Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01143/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01143-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSO BAILEY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07 CV 1143 JM (NLS)

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

2) GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND

3) DENYING MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

Doc. Nos. 58, 61, 63, 67

vs.

D. HOLLISTER ID NO. 3662, WILLIAM

LANSDOWNE, RUDY RESCH, STAR

TOWING, GEORGE VALUERDE, SAN

DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF DEPUTY NO.

1373, WILLIAM KOLENDER, 5

UNKNOWN POLICE AND SHERIFF

DEPUTIES,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC” or “Complaint”)

on August 27, 2008, alleging various violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986. (Doc. No. 56.)

Before the court are the following motions, including two by Defendants D. Hollister and the City of

San Diego (“City Defendants”) and one by Defendants Michelle Gardenhire, David Ingram, and the

County of San Diego (“County Defendants”):

1) The City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Complaint, directed

specifically to Plaintiff’s first and second “causes of action” (Doc. No. 58);

Case 3:07-cv-01143-JM-NLS Document 78 Filed 11/03/08 Page 1 of 12
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1

Based on the City Defendants’ unopposed request, the court takes judicial notice of the docket

in this case, all documents previously subject to judicial notice in this case, and the “Lodgment”

attached to the City’s Motion (Doc. No. 61).

2

The City Defendants move, in the alternative, to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the

alternative, for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). In light of the disposition on the City’s

motions for summary judgment, the court does not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(e) arguments.

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2) The City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all Plaintiff’s claims for

relief (Doc. No. 61);1

3) The County Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 63); and

4) Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 11 (Doc. No. 67).

Plaintiff filed an opposition titled to address only the second motion listed above. (Doc. No.

67.) Given the significant overlap in the two City motions, the court liberally construes Plaintiff’s

opposition as responding to both City submissions. The opposition was filed October 6, 2008 nunc

pro tunc and served sometime thereafter, beyond the deadline of September 26, 2008 set by Local

C.R. 7.1(e)(2). Although the court subsequently extended the City Defendants’ reply period to

October 17, 2008 (Doc. No. 71), the City Defendants object to the opposition as untimely. (Doc. No.

76 at 2:4-12.) In the interest of ensuring motions are determined on the merits after full briefing, and

seeing no prejudice to Defendants, the court declines to strike Plaintiff’s opposition. The City

Defendants filed timely reply briefs. (Doc. Nos. 75, 76.) Plaintiff filed no opposition to the County

Defendants’ motion.

Plaintiff objects to the City motions as untimely, as they were filed after the pre-trial motion

deadline of July 31, 2008 set by Magistrate Judge Stormes and without a concurrent request for

enlargement of time. (Doc. No. 16.) Prompted by this court’s grant to Plaintiff of leave to file his

SAC, all pre-trial dates have since been vacated. (Doc. No. 73.) Thus, the court allows the abovereferenced City and County motions to proceed. 

The three City and County motions were taken under submission by the court pursuant to Civil

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) on October 17, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, the court hereby

GRANTS the City Defendants’ motions for summary judgment,2 GRANTS the County Defendants’

motion to dismiss, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 

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3

Defendant Rudy Resch is owner and/or manager of Star Towing. The court notes Defendant

Rudy Resch may be considered a state actor and thus a City Defendant. There is a “sufficiently close

nexus between the State and the challenged action of the (towing company) so that the action of the

latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Stypmann v. City and County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1977). Even if Resch is not considered a City Defendant, Plaintiff’s

case against him is dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m) for failure of service.

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I. Background

Plaintiff brought this civil rights action on June 25, 2007. On July 3, 2007, the court granted

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice

as to defendants Lansdowne, Kolender and Valuerde. (Doc. No. 3.) On January 29, 2008, Plaintiff

filed an FAC (Doc. No. 20), which was dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. No. 50.) The court’s

order of dismissal defined the scope of Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims to include violations of §

1983 based on alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, use of excessive force, unlawful deprivation

of property without due process, and municipal liability under Monell, as well as a violation of § 1986.

(Doc. No. 50.) Plaintiff subsequently filed his SAC.

