Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03622/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03622-49/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Some of the plaintiffs also stated claims for retaliation. Those claims are not at issue in the

present motion.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCY AMBAT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-03622 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR

ON CLAIMS OF GENDER

DISCRIMINATION

Now before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s February 17, 2010

order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment on plaintiffs’ claims of gender discrimination. Having considered the papers submitted, and

for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action are a group of male and female sheriff’s deputies employed by the San

Francisco Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiffs filed this action on July 13, 2007, shortly after the Sheriff

instituted a policy of placing only female deputies in the female inmate housing units of County Jail #8

(“CJ8”), alleging that the new staffing policy (“the Policy”) constituted gender discrimination in

violation of Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).1

 

On February 17, 2010, the Court granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the gender

discrimination claims. See Feb. 17 Order at *13-14 (Docket No. 272). The factual background

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 Defendant also moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Policy had only a de

minimis impact on plaintiffs’ employment opportunities. The Court did not decide this issue because

it granted summary judgment based on the BFOQ defense. The Court observed, however, that

defendant had raised “some persuasive arguments regarding the de minimis nature of many of the harms

alleged in this case.” Feb. 17 Order at *14.

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underlying the development and implementation of the Policy, as well as a description of each of

plaintiffs’ claims, is contained in the Order and is incorporated here by reference. The Court’s summary

judgment ruling was based on its finding that defendant had met its burden of proof with respect to each

element of the bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) defense to plaintiffs’ Title VII and FEHA

employment discrimination claims.2

 Id. at *13.

Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit issued a published decision in Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., No.

09-15568, slip op. at 9675 (9th Cir. July 8, 2010), reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment

to an employer in a case involving a gender-based prison staffing policy, finding that gender was not

a BFOQ for the positions at issue and that the gender-based policy had more than a de minimis impact

on the plaintiffs’ employment opportunities. Plaintiffs have now moved for reconsideration of the

Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant in light of the Breiner decision.

DISCUSSION

In this motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to the standards set forth in

Breiner, they are entitled to summary judgment on their gender discrimination claims because defendant

cannot prove that gender was a BFOQ for the positions in question or that the Policy had only a de

minimis impact on plaintiffs’ employment opportunities. As stated above, the Court previously focused

on the BFOQ defense in granting summary judgment to defendant. Because the Court finds that the

BFOQ defense continues to apply, the Court does not reach the issue of whether defendant has proven,

under the standards set forth in Breiner, that the Policy at issue in this case had no more than a de

minimis impact on plaintiffs’ employment opportunities.

I. Elements of the BFOQ Defense

Under Title VII and FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex

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with respect to an employee’s compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

or to “limit, segregate, or classify” on the basis of sex in any way that deprives an employee of

employment opportunities or adversely affects his or her employment status. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

& (2); Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). A statutory defense to liability exists under both Title VII and

FEHA, however, when an employee’s sex qualifies as a BFOQ that is “reasonably necessary to the

normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); Cal. Gov. Code §

12940.

“As its language indicates, the BFOQ is an extremely narrow exception to the general

prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex that may be invoked only when the essence of the

business operation would be undermined by hiring individuals of both sexes.” Breiner, No. 09-15568,

slip op. at 9685 (original emphasis) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Dothard v.

Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). In the correctional context, the “essence” of the business includes

“the security of the prison, the safety of inmates, and the protection of the privacy rights of inmates.”

Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 753 (6th Cir. 2004). The employer must also

demonstrate that the qualification is directly related to an employee’s ability to do the job and is

reasonably necessary – not “merely reasonable or convenient” – to ensure continued operation of the

business. Id. at 748. The employer may prove reasonable necessity by showing “that sex is a legitimate

proxy for the qualification because (a) it has a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all men

lack the qualification, or (b) it is impossible or highly impractical to insure by individual testing that its

employees will have the necessary qualifications for the job.” Breiner, No. 09-15568, slip op. at 9685

(citation and alterations omitted). Finally, the employer must show that its interests could not have been

achieved through a viable non-discriminatory alternative. Everson, 391 F.3d at 749; Robino v. Iranon,

145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998).

