Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05232/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05232-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 29, 2019 Decided January 17, 2020

No. 18-5232

GRAND CANYON TRUST,

APPELLANT

v.

DAVID LONGLY BERNHARDT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-00849)

Matt G. Kenna argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge,

and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

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Opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH

concurring in the judgment. 

PER CURIAM: Under the Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA), a court “may” award attorney’s fees to a requester “in

any case under this section in which the complainant has

substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). In the

OPEN Government Act of 2007, Congress amended FOIA to

clarify that “a complainant has substantially prevailed if the

complainant has obtained relief” through either of the following: 

“(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or

consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or unilateral change in

position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not

insubstantial.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). This case concerns Grand

Canyon Trust’s eligibility for fees under the second prong,

known as the “catalyst theory.” Brayton v. Office of the U.S.

Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524-25 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

In August 2016, the Trust requested records from the

Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Office of the

Secretary of the Interior. All parties agree that the Trust

received the lion’s share of the records it requested only after it

filed suit. But the parties draw different conclusions from more

or less the same timeline. 

The Trust maintains that it brought about a change in the

agencies’ positions, at least to the extent that its suit caused a

“sudden acceleration” in the processing of its requests. Trust Br.

16 (quoting EPIC v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp.

3d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2016)). The agencies answer that the Trust’s

suit caused no such change: they produced all the requested

documents on approximately the schedule they had predicted

before the suit was filed. The district court sided with the

agencies, finding that the Trust failed to show that its suit caused

the agencies to change their positions. See Grand Canyon Trust

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v. Zinke, 311 F. Supp. 3d 381, 390 (D.D.C. 2018). The Trust

now appeals. 

I

We begin our analysis by resolving the parties’ dispute over

our standard of review.

The Trust maintains that we must review de novo the

district court’s finding that it did not cause the release of the

requested documents, whether more quickly or at all. The

agencies’ view is that the question of causation is reviewed only

for clear error. The agencies are correct. To explain why, we

start with a brief retelling of the history of the attorney’s fees

provision of the Freedom of Information Act.

For much of FOIA’s history, this court held that a plaintiff

could show that it “substantially prevailed,” and thus was

eligible for fees under then § 552(a)(4)(E), either by pointing to

a favorable action by a court (now codified in the first prong of

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)), or through the catalyst theory (now codified

in the second prong). See Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524-25. In the

2001 Buckhannon case, the Supreme Court disagreed,

concluding that “the ‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis

for the award of attorney’s fees” under the comparable language

of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing

Amendments Act. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.

Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001). 

Rather, fees could only be obtained by litigants who were

“awarded some relief by [a] court.” Id. at 603. Taking the hint,

we shelved the catalyst theory for FOIA actions as well. See

Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. DOE, 288 F.3d

452, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

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In the OPEN Government Act of 2007, however, Congress

disagreed with the Supreme Court and amended FOIA. As we

have recounted several times, “[t]he purpose and effect of this

law . . . was to change the ‘eligibility’ prong back to its preBuckhannon form,” Brayton, 641 F.3d at 525, and thus to

“reinstate[]the catalyst theoryin FOIA actions,” Judicial Watch,

Inc. v. FBI, 522 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We have 1

therefore returned to our original understanding, whereby a

plaintiff can prove fee eligibility by showing that its lawsuit

“substantially caused the government to release the requested

documents before final judgment.” Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524-

25.

We have not revisited our standard of review since

Congress restored the catalyst theory. Before Buckhannon,

however, we repeatedly held that whether a plaintiff’s suit

caused the production of documents “is, of course, a question of

fact entrusted to the District Court and the appellate court is to

review that decision under a clearly-erroneous standard.”

Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1496 (D.C. Cir.

1984); see also, e.g., Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 848 F.2d

1265, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Crooker v. Dep’t of the Treasury,

663 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cox v. Dep’t of Justice, 601

F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1979). That should come as no surprise. 

Appellate courts review findings of fact only for clear error, see

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); FED.R.CIV. P.

