Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04130/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04130-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

/ F·ILED 

Uuited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 14 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT HENRY WERNER aka Redelk ) 

Ironhorse Thomas, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

0. LANE MCCOTTER, SCOTT CARVOR, ) 

DAVID R. FRANCHINA, JEFFREY GALLI, ) 

NANCY KEMP, RICHARD BURT, LYNN ) 

WALLER, and C. KIM THOMPSON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-4130 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 92-C-261-S) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Robert Henry Werner aka Redelk Ironhorse Thomas, Pro Se PlaintiffAppellant, Draper, Utah. 

Elizabeth King, Assistant Attorney General, and Jan Graham, 

Attorney General, State of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 1 
Mr. Robert Werner, aka (and hereinafter referred to as) Mr. 

Thomas, currently an inmate in the Utah prison system, appeals 

summary judgment entered against him in a civil rights action 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 

1993). His pro se complaint alleges that the Utah prison system 

. unconstitutionally interferes with the free exercise of his chosen 

religion, Native American shamanism, and he seeks injunctive 

relief and damages from the Defendants (each an officer in the 

Utah penal system) in both personal and official capacities. 

After enduring a long barrage of preliminary motions from Mr. 

Thomas, the Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming both 

qualified immunity (with respect· to the damages claim) and 

adherence to the standards of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 

(1987), and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (as 

to the merits of Mr. Thomas's First Amendment claim). The district court granted summary judgment without addressing any of the 

legal or factual merits of any of Mr. Thomas's claims. 

Construed liberally, the complaint alleges four violations of 

Mr. Thomas's right of free exercise. First, and most seriously, 

Mr. Thomas contends that the Defendants have denied him· access to 

the sweat lodge and have thereby prevented him from engaging in a 

ritual fundamental to his faith. Second, it is undisputed that 

Defendants, pursuant to the applicable prison regulations, have 

prohibited him from receiving or possessing a medicine bag. 

Third, Mr. Thomas claims that the Defendants have failed to provide him with access either to a Cherokee Native American 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 2 
Spiritual Advisor or to religious literature appropriate to his 

beliefs. Lastly, he asserts that the Defendants have failed to 

obtain for him various religious symbols important to his faith 

(including, inter alia, a hawk feather and a crystal amulet). 

In addressing these alleged constitutional violations, the 

Defendants, both in their motion for summary judgment and in their 

brief on appeal, rely upon the "reasonable relationship" test 

espoused in Turner, Shabazz, and their progeny in this circuit. 

This reliance is in error. The recent passage of the Religious 

Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("the Act") legislatively overturned a number of recent Supreme Court decisions, including 

Turner and Shabazz, by defining a statutory (if not a constitutional) right to the free exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993). The Act establishes the 

"compelling interest" test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 

(1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 (1972), as the analytical framework governing "all cases where free exercise of 

religion is substantially burdened," 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (b) (1) 

(emphasis added) : 

Government may substantially burden a person's exercise 

of religion only if it demonstrates that application of 

the burden to the person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 

Id. § 2000bb-1(b). While we have yet to interpret the Act, our 

fellow circuits have determined that the claims of prisoners fall 

-3-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 3 
within its broad language, see Bryant v. Gomez, No. 94-15178, 1995 

WL 34272, at * 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1995) (per curiam); Brown-El 

v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir. 1994), and that the Act is to 

be applied retroactively, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a); Brown-El, 

26 F.3d at 69. This interpretation accords both with the plain 

language of the statute and with the legislative history of the 

Act, see. e.g., S. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11, 

reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-1901, and we see no 

reason to disagree. 

We therefore hold that a prison system may not substantially 

burden a prisoner's right of free exercise in the absence of a 

compelling state interest and must employ the least restrictive 

means necessary to further that interest.l "To maintain an 

1 Under Yoder, a plaintiff must make two threshold showings to 

state a prima facie free exercise claim. As the Act makes express 

reference to the Yoder standard, we see no reason not to read 

these threshold requirements into the statutory right created by 

the Act. First, the governmental action must burden a religious 

belief rather than a philosophy or a way of life. Wisconsin v. 