II. Background on Breiner

The plaintiffs in Breiner were four male correctional officers employed by the Nevada

Department of Corrections (“NDOC”). NDOC learned in 2003 that an inmate at the Southern Nevada

Women’s Correctional Facility (“SNWCF”) had become pregnant as a result of a sexual encounter with

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a male guard. Breiner, No. 09-15568, slip op. at 9676. The incident spurred an investigation into

conditions at SNWCF, and NDOC learned that, as a result of lax management by the Corrections

Corporation of America (“CCA”), the private corporation running the facility under contract with

NDOC, the facility was plagued by sexual and other improper relationships between female inmates and

male front-line prison staff. Id. These revelations led NDOC to terminate its contract with CCA and

resume direct control of the facility. At that time, NDOC also implemented two gender-based staffing

policies, which required (1) that seventy percent of the front-line prison guard positions must be filled

by women, and (2) that SNWCF’s three correctional lieutenant supervisor positions must be filled by

women. Id. at 9676-77. 

In their lawsuit against NDOC, the plaintiffs challenged only the second of the two staffing

policies listed above, alleging that the restriction on the correctional lieutenant positions unlawfully

limited their employment and promotional opportunities on the basis of their gender. Id. at 9677.

NDOC moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion, finding both that the

gender limitation had only a de minimis impact and that NDOC had carried its burden of proving that

gender constituted a BFOQ for the correctional lieutenant positions. The Ninth Circuit reversed on both

grounds. Id. at 9696-97. In finding that NDOC had failed to prove that gender was a BFOQ for the

correctional lieutenant positions, the Ninth Circuit rejected each of the three justifications advanced by

NDOC: (1) that male correctional lieutenants were more likely to condone sexual abuse by inferior

officers; (2) that male lieutenants were themselves likely to sexually abuse female inmates; and (3) that

female lieutenants had “an innate ability to manage women [and] understand some of the emotional

outbreaks” and were “more patient [and] . . . more maternal.” Id. at 9686-88. 

First, with respect to leadership, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that NDOC had resumed control

of the facility precisely as a result of prior mismanagement, and could not simply presume from the

leadership problems present under CCA that all male supervisors would turn a blind eye to sexual abuse

of female inmates by their subordinates. Id. at 9692, 9694. Second, the court held that NDOC could

not support the discriminatory policy by citing the potential for sexual abuse of female inmates by male

lieutenants themselves, absent any evidence of even a single such incident. The court noted that

although there was at least one documented incidence of abuse by a male guard, NDOC left a significant

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percentage of the front-line positions open to males. Id. at 9692-93. Third, the Ninth Circuit rejected

NDOC’s attempt to justify the discriminatory policy with “specious gender stereotypes” regarding

women’s superior ability to understand and manage female inmates. Id. as 9695. In holding that NDOC

had failed to establish that gender was a BFOQ for the correctional lieutenant positions, the court also

noted that NDOC had failed to refute the viability of any non-discriminatory alternatives for achieving

its goals. Id. at 9694-96.

The Court finds that the facts of the Breiner case are distinguishable from the facts of this case

in several key respects. First, the staffing decision in Breiner was implemented immediately after a

management shift which was carried out precisely in order to address pervasive mismanagement issues,

before the positive effects of the management change had been felt, and without adequate consideration

of any non-discriminatory alternatives. By contrast, this case involves a continuity of management and

a staffing policy that was developed and implemented by correctional officials well-acquainted with the

facility at issue and with potential alternative approaches. Second, Breiner involved a gender restriction

on hiring for supervisory positions, while this case involves a restriction on hiring for front-line guards

who are in direct contact with female inmates. Third, the correctional officials in Breiner relied largely

on gender stereotypes and unproven gender-based assumptions, while the officials who implemented

the policy at issue in this case relied on the actual history of misconduct in the San Francisco jails. In

light of these important distinctions, the Court finds that Breiner does not warrant reconsideration of

the Court’s order granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor.

III. Application of BFOQ Defense

A. Essence of the Business

In its order granting summary judgment to defendant, the Court first found that defendant had

proved that the Policy was implemented in order to protect essential correctional interests, including the

safety, security, privacy, and rehabilitation of female inmates and the maintenance of efficiency and

morale among deputies. See Feb. 17, 2010 Order at *5-7. With respect to inmate protection concerns,

the Court cited the history of sexual misconduct and other inappropriate relationships between male

deputies and female inmates, which included two civil rights lawsuits brought by female inmates as well

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 Plaintiffs find fault with the Policy because it does not focus on other forms of “statistically”

likely sexual conduct, such as “male guard and male inmate, female guard and female inmate, and

female guard and male inmate.” However, plaintiffs provides no evidence that these potential forms

of violations ever occurred or were a serious problem in the San Francisco jails. The Undersheriff could

not recall any instance where the Department sustained an allegation of same-sex sexual misconduct,

nor any complaints by male inmates against female deputies. Dempsey Decl. ¶ 24. While the

possibilities outlined by plaintiffs might be of academic interest, the Sheriff and his staff were charged

with the management of a real-world facility that faced concrete problems. The Sheriff cannot be

expected to prioritize non-existent issues in formulating his policies.

