Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06065/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

RUBY CRAIGG PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-6065

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Ruby Craigg, appealed to this Court from the denial of his application for

social security disability benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(hereinafter "Commissioner") (Doc. #1). On May 16, 2005, the undersigned remanded this

matter to the Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #9 & 10). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Richard S. Muse, filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to the

EAJA (the Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"), on June 23, 2005 (Doc. #11-

13). Although she has had ample time to respond, the Commissioner has filed no response to

the EAJA motion. This matter is now ready for consideration. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits

was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. By failing to respond, the Commissioner

fails to oppose the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate sought

and the number of hours for which compensation is requested. The Court construes the

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Commissioner’s failure to respond as both a lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee 

and as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially

justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing

Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the

benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the

contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen

v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The statutory ceiling for attorney fees is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2

412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award

accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $150.00 per hour, for the 18.00

hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this Court. Plaintiff’s

counsel seeks $150.00 per hour based upon an increase in the cost of living (Doc. #11-13). 

The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are

reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) provides:

“fees and other expenses” includes....reasonable attorney fees (The amount of

fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates

for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that....(ii) attorney fees

shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that

an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher

fee.)

Plaintiff’s counsel presented a copy of the December 2004 summary of the Consumer

Price Index as evidence of an increase in the cost of living (Doc. #12, Exhibit A), and thus, has

presented sufficient evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, his argument for

increased attorney fees, based on a cost of living increase, has merit. 

We further conclude that in light of the evidence of an increased cost of living, awarding

an enhanced fee in the amount of $146.00 per hour would promote consistency in the EAJA

awards in the judicial districts of Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th

Cir.1990). Thus, upon consideration of the above consideration, we find that an appropriate

hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $146.00 per hour. 

Further, as has been noted, the defendant failed to file an objection to the number of

hours for which counsel seeks a fee award. Yet, as always, we have carefully reviewed the time

records submitted in plaintiff’s counsel’s itemization (Doc. #13). 

Counsel seeks compensation for a total of: 0.75 hours on February 25, 2004; 0.25

hours on March 4, 2004; 0.50 hours on April 15, 2004; 1.00 hour on May 18, 2004; 0.50 hours

on May 20, 2004; and, 1.00 hour on May 24, 2004 (Doc. #13, pp. 1-2). However, plaintiff’s

district court case was not filed until May 26, 2004 (Doc. #1). Plaintiff’s counsel did not begin

work on preparation of the complaint until May 26, 2004 (Doc. #13, p. 2). Thus, we find that

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counsel is not entitled to compensation for this time, as it was not performed in representation

of the plaintiff in the district court. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th

Cir.1984); see also, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877

(1989) (An attorney is entitled to EAJA fees for services rendered at the district court level.) 

Accordingly, the 4.00 hours, alleged for services not performed before the District Court, must

be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel. 

Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to compensation for 14.00 hours spent

in the representation of this plaintiff before the district court. at the rate of $146.00 per hour, for

a total attorney's fee award of $2,044.00 under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to

prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of October, 2005.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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