Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00186/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00186-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS OLIVEREZ, JR.,

Petitioner,

 vs.

C. M. HARRISON, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-0186 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State Prison, Los

Angeles County, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 29

U.S.C. § 2254 claiming instructional error and ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A jury in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the

County of Santa Clara found petitioner and his co-defendant Adam Leroy Caris

guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and first degree murder. The jury also

found petitioner guilty of grand theft and found true allegations that Caris had

suffered a prior serious felony conviction and served three prior prison terms for

purposes of sentence enhancements. On March 6, 1998, the trial court sentenced

petitioner to 25 years to life and Caris to 25 years to life plus seven years. 

On May 31, 2002, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate

District, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. On August 21, 2002, the

Supreme Court of California denied review.

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Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought collateral relief from the state courts. 

On September 3, 2003, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied in a

reasoned opinion given by the Santa Clara County superior court. The petition

was subsequently denied by the California Court of Appeal on January 14, 2004

and the Supreme Court of California on December 1, 2004.

On January 12, 2005, petitioner filed this instant federal petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on April 15, 2005, the

court found that the petition, when liberally construed, stated cognizable claims

under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer on June 14, 2005. Petitioner

filed a traverse on July 13, 2005. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows: 

On September 27, 1993, at 2:21 a.m., San Jose Police

Officer Bridgette Blahut found the body of Paul Farfan in Watson

Park. Farfan had been shot five times. Farfan was a drug dealer

and member of the Northern Structure, a prison and street gang

subsidiary of the Nuestra Familia prison gang. Farfan’s parole

officer told police officers that Farfan’s girlfriend was Jessica

Salazar. Officers traced her to the Arena Hotel where Oliverez,

Jeannette Alarcon (Oliverez’s wife), and another person were also

staying. Officers found Farfan’s pouch inside Alarcon’s purse. 

Inside the pouch were two guns, ammunition, and a small amount

of methamphetamine. Officers found a large amount of dust on

Alarcon’s Geo Prizm automobile that was consistent with the dirt in

Watson Park. They also found Caris’s fingerprints in three places

on the car. The car’s tire tread pattern was consistent with patterns

near the crime scene. A bloodstain on the seat of the car was

consistent with Farfan’s blood. A dent in the door frame was

consistent with the bullet strike. In the trunk, officers found two

pairs of bloodstained athletic socks that were similar to socks

belonging to Oliverez, a pair of Reebok shoes with bloodstained

shoelaces, and a pair of Nike shoes. The sizes of the shoes were

different and consistent with the different sizes worn by Oliverez

(the Reebok shoes) and Caris (the Nike shoes). Police found a

paper in the car that had Farfan’s telephone number written on it

and another paper that had Caris’s address written on it.

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Oliverez told police that, between 11:00 p.m. and midnight

on the night of the murder, he had borrowed Alarcon’s car, driven

to Farfan’s brother’s home, picked up Farfan, and drove to Watson

Park to drink and talk. He added that he and Farfan stayed in the

park for 20 minutes and, afterward, he drove to an apartment,

dropped off Farfan, and returned to the Arena Hotel.

Robert Romero told the police that Caris had told him that

he, Caris, had shot Farfan five times after he, Caris, and Oliverez

had set Farfan up to be killed. Jesus Avila testified that Caris had

told him in jail that he, Caris, had killed Farfan because Farfan was

disrespecting Jerry Salazar by “messing with” with [sic] Salazar’s

wife.

Caris was a member of the Northern Structure. Oliverez

was either a member or sympathizer of the gang. The People’s

theory was that Farfan’s murder was a “gang hit” that was ordered

by Chente Arroyo because Farfan and Manuel Nanez had spent

drug profits instead of sending the profits to incarcerated gang

members. Arroyo was under a murder indictment with other

members of the Northern Structure. He was the highest ranking

Nuestra Familia and Northern Structure member in custody. The

Grand Jury agreed with the People’s theory and the indictment

alleged that Oliverez and Caris had committed the murder in

association with a criminal street gang for purposes of 10-year

sentence enhancements. As a result, at trial, the People introduced

general evidence about the organization and activities of Nuestra

Familia and Northern Structure and specific evidence about the

involvement and activities in gang business of Farfan, Oliverez,

Caris, and others. The jury, however, found the gang enhancement

allegations not true. 

Caris testified in his own defense and related the following.

Caris joined the Northern Structure in 1986 while he was in

prison. On the evening of the murder, Oliverez called him and

asked whether he wanted to party with Salazar’s wife and Farfan. 

