Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02365/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02365-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Anti-trust

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John R. Quain, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Capstar d/b/a Clear Channel

Communications, Inc.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-2365-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff owns Silk Purse Records and is the leader of the musical group Citizen

Quain. He has been unable to get his music played on a local radio station. He filed

suit against Defendants on November 12, 2009. Doc. 1. The second amended complaint

asserts breach of contract, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment claims. Doc. 33. On

November 18, 2010, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 35) and the

Clerk entered judgment accordingly. Docs. 40, 41.

Defendants have filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$39,047.50. Doc. 42. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 47-52. No party has requested oral

argument. For reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part and award

Defendants attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,317.50.

Defendants seek a fee award pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Subsection (A) of that

statute provides that “[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied,

the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” Subsection (C) requires

a fee award “upon clear and convincing evidence that the claim or defense constitutes

Case 2:09-cv-02365-DGC Document 55 Filed 12/29/10 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

harassment, is groundless and is not made in good faith.”

With respect to subsection (C), the Court cannot find by clear and convincing

evidence that Plaintiff’s claims constitute harassment. Defendants, however, clearly are

entitled to a fee award under subsection (A) of the statute. It is well-settled that a defendant

“‘is entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees under § 12-341.01 if the plaintiff is not entitled

to recover on the contract on which the action is based, or if the court finds that the contract

on which the action is based does not exist.’” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Schirmer, 11 F.3d

1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Berthot v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Ariz., 823 P.2d 1326, 1332

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)). Count one of the second amended complaint specifically asserts a

breach of contract claim based on Plaintiff’s alleged third-party beneficiary status to a

consent decree between Defendants and the FCC. Doc. 33 ¶¶ 15-21. The related

misrepresentation and unjust enrichment claims arise directly from Defendants’ alleged

refusal to comply with terms of the consent decree. Id. ¶¶ 22-33. Although the Court

ultimately determined that there is no contractual privity between Plaintiff and Defendants

(Doc. 40 at 2-3), this action arose “out of a contract” for purposes of § 12-341.01(A). See

Chevron, 11 F.3d at 1480 (defendant entitled to a fee award where the complaint alleged the

existence of contracts); Berthot, 823 P.2d at 1332 (affirming fee award where the trial court

“impliedly found that there was no contract between the parties”). Defendants, as successful

parties, are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees under § 12-341.01(A). 

The Court is familiar with the facts of this case and the manner in which it was

litigated. Having reviewed Defendants’ supporting memorandum (Doc. 42) and counsel’s

declaration and statement of fees (Doc. 42-1), and having considered the record as a whole,

Plaintiff’s pro se status, and the relevant fee award factors, see Associated Indemnity Corp.

v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985), the Court finds a fee award in the amount of

$15,317.50 to be reasonable and appropriate. See also LRCiv 54.2(c)(3)(A)-(M) (listing

factors bearing on the reasonableness of a fee award); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

429-30 & n.3 (1983) (same). This amount represents the fees Defendants incurred after

Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on May 14,

Case 2:09-cv-02365-DGC Document 55 Filed 12/29/10 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

2010. Doc. 27. Defendants’ motion to dismiss made clear that Plaintiff is not a party to the

consent decree, that he has no right, contractual or otherwise, to enforce its terms, and that

Defendants have no obligation to play or promote Plaintiff’s music. Doc. 25. Because the

pro se Plaintiff likely was not aware of the shortcomings of his claim before the motion was

filed, the Court will not award fees incurred before that time. After the motion identified the

clear flaws in Plaintiff’s legal theory, however, he continued to litigate, forcing Defendants

to incur fees defeating his claim. The Court concludes that those fees should be recovered

under the Arizona statute.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 42) is granted in part.

2. Defendants are awarded $15,317.50 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. §

12-341.01(A).

3. Defendants’ motion to strike sur-reply (Doc. 53) is denied as moot.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02365-DGC Document 55 Filed 12/29/10 Page 3 of 3