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 

707, 713-18 (1981). Second, the burdened belief must be sincerely 

held by the plaintiff; government need only accommodate the 

exercise of actual religious convictions. See Yoder, 405 U.S. at 

215-19; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-18. A plaintiff, however, need 

not hew to any particular religious orthodoxy; it is enough for 

the plaintiff to demonstrate that a government has interfered with 

the exercise or expression of her or his own deeply held faith. 

Thomas, 450 u.s. at 714-16 ("We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a 

line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an 

unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' 

with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with 

the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might 

employ .... Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not 

within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire 

whether the petitioner . correctly perceived the commands of 

[his] faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 4 
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great 

variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to 

the common good," United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982), 

but "only those interests of the highest order and those not 

otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 

exercise of religion,n Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 

(1972); see also Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057, 1061 (lOth 

Cir. 1976); Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116, 118-19 (6th Cir. 1982) 

(per curiam) . Courts should continue to give "due deference to 

the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in 

establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good 

order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of 

costs and limited resources." S. Rep. No. 111, at 1900. Nonetheless, even within the prison context, "the state must do more 

than simply offer conclusory statements that a limitation on 

religious freedom is required. for security, health or safety in 

order to establish that its interests are of the 'highest order.'" 

Jago, 675 F.2d at 119 (quoted with approval in S. Rep. No. 111, 

supra, at 1899). 

This is not to say that all regulation of religious activity 

or expression must be supported by a compelling state interest. 

Constraints upon religious conduct will not fall within the ambit 

of the Act unless a "substantial burden" is placed upon a prisoner's capacity to exercise or express his or her sincerely held 

beliefs or faith. To exceed the "substantial burden" threshold, 

government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain 

-5-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 5 
conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a 

prisoner's individual beliefs, see B~ant, 1995 WL at * 1; must 

meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability to express adherence to 

his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reasonable opportunities 

to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a prisoner's 

religion, see Cruz v. Beta, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (~972) (per 

curiam) (holding that a follower of a minority religion must have 

11 a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the 

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional 

religious precepts 11 ) .2 Thus, reasonable time, place, or manner 

restrictions upon communal religious gatherings would often not 

necessitate the identification of a compelling state interest; 

however, regulations that, for example, prevented a devout Muslim 

from observing daily prayers would be subject to the 11 Compelling 

interest 11 test. Compare Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 358-63 (Brennan, J., 

dissenting) (characterizing daily prayer as 11 core ceremony 11 of 

Islam). Similarly, the Act need not drive a prison to employ 

clergy from every sect or creed found within its walls; however, 

the failure to provide or allow reasonably sufficient alternative 

methods of worship would, in the absence of a compelling state 

interest, run afoul of the Act. Compare Beta, 405 U.S. at 322 

n.2. 

2 The burden of proving the existence of a substantial interference with the right of free exercise rests upon the religious 

adherent. See B~ant, 1995 WL at * 1. After this threshold 

showing has been made, the burden then shifts to the government to 

demonstrate that the challenged regulation furthers a compelling 

state interest in the least restrictive manner. 42 U.S.C. § 

2000bb-1 (b) . 

-6-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 6 
Turning now to the merits of Mr. Thomas's action, we find 

that we must remand for reconsideration by the district court the 

first of Mr. Thomas's claims for equitable relief. We may take 

judicial notice of the central and fundamental role played by the 

Sacred Sweat Lodge in many Native American religions. See Thomas 

v. Gunter, 32 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir. 1994); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 

563, 565 & nn.4, 5 (9th Cir. 1987); see also McKinney v. Maynard, 

952 F.2d 350 (lOth Cir. 1991). Even under the demanding Turner 

standard, courts have acknowledged that the construction, maintenance, and use of a sweat lodge may not place an unreasonable 

burden upon prison officials. See Gunter, 32 F.3d at 1260 (analyzing impact of daily access to.the sweat lodge; weekly access 

allowed); Toombs, 827 F.2d at 565-68 & nn.5, 9 (upholding regulations denying access to the sweat lodge by high security 

inmates; weekly access by general prison population allowed); see 

also Maynard, 952 F.2d at 353 n.9. Mr. Thomas has submitted 

credible evidence which indicates that the sweat lodge plays an 

indispensable role in his own sincerely held beliefs, and has thus 

made out a prima facie claim under the Act. The government, for 

its part, has indicated that Mr. Thomas has a Level One security 

classification, which places him in the prison's highest, and most 

heavily restricted, risk group. The record is almost devoid of 

any other evidence upon this issue. We have nothing by which to 

judge the magnitude of the governmental interest at stake; nothing 

by which to judge the burden that accommodation would place upon 

the state; nothing to which we may compare the restrictions placed 

upon Mr. Thomas; nothing, in short, to balance. We therefore 

-7-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 7 
reverse the grant of summary judgment upon this point and remand 

for further development of the record and for reconsideration 

under the "compelling interest" standard. 

