Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05009/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 19, 2005 Decided July 29, 2005

No. 04-5009

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

No. 04-5010

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

No. 04-5011

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,

APPELLANT

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 1 of 31
2

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00379)

(No. 00cv00558)

(No. 00cv01404)

Virginia S. Albrecht argued the cause for the appellants.

Karma B. Brown, Duane J. Desiderio, Felicia K. Watson,

Lawrence R. Liebesman, Rafe Petersen, Ethan Arenson, David

E. Frulla, Andrew D. Herman and Elizabeth A. Gaudio were on

brief.

Peter L. Gray, Robin S. Conrad, Richard S. Moskowitz, Alan

C. Raul and Brian T. Fitzpatrick were on brief for amici curiae

Honorable Donald A. Manzullo et al. Prasad Sharma and

Stephen A. Bokat entered appearances.

Greer S. Goldman, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees United States Army Corp

of Engineers et al. David C. Shilton, Martin McDermott and

Stephanie Tai, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice,

were on brief.

Howard I. Fox was on brief for appellees, Natural Resources

Defense Council and Sierra Club.

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 2 of 31
3

1 The other appellants are the National Stone, Sand and Gravel

Association (NSSGA), the American Road and Transportation

Builders Association (ARTBA), the Nationwide Public Projects

Coalition (NPPC), the National Federation of Independent Businesses

(NFIB) and Wayne Newnam, an Ohio homebuilder.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, State of New York, Peter H.

Lehner, Philip M. Bein and Tracy Hughes, Assistant Attorneys

General, State of New Mexico, were on brief for amici curiae

States of New York and New Mexico.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The National

Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and others1

(collectively, the appellants) appeal the dismissal of their multipronged challenge to the issuance of certain permits by the

United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) pursuant to

section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344. The district court granted summary judgment to the

Corps, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

entertain any of the appellants’ claims because the Corps’

issuance of the permits did not constitute “final agency action”

subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders

v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 297 F. Supp. 2d 74

(D.D.C. 2003), reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 146-52.

We disagree; the appellants’ claims, with one exception, are

cognizable. Accordingly, we reverse the district court in part

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The CWA aims to “restore and maintain the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33

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4

U.S.C. § 1251(a), by prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into

navigable waters of the United States—except, that is, by

permit, see id. § 1311(a). The CWA divides the authority to

issue permits to discharge pollutants between the United States

Environmental Protection Agency and the United States

Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, conferring on

the latter the power to issue permits for discharges of “dredged

or fill material” only. Id. § 1344(a). Responsibility for the dayto-day administration of the permitting regime falls to the

Corps’ district and division engineers. See 33 C.F.R.

§ 320.1(a)(2). 

The Corps issues a permit under section 404 of the CWA

either on a class-wide (“general permit”) or a case-by-case

(“individual permit”) basis. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (e). The

Corps issues a general permit “on a State, regional, or

nationwide basis for any category of activities involving

discharges of dredged or fill material.” Id. § 1344(e)(1); see

also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(h). Before issuing a general permit for

a “category of activities,” the Corps must “determine[] that the

activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only

minimal adverse environmental effects when performed

separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse

effect on the environment.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1); see also 33

C.F.R. § 323.2(h)(1). A general permit has a statutorily-limited

lifespan—i.e., no longer than five years—and may be revoked

or modified if the authorized activities “have an adverse impact

on the environment or . . . are more appropriately authorized by

individual permits.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2). 

The Corps’ individual permit process is, by contrast, “a longer,

more comprehensive procedure.” New Hanover Township v.

United States ArmyCorps of Eng’rs, 992 F.2d 470, 471 (3d Cir.

1993). The Corps makes a formal decision on an individual

application following site-specific documentation and analysis,

public interest review, public notice and comment and, if

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 4 of 31
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necessary, a public hearing. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4; id. §§ 323,

325;see also HomeBuilders Ass’nof Greater Chicago v. United

States ArmyCorps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2003).

If the Corps initially denies an individual application, the

applicant may challenge that determination through an

administrative appeals process. See 33 C.F.R. § 331. Indeed, a

disappointed applicant must exhaust his administrative remedies

before heading to federal court. See id. § 331.12. 

Thus a party desiring to discharge fill or dredged material into

our nation’s navigable waters may do so in either of two ways.

See New Hanover Township, 992 F.2d at 471. If the proposed

discharge activity is covered by a general permit, the party may

proceed without obtaining an individual permit or, in some

cases, even without giving the Corps notice of the discharge.

See 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e)(1) (“In most cases, permittees may

proceed with activities authorized by [nationwide general

permits] without notifying the [district engineer].”); New

Hanover Township, 992 F.2d at 471 (discharger may “simply

operate under the [general] permit without informing the Corps

in advance unless the [general] permit in question requires

advance approval from the Corps”). On the other hand, if the

proposed discharge is not covered by a general permit, the party

must secure an individual permit before undertaking the

discharge. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a). A party that discharges

without meeting the conditions of a general permit or obtaining

an individual permit faces both civil and criminal enforcement

actions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319; 33 C.F.R. § 326.5-.6. 

This litigation involves several nationwide permits, or NWPs,

a species of general permit designed to minimize delays and

paperwork for projects with minimal environmental impact. See

33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b). The Corps has issued this kind of permit

for five-year intervals since 1977, see Nat’l Ass’n of Home

Builders, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 77; Public Notice Concerning

Changesto Nationwide Permit 26, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,276, 39,277

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 5 of 31
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2

 The Corps’ GCs “must be followed in order for any authorization

by an NWP to be valid.” Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67

Fed. Reg. 2020, 2089 (Jan. 15, 2002).

