Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARIA HARRIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

COCHISE COUNTY, 

Defendant. 

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 No. CIV 08-008-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 163],

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 162], and the parties’ Stipulation to Extend

Time [Doc. # 164].

Procedural Background

 On or about September 21, 2006, Plaintiff Maria Harris (Harris) filed a complaint in

the Superior Court in and for the County of Cochise. On January 2, 2008, the matter was

removed to this Court. Harris’s Amended Complaint includes claims of defamation,

invasion of privacy, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress

(two claims), wrongful termination in violation of public, negligent training and supervision,

negligence (three claims), violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and violation

of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 

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On December 15, 2008, Cochise County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and

Harris filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On September 30, 2009, this Court

issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Harris’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment [Doc. # 132] and granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Harris on Count II (false light invasion of privacy), Count III (false

light), Counts IV and V (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count VI (wrongful

termination), Count VII (negligent training and supervision), Counts VIII, IX, and X

(negligence). The Court determined that Harris’s claims of defamation/slander and an ADA

violation remained pending. 

Motion for Reconsideration

The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate an order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d

1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.

1992). “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or

fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909

(3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986). However, motions for reconsideration

are disfavored. See generally Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc.,

841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is not to be used

to ask a court “to rethink what the court had already thought through – rightly or wrongly.”

Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohanan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983)

(limiting motions for reconsideration to cases where the court has patently misunderstood a

party, where the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the

court, where the court has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where there

has been a controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the

issue to the court); see also United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D.Ariz.

1998).

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Court’s Ruling Regarding Common Law Public Policy Wrongful Termination Claim 

Harris requests the Court to reconsider its decision that Arizona no longer recognizes

a common law public policy wrongful termination claim. While the Court recognizes that

Arizona may continue to recognize a common law public policy, see Lloyd v. AMF Bowling

Centers, Inc., 195 Ariz. 144, 985 P.2d 629 (App. 1999) (“[O]ur supreme court identified a

narrow public policy exception to the termination of at will employment. That exception

requires that the employee be fired for either refusing to commit a wrongful act or for

refusing to condone a wrongful act by the employer.”), that exception requires Harris to have

been fired, as applied in this case, for refusing to accept the privacy violation. As the Court

determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris’s working

conditions were intolerable such that she was constructively discharged, reconsideration of

this issue would not affect the Court’s ultimate ruling. 

Court’s Ruling Regarding Harris’s Working Conditions

In their motion, Plaintiffs request the Court to reconsider its decision that insufficient

evidence of a genuine issue of material fact has been presented as to whether Harris’s

working conditions were intolerable such that she was constructively discharged. Harris

asserts that the Court’s reliance on Harris’ assertion in her Statement of Facts that, because

Cochise County refused to issue a retraction of Oertel’s September 30, 2005, letter, she

declined the Defendant’s offer of reemployment, is contrary to the facts in the record. The

Court stated:

As previously stated, the facts presented by Harris involve a single isolated incident.

The Court considers Harris’s assertion that she declined Cochise County’s offer of

reemployment because Cochise County refused to issue a retraction of Oertel’s

September 30, 2005, letter. The reasonable inference from this assertion is that, had

Cochise County issued the retraction, she would have returned to the employment

even though her medical information had been included in Oertel’s letter. “The only

logical conclusion that the Court can draw from [plaintiff’s] wish to return to

[employer] is that the working conditions there were in fact not intolerable.”

Mosakowskiv. PSS World Medical, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1127 (D.Ariz. 2003),

quoting French v. Eagle Nursing Home, Inc., 973 F.Supp. 870, 877-78 (D.Minn.

1997). The Court finds that the facts presented by Harris do not present intolerable

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and discriminatory working conditions. Because Harris has not produced evidence

that she quit her employment because her workplace was intolerable, the County is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claim that Harris was constructively

discharged from her employment.

September 30, 2009, Order, pp. 16. Plaintiffs argue, however, that Harris insisted that any

offer of reemployment be for a position outside of the Health Department and without a

requirement that she report to either Brian Oertel or Diane Carper. In support of this

assertion, Plaintiffs reference the County’s letter of reemployment that specifically offered

a position outside of the Health Department. The Court notes that Plaintiffs did not argue

this inference in the briefings submitted prior to the Court’s ruling nor do they acknowledge

that it was their own recitation of the facts in the Statement of Facts that asserted that it was

because Cochise County refused to issue a retraction of Oertel’s September 30, 2005, letter,

that Harris declined the Defendant’s offer of reemployment. See Orr v. Bank of America,

NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 774-75 (9th Cir.2002), citing Huey v. UPS, Inc., 165 F.3d 1084,

1085 (7th Cir.1999) (“[J]udges need not paw over the files without assistance from the

parties.”). 

Nonetheless, this fact was merely one of numerous facts the Court considered in the

decision. As the above-quoted portion of the Order shows, the Court also considered that

Harris’s claim involved a single incident. Further, the Court had found that “[t]he facts

presented by Harris simply [did] not present a situation of conduct that is similar to sexual

assault, threats of violence, or a continuous pattern of discriminatory harassment by an

employer. The disclosure of Harris’s medical information does not compare to the

differential treatment, trumped-up inadequacies in job performance, abusive treatment,

removal of duties, and threatened demotion as presented in [Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,

823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987)].” September 30, 2009, Order, pp. 13-14. Contrary to

Harris’s assertion, the Court considered whether a “claim of constructive discharge requires

proof that the plaintiff’s ‘working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person

would have been compelled to resign.’” MacLean v. State Dept. of Educ., 195 Ariz. 235,

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245, 986 P.2d 903, 913 (App. 1999), quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.

1996).

Harris has not presented any newly discovered evidence or any basis for this Court

to determine that reconsideration of the Court’s determination that insufficient evidence of

a genuine issue of material fact had been presented as to whether Harris’s working conditions

were intolerable such that she was constructively discharged is needed to correct manifest

errors of law or fact. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d at 909. A motion for reconsideration is not an

appropriate method for an unsuccessful party to “rehash” arguments previously presented.

Hallas v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.Or. 2005), quoting 766347

Ontario Ltd. v. Zurich Capital Mkts., Inc., 274 F.Supp.2d 926, 929 (N.D.Ill. 2003). Rightly

or wrongly, this Court has issued its ruling, Above the Belt, Inc., 99 F.R.D. at 101, and

Harris has not presented any basis for this Court to reconsider its decision.

Court’s Ruling Regarding Oertel’s State of Mind

Harris also requests the Court to reconsider whether invasion of privacy and false light

claims require any proof of the publisher’s state of mind and whether the evidence creating

a disputed fact issue on Harris’s defamation claim defeats summary judgment on Harris’s

invasion of privacy and false light claims. Related to this request is Defendant’s request for

the Court to reconsider its determination that a genuine issue of material fact was presented

as to the defamation claim. The Court finds it appropriate to direct the parties to submit

responses and replies as to these issues. See L.R.Civ. 7.2(g). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 163] is DENIED IN PART.

2. The parties shall file any responses to the Motions for Reconsideration as set

forth in this Order on or before November 16, 2009.

3. The parties shall file any replies on or before November 30, 2009.

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4. The Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, including Motions in Limine, shall be filed

ten judicial days after the Court issues a final ruling on the pending Motions

for Reconsideration.

DATED this 30th day of October, 2009.

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