Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00859/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00859-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

---

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

LARESEA WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN UNITED LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:15-cv-00859-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action arises out of a claim for benefits under a life insurance policy 

issued by defendant American United Life Insurance Company (“AUL”) on the 

life of Corine Woods (deceased), the mother of plaintiff Laresea Woods 

(“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff, the beneficiary of her mother’s life insurance policy, 

alleges that AUL wrongfully denied her claim for benefits following her mother’s 

death and then, after acknowledging that benefits should have been paid, 

misrepresented the amount of the policy in an effort to get her to sign a release. 

She has asserted state-law claims against AUL for breach of contract, fraud, 

suppression/concealment, bad faith, deceit, and negligent screening, hiring, 

FILED

 2015 Nov-13 AM 11:50

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 1 of 18
2

training, and supervision. (Doc.1 1). She seeks to recover compensatory and 

punitive damages from AUL and has requested a trial by jury on her claims.

The case is before the court on AUL’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law 

claims and her demands for punitive and extra-contractual damages, and to strike 

her demand for a jury trial. (Doc. 6). AUL contends that all of Plaintiff’s claims

are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 

U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”), and that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover 

punitive or extra-contractual damages under ERISA or to a trial by jury. For the 

reasons stated below, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss/strike is due to 

be granted and that Plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend her 

complaint and replead her claims under ERISA.

I. FACTS2

Corine Woods was employed as a teacher in the Talladega County School 

System. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 7). In September 2003, through the county, she enrolled in a 

group term life insurance policy issued by AUL to Educator Benefits Corporation, 

 1

References to “Doc.(s) __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the Court to

the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket sheet in 

the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system. 

2

When considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations 

as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 2 of 18
3

a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Alabama Education Association (“AEA”).

3

 (Id. 

at ¶ 5; Doc. 6-1 at 2, 9). The initial amount of her coverage was $50,000.00, but in 

2004 she increased the coverage to $60,000.00 (with a corresponding increase in 

monthly premium). (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6).

Corine Woods voluntarily retired from her position as a teacher effective 

June 1, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 8). Shortly after retiring, she submitted an “Application to 

Continue/Port or Convert Group Insurance” to AUL, electing to continue her 

existing coverage and identifying Plaintiff as her primary beneficiary.4

 (Id. at ¶ 9; 

Doc. 10-1 at 6-7). To continue her coverage, Corine Woods was required to remit 

her insurance premium directly to AUL. (Doc. 10-1 at 7). Talladega County 

completed the employer’s section of the application, and verified that the amount 

of Corine Woods’s coverage was $60,000.00. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 10-1at 8-9). 

AUL received the application on July 12, 2012. (Doc. 10-1at 5-9).

 Corine Woods died on July 18, 2012. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 12). Plaintiff submitted 

a claim for life insurance benefits to AUL, but AUL denied the claim, asserting 

 3 Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the policy to her complaint, but a copy was attached as an 

exhibit to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike. (Doc. 6-1). Because the policy is referenced in 

Plaintiff’s complaint, the court may consider the policy in ruling on the motion to dismiss/strike. 

See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (“In analyzing the 

sufficiency of the complaint, we limit our consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, 

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.”). 

4 Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the application to her complaint, but did attach a copy to her 

opposition to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike. (Doc. 10-1).

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 3 of 18
4

that Corine Woods had not applied for continuation of coverage following her 

retirement. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). 

In January 2015, after receiving multiple requests for reconsideration from 

Plaintiff’s former and current counsel, AUL admitted that Plaintiff’s claim for 

benefits should have been paid. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-26). AUL asserted that the amount of 

Corine Woods’s insurance coverage was only $50,000.00, but told Plaintiff that it 

was willing to pay her $60,000.00 in exchange for a release. (Id. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff 

refused to sign a release, and instead filed this lawsuit. 

II. ANALYSIS

As noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint asserts state-law claims for breach of 

contract, fraud, suppression/concealment, bad faith, deceit, and negligent 

screening, hiring, training, and supervision. In its motion to dismiss/strike, AUL

argues that ERISA preempts all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff responds that her 

mother’s insurance policy falls within the ERISA “safe harbor” exemption and 

therefore is not an ERISA plan. She also argues that even if the policy is governed 

by ERISA, she may still pursue her claims for fraud, suppression/concealment, and 

deceit, which, she argues, are not preempted.