(July 22, 1998), including the once widely-used but now defunct

NWP 26, see Final Notice of Issuance, Reissuance, and

Modification of Nationwide Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,874,

65,892 (Dec. 13, 1996) (noting 13,837 activities were authorized

by NWP 26 in 1995 alone). There are currently 43 NWPs in

force—covering activities ranging from “Single-family

Housing” (NWP 29) to “Mining Activities” (NWP 44) to

“Cranberry Production Activities” (NWP 34)—that are subject

to 27 General Conditions (GCs)2—regarding matters like “Soil

Erosion and Sediment Controls” (GC 3) and “Notification” (GC

13). See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg.

2020, 2077, 2078-94 (Jan. 15, 2002). In their current version,

the assorted NWPs, applicable conditions and relevant

definitions span nearly 20 pages in the Federal Register. See id.

at 2077-94. 

In 1996, the Corps proposed to reissue a number of existing

NWPs, albeit with modifications, that were otherwise set to

expire on January 21, 1997. See Proposal to Issue, Reissue, and

Modify Nationwide Permits; Public Hearing, 61 Fed. Reg.

30,780 (June 17, 1996). As to NWP 26, which, at the time,

authorized a party to discharge dredged or fill materials

affecting up to ten acres of water into headlands and isolated

wetlands without an individual permit and required only notice

to a Corps district engineer of any discharge causing loss or

substantial adverse modification of one to ten acres of wetlands,

the Corps gave public notice of—and sought comment

on—proposed changes to its “pre-construction notification”

timeline and acreage threshold limits. See id. at 30,783. It also

notified the public that it planned to “initiate a process to

regionalize” NWP 26 to “further improve its effectiveness.” Id.

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 6 of 31
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Following public comment, the Corps decided to replace

NWP 26 with “activity-specific” general permits. See Final

Notice of Issuance, Reissuance, and Modification of

Nationwide Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,874, 65,875 (Dec. 13,

1996). To allow ample time to develop replacement permits,

however, it reissued NWP 26 for a two-year period but with

more stringent conditions. See id. at 65,877, 65,891, 65,895.

In July 1998, the Corps published a proposed suite of activityspecific general permits to replace NWP 26, see Proposal to

Issue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 63 Fed Reg. 36,040

(July 1, 1998), and extended, once more, the life of NWP 26

until December 30, 1999 “or the effective date of the new and

modified NWPs, whichever comes first,” Proposal to Issue and

Modify Nationwide Permits; Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 39,252,

39,260 (July 21, 1999). That same month the Corps also

reissued the NWP regarding single-family housing (NWP 29),

but reduced the authorized maximum acreage impact from onehalf to one-quarter acre. See Final Notice of Modification of

Nationwide Permit 29 for Single Family Housing, 64 Fed. Reg.

47,175 (Aug. 30, 1999). 

The Corps issued a second proposed set of activity-specific

NWPs to replace NWP 26 one year later. See 64 Fed. Reg. at

39,252. In March 2000, following another round of public

comment, the Corps promulgated activity-specific permits

consisting of five new NWPs and six modified NWPs, all

intended to replace NWP 26. See Final Notice of Issuance and

Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65Fed.Reg. 12,818 (Mar.

9, 2000). With some of the activity-specific NWPs, the Corps

reduced the authorized maximum per-project acreage impact

from ten acres to one-half acre and required preconstruction

notification for impacts greater than one-tenth acre. See 65

Fed. Reg. at 12,818. Although December 30, 1999 preceded

the effective date of the replacement permits, the Corps

nevertheless decided to have NWP 26 expire the same day the

new permits took effect—June 7, 2000. Compare 65 Fed. Reg.

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at 12,818 (extending NWP 26’s expiration date to June 5,

2000), with Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of

Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,255 (Mar. 16, 2000)

(making June 7, 2000 “the correct effective date for the new

and modified NWPs, as well as the correct expiration date for

NWP 26.”). 

The Corps’ new permits prompted three law suits the district

court eventually consolidated into one. The NAHB’s suit was

filed on February 28, 2000, followed by the NSSGA’s suit on

March 16, 2000, and the NFIB’s suit on June 14, 2000.

Together, the three suits allege four claims against the Corps,

to wit: (1) it exceeded its statutory authority under the CWA by

imposing certain permit conditions; (2) it acted arbitrarily and

capriciously, in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), by

failing to provide a rational basis for its permit acreage

thresholds; (3) it violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),

5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., by failing to evaluate the potential

impact of the permits on small businesses and other small

entities as well as alternatives to the permits; and (4) it violated

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4231 et seq., by failing to prepare a Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the permits. The

National Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club (the

intervenors) intervened in the district court proceedings in

support of the Corps.

 The appellants moved for summary judgment on February

15, 2001. The Corps and intervenors responded with motions

for summary judgment of their own on June 14, 2001. While

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment lay pending,

on January 15, 2002, the Corps reissued all 43 NWPs, including

the eleven March 2000 NWPs it issued to replace NWP 26, to

make their expiration dates coincide, thereby “reduce[ing]

confusion regarding the expiration of the NWPs and the

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3

Some of the NWPs expired on February 11, 2002, while others

expired on March 11, 2002. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020. As the Corps

reissued all of the NWPs, GCs and applicable definitions on March 18,

2002, they expire five years from that date. See id.; see also 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344(e)(2) (general permits limited to five-year lifespan).

administrative burden of reissuing NWPs at different times.”3

See 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020. In November 2003, the district court

granted summary judgment to the Corps, concluding that “the

Corps’ issuance of the new NWPs and general conditions,

while constituting the completion of a decisionmaking process,

does not constitute a ‘final’ agency action because no legally

binding action has taken place as to any given project until

either an individual permit application is denied or an

enforcement action is instituted.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home

Builders, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 78. Calling the “general permit

program . . . the first step of a larger permitting process that

enables the agency to streamline the overall process by limiting

the pool of applicants at the front-end of the process,” the

district court concluded that a party not eliminated from the

applicant pool must “simply apply for an individual permit”

and, consequently, “is not legally denied anything until [his]

individual permit is rejected.” Id. at 80.

