Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01929/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01929-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on 

December 5, 2014.

I. Screening the Petition

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 

MATTA J. SANTOS,

 Petitioner,

v.

K. HOLLAND,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01929-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A COGNIZABLE CLAIM (D0C. 1), 

DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECT 

THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

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1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....@ Habeas Rule 4; 

O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, patently 

frivolous or false, or palpably incredible are subject to summary 

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001). However, a petition for habeas corpus should not be 

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable 

claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. 

Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

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Petitioner alleges he is an inmate of the California 

Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, California (CCIT), serving a 

life sentence. (Pet., doc. 1 at 1, 22.) Petitioner challenges the 

forfeiture of 360 days of time credit that he suffered as a sanction 

in a prison disciplinary proceeding in which Petitioner was found to 

have battered an inmate with a weapon on October 9, 2010. (Id. at 

8-31.) Petitioner raises the following claims in the petition: 1) 

Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment right was violated when Petitioner was 

deprived of the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence 

at the disciplinary hearing without any explanation; 2) Petitioner’s 

right to a fair hearing was violated by the failure of an 

investigative employee to discover the unreliability of confidential 

information relied upon by the adjudicator; 3) Petitioner’s 

protected liberty interest and right to due process of law were 

violated by the finding that Petitioner was guilty of the misconduct 

because the evidence on which it was based was unreliable; and 4) 

the state superior court erred in failing to grant Petitioner an 

evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability of the confidential 

information. (Id. at 8-22.)

II. Background

The reporting officer stated that a confidential informant 

reported that on October 9, 2010, after Petitioner had approached 

the victim, Torres, and had spoken with Torres briefly, Petitioner 

slashed at his neck and chest with a weapon. Petitioner ran to 

another area, where he was battered by three other inmates in 

retaliation for having attacked Torres. (Pet., doc. 1 at 31.) The 

state court that issued a decision concerning the reliability of the 

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confidential informant stated the confidential informant 

incriminated himself. (Id. at 53.)

Although Torres apparently tried to hide his injuries and 

stitched himself up, a medical examination of Torres’ body performed 

the following day showed injuries consistent with the confidential 

information, including two cuts on his neck and one cut on his right 

front chest area. (Id. at 32-35.) All inmates and areas were 

searched, but no weapon was found; no officer observed the stabbing 

of Torres. Torres stated that he had cut himself shaving. At the 

hearing, Petitioner said that he was playing soccer or was near the 

canteen with his cellmate, Hernandez, and did not see the victim 

that day. (Id. at 31-39, 53-55.)

The state court upheld as supported by some evidence the 

hearing officer’s finding that Petitioner had battered inmate Torres 

based on the confidential information, which incriminated the 

confidential informant and was corroborated by the other three 

inmates’ retaliatory attack on Petitioner. The victim’s explanation 

was rejected as inconsistent with the physical evidence, which 

reflected multiple slashes on the neck and one on the chest which 

did not correspond with the victim’s shaving story; it was also 

understandable that the victim was reluctant to come forward. (Id.

at 53-61.) The information from the confidential informant met 

state standards of reliability because it was self-incriminating; to 

have revealed more information could have endangered the source. 

(Id. at 60.)

III. Denial of Witnesses

Petitioner contends his rights under the Eighth Amendment were 

violated when Petitioner was deprived of the right to present 

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witnesses and documentary evidence at the disciplinary hearing 

without any explanation.

A. Factual Summary

The documentation attached to the petition reflects that 

Petitioner initially requested the presence of the reporting 

officer, Palmer; Officer Durazo; the three inmates Petitioner 

alleged had assaulted him, including inmates Avila, Nava, and 

Guerrero; the victim, Torres; and Petitioner’s cellmate, Hernandez. 