A. Is the Policy Governed by ERISA? 

“In order to have an ERISA plan there must be (1) a plan fund or program 

(2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 4 of 18
5

(4) for the purpose of providing, among other things, medical or death benefits (5) 

to participants and their beneficiaries.” Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33 

F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 

1371 (11th Cir. 1982); see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining an “employee welfare 

benefit plan”). AUL argues that the policy of insurance at issue here is such an 

ERISA plan, asserting that the AEA is an “employee organization” and that “the 

policy of insurance referenced by Plaintiff in her complaint was issued to the AEA 

to insure the life insurance component of an AEA employee benefit plan.” (Doc. 6 

at 4-5). In support, AUL cites three opinions by federal district courts in Alabama 

all holding that insurance policies sponsored by the AEA are governed by ERISA. 

See Karns v. Disability Reinsurance Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 

1305 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (holding that a disability insurance policy sponsored by the 

AEA was a “relevant ERISA plan”); Hicks v. American United Life Ins. Co., Case 

No. 5:10-cv-01401-CLS (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 2011) 5 (“In short, the disability 

benefits plan at issue does not fall within the [ERISA] regulatory safe harbor and 

the AEA is an ‘employee organization’ for the purposes of ERISA. Accordingly, 

the plan is governed by ERISA.”); Abston v. The Murfee Group et al., Case No. 

 5 A copy of the Hicks opinion was attached to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike and is located at 

Doc. 6-2. 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 5 of 18
6

1:06-cv-482, KD-B (S.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2006)6 (“The question becomes, is the 

[AEA] an ‘employee organization’ such that the Plaintiff’s plan is properly 

governed by ERISA? ... [T]he answer to that question is a resounding yes.”).

The court agrees that the group term life insurance policy sponsored by the 

AEA here is an ERISA plan, and Plaintiff effectively admits as much. She 

acknowledges that the AEA is an “employee organization” and that “the group 

policy at issue was initially issued through the AEA.” (Doc. 10 at 8 n.1). Nowhere 

in her opposition to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike does she dispute that the AEA 

group policy is an ERISA plan. She argues, however, that “it is axiomatic that 

some insurance policies that were originally issued as part of an ERISA plan may 

no longer be covered by ERISA.” (Id.) That is what she claims occurred here. 

Plaintiff argues that once Corine Woods retired, made the voluntary decision to 

continue her life insurance coverage, and paid her insurance premium directly to 

AUL, her “individual” or “personal” continuation policy was no longer subject to 

ERISA. (Id. at 5-9). Plaintiff asserts that her claims against AUL “do not arise out 

of [the] AEA policy, but rather arise out of a policy that was individually and 

voluntarily continued and maintained by Corine Woods with ... AUL, as the policy 

at issue was ported by Corine Woods following her retirement.” (Id. at 5). She 

contends that this “individual voluntary” term life policy falls within the ERISA 

 6 A copy of the Abston opinion was attached to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike and is located at 

Doc. 6-3. 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 6 of 18
7

regulatory “safe harbor,” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j), which excludes certain “group or 

group-type insurance programs” from ERISA coverage. (Id.)

The court need not address the merits of Plaintiff’s safe harbor argument, 

because it is based on a faulty premise—namely, that Corine Woods’s election to 

continue her life insurance coverage following her retirement created an individual 

policy separate and apart from the AEA group policy. As Corine Woods’s 

Application to Continue/Port or Convert Group Insurance reflects, upon retirement 

she had the option to either “convert [her] existing life insurance coverage to an 

Individual Life Insurance contract” or “continue [her] existing coverage.” (Doc. 

10-1 at 5-6). She elected to continue her existing coverage, not convert her 

coverage to an individual contract. (Id.) In this regard, the court notes that there is 

no allegation in Plaintiff’s complaint—and certainly no evidence—that Corine 

Woods was issued a new “individual” insurance contract or certificate when she 

elected to continue her coverage. Moreover, the “Continuation of Insurance” 

provision of the AEA group policy expressly provides that coverage “in force 

under the policy” continues “without interruption” when a person elects to 

continue coverage. (Doc. 6-1 at 15). Therefore, because Corine Woods’s 

coverage continued under the AEA group policy, Plaintiff’s claim for benefits 

necessarily arose out of that policy, an ERISA plan.

