Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01159/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01159-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID B. DAVIS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MARTIN FRINK,1

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-1159-GEB-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss the case as partially unexhausted. ECF No. 15. 

For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion be granted in part, that the petition 

be deemed amended to delete the unexhausted claim, and that petitioner be allowed an 

opportunity to inform the court whether he wishes to proceed immediately or will seek to exhaust 

the deleted claim. 

I. Background 

Petitioner was convicted of various charges related to an incident of domestic violence in 

the Shasta County Superior Court in 2014. ECF No. 18, Resp’t’s Notice of Lodging Document in 

Paper, Lodged Document (hereinafter “Lodg. Doc.”) No. 1. The court sentenced him to a 

 1

 Petitioner named Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility as the respondent in this 

action. The court grants respondent’s request to substitute Martin Frink, Warden of that facility 

(where petitioner is housed), as the proper respondent in this action. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 

U.S. 426, 435 (2004). 

Case 2:16-cv-01159-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 02/07/17 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

determinate sentence of 21 years in prison. Id. Petitioner sought review of the conviction in the 

California Court of Appeal. Lodg. Doc. No. 2. The court rejected his appeal on January 28, 

2016. Id. The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s petition for review on 

April 13, 2016. Lodg. Docs. Nos. 3, 4. 

Petitioner has filed a single collateral attack on his conviction: a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus filed in the Shasta County Superior Court on April 6, 2016. Lodg. Doc. No. 5. The court 

denied the petition on April 26, 2016. Lodg. Doc. No. 6. 

II. The Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed because one of the claims raised 

in the instant case has not been exhausted. ECF No. 15. Petitioner responds that he tried to 

exhaust his claims by filing the same paperwork in the superior court, but that he is “not too 

bright on what court is what.” ECF No. 17. 

A. The Exhaustion Requirement 

A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner 

has exhausted available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed 

to have waived the exhaustion requirement unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the 

requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 

Exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners fairly present federal claims to the 

highest state court, either on direct appeal or through state collateral proceedings, in order to give 

the highest state court “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its 

prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (some internal quotations 

omitted). “[A] state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in 

state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 

2000). “[T]he petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal 

law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is self-evident . . . .” Id. (citations 

omitted); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (“[A] claim for relief in 

habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a 

Case 2:16-cv-01159-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 02/07/17 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.”); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (to 

exhaust a claim, a state court “must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting 

claims under the United States Constitution.”). 

In addition to identifying the federal basis of his claims in the state court, the petitioner 

must also fairly present the factual basis of the claim in order to exhaust it. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he petitioner 

must . . . provide the state court with the operative facts, that is, ‘all of the facts necessary to give 

application to the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” Davis v. Silva, 511 

F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 

1958)). 

Where a federal habeas petitioner has failed to exhaust a claim in the state courts 

according to these principles, she may ask the federal court to stay its consideration of her petition 

while she returns to state court to complete exhaustion. Two procedures may be used in staying a 

petition – one provided for by Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) and the other by 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under the Kelly procedure, the district court may stay a petition containing only exhausted claims 

and hold it in abeyance pending exhaustion of additional claims which may then be added to the 

petition through amendment. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71; King, 564 F.3d at 1135. If the federal 

petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims (a so-called “mixed” petition), a 

petitioner seeking a stay under Kelly must first dismiss the unexhausted claims from the petition 

and seek to add them back in through amendment after exhausting them in state court. King, 564 

F.3d at 1138-39. The previously unexhausted claims, once exhausted, must be added back into 

the federal petition within the statute of limitations provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 

however. King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. Under that statute, a one-year limitation period for seeking 

federal habeas relief begins to run from the latest of the date the judgment became final on direct 

review, the date on which a state-created impediment to filing is removed, the date the United 

States Supreme Court makes a new rule retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review or 

the date on which the factual predicate of a claim could have been discovered through the 

Case 2:16-cv-01159-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 02/07/17 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). A federal habeas petition does not toll the 

limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 

(2001). 

Under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition in its entirety, without requiring 

dismissal of the unexhausted claims, while the petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1139-40. Unlike the Kelly procedure, however, Rhines requires that the 

petitioner show good cause for failing to exhaust the claims in state court prior to filing the 

federal petition. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78; King, 564 F.3d at 1139. In addition, a stay pursuant 

to Rhines is inappropriate where the unexhausted claims are “plainly meritless” or where the 

petitioner has engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. 

B. Analysis 

This federal petition contains four claims, one of which was not presented to the 

California Supreme Court in petitioner’s sole filing there – that is, petitioner’s claim that his trial 

counsel rendered constitutionally deficient assistance. Compare ECF No. 1-1 with Lodg. Doc. 

No. 3. Accordingly, the petition is “mixed.” Petitioner has not expressly asked the court to stay 

proceedings while he tries to exhaust the ineffective assistance claim, much less shown “good 

cause” under Rhines. Soto v. Lewis, No. SA CV 13-1711-DPP (DFM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

140838, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) (noting that ignorance of the law is not good cause under 

Rhines); see Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the good cause 

standard must be interpreted to apply in limited circumstances according to the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s direction in Rhines). Indeed, it is not clear from petitioner’s response to the motion to 

dismiss whether he would like the court to stay the petition even under Kelly (which, as discussed 

above, does not require a showing of good cause). Petitioner states that he wants to go forward 

with this case and have the ineffective assistance claim “deleted,” but he also indicates some 

dissatisfaction with that prospect. ECF No. 17 at 2 (stating that he has done “a lot more home 

work on . . . ineffective counsel”). 

Because the petition contains an unexhausted claim and petitioner has not provided good 

cause for staying the case, petitioner has two options. The court can deem the petition amended 

Case 2:16-cv-01159-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 02/07/17 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

to delete the unexhausted claim, and then petitioner can either (1) inform the court that he wishes 

to proceed with the petition as amended or (2) petitioner can ask the court to stay the case while 

he files a petition in the California Supreme Court to exhaust the ineffective assistance claim and 

then seek to amend the petition again to add the claim back. If petitioner picks option (1), he 

should be aware that he may not thereafter be able to obtain federal review of his ineffective 

assistance claim. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation 

 In accordance with the above analysis, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s July 29, 2016 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 15) be granted in part such 

that petitioner’s ground four for relief (alleging ineffective assistance of counsel) be 

dismissed and the petition be deemed amended to delete that claim; and 

2. Petitioner be provided with 21 days from the date of any order adopting these findings 

and recommendations to either (1) inform the court that he wishes to proceed on the 

remaining claims or (2) file a motion with the court seeking to stay the case while he 

exhausts the ineffective assistance claim in the California Supreme Court. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 7, 2017. 

Case 2:16-cv-01159-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 02/07/17 Page 5 of 5