Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17200/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17200-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF

THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEE AND

MOVING PICTURE TECHNICIANS,

ARTISTS, AND ALLIED CRAFTS OF

THE UNITED STATES, IT’S TRUSTEED

LOCAL 720 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA,

AKA IATSE Local 720,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-17200

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00181-

GMN-PAL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 11, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 4, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez, Circuit

Judges, and Frederic Block, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Paez

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

SUMMARY**

Labor Law / Arbitration

The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting a

petition to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining

agreement between a union and an employer.

The district court granted the union’s petition and

“stayed” the case. The panel concluded that the district

court’s arbitration order was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

because the stay lacked any legal or practical effect under

either the Labor Management Relations Act or the Federal

Arbitration Act. The panel therefore exercised jurisdiction to

review the district court’s order.

Affirmingthe district court’s order compelling arbitration,

the panel held that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether

the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired

when the union sought to invoke the agreement’s grievance

and arbitration procedure, or whether, pursuant to an

“evergreen clause,” the agreement continued in effect.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 3

COUNSEL

Bryan J. Cohen (argued) and Gregory J. Kamer, Kamer

Zucker Abbott, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

David A. Rosenfeld (argued) and William A. Sokol,

Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld, Alameda, California; Kristina

L. Hillman, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Los Angeles,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents two issues arising from a petition to

compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement

between the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage

Employees and Moving Picture Technicians, Artists, and

Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories and Canada

and its Trusteed Local 720 Las Vegas, Nevada (“IATSE”)

and InSync Show Productions, Inc. (“InSync”). It is

undisputed that IATSE and InSync agreed to a collective

bargaining agreement containing both a grievance and

arbitration procedure and a provision governing the length of

the agreement’s life. After the parties unsuccessfully

negotiated regarding a potential successor agreement, IATSE

filed a petition to compel arbitration in federal court. The

district court granted IATSE’s petition to compel arbitration

pursuant to the parties’ initial agreement and “stayed” the

case. We must decide whether we have jurisdiction over

InSync’s appeal from the order compelling arbitration and, if

so, whether the district court properly compelled arbitration. 

We conclude that the district court’s arbitration order was

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4 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the stay lacked any

legal or practical effect. We therefore exercise jurisdiction to

review the order compelling arbitration, and we affirm.

I. Background

InSync and IATSE entered into a collective bargaining

agreement (the “2003–2007 CBA”) in January 2003. Article

26 of the 2003–2007 CBA, which governs the term of the

agreement, contains an “evergreen clause.” Article 26 stated:

Except as otherwise provided for herein, this

Agreement shall become effective on the 1st

day of January, 2003 and shall continue in full

force and effect to and including December

31st, 2007 and from year to year thereafter. 

The Employer agrees to live by the applicable

wages, terms and conditions for additional

projects in the future.

(emphasis added).

Article 15 of the 2003–2007 CBA includes a grievance

and arbitration procedure. That provision defines “a

grievance . . . as a claim or allegation by an employee in the

bargaining unit or by the Union that the Employer has

violated or is violating the provisions of this Agreement.” If

the parties proceed to arbitration, “[t]he arbitrator’s award

shall be based solely upon his interpretation of the meaning

or application of the provisions of this Agreement.”

On October 2, 2007, IATSE informed InSync that IATSE

was interested in changing the terms of the 2003–2007 CBA. 

InSync responded on November 10 with a letter, explaining

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 5

“that InSync did not intend to renew the [2003–2007 CBA].” 

IATSE wrote back on November 15, stating that the National

Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.,

required the parties to bargain in good faith. IATSE included

a proposed “Extension Agreement,” the “2008–2012 CBA,”

that InSync indicated would “extend the terms of the

2003–2007 [CBA].” InSync did not sign the 2008–2012

CBA. On December 21, 2007, IATSE reminded InSync of

the requirement to bargain in good faith. The record does not

reflect further communication until August 2008.

