Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-00641/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-00641-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

03cv641

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLIOT V. BRANDY, Civil No. 03CV641-BEN (BLM)

Petitioner, ORDER ADOPTING

REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION.

Petitioner Elliot V. Brandy (“Brandy” or “Petitioner”) commenced these habeas corpus

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in the

state courts, Brandy, through his attorney, has now filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

(“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for petty

theft with a prior conviction on federal constitutional grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“[A] district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . .”). 

Specifically, Brandy has two claims: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to appoint

counsel to investigate his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or writ to set aside his guilty plea; 

(2) his sentence of twenty-five years to life for petty theft with a prior violates the Eighth

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 03cv641

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. After the matter was fully briefed,

it was referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major for Report and Recommendation

(“Report”). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Judge Major issued a thoughtful and thorough Report, finding

Brandy’s claims lacked merit and recommending that the Petition be denied. 

Brandy only objects in part to Judge Major’s findings and does not object Judge Major’s

denial of his Eighth Amendment claim. Respondent Lamarque does not object to the findings in the

Report. The Court has made a de novo review of the Report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Having

done so, the Court ADOPTS the Report in full. As Judge Major found, Brandy has failed to show

that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Accordingly, Brandy is not entitled to habeas relief, and his Petition is

DENIED. 

II.

FACTS.

The facts are detailed in Judge Major’s Report. Brandy only objects in part to Judge Major’s

findings of fact. “The [C]ourt may . . . assume the correctness of that portion of the proposed

findings of fact to which no objection has been made . . . .” Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282,

1297 (E.D. Cal. 1995); see also U.S. v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989) (“If neither party

contests the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and

decide the motion on the applicable law.”). Moreover, in reciting the facts, Judge Major relied on

the state appellate court’s opinion. Absent clear and convincing contrary evidence, these factual

determinations are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“[A] determination of a factual

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”); see also Williams v. Rhoades, 354

F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We presume that state courts’ . . . factual findings are correct in

the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524 -

25 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he state court’s findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness on

federal habeas corpus review. This rule applies to the factual findings of both state trial and

appellate courts.”). 

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 03cv641

Brandy argues that the Report contains six factual discrepancies. First, Brandy objects to the

following statement in the Report: “Petitioner also fails to state a prima facie case by claiming in his

declaration that he did not believe he would get a ‘Three Strikes’ sentence and that he ‘felt deceived’

by the sentence.” See Doc. No. 35. Brandy suggests that “[t]his allegation . . . does not derive from

‘Petitioner’s declaration.’” However, the Court finds that the Report clearly and accurately relied on

Brandy’s declaration dated June 17, 2004, which was signed by Brandy himself. See Doc. No. 35. 

In this declaration, Petitioner does, in fact, state that he did not believe he would get a “three strikes”

sentence, and that he “felt deceived.” See id.

Second, Brandy challenges the Report’s conclusion that his actions suggest that he “simply

views withdrawing the plea as the next procedural step each time he receives an undesirable

sentence.” Brandy claims this conclusion is inaccurate because “at the time Mr. Brandy made the

request he had not been sentenced on cocaine possession charge.” Brandy’s objection misses the

mark, however. In his declaration, Brandy clearly acknowledged that, “after sentencing [he]

contacted the court clerk to explain that [he] wanted to withdraw [his] plea.” See Doc. No. 35. 

Furthermore, in making this statement, Judge Major apparently relied on the conclusion of the Court

of Appeal’s decision, which noted that Brandy’s efforts to withdraw his guilty plea simply show that

he was “unhappy with his sentence.” See Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) at 33 n.8. This

Court must presume correct a “determination of a factual issue made by a State court.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Third, Brandy challenges the Report’s conclusion that he “misrepresent[ed] the sequence of

events” in his Second Supplemental Brief “by suggesting that he had the simultaneous choice

between pleading guilty to petty theft with a prior and taking a nineteen year sentencing deal that

involved pleading guilty to robbery.” According to Brandy, he “made no such misrepresentation”

because he did have this choice. To support this contention, Brandy relies on his former attorney’s

statement that there was a possibility the judge could consider reinstating the nineteen-year deal, if

requested to do so. However, the Court’s independent review of Petitioner’s Second Supplemental

Brief reveals that he did, in fact, attempt to represent to the Court that he had a simultaneous choice

between these two deals. In reality, the government offered Brandy to plead guilty to petty theft at a

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 03cv641

later date – after he had already rejected the prior offer. There is also no evidence in the record

suggesting that Brandy requested that any previous offers be reopened. 

Fourth, Brandy maintains that the Report’s statement that he “had not shied away from

addressing the court” is erroneous. R&R at 22 n.4. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Report’s

conclusion on this collateral issue based on the evidence that the trial court (1) was clearly aware of

Brandy’s intellectual abilities; (2) gave Brandy numerous opportunities to address the court; and (3)

took adequate steps to ensure Brandy’s understanding and active participation in the proceedings.

