Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02608/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02608-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerardo Edmundo Andrada-Pastrano,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-14-2608-PHX-JAT (JFM)

CR-12-0877-PHX-JAT

Order and

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion To Vacate, Set Aside or 

Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on December 1, 2014 (Doc. 1). On May 26, 2015 Respondent filed its 

Response (Doc. 4). Movant filed a Reply on July 27, 2015 (Doc. 12). In addition, 

Movant has filed a Motion to Appoint Investigator (Doc. 11).

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Facts and Charges - On March 7, 2012, Movant was arrested following a traffic 

stop during which the Pinal County Sheriff’s Office found 169.4 pounds (77 kg) of 

marijuana in the rental vehicle he was driving. The investigation revealed that Movant 

was part of a marijuana trafficking operation shipping marijuana to the Midwest and east

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coast. (Plea Agreement, CR 692 at 9.) (The record in the underlying criminal case, CR12-0877-PHX-JAT, is referenced herein as “CR ___.”) 

Following an original Indictment filed April 26, 2012 (CR 3), and a First 

Superseding Indictment filed April 9, 2013 (CR 201), on November 19, 2013, Movant

was charged in a Second Superseding Indictment (CR 396) with one count of conspiring 

to possess with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 41(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (Count 1), and one count of 

possessing with the intent to distribute less than 100 kilograms, but 50 kilograms or more

of marijuana, in violation of U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 8). 

Plea Agreement - Counsel was appointed and eventually Movant entered into a 

written Plea Agreement (CR 692), agreeing to plead guilty to the lesser charge of Count 

8 (50 plus kilograms), in exchange for an agreement for a two or three level reduction in 

the offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and dismissal of Count 1. The Plea 

Agreement included the following provision:

6. WAIVER OF DEFENSES AND APPEAL RIGHTS

a. The defendant waives (1) any and all motions, 

defenses, probable cause determinations, and objections that the 

defendant could assert to the indictment or information; and (2) any 

right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or 

motion that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or 

forfeiture, the entry of judgment against the defendant, or any aspect 

of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the 

sentence is determined, including but not limited to any appeals 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (sentencing appeals) and motions under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255 (habeas petitions), and any right to file a 

motion for modification of sentence, including under Title 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c). This waiver shall result in the dismissal of any 

appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant might file 

challenging the conviction, order of restitution or forfeiture, or 

sentence in this case.

(CR 692 at 4.) 

Movant appeared with counsel for a change of plea on December 5, 2013 before 

U.S. Magistrate Judge Logan. (CR 458, M.E. 12/5/13; CR 752, R.T. 12/5/13.) Counsel 

initially advised the Court that Movant had concluded not to proceed with the Plea 

Agreement. (CR 752, R.T. 12/5/13 at 2.) The Court reviewed with the parties the 

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sentencing exposure at trial, including criminal history, the potential for sentencing as a 

career offender and a life sentence, and application of an “851 enhancement,” etc. (Id. at 

2-7.) The prosecution reviewed the potential for an 851 enhancement and the evidence 

against Movant. (Id. at 7.) The Court recessed to allow Movant to consult with counsel. 

(Id. at 8.) 

Upon returning, the parties had modified the Plea Agreement to delete a name 

from the factual basis, and to correct a serial number from the forfeited items. (Id. at 9-

10.) Movant was sworn and testified that he had changed his mind after consulting with 

counsel, not on the basis of the discussion with the Court, but because of the risk of the 

851 enhancement. Counsel advised that he and Movant had discussed the potential for 

the enhancement on a variety of occasions. (Id. at 10-11.) Movant testified that he had 

reviewed the Plea Agreement with counsel, understood the plea agreement, and was 

pleading voluntarily. The Court reviewed the potential fines, prison terms, and 

assessments, the application of the sentencing guidelines, agreements by the prosecution, 

and trial rights. (Id. at 11-21.) Movant inquired about his right to a jury to determine 

sentencing enhancements, and counsel responded that the matter would be left to the 

Court. (Id. at 21.) The prosecution verified that the amount of marijuana argued at 

sentencing would be limited to the amount in his possession upon arrest. (Id. at 22.) The 

Court reviewed the lack of limits on the sentencing judge, the forfeitures, and the 

elements of the offense. (Id. at 22-25.) The prosecution reviewed the factual 

background, and Movant admitted to knowingly possessing the marijuana in the car for 

delivery to another person. (Id. at 25-27.) Movant testified that he was satisfied with

counsel and his desire to plead guilty, and entered a plea of guilty. (Id. at 27-28.) The 

Court found the plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, supported by a 

factual basis, and that Movant was competent to plead, and accepted the plea. (Id. at 28.) 

The matter was set for sentencing. (Id.) A Findings and Recommendation Upon a Plea 

of Guilty (CR 460) was filed on the same date.

On December 23, 2013, District Judge Teilborg adopted the Magistrate Judge 

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Findings and Recommendation. (CR 544, Order 12/23/13.)

Sentencing - On April 9, 2014, defense counsel Kessler filed a Motion to 

Withdraw (CR 614) arguing a conflict of interest. The Motion was granted, and counsel 

Baggot was appointed. (CR 618, Order 4/14/14.) 

On May 30, 2014, the prosecution filed a Sentencing Memorandum (CR 679) 

requesting a sentence of 57 months, calculated upon a base offense level 22, a three level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, an additional two level reduction based upon 

anticipated modifications to the guidelines, for a calculated offense level 17. With a 

criminal history category V, the guidelines range was 46 to 57 months. The prosecution 

argued that, in accordance with the Pre-Sentence Report, sentencing at the higher end 

was appropriate. 

On June 2, 2014, Movant filed a Request for Change of Counsel (CR 685), 

arguing that prior counsel Kessler had: (1) improperly advised Movant that he could be 

sentenced as a career offender; (2) failed to adequately investigate the basis for the 

criminal investigation; (3) failed to pursue claims of failure to disclose information 

regarding the confidential informant; and (4) failed to do an adequate investigation of 

Movant’s criminal history prior to recommending the plea agreement, and that newly 

appointed counsel Baggot had refused to pursue the issue. 

On June 4, 2014, Movant appeared with counsel. The Court denied the motion 

for change of counsel, and advised Movant on his right to proceed pro se. Movant 

elected to proceed with sentencing with counsel. (CR 785, R.T. 6/4/14 at 1-3.) The 

Court accepted the plea agreement. Movant argued that he had seen the Pre-Sentence 

Report but had not reviewed it with counsel. Counsel reported that he had discussed the 

Pre-Sentence Report with Movant, and Movant seemed to understand it. The Court 

inquired whether Movant desired more time. Movant declined, and related that he had 

emailed his objections to the report to counsel Baggot, and reviewed his factual 

objections. The Court responded that the facts objected to would not bear on the Court’s 

decision. (Id. at 3-7.) Counsel objected to the inclusion of juvenile delinquencies as 

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convictions, and the parties and court discussed the disparate treatment of other drivers 

for the trafficking organization, and the basis for treating Movant as an average 

participant, rather than a minor role. The Probation Officer reported that the criminal 

history had been corrected in an amendment. (Id. at 7-10.) The Court accepted the 

probation officer’s calculation of the offense level, including the reductions for 

acceptance of responsibility and the downward departure for the pending guidelines 

modification, and the criminal history with a range of 46 to 57 months. (Id. at 10-12.) 

