Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00955/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00955-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROGER GIFFORD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROBERT PUCKETT, SR., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-0955 TLN AC (PS) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis. This proceeding was 

referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21).

 On May 26, 2016, the court dismissed plaintiff’s original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

(“Rule”) 8, and granted plaintiff leave to amend. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 5. The FAC is nearly identical to the original complaint. It 

contains the same 84 pages of allegations, although it corrects a paragraph numbering error in the 

original complaint, omits the 40 pages of exhibits and includes a table of contents. See ECF 

No. 5. The court accordingly dismissed the FAC for the reasons set forth in the original dismissal 

order. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff was again granted leave to amend, and was ordered to limit his 

amended complaint to 25 pages. Id. 

 Plaintiff has declined to amend his complaint. Plaintiff has instead filed an “Objection,” 

in which he has chosen to stand on the FAC as filed, and argues that his complaint satisfies 

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Rule 8. ECF No. 7; see Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (where 

“plaintiff makes an affirmative choice not to amend, and clearly communicates that choice to the 

court, there has been no disobedience to a court’s order to amend; as Yourish [v. California 

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)] itself noted, the plaintiff has the right to stand on 

the pleading”) (emphasis in text). Plaintiff’s arguments in favor of his FAC are addressed below.1

 1. Harrell v. Hornbrook Community Services District 

 Plaintiff points out that in Harrell v. Hornbrook Community Services District, 2:14-cv1595 KJM GGH, ECF No. 64 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2016), the magistrate judge ordered defendants 

to answer the 164-page complaint filed by plaintiff Peter T. Harrell. However, plaintiff omits the 

critical fact that Harrell’s original complaint was 27 pages long, not 164. Harrell, supra, ECF 

No. 1. It was that 27-page complaint that was screened, and on the basis of the screening, 

summons was issued. Harrell, supra, ECF No. 3. By the time the Harrell complaint had exploded 

to 164 pages, the screening stage was over. At that point, the court simply ordered defendants – 

who had already been brought into the case, and who had filed dismissal motions – to respond to 

the complaint, rather than, on its own, dive into the 164 pages to determine whether it should be 

dismissed sua sponte. 

 In contrast, Gifford’s complaint here is still in the screening stage. The question before 

this court is whether defendants should even be required to respond to the complaint under the 

screening procedure mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint fails to comply with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, defendants will not be required to respond. 

 In any event, the Harrell court, in ruling on the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, 

specifically criticized the exact type of “shotgun” pleading that plaintiff engages in here. 

Specifically, plaintiff here pre-loads the complaint with 48 pages of allegations (100 paragraphs, 

plus 119 footnotes), and then “realleges and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs 

above.” See, e.g., FAC at 49, text preceding ¶ 102. 

 

1

 Plaintiff previously sued HCSD in this court. See Gifford v. Hornbrook Community Services 

District, 2:15-cv-1274 MCE AC (E.D. Cal.). That case was dismissed, without leave to amend, 

on Rule 8 grounds. Id., ECF Nos. 9, 11. The case is now on appeal. See id., ECF No. 14. 

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 2. The complaint’s length 

 Plaintiff argues that the court rejected his complaint because it is “simply too long.” ECF 

No. 7 at 2. Plaintiff is correct that mere verbosity or length is not normally a basis for dismissing 

a complaint. See, e.g., Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of 81-page complaint where defendants argued only that “the 

complaint provides too much factual detail,” was reversible error). However, the Ninth Circuit 

cases instruct that a complaint may not be “of unlimited length and opacity.” United States ex rel. 

Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming 

denial of motion to file a 733-page amended complaint, and collecting cases). 

 In any event, the court did not reject the FAC simply because it was too long. Rather, it 

rejected the FAC because it fails to give “fair notice,” does not “state the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly,” is “effectively un-answerable due his [plaintiff’s] use of ‘shotgun 

pleading,’” and fails to “give the defendants a clear statement about what each defendant 

allegedly did wrong.” ECF No. 3. The extraordinary and unnecessary length and repetition of 

the FAC is a principal reason for all the failings the court noted, but it is not length alone that 

dooms the 84-page FAC. 

 Plaintiff argues that his “wordy” complaint “actually provides the Defendants with more 

notice than is required.” ECF No. 7 at 4 (emphasis in text). However, proper “notice” is given by 

complying with the Rules governing pleadings, not by applying plaintiff’s own notions of what 

“notice” means. Those rules call for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2) (emphases added). They call for each paragraph of the 

complaint to be “limited to a single set of circumstances,” where possible. Rule 10(b). The FAC 

is not a short and plain statement. In addition, most of its paragraphs are not limited to a single 

set of circumstances. Instead, paragraph after lengthy paragraph of the FAC mix facts about 

multiple claims, legal conclusions and sometimes case-law citations, and are supplemented with 

footnotes that may, or may not, include more charging allegations. 

