Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01810/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN ALAN GILLICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 3:12-cv-1810-LAB

(PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE: 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

(Doc. 11); and

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.

14.)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff seeks judicial review of Acting

Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application

for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act and Supplemental

Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Act. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 11), and Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 14). The Honorable Larry A. Burns referred the matter

to undersigned judge for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B). After a thorough review of all pleadings and the entire record

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submitted in this matter, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment be GRANTED. 

II.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Shawn Alan Gillick filed an application for Disability Insurance

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income on March 19, 2009, alleging an

inability to work beginning July 20, 2002. (A.R. 156-162.) After Plaintiff’s

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (A.R. 99-100.) On July 22,

2010, Plaintiff appeared and testified before ALJ Eve B. Godfrey. (A.R. 24-76.)

Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Id.) An impartial medical expert, Alfred G.

Jonas, M.D., appeared and testified. Vocational expert Mark Remas also appeared

and testified at the hearing. (Id.) In a decision dated February 25, 2011, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d) and

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. (A.R. 10-20.) In her decision, the ALJ made the

following findings: 

1. The claimant has met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2007.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 20, 2002, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Personality disorder with passive aggressive, borderline and narcissistic traits

(20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

404.1520(d), 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

following nonexertional limitations: The claimant can work in a

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nonpublic work environment with minimal contact with others.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a housekeeper. This work does not require the performance of

work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 20, 2002, through the date of this

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(A.R. 12-20.) 

On May 19, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

and adopted the decision of the ALJ as the final decision of the Commissioner.

(A.R. 1-3.) Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on July 23, 2012. (Doc. 1.) 

Defendant answered on September 20, 2012. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 11), and Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14). 

This Report and Recommendation addresses both motions pending before it. 

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

A. Medical Evidence

1. Treating Physicians

Plaintiff was honorably discharged from the United States Marine Corps on

July 19, 2002. (A.R. 164.) He cites the following day as the onset date for his

disability claim. (A.R. 156-162.) On September 26, 2002, Plaintiff presented to the

Department of Veterans Affairs as a new patient. (A.R. 433.) Plaintiff continued

treatment at the VA and was seen in relation to diagnoses of bipolar disorder as

well and addiction to cough syrup. (A.R. 363-357.)

On November 2, 2007, Plaintiff was admitted to the inpatient detox program at

the VA. (A. R 560.) Upon admission, his intake records reflect that he wished to

address “chronic use of dextromethorphan and intermittent binging on

methamphetamines.” (A.R. 552.) He remained there for 28 days and was

discharged on November 30, 2007. (A.R. 504.) In the discharge notes, the

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reporting nurse gave Plaintiff a good prognosis and opined he would “improve if

he remains in the recovery home and becomes active in the 12-step program, works

with his sponsor, finds a home group and attends Aftercare.” (A.R. 506.)

During detox, Plaintiff attended Substance Abuse Treatment Program (SATP)

group counseling and Substance Abuse Mental Illness (SAMI) program counseling

and received additional clinical counseling in nutrition and recreation. (A.R. 504-

571.) The SAMI program addressed Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder in concert with

substance abuse. (Id.) Progress notes made by clinicians during Plaintiff’s stay

detailed daily meetings attended, notable interactions with inpatient staff, and

updates on Patient’s progress through the detox process. (Id.) SATP notes included

interactions with peers, uses of day passes to socialize in the San Diego area, goal

setting, and general positive progression through the treatment process. (Id.)

Following the detox program, Plaintiff continued his participation in SAMI

while living at Way Back, a recovery home. (A.R. 498-500.) Plaintiff failed to

attend or reschedule his first four SAMI meetings following his discharge. (Id.) On

January 8, 2008, Plaintiff attended a SAMI meeting where he reported continued

drug abstinence and that he was attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and

Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings regularly. (A.R. 494.) Additionally, Plaintiff

reported that he was actively applying for jobs and that his goal was to submit four

applications per day. (Id.) On February 25, 2008, Plaintiff reported that he left Way

Back and moved back in with his surrogate father, Alan Harris. (A.R. 491.)

Plaintiff stated he left the recovery home because it was “not [an] environment

where I can work on recovery.” (Id.) Plaintiff failed to attend the two subsequent

SAMI meetings following his departure from Way Back. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contacted a VA social worker to indicate that he had relapsed on

February 25, 2008. (A.R. 490.) In the next SAMI meeting Plaintiff attended, he

reported that he was no longer attending AA or NA meetings. (Id.) Despite

relapsing, Plaintiff remained enrolled in SAMI until April 19, 2008, when he was

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discharged due to repeated absences. (A.R. 486.) Plaintiff enrolled in Alcohol Drug

Treatment Program (ADTP) group counseling on December 1, 2008; however, due

to consistent no-shows, he was discharged 23 days later. (A.R. 472.) Plaintiff’s

medical record lacked entries between late December 2008 and March of 2009,

when Plaintiff submitted his application for benefits with the Social Security

Administration.

2. Mental Health Consultation for Social Security Administration

At the request of the Department of Social Security, Dr. Gregory M. Nicholson

conducted a comprehensive Psychiatric Evaluation of the Plaintiff and completed a

report of his findings on May 4, 2009. (A.R. 329-335.) Dr. Nicholson was not

provided with any of Plaintiff’s past medical records at the time of his evaluation.

(A.R. 329.) In his report, Dr. Nicholson included a diagnostic impression that

Plaintiff was suffering from Bipolar Disorder (not otherwise specified) and OCD.

(A.R. 333.) Dr. Nicholson reported that Plaintiff’s condition was “expected to

improve in the next twelve months with active treatment.” (A.R. 334.)

