Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00682/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00682-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN BROOKS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-10-0682 DAD P

vs.

WHITSON, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed May 27, 2010, plaintiff’s complaint

was dismissed with leave to amend. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Whitson, Parks, and

Jackson violated his due process rights. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on or about September

18, 2006, plaintiff received a rules violation report for the possession of an inmate-manufactured

weapon. (Am. Compl. at 2.) According to plaintiff, the charges were based on conflicting, if not

false, information provided by defendant Whitson. (See id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff further alleges that

his disciplinary hearing regarding the matter was procedurally deficient because defendant Parks,

the investigative employee assigned to plaintiff’s case, failed to interview several key witnesses. 

(Id. at 2.) Finally, plaintiff avers that defendant Jackson failed to ensure that plaintiff received a

fair disciplinary hearing by not documenting the reasons for denying him witnesses, among other

things. (Id. at 3.) In terms of relief, plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

As the court advised plaintiff in its previous screening order, a plaintiff alleging a

procedural due process claim must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and then show that

the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th

Cir. 2002); Brewster v. Bd. of Education., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). In the context of a

prison disciplinary action, a prisoner may be deprived of a protected liberty interest if the action

in dispute resulted in the imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 

Here, plaintiff has failed once again to allege facts demonstrating that he has been

deprived of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The amended complaint does

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not allege any facts demonstrating that the disputed disciplinary action imposed an “atypical and

significant hardship on [plaintiff] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” or otherwise

caused “a major disruption in his environment.” Id. at 484, 486. Moreover, to the extent that the

amended complaint indicates that plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation as a result of

the disciplinary action now in dispute, such an allegation does not, in of itself, implicate a liberty

interest. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an inmate’s

placement in administrative segregation is insufficient to state a due process claim because such

confinement falls within the terms o confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence );

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986).

The allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint also now makes clear that the

rules violation report in question led to plaintiff forfeiting good time credits. (Am. Compl. at 4,

Ex. 1.) In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a

prisoner may not recover under § 1983 for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render his imprisonment invalid, unless he can prove that the basis for his confinement has been

reversed or expunged. Here, plaintiff challenges a disciplinary hearing that resulted in his loss of

good time credits. (Am. Compl. at 4, Ex. 1.) If plaintiff is successful on this claim, his success

would necessarily imply the invalidity of those lost good time credits and would therefore imply

the invalidity of his confinement. In addition, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the contested

disciplinary hearing has been properly reversed or set aside. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims

regarding the disciplinary hearing appear to be barred under Heck. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641 (1997) (dismissing a § 1983 action because a successful challenge to the plaintiff’s

disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his lost time credits). Plaintiff is

advised in this regard that his claims are properly presented in a habeas petition and not in a

§ 1983 action.

Accordingly, for all the reasons explained above, the court will recommend that

plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to randomly

assign this case to a United States District Judge.

Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 10) be dismissed without prejudice to

him bringing his due process claims in a habeas petition.

2. This case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 4, 2010.

DAD:sj

broo0682.56

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