Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00205/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00205-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANA PAGE,

Petitioner,

 v.

M. YARBOROGH, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-0205 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS WITH

PREJUDICE

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Dana Page filed a petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent M. Yarborogh, Warden, to

show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on

grounds the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner did not file an opposition, although his motion for an extension of time to do so

had been granted. The motion to dismiss was granted and judgment entered for

respondent. Thereafter, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the court’s order because

owing to a clerical error he had not received the court’s order extending the time for him to

file an opposition until after that time had expired, and he thus was unable to oppose the

motion. Along with his motion for reconsideration he filed his opposition to the motion to

dismiss. The court granted the motion for reconsideration and the judgment was vacated. 

Thereafter, petitioner filed an amended opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss,

respondent filed a reply and petitioner filed a response to the reply. For the reasons

discussed below, the court GRANTS respondent’s motion and hereby DISMISSES the

action WITH PREJUDICE.

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a California state prisoner who is proceeding pro se, pled guilty in 1989 to

a charge of first degree murder with use of a firearm, a violation of California Penal Code

sections 187 and 245(a)(2). See Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), Ex. B at 1. As

noted in this court’s prior order dismissing the petition, the trial court sentenced him to

thirty-seven years to life in state prison. Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction,

and direct review was completed in 1990. Petitioner filed many habeas petitions in the

California courts before filing his federal habeas petition on January 14, 2003. See

September 9, 2004 Order Granting respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (“Order”), Docket No.

28, at 2.

Respondent contends that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and that petitioner is entitled to neither statutory nor equitable

tolling. See MTD at 1, 3-5. 

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Pending Motions

Petitioner has filed two motions that are pending before the court. 

1. Motion to Modify Court Order

Petitioner filed a motion, see Docket No. 40, to modify the court’s order directing

respondent to file a reply to petitioner’s amended opposition to the motion to dismiss, see

Docket No. 39. Petitioner asked the court to modify the order to allow petitioner to expand

the record, and to require respondent to file a reply to the amended opposition within sixty

days. 

Petitioner’s first request is DENIED as moot because the court granted petitioner’s

motion to expand the record in its order directing respondent to file a reply. See Docket

No. 39. Petitioner’s second request is DENIED as moot because respondent has filed a

reply. See Docket No. 41. 

2. Motion for Enlargement of Time

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Petitioner moved for an enlargement of time to file a response to respondent’s reply.

See Docket No. 42. Before the court ruled on this motion petitioner filed his response. See

Docket No. 43. 

The court GRANTS petitioner’s motion and will, therefore, consider petitioner’s

response. 

B. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

1. The Petition is Barred by the Statute of Limitations

a. Background

As noted above, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and assault with a

deadly weapon in 1989. Direct review of his appeal was completed in 1990 and he filed his

federal habeas petition on January 14, 2003. See Order at 2. 

b. Applicable Federal Law

The statute of limitations is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion

of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time

during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review

is pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. See id. § 2244(d)(2). 

Regardless of how old the challenged conviction might be, the one-year time limit

does not start earlier than April 24, 1996; that is, a prisoner with a conviction finalized

before April 24, 1996 had until April 24, 1997, to file his federal habeas petition. See

Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997); see

also Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (clarifying method of

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calculating deadline). 

c. Analysis

Because petitioner’s conviction was final before April 24, 1996, petitioner comes

under the rule announced in Beeler, i.e., his federal petition was due on or before the

AEDPA due date of April 24, 1997, absent tolling. The petition was filed on January 14,

2003, well after the April 24, 1997, deadline. His petition is, therefore, barred as untimely

unless he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Statutory Tolling

a. Background

The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) because state collateral review proceedings were pending when AEDPA

became effective. As outlined in this court’s prior order of dismissal, petitioner filed his first

state habeas petition in the Supreme Court of California on December 7, 1992, and it was

denied on February 24, 1993. He then filed another state petition, this time in the California

Court of Appeal, on April 12, 1993. It was denied on April 19, 1993. See Order at 2. 

Based upon a recent submission, respondent concedes that petitioner “has provided

additional documentation . . . that he sent to the Alameda County Superior Court a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus on April 22, 1997,” that is, two days before the April 24, 1997,

deadline for filing the instant petition. Reply at 2. The superior court denied this petition on

July 2, 1997. See id. at 2. Then, on September 8, 1997, after the AEDPA statute of

limitations had expired on April 24, 1997, he filed another petition in the California Court of

Appeal. It was denied on January 30, 1998. He then filed another (successive) petition in

the California Court of Appeal, on March 17, 1998; it was denied on July 24, 1998. He then

filed a petition in the Supreme Court of California, on November 1, 1999, which was denied

on January 25, 2000 as untimely. He subsequently filed three more petitions in the

California Supreme Court, on April 4, 2000, July 25, 2001 and February 19, 2002, all of

which were also denied as untimely. See Order, at 2; Reply at 2-3. 

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b. Applicable Federal Law

Time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year time limit within which federal

habeas petitions must be filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The circumstances under

which a state petition will be deemed “pending” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) is a question

of federal law. See Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). An

application for collateral review is “pending” in state court “as long as the ordinary state

collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ – i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that process.” 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-220 (2002). In other words, until the application has

achieved final resolution through the state’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it

remains “pending.” Id. In California, this means that the statute of limitations is tolled from

the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the

petitioner’s final collateral challenge, as long as the petitioner did not unreasonably delay

seeking review. See id. at 222-226; accord Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999). 