Dr. Nicholson indicated Plaintiff is able to “understand, remember, and carry

out simple one or two-step job instructions” and that Plaintiff was capable of

carrying out “detailed and complex instructions.” (A.R. 334.) Dr. Nicholson

reported that Plaintiff’s ability to relate to and interact with coworkers and the

public, associate with day-to-day work activity, and maintain regular attendance in

the work place and perform work activities on a consistent basis are all moderately

limited. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Nicholson determined that Plaintiff’s ability to

maintain concentration and attention, persistence and pace and to perform work

activities without special or additional supervision is mildly limited. (Id.) Lastly,

Dr. Nicholson reported that Plaintiff’s ability to accept instructions from

supervisors is not limited. (Id.)

3. Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment

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On May 15, 2009, reviewing physician Dr. Kelly Loomis completed a

Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment. (A.R. 338-53.) Dr. Loomis conducted the assessment using medical

records from the Department of Veterans Affairs and Seagate Medical Group

(comprehensive psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Nicholson). (A.R. 352.)

Dr. Loomis determined that in terms of the categories of Affective Disorders,

Anxiety-Related Disorders, and Substance Addiction Disorders, Plaintiff suffered

from a medically determinable impairment, but that his impairments did not

“precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria.” (AR. 341, 342, 344.) In assessing the B

Criteria of the Listings, Dr. Loomis reported that Plaintiff’s difficulties in

maintaining social functioning and difficulties in maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace were moderately limited. (A.R. 346.) However, there was no

restriction of activities of daily living or repeated episodes of decompensation,

each of extended duration. (Id.) 

Dr. Loomis concluded that Plaintiff was “capable of understanding,

remembering and carrying out one to two step tasks.” (A.R. 352.) Additionally,

according to the report, Plaintiff is “able to interact adequately with coworkers and

supervisors but may have difficulty dealing with the demands of general public

contact.” (Id.)

4. Plaintiff’s Disability Reports

Plaintiff completed Disability Report – Adult-Form SSA-3368 – as part of his

initial application for benefits. (A.R. 217-223.) In the undated report, Plaintiff

stated that mental impairment, bipolar disorder, depression, social anxiety, and

obsessive compulsive disorder anxiety have limited his ability to work. (A.R. 218.) 

He stated his work is limited because he “isolate[s] and [does not] want to be in

places where there are people,” and he sleeps all day. (Id.) Plaintiff added that he

suffers from a “major anger control problem” and at one time cut himself. (Id.)

Plaintiff stated he stopped working “because of [his] disability,” though he did

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report working minor jobs after the date he claimed his disability first interfered

with his ability to work. (Id.) 

Plaintiff reported that he was previously employed as a hotel housekeeper,

cook, and logistics worker. (A.R. 219.) Plaintiff stated that his longest held job was

as a logistics and warehouse worker in the United States Marine Corps. (Id.) At

this job, Plaintiff cleaned barracks, did office and warehouse administrative work,

used forklifts, and shot at a rifle range. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that special tools,

machines, technical knowledge, and technical skills were required to complete his

job. (Id.) In his past work, Plaintiff stated that he walked or stood ten hours per day

and sat for four hours. (Id.) He stooped one hour, kneeled one and a half hours,

crouched one hour, handled large objects for three hours, reached three and a half

hours, and wrote or typed five hours per day. (Id.) Plaintiff stated he lifted or

carried boxes of supplies that were regularly 20 pounds but could exceed 100

pounds. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff reported that as a lead worker, a portion of his

position included supervising ten people, which was roughly forty percent of his

day. (A.R. 219-220.)

Plaintiff stated that he was seen by a doctor for his mental conditions. (A.R.

220.) He provided contact information so that SSA could access records from the

Department of Veterans Affairs, San Diego Healthcare System (Id.) Plaintiff

stated he completed two years of college in 2005. (A.R. 222.)

Plaintiff completed Disability Report Appeal – SSA-3441 – on August 17,

2009, after his initial application was denied. (A.R. 228-235.) There, he reported

that he continued to remain isolated, but had no new limitations. (A.R. 230.)

Plaintiff also stated that he could not care for his “hygiene, bathing, eating, and

other tasks related to daily functioning.” (A.R. 228.) Plaintiff stated he becomes

irritable which has an effect on his “dealings with other people” and that he is

“severely limited in [his] daily activities and routine.” (A.R. 229.) Plaintiff stated

he is “incapable of existing as a normal human being” which has rendered him

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“bed-ridden.” (Id.)

Plaintiff subsequently completed an additional undated appellate Disability

Report – Appeal Form SSA-3441. (A.R. 239-245.) There, Plaintiff reported that

his condition had worsened and that he was then suffering from “extreme

depression, anxiety, irritability, suicide ideation, chaos, and panic attacks,” and that

he felt “totally and completely out of control.” (A.R. 240.) 

B. Administrative Hearing

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Before ALJ Eve B. Godfrey, Plaintiff testified regarding his work history,

medical conditions, and consequent limitations. (A.R. 24-53.) Plaintiff testified in

person and was represented by his attorney, Mr. Roy Cannon. (A.R. 24.) Plaintiff

testified that he served in the Marine Corps from 1998 until 2002, and then

sporadically designed websites until 2006, but that his anxiety, OCD, and anger

problems prevented him from working. (A.R. 43.) Plaintiff testified that he last

worked in March of 2006. (A.R. 30.) 

Plaintiff testified that he has anxiety, depression, OCD, and a problem with

authority. (A.R. 43.) Plaintiff reported that he has agoraphobia and “social anxiety

to the point where [he] can’t even leave the house.” (A.R. 33.) According to

Plaintiff, because he suffers from OCD, he has to “check everything a million

times” if he were to leave the house. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he is unable to

keep appointments and “can’t function because of the anxiety of leaving the

house.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported that his daily routine consisted of sleeping for days

at a time and then using cough syrup. (Id.)

