Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00457/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00457-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT MCCULLOCK, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

R. STEVEN THARRATT, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 16-cv-00457-LAB (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

REGARDING MOTION TO 

DISMISS CIVIL RIGHTS 

COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 15) 

Plaintiff Robert McCullock1

 (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 

February 18, 2016, against Defendants R. Steven Tharratt, Daniel Paramo, Maryann Glynn, 

Jin Kul Yu, Steven Roberts, and R. Walker. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) On July 29, 2016, 

Defendants Tharratt, Paramo, Glynn, Roberts, and Walker (collectively, “Defendants”) 

                                               

1

 Plaintiff’s prison and medical records indicate Plaintiff’s name is spelled 

Robert McCallock. 

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filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim, and on the grounds of qualified immunity. (ECF No. 15.) 2

In accordance with Civil Local Rule 72.3, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is referred 

to the Honorable David H. Bartick for a Report and Recommendation. After a thorough 

review of the pleadings, the parties’ papers, and all supporting documents, the Court hereby 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with leave to 

amend. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is, and was at all relevant times, a prisoner confined at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Compl. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges 

he had a specialist-recommended biopsy in February 2015. (Id. at 13.) On March 4, 2015, 

Defendant Dr. Yu, a primary care provider at RJD, documented in a progress note that the 

pathology report on the biopsy was not available and stated that s/he would obtain the 

report “and follow-up with [Plaintiff] to address this and rule out cancer.” (Id. at 13, Exh. 

A.) On March 6, 2015, Defendant Dr. Yu obtained and initialed review of the pathology 

report. (Id.) The report allegedly noted a finding of “squamous cell carcinoma at deep 

margins.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Yu did not provide him with 

notice of the results or take appropriate action. (Id. at 11, 13, Exh. A.) 

 Plaintiff learned of the pathology report’s findings on April 29, 2015 from a 

specialist seeing Plaintiff via tele-medicine for valley fever. (Id. at 13, 26.) The specialist 

reviewed the pathology report’s findings with Plaintiff, specifically discussed it in his or 

her report, and recommended that Plaintiff be referred to a specialist. (Id. at 13.) On May 

1, 2015, Defendant Dr. Yu generated a “Request for Service” for plastic surgery and 

prioritized the referral as “routine.” (Id.) In the Request for Service, Defendant Dr. Yu 

does not state that the pathology report finding cancer had been issued months earlier. (Id.) 

                                               

2

 Defendant Dr. Yu did not join the Motion to Dismiss. It appears Defendant 

Dr. Yu has not been served with a copy of the Complaint in this matter. (See ECF No. 12.) 

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 On May 14, 2015, three specimens were excised from Plaintiff. (Id. at 21-22, Exhs. 

B, C.) The specimens, taken from both clavicles and the left shoulder, were negative. (Id.) 

The final diagnosis was mild actinic keratosis in all three specimens. (Id. at 14, 21-22, 

Exhs. B, C.) According to a Memorandum from California Correctional Health Care 

Services (“CCHCS”), dated June 2, 2015, Plaintiff did not have to follow up with plastic 

surgery at that time; however, he will require surveillance due to his higher risk for future 

malignancy. (Id. at 21, Exh. B.) This will be determined by his primary care provider and 

dermatology, if needed. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint a Training Participation Sign-In Sheet dated on 

or about May 12, 2015, which reflects that Defendants Walker and Roberts met with 

Defendant Dr. Yu regarding Plaintiff. (Id. at 12, 54.) Plaintiff further alleges that 

Defendant Dr. Yu was removed from his or her position in August 2015. (Id. at 2.) 

 On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Citizen’s Complaint. (Id. at 15, 23-26.) In the 

complaint, Plaintiff makes two allegations. (Id. at 23-26.) First, he alleges that “[w]hile at 

an appointment with the Valley Fever Specialist, I was informed I had cancer. This 

information should be given by ones ‘PCP,’ primary care physician, not found by chance.” 

(Id. at 24.) Plaintiff adds that the information was in the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) system on March 6, 2015, but that he did not 

find out until April 29, 2015. (Id. at 26.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Yu 

changed his prescriptions from the ones issued by the specialty doctors contracted by 

CDCR for their expertise. (Id. at 26.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint was rejected at the First Level on May 30, 2015, and 

subsequently assigned to the Health Care Appeals Office for response on or around June 

4, 2015, and assigned Log No. RJD HC 15053445. (Id. at 15, 23-31.) On June 17, 2015, 

Plaintiff was interviewed and examined by Defendant Dr. Yu. (Id. at 30.) At the First 

Level, Plaintiff’s first issue was granted in part, with CCHCS stating that Plaintiff has been 

“evaluated, treated, monitored, and educated concerning [his] health issues consistent with 

the medical plan of care as determined by medical staff,” and with Title 15. (Id. at 30.) 