Between August 22, 2008 and February 11, 2009, InSync

and IATSE corresponded about a possible successor

collective bargaining agreement. On February 11, 2009,

InSync wrote to IATSE, stating that “the parties had reached

impasse in bargaining and InSync reserved the right to

implement any or all of the terms and conditions set forth in

the Company’s [previously sent] December 10, 2008,

proposal.” Shortly thereafter, on February 20, 2009, InSync

sent and invited a response to its “last, best and final offer.” 

On March 17 and 18, IATSE sent a counterproposal, and

InSync reiterated its position without accepting that

counterproposal. The parties did not reach an agreement.

On August 2, 2011, IATSE invoked the parties’ grievance

and arbitration procedure and requested a meeting. Two

weeks later, InSync responded that the “parties had bargained

to impasse between 2007 and 2009, no extension agreement

had been signed, and the statute of limitations under Section

10(b) of the [NLRA] barred any legal actions based on the

negotiations during 2007–2009.”

On September 30, 2011, IATSE wrote to InSync,

asserting its position that InSync was bound by provisions in

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6 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

the 2003–2007 CBA that rendered the proposed 2008–2012

CBA effective. The 2008–2012 CBA had terms “identical”

to those in the 2003–2007 CBA. On October 10, InSync

informed IATSE that it believed that “a refusal to bargain

charge under Section 8(a)(5) [of the NLRA] was time barred,

and a grievance under Article 15 of the collective bargaining

agreement was also time barred.” On October 24, IATSE

responded with a letter, stating that the letter “serve[d] as the

Union’s grievance filed pursuant to Article 15, because the

Employer is violating each and every section of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement . . . insofar as the Employer

is operating on a completely non-union basis and ignoring the

contract completely.” InSync responded on November 2,

reiterating its views on timeliness, and concluding: “The best

I can tell you is do what you have to do.”

On February 2, 2012, IATSE filed a petition to compel

arbitration in the district court. IATSE argued that the

2008–2012 CBA, with terms identical to those in the

2003–2007 CBA, was enforceable as a result of the

2003–2007 CBA’s evergreen clause. InSync responded by

filing a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, for summary

judgment, on grounds that the NLRA preempted IATSE’s

action and that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

The district court rejected IATSE’s position that the

2008–2012 CBA “binds the parties,” reasoning that such a

position “apparently read out the portion of the Evergreen

Clause that states that the [2003–2007] CBA would continue

in effect ‘from year to year’ after its expiration, not in block

chunks of four-year periods.” Instead, the court considered

the text of the 2003–2007 CBA and declined to “reach the

merits of [InSync’s] argument [that InSync had cancelled the

2003–2007 CBA’s evergreen clause].” The court took no

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 7

position on the merits of InSync’s argument and “decide[d]

that because [the] argument requires interpretation of the

[2003–2007] CBA and a determination of whether it was

cancelled, the argument is better left for an arbitrator to

decide pursuant to the arbitration clause and [IATSE]’s

grievance process.” The court granted IATSE’s petition to

compel arbitration, denied InSync’s motion, and ordered “that

this case shall be STAYED pending the completion of

arbitration.”

II. Jurisdiction

A.

We turn first to whether we have jurisdiction to entertain

InSync’s appeal. IATSE argues that appellate jurisdiction

does not exist because the district court’s order compelling

arbitration and staying the case did not constitute a final order

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As we explain below, we conclude

that we have jurisdiction and that we may address the merits

of InSync’s appeal.

“Federal courts ‘have only the power that is authorized by

Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by

Congress pursuant thereto.’” Couch v. Telescope Inc.,

611 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bender v.

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). 

Generally, this court “ha[s] jurisdiction of appeals from all

final decisions of the district courts of the United States[.]” 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Appeal gives the upper court a power of

review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter

remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no

intrusion by appeal.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).

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8 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

Under Goodall-Sanford v. United Textile Workers of

America, A.F.L. Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550 (1957), we have

jurisdiction over InSync’s appeal of the order compelling

arbitration. In Goodall-Sanford, a union brought a suit in

federal district court under § 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),

and sought to “compel specific performance of a grievance

arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement.” 

Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. at 550–51. The union sought no

other relief. See id. The district court ordered arbitration,

and on appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 551. 

Subsequently, the Supreme Court also affirmed. Id. In

affirming, the Court held that appellate jurisdiction existed,

explaining that “[a]rbitration [wa]s not merely a step in

judicial enforcement of a claim nor auxiliary to a main

proceeding, but the full relief sought.” Id. “A decree under

§ 301(a) ordering enforcement of an arbitration provision in

a collective bargaining agreement is, therefore, a ‘final

decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Id. at

551–52.

We have held that Goodall-Sanford permits review of

appeals from orders compelling arbitration as the “full relief

sought” in § 301 cases. See United Food & Commercial

Workers Union, Locals 197, 373, 428, 588, 775, 839, 870,

1119, 1179 & 1532 v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1373

& n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Goodall-Sanford and stating:

“Because the district court’s granting of a petition to compel

arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is a final

decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . we have jurisdiction

over this appeal”); see also Abernathy v. S. Cal. Edison,

885 F.2d 525, 528 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the

immediate appealability of orders compelling arbitration

under Goodall-Sanford “is inconsistent with the policies

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 9

underlying the arbitration process[,]” but explaining that

“until the Supreme Court or Congress acts, the final judgment

cases require such an outcome”).1

Here, the district court reviewed the relevant evergreen

and arbitration provisions, determined that interpretation of

the evergreen clause in the 2003–2007 CBA should be

decided by an arbitrator, and entered an order compelling

arbitration. Notably, the only claim that IATSE alleged in its

petition was that it was entitled to enforcement of the

grievance and arbitration procedure in the 2008–2012 CBA

(with terms identical to those in the 2003–2007 CBA). Thus,

in ordering arbitration, the district court granted the full relief

IATSE sought, see Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. at 551–52, and

thereby terminated the litigation. As part of the order, the

court “stayed” the case pending arbitration, but the court did

not explain why it ordered the stay nor specify on what basis

it did so. The entry of the stay, in these circumstances, had

no legal or practical effect. Thus, under Goodall-Sanford, we

have jurisdiction over InSync’s appeal of the order

compelling arbitration.

B.

IATSE also invoked theFederal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),

9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., as a statutory basis for its petition to

compel arbitration. IATSE argues that the FAA applies to the

parties’ collective bargaining agreement and precludes

appellate jurisdiction because the district court “stayed” this

1 Other circuits confronted with similar facts have reached the same

conclusion. See, e.g., Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union (AFLCIO), Local 5-857, Labor Orgs. v. Conoco, Inc., 241 F.3d 1299, 1302

(10th Cir. 2001) (citing cases from the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits).

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10 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

case pending arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 16(b)(1).2 Under

the FAA, generally, “an appeal may not be taken from an

interlocutory order—(1) granting a stay of any action under

section 3 of this title; . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1). And under

9 U.S.C. § 3, the district court in any proceeding where an

issue is referable to arbitration under a written agreement

“shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the

action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with

the terms of the agreement . . . .”

We need not decide, however, whether the FAA applies

in this case because we have jurisdiction to review the order

compelling arbitration whether we apply the FAA, or the

LMRA as interpreted by Goodall-Sanford.

3 Even reviewing

2 The district court did not specify under what authority it issued the

stay. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 3 (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any

of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration

under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court . . . shall on

application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action . . . .”) with

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (noting that “the power to

stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time

and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”).

3 The Tenth Circuit recently held that the FAA could apply to an

arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. See Int’l Bhd. of

Elec. Workers, Local # 111 v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 773 F.3d 1100,

1105–07 (10th Cir. 2014). Cf. Matthews v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt.

Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1115 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (assuming “[f]or

purposes of . . . discussion” that the FAA would apply “to arbitration of

collective bargaining agreements”); PowerAgent Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys.

Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Circuit City [Stores, Inc.

v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001),] did not address a CBA, and we have not

considered . . . its application to such agreements.”).

