Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00156/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

The Clerk of this court stamped the original complaint “filed” on February 18, 2005, it is clear,

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however, that Peterson presented the complaint to prison officials for mailing prior to this date. A review of

the pleadings indicates that Peterson executed the initial complaint on February 17, 2005. Plaintiff’s Initial

Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 13. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint is deemed filed

the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams

v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-1341 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. th th

1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must assume

that [the instant complaint] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Peterson] signed it ....” Washington

v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 Cir. 2001). Although Peterson subsequently filed a second th

amended and substituted complaint on which this case proceeds, Court Doc. No. 10, the court considers

February 17, 2005 as the date of filing for this cause of action.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DEDRICK PETERSON, #148313, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:05-CV-156-MEF

) [WO]

)

WILLIAM SEGREST, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Dedrick Peterson [“Peterson”], a former state

inmate, complains that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when they failed to

properly consider him for parole and denied him the opportunity for release on parole.

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Peterson names William Segrest, executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles, Cynthia Dillard, assistant executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles, Nancy McCreary, Sidney Williams and Velinda Weatherly, former or current

members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Carolyn Flack, operations director

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of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles as defendants in this cause of action. Peterson seeks declaratory judgment,

injunctive relief and monetary damages.

The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and supporting

evidentiary materials addressing Peterson’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered

herein, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants’ reports as a motion for

summary judgment. Order of June 27, 2005 - Court Doc. No. 19; Order of September 22,

2005 - Court Doc. No. 34. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Upon consideration of such motion, the evidentiary materials filed in

support thereof and the plaintiff’sresponsesin opposition to the motion, the court concludes

that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment,

Peterson is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible

at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he

must “go beyond the pleadings and ... designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “If the

evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly

probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

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249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not

suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for

that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d

202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). A plaintiff’s th

conclusory allegations of a constitutional violation similarly do not provide sufficient

evidence to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916

(11 Cir. 1995); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-557 (11 Cir. 1984). Thus, when

th th

a plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322 (“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case th

the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary

judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Consequently, where the

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evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to

admissible form indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party

moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is

proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment is appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine issue as to

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party th

must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his

favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact.

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). In this case, Peterson has failed

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to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact in order to preclude summary

judgment. Matsushita, supra. 

II. DISCUSSION

Peterson asserts that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in the parole

consideration process and resulting denials of parole. Specifically, Peterson complains that

the defendants (i) denied him due process, (ii) acted in violation of the Ex Post Facto

Clause, (iii) engaged in a conspiracy against him, (iv) violated his civil rights under 42

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U.S.C. § 1997, (v) deprived him of equal protection due to his race, (vi) retaliated against

him for filing this lawsuit, and (vii) subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Under

applicable federal law, these claims entitle Peterson to no relief from this court. Summary

judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

A. The Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles

In the body of his complaint, Peterson lists the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles as a defendant. The law is well-settled that a state agency is absolutely immune

from suit. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). Moreover, a state agency is merely an

extension of the State and is therefore “not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983....”

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (1989).

Thus, the plaintiff’s claims against the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles are frivolous

as they are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 327 (1989). 

B. Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Peterson asserts that the parole consideration process and resulting denials of parole

occurring in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001 violated his constitutional rights. In

support of this assertion, Peterson contendsthat “[i]nstead of holding a parole consideration

hearing that was statutory enacted at the time of Plaintiff’s sentencing, [parole officials] held

... ‘illegal Screening Hearing[s]’ in Plaintiff’s case, starting from July 19, 1993 through July

10, 1995; June 17, 1996; June 15, 1998; October 4, 1999, and January 29, 2001, as a

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pretext for the Board’s mandatory statutory duties” with respect to providing notice to his

victims. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – Court Doc. No. 10 at 7. He further

contends that the defendants “refused and failed to notify Plaintiff’s victims” during the

afore referenced parole consideration proceedings as required by § 15-22-36(e)(1), Ala.

