Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02525/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02525-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dean Joseph Woodburn, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CIV 01-2525 PHX NVW (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 )

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Dean Joseph Woodburn ("petitioner") filed a pro se Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in the amended petition. 

(Doc. 11 at pp. 5-6). Respondents filed an answer seeking denial

based on the statute of limitations. (Doc. 24). Petitioner

filed a reply to the answer. (Doc. 28).

I. BACKGROUND

 On July 16, 1998, petitioner signed a plea agreement

pleading guilty to one count of attempted aggravated assault. 

(Doc. 24, Exhibit A at p. 1). The agreement informed petitioner

he was subject to a maximum prison sentence of 13 years if

adjudged guilty of this crime "if the trial court makes [an]

exceptional circumstances finding." (Id.). On September 23,

1998, the state trial court sentenced him to the maximum term of

13 years. (Id., Exhibit B). 

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1

The docket sheet incorrectly lists Document 1 as a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

2

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction review

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and the trial court denied the

petition. (Doc. 11 at p. 2; see also Doc. 24, Exhibit C). 

Although no copy of petitioner's actual petitions for review are

included in the record, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily

denied review on May 23, 2000, and the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review without comment on December 5, 2000. (See Doc. 11

at Attachments). Petitioner states he sought no further review

in state court, and, although no copy is in the record, further

states that the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on

December 15, 2000. (Doc. 11 at p. 2). There is no mandate

issued after a Rule 32 is denied. The issuance of a mandate

occurs only on direct appeal. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.23(a)(1) and

(3). As a result, petitioner's state court proceedings ended

December 5, 2000.

On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion for

Extension of Time 180 Days Filing a Federal Habeas Corpus." No

petition was attached to the Motion.1 (Doc. 1). On January 11,

2002, this Court denied the request for a 180-day extension to

file a habeas petition, but granted him an additional 30 days to

file an "amended petition on the court-approved form ..." (Doc.

3 at p. 2). 

Petitioner filed a new motion seeking a 180-day extension to

file the petition on February 19, 2002. (Doc. 4). On May 23,

2002, the Court again denied the request for a 180-day extension

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and noted petitioner had not paid his $5.00 filing fee. The

Court again granted petitioner an additional 30 days to file an

"amended petition" on the Court-approved form and to pay the

filing fee or file an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

(Doc. 7 at pp. 1-2). On June 24, 2002, petitioner filed a third

motion for an extension of time for an additional 180 days to

file an amended habeas petition along with a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 8, 9). On October 23, 2002, the Court

granted the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and granted

petitioner an additional 30 days to file an amended habeas

petition. (Doc. 10 at p. 1). 

Finally, on November 25, 2002 (the amended petition was

actually signed by petitioner on November 21, 2002), petitioner

filed his habeas petition raising the following grounds for

relief:

GROUND I: SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE WITH DUE PROCESS. COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST

COMPETENCY AND MITIGATION HEARINGS ....

GROUND II: FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS. PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA ... WAS NOT KNOWING

AND VOLUNTARY ....

(Doc. 11 at pp. 5-6). Respondents opposed the "amended petition"

contending the claims were barred by the one-year statute of

limitations found at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. 24). 

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the amended petition be denied as untimely. 

(Doc. 40). The District Court agreed and denied the amended

petition. (Doc. 44). The District Court also denied a

Certificate of Appealability. (Doc. 50). An appeal went forward

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and apparently petitioner argued, for the first time, he was

entitled to equitable tolling because he was not mentally

competent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and

remanded to the District Court for further factual development of

petitioner's mental incompetence claim as it related to equitable

tolling. (Doc. 57). Upon remand, the District Court referred

this matter back to the Magistrate Judge "for further development

of Petitioner's mental incompetence claim . . ." (Doc. 58).

