Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01982/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01982-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Martin Efezokhae,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Rocket Mortgage, LLC,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-01982-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pro Se Plaintiff Joseph Martin Efezokhae filed this lawsuit asserting disability 

discrimination and wrongful termination claims against Defendant Rocket Mortgage, 

LLC’s (“Rocket Mortgage”) following an alleged failure to provide reasonable 

accommodations from December 2020 to October 2021 and his ensuing termination (see 

Doc. 1-5). Rocket Mortgage now moves for summary judgment or in the alternative partial 

judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 51). Additionally, the parties filed six other motions

essentially stemming from that Motion that the Court will address in turn, which include a 

cross-motion for summary judgement and motions to strike, to assert affirmative defenses, 

for additional discovery, and for accommodations. (See Doc. 75 at 38–41; Doc. 80; Doc. 

81; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 90.)

This case involves the analysis sensitive topics, of which Efezokhae has aptly 

conveyed his emotional sensitivities. The disposition, however, involves issues of law and 

fact as presented by the parties—it does not reflect an insensitivity to the struggles 

Efezokhae has faced. Judges are oath-bound to apply the Constitution and laws of the 

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United States faithfully and impartially. So, having reviewed the parties’ filings, briefings,

and the applicable law, the Court will grant Rocket Mortgage’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 51). Next, the Court will grant Rocket Mortgage’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 

80) regarding Efezokhae’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75 at –38–41) but 

deny it otherwise. The Court will also grant Rocket Mortgage’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 

90), striking ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83, and 87. Additionally, the Court will deny all 

Efezokhae’s remaining Motions (Doc. 84; Doc. 85).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Efezokhae, an African American individual, suffers from various mental ailments 

but mainly anxiety and depression and has a history of asthma that can be exacerbated by 

his anxiety. (Doc. 1-5 at 14; see also Doc. 52-4 at 7.) His anxiety disorder has limited his 

ability to care for himself, concentrate, and interact with others at times. (See, e.g., Doc. 

52-4 at 7.)

Efezokhae applied for employment with Rocket Mortgage, a national mortgage 

lender. (Doc. 52 at 1 ¶ 1; Doc. 75-1 at 45, 47.) In March 2020, he passed an initial 

screening and participated in a virtual job tryout. (Id.) Efezokhae suffered an asthma attack 

during the onboarding process that caused a delay in his application. (Id. at 46, 55.) 

Efezokhae eventually accepted the job in August 2020, he began working remotely as an 

Associate Banker within the mortgage banking department. (Doc. 52-1 at 29–32.)

Efezokhae remained remote for the entirety of his employment with Rocket Mortgage. 

(Doc. 52-2 at 81.)

In his employment contract, Efezokhae agreed to abide by Rocket Mortgage’s 

policies and guidelines regarding his conduct and performance. (See id. at 30.) Through 

these guidelines and policies, Rocket Mortgage sought to foster a “culture of excellence,” 

which involved maintaining positive behavior, giving and receiving feedback, responding 

to issues and clients with urgency, and coach underperforming team members. (Doc. 52 

at 8 ¶¶ 47–48; see also Doc. 52-1 at 27.) The policies also included guidelines on how to 

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present and format documents and how to communicate and present at meetings. (See Doc. 

52-1 at 10–12.) 

Around December 2020 or January 2021, Efezokhae started expressing concerns 

about his growth within the role, work-life balance, and clashes with his director. (Doc. 

52-2 at 17; Doc. 75-1 at 70.) Come March 2021, Efezokhae began directly complaining 

about long work hours, leading management to place him on a different team in the banking

department. (Doc. 52 at 2 ¶ 4; Doc. 52-3 at 2, 9; Doc. 75-1 at 71, 78.) Efezokhae had only 

indicated he had asthma up to this point but no other disabilities. (Doc. 52-2 at 12–13.)

Shortly after his transfer, Efezokhae sought a transfer into the underwriting 

department, complaining of the hours and work-life balance again. (Doc. 52 at 2 ¶ 5; Doc. 

52-3 at 6.) In late March 2021, Rocket Mortgage allowed Efezokhae the second transfer

with a start date set for April 23, 2021 to allow time for necessary trainings. (Doc. 52-3 at 

11; see also Doc. 52-1 at 3.) Rocket Mortgage’s operations required it to shift other 

candidates into the training class, filling up the available slots and requiring a delay for

Efezokhae’s start date. (Doc. 52-1 at 3; Doc. 52-3 at 22; see also Doc. 88-3 at 211.) On 

April 9, 2021, Rocket Mortgage notified Efezokhae about the delay. (Id.) Efezokhae 

became depressed and angry and sought medical care. (Doc. 52-3 at 22; Doc. 75-2 at 2.) 

Efezokhae messaged Rocket Mortgage’s leave specialist insinuating that the decision to 

push his start date was racially motivated. (Doc. 75-2 at 3.) On April 10, 2021, Efezokhae 

sent his manager a doctor’s note, dated April 9, 2021, recommending that he abstain from 

working for a week due to his asthma. (Doc. 75-2 at 2.) Efezokhae also started inquiring 

about the availability of FMLA or short-term disability leave and submitted various 

doctor’s notes to qualify for disability leave. (Doc. 52 at 3 ¶ 15; Doc. 52-2 at 2–3; Doc.

52-3 at 30; Doc. 75-1 at 81; Doc. 75-2 at 1, 3–4; see also Doc. 88-3 at 139.) Efezokhae

was approved for short-term leave, which began on April 12, 2021 and continued until the 

underwriting role became available. (Doc. 52-2 at 2; see also Doc. 88-3 at 133–35.)

On April 28, 2021, Efezokhae sent a letter to Rocket Mortgage detailing the 

discrimination he believed he experienced after his transfer was delayed. (Doc. 52 at 3 

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¶ 10; Doc. 52-3 at 22–24.) In the letter, Efezokhae noted that he was suffering from asthma, 

PTSD, depression, and anxiety due to and exacerbated by his employment. (Id.) 