The appellants now appeal the district court’s judgment,

which we review de novo. See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v.

Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

II.

The jurisdictional infirmity the lower court found fatal to this

case was the want of a final agency action subject to judicial

review; that is only one of the issues, however, joined by the

parties and requiring our resolution. First, we consider whether

the Corps took “final agency action” subject to challenge under

the APA and, if so, whether the appellants’ challenge is

otherwise ripe for judicial review. Next, we address whether

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 9 of 31
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the appellants may challenge the Corps’ compliance with the

RFA and, again, whether that challenge is ripe. Finally, we

review the appellants’ standing vel non to challenge the Corps’

compliance with NEPA. 

A.

Where, as here, no more specific statute provides for judicial

review, the APA empowers a federal court to review a “final

agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a

court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see Home Builders Ass’n of Greater

Chicago, 335 F.3d at 614. “[T]wo conditions,” the United

States Supreme Court tells us, “must be satisfied for agency

action to be ‘final.’ ” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177

(1997). “First, the action must mark the consummation of the

agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely

tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must

be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or

from which legal consequences will flow.” Id. at 177-78

(internal quotation marks & citations omitted). In other words,

an agency action is final if, as the Supreme Court has said, it is

“ ‘definitive’ ” and has a “ ‘direct and immediate . . . effect on

the day-to-day business’ ” of the party challenging it, FTC v.

Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980) (quoting & citing

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967), overruled

on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105

(1977));see also ReliableAutomatic SprinklerCo. v. Consumer

Prods. SafetyComm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003), or

if, as our court has said, “it imposes an obligation, denies a

right or fixes some legal relationship.” Reliable Automatic

Sprinkler Co., 324 F.3d at 731 (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v.

White, 317 F.3d 327, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). There can be

little doubt that under these standards the Corps’ issuance of the

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4

 Only the intervenors make a “finality” challenge. The Corps does

not challenge the finality of its issuance of the NWPs but instead

questions the ripeness of the claim. See opinion infra at 15.

NWPs challenged by the appellants constitutes final agency

action subject to judicial review.4 

We need not tarry long on the finality test’s first prong;

plainly, the Corps’ issuance of the revised NWPs “mark[s] the

consummation of [its] decisionmaking process.” Bennett, 520

U.S. at 178. There is nothing “tentative” or “interlocutory”

about the issuance of permits allowing any party who meets

certain conditions to discharge fill and dredged material into

navigable waters. The intervenors argue, however, that, by

“setting terms and conditions for NWPs, the Corps did not

finally decide that a would-be discharger must comply with

those terms and conditions, nor did the Corps finally deny

authorization for discharges that exceed those terms and

conditions.” Intervenors’ Br. at 15. In their view, “[a] wouldbe discharger remains free to pursue an individual or general

permit that is free of those restrictions.” Intervenors’ Br. at 15.

The district court similarly opined that a party whose activities

do not meet the conditions set by the NWPs has not been

“denied anything until [he] has exhausted all of [his] permit

options.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 80.

This is so, said the district court, because “the general permit

program, in effect, is the first step of a larger permitting process

that enables the agency to streamline the overall process by

limiting the pool of applicants at the front-end of the process.”

Id. If the issuance of the NWPs had merely altered the

procedural framework for obtaining the Corps’ permission to

discharge fill or dredged material into navigable waters, the

district court’s reasoning—now advanced by the

intervenors—might be sound. A requirement that a party

participate in additional administrative proceedings “is different

in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what

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heretofore has been considered to be final agency action.”

Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 242. We have in fact noted that

“the doctrine of finality” would be no more than “an empty

box” if the mere denial of a procedural advantage constituted

final agency action subject to judicial review. ALCOA v.

United States, 790 F.2d 938, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

But the NWPs do not simply work a change in the Corps’

permitting procedures, thereby disadvantaging some within the

class of would-be dischargers. The NWPs are not a definitive,

but otherwise idle, statement of agency policy—they carry

easily-identifiable legal consequences for the appellants and

other would-be dischargers. Admittedly, our precedent

announces no self-implementing, bright-line rule in this regard;

the finality inquiry is a “pragmatic” and “flexible” one. See,

e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430,435-36 (D.C.Cir.

1986) (“[W]e are to apply the finality requirement in a

‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic’ way.” (quoting & citing Abbott

Labs., 387 U.S. at 149-50)). Nevertheless, if an EPA directive

forbidding the use of third-party human test data to evaluate

pesticides’ effects constituted final agency action subject to

judicial review before the EPA invoked it against any pesticide

applicant, see CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 881-83

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and a Federal Communications Commission

decision putting the burden on telephone companies to show

their entitlement to certain costs was suitable for judicial review

before any telephone company was denied costs, see Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1035, 1041 (D.C. Cir.