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The second issue was denied, with CCHCS claiming there was no evidence that any 

medications prescribed by a specialist were withheld by Plaintiff’s primary care provider. 

(Id. at 30-31.) Defendant Walker, as the Chief Physician & Surgeon at RJD, signed the 

appeal decision at the First Level, which is dated June 24, 2015. (Id. at 31.) 

Plaintiff appealed to the Second Level. (Id. at 32-33.) At the Second Level, 

Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted as to the first issue, and denied as to the second 

issue, on August 14, 2015. (Id.) As to the first issue, the Second Level decision from 

CCHCS states: “During your interview and examination with Dr. Yu on 06/17/15, your 

questions regarding your care were thoroughly addressed. Medical records (eUHR) show 

the documentation of that visit and what was discussed. Copies of those medical records 

can be obtained by completing the necessary request.” (Id. at 32.) The second issue was 

denied for the same reasons stated in the First Level response. (Id.) Defendant Roberts, 

as the Chief Medical Executive at RJD, and Defendant Glynn, as the Chief Executive 

Officer at RJD, signed the appeal decision at the Second Level. (Id. at 33.) 

Plaintiff appealed to the Third Level. (Id. at 34-36.) The appeal was denied on 

October 8, 2015, thereby exhausting Plaintiff’s administrative remedies. (Id. at 35-36.) As 

to the first issue, the Third Level decision notes: “[Inmate Correspondence and Appeals 

Branch] records indicate the Prison Law Office advocated on your behalf regarding the 

[primary care provider] not notifying you of the March 6, 2015, diagnostic test results. As 

noted in the response to the [Prison Law Office], this was an oversight on the physician’s 

part.” (Id. at 35.) The decision also states that Plaintiff had received ongoing follow-up 

evaluation and treatment by his primary care provider to September 16, 2015, for his 

history of “squamous cell cancer to left shoulder/clavicular area status post excision with 

wider biopsy showing acitinic keratosis (no skin cancer).” (Id.) 

On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a separate Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeal (Log 

No. 15053343). (Id. at 37-40.) Plaintiff’s grievance is that he was forced to see Defendant 

Dr. Yu, against whom he had a Citizen’s Complaint pending, or be denied medical care. 

(Id. at 37.) Plaintiff requested to see a doctor that “gives treatment in a timely manner, 

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who understands that Valley Fever is not cured, but controlled, that treats cancers as soon 

as found, and completely.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted at the First and 

Second Levels, with CCHCS finding that Plaintiff had been evaluated, treated, monitored, 

and educated concerning his health issues consistent with his medical plan of care as 

determined by his primary care provider, Title 15, and recognized standards of care. (Id.

at 42-45.) The First Level Appeal was signed by Defendant Walker and the Second Level 

Appeal was signed by Defendants Roberts and Glynn. (Id.) 

At the Third Level, in a decision dated September 4, 2015, Plaintiff’s request to be 

assigned to a “doctor who gives treatment in a timely manner, understands that Valley 

Fever is not cured, but controlled, and treats cancers as soon as found” was denied. (Id. at 

46-47.) The Third Level appeal decision provides the following summary of Plaintiff’s 

relevant medical history: 

 On June 19, 2015, you received a dermatology follow up visit noting 

your history of skin biopsies in February 2015, with the finding of 

squamous cell cancer – lesions was excised; your skin was examined 

with the finding of multiple actinic keratoses that were treated with 

liquid nitrogen; and suspicious lesions to right deltoid, left pectoralis 

areas were biopsied. 

 A [primary care provider] follow up appointment took place on July 2, 

2015, noted discussion of skin biopsy finding of actinic keratosis; you 

were advised to avoid sun exposure and to use solar precautions. 

(Id. at 46.) 

 On July 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed another Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeal (Log 

No. 15053656) seeking monetary compensation for unnecessary surgery for misdiagnosed 

squamous cell carcinoma. (Id. at 48-49.) The appeal was denied at the Third Level, stating 

that monetary compensation is beyond the scope of the appeals process. (Id. at 52.) The 

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board subsequently rejected Plaintiff’s 

claim on August 20, 2015. (Id. at 53.) 

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim against all defendants for deliberate 

indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 4-5, 15-16.) 

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He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, pain and suffering and emotional distress 

damages, declaratory relief, and a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering 

Defendants to transfer Plaintiff to a facility where he will receive competent medical care. 

(Id. at 8-9.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). For a plaintiff 

to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint 

must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 

749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984)). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true 

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 

1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that 

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Clegg v. Cult 

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on motion to 

dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 

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allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

 Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 

of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when plaintiffs have not 

“nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be 

dismissed.”)). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly 

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

 Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the sufficiency of a claim rather than the claim’s 

substantive merits, “[o]rdinarily, a court may look only at the face of the complaint to 

decide a motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 

(9th Cir. 2002). Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 151 F.3d 

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) “A court may, however, consider certain materials—

documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a 

motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions

 “In a civil rights case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–Panahi 

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v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 

of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim 

under § 1983). 

