Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01098/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01098-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WYNATHEN KETCHUM, ANA MENJIVAR, 

acting for themselves and 

others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF VALLEJO, 

 Defendant. / 

No. Civ. S-05-1098 RRB JFM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiffs Wynathen Ketchum (“Ketchum”) and Ana Menjivar 

(“Menjivar”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an action on 

behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Vallejo police 

officers against the City of Vallejo (“Defendant”) seeking to 

recover unpaid compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). Defendant now moves for 

summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim is 

time-barred. Alternatively, Defendant moves for summary 

judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the 

compensation they seek under the FLSA. Plaintiffs have filed a 

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cross-motion for summary adjudication seeking a determination 

that time spent training and transporting Mounted Patrol Unit 

horses is compensable work under the FLSA. 

For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED to 

the extent that it seeks a determination that the instant action 

has not been properly commenced. It is DENIED in all other 

respects. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary adjudication is 

GRANTED to the extent that it seeks a determination that the 

time spent training and transporting MPU horses is compensable 

work under the FLSA.1

 

I. BACKGROUND 

In or around 1995, the City of Vallejo created the Mounted 

Patrol Unit (“MPU”) for the purpose of patrolling certain 

special events on horseback. Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“UMF”) ¶¶ 1-4; Def.’s Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“UMF”) ¶ 15.2

 MPU officers were trained to 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

 

2

 MPU events occurred approximately once a month. Def’s UMF 

¶ 16. 

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perform various law enforcement activities on horseback, 

including crowd control and making arrests. Pl’s UMF ¶¶ 5-6. 

In order to join the MPU, officers were required to own their 

own horses and trailers as well as provide transportation to and 

from MPU events. Id. ¶¶ 8, 47-48. 

Prior to assignment with the MPU, officers were required to 

complete a Basic Assessment Test (“BAT”), which was established 

as the minimum riding skills required for admission into the 

unit. Pl.’s UMF ¶ 12. Additionally, prospective MPU officers 

had to successfully graduate from a Peace Officer Services 

Training approved “Mounted Patrol” course. Id. ¶ 13. Once 

assigned to MPU, officers were required to satisfy continuing 

training requirements and pass an annual “in-service test,” 

which was developed to measure horsemanship skills. Id. ¶¶ 19-

20. MPU officers were also required to ensure that their horses 

were adequately trained and that they met certain criteria, 

including proper temperament, physical condition, appearance and 

vaccination. Id. ¶¶ 10, 22, 52-53. 

 Plaintiffs joined the MPU unit in 1996 and 1997, 

respectively. Pl.’s UMF ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiffs allege that MPU 

officers were required to work approximately four-to-five offduty hours a week handling their horses in order to maintain the 

skills necessary to be an MPU officer. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs 

assert that they were routinely instructed by supervisors to 

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train off-duty and, until July 2002, were required to spend six 

off-duty hours a week training their horses pursuant to a 

Vallejo Police Department policy. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 32-33. 

Plaintiffs further assert that even after this requirement was 

eliminated, MPU officers were still required to train off-duty 

on a regular basis in order to be effective MPU officers and to 

pass the annual “in-service” test. Id. ¶¶ 29-33, 39-44. Id. ¶ 

46. 

Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that they received two 

extra hours of compensation for time spent handling their horses 

before and after MPU events, they maintain that they spent 

significantly more off-duty time handling their horses in 

preparation for MPU events. Pl’s UMF ¶ 62.3 Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege that they worked approximately four-to-seven 

uncompensated hours per week preparing their horses for MPU 

events from June 1, 2002 through June 1, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.4

 

 On June 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the instant action on 

their own behalf, and on behalf of other similarly situated MPU 

 

3

 Plaintiffs also acknowledge that they were reimbursed for 

expenses incurred in transporting their horses to and from MPU 

events and for veterinary expenses for on-duty injuries. 

However, Plaintiffs contend that they were not compensated for 

off-duty time in the ordinary care, veterinary care, shoeing, 

exercising, feeding, grooming and training of their horses. 

Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 10-13. 

 4

 The MPU was deactivated in June 2005. Def.’s UMF ¶ 25. 

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officers, seeking to recover for unpaid compensation for offduty time spent caring, training and transporting MPU horses. 

Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 27. More particularly, Plaintiffs seek the 

following relief: (1) unpaid compensation for all hours worked 

in excess of forty hours per week and eighty hours per pay 

period, at a rate of one and one-half their regular rate of pay; 

(2) a determination that Defendant’s conduct was an intentional, 

knowing and willful violation of the FLSA, entitling Plaintiffs 

to liquidated damages and a three year period of recovery for 

unpaid compensation; and (3) attorney fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b). Id. ¶ 40.

