Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01058/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

WANDA L. CURRY et al., PLAINTIFFS

V. 05-CV-1058

AERVOE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS

And

JUANITA WEST, Executrix of the

Estate of PAUL W. WEST, Deceased PLAINTIFFS

v. 05-CV-1099

AERVOE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions to Remand

(Doc. 14 in 05-CV-1058; Doc. 32 in 05-CV-1099) and Separate

Defendant Radiator Specialty Company’s (Radiator Specialty)

responses (Doc. 27 in 05-CV-1058; Doc. 36 in 05-CV-1099) which

Separate Defendant Halley Oil Company adopts (Doc. 29 in 05CV1058). Separate Defendant Radiator Specialty also filed

supplemental briefs in response (Doc. 36 in 05-CV-1058; Doc. 39 in

05-CV-1099). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motions to

Remand are GRANTED. 

Background

The Plaintiffs worked at a Georgia-Pacific factory in

Crossett, Arkansas that manufactured various paper products. Some

of the chemicals used in the manufacturing process included:

benzene, toluene, xylene, xylol, naphtha, methyl ethyl ketone,

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gasoline, diesel fuel and resultant exhausts, paints enamels,

epoxies, coatings, resins, coal tar paste, paint additives,

primers, solvents, mineral spirits, thinners, reducers, lacquers,

sealers, varnish, and hardners (chemicals). Plaintiffs allege they

were exposed to these chemicals daily, and the resultant exposure

caused them to develop adverse health conditions, including nonHodgkin’s lymphoma, chronic lymphocytic leukemia, multiple myeloma,

acute myelogenous leukemia, and chronic myelogenous leukemia. 

On May 31, 2005, and August 31, 2005, respectively, Plaintiffs

filed complaints in the Circuit Court of Ashley County, Arkansas,

against various factory suppliers and 10 John Doe Companies

alleging Defendants committed various torts when they failed to

warn of the health dangers associated with the chemicals.

Plaintiffs specifically disclaimed any and all claim arising under

the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.

(Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ¶ 16). Separate Defendant Radiator

Specialty removed the cases on July 6, 2005, and October 18, 2005,

contending that federal question jurisdiction arose under the

Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), and the Consumer Product

Safety Commission (CPSC) and its Regulations, and Plaintiffs’

state-law tort claims were therefore preempted. Plaintiffs move to

remand this action to the Circuit Court of Ashley County, Arkansas.

Discussion

Radiator Specialty removes the case from state court to

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federal court contending that this Court has jurisdiction because

Plaintiffs’ complaint raises a cause of action that originally

could have been brought in federal court because it arises under

federal law. A defendant has a right to remove a case from state

to federal court if the plaintiffs’ cause of action arose under

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). As the party seeking

removal and opposing remand, Radiator Specialty has the burden of

establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. In re Business

Men’s Assurance Co. Of America, 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8 Cir. 1993). th

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over

“federal question” cases, which “aris[e] under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Federal question jurisdiction exists when “the plaintiff’s right to

relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question

of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420

(1983). “It is long settled law that a cause of action arises

under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint

raises issues of federal law.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987).

Plaintiffs did not plead a federal question in their complaint and

expressly disclaimed any and all claims arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Radiator

Specialty contends that we should pierce the pleadings to determine

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the true nature of the Plaintiffs’ complaint. Radiator Specialty

contends Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding a failure to warn is

governed by the FHSA and that Plaintiffs’ complaint then arises

under federal law. Radiator Specialty removes the case to this

Court contending that the FHSA preempts Plaintiffs’ state law

claims. Plaintiffs contend that the FHSA does not carry the

preemptive force necessary to support federal question

jurisdiction. 

The doctrine of preemption, the resolving of any conflict

between federal and state law, flows from the Supremacy Clause of

the Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Preemption may

occur in two ways with the first turning on ascertaining the intent

of Congress. Congress may expressly provide that federal law

supplants state authority in a particular field or its intent to do

so may be inferred from its regulating so pervasively in the field

as not to leave sufficient vacancy within which any state can act.

See, e.g., Rice V. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67

S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Or absent an express or

implied congressional intent to preempt state authority in a field,

state law is nevertheless preempted by operation of law to the

extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. See Wisconsin

Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2476,

2482, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991). 

Ordinarily, federal preemption is a defense and will not

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The complete preemption doctrine is extraordinary and has only been 1

recognized under two statutes: § 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act in

Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Association of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), and §

502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in Metropolitan Life Inc.

Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987).

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support removal. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63. However, an

exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the doctrine of

complete preemption which essentially permits a district court to

“convert[] an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating

a federal claim.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,

393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).

