Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05279/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05279-52/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL C. BOLIN, 

Petitioner,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden of San Quentin 

State Prison, 

Respondent.

Case No. 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (1) 

DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

UNEXHAUSTED ALLEGATIONS, (2) 

DENYING CLAIM “C2” FOLLOWING 

LIMITED EVIDENTIARY HEARING, (3) 

DENYING FURTHER RECORD EXPANSION

AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING, (4) 

DENYING RECORD BASED CLAIMS A, B, 

and D THROUGH FF, (5) DENYING 

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS, and (6) ISSUING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY FOR 

CLAIMS C2, I13, L (L1-L4) & W2

CLERK TO VACATE ANY AND ALL 

SCHEDULED DATES AND SUBSTITUTE 

RON DAVIS AS RESPONDENT WARDEN 

AND ENTER JUDGMENT 

Petitioner is a state prisoner, sentenced to death, proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is represented in this action by appointed counsel Robert 

Bacon, Esq. and Brian Abbington, Esq. of the Office of the Federal Defender. 

Respondent Kevin Chappell1is named as Warden of San Quentin State Prison. He is

 

1

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Ron Davis, warden of San Quentin State Prison, is substituted as Respondent in place of 

his predecessor wardens.

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represented in this action by Rachelle Newcomb, Esq., and Ryan McCarroll, Esq. of the Office of the 

California Attorney General.

John Lee Holt, a state prisoner, sentenced to death, is a limited purpose intervener at the 

evidentiary hearing. He is represented by Jennifer Mann, Esq., of the Office of the Federal Defender. 

Before the Court for a decision are (1) claim C2, taken under submission following May 14, 

2013 limited evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 339), (2) matters reserved for ruling raised in Petitioner’s 

motion for evidentiary hearing and expansion of the record (ECF No. 214), and (3) the amended 

petition (ECF No. 113), record based claims A, B, and D through FF.2

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation pursuant to judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern imposing the 

death sentence, following his conviction by jury trial of two counts of first degree murder for which the 

multiple murder special-circumstance allegation as to the murders of Vance Huffstuttler and Steve 

Mincy was found true. The jury also found Petitioner guilty of one count of attempted first degree 

murder of Mr. Jim Wilson, and one count of marijuana cultivation. (CT at 399-400.)3 

On September 19, 1989, Petitioner was charged with the following offenses: the murder of 

Steve Mincy, pursuant to California Penal Code § 187 (Count I), the murder of Vance Huffstuttler, 

pursuant to California Penal Code § 187 (Count II), the attempted murder of James Wilson, pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 664/187 (Count III), and the cultivation of marijuana, in violation of Health 

and Safety Code § 11358 (Count IV). (CT at 125-29.) Counts I-III included alleged use of a firearm. 

Counts I and II included alleged multiple murder, a special circumstance pursuant to California Penal 

Code § 190.2(a)(3). All counts alleged that Petitioner had suffered a prior conviction for a serious 

felony. 

 

2 The Court previously denied claim C1. (ECF No. 276, at 40:27-28.)

3 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this order, “CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, “RT” to the Reporter’s 

Transcript on Appeal, “EH” refers to evidentiary hearing held May 14, 2013, “EH Ex” refers to joint final exhibit at the 

evidentiary hearing, “Supp. RT” refers to the Supplemental Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, “CSC” refers to the California 

Supreme Court, and “SHCP” refers to state habeas corpus petition. Other transcripts are referenced by date. Reference to 

page numbering is to the page numbering in the original document except Bates numbering is used for the CT. Any

reference to state law is to California law unless otherwise noted.

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At Petitioner’s arraignment on January 16, 1990, defense counsel Charles Soria and George 

Peterson were appointed to represent him. (CT at 4.) 

On March 16, 1990, Petitioner pled not guilty to the charges. (CT at 130.) Trial was set to 

begin on October 22, 1990. (CT at 131.) 

Several months later, Mr. Peterson suffered health issues and became unavailable to work on 

the case. (CT at 133-134.) 

Defense counsel Soria moved to withdraw shortly thereafter (CT at 137-39), citing Mr. 

Peterson’s departure and Soria’s desire for new and different employment. (7/18/90 RT at 3-4.) Mr. 

Soria agreed to stay on the case with the appointment of William Cater as second counsel on July 30, 

1990. (CT at 203; 7/30/90 RT at 9-10.) 

Petitioner, on October 12, 1990, moved to change venue because of the airing of two segments 

of the television program America’s Most Wanted re-enacting Petitioner’s alleged involvement in the 

crime and profiling his subsequent arrest, as well as local broadcast and print media reporting of the 

case.

4

 (CT at 238-46.) The Court heard argument on November 1, 1990 and reserved the motion until 

the conclusion of voir dire. (11/1/90 RT at 2-50.) There was no subsequent ruling on the change of 

venue motion. (RT at 1640:28-45:13.) 

The jury was sworn on December 3, 1990. (CT at 372.) 

On December 12, 1990, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts and enhancements and 

found the special circumstance to be true. (CT at 400-09.)

On December 13, 1990, prior to a bifurcated trial on Petitioner’s prior conviction for attempted

voluntary manslaughter, the Court granted the prosecutor’s motion to strike the prior-prison-term

allegation in count IV. (CT at 519-21, 524.) After the bifurcated trial, the jury found true the

allegation of a prior conviction. (Id.)

On December 14, 1990, following the guilt phase verdict, the Court granted Petitioner’s request 

for substitute defense counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), finding a complete 

breakdown in the relationship between Mr. Soria and Petitioner (RT at 2297-98), and appointed co-

 

4 There were two America’s Most Wanted broadcasts aired on the FOX television network: one on January 7, 1990, and the 

other on January 14, 1990. (See ECF No. 194 at 5 n.5.) 

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counsel Cater to represent Petitioner at the penalty phase. (RT at 2297-2301.) 

The penalty phase began in January 22, 1991. (CT at 584-89.) The jury returned a verdict of 

death on January 24, 1991. (CT at 626.)

On February 25, 1991, defense counsel Cater’s motion for appointment of independent counsel 

to prepare a motion for new trial was denied. (CT at 668; Supp. RT 2/25/91 at 1-8, 15-17; RT 2/25/91 

at 9-14.) Mr. Cater did not then move for a new trial. (Supp. RT 2/25/91 at 18-27.) Later that day, the 

trial court heard and denied Petitioner’s motion to modify the verdict pursuant to Pen. Code § 190.4 

and sentenced Petitioner to death on the capital charges. (RT 2/25/91 at 18-27.) The trial court also 

sentenced Petitioner to the upper term of nine years for attempted premeditated murder (Count III), 

three years with a stayed one-year enhancement for marijuana cultivation (Count IV), two years for the 

firearm enhancement pursuant to Pen. Code § 12022.5 and five years for the serious felony 

enhancement pursuant to Pen. Code § 667(a). (CT at 668-70; RT 2/25/91 at 24-27.)

 On June 18, 1998, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct 

appeal, as modified on August 12, 1998 upon denial of rehearing. People v. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297 

(1998), as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 12, 1998).

Petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on March 8, 1999. 

Bolin v. California, 526 U.S. 1006 (1999). 

On August 8, 2000, Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. On that same 

day, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. 

The state petition was summarily denied on January 19, 2005, each claim was denied on the 

merits, claims E1, E2, I3 (with respect to defense-requested penalty phase instruction No. 9) and L 

were denied on procedural grounds as raised and rejected on appeal, see In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 

824-29 (1993), and (except to the extent of claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel) claims 

A, B1 (to the extent of alleged trial court error), C, E3, E4, F, H, I1, I2, I3 (except as to defense 

requested penalty phase instruction No. 9), and J were also denied on procedural grounds because these 

claims could have been but were not raised on appeal, see In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953). In 

re Bolin, S090684. On that same day, Petitioner filed an amended federal petition alleging violations of 

the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, (ECF No. 113), 

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which is the operative pleading.5

Respondent filed an answer to the amended petition on June 17, 2005, admitting certain 

jurisdictional and procedural allegations, asserting procedural defenses, and denying all claims A

through FF. (ECF No. 120.) 

On September 30, 2005, the Court found all claims in the amended petition to be fully 

exhausted. (ECF No. 142 at 4:2-4.) 

On September 7, 2006, the Court granted Petitioner limited pre-briefing discovery as to 

prosecution files including background materials regarding potential jurors; witness Eloy Ramirez; 

victim/witness Jim Wilson; and notes of prosecution expert, criminologist Greg Laskowski. (ECF No. 

174.) 

On March 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the 

petition. (ECF No. 178.) 

On December 17, 2007, Respondent filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of 

his answer to the amended petition. (ECF No. 194.) 

On April 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s memorandum. (ECF No. 205.)

On December 22, 2008, Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing with respect to claims A, 

B2, C, D, F, G, I, J, K, W, Y, BB, CC, DD, and EE. (ECF No. 214.) Therein Petitioner also sought 

expansion of the record to include exhibits 52 through 94 not previously submitted, which supplement 

the exhibits that were before the state court.

On March 19, 2009, Respondent filed his opposition to the request for evidentiary development 

and hearing. (ECF No. 232.) 

On August 7, 2009, Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s opposition, (ECF No. 235); therein 

withdrawing claim CC and the request for evidentiary hearing on claim CC, alleging that lethal 

injection is cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 235 at 39:15-16; ECF No. 236.) 

On April 27, 2012, the Court granted an evidentiary hearing as to claim C2, ineffective 

assistance of defense counsel regarding “his trial attorneys’ failure to renew their request for a change 

of venue on the basis of presumed prejudice occasioned by pretrial publicity.” (ECF No. 261 at 54:12-

 

5 The Court takes judicial notice of the certified state record on appeal. 

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15; ECF No. 276, at 53:4-7.) The Court denied on the merits the request for evidentiary hearing for 

“[t]he trial error component of [c]laim C as well as the argument that juror impartiality (sic) followed 

from actual prejudice . . . .” (Id.) The Court reserved ruling on the balance of claims requested for 

evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 271 at 2:18-19.) 

On November 29, 2012, the Court granted Respondent pre-hearing discovery of claim C2 by 

authorizing deposition subpoenas duces tecum for attorneys Soria and Cater. (ECF No. 303.) 

On February 27, 2013, the Court granted the motion to intervene by third party intervenor John 

Lee Holt, for the limited purpose of asserting his attorney-client privilege and work product protection 

during the testimony of Soria, Howard Varinsky and Bruce Binns at the evidentiary hearing and in any 

other proceeding in this case in which such assertion may be necessary. (ECF No. 325.) Mr. Holt was 

represented by Messrs. Soria and Peterson when they were appointed to represent Petitioner. (EH RT 

at 30:14-31:14, 91:16-17.) 

The evidentiary hearing took place on May 14, 2013. Claim C2 was taken under submission 

following the evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 339.) Petitioner, at the hearing, requested an evidentiary 

hearing on other claims of ineffective assistance. (ECF No. 343 at 16, n.10.) 

On July 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a post-hearing brief. (ECF No. 343.)

On September 3, 2013, Respondent filed a post-hearing brief. (ECF No. 344.)

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This factual summary is taken from the California Supreme Court’s summary of the facts in its 

June 18, 1998 opinion. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1), the state supreme court’s summary 

of facts is presumed correct. Petitioner does not present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary; 

thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the state supreme court. Vasquez v. Kirkland, 

572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We rely on the state appellate court’s decision for our 

summary of the facts of the crime.”).

A. Guilt Phase

The crimes occurred Labor Day weekend of 1989, when defendant was living in a small 

cabin located in a secluded mountainous area of Walker Basin in rural Kern County. 

Vance Huffstuttler also lived on the property in a trailer. Together they cultivated 

marijuana defendant had planted nearby. Defendant had taken on Huffstuttler as an 

assistant in the marijuana venture and intended to give him a portion of the profits when 

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they sold the crop.

On Friday, September 1, Steve Mincy and Jim Wilson drove from Garden Grove to a 

campsite owned by Mincy’s father, Robert, near Twin Oaks, also in Kern County. 

Robert and several other family members and friends had already arrived and were 

planning to spend the weekend. The next day, Wilson went for a bicycle ride and then 

met Steve Mincy at a bar in Twin Oaks. Mincy was there drinking with several others, 

including Vance Huffstuttler; defendant was also among the group. Later, Wilson 

returned to the campsite, where he agreed to drive Huffstuttler back to his trailer; Mincy 

accompanied them.

According to Wilson’s trial testimony, the trip to Walker Basin took about 45 minutes in 

his truck, including 30 minutes on rough dirt roads leading into defendant’s property. 

Defendant had already returned to his cabin. Upon arriving, Mincy, Wilson, and 

Huffstuttler saw him there with Eloy Ramirez, a friend of defendant’s who was blind in 

one eye. When they got out of the truck, Huffstuttler took Mincy and Wilson across a 

creek bed and showed them numerous marijuana plants under cultivation. Defendant 

followed shortly thereafter and confronted Huffstuttler about bringing strangers to the 

location. Wilson testified defendant became “pretty agitated” and began arguing with 

Huffstuttler. The two returned to the other side of the creek bed toward the cabin, out of 

Wilson’s view, still arguing. Wilson then heard a gunshot from that direction. A moment 

later, he and Mincy saw defendant appear from behind a line of trees holding a revolver 

and saying he had “nothing against” them. As Wilson turned and ran, defendant fired a 

shot that hit him in the shoulder. He heard several more shots as Mincy begged for his 

life.

According to Ramirez’s testimony, when defendant and Huffstuttler returned across the 

creek bed arguing, defendant went into the cabin and came out with a revolver. 

Huffstuttler asked, “What are you going to do, shoot me?” Defendant did not respond, 

but instead fired one shot at close range. Huffstuttler fell to the ground and did not 

move. Defendant then approached Mincy and Wilson and fired several more rounds. 

Back at the cabin, he took a rifle and shot at Huffstuttler’s inert body. He also took other 

steps to make the scene appear like the result of a drug deal gone bad. Ramirez refused 

to assist him. When defendant finished, they both left for Southern California.

Meanwhile, after traveling all night over the mountainous terrain, Wilson found his way 

to a neighboring ranch, where the owner called the sheriff’s office. When sheriff’s 

deputies went to defendant’s cabin, they found Huffstuttler’s body lying near Wilson’s 

truck; Mincy’s body was in the creek bed in a fetal position. Both had several fatal 

gunshot wounds; Huffstuttler had been shot with both a revolver and a rifle. The area 

inside and outside the cabin was in disarray with broken bottles and marijuana 

paraphernalia as well as some loose marijuana scattered about. The revolver, wiped 

clean of fingerprints, was found near Huffstuttler. A knife was found nearby as well. 

Spent shell casings and bullets were retrieved from near each body. At trial, Criminalist 

Gregory Laskowski determined that grooves in the bullets were consistent with having 

been fired from the .45-caliber weapon found at the scene. He also testified that blood 

spatters around Mincy’s body indicated some gunshot wounds had been inflicted while 

he was running and at least one other while he was in a fetal position.

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Despite an extensive search, law enforcement was unable to locate defendant for several 

months. Authorities eventually arrested him in Chicago, where he had been living with 

friends and family members. Sheriff’s deputies also traced the whereabouts of Eloy 

Ramirez to the house of his girlfriend, Patricia Islas, in Covina, where he had gone after 

the killings. At trial, Ramirez corroborated the description of events recounted by 

Wilson.

The defense presented no evidence at the guilt phase.

B. Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution Evidence

At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of two instances of violent 

criminal conduct—an unadjudicated assault with great bodily injury of Matthew Spencer 

and the attempted manslaughter of Kenneth Ross, for which defendant was convicted 

and sentenced to prison. The prosecution also submitted a threatening letter defendant 

wrote to Jerry Halfacre while incarcerated awaiting trial. Halfacre had previously had a 

relationship with defendant’s daughter, Paula, and was the father of her child. Among 

other things, the letter warned Halfacre not to see Paula again or defendant would have 

him “permanently removed from the face of this Earth.” Halfacre had given the letter to 

his probation officer, who transferred it to a Kern County District Attorney investigator.

2. Defense Evidence

In addition to testimony that defendant had acted under provocation in the incidents 

involving Spencer and Ross, the defense presented evidence of his upbringing. 

Defendant’s parents divorced when he was eight years old, and within a few years 

neither wanted to care for him. He lived on the street until he was 16 years old when he 

joined the Navy and went to Vietnam. Defendant’s two daughters testified he had raised 

them from young ages when their mother abandoned them. Defendant also raised his 

stepdaughter, Pamela Castillo, after he and her mother were divorced. Other family 

members and friends recounted how defendant had helped them in various ways.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 309-11 (1998).

III. JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). 

Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The 

challenged conviction arises out of Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the 

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jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(d), 2254(a).

This action was initiated on March 11, 1999. Because this action was initiated after April 24, 

1996, the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) apply. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 

(2003).

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Legal Standard - Habeas Corpus 

Under AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is barred unless 

a petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

“[A] state has ‘adjudicated’ a petitioner's constitutional claim ‘on the merits' for purposes of § 

2254(d) when it has decided the petitioner's right to post-conviction relief on the basis of substance of 

the constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other 

rule precluding state court review of the merits.” Brown v. Walker, No. C 09-04663 JSW, 2014 WL 

4757804, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 

2004)). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this Court must look to 

the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant 

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’

under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the 

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time the state court renders its decision.” Id. In addition, the Supreme Court decision must “‘squarely 

address [] the issue in th[e] case’; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of 

review under AEDPA.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007); Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006). 

If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an end and the Court must defer to 

the state court’s decision. See Carey, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552 U.S. at 126; Moses, 555 F.3d at 760. 

In addition, the Supreme Court has recently clarified that habeas relief is unavailable in instances where 

a state court arguably refuses to extend a governing legal principle to a context in which the principle 

should have controlled. White v. Woodall, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014). The Supreme 

Court stated: “‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,’ then 

by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.’” Id.

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004)).

If the Court determines there is governing clearly established Federal law, the Court must then 

consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, [the] clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court 

decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “The word ‘contrary’ is commonly understood to 

mean ‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed.’” Williams, 529 

U.S. at 405 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 495 (1976)). “A state-court 

decision will certainly be contrary to [Supreme Court] clearly established precedent if the state court 

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Id. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal court 

may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant 

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state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. “A state 

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded 

jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, (citing

Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). The Supreme Court stated:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.

Id. at 101-05. In other words, so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the 

state courts decision, the decision cannot be considered unreasonable. Id. at 98-99. In applying this 

standard, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported . . . or could have 

supported the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme Court].” Id. at 101-03. This objective standard of reasonableness applies to review under 

both subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2012). 

If the Court determines that the state court decision is objectively unreasonable, and the error is not 

structural, habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless the error had a substantial and injurious effect 

on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or 

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 

F.3d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth 

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is 

objectively unreasonable. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The AEDPA requires considerable deference to the state courts. “[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) 

is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits,” and 

“evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on 2254(d)(1) review.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 180-85 (2011)). “Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear 

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and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). However, a state court’s factual finding is not entitled to deference if the relevant 

state court record is unavailable for the federal court to review. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 

319 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).

If a petitioner satisfies either subsection (1) or (2) of § 2254 for a claim, then the federal court 

considers that claim de novo. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953 (when § 2254(d) is satisfied, “[a] federal court 

must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires”); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 

F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008).

In this case, many of Petitioner’s claims were raised and rejected by the California Supreme 

Court on direct appeal. However, many of his claims were raised in his state habeas petition to the 

California Supreme Court, and summarily denied on the merits. In such a case where the state court 

decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, “the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. The 

Supreme Court stated that “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . 

could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 101-03 (emphasis added). Petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 

709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). “Crucially, this is not a de novo 

review of the constitutional question,” id., as “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102); see also Murray 

v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2014). When reviewing the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of a petition, this Court must consider that the California Supreme Court’s summary 

denial of a habeas petition on the merits reflects that court’s determination that: 

[T]he claims made in th[e] petition do not state a prima facie case entitling the petitioner to 

relief. It appears that the court generally assumes the allegations in the petition to be true, but 

does not accept wholly conclusory allegations, and will also review the record of the trial ... to 

assess the merits of the petitioner’s claims.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 188; see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094-96 (2013) (holding 

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that even where the state court does not separately discuss a federal claim there is a presumption that 

that state court adjudicated the federal claim on the merits). Accordingly, if this Court finds Petitioner 

has unarguably presented a prima facie case for relief on a claim, the state court’s summary rejection of 

that claim would be unreasonable. See e.g., Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2003).

For any habeas claim that has not been adjudicated on the merits by the state court, the federal 

court reviews the claim de novo without the deference usually accorded state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1). Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 

1167 (9th Cir. 2002). In such instances, however, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) still apply. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185 (“Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not 

bar federal habeas relief.”); Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167–68 (stating that state court findings of fact are 

presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1) even if legal review is de novo).

V. PROCEDURAL BARS

Some of Petitioner’s claims were alternatively denied by the California Supreme Court as 

procedurally barred. As to those claims, Respondent has invoked the independent state ground 

doctrine, pursuant to which a federal court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state 

court “if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question 

and adequate to support the judgment.” Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). 

Since “cause and prejudice” can excuse a procedurally defaulted claim, Smith v. Baldwin, 510 

F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007), (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750), and “prejudice” essentially 

requires a merits analysis, the Court will proceed to the merits of claims found to be procedurally 

defaulted without determining whether the state procedural default is adequate and independent to bar 

relief in federal court. Id., (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. 732-35). A district court may exercise 

discretion to proceed to the merits in advance of litigation of procedural default. See Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (courts empowered to reach the merits if on their face 

clearly not meritorious despite asserted procedural bar); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005) (an 

application for habeas corpus may be denied on the merits even if unexhausted in state court); Loggins 

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v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (relief may be denied on the merits where petition is 

clearly not meritorious despite asserted procedural bar). 

VI. LIMITED EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner alleges in claim C2 that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the 

October 12, 1990 change of venue motion (CT at 238-46) following voir dire of the jury and in spite of 

alleged inflammatory pretrial publicity and alleged lack of impartiality among the prospective jurors. 

(ECF No. 113 at 16-38; ECF No. 178 at 43-63.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal. (Appellant’s Opening Brief, “AOB”, at 11-

25.) The California Supreme Court denied the claim as procedurally barred because defense counsel 

did not renew the motion to change venue or seek a definitive ruling. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 312. That 

court also rejected the claim on the merits. See Id. at 312-14.

Petitioner raised the claim again in his state habeas corpus petition (SHCP at 53-89), which the 

California Supreme Court again rejected. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner supported the venue motion with: the America’s Most Wanted program, both the 

original re-enactment of the crime and the follow-up segment on Petitioner’s arrest (ECF No. 214, EH 

Ex. 54); a defense-commissioned Community Attitude Survey (ECF No. 214, EH Ex. 52; see also

11/1/90 RT at 3-28); a folder of newspaper clippings and videotapes (ECF No. 214, EH Ex. 53; CT at 

332); and a local News 29 broadcast about the role of America’s Most Wanted in Petitioner’s arrest. 

(CT 332; 11/1/90 RT at 28.) 

Petitioner offered, for prevailing professional norms, the 1989 ABA Guidelines for the 

Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”); the 1987

National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) Standards for the Appointment of Counsel in 

Death Penalty Cases; excerpts from the California Death Penalty Defense Manual (1986 through

1989) regarding jury selection as well as pretrial motions for change of venue; and the declaration of 

Strickland expert James S. Thomson. (ECF No. 214, EH Ex.’s 57, 58, 59, 60, and 72.) For evidence

regarding the performance of defense counsel, he offers the declarations of counsel Soria and Cater, 

and expert Thomson. (Id., EH Ex.’s 65, 66, and 72.)

Petitioner argued that his survey showed that 45 percent of Kern County residents surveyed 

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were familiar with the case. (11/1/90 RT at 21:27-22:2.) Petitioner requested that, if the change of

venue motion was not granted, those potential jurors who had seen the America’s Most Wanted 

reenactment be excused for cause without even participating in voir dire. (11/1/90 RT at 22:25-26.)

Respondent countered that only approximately 15 percent of the Kern County residents 

surveyed had seen the America’s Most Wanted reenactment (11/1/90 RT at 24:26-25:2) and that only a 

small portion of those felt swayed by seeing it (id.), such that Petitioner had not shown he could not get 

a fair trial in Kern County. (11/1/90 RT at 25:10-12.) 

The trial judge took the motion under consideration (RT 11/1/90, at 28:16-19, 50:6-24), 

informing defense counsel that he was not inclined to grant the motion to change venue but that he was 

“very, very concerned about that program. . . .” (11/1/90 RT at 28.) The court “reserve[d] ruling” on 

the venue motion (11/1/90 RT at 50:6-18) because it wanted:

[T]o see first of all how many prospective run-ins we get who actually have seen this 

video and then I would like to take a few of those and I realize you and Mr. Cater 

[defense counsel] would have a great many question that may not be necessary and see 

what their general reaction is . . . [¶] [I]f there are general reactions, what I think there is, 

I think I might be inclined to give a blanket for cause.” (11/1/90 RT at 50:8-16.)

The trial court then stated that:

“Let me just make a finding, I think I did this morning, but to make it perfectly clear, but 

for this re-enactment on America’s Most Wanted, I do not think there are grounds to 

change the venue on any of the criteria that we have before us concerning that. That’s 

the big issue. Fair enough? 

(11/1/90 RT at 50:19-24.)

Defense counsel never raised the venue issue again, and the trial court made no further ruling on 

it. (RT at 1640:28-45:13.) Respondent argues the motion was impliedly denied when the jury was 

sworn and the prosecution’s opening statement began. (Id.)

A. Clearly Established Law

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, applicable to the states through 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applies through the sentencing phase of a trial. 

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U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 

(1963); Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002); Murray, 745 F.3d at 1010-11.

The source of clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104; 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. More specifically, the petitioner must show that “counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or 

omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104, (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); accord United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 

78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so egregious as to 

deprive defendant of a fair trial, which Strickland defines as “one whose result is reliable.” 466 U.S. at 

688. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential, and the habeas court must guard 

against the temptation “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.” Id.

at 689. Instead, the habeas court must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 106-08. A court indulges a 

“‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); accord

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). This presumption of reasonableness means that 

not only does the court “give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” but the court must also 

“affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as 

they did.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 196.

The Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney 

conduct and instead ha[s] emphasized that ‘[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains 

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

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(2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). However, “general principles have emerged regarding 

the duties of criminal defense attorneys that inform [a court’s] view as to the ‘objective standard of 

reasonableness’ by which [a court must] assess attorney performance, particularly with respect to the 

duty to investigate.” Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629 (2005). “[S]trategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. However,

[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely 

to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 

investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 

make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 

counsel’s judgments.

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22, (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91); see also Thomas v. Chappell, 

678 F.3d 1086, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (counsel’s decision not to call a witness can only be considered 

tactical if he had “sufficient information with which to make an informed decision”); Reynoso v. 

Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1112–1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (counsel’s failure to cross-examine witnesses 

about their knowledge of reward money cannot be considered strategic where counsel did not 

investigate this avenue of impeachment); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(counsel’s choice of alibi defense and rejection of mental health defense not reasonable strategy where 

counsel failed to investigate possible mental defenses).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice, that is, he must show that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result . . . would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable 

effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104, (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

693). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Under this standard, 

the court asks “whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been different.” Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 112 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). That is, only when “[t]he likelihood of a different result 

[is] substantial, not just conceivable,” id., has the defendant met Strickland’s demand that defense 

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errors were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 103-05 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687). A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not 

result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Under AEDPA, the court does not apply Strickland de novo. Rather, the court must determine 

whether the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable. Richter, 562 U.S. at 100-101. 

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

is very difficult. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (on deferential § 2254(d) review, relief is granted only for 

“extreme malfunctions” in the state criminal justice system, not for ordinary errors that can be corrected 

on appeal).

Since the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential”, Richter, 

562 U.S. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689),“when the two apply in tandem, review is 

‘doubly’ so.” Id. (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). Further, because the 

Strickland rule is a “general” one, courts have “more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations” such that the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Id. at 123; see also Premo 

v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90) (“[T]he Strickland standard 

must be applied with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very 

adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.”). 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in issuing it decision following the limited evidentiary hearing, 

the Court “reviews de novo the evidence elicited through discovery and at the evidentiary hearing in 

these proceedings and is no longer constrained by the limitations imposed by § 2254(d).” Williams v. 

Davis, No. CV 00-10637 DOC, 2016 WL 1254149, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Frantz, 533 

F.3d at 737) (“In sum, where the analysis on federal habeas, in whatever order conducted, results in the 

conclusion that § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied, then federal habeas courts must review the substantive 

constitutionality of the state custody de novo.”); accord Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 

1161 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation).

2. Change of Venue

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The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury.

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377-78 (2010); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The 

Constitution further provides that the trial shall occur “in the State where the . . . Crimes . . . have been 

committed.” Art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. Const., Amend. 6 (right to trial by “jury of the State and 

district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). “The Constitution’s place-of-trial 

prescriptions, however, do not impede transfer of the proceeding to a different district at the 

defendant’s request if extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial—a ‘basic requirement of 

due process.’” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 378.

Nevertheless, “juror impartiality, we have reiterated, does not require ignorance.” Skilling, 561 

U.S. at 381 (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722) (jurors are not required to be “totally ignorant of the facts and 

issues involved”; “scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some 

impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-156 

(1879) (“[E]very case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all 

the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for 

jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to 

its merits.”). 

To merit relief for violation of his due process rights due to pretrial publicity, petitioner must 

demonstrate that the case is one in which prejudice is presumed, or he must demonstrate actual 

prejudice. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 379, 385. 

Under California law, “[a] motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted 

whenever it is determined that because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is 

a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had.” Maine v. Superior 

Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 383 (1968); (see CT at 257). The factors to be considered in granting or denying 

a motion for change of venue are: “1) the nature and gravity of the offense, 2) the size and nature of the 

community, 3) the status of the victim, 4) the status of the defendant, 5) the nature and extent of the 

publicity.” Martinez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 578 (1981); (see CT at 242, 257). 

a. Presumed Prejudice

A presumption of prejudice is “rarely invoked and only in extreme situations.” United States v. 

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McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998), partially overruled on other grounds by Hooks v. 

Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1227 (10th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has determined that pretrial publicity 

so manifestly tainted a criminal prosecution that prejudice must be presumed in only three cases: 

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); and Sheppard v. 

Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 

“The foundation precedent is Rideau.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 379. In Rideau, the case turned on 

an actual filmed confession broadcast to the entire community. 373 U.S. at 724. “What the people [in 

the community] saw on their television sets,” the Supreme Court observed, “was Rideau, in jail, 

flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers, admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, 

kidnapping, and murder.” Id. at 725. “[T]o the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it,” the 

Supreme Court explained, the interrogation “in a very real sense was Rideau’s trial—at which he 

pleaded guilty.” Id. at 726. The Supreme Court therefore “d[id] not hesitate to hold, without pausing 

to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire,” that “[t]he kangaroo court proceedings” trailing 

the televised confession violated due process. Id. at 726–727.

In the two cases to follow Rideau, the analyses and holdings turned on the massive media 

interference with court proceedings and the constant and pervasive media coverage during trial. See

Skilling, 561 U.S. at 379-80. In Estes, “extensive publicity before trial swelled into excessive exposure 

during preliminary court proceedings as reporters and television crews overran the courtroom and 

‘bombard[ed] . . . the community with the sights and sounds of the pretrial hearing. The media’s 

overzealous reporting efforts, we observed, ‘led to considerable disruption’ and denied the ‘judicial 

serenity and calm to which petitioner was entitled.’” Id. (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 536). In Sheppard, 

the Supreme Court noted that “bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took 

over practically the entire courtroom,” thrusting jurors “into the role of celebrities.” 384 U.S. at 353, 

355. Pretrial publicity consisted of “months [of] virulent publicity about [the defendant] and the 

murder.” Id. at 354. Ultimately, the Supreme Court “upset the murder conviction because a ‘carnival 

atmosphere’ pervaded the trial.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 380 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358).

When pretrial publicity is at issue, “primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes 

[especially] good sense” because the judge “sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its 

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effect” and may base her evaluation on her “own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that 

might influence a juror.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991). 

B. Analysis of Claim C2

Petitioner alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and renew his 

change of venue motion following (1) voir dire, which he claims demonstrated inflammatory pretrial 

publicity and partiality among the prospective jurors; and (2) the trial court’s denial of certain of 

defense counsel’s “for cause” challenges of potential jurors who had seen the America’s Most Wanted

re-enactment. 

As noted, the trial court reserved ruling on the change of venue motion until it could question 

potential jurors regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity (11/1/90 RT at 50:6-18; RT at 1640:28-

45:13) and see “first of all how many prospective run-ins we get who actually have seen this video and 

. . . what their general reaction is.” (11/1/90 RT at 50:8-12.) However, that court voiced its concern 

that the average person might be unable to rise above the publicity relating to the show’s “quite 

dramatic” re-enactment of the alleged incident (11/1/90 RT at 26:20)), and noting that:

Let me just make a finding, I think I did this morning, but to make it perfectly clear, but 

for this re-enactment on America’s Most Wanted, I do not think there are grounds to 

change the venue on any of the criteria that we have before us concerning that. That’s 

the big issue. Fair enough? 

(11/1/90 RT at 50:19-24.)

The California Supreme Court, in rejecting this claim, stated: 

Prior to trial, defendant moved for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity about the 

case. Not only had the local television and print media given the killings substantial 

coverage, the program, America’s Most Wanted, featured a television reenactment of the 

crimes during a segment aired just prior to defendant’s arrest. The broadcast apparently 

led to his identification in Chicago as the alleged perpetrator, and a second airing shortly 

thereafter described his apprehension. In support of the motion, defendant submitted 

videotaped copies of the television episodes as well as local news clippings reporting the 

crimes. At the hearing on the change of venue motion, defense counsel also referred to 

the results of a public opinion survey the defense had undertaken in Kern County. Based 

on the survey, counsel represented that 45 percent of the people responding indicated 

they had some knowledge of the case due to the media attention. Of this number, 20 

percent had seen the America’s Most Wanted reenactment.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 311-12. That court went on to observe that: 

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Counsel’s failure to renew the change of venue motion did not result from ignorance or

inadvertence and reflected a reasonable trial strategy. [Citation] The impact of the

pretrial publicity generally and the America’s Most Wanted episodes in particular was a

critical focus of the voir dire. Although many prospective jurors had been exposed to

some pretrial publicity, including the segment reenacting the killings, for the most part

few recalled the specifics or had formed a resolute impression of [Petitioner’s] guilt. In

particular, those who eventually sat on the jury all gave assurances they would decide 

the case based solely on the courtroom evidence. [Citation]

In light of these responses, counsel could well have recognized the effect of the publicity 

had not been as substantial as feared, especially after an 11-month interim. Thus, 

renewed effort to seek a change of venue would be futile since the trial court had

conditioned any change in its tentative ruling on a determination the television coverage

had impaired the ability to assemble an impartial jury. In addition, the reenactment was

relevant only to the guilt phase portion of the trial. With guilt virtually a foregone

conclusion, counsel’s concern may at that point have turned to the penalty phase, which

was substantially insulated from the effect of pretrial publicity. [Citation] Given the

possibility of a valid trial tactic, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance. [Citation]

Id. at 314. 

Upon consideration of the record and the following findings of fact after limited evidentiary 

hearing the Court concludes that voir dire of the jury did not demonstrate exposure to pretrial publicity 

rising to the level of presumptive prejudice, and that defense counsel was not deficient by failing to 

renew the change of venue motion. 

1. Presumed Prejudice 

Petitioner argues that the nature and extent and material falsity of the pretrial publicity, and the 

lack of impartiality among the venire pool, support a presumption of prejudice. 

As noted, the Court previously denied Petitioner claim of actual prejudice (i.e., “actual partiality 

or hostility that could not be laid aside”), see Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988). 

(ECF No. 261 at 54:12-15; ECF No. 276, at 53:4-7.) 

Furthermore, the Court previously stated that the Strickland prejudice prong must be established 

for claim C2 and that its Strickland analysis will be informed by whether it is reasonably likely that 

venue would have been changed from Kern County because of presumed prejudice had Bolin’s 

attorneys renewed the motion. (ECF No. 330 at 2:2-3); see Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695) (“[T]he governing legal standard plays a critical role in 

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defining the question to be asked in assessing prejudice for counsel's errors.”). Thus Respondent’s 

argument that the Court has substituted a presumed prejudice standard in place of the Strickland 

standard of prejudice is rejected. Respondent’s re-argument and citation to Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 

1147, 1149-52 (9th Cir. 1998), a case rejecting an ineffective assistance claim relating to jury 

composition by applying the Strickland prejudice standard, does not persuade the Court otherwise.

a. Nature and Extent of Pretrial Publicity

1) America’s Most Wanted Program

Petitioner contends that the program, which initially aired on January 7, 1990, was an 

inflammatory re-enactment of events according to the Kern County Sheriff’s Department (ECF No. 113 

at 21:1-3) and that the prosecution admitted as much. (11/1/90 RT at 25:6-9.) He also contends the 

program presented inaccurate background information on Petitioner. (ECF No. 113 at 21:2-4.) 

The trial court, after viewing the program, found it “quite dramatic” (11/1/90 RT at 26:20)

attended by considerable “media hoopla” (RT at 1226:21-25) and a “pretty graphic dramatization of 

this alleged incident.” (RT at 761:8-9). The trial court was “very, very concerned about that program.”

(Id. at 28:18-19.) 

Shortly thereafter, local television news aired a story on Petitioner’s capture, including excerpts 

from the America’s Most Wanted program. (ECF No. 214, EH Ex. 54.) 

On January 14, 1990, America’s Most Wanted aired a follow-up program, advising viewers of 

Petitioner’s arrest (Id.; 11/1/90 RT at 17:6-13; 113 at 21:17-19), including an interview with Jim 

Wilson and a rebroadcast of the alleged last words of Steve Mincy pleading for his life, comments from 

Mr. Mincy’s mother that his daughter was missing her deceased dad (ECF No. 113 at 21:17-23), and 

information about the fear of residents near the crime scene that Petitioner might return. (ECF No. 113 

at 21:23-27; 1/1/90 Supp. RT at 16:24-20:25.) This second broadcast revisited the false booby trap 

allegations (11/1/90 RT at 7), discussed below, included victim impact statements from Jim Wilson 

and from Steve Mincy’s daughter, (11/1/90 RT at 7:9-20:25), and falsely stated that: “[I]n 1981 

[Petitioner] killed a man with a shotgun blast in an argument. He was paroled after serving 2 years. In 

1986, [Petitioner] stabbed a man 15 times, but he was acquitted.” (11/1/90 RT at 16:7-12; cf., RT at 

2246-48; CT at 125-28; SHCP Ex. 42:191.) 

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2) Local Media Coverage 

Prior to the March 2, 1990 preliminary examination hearing, four motions for media coverage

of proceedings were filed, one from a newspaper, the Bakersfield Californian, to include a still camera

and tape recorder; one from radio station KUZZ, for audio; and one each from television stations 

Channel 17 and Channel 23. (CT at 8:3-12.) These motions were granted by the trial court. (CT at 

15:25-28.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s request to close the preliminary hearing and seal the 

transcript. (CT at 14-15.) Local media interest during the trial included television cameras 

permanently in the courtroom to record witness testimony (RT at 1643:7-12; RT-8 at 1780:15-82:11), 

and requests to accompany the jurors on their crime scene visit. (RT at 1892:26-1893:4.)

Petitioner cites the following articles published in the Bakersfield Californian during the period 

September 1989 to March 1990: 

 A September 4, 1989 article, which falsely attributed booby traps and pipe bombs to 

Petitioner, who was falsely described as a former Navy SEAL with explosives expertise. 

(ECF No. 113 at 17:1-20.) This article also erroneously stated that Jim Wilson had to 

find a road where he flagged down a passing motorist. (EH Ex. 53.) 

 A September 6, 1989 article, which repeated the false pipe bomb statement and falsely 

described Petitioner as a “convicted killer.” (Id.; 11/1/90 RT at 23.) In fact, Petitioner 

asserts, no pipe bomb had been assembled from the components found at the crime 

scene. (ECF No. 113 at 18:8-13; RT at 1887-88.) Petitioner claims this article also left 

the false impression that Petitioner may have been involved in a 1985 shooting of a law 

enforcement officer who was investigating a marijuana farm in the same general area. 

(ECF No. 113, at 18-25.) 

 A September 7, 1989 article which falsely reported that Petitioner had shot Kenneth 

Ross with a shotgun, when in fact Ross had been shot with a rifle. (Id.; EH Ex. 53; RT 

at 2565.) 

 A September 8, 1989 article, which related to the search for Petitioner and included 

irrelevant and prejudicial information relating to other pot farms in the area, implying 

Petitioner was connected to the other pot farms. (EH Ex. 53; ECF No. 113 at 19:7-24.) 

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 A September 9, 1989 article which reported that Petitioner’s van had been found 

abandoned in Covina, California; that the search for him continued; and that police 

patrols in the Walker Basin area had increased following possible sightings of Petitioner 

in the area. (EH Ex. 53.) The article also included information about other pot farms in 

that area. (Id.)

 A January 6, 1990 article, which falsely report details of Wilson’s escape, that he 

crawled to safety over 14 hours (id.; ECF No. 113 at 20-22); reported on Petitioner’s 

alleged violent history; and falsely reported that 4 pipe bombs were found at the crime 

scene when in fact only 3 unloaded alleged pipe bombs were found. (ECF No. 113 at 

20:20-28; RT at 1863, 1888.) 

 A January 8, 1990 article which reported on Petitioner’s arrest and repeated the 

erroneous information that Jim Wilson had “crawled eight miles over 14 hours to reach 

safety.” (ECF No. 113 at 22:25-28.) 

 A January 17, 1990 article, which repeated the erroneous information above and 

reported Petitioner’s return to California following his capture in Illinois, his pleading 

not guilty to the two murder counts, the attempted murder count, and the marijuana 

cultivation count, discovery of four pipe bombs in the cabin which officials thought 

were used as booby traps, (EH Ex. 53; ECF No. 113 at 22:24-23:1), and stated that 

during arraignment, the courtroom “was fortified by seven Kern County sheriff’s 

deputies.” (ECF No. 113 at 23: 2-3.)

 A January 27, 1990 article, which repeated the erroneous information above and

reported a delay in Petitioner’s preliminary hearing until March 2, 1990. (EH Ex. 53; 

ECF No. 113 at 22:24-23:1.)

 A March 3, 1990 article summarizing the March 2, 1990 preliminary examination 

testimony of Jim Wilson and Eloy Ramirez. (EH Ex. 53; ECF No. 276 at 13:27-28.) 

Respondent counters that the print publicity was not persistent and pervasive because only one 

newspaper, the Bakersfield Californian, covered the trial, with six articles published in the week 

following the crime (through September 9, 1989), and another four articles published near the 

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televising of the America’s Most Wanted segments (through January 27, 1990.) (ECF No. 194 at 

40:27-41:7.) Respondent argues these facts support the state court finding that most of the news 

articles appeared almost a year before trial, Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 314, and that the articles were 

insufficient to show presumed prejudice. See Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1093 (E.D. 

Cal. October 30, 2006), reversed in part on other grounds, 583 F.3d 1100, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citing United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 410 (9th Cir. 1996) (presumed prejudice standard 

requires the community be “saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the 

crime.”). 

The record suggests that there was no local media coverage (print, radio or television) following 

the preliminary hearing (CT at 8-12) until jury selection began in late November 1990. (EH RT 41-43, 

181.) Moreover, the potential jurors were admonished numerous times by the trial court to avoid any 

contact with the media coverage of the case. (RT at 25, 228, 235, 249, 326, 1642-43, 1892-93, 1976-

77, 2090.) 

3) Community Attitude Survey

Petitioner argued at the hearing that the defense-commissioned Kern County community 

attitude venue change survey (EH Ex. 52), which involved 317 Kern County residents registered to 

vote and holding California driver’s licenses, showed that 45% of the Kern County residents surveyed 

were familiar with the case from various sources, (id. at 3-5; 11/1/90 RT at 21:27-24:11); 52% of those 

familiar with the case, or 23% of all respondents, had seen the America’s Most Wanted program, (id.; 

see also ECF No. 178 at 45:12-14); and 66% of those familiar with the case, or 29.7% of all 

respondents, had been exposed to other pretrial publicity, (EH Ex. 52 at 3-5). 

Of the 45% who were aware of the case, 60% of those, or 27% of all respondents, believed 

Bolin to be guilty. (Id.) The percentage of respondents who believed Bolin to be guilty was higher in 

the category of individuals who saw the America’s Most Wanted program (77%, versus 45% for those 

who had not seen the program). Furthermore, of those who watched the program, 66% responded they 

were led to their belief in Bolin’s guilt because of the program, while 34% did not form an opinion. 

(Id.)

Additionally, of the 45% who were aware of the case, 69% favored death, 14% favored life, and 

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17% needed more information to form an opinion. (Id.) Comparing respondents who saw the 

America’s Most Wanted program against those who did not see it, the percentage favoring the death 

penalty was 76% for those who saw it versus 61% for those who did not see it. (Id.)

Petitioner argues that defense counsel Soria misstated the results of the survey at the venue 

change hearing by telling the trial judge that “of the 45% of residents who were aware of the case 

through the media, 20% had seen the America’s Most Wanted program.” (ECF No. 178 at 45 n.40.) 

He claims that according to his community survey, 75% of those who saw the American’s Most Wanted

program were convinced of Petitioner’s guilt of the charged crimes, (ECF No. 113 at 22:21-24; 11/1/90 

RT at 21) and that over half the final jury pool (56 of 110) admitted seeing and remembering portions 

of the America’s Most Wanted program. (ECF No. 113 at 23:21-24.) 

Mr. Soria argued at the time of the motion that over half the potential jury pool would have seen 

portions of the America’s Most Wanted reenactment; and that about three-quarters of those who saw the 

show believed Petitioner was guilty. (RT, 11/1/90 at 21.) He suggested at that time about 15 percent of 

Kern County residents had actually viewed the reenactment of the crime on America’s Most Wanted. 

(11/1/90 RT at 24:1-5, 28:11.) 

The prosecution admitted the show was “probably inflammatory” (11/1/90 RT at 25:7-9) and 

that the show included inaccurate information regarding Petitioner’s background (RT at 386:12-19), but 

argued that only 15% of the Kern County residents surveyed had actually seen the America’s Most 

Wanted reenactment (11/1/90 RT at 24:24-26:14) and that only a small percentage of those felt they 

were prejudiced by seeing it (Id.). The prosecution asserted that such small percentages did not support 

a change of venue, (id.; ECF No. 194 at 34:22-35:8), i.e., that prior to voir dire, the pretrial publicity 

did not establish that Petitioner could not get a fair trial in Kern County. (ECF No. 194 at 40:20-24.) 

Respondent contends the motion to change venue was impliedly denied by the trial court when 

the jury was sworn. (RT at 1641:28-41:5.) 

4) Voir Dire

Petitioner argues that the initial venire pool reflected a “high degree of prejudicial media 

exposure,” noting that, of the 158 prospective jurors initially questioned on voir dire: 37 prospective 

jurors had seen the America’s Most Wanted program, (ECF No. 178 at 46:2-5), of whom 16 were 

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excused for cause “because of attitudes hostile to the defense” (Id. at 46:4-5); 18 prospective jurors had 

learned about the case primarily from television other than America’s Most Wanted (ECF No. 178 at 

49:26-50:1); and 31 prospective jurors read about Petitioner’s case in the newspaper. (ECF No. 178 at 

53:2-4.) 

Petitioner’s Strickland expert, Mr. Thomson, noting Mr. Soria’s averment of not recalling any 

strategic reason for failing to renew the change of venue motion unless he and Mr. Cater had been 

successful in selecting a jury of people who had not seen the America’s Most Wanted program, stated 

that:

Unfortunately, counsel had not been successful in that regard: four seated jurors (Lee,

Vaughn, Hanson, and Bowles) disclosed that they had seen the America’s Most Wanted 

episode regarding Mr. Bolin [Record citation] Another seated juror (Barnes) admitted to 

being influenced by newspaper reports about the case. [Record citation] Failure to renew 

the venue motion under these circumstances is inconsistent with prevailing professional 

norms at the time of Mr. Bolin’s trial.

(EH Ex. 72, ¶ 48.) 

Respondent counters that Petitioner, at the time of the motion, did not carry his burden of 

showing that he could not get a fair trial in Kern County, (RT 11/1/90 at 24), given that only 15% of 

surveyed county residents had seen the America’s Most Wanted reenactment (id. at 28), and that only a 

small portion of those expressed possible prejudice from seeing the program (id. at 24-26). Respondent 

contends the survey supports a tactical decision by defense counsel not to pursue the change of venue 

motion where counsel reasonably could have been satisfied with the jury as constituted following voir 

dire. (See ECF No. 194 at 39:3-7.) Respondent goes on to argue that, for the same reasons, the change 

of venue motion, even if it had been re-asserted, had no reasonable probability of success. (Id. at 39:8-

11.) 

b. No Presumed Prejudice

Petitioner claims that prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community. He argues this 

included the dramatic and graphic America’s Most Wanted re-enactment of the crime. (See RT at 282, 

565, 574, 602-603, 675, 1060, and 1133-35.) He argues the broadcast’s dramatized re-enactment was 

akin to the televised confession in Rideau. (ECF No. 178 at 44:16-25.) He emphasizes what he views 

as non-factual and factually incorrect and conflated content, citing to Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 

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1181, 1210-12 (9th Cir. 2005), as an analogous case where prejudice was presumed from pretrial 

publicity. He points out even the prosecution admitted that the information provided in America’s Most 

Wanted was “inaccurate with regard to [Petitioner’s] background.” (RT at 386:12-19.) 

Petitioner contends that voir dire demonstrated media coverage at preliminary hearing (CT at 8-

12) and thereafter was so extensive and extreme that a fair trial could not be had in Kern County and 

counsel’s failure to renew the venue change motion following voir dire was presumptively prejudicial 

given his evidentiary proffer at the hearing. (ECF No. 214 at 18:16-20:16.)

This Court finds that the noted facts developed during the evidentiary hearing do not stray 

significantly from those in the state record, as discussed below. 

Mr. Soria testified that he believed less than 50% of the venire pool was aware of the 

American’s Most Wanted program. (EH RT at 32:25-33:4.) 

The record at evidentiary hearing suggests that, of the jurors who passed the initial hardship 

process and who filled out the juror questionnaires, approximately 51% were aware of the case; about 

24% of those stated they were aware of the case from America’s Most Wanted (this percentage 

increases to approximately 40% if jurors who were expressed uncertainty of their awareness and/or its 

source are considered). (EH Ex.’s. 1-7, 9.) Moreover, of the jurors aware of the case, approximately

29% believed Petitioner was probably guilty, and approximately 23% believed Petitioner was probably 

guilty because of pretrial publicity. (Id.)

These percentages were similar to the community survey, which showed 45% of those surveyed 

were aware of the case; 23% were aware of the case from America’s Most Wanted with 66% of those 

led to believe Petitioner was guilty of the charges; and 29% had seen or heard media stories about the 

case other than America’s Most Wanted. (ECF No. 214, EH Ex. 52.) Those jurors responding to the

survey who had seen America’s Most Wanted were more likely to view Petitioner as guilty of the 

charges than those responding to the survey who had not seen America’s Most Wanted. (Id.) Those 

jurors responding to the survey who had seen America’s Most Wanted also were more likely to favor a 

death sentence upon conviction. (Id.)

The foregoing reasonably suggest that no more than 40% of the venire pool had seen the 

America’s Most Wanted program and no more than a one-third of those were predisposed to guilt. 

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The Court finds that the media coverage in this case falls short of the type of massive media 

attention that manifestly tainted proceedings in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard. In those cases, “the 

influence of the news media, either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the 

proceedings. Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1135 (9th Cir. 2007), (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 

U.S. 794, 799 (1975)). Those cases “cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to 

information about a state defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he 

is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.” Id.

Moreover, the size and characteristics of the community from which the instant venire was 

drawn suggest as much. For example, in Rideau, defendant’s jailhouse interrogation and confession 

was broadcast three times to a total of some 97,000 (i.e., 65%) people living in the parish of 150,000 

from which the venire was drawn. 373 U.S. at 724. Kern County, on the other hand, was double that

size with a population of 300,000, (EH RT at 44:13-14), of which the Community Survey suggested 

23% had seen the America’s Most Wanted broadcast. 

Moreover, the taped interrogation and confession in Rideau had been created “with the active 

cooperation and participation of the local law enforcement officers, [citation] and two local deputy 

sheriffs later were seated on Rideau's trial jury for what the Supreme Court denounced as “kangaroo 

court proceedings.” Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726. Here, Kern County deputies took phone calls generated 

by America’s Most Wanted, but Petitioner has not demonstrated the deputies participated in production 

of the America’s Most Wanted reenactment as seen in Rideau. 

The publicity in this case was not pervasive and constant. There were news articles, local 

television and the America’s Most Wanted broadcasts concerning the case around the time of the 

murders, Petitioner’s capture, and preliminary hearing. However, the coverage subsided over the 

nearly 1-year period prior to jury selection and trial, and was not persistent and pervasive. Bolin, 18 

Cal. 4th at 314. 

Coverage in the Bakersfield Californian was sporadic: ten articles spanning September 1989 to 

March 1990, all substantially prior to the December 3, 1990 empaneling of the jury. There were no 

further articles or media coverage in the local news prior to jury selection in late November 1990. (EH 

RT at 41-42.) Once jury selection began, jurors were repeatedly admonished to avoid any radio, 

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television, or newspaper coverage of the case. (EH Ex. 26.)

The trial court made clear that neither the press coverage in the Bakersfield Californian nor the 

local January 1990 local news broadcasts warranted a change of venue. (EH Ex. 24 at 50.) Mr. Soria, 

at the evidentiary hearing, acknowledged his view that there was no media saturation between the 

preliminary hearing and the opening statement. (EH RT at 43:5-9.) Mr. Cater agreed that the publicity 

had attenuated over time. (EH RT at 181:4-9.) 

The false allegations relating to the voluntary manslaughter, the stabbing assault and battery, 

Petitioner allegedly being an ex-Navy SEAL explosives expert, and his alleged connection to other 

marijuana operations in the area, were clarified by the argument and evidence presented to the jury. 

(RT at 1652:4-14, 1666:14-1667:6, 2588-89, 2598; CT at 125-30, 588.) The supposed pipe bombs 

found in the cabin, (RT at 1862-65, 1887:10-1891:18), were not charged as a criminal offense or 

argued as aggravating circumstance evidence during the penalty phase. (CT at 229, 552.) 

The Court concludes that, for the reasons stated, prejudice cannot be presumed in this case. See

Hamilton, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (prejudice is not established where the nature of the news coverage 

was factual and not inflammatory and the bulk of the publicity occurred months before jury selection 

began); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 2004) (whether a jury was biased is a question of 

fact and trial court's finding on this question is entitled to a presumption of correctness); Nebraska Press 

Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976) (pretrial publicity even pervasive, adverse publicity does not 

inevitably lead to an unfair trial); accord McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1181 (noting that presumed prejudice is 

“rarely invoked and only in extreme situations”). Nor has Petitioner provided any authority that 

selection for portrayal on America’s Most Wanted is alone a basis to presume prejudice. 

In the rare case that prejudice is presumed, there will have been a “‘barrage of inflammatory 

publicity immediately prior to trial,’ . . . amounting to a ‘huge . . . wave of public passion.’” Patton v. 

Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984) (quoting Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798 and Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728). For 

the reasons stated, such was not the case here.

2. Defense Strategy: The Empaneled Jury Was Acceptable to Counsel

Mr. Soria and Mr. Cater used a juror rating system that scored the jurors; they discussed the 

scoring for each individual juror. (EH RT at 52:18-53:5.) The criteria used by counsel in scoring 

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jurors included consideration of how much negative impact was elicited for those jurors who saw 

America’s Most Wanted (EH RT at 55:5-17) and other forms of pretrial publicity (EH RT at 55:20-

56:11), and whether the juror was believable (EH RT at 57:7-9). 

Additionally, the rating system reflected whether, and the extent to which, a juror’s initially low 

score was rehabilitated by beliefs that would support selection of a sentence of life without parole, 

jurors he referred to as being “pro-life”, resulting in a higher juror score. (EH RT at 67:9-21.) A

juror’s rating could change over time, from juror questionnaire through voir dire. (EH RT at 123:13-

24.) 

Defense counsel considered each juror as a whole package. (EH RT at 57:18-21.) A juror was 

dismissed where the rating system dictated. (EH RT at 59:20-25.) 

Mr. Soria stated that he challenged jurors for cause, for having seen America’s Most Wanted, in 

order to preserve the issue on appeal. (EH RT at 50:17-21.) The trial judge denied some of these forcause challenges. (See e.g., EH RT at 51:8-11.) Defense counsel unsuccessfully challenged for cause 

six of the twelve seated jurors (jurors Robert Bowles, Dale Campbell, Julie Hanson, Patricia Hinson, 

Jeannine Lee, and Michael Vaughn). (See ECF No. 276 at 33-34 & n.17.) 

Mr. Soria stated that he left on the panel jurors who had seen America’s Most Wanted because 

he felt evidence of guilt was overwhelming. (See EH RT at 13:4.) He was more concerned with 

avoiding jurors whose beliefs would support selection of a death sentence, jurors he referred to as being 

“pro-death penalty” (EH RT at 13:10-11) and picking pro-life jurors (EH RT at 17:12, 81:16-18). Mr. 

Soria, who was lead counsel at the time, states that he and Mr. Cater were in agreement on this primary 

goal of selecting a pro-life jury, which he states was difficult in Kern County at that time. (EH RT at 

49:1-13.) Though Mr. Cater testified at the evidentiary hearing that he felt the major objective was to 

get jurors empaneled who had not seen America’s Most Wanted (EH RT at 154:2-9), he agreed that 

getting a pro-life jury was a primary consideration. (EH RT at 184: 11-15.)

Mr. Soria was responsible for filing the change of venue motion. (EH RT at 151:1-7.) He 

stated that it did not occur to him to renew the motion (EH RT at 11:23-24, 12) to keep off jurors who 

had seen the America’s Most Wanted program (EH Ex. 16, ¶ 8; EH RT at 86-89); that he was satisfied 

with the jury empaneled; and that any contrary statements in his 2008 declaration were prior to 

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refreshing his recollection for the 2013 evidentiary hearing. (EH RT at 33, 49-60, 85, 105:11-107:3, 

185-89.) Mr. Soria testified that he did not see the need to use preemptory challenges simply because 

he had challenged for cause (EH RT at 26: 9-17, 69:19-70:7), and he was concerned whom he might 

get if he dismissed any of the finally empaneled jurors. (EH RT at 77:4-6.) Mr. Soria could not recall 

any disagreement with Mr. Cater that the finally empaneled jury was acceptable to the defense. (EH 

RT at 81:8-11.) 

Mr. Cater stated that he was not happy with the jury they passed on, and that he had expected 

the prosecution to continue with challenges. (EH RT at 189:16-23.) However, Mr. Cater conceded that 

he consulted with Mr. Soria regarding the selection of jurors and had no major disagreements with Mr. 

Soria as to the jury chosen. (EH RT at 190:10-12.) Mr. Cater also conceded that a potential juror’s 

awareness of the case was not “an absolute death knell”; that if the juror appeared impartial even 

though having viewed the America’s Most Wanted program and was “very good” on the death penalty, 

the juror would not have warranted a peremptory challenge. (EH RT at 154.) He also agreed that 

saving a defendant’s life in a capital case was the primary consideration. (EH RT at 184.)

The Court finds and concludes that Petitioner has not impeached defense counsel’s juror 

selection methodology. Defense counsel, in addition to the effect of pretrial publicity, considered 

potential jurors’ feelings about the death penalty and Petitioner not testifying and the prosecution 

witnesses. (See e.g., EH RT at 13, 17, 29, 37, 48, 54-55, 154, 184-85; EH Ex.’s. 1r at TC000843, 

TC000230; 2a at TC001225; 2c at TC001226, TC000244; 2e at TC001224; 2f at TC001221; 2g at 

TC001227, Q19; 2i at TC001220; 5d at TC000244; 5l at TC000900, TC000437; 5r at TC000893, 

TC000251; and 6b at TC000243.) To this end, although juror Barnes was familiar with the case from 

sources other than America’s Most Wanted, defense counsel favored his views on the death penalty (EH 

RT at 61-63, 66-67) because juror Barnes believed that imposition of the death penalty should be used 

“only . . . as a last resort if the crime demands it.” (EH Ex. 2a at Q20; EH RT at 61.) 

Similarly, juror Bowles’s exposure to America’s Most Wanted was minimal and, more 

importantly, he was offended by the show because it suggested Petitioner was guilty of the crimes 

charged. (EH RT at 25, 55; EH Ex. 2b at TC001219, 13971401.) Juror Hanson gave a credible

assurance of impartiality during voir dire and remembered little about the show despite her earlier

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questionnaire response that she thought Petitioner was probably guilty based on the show. (EH RT at 

25, 64-66; EH Ex. 2d at 1092-1100.) Defense counsel retained juror Hinson, despite having made a pro 

forma challenge for cause based on the show, because she did not remember the show, believed it 

would be difficult to vote for death, and her overall rating was middling, a three. (EH RT at 27, 63-64; 

EH Ex. 2e at TC001224.) Juror Lee “absolutely” could put aside what she had learned from America’s 

Most Wanted, had not read any other news, and hated to see the death penalty used. (EH RT at 55-56; 

EH Ex. 2g at TC001227, Q19-20, 240-247.) Juror Lee believed that defense attorneys had “tough

job[s]” and that both the guilty and innocent deserved representation. (EH RT at 56; EH Ex. 2g at 

Q13.) Juror Goff was subjected to a pro forma “for cause” challenge based on his having seen the 

America’s Most Wanted program, to preserve the issue for appeal, but Mr. Goff was retained as a prolife sentence juror favorable to the defense (RT at 1427-1441.)

Petitioner makes much of defense counsel allowing juror Vaughn to remain in the final twelve 

jurors. (See EH RT at 85:20-89:11.) Petitioner argued that the score defense counsel had given 

Vaughn warranted removal. Petitioner argued that Vaughn’s juror questionnaire suggested that he was 

pro-death penalty, had been exposed to pretrial publicity, and felt Petitioner was guilty. However, 

defense counsel Soria responded that juror Vaughn’s score was middling, not low, (EH RT at 104:16-

17), and that he saw things in juror Vaughn’s background (e.g., drug use; military service in Viet Nam) 

that made him a favorable juror for the defense. (EH RT at 127-29.) Co-counsel Cater was uncertain 

whether Vaughn’s overall rating favored the defense or the prosecution. (EH RT at 174:16-19.) He 

scored juror Vaughn as middling on death penalty. (EH RT at 178:14-16.) Mr. Cater also testified at 

the evidentiary hearing that juror Vaughn’s belief the crime involved Petitioner fighting with a friend, 

(EH RT at 176:11-13) favored the defense theory of voluntary manslaughter or imperfect self-defense.

The evidence developed at the May 14, 2013 hearing suggests that as a matter of jury selection 

strategy, defense counsel viewed pretrial publicity as important, but not controlling, as long as the juror 

gave credible assurances of impartiality and offered other benefits for Petitioner toward the overarching 

goal of avoiding a death sentence. This was not an unreasonable strategy given that Kern County juries 

were “very pro-prosecution” regarding guilt in the 1980’s, (EH RT at 49-50), with one-third to one-half 

of Kern County jurors then favoring the death penalty. (Id. at 110.)

