Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01716/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01716-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LUIS LORENZO ARMENTERO, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 2:08-cv-01716-MSB

ORDER

Plaintiff Luis Lorenzo Armentero, who is currently confined in the Avenal State

Prison (ASP) in Avenal, CA, has filed an amended pro se civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. #18) pursuant to the Court’s November 23, 2009 order dismissing

Armentero’s original complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

and granting Armentero leave to amend his complaint (Dkt. #15). After screening the

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Armentero’s First Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Eighth

Amendment. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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In his original complaint, Armentero also asserted claims under the First and 1

Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. #1). In dismissing his original complaint for failure to state

a claim, the Court informed Armentero that “[a]ny cause of action that was raised in the

original complaint is waived if it is not raised in a first amended complaint.” (Dkt. #15 at

10). Because he does not reassert them in his First Amended Complaint, Armentero has

waived his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987). 

The other documents attached to Armentero’s First Amended Complaint, unlike a 2

number of the documents that had been attached to Armentero’s original complaint,

generally appear to be unrelated to the allegations contained in the First Amended

Complaint; they involve separate incidents at a different prison and do not involve the named

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be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Id. at § 1915A(b).

II. First Amended Complaint

In his First Amended Complaint (FAC), Armentero presents one claim for

relief against the named defendants—D.K. Sisto, A.C. Navarro, R. Long, L. Ingrao, L. 1

Murray Fries, L.E. Delapp, L. Rohrer, Alvaro Traquina, W.A. Rodriguez, C.M. Scavetta, C.

Primm, and A. Noriega—under the Eighth Amendment: “[A]ll defendants named in this

complaint intentionally were risking [Armentero’s] health by their refusal of his prescribed

medical treatment and his serious medical need, acting with deliberate indifference.” (Dkt.

#18 at 11).

Armentero alleges that he “has been diagnose[d] by . . . physicians as medically

unassigned since 2005, due to . . . . degenerative joint disease or osteoarthritis.” (Dkt. #18

at 12). According to Armentero, “[d]ue to [his] osteoarthritis . . . he has joint pain and some

movement limitation. . . . . [The] [s]ymptoms and effects of [his] osteoarthritis . . . include

stiffness, swelling, and pain, which make it hard [for him] to walk, climb[,] and bend[].” (Id.

at 12–13). A document attached to the FAC entitled “Comprehensive Accommodation

Chrono,” shows that in September 2005 a physician at North Kern State Prison wrote

“medically unassigned” in response to a question whether Armentero had “any physical

limitations to job assignments,” and assigned Armentero to a “bottom bunk” on a permanent

basis. (Id., Exh. D). The document states: “Chronos indicating permanent accommodations 2

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defendants.

In his FAC, Armentero states that he and Defendant Navarro specifically discussed 3

his “medical status and medical condition, as well [as] the medical chronos CDC 1845 and

CDC 7410, which function as a physician’s order.” (Dkt. #18 at 13). Armentero, however

does not explain what “the medical chronos CDC 1845 and CDC 7410” are. Although there

is a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono dated September 2005 attached to the FAC, as

discussed above, nothing on that document indicates that it is a CDC 1845 or CDC 7410

chrono.

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shall be reviewed annually. This form shall be honored as a permanent chrono at all

institutions.” (Id.).

Armentero was subsequently transferred to California State Prison - Solano (CSPSolano) in Solano, CA. (Dkt. #18 at 10-11, Exh. C). Armentero alleges that he discussed

his “medically unassigned” status and medical condition as reflected in his 2005

Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono with Defendant Navarro, a former counselor at

CSP-Solano. (Id. at 13). Navarro allegedly ignored Armentero’s medically unassigned 3

status and referred him to the Unit Classification Committee (UCC), recommending to

Defendant Long, a UCC supervisor, that Armentero be assigned to attend Adult Basic

Education (ABE-1.115) school. (Id. at 13). Long assigned Armentero to ABE-1.115,

refusing to grant him an exemption despite allegedly being aware of his unassigned status.

(Id. at 14).

Armentero also alleges that Defendant Fries, a Correctional Officer at CSP-Solano,

and Defendant Ingrao, the ABE-1.115 teacher at CSP-Solano, “compell[ed] [him] to attend

the ABE[-1.115] school” and refused to recognize his medically unassigned status and grant

him an exemption from attending the ABE-1.115 school. (Dkt. #18 at 15–16). According

to Armentero, “[a]s [a] result of defendant[s’] action[s,] [his] knee and a disc in [his] spinal

column were injured when he [fell while] trying to climb [up a] hill to reach the school,” and

he “now [has to] walk with [the] help of a can[e].” (Id. at 16). Additionally, Defendant

Rohrer, a physician at CSP-Solano, examined Armentero after his fall and “prescribed [him]

pain medication, a knee sleeve, and a cane,” but allegedly refused to recognize Armentero’s

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medically unassigned status, thus “[e]xposing [him] to future unreasonable health risk[s].”

