Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15743/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15743-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

E.M., a minor, by and through his

parents, E.M. and E.M.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PAJARO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT OFFICE OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-15743

D.C. No.

3:06-cv-04694-

MMC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maxine M. Chesney, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 7, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed July 15, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Kermit V. Lipez*, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

* The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior Circuit Judge for the First

Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD

SUMMARY**

Education Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment on

remand in an action brought by a student, by and through his

parents, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Improvement Act of 2004.

The student’s school district determined in 2005 that,

despite his learning disability of auditory processing disorder

or central auditory processing disorder, the student was not

eligible for special education services. In 2008, as a result of

further testing procured by his parents, the school district

determined that the student did qualify for special education. 

Shortly thereafter, he moved to another school district, which

also recognized that he qualified for special education.

The panel held that the student failed to show that the

school district acted unreasonablyin determining in 2005 that

he did not qualify for special education services under the

“specific learning disability” category because he lacked the

required severe discrepancy between his intellectual ability

and his achievement.

The Department of Education, as amicus curiae, took the

position that a central auditory processing disorder is eligible

for consideration for benefits under the “other health

impairment” category. The panel held that this position

merited deference. The panel nonetheless determined that the

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 3

student failed to show that the school district acted

unreasonably in not considering him for benefits under the

“other health impairment” category in 2005.

COUNSEL

Mandy G. Leigh (argued), Jay T. Jambeck, and Sarah J.

Fairchild, Leigh Law Group, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Laurie E. Reynolds and Kimberly A. Smith (argued), Fagen

Friedman & Fulfrost, Oakland, California, for DefendantAppellee.

Philip H. Rosenfelt, United States Department of Education,

and Thomas E. Perez, Mark L. Gross, and Jennifer L.

Eichhorn (argued), United States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., Amicus Curiae United States of America.

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OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

In 2004, before E.M. entered the fourth grade, he was first

tested for a learning disability. Through this lengthy

litigation it has been established that E.M. has an auditory

processing disorder or a central auditory processing disorder. 

However, in the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005, E.M.’s

school district, the Pajaro Valley Unified School District

(“PVUSD”) tested E.M. and determined that, despite his

learning disability, E.M. was not eligible for special

education services. Subsequently, as a result of further

testing procured by E.M.’s parents, PVUSD determined in

February 2008 that E.M. did qualify for special education. 

Shortly thereafter, E.M. moved to another school district

which also recognized that he qualified for special education.

Meanwhile, E.M. filed an administrative complaint with

the Special Education Division of the California Office of

Administrative Hearings. When the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision in favor of PVUSD, E.M.,

through his parents (the “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

California alleging that E.M. had been denied a “Free and

Appropriate Public Education” as set forth in the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004

(“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of PVUSD, Plaintiffs

appealed, and we issued an opinion affirming in part,

reversing in part and remanding. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley

Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2011). On remand

the district court again denied Plaintiffs any relief and further

ruled that E.M.’s central auditory processing disorder could

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E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 5

not be considered an “other health impairment” under the

applicable federal and state regulations. See 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.7(c)(9) (2005); Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 5, § 3030(f)

(2005).1

On this appeal we address three primary issues. First, we

conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to show that PVUSD

acted unreasonably in determining in 2005 that E.M. did not

qualify for special education services under the “specific

learning disability” category. See 20 U.S.C. § 1403(1)(A). 

Second, we conclude that the Department of Education’s

position that a central auditory processing disorder is eligible

for consideration for benefits under the “other health

impairment” category merits deference. Finally, we

determine that Plaintiffs have failed to show that PVUSD

acted unreasonablyin not considering E.M. for benefits under

the “other health impairment” category in 2005. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief to Plaintiffs.

I

A. PVUSD’s Initial Assessment of E.M.

E.M. enrolled in PVUSD as a kindergarten student in

1999. Plaintiffs assert that E.M. struggled at school and that

PVUSD should have referred him for a special education

assessment as early as December 2002, pursuant to its “child

find” obligation. This provision of the IDEA requires school

districts to identify children with disabilities and to ensure

1 Both the federal and state regulations have been subsequently

amended.

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that each child is evaluated and provided appropriate special

education services.2

In the summer of 2004, before E.M. entered the fifth

grade, Plaintiffs had E.M. tested by psychologist Dr. Roz

Wright, who administered the Weschsler Intelligence Scale

for Children (3d ed.) and the Woodcock Johnson Tests of

Achievement-III (“WISC”). Dr. Wright estimated E.M.’s

intelligence quotient (“IQ”) to be 104, based on the test. 

Plaintiffs then requested that PVUSD evaluate E.M. and

submitted Dr. Wright’s assessment.

In October 2004, PVUSD convened a meeting of E.M.’s

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) team. In addition

to Dr. Wright’s assessment, the IEP team considered the

results of additional tests administered by Leslie Viall,

PVUSD’s psychologist.

Ms. Viall, who had more than fifteen years of experience

administering educational assessments of children, testified

that she thought the WISC score of 104 was a valid measure

of E.M.’s intellectual ability. She stated that in October 2004,

 

2

 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) states:

All children with disabilities residing in the State,

including children with disabilities who are homeless

children or are wards of the State and children with

disabilities attending private schools, regardless of the

severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of

special education and related services, are identified,

located, and evaluated and a practical method is

developed and implemented to determine which

children with disabilities are currently receiving needed

special education and related services.

