Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO CABRERA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09cv1330-H (PCL)

ORDER DENYING THE

vs. HABEAS PETITION

JAMES YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

On June 17, 2009, Francisco Cabrera, (“Petitioner”) a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his California convictions and sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254. (Doc. No. 6.) On June 17, 2009, Petitioner also filed a motion

for appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 3.) On July 6, 2009, the Court dismissed the habeas

petition without prejudice, and Petitioner filed an amended petition on August 10, 2009. (Doc.

Nos. 4, 6.) On October 23, 2009, Respondent filed an answer, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on January 4, 2010. (Doc. Nos. 9, 11.) On January 7, 2010, the magistrate judge issued a

report and recommendation to deny the petition. (Doc. No. 12.) On January 28, 2010,

Petitioner filed an objection to the report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 14.) 

After due consideration, the Court denies the petition for habeas corpus.

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BACKGROUND

Federal habeas courts presume the correctness of a state court’s determination of factual

issues unless Petitioner “rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006). The parties do not challenge the accuracy of the

California Court of Appeal’s summary of the underlying facts adduced at trial, although

Petitioner disputes his guilt of the rape. The court of appeal summarized the underlying facts

as follows: 

Appellant and defendant Francisco Cabrera and Claudia 

T. began a romantic relationship in 2003. Because Claudia 

discovered appellant was seeing another woman, Claudia 

attempted to end the relationship in November 2004 and again 

in January 2005. Claudia was afraid of appellant, and in 

February and March 2005 she took measures to prevent 

appellant from finding her, including storing her car at a 

friend's house because she was afraid appellant might see her in 

it.

On March 23, 2005, appellant found Claudia at a car 

wash in San Diego. After climbing inside Claudia's car and 

talking to Claudia for a while, appellant forced Claudia into the 

passenger seat and drove Claudia's car to a motel in Tijuana. 

During the trip to Tijuana, appellant threatened to stab Claudia; 

and when they reached the motel, appellant forced Claudia to 

go into a room and undress. Appellant undressed and lay down 

on top of Claudia. Claudia told appellant to stop; however, 

while appellant was on top of Claudia, he partially inserted his 

penis in her vagina. Claudia screamed and appellant stopped. 

Because Claudia wanted to get appellant off her, she began 

"sweet-talking" appellant and told him they could get back 

together. Appellant eventually drove Claudia back to the car 

wash, and on two additional occasions Claudia met appellant. 

According to Claudia, she met with appellant because she 

wanted to convince him that she no longer loved him and that 

she wanted to end their relationship. Her efforts at ending the 

relationship peacefully were not successful.

On April 1, 2005, Claudia went to the Chula Vista police 

and reported the events of March 23, 2005. At that point 

Claudia was afraid of appellant and was planning to move. In 

addition to reporting the assault of March 23, Claudia reported 

appellant was constantly calling her and driving by the house 

where she was staying.

On the morning of April 6, 2005, Claudia found 

appellant sitting in the back seat of her car. When Claudia 

started screaming, appellant got out of the car, grabbed Claudia, 

twisted her shirt collar, punched her in the chin and forced her 

into her car. Neighbors who witnessed the incident called 

police. Appellant and Claudia struggled in the car, and 

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appellant started driving in a somewhat circuitous route toward 

the San Ysidro border crossing. The car was stopped at the 

border by police officers. Appellant attempted to flee on foot 

and was apprehended. As appellant was booked into jail, a 

police officer asked him whether he had taken Claudia against 

her will. Appellant replied: "Yes, but I didn't know it was 

kidnapping for an adult."

The district attorney filed an information against 

appellant, alleging he was guilty of forcible rape, two counts of 

kidnapping, making a criminal threat, carjacking and inflicting 

corporal punishment on a roommate. The information further 

alleged appellant had a prior record which included convictions 

for domestic violence.

Prior to the preliminary hearing, appellant called Claudia

from jail and apologized. Appellant stated: “Look, forgive me. I

love you a whole lot. What I did, I did it because I love you a

whole lot and I wanted ... to fix the whole, the, the situation

with us. I don't know what to do. .... [T]hey want to give me ten

years. I want you to help me in court.” Appellant then asked

Claudia to testify that she had just been mad at him. Appellant's

call was recorded and at trial the prosecution played it for the

jury.