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Furthermore, the Court finds Mr. Soria’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was forthcoming 

and corroborated by defense jury selection notes. He adequately addressed why his 2008 declaration 

(see EH Ex. 16) failed to explain the reasons he did not renew the venue motion – because he had not 

received and reviewed relevant case materials prior to making the statements therein – and that he had 

reviewed such materials prior to his testimony at the hearing. (EH RT at 8-9, 11, 33-40, 107.)

It does not appear unreasonable that, on the facts of this case, defense counsel would have a

primary strategic goal of selecting pro-life jurors, and a secondary strategic goal of selecting jurors who 

had not seen the America’s Most Wanted broadcast. See Duff-Smith v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1175, 1183 

(5th Cir. 1992) (strategic choice not to pursue change of venue motion proper where counsel could 

have been satisfied with the panel as constituted after voir dire). Petitioner has not made a sufficient 

evidentiary showing that the defense strategy was objectively unreasonable. Nor is the Court 

convinced by Petitioner’s contention that the above-described jury selection strategy was simply an 

excuse for counsel’s insufficient investigation. (See, e.g., EH RT at 13, 48-50, 167-72.) That

contention fails for reasons discussed ante and in claim W, post. 

At bottom, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the defense in mitigation, including life 

experience and social history, was insufficiently developed prior to voir dire so as to preclude defense 

counsel’s use of their asserted juror scoring methodology. Cf. Chateloin v. Singletary, 89 F.3d 749, 

753 (11th Cir. 1996) (effective assistance found where counsel had no recollection of whether he 

waived jury trial to avoid death penalty, but testified that he believed that to be a reasonable tactic and 

had experience to support that opinion).

Furthermore, defense counsel’s consistent “for cause” challenges of jurors who had seen the 

America’s Most Wanted program, (see EH RT, at 50:13-19; 181:16-20; EH Ex.’s. 1a at 562; 1f at 1435; 

1k at 1507; 1o at 1235; 1r at 868; 2b at 1402; 2c at 1012; 2d at 1100; 2e at 1120; 2g at 245; 2l at 384-

87; 4c at 729; 5d at 987; 5h at 436; 5u at 1172-73; 5w at 1185; 5bb at 766; 6a at 955-56; 6d at 619; 6e 

at 1057; 6f at 1141; 6h at 1162; 6i at 1177; 6j at 290; 6k at 1299; 6m at 452; 6n at 847; 7b at 1372; RT 

at 465; EH RT at 50:17-51:22, 101:15-21, 120-122, 181-186), could have reasonably been seen as a 

means to preserve the issue on appeal without risking use of peremptory challenges in a way that 

impaired final say on the jury selected. See Jeffrey G. Adachi et al., Cal. Criminal Law Procedure and 

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Practice § 15.26 (2013 CEB); see also id. at § 15.17 (“it is unlikely that a trial judge who may have just 

denied a challenge to a juror for cause based on prejudice stemming from publicity will grant a motion 

to change venue a short time later.”). Especially so here, given that the same jury sat for the guilt and 

penalty phases. (See EH RT at 22:7-10.)

3. Futility of Renewed Motion to Change Venue

The Court finds that the trial court’s statements and rulings during voir dire, as well as the 

testimony of counsel Cater and Soria, reasonably demonstrated that a renewed change of venue motion 

likely would have been denied. 

a. State Law Requirements 

Defense counsel could not renew a change of venue motion until facts were disclosed during 

voir dire supporting the claim that a fair trial could not be had in Kern County because of pretrial 

publicity. People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 133, 136 (1989); Odle v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 932, 

943-44 (1982); People v. Wallace, 6 Cal. 2d 759, 764 (1936); see also EH Ex. 24 at 50. 

Even then, counsel had to demonstrate that other efforts besides a venue change had been 

insufficient to protect his client’s right to an impartial jury, by: (1) challenging for cause every juror 

who had been exposed to pretrial publicity; (2) exercising a peremptory challenge against every juror 

who had been so exposed; and (3) moving to strike the jury panel. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d at 136; Odle, 

32 Cal. 3d at 943; see also People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 1087-88 (1989), overruled on other

grounds by People v. Black, 58 Cal.4th 912 (2014) (to preserve claim of improper denial of cause 

challenge, defendant must use peremptory challenge against juror, exhaust peremptory challenges or 

justify failure to do so, and state dissatisfaction with jury selected).

b. Trial Court Disinclined to Grant Relief 

Petitioner faults defense counsel for not renewing the venue motion. He argues that under state 

law, the venue change was required given the reasonable likelihood a fair trial could not be had, the 

small community size and the nature of the crime. Corona v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 3d 872, 

883-84 (1972); Martinez, 29 Cal. 3d at 583-85 (1981). 

Petitioner also faults counsel for not seeking a “blanket for cause” ruling excluding all jurors 

who had been exposed to the America’s Most Wanted program. (ECF No. 178 at 59: 16-19.) He points 

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to the trial judge’s statement that:

[H]e wanted to determine first of all how many prospective run-ins we get who actually 

have seen this video [America’s Most Wanted] and... see what their reaction is. [T]hat if 

there were] general [prejudicial] reactions... [he] might be inclined to give a blanket for 

cause. 

(Id.; see also 11/1/90 RT at 50.)

Petitioner argues these omissions were not part of any reasonable litigation strategy or 

intentional abandonment of the venue motion. 

1) Venue Change Motion 

Counsel could reasonably have believed that a renewed venue change motion would have been 

denied given the facts of this case. Mr. Soria, though acknowledging the importance of making 

motions and objections in the trial court in order to preserve issues for appellate review (EH RT at 50, 

101-03, 109), testified at the evidentiary hearing that he believed the venue motion, if renewed, would 

have been denied. (EH RT at 32-33; 46; 81:3-7; 109:25-110:3; 114, 153:15-17.) Likewise, Mr. Cater 

testified that it was unlikely such a motion would have been granted. (EH RT at 194-95.) 

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Soria testified that he felt the motion to change venue was “not 

good” because less than 50% of the jurors were aware of the American’s Most Wanted program. (EH 

RT at 32:25-33:4.) Co-counsel Cater testified at the evidentiary hearing that, although he believed the 

venue motion had merit given the level of publicity and uniqueness of the America’s Most Wanted

program, (EH RT at 151:17-21), he had never brought a venue motion himself and that he had never 

seen one granted in Kern County. (EH RT at 179:2-12.)

Defense counsel acknowledged that, according to their survey, the number of Kern County 

residents who had heard of his case was small compared to other cases where venue motions had been 

granted, (11/1/90 RT at 23), and conceded that the nature and extent of the news coverage would not 

have warranted a change of venue absent the reenactment of the crime on America’s Most Wanted. 

(11/1/90 RT at 23.) Moreover, voir dire could reasonably have suggested that the passage of time 

between significant media coverage and the trial limited the effect of pretrial publicity. (See, e.g., EH 

Ex.’s. 1c at 1460:7-10; 2c at 1005-06; 6f at 1135-36.) 

Mr. Soria stated that he did not regret commissioning the survey or filing the venue motion,

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because he believed the then-unique nature of America’s Most Wanted warranted the filing of the 

motion. (EH RT at 46, 114, 176, 180.) But he nonetheless believed his chances of getting the motion 

granted were “nonexistent.” (Id. at 109:25-110:3.) 

Mr. Cater testified that there was no strategic reason for not renewing the motion, (EH RT at 

153:6-8), that he and Mr. Soria simply overlooked doing so, (EH RT at 194:2-3), and that it was “a 

mistake” not to get a final ruling on the motion. (EH RT at 153:18-21.) However, Mr. Cater goes on to 

concede that the trial court likely would not have granted the venue motion. (EH RT at 153:15-17.) He 

believed that the trial judge would have invited them to renew the motion had the judge been inclined 

to grant it. (Id. at 194-95.) 

Defense counsel acknowledge that they did not use all their peremptory challenges, (EH RT at 

19:21-23; 187:5-14), exercising only four of the available twenty peremptory challenges, (RT at 1633-

38), effectively precluding any change of venue. (EH RT at 69:19-70:7.) However, Mr. Soria was an 

experienced capital defense attorney, (EH RT at 37-39), who, prior to the venue change motion, had 

consulted with jury experts in a separate action regarding the requirements for a successful venue 

change motion. (EH RT at 45-47.) Furthermore, neither Mr. Soria nor Mr. Cater had seen a venue 

motion granted in Kern County. (EH RT at 44, 179.) Mr. Soria stated that he was aware of a venue 

motion with 70% media saturation that was nonetheless denied in Kern County. (EH RT at 44:20-

45:3.) This suggests a basis for deference to counsel’s decision not to renew the motion given 

Strickland’s presumption of competent assistance. Stewart v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corrections, 476 F.3d 

1193, 1209 n.25 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that counsel’s experience strengthens the presumption of 

reasonable assistance).

Defense counsel could reasonably have concluded that the trial court would have denied a 

renewed change of venue motion. (See EH RT at 51, 182-83.) 

2) “Blanket For Cause” Ruling 

Counsel could reasonably have believed the trial court would not grant a “blanket for cause” 

ruling relating to America’s Most Wanted because that court actively rehabilitated certain of these 

jurors. The trial court granted defense cause challenges for jurors who not only remembered pretrial 

publicity about the case but who also could not set aside their beliefs about Petitioner’s guilt because of 

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this publicity. (See, e.g., EH Ex.’s. 6a at 955-56; 6c at 1604; 6d at 619; 6e at 1062-63; 6h at 1161-62; 

6i at 1177; 6j at 280-90; 6k at 1296-99; 6n at 844-47.) The trial court also denied many other cause 

challenges based on exposure to pretrial publicity because the jurors either remembered very little 

about the case or could set aside what they had learned, and they had provided credible assurances that 

they could put aside any initial beliefs about Petitioner’s guilt. (See e.g., EH RT at 182; EH Ex.’s. 1a at 

563; 1f at 1435-40; 1k at 1498-1507; 1o at 1228-35; 1r at 859-68; 2b at 1402-03; 2c at 1005-13; 2d at 

1098-1100; 2e at 1111-20; 2g at 243-45; 2l at 373-78, 384-87; 4c at 724-30; 5d at 976-91; 5h at 433-38; 

5u at 1162-74; 5w at 1178-90; 5bb at 761-66; RT at 459-66.) 

Here, the trial court excused nine jurors based on exposure to pretrial publicity. On the other 

hand, it denied nineteen cause challenges on the same basis because none of these jurors “had such 

fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.” See Yount, 467 U.S. at 

1035. Six of these potential jurors who saw the America’s Most Wanted program or believed they may 

have seen it were actually selected as jurors, over defense challenges for cause, based on credible 

assurances of impartiality. (RT at 243-45 re Marie Lee; RT at 1111-20 re Patricia Hinson; RT at 362-

87 re Michael Vaughn; RT at 1005-14 re Dale Campbell; RT at 1092-1102 re Julie Hanson; RT at 

1393-1403 re Robert Bowles.) Similarly, juror Gilbert Barnes as selected as a juror even though he 

was exposed to print and television coverage (RT at 90-106) and stated during voir dire that he thought 

Petitioner was guilty based thereon. The trial court’s resolution of these questions is entitled to 

deference. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1038 (deference accorded to trial judge’s determination where based on 

voir dire and juror demeanor). 

Defense counsel could reasonably have concluded that the trial court would not have entertained 

a blanket challenge for cause. (See EH Ex. 24 at 50.)

4. No Prejudicially Deficient Conduct by Defense Counsel

Petitioner argues that defense counsel Soria was deficient by not renewing the venue motion 

and by being pre-occupied with the prospect of a job change and the press of the noted concurrent 

capital case, People v. Holt, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:97-cv-6210-AWI, and did not adequately prepare for 

voir dire, the venue change, or the penalty phase.

It was not unreasonable for defense counsel to adopt the strategy discussed above for selecting 

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the jury, and to forego renewal of the venue motion by placing priority in avoiding a death sentence 

over the effect of pretrial publicity. (EH RT at 48-49.) The joint decision of defense counsel to select a 

favorable jury regarding penalty selection was a reasonable strategic alternative to exhausting all of 

Petitioner’s peremptory challenges, which could have resulted in losing favorable jurors and still not 

obtaining a change of venue. Given Mr. Soria’s almost ten years’ experience as a criminal defense 

attorney at the time, his experience as counsel in fifteen prior murder cases and three prior capital cases, 

(EH RT at 37-47), Strickland’s presumption of competent assistance is persuasive. See Stewart, 476 

F.3d at 1209 (noting that counsel’s experience strengthens the presumption of reasonable assistance).

In rejecting Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, the California 

Supreme Court observed:

Counsel’s failure to renew the change of venue motion did not result from ignorance or 

inadvertence and reflected a reasonable trial strategy. [Citation] The impact of the pretrial 

publicity generally and the America’s Most Wanted episodes in particular was a critical focus 

of the voir dire. Although many prospective jurors had been exposed to some pretrial 

publicity, including the segment reenacting the killings, for the most part few recalled the 

specifics or had formed a resolute impression of [Petitioner’s] guilt. In particular, those who 

eventually sat on the jury all gave assurances they would decide the case based solely on the 

courtroom evidence. [Citation] In light of these responses, counsel could well have recognized 

the effect of the publicity had not been as substantial as feared, especially after an 11-month 

interim. Thus, renewed effort to seek a change of venue would be futile since the trial court 

had conditioned any change in its tentative ruling on a determination the television coverage 

had impaired the ability to assemble an impartial jury. In addition, the reenactment was 

relevant only to the guilt phase portion of the trial. With guilt virtually a foregone conclusion, 

counsel’s concern may at that point have turned to the penalty phase, which was substantially 

insulated from the effect of pretrial publicity. [Citation] Given the possibility of a valid trial 

tactic, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance. [Citation]

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 314. 

The above noted record on evidentiary hearing suggests that defense counsel employed this 

strategy in jury selection. While defense counsel believed that the effect of the pretrial publicity upon 

potential jurors was an important consideration in selecting a jury, it appears that counsel considered 

avoiding a death sentence to be of paramount importance to Petitioner. Moreover, jurors “who are least 

willing and likely to vote death are more apt to be good jurors on the question of guilt.” (EH Ex. 15 at 

A-20.)

Defense counsel could reasonably have found that given the strength of the evidence against 

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Petitioner and the knowledge that Kern County jurors were generally supportive of the death penalty, 

jurors’ thoughts about the death penalty were more important than mere exposure to pretrial publicity 

or even significant exposure to pretrial publicity if the juror gave credible assurances of impartiality and 

offered other benefits for Petitioner. Mr. Soria’s experience with Kern County juries for 10 years had 

demonstrated that such juries were “very pro-prosecution.” (EH RT at 49-50.) Moreover, at that time, 

one-third to one-half of Kern County jurors were in favor of the death penalty. (Id. at 110.) 

Defense counsel also considered whether potential jurors wanted Petitioner to testify to prove 

his innocence, their likely reactions to the prosecution witnesses including the surviving victim, Jim 

Wilson, and juror rehabilitation during voir dire. (EH RT at 13, 17, 29-30, 37, 48, 54-55, 154, 184-85; 

see also EH Ex.’s. 1a at 563; 1f at 1435-40; 1k at 1498-1507; 1o at 1228-35; 1r at 859-68; 2b at 1402-

03; 2c at 1005-13; 2d at 1098-1100; 2e at 1111-20; 2g at 243-45; 2l at 373-78, 384-87; 4c at 724-30; 5d 

at 976-91; 5h at 433-38; 5u at 1162-74; 5w at 1178-90; 5bb at 761-66; RT at 459-66.) For example, 

juror Barnes was familiar with the case from media exposure, yet defense counsel liked his views on 

the death penalty (EH RT at 61-67) because juror Barnes believed that imposition of the death penalty 

should be used “only. . . as a last resort if the crime demands it.” (EH Ex. 2a at Q20; EH RT at 61.) 

Similarly, juror Bowles saw, but was offended by the America’s Most Wanted program. (EH RT 

at 25, 55; EH Ex. 2b at TC001219, 1397.) Juror Hanson, who stated in her juror questionnaire that she 

thought Petitioner was probably guilty based on the America’s Most Wanted program, later gave 

assurance of impartiality during voir dire, saying she remembered little of the show. (EH RT at 25, 64-

66; EH Ex. 2d at 1092-94, 1097-1102.) Defense counsel retained juror Hinson, despite having made a 

pro forma challenge for cause based on the program, because she did not remember the show, believed 

it would be difficult to vote for death, and her overall rating was a three. (EH RT at 27, 51, 59, 63-64; 

EH Ex. 2e at TC001224.) Juror Lee “absolutely” could put aside what she had learned from America’s 

Most Wanted, had not read any other news, and hated to see the death penalty used. (EH RT at 55-56; 

EH Ex. 2g at TC001227, Q19-20, 240-43.)

While perhaps not as important as significant exposure to publicity or views on the death 

penalty, defense counsel also weighed other juror characteristics in deciding whether to exercise 

peremptory challenges against jurors who either had limited exposure to publicity or who had provided 

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credible assurances of impartiality. (EH RT at 125-26.) Counsel relied upon their instincts and 

considered each juror independently in deciding which jurors to select. (Id. at 57, 59-60, 66-67, 185.) 

For example, though one potential juror, Mr. Newberry, had seen the American’s Most Wanted

program and felt Petitioner was probably guilty, defense counsel’s notes reflect both counsel and 

Petitioner liked Mr. Newberry. (EH Ex. 4c at Q1.) Similarly, a juror’s prior experience with inmates 

or drugs was considered by defense counsel, (see EH Ex.’s. 1d at TC000436, TC000868; 2b at Q13; 

5bb at TC000227), as was prior military service in Vietnam, (EH Ex. 2l at Q5, Q13).

Though counsel Cater could not recall the meaning of the defense notes on juror Vaughn, (EH 

RT at 173-76), he “was pleased to see” that Vaughn’s knowledge of the case gained from the America’s 

Most Wanted program was consistent with their “theory of defense.” (EH RT at 176.) Defense counsel 

also considered juror Lee’s belief that defense attorneys had “tough job[s]” and that both the guilty and 

innocent deserved representation. (EH RT at 56; EH Ex. 2g at Q13.)

Mr. Soria, at the evidentiary hearing went on to explain that he did not exhaust all his 

peremptory challenges because he liked the jurors he had on the panel. (EH RT at 60.) Had he used all 

of his peremptory challenges, he would not have known the final composition of the jury, especially in 

a case such as this where counsel was unaware which jurors would be called to replace jurors who had 

been excused on a peremptory challenge. (Id. at 70.) 

Additionally, the noted defense strategy for juror selection was independently supported by trial 

counsel’s handwritten notes taken during jury selection, (see, e.g., EH Ex.’s 1a-7i.), regarding decisions 

about particular jurors. (See, e.g., EH RT at 16, 122-23, 186.) As noted, Mr. Soria explained why his 

2008 declaration (see EH Ex. 16) failed to clearly set out the defense jury selection and venue strategy, 

i.e., that he had not reviewed any of these materials prior to making the statements in his 2008 

declaration but had reviewed them prior to his testimony at the evidentiary hearing. (EH RT at 8-9, 11, 

33-34, 36, 39-40, 95-96, 107.)

Petitioner also claims counsel was deficient for not seeking a ruling on the venue motion in 

order to preserve the issue for appeal. He argues the professional norms embodied in the ABA 

Guidelines provide for preservation of appeal issues. (See ECF No. 178 at 62:24-63:2; ABA Guideline

11.7.3.) However, Petitioner has not demonstrated ABA Guidelines create a duty counsel was bound to 

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follow. See e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8-9 (2009) (ABA Guidelines have been viewed as 

essentially guides that inform reasonable attorney conduct, but not “inexorable commands”). Even if 

ABA Guidelines could be viewed as required conduct, counsel could reasonably have decided that an 

appeal of the venue issue would have lacked merit for the reasons discussed above. Additionally, 

counsel’s noted juror selection strategy, going to trial with a jury with whom they were satisfied, could 

reasonably be seen as outweighing considerations of appeal preservation. 

The facts developed at the evidentiary hearing suggest that it was not unreasonable for the 

California Supreme Court to reject claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the motion to 

change venue. Defense counsel was not required to make a futile and potentially counterproductive 

renewal of the change of venue motion, even in a capital case. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (counsel not incompetent for failing to file meritless suppression motion). Nor was it 

prejudicial because there was no reasonable probability the motion to change venue, if renewed, would 

have been granted. Finally, even if there was a violation of state law as Petitioner contends, see

Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d at 136, such is not alone a sufficient basis for federal habeas relief. Pulley v. 

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

5. Conclusions Regarding Limited Evidentiary Hearing – Claim C2

For the reasons stated, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient by failing 

to renew the change of venue motion and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, venue in this 

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

Claim C2 is denied.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Petitioner, at the evidentiary hearing, attempted to develop facts relating to Mr. Soria’s 

allegedly inadequate penalty phase preparation and conduct. However, such matters are outside the 

scope of the evidentiary hearing granted by the Court. (ECF Nos. 261 at 54:12-15, 276 at 53:4-7.) 

Moreover, for claims like these, that are adjudicated on the merits in state court, a petitioner can only 

rely on the record that was before the state court to satisfy the requirements of § 2254(d). See Schriro 

v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. Here, evidentiary development of 

allegations relating to IAC at the penalty phase is precluded because Petitioner has not satisfied the § 

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2254(d) gateway for reasons stated in claim W, post. 

Even if the Court could consider the purported evidentiary proffer at the evidentiary hearing, no 

prima facie claim has been stated. Mr. Soria, at the evidentiary hearing, initially testified he took no 

steps, prior to November 1990, to prepare for the penalty phase. (EH RT at 23:23-24:7.) He stated that 

he was somewhat pre-occupied with the prospect of taking a job with the Monterey Public Defender, 

(Id. at 21:11-15), and with the demands of acting as petitioner’s counsel in Holt through May 1990. 

(Id. at 30:24-31:11.) However, Mr. Soria later testified that he was in fact preparing for both the guilt 

and penalty phases in this action prior to trial, during the period July-November 1990. (Id. at 68:15-

69:15.) 

Mr. Cater, who came in as second chair in late July, testified at the evidentiary hearing that no 

sufficient penalty defense had been prepared by Mr. Soria. (Id. at 161:14-19, 163:8-22, 166:17-19, 

167:12-16, 169:19-21.) Mr. Cater testified that Mr. Soria and his investigator, Bruce Binns, provided 

little, if anything, relating to their penalty phase preparation. (Id. at 148:9-12.) But later in his 

testimony, Mr. Cater conceded that he did receive Mr. Soria’s penalty file, including research and 

discovery, though stating that these files did not contain much information. (Id. at 159:15-21.) 

For the reasons stated above and in claim W, post, Petitioner was not and is not entitled to 

evidentiary development of claimed ineffective assistance of defense counsel at the penalty phase. 

VII. REVIEW OF RECORD CLAIMS

A. Claims Relating to Pretrial Issues 

1. Review of Claim A 

Petitioner alleges the trial court erred in denying Mr. Soria’s July 1990 pretrial motion to 

withdraw from the case, despite Mr. Soria’s lack of interest and preparation and his valid reasons to 

withdraw, forcing Petitioner to proceed to trial with an unwilling, incompetent, disloyal and ineffective 

attorney. 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that, to the extent Petitioner’s claim alleged trialcourt error, the claim was procedurally barred because this claim could have been, but was not, raised 

on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In 

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re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s 

claim on the merits in a decision unaccompanied by explanation. (Id.) 

a. Clearly Established Law 

Trial court error violates due process where it renders the resulting criminal trial fundamentally 

unfair. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 303 (1973).

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth at in claim C2, ante. 

b. Analysis of Claim A

Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint new lead 

counsel unless Mr. Soria could quickly find replacement lead counsel agreeable to keeping the 

previously set October 22, 1990 trial date. (7/18/90 RT at 3-4.) Mr. Soria was unable to do so, but he 

agreed to go forward with Mr. Cater as second counsel. (7/30/90 RT at 9-11.) 

A breakdown in the attorney-client relationship can result in a denial of the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 782-83, 785 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d. 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court’s failure to conduct inquiry into 

irreconcilable conflict arising from the client’s refusal to communicate or cooperate with counsel 

resulted in denial of effective assistance of counsel); Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026, (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991)) (the overarching constitutional 

question is whether the attorney-client conflict has become so great that “it resulted in a total lack of 

communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship 

that fell short of that required by the Sixth Amendment”). 

Here, the record reflects that, on July 18, 1990, the trial court heard Soria’s motion to 

withdraw as counsel. Soria argued that he had been seeking other employment, (7/18/90 In Camera 

Hearing RT 14 at 3-4, 11), and that sufficient time remained for new counsel to get up to speed. 

(7/18/90 In Camera Hearing RT at 4-5, 10-11.) The trial court denied Soria’s request without 

prejudice and stated that it would reconsider Soria’s motion on the following conditions: (1) that 

Soria provided the court with the names of two attorneys who were willing to work together and 

represent Petitioner “within the next week”; (2) the attorneys would be ready to begin trial on 

October 22, 1990, “or very shortly thereafter”; and (3) Petitioner had met with the two attorneys and 

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felt “comfortable” with them representing him. (7/18/90 RT at 12; see also 7/18/90 RT at 3.) Both 

Mr. Soria and Petitioner agreed that the court’s denial of the motion to withdraw and the conditions 

on reconsideration of the motion were “fair.” (7/18/90 RT at 12.) 

On July 30, 1990, Mr. Soria indicated his willingness to continue handling Petitioner’s case and 

that he had found a co-counsel, Mr. Cater, to assist him. (7/18/90 RT at 9.) The trial court then 

appointed Mr. Cater as co-counsel. (Id. at 9-10.)

Petitioner cites to the ABA Guidelines and argues that the trial court “unreasonably applied” the 

Sixth Amendment duty of investigation in a capital case because its ruling would not have allowed a 

new counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial. (ECF No. 178 at 17-18.) But even if a failure to abide 

by the ABA Guidelines could establish ineffectiveness of counsel, the trial court was not provided any 

reason to believe that Mr. Soria was not abiding by them, (see claim I, post), or that any newly 

appointed counsel could not abide by them. 

Mr. Soria informed the court that he brought the motion when he did because “there would be a 

significant amount of time for new counsel to come in” and he had “done enough investigation that [he] 

could bring [new] counsel up to speed” before trial. (7/18/90 In Camera Hearing RT at 4-5.) Moreover, 

even if the trial court’s ruling could have conflicted with the ABA Guidelines regarding the amount of 

preparation time needed for a newly appointed counsel, the issue was never before the trial court 

because Mr. Soria chose to remain on the case. (7/18/90 RT at 9.) 

Mr. Soria also had indicated that he was “on the middle of the fence” about withdrawing in any 

event and agreed with the court’s assessment that he was primarily making the motion to withdraw 

because he did not currently have a second counsel, which he felt was necessary to presenting the case 

effectively. (7/18/90 In Camera Hearing RT at 7-8, 10-11.) Mr. Soria then indicated that another 

counsel, Mr. Cater, had expressed interest, and the court indicated he would do “an excellent job.” 

(7/18/90 In Camera Hearing RT at 13.) 

To the extent Petitioner complains that Mr. Soria subsequently performed deficiently alleged in 

claims B2, C2, D, G2, H2, I1-I17, J, W1-W9 and Y, these claims all fail for the reasons stated, post. 

Petitioner also argues by inference that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. 

Soria’s motion to withdraw given that court’s subsequent grant of Petitioner’s Marsden motion

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following the guilt phase. In granting the Marsden motion, the trial court removed Mr. Soria due to a 

complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship to the point of conflict of interest (RT at 2271-

96), appointing Mr. Cater to be lead counsel for the penalty phase. (CT at 544-45; RT at 2298-2301.) 

However, the trial court cannot be found to have abused its discretion in denying the motion to 

withdraw based upon events that occurred after ruling on that motion. (See ECF No. 178 at 14-18.) 

Mr. Soria’s performance at trial is irrelevant when determining the propriety of the trial court’s pre-trial 

ruling on the motion to withdraw.

Similarly unavailing is Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in subsequently denying Mr. 

Cater’s post-sentencing motion for appointment of independent counsel. At that time, the trial court 

“did not see anything wrong with [Mr. Soria’s] representation and [did not think] by any stretch of the 

imagination that any more favorable determination would have occurred.” (2/25/91 RT at 16-17.) This 

Court agrees, for reasons discussed in claim W, post. 

A fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish that he was denied a fair 

trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98.

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim A is denied.

2. Review of Claims B1 & B2

Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance by defense counsel’s preparation and submission of 

a jury questionnaire that contained prejudicial information and induced the jurors to prejudge the 

question of his guilt or innocence, and he claims that the trial court erred in using the questionnaire. 

(ECF No. 113 at 14-15.) 

Petitioner raised both claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court. (CSC Pet. Habeas Corpus at 25-28, 51-53.) The California Supreme Court ruled that 

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Petitioner’s first claim was procedurally barred because the claim could have been, but was not raised 

on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 & In re 

Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected both of Petitioner’s 

claims on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

a. Clearly Established Law 

“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 

‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 377-78. In a capital case, “a 

prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . if 

the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 

accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (citing

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). Thus, “a juror who in no case would vote for capital 

punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for 

cause.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992). Likewise, a juror who would automatically 

impose the death penalty if a defendant is found guilty is not impartial and must be removed for cause. 

Id. at 733; Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988). 

“[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to 

identify unqualified jurors.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. “Voir dire ‘is conducted under the supervision 

of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 

U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895)). “[T]he trial court 

retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 

424. No hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire, see United States v. 

Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–146 (1936), and “[t]he Constitution . . . does not dictate a catechism for voir 

dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. A trial 

court’s failure to ask certain questions does not violate the Constitution unless it “render[s] the 

defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 426. 

“[T]he trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir 

dire.” Id. at 424. A trial court’s failure to ask certain questions does not violate the Constitution unless 

it “render[s] the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 426. 

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Two specific inquires of voir dire are constitutionally compelled: inquiries into racial prejudice 

against a defendant charged with a violent crime against a person of a different racial group, id. at 424; 

and, in a capital case, inquiries into a juror’s views on capital punishment. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 730-32. 

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 299 U.S. 123

b. Analysis of Claims B1 & B2

Petitioner alleges that the questionnaire, prepared and submitted by defense counsel (SHCP Ex. 

1; 11/1/90 Supp. RT at 35-36), prejudicially informed potential jurors of outside evidence, that he had 

been the subject of America’s Most Wanted, leading jurors to prejudge his guilt, biasing them against 

him. (See, e.g., RT 92-93; 364-378; 1482-83; 1488-89.) He complains counsel was ineffective in 

unnecessarily exposing jurors to the information about the America’s Most Wanted broadcast and that 

doing so may have caused jurors to form conclusions not based upon the admitted evidence. See

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (jury to reach their conclusion solely from the legal 

evidence adduced); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

The questionnaire informed potential jurors that America’s Most Wanted had created and aired a 

detailed re-enactment of the crime and that local stations had referenced, promoted and aired the 

episode. (See SHCP Ex. 1, Question 71.) The questionnaire asked potential jurors to state, based upon 

what they had seen, heard or read about the case, whether they would say that Petitioner was “definitely 

guilty, probably guilty, definitely not guilty or probably not guilty.” (SHCP Ex. 1, Questions 71 C, 73.) 

The Court finds these claims unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the trial court has broad 

discretion in the manner in which it conducts voir dire. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594; Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 

424. There is no constitutional right to a written questionnaire or that certain questions be included or 

omitted. When a defendant challenges voir dire procedures, the issue is whether a particular question 

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 425-266. Equally so where the case 

has appeared on American’s Most Wanted, such a “[a] searching voir dire of the prospective jurors is 

the primary tool to determine if the impact of the publicity rises to th[e] level of actual prejudice.” Jin 

Sig Choi v. Warren, No. CIV. 12-3473 KM, 2015 WL 4042016, at *17 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015).

The California Supreme Court, for reasons discussed in claim C2, ante, could reasonably have 

determined that the trial court’s need to gauge potential prejudice relating to America’s Most Wanted

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supported the specific questions regarding America’s Most Wanted. Rather than inviting unfair 

prejudgment of guilt, the questionnaire reasonably could be seen as exposing it. “The Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees each criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury free of outside 

influences. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. Even if some potential jurors’ view of Petitioner’s guilt or 

innocence was impacted by the questionnaire, (see e.g., RT at 1489-91 where the trial court appears to 

acknowledge as much), where responses demonstrated bias the Petitioner was able to mount a for cause 

challenge. (See e.g., RT at 452 [juror Thompson], RT at 619-20 [juror Crawford], RT at 1497, 1510

[juror Clifford].) 

At voir dire, the court must examine the jurors' statements “to determine whether a communitywide sentiment exists against the defendant [citation] . . . [n]egative media coverage by itself is 

insufficient to establish actual prejudice, and the existence of a juror's preconceived notion as to the 

guilt or innocence of the defendant, without more, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of 

impartiality. Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 387 (6th Cir. 2007). Petitioner has not demonstrated the 

questionnaire was improper under clearly established law. “[N]either th[e] court nor the parties should 

be precluded from asking ‘case-specific’ questions to attempt to discover a potential juror's bias based 

on facts that are or are likely to be at issue in this case.” U.S. v. Johnson, 366 F. Supp.2d 822, 849 

(N.D. Iowa 2005). Similarly, the Court rejects Petitioner’s argument under Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 

F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1986), that the questionnaire introduced the jury to prejudicial extrinsic 

evidence. Bayramoglu is distinguishable to the extent that case involved clear juror misconduct during 

deliberations, researching possible criminal penalties and providing the results to other jurors. Here, 

the allegedly prejudicial outside information was provided to the venire pool pretrial and was 

reasonably necessary to ferret out jurors who might be biased upon learning of evidence to be admitted

at trial. Even if Bayramoglu were factually on point, that court’s determination the juror misconduct 

was harmless because the offending juror was removed and the other jurors were told to disregard the 

outside evidence would suggest harmless error here as well. Potential jurors whose bias was shown by 

the questionnaire were removed for cause; the petite jury was instructed to consider only the admitted 

evidence. 

It follows that counsel was not ineffective by drafting and submitting the questionnaire. As 

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noted, in addition to broadcast media, numerous articles about the crime also appeared in the local 

newspaper, the Bakersfield Californian. (EH Ex. 53.) Given the facts of this case, a fair trial 

necessitated gauging the jurors’ exposure to media coverage and its impact. As Respondent notes, 

counsel had “full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 

(1988); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000). Petitioner was “bound” by the acts of his 

counsel and, “[a]bsent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such matters is the last.” 

Hill, 528 U.S. at 115; Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1973) (“assuming the lawyer’s 

competence, the client must accept the consequences of his trial strategy”). 

Even if counsel was deficient regarding the questionnaire, Petitioner has not demonstrated 

prejudice. The state supreme court could reasonably have determined the information in the 

questionnaire did not add to or conflict with evidence admitted at trial in any material way. Moreover, 

all jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity agreed they would follow instructions and 

deliberate based solely on the admitted evidence. (RT at 2182-2218; ECF No. 194 at 32:1-7 citing RT 

at 1005-07, 1011-12 [juror Campbell], 1111-15 [juror Hinson], 1142, 1145 [juror Lauer], 94, 100-03 

[juror Barnes], 365-66, 375, 377-78 [juror Vaughn], 1397-98 [juror Bowles], 238, 240, 244-45 [juror 

Lee], 1092-94, 1097-1100 [juror Hanson], and 1422-23, 1426 [juror Medina].) The state supreme court 

could reasonably have concluded there was no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had 

the questionnaire not been used. 

Finally, Petitioner’s re-argument relating to actual and presumed prejudice is unpersuasive for 

reasons discussed in claim C2, ante, summarized as follows. The Court previously denied on the 

merits Petitioner’s allegation of actual prejudice (i.e., “actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid 

aside.” See Harris, 885 F.2d at 1363; ECF No. 261 at 54:12-15; ECF No. 276, at 53:4-7.) This was not 

a case where prejudice is presumed, i.e., where there was a “barrage of inflammatory publicity 

immediately prior to trial,’ . . . amounting to a ‘huge . . . wave of public passion.” Yount, 467 U.S. 

1025, 1033 (1984) (quoting Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798 and Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728). 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

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proceeding would have been different, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. It follows that there was no trial 

court error in that regard.

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claims B1 and B2 are denied. 

3. Review of Claim D

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that defense counsel was ineffective during voir dire of each of 

the twelve emplaned jurors regarding whether the jurors were willing to consider mitigating factors at 

the sentence selection phase. Petitioner also claims that the trial court compounded the error by failing 

to explain the mitigating factors to be considered at the penalty phase. 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court (CSC Pet. Habeas Corpus at 35-51), which the California Supreme Court rejected on 

the merits. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

a. Clearly Established Law 

The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 

b. Analysis of Claim D 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel conducted ineffective voir dire regarding “whether the 

jurors were willing to consider mitigating factors” and that “[t]he trial court compounded that error by 

limiting its explanation of factors to consider at the penalty phase to the circumstances of the crime as 

opposed to mitigating factors.” (ECF No. 113 at ¶ 164.) 

Petitioner alleges that defense counsel’s voir dire was deficient regarding “the nature of 

mitigation” and the statutory mitigation factors so that the jurors could answer whether they were 

willing to consider mitigating factors during their sentence deliberations. (ECF No. 113 at ¶ 165; see

also RT at 90-106 re Gilbert Barnes; RT at 389-97 re Connie Pauley; RT at 236-50 re Marie Lee; RT at 

361-87 re Michael Vaughn; RT at 1111-23 re Patricia Hinson; RT at 1144-47 re Beverly Lauer; RT 

1088-91 re Ralph Lopes; RT at 1009-14 re Dale Campbell; RT at 1096-1102 re Julie Hanson; RT at 

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1352-62 re Steven Parkison; RT at 1399-1404 re Robert Bowles; RT at 1424-27 re John Medina.)

The Court is not persuaded that defense counsel acts ineffectively at voir dire by not requesting 

that potential jurors be instructed about the nature of statutory mitigation. As noted, only two specific 

inquires of voir dire are constitutionally compelled: inquiries into racial prejudice against a defendant 

charged with a violent crime against a person of a different racial group, Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595; and, 

in a capital case, inquiries into a juror’s views on capital punishment. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 730-732. 

Since the Supreme Court has not decided the issue raised by Petitioner, the state supreme court’s 

decision could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court 

precedent. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

Moreover, defense counsel could have had tactical reasons for not asking questions about 

mitigation in the abstract. Knowing that there may not have been anything significant to present in 

mitigation or that what was available may not ultimately materialize, counsel may have sought to avoid 

potential prejudice caused by discussion of mitigating factors not later presented at the penalty phase. 

“[W]hen counsel focuses on some issues [and excludes] others, there is a strong presumption that he 

did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 118 (3d Cir. 

2005) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)); cf. People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415, 482-84 

(1995) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he needed a new penalty jury to avoid potential prejudice 

caused by court’s voir dire statements that defense would present evidence in mitigation at penalty 

trial). 

Even had defense counsel sought to question prospective jurors regarding “the nature of 

mitigation,” the trial court could have properly denied such requests or sustained objections to such 

questions. People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 539 (1995) (the scope of questions to be asked at voir 

dire is a matter for the court’s discretion); see also 11/1/90 RT at 37-45 (court notes limitations in voir 

dire set by Proposition 115 and desire not to unnecessarily prolong voir dire, allowing use of juror 

questionaire). In short, defense counsel was not required to question the venire about potential 

mitigation evidence in order to be constitutionally effective. See Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1317-

18 (10th Cir. 2000) (no ineffectiveness for failure to voir dire about defense strategy); Paradis v. Arave, 

954 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 1026 (1993) (no 

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ineffectiveness for failure to voir dire about possible defense).

Petitioner also alleges that the trial court failed to explain the mitigating factors to be considered 

at the penalty phase and (along with the prosecutor) referred to the Penal Code § 190.3 factors as 

“guidelines” (see claim U1, post), “clearly vitiat[ing] any narrowing of the jury’s discretion in 

determining what penalty to render.” (ECF No. 113 at 47:9-11.) However, the trial court is not 

required to instruct the jurors at voir dire. The jury was properly instructed at the penalty phase. Prior 

to commencing their deliberations, the jurors were instructed with CALJIC No. 8.85 and specifically 

instructed that they “shall consider all of the evidence,” including any mitigating factors found 

applicable (RT at 2605-07; see also claim U, post); they were provided instructions explaining what 

mitigating factors were (RT at 2615); and they were told how they should be weighed. (RT at 2615-

16.) Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 

(2000); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993); Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th 

Cir. 1997); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1978). Petitioner’s suggestion the 

jury’s impartiality was undermined by the alleged error (see ECF No. 178 at 66:5-6) could reasonably

be seen as only speculative. 

Petitioner’s allegation that the trial court “limit[ed] its explanation of factors to consider at the 

penalty phase to the circumstances of the crime as opposed to mitigating factors”, (see ECF No. 113 at 

37:16-17), does not demonstrate constitutional error. It does not appear that the court’s comments were 

meant to be an exhaustive list of the penalty factors and the law. Instead, it appears that court’s 

comments were meant to give the prospective jurors “a general idea of the nature of the proceeding.”

People v. Livaditis, 2 Cal. 4th 759, 781 (1992). If the jury somehow misunderstood this, “the penalty 

phase instructions ultimately given obviated any prejudice.” People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 414 

(1990) (disapproved on other grounds by People v. Wright, 49 Cal.4th 405, 459 (2010)). 

Futhermore, Petitioner does not allege that the trial court failed to inquire into the noted 

constitutionally compelled areas of voir dire. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595; Morgan, 504 U.S. at 730-732. 

Since the Supreme Court has not decided the issue raised by Petitioner, the state supreme court’s 

decision could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court 

precedent. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

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Finally, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any prejudice on this claim. Even if counsel had asked 

the mitigation questions he claims should have been asked, it is unknown what the jurors’ answers 

would have been, what rulings the trial court would have made on cause challenges subsequently made, 

and how the jury makeup would have changed, if at all. White v. Luebbers, 307 F.3d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 

2002). Furthermore, “it is exceedingly unlikely that directing the venire’s attention to the potential 

mitigating evidence would either have disposed the jury that was selected to lenity or have altered the 

composition of the jury in a direction favorable to him.” Lear v. Cowan, 220 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 

2000). More importantly, prior to trial, each of the jurors assured the court that he or she could be fair 

and impartial. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 314, 316; see Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 826-27 (9th Cir. 

2004) (giving weight to jurors’ assurances of impartiality); Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1350 & n.5 

(trial court’s conclusion regarding “juror impartiality” is a “factual issue” given “special deference”

under AEDPA).

A fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish defense counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-98. 

For the reasons above, this Court also agrees with the California Supreme Court that there was 

no reasonable likelihood that Petitioner did not receive a fair trial despite the limited voir dire regarding 

Penal Code § 190.3 mitigation factors. 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim D is denied. 

4. Review of Claim E

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to excuse five prospective 

jurors, who were ultimately placed on the panel, four of whom were challenged for cause, and he 

alleges ineffective assistance by counsel’s failure to dismiss these jurors by peremptory challenge. 

Petitioner presented this same claim to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. (AOB at 

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26-34.) The California Supreme Court held that Petitioner’s claim had not been preserved for appeal 

based on the well-settled rule in California that “exhaustion of peremptory challenges is a condition 

precedent to an appeal based on the composition of the jury.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 315, (citing Ross, 

487 U.S. at 90). That Court stated: 

Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised as long [as] he could have 

secured the juror’s removal through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Accordingly, 

California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove 

prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal 

of the composition of the jury, the defendant must have exhausted those challenges. [Citation] 

Defendant did not do so; he may not now claim error.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 315. The California Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s related ineffective 

assistance claim as follows: 

[W]e also reject defendant’s passing suggestion that defense counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to utilize all available peremptory challenges. “[T]he decision whether to 

accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on the appellate record 

demonstrates counsel’s tactical choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial.” [Citation] 

We have reviewed the voir dire of the jurors in question. Whether or not they had been 

exposed to any pretrial publicity, including viewing America’s Most Wanted, each gave 

credible assurances he or she would decide the case based only on what transpired in the 

courtroom.

Id. at 316. 

a. Clearly Established Law

“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of 

impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 377-78. 

In a capital case, “a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on 

capital punishment . . . if the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of 

his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 

(quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45). Thus, “a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, 

regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.” 

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728. Likewise, a juror who would automatically impose the death penalty if a 

defendant is found guilty is not impartial and must be removed for cause. Id. at 733; Ross, 487 U.S. 

at 85. 

“[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to 

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identify unqualified jurors.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. “Voir dire ‘is conducted under the 

supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’” Ristaino, 

424 U.S. at 594 (quoting Connors, 158 U.S. at 413). “[T]he trial court retains great latitude in 

deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 424. “No hard-and-fast 

formula dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire,” Wood, 299 U.S. at 145–146, and “[t]he 

Constitution . . . does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an 

impartial jury.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. A trial court’s failure to ask certain questions does not 

violate the Constitution unless it “render[s] the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Mu’Min, 500 

U.S. at 426. 

The ineffective assistance standard is set out in claim C2, ante. 

b. Analysis of Claim E

Petitioner alleges that these jurors were biased due to media coverage. Juror Barnes stated he 

“definitely” believed Petitioner was guilty based on newspaper and television coverage. (RT at 90-

93.) However, Mr. Barnes later stated he was did not “know” whether Petitioner was guilty (RT at 

93-94) and stated he could decide the case based on what he heard in the courtroom. (Id.) Petitioner 

also alleges that juror Barnes was pre-disposed toward the death penalty. (ECF No. 113 at 48:28-

49:13.) Juror Barnes stated that he would have no doubt about the death penalty for very violent 

crime consistent with the perpetrator’s past record. (RT at 104.) 

Juror Vaughn saw the America’s Most Wanted broadcast and based on it felt Petitioner was 

“probably guilty” (RT at 364-65), but not necessarily so. (RT at 378.) Petitioner notes that Juror 

Vaughn also failed to disclose on his questionnaire a prior arrest for possession of marijuana. (RT at 

381-83.) 

Juror Bowles had seen the America’s Most Wanted program. (RT at 1396.) 

Juror Lee may have seen the America’s Most Wanted program. (RT at 238-39.) 

Juror Hanson saw the America’s Most Wanted program and remembered some general 

information about the crime. (RT at 1092-1100.) 

Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the above showing of “bias,” the trial court denied 

defense counsel’s for-cause challenges against jurors Lee, Vaughn, Hanson and Bowles. (See RT at 

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245 (Lee); RT at 378-79 (Vaughn); RT at 1100 (Hanson); RT at 1402 (Bowles.)

This claim fails. Petitioner does not cite to established authority that a trial court violates due 

process in not excusing a juror for cause even when the defendant is able to but fails to exercise a 

peremptory challenge. In Ross, the Supreme Court found no due process violation where the state 

had a rule requiring the defendant to exhaust all peremptory challenges before complaining of an 

allegedly erroneous denial of a cause challenge. 487 U.S. at 90. Accordingly, the state supreme 

court’s decision could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme 

Court precedent. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 76.

Additionally, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that Petitioner 

failed to show that these jurors were other than impartial. (See claim C2, ante.) Petitioner’s argument 

that juror Barnes was predisposed to the death penalty is not sufficiently supported in the evidentiary 

record. A potential juror’s view regarding the death penalty may not be the basis of a for-cause 

challenge unless those views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as 

a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting

Adams, 448 U.S. at 45). 

The record demonstrates that each of the five jurors referenced by Petitioner assured the trial 

court that she/he could be fair and impartial. Juror Barnes assured the court and counsel that he could 

decide the case on the facts presented in court, not in the media (RT at 92-103) and that he could 

presume Petitioner’s innocence at the start of trial (id.); Juror Vaughn likewise assured the court and 

counsel that he accepted the presumption of innocence (RT at 365-84) and that he could be fair 

despite prior knowledge of the case (id.); Juror Bowles told the court that he had not seen enough of 

the America’s Most Wanted program’s reenactment of the crime “to really remember what it was 

about” (RT at 1397), that he had no opinion one way or the other about Petitioner’s guilt or innocence 

(id.), and that he could be a fair and impartial juror in this case (RT at 1398); Juror Lee “[v]aguely”

remembered the case from television (RT at 238), but she assured the court and counsel she 

absolutely could put aside whatever prior knowledge of the case she had and decide the case on the 

evidence presented in the courtroom (RT at 240-46); and Juror Hanson recalled some of the details of 

the charged crimes from the America’s Most Wanted program (RT at 1092-1102) but assured the 

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court she could put that information out of her mind and decide the case on the evidence presented in 

court. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends the trial court gave too much weight to these jurors’ statements that they 

could follow the law. (ECF No. 178 at 58:18-59:7.) However, for the reasons discussed above, the 

state supreme court could reasonably have found that Petitioner “presented no evidence that any of 

the jurors that convicted and sentenced him were unable or unwilling to properly perform their 

duties.” United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1998). “[A]n impartial jury 

consists of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.’”

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423). Each of the

above five jurors stated that their prior knowledge of the case would not affect their sitting as fair and 

impartial jurors. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that the trial court’s 

denial of Petitioner’s for-cause challenges as to these jurors was not an abuse of its discretion causing 

an unfair trial. 

Even if the trial court had erred, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found 

the error to be harmless. The overarching issue was whether the jury that sat for the trial was 

impartial. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding trial court’s denial of 

challenges for cause did not violate Sixth Amendment where no prejudice shown). Here, Petitioner 

has not demonstrated on the evidentiary record that the empaneled jury was other than impartial. 

(See claim C2, ante.) 

Petitioner’s additional allegation, albeit un-argued, that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to make peremptory challenges against these five allegedly biased jurors fails for the reasons 

stated above, as well as those discussed in claim F, post. Accordingly, a fair-minded jurist could have 

found that Petitioner failed to establish trial court error, or that he was denied a fair trial, or that 

defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

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that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim E is denied.6

5. Review of Claim F 

Petitioner alleges in this claim that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the 

empaneled jurors for cause or by available peremptory challenges. 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected this same claim on the merits on direct 

appeal, noting that: 

“‘[T]he decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical, and nothing on 

the appellate record demonstrates counsel’s tactical choice here was either unreasonable or 

prejudicial.’ [Citation] We have reviewed the voir dire of the jurors in question. Whether or 

not they had been exposed to any pretrial publicity, including viewing America’s Most 

Wanted, each gave credible assurances he or she would decide the case based only on what 

transpired in the courtroom.”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316.

a. Clearly Established Law

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 

b. Analysis of Claim F

Petitioner faults defense counsel for failing to challenge and remove Jurors Barnes, Vaughn, 

Bowles, Hanson, and Lee. (ECF No. 178 at 70-72.) 

Petitioner re-argues that the empaneled jury was tainted with prejudicial publicity; that juror 

Barnes had prejudged guilt and the penalty; and that at least juror Vaughn had prejudged guilt. He 

argues that defense counsel acknowledged as much when making for-cause challenges against jurors 

Lee, Vaughn, Hanson and Bowles, who had seen the America’s Most Wanted program. (See RT at 

245 (Lee); RT at 378-79 (Vaughn); RT at 1100 (Hanson); RT at 1402 (Bowles.) Petitioner also 

claims defense counsel was ineffective by failing to exercise available peremptory challenges against 

these five jurors. 

However, the evidentiary record suggests defense counsel may have had tactical reasons to 

 

6 Here, Respondent contends this claim is not cognizable because it creates and retroactively applies a “new rule” of 

constitutional law under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Respondent advances this argument as to numerous other 

claims as well. Unless otherwise noted, the Court declines to address Respondent’s Teague arguments where the claim 

lacks merit. 

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keep all of the noted jurors. Juror Barnes had some reservations about the death penalty (RT at 97-

98, 104) and had not seen the reenactment of the charged crimes on the America’s Most Wanted 

program (RT at 92), the latter possibly being the reason defense counsel did not challenge juror 

Barnes for cause (see claim E, ante). 

Juror Vaughn admitted in his questionnaire that at one time he had a “problem” with 

marijuana, and he admitted during voir dire that he had used marijuana for “probably four or five 

years.” (RT at 371.) Juror Vaughn also admitted that he had been arrested once for marijuana and 

ultimately had the charge reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor. (RT at 381-83.) Since Petitioner 

was charged with a marijuana offense, counsel could have tactically believed that having juror 

Vaughn, who himself had used marijuana and who had been convicted of a crime, would be 

sympathetic to Petitioner in some respects. 

As to juror Bowles, he specifically stated that he doesn’t “agree” with America’s Most Wanted 

(RT at 1396) because “everybody has their day in court and if a person has not been convicted or 

proven guilty, I don’t feel they should be shown on that program . . . . [¶] They, now, people, the 

general public, oh, he is guilty because it’s shown on TV. He is guilty. I don’t agree with that.” (RT at

1397:19-26.) Mr. Soria lodged a pro forma challenge based on the America’s Most Wanted program. 

(RT at 1402:14-15.) However, Mr. Soria otherwise passed juror Bowles for cause. (RT at 1402:14-

15.) This could suggest that apart from building the appeal record regarding the America’s Most 

Wanted program, Mr. Soria found juror Bowles to be unbiased. 

Juror Lee indicated that she “absolutely” does not believe everything in the newspaper and 

views television as “entertainment” rather than a source of news. (RT at 237:16-21.) She expressed 

some uncertainty about imposing the death penalty (RT at 242:9-21) and held a job as a union 

steward (RT at 243:9-13), something the defense could have found favorable. In any event, she 

assured the court that she “absolutely” could put her prior minimal knowledge about the case aside 

and decide it on the evidence presented in court. (RT at 240, 242-45.) 

Juror Hanson remembered little about the case from America’s Most Wanted, assuming what 

she knew even pertained to Petitioner’s case and she had not mistaken it for something else. (RT at 

1092-94, 1097-99.) Furthermore, defense counsel could have felt that juror Hanson’s former career 

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with the welfare department and the fact that she was presently unemployed were favorable to the 

defense. (RT at 1095:8-15.) Juror Hanson also had taken many courses in psychology and 

psychiatry in preparation for becoming a counselor. (RT at 1101:16-25.) Since Petitioner was 

considering whether to offer psychiatric evidence, he may have viewed juror Hanson as someone who 

would favorably view such evidence.

This Court is not persuaded by the claim. Petitioner has not made an evidentiary showing that 

undermines the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that defense counsel’s failure to use 

peremptory challenges could have been a reasonable tactical decision. Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 

982, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded 384 F.3d 628, 643 (9th Cir. 2004) (no 

ineffectiveness in failing to use peremptory challenges where jurors’ statements did not demonstrate 

actual or implied bias; each said they could “follow the judge’s instructions and decide the case 

impartially”); Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1349-50 (where juror stated it would be “difficult” for 

him to be impartial because he believed persons to be guilty until proven innocent, no ineffectiveness 

in failing to strike juror because decision was manifestly tactical and due respect was paid to juror’s 

oath); Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1992) (where juror stated that defendant may 

have told her about the charged crime while she waited on them at work, no ineffectiveness to fail to 

challenge her because she said she could be fair and where decision could be tactical).

Nor has Petitioner shown that the California Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that

Petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the decision of counsel not to object to these

jurors. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316 (“nothing on the appellate record demonstrates counsel’s tactical 

choice here was either unreasonable or prejudicial”). Prior to trial, each of the jurors assured the 

court that he or she could be fair and impartial. Id. at 314, 316; see Leavitt, 383 F.3d at 826-27 

(giving weight to jurors’ assurances of impartiality). As explained in claim E, ante, all five of these 

jurors provided what could reasonably be viewed as credible assurances that each could decide the 

case on the evidence presented in court. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of 

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the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim F is denied.

6. Review of Claims G, G1 & G2

Petitioner, in these claims, cites to People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978), and Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and alleges that the prosecution improperly used racially 

discriminatory peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors with Hispanic surnames. 

Specifically, he points to potential jurors Nancy Burciaga (RT at 1632:19-20), Dina Romero (RT at 

1635:22-23), and Arthur Cordova (RT at 1636:19-20). He faults both the trial court and counsel for 

failing to make a Wheeler/Batson objection. (ECF No. 113 at 52-54; ECF No. 178 at 72-80.) 

Petitioner also contends that the California Supreme Court did not adjudicate the merits of his 

constitutional allegations. (Id.) All this, he claims, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 

drawn from a representative cross-section of the community and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 

equal protection. (Id.)

Petitioner presented these same allegations to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. 

That court held Petitioner’s failure to make a Wheeler motion waived alleged prosecutorial misconduct 

and trial court error. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316-17. The California Supreme Court also denied on the 

merits the allegation that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to preserve the Wheeler issue. Bolin, 

18 Cal. 4th at 317. 

Respondent counters that the claims are procedurally defaulted, waived by counsel’s failure to 

object—an independent and adequate state ground. Petitioner replies that any waiver and default was 

caused by the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 

(2012) (an attorney's errors during direct appeal may provide cause to excuse a procedural default).

The Court will review the merits of the unadjudicated allegations de novo, see Pirtle, 313 F.3d 

at 1167-68 & n.4; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732-35, without determining whether the state procedural 

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default is adequate and independent to bar relief in federal court. See Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232 

(courts empowered to reach the merits if on their face clearly not meritorious despite asserted 

procedural bar); Loggins, 654 F.3d at 1215 (relief may be denied on the merits where petition is clearly 

not meritorious despite asserted procedural bar). 

As to the adjudicated ineffective assistance allegations, these are reviewed deferentially under 

AEDPA. See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1094-96. 

The three claims are analyzed separately below. 

a. Review of Claim G – Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner alleges that the noted three potential jurors were improperly removed by the 

prosecution’s discriminatory peremptory challenges. 

1) Clearly Established Law

To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be “of sufficient 

significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 

756, 765 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “Before a federal court 

may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial . . . it must be established not merely that the 

[State’s action] is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned, but that it violated some 

right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 

U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). 

Any claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be reviewed within the context of the entire trial. 

Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994). The 

court must keep in mind that “[t]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor” and “the aim 

of due process is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an 

unfair trial to the accused.” Phillips, 455 U.S. at 219. “Improper argument does not, per se, violate a 

defendant’s constitutional rights.” Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated:

[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the 

court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not 

evidence, . . . , and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often 

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recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law. Arguments of counsel 

which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court. This is not to 

say that prosecutorial misrepresentations may never have a decisive effect on the jury, but 

only that they are not to be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court. 

And the arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the context 

in which they are made.

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-85 (1990).

If prosecutorial misconduct is established, and it was constitutional error, the error must be 

evaluated pursuant to the harmless error test set forth in Brecht. See Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1577 

(“Only if the argument were constitutional error would we have to decide whether the constitutional 

error was harmless.”). 

2) Analysis of Claim G

The California Supreme Court reviewed this claim on direct appeal and held that Petitioner’s 

failure to make a Wheeler motion waived the claim. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316-17. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of 

the community. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from 

using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on account of their race, e.g., on the 

assumption that black jurors as a group are unable to impartially consider the case against a black 

defendant. Id. at 79.

Under Batson and its state corollary, Wheeler, in order to contest the discriminatory use of 

peremptory challenges by the prosecution, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by showing circumstances indicating that the exclusion of jurors was based on their

race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 1723; Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281. These circumstances include but are not 

limited to a pattern of striking members of a certain racial group, or voir dire questions that reveal the

prosecutor’s intent to strike solely for racial reasons. Id. Once a defendant puts forth a prima facie 

case, the prosecutor must come forward with “clear and reasonably specific” neutral explanations for 

the peremptory strikes. Id.

In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995), the Supreme Court provided a three-step Batson

analysis: (1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge makes a prima facie showing of racial 

discrimination, (2) the burden of proof then shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a raceCase 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 350 Filed 06/09/16 Page 65 of 305
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neutral explanation, noting that unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the 

reason offered will be deemed race-neutral, and (3) the court then determines whether the opponent of 

the strike has proved purposeful discrimination. In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Powers v. Ohio, 

499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991), which expanded the Batson rule to cases where, as here, the petitioner and 

excluded jurors are not of the same ethnicity.

In considering a Batson objection or ruling, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue 

of racial animosity must be consulted. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (citing MillerEl v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005)). In the Ninth Circuit, the first prong under Batson, the prima 

facie showing of racial discrimination, is accorded deferential review in a habeas proceeding. Tolbert 

v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1999).

Because there was no Wheeler/Batson objection at trial the reasons for the prosecution 

challenge of these three potential jurors are not express in the state record. See Dias v. Sky Chefs, 

Inc., 948 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1991) (Batson objections “must occur as soon as possible, preferably 

before the jury is sworn.”). Petitioner relies upon an inference of racial discrimination arising from 

his allegations that, of thirteen Hispanic potential jurors in the original pool of 158 (AOB at 36), nine 

were removed for hardship or cause, (ECF No. 178 at 52-53), and the three noted above were 

removed by prosecution peremptory challenge, leaving one Hispanic, juror Medina, seated on the 

jury. (Id.) He cites to Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006), in arguing that this 

statistical disparity is sufficient to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. (See ECF No. 178 

at 74.) 

As the California Supreme Court noted, excuse for financial hardship is not alone a basis for a 

Wheeler challenge. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316, n.3. Petitioner claims a statistical inference of 

discrimination, that though Hispanics comprised only a small percentage of the venire pool surviving 

hardship (i.e., 4 Hispanics in the 149 member venire pool), 75% of Hispanics (i.e., 3 of 4) were 

subject of peremptory challenge. Petitioner argues these circumstances suggest purposeful racial 

discrimination. See Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1099 (1998) (“to establish a prima facie 

case of purposeful racial discrimination, a defendant must interpose an objection on the ground that 

the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges against prospective jurors because of their race

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[and] defendant must articulate facts and other relevant circumstances that raise an inference that the 

prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account 

of their race.”). 

Respondent counters that the claim is waived by defense counsel’s failure to object. 

Petitioner replies that any waiver was caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Here, Petitioner relies upon only the alleged Hispanic surnames of the challenged jurors to 

support an inference of discrimination. However, Petitioner does not demonstrate, other than through 

counsel’s surmise, that the challenged jurors Burciaga, Romero and Cordova had Hispanic surnames 

and were Hispanic. Cf. Williams, 432 F.3d at 1107 (petitioner, an African-American, made a prima 

facie statistical disparity showing under Batson where prosecution excused three of four AfricanAmericans from a 59 member jury pool). 

Petitioner also fails to show that anything in these jurors’ questionnaires and voir dire signaled 

purposeful racial motivation. See e.g., U.S. v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1465-67 (10th Cir. 1991) (no 

discriminatory peremptory challenge where racial identity of venire members with Hispanic surnames 

was uncertain and nothing during voir dire suggested a racial motivation); cf. People v. Trevino, 39 

Cal. 3d 667, 684-86 (1985), disapproved on other grounds, People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d. 1194, 

1216-21 (1989) (prima facie Wheeler claim to exclude Hispanics stated where prosecution challenged 

individuals based solely on Spanish surnames where Hispanics comprised 30% of the total population 

of the county). 

Moreover, that an alleged Hispanic, Mr. Medina, was not challenged and remained a sitting 

juror, suggests an absence of discriminatory selection. See Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1468 (presence on 

the final jury of a member of the excluded cognizable group is relevant to a Batson challenge when 

the prosecution had an opportunity to strike the juror). 

A California Court of Appeal has held that “the exclusion of disproportionate numbers of 

minority jurors per se” does not automatically establish a prima facie case of discrimination under

Wheeler. People v. Allen, 212 Cal. App. 3d 306, 316 (1989). Furthermore, “[a] prima facie case of 

group bias requiring prosecutorial explanation arises only if from all the circumstances of the case the 

trial court finds a strong likelihood that the persons were being challenged because of their group 

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association rather than specific bias.” Carrera v. Ayers, 699 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Here, the evidentiary record also suggests non-discriminatory reasons for these peremptory 

challenges. Potential juror Burciaga expressed a pro-life stance during voir dire, (see RT at 1461-67), 

and questioned her ability to impose a death sentence in this case. (Id.) Petitioner appears to concede 

that juror Burciaga was challenged due to her position on the death penalty. (See claim H, post; ECF 

No. 113 at 54-55.) 

