Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01030/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

VICKIE L. BARNETTE, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-cv-1030-MEF

 ) (WO)

DOLLAR TREE STORES, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Vickie and Earl Barnette bring this action for injuries relating to Vickie

Barnette’s slip and fall accident at a Dollar Tree store in Eufaula, Alabama. Plaintiffs, both

citizens of Alabama, filed their complaint in the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama

on October 19, 2006. Plaintiffs asserted various state law claims against Defendants Dollar

Tree Stores, Inc. (“Dollar Tree”), Eugene Hamric (“Hamric”), Logan Germann, and Jerry

Germann. Asserting that the Hamric was fraudulently joined, Dollar Tree and Hamric

removed the case solely on the basis of diversity of the citizenship of the parties. Logan and

Jerry Germann consented to the removal. This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’

Motion to Remand (Doc. # 4) filed on December 5, 2006. Having thoroughly considered the

motion, as well as all other relevant submissions, the Court concludes that the motion to

remand is due to be GRANTED. 

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 8, 2005, Vickie Barnette was shopping at the Dollar Tree Store in

Eufaula, Alabama. Around 4 p.m., as she was leaving the store, Vickie Barnette slipped and

fell on a handicap access ramp that led to the parking lot. The ramp was wet from recent

rainfall. Mrs. Barnette fractured her right ankle as a result of the fall. At the time of the

accident, Hamric, the store manager, had left for the day and put an assistant manager in

charge. Hamric began working at the store on July 18, 2005 and had been the store manager

since August 18, 2005.

Dollar Tree had been sued in the past for an accident occurring on the same handicap

ramp. In a lawsuit filed in September 2003 in state court, a plaintiff alleged that her

wheelchair overturned on the handicap access ramp at the store. That case settled out of

court on July 21, 2005, three days after Hamric began working at the store. The Defendants

contend that Hamric was never made aware of the lawsuit and thus had no knowledge of any

dangerous condition. 

III. DISCUSSION

A civil case filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if

the case could have been brought in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). Federal

courts have diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000 and there is complete diversity of the parties, meaning that every plaintiff’s

state of residency is diverse from every defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §1332; Tapscott v. MS

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Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds, 204

F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Additionally, cases such as this one that do not, on their face, have complete diversity

of parties may nevertheless be removed to federal court if the defendant can demonstrate that

the non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154

F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).

Joinder may be deemed fraudulent in three situations: (1) “when there is no possibility

that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse) defendant,”

(2) “when there is outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts,” or (3)

“where a diverse defendant is joined with a non[-]diverse defendant as to whom there is no

joint, several or alternative liability and where the claim against the diverse defendant has no

real connection to the claim against the non[-]diverse defendant.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287.

The burden of proving fraudulent joinder rests with Dollar Tree and Hamric because

they are the removing parties. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).

A claim of fraudulent joinder must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Parks

v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).

 In evaluating whether there has been fraudulent joinder, all allegations and submissions must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. In fact,

“the district court should resolve all questions of fact and controlling law in favor of the

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It is important to note that the Court should determine its jurisdiction over the case 1

“based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal,” Coker, 709 F.2d 1433, 1440

(11 Cir. 1983), supplemented by any affidavits or deposition transcripts filed by the parties. th

“While ‘the proceeding appropriate for resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is similar to

that used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b),’ the

jurisdictional inquiry ‘must not subsume substantive determination’. . . When considering

a motion for remand, federal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff’s claim beyond

determining whether it is an arguable one under state law.” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d

1536, 1538 (11 Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). th

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plaintiff. . . .” Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989).

This burden on the defendant is a heavy one. It requires the court to evaluate the

parties’ factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all

uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff. See id. If there is a

possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any

one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder is proper and remand

the case to the state court. See Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11 Cir.

th

1983). In other words, a motion to remand should be denied only if the court is convinced 1

that there is “no possibility that the plaintiff can establish any cause of action against the

resident defendant.” See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553,1561 (11 Cir.

th

1989). 

Defendants assert only the first type of fraudulent joinder. Specifically, they argue

that there is no possibility that Plaintiffs can establish a cause of action against Hamric. The

Court has carefully reviewed the claims against Hamric and the arguments of the parties, and

it must conclude that in this case there is a possibility that the Plaintiffs can establish at least

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one of their causes of action against Hamric. Accordingly, this Court must find that the

joinder is proper and remand the case to the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama. 

IV. CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 4) is GRANTED.

(2) This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama.

(3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.

DONE this the 16 day of May, 2007 th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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