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 7 of 18
8

Plaintiff has cited no authority that supports her contention that when Corine 

Woods retired, voluntarily elected to continue her life insurance coverage, and paid 

the premium directly to AUL, her coverage ceased to be part of the AEA group 

policy and was no longer within the purview of ERISA. Indeed, courts have 

consistently rejected similar arguments. For instance, in Lewis v. Blue Cross Blue 

Shield of Ga., 2015 WL 1475610, *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2015), the plaintiff and 

her husband were covered under a group term life insurance policy issued as part 

of a group plan sponsored by her employer, ESG. When the plaintiff decided to 

leave her employment with ESG, she was advised that she could take the policy 

with her and retain coverage by paying the insurance premiums herself, which she 

did. When her husband died many years later, the plaintiff submitted a claim for 

benefits under the policy, but the insurer denied the claim. The plaintiff then filed 

suit against the insurer, raising only state-law claims. In response to the insurer’s 

argument that her claims were all preempted by ERISA, the plaintiff asserted that

“when she left her employment with ESG, requested portability of her policy, and 

began making premium payments personally, her policy ceased to be part of ESG’s 

sponsored group employee benefit plan.” Id. at *3. Citing Glass, the district court 

rejected the plaintiff’s argument, holding that her policy “remain[ed] properly 

under the scope of ERISA.” Id. See also Griggers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y 

of the U.S., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195-96 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that a policy 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 8 of 18
9

issued under an ERISA-covered plan continued to be covered by ERISA after the 

plaintiff resigned her employment and kept the policy in force by paying the 

premium); Albright v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (S.D. 

Fla. 1999) (“[T]he continuation of payments by an employee into an insurance 

policy after his or her termination does not change coverage under a policy 

governed by ERISA. Rather, this constitutes a continuation of coverage, and 

ERISA continues to govern the insurance policy.”). Plaintiff has cited no contrary 

authority.

Here, after Corine Woods retired from her employment with the Talladega 

County School System, she elected to continue her existing coverage under the 

AEA group policy, an employee benefits plan governed by ERISA. Consequently, 

her coverage remained under the scope of ERISA, notwithstanding that she was no 

longer employed by the County and was required to make her premium payments 

directly to AUL. As the above cases all hold, when an employee participates in an 

employee benefits plan and then keeps her coverage in force by paying the 

premiums herself after her employment ends, ERISA continues to govern the 

coverage. That is what occurred here. 

B. ERISA Preemption 

Having determined that Corine Woods’s continuation coverage remained 

subject to ERISA, the court turns to whether ERISA preempts Plaintiff’s state-law 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 9 of 18
10

claims. As noted, Plaintiff argues that even if the “continued voluntary plan” 

between Corine Woods and AUL is governed by ERISA, her claims for fraud 

(Count II of her complaint), suppression/concealment (Count III), and deceit 

(Count V) are not preempted. (Doc. 10 at 9). In other words, she concedes that 

her other claims—for breach of contract (Count I), bad faith (Count IV), and

negligence (Count VI)—are preempted if ERISA applies, which it does.

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized two kinds of ERISA preemption: 

“conflict” (or “defensive”) preemption and “complete” (or “super”) preemption. 

Connecticut State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337 (11t h 

Cir. 2009). As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Anthem Health Plans:

ERISA is one of only a few federal statutes under which two 

types of preemption may arise: conflict preemption and complete 

preemption. 

Conflict preemption, also known as defensive preemption, is a 

substantive defense to preempted state law claims. Jones v. LMR Int'l, 

Inc., 457 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2006). This type of preemption 

arises from ERISA’s express preemption provision, § 514(a), which 

preempts any state law claim that “relates to” an ERISA plan. 29 

U.S.C. § 1144(a). Because conflict preemption is merely a defense, it 

is not a basis for removal. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,

115–16, 57 S. Ct. 96, 99, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936); see also Ervast v. 

Flexible Prods. Co., 346 F.3d 1007, 1012 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2003)

(stating that “defensive preemption ... provides only an affirmative 

defense to state law claims and is not a basis for removal”).

Complete preemption, also known as super preemption, is a 

judicially-recognized exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. It 

differs from defensive preemption because it is jurisdictional in nature 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 10 of 18
11

rather than an affirmative defense. Jones, 457 F.3d at 1179 (citing 

Ervast, 346 F.3d at 1014). Complete preemption under ERISA 

derives from ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, § 502(a), which 

has such “extraordinary” preemptive power that it “converts an 

ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim 

for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” [Metro. Life Ins. 

Co. v.] Taylor, 481 U.S. [58] at 65–66, 107 S. Ct. [1542] at 1547.

Consequently, any “cause[ ] of action within the scope of the civil 

enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [is] removable to federal court.”

Id. at 66, 107 S. Ct. at 1548.