Code (1975, as amended), thereby denying him a protected liberty interest in such notices

and prejudicing his opportunity for release on parole. Id. at 8. Peterson further argues that

the defendants denied him “the same essential element for parole eligibility as they have

similarly situated white prisoners [as these prisoners] ... had benefit of Defendants locating

and providing written notices to their victims [affording the referenced white inmates] ...

a statutory required parole consideration hearing ... [whereas] the Plaintiff on [these] six (6)

prior occasions [of parole consideration was] ... arbitrarily and capriciously denied ... proper

parole consideration with benefit of notice to victims Plaintiff is convicted of perpetrating

crimes against....” Id. at 7-8. 

The claims presented by Peterson arising from adverse parole actions or decisions

which occurred prior to February 16, 2003 are barred by the statute of limitations. 

Federal courts must look to state law to determine, first, what statute

of limitations is applicable, and second, whether that limitations period is

tolled. Whitson v. Baker, 755 F.2d 1406, 1409 (11 Cir. 1985). Selection of th

a limitations period for § 1983 actions changed several times [between 1985

and 1989]. Alabama law, however, provides that the applicable limitations

period is the one in effect when the claim is filed, not when the cause of

action arose. Tyson v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263, 269-70

(Ala. 1981). It is undisputed that § 1983 claims were subject to a two year

limitations period at that time. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d

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1480, 1483-84 (11 Cir. 1989) (Jones II). th

Dukes v. Smitherman, 32 F.3d 535, 537 (11 Cir. 1994). In Alabama, the general statute th

of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). Thus, at the

time Peterson filed the instant complaint, the applicable statute of limitations for actions

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was two years. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-250

(1989)(the proper statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the forum state’s general or

residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Lufkin v. McCallum, 956

F.2d 1104, 1105 (11 Cir. 1992) th

Peterson challenges actions related to the parole consideration process and parole

decisions which occurred in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001. On May 17, 1996,

the Alabama legislature rescinded that portion of the tolling provision which previously

applied to convicted prisoners. Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) (1975, as amended). The tolling

provision of Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) is therefore unavailing. As previously noted, Peterson

filed the instant complaint on February 17, 2005. This filing occurred after the applicable

period of limitation had lapsed on the aforementioned claims. 

Based on the uncontroverted facts of this case, Peterson has no legal basis on which

to proceed with respect to any claims that arose before February 16, 2003 as he filed this

cause of action more than two (2) years after these alleged violations accrued. As

previously determined, the statutory tolling provision provides no basis for relief. In light

of the foregoing, the court concludes that Peterson’s challenges to adverse actions taken

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against him prior to February 16, 2003 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations

and the defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 

C. Claims Related to the Scheduled 2004 Parole Consideration Hearing

1. Due Process

Peterson maintains that the defendants deprived him of due process with respect to

the parole consideration hearing scheduled for January of 2004. Specifically, he complains

that the defendants acted in violation of his due process rights when they (i) failed to

provide him a parole consideration hearing on his scheduled date and delayed such hearing

without justifiable reason, (ii) failed to act in accordance with laws and regulations

applicable to the determination of parole consideration dates and scheduling of parole

hearings, (iii) utilized statutes and regulations enacted after his date of conviction in the

parole consideration process, and (iv) failed to properly interview him prior to his parole

hearing. Peterson’s claims arising from an alleged lack of due process in the parole

consideration process entitle him to no relief.

“The Alabama [parole] statute ... callsfor discretionary rather than mandatory action

on the part of the board. The law directs the board to consider a number of factors in

making their determination, which is a subjective rather than objective determination. It

does not contain any language that mandates parole.... When the statute is framed in

discretionary terms there is not a liberty interest created.” Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487,

489 (11 Cir. 1982). This court’s exhaustive review of the history of the Alabama parole th

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statute establishes that from its inception the statute has been framed in discretionary terms.

The law is well settled that “[t]he mere possibility of parole provides simply ‘a hope that

is not protected by due process....’ Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11, 12, 96 S.Ct. at 2105, 2106

(1979).... [Moreover], the Alabama parole statute frames the Parole Board’s authority in

discretionary terms, and thus does not create for Alabama prisoners a protected liberty

interest in the expectation of parole. See Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487 (11 Cir. 1983).” th

Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 942 (11 Cir. 1987). 

th

Unless there is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in

making the parole determination are not required to comport with standards

of fundamental fairness. See Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 308, 50 L.Ed.2d 283 (1976). In Staton

v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5 Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit decision),

th

the court concluded that no liberty interest in parole was created by the

Florida statutes. The court, therefore, rejected appellant’s claim that his due

process rights were violated when he did not receive an initial parole

interview within the time required under the parole laws. The analysis in

Staton was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Hunter v. Florida Parole and

Probation Commission, 674 F.2d 847 (11 Cir. 1982), where the court held th

that no due process violation could be shown through an allegation that the

Florida Parole and Probation Commission improperly calculated a prisoner’s

“presumptive parole release date.” 

