Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00051/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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1 In his motion for summary judgement, Avendano requested oral

argument on this matter. Mot. (doc. 5). Finding oral argument

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven R. Avendano, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-05-051 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

JoAnne B. Barnhart, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. ) )

On January 6, 2005, Plaintiff Steven R. Avendano, ("Avendano")

filed his complaint in this case. Complaint (doc. 1). Avendano

seeks review in this court of a decision rendered by an

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the Social Security

Administration ("SSA"), who denied him disability and disability

benefits. Id. at 2. A motion for summary judgment was filed on

April 18, 2005, which provides the basis for Avendano's appeal of

the ALJ's findings. Mot. (doc. 5).1 On May 23, 2005, Defendant

Case 2:05-cv-00051-RCB Document 15 Filed 02/07/06 Page 1 of 15
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28 unnecessary, the Court shall deny this request.

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JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security ("the

Commissioner"), filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking

for this court to affirm the ALJ's decision. Cross-Mot. (doc. 8). 

These motions were fully briefed on June 22, 2005. Reply (doc.

13). The court, having carefully considered the arguments

presented by the parties, as well as the Administrative Record, now

rules.

I. Facts

A. Procedural History

On April 16, 2002, Avendano filed an application for

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income

Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42

U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Administrative Record ("A.R.") (doc. 2) at 16.

The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Id.

Thereafter, a hearing was held on July 16, 2003, before

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Frederick J. Graf. Id. The ALJ

issued a decision in which he found Avendano not disabled within

the meaning of the Act. Id. Specifically, the ALJ found that

Avendano's back disorder, as well as his affective and substance

abuse disorders were "severe." Id. at 21. However, the ALJ

concluded that despite these impairments, Avendano had the residual

functional capacity to perform light level functioning with the

complete inability to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and some

limitations in climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching

or crawling on more than an occasional basis. A.R. (doc. 2) at 22.

Although Avendano had moderate difficulties in understanding and

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remembering detailed instructions, getting along with co-workers

and maintaining socially appropriate behaviors, the ALJ determined

that Avendano could return to the occupations he had previously

performed and was not under a disability as defined in the Social

Security Act. Id.

On October 15, 2003, Avendano requested review by the Appeals

Council. A.R. (doc. 2) at 9. On November 10, 2004, the Appeals

Council denied the request for review of the ALJ decision and

adopted the decision as the Commissioner's final decision. Id. at

5. Avendano then commenced this action for judicial review

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Complaint (doc. 1) at 1. Avendano

seeks for this Court to reverse the ALJ's decision, arguing that

the "decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is

founded on multiple legal errors[.]" Mot. Memo. (doc. 6) at 2.

B. Background Facts

Avendano was born on November 1, 1969. A.R. (doc. 2) at 47.

He was 33 years old at the time of the hearing in July 2003. Id.

at 17. Avendano has a limited education and has past work

experience as a corrections officer, prep cook, dishwasher, painter

and general laborer. Id. He alleges he became disabled on April

16, 2002, due to severe depression. Id.

II. Standard of Review

Both parties have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and...the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This case is an appeal from the decision of

an ALJ. A district court reviews the decision of a social security

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administrative law judge de novo. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d

1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2001). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), "the

findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...." Hence,

if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial

evidence, and based on application of the correct legal standards,

it is conclusive upon judicial review. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d

1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980

(9th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion." Sandgathe, 108 F.3d at 980. 

To determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported by

substantial evidence, the court reviews the administrative record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence which supports and that

which detracts from the ALJ's conclusion. Id. If the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the district

court will uphold the ALJ's decision. Id. The court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner]. Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

As discussed above, the critical issue at the heart of this

proceeding is whether Avendano is, in fact, disabled under the

Act. The ALJ answered this question in the negative. In order to

qualify for the benefits sought, Avendano had to show the ALJ that

his impairments were so functionally limiting as to prevent him

from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for at least

twelve consecutive months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(definition of

"Disability"). Avendano shoulders the burden of proving his

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disability. Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985);

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)("In

determining the ultimate issue of disability, claimant bears the

burden of proving she is disabled.").

