Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01865/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01865-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO COMIC CONVENTION, a 

California non-profit corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAN FARR PRODUCTIONS, a Utah 

limited liability company; DANIEL 

FARR, an individual; and BRYAN 

BRANDENBURG, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-cv-1865 AJB (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION OF THE 

COURT’S ORDER EXCLUDING 

THE TESTIMONY OF CLARKE 

NELSON

(Doc. No. 277)

Presently before the Court is Defendants Dan Farr Productions, Daniel Farr, and 

Bryan Brandenburg’s (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) ex parte application for a 

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order excluding the testimony of Clarke Nelson. 

(Doc. No. 277.) Plaintiff San Diego Comic Convention (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. 

(Doc. No. 293.) As explained more fully below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND 

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ ex parte motion. 

BACKGROUND

On August 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants asserting causes 

of action for (1) federal trademark infringement and (2) false designation of origin. (Doc. 

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No. 1.) The heart of the instant lawsuit revolves around Defendants’ production of Salt 

Lake Comic Con, which Plaintiff asserts infringes on their trademark “Comic-Con” 

registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.) 

On June 23, 2017, both parties filed various motions. Relevant to the purposes of the 

instant matter is Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Defendants’ expert Clarke B. Nelson. (Doc. 

No. 91.) On September 12, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to exclude. (Doc. 

No. 252.) On October 11, 2017, Defendants filed the present matter, their ex parte motion 

for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 277.) This Order follows. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to alter judgment is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 

See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1983). An amendment 

to a judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) if: “(1) the district court is 

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or 

made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in

controlling law.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources, Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly.” Kona Enter., Inc. 

v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Issues

As a threshold matter, the Court first notes that Defendants failed to follow the local 

rules. Per the local rules, any application for reconsideration must be filed with a “certified 

statement of an attorney setting forth . . . (1) when and to what judge the application was 

made, (2) what ruling or decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or different 

facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon 

such prior application.” CivLR 7.1.i.1. 

Next, the Court highlights that the present motion represents Defendants’ second 

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attempt at filing their ex parte application. Defendants filed their initial ex parte motion on 

October 9, 2017, a day before the twenty-eight day deadline to file motions for 

reconsideration was to expire. (Doc. No. 270 (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). However, 

Defendants’ failure to follow Judge Battaglia’s Civil Case Procedures resulted in this initial 

ex parte motion being struck from the docket. Defendants then filed their amended ex parte 

motion on October 11, 2017. (Doc. No. 277.) Thus, the present motion is untimely, as a 

result of Defendants’ own actions. However, the Court declines to deny the motion based 

on procedural grounds in light of the Court’s desire to decide matters on the merits. 

B. Motion for Reconsideration 

Defendants seek reconsideration of three categories of rebuttal opinions provided by 

their expert Mr. Nelson: (1) identification of costs and expenses incurred by Defendants to 

generate the $22.8 million of gross revenue accused of infringement by Plaintiff’s financial 

expert, Dr. Patrick Kennedy, and deduction of the same; (2) a rebuttal to Plaintiff’s 

financial expert’s opinion of up to $9.8 million in potential corrective advertising damages; 

and (3) various economic data points in rebuttal to Plaintiff’s financial expert’s failure to 

provide any meaningful analysis of the potential contribution of the asserted marks to 

Defendants’ profits. (Doc. No. 292 at 2–3.) Defendants make clear that they are not seeking 

reconsideration of the exclusion of Mr. Nelson’s 5-10% conclusion.1(Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff states in opposition that Defendants’ motion (1) fails to address the proper 

legal standard; (2) is attempting to reargue issues already briefed by the parties and ruled 

upon by the Court; (3) incorrectly argues that Plaintiff failed to address certain opinions in 

its motion to exclude Mr. Nelson; and (4) allowing Mr. Nelson to testify to Defendants’ 

aforementioned topics would render the gatekeeping function of the Court meaningless. 

(See generally Doc. No. 293.) 

 

1 After analyzing over fifteen various qualitative and quantitative considerations in his 

expert report, Mr. Nelson concluded that “it [was] his opinion that not more than 5% to 

10% of [Defendants’] operating profits could be attributed to the accused marks.” (Doc. 

No. 234-2 at 58.) 

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The Court will take each of Defendants’ reconsideration requests in turn.

i. Identification of Costs and Expenses 

Under this first category, Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its order excluding 

Mr. Nelson’s cost opinions. (Doc. No. 292 at 4.) Specifically, Defendants seek to have Mr. 