At the preliminary hearing and at trial, Claudia in fact

altered her previous recapitulation of the events of March 23.

At the preliminary hearing, Claudia acknowledged she initially

told police officers appellant raped her, but testified the sex was

consensual and that at the time she spoke to police officers, she

was just mad at appellant.

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the

magistrate declined to bind appellant over on the rape

allegation, but did bind appellant over on all the remaining

allegations of the information. The magistrate stated: “I'm not

making a factual finding. I just think I wouldn't want to stand in

front of a jury and say that she was raped if I were a prosecutor.

Who knows what the truth really is? Only two of them were in

the room, and only they know. So I'm not making a factual

finding as to that.”

“But I am saying that the evidence is insufficient for me

to not even a threshold amount of believability as far as I'm

concerned that she was raped. But maybe she was. I don't

know.... She could have been.”

Following the preliminary hearing, the district attorney

refiled the information and again included the rape allegation.

Appellant moved under Penal Code section 995 to dismiss the

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1

 CAL. PENAL CODE § 995(a)(2) (2008) provides in pertinent part that an information

shall be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned if before the filing thereof

the defendant had not been legally committed by a magistrate, or that the defendant had been

committed without reasonable or probable cause. 

2

 This testimony was admitted under CAL. EVID.CODE § 1109 (2006), which provides

for the admission of evidence of the defendant’s commission of other incidents of domestic

violence if the defendant is presently accused of an offense involving domestic violence. 

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rape allegation, and the trial court denied his motion.1 Prior to

trial appellant did not challenge the trial court's ruling on his

motion.

(Lodg. 10 at 2-5.)

 At trial the victim again testified that Petitioner did not rape her and that she had

been mad at him when she filed the police report. (Lodg. 10 at 4.) This testimony was

impeached through police officers’ testimony regarding her prior statements to them. 

(Lodg. 10 at 4.) Furthermore, the jury heard the recording of a phone call Petitioner made

from jail to the victim prior to his preliminary hearing asking for help in avoiding prison. 

(Lodg. 10 at 4.) The trial court also disallowed a claim of right defense to the carjacking

charge, and allowed two of Petitioner’s former girlfriends to testify regarding prior

episodes of domestic abuse involving Petitioner.2

 On October 17, 2005, a jury convicted

Petitioner of forcible rape, two counts of kidnaping, making a criminal threat, car jacking,

and corporal injury on a roommate. (Lodg. 2, Vol. 1, CT at 158-65; Vol. 2, CT at 321.) On

January 6, 2006, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years to life on the rape

conviction plus a five year consecutive sentence on the carjacking conviction. (Lodg. 10 at

5-6.) The trial court did not impose a term on one of the kidnapping convictions because it

was used to enhance the rape sentence. (Lodg. 10 at 5-6.) The court also imposed sentence

on the remaining counts, but stayed each of these sentences. (Lodg. 10 at 5-6.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, alleging: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the district attorney to refile the rape

charge after it was dismissed at the preliminary hearing; (2) the trial court erred by prohibiting

Petitioner from presenting a claim of right defense to the car jacking charge; (3) the trial court

erred by imposing a four-year term on the corporal punishment count; and (4) California

Evidence Code section 1109 is unconstitutional. (Lodg. 7.) On June 25, 2007, the court of

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3

 People v. Cabrera, 152 Cal.App.4th 695 (2007). 

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appeal filed a published opinion, ordering the sentence on Petitioner’s corporal punishment

count to be reduced and stayed, and in all other respects affirming the trial court’s judgements.3

(Lodg. 10 at 2, 15.) On August 6, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court regarding the remaining claims denied by the court of appeal. (Lodg. 11.) On

October 12, 2007, the supreme court summarily denied these claims. (Lodg. 12.) 