 Nevertheless, a court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless 

it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

complaint may be dismissed, the Court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a 

pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James 

v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). It 

imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under 

color of state law committed the conduct at issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived the 

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), 

overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. 

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Here, there appears to be no 

dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law in their official capacities as 

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employees of RJD or CCHCS.3

 “[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of state 

law while acting in his [or her] official capacity or while exercising his [or her] 

responsibilities pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s federal claims turn on the second inquiry, namely, whether Defendants deprived 

Plaintiff “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of 

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs (Eighth Amendment) 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment. (Compl. at 4, 5, 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that although his primary 

care provider, Defendant Dr. Yu, obtained and reviewed Plaintiff’s pathology report, which 

contained a finding of “squamous cell carcinoma at deep margins,” on March 6, 2015, he 

“did not understand the report, and most certainly did not follow-up with [Plaintiff] or take 

appropriate action.” (Id. at 4, 13.) Plaintiff alleges he did not learn of the pathology 

report’s findings until April 29, 2015, nearly two months later, from a specialist seeing 

Plaintiff via tele-medicine for valley fever. (Id. at 13.) Thereafter, on May 1, 2015, 

Defendant Dr. Yu generated a Request for Service for plastic surgery, allegedly improperly 

prioritizing the referral as “routine.” (Id.) 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff cites to and attaches a letter, dated May 11, 2015, drafted 

by the Prison Law Office and addressed to CCHCS and the Receiver’s Office of Legal 

Affairs. (Compl. at 13-14, 19-20 (Exh. A.) The Prison Law Office asked two questions: 

1. Why did the [primary care provider] who reviewed the pathology report 

on 3/6/15 neither notify [Plaintiff] of the results nor take appropriate 

                                               

3

 Defendant Tharratt is alleged to be a Director of Health Care Operations for 

CCHCS. (Compl. at 2, 10.) Defendant Paramo is alleged to be the Warden of RJD. (Id.) 

Defendant Glynn is alleged to be the Chief Executive Officer of Medical at RJD. (Id. at 2, 

11, 33.) Defendant Roberts is alleged to be the Chief Medical Executive at RJD. (Id. at 3, 

12, 21.) Defendant Walker is alleged to be the Chief Physician and Surgeon at RJD. (Id. 

at 3, 21, 31.) 

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action at that time, or at any time until another specialist raised concerns 

on 4/29/15? 

2. Was the 5/1/15 [Request for Service] for plastic surgery approved, and 

has the appointment been scheduled/taken place? Is prioritizing that 

referral as routine appropriate, including because of the apparent delay 

in initiating the referral? Please explain. 

(Compl. at 19-20 (Exh. A).) 

 A member of the Litigation Support Unit for CCHCS responded on June 2, 2015, as 

follows: 

1. What were the pathology results of the specimens excised from Mr. 

McCallock on 5/14/15, and what is the updated assessment and 

treatment plan? The pathology specimens from both clavicles and the 

left shoulder were negative. The final diagnosis was actinic keratosis 

in all three specimens. Mr. McCallock does not have to follow-up with 

plastic surgery at this point in time; however, he will require 

surveillance due to his higher risk for future malignancy. This will be 

determined by his PCP and dermatology if needed. Attached is 

supporting documentation.

(Compl. at 21 (Exh. B).) In his Complaint, Plaintiff notes that he did not receive a response 

to the latter half of the second question posed by the Prison Law Office. (Id. at 14, lines 

10-13.) 

 Plaintiff also attaches to his Complaint a copy of Page 2 of an Alvarado Hospital 

Medical Center report, dated May, 20, 2015. (Compl. at 22 (Exh. C).) The report provides 

the laboratory results of Plaintiff’s excisions, which took place on May 14, 2015. (Id. at 

21-22 (Exhs. B, C).) The report further notes in a “Comment” section, the following: 

The previous surgical pathology report from Tri-City medical center is 

reviewed. The patient has a history of incompletely excised squamous cell 

carcinoma and the material is excised to obtain clear margins. There is no 

invasive lesion remaining. There is some melanocytic atypia. The case is 

reviewed within the department. Some areas are concerning for lentigo, but 

no invasive lesion, either squamous or melanotic, is identified. Please 

correlate with clinical findings. If a pigmented lesion is clinically remaining, 

it should be submitted for histologic examination. 

(Id. at 22 (Exh. C).) In his Complaint, Plaintiff asks: “Where is ‘previous surgical’?” and 

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“Why is it incompletely excised?” (Id. at 14, lines 16-18.) He further notes that, “[i]n the 

end, the diagnosis is mild actinic keratosis,” which he alleges he is receiving treatment for 

from a skin specialist at Tri-City Medical Center. (Id.) 