Plaintiff enrolled in a dual diagnosis program through the VA called SAMI

(Substance Abuse and Mental Illness), where he obtained treatment prior to a

relapse. (A.R. 34-5.) After the relapse, Plaintiff testified that he was kicked out of

SAMI. He reported “feeling that I didn’t have a problem with it” and did not think

that he should have to go. (A.R. 35.) Plaintiff reported he was hospitalized in

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December of 2007 and successfully detoxed for thirty days. (Id.) That thirty day

period was “the only time that [he] has been clean of the dextromethorphan.” (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he has been unable to remain drug-free for a period that long

since December/January 2007. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he began ADTP “around September or November” of

2009 and at the time of the ALJ hearing he had been attending “religiously.” (A.R.

36.) Plaintiff testified that although he has been attending ADTP consistently, he

still used cough syrup. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that the role of the ADTP meetings

was simply to “gain information about addiction.” (A.R. 37.) Plaintiff reported that

he believed that he was getting help “in some way” by attending the meetings, even

though he was continuing to use the drug. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he experiences anxiety when he goes to the VA, though

he stated that he has not taken medication for anxiety at any time. (A.R. 46.)

Plaintiff reported “I feel like they’re not listening to me and they’re not there for

me. I just don’t trust ‘em.” (A.R. 41.) He testified to being unsatisfied with the

VA’s lack of individual counseling programs as well as the insufficiency of the

group counseling. (A.R. 41.) He reported that going to the VA was a big hassle for

him. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he struggles to find transportation from his home in

Hillcrest, California to the VA, which is located in La Jolla, California. (A.R. 42.)

Plaintiff testified that without an income he does not have money to afford bus

fare. (Id.) 

Plaintiff testified that prior to his service as a Marine, he was employed in two

service industry jobs. (A.R. 67.) Plaintiff stated that he worked as a hotel

housekeeper at a Best Western from 1995 to 1997. (Id.) While the dates are not

provided, Plaintiff also testified that he worked at McDonalds as a fast food

worker. (A.R. 68.) 

Plaintiff enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1998. (A.R. 34.) In 1999, Plaintiff was

deployed overseas for two months and then spent one year deployed in Okinawa,

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Japan in 2000. (Id.) While Plaintiff had stopped his substance abuse at the start of

his military career, it was in Okinawa that Plaintiff resumed abusing cough syrup

moderately. (Id.) 

As a Marine, Plaintiff served as a Logistics Coordinator. (A.R. 47.) Plaintiff

likened his role in the Logistics Warehouse to a position as a package carrier for

UPS. (A.R. 68.) Plaintiff testified that he had additional administrative duties that

included coordinating movement of personnel, movement of large vehicles, and

logistical support for deployment overseas. (Id.) He was discharged honorably at

the end of his service obligation and testified that he did not want to continue

serving in the military as a gay man under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.

(A.R. 47.) Plaintiff testified that he had “irritability issues and anxiety issues even

back when [he] was in the military.” (A.R. 48.) When asked to explain how he was

able to successfully serve as a Marine despite his stated issues with authority

figures, Plaintiff testified that service was his only way to afford college and that it

was “a very good experience.” (A.R. 49.)

Plaintiff testified that after leaving the military he used the G.I. Bill to fund

college. (A.R. 48.) Plaintiff attended for two years and earned a 4.0 GPA. (A.R.

50.) Plaintiff reported his success in college was because he “didn’t feel like the

people at college were like the people in the military.” (Id.) Plaintiff said he saw

his professors as authority figures but that it was different because he was

“achieving things.” (Id.) Plaintiff testified his goal was to eventually be a professor

and that he enjoyed school, learning, academia, and “that kind of life.” (A.R. 51.)

Plaintiff testified that he stopped going to school because his funding through

the G.I. Bill ran out and that he had not planned ahead by working part time for

supplemental income. (A.R. 51.) Plaintiff further testified that he was unable to get

a job due to the economy. Plaintiff stated that he had submitted applications for

administrative assistant and website design positions in January of 2008, but he

believed he was not hired due to weight-based discrimination. (A.R. 51-52.)

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In March 2006, Plaintiff worked a web design job for roughly a week. (A.R.

30.) The position ended because Plaintiff had a “heated-confrontation with the

owner.” (Id.) Plaintiff testified that his supervisor would say “...this isn’t rocket

science” and ask “Do you not know how to do this?” (A.R. 31.) After storming into

an associate’s office and threatening to quit, the company decided to let Plaintiff go

and paid him for the remainder of the week. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he briefly had his own business doing website design but

that it “was not substantive enough to be considered an income.” (A.R. 32.)

Plaintiff said that the jobs he had were very limited and he was paid “a couple

hundred dollars here, a couple hundred dollars there.” (Id.) Plaintiff testified that

the jobs were hard to find and that when he worked, he was “a perfectionist to a

fault” as a result of his OCD. (A.R. 52.) Plaintiff stated that the clients who hired

him for web design projects were satisfied with his work. (A.R. 53.)

Plaintiff testified that all of his living expenses including clothing, food, and

shelter were provided for by his surrogate father, Mr. Alan Harris. (A.R. 32.)

Plaintiff testified that he met Mr. Harris online in 1996 when Plaintiff threatened to

commit suicide. (A.R. 42.) When Plaintiff left the military in 2002, he moved in

with Mr. Harris and has continued to live with him since that time. (A.R. 43.)

Plaintiff is totally dependent on Mr. Harris for everything and testified that if

Harris died tomorrow, he would be homeless on the street or likely dead. (A.R.

46.) Mr. Harris is not working and at the time of the ALJ hearing, Mr. Harris’

unemployment benefits had just run out. (A.R. 32.) Plaintiff said that financially,

things were currently “pivotal” and “critical.” (A.R. 32-33.)