Movant argued extensively in his own behalf about the inappropriateness of a 

lengthy sentence. (Id. at 12-15.) Counsel argued the inappropriateness of a long 

sentence, Movant’s family and criminal history, his 20 year clean record, and 

insignificant role in the trafficking organization, and Movant’s lack of sophistication as a 

criminal. Counsel requested a sentence of 30 months. (Id. at 15-22.) The prosecution 

argued Movant’s priors, supervised release and probation, the seriousness of the offense, 

and the concessions already made, and requested a sentence of 57 months. (Id. at 23-

25.) 

Movant was sentenced to 57 months. (Id. at 25-31.) The Court reviewed the 

waiver of rights of appeal and collateral attacks in the plea agreement, and Movant 

eventually agreed that he understood he had waived those rights. (Id. at 31-32.) The 

Court recommended participation in a drug and alcohol abuse program, but declined to 

recommend a place of incarceration. (Id. at 32-35.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Notwithstanding his waivers, Movant promptly filed a Notice of Appeal (CR 

701), but eventually filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, which was granted on 

September 29, 2014. (See CR 815, Order of 9th Circuit, 9/29/14.) 

C. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion to Vacate – Movant commenced the current case by filing his Motion to 

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Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on December 1, 

2014 (Doc. 1). Movant’s Motion asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) His guilty plea was involuntary because plea counsel Kessler rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to:

a. investigate claims that the arresting officer had completed the traffic 

stop prior to searching Movant’s vehicle (Motion, Doc. 1 at 

physical page 5);

b. investigate benefits to the informant for cooperating, including 

removal of a $100,000 tax lien (id. at physical page 5-6);

c. file a motion to recuse the trial judge for bias based upon a 

reputation for never granting a motion to suppress (id. at physical 

page 6-7); 

d. investigate whether Movant’s deferred adjudication could be used 

to enhance his sentence under section 851 because it did not amount 

to a conviction and the 180 speedy trial time under the Interstate 

Agreement of Detainers had expired, with detainers being twice 

removed improperly (id. at physical page 7-8);

e. investigate whether prior convictions could subject Movant to 

sentencing under the Career Criminal Act (id. at physical page 8-9);

f. investigate an affirmative defense to the conspiracy count based on 

a buyer/seller relationship between the drug trafficking organization 

and Movant’s aunt and uncle (id. at physical page 9-10); and

g. lying to Movant that his co-defendants had already signed plea 

agreements (id. at physical page 11). 

(2) Prosecutorial misconduct by willfully withholding favorable evidence from 

the defense. He alleges that this was prosecutorial misconduct and that the 

government’s interference “amounts to a constructive denial of effective 

assistance of counsel.” 

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(3) Ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, Mr. Baggot, by failing to 

challenge the use of the deferred adjudication to enhance his sentence, and 

failure to investigate Movant’s claims that plea counsel had misled Movant 

into accepting the plea agreement. 

(4) The Court abused its discretion during sentencing because the Court 

“dismissed...as irrelev[a]nt” Movant’s request for a minor role variance, 

the Court’s reasoning for a maximum sentence was unreasonable, and the 

Court failed to liberally construe Movant’s motion for change of counsel as 

a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement.

Response - On May 26, 2015, Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 4). 

Respondent argues that: (1) Movant expressly waived his right to collateral attacks (id. at 

3-5); (2) Movant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of plea counsel Kessler (id.

at 5-12); (3) Movant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel 

Baggot (id. at 12-14); (4) no favorable evidence was withheld, disclosures prior to a plea 

agreement are not required, and Movant was aware of the information (id. at 14); (5) the 

sentence was proper, and his arguments against are without merit (id. at 14-15). 

Reply - On July 27, 2015, Movant filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Movant argues his 

appellate rights are not waivable, his claims are meritorious, and an evidentiary hearing 

is required to resolve them.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. WAIVER OF COLLATERAL ATTACK RIGHTS

Respondents argue that Movant has waived his right to file the instant Motion to 

Vacate. Movant’s plea agreement included a waiver of “any right to file...any collateral 

attack...that challenges the conviction...the entry of judgment against the defendant, or 

any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the sentence is 

determined, including but not limited to any...motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 

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2255 (habeas petitions).” (CR 692 at 4.) The present motion is just such a collateral 

attack. 

Enforceability of Waivers - The Ninth Circuit regularly enforces "knowing and 

voluntary" waivers of appellate rights in criminal cases, provided that the waivers are 

part of negotiated guilty pleas, see United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th 

Cir.1994), and do not violate public policy, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 

840, 843 (9th Cir.1996) (cataloguing public policy exceptions). Similarly, the right to 

collateral review may be waived. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 

(9th Cir.1993). Such waivers usefully preserve the finality of judgments and sentences 

imposed pursuant to valid plea agreements. See Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 843.

Moreover, the defendant's rights to challenge any sentencing errors may be 

explicitly waived. See e.g. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991). 

Further, where a waiver specifically includes the waiver of the right to attack a sentence, 

then it also waives “the right to argue ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.” 

U.S. v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Movant’s waiver extended to 

sentencing issues.

Granted, there are some flavors of errors at sentencing that are not waivable. See 

e.g. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991) (sentence violates the 

terms of the plea agreement); United States v. Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 203 n. 6 (9th 

Cir.1995) ("sentencing error could be entirely unforeseeable and therefore not barred"); 

United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir.1994) (sentencing disparity among codefendants based entirely on race); United States v. Marin, 961 F .2d 493, 496 (4th 

Cir.1992) (sentence in excess of maximum statutory penalty or based on a 

constitutionally impermissible factor such as race). Here, however, Movant does not 

assert any error of those types occurred at sentencing. Thus, Movant’s sentencing claims 

remain subject to his waiver.

