff.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff

does not mention Defendant Newton in the body of the Complaint. The Court cannot speculate

as to what to role, if any, Newton played. Plaintiff must provide additional factual allegations

that would directly connect Defendant Newton to an alleged constitutional violation.

Finally, Plaintiff attempts to defeat the Defendants’ Motions by supplying factual

allegations in his Opposition that are not contained in the Complaint. However, Plaintiff cannot

avoid dismissal by alleging new facts in his Opposition. See Schneider v. Calif. Dep’t of

Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that “‘new’ allegations contained

in the [plaintiff]’s opposition . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”) 

For all the above stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth

Amendment claim against the named Defendants with the exception of Defendant Morris.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’S Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 37) without

prejudice;

(2) GRANTS Defendant Morris’ Motion to Dismiss official capacity claims and

DENIES Defendant Morris’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); 

(3) GRANTS Defendants’ Campbell, Ridge, Newton, Seely, Glynn and Lowe’s

Motions to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF Doc Nos. 12, 13). 

(4) Plaintiff has forty five (45) days from the entry of this Order to either: (1) file a

First Amended Complaint to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order;

or (2) file a Notice with the Court indicating an intent to proceed with this matter as to

Defendant Morris only. 

If Plaintiff chooses to file a First Amended Complaint it must be complete in itself

without reference to his previous Complaint. Defendants not named and all claims not re-

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alleged in the First Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. 

If Plaintiff chooses to proceed as to Defendant Morris only, the Court will enter an Order

dismissing the remaining Defendants from this action and direct the United States Marshal

Service to effect service of Plaintiff’s Complaint on Defendant Morris.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(5) Defendant Lowe’s Motion to Strike (ECF Doc. No. 13) is DENIED as moot and

without prejudice.

(6) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights

complaint form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2014

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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