Caris agreed. Oliverez picked him up in the Geo Prizm. Farfan

was in the car. The three drove to Milpitas. Oliverez and Farfan

argued in the front seat. The three encountered police near their

destination and, because Farfan indicated that he possessed a gun,

drove back to San Jose and Watson Park. Oliverez and Farfan

escalated their argument. The three got out of the car. Caris

walked 30 feet away to urinate. When he turned to walk back to

the car, he saw Oliverez and Farfan struggling. He then heard a

gunshot and saw a flash. He heard more shots and saw Oliverez

holding a gun. Oliverez was pulling Farfan out of the car. Farfan

called to Caris to help get Oliverez away. Farfan jumped out of the

car and ran around to the front. Oliverez followed . Caris saw the

two on the ground, heard shots, and saw a flash. Oliverez broke

free, stepped away, and shot Farfan. Caris started to run away but

Oliverez exclaimed that there had been a green light (murder

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contract) on Farfan because of Farfan’s relationship with Salazar’s

wife. Caris got into the car on the driver’s side and crawled to the

passenger side. Oliverez drove Caris to his girlfriend’s home. 

Caris cried and told his girlfriend that Oliverez shot Farfan. 

Oliverez did not testify in his own defense. After the

prosecution’s rebuttal case, however, Oliverez testified in

surrebuttal. He related the following.

Oliverez and Farfan decided to party on the evening of the

murder. Oliverez picked up Farfan in the Geo Prizm. Farfan was

carrying a black duffel bag. They drove to Milpitas. They

encountered police near their destination and, because Farfan

indicated that he possessed a gun, drove back to San Jose and

picked up Caris. The three drove to Watson Park. Oliverez exited

the car to go urinate. As he walked back to the car, he heard a

gunshot. He saw Caris jumping from the driver’s side of the car. 

He heard another shot and saw Farfan run away. Caris chased after

Farfan and shot him again. [Caris] came back to the car with a gun

in his hand. [Caris] ordered [Oliverez] to drive out of the park. In

the car, Caris exclaimed that Farfan “had it coming, fuck with my

old lady.” Oliverez dropped Caris off at Caris’s home and drove to

the Arena Hotel. He took Farfan’s black pouch into the hotel and

left Caris’s shoes in the trunk. 

People v. Caris, No. H018246, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *2-7 (Cal.

Ct. App. May 31, 2002). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

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in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the[ Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

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B. Claims

Petitioner presents eights claims for relief to the court. Petitioner’s first

claim is that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to give a

modified instruction for CALJIC 3.18. Petitioner’s seven remaining claims cite

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise various issues: (1)

the trial court committed a reversible error for failing to sever the trial of

petitioner and co-defendant Caris, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting co-defendant’s hearsay statement, (3) post trial counsel was ineffective

in challenging the verdict based upon insufficiency of the evidence, 

(4) prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured

testimony, (5) prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecution’s withholding

exculpatory evidence from the defense, (6) prosecutorial misconduct based on the

prosecution’s knowing presentation of a false theory of guilt based on false

testimony, and (7) cumulative error. 

1. Instructional error

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in limiting CALJIC No.

3.18 in its instructions to the jury. The trial court instructed the jury in the

language of CALJIC No. 3.18 as follows: 

You should view the testimony of an accomplice called as a

witness by the prosecution which tends to incriminate a defendant

with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard

the testimony. You should give that testimony the weight you think

it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in light of

all the evidence in the case.

People v. Caris, No. H018246, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *8 (Cal. Ct.

App. May 31, 2002). Petitioner contends that this instruction was erroneous

because although it cautioned the jury to view accomplice testimony with

distrust, it limited the testimony to accomplices called as witnesses by the

prosecution. Petitioner claims that because co-defendant Caris testified in his

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own defense and was not a witness for the prosecution, petitioner was denied the

advantage of an instruction to regard Caris’s testimony with distrust. 

To obtain federal habeas relief for error in the jury charge, petitioner must

show that the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The error

may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of

the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. Petitioner must also show

actual prejudice from the error, i.e., that the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, before the court may grant

federal habeas relief. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (citing

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

A state trial court’s failure to give an instruction does not alone raise a

ground cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst v. Deeds,

859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The omission of an instruction is less likely to

be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470,

475-76 (9th Cir. 1987). A habeas petitioner whose claim involves failure to give

a particular instruction, as opposed to a claim that involves a misstatement of the

law in an instruction, bears an “especially heavy burden.” Villafuerte v. Stewart,

111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,

155 (1977)). 

