Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02698/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02698-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO RINCON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv2698-JLS (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 15.]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Alfredo Rincon (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

is currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) in Imperial, California. He filed

a civil rights Complaint on November 30, 2009, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. No. 1].

Plaintiff claims the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and

CEN officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care by acting or

failing to act with deliberate indifference to his need for a liver transplant. (Compl. at 2-7.)

Plaintiff seeks both general and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. (Id. at 18-19.)

Defendants Matthew Cate, Secretary of CDCR, and Drs. Barreras, Khatri, and Frueh,

CEN Chief Medical Officers, have filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing: (1) collateral estoppel;

(2) failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); (3) that CDCR’s

delivery of medical care for prisoners is under the jurisdiction of a Receiver; (4) that injunctive

relief must come through the Receiver; and (5) qualified immunity. [Doc. No. 15.] Plaintiff

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 All references to “Defs.’ Attachs.” are to exhibits lodged along with Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. The Court takes judicial notice of these exhibits pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d)

(court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information).

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has filed an Opposition [Doc. No.16] to which Defendants have filed a Reply [Doc. No. 17].

The Court takes the papers under submission without oral argument and for the reasons

outlined below RECOMMENDS Defendants’ motion be GRANTED. 

II. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2007, Plaintiff was told he had one year to live if he did not receive a liver transplant.

(Compl. at 3.) On March 24, 2008, the University of California at San Diego Medical Center

(“UCSD”) preliminarily approved Plaintiff for a transplant procedure. [Id.; see also Defs.’

Attachs.1

 at 13-14.] In a memorandum dated April 4, 2008, Dr. Alan Frueh, CDCR Chief

Medical Officer, stated CDCR could not “guarantee funding for three years post transplant

regardless of [Plaintiff’s] incarcerated status.” [Id.; see also Defs.’ Attachs. at 51.]

Subsequently, on April 14, 2008, UCSD declined to carry out the procedure. [Id.; see also

Defs.’ Attachs. at 11-12.] 

On April 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal stating that CDCR staff had “refused

to pay for life saving treatment” and that he was experiencing pain as a result of his liver

cancer and Hepatitis C. [Defs.’ Attachs. at 2.] He requested that a liver transplant be provided

and that he be given “effective pain medication(s).” [Id.] 

At the first level of appeal, Plaintiff stated he “understood the reason for previous denial

of narcotics [was] so not to jeopardize the transplant procedure if approved.” [Defs.’ Attachs.

at 5.] On June 18, 2008, Defendant Khatri informed Plaintiff that approval of a liver transplant

was not within the prison’s jurisdiction but that his appeal would be partially granted with

regard to the request for pain medication. [Id. at 3.] On July 15, 2008, at the second level of

appeal, Defendant Barreras partially granted the appeal and indicated that there were no formal

changes to the first level appeal response. [Id. at 5.] On September 23, 2008, the director’s

level review was issued and stated that Plaintiff was receiving the medical care and treatment

deemed medically necessary. [Id.] At that time Plaintiff was being evaluated at Loma Linda

University Medical Center (“LLMC”) for a liver transplant. [Id.] 

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2

 California Prison Health Care Receivership is the body assigned to oversee the delivery of

medical services to inmates under the custody of CDCR. See Plata v. Schwarznegger, No C01-

1341 THE (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2006). 

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On August 18, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in State court

alleging that prison medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying

him a liver transplant and pain medication. [Defs.’ Attachs. at 1-25.] On August 24, 2009, the

Superior Court for the County of Imperial issued an Order to Show Cause instructing the

Office of the Receiver to file a Return to Plaintiff’s petition.2

 

On November 20, 2009, the Receiver filed a Return with the Superior Court, stating that

pursuant to “TACE” therapy treatment received at UCSD Plaintiff’s liver tumors had shrunk

to undetectable sizes and that laboratory studies on April 2, 2009 showed that Plaintiff’s liver

and kidneys were functioning well. [Defs.’ Attachs. at 30.] As such, Plaintiff was no longer

a good candidate for a liver transplant and because his medication had been corrected, “the

issues raised by [Plaintiff] have been resolved since filing his grievance.” [Id. at 31.]

On February 22, 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Plaintiff habeas relief

and holding, “The petition is now moot, as the uncontroverted medical evidence before the

court shows that petitioner’s condition has changed, and that he is no longer a candidate for

transplant.” [Defs.’ Attachs. at 55.]