Nelson opine as to his financial analysis of Defendants’ accounting records to determine 

which of Defendants’ costs should be applied to accused revenues to then calculate their 

total profits—as reflected in Schedule 3. (Id.) Plaintiff retorts that Mr. Nelson’s cost 

opinions fail to engage in any discussion or analysis of any methodology for calculating 

deductions from their expert’s $22,099,489 revenue figure. (Doc. No. 293 at 7.) 

The Court notes that it was not its intention to exclude the data represented in 

Schedule 3. The Court clarifies that it found Schedule 3 inextricably intertwined with the 

various considerations the Court finds unsupported and unreliable as discussed infra pp. 

6–7. However, having reviewed Schedule 3 on its own, the Court finds that the data fits 

within the definition of expenses under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)—“Expenses are all operating 

costs] [overhead costs][and] production costs incurred in producing the defendant’s gross 

revenue. The defendant has the burden of proving the defendant’s expenses by a 

preponderance of evidence.” Accordingly, upon reconsideration, and if authenticated, the 

Court would allow a summary of the data from Defendants’ accounting records, (FRE 

1006) (presumably Schedule 3), to be offered. Thus, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in 

part, and in this regard.

On a side note, the Court makes clear that the data within Schedule 3, if otherwise

admissible as matters of fact, is simply monetary amounts associated with advertising, 

sales, and costs of goods, etc. (Doc. No. 234-2 at 75–78.) Thus, an expert is not required 

to testify to these data points. However, if Defendants wish to call upon Mr. Nelson to 

testify to the creation of Schedule 3, he is to only testify to the numbers presented in the 

schedule and their source. He is precluded from giving any opinions about or drawn from 

the data. Of course, any defense witness with personal knowledge could do the same. From 

the data itself, the jury, consistent with Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 15.29, could 

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deduct relevant sums in considering profits.

One further note, the Court finds the litigation fees and costs associated with this 

data fall outside of “operating, overhead, and production costs incurred in producing the 

gross revenue,” (See Model Instruction 15.29), and would need to be redacted from the 

data presented. 

ii. Corrective Advertising Damages 

Next, Defendants ask the Court to reconsider exclusion of Mr. Nelson’s rebuttal 

corrective advertising opinions as they are vital to demonstrating how Plaintiff’s expert Dr. 

Kennedy’s corrective advertising claim is unsupported. (Doc. No. 292 at 6–7.) Plaintiff 

retorts that Mr. Nelson’s corrective advertising claim does nothing more than criticize the 

advertising methodology employed by Dr. Kennedy, which Plaintiff’s argue Mr. Nelson is 

not qualified to do. (Doc. No. 293 at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Nelson failed 

to address Dr. Kennedy’s $2,832,363 alternative damages figure. (Id.) 

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration as to this factor does not meet any of the 

specified criteria for a motion for reconsideration. Rather, the motion addresses the 

contention that Mr. Nelson’s rebuttal opinions are “reliable and important considerations 

for the trier of fact to properly assess damages and evaluate deficiencies in Dr. Kennedy’s 

opinions.” (Doc. No. 292 at 6.) However, the Court disagrees. In contrast, the Court finds 

Mr. Nelson’s corrective advertising arguments unreliable and unsupported. 

First, the Court notes that Mr. Nelson’s report is lacking in any substantive financial 

analysis as to how Dr. Kennedy’s corrective advertising figure is erroneous. Instead, Mr. 

Nelson states that Dr. Kennedy’s opinion is “speculative and unreliable” and that Dr. 

Kennedy’s estimate “appears to be nothing more than a loosely constructed memo 

proposing a ‘campaign’ having two key targets.” (Doc. No. 234-2 at 59–60.) Moreover, 

the various rebuttal opinions he makes against Dr. Kennedy are so heavily entrenched in 

unsupported arguments that the Court is concerned that these opinions would not be 

reasonably accurate so as to help the trier of fact make an appropriate determination 

regarding corrective advertising. See In re Silicone Gel Breasts Implants Prods. Liab. 

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Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 893–94 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a court under Rule 702 

must make an inquiry into whether an expert’s opinion would be useful or helpful to the 

trier of fact).

Second, the Court finds Mr. Nelson unqualified to provide an opinion on the various 

conclusions he made within this portion of his report. Mr. Nelson’s opinion jumps from

public confusion, license agreements as related to corrective advertising, the value of the

trademarks in question, to the survey commissioned by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 234-2 at 60–

62.) As Defendants repeatedly declare in their motion, Mr. Nelson is a certified public 

accountant, a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, is 

certified in Financial Forensics, and Accredited in Business Valuation. (Doc. No. 292 at 

4.) Taking a closer look at Mr. Nelson’s curriculum vitae reveals that he states that he has 

“experience” in intellectual property matters, has assisted intellectual property holders with 

“licensing negotiations,” and engaged in various trademark “business disputes.” (Doc. No. 

