Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05351/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 11, 1995 Decided December 12, 1995

No. 94-5351

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with

94-5353, 94-5377, 95-5028

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(87cv02076, 88cv02273, 88cv02416)

Joseph M. Klise argued the cause for appellants, with whom John A. MacLeod, Thomas C. Means,

Harold P. Quinn, Jr., and Dean K. Hunt were on the briefs. Gregory E. Conrad was on the brief for

appellant Interstate Mining Compact Commission.

Lisa E. Jones, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees, with

whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and J. Carol Williams, Attorney, were on the

brief.

Glenn P. Sugameli and Thomas J. Fitzgerald were on the brief for appellee National Wildlife

Federation, et al.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellants, National Mining Association (the Association) and

the Interstate Mining Compact Commission, appeal the district court'ssummary judgment disposing

oftheir claimsthat the Department ofInterior acted arbitrarilyor capriciouslyin denying a rulemaking

petition. The petition sought to repeal a regulation, promulgated under the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (SMCRA), which permits the Department

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1There is at least one other circumstance in which a 10-day notice may be used to inform a

state of the need to take corrective action. Under § 1271(a)(1), if the Department has reason to

believe that a mine operator is violating a requirement of SMCRA, it must notify the state

regulatory authority. If the state fails to take appropriate action within 10 days then the

Department has the authority to inspect the mine. In certain circumstances, based on this

inspection, the Department may order the cessation of mining under § 1271(a)(2). 

to issue notices of violation to mine operators in so-called "primacy" states. We affirm the order of

the district court, althoughas to those claims over which we conclude the district court lacked

jurisdictionon a different rationale.

I.

The Department is charged with enforcing the provisions of SMCRA. Any state, however,

hasthe option of becoming the primary enforcement body within its borders if it promulgates a state

programthat is approved by the Department. In such a state (a "primacy" state), federal enforcement

authority islimited. See generally In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514,

516 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Peabody Coal Co. v. Watt, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).

The Department retains oversight and back-up enforcement authority including the power to issue

a notice of violation (NOV) to a mine operator who, although not posing an imminent danger to the

environment or to the health or safety of the public, is not satisfying a permit condition or a

requirement of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(3) (1986). A NOV "describes the violation and what

remedial action needs to be [taken] to correct it." The statute provides that NOVs may be issued

when violations are discovered during certain, enumerated types ofinspections. Id. The rule at issue,

30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1995), permitsthe Department to issue a NOV based on inspections other

than those set forth in § 1271(a)(3) if it determines that there is a violation of SMCRA, the state

program, or a permit condition and the state does not take appropriate action within 10 days of being

notified of the violation by the Department.1

The Department proposed to amend the rule and sought comments in 1981, two years after

it was promulgated, expressing concern over whether the rule exceeded the statutory grant of

authority. In 1982, the Department decided to prepare an environmental impact statement with

respect to its SMCRA regulations and solicited further public comment on the NOV rule. Later that

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year, the Department promulgated new final rules but indicated that it was deferring action on the

NOV rule until the environmental impact statement was completed. On March 3, 1983, the

Department announced that the NOV rule had been "properly and lawfully promulgated; therefore

there is no need to reconsider the issue."

In 1986, a group of coal industry participants petitioned for a rulemaking to repeal the NOV

rule and to modify the standard under which the adequacy of state responses to 10-day notices is

determined. The petition contended that the NOV rule ought to be repealed because (1) it did not

comport with SMCRA, was inconsistent with the statute's legislative history, and was contrary to

case law that had developed since the enactment of SMCRA; and (2) the Department was using its

