Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00761/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00761-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Western Alliance Bank, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:14-cv-00761 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

Richard Jefferson, ) [Re: Motions at docket 127, 129, 131 

) and 132]

Defendant. )

)

)

Richard Jefferson, )

)

Counter-claimant, )

)

vs. )

)

Western Alliance Bank, )

)

Counter-defendant. )

)

)

Richard Jefferson, )

)

Third-party plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

Theodore Kritza & Michelle Lee )

Kritza, )

)

Third-party defendants. )

)

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

Before the court are four summary judgment motions. At docket 127 third-party

defendants Theodore Kritza and Michelle Lee Kritza (collectively, “Kritza”) filed a motion

for partial summary judgment supported by a statement of facts at docket 128. 

Defendant, counter-claimant, and third-party plaintiff Richard Jefferson (“Jefferson”) filed

an opposition to Kritza’s motion at docket 160 supported by a separate statement of

Case 2:14-cv-00761-JWS Document 235 Filed 11/13/15 Page 1 of 33
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facts and controverting statement of facts at docket 161. Kritza filed a reply in support

of his motion at docket 212 and a supplemental statement of facts at docket 226. 

Jefferson filed a sur-response at docket 228 and a controverting statement of facts

regarding Kritza’s supplemental statement of facts at docket 229.

At docket 131 plaintiff and counter-defendant Western Alliance Bank (“Alliance”)

filed a motion for summary judgment supported by a statement of facts at docket 134. 

Alliance argues that it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the ratification

doctrine and A.R.S. § 47-4406. At docket 163 Jefferson filed an opposition to Alliance’s

motion supported by his controverting statement of facts, objections, and additional

statement of facts at dockets 166 and 167. At docket 174 Alliance filed a reply in

support of its motion, and at docket 177 it filed a separate response to Jefferson’s

controverting statement of facts and additional statement of facts. At docket 227 the

court granted Jefferson’s motion to strike Alliance’s filing at docket 177.

At docket 132 Kritza filed a joinder to Alliance’s motion as it relates to the issue of

ratification and a motion for summary judgment on that issue. At docket 164 Jefferson

filed an opposition to Kritza’s motion supported by his objections and controverting

statement of facts at docket 165. At docket 188 Kritza filed a reply in support of his

motion. 

At docket 129 Jefferson filed a motion for partial summary judgment against

Kritza or, in the alternative, an order treating certain facts as established. Jefferson’s

separate statement of facts in support of his motion is at docket 130. Kritza’s opposition

to Jefferson’s motion is at docket 158, which is supported by his controverting statement

of facts at docket 159. Jefferson filed his reply at docket 175 and unredacted copies of

Exhibits 4 and 7 to Kritza’s controverting statement of facts at docket 176, both under

seal. 

Finally, at docket 162 Jefferson’s counsel submitted an affidavit in which he

states that Jefferson cannot present facts essential to his oppositions to Kritza’s and

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Alliance’s motions and therefore asks the court to deny those motions pursuant to Rule

56(d). 

Oral argument was held on November 9, 2015.

II. BACKGROUND

Jefferson is a professional basketball player in the National Basketball

Association (“NBA”)1 who employed Kritza from 2001 to 2013 as his personal business

manager in charge of his day-to-day affairs, investments, and business ventures.2

A. The Alliance Line of Credit

Alliance alleges that on October 5, 2004 it issued Jefferson a revolving line of

credit in an original principal amount not to exceed $500,000 (“LOC”) that Jefferson

failed to pay by its maturity date.3 Alliance attached to its complaint the following

documents as evidence of the parties’ contractual relationship: 

1. An October 5, 2004 Consumer Revolving Line of Credit

agreement (loan number 0129104825, “Loan 4825”) with an

October 5, 2005 maturity date;4

2. A September 13, 2005 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

4825 that extended the LOC’s maturity date to October 5,

2006;5

3. A September 25, 2006 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

4825 that extended the LOC’s maturity date to October 5,

2007;6

1Doc. 134 at 2-3 ¶¶ 1, 7; Doc. 134-1 at 3:23-24; Doc. 166 at 37 ¶ 1.

2Doc. 33 at 4 ¶ 13; Doc. 134-1 at 16:13-15, 17:1-14, 53:2-11, 101-02.

3Doc. 1-3 at 3 ¶ 6, 4 ¶ 12.

4Doc. 1-4 at 5-13 (Exhibit A). 

5

Id. at 15-21 (Exhibit B).

6

Id. at 23-27 (Exhibit C).

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4. An August 13, 2007 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

4825 that extended the LOC’s maturity date to October 5,

2008;7

5. An August 5, 2008 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

4825 that extended the LOC’s maturity date to August 15,

2009;8

6. An August 15, 2009 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

4825 that extended the LOC’s maturity date to August 15,

2010;9

7. An August 16, 2010 Consumer Revolving Line of Credit

agreement (loan number 129125289, “Loan 5289”) with an

August 15, 2011 maturity date;10

8. A December 23, 2011 Promissory Note11 and Business Loan

Agreement12 (loan number 0602129169, “Loan 9169”) with a

November 15, 2012 maturity date;

9. A November 15, 2012 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

9169 that extended the loan’s maturity date to January 15,

2013;13

10. A January 15, 2013 Change in Terms Agreement to loan

9169 that extended the loan’s maturity date to November 15,

2013.14

At his deposition Jefferson testified that he was advised by Kritza, his former

agent Todd Eley (“Eley”), and former financial advisor Mark Love (“Love”) to obtain a

LOC to cover his expenses during the gap between his first and second NBA

7

Id. at 29-35 (Exhibit D).

8

Id. at 37-43 (Exhibit E).

9

Id. at 45-51 (Exhibit F).

10

Id. at 53-59 (Exhibit G).

11

Id. at 61-62 (Exhibit H).

12

Id. at 64-70 (Exhibit I).

13

Id. at 72-75 (Exhibit J).

14

Id. at 77-80 (Exhibit K).

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contracts.15 He maintains, however, that his signature on the original Loan 4825 credit

agreement was forged.16

 Jefferson also testified that he did not know that the LOC was

extended17 or about any of the subsequent loan commitments that were taken out in his

name.18

 The five extensions of Loan 4825,19

 the original Loan 5289 document,20

 the

Loan 9169 promissory note,21 the Loan 9169 “business loan agreement,”22 and the two

15Doc. 134-1 at 12:10-13, 94; Doc. 166-2 at 27:2-6.

16Doc. 166 at 62; Doc. 166-2 at 93 (“Q. Are you taking the position that all of those

documents that we have gone through from Alliance Bank that looks like it has your signature

on it, are they all forgeries? A. The documents that I have seen today do not look like my

signature. Q. Are you taking the position that they were forged? A. I’m taking the position that

they are not my signature.”).

17Doc. 134-1 at 18:10-12. Jefferson testified that Kritza told him that the line of credit

was paid off sometime around 2004 or 2005. Doc. 166-2 at 27:10-21. He also testified that he

thought the line of credit was kept open after that, but did not know about any disbursements. 