The SAC contains the following factual allegations. On July 1, 2006, Plaintiff was driving his

motorcycle in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego and encountered a police motorcycle parked in the

roadway. (SAC at 3.) He noticed a police officer, later identified as Defendant Hollister, at the

entrance of a Ralph’s grocery store, facing away from the street. (SAC at 3.) As Plaintiff passed the

parked police motorcycle, he raised his foot “to avoid contact with the police motorcycle” and, after

passing, replaced his foot back on his motorcycle foot peg. (SAC at 3.) Defendant Hollister and an

unknown San Diego City sergeant stopped Plaintiff, allegedly without cause. (SAC at 3-4.) After

checking Plaintiff’s driver’s license, Hollister issued Plaintiff a notice to appear for operation of the

motorcycle without an endorsement, in violation of California Vehicle Code § 12500. (SAC at 4.)

In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues he holds a valid motorcycle endorsement. (SAC at 7.) Hollister and

the unknown City sergeant took possession of Plaintiff’s motorcycle and instructed Plaintiff he could

contact Star Towing to claim it.3 (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff called Star Towing later the same evening and

was told the cost to recover the motorcycle was $600. (SAC at 5). Plaintiff never retrieved his

motorcycle. 

 In a separate incident on October 16, 2006, three San Diego County Sheriff Deputies arrested

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Plaintiff while Plaintiff attended traffic court at 8950 Clairemont Mesa Boulevard in San Diego. (SAC

at 6.) Plaintiff was handcuffed and was “forcefully, with excess, stripped of the contents of [his]

pockets.” (SAC at 6.) The County Defendants transported Plaintiff to 1173 Front Street, where he

was “falsely imprisoned” until the following day. (SAC at 6.) On October 17, 2006, Sheriff Kolender

and Kolender’s deputies transported Plaintiff to a California state court at 250 Main Street in El Cajon,

California. (SAC at 6.) Plaintiff was “instructed to stand in a closet before a television with a blur

figure.” (SAC at 6.) The “unknown woman” accompanying him did “not produce a complaint nor

a warrant, or respond with a reason for [his] detention.” (SAC at 6.) Plaintiff was then transported

back to 1173 Front Street and “falsely imprisoned” for another four days. (SAC at 6.) He was

“expelled from the County Jail” on October 21, 2006. (SAC at 6.) Later that morning, upon returning

to 8950 Clairemont Mesa Boulevard to retrieve his vehicle, he found it had been “vandalized by the

Unknown Police Deputies” on state property. (SAC at 6.) “The automatic transmission fluid was

drained out and was not on the ground below the Plaintiff’s Vehicle. The vehicle engine would start

and run but the transmission would not engage.” (SAC at 7.)

As the County Defendants aptly note, Plaintiff’s two “causes of action” are more appropriately

considered as factual support for his “claims for relief.” The court therefore construes Plaintiff’s

complaint as directed to § 1983 claims based on municipal liability under Monell (claim 1), false

arrest and false imprisonment (claim 2), and use of excessive force and unlawful deprivation of

property without due process (claim 4), a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (claim 3), and state law claims

arising under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (claim 5) and respondeat superior theories (claim 6).

II. City Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

981 (1979). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its

motion and identifying those portions of the file it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

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of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Rule 56 contains “no express

or implied requirement . . . that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar

materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. The opposing party cannot rest on mere allegations or

denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely

solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989).

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt as to the existence of any issue

of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). On a motion for summary judgment, when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at

trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence

were uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Int’l

Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059

(1992)).

B. Analysis

1. Municipal Liability under Monell

The City Defendants move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claim for

municipal liability. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 only where “action pursuant to official

municipal policy ofsome nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.

Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional

violation. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated” by City officials. Id. at 690; see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d

911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). The court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of the City

Defendants on the Monell claim.

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Plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony, taken during discovery in this case, is appropriately

considered on a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e)(1).

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2. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

For the July 1, 2006 incident, Plaintiff makes a claim for false arrest, and for the October 16,

2006 incident, he alleges he was subject to false arrest and false imprisonment. Plaintiff conceded in

his deposition4 no City Defendants were involved in his arrest on October 16 or his subsequent

incarceration. (Doc. No. 58 at 18:8-15.)