III. Discussion

Avendano asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment for

three separate reasons. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 2-3. He claims

that the ALJ erred by "adopting" the opinion of Francis Enos,

Ph.D. and "rejecting" the opinion of Steven Hirdes, Ed.D., by

speculating that Avendano's condition would improve, and by

failing to credit Avendano's testimony. Id. Defendant contests

all of these charges. The Court will address each issue in turn.

A. Opinions of Nonexamining and Examining Physicians

Avendano's first argument is that the ALJ erred by "adopting"

the opinion of Francis Enos, Ph.D., and "rejecting" the opinion of

Steven Hirdes, Ed.D. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 2-3. Dr. Enos is a

state agency psychologist who did not examine Avendano and did not

testify at the hearing. On the other hand, Dr. Hirdes examined

Avendano on behalf of the state agency. 

Avendano asserts that the ALJ committed an error of law when

he relied on the opinion of Dr. Enos in making his decision in

this case. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 3. Specifically, Avendano

argues that because Dr. Enos did not examine him, the ALJ could

not base the decision to deny him benefits on Dr. Enos' opinion. 

Id. at 3-4. Avendano cites numerous Ninth Circuit cases in

support of his argument. Id. citing Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d

587 (9th Cir. 2004); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.

2003); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001; Lester

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v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1996); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d

953 (9th Cir. 1993). Moreover, Avendano contends that the ALJ's

statement that he "adopt[s] the rationale referenced in [Dr. Enos'

opinion]" indicates that the ALJ solely relied on Dr. Enos' report

in making his decision. Reply (doc. 13) at 2.

The opinions of treating and examining physicians are

entitled to greater weight than the opinions of nonexamining

physicians. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Although Avendano correctly

states the law that an ALJ may not solely base his decision on the

opinion of a nonexamining physician, such a situation is not the

case here.

In the case at bar, the ALJ did not rely on Dr. Enos' opinion

alone in determining that Plaintiff's mental problems were not

disabling. In his decision, the ALJ cites numerous reports and

records from different doctors as evidence indicating that

Avendano is not disabled under the definition of the Act. A.R.

(doc. 2) at 18-20 (citing evidence from the reports of Dr. Ashok

Narayan, Dr. Anthony Pellegrino, Dr. Steven Hirdes, Dr. Michael

Vines, and two State Agency medical consultants, one of which was

Dr. Enos). In addition, the ALJ notes that he found it

"particulary significant...that from a physical standpoint, none

of [Avendano's] treatment providers have concluded he is

disabled." Id. at 19. The decision shows that the ALJ considered

the entire medical record in determining that Avendano was not

disabled under the Act. Thus, the Court does not find that the

ALJ's consideration of Dr. Enos' opinion was improper.

In addition, Avendano argues that there was little

explanation for Dr. Enos' assessment, and that the ALJ's reliance

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on such assessment in reaching the limited mental residual

functional capacity determination was inappropriate. Mot. Memo

(doc. 6) at 4-5. Again, these claims are based on the presumption

that the ALJ in this matter relied only on Dr. Enos' opinion in

making his decision. As previously stated, the Court finds that

the ALJ considered the entire record in this case and relied on

multiple facets of that record in making his decision to deny

Avendano's request for benefits. 

In contrast, Avendano argues that the ALJ committed an error

of law when he "rejected" the opinion of examining physician, Dr.

Hirdes. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 7. Avendano asserts that based on

inconsistencies in his testimony, the ALJ discredited Dr. Hirdes'

opinion because he believed that Plaintiff had been "less

forthcoming [sic] to the consultative psychologist[.]" Id. at 8

(citing A.R. (doc. 2) at 20). "It was legal error for the ALJ to

base rejection of Hirdes' opinion on specious inconsistencies." 