Knowing and Voluntary Requirement - It is true that to be enforceable, such 

waivers must be made “knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 

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896, 898 (9th Cir.1994). The Supreme Court has stated that where “a defendant is 

represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of 

counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . [A] defendant who 

pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 

[ineffective].” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Because, as discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that Movant has 

failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in entering into the plea agreement, 

thus Movant is bound by his waiver, and this Motion must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN ENTERING PLEA

1. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

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233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

To establish prejudice, a movant "must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The pleading 

defendant must prove he was prejudiced from counsel's ineffectiveness by demonstrating 

a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 

(1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court must assess the circumstances 

surrounding the case to determine if the petitioner's allegation that he would have 

proceeded to trial is plausible. See United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (movant failed to show prejudice because he entered plea as alternative to 

long trial, possible conviction on more serious charges and a longer sentence).

2. Standard for Evidentiary Hearing

Section 2255 requires that the district court grant a movant’s motion to hold an 

evidentiary hearing “unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively 

show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “The court may deny a 

hearing if the petitioner's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for 

relief or are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary 

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dismissal.” U.S. v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations 

omitted). For the reasons discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that 

Movant’s claims are either conclusively determined by the record, or fail to state a clam 

for relief or are so palpably meritless as to render a hearing unnecessary.

3. Ineffectiveness of Sentencing Counsel

Movant argues in Ground Three that counsel was ineffective at sentencing in two 

aspects, one relating to a sentencing issue, and one relating to the performance of plea 

counsel. 

To the extent that Movant argues that counsel was ineffective with regard to 

arguments at sentencing, or investigations relating to sentencing, those matters would not 

be relevant to the voluntariness of his plea, and thus are waived by his waiver of his 

collateral attack rights. See Nunez, 223 F.3d at 959.

To the extent that Movant contends that the counsel who represented him at 

sentencing (Mr. Baggot) failed to investigate the allegations of ineffectiveness regarding 

plea counsel (Mr. Kesseler) in Ground One, those claims will be addressed hereinafter in 

connection with the claims in Ground One.

4. Ineffectiveness of Plea Counsel

Movant argues in Ground One of his Motion to Vacate that his guilty plea was 

involuntary because plea counsel Kessler rendered ineffective assistance with regard to:

(1) the traffic stop; (2) the informant; (3) the bias of the trial judge; (4) his Texas 

deferred adjudication and § 851 enhancement; (5) the career offender guidelines; (6) a 

buyer/seller defense to conspiracy; and (7) misrepresentations regarding co-defendants’

pleas. 

a) Ground 1(a) - IAC re Traffic Stop

In Ground 1(a), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

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investigate claims that the arresting officer had lied about completing the traffic stop 

prior to searching Movant’s vehicle. Movant argues that the narrative of other officers 

indicates that the car rental agreement was found “upon searching the vehicle” while the 

arresting officer claims to have returned those documents to Movant upon completing 

the traffic stop and prior to undertaking a search (Motion, Doc. 1 at physical page 5.) 

Respondent argues: (1) trial counsel did investigate and filed a Motion to 

Suppress arguing that the traffic stop was pretextual and the ensuing search was illegal; 

(2) Movant was already aware of the discrepancy; (3) the motion would have ultimately 

been unsuccessful; and (3) Movant elected to plead guilty prior to resolution of the 

motion to obtain a more favorable sentence. (Response, Doc. 4 at 10.) 

Movant replies that the motion to suppress had merit under Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 

S.Ct. 1609, 575 U.S. ___ (2015). Movant argues that Rodriguez is retroactively 

applicable, and had he proceeded to trial he could have had the benefit of Rodriguez on

appeal. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 3-4.) 

Indeed, on September 16, 2013, trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress (CR 

314), arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to perform a traffic stop, improperly 

opened a vehicle door and encouraged the canine to alert. But those are not the 

arguments that Movant now asserts. Instead, he argues that counsel should have 

challenged the timing of the movement of the documents and search in comparison to the 

traffic stop.

In his Reply, Movant relies upon Rodriguez in which the Court held that the 

police may not routinely “extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable 

suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.” 135 S. Ct. at 1614. In doing so, the Court 

observed that the relevant issue was not the relative timing of the search and completion 

of the traffic stop, but whether the search prolonged the stop. “The critical question, 

then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket...but 

whether conducting the sniff “prolongs”—i.e., adds time to—“the stop.” 135 S. Ct. at 

1616 (citations omitted).

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Thus, the fact that the search may have been conducted before completion of the 

traffic stop suggest not that the search was illegal under Rodriguez, but rather that it did 

not extend the time of the traffic stop and thus was not improper. Thus, a motion to 

suppress (or advice to Movant about the potential for such a motion) on the basis that the 

search was conducted while the traffic stop was on-going, would not have been fruitful. 

Moreover, to the extent that Movant suggests that counsel should have anticipated 

Rodriguez, his claim contravenes the Supreme Court’s instruction that counsel’s conduct 

is to be evaluated without the benefit of hindsight. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 

365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “What was reasonable under the 

circumstances must be evaluated as of the time that the legal services were rendered so 

as to minimize the distortions of hindsight.” Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1254 

(9th Cir. 2002). In June, 2014, when counsel was advising Movant on his plea 

agreement, Rodriguez had not yet been decided, and was the resolution of a split among 

lower courts, including the Eighth Circuit and state courts. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at

1614. Reasonable counsel could have relied upon contrary authority to conclude that a 

claim along the lines of Rodriguez would have been futile. 

Moreover, because the effectiveness of counsel is not measured with hindsight, 

neither the retroactivity of Rodriguez nor its availability on direct appeal is relevant.

To the extent that Movant simply argues the discrepancy in timing as a basis for 

impeachment of the arresting officer (e.g. to pursue the pretextual nature of the stop), 

Movant was aware of the underlying facts. In his pro per Request for Change of 

Counsel, filed May 21, 2013 (CR 259), Movant argued the discrepancy in the relative 

timing arising from the return of Movant’s documents. (CR 259 at 3.) 

Further, reasonable counsel could have discounted the impact of the discrepancy 

in advising Movant. The subsequent discovery of the documents during the search by 

other officers is not inconsistent with the first officer having returned them to Movant. 

They could have been left in the vehicle after being returned. Moreover, the 

impeachment would have been weak, focusing on a collateral issue, and depending upon 

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applying exacting interpretations of the officers’ records of the relative timing issues. 

Reasonable counsel could conclude that the court would not have employed the same 

exactitude in evaluating the officers’ reports and thus no significant damage to their 

credibility would result.

Moreover, counsel could have simply reach a reasonable conclusion that the 

issues he had raised in the motion to suppress stood the greatest likelihood of success, 

and thus made the tactical decision to focus on those issues, and tailored his motion and 

his advice to Movant accordingly. 

The undersigned concludes that Movant has failed to allege facts to show that 

counsel performed deficiently with regard to the propriety of the traffic stop.

b) Ground 1(b) - IAC re Informant

In Ground 1(b), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate benefits to the informant for cooperating, including his involvement as the 

target of an IRS investigation and the removal of a $100,000 tax lien. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 

physical page at 5-6.)