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she had given E.M. the Kaufman Assessment Battery for

Children test (“K-ABC” test) and that E.M. had obtained a

higher score of 111. Ms. Viall explained that she

administered the K-ABC test because the parents’ assessor,

Dr. Wright, had recently administered the WISC test and that

re-administering the same test less than four months later

would have produced an invalid score. When the K-ABC test

produced a significantly higher score, Ms. Viall administered

a third intelligence test, the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence

(“TONI”), on which E.M. scored a 98. Because E.M.’s TONI

score was consistent with his performance on the WISC,

rather than the higher score on the K-ABC, Ms. Viall

determined that 104 was the most reliable measure of E.M.’s

intellectual ability.

In 2005, to qualify for special education under the

“specific learning disability” (sometimes referred to as

“SLD”) category in California, a child had to meet three

requirements: (1) “there must be a severe discrepancy

between intellectual ability and achievement in oral

expression, listening comprehension, written expression,

basic reading skills, reading comprehension, mathematics

calculation, or mathematical reasoning”; (2) “the severe

discrepancy must be due to a disorder in one or more of the

basic psychological processes and must not be primarily the

result of an environmental, cultural, or economic

disadvantage”; and (3) “the discrepancy cannot be

ameliorated through other regular or categorical services

offered within the regular education program.” Cal. Educ.

Code § 56337 (2005).

PVUSD determined that E.M. had not demonstrated the

requisite “severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and

achievement.” The applicable California regulations defined

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a severe discrepancy as a difference of at least 22.5 points,

adjusted by 4 points, between a child’s ability and

performance. Faced with three scores, 111 on the K-ABC,

104 on the WISC, and 98 on the TONI, PVUSD opted to use

the middle score, 104 on the WISC. E.M.’s lowest standard

score in any academic area was 87 on listening

comprehension. The discrepancy between 87 and 104 was

only 17 points, not sufficient to constitute a severe

discrepancy.

B. Plaintiffs’ Initial Proceedings Before the

Administrative Law Judge and the District Court

When PVUSD denied E.M. special education benefits,

Plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with the Special

Education Division of the California Office of Administrative

Hearings. A hearing was held, and on May 2006, the ALJ

issued a final decision denying Plaintiffs any relief.

Plaintiffs then commenced this action in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. In

October 2007, the district court denied cross-motions for

summary judgment and remanded the case to the ALJ. The

ALJ was asked to “set forth more completely his reasoning as

to why the WISC test was favored over the K-ABC, as well

as his approach to evaluating all of the quantitative test data

in light of the mixed results of that data.”

Meanwhile, Plaintiffs had E.M. tested by Dr. Cheryl

Jacques, who estimated his IQ to be 110. PVUSD then

retested E.M. for eligibility for special education and found

E.M.’s IQ to be 114. This led PVUSD to determine in

February 2008 that E.M. was eligible for special education

benefits. Shortly thereafter, E.M. moved to the Fullerton

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Joint Union High School District, which also determined that

he was eligible for special education services.

On remand, the ALJ again determined that Plaintiffs were

not entitled to any relief. Plaintiffs appealed to the district

court.

On August 27, 2009, the district court granted PVUSD’s

motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court first

agreed with the ALJ that Ms. Viall was credible and her

reasoning persuasive.3 The court noted the irony that PVUSD

relied on the diagnostic score provided by Plaintiffs, while

Plaintiffs claimed that PVUSD should have used its own KABC scores. The district court further agreed with the ALJ

that PVUSD had administered multiple tests to E.M. and had

used the totality of the results to arrive at its ultimate

determination of ineligibility.

3 The district court noted that Ms. Viall had stated that she felt “the

WISC is a test of choice and it showed consistency with the TONI, and [I]

didn’t use the full scale score because of [E.M.’s] bilingual background,

so it seemed more valid to use the performance score.” The court also

observed that Ms. Viall had indicated that she thought E.M.’s score on the

K-ABC was inflated because it was not consistent with the WISC or

TONI scores, and testified that she “no longer used the K-ABC because

she had found that the test failed to provide ‘good information for looking

at student’s processing.’” The court further observed that “Ms. Viall had

conferred with other educators, who had confirmed the possibility of

inflated K-ABC scores, and at the time of the due process hearing she

believed that ‘the WISC is a much more researched and much more

reliable and valid measure.’” The court discounted Dr. Wright’s

testimony to a certain extent because she did not observe E.M. in the

classroom, review his school records, or speak with his teachers, and Dr.

Wright’s assessment “was intended to serve an entirely different purpose,

namely a finding of eligibility under the ADA that would be relevant to

the family’s immigration proceedings.”

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The district court further noted that “viewed as a whole,

the observational and anecdotal evidence describes a student

who was distracted easily but who also responded to various

forms of classroom intervention.” It opined that had E.M.

“been able to complete assignments and homework on a more

consistent basis, it seems likely that he would have been a

consistently average to above-average performer.”

Finally, addressing Plaintiffs’ allegation that PVUSD

failed to perform assessments with respect to E.M.’s auditory

processing, hearing and behavior, the district court

commented that at least one auditory processing test was

administered by Ms. Viall, and that PVUSD’s resource

specialist “conducted the Brigance test in both Spanish and

English as part of the initial assessment, and this test arguably

addresses auditory processing through a subtest involving

sentence repetition.”4

C. Plaintiffs’ Initial Appeal to the Ninth Circuit

Plaintiffs appealed, and we issued an opinion affirming in

part and reversing in part. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch.