Potential juror Romero suggested during voir dire that previously her husband was the subject 

of child support proceedings brought by the district attorney’s office. (RT at 317-18.) Similarly, 

during voir dire, potential juror Cordova suggested possible dissatisfaction with law enforcement 

relating to criminal proceedings against family members, (RT at 160-61), that his prior service as a 

juror in a murder case had been “very stressful” (RT at 167:25-27), and that he questioned whether 

the death penalty was fairly applied (RT at 166-75).

Petitioner also alleges in passing that he was denied the opportunity to develop facts 

supporting this claim. (See ECF No. 178 at 76 n.71.) But he has shown neither the requisite (28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii)) diligence, i.e., facts that could not have been previously discovered by 

diligent counsel, nor the requisite purposeful discrimination against these jurors by the prosecution.

Any suggestion that counsel was deficient by failing to make a Wheeler/Batson objection is 

insufficient to support this claim given the possibility counsel was reasonably motivated by trial 

tactics a discussed in claim G2, post. Furthermore, Petitioner has not otherwise shown on the record 

that he was denied factual development of this claim. See Dias, 948 F.2d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“No case requires a trial court to address sua sponte [an unadvanced Wheeler objection], an issue 

that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has decided. Trials are still adversary proceedings in 

which counsel may not lay traps for a trial judge and then expect relief from an appellate court.”).

In sum, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found the record devoid of facts 

showing how race was involved in the instant peremptory challenges and supporting an inference that 

the prosecutor exercised the challenges on account of race. See Carrera, 699 F.3d at 1110 (six 

peremptory strikes of Hispanic-surnamed venirepersons not sufficient to show Wheeler bias where 

obvious non-discriminatory reasons for striking and two Hispanic-surnamed persons seated on the 

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jury); cf. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418 (inference of discriminatory statistical disparity found where 

African-American petitioner being tried for murdering his Caucasian girlfriend’s daughter objected to 

prosecutor’s challenge of all three African-American’s on the jury panel). 

For the reasons stated, this claim does not demonstrate constitutional error. Moreover, 

Respondent would be prejudiced by consideration of an untimely Wheeler objection when 

Respondent did not have the opportunity to contemporaneously respond during voir dire. See Dias, 

948 F.2d at 535.

Claim G is denied. 

b. Review of Claim G1 – Trial Court Error on Batson/Wheeler Claim

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in not sua sponte initiating a Wheeler/Batson

objection to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges against the three potential jurors.

The California Supreme Court reviewed this claim on direct appeal and, as with the above 

claim, held that Petitioner’s failure to make a Wheeler motion waived the claim. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 

316-17. 

1) Clearly Established Law

The standard for trial court error is set out in claim A. 

2) Analysis of Claim G1

Petitioner alleges that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to raise the Wheeler/Batson issue 

because of the prosecution’s blatant use of peremptory challenges on racial grounds and that failure to 

do so “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” (ECF No. 

113 at 53:14-15); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. He claims this violated his Sixth Amendment right to a 

jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community and his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to equal protection. 

The initial burden of mounting a Batson challenge is on the aggrieved party. See Purkett, 514 

U.S. at 767. Petitioner has not cited authority that the trial court had a sua sponte obligation to 

question the prosecution’s challenges. On review, the California Supreme Court found no such 

obligation. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 316-17 (citing Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280); see also Dias, 948 F.2d 

532, 535 (9th Cir. 1991) (“It is too late to claim on appeal that the trial court erred when counsel 

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never asked the judge to do anything.”). Even if such an obligation were found to exist, the 

prosecution’s challenges to jurors Burciaga, Romero and Cordova were not constitutionally infirm for 

the reasons stated above. 

For the reasons stated, this claim does not demonstrate constitutional error. Moreover, 

Respondent would be prejudiced by consideration of an untimely Wheeler objection when 

Respondent did not have the opportunity to contemporaneously respond during voir dire. See Dias, 

948 F.2d at 535.

Claim G1 is denied. 

c. Review of Claim G2 – Ineffective Assistance on Wheeler/Batson Claim

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by not lodging a Wheeler/Batson

objection to the above noted peremptory challenges. 

The California Supreme Court reviewed this claim on direct appeal and found it to be without 

merit. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317.

1) Clearly Established Law

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 

2) Analysis of Claim G2

The California Supreme Court denied these allegations, finding: 

On this record, we are unable to determine the reason counsel did not make a timely 

challenge. He may have perceived the prosecutor could adequately rebut the charge, or 

he himself may have been dissatisfied with the individuals excused. Since the decision 

may well have been “an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable 

competence, the conviction must be affirmed. [Citation]”

Id.

The Court, considering the discussion in claims G and G1, ante, finds this determination is not 

unreasonable. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and the habeas court 

must guard against the temptation “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse 

sentence.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court indulges a “‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s 

representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 

104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). This presumption of reasonableness means that not only do 

we “give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” we must also “affirmatively entertain the range of 

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possible reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 

196.

“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simple reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The California 

Supreme Court could reasonably have found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate the prosecution’s 

challenge of these three jurors was for reasons of race, and that defense counsel could have reasonably 

refrained from raising a futile Wheeler/Batson objection. 

A fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish that he was denied a 

fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability Petitioner would have prevailed on a 

Wheeler challenge had it been raised by counsel. Mitcham v. Davis, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1108, 

citing Carrera, 699 F.3d at 1108; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim G2 is denied. 

7. Review of Claims H, H1 & H2

Petitioner, in these claims, alleges prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance relating 

to exclusion of nine potential jurors with reservations about the death penalty, denying him rights to 

equal protection, an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community, and a reliable 

determination of guilt and sentence, violating his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

The prosecutorial misconduct claim was raised on direct appeal and denied on the merits. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317. 

The ineffective assistance claim, failing to object to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 

challenges to exclude potential jurors with reservations about the death penalty, (ECF No. 113 at 57-

58; ECF No. 178 at 82), also was raised on direct appeal and denied on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 

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at 317. 

Petitioner alleges that these claims were not adjudicated by the state court. (ECF No. 113 at 

57:11-12.) This is incorrect, as the California Supreme Court rejected these allegations on the merits. 

See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317. 

These claims are analyzed separately below.

a. Review of Claims H, H1

1) Clearly Established Law

The legal standard for prosecutorial misconduct is set out in claim G, ante. 

The legal standard for ineffective assistance is set out in claim C2, ante.

2) Analysis of Claims H and H1

In claims H and H1, Petitioner alleges that the prosecution used at least nine of fourteen 

peremptory challenges exercised to exclude potential jurors who, while voicing some concern of 

sentencing someone to death, nonetheless stated they could vote for death in an appropriate case. 

(ECF No. 113 at 54-57); (juror Fuson, RT at 1316-22); (juror Burciaga, RT at 1461-65); (juror Goff, 

RT at 1427-40); (juror Lewis, RT at 1501-07); (juror O’Neal, RT at 734-35); (juror Lucas, RT at 542-

48); (juror Hatfield, RT at 661-64); (juror Sprague, RT at 814, 818-20); (juror Holder, RT at 1413-

15). 

Petitioner cites Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1967), as authority that the 

prosecution improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of reservations 

about the death penalty. He claims this denied him an impartial jury and “had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

In rejecting this claim on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court stated: 

Relying primarily on Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 and Wainwright v. Witt

(1985) 469 U.S. 412, defendant contends the prosecutor violated various constitutional rights 

by using peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed scruples about 

imposing the death penalty. Witherspoon and Witt set forth the standard for determining 

whether the trial court properly excused prospective jurors for cause based on their attitudes 

toward capital punishment. [Citation] With respect to peremptory challenges, this court has 

consistently held such excusals do not implicate any constitutional guaranty. [Citation] 

Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reexamine that determination. Consequently, 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an objection. 

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Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317.

This Court agrees that Petitioner’s reliance upon Witherspoon, and also Gray v. Mississippi, 

481 U.S. 648 (1987), is misplaced given their facts. Those cases involved prosecution for-cause 

challenges of potential jurors who expressed general objections to or scruples about the death penalty. 

As noted in claim E, ante, “[t]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a 

panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 377-78. 

In a capital case, “a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on 

capital punishment . . . if the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of 

his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 

(quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45). Thus, “a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, 

regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.” 

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728. 

The California Supreme Court held that, because the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory 

challenges to excuse jurors with scruples about the death penalty does not implicate any 

constitutional guaranty, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317. Failure to object is not ineffectiveness where an objection would have 

lacked merit. United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1172 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other

grounds by Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 

“The Supreme Court has never questioned the propriety, under the Constitution, of using 

peremptory challenges to remove from the jury persons likely to support the defendant’s position” on 

capital punishment. Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999). It follows that the 

California Supreme Court’s conclusion was neither an unreasonable application of, nor contrary to, 

Supreme Court law. Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

A criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been 

tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause. Uttecht v. 

Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007); cf. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (exclusion for cause is proper where a 

juror’s views on capital punishment would impair the performance of his duties). Petitioner concedes 

that none of the jurors about whom he complains was excluded for cause. (ECF No. 113 at 54:12-19; 

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ECF No. 178 at 80:22-81:2.) Furthermore, peremptory challenges are not of constitutional 

dimension. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88; Gray, 481 U.S. at 663. The California Supreme Court on direct 

appeal stated that: 

“[W]ith respect to peremptory challenges, this court has consistently held such excusals do 

not implicate any constitutional guaranty.”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 317. The Supreme Court has upheld use of peremptory challenges that do not 

discriminate on a constitutionally suspect basis. See e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) 

(rejecting argument that “a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to eliminate a distinctive group 

in the community deprives the defendant of a Sixth Amendment right to the ‘fair possibility’ of a 

representative jury”). 

Respondent suggests, and this Court agrees that the California Supreme Court reasonably 

could have determined these nine peremptory challenges were not related to the potential jurors’

reservations over the death penalty. Prospective juror Lucas’s son had a drug related arrest (RT at 

539-40); prospective juror Hatfield had a DUI (RT at 656-58); prospective juror Sprague had been 

federally indicted and prosecuted, but not convicted (RT at 810-13); and prospective juror O’Neal 

was an ex-felon who had served time in prison for burglary and robbery (RT at 731-33). As to the 

other five challenges, Petitioner’s speculation alone that a challenge was exercised because of the 

prospective juror’s reservations about the death penalty is not a basis for a constitutional violation. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different

Accordingly, it does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of these claims was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claims H and H1 are denied. 

b. Review of Claim H2

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In claim H2, Petitioner alleges defense counsel’s ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

the prosecution’s noted selection of an allegedly pro-death penalty jury. Petitioner alleges that there 

was no tactical reason for counsel’s failure to object. 

1) Clearly Established Law

The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 

2) Analysis of Claim H2

This claim fails for the same reasons discussed in claims H and H1, ante. A fair-minded jurist 

could have found that Petitioner has not demonstrated the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges 

was constitutionally infirm, or that he was denied a fair trial. Defense counsel’s failure to object, 

where objection would be futile, was not objectively unreasonable. See Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1172; 

Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-698. Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that but for counsel’s 

performance there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-

98. For the reasons discussed in claim E, ante, he has not demonstrated on the evidentiary record that 

the empaneled jury was other than impartial. 

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim H2 is denied.

B. Claims Relating to Guilt Phase

1. Review of Claim I

This claim consists of seventeen subclaims alleging ineffective assistance at the guilt phase, 

resulting in a complete breakdown of the adversarial process, denying Petitioner’s rights under the 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims at the guilt phase on direct appeal, noting generally that:

Defendant alleges numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such 

claims, he must establish not only deficient performance, i.e., representation below an 

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objective standard of reasonableness, but also resultant prejudice. [Citation] Tactical errors are 

generally not deemed reversible, and counsel’s decision making must be evaluated in the 

context of the available facts. [Citation] To the extent the record on appeal fails to disclose 

why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, we will affirm the judgment 

“unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply 

could be no satisfactory explanation ....” [Citation] Finally, prejudice must be affirmatively 

proved; the record must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” [Citation] 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333-35.

The seventeen subclaims are addressed separately below

a. Clearly Established Law 

The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in claim C2, ante. 

b. Review of Claim I1

In this claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel’s cumulative failure to adequately investigate, 

prepare for or present the guilt phase as alleged in claims I2-I17 amounts to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

This claim was raised and denied on direct appeal. 

Petitioner also raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which was summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

Petitioner cites to claim A and alleges that lead counsel Soria and initial second counsel 

Peterson did little work on this case prior to appointment of Mr. Cater as replacement second counsel 

in July 1990. (ECF No. 113 at 58-62; ECF No. 178 at 92-94.) Petitioner argues that Mr. Soria, who 

was engaged in another capital trial for the initial four months of his appointment in this case, did not 

do a complete guilt phase investigation. He complains that Mr. Soria used an incompetent 

investigator, Bruce Binns Investigations; that Mr. Soria did not have a trial strategy; that Mr. Soria 

did not consult necessary experts; that Mr. Soria did not test forensic evidence; and that Mr. Soria 

nonetheless did not request a continuance of trial. 

Petitioner also alleges that when Mr. Cater was appointed, Mr. Soria told him the 

investigation for both phases of trial was virtually completed, even though that was not true, and that 

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Cater had no reason to believe otherwise. (SHCP Ex. 47; 2/25/91 RT at 11-12.) As a result, 

Petitioner alleges that Mr. Cater ended up cross-examining witnesses without investigative materials 

to rely upon. 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have denied this claim as lacking support in 

the evidentiary record. Claim A, to the extent re-alleged here, fails for the reasons stated therein, 

ante. As noted by the California Supreme Court, conclusory allegations of failure to investigate are 

insufficient to raise a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 332-

34; see also Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory suggestions that counsel

provided ineffective assistance “fall far short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation”); 

United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (petitioner’s “vague and speculative 

assertions” failed to satisfy his burden under Strickland).

Petitioner’s only specific allegations refer to investigator Binns, (ECF No. 113 at 59-61), 

whom he describes as drunk and ineffective during pretrial witness interviews. (Id.; SHCP Ex. 4; 

SHCP Ex. 5; 2/25/91 RT at 11.)

The California Supreme Court rejected this claim for the following reasons:

Without elaboration, defendant asserts the investigator employed on his case must have been 

inadequate because counsel’s performance was so deficient, also noting the investigator 

admitted stealing money from defendant. These assertions are entirely too vague and 

conclusory to demonstrate any lack of competence on the part of either. Absent such a 

demonstration, we will not speculate defendant received ineffective assistance.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 334. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not 

unreasonable. As noted by that court, defense counsel had “few viable options” because “[w]ith two 

eyewitnesses to the killing, the defendant’s state of mind and intent were the only issues open to 

question. The forensic evidence bearing on those elements was straightforward, to the point, and not 

susceptible to much controversy. The guilt phase was matter-of-fact in tenor, and the penalty phase 

was presented and argued without inflammatory rhetoric or vilification.” Id. at 313. That court went 

on to describe the evidence against Petitioner as “overwhelming.” Id. at 334. 

Petitioner points to the ABA Guidelines, which require a thorough capital case defense 

investigation, in support his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (ECF No. 178 at 83-85.) But 

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the ABA Guidelines are “only guides.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1198 (ABA 

Standards serve only as a ‘guide’ for determining whether an attorney’s performance is adequate”). It 

follows that a failure to follow the ABA Guidelines “does not necessarily make out a denial of the 

Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). 

This Court “need not determine the actual explanation for defense counsel’s strategic choices, 

so long as his [choices] fall[] within the range of reasonable representation.” Morris v. State of 

California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991). “The mere criticism of trial tactics is insufficient to 

establish ineffectiveness or prejudice.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Here, counsel’s primary defense theory, to avoid a death sentence by showing the 

Huffstuttler and Mincy killings were not first degree murder, could be seen as reasonably furthered 

by the guilt phase investigation and presentation. 

Counsel, individually or through investigator Binns, inspected the physical crime scene and 

viewed crime scene photos (see claims I8-I9, post); reviewed police reports and eye witness 

statements of Ramirez and Wilson (see claims I2-I3, post); reviewed the report of criminologist 

Laskowski (see claims I8-I9); interviewed witnesses Ms. Ward and Ms. Islas (see claims I4-I5, post);

interviewed Petitioner’s daughter Paula and attempted to contact her common law husband, Jerry 

Halfacre and reviewed Petitioner’s threatening letter to Halfacre and Detective Williamson’s 

interview of Halfacre (see claim I6, post); contacted or attempted to contact potential witnesses Mr. 

Daser, Mr. Jones, Mr. Williams and Mr. (Brent) Wilson and reviewed related police reports (see

claim I7, post); contacted Dr. Markman and investigated mental state defenses (see claim I10, post);

traveled to the Los Angeles area to identify and interview potential witnesses and obtained Detective 

Nikkel’s report regarding Covina California potential witnesses including Ms. Hooten (see claim K, 

post); and traveled to Chicago, Illinois to identify and interview potential witnesses among 

Petitioner’s extended family (see claim W1, post; SHCP Ex. 47, 1/7/91 Marsden RT at 2304-11). 

These efforts were to garner evidence that Petitioner acted in the heat of passion or by selfdefense, including evidence that Petitioner feared Huffstuttler; that Petitioner’s mental state precluded 

premeditation; that Petitioner and Huffstuttler were scuffling at the time Huffstuttler was shot; that 

circumstances under which Petitioner shot Huffstuttler carried over to his shooting Mincy and 

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Wilson; that Petitioner may have been stabbed during the scuffle; and that one or more unidentified 

parties may have been involved in the murders. 

To the extent Petitioner bases this claim on claims I2 through I17 (see ECF No. 178 at 93), for 

the reasons set forth in those claims, post, Petitioner fails to demonstrate any singular errors for this 

Court to aggregate. Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509, 1521 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 109 

F.3d 1358, 1369 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 120 F.3d 1045 (en banc), opinion reinstated, Calderon v. 

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 566 (1998) (“finding no prejudice from the errors considered separately, 

we also find no cumulative prejudice”); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(holding that there was no reason to reverse for cumulative error because there was no violation of 

federal rights in the guilt phase).

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S., at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I1 is denied. 

c. Review of Claim I2

Petitioner alleges multiple failures by counsel to investigate and present evidence to impeach 

witness Eloy Ramirez, who was present during the crime and fled the scene with Petitioner to the 

home of Ramirez’s girlfriend, Patricia Islas, where they spent the night following the murders. 

The state supreme court rejected this claim on direct appeal, stating that: 

Defendant contends counsel’s investigation and review of discovery were inadequate 

because he failed to interview Patricia Islas or to anticipate her testimony about 

statements made by Ramirez. At trial, counsel made a hearsay objection to this 

testimony and also complained the statements had not been disclosed on discovery. In 

response, the prosecutor noted they were contained in a police report. On that basis, 

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defendant asserts counsel’s review and preparation must have been deficient. The record 

reflects, however, that the “discovery” objection was predicated on a lack of detail in the 

report regarding Ramirez’s statements, implying counsel had in fact reviewed what was 

provided. The record also suggests a defense investigator contacted Islas prior to trial. 

More importantly, even if he did not, defendant fails to establish additional investigation 

would have produced exculpatory or impeachment evidence. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court, which was summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus). 

Mr. Ramirez, a friend of Petitioner’s who is apparently blind in one eye and drinks heavily, was 

present at the crime scene when Petitioner shot and killed both victims. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 310.

Ramirez, who was arrested by Kern County Sheriff for the homicides (SHCP Ex. 13), testified to what 

he saw and heard of the events surrounding the killings. (Id.; RT at 1919-62.) Petitioner faults counsel 

on several fronts. 

1) Ramirez’s Statement to Law Enforcement

Petitioner first asserts that defense counsel failed to investigate the circumstances surrounding

Ramirez’s statement to the police and/or to investigate any mental and physical conditions that would 

have affected Ramirez’s ability to perceive, recall, or testify about the events as an eye witness. (ECF 

No. 113 at 63-67.) More specifically, Petitioner asserts that defense counsel failed to interview

Joseph Gutierrez, Ramirez’s attorney, about Ramirez’s condition at the time of Ramirez’s interview

with the police or any promises made in exchange for his statement. (Id.) Petitioner claims Gutierrez

would have provided information showing that Ramirez was strongly motivated to exculpate himself 

and could have led to evidence of law enforcement inducement, and that the failure to interview him 

prevented any effective challenge of the testimony of Ramirez and Deputy Williamson. (Id.) 

Petitioner also faults counsel for failure to interview Kern County Sheriff’s Deputies Nickel 

and Williamson, who interviewed Ramirez after his arrest. (Id.)

Though the declaration of Mr. Gutierrez indicates that defense counsel did not contact him 

regarding Ramirez’s “statement or the circumstances under which it was given” (SHCP Ex. 7 at 2), 

ex parte motions for funds filed by counsel indicate that the defense team made an unsuccessful 

attempt to contact Gutierrez on April 9, 1990 (SHCP Ex. 69A, 4/17/90 Binn’s Invoice, at 9) and that 

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the defense team contacted Gutierrez on July 30, 1990, and drafted a letter to him on July 31, 1990. 

(SHCP Ex. 69B, 8/28/90 Binn’s Invoice, at EMF Billing Statement at 1.) Nothing suggests that the 

defense team spoke to Gutierrez about anything other than Ramirez.

Documentary evidence indicates that Petitioner’s counsel investigated Ramirez and prepared 

for his testimony. (See SHCP Ex. 69A, Binn’s 3/13/90 Invoice, at 2 [reviewed Ramirez’s taped 

statement]; SHCP Ex. 69A, 6/6/90 EMF Billing Statement at 2 [reviewed reports for information on 

Ramirez]; 6/6/90 EMF Billing Statement at 5 and 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 2 [contacted

Paula Bolin regarding Ramirez]; 7/18/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3 and 8/28/90 EMF Billing

Statement at 1 [prepared letter to Paula Bolin regarding Ramirez]; 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 

2-3 [attempted to locate Ramirez]; 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3 and 10/16/90 Billing

Statement at 3 [contacted Frank Jones regarding Ramirez].)

Additionally, as discussed in claim K1, post, defense counsel was already aware of the only

inducement made to Ramirez, i.e., that if he was uninvolved in the murders, he would be released 

without charges being filed. (RT at 1861.) Deputy Williamson testified at trial:

We felt that Mr. Ramirez knew a lot more than what he was telling us, because he wasn’t 

telling us anything, and that basically if by [sic] were able to determine that he was involved, 

we would file charges; if we were able to determine that he was not involved, we would not 

file charges. But there was no promises other than we were trying to conduct an investigation.

(Id.) The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that attorney Gutierrez allowed 

Ramirez to talk with authorities because Ramirez was uninvolved in the crime. (Id.; see SHCP Ex. 

13, Supplemental Report of Senior Deputy Nikkel dated 9/7/89.) Gutierrez admits “[i]t appeared to 

me at the time that the deputies did not really feel [Ramirez] was involved, but had arrested him 

solely to obtain his cooperation.” (SHCP Ex. 7, ¶ 4.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated on the evidentiary record that further interviewing of 

Ramirez, Gutierrez, or Deputies Nickel or Williamson, other than that already done by counsel, 

would have provided any new helpful or useful information. The defense team was in possession of 

Ramirez’s taped statement and the deputies’ reports (see SHCP Ex. 69A, Binns’ 3/13/90 Invoice, at 

2; SHCP Ex. 13; RT at 1850-55, 1935-38), and Petitioner has failed to set forth what additional 

information would have been obtained had the defense team personally interviewed Deputies Nickel 

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and Williamson.

Moreover, Gutierrez had an attorney-client privilege with Ramirez which, absent waiver,

would have prevented him from discussing any privileged information with Petitioner’s counsel.

(See, e.g., RT at 1937; SHCP Ex. 7 at 3.) Since counsel were well-informed regarding the nature of 

the testimony to be presented by these individuals, and Petitioner presents only conjecture about 

alleged inducements which might be discovered had further investigation been done, his claim of 

ineffective assistance fails. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001); LaGrand v. 

Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (defense counsel need not personally conduct 

interviews where he had transcripts of prosecution interviews). 

Nor has Petitioner argued or established prejudice from any defense counsel failure to conduct 

further interviews. The “inducement” as noted above was presented during trial and argued during 

counsel’s closing argument. (RT at 1861, 1962, 2163, 2170-71.)

Given the noted substantial evidence against Petitioner, (see claims O, R, S, post), any 

additional inducements which might have been uncovered likely would not have resulted in a 

different outcome. Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088. Ramirez was not the only witness to the crime. Wilson 

also saw and heard Petitioner arguing with Huffstuttler before Petitioner killed Huffstuttler and

Mincy, and then tried to kill him (Wilson). Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 310; RT at 1739-43, 1765-71.

Wilson’s testimony corroborated Ramirez’s testimony in many important respects. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 

at 310-311. Likewise, Ramirez corroborated the significant events to which Wilson testified. (RT at 

1922-25, 1950-58.) Ramirez’s testimony regarding various forensic aspects of the case, e.g., that 

Huffstuttler immediately fell to the ground after being shot only to be fired upon again and that 

Petitioner made the scene look like a drug deal gone bad, also was confirmed by other testimony and 

photographic and physical evidence. (See RT at 1792-96, 1806-10, 1818-24, 1834-36, 1843-55, 

1928-34, 1945-58, 1969-71, 1978-2013, 2015, 2017.) Additionally, Patricia Islas, Ramirez’s 

girlfriend, to whom Ramirez first spoke about the murders, testified to Ramirez’s statements to her, 

which were consistent with his testimony at trial and to the above detectives. (RT at 1969-73.)

2) Ramirez’s Physical and Mental Condition at the Time of the Crime

Petitioner faults defense counsel’ for failing to investigate Ramirez’s physical and mental 

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condition at the time of the crime. (ECF No. 113 at 65-67.) Petitioner claims that this would have 

led to discovery of various facts about Ramirez’s vision and drug and alcohol use, (id.; RT 1912-19; 

SHCP Ex. 8), demonstrating that he was an incompetent and/or not credible witness. 

Petitioner states Ramirez was an alcoholic (SHCP Ex. 3 at ¶ 7-8, Ex. 11 ¶ 25, Ex. 12 at ¶ 10-

11) who had been drinking at the time of the crime and who may have had pre-existing memory and 

perception issues from a car accident the year before the crime. (SHCP Ex. 9 at ¶ 28.) 

However, the record reflects that defense counsel was aware of, and presented to the jury, 

evidence of Ramirez’s vision problem. (SHCP Ex. 13 at 6; RT at 1834-35, 1912-13.) Similarly, 

defense counsel was aware that Ramirez had been drinking just prior to his arrest. (SHCP Ex. 13 at 

3.) Evidence of Ramirez’s alleged alcoholism and drinking the day of the murders was presented to 

the jury. (RT at 1726, 1850-51, 1917-19, 1942.)

Ramirez testified that, prior to the shooting, he had been drinking beer, (RT at 1918; see also 

RT at 1918, 1942), and that he felt the effects of the beer and was “feeling good.” (RT at 1918-19.) 

Deputy Williamson further testified that Ramirez had obviously been drinking when he was arrested 

shortly after the murders and was “an alcoholic type.” (RT at 1850:25-28.) 

When counsel asked Ramirez if he got drunk the day after the murders, Ramirez testified that 

he did not remember. (RT at 1962.) The jury was presented with additional evidence that Ramirez 

had difficulty remembering events. (RT at 1914, 1918, 1925, 1931, 1938-42, 1944, 1948-49, 1951, 

1953, 1960; see also SHCP Ex. 13 at 2.) Any failure to present cumulative evidence of Ramirez’s 

alcoholism or inebriated status on the day of the murders could not have been prejudicial.

The record reflects that the jury also considered other evidence potentially impeaching 

Ramirez’s testimony. (See RT at 1850-1861 [inducements]; RT at 1956 [spontaneous denial of 

participation in the crimes]; RT at 1957 [admitted nervousness].) Here, again, the failure to present 

cumulative evidence would not be prejudicial. 

3) Impeachment with Inconsistent Statements

Petitioner faults defense counsel for failing to present at the December 1990 trial Ramirez’s 

inconsistent tape recorded statements given to Kern County Sheriff’s deputies on September 6, 1989, 

several days after the crime, and at the March 1990 preliminary hearing. (ECF No. 113 at 67-70.) 

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Petitioner claims that defense counsel did not develop Ramirez’s alleged inconsistent 

statements whether Petitioner was surprised by the arrival of Huffstuttler and the victims at the cabin,

i.e., Ramirez initially stated Huffstuffler told him and Bolin that Huffstuttler was going to stay with 

the victims for a couple days but this information was not adduced at trial (see SHCP Ex. 13 at 3-4;

RT at 1944), thereby missing an opportunity to support the heat of passion defense. However, 

Ramirez did testify at trial that, though he was unsure what was said between Petitioner and the 

victims at the bar (RT at 1944), and that Petitioner was cordial in greeting the group at the cabin (RT 

at 1733-34), Petitioner nonetheless told Huffstuttler upon the latter’s arrival at the cabin that 

“bringing his friends up there” was a “no no” (RT at 1950). 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel did not develop Ramirez’s inconsistent statements 

whether he saw Huffstuttler and the other victims go down to the marijuana field, i.e., Ramirez

initially stated he did not see where the victims went upon arriving at the cabin, but at trial he stated 

the victims went down to the marijuana patch. (CT at 23-24, 36-39; RT 1922, 1949-52; see also

SHCP Ex. 13 at 14, 16; CT at 23, 38-39, 41.) However, there is no material inconsistency in this 

regard. Ramirez’s statement that he was unsure whether he could see victims Mincy and Wilson at 

the time Huffstuttler was shot is not inconsistent with his subsequent statements that Mincy and 

Wilson went to the marijuana field. (Id.) 

Petitioner claims that counsel did not develop Ramirez’s inconsistent statements regarding 

what Huffstuttler said and did just prior to being shot, i.e., prior to and at trial Ramirez stated he heard 

Huffstuttler say something to Petitioner like “what are you going to do, shoot me?” or “shoot me 

then” or “why don’t you shoot me” and raised his hands in the air (RT at 1922; CT at 25-26; SHCP 

Ex. 13 at 4, 6; see ECF No. 113 at 68), but at a point during his pretrial interview with Officer Nikkel 

the following colloquy took place: 

Question: When [Petitioner] went in the house to get the gun, did he say he was gonna 

get the gun?

Answer: Um-hmm. No ...(?)

Question: Did he say anything?

Answer: No

Questions: To [Huffstuttler]?

Answer: (Unintelligible)

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Question: And [Huffstutterl] said, “What are you gonna do, shoot me?”

Answer: I didn’t really know. I didn’t hear him ... nothing. 

Question: He didn’t say anything? He didn’t say yes to [Huffstutter] or anything?

Answer: No. 

(SHCP Ex. 13 at 16.) However, Ramirez’s noted answer to Nikkel’s question appears ambiguous 

when taken in the context of Nikkel’s questions about whether Petitioner said anything prior to 

shooting Huffstuttler. Ramirez may have been confused and his statement that he did not “hear ... 

nothing” was meant to be a response to Nikkel’s questions whether Petitioner said anything. Even if 

the response referred to Huffstuttler, it is incomplete and uncertain as to what Ramirez meant to say. 

Because Ramirez’s noted statements to authorities prior to and at trial were not necessarily 

inconsistent there was nothing for defense counsel to impeach Ramirez with at trial. (RT at 1922-23; 

CT 25-26; SHCP Ex. 13 at 4-6, 16.)

Petitioner claims that counsel did not develop Ramirez’s inconsistent statements regarding

whether Ramirez knew where Petitioner kept the rifle used in the crime, i.e., prior to trial Ramirez 

denied knowing where Petitioner kept the rifle (CT at 49; SHCP Ex. 13 at 5), but at trial Ramirez 

testified that Petitioner kept the rifle at his bedside (RT at 1955-56). However, Ramirez’s pretrial 

statements reflected that he did not know where the rifle came from immediately prior to the shooting 

(CT at 49) but that he previously had seen the rifle “in the cabin” (id.) and that he thought the rifle 

was kept “either in the lounge, or in – inside the house.” (SHCP Ex. 13 at 5.) 

Here again, the state supreme court could reasonably have found no inconsistency. Ramirez’s 

initial statement that he did not know where the rifle was on the day before the shooting is not 

inconsistent with his later statement that Petitioner kept the rifle at his bedside. (Id.) Ramirez’s 

testimony regarding where the gun was also helped Petitioner because it supported Rebecca Ward’s 

testimony that the guns were kept there only to kill rattlesnakes. (RT at 1668.) It also supported 

Petitioner’s alternate defense that Ramirez knew where the gun was and could describe it because 

Ramirez actually participated in the murders. (RT at 1955, 2167.)

Petitioner claims that counsel did not develop Ramirez’s allegedly inconsistent statements 

regarding whether he saw Petitioner break bottles of hot sauce to make the scene look like a “bad 

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dope deal”, i.e., that Ramirez did not mention the bottles during his testimony at preliminary hearing

(CT 31) or early in his interview with detective Nikkel (SHCP Ex. 13 at 7), but later in his interview 

with Nikkel stated that Petitioner broke bottles (id. at 16) and at trial Ramirez testified that Petitioner 

“broke bottles and poured stuff on them.” (RT at 1929.) However, these statements are not 

necessarily inconsistent. Any conflict between Ramirez’s testimony and his pretrial statements in this 

subject area was speculative, partly because different questions were asked at different times. The 

California Supreme Court reasonably could have found no material conflict. Where a witness is 

thoroughly examined, failure to impeach with minor inconsistencies between preliminary hearing and 

trial testimony does not establish ineffectiveness because “the decision to not use everything is 

preeminently a tactical decision best made by counsel.” Jaiceris, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.

Petitioner argues that Ramirez gave conflicting testimony regarding whether Petitioner had 

gone in the cabin immediately before shooting Huffstuttler. Ramirez testified prior to trial that while 

Petitioner and Huffstuffler were arguing Petitioner went into the cabin and came out and he 

(Ramirez) then heard a shot. (SHCP Ex. 13 at 4; CT 19, 25, 41; RT 1923, 1950-52.) Ramirez 

initially confirmed this at trial, testifying that “[Petitioner] walked in, came back out and shot 

[Huffstuttler].” (RT at 1950:16.) But then Ramirez responded to a question whether Petitioner went 

into the cabin before shooting Huffstuttler by stating “I don’t remember.” (RT 1952:2-4.) The 

California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded counsel’s failure to follow-up on this 

inconsistency to be a matter of trial tactics. As noted, prior to and at trial Ramirez testified that 

Petitioner went into and came out of the cabin prior to shooting Huffstutter. His statement that he 

could not remember could be seen as transient and not necessarily inconsistent with his prior 

statements. Moreover, counsel could have determined that exploring the inconsistency might have 

led to further testimony contrary to the defense theory that the killing of Huffstuttler occurred in the 

cabin during an argument and was manslaughter, not murder. (ECF No. 113 at 79.) The mere 

criticism of trial tactics is insufficient to establish ineffectiveness or prejudice. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d at 1254. 

Petitioner argues that Ramirez gave conflicting testimony regarding his statement that 

Huffstuttler had his “hands raised up out from his side” just prior to being shot, i.e., prior to trial 

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Ramirez stated that Huffstuttler had his hands raised prior to being shot (SHCP Ex. 13 at 6), but did 

not so testify at trial (see RT at 1922-23, 1950-52). Trial tactics were seemingly implicated here as 

well. If Petitioner wanted to emphasize Ramirez’s intoxication, poor vision and memory, getting 

Ramirez to describe specific movements might not have been helpful to the defense, especially given 

the absence of evidence that Huffstuttler ever had any weapons that day or fought Petitioner. (See RT

at 1689-90, 1707, 1731, 1740-43, 1747, 1922-24, 1930, 1950-52, 1958.) Further, the California 

Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that defense counsel was in a better position by 

simply arguing that Huffstuttler might have made threatening gestures, supporting their heat of 

passion defense, than allowing Ramirez to clarify that Huffstuttler did not do so.

Finally, an additional explanation for any alleged inconsistency regarding recorded statements 

made on September 6, 1989 (SHCP Ex. 13 at 1), is that the batteries in the tape recorder ran down 

during the interview and only a portion of the September 6, 1989 interview was taped. This could 

suggest that untaped portions of the interview might have resolved apparent inconsistencies. 

4) Impeachment with Prior Misdemeanor Convictions

Petitioner contends that his counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to impeach 

Ramirez with prior misdemeanor convictions for theft (1965 and 1967) and for resisting, delaying, or 

obstructing an officer (1973), convictions defense counsel presumptively knew about. (ECF No. 113 

at 70; SHCP Ex. 14.) 

Here, again, trial tactics could reasonably have dictated counsel not pursue impeachment 

given the nature of these offenses, their age, and potential difficulties in garnering supporting 

evidence and witnesses to prove these crimes. People v. Wheeler, 4 Cal. 4th 284, 297-301 (1992) 

(misdemeanor conviction is inadmissible hearsay).

5) No Prejudice

Petitioner claims that had Ramirez been impeached with the noted evidence in this claim, the 

jury might have discounted Ramirez’s testimony which was key to the prosecution’s theory that the 

killing of Huffstuttler was first degree murder; and instead credited statements of the other eye 

witness, Mt. Wilson, which Petitioner contends support the defense theory of voluntary manslaughter

arising from a scuffle between Petitioner and Huffstuttler or Petitioner protecting himself upon being 

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threatened by Huffstuffler. 

Even if counsel was deficient as alleged, for the reasons discussed above and those discussed 

in claim I3, post, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found no Strickland prejudice 

arising from claim I2. Moreover, defense counsel questioned Ramirez about the circumstances under 

which he gave his statement to the police, his awareness of Petitioner’s marijuana venture, his alcohol 

consumption on the day of the crimes, his poor memory of and inability to perceive the details of the 

crimes, and his apparent lack of participation in the crimes. (RT at 1935-62.) The jury was able to 

consider this information. Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice under claim I2 by counsel’s 

failure to further investigate and present evidence impeaching eye witness Ramirez. See e.g., Burger

v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795 (1987) (failure to pursue fruitless investigation not unreasonable). 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I2 is denied.

d. Review of Claim I3

Petitioner faults counsel’s failure to impeach victim witness Wilson regarding his alleged 

inconsistent statements about the shooting of Huffstuttler. (ECF No. 113 at 71-74.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily rejected on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner claims that Wilson’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his pretrial statements on 

the issue of whether Huffstuttler was shot in the cabin. Petitioner argues that in his pretrial 

statements Wilson told authorities that Petitioner and Huffstuttler entered the cabin, but later testified 

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that it sounded as if one or both entered the cabin, but that he could not see the cabin. (SHCP Ex. 6 at 

7, 31; RT 1740-42; RT 1764-69; RT 1809.) 

Petitioner claims prejudice in that impeachment on this issue would have called into question 

Ramirez’s credibility, and supported Petitioner’s argument for manslaughter, creating a reasonable 

likelihood of a totally different outcome. 

The Court is not persuaded by this claim. Wilson’s pretrial statements were not inconsistent 

with, but rather could be seen as clarifying of, his subsequent testimony. Wilson stated at the 

preliminary hearing and at trial that he could not see the entrance to the cabin. Deputy Layman, who 

had written in his police report that “Wilson said [Huffstuttler] and [Petitioner] went into the 

residence,” clarified during his trial testimony that Wilson had told him that he could not see the front 

of the cabin. (RT at 1809-10.)

Moreover, even though Wilson testified at trial that he did not hear scuffling, (RT at 1767-68), 

but had told Kern County Deputy Layman that he had (RT at 1809-10), the state supreme court could 

reasonably have found no inconsistency. The term “scuffle” could refer to a verbal argument as 

suggested during the prosecution’s closing argument. (RT 2154-55.) Wilson’s testimony at trial was 

consistent with an ongoing argument of some sort between Petitioner and Huffstuttler. (RT at 1767-

68.) Deputy Layman might have used “scuffle” to describe the argument, whether verbal or physical. 

Accordingly, the state supreme court could reasonably have determined that Wilson’s

statements on this matter were substantially consistent and that impeachment would not have been 

successful. In that Wilson’s statements were not clearly inconsistent, defense counsel was not 

necessarily deficient for failing to impeach on these points. Given Wilson’s consistent testimony that 

he could not see the cabin, Wilson could have explained any alleged inconsistencies between what 

Deputy Layman had reported and what Wilson had told him. Defense counsel could have determined 

that the alleged inconsistencies were explainable based on the circumstances in the record and thus 

not a basis for impeachment. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

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of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I3 is denied. 

e. Review of Claim I4

In this claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate or 

challenge the testimony of Rebecca Ward, victim Huffstuttler’s girlfriend, who had previously lived 

at the cabin but was not present during the murders. (ECF No. 113 at 74-75.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court (SHCP at 113-15), which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. 

(CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that defense counsel failed to interview Ward and impeach her regarding 

how she and others were involved in the marijuana operation, and regarding prior threats of violence 

by Huffstuttler against Petitioner and Huffstuttler’s financial interest in the marijuana operation. He 

claims these failures by defense counsel were not tactical because her testimony damaged Petitioner’s 

manslaughter defense. 

Ward testified regarding the weapons kept at the cabin. (RT at 1660-69, 2143.) She also 

testified regarding Petitioner’s partnership with Huffstuttler in the marijuana growing operation. (RT 

at 1660-69, 2142-43.) Petitioner claims the prosecutor argued that Petitioner had a financial motive 

for killing Huffstuttler, undermining the defense manslaughter theory. 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel should have asked Ward on cross-examination whether 

she had a financial interest in the marijuana farm or whether she used marijuana or any other drugs. 

But even if Petitioner could demonstrate the relevance of such questions, the California Supreme 

Court reasonably could have found it unlikely Ward would take the stand and inculpate herself in this 

fashion. That court could also have found trial tactics in play. Should Ward have responded 

negatively to such questions, it could have bolstered her credibility. Defense counsel had 

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investigated Ward and presumptively aware that she had admitted knowledge of the marijuana crop 

and helped to water it on occasion, (RT at 1664), but stated that the marijuana venture was between 

Petitioner and Huffstuttler. (RT at 1667; SHCP, Ex. 18b, 9/7/89 Nikkel Supp. Report at 13.)

Petitioner also claims that defense counsel failed to investigate and to interview Ward prior to 

the trial, thereby missing crucial information. However, the record belies these allegations. (See

SHCP Ex. 69B, 10/16/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3 [contacted Ward in Pineville Oregon]; see also

3/20/90 EMF Billing Statement at 5 [contacted Barbara Ward regarding Rebecca Ward]; 4/26/90 

EMF Billing Statement at 4 [searched court files for information regarding Ward]; 6/6/90 EMF 

Billing Statement at 2 [reviewed discovery regarding Ward]; 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 6 

[attempted to locate and serve subpoena on Ward]; 10/16/90 EMF Billing Statement at 2-3, 5 

[attempted to locate Ward, attempted to contact Ward’s ex-husband, spoke with bar owner regarding 

Ward].)

Even if counsel should have done more to obtain information from Ward prior to trial, nothing 

supports Petitioner’s theory that Ward would have provided information favorable to the defense.

Petitioner cites to the declaration of Paula Bolin and claims that Ward might have been able to 

provide information that Jerry Halfacre had a financial interest in the marijuana plantation. (See

SHCP Ex. 9 at ¶ 10.) But nowhere in Paula Bolin’s declaration does she indicate Ward or her 

boyfriend, Huffstuttler, was aware of any alleged financial interest of Halfacre. (Id.) Petitioner has 

not demonstrated that defense counsel reasonably could have expected to get this information from 

Ward.

Petitioner suggests that Ward could have provided information helpful to a self-defense theory 

relating to an alleged fight between Petitioner and Huffstuttler that occurred shortly before the 

shootings. It appears that, when authorities interviewed Ward shortly after the shootings, she 

referenced a confrontation of some sort between Petitioner and Huffstuttler: 

[Ward] said one time, when [Ward, Petitioner, and Huffstuttler] were at the cabin, 

[Huffstuttler] had gone out to get their pillows out of the van. She said when 

[Huffstuttler] closed the door to the van, he slammed it. She said that [Petitioner] came 

into the bedroom where they were at and stuck the .45 into [Huffstuttler’s] mouth, 

telling him that he should not slam the door to his van. She said she and two (2) other 

people, who were friends of [Petitioner’s], named Sandra and Dennis, from Covina, 

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pulled [Petitioner] off of [Huffstuttler].

(SHCP, Ex. 18b, 9/7/89 Nikkel Supp. Report at 13.)

However, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense counsel 

may have been tactically motivated in not further investigating Ward’s knowledge of this confrontation. 

The jury was unlikely to believe that Petitioner feared Huffstuttler as a result of this incident, (SHCP 

Ex. 15 at ¶ 8), but was more likely to focus on Petitioner’s violent temper and display of the weapon. 

Sondra Hooten, who apparently witnessed the fight, does not mention Ward was present during the 

fight, (SHCP Ex. 15 at ¶ 7-8), suggesting a basis to discount such testimony by Ward. Additionally, it 

appears that Ward was a minor witness given the testimony of Ramirez and Wilson, eyewitnesses to the 

shooting of Huffstuttler.

Relying upon a remark from the prosecutor’s closing argument (RT at 2142-43), Petitioner also 

asserts that his counsel was ineffective because they failed to question Ward about her drug use, which 

was allegedly apparent during her testimony. The Court finds the allegation unavailing. During 

closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement about Ward: “Becky probably uses 

drugs. We don’t have any evidence of that other than what you could see on the witness stand, and I 

think you could all see that she was not all there.” (RT at 2142-43.) However, the California Supreme 

Court could reasonably have found that the prosecutor’s statement was not evidence that Ward was 

intoxicated when testifying, but rather a reference to how drug use had affected Ward and her 

credibility as a witness: her demeanor, appearance, and ability to communicate and recall.

Petitioner does not cite to any evidence supporting the contention that Ward was intoxicated 

while testifying. Even if Ward’s demeanor did suggest obvious intoxication, defense counsel might 

have made a tactical decision to not question her on the subject, reserving this “obvious” information 

about her demeanor for argument, only to have the prosecutor mention it first. 

Even if counsel did unreasonably fail to investigate or challenge Ward’s testimony, Petitioner 

has not demonstrated prejudice. Any further information from Ward about the alleged confrontation 

between Petitioner and Huffstuttler could be seen as duplicative of Ms. Hooten’s testimony regarding 

that confrontation. See e.g., Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1994) (no ineffectiveness for 

failure to investigate minor witness whose testimony was consistent with other witnesses). 

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Additionally, the substantial evidence cited by the prosecution in closing could reasonably have 

supported the prosecution theory that Petitioner had murdered Huffstuttler, not due to fear of 

Huffstuttler or self-defense, but because Huffstuttler had brought strangers to the marijuana farm. 

(RT at 2154:11-14.) 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I4 is denied. 

f. Review of Claim I5

In this claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately 

investigate or impeach the testimony of Patricia Islas, Ramirez’s girlfriend, who gave testimony 

corroborating that of Ramirez. (ECF No. 113 at 75-76.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, and in his direct appeal, both of which were denied on the merits. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus; Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333.) 

Petitioner alleges that counsel or defense investigator Binns “attempted to question Islas prior 

to trial without success.” (ECF No. 113 at 75-76.) Petitioner concludes this interview was

unsuccessful because investigator Binns was incompetent. (ECF No. 113 at 76.) Petitioner also 

alleges that Islas was a heavy drinker and drug user (id.; SHCP Ex’s 3, 11, 12) whose competency 

and credibility could have been challenged on such basis. He claims her testimony supported that of 

Ramirez and was prejudicial, and that impeaching her would have significantly supported his 

voluntary manslaughter defense. 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected this claim on direct appeal, noting that: 

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Defendant contends counsel’s investigation and review of discovery were inadequate 

because he failed to interview Patricia Islas or to anticipate her testimony about 

statements made by Ramirez. At trial, counsel made a hearsay objection to this 

testimony and also complained the statements had not been disclosed on discovery. In 

response, the prosecutor noted they were contained in a police report. On that basis, 

defendant asserts counsel’s review and preparation must have been deficient. The record 

reflects, however, that the “discovery” objection was predicated on a lack of detail in the 

report regarding Ramirez’s statements, implying counsel had in fact reviewed what was 

provided. The record also suggests a defense investigator contacted Islas prior to trial. 

More importantly, even if he did not, defendant fails to establish additional investigation 

would have produced exculpatory or impeachment evidence.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333. 

The record reflects that Islas did speak to a member of the defense team, but it appears that she 

did not speak about the events she testified to at trial. (RT at 1972-73; SHCP Ex. 69B, 6/6/90 EMF 

Billing Statement at 2, 4; Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333.) Petitioner does not state what favorable or 

exculpatory facts Islas would have provided had she been interviewed. Petitioner suggests, but points 

to no evidence that Islas would have told counsel that she abused drugs and “thus might not have 

accurately recalled the events to which she testified.” (ECF No. 113 at 76.) See U.S. v. Schaflander,

743 F.2d 714, 721 (1984) (claim of failure to interview witness rejected because the defendant did “not 

produce[] affidavits or sworn statements from . . . the witness[] or from counsel.”).

Petitioner cites to declarations from Joyce Sophie Balsamico (SHCP Ex. 3 at 2) stating that “I 

also knew Eloy’s girlfriend, Pat Islas. Pat drank a lot, too”; and from Richard Brogden (SHCP Ex. 11 

at 7-8) stating that Islas was a “very heavy drinker” and “did a lot of drugs. Pat used marijuana,

cocaine, and various narcotics”; and from Richard Balsamico (SHCP Ex. 12 at 2-3) stating that Islas 

was a “drinker.”

However, none of these declarations suggests Islas was abusing drugs or alcohol at or near the 

time period that she testified, or that she had difficulty remembering things. Her interview with

Detective Nikkel, which was available to defense counsel (SHCP Ex 18b, 9/7/89 Nikkel Supp. Report 

at 7-8), and her testimony at trial (RT at 1963-73) suggest that Islas had no trouble remembering 

details about the relevant information she knew about the crime. Moreover, one of Petitioner’s 

exhibits corroborates Islas’s testimony that Petitioner went to her house the day after the murders. 

(SHCP Ex. 15 at 3.)

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Petitioner cannot show prejudice relating to this claim. Islas’s testimony was minor given the 

eyewitness testimony of Ramirez and Wilson, and corroborated only in general terms Ramirez’s 

testimony that Petitioner had murdered Huffstuttler because he had brought strangers to his marijuana 

farm. (RT at 1963-73.)

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I5 is denied. 

g. Review of Claim I6

Petitioner claims that defense counsel did not investigate Jerry Halfacre, who had been living 

with Petitioner’s daughter, Paula Bolin, was the father of Paula’s child, Ashley, and who provided a 

threatening letter he received from Petitioner to authorities, through his probation officer Georgia 

O’Connor, that was used by the prosecution in aggravation as alleged in claim R, post. (ECF No. 113 

at 76-77.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner faults counsel’s failure to interview Halfacre about various matters, claiming that, if 

they had done so, they “would have learned that Halfacre was an active partner in the marijuana 

venture himself and perhaps in the crime itself” as suggested by Paula Bolin. (ECF No. 113 at 77:12-

14; see also SHCP Ex. 9 at ¶ 10-12; SHCP Ex. 16.) 

The record is uncertain regarding whether counsel interviewed Halfacre. It appears that 

defense investigators contacted Halfacre (SHCP Ex. 18b, 4/26/90 EMF Billing Statement at 4, 7), and 

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later attempted further contact with him. (6/6/90 EMF Billing Statement at 4.) Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that counsel failed to interview Halfacre. See e.g., Schaflander, 743 F.2d at 721 

(without the necessary factual showing, defendant’s allegations remain mere conclusory statements.) 

Counsel could reasonably have discounted Paula Bolin’s sworn and unsworn statements that 

Halfacre had a business interest in the marijuana farm (SHCP Ex. 9 at ¶¶ 10-11) as well as her 

suggestion that Halfacre may have been at the cabin on the day of the shooting because “the day of 

the shooting [she] was not with Jerry [Halfacre]” (SHCP Ex. 9 at ¶ 12). Significantly, Paula was a 

self-acknowledged drug user who was then estranged from Halfacre. (RT at 2490-93; SHCP Ex. 9 at 

1-5; SHCP Ex. 16 at 2.) 

Counsel apparently were aware of the contents of Deputy Williamson’s September 7, 1989 

interview of Halfacre. (See SHCP Ex. 18b, 3/20/90 EMF Billing Statement at 6 indicating that 

defense counsel investigator reviewed the tape.) Deputy Williamson also testified at trial as to details 

of this interview. (RT at 1836-37.) For instance, counsel was presumably aware that Halfacre, 

through his probation officer, assisted police in locating Petitioner’s van, used to flee the scene of the 

crime. Halfacre also turned over to authorities the threatening letter written to him by Petitioner 

which was used in the penalty phase. (RT at 1868, 2442-44; SHCP Ex. 18b at 8-10; SHCP Ex. 6 at 

33-35; Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 & n.11.) Although Halfacre did not testify at trial, this information 

came in through the testimony of other witnesses. (RT at 1836-37, 1867-68, 2442-44.) 

Halfacre was on probation around the time of trial. (RT at 1866.) It is likely that he would 

not have admitted any of these allegations for fear of facing a probation violation. Paula’s conjecture 

that Halfacre might have been involved in the crimes reasonably could be accorded little if any 

weight. The weight of evidence was to the contrary. In his interview with law enforcement, Halfacre 

stated that he had not been up to the cabin where the murders had occurred in about nine months. 

(SHCP Ex. 18b, 9/7/89 Halfacre Interview at 5.) 

Given the foregoing and Halfacre’s seemingly poor relationship with his former common law 

wife, Petitioner’s daughter Paula, counsel could have determined that they had enough information 

about Halfacre and that additional information would not have been helpful to their theory of defense. 

(See e.g., SHCP Ex. 6 at 33-35); United States v. Farr, 297 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (counsel “is 

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not obligated to . . . personally investigate every conceivable lead”). Moreover, Halfacre indicated in 

his interview with police that he did not “want to be involved,” (SHCP Ex. 18b 9/7/89 interview with

Jerry Halfacre, at 6), suggesting he would not have cooperated with defense counsel. Given the 

likelihood that Halfacre would have provided only unfavorable information, counsel could have made 

a reasonable tactical decision not to pursue an interview of Halfacre. 

Additionally, Petitioner cannot show prejudice relating to this claim. Even if Petitioner could 

have shown that Halfacre had an interest in the marijuana farm, it likely would not have impacted the 

verdict. The prosecution did not argue that Petitioner’s motive for killing Huffstuttler was to avoid 

profit sharing, but that rather the motive was Huffstuttler’s showing the marijuana to the victims, 

(RT at 2152-54), as otherwise apparent in the record. (See e.g., RT at 2492-93, 2578.)

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I6 is denied. 

h. Review of Claim I7

Petitioner claims defense counsel did not investigate or interview other possible guilt phase 

witnesses who may have been involved in the crime. (ECF No. 113 at 77-79.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner argues that defense counsel did not investigate or interview other possible guilt 

phase witnesses, friends of Petitioner, who may have been involved in the crime, specifically Mark 

Daser, Frank Jones, Ulysses Williams, and Brent Wilson. 

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1) Mark Daser

Petitioner claims that he described the crime and how he acted in self-defense to Daser, telling 

him that Huffstuttler had pulled a knife on him and stabbed him before Petitioner shot him. (ECF No.

113 at 78; SHCP Ex. 4.) Petitioner alleges that he also showed fresh wounds to Daser. (Id.) 

The record reflects that Daser was contacted by the defense team. (SHCP Ex. 4 at ¶ 19; 

SHCP Ex. 69B, 4/26/90 EMF Billing Statement at 9; 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 2.) Counsel 

was also aware of Daser’s statement to local law enforcement. (SHCP Ex. 18b, Supplemental Report

of Deputy Williamson dated 1/29/90.) Defense counsel clearly considered calling Daser as a witness 

but made a reasonable tactical decision not to, determining it would be “counterproductive” given the 

opinion of Dr. Markman regarding the scars: 

[A]nd we felt if Dr. [Markman] after two hours of talking to [Petitioner] and seeing him and 

felt that [the scars] went the wrong way, that that would look like fabricated evidence, and 

that was my opinion. 

(RT at 2289.) The record reflects that counsel contacted “Dr. Markowitz (sic),” who interviewed 

Petitioner and inspected the wounds. (RT at 2288-89.) Petitioner alleges that Dr. Markowitz was 

actually Dr. Ronald Markman, the psychiatrist who evaluated Petitioner for trial competency. (ECF 

No. 113 at 111 n.22.) As noted, Dr. Markman advised defense counsel that the wounds “went the 

wrong way” (RT at 2289) i.e., appeared self-inflicted rather than inflicted by Huffstuttler as Petitioner 

suggested. (SHCP Ex. 20 at 3.) Petitioner’s subsequent argument that Dr. Markman was unqualified 

to opine on the nature of the scars appears unsupported in the record. See e.g., Affinito v. Hendricks, 

366 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2004) (where defendant has failed to show that the expert selected is 

unqualified, selection of expert is a matter of strategy and tactics).

Furthermore, the prosecutor argued at closing that no witness saw Huffstuttler with a knife 

and no blood was on the knife found at the crime scene. (RT at 2175-76.) Witness Ramirez 

suggested that Petitioner went to see Daser to get a “solid alibi.” (SHCP Ex. 13 at 9.) Significantly, 

witness Wilson did not testify as to any limp or injury to Petitioner following the shooting of 

Huffstuttler. (RT at 1770-71.) 

Defense counsel also considered Daser’s statements regarding what Petitioner had told him 

about the alleged knife fight to be inadmissible hearsay. (RT at 2289.) Furthermore Daser’s 

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credibility was likely in issue. Mr. Daser was “one of [Petitioner’s] closest friends” (SHCP Ex. 4 at 

1) and the knife fight statements, helpful to Petitioner, were contrary to the noted testimony of the 

witnesses present during the crimes, and unsupported by Daser’s own statements to Deputy 

Williamson shortly after the crimes. (SHCP Ex. 18b, 1/29/90 Williamson Supp. Report at 2.) 

Given the foregoing, it is unlikely that Petitioner could have suffered prejudice from his 

counsel’s failure to further investigate Daser and present his testimony about the knife fight. The 

California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense counsel made a tactical 

choice not to further investigate the knife fight scenario and call Daser about the knife wounds. 

2) Frank Jones 

Petitioner next argues that defense counsel failed to interview Jones, another friend of

Petitioner who allegedly saw him after the crime and before he fled California for Chicago. (ECF 

No. 113 at 78:2-4.) He claims that Jones had knowledge of Halfacre’s involvement in the marijuana 

farm and could have provided impeachment about Ramirez. (ECF No. 113 at 78:9-11.) However, 

Petitioner does not specify the nature of Halfacre’s involvement nor of Jones’ knowledge thereof. In 

any event, as explained in claim I6, ante, even if Halfacre had also been Petitioner’s partner in the 

marijuana venture, Halfacre’s involvement was not relevant to the “voluntary manslaughter” defense 

theory. 

Moreover, the record reflects that Jones was contacted by the defense team; he was 

interviewed numerous times both in person and over the telephone. (SHCP Ex. 69B, 3/20/90 EMF 

Billing Statement at 5; 6/6/90 EMF Billing Statement at 4; 8/28/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3; see

also SHCP Ex. 24 at 11.) Defense counsel also had a police report concerning an interview of Jones. 

(SHCP Ex. 6 at 32-33.) 

Petitioner does not specify what impeachment information Jones had about Ramirez. 

Ramirez’s taped interview with Deputy Nikkel indicates that Jones could have corroborated Ramirez 

in much the same way that Islas did. (SHCP Ex. 13 at 10-12.) “Speculation that [a] missing witness[] 

would have been helpful. . . . is insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner.”

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Aldrich v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 

630, 636 (11th Cir. 1985)). Petitioner does not explain what other information Jones had that would 

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have assisted the defense. Jaiceris, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82 (finding no ineffectiveness or 

prejudice for counsel’s failure to call various witnesses where the “[p]etitioner’s explanation is 

incoherent as to who they were, where they could be found, and what they could testify to, and lacks 

any indication that he informed his counsel any more clearly about them than he did the court.”).

Given the foregoing, it is unlikely that Petitioner could have suffered prejudice from his 

counsel’s failure to further investigate Jones and present his testimony regarding Halfacre and 

Ramirez. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense counsel

made a tactical choice not to further investigate these allegations. 

3) Ulysses Williams

Petitioner argues that defense counsel were ineffective in their investigation of Ulysses

Williams, a Kern County Sheriff’s Department narcotics officer who “might have been involved in 

the crime.” (ECF No. 113 at 78; see also RT at 2279-80.) 

It appears that defense counsel was aware of Petitioner’s belated contention that Williams was 

involved in the crime and tried to locate Williams without success. (RT at 2288.) 

Petitioner does not state what information Williams might have provided and how he was 

prejudiced without it. As noted, “speculation that [a] missing witness[] would have been helpful. . . . 

is insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1186-87. 

Petitioner does not explain how information Williams had would have assisted the defense. See

Jaiceris, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82. 

Given the foregoing, it is unlikely that Petitioner could have suffered prejudice from his 

counsel’s failure to further investigate Williams and present his testimony regarding the shootings. 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense counsel made a tactical 

choice not to further investigate these allegations.

4) Brent Wilson

Petitioner argues that defense counsel was deficient for failing to locate or interview Brent 

Wilson, a man allegedly mentioned in police reports obtained by trial counsel as being near the crime 

scene and arrested for “suspicious activities.” (ECF No. 113 at 78.)

The record indicates that defense counsel attempted to locate and interview Wilson based on 

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information in discovery provided by Kern County law enforcement, but was unsuccessful. (See

SHCP Ex. 69B 10/16/90 EMF Billing Statement at 6; 2/8/91 EMF Billing Statement at 1-2; 10/16/90 

EMF Billing Statement at 2.) Petitioner suggests trial counsel was deficient in this regard, but does 

not point to facts showing counsel’s efforts were unreasonable, or what evidence, if any, Brent 

Wilson could or would have provided about the murders.

Given the foregoing, it is unlikely that Petitioner could have suffered prejudice from his 

counsel’s failure to further investigate Brent Wilson and present his testimony regarding the crimes. 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense counsel made a tactical 

choice not to further investigate these allegations.

5) Conclusions

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in finding that defense 

counsel was not deficient in foregoing further investigation of Daser, Jones, Williams and Brent 

Wilson. Petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s doing so. For the reasons stated, a fairminded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish that he was denied a fair trial, or to 

the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of this proceeding 

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98. 

In sum, it does not appear that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I7 is denied. 

i. Review of Claims I8 and I9

Petitioner in these next claims alleges that defense counsel, apart from visiting the crime 

scene, did not conduct any significant forensic investigation; failed to consult any forensic expert in 

order to show the shooting of Huffstuttler was in the heat of passion or self-defense, and that Mincy 

was not running away from the shooter when he was shot; and failed to challenge the qualifications of 

and inadequately cross-examined criminologist Gregory Laskowski regarding the Huffstuttler and 

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Mincy shootings. (ECF No. 113 at 79-83.) He supports this argument with the habeas declaration of 

criminologist Peter Barnett. (See SHCP Ex. 17.)

Petitioner raised these same claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which were summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

1) Crime Scene Photographs

Petitioner claims generally that defense counsel failed to obtain a complete set of crime scene 

photographs taken by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department during the post-crime investigation.