 In summary, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to allege the following: 

Defendant Dr. Yu was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs in the following 

ways: (1) he neglected to inform Plaintiff of the March 6, 2015 pathology report finding of 

“squamous cell carcinoma at deep margins” until Plaintiff discovered and raised the issue 

himself nearly two months later; and (2) he improperly prioritized the May 1, 2015 Request 

for Service for plastic surgery as “routine.” Plaintiff further alleges the moving Defendants 

were deliberately indifferent by failing to prevent Defendant Dr. Yu’s violations, including 

a failure to train.4

 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference against them 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 15.) Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff’s claim, which is “based on a delay in diagnosing and treating his skin 

cancer[,] . . . should be dismissed because his allegations fail to show that the moving 

Defendants were personally involved in the evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment of 

Plaintiff’s skin cancer.” (ECF No. 15-1 (“Mot.”) at 2, lines 9-12.) Defendants contend 

“Plaintiff’s claim against [them] is either based on their roles as supervisors, or 

                                               

4

 Although Plaintiff appears to be concerned about the Comment noting a 

“history of incompletely excised squamous cell carcinoma,” and alleges unnecessary 

surgery for misdiagnosed squamous cell carcinoma, he does not make any allegations 

against Defendants or Defendant Dr. Yu with regard to these concerns. Plaintiff also notes 

that he did not have the symptoms of squamous cell carcinoma, and was being properly 

treated for actinic keratosis by a skin specialist at Tri-City Medical Center. (Compl. at 14, 

35.) Therefore, the Court does not construe the Complaint as alleging improper treatment 

for his diagnosed actinic keratosis. Plaintiff also attaches CDCR health care appeals which 

address Defendant Dr. Yu’s alleged failure to provide certain prescriptions and improper 

statements he made concerning Plaintiff’s valley fever. However, Plaintiff makes no 

allegations regarding these issues in the Complaint, and the Court declines to construe the 

Complaint as including them. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

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involvement in the medical appeal process, neither of which create liability under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.” (Id. at 2, lines 12-14.) Defendants further argue that “Plaintiff has not pled facts 

showing that Defendants . . . participated in or directed any violations, or knew of any 

violation and failed to act to prevent it,” and that “Plaintiff’s apparent dissatisfaction with 

the outcome of his administrative appeals is not a basis for holding Defendants liable for 

the alleged violation that was the subject matter of those appeals.” (Id. at 5, lines 15-17; 

6, lines 21-23.) Lastly, Defendants argue that even if the Court were to find that Defendants 

possessed the requisite state of mind, Plaintiff still fails to allege a claim for deliberate 

indifference, and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 6-12.) 

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have come “to the wrong 

conclusion,” asserting “[t]here was no treating of skin cancer because there was no skin 

cancer.” (ECF No. 17 at 1.) Rather, “[t]he delay was because everyone that should be 

responsible, from the original biopsy to the [Request for Service] Form 7243, that was 

instigated by the Valley Fever Specialist’s RN, failed in their care.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues 

that Defendants “were personally involved, or should have been involved and failed to act.” 

(Id.) He contends the failure to be involved amounted to “recklessness,” which he claims 

is an ongoing problem at RJD. (Id. at 1-2.) 

For the first time in his opposition, Plaintiff also alleges the CCHCS review process 

failed, the excisions amounted to an unnecessary surgery, and RJD, CDCR, and CCHCS 

are deliberately indifferent on the subject of skin cancer because they do not provide 

prisoners with adequate protection (e.g., a wide-brimmed hat). (Id. at 2-7.) However, 

“[t]he ‘new’ allegations contained in [Plaintiff’s] opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for 

Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court 

may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum 

in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1; see 

also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, while the new 

allegations may be considered by the Court in determining whether granting leave to amend 

is appropriate, the Court will not consider these new allegations in deciding whether 

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Plaintiff’s present Complaint states a claim against Defendants. See Broam, 320 F.3d at 

1026 n.2 (“Facts raised for the first time in plaintiff’s opposition papers should be 

considered by the court in determining whether to grant leave to amend or to dismiss the 

complaint with or without prejudice.”) 

1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 

a. Applicable Law

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. 

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). This principle “establish[es] the government’s 

obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his 

medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Id.; see also 

West, 487 U.S. at 54-55. 

Prison officials violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment if they are deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-06; Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to 

the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to 

medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of 

how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause 

of action under § 1983.” Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). To establish 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the Ninth Circuit requires a two-step 

inquiry. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 First, the prisoner must have a serious medical need. Id. “A ‘serious’ medical need 

exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury 

or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other grounds by 

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In making this 

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determination, courts should consider whether “a reasonable doctor or patient would find 

[the prisoner’s condition] important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of 

a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200-01). 

