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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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-·· UNIT-ED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cira.ii t 

JOE ROBERT HERRERA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PAT BURROUGHS and JANE DOE, 

Individually and in their 

official capacities as head 

nurse and nurse providing 

medical care to prisoners at 

Wyoming Penitentiary, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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APR l 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-8030 

(D.C. No. Misc. 89-014) 

(D. Wyoming) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from a sua sponte dismissal of Mr. 

.' Herrera's pro se · civil rights complaint on the ground of 

frivolousness, 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d). We affirm. 

Mr. Herrera's complaint sought redress under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, claiming defendant Pat Burroughs, allegedly the head nurse 

at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and Jane Doe, a penitentiary 

employee, had deprived Mr. Herrera of his Fifth and Eighth 

Amendment rights. Mr. Herrera asserted Jane Doe "deliberately and 

indifferently" administered to him a medication prescribed for 

another inmate. Mr. Herrera averred as a consequence of ingesting 

this medication he suffered, and continued to suffer, a number of 

physical ailments. Additionally, Mr. Herrera contended Ms. 

Burroughs knew or should have known that the medication given to 

him would "cause unnecessary pain and suffering" and Mrs. 

Burroughs "acted with deliberate indifference in not staffing the 

prison infirmary with adequately trained personnel to prevent this 

kind of mistake. 111 Mr. Herrera prayed for compensatory damages in 

the aggregate of $300,000 for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and 

lost wages. 

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice 

before the filing of a responsive pleading. The court held Mr. 

Herrera's assertion of "deliberate indifference" was nothing more 

than an attempt to raise "a tort claim to the level of a claim for 

violation of constitutional rights." The court concluded the 

1Mr. Herrera makes no claim that staffing was within 

of Ms. Burroughs or that she otherwise had authority 

the composition of the infirmary staff. 

-2-

the control 

to determine 

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 2 
-complaint .did -0ot state a violation of a right -guaranteed by the 

United States.-Constitutio~cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On appeal, Mr. Herrera fires a broadside against this ruling 

contending, among other things, that the complaint was not 

frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d); that the complaint 

asserted a cognizable§ 1983 claim; and that the district court 

exercises docket controls designed to discriminate against state 

prisoners. 

The only question before us is whether the district court 

correctly dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Mr. 

Herrera failed to attack the allegedly discriminatory docket 

practices in the district court, and we have no record before us 

upon which to review that claim. Mr. Herrera also asserts at 

great length eleven different ways in which health care at the 

Wyoming State Penitentiary is deficient. Even though he claims 

these assertions could have been proved had the complaint not been 

dismissed, they have nothing to do with the lawsuit filed by him. 

The only claim made by Mr. Herrera was to address injury allegedly 

arising from a specific act of improper medication. Even with a 

most liberal reading of the complaint, no averment refers to any 

claim of general inadequacy of the prison's medical facilities. 

Moreover, the only defendants named in the complaint were Ms. 

Burroughs and Jane Doe. The only actions assailed were those of 

Ms. Burroughs and Jane Doe. Neither the warden nor any other 

person responsible for the condition and provision of medical care 

was named a defendant. The contentions of constitutional 

deprivation relating to inadequate medical care in the Wyoming 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 3 
... prison.'.;_ raised in Mr. Herrera's brief are· thus -beyond the pale of 

this appeal. 

The real issue is whether Mr. Herrera asserted facts which 

prohibited the trial court's summary dismissal. We review the 

district court's sua sponte conclusion of frivolousness to 

determine whether the court abused its discretion. Van Sickle v. 

Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434 (10th Cir. 1986). It is only when a 

plaintiff can make no rational argument on the law or facts that a 

complaint should be dismissed as frivolous. Id. The Supreme 

Court has condoned this test. Neitzke v. Williams, 

109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989). 

U.S. 

The district court dismissed Mr. Herrera's complaint because 

the court concluded the only claim asserted was one of negligence 

which did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. 

The court correctly held that a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 

for deprivation of proper medical care must arise from the 

deliberate indifference of prison officials toward the medical 

needs of prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 

S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1530 (10th 

Cir. 1988). Thus, for example, when a prisoner alleges he was 

ill, requested care, but was deprived treatment, he has stated a 

sufficient claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Meade, 841 F.2d at 1530. 

