Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01412/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01412-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISSA FAIRFIELD,

Plaintiff, CV F 07 1412 LJO WMW PC

vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

 WITH LEAVE TO

 FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 

(THIRTY DAY DEADLINE)

DEBORAH PATRICK, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding prose in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the complaint. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at the Central California Women’s

Facility in Chowchilla, brings this civil rights action against defendant correctional officials

employed by the CDCR at Chowchilla. 

Plaintiff’s claims in this complaint relate to her prison employment. It appears that

Plaintiff is challenging the prison’s policy of prohibiting inmates from riding to their worksite on

the supervisor’s cart. Plaintiff also appears to challenge the wage that she is paid.

To warrant relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that

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In Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court abandoned earlier case law which had held that 1

states created protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. Id. at 481-84. Instead,

the Court adopted an approach in which the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the nature of the

deprivation. Id. In doing so, the Court held that liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom

from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484. 

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defendant’s acts or omissions caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege that: (1) a person was acting under color of state law at the time the

complained of act was committed; and (2) that person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paratt

v.Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978).

Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in her prison job , Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 1

472, 484 (1995), and plaintiff does not have a property interest in his job. See Vignolo v. Miller,

120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Because plaintiff has neither a liberty interest nor a property interest in his prison job, plaintiff

was not entitled to any procedural due process protections in conjunction with his removal. 

Further, plaintiff has alleged no facts that suggest that he was removed on a basis that infringed

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“Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v.

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Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation

of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

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upon any constitutionally protected interests. Vignolo, 120 F.3d at 1077. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s allegations fail to give rise to a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 for

violation of the Due Process Clause, or for any other constitutional violation.2

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague and conclusory. The court

has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint

must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's

claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

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general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

first amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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