NOV power in primacy states to replace its judgment for that of the state regulatory authorities on

a case-by-case basis, catching mine operators in the middle of disputes between federal and state

regulators while large, systemic problems went unremedied. The Department published the petition

and sought comments on whether it should institute a rulemaking proceeding. After reviewing the

commentssubmitted, the Department granted only that portion ofthe petition concerning the 10-day

notices. The Department, in denying the portion of the petition seeking to repeal the NOV rule,

explained that the question whether the NOV rule should be retained had already been considered in

previous rulemakings. It also noted statistics showing that NOVs were issued in a small number of

primacy states in limited and decreasing numbers, the need to retain NOV authority to comply with

court orders, the Department's belief that the rule encouraged operator compliance with state

programs, and the desire of the Department to be able to address specific problems without resort

to the lengthy process ofsubstituting federalforstate primary enforcement authority. Problems with

the NOV rule, the Department stated, would be ameliorated with the adoption of a more deferential

standard concerning the adequacy of a state's response to a 10-day notice. The rulemaking on the

10-day notice standard resulted in a rule under which a state response to a 10-day notice is deemed

adequate if it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."

Appellants petitioned for review in the district court. The court, noting the highly deferential

standard of review given an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking, concluded that the

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Department's decision to deny the petition wasreasonable. The court also analyzed appellants' claim

that the NOV rule exceeded the statutory grant of authority and determined that it did not.

Appellants concentrate their arguments here on whether the rule is permitted by SMCRA. They

argue that the language, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the statute preclude issuance

of NOVs in primacy states. It is argued that the NOV power is derived solely from § 1271(a)(3),

which permits the issuance of NOVs based on certain types of inspections. The NOV rule, vesting

authority to issue NOVs after "any inspection" other than those listed in § 1271(a)(3) is, appellants

contend, ultra viresthe statute and frustrates Congress' concern with allowing statesto have primary

responsibility. The Department's alleged enforcement increasingly extensive use of NOVs further

undermines Congress' efforts to fix exclusive jurisdiction over intra-state mining operations in state

regulatory authorities.

The government and defendant-intervenor below, National Wildlife Federation, respond that

the statute does authorize the NOV rule, and present their own construction of the relevant sections

of SMCRAalong with their own interpretation ofthe legislative history. The government argues that

its construction of the statute as permitting the NOV rule is a permissible one under Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and that state primacy is not

so ascendant a statutory purpose that the NOV rule cannot stand.

II.

A.

We consider at the outset whether either of the appellants has established that it is injured by

agency action, "one of the elements necessary to establish the "irreducible constitutional minimum

of standing.' " Marathon Oil Co. v. FERC, No. 94-1698, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 1995)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Having reviewed the parties'

supplemental briefs on the question, we are satisfied that the Association has suffered sufficient

injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III. Since we conclude that one party has standing, we need not

decide whether the Interstate Mining Compact Commission also has standing. See, e.g., United

States Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 719 (1990); Environmental Action v. FERC, 996

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F.2d 401, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

If the Association claimed that it was injured only because its members were regulated by

federal authorities but wished to be regulated instead by state authorities, we would have doubts as

to whether the Association had standing. We have reserved this question in SMCRA litigation

before. See National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 708 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The

Association, however, asserts that it has standing as the representative of mine operators caught in

the regulatory crossfire between state and federal authorities, and cites a series of casesin which mine

operators have incurred expenses attempting to appease the two competing regulators. See, e.g.,

Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Hodel, 640 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Va. 1985) (enjoining the Department from

requiring mine operator to relocate drainage ditch when state regulatory authority explicitly

authorized ditch), rev'd for lack of jurisdiction sub nom. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Department of the

Interior, 802 F.2d 102 (4thCir. 1986); Willowbrook MiningCo., 108 I.B.L.A. 303 (1989); Harman

Mining Corp., 110 I.B.L.A. 98 (1989). The Association asserts that its members are, at best, subject

to costly uncertainty asto which standards must be met in their mining operations, and are, at worst,

responsible for expensive efforts to redo or undo actions taken at the behest of the state authority

with which the Department later disagrees.

We agree that the Association is sufficiently injured-in-fact to establish Article III standing.