1991), the Corps’ issuance of NWPs likewise satisfies the

second prong of the finality test. To our mind, all three

constitute challenges to agency action “with legal consequences

that are binding on both petitioners and the agency.” CropLife

Am., 329 F.3d at 882;see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,

939 F.2d at 1041.

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 12 of 31
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The Corps’ NWPs create legal rights and impose binding

obligations insofar as they authorize certain discharges of

dredged and fill material into navigable waters without any

detailed, project-specific review by the Corps’ engineers. See,

e.g., 65 Fed. Reg. at 12,818 (“The terms and limits of the new

and modified NWPs are intended to authorize activities that

have minimal adverse effects on the aquatic environment,

individually and cumulatively.”). The “direct and immediate”

consequence of these authorizations for the appellants’ “day-today business” is not hard to understand: While some builders

can discharge immediately, others cannot. If the appellants’

planned activities do not meet the applicable NWP’s conditions

and thresholds, they have two options. They can either put

their projects on hold and run the Corps’ individual-permit

gauntlet or modify the projects to meet the conditions. Either

way, through increased delay or project modification, the

NWPs directly affect the investment and project development

choices of those whose activities are subject to the CWA.

Indeed, the Corps itself appreciated that its permits would

influence project design. “Many project proponents,” it noted,

“will design their projects to comply with the 1/2 acre limit so

that they can qualify for an NWP and receive authorization

more quickly than they could through the standard permit

process.” 65 Fed. Reg. at 12,821. We would be hard pressed,

and in fact decline, to conclude that the NWPs do not “impose[]

an obligation, den[y] a right or fix[] some legal relationship.”

Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co., 324 F.3d at 731. 

In addition, the intervenors argue that environmental groups,

such as themselves, may challenge the Corps’ issuance of

NWPs as final agency action but the appellants may not. This

is so, they say, because an environmental group would

challenge the discharges authorized by the Corps—that is, it

would oppose an agency action—while the appellants challenge

the Corps’ failure to authorize certain discharges—that is, they

seek to compel agency action. The appellants seek to compel

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agency action in this instance, the intervenors maintain,

because “the Corps did not finally decide that a would-be

discharger must comply with [the NWP] terms and conditions,

nor did the Corps finally deny authorization for discharges that

exceed those terms and conditions.” Intervenors’ Br. at 15.

Thus “would-be dischargers” such as the appellants “remain

free to pursue an individual or general permit.” Intervenors’

Br. at 15. It is true that a party seeking to challenge an

agency’s failure to act faces a different burden from that borne

by a challenger of agency action. An action to “compel agency

action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(1), is similar to a petition for mandamus and we apply a

six-factor standard to determine if “the agency has a duty to act

and [if] it has ‘unreasonably delayed’ in discharging that duty.”

In re Am. Rivers, 372 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also

Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76

(D.C. Cir. 1984). A challenge to agency action, by contrast, is

simply resolved according to the APA. But the case on which

the intervenors principally ground their argument—Norton v.

S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 124 S. Ct. 2373

(2004)—tends only to demonstrate why the oppose

action/compel action dichotomy does not make the Corps’

action non-final as to the appellants. In S. Utah Wilderness

Alliance, various environmental groups challenged the Bureau

of Land Management’s failure to protect public lands from

damage allegedly caused by off-road vehicles. See id. at 2377-

78. At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that “[f]ailures to

act are sometimes remediable under the APA, but not always,”

and ultimately held that the BLM’s failure was not reviewable

because “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a

plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency

action that it is required to take,” id. at 2379 (emphases in S.

Utah Wilderness Alliance), and the BLM did not fail to take

“required” action, id. at 2380, 2384. Here the appellants

challenge not the Corps’ failure to act—i.e., “the omission of an

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 14 of 31
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action without formally rejecting a request,” id. at 2379—as

unreasonable under APA section 706(1); instead, they attack

the NWPs the Corps did issue as arbitrary and capricious and

beyond its permitting authority under APA section 706(2)(A).

Because the Corps’ NWPs mark the completion of the Corps’

decision-making process and affect the appellants’ day-to-day

operations, they constitute final agency action regardless of the

fact that the Corps’ action might carry different (or no)

consequences for a different challenger, such as an

environmental group. In any event, the notion that “would-be

dischargers” like the appellants nevertheless “remain free to

pursue an individual or general permit” suggests a

ripeness—not a finality—problem. See Office of

Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d

813, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (FCC’s refusal to adopt antitrafficking policy and presumption that broadcast license

transfer in less than three years is contrary to public interest are

matters ripe for review). We turn to that issue now. 

B.

Both the Corps and the intervenors, recognizing that we may

affirm the district court on an alternative ground, see, e.g.,

Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(“In this appeal, appellee has sought to justify the judgment

below upon a ground argued below but not relied upon by the

opinion of the district court. We may of course sustain on such

a ground.”) (citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39

(1931)), maintain that the appellants’ challenge is not ripe for

judicial review. Not so.

The doctrine of ripeness shares with its statutory counterpart,

viz., finality, “the dual concerns of prematurity of judicial

intervention in agency processes and the proper and principled

exercise of judicial power.” USAA Fed. Sav. Bank v.

McLaughlin, 849 F.2d 1505, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That is,

“its basic rationale,” the Supreme Court tells us, “is to prevent

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the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49. The

ripeness doctrine has two components: “[It] requires us to

consider ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the

hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ”

Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1119 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (quoting & citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).

Neither of these considerations—which we address in

turn—counsels in favor of postponement here. 

