Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01557/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01557-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BARRY ESTEP,

Petitioner, No. 2:07-cv-01557-NRS

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden, ORDER

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Estep raises two claims. For the

reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s claims are DENIED.

STATEMENT

Because the parties are familiar with the factual background as well as the

state procedural background of this case, this court highlights here only the events

giving rise to the current federal action. 

Estep appeared before the Board of Parole Terms (“BPT”) on June 24, 2005. 

At the hearing, Estep was questioned regarding the pre-commitment factors

affecting his possible parole, his parole plans, and the post-commitment factors

affecting his possible parole. During this questioning, Estep was allowed to

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answer the questions and present his arguments as to the proper inferences and

conclusions that should be drawn from each of these areas of questioning. Much

of the discussion centered around Estep’s history of problems with anger

management. 

Estep’s claims center around the legality of his removal from the hearing,

and the legality of the determination. Estep was removed during the time for

closing statements. Preceding his removal, the following exchange took place:

Presiding Commissioner Angele: All right, closing please Mr.

Gonzalez. [Attorney from the District Attorney’s Office in

Sacramento]

Inmate Estep: Can I get a chance to say something here?

Presiding Commissioner Angele: What do you want to say?

Inmate Estep: Ok, on and for the record I John Estep, do not

consent to contract with you but freedom of contract is a declaration

that.

Presiding Commissioner Angele: Mr. Estep, Mr. Estep,

remove the inmate.

Inmate Estep: You denied me my right, you denied me my

judicial right. You are denying my rights, this is not legal concept.

Attorney Mondorf [Attorney for Estep]: Excuse me officer.

Presiding Commissioner Angele: (indiscernible)

Deputy Commissioner Nielsen: Anger management.

Presiding Commissioner Angele: Well it is obvious that the

inmate needs to get involved in some rage control or anger

management. But regardless (indiscernible) Mr. Mondorf, I don’t

accept any sort of disrespecting of the chair by the inmate and he was

clearly out of control. Closing please Mr. Gonzalez.

Estep describes his behavior during that exchange as an act of civil defiance. 

Estep’s attorney did not object to Estep’s removal.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 5, 2007. The

state concedes that Estep exhausted his state judicial remedies as to these claims. 

The Superior Court for the County of Sacramento denied Estep’s state petition on

the grounds that Estep was not able to state a prima facie case for relief. Both the

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California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court denied Estep’s

petition in one sentence denials.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with respect to

a state prisoner’s claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–13 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;”

or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75–76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that

individuals are constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887

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(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept

all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516

U.S. 99 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally,

even if this court finds a constitutional violation, such a violation does not warrant

habeas relief unless the violation in question “had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637–38 (1993). 

Moreover, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the court to

make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court

must dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that

the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases;

see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on two grounds: (1) the BPT violated Estep’s

right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not permit

him “to speak on his behalf” at the parole consideration hearing; and (2) the BPT

violated Estep’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it

“breached the initial, original, sentencing contract with Prisoner Estep.”

1. Estep’s Right to Speak on His Own Behalf of that Hearing

The Superior Court denied this claim on two grounds: (a) because Estep had

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not provided a complete transcript of the BPT proceeding, it could not determine

whether his removal was justified; and (b) even if his removal was not justified, he

was not prejudiced, because he could not show that, even if he had been allowed to

continue in his statement, the BPT would have been more likely to grant parole or

deny parole for a shorter period than five years.

A parole board’s procedures must “afford[] an opportunity to be heard, and

when parole is denied . . . inform[] the inmate in what respects he falls short of

qualifying for parole. The Constitution does not require more.” Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979). Estep

argues that he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard. Estep does not set out

or define the boundaries or nature of his constitutional right to be heard. However,

the Superior Court made its holding on the merits in its prejudice determination. 

Therefore, Estep must demonstrate that the Superior Court’s finding of lack of

prejudice was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or was an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the proceeding. 

Estep has not offered any clearly established law prohibiting the Superior

Court from finding that there was no prejudice even if he was improperly removed. 

Further, Estep has not presented facts showing that the Superior Court’s

determination was unreasonable. A reading of the BPT proceeding transcript

reveals that Estep was given ample time to answer questions, was treated with

respect, and was removed only after he disrupted the proceedings with a seemingly

irrelevant speech.

Therefore, Estep’s claim that the BPT’s actions deprived him of his right to

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is denied.

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2. Sentencing Contract

“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific

facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(citing Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970)). It is not entirely

clear what Petitioner is alleging in the second ground of his habeas petition. 

Petitioner argues that the BPT “has breached the initial, original, sentencing

contract with Prisoner Estep.” Memo of Points and Authorities in Support of

Habeas Relief at 5. Because this court is unable to identify a cognizable claim for

federal habeas relief, it must deny this claim.

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s habeas

petition is DENIED. Petitioner’s first claim is denied with prejudice. Petitioner’s

second claim is denied without prejudice.

DATED: January 6, 2010

 

Honorable N. Randy Smith

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge

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