 As an example, the court has attempted to identify the claims against the first defendant, 

Robert Puckett, Sr. (“Puckett”). According to the complaint, Puckett is the President of the Board 

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of Directors (“the Board”) of defendant Hornbrook Community Services District (“HCSD”). 

FAC at 4 ¶ 9. The paragraph which identifies Puckett as a defendant does not simply state who 

he is and what position he holds. Rather, the 19-line single-sentence paragraph goes on to make 

several different substantive allegations against Puckett. Specifically, it alleges that Puckett 

conspired with the other Board members and others to: (1) hold “illegal” Board meetings; 

(2) engage in conduct violating unspecified State laws; (3) engage in conduct violating 

unspecified HCSD bylaws; (4) retaliate against plaintiff for his complaints to unspecified 

government agencies and unspecified courts; and (5) deprive plaintiff of his right to petition the 

government. Within the same sentence, plaintiff further alleges that Puckett: (6) wrongfully 

diverted HCSD funds to other defendants; (7) waived past due accounts of certain, unspecified 

persons; (8) failed to have his water meter read; and (9) produced fraudulent official documents. 

Id. The paragraph also contains two footnotes, one of which defines what is meant by “illegal,” 

and one of which seems to include charging allegations against other defendants. Id. ¶ 9 nn.11, 

12. 

 The main portion of the paragraph also contains charging allegations against other 

defendants. Moving on through the complaint, it emerges that subsequent “identification” 

paragraphs and footnotes, although bearing the names of other defendants, also appear to contain 

charging allegations against Puckett. See, e.g. id. ¶¶ 21 n.28 (defendant Bowles), 46 (defendant 

Crittenden), 52 (defendant Kirsher), 57 n.67 (defendant Winston). 

 Accordingly, for Puckett to learn what the charges are against him, he must scour every 

identification paragraph and footnote for his name, he must then figure out if the mention is a 

charging allegation or simply background to the charges of another defendant. Puckett must then 

scour every other paragraph and every footnote of the complaint to see if he is mentioned there, 

and if those mentions are charging allegations or not. That is because only some of the “counts” 

identify which defendants are involved. 

 To his credit, plaintiff attempts to provide instructions on how to put this puzzle of a 

complaint together: 

//// 

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In making out the following “Counts” against one or more 

Defendants in the First and Second Claims for Relief, Plaintiff, in 

addition to incorporating the factual allegations found in the 

preceding generalized sections and paragraphs, hereby specifically 

incorporates those Sections corresponding to each Defendant 

named in the specific Count. That is, if a Count lists “Puckett”, 

then the reader should refer to Section II on page 4 for additional 

details of his conduct, and other factual allegations, that apply to the 

Count. If the Count lists the “HCSD”, one would refer to Section 

VI at page 8, etc. 

Id. ¶ 101. However, providing a key to unlocking this puzzle is not the same as writing a clear, 

short and plain statement of the claims. The allegations against a defendant must be clear to the 

defendant and to the court. 

 Worse, the key plaintiff provides to this puzzle would leave defendants unaware of 

allegations made against them. According to plaintiff, defendants need only “refer to the clearlylabeled section relating to them in the Complaint for the facts concerning the allegations made 

against them, and as which apply in any applicable ‘count.’” ECF No. 7 at 5. However, if 

Puckett, for example, only looked to the “clearly-labeled section” relating to him, and then turned 

to the “counts,” he would miss all the other references to him, and the possibly charging 

allegations made against him in the “clearly-labeled section[s]” relating to other defendants, the 

ones that pop up in footnotes, and those contained in introductory and “overview” sections. See, 

e.g., FAC ¶¶ 4 n.7, 19 (defendant Bowles), 21 & n.28 (same), 46 (defendant Crittenden), 52 

(defendant Kirsher), 57 n.67 (defendant Winston), 77 n.90 (“Overview”), 78 n.93 (same), 80 & 

n.98 (same), 82 n.103 (same), 90-92 (same), 97 n.116 (“Civil Conspiracy”). 

 Indeed, plaintiff appears to have buried entire claims in the footnotes. See, e.g., FAC 

¶¶ 16 n.23 (“HCSD’s water production, treatment and distribution equipment ... does not meet 

the requirements of the Act”), 20 n.26 (“Plaintiff asserts, on information and belief, that the extra 

money was a ‘payoff’ to Dingman ...”), 78 n.93 (“assignment of executive ... power to Puckett” 

and others, “would violate the provisions of the Brown Act”). 