Dist., 652 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2011). We recognized that

“school districts have discretion in selecting the diagnostic

tests they use to determine special education eligibility.” Id.

at 1003. Noting the different tests used to evaluate E.M., we

4 The district court related that “Ms. Viall testified that E.M. did not

appear to suffer from auditory processing difficulties because he started

tasks immediately when given oral instructions, and the WISC-III

assessment had not shown a processing disorder.” She further stated that

“the fact that E.M. had progressed to an A-level student in certain

academic areas, as well as his improvement in standardized math skills to

the basic level, are highly probative of an ability to succeed in the regular

classroom environment.”

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held that a school district, “considering all relevant material

available on a pupil, must make a reasonable choice between

valid but conflicting test results in determining whether a

‘severe discrepancy’ exists.” Id. at 1004.

We did not determine whether PVUSD’s choice was

reasonable because we determined that the district court had

erred in excluding Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report.5Id. at 1006. 

Accordingly, the district court was instructed on remand to

consider whether Dr. Jacques’s report, as well as PVUSD’s

2008 assessment of E.M., were “relevant to the determination

whether PVUSD met its obligations to E.M.” Id.

We then held, over a dissent, that Plaintiffs had not

waived their assertion that the district court should have

considered whether E.M.’s auditory processing disorder

qualified him for special education as a child with an “other

health impairment.” Id. at 1006. We remanded the case to

the district court “for a determination whether, during all

relevant times, PVUSD met its affirmative obligation to

locate, evaluate, and identify E.M. as a child with an other

health impairment or a specific learning disability related to

his auditory processing disorder.” Id at 1007.

 

5

 We explained:

The district court excluded Dr. Jacques’s report as not

“necessary to evaluate the ALJ’s determination.” The

proper inquiry was whether the report was relevant,

non-cumulative, and otherwise admissible.

652 F.3d at 1006.

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D. The District Court’s Opinion on Remand

On remand, the district court read our opinion as holding

that “E.M. had a ‘disorder in a basic psychological process,’

specifically, ‘an auditory processing disorder.’” However,

the court found that we had not reached “the issue of whether

PVUSD’s choice among test scores was reasonable; rather

[we] remanded the matter for further consideration of that

issue.” The district court proceeded to determine whether

Plaintiffs had shown that there was a “severe discrepancy”

between E.M.’s intellectual ability and his achievement.

The district court noted that all agree that E.M.’s lowest

academic standard score was 87. The court then reviewed the

three test scores, and concluded that the ALJ’s use of the

WISC’s score of 104, and the consequential finding that there

was no severe discrepancy (only 17 points difference), were

“thorough and careful” and entitled to deference. The court

further conducted its own de novo review of the evidence in

the administrative record, and concluded that Plaintiffs had

not met their burden of showing that it was unreasonable for

PVUSD to use the WISC test score.

The district court agreed with the ALJ that the school

psychologist’s testimony was more persuasive than Dr.

Wright’s perspective because of her experience

administrating educational assessments to children and her

actual knowledge of E.M.6 The court further found that

 

6

 The ALJ had reasoned:

Leslie Viall’s testimony established that the

performance score on the WISC-III of 104 is the valid

measure of [E.M.’s] intellectual ability. Ms. Viall is a

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neither Dr. Jacques’s report nor the PVUSD’s 2008

assessment of E.M. altered its determination that PVUSD’s

2005 assessment of E.M. was not unreasonable.

Turning to the issue of whether E.M. could qualify for

special education on the basis of having an “other health

impairment,” the district court noted that 20 U.S.C.

§ 1401(3)(A)(i) listed nine defined categories such as

“intellectual disabilities,” “autism,” and “specific learning

disabilities,” and a tenth category described broadly as “other

health impairment.” At the time of the PVUSD assessment,

“other health impairment” (sometimes referred to as “OHI”)

was defined as follows:

Other health impairment means having

limited strength, vitality or alertness to

environmental stimuli, that results in limited

credentialed school psychologist with more than 15

years’ experience administering educational

assessments to children. She testified that the WISC is

the most common intelligence quotient test

administered to children, as well as the best predictor of

school performance. Ms. Viall administered the KABC when she assessed [E.M.] in October 2004 only

because the parents’ assessor, Dr. Wright, had recently

administered the WISC-III. If Ms. Viall had

administered the WISC-III less than four months after

Dr. Wright’s administration, Ms. Viall would have

obtained an invalid score. When Ms. Viall obtained a

significantly higher score on the K-ABC (111), she

administered another intelligence test, the [TONI,] to

obtain more information. [E.M.’s] TONI score of 98

was consistent with [E.M.’s] performance score on the

WISC-III, not the inflated score on the K-ABC.

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alertness with respect to the educational

environment, that –

(i) Is due to chronic or acute health problems

such as asthma, attention deficit disorder or

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

diabetes, epilepsy, a heart condition,

hemophilia, lead poisoning, leukemia,

nephritis, rheumatic fever, and sickle cell

anemia; and

(ii) Adversely affects a child’s educational

performance.

34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9)).

Despite Plaintiffs’ contraryassertion, the district court did

not find any decisions by courts or hearing officers

specificallyholding that auditoryprocessing disorders qualify

as OHIs. Accordingly, the court approached the question as

a matter of first impression, using canons of construction. 