52(a)(6), and actual causation is as much a question of fact in

the FOIA context as it is in any other, cf. Pub. Citizen Health

Res. Grp. v. Young, 909 F.2d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(reviewing but-for causation for clear error under the Equal

Accord Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 569 F.3d 500, 502-03 1

(D.C. Cir. 2009); Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 610 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C.

Cir. 2010); see also S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 6 (2007) (describing 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii) as the “Buckhannon fix”)

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Access to Justice Act); Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d

354, 357-58 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same in a negligence case). 

The Trust notes that, in several cases decided after

Buckhannon, we reviewed a district court’s conclusion about fee

eligibility de novo. We did -- but only to the extent that it

“rest[ed] on an interpretation of the statutory terms that define

eligibility for an award.” Edmonds v. FBI, 417 F.3d 1319, 1322

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quotingNat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Labor,

159 F.3d 597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Where parties dispute a

question of law -- such as the meaning of a statutory term or of

a judicial precedent like Buckhannon -- we apply the de novo

standard. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 557. In Edmonds, for

example, we reviewed de novo whether a plaintiff who had won

a court order requiring expedited processing had “been awarded

some relief by [a] court” within the meaning of Buckhannon. 

Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1322 (quoting, inter alia, Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 603);see also Judicial Watch, 522 F.3d at 367 (same

regarding a court-approved stipulation to disclose specified

documents by dates certain); Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 164

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (same). But in none of those cases did we

purport to alter the established clearly-erroneous standard for

questions of fact. Accordingly, we apply that standard here. 

II

As the plaintiff acknowledges, “the question under th[e]

‘catalyst theory’ is whether the ‘institution and prosecution of

the litigation cause[d] the agency to release the documents

obtained.’” Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, at 2 (ECF

No. 17) (quoting Church of Scientology v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584,

587 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Accord Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524; see

also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (noting that, under the

“catalyst theory,” the test was “whether the lawsuit was a

substantial . . . cause of the defendant’s change in conduct”). 

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Here, the parties agree that the Trust received the bulk of the

documents responsive to its request only after it filed suit. But

“the mere filing of the complaint and the subsequent release of

the documents is insufficient to establish causation.” Weisberg,

745 F.2d at 1496; see also Cox, 601 F.2d at 6 (“[A]n allegedly

prevailing complainant must assert something more than post

hoc, ergo propter hoc.”). Rather, as the parties again agree, the

plaintiff has the burden of showing “that it is more probable than

not that the government would not have performed the desired

act absent the lawsuit.” Pub. Citizen Health Res. Grp., 909 F.2d

at 550; Trust Br. 16; Sec’y Br. 35.

As the district court’s opinion observed, the plaintiff’s own

evidence “makes clear that both [agencies] had begun

processing the plaintiff’s request well before this lawsuit was

initiated and that both agencies had even made partial

releases . . . before the complaint was filed.” Grand Canyon

Trust, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 388. Neither agency suggested it

would fail to comply with the request; to the contrary, both gave

the plaintiff their predictions as to when production would be

completed. Moreover, both “completed their disclosures within

four months of the start of litigation, and these disclosures were

satisfactory to the plaintiff.” Id.; see also Trust Br. 12 (noting

that “the Trust determined that it would not challenge any of the

agencies’ redactions”). These facts were sufficient for the

district court to find that the “plaintiff has failed to show that

this suit ‘cause[d] the agenc[ies] to release the documents.’” Id.

at 388-89 (quoting Church of Scientology, 653 F.2d at 587)).

The Trust does not dispute this point on appeal. Rather than

claim that its lawsuit caused the agencies to release documents

they otherwise would not have released, it argues that the

lawsuit “caus[ed] the Government to accelerate its final

determinations and productions of documents.” Trust Br. 13

(emphasis added). “The record shows,” the Trust maintains, that

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its “lawsuit prompted the agencies to produce the requested

documents more quickly than the agencies planned or said they

would prior to when the suit was filed.” Id.