In applying the complete preemption doctrine , courts 1

generally look first to the preemptive scope of the federal statute

and second to its preemptive force. See Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d

1156, 1165 (4 Cir. 1996). A statute’s preemptive force is th

measured by the extent to which it precludes state court

consideration of claims falling within the statute’s preemptive

scope. Id. Only where the federal statute’s preemptive scope is

sufficiently broad to reach a purported state law claim and its

preemptive force is sufficiently powerful to convert that

particular claim into a federal claim will the complete preemption

doctrine apply. Custer, 89 F.3d at 1165 (emphasis in original). 

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized two presumptions with

reference to the nature of preemption. First, because the States

are independent sovereigns in our federal system...Congress does

not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action. Medtronic,

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Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996).

Second, analysis of the scope of the statute’s preemption is guided

by the comment that “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate

touchstone” in every preemption case. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at

485; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516,

112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617; Gade, 505 U.S., at 96, 112 S.Ct., at 2381-

2382; Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct.

1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978).

The Fourth Circuit discussed the purpose of Congress in

passing the FHSA in Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 509 U.S. 906, 113 S.Ct. 2999, 125 L.Ed.2d 693 (1993).

The Moss court, in deciding whether Congress intended to preempt

the regulations of hazardous substances to such a degree as to

preclude claimants from suing private parties for money damages for

alleged violations of the FHSA under either the statute itself or

through a state law tort action, examined Congress’ intent in

passing the FHSA and set forth the relevant history of the

statute’s limited preemption provision: 

The FHSA was enacted in 1960. The purpose of the

law was to “provide nationally uniform requirements

for adequate cautionary labeling of packages of

hazardous substances which are sold in interstate

commerce and are intended or suitable for household

use.” As enacted, the FHSA did not contain a

preemption section. However, when the Act was

amended in 1966, the legislative history discussed

the impracticality of having the states produce

potentially fifty different labels for a particular

hazardous substance. Congress recommended “a

limited preemption amendment which would encourage

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and permit states to adopt requirements identical

with the federal requirements for substances

subject to the Federal Act, and to enforce them to

complement Federal enforcement.” 

Id. at 739, (citations omitted). The FHSA’s preemption provision

states:

If a hazardous substance or its packaging is

subject to a cautionary labeling requirement under

section 2(p) or 3(b) [subsection (p) of this

section or section 1262(b) of this title] designed

to protect against a risk of illness or injury

associated with the substance, no State or

political subdivision of a State may establish or

continue in effect of a cautionary labeling

requirement applicable to such substance or

packaging and designed to protect against the same

risk of illness or injury unless such cautionary

labeling requirement is identical to the labeling

requirement under section 2(p) or 3(b) [subsection

(p) of this section or section 1262(b) of this

title].

15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (1988) (Effect Upon Federal and State Law, §

(b)(1)(A), Pub.L. 94-284 § 17(a)). The FHSA prohibits a state from

imposing through statute or regulation a labeling requirement that

is not identical to the FHSA. The Moss court held that so long as

a plaintiff charges a manufacturer with violations of the FHSAmandated labeling requirements and does not seek more stringent

labeling requirements, the plaintiff’s common law tort action for

damages is not preempted. 585 F.2d at 440-441.

In Worm v. American Cyanamid Company, 970 F.2d 1301, (4 Cir. th

1992), the Fourth Circuit held that the Federal Insecticide,

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The preemption issues arising under the FHSA are identical to those 2

arising under FIFRA. See, e.g., Comeaux v. National Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42, 44

(5 cir. 1996) (characterizing the FHSA preemption clause as “almost th

identical” to that of FIFRA; National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v.

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 993 (8 Circ. 1994) (agreeing with other th

circuits that FHSA preemption language is essentially identical to that of

FIFRA; Moss, 985 F.2d at 741 n.3 (“[t]he preemtion issues arising under FHSA

are identical to those arising under FIFRA”) (quoting Chemical Specialties

Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, (9 Cir. 1992)). th

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Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted the plaintiff’s 2

failure to warn claims as the plaintiff sought “more elaborate or

different” regulations than those promulgated pursuant to FIFRA.

However, Worm also held that a state may regulate so long as any

state law is not different from the federal standard. Id. at 1308

This same reasoning was applied by the Eighth Circuit which

held that “when a statute only preempts state requirements that are

different from or in addition to those imposed by federal law,

plaintiffs may still recover under state tort law when defendants

fail to comply with the federal requirements.” Mattis v. Carlon

Electrical Products, 295 F.3d 856, 862 (8 Cir. 2002)(quoting th

National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38

F.3d 988, 993 (8 Cir. 1994)). The Mattis court also noted that th

other circuits, interpreting the FHSA preemption provision, held

that a plaintiff may not bring a claim for failure to warn based on

state requirements that are more elaborate than the FHSA; however,

a common law tort action based on failure to warn may be brought

for noncompliance with the federal labeling requirements. Mattis,

295 F.3d at 862 (citing e.g. Milanese, 244 F.3d at 109-110; Moss,

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In Medtronic, a sharply divided Supreme Court described a series of 3

requirements necessary for a finding of preemption under the 1976 Medical

Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. To be

preempted, State requirements must be “with respect to” medical devices and

“different from, or in addition to,” federal requirements. Medtronic, 518

U.S. at 500, 116 S.Ct. 2240. State requirements must also relate “to the

safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a

requirement applicable to the device,” and state requirements of “general

applicability” are subject to preemption only if they have the effect of

establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device. Id. Federal

requirements must also be “applicable to the device” in question; that is,

they must be “specific counterpart regulations” or specific to the particular

device. Id. State law will be preempted...when “a particular state

requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest. Id. 