Fifth, Brandy challenges the Report’s conclusion that he failed to establish that he sought

new counsel due to a conflict with his attorney. See R&R at 25. After reviewing the record,

however, the Court agrees with the Report’s finding. Brandy failed to offer any evidence from the

record to contravene this finding. Although he relies on his former attorney’s statement to the trial

court that the attorney’s “objective handling of the case will be at issue,” this statement does not

support Brandy’s contention. At best, it informed the court that Brandy was dissatisfied with his

former attorney. It was insufficient, however, to put the trial court on notice regarding a conflict or

to demonstrate that there was a conflict of interest.

Finally, Brandy claims that the Report erroneously concluded that “it does not appear from

the face of the motion that Petitioner himself ever sought to replace counsel.” To support his claim,

Brandy relies on the following language in the motion presented to the trial court: “COMES NOW

Defendant Elliot V. Brandy and respectfully requests that this court appoint counsel[.]” Brandy

apparently perceives this standard language in the motion as inconsistent with the Report’s

conclusion that he himself sought to replace counsel. In fact, the Report unambiguously cites to the

paragraph in the motion indicating that the motion was prepared at the initiative of Brandy’s former

attorney, after Brandy asked the attorney “to get this plea back.” See R&R at 21, n.3.

In sum, Brandy offers no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to rebut these

factual findings in the Report. Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Major’s recitation of the facts in

full and refers to them to the extent necessary to analyze Brandy’s claims and objections. 

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 03cv641

III.

BRANDY IS NOT ENTITLED TO HABEAS RELIEF.

A. Standard of Review.

The Court’s role in reviewing Judge Major’s Report is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Under this statute, the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . .

to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” Id.; Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13

(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The

statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise. Neither the Constitution nor the

statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties

themselves accept as correct.”).

Further, “[i]n 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA). In that Act, Congress placed a new restriction on the power of federal courts to grant

writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000). “AEDPA

imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d

1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “The highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings reflects a respect for state courts as part of a co-equal judiciary and as competent

interpreters of federal law.” Turney v. Pugh, 400 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the

AEDPA, the Court may grant habeas relief if, and only if, the last reasoned state court decision on

the contested issue “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)); see also Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000).

 Habeas relief may also be granted if the state court’s ruling “resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, “[t]o obtain federal habeas relief, [a

petitioner] must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1).” Williams

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

In support of his Petition, Brandy relies on a Declaration signed on June 17, 2004 and

purportedly filed with the state court at that time. See Doc. No. 35, Ex. A. Notably, the record does not

reflect that Brandy ever filed this Declaration with the state court, and Brandy was unable to provide

evidence to the contrary.

6 03cv641

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 403. As noted above, Brandy does not provide any clear and contrary

evidence showing that the state court’s determination of facts was unreasonable. See Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (For purposes of Section 2254(d)(2), “we presume the [state]

court’s factual findings to be sound unless [petitioner] rebuts the ‘presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.’”). Thus, only subsection (d)(1) of Section 2254 is at issue.1 

Turning to that subsection, a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

precedent or existing federal law if it is “‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’

or ‘mutually opposed’” to the Supreme Court’s precedent. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405. “The text of §

2254(d)(1) therefore suggests that the state court’s decision must be substantially different from the

relevant precedent of the [Supreme] Court.” Id. “A state-court decision will also be contrary to th[e]

Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from [that] precedent.” Id. at 406. 

“By contrast, the mere failure to identify expressly the correct legal standard does not render

the state court’s decision ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court so long as the state court’s reasoning and result are not ‘contrary to’ that precedent.” Fowler

v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (The state court’s decision “does not even require awareness of our cases, so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”) (emphasis

in original). 

“A state court’s decision can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either:

1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is

objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a

new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 03cv641

(9th Cir. 2002). In that regard, the state court’s decision must be “something more than merely

incorrect.” Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dept., 421 F.3d at 1035. “The state court’s

application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 75(2003). “[T]he range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the

relevant rule . . . . The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in

case by case determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). Significantly, “a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411.

“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ . . . is the governing legal principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

“The statutory language plainly restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“When applying this standard, [the Court] review[s] the last reasoned decision by a state

court.” Plumlee v. Sue del Papa, 426 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Williams v. Rhoades,

354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). That decision here was the Court of Appeal’s decision. The

Court must “presume that state courts know and follow the law.” Rhoades, 354 F.3d at 1106. 

“Finally, even if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, habeas relief may still be denied absent a showing of prejudice.” 