Doc. 134-1 at 25-26.

18Doc. 166-2 at 131:8-10. Id. at 21-23 (“I believe there was a line of credit that was

taken out in 2004, which I was informed was paid off, and that was the only one.”).

19See the September 13, 2005 extension, doc. 134-2 at 84-86 (Richard Jefferson is the

listed borrower and purported signatory); the September 26, 2005 extension, id. at 92-94

(same); the August 13, 2007 extension, id. at 98-100 (same); the August 5, 2008 extension, id.

at 106-08 (“Richard Jefferson c/o Stratosphere Sports” is the listed borrower and Richard

Jefferson is the purported signatory); and the August 15, 2009 extension, id. at 114-16 (same).

20

Id. at 122-24 (“Richard Jefferson c/o Stratosphere Sports” is the listed borrower and

Richard Jefferson is the purported signatory). 

21

Id. at 130-31 (“Richard Jefferson c/o Stratosphere Management LLC” is the listed

borrower and Richard Jefferson is the purported signatory).

22

Id. at 133-38 (“Richard Jefferson c/o Stratosphere Management LLC” is the listed

borrower and Richard Jefferson is the purported signatory).

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extensions of Loan 916923 all bear Jefferson’s purported signature. Jefferson testified

that Kritza has admitted to forging his signature.24

 

Kritza testified that he helped get Jefferson’s signature on the original Loan 4825

paperwork in 200425

 and on the 2006 Change in Terms Agreement.

26

 Kritza also

testified that Jefferson authorized him to extend the LOC and make disbursements from

it.27

B. Stratosphere Management

Kritza testified that in 2006 Jefferson agreed to help him fund a business he was

starting called Stratosphere Management, LLC (“Stratosphere Management”). Kritza

described his business plan for Stratosphere Management as a “24-hour concierge-type

VIP service that was available to players.”28 Kritza contends that Stratosphere

Management executed a $500,000 promissory note in Jefferson’s favor.29 Jefferson did

not give these funds to Stratosphere Management directly, Kritza said. Instead,

23See the November 15, 2012 extension, id. at 141-43 (“Richard Jefferson c/o

Stratosphere Management LLC” is the listed borrower and Richard Jefferson is the purported

signatory); the January 15, 2013 extension, id. at 146-48 (same).

24Doc. 166-2 at 93:5-8; id. at 109:15-18 (“Ted Kritza told me that he had signed

documents in my name and had forged signatures, on a recorded call with the FBI, so that he

could take out money in my name.”).

25Doc. 134 at 7 ¶ 20; Doc. 134-1 at 65:4-7.

26Doc. 134 at 7 ¶ 20; Doc. 134-1 at 66:16-18.

27Doc. 134 at 4 ¶ 8; Doc. 134-1 at 70:12-15, 71:7-10. 

28Doc. 166-3 at 22:15-18.

29Doc. 159-1 at 10:10-12 (“We had originally started with the $500,000 note to create the

concierge service and move forward.”). See also id. at 47 § 14 (“Borrower acknowledges that

$525,500.00 in loan proceeds are outstanding which represent principal and accrued interest

owing by Borrower to Lender pursuant to Promissory Note issued to Lender by Borrower

effectively dated July 29, 2006 in the original principal amount of $500,000.00, and cancelled

concurrently with the issuance of the Note.”). The court was unable to find a copy of this

promissory note in the record. Jefferson apparently concedes that this note exists, but disputes

its authenticity. Doc. 161 at 9 ¶ 50.

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Jefferson allowed Kritza to access the $500,000 Alliance LOC “so that line continued to

carry . . . a balance that was owed by [Kritza].”30

According to Kritza, Stratosphere Management executed a second promissory

note in 2008 that increased Jefferson’s loan to $2 million and extended the loan’s

maturity date to August 31, 2016.31 Kritza testified as follows:

I put together a plan and went back and . . . discussed it with [Jefferson]

on, I think it was two or three different occasions I remember one of them

was during the All Star break—of expanding what Stratosphere

Management was and to go out and form companies that were specifically

related and tied into what the concierge service would need. So there

were entities that were created that helped in the transportation of cars, in

the customization of vehicles. So a guy would buy a Lamborghini, for

example, but he would want different things done to it, so they would go to

this—it would stay in-house, basically. And that’s where . . . the whole

requirement of an extra million and a half dollars kind of fell on that plate

as to creating all these other possibilities.32

Kritza has submitted an email exchange purportedly between Jefferson and Kritza in

2008 in which Kritza thanks Jefferson for “agreeing to increase and extend the term of

the LOC, so that [Kritza] can look at other opportunities,” and Jefferson acknowledges

Kritza’s email.33 The alleged 2008 promissory note does not reference the Alliance

LOC.

At his deposition Jefferson denied having any involvement with Stratosphere

Management.34 He denied loaning Stratosphere Management either $500,000 or $2

million, denied that Krtiza gave him either the $500,000 or the $2 million promissary

note, and denied authorizing Kritza to use the Alliance LOC to fund Kritza’s business

30Doc. 166-3 at 21:21-23:10. See also id. at 24:17-22; Doc. 159-1 at 25:1-3.

31Doc. 159-1 at 8:7-12:18, 25:1-3. See also id. at 44-48 (the alleged $2 million

promissory note).

32Doc. 159-1 at 11:10-12:2.

33

Id. at 50.

34Doc. 166-2 at 176:13-15.

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investments.35 Jefferson testified that the first time he saw the $2 million note was when

Eley emailed it to him, and that his signature on the note was forged.36

 

C. The 2011 NBA Lockout

Between July 1 and December 8, 2011 there was an NBA lockout,37

 during which

time teams could not trade or enter into contracts with players.38 Jefferson testified that

during the lockout Kritza told him he “was stressed” about the “financial strain” Jefferson

would suffer if the lockout lasted all season.39

 Jefferson testified that he was

disappointed with the state of his personal finances after playing in the NBA for ten

years and “confused as to some of the numbers,” so he had Richard Murnick

(“Murnick”), his current financial manager, review his finances.40

 

According to Murnick, Jefferson called him in late 2011 because Jefferson was

concerned about not having as much money as he thought he should.41 Murnick said

that after speaking with Jefferson, seeing his brokerage statement, and “thumb[ing]

through” his tax return, he agreed with Jefferson “that there were some concerns.”42

“[T]he amount that was in the brokerage account—that it wasn’t more—I was expecting

35Doc. 161-1 at 81:15-23, 106:5-12.

36Doc. 161-1 at 97:22-99:12. Jefferson states that Eley sent this email “recently,” but the

court could not locate a copy of the email, which was apparently marked as exhibit 128. Doc.

161 at 10 ¶ 51. Jefferson cites pages 83 and 84 of the transcript from his February 13, 2015

deposition but does not provide the court with these pages either. 

37Doc. 128 at 3 ¶ 11; Doc. 161 at 19 ¶ 11.

38Doc. 128 at 3 ¶ 12; Doc. 161 at 19 ¶ 12.

