Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06770/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06770-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM PIERCE PLUMMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN EDWARD CADEN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-06770-AWI-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on December 30, 2004. After some

difficulty obtaining the correct documents, plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on February 1, 2006. Plaintiff filed an appeal of this Court’s denial of his motion to vacate the

payment order and the Court’s denial of relief from paying the filing fee. On January 22, 2007, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court now

issues its screening order of the original complaint.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds it to be confusing and difficult to

follow. In the following sections, the court will provide plaintiff with the legal standards for those

claims that it appears plaintiff is attempting to pursue. Where possible, the court will address the

claims it believes plaintiff is attempting to raise in this action and notify plaintiff of the deficiencies

in his claims. To the extent there are claims plaintiff intended to raise but which are not addressed,

plaintiff bears the burden of clarifying his claims in his amended complaint.

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Plaintiff is informed that his complaint must satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon

at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff has chosen to pursue multiple claims for relief against multiple defendants. It is

plaintiff’s responsibility to lay out each claim against each defendant. Plaintiff should separate and

identify each claim. Plaintiff should then allege specific facts linking the defendants to the claims

against them. Laying out claims in a clear and concise manner becomes especially important in an

action such as this where the plaintiff is pursuing many claims against many defendants. 

Plaintiff names Warden Edward Caden; Lieutenant R. Bass; Mailroom Supervisor Montoya;

Associate Warden J. Alison; United States District Judge Thelton Henderson and his clerk R.B.

Espinosa; Attorney General Bill Lockyer; Deputy Attorney General Stephanie Mitchell; Salinas

Valley District Attorney’s Office and Monterey County Superior Court Clerk Marge.

Plaintiff first alleges that Judge Henderson improperly dismissed his prior Civil Rights

complaint which he identifies as “CO4-0946.” Plaintiff is advised that Federal judges are absolutely

immune from civil liability for damages and declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief for

their judicial acts. Mullis v. U.S. BankruptcyCourt, Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). “‘A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the

action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will

be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Mullis, 828

F.2d at 1388 (quoting Stumpman v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978)). A clear absence of

all jurisdiction means a clear lack of all subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1389. Accordingly,

plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief against Judge Henderson.

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a. Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that defendant Lieutenant Bass falsified a lock up order on June 10, 2004 by

stating that plaintiff slept in the upper bunk. Plaintiff alleges that prison authorities claim to have

found a knife in the vent closest to the upper bunk. Plaintiff claims his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated by the lock-up order. It is unclear whether plaintiff claims his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated by a search or by a seizure. Plaintiff must clarify this claim. In doing so,

plaintiff is advised that prisoners, despite their conviction and confinement, do not forfeit all

constitutional rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877 (1979). "Prison walls

do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. at 2259. Nevertheless, prisoners' constitutional rights are subject

to substantial limitations and restrictions in order to allow prison officials to achieve legitimate

correctional goals and maintain institutional security. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47, 99 S.Ct. at 1877-78. The

Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment right of people to be secure against unreasonable

searches and seizures "extends to incarcerated prisoners; however, the reasonableness of a particular

search is determined by reference to the prison context." Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699

(9 Cir. 1997), citing, Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.1988); In Turner v. th

Safley, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims. The

Court held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation

is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at

89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261. Further, “[T]he fourth amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure

and destruction of his property.” Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989). “This does

not mean a prisoner is without redress; it simply means a prisoner’s form of redress is through the

fifth and fourteenth amendments.” Id.

b. Denial of Access to the Court

Plaintiff claims that he was denied his access to the court system because Officer Peterson

refused to make copies for him. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Montoya, Bass, and Allison

denied him “indigent envelopes.” Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the

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courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals,

habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking

access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking

claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). To prevail

on a claim, the plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury by being shut out of court. Id.

at 415; Lewis, 518 at 351.

Although the court is mindful that the federal system is one of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a), plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim for relief under section 1983 for

denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has suffered any actual injury

resulting from the actions complained of. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim.

c. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

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F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff has named R.B. Espinosa; AttorneyGeneral Bill Lockyer, Deputy Attorney General

Stephanie Mitchell; District Attorneys’ Office Salinas Valley and MontereyCounty Clerk “Marge.”

However, plaintiff’s allegations do not link any acts or omissions of these defendants to a violation

of his plaintiff’s rights under federal law. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which

relief may be granted under section 1983 against these defendants. Plaintiff’s amended complaint

must set forth sufficient facts linking each named defendant to an action or omission that

demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s rights.

d. Supervisory Defendants

 In addition, in amending his complaint, plaintiff is advised to carefully review the following

legal standards with respect to his claims against supervisory personnel such as Warden Caden and

Bill Lockyer. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official

capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9 Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith th

v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9 Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9 Cir. 1992). For th th

this reason, a damages claim against defendants in their official capacities is not cognizable and must

be dismissed from the action. 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their

personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena v. Gardner, 976 th

F.2d 469, 472 (9 Cir. 1992). “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a th

government official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, such

as in the instant action, this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit because an officialcapacity suit would be barred. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968,

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973 n.16 (9 Cir. 1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 th

(9 Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9 Cir. 1991). th th

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case

of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory defendants either:

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some

facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

In amending his complaint, plaintiff is directed to be mindful that the warden and Attorney

General’s positions, without more, are an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability under

section 1983.

e. Inmate Appeals

While unclear, plaintiff makes various allegations regarding his inmate appeals. To the

extent plaintiff seeks to bring claims based on these grievances, he is advised that to state a claim

under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law and

(2) that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson

v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow,

997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982));

see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of

appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641,

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647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann

v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Absent circumstances not alleged in the instant

complaint, actions in reviewing prisoner’s inmate appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under

section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint, as filed, does not contain any claims for relief that

are cognizable under section 1983. The court has provided plaintiff with the applicable legal

standards and will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the

deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete

in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. The failure to file an amended complaint may result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 13, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3c0h UNI j8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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