Out of an abundance of caution, we also remand for reconsideration Mr. Thomas's second claim for equitable relief. We 

recognize that religious symbols often play an important role in 

expressing an individual's adherence to a particular faith; possession of the symbol in and of itself manifests belief in one's 

religious creed. A prohibition against the possession of a medicine bag therefore could, for those faiths for whom the symbol 

has sufficient importance, qualify as a "substantial burden" under 

the Act. Mr. Thomas's prison, however, does not prohibit all 

inmates from possessing a medicine bag. It merely forbids those 

inmates with a Level One or Two security classification from 

possessing a medicine bag because these inmates are more apt to 

use the bag as a means by which to smuggle drugs. Moreover, even 

Level One or Two prisoners may possess less threatening religious 

symbols, such as hawk feathers. It seems likely that this regulation furthers a sufficiently important government interest in an 

appropriately narrow way. The Defendants, however, based their 

arguments for summary judgment upon the now-abandoned "reasonable 

relationship" test. The district court, moreover, did not 

explicitly set forth its analysis under the Act. We therefore 

have nothing concrete to review and are reluctant to base a 

judgment upon this record. As we are remanding to the district 

-8-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 8 
court for reconsideration of the first alleged violation, we 

remand this issue for further elaboration as well. 

The record demonstrates that Mr. Thomas's latter claims are 

without factual merit. The prison at which Mr. Thomas is confined 

.employs six part-time chaplains who provide nondenominational 

religious support to the prison population; while none of these 

individuals is a Native American, two Native American Spiritual 

Advisors provide appropriate services on a volunteer basis. Mr. 

Thomas, who is Cherokee, refuses to meet with these Spiritual 

Advisors because both are Lakota Sioux rather than Cherokee. 

Although the Utah prison system budgets no funds to assist inmates 

in the purchase of religious artifacts or literature, the Defendants in fact arranged for Mr. Thomas to receive a hawk feather 

donated by one of the volunteer Spiritual Advisors. Mr. Thomas, 

however, refused to accept any feather that did not come from a 

Spiritual Advisor of Cherokee heritage. The Defendants also 

arranged for Mr. Thomas to receive a book on American Indian 

religious beliefs, which he deigned to accept. 

Mr. Thomas does not dispute that Native Americans compose a 

small percentage of the Utah prison population. The Defendants 

have introduced affidavits which indicate that they have made 

laudable efforts to accommodate Mr. Thomas's desire to pursue a 

Native American faith and that these efforts have been continuously thwarted by Mr. Thomas himself. Mr. Thomas has failed to 

respond with specific facts which would suggest that his claims 

-9-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 9 
have any factual basis whatsoever. Summary judgment as to all 

aspects of the third and fourth claims of his complaint is 

therefore appropriate. See Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 

(lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 s. Ct. 1075 (1994). 

Irrespective of the final resolution of Mr. Thomas's equitable claims, summary judgment was properly entered against Mr. 

Thomas's claims for damages. Qualified immunity shields the 

Defendants from pecuniary liability unless they violated "clearly 

established" constitutional or statutory norms. Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 

u.s. 800 (1982). Mr. Thomas bears the burden of proving that the 

law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation(s). He cannot meet this burden. The Defendants, reasonably 

and in good faith, acted under the then-applicable standard of 

Turner and Shabazz. Congress supplanted that rather forgiving 

test with the markedly more rigorous "compelling state interest" 

framework after Mr. Thomas commenced this suit. The Defendants 

cannot therefore be held personally liable for constitutional or 

statutory violations created by this change in the law. 

That portion of the district court's judgment pertaining to 

Mr. Thomas's first and second claims for equitable relief is 

REVERSED and REMANDED for reconsideration in light of this 

opinion. The remainder of the district court's decision is 

AFFIRMED. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 94-4130 Document: 01019282428 Date Filed: 03/14/1995 Page: 10