Plaintiff attributed much of his inability to work to a combination of anxiety

and anger. He testified that he becomes so anxious prior to work that he becomes

nauseated, and cannot eat or concentrate. (A.R. 43.) Plaintiff testified that he is

unable to “deal with the pressure of somebody scrutinizing and ... nitpicking

everything I do,” and that he “[doesn’t] do authority very well.” (Id.) Additionally,

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Plaintiff testified that he would be unable to do a job that consisted of simple

repetitive tasks. (A.R. 46.) Plaintiff reported that he had anxiety related to dealing

with inanimate objects and mundane employment. Additionally, he argued that he

would be unable to complete anything due to complications from his OCD. (Id.)

2. Psychological Expert’s Testimony

Psychological Expert Mr. Alfred Jonas, M.D. testified at the hearing on

Plaintiff’s mental health conditions. (A.R. 54-66.) Dr. Jonas addressed the medical

record he was provided and was also afforded an opportunity to interview Plaintiff

during the hearing. (A.R. 47-53.) Dr. Jonas testified to the following conditions

discussed in Plaintiff’s medical record: bipolar disorder, OCD, and substance

abuse. (A.R. 54.) In addition, Dr. Jonas proposed that the testimony of Plaintiff

was evidence of a personality disorder with “narcissistic and borderline

components.” (A.R. 55.) 

Dr. Jonas, after having reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, testified that there

was “absolutely nothing in [the] record that would allow confirmation of 12.04

[bipolar disorder] in any form.” (A.R. 55.) Dr Jonas stated that exhibited symptoms

were a function of Plaintiff’s substance abuse and that there was no support for a

bipolar disorder diagnosis. (A.R. 56.) Additionally, Dr. Jonas testified that

Plaintiff’s description of his behaviors provided no outward manifestations with

implications as to Plaintiff’s ability to function. (A.R. 56-57.) According to Dr.

Jonas, Plaintiff’s complaint of “OCD” is “simply a passive aggressive expression

of a personality problem.” (A.R. 57) As a result, Dr. Jonas testified that neither

bipolar disorder or OCD would be able to satisfy the A-Criteria. (A.R. 56-7.)

In discussing Plaintiff’s substance abuse, Dr. Jonas testified that the resulting

complications easily satisfied A-Criteria requirements. (A.R. 57.) Citing VA

medical records regarding Plaintiff’s hospitalization, Dr. Jonas testified that there

were no observable manic behaviors associated with bipolar disorder in Plaintiff

“apart from the substance abuse.” (Id.) Quoting direct passages from Plaintiff’s

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medical record, Dr. Jonas testified that Plaintiff’s substance abuse “is not only

active but consequential in terms of functioning.” (A.R. 59.)

Finding the A Criteria met through substance abuse (12.09) and a personality

disorder (12.08), Dr. Jonas then “attempted to analyze the B Criteria in terms of

activities of daily living (ADL).” (A.R. 59.) Dr. Jonas reported that the

comprehensive evaluation conducted by Dr. Nicholson in May of 2009 shows

ADLs as “fully intact.” (A.R. 329.) Dr. Jonas stated that there was no evidence in

the record that would support a finding of impairment in ADLs despite Plaintiff’s

complaints of “considerable impairment in his personal testimony.” (Id.) Dr. Jonas

testified that “on the basis of the record, it is not clear that there’s any actual

impairment in ability to perform activities of daily living.” (Id.)

Dr. Jonas testified that maintenance of appropriate social functioning, as a

viewed with respect to 12.08, was markedly impaired. (A.R. 60.) Dr. Jonas further

reported that there was only a “possibility of a mild impairment” with regard to

concentration, persistence, and pace. (Id.) Deterioration of functional settings was

challenging for Dr. Jonas to report on, because Dr. Jonas reported that Plaintiff has

taken “discretionary opportunities” and “has chosen not to function in settings

where he can essentially afford not to function because he has Mr. Harris to do the

functioning for him.” (Id.) Dr. Jonas offered that Plaintiff’s experience in the

Marines, two years of college, and the odd jobs after the Marines are evidence of

successful functioning at Plaintiff’s discretion. (A.R. 60-61.)

Testifying that Plaintiff would have a “meaningful personality problem”

regardless of his substance abuse, Dr. Jonas still regarded Plaintiff’s substance

abuse as “somewhat material” in that it makes Plaintiff “less stable.” (A.R. 61.) Dr.

Jonas reported that Plaintiff would have a “capacity for pretty good or very good

functioning that he has actualized in other settings like the military, college, and a

few little jobs” if he were to stop using cough syrup and remain drug-free. (A.R.

62.) 

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In discussing Plaintiff’s ability to work, Dr. Jonas testified that Plaintiff could

work an unskilled job. Dr. Jonas contended that Plaintiff would “have problems

with people, but especially authority figures” while also noting that “there are

times that he’s willing to set all of that aside and simply do a reasonable job or a

credible job or even a good job.” (Id.) Dr. Jonas reported that there is evidence of

Plaintiff in situations with authority figures where he has been successful including

the military, school, and the highly authoritarian environment of an inpatient

rehabilitation program. (A.R. 65.) Dr. Jonas testified that Plaintiff was “capable of

applying himself when he wants to and when the substance issue doesn’t intervene,

and [that] he can be successful.” (Id.)

When asked to discuss Plaintiff’s psychiatric evaluations, reported

impairments and level of functioning in terms of equaling a listed impairment, Dr.

Jonas testified that he believed that “a lot of this low level function or abdication of

function is essentially discretionary” and that “12.08 [personality disorder] and

12.09 [substance abuse] ... don’t matter in terms of whether we should look at [a

listing].” (A.R. 66.) Dr. Jonas maintained that Plaintiff is “acting on a choice.”

(A.R. 66) Only when asked by Plaintiff’s attorney to remove the option of “choice”

from his evaluation did Dr. Jonas testify that Plaintiff would meet a listing “by

definition.” (Id.) 

