Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04992/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04992-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Michael J. Astrue became Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration in February 2007.

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have

expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated

by the undersigned.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JACK TOSSMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

 /

No. C06-04992 HRL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PARTIES’ CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Re: Docket Nos. 9 and 10]

In this Social Security action, plaintiff Jack Tossman (“plaintiff”) appeals a final

decision by the Commissioner1 (“defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying his application for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Presently before this court are

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.2

 The matter was deemed submitted without

oral argument. Upon consideration of the papers filed by the parties, and for the reasons set

forth below, the parties’ cross-motions are granted in part and denied in part, and the case is

remanded for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

*E-FILED 9.18.2007*

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2

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1947 and was 58 years old at the time the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) rendered the decision under consideration here. He completed high school as

well as two years of college and additional vocational training as a studio recording and sound

technician. He has past relevant work experience as a sound mixer.

In 2003, he filed an application for disability insurance benefits, claiming disability

since July 2002 due to severe bilateral hearing loss, depression, neck and back pain. The

application was denied initially; and, plaintiff requested reconsideration, additionally alleging

hypertension, anxiety, and impaired ability to focus. His claims were denied on

reconsideration, and plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. In his hearing brief, he further

contended frequent shortness of breath and an inability to tolerate noisy or crowded

environments.

A hearing was held before an ALJ on August 30, 2005. In a decision dated October 6,

2005, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. She

found that plaintiff has almost complete hearing loss in the left ear and mild to moderate hightone hearing loss in the right ear and suffers from secondary dysthymic disorder – and that these

were “severe” impairments. However, she concluded that plaintiff did not have an impairment

listed in or medically equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Noting

that plaintiff is an individual of “advanced age” (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963), the ALJ

further found that he has no objective exertional limitations and retains the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform a significant range of “medium” work that does not require

exposure to very loud working environments, performance of detailed or very complex tasks,

and frequent interaction with others. She found that plaintiff cannot perform his previous work

and has no transferable skills, but concluded that he could perform assembly and janitorial jobs

which exist in significant numbers in the national and local economy.

On June 20, 2006, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, and the

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial

review of that decision.

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3 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pound at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). If an

individual can do medium work, he is also deemed capable of performing sedentary and light

work. Id.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only

if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper

legal standards. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999);

Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). In this context, the term “substantial

evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance – it is such relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” 

Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). 

When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision,

the court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as

supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th

Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, the court

must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1258.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s conclusion that he retains the RFC to perform

medium work.3

 However, he contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of the

vocational expert (VE) in concluding that he can perform unskilled janitorial jobs because that

testimony unjustifiably conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT’). Further,

he asserts that, even assuming the ALJ’s RFC determination is correct, the VE otherwise

identified only sedentary (assembly) jobs and the ALJ therefore was obliged to apply the

sedentary medical-vocational guideline (“grid”) rules and find that he is disabled.

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A. ALJ’s Reliance on VE Testimony

If a claimant is unable to perform his previous work, the Commissioner must “identify

specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that [the] claimant can

perform despite [the] identified limitations.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.

1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The DOT raises rebuttable job classification

presumptions. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435-36. “[A]n ALJ may rely on expert testimony which

contradicts the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the

deviation.” Id. at 1435.

The Ninth Circuit recently held that, in view of the requirements of Social Security

Ruling 00-4p, an ALJ may not rely on a VE’s testimony about the requirements of a particular

job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the DOT and whether there is a

reasonable explanation for any deviation. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir.

2007). The failure to do so may be harmless where there is no conflict or where the VE

provides sufficient support justifying any deviations. See id. at 1154 n.19.

In this case, the ALJ posited a hypothetical for an individual of plaintiff’s age, education

and experience, with an RFC for medium work that did not require exposure to very loud

working environments. The VE testified that plaintiff could not perform his previous work and

had no transferable skills. (AR 440-41). However, he stated that there were a number of

unskilled, sedentary jobs plaintiff could perform – namely, assembly jobs (5,000 in the Bay

Area region) and electronic assembly jobs (5,000-6,000 in the Bay Area region). (AR 441). 

