Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00338/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00338-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Anthony Staples, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Anna Jacobs, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-338-TUC-RCC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner James Anthony Staples’ Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and

Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 17). After

reviewing the record, the Court accepts the R&R and denies Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer on October 12, 2010. (Doc.

12). Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on

December 3, 2010 recommending that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied in full. (Doc.

17). On February 14, 2011, Petitioner filed his objections to the R&R. (Doc. 26).

The state level factual and procedural background in this case is thoroughly detailed

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in the “Factual and Procedural Background” of Magistrate Judge Guerin’s R&R. This Court

fully incorporates by reference the Factual and Procedural Background of the R&R into this

Order. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court must

review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those facts to

which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a

de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made”). “Failure to object to a magistrate judge's

recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207

F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000).

III. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) a federal court can only consider a petitioner's writ of

habeas corpus after the petitioner exhausts all available state remedies. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, the petitioner must give each state court the opportunity to rule upon the

merits of his claims in a procedurally appropriate manner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1)(A); see

also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). A

complete round of appellate review, however, does not include discretionary review before

the Arizona Supreme Court when the prisoner was not sentenced to death. See Crowell v.

Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz.2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir.1999)); Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (stating that “Arizona has declared that its

complete round [of appellate review] does not include discretionary review before the

Arizona Supreme Court.”). Therefore, when Petitioner is not sentenced to death, this

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court

of Appeals on either direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief.

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A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th

Cir.2001). A mere reference to the Constitution of the United States does not establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63, 116

S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not establish

fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th

Cir.2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001); Shimway v. Payne, 223

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2000). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self evident” or if the

claim would be decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the

petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or

the decision of the federal courts.” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly

present a claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the petition to discover the

federal claim. Fundamentally, “if a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he

is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its

similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th

Cir.1996).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321, 115 S.Ct.

851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U .S.

478, 495-96 (1986). Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to

some external cause that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court

and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner's]

efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such

as government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim's factual basis.” Robinson

v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

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Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner has asserted five grounds for relief: (1) The trial court abused its discretion

by denying Petitioner’s motion for continuance; (2) The trial court improperly denied

Petitioner’s motion for a new trial; (3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel

when trial counsel failed to request a Dessureault hearing to test the reliability of Arturo’s

in-court identification; (4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel failed to move for severance; and (5) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to move for a continuance. The Magistrate Judge

recommended Grounds 1 and 2 be denied on the basis of procedural default and that Grounds

3, 4, 5 be denied on the merits. Petitioner filed his timely objection to the R&R which the

Court will address in turn.

1. Grounds 1 and 2

The Magistrate Judge found that Grounds 1 and 2 were presented on direct review;

however, Petitioner failed to argue these grounds based on federal law and presented these

allegations in support of claims arising under state law. The Magistrate Judge further found

that Petitioner had not alleged cause and prejudice or actual innocence which would warrant

a merit review of these claims. As such, these claims were procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner objected to the Magistrate Judge’s determination, arguing that his citation

to state cases analyzing federal constitutional issues overcomes any procedural hurdles. He

highlights the Ninth Circuit case of Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003) in

which the court held that “for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing a

federal constitutional issues serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing

such an issue.” 319 F.3d at 1158.

Upon review of Petitioner’s state court documents, the Court agrees that he failed to

exhaust these claims at the state court level. Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal brief suffers

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from the same inadequacies addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Peterson. Despite the fact that

Petitioner was represented by counsel at the time of his direct appeal to the Court of Appeals,

his brief fails to alert the state court to a violation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Instead, Petitioner merely presented arguments under state law and at no point did he

reference the United States Constitution or a federal statute. This is not a situation in which

Petitioner asserted a violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right and then offered state law

cases in support of his claim. Petitioner’s state court brief fits squarely within the confines

of established precedent that prevents this Court from undertaking a merit review of these

claims.