3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Vocational expert Mr. Mark Remas testified at the hearing on the issue of

Plaintiff’s previous employment and capacity to work. (A.R. 68-74.) Mr. Remas

testified that Plaintiff’s work in the Marines as a shipping and receiving clerk,

which is classified as skilled work, medium work, and Specific Vocational

Preparation (SVP) level 5, would be considered. (A.R. 69.) Also considered was

Plaintiff’s previous work as both a hotel housekeeper and fast food worker, which

were classified as unskilled, light work at SVP-2. (Id.)

In response to the hypothetical created from Dr. Nicholson’s psychiatric

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evaluation, Mr. Remas testified that an individual described in that functional

assessment would be able to work as a cleaner or housekeeper. (A.R. 69.) Further,

Mr. Remas testified that within certain settings, work as a shipping/receiving clerk

would also be appropriate. (Id.) Looking at a hypothetical created from Dr.

Loomis’ Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, Mr. Remas noted that

“all past relevant work would be appropriate.” (A.R. 70.) The ALJ created a third

hypothetical as “non-public, minimal contact with others, and no skill assessment

or limitation at this point” to which Mr. Remas testified that work as a

cleaner/housekeeper would be appropriate. (A.R. 70-71.) When the no skill

assessment was modified to semi-skilled, Mr. Remas testified that work as a

warehouse worker would be appropriate. (A.R. 71.)

Mr. Remas testified that Plaintiff can work as a warehouse worker, laundry

laborer, bottling-line attendant, or cable worker. (A.R. 71-72.) The jobs Mr.

Remas described all required minimal contact with others. Mr. Remas testified

that each of these jobs are medium to sedentary, unskilled jobs, that are rated SVP1 or 2. (Id.) Mr. Remas stated that there are a variety of such jobs available in

significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 72-73.)

4. Additional ALJ Comments in the Record

Following all testimony, upon request of Plaintiff’s attorney, the ALJ agreed to

hold the record open for an additional thirty days so that Plaintiff could be

evaluated by a psychologist in light of Dr. Jonas’ testimony regarding the 12.08

Criteria. The evaluation was never submitted to the ALJ and was not added to the

record until seven months after the hearing and one month after the ALJ’s decision.

(A.R. 668.)

C. ALJ Decision

The ALJ sought to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled under section

216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. (A.R. 10.) After determining that

Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31,

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2007, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Act from July

20, 2002 through February 25, 2011, the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id.) 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has a personality disorder with passive

aggressive, borderline and narcissistic traits. (A.R. 12) The ALJ then concluded

that Plaintiff’s conditions, taken together, did not meet or medically equal any of

the criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1. (A.R. 14.) 

The ALJ determined that the record does not indicate Plaintiff suffers from

functional impairments as a result of his mental impairments. (A.R. 14.) In making

this finding, the ALJ considered whether the paragraph B criteria were satisfied.

The ALJ, through the testimony of Dr. Jonas and the provided psychological

evaluations of Doctors Nicholson and Loomis, determined that Plaintiff had

marked difficulties only with regard to social functioning. The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff had mild restriction and difficulty in activities of daily living and in terms

of concentration, persistence, or pace. Further, Plaintiff was determined to have no

episodes of decompensation with extended duration. (Id.) Based on these findings,

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not meet the criteria for a

listed impairment. (Id.)

After concluding that Plaintiff’s conditions did not meet or equal a listed

impairment, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (A.R. 15.) 

The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity required to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. (Id.) The ALJ established a

nonexertional limitation by determining that Plaintiff can work in a nonpublic

work environment with minimal contact with others. (Id.) The ALJ based her

conclusion on medical records, doctors’ reports as to Plaintiff’s mental

impairments, and the ALJ’s own determination that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony lacked credibility. (A.R. 15-16.)

The ALJ then addressed the opinion evidence from both Dr. Nicholson and Dr.

Loomis. (A.R. 17-18.) Both Dr. Nicholson and Dr. Loomis’ reports were given

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moderate weight as they are “well-supported by the medical evidence, including

[Plaintiff’s] medical history and clinical and objective signs and findings as well as

detailed treatment notes, which provides a reasonable basis for [Plaintiff’s] chronic

symptoms and resulting limitations.” (A.R. 18.) After reviewing the reports and

giving maximum reasonable benefit of the doubt to Plaintiff’s subjective claims,

the ALJ limited Plaintiff to nonpublic work with limited contact with others. (Id.)

The ALJ adopted the testimony of vocational expert Mark Remas, who

addressed Plaintiff’s relevant previous work and subsequently concluded that while

Plaintiff is unable to engage in his past employment as a Logistics Coordinator , he

is capable of performing past relevant work as a housekeeper. (A.R. 18-19.) In

addition, the ALJ found that other jobs exist in the national economy in significant

numbers that Plaintiff is capable of performing. (A.R. 19.) The Plaintiff, therefore,

was found not to be disabled under the Act from July 20, 2002 through the date of

her decision on February 25, 2011. (A.R. 20.) 

D. Evidence Submitted to Appeals Council

1. Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Milton Lessner

Plaintiff submitted the results of a Psychological Assessment conducted by Dr.

Milton Lessner on March 30, 2011. (A.R. 668-79.) Dr. Lessner administered

numerous diagnostic tests and inventories and interviewed Plaintiff. (A.R. 674.)

Dr. Lessner’s report included the results of Plaintiff’s self-assessment, a detailed

family history, comments from a discussion between Dr. Lessner and Alan Harris,

the diagnostic test findings, and Dr. Lessner’s diagnostic impressions. (A.R. 669-

679.)

Dr. Lessner only briefly discussed Plaintiff’s drug use noting that it was a

“pain killing device” and “created a false sense of security.” (A.R. 668.) Dr.

Lessner noted that Plaintiff had decided two weeks prior that he would abstain

from using cough syrup. (Id.) Dr. Lessner noted that Plaintiff identified his drug

addiction on the Mooney Problem Check List. (A.R. 676.) Despite this mention,

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the report did not contain information regarding Plaintiff’s history of drug use, and

Dr. Lessner does not identify substance abuse as a concern in his diagnostic

impression. (A.R. 678.)