The appellants’ challenge easily satisfies the first ripeness

prong—fitness. “[T]he fitness of an issue for judicial decision

depends on whether it is ‘purely legal, whether consideration of

the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and

whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.’ ” Atl. States

Legal Found. v. EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting & citing Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA,

150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The appellants’ APA

challenge is “purely legal,” Atl. States Legal Found., 325 F.3d

at 284: They allege that the Corps exceeded its statutory

authority in drafting the NWPs and that the Corps failed to

offer a reasoned basis for their conditions and restrictions. See

J.A. 8-9, 27, 44-51, 73-78; Appellants’ Br. at 14-16. We have

repeatedly held that “[c]laims that an agency’s action is

arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law present purely legal

issues.” See, e.g., Atl. States Legal Found., 325 F.3d at 284

(citing Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,

1039 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). We have also often observed that a

purely legal claim in the context of a facial challenge, such as

the appellants’ claim, is “presumptively reviewable.” Nat’l

Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2003);

see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 939 F.2d at 1041 (“In

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 16 of 31
17

light of the wholly legal and facial nature of the present

challenge, we cannot agree that our ability to review the

agency’s decision would be increased by delay.”). 

While we have cautioned that sometimes “even purely legal

issues may be unfit for review,” Atl. States Legal Found., 325

F.3d at 284, we cannot accept the Corps’ argument that the

appellants’ purely legal challenge is unfit for review at this

time. It initially argues that the NWPs are not fit for review

because their applicability to a given activity remains within the

Corps’ discretion. We have already debunked this theory. In

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.

Cir. 2000), we explained that “the fact that a law may be altered

in the future has nothing to do with whether it is subject to

judicial review at the moment.” Id. In addressing the ripeness

of an EPA Guidance, we recently explained that “if the

possibility . . . of future revision in fact could make agency

action non-final as a matter of law, then it would be hard to

imagine when any agency rule . . . would ever be final as a

matter oflaw.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). That the Corps retains some measure of discretion

with respect to the NWPs does not make the appellants’ purely

legal challenge unripe. 

The Corps and the intervenors further argue that the

appellants’ APA challenge remains “hopelessly abstract” until

“a member submits an actual individual permit application

proposing a specific project, has its application denied or

unlawfully conditioned, and completes the administrative

appeal process provided by Corps regulations.” Appellees’ Br.

at 24; see also Intervenors’ Br. at 20-23. While it is

undoubtedly true that a “claim is not ripe for adjudication if it

rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed not occur at all,” we see no reason here

to “wait for a rule to be applied to see what its effect will be.”

Atl. States Legal Found., 325 F.3d at 284 (internal quotation

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 17 of 31
18

marks & alteration omitted). No further factual development

is necessary to evaluate the appellants’ challenge. All of the

facts necessary for judicial review were before the Corps when

it issued the permits and, on APA review, its action necessarily

stands or falls on that administrative record and its statutory

permitting authority under the CWA. See Fox Television

Stations, 280 F.3d at 1039 (issue fit for judicial review because

whether agency action is arbitrary and capricious or contrary to

law is “purely legal” question); cf. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v.

FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (claim fit for

review “as it can be wholly resolved by an analysis of the

Sunshine Act, the Act’s legislative history, and its construction

by relevant case law”). 

Relying on Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871

(1990), the intervenors also argue that the appellants’ challenge

is not ripe because the CWA does not explicitly provide for

facial review of a NWP and because the appellants need not

adjust their conduct immediately. In Lujan, the Supreme Court

rejected the National Wildlife Federation’s attempt to challenge

the “continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of

the [Bureau of Land Management] in reviewing withdrawal

revocation applications and the classifications of public lands

and developing land use plans.” Id. at 890. The Court

explained: 

[R]espondent cannot seek wholesale

improvement of this program by court decree

. . . . Under the terms of the APA, respondent

must direct its attack against some particular

“agency action” that causes it harm. Some

statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the

“agency action,” and thus to be the object of

judicial review directly, even before the concrete

effects normally required for APA review are

felt. Absent such a provision, however, a

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regulation is not ordinarily considered the type

of agency action “ripe” for judicial review under

the APA until the scope of the controversy has

been reduced to more manageable proportions,

and its factual components fleshed out, by some

concrete action applying the regulation to the

claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or

threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of

course, is a substantive rule which as a practical

matter requires the appellant to adjust his

conduct immediately. Such agency action is

“ripe” for review at once, whether or not

explicit statutory review apart from the APA is

provided.)

Id. at 891 (internal citations omitted; second emphasis added).

But the appellants, unlike the National Wildlife Federation in

Lujan, do not seek “wholesale” revision of the Corps’ permitting

framework. Rather, they challenge a specific agency

action—i.e., the Corps’ issuance of NWPs authorizing certain

discharges of dredged and fill material—that requires them to

adjust their conduct immediately, as discussed above. And

“[s]uch agency action,” the Court observed in Lujan, “is ‘ripe’

for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart

from the APA is provided.” Id. Accordingly, “[i]n light of the

wholly legal and facial nature of the present challenge,” the

appellants’ APA claim is fit for judicial review now. Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co., 939 F.2d at 1041. 

Turning to the hardship prong of the ripeness test, we

conclude that this requirement is also satisfied. Any

institutional interest in postponing review must be balanced

against the resultant hardship to the appellants in order to

determine whether immediate review is proper. See Consol.

RailCorp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(“If we have doubts about the fitness of the issue for judicial

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20

resolution, then we balance the institutional interests in

postponing review against the hardship to the parties that will

result from delay.”). On the one hand, no institutional interest

of the court supports postponement. See Mountain States Tel.