Slocum v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940, 942 (11 Cir. th

1982). Peterson does not possess a liberty interest in being granted parole that is protected

by the Due Process Clause. Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11 Cir. 1991); th

Ellard, 824 F.2d at 941-942; Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488-489. Thus, the procedural due

process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to either the parole decision

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making process, Thomas, supra, or the determination of parole consideration dates.

Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942 (failure to provide parole review within time required under parole

laws or properly calculate presumptive date of release on parole does not constitute a

violation of due process). 

Moreover, a delay in holding a parole consideration hearing past the originally

scheduled hearing date in violation of the governing administrative regulations likewise

does not run afoul of the Constitution. Federal courts no longer ascertain whether a state

created a constitutionally protected liberty interest by parsing language of statutes and

regulations to determine if the language was “of an unmistakably mandatory character”

placing “substantive limitations on official discretion” but must instead look to the nature

of the deprivation to determine if a state created a liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995). As previously noted, an Alabama inmate has no liberty interest

in parole protected by the Due Process Clause. Although “States may under certain

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause[,] ...

these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not

exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the

Due Process Clause of its own force, ... nonetheless imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. “Since an

inmate is normally incarcerated in prison, [the plaintiff’s remaining in prison while awaiting

parole consideration] did not impose atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to

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the ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, did not deprive him of a protected liberty

interest.” Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 412 (3 Cir. 1999). 

rd

Nevertheless, even though there is no liberty interest involved, a parole board may

not engage in “flagrant or unauthorized action.” Thomas, 691 F.2d at 489. The defendants

maintain any delay in the parole consideration process occurred due to their efforts to notify

Peterson’s victims of his pending parole consideration as required by state law. These

efforts demonstrate reasonable and appropriate actions, Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850,

853 (11 Cir. 1986), rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring that only th

those inmates best suited for parole are actually granted this privilege. Cf. Conlogue v.

Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378 (11 Cir. 1991); see also Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526 (11 th th

Cir. 1988). Peterson has therefore failed to present any evidence indicating arbitrary or

capricious action on the part of the defendants. Consequently, the motion for summary

judgment with respect to each of Peterson’s due process claims should be granted in favor

the defendants.

2. Ex Post Facto

Peterson asserts that the defendants violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when they

utilized the 1996 Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Ala. Code § 15-23-60 et seq., and the 2004

amendment to Ala. Code § 15-22-36(e)(1), statutes adopted after his conviction by the

Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama on September 30, 1986, during the parole

consideration process. Peterson argues that such reliance resulted in the denial of parole and

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increased punishment. 

The Ex Post Facto Clause directs that the government may not apply a law

retroactively that “inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when

committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). Imposition of

punishment upon Peterson under the Act is an essential element of his ex post facto claim.

Upon review of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act and the challenged amendment to § 15-22-

36(e)(1) , the court concludes that Peterson’s claim is without merit.

The relevant provision of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act provides that “[t]he victim

... may submit a written statement, or recorded oral transcription, which shall be entered into

the prisoner’s [correctional] records. The statement shall be considered during any

[classification] review for community status of the prisoner or prior to release of the

prisoner.... The victim shall have the right to be notified by the Board of Pardons and

Paroles and allowed to be present and heard at a hearing when parole or pardon is

considered ....” Ala. Code § 15-23-79(a)-(b). Since initial enactment of the Alabama Code

in 1940, the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles has been required to notify crime

victims and, subsequently, either the victims or their immediate families of any action to be

undertaken by the board. Ala. Code § 15-22-36(e)(1) (1975, as amended), formerly

codified at Ala. Code § 15-22-36(e)(1)(i) (1940). Additionally, a victim or someone on

their behalf has always been afforded the right, “at their option, to either appear before the

board or give their views in writing.” Ala. Code § 15-22-36(e)(2)i. (1975, as amended),

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formerly codified at Ala. Code § 15-22-36(e)(2)i. (1940). 