With respect to the July 1 event, Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating he was arrested

by Defendant Hollister. In fact, Plaintiff testified under oath he was not arrested when he was pulled

over in Pacific Beach. (Doc. No. 61 at 11:11-15 and 12:10-12). Without an arrest, there can be no

issue of material fact regarding a lack of cause for the arrest, and Plaintiff’s claim therefore fails. The

court grants summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants on the claims for false arrest and false

imprisonment.

3. Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges a violation of § 1986 by the City Defendants. “Section 1986

imposes liability on every person who knows of an impending violation of section 1985 but neglects

or refuses to prevent the violation.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626

(9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). A plaintiff can only state a claim under § 1986 if the plaintiff

alleges a valid claim under § 1985. Id. Section 1985 prohibits, inter alia, conspiracy “for the purpose

of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws[.]” 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim for violation of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege four elements:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and

(3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or

property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp

Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). The second element additionally requires a plaintiff to

“demonstrate a deprivation of that right motived by ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

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In fact, Plaintiff admits in his deposition Defendant Hollister used no force against him during

the July 1, 2006 traffic stop. (Doc. No. 61 at 15:14-15.)

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invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’” Id. (quoting Griffith v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations related to conspiracy are largely conclusory. He alleges

Defendants “are responsible for ‘the unknown police deputies’ that witness the civil rights violations

and made no attempt to intervene or to prevent” such acts. (SAC at 9.) Notably, Plaintiff’s § 1986

claim does not allege any deprivation of rights was motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Despite the court’s directive in its prior order, Plaintiff fails to address these deficiencies

in his SAC. (Doc. No. 50.) The court grants summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants on

Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim.

4. Use of Excessive Force and Unlawful Deprivation of Property

Although Plaintiff’s fourth claim is entitled “excessive force,” it appears to make a claim only

for unlawful deprivation of property without due process.5

 For the reasons set forth in the court’s

August 12 order (Doc. No. 50), Plaintiff fails to state a viable due process claim related to the taking

of his motorcycle on July 1, 2006. As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any City

Defendants were involved in any alleged excessive force or unlawful deprivation during his October

16 arrest or subsequent incarceration. Finally, Plaintiff does not identify specific City Defendants who

allegedly damaged his vehicle during his October 16-21 incarceration. The court grants summary

judgment for the City Defendants on the claims for excessive force and unlawful deprivation of

property without due process. 

5. State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s fifth claim alleges a state law violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, predicated on

violations of the United States and California Constitutions, and his sixth claim asserts liability of the

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6

The court notes the San Diego Police Department is not a defendant in this case.

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San Diego Police Department6 and the City of San Diego under a theory of respondeat superior. As

courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional

power and are “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence....” Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)(citations omitted). In light

of Plaintiff’s failure to state any federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

and does not reach the merits of the state law claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715

(1966). Thus, these claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).

III. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in “extraordinary”

cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). In evaluating a 12(b)(6)

motion, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.

dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996). The court should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where the complaint

lacks either a “cognizable legal theory” or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The complaint’s “factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (U.S. May 21, 2007) (allegations must provide “plausible

grounds to infer” that plaintiff is entitled to relief). In testing the complaint’s legal adequacy, the court

may consider material properly submitted as part of the complaint or subject to judicial notice. Swartz

v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Where a plaintiff in a civil rights case appears in propria persona, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panaki v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the court may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673

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F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A complaint’s “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations” will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id.; see also Jones v.

Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

are insufficient to state claim under § 1983). Instead, “[t]he plaintiff must allege with at least some

degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Municipal Liability under Monell

The County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claim for municipal

liability. As discussed above, see section II.B.1, supra, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional

violation and fails to allege facts demonstrating any County policy or regulation is responsible for

such violation. The court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County Defendants.

2. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Plaintiff bases his claims on the July 1 (false arrest) and October 16 (false arrest and false

imprisonment) incidents. As a first consideration, Plaintiff provides no facts linking any County

Defendant to the July 1 event. 

Plaintiff alleges County Defendants Gardenhire and Ingram falsely arrested him without a

warrant on October 16, 2006, and falsely imprisoned him from October 16-21, 2006. (SAC at 8.)

Neither these contentions nor any others in the SAC establish the circumstances of the arrest and

imprisonment. This deficiency alone warrants dismissal of the claims.