Although related, complete and defensive preemption are not 

coextensive:

Complete preemption is [ ] narrower than “defensive” 

ERISA preemption, which broadly “supersede[s] any and 

all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any [ERISA] 

plan.” ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis 

added). Therefore, a state-law claim may be defensively 

preempted under § 514(a) but not completely preempted 

under § 502(a). In such a case, the defendant may assert 

preemption as a defense, but preemption will not provide 

a basis for removal to federal court.

Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir.

2005); accord Ervast, 346 F.3d at 1012 n. 6 (“Super preemption is 

distinguished from defensive preemption, which provides only an 

affirmative defense to state law claims and is not a basis for 

removal.”).

Anthem Health Plans, 591 F.3d at 1343-44 (footnotes omitted); see also Butero v. 

Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). 

This case was originally filed in this court, not removed from state court. 

The court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is based on federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 11 of 18
12

U.S.C. § 1132, as the parties are completely diverse in citizenship and the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3). Although the parties have 

addressed complete ERISA preemption in their submissions, the court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction is not dependent on Plaintiff’s claims being completely 

preempted; the court has independent diversity jurisdiction. For purposes of 

AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike, therefore, the relevant question is whether 

Plaintiff’s state-law claims for fraud, suppression/concealment, and deceit are 

subject to defensive (conflict) preemption. See Jones, 457 F.3d at 1179 (“Plaintiffs 

argue that [their state-law] claims should be remanded because they are not 

completely preempted. Regardless of whether they are completely preempted, 

however, the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims .... 

Accordingly, we consider only whether the claims are defensively preempted.”); 

Butero, 174 F.3d at 1212 (“Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the 

complaint ... raises only the question of whether the state-law claims were subject 

to defensive preemption.”).

A state-law claim is defensively preempted under ERISA if it “relates to” an 

ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws as 

they may or may hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....”). “A [state] 

law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it 

has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 12 of 18
13

463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). “[T]he sweep of ERISA preemption is broad, applying 

well beyond those subjects covered by ERISA itself.” Jones, 457 F.3d at 1179-80 

(citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims for fraud, suppression/concealment, and deceit all

relate to the existence and amount of Corine Woods’ life insurance coverage under 

an ERISA plan (the AEA group policy) and Plaintiff’s rights as a beneficiary under 

that plan. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is based on the allegation that AUL 

misrepresented that benefits were not payable under the plan because Corine 

Woods had not applied for continuation of her insurance coverage. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 

46-47). Her suppression/concealment claim is based on the allegation that AUL 

concealed the true facts regarding Corine Woods’s application for continuation of 

coverage and the amount of her coverage. (Id. at ¶52). And her deceit claim is 

similarly based on the allegation that AUL falsely represented the amount of 

Corine Woods’s coverage to induce her to sign a release. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66). All of 

these claims are premised on the existence of the ERISA plan and Plaintiff’s 

alleged entitlement to benefits under the plan. In fact, even Plaintiff herself states 

in her opposition to AUL’s motion to dismiss/strike that AUL’s alleged 

misrepresentations and suppressions were “critical to the policy’s existence and to 

Plaintiff’s rights as a claimant/beneficiary.” (Doc. 10 at 15). If the plan did not 

exist, or if Plaintiff had no claim to benefits under the plan, then she would have no 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 13 of 18
14

fraud, suppression/concealment, or deceit claims to assert against AUL. All three 

claims have a “connection with” the ERISA plan and, consequently, are preempted 

by ERISA. See, e.g., Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 621 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted a fraudulent representation claim where 

the misrepresentation related to the plaintiff’s benefits under a retirement plan and

“the [fraud] statute would not apply to this case without the existence of the 

retirement plan”); Lewis, 2015 WL 1475610, *7 (“Lewis alleges that [the 

defendants] ... made misrepresentations and suppressed material facts concerning 

her life-insurance policy. These claims not only refer to the ... ERISA-covered 

plan, but are based entirely on the plan. They are classic examples of state-law 

claims that relate to an ERISA plan and are thus preempted under federal law.”). 

