Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01877/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01877-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN G. CALKINS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-01877-AC 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), filed on November 6, 2015. ECF No. 30. The Commissioner 

has not filed an opposition. 

 Plaintiff brought this action on August 10, 2014, seeking judicial review of a final 

administrative decision denying his application for period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). ECF No. 1. On September 

18, 2015, following the filing of a motion for summary judgment by plaintiff and a cross-motion 

for summary judgment by defendant, the court granted plaintiff’s motion in part, reversed the 

decision of the Commissioner and remanded the action for further proceedings. ECF No. 28. 

 The court’s decision was based upon the conclusion that (1) the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) did not give clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for 

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discounting plaintiff’s testimony, and (2) the ALJ committed legal error by failing to articulate 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for affording the medical 

opinion of Dr. Song, plaintiff’s treating physician, little weight. Id. at 5–7, 13–15. Summary 

judgment was therefore entered for plaintiff on these issues, but denied on the remaining issues. 

Id. at 5–7, 13–15, 15–16 n.4. The court remanded the matter for a new hearing and directed the 

ALJ to reconsider the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Song’s Medical Source 

Statement. Id. at 15. 

 On November 06, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees seeking a fee award of 

$5,501.57 for 29 hours of attorney time expended in connection with this action. See ECF No. 30 

at 4. 

 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other 

expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States 

. . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 

exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The 

term “fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

“The statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the 

prevailing party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final 

resolution of the case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2412(d)(1)(C) & 2412(d)(2)(D)). 

 A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes 

of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has 

ever denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence 

four of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff.”). “An 

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applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the 

denial of his benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits 

ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257. 

 Here, the court finds that plaintiff is the prevailing party. Moreover, the court finds that 

plaintiff did not unduly delay this litigation, and that his net worth did not exceed two million 

dollars when this action was filed. The court also finds that the position of the government was 

not substantially justified. Once again, “[i]t is the government’s burden to show that its position 

was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” 

Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. The Commissioner has not filed an opposition to plaintiff’s request 

for EAJA fees. Accordingly, the court finds that the Commissioner has not met its burden and the 

position of the government was not substantially justified.1

 The EAJA expressly provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(2)A). Under the EAJA, hourly rates for attorney fees have been capped at $125.00 since 

1996, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for an increase in the cost 

of living.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147–49 (9th Cir. 

2001); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. Determining a reasonable fee “requires more inquiry by a district 

court than finding the ‘product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Atkins, 154 F.3d at 

 

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 Even if the Commissioner had opposed plaintiff’s request for EAJA fees, the court would not 

have found the government’s position to be substantially justified or that special circumstance 

exist. A treating physician’s medial opinion cannot be disregarded solely because it relies upon 

the claimant’s subjective complaints unless the subjective complaints themselves have been 

refuted. Webber v. Astrue, 305 F. App’x 311, 314 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 

242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)). As the court details more in its September 18, 2015, order, 

ECF No. 28, the ALJ disregarded Dr. Seng’s medical opinion without giving substantial evidence 

for disregarding plaintiff’s subjective pain allegations. The court will not, therefore, find that the 

government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist making the 

award of EAJA fees unjust. See Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (position of 

the government “includes both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency 

action giving rise to the civil action.”). 

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 In accordance with Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005), and Ninth 

Circuit Rule 39-1.6, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals maintains a list of the statutory maximum 

hourly rates authorized by the EAJA, as adjusted annually. The rates may be found on the 

Court’s website. See http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov. Here, plaintiff’s requested rates are 

consistent with the statutory maximum rates established by the Ninth Circuit. 

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988 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The district court must consider 

“‘the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.’” Id. at 989 

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). 

 Here, plaintiff’s attorney obtained an order for a new hearing despite defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment. After carefully reviewing the record and the pending motion, the 

court finds that the claimed 29 hours to be a reasonable amount of attorney time to have expended 

on this matter and declines to conduct a line-by-line analysis of counsel’s billing entries. See, 

e.g., Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-

cv-3088 KJN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106571, at *14 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Destefano v. Astrue, No. 

05-cv-3534, 2008 WL 623197, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008). 29 hours can be fairly 

characterized as well within the limit of what would be considered a reasonable amount time 

spent on this action when compared to the time devoted to similar tasks by counsel in like social 

security appeals coming before this court. See Boulanger v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0849 DAD, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121149, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (finding 58 hours to be a 

reasonable amount of time); Watkins v. Astrue, No. CIV S-06-1895 DAD, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 118497, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (finding 62 hours to be a reasonable amount of 

time); Vallejo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106571, at *14 (finding 62.1 hours to be a reasonable 

amount of time); Dean v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0529 DAD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29175, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding 41 hours to be a reasonable amount of time). 

The court will not, however, grant plaintiff’s motion in full because plaintiff’s counsel 

does not show why he and not plaintiff is entitled to the EAJA fees. Generally, “a § 2412(d) fees 

award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a preexisting debt that the litigant owes the United States.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 586 

(2010). Although this court has often upheld agreements where a plaintiff has assigned his right 

to EAJA fees to his attorney, see Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-1454 EFB, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 35744, at *13–14 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Dorrell v. Astrue, 2:09-cv-0112 EFB, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 31979, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Calderon v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-01015 GSA, 2010 WL 

4295583, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010), plaintiff’s counsel does not attach any such agreement 

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to his motion, or even allege that one exists. Accordingly, unless counsel for plaintiff can supply 

the Commissioner with a valid agreement assigning plaintiff’s right to EAJA fees to his counsel 

the Commissioner shall pay EAJA fees to plaintiff himself. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, ECF No. 30, 

is GRANTED IN PART; 

 2. Plaintiff is awarded $5,501.57 for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); and 

 3. Defendant shall determine whether plaintiff’s EAJA attorneys’ fees are subject to any 

offset permitted under the United States Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program and, if the 

fees are not subject to an offset, shall pay EAJA fees directly to plaintiff unless plaintiff’s counsel 

can provide the Commissioner with a valid agreement assigning EAJA fees to plaintiff’s counsel. 

DATED: January 13, 2016 

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