Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01432/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert P. Guevara, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01432-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Robert P. Guevara has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising two grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents 

assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations 

applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 10.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims 

is procedurally barred. Petitioner has filed a reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 13.) 

For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied as untimely and 

does not reach Respondents’ alternative argument. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On December 19, 2003, Petitioner pleaded guilty in Maricopa County Superior 

Court to one count of second-degree murder. (Doc. 10, Exs. A, B.) On January 26, 

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2004, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of twenty years’ 

imprisonment. (Doc. 10, Ex. C.) 

B. Post-Conviction Review 

 1. Rule 32 Of-Right Proceeding 

 On March 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 10, Ex. D.) Petitioner 

then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss that proceeding. (Doc. 10, Ex. E.) On 

September 10, 2004, the court granted Petitioner’s motion and dismissed the Rule 32 

proceeding. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.) 

 2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 Six years later, on September 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a pleading entitled “Writ of 

Coram Nobis,” alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, that his plea was not knowing 

and voluntary, and that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because it was based on 

facts found by the judge, rather than by a jury. (Doc. 10, Ex. G.) 

 The trial court construed Petitioner’s pleading as a notice of post-conviction relief 

and, on September 30, 2010, dismissed the proceeding as untimely under Rule 32.4(a). 

(Doc. 10, Ex. H.) 

 3. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On August 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction relief raising 

the following claims: (1) the trial court improperly imposed an aggravated sentence 

because the aggravating factors were found by the judge rather than the jury in violation 

of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); (2) defense counsel was ineffective for 

waiving any Blakely objection during sentencing; and (3) counsel was ineffective during 

the Rule 32 of-right proceeding for failing to present a Blakely claim. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.) 

 On September 17, 2012, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims as untimely. (Doc. 10, Ex. J.) The court, however, concluded that 

because Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was still pending when Blakely was 

decided, Blakely represented a significant change in the law and, thus, it could possibly 

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provide justification for the court to consider Petitioner’s untimely claim under Rule 

32.1(g). (Id.) Accordingly, the court permitted the post-conviction matter to proceed on 

the Blakely claim. After considering further briefing, the court concluded that 

Petitioner’s Blakely claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2) because Petitioner 

previously raised that claim in his second post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 10, Exs. K, 

L, M.) 

 On January 10, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals arguing that he should be resentenced because the trial court, rather than a jury, 

determined the existence of aggravating factors for sentencing purposes, and that trial 

counsel and counsel during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding were ineffective for failing to 

raise the sentencing issue or otherwise explain his rights. (Doc. 10, Ex. N.) On April 17, 

2014, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. Q.) The court 

concluded that: (1) Petitioner’s Blakely claim was preluded under Rule 32.2(a) because it 

had been raised in a prior proceeding; and (2) Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims were waived because Petitioner could have raised them in a prior 

proceeding. (Id.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On June 25, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises the following two claims: (1) his Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated because his sentence was aggravated based on facts found by the 

judge rather than by a jury; and (2) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his 

sentence was in excess of the maximum allowed. (Id. at 6-9.) He also argues that trial 

counsel and Rule 32 of-right counsel were ineffective related to his aggravated sentence. 

(Doc. 1 at 7, 9.) Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely under the applicable 

statute of limitations and, alternatively, that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred 

from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner disputes these assertions. 

(Doc. 13.) 

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II. Statute of Limitations 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year 

limitations period starts running from the latest of four alternative dates set forth in 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).1

 Respondents argue that § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies to this case. 

(Doc. 10 at 5.) That section provides that the one-year limitations period begins to run 

from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Liberally construing Petitioner’s reply, he argues that the limitations period runs from a 

date determined by the application of § 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D). Accordingly, the Court 

considers the statute of limitations commencement date under each of these sections to 

determine which date is the latest and, thus, provides the starting date for the one-year 

limitations period. 

A. Date the Statute of Limitations Commenced 

 1. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) – The Date the Judgment Became Final 

By pleading guilty, Petitioner was precluded from pursuing a direct appeal in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could 

seek review of his conviction and sentence in an of-right proceeding pursuant to Rule 32, 

which is the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 

 

1

 Specifically, those four alternative dates are: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

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32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Arizona 

courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct review).2

 On March 4, 2004, Petitioner commenced a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. F.) On Petitioner’s motion, the trial court dismissed that proceeding on 

September 10, 2014. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.) Under Arizona law, a petition for appellate 

review of the trial court’s order denying a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed 

within thirty days after the final decision of the trial court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). 

Petitioner, however, did not seek review of the trial court’s September 10, 2004, 

dismissal order. Thus, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s judgment became final on 

October 10, 2004, thirty days after the trial court dismissed his Rule 32 proceeding. See 

Summers, 481 F.3d at 717. 