On November 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed this federal § 1983 action against Defendants.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue that because this civil rights action relitigates the constitutional issues

already adjudicated by the state court in ruling on Plaintiff’s state habeas petition, Plaintiff is

collaterally estopped from raising them here in federal court. (Defs.’ Mem. at 5.) Plaintiff

contends that collateral estoppel should not apply because he seeks punitive damages based

on a past injury as opposed to injunctive relief. He also states the issue should be resolved now

because his medical condition is likely to change and the issue of a transplant will likely recur.

“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary

to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause

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3

 Application of collateral estoppel is governed by state law. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96. Five

factors are to be considered: (1) issues must be identical; (2) issue must have been actually litigated;

(3) issue must have been necessarily decided; (4) prior judgment must have been final and on merits;

and (5) party against whom asserted must be same as in prior action. Lucido v. Superior Court, 51

Cal.3d 335, 341 (1990).

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of action involving a party to the first cause.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)

(internal citation omitted). Collateral estoppel applies in § 1983 actions to preclude claims

identical to those adjudicated in state court where the court “afforded a full and fair

opportunity for the issue[s] to be heard and determined under federal standards.” Silverton v.

Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (giving preclusive effect to state habeas

petition in subsequent § 1983 action brought in federal court); see also Allen, 449 U.S. at 103-

104. 

Defendants state that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to have his claims

determined and that the denial of habeas was “final and a decision on the merits.”3

 (Defs.’

Mem. at 7.] The Court disagrees. The Superior court denied Plaintiff’s petition as moot.

[Defs.’ Attachs. at 55.] Mootness deprives a court of “‘power to declare the law’ by deciding

the claims on the merits” and thus a judgment of mootness is not based on a full and fair

determination of the claims raised. In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). A

dismissal for mootness is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction “and a court that has no

jurisdiction cannot enter a judgment with preclusive effect.” In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 901

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Defendants mistakenly view the state

court’s finding that “petitioner’s condition has responded to treatment and that petitioner is no

longer a candidate for transplant” as a substantive finding on the merits. However, Plaintiff

was not claiming that his condition had not changed. His substantive claim was that because

CDCR officials told UCSD they could not guarantee funds for post surgical care, UCSD

refused to conduct the transplant and that this constituted a violation of his rights under the

Eighth Amendment. The state court did not decide Plaintiff’s constitutional claim of deliberate

indifference to medical needs. 

Moreover, although Plaintiff’s improved condition did render his request for a

transplant and for injunctive relief moot, this case falls into an exception to mootness because

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the challenged action is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Center for Biological

Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (there must be reasonable expectation that

injury will arise again and that it is likely to become moot before litigation is complete due to

inherently limited duration of injury). Nowhere in the record is there a medical opinion that

Plaintiff is “cured” of his cancer. LLUMC reported that “currently” there is no indication for

a liver transplant, and the Receiver concluded Plaintiff was not suitable “at this time” for a

transplant. [Defs.’ Attachs. at 29-30.] Plaintiff’s tumors have been shrunk to “undetectable

sizes,” not eradicated altogether. [Id.] Plaintiff was given a year to live in March 2007. Had

the TACE treatment not worked, Plaintiff could have died before he had an opportunity to

submit his April 24, 2008 administrative appeal let alone his August 18, 2009 state habeas

petition.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that collateral estoppel not be applied to

preclude Plaintiff’s claim and that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard be DENIED.

B. Plata v. Schwarznegger 

Dismissal Against Cate

Defendants seek to dismiss the case against Secretary of CDCR, Matthew Cate,

pursuant to the decision in Plata v. Schwarznegger, No C01-1341 THE (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16,

2006). Plata involved a class action by California prisoners challenging deficiencies in prison

medical care that violated the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Plata v. Schwarznegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). In

February 2006, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued

an order appointing a Receiver to whom all the powers of the Secretary of CDCR regarding

delivery of medical care were transferred. Id. at 1092. The Receiver has established an Office

of the Receiver and the receivership continues to be in effect.

Therefore, Defendant Cate is not liable under Plaintiff’s alleged indifference by prison

staff to his medical needs. Nor has Plaintiff asserted any personal or direct involvement by

Cate in the denial of medical care. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446

(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (A supervisory official may be liable in a § 1983 action only if he or

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4

 The members of the class and the CDCR entered into a stipulation to “implement Health Care

Services Division Policies and Procedures” that are “designed to meet or exceed the minimum level

of care necessary to fulfill the defendants’ obligation to plaintiffs under the Eighth Amendment.”

Burnett, 618 F.Supp.2d at 1236.

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she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendant Cate’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED. 