In National Coal Ass'n v. Lujan, 979 F.2d 1548, 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1992), we held that the progenitors

of the Association (the National Coal Association and the American Mining Congress) had standing

to challenge a rule under which "stiff individual penalties" were visited upon coal company officers

for willful violations of SMCRA. Id. at 1552. Even though no individual officers had been cited

under the rule, we held that, because the purpose of the rule was to "propel corporate action" by the

imposition of "[s]ure and swift" individualpenalties, id. (emphasisin original), the corporate members

of the Association were sufficiently injured-in-fact. The NOV rule is like the civil penalty provision

in some respects, and the differences provide further support for the Association'sstanding here. To

the extent that the NOV rule is designedas the Department has said that it isto compel

compliance with SMCRA and with state programs, the NOV rule is indistinguishable from the civil

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fine provision. To the extent that the NOV rule creates uncertainty and actual conflicts between state

enforcement authorities and the Department which force mine operators to expend money to satisfy

one and then the other, the NOV rule can be said to cause greater injury to mine operators than the

civilpenaltyprovision. We thus believe that the Associationthrough the injury to its membershas

established Article III injury-in-fact.

B.

Appellants' jurisdictional difficulties are not over. SMCRA provides that "[a]ny action by the

Secretary promulgating nationalrules or regulations...shallbe subject to judicialreview in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit." 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1986). The Act

further provides:

A petition for review of any action subject to judicial review under this subsection

shall be filed in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such action,

or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth

day.

Id. (emphasis added). We have repeatedly held that temporal limitations on judicial review are

jurisdictional in nature. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Institute v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1993);

Simmons v. ICC, 716 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Natural Resources DefenseCouncil v. NRC, 666

F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). To the extent that appellants' challenge to the NOV rule is based

on groundsthat existed within 60 days of the NOV rule's adoption (or readoption), the district court

did not have jurisdiction over the challenge.

Appellants' essential case, although phrased as a petition for a new rulemaking that would

repeal the rule, is based on the claimthat the rule is ultra vires. It is undisputed that all the arguments

appellants make in support of that proposition were available to them at the time the rule was

adopted. Indeed, the agency highlighted these concerns over whether the statute authorized the

NOV ruleconcerns identical to those now raised by appellantsboth when it adopted the NOV

rule in 1979 and when it considered repealing it in 1982. Appellants cite cases decided in the

meantime only to bolster their argument that the statute does not authorize the rule. Congress in §

1276(a)(1) struck a careful balance between the need for administrative finality and the need to

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2Congress has adopted similar limitations on judicial review in other environmental statutes. 

See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (review available after 120 days from

challenged action "only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such

120th day"); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(b) (1991) (review available after 45

days "if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the expiration of such period"); Noise

Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a) (1995) (review available after 90 days "if such petition is based

solely on grounds arising after such ninetieth day"); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (1995) (review available after 90 days if "based solely on grounds arising

after such ninetieth day"); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1995) (review available for 60

days, "except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then

any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds

arise"). 

3

In NLRB Union, we described the situations in which we have permitted out-of-time

challenges to regulations. 834 F.2d at 195-97. 

provide for subsequent review in the event of unexpected difficulties.2 Permitting review of

appellants' petition based on grounds clearlyavailable within 60 days ofthe rule's promulgationwould

thwart Congress' well-laid plan.

Appellants rely, however, on our cases that have permitted challenges to rules beyond the

statutory period. We have repeatedly recognized that such challenges may be brought as petitions

for a new rule and thereafter as petitionsfor review of an agency denial. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst.

v. ICC, 969 F.2d 1221, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 901

F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nuclear Management & Resources Council v.

