Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01569/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELDON LEE BURROWS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01569 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 12]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by Brian 

G. Smiley, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a February 3, 1988 jury verdict of the Superior Court of California, County of 

Fresno, of two counts of first degree murder and a count of attempted robbery. (See

Lodged Doc. 1.) On March 11, 1988, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state 

prison term of fifty years and four months to life. (Id.) 

On December 8, 1989, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

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affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 3.) Review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on July 16, 1987. (Lodged Doc. 2.) It is unclear how review by the California 

Supreme Court was completed prior to the appellate court decision, however, the 

records relating to the petition for review have been destroyed.

Twenty-four years later, Petitioner filed three petitions for relief in state court in the 

form of petitions for writ of habeas corpus. (Lodged Docs. 4-9.) The first petition was filed 

in July 2014 and the last petition was denied in February, 2015. (Id.) 

On October 11, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in this Court.1 On December 18, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to 

Dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12.) Petitioner did not file objections to 

the motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 101 L. Ed. 2d 

245 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. While the Court received the petition on October 15, 2015, the Court shall consider 

the petition filed on October 11, 2015, the date Petitioner signed the petition. 

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Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on October 11, 2015 and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

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recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the 

statute was enacted on April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S. 

Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). For state prisoners, like this one, whose convictions 

became final prior to AEDPA's enactment, the one-year statute of limitations began to 

run on April 25, 1996, the day after AEDPA became law. See Malcom v. Payne, 281 

F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, unless he can show he is entitled to tolling of 

the limitations period, Petitioner had until April 24, 1997, in which to file a timely petition 

under AEDPA. Id.

Petitioner delayed in filing the instant petition until October 2015, over eighteen 

years after the statute of limitations period expired. Absent the later commencement of 

the statute of limitations or any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the 

statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

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Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

The limitations period commenced on April 25, 1996, the day after AEDPA 

became law and expired one year thereafter on April 24, 1997. Petitioner did not file any 

state post-conviction applications until 2014. Petitions filed after the expiration of the 

statute of limitations period have no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 

(9th Cir. 2003) ("section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period 

that has ended before the state petition was filed."). 

The present petition was filed on October 11, 2015, over eighteen years after the 

expiration of the year statute of limitations period. The instant federal petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Petitioner has presented no evidence that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently or that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Petitioner is not 

entitled to equitable tolling.

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for habeas corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is not 

entitled to the benefit of statutory or equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, this Court 

recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to 

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's 

order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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