39Doc. 128-2 at 160:19-23, 163:6-8. Jefferson later backtracked, testifying that Kritza

“was not worried . . . he was not stressed, but he was preparing for the worst.” Doc. 128-2 at

193:2-4.

40Doc. 128-2 at 160:24-25, 161:1-5, 163:14-24, 167:11-13.

41Doc. 128-3 at 28-32.

42Doc. 128-3 at 40:22-25, 41:1-6.

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to see more in the brokerage account,” testified Murnick.43 Murnick also testified that

Jefferson was concerned that Kritza “may have taken money from him.”44

 In November

2011 Jefferson hired Murnick to replace Love as his financial advisor.45

D. Jefferson Communicates Concerns to Kritza

On February 8, 2012 Jefferson emailed Kritza stating that Murnick was going

through his tax returns and that he did not understand why his savings were so low.46

“Even if we included property we are so far off of the number we needed to be at,”

Jefferson stated. “As my primary handler, that wasn’t a red flag for you?”47 Kritza’s

response, sent the same day, addresses Jefferson’s concerns: “there was the

opportunity for you to save more, but you paid down your debt . . . and yes there were

other situations and circumstances that took away for [sic] the ability to save.”48

E. Jefferson Hires an Accountant to Review His Finances

Jefferson testified that Kritza’s response to his February 8 email led him to

believe he “was not going to get very many answers” from Kritza, and so he hired

accountant Jim Tucciarone (“Tucciarone”) to review his finances.49 Tucciarone

conducted an initial review of Jefferson’s tax returns and investment documents50 and

concluded that these documents “raised questions as to the financial controls and

43Doc. 128-3 at 41:16-19.

44

Id. at 54:9-12. See also id. at 58:11-22.

45Doc. 134 at 10 ¶ 40; Doc. 166 at 108 ¶ 40.

46Doc. 128-2 at 199:11-200:2; Doc. 128-3 at 100. 

47Doc. 128-3 at 101.

48

Id. at 100.

49Doc. 128-2 at 205:3-11. See also Doc. 128-3 at 41:2-6, 44:9-14, 45:11-18; 53:19-24.

50Doc. 128-3 at 187-201.

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benefits of many of [Jefferson’s] investments.”51 In his June 12, 2012 engagement letter

Tucciarone offered to provide Jefferson with a comprehensive review of his tax returns

and other documents to demonstrate how his financial affairs were being managed.52 In

the email that accompanied that letter Tucciarone stated, “Once signed I will send

authorization that will allow me to contact Stratosphere and request documents. We

should get the management contract and see where we stand on relieving them of their

duties ASAP.”53

 Jefferson engaged Tucciarone’s services the following day.54

 

Jefferson testified that the more he learned from Tucciarone the more he

believed “there was wrongdoing.”55 But instead of filing a “lengthy” court case, Jefferson

testified that he decided to “kind of just move on.”56

 “I really didn’t believe that there was

money to be found or money to be turned over,” Jefferson testified. “So I just decided to

try and move on with my life and I pretty much let go of my entire team and just tried to

focus on the rest of my career and my future earnings.”57 On October 9, 2012 Jefferson

executed a document stating that he was revoking the durable general power of

attorney that he executed in favor of Eley and Kritza in 2011 any other powers of

attorney he granted in favor of Eley and Kritza.58 

51Doc. 128-3 at 176, 184; Doc. 161 at 8 ¶ 35.

52Doc. 128-3 at 184.

53

Id. at 182.

54Doc. 161 at 8 ¶ 39.

55Doc. 128-3 at 11:3-8.

56

Id.

57Doc. 161-5 at 26:17-21.

58Doc. 134 at 11 ¶ 42; Doc. 134-14 at 50; Doc. 161-1 at 74-75; Doc. 166 at 111 ¶ 42.

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F. Jefferson Allegedly Confronts Kritza, Contacts Alliance

Jefferson testified that he did not know that Kritza “was the individual that had

taken out this money and taken out loans and used my money to pay back certain

loans” until he got a permanent mailing address and started receiving documents from

Alliance Bank.59 Jefferson testified:

when Ted Kritza was no longer receiving my mail . . . I started receiving . .

. all of my statements from Alliance Bank, I found some discrepancies. I

first contacted Ted Kritza about them. Apparently he had a loan that was

taken out in my name, so I addressed that. He told me that he was paying

off this loan that I was not aware of. And so I want to say a month later I

received a document saying that I owed an amount of money, and I was

confused and so I called the bank myself.60

Former-Alliance employee Gina McRostie (“McRostie”) testified that Jefferson called her

to request information about his accounts in the fall of 2013.61 On October 11, 2013

McRostie emailed Jefferson bank statements related to the Alliance LOC.62 Her email

notes that “the line was continuous but had three different account numbers due to bank

changes in documentation.”63 By no later than October 15, 2013, Jefferson, through his

attorney Bryan Saalfeld (“Saalfeld”), had contacted the FBI about his Alliance account.64

G. The Forbearance Agreement

In a November 11, 2013 letter Saalfeld asked Alliance for “an immediate

forbearance on any payments owing and/or due on Alliance Bank of Arizona Loan

Account Number #602129169, unlawfully registered in [Jefferson’s] name c/o

59Doc. 161-5 at 27:12-16; Doc. 166-2 at 123:22-25.

60Doc. 166-2 at 24:4-14. See also id. at 123:22-125:14.

61Doc. 134 at 11 ¶ 45; Doc. 134-2 at 48 p.134:21-135:7.

62Doc. 134-3 at 2-104.

63

Id. at 2.

64Doc. 134-16 at 37.

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Stratosphere Mgt, LLC.”65 Saalfeld explained that such a forbearance was justified by

the Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into fraud perpetrated against

Jefferson “and the fact that Mr. Jefferson did not knowingly consent to the account, or

any of the amounts apparently owing and due on the account.”66

 Alliance responded by

proposing terms for a potential forbearance agreement67 and providing Saalfeld with

loan documents related to the LOC.68 Jefferson and Alliance executed the forbearance

agreement on December 20, 2013.69

 Under the terms of this agreement, Jefferson

acknowledged that he entered into the LOC, which matured on November 15, 2013,

and agreed to make a $50,000 principal reduction payment. Alliance agreed to “forbear

from the exercise of any of its rights and remedies . . . in connection with” the LOC’s

maturity until January 15, 2014.70 Jefferson’s failure to repay the LOC’s balance by this

January 2014 deadline is the operative default alleged in the one-count breach of

contract action that Alliance brought against Jefferson in state court.71

H. Procedural History

Jefferson removed the case to this court,72 filed his answer, and brought two

negligence counterclaims against Alliance. In his answer Jefferson admits that he is the

borrower listed on the paperwork for above-referenced loans but he claims that his

65Doc. 134-15 at 2

66

Id.

67Doc. 162-1 at 4-6.

68Doc. 134-15 at 5-79.

69Doc. 134-14 at 52-55.

70

Id. at 52-55.

71Doc. 1-3 at 4 ¶¶ 10-13. 