Respondents argue that Movant and counsel were aware of those facts, and plea 

counsel had moved to suppress the results of the wiretap as a result, and Movant fails to 

allege facts to show that he would not have pled guilty with additional information on 

this point. (Response, Doc. 4 at 11.) 

In his Reply, Movant argues that while he and counsel may have been aware of 

the investigation, counsel failed to “obtain the necessary documents” to establish that the 

investigating agent had made misleading statements under oath in obtaining the wiretap. 

(Reply, Doc. 12 at 11-13.) In particular, Movant references documents seized in a raid 

on lead counsel’s home and office. (Id. at 12.) Movant proffers no information on what 

was contained in such documents.

The record reflects that plea counsel filed a motion to suppress the results of the 

wiretap, based in part on the assertions that “the informant was intimately wrapped up 

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with the IRS criminal division... engaged in some form of fraudulent conduct on his 

taxes.” (CR 347 at 11.) The prosecution responded, arguing that Movant lacked 

standing to challenge the wiretaps because he failed to show that he was ever intercepted 

over the resulting wiretaps. (CR 362) Movant did not reply, and the motion was not 

decided.

Movant proffers nothing to show that he was in fact intercepted with the wiretaps. 

The fact that evidence from those wiretaps might have been used against Movant 

is irrelevant. 

The established principle is that suppression of the product of a 

Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by 

those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those 

who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. 

Coconspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special 

standing.

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 

2518(10)(a) limits motions to suppress wiretaps to an “aggrieved person.” “Aggrieved 

person” is limited under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) to “a person who was a party to any 

intercepted” communication.

Absent a showing that Movant was indeed a party to any of the intercepted 

communications, pursuing a motion to suppress the communications would have been 

futile regardless of the untrustworthiness of the confidential informant who supplied the 

basis for the wiretap order, or the misrepresentations made by the officer obtaining the 

order.1 Thus, further investigation on this point or advice to Movant would have been 

futile.

The undersigned concludes that Movant has failed to allege facts to show that 

counsel performed deficiently with regard to the informant.

/ /

/ /

 

1

Even if Movant could show that some communication with him was intercepted, he 

proffers nothing to suggest that the contents of his communication were significant 

enough evidence to have impacted his decision to plead guilty.

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c) Ground 1(c) - IAC re Judge Bias

In Ground 1(c), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

a motion to recuse the trial judge for bias based upon a reputation for never granting a 

motion to suppress. (Motion, Doc. 1 at physical page 6-7.) Respondents argue that any 

such motion would have been futile because the motion to suppress was, in any event, 

futile. (Response, Doc. 4 at 10, n.8.) 

Movant proffers no basis for his conclusion that Judge Teilborg was biased 

against granting motions to suppress.2 Even it were assumed arguendo that a review of 

the judge’s rulings would evidence such a pattern, that would not support a motion to 

recuse. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

Moreover, a motion to recuse based on bias must demonstrate bias towards the 

particular litigant. 

For a judge to be disqualified for bias or prejudice...the bias or 

prejudice must be “personal,” as opposed to “judicial.” A personal 

bias has been defined as “an attitude toward petitioner that is 

significantly different from and more particularized than the normal, 

general feelings of society at large.”

Wright & Miller, Grounds for Disqualification—Bias or Prejudice, 13D Fed. Prac. & 

Proc. Juris. § 3542 (3d ed.). Almost by definition, a pattern of rulings in prior cases 

would not support such a showing. Moreover, such rulings may just as likely result from 

a stringent view of the applicable law. “A judge's views on legal issues may not serve as 

the basis for motions to disqualify.” United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 882 (9th 

Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, a motion to recuse would have been sufficiently unlikely to succeed 

that reasonable counsel could have concluded it to be unworthy of pursuing, unworthy of 

 

2 A glancing review reflects that Judge Teilborg had indeed granted at least one motion 

to suppress in the year preceding Movant’s conviction. See e.g. United States v. 

Quintero-Mendoza, CR 11-1298-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 1946836, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 30, 

2012). Moreover, in general, motions to suppress are rarely successful. See Russell M. 

Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor's Role, 47 U.C. Davis L. 

Rev. 1591, 1665 nn. 315-317 (2014) (citing studies). 

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discussion with Movant as part of advising him to accept the plea, or unworthy of 

altering Movant’s analysis of the advisability of the plea.

The undersigned concludes that Movant has failed to allege facts to show that 

counsel performed deficiently with regard to a motion to recuse.

d) Ground 1(d) - IAC re 851 Enhancement and Deferred Adjudication

In Ground 1(d), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate whether Movant’s deferred adjudication in Texas could be used to enhance 

his sentence under section 851 because it did not amount to a conviction and the 180 day

speedy trial time under the Interstate Agreement of Detainers (IAD) had expired, with 

detainers being twice removed improperly. (Motion, Doc. 1 at physical page 7-8.)

Respondents argue that any such claims by counsel would have been futile 

because the Texas prosecution was properly considered at sentencing because it was not 

unconstitutionally obtained without counsel, and deferred adjudications are properly 

treated as convictions under the Sentencing Guidelines. (Response, Doc. 4 at 13-14.)

Movant replies that the trial court was obligated to rule on the IAD issue before 

relying on the prior. He further argues that Respondents argument is founded upon a 

hypothetical enhancement and outcome at trial. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 3, 6-7.) 

Hypothetical Analysis – Movant complains that the deficiency of counsel’s 

advice cannot be measured based upon an amended indictment and trial that never 

occurred. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 3.) To the contrary, counsel is obligated to use his 

reasonable professional judgment to provide a defendant considering a plea offer with 

information about the potential consequences of proceeding to trial. That, by nature, 

mandates providing a prognosis on events yet to occur (and when the plea is accepted, to 

never occur). As discussed hereinafter, Movant provides no valid reason to believe that 

the Government would not or could not amend the indictment to allege the § 851 

enhancement. 

Nor does Movant provide any reason to believe that counsel performed 

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deficiently by anticipating a significant risk of loss at trial. Movant proffers no defenses 

other than those which, as discussed herein, either were futile or at best questionable. 

851 Enhancements – Movant was indicted in Count I under 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(B)(vii), which mandates a sentence of 5 to 40 years for possession within 

intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana.3 However, that section also 

provides: “If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony 

drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

which may not be less than 10 years and not more than life imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(B). 

However, 21 U.S.C. § 851 mandates that before the government seeks such 

enhanced sentencing based upon a prior conviction, that the prosecution must first file an 

information alleging the prior conviction. The statute then provides an opportunity for 

the defendant to deny the prior conviction, or challenge its validity. 21 U.S.C. § 851(c). 

