Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05228/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05228-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed November 19, 2004

No. 02-5228

THADDEUS FLETCHER,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

On Petition for Rehearing

–————

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: In March of 2001, Thaddeus

Fletcher sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. Department

of Corrections, the D.C. Board of Parole, and the United

States Parole Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

claiming the Parole Commission ‘‘violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause of the Constitution of the United States by determining his parole eligibility date on the basis of parole regulaUSCA Case #02-5228 Document #860808 Filed: 11/19/2004 Page 1 of 3
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tions and guidelines promulgated after the crime for which he

was incarcerated.’’ Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d

1223, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The district court dismissed

Fletcher’s claim as premature and he appealed. Although we

disagreed with the district court’s procedural disposition, we

went on to hold Fletcher’s claim failed on the merits because

‘‘a parole guideline is not a ‘law’ within the proscription of the

Ex Post Facto Clause.’’ Id. at 1228.

In his petition for rehearing, Fletcher calls our attention to

Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), in which the Supreme

Court considered a challenge to a non-binding parole regulation under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court in Garner

reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that a parole board

rule changing the time for reconsideration of parole from

three to eight years necessarily violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause, noting that the board had discretion to shorten the

eight-year period. The Court explained that the ‘‘controlling

inquiry’’ is ‘‘whether retroactive application of the change’’ in

a regulation respecting parole creates ‘‘a sufficient risk of

increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered

crimes.’’ Id. at 250. Further, ‘‘[w]hen the rule does not by

its own terms show a significant risk, the [claimant] must

demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s practical

implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer

period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.’’ Id. at

255. That is, the claimant ‘‘must show that as applied to his

own sentence the law created a significant risk of increasing

his punishment.’’ Id. The Supreme Court thus foreclosed

our categorical distinction between a measure with the force

of law and ‘‘guidelines [that] are merely policy statements

from which the Commission may depart in its discretion.’’

370 F.3d at 1228. Rather, the question is one of practical

effect.

Accordingly, we vacate our previous judgment and remand

this matter to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with Garner. We note, however, that Fletcher

made a related claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

which the district court denied pursuant to Garner, see

USCA Case #02-5228 Document #860808 Filed: 11/19/2004 Page 2 of 3
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Fletcher v. Reilly, No. 01cv2058 (D. D.C. November 24, 2003),

and which is now pending in this court, No. 03–5359. On

remand therefore the district court need consider only such

matters, if any, as are not foreclosed by its decision in No.

01–2058 and by principles of claim preclusion.

So ordered.

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