Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01222/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patricia H. Cavanaugh, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-01222-TUC-JAS (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Plaintiff Patricia Cavanaugh brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 

and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security (Commissioner). Cavanaugh filed her opening brief, seeking a remand for 

further proceedings. (Doc. 19.) The Commissioner filed an opposition and Cavanaugh 

filed a reply. (Docs. 21, 22.) Based on the pleadings and the administrative record 

submitted to the Court, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its 

independent review, remand for further proceedings. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Cavanaugh filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and 

Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) on June 29, 2010. (Administrative Record (AR) 175, 

177.) Cavanaugh was born on July 29, 1954, making her 55 years of age at the time she 

applied for disability. (AR 175.) She alleged disability from June 1, 2008. (Id.) 

Cavanaugh’s application was denied upon initial review (AR 104-11) and on 

reconsideration (AR 113-18). A hearing was held on April 13, 2012. (AR 51-76.) ALJ 

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Peter J. Baum found that Cavanaugh had severe impairments of depressive disorder and 

anxiety disorder but, at Step Five, he concluded Cavanaugh was not disabled. (AR 21-

32.) The Appeals Council considered additional evidence but denied Cavanaugh’s 

request to review the ALJ’s decision. (AR 2-5.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate SSI and 

DIB claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 

458, 460-462 (1983). To establish disability the claimant bears the burden of showing she 

(1) is not working; (2) has a severe physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment 

meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; and (4) claimant’s RFC 

precludes her from performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 

416.920(a)(4). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the 

claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the 

national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). If the 

Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled” or “not disabled” at any point 

in the five-step process, she does not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings 

of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to 

deny benefits only “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must 

resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the 

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court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision, 

however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence 

that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). 

DISCUSSION 

Cavanaugh argues the ALJ committed two errors: (1) the ALJ’s RFC failed to 

account for Cavanaugh’s moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence 

and pace; and (2) the ALJ was required to obtain vocational expert testimony at Step 

Five, in light of Cavanaugh’s moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence and pace. The questions presented in this case are narrow and primarily legal.

The ALJ’s Decision 

At Step Three, the ALJ concluded that Cavanaugh did not satisfy the “paragraph 

B” criteria but found she had moderate limitations with regard to concentration, 

persistence, or pace. (AR 24.) Before moving to the next step of the analysis, the ALJ 

stated “the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of 

limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental function analysis.1

 (AR 

25.) The ALJ then found that Cavanaugh’s RFC allowed her to perform at all exertional 

levels but she had one non-exertional limitation, she was limited to unskilled work. (Id.) 

After finding that Cavanaugh could not perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found 

her not disabled at Step Five based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. (AR 30, 31.)

 

1

 This statement by the ALJ undermines Defendant’s argument that the ALJ’s consideration of functional limitations in Step Three is entirely separate from his RFC finding. (Doc. 21 at 7-8.) Rather, an RFC determination is a more detailed 

assessment of the functions evaluated in Step Three. SSR 96-8p. 

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 In reaching these determinations, the ALJ gave significant weight to psychologist 

Noelle Rohen, who examined Cavanaugh. (AR 28.) Dr. Rohen concluded that 

Cavanaugh’s ability to remember and carry out instructions, and her ability to interact 

with others and respond to changes in the work setting were not affected by her 

impairments. (AR 729-30.) However, Dr. Rohen stated that Cavanaugh’s impairments 

did impact her speed of processing and stamina/fatigue. (Id.) 

Residual Functional Capacity 

 Cavanaugh argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she had moderate limitations 

in concentration, persistence or pace but not including that limitation in her RFC. Further, 

she contends that limiting her to unskilled work did not account for these moderate 

deficiencies. 

 Defendant argues that the RFC was sufficient and conformed to the medical 

opinion evidence. In support of that argument, the Commissioner relies upon StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, two doctors identified 

that the claimant had limitations in pace. Id. at 1173. One of the doctors concluded that, 

despite that limitation, the claimant retained the ability to do simple tasks. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit found it was proper for the ALJ to restrict the claimant to simple, routine work 

because that was the only concrete restriction offered by a doctor. Id. at 1174, 1175 

(finding that the ALJ explained his decision to omit the claimant’s pace deficiencies by 

referencing the doctor’s opinion). 