One Prior Sufficient – Movant had two prior drug offense convictions. Section 

841(b)(1)(B) only requires one prior. Thus, elimination of the one deferred adjudication 

would have left him still subject to the enhancement. Movant proffers no basis for 

precluding reliance on his other drug prior.

Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, Movant could not show the deferred 

adjudication was not countable under § 841. 

Qualification as a Conviction – Movant argues that the deferred prosecution 

could not properly be used as a prior “conviction.”

Indeed, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) only provides for enhanced sentencing where a 

conviction is “final.” However, the Fifth Circuit had plainly held that a Texas deferred 

adjudication is, for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a final conviction. United 

 

3 Movant makes passing reference to the fact that he was apprehended with less than 77 

kilograms (169.4 pounds) of marijuana, less than the 100 kilograms necessary to trigger 

§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). However, as a co-conspirator, Movant was chargeable with the 

entire quantity “within the scope of [his] agreement with his coconspirators or that the 

type and quantity were reasonably foreseeable to [him].” United States v. Banuelos, 322 

F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307, 308 (5th Cir. 2007). See also U.S. v. Cisneros, 112 

F.3d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1997) (detailing similar holdings from 11th, 3rd, 4th and 7th

Circuits). The Ninth Circuit has focused upon the completion of direct review as 

triggering the availability of a prosecution for enhancing a sentence under § 841(b)(1). 

See Williams v. U.S., 651 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that conviction still

subject to petition for writ of certiorari was not final). Under Texas law, “a defendant 

placed on deferred adjudication has to appeal issues relating to the original deferred 

adjudication proceeding when deferred adjudication is first imposed.” Daniels v. State, 

30 S.W.3d 407, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Cf. United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d 

609, 616 (5th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging bifurcated appeal process on Texas deferred 

adjudication). 

Movant argues that United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2005) is to 

the contrary. However, Valentine did not involve application of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 

851, but a determination whether the defendant remained under indictment despite his 

guilty plea and deferred adjudication in a Texas proceeding. Valentine had been charged 

with being an indictee shipping or transporting a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(n). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the deferred adjudication left the defendant, for 

purposes of § 922(n), under indictment. Two years later, notwithstanding its decision in 

Valentine, two years later, the Fifth Circuit decided Fazande, and concluded that a Texas 

deferred adjudication constituted a prior conviction for purposes of § 841. Thus, 

Valentine would not preclude reliance upon Movant’s Texas deferred adjudication.

Only Limited Collateral Attack Permitted - A defendant’s right to collaterally 

attack a prior conviction is limited. In general, the right to collaterally attack a prior 

conviction is limited to claims of a complete denial of counsel. Custis v. U.S., 511 U.S. 

485, 496 (1994).4 Movant makes no assertion of a denial of counsel in the Texas 

proceeding.

 

4 No such right exists under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Id. at 

497. 

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A limited right to challenge a prior conviction exists under 21 U.S.C. § 851(c) 

under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Id. at 491-

492. However paragraph (2) of section 851(c) specifically references challenges arguing 

the conviction was obtained “in violation of the Constitution of the United States.” 21 

U.S.C. § 851(c)(2). This suggests that attacks permitted under § 851(c) are limited to 

Constitutional attacks. The undersigned has found no case law addressing this issue. 

Base on the language in § 851(c)(2), the undersigned concluded that challenges under § 

851(c) are limited to Constitutional attacks.

Movant proffers nothing to show that his Constitutional rights were violated in the 

Texas proceeding, merely that the IAD was violated. “The protections of the IAD are 

not founded on constitutional rights, or the preservation of a fair trial, but are designed to 

facilitate a defendant's rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when 

charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction.” United States v. 

Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979). 

IAD Not Applicable – Even if § 851(c) extends to non-constitutional claims 

under the IAD, Movant’s claim fails because the IAD did not apply to his deferred 

adjudication. By its terms, the IAD only applies to detainers based on an “untried 

indictment, information, or complaint.” 18 U.S.C.A. § APP. 2 § 2, Art. III(a). Movant 

had pled guilty to the charges. (Response, Doc. 4, Exhibit A, Order of Deferred 

Adjudication.) His guilt was established, and it was only a sentence which had not yet 

been entered. “A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused 

did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and 

determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 

IAD Trial Limit Not Triggered - Moreover, the 180 day trial limit mandated in 

the IAD only applies “after [the defendant] shall have caused to be delivered to the 

prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction 

written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to 

be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.” 18 U.S.C.A. § APP. 2 § 2, Art. 

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III(a). Movant proffers nothing to suggest that he had ever made such a demand for final 

disposition. To the contrary, the correspondence he provides between himself and Texas 

authorities suggests that he was actively opposing being returned to the government of 

Texas for a disposition.5 (Motion to Vacate, Doc. 1 at Exhibit B (referencing Movant’s 

medical condition and intent to pursue return to Texas nonetheless). 

Withdrawal of Detainer Not Prohibited – Further, that Texas may have twice 

removed its detainer, that created no violation of the IAD.

6

 In support of his argument, 

Movant cites U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), U.S. v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1325-

1326 (11th Cir. 2009), and Bloomgarden v. Bureau of Prisons, 426 Fed. Appx. 487 (9th

Cir. 2011). However, none of these cases stand for the proposition that a receiving state 

may not withdraw a detainer. 

In Mauro, the United States had indicted two defendants then serving state 

sentences in New York, and served a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on the 

state wardens, obtained custody of the defendants for arraignment, the defendants were 

then returned to state custody, but obtained again by a writ for a subsequent proceeding. 

The defendant argued that this violated the mandate of Article IV(e) of the IAD that a 

prosecution be completed by the receiving state before a prisoner is returned to the 

sending state. The Government argued that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum

did not qualify as a detainer. The Court adopted the argument and found that obtaining 

immediate custody under a writ was not the equivalent of a detainer (which implied a 

deferred plan to obtain custody), and thus the IAD’s prohibition upon return before 

 

5

The letter reflects that although Movant was in the territory of the State of Texas at the 

time, he was in federal custody. 

6 Movant provides no evidence that the detainer was withdrawn twice. He provides one 

undated letter from Texas authorities addressed to Movant at the 4th Avenue Jail in 

Phoenix indicating that the detainer with Maricopa County had been withdrawn. 

(Motion, Doc. 1 at Exhibit C.) He provides another letter from May 3, 2010, but that 

letter does not address any detainer, but instead evidences an intent to seek a warrant 

against Movant if he did not voluntary return to face charges in Carson County, Texas. 

(Id. at Exhibit B.) In any event, the mere withdrawal of a detainer is not a violation of 

the IAD.

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completion of prosecution did not apply. 