Id. at 9. Avendano contends that Hirdes "established limitation

facially inconsistent with the ability to sustain work

activities," thus clearly indicating that Plaintiff is disabled. 

Id. at 9-10.

In July 2002, Avendano was examined by Steven C. Hirdes,

Ed.D., a licensed psychologist. A.R. (doc. 2) at 148. Avendano

complained of depression and mood swings. Id. He said he

currently lived with his mother, who was disabled, and that he

helped her with the cooking and cleaning. Id. at 148-49. He

indicated that he did very little during the day and, although he

slept from 9:00p.m. to 10:00a.m., he also napped 3-5 hours each

day. Id. at 149-50. He said he drank heavily in the past, but

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had virtually no alcohol in the past 3 to 4 years. Id. at 148.

Upon mental status examination, Dr. Hirdes noted that

Avendano was poorly groomed, was interpersonally immature, and

that Avendano acknowledged thoughts of suicide but had made no

suicidal efforts. A.R. (doc. 2) at 149. Avendano did not exhibit

any thought disorder, delusions or hallucinations. Id. His

judgment and insight were poor and his intelligence was in the low

average range. Id. at 150. Dr. Hirdes diagnosed major depressive

disorder, single episode, severe without psychotic features; rule

out bipolar disorder, learning disorders, attention

deficit/hyperactivity disorder; and history of alcohol abuse in

three year remission, by the claimant's report. Id. Dr. Hirdes

completed a check-list form in which he indicated that Avendano

would be either "limited but satisfactory" or "seriously limited,

but not precluded" in a number of work-related areas. Id. at 152-

53.

The Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons

for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining

physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Even if the opinion is

contradicted by another doctor, it can only be rejected for

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Id. at 830-31. "The opinion of a

nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an

examining physician or a treating physician." Id. at 831. 

In the case at bar, the ALJ notes specific inconsistencies in

Avendano's testimony related to his past history of substance

abuse. A.R. (doc. 2) at 20.

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At the [evaluation in July 2002 with Dr. Hirdes],

the claimant acknowledged having a history of

extensive alcohol abuse, but essentially denied

consuming anything in nearly four years. Barely

two weeks later, the claimant reported a somewhat

more extensive, albeit contradictory, history of

alcohol abuse to the Administration (Ex. 6E).

Initially, he reported consuming only one beer per

month, but denied having any in the past two

months. He later elaborated that he consumed 1 to

2 beers at a time, on one or more occasions each

month. His mother, while aware he had a substance

abuse problem, reported that she was unaware of

its 'magnitude[.]'"

Id. Due to these inconsistencies, the ALJ concludes that "[i]t is

relatively apparent...that the claimant [has] been less than

forthcoming to [Dr. Hirdes] and therefore the findings and

conclusions of that report must be considered with caution." Id.

According to this statement, it is not clear whether the ALJ

summarily "rejected" Dr. Hirdes' opinion, or merely considered it

with "caution." In his report, Dr. Hirdes does not conclusively

find that Avendano is disabled, and, in contrast, notes that

Avendano would be either "limited but satisfactory" or "seriously

limited, but not precluded" in a number of work-related areas. 

A.R. (doc. 2) at 152-53. In any event, the ALJ notes other

evidence in the record that did not corroborate Dr. Hirdes'

opinion. A.R. (doc. 2) at 20.

[Dr. Hirdes] noted that the claimant presented

himself in a rather unkempt and unclean manner and

that he slept excessively. Curiously, during [the

time period between July 2002 and July 2003], none

of claimant's treatment providers, including his

specialists in pain management and neurology,

reported observing anything unusual concerning

either his demeanor or hygiene. In addition, the

nonexamining State Agency medical consultant

opined in January 2003, that the claimant's

depressive disorder improved to the point that it

was no longer severe. In contrast, when evaluated

in July 2003, Dr. Vines noted that he exhibited

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good hygiene, slept erratically, and denied any

history of either drug or alcohol abuse.

