Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00343/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00343-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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At times in the Complaint, Plaintiff spells his name Parrillo. The Complaint’s caption,

however, spells his last name as Parillo; accordingly, the Court has used that spelling

throughout this Order. 

WO 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald W. Parillo, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Paul Schoof, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-343-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 10) for lack of personal

jurisdiction filed by Defendant Officer Paul Schoof (“Officer Schoof”). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court dismisses this case without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of a November 2008 traffic stop in Trail Creek, Indiana. (Dkt.

# 1.) According to Plaintiff Donald W. Parillo (Mr. Parillo)1

, he was traveling through Trail

Creek when Officer Schoof pulled him over and threatened to give him a warning for failure

to signal a right turn. (Id. at 3.) When Mr. Parillo indicated that no warning was necessary,

Officer Schoof allegedly became angry, ordered Mr. Parillo out of his vehicle and then

proceeded to “slap,” “hit,” and “physically assault” Mr. Parillo. (Id. at 4.) Officer Schoof

then arrested Mr. Parillo, subjected him to a breath and field sobriety test, and charged him

Case 2:10-cv-00343-GMS Document 15 Filed 06/17/10 Page 1 of 6
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with driving while intoxicated. (Id.) Mr. Parillo further alleges that he suffered a heart attack

due to the violation of his civil rights. (Id. at 7.)

On February 18, 2010, Mr. Parillo filed a pro se Complaint against Officer Schoof

alleging six causes of action: (1) denial of due process of law: (2) denial of equal protection

of the law; (3) denial of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness; (4) and violation of his civil

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. # 1 at 6–7.) Officer Schoof now moves to dismiss

this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal

jurisdiction. 

LEGAL STANDARD

When the parties dispute whether personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant

is proper, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Rio Props.

Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002). This is so, even though the

defendant is the moving party on a 12(b)(2) motion. Id. In the absence of an evidentiary

hearing, however, the plaintiff need only make “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts

to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, ___ F.3d

___, 2010 WL 2135302, at *2 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d

1151 (9thCir. 2002)).In considering the motion, a court may “assume the truth of allegations

in a pleading” to the extent thatsuch allegations are not “contradicted by affidavit.” See Data

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9thCir. 1977)(citing Taylor v. Portland

Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967));see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019

(observing that only “uncontroverted allegations in [the] complaint must be taken as true”).

Where there are “conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits,” depositions,

and other filings, those conflicts “must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Am. Tel & Tel.

Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations

omitted).In cases where a plaintiffsurvivesthe motion to dismiss under a prima facie burden

of proof, the plaintiff still must prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the

evidence at a preliminary hearing or at trial. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n. 2.

To establish that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper, the plaintiff must

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demonstrate that (1) the state’s long arm statute confers jurisdiction over that defendant; and

(2) that “the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the constitutional principles of Due

Process.” See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). Because Arizona’s long-arm

statute extends jurisdiction “to the maximum extent permitted by the . . . Constitution of the

United States,” the Court’s personal jurisdiction inquiry largely collapsesinto an analysis of

Due Process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th

Cir. 1989); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000). 

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Officer Schoof.

Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts”

with the forum state so that subjecting the defendant to its jurisdiction will not “offend

traditional conceptions offair play and substantial justice.” Int’l ShoeCo. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, “the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he [or she]

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 (1980). In accord with the Due Process Clause, the

“minimum contacts” standard may be satisfied in two ways. First, a court may exercise

general jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “continuous and

systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).

Second, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a defendant “has purposefully directed

his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that

arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472,

(1985) (internal quotation omitted). “In addition to establishing the requisite contacts, the

assertion ofjurisdiction must be found reasonable.” In re PhenylpropanolamineProds. Liab.

Litig., 344 F. Supp.2d 686, 690 (W.D. Wash. 2003).

A. Officer Schoof Is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in Arizona.

A court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant’s activities

in the state are substantial or continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action is

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unrelated to those activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.

Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)); Data Disc, 557 F.2d at

1287 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952)).

Mr. Parillo has not asserted any facts even remotely suggesting that Officer Schoof

is subject to general jurisdiction in Arizona. Rather, the record indicates that Officer.

Schoof’s only contact with Arizona occurred when he drove through the state in 1979. This

brief contact is insufficient to constitute continuous or systematic contacts as required by

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415.

B. Officer Schoof Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in Arizona.

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the cause of action

arises directly from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d

1357, 1361 (1990). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction.

Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Under this three-part inquiry, specific

jurisdiction exists only if: (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,

or purposely directs conduct at the forum that has effects in the forum; (2) the claim arises

out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports

with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it is reasonable. Id.; see also Bancroft & Masters,

Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cybersell, Inc. v.

Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Under this three-step analysis, the Court finds that Officer Schoof is not subject to

specific jurisdiction in Arizona. There are no facts suggesting that Officer Schoof purposely

availed himself of jurisdiction in Arizona. Officer Schoof’s drive across Arizona some thirty

years ago does not establish the requisite minimum contacts in Arizona. Similarly, Officer

Schoof’s arrest and incarceration of Mr. Parillo in November of 2008 does not arise out any

activity related to Arizona. That action took place in Indiana. The Court, therefore, lacks

specific personal jurisdiction over Officer Schoof.

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II. The Court Will Not Transfer of this Matter to Another Jurisdiction. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a district court that lacks personal jurisdiction over an action

“shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in

which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed.” According to the

Ninth Circuit, this requires the district court to “‘consider whether the action would have

been timely if it had been filed in the proper forum on the date filed, and if so, whether a

transfer would be ‘in the interest of justice.’” Hays v. Postmaster General of United States,

868 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Taylor v. Social Sec. Admin., 842 F.2d 232, 233

(9th Cir. 1988)). 

While this action could have been filed in the Northern District of Indiana, the Court

finds that transfer of this case to that district or any other is not in the interest of justice. It

appears that Mr. Parillo filed this action in Arizona to avoid a paying a sanction imposed by

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Dkt. # 10, Ex. B at 4.) According to the Seventh

Circuit, Mr. Parillo has filed several frivolous lawsuits and has been sanctioned in the amount

of $5,000. (Id.) That court has further barred Mr. Parillo from filing any subsequent lawsuits

in the District of Indiana until those sanctions are paid. (Id.) Accordingly, transferring this

case to Indiana could have the effect of allowing Mr. Parillo to circumvent the Seventh

Circuit’s sanction. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that

the interests of justice are not served by transferring a claim to a jurisdiction that the plaintiff

purposefully sought to avoid). 

Furthermore, Mr. Parillo will not be left without a remedy. Should he choose to pursue

his claims against Officer Schoof, he can pay the Seventh Circuit’s sanction and file his

Complaint in the North District of Indiana. In addition, there is no indication that any of Mr.

Parillo’s claims will be time-barred if he promptly pays the sanction and refiles his claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Officer Schoof’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Personal Jurisdiction (Dkt # 10) is GRANTED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Parillo’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE this action. 

DATED this 16th Day of June 2010. 

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