On February 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court alleging: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the district attorney

to refile the rape charge after it was dismissed at the preliminary hearing; (2) the failure to

impose a sentence on one of the kidnaping counts result in an unauthorized sentence; and (3)

the trial court erred when it prohibited Petitioner from presenting a claim of right defense to

the carjacking charge. (Lodg. 13.) On April 2, 2008, the court denied the petition because

Petitioner’s claims had either been presented on appeal or could have been presented on

appeal. (Lodg. 14 at 2.) On June 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal alleging the same three claims presented to the superior court

and additional claims of prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel. (Lodg. 15.) On July 29, 2009, the court of appeal denied the petition on all grounds

because Petitioner’s claims were either repetitive, could have been presented on direct appeal,

or were incomprehensible. (Lodg. 16.) On October 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court alleging essentially the same claims

brought before the court of appeal. (Lodg. 17.) On April 22, 2009, the petition was summarily

denied. (Lodg. 18.) 

DISCUSSION

The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report

. . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006).

Petitioner objects to the report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 14.) Accordingly, the Court

shall make a de novo determination of all sections of the report and recommendation. 

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Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996, are governed by AEDPA. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-27 (1997). AEDPA provides

the following standard of review applicable to state court decisions:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).

AEDPA establishes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” requiring

that “state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 24 (2002). A state court’s decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law if it

applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court authority, or it “confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from” a Supreme Court decision and reaches a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Clearly established federal law refers to the

holdings, not the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions at the time of the relevant state court

decisions. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court’s application of federal

law is “unreasonable” only if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted). An “incorrect or erroneous” application is insufficient.

Id. Lastly, a state court’s adjudication rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts if

the state court’s factual findings are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340 (2003). The state court’s factual determinations are presumed to be correct and

Petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006). 

Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the habeas petition to

“specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting

each ground.” Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (2004). “Notice pleading is not sufficient, for

the petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.”

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Advisory Committee notes to § 2254, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, p. 1111. See Mayle v. Felix, 545

U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (quoting this language with approval); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d

1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979). Conclusory allegations unsupported by statements of facts do not

warrant habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (1994).

A. The Rape Charge

Petitioner claims his right to due process was violated when the trial court allowed the

district attorney to refile the rape charge after it was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.

(Doc. No. 6 at 6.) Petitioner alleges further violations of equal protection, but does not state

the facts supporting these grounds. (Doc. No. 6 at 9.) Respondent argues there is no

cognizable federal claim presented because there is no constitutional right to a preliminary

hearing, and Petitioner’s claims rest solely on a question of state law interpretation which was

based on a reasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. 9-1 at 13-15.) 

Federal habeas courts are bound by a state’s interpretation of it’s own laws, and any

error of interpretation is inconsequential unless it violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties,

of the United States. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d

882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). Under California law, a judge may dismiss a charge filed in an

information at a preliminary hearing if the judge determines as a matter of fact that the offense

did not occur or the evidence presented does not establish probable cause to believe the crime

was committed. People v. Day, 174 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1015 (Ct. App. 1985). The district

attorney may not refile the dismissed charge if the magistrate determines as a matter of fact the

offense did not occur. Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 660, 666 (1971).

The district attorney may refile the dismissed charge if the magistrate determines

probable cause was not established, and if the offense arises from the transaction that was the

basis for the commitment on the related crime and the offense is shown by the evidence taken

before the magistrate to have been committed. CAL.PENAL CODE § 739; Day, 174 Cal.App.3d

at 1015-16. The California Superior Court reviews the refiled charge to determine if the

evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of probable cause if the accused attacks the

refiled charge through a CAL.PENAL CODE section 995 motion. Day, 174 Cal.App.3d at 1015-

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16. The refiled charge will stand and the case will proceed to trial on the amended information

if the California Superior Court finds probable cause to believe the charged crime was

committed. Id. California Courts hold this process provides the accused sufficient notice of

the charges they may face at trial. See People v. Brice, 130 Cal.App.3d 201, 207 (1982) (the

totality of the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing determines whether the defendant

had sufficient notice of the potential charges). 