Id. (internal citations omitted). When presented with conflicting

medical opinions, the ALJ must determine credibility and resolve

the conflict. Batson v. Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Greater

weight must be given to the opinions of examining physicians, and

in the case of a conflict the ALJ must give specific, legitimate

reasons for disregarding the opinion of such a physician. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830-31. Here, these rules were satisfied as the ALJ

gave specific and legitimate reasons to question Dr. Hirdes'

opinion on the degree of Avendano's impairment. The fact that the

ALJ did not give Dr. Hirdes' opinion the weight Avendano desires

does not create an error of law.

B. Speculation on Avendano's Condition

Second, Avendano argues that the ALJ erred by "speculating

that Avendano's condition would improve without any basis in the

record for doing so." Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 3. Plaintiff refers

to the ALJ's statement that "[t]here has been no evidence

presented to date to contradict the conclusion that [Avendano's

anxiety related disorder], with treatment, will also become nonsevere in less than 12 months." A.R. (doc. 2) at 20. Avendano

asserts that the ALJ committed an error of law because, in making

this assessment, he relied on the opinion of non-examining

psychologist Dr. Enos, and that such a statement is mere

speculation. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 10. Thus, Avendano argues

that the ALJ's decision is "supported by speculation, not

substantial evidence." Id. at 10-11.

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In his decision, the ALJ supports his statement concerning

Avendano's possible improvement with evidence in the record. A.R.

(doc. 2) at 20. The ALJ notes that the record indicated that, in

the past, Avendano's substance and affective disorders had

improved to the point of becoming non-severe, and that he had only

recently incurred an anxiety related disorder. Id. Although

Avendano maintains that the ALJ's statement equals improper

speculation, the Court finds such statement to be more likely

related to the ALJ's interpretation that Avendano failed to prove

that his anxiety related disorder would last for "a continuous

period of at least twelve months[.]" 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A)(definition of "Disability"). Regardless, although

the basis for this statement may have come from the report of a

nonexamining doctor, the Court finds that the ALJ considered the

entire medical record in this case in making his decision to deny

Avendano's request for disability benefits. Thus, the Court

disagrees with Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ based his

decision solely on this "speculation" concerning Avendano's

possible improvement. 

C. Avendano's Credibility

Avendano's final argument is that the ALJ improperly rejected

his testimony. Mot. Memo (doc. 6) at 3. He asserts that the

reasons provided by the ALJ for discrediting his testimony do not

"satisfy the requirements for a credibility analysis." Id. at 12. 

Avendano asserts that the ALJ did not specifically identify what

testimony was not credible, and did not provide clear and

convincing reasons for finding such testimony not credible. Id.

Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying

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impairment which is reasonably likely to be the cause of certain

subjective symptoms, the ALJ may not discredit a claimant's

testimony on that issue solely because the degree of limitation

alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical

evidence. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir. 1995);

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991). The

ALJ cannot reject the claimant's testimony about subjective

complaints without making findings sufficiently specific to permit

the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily

discredit that testimony. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-47. Factors

the ALJ may legitimately consider to make a credibility

determination include the claimant's daily activities,

inconsistencies in testimony, effectiveness or adverse side

effects of any pain medication, and relevant character evidence. 

Id.; Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792-93

(9th Cir. 1997); Fair, 885 F.2d at 602-04. However, the ALJ is

the trier of fact. Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. As long as the ALJ's

determination was reached based on an explicit consideration of

the appropriate factors, it is not the reviewing court's place to

second-guess that determination. Id.

At the hearing on July 16, 2003, Avendano testified that he

was born in 1969 and finished the 9th grade. A.R. (doc. 2) at 36-

37. He noted that he did not have a GED. Id. at 37. Avendano

stated that he was five feet ten inches tall and weighed 210

pounds. Id. He also stated that he had gained 63 pounds in the

last six or seven months. Id. Avendano indicated that he had not

driven for about one year because he was too anxious. Id. at 38-

39. He testified that he was getting treatment for his depression

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and anxiety from Dr. Vines, and that he also saw a counselor. 