(ECF No. 113 at 79.) He claims this was crucial because, by the time counsel was appointed, the 

crime scene had been altered by the weather, the media, and vandalism, and might have yielded 

evidence that the shootings occurred at different times and with different weapons, suggesting more 

than one shooter was involved. (ECF No. 113 at 82.) 

However, Petitioner does not demonstrate, by citation to facts in the record, that the defense 

had less than all of the crime scene photographs taken by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department. Nor 

does he explain or make a proffer as to what photographs were missing and how they might have 

supported his defense. 

The state supreme court reasonably could have rejected Petitioner’s unsupported suggestion 

that unspecified crime scene photographs might have helped the defense in unspecified ways. See

e.g., Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979) (petitioner must demonstrate 

entitlement to habeas relief through specific allegations that “state facts that point to a ‘real possibility 

of constitutional error’”).

2) Failure to Consult a Forensic Expert

Petitioner faults defense counsel for failure to consult with a forensic expert. 

The state supreme court denied this claim on direct appeal, stating that: 

Defendant faults counsel’s . . . failure to call defense experts to counter the ballistics 

and blood-spatter evidence presented by the prosecution.) ... Defendant identifies no 

exculpatory or impeachment evidence that counsel could have revealed by further 

questioning of prosecution witnesses [or examination of defense experts] and that would 

have produced a more favorable result at trial. [¶] ... Such claims must be supported by 

declarations or other proffered testimony establishing both the substance of the omitted 

evidence and its likelihood for exonerating the accused. [Citations] We cannot evaluate 

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alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated 

speculation.” [Citation] Whether to call certain witnesses is also a matter of trial tactics, 

unless the decision results from unreasonable failure to investigate. [Citation] The record 

does not establish defense experts would have provided exculpatory evidence if called, 

and we decline to speculate in that regard as well.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333-35. 

Petitioner claims that “[a] qualified forensic expert would have cast significant doubt on the 

prosecution’s reconstruction of the crime, that Huffstuttler was shot outside the cabin where he was 

found and that Mincy was shot while running from the shooter [SHCP Ex.’s 17, 18; RT at 2054-59], 

and would have provided evidence to support the defense theory that the killing of Vance Huffstuttler 

occurred in the cabin during an argument, and was manslaughter, not murder.” (ECF No. 113 at 79.)

Mr. Huffstuttler

Petitioner, pointing to the declaration of his habeas criminalist, Mr. Barnett, faults defense 

counsel for failing to retain a forensic expert who could have testified that the prosecution’s forensic 

case supporting first degree murder was insubstantial and inconclusive. (ECF No. 113 at 81:22-24.) 

Barnett concludes Huffstuttler may have been shot once during an argument with Petitioner inside the 

cabin, and then dragged outside over the dirt and later shot three more times with the intent to show a

“drug deal that had gone bad.” (ECF No. 113 at 81:16-21; SHCP Ex. 17.) 

Barnett notes that Huffstuffler was wearing only socks which had no dirt on them, but only hot 

sauce (ECF No. 113 at ¶ 324; SHCP Ex. 17); the dirt found on Huffstuttler’s pants and shirt suggests he 

was dragged to where he was found (id.); the trajectory of the bullets suggests three of the four shots 

were fired from the same angle causing Barnett to conclude that one shot was fired while Huffstuttler 

was standing in the cabin and three were fired after he had fallen to the ground (id.); the .45 caliber 

bullet and pistol found near Huffstuttler’s body were not linked to the murders by ballistics analysis or 

fingerprints (id.); and the crime scene photographs suggest two sets of footprints around HuffStuttler’s 

body (id.).

However, the state supreme court could reasonably have concluded that Barnett provides only 

minimal support for a manslaughter defense. Firstly, Barnett’s conclusion of two different bullet 

trajectories is not inconsistent with that of prosecution criminologist Laskowski; Barnett in fact 

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concedes that Huffstuttler may have been shot once while standing and then three times while on the 

ground as the prosecution argued. (See SHCP Ex. 17 at 6-7, Ex. 18 at 1-3.) 

According to Barnett, the gunshot trajectory suggest Huffstuttler could have been shot during an 

argument in the cabin and then dragged outside where he was found. But this seems speculative. 

Barnett ignores the trial testimony of eyewitnesses Ramirez and Wilson supporting the prosecution case 

that the shooting occurred outside the cabin and that Huffstuttler, when shot, was not fighting with or 

threatening Petitioner. (See claims I2 and I3, ante.) Significantly, Petitioner has not pointed to facts in 

the record suggesting Huffstuttler’s blood was found in the cabin. Petitioner chose not to testify. 

Barnett appears to provide little if any support for the alternative defense theory that Petitioner 

acted out of self-defense when he shot Huffstuttler. (See ECF No. 113 at 80-81.) Nothing in the record 

before the state supreme court suggests that Huffstuttler attacked Petitioner or that Huffstuttler 

possessed any weapons. (See RT at 1689-90, 1707, 1731, 1740-43, 1747, 1922-24, 1930, 1950-52, 

1958.) 

The state supreme court could reasonably have determined that the noted evidence of bullet 

trajectory and stains on Huffstuttler’s clothing were consistent with the prosecution theory that 

Petitioner attempted to make the murder look like a drug deal gone bad by shooting into Huffstuttler’s 

body while it was on the ground and changing the scene to make it appear a scuffle had taken place. 

(See SHCP Ex. 13 at 7, 16; Ex. 17 at 4-6.) Moreover, there apparently were no drag marks at the 

murder scene. As Respondent notes, there was testimony at trial that the dirt stains could have been 

caused when Huffstuttler fell to the ground after being shot. (ECF No. 194, at 169:10-13, citing RT at 

1923-24, 1958, 2061); Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 310.

Petitioner’s observation that the Laskowski’s report suggests the rifle connected to Petitioner 

may not have been the weapon that killed Huffstuttler (see SHCP Ex. 18) is not inconsistent with the 

prosecution theory that Petitioner used the rifle to shoot Huffstuttler after the latter was on the ground 

and not moving. (RT at 1928.) Nor is it inconsistent with the trajectory evidence noted by Bennett. 

(See SHCP Ex. 17 at 4-9.) 

Barnett notes the two sets of footprints around Huffstuttler’s body could suggest more than one 

shooter. (SHCP Ex. 17 at 4-5, 9.) However, the jury was already aware of the multiple shoeprints 

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found at the scene by the evidence presented at trial. (RT at 1829-30, 1848-49.) The evidentiary 

record before the state court demonstrated that a total of five people were at the scene, the three 

victims, Ramirez and Petitioner. The presence of more than one person at the scene of Huffstuttler’s 

murder does not necessarily suggest multiple shooters were involved. Barnett does not dispute that 

“[t]he absence of complete documentation” regarding the shoe impressions made “the paths of the 

various individuals present during the incident impossible to reconstruct.” (SHCP Ex. 17 at 5.) 

Barnett does not suggest Petitioner was not the shooter; nor does he opine that there was more 

than one shooter. (See Id. at 9.) The jury heard Laskowski’s testimony that he could not positively link 

the .45-caliber bullet and .45-caliber pistol found at the crime scene (RT at 2048-49), and that there 

were no fingerprints found on the .45 pistol. (Id.) Barnett himself concludes that there was “little 

significance” to the failure to recover “useable latent fingerprints” from the .45-caliber pistol. (SHCP 

Ex. 17 at 4.) The jury had before it evidence that Petitioner removed prints from the gun. (RT at 1930, 

1958-59.) Counsel did argue, albeit unsuccessfully, a possible multiple shooter theory for the jury to 

consider. (See e.g., RT at 2164, 2167-69.) 

Accordingly, the state supreme court could have concluded there was no reasonable probability 

of a more favorable result even with additional forensic analysis of the crime scene regarding the 

Huffstuttler shooting. That court could reasonably have discounted Barnett’s testimony as not adding 

anything of more than minor probative value. See Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 792-93 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (finding no ineffectiveness because proffered defense expert affidavits “are consistent with 

and add no new evidence to the evidence that was already before the jury.”). 

For the reasons stated, the state supreme court could reasonably have found that defense counsel 

was not ineffective regarding forensic investigation of the Huffstuttler shooting. “Counsel for the 

defense is not required to present expert testimony on all possible defenses in a case.” Hall v. Sumner,

512 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (1981).

Mr. Mincy

Petitioner faults counsel for not challenging Laskowski’s conclusion, based in part upon blood 

splatter and bullet trajectory analysis, that Mincy was shot while running, dropped to the ground, and 

was shot again (SHCP Ex. 18; RT at 2050-59), a conclusion the prosecution used in arguing the killing 

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of Mincy was first degree murder. Petitioner points to Barnett’s conclusion that Mincy was not 

involved in a struggle because the body shows no abrasions or lacerations; and that Mincy was shot 

where he was found because no blood stains were found in the area leading up to where Mincy’s body 

was found. (SHCP Ex. 17 at 7.) However, Barnett’s conclusions could be seen as conflicted and based 

on conjecture.

Barnett states that bullet trajectory analysis suggests one of the shots occurred when Mincy was 

in some position other than his final resting position and that multiple shots occurred when Mincy was 

on the ground in his final resting position. (Id.) Yet Barnett seems to contradict himself by stating that 

“[b]lood smears and spatters on Mincy’s body all appear consistent with [the] victim being in

essentially the position where found when all of the gunshot wounds occurred.” (Id. at 8.) 

Barnett states that blood splatter near Mincy’s body “seems unlikely to have resulted from the 

position in which the body was found” and that “blood splatter on the trucks (sic) and on the right thigh 

could all have originated from Mincy when he was scrambling around after having been shot in the 

arm.” (Id.) Barnett concludes that the blood splatter could have occurred when Mincy “mov[ed] his 

[wounded] arm around in a rapid manner while in a position near the rock . . . .” (Id.) 

But Petitioner ignores that Barnett’s findings could be seen as supportive of Laskowski’s 

conclusion that Mincy was initially shot in the back and the right arm while erect and running and then 

shot again when on the ground. (SHCP Ex. 18 at 4-5; RT at 2050-59.) Moreover, Barnett fails to 

arrive at any conclusion based on his noted findings. (SHCP Ex. 17 at 9.) 

The state supreme court could have concluded there was no reasonable probability of a more 

favorable result even with additional forensic analysis of the crime scene regarding the Mincy 

shooting. That court could reasonably have discounted Barnett’s testimony as not adding anything of 

more than minor probative value. See Ainsworth, 138 F.3d at 792-93 (finding no ineffectiveness 

because proffered defense expert affidavits “are consistent with and add no new evidence to the 

evidence that was already before the jury.”). 

For the reasons stated, the state supreme court could reasonably have found that defense 

counsel was not ineffective regarding forensic investigation of the Huffstuttler shooting. “Counsel 

for the defense is not required to present expert testimony on all possible defenses in a case.” Hall,

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512 F. Supp. at 1021.

3) Failure to Challenge Criminologist Laskowski’s Qualifications

Petitioner faults counsel for failing to cross-examine prosecution criminologist Laskowski 

regarding Laskowski’s alleged lack of knowledge, skill, education, experience and training in the 

analysis of blood splatter evidence (ECF No. 113 at 83-87), claiming that Laskowski did not qualify 

as a blood splatter expert under state law. (Id.) 

The California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s challenge of Laskowski’s qualifications as 

an expert, observing that: 

Utilizing photographs of the crime scene, Criminalist Laskowski testified regarding the 

various positions of Mincy's and Huffstuttler's bodies when they were shot. Based on 

blood spatters and drips depicted in the photos, he indicated one shot was to Mincy's 

body while in a “fetal-like” position on its left side; as to the others, his body was in a 

vertical position. Laskowski also concluded Mincy “was moving at a relatively rapid 

pace” after being initially wounded. With respect to Huffstuttler, he determined that for 

several shots the body was prone and not moving. Defendant now contends this 

evidence was inadmissible because the witness was not qualified to render an expert 

opinion [Citation] and because he did not personally investigate the crime scene. 

. . . 

[A]ny objection would have been properly overruled. Evidence Code section 720 

provides that a person may testify as an expert “if he has special knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him,” [Citation] which “may be 

shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.” [Citation] 

The trial court’s determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert is a matter of 

discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. [Citation] 

“‘Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his 

opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the 

weight of the evidence than its admissibility.’” [Citation]

The record establishes Laskowski was fully qualified to testify based on his educational 

background in biochemistry and serology and his training as a criminalist for 13 years, 

including attending and giving seminars in blood-spatter analysis and crime scene 

investigation. He had also testified as an expert witness on numerous prior occasions.

Given his expertise, Laskowski’s testimony was not cumulative. Utilizing his knowledge 

of blood spatters and drips, he was better able to describe the particulars of what 

occurred during the shooting of Huffstuttler and Mincy than any photographic depiction 

of their bodies. For example, he concluded from the spatter evidence that Mincy was 

moving around after he was first shot and before he fell into a fetal position, where he 

was shot one more time. He also explained that the large pool of blood around 

Huffstuttler’s body indicated he was prone and not moving when he received the final 

shots. As discussed in other contexts, this evidence was relevant to the issues of intent 

and premeditation and deliberation. The photographs Laskowski referred to adequately 

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illustrated his testimony; therefore, the fact he did not personally examine the crime 

scene was a matter of evidentiary weight. Since his testimony was admissible on all 

grounds, counsel had no basis for objecting.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 321-22; see also RT at 2040-43.

The record reflects that Laskowski, a thirteen-year employee of the Kern County Regional 

Criminalistics Laboratory, testified that he attended seminars “essentially having to do with . . . blood 

splatter analysis” (RT at 2041-42) and that he had given “papers and lectures at these same type of 

seminars.” (RT at 2042.) Petitioner cites to People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 852 (1982), disapproved

on other grounds by People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 836 (1991) (the qualifications of an expert must 

be related to the particular subject upon which he is giving expert testimony). He argues that this 

testimony is ambiguous and that Laskowski may have received minimal or no blood splatter training 

and given few if any papers and lectures. (See ECF No. 113 at 85 n.17.) He argues that Laskowski did 

not clearly testify as to the topics upon which he had given seminars. 

However, the following colloquy between the prosecutor and Laskowski at trial suggests 

otherwise: 

 

Q What are the nature of those seminars that you have attended?

A They are all essentially having to do with the field of criminalistics and the varied

disciplines in criminalistics that would include hair and fiber examination, shoe track, 

tire track analysis, firearms and tool mark analysis, blood spatter analysis, crime scene 

investigation, collection and preservation of physical evidence and arson and explosive 

analysis.

Q And you yourself, Mr. Laskowski, have also given papers and lectures at these same

types of seminars, have you not?

A That is correct.

(RT at 2041-42.) 

Laskowski testified that he had qualified as an expert in blood spatter analysis on “several 

hundred occasions.” (RT at 2042.) Petitioner’s speculation that Laskowski’s training “may have”

encompassed only “a ten or fifteen minute lecture” on blood spatter evidence, or that Laskowski 

“could have attended a seminar where [blood spatter analysis] was supposed to have been addressed, 

but never was” (ECF No. 113 at 85) is not sufficient to demonstrate that the state supreme court’s 

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finding based on evidence in the record was objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2)(e)(1). Nor is it necessarily probative of the issue that Petitioner can conceive of 

alternatives to the conclusions drawn by Laskowski. (ECF No. 178 at 109:19-110:4.) 

Respondent points out that defense counsel Soria was familiar with Laskowski’s 

qualifications, both from discovery in this matter and from work on other cases. (See EH Ex. 69B at 

10/16/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3); see also Berryman v. Ayers, No. 95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 

WL 1991049, at **3, 5-7 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) [a prior capital case in which Soria was counsel

and Laskowski testified].) Soria could reasonably have believed that Laskowski, a thirteen-year 

criminalist with Kern County who had qualified as an expert hundreds of times (RT at 2041-42), was 

sufficiently qualified to testify regarding blood-spatter and tactically chose not to question him further 

because doing so would only stress his qualifications to the jury. This being the case, counsel could 

reasonably have determined the better argument was to suggest to the jury that little weight should be 

accorded Laskowski’s allegedly unqualified opinions. See e.g., RT at 2064 [counsel highlights 

Laskowski’s disagreement with defense forensic pathologist and that unlike the pathologist, 

Laskowski was not “a doctor”].) 

Defense counsel also may have made a tactical decision not to object to Laskowski’s 

testimony, reserving objection for the gruesome photographs upon which Laskowski relied in 

forming his opinions, photographs which defense counsel viewed as cumulative, inflammatory and 

prejudicial. (See RT at 2084-85.) The extent and nature of cross-examination is a matter of trial 

tactics entrusted to the judgment of defense counsel. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d, 480, 487 (9th Cir. 

2003); United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985). Decisions about cross 

examination “are given great deference and must . . . meet only objectively reasonable standards.” 

Dows, 211 F.3d at 487. Even if a witness could have been subjected to more vigorous examination, 

no prejudice lies where evidence of guilt is strong. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 953 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Furthermore, failure to object -- such as to a witness’s expertise -- is not ineffectiveness 

where an objection would have lacked merit. Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1172.

Petitioner citation to Hogan (see ECF. 113 at 84-85; Doc. 178 at 138-40) in support of the 

argument Laskowski was unqualified is of no assistance on these facts. In Hogan, the California 

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Supreme Court found the prosecution’s otherwise qualified criminalist to be unqualified in blood 

splatter because he admitted he had no formal education or training in this area. 31 Cal. 3d at 852-53. 

But here Laskowski’s qualifications included “attending and giving seminars in blood-spatter 

analysis.” Id. at 322. As discussed above, Laskowski’s qualifications were supported by the record. 

(RT at 2040-43.)

Petitioner claims that Laskowski was unqualified as a pathologist because the prosecution’s 

pathologist, Dr. Holloway, disagreed with Laskowski’s interpretation of gunshot wounds, i.e., the

number of Huffstuttler’s gunshot wounds which demonstrated a “shoring” or “buttress” effect.” 

(ECF No. 113 at 86:14-16; RT at 2065.) Dr. Holloway found possible buttress effect with only one 

of Huffstuttler’s wounds (SHCP Ex. 19 at 5.) Laskowski, in his September 10, 1990 report, noted Dr. 

Holloway’s finding. (SHCP Ex. 18 at 3.) In his subsequent trial testimony, Laskowski stated his 

opinion that at least three of Huffstuttler’s wounds showed buttress effect (RT at 2064), consistent 

with the prosecution theory that Huffstuttler was shot three times while on the ground. (RT at 2065.) 

However, the California Supreme Court reasonably could have discounted any such difference of 

opinion as mere disagreement among experts which alone does not demonstrate that one expert is 

unqualified. See e.g., Toler v. Troutt, 2015 WL 1408490 at *9 (W.D. Okla., Feb. 20, 2015) (medical 

difference of opinion not actionable under the Eighth Amendment).

Petitioner also claims in passing that counsel Soria must have been ineffective in crossexamining Laskowski because co-counsel Cater stepped in to lodge an objection (see ECF No. 113 at 

83 [citing RT at 2072].) The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found this claim 

speculative, or a reflective of trial tactics. Petitioner has not shown how and why an objection by cocounsel necessarily rises to the level of prejudicial deficient performance under Strickland. 

Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. Laskowski seems properly qualified 

as an expert and had been qualified by courts as such on several hundred prior occasions. The failure 

to cross-examine him on this basis could not have been prejudicial. (See claim N, post; see also

Lochart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 374 (1992) (counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection is not 

prejudicial under Strickland). Petitioner’s argument that without Laskowski’s testimony there would 

have been no sufficient forensic evidence showing Petitioner’s intent, premeditation, and planning 

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(ECF No. 178 at 143-44; Respondent’s Brief on Appeal at 126), is unavailing for reasons stated by 

the California Supreme Court, as follows (see also claim O, post): 

[Petitioner] correctly notes the killings took place within a few minutes of the victims’

arrival at his cabin. What occurred within those few minutes, however, is particularly

telling with respect to his state of mind. According to both Wilson and Eloy Ramirez, 

[Petitioner] began arguing with Huffstuttler when Mincy and Wilson were shown the 

marijuana plants. [Petitioner] continued berating Huffstuttler as the two walked back 

toward the cabin. [Petitioner] went inside, retrieved a revolver, and shot Huffstuttler at 

close range. He proceeded back across the creek and confronted Wilson and Mincy. 

After apologizing that he had “nothing against” them, he opened fire. As a wounded 

Wilson fled the scene, he heard Mincy plead for his life. More shots were fired.

[Petitioner] returned to Huffstuttler and fired several rifle rounds into his motionless 

body. The autopsy report indicated at least three shots were inflicted before he died, 

although according to Ramirez he did not move after the first shot. After the shootings, 

[Petitioner] told Ramirez he was going to make the scene look like a bad dope deal had 

occurred and scattered marijuana, broke bottles, and poured chili sauce around 

Huffstuttler’s body. None of the victims were armed; nor did they engage in any 

provocative conduct. From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could infer 

[Petitioner] had a motive for the killings, both to punish Huffstuttler for revealing the 

marijuana operation to strangers and to protect his crop from theft or exposure to law 

enforcement. He also may have wanted to eliminate Mincy and Wilson as witnesses to 

the Huffstuttler shooting. In conjunction with these possible motives, the manner of 

killing supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Both victims died of 

multiple gunshot wounds, several of which would have been fatal individually. While 

[Petitioner] fired some shots at Mincy as he was attempting to flee, at least one shot 

entered his body as he lay in a fetal position. This forensic evidence indicates 

[Petitioner] did not want merely to wound either victim; he wanted to make certain they 

died. The trial testimony also suggests rapid but purposeful planning activity once 

[Petitioner] realized the potential consequences of his partner’s carelessness. While 

chastising Huffstuttler, he walked back to the cabin where he got a gun. Rather than seek 

reconciliation, he shot Huffstuttler without warning. He then shot Mincy and Wilson and 

made good his escape after attempting to conceal his own involvement in the crimes. 

Viewing the record in its entirety, we find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

finding of first degree murder. [Citation] [Petitioner]’s argument simply asks this court 

to reweigh the facts.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 331-33.

The state supreme court’s prejudice analysis also noted that: 

[Petitioner] identifies no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that counsel could have 

revealed by further questioning of prosecution [expert] witnesses . . . and that would 

have produced a more favorable result at trial. [¶] ... Such claims must be supported by 

declarations or other proffered testimony establishing both the substance of the omitted 

evidence and its likelihood for exonerating the accused. [Citations] We cannot evaluate 

alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated 

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speculation.” [Citation] 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 333-35. Apart from Laskowski’s testimony, the noted evidence against Petitioner 

that was before the state court was substantial. (See claims O, R and S.) 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of 

this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of these claims was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claims I8 and I9 are denied. 

j. Review of Claim I10

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that defense counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation 

into Petitioner’s mental health. (ECF No. 113 at 87-94.)

This claim was presented on state habeas corpus and summarily rejected on the merits without 

explanation by the California Supreme Court. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that defense counsel was ineffective by not conducting a sufficient social, 

life and mental health investigation, which led to an inadequate mental defense evaluation. As a 

result, defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Markman, who conducted a single, brief pre-trial evaluation 

of Petitioner, based his report on insufficient life and social history, insufficient background and 

insufficient investigative information. (See SHCP Ex. 20.) Petitioner also points to the circa 2000 

habeas declarations of his experts, Drs. Khazanov and Matthews (see SHCP Ex.’s 10, 22), who 

opined that Dr. Markman’s diagnosis was not sufficiently supported in the evidence and professional 

protocols. 

Petitioner relies upon Drs. Khazanov and Matthews in complaining that Dr. Markman’s 

September 22, 1990 pre-trial competency evaluation failed to address Petitioner’s serious head injuries 

including brain damage; neuropsychological impairment affecting his ability to assist in his defense; 

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extended exposure to neurotoxins; chronic alcohol abuse; military career including combat in Vietnam; 

and a life of significant trauma, abuse and stress, (SHCP Ex.’s 10 and 22), each of which could have 

negated malice aforethought and supported his manslaughter defense. 

According to Dr. Markman’s November 20, 1990 assessment letter:

Mental status examination revealed [Petitioner] to be fully oriented in all spheres, alert, 

cooperative, and above normal intelligence with an excellent fund of knowledge.

Responses were relevant and coherent, memory and concentration were not impaired 

and affect was appropriate, though detached. There was no evidence of a major mental

disorder, thought disorder or psychosis, judgment was not impaired and insight into his

status was adequate. He was able to provide a coherent narration of his version of the

events of September 2, 1990 and their sequeiae.

In broad terms and without reviewing the specifics of the events, [Petitioner] emphasizes 

that he acted in self-defense. He goes into great detail about the circumstances and 

attributes everything to a “dope deal that went bad,” a series of events when “someone 

comes walking into the cabin with a .44 caliber gun in his waistband.” He reports that he 

acted offensively only after “Vance [one of the victims] cut me across my legs.” (He 

demonstrated scars on both anterior thighs, the left higher than the right.)

[¶ . . . ¶]

There is no history of previous psychiatric treatment or hospitalization. He does admit to 

poly-drug abuse “years ago–you name it,” to include intravenous heroin and cocaine. 

There is also an extended history of daily alcohol use.

[¶ . . . ¶]

In summation, [Petitioner] demonstrates no current evidence of a major mental disorder. 

Treatment, hospitalization or medication on a mandatory basis is not indicated and the 

prognosis for change remains guarded. His psychiatric status exhibits long-term

behavioral patterns, difficult to alter or treat. His story narration is not a function of

fantasy, but rather a presentation based on self-protective grounds. If fabricated, he is

fully aware that he is doing so.

He is clearly competent to stand trial within the meaning of Section 1368, P.C. He is 

fully oriented, aware of the nature and the purpose of the proceedings pending and can

cooperate rationally in presenting a defense. There is no data to support an insanity plea

under M’Naughten criteria. Furthermore, I find no evidence that would point to

diminished actuality for the crime of murder.

(SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3.) Dr. Markman’s letter to counsel specifically stated that his opinion would not 

support an insanity or diminished capacity defense. (Id. at 3.)

The California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in finding that defense counsel

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appropriately retained the services of an expert and investigated whether to present evidence supporting 

a mental defense. That expert, Dr. Markman, reviewed Kern County Sheriff reports, “past records and 

probation reports,” the preliminary hearing transcript, and the coroner’s report. (SHCP Ex. 20.) He 

also personally examined Petitioner and consulted with counsel. (ECF No. 113 at 87:21-88:4; SHCP 

Ex. 20.) Nothing in Dr. Markman’s report appears to suggest that further mental defense investigation 

or examination was necessary or warranted. Petitioner argues in isolation that additional investigation 

and testing should have been done, but does not support this argument with the evidentiary record then 

before the state court. That a subsequently retained expert such as Dr. Matthews suggests a more 

comprehensive mental examination and neuropsychological assessment could have been done (ECF 

No. 113 at 89:6-90:14; SHCP Ex. 22) is not evidence such reasonably should have been done, or that 

facts otherwise related by Petitioner to counsel or known to counsel reasonably warranted further 

investigation or examination. 

Here, defense counsel could reasonably have made a tactical choice not to conduct further 

investigation, in reliance upon the qualified expert’s opinion that there was no basis to support such a 

mental defense. Because that choice was not unreasonable, counsel’s assistance was not ineffective. 

See Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1525 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is certainly within the ‘wide range of 

professionally competent assistance’ for an attorney to rely on properly selected experts.”); see also 

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 611 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding counsel’s decision not to 

investigate mental defense further was reasonable in light of conclusions of mental health experts).

The decision not to call Dr. Markman as a witness also could have been a matter of tactics. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see also Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(observing that “few decisions draw so heavily on professional judgment as whether or not to proffer 

a witness at trial”). For the reasons stated, Dr. Markman’s testimony likely would have supported the 

charges, not a mental defense to them. “Rare are the situations in which the ‘wide latitude counsel 

must have in making tactical decisions’ will be limited to any one technique or approach.” Richter, 

562 U.S. at 106-08 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 415 (defense 

counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into Petitioner’s troubling background and unique 

personal circumstances and developed a coherent and organized strategy, proffered evidence, and 

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presented a case for mitigation); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (“the 

proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms.”). As the Supreme Court noted in Van Hook, 

This is not a case in which the defendant’s attorney [] failed to act while potentially 

powerful mitigating evidence stared [him] in the face [Citation] or would have been 

apparent from documents any reasonable attorney would have obtained, [Citation]. It is 

instead a case, like Strickland itself, in which defense counsel’s “decision not to seek 

more” mitigating evidence from the defendant’s background “than was already in hand”

fell “well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments.”

558 U.S. at 11-12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699).

Petitioner also claims that in 1989 and 1990, he suffered from substance abuse, traumainduced stress disorder, impairment of brain function, and organic brain damage, citing to his decadelater neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Khazanov (SHCP Ex. 10, at ¶ 41), and assessment by Dr. 

Matthews (SHCP Ex. 22 at 42), who concluded that: 

[T]o a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the shooting of Vance Huffstuttler 

was “the result of trigger responses to perceived dangers to [Petitioner] himself.”

Petitioner’s exaggerated perceptions and reactions were the result of “[Petitioner’s] 

many deficits, his organic brain damage, the stress he was under at the time of the crime 

and his ingestion of alcohol and cocaine.

(ECF No. 178 at 355-56.) 

The Court is unconvinced by this claim. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have 

found unpersuasive these mental defense allegations based on evaluations made ten years after Dr. 

Markman’s evaluation, allegations that were contradicted by a record which included substantial 

evidence that Petitioner functioned and communicated at a high level and assisted in his own defense.

(See claim O, post; 7/18/90 RT at 5-14 [re Petitioner’s participation in hearing on motion to withdraw];

12/13/90 RT at 2270-72, 2275-76, 2278-87, 2295 [re Petitioner’s participation in Marsden hearing].) 

There was testimony that Petitioner shot Mincy several times when he was lying in a creek bed curled 

in the fetal position and begging for his life, (RT at 1741, 1743, 1792, 2054-58), and that Petitioner 

removed the wires from Wilson’s car to ensure that he bled to death before finding help. (RT at 1738, 

1863-64, 1929, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1975.) 

Petitioner’s cited authority, Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 102-04 does not suggest otherwise. See e.g., 

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Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that if new mental health evidence, obtained after the trial, were sufficient to establish the 

petitioner’s innocence, the petitioner could “always provide a showing of factual innocence by hiring 

psychiatric experts who would reach a favorable conclusion”).

The Court finds similarly unpersuasive Petitioner’s argument that ABA Guidelines and related 

commentary and unspecific general practices required that counsel further investigate and present life 

history and mental health defenses on the facts of this case. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the 

ABA Guidelines require further investigation where counsel makes a reasonable tactical decision 

based on the available information. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 611 (holding counsel’s decision not to

investigate mental defense further was reasonable in light of conclusions of mental health experts). 

Counsel is entitled to rely on the expert consulted, and the consultation may support a limitation on

further investigation. See Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1994). Allowing “battles 

of psychiatric opinions during successive collateral challenges to a death sentence would place 

federal courts in a psycho-legal quagmire resulting in the total abuse of the habeas process.” Harris, 

949 F.2d at 1518.

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was deficient in choosing Dr. Markman because his 

expertise was in serial killers and he was known to advocate tougher sentencing in order to keep 

society safe. (SHCP Ex. 21.) Yet nothing in the evidentiary record suggests Dr. Markman was 

unqualified, or that counsel’s selection was objectively unreasonable given the facts of this case. Dr. 

Markman was apparently well-known in the field of forensic psychiatry and had been retained as a 

mental health expert in other criminal cases, including other murder cases, by both the prosecution 

and defense. (Id.) Furthermore, Dr. Markman had both law and medical degrees and, like Petitioner, 

Dr. Markman had served in the armed forces. (Id.) Moreover, selection of experts is generally at 

counsel’s discretion. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84-85 (1985) (counsel under no obligation 

to seek out an expert that would render an opinion, or to use tests, that he now figures would have 

better withstood the prosecutor’s cross-examination). 

Even if defense counsel’s investigation and presentation of mental defenses was deficient, the 

state supreme court could reasonably have found unaffected the jury’s imposition of the death 

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penalty, given the noted substantial evidence against Petitioner. (See claim O, post.)

For these reasons, Petitioner has failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel made 

decisions in the exercise of professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Even if defense 

counsel had discovered this evidence and still chose to proceed with his strategy as opposed to the 

strategy Petitioner now advocates, a fair-minded jurist could conclude that counsel’s decision was 

reasonable. “Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to 

balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 

107. “[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with 

the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 8. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I10 is denied. 

k. Review of Claim I11

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object 

to introduction of evidence of weapons unrelated to the crimes, i.e., a shotgun and suspected, albeit 

unloaded pipe bombs, all found at the murder scene. (ECF No. 113 at 94-96.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner claims the shotgun introduced into evidence at trial, (RT at 1823-30; 1903), and 

testimony regarding the pipe bombs given at trial (RT at 1863, 1885, 1887-90), was irrelevant and 

prejudicial under state law and deficient and prejudicial under Strickland depriving him of rights 

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under the Sixth Amendment. However, the state supreme court was not unreasonable in rejecting this 

claim. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated this evidence was admitted in violation of state evidentiary 

requirements. In this case, the prosecution had the burden of proving that Petitioner was knowingly 

cultivating marijuana, one of the charged offenses. (RT at 2212.) The state supreme court could 

reasonably have found the presence of a shotgun and suspected pipe bombs near the marijuana patch 

was relevant to this issue and therefore admissible under California law and that counsel’s failure to 

object was not deficient performance. There was testimony at trial that these types of weapons are 

often found on property where illicit substances are being cultivated. (RT at 1885.) In particular, 

evidence of pipe bombs on the property assisted the prosecution in meeting that burden because Kern 

County Sheriff’s Sergeant Glen Johnson specifically testified, without objection, that he often finds 

bombs in illicit cultivation areas (RT at 1885-86) and that the pipes quickly could have been loaded to 

explode using gunpowder and a car battery located nearby. (RT at 1862-65, 1884-90.) 

These weapons also could be seen as relevant to the parties’ respective theories regarding the 

shootings. The weapons could support the prosecution’s theory that Petitioner’s motive for the 

murders was to protect his marijuana crop. (See ECF No. 113 at 96.) 

The shotgun, which was recovered from under the mattress in the bedroom (RT at 1825), 

could have supported the Petitioner’s defense theory that he was afraid of Huffstuttler and acted in 

self-defense. (See e.g., ECF No. 113 at 79-83.) 

Even if the evidence was errantly admitted, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the error rose 

to the level of a constitutional violation. Petitioner may not raise an issue of state law as a basis for 

habeas relief. “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. This evidence was not highlighted by the 

prosecution, (RT at 1824, 1885, 1888, 2030); it was not mentioned in the prosecution’s closing 

argument (RT at 2142-2144). Federal courts may not interfere with a state evidentiary ruling unless 

the evidence was so prejudicial that its admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a 

fair trial. Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1192; Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1985). Such was 

not the case here. 

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Furthermore, defense counsel successfully objected to portions of the testimony meant to link 

marijuana cultivation and pipe bombs, obviating any need for curative instruction in that regard. (RT at

1888; see also ECF No. 113 at 96.) The jury was properly instructed to disregard the testimony. (RT at 

2184.) Defense counsel could reasonably have determined not to call further attention these matters for 

the reasons stated and to avoid giving the jury additional harmful detail. In any event, the noted 

evidence otherwise against Petitioner was substantial. (See claims O, R and S, post.) 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. 

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I11 is denied. 

l. Review of Claim I12

Petitioner alleges in this claim that defense counsel was ineffective by not objecting to 

admission of irrelevant, cumulative, gruesome color photographs, depicting the deceased victims at 

the crime scene, and two autopsy photographs, denying him due process and a fair and reliable 

penalty determination. (ECF No. 113 at 96-98.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Additionally this claim was raised to, and rejected by the California Supreme Court on direct 

appeal. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 318-19.

Petitioner complains that the prosecution was allowed to introduce thirteen gruesome and 

inflammatory photographs, eleven color photographs of Mincy and Huffstuttler as they were found at 

the crime scene, and two autopsy photographs. Prior to trial, defense counsel objected to all thirteen 

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photographs. (CT at 214-24.) The trial court deferred ruling. (11/1/90 RT at 28-30). At trial, 

defense counsel objected only to four of the photographs, and then only on state law grounds. (RT at 

2083-88; Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 319, n.4.) A total of eleven photographs were admitted into evidence. 

(People’s Ex.’s. 3-4, 10, 17, 35, 40, 42-44, 72-73; RT at 2079-88.) Petitioner claims all of these 

photographs were prejudicial and cumulative and that consistent with ABA Guidelines, should have 

been objected to and excluded under state law as more prejudicial than probative. He claims that 

admission of these photographs caused the penalty trial to be fundamentally unfair, that there was no 

tactical reason not to object to these photographs, and that had these photographs not been admitted, 

there is a reasonable probability Petitioner would not have suffered a capital conviction. (RT at 2083-

84.)

A due process claim can be stated where graphic photos of victims make the trial 

fundamentally unfair. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Photographs that 

are relevant to the crime charged are generally admissible. See Villafuerte v. Lewis, 75 F.3d 1330, 

1343 (1996). Under California law, “photographs which disclose the manner in which the victim was 

wounded are relevant on the issues of malice and aggravation of the crime and the penalty.” People 

v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 182 (1990). 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected Petitioner’s allegations on direct 

appeal, noting that: 

Over defense objection, the trial court admitted into evidence three photographs of 

Mincy’s body, which Criminalist Gregory Laskowski utilized to illustrate his testimony 

about blood spatters and drips found at the crime scene. Defendant renews his 

contention these photos were cumulative and more prejudicial than probative due to 

their “gruesome” nature. [Citation]

The admission of photographs of a murder victim lies within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse, 

i.e., that their probative value is clearly outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citation] 

In overruling the objection, the court here characterized the evidence as “highly 

relevant” because Laskowski used all three pictures to explain how he concluded from 

the blood spatters and drips that Mincy had been in motion when defendant fired some 

of the shots. In the court’s view, “it certainly goes to the issue of intent and 

premeditation and planning ....” These conclusions reflect a proper exercise of the 

court’s discretion. Since identity was not at issue, defendant’s state of mind was critical 

to the charge of first degree murder [Citation], and firing at a fleeing victim reasonably 

reflects an intention to kill. [Citation] Moreover, even though the pictures served to 

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corroborate a testimonial witness, they were not cumulative since the photographic 

evidence could assist the jury in understanding and evaluating that testimony. [Citation] 

Indeed, Laskowski’s testimony may have made little sense without appropriate 

illustration. We have examined the exhibits and also do not find them unduly gruesome.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 318-19. 

For these reasons, the state supreme court could reasonably have found that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by introduction of the photos or failure of defense counsel to further object to them. The 

photographs could be relevant and probative of the charges and their elements, including intent to kill, 

aggravation and penalty.

Significantly, Laskowski relied upon People’s Exhibits 42 through 44, 72, and 73 to support his 

testimony and conclusions that Huffstuttler was shot and died where he was found and that he was shot 

after he was no longer moving. (RT at 2055-65.) The other photographs were not close-ups and not 

particularly bloody or gruesome and were reasonably probative of the manner of death and the crime 

scene and the victims in relation to it. (RT at 1661-62, 1671, 1683, 1732, 1790-92, 1817, 1946-47.) 

Defense counsel could reasonably have recognized the probative value of these photographs

(see, e.g., RT at 2083), which the trial court found “highly relevant” (RT at 2084), and, as a matter of 

tactics, determined that it would have been pointless to argue for their exclusion.

Petitioner also faults defense counsel for objecting to the photographs at trial on only state 

evidentiary grounds. Petitioner argues that counsel should have also objected on federal constitutional 

grounds. (ECF No. 113 at 97.) However, the “admissibility of evidence in a state trial is matter of state 

law,” which is binding on the federal court unless there is a due process violation. Clark, 16 F.3d at 

963-64. Only if no permissible inferences can be drawn from admitted evidence will due process be 

violated. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920; cf. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (Ninth Circuit erroneously “relied in part 

on its conclusion that the [prior injury] evidence was ‘incorrectly admitted . . . pursuant to California 

law’ in ruling that McGuire’s due process rights were violated by admission of the evidence.”). 

Here, the California Supreme Court also could reasonably have found that the Petitioner did 

not show prejudice relating to admission of the photographs. Even without these photographs, it is 

not reasonably probable the jury would have returned a sentence less than death given the substantial 

evidence against Petitioner. (See claims O, R and S, post.)

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For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim I12 is denied. 

m. Review of Claim I13

In this claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective because of irregularities and 

improprieties that occurred during the jury’s view of the crime scene and related locations. (ECF No. 

113 at 98-100.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

Related allegations were also raised and rejected on direct appeal. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 323-

26. 

Petitioner faults defense counsel for agreeing to the jury view, and for not objecting “to the 

taking of testimony during the jury view, the absence of [Petitioner] while testimony was being taken, 

the admission of evidence when the entire jury was not present, and/or media coverage of the view.” 

(ECF No. 113 at 98; see also claims L1-L4, post.)

The California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, stated that: 

At the prosecutor’s request and with the express agreement of the defense, the jury was 

taken to defendant’s cabin to view the scene of the crimes accompanied by the court, 

counsel, a court stenographer, and Sheriff’s Deputies Layman and Williamson, who 

acted as bailiffs . . . 

When the jury arrived at the scene, the court indicated “we are not going to take any 

testimony at this time.” The jurors were then permitted to walk around the area, 

including where the marijuana plants had been growing, but were admonished not to 

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discuss the case. After the jurors had looked around for an unspecified time, the court 

inquired, “Do any of you have any questions?” One juror asked for the location of the 

trailer where Huffstuttler had lived, which defense counsel indicated. Thereafter, on 

inquiry primarily from the court, Layman and Williamson, who had originally 

investigated the crime scene, pointed out the location of Wilson’s truck, Huffstuttler’s 

body, a woodpile, and the main road into the cabin area, all of which had been testified 

to in court. Williamson also described the foliage as taller at the time of the 

investigation, obscuring the view of the marijuana plants from the cabin. . . . 

In putting certain questions to the ‘shower,’ the trial judge intended to clarify and 

expedite the proceedings; as to any other alleged irregularity at the scene of the view ..., 

there can be no contention on appeal that there was error, for the silence of the 

defendant’s counsel in those circumstances constitutes a waiver. [Citations]

[T]he trial court conducted the jury view in full conformance with the provisions of 

[Penal Code] section 1119, which expressly provides that when the court determines a 

jury view of the scene is proper, the place or property must be shown to them by a 

person appointed by the court for that purpose .... For more than a century, courts have 

consistently applied this interpretation, implicitly recognizing that the admonition that 

“no person ... speak or communicate with the jury” (§ 1119) is plainly directed to 

insulating the jury from extraneous contact and potential tampering. [Citations] 

In this case, Layman and Williamson investigated the crime scene; the trial court 

therefore reasonably designated them as “showers” to explain how the actual physical 

conditions related to their trial testimony. The record establishes that their involvement 

was limited to that end, i.e., “showing” the jury what their words had described and the 

photographs had depicted. [Citations] Given the court’s broad discretion in these 

matters, we find no abuse in having the deputies respond to specific questions rather 

than proceeding in some other manner. [Citation] Williamson’s statement that the 

foliage differed in height from the time of the crime was also proper “to account for any 

change in [the] condition between [its] state as shown by the evidence and [its] 

appearance at the time the jury inspected [it].” [Citation] 

We also find no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of his absence 

during the view. Prior to the excursion, defendant expressly waived his presence and 

acknowledged he did so voluntarily. The record reflects that before making this decision 

he had discussed the matter with counsel. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that 

the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause of the United States Constitution or the due 

process clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 15) prevents a criminal defendant 

from waiving the right of presence at a critical stage of a capital trial. [Citation] We have 

no reason to reconsider that conclusion, particularly when no additional testimony was 

taken in conjunction with the view. [Citation]

We also find no prejudicial error with respect to defendant’s statutory rights. In People 

v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1211, this court held “that a capital defendant may 

not voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977, 

including those portions of the trial in which evidence is taken [before the trier of fact] 

....” [Citation] Although a jury view is not among the designated proceedings in section 

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977, we have long held that “in so viewing the premises the jury was receiving 

evidence” even if nontestimonial. [Citation] Thus, it comes within the purview of 

section 977. Nevertheless, in this case it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable 

result would have been reached had defendant, in addition to his counsel, been present. 

[Citation] On this record, we find “no sound basis to question the contemporaneous 

judgment of defense counsel, with which defendant then agreed, that defendant’s trial 

interests would be better served by not attending the jury view.” [Citation]

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 323-26. 

Petitioner complains that, under California law, the jury view should not have taken place at all 

because it was uncertain whether and the extent to which, in the months intervening between the crime 

and the jury view, the crime scene had been altered by America’s Most Wanted, the media, weather and 

seasonal changes, defense investigator Bruce Binns, and vandals. See People v. Pompa, 192 Cal. 412, 

421 (1923) (trial court is to consider changed physical conditions in making decision whether to allow a 

jury view of crime scene). He claims that there had been “many significant changes” to the crime 

scene: potential evidence trampled, plastic marijuana leaves strewn about, the cabin ransacked, items 

removed from the scene, bullet holes from Binns’s target practice, and changed vegetation and lighting 

conditions. (See ECF No. 178 at 127:24-25.) 

It was not unreasonable for defense counsel to believe that the crime scene viewing would assist 

the jury (11/1/90 RT at 46-48) and support Petitioner’s defense. (RT at 2164, 2168.) Petitioner’s 

primary theories of voluntary manslaughter and self-defense related in part to claimed inconsistencies 

in eye-witness testimony. These inconsistencies implicated consideration of the crime scene layout 

including location, topography and visual obstructions, improvements, and the location of forensic 

evidence discussed in court. Furthermore, defense counsel was present to represent Petitioner during 

the entire jury viewing. 

Counsel apparently had tactical reasons not to object to the jury view. Petitioner, having 

waived his presence at the jury view, avoided potentially prejudicing the jury by seeing Petitioner in 

full restraints. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 325-26; (RT at 1776-79.) Counsel apparently believed the crime 

scene view might cause the jury to discredit the testimony of prosecution witnesses. A court “need not 

determine the actual explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object, so long as his failure to do so 

falls within the range of reasonable representation.” Morris, 966 F.2d at 456; see also Pop v. 

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Yarborough, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

Beyond tactical reasons not to object to the jury view, the record clearly demonstrates that 

defense counsel believed that viewing the scene of the shootings would assist the jury. (See, e.g., 

11/1/90 RT at 46-48.) As to the condition of the crime scene, the jurors were aware of the passage of 

time and seasonal change and presumably took that into account. (See e.g., RT at 1788-89, 1929-30.) 

Moreover, the jury was aware from voir dire and trial proceedings that the case and the crime scene had 

received publicity and would continue to receive publicity. Significantly, the jury was aware the 

America’s Most Wanted program was staged at the crime scene, possibly altering it. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the jury view violated state law. The California Supreme 

Court could reasonably have determined that no additional testimony was taken as such during the jury 

view. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has confirmed that “showing,” which is what actually occurred 

at the jury’s view of the crime scene (see claim L, post) is historically based and does not offend due 

process. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1934) (overruled in part on other grounds by

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (“statements to the jury pointing out the specific objects to be 

noted have been a traditional accompaniment of a view for about two centuries, if not longer. The 

Fourteenth Amendment has not displaced the procedure of the ages.”). Even if Petitioner had 

demonstrated a violation of California law regarding the jury view, as noted a federal habeas court may 

not examine questions of state law; it “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

The state court could reasonably have determined that Petitioner’s presence during the jury 

view was unnecessary. Due process does not require a defendant be present during a jury view of a 

crime scene “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 

U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07); see also Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1140 

n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) (there is a strong presumption that any errors are subject to harmless error analysis if 

defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator). Petitioner has not made a showing 

that his presence at the crime scene was necessary - defense counsel was present throughout the 

viewing. Petitioner’s waiver of attendance at the jury view suggests as much. (11/1/90 RT at 46-48). 

Petitioner argues, but does not support in the record, that the presence of the media at the jury 

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view was unavoidable and affected the jurors’ view of the crime scene. (ECF No. 113 at 100.) His 

conclusion that media presence detracted from the “remoteness of the scene,” presumably because 

they were able to travel there with all their equipment, (id.) is similarly unsupported. Moreover, the 

court also specifically told the jury about the possible media presence at the jury view and that “they 

are ordered not to talk, and you are ordered not to talk to them.” (RT at 1892-93, 1976-77). The court 

also admonished the jury numerous times to avoid any and all contact with the media. (RT at 25, 

228, 235, 249, 326, 1642-43, 1892-93, 1976-77, 2090.) Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s 

instructions. Therefore, an objection to the presence of the media at the jury view on such a basis 

would have lacked merit. 

As to juror Barnes’s request to drive separately to the jury view, Petitioner does not demonstrate 

a basis for objection. He does not cite to facts in the record showing how and why allowing juror 

Barnes to drive separately impacted his defense. Furthermore, in light of the amount of miles juror 

Barnes already had to drive each day just to get to court, and the additional miles he would have to 

drive to go to the courthouse before seeing the crime scene, it was unlikely the court would have 

sustained any objection. (RT at 2033-34, 2089-90.) The state court also could reasonably have found 

that, had juror Barnes traveled with the other jurors, it is not reasonably probable that the result of 

Petitioner’s proceeding would have been different.

Petitioner complains the jury improperly viewed the Sand Canyon Store without juror Barnes. 

The jurors were told they would drive past the Sand Canyon Store, but not stop and inspect it, without 

juror Barnes. (RT at 2121.) However, the record is unclear whether the jury did in fact drive past it 

or receive any information about the Sand Canyon Store, without juror Barnes present. Even if they 

had, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial testimony of eyewitnesses Ramirez and Wilson was

dependent upon or related to the location and structure of the Sand Canyon Store or that the Sand 

Canyon Store had some material relationship to other locations and events described in the trial 

testimony. Again, Petitioner, at all times during the jury view, was represented by defense counsel. 

Moreover, all jurors, including juror Barnes, saw photographs of the Sand Canyon Store. (RT 

at 1724-25; CT at 390.) Even if juror Barnes was absent from an exterior viewing of it, the California 

Supreme Court could reasonably have found this had only a minor, if any, impact on the jury’s 

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determinations. See e.g., Olano, 62 F.3d at 1188 (finding no error where juror missed an afternoon 

of testimony but reviewed a written transcript of what he missed; cf. Tanner v. United States, 483 

U.S. 107, 126 (1987) (jurors falling asleep during testimony are not incompetent). Petitioner 

speculates that the credibility of witnesses Ramirez and Wilson could have been impugned to the 

extent their testimony describing the Store varied from what the jurors saw when driving past it. (See 

claim L3, infra.) But Petitioner does not point to any facts showing such inconsistency or related 

credibility issues. 

For all the reasons stated above and in claim L, post, the California Supreme Court could have 

reasonably concluded that no prejudicial errors occurred in the jury’s view of the crime scene. 

Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by any actions of counsel in this regard. A fair-minded 

jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent 

alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of this proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I13 is denied. 

n. Review of Claim I14

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel did not notice and object to the trial 

court’s misreading of guilt phase instructions, omitting elements, misstating the law, and failing to 

instruct the jury on its function, as alleged in claims P1, P2, P3, P6, P7, P8, and P9, post. (ECF No. 

113 at 100-01.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas 

Corpus.)

Petitioner complains that defense counsel failed to object to the trial court’s misreading of 

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CALJIC 2.22, 3.31.5, 8.20, 8.30, 8.67, 8.80, 17.40, or 17.41 as discussed in claims P1, P2, P3, P6, 

P7, P8 and P9, post. (ECF No. 113 at 101:1-4.) He claims that even though these instructions had 

been agreed to by counsel and the trial court (RT at 2097, 2100-03, 2107), defense counsel failed to 

catch instances where the court’s oral instructions added to or omitted from the written instructions. 

In this case, the trial court provided the jury with copies of the correctly worded instructions, 

which the jury had during deliberations. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in claims P1, P2, P3, P6, 

P7, P8, and P9, post, even if defense counsel’s performance was deficient, it is not reasonably 

probable that the jury verdict would have been affected by it. As discussed in those claims, in light of 

the jury instructions as a whole, it is also not reasonably probable that the jury misunderstood the 

burden of proof as to any element of the case, particularly premeditation and deliberation as it related 

to counts I, II, and III. 

Defense counsel is not ineffective by failing to make meritless objections. Aguon, 851 F.2d at 

1172. These alleged errors, singly and cumulatively, are not persuasive. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 566 

(“finding no prejudice from the errors considered separately, we also find no cumulative prejudice”); 

see also Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445 (holding that there was no reason to reverse for cumulative error 

because there was no violation of federal rights in the guilt phase).

 For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I14 is denied. 

o. Review of Claim I15

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective by failing to request the 

use of “not guilty” in place of “innocent,” as the former term is used in CALJIC Nos. 1.00

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(“Respective Duties of Judge and Jury”), 2.51 (“Motive”), and 2.52 (“Flight After Crime”), as more 

specifically alleged in claim P5, post. (ECF No. 113 at 101-02.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas 

Corpus.)

Petitioner complains that the trial court’s use of “innocent” instead of “not guilty” misled the 

jury regarding the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, depriving 

Petitioner of his rights to due process and trial by jury.

Respondent argues, correctly, that at the time of trial, the instructions given were the standard

instructions on the issues as approved by the California Supreme Court. See People v. Wade, 39 Cal.

App. 4th 1487, 1491-92 (1995) (determining that use of “innocent” instead of “not guilty” did not 

mislead the jury regarding the prosecution’s burden of proof). 

For this reason and those explained in claim P5, post, defense counsel was not ineffective in 

failing to object to the noted instructions. Pelmer v. White, 877 F.2d 1518, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989) 

(holding assistance not ineffective where counsel failed to object to instructions approved by state 

appellate court). Nor was Petitioner prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request instructions deviating 

from the standardized approved CALJIC instructions at the time of his trial.

 For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I15 is denied. 

p. Review of Claim I16

Petitioner claims defense counsel was ineffective by failing to make adequate objections to 

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the trial court’s reading of CALJIC 2.06 and 2.52, regarding consciousness of guilt. (ECF No. 113 at 

102-103; Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 326-27.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Additionally, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected these allegations on direct 

appeal. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297, 326-27.

Petitioner complains that use of these instructions was not supported by the evidence and 

improperly suggested his alleged conduct was an admission of guilt. He alleges that counsel Soria, 

who objected to CALJIC 2.52 but not CALJIC 2.06, did not state adequate grounds for objecting to 

these instructions and “admitted” facts that were in dispute when discussing instruction 2.06 with the 

trial court and the district attorney (RT at 2096), as more specifically alleged in claims P4 and P5, 

post. He claims there was no tactical advantage in doing so and that he was prejudiced both by 

waiver of objection and because there is a reasonable probability the jury’s determination would have 

been different absent the instructions. 

The trial court gave these instructions as follows:

CALJIC No. 2.06 (5th ed. 1988) - “If you find that a defendant attempted to suppress 

evidence against himself in any manner such as by destroying evidence or by concealing 

evidence, such attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a 

consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, 

and its weight and its significance, if any, are matters for your consideration.”

CALJIC No. 2.52 (5th ed. 1988) - “The flight of a person immediately after the 

commission of a crime or after being accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to 

establish guilt, but it is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all 

the other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or his innocence. [¶] The 

weight to be given such a circumstance is entirely up to the jury.”

(CT at 440, 450.)

The California Supreme Court, in rejecting these allegations, stated that: 

At the time the court discussed jury instructions, defense counsel agreed the evidence 

supported CALJIC No. 2.06 and did not object to the court’s proposed wording. Any 

claim of error is therefore waived. [Citation] Regardless, no error occurred. Sufficient 

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evidence supported the instruction in light of Ramirez’s testimony defendant attempted 

to make the murder scene “look like a bad dope deal” by breaking bottles, scattering 

loose marijuana, and shooting the body several more times with a rifle after the initial 

revolver shot. Defendant wiped his fingerprints off the handgun, put the weapon in 

Huffstuttler’s hand, placed a knife near the body, and poured chili sauce around it. He 

then fled south before leaving the state for Chicago. Along the way he threw away some 

wires he had taken to disable Wilson’s truck. 

CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.52 do not impermissibly emphasize noncriminal activity as 

“consciousness of guilt.” On the contrary, these instructions “made clear to the jury that 

certain types of deceptive or evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate 

consciousness of guilt, while also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient 

to prove a defendant’s guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and 

significance assigned to such behavior. The cautionary nature of the instructions benefits 

the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might 

otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory. [Citations] Moreover, section 1127c 

requires a flight instruction when the prosecution relies on such conduct as tending to 

show guilt.

As in past decisions, we find no merit in the contention the instructions improperly 

allow the jury to draw inferences about defendant’s state of mind and equate evidence of 

suppression or concealment with a confession. “A reasonable juror would understand 

‘consciousness of guilt’ to mean ‘consciousness of some wrongdoing’ rather than 

‘consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.’ The instructions 

advise the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of 

consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, 

thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to 

be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instructions do not address the 

defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the 

drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.” [Citation] For cognate reasons 

they do not violate the proscription of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 

against referring to the defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify 

as evidence of guilt. The instructions in no respect implicated defendant’s failure to 

testify or directed the jury to draw negative inferences from it.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 326-27. 

The Court finds Petitioners allegations to be unpersuasive. (See also claims P4 and P5, post.) 

As reasoned by the state supreme court, these instructions appear to unequivocally state that the 

conduct described therein is not sufficient to prove guilt, but instead that it “may be considered.” The 

California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that these instructions did not improperly 

reduce the prosecution’s burden of proof. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 

167 (1979) (prosecution may rely on all the evidence in the record to meet the reasonable doubt 

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standard where the state presumption is permissive rather than mandatory).

The trial record supported giving these instructions. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 327. The crime 

scene was remote and secluded. (RT at 1731, 1760-61.) Petitioner told Huffstuttler, just prior to 

shooting him, that it was a “no-no” to bring people to see the marijuana farm. (RT at 1739, 1922, 

1950.) Petitioner also told Huffstuttler that he did not know Mincy and Wilson and could not 

understand Huffstuttler’s reasons for bringing them to see the marijuana plants. (RT at 1739-40.) 

Immediately after shooting Huffstuttler, Petitioner approached Mincy and Wilson with a gun, told 

them that he had nothing against them, and then shot them. (RT at 1741.) Petitioner re-arranged the 

crime scene to make it look like a failed drug transaction and fled to Los Angeles and then Chicago. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 331-33. Counsel did not admit disputed facts precluding these instructions. (See

RT at 2096.) This Court finds no basis to discount these facts in the record. See e.g., Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 340; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). 

At the time of trial, these instructions were the standard instructions on these issues, approved 

by the California Supreme Court. See People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 871 (1988) (abrogated on

other grounds by People v. Crayton, 28 Cal. 4th 346, 364-65; see also Pelmer, 877 F.2d at 1522

(holding assistance not ineffective where counsel failed to object to instructions approved by state 

appellate court). Here, the state supreme court could reasonably have found defense counsel not to be 

ineffective by failing to object to these instructions given the evidence in the record supporting their 

use. 

Additionally, to the extent Petitioner argues that the language of the instructions violated his

constitutional rights, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the use of a very similar consciousness of guilt

instruction. See United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1991). As long as 

the instruction does not convey that inconsistent statements constitute evidence of guilt, but merely

that the jury may consider them as indicating a consciousness of guilt, the instruction does not violate 

constitutional rights. See Id. CALJIC No. 2.06 and 2.52 are not constitutionally infirm under this 

standard. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 327. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

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an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I16 is denied. 

q. Review of Claim I17 

In this final claim, Petitioner alleges counsel Soria was ineffective by making an incoherent 

guilt phase closing argument that was too short, misstated the law and his defense theories and 

conceded Petitioner’s guilt for criminal behavior without his consent. (ECF No. 113 at 103-109; RT 

at 2162-69.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

The California Supreme Court also considered and rejected on direct appeal Petitioner’s 

allegation that his counsel was ineffective for admitting his culpability during guilt phase closing 

argument. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 334-35. 

1) Abbreviated Closing

Petitioner alleges that Soria, without consulting co-counsel or Petitioner, delivered a shorter 

and less detailed version of his originally prepared closing argument. Petitioner alleges Soria did this 

in order to force the prosecutor to give her final summation prior to the lunch break, i.e., without 

extra time for her to prepare over the lunch break. Petitioner alternatively argues that Mr. Soria 

shortened the closing argument as a practical joke on the prosecutor. (ECF No. 113 at 103; RT at 

2178.) 

Petitioner alleges the failure to give a sufficient closing was especially prejudicial because the 

defense presented no evidence during the guilt phase. 

The state supreme court reasonably could have found these arguments to be mere conjecture, 

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lacking support in the evidentiary record. To the extent the closing argument was of short duration, 

Petitioner failed to show that “a longer or more passionate closing argument would have resulted in 

an alternative” verdict. Griffin v. Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 903 (1994).

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that “defense counsel had few 

viable options, but made reasonable efforts to negate first degree murder despite considerable factual 

impediments.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 313, 334-35. The record reasonably supports this determination, 

as discussed below. 

2) Conceding Guilt

Petitioner alleges that Soria, without Petitioner’s consent, conceded guilt as to some of the 

charges, (ECF No. 113 at 103-05, 108), as follows: 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. There is no doubt that the events that happened on 

Labor Day weekend with my client has some liability for, some responsibility for. We 

are not going to say not guilty on all counts. That is just not what happened. But you 

have to assess the responsibility. You have to determine from the facts and the law that 

the Court gives you what his responsibility is, and I think the facts to some extent are not 

as clear as the prosecutor presented to you.

Certainly on Count 4, the count of cultivation of marijuana, the defense will simply ask 

you to review the evidence, apply the law the Court gives to you and render a verdict.

We will not present any argument on that.

With regards to what happened in the creek bed, certainly [Petitioner] is responsible for 

some of it. Once again, you have to decide the liability based on the law the Court gives 

you and you have to determine from the facts and that’s interesting because you have

two parallel stories where they intersect at some point, but you have two storytellers.

(RT at 2162.)

Petitioner also alleges that Mr. Soria went on to vouch for the credibility of victim witness Jim 

Wilson: 

Let’s take up the negative thing regarding Jim Wilson. If he is lying, why is he lying? I 

think looking at the evidence the only thing he is probably lying about is what he knew 

or didn’t know about the marijuana going up the hill or when or when he didn’t see it. I 

don’t think he is lying about being shot. There is physical evidence he got shot, and I 

don’t think his evidence is unreliable regarding what he heard Mr. Mincy say or what he 

observed. 

(RT at 2163.) 

Petitioner faults Soria for breaching his duty of loyalty by essentially conceding guilt as to the 

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three shootings and marijuana cultivation without Petitioner’s consent, citing United States v. Swanson, 

943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991) (attorney who informs the jury that there is no reasonable doubt 

about factual issues in dispute fails to act as adversary to prosecution). Particularly prejudicial, he 

claims, was the concession that Wilson heard Mincy begging Petitioner not to shoot. According to 

Petitioner, Soria ended up advocating for the prosecution, not the defense. He cites in this regard 

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 666 (1984) (complete failure to subject prosecution case to 

meaningful adversarial testing denies sixth amendment rights). 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected the allegation that Soria was 

ineffective by acknowledging some culpability during closing, stating that: 

Defendant asserts defense counsel was ineffective for acknowledging some culpability 

on defendant’s part in closing argument: “There is no doubt that the events that 

happened on Labor Day weekend with my client has some liability for [sic], some 

responsibility for. We are not going to say not guilty on all counts. That is just not what 

happened.”