 2. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) – Date Constitutional Right Asserted Initially Recognized by the Supreme Court 

 Petitioner’s reply can be construed as arguing that pursuant to Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), the AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations commenced on the “date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the 

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004 and the Ninth Circuit has 

held that it announced a new rule. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court announced a new rule in Blakely v. Washington . . . ”). 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was still pending on June 24, 2004 and thus was 

not final. Accordingly, Blakely applies to Petitioner’s case. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 

542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (“When a decision of this Court results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule 

applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review.”). Thus, it appears that 

 

2

 Because Petitioner pled guilty, his only avenue of direct review was a Rule 32 

“of-right” proceeding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) ([I]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding”). 

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§ 2244(d)(1)(C) applies and, under that section, the limitations period would have 

commenced on June 24, 2004. However, the limitations period “run[s] from the latest 

of” the dates determined by applying § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Therefore, the date on which 

Petitioner’s judgment became final on direct review, October 10, 2004, as determined 

under § 2244(d)(1)(A), is the latest date on which the limitations period could have 

commenced. Thus, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not provide the start date for the running of the 

limitations period. 

 3. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) – The Date the Factual Predicate of Claim 

 Could Have Been Discovered 

 Finally, the Court considers whether § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies to determine when 

the statute of limitations started to run. Under that section, the AEDPA statute of 

limitations commences on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). To the extent the Blakely decision prompted Petitioner to file 

the pending habeas petition, that decision is the legal predicate for Petitioner’s claims, but 

it is not the “factual predicate” of his claims, and it is not evidence relevant to his 

sentence. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 

the AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run when petitioner knows important facts, 

not when petitioner recognizes their legal significance). Because Petitioner was aware of 

the pertinent facts at the time of his conviction and sentencing, § 2244(d)(1)(D) does not 

supply a later starting date for the one-year limitations period. 

 After analyzing § 2244(d)(1)(A), (C), and (D), as applied to this case, the Court 

concludes that § 2244(d)(1)(A) supplies the date on which the one-year limitations period 

began to run. Applying that section, Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 10, 

2004. See Summers, 481 F.3d at 717. Accordingly, he had until October 10, 2005 to file 

a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because 

Petitioner did not file the pending Petition until June 25, 2014, almost nine years after the 

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limitations period expired, it is untimely. Thus, unless statutory or equitable tolling 

applies, the Petition is time-barred. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 The limitations period expired on October 10, 2005. Nearly five years after the 

limitations period expired, on September 30, 2010, Petitioner filed a writ of coram nobis 

in the state trial court, which the state court construed as a petition for post-conviction 

relief under Rule 32. (Doc. 10, Ex. H.) Petitioner later filed a third notice of postconviction relief on August 14, 2012. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.) Because the AEDPA statute of 

limitations expired before Petitioner commenced these post-conviction actions, they did 

not toll the limitations period. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a 

subsequently filed state post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of 

limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that an 

application for state post-conviction relief filed after expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations did not reinitiate the limitations period). Accordingly, statutory tolling does 

not apply. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

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equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 In his reply, Petitioner asserts that counsel during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

did not pursue a claim under Blakely and did not advise Petitioner of the change in the 

law. (Doc. 13 at 4.) He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective. (Id.) It appears 

that Petitioner argues that the ineffective assistance of trial and post-conviction counsel 

led to the untimely filing of his § 2254 habeas petition. Even if the alleged circumstances 

were extraordinary, see Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, the record does not support a finding that 

Petitioner diligently pursued his rights. After the dismissal of his Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding, Petitioner did not seek further review of his conviction or sentence until he 

filed a writ of coram nobis six years later. Considering this lengthy delay, Petitioner has 

not shown that he diligently pursued his rights. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (petitioner was 

not entitled to equitable tolling when he “waited years, without any valid justification, to 

assert” his claims in state court.) 

 Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct 1309 (2012), delays or tolls the AEDPA 

limitations period, his argument fails. In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, under 

limited circumstances, ineffective post-conviction counsel could constitute cause to 

excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 132 S. Ct. at 

1315; see also Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293-95 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(extending the holding in Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel). 

 The Martinez decision does not address the timeliness of a habeas petition or the 

tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. See Wheelwright v. Wofford, 2014 WL 

3851155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an equitable 

one, it applied only to procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable tolling 

principles pertinent to the AEDPA limitations issue.”); see also White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 

882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide procedural default issues 

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is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas petition was barred by the 

AEDPA statute of limitations); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 

2014) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that Martinez delayed the start of the limitations 

period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) and finding that “Martinez has no 

applicability to this action as it does not concern the timeliness of a habeas petition.”). 

 Finally, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do 

not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. See 

Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s 

pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing 

period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

 Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably 

tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, his § 2254 habeas petition should be denied as 

untimely and therefore the Court does not address Respondents’ alternative grounds for 

denying habeas corpus relief. 

III. Conclusion 

 Because Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus after the 

expiration of the statute of limitations, and neither statutory nor equitable tolling render 

the Petition timely, it should be dismissed as untimely. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

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fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 1st day of May, 2015. 

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