In addressing Plaintiff’s test results, Dr. Lessner reported that at the time of the

evaluation, Plaintiff was experiencing depression, anxiety, various psychotic

symptoms, anger, and suicide ideation. (A.R. 674-5, 677-8.) Based on the results of

the tests and his discussion with both Plaintiff and Mr. Harris, Dr. Lessner’s

diagnostic impression included the following: major depression with psychotic

features, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and

borderline personality disorder. (A.R. 678.)

Dr. Lessner’s report is silent as to whether Plaintiff’s impairments preclude

him from work. Further, it does not include information regarding the A and B

Criteria and if Plaintiff meets any of the required criteria to be found disabled

under Title II or Title XVI of the Act.

2. Statements by Alan Harris and Jeremy Tiefenbrun

Alan Harris, Plaintiff’s surrogate father and live-in roommate, submitted a

written statement on April 21, 2011. (A.R. 260, 262.) This two-page statement

contained a brief description of their relationship and a list of incidents that

highlight Plaintiff’s behavioral concerns. (Id.) These examples include instances of

road rage, confrontations with strangers, and threats of self harm. (Id.) Mr. Harris

contended that Plaintiff “has been disabled by a host of psychological impairments

that are highlighted by violent outbursts... [that] caused or almost caused fights and

always create uncomfortable and scary scenes for everyone present.” (A.R. 260.)

Jeremy Tiefenbrun has been Plaintiff’s friend for over five years. (A.R. 263.)

His statement, submitted April 7, 2011, presented examples of Plaintiff’s behavior

that Mr. Tiefenbrun believes gives credence to Plaintiff’s claims of impairment.

(Id.) The statement contained examples of Plaintiff’s alleged OCD, suicidal

tendencies, and drastic changes in mood. (Id.) Mr. Tiefenbrun reported that

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Plaintiff “can become belligerent, angry, and even violent” and described an

instance where Plaintiff “spontaneously shoved a difficult person into a taxicab.”

(Id.)

IV. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant

must show that: (1) he suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can

be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of twelve months or more, and (2) the impairment renders the

applicant incapable of performing the work that he previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy. See 42

U.S.C.A. § 423 (d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2004). An applicant must meet both

requirements to be “disabled.” Id.

A. Sequential Evaluation of Impairments

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process to determine

whether an applicant is “disabled.” The five steps are as follows: (1) Whether the

claimant is presently working in any substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant

is not disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Whether the

claimant’s impairment is severe. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the

evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Whether the impairment meets or equals a

specific impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments. If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Whether the claimant is

able to do any work she has done in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If

not, the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any

other work. If not, the claimant is disabled. Conversely, if the Commissioner can

establish there are significant number of jobs in the national economy that the

claimant can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1520; see also Tackett

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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B. Judicial Review

Sections 206(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow unsuccessful

applicants to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial review is limited. The

Commissioner’s final decision should not be disturbed unless: (1) the ALJ’s

findings are based on legal error or (2) are not supported by substantial evidence in

the record as a whole. Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968,

973 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing

both the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. See Mayes

v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving

ambiguities.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one

rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. Id. (citation and

quotations omitted). 

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). This matter may

also be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

Furthermore, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are

harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

V.

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for her adverse credibility

determination.

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination is in error as

it is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11-1, at 11.) Plaintiff contends

that the ALJ’s credibility findings ignore Plaintiff’s regular treatment at the VA

hospital and statements provided to the Appeals Council from friends Alan Harris

and Jeremy Tiefenbrun which corroborate his own reports of his symptoms and

limitations. (Doc. 11-1, at 11-12.) 

It is the responsibility of the ALJ to make findings of fact as to a claimant’s

credibility. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Social

Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). In evaluating

the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain and limitation

symptoms, the “ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). At step one, “‘the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged.’” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007)). The claimant need not show that his impairment “‘could reasonably be

expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; [he] need only

show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.’” Id.

(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). Second, if the

claimant satisfies the first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, at step two,

the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms

only by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for doing so. Id. The ALJ

must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms” to determine

whether and how these symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(c)(1). In his analysis, the ALJ may consider objective medical

evidence, the claimant’s daily activities, the location, duration, frequency, and

intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, precipitating and aggravating

factors, medication taken, and treatments for relief of pain or other symptoms.

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Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991). Moreover, evidence

provided by non-medical sources such as third parties may be used to evaluate the

severity of impairments and the impact it has on daily life. C.F.R. §

404.1513(d)(4). These non-medical sources include “spouses, parents and other

care givers, siblings, other relatives, friends, neighbors, and clergy.” Id. The ALJ

may discount the testimony of the lay witnesses; [however], he must give reasons

that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.

1993). Lay witness testimony that conflicts with medical evidence may be rejected.

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s decision to discredit

Plaintiff’s testimony must be clearly articulated and based on clear and convincing

reasons. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160-61 (9th Cir.

2008). Credibility determinations are findings of fact that must be determined by

the ALJ. Where the “record would support more than one rational interpretation,

we defer to the ALJ’s decision.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Here, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony because “the weight of the

objective evidence does not support [Plaintiff’s] claims of disabling limitations to

the degree alleged.” (A.R. 16.) In support of her credibility determination, the ALJ

pointed out that “none of [Plaintiff’s] physicians [have] opined that he is totally

and permanently disabled from any kind of work.” (A.R. 16.) The ALJ indicated

that Plaintiff’s claim that he cannot work because of his anxiety is directly contrary

to the medical evidence that shows that Plaintiff has not been diagnosed with an

anxiety disorder and that “Dr. Jonas did not identify it as a condition [he has].”