 Second, the prisoner must establish that prison officials exhibited deliberate 

indifference to the serious medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This requirement “is 

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1059). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate 

treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional 

violation. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of medical malpractice 

or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth 

Amendment.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Mere 

medical malpractice does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”); Wood, 900 F.2d 

at 1334 (stating that even gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional 

violation)). 

 The deliberate indifference standard includes a subjective intent requirement and is 

not met “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate 

must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of 

mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Courts must focus on the seriousness 

of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature of the defendants’ response to those needs. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison 

medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough 

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to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

 Deliberate indifference can be established when “prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which 

prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citation omitted). 

However, a mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, unless the delay or denial was harmful. Id. at 1060 (quoting Shapley v. Nev. 

Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); Hunt, 865 

F.2d at 200 (“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does 

not constitute an [E]ighth [A]mendment violation.”). While the harm caused by delay need 

not necessarily be “substantial,” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 & n.12, the Eighth 

Amendment is violated if “delays occurred to patients with problems so severe that delays 

would cause significant harm and that [the d]efendants should have known this to be the 

case,” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 746, and “a finding that the inmate was seriously harmed by the 

defendant’s action or inaction tends to provide additional support to a claim that the 

defendant was ‘deliberately indifferent’ to the prisoner’s medical needs: the fact that an 

individual sat idly by as another human being was seriously injured despite the defendant’s 

ability to prevent the injury is a strong indicium of callousness and deliberate indifference 

to the prisoner’s suffering.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106). 

 i. Supervisory Liability 

 “‘Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates 

on any theory of vicarious liability.’” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645–46 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘A supervisor 

may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, 

or (2) there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct 

and the constitutional violation.”‘” Id. (quoting Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646); see also Starr 

v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). In order to demonstrate a sufficient causal 

connection, “a plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was 

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the proximate cause of the injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Redman v. Cnty. Of 

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). “‘The requisite causal connection can be 

established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others,’ . . . , or by ‘knowingly 

refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.’” Id. at 1207-08 

(internal citations omitted and alteration in original). 

 “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or 

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in 

the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference 

to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (“[A] 

plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the 

supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her 

subordinates.”). Supervisory liability may also exist “if supervisory officials implement a 

policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the 

moving force of a constitutional violation.’” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (quoting Hansen, 

885 F.2d at 646); see also OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1076 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“Advancing a policy that requires subordinates to commit constitutional violations 

is always enough for § 1983 liability, no matter what the required mental state, so long as 

the policy proximately causes the harm—that is, so long as the plaintiff’s constitutional 

injury in fact occurs pursuant to the policy.”) 

 b. Analysis

Defendants do not dispute, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s skin cancer, or 

suspected skin cancer, constitutes a serious medical need.5

 Therefore, the Court now turns 

                                               

5

 According to the Complaint and its attachments, the pathology report received 

on March 6, 2015, relating to a February 2015 biopsy, made a finding of skin cancer. 

However, when further excisions were made on May 14, 2015, there was no finding of skin 

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to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

 i. Defendant Tharratt 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tharratt is the Director of Health Care Operations for 

CCHCS. (Compl. at 2, 10.) Plaintiff alleges that in this capacity he is “legally responsible 

for the overall operation of [CCHCS] and each institution under its jurisdiction, including 

[RJD].” (Id. at 10.) Without identifying the policy, Plaintiff contends that Defendant 

Tharratt’s “policy is and was so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

also alleges that Defendant Tharratt knew or should have known about the facilities under 

his control or authority, and “was informed, and failed to act to prevent” the alleged 

constitutional violations. (Id. at 2, 10.) 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support personal involvement or direct action 

by Defendant Tharratt in the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint relies on a theory of supervisory liability to establish liability. Other than stating 

that Defendant Tharratt knew or should have known of the alleged constitutional violations, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any factual allegations which allow the Court to 

draw the reasonable inference that Defendant Tharratt knew or should have known of 

Defendant Dr. Yu’s alleged constitutional violations. 

As stated above, “a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate 

indifference based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 

unconstitutional conduct.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis added). In addition, a 

plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference if the supervisor 

“knowingly refus[es] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew 

                                               

cancer. Accordingly, for purposes of this Order, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint 

as alleging Plaintiff had skin cancer at one time, but does not currently have skin cancer. 

When the skin cancer was first diagnosed, and later fully excised, remains unclear. 

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or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” 

Id. at 1207-08 (emphasis added) (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 

959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001)). In order to sufficiently allege knowledge, however, the 

allegations cannot be bald or conclusory. In Starr and Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 

(9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit discusses the allegations required to sufficiently allege a 

claim of supervisory liability. 

In Starr, the plaintiff alleged the defendant sheriff was liable for unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because 

he “knew or should have known about the dangers in the Los Angeles County Jail, and that 

he was deliberately indifferent to those dangers.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1204-05. The Ninth 

Circuit held the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly suggest the defendant sheriff’s 

“knowledge of” and “acquiescence in” the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. 

