Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02897/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02897-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARRY BORESS,

Plaintiff

v

SCOTT REYNOLDS, et al,

Defendants. /

No C-03-2897 VRW

ORDER

On August 5, 2004, the court granted defendants’ motion

to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc

#21 (Order). Additionally, the court granted defendants’ motion

for sanctions pursuant to 28 USC § 1927. Id at 8. In the closing

paragraph of its August 5, 2004, order, the court instructed

defendants to “file their request for costs and attorney’s fees

with the court no later than August 26, 2004.” Id at 8. Six

months later, on February 25, 2005, the court received defendants’

request for costs and fees. Doc #25. In their request, defendants

move this court for Rule 60(b) relief from the August 5, 2004,

Case 3:03-cv-02897-VRW Document 31 Filed 05/04/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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order inasmuch as it required them to file their costs and fees

request by August 26, 2004. Doc #27. Because the court finds this

matter suitable for decision without oral argument, the hearing

scheduled for May 12, 2005, is VACATED. Civ L R 7-1(b). For the

reasons that follow, the court DENIES defendants’ motion.

I

Defendants premise their Rule 60(b) request for relief on

the “excusable neglect” and “inadvertence” of their counsel, namely

the law firm of Gaw, Van Male, Smith, Myers & Miroglio (GVM). Id

at 2. The court will construe defendants’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion for

relief as a motion for an enlargement of time pursuant to FRCP

6(b)(2). 

FRCP 6(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that

when * * * by order of court an act is required * * * to

be done * * * within a specified time, the court for good

cause shown may at any time in its discretion * * * upon

motion made after the expiration of the specified period,

permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the

result of excusable neglect. 

“Although ‘excusable neglect’ is a flexible, equitable concept * *

* the moving party nevertheless bear[s] an inescapable burden of

establishing a satisfactory reason for not complying with the

unambiguous deadline prescribed by the court.” Pantoja-Perales v

Hopper Bros, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 10844, *4 (D Ore 1996) (citing Kyle

v Campbell Soup Co, 28 F3d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir 1994)). The Tenth

Circuit has held that a movant may meet this burden by a showing of

good faith coupled with a showing that there was a reasonable basis

for not complying within the time specified by the court. See In

re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 493 F2d 1288, 1290

Case 3:03-cv-02897-VRW Document 31 Filed 05/04/05 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(10th Cir 1974). It appears the Ninth Circuit has adopted the

Tenth Circuit’s standard. See Silber v Mabon, 18 F3d 1449, 1455

(9th Cir 1994) (citing with approval the standard announced in Four

Seasons).

Defendants offer only one explanation for not complying

with the August 26, 2004, deadline. In his declaration, Jeffrey

Daniel (counsel for defendants) states:

The attorney handling this matter on behalf of [GVM]

was Jay Menchaca * * *. Mr Menchaca is no longer with

[GVM]. Mr Menchaca left the firm in February 2004,

shortly after the court heard [d]efendant’s [sic]

motion to dismiss. On or about August 9, 2004, [GVM]

received from the court a copy of the order dismissing

[p]laintiff’s complaint. The order was placed in the

file. * * *. I took over the case in or about late

October or early November 2004 * * *. The question of

attorneys [sic] fees did not arise until mid-December

when I made a settlement offer to [p]laintiff. Until

that time, I had assumed that the issue of attorneys

[sic] fees was stayed pending the outcome of

[p]laintiff’s appeal [to the Ninth Circuit]. It was

not until late December that I discovered that there

was no order staying further action * * * and that the

motion for attorneys [sic] fees had not been timely

presented to the court.

Doc #26 (Daniel Decl) at 2, ¶¶7-8 (emphases added).

While the court is convinced there is no bad faith on the

part of GVM, there must still be a reasonable basis for not

complying with the court-ordered deadline. Defendants’ counsel

admits that it received the court’s August 5, 2004, order; but no

one in the firm read it. Because Mr Manchaca had left the firm, the

court’s order in this case was simply “placed in the file.” (The

court wonders how many other landmines are hiding in Mr Manchaca’s

apparently unperused files.) GVM’s failure to review the court’s

August 5, 2004, order is made all the more astonishing by the fact

that defendant Scott Reynolds is a senior partner at GVM. See

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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http://www.gawvanmale.com/ssreynolds.htm. 

Applying the “excusable neglect” standard described above,

it is clear that GVM’s failure to meet the deadline in this case is

not excusable neglect. While “reasonable basis” is a very lenient

standard, complete failure to read a court order and simply placing

it in a file because the attorney assigned to the case has left the

firm is not a reasonable basis. Moreover, once Daniel was assigned

to the case, it appears he did not pull the order from the file; he

simply “assumed” that the issue of attorney’s fees was stayed. But

this assumption was not reasonable. The court’s August 26, 2004,

deadline was not stayed by plaintiff’s appeal; plaintiff did not

appeal until August 30, 2004, -- four days after the deadline had

expired. 

This is not excusable neglect.

II

Accordingly, defendants’ Rule 6(b) motion to enlarge the

time to file their requests for costs and attorney’s fees is DENIED.

 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:03-cv-02897-VRW Document 31 Filed 05/04/05 Page 4 of 4