Neither the terms of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act nor the victim notification

provision of § 15-22-36(e)(1) inflicts greater punishment on Peterson. These statutes

likewise did not create any risk of increased punishment to Peterson. Moreover, the

directives of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act relative to parole merely address rights of

victims previously and continuously provided under the provisions of Ala. Code § 15-22-

36(e)(1). In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Peterson has failed to establish

a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to application of either the Crime

Victims’ Rights Act or the notification provision of § 15-22-36(e)(1) and summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on this claim. 

3. The Conspiracy Claims

Peterson alleges that the defendants committed a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 when

they engaged in a conspiracy to subject him to a parole consideration process different from

that provided other inmates. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – Court Doc. No. 10

at 13. He further argues that the defendants “having knowledge of the wrongs conspired

to be done and about to be committed” failed to prevent the “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985”

as required by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Id. at 15. To establish a conspiracy, a

plaintiff “‘must show that the parties “reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff his

or her rights [and] prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.’ Bendiburg v.

Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11 Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 2053, th

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114 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991).... [T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement....” Bailey v. Board

of County Comm'rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 506 th

U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 58 (1992). In order for a plaintiff “to establish the

‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required to show a conspiracy, ... [he] must

[produce] some evidence of agreement between the defendants.... For a conspiracy claim

to survive a motion for summary judgment ‘[a] mere “scintilla” of evidence ... will not

suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that

party.’ Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11 Cir. 1990).” Rowe v. City of Fort th

Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283-1284 (11 2002). Merely “stringing together” adverse th

acts of individuals is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. Harvey v.

Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11 Cir. 1992). th

The defendants deny that they conspired to violate Peterson’s constitutional rights

and argue that they undertook the actions about which Peterson complains in an attempt to

comply with state law. The court has carefully reviewed the pleadings filed by Peterson.

There is a total lack of evidence to support his theory that the defendants conspired to

deprive him of his constitutional rights and/or failed to undertake actions to prevent a

conspiracy. Specifically, Peterson fails to present any probative evidence which

demonstrates that the defendants “reached an understanding” to violate his rights or

committed an “actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122;

Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468. At best, Peterson’s assertions are self serving, purely

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conclusory allegations that fail to assert those material facts necessary to establish a

conspiracy between the defendants. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553 (11 Cir.

th

1984). Thus, Peterson has failed to produce requisite evidence of a conspiracy and

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants as to the claims related

to a purported conspiracy. Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122. 

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1997

Peterson seeks to bring this pro se civil action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997 for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint – Court Doc. No. 10 at 16. However, Peterson is precluded from asserting

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 because there is no private right of action under this

statute. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) directs that only the Attorney General for the

United States “may institute a civil action” under such statute. An additional condition of

a 42 U.S.C. § 1997 action is that the “Attorney General shall personally sign any complaint

filed pursuant to this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(c). Consequently, Peterson may not seek

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and his claims under this section are subject to

dismissal. 

5. Equal Protection

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Peterson asserts that the defendants failed to provide him the same protections

afforded to “similarly situated white prisoners” such that he “has been arbitrarily barred

from Parole Consideration.” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint - Court Doc. No. 10

at 17. The defendants adamantly deny that they acted in violation of the plaintiff’s equal

protection rights; instead, the defendants maintain that every action undertaken in the parole

consideration process occurred due to their efforts to comply with state law and that

Peterson’s race did not impact any decision or action. 