Petitioner also asserts in his objection that because he received ineffective assistance

from his appellate counsel, he satisfies the “cause and prejudice” standard in order to excuse

his procedural default. The Court does not agree. To rely on ineffective assistance of

counsel to excuse a procedural default, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must

itself have been fairly presented to the state court. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451-54 (2000) (An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for procedural

default “is itself an independent constitutional claim” and is subject to the same exhaustion

requirement as other habeas claims). Here, although Petitioner did raise claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in his PCR Petition, he never presented the state court with a claim

that appellate counsel was ineffective. Additionally, because there is no Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel, Petitioner cannot rely on an

argument of ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel to excuse his procedural

default. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548

U.S. 927, 126 S.Ct. 2984, 165 L.Ed.2d 990 (2006).

Likewise, Petitioner has also failed to establish that failure to consider his defaulted

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. “[T]he miscarriage of justice

exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.” Calderon v. Thompson,

523 U.S. 538, 559, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998) (quoting Schlup 513 U.S. at 324.

“‘To be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

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presented at trial.” Id. at 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). To establish a claim

of actual innocence, a petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence presented in his

habeas petition.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559. The “actual innocence” exception is narrow and

“claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Here, Petitioner

has failed to present any new evidence that would allow this Court to make a determination

as to his actual innocence claim. In his objection, Petitioner simply recites evidence that was

considered at the trial level. This is insufficient for a showing of miscarriage of justice.

Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Petitioner

has procedurally defaulted Grounds 1 and 2 and will overrule Petitioner’s objections as to

these claims.

2. Grounds 3, 4, and 5

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) that his trial

counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel's deficient performance

prejudiced petitioner's defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir.1998) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious ... that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–688. In considering this

factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel's performance is

highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the

wide range of reasonable representation.’ “ Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist,

67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir.1995)).

To establish prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability

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that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Under the prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel,

even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal

proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. Because failure to make

the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court

need not address both factors where one is lacking. Id. at 697–700.

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court's review of the state court's decision

is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689–699, 122 S.Ct. 1843,

152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the

additional showing that the state court's ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted

an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Harrington

v. Richter, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (Jan. 19, 2011) (“Federal

habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland

with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether

counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument

that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”); West v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4240859,

*7 (D.Ariz. Nov.29, 2007).

Here, the Magistrate Judge agreed with the trial court’s conclusions and determined

that the trial court reasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Petitioner’s case. Therefore,

the Magistrate Judge recommended that Grounds 3, 4, and 5 be denied on the merits. As to

Ground 3, the Magistrate Judge agreed with the state court determination that trial counsel

did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a Dessureault hearing

to contest a witness’ identification of Petititioner given that other evidence of Petitioner’s

identity and guilt were presented at trial. As to Ground 4, the Magistrate Judge found that

the state court’s adverse determination was warranted because it would have been futile for

trial counsel to file a motion to sever given that his co-defendant’s motion to sever was

denied. As to Ground 5, the Magistrate Judge agreed with the state court determination that

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trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in moving for a continuance on the day of

trial. Petitioner in his objection contests the Magistrate Judge’s finding on the basis that the

Magistrate Judge, like the state court, unreasonably applied the Strickland standard and

arrived at the wrong conclusion of law. 

Upon de novo review, and in light of the highly deferential standard of § 2254(d), the

Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and overrule Petitioner’s objections

to the R&R on these claims. Here, Petitioner’s objections constitute no more than a reargument of Petitioner’s case and simply disagrees with what the Court finds are correct

conclusions concerning Petitioner’s three claims. Habeas relief is not permitted “simply

because [a federal habeas] court concludes in its independents judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000). Here, this Court simply cannot conclude that the state court applied the Strickland

standard unreasonably. The state court, citing Strickland, analyzed each of Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in detail and provided reasonable arguments for its

determination that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel.

As such, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any of

his claims and will deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the

“district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning detentions

arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2255

attaching a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1).

Here, the petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State Court judgment. This court must determine, therefore, if a COA shall

issue.

The standard of issuing a COA is whether the applicant has “made a substantial

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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1). “Where a district

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy

§2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). “When the district

court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s

underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional rights and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

This Court’s decision is in part on procedural grounds and in part on the merits. As

to both, the Court finds that jurists of reasons would not find the conclusions reached herein

debatable. Accordingly, a COA shall not issue as to Staples’ claims.

Any further request for a COA must be addressed to the Court of Appeals. See Fed.

R. App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1.

Consistent with the above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge (Doc. 17) is accepted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment denying

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1)

with prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal are denied.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2011.

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