We find no incompetence in these remarks. Given the overwhelming evidence of 

defendant’s guilt, including the testimony of two eyewitnesses, the concession appears 

to be a reasonable trial tactic by which counsel could urge the jury to return verdicts on 

the lesser included offenses of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. Since 

counsel could also reasonably anticipate having to conduct a penalty phase, it also 

allowed him to preserve his credibility in arguing mitigation. [Citation] In resolving 

these claims, “we must ‘assess counsel’s overall performance throughout the case’

[citation], evaluating it ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in 

light of all the circumstances. [Citations] Moreover, when read in context, the argument 

in no respect reflects a breakdown of the adversarial process. [Citation] Counsel noted 

discrepancies between the testimony of Wilson and Ramirez, suggested the jury could 

infer Ramirez was more involved in the crimes than claimed, and pointed to other 

evidence defendant was guilty of less than first degree murder. The multiple-murder 

special circumstance would be triggered even if the jury found only one of the killings 

was first degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); therefore, counsel reasonably focused his 

guilt phase argument on reducing that possibility. Conceding some measure of 

culpability was a valid tactical choice under these restrictive circumstances.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 334-35.

This Court finds that, based on the evidentiary record, the state supreme court could reasonably 

have found the noted conduct to be tactically motivated and consistent with the defense strategy of 

arguing for manslaughter in order to avoid death sentence eligibility. Petitioner had certain liability for 

the crimes and only limited evidence in defense. (RT at 2162-69.) Defense counsel argued that 

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Petitioner was less than fully culpable for the crimes, variously focusing on Ramirez and the inference 

he might have been involved in the Huffstuttler shooting, (RT at 2166-69), and heat of passion and 

imperfect self-defense theories. 

Regarding the shooting of Mincy, in the absence of direct evidence of heat of passion or selfdefense, counsel could and did reasonably argue that Petitioner was still acting under heat of passion 

from the Huffstuttler shooting when he shot and killed Mincy, in an attempt to reduce Petitioner’s 

culpability for that offense. (RT at 2175.) On the facts of this case, the California Supreme Court

reasonably could have found such a tactical decision to admit some liability, even in the absence of 

consent by the accused, not to be ineffective assistance. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91

(2004) (counsel in capital case where guilt is clear may reasonably focus on penalty phase). 

It was not unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to discount Petitioner’s contention 

that Soria’s noted tactic was not based upon an adequate investigation. The guilt phase investigation 

was constitutionally sufficient for the reasons discussed in claims I1-I16, ante. The same can be said 

of the penalty phase investigation (see claim W, post), even if it was incomplete at the time of the 

guilt phase. Significantly, Petitioner has not provided any declaration of counsel relating to trial 

tactics or the absence of tactics, in these regards. 

Unsuccessful trial strategies are not alone ineffective assistance. Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 

1384 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Although the [defense] closing apparently was not persuasive, a strategy need 

not be successful to be reasonable.”). “The mere criticism of trial tactics is insufficient to establish 

ineffectiveness or prejudice.” Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d at 1254. 

3) Misstating Law and Defense Theories

Petitioner alleges that Soria’s abbreviated closing statement, to the extent it was intelligible, 

included the following prejudicial misstatements of law regarding the elements of voluntary 

manslaughter (Pen. Code § 192) and second degree murder (Pen. Code § 189):

Now, [Petitioner] is part of the scuffle, is part of an argument, heat of passion,

unreasonable self-defense and if you find that acceptable regarding the initial shooting 

of Vance Huffstuttler, you don’t believe that he shot him a second time, he is only guilty 

of voluntary manslaughter which isn’t intentional killing, but it is not without malice

aforethought, it is not without premeditation, it is not with intent. It is basically a

homicide we can’t excuse, but there is an excuse.

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(RT at 2169.)

The California Supreme Court summarily rejected this allegation on the merits without 

explanation. (See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner argues the deficient closing had its genesis in a breakdown in the adversarial process, 

resulting in an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting Soria’s performance and giving rise to a 

presumption of prejudice. Petitioner contends that the trial court acknowledged as much when, 

following the guilt phase, it found irreconcilable differences between Soria and Petitioner and removed 

Soria from the case. Furthermore, even if prejudice is not presumed, Petitioner claims it is reasonably 

probable that a more favorable result would have obtained had Soria presented a competent closing 

argument. 

Petitioner also argues that Soria’s closing argument confused defense theories: a heat of passion 

or unreasonable self-defense theory in which Petitioner shot Huffstuttler, and an alternative theory 

under which Ramirez fired the shots that killed Huffstuttler. (RT at 2163-69.) However, Soria’s 

strategy of presenting alternate theories need not be seen as unreasonable given that Ramirez’s 

participation in Huffstuttler’s death was not established by any direct evidence. Even if the jury had 

chosen to believe such theory without evidence, Ramirez’s participation would not have exculpated 

Petitioner, but simply made him an accomplice to it. That these strategies were not ultimately 

successful does not make them unreasonable. Sloan, 54 F.3d at 1384.

The jury was aware of the primary defense theory that the killings were not first degree murder, 

even if this theory was misstated during Soria’s closing. (See e.g., RT at 2166-67.) The jury would 

have understood that Soria’s closing focused on Petitioner’s reduced culpability and responsibility for 

the killings. 

Furthermore, as the Respondent notes, Soria told the jury that the court would be providing 

instructions regarding heat of passion and self-defense, and suggested that the jury should listen to and 

consider the instructions carefully along with the evidence in reaching its verdict. (RT at 2166.) The 

court did provide those instructions as well as instructions regarding intent for murder and 

manslaughter (RT at 2195-2211), and also told the jury that it should follow the court’s instructions 

over the arguments of counsel if they conflicted. (RT at 2182-83). The jury is presumed to have 

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followed these instructions. 

Given the weight of the noted evidence against Petitioner, the California Supreme Court

reasonably could have found that Petitioner did not show prejudice relative to this claim. See U.S. v. 

Johnson-Wilder, 29 F.3d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1994) (where evidence of guilt is “very substantial . . .

there is no reason to conclude that a defense free of the alleged errors would have brought about a 

different result.”)

 While “[t]he right to effective assistance extends to closing arguments,” Gentry, 540 U.S. at 5

(citing Bell, 535 U.S. at 701-02, and Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975)), “counsel has 

wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and deference to counsel’s tactical decisions 

in his closing presentation is particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate strategy 

at that stage.” Id. at 5-6. Judicial review of defense counsel’s closing argument “is therefore highly 

deferential - and doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas.” Id. at 6. 

The arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the context in which 

they are made. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 384-85.

Finally, Petitioner’s suggestion that prejudice should be presumed based on actual conflict of 

interest arising from a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship fails for reasons discussed in 

claims J and W1, post.

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim I17 is denied.

2. Review of Claim J

Petitioner next claims that Soria’s divided loyalties caused Petitioner to distrust him, resulting 

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in a breakdown of the relationship and an actual conflict of interest, denying Petitioner effective 

representation and due process under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 

109-112.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because this claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The 

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s habeas claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to “the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth 

Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694. 

However, an exception exists for cases in which counsel actively represents conflicting 

interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345-50. In such a case, 

prejudice is presumed. Id. However, Petitioner must establish that “an actual conflict of interest 

actually affected the adequacy of [defense counsel’s] representation.” 

b. Analysis of Claim J

Petitioner alleges Soria’s desire to withdraw to seek other employment caused a loss of 

loyalty to and inadequate representation of Petitioner and a breakdown in the attorney-client 

relationship resulting in an actual conflict of interest. (ECF No. 113 at 109-112; claim I17; see RT at 

2268, 2271-96.) Petitioner also alleges Soria had a personal conflict because, the evening before a 

crucial point in the guilt phase, Soria was out celebrating a new job offer. (ECF No. 113 at 110.) 

1) Actual Conflict of Interest

Petitioner alleges Soria had an actual conflict of interest. As previously discussed, following 

the guilt phase, the trial court considered ex parte Petitioner’s Marsden motion including his 

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complaints about Soria’s guilt phase performance. That court found that: 

[A]s as result of the disagreement between Mr. Soria and [Petitioner] there has been a 

complete breakdown in that relationship to the point that I don’t think they are talking to 

each other

(RT at 2298:19-22.) As a result, on December 14, 1990, the trial court appointed Cater to take over for 

the penalty phase. However, the trial court did not make a finding that Mr. Soria had an actual, or any, 

conflict of interest. Instead the trial court found a breakdown in communication and “estrangement,”

pointing to Petitioner’s stated refusal to accept a visit from Mr. Soria. (RT at 2298-99); Bolin, 18 Cal. 

4th at 347. 

Petitioner supports his actual conflict claim by pointing to Soria’s decision not to present 

evidence relating to his leg wounds. As discussed more fully in claim I7, ante, petitioner contends 

scars on his legs were incurred while he defended himself during the Huffstuttler shooting. But Soria 

was aware Dr. Markman had examined the scars and opined they were self-inflicted. (RT at 2289.)

Soria’s concern this evidence appeared fabricated and based upon inadmissible and uncorroborated 

hearsay suggests his decision not to present it was a matter of trial strategy rather than a result of an 

“actual conflict” with petitioner. (See 12/13/90 RT at 2288-89; claim I7, ante.) 

Counsel Soria was entitled to make tactical decisions, “even in the face of his client’s 

incomprehension or even explicit disapproval.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1017, 1026 and n.8. Soria 

explained his reasons for not informing Petitioner of this tactical decision. (12/13/90 RT at 2289.) A 

conflict of interest is not created every time an attorney responds to an accusation from a client for to 

do so would create in the client a unilateral power to create a conflict by expressing dissatisfaction. 

United States v. Moree, 220 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2000).

Petitioner cannot create a conflict of interest predicated solely on his expressed dissatisfaction 

with counsel. United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). At the time of Soria’s 

request to withdraw, the record reflects that Petitioner wanted Soria to represent him. (7/18/90 RT at 

10-12); see Garcia v. Bunnell 33 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994) (no actual conflict where record 

discloses no active representation of competing interest). 

Any re-allegation of ineffective assistance, discussed in claim I, fails for the reasons stated 

therein. 

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2) Personal Conflict of Interest

A conflict of interest claim cannot be based on an alleged conflict between the client’s interests 

and the lawyer’s personal interests. Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1184 (2005) (finding that the 

Cuyler line of cases is limited to conflicts involving joint representation). Earp specifically noted the

case upon which Petitioner relies, Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988), and found 

argument relying on it to be futile under AEDPA. Id. at 1183 n.23. 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that Soria did not suffer from a 

personal conflict of interest and perform deficiently by virtue thereof. 

3) Prejudice – Actual Conflict

Petitioner argues that no showing of prejudice is required because Soria had an actual conflict 

of interest. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. He claims that the trial court found as much. However, 

petitioner’s argument for the less stringent standard of Cuyler (regarding presumed prejudice in cases 

of actual conflict of interest) is unavailing. (See ECF No. 113 at 109); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-49. 

“Until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not 

established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. 

Petitioner has not made such a showing, for the reasons stated. 

4) Prejudice – Personal Conflict

Petitioner’s claim that counsel’s personal conflict of interest violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to the assistance of counsel is governed by Strickland. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75 

(explaining that clearly established Supreme Court precedent does not permit application of a 

prejudice standard less stringent than Strickland unless the alleged conflict results from joint 

representation, a situation which involves both a high probability of prejudice and inherent difficulty 

in proving that prejudice). 

Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been 

different if counsel had taken some action that was not taken because of the alleged personal conflict 

of interest. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 347; United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“mere possibility of an actual conflict of interest created by service of a grand jury subpoena 

upon a target’s counsel is insufficient to disturb a conviction” absent proof of actual prejudice).

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Petitioner also contends that the breakdown in his attorney client relationship mandated a 

mistrial. (ECF No. 113 at 109.) For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court reasonably 

could have found otherwise. Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that Petitioner moved for 

a new trial or that he was dissatisfaction with Cater’s continuing representation. (12/13/90 Marsden

RT at 2292, 2295-99.)

5) Conclusions

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel had an actual conflict of 

interest, Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, or that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of this 

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim J is denied. 

3. Review of Claim K

Petitioner next claims that during discovery, the prosecution withheld from the defense certain 

material exculpatory evidence discussed below. (ECF No. 113 at 112-17.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas 

Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law 

1) Brady

The Supreme Court held that if the state fails to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1963), the conviction cannot stand if there is a reasonable 

probability that the evidence, considered cumulatively, would have produced a different result at trial. 

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). If a habeas petitioner establishes the “reasonable 

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probability” of a different result, the error cannot subsequently be found harmless. Id. at 436. In 

Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

There are three components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable 

to the accused either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have 

been suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. 

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). “Such 

evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). “[T]here is never a real Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so 

serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a 

different verdict.” Id. at 281.

2) Due Process

A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. 

at 643. To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be “of sufficient 

significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 

(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667). 

Any claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be reviewed within the context of the entire trial. 

See Greer, 485 U.S. at 765-66; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1291. A court must keep in mind that “[t]he 

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the 

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor” and “the aim of due process is not punishment of society 

for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.” Phillips, 455 U.S. 

at 219. “Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.” Thompson, 

74 F.3d at 1576 (quoting Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1191). 

b. Analysis of Claim K 

1) Inducements to Ramirez

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Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld evidence that charges pending against 

prosecution witness Ramirez were dropped in exchange for his testimony against Petitioner. (ECF 

No. 113 at 113.) Petitioner claims this information had significant impeachment value for reasons 

discussed in claim I2, ante, and that withholding it had a substantial and injurious effect in 

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 

Petitioner argues that there must have been such an agreement because Ramirez’s attorney, 

Gutierrez, declared that he would not have advised Ramirez to speak to the authorities if he 

(Gutierrez) did not believe that Ramirez would be released as a result. (SHCP Ex. 7 at 2.) He argues 

that even a tacit agreement must be disclosed. United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 

1986) (facts which imply an agreement regarding material evidence must be disclosed). 

However, the record could reasonably suggest that the alleged incentive was the promise by 

law enforcement that if Ramirez was uninvolved in the crime then he would be released upon giving 

a statement to authorities, and that this incentive was disclosed to the defense. (See RT at 1850-61, 

1934-38.) Petitioner’s proffer of the Gutierrez declaration is not evidence otherwise. The inference 

which Petitioner draws from the Gutierrez declaration is not supported by facts stated in that 

declaration.

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found such allegations to be 

unsupported in the evidentiary record. Surmise alone is not sufficient to show entitlement to habeas 

relief under § 2254(d). 

2) Inducements to Halfacre

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld evidence that its witness, Jerry Halfacre,

received inducements from the prosecution to provide information used at the penalty phase. This 

allegation is briefly discussed here because Petitioner includes it in his guilt phase claims. (See ECF

No. 113 at 113:24-114:18.) However, this allegation relates primarily to the penalty phase and is 

discussed at length in claim R, post. 

As noted, Halfacre had been living with Petitioner’s daughter, Paula Bolin, and was the father 

of Paula’s child, Ashley. Halfacre gave his probation officer Georgia O’Connor a threatening letter 

he had received from Petitioner. As discussed more specifically in claim R, post, in the letter 

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Petitioner threatened, among other things, to have Halfacre “permanently removed from the face of 

this Earth.” (RT at 2390-93, 2442-43); Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 n.11. 

The letter was used by the prosecution at Petitioner’s penalty trial as aggravating evidence of 

“criminal activity which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 

implied threat to use force or violence” pursuant to Pen. Code § 190.3(b). (ECF No. 113 at 113:27-

28.) At that time, Halfacre was on probation for vehicular manslaughter. Petitioner alleges Halfacre 

was released from probation and allowed to leave the state in exchange for giving his probation 

officer the letter. (See ECF No. 113 at 114:4-5; RT at 2442-43.) Petitioner alleges the prosecution’s 

failure to disclose this inducement prevented him challenging admission of the letter on grounds it did 

not satisfy the elements of a threat under Penal Code § 422. That is, Halfacre turned the letter over to 

authorities not because of he was in fear of immediate harm, but solely to receive concessions from 

the prosecution. Petitioner alleges this prosecutorial wrongdoing had a substantial and injurious 

effect in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner states that Penal Code § 422 provided in pertinent part: 

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great 

bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken 

as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and 

under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional,

immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and

an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person

reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate

family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one 

year, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 

(ECF No. 113 at 154:18-23); see also Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 337. 

The state supreme court was not unreasonable in denying this allegation. Preliminarily, the 

alleged inducement does not appear to be Brady information because it was not exculpating of 

Petitioner and could not have impeached or impugned the credibility of Halfacre because Halfacre did 

not testify at Petitioner’s trial. (RT at 1867-69, 2442-44; SHCP Ex. 6 at 34.) 

Petitioner has not demonstrated the undisclosed inducement denied him a fair trial. He does 

not deny that he wrote the letter. He does not support with facts in the record his allegation the letter 

was provided by Halfacre in exchange for Halfacre’s release from probation and travel restrictions. 

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That allegation could be seen as merely speculative. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005)

“[P]etition[er] is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.").

Finally, for the reasons discussed in claim R1, post, the state court could reasonably have 

concluded that the letter threatened force or violence within § 422, placing Halfacre in sustained fear 

that Petitioner would follow-through on the threats in the letter; and that the letter was not otherwise 

improperly admitted at Petitioner’s penalty phase. 

In any event, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. The California Supreme Court, 

reviewing the admissibility of the letter on direct appeal, stated that:

Although some of the language in the letter is menacing, it also reflects [Petitioner’s]

concern for his daughter’s and granddaughter’s well-being, a point stressed by the 

defense in mitigation. Moreover, the nature and circumstances of the threats would not

necessarily provoke serious concern, especially considering [Petitioner] was incarcerated

and would at least have to make outside arrangements to effect them. Halfacre waited

four months before giving the letter to his probation officer, during which time 

apparently nothing had happened.

More importantly, the letter paled compared to other aggravating evidence, which the 

prosecutor focused on in closing argument. In particular, the guilt phase testimony

revealed [Petitioner] as a calculating and callous individual, willing to kill defenseless

victims, including his friend and partner Huffstuttler, in cold blood to protect his drug

enterprise. In addition, the assault with great bodily injury against Matthew Spencer and

attempted manslaughter against Kenneth Ross confirmed [Petitioner’s] pattern of 

resorting to violence in dealing with problems. Given this history, it is unlikely the jury 

accorded the letter much, if any, weight in fixing the penalty at death.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340-41. This Court finds that California Supreme Court’s conclusions to be 

reasonable, especially given the noted substantial evidence against Petitioner. (See claims O, R, and

S, post.) 

3) Police Contacts with Wilson

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld information regarding the disposition of 

Wilson’s truck and further communications between him and authorities or the prosecution. (ECF 

No. 113 at 114-16.) Petitioner points to Wilson’s testimony at trial that at some later date he returned 

to the property to retrieve his truck, (RT at 1738), and infers that Wilson must have been escorted by 

law enforcement to the crime scene to obtain his truck and that law enforcement must have 

documented these events. (ECF No. 113 at 114-15.)

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However, Petitioner knew from Wilson’s above noted testimony that Wilson picked up the 

truck. It appears that Petitioner had enough information to obtain this evidence, if it existed, on his 

own. See Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no Brady error since the 

petitioner knew of the existence of medical records and “his counsel could have sought the

documents through discovery.”). Petitioner does not demonstrate that the government had a duty to 

turn it over to him. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found no 

Brady error. 

Petitioner’s further allegation that there must have been an inducement because Wilson’s trial 

testimony was more consistent with witness Ramirez than had been Wilson’s pretrial statements, (see 

claim I3, ante), is similarly unpersuasive. Petitioner does not point to anything in the evidentiary 

record showing that Wilson had any contact with law enforcement during this time in the nature of an 

inducement or otherwise. 

Even if there was such a withholding of information, the California Supreme Court could 

reasonably have found it harmless. Nothing in the record suggests that any information relating to 

Mr. Wilson’s retrieval of his truck would have resulted in a different outcome. The jury was already 

aware that Wilson had returned to the crime scene from his own testimony. (RT at 1738.) The state 

court could reasonably have found the result of proceedings would not have been different absent the 

alleged Brady error. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

4) Police Interviews Regarding Threats by Huffstuttler against Petitioner

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld evidence that, a week before the shootings, 

Petitioner had assaulted Huffstuttler and placed the barrel of a gun in Huffstuttler’s mouth (see CT at

225-26; RT at 2363-70), in response to which Huffstuttler threatened violence against Petitioner, 

causing Petitioner to fear Huffstuttler. (SHCP Ex. 15.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the 

prosecution withheld law enforcement interviews with Petitioner’s friends and neighbors in Los 

Angeles County, including Sondra Hooten and her boyfriend Dennis Dademasch, who apparently 

witnessed the alleged confrontation and consequent threats while guests at the cabin. (ECF No. 113 

at 116-17.) Petitioner claims this undisclosed evidence would have supported a defense of 

unreasonable or imperfect self-defense, and that withholding it had a substantial and injurious effect 

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in determining the jury’s verdict. 

The record suggests that defense counsel had discovery on the incident in question; defense 

counsel Cater apparently admitted as much. (See RT at 2363-65; see also SHCP Ex. 69B 6/6/90 

EMF Billing Statement at 2.) For example, as discussed in claim I4, ante, Deputy Nikkel’s report 

clearly includes his interview with Huffstuttler’s girlfriend, Ms. Ward, about this confrontation of 

sorts between Petitioner and Huffstuttler, as follows:

[Ward] said one time, when [Ward, Petitioner, and Huffstuttler] were at the cabin, 

[Huffstuttler] had gone out to get their pillows out of the van. She said when 

[Huffstuttler] closed the door to the van, he slammed it. She said that [Petitioner] came 

into the bedroom where they were at and stuck the .45 into [Huffstuttler’s] mouth, 

telling him that he should not slam the door to his van. She said she and two (2) other 

people, who were friends of [Petitioner’s], named Sandra and Dennis, from Covina, 

pulled [Petitioner] off of [Huffstuttler].

(SHCP, Ex. 18b, 9/7/89 Nikkel Supp. Report at 13.)

Petitioner has not shown the existence of additional law enforcement interviews with 

Petitioner’s friends and neighbors in Los Angeles County. The declaration of Sondra Hooten 

included with his habeas proffer does not suggest that at the time of trial she had talked to authorities 

or the prosecution team about the alleged confrontation. (See SHCP Ex. 15 at 2-3.) Absent from 

Petitioner’s habeas proffer is any declaration from Mr. Dademasch. 

Since Petitioner had the police report concerning this incident, it appears that there could be 

no Brady error.

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that Petitioner, who at the time of 

trial was in possession of Detective Nikkel’s report concerning the alleged confrontation, had enough 

information to obtain this evidence on his own, had there actually been any evidence to obtain. See

Raley, 470 F.3d at 804. Defense counsel could have interviewed these individuals. Counsel 

apparently did contact Ms. Ward and could have spoken to her about the incident. (SHCP Ex. 69B 

10/16/90 EMF Billing Statement at 3.)

Additionally, even if the prosecutor should have turned over evidence of these alleged

interviews, Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34. Petitioner’s 

habeas proffer of Ms. Hooten declaration referring to this incident does not suggest that Huffstuttler 

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acted violently toward or threatened violence upon Petitioner. Furthermore, the noted evidence 

against Petitioner was substantial. (See claims O, R and S, post.) 

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim K is denied. 

4. Review of Claim L

Petitioner next claims his rights were violated by the jury’s view of the crime scene. He 

asserts four subclaims which are addressed separately below. He claims cumulative error. 

a. Claim L1

Petitioner alleges that he did not waive his right to be present at the jury view, or to the taking 

of testimony during the view, or to the viewing of the Sand Canyon Store by less than all jurors. 

(ECF No. 113 at 120-23.) He claims a denial of due process and the right to confront witnesses 

against him. (Id.)

Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court held that 

Petitioner’s state and federal constitutional rights had not been violated because he had expressly 

waived his right to be present at the jury view of the crime scene. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 325. That

court also found that the trial court had not committed prejudicial error under state law. Id.

Petitioner also raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied on the merits without 

explanation (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus) as well as on procedural grounds (because the 

claim was repetitive of a claim that had been raised and rejected on direct appeal). (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus, citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 824-29; In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d at 225.) 

1) Clearly Established Law

A defendant has a federal due process right to be present at court proceedings if his presence 

has a reasonably substantial relation to his ability to defend himself. United States v. Gagnon, 470 

U.S. 522, 526 (1985). A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 

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known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 

2) Analysis of Claim L1

Petitioner alleges that he did not knowingly waive being present at the jury view because he 

did not anticipate that during the jury view, Kern County Sheriff’s Department deputies Layman and 

Williamson, both of whom had previously been sworn in the case, would answer questions from the 

jury about issues such as the relative location of Huffstuttler’s body and Wilson’s truck and whether 

and the extent to which vegetation obscured views of portions of the crime scene, (RT at 1892-93;

2120-22), matters only he (Petitioner) could challenge. He complains that the jurors may have 

understood the deputies to be continuing their prior testimony even though the deputies were not then 

under oath. 

Petitioner also complains that, unbeknownst to him, Penal Code § 977 precluded waiver of 

presence at a proceeding where evidence is taken and requires a written waiver, not provided here. 

Petitioner alleges that the information provided by the deputies during the crime scene view 

was relevant to his voluntary manslaughter defense and that at least to this extent his absence was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), and had a 

substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict (see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

The record reflects that, on December 10, 1990, prior to the conclusion of the guilt phase 

evidence, pursuant to the agreement of the prosecutor and defense counsel (11/1/90 RT 46-48), the 

jurors were taken to view the crime scene. (RT at 2119-22.) Defense counsel believed that it would 

be helpful to the jury and “agreed that the jury really needed to see the scene.” (11/1/90 RT at 47-48.) 

After Soria advised the trial court that Petitioner wished to waive attending the crime scene 

view (11/1/90 RT at 48), the following colloquy occurred: 

MR. SORIA: Yes, your Honor, in order to facilitate the trip up on Monday, I believe my 

client will waive his presence to going up the mountain.

THE COURT: Yes, we had really kind of assumed he would. But, Mr. Bolin, would 

you waive your presence there, I take it?

DEFENDANT BOLIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right, and nobody has threatened you in order to get you to do this, 

have they?

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DEFENDANT BOLIN: No, sir. 

THE COURT: All right, are you satisfied with the waiver, Mrs. Ryals?

MRS. RYALS: Yes, your Honor.

(RT at 1893; see also CT at 380.)

Petitioner did not attend the jury view on December 10, 1990. (RT at 2119.) 

The California Supreme Court reviewed and rejected these same allegations, finding that: 

We also find no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of his absence 

during the view. Prior to the excursion, [Petitioner] expressly waived his presence and 

acknowledged he did so voluntarily. The record reflects that before making this decision 

he had discussed the matter with counsel. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that 

the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause of the United States Constitution or the due 

process clause of the California Constitution prevents a criminal defendant from waiving 

the right of presence at a critical stage of a capital trial. [Citation] We have no reason to 

reconsider that conclusion, particularly when no additional testimony was taken in 

conjunction with the view. 

We also find no prejudicial error with respect to defendant’s statutory rights. In People 

v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1211, this court held “that a capital defendant may 

not voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977, 

including those portions of the trial in which evidence is taken [before the trier of fact] 

....” [Citation] Although a jury view is not among the designated proceedings in section 

977, we have long held that “in so viewing the premises the jury was receiving 

evidence” even if nontestimonial. [Citation] Thus, it comes within the purview of 

section 977. Nevertheless, in this case it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable 

result would have been reached had defendant, in addition to his counsel, been present.

[Citation] On this record, we find “no sound basis to question the contemporaneous 

judgment of defense counsel, with which defendant then agreed, that defendant’s trial 

interests would be better served by not attending the jury view.” [Citation]

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 325.

As noted, that court also concluded that no additional testimony was taken in conjunction with 

the jury view: 

In this case, Layman and Williamson investigated the crime scene; the trial court

therefore reasonably designated them as “showers” to explain how the actual physical 

conditions related to their trial testimony. The record establishes that their involvement 

was limited to that end, i.e., “showing” the jury what their words had described and the 

photographs had depicted. Given the court’s broad discretion in these matters, we find 

no abuse in having the deputies respond to specific questions rather than proceeding in 

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some other manner. Williamson’s statement that the foliage differed in height from the 

time of the crime was also proper “to account for any change in [the] condition between 

[its] state as shown by the evidence and [its] appearance at the time the jury inspected 

[it].”

Id. at 324-25.

The Court finds this claim to be unpersuasive. Petitioner has not demonstrated a clearly 

established federal right to be present at a jury view of a crime scene. See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 117-18 

(due process does not require the defendant’s presence at a jury view of the crime scene); see also

Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (“the issue of whether a defendant must be 

present at all times in a capital trial has not yet been settled by the Supreme Court”). Mr. Soria stated 

that he had talked with Petitioner about the importance of viewing the scene. (11/1/90 RT at 48.) 

Having waived his presence, Petitioner did not attend the jury view of the scene. (RT at 1893, 2119; CT 

at 380.)

Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that his presence at the jury view would have contributed to 

the fairness of the proceeding, even where the “showers” then “point[ed] out particular features of the 

scene and [] request[ed] the jury to observe them.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 110-11; see also Monroe v. 

Kuhlman, 433 F.3d 236, 245-47 (2d Cir. 2006) (attorney’s absence from jury view harmless error 

even though defendant could have learned something from observing what jury focused upon).

A defendant has a right to be present “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably 

substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 

(quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06). However, he need not be present “when presence would be 

useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07); see Rice, 77 F.3d at 

1140 n.2 (listing cases finding right to presence not violated). The state supreme court could 

reasonably have found this to be such a case. 

Once at the crime scene, the jurors were allowed to “look through the property” and to “walk 

down [to the marijuana area”, which they had previously seen in crime scene photographs. (RT at 

1119.) The jurors were then allowed to ask questions, initially of the court and trial counsel and then 

of deputies Layman and Williamson as “showers.” The deputies variously spoke to the location of 

Wilson’s truck; the location and angle of Huffstuttler’s body; the location of the gun relative to 

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Huffstuttler’s body; the location of the main road; and the height of the surrounding vegetation and 

line of sight to the marijuana area at the time of the crime. (RT at 2120-22.) Detective Williamson 

stated that the crime scene was “intact” other than the wintertime foliage. (Id.) 

The jurors, without juror Barnes, may have driven past the Sand Canyon store, where the 

victim met up with Petitioner prior to the shootings. (Id.) It appears the jurors were familiar with the 

crime scene through the photographs admitted into evidence and readily able to discern how the 

photographs might have differed from their view of the crime scene including the noted statements at 

the crime scene. Petitioner’s suggestion that his presence was required to provide further clarity in 

these regards lacks factual support. Moreover, defense counsel was present at the jury view and 

apparently did not object to the noted statements or seek correction of the transcript of the jury’s 

viewing. 

Petitioner’s state law claim is not a basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

68. Under California law, a defendant shall be personally present at other proceedings involving the 

taking of all evidence, unless he signs a written waiver. Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Pen. Code §§ 977(b), 

1043(a); People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 4th 1, 17 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Rogers, 

39 Cal. 4th 826, 879 (2006). But a defendant’s “absence from various court proceedings, even 

without waiver, may be declared non-prejudicial in situations where his presence does not bear a 

reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” 

Johnson, 6 Cal. 4th at 18 (citing People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 782 (1989)) (quoting People v. 

Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 359-60 (1987)). 

Even if the Court were to assume the state law gave rise to a protectable federal right, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. 

It was not unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to determine that “on this record, 

we find no sound basis to question the contemporaneous judgment of defense counsel, with which 

defendant then agreed, that defendant’s trial interests would be better served by not attending the jury 

view.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 325. 

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim L1 is denied. 

b. Claim L2 

Petitioner claims that the manner in which the jury viewed the crime scene violated Penal 

Code § 1119 (“§ 1119”) (ECF No. 113 at 123-25), which in turn denied Petitioner state-created due 

process and fair trial rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 125:1-2.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal, which the California Supreme Court 

rejected based on counsel’s failure “to object to any aspect of the jury view.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 

323. In the alternative, the California Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by having “the deputies respond to specific questions[.]” Id. at 325. 

Petitioner also raised this same claim on state habeas corpus, which the California Supreme 

Court summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

1) Clearly Established Law

The due process standard is set out in claim L1, ante. 

2) Analysis of Claim L2

Petitioner alleges the jury received communications not authorized under § 1119, violating 

state created federal due process and fair trial rights. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1979) 

(a criminal jury may deprive defendant of liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the 

exercise of its statutory discretion). 

Section 1119 provides in pertinent part: 

When, in the opinion of the court, it is proper that the jury should view the place in 

which the offense is charged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact 

occurred, or any personal property which has been referred to in the evidence and cannot 

conveniently be brought into the courtroom, it may order the jury to be conducted in a 

body, in the custody of the sheriff or marshal . . . to the place, or to the property, which 

must be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose; and the 

officer must be sworn to suffer no person to speak or communicate with the jury, nor to 

do so himself or herself, on any subject connected with the trial. . . .”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 323 n.5.

The California Supreme Court reviewed and rejected this claim, by stating: 

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[T]he trial court conducted the jury view in full conformance with the provisions of 

section 1119, which expressly provides that when the court determines a jury view of 

the scene is proper, the place or property “must be shown to them by a person appointed 

by the court for that purpose ....” Originally, in People v. Green (1878) 53 Cal. 60, 61,

this court construed the statute to preclude any person, even on direction of the trial 

court, from speaking to the jury on any subject connected with the trial. In People v. 

Bush (1887) 71 Cal. 602, 606, however, this rigid construction was rejected as illogical 

and inconsistent with the statutory language: “[W]e cannot conceive how [the shower] 

could have shown the jury the ... places which they were sent to view in any other way 

[than pointing out and naming such places], under the statute.” [Citation] For more than 

a century, courts have consistently applied this interpretation, implicitly recognizing that 

the admonition that “no person ... speak or communicate with the jury” (§ 1119) is 

plainly directed to insulating the jury from extraneous contact and potential tampering. 

[Citations] 

At the same time, the broad discretion conferred by the statute authorizes the trial court 

to conduct the view as appropriate to the circumstances. For example, in People v. 

Pompa, supra, 192 Cal. 412, we rejected the defendant’s claim of error that the view was 

not, as originally directed by the court, strictly limited to an inspection of the premises. 

[Citation] Although considerable testimony was taken and evidence received by the jury, 

“the record expressly disclose[d] that during the entire proceedings ... the court in its 

completeness, including the judge, the clerk, the bailiff, the reporter, the interpreter, the 

jury, the defendant, and the respective counsel was at all times present, the only element 

absent being the walls and fittings of the courtroom wherein the court is usually 

convened.” [Citation] Since “the forms of law governing the trial of causes” was 

otherwise observed, we declined to hold this “absence of formality” had compromised 

the proceedings. [Citation]

In this case, Layman and Williamson investigated the crime scene; the trial court 

therefore reasonably designated them as “showers” to explain how the actual physical 

conditions related to their trial testimony. The record establishes that their involvement 

was limited to that end, i.e., “showing” the jury what their words had described and the 

photographs had depicted. [Citations] Given the court’s broad discretion in these 

matters, we find no abuse in having the deputies respond to specific questions rather 

than proceeding in some other manner. [Citation] Williamson’s statement that the 

foliage differed in height from the time of the crime was also proper “to account for any 

change in [the] condition between [its] state as shown by the evidence and [its] 

appearance at the time the jury inspected [it].” [Citation]

We also find no prejudicial error with respect to defendant’s statutory rights. [Citation] 

[I]n this case it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been 

reached had defendant, in addition to his counsel, been present. [Citation] On this 

record, we find “no sound basis to question the contemporaneous judgment of defense 

counsel, with which defendant then agreed, that defendant’s trial interests would be 

better served by not attending the jury view.” [Citation] 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 324-325.

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Petitioner has not convinced the Court that the comments of deputies Layman and Williamson, 

while showing the jury the crime scene, violated § 1119, denying him federal rights. As noted, the 

California Supreme Court, in rejecting this claim, broadly construed § 1119 to allow the appointed 

showers “to explain how the actual physical conditions related to their trial testimony.” Id. at 324-25. 

Because “their involvement was limited to that end,” id. at 325, and § 1119’s provision against 

communicating with the jury has been recognized by the California Supreme Court as directed to

insulating the jury from “extraneous contact and potential tampering,” id. at 324, citing People v. Tarm 

Poi, 86 Cal. 225 (1890), the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that no abuse 

of discretion or violation of the statute occurred. 

Petitioner has not cited any applicable clearly established Supreme Court laws. Accordingly, 

the state supreme court’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States 

Supreme Court precedent. Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner’s argument raises an issue of state law his claim is not a 

basis for habeas relief. (ECF No. 113 at 123-25.) “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for 

errors of state law.” Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780. A federal habeas court may not examine questions of 

state law; it “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

As with claim L1, ante, even if the Court were to assume the state law gave rise to a 

protectable federal right, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. Petitioner concedes “the 

requirements of Penal Code § 1119 have not been strictly construed by the California courts . . . .” 

(ECF No. 178 at 158:1-2.) He complains of a lack of courtroom decorum and that the court clerk was 

not present. Yet he does not explain with reference to the record how this, or the comments of the 

“showers,” prejudicially impacted him. 

In sum, the California Supreme Court could reasonably find that Petitioner did not make a 

showing of why and how the manner in which the jury view was conducted denied him a fair trial. 

This Court agrees with the state supreme court that, “[o]n this record, we find no sound basis to 

question the contemporaneous judgment of defense counsel, with which defendant then agreed, that 

defendant’s trial interests would be better served by not attending the jury view.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th

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at 325. 

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim L2 is denied.

c. Claim L3

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges that the viewing of the Sand Canyon Store by only 11 of 

the 12 jurors violated Penal Code § 1119, that he did not waive this violation, and that the violation 

denied him a fair jury trial and due process under state and federal law. (ECF No. 113 at 125-28.)

Petitioner raised this same claim on habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The 

California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred because this claim 

could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In 

re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court 

also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus.) 

1) Clearly Established Law

The due process standard is set out in claim L1, ante. 

2) Analysis of Claim L3

Petitioner alleges that the jury, as a body, did not view the Sand Canyon Store, the location 

where Petitioner and Ramirez met the victims on the day of the shootings. (RT at 2121.) Petitioner

states that he did not anticipate this alleged structural error and did not knowingly waive his rights 

regarding it. (RT at 1892-93.) 

As noted, juror Barnes, with the agreement of the parties and the trial court, was allowed to 

drive home from the crime scene view separately from the other jurors. (RT at 2121.) After juror 

Barnes departed, the remaining jurors were told they would drive past the Sand Canyon Store. (Id.)

Petitioner argues that once Barnes left, the jury was no longer constituted as a jury, such that 

any action taken by the partial jury denied him fair trial and due process under Article I § 16 of the 

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California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. He 

argues the eleven jurors received additional information relevant to testimony of witnesses Ramirez 

and Wilson outside his presence, i.e., effectively conducting the jury trial without the full jury. He 

alleges this created structural error, exempt from harmless error review, and highly prejudicial under 

Brecht. 

This claim fails. Preliminarily, the record is unclear whether juror Barnes and/or the 

remaining 11 jurors actually drove past and saw the Sand Canyon Store. Equally uncertain is whether 

deputies Layman and Williamson commented on the Store during the jury view. In short, Petitioner 

makes no showing that during the jury view, any juror received information about the Store that was 

relevant to the testimony of Ramirez and Wilson. The California Supreme Court would not have 

been unreasonable in determining that speculation alone is not a basis for error. 

Similarly, any violation of § 1119 could be seen as speculative. Even if juror Barnes was absent 

from a jury viewing of the San Canyon Store, the state supreme court could reasonably find such a state 

law violation did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial violating Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

Petitioner argues that because Ramirez and Wilson described the Sand Canyon Store in their testimony, 

their credibility would have been impacted by any inconsistencies between their description of the Sand 

Canyon Store and what the jury saw when viewing the Store. But Petitioner does not point to any facts 

in his proffer suggesting such inconsistencies existed, much less reflected upon witness credibility. 

This argument could be seen as speculative. 

Petitioner’s citation to Hicks in support of the argument that § 1119 supports a state created due 

process right is unavailing. Hick’s does not so hold. Petitioner does not demonstrate that the state 

legislature intended this result, or that courts have interpreted § 1119 in this fashion. 

Petitioner’s waiving attendance at the scene view did not run afoul of due process protections 

for reasons discussed in claim L1, ante. Moreover, it appears that defense counsel was present during 

the jury view and did not object in relation to any viewing of the Sand Canyon Store. (RT at 2121.)

Finally, Petitioner has not established any prejudice related to this allegation. Petitioner has 

not demonstrated that the trial testimony of eyewitnesses Ramirez and Wilson was dependent upon or 

related to the location and structure of the Sand Canyon Store or that the Sand Canyon Store had 

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some material relationship to other locations and events described in the trial testimony. Moreover, 

all the jurors had seen photographs of the Sand Canyon Store. (RT at 1724-25; CT at 390). Even if 

juror Barnes was absent from a viewing of the Store, the California Supreme Court could reasonably 

have found this had only a minor, if any, impact on the jury’s determinations, for the reasons stated. 

See e.g., Olano, 62 F.3d at 1188 (finding no error where juror missed an afternoon of testimony but 

reviewed a written transcript of what he missed). 

In sum, Petitioner makes no showing that during the jury view, any juror received information 

about the Store that was relevant to the testimony of Ramirez and Wilson, or that any absence of juror 

Barnes from a jury viewing of the San Canyon Store resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial violating 

Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

It follows that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim L3 is denied. 

d. Claim L4 

In this final claim, Petitioner complains that the trial court did not take steps to reduce the 

intrusive effect of press coverage during the jury view, denying Petitioner due process and a fair jury 

trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 128-30.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim on habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (CSC 

Pet. Habeas Corpus at 197-200.) The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was 

procedurally barred because this claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC 

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 

at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected the claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

1) Clearly Established Law

The standard for due process is set out in claim L1, ante.

2) Analysis of Claim L4

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Petitioner argues that the jury view was tainted by excessive media involvement, denying 

fairness and integrity of the proceedings. 

The trial court, prior to the jury view, warned jurors that the press would be “tailing” them up 

the mountain to the crime scene. (RT at 1892-93.) Petitioner claims that the media presence at the 

jury view denied “judicial serenity and calm,” Estes, 381 U.S. at 536, and changed the jury’s 

perception of the crime scene and how it relates to the testimony at trial. (ECF No. 113 at 129.) This, 

he claims, had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

But the state court could reasonably have found these allegations, relating to media at the jury 

view and how the media might have influence matters there, to be speculative and without merit. 

Petitioner seizes upon two comments the trial court made prior to the trip to the crime scene. (ECF 

No. 113 at 128-29.) The court first stated: “[w]e will be tailed by a television crew who will be

filming again.” (RT at 1892.) Later, the court commented:

[T]his trip Monday has gotten a little more complicated and publicized than I might 

wish, and I cannot close down these highways, at least I don’t think that’s within my 

power, and there are going to be television stations following us up and down and 

around, so I just have to warn you about that. Avoid contact with them, and I am sure 

that we will make some security arrangements for you but there’s going to be more than 

one television crew, I think, tailing us, so to speak, up the mountain. [Citation] The trial 

court also told jurors that the media “are ordered not to talk [to you], and you are 

ordered not to talk to them.

(RT at 1976-77.) 

Notwithstanding these comments, nothing in the record reasonably suggests that media was in 

fact present at the jury view. It follows that Petitioner’s suggestion the presence of the media “would 

have dramatically altered the jury’s perceptions” of the crime scene, and his ruminations regarding 

how media might have impacted the jury view, e.g., detracting from the sense of remoteness and 

creating background noise, are all unavailing absent any showing the media was present for the 

viewing. (ECF No. 113 at 129.) Petitioner was given the opportunity to obtain discovery regarding 

this claim. (ECF No. 174 at 11.) Nonetheless, the claim remains unsupported in the record. 

Even if the media was present for the jury’s view of the crime scene, the state supreme court 

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could reasonably have concluded there was no prejudice. Nothing in the record suggests media 

activity that impacted or altered the jury’s view of the crime scene. The court referenced security 

arrangements for the trip which could have ameliorated distraction the media might otherwise 

present. (RT at 1893, 1976-77.) Moreover, the trial court admonished the jury numerous times to 

avoid any and all contact with the media. (RT at 25, 228, 235, 249, 326, 1642-43, 1892-93, 1976-77, 

2090.) Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. Olano, 507 U.S. at 740.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim L4 is denied. 

5. Review of Claim M

Petitioner, in his next claim, alleges trial court error by admitting cumulative, irrelevant, and 

gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs, discussed in claim I12, ante, which he alleged were 

unduly prejudicial and violated Petitioner’s state law rights and rights under the Fifth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 130-32.)

Petitioner presented these same allegations to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal.

The California Supreme Court held that Petitioner’s failure to object on federal constitutional grounds 

in the trial court waived the claim. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 319. The California Supreme Court also 

held that Petitioner’s failure to object to the admission of photographs other than People’s Exhibits 

42, 43, and 44 waived any state law objection to the remaining photographs. Id. at 319 n.4.

Petitioner raised this same claim on habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (CSC 

Pet. Habeas Corpus at 148-150.) That court summarily rejected the claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

As noted, a due process claim can be stated where graphic photos of victims make the trial 

fundamentally unfair. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. However, photos that are relevant to the crime 

charged and elements thereof are admissible. See Villafuerte, 75 F.3d at 1343. 

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Under California law, “photographs which disclose the manner in which the victim was 

wounded are relevant on the issues of malice and aggravation of the crime and the penalty.” 

Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 182. But otherwise relevant evidence will be precluded if “its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Evid. Code §§ 350, 

352; People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal. 3d 897, 903-04 (1982). 

b. Analysis of Claim M

Petitioner revisits the photographs which were the subject of ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim I12, ante, but this time alleging trial court error in allowing the prosecution to introduce the 

color photographs of Mincy and Huffstuttler at the crime scene and during autopsy. (People’s Ex.’s. 

3, 4, 10, 17, 35, 40, 42, 43, 44, 72, and 73; see RT at 2079-80, 2083-85, 2088; ECF No 113 at 130:20-

24; CT at 391.) These photographs were used by prosecution criminalist Laskowski to support his 

allegedly improper blood splatter testimony. (See e.g., RT at 2084.) Petitioner claims the 

photographs had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

This claim fails for the same reasons discussed in claim I12, summarized below. 

The state supreme court could reasonably have found the photographs corroborative of the 

trial testimony and forensic evidence; relevant to expert testimony; probative for sentence selection; 

and not unnecessarily inflammatory or gruesome. These photographs clearly relate to the 

circumstances of the murders and the identities of the victims. These photographs could reasonably 

inform as to state(s) of mind of the perpetrator(s) and thus have probative value regarding charges and 

elements including intent to kill, aggravation and penalty. Photographs that are relevant to the crime 

charged are admissible. See Villafuerte 75 F.3d at 1343; Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 182

(“[P]hotographs which disclose the manner in which the victim was wounded are relevant on the 

issues of malice and aggravation of the crime and the penalty.”). 

Significantly, criminologist Laskowski relied upon People’s Exhibits 42 through 44, 72, and 73 

to support his testimony and conclusions that Huffstuttler was shot and died where he was found and 

that he was shot after he was no longer moving. (RT at 2055-65.) The other photographs were not 

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close-ups and not particularly bloody or gruesome and were reasonably probative of the manner of 

death and the crime scene and the victims in relation thereto. (RT at 1661-62, 1671, 1683, 1732, 1790-

92, 1817, 1946-47.) 

Petitioner argues that the photographs were cumulative of and offered little beyond the 

testimony of those who saw what was depicted. However, he does not point to facts in his proffer 

showing the photographs lacked all probative value and permissible inference and were unduly 

prejudicial and that their admission prevented Petitioner from having a fair trial. It appears that the 

photographs informed the expert testimony of criminologist Laskowski (see People’s Ex.’s 42-44, 72-

73), and might have been of value to the jury in understanding and evaluating the credibility of this 

and other testimony. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A]dmission of 

photographs lies largely within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed . . . 

unless the admission of the photographs rendered the trial fundamentally unfair”). Some of the 

photos were wide area shots of the crime scene, not focusing on the bodies, which reasonably could 

have provided useful context to the testimony of the eyewitnesses. (See People’s Ex.’s 17, 35, 40.)

Even without the photographs, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have returned a

more favorable verdict. Petitioner argues the jurors were likely to accord more weight to the 

photographs than deserved because the jurors were unused to seeing such photos. But the noted 

evidence against Petitioner including the circumstances surrounding the murders and their aftermath 

was substantial. (See claims O, R and S, post.) As the California Supreme Court observed: “[w]ith 

two eyewitnesses to the killing, the defendant’s state of mind and intent were the only issues open to 

question. The forensic evidence bearing on those elements was straightforward, to the point, and not 

susceptible to much controversy.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 313. 

Petitioner’s argument that admission of the photos was unduly prejudicial and violated state 

law, citing Pen. Code §§ 350, 352, cannot alone be a basis for federal habeas relief. Lewis, 497 U.S. 

at 780; see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41.

For the reasons stated, admission of the photographs of the victims did not cause Petitioner’s 

trial to be fundamentally unfair. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. This Court does not find that the state 

supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

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established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim M is denied. 

6. Review of Claim N

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges trial court error by allowing criminologist Laskowski to 

testify as an “expert” regarding blood splatter evidence and by admitting his irrelevant, cumulative 

and prejudicial testimony relating to blood splatter causing Petitioner’s trial to be unfair. (ECF No.

113 at 132:14-134:-1.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. The 

California Supreme Court held that Petitioner’s claim was waived because he failed to object 

contemporaneously to Laskowski’s testimony on the grounds urged on appeal. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 

319.

Petitioner raised this same claim on habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (CSC Pet. 

Habeas Corpus at 126-133.) The California Supreme Court summarily rejected the claim on the 

merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

The standard for trial court error is set out at claim A. 

b. Analysis of Claim N

This claim is related to claims I8 and I9, denied ante, wherein Petitioner raised failure to 

challenge Laskowski’s qualifications to opine on blood splatter evidence in the context of claimed 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Laskowski testified regarding analysis of bullets removed from the victims and the patterns of 

blood spatters and drips on and near the victims. (RT at 2053-63.) Laskowski did so having never 

visited the crime scene, relying instead on crime scene photographs. (RT at 2053-63.)

Petitioner alleges that Laskowski was not qualified to give expert testimony as to blood 

splatter evidence. He alleges the testimony was not probative, but inflammatory, and so prejudicial 

as to violate Petitioner’s federal due process rights. He faults the trial court for allowing the 

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testimony and defense counsel for failing to challenge Laskowski’s qualifications as a blood splatter 

expert. (ECF No. 113 at 132-34.) 

Petitioner also alleges that California Supreme Court did not adjudicate the federal claims, 

instead disposing of these allegations on state law procedural grounds given trial counsel’s failure to 

contemporaneously object to Laskowski’s testimony. (ECF No. 113 at 133:22-26); see also Bolin, 18 

Cal. 4th at 319. 

However, the record reflects that the California Supreme Court on direct appeal did review 

these same allegations, as a federal constitutional violation (ineffective assistance of counsel), and 

denied them. See Bolin, 19 Cal. 4th at 321-22; see also claims I8-I9, ante. Thus the summary denial 

does not alone rest on an unadjudicated procedural denial of these allegations. See e.g., Kernan v. 

Hinojosa, No. 15-833, 2016 WL 2842454, at *2 (U.S. May 16, 2016) (strong evidence can refute 

presumption that a later decision rejecting claim did so on the basis of an earlier reasoned opinion 

imposing a procedural default). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s related ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to 

challenge Laskowski’s qualifications, the state supreme court observed that: 

Utilizing photographs of the crime scene, Criminalist Laskowski testified regarding the 

various positions of Mincy's and Huffstuttler's bodies when they were shot. Based on 

blood spatters and drips depicted in the photos, he indicated one shot was to Mincy's 

body while in a “fetal-like” position on its left side; as to the others, his body was in a 

vertical position. Laskowski also concluded Mincy “was moving at a relatively rapid 

pace” after being initially wounded. With respect to Huffstuttler, he determined that for 

several shots the body was prone and not moving. Defendant now contends this 

evidence was inadmissible because the witness was not qualified to render an expert 

opinion (Evid. Code, § 720) and because he did not personally investigate the crime 

scene. He further asserts it should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 352. Since he failed to make these objections at trial, the issue is waived. 

[Citation] 

...

Evidence Code section 720 provides that a person may testify as an expert “if he has 

special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him,” 

[Citation] which “may be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his 

own testimony.” [Citation] The trial court's determination of whether a witness qualifies 

as an expert is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of 

manifest abuse. [Citation] “Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the 

subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his 

knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility.” [Citation] 

The record establishes Laskowski was fully qualified to testify based on his educational 

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background in biochemistry and serology and his training as a criminalist for 13 years, 

including attending and giving seminars in blood-spatter analysis and crime scene 

investigation. He had also testified as an expert witness on numerous prior occasions. 

Given his expertise, Laskowski's testimony was not cumulative. Utilizing his knowledge 

of blood spatters and drips, he was better able to describe the particulars of what 

occurred during the shooting of Huffstuttler and Mincy than any photographic depiction 

of their bodies. For example, he concluded from the spatter evidence that Mincy was 

moving around after he was first shot and before he fell into a fetal position, where he 

was shot one more time. He also explained that the large pool of blood around 

Huffstuttler's body indicated he was prone and not moving when he received the final 

shots. As discussed in other contexts, this evidence was relevant to the issues of intent 

and premeditation and deliberation. The photographs Laskowski referred to adequately 

illustrated his testimony; therefore, the fact he did not personally examine the crime 

scene was a matter of evidentiary weight. Since his testimony was admissible on all 

grounds, counsel had no basis for objecting.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 321-22.

This Court, for purposes of this claim, finds that the California Supreme Court’s conclusion 

that Laskowski was “fully qualified” as an expert in blood spatter analysis, Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 321-

22, was not unreasonable given the facts on record and inference therefrom, as more fully discussed 

in claims I8 and I9, ante. Laskowski’s testimony regarding the forensic evidence and photographs 

was probative of the charged offenses and neither cumulative nor more prejudicial than probative. 

See claims I8, I9 and M, ante, and O, post. The state court could reasonably have found his 

testimony instructive on matters of intent, premeditation, deliberation, and self-defense, as explained 

in claims I8, I9, M and O. Federal courts may not interfere with a state evidentiary ruling unless the 

evidence was so prejudicial that its admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair 

trial. Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1192; Butcher, 758 F.2d at 378. Only if no permissible inferences can be 

drawn from admitted evidence will due process be violated. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. This is not 

such a case, for the reasons stated. 

Even without Laskowski’s testimony, the California Supreme Court could have found no 

reasonable probability and likelihood that the result of the proceeding would have changed. The 

noted evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was substantial. (See claims O, R and S, post.) Laskowski’s 

testimony was not the only evidentiary support for Petitioner’s intent, premeditation, and planning. 

See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 331-33. As the California Supreme Court observed: “[w]ith two 

eyewitnesses to the killing, the defendant’s state of mind and intent were the only issues open to 

question. The forensic evidence bearing on those elements was straightforward, to the point, and not 

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susceptible to much controversy.” Id. at 313. 

For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim N is denied.

7. Review of Claim O

Petitioner claims the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt all the elements of first-degree murder, denying him due process and a fair jury trial. (ECF No. 

113 at 134-36.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court denied the 

claim on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 331-33.

a. Clearly Established Law

Then applicable California law provided, “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being . 

. . with malice aforethought.” Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a). “[A]ll murder which is perpetrated . . . by 

any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree.” Pen. Code 

§ 189; see People v. Berryman, 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 1085 (1993), overruled on other grounds, People v. 

Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 822-23 (1998). Premeditation and deliberation are generally established by 

proof of (1) planning activity; (2) motive (established by a prior relationship and/or conduct with the 

victim); and (3) manner of killing. People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27 (1968). The California 

Supreme Court “sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three 

types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in 

conjunction with either (1) or (3).” Id. at 27. 

A federal habeas court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by determining 

whether in “viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lewis, 497 U.S. at 

781. “A reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless 

whether that evidence was admitted erroneously.” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010). 

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Sufficiency of the evidence claims raised in § 2254 proceedings must be measured with 

reference to substantive requirements as defined by state law. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 

n.16 (1979). In cases where the evidence is unclear or would support conflicting inferences, the 

federal court “must presume -- even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record -- that the trier of 

fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at

326. To prevail here, Petitioner must show “that the prosecution’s case against him “was so lacking 

that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.” McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 131. 

AEDPA adds another layer of deference over the already deferential Jackson standard. Under 

AEDPA, the federal court may not grant a habeas petition unless it finds that the state court 

unreasonably applied the principles underlying the Jackson standard when reviewing the petitioner’s 

claim. See, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that “unreasonable application” standard applies to 

insufficient evidence claim). “Expressed more fully, this means a reviewing court faced with a record 

of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume -- even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record -- that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 133.

b. Analysis of Claim O

Petitioner alleges the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that he acted with 

deliberation and premeditation. (ECF No. 113 at 134); Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 26-27. He re-argues 

his voluntary manslaughter theory, namely, that the Huffstuttler shooting resulted from a sudden 

argument with Petitioner (ECF No. 113 at 135:1-4) caused by Huffstuttler bringing Mincy and 

Wilson to the cabin and showing them the marijuana field (RT at 1729-42, 1755, 1764-65). 

Petitioner goes on to assert that he then immediately shot Mincy and Wilson (RT at 1741), not 

because he planned to, but by reacting on impulse to a perceived threat from Huffstuttler and because 

they were uninvited intruders. (ECF No. 113 at 135:13-17.) 

Petitioner points out that Wilson initially told authorities he heard a scuffle before shots were 

fired (RT at 1809-10), though by the time of trial he was unable to remember a scuffle. (RT at 1770.) 

Petitioner also points out that the prosecution expert identified dust on Huffstuttler’s clothing which 

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Petitioner contends is consistent with a struggle having occurred prior to the gunshots. (RT at 2071.) 

Petitioner contends that this claim was not adjudicated by the state court because that court 

did not address the constitutional issues presented. (ECF No. 135 at 135:24-25.) This Court 

disagrees for the reasons that follow.

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected these allegations on direct appeal, 

noting that: 

Defendant contends the evidence of first degree murder was insufficient to establish a 

preconceived design or careful thought or reflection. [Citation] In particular, he argues 

that he could not have formed the requisite state of mind because the unexpected arrival 

of Mincy and Wilson immediately precipitated both the argument with Huffstuttler 

about the strangers’ observations of the marijuana plants and the shootings.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted 

unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 

evidence to support [the conviction].” [Citation] In People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal. 

2d at pages 26-27, we identified three categories of evidence relevant to resolving the 

issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. 

However, as later explained in People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 195, 247: “Anderson

does not require that these factors be present in some special combination or that they be 

accorded a particular weight, nor is the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to 

guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that 

the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or 

rash impulse. [Citation]” Thus, while premeditation and deliberation must result from “

‘careful thought and weighing of considerations’ “ (70 Cal. 2d at p. 27), we continue to 

apply the principle that “[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require 

any extended period of time. ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the 

extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, 

calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly ....’ [Citations]”

Defendant correctly notes the killings took place within a few minutes of the victims’

arrival at his cabin. What occurred within those few minutes, however, is particularly 

telling with respect to his state of mind. According to both Wilson and Eloy Ramirez, 

defendant began arguing with Huffstuttler when Mincy and Wilson were shown the 

marijuana plants. Defendant continued berating Huffstuttler as the two walked back 

toward the cabin. Defendant went inside, retrieved a revolver, and shot Huffstuttler at 

close range. He proceeded back across the creek and confronted Wilson and Mincy. 

After apologizing that he had “nothing against” them, he opened fire. As a wounded 

Wilson fled the scene, he heard Mincy plead for his life. More shots were fired. 

Defendant returned to Huffstuttler and fired several rifle rounds into his motionless 

body. The autopsy report indicated at least three shots were inflicted before he died, 

although according to Ramirez he did not move after the first shot. After the shootings, 

defendant told Ramirez he was going to make the scene look like a bad dope deal had 

occurred and scattered marijuana, broke bottles, and poured chili sauce around 

Huffstuttler’s body. None of the victims were armed; nor did they engage in any 

provocative conduct.

From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could infer defendant had a motive for the 

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killings, both to punish Huffstuttler for revealing the marijuana operation to strangers 

and to protect his crop from theft or exposure to law enforcement. He also may have 

wanted to eliminate Mincy and Wilson as witnesses to the Huffstuttler shooting. In 

conjunction with these possible motives, the manner of killing supports a finding of 

premeditation and deliberation. Both victims died of multiple gunshot wounds, several 

of which would have been fatal individually. While defendant fired some shots at Mincy 

as he was attempting to flee, at least one shot entered his body as he lay in a fetal 

position. This forensic evidence indicates defendant did not want merely to wound either 

victim; he wanted to make certain they died. The trial testimony also suggests rapid but 

purposeful planning activity once defendant realized the potential consequences of his 

partner’s carelessness. While chastising Huffstuttler, he walked back to the cabin where 

he got a gun. Rather than seek a reconciliation, he shot Huffstuttler without warning. He 

then shot Mincy and Wilson and made good his escape after attempting to conceal his 

own involvement in the crimes. Viewing the record in its entirety, we find sufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s finding of first degree murder. [Citation] Defendant’s 

argument simply asks this court to reweigh the facts.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 331-33. Petitioner argues the facts demonstrate that he had insufficient time to 

plan the killings, and that he had no prior relationship with any of the victims that would suggest a 

motive for the killings. (ECF No. 178 at 177:14-178:5, citing the Anderson factors.) The Court 

disagrees for the reasons stated by the California Supreme Court. The trial record suggests Petitioner 

was motivated to kill Huffstuttler for bringing strangers to the marijuana field, followed by some 

amount of time to retrieve a gun, return and take Huffstuttler down to the ground with a single shot. 

Petitioner then pursued Mincy, apologized for what he was about to do, and shot him dead while 

Mincy begged to live. Petitioner’s conduct after the shootings could reasonably inform the manner in 

which he killed his victims. See People v. Perez, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1128 (1992). Petitioner searched 

for Wilson after he escaped wounded into to the forest; when he could not find him, Petitioner 

commented to Ramirez that Wilson would bleed to death before he got off the hill. (RT at 1928-29.) 

Apparently to ensure this, Petitioner disabled Wilson’s truck, removing wires and discarding them 

during his flight to Los Angeles. (RT at 1738, 1863-64, 1929, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1975.) Petitioner 

altered the crime scene and then fled. All these facts reasonably suggest Petitioner was motivated to, 

planned to and purposefully obtained a gun and shot Huffstuttler and Mincy in order to kill them. 

These facts do not suggest the victims threatened to physically harm Petitioner. 

A rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt based on the noted evidence in the record. The state supreme court’s denial of these 

claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or based 

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on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

For the stated reasons, the California Supreme Court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s 

constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim O is denied. 

8. Review of Claim P

Petitioner next claims instructional error, in 10 subclaims, which he alleges individually, 

cumulatively, and in combination with defense counsel’s deficient guilt phase closing argument (see

claim I17, ante), confused the elements of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary 

manslaughter, and denied him due process and a fair jury trial. (ECF No. 113 at 136-52.) Each 

subclaim is discussed separately below. 

a. Clearly Established Law

Initially, the Court notes that any error in the state court’s determination of whether state law 

supported an instruction in this case cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 71 (1991) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)) (“[T]he Due Process 

Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state 

evidentiary rules”). “Failure to give [a jury] instruction which might be proper as a matter of state 

law, by itself, does not merit federal habeas relief.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

The Supreme Court has stated instead that a claim that a court violated a petitioner’s due 

process rights by omitting an instruction requires a showing that the error “so infected the entire trial 

that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)

(quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). The burden on Petitioner is especially heavy “where . . . the alleged 

error involves the failure to give an instruction.” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006).

