Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00392/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12102 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Disability Definition

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE KRISTOFFERSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

RVS110, LLC; and

DOES 1-10,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-0392-BEN-AGS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Doc. 18]

Plaintiff Michelle Kristoffersen brought suit against Defendant RVS110, LLC for 

violation of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Civil 

Rights Act for Defendant’s alleged failure to provide an accessible guest room at the 

Holiday Inn Express in San Diego. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment. [Doc. 

18.] For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a resident of Santa Ynez, California in Santa Barbara County. As a 

paraplegic, Plaintiff cannot walk and uses a wheelchair for mobility. On July 22, 2017, 

 

1

In conjunction with summary judgment briefing, Defendant filed several objections 

to Plaintiff’s submitted evidence. Because the Court did not rely upon that evidence in 

ruling Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, however, Defendant’s objections are 

DENIED as moot.

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Plaintiff visited a skate park in San Diego with her 13-year-old son and his two 14-yearold friends. Although Plaintiff planned the San Diego trip two weeks prior, she waited to

book her motel room on Expedia until the afternoon of July 22, 2017, because she believed 

rates would be cheaper last-minute. On Expedia, she booked a standard room with two 

queen beds at Defendant’s Holiday Inn Express Motel, and in the “special request” section 

of the reservation, she requested a roll-in shower. 

San Diego’s annual Comic-Con convention took place from July 20, 2017 through 

July 23, 2017. When Plaintiff and the three boys arrived at Defendant’s Motel on July 22, 

2017, Plaintiff requested an ADA-accessible room with two beds and a roll-in shower. 

None of the Motel’s ADA-accessible rooms were available. Further, the room 

configuration Plaintiff requested does not exist at the Motel. Of the Motel’s 113 rooms, 

the Motel categorizes seven of them as ADA-accessible. Of those seven rooms, two are 

configured with a king bed and roll-in shower, and five are configured with a king bed and 

accessible tub. Of the five ADA-accessible king/tub rooms, two rooms have a separate 

alcove containing a sofa that pulls out to a queen bed. The Motel does not maintain any

ADA-accessible rooms with two queen beds and a roll-in shower. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s Motel violates Title III of the ADA in many ways. 

Specifically, she asserts the Motel’s allegedly ADA-accessible rooms do not comply with 

several of the ADA’s measurement specifications; the Motel fails to spread ADAaccessible rooms across room configurations, e.g., maintaining an ADA-accessible room 

with a roll-in shower and two queen beds; and the Motel uses its ADA-required lower 

transaction counter to store promotional materials, obstructing disabled individuals from 

using the counter. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on both of her claims. First, for her violation 

of the ADA claim, she seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to bring its motel into 

compliance with the ADA. Second, as to her derivative state law Unruh Civil Rights claim,

which is premised on a finding that Defendant violated the ADA, she seeks a statutory 

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penalty of $4,000. As a threshold matter, Defendant argues summary judgment must be 

denied because Plaintiff fails to carry her burden to establish Article III standing for her

ADA claim. The Court agrees.2 

“A party is entitled to summary judgment if the ‘movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.’” City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The moving party initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986)). “The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant 

and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona, 750 F.3d 

at 1049. “‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

To demonstrate Article III standing, Plaintiff must establish she suffered “an injuryin-fact, that the injury is traceable to the [defendant’s] actions, and that the injury can be 

redressed by a favorable decision.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 

946 (9th Cir. 2011). Because injunctive relief is the only remedy available to private 

plaintiffs alleging ADA violations, Plaintiff must also demonstrate a “real and immediate 

threat of repeated injury.” Id.

Courts take a “broad view of constitutional standing in civil rights cases, especially 

where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits ‘are the primary method of obtaining 

compliance with the ADA.’” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). Despite this 

“broad view,” the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is clear that standing is not a “mere 

 

2 Because Plaintiff fails to establish standing, the Court does not reach Defendant’s 

many alternative arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

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pleading requirement[] but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.” Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Accordingly, “each element [of standing] 

must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 

stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561; see also Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (“[A]s with other 

civil rights statutes, to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a disabled individual 

claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by 

demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.”). 