II. DISCUSSION 

 Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate 

because Plaintiffs have failed to properly commence this action 

within FLSA’s two-year statutory period since they have not 

filed consent to suit forms with this court as required by 29 

U.S.C. § 216. Alternatively, Defendant argues that summary 

judgment is appropriate because the time spent by Plaintiffs 

training and transporting their horses for MPU events is not 

compensable work under the FLSA. These claims are addressed 

individually below. 

A. Legal Standard 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary 

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. § 56(c). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 

“genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A fact is material if it 

could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

substantive law. Id. at 248. A material fact is “genuine,” if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. If the moving party meets 

its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 

establish, beyond the pleadings, and by his or her own 

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.” 

Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hunt v. 

Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). “But the non-moving party 

must come forward with more than ‘the mere existence of a 

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scintilla of evidence.’ ” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Thus, “ ‘[w]here the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for 

the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Where 

divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the 

undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. Miller, 454 

F.3d at 988. 

B. FLSA Statute of Limitations 

 Defendant argues that the instant action is time-barred 

because Plaintiffs have failed to properly commence it within 

FLSA’s two-year statute of limitations since they have not filed 

consent to suit forms with this court as required by 29 U.S.C. § 

216. 

 Plaintiffs filed the instant action as a collective action 

under the FLSA, which authorizes an employee to bring an action 

on behalf of “himself . . . and other employees similarly 

situated” if an employer has failed to pay overtime 

compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat.

Ass’n, 2007 WL 2263880, * 1 (9th Cir. 2007).5 The FLSA provides 

 

5

 “Section 7 of the FLSA provides for overtime compensation: 

an employee who works more than forty hours a week must be paid 

at least one and one-half times his or her regular rate for 

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that no party may join a collective action “unless he gives his 

consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is 

filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b).6 Under the FLSA, a “collective action” is considered 

to be commenced with respect to any individual claimant “on the 

date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as 

a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to 

become a party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in 

which the action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 256(a). A cause of 

action under the FLSA “may be commenced within two years after 

the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be 

 

those additional hours.” Dent v. Cox Communications Las Vegas, 

Inc., 2007 WL 2580754, * 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 

207(a)(1)). “Section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216, addresses 

courses of action available to remedy an employer’s violation of 

the statute. Subsection 16(b) provides, in relevant part, for a 

private cause of action to recover unpaid overtime compensation 

and ‘an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.’ 

[Citation]. The same subsection also allows a prevailing 

plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney's fee and the costs 

of the action from the defendant.” Dent, 2007 WL 2580754 at *2 

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 

6

 A “collective action” differs from a class action insofar 

as each plaintiff must opt into the suit by giving his consent 

in writing. McElmurry, 2007 WL 2263880 at * 1. Thus, unlike a 

class action where an individual becomes a member of the class, 

and thereby bound by any judgment in the matter, unless he 

expressly opts-out, only those plaintiffs who expressly join the 

collective action are bound by its results. Id.; see Ballaris 

v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 906 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(if employees do not opt-in by filing consent to the collective 

action, they are not bound by the outcome of such action and may 

bring a subsequent private action). 

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forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause 

of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of 

a willful violation may be commenced within three years after 

the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 

 When a “collective action” is filed under § 216(b) all 

plaintiffs, including named plaintiffs are required to file a 

consent to suit form with the court in which the action is 

brought. Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 

1101 (6th Cir. 2004); Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 

F.Supp.2d 1129, 1133 (D. Nev. 1999). A “collective action” is 

not deemed commenced with respect to each individual plaintiff 

until his or her consent has been filed. Harkins, 385 F.3d at 

1101; Bonilla, 61 F.Supp.2d at 1133 (citing cases); see also

Gonzalez v. El Acajutla Restaurant, Inc., 2007 WL 869583, * 5 

(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (an FLSA suit does not commence with respect to 

a plaintiff, including a named plaintiff, until their written 

consent has been filed).7

 

 

7

 In Harkins, the Sixth Circuit explained that “[t]he 

statute is unambiguous: if you haven’t given your written 

consent to join the suit, or if you have but it hasn’t been 

filed with the court, you’re not a party. It makes no 

difference that you are named in the complaint, for you might 

have been named without your consent. The rule requiring 

written, filed consent is important because a party is bound by 

whatever judgment is eventually entered in the case, and if he 

is distrustful of the capacity of the ‘class’ counsel to win a 

judgment he won't consent to join the suit.” Harkins, 385 F.3d 

at 1101.

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 Plaintiffs filed the instant action on June 1, 2005, 

alleging a single cause of action under the FLSA “on their own 

behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated.” Compl. 

¶¶ 4-5. To date, no Plaintiff, including the named Plaintiffs, 

has filed a written consent to join this action. Plaintiffs, 

however, maintain that this is of no consequence because, as 

named plaintiffs, they are not required to file written consent 

forms with the court in order to commence their action. Pl.’s 

Opp. at 8-9. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that they are 

not required to file written consent forms because their action 

is a joint action alleging individual claims, not a “collective 

action.” Id. at 9-10. The court disagrees. 