Even if constitutional instructional error has occurred, the federal court must still determine 

whether Petitioner suffered actual prejudice, that is, whether the error “had substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. A “substantial and 

injurious effect” means a “reasonable probability” that the jury would have arrived at a different 

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verdict had the instruction been given. Clark, 450 F.3d at 916. 

b. Review of Claim P1

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s failure to instruct with CALJIC No. 3.31 allowed the 

jury to convict him of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder without finding a joint 

concurrence of an act and specific intent. (ECF No. 113 at 136-39; ECF No. 178 at 215.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court found that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas 

Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California 

Supreme Court also summarily denied the claim on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on concurrent act and intent 

where specific intent crimes, such as murder, were charged. (ECF No. 113 at 137:8-10); see People 

v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 220 (1996). He claims the trial court should have given CALJIC 3.31, 

which requires that for murder there be a concurrence of act and intent, and states in pertinent part: 

In the crime(s) and allegation(s) charged in Counts [ ] of the information, and [or] which 

[is a] [are] lesser crime[s] thereto], [namely ___,], there must exist a union or joint 

operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. 

Unless such specific intent exists the [crime(s)] [or] [allegation(s)] to which it relates [is 

not committed] [or] [is not true]. [The specific intent required is included in the 

definition[s] of the [crime[s]] [or] [allegation[s]] set forth elsewhere in these 

instructions.]

Petitioner claims that, instead, the trial court gave CALJIC 3.31.5, which is to be read for 

crimes in which a specific mental state is an element of the crime, as follows: 

In each of the crimes charged in Counts one and two and in the lesser included crimes of 

2nd degree murder and voluntary manslaughter there must exist a certain mental state in 

the mind of the perpetrator and unless that mental state exists the crime to which it 

relates is not committed . . . . 

(RT at 2195-96.) He claims instruction 3.31.5 does not require concurrent act and intent and because of 

that is intended to be read in addition to instruction 3.31 where the charged crime involves act and 

intent. (ECF No. 113 at 137:19-24.) Petitioner claims that, because of this error, the jury was never 

instructed that intent to kill had to be concurrent with the act of shooting the victims. As a result, he 

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claims, the jury may have believed it could find the requisite mental states from actions that occurred 

after the crimes. (ECF No. 113 at 139:1-4.) 

Petitioner also argues that the government failed to carry its burden of showing this instructional 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, and denied him due process, 

a fair trial, and a reliable adjudication of the charges under Brecht, violating the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 

protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 

necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 

Respondent concedes the trial court did not instruct with CALJIC No. 3.31 (which explains 

the requirement of a joint concurrence of intent and act) in relation to counts I and II, but argues that 

other instructions substantially covered the same principle. (ECF No. 194 at 209:1-3.)

The California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, considered claimed instructional error for 

CALJIC 3.31.5, 8.30, 8.40 and 8.43, regarding mental state for lesser included offenses, and found 

the instructions correctly stated the law and were not likely to confuse the jury when considered in 

context and in relation to each other. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 328-29.

The Court finds this claim to be unpersuasive. The record reflects that the trial court 

instructed the jury on the essential elements of murder (RT at 2197; CT at 458-59; CALJIC No. 

8.10), on the intent required for first degree murder under the theory of willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing (RT at 2198; CT at 463; CALJIC No. 8.20), and on the sufficiency of 

circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state (RT at 2196-97; CT at 472; CALJIC 

No. 2.02). 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed that jury with CALJIC No. 3.31.5 as follows:

In each of the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2 and in the lesser included crimes of

second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as to counts 1 and 2, there must exist

a certain mental state in the mind of the perpetrator, and unless that mental state exists,

the crime to which it relates is not committed.

The mental state required or the mental states required are included in the definition of 

the crimes charged, which I will read to you later. The specific intent or mental state 

with which an act is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the 

commission of that particular act, but you may not find the defendant guilty of the 

offenses charged in Counts 1, 2, and 3 [. . .] unless the proved circumstances which are 

not only, first of all, consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required 

specific intent or mental state but, secondly, cannot be reconciled with any other 

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rational conclusion.

(RT at 2195-96, emphasis added.)

The trial court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.20 (ECF No. 113 at 139:12-19), 

stating that:

All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 

killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. [¶] The word 

“willful,” as used in this instruction, means intentional. [¶]

The word “deliberate” means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of

careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of

action. The word “premeditated” means considered beforehand. [¶]

The significance of an omitted instruction is evaluated by a comparison of the omitted 

instruction with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 971 (citing Henderson, 431 

U.S. at 156).

Here, the instructions given, in particular CALJIC Nos. 3.31.5 and 8.20 (see also claim P2, post) 

expressed to the jury that the killing must be committed with the requisite mental state, i.e., 

intentionally, willfully and with premeditation, in order to be first degree murder. The noted 

instructions given specifically referenced the “specific intent or mental state with which an act is done.” 

(RT at 2196.) The jury would have understood that there must be joint union of such intent and the act 

of murder in order to find Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. The jury would not reasonably have 

understood this instruction to consider only Petitioner’s mental state formed after the killings. See e.g.,

Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th at 219-20 (holding that the omission of CALJIC No. 3.31 with regard to the 

charge of murder did not require reversal because the murder instructions “substantially covered” the 

concept of concurrence of act and specific intent); People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1142-43 

(1994) (holding that the court’s instructions as a whole properly guided the jury’s consideration of the 

evidence because CALJIC No. 8.20 “adequately expressed the need for joint operation of act and intent 

on that theory”) (citing People v. Kozel, 133 Cal. App. 3d 507, 522 (1982)); see also People v. 

Benjamin, 52 Cal. App. 3d 63, 84-85 (1975).

The state supreme court could reasonably have found that the noted instructions given 

adequately express the requirement for a joint concurrence of requisite intent and act with regard to first 

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degree murder.

Petitioner may believe that CALJIC No. 3.31 would have communicated the relevant 

principle to the jury better. However, “[t]he availability of a better instruction is not a ground for 

reversal” under federal law. United States v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir. 1990).

Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner complains of a state law violation, this Court must 

defer to the ruling by the California Supreme Court. Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether 

any violation of state law occurred that rose to the level of a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the 

federal Constitution. For the reasons stated, it did not.

It follows that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim P1 is denied. 

c. Review of Claim P2

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges that the trial court prejudicially misspoke when 

instructing the jury on the definition of first degree murder. (ECF No. 113 at 139-40.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. (CSC Pet. Habeas Corpus at 206-08.) The California Supreme Court ruled that 

Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred because this claim could have been, but was not, raised on 

direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In 

re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) That court also summarily denied the claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court read the word “reflex” instead of the word “reflection,”

when instructing with CALJIC No. 8.20 (ECF No. 113 at 139:12-19), specifically as follows:

All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 

killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. [¶] The word 

“willful,” as used in this instruction, means intentional. [¶]

The word “deliberate” means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of

careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of

action. The word “premeditated” means considered beforehand. [¶]

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If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on

the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation,

so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflex and not under a sudden heat of

passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first

degree. [¶]

The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during

which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is 

truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and 

under varying circumstances.

The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold,

calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere

unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not 

deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first 

degree. [¶] To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh 

and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, 

having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill.

(RT at 2198-2200.) Petitioner argues this error prejudiced his defense. He claims the jury could have 

convicted him of first degree murder even though he may have acted without malice aforethought. 

He contends this instructional error was prejudicially erroneous not merely ambiguous, Boyde, 494 

U.S. at 378-80, and had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Respondent concedes that the Reporter’s Transcript indicates the trial court misspoke by 

stating the word “reflex,” instead of “reflection,” when reading CALJIC No. 8.20 to the jury. (ECF 

No. 194 at 213:19-21; RT at 2198-2200.) 

The Court finds this claim unavailing. The record reflects that the trial court also provided the

jury the instructions in written form, which correctly used the word “reflection” rather than “reflex.” 

(CT at 412, 463.) Furthermore, the jury was instructed that “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at 

or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the

proposed course of action,” and that premeditated means “considered beforehand.” (RT at 2198.)

Properly considering the jury instructions as a whole, the trial court’s misstatement was 

unlikely to mislead the jury into believing, as Petitioner suggests, that they could convict him of 

premeditated murder based on a “reflexive” urge to kill (ECF No. 178 at 187). See United States v. 

Marin-Cuevas, 147 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering whether the jury instructions “taken as 

a whole were misleading or represented a statement inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberations” 

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(quoting Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis in original).

In light of the definitions provided to the jury and the instruction as a whole, the California 

Supreme Court reasonably could have found that no reasonable juror would give the instructions the 

meaning that Petitioner proposes, rather than the obvious meaning stated in the written form. People 

v. Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th 83, 138 (1994) (inadvertent misreading of instruction not error where no 

reasonable juror would have given the instruction the meaning asserted by defendant). It is not 

reasonably likely that the jury would have misunderstood the instruction in this context. See Boyde, 

494 U.S. at 380; United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1994) (misreading of a single 

phrase in the conspiracy instruction not plain error where corrected in the written instructions 

provided to the jury). 

Petitioner’s argument that the Ninth Circuit requires precedence be given to the oral 

instructions, citing People of Territory of Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1992),

is likewise misplaced. Marquez stands for the proposition that “all jury instructions must be read 

aloud to the jury in the presence of counsel and the defendant.” 963 F.2d at 1314-15. The trial court 

in Marquez failed entirely to instruct the jury orally on any elements of the crimes charged and the 

definitions of the terms used in a description of the charges, providing only written instructions, such 

that the reviewing court could not tell from the record whether each juror was aware of the elements. 

Id. at 1315-16. The Marquez court found the refusal of the trial court to read the elements of the 

alleged offense to be structural error that precluded harmless error analysis. Id. 

Here, the trial court did not refuse to read the elements of the charged offense, but rather nonprejudicially misspoke in doing so. Nor is Marquez clearly established law of the Supreme Court. 

Casey, 386 F.3d at 907. Petitioner’s cited California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 7 (1996), wherein that court 

applied harmless error analysis in reviewing instructional error omitting the intent element from the 

definition of the crime, is not authority that the error in this case was structural, or more than 

harmless. 

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 

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For the reasons stated, claim P2 is denied. 

d. Review of Claim P3

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that the trial court prejudicially misspoke when instructing the 

jury on the premeditation element of attempted murder (ECF No. 113 at 140-42), denying him due 

process and a fair jury trial, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred because 

this claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas 

Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California 

Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without explanation. (CSC 

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court read the word “events” in place of the word “reflection,”

when instructing with CALJIC No. 8.67. (ECF No. 141:1-4.) Specifically, the trial court instructed 

the jury as follows:

It is also alleged in Count 3 that the crime attempted was willful, deliberate, and

premeditated murder. If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder, you must

determine whether this allegation is true or not true. [¶] “Willful” means intentional.”

Deliberate” means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought

and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.

“Premeditated” means considered beforehand. [¶] If you find that the attempted murder

was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result

of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing

reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea

of deliberation, it is attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. [¶]

The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during

which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is 

truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and 

under varying circumstances. [¶] The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the 

extent of the events. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a

short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes

an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation. [¶]To constitute willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, the would-be slayer must weigh and 

consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having 

in mind the consequences, decides to kill and makes a direct but ineffectual act to kill 

another human being. [¶] The People have the burden of proving the truth of this 

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allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find it to be not true.

(RT at 2208-10) (emphasis added.)

Petitioner alleges that this error “instructed the jury to rely on the extent of Petitioner’s actions 

or other events prior to the shootings, rather than the extent of any thought taken before [the 

shootings],” precluding the jury from considering the requirement for deliberation. (ECF No. 113 at 

141:5-8); see Roy, 519 U.S. at 7 ([prejudicial instructional error mis-describing element violates 

constitution). 

Petitioner alleges this instruction was not provided to the jury in writing, (ECF No. 178 at 

181:6-17; CT 412-30), and that in any event the incorrect oral instruction must be given precedence. 

Marquez, 963 F.2d at 1314-15. 

Petitioner alleges this instruction was prejudicially erroneous, Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378-80, was 

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id., and had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Respondent does not dispute that the trial court read the word “events” in place of the word 

“reflection,” when reading CALJIC No. 8.67. (RT at 2209.) However, Respondent contends, and the 

record demonstrates that the trial court also provided the jury the instructions in written form, which 

correctly used the word “reflection,” rather than “events.” (CT at 412, 486.) Moreover, it appears that 

the jury was properly instructed that the crime of attempted murder must be committed with the 

requisite mental state, i.e., willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. (CALJIC No. 8.67; RT at

2208-10.) Specifically, the instruction given provided that, in order to find Petitioner guilty of the 

crime, the jury must find “that the attempted murder was preceded and accompanied by a clear, 

deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have 

been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition 

precluding the idea of deliberation[.]” (RT at 2209.) 

The state supreme court, viewing the jury instructions as a whole, could have found no 

reasonable likelihood that the jury’s finding of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder 

was based on “the events” surrounding the shooting of Mr. Wilson, rather than the extent of 

Petitioner’s reflection. This is because the instructions given, viewed in toto, appear to clearly 

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require that the jury find Petitioner committed the act with this state of mind in order to find the 

special allegation true. See Marin-Cuevas, 147 F.3d at 893 (stating the test for error is whether the 

jury instructions “taken as a whole were misleading or represented a statement inadequate to guide 

the jury’s deliberations”). It is not reasonably likely that the jury would have misunderstood the 

instruction given the plain language of the instructional charge in its entirety. See Boyde, 494 U.S. 

at 380; see Ancheta, 38 F.3d at 1117 (misreading of a single phrase in the conspiracy instruction not 

plain error where corrected in the written instructions provided to the jury). Petitioner’s citation to 

Roy is not authority otherwise, for the reasons stated, ante. 

As was the case above, Petitioner’s reliance upon Marquez in support of this claim is 

misplaced. The trial court in this action did not refuse to read the elements of the charged offense. 

For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude the jury was 

not misled by the attempted murder instructional error. 

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 

Claim P3 is denied. 

e. Review of Claim P4

Petitioner alleges the trial court erred in giving duplicative, unnecessary and prejudicial 

instructions, partially over defense objection, regarding both consciousness of guilt by suppression of 

evidence (CALJIC 2.06) and flight from the crime scene (CALJIC 2.52). (ECF No. 113 at 142-44.)

Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court found that 

Petitioner had forfeited his right to object to any claim relating to CALJIC No. 2.06 by failing to 

object below, and in fact agreeing that the evidence supported giving the instruction. Bolin, 18 Cal. 

4th at 326-27 (citing People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1223 (1996)). The California Supreme 

Court also rejected the entire claim on the merits. Id. 

Petitioner revisits allegations in claim I16 (ineffective assistance), alleging that the trial court 

erred by giving CALJIC 2.06 (regarding consideration of suppression of evidence against defendant 

as showing consciousness of guilt) and CALJIC 2.52 (regarding consideration of flight after 

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commission of a crime as showing consciousness of guilt). (RT at 2172-92; CT at 440, 450.) 

Petitioner claims giving these instructions “effectively circumvented” the requirement that 

jurors find deliberation and premeditation, Penal Code § 189, by “providing duplicitous jury 

instructions which unduly emphasized noncriminal actions allegedly taken by [Petitioner] after the 

shootings as the basis for using consciousness of guilt in place of a finding of deliberation and 

premeditation.” (ECF No. 113 at 143:12-15.) 

Petitioner claims these instructions may have drawn the jury’s attention from the 

premeditation and deliberation elements, denying him due process and a fair trial under the Brecht

standard. 

Petitioner also states that this claim was not adjudicated by the state court because that court 

did not address the constitutional issues. (ECF No. 135 at 144:8-9.) The Court disagrees, for the 

reasons stated below.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court considered whether the consciousness of guilt 

instructions prejudicially emphasized “noncriminal conduct occurring after the shootings” and

concluded they did not, as follows:

CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.52 do not impermissibly emphasize noncriminal activity as

“consciousness of guilt.” On the contrary, these instructions “made clear to the jury that

certain types of deceptive or evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate

consciousness of guilt, while also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient

to prove a defendant’s guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and

significance assigned to such behavior. The cautionary nature of the instructions benefits

the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might

otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory. [Citations] Moreover, section 1127(c) 

requires a flight instruction when the prosecution relies on such conduct as tending to 

show guilt.

As in past decisions, we find no merit in the contention the instructions improperly 

allow the jury to draw inferences about defendant’s state of mind and equate evidence of

suppression or concealment with a confession. “A reasonable juror would understand

‘consciousness of guilt’ to mean ‘consciousness of some wrongdoing’ rather than

‘consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.’ The instructions 

advise the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of

consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt,

thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to

be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instructions do not address the

defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the 

drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.” [Citation] For cognate reasons 

they do not violate the proscription of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615, 

against referring to the defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify 

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as evidence of guilt. The instructions in no respect implicated defendant’s failure to 

testify or directed the jury to draw negative inferences from it.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 326-27.

The Court finds this claim unpersuasive for the reasons stated above and those discussed in 

claim I16, ante. These instructions appear to unequivocally state that the conduct described therein is 

not sufficient to prove guilt, but instead that it “may be considered.” The California Supreme Court

could reasonably have found that these instructions did not improperly reduce the prosecution’s burden 

of proof. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 167 (prosecution may rely on all the evidence in the record to meet the 

reasonable doubt standard where the state presumption is permissive rather than mandatory).

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court found these instructions appropriately supported by 

the trial record: 

[S]ufficient evidence supported the instruction in light of Ramirez’s testimony defendant

attempted to make the murder scene “look like a bad dope deal” by breaking bottles,

scattering loose marijuana, and shooting the body several more times with a rifle after 

the initial revolver shot. Defendant wiped his fingerprints off the handgun, put the 

weapon in Huffstuttler’s hand, placed a knife near the body, and poured chili sauce 

around it. He then fled south before leaving the state for Chicago. Along the way he 

threw away some wires he had taken to disable Wilson’s truck.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 327. This Court finds no basis to depart from these factual determinations, which 

are to be “presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 

at 340; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). The crime was remote and secluded. (RT at 1731, 1760-61.) 

Petitioner told Huffstuttler, just prior to shooting him, that it was a “no-no” to bring people to see the 

marijuana plantation. (RT at 1739, 1922, 1950.) Petitioner also told Vance that he did not know Mincy 

and Wilson and could not understand Huffstuttler’s reasons for bringing them to see the marijuana

plants. (RT at 1739-40.) Immediately after shooting Huffstuttler, Petitioner approached Mincy and 

Wilson with a gun, told them that he had nothing against them, and then shot them. (RT at 1741.) 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that 

sufficient evidence was presented to justify giving instructions regarding consciousness of guilt and 

flight.

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the 

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facts. 

Claim P4 is denied. 

f. Review of Claim P5 

Petitioner’s next claim alleges that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALJIC 

1.00 (Respective Duties of Judge and Jury), CALJIC 2.51 (Motive), and CALJIC 2.52 (Flight After 

Crime), which directed the jury to decide between “guilt and innocence,” rather than between “guilty 

and not guilty.” (ECF No. 113 at 144-45.) He claims this error lowered the prosecution’s burden to 

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, depriving Petitioner of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to a jury trial, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. (Id.; ECF No.

178 at 195-98.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because this claim could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The 

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that the jury’s obligation is to find whether there is sufficient evidence to

support a guilty verdict, and that use of an “innocence” standard impermissibly relieves the 

prosecution of the burden to prove guilt and places the burden on Petitioner to prove innocence. 

(ECF No. 113 at 144:24-25); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (due process requires 

that prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion when the issue is 

presented in a homicide case). Petitioner points to the trial court’s reading of CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 

2.51, and 2.52 referring to “innocent” or “innocence”, as follows: 

CALJIC No. 1.00, discussing the respective duties of the judge and the jury, included, as 

given, in its final paragraph:

You must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him. You

must not be biased against the defendant because he was arrested for this offense, 

because he was charged with certain crimes, or because he was brought here to stand 

trial. None of these circumstances is evidence of his guilty [sic], and you must not infer 

or speculate from any or all of them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.

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(RT at 2183.)

CALJIC No. 2.51, instructing on motive, as given, provided:

Motive is not an element of the crimes charged and it does not have to be shown.

However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.

Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt and absence of motive may tend to

establish innocence. You will, therefore, give its presence or absence, as the case may 

be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.

(RT at 2191.)

CALJIC No. 2.52, instructing on flight, as given, provided:

The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime or after being

accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish guilt, but it is a fact which, if

proved, may be considered by you in light of all the other proved facts in deciding the

question of his guilt or his innocence.

(RT at 2191-92.)

Petitioner contends it was not enough that subsequent instructions may have correctly stated 

the law because the jurors’ deliberative process had been “inescapably tainted” by the “notion that 

they had to find [Petitioner] innocent of the offenses to return a verdict of not guilty.” (ECF No. 113 

at 145:2-6.) 

Petitioner contends that requiring the jury to decide between “guilty” and “innocence” had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s determination of a verdict, Brecht, 507 U.S. 

at 637, denying him due process and a fair jury trial. 

The Court is not persuaded by this claim. The record shows that the trial court instructed the 

jury with CALJIC No. 1.01, requiring that the jury consider the instructions as a whole. (RT at 2183-

84.) A reasonable juror would have understood that any reference to guilt or innocence in these

instructions was to be considered in light of CALJIC No. 2.90, instructing the jury that it must use the 

proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in its determination of guilt. (RT at 2195.)

Also, as Respondent points out, the trial court also made several references to reasonable

doubt. It did so when instructing on: (1) sufficiency of circumstantial evidence (CALJIC No. 2.01;

RT at 2186-87), (2) reliance on the state of the evidence (CALJIC No. 2.61; RT at 2192), (3) murder 

and manslaughter distinguished (CALJIC No. 8.50; RT at 2204), (4) reasonable doubt as to whether a 

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murder was of the first or second degree (CALJIC No. 8.71; RT at 2205), (5) reasonable doubt as to 

whether killing was murder or manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.72; RT at 2205), (6) special 

circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.80; RT at 2206), (7) willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted 

murder (CALJIC No. 8.67; RT at 2210), (8) use of a firearm (CALJIC No. 17.19; RT at 2213), and 

(9) implied acquittal before conviction of a lesser included or lesser related offense (CALJIC No. 

17.10; RT at 2214). (See ECF No. 194 at 224.) 

The Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that 

CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.51, and 2.52, considered in conjunction with the entire set of instructions, 

including CALJIC No. 2.90, sufficiently made the jury was aware that it must apply the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard of proof. (See RT at 2183, 2191-92; CT at 432-33, 449-50.) 

“Although the Constitution does not require jury instructions to contain any specific language, 

the instructions must convey both that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that 

he may only be convicted upon a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 

F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 866 (9th 

Cir. 2009). “Any jury instruction that reduces the level of proof necessary for the Government to 

carry its burden is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” 

Id. “Any challenged instruction must be considered in light of the full set of jury instructions and the 

trial record as a whole.” Id. at 821.

Here, for the reasons stated, the use of the noted instructions could not reasonably have

resulted in the violation of any constitutional right.

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Claim P5 is denied. 

g. Review of Claim P6

In this claim Petitioner alleges that the trial court misread CALJIC 2.22, the instruction on 

weighing conflicting testimony. (ECF No. 113 at 145-47.)

Petitioner first raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

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Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because this claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The 

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court prejudicially misspoke when instructing with CALJIC 

No. 2.22, regarding the weight to be given to conflicting testimony. The Reporter’s Transcript 

indicates that the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.22, as follows:

Now, you are not bound to decide an issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of [a 

number of] witnesses which does not convince you as against the testimony of a lesser 

number or some other evidence which appeals to your mind with more convincing force. 

[¶] You may not disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses merely from 

caprice or whim or prejudice or from a desire to favor one side as against the other. [¶] 

You must not decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of witnesses 

who have testified on the opposing sides [because] [t]he final test is not in the relative 

[number of witnesses but in the] convincing force of the evidence.

(RT at 2190-91 [material omitted by the court is striked-through, bolded and bracketed; material 

added by the trial court is bolded and bracketed].)

Petitioner argues this instruction, as read, suggested jurors should not resolve conflicting 

testimony by focusing on the convincing force of evidence but rather on matters outside the 

evidentiary record, and allowed the jurors to disregard one witness’s credible testimony in favor of 

testimony from two witnesses lacking in credibility, the opposite of what the instruction was intended 

to convey. He contends this was especially prejudicial given the pretrial publicity from the America’s 

Most Wanted program and what he believes was the substantially conflicting testimony from the two 

eyewitnesses, Ramirez (who testified the shooting occurred outside the cabin and that Wilson and 

Mincy were on their way to the cabin) (RT at 1923, 1952), and Wilson (who testified he originally 

thought that the shooting occurred inside the cabin and that he was in the creek bed at the time). (RT 

at 1768-69.) He suggests a properly instructed jury would have found Wilson more credible. (ECF 

No. 113 at 147:8-11.) He claims the instructional error was prejudicial because Wilson’s testimony 

supported Petitioner’s “heat of passion” defense. (ECF No. 113 at 147:14-17.) 

Petitioner also claims this instruction was not provided to the jury in writing. However, the 

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record reflects that the trial court provided the jury the instruction in written form. The copy of 

CALJIC No. 2.22 provided to the jury during deliberations was worded correctly and properly set 

forth the jury’s duty in weighing conflicting testimony. (CT at 412, 447.)

The trial court also clearly instructed the jury that it must:

[D]ecide all of the questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial 

and not from any other source. That means that you must not make any independent

investigation of the fact or the law or consider or discuss facts as to which there is no

evidence.

(RT at 2184-85.) The California Supreme Court, upon consideration of this instruction, could have 

determined there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury based its decision on sources outside of 

evidence presented at trial simply because the trial court omitted the phrase “number of” when 

instructing with CALJIC No. 2.22. 

CALJIC No. 2.22, as read to the jury, plainly told the jury that it “is not bound to decide an 

issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of witnesses which does not convince you as against 

the testimony of a lesser number or some other evidence which appeals to your mind with more 

convincing force.” (RT at 2190.) In light of this instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood that the 

jury would have disregarded the credible testimony of one witness in favor of the less-credible 

testimony of two other witnesses. 

The Court also finds that, viewing the jury instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable 

likelihood that the jury would have been confused or misled into believing, as Petitioner suggests, 

that they could find him guilty of the premeditated attempted murder based on information presented 

outside of the trial, or by incorrectly weighing witness testimony. Given the instructions as a whole, 

a reasonable juror would give the instructions the obvious meaning stated in the written form. 

Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th at 13; see also Marin-Cuevas, 147 F.3d at 893 (stating the test for error is 

whether the jury instructions “taken as a whole were misleading or represented a statement 

inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberations” (emphasis in original)). It is not reasonably likely that 

the jury would have misunderstood the instruction in this context. As was the case above, the Court 

finds that Petitioner’s cited case of Roy, 519 U.S. at 7, is not authority otherwise. 

Additionally, any possible misunderstanding that could have resulted from the court’s 

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misstatement was harmless because the written instructions given to the jury provided the correctly 

worded instruction. See Ancheta, 38 F.3d at 1117. 

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Claim P6 is denied. 

h. Review of Claim P7

Petitioner next alleges that the trial court misread the instruction on the special circumstance 

of multiple murder, CALJIC 8.80, denying Petitioner due process and reliable sentencing, violating 

the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 148-49.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that CALJIC No. 8.80 did not define “reasonable doubt.”

The California Supreme Court held that the trial court’s instruction with CALJIC No. 8.80 correctly 

stated the law and that Petitioner waived the issue on appeal based on his defense counsel’s failure to 

request clarification or amplification of the instruction. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 327-28 (citing People v. 

Arias, 13 Cal. 4th 92, 171 (1996)); People v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 208 (1866)). The California 

Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits. Id. at 328.

Petitioner raised that claim a second time in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court and added the allegations in this claim. The California Supreme Court 

ruled the habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not raised on 

direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In 

re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected the habeas 

claim on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s reading of CALJIC No. 8.80 was incomprehensible, did 

not define “reasonable doubt,” and did not inform the jurors that they must find the special 

circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt by unanimous finding. (ECF No. 113 at 148:14-

18.)

At the time of trial, CALJIC 8.80 read as follows: 

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must 

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find it to be not true . . . In order to find a special circumstance alleged in the case to be 

true or untrue, you must agree unanimously. 

CALJIC 8.80 (1989 Revision)

Petitioner claims the trial court read CALJIC 8.80 as follows: 

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must 

find it to be unreasonable. In order to find the special circumstance alleged in the case 

to be true or untrue, it has unanimously.

(RT at 2206, emphasis added.) 

Petitioner claims that the jury was not instructed that the special circumstance finding had to be 

beyond a reasonable doubt, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 

358, 361 (1970), and had to be unanimous, People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 693 (1976). He claims 

this resulted in structural error, Boyde, 490 U.S. at 380, and an unreliable death finding and death 

sentence. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986). Petitioner also claims this instruction as not 

provided to the jury in writing. (CT at 412-30.) 

Here, the record reflects that the trial court read the word “unreasonable,” instead of the phrase 

“not true,” when reading CALJIC No. 8.80, as follows:

Now, if you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must

then determine if the following circumstance is true or not true. That special 

circumstance is multiple murder. The People have the burden of proving the truth of that 

special circumstance.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not a special circumstance is true, then

you must find it to be unreasonable. In order to find the special circumstance alleged in

this case to be true or untrue, it has to be unanimous. You will state your special finding

as to whether the special circumstance is or is not true on the form that will be handed to

you at the end of these instructions.

(RT at 2206-2207) (emphasis added); see also CSC Order dated 9/24/97.

The California Supreme Court rejected on direct appeal the allegation that the jury was not 

sufficiently instructed that it must find the special circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and on the definition of reasonable doubt, stating that: 

Shortly before giving the special circumstance instruction, the court had already charged 

the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the prosecution has the burden 

of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It then delineated the applicable standard:

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“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt because 

everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some 

possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after the entire comparison 

and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that 

they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the 

charge.”

It is well established in California that the correctness of jury instructions is to be 

determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an 

instruction or from a particular instruction. [T]he fact that the necessary elements of a 

jury charge are to be found in two instructions rather than in one instruction does not, in 

itself, make the charge prejudicial. The absence of an essential element in one 

instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.

In [People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505 (1986)], the court had not defined reasonable 

doubt in conjunction with the instruction on express malice but had given the definition 

elsewhere. Hence, the instruction was not defective. Given the entirety of the charge to 

the jury, it is clear that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have been 

misled as to the appropriate standard for their special finding on express malice. The 

instructions taken as a whole indicate that the prosecution’s burden of proof throughout 

was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach a similar conclusion on this record.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 328. 

On this basis, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found any error was no more 

than harmless. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (“most constitutional errors can be 

harmless”) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). Any error by failing to instruct 

the jury specifically that it must find the special circumstance unanimously true beyond a reasonable 

doubt appears similar to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, which is subject to 

harmless error analysis. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 10. 

The jury was correctly instructed on reasonable doubt before the special circumstance 

instruction was given. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 328. A reasonable juror would have understood from the 

trial judge’s instruction that the multiple murder special circumstance could not be found unless, based 

on the evidence presented at trial, all jurors unanimously believed the special circumstance was true 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT at 2206-2207.) The jurors were given the CALJIC No. 8.80 special 

circumstance form referred to by the judge in his instructions (id.) upon which to render its true or not 

true finding on the special circumstance. (See CT at 537.) Furthermore, the jury was polled following 

the penalty verdict and revealed that its decision was unanimous. (RT at 2620.) Given this record, it 

does not reasonably appear that the jury could have been misled as to the appropriate standards for 

finding the special circumstance to be true.

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Additionally, the trial court did provide the jury with the correctly worded instruction in 

written form. (CT at 412, 481-82.) The trial court also read to the jury similar instructions regarding 

true or not true findings as to willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (CALJIC No. 

8.67; RT at 2210), and personal use of a firearm (CALJIC No. 17.19; RT at 2213).

Petitioner does not make an evidentiary showing of any trial court misstatement related to the 

unanimity requirement. (CT at 481; RT at 2206; CSC Order dated 9/24/97.) It appears that the 

California Supreme Court corrected the language “it has unanimously” by replacing it with “it has to 

be unanimous.” (See CSC Order dated September 24, 1997.)

The entire charge to the jury was clear that it had to make a true or not true finding, not an

“unreasonable” finding, on the special circumstance. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47. Furthermore, a true 

finding on the special circumstance of multiple murder followed from the jury’s verdicts of guilt on 

both of Petitioner’s first degree murder counts. (CT at 533, 535, 537.)

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Claim P7 is denied.

i. Review of Claim P8

Petitioner next alleges that the trial court misread CALJIC 17.40, errantly instructing the jury 

to discuss the evidence with individuals other than their fellow jurors. (ECF No. 113 at 149-50.)

Petitioner first raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred

because this claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet.

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s misreading invited each juror to discuss the evidence, 

not with “the other jurors” but rather with “your colleagues.” (RT at 2216; CT at 506.) 

At the time of trial, CALJIC 17.40, entitled “Individual Opinion Required – Duty to 

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Deliberate,” read as follows:

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after discussing the 

evidence and instructions with the other jurors.

CALJIC 17.40 (1989 Revision, emphasis added) 

Petitioner claims the trial court read CALJIC 17.40 as follows: 

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after discussing the 

evidence and instructions with your colleagues. 

(RT at 2216, emphasis added.) 

Petitioner argues that, because of this error, the jurors may not have based their verdict “solely 

on the evidence before them in a fair and unbiased manner” (ECF No. 113 at 150:3-4), denying him 

due process, violating the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He claims the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

This claim fails. When considered in context, it is clear that the jurors’ “colleagues” were 

limited to the other jurors. The instruction itself provided that each of them had to decide the case for 

themselves after discussing the evidence and instructions. (RT at 2216.) Because individuals other 

than jurors were not present for all of the evidence and instructions, the jurors would not have 

understood the court to be instructing them to discuss the case outside of the jury room. 

Additionally, as Respondent notes, other instructions clarified that the jury alone was able to 

render a verdict. The jury was instructed:

You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial 

and not from any other source. [¶] You must not make any independent investigation of 

the facts or the law or consider or discuss facts as to which there is no evidence. This 

means, for example, that you must not on your own visit the scene, conduct experiments, 

or consult reference works or persons for additional information. [¶] You must not 

discuss this case with any other person except a fellow juror, and you must not discuss 

the case with a fellow juror until the case is submitted to you for your decision and only 

when all jurors are present in the jury room.

(ECF No. 194 at 234:2-6; see CT at 436; RT at 2184-85, 2215-17; CALJIC No. 1.03.) Furthermore, at 

the end of the jury instructions, the court swore the bailiff using these words:

You do solemnly swear that you will take charge of this jury and take them to some

private and convenient place where they may deliberate upon a verdict, and suffer no

person or persons to communicate with them, nor do so yourself except to ask them if 

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they have agreed upon a verdict, or by order of the Court, and you will return them to 

this courtroom when they have agreed upon a verdict or by order of the Court, so help 

you God?

(RT at 2218-19.)

To the extent Petitioner also claims that the correction version of CALJIC 17.40 was not 

provided to the jury in writing, the record suggests otherwise. (CT at 412, 506.) But in any event, the 

claim fails because, for the reasons stated above, it was clear from the entire charge to the jury that it 

was not to speak with anyone other than fellow jurors during the deliberations. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-

47.

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 

Claim P8 is denied. 

j. Review of Claim P9

Petitioner next alleges that the trial court misread CALJIC 17.41 (How Jurors Should Approach 

Their Task) so as to omit the instruction that they be “impartial” jurors. (ECF No. 113 at 150-51.)

Petitioner first raised this claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because the claim could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The 

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

At the time of trial, CALJIC 17.41, entitled “How Jurors Should Approach Their Task” read 

as follows:

The attitude and conduct of jurors at all times are very important. It is rarely helpful for 

a juror at the beginning of deliberation to express an emphatic opinion on the case or to 

announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at the 

outset, a sense of pride may be aroused, and one may hesitate to change a position even 

if shown it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocate in this matter. 

You are impartial judges of the facts. 

CALJIC 17.40 (1989 Revision, emphasis added.) 

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Petitioner claims the trial court read CALJIC 17.40 as follows, leaving out the strikethrough 

word: 

The attitude and conduct of jurors at all times are very important. It is rarely helpful for 

a juror at the beginning of deliberation to express an emphatic opinion on the case or to 

announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at the 

outset, a sense of pride may be aroused, and one may hesitate to change a position even 

if shown it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocate in this matter. 

You are impartial judges of the facts. 

(RT at 2217, emphasis added.) 

Petitioner argues that this error deprived him of a fair trial and of due process and caused him 

prejudice under Brecht, i.e., the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally 

accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.”); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 377-78. 

Respondent concedes the error (ECF No. 194 at 289:16-19), but notes that the trial court did 

charge the jury to “keep in mind that you are not partisans and you are not advocates, you are judges.” 

(RT at 2217.)

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that the entire charge of the 

jury instructions adequately apprised the jurors of their duty to be impartial and unbiased in their 

deliberations. The jurors were instructed with CALJIC No. 1.00 which told them that they “must 

accept and follow the law . . . whether or not [they] agree with the law,” and that in reaching their 

verdict they must not be influenced by pity, prejudice, sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 

public opinion or public feeling. (CT at 432; RT at 2182-83.) 

Furthermore, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.22, which informed them that they 

“may not disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses merely from caprice, whim or 

prejudice, or from a desire to favor one side against the other.” (ECF No. 194 at 289:23-26; see also

CT at 447; RT at 2190-91.) 

Respondent correctly notes that the jurors were repeatedly advised their determination was to 

be based upon reasonable interpretations of the evidence, only the evidence, and not on any sort of 

bias. (ECF No. 194 at 235:26-236:4, citing CT at 427 [CALJIC No. 2.02]; CT at 436 [CALJIC No. 

1.03]; CT at 438-39 [CALJIC No. 2.01]; CT at 447 [CALJIC No. 2.22]; CT at 451 [CALJIC No. 

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2.60]; CT at 472 [CALJIC No. 2.02]; CT at 504 [CALJIC No. 17.30]; CT at 505 [CALJIC No. 

17.31]; CT at 506 [CALJIC No. 17.40].) 

Petitioner also claims this instruction was not provided to the jury in writing. (CT at 412-30.)

But here again the record shows the jury was provided with a written copy of CALJIC No. 17.41 

during its deliberations, which included the word “impartial” that was omitted by the trial court’s 

reading of the instruction. (CT at 412, 507.)

For all the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined 

that it was clear from the entire charge to the jury that jurors understood they had a duty to be 

impartial. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47.

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court law, or based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Claim P9 is denied. 

k. Review of Claim P10

In this final claim, Petitioner claims that cumulative instructional error arising from claims P1

through P9 ante, left the jury with insufficient guidance to render a fair and accurate guilt 

determination, (ECF No. 113 at 151-152) denying him a fair jury trial and due process under the 

Sixth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because this claim could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The 

California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner cites to claims P1-P9, alleging that “the jury was not properly instructed on the 

mental states for first degree murder or attempted murder, the concurrence of act and mental state or 

specific intent for murder, how to judge conflicting testimony, or even how to comport themselves as 

jurors.” (ECF No. 113 at 151:17-20.) He claims the cumulative effect of this error was to deny him a 

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fair trial and due process, prejudice under Brecht. 

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple trial errors 

may give rise to a due process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each 

error considered individually would not require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). 

Although individual errors looked at separately may not rise to the level of reversible error, 

their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial as to require reversal. United States v.

Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993). However, the fact that errors have been committed 

during a trial does not mean that reversal is required. “[W]hile a defendant is entitled to a fair trial;

[she] is not entitled to a perfect trial, for there are no perfect trials.” United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 

1458, 1477 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, for the reasons stated above, claims P1-P9 are insubstantial whether considered singly 

or cumulatively. See United States v. Karterman, 60 F.3d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[b]ecause each 

error is, at best, marginal, we cannot conclude that their cumulative effect was ‘so prejudicial’ to 

[defendant] that reversal is warranted.”); see also Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445; Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1237, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013). “Cumulative error analysis applies where there are two or more actual 

errors. It does not apply . . . to the cumulative effect of non-errors.” Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 

1152, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 832 (10th Cir. 1998)).

This Court does not find that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim P10 is denied. 

9. Review of Claim Q

Petitioner, in his next claim, alleges that cumulative error during the guilt phase denied him 

due process, an impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable determination of guilt 

and sentence, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF 

No. 113 at 152-53.)

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Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal and in his petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Supreme Court, which that court denied on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335; 

(CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus). 

Petitioner alleges that the cumulative effect of guilt phase errors denied him fundamental 

fairness at trial and prejudiced the jury’s determination of their verdict under the Brecht standard. 

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814, n.6 (9th Cir. 1987); Odle v. Calderon, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 

1076-77 (1999). 

As noted, “the Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple trial 

errors may give rise to a due process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where 

each error considered individually would not require reversal.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (citing

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). Although individual errors looked at separately may not rise to the level 

of reversible error, their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial as to require reversal. 

Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1282. 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected this claim on direct appeal, noting that: 

[D]efendant contends that even if harmless individually, the cumulative effect of the 

trial errors mandates reversal. Because we have rejected all of his claims, we perforce 

reject this contention as well.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335

Likewise, for the reasons stated, ante, this Court has found no guilt phase constitutional 

errors. There is nothing to accumulate to a level of reversible error. Petitioner was “entitled to a fair 

trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.” McDonough Power Equipment v. 

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-232 

(1973)). 

Even if there were guilt phase error, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error, 

whether individually or in sum. The Court’s analysis of guilt phase claims, ante, determines no 

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result, for the reasons stated and given the noted substantial 

evidence against Petitioner. (See claim O, ante; claims R and S, post.)

Accordingly, the Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

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contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim Q is denied. 

C. Claims Relating to Penalty Phase

1. Review of Claim R

In this next claim, Petitioner alleges that, over defense objection, the trial court allowed the 

prosecution to admit as Pen. Code § 190.3(b) aggravating evidence (i.e., evidence of uncharged 

“criminal activity which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence”), Petitioner’s 

June 25, 1990 letter in which he appears to threaten Jerry Halfacre. (See RT at 2442-54.) Petitioner 

claims this was error because the letter did not satisfy the elements of a “threat” under Penal Code § 

422 and did not place Halfacre in fear of immediate harm.

The letter read as follows:

Jerry 6/25/90

Well I finally heard from Paula [defendant's daughter and mother of Halfacre's child] 

and what I heard from her I'm not to[o] pleased with. I heard her side of things w[h]ich 

are real different from what you had to say. I'm only going to say this one time so you 

better make sure you understand. If you ever[] touch my daughter again, I'll have you 

permanently removed from the face of this Earth. You better thank your lucky stars 

you['re] Ashley's father or you[']d already have your fucking legs broke.

I found out what happen[e]d to most of the money from the van, and I also found out

you got 1500 for the truck not 1300 like you said. I'm still going to find out how much 

you got for the Buick and if it's 1¢ over 1000 you can kiss your ass good by[e]. I also 

found out it was running like a top and the burnt valves was a bunch of bull shit, just like 

I thought in the first place. You sounded a little shak[]y over the phone and gave 

yourself away.

I told you a long time ago don't play fucking games with me. You're playing with the 

wrong person asshole. I've made a couple of phone calls to San Pedro to some friends of 

mine and the[y're] not to[o] happy with your fucking game playing with other people's 

money and especially you hitting Paula.

What I want done and it better be done. Everything that's mine or hers tools, clothes, 

books, gun, TV, VCR, I don't fucking care if it's a bobby pin, you better give it to Paula. 

I want all my shit given to her and I mean every fucking thing. You have a week to do it 

or I make another phone call. I hope you get the fucking message. Your game playing is 

eventually going to get you in more than a poo butt game player can handle.

1 week asshole. “And keep playing your game with [my granddaughter] and see what 

happens.

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Petitioner concedes the jury was instructed (albeit deficiently, see claim R4) on the elements 

of California Penal Code § 422. (See ECF No. 113 at 213:7-8; CT 643.) Section 422 provides in 

pertinent part that: 

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great 

bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken 

as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and 

under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, 

immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and 

an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person 

reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate 

family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one 

year, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 

(See ECF No. 113 at ¶ 586; see also Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 337.) 

Petitioner alleges this error by the trial court denied him free speech, due process, and a fair 

sentence determination, violating his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 154-62.) 

Petitioner raises multiple subclaims which are addressed separately below. 

Petitioner raised certain of these allegations on direct appeal, and raised the claim in his state 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the 

allegations, holding that a threat under Penal Code § 422 need not be unconditional, Bolin, 18 Cal. 

4th at 336-41, and that Petitioner suffered no prejudice based on the introduction of the letter at the 

penalty phase. Id. at 340-41.

The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s state habeas claim was procedurally 

barred because certain of the allegations could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC 

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 

at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s habeas claim on the 

merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

A state law error that renders the trial fundamentally unfair violates the Due Process Clause. 

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, 302-03; Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346 (due process protects defendant from 

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arbitrary deprivation of expectations under state law).

Under California law, otherwise relevant evidence is precluded if “its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of 

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Evid. Code §§ 350, 352; 

Cardenas, 31 Cal. 3d at 903-04.

b. Factual Background

During the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced in aggravation Petitioner’s June 25, 1990 

letter to Jerry Halfacre, the common-law husband of Petitioner’s daughter, Paula, and father of their 

child, Ashley. (RT at 1836, 1867, 2442-45.) Halfacre had given the letter to his former probation 

officer, Ms. Lancia O’Connor, on October 12, 1990. (RT at 2442-44, 2455); Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 

n.11.

As noted, in the letter, Petitioner appears to threaten Halfacre never to touch his daughter 

again or Petitioner would have him “permanently removed from the face of this Earth.” Petitioner 

also threatened to kill Halfacre if Petitioner found out that Halfacre had lied to Petitioner about a 

Buick that Halfacre had sold. Petitioner warned Halfacre that he had made phone calls to friends 

outside of prison about Halfacre’s behavior, implying that these friends would carry out Petitioner’s 

threats. Finally, Petitioner ordered Halfacre to deliver all of Petitioner’s and Paula’s belongings to 

Paula within one week or Halfacre would be killed. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 n.11.

Defense counsel objected to introduction of the letter on various grounds, all overruled by the 

trial court, (RT at 2390-93, 2453-54), which then instructed the jury on the elements of Penal Code § 

422. (See CT at 643.) 

c. Analysis of Claim R1

In this claim, Petitioner alleges that the Halfacre letter as introduced was more prejudicial than 

probative under California Evidence Code §§ 350, 352. He also claims the letter as introduced did 

not satisfy the elements of a “threat” under California Penal Code § 422. Petitioner’s arguments are 

analyzed separately below. 

1) Sustained Fear

Petitioner argues that Halfacre may not have actually received the letter, and that if he did it 

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did not place him in sustained fear. He points out that Halfacre waited four months before giving the 

letter to his probation officer. (RT at 2443-44; ECF No. 113 at 157); see Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340. 

He points out that Halfacre did not testify, about his state of mind regarding the letter or otherwise. 

However, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have drawn 

inference from the record that Halfacre received the letter and feared that Petitioner would follow 

through on the threats in it. The envelope which contained the letter was introduced into evidence 

and indicates that the letter was addressed to Halfacre and was postmarked. (People’s Ex. 1; RT at 

2443-54.) 

The threats appear to be serious, angry, and immediate. The letter could be seen as 

threatening on its face. The prospect that Halfacre might be killed by Petitioner’s friends on the 

outside was reasonably apparent. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 n.11. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated otherwise. Given Halfacre’s relationship with Paula (RT at 

2490-91), it was reasonable to conclude that Halfacre knew of the allegations that Petitioner had acted 

violently in the past and was wanted by the police for murder. (RT at 1867-68.)

2) Unconditional and Immediate

Petitioner argues that, at the time the letter was sent, he was incarcerated and unable to 

execute any immediate action on the alleged threats. (ECF No. 113 at 155:4-5); see People v. 

Stanfield, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1157 (1995). He also argues that his alleged threats were 

“conditional” and that his “goal was plainly to persuade Mr. Halfacre to behave himself, not to create 

a circumstance under which he could harm Mr. Halfacre.” (ECF No. 178 at 217.) 

However, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected these arguments on direct 

appeal, noting that: 

[T]he reference to an “unconditional” threat in section 422 is not absolute. As the court 

in People v. Stanfield noted, “By definition, extortion punishes conditional threats, 

specifically those in which the victim complies with the mandated condition. [Citations] 

Likewise, many threats involved in assault cases are conditional. A conditional threat 

can be punished as an assault, when the condition imposed must be performed 

immediately, the intent is to immediately enforce performance by violence and 

defendant places himself in a position to do so and proceeds as far as is then necessary. 

[Citation] It is clear, then, that the Kelner court’s use of the word ‘unconditional’ was 

not meant to prohibit prosecution of all threats involving an ‘if’ clause, but only to 

prohibit prosecution based on threats whose conditions precluded them from conveying 

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a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.” As the court commented in 

U.S. v. Schneider (7th Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 1569, 1570: “Most threats are conditional; 

they are designed to accomplish something; the threatener hopes that they will 

accomplish it, so that he won’t have to carry out the threats.”

Moreover, imposing an “unconditional” requirement ignores the statutory qualification 

that the threat must be “so ... unconditional ... as to convey to the person threatened, a 

gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution . . . .” (§ 422, italics added.) 

“The use of the word ‘so’ indicates that unequivocally, unconditionally, immediacy and 

specificity are not absolutely mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and 

surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of 

execution to the victim.” “If the fact that a threat is conditioned on something occurring 

renders it not a true threat, there would have been no need to include in the statement the 

word ‘so.’” This provision “implies that there are different degrees of unconditionally. A 

threat which may appear conditional on its face can be unconditional under the 

circumstances. . . . [¶] Language creating an apparent condition cannot save the 

threatener from conviction when the condition is illusory, given the reality of the 

circumstances surrounding the threat. A seemingly conditional threat contingent on an 

act highly likely to occur may convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and immediate 

prospect of execution.” Accordingly, we reject defendant’s threshold contention that the 

letter was inadmissible because it contained only conditional threats.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 339-40; see also Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 

1996) (finding that “any person could reasonably consider the statement ‘If you don’t give me this 

schedule change, I’m going to shoot you,’ made by an angry teenager, to be . . . unequivocal and 

specific enough to convey a true threat of physical violence”).

The California Supreme Court reasonably determined that these threats taken together were 

“unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific.” That court’s analysis is not contrary to the 

holding of the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that 

statement “If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” was 

hyperbolic speech, not a true threat), post.

The California Supreme Court reasonably could have found these threats to be non-illusory. 

The only unmet condition to the threatened conduct was Petitioner’s awareness that certain events 

had occurred, i.e., whether Petitioner found out about Halfacre selling his Buick for more than $1,000 

or touching his daughter, Paula. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 n.11. Specifically, regarding the threat 

relating to the possibility that Halfacre sold Petitioner’s Buick for more than the $1000 amount 

Halfacre said he got for it, that amount had already been determined and Halfacre was aware of it 

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since the sale had already taken place. Regarding the threat relating to the possibility Halfacre might 

touch Petitioner’s daughter Paula and granddaughter Ashley, it is unreasonable to assume that

Halfacre would never again have contact with his former girlfriend and their daughter. Halfacre 

would know whether the conditional events had occurred and he could reasonably anticipate that 

Petitioner would find out from Paula that they had occurred. If so, Petitioner stated that he would 

“make another phone call to his friends,” apparently to make good on his threats. (Id.) 

3) Exaggerated

Petitioner argues the alleged threat was exaggerated, (ECF No. 113 at 155:4-28), and did not 

convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution. Stanfield, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 

1157; Watts, 394 U.S. at 705. He argues that the letter could not be a threat because “[t]he statements 

were plainly hyperbolic” (ECF No. 178 at 217:24) in that “touch my daughter” really meant “harm 

my daughter.” (ECF No. 178 at 218:1-3.) He claims Petitioner was merely advising Halfacre not to 

commit criminal acts of domestic violence, child abuse, or theft. He argues that he was incarcerated

and not in a position to make good on the alleged threats. However, the threatened actions and 

events triggering them were sufficiently clearly and angry. Petitioner states in the letter that Halfacre 

would already have had his “fucking legs broke” if he were not the father of Petitioner’s 

granddaughter and that he “can kiss [his] ass goodby[e]” if he sold the Buick for any amount over 

$1,000. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336 n.11. Petitioner’s reference to friends in San Pedro who could carry 

out his threats suggests they could be carried out. Id.; see also Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 987, 

1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (incarceration is not a deterrent to directing crime outside the institution). 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found the statements in the letter not 

simply rhetorical as petitioner contends. 

4) No Foundation or Probative Value

Petitioner argues that Halfacre did not testify, and that the prosecution presented no evidence 

showing if, when and how Halfacre received the letter, or that the letter caused Halfacre to fear 

Petitioner. Because of this, Petitioner claims the letter was admitted without evidentiary foundation 

and lacked probative value. The Court is unpersuaded. Probation officer O’Connor testified that 

she received the letter from Halfacre on October 12, 1990, a few months after it was mailed to 

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Halfacre. (RT at 2442-46; see also RT at 2453:21 [the prosecutor argued at trial: “I think the evidence 

has shown that Jerry Halfacre gave the letter to his probation officer. If he didn’t receive the letter, he 

couldn’t have had it[.]”].) Moreover, Evidence Code § 641 provides: “A letter correctly addressed 

and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail.” The envelope 

which contained the letter was introduced into evidence and indicates that the letter was addressed to 

Halfacre and was postmarked. (People’s Ex. 1; RT at 2443-54.)

5) No True Threat or Prejudice

Petitioner argues that Penal Code § 422 is based on wording taken from United States v. 

Kelner, which “defined true threats as only those which according to their language and context 

conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to constitute speech beyond the pale 

of protected [speech].” 534 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1976); (see also ECF No. 113 at 154:25-28, 

citing Stanfield, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 1160). Applying these standards, Petitioner argues that the 

Halfacre letter contained only conditional language which did not satisfy the elements of a true threat 

under Penal Code § 422. (ECF No. 113 at 154-58.)

As discussed in claim R4, post, the California Supreme Court, in denying this claim on direct 

appeal, did not definitively rule whether the letter constituted a threat for purposes of § 422, due to 

instructional error. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340 n.13. However, for the reasons stated and for 

purposes of this claim, that court could reasonably have found that introduction of the letter was not 

improper under § 422 as set out above and § 190.3(b).

Petitioner also argues introduction of the letter was inflammatory and prejudicial under 

Brecht, and denied him due process and a fair jury determination. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346; Hamilton, 

458 F. Supp.2d at 1090 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). He argues the letter was significantly 

prejudicial because it suggested to the jury that Petitioner posed a risk of future dangerousness. 

But even if the trial court erred in admitting the letter, the California Supreme Court

reasonably determined in claim R4, post, that such error did not substantially impact the jury’s verdict 

or deny him a fair sentencing determination. The aggravating evidence, including the circumstances 

of the charged crimes and prior violent activity, was substantial. (See claims O, ante; claim S, post.)

In this regard, the California Supreme Court concluded that:

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[T]he letter paled compared to other aggravating evidence, which the prosecutor focused

on in closing argument. In particular, the guilt phase testimony revealed [Petitioner] as a

calculating and callous individual, willing to kill defenseless victims, including his

friend and partner Huffstuttler, in cold blood to protect his drug enterprise. In addition,

the assault with great bodily injury against Matthew Spencer and attempted 

manslaughter against Kenneth Ross confirmed [Petitioner’s] pattern of resorting to 

violence in dealing with problems. Given this history, it is unlikely the jury accorded the 

letter much, if any, weight in fixing the penalty at death.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341. This Court agrees.

The letter also had some mitigating value. (Id.; see also claim R4.) To the extent the letter 

might have suggested future dangerousness, Halfacre’s apparent lack of concerned for his safety, 

having waited four months before giving his probation officer the letter, appears to be mitigating. (Id.) 

Moreover, the letter demonstrated Petitioner’s concern for his family, as noted by the defense. Bolin, 

18 Cal. 4th at 340; (RT at 2492-93; 2578-91). The California Supreme Court could reasonably have 

discounted as conjecture, Petitioner’s argument that the Halfacre letter, suggesting a propensity for 

violence, negatively impacted the jury’s assessment of mitigating testimony by defense witnesses. 

Additionally, to the extent this claim raises solely issues of state law, it is no basis for federal 

habeas relief. (See ECF No. 113 at 154-58 [arguing that the letter did not satisfy the elements of § 

422]; ECF No. 113 at 157 [arguing that admission of letter violates Evid. Code §§ 350, 352].) As 

noted, “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; see

also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41.

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim R1 is denied. 

d. Analysis of Claim R2

Petitioner’s next claim alleges that applying the § 422 factors to show the letter was a criminal 

threat and aggravating at the penalty phase, improperly served to criminalize constitutionally 

protected speech, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 158-60.) 

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Petitioner argues that only “true threats” may be punished without violating the First 

Amendment, Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1026, and that the Halfacre letter did not contain any true threat. 

This, he claims, was evident in Halfacre’s delay in providing the letter to authorities, and the slim 

likelihood that the conditions of the threats would be satisfied, and even then that Petitioner would be 

able to make good on the threatened action. 

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on habeas review and denied it as 

procedurally barred because the claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC 

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus, citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 

759.) The California Supreme Court also summarily denied the claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

“In general, threats are not protected by the First Amendment.” Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371 (citing

Watts, 394 U.S. at 705). Only “true threats” may be punished without offending the First

Amendment. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that Petitioner’s threats 

were not “constitutionally protected speech.” See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08. “A ‘true’ threat, where 

a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will be subjected to physical 

violence upon his person, is unprotected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.” United States v. OrozcoSantillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by United 

States v. Keyser, 704 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the 

surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners.” Id.; Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372; accord Kelner, 534 

F.2d at 1027 (“So long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific . . . as to convey a gravity of purpose and

imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied”).

“[S]peech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime

itself.” United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970). “[A]s expansive as the [F]irst 

[A]mendment’s conception of social and political discourse may be, threats made with specific intent 

to injure and focused on a particular individual easily fall into that category of speech deserving of no 

[F]irst [A]mendment protection.” Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying 

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habeas relief to inmate convicted under telephone harassment statute). “A threat to break a person’s 

knees . . . is a statement of intention rather than an idea or opinion and is not part of the marketplace 

of ideas.” United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985). 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected Petitioner’s contention that the letter 

was inadmissible because it contained only conditional threats, Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340, finding that 

“[a] seemingly conditional threat contingent on an act highly likely to occur may convey to the victim 

a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution.” Id. Petitioner contends the evidentiary 

record does not demonstrate the contingencies in the letter, which he characterizes as criminal acts by 

Halfacre, were “highly likely to occur.”

It was not unreasonable for the state court to determine the contingencies in question were 

“highly likely to occur,” because, as mentioned, the contingency regarding the Buick did in fact occur 

and it was reasonable to conclude Halfacre would have future contact with his child and the mother of 

his child. It is not dispositive for First Amendment purposes that Halfacre did not act immediately 

upon receiving the threat. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (fact that victim “chose not to seek help 

instantly is not dispositive”). For reasons discussed in claim R1, ante, the California Supreme Court 

could reasonably have determined that Petitioner’s threats were not protected speech. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of these 

allegations was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim R2 is denied. 

e. Analysis of Claim R3

Petitioner next alleges that the California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, unforeseeably and 

for the first time interpreted § 422 as applying to “conditional” threats, and then retroactively applied 

this new interpretation to uphold Petitioner’s sentence. He argues that this unforeseeable judicial 

enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, violated due process under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 113 at 160); cf. Bouie v. City of 

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Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964) (due process implicated when an unforeseeable state-court 

construction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively). 

Petitioner raised this same claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California 

Supreme Court, which denied it as procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not raised 

on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In 

re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) 

The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected the habeas claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner argues that, under Bouie’s fair warning rationale, the test is whether a petitioner 

could reasonably determine that his conduct violated the law:

This circuit has in the past held that retroactive application of an interpretation of state 

law is not prohibited per se; however, “[s]uch a decision may violate due process if the 

court’s interpretation of a criminal statute enlarges its scope to cover behavior not 

previously considered to be unlawful.” Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 

1983); see also United States v. Walsh, 770 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1985) (“radical 

and unforeseen departure from prior law”).

McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1053 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989). He argues that, in 1990, when he wrote 

the letter to Halfacre, prior judicial interpretation all precluded conviction for a conditional threat. 

(ECF No. 178 at 223:6-8.)

Respondent counters that the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 422 had been 

uncertain on this issue and was still evolving in 1990 when Petitioner wrote the Halfacre letter. At 

that time, according to Respondent, the California Supreme Court had not interpreted the language in 

Penal Code § 422. Respondent points out that the authority on which Petitioner relies, People v. 

Brown, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1251 (1993), post-dates his letter, and that in any event it was not 

unforeseeable that a conditional threat might be found to violate Penal Code § 422. See United States 

v. Burnom, 27 F.3d 283, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding Bouie does not apply “to the resolution of 

uncertainty that marks any evolving legal system”); cf., Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th 

Cir. 1985) (significant change in state law which, if applied retroactively, would materially expand 

defendant’s criminal liability cannot be applied retroactively). 

Petitioner concedes that “intermediate appellate courts of California had been divided on the 

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question.” (ECF No. 178 at 216, n.142); see e.g., People v. Brooks, 26 Cal. App. 4th 142, 145

(1994) (“if you testify, I’ll kill you” found sufficient to support conviction under Penal Code § 422); 

Brown, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 1251 (“if you call the police, I’ll kill you” found insufficient to support 

conviction under § 422). 

The California Supreme Court, in its review of this claim noted that the language of Penal 

Code § 422 was “adopt[ed] almost verbatim language from United States v. Kelner” which in turn 

relied upon Watts. That court stated: 

In Kelner, the defendant, a member of the Jewish Defense League, had been convicted

under a federal statute for threatening to assassinate Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, 

who was to be in New York for a meeting at the United Nations. Kelner argued that 

without proof he specifically intended to carry out the threat, his statement was political 

hyperbole protected by the First Amendment rather than a punishable true threat. 

[Citation] 

The reviewing court disagreed and concluded threats are punishable consonant with

constitutional protections “when the following criteria are satisfied. So long as the threat

on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,

immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose 

and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied.” [Citation] In 

formulating this rationale, the Kelner court drew on the analysis in Watts v. United 

States (1969) 394 U.S. 705 [ ], in which the United States Supreme Court reversed a 

conviction for threatening the President of the United States. Defendant Watts had 

stated, in a small discussion group during a political rally, “And now I have already 

received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this 

Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 

to get in my sights is L.B.J.” [Citation] Both Watts and the crowd laughed after the 

statement was made. [Citation] The Supreme Court determined that taken in context,

and considering the conditional nature of the threat and the reaction of the listeners, the

only possible conclusion was that the statement was not a punishable true threat, but

political hyperbole privileged under the First Amendment. [Citation]

As the Kelner court understood this analysis, the Supreme Court was not adopting a 

bright line test based on the use of conditional language but simply illustrating the

general principle that punishable true threats must express an intention of being carried

out. [Citation] “In effect, the Court was stating that threats punishable consistently with 

the First Amendment were only those which according to their language and context 

conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to constitute speech 

beyond the pale of protected [attacks on government and political officials].” [Citation] 

Accordingly, “[t]he purpose and effect of the Watts constitutionally-limited definition of 

the term ‘threat’ is to insure that only unequivocal, unconditional and specific 

expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury may be punished – only such 

threats, in short, as are of the same nature as those threats which are . . . ‘properly 

punished every day under statutes prohibiting extortion, blackmail and assault. . . .’” 