Constitutional due process requires the accused to have reasonable notice of the charges

against him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273

(1948). Reasonable notice must include disclosure of the “specific issues” the party must

meet, and appraisal of the “factual material” relied upon by the government so the accused may

rebut it. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967); Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 288 (1974). Due process also requires a conviction to be

based upon sufficient evidence that convinces a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the

existence of every element of the charged offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16

(1979). 

The denial of a habeas petition by the California Supreme Court without comment or

citation constitutes a decision “on the merits of the federal claims presented.” Hunter v.

Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992). When there is no reasoned decision from the

state’s highest court, the reviewing federal court “looks through” to the rationale of the

underlying reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Campbell v.

Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). Under California law, an erroneous CAL. PENAL

CODE section 995 ruling is only reversible if the defendant demonstrates prejudice at trial

flowing from the purportedly inadequate evidentiary showing at the preliminary hearing.

People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal.4th 83, 136-37 (1994). The defendant cannot be prejudiced if

sufficient evidence is introduced at trial to support the jury’s finding of guilt. Id. Conclusory

allegations unsupported by statements of facts do not warrant habeas relief. James v. Borg,

24 F.3d 20, 26 (1994).

Here, the Court denies Petitioner’s claims because there was no constitutional violation

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4

 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) provides in pertinent part that rape is an act of sexual

intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator. . .against a person’s

will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily

injury on the person of another. 

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of due process, the state court’s adjudication of this claim rested on a reasonable determination

of the facts, and Petitioner’s equal protection claims are conclusory allegations unsupported

by facts. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34; Bowman, 419 U.S. at 288; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16;

Ali, 584 F.3d at 1180-81; James, 24 F.3d at 26. Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process

was not violated because he was provided reasonable notice of the charges against him and his

rape conviction was based upon sufficient evidence presented at trial.4

 Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-

34 (1967); Bowman, 419 U.S. at 288; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16. Specifically, Petitioner

was informed of the rape charge and the facts underlying this charge by: (1) the original

information; (2) the proceedings at the preliminary hearing; (3) the refiled information; and

(4) the superior court’s finding of probable cause to support the rape charge at the hearing on

the section 995 motion to dismiss. (Lodg. 10 at 2-5.) Moreover, Petitioner’s phone call to the

victim in this case asking for help in avoiding jail time further indicates he was aware of the

rape charge and the underlying facts supporting this charge. (Lodg. 10 at 2-5.) At trial, the

jury was presented with the statements of police officers regarding the victim’s initial police

report of the rape, and Petitioner’s phone call to the victim asking for help in avoiding prison.

(Lodg. 10, at 6-7.) The jury credited this evidence over the victim’s trial testimony claiming

the sexual encounter she had with Petitioner was consensual. (Lodg. 10 at 2-4.) Accordingly,

the jury found each element of the rape charge beyond a reasonable doubt and returned a guilty

verdict. (Lodg. 10 at 2-4.) 

The court of appeal’s adjudication of this claim was based on a reasonable

determination of the facts. Ali, 584 F.3d at 1180-81. This Court “looks through” to the

decision of the court of appeal to determine the objective reasonableness of the court’s

determination of the facts. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The court of appeal held Petitioner was not

prejudiced by the trial court’s section 995 ruling because sufficient evidence of the rape was

presented at trial. Crittenden, 9 Cal.4th at 136-37. (Lodg. 10 at 4-6.) Specifically, the court

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of appeal found the evidence supporting the rape conviction was sufficient because it was

based upon the statements of police officers regarding the victim’s initial police report of the

rape, and Petitioner’s phone call to the victim asking for help in avoiding prison. (Lodg. 10,

at 6-7.) This Court’s review of the trial record confirms the objective reasonableness of the

court of appeal’s determination of these facts. (Lodg. 1, RT at 66-67; Lodg. 6. Vol 1, RT at

6.) Lastly, Petitioner’s equal protection claims are conclusory allegations devoid of supporting

facts, and they do not warrant habeas relief. James, 24 F.3d at 26. See (Doc. No. 6 at 9.)

Accordingly, the Court denies habeas relief on this ground. 