We need not decide whether a “sudden acceleration” of

production can, of itself, represent a “change in position” within

the meaning of the statute. Here, even accepting the plaintiff’s

own characterization of the agencies’ pre-suit predictions about

their compliance timelines, those predictions were reasonably

close to the final outcomes. The plaintiff alleges that the BLM

said in October of 2016 before suit was filed that it would take

“at least a year to compile and produce the responsive

documents.” Compl. ¶ 54 (App. 15). In fact -- without any

court-imposed deadlines -- the agency wrapped production with

the release of a final 57,112 pages on August 31, 2017, just six

weeks before the earliest date it had predicted. See Grand

Canyon Trust, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 385-86; Joint Status Report

(App. 40-41); Levine Decl. ¶ 10 (App. 113).

As for the Office of the Secretary, before the onset of

litigation it represented that it would need at least two more

months -- and probably some undefined further amount of time

-- to finish processing its remaining 8,100 pages because of the

need for attorney review. See Trust Br. at 18; Compl. ¶ 43

(App. 13). In the end -- again without any deadlines imposed by

the court -- it completed its work just two weeks earlier than

predicted. See Grand Canyon Trust, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 385-86;

Joint Status Report (App. 40-41). 

These facts show that the agencies produced all of the

requested documents roughly within the schedules that they had

estimated before the litigation began. At most, the timeline

reflects a modest acceleration from those earlier predictions. 

But predictions, by their very nature, are not perfect. The

routine administrative and legal tasks required before agencies

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can release documents readily explain the minor timeline

discrepancies here, particularly given the thousands of

documents involved. Whatever we might have made of those 2

discrepancies if we were deciding the question in the first

instance, the district court certainly did not clearly err in finding

that the plaintiff’s lawsuit did not cause a change in the

agencies’ positions.3

III

In order to establish eligibility for attorney’s fees, a FOIA

plaintiff must show that its lawsuit caused a change in the

agency’s position regarding the production of requested

documents. We review a district court’s fact-finding regarding

causation only for clear error. Because we find no such error

here, the judgment of the district court is

See CREW v. FEC, 711 F.3d 180, 189 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

2

(noting that FOIA itself “acknowledge[s] that some requests may

require significant processing time to search for, collect, examine, and

consult about documents before a ‘determination’ can be made”). In

this case, some delay and uncertainty resulted from the agencies’

obligation to notify third-parties of the opportunity to object to

disclosure of confidential information they had submitted to the

agencies, and to review whether those objections in fact satisfied an

exemption. See 43 C.F.R. § 2.27 (so requiring); id. § 2.30 (providing

a process for submitters to object); see also Compl. ¶ 43 (App. 13)

(recounting that the “Office of the Secretary furtherstated that it could

not release the remaining 8,000 pages of records . . . until after review

by the attorneys in its office, and that it could not estimate how long

those attorneys would need to complete their review”); App. 82-85

(letter from the Office of the Secretary to a submitter, notifying it of

its right to raise trade secret objections).

Although we have considered the plaintiff’s additional 3

arguments, we find them insufficient to warrant further discussion. 

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Affirmed.

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RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the

judgment: Every case about the meaning of a statute begins

with a question. Here the initial question is whether, under the

2007 amendment to the Freedom of Information Act, the

government changed its position after the plaintiff filed its

lawsuit. My colleagues answer that the government did not

change its position and so the plaintiff was not eligible for

attorney fees. If they restricted their opinion to that issue I

would be with them. But their opinion goes further and

perpetuates what I consider to be a misunderstanding about the

meaning of the 2007 FOIA amendment.

The misunderstanding, stated in one early case and then

leapfrogged into three more of our opinions, is that the 2007 1

FOIA amendment reinstated the so-called “catalyst theory”

rejected in Buckhannon v. West Va. Dep’t of Health & Human

Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). The catalyst theory is as

follows. Even if the FOIA plaintiff obtained relief without a

favorable judgment, the plaintiff could still recover attorneyfees

by proving that its lawsuit “caused” the government to change

its position by disclosing previously withheld documents or

producing documents on an accelerated timeline.

The statements in these four opinions about the catalyst

theory appear to be casual, offhand. No analysis, rigorous or

otherwise, backs them up. The opinions do not even attempt to

square their statements with the words of the 2007 amendment. 