The County Defendants argue the claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), as arising out of Plaintiff’s prior conviction in People v. Bailey, San Diego Superior Court

Case No. C245556 (hereinafter “Case No. C245556”). In Heck, the Supreme Court held,

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness could render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a writ of

habeas corpus.

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Id. at 486-87. A damages claim bearing a direct relationship to the length or validity of a sentence that

has not already been shown to be invalid is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Claims

potentially barred by Heck include wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. See Guerrero v. Gates,

442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (wrongful arrest cannot have occurred unless the defendant “were

innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d

374, 380 (1998) (“To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [plaintiff] would

have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him.”).

In its dismissal of Plaintiff’s FAC, the court instructed Plaintiff to set forth sufficient

allegations to inform the court and Defendants whether his claims are based upon an arrest in Case

No. C245556 or whether another basis for the claim exists. (Doc. No. 50.) Rather than addressing the

court’s directive, Plaintiff removed all reference to Case No. C245556 in his SAC. The court relies

on the People v. Bailey case documents previously subject to judicial notice in this case, and finds

Plaintiff’s claim on the October 16 incident barred by Heck. 

The court therefore grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the false arrest and

false imprisonment claims. 

3. Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges a violation of § 1986 by the County Defendants. For the same

reasons discussed with respect to the City’s motions (section II.B.3., supra), Plaintiff’s claim fails.

The County Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on the § 1986 claim. 

4. Use of Excessive Force and Unlawful Deprivation of Property

In support of Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force based on his October 16, 2006 arrest, he

contends “[t]hree San Diego Sheriffs...grabbed my arms and handcuffed me” and that he was then

“forcefully, with excess, stripped of the contents of [his] pockets.” (SAC at 6.) However, as the

authorities relied on by the County Defendants make clear, handcuffing an arrestee under such

circumstances is “objectively reasonable” and does not qualify as excessive force. See Walker v.

Benter, 41 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1074-75 (C.D.Cal. 1999); Davenport v. Rodriguez, 147 F.Supp.2d 630,

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637 (S.D.Tex. 2001). Though reasonableness questions are usually reserved for jury consideration,

“defendants can still win on summary judgment if the district court concludes after resolving all facts

in favor of the plaintiff, that the officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances.” Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). Since

Plaintiff alleges no additional relevant facts, the court finds excessive force was not used during his

arrest and incarceration and grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim.

On the unlawful deprivation issue, Plaintiff provides no facts linking any County Defendant

to the taking of his motorcycle by Officer Hollister on July 1. In addition, Plaintiff fails to identify

any specific County Defendants involved in the alleged “vandaliz[ing]” of his vehicle during his

October 16-21 incarceration. The court therefore grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss

on Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful deprivation of property.

5. State Law Claims (Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief)

As discussed above, without any viable federal claims, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear

Plaintiff’s state law claims. The court therefore grants the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on

Plaintiff’s claims under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 and respondeat superior theories and dismisses the

claims without prejudice.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

A. Legal Standards

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1), the court may impose sanctions upon an attorney who presents to

the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper “for any improper purpose, such as to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” FRCP 11(b)(1). A motion for

sanctions “must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” FRCP 11(c)(2).

Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement, a party seeking sanctions must give the

opposing party 21 days after service of the motion to “withdraw or appropriately correct[]” the

challenged document. FRCP 11(c)(2). Courts “enforce this safe harbor provision strictly” and will

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not impose sanctions “when the challenging party failed to comply with the safe harbor provisions,

even when the underlying filing is frivolous.” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 2005);

see also Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.2d 1046, 1052 (“before sanctions may be imposed upon a party there

must be sufficient, advance notice of exactly which conduct was alleged to be sanctionable” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that Defendants filed their motions to dismiss

in bad faith. He objects to references to alleged prior criminal proceedings against him. While he

raises numerous evidentiary objections, he fails to provide evidence of bad faith. Furthermore,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he complied with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision. The court

therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s request for Rule 11 sanctions.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby GRANTS the City Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 58 and 61), GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss (with prejudice

on the federal claims and without prejudice on the state law claims) (Doc. No. 63), and DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 67). As this ruling disposes of all claims, the Clerk of Court

is instructed to close the case file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2008

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

Case 3:07-cv-01143-JM-NLS Document 78 Filed 11/03/08 Page 12 of 12