Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02417/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Byron C. Ellis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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CIV 14-2417-PHX-MHB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Byron C. Ellis’s appeal from the Social Security

Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. After reviewing the administrative record and the arguments

of the parties, the Court now issues the following ruling.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income alleging disability beginning April 7, 2011. (Transcript of Administrative Record

(“Tr.”) at 30, 178-79.) His applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.

at 28, 80-117.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge.

(Tr. at 28, 133-34.) A hearing was held on February 21, 2013, (Tr. at 45-79), and the ALJ

issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. at 25-44). The Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. at 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision

of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if the findings are supported by substantial

evidence and are free from reversible legal error. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720

(9th Cir. 1998); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence

means “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720.

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court considers

the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “The ALJ

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for

resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can reasonably

support either affirming or reversing the [Commissioner’s] conclusion, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21.

III. THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In order to be eligible for disability or social security benefits, a claimant must

demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An ALJ determines a claimant’s eligibility for

benefits by following a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity”;

(2) determine whether the applicant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments;

(3) determine whether the applicant’s impairment equals one of a number of listed

impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe as to preclude the

applicant from engaging in substantial gainful activity;

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 “Residual functional capacity” is defined as the most a claimant can do after

considering the effects of physical and/or mental limitations that affect the ability to perform

work-related tasks.

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(4) if the applicant’s impairment does not equal one of the listed impairments,

determine whether the applicant is capable of performing his or her past relevant

work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant work,

determine whether the applicant is able to perform other work in the national

economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920). At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the

claimant can perform other substantial gainful work. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956

(9th Cir. 1993).

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful

activity since April 7, 2011 – the alleged onset date. (Tr. at 30.) At step two, he found that

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar stenosis status post laminectomy

fusion L3-L5, history of alcohol dependence, and hypertension. (Tr. at 31-33.) At step three,

the ALJ stated that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1 of the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. at 33.) After consideration of the entire record,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained “the residual functional capacity to perform light work

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant is able to lift and carry

10-20 pounds occasionally in each hand individually, 20-30 pounds with both hands, sit for

30 min to one hour, stand 10 min, walk the equivalent distance of 2 blocks at one time, but

may need a cane for ambulating or standing if no other supportive option.”1

 (Tr. at 34-37.)

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not capable of performing past relevant work, but that

considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity

“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can

perform.” (Tr. at 37-38.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a

disability from April 7, 2011, through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 38-39.)

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IV. DISCUSSION

In his brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to make a proper finding

at step five of the sequential evaluation process. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that ALJ

erroneously relied on the VE testimony and failed to resolve conflicts between the DOT and

the sit/stand option and the possible need for a cane set forth in the residual functional

capacity assessment.

At step five, the Commissioner has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant can

perform some work that exists in “significant numbers” in the national or regional economy,

taking into account the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work

experience. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). “The Social Security

Administration has taken administrative notice of the [DOT], which is published by the

Department of Labor and gives detailed physical requirements for a variety of jobs.”

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 n.8. “In making disability determinations, the

Social Security Administration relies primarily on the [DOT] for ‘information about the

requirements of work in the national economy.’” Id. at 1153 (quoting SSR 00-4p at *2). The

ALJ may also use testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”). See id. Evidence by a VE

should generally be consistent with the DOT, and while neither the DOT nor VE testimony

trumps the other when there is a conflict, it is incumbent on the ALJ to identify if a conflict

exists and then determine whether the VE’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and

whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the DOT. See id.

At the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE whether there were

jobs in significant numbers in the economy for someone with Plaintiff’s RFC, given his age,

education, and work history. (Tr. at 75.) The ALJ stated, in pertinent part, “[t]he individual

can sit at one time ... for thirty minutes to one hour, and the individual can stand at one time

for ten minutes and walk at one time for two blocks. The claimant may need a cane for

ambulating or standing ... if there’s nothing to hold onto.” (Tr. at 75.)

After the VE found that, based on these limitations, Plaintiff could not perform his

past relevant work, the ALJ asked the VE whether there are jobs that exist in significant

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 The Court also notes that – as to the sit/stand option – SSR 83-12 explicitly states

that, in cases where a claimant has a residual functional capacity that is “compatible with the

performance of either sedentary or light work except that the person must alternate periods

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numbers in the regional and national economies that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. at 75-76.)

Before the VE answered, she asked the ALJ a clarifying question – “Could this person sit,

stand, or walk for an eight-hour day if they had a sit/stand option?” (Tr. at 76.) The ALJ

responded, “Yes.” (Tr. at 76.) The VE then identified three representative occupations from

the DOT, which satisfied the hypothetical limitations: parking lot attendant, cashier, and

order caller. (Tr. at 76-77.)

In identifying the three representative occupations, the VE acknowledged that the

need for a sit/stand option erodes the number of jobs listed in the DOT. Specifically, she

stated, “I would say one-third of the cashiering jobs ... would exist with a sit/stand option

based on my experience. That would make the eroded numbers 4,000 in Arizona and

275,000 in the United States. ... And there are order caller jobs that could be done with a

sit/stand option, Your Honor ... 195 in Arizona, and 11,100 in the United States.” (Tr. at 76.)

After considering the record before the Court, the Court finds no error. The record

demonstrates that the ALJ posed proper hypothetical questions to the VE setting out all of

Plaintiff’s particular limitations and restrictions. Then, considering Plaintiff’s limitations,

the VE found three representative occupations from the DOT – specifically noting that

“based on [her] experience,” the sit/stand option “eroded” the numbers in Arizona and the

United States.

Thus, the ALJ did not need to inquire about an apparent conflict because no conflict

between the VE and the DOT existed. And, even if an apparent conflict can be construed

from the VE’s testimony and the DOT’s silence or failure to address a sit/stand option or the

possible need for a cane, the VE’s response – voluntarily reconciling any apparent conflict

based on her experience – would qualify as a reasonable explanation according to SSR 00-4p

(stating that one reasonable explanation for a conflict could be testimony from a VE based

on his personal experience).2

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of sitting and standing . . . a [vocational source] should be consulted to clarify the

implications for the occupational base.” This ruling fails to indicated that a sit/stand option

is in conflict with the DOT; rather, it seems to acknowledge that the DOT makes no comment

on the existence, or non-existence, of a sit/stand option with regard to particular jobs. As a

result, SSR 83-12 requires the ALJ to call upon the services of a VE to inquire as to the

implications of a sit/stand option on the occupational base.

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Plaintiff cites Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.2007), as support for

his claim. The Court is not persuaded. In Massachi, the Ninth Circuit held that an ALJ may

not “rely on a vocational expert’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular job

without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the [DOT].” Id. “The ALJ must

first determine whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must then determine whether the

vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists for

relying on the expert rather than the [DOT].” Id. at 1153. In contrast to the present case, in

Massachi, there was an apparent conflict between the VE testimony and the information set

forth in the DOT, but the VE did not volunteer an explanation or attempt to reconcile the

apparent conflict, thus triggering the ALJ’s duty to inquire. See Massachi, 486 F.3d at

1153-54. Here, there was no apparent conflict, but even if there had been, the VE testified

based on her professional experience. Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on Massachi is misplaced.

The Court finds no error.

V. CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Consequently, the ALJ’s

decision is affirmed.

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Based upon the foregoing discussion,

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ and the Commissioner of Social

Security be affirmed;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly. The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court.

DATED this 15th day of January, 2016.

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