(Id.) Additionally, the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s testimony that he had never taken

medication for anxiety to discredit the contention that his anxiety precluded him

from working. (Id.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “testimony that he cannot work

because he has difficulty with people is not credible.” (A.R. 16.) The ALJ pointed

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to four pieces of evidence in the Administrative Record that belie Plaintiff’s

testimony: 1) Plaintiff’s four years of service in the Marines and subsequent

honorable discharge; 2) Plaintiff’s academic success for the two years he was in

college; 3) Plaintiff’s attempt at establishing his own web design business which

failed due to the national economy and “not his inability to get along with others;”

and 4) portions of Plaintiff’s medical record that show Plaintiff has “many friends

and enjoys people.” (Id.) 

Moreover, the ALJ pointed to the behavior that suggests Plaintiff’s

impairments may not be as serious as he claims. (A.R. 16.) Specifically, this

included Plaintiff’s repeated canceling of and/or failure to show up to

appointments at the VA. The ALJ also pointed to Plaintiff’s discharge from the

SAMI (Substance Abuse Mental Illness) group for repeated failure to attend

sessions. (A.R. 17.) Citing Plaintiff’s statement in the record that he “did not want

to attend the group because it met too early in the morning (11:00 a.m.) and he

liked to stay up late and sleep in the next day,” the ALJ decided that the “record

suggests that [Plaintiff] is not motivated toward recovery.” (Id.)

Furthermore, the statements by third party witnesses in support of Plaintiff’s

claim of having OCD were given little weight by the ALJ as they conflict with all

evidence by medical experts and Plaintiff’s medical records. (A.R. 18.) None of the

doctors reports support Plaintiff’s claim that he has OCD or that his idiosyncracies 

prevent him from interacting with others and working. Additionally, the ALJ

determined that Mr. Harris, Plaintiff’s roommate, has a “direct pecuniary interest in

the outcome of [Plaintiff’s] disability claim.” (Id.) In his testimony, Plaintiff

testified that he and Mr. Harris’ living situation was “very pivotal” as Mr. Harris

had recently lost his job, Mr. Harris’ unemployment benefits had just ended, and

the two were at risk of living off of credit cards. (A.R. 32.) In this testimony,

Plaintiff essentially identified his application for disability benefits as an

alternative to Mr. Harris seeking new employment. The ALJ’s determination that

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Mr. Harris’ testimony should be given little weight was legally supported despite

Plaintiff’s contention that it was contrary to law. Similarly, the statement provided

by friend Jeremy Tiefenbrun, which was submitted two months after the ALJ’s

decision and was considered by the Appeals Council, also contradicted the three

medical experts and did not provide a sufficient basis for changing the ALJ’s

decision. 

In sum, by showing that Plaintiff’s testimony contradicted the objective

medical evidence, by identifying discrepancies between Plaintiff’s claims and

conduct, and by providing legally sound reasons for discrediting the testimony of

lay witnesses, the ALJ articulated clear and convincing reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s testimony and his credibility. Consequently, this Court recommends that

the ALJ’s decision on this ground be upheld.

B. Dr. Lessner’s report or Dr. Jonas’ testimony do not establish a listed

impairment in Step 3 of the sequential process.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1...fails to

consider the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council and is not supported by

substantial evidence.” (Doc. 11-1, at 10.) It is Plaintiff’s contention that the report

of Dr. Lessner submitted to the Appeals Council establishes that Plaintiff’s

diagnosed personality disorder is a mental impairment that meets or equals a listing

at step 3 of the sequential evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Jonas

reported that Plaintiff met a listing “by definition.” (Doc. 11-1, at 14-15.) 

A personality disorder “exists when personality traits are inflexible and

maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational

functioning or subjective distress.” (20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1.) The level of severity

required to establish a listed personality disorder for the purpose of obtaining

Social Security disability benefits is determined by a two-part analysis requiring

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satisfaction of both A and B Criteria. Id. The criteria for a listed impairment cannot

be met by diagnosis alone. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d), 416.925(d).) A personality

disorder diagnosis without a medical determination that both A and B Criteria are

met is insufficient to establish that an individual’s mental impairment meets the

requirements of a listing. Id.

Here, after reviewing all medical records, reports by psychiatrists, and

testimony during the hearing, the ALJ determined that because “[Plaintiff’s] mental

impairments do not cause at least two marked limitations or one marked limitation

and repeated episodes of decompensation,...the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not

satisfied.” (A.R. 14.) The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairments do not

meet or equal Listing 12.08 (personality disorder) is supported by substantial

evidence. Specifically, the ALJ referred to the opinions of an examining

psychiatrist, a reviewing psychiatrist, and a testifying psychiatrist to make her

determination. (A.R. 14-18.) These psychiatrists all opined that while Plaintiff

suffers on some level from mental impairment as well as an addiction to cough

syrup, Plaintiff was not precluded from working and with active treatment would

greatly improve. 

Notwithstanding these three medical opinions, Plaintiff argued that definitive

weight instead should be given to the report of Dr. Milton Lessner, who examined

Plaintiff after the ALJ’s hearing at Plaintiff’s expense. (Doc. 11-1 at 9.) Further,

Plaintiff argued that testifying psychiatrist Dr. Jonas reported that Plaintiff

“meet[s] the listings by definition.” (Doc. 11-1, at 15.) 

The findings in Dr. Lessner’s report are contradictory to the findings of the

three medical experts whose opinions were weighed by the ALJ. Additionally, Dr.

Lessner’s findings at times contradict the provided medical record and Plaintiff’s

own reports regarding his limitations. Where the three medical experts provide that

Plaintiff’s drug use is a significant contributor to his limitations, Dr. Lessner only

briefly stated that Plaintiff admitted to abusing drugs. Also, Dr. Lessner’s report

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stated that Plaintiff suffered from suicide ideation where provided medical records

show that Plaintiff himself routinely denied experiencing such ideation. Plaintiff’s

records, three expert’s opinions, and all testimony did not include the same

impairments Dr. Lessner diagnosed Plaintiff with including depression with

psychotic features and “social, emotional, psychotic health problems.” (A.R. 678-

79.)

