Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01841/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01841-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR VARELA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO CITY & COUNTY,

ALAN LEVY, JOHN DOE TOOMEY, DOE

ONE, DOE TWO, DOE THREE, AND DOE

FOUR,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-01841 WHA

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF’S

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

INTRODUCTION

In this action for assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and deprivation of

constitutional rights, defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FRCP 12(c) as

to plaintiff’s claim for deprivation of constitutional rights. Because Varela fails to plead facts

on which relief could be granted, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is

GRANTED, and accordingly, plaintiff’s fourth claim for deprivation of constitutional rights is

DISMISSED. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Oscar Varela filed a complaint against defendants City and County of San

Francisco, San Francisco police officer Alan Levy, a San Francisco police officer identified as

John Doe Toomey, and two San Francisco police officers identified as John Doe (Compl. ¶ 2). 

Case 3:06-cv-01841-WHA Document 22 Filed 12/14/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Varela alleges that he was lawfully in his home on October 17, 2004, when at about 2:20 a.m.,

the officers entered his home without his consent and without a warrant (Compl. ¶¶ 3–4). 

Varela further alleges that the police officers committed assault and battery against him and

falsely arrested him (Compl. ¶ 6). 

He filed a complaint in California Superior Court alleging state law claims of assault

and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment, and a claim for deprivation of constitutional

rights. His claim for deprivation of constitutional rights alleged only that his constitutional

rights were violated because he was falsely arrested and imprisoned, and that he was deprived

of due process. It incorporated his other claims by reference. 

The action was removed from Superior Court to federal district court on March 10,

2006. Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings on November 2, 2006.

After several reminders from defendants’ counsel and from the court, plaintiff finally filed an

opposition to defendants’ motion on December 8, 2006, some two weeks after it was due and

less than one week before the hearing was to be held. 

ANALYSIS

“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party

may move for judgment on the pleadings.” FRCP 12(c). A motion for judgment on the

pleadings is evaluated according to virtually the same legal standard as a motion to dismiss

under FRCP 12(b)(6), in that the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc., 369 F. Supp.2d 1127, 1130-31 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

“Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences” are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12

motion. Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). “Judgment on

the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings

that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff seems to be bringing a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as

the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause protects against action by state governments. 

Case 3:06-cv-01841-WHA Document 22 Filed 12/14/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001). The exclusive remedy for

vindicating alleged violations of constitutional rights by state actors is 42 U.S.C. 1983. If a

plaintiff has a remedy available to him under 42 U.S.C. 1983, direct constitutionally-based

claims against state defendants are not permitted. Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.

1981). 

Plaintiff alleges state and federal due process claims, but tries to bring them as direct

constitutional claims, presumably under the law of substantive due process. He is clearly not

allowed to do this as a remedy may be available to him under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff goes on

to argue that what he alleged constitutes a Section 1983 claim. Even if plaintiff were bringing a

Section 1983 claim, he does not identify the source of his due process rights or allege which of

his constitutional rights were violated. 

In support of his claim, plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of his constitutional rights

because he was falsely arrested and imprisoned. Plaintiff’s argument fails, however, because

the Fourth Amendment, and not due process principles, governs false arrest and false

imprisonment pursuant to such arrest. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127

(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff fails to allege that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, thus he

has not pleaded a cognizable legal theory. Varela’s claim fails as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff argues that because his complaint was removed from state court to federal

court, his pleadings should be judged under California Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure apply to actions in federal court. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–474

(1967). Because the federal rules apply, Varela’s claim must be judged under FRCP 8(c) which

requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Cal. Civ. Proc. 425.10 does him little good because it

requires “a statement of facts constituting the cause of action.” As discussed above, plaintiff’s

claim for deprivation of constitutional rights neither shows that he is entitled to relief nor states

a cause of action. 

Case 3:06-cv-01841-WHA Document 22 Filed 12/14/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Pursuant to statements made by plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument, all references to the

Constitution of the State of California are hereby STRICKEN from plaintiff’s fourth cause of

action for deprivation of constitutional rights. 

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons mentioned above, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings

as to plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights is GRANTED.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-01841-WHA Document 22 Filed 12/14/06 Page 4 of 4