Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06619/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06619-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 15:78m(a) Securities Exchange Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

B & H MANUFACTURING )

COMPANY, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

LYN E. BRIGHT, ByH DE LAS )

AMERICAS, S.A. de C.V., and DOES )

1 THROUGH 10, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 01-6619 AWI SMS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

ALTER AND AMEND JUDGMENT,

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW, AND MOTION

FOR A NEW TRIAL

(Document #592)

In the third amended complaint, filed on February 19, 2004, Plaintiff raised four causes of

action: (1) False Designations of Origin and False Descriptions in violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a); (2) Dilution in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); (3) Infringement of Registered

Trademarks in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; and (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. After a jury

trial, on October 8, 2004, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. Pursuant to the verdict form,

the jury awarded Plaintiff $145,000 for Defendant Bright’s breach of fiduciary duty, $501,500 for

Defendants’ trademark infringement, $105,000 for Defendants’ dilution, and $100,000 for

Defendants’ trade dress infringement. On February 17, 2005, the court denied Plaintiff’s

request for additional monetary relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion to alter and amend judgment, motion for judgment

as a matter of law, and motion for a new trial. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the court

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erred in denying monetary relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (b). 

Plaintiff argues the court erred in finding no counterfeiting claim was tried. Plaintiff also argues

the court erred in finding Plaintiff was not entitled to additional monetary relief pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 1117(a). In the alternative, Plaintiff requests the court grant judgment as a matter of

law on a counterfeiting claim or a new trial. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment

The court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d

1185, 1198 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.1992).

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties to make

new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood

Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir.1988). Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the

court to rethink what it has already thought. United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112,

1116 (D.Ariz.1998). “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with

the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before

rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” U.S. v. Westlands

Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). Motions to reconsider are committed

to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir.

1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must

set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior

decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665

(E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 59(e), any motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no later than

ten days after entry of judgment. Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy, to 

be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona

Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.2000). Amendment or alteration

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is appropriate under Rule 59(e) if: (1) The district court is presented with newly-discovered

evidence; (2) The district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was

manifestly unjust; or (3) There is an intervening change in controlling law. Zimmerman v. City

of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001); School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). This showing is a “high hurdle.” Weeks v.

Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). A judgment is not properly reopened “absent highly

unusual circumstances.” Id. A district court's denial of a motion for a new trial or to amend a

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court abuses its

discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous

assessment of the facts. Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff previously requested the court treble damages on the damage award for all of the

trademark causes of action. Specifically, Plaintiff requested treble damages under Section 1117

because Defendants’ conduct was intentional. The court previously found that treble damages

were not appropriate pursuant to Section 1117(b) because no counterfeiting claim had been tried

and not appropriate pursuant to Section1117(a) because Plaintiff had been adequately

compensated. In the current motion, Plaintiff requests the court amend judgment to allow for

treble damages under both Section 1117(b) and Section 1117(a). 

The court finds that Plaintiff has not shown the unusual circumstances necessary for the

court to amend its judgment and find a counterfeiting claim was before the court, allowing treble

damages. Plaintiff clearly disagrees with the court’s findings in the February 17, 2005 order. 

However, Plaintiff’s present motion is essentially an attempt to re-litigate the issue of whether a

counterfeiting claim was before the court. Plaintiff cites no new evidence. Plaintiff points to no

intervening change in the law. Plaintiff has made no showing that the court’s order was

manifestly unjust. Instead, Plaintiff has made a series of arguments that were already raised, or

could have been raised, prior to the entry of judgment. As such, Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to

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Rule 59(e) must be denied.

Treble damages pursuant to Section 1117(b) are only available for a counterfeiting claim. 

Nothing in Plaintiff’s motion causes the court to believe it committed injustice by finding a

counterfeiting claim was never tried. As discussed in the prior order, Plaintiff’s pretrial

statement, the representations made by the parties during trial, and the court’s understanding of

the claims before it did not include a counterfeiting claim. In its motion, Plaintiff points out that

the passages and statements the court cited when finding no counterfeiting claim was before the

court are not inconsistent with Plaintiff’s understanding that such a claim was before the court. 