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 11

this case (and the district court’s stay) as strictly a § 301 case,

we properly could look to the FAA for guidance. See United

Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.

29, 41 n.9 (1987) (“[F]ederal courts have often looked to the

[FAA] for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in

the wake of the holding that § 301 . . . empowers the federal

courts to fashion rules of federal common law . . . .”).

Whether we apply the FAA or look to it for guidance, we

would reach the same result as applying the LMRA and

Goodall-Sanford because the petition to compel arbitration

was the only matter before the district court. See Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3), an “appeal may be taken from . . .

a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to

this title.”

The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase, “final decision

with respect to an arbitration,” in Green Tree Financial

Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86–87 (2000). 

“[T]he term ‘final decision’ in § 16(a)(3) has the longstanding

meaning of a decision that ‘ends the litigation on the merits

and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the

judgment.’” Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d

1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at

86). In Green Tree, a plaintiff initially had alleged statutory

claims against a lender, after which the lender brought a

motion to compel arbitration as provided in the parties’

written agreement and to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims with

prejudice. 531 U.S. at 83–84. Until that point, the federal

courts had distinguished “independent” proceedings (when “a

request to order arbitration is the sole issue before the court”)

from “embedded” proceedings (“actions involving both a

request for arbitration and other claims for relief”) to

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12 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

determine whether a “final decision” arose under § 16(a)(3). 

Id. at 87. The Supreme Court rejected this distinction as one

at odds with the plain text in § 16(a)(3). See id. at 88–89. 

Green Tree ultimately held that “where . . . the District Court

has ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, and

dismissed all the claims before it, that decision is ‘final’

within the meaning of § 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable.” 

Id. at 89. Separately, in a footnote, the Court noted a

distinction not at issue in Green Tree: “Had the District Court

entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order

would not be appealable.” Id. at 87 n.2 (citing 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(b)(1)).

When the only matter before a district court is a petition

to compel arbitration and the district court grants the petition,

appellate jurisdiction may attach regardless of whether the

district court issues a stay. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1302. The

limitation on appellate jurisdiction noted in Green Tree’s

footnote 2 does not apply here because in Green Tree, the

lender moved to compel arbitration where the plaintiff had

alleged substantive claims for relief in her complaint. See

Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83. Before the Supreme Court

decided Green Tree, we had held that: “if the motion to

compel arbitration in a given case is the only claim before the

district court, a decision to compel arbitration is deemed to

dispose of the entire case, and permit appellate review under

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).” Lai, 42 F.3d at 1302.4 Green Tree does

4

See also Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,

347 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Yet we have suggested . . . that if all

the judge is retaining jurisdiction for is to allow the arbitrator’s award to

be confirmed without need for the filing of a separate lawsuit, the order to

arbitrate is final (final enough might be the better way to put it) and

therefore immediately appealable.”); 3M Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d

1193, 1197–98 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing approvingly to Lai, and concluding

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 13

not disturb our holding in Lai, and it remains good law today. 

See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1105

(9th Cir. 2003); Interactive Flight Techs., Inc. v. Swissair

Swiss Air Transp. Co., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001).5

C.

In sum, following case law under the LMRA or FAA

leads to the same result: a district court presented with a

petition to compel arbitration and no other claims cannot

prevent appellate review of an order compelling arbitration by

issuing a stay. Thus, the order compelling arbitration in this

case is a final decision over which we have jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Because the district court’s order compelling arbitration

is final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have

jurisdiction over this appeal, and we need not address

InSync’s alternative theories for jurisdiction under Moses H.

that “when a motion to compel arbitration and a motion for a stay are

brought [in separate district courts in different circuits], they should be

treated individually and the resulting order compelling arbitration is final

and appealable”).