Efezokhae also accused Rocket Mortgage of failing to make appropriate accommodations 

after not providing a guaranteed start date, an hour for lunch, and maximum hours capped 

to sixty hours per week. (Id.) Additionally, Efezokhae vaguely accused Rocket Mortgage 

of failing to recognize the challenges he has faced due to his race and disabilities. (Id.) 

Rocket Mortgage responded by requesting additional information to investigate the 

accusations. (Doc. 52-3 at 26–28.) Efezokhae refused to speak about the details of the 

discrimination, believing it would force him to relive the trauma he supposedly endured, 

and instructed Rocket Mortgage to rely on the documents he has already provided. (Id.; 

see also Doc. 52-2 at 50–51; Doc. 75-2 at 10–11.)

Thereafter, around mid-May 2021, Efezokhae requested indefinite accommodations

for his work, asking that his hours not exceed fifty per week and an hour break on Tuesdays 

for counseling. (Doc. 75-2 at 12–22.) He also sent Rocket Mortgage documents detailing 

his generalized anxiety disorder and depression. (Id.) The documents included a fitness 

for duty certification, submitted by his therapist, for his return to work, noting that his 

impairment restricted him to a fifty-hour workweek with the length determined according 

to an “adjustment period.” (Doc. 75-2 at 17.) Rocket Mortgage informed Efezokhae that 

it would likely only approve temporary accommodations based on the adjustment period 

and because a longer term would require additional paperwork. (Doc. 88-3 at 148, 153, 

177; see also Doc. 75-2 at 18.) Efezokhae responded, asking for a 2.5-year period but 

accepted for the six-month term and indicated he would work around the counselling 

sessions. (Doc. 88-3 at 169–70, 176–78; see also Doc. 75-2 at 18.) Efezokhae would go 

on to complete the training and to start in the underwriting role on July 16, 2021. (See Doc. 

75 at 2.)

On August 13, 2021, Rocket Mortgage reached out to Efezokhae about one his

accommodation requests. (Doc. 88-3 at 106; see also Doc. 75-2 at 31.) After Efezokhae 

did not respond for two weeks and Rocket Mortgage followed up, Efezokhae refused to 

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answer any questions regarding an accommodation and asked for any communications to 

go through his therapist. (Doc. 88-3 at 204–05.) 

On September 14, 2021, one of Efezokhae’s supervisors had reached out to him 

about missing meetings. (Doc. 75-2 at 44.) That same day, Efezokhae submitted a packet 

for his accommodation requests, where he asked to work from home permanently and to 

participate on video calls using only audio. (Doc. 52 at 4 ¶ 19; Doc. 52-4 at 2.) The packet 

included supporting documents detailing his generalized anxiety disorder, which limited 

his ability to concentrate and interact with others and would require him to temporarily 

remain remote. (Doc. 52-4 at 5–9.) The packet also included an authorization for Rocket 

Mortgage to contact Efezokhae’s medical providers for medical records to evaluate his 

request. (Doc. 75-2 at 37.) Efezokhae admitted that he never provided any doctor’s 

recommendation indicating his impairment required being off screen during meetings. 

(Doc. 52-2 at 30–32.)

On October 7, 2021, Efezokhae sent an email to a client that caught his supervisor’s 

attention, in which he included a new disclaimer that read:

Ps - My preferred contact method: Email 

The Why Behind It? - Email allows me time to research your concern so that 

we’re always moving forward towards your goal! If you let me know in a 

concise email, I can work wonders with that! If you have to call, just 

remember, my time as an underwriter is scarce, so the more time I am 

underwriting the more time I have to address your concern (in the order it is 

presented). Thank you for understanding. : )

(Doc. 52-5 at 2–7; see also Doc. 75 at 6.) Efezokhae’s supervisor instructed him to remove 

the disclaimer because his job required him communicate with clients directly and over the 

phone. (Doc. 52-5 at 5; Doc. 52 at 6 ¶ 37; Doc. 75 at 6; Doc. 75-2 at 25.) Efezokhae asked 

for an explanation as to why removal was necessary but refused to communicate with the 

supervisor and requested that he only speak with a team leader. (Doc. 52-5 at 3–4.) The 

supervisor explained that the disclaimer conflicted with the company’s culture and that it 

would give clients the wrong impression. (Id. at 2; see also Doc. 52 at 8 ¶¶ 47–49; Doc. 

75 at 6.) During this time and in the weeks preceding, Efezokhae pushed back on receiving 

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feedback, complaining that the critiques and guidance exacerbated his condition and 

implied that he was stupid. (Doc. 52-2 at 24; Doc. 52-4 at 19–23; Doc. 52-5 at 2–13, 

18–20.)

The supervisor informed Efezokhae that she was setting a meeting with him, herself, 

and the team leader. (Doc. 52-5 at 2.) Efezokhae refused to participate and reiterated he 

would only speak with the team leader. (Id. at 9–10.) On October 15, 2021, Efezokhae 

met with team leader. (Id. at 15.) On October 18, he proceeded to email his supervisor 

recapping the meeting, noting that he was struggling with tasks, and was suffering from a 

mood disorder but did not intend no harm or to offend her. (Id.) That same day, Rocket 

Mortgage approved a temporary accommodation for remote work for thirty days but denied 

permitting Efezokhae to participate in meetings using only audio. (Doc. 52-4 at 11–12.) 

Rocket Mortgage informed Efezokhae that it had an expectation that team members 

participate and collaborate with colleagues on video calls. (Id.)

Rocket Mortgage terminated Efezokhae for insubordination on October 22, 2021. 

(Doc. 52 at 9 ¶ 54; Doc. 52-6 at 2.) In the days following, Efezokhae emailed various team 

leaders threatening to file ADA complaints and stating “[p]lease don’t force my hand (it 

was never meant for you).” (Doc. 52-6 at 11–14.)

During this litigation, Rocket Mortgage discovered Efezokhae made entries in its

internal notes system, DRIVE. (Doc. 52-4 at 27; Doc. 52-5 at 22–25.) In the weeks 

preceding his termination, Efezokhae wrote about his anger, losing sleep, the abuse and 

discrimination he believed he was experiencing, and frustration in gaining 

accommodations. (Doc. 52-5 at 22–25.) Efezokhae admitted that these entries were not 

entirely private and wanted someone to discover them. (Doc. 52 at 8 ¶ 51; Doc. 75 at 6.) 