In the present case, the Plaintiffs have styled their 

action as a representative action seeking to represent 

themselves and other similarly situated MPU officers. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs assert that their action is not a 

“collective action.” The plain language of the Complaint 

contradicts this assertion. Notably, the Complaint contains an 

entire section entitled “Collective Action Allegations,” which 

sets forth the basis by which Plaintiffs, on their own behalf 

and “on behalf of all others similarly situated,” seek to 

recover compensation for unpaid overtime under the FLSA. 

Moreover, the Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations 

supporting individual causes of action or individual damage 

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claims. Indeed, the Complaint simply contains a single cause of 

action under the FLSA alleged on behalf of Plaintiffs and other 

“unnamed Plaintiffs” who “worked similar uncompensated hours” as 

Plaintiffs. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the 

instant action is a “collective action.” It is captioned as a 

representative action under § 216 of FLSA and contains specific 

allegations seeking relief on behalf of named Plaintiffs for the 

benefit of similarly situated unnamed plaintiffs. See Gray v. 

Swanney-McDonald, Inc., 436 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1971) (a 

collective action is an action brought by an employee or 

employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other 

employees similarly situated); Bonilla, 61 F.Supp.2d. at 1138 (a 

collective action is an action under § 216(b) where plaintiffs, 

on the face of their complaint, purport to sue on behalf of 

themselves and “others similarly situated”).8

 

Accordingly, because this action is a “collective action,” 

each plaintiff’s action commences on the date their consent to 

suit form is filed with the court. Therefore, because no 

consent to suit form has been filed, this action has not been 

 

8

 Although Plaintiffs contend that they abandoned their 

pursuit of a collective action, they failed to convert their 

action into a joint action on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 

 

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properly commenced.9 As such, Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim is timebarred under FLSA’s two-year statutory period, unless Plaintiff 

can demonstrate that the FLSA’s three-year statutory period 

applies, i.e., Defendant willfully violated the FLSA.10 

 

9

 To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on Allen v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) to support their 

position that they were not required to file written consent 

forms to join this action, the court finds such reliance 

misplaced. Allen is distinguishable. In Allen, unlike here, 

the court concluded that the named plaintiffs were not required 

to file written consents because the suit consisted of a number 

of individual actions as it alleged individual causes of action, 

sought individual relief in the form of individual damage claims 

and none of the plaintiffs sought to represent anyone else. 

Allen, 724 F.2d at 1135. Additionally, to the extent that 

Plaintiffs rely on Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852 F.2d 

1008 (7th Cir. 1988) to support their position that they were 

not required to file written consent forms, the court finds such 

reliance misplaced. Anderson is distinguishable. In Anderson, 

unlike here, the case was styled as a joint action, not a 

representative action. Id. at 1011. As such, its reasoning has 

no applicability to the present case because the relief sought 

in that case was not sought on behalf of others similarly 

situated. See Harkins, 385 F.3d at 1102. 

 10 Although Plaintiffs have not raised the issue of 

equitable tolling, this court must consider whether the 

circumstances warrant tolling the statute of limitations. See

Partlow v. Jewish Orphans’ Home of Southern Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 

757, 760 (9th Cir. 1981) (implying doctrine of equitable tolling 

into FLSA) abrogated on other grounds by Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. 

v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989). Equitable tolling has 

generally been applied in two kinds of situations, the first 

being where a plaintiff was prevented from asserting a claim by 

some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, and 

the second being where extraordinary circumstances beyond the 

plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file the claims on 

time. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 

(9th Cir. 1997). The court concludes that this case is not an 

appropriate case for equitable tolling because Defendant has not 

engaged in any wrongful conduct which prevented Plaintiffs from 

filing their consent to suit forms. Nor have Plaintiffs 

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C. Willful Violations of the FLSA 

 Section 255(a) states that a “cause of action arising out 

of a willful violation [of the FLSA] may be commenced within 

three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 

255(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted the term “willful” to 

mean “that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard 

as to whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” 

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). 

To establish a “willful violation” of the FLSA, the 

employee must prove “that the employer either knew or showed 

reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was 

prohibited by the statute.” McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133; Adams 

v. U.S., 350 F.3d 1216, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bull v. U.S., 68 

Fed. Cl. 212, 272 (Fed. Cl. 2005). “The word ‘willful’ is 

widely used in the law, and, although it has not by any means 

been given a perfectly consistent interpretation, it is 

generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely 

negligent.” McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133. “ ‘Reckless 

 

articulated any extraordinary circumstances beyond their control 

that prevented them from filing their consent to suit forms; 

indeed, the ability to file the consent forms was solely within 

Plaintiffs’ control. See Bonilla, 61 F.Supp.2d 1129 (refusing 

to toll statute of limitation for three named plaintiffs who did 

not file consents). Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs 

argue that their failure to file consent forms constitutes 

excusable neglect, the court disagrees. Plaintiffs have not 

presented any evidence demonstrating that they were not culpable 

for failing to file the consent forms. 