Following referral, the Magistrate Judge ordered further

briefing ". . .to determine if an evidentiary hearing (including

appointment of counsel) [which is now moot] is warranted with

respect to the issue of equitable tolling." The Court ordered an

evidentiary hearing to address petitioner's new claim that he was

not mentally competent from December 5, 2000 to December 26, 2001

and, at the same time, to address his claim (raised on the

merits) of mental competence at the change of plea hearing. The

later issue was allowed to save time in the event the Court

should find equitable tolling and address the merits. The

evidentiary hearing took place on September 27, 2006. Petitioner

testified and Exhibits 1-5 were admitted in evidence. 

Respondents called no witnesses and exhibits 16-42 were admitted

in evidence.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Issue of Remand

The issue on remand is a narrow one, namely, whether

petitioner was mentally incompetent during the period the statute

of limitations ran (between December 5, 2000 and December 26,

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2001) and whether he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute as a result. (See Doc. 57 at p. 3). In remanding on

this issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

 Under Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.

2003), a habeas petitioner is entitled to a remand for

further factual development of his claim of equitable

tolling due to mental incompetence whenever the

petitioner alleges "in a sworn pleading, against which

the state has offered no evidence at all, that he was

incompetent in the years when his petitions should have

been filed." Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. Woodburn has made

such an allegation. Accordingly, the district court's

denial of Woodburn's habeas corpus petition for

untimeliness is VACATED AND REMANDED for further

factual development of his mental competence.

(Doc. 57 at p. 3).

B. Statute of Limitations 

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

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and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations

period contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that

prior to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost

unfettered discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas

petition" and that "delays of more than a decade did not

necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128

F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Beeler

Court held § 2244(d) established a customary statute of

limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id. at 1288-

89. The statute itself provided for tolling the limitations

period when a "properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

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2

Of course, petitioner's burden of proof would be quite

different on the substantive issue of whether he was competent at

the change of plea. Since the state trial court made a factual

finding of competence (affirmed by the Arizona appellate courts),

petitioner would have the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that he was not competent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

7

time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)). Mental

incompetency justifies tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Laws v. LaMarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner

has the burden of proving mental incompetence warranting

equitable tolling. Id.; Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068

(9th Cir. 2006). 

The Court has not found a case setting forth the burden of

proof standard so preponderance of the evidence standard has been

used by the Magistrate Judge.2

C. Petitioner's Claim for Equitable Tolling

During the evidentiary hearing (and in his filings),

petitioner took the position he has not been mentally competent

at any time over the last 9 years of incarceration. However, he

testified at the evidentiary hearing and he appeared to be

competent during his testimony. He was appropriate in Court, he

demonstrated a recollection of events, he answered questions

appropriately on direct examination but was evasive on crossexamination and lacked credibility. The State asked for a

competency ruling after direct exam and the Court found

petitioner to be competent. Petitioner testified he has been off

all psychotropic medications for the past 6-8 months because he

is being treated for Hepatitis C and, due to drug interactions,

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he had to choose one treatment or the other. He chose to be

treated for liver disease and give up psychotropic medications. 

Despite this, he appeared to be competent.

To support his assertion of mental incompetence from

December, 2000 to December, 2001, petitioner relies on letters

written by Dr. Thomas N. Thomas, M.D. (Exhibits 1 and 2). The

first letter is from December 2, 1994, and the second is dated

January 26, 1997. 

In the first letter, written in 1994 to petitioner's public

defender (in a criminal proceeding not at issue in this habeas),

Dr. Thomas states he reviewed "most of the documents involved in

the case" and also went to see petitioner. Dr. Thomas opined

that petitioner exhibits many of the hallmarks of bi-polar

disorder and concluded he "is not, in my opinion, fully capable

of assisting you in a rational and factual manner. I believe he

is still in the throws of an inadequately treated manic state." 

Dr. Thomas went on to state that once the prescribed medications

take hold, "[m]y anticipation is that he will be able to respond

more fully and may well improve." (Exhibit 1). The letter

explains that, according to Mr. Woodburn, while out of custody he

was off his medications and became manic. Dr. Thomas recommended

he continue with his treatment by Correctional Health Services

staff "which is quite competent." Id.