Rocket Mortgage also discovered Efezokhae’s private journal entries where he wrote 

expletives directed towards Rocket Mortgage and its handling of his transfer and requested 

accommodations. (See Doc. 52-7 at 11–17.)

B. Procedural Background

Efezokhae filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Opportunity 

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Commission (“EEOC”) on February 15, 2022, and received a right to sue letter on June 23, 

2022. (Doc. 88-3 at 2, 127.) Efezokhae filed an initial Complaint in the Superior Court of 

Arizona on September 21, 2022, alleging disability discrimination under the Arizona Civil 

Rights Act (“ACRA”) (Count I) and wrongful termination under the Arizona Employment 

Protection Act (“AEPA”) (Count II). (Doc. 1-4 at 4, 9–10.) Efezokhae amended his 

Complaint to allege disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III). (Doc. 1-4 at 18–21.) 

Rocket Mortgage removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1.) The parties filed various 

motions and coinciding briefings now pending before the Court, outlined below.

First, Rocket Mortgage moves for partial summary judgment and judgment on the 

pleadings on all claims. (Doc. 51.) This Court previously issued two Orders striking 

Efezokhae’s responsive documents for failure to comply with the Federal Rules and Local 

Rules of Civil Procedure (see Doc. 64 (striking ECF Nos. 54–59, 62–63); Doc. 74 (striking 

ECF Nos. 65–69)). The Court allowed Efezokhae a final opportunity to file a compliant 

Response. (Doc. 74.) Efezokhae timely filed his Response thereafter. (Doc. 75 at 1–10, 

24–41.) Within Efezokhae’s Response, he also tacked on a Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Request for Immediate Relief. (See Doc. 75 at 38–41.) Rocket Mortgage 

filed a Reply. (Doc. 88.)

Second, Rocket Mortgage also moves to strike Efezokhae’s Response, faulting him 

for failure to comply with governing rules again. (Doc. 80.) Thereafter, Efezokhae made 

a slew of filings. Efezokhae filed a Response to the Motion to Strike (Doc. 86) and a notice 

of “Case Law” supporting that Response (Doc. 87). Rocket Mortgage filed a Reply. (Doc. 

89).

Third, Efezokhae filed a “Motion or Affirmative Defenses” (Doc. 81), a 

“Declaration in Support of Rule 56(d), Affirmative Defenses” (Doc. 83), a “Case Law 

Synopsis” in support of his Declaration (Doc. 82). Fourth, Efezokhae filed a Motion for 

Accommodations and Additional Time to Respond. (Doc. 85.) Fifth, Efezokhae filed a 

Motion Requesting Additional Discovery. (Doc. 84.) Rocket Mortgage filed a Response

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to both the Motion for Accommodations and Motion Requesting Additional Discovery. 

(Doc. 92; Doc. 91.)

Lastly, Rocket Mortgage moves to strike Efezokhae’s following filings: ECF Nos. 

81 (Motion for Affirmative Defenses), 82 (Case Law Synopsis), 83 (Declaration), and 87

(Case Law Synopsis). (See Doc. 90.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate in circumstances where “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of a case under 

the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Factual disputes are genuine when the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find in 

favor of the nonmoving party. Id. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record” or by “showing that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B). Additionally, the Court may enter 

summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A principal 

purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” 

Id. at 323–24.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw reasonable inferences in his 

favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Additionally, the Court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 253. The determination of whether a given 

factual dispute requires submission to a jury is guided by the substantive evidentiary

standards that apply to the case. Id. at 255. The burden initially falls with the movant to 

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demonstrate the basis for a motion for summary judgment, and “identifying those portions 

of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If this initial burden is not met, the nonmovant does 

not need to produce anything even if they would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at 

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the initial burden is met by the movant, then the nonmovant has a burden to 

establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103. The nonmovant “must 

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 586. Bare assertions alone do not create a material issue 

of fact, and “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 

summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–50 (citations omitted).

B. Judgement on the Pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “a party may move for judgment on 

the pleadings” after the pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay trial.” A motion 

for judgment on the pleadings can be brought to challenge the legal sufficiency of the 

opposing party’s pleading. Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 

1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The motion should only be granted if “the moving party clearly 

establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved 

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Despite the difference in timing 

between the two motions, a Rule 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the same legal standard applies to both 

motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989).

C. Strike Pleadings

On its own or by motion by either party, “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of 

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those 

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issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

These motions are generally disfavored, “as they involve a drastic remedy and may be used 

as a ‘dilatory or harassing tactic.’” J & J Sports Prods. Inc. v. Mosqueda, No. CV-12-0523 

PHX DGC, 2013 WL 951366, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2013) (citation omitted). The 

motions are generally denied absent a showing of prejudice to one of the parties or if the 

pleadings have no relation to the controversy. Colonial Sav., FA v. Gulino, No. CV-09-

1635-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 1996608, at *9 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2010) (noting “[w]here the 

Court is uncertain whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law, the 

motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the sufficiency of the 

allegations for adjudication on the merits”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Efezokhae’s Motion for Additional Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by 

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 

its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to 

obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate 

order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) creates “a device for litigants to avoid summary 

judgment when they have not had sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence.” United 

States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002). “The burden is on 

the party seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence 

sought exists and that it would prevent summary judgment.” Okabayashi v. Travelers 

Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. CV-17-03612-PHX-DJH, 2019 WL 1059982, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 6, 2019) (citing Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2001)). The moving party must show: “(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the 

specific facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, 

and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment motion.” 

Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Thus, a party requesting relief must “make clear what information is sought 

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and how it would preclude summary judgment.” Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083, 

1088–89 (9th Cir. 2001). “Failure to comply with these requirements ‘is a proper ground 

for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.’” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., 

525 F.3d at 827 (quoting Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779).

Efezokhae moves for additional discovery but fails to make the requisite showing. 