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disregard’ ” is defined as the ‘failure to make adequate inquiry 

into whether conduct is in compliance with the Act.’ ” Bull v. 

U.S., 68 Fed.Cl. at 272-73; see also Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 

F.3d 894, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003) (“For § 255’s extension to 

obtain an employer need not knowingly have violated the FLSA; 

rather, the three-year term can apply where an employer 

disregarded the very ‘possibility’ that it was violating the 

statute, although we will not presume that conduct was willful 

in the absence of evidence”). The fact that an employer acts 

unreasonably in determining its legal obligations is not 

sufficient to show that the employer acted recklessly. See

McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n.13; see also Allen v. Board of 

Public Educ. for Bibb County, 2007 WL 2332506, *15 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“If an employer acts unreasonably but not recklessly in 

determining its legal obligation under the FLSA, then its 

actions should not be considered willful and the two-year 

statute of limitations should be applied”). 

In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 

knowingly and willfully violated the FLSA by refusing to pay 

overtime compensation for off-duty hours worked caring, training 

and transporting MPU horses. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert 

that Chief Nichelini was aware by June 2001 that MPU officers 

were working uncompensated off-duty hours caring, training and 

transporting their horses. Pl.’s UMF ¶ 65. Plaintiffs assert 

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that Defendant was aware of these hours because they made 

numerous complaints to supervisors requesting proper 

compensation for such hours. Id. ¶¶ 64-65. For their part, 

Defendant argues that it did not willfully violate the FLSA 

because it compensated Plaintiffs in accordance with the 

Department of Labor’s Letter Ruling (“DOL Letter”) dated 

December 30, 1985. Def.’s Mtn. for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) at 

9-10. As such, Defendant argues that it is shielded from 

liability by the FLSA’s good faith provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 

259; Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 907 (observing that § 259, “ ‘was 

designed to protect employers from liability if they took 

certain actions on the basis of an interpretation of the law by 

a government agency’ ”). 

Section 259(a) provides, in relevant part: “no employer 

shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on 

account of the failure of the employer to pay . . . overtime 

compensation under the [FLSA] . . . if he pleads and proves that 

the act or omission complained of was in good faith in 

conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative 

regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the 

agency of the United States specified in subsection (b) of this 

section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of 

such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he 

belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the 

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action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or 

omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, 

approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is 

modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to 

be invalid or of no legal effect.” See also 29 C.F.R. § 

790.13.11 “To be insulated from liability under § 259’s good 

faith exception, an employer must “ ‘show it acted in (1) good 

faith, (2) conformity with, and (3) reliance on the DOL’s 

regulations or the Administrator’s Opinion Letter.’ ” Alvarez, 

339 F.3d at 907.12 “This test has both objective and subjective 

 

11 The agency referred to in subsection (a) of this section 

in the case of the FLSA is the Administrator of the Wage and 

Hour Division of the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 

259(b)(1).

12 “One of the most important requirements of sections 9 and 

10 is proof by the employer that the act or omission complained 

of and his conformance with and reliance upon an administrative 

regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice or 

enforcement policy, were in good faith. The legislative history 

of the Portal Act makes it clear that the employer’s ‘good 

faith’ is not to be determined merely from the actual state of 

his mind. Statements made in the House and Senate indicate that 

‘good faith’ also depends upon an objective test--whether the 

employer, in acting or omitting to act as he did, and in relying 

upon the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, 

administrative practice or enforcement policy, acted as a 

reasonably prudent man would have acted under the same or 

similar circumstances. ‘Good faith’ requires that the employer 

have honesty of intention and no knowledge of circumstances 

which ought to put him upon inquiry.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.15(a) 

(footnotes omitted). “The ‘good faith’ defense is not available 

to an employer unless the acts or omissions complained of were 

‘in conformity with’ the regulation, order, ruling, approval, 

interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy 

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components, asking how a ‘reasonably prudent [person] would have 

acted under the same or similar circumstances” and requiring 

“that the employer have honesty of intention and no knowledge of 

circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry.’ ” Id. 

Under § 259, employers have an affirmative duty to inquire about 

uncertain FLSA coverage issues and the risk of a close case is 

on the employer. Id. The employer bears the burden of proving 

the good faith exception. Id.