5 Similarly, in Dees v. Billy, 394 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2005), we

distinguished a Fifth Circuit case by explaining: “While the plaintiff in

[the Fifth Circuit case] sought only to obtain an order compelling

arbitration, Dees initiated this suit to recover damages for medical

malpractice, and that claim—although currently stayed—remains before

the trial court.” Id. at 1293 (citing Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr,

294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002)). Although Dees “h[eld] that a district court

order staying judicial proceedings and compelling arbitration is not

appealable even if accompanied by an administrative closing,” id. at 1294,

it distinguished a case that solely involved a claim to compel arbitration

in a district court, id. at 1292. That distinction is consistent with Lai.

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14 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,

460 U.S. 1 (1983), or the collateral order doctrine.6

III. Order Compelling Arbitration

A.

Having determined that we may exercise jurisdiction over

this appeal, we turn to the merits. We review de novo the

district court’s order compelling arbitration. Bushley,

360 F.3d at 1152.

We begin by recognizing some established principles

regarding arbitration of disputes under a collective bargaining

agreement. First, “‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a

party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute

which he has not agreed so to submit.’” AT & T Techs., Inc.

v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)

(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.

 

6

 Separately, InSync argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction in

this case because IATSE alleged claims within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the National Labor Relations Board. We disagree. “Claims brought

under Section 301(a) of the LMRA may be heard in federal court even if

they allege conduct that is arguably an unfair labor practice.” Int’l Bhd.

of Teamsters, Office Food & Warehouse Local 952 v. Am. Delivery Serv.

Co., 50 F.3d 770, 773–74 (9th Cir. 1995). “Section 301(a) of the LMRA

‘carves out a broad exception to the [National Labor Relations Board]’s

primary jurisdiction for claims arising out of collective bargaining

agreements, whether or not such claims would also be an unfair labor

practice . . . .’” Id. at 774 (citation omitted). IATSE claimed that InSync

violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and invoked § 301

of the LMRA as authority for the petition to compel arbitration under the

agreement. The district court had jurisdiction over that proceeding. See

LAWI/CSA Consolidators, Inc. v. Wholesale & Retail Food Distribution,

Teamsters Local 63, 849 F.2d 1236, 1238 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988).

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 15

Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v.

NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 200–01 (1991). And “except where ‘the

parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,’ it is ‘the

court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine

whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances

concerning’ a particular matter.” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301 (2010) (citation

omitted) (quoting AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649, 651). 

Further,

where the contract contains an arbitration

clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability

in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate the

particular grievance should not be denied

unless it may be said with positive assurance

that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of

an interpretation that covers the asserted

dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor

of coverage.”

AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf,

363 U.S. at 582–83).

Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local

No. 70 v. Interstate Distributor Co., 832 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.

1987), governs our approach to InSync’s appeal. Interstate

Distributor explained how to approach a case in which the

parties to a collective bargaining agreement disagree about

“the proper meaning or interpretation of [a] termination

clause[ in their agreement,]” and whether an arbitrator

“should decide that question[.]” Id. at 510. There, the parties

“agree[d] that they entered into an agreement containing an

arbitration clause,” did not dispute “the scope of the

arbitration clause,” and “point[ed] to no language purporting

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16 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

to exclude termination disputes from the scope of the

arbitration clause, nor to any ambiguity or uncertainty in that

clause.” Id. at 510–11. Interstate Distributor held “that

where a dispute exists over whether a contract with an

arbitration clause has expired or been terminated, the proper

initial inquiry for the court is whether the arbitration clause

covers such disputes, not whether the termination clause

means what [either party] says it means.” Id. at 511. In such 

a case, “the real question [about the termination clause’s

meaning or interpretation] is one step removed from the

issue of substantive arbitrability discussed in AT & T

Technologies.” Id. at 510.

Here, Article 26 of the 2003–2007 CBA sets out the term

of the agreement and includes the evergreen clause,

providing, in part, that the 2003–2007 CBA “shall continue

in full force and effect to and including December 31st, 2007

and from year to year thereafter.” (emphasis added). 