 Here, the facts are distinct from those in Stubbs-Danielson. In Stubbs-Danielson, 

the ALJ did not make an explicit finding that the claimant had pace limitations. 539 F.3d 

at 1175. Instead, the ALJ relied upon a doctor that acknowledged the claimant had pace 

deficiencies but determined she could perform unskilled work despite those limitations. 

In contrast, in Cavanaugh’s case, the ALJ made a finding that she had a concentration, 

persistence, or pace deficiency. And, he gave great weight to a doctor that found 

Cavanaugh’s ability to perform the tasks required for unskilled work could be limited by 

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problems in pace. Thus, in the instant case, the RFC was not consistent with the medical 

testimony as it was found to be in Stubbs-Danielson. 539 F.3d at 1174. 

 Defendant also relies upon an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion, but it also is not 

directly analogous. In Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 F. App’x 15, 17 (9th 

Cir. 2012), the ALJ found, at Step Three, that the claimant had moderate limitations in 

social functioning. In formulating an RFC, however, the ALJ determined those 

deficiencies did not translate to any significant, concrete work-related limitations 

preventing her from doing unskilled work. Id. The appellate court found no error, 

concluding the RFC was consistent with the medical testimony on limitations in workrelated abilities. Id. at 17-18. It appears that, in Rogers, the ALJ resolved the conflict 

between finding a moderate limitation but not reflecting that deficiency in the RFC by 

concluding it did not equate to a work-related limitation. It could be that a limitation in 

social functioning has less impact on unskilled work than a pace limitation.2

 Regardless, 

the ALJ in Cavanaugh’s case did not resolve the conflict. Rather, the ALJ relied upon Dr. 

Rohen’s opinion but failed to account for the doctor’s finding that Cavanaugh’s work 

capabilities would be impacted by her speed of processing and stamina/fatigue. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s determination was not consistent with the medical testimony as the 

court found in Rogers. 

 In other unpublished opinions, the Ninth Circuit has held that when an ALJ finds a 

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence or pace, he must include that limitation 

in a claimant’s RFC. See Lubin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 507 F. App’x 709, 712 

(9th Cir. 2013) (clarifying that limiting a claimant to one to three step tasks did not 

capture a concentration, persistence or pace deficiency); Williamson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

 2

 Unskilled work requires working primarily with objects and not people, therefore, a moderate social deficiency may not substantially erode the occupational base. SSR 85- 15. Concentration, persistence and pace is defined as “the ability to sustain focused 

attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings. 20 C.F.R. § 404, App. 1 to Subpart P, 12.00(c)(3). Thus, limitations in this area could impede a claimant’s ability to complete even unskilled work. See Brink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 F. App’x 211, 212 (9th Cir. 2009) (“repetitive assembly-line work . . . might well require extensive focus or speed.”) 

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Sec., 438 F. App’x 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court has issued several opinions 

consistent with those Ninth Circuit cases. See Perkins v. Colvin, No. CV-13-01817-PHXBSB, 2014 WL 4425785, *13-14 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2014) (finding case analogous to 

Brink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 F. App’x 211 (9th Cir. 2009), which 

distinguished Stubbs-Danielson); Cornelius v. Colvin, No. 13-00535-PHX-SPL, 2014 

WL 4702614, *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that an ability to perform unskilled 

tasks could be compromised if a person cannot perform those tasks at a consistent pace); 

Wendte v. Colvin, No. 12-01523-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 2390267, *6 (D. Ariz. May 30, 

2013). All of these cases, although not precedential, are of significant persuasive value.3

 The ALJ failed to provide an explanation as to how a restriction to unskilled work 

accounted for a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. See Newton v. 

Chater, 92 F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding a limitation to simple jobs did not 

adequately represent a deficiency in concentration, persistence or pace), cited with 

approval in Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002); Craft v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the ALJ failed to provide an “accurate and 

logical bridge” between the medical testimony regarding mental limitations and the 

restriction to unskilled work). It was error for the ALJ to fail to include Cavanaugh’s 

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC. 

Vocational Expert 

 Cavanaugh argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the medical-vocational 

guidelines (the Grids) at Step Five, and he was required to call a vocational expert (VE) 

in light of Cavanaugh’s deficiency in concentration, persistence, or pace. The 

 3

 In a 2013 case in this Court, the Commissioner conceded that it was error for an 

ALJ to find that a claimant had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, but then to limit her to unskilled work without including detailed functional limitations. Pronovost v. Astrue, No. CV-12-01168-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 1092902, *1 

(D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2013). 