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as twelve inmate complaints during the five years preceding the implementation of the Policy, some of

which resulted in deputies resigning or being disciplined, and one of which was referred to the District

Attorney for prosecution. Id. at *5-6 (citing Flewellen Decl. ¶ 16; Hennessey Decl. ¶ 9; Ofierski Decl.

Ex. A & B). The Court also observed that the Policy aided in protecting female inmates’ privacy

interests by ensuring that male deputies could not view them while they were showering, using the toilet,

or changing clothes, an issue of particular concern due to the circular structure of CJ8. Id. at *7 (citing

Dempsey Decl. ¶¶ 12, 27). With respect to maintenance of deputy morale and efficiency, the Court

cited evidence that male deputies’ reluctance to supervise female inmates closely due to a fear of false

misconduct allegations had led to increased possession of contraband by female inmates, and to

resentment among female deputies who were forced to shoulder a heavier workload. Id. at *6 (citing

Hennessey Decl. ¶ 12; Dempsey Decl. ¶¶ 22-23).

These justifications continue to meet defendant’s burden of proving that the Policy was designed

to protect interests that go to the essence of the Sheriff’s business. The record does not support

plaintiffs’ assertion that the Policy was developed simply because the Sheriff believed that “all men are

predatory and cannot be trusted with female inmates.” Rather, as described above, defendant presented

evidence demonstrating that the Policy was designed to address fundamental and ongoing problems in

the San Francisco jails.3

 This evidence distinguishes this case from Breiner, in which there was no

evidence that NDOC’s discriminatory policy aided it in protecting any of the essential interests claimed

by NDOC officials. 

B. Reasonable Necessity

In its summary judgment order, the Court also found that defendant had proved that the Policy

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was reasonably necessary to ensure the continued operation of the jails and to address the specific

problems identified by the Sheriff. Feb. 17, 2010 Order at *11-12. The Court noted first that the Policy

was directly aimed at solving the potential problems created by the circular, “direct supervision”

structure of the female housing units. Id. at *11. The Court also cited the security concerns associated

with male deputies’ fear of false misconduct allegations and their resulting reluctance to supervise

female inmates closely and thoroughly. Id. at *11-12.

Breiner requires correctional officials “to identify a concrete, logical basis for concluding that

gender restrictions are ‘reasonably necessary.’” Breiner, No. 09-15568, slip op. at 9690. “[E]ven in

the unique context of prison employment, administrators seeking to justify a BFOQ must show a high

correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions.” Id. at 9691 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). In Breiner, the Ninth Circuit found that there was no such correlation where NDOC’s

argument was essentially “that because the supervisors employed by CCA were male and had failed to

prevent sexual abuse, NDOC was entitled to conclude that men as a class were incapable of adequately

supervising front line staff in female prisons.” Id. at 9692. The Court found that CCA’s prior

mismanagement did not give NDOC the unchecked ability to experiment with discriminatory staffing

policies, absent any evidence that the past problems were likely to continue and that gender restrictions

were necessary to curb these problems. Id. The Ninth Circuit also found that NDOC could not show

a “high correlation” between sex and the ability to perform the correctional lieutenant position by

relying on gender-based stereotypes. Id. at 9688, 9695.