Public Citizens, 498 U.S. 992 (1990); NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1987);

Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813

(1959).3 But in those cases, Congress did not specifically address the consequences of failure to bring

a challenge within the statutory period. Although it was argued that Congress meant totally to

foreclose review after the statutoryperiod, the statutesinvolved, like the Hobbs Act, did not explicitly

say that. Here, Congress directly focused on the issue, stating that review is barred unless and only

to the extent that it is sought on grounds arising after the sixtieth day. Appellants suggest that

nevertheless the congressional bar extends only to direct attacks on a rule after the 60-day period,

not to the procedural device utilized in Functional Music and its progenypetitioning for a new

rulemaking and seeking review of its denial. We reject that interpretation as a misreading of our

precedent. We have never held that this procedural device, standing alone, was sufficient to avoid

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4The closest that we have come to extending the rule of Functional Music to SMCRA was in

Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Montana v. Hodel, 474

U.S. 919 (1985). There, in a footnote, we adverted to the possibility that Functional Music might

bear on an out-of-time petition for review under SMCRA. Id. at 744 n.8. That was, of course,

only dicta. 

the congressional bar. See, e.g., NLRB Union, 834 F.2d at 195. Such an interpretation would make

a mockery of Congress' careful effort to force potential litigants to bring challenges to a rule issued

under this statute at the outset unless they can meet the after-arising test.4 When SMCRA was

enacted, the rule of Functional Music was well-established in this circuit and therefore Congress

appears to have devoted particular efforts to express its intention on the question.

The Association argues that, even under our reading of SMCRA's 60-day limit, it filed its

petition in the district court in time. It relies on the "reopener doctrine." Under this doctrine, " "the

period for seeking judicial review may be made to run anew when the agency in question by some

new promulgation creates the opportunity for renewed comment and objection.' " Edison Elec.

Institute, 996 F.2d at 331 (quoting Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). A number

of the agency's actions are argued to have reopened the NOV rule to our review. The Association

pointsto the Department's publication and request for comment on the petition for rulemaking. The

agency's own regulation concerning publication of petitions requires publication for comment of a

petition that "has a reasonable basis," 30 C.F.R. § 700.12(c) (1995). Therefore, it is argued, the

Department implicitlyreopened the NOV rule when it published the petition. The Association further

contendsthat the Department's action on the petition amounted to "renewed adherence" to the NOV

rule, which is "substantively reviewable." Public Citizen, 901 F.2d at 150 (citation omitted). And,

since the NOV rule and the 10-day notice standard are inextricably linked, the Department's 10-day

notice rulemaking triggered the 60-day period for the review of the NOV rule.

We are not persuaded. The reopener doctrine allows judicial review where an agency

haseither explicitly or implicitlyundertaken to "reexamine itsformer choice." Id. at 151. We do

not discern in anything proffered by the Association evidence that the Department reexamined the

NOV rule. The decision to publish a petition for rulemaking, even if that decision is based on the

agency's belief that the petition sets forth a reasonable basis (we are not certain that the Department

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had such a beliefthe petition was published for the stated reason that there was "public interest on

this topic"), is not evidence of a reexamination of the policy at issue in the petition. At the point of

publishing a petition for rulemakingparticularly when publishing the petition in this casean

agency has heard from only one side of the rulemaking issue and has itselfsaid nothing on the merits

of the petition. That agency may still, as the Department did in this case, deny the petition without

having rethought the subject policy. Nor are we impressed by appellants' argument that the

Department's undertaking of the rulemaking concerning the 10-day notice standard reopened the

NOV rule. The Department itself said that it was doing nothing of the kind. And the fact that the

10-day notice rule is related to the NOV rule (among other rules) is not sufficient to restart the 60-

day clock on the NOV rule. We can scarcely imagine any rulemaking that does not impact at least

several rules that are not explicitly at issue in the rulemaking. Permitting any affected rule to be

reopened for purposes of judicial review by a rulemaking that does not directly concern that rule

would stretch the notion of "final agency action" beyond recognition and do little to encourage

agencies to respond favorably to any petition for rulemaking.