Id. at 1207-08, 1216. 

In finding the complaint satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s pleading 

standard, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact the complaint “makes detailed factual 

allegations that go well beyond reciting the elements of a claim of deliberate indifference.” 

Id.; see also Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 940. These detailed factual allegations include: 

(a) a letter Sheriff Baca received from the Department of Justice in 1997 

discussing a pattern and practice of “abuse of inmates by sheriff’s deputies 

working in the jail and inmate on inmate violence”; (b) weekly reports Sheriff 

Baca received “from his subordinates responsible for reporting deaths and 

injuries in the jails”; (c) a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding that Sheriff 

Baca and the County of Los Angeles entered into with the Department of 

Justice, where Sheriff Baca and the County agreed to “address and correct the 

continuous constitutional violations to which inmates were being subjected”; 

(d) a 2006 report by the Department of Justice which found “noncompliance 

with many of its recommendations regarding the abuse of inmates”; (e) an 

incident in 2002 where Sheriff Baca was informed of a physical attack on an 

inmate by a sheriff’s deputy and the inmate’s subsequent death, and no 

investigation was conducted; (f) the deaths of two inmates in 2003 as a result 

of lax oversight by sheriff’s deputies; (g) the deaths of three inmates in 2004 

as a result of lax oversight by sheriff’s deputies; and, (h) a 2005 incident where 

an inmate who was booked on a non-violent misdemeanor was misclassified 

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by sheriff’s deputies, placed near “high risk” inmates, and beaten to death by 

fellow inmates. 

Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 941 (citing Starr, 652 F.3d at 1209-11). 

Thus, the complaint “specifically allege[d] numerous incidents in which inmates in 

Los Angeles County jails have been killed or injured because of the culpable actions of the 

subordinates” of the defendant sheriff, the defendant sheriff “was given notice, in several 

reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under his supervision that have resulted 

in these deaths and injuries,” and he did not take action to protect inmates under his care. 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. These factual allegations “plausibly suggest[ed] that [the 

defendant sheriff] acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was 

thereby deliberately indifferent to the danger posed to [the plaintiff].” Id. Based on these 

allegations, the Ninth Circuit found there was no “obvious alternative explanation, within 

the meaning of Iqbal,” for why the defendant sheriff took no action to stop his subordinates’ 

repeated violations other than deliberate indifference. Id. 

In contrast, in Hydrick, the Ninth Circuit determined that plaintiffs, a class of civilly 

committed persons at Atascadero State Hospital, failed to state a Section 1983 claim 

against hospital administrators and other supervisory defendants. Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 

941. Unlike in Starr, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the “[p]laintiff’s complaint is based on 

conclusory allegations and generalities, without any allegation of the specific wrong-doing 

by each [d]efendant . . . . [T]here is no allegation of . . . a specific policy implemented by 

the [d]efendants or a specific event or events instigated by the [d]efendants that led to [the] 

purportedly unconstitutional [conduct].” Id. at 942 (emphasis in original). Nor were there 

“specific allegations regarding each [d]efendant’s purported knowledge” of the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct. Id. Rather, the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants were 

“devoid of specifics.” Id. To establish supervisory liability for deliberate indifference, a 

plaintiff “must still allege sufficient facts to plausibly establish the defendant’s ‘knowledge 

of’ and ‘acquiescence in’ the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates.” Id. (citing 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206-07). Relying on Iqbal, the Court stated that “bald” and 

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“conclusory” allegations are insufficient to establish individual liability under Section 

1983. Id. 

Here, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations by which the Court can draw 

the reasonable inference that Defendant Tharratt is liable for deliberate indifference. 

Although Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendant Tharratt, by virtue of his 

position, knew or should have known about the facilities under his control or authority, he 

does not make any specific allegations, in contrast to Starr, demonstrating that Defendant 

Tharratt knew or had reason to know of Defendant Dr. Yu’s alleged constitutional 

violations. See Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding 

insufficient allegations against individual defendants who directed agencies which have 

oversight responsibility and are required to ensure compliance with state and federal law, 

in the absence of allegations that the individuals had “any personal knowledge of the 

specific constitutional violations that led to [the p]laintiffs’ injuries, or that they had any 

direct responsibility to train or supervise the” offending subordinate). 

Moreover, while supervisory liability may exist “if supervisory officials implement 

a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is 

‘the moving force of a constitutional violation,’” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977, Plaintiff does 

not identify any policy implemented by Defendant Tharratt. Accordingly, the Court finds 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate Defendant Tharratt acted with the 

requisite culpable state of mind to establish liability for deliberate indifference. See Wilson, 

501 U.S. at 297; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

Defendant Tharratt. 

 ii. Defendant Paramo 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paramo is the Warden of RJD. (Compl. at 2, 10.) As the 

Warden, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is responsible for the safe custody of the inmates 

confined at RJD, citing California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 3271. (Id. at 2, 

10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Paramo was “informed and failed and is failing to still 

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prevent” the constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff. (Id. at 11.) 