The court determined that “specific learning disability” and

“other health impairment” concerned two different categories

of impairment.7 The district court, noting that the statute

 

7

 The district court explained:

In the regulations, “specific learning disability” is

defined to mean “a disorder in one or more of the basic

psychological processes involved in understanding or

in using language,” see 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(10)

(2005); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2005),

provided such disorder results in a “severe discrepancy

between [the child’s] intellectual ability and

achievement,” see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)

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included a non-exhaustive list, employed the dictionary

meaning of “other” as “another,” and concluded that because

a qualifying auditory processing disorder is a “specific

learning disability,” “it necessarily follows that an auditory

processing disorder cannot at the same time be an ‘other

health impairment.’” The court expressed concern that a

contrary finding would render superfluous the requirement of

showing severe discrepancy to qualify for benefits under the

“specific learning disability” category.

8

(2005); see also Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 (2005). A

“specific learning disability” thus is “specific” to

disorders adversely affecting the processing of the

written and/or spoken word. As is set forth in the

applicable regulations, such processing disorders

expressly include “auditory processing” disorders. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(1) (2005).

As defined in the regulations, an “other health impairment” is a “chronic

and acute health problem” that “[a]dversely affects a child’s educational

performance.” See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9) (2005); see also Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f) (2005) (providing pupil is entitled to special

education where pupil has “chronic and acute health problem[ ]” that

“adversely affects a pupil’s educational performance”).

 

8

 The district court reasoned:

A contrary finding would effectively negate and render

superfluous the statutory and regulatory provisions that

a “disorder in a basic psychological process” qualifies

as a “specific learning disability” only if, as a result of

such disorder, a “severe discrepancy” exists between

the child’s intellectual ability and academic

achievement. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 (2005);

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2005); see also Hart

v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding

“in the construction of administrative regulations, as

well as statutes, it is presumed that every phrase serves

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Having concluded that PVUSD had reasonably

determined that Plaintiffs had failed to show a “severe

discrepancy” between E.M.’s intellectual ability and

academic achievement in 2005, and that E.M.’s auditory

processing disorder could not be an “other health

impairment,” the district court granted judgment in favor of

PVUSD. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

A district court’s compliance with our mandate is

reviewed de novo. United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970, 973

(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084,

1092 (9th Cir. 2000). We also review de novo “the district

court’s decision that the school district complied with the

IDEA.” K.D. v. Dep’t of Education, 665 F.3d 1110, 1117

(9th Cir. 2011); N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist.,

541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). However, we give “due

weight to judgments of education policywhen reviewing state

hearings and must take care to not substitute [our] own

notions of sound educational policy for those of the school

authorities [we] review.” K.D., 665 F.3d at 1117 (internal

a legitimate purpose and, therefore, constructions which

render regulatory provisions superfluous are to be

avoided”). If a “specific learning disability” were

deemed to constitute an “other health impairment” as

well, a child with a specific learning disability would

need to show only a generalized “adverse[ ]” effect on

academic performance. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9)

(2005). As PVUSD argued at the hearing, and E.M. did

not dispute, the “adversely affects” standard and the

“severe discrepancy” standard are different. E.M. fails

to explain why Congress, for purposes of the IDEA,

would have intended the same impairment be assessed

under two tests of differing magnitude.

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quotation marks omitted). Although “[t]he extent of

deference given to the state hearing officer’s determination is

within our discretion,” “[w]e give deference to the state

hearing officer’s findings particularly when, as here, they are

thorough and careful.” Id.; see also Union Sch. Dist. v.

Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994).

In K.D., we further reiterated that: (1) we review “the

district court’s factual determinations for clear error, even

when based on the administrative record”; (2) a “finding of

fact is clearly erroneous when the evidence in the record

supports the finding but the reviewing court is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed”; and (3) the party “challenging the district court’s

ruling, bears the burden of proof on appeal.” 665 F.3d at

1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).

III

A. The District Court Complied with Our Mandate

Initially, we affirm that the district court order is

consistent with our mandate. Plaintiffs argue that we had

found that E.M. had a specific learning disability, that we

held that the district court should apply more of a de novo

standard of review, and that the ALJ should not have relied

on the testimony of PVUSD’s psychologist. We held that

E.M. had alleged an auditory processing disorder, but we did

not reach the question of whether Plaintiffs had shown that

E.M. had qualified for special education benefits under the

“specific learning disability” category. Our opinion did not

alter the standard of review or make any factual

determinations as to any witness’s credibility. Rather, we

remanded for a determination whether “PVUSD met its

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affirmative obligation to locate, evaluate, and identify E.M.

as a child with an other health impairment or a specific

learning disability related to his auditory processing

disorder.” E.M., 652 F.3d at 1007. The district court did this

in compliance with our mandate.

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown that PVUSD

Unreasonably Found that E.M. Lacked the Severe

Discrepancy Between His Achievement and

Academic Test Scores Then Required to Qualify

for Benefits Under the “Specific Learning

Disability” Category

In Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–58 (2005), the

Supreme Court clarified that under the IDEA, the burden of

persuasion rests with the party seeking relief. Here, all

appear to agree that E.M.’s achievement score in 2004 was

87, and that then applicable state regulations required a

difference of 22.5 points between E.M.’s achievement and

ability scores. Thus, to prevail on their claims that E.M. was

entitled to special education benefits under the “specific

learning disability” category, Plaintiffs have to show that it

was unreasonable for PVUSD to use any test results other

than E.M.’s score on the K-ABC test. This they have failed

to do.