In order to present a claim cognizable underthe Equal Protection Clause, “a prisoner

must demonstrate that (1) ‘he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received’ more

favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some

constitutionally protected interest such as race. Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n,

785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir.1986) (per curiam).” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-947 th

(11 Cir. 2001). Moreover, to establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must th

demonstrate the existence of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Whitus v. Georgia,

385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Jones v. White, 992

F.2d 1548, 1573 (11 Cir. 1993); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1113-1114 th

(11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. th

Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266 (1977). “Mere error or mistake in

judgment ... does not violate the equal protection clause. There must be intentional

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discrimination [by the defendants].... Even arbitrary administration of [parole regulations],

without purposeful discrimination, does not violate the equal protection clause.” E & T

Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114 (citations omitted); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-293

(1987) (simple disparity of treatment between individuals of different races is insufficient

to establish discrimination). “The requirement of intentional discrimination prevents

plaintiffs from bootstrapping all misapplications of state [rule and regulations] into equal

protection claims. ‘Probably no law contrived by man for his own governance ever has had

or will be enforced uniformly and without exception. But the Constitution does not demand

perfection.’” E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114 (citations omitted). Consequently,

“[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at

265, 97 S.Ct. 555. Indeed, it is well established that proving intent to

discriminate is the essential element of an equal protection claim. See, e.g.,;

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d

395 (1991) (“A court addressing [an equal protection claim] must keep in

mind the fundamental principle that ‘official action will not be held

unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate

impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to

show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’” (omission in original)

(quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-265, 97 S.Ct. 555)); Washington

v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Johnson

v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11 Cir.2005); Citizens Concerned About Our th

Children v. Sch. Bd., 193 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11 Cir.1999); Elston v. th

Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11 Cir.1993); th

Mencer v. Hammonds, 134 F.3d 1066, 1070 (11 Cir.1998); Parks v. City th

of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11 Cir. 1995). th

Holton v. City of Thomasville School District, 425 F.3d 1325, 1348-1349 (11 Cir. 2005). th

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“‘Discriminatory purpose[]’ ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences.... It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular

course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects

upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442

U.S. 256, 279 (1979). In a case such as this one, where the plaintiff challenges actions of

state parole officials, exceptionally clear proof of discriminatory intent is required. Fuller

v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. 1988). Where a th

plaintiff presents no evidence of purposeful discrimination, the law requires entry of

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292; E & T Realty,

830 F.2d at 1115. 

Since this case is before the court on a properly supported motion for summary

judgment from the defendants, Peterson bears the burden of producing specific, substantial

evidence that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him due to his race.

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Wallis v. J. R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9 Cir.

th

1994). Purposeful discrimination can be shown either by direct evidence, i.e., admissions

of the defendant, or indirectly by way of substantially probative circumstantial evidence.

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-266. A plaintiff, however, cannot rest on conclusory

allegations of a constitutional violation to defeat summary judgment nor is “[t]he mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position” sufficient to avoid summary

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19

judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. Instead, the law is clear that a

plaintiff must present significant probative evidence to preclude summary judgment in favor

of the defendants. Id. at 249.

Peterson alleges that the defendants denied him fair parole consideration due to his

race. The defendants deny that the actions undertaken with respect to Peterson occurred due

to Peterson’s race and maintain that these actions transpired in their efforts to comply with

state law. Assuming, without deciding, that Peterson and the white inmates he alleges

received more favorable treatment were similarly situated, Peterson has utterly and

completely failed to present any evidence, significantly probative or otherwise, that racial

discrimination or purpose constituted a motivating factor in the actions of the defendants

about which he complains. The circumstantial evidence presented by Peterson does not

warrant an inference of discriminatory intent as the showing of a disparate impact upon

racially diverse inmates is insufficient to demonstrate an equal protection violation. E & T

Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114-1115; Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d

265, 276 (6 Cir. 1994). Additionally, the arbitrary application of administrative rules does th

not run afoul of the Constitution. E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114. Peterson simply makes

the conclusory legal assertion that the actions undertaken by the defendants in his parole

consideration process resulted from racial discrimination because some white inmates

allegedly received more favorable treatment. Beyond this self-serving and conclusory

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allegation, Peterson produces nothing which suggests that racial animus motivated the

defendants’ actions. Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of the

defendants on Peterson’s equal protection claim.

6. Retaliation

Peterson asserts that the defendants retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit

because such resulted in a further delay of his parole consideration hearing. The defendants

deny that they acted in retaliation for plaintiff filing this case of action; rather, the

defendants maintain that retrieval of Peterson’s parole file from officials “in the process of

preparing the file for a hearing” was necessary for preparation of a response to the

complaint and “[a]s soon as the Special Report was prepared, the file was returned to be

processed for hearing.” Defendants’ Supplemental Special Report – Court Doc. No 33 at

2. The defendants therefore argue that the filing of this case necessitated a review of

Peterson’s parole file and such review occurred in response to the orders of this court that

they file a special report addressing the claims presented in the complaint, not in retaliation

for Peterson filing the lawsuit. 