(Pet., doc. 1 at 60-61.) Petitioner waived the presence of Officer 

Palmer. (Id. at 55.) The hearing officer questioned Torres and 

Avila, who refused to answer any questions. Other questioning was 

accomplished by telephone. Nava and Guerrero were questioned and 

responded that neither saw any arguing between Petitioner and the 

victim, Petitioner attacking another inmate, Petitioner holding a 

weapon, or the victim bleeding; they denied seeing anything. (Id.

at 60-61.) Neither Hernandez nor Officer Durazo saw any argument or 

other contact between Petitioner and the victim. (Id. at 61.)

B. Analysis

The Due Process Clause is the source of procedural protections 

applicable to prison disciplinary hearings. Procedural due process 

requires that where the state has made conduct credit subject to 

forfeiture only for serious misbehavior, prisoners subject to a loss 

of conduct credits must be given advance written notice of the 

claimed violation, a right to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence where it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional 

safety or correctional goals, and a written statement of the finder 

of fact as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for 

disciplinary action taken. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 

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(1974). If the inmate is illiterate, or the issue so complex that 

it is unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present 

the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case, 

the inmate should have access to help from staff or a sufficiently 

competent inmate designated by the staff. However, confrontation,

cross-examination, and counsel are not required. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 

568-70.

 The right to call witnesses and to present evidence at a 

disciplinary hearing is limited by the prison authorities= discretion 

concerning undue hazards to institutional safety or correctional 

goals. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563-64. The right to call 

witnesses is circumscribed by the necessary mutual accommodation 

between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the 

Constitution that are of general application. A disciplinary 

authority may decline to allow an inmate to call a witness for 

irrelevance, lack of necessity, or hazards presented in individual 

cases. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321 (1976). A prison 

disciplinary hearing officer's decision that an inmate's request to 

call witnesses may properly be denied as irrelevant, unnecessary, 

unduly prolonging the hearing, or jeopardizing of prison safety, is 

entitled to deference from the Court. See, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. at 563-64; Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1985); Neal v. 

Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 

F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, the hearing officer questioned all requested witnesses 

and was not responsible for the two inmates’ refusal to answer 

questions. There is no showing that questioning the other witnesses 

by telephone was arbitrary or unreasonable under the circumstances, 

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or that it had any effect on the fairness or integrity of the 

proceedings. In short, it does not appear that a specific request 

of Petitioner to present specific evidence was denied. This is not 

a situation in which a duty to include an explanation in the record 

arises from the denial of a specific request to present a witness. 

Cf. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. at 497. 

In summary, with respect to his right to call witnesses and 

produce evidence, Petitioner has not shown a denial of due process.

IV. Reliance on Information from a Confidential Informant

Petitioner raises several related claims concerning the use in 

the disciplinary proceeding of information from a confidential 

informant.

A. Investigative Employee’s Lack of Access

Petitioner alleges his right to a fair hearing was violated by 

the failure of an investigative employee to discover the 

unreliability of confidential information from an unidentified 

informant that was relied upon by the reporting officer and hearing 

officer. Petitioner in effect argues that a staff assistant in the 

form of an investigative employee acting on Petitioner’s behalf 

should have been able to confront and interview the informant to 

determine his reliability, which was critical to Petitioner’s 

defense to the disciplinary charge. 

Access to information from confidential informants is a matter 

intertwined with the security of the inmates and the institution 

and, as such, is largely within the purview of the prison 

administrators. Here, considering the violent and retaliatory 

nature of the conduct of the Petitioner and of the other inmates, it 

was reasonable to apprehend danger to the source if additional 

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information were revealed. Further, more generally, as a policy 

matter, granting the right to confront and interview confidential 

informants to investigators acting on behalf of accused inmates 

might well discourage informants from stepping forward. The 

confidential information was strongly corroborated by independent 

evidence, including the injuries to the victim, the inconsistency of 

the victim’s injuries with the victim’s explanation of how he was 

injured, and Petitioner’s assault by three inmates in retaliation 

for Petitioner’s slashing the victim. The record also indicates 

that the informant incriminated himself in the course of reporting 

his information, which tends to indicate reliability.

In sum, Petitioner has not shown how lack of his investigator’s 

access to a confidential informant prejudiced him. In general, a 

failure to meet a prison guideline regarding a disciplinary hearing 

would not alone constitute a denial of due process. See Bostic v.