Bloomgarden, a Ninth Circuit unpublished decision from 2011, see F.R.A.P 32.1,

involved a similar scenario, where California had served a writ on federal prisoners 

against whom it had filed a detainer, and then attempted to argue that temporary custody 

under the writ did not trigger the prisoner’s right under the IAD to ask the sending state 

(in that case the federal government) to disapprove the transfer. Relying on Mauro, the 

Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, found the writ to trigger the IAD, and held that the 

prisoner was entitled to rely upon his right under the IAD to request that his transfer be 

disapproved by the U.S. Attorney General as the equivalent of the governor of the 

sending state.

Also in Mauro, a third defendant, Ford, had been arrested on federal warrants but 

turned over to state authorities on other matters. The Government lodged a detainer, and 

the defendant demanded speedy trial under the IAD. The Government eventually 

obtained the defendant’s presence by a writ, but failed to proceed to trial in a timely 

fashion, and the defendant moved to dismiss under the IAD. The Government argued 

that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum did not qualify as “written request for 

temporary custody” within the meaning of Article IV of the IAD. The Court rejected 

that argument, finding that the means of obtaining temporary custody was not 

controlling. In doing so, the Court reasoned: “Because the detainer remains lodged 

against the prisoner until the underlying charges are finally resolved, the Agreement 

requires that the disposition be speedy and that it be obtained before the prisoner is 

returned to the sending State.” 436 U.S. at 362. But this was not a determination that a 

detainer could not be withdrawn once lodged, only that once custody had been obtained 

when a detainer was in place, the requirement for a full, speedy determination took 

effect, and it was irrelevant that the custody was obtained by writ.

At no point did the Mauro court consider whether a detainer could be withdrawn.

Similar to the decision in Mauro regarding Ford, in Knight the Eleventh Circuit 

simply held that a detainer was not automatically terminated merely because the original 

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indictment under which it had been issued was dismissed without prejudice, and a 

second indictment then filed. “Although Knight was in federal custody for only 28 days 

between the two federal indictments, the failure of the United States to return Knight to 

state custody, lodge a new detainer, and obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum

kept the 120–day period from resetting so that Knight was in federal custody for more 

than 120 days after his initial arrival.” Knight, 562 F.3d at 1326. Although quoting the 

portion of Mauro regarding the detainer remaining in place, at no point did the Knight

court hold that a detainer could not be withdrawn. Indeed, its reference to the preference 

for a new detainer suggests that detainers are not some spectral, eternal thing, but rather 

something with a limited life, subject to termination on the direction of the receiving 

state. 

Indeed, several courts have discussed the propriety of a receiving state 

withdrawing a detainer. See e.g. United States v. Donaldson, 978 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 

1992) (“The withdrawal of the detainer removed Donaldson from the purview of the 

Act.”); United States v. Koufus, 280 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (“The Court's 

order withdrawing the detainer removed Koufus from the purview of the IAD.”). Cf. 

United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.1991)(180–day provision not tolled after 

demand for disposition when charges dismissed, but detainer remained lodged, because 

government did not inform defendant of dismissal of charges). 

While the IAD may preclude a receiving state from trying to evade the time limits 

under the IAD by withdrawing a detainer once having obtained custody, Movant proffers 

nothing to show that occurred here.

DOJ Policy – For the first time in his Reply, Movant argues that a Department of 

Justice policy statement issued August 12, 2013 limits the application of § 851 to high 

level or dangerous drug traffickers. Thus, he contends, such an enhancement would not 

have been forthcoming. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 7.) 

The undersigned presumes, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, that 

counsel would reasonably presume that prosecutors would comply with the policies of 

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the Department of Justice in their charging decisions.7

However, Movant reads too much into the policy. 

In his Memorandum regarding “Department Policy on Charging Mandatory 

Minimum Sentence and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases,” issued August 

12, 2013,8 Attorney General Holder continued a departmental policy calling for 

individualized charging decisions, but directed that “Prosecutors should decline to file an 

information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 unless the defendant is involved in conduct that 

makes the case appropriate for severe sanctions.” Id. at 3. Movant argues, in essence, 

that he was not a high level or dangerous drug trafficker, and therefore he would not 

meet that mandate. 

However, Movant selectively quotes the Attorney General, who directed: “We 

must ensure that our most severe mandatory minimum penalties are reserved for serious, 

high-level, or violent drug traffickers.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, the 

Attorney General then went on to detail the kinds of considerations justifying a decision

to charge as a recidivist: 

• Whether the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or 

supervisor of others within a criminal organization;

• Whether the defendant was involved in the use or threat of 

violence in connection with the offense;

• The nature of the defendant's criminal history, including any 

prior history of violent conduct or recent prior convictions for 

serious offenses;

• Whether the defendant has significant ties to large-scale drug 

trafficking organizations, gangs, or cartels;

• Whether the filing would create a gross sentencing disparity with 

equally or more culpable co-defendants; and

• Other case-specific aggravating or mitigating factors.

Thus, counsel could have reasonably concluded that in reaching a decision to charge 

Movant as a recidivist prosecutors could look at Movant’s expansive criminal history, 

 

7 Because of this presumption, the undersigned need not address whether counsel would 

have been reasonable in considering the potential for the prosecutors in Movant’s case to 

thwart the policy, nor whether any actions in violation of the policy would have been 

challengeable by Movant.

8 Available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2014/04/11/ag-memodrug-guidance.pdf, last accessed 10/27/15.

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and the size of the drug operation with which he was involved. In addition, the policy 

leaves open the opportunity for prosecutors to consider “[o]ther case-specific 

aggravating or mitigating factors.” So, for example, counsel could have reasonably 

concluded that the prosecutors could properly charge Movant as a recidivist based upon 

the substantial quantity of drugs he was transporting, and his repeated involvement in 

efforts to transport. Therefore, even if Movant were not a “high level” or “violent” or 

“dangerous” trafficker, counsel could have reasonably concluded that the prosecution 

would bring an enhancement against Movant as a “serious” trafficker.

Conclusion - For the foregoing reasons, counsel did not perform deficiently for 

failing to pursue challenges to reliance on the Texas deferred adjudication, nor for failing 

to advise Movant about the possibility of such arguments, nor for advising Movant he 

risked prosecution under § 851.

e) Ground 1(e) - IAC re Career Offender Guidelines

In Ground 1(e), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise Movant that he was not subject to sentencing under the career offender sentencing 

guidelines. Movant argues that two convictions for violence or drugs were required to 

trigger the guidelines, and his Texas deferred adjudication (one of the two available) did 

not qualify as a conviction and was invalid because the detainers related to the 

conviction had been twice removed. (Motion, Doc. 1 at physical page 8-8.)

Respondent argues that Movant was properly subject to a sentencing range of 360 

months to life under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) as a career offender. (Response, Doc. 4 at 7.)