72Doc. 1.

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signature was forged.73 Jefferson’s first counterclaim alleges that Alliance was

negligent in failing “to implement and/or follow appropriate procedures to verify the

authenticity of the signatures on documents purporting to name Jefferson” as a

borrower.74

 His second counterclaim alleges that Alliance was negligent in supervising

and training its agents.75

Jefferson then filed a ten-claim third-party complaint against Kritza alleging: (1)

fraud/concealment; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) negligence; (4) breach of contract;

(5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) accounting; (8) conversion;

(9) contribution/indemnification; and (10) a declaratory judgment regarding

contribution/indemnification.76

 Jefferson later amended his third-party complaint to

name Kritza’s wife as an additional third-party defendant.77 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jefferson’s Rule 56(c)(2) Objections

Before discussing the merits of the parties’ motions, it is necessary to address

Jefferson’s Rule 56(c)(2) objections. Rule 56(c)(2) states that at summary judgment “[a]

party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented

in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” The advisory committee note states

that a Rule 56(c)(2) objection “functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the

pretrial setting. The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible

as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.”78 “If the case goes to

73Doc. 14.

74

Id. at 16-17 ¶ 13.

75

Id. at 18 ¶ 20.

76Doc. 16.

77Doc. 33.

78Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.

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trial, failure to challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage does not forfeit

the right to challenge admissibility at trial.”79

Jefferson has raised hundreds of Rule 56(c)(2) objections to the materials cited

in Alliance’s and Kritza’s statements of facts. For example, Alliance’s statement of facts

is 60 paragraphs long and Jefferson raises a bevy of mostly boilerplate objections to

each paragraph except the first. A majority of these objections are inappropriate in the

context of summary judgment. 

Jefferson’s objections that cited materials are irrelevant, vague, ambiguous, or

inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403 are all inappropriate because they duplicate the

summary judgment standard itself. Because the court “can award summary judgment

only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact,”80 it cannot rely on irrelevant,

vague, ambiguous, or otherwise insufficiently-probative evidence. “Similarly,

statements in declarations based on speculation or improper legal conclusions, or

argumentative statements, are not facts and likewise will not be considered on a motion

for summary judgment. Objections on any of these grounds are simply superfluous in

this context.”81 

A number of Jefferson’s objections argue that cited materials are

inadmissible—for example, because they contain testimony not made under oath—but

not that such materials cannot be presented in an admissible form at trial. These

objections are insufficient under Rule 56(c)(2) and are overruled. Further, the court

notes that Jefferson regularly objects to deposition testimony as not being made under

oath.82 These objections have no basis in fact, and are overruled. 

79

Id.

80Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

(emphasis in original).

81

Id. (emphasis in original).

82See, e.g., doc. 161 at 12 ¶ 5; doc. 166 at 54-55 ¶ 8. 

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The court has considered the remainder of Jefferson’s objections. Those that

merit discussion are mentioned below. 

B. Ratification

Ratification is a doctrine that arises in various contexts, and is generally defined

as “[c]onfirmation and acceptance of a previous act, thereby making the act valid from

the moment it was done.” 83 In the context of agency law, a person ratifies a prior act in

two ways: (1) by “manifesting assent that the act shall affect the person’s legal

relations;” or (2) by “conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption that the person so

consents.”84 One example of such conduct is knowingly accepting the benefit of a

transaction.85

 “This is so even though the person also manifests dissent to becoming

bound by the act’s legal consequences.”86

Alliance argues that even if Kritza forged the LOC documents, Jefferson explicitly

ratified them in the forbearance agreement, and implicitly through his conduct in

transferring the LOC’s proceeds into his personal bank account on multiple occasions87

and deducting the LOC’s interest on his tax return.88 Because Jefferson explicitly

83Ratification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also Restatement (Third) Of

Agency § 4.01 cmt. c (2006). 

84Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.01(2).

85Miller v. Boeger, 405 P.2d 573, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). See also Restatement

(Third) Of Agency § 4.01 cmt. g (“A person may ratify an act under subsection (2)(b) by

receiving or retaining benefits it generates if the person has knowledge of material facts and no

independent claim to the benefit.”) (citation omitted).

86Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.01 cmt. d.

87Alliance cites its own interrogatory response that identifies the destination of funds

transferred from the Alliance LOC between 2004 and 2013. Doc. 134-14 at 22-24. 

88Doc. 131 at 14. Alliance cites what it describes as Jefferson’s 2012 tax return, which

shows a $26,304 deduction for the Alliance LOC, doc. 134-14 at 16-17, and Jefferson’s

accountant’s deposition testimony regarding that return. Doc. 134-14 at 13:17-22.

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consented to be bound by the Alliance LOC under the forbearance agreement, there is

no need to consider implicit ratification.89

 

Jefferson raises four arguments in opposition. First, he argues that Alliance is

judicially estopped from raising ratification. Second, he argues that Kritza “went rogue”

and therefore lacked apparent authority to bind Jefferson to the LOC documents. Third,

he argues that forgeries cannot be ratified. And fourth, he argues that the alleged

ratification is ineffective because he lacked knowledge of all material facts regarding the

“true status” of the Alliance LOC. 

1. Judicial estoppel does not apply

The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial system by

preventing a party from changing its litigation positions.90 “[S]everal factors typically

inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case.”91 The most

relevant factor here is that courts have “restricted the application of judicial estoppel to

cases where the court relied on, or ‘accepted,’ the party’s previous inconsistent

position.”92

Jefferson argues that Alliance is judicially estopped from asserting the ratification

doctrine because that theory is at odds with the arguments Alliance “prevailed upon” in

89

Jefferson objects to the forbearance agreement on the ground that it has not been

authenticated and is not self-authenticating. Doc. 166 at 113. Because Jefferson does not

argue that Alliance cannot authenticate this document at trial, this objection is overruled. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

90Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Maricopa Cnty., 993 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1999) (quoting State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996)). See also New

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). Neither party addresses whether state or

federal law applies to Jefferson’s judicial estoppel argument. Because his argument fails under

both, there is no need for the court to reach this question.

91New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.

92Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001). See also

Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 993 P.2d at 1140 (holding that judicial estoppel does not

apply “unless (a) the court in that proceeding granted the party relief or accepted the party’s

earlier inconsistent position either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition, and

(b) the party’s inconsistent position was a significant factor in the relief granted.”).

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defeating Jefferson’s motion for a more definite statement at docket 5.93 Specifically,

Alliance argued in opposition to that motion that there was “nothing ambiguous or

confusing about Alliance’s less than five page Complaint which makes a very simple,

concise, and direct breach of contract claim against Jefferson.”94

The main issue before the court was whether Alliance’s complaint “is so vague or

ambiguous” that Jefferson could not reasonably prepare a response.95 The court

denied Jefferson’s motion, ruling that Alliance’s complaint asserts a straightforward

claim that is not vague or ambiguous.96 Whether Alliance loaned money to Jefferson

directly, or indirectly through Krtiza, was immaterial to the court’s decision. Judicial

estoppel does not apply.