The California Court of Appeal gave a reasoned opinion denying

petitioner’s claim of instructional error on direct appeal. The court of appeal

determined that the instruction given by the trial court was not a misstatement of

the law and the instruction “plainly and correctly said that prosecution

accomplice testimony that incriminates should be viewed with distrust.” People

v. Caris, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *12. The court of appeal

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concluded that petitioner was required to request a broader accomplice

instruction if he considered the instruction that was given to be too limited. In

support of its conclusion, the court of appeal cited People v. Box, 23 Cal. 4th

1153, 1209 (2000), where the Supreme Court of California held that a cautionary

instruction regarding a co-defendant accomplice is required when requested by

the defendant in a case where the co-defendant testifies. People v. Caris, 2002

Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *11. The court of appeal determined that

because neither petitioner nor his co-defendant requested the broader instruction,

the trial court did not err in giving the modified instruction. Id. at *12. 

In order for petitioner to show that the court of appeal unreasonably

applied controlling federal law, he must show that the trial court’s omission of

the broader accomplice-distrust instruction “so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Viewing the

jury instructions as a whole within the context of the entire trial record, it is clear

that the modified jury instruction given by the trial court did not infect the trial to

the degree of violating petitioner’s due process rights. The convictions of both

defendants clearly show that the jury did not wholly accept Caris’s testimony,

and instead viewed his testimony with distrust, as petitioner’s broader instruction

would require. 

Even if the limited instruction was error, the ample physical and

testimonial evidence supporting the prosecution’s case against petitioner

precludes a finding of prejudice. Petitioner was found with Farfan’s pouch,

containing Farfan’s gun and drugs. Farfan’s blood was found in the car petitioner

was driving on the night of the murder. Farfan’s blood was also discovered in the

trunk of the car on shoes in the size petitioner wears. Prosecution witness John

Castaneda testified that petitioner was involved in a conspiracy with Caris to

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murder Farfan. Additionally, prosecution witness Robert Romero implicated

petitioner in the conspiracy. It simply cannot be said that the alleged

instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. See Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146. Petitioner is not

entitled to federal relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees

a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of

right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.

1986). A defendant must show that counsel’s advice fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the defendant would have prevailed on appeal. 

Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9. 

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,

751-54 (1983). The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of

the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See Miller 882 F.2d at 1434

(footnote and citations omitted). Appellate counsel will frequently remain above

an objective standard of competence and have caused his client no prejudice for

the same reason--because he declined to raise a weak issue. See id.

a. Denial of Severance

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

for failing to raise on appeal the trial court’s denial of severance of his case from

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co-defendant Caris. Petitioner first contends that he and co-defendant Caris

presented irreconcilable, antagonistic defenses which posed a danger of jury

confusion. Petitioner asserts that antagonistic defenses of the two defendants

“presented the question to the jury of whom they should believe rather than

whether either had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the

prosecution.” Pet. at 32. According to petitioner, the trial court’s denial of

severance was an error because it relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof,

by allowing the jury to hear and consider defendants’ antagonistic defenses. 

There is a judicial preference for joint trials due to efficiency and the

desire to avoid “the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.” Zafiro v.

United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). A judge should grant a severance only

if there is a “serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific right of

one of the defendants or prevent a jury from making a reliable judgment about

guilt or innocence.” Id. However, a denial of severance of co-defendants may

prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in

violation of due process. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997);

Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). It may also result in the

deprivation of the specific constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation. 

Id.

To prevail on a habeas claim in federal court, petitioner must demonstrate

that the state court’s denial of the severance motion resulted in prejudice great

enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. In

addition, petitioner must show that the failure to sever had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence on determining the jury’s verdict. Sandoval v.

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

Severance may be in order when a defendant “shows that a co-defendant’s

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defense is so irreconcilable with the core of his own defense that the acceptance

of the co-defendant’s theory by the jury precludes the acquittal of the defendant.” 

United States v. Throckmorten, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

“the mere presence of hostility among defendants or the desire to exculpate

himself by inculpating the other does not generate the kind of prejudice that

mandates severance.” United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1363 (9th Cir.

1992). Mutually antagonistic defenses amongst co-defendants are not prejudicial

per se. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. To warrant severance on the basis of

antagonistic defenses, co-defendants must show that their defenses are both

irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. See Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1363. Even if

deprivation of severance may potentially result in prejudice enough to create a

constitutional violation, limiting jury instructions will often suffice to cure any

risk of prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538.

In the instant case, the California Court of Appeal gave a reasoned opinion

addressing the trial court’s failure to sever brought on appeal by petitioner’s codefendant Caris. The Santa Clara County superior court, reviewing petitioner’s

habeas claims, adopted the reasoning of the court of appeal and denied

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise

denial of severance as a meritorious claim. This court will review the court of

appeal’s reasoning to determine if the superior court’s decision was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, controlling federal law. 