(Id. at 19).

Disciplinary charges were filed against Armentero for failing to report to his ABE1.115 assignment. (Dkt. #18 at 17). After holding a hearing on September 20, 2007,

Defendant Primm, a Correctional Sergeant at CSP-Solano, found Armentero guilty as

charged. (Id.). According to Armentero, Primm ignored Armentero’s medically unassigned

status. (Id.). Armentero appealed. (Id. at 19). On appeal, Defendant Delapp, the Supervisor

of Academic Instruction at CSP-Solano, allegedly filed a report stating that Armentero “had

no additional document[ation] to support his unassigned status” (id. at 20) despite knowing

that Armentero had produced such documentation (id. at 19). Thereafter, Defendants

Scavetta, Associate Warden of Level II Operations at CSP-Solano, Rodriguez, Associate

Warden of Health Care Services at CSP-Solano, Noriega, Chief Physician and Surgeon at

CSP-Solano, Rallos, Chief Physician and Surgeon of Health Care Services at CSP-Solano,

and Sisto, Warden at CSP-Solano, allegedly “support[ed] and acquiesc[ed] [in] . . . Delapp’s

false report” and refused to recognize Armentero’s medically unassigned status, despite

having “the power and the authority to alleviate or to correct the violation.” (Id. at 20,

20–23).

In December 2007, Armentero was transferred by Defendant Traquina, the Chief

Medical Officer at CSP-Solano, to the California Medical Facility (CMF) in Vacaville, CA.

(Dkt. #18 at 18; id. at Exh. B). According to Armentero, CMF is more “hilly” than CSPSolano and “is a stairs system facility”; it has elevators, but they are usually broken. (Id. at

18). 

III. Failure to State a Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state

law who have violated rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See Buckley v.

City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139,

1146 (9th Cir. 1984). To state a valid claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that he suffered a specific injury as a result of a defendant’s specific conduct and show an

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affirmative link between the injury and that defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

A. Pleading Standard

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hains v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading standard set forth in the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In

addition,“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. If the Court determines that a pleading

could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity

to amend his complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). 

B. Eighth Amendment

Armentero claims that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Armentero claims that “all defendants

named in [the] [FAC] intentionally were risking [his] health by their refusal of his prescribed

medical treatment and his serious medical need, acting with deliberate indifference.” (Dkt.

#18 at 11).

As explained by the Court’s in its previous order dismissing Armentero’s original

complaint, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976). In his FAC, as in his original complaint, Armentero alleges a serious medical

need—he has osteoarthritis that limits his mobility and causes him pain. His condition is

serious enough that a physician at North Kern State Prison declared him medically

unassigned with a permanent bottom bunk. The question, as with the original complaint, is

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whether Armentero’s allegations in the FAC meet the requisite standard for deliberate

indifference.

“Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs

when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.’” Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394

(9th Cir. 1988)). In addition, prison officials may not “ignore[] the instructions of the

prisoner’s treating physician or surgeon.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th

Cir. 1999).

Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard: “the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Thus,

an “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

. . . cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. In other words,

mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not constitute

deliberate indifference. See Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980);

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36 & n.4 (equating deliberate indifference with reckless

disregard).

In his FAC, Armentero repeatedly asserts that each of the named defendants’

“intentionally interfered with [his] medical treatment” and “knew of and disregard[ed]

excessive risk to [his] health and safety exposing [him] to [an] unreasonable health risk;

deliberate indifference to such risks constitutes punishable behavior.” (Dkt. #18 at 13; see

id. at 14–23). As previously noted, however, rote repetition and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Rather, “[a] claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see id. at 1950 (“While legal

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conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.”).

Armentero’s FAC contains only the following facts: (1) Armentero has osteoarthritis,

which causes him “joint pain and some movement limitation,” making it “hard [for him] to

walk, climb[,] and bend”; (2) Armentero was declared to be “medically unassigned” with

respect to job assignments in a September 2005 Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono by

a physician at the North Kern State Prison; (3) two years later, Armentero was assigned by

Defendants Navarro and Long to attend classes at the ABE-1.115 school at CSP-Solano

despite showing them his 2005 Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono from North Kern

State Prison; (4) Armentero fell and injured himself while walking up a hill to the ABE 1.115

school after being compelled to attend the school by Defendants Fries and Ingrao, despite the

fact that both of them knew about Armentero’s 2005 Comprehensive Accommodation

Chrono; and (5) the remaining defendants subsequently refused to recognize Armentero’s

medically unassigned status despite knowing about his 2005 Comprehensive

Accommodation Chrono.