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985 F.2d at 740). 

Radiator Specialty urges us to follow the analysis set out by

the U.S. Supreme Court in Medtronic to decide whether Congress

intended to occupy the field for complete preemption. We do not 3

think that necessary for we are guided by the purpose of Congress.

See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. at 2250. We are

convinced that when Congress enacted the limited preemption

provision of the FHSA, it was primarily concerned with the problem

of potentially fifty different labeling requirements in state

regulations that were not identical to the requirements of the FHSA

as opposed to occupying the field to the exclusion of state power.

Congress recommended a limited preemption provision to encourage

and permit states to adopt requirements identical with the federal

requirements. Moss, 985 F.2d at 739. To the extent that

Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims do not require a standard that

is not identical to the FHSA requirement, Plaintiffs’ claims are

not preempted. Moreover, the ability to maintain a cause of action

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based on the failure to comply with the FHSA is reasonable;

otherwise, there would be no redress for harm caused by

inadequately labeled products regulated by the federal statute.

See Canty v. Ever-last Supply, Co., 685 A.2d 1365 (N.J. Super. Ct.

Law Div. 1996). 

Radiator Specialty contends the additional preemption

provisions within paragraphs two, three, and four of Section 18 of

the FHSA further limit state law regulation to the extent that any

court’s analysis of the FHSA must include discussion of this

language. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (1988) (Effect Upon Federal

and State Law § (b)(2-4). Radiator Specialty argues that a state

must take action before it can impose a duty upon a manufacturer of

a hazardous consumer product that is more or less stringent than

the warnings proscribed by the CPSC. Radiator Specialty concedes

it can cite no cases that specifically discuss the additional

preemption language. While we agree with Radiator Specialty’s

reading of the provision, we find the additional language

irrelevant to the issue at hand. If a state wishes to impose a

duty that is more or less stringent than the FHSA, then the state

must follow the action proscribed in that section. If a plaintiff

wishes to file a claim against a manufacturer, it may do so as long

as it does not seek more or less stringent labeling requirements.

Radiator Specialty contends its only duty to warn is found in

the FHSA which may not be supplemented or augmented by a reasonable

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man standard in state law. To support this contention, Radiator

Specialty cites Comeaux v. National Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42 (5 Cir. th

1996). The Fifth Circuit held that the FHSA preempts any state law

warnings requirements other than those imposed by the FHSA and its

implementing regulations. Id. at 43. The Comeaux court found

undisputed that the warnings were subject to the FHSA and in full

compliance. In the present case, we make no finding that any

warnings are in full compliance with the FHSA. Moreover, the

Comeaux court stated it applied the same reasoning to the FHSA and

its implementing regulations as did the Fourth Circuit in Moss

which we noted, supra, and with which reasoning we agree and apply

today. See id. at 44.

Radiator Specialty also cites Frith v. BIC Corp., 863 So.2d

960 (Miss. 2004) to reflect that a state court, after reviewing the

purpose of the federal law, has held that a common law cause of

action was determined to be preempted by it. However, this case

also supports the reasoning that so long as a plaintiff does not

seek requirements that are not identical to the ones set out in the

FHSA, a plaintiff’s common law tort action is not preempted. The

Frith court noted that the purpose of Consumer Product Safety Act

(CPSA) regarding disposable lighters was to set feasible standards

for the production of a disposable lighter for the adult consumer

to use so that the adult consumer might not choose less safe

alternatives to produce fire. The standards were also required to

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be child-resistant for children five years of age and younger. The

plaintiffs sought a standard so that a ten-year-old could not

operate the lighter. The court found this to be a higher standard

than that set by the CPSA. This higher standard would make the

lighter sufficiently difficult for an adult to operate. The adult

might resort to less safe alternatives to produce fire which would

thwart the federal objective. 

 The weight of authority including those cited by Radiator

Specialty, require us to conclude that because Plaintiffs’ failure

to warn claim does not demand that the Defendants should have

conformed to any higher standard than that set out by the FHSA,

Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, this court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ motions to remand are GRANTED.

These actions are remanded to the Circuit Court of Ashley County,

Arkansas. All parties are to bear their respective costs. All

pending motions (Doc. 20, 25, 26, 43 in 05-CV-1058; Doc. 11, 20,

21, 44 in 05-CV-1099) are DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson

Hon. Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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