(Doc. 84.) First, Efezokhae argues that he is missing the deposition testimony of key 

witnesses. Yet, Efezokhae does not identify any specific facts that are essential to resist 

summary judgment. Efezokhae simply makes conclusory statements that “exclusion 

leaves unresolved factual disputes” open and that “[t]heir testimony is critical to resolving 

material factual disputes.” (See Doc. 84 at 7–8.) Efezokhae further blames his former 

counsel for failing to secure the necessary depositions. (Id.) But the Court granted an 

extension of time to complete discovery after his former counsel’s withdrawal. (See Doc. 

45; Doc. 46.) Efezokhae filed a Declaration, but it provides no relevant information to his 

purported entitlement to additional discovery and appears to assert irrelevant legal 

argument. (See Doc. 83.) Thus, Efezokhae has failed to adequately explain what he seeks 

to uncover and why he did not seek the discovery for which he now complains is missing.

Next, Efezokhae complains of deceptive deposition practices, which he argues 

include: (1) a technical error in the deposition transcript where it lists the wrong location; 

(2) the presence of a video camera at the deposition exacerbated his mental health 

challenges; and (3) he should have received the written deposition questions prior to the 

deposition for him to respond in writing. (Doc. 84 at 7; see also Doc. 75-1 at 27, 28.) The 

first issue relates to an irrelevant mistake in listing the location, but the deposition did in 

fact occur. Regarding the second and third issue, Efezokhae has not explained the authority 

for an entitlement to these conditions or lack thereof. Further, Efezokhae appears to take 

issue with Rocket Mortgage’s counsel’s demeanor and tactics in his own deposition. 

Efezokhae does not provide an actual justifiable reason for his failure to depose any other 

relevant individuals to garner the facts necessary to oppose summary judgment. (See Doc. 

83 at 4.)

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Finally, Efezokhae makes additional arguments that his “evidence binder” reveals 

discrepancies in Rocket Mortgage’s records, which presumably refers to his attached 

exhibits to his Reply. (Doc. 75.) Efezokhae, however, provides no context for how these 

documents show that his inability to conduct discovery or the reason for failing to seek 

such discovery. (See Doc. 84 at 8; see also Doc. 75-1 at 6, 69, 72, 76; Doc. 75-2 at 46, 48, 

49, 21, 22.) Therefore, Efezokhae has failed to explain how additionally discovery would 

preclude a grant of summary judgment, thus the Court will deny his Motion (Doc. 84).

B. Rocket Mortgage’s Motions to Strike

1. Motion to Strike Efezokhae’s Response

Rocket Mortgage moves to strike Efezokhae’s Response to its Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Controverting Statement of Facts, and attached Exhibits filed at ECF No. 75. 

(Doc. 80.) Additionally, Rocket Mortgage moves to strike the Response because it 

improperly includes a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Immediate 

Relief (the “Cross-Motion”). (Id.; see also Doc. 75 at 38–41.) 

The Court first addresses that Cross-Motion. The deadline to file dispositive 

motions was August 25, 2024. (Doc. 18 at 4.) Efezokhae did not seek an extension of this 

deadline prior to filing his Response on November 21, 2024. Additionally, the Court 

previously struck Efezokhae’s first attempt at moving for summary judgement as untimely. 

(See Doc. 64 (striking Docs. 54 to 59).) The deadline to file has passed and the filing is 

improper. Therefore, the Court will grant Rocket Mortgage’s Motion in part and strike the

Cross-Motion. (See Doc. 75 at 38–41).

Next, the Court notes that Efezokhae filed his Response, Controverting Statement 

of Facts, and the Exhibits as a single filing contravening LRCiv. 56.1(b) and the Court is 

cognizant that they do not comply with LRCiv. 7.1(b) as they include improper font sizes 

and margin widths. (See Doc. 75 at 1–11, 24–41.) Additionally, his Controverting 

Statement of Facts paragraphs are not set in proper form and include additional argument 

that violates LRCiv. 7.2(m)(2), 56.1(b). (Id. at 1–11.) This Court previously cautioned 

that failure to comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Procedure could result in a 

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summarily granting summary judgment. (Doc. 74 at 3.) Efezokhae appears to have at least 

attempted to address many of the pitfalls the Court previously outlined, i.e., no longer citing 

to a flash drive and Google documents in his Response. (See, e.g., id. at 2; Doc. 75 at 2.)

The Court cautions Efezokhae against further improper filings, but whether the 

Court strikes his Response is not dispositive to this matter. Rocket Mortgage aptly replied 

to Efezokhae’s Response. (See Doc. 88.) In the interest of deciding the Motion for 

Summary Judgment on the merits and not on technicalities, and with no prejudice to Rocket 

Mortgage resulting, the Court declines to strike Efezokhae’s Response, Controverting 

Statement of Facts, or attached Exhibits. The Court proceeds, however, with the caveat 

that it will not address improper argument asserted outside of Efezokhae’s Response and

will address only the facts he adequately cites.

2. Motion to Strike ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83, and 87

Rocket Mortgage moves to strike ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83, and 87 as improper, 

duplicative, or untimely. (Doc. 90.) The Court first addresses ECF No. 81.

Efezokhae filed the instant Motion for Affirmative Defenses on December 12, 2024. 

(Doc. 81.) Rocket Mortgage has not asserted any counterclaims against Efezokhae. As 

Rocket Mortgage argues (Doc. 90 at 3–4), any purported affirmative defenses are irrelevant

and improper. To the extent the Court construes the Motion as an addition to his Response 

(Doc. 75), he failed to assert any of the arguments contained therein in a timely manner 

within his Response. The deadline to file dispositive motions was August 25, 2024. (Doc. 

18 at 4.) Efezokhae did not seek an extension of this deadline prior to filing his Response 

on November 21, 2024. Additionally, the Court previously struck Efezokhae’s first attempt 

at moving for summary judgement as untimely. (See Doc. 64 (striking ECF Nos. 54–59).) 

The deadline has passed. Therefore, the Court will strike Efezokhae Motion for 

Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 81). LRCiv. 7.2(m)(1).