 Plaintiff complains that it is not his fault that so many defendants have wronged him over 

such a long period of time. ECF No. 7 at 6. The fault, however, lies not in the number of 

defendants, but in plaintiff’s habit of over-long, repetitive pleading. The “Jurisdiction” section, 

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for example, spans four pages, even though jurisdiction could be alleged in one simple paragraph. 

See FAC ¶¶ 1-8. The paragraphs of the complaint that should only be identifying the parties, 

instead span 28 pages of identification, substantive allegations, footnotes, website links, statutory 

citations, and case citations. See id. ¶¶ 9-72. Moreover, many of the lengthy substantive 

allegations are repeated, nearly verbatim, for each defendant, even where they are each alleged to 

be part of the same conspiracy, engaging in the same conduct. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 9 (alleging that the 

conspirators – Board Members, and defendant Winston – held illegal meetings), 11 (same 

conspirators held the same illegal meetings), 12 (same), 13 (same).2

 3. The merits of the complaint 

 Plaintiff argues that the court should analyze the complaint on the merits rather than 

dismissing it on Rule 8 grounds. ECF No. 7 at 7-9. The problem with this argument, as it applies 

to the FAC, is that untangling this complaint would require the court to “waste[] half a day in 

chambers preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996). Even after doing so, the court could not 

be confident that its understanding of the case is the same as plaintiff’s. 

 For example, the court’s analysis of one of the First Amendment claims against Puckett is 

that Puckett conspired with others to hold “illegal” meetings on matters where public hearings 

were required. See Complaint ¶ 102. However, the only basis for plaintiff’s claim that the 

meetings are “illegal” is that they violate state law governing the conduct of public hearings. See 

Complaint ¶ 9 n.10 (“[t]hat is, the meetings were held in violation of the Brown Act and/or the 

HCSD Bylaws, and that actions taken at the meetings also violated the Brown Act, other State 

laws, and/or the HCSD Bylaws ...”). If the court’s view of the complaint is correct, then this 

portion of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim would likely be dismissed on the merits, as a 

violation of state law, by itself, does not amount to a Section 1983 claim. See Moreland v. Las 

Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1998) (“state law violations do not, on 

//// 

 

2

 Paragraphs 12 and 13 omit Winston as a co-conspirator, but this appears to be merely a 

typographical omission, as the paragraphs are referring to the same allegedly illegal meetings. 

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their own, give rise to liability under § 1983”) (citing Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. 

Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 However, the court is reluctant to decide this claim – or any of the claims in the FAC – on 

the merits. The confusing nature of the complaint, especially the sprinkling of defendants’ names 

throughout the complaint, the incorporation of unrelated allegations into plaintiff’s many 

“counts,” the burying of facts and claims in the footnotes, and the sheer volume of factual and 

conclusory allegations, leaves the court without confidence that its view of the facts underlying 

plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, or any other claim, is complete. In other words, the FAC 

forces the court and the defendants to guess at what is being alleged against whom. See 

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was 

“literally guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 

defendants”). 

 4. Issuing summons 

 Plaintiff argues that the court should issue process and have the complaint and summons 

served, regardless of problems with the complaint. He argues that defendants might choose to 

waive the defects or they might settle the case, and that the court “should not presume to act for 

the defendant.” ECF No. 7 at 10. Plaintiff further argues that issuing process “would either 

assure that adversarial parties would be present on appeal, or provide a more secure ground for 

disposition of the complaint on appeal.” Id. at 11. 

 In fact, plaintiff is proceeding in this action “in forma pauperis” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Under that statute, the court is required to act for the defendants by protecting them from having 

to respond to frivolous and harassing lawsuits. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998) (“federal trial judges are undoubtedly familiar with two additional tools that are available 

in extreme cases to protect public officials from undue harassment,” one of which is 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), which authorizes dismissal ‘at any time’ of in forma pauperis suits that are 

‘frivolous or malicious’”). The court cannot carry out this statutory mandate, where, as here, the 

complaint presents a lengthy, confused jumble of facts, legal conclusions, footnotes and case 

citations, rather than a short and plain statement showing plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. 

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 5. Amending the complaint 

 Plaintiff will therefore be afforded another opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff 

is again cautioned that his complaint must contain a “short and plain statement” of the basis for 

federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), as 

well as a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief (that is, who harmed 

the plaintiff, and in what way). See “Rule 8” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting 

point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a 

claim”). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize the complaint in the proper way. 

They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814, or online 

at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 6. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff is granted thirty 

days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of this court. 

 a. The amended complaint must not exceed 25 pages in length. Plaintiff shall 

not evade the page requirement by using small type or otherwise failing to comply with Local 

Rule 130 (general format of documents), or by placing allegations in attachments or exhibits, or 

by any other means. 

 b. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and 

must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 

 c. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this 

action be dismissed. 

DATED: August 24, 2016 

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