The California Court of Appeal noted that, although “conflicting defenses”

may be grounds for severance in a criminal trial, that “severance is the exception”

and most trials involving multiple defendants result in joint trials. The court

found no error in the trial court’s denial of severance because there was no

showing that the defendants received an unfair trial as a result of joinder. The

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court noted that the defenses of the two defendants, although antagonistic, were

not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The jury did not have to accept or reject each defendant’s theory in

total . . . Thus, the jury could have accepted either defendant’s

assertion that his co-defendant shot Farfan but rejected the

secondary claim that the non-shooting defendant was not a

conspirator or aider and abettor. This is apparently what the jury

did.

People v. Caris, No. H018246, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *19-20 (Cal.

Ct. App. May 31, 2002). The court also noted that limited jury instructions on

the prosecution’s burden of proof and on the jury’s obligation to give separate

consideration to each defendant and each charge likely precluded any possible

prejudice. See id. at *20.

Because of the jury was able to consider conspiracy and aider and abettor

charges, the state court reasonably concluded that petitioner and co-defendant

Caris’s defenses were not mutually exclusive and did not warrant severance. See

Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1363. The court also reasonably applied Zafiro in

determining that the limiting instructions to the jury regarding the prosecution’s

burden of proof and the separate consideration to be given to each defendant and

each charge prevented prejudice sufficient to render petitioner’s trial

fundamentally unfair. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise on appeal that the failure to sever caused him to suffer a violation of his

right to confront an adverse witness when the prosecution introduced codefendant’s hearsay statement within their questioning of Robert Romero. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in

criminal cases the accused has the right “to be confronted with witnesses against

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause applies to all

“testimonial” statements, including “testimonial hearsay” or out of court

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statements. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004). 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that an out-of-court testimonial

statement may not be admitted against a criminal defendant unless the declarant

is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the

declarant. Id. at 59. The reliability of such statements, for Confrontation Clause

purposes, depends solely upon these two factors. Id. at 68. Where

“nontestimonial hearsay” is at issue, the states may develop evidentiary rules for

its admissibility, including exemption of such statements from Confrontation

Clause scrutiny all together. Id. at 68. 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court, although not supplying a precise

definition of “testimonial,” provided some guidance for ascertaining whether

evidence is testimonial. Id. 68. The Court observed that testimony is “typically

a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or

proving some fact.” Id. at 50-51. The Court noted that “[a]n accuser who makes

a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a

person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51. The

Court also offered three “formulations of [the] core class of ‘testimonial’

statements”:

[1] “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent- that is,

material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony

that the defendant was unable to cross-examine or similar pretrial

statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used

prosecutorially,” [2] “extrajudicial statemetnts . . . contained in

formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,

prior testimony, or confessions,” and [3] “statements that were

made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use

at a later trial[.]”

Id. at 51-52 (omission in original) (citations omitted). 

A Crawford claim is subject to harmless error analysis. United States v.

Nielson, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004) (post-Crawford case); see also United

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States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005). For purposes of federal

habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation

Clause is whether the inadmissable evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect

upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

The Confrontation Clause claim asserted by petitioner was not addressed

on appeal by the California Court of Appeal, nor was it addressed in a reasoned

opinion on state habeas review. When there is no reasoned state court decision

on a petitioner’s habeas claim, a federal court should conduct “an independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The admitted statements, which petitioner claims violated his rights under

the Confrontation Clause, were statements made by Caris to Robert Romero. 

During Romero’s testimony, the prosecution played a tape of Romero’s statement

to the police in which Romero stated that during a trip to Reno, Nevada, Caris

told him that he and petitioner had set up Farfan to be killed and that Caris had

shot Farfan five times. RT: 6490. Following the playing of the tape, Romero

testified that Caris did not tell him about the murder and it may have been

something he “put together” himself. RT: 6494- 6495. Romero also testified that

he was under the influence of narcotics during the taped police interview and

would have said anything to gain release from prison at the time. RT: 6491-

6498. Earlier in the trial, Caris testified that he had a conversation with Romero

about his gun, but denied saying that the gun had been used or that he had killed

Farfan. RT: 5871, 5872, 5867.