Similarly, when a plaintiff alleges prison officials refused to 

treat a previously diagnosed illness and subjected him to 

conditions contrary to that prescribed by the prison doctor, his 

complaint of an Eighth Amendment violation is not frivolous. 

Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. at 1833. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 4 
. -- The quest-ion faced -by -- the district court, -and that which we 

- must consider, is- whether Mr. Herrera's claim arose ~roman act of 

isolated negligent conduct or intentional deprivation of proper 

medical care. Only the latter constitutes cruel punishment. 

Estelle, 97 S. Ct. at 291. 

Our scrutiny of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that 

despite Mr. Herrera's diligent use of the shibboleth "deliberate 

indifference" throughout his complaint, what he really complains 

of is a discrete act of negligence. Alleging that act was 

performed with "deliberate indifference" does not change its legal 

consequence. 

Not every claim of a prisoner that he received inadequate 

medical care rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation. 

Mere negligence, even though it produces pain or anguish, does not 

result in a civil rights claim. Estelle, 97 S. Ct. at 291-92. 

Indeed, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care 

cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain' or to be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. 

at 292 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976)). 

Stripped of its resourceful verbiage, Mr. Herrera's claim is 

that he was carelessly administered the wrong prescription, and, 

as a result, he suffered harm. 2 

That claim in no way alleges the type of deliberate and 

2 Even were we to construe the complaint as an allegation that the 

defendants intentionally administered the wrong medication, that 

would still not constitute the allegation of a deprivation of 

medical care. At most, the conduct giving rise to the claim would 

amount to an intentional tort because the action would have been 

discrete and isolated to the one incident in which the object was 

to inflict pain or injury. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 5 
. ·· intentional ,-act ~of deprivation- that would const-i tute a valid 

§ 198-3 ·· claim. The ·,gravamen- of -Mr. Herrera's complai-n-t is not that 

he was deprived of medical care, but that he was given the wrong 

care. The distinction is fatal to his cause. Because the 

underlying legal theory of the complaint is irrational, Mr. 

Herrera could never prove his claim. Consequently, the trial 

court properly found his action frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 6 
Herrera v. Burroughs, No. 89-8030 

EBEL, J., dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent. In light of the fact that prose 

pleadings are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519 (1972), and the fact that a complaint can be dismissed as 

frivolous under 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) only if "it lacks an arguable 

basis either in law or in fact," Neitzke v. Williams, 109 s. ct. 

1827, 1831 (1989), I believe that the district court abused its 

discretion in dismissing the complaint. 

Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants Jane Doe and Pat 

Burroughs acted deliberately and indifferently toward him in a way 

that caused him to be injured medically. There is enough specific 

detail alleged in the complaint to cause it to rise above a mere 

conclusory pleading. For example, the plaintiff has specifically 

identified the acts which caused him injury: the administration 

to him of the improper medication and the subsequent cover-up of 

that act. It is true that plaintiff does not specifically allege 

that the ill effects of ingesting the wrong medication could have 

been relieved had there been no cover-up. However, I do not 

believe that the absence of such an allegation warrants dismissal 

of his complaint because plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he 

was injured as a result of ingesting the wrong medication. In any 

event, it is at least "arguable," within the meaning of Neitzke, 

that plaintiff suffered significant injury as a result of the 

alleged cover-up. 

In addition, I have some difficulty with the majority's 

assertion, in footnote 2 of the order and judgment, that even if 

Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 7 
. . 

the complaint is alleging that defendants intentionally 

administered the wrong medication, it would still not constitute a 

sufficient allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation because the 

alleged misconduct was "discrete and isolated." I am not familiar 

with any constitutional principle that would support the 

proposition that a state actor cannot violate the Eighth Amendment 

if the actor's objectionable conduct relates only to a single 

incident, even if he acts with deliberate indifference to a 

prisoner's serious medical needs. 

Finally, I cannot accept the majority's distinction between a 

nurse giving a prisoner the wrong care as opposed to depriving a 

prisoner of medical care. Both seem equally violative of the 

Eighth Amendment and equally able to harm the prisoner. 

In sum, although it may very well be that plaintiff's 

complaint would not survive a motion for summary judgment, or some 

other dispositive motion down the road, the complaint has at least 

an arguable basis in law and fact and therefore satisfies 

§ 1915(d). 

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Appellate Case: 89-8030 Document: 01019971294 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 8