Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 The court is well aware that defendants have not yet filed responses

to these motions. Such responses would not aid in the court’s decisional process,

however. Moreover, there is no prejudice to defendants in not allowing them to

respond as these motions are being resolved in their favor. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry Northcross Patterson, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-05-1159-PHX-RCB (MHB)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al. )

)

Defendants. ) )

Currently pending before the court are two motions filed by

plaintiff pro se, Barry Northcross Patterson: (1) a “Motion to

Strike Defendants’ []Amended Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and

Injunction Claims[]” (Doc. 121); and (2) a “Motion for Extension of

Time” (Doc. 122).1

 For the reasons set forth below, the court

DENIES both of these motions. 

Background

Assuming familiarity with this protracted litigation, the

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2 At first glance, this motion appears to run afoul of LRCiv 7.2(m),

which narrowly circumscribes when a motion to strike may be filed. In particular,

that rule states:

 Unless made at trial, a motion to strike may be filed 

only if it is authorized by statute or rule, such as Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f), 26(g)(2) or 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), 

or if it seeks to strike any part of a filing or submission 

on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a 

statute, rule, or court order.

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court sets forth only the background essential to resolving the two

motions identified above. On April 21, 2010, defendants Broderick

and Mason filed a “Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and Injunction Claims”

(Doc. 90), which plaintiff opposed (Doc. 92). That motion was

directed to plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”). Prior to

the resolution of that motion to dismiss, however, plaintiff was

granted leave to and did file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).

 Based upon the well-settled rule that “[a]n amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint[,]” and “[a]fter amendment, the

original pleading is treated as nonexistent[,]” this court held

that defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC was “moot and . . .

denied [it] without prejudice.” Ord. (Doc. 113) at 3:11. Shortly

thereafter, on October 27, 2010, defendants Broderick and Mason

filed their “Amended Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and Injunction

Claims” (Doc. 115). Plaintiff is seeking to strike that motion,

which he “believes is erroneously being accepted as a Motion to

Dismiss his 2nd Amended Complaint.” Mot. (Doc. 122). If the court

denies his motion to strike, plaintiff is seeking additional time,

beyond the current court ordered date of December 8, 2010, to

respond to defendants’ amended motion.

Discussion

Plaintiff is moving to strike2 defendants’ motion to dismiss

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LRCiv 7.2(m) (emphasis added). It is possible, however, to construe plaintiff’s

motion as seeking to strike because defendants’ amended motion violates a prior

court order. Based upon that generous construction, the court will consider the

merits of plaintiff’s motion to strike. 

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because they did not seek a court order “allowing an Amended

Motion[.]” Mot. (Doc. 121). Seemingly, plaintiff is operating

under two misconceptions. The first is that because he had to seek

leave to file an amended complaint, defendants also had to seek

leave of court before filing their most recent motion to dismiss. 

The second related misconception is that because the court denied

defendant’s prior motion to dismiss, defendants also were required

to seek a court order prior to filing the present motion. 

Plaintiff is wrong on both counts. 

Even absent a court order, defendants were entitled (as they

did) to file their pending motion to dismiss. Indeed, in its

October 13, 2010, order denying as moot defendants’ motion to

dismiss the FAC, the court recognized the possibility that

defendants would file a motion to dismiss the SAC. The court

directed that “[i]f Defendants decide to move for dismissal of

Plaintiff’s [SAC] for any defense listed under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b), any such motion must be filed before a

responsive pleading.” Ord. (Doc. 113) at 3:12-14 (citation

omitted). Defendants complied with that Order by filing their

“Amended Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and Injunction Claims.” 

To be sure, the SAC is not referenced in the title of

defendants’ motion. Indeed, there is no mention of any complaint

in the title. But it is clear from even a quick perusal of

defendants’ motion that it is directed at the SAC. See, e.g., Mot.

(Doc. 115) at 2:20; and at 2:24. Thus, despite plaintiff’s

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contrary assertion, there is nothing “erroneous” about defendants

filing a motion to dismiss the SAC. See Mot. (Doc. 122). 

Although defendants, for whatever reason, styled their motion as

“amended,” that does not change the fact that it is properly

directed at certain claims in the SAC. Accordingly, there is no

basis for striking defendants’ “Amended Motion,” and the court

DENIES plaintiff’s motion to do so (Doc. 121).

If the court, as it has, denies plaintiff’s motion to strike,

he is seeking “additional time” to file a “supplement” to his

response to defendant’s “Amended Motion to Dismiss.” Mot. (Doc.

122). This motion can also be read as seeking additional time to

respond to defendants “mooted and denied motion [to dismiss]

[(Doc.)] . . . 90[.]” Id. The court denies this particular request

as moot. Because, as plaintiff acknowledges, the court denied that

earlier motion to dismiss, there is no need for him to file any

further response as to that motion. 

Turning to plaintiff’s request to supplement his response to

the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff does not specify how much

additional time he is seeking, nor why he needs such an extension. 

Regardless, the court sees no basis for granting plaintiff an

extension of time. 

After defendants filed their “Amended Motion to Dismiss,”

“[p]rior to receiving the required Notice and Warning from the

Court, Plaintiff filed his response to Defendants’ Motion (Doc.

116).” Ord. (Doc. 120) at 1:17-18. “On November 10, 2010, the

Court, nonetheless, provided Plaintiff with a Notice and Warning

stating that, ‘if he has not already done so, Plaintiff must file a

response – or supplement his response – to Defendants’ Motion to

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Dismiss no later than December 8, 2010' (Doc. 118).” Id. at 1:18-

21. Plaintiff then sought “clarification of the Court’s briefing

schedule[.]” Id. at 1:22. Reiterating, “the Court instruct[ed]

Plaintiff that if he so chooses . . . , he may file a supplement to

his response to Defendants’ ‘Amended Motion to Dismiss’ no later

than December 8, 2010.” Id. at 1:23-25. 

Plaintiff has had ample opportunity and notice of the December

8, 2010, date for filing his supplemental response. He is not

offering any reason, let alone a compelling one, for an extension

of time. Therefore, the court abides by the prior order and DENIES

plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (Doc. 122). Plaintiff

must file a supplement to his response, if any, to defendants’

“Amended Motion to Dismiss” no later than December 8, 2010. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Defendants’ []Amended 

Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA and Injunction Claims of 10-27-

10 []” (Doc. 121) is DENIED; and

(2) plaintiff’s “Motion for Extension of Time” (Doc. 122)

is DENIED.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2010.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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