Caris’s statement to Romero, which was admitted into evidence, was not

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“testimonial hearsay” for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Caris’s

account of the murder made to Romero were remarks made to a friend, not

formal statements made to government officers. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. In his

testimony, Caris told the court that using drugs together was the basis of his

relationship with Romero. RT: 5861-5862. Caris’s statements to Romero, his

friend with whom he did drugs with, during a trip to Reno, are not statements that

were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

Even if Caris’s statements to Romero were considered testimonial,

petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by admission

of these statements into evidence. During Caris’s testimony, petitioner’s attorney

questioned Caris about his conversations with Romero and Caris denied ever

having admitted the murder of Farfan. RT: 6409. As stated in Crawford, the

Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of testimonial hearsay when the

declarant appears for cross-examination at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9

(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). Because petitioner had an

opportunity to cross-examine Caris about his statements to Romero, the

admission of the statements is not prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel relating to

counsel’s failure to raise the trial court’s denial of severance are without merit. 

In order for petitioner to prevail on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claims, he must establish that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

Petitioner must also show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id.; Miller,

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882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9. 

Because denial of severance by the trial court did not render petitioner’s

trial fundamentally unfair or violate his confrontation rights, petitioner’s

appellate counsel was not unreasonable for failing to bring these issues on appeal. 

Under controlling federal law, petitioner’s assertion that the trial court erred in

denying severance was a weak claim, unlikely to be meritorious on appeal. The

weeding out of weaker issues is recognized as one of the hallmarks of appellate

advocacy. See Miller 882 F.2d at 1434. Appellate counsel’s failure to raise a

weak issue frequently will fall within an objective standard of competence, and

cause his client no prejudice. Id. Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s failure to raise

the weak and likely unsuccessful claim of denial of severance did not amount to

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under Strickland. Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

b. Improper Admission of Hearsay

Co-defendant Caris’s girlfriend, Stacy Kinner, testified at

trial that she received a phone call from Caris on the night of Farfan’s murder. 

Kinner testified that during the phone call, Caris told her that he was calling from

a phone booth and that he loved her. Petitioner contends that he was denied

effective assistance of appellate counsel for counsel’s failure to raise the claim

that Kinner’s testimony should have been excluded on hearsay grounds. 

In order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary issue, a

petitioner must show that the error was one of constitutional dimension and that it

was not harmless error. Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The admission of evidence at trial is not subject to habeas review unless a

specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such a magnitude

that the result is a denial of a fundamentally fair trail guaranteed by due process. 

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See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Only if there are no

permissible inferences that a jury may draw from the evidence can its admission

violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

1991). In order to establish that the admission of evidence was not harmless

error, petitioner would have to show that the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence on the verdict. Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767 n.7 (citing Brecht, 507

U.S. at 637).

The admission of Caris’s hearsay statement to Kinner was addressed by

the Santa Clara County superior court during petitioner’s state habeas

proceedings. The superior court determined that petitioner’s assertion that the

trial court abused its discretion in admitting Caris’s statements to Kinner was

without merit. The court noted that Caris’s statements to Kinner fell within the

co-conspirator’s exception to the hearsay rule under California Evidence Code

section 1223. Pet. Exh. E at 5. Under section 1223, a co-conspirator’s

statements can be admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule if: (1) declarant

was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration, (2) that the

declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy, and (3) at the

time of the declaration, the party against whom the evidence is offered was

participating or would later participate in the conspiracy. Cal. Evid. Code §

1223. The superior court also noted that if Caris’s statement was not admissable

as a statement of a co-conspirator, it was admissable as nonhearsay as

circumstantial evidence of Caris’s state of mind. The superior court reasoned

that Caris’s statement was relevant to prove that Caris was in a “worried state of

mind in the moments before the murder.” Pet. Exh. E at 6.

For purposes of habeas review, this court need not determine whether or

not the evidence was properly admitted under a co-conspirator exception or other

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exception to the hearsay rule because petitioner cannot show that the evidence

had a prejudicial effect on the verdict. Under Brecht, petitioner must show that

the trial court’s admission of Caris’s statements had a substantial and injurious

effect on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Caris’s statements to Kinner that

he was at a phone booth and that he loved her in no way implicate petitioner in a

conspiracy to murder Farfan. Additionally, other evidence against petitioner

strongly supports the jury’s verdict. Noting the substance of the statements made

to Kinner and the other evidence implicating petitioner, it is clear that had the

trial court excluded Caris’s statements to Kinner on hearsay grounds, the jury

verdict would remain unchanged. Thus, even if the trial court erred in admitting

Caris’s statements to Kinner, this error was harmless error and would not support

federal habeas relief.