 In support of her contention that her fraud, suppression/concealment, and 

deceit claims are not preempted by ERISA, Plaintiff relies primarily on a single 

case, Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402 (11th Cir. 1994). Forbus, 

however, bears no resemblance to this case. In Forbus, the plaintiffs alleged that 

Sears had misrepresented that the facility where they worked was closing and that 

they would be terminated without benefits unless they elected to “involuntarily” 

retire and participate in a retirement benefits program. Id. at 1403-04. The 

plaintiffs elected to resign, but later discovered that the facility was being kept 

open and that younger workers were being hired to replace them. Id. at 1404. 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 14 of 18
15

They filed suit against Sears, alleging that Sears had fraudulently induced them to 

resign. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ fraud claims did not 

“relate to” an ERISA plan and were not preempted, noting that their claims 

“center[ed] on Sears’ alleged fraud concerning the elimination of [their] jobs, not 

fraud concerning an ERISA plan or any other benefits package.” Id. at 1405-06. 

The court further noted that the plaintiffs had not claimed any fraud “as it relates to 

the amount of benefits received” or made any allegation that Sears “misrepresented 

the availability of pension benefits to the plaintiffs.” Id. at 1406.

Here, in contrast, Plaintiff’s fraud, suppression, and deceit allegations relate 

to the availability and amount of benefits payable to Plaintiff under an ERISA 

plan. Again, these claims are based on the core allegations that AUL 

misrepresented that no insurance benefits were payable to Plaintiff because Corine 

Woods had not continued her coverage under the AEA group policy; concealed the 

existence of the documents reflecting that Corine Woods had increased her 

coverage and had continued her coverage at retirement; and misrepresented the 

amount of Corine Woods’s continuation coverage. In other words, the 

misrepresentations and omissions alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint relate directly to 

the subject ERISA plan. 

Because Plaintiff’s fraud, suppression/concealment, and deceit claims all 

relate to an ERISA plan, and because Plaintiff concedes that her other state-law 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 15 of 18
16

claims are preempted if ERISA applies, all of Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by 

ERISA and due to be dismissed. 

C. Plaintiff’s Demands for Punitive and Extra-Contractual Damages and 

for a Jury Trial

AUL has also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s demands for punitive and extracontractual damages and to strike her demand for a jury trial. Except to the extent 

that Plaintiff argues that Corine Woods’s continuance coverage is not governed by 

ERISA and that her fraud, suppression/concealment, and deceit claims are not, in 

any event, preempted by ERISA, Plaintiff does not address or dispute AUL’s 

assertions that punitive and extra-contractual damages are not recoverable under 

ERISA and that plaintiffs are not entitled to trial by jury in ERISA cases. She 

effectively concedes that if ERISA applies and if her state-law claims are 

preempted by ERISA—as the court has held—then she is not entitled to recover 

any punitive or extra-contractual damages and is not entitled to a jury trial.

As AUL asserts in its motion to dismiss/strike, and as Plaintiff effectively 

concedes, punitive and extra-contractual damages are not recoverable under 

ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (A civil action may be brought under ERISA by 

a beneficiary “to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 

his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 

under the terms of the plan” and “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 

provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain other 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 16 of 18
17

appropriate equitable relief ....”); Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 89 F.3d 

755, 761 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The District Court did not err in holding that extracontractual damages are no available in this case; a plan beneficiary can sue to 

enforce her rights under the plan and under ERISA, and for equitable relief, but not 

for punitive or compensatory damages.”); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 

1173, 1174 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Congress did not intend the recovery of punitive 

damages under section 1132(a).”).

Likewise, plaintiffs are not entitled to jury trials in ERISA actions. See, e.g.,

Rolland v. Textron, Inc., 300 F. App’x 635, 636 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled 

that plaintiffs bringing ERISA claims are not entitled to jury trials under ERISA 

because such claims are equitable in nature.”); Broaddus v. Fla. Power Corp., 145 

F.3d 1283, 1287 n. ** (11th Cir. 1998) (“The district court was correct in granting 

[the defendant’s] motion to strike [the plaintiff’s] demand for a jury trial on the 

ERISA claim. Relief under ERISA is limited to equitable remedies.”).

Therefore, because Plaintiff’s claims are all preempted by ERISA, she is not 

entitled to recover punitive or extra-contractual damages and is not entitled to a 

trial by jury.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s state-law claims are all subject to and preempted by ERISA. 

Accordingly, AUL’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law claims, to dismiss her 

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 17 of 18
18

demands for punitive and extra-contractual damages, and to strike her demand for 

a trial by jury (doc. 6) is due to be granted. Plaintiff will be afforded two weeks to 

amend her complaint to plead her claims under ERISA.

An appropriate order consistent with this opinion will be entered. 

DONE, this 13th day of November, 2015.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:15-cv-00859-JEO Document 18 Filed 11/13/15 Page 18 of 18