 Here, Defendant argues that it is shielded from liability 

for its alleged failure to pay overtime compensation because its 

omission in this regard was based on its good faith reliance on 

the DOL Letter. Def.’s Mtn. for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) at 9-

10. Specifically, Defendant asserts that it relied on the DOL 

Letter to: (1)compensate Plaintiffs at regular or overtime rates 

for MPU events; (2) reimburse Plaintiffs for transportation, 

shoeing, veterinary expenses and on-duty injuries; and (3) not 

 

upon which he relied. This is true even though the employer 

erroneously believes he conformed with it and in good faith 

relied upon it; actual conformity is necessary.” 29 C.F.R. § 

790.14(a) (footnote omitted). “In addition to acting (or 

omitting to act) in good faith and in conformity with an 

administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, 

interpretation, enforcement policy or practice, the employer 

must also prove that he actually relied upon it.” 29 C.F.R. § 

790.16(a). If an employer has “no knowledge of the 

administrator’s interpretation at the time of his violations, 

his failure to comply with the overtime provisions could not 

have been ‘in reliance on’ that interpretation; consequently, he 

has no defense under section 9 or section 10 of the Portal Act.” 

29 C.F.R. § 790.16(b). 

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compensate Plaintiffs for off-duty hours spent caring, training 

and transporting their horses for MPU events. Id. at 10.13

 The DOL Letter specifically addresses two questions: (1) 

whether time spent by MPU officers traveling to their duty 

location with their horses is compensable under the FLSA, and 

(2) whether time spent by mounted officers feeding and grooming 

their own horses on their own time is compensable. Decl. of 

Chief Robert W. Nichelini (“Nichelini”), Exh. A. In this 

regard, the DOL Letter states unequivocally that the time spent 

by mounted officers feeding and grooming their horses during 

off-duty hours is not compensable under the FLSA. Id. With 

respect to travel, the DOL Letter states that normal travel from 

home to work, including the transporting of a personal horse to 

the job location prior to the commencement of an officer’s 

regular shift, is normally not compensable under the FLSA. Id. 

Although the DOL Letter does not specifically address 

whether off-duty time spent training MPU horses is compensable 

 

13 Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were paid regular or 

overtime pay for MPU events and scheduled training for such 

events. Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UMF ¶ 9. Plaintiffs also do 

not dispute that they were compensated for two hours of handling 

time (one hour before an MPU event and one hour after), or that 

they were reimbursed for expenses such as transporting the 

horses to events, shoeing and veterinary expenses for on-duty 

injuries. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Rather, Plaintiffs dispute whether 

Chief Nichelini actually relied on and acted in conformity with 

the DOL Letter in deciding how to compensate Plaintiffs for 

expenses and training related to MPU events. Id. ¶¶ 8-14; Pl.’s 

Opp. to Def.’s MSJ at 15-20. 

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under the FLSA, Defendant contends that the letter implicitly 

holds that such time is not compensable because off-duty 

training is similar to off-duty feeding and grooming insofar as 

it is related to off-duty care. As such, Defendant contends 

that it did not willfully violate the FLSA because its refusal 

to compensate Plaintiffs in this regard was based on its 

reasonable interpretation of the DOL Letter. Additionally, 

Defendant contends that Chief Nichelini’s reliance on the DOL 

Letter, combined with the absence of contrary authority, 

demonstrates that his refusal to compensate Plaintiffs for offduty time spent caring, training and transporting MPU horses was 

not a willful violation of the FLSA because it was made in good 

faith and in conformity with the DOL Letter. The court 

disagrees. 

The court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact 

exists as to whether Defendant acted in conformity with the DOL 

Letter when it refused to pay Plaintiffs for off-duty time spent 

training their horses for MPU events. This is because the DOL 

Letter is silent as to whether the off-duty training of MPU 

horses is compensable under the FLSA and Defendant did not 

demonstrate that it satisfied its affirmative duty to inquire 

about the uncertainty of FLSA coverage in this regard. 

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 

Defendant acted in conformity with the DOL Letter. 

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Additionally, the court concludes that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to whether Defendant actually relied on 

the DOL Letter when it refused to compensate Plaintiffs for offduty time spent caring, training and transporting MPU horses. 

While Defendant submitted Chief Nichelini’s declaration stating 

that he relied on the DOL Letter in determining how to 

compensate Plaintiffs for off-duty work related to the caring, 

training and transporting of MPU horses, Decl. of Nichelini ¶¶ 

4-12, Plaintiffs submitted evidence indicating that Chief 

Nichelini never mentioned the DOL Letter when he addressed 

complaints regarding such hours. Supp. Decl. of Sergeant Howard 

Mason (“Mason”) ¶¶ 3-4, 8, 9; Supp. Decl. of Menjivar ¶¶ 8, 9, 

12; Supp. Decl. of Ketchum ¶¶ 4-5; Dep. of Captain Tom Hauser 

(“Hauser”) at 16:3-25, 17:1-24. Therefore, a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to whether Chief Nichelini relied on the 

DOL Letter when he refused to compensate Plaintiffs for off-duty 

time spent caring, training and transporting MPU horses. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether FLSA’s three-year statute of limitations applies. 

However, the court cautions that because this action has yet to 

be properly commenced, the statute of limitations will continue 

to run until Plaintiffs file their consent to suit forms with 

this court. 

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D. Compensable Work under the FLSA 

 Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate 

because the time spent transporting MPU horses to and from MPU 

events and the off-duty time spent training MPU horses is not 

compensable under the FLSA. 