Moreover, the report provided by Dr. Lessner differs from the reports of Drs.

Loomis, Jonas, and Nicholson in that Lessner’s report fails to discuss Plaintiff’s

ability to work. His report was silent as to the presence of either the A and B

Criteria, and the impacts on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are not discussed.

As Plaintiff’s capacity to work was not mentioned, Dr. Lessner’s report would be

of no help to the ALJ or Appeals Council in reaching a determination about

whether or not Plaintiff is precluded from working by his impairments. Similarly,

Dr. Lessner, in making his diagnosis, did not refer to Plaintiff’s prior medical

records or the examinations of the three medical experts with whom Plaintiff met.

Because Dr. Lessner did not discuss Plaintiff’s impairments in terms of its onset,

Dr. Lessner’s report cannot be used to establish that Plaintiff has impairments that

satisfy the requirements for either title II or XVI benefits as the requirements are

tied to specific time lines. 42 U.S.C §§ 423(c), 1382( c). For title II benefits,

Plaintiff’s disability must be shown to exist on or before his date last insured, and

for title XVI, the cutoff time moves up to the date of the ALJ’s decision. Id. Dr.

Lessner’s diagnosis contains no indicators as to the onset of Plaintiff’s

impairments, and his diagnosis contradicts the reports and testimony of the three

medical experts. As Dr. Lessner’s report did not sway the entirety of the medical

evidence in the record, the Appeals Council properly found that it did not provide a

“basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision.” (A.R. 2.) 

With regard to Dr. Jonas, Plaintiff’s contention that he reported Plaintiff met a

disability listing “by definition” is a misrepresentation of his testimony. Dr. Jonas

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testified that it was his medical determination that Plaintiff was “acting on choice”

(A.R. 66), and that if Plaintiff were to cease using cough syrup, Plaintiff would

have “a capacity for pretty good or very good functioning.” (A.R. 62.) Dr. Jonas

merely postulated that if he were to assume that Plaintiff had no choice in the

matter of his substance abuse, then he would have met the impairment listing by

definition. (A.R. 66.) As Dr. Jonas testified that Plaintiff did not meet or equal a

listed impairment, and the ALJ reasonably relied on his testimony, this Court

recommends that the ALJ’s decision on this ground be upheld.

C. The ALJ’s determinations at steps four and five of the sequential process

are supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that because his impairments meet or equal a listing at step

three, findings under steps four and five of the sequential process are not required.

(Doc. 11-1, at 15.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s step-four determination that Plaintiff

can perform past relevant work as a housekeeper “is both based on flawed

vocational testimony and by error of law.” Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the

ALJ’s step-five decision was based on a hypothetical question that “fail[ed] to

recognize all of the limitations suffered by Plaintiff.” (Doc. 11-1, at 17.)

The step-four determination aims to determine if the claimant, with the

residual functional capacity as determined by the ALJ, can resume past relevant

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. An expedited process exists whereby an ALJ can skip

step four if sufficient information to make a decision at that step does not exist. 20

C.F.R § 404.1520(h). As a result, if the ALJ finds that a claimant can obtain other

work as a result of the claimant’s age, education, and the previously made residual

functional capacity assessment, the claimant will be found not disabled. Id. With

regard to step five, a determination that a claimant can return to work based on a

hypothetical containing all limitations the ALJ has found to be credible and is

supported by substantial evidence is proper. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d at 1217

(because the “hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the

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limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in

the record,” the ALJ’s reliance on testimony the VE gave in response to the

hypothetical therefore was proper). 

Here, Plaintiff does not argue the merits of the ALJ’s step-four decision that

Plaintiff is capable of returning to work as a housekeeper; rather, Plaintiff simply

asserts that past relevant work must be within fifteen years (20 C.F.R. § 404.1656,

416.965) and that the record lacks a reference as to how long in the past Plaintiff’s

work as a housekeeper took place. (Doc. 11-1, at 16.) Plaintiff’s Work History

Report includes an entry where Plaintiff reported working as a “Hotel

Housekeeping/Cook” between 1995 and 1998. (A.R. 187.) Further, Plaintiff

testified that he worked as a housekeeper until 1997. (A.R. 67.) Assuming liberally

that Plaintiff left housekeeping work on January 1, 1997, the amount of time that

lapsed between that day and the date of the ALJ’s decision denying benefits was

just over fourteen years. As a result, Plaintiff’s argument that the record lacks work

history information is contrary to the information that Plaintiff himself twice

provided to the ALJ.

Plaintiff also argues that the step-five decision that jobs exist in the national

economy that Plaintiff could perform is not supported by substantial evidence as

the decision was based on flawed testimony by the vocational expert. (Doc. 11-1,

at 17.) Plaintiff contends that the “the hypothetical question upon which the finding

is based fails to recognize all of the limitations suffered by plaintiff.” (Id. at 17.)

For example, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not including a limitation that

Plaintiff cannot accept instructions from supervisors. (Doc. 11-1, at 16.) However,

Plaintiff fails to point to evidence from a doctor who opined that Plaintiff was

unable to accept instructions from supervisors. Thus, the Vocational Expert

properly determined that an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, and residual

functional capacity could assume work as a warehouse worker, laundry laborer,

bottling line attendant, or table worker. (A.R. 19.) Because this determination was

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based on a proper hypothetical that included all of Plaintiff’s limitations that the

ALJ found credible and supported with substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in

relying on the expert’s response to the hypothetical to make his step-five findings.

Consequently, this Court recommends that the ALJ’s decision on this ground be

upheld.

VI. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTING Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry A.

Burns, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before September 4, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and

filed on or before September 13, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specific time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: August 21, 2013

 

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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