Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-16-06168/USCOURTS-ca6-16-06168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0124n.06 

 Case No. 16-6168 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

BRANDENBURG HEALTH FACILITIES, et 

al., 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

IVYE MATTINGLY, Administratrix of the 

estate of Mary Jo Hancock, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

KENTUCKY 

BEFORE: BOGGS, SILER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

SILER, Circuit Judge. Ivye Mattingly appeals the district court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ 

motion to compel arbitration and enjoin state court proceedings. The Plaintiffs filed a motion to 

dismiss Mattingly’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Since the district court stayed the 

case pending the completion of arbitration, the district court has not issued a final order, and we 

have no jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal. For this reason, the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss 

the appeal is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mattingly is the administratrix of Mary Jo Hancock’s estate. Hancock was a resident at a 

nursing home owned and operated by the Plaintiffs (collectively “Preferred Care”). In 2007, 

before entering into the facility operated by Preferred Care, Hancock executed a durable power 

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of attorney granting Mattingly the authority to “make and enter into any contract or contractual 

arrangement.” Mattingly brought a claim in state court on behalf of Hancock alleging that 

Hancock suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of negligent care provided by 

Preferred Care in 2013. Preferred Care filed a motion to dismiss that lawsuit for failure to 

properly file suit as a next friend. Preferred Care also filed a motion to compel arbitration as 

contemplated in the parties’ agreement based on the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The state 

court did not rule on the motion to compel arbitration, instead holding the case in abeyance 

pending a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court. After Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 

478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015), was issued, Preferred Care brought a complaint in federal court 

seeking to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, 

enjoined Mattingly from pursuing her claims in state court except for the wrongful death claim, 

and stayed the federal case pending the conclusion of arbitration. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We must determine for ourselves whether this court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory 

appeal. See Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2003). Review of 

whether the district court violated the Anti-Injunction Act is de novo. Six Clinics Holding Corp., 

II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1997). 

DISCUSSION 

Preferred Care moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 6th 

Cir. R. 27(d)(1). The basis of this motion is Preferred Care’s assertion that the district court’s 

order was an interlocutory order which cannot be appealed pursuant to the text of the FAA. 

The text of the district court order is important in assessing our jurisdiction: 

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration and enjoin the state court action is 

GRANTED. Mattingly is ENJOINED from proceeding against Plaintiffs in the 

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Meade Circuit Court action on all but the wrongful-death claim. The parties are 

COMPELLED to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement the 

claims which are the subject of Mattingly’s Meade Circuit Court complaint, 

excluding only the wrongful-death claim. Counsel shall promptly inform the 

Meade Circuit Court of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

(2) Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, this proceeding is STAYED until the conclusion of 

the ordered arbitration, at which time the Court will decide whether to enter 

judgment approving any arbitral award. The parties shall submit a joint status 

report every ninety (90) days from the date of entry of this Order until the 

resolution of the arbitration. The parties shall promptly report on the resolution of 

the arbitration, or of any settlement. 

The critical language for the jurisdictional analysis is subpart (2) staying the case pending the 

completion of arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. Since the case was stayed under 9 U.S.C. § 3, an 

appeal cannot be taken from the order under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) unless otherwise provided for in 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) requires a district judge to state in writing in the relevant 

interlocutory order that the order involves a controlling question of law whose resolution may 

materially advance completion of the litigation, but the district court did not make such a finding 

here. 

In an attempt to circumvent this textual bar on appellate jurisdiction, Mattingly cites a 

case from the Ninth Circuit where that court held that “where an order compelling arbitration is 

inextricably bound up with an injunction order, [appellate courts] have jurisdiction to review 

both orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1379 

(9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). This authority runs directly counter to our ruling in 

Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Estate of Hopkins by & through Hopkins addressing an 

almost identical scenario. 845 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2017). 

There is similarly no jurisdiction over Mattingly’s appeal of the district court’s injunction 

of Mattingly’s proceeding on certain claims in state court. The district court has the authority 

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under § 4 of the FAA to direct arbitration to proceed in accordance with the terms of the 

arbitration agreement. This arbitration clause does not allow litigation to proceed while 

arbitration is ongoing. Since the injunction was entered pursuant to § 4 of the FAA, review of it 

is foreclosed by 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2). See id. at 768-69. 

Mattingly also challenges the state-court injunction as it pertains to the Kentucky 

defendants. Since those defendants could not have participated in federal litigation premised 

upon diversity of citizenship, she argues that she should be allowed to pursue her claims against 

them in state court. This argument fails to grasp that the district court’s jurisdiction is predicated 

upon the FAA, a federal statute conferring federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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