Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02069/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02069-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph E James, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Peoria, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-02069-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 24) on November 8, 2019, after 

this Court dismissed his prior Complaint with leave to amend (Doc. 23). Before the Court 

is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, filed on November 27, 

2019. (Doc. 25.) The Response to the Motion to Dismiss was due on December 17, 2019. 

Plaintiff Joseph E. James missed that deadline. On December 30, 2019, the Court warned 

Plaintiff that the Motion to Dismiss is a dispositive one and that failure to respond to it by 

January 10, 2020, might result in dismissal of the case pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(i). 

(Doc. 26.) On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Response that did not provide additional 

substantive legal arguments but instead stressed the importance of allowing a jury to 

decide the case. (Doc. 27.) Defendants filed their reply brief on January 21, 2020. (Doc. 

28.) Thus, the Motion is fully briefed.

Despite the lack of legal argument in the Response, the Court nonetheless 

evaluated the merits of the First Amended Complaint to determine whether it contained 

any theories, which if liberally construed in Plaintiff’s favor, could be pursued without 
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futility. The Court could not find any such theory. The Court has already recited the 

essential factual findings in its prior Order (Doc. 23 at 1-2) and relies on them here since

the First Amended Complaint did not provide any additional legally significant facts. For 

the reasons expressed herein, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all claims 

with prejudice. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a court to dismiss a case when 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

On a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s 

allegations in the Complaint as true so long as they plausibly state “sufficient allegations 

of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Eclectic 

Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)).

However, “[t]he Court is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Khoja v. 

Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal marks omitted).

“A pleading that offers . . . naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” does 

not state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal marks omitted).

“Although leave to amend a deficient complaint shall be freely given when justice 

so requires . . . leave may be denied if amendment of the complaint would be futile.”

Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). “An amendment 

is futile when no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that 

would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Missouri ex rel. Koster v. 

Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal marks omitted).

II. COUNT ONE § 1983 – VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

In Count One of his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the City of 

Peoria is subject to liability because it, “by policy and custom, set up a police 
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organization to service citizens,” and the police department treated him with indifference 

on three occasions by not responding to his requests for assistance in a satisfactory 

manner. (Doc. 24 at 7, ¶¶6-7.) Plaintiff does not cite a constitutional or statutory right that 

the alleged indifference violates,

1 but the Court construes this as a substantive due 

process claim. This argument appears to be an attempt to bring the Complaint into the 

scope of Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

which rejects vicarious liability for the acts of municipal employees and recognizes § 

1983 liability when the injury was caused by the execution of a government policy or 

custom. Id. at 694. However, a policy of indifference that allows a private actor to 

“inflict[] harm to plaintiff and his property” (Doc. 24. at 8, ¶10) is not a cognizable claim 

under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause absent an affirmative 

government act that creates the danger that injured the plaintiff. See DeShaney v. 

Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989); see also Kennedy v. City 

of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining the state-created 

danger doctrine). 

Plaintiff’s failure to train claim (Doc. 24 at 8, ¶8) fails for similar reasons. See 

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“our first inquiry . . . is the question whether 

there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation.”). Here, because there is no affirmative constitutional right to 

police services, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, the City cannot be liable under § 1983 for 

failing to train its employees. Future amendments to this claim would be futile because 

the Supreme Court has foreclosed Plaintiff’s legal theory. Therefore, the Court dismisses 

this claim with prejudice.

III. COUNT TWO § 1983 – FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 

VIOLATIONS

Plaintiff alleges in Count Two that the City of Peoria violated his Fifth and 

 

1 Plaintiff styles Count One as “Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 USC Section 1983” 

(capitalization altered), however “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, 

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal marks omitted).
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Fourteenth Amendment rights “by failing to provide due process of law and access to the 

services of the City of Peoria Police Organization.” (Doc. 24 at 9, ¶ 2.) As discussed 

earlier, Plaintiff’s legal theory that creating the police department “forced [him] to rely on 

the City,” thus creating liability for the police department’s alleged failure to investigate,

runs contrary to Supreme Court case law. Plaintiff encourages the Court to adopt the 

dissents in DeShaney. (Doc. 24 at 9, ¶ 5.) Those dissents would allow a Fourteenth 

Amendment § 1983 claim when the government has entered the arena of protecting 

citizens and acquires knowledge about danger to a particular citizen yet does not 

intervene. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 213 

(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Under our system of government, however, the lower courts 

do not have the authority to set aside the holding of binding Supreme Court precedent in 

favor of a dissent. See Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2016). 

Plaintiff makes another argument under Count Two. He alleges that “failing to 

provide plaintiff with [requested police] services was discriminatory.” (Doc. 24 at 9, ¶9.) 

He has not alleged that he is a member of a protected class, however, which might be a 

basis for a discrimination claim if it motivated the police department’s alleged decision 

not to provide services. Cf. Weathers v. Hagemeister-May, 663 Fed. Appx. 547, 549 (9th 

Cir. 2016). To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to make a class-of-one Equal Protection 

argument in the First Amended Complaint, he did not come close to making the required 

showing that Defendants (1) intentionally; (2) treated him differently than others 

similarly situated; (3) with no rational basis for the different treatment. See Willowbrook 

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Moreover, “[t]he class-of-one doctrine does not 

apply to forms of state action that by their nature involve discretionary decision making 

based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.” Towery v. Brewer, 672

F.3d 650, 660 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Police investigations fall into 

that category. Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Given the gravamen of this case, this Court finds that filing additional amended 

complaints would be futile. Specifically, Plaintiff acknowledges that a private actor, who 
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had access to Plaintiff’s property because of a lease rather than the actions of the police 

department, stole Plaintiff’s property. (Doc. 24 at 4, ¶¶ 20, 25.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot 

state facts that support a cognizable claim.

IV. STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes four state law causes of action: 

negligent supervision, “intentional infliction,” fraudulent concealment, and “emotional 

distress.” (Doc. 24 at 10-12.) This Court has already ruled that Plaintiff’s state law claims 

are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 23 at 5.) Nothing in the First Amended 

Complaint changes this. Therefore, the Court need not decide the other bases for which 

Defendants seek dismissal on the state law causes of action. 

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff asks this Court to find Defendants liable because they did not investigate 

the report of a series of crimes with the diligence that he expects. But this Court cannot 

constitutionalize every grievance concerning perceived government inefficiency. 

Investigations and prosecutions are inherently discretionary functions. The facts of this 

case do not state a plausible Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Claim. As to the state law 

claims, they are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court finds that the First 

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting with prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 

25.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in 

this case in favor of Defendants as set forth herein.

Dated this 22nd day of January, 2020.