 The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime wages equal to 

one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for work 

performed in excess of 40 hours per week. Leever v. Carson 

City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 

207(a)); see Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902 (“[i]t is axiomatic, under 

the FLSA, that employers must pay employees for all ‘hours 

worked’ ”). The term “employ” is defined as “to suffer or 

permit to work” and work not requested but suffered or permitted 

is considered work time. See Reich v. Department of 

Conservation and Natural Resources, 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th 

Cir. 1994) (“The reason an employee continues to work beyond his 

shift is immaterial; if the employer knows or has reason to 

believe that the employee continues to work, the additional 

hours must be counted”). An activity constitutes “work,” and is 

compensable under the FLSA, if it involves “physical or mental 

exertion (whether burdensome or not),” or the loss of an 

employee’s time, that is “controlled or required by the employer 

and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 

employer and his business.” Reich, 45 F.3d at 651; Alvarez, 339 

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F.3d at 902; see 5 C.F.R. § 551.401(a)(1)(2) (“Hours of work” is 

defined as all time spent by an employee performing an activity 

for the benefit of an agency and under the control or direction 

of the agency, including “time during which an employee is 

required to be on duty” and “time during which an employee is 

suffered or permitted to work”). 

“ ‘Workday’ as used in the Portal Act means, in general, 

the period between the commencement and completion on the same 

workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities.” 29 

C.F.R. § 790.6(b); see 5 C.F.R. § 551.411(a)(“workday” is 

defined as “the period between the commencement of the principal 

activities that an employee is engaged to perform on a given 

day, and the cessation of the principal activities for that day. 

All time spent by an employee in the performance of such 

activities is hours of work). Under the Portal Act an employee 

is entitled to be compensated for the “[p]eriods of time between 

the commencement of the employee's first principal activity and 

the completion of his last principal activity on any workday.” 

29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a). 

Generally, commuting to and from work is not compensable 

under the FLSA. Reich, 45 F.3d at 650; see 5 C.F.R. § 

551.422(b) (“An employee who travels from home before the 

regular workday begins and returns home at the end of the 

workday is engaged in normal ‘home to work’ travel; such travel 

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is not hours of work”). However, time spent traveling is 

considered hours of work if: “[a]n employee is required to 

travel during regular working hours;” or “[a]n employee is 

required to drive a vehicle or perform other work while 

traveling”).14 Under the FLSA, employees are not entitled to 

overtime compensation for “walking, riding or traveling to and 

from the actual place of performance of the principal activity 

or activities which such employee is employed to perform” or for 

“activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said 

principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to 

the time on any particular workday at which such employee 

commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday 

at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” 29 

U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)(2).15 The “ ‘walking, riding or traveling’ to 

which section 4(a) refers is that which occurs, whether on or 

 

14 The regulations governing the Portal Act provide that, as 

a general rule, same-day travel time to and from work on a 

regular workday is not compensable. 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. This 

is true whether an employee works at a fixed location or at 

different jobsites. 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. However, under § 

785.37, an employee working at a fixed location must be 

compensated for travel time associated with a special/unusual 

one-day assignment in a city other than the one in which his or 

her place of employment is located. 29 C.F.R. § 785.37. 

15 “The words ‘preliminary activity’ mean an activity 

engaged in by an employee before the commencement of his 

‘principal’ activity or activities, and the words ‘postliminary 

activity’ means an activity engaged in by an employee after the 

completion of his ‘principal’ activity or activities.” 29 

C.F.R. § 790.7(b). 

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off the employer’s premises, in the course of an employee’s 

ordinary daily trips between his home or lodging and the actual 

place where he does what he is employed to do. It does not, 

however, include travel from the place of performance of one 

principal activity to the place of performance of another, nor 

does it include travel during the employee’s regular working 

hours.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(c). 

The Supreme Court has held that a given activity 

constitutes a “principal activity,” as opposed to a 

noncompensable preliminary or postliminary task, if it is “an 

integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for 

which covered workmen are employed.” Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 

U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also Reich v. New York City Trans. 

Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1995).16 “To be ‘integral 

and indispensable,’ an activity must be necessary to the 

principal work performed and done for the benefit of the 

 

16 “[I]n order for an activity to be a ‘principal’ activity, 

it need not be predominant in some way over all other activities 

engaged in by the employee in performing his job; rather, an 

employee may, for purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act be 

engaged in several ‘principal’ activities during the workday. 

The ‘principal’ activities referred to in the statute are 

activities which the employee is ‘employed to perform.’ ” 29 

C.F.R. § 790.8(a) (footnote omitted). The meaning of 

“ ‘principal activities’ [is] to be construed liberally . . . to 

include any work of consequence performed for an employer, no 

matter when the work is performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a). 

“Among the activities included as an integral part of a 

principal activity are those closely related activities which 

are indispensable to its performance.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c). 