Next, the Court addresses ECF No. 83. There, Efezokhae filed a “Declaration in 

Support of Rule 56(d), Affirmative Defenses.” (See Doc. 83.) The Declaration merely 

reasserts Efezokhae’s improper and untimely arguments asserted in his Motion for 

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Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 81) and Response to Rocket Mortgage’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (see Doc. 75 38–41). (Doc. 83 at 3–6.) Further, the Declaration is irrelevant to 

Rocket Mortgage’s Motion to Strike and pertains to summary judgment. In that regard, 

the Declaration is inadequate to oppose summary judgment as it merely asserts legal 

conclusions and bare allegations without detailed facts and supporting evidence. See, e.g., 

United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting conclusory 

affidavits without sufficient factual enhancement are not cognizable to establish a genuine 

dispute of fact); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The filing is also a procedurally improper 

attempt to supplement his Response, or alternatively an improper sur reply, absent prior 

leave from the Court. Therefore, the Court will strike ECF No. 83.

Lastly, the Court addresses ECF Nos. 82 and 87. There, Efezokhae provides various 

case synopses in support of his Motion for Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 81), Motion for 

Accommodations (Doc. 85), and Motion Requesting Additional Discovery (Doc. 84). As 

Rocket Mortgage argues (Doc. 90 at 2–3), nothing in the Federal or Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure permit these addition arguments and citations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), 56(d). 

Notably, these citations merely duplicate citations already provided for in the respective 

briefing. (Compare Doc. 82, with Doc. 84, and Doc. 85; compare Doc. 87 with Doc. 86.) 

The filings are redundant and improper. Accordingly, the Court will strike ECF Nos. 82 

and 87 and grant Rocket Mortgage’s Motion in full. (See Doc. 90)

C. Rocket Mortgage’s Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Efezokhae’s Racial Discrimination Claim

Rocket Mortgage argues Efezokhae’s Title VII racial discrimination claim is 

untimely as he failed to assert it within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter of 

the EEOC. (Doc. 51 at 7–8.) Alternatively, Rocket Mortgage argues that Efezokhae fails 

to state a claim because his claim is based on purported disability discrimination, not race. 

(Id.) 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on 

his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As the Ninth 

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Circuit has succinctly stated: “Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of 

disability.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008). Efezokhae 

makes obscure references to his race in his factual allegations, but those references have 

not materialized into a legal claim. In Count III, where Efezokhae asserts Title VII 

discrimination, he premises his legal theory entirely on alleged disability discrimination, 

which does not fall under Title VII’s protections. See id. And even considering 

Efezokhae’s Response, he fails to address Rocket Mortgage’s arguments on this claim. 

Additionally, Rocket Mortgage is correct that Efezokhae failed to assert the Title VII claim 

within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Efezokhae’s failure to respond has provided the Court with no basis to relieve him from 

the time bar, and he has seemingly abandoned his Title VII claim. Therefore, Efezokhae 

has failed to state a Title VII claim, nor has he established a genuine dispute of fact. Thus,

Rocket Mortgage is entitled to judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.

2. Efezokhae’s Disability Discrimination Claims

Efezokhae appears to allege ADA and ACRA violations under two theories: a 

failure to accommodate claim and a termination-based discrimination claim. (Doc. 1-5 

at 18–21.) Rocket Mortgage argues it is entitled to summary judgment on both claims. 

(Doc. 51 at 8–14.)

The ADA and ACRA provide that no employer “shall discriminate against a 

qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 

other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 41-1463(B); see also Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)

(noting disability discrimination claims are generally based on allegations that (1) the 

defendant failed to provide a requested reasonable accommodation, (2) failed to engage in 

an interactive process to identify a possible reasonable accommodation, or (3) terminated 

the employee because of the disability). The ADA and ACRA are interpreted according to 

the same legal standards. Nicolini v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. CV-20-01798-PHXCase 2:23-cv-01982-SMB Document 96 Filed 01/15/25 Page 15 of 27
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GMS, 2021 WL 1597898, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2021).

i. Failure to Accommodate Claim

An employer engages in unlawful discrimination under the ADA and ACRA by not 

making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 

otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 41-1463(F)(4); Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(“The ADA treats the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation as an act of 

discrimination if the employee is a qualified individual[.]”). A qualified individual is a 

person who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 

functions of the employment position he holds or desires. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 41-1461(12).

a. Qualified Individual

Rocket Mortgage argues Efezokhae is not a qualified individual because, with or 

without a reasonable accommodation, he could not perform the following essential

functions: (1) participate on video during meetings and talking to clients over the phone; 

(2) work in the office; and (3) receive feedback on his performance. (Doc. 51 at 9.) As 

Rocket Mortgage points out, Efezokhae failed to respond by showing he could perform 

these essential functions. (Doc. 88 at 2–3; see also Doc. 75 at 24–41.)

The burden falls on the employee to demonstrate that he can perform the essential 

functions of a job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481. 

But an employer has the burden of establishing what job functions are essential. Samper 

v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012). A job function 

may be essential if: (i) the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) there 

are a limited number of employees available who can perform that function; or (iii) the 

function requires specialization or expertise. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Evidence of what 

is essential includes the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and the amount of 

time spent performing the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(8). Such evidence, however, is not conclusive: “an employer may not turn every 

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condition of employment which it elects to adopt into a job function, let alone an essential 

job function, merely by including it in a job description.” Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. 

Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 864 (9th Cir. 2009).

Aside from the necessity of client communications, it is not clear to the Court that

Rocket Mortgage has carried its burden in establishing these functions are essential. As to 

the second proffered essential function, Efezokhae was never under an obligation to return 

to the office during his employment. For the third, accepting feedback and coaching does 

not necessarily equate to performing a job function. Rocket Mortgage cites to a guidance 

manual indicating character traits it emphasizes the importance of giving and receiving 

feedback, and Efezokhae being unreceptive to feedback. (Doc. 51 at 10; Doc. 52-1 at 8.) 