The Department's statement of denial of the petition for rulemaking to repeal the NOV rule

presents a closer question. We are, however, convinced that the denial does not evince the kind of

agency reconsideration that we have held sufficient to give rise to judicial review. Of course, that a

statement accompanies the denial of a petition for rulemaking is not, without much more, sufficient

to trigger the reopener doctrine. An agency is normally obliged under the Administrative Procedure

Act to issue some sort of explanation when it denies a petition. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1977). In the

FederalRegisterstatement that accompanied the denial of the petition, the Department discussed the

past, full-dress, notice-and-comment rulemakings on the precise questions presented in the petition

and noted that the Department had, at those times, satisfied itself that the NOV rule was properly

promulgated. The Department also responded to assertions in the petition and comments that the

NOV rule was being used excessively with statistics demonstrating limited use in a limited number

of states. Absent from this petition for rulemaking, but present in cases such as Public Citizen, was

anyindication that the Department had undertaken a serious,substantive reconsideration ofthe NOV

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rule. Unlike the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Public Citizen, the Department did not set out

a formal "evaluation period," 901 F.2d at 151, after which it decided to stand by the NOV rule. An

application of the "reopener doctrine" would have been appropriate in 1983. At that time, the

Department explicitly requested comment on the repeal of the NOV rule (as opposed to merely

requesting comment on whether to open a rulemaking) and then, having received comment and

having repromulgated other rules while explicitly deferring action on the NOV rule, the Department

retained it. If appellants had sought to petition for review of the NOV rule (first promulgated in

1979) within 60 days after March 3, 1983the date on which the Department ended itsreevaluation

of the NOV rule and stuck by itwe would properly have exercised jurisdiction over that petition.

We believe, however, that the Department did not reopen the NOV rule in 1987 or 1988 such that

the judicial review limitation in SMCRA began to run anew. The district court thus did not have

jurisdiction to review the NOV rule.

C.

The district court properly exercised jurisdiction as to the aspects of the petition for review

that remain: those based on grounds that arose after the sixtieth day. Although appellants

concentrated their energies on attacking the authority of the Department to enact the regulation, they

did provide, in both their petition for rulemaking and in their briefs here, other grounds to support

the repeal of the NOV ruleappellants particularly point to the conflict between state regulatory

authorities and the Department created by the Department's use ofits NOV authority. Unfortunately

for appellants, the scope of our review of an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking is quite

limited. See, e.g., Cellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("an

agency's refusal to initiate a rulemaking is evaluated with deference so broad as to make the process

akin to non-reviewability"); National Customs Brokers &Forwarders v. United States, 883 F.2d 93,

96 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (refusal to institute rulemaking proceedings is subject to review of "extremely

limited, highlydeferentialscope"). The petition for rulemaking asserted that the Department's actions

under the NOV rule were frustrating the state primacy scheme set out byCongress. The Department

responded that, as it had concluded before, the rule was authorized by the statute so that the

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5Appellants suggest that, as it turns out, the Department was not particularly prescient on this

score. They cite statistics to the effect that the Department has in fact issued an increasing

number of NOVs. We may not consider this non-record information in deciding whether the

Department acted reasonably in denying the rulemaking. See § 1276(b) ("The court shall hear

such petition or complaint solely on the record made before the Secretary."). 

Department's use of the rule could hardly frustrate the statute'sscheme. And, the Department noted

that the incidence of NOVs under the rule was limited to a small number of states, and in any event

was declining in each successive yearsuch that whatever unwarranted intrusion the NOV rule created

was diminishing over time.5 Given the limited scope of our review, and given the Department's

adequate response to the concerns expressed in the petition based on grounds arising after the sixtieth

day, we do not think that the Department acted unreasonably in denying the petition for rulemaking.

* * * *

Although the district court acted on the merits asto all claims and we conclude that the court

lacked jurisdiction as to those claims based on grounds existing within 60 days of the promulgation

or repromulgation ofthe NOV rule, we have "discretion to uphold a summary judgment under a legal

theory different from that applied by the trial court, and rest the affirmance on any ground that finds

support in the record." Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 710, 720 n.23

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We therefore affirm the district court's

judgment dismissing all counts.

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