2. Kritza’s apparent authority is irrelevant

Jefferson argues that Alliance cannot establish ratification because it has not

shown that Kritza acted with apparent authority. But Alliance need not show that Kritza

acted with apparent authority to establish ratification. In contrast to apparent authority,

which depends on the principal’s manifestations to the third party, ratification requires

only “an objectively or externally observable indication that a person consents that

another’s prior act shall affect the person’s legal relations.”97 “[T]he consent need not

be communicated to the third party or the agent. This is so because the focal point of

ratification is an observable indication that the principal has exercised choice and has

consented.”98

93Doc. 163 at 14.

94Doc. 11 at 2.

95Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

96Doc. 13. 

97Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.01 cmt. d.

98

Id.

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3. Forgeries can be ratified 

“At common law it was held by some, but not all, courts that a forgery . . . could

not be ratified.”99 One rationale behind this doctrine was that a forger is not an agent

because she “purports to act, not for someone else, but as someone else.”100

 Other

courts, such as the Pennsylvania courts that Jefferson cites, held that a forgery cannot

be ratified as a matter of public policy because forgery is a crime.101 The rule against

ratification of forgeries “was not uniformly supported by the cases,” however, “with some

cases holding ratification by a principal to be effective although it did not relieve the

forger of criminal liability.”102

“Most contemporary courts recognize that a forgery may be ratified because

pretending to be the principal is not so different from pretending to have authority to act

on behalf of the principal.”103 Consistent with this modern trend, the UCC provides that

“[a]n unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of” Article 3.104 Arizona

codified this rule at A.R.S. § 47-3403(A). “Although a forger is not an agent, ratification

99Restatement (Second) of Agency § 85 cmt. b (1958).

100Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.03 cmt. c.

101Doc. 163 at 16-17. See, e.g., Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. York Bank &

Trust Co., 69 F.3d 695, 702 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Pennsylvania does not permit ratification of a

forgery on a non-negotiable item.”); Funds for Bus. Growth, Inc. v. Woodland Marble & Tile Co.,

278 A.2d 922, 925 (Pa. 1971) (“It has long been an established principle in this Commonwealth

that a forgery may not be ratified since it is a crime the adjustment of which is forbidden by

public policy.”).

102Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.03 cmt. c. See, e.g., Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 500

P.2d 1401, 1405 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he ratification of an act of forgery by one held out to be a

principal creates an agency relationship between such person and the purported agent and

relieves the agent of civil liability to the principal which otherwise would result from the fact that

he acted independently and without authority.”); President, etc., of Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 86

Mass. 447, 455 (Mass. 1862).

103Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.03 reporter’s note c. See also Scott D. Erler,

D.D.S. Profit Sharing Plan v. Creative Fin. & Investments, L.L.C., 203 P.3d 744, 752 (Mont.

2009) (compiling cases).

104U.C.C. § 3-403(a) (2002).

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is governed by the rules and principles applicable to ratification of unauthorized acts of

an agent”105

 because a person’s retroactive adoption of a forger’s signature, like

ratification under agency law, “is a unilateral expression of a person’s consent.”106 

A.R.S. § 47-3403(A) does not control here because Alliance does not contend

that the forbearance agreement is a negotiable instrument. And no party cites on-point

authority from Arizona regarding the ratification of a forged nonnegotiable instrument. 

The only Arizona case that Jefferson cites is a case from 1898, Barry v. Kirkland,

involving an oral promise to pay a forged note that was made under the

misapprehension that their signatures on the note were authentic.107 The Supreme

Court of the Territory of Arizona considered numerous authorities from other

jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, which hold that a forgery cannot be ratified.108 But

Barry is unavailing to Jefferson because the court declined to adopt such a per se

rule109 and in any event was analyzing a negotiable instrument.110 Kritza cites Cook v.

Great Western Bank & Trust, but that case is similarly inapposite because it was

decided under Article 3 of the UCC.111

“When interpreting state law, federal courts are bound by decisions of the state’s

highest court.”112 If that court has not addressed the relevant issue, the district court

105U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3.

106Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.03 cmt. c.

107

52 P. 771, 771 (Ariz. 1898).

108

Id. at 772.

109

Id. at 773. 

110

Id. at 772-73 (citing 1 John W. Daniel, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments § 859 (1879);

2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments § 1352).

111

685 P.2d 145, 148-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting A.R.S. § 44–2541 (repealed)).

112Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.1996)

(quotation omitted).

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must use its best judgment to predict how the highest state court would resolve it “using

intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes,

treatises, and restatements as guidance.”113 Because the Arizona Supreme Court has

not decided whether a forged nonnegotiable instrument can be ratified, the court must

use its best judgment to predict how it would rule. Given the weight of modern

authority, the fact that the Arizona legislature has provided that forged negotiable

instruments can be ratified, and the absence of compelling reasons why Arizona law

should “treat contracts and negotiable instruments differently”114 in this context, the court

concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court would likely hold that forged nonnegotiable

instruments can be ratified, governed by the “rules and principles applicable to

ratification of unauthorized acts of an agent.”115 

4. Jefferson’s knowledge of material facts

“Ratification requires that a principal have full and actual knowledge of all

material facts at the time he, by subsequent act or conduct, binds himself to a

previously unauthorized act of an agent.”116 Jefferson argues that Alliance

misrepresented that the LOC was one line of credit when it was actually three separate

lines, and concealed the fact that the first two loans had already been paid off.117 As a

result, Jefferson argues that he did not know all of the material facts when he signed the

agreement.

113

Id. (quotation omitted). See also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos.,

Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).

114

Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am. v. Estate of Corrado, 838 N.W.2d 640, 647 (Iowa 2013).

115U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3. See also Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.03 cmt. c; Estate

of Corrado, 838 N.W.2d at 647.

116Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 

See also Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.06 (“A person is not bound by a ratification made

without knowledge of material facts involved in the original act when the person was unaware of

such lack of knowledge.”).

117Doc. 163 at 16-17.

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A fact is material if “a reasonable person ‘would attach importance to its

existence or nonexistence in determining [his or her] choice of action in the transaction

in question.’”118 In the context of ratification, materiality is concerned with “the relevance

of the fact to the principal’s consent to have legal relations affected by the agent’s

act.”119 Thus, a fact is material here if a reasonable person in Jefferson’s position would

have attached importance to its existence or nonexistence when determining whether to

sign the forbearance agreement. “Materiality is generally a question of fact, but may be

resolved as a matter of law where the information is so obviously important or

unimportant . . . that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of

immateriality.”120

The court agrees with Kritza121 that no reasonable juror could find that the facts of

which Jefferson was allegedly unaware would have influenced a reasonable person’s

decision to consent to be bound by the LOC. Jefferson testified that he believed that

the LOC he authorized in 2004 was paid off in 2004 or 2005 and that he did not

authorize any subsequent disbursements from that LOC.122 Before he signed the

forbearance agreement, Jefferson was provided with documents that show that the

original LOC was extended and that two other loan commitments with different loan

numbers were taken out in his name. Jefferson possessed full and actual knowledge of

all material facts at the time he bound himself to the debt that Kritza allegedly incurred.