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). “There are two forms of prejudice. Only a

small group of ‘structural errors’ are deemed so harmful that they warrant per se relief. The

overwhelming majority of trial errors are non-structural and do not trigger habeas relief unless the

error resulted in ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’, or

unless the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about the harmlessness of the error.” Id. In other words, a

“determination that [a petitioner’s] constitutional rights were violated does not end the inquiry.” 

Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001). “Thus, in determining whether this violation of

[a petitioner’s] constitutional rights entitles him to habeas relief, [the Court] must ask ‘whether the

error had a substantial and injurious effect’ on the outcome of the trial.” Id. “Under this standard of

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 03cv641

review, [the Court] may not grant habeas relief unless [the petitioner] can establish that, as a result of

the state trial court’s error, he suffered ‘actual prejudice’; i.e., that as a result of the error, the

outcome of the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair.” Id. Against this backdrop, the Court finds

that Brandy is not entitled to habeas relief. 

B. The State Court’s Decision Was Neither Contrary to, Nor an Unreasonable

Application of, Existing Federal Law.

First, Brandy alleges that the Report erred by failing to apply the “appropriate inquiry”

standard to the trial court’s handling of his motion to substitute counsel. The Court finds, however,

that Judge Major applied the correct legal standard to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Specifically, the governing case law, on which the Report properly relied, applied the “adequate

steps” analysis to the substitution of counsel issue. See R&R at 22 (citing Campbell v. Rice, 408

F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978)). Notably, “the

statutory language [of § 2254] plainly restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme

Court’s jurisprudence.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, “the

mere failure to identify expressly the correct legal standard does not render the . . . decision ‘contrary

to’ clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court so long as the . . . court’s

reasoning and result are not ‘contrary to’ that precedent.” Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Finally, even if – as Brandy claims – the

“appropriate inquiry” standard articulated in Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000),

governs this case, the result remains the same. The state court “had a duty to inquire into the

problems with counsel when they were first raised.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1211 (2008).

Even under the Schell standard, the Court finds that the trial court made an appropriate inquiry into

the substitution of counsel issue. 

Second, Brandy alleges that he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his conflict claim. He

relies on the Schell decision to support this argument. However, as the Report correctly notes, the

Court does not have an obligation to initiate an inquiry into the conflict issue unless “the defendant

asserts directly or by implication that his counsel’s performance has been so inadequate as to deny

him the constitutional right to effective counsel.” R&R at 19 (citing People v. Molina, 74 Cal. Appl.

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 03cv641

3d 544, 549 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1977)). Furthermore, the Schell decision is not controlling here

because, among other reasons, the petitioner’s attorney in that case had clearly informed the court

about the conflict. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1021. Meanwhile, neither Brandy nor his attorney had

adequately informed the trial court about the alleged conflict. The Court, therefore, agrees with the

Report’s conclusion that “[n]either Petitioner nor his attorney identified any specific conflicts or

inadequacies in counsel’s representation.” R&R at 20. “Unless the trial court knows or reasonably

should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.” Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).

Finally, Brandy argues that the Report failed to apply Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1050

(9th Cir. 2003), to the case at hand. As the Report correctly notes, however, the instant case is

different from Nunes. See R&R at 37. Stated simply, taken at face value, Brandy’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 

Unlike in Nunes, there is no “evidence in the record before the state court to support [the

petitioner’s] assertions” regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in this case. Id. at 1054. Brandy

simply failed to “demonstrate that he had sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude

with ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have accepted the plea offer, a probability ‘sufficient to

undermine the result.’” Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 

Although Brandy now claims that there was “other evidence” in the record to support his

contention, Brandy did not even mention this issue to the trial court when he was addressing the

court after learning about his twenty-five-year-to-life sentence. Furthermore, the mere fact that

Brandy sought to withdraw his guilty plea does not indicate that he was deceived by his attorney into

pleading guilty. On the contrary, as the Report concludes, Brandy’s attempt to withdraw his plea

simply suggests that he was unhappy with the sentence he received. Likewise, Brandy’s contention

that he “quickly responded to his sentence” misstates the facts. In fact, Brandy did not immediately

notify the court about the alleged “deception” by his attorney. Rather, he did so nine days after the

court had imposed its sentence. See R&R at 9. Finally, Brandy’s former attorney’s request that a

new attorney be appointed does not suggest that Brandy was deceived into pleading guilty. Rather,

the attorney did what any prudent attorney would do after learning that his client was unhappy with

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 03cv641

his representation – he tried to help the client obtain new representation. In conclusion, there is

simply no evidence on the record that Brandy’s former attorney acted improperly and deceived

Brandy into agreeing to plead guilty. 

Brandy has failed to show that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Court, therefore, adopts Judge

Major’s Report in its entirety.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court fully ADOPTS Judge Major’s Report. Brandy is not

entitled to habeas relief, and his Petition is DENIED. The Clerk shall close the file. 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 27, 2008

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-00641-BEN-BLM Document 107 Filed 03/27/08 Page 10 of 10