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[Citation] 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 338-39. 

The California Supreme Court, consistent with its noted analysis, could reasonably have 

determined that “the reference to an ‘unconditional’ threat in section 422 is not absolute.” Bolin, 18 

Cal. 4th at 339. That court also could reasonably have found Petitioner’s letter to be truly threatening 

notwithstanding any involved contingency. The conditions stated in Petitioner’s letters reasonably 

could be seen as coated with threatening language. See Id. at 336, n.11. “Bouie applies only to 

unpredictable shifts in the law, not to the resolution of uncertainty that marks any evolving legal 

system.” Burnom, 27 F.3d at 284-85. The California Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusions 

relating to § 422 could reasonably fall within the latter. See e.g., United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 

1137, 1149 (2d Cir. 1978) (due process requires only that “the law give sufficient warnings that men 

may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden, and thus not lull the potential

defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that his conduct might 

be within its scope”). 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim R3 is denied.

f. Analysis of Claim R4

Petitioner’s final claim alleges that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 

accurately and completely on the elements of a § 422 criminal threat regarding the Halfacre letter that 

was introduced as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase. Petitioner alleges this error denied him 

due process and a fair trial and sentence. (ECF No. 113 at ¶¶ 611-618.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court, which denied it as procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not raised on direct 

appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In re Dixon, 

41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s habeas claim 

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on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

The record reflects that at the penalty phase, the jury was instructed that evidence had been 

introduced to show Petitioner had committed various criminal acts, including writing a threatening 

letter to Halfacre. (RT at 2608; CT at 634, 643.) They were instructed that: “[b]efore a juror may 

consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, the jury must first be 

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal acts.” (CT at 

634.) They were also instructed regarding the concurrence of act and specific intent for criminal 

threats. (RT at 2611-13; CT at 641.) 

As to the § 422 criminal threat, the jury was instructed that:

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great 

bodily injury to another person with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken 

as a threat, which causes that person reasonably to sustain fear for his own safety, is 

guilty of a violation of Penal Code Section 422.

In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be proved:

One, a person made a threat to commit a crime which, if carried out, would result in

death or great bodily injury to another person.

Two, such threat is made with the specific intent the statement was to be taken as a

threat.

Three, that such threat caused another person to fear for his own or his family’s personal 

safety.

It is not necessary that the defendant have the intent to carry out the threats.

(RT at 2613; CT at 643.)

Petitioner alleges that the trial court also should have instructed the jury that a § 422 “threat”

must be “on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, so unequivocal, unconditional, 

immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat.” See CALJIC 9.94. 

The California Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner when it reviewed this allegation on direct 

appeal. See Bolin, 18 Cal.4th at 340 n.13. However, that court found such instructional error harmless, 

see Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340 n.13, stating that: 

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Alternatively, defendant argues that the letter still does not meet the statutory definition 

because the threat lacked immediacy and Halfacre did not testify he feared for his safety. 

We need not definitively resolve these contentions. Even if the trial court should have 

excluded the letter, we find no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. 

[Citation] Although some of the language in the letter is menacing, it also reflects 

defendant’s concern for his daughter’s and granddaughter’s well-being, a point stressed 

by the defense in mitigation. Moreover, the nature and circumstances of the threats 

would not necessarily provoke serious concern, especially considering defendant was 

incarcerated and would at the least have to make outside arrangements to effect them. 

Halfacre waited four months before giving the letter to his probation officer, during 

which time apparently nothing had happened. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340. 

The California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in this regard. Though as noted, the jury 

may have been given incomplete instructions on the elements the aggravating criminal threat (id. at 340 

n.13), the state supreme court was not unreasonable in finding the error harmless for reasons stated in 

the discussed of claim R1, ante, summarized as follows. The aggravating evidence, including the 

circumstances of the charged crimes and prior violent activity, was substantial. (See claims O, ante; 

claim S, post.) Halfacre’s months long delay in taking any action on the letter could reasonably suggest 

Petitioner did not pose a future danger. The letter could be mitigating to the extent it suggested 

violence was not imminent and that Petitioner was motivated by his desire to protect his family. See

e.g., Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 340; (RT at 2492-93; 2578-91). The state supreme court noted that:

[T]he letter paled compared to other aggravating evidence, which the prosecutor focused

on in closing argument. In particular, the guilt phase testimony revealed [Petitioner] as a 

calculating and callous individual, willing to kill defenseless victims, including his

friend and partner Huffstuttler, in cold blood to protect his drug enterprise. In addition,

the assault with great bodily injury against Matthew Spencer and attempted 

manslaughter against Kenneth Ross confirmed [Petitioner’s] pattern of resorting to 

violence in dealing with problems. Given this history, it is unlikely the jury accorded the 

letter much, if any, weight in fixing the penalty at death.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341.

Equally unavailing is Petitioner’s re-argument (see claim R1, ante) that admission of the letter 

“altered the credibility analysis regarding [Petitioner’s aggravating] assaults on Matthew Spencer and 

Kenny Ross” and that without the “prejudicial character evidence” of the letter “the jury would likely 

have given greater consideration to the defense’s mitigating evidence regarding those [other 

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aggravating] incidents.” (ECF No. 178 at 229: 7-14.) Such re-argument appears nothing more than 

speculation. The noted evidence in aggravation was substantial apart from the letter. Additionally, 

for the same reasons, neither Petitioner’s trial counsel (for failing to object on this ground in the trial 

court) nor his appellate counsel (for failing to raise this ground on appeal) was ineffective. (ECF No. 

113 at 161 n.45 [re claim W8, post]; Id. at 235-36 [re claim DD, post].) 

It is not enough for habeas relief that “[an] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state 

law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. “In the absence of a federal constitutional violation, no relief can be 

granted even if the instruction given might not have been correct as a matter of state law.” Mitchell 

v. Goldsmith, 878 F.2d 319, 324 (9th Cir. 1989). For the reasons stated above and those discussed in 

claims R1-R3, Petitioner has not demonstrated the state instructional error as to § 422 denied him a 

fair sentence determination. See e.g., Hamilton, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (“The limited scope of 

federal habeas review does not warrant relief unless trial errors had a ‘substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’ and deprived [the petitioner] of a fair trial in violation 

of his right to due process.”).

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim R4 is denied. 

2. Review of Claim S

Petitioner, in his next claim, alleges that the jury erroneously was allowed to consider in 

aggravation evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity, denying him equal protection, due 

process, a fair jury trial, a reliable sentence, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, 

violating his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 162-164.) 

Petitioner made this same claim on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, which was denied 

on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335-36.

a. Clearly Established Law

A state law error that renders the trial fundamentally unfair violates the Due Process Clause. 

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Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, 302-03; Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346 (due process protects defendant from 

arbitrary deprivation of expectations under state law).

In a capital case, evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct may constitute an aggravating 

circumstance and be admissible at sentencing. See Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (holding unadjudicated criminal conduct may be introduced to support the aggravating 

factor of probable future violence). 

b. Analysis of Claim S

Petitioner complains that the jury was allowed to consider, as aggravating, unconvicted 

criminal conduct in the form of his 1979 assault on Matthew Spencer (RT at 2371-2385, 2412-43; CT 

at 634) and his 1990 threatening letter to Halfacre (RT at 2442-54; CT 634). He argues he was never 

convicted, prosecuted, or charged with these events and that the jury’s consideration of them fell 

below the heightened reliability requirement for capital sentencing. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 

428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).

He also complains that the penalty jury, having just convicted him of capital murder, was 

biased against him; that the jury was not instructed that the presumption of innocence applied to 

unadjudicated criminal activity; that the jury was not instructed that they must unanimously find these

allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt and make their findings in writing; and that the limitations 

period had run on the assault charge. 

All of these alleged infirmities, he claims, had a substantial and injurious effect or influence 

on the jury’s verdict under Brecht. 

Preliminarily, the Court rejects Petitioner’s allegations that the foregoing constitutional errors 

were not adjudicated by the state court. Rather, the California Supreme Court adjudicated these 

allegations by considered and rejected them on direct appeal, as follows: 

Defendant makes several claims regarding the jury’s consideration of unadjudicated 

criminal activity as a circumstance in aggravation. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) He 

acknowledges this court has previously upheld the use of such evidence at the penalty 

phase. [Citation] He argues, however, that he was denied his constitutional right to an 

impartial fact finder and reliable penalty determination because the same jury that 

decided his guilt could not be expected to evaluate this evidence without bias or 

prejudice. We have considered and rejected this argument in People v. Balderas, [ ] , and 

find no reason to reconsider our conclusions. We have also previously determined that 

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the use of factor (b) evidence does not run afoul of the statute of limitations. [Citation] 

Nor was the jury required unanimously to agree defendant committed the alleged 

crimes. [Citation]

On this record, we find no error by virtue of the trial court’s failure to repeat the 

“presumption of innocence” instruction given prior to guilt phase deliberations. At the 

beginning of the penalty phase, the court expressly alerted the jury that “[m]ost of the 

rules that I gave you before ... will apply to this case.” Nothing in the court’s subsequent 

penalty instructions suggested the jury should disregard the earlier admonition that a 

criminal defendant is presumed innocent; and a reasonable juror would assume it 

continued to apply. [Citation] 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335-36. 

That court’s determination in these regards was not unreasonable. Petitioner has not 

demonstrated clearly established authority from the United States Supreme Court holding that a jury

may not consider prior unadjudicated criminal activity during the penalty phase of a capital case. See

Sharp v. Texas, 488 U.S. 872 (1988) (Marshall J, dissenting) (“I would grant the petition to resolve 

the question whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments preclude the introduction of evidence of 

unadjudicated criminal conduct at the sentencing phase of a capital case.”); Miranda v. California, 

486 U.S. 1038 (1988) (same); see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-564 (1967) (approving limited 

use of other crimes evidence for purposes other than propensity). Given the Supreme Court has not 

decided the issue, the California Supreme Court’s above decision could not be contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of California’s 

death penalty law, including § 190.3(b), which permits evidence of prior criminal activity involving 

violence or threats of violence. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987); see also Tuilaepa v. 

California, 512 U.S. 967, 975-80 (1994). California’s death penalty statute expressly provides that a 

capital defendant’s prior violent conduct is relevant to the penalty determination. 

Petitioner’s allegation that because he had been previously convicted of only one felony (the 

attempted voluntary manslaughter on Ross), the instruction on aggravating unadjudicated criminal 

activity unduly emphasized this evidence as an aggravating factor, was rejected by the state supreme 

court. That court reasonably was “unpersuaded the jury was likely to interpret the court's direction in 

this manner.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341. This Court agrees. The allegation appears no more than 

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speculation and was reasonably rejected. 

California law also calls for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty. People v. 

Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 205 (1985). Petitioner cites no United States Supreme Court authority for 

his contention that presenting evidence of his prior uncharged offenses to the same jury that found 

him guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances denies him an impartial fact finder. 

(ECF No. 113 at 163.)

Petitioner does not cite any authority for his claim that, in the penalty phase of a capital trial, 

the prosecution should be barred from presenting evidence of offenses that might be barred from 

actual prosecution by a statute of limitations. (Id. at 164.) The California Supreme Court could 

reasonably find that that penalty phase use of evidence of prior violent crime did not make the verdict 

unfair or unreliable. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335 (“[T]he use of [§ 190.3] factor (b) evidence does 

not run afoul of the statute of limitations.”).

Petitioner’s argument, that his rights were violated by the absence of a requirement that the 

jurors unanimously agree in writing beyond a reasonable doubt that an allegation of criminal activity 

is true, (ECF No. 113 at 163), also is unavailing. The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected 

these allegations, stating “[w]e have long held the Constitution does not mandate such a finding.” 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341. Petitioner was not being tried for the aggravating conduct adduced at the 

penalty phase. The safeguards he seeks were unnecessary. See e.g., Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. 

Supp. 1443, 1471 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding lack of jury instruction enumerating elements of offenses 

or standard of proof which must be met before jury can consider those offenses does not render 

unconstitutionally vague California’s aggravating factor allowing jury to weigh unadjudicated 

criminal conduct). 

For the reasons stated, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim S is denied. 

3. Review of Claim T

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In his next claim, Petitioner alleges the lack of a unanimous jury finding beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the prior criminal activity discussed in claim S, ante, was true, denied him equal 

protection, presumption of innocence, due process, a reliable and fair penalty determination, a 

unanimous jury, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, violating his rights under the

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 113 at 164-66.) 

The California Supreme Court considered this same claim on direct appeal and rejected it on 

the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 335-36, 341.

a. Clearly Established Law

The applicable legal standards are set out in claim S, ante. 

b. Analysis of Claim T

Petitioner argues that the absence of a unanimity requirement denied him a presumption of 

innocence, available in the non-capital context, resulting in an unfair trial and unreliable sentence 

determination. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. 

Petitioner finds fault with the following instruction given the jury: 

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has 

committed the following criminal acts, to wit: assault with a deadly weapon and writing 

a threatening letter which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the 

threat of force or violence. 

Before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in 

this case, the jury must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

did, in fact, commit such criminal acts. 

A juror may not consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating 

circumstance. 

It is not necessary for all the jurors to agree. If any juror is convinced beyond a 

reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that 

activity as a fact in aggravation. If a juror is not so convinced, then that juror must not 

consider that evidence for any purpose. 

(RT at 2608; see also CT at 634.) Petitioner claims that, “in light of the importance of the [evidence 

of prior unadjudicated criminal activity] to the prosecution’s case in aggravation,” the errors alleged 

in this claim are prejudicial under Brecht. 

Petitioner also alleges that the foregoing constitutional arguments were not adjudicated by the 

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state court. The Court disagrees, and finds the claim unpersuasive for the reasons stated in claim S, 

ante, and as follows. 

Petitioner does not identify any clearly established authority from the United States Supreme 

Court holding that a jury must unanimously find Petitioner’s prior unadjudicated criminal activity to 

be true in order to consider it as a factor in aggravation during the penalty phase of a capital case. See

Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 238 (2007) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has 

not resolved this issue and thus, under AEDPA, claim must be denied). Additionally, an issue solely 

of state law is not a basis for habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

As noted, Petitioner was not being tried for the unadjudicated conduct offered at the penalty 

phase. Thus the unanimity safeguard was unnecessary. Aggravating circumstances are not separate 

penalties but are standards to guide the making of the choice between death and life imprisonment.

People v. Raley, 2 Cal. 4th 870, 910 (1992). A factor set forth in Penal Code § 190.3 does not require 

a “yes” or “no” answer to a specific question, but points the sentencer to the subject matter which 

guides the choice between the two punishments. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 975. 

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “the constitutional prohibition on 

arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing 

‘scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death 

penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible

for that penalty by statute.’” Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1008 n.22, (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 

875 (1983)).

Petitioner’s citation to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), (see ECF No. 178 at 

239:2-3) does not support this claim. Apprendi, which requires that any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, must be submitted to a jury and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, is not contravened by California’s death penalty scheme. This is because 

once a California jury convicts of first degree murder with a special circumstance “the defendant 

stands convicted of an offense whose maximum penalty is death.” People v. Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th 398, 

454 (2001),abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th 226, 263 n.14 (2003).

Petitioner’s reliance upon cases involving the requirement of a unanimous verdict for a 

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criminal conviction (i.e., not for finding a factor in aggravation - see ECF No. 178 at 236-38) is 

misplaced, for the reasons stated. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim T is denied.

4. Review of Claim U

Petitioner alleges, in seven subclaims, that the trial court committed multiple instructional 

errors at the penalty phase, “by refusing several entirely appropriate and necessary instructions 

offered by the defense, and by failing to inform the jury of the scope of their task and adequately 

guide their discretion, thereby failing to guarantee that the charge as a whole adequately guided the 

jury’s discretion in determining whether [Petitioner] should live or die.” (ECF No. 113 at 166:11-

13.) 

The clearly established law applicable to the subclaims is set out below. The subclaims are 

reviewed separately. 

a. Clearly Established Law

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. Rather, 

in order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely undesirable, 

erroneous, or even universally condemned, but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the 

[F]ourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (1988) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 

146). Petitioner must demonstrate the instructional error infected the entire trial as to render it unfair. 

Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (1988); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 

U.S. at 147). If an error is found, then the court must also determine that the error had “a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict before granting relief in habeas 

proceedings.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

In evaluating a claim of instructional error, a single instruction is not viewed in isolation, but

rather in the context of the overall charge. Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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“[T]he proper inquiry . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 

challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.”

Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Additionally, a reviewing court does not engage in a technical parsing of the 

instruction’s language, but instead approaches the instructions in the same way that the jury would, 

with a “commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the 

trial.” Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368. Lastly, federal courts presume that juries follow instructions, 

including cautionary instructions. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234; Olano, 507 U.S. at 740. 

b. Analysis of Claim U1

Petitioner alleges that, beginning in voir dire and continuing through instructions at the 

penalty phase, the trial court erroneously told the jury that the penalty phase instructions, in their 

entirety, were simply “guidelines” (see RT at 242, 368, 395, 1009, 1091, 1114, 1117, 1354, 1399, 

1419, 1906, 2394), and that the penalty decision would be entirely within the juror’s discretion. (ECF 

No. 113 at 166-71.) 

Petitioner complains that the trial judge characterized the determination of the death penalty 

as “just a balancing, not beyond a reasonable doubt” (see, e.g., RT at 1122:25-28), thereby failing to 

limit the jurors’ discretion by objective standards, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976), 

denying Petitioner due process, Estelle, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), and a fair and reliable sentence 

determination, Tuilaepa, 512 U.S at 973.

Specifically, Petitioner complains this violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and 

his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have the jury consider all mitigating evidence,

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978), and to 

have each element of aggravating prior criminal conduct established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on petition for writ of habeas corpus and 

rejected it as procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal.

(CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3 and In re Dixon, 41 

Cal. 2d at 759].) That court also summarily denied the habeas claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

This claim fails. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that the 

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instructions given in this case, when considered as a whole, “adequately performed the constitutional 

function of guiding the jury’s discretion in sentencing.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 343. The jury was 

specifically instructed that it “shall” consider the mitigating factors it found applicable (RT at 2605-

07), what the mitigating factors were (RT at 2615; CT 631-32), and how they should be weighed (RT 

at 2615). The jurors were specifically instructed that aggravating and mitigating factors were not 

simply to be counted. (RT at 2615; CT at 647.)

Petitioner argues the errors alleged above may have led the jury to consider less than all the 

mitigating evidence. But for the reasons stated below, the California Supreme Court could 

reasonably have found that the jury was fully instructed on the factors to consider when determining 

the appropriate penalty for Petitioner. (RT at 2605-07.) 

The jury was instructed with CALJIC 2.60 relating to Petitioner’s decision not to testify (CT 

at 646) and CALJIC 8.85 relating to the statutory factors they must consider at the penalty phase (CT 

at 631-32). The trial court directed the jurors that, “[y]ou must accept and follow the law as I give it 

to you, whether or not you agree with the law.” (RT at 2604.) That court also instructed the jury that 

most of the guilt phase rules applied to the penalty phase, (RT at 2394), and that they should be 

guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as instructed (CT at 

647-48, CALJIC 8.88). 

As noted, when evaluating the effect of an instruction on the jury, courts must follow “the 

well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, 

but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378; Middleton v. 

McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 435-36 (2004) (finding that an erroneous instruction was cured by the 

spillover effect of correct instruction on the law elsewhere). 

The California Supreme Court generally reviewed instructional error claims on direct appeal 

and reasonably rejected any suggestion that a proper interpretation of California’s death penalty law 

required the jury to be instructed in the manner requested by Petitioner. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341-

345. It is unlikely that the jury would have interpreted the trial court’s brief comments earlier in the 

trial as authorization to wholly ignore the guilt phase instructions when determining the appropriate 

penalty. (RT at 2603-16.) It follows that Petitioner has not demonstrated instructional errors that had 

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a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict under Brecht. See also

claim D, ante. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim U1 is denied. 

c. Analysis of Claim U2

Petitioner next alleges that the trial court erred by not reading CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (“Duty of 

Jury – Penalty Proceeding”) regarding the penalty phase duty of the jury. Specifically he claims the 

jury was not instructed to “[d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial”

and that it must “neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice against the defendant, nor swayed by 

public opinion or public feelings [and that] you will consider all of the evidence, follow the law, 

exercise your discretion conscientiously, and reach a verdict.” (ECF No. 113 at 171:19-28.)

This, he contends, may have left the jury confused as to whether it could consider sympathy, 

pity, compassion or mercy in the penalty phase. (RT at 2394); People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 718 

n.26 (1988) (as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 25, 1988) (trial courts should expressly inform the 

jury at the penalty phase which instructions previously given continue to apply). 

Petitioner also alleges that at the penalty phase, the jury did not consider the consequences 

their verdict and their individual sense of morality, because they were not instructed to disregard the 

guilt phase instruction requiring them to return a “just” verdict, “regardless of the consequences.” 

(CT at 432-33; CALJIC 1.00.) 

Petitioner raised the same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, (CSC Pet. Habeas Corpus at 246-50), which that court found to be procedurally 

barred because the claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) 

The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected the claim on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

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CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (“Duty of Jury – Penalty Proceeding”) (1989 New), provides in full:

You will now be instructed as to all of the law that applies to the penalty phase of this 

trial.

You must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial 

unless you are instructed otherwise. You must accept and follow the law that I shall state 

to you. Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial.

You must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice against the defendant, nor swayed 

by public opinion or public feelings. Both the People and the Defendant have a right to 

expect that you will consider all of the evidence, follow the law, exercise your discretion 

conscientiously, and reach a just verdict.

(ECF No. 178 at 244:20-45-4.) 

Respondent concedes that the trial court did not give CALJIC 8.84.1 (ECF No. 194 at 284:17-

18), but argues that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that the jury was 

sufficiently instructed, through the other instructions given, with all the requirements contained in 

CALJIC 8.84.1. This Court agrees. 

Petitioner cites to Babbitt and argues that CALJIC 8.84.1 was to be used at the penalty phase 

in lieu of CALJIC 1.00 due to the latter’s lack of clarity as to applicability of guilt phase instructions 

at the penalty phase. 45 Cal. 3d 660, 717-18 & n.26. The Babbitt court stated that: 

[W]e upheld the 1978 death penalty statute against a challenge that it withdraws 

constitutionally compelled sentencing discretion from the jury. [Citation] To forestall 

any possible confusion we directed trial courts in the future to instruct the jury as to the 

scope of its discretion and responsibility in accordance with the principles set forth in 

Brown. 

Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d at 714. 

Here, the state supreme court could reasonably have concluded that the jury was instructed as 

to their penalty phase responsibilities and the scope of their sentencing discretion. The jury was 

given the factors to consider in determining the penalty. (CT at 631-32; RT at 2605-07; CALJIC No. 

8.85.) They were instructed not to consider “for any reason whatsoever the deterrent or non-deterrent 

effect on [sic] the death penalty or the monetary cost to the State of California of execution or 

maintaining a prisoner for life.” (RT at 2614; CT at 644; see also Defendant’s Proposed Instruction 

No. 15, CT at 644.) They were instructed they “must conscientiously consider and weigh the 

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evidence and apply the law” and must return a verdict that is “just and reasonable.” (RT at 2604; CT 

at 628-29; Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1.00.) They were instructed (at the guilt phase) 

not to be swayed by public opinion or prejudice. Id. They were instructed “to assume that if you 

sentence [Petitioner] to death, he will be executed in the gas chamber.” (RT at 2614; CT at 645; 

Defendant’s Proposed Instruction No. 4, CT at 645.) They were instructed to disregard conflicting 

guilt phase instructions. (RT at 2607; CT at 632; CALJIC No. 8.85.) 

The state supreme court could reasonably have determined that the jury was bound to the 

principles embodied in CALJIC 8.84.1 and that “the jury could not have been misled about its sole 

responsibility to determine, based on its individualized weighing discretion, whether death was 

appropriate.” Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d at 718. Here again, jurors are presumed to follow the instructions 

as given and in their entirety and to use the appropriate factors when making their penalty 

determination. Middleton, 541 U.S. at 435-36 (not reasonably likely jury misunderstood 

requirements of charged offense when all the instructions are considered in their entity). Petitioner 

has not demonstrated that the court’s failure to give CALJIC 8.84.1 was instructional error that made 

his trial unfair. 

To the extent Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in 

connection with this alleged instructional error, as more specifically discussed in his claims W8 and 

DD, such allegations fail for the reasons stated above and in claims W8 and DD, post. 

Petitioner’s related argument that he was prejudiced by the alleged extensive misleading and 

negative pretrial publicity in this case, and by the prosecution’s improper penalty phase closing 

argument that the jury should consider public sentiment in reaching their verdict, (see RT at 2574), 

fails for reasons discussed in claim V, post. Petitioner has not demonstrated federal constitutional 

error, Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67, and cannot show prejudice under Brecht. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Claim U2 is denied. 

d. Analysis of Claim U3

Petitioner next alleges the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances in the penalty phase instructions, denying him due process and a reliable 

penalty determination, violating his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

(ECF No. 113 at 174-75.)

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s use of CALJIC 8.85 (CT at 631-32), which 

lists the Penal Code § 190.3 aggravating and mitigating factors without distinguishing which are 

aggravating and which are mitigating, allowed the jury to give mitigating factors aggravating weight, 

and to consider the absence of statutory mitigating factors as aggravating factors. 

Petitioner also alleges that the state court did not adjudicate his constitutional arguments in 

this claim. The Court disagrees, and denies the claim for the following reasons.

The California Supreme Court reviewed these allegations on direct appeal and adjudicated 

them by denying the allegations on the merits, stating that: 

Defendant asserts the trial court violated various constitutional rights by failing to 

delineate which statutory factors were aggravating and which were mitigating. We have 

consistently rejected this argument. “[T]he aggravating or mitigating nature of [the 

section 190.3] factors should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context 

of each particular case.” [Citation] Here, the court explained that an aggravating factor 

was anything connected with the crime “which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to 

the injurious consequences ....” By contrast, a mitigating factor was any “extenuating 

circumstance” short of justification or excuse. Nothing in these commonly understood 

definitions supports defendant’s assertions that the jury could have considered section 

190.3, factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance), factor (g) (acting under the 

substantial domination of another), or factor (h) (impairment due to mental defect or 

intoxication) as aggravating, particularly since there was no evidence of such 

circumstances. Moreover, in closing argument both the prosecutor and defense counsel 

identified which factors could be considered aggravating and which mitigating. 

We are also unpersuaded that language instructing the jury to determine “whether or 

not” section 190.3, factors (d) through (h) and (j) existed caused any confusion in this 

regard. [Citation] This reference simply complemented the court’s generic instruction 

that the jury’s function was to “decide what the facts are from the evidence received in 

the trial ....” Furthermore, in the final analysis “the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary 

and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing 

‘scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the 

death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the 

class made eligible for that penalty by statute.” [Citation]

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Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341-42. 

“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind 

of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 

character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for 

a sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 at 604; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-114 (adopting rule 

in Lockett). “The standard against which we assess whether jury instructions satisfy the rule of Lockett

and Eddings was set forth in Boyde, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).” Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367-68 

(1993). In Boyde, the Supreme Court held that “there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered 

sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating 

evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’” 

494 U.S. at 377 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988)). 

In evaluating the instructions, the “reviewing court must determine ‘whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 

consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.’” Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367 (quoting Boyde, 494 

U.S. at 380). “[W]e do not engage in a technical parsing of this language of the instructions, but 

instead approach the instructions in the same way that the jury would—with a commonsense 

understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial.” Id. at 368 

(quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381). Further, a single instruction “may not be judged in artificial 

isolation, but must be considered in light of the instructions as a whole and the entire trial record.” 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

The failure to identify whether factors are aggravating or mitigating is not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. In Pulley, the Supreme Court reviewed 

California’s sentencing system, including the manner in which the jury considered relevant factors in 

deciding the penalty. 465 U.S. at 51. The Supreme Court noted that the 1977 death penalty law (like 

the 1978 law applicable in this case) did not identify or separate the aggravating or mitigating factors. 

Id. at 53 n.14. The Court found California’s death penalty law to be constitutional. Id. at 51 

(“Assuming that there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness 

that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review, the 1977 

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California statute is not of that sort.”). Pulley was clearly established authority at the time 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on March 8, 1999. 

In Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court revisited California’s death penalty sentencing scheme. The 

Supreme Court rejected the argument that California’s “single list of factors” was unconstitutional. 

The Court stated:

This argument, too, is foreclosed by our cases. A capital sentencer need not be instructed 

how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. In California v. 

Ramos, for example, we upheld an instruction informing the jury that the Governor had 

the power to commute life sentences and stated that “the fact that the jury is given no 

specific guidance on how the commutation factor is to figure into its determination 

presents no constitutional problem.” [Citation] Likewise, in Proffitt v. Florida, we 

upheld the Florida capital sentencing scheme even though “the various factors to be 

considered by the sentencing authorities [did] not have numerical weights assigned to 

them.” [Citation] In Gregg, moreover, we “approved Georgia’s capital sentencing statute 

even though it clearly did not channel the jury’s discretion by enunciating specific 

standards to guide the jury’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances.” [Citation] We also rejected an objection “to the wide scope of evidence 

and argument” allowed at sentencing hearings. [Citation] In sum, “discretion to evaluate 

and weigh the circumstances relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he 

committed” is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process. [Citation] “Once the 

jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons 

eligible for the death penalty ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to 

determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.” [Citation] Indeed, the sentencer 

may be given “unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be 

imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for 

that penalty.” [Citations] In contravention of those cases, petitioners’ argument would 

force the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury to 

sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a certain kind or number of facts, 

or found more statutory aggravating factors than statutory mitigating factors. The States 

are not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that fashion. [Citation] 

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979-80. 

Here, at the penalty phase, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.85, which sets forth the 

factors the jury should consider in determining penalty:

In determining which penalty is to be imposed on this defendant, you shall consider all 

of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial in this case. You 

shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable.... 

(CT at 631; RT at 2605.) The court then read the several factors under headings A through J, 

(informing the jury of the statutory factors from Penal Code § 190.3(a) through (i) and (k)), but did 

not expressly inform them which factors were relevant solely as mitigating factors. (CT at 631-32; 

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RT at 2605-07.) However, the trial court did instruct the jury that it could consider any other 

circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the 

crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant 

offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on 

trial; and that it must disregard any instruction given in the guilt or innocence phase which conflicted 

with the foregoing instruction. (RT at 2607; CT at 632.)

There is no clearly established authority from the United States Supreme Court holding that a 

jury must be instructed in a particular manner. The Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury be 

instructed on particular statutory mitigating factors. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-77 

(1998). Accordingly, since the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the state supreme court’s 

decision could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court 

precedent. Carey, 549 U.S. 76. 

Petitioner has made no evidentiary showing that the instructions given in this case in any way 

foreclosed the jury from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court has 

examined the language in California’s jury instruction on mitigation multiple times, and upheld it 

against constitutional challenges every time. See Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 24 (2006); Brown 

v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 142 (2005); Boyde, 494 U.S. 370, 386. 

Even if there were instructional error by failing to distinguish between aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found no “substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. The jury 

was instructed that:

An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event in the commission of a crime which 

increases its guilt or enormity or adds to the injurious consequences which is above and 

beyond the elements of the crime itself. 

The mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which if such does not 

constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question but may be considered as an 

extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. 

RT at 2615. The state supreme court reasonably found that these definitions used commonly 

understood terms. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341-42. Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated on the 

evidentiary record that the jury gave mitigating factors aggravating weight or considered the absence of 

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statutory mitigating factors to be aggravating. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341-42. Though Petitioner argues 

that “[i]t is reasonably likely that the jury applied CALJIC No. 8.85 in a manner inconsistent with the 

Constitution” (ECF No. 178 at 251:5-6), he fails to demonstrate on the evidentiary record that any juror 

was precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 

circumstances of the offense to be mitigating. 

In any event, it seems unlikely the jury would have held such an erroneous belief. The jury 

was instructed that it could consider any non-statutory extenuating, sympathetic, or other basis for a 

sentence less than death, whether or not related to the conviction, and that the jury must disregard any 

instruction given in the guilt or innocence phase which conflicted with the foregoing instruction. (RT 

at 2607; CT at 632.) 

There also appear additional reasons that the state supreme court could have found no 

prejudicial error. Both sides, in their respective closing arguments, identified those factors which 

could be aggravating and those which could be considered mitigating. See RT at 2573-2601; see also

Bolin, 18 Cal.4th at 341. The noted circumstances of the instant capital murders and evidence of 

adjudicated and unadjudicated past criminal acts also suggest substantial aggravating evidence. (See

claims 0, R and S, ante; RT at 2605-14; CALJIC Nos. 8.85, 8.86, 8.87, CT at 631-33.) 

For the reason stated by the California Supreme Court as well as those discussed above, the 

Court finds it unlikely that the jurors improperly and prejudicially applied CALJIC 8.85 as a result of 

the alleged failure to distinguish between aggravating and mitigating factors. Moreover, an error 

solely of state law is not a basis for federal habeas relief. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim U3 is denied.

e. Analysis of Claim U4

Petitioner next alleges that, at the penalty phase, the trial court failed to instruct on the 

definition of “reasonable doubt” applicable to aggravating criminal acts, denying him due process 

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under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 175-76.) 

Petitioner made this same claim on direct appeal, which the California Supreme Court 

considered and rejected on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 342. He alleges the state court did not 

fully adjudicate the claim. 

However, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected the claim, stating that: 

During penalty phase instruction, the trial court did not repeat the definition of 

reasonable doubt given at the guilt phase. Defendant contends this omission violated 

various constitutional rights because the term is not commonly understood outside the 

law. We find no error. At the beginning of the penalty phase, the court expressly alerted 

the jury that “[m]ost of the rules that I gave you before ... will apply to this case.”

Nothing in the court’s subsequent instructions suggested the jury should disregard the 

earlier definition; a reasonable juror would assume it continued to apply. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 342. 

As noted, during the penalty phase, the prosecution presented aggravating evidence of 

Petitioner’s prior felony conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter and his two prior 

unadjudicated criminal acts of assault and writing a threatening letter. The jury was instructed at the 

penalty phase that it “must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” that Petitioner was convicted 

of or committed these criminal acts before they could be considered aggravating circumstances. (CT 

at 633-34; RT at 2607-08; CALJIC Nos. 8.86, 8.87.) 

Petitioner concedes that the jury was instructed on the definition of “reasonable doubt” at the 

guilt phase, (CT at 457), but complains that jury was not re-instructed on this definition at the penalty 

phase. (RT at 2607; CT at 633.) He alleges that penalty phase instructions implied that the guilt 

definition did not apply at penalty phase. (RT at 2603-04; CT at 628.) He claims this error left the jury 

“unguided in their determination as to whether or not to accept the evidence presented by the 

prosecution in aggravation,” (RT at 2603-08; CT at 628-34), which substantially and injuriously 

affected the jury’s verdict under Brecht. 

The Court is unpersuaded. The trial court’s admonition at the beginning of the penalty phase

instructions, that it would now “tell [the jury] about the law which applies to this phase of the trial”, 

(see RT at 2603; CT at 628) was not followed by any penalty phase instruction that the jury disregard 

the definition of reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90) that had been given to them during the guilt 

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phase. (CT at 457; RT at 2195.) Instead, as noted by the state supreme court on direct appeal, the 

jury was instructed that “most of the rules that I gave you before . . . will apply to [the penalty 

phase].” RT at 2394; see also Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 342. The instructions are considered in their 

totality. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The jurors were presumed to follow the instructions given by the 

trial court. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234.

Petitioner has not demonstrated the jury was instructed to disregard the CALJIC No. 2.90 

instruction. Nor has he demonstrated clearly established law required the trial court to re-read the 

reasonable doubt definition. See Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th at 561 (the court at the penalty phase is not 

required to re-read guilt phase instructions when the latter were not limited to use at the guilt phase 

and when no penalty phase instructions contradict the guilt phase instructions).

The Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably determine it unlikely that 

a failure to re-instruct with CALJIC No. 2.90 at the penalty phase confused the jury such that they 

were left unguided in determining whether to accept aggravating evidence. The inference otherwise 

argued by Petitioner does not find sufficient support in the record. 

Accordingly, this Court does not find that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim U4 is denied. 

f. Analysis of Claim U5 

Petitioner next alleges that the then-effective California death penalty statute suffered from 

constitutional infirmities, which are reviewed separately below. (ECF No. 113 at 176-78.) 

1) Failure to Minimize Risk of Arbitrary Penalty

Petitioner cites to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972), and complains that his death 

sentence was imposed arbitrarily and capriciously because jury instructions at the penalty phase did not 

provide “a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed 

from the many cases in which it is not,” exposing Petitioner to cruel and unusual punishment and 

denying him due process in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 176:20-

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21.) 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected these allegations on direct appeal, stating 

that: 

In sum, our capital sentencing scheme does not contain so many special circumstances 

that it fails to perform the constitutionally mandated narrowing function. [Citation] Nor 

does the felony-murder rule falter in this regard. [Citation] The statutory categories 

have not been construed in an unduly expansive manner. [Citation] The breadth of the 

prosecutor’s discretion in choosing to seek the death penalty does not render it 

unconstitutional. [Citation] The jury need not make express findings with respect to 

circumstances in aggravation [Citation], or find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is 

the appropriate penalty [citation].

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345-46. 

Supreme Court cases have established that a state capital sentencing system must: “(1) 

rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, 

individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal 

characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.” Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006). If 

the “state system satisfies these requirements,” then the “state enjoys a range of discretion in imposing 

the death penalty, including the manner in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances are to be 

weighed.” Id. (citing Franklin, 487 U.S. at 179 and Zant, 462 U.S. at 87576, n.13.)

A state may narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty by defining degrees of 

murder. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 342 (1992). A state may further narrow the class of 

murderers by finding “beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of a list of statutory aggravating factors.” 

Id.; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97.

In California, a defendant may be sentenced to death for first degree murder if the trier of fact 

finds the defendant guilty and also finds true one or more of the special circumstances listed in Penal 

Code § 190.2. As relevant here, one of the circumstances is: “[t]he defendant, in this proceeding, has 

been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.” Penal Code § 

190.2(a)(3). There is no question that this sentencing scheme satisfies clearly established constitutional 

requirements. First, the subclass of defendants eligible for the death penalty is rationally narrowed to 

those who have committed multiple murders. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 969-73. The multiple murder 

special circumstance sufficiently guides the sentencer and is not unconstitutionally vague. See Godfrey 

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v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (the sentencer’s discretion must be guided by “clear and objective 

standards.”). 

In California v. Ramos, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[o]nce the jury finds that 

the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty”

the jury’s consideration of a myriad of factors and exercise of “unbridled discretion” in determining 

whether death is the appropriate punishment is not arbitrary and capricious. 463 U.S. at 1008-09. At 

the selection stage, an individualized determination includes consideration of the character and record 

of the defendant, the circumstances of the crime, and an assessment of the defendant’s culpability. 

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972-73. However, the jury “need not be instructed how to weigh any particular 

fact in the capital sentencing decision.” Id. at 979.

Here, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined 

that California’s death penalty scheme then in effect did not fail to genuinely narrow the class of 

murderers eligible for the death penalty. California’s scheme, which narrows the class of deatheligible offenders to less than the definition of first degree murder and permits consideration of all 

mitigating evidence, has been approved by the United States Supreme Court, Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 

972-79; Harris, 465 U.S. at 38, and this Court, Ben-Sholom v. Woodford, E.D. Cal. Case No. CV-F93-5531, ECF. No. 421 at 122, 124-25.

2) Vagueness Regarding Sentence Determination

Petitioner complains of vagueness in the trial court’s instruction, CALJIC 8.88, that in order 

to “return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence and/or 

circumstances is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 

instead of life without parole.” (ECF No. 113 at 177:2-11; RT at 2616; CT at 648); see also

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. He contends the trial court failed to inform the jury that it must find death 

to be the “appropriate” penalty and not just “warranted.” (ECF No. 113 at 177:12-17.) 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected these allegations on the merits on 

direct appeal, stating that: 

In explaining the nature of the penalty phase deliberative process, the trial court 

instructed: “To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the 

aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors, that it 

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warrants death instead of life without parole.” Defendant now argues the “so 

substantial” and “warrants” phrasing is impermissibly vague and does not adequately 

guide the decision to impose death. As in the past, we find no constitutional infirmity. 

[Citation] Prior to this instruction, the [trial] court explained, “In the weighing of 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it does not mean a mere mechanical counting 

of the factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights 

to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem 

appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In 

weighing the various circumstances, you determine under the relevant evidence which 

penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating 

circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.” Assessed in this 

context, the “so substantial” instruction “clearly admonishes the jury to determine 

whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. 

[Citations]”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 342-43.

That court went on to find that, “considered as a whole,” the instructions were “sufficient to 

guide the jury’s deliberative process and inform the jurors they must find death is the ‘appropriate’

penalty if that [is] their verdict.” Id. at 343. 

Prior to the instant instruction, the trial court instructed the jury that “[i]n weighing the 

various circumstances, you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and 

appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the 

mitigating circumstances.” (RT at 2616; CT at 647-48.) That court also instructed the jury on the 

meaning of a mitigating circumstance, noting that such a circumstance may be used “in determining 

the appropriateness of the death penalty.” (RT at 2615; CT at 647.) Defense counsel informed the 

jury that it would be deciding what is the “appropriate penalty.” (RT at 2467, 2584, 2596.)

Upon consideration of the entire charge to the jury and related argument, it is unlikely the 

alleged vagueness prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence in sentence 

determination. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. As noted, a reviewing court approaches the instructions in 

the same way that the jury would, with a “commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light 

of all that has taken place at the trial.” Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368. It can be presumed that the jury 

followed the instructions, including the cautionary instructions. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234.

Even if there was constitutional error, Petitioner has not demonstrated error under Brecht, i.e., 

that there is a reasonably likelihood the jury improperly applied the allegedly ambiguous terms in 

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determining their verdict, for the reasons stated and given the noted substantial evidence against 

Petitioner. (See claims O, R and S, ante; cf., Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145 (1998) 

(inaccurate sentence commutation instruction was Brecht error).

3) Aggravation, Sympathy and Mercy

Petitioner complains that the trial court, upon rejecting defendant’s proffered Instruction No. 

9, failed to instruct the jurors that they could return a life without parole sentence even where the 

aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances (ECF No. 113 at 177)

(citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199), and that they could consider other mitigating factors, such as 

sympathy and mercy. 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected these allegations on the merits on 

direct appeal, stating that:

Defendant contends the trial court erroneously refused instructions informing the jurors 

in various terms that sympathy, pity, compassion, and mercy were factors in deciding 

the appropriate sentence. We find no error. “We have repeatedly held that a jury told it 

may sympathetically consider all mitigating evidence need not also be expressly 

instructed it may exercise ‘mercy.’” [Citations] Here, the trial court gave the standard 

instruction to take into account “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of 

the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other 

aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a 

sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.”

The court also told the jury “to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem 

appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.” No 

additional instruction was required.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 343-44. 

As noted, in reviewing penalty phase instructions, the test is “whether there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration 

of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Further, a single instruction “may not 

be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in light of the instructions as a whole and the 

entire trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

Here, the state court could reasonably have found that the jury was not precluded from 

considering constitutionally relevant mitigating and sympathetic evidence during their sentence 

deliberations. The Supreme Court has never required a sentencing court to instruct a jury on how to 

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weigh and balance factors in aggravation and mitigation. In Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court stated, “[a]

capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing 

decision.” 512 U.S. at 979. “Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively 

defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad 

of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.” Id. (quoting Ramos, 463 U.S. at 

1008.)

In Marsh, the Supreme Court stated:

In aggregate, our precedents confer upon defendants the right to present sentencers with 

information relevant to the sentencing decision and oblige sentencers to consider that 

information in determining the appropriate sentence. The thrust of our mitigation 

jurisprudence ends here. “[W]e have never held that a specific method for balancing 

mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally 

required.”

548 U.S. at 175 (quoting Franklin, 487 U.S. at 179). Here, in explaining the factors the jury was to 

consider in reaching its decision, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that it could consider:

[A]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not 

a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 

character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, 

whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.

(RT at 2607; CT at 632.) The trial court also told jurors that they were “free to assign whatever moral 

or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to 

consider.” (RT at 2615; CT at 647.) The prosecutor also noted that the jury could and should 

consider sympathy for the defendant in determining the appropriate penalty. (RT at 2396, 2579,

2581.) 

There is no clearly established authority from the United States Supreme Court holding that a 

jury must be instructed in a particular manner. Accordingly, since the Supreme Court has not decided 

the issue, the state supreme court’s decision could not be contrary to or an unreasonable application 

of United States Supreme Court precedent. Carey, 549 U.S. at 76.

To the extent Petitioner alleges the jury may have applied the instruction in a manner contrary 

to state law (see ECF No. 113 at 177: 23-24 [“state law provides that jurors may sentence a defendant 

to life without parole even where the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating 

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circumstances”]), this allegation is not alone a basis for federal habeas relief. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. 

Accordingly, the state supreme court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

Nor was the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim U5 is denied. 

g. Analysis of Claim U6

Petitioner next claims that the trial court erroneously refused certain of his proposed penalty 

phase instructions which were designed to guide jury discretion in sentence selection, denying him 

due process and a fair penalty phase determination. (ECF No. 113 at 178-86.) 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected the allegation relating to Petitioner’s 

proposed Instruction No. 9 on direct appeal. He also raised all these same allegations in his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. That court found Petitioner’s habeas 

claims were procedurally barred because these claims could have been, but were not, raised on direct 

appeal, or were repetitive of such claims. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 

Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) The California Supreme Court also rejected the 

habeas claims on the merits. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus); Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 343. 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erroneously determined that CALJIC 8.88 was “good 

enough,” rejecting his proposed penalty phase instructions number 2, 9-14, and 19-21, all of which 

were allegedly designed to inform the jury that they should consider only instructions given at the 

penalty phase; that they could consider non-statutory mitigating factors; that “unlike in the guilt phase 

of the case, sympathy, mercy and compassion, or any other mitigating factors, are appropriate 

considerations for a penalty determination”; that they could return for life without parole even if

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; and that doubt is to be resolved in 

favor of life without parole. (ECF No. 113 at 178-81; RT at 2549-50; CT at 651, 652, 655, 656, 657, 

658, 659, 660, 663, 665.) He also alleges that the trial court did not inform the jury that weighing of 

aggravating and mitigating factors was not to be done mechanically and that death was to be imposed 

only if it was the appropriate penalty. 

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However, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably rejected 

this claim for the reasons stated in claims U1-U5, ante. The trial court separately instructed the jury 

on the requirement that it follow the penalty instructions and stated rules of law, such that Petitioner’s 

proposed Instruction No. 2 (CT at 663) could reasonably be seen as unnecessary. (RT at 2607; CT at 

632; CALJIC No. 8.85.) 

Petitioner acknowledges that the jury was instructed that it could consider “any sympathetic or 

other aspect of the defendant’s character or record” to support a life sentence (CALJIC 8.85) and that 

it was free to assign whatever “moral or sympathetic value” was “appropriate” to the various factors it 

was “permitted to consider.” (CALJIC 8.88; ECF No. 113 at 183:22-25.) 

Petitioner’s proposed instructions could have reasonably been seen as unnecessary given the 

overall charge to the jury regarding its exercise of sentencing discretion as discussed in claims U1-

U5, ante. Spivey, 194 F.3d at 976. The trial court could properly reject a petitioner’s proposed jury 

instruction if other instructions adequately cover the issues about which the defense is concerned. 

United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 

F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1979) (“there is no right to have the instruction phrased in the precise terms 

requested by defendant”). 

Additionally, Petitioner’s proposed instruction that jurors could not return a verdict of death 

unless they were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the appropriate penalty, (ECF No. 

113 at 184-85), was reasonably rejected. See, e.g., Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1485 (1995) 

(failure to require a specific finding that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt 

does not render California’s death penalty statute unconstitutional); accord People v. Webb, 6 Cal. 

4th 494, 536 (1993).

Under California law “neither death nor life is presumptively appropriate or inappropriate 

under any set of circumstances, but in all cases the determination of the appropriate penalty remains a 

question for each individual juror.” People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal. 4th 795, 853 (1997); see also Walton 

v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 

589 (2002) (a defendant may constitutionally be required to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence the existence of mitigating circumstances, a conclusion manifestly inconsistent with 

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Petitioner’s assertion that the Constitution requires the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt 

that death is the appropriate penalty). Petitioner’s cited People v. Cancino is not authority otherwise 

because here, for the reasons stated, the jury was adequately instructed as to its sentencing discretion. 

10 Cal. 2d 223, 230 (1937). 

The California Supreme Court considered and rejected on direct appeal, alleged instructional 

error relating to Petitioner’s proposed Instruction No. 9, noting that: 

[T]he instructions adequately performed the constitutional function of guiding the jury’s 

discretion in sentencing. [Citation] In this case, the court gave similar instructions that 

told the jury “it could return a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances 

predominated and death is the appropriate verdict.

Here, the trial court gave the standard instruction to take into account “any other 

circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal 

excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 

record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not 

related to the offense for which he is on trial.” The court also told the jury “to assign 

whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various 

factors you are permitted to consider.” No additional instruction was required.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 343-44. 

That court could reasonably have found that the standard penalty phase instructions given in 

this case, CALJIC Nos. 8.85, 8.86, 8.87, and 8.88, adequately guided the jury’s sentencing discretion 

and determination. (RT at 2605-08, 2614-16; CT at 631-34, 647-48.) As the California Supreme 

Court stated on direct appeal:

[I]n the final analysis “the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital 

sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing ‘scheme that permits 

the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should 

be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible 

for that penalty by statute.’ [Citation]”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 342 (quoting Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1009 n.22).

“The requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury 

to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.” Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 307 (1990); 

Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377. Here, the jury was specifically instructed to consider, in reaching their 

decision regarding the appropriate penalty, “any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 

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character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not 

related to the offense for which he is on trial.” (RT at 2607.) The instructions given by the trial court 

could reasonably be seen as satisfying the Blystone and Boyde standards. A mere state law 

instructional error, if there were one, is not a basis for federal habeas relief. Dunckhurst, 859 F.2d at 

114 (“a state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a 

federal habeas corpus proceeding.”).

Additionally, the court’s instruction to the jury about not “mechanical[ly] counting” the 

aggravating and mitigating factors (RT at 2615; CT at 647) adequately informed the jury that it could 

base a life sentence on the existence of only one factor in mitigation. 

Accordingly, the state supreme court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

Nor was the state court’s ruling based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim U6 is denied.

h. Review of Claim U7

Petitioner claims cumulative penalty phase instructional error as alleged in claims U1-U6 

rendered the court’s charge to the jury insufficient as a whole to provide guidance necessary for a fair 

and reliable sentencing determination. (ECF No. 113 at 186-87.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which that court summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order 

Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner re-argues claims U1-U6 and claims cumulative effect of these errors caused 

substantial prejudice in the jury’s determination of the verdict under Brecht. 

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple trial errors 

may give rise to a due process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each 

error considered individually would not require reversal.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (citing Donnelly, 

416 U.S. at 643). However, the fact that errors have been committed during a trial does not mean that 

reversal is required. “[W]hile a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, [he] is not entitled to a perfect 

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trial, for there are no perfect trials.” Payne, 944 F.2d at 1477; U.S. v. De Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 868 (9th 

Cir. 1996).

Here, for the reasons stated above in claims U1 through U6, the California Supreme Court

could reasonably have found that there was no penalty phase instructional error, individually or 

cumulatively. 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that Petitioner failed 

to establish that rejection of claim U and all its subclaims was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or an or an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim U7 is denied. 

5. Review of Claim V

Petitioner next claims prosecutorial misconduct during penalty phase closing argument, 

denying him a fair trial, due process and fair and reliable penalty determination in violation of the 

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 187-90.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred 

because this claim could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal. (CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus [citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 825 n.3; In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759].) 

The California Supreme Court also summarily rejected Petitioner’s habeas claim on the merits

without explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

The standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct is a “narrow one of due 

process”; the federal habeas court must determine whether the alleged instances of misconduct “so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643); see also Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; Tan v. 

Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). 

To constitute a denial of due process, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient 

significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 

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(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 (1976); Smith, 

455 U.S. at 221 (ordinary trial errors by a prosecutor do not suffice; the misconduct must be 

egregious enough to deny the defendant a fair trial). The remarks complained of, in order to 

constitute a denial of due process, must be of such a quality that they prevent a fair sentencing 

hearing. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1278 (5th Cir. 1997). A petitioner is entitled to relief in this 

context only where the constitutional violations exerted a “substantial and injurious” effect on the 

judgment. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 620; Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating 

the Ninth Circuit applies Brecht if misconduct of constitutional dimension is established), amended

315 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). 

b. Analysis of Claim V 

Petitioner alleges the penalty phase was unfair because the prosecutor’s closing improperly 

argued matters outside the evidence, improperly stated her own personal opinion of the credibility of 

witnesses, misstated the law regarding the role of sympathy, and urged jurors to impose the moral

judgments of the community rather than their individual moral judgments. The specific instances of 

alleged misconduct are discussed separately. 

1) Public Sentiment 

Petitioner alleges the prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to consider public sentiment 

about petitioner and the death penalty during her closing argument, as follows: 

You must determine whether or not Paul Clarence Bolin, twice a killer, should be

given the death penalty or should live out his natural life in prison. As jurors in this 

phase, you will be required to bring into play all of your individual and all of your 

collective consciousness, all of your sense of duty, all of your values, your morals, your 

ethics, your individual and your collective experiences in life, your personal values and 

also your value of what the community expects of you because you, as a member of this 

jury, are representatives of the community.

(RT at 2574; see also ECF No. 113 at 188:10-16.)

Paul Bolin has crossed the line which society draws. He has to now accept the proper 

punishment for what he has done. When you came into this courtroom, you did not 

know that this is what your responsibility would be, it is a heavy responsibility. I am 

glad it is not mine, but I appreciate the fact that each of you has listened and each of you 

has paid attention, and I would like for you, as representatives of society, to draw the 

line that society draws and say to this man, "Paul Clarence Bolin, you have stepped over 

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that line and now you must suffer the same fate as those people that you saw to cut their 

life off" and give this man the ultimate punishment, that punishment which I believe the 

evidence shows that he deserves, that is death.

(RT at 2582; see also ECF No. 113 at 188:10-16.)

However, these comments do not reasonably suggest the jury consider matters not in the record, 

or that they deviate from the instructions to be given by the trial court. The California Supreme Court

could reasonably have determined the prosecutor’s noted comments simply argued the crimes and 

aggravating factors already in the record and were not unfair. For example, the prosecutor specifically 

told the jury: “I would like you to consider your verdict rationally, with rational thoughts from all the 

evidence and not from emotion.” (RT at 2582.) The prosecutor also asked the jurors to consider future 

dangerousness and the protection of society in general in determining whether Petitioner should spend 

his life in prison or be put to death for his crimes. (RT at 2577.) Significantly, these comments were 

consistent with the prosecution theme that Petitioner resolves conflict with violence. (RT at 2578-79); 

see Runnels, 413 F.3d at 1115 (the presence of a relevant theory in argument will place the argument 

outside those prohibited as based solely on appeals to passion and prejudice). 

2) Matters Not In Evidence

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor argued matters not in evidence when she asked jurors to

consider Petitioner’s character and influence upon others:

Consider the fact that there are two people no longer alive because this man wanted

to protect 300 lousy marijuana plants. And when you are thinking about his protection

of his 300 marijuana plants, think about the people from Chicago and the help that this

man, they thought, was giving to their youngsters, their teen-age children and think 

about what happens to those marijuana plants of Mr. Bolin when they are grown and 

sold on the streets in Los Angeles; think about who they are sold to and think about what 

kind of role model this man would be making for those teen-agers in Chicago.

(RT at 2581.) Petitioner claims there was no evidence of any intended or actual sale of marijuana. 

However, the state supreme court could reasonably have found that this argument was relevant to 

evidence presented regarding the marijuana farm - that at the time of the shootings the plants were not 

yet ready to harvest and sell (RT at 1879-80) - that Petitioner had not yet found a buyer (RT at 1669); 

and to rebut evidence presented by the defense relating to Petitioner helping his young relatives in 

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Chicago during his flight from authorities. Moreover, any such prejudice was likely ameliorated by the 

defense theory that the shootings were not motivated to save Petitioner’s marijuana business. (RT at 

2587); see Roberts v. Bowersox, 137 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 1998) (a defense attorney’s argument 

may minimize any potential prejudice from inappropriate prosecution argument). 

3) Personal Opinion

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor, during closing argument, improperly expressed her 

opinion that Mary Bolin did not testify truthfully and credibly about her father’s involvement in the 

aggravating Spencer assault event. As discussed in more detail in clam W6, post, Mary, testified that 

the event occurred when she was 12 years old. (See RT at 2469, 2483.) She testified that Spencer was 

partying at her house, smoking pot and sniffing paint, when he put his hands down her pants and tried 

to pull her top down. (See RT at 2470-71.) She testified that Petitioner, upset after Mary told him what 

had happened, arrived and ran towards Spencer and ordered Spencer to leave, and that Spencer then 

exited through the backyard where Petitioner’s friend, Richard Balsamico, began beating him with a 

stick. (See RT at 2412-72.) Mary testified that she did not see Petitioner hit Spencer. (See RT at 

2473.) 

On cross-examination, Mary told the prosecutor she did not remember the police coming to her 

house or talking to the police. (See RT at 2480-81.) She was then impeached with Deputy Gutierrez’s

police report of the Spencer incident in which Mary failed to provide the information to which she 

testified, noted above. (See RT at 2479-83.) 

During closing, the prosecutor argued as follows with regard to that testimony: 

Now, one of Paul Bolin's daughters took the witness stand and told you a story which

did not go along with the police report and, of course, when she was questioned about it,

she couldn't remember whether or not she told that to the police. When shown the police

report, she couldn't remember anything, but I am sure that she loves her father, and I am

sure that she thought she could help him by misrepresenting or perhaps just forgetting

what actually happened.

(RT at 2578.) 

Again, a daughter came in and told a story which simply was not true but, then, again, 

this girl loves her father. A poor father is better than no father at all, so she would come 

in and tell a story that was entirely different than that which was told to the police 

or that [other witnesses] told, but just remember this man was convicted of this crime.

. . .

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(RT at 2579.)

However, as Respondent notes, the prosecutor was free to argue relative credibility and lack of 

truthfulness based upon reasonable inference raised by admitted evidence. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 

F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1496-1497 (9th Cir. 1995). Here 

Petitioner acknowledges that Mary’s testimony was contradicted by another witness. (ECF No. 113 at 

189:13-16.) It was not unreasonable for the state court to find that the prosecutor’s argument was 

properly related to Mary’s credibility. The prosecutor also told jurors that they should be guided by 

their own feeling regarding the evidence, not counsel’s argument. (RT at 2574-75.) The court's 

instructions emphasized this principle. (CT at 628-29; RT at 2604; Def.'s Proposed Instr. No. 1, CT at 

628.) 

At closing, a prosecutor is allowed wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the

evidence, including casting a witness’s testimony as lies or fabrication. See Turner v. Marshall, 63 

F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 685. It follows that 

Petitioner’s further citation to Turner v. Louisiana for the proposition that the prosecutor’s conduct was 

unfair because it was not based on the admitted evidence, see 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965), is 

unavailing. Ms. Ryals’s comments could reasonably be seen as inference from noted evidence in the 

record. 

Petitioner’s allegation that federal law precludes the prosecutor’s offering her personal opinion 

of issues of guilt and credibility, citing to United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 392 (9th Cir. 1979) and 

United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 866 (9th Cir. 1977), also is unavailing. The Potter court 

acknowledged the impropriety of the prosecutor interposing his own opinion and commentary on 

factual matters not in evidence, and found any prejudice neutralized by the court’s instruction that 

argument is not evidence. Potter, 616 F.2d at 392. The Davis court likewise acknowledged the limits 

of personal opinion where not based on evidence in the record. Davis, 564 F.2d at 846. Here, the 

prosecutor’s comments could be seen as proper given the conflicting testimony, and any error could be 

seen as harmless given the jury instruction the argument was not to be taken as evidence. 

4) Ethical Norms

Similarly, Petitioner’s allegation that the prosecutor’s noted comments violated ethical norms

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is unpersuasive. Even if the prosecutor’s argument could be seen as unethical, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated it was contrary to clearly established Federal law. 

5) Sympathy

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor, in closing argument, improperly stated that sympathy 

should be limited to Petitioner’s culpability for the crimes, and contradicted the language of 

California Penal Code § 190.3(j), by telling the jurors that: 

Mr. Cater and Mr. Bolin put on evidence of that factor which you can also consider

called sympathy. That is anything which lessens the culpability of this man for these

crimes. You can consider anything that makes this less serious, that mitigates his act and

he put on the family and he put on friends, and he put on people who had known Mr.

Bolin.

(ECF No. 113 at 189:23-26, citing RT at 2579:23-26.) The jury was instructed with CALJIC 190.3(j) 

which allows the jury to consider: 

Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a

legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's 

character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, 

whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.

(CT at 632; RT at 2607.)

 Petitioner contends the prosecutor’s comment misled the jury as to what they could properly 

consider in determining their penalty verdict. However, the state supreme court could reasonably 

have found otherwise. The prosecutor neither argued against sympathy for Petitioner and his family, 

(RT at 2581), nor in favor of sympathy for the victims. (RT at 2575.) Instead the prosecutor urged 

the jury to consider the circumstances of crimes admitted into evidence. (RT at 2575.) Petitioner’s 

reliance upon Penry v. Lynaugh is misplaced because in that case, unlike this case, the jury was not 

instructed that it could consider and give effect to mitigating evidence. 492 U.S. 302, 320 (1989)

(abrograted by Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)). 

Nor do the other allegations in claim U demonstrate that the jury was improperly instructed 

regarding mitigating considerations of sympathy, for reasons stated in the discussion of that claim. 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that sympathy could be considered in determining the 

sentence. (RT at 2607, 2615; CALJIC Nos. 8.85, 8.88.)

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6) Prejudice

Even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, there was no more than harmless error

under Brecht. The prosecutor told the jurors that it was their feelings about the evidence and factors 

in aggravation that mattered, not her own. (RT at 2574-75.) The trial court properly instructed the 

jury on this point. (CT at 628-29; RT at 2604.) The prosecutor stated that the jury’s deliberations 

should be based upon the evidence. (RT at 2574.) The trial court instructed the jury that the 

argument of counsel was not evidence. (RT at 2573.) The trial court also instructed the jury to 

follow its instructions if anything said by the lawyers contradicted the instructions. (RT at 2604.) 

Jurors are presumed to follow instructions. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381-85. See Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 

392 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor’s closing contained some improprieties albeit not purposeful or 

flagrant or requiring reversal); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting 

habeas claim where, although some of prosecutor’s arguments were improper, jury was told 

comments were not evidence, and evidence against defendant was substantial).

For all the reasons stated, the state supreme court could reasonably have found this claim

unavailing. A jury generally accords less weight to the arguments of counsel than to the instructions 

it is given. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. at 

384) (jurors generally accord less weight to arguments of counsel than the court's instructions and 

such arguments must be viewed in the context of all argument and the instructions); see also Darden, 

477 U.S. at 182 (claim of prosecutorial misconduct rejected where the prosecutor’s comments “did 

not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor . . . implicate other specific rights of the accused, such as 

the right to counsel or to remain silent”).