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure

to raise the hearsay claim on appeal is without merit. For essentially the reasons

that the admission of Caris’s statements to Kinner did not have a substantial or

injurious effect on the jury verdict, appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue

on appeal did not result in prejudice under Strickland. It simply cannot be said,

in light of the substance of the statements made to Kinner and the other evidence

implicating petitioner, that there is a reasonable probability that petitioner would

have prevailed on appeal had counsel raised the hearsay claim. See Miller, 882

F.2d at 1434 n.9. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

c. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner claims that his post trial counsel was ineffective for

“failing to competently and diligently argue” the issue of insufficiency of the

evidence. Petitioner’s post trial counsel filed a motion to challenge the verdict

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based on insufficiency of the evidence but did not make an oral argument to the

court on the motion. Petitioner claims that post trial counsel’s failure to advocate

orally the claim of insufficient evidence denied the trial court the ability to base

its decision regarding the motion on the “totality of the evidence.” Pet. at 70. 

Here, petitioner specifically claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for

failure to raise on appeal post trial counsel’s alleged incompetence. 

Along with its decision to convict petitioner for first degree murder, the

jury found true two overt acts that defined petitioner and co-defendant’s role in

the conspiracy to commit murder. The jury found overt act six to be true, which

stated that petitioner traveled with Farfan to Watson Park. The jury also found

overt act seven to be true, which stated that Farfan was ambushed and shot to

death at Watson Park by petitioner and co-defendant. Noting the jury’s findings

for the overt acts, petitioner claims that the jury found true that petitioner traveled

to Watson Park with Farfan alone and that petitioner and Caris killed Farfan at

the Park. Petitioner considers the jury’s findings a “defective verdict” that

misapplied the law and evidence presented to the jury at trial. Pet. at 78. 

A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state

conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier

of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt states a constitutional claim, which

if proven, entitles him to habeas relief. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

321 (1979). A federal court “determines only whether ‘after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rationale trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, may a writ of habeas corpus based on insufficiency of

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the evidence be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

The Santa Clara County superior court addressed petitioner’s claim in the

state habeas proceedings. The superior court explained that petitioner

misunderstands overt act six, which defines petitioner’s role in the conspiracy. 

The failure to mention Caris’s presence in overt act six is of no importance

because overt act six merely charges petitioner as part of the conspiracy for

committing the overt act of driving the victim to the place of the murder. Pet.

Exh. E at 6. The court reasoned that the jury’s refusal to find the various other

overt acts true simply reflects the jury’s determination that the murder was not

gang-related, which does not foreclose the possibility that the murder was still a

conspiracy between petitioner and Caris. See id. The court concluded that there

was no ineffective assistance of counsel because the trial court did not err in

denying the motion to set aside the verdict on insufficiency of the evidence

grounds. See id. at 7. 

The superior court’s determination that the jury’s findings were not

inconsistent and were supported by the evidence is not unreasonable. A rational

trier of fact could have found from the evidence that petitioner and Caris

conspired to kill Farfan, and that petitioner’s involvement in the conspiracy was

defined by his overt act of driving Farfan to Watson Park. See Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319. In addition, physical evidence tied petitioner to the murder, and petitioner

admitted to being at Watson Park at the time of the murder. A rationale trier of

fact certainly could have interpreted the evidence in a way consistent with the

jury verdict; consequently, it is unlikely that a motion to set aside the verdict on

insufficiency of the evidence grounds would have been granted.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. The state court’s rejection of the claim was

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not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It simply cannot be said

that there is a reasonable probability that petitioner would have prevailed on

appeal had counsel raised the insufficiency of the evidence claim. See Miller,

882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9.

d. Prosecutorial Misconduct for the Knowing Use of Perjured

Testimony Petitioner claims that the prosecution knowingly used the

perjured testimony of Jerry Salazar in their case against petitioner and codefendant Caris. Jerry Salazar, a member of the Nuestra Familia prison gang,

testified that Chente Arroyo, another Nuestra Familia member, had put a “green

light” out on Farfan for Farfan’s failure to send profits from his drug sales to

gang members in prison. Petitioner claims that Salazar’s testimony was perjured

and introduced inflammatory gang evidence into trial. Petitioner contends that

his right to a fair trial and due process were violated by the prosecution’s

knowing use of perjured testimony. In his habeas petition, petitioner claims

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to bring the prosecutorial

misconduct claim on appeal. 

A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s

misconduct renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

168, 181 (1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“[T]he touchstone

of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Claims of

prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed “on the merits, examining the entire

proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor’s [conduct] so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995). Federal habeas relief for

claims of prosecutorial misconduct is appropriate only if the misconduct has a

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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

When a prosecutor obtains a conviction by the use of testimony which he

knows or should know is perjured, it has been consistently held that such a

conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The same result occurs when the prosecutor, although

not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, mere inconsistencies in

testimony do not establish knowing use of perjured testimony. United States v.

Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992) (prosecutorial misconduct claim

denied because defendants failed to show that prosecutor knew which of the

inconsistent statements by witness were true or false). Contradictions and

changes in witness’s testimony do not alone constitute perjury and do not create

an inference, let alone prove, the prosecutor knowingly presented perjured

testimony. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1563 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The California Court of Appeal gave a reasoned opinion addressing the

prosecutorial misconduct for the use of perjured testimony given by Jerry Salazar

on a claim brought by petitioner’s co-defendant Caris. The Santa Clara County

superior court, reviewing petitioner’s habeas claims, adopted the reasoning of the

court of appeal in denying petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel for failure to raise prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. This court will

review the court of appeal’s reasoning to determine if the superior court’s denial

of petitioner’s claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

controlling federal law. 

According to the trial record and facts cited in the court of appeal opinion,

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Salazar testified for the prosecution that a “green light” was put out on Farfan by

members of the Northern Structure prison gang. Salazar’s testimony regarding

the “green light” was consistent with his grand jury testimony. On crossexamination, defense counsel played an audiotape of an interview of Salazar

conducted by police and deputy district attorneys in June 1993 (before Farfan’s

murder). After reading a transcript of the audiotape, Salazar agreed that the tape

recording would supersede his testimony. Defense counsel then played a portion

of the tape and questioned Salazar about its contents. The relevant portion of the

transcript of the audiotape stated that Salazar said the following: “and . . . after

that [Arroyo] was mad and he said, well, you know what? I want a green light on

Manuel Nanez, send word to Jessica to tell Far, tell Farfan to put a green light on

Manuel Nanez.” 

Petitioner claims that Salazar committed perjury by testifying before the

grand jury and at trial that a “green light” had been put out on Farfan and Nanez,

because his June 1993 interview stated that a “green light” had been put out on

Nanez to be executed by Farfan. Petitioner contends that because representatives

of the District Attorney’s office were present during the June 1993 interview, that

the prosecutor had knowledge of Salazar’s perjury and used the perjured

testimony to convict petitioner. Petitioner argues that admission of the perjured

testimony by Salazar rendered his trial fundamentally unfair because the

testimony introduced evidence of gang conspiracy and highly inflammatory gang

evidence. 

The California Court of Appeal found that the record established only that

Salazar made inconsistent statements before he testified, which defense counsel

fully exposed in cross-examination. The court explained that Salazar’s testimony

was not the only gang conspiracy evidence. People v. Caris, No. H018246, 2002

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Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *25 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31, 2002). Prosecution

witness and gang member Avila testified that Caris bragged to him that he had

killed Farfan for “messing with” Jessica Salazar, Jerry Salazar’s wife. Id.

Additionally, the prosecution put forth evidence that sleeping with a gang

member’s wife was an act of disrespect that could generate a green light. Id.

The California Court of Appeal decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, controlling federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner did not establish that Salazar’s testimony amounted to perjury. 

Inconsistencies in testimony and contradictions or changes in testimony do not

alone constitute perjury. See Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1364; Tapia, 926 F.2d at

1563. Nor does petitioner present any evidence to establish that the prosecution

knowingly presented false testimony, besides the audio-taped interview in which

Salazar gives statements that are different from his grand jury and trial testimony. 

To prove misconduct by the government, petitioner must establish a factual basis

for attributing knowledge that the testimony given was perjured. See Morales v.

Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). The mere fact of inconsistent or

contradictory testimony does not itself establish that a prosecutor knowingly

presented perjured testimony. Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1563. 

 Petitioner also claims that use of Salazar’s testimony rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair because the testimony introduced gang evidence that would

not have been presented otherwise. However, as noted by the California Court of

Appeal, the record contains other evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory of

gang motive. People v. Caris, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1767, *25. 

Additionally, the superior court correctly noted in its denial of petitioner’s habeas

claims that the gang enhancements were rejected by the jury, exhibiting the jury’s

rejection of the prosecution’s gang motive theory. 

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 Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. The state court’s rejection of the claim was

not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It simply cannot be said

that there is a reasonable probability that petitioner would have prevailed on

appeal had counsel raised the prosecutorial misconduct claim for knowing use of

perjured testimony. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9.

e. Brady Violation

Petitioner claims that the prosecution exhibited misconduct

for knowingly withholding exculpatory evidence from defense counsel regarding

Salazar’s false testimony. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution gave defense

counsel the audio-taped interview between police, district attorneys and Salazar,

but that the tape was inaudible and transcript contained omissions. Petitioner

argues that this withholding of evidence by the prosecution amounted to a Brady

violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Petitioner’s habeas

petition asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to

raise the Brady violation claim on appeal.