Career Offender Requirements – The Sentencing Guidelines provide 

substantially enhanced sentencing for a “career offender,” and defines the term as 

requiring, inter alia, “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence 

or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 

Movant does not challenge the argument that application of this guideline 

substantially expanded the guidelines sentence, but argues the provisions could not 

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properly be applied to him.

Texas Deferred Adjudication Qualified As Conviction – Movant argues that 

his Texas deferred adjudication did not qualify as a prior conviction for purposes of the 

career offender guidelines because it did not qualify as a “conviction.” 

Section 4A1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines governs the evaluation of criminal 

histories for purposes of applying the guidelines. Subsection (f) provides:

Diversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., 

deferred prosecution) is not counted. A diversionary disposition 

resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo 

contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under § 

4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered, except that 

diversion from juvenile court is not counted.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f). In U.S. v. Giraldo-Lara, 919 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth 

Circuit held that a Texas deferred adjudication counted as a conviction for purposes of § 

4A1.2. See U.S. v. Frank, 932 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1991) (treating as a prior sentence a 

Minnesota deferred adjudication based on a guilty plea). 

Movant proffers nothing to show that he had not pled guilty in the Texas 

proceeding, nor that it was a juvenile proceeding. The Order of Deferred Adjudication 

from Texas reflects that he did, in fact plead guilty. (Response, Doc. 4, Exhibit A.) 

Validity of Conviction Not Assailable Based on IAD – For the reasons 

discussed hereinabove in regards to Ground 1(d), the undersigned concludes that 

Movant’s Texas deferred adjudication was not assailable under the Interstate Agreement 

on Detainers (IAD). As noted above, a defendant’s right to collaterally attack a prior 

conviction is generally limited to claims of a complete denial of counsel. Custis v. U.S., 

511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994). “As a general rule, however, collateral attacks on prior state 

convictions are not permitted in federal sentencing proceedings unless the defendant 

asserts a total denial of his right to counsel in the previous proceeding.” United States v. 

Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). 

Movant proffers nothing to show that he was completely denied counsel in the 

Texas proceeding. Thus, any challenge to the Texas proceeding founded upon the IAD 

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would not have been cognizable for purposes of avoiding enhancement under the career 

offender guidelines.

Conclusion – Based on the foregoing, undersigned concludes that Movant has 

failed to allege facts to show that counsel performed deficiently with regard to 

application of the career offender guidelines.

f) Ground 1(f) - IAC re Buy/Seller Defense

In Ground 1(f), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate an affirmative defense to the conspiracy count based on a buyer/seller 

relationship between the drug trafficking organization and Movant’s aunt and uncle 

(Motion, Doc. 1 at physical page 9-10.)

Respondent concedes that “mere sales to other individuals do not establish a 

conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute.” United States v. Moe, 781 

F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015). (Response, Doc. 4 at 11.) However, Respondents argue 

the exception is narrow and limited to casual sales for personal use. Respondents argue 

that the quantity of drugs – 169.4 pounds of marijuana – forecloses a defense of personal 

use. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Movant replies that the government could not prove he “knew or agreed to what 

would happen to the marijuana after it was dropped off to the Ortiz's.” He argues that the 

quantity he possessed would have made a conviction on the conspiracy charge unlikely. 

(Reply, Doc. 12 at 4-5.) He argues that the evidence showed an isolated transaction 

(involving one attempt and one completed transaction), and no other direct relationship 

between Movant and the Ortiz DTO, and that they didn’t even bother to bail him out of 

jail. (Id. at 13-15.) He argues this is insufficient to show the kind of prolonged and 

actively pursued course of sales necessary to proving a conspiracy, citing U.S. v. 

Ramirez, 714 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013). (Id. at 15.) 

Movant overstates the quantum of proof necessary for a conspiracy to transport 

drugs. 

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It is true that the mere purchase or sale of drugs is not sufficient to establish a 

conspiracy.

As most circuits have held, proof that a defendant sold drugs to 

other individuals does not prove the existence of a conspiracy. 

Rather, conspiracy requires proof of “an agreement to commit a 

crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” Were the 

rule otherwise, every narcotics sale would constitute a conspiracy.

United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1994). This is so even if the seller 

knows the buyer intends to further distribute the drugs. Id. 

Thus, for a charge of conspiracy to possess a drug with intent 

to distribute, “the government must show that the buyer and seller 

had an agreement to further distribute the drug in question.” 

“Express agreement is not required; rather, agreement may be 

inferred from conduct.” 

Moe, 781 F.3d at 1124-25 (citations omitted). 

The Moe court recognized that “[d]istinguishing between a conspiracy and a 

buyer-seller relationship requires a fact-intensive and context-dependent inquiry that is 

not amenable to bright-line rules.” Id. at 1125. The court distinguished between the 

“casual sale of drugs, of a quantity consistent with personal use on the part of the buyer, 

with no evidence of any subsequent (or planned) redistribution of purchased drugs” and 

the case “where there is ‘ ‘evidence of a prolonged and actively pursued course of sales 

coupled with the seller's knowledge of and a shared stake in the buyer's illegal 

venture.’’” Id. (quoting Ramirez, 714 F.3d at 1140).

Movant essentially argues the former better describes his situation. But here there 

was no mere buying and selling relationship between Movant and the Ortiz DTO. 

Movant was not an arms-length purchaser or seller of drugs who just happened to be 

doing business with someone else with the intent to distribute.9 Rather, the expected 

evidence showed that Movant was acting on behalf of the Ortiz DTO in going to pick up 

 

9

Perhaps Movant intends to argue that he was actually working for his aunt and uncle, 

who were involved in selling drugs to the Ortiz DTO. If so, then perhaps the buyer/seller 

exception might apply. But then that would have simply moved Movant from the frying 

pan into the fire, making him a co-conspirator with his aunt and uncle. But, Movant 

neither makes that factual claim explicit, nor does he proffer anything to support it. 

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(and eventually deliver to the Ortiz’s) the drugs. Nor could Movant credibly argue to a 

jury that the Ortiz’s expected to personally use 169.4 pounds of marijuana. The intent to 

distribute, and the agreement to participate by delivering the drugs to be distributed,

would be obvious to all but the most trusting (or arguably naïve) of jurors. 

Movant objects that this was a short lived engagement of 15 days with only two 

acts, the failed trip and the one resulting in his arrest. The reference in Ramirez to a 

prolonged course of dealing arose in the context of distinguishing between a few sales to 

a presumed distributor and the kind of repeated sales which would show the necessary 

agreement to distribute. The typical seller does not care what the buyer does with the 

purchased goods, and has no reason to agree to that conduct. He simply wants to 

exchange product for money. For all he cares, the buyer can throw away the product. 

Had Movant been engaged in selling drugs to the Ortiz’s for his own profit, then perhaps 

he could rely upon Ramirez. But here, the import of the Government’s case was that 

Movant was delivering the drugs not for his own direct profit, but to assist the Ortiz’s in 

their own distribution. That would amount to an agreement to further distribution.