Jefferson’s professed misunderstanding that the debt was based on the original

LOC instead of a new LOC does not change the court’s analysis. Regardless whether

118Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 311 P.3d 237, 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1977)).

119Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.06 cmt. c.

120Caruthers v. Underhill, 287 P.3d 807, 818 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).

121Doc. 188 at 6.

122Doc. 134-1 at 18, 25-26. 

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the debt was based on unauthorized disbursements from the original LOC that was

extended without authorization, or a new LOC that was obtained without authorization,

the salient fact that Jefferson cannot avoid is that he knew he did not authorize Kritza to

incur the debt.123

 Yet, he nevertheless affirmed his obligation to repay that debt, and

Alliance granted him an extension of time to do so.124 Whether the debt was based on

one continuous line of credit or a series of lines of credit was immaterial.125

C. The Effect of Ratification on Jefferson’s Third-Party Complaint

“Ratification recasts the legal relations between the principal and agent as they

would have been had the agent acted with actual authority.”126 “The principal thereby

consents to the agent’s acts, including acts that would otherwise constitute breaches of

fiduciary duty.”127 Kritza asserts that Jefferson ratified not only the LOC, but also “any

alleged misconduct by Kritza related to the line of credit.”128 Jefferson’s opposition does

not discuss how ratification would affect his third-party claims. At oral argument

Jefferson’s counsel cited Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bondwriter Sw., Inc.,

129

 and

123See, e.g., Doc. 160 at 17 (Jefferson admits that in October 2013, before he signed the

forbearance agreement, he learned that Kritza was unlawfully using the LOC funds).

124Doc. 134-14 at 53.

125This conclusion also disposes of Jefferson’s argument that the forbearance

agreement is voidable because of Alliance’s failure to disclose the “true status” of the debt. 

Doc. 163 at 17. Although ratification is not effective if it is induced by conduct that would make

a contract voidable, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.02 cmt. c, “a non-fraudulent

misrepresentation does not make [a] contract voidable unless it is material.” Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 164 cmt. b (1981).

126Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bondwriter Sw., Inc., 263 P.3d 633, 639 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2011) (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.02 cmt. b).

127Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 4.02 cmt. c. 

128Doc. 132 at 4.

129

263 P.3d 633, 639 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“Ratification is not effective in favor of an

agent against a principal when ‘the principal is obliged to affirm in order to protect his own

interests,’ or when the principal ratifies to avoid a loss.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Agency § 101(b); citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.02(2)(b)).

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argued for the first time that ratification is ineffective in favor of Kritza because Jefferson

signed the forbearance agreement to protect his own interests. Jefferson waived this

argument by not raising it in his opposition.130

The court agrees with Kritza that Jefferson’s ratification of the LOC bound him to

the terms of the allegedly forged LOC documents as if he had signed them himself. 

Accordingly, Jefferson’s claims for fraud/concealment (count one),131 negligence (count

three),132

 negligent misrepresentation (count five),133

 contribution/indemnification (count

nine),134 and declaratory judgment (count ten)135 all fail because each requires Jefferson

to show that Kritza is at fault for approving, extending, or amending the LOC. Judgment

will be entered in Kritza’s favor on these claims, and Jefferson’s motion for partial

summary judgment will be denied.136 

130Doc. 164; Doc. 165 at 10-17. See also Doc. 97; Doc. 99; Doc. 163 at 9-13, 16-17;

Doc. 166 at 28-37; Johnson v. Gruma Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (arguments

raised for first time at oral argument are waived).

131Doc. 33 at 5 ¶ 18 (“Between 2004 and 2013, T. Kritza intentionally failed to disclose

an important fact to Jefferson, that he was fraudulently amending and extending the purported

LOC with Alliance.”) (emphasis added).

132

Id. at 6 ¶ 31 (“T. Kritza breached his duty by failing to implement and/or follow

appropriate procedures to manage Jefferson’s business accounts and ventures, specifically as

it relates to verifying Jefferson’s approval of the purported Alliance Line of Credit.”) (emphasis

added).

133

Id. at 8 ¶ 40 (“In his role as Jefferson’s business manager between 2001 through

2013, T. Kritza negligently gathered, compiled, and communicated information regarding the

purported Line of Credit agreements to Jefferson.); id. at ¶ 45 (“If T. Kritza disclosed his true

activities to Jefferson, Jefferson would not have approved of the Line of Credit.”) (emphasis

added).

134

Id. at 10 ¶ 60 (alleging that if Jefferson is found liable to Alliance for the LOC, he

“would be obligated to pay sums representing a percentage of liability not Jefferson’s own, but

rather that of T. Kritza and the community of T. Kritza and M. Kirtza.”). 

135

Id. at 10-11 ¶ 63 (“Jefferson desires adjudication determination [sic] of the respective

rights and duties of Jefferson and T. Kritza and the community of T. Kritza and M. Kritza with

respect to the damages claimed in the Action against Jefferson.”) (emphasis added).

136Doc. 129. 

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But Kritza goes too far in arguing that Jefferson ratified all of Kritza’s unspecified

“misconduct” related to the LOC. Jefferson’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty (count

two),137 breach of contract (count four),138 unjust enrichment (count six),139 accounting

(count seven),140

 and conversion (count eight)141

 each allege acts of “misconduct” that

Jefferson did not ratify by affirming the LOC. Jefferson’s unjust enrichment and

accounting claims do not depend on the validity of the LOC, nor do Jefferson’s breach

of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, or conversion claims to the extent those claims are

based on Kritza use of or control over the LOC funds. Kritza’s motion for summary

judgment at docket 132 will be denied as to counts six and seven, and granted in part

and denied in part as to counts two, four, and eight. 

D. Whether Jefferson’s Entire Third-Party Complaint Fails Because His Rule

14 Claims Fail

Kritza argues that if Jefferson’s two Rule 14 claims (counts nine and ten) are not

viable then “the entire third-party complaint cannot move forward.”142

 He relies on cases

where courts have dismissed third-party complaints in their entireties because the thirdparty plaintiffs failed to successfully implead the third-party defendants under Rule

137Doc. 33 at 6 ¶ 26 (“T. Kritza violated and breached his fiduciary duties . . . through his

unauthorized use unauthorized use, extension and amendment of the alleged Line of Credit

without Jefferson’s knowledge.”) (emphasis added).

138

Id. at 7 ¶ 35 (“T. Kritza breached his obligations under the contract, including but not

limited to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by, among other things, forging

Jefferson’s signature on certain various documents and misappropriating monies through the

purported Alliance LOC.”) (emphasis added).

139

Id. at 8 ¶ 47 (“. . . T. Kritza obtained possession and control of the LOC fund to

the exclusion of Jefferson; T. Kritza defrauded and tortiously misrepresented Jefferson in order

to unlawfully obtain dominion and control of Jefferson’s LOC funds.”) (emphasis added).

140

Id. at 9 ¶¶ 50-52 (requesting an accounting and return “of all funds taken by T.