B. State Sentencing 

Petitioner claims a constitutional error was committed when the trial court failed to

impose sentence on one of his kidnapping charges and instead used it to enhance his sentence

for the rape charge. (Doc. No. 6 at 11-12.) According to Petitioner, this resulted in an

unauthorized sentence. (Doc. No. 6 at 11-12.) Petitioner further argues this claim cannot be

procedurally barred because he is actually innocent of the rape and kidnapping. (Doc. No. 6

at 13.) Respondent argues Petitioner’s sentencing claim is procedurally defaulted, and does

not present a cognizable federal claim because it only involves the interpretation and

application of state law. (Doc. No. 9 at 17-18.) 

A federal court may not review a habeas claim if the decision of the state court rested

on a state law ground, whether substantive or procedural, that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support it. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991);

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991). A decision on procedural grounds

deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to consider a federal claim. Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S.

527, 533 (1992). Even a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground

to bar federal habeas review. Beard v. Kindler, 130 S.Ct. 612, 618 (2009). Once the state has

pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to overcome that defense shifts to Petitioner. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d

573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, such as inconsistent

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application of the rule. Id. A claim of actual innocence can also defeat a procedural bar.

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). This claim requires Petitioner to make an

“extraordinarily high” threshold showing of actual innocence. Id. The claim “must go beyond

demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably

innocent.” Id. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring

affirmative proof of innocence, not merely an attack on the evidence presented at trial).

California’s sentencing provisions raise questions of state law federal habeas courts are

not authorized to revisit. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). A federal court can only intervene

if there were errors so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a due process violation. See

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The category of infractions that violate

“fundamental fairness” are defined “very narrowly.” Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342, 352-53

(1990); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (“Due process clause guarantees the

fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”). Due process requires a conviction to

be based on a charge made and sufficient evidence that convinces a trier of fact beyond

reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the charged offense. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979).

Here, Petitioner’s sentencing claim is procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner did not

meet his shifted burden nor establish actual innocence. Beard, 130 S.Ct. at 618; Herrera, 506

U.S. at 417; Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner raised this sentencing issue in all his state

habeas petitions. (Lodg. 13-18.) All levels of the California State Court system rejected

Petitioner’s sentencing claim because Petitioner failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. In

re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953). Respondent properly raised this affirmative defense, and

Petitioner did not meet this shifted burden. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. See (Doc. No. 9-1 at 17;

Doc. No. 11, 14.) Petitioner did not establish “actual innocence” to overcome this procedural

bar. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. Petitioner cites no new evidence of innocence, no new legal

theory, and only attacks the evidence presented at trial. Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476. (Doc. No.

6 at 13.) His allegations of actual innocence are conclusory, and do meet the “extraordinarily

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high” standard required for actual innocence claims. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; James v. Borg,

24 F.3d 20, 26 (1994). Lastly, even if Petitioner’s sentencing claim was not procedurally

defaulted, this claim only raises questions of state law this Court is not authorized to revisit

because there was no fundamental unfairness. Miller, 868 F.2d at 1118-19; Christian, 41 F.3d

at 469. There is no fundamental unfairness because Petitioner’s convictions conformed with

due process requirements. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-16. The kidnapping and rape allegation

were both charged by information and the jury found each element of the alleged charges

beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lodg. 10 at 2-4.) Accordingly, the Court denies the habeas

petition on this ground. 

C. Claim of Right Defense 

Petitioner conclusorly claims structural error, a violation of an international treaty, and

a violation of his “right to a fair trial” occurred when the trial court disallowed a claim of right

defense to the carjacking charge and refused to instruct the jury on this defense. (Doc. No. 6

at 14-15.) In essence, a claim of right defense asserts the defendant had a good faith belief that

he was entitled to the property taken which negates the intent to steal. United States v.

Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 892 (9th Cir. 2008); People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal.4th 935, 938

(1999). Respondent argues the court of appeal reasonably rejected this claim under state law,

and that this result was consistent with, and a reasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. (Doc. No 9-1 at 18-20.) 

The state defines crimes and defenses. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006).