& Tel. Co., 939 F.2d at 1041. The administrative process has

run its course, resulting in general permits and conditions that

the appellants have challenged as arbitrary, capricious and

contrary to law under the APA. Their success depends on the

administrative record and the statutory parameters of the Corps’

permitting authority under the CWA. On the other hand, we

cannot agree with the Corps that the appellants face no hardship

as a result of postponed judicial review because, as it would

have us believe, legal consequences flow only from “a collective

permitting decision on a specific project” and consequently any

alleged harm is purely “hypothetical at this time.” Appellees’

Br. at 28. Nor do we agree with the intervenors’ similar

suggestion that any alleged harm is ameliorated by the

appellants’ ability to “pursue further agency remedies.”

Intervenors’ Br. at 23. To the contrary, the fact of the matter is

that in the absence of judicial review the appellants are left with

the choices we identified earlier: They must either modify their

projects to conform to the NWP thresholds and conditions (as

the Corps contemplates they will do) or refrain from building

until they can secure individual permits. The NWPs therefore

affect the appellants’ activities in a “direct and immediate” way.

See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 391 F.3d at 1263 (hardship

demonstrated where “implementation of the market monitor

exemption will have a direct and immediate impact on the

appellant that rises to the level of hardship.” (internal quotation

marks & alteration & citations omitted)); Better Gov’t Ass’n v.

Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (DOJ guidelines

caused hardship where “ ‘direct and immediate impact’ ” on

appellants’ “primary conduct” would be “felt immediately”

(citing & quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152; Toilet Goods

Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967))); cf. Texas v.

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 20 of 31
21

United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301 (1998) (no hardship where

party “not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any

conduct”); Pfizer Inc. v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 975, 979 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Accordingly, we hold that the appellants’ APA challenge

is ripe for judicial review. 

C.

For “any rule subject” to the RFA, “a small entity that is

adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled

to judicial review of agency compliance with the requirements

of sections 601, 604, 605(b), 608(b), and 610.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 611(a)(1). The Corps and the intervenors have an argument

apiece as to why the appellants cannot challenge the Corps’

compliance with the RFA under this provision. We reject both

and hold instead that the appellants’ RFA claim, like their APA

claim, is justiciable. 

The NWPs, the Corps says, do not constitute a “rule” subject

to review under section 604 of the RFA for two reasons, both of

which hinge on the RFA’s definition of a rule as “any rule for

which the agency publishes a general notice of proposed

rulemaking pursuant to section 553(b) of [the APA], or any

other law.” 5 U.S.C. § 601(2). The Corps initially contends that

the NWPs fall within the APA’s definition of

“adjudication”—defined as an “agency process for the

formulation of an order,” id. § 551(7)—rather than “rule,” which

is defined as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of

general or particular applicability and future effect designed to

implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,” id. § 551(4).

Each NWP constitutes an “adjudication,” so the Corps’

argument goes, because it fits the APA’s definition of

adjudication as the formulation of an “order,” id. § 551(7), an

“order” includes a “licensing” disposition, id. § 551(6), and a

“license” includes a “permit,” id. § 551(8). We reject this

elaborate statutory construction for the more straightforward

one.

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Each NWP easily fits within the APA’s definition of “rule.”

This is so because each NWP, which authorizes a permittee to

discharge dredged and fill material (and thereby does not allow

others without an individual permit), is a legal prescription of

general and prospective applicability which the Corps has issued

to implement the permitting authority the Congress entrusted to

it in section 404 of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). As

such, each NWP constitutes a rule: An “agency statement of

general or particular applicability and future effect designed to

implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 551(4); see generally Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 117

(D.C. Cir. 1978). It is of course the Corps’ decision whether to

proceed by rule or adjudication, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194, 203 (1947), but “rules is rules,” no matter their gloss.

See Granholm ex rel. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. FERC, 180

F.3d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting & citing BARTLETT J.

WHITTING, MODERN PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL SAYINGS 541

(1989)).

Relying again on section 601(2) of the RFA, the Corps asserts

that the NWPs are not rules because it did not issue any notice

of proposed rulemaking pursuant to APA’s rulemaking

provision, 5 U.S.C. § 553, or publish them in the Code of

Federal Regulations. We have explained that an agency must

comply with the “procedures laid down” in the APA only when

it promulgates “legislative rules.” Appalachian Power Co., 208

F.3d at 1020. “Legislative rules,” we have said, “are those that

grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant

effects on private interests.” Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d

694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

Despite our declarations that “[o]nly ‘legislative rules’ have

the force and effect of law” and “[a] ‘legislative rule’ is one the

agency has duly promulgated in compliance with the procedures

laid down in the statute or in the Administrative Procedure Act,”

Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1020, we have not

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23

hesitated to consider an agency pronouncement issued without

meeting required APA procedures a rule. See id. at 1020 n.11

(“We have also used ‘legislative rule’ to refer to rules the

agency should have, but did not, promulgate through notice and

comment rulemaking.” (citing Am. Mining Cong. v. Dep’t of

Labor, 995 F.2d 1106, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). While an

“agency’s characterization of an official statement as binding or

nonbinding has been given some weight, of far greater

importance is the language used in the statement itself.” Brock

v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537-38 (D.C.

Cir. 1986) (citation omitted; emphasis added). As we said in

Appalachian Power Co.: 

If an agency . . . treats the document in the

same manner as it treats a legislative rule, if it

bases enforcement actions on the policies or

interpretations formulated in the document, if

it leads private parties or State permitting

authorities to believe that it will declare

permits invalid unless they comply with the

terms of the document, then the agency’s

document is for all practical purposes

“binding.” 

208 F.3d at 1021. The NWPs authorize certain discharges of

dredged and fill material and in so doing “grant rights, impose

obligations, [and] produce other significant effects on private

interests.” Batterton, 648 F.2d at 701-02; see also Appalachian

Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1021.