Unlike the policy rejected in Breiner, the Policy at issue in this case is devoid of baseless

assumptions regarding the recurrence of past problems and of reliance on stereotypes of male or female

behavior. The Sheriff did not attempt to defend the Policy by simply arguing that all male deputies were

likely to sexually abuse female inmates. Rather, the Sheriff cited concrete examples of the security,

privacy, and morale concerns created by male deputies’ presence within CJ8. With respect to inmate

security and safety, the Court has already pointed to evidence of the numerous complaints and incidents

of sexual misconduct by male deputies which occurred within the five years prior to the implementation

of the Policy. The Sheriff made multiple attempts to resolve these problems – including through

investigation, discipline, termination, and criminal referral – before formulating the Policy. With

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respect to privacy, Undersheriff Dempsey noted that Sheriff’s Department policy requires male deputies

to announce their presence before entering a female housing unit, while female deputies face no such

restriction. Dempsey Decl. ¶ 25. Undersheriff Dempsey stated that female deputies therefore “have

additional opportunities to observe behavior that inmates attempt to hide, which increases safety for

everybody.” Id. Finally, with respect to deputy morale, defendant presented evidence that female

deputies were unwilling to report their male colleagues for the poor performance occasioned by their

reluctance to work closely with female inmates. Dempsey Depo., Murray Decl. Ex. F, at 192:5-7. 

These practical considerations distinguish the Policy at issue in this case from the poorlyreasoned policy rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Breiner.

C. Consideration of Alternatives

In granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, the Court found that the Sheriff had

considered and rejected three non-discriminatory alternatives before enacting the Policy. First, the

Sheriff concluded that there was no reliable method of testing or screening male deputies to discover

those who might engage in sexual misconduct. Second, the Sheriff determined that installing additional

security cameras would be cost-prohibitive. Third, the Sheriff determined that additional training would

be ineffective, as all deputies were already taught that personal relationships of any kind between

deputies and inmates were forbidden. Feb. 17, 2010 Order at *12 (citing Hennessey Decl. ¶ 16). The

Court found that each of the other alternatives suggested by plaintiffs – namely requiring further

training, installing rotating cameras to provide more coverage of the female pods, and installing

improved cell doors and inmate restraints – would not address the problems targeted by the Policy. Id.

at *12-13. The Court noted in particular that plaintiffs’ own expert testified at his deposition that

additional training would “not prevent and not discourage all staff from engaging in sexual misconduct.”

Id. at *13 (citing Marquart Depo., Ofierski Decl. Ex. FF, at 90:6-9).

In Breiner, the Ninth Circuit found that NDOC had failed to show that it considered any

alternative, non-discriminatory measures before placing the gender restriction on its correctional

lieutenant positions. The court stressed that NDOC could not be absolved of the fundamental

responsibility to supervise its staff and listed the multiple resources that could be deployed to control

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employee behavior, including “background checks, prompt investigation of suspected misconduct, . .

. severe discipline for infractions,” and training. Breiner, No. 09-15568, slip op. at 9694.

Unfortunately, in this case, many of these measures have already been deployed by the Sheriff with little

success, or the Sheriff has advanced cogent arguments explaining why they will be ineffective. Thus,

there is no basis for plaintiffs’ contention that the Sheriff made no effort to identify alternative measures

before implementing the Policy. Additionally, as discussed below, the Sheriff’s extensive experience

in running the female housing units in the San Francisco jails lends credence to his evaluation of

reasonable alternatives. By contrast, in Breiner, NDOC lacked a history of operating SNWCF, and

under CCA, there was virtually no record of investigation and discipline of employee misconduct.

D. Deference

The Court previously found that the Sheriff’s policy decisions were entitled to “some deference”

based on the Sheriff’s and Undersheriff’s significant expertise and their consultation with senior staff.

Feb. 17, 2010 Order at *9-10. The Court emphasized that the Court is “not charged with determining

whether the Policy was the best means of addressing the problems the Sheriff and Undersheriff were

seeking to remedy,” but rather with “determining whether the Sheriff’s actions were lawful.” Id. at *10

(original emphasis). In Breiner, the illogical nature of NDOC’s policy, the lack of any direct

management history of SNWCF, and the speculative and stereotyped assumptions that pervaded the

policy made it all but impossible for the Ninth Circuit to defer to NDOC’s judgment. Breiner, No. 09-

15568, slip op. at 9692-95. In the present case, by contrast, the Sheriff based the Policy on the practical

considerations discussed above, and after months of deliberations with the Undersheriff and other senior

staff. As stated in the summary judgment order, the Court is unwilling to substitute its judgment for that

of these professional administrators. 

In view of the deference due to the Sheriff’s policy decision, the evidence showing that the

restrictions set forth in the Policy were reasonably necessary to carry out essential correctional interests,

and the lack of viable non-discriminatory alternatives, the Court must conclude that reconsideration of

the grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor is not warranted.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s prior grant of summary judgment to the defendant. (Docket

No. 301).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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