Here, as the movant for summary judgment, Plaintiff bears the burden of setting 

forth evidence sufficient to establish each element of her standing. Defendant argues 

Plaintiff fails to carry her burden of demonstrating “a sufficient likelihood that [s]he will 

again be wronged in a similar way.” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). That 

is, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s showing of a “real and immediate threat of repeated 

injury,” as required for injunctive relief. 

The Ninth Circuit has “clarified the scope” of this inquiry within the context of Title 

III ADA suits for injunctive relief, explaining:

A disabled individual who is currently deterred from patronizing a public 

accommodation due to a defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA has 

suffered “actual injury.” Similarly, a plaintiff who is threatened with harm in 

the future because of existing or imminently threated non-compliance with the 

ADA suffers “imminent injury.”

D’Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002)). Thus, 

“[a]pplying this rule in cases where, as here, the public accommodation being sued is far 

from the plaintiff’s home, [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] found actual or imminent injury 

sufficient to establish standing where a plaintiff demonstrates an intent to return to the 

geographic area where the accommodation is located and a desire to visit the 

accommodation if it were made accessible.” Id. (citing Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1138 and 

Doran, 524 F.3d at 1037-40).

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For example, in Pickern Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found the 

plaintiff established an actual or imminent injury where he encountered barriers at a 

Holiday Paradise grocery store 70 miles from his home and stated that he “prefers to shop 

at Holiday markets and that he would [return to] shop at the Paradise market [near his 

grandmother’s home] if it were accessible.” 293 F.3d at 1138. Similarly, in Doran v. 7-

Eleven, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff demonstrated an actual or imminent 

injury because he established his intention to return to the defendant’s 7-Eleven store 550 

miles from his home once the barriers to access were removed. The Doran plaintiff did so 

by “alleg[ing] that he had visited the 7-Eleven store on ten to twenty prior occasions, that 

he is currently deterred from visiting the store because of its accessibility barriers, that the 

store is conveniently located near his favorite fast food restaurant in Anaheim, and that he 

plans to visit Anaheim at least once a year on his annual trips to Disneyland.” 524 F.3d at 

1037-40.

Finally, in D’Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, the Ninth Circuit found the

plaintiff demonstrated her intent to return to the Santa Barbara area “by the regularity with 

which she visited the city before, during, and after her stay at the [defendant’s hotel,] Best 

Western Encina.” 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically, the plaintiff offered her 

declaration and testimony that detailed her visits to Santa Barbara since the early 1980s for 

both business and pleasure, her recent vacations there, her intent to return to Santa Barbara, 

and why she preferred to stay at the Best Western Encina. Id. at 1037. 

Notably, Plaintiff lives in Santa Ynez in Santa Barbara County, approximately 250 

miles north of Defendant’s San Diego Motel. [Doc. 24-12 at 10:6-10.] Despite living far 

away, Plaintiff’s proffered evidence of this element of standing is limited to two sentences 

in her Declaration:

13. The Motel is a convenient place for me to stay whenever I visit San Diego.

14. Once the barriers are removed, I will return and continue to patronize the 

Motel regularly whenever I am in the area and need a place to stay.

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[Doc. 18-3 at p. 2, ¶¶13-14.] As Defendant argues, Plaintiff “merely claims a vague desire 

to stay at the Motel whenever she visits San Diego” and “has identified no dates of a future 

visit, does not have any specific reservations for a future stay, and has not described 

concrete plans to return to the Motel.” [Doc. 24 at p. 12.] Defendant additionally points 

to Plaintiff’s testimony that, other than in connection with her lawsuit, she has visited San 

Diego only three times in her life. [Doc. 24-13 at 10:17-12:12 (Kristoffersen Deposition).] 