As with Defendant Tharratt, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support personal 

involvement or direct action by Defendant Paramo in the alleged constitutional violations. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint relies on a theory of supervisory liability to establish 

liability. In the Complaint, Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that Defendant 

Paramo was informed of the constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff. (Compl. at 11.) 

However, Plaintiff does not identify when or how Defendant Paramo was informed of the 

alleged constitutional violations. For the reasons stated above, absent any factual 

allegations plausibly suggesting Defendant Paramo’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 

the unconstitutional conduct of Defendant Dr. Yu, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts 

to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant Paramo is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08, 1216; Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 941; Henry 

A., 678 F.3d at 1004. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant 

Paramo. 

 iii. Defendant Glynn 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Glynn is the Chief Executive Officer of medical at RJD. 

(Compl. at 2, 11, 33.) He alleges that she is legally responsible for the overall health care 

operation at RJD. (Id. at 11.) He alleges that she “did not monitor employees under [her] 

authority for licensing and competency.” (Id. at 2.) He contends that Defendant Dr. Yu 

should have been “trained from the beginning, rather then [sic] after the abuse, at which 

point the thirdty [sic] minute training was useless.” (Id. at 11.) He further alleges that she 

was informed via CDCR 602 HCs and a Citizen’s Complaint of the alleged constitutional 

violations against Plaintiff and took no action, and violated California Code of Regulations, 

Title 15, Section 3271 by failing to maintain the safe custody of inmates at RJD. (Id. at 2, 

11.) 

Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint an Institution Response for Second Level HC 

Appeal from CCHCS, dated August 14, 2015, in response to his internal complaints. (Id. 

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at 32-33.) The response is signed by Defendant Roberts as the Chief Medical Executive at 

RJD and Defendant Glynn as the Chief Executive Officer at RJD. (Id.) Plaintiff makes 

no further allegations against Defendant Glynn. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Glynn failed to monitor Defendant Dr. Yu for 

licensing and competency, and failed to train Defendant Dr. Yu in a timely manner. In the 

Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Dr. Yu, a primary care provider at RJD, 

was improperly licensed. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a causal 

connection between Defendant Glynn’s conduct and any alleged constitutional violation. 

As to Defendant Dr. Yu’s competency, Plaintiff alleges “it appears [Defendant Dr. 

Yu] did not understand the report” and did not follow up with Plaintiff. (Compl. at 4, 11.) 

Plaintiff makes no specific allegation that Defendant Glynn knew, or should have known, 

of Defendant Dr. Yu’s alleged incompetency. As stated above, Plaintiff must make 

specific factual allegations regarding Defendant Glynn’s knowledge sufficient to plausibly 

establish her knowledge of and acquiescence in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of 

Defendant Dr. Yu. 

To the extent Plaintiff relies on his CDCR 602 HCs and Citizen’s Complaint to 

establish knowledge, the timeline alleged in the Complaint suggests that these grievances 

were filed after the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff first alleges Defendant Dr. 

Yu received the pathology report at issue on March 6, 2015 and failed to take appropriate 

action. (Compl. at 13.) Defendant Dr. Yu thereafter generated the Request for Service, 

allegedly improperly prioritizing the referral as “routine,” on May 1, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff’s 

Citizen’s Complaint was filed with RJD on May 5, 2015. (Id. at 24.) Defendants Walker 

and Roberts met with Defendant Dr. Yu regarding Plaintiff for an apparent thirty-minute 

training on May 12, 2015. (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff underwent the referred procedure on May 

14, 2015. (Id. at 20, 21.) Defendant Glynn signed the Institution Response for Second 

Level Appeal on August 14, 2015. (Id. at 32.) Based on this timeline, Plaintiff did not file 

his grievances, and Defendant Glynn was not involved, until after the alleged 

unconstitutional violations occurred. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not 

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sufficiently alleged that Defendant Glynn knew or had reason to know of Defendant Dr. 

Yu’s alleged incompetency prior to the alleged unconstitutional acts. 