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Commissioner has the burden at Step Five to prove the claimant has the RFC to perform 

other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Hoopai, 499 F.3d 

at 1074. If a claimant’s RFC and vocational factors coincide entirely with a rule under the 

Grids then the rule directs a finding of disabled or not disabled. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. 

P, app. 2. § 200.00(a). However, if a claimant has a non-exertional limitation that is 

“‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the 

claimant’s exertional limitations” then an ALJ must obtain the testimony of a vocational 

expert. Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th 

Cir. 1988)). 

 There are several Ninth Circuit cases that require an ALJ to include the claimant’s 

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in a hypothetical question 

posed to a VE. See Lubin, 507 F. App’x at 712; Williamson, 438 F. App’x at 611; Brink, 

343 F. App’x at 212; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956 (incorporating a doctor’s 

testimony of a claimant’s deficiency in concentration, persistence, or pace into the 

hypothetical to a VE adequately captured that mental limitation). No circuit case directly 

addresses whether it is mandatory to call a vocational expert solely for a non-exertional 

limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. However, this Court has held that the 

Grids do not adequately account for a moderate deficiency in concentration, persistence, 

or pace. Perkins, 2014 WL 4425785, at *15 (citing Perkins v. Colvin, No. CV-12-01801-

PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 3930407, *10 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2013) (requiring testimony of 

vocational expert when claimant had non-exertional limitations related to cognitive 

impairments)). 

 Defendant contends the ALJ properly relied on the grids, and to support that 

argument she cites the Ninth Circuit case of Hoopai. In Hoopai, the circuit court noted 

that they had “not previously held mild or moderate depression to be a sufficiently severe 

non-exertional limitation that significantly limits a claimant’s ability to do work beyond 

the exertional limitation.” 499 F.3d at 1077. The court concluded that, in that case, the 

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claimant’s depression was not sufficiently severe as to require the testimony of a 

vocational expert. Id. 

 The facts in Hoopai are distinguishable from the instant case. In Hoopai, the court 

summarized medical testimony that identified functional non-exertional limitations, 

including a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. However, the 

appellate court did not indicate that the ALJ adopted any non-exertional limitations. 

Rather, it appears the ALJ determined that the claimant’s depression did not cause a 

significant functional limitation. In contrast, ALJ Baum explicitly found that 

Cavanaugh’s impairments caused a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or 

pace. As this Court has found previously, that limitation should have been included in the 

RFC. 

 The Social Security Administration provides the following direction on use of a 

vocational specialist: “[w]here the adjudicator does not have a clear understanding of the 

effects of additional limitations on the job base, the services of a VS will be necessary.” 

SSR 83-14. This guideline is applicable to Cavanaugh’s case. In Stubbs-Danielson, the 

court mentioned that a VE testified before the ALJ that a person with more than a mild 

pace impairment was not employable. 539 F.3d at 1173-74; see also Brink, 343 F. App’x 

at 212 (noting VE testified that moderate to marked concentration deficiency would 

preclude simple, repetitive work). While that testimony does not control here, it is not 

clear that a moderate limitation would not substantially erode the occupational base. 

Thus, a moderate limitation in pace is sufficiently severe to require the testimony of a 

VE. That conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit cases cited above, holding that 

when asking a vocational expert a hypothetical, an ALJ must include in the question a 

claimant’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace that the ALJ has 

adopted as a finding. 

CONCLUSION

 The Court finds the ALJ erred in determining Cavanaugh’s RFC, in that he failed 

to include a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. Including that 

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limitation in the RFC, it was error for the ALJ not to call a vocational expert at Step Five. 

 A federal court may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand a social security case. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). When a court finds that an administrative decision is flawed, the remedy 

should generally be remand for “additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2006) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 

(1985)); see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). However, if there 

are no outstanding issues because “the record has been developed fully and further 

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the . . . court should remand 

for an immediate award of benefits.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 

2004). Here, outstanding issues remain because the ALJ must revise the RFC and then 

obtain the testimony of a vocational expert before making a decision at Step Five. This 

fact is recognized by Cavanaugh who seeks only a remand for further proceedings. 

RECOMMENDATION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, 

after its independent review, enter an order granting Plaintiff’s request to reverse the 

Commissioner’s final decision and remand to the ALJ to conduct further proceedings. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 13-1222-TUC-JAS. 

 Dated this 24th day of November, 2014. 

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