In challenging PVUSD’s use of the WISC test, Plaintiffs

argue that: (1) the school psychologist, Ms. Viall testified that

the K-ABC test was a good cognitive test; (2) although Ms.

Viall testified that other colleagues thought the scores on the

K-ABC test can be inflated, she “was never able to identify

which colleagues and what their credentials were”; and

(3) Ms. Viall’s belief that E.M.’s score on the K-ABC test

was high was a product of her unreasonablylow expectations. 

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Plaintiffs assert that at least one authoritative article in a peer

reviewed journal identified the K-ABC test as the best

predictor of achievement of all cognitive tests. They also

submitted a declaration from Dr. Kaufman, who authored

both portions of the WISC test and the K-ABC test, favoring

the use of the K-ABC test and noting that it was not

appropriate to substitute a brief test such as the TONI for

comprehensive tests such as the K-ABC. In addition, Dr.

Wright, who administered the WISC test, testified that E.M.

had been unusually distracted when he took the test.

Plaintiffs also contend that Dr. Jacques’s report supports

their positions that: (1) E.M. had a long history of auditory

processing disorder symptoms; (2) PVUSD was on notice that

E.M. had a learning disability; and (3) E.M. had a long

history of school failures. Plaintiffs point to Dr. Jacques’s

statement that she found it “puzzling” that the district did not

find E.M. eligible for special education services in 2005.

Plaintiffs have shown that PVUSD could have used

E.M.’s K-ABC score, but they have not shown that PVUSD

acted unreasonably in using his WISC score. The record

shows that Dr. Wright gave E.M. the WISC test in the

summer of 2004 and that E.M. scored a 104 on that test. 

Plaintiffs then asked PVUSD to test E.M. for a learning

disability. PVUSD did so. The school psychologist

administered the K-ABC test because re-administering the

WISC test would not have produced a reliable score. E.M.

scored 111 on the K-ABC test. Ms. Viall, noting the disparity

between the test scores and having concerns both about KABC test scores in general and E.M.’s score in particular,

administered a third test. On the TONI test, E.M. scored 98. 

PVUSD considered all three test results and then decided to

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use the middle score, the one submitted by Plaintiffs. This

course of action has the indicia of reasonableness.

Plaintiffs’ evidence and arguments do not undermine the

reasonableness of PVUSD’s decision. Plaintiffs presented

evidence such as Dr. Kaufman’s declaration praising the KABC test, but not evidence that the other two tests were not

well-respected tests for cognitive ability or that it was

unreasonable to average test scores from different tests. 

Moreover, none of the later developed information – Dr.

Jacques’s report, the 2008 assessment, or the later

assessments by E.M.’s new school district – bear on

PVUSD’s 2005 determination because theydo not undermine

E.M.’s test scores on the WISC and TONI. The later

developed evidence does indicate that E.M. had a learning

disability in 2004, but PVUSD did not deny that he had a

disability. Rather, it denied relief because there was not a

22.5 point discrepancy between E.M.’s tested ability and

performance. Subsequently, when E.M. was retested and

reevaluated, PVUSD in 2008 determined that he was eligible

for special educational benefits.9

 

9

 Dr. Jacques’s report included the following comment:

Why has the gap widened between [E.M.’s] measured

IQ scores and his achievement scores? The current

testing used the most recent versions and normative

updates, and because of the proposed population

advances in knowledge, the updated tests are harder. 

Probably more importantly for [E.M.], the increased

academic load in middle school and the cumulative

experiences of failure have contributed to a widening

gap in his intelligence and his achievement levels.

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In Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62, the Supreme Court held that

the party challenging the district court’s ruling bears the

burden of proof on appeal, and in K.D., 665 F.3d at 1117, we

held that we review the district court’s factual determinations

for clear error. In E.M., we reiterated that “school districts

have discretion in selecting the diagnostic tests they use to

determine special education eligibility.” 652 F.3d at 1003. 

Applying these standards, we conclude that the record,

developed over at least seven years, does not show that

PVUSD unreasonablydenied E.M. special education benefits

in 2005 under the “specific learning disability” category. 

Accordingly, the district court’s determination of this issue

must be affirmed.

C. We Defer to the Department of Education’s

Position that a Child With a Disability May Be

Eligible for Special Educational Benefits Under

More Than One Category

Although we held in E.M., 652 F.3d at 1007, that

Plaintiffs had not waived their contention that E.M.’s auditory

processing disorder could qualify him for special education

as a child with an “other health impairment,” the merits of

this contention had not been previously addressed. In

addressing the contention in the first instance, the district

court did not have the benefit of the perspective of the

Department of Education (“DOE”). On appeal, the DOE has

participated as an amicus curiae. Thus, in reviewing the

district court’s reading of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i), we have

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the benefit of the views of the agency charged by Congress

with administering the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1406, 1416.10

In 1991, the DOE issued a Joint PolicyMemorandum that

explained that a child with attention deficit disorder or

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder might qualify for

special education benefits under one of three categories of the

IDEA’s definition of “child with a disability” – “other health

impairment,” “specific learning disability,” or “serious

emotional disturbance.” 18 IDELR 116 (Sept. 16, 1991). In

1994, the DOE’s Office of Special Education Programs

issued a letter explaining that a child with chronic fatigue

syndrome could qualify for special education under the “other

health impairment” category or under another category if the

child met the criteria for that category. Letter to Fazio,

21 IDELR 572 (Apr. 26, 1994). The DOE asserts that while

these documents do not address auditory processing

disorders, they reflect the Secretary’s position that a

particular condition may qualify for benefits under more than

one of the IDEA categories.