However, the time between successive filings in the same court is not tolled. See

Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). A state habeas petition filed after

AEDPA’s statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitation period. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even

if the state petition was timely filed). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive” the limitation period

once it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has

not yet fully run. “Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer

serve to avoid the statute of limitations.” Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259

(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

c. Analysis

The court finds that the federal petition is untimely. Reading the above cited

authorities together, the statute of limitations would have been tolled until the California

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 Petitioner’s March 17, 1998 petition to the California Court of Appeal was a successive

filing in the same court and therefore cannot serve as a basis for tolling. 

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Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s final collateral challenge, provided that petitioner did

not unreasonably delay seeking review. Petitioner filed a petition with the superior court of

California on April 22, 1997, two days before the statute of limitations would have run. 

Thus, the statute began to toll when the superior court petition was filed, but once tolling

ended, petitioner would have had only two days to file a timely federal petition. The

superior court denied the petition on July 2, 1997, and petitioner did not file a federal

petition within two days. Instead, petitioner filed his next petition in the California Court of

Appeal on September 8, 1997, which denied it on January 30, 1998. Petitioner did not file

with the California Supreme Court until November 1, 1999, a delay of nearly two years after

his last petition was denied.1

 The California Supreme Court denied the 1999 petition with a

citation in its order to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998), which at the page

indicated stands for the proposition that undue delay is grounds for denying a state petition. 

If a state court clearly rules that the petitioner’s delay was “unreasonable,” that is the end of

the matter. See Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. Accordingly, while the statute was tolled while

petitioner pursued his state collateral remedies in the superior and appellate courts,

because of the California Supreme Court’s finding of unreasonable delay, petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling for the period between the California Court of Appeal’s denial of

his petition and the filing of his petition in the California Supreme Court. As petitioner filed

his federal petition well more than two days after the California Court of Appeal’s denial, the

instant petition is untimely.

3. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

a. Background

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not have

access to the prison library for fifteen months and he did not timely receive his mail after he

was moved to another prison. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Reply to

Petitioner’s Opposition and Amended Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“Pet. Res.”) at 1. 

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Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to tolling because he found new evidence that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea negotiations and because prison

officials took and destroyed petitioner’s property in 1994. See Petitioner’s Opposition to

Motion to Dismiss (“Pet. Op.”) at 1-2. 

b. Applicable Federal Law

The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable

tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 n.8 (2005), but the Ninth Circuit has held that the one-year limitation period can be

equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. 

See Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288. Equitable tolling will not, however, be available

in most cases because extensions of time should be granted only if “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

“extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 

(9th Cir. 2002). The petitioner must establish two elements in order to be granted equitable

tolling: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 419). Where a prisoner fails to show “any causal connection”

between the grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to

timely file a federal habeas application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a pro se petitioner's inability to access information

about the statute of limitations deadline, when combined with the prisoner’s lack of

knowledge of the deadline, constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” that warrants

equitable tolling, provided the petitioner acted with due diligence. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d

964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006).

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c. Analysis 

In support of his first claim, petitioner submitted memoranda from prison officials

dating from late 1999 to 2002 stating that the prison library would be closed for various

periods. See Pet. Res., Ex. 3. One memorandum declares that a state of emergency

existed in petitioner’s prison in November 1998, but does not indicate how long this state

lasted nor whether or for how long petitioner was denied access to the prison library. See

Pet. Op., Ex. M-1. 

Petitioner had many opportunities to file a federal petition, specifically, after the

California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal denied his 1993 petitions and

after the Alameda Superior Court denied his 1997 petition. This fact, along with petitioner’s

submissions that cover one possible library closure in 1998, and intermittent library

closures in 1999 to 2002, indicate that he did not pursue his rights diligently and that no

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Furthermore, he filed another petition with the

California Court of Appeal in March 1998, which indicates to the court that petitioner had

the time, ability and adequate access to legal materials to prepare and file a federal

petition. This is entirely unlike the situation in Roy v. Lampert, where that petitioner had no

notice of AEDPA requirements because the prison law library was “woefully deficient.” 465

F.3d at 967. Here, petitioner does not make any such assertion and it appears that he had

sufficient access and materials to properly file earlier than he did. 

In support of the second claim, petitioner submitted a declaration by his trial counsel,

dated August 14, 1992, filed “in support of the writ of habeas corpus” in which he states

that he gave inadequate legal advice to petitioner. See Petitioner’s Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. E at 1. In support of the third claim, petitioner

submitted a memorandum from prison officials, dated November 14, 1994, stating that

petitioner’s confiscated materials, which had been held for thirty days until the inmate paid

the costs for shipping, were destroyed. See id., Ex. F-1. The memorandum does not state

what the exact materials were. 

Petitioner fails to provide an explanation why he did not include in his 1993 petition –

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and subsequent petitions – contentions based on evidence he acquired in 1992. Although

petitioner states that he did not receive this information until June 1993, see Pet. Op. at 3,

trial counsel’s declaration is dated August 1992 and states that it is being submitted as part

of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, indicating that petitioner had knowledge of this

information in 1992. As to the third claim, even if his legal materials were destroyed in

1994 – an act which may have been caused in part by petitioner’s failure to pay the

appropriate costs – petitioner bases his contention on the fact that he needed these

materials to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which, as just noted

above, he had notice of in 1992. The court finds that there is insufficient evidence to show

that petitioner pursued his rights diligently or that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that petitioner has failed to show a causal

connection between the grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his

inability to file a federal habeas petition.

Because petitioner is entitled to neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. 

CONCLUSION

 The petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This order terminates docket

numbers 40 and 42 and all other pending motions. 

The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: August 22, 2007

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

 United States District Judge

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