Similarly, in a January 26, 1997 letter to another attorney,

(also representing petitioner in an unrelated criminal matter),

Dr. Thomas stated he again saw petitioner and determined "he has

suffered a relapse of the bipolar illness which I had previously

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diagnosed." (Exhibit 2). Dr. Thomas noted that petitioner told

him "he had been off his medicine and had relapsed into his

methamphetamine abuse." (Id.). Dr. Thomas stated petitioner's

competence may fail when he decompensates and becomes "manic." 

Dr. Thomas also noted in the letter that petitioner was put back

on medication in the 10 days prior to their meeting (after he was

re-incarcerated). Dr. Thomas observed "encouraging improvement"

in petitioner's condition after he was re-medicated, noting

petitioner told him he was no longer suicidal and that he was

feeling much better. However, Dr. Thomas stated petitioner was

not yet "competent to assist you in his own defense. . .Happily

as has happened in the past, I expect him to improve further on

his present treatment. I don't anticipate it will take a very

long time, perhaps a few weeks." Id. 

Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is a presentence report which details

6 prior felony convictions which are similar to the conviction

which is the subject of this habeas. The presentence report

recommends a sentence of 13 years. (Exhibit 3). Petitioner

received a sentence of 13 years. 

Petitioner also relies on an affidavit he executed in June,

2004, in support of a request for appointment of counsel in this

habeas proceeding. (Exhibit 4). In this affidavit, petitioner

discusses the findings of Dr. Thomas. In addition, petitioner

states he has been in several programs while in prison but that

in his latest place of incarceration "I don't get any type of

mental health help. . ." Petitioner further states in the

affidavit, however, that he has been given medications on an

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ongoing basis to aid with his bi-polar disorder and epilepsy. 

(Exhibit 4).

In Exhibit 5, petitioner directed the Court's attention to

an Inmate Letter dated August 26, 2004 where petitioner wrote:

"Please-send me to M.T.V. so I can get some Professional Mental

Health-Help 'Right Away.'" (Exhibit 5 at p. 7). The letter

appears to be about a physical injury and resulting pain

(physical and mental) for which petitioner wants ". . . to be

fully compensated." Id..

In contrast, respondents assert petitioner failed to support

a claim he was mentally incompetent during any time between

December, 2000 through December, 2001. Respondents' counsel

cross-examined petitioner and Exhibits 16-42 were admitted. The

Court also took judicial notice of documents in a prior habeas

corpus proceeding in this Court (CIV 00-1656) and a prior civil

suit (CIV 98-1734).

The record from the previous habeas petition, Woodburn I,

CIV 00-1656 (challenging a different 1997 conviction), shows that

at two separate hearings during March and April, 1997, the trial

court considered whether there was a sufficient basis warranting

a full competency evaluation of petitioner under Arizona law. 

(Woodburn I, Doc. 9A at Exhibits B and C). The record indicates

that at the first hearing in March, 1997, Dr. Thomas testified. 

Afterward, the Court ordered a "prescreening" evaluation which

was completed by Dr. Potts (a psychiatrist) and the court

determined the facts did not warrant granting a motion for a full

competency evaluation under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11. Dr. Potts found

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petitioner competent at the time of his examination. Petitioner

testified that Dr. Potts saw him after Dr. Thomas concluded

petitioner needed additional time on medications to regain

competency. (Exhibits 18, 19, 20, 21 at p. 2). Petitioner

testified in the evidentiary hearing, before this Court, that Dr.

Potts spent two minutes with him in the evaluation. Petitioner

was very defensive and not credible on this point.

In June, 1998, in this same unrelated case (CR 97-90286),

petitioner's counsel moved to continue the sentencing and asked

the Court for another mental health evaluation. (Exhibit 22). 

The Court granted the motion. (Exhibit 23). The record does not

include the result. However, petitioner's counsel in a

sentencing memorandum (August 24, 1998) asked for a mitigated

sentence because of petitioner's bi-polar disorder. (Exhibit

24). 