Kritza.”).

141

Id. at 9 ¶ 55 (“. . . T. Kritza’s control or possession of the LOC Fund is not lawful.”).

142Doc. 132 at 2. 

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14(a).143 These cases are inapposite because the court has already ruled, at docket

183, that Jefferson successfully impleaded Kritza under Rule 14(a).144

 Kritza cites no

authority for the proposition that a court must dismiss a third-party plaintiff’s additional

claims that were joined under Rule 18(a) once his Rule 14(a) claims are resolved. The

court sees no basis for so holding here. For example, Kritza does not contend that this

court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over Jefferson’s remaining claims.145

E. Whether Jefferson’s Tort Claims Are Timely

Kritza’s motion at docket 127 seeks partial summary judgment on several of

Jefferson’s claims, including his remaining breach of fiduciary duty and conversion

claims. Kritza argues that these claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year

statute of limitations146 because they accrued before June 12, 2012.147 In response,

Jefferson argues that whether his tort claims are time barred is at most a disputed

question of material fact under Arizona’s “discovery rule.” The court agrees with

Jefferson. 

143Stewart v. Am. Int’l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.

One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 450 SEL, VIN 11603302064538, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983); 

TRC & Associates v. NuScience Corp., No. 2:13-CV-6903-ODW CWX, 2014 WL 211781, at *3-

4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014); Smith v. Cardinal Logistics Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-2104 SC, 2008 WL

2345129, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008).

144Doc. 183 at 20-21.

145

Jefferson’s remaining claims are independently supported by this court’s diversity

jurisdiction.

146A.R.S. § 12-542 (setting out two year statute of limitations for tort claims). See CDT,

Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 7 P.3d 979, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (applying

A.R.S. § 12-542 to breach of fiduciary duty claim); Jackson v. Am. Credit Bureau, Inc., 531 P.2d

932, 934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (applying A.R.S. § 12-542 to conversion claim).

147Doc. 16 (Jefferson filed his third-party complaint against Kritza on June 12, 2014).

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Arizona law’s discovery rule applies where “the plaintiff’s injury or the conduct

causing the injury is difficult for plaintiff to detect.”148

 “The rationale offered for the

discovery rule ‘is that it is unjust to deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action before the

plaintiff has a reasonable basis for believing that a claim exists.’”149

 The plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing that the discovery rule applies.150 “When discovery occurs

and a cause of action accrues are usually and necessarily questions of fact for the

jury.”151

 

Under the discovery rule, a cause of action “does not accrue until the plaintiff

knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the

cause.”152

 Thus, a cause of action accrues if the plaintiff knows (1) that a wrong

occurred and caused injury (the “what”) and (2) the person or entity at fault (the

“who”).153 Even where the plaintiff lacks actual knowledge of the “what” or “who,”

however, she is “charged with a duty to investigate with due diligence to discover the

necessary facts.”154 

Under this duty to investigate, accrual occurs when the plaintiff has “reason to

connect the ‘what’ to a particular ‘who’ in such a way that a reasonable person would be

148Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 898 P.2d 964, 968 (Ariz.

1995).

149Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (Ariz. 1998) (quoting Gust, 898 P.2d at 967).

150

Logerquist v. Danforth, 932 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).

151Doe, 955 P.2d at 961.

152Gust, 898 P.2d at 966.

153Doe, 955 P.2d at 961 (“[C]ause of action accrues when plaintiff discovers injury is

attributable to particular person’s conduct; plaintiff must know both the what and who

elements.”) (citing Lawhon v. L.B.J. Institutional Supply, Inc., 765 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1988)). 

154

Id. at 962.

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on notice to investigate whether the injury might result from fault.”155 For example, even

if a patient knows that a medical procedure caused him pain, his malpractice cause of

action does not accrue until he receives sufficient information that would cause a

reasonable person to “commence investigating whether negligence was involved.”156

 In

this context, “summary judgment is warranted only if the failure to go forward and

investigate is not reasonably justified.”157

“To determine when a cause of action accrues, an analysis of the elements of

[the cause of action] is necessary.”158 For present purposes the relevant element of

Jefferson’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is breach—whether Kritza breached his

fiduciary duties to Jefferson through his unauthorized use of the LOC funds. The

relevant element of Jefferson’s conversion claim is whether Kritza’s “control or

possession” of the LOC funds was unlawful.159 

Kritza does not argue that Jefferson had actual knowledge of his use, control, or

possession of the LOC funds before June 12, 2012. Instead, he argues that Jefferson’s

claims accrued when he was put on “notice to investigate”160 by (1) the book of financial

information that Jefferson allegedly received in 2008 and (2) the series of events that

caused Jefferson to question his finances in 2011 and 2012. 

155Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 996 (Ariz. 2002).

156

Id. at 995.

157

Id. at 996.

158Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).

159See Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“Conversion is

defined as ‘an act of wrongful dominion or control over personal property in denial of or

inconsistent with the rights of another.’”) (quoting Sears Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Thunderbird

Prods., 802 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)).

160Doc. 127 at 14.

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1. The 2007 Fiscal Year in Review Book

Jefferson testified that Kritza provided him with financial documents every two to

three years that purportedly summarized all of his accounts.161 Kritza states in his

declaration that in the summer of 2008 he brought a “year-end financial book titled

‘2007 Fiscal Year in Review’ to Richard Jefferson at Jefferson’s house in California”

(“2007 book”).162 Kritza states that exhibit 1 to his statement of facts is an accurate

copy of the 2007 book.163

 Twelve pages of this 133 page book contain monthly loan

billing statements from Loan 4825.164 Among other things, these statements show that

on December 21, 2006 the loan had a principal balance of $451,300 and a maturity date

of October 5, 2007;165

 interest only payments were made every month, totaling

$41,176.48; in April, June, and July there were three principal advances, totaling

$47,000, bringing the principal balance to $498,300;166 and by September 20 the loan’s

maturity date had been extended to August 5, 2008.167

The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Jefferson’s receipt of the 2007

book triggered his duty to investigate Kritza’s use of the LOC. At least two issues of

material fact prevent such a conclusion. First, there is conflicting evidence regarding

whether Jefferson received this book. At his deposition Jefferson said that he thought

he had seen the 2007 book before, but he remembered only the picture on the front and

161Doc. 128-2 at 157; Doc. 161 at 7 ¶ 27; Doc. 134-1 at 19:8-19.

162Doc. 128 at 2 ¶ 4; Doc. 128-2 at 138 ¶ 3.

163Doc. 128-2 at 138 ¶ 4. See also Kritza’s Exhibit 1, doc. 128-1 at 3-136. 

164Doc. 128-1 at 167; Doc. 128-2 at 1-11.

165Doc. 128-1 at 167.

166Doc. 128-2 at 4-6.

167

Id. at 11.