The DOE asserts that its interpretation of a “child with a

disability” is consistent with the history and purpose of the

IDEA. Congress first enacted the IDEA in 1970 “to reverse

this history of neglect” of disabled children in the United

States. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52. Congress subsequently

expanded the definition of children with disabilities to

10 Section 1406 authorizes the Secretary of Education to issue certain

regulations “necessary to ensure that there is compliance” with the IDEA. 

Section 1416 authorizes the Secretary to monitor, review and enforce the

implementation of the IDEA.

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include specific learning disabilities,11autism and traumatic

brain injury,

12

and children between the ages of three and nine

who experienced developmental delays.

13 These amendments

furthered the IDEA’s overarching substantive goal “to ensure

that all children with disabilities have available to them a free

appropriate public education that emphasizes special

education and related services designed to meet their unique

needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Forest Grove Sch. Dist.

v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 244–45 (2009) (noting the IDEA’s

express purpose as set forth in the statute and holding that

“[a] reading of the Act that left parents without an adequate

remedy when a school district unreasonably failed to identify

a child with disabilities would not comport with Congress’

acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly

identifying each child eligible for services.”).

The DOE further claims that its perspective is consistent

with a State and local school district’s duty under the “child

find” provisions of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). 

The DOE argues that considering a child’s condition under

only one possible category of disability, when more than one

might apply, elevates a myopic concern with the child’s

specific classification over determining the child’s actual

educational needs. See Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d

1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting “whether Heather was

described as cognitively disabled, other health impaired, or

11 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.

94-142, § 4(1), 89 Stat. 773, 775.

12 See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.

No. 101-476 § 101, 104 Stat. 1103.

13 See Individual with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997,

Pub. L. No. 101-105, § 602(3)(B), 111 Stat. 37, 42–43.

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learning disabled is all beside the point. The IDEA concerns

itself not with labels, but with whether a student is receiving

a free and appropriate education.”); see also 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(3)(B) (“Nothing in this chapter requires that

children be classified by their disability so long as each child

who has a disability listed in section 1401 of this title and

who, by reason of that disability, needs special education and

related services is regarded as a child with a disability under

this subchapter.”).

Where a statute speaks clearly to the precise question at

issue, we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). However,

“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the

specific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Id. at 843.

The Supreme Court has noted that deference may be

extended to an agency’s perspective not only when it

exercises its rulemaking authority, but also when an agency

authorized to administer a statute interprets its own regulation

or the statute by other means. In Chase Bank USA, N.A. v.

McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 781 (2011), the federal agency presented

its position in an amicus brief and the Supreme Court held:

“we defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation,

advanced in a legal brief, unless that interpretation is ‘plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 880

(quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). In

Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d

884 (9th Cir. 1995), the DOE clarified its position in a “letter

to all chief state school officers,” and we held that the agency

was “entitled to deference in its interpretation of the statute,

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because the interpretation is based on a permissible

construction of the existing statutory language.” Id. at 894.

The Supreme Court has recognized that even where the

express delegation of specific interpretive authorityisimplicit

and the agency has not engaged in the process of rulemaking

or adjudication, an agency’s decision may still be entitled to

Chevron deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.

218, 229–30 (2001). Moreover, even when an agency’s

decision does not qualify for Chevron deference, “an

agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever

its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader

investigations and information’ available to the agency, . . .

and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and

judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Id.

at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139–40

(1994)). We need not determine whether DOE’s policy

letters and amicus brief command Chevron deference as we

find its interpretation of the statute persuasive under

Skidmore.

Here, as the district court’s resort to a canon of

construction implicitly admits, Congress’ intent is not clear. 

Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) offers a number of ways in

which an individual can qualify as a “child with a disability.” 

Some of the proffered categories are quite specific, for

example: “orthopedic impairments,” “autism,” and “traumatic

brain injury.” Other categories appear to be relatively broad,

such as “intellectual disabilities,” “hearing impairments,” and

“serious emotional disturbance.” It is not clear from the

statute whether the category “other health impairments” was

intended as an alternate category or an additional category. 

In other words, Congress did not indicate whether “other

health impairments” was limited to disabilities that did not fit

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into any of the other listed categories or included disabilities

that might also fit within another category.

Because Congress was not clear, we must consider the

DOE’s interpretation. We find neither of the grounds

advanced in support of a restricted interpretation of the statute

to be persuasive. Certainly, the application of a canon of

construction should yield to Congress’ purpose in passing the

IDEA of ensuring that all children with disabilities have

available to them a free appropriate public education. 

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Children with disabilities will be

disadvantaged if they have to select one category to the

exclusion of any other category. In many instances, neither

the child nor the parents will initially know which category

encompasses the child’s disability. Indeed, compelling a

selection of one category seems contrary to the school

district’s child find duty.

Upon further inspection, the second proffered ground, a

fear that allowing a disability to qualify under more than one

category will “negate and render superfluous” the distinct

requirements for various categories, proves to be unfounded. 