From August 28, 2000 to November 14, 2002, petitioner was

pursuing a habeas corpus challenging the conviction in CR 97-

90286 in Maricopa County. (Exhibit 25). Petitioner was not

represented by counsel. The habeas corpus ended in denial of the

petition. Id.

From September 24, 1998 to January 31, 2003, petitioner

(acting pro se) was pursuing a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Exhibits 31-41). The lawsuit ended in a judgment for defendants

but petitioner pursued his claims vigorously. Id. 

When questioned about these lengthy filings with many legal

arguments, petitioner testified that the handwritten documents in

the previous habeas and 1983 lawsuits were in his handwriting but

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that someone else wrote them and he copied their work. He also

testified the typed documents were prepared by someone else and

he just signed them. However, he testified he read, signed and

filed all of them. Petitioner's testimony that he did not

prepare the documents was not credible. Many of the handwritten

documents are lengthy and contain personal information that,

according to his testimony, came from him.

Finally, Exhibit 42 contains petitioner's mental health

records from the Arizona Department of Corrections from 

October 15, 1998 to February 11, 2005. The section from

December, 2000 through December, 2001 shows he was medicated,

stable and oriented. (Exhibit 42). The records do reflect

depression and sleeping problems at times but nothing that would

support a finding he was not competent. Id. For example,

following a document review, a psychologist noted a history of

exaggerating mental health problems "to achieve secondary goals." 

(Exhibit 42 at 4/20/01).

D. Findings of Fact

Based on the evidence admitted in the evidentiary hearing,

the documents filed in this case and the documents in CIV 98-1734

and CIV 00-1656 of which the Court takes judicial notice, the

Magistrate Judge makes the following findings of fact:

1. From September 24, 1998 to January 31, 2003, petitioner

was actively litigating a conditions of confinement (42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983) lawsuit (CIV 98-1734) in this Court. During December,

2000 - December, 2001, he was writing, signing and filing

documents that contained lucid legal arguments and factual

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presentations.

2. From August 28, 2000 to November 14, 2002, petitioner

was actively pursuing a habeas corpus action challenging his

conviction in state case CR 97-90286, an unrelated case. In that

case, petitioner filed documents and argued legal positions that

demonstrated he was competent during the litigation.

3. Petitioner's testimony at the hearing was not credible

when he testified that he copied others legal work and did not

write the documents he signed in CIV 98-1734 and CIV 00-1656.

4. Petitioner's testimony in CR 97-90286 that Dr. Potts'

competency examination lasted two minutes was not credible.

5. Petitioner's testimony that he did not write the

affidavit found at Exhibit 4, Doc. 47, is not credible. The

affidavit itself demonstrates he wrote it: "Please bear with me,

I am trying my best in writing this affidavit." It is signed by

petitioner and sworn as true before a notary.

6. Petitioner's testimony that he has been incompetent

since his sentence began 9 years ago is not credible.

7. Petitioner's medical records, December, 2000 - 2001,

show petitioner was medicated, going to therapy and receiving

regular examinations where he was found to be without psychotic

features, stable and oriented. 

8. When petitioner uses methamphetamine, he relapses into

mental illness.

9. Petitioner has had no illegal drugs while incarcerated

over the last 9 years.

 10. Petitioner was not truthful with this Court when he

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claimed initially that he was not aware of the one-year statute

of limitations. In Doc. 19 in CV 00-1656, petitioner attached a

letter to his filing where an attorney advised petitioner in

July, 2001 that there is a one-year statute of limitations in

habeas cases and ". . . if your Rule 32 and any related appeals

are over, you have, at most, one year from the date the

proceedings ended to file your federal habeas corpus. . . " (Doc.

19 in CV 00-1656). Petitioner told this Court he missed the oneyear statute of limitations because he was not aware of it and

the libraries did not contain the statute. (Doc. 28 at pp. 5-6). 

Respondents then provided evidence that petitioner's statement

was not correct. (Doc. 35). 