IATSE’s claims that InSync violated provisions of the

2003–2007 CBA require interpretation of the evergreen

clause to determine whether the CBA was enforceable

between the parties. And InSync does not argue that, under

the 2003–2007 CBA, interpreting the evergreen clause falls

outside the scope of the arbitration provision. See Interstate

Distrib., 832 F.2d at 510–11. Thus, this case is analogous to

Interstate Distributor.

B.

The 2003–2007 CBA arbitration provision is similar in

scope to the arbitration agreements in Interstate Distributor

and Camping Construction Co. v. District Council of Iron

Workers, 915 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the

provision covers a dispute between IATSE and InSync—

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 17

whether the CBA has expired or been terminated—that must

be decided before addressing the parties’ underlying dispute. 

See Interstate Distrib., 832 F.2d at 511; Camping, 915 F.2d

at 1338.

Camping applied InterstateDistributor’s rule that “‘when

the collective bargaining agreement contains a customary

arbitration clause acts of repudiation and other acts of

termination must be submitted to arbitration.’” Camping,

915 F.2d at 1338 (quoting Interstate Distrib., 832 F.2d at 511

n.4). Camping guides our determination of whether the

2003–2007 CBA arbitration provision was “of the type

referred to in Interstate Distributor.” Id. If the provision is

similar in scope to that of Interstate Distributor, then “the

dispute is arbitrable, and the arbitrator rather than the court

must examine the facts, construe the termination provision of

the contract, and decide whether the contract has in fact been

terminated.” Id.

The 2003–2007 CBA arbitration provision’s text is

similar in scope to that of Interstate Distributor and Camping. 

In Camping, we explained that “an agreement to arbitrate

‘any differences that may arise regarding the meaning and

enforcement of this Agreement,’ or anyother broad arbitration

clause, such as ‘any dispute arising out of this Agreement,’

ordinarily requires us to hold that the parties have provided

for arbitration of disputes regarding termination[.]” Id. at

1338–39 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also

McKinney v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 954 F.2d 590, 593 (9th

Cir. 1992) (applying Interstate Distrib. and Camping to an

agreement covering “[a]ny grievance or controversyaffecting

the mutual relations of the Employer and the Union” and

holding that a dispute over whether a labor contract continued

to exist after merger was subject to arbitration). And here,

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18 IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS

the 2003–2007 CBA arbitration provision applies to “a claim

or allegation by an employee in the bargaining unit or by the

Union that the Employer has violated or is violating the

provisions of th[e] Agreement.” “The arbitrator’s award shall

be based solely upon his interpretation of the meaning or

application of the provisions of this Agreement.” The

arbitration provision does not except any particular type of

claim or allegation. See Interstate Distrib., 832 F.2d at

510–11.

Further,Camping explained that the Interstate Distributor

rule “applies whether the dispute between the parties is solely

over termination or repudiation, or whether, as [in Camping],

their disagreement over that question is a threshold issue that

must be resolved before the underlying dispute can be

reached.” Camping, 915 F.2d at 1338. And claims or

allegations, like IATSE’s here, that InSync violated

provisions of the 2003–2007 CBA require, as “a threshold”

determination, the interpretation of the CBA’s Article 26 to

determine whether the CBA was enforceable between the

parties. See id. Thus, the parties’ dispute falls within the

scope of the 2003–2007 CBA arbitration provision and is

subject to arbitration.7

7 Because the scope of the arbitration provision broadly covers claims

or allegations of employer violations of the agreement, this case is not one

in which the arbitration provision’s scope is too narrow to “‘clearly and

unmistakably’ leave questions of arbitrability for determination by the

arbitrator,” LAWI/CSA Consolidators, 849 F.2d at 1239 (quoting AT & T

Techs., 475 U.S. at 649). Nor is it one in which an arbitration provision

limits “arbitrable disputes to those involving ‘application of’ the [parties’

agreement],” and in which resolving a dispute “does not require the

interpretation or construction, i.e., ‘application’, of any substantive

provisions of the [parties’ agreement],” N. Cal. Newspaper Guild Local

52 v. Sacramento Union, 856 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988).