As the DOE asserts and the district court found, the

regulations that defined “specific learning disability” and

“other health impairments” in California in 2005 pertained to

two different categories of impairment with distinct criteria. 

Viewing the requirements side by side reveals their

distinctiveness.

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Specific Learning

Disability

Cal. Educ. Code § 56337

(2005)14

- severe discrepancy

- due to disorder of the

basic psychological

processes

- cannot be otherwise

ameliorated

Other Health

Impairment

34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9)

(2005)

- limited strength, vitality

or alertness

- due to chronic or acute

health problems

- adversely affects child’s

educational performance

A severe discrepancy, which all parties agreed in 2005

required a difference of 22.5 points between tested ability and

performance, is not the same thing as a condition that limits

“strength, vitality or alertness.” Also, it appears that a

“disorder of the basic psychological processes” is distinct

from “chronic or acute health problems.” Of course, a

“disorder” could also be a “health problem,” but presumably

a child could be otherwise very healthy and still have a

“disorder of the basic psychological processes.” The third

criterion was also different. An “other health impairment”

only required a showing that the condition adversely affects

the child’s educational performance, whereas a “specific

learning disability” required a showing that other educational

tools were inadequate. Perhaps, as the district court found,

the third criterion for an “other health impairment” might be

14 As noted, both the California Education Code and the Code of Federal

Regulations have been amended since 2005.

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easier to meet than the third criterion for a “specific learning

disability,” but the different provisions of the categories’

other criteria indicate that an “other health impairment” is not

necessarily easier to show than a “specific learning

disability.” Regardless of the comparative difficulty of

qualifying for benefits under the different categories, the two

categories definitely have different requirements and appear

to address different facets of disabilities. Thus, the fact that

a particular child might qualify under both categories is in no

way contrary to or inconsistent with Congress’ purposes in

enacting the IDEA. A contrary position would create the

possibility that a child with a disability could be denied

special education benefits not because he did not qualify for

benefits, but because the child, his parents, or the school

district’s initial selection of one categorybarred consideration

of a more appropriate category.

The district court, faced with a question of first

impression, reasonably turned to a canon of construction to

interpret an ambiguous statute. On appeal we have the

benefit of a presentation by the DOE, which is charged by

Congress with enforcing the IDEA. Because Congress did

not clearly address the issue, and because we determine that

the DOE’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations is

reasonable and furthers the overall intent of the IDEA, we

defer to the agency’s interpretation. Accordingly, we hold

that a “child with a disability” may seek to qualify for special

education benefits under more than one of the categories

listed in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i).

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D. Plaintiffs Have Not, and Cannot, Show that

PVUSD Unreasonably Denied E.M. Special

Education Benefits in 2005 Under the “Other

Health Impairment” Category

Our decision that E.M. may qualify for special education

services under the other health impairment category does not

answer the question whether he did qualify for services in

2005, or more to the point, whether Plaintiffs can show that

PVUSD unreasonably failed to extend special education

benefits to E.M. in 2005 based on his “other health

impairment.” In a usual case, we would remand for the

district court or the ALJ to determine such a factual question

in the first instance. However, over the last eight years this

matter has been before the ALJtwice, before the district court

thrice, and is now before us a second time. E.M. has

graduated from high school. Accordingly, judicial efficiency

and fairness to all concerned recommend that we review the

existing record to consider whether a remand would be futile

and would needlessly prolong this litigation.

The record is not clear as to when the possibility of E.M.

qualifying for educational benefits under the OHI category

first arose. There is no indication that this possibility was

specifically mentioned by anyone in 2004 or 2005. As we

noted in our prior opinion, Plaintiffs’ prayer in their January

2006 filing with California’s Office of Administrative

Hearings included the words “other health impairment.” 

E.M., 652 F.3d at 1006. However, the filing as a whole does

not present any evidence or arguments that E.M. met the

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criteria for qualifying under the other health impairment

category.

15

A review of the ALJ’s decisions show that all parties were

focused on E.M.’s auditory processing disorder. The issues

presented were broad, including whether PVUSD fulfilled its

child find and search and serve obligations, whether PVUSD

denied E.M. a free and appropriate public education and

whether PVUSD failed to assess E.M. in all areas of

suspected disability.

15 The prayer in the initial complaint to the Office of Administrative

Hearings read:

To be found eligible for special education and related

services under the IDEA as a child primarily with a

learning disability and also as a child having an other

health impairment due to his auditory processing

deficits as outlined in paragraphs 12, 18, 21 and 22

above.

Paragraph 12 simply recites that, based onDr. Wright’s findings, Plaintiffs

requested that E.M. be assessed for special education services. Paragraph

18 recites efforts by Dr. Wright in 2005 in support of E.M.’s request for

benefits and concludes with the assertion that E.M. “qualified as a child

with a learning disability with additional deficits in auditory processing.” 

Paragraph 21 alleges that based on the assessments and observations of

E.M., he “clearly met the criteria of a learning disability.” Paragraph 22

reiterates that E.M. “has a learning disability and moreover a central

auditory processing disorder.” It states that the audiologist “found

problems with short-term memory, language processing and an

impairment in background noise,” and that E.M.’s verbal responses

“require changing an auditory input into a more complex output involving

conscious thought and mediation by language processing.” All of the

paragraphs appear to address the criteria for a “specific learning disability”

rather than for an “other health impairment.”