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employer.” Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902-03.17 The test for 

principal activities and integral and indispensable parts of 

such activities is “whether [the activities] are performed as 

part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary course 

of business.” Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 401 

(5th Cir. 1976).18

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the time 

spent transporting horses to and from MPU events was compensable 

work under the FLSA because such activity occurred between the 

commencement and conclusion of principal activities related to 

MPU events. Plaintiffs’ time spent preparing their horses and 

 

17 “If an agency reasonably determines that a preparatory or 

concluding activity is closely related to an employee’s 

principal activities, and is indispensable to the performance of 

the principal activities, and that the total time spent in that 

activity is more than 10 minutes per workday, the agency shall 

credit all of the time spent in that activity, including the 10 

minutes, as hours of work.” 5 C.F.R. § 551.412(a)(1). 

18 “In contrast to integral and indispensable activities, 

preliminary or postliminary activities are activities spent 

predominantly in the employees’ own interests.” Jerzak v. City 

of South Bend, 996 F.Supp. 840, 848 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing 

Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 398-400). “Activities are classified as 

preliminary or postliminary only if they are ‘undertaken for 

[the employees’] own convenience, not being required by the 

employer and not being necessary for the performance of their 

duties for the employer.’ ” Jerzak, 996 F.Supp. at 848 (citing 

Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 398). Here, the activities at issue are not 

accurately characterized as preliminary or postliminary because 

they are not undertaken for Plaintiffs’ convenience. Rather, 

such activities are required by Defendant and necessary to 

ensure that MPU horses perform up to the standards established 

by Defendant. 

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equipment,19 including time spent traveling to pick-up their 

horses prior to MPU events, was sufficiently “principal” to 

commence the work day since such activities were integral and 

indispensable to Plaintiffs law enforcement duties at MPU events 

and were undertaken necessarily and primarily for the benefit of 

Defendant. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34-7 (2005) 

(holding that “any activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ 

to a ‘principal activity’ is itself a ‘principal activity’ that 

commences the workday and is compensable under the FLSA).20 

Likewise, Plaintiffs’ handling of their horses following the 

cessation of MPU events was sufficiently “principal” to conclude 

the work day because such activities were integral and 

indispensable to Plaintiffs duties at MPU events and were 

 

19 Time spent preparing a horse for an MPU event included 

cleaning and grooming the horse as well as cleaning the horse’s 

bridle, saddle, conch and breast collar. It also included 

hooking-up the trailer and inspecting it for safety as well as 

loading the horse, its equipment, water, hay and medical 

supplies. Pl.’s UMF ¶¶ 54-55, In Opp. to Def.’s MSJ. 

20 In IBP, the court concluded that donning special safety 

gear at the “place of performance” of the principal activity was 

sufficiently “principal” to commence the workday such that the 

walking of employees from that place to another area at the 

jobsite was compensable under FLSA. IBP, 546 U.S. at 34. The 

court held that “any activity that is ‘integral and 

indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity’ is itself a ‘principal 

activity’ under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. Moreover, 

during a continuous workday, any walking time that occurs after 

the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and 

before the end of the employee’s last principal activity is 

excluded from the scope of that provision, and as a result is 

covered by the FLSA.” Id. at 37. 

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undertaken necessarily and primarily for the benefit of 

Defendant. The handling of horses and equipment after MPU 

events was within the range of principal activities covered by 

the FLSA because such activities were necessary to ensure that 

MPU horses could perform up to the standard required by 

Defendant. Indeed, Defendant’s policy of compensating 

Plaintiffs for one hour before and one hour after each MPU event 

supports the determination that such activities were an 

indispensable part of the principal activities required by 

Defendant. Accordingly, because the transporting of horses to 

and from MPU events occurred after commencement of Plaintiffs’ 

principal activities and ceased before Plaintiffs’ principal 

activities concluded, it was compensable work under the FLSA.21 

 

21 The court acknowledges that the DOL Letter states that 

mounted police unit officer time spent traveling to and from an 

assigned duty location normally is not compensable under the 

FLSA, even if it includes the transportation of a personal horse 

to the job location. The court also acknowledges that, while 

DOL opinion letters are normally entitled to a high degree of 

deference, they are not binding on the court if they are plainly 

erroneous or are inconsistent with the regulations they 

interpret. Imada v. City of Hercules, 138 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th 

Cir. 1998). The court concludes that the DOL Letter is not 

dispositive as to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to 

compensation for transporting MPU horses to and from MPU events. 

This is because the transportation of horses to and from MPU 

events was not normal travel to and from an assigned duty 

location as it required MPU officers to spend significant time 

handling their horses and equipment before and after such 

travel. 

