Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIS W. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER PETERSON, et al.,

Defendants. 

 /

1:06-cv-01062-AWI-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS IN PART

 (Doc. 17)

ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN

CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Francis W. Davis (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On April 10, 2007, the Magistrate Judge filed a Findings and Recommendations that

recommended Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, due process, equal protection, violation of Penal

Code § 147, and injunction claims be dismissed and that this action proceed on Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims. The Findings and Recommendation were served on Plaintiff and contained

notice to Plaintiff that any objection to the Findings and Recommendations was to be filed within

thirty days. 

On May 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Findings and Recommendations.

Case 1:06-cv-01062-AWI-GSA Document 19 Filed 07/02/07 Page 1 of 5
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 73-305,

this Court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file,

the Court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper

analysis with one exception.

In the objections, Plaintiff agrees with some of the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and

findings. However, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending the

Court dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims. In these claims, Plaintiff contends that he was

confined to his cell without any procedural due process. As explained by the Magistrate Judge,

the threshold requirement to a procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty

or property interest protected by the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569

(1972); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9 Cir. 1999); Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. th

v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9 Cir. 1994). In the prison context, actions that impose th

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life” require due process protections prior to the action. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995). In determining if segregation is an “atypical and significant hardship” the Court in

Sandin compared the conditions of disciplinary segregation in the prison system to those imposed

on other inmates in analogous discretionary confinement settings, namely administrative

segregation and protective custody. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. 

The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s allegations that he was

confined to his cell for a matter of days is not an “atypical and significant deprivation” giving rise

to a liberty interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 (placement in segregation for 30 days did

not give rise to a liberty interest); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9 Cir. 1997); (no liberty

th

interest in remaining free from placement in administrative segregation); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59

F.3d 931, 932 (9 Cir. 1995) (despite prior case law determining disciplinary regulations created th

liberty interest, under Sandin no liberty interest when inmate placed in disciplinary segregation

for fourteen days); Hunt v. McKay, 2007 WL 642938, *5 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (finding that

confinement to a cell and deprivation of commissary, recreation, and visitation privileges for a

period of 12 days is not atypical in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life); George v.

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Lamey, 2007 WL 118912, *2(D.Mont. 2007) (finding 15 days confinement to cell

constitutionally insignificant under Sandin). Thus, Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims

must be dismissed.

Plaintiff also contends that he has sufficiently alleged equal protection violations. The

Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim

may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal protection claim by

showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff's

membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir.2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’

actions were a result of the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. Thornton v.

City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9 Cir. 2005). Assuming that Plaintiff sought to allege th

an equal protection claim under this theory, the Magistrate Judge found that the complaint failed

to allege Plaintiff was treated differently based on his membership in a protected class. The

court agrees. However, there is a second way to establish an equal protection violation not

addressed by the Magistrate Judge.

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

(1972); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9 Cir.2004); SeaRiver th

Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9 Cir. 2002). To state an equal th

protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an

identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of

Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal protection claim is based upon the defendant’s

selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement

is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of

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Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9 Cir.1995). th

Under Rule 8's pleading standards, the complaint state a claim for an equal protection

violation under this theory. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff, along with other inmates, was

given an AIA classification. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was similarly situated to other

inmates with an AIA classification. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was confined to his cell

while other inmates were allowed to go to the day room and have other privileges. The

complaint alleges that there was no rational basis to confine Plaintiff to his cell. The complaint

alleges that Defendants’ confined him to his cell based on an impermissible motive – retaliation. 

Ultimately the evidence may show that Plaintiff was not similarly situated to other inmates with

an AIA classification because he was being charged with an offense. In addition, the evidence

my eventually show that Defendants had a rational basis to confine Plaintiff to his cell. 

However, at this stage of the proceedings the complaint is sufficient to meet Rule 8(a)’s “short

and plain statement of the claim” requirement. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint’s

allegations are sufficient to provide Defendants with fair notice of the equal protection claim

against them. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9 Cir. 2001); Lynn v. Sheet th

Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1482 (9 Cir. 1986). It is not clear “that no relief th

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with [Plaintiff’s equal

protection] allegations.” See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). Thus,

this action may proceed on Plaintiff’s equal protection claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed April 10, 2007, are ADOPTED IN

PART;

2. This action shall proceed on Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed November 16,

2006, against Defendants Peterson and Valles for retaliation and equal protection

violations;

3. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process claims against Defendant Peterson

and Defendant Valles are DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim;

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4. Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of Penal Code § 147 is DISMISSED, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim;

5. Plaintiff’s claim for an order mandating he be allowed to make statues is

DISMISSED; 

6. This action SHALL proceed as one for damages only; and

7. This action is referred to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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