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nothing else.168 He testified that he did not recall exactly when he saw the book with

that picture, but he stated that it was probably around 2007.169

 He also testified that he

could not recall whether the book he received from Kritza was the 2007 book or another

similar book.170

Second, even assuming that Jefferson had received this book, there is no

evidence that Jefferson actually saw the twelve pages that contain the Loan 4825

statements. And it cannot be said as a matter of law that a reasonable person in

Jefferson’s situation would have read and analyzed this relatively small segment of a

133-page book. 

2. The series of events that began in 2011

Kritza next focuses on the series of events that occurred between 2011 and “mid2012” that, according to Kritza, combined to put Jefferson on notice to investigate his

use of the LOC funds.171 According to the evidence put forth by Kritza, during this time:

∙ Jefferson learned that his finances were being affected by loans of which

he was unaware.172

∙ Jefferson learned that Kritza had ceased sending his discretionary income

to his financial advisor for investment.173

∙ Jefferson was confused about why Kritza was “stressed” about his

finances during the 2011 NBA lockout, which led him to have Murnick

review his Charles Schwab investment account.174 

168Doc. 128-3 at 2:1-15.

169

Id. at 2:16-19.

170

Id. at 2:17-25, 3:1-5.

171Doc. 127 at 13.

172Doc. 128-2 at 165:2-11.

173

Id. at 168:25-169:7.

174Doc. 128-2 at 160:19-161:1.

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∙ Jefferson told Murnick that he was worried that Kritza may have taken

money from him.175

∙ Murnick told Jefferson that he had some “concerns” with Jefferson’s

investment account.176

∙ Jefferson realized that his investment account contained between $5 and

$10 million less than he expected.177

∙ Jefferson told Kritza on February 8, 2012 that he was concerned about

how little was in his investment account.178

∙ Jefferson opened a Wells Fargo account that only he could access that he

started depositing his paychecks into.179

∙ Jefferson hired Tucciarone, who reviewed Jefferson’s tax returns and

investment documents180 and concluded that they “raised questions as to

the financial controls and benefits of many of [Jefferson’s] investments.”181

This evidence establishes that before June 12, 2012 Jefferson had reason to

believe that his money was being mismanaged or misappropriated by one of his

advisors, including Kritza. And if Jefferson had contacted Alliance to inquire into the

LOC, there is a reasonable chance he would have discovered Kritza’s use, control, or

possession of the LOC funds. The question here, however, is whether as a matter of

law Jefferson was on notice to commence such an investigation. According to

Jefferson, he was not even aware that he had an open LOC with Alliance. While it is

possible that the jury may interpret this lack of awareness as a lack of diligence, the

court cannot conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable person in Jefferson’s

position would have had reason to connect his financial problems to the Alliance LOC. 

175Doc. 128-3 at 54:9-12. See also id. at 58:11-22.

176

Id. at 41:13-19.

177Doc. 128-2 at 170:5-19.

178Doc. 128-3 at 100-01.

179Doc. 128-2 at 179:25-180:7.

180Doc. 128-3 at 187-201.

181

Id. at 176, 184; Doc. 161 at 8 ¶ 35.

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3. Jefferson’s supplemental disclosure statement

In reply Kritza asserts that Jefferson’s supplemental disclosure statement shows

that he is seeking $9.7 million in damages for Kritza’s alleged misuse of not only the

Alliance LOC funds, but also funds from Jefferson’s personal bank accounts.182

 Kritza

argues that Jefferson’s claims are untimely because Jefferson knew or should have

known he was missing millions of dollars, and that Kritza might have been involved. 

Kritza’s argument mises the mark. Whether Jefferson knew or should have

known that Kritza was misappropriating millions of dollars from his personal bank

accounts is not at issue in this case. Regardless of what Jefferson states in his

supplemental disclosure statement, his complaint is what controls. His complaint

alleges that Kritza breached his fiduciary duties “through his unauthorized use . . . of the

alleged Line of Credit without Jefferson’s knowledge.”183 And it alleges that Kritza is

liable for conversion because of his unlawful “control or possession of the LOC Fund.”184

Jefferson’s complaint does not allege that Kritza misappropriated any other funds.185

Jefferson cannot recover damages for claims not alleged in his complaint.

F. Jefferson’s Rule 56(d) Request

At docket 162 Jefferson filed a declaration from Saalfeld that requests dismissal

of Alliance’s summary judgment motion pending Kritza’s production of the documents

he was ordered to produce at docket 217. Specifically, Saalfeld states that he is

182Doc. 212 at 2-3.

183Doc. 33 at 6 ¶ 26 (emphasis added).

184

Id. at 9 ¶ 55 (emphasis added). 

185See id. at 4 ¶ 11 (“T. Kritza admitted to Jefferson that he had used LOC funds without

Jefferson’s consent or authorization in an amount exceeding $500,000.”); id. ¶ 12 (“Jefferson

did not consent to T. Kritza’s personal use of these amounts owing on the LOC.”); id. ¶ 13 (“[A]t

no point did Jefferson provide his consent as it relates to T. Kritza’s personal and unauthorized

use of monies relating to the LOC as alleged by Alliance.”); id. at 4-5 ¶ 14 (“During the years

2004 to 2013, T. Kritza concealed from Jefferson that he had unlawfully used . . . the LOC

funds. In doing so, T. Kritza misappropriated the LOC funds for his own personal use and

unauthorized us [sic] use, to which Jefferson has no involvement or ownership interest.”).

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awaiting production of documents relating “to the amounts received by Kritza and his

entities, including bank account records detailing transfer [sic] of such amounts from

Jefferson’s accounts into Kritza Entities.”186 Saalfeld states that he believes these

documents will raise additional issues of material fact regarding “Kritza’s concealment of

unauthorized transfers from Jefferson’s accounts, including the Alliance lines of credit,

and [Alliance’s] potential knowledge thereof.”187 

The party moving under Rule 56(d) bears the burden of showing “(1) it has set

forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the

facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary

judgment.”188

 “Failure to comply with these requirements is a proper ground for denying

discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.”189 

Although Saalfeld sets forth the facts he hopes to elicit from discovery and his

basis for believing that these facts exist, he fails to offer any explanation of how facts

regarding Kritza’s transfers from Jefferson’s accounts are essential, or even relevant, to

Jefferson’s opposition to Alliance’s summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Jefferson’s

request is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Kritza’s motion at docket 127 is DENIED. 

Jefferson’s motion at docket 129 is DENIED. Alliance’s motion at docket 131 is

GRANTED. Kritza’s motion at docket 132 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART as follows: Kritza is GRANTED summary judgment on counts one, three, five,

186Doc. 162 at 4-5.

187

Id. at 5.

188Family Home and Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage, 525 F.3d

822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing former subdivision (f), the substance of which was moved

to subdivision (d) in 2010). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010

amendments.

189Family Home and Finance Center, 525 F.3d at 827 (citation omitted).

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nine, and ten; Kritza is GRANTED summary judgment on counts two, four, and eight to

the extent those claims seek damages based on the approval, extension, or

amendment of the Alliance LOC; and in all other respects the motion at docket 132 is

DENIED. Jefferson’s request for Rule 56(d) relief at docket 162 is DENIED. 

DATED this 13th day of November 2015.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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