 As stated above, the causal connection required to establish supervisory liability can 

also include a supervisor’s “inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates.” See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093; see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014). Supervisors are only liable, however, if they 

are on actual or constructive notice of the need to train. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1085 (citing 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841). Based on the timeline laid out above, the Court finds Plaintiff 

has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant Glynn was on actual or constructive notice of 

the need to train prior to the alleged constitutional violations occurring. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

Defendant Glynn. 

 iv. Defendant Roberts 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Roberts is the Chief Medical Executive at RJD. (Compl. 

at 3, 12, 21.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Roberts was put on notice of the alleged 

constitutional violations via CDCR 602, California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 

3271, a memorandum from the Prison Law Office, dated May 11, 2015, and the response 

from CCHCS, dated June 2, 2015, and failed to act. (Compl. at 3, 19-21.) Plaintiff further 

alleges Defendant Roberts was responsible for the training and supervision of medical staff 

at CCHCS and RJD and failed to train Defendant Dr. Yu. (Id. at 12.) Lastly, Plaintiff 

contends Defendant Roberts violated California Penal Code section 422.6(a). (Id.)6

                                               

6

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Complaint against Defendants Roberts and Walker, the Court notes that this Penal Code 

section does not provide for a private right of action or imply that a civil remedy is 

available. See Thomas v. Rest., No. 15-cv-01113-DAD (SKO), 2015 WL 9583029, at *2, 

n. 3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2015); Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 12-02950 

CRB, 2012 WL 5869707, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012); Womack v. Metro. Transit Sys., 

No. 09cv2679 BTM (NLS), 2011 WL 839387, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011). 

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Similar to Defendant Glynn, Defendant Roberts signed the Institution Response for 

Second Level HC Appeal from CCHCS, dated August 14, 2015, in response to Plaintiff’s 

CDCR 602 complaints. (Compl. at 32-33.) Defendant Roberts also participated, as noted 

above, in the apparent thirty-minute training regarding Plaintiff on May 12, 2015 with 

Defendants Walker and Yu. (Id. at 12, 54.) 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support personal involvement or direct action 

by Defendant Roberts in the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint relies on a theory of supervisory liability to establish liability. Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Roberts failed to prevent the alleged constitutional violations and failed to train 

Defendant Dr. Yu. However, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege the subjective 

component of supervisory liability. Given the timeline set forth in the Complaint, and 

outlined above, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Roberts knew or should have 

known of the alleged violations prior to May 12, 2015, when the training took place, which 

is after the alleged constitutional violations occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to 

allege sufficient facts by which the Court can draw the reasonable inference that Defendant 

Roberts is liable for deliberate indifference. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant 

Roberts. 

 v. Defendant Walker 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker is the Chief Physician and Surgeon at RJD. 

(Compl. at 3, 21, 31.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Walker was put on notice of the alleged 

constitutional violations via CDCR 602, California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 

3271, and an “Evaluation of RJD” from Case No. 01-cv-01351-THE,7

 and failed to act. 

                                               

7

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Facility Health Care Evaluation,” dated March 18, 2013 (ECF No. 2572), in Plata v. 

Brown, Case No. 01-cv-01351-TEH (N.D. Cal.). The report’s “Overall Finding” is that 

RJD “is not providing adequate medical care, and that there are systemic issues that present 

an on-going serious risk of harm to patients and result in preventable morbidity and 

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(Compl. at 3, 12.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Walker was legally responsible for 

his subordinates’ training and supervision and his thirty minute “after the fact” training of 

Defendant Dr. Yu was “inadequate.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Walker 

was willfully blind to multiple appeals concerning Defendant Dr. Yu, dated May 5, 2015 

(Log Nos. 15-1861/15053445) and May 29, 2015 (Log No. 15053343), and failed to 

prevent the constitutional violations. (Id. at 12, 24-47.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

Walker violated California Penal Code section 422.6(a). 

Plaintiff again does not allege any personal involvement or direct action by 

Defendant Walker in the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint 

relies on a theory of supervisory liability to establish liability. In addition to the May 12, 

2015 training, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker signed the appeal decision at the First 

Level, which is dated June 24, 2015. (Id. at 31.) As with Defendant Roberts, based on the 

timeline set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Walker had 

actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged violations prior to May 12, 2015, when the 

training took place, which is after the alleged constitutional violations occurred. To the 

extent Plaintiff relies on the RJD Evaluation, which was issued in March 2013, to put 

Defendant Walker on notice of Defendant Dr. Yu’s alleged constitutional violations in 

2015, the Court finds Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a connection between the report 

and the violations at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

against Defendant Walker. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a 

deliberate indifference claim against Defendants and recommends that Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss be granted for failure to state a claim. As the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to 

                                               

mortality.” (Id. at 5.) In the report, Court Medical Experts described their findings and 

made several recommendations. (Id. at 3-50.) For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the 

Court takes judicial notice of the existence and filing of the report. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, 

LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of 

pleadings, memoranda, and other court filings). 

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sufficiently allege a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants, the Court need not address Defendants’ 

remaining arguments. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Larry A. Burns pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order: 

 1. Approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; 

 2. Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend; and 

 3. Ordering Plaintiff to show cause why Defendant Jin Kul Yu should not be 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m), in that it appears he has not been served with the Complaint. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than February 10, 2017, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply 

to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

February 22, 2017. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 20, 2017 

 _________________________ 

 LOUISA S PORTER 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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