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 19

InSync’s argument that Litton, 501 U.S. 190, compels

reversal is unavailing. Indeed, that case is inapposite. Litton

involved “whether a dispute over layoffs which occurred well

after expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement must be

said to arise under the agreement despite its expiration.” Id.

at 193 (emphases added). There, the parties did not dispute

that the agreement had expired. See id. at 193, 200–01. In

fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “a collectivebargaining agreement might be drafted so as to eliminate any

hiatus between expiration of the old and execution of the new

agreement, or to remain in effect until the parties bargain to

impasse.” Id. at 201 (footnote omitted). Litton is

inapplicable when the parties dispute the effect of an

evergreen clause in their collective bargaining agreement on

the issue of whether the agreement has expired or been

terminated. Whether the 2003–2007 CBA has expired or

been terminated, therefore, is for an arbitrator, not the court,

to decide.8

In effect, what InSync urges this court to decide—

whether the 2003–2007 CBA had expired when IATSE

sought to invoke the grievance and arbitration procedure—is

for an arbitrator. In attempting to distinguish Interstate

8

InSync also argues that IATSE “repudiated the 2003–2007 CBA” in

proceedings before the district court and should be “estopped from

asserting that [the 2003–2007 CBA] is still in effect . . . .” But InSync did

not raise this estoppel issue before the district court. And the

circumstances do not justify exercising our discretion to address it for the

first time on appeal as an issue of law. See A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v.

Cnty. of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333, 338–39 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on

denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (July 31, 1996); Local Union No. 370

of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 786 F.2d

1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Thus, InSync has waived this

issue and we decline to address it.

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Distributor and Camping, InSync argues that the 2003–2007

CBA had expired and that the parties reached impasse in

“attempting to negotiate the terms of a successor agreement.” 

But “once it is found that a contract did exist at some time,

the questions of whether that contract has expired, or has

been terminated or repudiated, may well present arbitrable

issues, depending on the language of the agreed-upon

arbitration clause.” Camping, 915 F.2d at 1340.9 Article 26

of the 2003–2007 CBA contains an evergreen clause. Given

the scope of the arbitration provision and the nature of the

parties’ dispute, as previously discussed, the arbitrator and

not the district court must consider IATSE and InSync’s

competing interpretations of the evergreen clause and decide

whether the 2003–2007 CBA expired or was terminated. We

therefore affirm the district court’s order compelling

arbitration.10

9 Because this appeal involves the parties’ dispute relating to expiration

or termination of their CBA, cases involving contract formation and

disputes regarding the scope of an arbitration provision are distinct. See

Camping, 915 F.2d at 1340; see also Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 299

(“[O]ur precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute

only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’

arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically

committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or

applicability to the dispute is in issue.”); Unite Here Local 217 v. Sage

Hospitality Res., 642 F.3d 255, 262 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011) (distinguishing

disputes involving the arbitrability of contract duration from those

involving contract formation, and arbitration clause language of “aris[ing]

under [a contract]” from language of “dispute[s] over [a contract’s]

interpretation or application”).

10 InSync argues that IATSE’s claim was untimely under 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(b). This argument is without merit. IATSE filed its petition within

six months of InSync communicating “an unequivocal, express rejection”

of IATSE’s request for arbitration. See Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las

Vegas, Bartenders Union Local 165, Culinary Workers’ Local Union No.

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IATSE V. INSYNC SHOW PRODUCTIONS 21

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we exercise jurisdiction

over the district court’s order granting IATSE’s motion to

compel arbitration, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

226 v. Exber, Inc., 994 F.2d 674, 675–76 (9th Cir. 1993); Teamster Union

Local 315 v. Great Western Chemical Co., 781 F.2d 764, 769 (9th

Cir.1986). Alternatively, InSync argues in its reply brief that IATSE’s

grievance was filed outside the time limit specified in the 2003–2007CBA

and, therefore, is contractually time-barred. Because InSync failed to raise

this issue until its reply brief and “[t]he issue has not been fully explored,”

Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990), InSync has

waived the issue and we decline to address it.

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