Case to be Brought Through Federal Receiver 

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed and

brought through the Receiver because he is part of the class in the Plata case and his interests

are already being provided for in that context. (Defs.’ Mem. at 12.) 

As a general proposition, a plaintiff who is a class member in a separate action for

equitable or injunctive relief from prison conditions may not maintain an individual suit raising

the same subject matter. Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff in

this case is necessarily a member of the Plata class because he is a state prisoner with serious

medical needs. However, in Burnett v. Dugan, 618 F.Supp.2d 1232 (S.D. Cal. 2009), Judge

Lorenz of this district noted that the stipulation4

 in Plata provided an exception for cases in

which a prisoner required “urgent medical care” and was attempting “to enforce a specific

medical treatment or doctor’s order related only to that individual plaintiff.” Burnett, 618

F.Supp.2d at 1237. Thus, because Plaintiff’s case is specific to his urgent medical need rather

than the general system-wide health care provisions at issue in Plata, he may maintain a

separate suit arising from his discrete medical condition.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this

basis be DENIED. 

C. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim 

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Rule

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12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive merits, “a

court may [typically] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.”

Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570).

 While allegations of material fact are accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th

Cir. 1996), the court need not accept as true generic legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions

of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.”). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must

be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then decide whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 1949. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s

liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to

relief.’” Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.”). 

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“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,

969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).

Eighth Amendment Standard

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they act with deliberate indifference

to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff

alleging such a violation must satisfy a two-part test containing both an objective and a

subjective component. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff must prove that defendant prison official (1) deprived him of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities;” and (2) acted with deliberate indifference by denying, delaying

or intentionally interfering with medical treatment. Id. (citing Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998), Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991), Hamilton v. Endell, 981

F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992)). A prisoner’s civil rights will only be abridged if “the

indifference to his medical needs [is] substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab’s, 622

F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). 

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the

[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Toguchiv.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gibson v. County, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188

(9th Cir. 2002)). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

1060. Where a prisoner alleges delay in receiving medical treatment, he must show that the

delay led to further harm. Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407

(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). 

Application to Plaintiff’s Case

Plaintiff alleges that UCSD eventually rejected him for the transplant because

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Defendant Frueh told them CDCR would not provide medical care financing for the three year

period following the transplant. [Compl. at 3.] Thus, Plaintiff appears to argue Frueh

deliberately interfered with his medical treatment and effectively denied the life-saving

transplant he needed.

The record reflects that on March 24, 2008, UCSD Medical Center sent a letter to

Plaintiff stating that he was “surgically acceptable as a candidate for the liver transplant

procedure.” [Defs.’ Attachs. at 14.] The letter contained a proviso; “However, your Clinical

plan of care [] is of great importance to the Committee. Your case was currently deferred.

Once a written comprehensive understanding has been reached between UCSD and the

California Department of Corrections regarding your clinical plan of care, your case will be

represented and re-evaluated for listing on the UNOS waiting list by the Committee.” [Id.] 

 On April 4, 2008 Defendant Frueh wrote to UCSD concerning Plaintiff’s care. The

following is an excerpt from the relevant portion of the correspondence:

Your requests were the following:

1. Guarantee of financial funding for 3 years posttransplant regardless of incarceration status: We

understand that the CDC’s jurisdiction financially or

otherwise ends when a person is released from custody.

We also understand that the CDC can tell us the length of

the inmate’s expected incarceration and whether they will

be up for parole within that time period.

CDCR cannot guarantee funding for three years post transplant

regardless of incarceration status. CDCR will pay for medical care

while [Plaintiff] is incarcerated. [Plaintiff’s] expected release date is

2018. However, CDCR cannot guarantee that date. There is always the

possibility, albeit slight, that new evidence or information might result in

exoneration or a reduced sentence. 

[Defs.’ Attachs. at 51.] UCSD responded to this correspondence with a letter stating that

Plaintiff’s case for organ transplantation was formally declined due to several factors one of

which was CDCR’s representation that they could “not guarantee funding for three years post

transplant regardless of incarceration status.” [Id. at 11.] The UCSD letter stated that the

organ transplant program “remains liable for its short and long-term outcomes for Graft and

Patient survivals for a period of no less than three calendar years after transplant.” [Id.] By way

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 The text of the letter reads, “As we have previously communicated to CDCR, the assessment

of patient suitability for an organ transplant depends on several factors. While not in order of

importance, the first factor involves the potential for long term success of the transplanted candidate

(Graft and Patient Survival). This factor contemplates issues such as the current physical ability to

endure the rigors of such a significant medical/surgical intervention. In addition, the probability for

a firm long term psychological support represents an important consideration. Another factor that can

not go without consideration, . . .is the probability for long term financial support. Finally, the

existence of a contract with a responsible and fiscally sound party as Payor must be taken into account

in respect to the overall probability for a successful transplant and a long-term post-transplant

commitment to a complex medical regimen. . . . ¶ At this juncture, there does not seem to be a

preponderance of these factors for a reasonable level of potential success in the incarcerated patient

population. In addition, your memo clearly indicates that “CDCR cannot guarantee funding for three

years post transplant regardless of incarceration status.” [Defs.’ Attachs. at 11.] 