E. Conclusions

The evidence presented by petitioner is insufficient to

warrant equitable tolling. The mere fact petitioner is bi-polar

is not enough to establish lack of competence. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (no equitable

tolling based on physical or mental disabilities as petitioner

was able to prepare and file other court documents during the

time the statute was running) revised on other grounds, 447 F.3d

1165 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371,

378-9 (9th Cir. 2002).

In this case, petitioner has failed to present any evidence

that his bi-polar condition rendered him mentally incompetent

during any part of the period the statute of limitations ran on

his habeas claims. The letters by Dr. Thomas, and/or his

testimony before the state trial court in another case in 1997,

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when considered with other evidence, did not convince the state

trial court that a sufficient basis for a Rule 11 examination

existed. (Exhibits 16-25). In fact, Dr. Thomas indicated

petitioner is rendered competent when properly medicated. 

(Exhibit 18 at Attachment). Petitioner testified in his 2004

affidavit and at the hearing he continued to receive medications

for his bi-polar condition during the relevant time frame. This

is documented in his mental health records. (Exhibit 42).

In addition, the Magistrate Judge has reviewed the

transcript of petitioner's change of plea hearing (regarding the

conviction challenged in the current case) on July 16, 1998. 

Based on this review, the Magistrate Judge does not see any

evidence that petitioner was not mentally competent. At the

outset, the trial judge asked petitioner if he was taking any

medication. Petitioner said he was and that among the drugs he

was taking were Tegretol and Vistral, which he stated were

specifically for his bi-polar condition. (Exhibit 16 at p. 5). 

Petitioner stated he did not believe any of his medication

impaired his ability to understand the proceedings. Id.

Petitioner also stated, in response to a series of questions

regarding the implications of his guilty plea, that he fully

understood the implications, including the possible sentences he

might receive, and pointedly admitted to the substance of the

crime, namely, that he knowingly attempted to assault a police

officer by driving a car at him. Review of the transcript of the

change of plea hearing reveals petitioner wrote a "poem" that

raised concerns that he might be suicidal but petitioner assured

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the court he was not. The trial court determined the plea was

knowing, intelligent and voluntary and this is supported by the

record. The plea hearing occurred on July 16, 1998, a time

subsequent to Dr. Thomas' letters, when petitioner was medicated. 

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, there is nothing from the

change of plea transcript in this case to indicate he was not

competent. 

As noted in State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 286, 670 P.2d

383, 391 (Ariz. 1983), a trial court, in determining a

defendant's mental competency need "not only rely ... on the

psychiatrists' opinions, but it also observed the defendant's

demeanor and heard his responses to inquiries ..." The trial

court had the ability to observe petitioner's demeanor and the

quality of his answers at the change of plea. When petitioner

raised his competence at the change of plea in a Rule 32

petition, the Judge who took his change of plea also considered

and denied his Rule 32 petition finding that he was competent. 

Finally, the Court notes that during the entire time the

statue of limitations was running in this case, and petitioner

contends his bi-polar rendered him incompetent, petitioner was

actively litigating a pro se habeas case challenging a different

conviction in Woodburn I, CIV 00-1656 PHX MHM (VAM) and a civil

rights case in this Court in Woodburn v. Himmelberger, CIV 00-

1734. Petitioner filed numerous papers and coherently and

forcefully argued his position in both cases. This belies any

claim of incompetence, particularly incompetence preventing him

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The Court also notes that when petitioner filed in this

Court, it appears he realized he was beyond the statute of

limitations. (Doc. 1). Instead of filing a habeas petition, he

filed a Motion for additional time to file and made excuses as to

why he did not file earlier.

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from filing a timely petition in the current case.3

 

In sum, petitioner has not carried his burden of proof and

demonstrated that he was not competent during the time the

statute of limitations was running. Upon review of all the facts

in the record, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing and the

exhibits in evidence, the Magistrate Judge finds petitioner was

competent during the time the statute of limitations ran and he

is not entitled to equitable tolling.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied as untimely.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Any notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of

the district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have

ten (10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right

to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will

constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

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findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2006.

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