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With respect to off-duty time spent training MPU horses, 

the court concludes that such time was compensable work under 

the FLSA because it was indispensable to the employer’s use of 

MPU horses at MPU events. In this regard, the court finds that 

the off-duty training of horses is sufficiently similar to the 

off-duty training of canines insofar as such training was 

integral to the effectiveness of MPU patrolled events and was 

pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of Defendant 

and its business.22 Thus, the question becomes whether Defendant 

knew or should have known that Plaintiffs’ worked overtime hours 

training their horses. See Reich, 28 F.3d at 1082 (employers 

are required to compensate employees for hours worked beyond his 

shift if the employer knows or has reason to believe that the 

employee continues to work); 29 C.F.R. § 785.12 (“If the 

employer knows or has reason to believe that the work is being 

performed, he must count the time as hours worked”); see also

Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 

(9th Cir. 1981) (“[A]n employer who knows or should have known 

 

22 Courts have found, as a general matter, that time spent 

by a police officer caring for or training his or her assigned 

police dog during that officer’s off-duty hours constitutes 

compensable work as it is an integral and indispensable part of 

officer’s principal activities. See Jerzak, 996 F.Supp. at 846 

(citing cases). 

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that an employee is or was working overtime must comply with the 

provisions of [29 U.S.C.] § 207 [mandating overtime pay]”).23 

An employer’s knowledge of overtime hours worked is 

measured in accordance with his duty to inquire into the 

conditions prevailing in his business. Reich, 28 F.3d at 1082. 

This duty cannot be avoided simply because the business 

precludes his personal supervision and compels reliance on 

subordinates. Id. In reviewing the extent of an employer’s 

awareness, a court need only inquire whether the circumstances 

were such that the employer either had knowledge of overtime 

hours being worked or else had the opportunity through 

reasonable diligence to acquire such knowledge. Id.24 

Based on the evidence in the record, the court concludes 

that Defendant knew that Plaintiffs worked off-duty hours 

training their horses for MPU events. Sergeant Mason, Field 

 

23 See 5 C.F.R. § 551.423 (a)(2)(i)(ii) (time spent training 

outside regular working hours is considered hours of work if: 

“(i) The employee is directed to participate in the training by 

his or her employing agency; and (ii) The purpose of the 

training is to improve the employee’s performance of the duties 

and responsibilities of his or her current position.” 

24 Management has a duty to exercise its control and ensure 

that work it does not want performed is not performed. It 

cannot sit back and accept benefits from employees without 

compensating them. Reich, 28 F.3d at 1082 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 

785.13). Moreover, once an employer knows or has reason to know 

that an employee is working overtime, it cannot deny 

compensation even where the employee fails to claim overtime 

hours. See Forrester, 646 F.2d at 414. 

 

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Supervisor and creator of the MPU, submitted a declaration 

stating that the Vallejo Police Department had a policy 

(authorized by Chief Nichelini)25 requiring MPU officers to 

commit at least six off-duty hours to MPU related training a 

week. Decl. of Mason ¶¶ 4, 6. While this requirement was 

eliminated in July 2002, Sergeant Mason declared that he was 

aware that MPU officers regularly trained their horses during 

off-duty hours. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 16.26 Additionally, Sergeant 

Mason stated that he met several times with Chief Nichelini and 

Captain Hauser to discuss complaints about overtime compensation 

regarding off-duty work related to MPU duties. Supp. Decl. of 

Mason ¶¶ 5, 7, 8.27 Finally, Captain Hauser stated in his 

deposition that he met with Chief Nichelini and discussed 

officer complaints about overtime compensation regarding offduty work related to MPU duties. Dep. of Hauser at 16:3-22. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Defendant 

was aware that MPU officers worked off-duty hours training their 

horses for MPU events. Both Sergeant Mason and Captain Hauser 

 

25 Decl. of Nichelini ¶¶ 4-5. 

26 Sergeant Mason retired in 2004. Decl. of Mason ¶ 2. 

27 Plaintiffs both submitted declarations stating that they 

complained to supervisors on numerous occasions about overtime 

compensation regarding off-duty hours worked in connection with 

MPU events. Supp. Decl. of Menjivar ¶¶ 4-8; Supp. Decl. of 

Ketchum ¶ 4.

 

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stated that they were aware of MPU officer complaints about such 

hours and that they discussed this issue with Chief Nichelini.28 

Accordingly, Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiffs were 

working off-duty hours training their horses for MPU events. 

 For these reasons, the court DENIES Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary 

adjudication. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the above stated reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED to 

the extent it seeks a determination that the instant action has 

not been properly commenced. It is DENIED in all other 

respects. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary adjudication is 

GRANTED to the extent that it seeks a determination that the 

/// 

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/// 

 

28 See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (employer is defined broadly to 

include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 

interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . .”); 

Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 

1469 (9th Cir. 1983) disapproved of on another ground by Garcia 

v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 539 

(1985) (the definition of “employer” under the FLSA is not 

limited by the common law concept of “employer,” and is to be 

given an expansive interpretation in order to effectuate the 

FLSA’s broad remedial purposes). 

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time spent training and transporting MPU horses is compensable 

work under the FLSA. 

 ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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