Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01428/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

VALERIE MALISSIA VEAZEY

LOUCKS,

Plaintiff;

vs.

SUNRISE USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

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2:14-cv-01428-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this case as a duplicative

action,(Doc. 11), and Motion to Transfer the case to the Middle District of Alabama.

(Doc. 12). The issues have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for decision.

For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is due to be denied while the

motion to transfer is due to be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff Valerie Malissia Veazey Loucks (“Loucks”) brought this action,

alleging violations by Sunrise USA,Inc.; Restaurant Help,Inc.; Service Solution,Inc.;

and Rory S. Smith (“Defendants”) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along

with several state law causes of action. 

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FILED

 2014 Sep-19 PM 01:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01428-LSC Document 16 Filed 09/19/14 Page 1 of 6
Louckswas employed by the Defendants beginning on August 5, 2009,working

as a waitress at the Shoney’sRestaurant in Clanton,Alabama. On August 1, 2011, after

allegedly suffering from sexual harassment at the hands of co-workers and supervisors,

Loucksfiled an EEOC charge against the Defendants. After receiving her right to sue

letter, Loucksfiled suit against the Defendants in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Alabama, alleging unlawful employment practices, intentional

gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. See Loucks, et al. v. Smith,

et al., 2:12-cv-304-WHA. That case is still pending at this time.

Loucks now alleges that she has been the victim ofretaliation by the Defendants

since filing the initial EEOC charge and lawsuit in 2011, and alleges variousmental and

physical damages, as well as constructive termination from her employment, as a

result. On July 24, 2014, Loucks brought the instant action against the Defendants in

this Court, alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII and several state law

causes of action stemming from the retaliatory conduct. Defendants then filed the

motion to dismiss, arguing that the instant litigation involved essentially the same

parties, facts, and circumstances as the pending case in the Middle District, and thus

should be dismissed as duplicative, or in the alternative transferred to the Middle

District.

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II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

There is no precise rule governing concurrent jurisdiction of claims between

federal district courts, but the “general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation” in

such circumstances. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976). When determining how to handle multiple federal filings, a district court

should consider all the equities of the situation. See Curtis v.Citibank, N.A., 226 F. 3d

133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). “[T]he true test of the sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit

pending’ in another forum [i]sthe legal efficacy of the first suit, when finally disposed

of, as ‘the thing adjudged,’ regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.” The

Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894). To determine how effectively the first suit

will dispose of the matters in the second suit, federal courts typically borrow the test

for claim preclusion and ask whether the second suit involves “the same parties or

their privies” and “arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions” asthe

first suit. Adams v. Cal. Dept. of Health Serv., 487 F. 3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2007); see

also The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. at 124 (“There must be the same parties. . . there

must be the same rights asserted and the same relief prayed for; the relief must be

founded upon the same facts, and the title, or essential basis, of the relief sought must

be the same.”); Curtis, 226 F. 3d at 139.

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Case 2:14-cv-01428-LSC Document 16 Filed 09/19/14 Page 3 of 6
In this case, the claims currently in the Middle District and the claims currently

before this Court involve the exact same parties. However, the facts that the second

suit are based on differ from those involved in the first suit. While both suits are based

around unlawful discrimination allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff at the hands of her

employers, the claims in this complaint revolve around unlawful retaliation that the

Plaintiff has allegedly suffered subsequent to filing her complaint in the Middle

District. Therefore, the two cases are not “founded upon the same facts” and

dismissal on the grounds of duplicative litigation is improper. Therefore, Defendants

Motion to Dismiss the action as duplicative litigation is denied.

B. Motion to Transfer

Under the special venue provision of Title VII, venue is appropriate in “any

judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to

have been committed. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The special venue provisions of

Title VII are the exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination

actions. Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006). However, “[f]or

the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It is proper for a district court to transfer a Title VII

employment discrimination case under § 1404(a)where,though venue is proper in the

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district, all the relevant parties and facts are located in another district. See Ross v.

Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F. 2d 648, 655 (11th Cir. 1993)(transfer of Title VII action

to the Middle District of Georgia was not an abuse of discretion under § 1404(a), even

though venue was also proper in both the Northern or Southern Districts of Georgia,

because all relevant locations, records, and witnesses for the suit were located in the

Middle District).

Inthe present case, venue is proper in the Northern District ofAlabama because

the unlawful employment practices at issue occurred in the state of Alabama.

However, the Court is convinced that, under the circumstances of this case, the

interests of justice counsel in favor of a transfer to the Middle District of Alabama.

Loucks is a resident of Chilton County in the Middle District. Loucks was

employed, and all the relevant actions took place, at a Shoney’s restaurant located in

Chilton County. The defendant corporations were all operating that same Shoney’s

restaurant in Chilton County. The individual defendant, Rory S. Smith, is a resident

of Tennessee but is the controlling shareholder in corporations which operated the

Shoney’s in Chilton County. According to the complaint, the relevant events all

occurred at the Shoney’srestaurant in Chilton County. It is reasonable to assume that

any witnesses and evidence involved in the case will primarily be located in Chilton

County.

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Case 2:14-cv-01428-LSC Document 16 Filed 09/19/14 Page 5 of 6
Also relevant to the Court’s decision is the fact that claims based on similar

(although not identical) facts are already pending in the Middle District.Atransfer will

allow the Middle District to determine whether it would be proper to consolidate this

action with the already pending action. Therefore, this Court will exercise its

discretion to transfer this case to the Middle District of Alabama.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is

DENIED. Defendants’ Motion to Transfer (Doc. 12)is GRANTED. TheClerk of the

Court is directed to transfer this case to the Middle District of Alabama.

Done this 19 day of September 2014. th

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

177825

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