234-2 at 70.) However, the majority of his experience is centered on accounting and his 

publications mainly revolve around patent infringement. (Id. at 70, 72.) Consequently, the 

Court finds that Mr. Nelson goes beyond his expertise and formulates unreliable opinions 

regarding trademark law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 702 (holding that a person is qualified to 

testify as an expert if he or she has the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education” sufficient to qualify them as an expert on the subject to which their testimony 

relates).

2 Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion in this aspect. 

The Court clarifies that testimony as to the amount of money either party has spent 

 

2 Defendants broadly mischaracterize Mr. Nelson’s intellectual property experience. 

Defendants’ motion states that Mr. Nelson “is a highly experienced intellectual property 

damages expert . . . given his education, training, experience . . . [and] recognition.” (Doc. 

No. 292 at 9.) However, experience in intellectual property damages does not render Mr. 

Nelson an expert on trademark law in general. Moreover, Mr. Nelson’s education and 

training, as reflected in his resume, are centered in accounting, financial forensics, and 

business valuation. (Doc. No. 234-2 at 70.) Mr. Nelson does not hold a degree or 

certification in intellectual property, nor does he have any legal training in trademark law. 

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on advertising or corrective advertising are simply data points that can be testified to by a 

fact witness with appropriate personal knowledge. However, the various opinions detailed 

above are improper and are thus appropriately excluded. 

iii. Contribution Rates 

Under this final category, Defendants seek reconsideration of Mr. Nelson’s 

contribution opinions, “which represent the types of information considered and analyses 

commonly applied by other courts to assess the contribution of the asserted trademarks to 

Defendants’ profits.” (Doc. No. 292 at 9.) Specifically, Defendants point to various license 

and proposed license agreements for the asserted trademarks. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that 

reconsideration as to this factor is not warranted as these various considerations, detailed 

in around fifty-seven pages, are not tied to a particular methodology or reliable damages 

opinion. (Doc. No. 293 at 9.) 

First, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that the Court offered no 

criticism of any of the specific economic data points discussed by Mr. Nelson—geographic 

characteristics of the parties’ customers, revenue by various geographies, the parties 

advertising and promotional expenditures, national attendance figures, and competition 

between the parties. (Doc. No. 292 at 10.) The Court’s previous order clearly stated that 

the various considerations presented by Mr. Nelson were produced for the Court without 

any background as to why “Mr. Nelson chose to focus on the considerations he did” nor 

“why the factors he chose were important.” (Doc. No. 263 at 15.) 

Next, Defendants have not set forth any basis that warrants reconsideration. Rather, 

in their motion to reconsider, Defendants appear to be re-litigating issues the Court 

considered when ruling on Plaintiff’s motion to exclude. (See generally Doc. No. 263.) 

This is improper. See, e.g., Costello v. U.S. Gov’t, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 

1991) (holding that in general, “courts avoid considering Rule 59(e) motions where the 

grounds for amendment are restricted to either repetitive contentions of matters which were 

before the court on its prior consideration or contentions which might have been raised 

prior to the challenged judgment.”); Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 

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99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983) (holding that “Plaintiff improperly used the motion to 

reconsider to ask the Court to rethink what the Court had already thought through—rightly 

or wrongly.”). 

The Court reiterates that it finds that Mr. Nelson’s various contribution opinions are 

essentially pure argument without any methodology to support his conclusions. See Diviero 

v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that expert 

testimony is “unreliable and inadmissible” when an expert fails to “satisfactorily [] explain 

the reasoning behind his opinions,” rendering his opinions “unsubstantiated and 

subjective”). Moreover, the Court is puzzled as to how these considerations are relevant as 

they are directly connected to Mr. Nelson’s 5-10% conclusion. (See Doc. No. 234-2 at 58 

(“Based on the above qualitative and quantitative considerations . . . it is my opinion that 

not more than 5% to 10% of [Defendants’] operating profits could be attributed to the 

accused marks.”)). Defendants assert that the various contribution opinions will help the 

trier of fact assess the contribution of the trademarks to Defendants’ profits. (Doc. No. 292 

at 9.) In direct opposition, the Court finds that these various qualitative and quantitative 

considerations would be wholly unconstructive and impractical as the trier of fact would 

be left with a smattering of opinions without any direction as to how much each 

consideration weighed in its analysis or how to put these considerations together to come 

to a percentage. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion as to this factor is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

As explained more thoroughly above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND 

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ ex parte motion for reconsideration. See Navajo Nation 

v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, (9th Cir. 

2003) (“Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the 

court.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2017

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