Even if some novel extension of the Lennick, Moe, and Ramirez line of cases 

could be imagined that would have legally mandated acquittal, the undersigned cannot 

find that counsel acted unreasonably in failing to develop such a novel argument or 

nonetheless advising Movant that a conviction at trial was likely. “Counsel's failure to 

raise this novel argument does not render his performance constitutionally ineffective.” 

Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2005)

g) Ground 1(g) - IAC re Co-Defendants Pleas

In Ground 1(g), Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for lying to 

Movant that his co-defendants “had already signed pleas.” (Motion, Doc. 1 at physical 

page 11.) In support, Movant attaches a December 3, 2013 letter from plea counsel 

stating the co-defendants “are accepting pleas” (id. at Exhibit D), and a press release 

from the United States Attorney’s Office showing that the co-defendants’ change-of-plea

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hearings occurred shortly after his (id. at Exhibit E.).

Respondents argue that the record reflects that counsel’s advice was accurate. 

(Response, Doc. 4 at 9.) 

Movant does not reply. 

Indeed, Movant fails to proffer anything to show that co-defendants had not 

signed pleas at the time he entered his own guilty plea on December 5, 2013.

10

 The 

letter from plea counsel (dated a few days before Movant pled guilty), simply indicates 

that the co-defendants were all “accepting pleas,” which is not inconsistent with them 

having signed pleas. The press release simply reports the ultimate sentencing and the 

entry of guilty pleas on a variety of dates in December, 2013 and on January 3, 2014, 

which is not inconsistent with having signed pleas on December 5, 2013. While Movant 

may have entered his plea on the same date he signed the plea agreement, that was 

neither required for his co-defendants, nor necessarily normal.

Accordingly, the undersigned cannot find that counsel acted unreasonably in 

advising Movant that the co-defendants had signed pleas.

h) Ground 2 - Disclosures

Finally, Movant complains in his Ground 2 that he was constructively denied 

counsel because the prosecution failed to make disclosures of evidence to show that the 

agent obtaining the wiretap lied in his affidavit. To the extent that Movant would 

contend that this rendered counsel’s advice on his guilty plea ineffective, the claim must 

fail. Movant’s arguments suggest two bases for relevance of the undisclosed evidence: 

(1) exclusion of the resulting wiretap information; and (2) impeachment of the agent. 

Neither is a valid basis. 

To the extent that Movant intends to argue that the wiretaps were obtained 

improperly, as discussed hereinabove, any such impropriety in was not assertable by 

 

10 Nor does he suggest how his decision to accept a plea was affected by such advice, 

preventing a finding of prejudice.

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Movant because he was not a party to the intercepted calls, and therefore he had no 

standing to object. 

Second, to the extent that Movant complains he could use the information to 

impeach the agent, his underlying claim is not meritorious. Although the Ninth Circuit 

has held that failure to disclose material exculpatory information may render a plea 

involuntary or unintelligent, Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995), “the 

Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment 

evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” United States v. 

Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). 

Accordingly, the undersigned cannot find that counsel acted unreasonably in 

failing to pursue disclosures regarding the misrepresentations in the wiretap request 

affidavit.

i) Prejudice

Respondents argue that even if counsel somehow performed deficiently in 

advising Movant on his guilty plea, that Movant fails to show prejudice, i.e. that but for 

such deficient advice, he would not have pled guilty but would have proceeded to trial.

Ordinarily, at this stage, the undersigned would ignore the foregoing performance 

evaluations, and presume that counsel if performing reasonably would have proffered the 

advice posited by Movant. Then, the undersigned would evaluate the circumstances to 

judge the credibility of Movant’s assertion that he would not have otherwise pled guilty.

Here, it is plain that Movant was reticent to plead guilty. From his conduct at the 

time, it is apparent that Movant was busily second-guessing counsel and working to 

develop defenses, albeit futile ones. There is at least some potential that, proffered any 

glimmer of hope, Movant would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded on towards 

what, at least from this vantage, appears to have been the very high likelihood of a 

conviction and at least a substantial potential for a much longer sentence than he 

received under the plea. For some defendants, that risk is such a likely deterrent that 

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claims to have preferred trial are incredible. Here, however, one has to wonder whether 

Movant would have resisted the urge to roll the dice in the face of anything other than 

the consistently dismal prospects Movant complains counsel painted. 

Fortunately for defendant, his counsel (both plea counsel and sentencing counsel) 

were not swayed by Movant’s efforts to impose his theories on them, and instead 

proffered seasoned and well reasoned advice. In all likelihood that advice has saved 

Movant years, and potentially the rest of his life, in prison.

In any event, a court may reject a claim of ineffectiveness upon finding either that 

counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Thus, the undersigned does not reach the prejudice issue.

j) Summary

Movant has failed to show that plea counsel (Mr. Kessler) performed deficiently

in advising Movant to plead guilty, whether through failing to conduct investigations, or 

in the counsel given Movant. For the same reasons, Movant has failed to show that 

sentencing counsel (Mr. Baggot) was ineffective for failing the foregoing claims of

ineffectiveness of plea counsel.

Because Movant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in 

entering into the plea agreement, Movant is bound by his waiver of his collateral attack 

rights, and this Motion must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. MOTION FOR INVESTIGATOR

On July 10, 2015, Movant filed a Motion [Request] for Appointment of an 

Investigator (Doc. 11). Movant argues an investigator is required to “interview Pinal 

County deputy La Silva and to obtain March 7th, 2012 arrest/booking slip to establish 

that plea counsel failed to do an adequate investigation into his client’s claim that deputy 

Williams lied in his report when he stated that he had completed the traffic stop by 

giving petitioner his documents back prior to searching Petitioner’s vehicle.” (Id. at 1.) 

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Movant seeks that information to support his argument that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to pursue Movant’s assertions that the traffic stop had been completed at the time 

his vehicle was searched. 

Respondent has not responded.

As discussed hereinabove in connection with Movant’s assertions of ineffective 

assistance in Ground 1(a), the relative time relationship between the completion of the 

traffic stop and the search is not controlling. Moreover, Movant’s underlying argument 

is founded upon the subsequent decision in Rodriguez, which counsel was not deficient 

for failing to anticipate.

Accordingly, the motion will be denied. 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Movant’s Motion being resolved adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision 

on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the procedural grounds that Movant 

has waived his collateral attack rights. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of 

reason would not find it debatable whether the procedural ruling is correct.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

VI. ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Movant’s Motion [Request] for 

Appointment of an Investigator, filed July 10, 2015 (Doc. 11) is DENIED.

VII. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed December 1, 2014 

(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VIII. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: November 3, 2015

14-2608r RR 15 10 22 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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