Although Plaintiff’s vague desire to stay at the Motel some day—“whenever she 

visits San Diego” and “need[s] a place to stay”—might withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss, Plaintiff does not carry her burden to demonstrate standing at the summary 

judgment stage.

3

 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without 

any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day 

will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases 

require.”). Like in Pickern, Doran, and D’Lil, Plaintiff lives far away from the public 

accommodation she is suing. Unlike those cases, however, she attempts to establish 

standing with a declaration articulating only a vague desire to stay in Defendant’s motel 

some day when she returns to San Diego. She offers no evidence of any plans or a general 

intention to visit San Diego in the future. She offers no evidence of reasons why she might

 

3 Plaintiff’s reliance on Civil Rights Educ. and Enforcement Ctr. v. Hospitality, 867 

F.3d 1093 (2017) does not require a different result. First, the case is distinguishable

because it concerned whether a putative class plausibly alleged standing at the class 

certification stage. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry was limited to the Named Plaintiffs’ 

allegations in the pleadings, not evidence. Civil Rights, 867 F.3d at 1099 (“The relevant 

question, therefore, is whether the Named Plaintiffs are presently deterred from visiting 

HPT-owned hotels. We limit our evaluation to the pleadings.”). Second, Plaintiff’s 

reliance on the case is limited to the Ninth Circuit’s reiteration of its longstanding 

“deterrent effect doctrine,” first enunciated in Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 

F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002). See Civil Rights, 867 F.3d at 1098-99 (quoting 

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1137) (“‘So long as the discriminatory conditions continue, and so 

long as the plaintiff is aware of them and remains deterred, the injury under the ADA 

continues.’”). 

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visit San Diego in the future or why she would stay in Defendant’s Motel. And, she offers 

no record of “regularity with which she visited” San Diego in the past. D’Lil, 538 F.3d at 

1037. Rather, the evidence shows Plaintiff has visited San Diego only three times in her 

life, including the visit that led to her lawsuit. 

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant as the nonmovant,

then, Plaintiff does not proffer evidence sufficient to demonstrate either an intent to return

to Defendant’s Motel or that she is actually deterred from visiting it. In other words, a 

reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has no intention of returning to Defendant’s Motel 

in San Diego and is not currently deterred from visiting the Motel because of Defendant’s 

alleged non-compliance with the ADA. Thus, Plaintiff does not carry her burden of 

establishing “a real and immediate threat of injury,” as required to show standing for 

injunctive relief under the ADA.4 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

on her ADA claim and derivative Unruh Act claim is DENIED.

 

4 See also, e.g., Feezor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 608 Fed. App’x 476, 477 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“To establish standing based on deterrence, an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate 

that he would return but for the barrier . . . Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that he is 

deterred from visiting Sears are insufficient to demonstrate that he would shop at Sears if 

it were accessible.”); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)

(concluding a declaration “d[id] not assert, however, any firm intention to visit their 

locations,” by “say[ing] only that [the affiant] “want[s] to” go there. . . . This vague desire 

to return is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury”); Chapman v. Pismo 

Food Store, 710 F. App’x 769, 770 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Chapman failed to establish any 

regularity in his visits to Pismo Beach, where the store is located, and likewise failed to 

present sufficient evidence of more than a vague desire to return to the store.”); Kalani v. 

Starbucks Coffee Co., 698 F. App’x 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Kalani made the requisite 

showing by averring that he intended to return to Starbucks Coffee Store #6931 . . . when 

he met with his attorney, attended a yearly expo and meetings of the San Jose chapter of 

the Californians for Disability Rights organization, or visited family nearby.”); Rocca v. 

Den 109 LP, 684 F. App’x 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The district court also did not err in 

finding it implausible that Rocca would return to Denny’s because it was far from his home. 

. . . Rocca did not testify that he had an intent to return, let alone provide detailed reasons 

for the long distance visit such as a regular business trip, an annual amusement park visit, 

or a family member nearby.”). 

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CONCLUSION

For the previous reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, [Doc. 18], is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2019 ______________________________

HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ

United States District Judge

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