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court notes that 

several courts have concluded that to establish a denial of due 

process of law, prejudice is generally required. See Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (proceeding pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254); see also Tien v. Sisto, Civ. No. 2:07 cv-02436-VAP 

(HC), 2010 WL 1236308, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) (recognizing 

that while neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken on the issue, numerous federal 

Courts of Appeals, as well as courts in this district, have held 

that a prisoner must show prejudice to state a habeas claim based on 

an alleged due process violation in a disciplinary proceeding; see

also Smith v. United States Parole Commission, 875 F.2d 1361, 1368-

69 (9th Cir. 1989); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (9th 

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Cir. 1977). Petitioner has not shown that he was denied a fair 

hearing.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s claim that barring investigative access to the 

confidential informant violated his right to a fair hearing.

B. Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Supporting the Disciplinary Finding

 

Petitioner alleges that his protected liberty interest and 

right to due process of law were violated by the finding that he 

was guilty of the misconduct because the evidence on which it was 

based was unreliable. Petitioner’s challenge appears to be 

primarily to the use of the information from the confidential 

informant.

Where conduct credits are a protected liberty interest, the 

decision to revoke credits must be supported by some evidence in the 

record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The 

Court in Hill stated:

We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied 

if some evidence supports the decision by the prison 

disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This 

standard is met if Athere was some evidence from which the 

conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be 

deduced....@ United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner 

of Immigration, 273 U.S., at 106, 47 S.Ct., at 304. 

Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not 

require examination of the entire record, independent 

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of 

the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid.;

United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-134, 

44 S.Ct. 260, 260-261, 68 L.Ed. 590 (1924); Willis v. 

Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 (CA8 1974).

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Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The Constitution does 

not require that the evidence logically preclude any conclusion 

other than that reached by the disciplinary board; rather, there 

need only be some evidence in order to ensure that there was some 

basis in fact for the decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 

457.

Here, although the confidential informant’s information was one 

basis of the finding, the hearing officer relied on other

independent evidence. The victim, who was obviously reluctant to 

report his injuries let alone accuse another inmate of inflicting 

them, suffered injuries consistent with the confidential report but 

inconsistent with the victim’s own explanation. Three inmates 

assaulted Petitioner in apparent retaliation for his attack on the 

victim. Finally, the confidential informant’s information 

incriminated the informant and thus was reliable according to

established state standards. The decision was supported by some 

evidence. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s due process challenge to the use of the confidential 

information to support the disciplinary finding.

C. Failure to Afford Petitioner an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner argues that the state superior court erred in 

failing to grant Petitioner an evidentiary hearing to determine the 

reliability of the confidential informant. 

Petitioner appears to contend that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2), the state court’s conclusion was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding. Section 2254(d)(2) applies 

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where the process of the state court is claimed to have been 

defective. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 

2004). To determine that a state court’s fact finding process is 

defective in some material way or non-existent, a federal habeas 

court must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect 

is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the state 

court’s fact finding process was adequate. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d at 1000. 

Here, the record of the disciplinary proceeding itself 

reflected that the confidential information was substantially 

corroborated by physical evidence of the wounds to the victim and 

the retaliatory assault on Petitioner. It was not necessary for the 

state court to engage in discovery or weigh the evidence because the 

quantum of evidence required by due process was the relatively low 

standard of “some evidence,” which the confidential informant’s 

information and the independent corroborating evidence easily 

satisfied. It was not unreasonable for an appellate court to 

conclude that the state’s fact finding process was adequate. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

claim that the state court improperly failed to provide Petitioner 

an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the reliability of the 

confidential informant. 

In sum, Petitioner has not alleged facts that point to a real 

possibility of constitutional error, and the documentation submitted 

in support of the petition forecloses relief on Petitioner’s claims. 

It will be recommended that the petition be dismissed without leave 

to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim. 

/// 

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V. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

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Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

VI. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without 

leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim; 

2) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and 

3) The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the action because dismissal 

would terminate the proceeding in its entirety.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

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Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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