When further probed by the ALJ as to the existence of any medium, unskilled work, the VE

identified janitorial jobs (12,000-14,000 in the Bay Area economy), with a subcategory of

afternoon/evening janitorial positions (school janitor being one example) that did not require

contact with crowds (3,000-4,000 in the Bay Area economy) (AR 444).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that he could perform the identified

janitor jobs because the DOT contains no listing for school janitor jobs. However, “[t]he DOT

‘is not the sole source of admissible information concerning jobs.’” Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435

(quoting Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1994)). “‘The Secretary may take

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administrative notice of any reliable job information, including . . . the services of a vocational

expert.’” Id. (quoting Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1991)). 

“Introduction of evidence of the characteristics of specific jobs available in the local area

through the testimony of a vocational expert is appropriate, even though the job traits may vary

from the way the job title is classified in the DOT.” Id. In this case, as noted above, school

janitor was but one example of afternoon/evening janitorial positions identified by the VE. The

fact that the DOT may not contain a specific listing for school janitor is of no moment:

The DOT itself states that it is not comprehensive, but provides only

occupational information on jobs as they have been found to occur, but they

may not coincide in every respect with the content of jobs as performed in

particular establishments or at certain localities. DOT users demanding

specific job requirements should supplement this data with local information

detailing jobs within their community.

Id. (citing DOT at xiii; Barker, 40 F.3d at 795). Here, the VE testified that there are 3,000-

4,000 such jobs existing in the Bay Area economy. (AR 444).

Plaintiff nevertheless maintains that the DOT contains no listing for unskilled janitor

jobs and that the VE did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the DOT’s classification of

such jobs. The Commissioner seems to acknowledge that the DOT classifies some janitorial

jobs as semi-skilled, but argues that the VE “fully explained” why various skill levels exist

within the janitor category. The record shows that the VE did not provide a DOT number for

the unskilled janitorial jobs he identified. When, on cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel

probed into the VE’s classification of such jobs as unskilled, the VE answered only, “You can

just hire off the street for these positions.” (AR 445).

The Commissioner argues that the VE’s testimony is sufficient to sustain the ALJ’s

findings and further contends that common sense dictates that unskilled janitorial positions in

fact exist. “Evidence sufficient to permit such a deviation may be either specific findings of

fact regarding the claimant’s residual functionality or inferences drawn from the context of the

expert’s testimony.” Light v. Social Security Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). Here, however, the ALJ did not inquire or determine whether the VE’s

testimony conflicted with the DOT. See Masachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-53. Moreover, the court

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cannot conclude that the VE’s testimony that these are jobs for which one might “just hire off

the street” sufficiently describes “the specific requirements of a designated occupation with the

specific abilities and limitations of the claimant.” See Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435-36 (VE

testimony that production assembler and office helper jobs are “low stress occupations with

sit/stand options which require lifting of objects weighing mostly from one to five pounds” was

sufficient to rebut the DOT’s classification of such jobs as light work). Thus, the court is

unable to determine whether the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony. Accordingly, the

case will be remanded so that the ALJ can perform the appropriate inquiries. See Masachi, 486

F.3d at 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2007).

B. Use of the Grids

Plaintiff argues that because the only other jobs identified by the VE (i.e., assembly

positions) fall within the sedentary category, the ALJ was obliged to apply the sedentary grids

and find that he is disabled. The Commissioner argues that the sedentary grids are entirely

irrelevant because plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that he retains the RFC for

medium work. See 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 203.00; see also Heckler v. Campbell,

461 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1983). However, defendant does not address plaintiff’s cited cases

which indicate that where VE testimony establishes that only sedentary jobs are available to a

claimant, there is no substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s decision to use grid rules for

higher exertional levels. SeeDistasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1995); Cooper v.

Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989).

In any event, the court does not reach this particular issue because, as discussed above, it

agrees that remand is required as to the VE’s testimony about the identified janitorial positions.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT the parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part and the matter is remanded for further 

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proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

September 18, 2007

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5:06-cv-4992 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Shea Lita Bond shea.bond@ssa.gov 

Marc V. Kalagian marckalagian_rohlfinglaw@hotmail.com, MKalagian@aol.com;

bg_rohlfinglaw@hotmail.com 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov; claire.muller@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Case 5:06-cv-04992-HRL Document 13 Filed 09/18/07 Page 8 of 8