While in hindsight one can argue for several meanings to be given to the cited statements, the

court finds of primary significance is what this court understood were the claims being tried. 

During the trial, the court never understood a counterfeiting claim was before the court. Because

it was Plaintiff’s burden to put the court on notice of its claims, the price for the ambiguity

ultimately falls at Plaintiffs feet. 

Plaintiff spends considerable time in its brief disputing the court’s finding that the jury

verdict was not a special verdict. While nothing in Plaintiff’s brief convinces the court that the

verdict form was a special verdict form within the meaning of Rule 49(a), the court did allow for

the possibility that the issue of damages pursuant to Section 1117 was presented to the jury by

special verdict. 

Preliminarily, the court recognizes that if the parties agreed that the court would

decide all Section 1117 issues, including whether Defendants counterfeited

Plaintiff’s marks, Rule 49(a) would come into play. While the verdict was

primarily a general verdict, the jury was asked a specific question regarding

damages under Section 1117. The jury was asked whether Defendants’ conduct

was intentional. The jury was not asked to apply this factual finding to the law to

determine whether trebling damages under Section 1117 were appropriate. 

Rather, the parties and the court agreed the court would take this factual finding

and apply Section 1117. Such a factual question appears to be a special verdict. 

If the parties and the court agreed that the court would decide all issues relating to

Section 1117 and the jury would only make factual findings concerning Section

1117, then Rule 49(a) would allow the court to make any factual findings not

deciding by the jury, such as whether Defendants counterfeited Plaintiff’s marks

and the damages for such counterfeiting. 

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1

 In its motion, Plaintiff points out that the court did not list Plaintiff’s claims in its

Pretrial Order. Plaintiff appears to argue that by not issuing a Pretrial Order containing

Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff was misled by the court about the claims before the court. A motion

for reconsideration is not the proper avenue for raising legal theories that could have been, but

were not, raised before the court issued the order for which reconsideration is sought. Rosenfeld

v. United States Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir.1995); In re Agric. Research & Tech.

Group, Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 542 (9th Cir.1990). In addition, a Pretrial Order listing Plaintiff’s

claims would not change the result. In such an order, the court would have copied Plaintiff’s

recitation of the claims before the court from Plaintiff’s pretrial statement. In copying Plaintiff’s

pretrial statement, the court would have referenced a remedy under Section 1117(b) but not

mentioned a counterfeiting claim. This would leave the court in the same position that it found

itself; A remedy requiring a counterfeiting claim, but no counterfeiting claim. In this situation,

the court would do exactly what it has done and find no remedy available because no

5

Even finding all Section 1117(b) issues were submitted as a special verdict, nothing in Plaintiff’s

motion convinces the court that the court should find a counterfeiting claim was ever before the

court. Rule 49(a) does not speak to claims for relief or causes of action that were not submitted

to the jury. The court did not find, and because nothing in Plaintiff’s brief convinces the court it

erred, the court continues to not find that Plaintiff’s references to Section 1117(b) were sufficient

to have raised a counterfeiting claim. In its brief, Plaintiff appears to imply that Defendants and

the court somehow colluded to mislead Plaintiff about Section 1117(b) and Plaintiff’s

counterfeiting claim. It is unclear what Defendants believed when they read and heard references

to Section 1117(b). Regardless of Defendants’ intent and motives, the court did not understand

Plaintiff’s references to Section 1117(b) to mean that Plaintiff was raising a counterfeiting claim. 

It was Plaintiff’s burden, at some point, to have discussed counterfeiting elements and

definitions, mentioned the need for findings on a counterfeiting claim, and informed the court

that in deciding whether to treble damages under Section 1117(b) the court would need to

determine whether Defendants counterfeited Plaintiff’s marks and the amount of damages

Plaintiff sustained. If the court had understood that a counterfeiting claim was at issue by

Plaintiff’s references to Section 1117(b), the court would have discussed submitting this claim to

the jury. Nothing in Plaintiff’s motion convinces the court that it erred in finding that

Defendants did not waive the right to have the jury instructed on counterfeiting because it was

Plaintiff’s obligation to preserve, present, and pursue its claims.1

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counterfeiting claim was before the court. 