But without further development, what appears as friction in communicating lacks a tie to 

Efezokhae’s inability to perform an essential function. Additionally, Rocket Mortgage 

cites Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2001) for the 

proposition that accepting feedback is always an essential function. That case, however, is 

inapposite as it addresses alleged racial discrimination after an employee was discharged 

following him taking disability leave to cope with stress and based on a doctor’s 

fitness-for-duty recommendation. See Wade, 259 F.3d at 457, 462–63. In Wade, dealing

with coworkers and accepting criticism were among the many circumstances the court 

considered to conclude the employee could not perform the essential functions of the job, 

and therefore the racial discrimination claim failed. Id. at 462–63. The case is 

unpersuasive here.

Regarding the first proffered function, there is no dispute that an essential function 

of the underwriting role involves directly communicating with clients over the phone. (See 

Doc. 52 at 6 ¶ 37; Doc. 75 at 6.) Efezokhae sought accommodations for permanent remote 

status to remain off camera during meetings. Rocket Mortgage has not pointed the Court 

to any evidence explicitly requiring employees to use video during meetings. (See Doc. 51 

at 9, 12; Doc. 52 at 8 ¶¶ 47–48.) Notably, Rocket Mortgage’s guidance manual 

incorporations instructions regarding those participating in meetings over the phone, i.e., 

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presumably not on camera. (See Doc. 52-1 at 11.) Rocket Mortgage has failed to articulate 

how being on video during meetings is an essential function of Efezokhae’s job. 

With or without the accommodations for remote status or remaining off video, 

Efezokhae, however, has undisputedly demonstrated that he refused to communicate with 

clients over the phone. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Efezokhae did not expressly request an 

accommodation that would allow him to only communicate with clients via email, but even 

so, such an accommodation would effectively exempt him from an essential function of 

the job. See, e.g., Samper, 675 F.3d at 1240 (refusing to allow a plaintiff to ask for a 

reasonable accommodation that exempts her from an essential function). Therefore, 

Efezokhae is not a “qualified individual” because the accommodations he sought do not 

remedy his unrefuted inability and unwillingness to perform an essential function of the 

underwriting role. This alone warrants granting Rocket Mortgage’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on this claim. But the Court will also analyze the reasonableness of the 

accommodations.

b. Reasonable Accommodations

Next, Rocket Mortgage argues that it provided Efezokhae with reasonable 

accommodations for his unreasonable requests, therefore his failure to accommodate claim 

fails. (Doc. 51 at 11–13.) 

Discrimination based on a disability includes “not making reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 

individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 

can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation 

of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 41-1463(F)(4). To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff need only show than an

accommodation seems reasonable on its face, i.e., “ordinarily or in the run of cases.” U.S.

Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002). “Once the [employee] has made 

this showing, the [employer] then must show special (typically case-specific) 

circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.” Id. “The 

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Ninth Circuit has held that notifying an employer of a need for an accommodation triggers 

a duty to engage in an ‘interactive process’ through which the employer and employee can 

come to understand the employee’s abilities and limitations, the employer’s needs for 

various positions, and a possible middle ground for accommodating the employee.” Snapp 

v. United Transportation Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018). An employer is not 

obligated to provide an employee with the accommodation he requests or prefers, the 

employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation. Zivkovic v. S. California 

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002).

The parties do not dispute that Efezokhae has generalized anxiety disorder. As 

Rocket Mortgage acknowledges, Efezokhae first sought reduced hours and a better 

work-life balance, and then permanent remote work and to be excused from using video 

during video call meetings as accommodations. (Doc. 51 at 11.) Accordingly, Rocket 

Mortgage provided accommodations by providing the transfer, the reduction in hours, and 

allowing him to go on leave pending the transfer. See, e.g., Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting unpaid medical leave may be a reasonable 

accommodation). In response to Efezokhae’s early 2021 requests, Rocket Mortgage also 

attempted to communicate and work with Efezokhae on finding accommodations, but he 

pushed back and refused to communicate at times. (Doc. 52-3 at 26–28.); Allen v. Pac. 

Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding an employee’s failure to 

participate in the interactive process may preclude a finding that the employer failed to 

fulfill its interactive duties). Efezokhae instructed Rocket Mortgage to rely on the medical 

recommendations for its “formal investigation,” and that is exactly what it did in providing 

the transfer and temporary accommodations. (See Doc. 52-3 at 28.)

Regarding Efezokhae’s later-requested accommodations, on its face, the 

permanency of the requested work-from-home status does not appear reasonable. See, e.g.,

29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App. (“[T]he employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate 

discretion to choose between effective accommodations.”). As alleged, Efezokhae was 

receiving ongoing treatment, and in his request acknowledged the length of the requested 

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accommodation was “was truly dependent on [his] progress in therapy and overall health,”

indicating that he anticipated his condition had some temporal limitation based on his 

treatment. (See Doc. 52-4 at 3.) His medical recommendation also indicated that his 

impairment was temporary. (See id. at 7.) Based on these facts, Rocket Mortgage’s 

decision to allow Efezokhae to temporarily work from home status provided him with a 

reasonable accommodation, even though he preferred a permanent accommodation. See 

Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089.

Rocket Mortgage’s denial of Efezokhae’s request refrain from being on video 

during meetings was not improper. An employer who fails to participate in the interactive 

process in good faith “will face liability ‘if a reasonable accommodation would have been 

possible.’” Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018). “[T]here 

exists no stand-alone claim for failing to engage in the interactive process. Rather, 

discrimination results from denying an available and reasonable accommodation.” Id. If 

an employer fails to engage in the interactive process, the burden shifts to the employer to 

prove the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation. Id. However, Rocket Mortgage, 

by engaging in an interactive process in requesting medical records and working with 

Efezokhae, did provide him a reasonable accommodation consistent with his doctor’s 

recommendations, i.e., temporary remote status. Additionally, he repeatedly made 

demands for various accommodations throughout his employment and accepted what 

Rocket Mortgage offered, only to move the goal post with subsequent requests.

Throughout that time, Rocket Mortgage consistently required medical evidence to support 

providing accommodations for his impairment, and when he would refuse to participate, 

relied on the medical recommendations to grant accommodations. It is undisputed that 

there is zero evidence of any recommendation that Efezokhae refrain from participating on 

video. (Doc. 52-2 at 30–32.) Again, Efezokhae is not entitled to accommodation he 

prefers. See Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089. Therefore, the Court finds that a requested 

accommodation to indefinitely participate via only audio during meetings in an entirely 

remote position is unreasonable. 