To present a retaliation claim cognizable under § 1983, a prisoner must demonstrate

that (i) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (ii) he suffered adverse treatment

simultaneously with or subsequent to such activity, and (iii) a causal connection existed

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corporation,

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794 F.2d 598, 600-601 (11 Cir. 1986); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11 Cir.

th th

2003); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2 Cir. 2004); Morales v. Mackalm, 278 nd

F.3d 126, 131 (2 Cir. 2002); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6 Cir. 1999). nd th

Proper assertion of a claim for retaliation requires that a prisoner demonstrate correctional

officials intended to retaliate for his exercise of a right protected under the Constitution and,

but for the retaliatory motive, the adverse act complained of would not have occurred.

Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5 Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom Palermo v. th

Woods, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S.Ct. 800, 133 L.Ed.2d 747 (1996). However, it is essential

that federal courts “carefully scrutinize retaliation claims” brought by prisoners challenging

actions of correctional personnel. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. “[C]ourts must approach

prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care. See Flaherty v. Coughlin,

713 F.2d 10, 13 (2 Cir. 1983). This is [necessary because prisoners’] ... claims of nd

retaliation are ... easily fabricated [and] pose a substantial risk of unwarranted judicial

intrusion into matters of general prison administration. This is so because virtually any

adverse action taken against a prisoner by a state official--even those otherwise not rising

to the level of a constitutional violation--can be characterized [by the prisoner] as a

constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2 Cir.

nd

2001), overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct.

992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).

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An inmate has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence, which once established raises a presumption

that parole officials retaliated against the inmate. Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Merely alleging the ultimate fact of retaliation, however,

is insufficient. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142, n.6 (7 Cir. 1988); Woods, 60 F.3d at th

1166. Additionally, conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of

each element requisite to establishing retaliation. Morales, 278 F.3d at 131; Bennett v.

Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2 Cir. 2003) (Because prisoner retaliation claims are prone to nd

abuse, “we are careful to require non-conclusory allegations.”). If an inmate establishes a

prima facie case, the burden then shifts to parole officials to rebut the presumption by

producing sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the parole

official retaliated against the inmate. This may be done by the parole official articulating

a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse decision or action, which is clear,

reasonably specific and worthy of credence. The parole official has a burden of production,

not of persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a court that he or she actually was

motivated by the reason advanced. Burdine, supra. Once the parole official satisfies this

burden of production, the inmate then has the burden of persuading the court by sufficient

and admissible evidence that the proffered reason for the adverse decision is a pretext for

retaliation. Id. 

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Peterson asserts that the defendants delayed his parole consideration hearing in

retaliation for his filing this lawsuit. The defendants, however, have demonstrated through

relevant admissible evidence that the adverse action about which Peterson complains

resulted solely from their effort to prepare a response in this case. Peterson offers only his

conclusory allegation that the defendants acted in an unconstitutional retaliatory manner.

As this court must “carefully scrutinize retaliation claims” arising from adverse actions of

correctional personnel, Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166, and evaluate such claims “with skepticism

and particular care[,]” Dawes, 239 F.3d at 491, it is clear that Peterson’s conclusory

allegation of retaliation is insufficient to show that the reason proffered by the defendants

for review of Peterson’s parole file, a reason substantiated by the evidentiary materials and

orders issued by this court, is pretextual. The defendants are therefore entitled to summary

judgment on the retaliation claim as Peterson has failed to establish a causal relationship

between his protected activity and the challenged adverse action. Farrow, 320 F.3d at

1249.

7. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

To the extent Peterson alleges the defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual

punishment, he is likewise entitled to no relief. The Eighth Amendment proscribes those

conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). Only actions which deny an inmate “the

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minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are grave enough to violate the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 347; see also Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). Neither a delay in parole consideration nor the denial of

parole rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Consequently, the defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 2, 2007 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

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attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, th th

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 20th day of July, 2007.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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