At best, Armentero’s allegations establish that the defendants knew that Armentero

had been deemed medically unassigned to job assignments in 2005 by physicians at North

Kern State Prison. Armentero does allege that his 2005 Comprehensive Accommodation

Chrono and accompanying “medically unassigned” status remained valid in 2007 at CSPSolano. In fact, although the 2005 Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono states that it

“shall be honored as a permanent chrono at all institutions,” it also states that it “shall be

reviewed annually.” In addition, Armentero does not allege that his medically unassigned

status applies to assignments to attend school, as opposed to only job assignments, as the

2005 Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono appears to indicate—the form explicitly

applies to “physical limitations to job assignments.” Finally, Armentero alleges only that his

osteoarthritis causes him “some movement limitation” and makes it “hard [for him] to walk”;

he does not allege that he is physically unable to walk up a hill without injuring himself or

that the defendants knew that he could injure himself if they required him to walk up a hill

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Based on the allegations contained in Armentero’s original complaint and the 4

documents attached thereto, the Court concluded that Armentero had alleged, at best, a

difference of medical opinion between the physicians at North Kern State Prison and those

at CSP-Solano, who found that he was not mobility impaired and that his physical

examination was “unremarkable.” (Dkt. #15 at 7); see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] mere difference of medical opinion is in sufficient, as a matter of

law, to establish deliberate indifference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Armentero’s

FAC, however, does not include the exhibits attached to his original complaint showing that

he was transferred to Folsom State Prison from North Kern State Prison before arriving at

CSP-Solano and that physicians at Folsom State Prison examined him and determined that

the “objective data [did] not support [his] claimed disability” and medically unassigned

status. The Court reminds Armentero that it has the power to sanction a party if it determines

that the party has engaged in deceptive practices, willfully deceived the Court, or otherwise

acted in bad faith. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958

(9th Cir. 2006). 

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to attend the ABE-1.115 school. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the

defendants’ alleged conduct—refusing to grant Armentero an exemption from assignment

to the ABE-1.115 school at CSP-Solano in 2007 in light of his “medically unassigned” job

status in 2005 at North Kern State Prison—amounts to deliberate indifference to Armentero’s

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment.4

IV. Dismissal With Prejudice

For the foregoing reasons, Armentero’s FAC fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. As the FAC might be cured by the allegation of other facts, however, the

Court will grant Armentero leave to amend the FAC. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. Within

45 days, Armentero may submit a second amended complaint on the form provided with this

Order.

Armentero must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “Second

Amended Complaint.” The complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the form

provided with this Order and may not incorporate any part of the previous complaints by

reference. An amended complaint entirely supersedes any previous complaints. Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the Court will treat the

previous complaints as nonexistent. Id. Any cause of action that was raised in a previous

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complaint is waived if it is not raised in the second amended complaint. See King, 814 F.2d

at 567.

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Armentero must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with

Rules 83-182(f) and 83-183(b) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court of the

Eastern District of California. Armentero must not include a motion for relief with a notice

of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action. See L.R. 83-

183(b).

B. Copies

Armentero must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

L.R. 5-133(d)(2). Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further

notice.

C. Possible “Strike”

Because the First Amended Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim,

if Armentero fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this

Order, the dismissal will count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a prisoner may not bring a civil action in forma pauperis

“if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless a prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).

D. Possible Dismissal

If Armentero fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963

F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order

of the Court).

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Dkt. #18) id dismissed for failure to state

a claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint and may file a Second Amended

Complaint in compliance with this Order no later than 45 days from the date this Order is

filed. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint and the Court finds the amended complaint

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, it will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2) and count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Alternatively, Plaintiff may elect to file a motion to voluntarily dismiss his

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) no later than 45 days from the date this

Order is filed.

(2) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a Prisoner Complaint form along

with this order.

(3) If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint or a Motion to

Voluntarily Dismiss the First Amended Complaint within 45 days from the date this order

is filed, the Clerk of the Court shall, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of

this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).

DATED this 10th day of June, 2010.

/s/ Marsha S. Berzon 

MARSHA S. BERZON

United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation

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