Still worse, none of these four cases even turned on an

See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. F.B.I., 522 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir.

1

2008); Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 569 F.3d 500, 503 (D.C. Cir.

2009); Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 610 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010);

Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 525

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 

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application of the 2007 amendment. To put it in another word,

each of the statements was dicta.2

Yet the majority opinion here cites these four opinions and,

again without analysis, endorses their dicta that the 2007

amendment incorporated the essential requirement of the

catalyst theory – namely, that the plaintiff must prove that its

lawsuit caused the government to change positions. As in the

other four opinions, the majority’s statement is dictum because

the government did not change positions.

I am tempted to stop here. But extraneous pronouncements

in a growing number of our cases seem to be taking hold. And

so I believe it appropriate to counter dicta with my own dictum. 

Which brings me to the language of the 2007 amendment,

otherwise known as the OPEN Government Act.

In the earliest case, Judicial Watch, 522 F.3d at 370, the 2007 2

amendment was not at issue and the court did “not interpret the new

statute.”

In the next two cases the court held that the 2007 amendment did

not apply to the claims for attorney fees because the amendment was

notretroactive. Summers, 569 F.3d at 504; Davis, 610 F.3d at 753–55.

In the fourth case, the court held that even if the plaintiff was

eligible to receive attorney fees he was not entitled to them because

the government was legally correct in refusing his FOIA request, a

standard unaffected by the 2007 amendment. Brayton, 641 F.3d at

526–28.

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FOIA plaintiffs are eligible for attorney fees if they have

“substantially prevailed.” The 2007 amendment defined

3

“substantially prevailed” to mean that the plaintiff “has obtained

relief through either– (I) a judicial order, or an enforceable

written agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or

unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s

claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). 

We are concerned with subsection II. It contains three and

only three conditions. The first is that the plaintiff “has obtained

relief through” the government’s “change in position.” Second,

the government’s change in position was “voluntary or

unilateral.” Third, the plaintiff’s lawsuit must not have been

“insubstantial.” 

The conclusion is inescapable – subsection II does not

embody the catalyst theory. It does not do so because the

provision requires only correlation not causation. Absence of

statutory language supporting a theory (here the catalyst theory)

is not evidence that Congress enacted the theory. Just the

opposite. 

Consider also Congress’s use of the word “unilateral” to

describe the government’s action that qualifies the plaintiff for

an award of attorney fees. “Unilateral” action signifies an

undertaking by one side only, without involvement of the other

side, a description quite at odds with the dicta coming from this

court.

The original provision, now contained in 5 U.S.C. §

3

552(a)(4)(E)(i), stated: “The court may assess against the United

States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably

incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has

substantially prevailed.” 

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The statute thus does not require a plaintiff to show a causal

connection between its lawsuit and the government’s

capitulation. It is fair to ask why Congress would have enacted

such a provision. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts at 34 (2012). 

There is a ready answer. FOIA plaintiffs who have not received

a judgment face obstacles in proving that their lawsuits caused

the government to release previouslywithheld documents. Only

government employees know with certainty why an agency

changed its position. Those employees will doubtless be in the

agency’s general counsel office and the appropriate division of

the Department of Justice representing the agency. So the most

plausible way for a plaintiff to prove that its lawsuit actually

caused the government’s about-face would be to take

depositions and seek documents from FOIA officers and other

government employees. As the Grand Canyon Trust points out,

this undertaking would effectively elevate the attorneys’ fee

litigation to a “second major litigation,” a result the Supreme

Court has warned against. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.

552, 563 (1988) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983)). In addition, the most important communications would

involve government attorneys and so would be protected by

attorney-client privilege, making it even more challenging for

litigants to make the required showing.

In all of this I am impressed by Judge Berzon’s

comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion on this subject,

making many more points against our colleagues’ opinion here

and in the four prior cases I have discussed. See First

Amendment Coalition v. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 1119, 1130

(9th Cir. 2017) (Berzon, J., concurring).

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