Federal habeas courts are bound by the state’s interpretation of it’s own laws. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Federal habeas courts may only consider whether evidence

admitted or excluded at trial violated due process and infringed Petitioner’s right to a fair trial.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). There is

no constitutional right to present irrelevant, incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible

evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544,

1549-50 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated because evidence of ownership

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was not a defense to the crime of carjacking, and this evidence was therefore irrelevant.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42; Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549-50; People v. Cabrera, 152 Cal.App.4th 695,

701-02 (2007). Under California law, the crime of carjacking “is strictly a crime against

possession rather than ownership . . . [and] is not subject to a claim of right defense.” Cabrera,

152 Cal.App.4th at 701-02. This Court is bound by the state’s holding that there is no claim

of right defense to the crime of carjacking. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. Therefore, Petitioner had

no constitutional right to present this irrelevant evidence and it’s exclusion raises no

constitutional concern because it is not a valid defense to the crime charged. Egelhoff, 518

U.S. at 42; Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549-50. Accordingly, the Court denies the habeas petition on

this ground. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner does not present his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim as a

distinct ground for relief. (Doc. No. 6 at 25.) Rather, Petitioner suggests the Court should

factor alleged attorney misconduct into it’s ruling on the other grounds. (Doc. No. 6 at 25.)

Specifically, Petitioner claims his counsel: (1) failed to challenge the district attorney’s

refiling of the rape charge; (2) failed to investigate Petitioner’s understanding of English and

need for a Spanish interpreter at trial; (3) failed to seek sufficient information from Petitioner

“about his relationship;” and (4) failed to provide Petitioner an accurate prediction of the likely

outcome and the effects of going to trial. (Doc. No. 6 at 24-25.) 

The Court has a “duty . . . to construe pro se pleadings liberally, especially when filed

by prisoner.” Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate

ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show his counsel’s performance was deficient

and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). A deficient performance is one that is “outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance.” Id. at 689. Prejudice requires “showing that counsel's errors were so

serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687.

Counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. Conclusory

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allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Court construes Petitioner’s complaint liberally, and will therefore treat Petitioner’s

IAC claim as a distinct ground for relief. Hamilton, 67 F.3d at 764. Here, Petitioner’s claims

of IAC are either rebutted by the state court record or conclusory allegations unsupported by

specific facts. James, 24 F.3d at 26. The state court record makes clear that Petitioner’s

defense counsel unsuccessfully challenged the refiled rape charge. (Lodg. 10 at 4-5; Lodg. 2,

Vol. 1, CT at 0012-28.) While the Court notes Petitioner was assisted by an interpreter at his

preliminary hearing, Petitioner does not claim he was unable to understand or participate in his

defense at trial, and his pro se pleading papers demonstrate an adequate grasp of the English

language. James, 24 F.3d at 26. (Doc. Nos. 6, 14; Lodg. 6, Vol. 2 at 101.) Lastly, Petitioner’s

vague references to his relationship and the alleged prediction he received from counsel

regarding the outcome and the effects of going to trial, are wholly unsupported by facts and

are mere conclusory allegations. James, 24 F.3d at 26. Accordingly, the Court denies the

habeas petition on this ground. 

E. Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing

There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in federal habeas proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728

(9th Cir. 1986). However, a federal court may appoint counsel in habeas proceedings if it

“determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(b) (2006);

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). In making this determination, the court

evaluates the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of Petitioner to articulate his

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Weygandt v. Look, 718

F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, Petitioner’s case does not warrant the appointment of

counsel because the issues presented are not complex, and Petitioner has articulated his claims

reasonably well. Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954. See (Doc. Nos. 6, 9-2.) An evidentiary hearing

is not required because the habeas petition can be resolved by reference to the state court

record. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Accordingly, the Court denies

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Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel and request for an evidentiary hearing. 

F. Certificate of Appealability

“A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). 

When the district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, “[t]he

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 483-84 (2000). Here, the Court grants a certificate of appealability for the refiling of

the rape charge, and denies a certificate of appealability in all other regards.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion for appointment

of counsel, request for an evidentiary hearing, and all grounds of the habeas petition as

follows:

1. The Court denies the habeas petition.

2. The Court denies Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 3.).

3. The Court denies Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 

4. The Court denies a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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