Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02763/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02763-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:0187 Labor: Recover Damages from Unfair Labor Practice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVANS HOTELS, LLC, a 

California limited liability 

company; BH PARTNERSHIP 

LP, a California limited 

partnership; ESHW, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability 

company,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITE HERE LOCAL 30; 

BRIGETTE BROWNING, an 

individual; SAN DIEGO 

BUILDING AND 

CONSTRUCTION TRADES 

COUNCIL, AFL-CIO; TOM 

LEMMON, an individual; and 

DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-2763-WQH-KSC

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Amended Complaint (ECF No. 61) and the Motion for 

Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 62) filed by Plaintiffs Evans Hotels, 

LLC, BH Partnership LP, and ESHW, LLC.

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I. BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2018, Plaintiffs Evans Hotels, LLC (“Evans Hotels”), BH 

Partnership LP, and ESHW, LLC, filed a Complaint against Defendants UNITE HERE 

Local 30 (“Local 30”), Brigette Browning, San Diego County Building and Construction 

Trades Council, AFL-CIO (“Building Trades”), and Tom Lemmon. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs 

amended the Complaint on March 7, 2019. (ECF No. 19). In the Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiffs brought claims against Local 30 and Building Trades for unlawful secondary 

boycott in violation of section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 187(a), and claims against all Defendants for attempted monopolization and 

conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, for violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1692(e) and conspiring to violate § 1692(a)-(c) under the Racketeer Influenced 

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and for interference with contract and attempted 

extortion.

On March 15, 2019, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. 

(ECF Nos. 29, 31). On January 7, 2020, the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

Amended Complaint without prejudice and with leave to file a motion for leave to amend. 

(ECF No. 60). The Court determined that Defendants’ activities as alleged in the Amended 

Complaint were protected by the Noerr-Pennnington doctrine. The Court determined that 

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to allege facts that support an inference that 

Defendants engaged in non-petitioning activity or that Defendants’ petitioning conduct was 

a sham. 

On February 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 61). On February 6, 2020, 

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 62). On 

March 9, 2020, Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration 

(ECF No. 69) and Oppositions to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended 

Complaint (ECF Nos. 70-71). On March 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed Replies. (ECF Nos. 72-

74). 

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II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiffs move the Court for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

to remove the RICO claims for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(b), to add a 

claim for unfair competition in violation of sections 17200, et seq., of the California 

Business and Professions Code, and to add factual allegations related to Defendants 

communications with City Councilmembers, threats to Sea World, and opposition to 

projects by entities other than Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that leave to amend is warranted 

because the facts alleged in the proposed SAC demonstrate conduct by Defendants that 

falls outside the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Plaintiffs contend that the facts 

alleged in the proposed SAC demonstrate that Defendants employed unlawful means of 

communicating with, and coordinating votes by, members of the City Council. Plaintiffs 

contend that the facts alleged in the proposed SAC demonstrate conduct by Defendants 

that meets the serial sham petitioning exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 

Plaintiffs contend that the facts alleged in the SAC demonstrate that Defendants made 

direct threats to Plaintiffs that were about conduct unrelated to petitioning activity. 

Defendants contend that leave to amend would be futile. Defendants contend that 

the allegations in the proposed SAC fail to cure the deficiencies that the Court identified in 

its Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. Defendants contend that the facts alleged in 

the proposed SAC fail to demonstrate conduct by Defendants that falls outside of the 

Noerr-Pennington doctrine or that Defendants’ petitioning conduct was a sham. 

Defendants contend that the new factual allegations in the proposed SAC regarding serial 

litigation are futile, because the Court determined that Defendants’ petitioning activities 

related to entities other than Plaintiffs are irrelevant under the Noerr-Pennington analysis. 

Defendants contend that SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that leave to amend “be 

freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “This policy is to be applied 

with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 

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712 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Supreme Court has identified several factors district courts should 

consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend: “undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 

182 (1962); see also Smith v. Pac. Props. Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Not all of the [Foman] factors merit equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it 

is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. “The party opposing amendment bears the 

burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th 

Cir. 1987). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, 

there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence 

Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

In this case, Defendants do not contend that the SAC would impose undue prejudice 

or that Plaintiffs have exhibited undue delay or bad faith. Defendants’ sole argument 

against granting leave to amend is futility. “‘[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no 

set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleading that would constitute a 

valid and sufficient claim or defense.’” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject 

of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman, 

371 U.S. at 182. 

Defendants contend that leave to amend would be futile because the SAC fails to 

state a claim on which relief can be granted. However, “the sufficiency of an amended 

pleading ordinarily will not be considered on a motion for leave to amend.” Brier v. N. Cal. 

Bowling Proprieters’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1963); see Netbula v. Distinct 

Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Denial of leave to amend on [futility] 

ground[s] is rare.”). The Court will defer consideration of Defendants’ challenges to the 

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merits of the proposed SAC until after the amended pleading is filed. See Netbula, 212 

F.R.D. at 539 (“Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a 

proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading 

is filed.”); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., No. C-04-4708 VRW, 2006 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 82148, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2006) (Defendant’s challenges to the merits 

of a proposed amended pleading “should be addressed in a motion to dismiss or for 

summary judgment, not in an opposition to the present motion for leave to amend.”). Upon 

consideration of the Foman factors, the Court finds that leave to amend should be granted 

pursuant to Rule 15(a).1

III. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 62) is granted. Plaintiffs shall file the proposed SAC 

attached to the Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 62-2) within five (5) days of the date 

of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order 

Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Amended Complaint (ECF No. 61) is denied as 

moot. 

Dated: April 20, 2020

 

1 Defendants Local 30 and Brigette Browning request that the Court take judicial notice of the May 16, 

2013, City of San Diego Percentage Lease By and Between the City of San Diego and BH Partnership. 

(ECF No. 70-1). Judicial notice of the requested documents is unnecessary for this Order. Local 30 and 

Brigette Browning’s request for judicial notice is denied. See Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1010 

n. 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying request for judicial notice where judicial notice would be “unnecessary”).

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