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of clarification, Defendant Frueh then sent a further letter to UCSD stating:

I want to point out that in your attached letter the quote ‘CDCR

cannot guarantee funding for three years post transplant regardless

of incarceration status’ is ambiguous since it is taken out of

context. [] The sentence which follows it is essential to the

understanding of CDCR’s position. [] That statement is, ‘CDCR

will pay for the medical care while [Plaintiff] is incarcerated.’ []

The summary to my letter was, ‘CDCR will pay for [Plaintiff’s]

medical care as long as he is under CDCR jurisdiction.’ [] I hope

there is no misunderstanding. Please call me if further

clarification is needed.”

[Defs.’ Attachs. at 28-29.] UCSD did not respond to this letter.

From the above facts, it is clear that UCSD’s final refusal of a transplant was based on

several factors, not just funding for post transplant care.5

 Even if the Court were to assume the

final decision turned on representations by Frueh with regard to financing for such care, the

Court does not read Frueh’s correspondence to UCSD as meaning CDCR would not provide

the care Plaintiff would require. On the contrary, Defendant Frueh went so far as to clarify in

a follow-up letter [Defs.’ Attachs. 28-29] to UCSD that CDCR’s position is that they would

fund treatment as long as Plaintiff was in custody. It is possible that Plaintiff misunderstood

the sentence “CDRC cannot guarantee funding for three years post transplant regardless of

[Plaintiff’s] incarcerated status” to mean that even if he were incarcerated CDCR could not

guarantee funding for three years. The Court agrees the point could have been made more

clearly in the first place but Frueh recognized this and clarified that regardless of the threeyear benchmark set by UCSD the operative focus is the fact of incarceration, which looked

likely until 2018. In Frueh’s initial memorandum, by stating Plaintiff’s release date as 2018

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and by indicating that there was only a slight chance that he could be released prior to that

time, his response was actually favorable to Plaintiff’s position. 

Defendants Barreras and Khatri responded to Plaintiff’s administrative appeals

regarding medication and the transplant. As they stated in their letters to Plaintiff they were

not in a position to grant Plaintiff a transplant. However, Plaintiff’s request to resume the

medication was granted. Moreover, only six days following UCSD’s rejection letter, on April

17, 2008, CDCR referred Plaintiff to the Stanford University Transplant Program which

refused to see him. [Defs.’ Attachs. at 29.] Two days later on August 19, 2008 Plaintiff was

seen by a physician at LLUMC. [Id.] The consultation report stated that Plaintiff would be

considered for a transplant and that further testing would be done. [Id.] An MRI and CT scan

of the liver were done at that time. [Id.] Plaintiff immediately began being monitored and

continues to be monitored at LLUMC.

Defendants all responded to Plaintiff’s medical needs and requests without delay. Even

if Plaintiff ascribed a delay in receiving a transplant to any action of Defendants, the delay did

not lead to further harm. In fact, Plaintiff’s condition has responded to the treatment provided

and improved to such a degree that he no longer requires a transplant at this time. From this

record the Court cannot reasonably infer that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s serious medical. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a claim be GRANTED.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert protection against civil damages under the doctrine of qualified

immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. at 12-14.) Under this doctrine, state officials are protected from

"liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The inquiry has two parts: (1) "whether the law

governing the official's conduct was clearly established;" and (2) whether "under that law, a

reasonable official would have believed the conduct was lawful." Somers v. Thurman, 109

F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1997); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001). Qualified immunity

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entitles government officials to “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;

and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original).

The law regarding deliberate indifference to serious medical need under the Eighth

Amendment is clearly established. However, having decided that Defendants’ actions do not

raise a reasonable inference that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to medical

care, the Court also concludes that under the law, a reasonable official would not have believed

the conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss on this ground be GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED. This report and recommendation is submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) to the United States District Judge assigned to this case.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 13, 2010 any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than December 23, 2010 The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2010

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:09-cv-02698-CAB-NLS Document 18 Filed 11/15/10 Page 12 of 12