Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17131/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17131-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-17131

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-04376-EDL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Elizabeth D. Laporte, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted En Banc August 26, 2016*

San Francisco, California

Filed September 2, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Stephen

Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, Ronald M. Gould, Richard A.

Paez, Richard C. Tallman, Jay S. Bybee, Milan D. Smith,

Jr., Morgan Christen, Jacqueline H. Nguyen and John B.

Owens, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The en banc court unanimously concludes this case is suitable for

decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 ALDF V. USFDA

SUMMARY**

Freedom of Information Act

The en banc court adopted a de novo standard of review

for summary judgment decisions in Freedom of Information

Act cases, overruled other decisions to the contrary, and

remanded the case to the three-judge panel to resolve the

merits issues.

COUNSEL

Monte M.F. Cooper, Derek F. Knerr, and Scott Lindlaw,

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Menlo Park, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dara S. Smith and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, Appellate

Staff; Victoria R. Carradero, Assistant United States

Attorney; Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee.

Caitlin Zittkowski and Cristina R. Stella, San Francisco,

California, as and for Amicus Curiae Center for Food Safety.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALDF V. USFDA 3

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

We voted to rehear this case en banc to reconsider our

circuit precedent on the standard of review applicable to

summary judgment decisions in cases brought pursuant to the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. We

agree with the three-judge panel that the appropriate standard

of review is de novo.

We adopt and reiterate the reasoning set forth by the

three-judge panel in its concurrence. Under our usual

practice, “[w]e review the district court’s grant or denial of

motions for summary judgment de novo.” Ariz. Dream Act

Coal. v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing

Besinga v. United States, 14 F.3d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Thus, on appellate review, we employ the same standard used

by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 

See Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 330 F.3d

1110, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003). As required by that standard, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, determine whether there are any genuine

issues of material fact, and decide whether the district court

correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See Olsen v.

Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).

Most FOIA cases are resolved by the district court on

summary judgment, with the district court entering judgment

as a matter of law. See Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U. S. Postal

Serv., 356 F.3d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 2004). But some FOIA

cases require resolution of disputed facts. See, e.g., GC

Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1110

(9th Cir. 1994) (requiring a factual determination of

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substantial competitive harm). In those cases, we have

employed a different summary judgment standard, as we

described in Yonemoto v. Department of Veterans Affairs:

[I]n essence, we treat the judgment as if it

were a bench trial: We first determine, de

novo, “whether an adequate factual basis

exists to support the district court’s

decisions.” If not, we must remand for further

development of the record. If such a basis

does exist, “then the district court’s

conclusions of fact are reviewed for clear

error”—which is the way in which the

proceeding is treated like a bench

trial—“while legal rulings, including its

decision that a particular exemption applies,

are reviewed de novo.”

686 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2012) (footnote and citations

omitted).1

This “two-step test,” Lion Raisins Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), began with

Church of Scientology of California v. U.S. Department of the

Army, 611 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1979), in which we borrowed

the “clearly erroneous” standard from the D.C. Circuit, id. at

743 (citing Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force,

566 F.2d 242, 251 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). However, the

D.C. Circuit has long since abandoned this standard and,

1

If “the parties do not dispute that the court had an adequate basis for

its decision, we review de novo the court’s conclusion” that the documents

are exempt from disclosure. Lissner v. U.S. Customs Serv., 241 F.3d

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

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ALDF V. USFDA 5

instead, now reviews summary judgment decisions in FOIA

cases de novo, as in all other cases. See Petroleum Info.

Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C.

Cir. 1992). The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth

Circuits also apply de novo review to district court FOIA

summary judgment decisions.2

In reviewing our precedents, as well as those of our sister

circuits, we conclude there is no principled distinction to be

drawn between our usual summary judgment standard and the

standard to be applied in FOIA cases. We have noted the

oddity of this analytic difference: “By definition, summary

judgment may be granted only when there are no disputed

issues of material fact, and thus no factfinding by the district

court.” Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 688 n.5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)). Thus, where the district court has made a factual

determination, summary judgment cannot be appropriate.

In short, there is “no compelling reason to depart from a

pure de novo standard,” Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 287

(2d Cir. 1999), when reviewing FOIA summary judgment

decisions. We agree with the Second Circuit that de novo

review fits better with the policy and purpose of FOIA:

2

See Church of Scientology Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 30 F.3d 224,

228 (1st Cir. 1994); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 287–88 (2d Cir. 1999);

Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir.

1998); Missouri ex rel. Garstang v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 297 F.3d 745,

749 (8th Cir. 2002); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 9 v. U.S.

Air Force, 63 F.3d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1995). The Third, Fourth, Fifth,

Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits appear to use the same “clearly erroneous”

standard that we have. See Lame v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 767 F.2d 66, 70

(3d Cir. 1985); Willard v. IRS, 776 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1985);

Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140, 1144 (5thCir. 1980); Antonelli v. DEA,

739 F.2d 302, 303 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Chilivis v. SEC, 673 F.2d

1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982).

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In striking a balance between the incompatible

notions of disclosure and privacy when it

enacted FOIA in 1966, Congress

established—in the absence of one of that

law’s clearly delineated exemptions—a

general, firm philosophy of full agency

disclosure, and provided de novo review by

federal courts so that citizens and the press

could obtain agency information wrongfully

withheld. De novo review was deemed

essential to prevent courts reviewing agency

action from issuing a meaningless judicial

imprimatur on agency discretion.

Id.

Accordingly, we adopt a de novo standard of review for

summary judgment decisions in FOIA cases. Church of

Scientology, 611 F.2d at 743, and our other decisions to the

contrary are overruled.

Consistent with our usual procedure, if there are genuine

issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the district court

should proceed to a bench trial or adversary hearing. 

Resolution of factual disputes should be through the usual

crucible of bench trial or hearing, with evidence subject to

scrutiny and witnesses subject to cross-examination. The

district court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Our review remains the same

as in all civil cases: we review the findings of fact for clear

error and the conclusions of law de novo. See OneBeacon

Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.

2011).

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ALDF V. USFDA 7

We confine our en banc consideration to the question of

controlling circuit precedent. We decline as an en banc court

to reach any other issue presented by the parties. The threejudge panel that heard the appeal was bound by the standard

articulated in Church of Scientology and issued its opinion

based on that assumption. In issuing our order granting

rehearing en banc, we declared that the three-judge panel

opinion should not be cited as precedent by or to any court of

the Ninth Circuit. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. FDA, — F.3d

—, No. 13-17131, 2016 WL 4120696 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2016). 

With this correction of our precedent, en banc proceedings

with respect to this case are terminated, and we return control

of the case to the three-judge panel. The panel will resolve

the merits issues in this case and will issue a new or an

amended opinion.3

REMANDED.

3 All pending motions are DENIED as moot, without prejudice to

renewal before the three-judge panel.

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