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Accordingly, Rocket Mortgage did not fail to provide reasonable accommodations 

and is entitled to summary judgment on the claims.

ii. Termination-Based Discrimination Claims

Rocket Mortgage argues that at bottom Efezokhae has failed to prove discriminatory 

conduct, and therefore, to the extent Efezokhae asserts claims beyond a failure to 

accommodate, those claims fail. (Doc. 51 at 13–14.) Rocket Mortgage disclaims any 

reliance on Efezokhae’s disability in its termination decision. (Doc. 51 at 13–24; Doc. 88 

at 7–10.) According to Rocket Mortgage, Efezokhae’s allegations of being mocked and 

humiliated are based on his own heightened sensitivities and factually unsupported. (Id.

at 10–11, 13–14.) It is not clear if Rocket Mortgage is arguing Efezokhae failed to establish 

a prima facie case of discrimination or that Efezokhae failed to establish a presumption of 

discrimination because it provided no legal standard to guide the inquiry and appears to 

advance arguments applicable to both. Regardless, as explained below, it is a distinction 

without a difference. 

Efezokhae argues the temporal proximity between his final accommodation request 

and termination support finding that a genuine dispute of fact exists about Rocket 

Mortgage’s motives. (Doc. 75 at 27–28.) Efezokhae additionally argues that he was 

subjected to increased scrutiny and hostility, and although there is a “scintilla of evidence 

presented,” the facts strongly demonstrate discriminatory intent. (Id. at 28.) Rocket 

Mortgage replies that Efezokhae misrepresents the record and none his citations to the 

record show actual harassment nor mocking. (Doc. 88 at 4–5.)

To establish an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is 

disabled; (2) he is a qualified individual in that he can perform the essential functions of 

his job; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of his disability. 

Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988–90 (9th Cir. 2007). If an employee 

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a 

nondiscriminatory reason. Mustafa v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th 

Cir. 1998). If the employer disclaims any reliance on a discriminatory reason for taking 

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the employment action, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the proffered 

reason serves a pretext for disability discrimination. Id. “[A] plaintiff can prove pretext 

either (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 

credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, 

by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Fonseca v. 

Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).

Rocket Mortgage cites to the record and Efezokhae’s deposition testimony to refute 

any inference of discriminatory animus. (See Doc. 51 at 10–11; Doc. 52 at 5–6 ¶¶ 27–36.) 

In review of those records, the Court finds there is no direct or circumstantial evidence of 

threatening or mocking behavior by Rocket Mortgage. See Vasquez v. County of Los 

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004) (“Direct evidence 

is ‘evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without 

inference or presumption.’” (citation omitted)). Those records tend to show 

miscommunications between Efezokhae and his supervisors in late February 2021, a chat 

from March 2021 where a supervisor inquired about one of Efezokhae’s business decisions, 

and an email chain from September 28, 2021 where his one of his supervisors instructed 

him to follow the guidelines when servicing a client. (Doc. 52-4 at 14, 16–17, 19–23.) 

Efezokhae testified about perceiving his managers and supervisors as yelling and their 

behavior as mocking or condescending to infer that that they thought he was stupid. (Id.

at 21, 23–24, 28, 36–37.) Aside from Efezokhae’s termination, these instances of Rocket 

Mortgage’s purported misconduct are not misconduct and do not give rise to an adverse 

employment action. See, e.g., Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2000) (finding that “increased criticism” does not constitute an adverse employment 

action); Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]imple teasing, 

offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to 

discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” (citation omitted)). 

And because Efezokhae has produced no direct evidence to suggest otherwise, he must 

proceed under the McDonnel Douglas framework to raise a presumption of discrimination. 

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Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “unlawful discrimination is presumed if 

the plaintiff can show that ‘(1) [he] belongs to a protected class, (2) [he] was performing 

according to [his] employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) [he] suffered an adverse 

employment action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to [his] own were 

treated more favorably.’” Id. at 640 n.3. As Rocket Mortgage points out, Efezokhae has 

failed to identify a single non-disabled or similarly situated employee that was treated more 

favorably. (See Doc. 51 at 14.) “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar 

jobs and display similar conduct. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. The evidence Efezokhae cites 

to support that Rocket Mortgage discriminated against him does not raise a genuine dispute 

of fact. (See Doc. 75 at 5 (citing Doc. 75-1 at 6, 10, 12–14, 22, 27–28, 69–71, 73–77, 

80–81; Doc. 75-2 at 3, 38, 41, 47, 53–54, 56, 58, 62–64).) At most, Efezokhae has 

produced screen captures of video calls with his supervisors or managers’ cameras turned 

on and off, showing some inconsistency on the necessity of being on camera, but that alone 

is insufficient. See, e.g., Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641 (noting employees in supervisory 

positions are generally not similarly situated). Additionally, Efezokhae admitted that he 

was not aware of any employees who were allowed to permanently participate in meetings

without video. (Doc. 52-2 at 38.) 

With regards to his termination, Efezokhae has made no showing that similarly 

situated employees who used an email signature to indicate a direct refusal to communicate 

with clients over the phone were not terminated. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641 (noting the 

problematic conduct of an employee is relevant to the inquiry); see also Collings v. 

Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment where 

the employer terminated employees for their misconduct, rather than any alleged 

disability). On top of missing meetings and being uncooperative, Efezokhae refused to 

perform a fundamental role in his job and cannot show he was performing according to 

expectations when the undisputed evidence proves he refused to do so. 

Therefore, Efezokhae has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

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Even assuming he did based on his argument regarding temporal proximity of his 

termination to his request for accommodations, his claim would fail because he has not and 

cannot show on these facts that his insubordination was a pretext for discriminatory intent. 