A.R. (doc. 2) at 39. In addition, Avendano said (1) he had severe

depression and suicidal thoughts; (2) that he slept all day and

did not shower or shave for months at a time; and (3) that he did

not leave the house because he got nervous around people. Id. at

39-41. He stated that he lived with his mother, and that four

months ago he tried to kill himself with a razor blade. Id. at

40-41. He also said that he scratches himself and bites his

nails. Id. at 42-43. Avendano reported that he was let go from

his last job in April 2002 because of a lack of motivation. Id.

at 43.

In his decision, the ALJ offered specific reasons for

discounting Avendano's testimony. The ALJ found Avendano not

credible because of three specific inconsistencies in his

testimony. First, as described above, the ALJ states that it

appeared that Avendano had not been entirely honest with either

the consulting psychologist, Dr. Hirdes, or treating psychiatrist,

Dr. Vines, concerning the presence and extent of his substance

abuse. A.R. (doc. 2) at 20. Second, the ALJ notes that

Avendano's testimony about his recent weight gain was inconsistent

with evidence in the record. Id.

Similarly, the claimant's testimony that his

current weight of 210 pounds included a 63 pound

increase over the past 7 months is not supported

by the evidence of record. He reported in April

2002 that he weighed 210 pounds and as recently as

August 2002, weighed 212 pounds. 

Id. Third, the ALJ noted that Avendano's reports of suicidal

gesture and self-mutilation (excessive scratching and fingernail

biting) were not supported by the record in that Dr. Vines'

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evaluation and subsequent therapy notes do not make any reference

to them. Id. "If he is indeed exhibiting these symptoms, it is

exceedingly odd that they are being reported to the undersigned

for the first time rather than to [Dr. Vines,] the individual

seeking to treat him for his impairment(s)." Id. For these

reasons, the ALJ did not find Avendano to be a credible witness as

to the nature and degree of his symptoms and limitations.

Avendano argues that these reasons are not sufficient to

discredit his testimony. He asserts that (1) the inconsistencies

found by the ALJ regarding his statements about his substance

abuse were unfounded; (2) that the ALJ's finding regarding

fluctuations in his weight was irrelevant to the issue of the

severity of his mental impairments; and (3) that the lack of

notations in Vines' report regarding a history of excessive

scratching and fingernail biting does not prove that such a

history is untrue. Id. at 12-13. 

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, there are sufficient

reasons addressed to Avendano's testimony that support the ALJ's

credibility determination. An ALJ is permitted to reject

testimony regarding subjective symptoms as long as he makes

specific findings justifying that decision. Fair, 885 F.2d at

604. In addition, an ALJ is entitled to use "'ordinary techniques

of credibility evaluation' to test a claimant's credibility." 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. Here, although the inconsistencies in

Avendano's testimony may not relate to the severity of his

physical or mental impairments, the ALJ could find that they were

probative as to whether Avendano's subjective complaints were

believable. The Court concludes that the ALJ made the requisite

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specific findings, and there is substantial evidence to support

his decision.

iv. Conclusion

Upon review of each of Avendano's challenges to the ALJ's

decision, the Court finds that the ALJ fulfilled his

responsibility to consider the medical evidence, and the record as

a whole, in making specific findings concerning Avendano's alleged

disability. The evidence cited by the ALJ in his decision is

relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support his conclusion that Plaintiff in not disabled. 

Although some of the evidence highlighted by Avendano is possibly

susceptible to more than one interpretation, the district court

must uphold the ALJ's decision. Id. Therefore, the Court finds

that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Avendano's motion for summary judgment

(doc. 5) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's cross-motion for

summary judgment (doc. 8) is GRANTED. The court clerk is directed

to enter JUDGMENT for Defendant and terminate this case.

DATED this 6th day of February, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:05-cv-00051-RCB Document 15 Filed 02/07/06 Page 15 of 15