In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith or

bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material only if there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion). To establish a Brady violation,

petitioner must show that the exculpatory or impeaching evidence was

suppressed by the state, either wilfully or inadvertently, resulting in prejudice. 

Morris v. Y1st, 447 F.3d 735, 743 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Petitioner’s Brady violation claim was not addressed on appeal by the

California Court of Appeal, nor was it addressed in a reasoned opinion on state

habeas review. When there is no reasoned state court decision on a petitioner’s

habeas claim, a federal court should conduct “an independent review of the

record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner has not shown that the prosecution withheld any evidence from

defense counsel. If the government turns over all information necessary for

defense to discover the alleged Brady material on its own, the government is not

guilty of suppressing evidence favorable to the defendant. See United States v.

Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-9 (9th Cir. 1995). The record shows that the 

prosecution gave defense counsel the audiotapes and corresponding transcripts. 

Although petitioner claims the tape was inaudible and the transcript contained

omissions, defense counsel was able to extract from the evidence Salazar’s

inconsistent statements in order to impeach him upon cross-examination. 

Petitioner puts forth no evidence that the prosecution had access to audiotapes or

transcripts of the interview with Salazar that were in better condition and less

defective than those given to defense counsel. 

Even if petitioner could show that the prosecution suppressed evidence by

giving defense counsel evidence that was defective, petitioner has not shown

prejudice. Defense counsel was able to extract from the audiotape and transcripts

of the interview with Salazar that he made inconsistent statements, allowing

defense counsel to impeach Salazar on the stand. Petitioner cannot show that the

defective audiotape prevented defense counsel from being able to present

evidence that would have changed the result of the proceeding and undermined

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confidence in the verdict. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. The state court’s rejection of the claim was

not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It simply cannot be said

that there is a reasonable probability that petitioner would have prevailed on

appeal had counsel raised the Brady violation claim. See Miller, 882 F.2d at

1434 & n.9.

f. Prosecutorial Misconduct for Knowingly Presenting a False

Theory of Guilt Based on False Testimony

Petitioner claims that the prosecution knowingly presented a

false theory of guilt based on Jerry Salazar’s false testimony that there was a

“green light” out on Farfan at the time of his murder. Petitioner claims

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to bring this false theory

claim on appeal.

Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecution exhibited misconduct by

knowingly presenting a false theory of guilt is based on the assumption that

Salazar’s testimony was perjured. As stated above, petitioner has not shown that

Salazar’s testimony amounted to perjury and was not merely inconsistent with his

prior interview statements. Additionally, petitioner has not shown that the

prosecution had knowledge of the false testimony on the part of Salazar. 

Petitioner cannot establish the claim of prosecutorial misconduct for knowingly

presenting a false theory of guilt.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. The state court’s rejection of the claim was

not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It simply cannot be said

that there is a reasonable probability that petitioner would have prevailed on

appeal had counsel raised the prosecutorial misconduct claim. See Miller, 882

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F.2d at 1434 & n.9.

g. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims that cumulative error by the trial court

amounted to prejudice that rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. He

also claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise on

appeal the cumulative error claim. 

The Ninth Circuit has had that the cumulative effect of several trial errors

may prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. See

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Hubbard,

273 F.3d 1164, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 2002). However, it has also held that where

there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the

level of a constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Oliveraz, 292 F.3d 939, 957

(9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood,

93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). It does not appear that a single constitutional

error exists here. Regardless, habeas relief is not in order because this is not one

of the exceedingly rare cases in which the cumulative effect of the alleged trial

errors so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process. Cf. Alcala, 334 F.3d at 893-95 (reversing a conviction

where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge

every important element of proof offered by prosecution); Thomas, 273 F.3d at

1179-81 (reversing conviction based on cumulative prejudicial effect of (a)

admission of triple hearsay statement providing only evidence that defendant had

motive and access to murder weapon; (b) prosecutorial misconduct in disclosing

to the jury that the defendant had committed prior crime with use of firearm; and

(c) truncation of defense cross-examination of police officer, which prevented

defense from adducing evidence that someone else may have committed the

crime and evidence casting doubt on credibility of main prosecution witness). 

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of cumulative

error/prejudice. See 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied

that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the respondent and close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00186-CRB Document 14 Filed 07/26/06 Page 29 of 29