See, e.g., Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641 at 642 (concluding summary judgment was appropriate 

where, assuming plaintiff set out a prima facie case, the plaintiff failed to put forward 

substantial and specific evidence to attack the defendant’s credibility as to its motives). He 

has failed to refute that he refused to perform one of his fundamental job duties. Efezokhae 

has also failed to produce evidence that Rocket Mortgage’s reason for terminating him 

lacks credibility. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment for Rocket Mortgage on

the of termination-based discrimination claims.

3. Efezokhae’s State Law Wrongful Termination Claim

Efezokhae alleges that Rocket Mortgage violated the Arizona Employment 

Protection Act (“AEPA”) after it retaliated against him for reporting the purported racial 

and disability discrimination to human resources. (Doc. 1-7 at 96–97.) Rocket Mortgage 

argues the AEPA claim fails because Efezokhae was terminated for insubordination and 

otherwise fails to show he engaged in a protected activity. (Doc. 51 at 14–16.)

The AEPA permits wrongful termination claims when (1) a discharge is in violation 

of an employment contract; (2) a discharge violates an Arizona statute; or (3) a discharge 

is in retaliation for the employee’s assertion of certain rights protected by state law. 

Guernsey v. Elko Wire Rope Inc., No. CV-21-00848-PHX-DJH, 2023 WL 5348567, at *2

(D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2023). 

Rocket Mortgage’s briefing addresses only the third option. (See Doc. 51 at 14–16 

(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).) However, Efezokhae premises his entire

claim on alleged state law violations under the ACRA for disability and race 

discrimination. (See Doc. 1-7 at 96–97.) Although not argued by Rocket Mortgage, 

Arizona Revised Statute § 23-1501(B) bars such a claim in the first place and is not 

actionable. See, e.g., Archer v. Partners in Recovery LLC, No. CV-18-01885-PHX-DWL, 

2019 WL 3253175, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. July 19, 2019) (finding that an AEPA claim premised 

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on ACRA violations is not actionable as a separate claim); Guernsey, 2023 WL 5348567, 

at *3–4 (finding § 23-1501(B) barred plaintiff’s AEPA retaliation claim under Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) because it was premised on Arizona’s Fair Wages Act, which 

contains its own remedies for violations); Baker v. Walgreens Ariz. Drug Co., No. CV-15-

00342-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 3181683, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2016), aff’d, 691 F. App’x 

861 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding AEPA claims premised on ACRA claims are not actionable).

While it is not clear to the Court that Efezokhae premised his AEPA claim on 

anything beyond an ACRA violation, Rocket Mortgage is correct that Efezokhae has failed 

to establish that he was terminated on the basis of reporting general violations of state law. 

To prevail on a AEPA claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing either that the employer terminated his employment because he refused to 

violate Arizona law, or because he reasonably believed the employer violated Arizona law 

and reported it. See Rowberry v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. CV-14-01801-PHX-DLR, 

2015 WL 7273136, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2015). The record is void of any allegations 

beyond the aforementioned discrimination claims. Even so, to sustain the claim, an 

employee must prove the conduct was protected and that it was a substantial or motivating 

factor in the termination, and if so, the employer can escape liability by showing it would 

have taken the same action in the absence of the protected conduct. Rowberry v. Wells 

Fargo Bank NA, No. CV-14-01801-PHX-DLR, 2015 WL 7273136, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 

18, 2015). As previously discussed, Rocket Mortgage has made a showing that it 

terminated Efezokhae for insubordination, not based on discriminatory motives. Thus, 

Rocket Mortgage is entitled to summary judgement.

D. After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

Lastly, Rocket Mortgage dresses its summary judgment salad with an argument that 

the after-acquired evidence doctrine “precludes recovering on any” of Efezokhae’s claims. 

(Doc. 52 at 17.) But Rocket Mortgage also posits that the after-acquired evidence doctrine 

would bar his claims and functionally preclude liability all together. (See Doc. 88 at 10 

(“[Efezokhae] has no response to Rocket Mortgage’s argument that his claims are barred 

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by the after-acquired evidence doctrine.”). A closer look, however, reveals Rocket 

Mortgage misapplies this doctrine.

As Rocket Mortgage cites (see id. at 16–17), the after-acquired evidence doctrine 

“precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the 

employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee’s 

termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 

1057, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 

352, 360–63 (1995)). The Ninth Circuit further explained “[a]n employer can avoid 

backpay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an 

employee’s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

would have fired the employee for that misconduct.” Id. at 1071 (citation omitted); see 

also McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361–62 (explaining the doctrine would bar front pay and 

reinstatement remedies and limit recovery for “backpay from the date of the unlawful 

discharge to the date the new information was discovered”).

Courts in this district have found that generally “after-acquired evidence cannot 

stand as an affirmative defense to employment discrimination under the ADA.” Burkhart 

v. Intuit, Inc., No. CV-07-675-TUC-CKJ, 2009 WL 528603, at *12 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2009)

(refusing to find an employee was not qualified based on after-acquired evidence because 

it would bar recovery all together). The doctrine simply has no bearing on establishing 

discriminatory motives. Montgomery v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV17-00201-TUC-RM, 

2019 WL 1790281, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2019) (noting the doctrine is “clearly not 

relevant” to an employer’s motives); but see Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 

1131 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding after-acquired evidence is relevant to rebut an employee’s 

claim he is a qualified individual). Likewise, the doctrine is not a defense to a claim of 

tortious wrongful termination under Arizona law, rather it limits the availability of 

reinstatement, front pay, and some lost earnings but not other compensatory damages. 

O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 797 (Ariz. 1998).

Thus, while after-acquired evidence may limit a plaintiff’s remedies, it does not 

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serve as a basis for summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Rocket Mortgage’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 51) with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part Rocket Mortgage’s Motion to 

Strike (Doc. 80), and striking page 39, lines 24 through page 40, lines 21 of Plaintiff’s 

Response (Doc. 75), and denying in part the remainder.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Rocket Mortgage’s Motion to Strike 

(Doc. 90), and striking ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83, and 87.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Additional 

Discovery (Doc. 84) and Motion for Accommodations and Additional Time to Response 

(Doc. 85).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and terminate this case.

Dated this 15th day of January, 2025.

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