6

In its motion, Plaintiff also objects to the court’s refusal to treble damages pursuant to

Section 1117(a). As discussed in the prior order, awarding additional damages under Section

1117(a) is not automatic, even in the case of intentional conduct. The court can only award

additional damages if the court finds the jury’s verdict did not adequately compensate Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has not shown legal authority that the court must enhance damages pursuant to Section

1117(a) if the jury’s verdict adequately compensated the plaintiff even where the defendants’

actions were intentional. See Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir.

1993) (“To award profits in this situation would amount to a punishment in violation of the

Lanham Act which clearly stipulates that a remedy ‘shall constitute compensation not a penalty.’

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”). Nothing in Plaintiff’s brief convinces the court that the court erred in

finding the jury’s verdict adequately compensated Plaintiff. Thus, an amendment to the

judgment is not required. 

B. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff seeks judgment as a matter of law on a counterfeiting claim. Plaintiff contends

that because it pled and preserved this issue and because the evidence supports a counterfeiting

claim, the court should grant judgment as a matter of law on a counterfeiting claim.

The court may enter a judgment as a matter of law if there is no legally sufficient

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party on an issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). In the

Ninth Circuit, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “the evidence, construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that

conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th

Cir. 2002); Omega Envt'l, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.1997).

Judgement as a matter of law is not appropriate because Plaintiff never asked for

judgment as a mater of law on a counterfeiting claim at the close of the evidence. Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 50 requires that a motion for a directed verdict be made at the close of all the

evidence in order to be renewed following entry of judgment. Zhang v. American Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003); Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d

883, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2002). “By definition, a Rule 50(b) motion is a renewal of a prior Rule

50(a) motion made at the close of evidence and as such is limited to those issues raised in the

previous motion.” Andreas v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 2003). A

renewed motion on a ground not specifically raised in an earlier motion is barred. Doctor's

Assocs., Inc. v. Weible, 92 F.3d 108, 112 (2nd Cir. 1996). 

The court does note that technical precision is not necessary in stating grounds for a

motion as a matter of law at the close of the evidence so long as the trial court is aware of the

movant's position. Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1158 (8th Cir.

2003). In this case, the court was not aware that Plaintiff believed it was trying a counterfeiting

claim. Similarly, the court was not aware that Plaintiff’s position was that judgment as a matter

of law was appropriate on a counterfeiting claim. Thus, judgment as a matter of law is not

appropriate at this time because Plaintiff never requested judgment at the close of the evidence.

Further, the court finds that no counterfeiting claim was ever tried. The court cannot

enter judgment as a matter of law on a claim that was not tried. 

C. New Trial

Plaintiff moves for a new trial on a counterfeiting claim. Rule 59(a) provides that: “[A]

new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action

in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore

been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” A district court's denial of a

motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Far Out

Productions, 247 F.3d at 992.

As discussed above and in the court’s prior order, the court finds that no counterfeiting

claim was tried, and Plaintiff tried only a general trademark claim. This finding precludes the

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court from allowing a new trial on something that was not tried in the prior trial.

In addition, Plaintiff is only requesting a new trial on one issue. Courts have broad

discretion to grant new trials on all or only some issues. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin

Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.

1981). The items to be retried must be distinct and separable from the issues not to be retried. 

Hasbrouck, 663 F.2d at 933. “Partial trials ‘may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly

appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from others that a trial of it alone

may be had without injustice.’” Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1133-34

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gasoline Products Co., 283 U.S. at 500)). While the court previously

found that a counterfeiting claim is distinct from the infringement claim Plaintiff tried, the

elements for the two claims partially overlap. It is possible that some of the damages for

infringement could also be damages for counterfeiting. The trademark issues in this action are

so interwoven that a new trial on all trademark issues would be warranted if the court allowed a

new trial on counterfeiting. Thus, a partial new trial on a counterfeiting claim that was not tried

in the first trial is not justified.

ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the above memorandum opinion and order, the

court ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to alter and amend judgment is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED; and

3. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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