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The ALJ’s report concentrates on Plaintiffs’ claim that

E.M. was eligible for services under the “specific learning

disability” category, but it also considered Plaintiffs’

allegations that PVUSD failed to assess E.M. “[i]n the areas

of auditory processing, hearing and behavior.” The ALJ

found that Ms. Viall administered the Spanish and English

versions of a test that included a subtest for auditory

processing and that Plaintiffs had failed to establish that

PVUSD failed to assess E.M. “in the suspected area of

disability of auditory processing.”

16 As to testing for hearing,

the ALJ noted that E.M.’s “initial evaluation report dated

October 13, 2004, states that [E.M.] was screened for hearing

problems” and that E.M. “passed the hearing screening.” The

ALJ found that Plaintiffs had failed to show that PVUSD had

failed to assess E.M. in the area of hearing and commented:

“[w]hile [E.M.] listed this as an issue, he presented no

evidence in support of his claim that [PVUSD] failed to

screen his hearing.”

As noted, the criteria for qualifying for special education

benefits under the “other health impairment” category were

 

16 The ALJ further noted:

While [E.M.] subsequently obtained an assessment

from a private audiologist who determined that [E.M.]

had an auditory processing disorder (although as

[PVUSD] correctly points out, her ultimate conclusion

in that regard was vague) there was no persuasive

evidence that Ms. Viall was not appropriately trained

and qualified to administer the TAP-R, which, as

determined above,tests “auditory processing.” The fact

that [E.M.] obtained a different result from a different

test administrator does not detract from the fact that

[PVUSD] did assess [E.M.] in the area of auditory

processing.

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(1) limited strength, vitality or alertness (2) due to chronic or

acute health problems, that (3) adversely affects the child’s

educational performance. Here, there is no suggestion that

E.M. had limited strength or vitality, but his auditory

processing disorder might well have limited his “alertness.” 

However, the record, rather than supporting this possible

connection, indicates that when E.M. was tested for hearing,

the results were normal, and that Plaintiffs failed to proffer

any contrary evidence.

It is now too late to develop new evidence as to E.M.’s

“alertness” in 2005. The existing evidence suggests that E.M.

did not have limited “alertness.” Ms. Viall and Nancy

Navarro, the resource specialist who assessed E.M., reported

that he was alert and responsive during assessment. E.M.’s

fourth and fifth grade teacher testified that she believed E.M.

was no more distractable than her other students, and his sixth

grade teacher reported that after she worked with E.M. on his

attention, his attention to tasks improved significantly. 

Moreover, there was evidence that none of his teachers, nor

the speech and language therapists, thought that E.M. had

trouble following oral directions. This evidence might not

prove that E.M. was alert, but is more than sufficient, absent

any contrary evidence from 2004 and 2005, to compel a

finding that in 2005 PVUSD did not unreasonably fail to

diagnose E.M. as having limited alertness.

Limited alertness is the criteria for eligibility for benefits

under the “other health impairment” category that E.M. was

most likely to meet. Because Plaintiffs have failed to show

that PVUSD unreasonably failed to diagnose limited

alertness, we need not consider whether there was evidence

that E.M. met the other criteria for eligibility under the OHI

category. Nonetheless, we note that our review of the record

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reveals nothing to suggest that E.M. suffered from chronic or

acute health problems. Furthermore, even assuming that

E.M. had limited alertness, there is scant evidence that this,

rather than other causes, such as his failure to complete his

homework, adversely affected his educational performance.

IV

We can hope that today, with the evolution of the law and

improved testing, a child with a disability, such as E.M., will

not have to wait three years to be determined eligible for

special educational services. However, our task is to

determine whether PVUSD’s past determinations were

unreasonable. We conclude that they were not.

PVUSD was not insensitive to Plaintiffs’ request that

E.M. be assessed. It formed an IEP team and had E.M. tested

and evaluated. Morever, PVUSD did not deny E.M. benefits

on the basis of some subjective evaluation or opinion, but

because E.M.’s test scores did not show the severe

discrepancy between his ability and achievement then

required. Plaintiffs have not shown that PVUSD’s decision

was unreasonable.

We do agree with Plaintiffs and the Department of

Education that a child with an auditory processing disorder,

such as E.M., may seek special education services pursuant

to more than one of the categories listed in 20 U.S.C.

§ 1401(3)(A). The DOE is charged by Congress with

administering the IDEA and its interpretation of the statute is

permissible and furthers Congress’ intent in enacting the

IDEA. Accordingly, we defer to its position. See Mead

Corp., 533 U.S. at 234–35.

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Finally, while we recognize that a child with an auditory

processing disorder may qualify for special educational

services under the “other health impairment” category, we

conclude that Plaintiffs cannot show that PVUSD was

unreasonable in 2005 in failing to diagnose E.M. under the

OHI category. Our review of the record reveals a dearth of

any evidence that in 2005 E.M.’s auditoryprocessing disorder

manifested itself by limiting E.M.’s alertness or that the

disorder was due to chronic or acute health problems. 

Plaintiffs over the last eight years have broadly challenged

PVUSD’s alleged failure to fulfill its child find obligations

and failure to assess E.M. in all areas of suspected disability. 

We doubt that Plaintiffs have any additional evidence

concerning E.M.’s “other health impairment” in 2005 and

question whether such evidence, if it exists, could now be

admitted.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment

in favor of PVUSD.

Each side shall bear its own costs.

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