The intervenors, for their part, contend that “even if an NWP

could be considered a ‘rule’ within the meaning of the RFA,

[the appellants’] claims here do not challenge final agency

action, . . . and thus are not cognizable under the RFA’s judicial

review provision.” Intervenors’ Br. at 28 (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 611(a)(3)(A)). We have already explained at length that, as

the Corps’ NWPs represent its final word, there can be little

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24

doubt that the appellants do challenge a final agency action.

Accordingly, we hold that the appellants are entitled to press

their RFA challenge now as the Corps’ issuance of the NWPs

constitutes final agency action in the form of a legislative rule

and their challenge focuses on the Corps’ compliance with

sections 604 and 605 of the RFA. See J.A. 27-28. 

Although both the Corps and the intervenors appear not to

question the ripeness of the appellants’ RFA claim, we briefly

explain why we think the RFA claim is ripe. The Supreme

Court has admonished that “ ‘procedural rights’ are special,”

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992),

and that “a person with standing who is injured by a failure to

comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure

at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get

riper.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,

737 (1998). The RFA, similar to NEPA in the environmental

sphere, requires an agency to evaluate the adverse economic

effects of and less harmful alternatives to its actions before

taking them. See Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley,

127 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[A] useful parallel can be

drawn between RFA § 604 and the National Environmental

Policy Act, which furthers a similar objective . . . .”). Thus, as

with a NEPA challenge, the appellants may complain of the

Corps’ alleged failure to comply with the procedures set forth

in sections 604 and 605 of the RFA at the time the alleged

failure occurred, i.e., when the Corps issued the NWPs without

complying with those procedures. In sum, the appellants’ RFA

challenge “can never get riper.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S.

at 737. 

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5

 Although the district court did not make explicit the basis for

dismissing the NEPA claim, presumably it did so for the same reason

it dismissed the RFA claim, i.e., no final agency action. See Nat’l

Ass’n of Home Builders, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.5.

D.

Finally, we address the Corps’ assertion that the appellants

lack prudential standing to maintain their NEPA challenge.5

Three propositions bearing on federal court jurisdiction are by

now obvious: Want of jurisdiction robs a federal court of the

power to act,see, e.g., B & J Oil & Gas v. FERC, 353 F.3d 71,

74-75 (D.C. Cir. 2004), standing is a prerequisite to

jurisdiction, see, e.g., Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Brownlee, 331

F.3d 912, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the appellants bear the

burden of establishing their standing to sue, see, e.g., KERM,

Inc. v. FCC, 353 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A fourth is now

equally manifest in our Circuit. When a complainant’s standing

is not “self-evident,” he must “supplement the record to the

extent necessary to explain and substantiate [his] entitlement to

judicial review.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). That is, in Sierra Club, we put on notice all

complainants whose standing is unclear that they must prove

their standing by a “substantial probability,” id. at 899, and that

they should do so “by the submission of [their] arguments and

any affidavits or other evidence appurtenant thereto at the first

appropriate point in the review proceeding,” id. at 900. Our

Sierra Club rule is rooted in notions of fairness and judicial

economy not difficult to grasp: As the complainant is ordinarily

in possession of the facts on which he relies for standing,

making those facts manifest at the outset saves the parties and

the court from squandering time and energy, either by

“flail[ing] at the unknown in an attempt to prove the negative”

or by needlessly wrangling over an uncontested point. Id. at

901.

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We think that it is fairly “self-evident” that the various

appellants as representatives of the regulated parties satisfy the

“irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing,

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)

and the additional requirements for representational standing,

see Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,

342-43 (1977) (one member with standing to sue in his own

right, association seeks to protect interests germane to its

purpose, no individual member need participate in lawsuit).

But as the Supreme Court has explained, constitutional standing

is not the end of the game because the “question of standing

‘involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court

jurisdictionandprudential limitations on its exercise.’

” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (quoting & citing Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Prudential standing requires “that

a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within the zone of

interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision.”

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373

F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The zone-of-interest test,

however, is intended to “exclude only those whose interests are

so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes

implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that

Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus.

Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). And it is by no means selfevident to us that the appellants have prudential standing to

advance their NEPA challenge. 

The Corps and the intervenors agree with our conclusion but

for reasons with which we do not agree. The Corps offers that

the appellants do not fall within NEPA’s zone-of-interest

because their claims are more likely to frustrate than effectuate

NEPA’s purposes, their asserted injury is “purely economic”

and their interest is merely “in avoiding ‘unnecessary delays,

regulatory uncertainty, and considerable cost to [their]

members.’ ” Appellees’ Br. at 35-36 (quoting NSSGA’s

complaint; alteration in Appellees’ Br.). The intervenors

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27

similarly assert that the appellants do not constitute “an

appropriate representative of the environmental interests

underlying the statute.” Intervenors’ Br. at 28 n.14. The

premise underlying this reasoning is flawed—commercial

entities are not per se excluded from NEPA’s zone-of-interest.

“[A]n allegation of injury to monetary interest alone may

not,” of course, “bring a party within the zone of environmental

interests as contemplated by NEPA for purposes of standing.”

Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir.

1977). But we have often observed that “a party is not

precluded from asserting cognizable injury to environmental

values because his ‘real’ or ‘obvious’ interest may be viewed

as monetary” or “ ‘disqualified’ from asserting a legal claim

under NEPA because the ‘impetus’ behind the NEPA claim

may be economic.” Id.; see also Mountain States Legal Found.

v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “[P]arties

motivated by purely commercial interests routinely satisfy the

zone of interests test,” we have said, as “[c]ongruence of

interests, rather than identity of interests, is the benchmark.”

Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We

have even observed that “it surely does not square with the

broad Congressional purpose in NEPA of assuring that

environmental values would be adequately and pervasively

considered in federal decision-making for private parties who

may not be ‘pure of heart’ to be excluded from vindicating the

Act.” Realty Income Trust, 564 F.2d at 453. 

Thus the appellants’ problem is not that their “economic

interests . . . blight [their] qualifying ones,” Mountain States

Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1236; rather, they have failed to

demonstrate by a “substantial probability” that they have any

qualifying ones, Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899. Prudential

standing need only be shown by one appellant and, as only the

NPPC presses the NEPA challenge, it is no surprise that the

appellants rely solely on NPPC’s averments in their effort to

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demonstrate prudential standing. See Mountain States Legal

Found., 92 F.3d at 1232 (Because “prudential standing can be

shown for at least one appellant,” court need “not consider the

standing of the other appellants to raise th[is] claim.” (citing

Watt v. Energy ActionEduc.Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981);

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 264 n.9 (1977))). The NPPC’s membership is principally

composed of local government agencies that “are involved in

municipal, industrial and agricultural water supply, flood

control, irrigation, wastewater and stormwater management,

street and highway construction and maintenance, and

environmental quality amenities.” J.A. 125. To support its

contention that it falls within NEPA’s zone-of-interest to

challenge the NWPs, it relies on the averments of its Executive

Director, Robert Tonsing, in paragraph eight of his affidavit: 

[D]ue to the inflexible one-half acre rule, the

incentive for NPPC members to narrowly tailor

their projects so as to fit under the “minimal

effects” acreage cap has been significantly

reduced. In many cases, under the three-acre

rule previously enforced by the Corps, members

would scale back their projects in order to satisfy

the “minimal effect” standard. But with the onehalf acre rule, it is virtually impossible for NPPC

members to do so because very few projects can

fit within the one-half acre cap. Thus, the

imagined environmental benefit to be achieved

by the Corps’ inflexible one-half acre rule is

unlikely to be realized. 

J.A. 128. In their brief, the appellants characterize this

paragraph as supporting the proposition that “[t]he restrictions

in the [permits] and the delays in processing times mean that

NPPC members cannot provide [their] important public services

in a timely manner, increasing flood risk for the communities

USCA Case #04-5009 Document #909109 Filed: 07/29/2005 Page 28 of 31
29

that NPPC members serve, posing a significant threat to people

and property.” Appellants’ Br. at 13 (citing J.A. 128, ¶ 8). 

NPPC’s theory of prudential standing, so far as we can tell, is

rooted in the contention that the Corps’ failure to issue more

lenient NWPs prevents NPPC from improving the environment.

We need not conclude that NPPC’s theory fails to “square with

the broad Congressional purpose in NEPA of assuring that

environmental values would be adequately and pervasively

considered in federal decision-making.” Realty Income Trust,

564 F.2d at 453. Even if we accept that it may be possible for

NPPC’s members to suffer a procedural injury sufficient to

bring them within NEPA’s zone-of-interest, nowhere does

NPPC point to any evidence “supporting the proposition that

there is a ‘substantial probability’ of ‘actual or imminent’ injury

to its members arising from” the Corps’ failure to conduct an

environmental analysis (i.e., a PEIS) of permits it did not issue

but should have. Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 902 (quoting & citing

Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

Tonsing’s declaration offers plenty of speculation: Paragraph

eight speaks of its members’ “reduced” incentives in attempting

to bring their projects within the parameters of the general

permits, of the “very few” projects that “can” fit the new

conditions, of the “virtual[] impossib[ility]” of meeting the

conditions and of the “imagined environmental benefits”

resulting from them. J.A. 128. But it offers nothing concrete

from which we can conclude there is a “substantial probability”

that NPPC’s members will suffer an injury sufficient under

Sierra Club. See 292 F.3d at 898. The declaration does not

mention a single specific project or activity that will not be

undertaken because of the more restrictive NWPs the Corps did

issue—as opposed to some other, presumably more lenient,

permits favored by NPPC’s membership. See J.A. 125-29.

Further casting doubt on the likelihood that, under its theory,

NPPC will suffer any NEPA procedural harm is that, to the

extent that NPPC members refuse to scale back their projects

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and try to secure an individual permit instead, the environmental

impact of any such project would be evaluated as part of the

individual permitting process. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(4) (“A

decision on a permit application will require either an

environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement

unless it is included within a categorical exclusion.”).

Accordingly, because “a NEPA claim may not be raised by a

party with no . . . apparent environmental interest,” we are

constrained to hold that the appellants cannot advance theirs.

Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). NEPA “cannot be used as a handy

stick by a party with no interest in protecting against an

environmental injury to attack a defendant.” Id. 

Because we conclude that the appellants have not

demonstrated a “substantial probability” that they fall within

NEPA’s zone of interest, we affirm the dismissal of this claim.

In view of this holding, we do not reach the NEPA ripeness

issue. See N.J. Television Corp. v. FCC, 393 F.3d 219, 221

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The priority for jurisdictional issues . . .

doesn’t control the sequence in which we resolve non-merits

issues that prevent us from reaching the merits.” (citing Ruhrgas

AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1999); Grand

Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir.

2000))); see also Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d

461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“There is an array of nonmerits

questions that we may decide in any order.”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the Corps on the appellants’ APA and

RFA claims is reversed and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. The dismissal of the appellants’

NEPA claim is affirmed.

So ordered.

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