A fair-minded jurist could therefore reasonably conclude that Petitioner failed to establish 

rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim V is denied.

6. Review of Claim W

Petitioner next alleges multiple subclaims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel during 

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the penalty phase, resulting in a complete breakdown of the adversarial process, denying Petitioner 

due process, a fair trial, and a reliable verdict, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 190-219.) Petitioner also asserts ineffective assistance by 

state appellate counsel, Richard Gilman. These subclaims are reviewed separately.

a. Clearly Established Law

The applicable legal standard for ineffectiveness of counsel is set forth out in claim C2, ante. 

The basic requirements of Strickland apply with equal force in the penalty phase. Thus, Petitioner 

must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the 

alleged errors resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98. In the context of the penalty 

phase, just as in the guilt phase, the Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific guidelines for 

appropriate attorney conduct and instead [has] emphasized that ‘[t]he proper measure of attorney 

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

In the penalty phase, defense counsel has an “obligation to conduct a thorough investigation 

of the defendant’s background,” Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, and defense counsel has a duty to 

investigate, develop, and present mitigation evidence during penalty phase proceedings. Wiggins, 

539 U.S. at 521-23. Counsel has a duty to make a “diligent investigation into his client’s troubling 

background and unique personal circumstances.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 415. 

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that the duty to investigate does not require 

defense counsel “to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent 

counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a 

waste.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 382-83 (2005) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525) (further 

investigation is excusable where counsel has evidence suggesting it would be fruitless); Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 699 (counsel could “reasonably surmise . . . that character and psychological evidence 

would be of little help”). As the Strickland court stated:

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible 

options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete 

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments 

support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

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unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments. 

466 U.S. at 690-91.

“In assessing counsel’s investigation, the court must conduct an objective review of their 

performance, measured for reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen “from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Further, the reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially 

influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite 

properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the 

defendant. In particular, what investigative decisions are reasonable depends critically on such 

information. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

In order to demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 693-

94. To assess that probability, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the available 

mitigation evidence and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation. Porter v. McCollum, 558 

U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-398). The court must consider whether the 

likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in is “sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome” actually reached at sentencing. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694). 

b. Analysis of Claim W1

Petitioner claims generally that counsel Soria and his investigator Binns were lax and 

inefficient in their trial investigation and preparation and did not provide reports to, or communicate 

with co-counsel Cater following Cater’s appointment as lead counsel. (ECF No. 113 at 193-94; RT at 

2273-74.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which summarily rejected it on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den.

Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

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1) Withheld and Inaccurate Information

Petitioner alleges that investigator Binns did not conduct an effective investigation and 

provided misinformation regarding his investigation of Petitioner’s relatives. (See SHCP Ex. 47.) 

Petitioner suggests that Binns did not share the small amount of information he gleaned during his 

investigation, placing Soria in breach of his ethical obligations as predecessor counsel. (See 1/7/91 

RT at 2304-11.) 

Petitioner alleges that Soria and Binns did not provide Cater with complete and accurate 

information, (id.; ECF No. 113 at 193), and that the “failure of Soria and Binns to turn over all 

information regarding the status and results of the penalty investigation forced Cater to start the 

investigation from scratch [and] to waste a significant portion of the short time that he had in 

reduplicating work already accomplished by Binns.” (ECF No. 113 at 193:27-194:3.) 

Petitioner also alleges that Soria failed to advise Cater of the evidence the prosecutor intended 

to use in aggravation, matters the prosecutor had spoken to Soria about “at great length.” (RT at 

2391.)

The California Supreme Court reviewed certain of these allegations in the context of denial of 

Cater’s new trial motion, and determined that: 

With respect to Cater’s concern about the adequacy of penalty phase investigation, the 

record contains no colorable claim that it was in fact deficient. At best, he offered only 

speculation based on hearsay reports, and defendant added nothing to substantiate the 

allegation.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 347. 

This Court finds that, on the record before it, the California Supreme Court could reasonably 

have found Soria and Binns were not deficient in their investigation and did not withhold information 

from Cater. Binns did engage in penalty phase investigation, locating and interviewing witnesses 

including Petitioner’s friends and family members in Covina and Chicago. (See SHCP Ex. 47, 1/7/91 

Marsden RT at 2304-11.) Binns did turn over his written files to Cater (id.; see also SHCP at 91) and 

did respond to Cater’s questions about the files (Id.). The California Supreme Court could reasonably 

have found no deficient investigation or inaccurate information was provided, even though Binns may 

have worked independently and largely provided oral reports of his investigative activities. (Id.) 

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Cater stated that his manner of investigating the penalty phase “differ[ed] greatly” from that 

used by Soria and Binns. (CT at 548.) However, this could reflect a matter of trial tactics. Nor was 

it unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that Cater’s generalized complaint, that 

Binns’s reports were incomplete and certain of the information provided by Soria and Binns was 

inaccurate, (see SHCP Ex. 47, 1/7/91 Marsden RT at 2304-11), was speculative. Similarly, Petitioner 

points to scant support in the record for Cater’s allegation that Binns and Soria withheld information. 

Petitioner himself stated in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California 

Supreme Court that:

Trial counsel’s files were not properly maintained, making it difficult to establish 

precisely what steps were taken, and when, by counsel. Nonetheless, Soria claims to 

have turned over all trial materials to Cater, when Cater took over the penalty phase. 

Soria’s investigator, Bruce Binns claims to have turned over all records maintained by 

him to either Soria or Cater. Thus, the files obtained by appellate counsel from Cater 

appear to be the complete record of trial preparation in this case.

(SHCP at 91.)

2) Failure to Communicate

Petitioner also asserts that Soria and Cater failed to communicate effectively about the 

prosecution’s intended case in aggravation. See e.g., Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 

1998) (deficient development of mitigating evidence related to confusion between co-counsel as to 

respective duties constituted ineffective assistance). Petitioner points to a portion of the record in 

which the prosecutor suggested she had spoken with Soria about the prosecutor’s intent to call

Huffstuttler’s girlfriend, Ms. Ward, as a witness during the penalty phase, and suggested Soria never 

passed this information along to Cater. (ECF No. 113 at 194; RT at 2363-64, 2391.) 

However, it appears the prosecutor had also served Cater with notice regarding her intent to 

call Ward as a witness in support of an aggravating factor. (RT at 2363-64.) In fact, the prosecution 

provided adequate notice of that information, and Cater acknowledged that he had received discovery 

regarding it. (See claim K, ante.) 

Petitioner also complains that Soria did not tell Cater of the prosecution’s intent to introduce

the letter to Halfacre, and that Cater was unaware of this fact until “three days before the penalty

phase.” (ECF No. 113 at 194.) But the record demonstrates that the prosecutor gave the required 

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notice of such to both Cater and Soria. (See RT at 2391.) The trial court overruled Cater’s objection 

to admitting the letter on such notice grounds, finding “[the prosecutor] did give notice and did ask 

for an exemplar.” (Id.) Additionally, the California Supreme Court reviewed the claim and 

determined that proper notice had been provided. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 336-37.

Petitioner fails to show that any of the alleged errors gave rise to deficient performance 

resulting in prejudice under the Strickland standard. Cater apparently was able to talk to all of the 

necessary witnesses and contends that he was able to and did conduct a more thorough investigation

than had Soria and Binns. (See SHCP Ex. 47 at 2305-10.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he was 

prejudiced by any alleged failure to communicate accurately, through role confusion, see Bean, 163 

F.3d at 1078, or otherwise. 

3) Appellate Counsel

Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to review a copy of the 

Reporter’s Transcript from the January 7, 1991 Marsden hearing (see SHCP Ex. 47; ECF No. 113 at 

191 n.52), and failed to include the transcript in the state certified record. But these claims are 

unsupported in the record. It appears that the transcript was before the state habeas court. (See 

SHCP Ex. 47.) Accordingly, no prejudice is apparent.

4) Conclusions

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687-98.

A fair-minded jurist could therefore reasonably conclude that Petitioner failed to establish 

rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim W1 is denied. 

c. Analysis of Claim W2

Petitioner alleges that Cater, upon his appointment as penalty phase counsel, was ineffective 

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by requesting only a two-week continuance to allow completion of the penalty phase investigation, 

when he knew or should have known that a life history investigation had not been done and that more 

time was required. (ECF No. 113 at 194-95.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which that court summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order 

Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner complains counsel Cater was ineffective by failing to investigate, prepare and 

present an adequate penalty phase defense. Cater had advised the trial court of his dissatisfaction 

with the previous investigation and opined that his investigator had obtained more satisfactory results. 

(See SHCP Ex. 47 at 2305-07). As noted, Cater indicated to the court that his investigation into the 

penalty phase “differ[ed]” from Soria’s. (CT at 548.) Yet Cater requested only the additional twoweek continuance to prepare for the penalty phase. 

The record reflects that the trial court initially granted defense counsel three weeks to prepare 

for the penalty phase. (See RT at 2297-98.) At the Marsden hearing on January 7, 1991, Cater 

requested and was granted an additional two-week continuance. (See SHCP Ex. 47; RT at 2312-13.) 

During the Marsden hearing, Cater explained to the trial court what had been done and what remained 

to be done within the requested additional time. (See SHCP Ex. 47 at 2304-11). At that point, Cater 

stated to the court his belief that the requested further continuance would be sufficient “because we 

have got an excellent head start, Mr. Roger Ruby has practically closed down his office working full 

time for me right now to gather this together.” (Id. at 2310.)

Petitioner concedes that Cater and his investigator, Roger Ruby, spent the five weeks 

following Cater’s December 14, 1990 appointment, investigating and preparing the penalty phase 

defense. (See ECF No. 113 at 194-95.) Yet Petitioner argues that, because of the extent of the 

aggravating incidents, this was still not enough time to follow-up on mitigating life history facts 

including childhood abuse and neglect that caused Petitioner to live on the streets as a minor; work 

history including apparent occupational exposure to toxic solvents; prison records; and possible 

mental state defenses. (See RT 2504; SHCP Ex. 24; RT at 2307-08.) Petitioner contends that this 

failure to conduct additional investigation was unreasonable. He notes Cater presented a penalty 

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phase defense that lasted only a little over two hours, (see CT at 588-589), and presented no evidence 

regarding Petitioner’s mental status, childhood abuse and trauma, exposure to neurotoxic chemicals, 

physical injuries, substance abuse, or military service.

However, it was not unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to determine that Cater’s 

performance at the penalty phase was not deficient for reasons discussed in claims W1 ante and W3,

through W10 post. Petitioner’s reliance on Bean is unpersuasive because Bean appears factually 

distinguishable. 163 F.3d at 1078. Counsel in Bean, due to role confusion, did no penalty phase 

work until after the guilt phase was completed. Id. Here, defense counsel did conduct penalty phase 

investigation in the months before trial without any semblance of role confusion. (See claim C2, 

ante.) Cater’s expressed dissatisfaction with the efforts of Soria and Binns did not appear to arise 

from role confusion or a failure by Soria and Binns to initiate the pretrial investigation. 

As noted, Cater apparently was able to talk to all of the witnesses he felt necessary, and that 

he was able to do a more thorough investigation in his estimation than the investigation previously 

undertaken. (See SHCP Ex. 47 at 2305-10.) It does not appear that Cater requested or required any 

continuance beyond the five weeks previously granted. 

Petitioner’s cited Daniels v. Woodford in support of his argument that external constraints 

necessitated further continuance is unavailing because Petitioner has not demonstrated on the 

evidentiary record the existence of any external constraints. 428 F.3d at 1206 (counsel’s deficient 

investigation resulted in part from court’s refusal to grant a continuance and problems getting state 

funding). In fact, the record suggests the opposite. Cater requested, and trial court granted, 

additional funding to support further investigation during the two continuances to prepare for the 

penalty phase. (See SHCP Ex. 47.) Cater represented that he thought two weeks would be sufficient. 

(Id. at 2310.) Counsel’s actions could be seen as strategic rather than the result of external 

constraints. 

Petitioner also relies upon Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), in support of 

his argument that Cater did not spend sufficient time preparing for the penalty phase. But Jackson

too is distinguishable because there defense counsel, based on the belief trial would not reach the 

penalty phase, spent about 2 hours preparing for it by interviewing two witnesses and reviewing

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defendant’s juvenile and military records. Id. at 1162. Here, Cater acted as co-counsel during the

guilt phase, and when the trial court appointed him to be lead counsel for the penalty phase, that court 

provided additional funding for another investigator and five weeks of additional time to further

investigate and prepare. As discussed in claims W1 and W3-W10, counsel Cater and his investigator 

Ruby marshaled mitigating evidence including through interviews with numerous of petitioner’s 

family and friends in California and Chicago, and otherwise by investigating family, social, military 

and medical and mental health background information and the aggravating evidence of the 

prosecution. 

Based on the record, the state supreme court could reasonably have determined that Cater’s 

decision to proceed to the penalty phase without requesting an additional continuance and funding 

was based on informed professional judgment following a reasonably adequate investigation.

A fair-minded jurist could have reasonably have determined that, based on the evidence, a 

longer continuance would not have resulted in a more favorable disposition for Petitioner, for the 

reasons stated and given the substantial evidence presented against Petitioner at the penalty phase. 

(See claims O, R and S, ante.)

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of this proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W2 is denied. 

d. Analysis of Claim W3

Petitioner next alleges that defense counsel Cater did not adequately interview and prepare 

penalty phase witnesses Mary Bolin and Paula Bolin. (ECF No. 113 at 195-96.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

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Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily rejected on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

1) Pretrial Interview and Preparation

Mary Bolin was the sole defense witness regarding the Spencer and Ross incidents in 

aggravation. (See RT at 2468-2477.) Mary also testified that Petitioner had been a good father to 

her. (RT at 2477-80.)

Mary’s sister, Paula, testified that Petitioner had suffered a personal tragedy (the death of a 

beloved girlfriend) shortly before the capital crimes, and that he had lived at the remote cabin, the site 

of the murders, for close to a year after his girlfriend’s death. (See RT at 2494-95.)

Petitioner faults Cater for allowing his investigator, Ruby, to conduct the pre-testimony 

interviews and preparation with Mary and Paula for direct and cross-examination, rather than doing 

so personally. Petitioner contends this made their testimony less compelling than it could have been 

given the mitigating information referenced in their respective habeas declarations given ten years 

later. (See RT at 2477-2480, 2490-95; SHCP Ex.’s 5, 9.)

Petitioner also claims that the first time Mary ever spoke to Cater was on the witness stand. 

(See EH Ex. 5, p. 9.) Likewise, Paula did not discuss her testimony with defense counsel before she 

took the stand. (See EH Ex. 9, p. 15.) Petitioner claims this lack of preparation allowed these 

witnesses to be unnecessarily impeached (see RT at 2479-83), constituting ineffective assistance. See

Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) (it is imperative in penalty phase that all 

relevant mitigation information be unearthed). 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have denied this claim. Neither Mary nor 

Paula recalled speaking directly to Cater before their testimony. (See SHCP Ex. 5 at 9; SHCP Ex. 9 

at 15.) Nonetheless, Ruby interviewed these witnesses prior to trial, prepared a written report, and

may have spoken with Cater about these interviews. Cater presumptively knew what mitigating 

information these witnesses had to offer. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 5, 9, 24.) Cater could reasonably have 

believed that other tasks were more important than interviewing these witnesses personally given 

information already learned from Mr. Ruby. 

The record demonstrates that both Mary and Paula likely knew the general nature of their 

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expected testimony at Petitioner’s trial given the facts covered in Ruby’s interview with them. (See

e.g., RT at 2478-79, 2495; SHCP Ex.’s 5 at 8, 9 at 14, 24 at 8-10.) Each knew their father was facing 

the death penalty and neither wanted him to be sentenced to death. (See RT at 2478-79, 2495.)

Petitioner’s attempt to support his argument with citation to Douglas, Bloom v. Calderon, 132 

F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), and Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006), is unavailing because 

each case is distinguishable. (See ECF No. 178 at 277-78.) Douglas is a pre-AEDPA case, thus on 

review AEDPA deference was not given to the state court’s finding of no error. 316 F.3d at 1085.

Moreover, in Douglas, “Douglas’s wife assert[ed] that she did not even know she would be testifying 

until the night before the penalty phase began.” Id. at 1087. Here, Petitioner’s daughters were 

interviewed multiple times and given information regarding the nature of their testimony in the weeks 

before trial. 

The Bloom and Hovey courts considered the failure of counsel to prepare expert witnesses 

who were not given important documents and background materials regarding the defendants, 

seriously impairing the credibility and testimony of critical mitigation witnesses. See Bloom, 132 

F.3d at 1277; Hovey, 458 F.3d at 930. Here, Petitioner’s daughters had lived with him and were 

generally aware of his background. (See SHCP Ex’s. 5 and 9.) Furthermore, both were presented as 

lay witnesses.

Petitioner also alleges that Cater failed to elicit from Mary and Paula certain details in 

mitigation relating to Petitioner’s mental state, his family background, the effects of his experiences 

in Vietnam, his chronic physical pain, his many good deeds and the death of his girlfriend shortly 

before the capital crimes. (ECF No. 178 at 297-98.) However, it appears that neither Mary nor Paula 

could testify to Petitioner’s mental state near the time of the shootings, not only because they were 

without sufficient knowledge or expertise, but because each stated that they had seen him only 

occasionally in the months leading up to the murders. (See SHCP Ex.’s 5 at 6, 9 at 14.) 

Testimony regarding Petitioner’s alleged good deeds was presented through other witnesses. 

(RT at 2508-09, 2515-19, 2523-24.) There was other testimony that Petitioner housed neighborhood 

teenagers and took in and provided for those in need of a home. (RT at 2402, 2469-70, 2473, 2486-

89, 2567.) 

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It seems unlikely Mary and Paula could have provided any significant mitigating testimony 

relating to Petitioner’s childhood and family life because Petitioner refused to discuss such matters 

with them. (See SHCP Ex. 9 at 8.) The record otherwise reflected Petitioner’s troubled home and 

life as a youth, (see RT 2503-04); his enlistment in the Navy, (see RT at 2505); and his positive 

influence on his children and others. (See RT 2502-29.) As noted, Paula did testify about the death 

of Petitioner’s girlfriend. (See RT at 2494-95.)

Petitioner claims that Cater’s failure to prepare Mary to testify resulted in her impeachment 

regarding the Spencer assault. As discussed more fully in claim W6, post, Petitioner’s unadjudicated 

1979 assault upon Spencer, witnessed by Mary, was offered in aggravation at the penalty phase. (See

ECF No. 113 at 200-03.) Mary testified that Spencer was partying at her house and put his hands 

down her pants and tried to pull her top down. (See Id. at 2470-71.) She testified that Petitioner, 

upset after Mary told him what had happened, arrived and ran towards Spencer and ordered him to 

leave and that Spencer exited through the backyard where Richard Balsamico began beating him with 

a stick. (See RT at 2412-72.) Mary testified that she did not see Petitioner hit Spencer. (See RT at 

2473.) However on cross-examination, Mary told the prosecutor she did not remember the police 

coming to her house or talking to the police. (See RT at 2480-81.) She was then impeached with the 

police report of Deputy Gutierrez regarding the Spencer incident in which Mary failed to state the 

events to which she testified. (See RT at 2479-83.) 

However, Cater was presumably aware of Mary’s involvement in the Spencer assault from the 

police report and from her interview with investigator Ruby. (See SHCP Ex. 24 at 9.) Cater may 

have chosen, as a matter of trial tactics, not to have Mary re-read the police report from the Spencer 

assault prior to her testimony because: (1) she had told police at the time that she had not seen 

anything (see RT at 2480-83, 2578; SHCP Ex. 27 at 6-7) and (2) Cater could reasonably have 

believed that the jury would find her more credible if she simply indicated that she did not remember 

certain events rather than if she had prepared her testimony by reviewing the police report and the 

statements of others. 

Along the same lines, Cater may have decided for tactical reasons to avoid in depth 

questioning of Paula and Mary at trial about the Ross and Spencer incidents. Mary, at the time of the 

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Spencer assault, apparently had declined to provide police with the information to which she testified. 

(RT at 2480-83, 2578.) 

Nothing in the record suggests that Paula was present for the Ross shooting (Ross Police 

Reports), or that Paula had been untruthful to police (RT at 2496-97), or that Paula may have been 

using drugs at the time of trial. (SHCP Ex. 9 at 1). 

Defense counsel reasonably could have concluded that further questioning Mary and Paula 

about these issues might have served only to emphasize the aggravating circumstances, rather than 

elicit information helpful to the defense. 

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Cater was not ineffective 

by failing to interview and prepare these witnesses personally. 

2) Prejudice

Even if counsel was deficient as alleged, the state supreme court could reasonably have 

concluded there was no prejudice. 

Petititioner makes no evidentiary showing that had counsel Cater personally interviewed Mary 

and Paula, he would have discovered more favorable evidence for use at the penalty phase trial. Mary 

and Paula were each interviewed by investigator Ruby. Yet neither apparently provided the 

information about the aggravating events that is contained in their respective habeas declarations of a 

decade later. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 5, 9, 24.) Moreover, as discussed in claim W7, post, defense counsel 

did present some of the information included in their declarations, and that which was not presented 

could reasonably be seen as essentially cumulative. 

As to Mary’s impeachment regarding the Spencer incident, i.e., that Mary, at the time of the 

Spencer assault, apparently had declined to provide police with the information to which she testified

at trial (RT at 2480-83, 2578), mitigation is apparent in the record. Mary testified that she was only 

thirteen at the time of the incident. (RT at 2483.) She also may not have talked to police because she 

was scared (RT at 2482), given her youth and having just been the victim of an alleged sexual assault

(RT at 2471). 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

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an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

For the reasons stated, it does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court, or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W3 is denied. 

e. Analysis of Claim W4

Petitioner next alleges ineffective assistance by defense counsel’s failure to investigate and 

present evidence concerning the letter to Jerry Halfacre. (ECF No. 113 at 195-98.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court (see SHCP at 280-82), which that court summarily rejected on the merits without 

explanation. (See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus). 

The prosecution introduced the letter written by Petitioner to Halfacre at the penalty phase 

trial. (See RT at 2443.) Though Halfacre did not testify at the penalty phase, his probation officer

did, stating that Halfacre gave her the letter on October 12, 1990. (Id.) The letter and its contents are 

discussed in detail in claim R, ante. 

Petitioner alleges that there were additional pages of that letter, subsequently obtained by 

Petitioner’s daughter Paula as described in her unsworn statement, which allegedly implicate Halfacre

in the capital murders and Petitioner’s marijuana farm. (See ECF No. 113 at 197; SHCP Ex.’s 9, 16, 

25.) 

Petitioner also faults defense counsel for not interviewing Halfacre or his Probation Officer, 

Ms. O’Connor, regarding the surrounding circumstances including any inducement or benefit 

Halfacre might have received. (See ECF No. 113 at 196; see also claims R1-R4.) Petitioner alleges 

that in exchange for providing the letter to authorities, Halfacre was released from probation and 

allowed to leave the state. 

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Strategic decisions based upon investigation conducted by counsel are accorded deference:

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less 

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 

professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel 

has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 

makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular 

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. “The scope of a defense counsel’s pretrial investigation necessarily 

follows from the decision as to what the theory of defense will be.” Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 

473 (2004). In determining whether counsel made reasonable tactical decisions about certain 

evidence, a court focuses on whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision to introduce or 

omit certain evidence was itself reasonable. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523. 

Here, for reasons discussed in claims I6 and K, ante, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate both 

that counsel failed to investigate these circumstances and, even if he did, that his failure to do so was 

prejudicial. Even assuming that the missing pages of the letter, allegedly obtained by Paula, could 

establish that Halfacre turned over the letter out of fear he would be arrested, nothing in the record 

suggests counsel, or Halfacre for that matter, were aware of the alleged missing pages. 

Petitioner suggests that Cater obtained the missing pages of the letter sometime after the guilt 

phase, (see ECF No. 113 at 197), but has not offered Cater’s declaration in this regard. If Petitioner is 

correct that Cater had the letter, he does not show that Cater failed to consider it. Significantly, 

nothing in the noted testimony about the shootings suggests that Halfacre was involved. A defense 

attorney is not obligated to track down each and every possible witness or to personally investigate 

every conceivable lead. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot rest upon counsel’s alleged 

failure to engage in a scavenger hunt for potentially exculpatory information with no detailed 

instruction on what this information may be or where it might be found. Farr, 297 F.3d at 658. 

As more fully discussed in claim K, ante, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Halfacre

provided the letter in exchange for his release from probation and travel restrictions. The state 

supreme court could reasonably have determined that Halfacre received no undisclosed benefits in 

exchange for his providing the letter to his probation officer. 

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Additionally, for reasons discussed in claims R and I6, ante, any alleged failure to investigate 

or present this evidence was not prejudicial. The state supreme court could reasonably have found 

that the missing page(s) of the letter could not have been used to “defeat[ ] any argument that 

[Halfacre] was in fear of [Petitioner’s] threats” and thus prevent admission of the Halfacre letter

under Penal Code § 422. (See ECF No. 113 at 197.) 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W4 is denied. 

f. Analysis of Claim W5

Petitioner next claims that defense counsel did not adequately investigate and present 

evidence concerning Petitioner’s prior serious felony conviction for attempted voluntary

manslaughter of Kenneth Ross. (See ECF No. 113 at 198-200.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which the California Supreme Court summarily rejected on the merits without 

explanation. (See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner, then the legal guardian of Nyla Olsen, alleges that the shooting of Ross, then 

Nyla’s boyfriend, occurred following an argument between Ross and Olsen at Petitioner’s residence. 

(See RT at 2400-10.) Ross eventually walked back to Petitioner’s house to ask him what Olson had 

told him. (See RT at 2400, 2408.) Petitioner allegedly came out the front door and shot Ross once in 

the chest with an M-1 .30 caliber carbine rifle (see RT at 2400-02, 2563) and began to beat Ross all 

over his upper body with his rifle. (RT at 2401.) Ross was taken to the hospital by paramedics and 

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stayed there off-and-on for about a month while being treated for a torn liver, punctured diaphragm 

and lung, and broken rib. (RT at 2403.)

Mary, then 15 years old, was a witness to the shooting and testified that Ross was crazed, 

drunk, slapping Nyla around and that Ross appeared to have had something in his hand and gestured 

toward Petitioner prior to being shot. (See RT at 2473-76.) Olsen, who had married Ross by the time 

of trial, gave testimony that partially contradicted Mary’s testimony. (See RT at 2555-72.) 

Petitioner faults Cater for not cross-examining Olsen about contradictory testimony she gave 

at the preliminary hearing in the Ross matter (Testimony of Nyla Olsen, Preliminary Hearing 

Transcript, People v. Bolin, Los Angeles County Municipal Court No. A527608, SHCP Ex. 26), in 

order to show that Petitioner acted out of fear of Ross. This omission, Petitioner argues, allowed the 

prosecutor to use Olsen’s testimony to support the prosecutor’s statement to the jury that “[a]gain, a 

daughter [Mary] came in [and] told a story which simply was not true but, then, again, this girl loves 

her father.” (See RT at 2579.) 

Petitioner faults defense counsel for allowing Mary to testify regarding the Ross incident. He 

claims this created an inconsistent role for Mary, in that her testimony regarding the Ross incident 

undermined Petitioner’s mitigation case because her credibility as a fact witness was compromised by 

her desire to assist her father, whom she loved. Petitioner claims further investigation would have 

turned up a witness to the event, Richard Brogden, who knew Ross and would have testified that, 

immediately before the shooting, he had told Petitioner that Ross carried a gun. (See ECF No. 113, at 

199:21-200:8; SHCP Ex. 11.) 

Petitioner faults defense counsel for not retaining a mental health expert to evaluate penalty 

phase issues and arrive at explanations for the shooting of Ross which might have become apparent to 

counter the prosecution’s argument that Petitioner “is a violent man who uses violence to solve 

problems.” (See RT at 2579.) 

However, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that defense 

counsel was not ineffective in any of these regards. Olsen testified at the preliminary hearing that she 

had been crying and screaming while she and Ross were outside arguing. (See SHCP Ex. 26 at 50-

51.) At the penalty phase trial, she stated that she had argued with Ross outside, but she was never 

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asked if she was crying during that time. (See RT at 2563-73.) Also, at both the preliminary hearing 

and the penalty phase trial, Olsen confirmed Mary’s testimony that Ross may have grabbed Mary and 

pushed her aside. (See SHCP Ex. 26 at 49-50; RT at 2572.) There was no apparent material 

inconsistency in these regards. 

As to Olsen’s testimony that there might have been a fight between Petitioner and Ross, Olsen

never testified that the fight was anything more than verbal, or that Ross had a weapon. (See SHCP 

Ex. 26.) Instead, Olsen testified at the preliminary hearing that Ross had told Petitioner only “that he 

wanted to talk to him,” not that he threatened him. (See SHCP Ex. 26 at 48.) 

Defense counsel reasonably could have made a tactical decision not to focus on this testimony 

because it was minor and likely aggravating, and that attacking Olsen’s credibility based on her 

marriage to Ross was a more promising strategy. As noted in claim I2, ante, impeachment tactics are 

a matter of trial strategy. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d at 1254; Jaiceris, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1080-82. 

Similarly, the extent and nature of cross-examination is also a matter of trial tactics entrusted to the 

judgment of counsel. Dow, 211 F.3d at 487. 

Petitioner’s claim that allowing Mary to testify regarding the Ross incident created an 

inconsistent role for Mary is likewise not compelling. Mary was a witness to the Ross shooting and 

provided some mitigating evidence regarding the shooting. Even assuming that this allegation has 

been exhausted (Respondent argues otherwise, see ECF No. 194 at 334:21-24), any potentially 

“inconsistent role[]” created for Mary by allowing her to testify regarding both aspects of the case,

likely was not prejudicial since Mary’s testimony in both areas provided some mitigating evidence 

for Petitioner. Significantly, Petitioner does not explain how and why impeaching Mary’s credibility 

regarding the Ross shooting necessarily resulted in “her ability to generate mercy [being] greatly 

reduced.” (See ECF No. 178 at 283.)

Regarding defense counsel’s failure to investigate potential witness Richard Brogden’s 

information about the Ross shooting, counsel reasonably could have determined that Brogden’s 

testimony would have been of questionable value. Brogden did not testify at the trial or the 

preliminary hearing in the Ross case. (See CSC Informal Response Ex. H.) Nor was he questioned 

by the police in that case. (See SHCP Ex. 11 at 6-7; see also SHCP Ex. 18b.) 

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Even had Brogden testified, it is not reasonably probable that the result of Petitioner’s 

proceeding would have been more favorable. Brogden apparently did not see Petitioner shoot Ross or 

witness any altercation, other than verbal, between them. (See SHCP Ex. 11 at 6-7.) Though Brogden 

states in his declaration that he told Petitioner that Ross owned a gun, he also states that he had no idea 

whether Ross had it with him the day that Petitioner shot Ross. (See SHCP Ex. 11 at 6-7.)

Defense counsel also reasonably could have found that aspects of Brogden’s testimony would 

have been unfavorable. Brogden states in his declaration that Petitioner “snaps” when he gets angry, 

that “once he snaps, all bets are off,” and that he (Brogden) tells his friends to “get the hell out of 

Dodge . . . [w]hen [Petitioner] gets to the ‘snapping’ point.” (See SHCP Ex. 11 at 1, 5-6.) Testimony 

along these lines would have supported the prosecution theme that Petitioner used violence to resolve 

problems. 

Petitioner also faults defense counsel’s failure to present mental health evidence to mitigate 

Petitioner’s actions in the Ross shooting. Yet Petitioner apparently did not offer any mental health 

evidence or defense at his earlier trial in the Ross matter. Nor does it appear that Petitioner’s own 

mental health experts opine that he was acting under a mental disorder at the time of the assault 

against Ross. (See SHCP Ex.’s 10, 22.) 

For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that 

Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failure to investigate or present evidence regarding 

the Ross shooting and that counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance at trial in this regard. 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 

687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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Claim W5 is denied.

g. Analysis of Claim W6

Petitioner next alleges that defense counsel did not adequately investigate and present 

evidence concerning his unadjudicated 1979 assault upon Spencer offered in aggravation at the 

penalty phase. (See ECF No. 113 at 200-03.) Petitioner raised same allegations regarding the 

Spencer assault in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court (see SHCP 

at 287-90), which that court summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (See CSC Order 

Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

The prosecutor presented the testimony of Spencer during the penalty phase. (See RT at 

2411-29) Spencer testified that in 1979, he was Petitioner’s 23-year-old neighbor. He had gone to 

Petitioner’s house at the invitation of “Becky,” who was renting a room there. Petitioner’s daughters 

were present, as was an individual named Brian Martinez. (See RT at 2413-30.) 

Spencer testified that the door flew open and Petitioner came in and swung a tree limb at him; 

Spencer ran out the back while “Rick” began beating him with a stick; Petitioner then hit Spencer in 

the head with a pipe. (See RT 2374-77.) Spencer was treated for abrasions and required eight 

stitches. (See RT at 2425-26.)

Mary, then about 12 years old (see RT at 2469, 2483), testified that Spencer and Brian 

Martinez were partying at her house, smoking pot and sniffing paint, when Spencer put his hands 

down her pants and tried to pull her top down. (See RT at 2470-71.) She testified that Petitioner, 

upset after Mary told him what had happened, arrived and ran towards Spencer and ordered Spencer 

and Martinez to leave, and that Spencer then exited through the backyard where Richard (Rick) 

Balsamico, who disliked Spencer, began beating him with a stick. (See RT at 2412-72.) Mary 

testified that she did not see Petitioner hit Spencer. (See RT at 2473.) 

On cross-examination, Mary told the prosecutor she did not remember the police coming to 

her house or talking to the police. (See RT at 2480-81.) She was then impeached with the police 

report of Deputy Gutierrez regarding the Spencer incident in which Mary failed to provide the 

information to which she testified. (See RT at 2479-83.) 

Petitioner faults counsel for not preparing Mary for the cross-examination (see SHCP Ex. 5) 

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and for not rehabilitating Mary thereafter. (See SHCP Ex. 27.) He complains defense counsel did 

not attempt to rebut the prosecutor’s suggestion that Mary was lying to protect her father. (See RT at 

2578.) He also complains that counsel did not present testimony from Balsamico, who would have 

stated that Spencer was drunk, armed with a knife and that it was Balsamico, not Petitioner, who beat 

Spencer. (See SHCP Ex. 12.) 

The Court is not persuaded. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found 

defense counsel’s questioning of Mary about the Spencer assault was tactically motivated to avoid 

further harm to her testimony. Spencer testified that he had not been using drugs or alcohol that day 

and did not believe any of the teenagers at Petitioner’s house were either. (See RT at 2417-25; see

also SHCP Ex. 27.) He testified that he was not carrying any weapons, did not make any threats or 

moves toward Petitioner, and never spoke to Petitioner during the assault. (See RT at 2416, 2423, 

2425.) 

On cross-examination, Mary admitted that she did not tell the police any of this information to 

which she testified. (See RT at 2480.) She did not remember the police ever coming to talk to her or 

refusing to talk to them (see RT at 2480-81), or that the others were using drugs or alcohol that 

evening. (See RT at 2480-82.) However, she admitted that she may have told the police that she did 

not see anything because she was scared. (See RT at 2482.) She also admitted that she did not 

remember the incident very well. (See RT at 2480.) On redirect examination, counsel confirmed that 

Mary was only thirteen at the time of the incident. (See RT at 2483.)

Petitioner does not suggest how Mary’s testimony could have been rehabilitated given the 

foregoing. It appears that, notwithstanding her denial, Mary gave statements to the police at the time 

of the incident. (See SHCP Ex.’s 5, 27.) The California Supreme Court could have found it 

reasonable for defense counsel not to pursue any significant rehabilitation attempt, but to move on to 

other defense matters. 

As for Petitioner’s assertion that his counsel failed to prepare Mary for her testimony resulting

in her effective impeachment (see ECF No. 113 at 202; ECF No. 178 at 316), the state supreme court 

could reasonably have found the assertion refuted for reasons discussed in claim W3, ante. Similarly, 

Petitioner’s complaint that Mary was placed in an inconsistent role by being asked to testify about the 

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Spencer and Ross incidents and to plead for mercy (ECF No. 178 at 316), fails for the same reasons 

discussed in claim W5, ante.

Petitioner also faults defense counsel for not presenting the testimony of his friend, 

Balsamico, (see ECF No. 113 at 202-03), who appears to claim responsibility for the assault on 

Spencer and who states that he would have testified on Petitioner’s behalf had he been asked. (See

SHCP Ex. 12 at 3, 5-6.) However, counsel could reasonably have found such testimony suspect. 

Balsamico’s statement to the police at the time of the Spencer incident was that Petitioner was 

involved in a physical fight with Spencer, in which Balsamico joined in aid of Petitioner. (See SHCP 

Ex. 27 at 6.) Petitioner himself admitted that he was involved in the fight and struck either Spencer 

or Martinez. (See Id. at 5.) 

Balsamico’s habeas declaration, provided ten years after the shootings, also appears 

inconsistent with Mary’s testimony and interview about the assault. (See RT at 2469-73; SHCP Ex.

12 at 3-4.) Counsel, for tactical reasons, may have chosen not to present such testimony that could 

have been readily impeached. See, e.g., Denham, 954 F.2d at 1505-06 (defense counsel not 

ineffective where decision not to call witness based on inconsistencies in witness’s testimony).

Petitioner also complains that defense counsel should have presented the testimony of a 

mental health expert to attempt to explain Petitioner’s behavior in the Spencer assault. This claim, 

which appears to be unexhausted, in any event lacks merit. Not even Petitioner’s mental health 

experts opine the existence of a mental defense to his assault against Spencer. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 10, 

22.) Moreover, counsel could have chosen not to present a mental defense, if one existed, because 

the Spencer assault was remote in time (ten years prior to the instant capital murders) and suggested 

some mitigating evidence (action by Petitioner protecting his daughter from a perceived sexual 

assault). 

Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. Mary was rehabilitated somewhat 

following her impeachment, by her testimony that she was only thirteen at the time of the Spencer 

incident, (see RT at 2483), and may not have talked to police because she was scared, (see RT at 

2482), and having been the victim of an attempted sexual assault. (See RT at 2471). Thus tactical 

explanations may have existed for not pursuing Balsamico’s testimony. 

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For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W6 is denied. 

h. Analysis of Claim W7

Petitioner next presents multiple allegations that defense counsel was ineffective in the 

investigation, preparation, and presentation of the case in mitigation, denying the jury a fair and 

accurate profile of him, in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(See ECF No. 113 at 203-18.)

Petitioner raised these allegations to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal, which 

that court rejected, noting that:

Although several family members and friends presented mitigating testimony as to his

background and character, defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance at the penalty phase in failing to submit additional evidence regarding his 

childhood, including alleged abuse, his mental health, his military service and injuries, 

and his employment history. We find none of this evidence of record. Accordingly, 

“without engaging in speculation, we cannot infer anything about its existence, 

availability, or probative force, or the probable consequences of its use at trial.”

Defendant has thus failed to establish either incompetence or prejudice.

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345.

Petitioner also raised these allegations in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, which summarily rejected the claim on the merits without explanation. 

(See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus). 

1) Petitioner’s Background and Life History

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his

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background and family history, and by not conducting a social history or life history evaluation, as 

required by the ABA Guidelines. (See ECF No. 113 at 203-218; SHCP Ex. 47 1/7/91 Marsden

Hearing RT at 2309); see also ABA Guidelines, §§ 11.4.1, 11.8.3.F(1).) Petitioner argues that further 

investigation would have revealed: a history of child abuse, head injuries, and neglect; a history of 

exposure to neurotoxins, back injury and substance abuse; his mental health issues related to his six 

months of service in the Vietnam War; his long history of polysubstance abuse; his alleged ingestion 

of multiple narcotics on the day of the shootings; and his character for hard work and generosity. 

(See ECF No. 113 at 203:13-18.) 

The California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in rejecting these allegations. Mr. 

Cater’s investigator, Mr. Ruby, discovered much information about Petitioner’s background, despite 

the fact that Petitioner apparently was unwilling to discuss his childhood and was not particularly 

forthcoming with details about his background in general. (See SHCP Ex. 9 at 8 [Paula Bolin’s 

declaration indicating that Petitioner refused to discuss his childhood, his family, or her mother]; 

SHCP Ex. 20 at 2 [interview with Dr. Markman during which Petitioner refused to discuss his family 

background]; see also February 25, 1991, Probation Officer’s Report and Recommendation at 3, 16 

[indicating that Petitioner refused to discuss his background or family history].) 

Petitioner claims the “full story” of his abuse and neglect was never told. (See ECF No. 113 

at 205:20-21.) However, the record reflects details of Petitioner’s broken home and life on the street 

as a youth, (see RT at 2503-04); his enlistment in the Navy as a teen, (see RT at 2505); his positive 

influence on his kids and others (see RT 2502-29); and that he was a model inmate during his earlier 

incarceration relating to the Ross incident (see RT at 2498-2500; SHCP Ex. 24). 

Capital defense counsel has “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make reasonable 

decisions that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” and “a particular decision not to 

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 

measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see also Babbitt v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (1998) (a lawyer may make a reasonable decision that a particular 

investigation is unnecessary). The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could have pursued but 

whether the choices counsel made were reasonable. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 736 (9th 

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Cir. 1998). 

Mr. Cater relied upon interviews with and statements from friends and family; materials 

related to Petitioner’s prior convictions; materials related to the current offense; portions of 

Petitioner’s trial testimony; and information related to his medical care, military service, employment, 

and education. (See, e.g., SHCP Ex 20, 24.) These are all sources similar to those relied upon ten 

years later by Petitioner’s habeas expert, Dr. Matthews. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 22, 24, 29, 31, 32.) 

Mr. Cater also spoke with Petitioner and questioned him about his background, including his 

employment history and military service, as well as his relationships with family and friends. (See

SHCP Ex. 47, 1/7/91 Marsden RT at 2308-09.) Cater’s investigator, Mr. Ruby, interviewed 

Petitioner’s daughters Mary and Paula, his stepdaughter Pamela Castillo, Petitioner’s sisters Francis 

and Rosemary, and other relatives, including Gary Monto, Marilyn Perez, Trina Perez, Florence 

Monto, Betty Monto, Jermiah Monto and Sylvester Monto. (See SHCP Ex. 24 at 1-5.) Ruby 

interviewed David Alexander, Petitioner’s probation officer in Oklahoma (see SHCP Ex. 24 at 1), and 

a family friend named Mrs. Myrick, who agreed to testify on his behalf. (See Id. at 11-12.) 

It appears that Ruby interviewed these witnesses prior to the penalty phase trial, prepared a 

written report and spoke with Cater about his interviews. (See SHCP Ex. 24.) It also appears that 

Cater spoke to Ruby about Paula and Mary Bolin and that Cater likely knew what mitigating 

information these witnesses had to offer. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 5, 9, 24.) 

Based on this investigation, Cater could reasonably have determined which witnesses would 

provide the most effective presentation given the mitigation theory that Petitioner had positive 

attributes and could adjust well to prison. Even if defense counsel did not review and present 

evidence from Petitioner’s prison file showing he would function well in a life without parole setting,

(see ECF No. 113 at 212-13), such likely would have been cumulative of the above noted life history, 

and unlikely to affect the result of proceedings given the noted substantial aggravating evidence. (See

claims O, R and S, ante.) 

Significantly, Petitioner did not provide a declaration from either Ruby or Cater regarding the 

extent to which they discussed noted interviews and witnesses and trial tactics. Petitioner does not 

specifically identify any school, employment, medical or psychiatric records that Ruby or Cater could 

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have sought or introduced in 1990 that would have provided additional information in support of a 

mitigating factor.

Petitioner also argues that Soria and Cater did not communicate sufficiently with each other 

and relied on incomplete military, prison, and life history records. However, these allegations fail for 

reasons discussed in claim W1, ante.

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have found defense counsel’s penalty phase 

investigation was not deficient in the above regards, for the reasons stated. See e.g., Hamilton, 458 F.

Supp. 2d at 1134 (defense interviewed the available witnesses, and no better available witness about 

petitioner’s background and social history other than his mother was uncovered).

2) Medical and Mental Health History

Petitioner claims counsel failed to investigate, develop and present mitigating medical and 

mental health evidence. (See ECF No. 113 at 203:4-8.) He faults counsel for failing to provide 

competency examiner, Dr. Markman, with sufficient information about Petitioner’s family and life 

history; for failing to request that Dr. Markman evaluate potential issues in mitigation; and for failing 

to consult with other qualified experts regarding potential issues in mitigation. (See ECF No, 113 at 

203-18.) 

Petitioner claims that these shortcomings left his history of exposure to neurotoxins and 

organic brain damage undeveloped and unpresented. (See ECF No. 113 at 203:18-23; SHCP Ex.’s. 

10, 20, 22.) 

Petitioner claims counsel’s deficiencies impaired his defense theory that the cumulative effect 

of medical and mental health factors, coupled with alcohol and cocaine ingestion prior to the crime, 

caused him to perceive a great threat from the actions of Huffstuttler and triggered a strong selfdefense reaction at the time of the crimes. (See ECF No. 113 at 215:21-28; SHCP Ex. 22.) 

The record reflects that Dr. Markman, during his trial competency (psychiatric) evaluation,

asked Petitioner about his family history. Dr. Markman related his findings to counsel in a letter. 

(See SHCP Ex. 20 at 2.) Petitioner told Dr. Markman that his parents divorced when he was nine 

years old; that he was shuttled among different living situations; that he completed the tenth grade, 

performing poorly in school; and that he had been married and divorced three times. (Id.) Dr. 

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Markman noted that Petitioner refused to provide any further information regarding his family 

background. (Id.) Petitioner claimed polysubstance abuse “years ago” and an extended history of 

using alcohol daily. (Id.) 

Petitioner told Dr. Markman that the shootings related to an exchange of marijuana for 

cocaine and that he had ingested a substantial amount of alcohol and smoked cocaine prior to the 

shootings. (Id.) However, Petitioner “repeatedly maintained that he knowingly acted in self-defense 

and that another individual, as yet unidentified, may have been responsible for some of the deaths.”

(Id.) Dr. Markman noted that Petitioner had a successful nine-year history of military service in the 

Navy and also that he had been discharged because of a back injury. (Id.)

Here, the state supreme court was not unreasonable in concluding counsel was not deficient 

regarding development and presentation of medical and mental health mitigating information. Dr. 

Markman’s report, though generated with a view toward trial competency, did not reasonably suggest 

the need to investigate potentially mitigating medical and mental health defenses. Dr. Markman 

apparently did not identify matters warranting further investigation, concluding that Petitioner 

“demonstrates no current evidence of a major mental disorder.” (SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3.) Nor are the 

facts of this case suggestive of the need for such further investigation. Petitioner’s noted seemingly 

purposeful and goal oriented statements and actions just prior to, during and after the capital murders 

do not suggest uninvestigated potentially mitigating medical or mental state defenses. Counsel is not 

put to further investigation where reasonable initial investigation suggests such would not bear fruit. 

See Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 186 (9th Cir. 1995).

Even though Petitioner may not have been forthcoming with useful information regarding his 

medical and mental health background, by speaking with friends and family Ruby and Cater 

discovered and presumably considered aspects of Petitioner’s violent family background; that he had

lived on the streets from a young age; that he served in the Navy for nine years; that he served in the

Vietnam War in 1972; that he was discharged from the Navy a year later because of a back injury;

that he had behaved well while on parole and while incarcerated in Chino; and that he claimed to

have had a long history of substance abuse, including ingestion of alcohol and cocaine on the night of 

the shootings (although this latter claim appears rebutted by other facts in the record). (See SHCP 

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Ex.’s. 9, 20.) 

Regarding alleged exposure to toxic substances, the California Supreme Court reasonably 

could have found that defense counsel might not have been on notice of such and that Petitioner’s 

work as a machinist and a pipefitter in the Navy may have exposed him to toxic solvents. 

Petitioner asserts that,

[L]ay witnesses also had a wealth of information about Mr. Bolin’s exposure to toxic

chemicals, and their apparent effects. See, e.g., Exhibits 4 (Declaration of Mark Daser),

9 (Declaration of Paula Bolin), 11 (Declaration of Richard Brogden). Counsel made no

efforts to locate such witnesses, nor to identify work and military records which would

document the exposure.

(See ECF No. 178 at 293:12-18.) But Petitioner does not suggest that any of the noted witnesses saw 

in Petitioner signs of harmful toxics exposure, or were qualified to offer an opinion regarding toxic 

chemicals. Here again, the record seemingly contradicts any suggestion that Petitioner was impaired 

when he committed the capital crimes or while he was in custody. Ramirez described how Petitioner 

had wiped his prints off the gun, put the gun into Huffstuttler’s hand, put marijuana near the body, 

staged the scene to look like a “drug deal gone bad,” and pulled the wires from Wilson’s car to 

prevent its use should Wilson return, thus ensuring that Wilson would bleed to death before getting 

help. (See SHCP Ex. 13 at 4-7, 15-17; RT 1738, 1863-64, 1928-29, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1975.)

Additionally, for the reasons noted above and in claim I10, ante, the California Supreme 

Court could have reasonably discounted evidence relating to exposure to toxins. As stated, after 

examining Petitioner and inquiring into his employment and service with the Navy, Dr. Markman 

concluded that Petitioner “demonstrates no current evidence of a major mental disorder.” (See SHCP 

Ex. 20 at 1-3.) Petitioner’s taking flight from the crime scene to the Los Angeles area and then 

Chicago, and his apparent self-serving statements to Dr. Markman, all suggested that he was mentally 

capable, as did his pursuit of heat of passion and imperfect self-defense theories. (See Id. at 1-2.)

In Hensley, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a petitioner must show that counsel was 

somehow put on notice to investigate a particular matter. 67 F.3d at 186; see also Langford v. Day, 

110 F.3d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691) (the “reasonableness of 

counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or 

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actions.”); Dyer v. Calderon, 113 F.3d 927, 941 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 151 F.3d 

970 (9th Cir. 1998) (petitioner never told attorney that he smoked PCP, and doctors were also 

unaware, so no need to investigate despite current declarations). Here, it does not appear that either 

Petitioner or any other witness discussed prior exposure to toxic substances, or that Petitioner 

behaved as if he suffered from brain damage or had any noticeable cognitive deficits. 

3) History of Substance Abuse

Petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to investigate his long 

history of substance and alcohol abuse even though counsel was aware and could have introduced 

evidence through Dr. Markman and/or Petitioner. (ECF No. 178 at 294-95; SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3.) 

However, defense counsel could reasonably have decided to omit this evidence for fear it 

might not be viewed as mitigating by the jury. See Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 

1994) (“precedents show that many lawyers justifiably fear introducing evidence of alcohol and drug 

use”); see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 1992) (“counsel’s strategy not 

to dwell on the intoxication issue” was tactical and reasonable). 

Defense counsel may have felt that introducing a long history of substance abuse would have

contradicted the other evidence presented in mitigation, namely that Petitioner was devoted to his 

family, had worked hard throughout his life to support his family, and that he had adjusted well to 

prison life. Furthermore, counsel also may have felt that evidence of substance abuse would have 

supported the defense theory that Petitioner shot the victims because his drug operation had been 

exposed. In such regards, the record could reasonably support a determination that defense counsel 

was aware of Petitioner’s substance abuse and did not present this evidence for tactical reasons. If so, 

it appears unlikely that any further investigation would have changed counsel’s decision not to 

present this type of evidence during the penalty phase.

Petitioner argues that the investigation in his case was similar to investigations which the

Ninth Circuit had previously found to be deficient. He cites to the cases of Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 

1006 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, (9th Cir. 2008); Boyde, 404 F.3d 

1159 amended by 421 F.3d 1154; Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006); and Karis v. 

Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). However, each of these cases is distinguishable. 

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In Correll, a pre-AEDPA case subject to de novo review, defense counsel met only briefly 

with defendant between the trial and penalty phase, almost completely failed to investigate available 

mitigation evidence, and put on no affirmative penalty defense. 539 F.3d at 943-44. In Boyde,

defense counsel failed to investigate mitigating childhood abuse, and failed to introduce the evidence 

his limited investigated did uncover. 404 F.3d at 1176. In Frierson, defense counsel was on notice 

of, but failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of extensive drug history, childhood 

abuse and head trauma, mental impairment and brain damage. 463 F.3d at 992-96. In Karis, defense 

counsel failed to investigate and present significant mitigation evidence; the defense mitigation 

presentation took only 48 minutes and omitted evidence of childhood poverty and abuse. 283 F.3d at 

1133-41. 

By contrast, in this case, investigator Ruby contacted numerous mitigation witnesses, 

including family and friends suggested by Petitioner, for additional information regarding his 

background, with noted positive results. (See SHCP Ex.’s. 5, 9, 24.) Moreover, the only evidence 

that Petitioner may have suffered drug and alcohol intoxication at the time of the capital murders was 

his possibly self-serving statement to Dr. Markman. (See SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3.) Ramirez testified 

that he and Petitioner left the bar together and were at the cabin less than an hour before the victims 

arrived. (See RT at 1947.) In all the statements made to the police and during trial, Ramirez did not 

mention anything about Petitioner smoking cocaine prior to the shootings, or for that matter drinking 

alcohol at the cabin the day of the shootings. Additionally, Petitioner’s noted conduct during and 

after the shootings reasonably suggests the absence of alcohol and drug intoxication. 

4) Lay Witnesses

Petitioner complains defense counsel did not elicit from lay witnesses and present all possible

information regarding circumstances in mitigation. (ECF No. 113 at 201-11.)

Petitioner argues that the mitigation defense was “meager” (see ECF No. 178 at 298:4); that 

defense counsel was ineffective by “fail[ing] to elicit testimony from the witnesses which would have 

provided the jury with insight into [Petitioner’s] troubled childhood, his history of substance abuse, 

and his mental and emotional problems.” (Id. at 298:9-12.) He claims this missed the opportunity to 

develop a “comprehensive mitigation picture.” Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 

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2001) (defense counsel ineffective for failing to adequately investigate, develop and present readily 

available substantial mitigating evidence). 

However, the defense presented numerous mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase, 

including several family members, who testified that: (1) Petitioner supported and took custody of his 

two daughters who had been abandoned by his first wife; (2) Petitioner served in Vietnam in the 

Navy; (3) Petitioner financially supported and provided a home for his step-daughter after her 

biological mother (Petitioner’s ex-wife) abandoned her; (4) Petitioner opened his home to other 

young people who needed his help and provided them with food and shelter; (5) Petitioner protected 

his daughters and other people who lived with him; (6) Petitioner was a “model inmate” when 

imprisoned in Chino for the attempted voluntary manslaughter of Ross; (7) Petitioner moved up to the 

secluded cabin after his fiancée Rhonda died in a car crash; (8) Petitioner had a difficult childhood 

and suffered the hatred of his biological father and his stepfather; (9) Petitioner was forced to live on 

the streets starting at about nine years of age for the greater part of his childhood; and (10) Petitioner 

fixed up the house where he was staying in Chicago, was generous and helpful, and established close 

ties with his family in Chicago after the capital murders. (See RT at 2402-2528.) 

Petitioner also faults defense counsel for emphasizing his positive conduct with family 

members while he was a fugitive, rather than on developing mitigation from Petitioner’s life history 

and experience. Petitioner claims this strategy was not based on any sufficient investigation. 

However, the California Supreme Court reasonably could have found defense tactics developed 

through the mitigation investigation influenced counsel’s actions relative to lay witnesses. Counsel 

sought to portray the Petitioner as a person with positive qualities who had the potential to 

rehabilitate and to adjust to life in prison. Counsel here, unlike counsel in Ainsworth, did investigate 

and consider Petitioner’s background and mental state, including witness interviews and examination 

of personal history records, and presented the noted evidence relating to his troubled childhood, 

substance abuse history, military and employment history, and prior incarceration. A more 

comprehensive background presentation reasonably might have opened the door to evidence of 

aggravating criminal activities, Petitioner’s violent temper and use of violence, and his attempts to 

avoid responsibility for his violence.

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To the extent Petitioner relies on pre-AEDPA cases noted ante (Summerlin, Bean, Jackson, 

Ainsworth, and Douglas), his reliance is misplaced. Bean and Jackson are unavailing for reasons 

discussed in claims W1 and W2, ante. Summerlin, Ainsworth and Douglas found counsel therein 

ineffective where there was no or only insubstantial investigation and presentation of available 

mitigation evidence, in contrast to the noted efforts of defense counsel in this case. 

5) Mental State Defenses 

Petitioner complains defense counsel did not consult or retain an expert to develop mental 

deficits and defenses. (ECF No. 113 at 203:11-12, 211-18.) He claims, and Respondent concedes 

(ECF No. 194 at 353:27), that the competency evaluation of Dr. Markman was not necessarily meant 

to evaluate mental illness for the purpose of presenting mitigation evidence. (ECF No. 178 at 300.) 

Petitioner relies upon declarations of his habeas experts, Drs. Khazanov and Matthews, 

provided ten years after the capital crimes, suggesting the existence of brain impairment predating the 

crimes and that the crimes were triggered by a traumatic stress reaction and alcohol and cocaine 

ingestion. (See SHCP Ex.’s 10, 22.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a defense attorney in the sentencing phase of a capital trial has 

“a professional responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental health experts who 

are examining his client facts that the experts do not request.” Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112,

1116 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1254, 1254 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel has 

an affirmative duty to provide mental health experts with information needed to develop an accurate 

profile of the defendant’s mental health). But defense counsel only has a duty to investigate a 

defendant’s mental state “if there is evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired,” Douglas, 316 

F.3d at 1085, and counsel has notice of the mental impairment. Caro, 280 F.3d at 1254. Petitioner 

was evaluated by a qualified forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Markman, prior to trial. Dr. Markman 

determined that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. Dr. Markman also determined that Petitioner 

did not suffer from mental disorders, (SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3), based on an examination that:

[R]evealed [Petitioner] to be fully oriented in all spheres, alert, cooperative, and above 

normal intelligence with an excellent fund of knowledge. Dr. Markman found that 

Petitioner’s responses to be relevant and coherent and his memory and concentration 

were unimpaired and his affect was appropriate, though detached. There was no 

evidence of a major mental disorder, thought disorder or psychosis, judgment was not 

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impaired and insight into his status was adequate. He was able to provide a coherent 

narration of his version of the events of September 2, 1990 and their sequeiae.

(SHCP Ex. 22, at 58.) 

Petitioner argues that his habeas expert, Dr. Matthews, determined that the shooting of Mr. 

Huffstuttler was likely the result of an exaggerated response to perceived dangers, that is: 

[T]o a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the shooting of Vance Huffstuttler 

was the result of trigger responses to perceived dangers to [Petitioner] himself. 

Petitioner’s exaggerated perceptions and reactions were the result of [Petitioner’s] many 

deficits, his organic brain damage, the stress he was under at the time of the crime and 

his ingestion of alcohol and cocaine.

(Id.) Even if this was the case, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that 

Petitioner’s noted subsequent acts of walking down to the creek bed and shooting Mincy multiple 

times while the latter was curled on the ground begging for his life, wounding Wilson and searching 

for him following his escape, changing the scene of the murders to make it look like drug deal gone 

bad, disabling Wilson’s truck and leaving him on the mountain to bleed to death, and then fleeing to 

the Los Angeles area and ultimately Chicago, all suggested mental state defenses were unavailable. 

As noted, the only evidence that Petitioner was under the influence of intoxicants was his statement to 

Dr. Markman. (See SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3.) Ramirez did not mention it. Petitioner’s close friend, 

Daser, stated that Petitioner drank only on the weekend and that Petitioner was not a binge drinker. 

(See SHCP Ex. 4 at 1, 4.) Petitioner’s daughter, Mary, agreed with this assessment. (See SHCP Ex. 

5 at 10.) 

Nor does Dr. Matthews’s mental evaluation, conducted over a decade after the capital 

murders, change the fact that shortly before trial, Dr. Markman, a qualified psychiatrist, evaluated 

Petitioner and concluded that he showed no signs of suffering from any “major mental disorder, 

thought disorder or psychosis” and furthermore that his judgment did not appear to be impaired.

(SHCP Ex. 20.) Dr. Markman took into consideration Petitioner’s claimed daily use of alcohol and

claimed long history of substance abuse. (Id. at 2-3.) Dr. Markman diagnosed Petitioner with 

polysubstance abuse and a personality disorder with paranoid, explosive, and antisocial features. (Id.

at 3.) The fact that Dr. Matthews, ten years hence, may have disagreed with Dr. Markman does alone 

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render Dr. Markman’s opinions incorrect. See e.g., Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1168-69 (holding that if new

mental health evidence, obtained after the trial, were sufficient to establish the petitioner’s innocence, 

the petitioner could “always provide a showing of factual innocence by hiring psychiatric experts 

who would reach a favorable conclusion”).

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that Dr. Matthews’s belief 

that Petitioner “may” have experienced neuropsychological damage in utero because his father may 

have beaten his mother, or because his mother may have worked at a metal plating shop (see SHCP 

Ex. 22 at 42-43), amounts to surmise and nothing more. The same can be said about the suggestion 

of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Khazanov, that Petitioner suffered post-partum closed head injuries. (See

SHCP Ex. 10 at 11.) Dr. Khazanov apparently based this conclusion only upon her assumption that 

Petitioner suffered a closed head injury when his father threw him against a wall, (see SHCP Ex. 10 

at ¶ 31-34), given head scars of undetermined origin. (Id.) 

Dr. Khazanov’s statement that Petitioner may have suffered organic brain deficits secondary 

to the effects of long-term military and workplace exposure to toxic substances (see SHCP Ex. 10 at 

¶¶ 35-40) likewise could reasonably be seen as speculative, notwithstanding declarations from 

Petitioner’s former coworkers purportedly vouching for their own exposure to toxic substances. (See

SHCP Ex.’s 4, 11.) Petitioner was found to be healthy when he received a physical examination in 

1981. (See SHCP Ex. 41.) Petitioner certified at that time that he did not suffer from eye trouble 

(pain, burning, itching, etc.), headaches or throbbing temples, depression, excess worry, or trouble 

sleeping, illness or injury from chemical exposure, or dizziness or fainting spells. (Id.) Again, the 

noted level of functioning suggested by the record, both in the military (see e.g., SHCP Ex. 33) and 

during and after the capital murders (see SHCP Ex. 13), belies a claim of brain damage. 

Petitioner’s claim that Dr. Markman failed to identify his “organic brain damage” and that 

counsel should have consulted and retained other experts in this regard (ECF No. 178 at 303) could 

reasonably be viewed as unsupported in the record that was before the state court. Defense counsel 

provided Dr. Markman with access to Petitioner to conduct an evaluation, along with Petitioner’s 

prior police reports, the reports related to the capital crimes, and his prior probation reports (which 

presumably detailed much of his employment and life history). (See SHCP Ex. 20 at 1.) It is 

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reasonable to conclude that defense counsel could not have known that Dr. Markman would require 

any other information absent his request or further relevant information from Petitioner. Hendricks, 

70 F.3d at 1038 (expert must provide guidance regarding information that may be helpful). 

Nor does the record necessarily suggest that defense counsel was reasonably on notice of a 

toxic substances defense. Counsel has no duty to pursue neurological experts when a qualified 

forensic psychiatrist does not indicate that such testing is implicated, Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 

827, 835 (8th Cir. 1998), or when there is no indication of brain damage, Wright v. Angelone, 151 

F.3d 151, 163 (4th Cir. 1998). Defense counsel is entitled to and can rely on the report of an expert 

who is consulted. Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1174 (counsel has no duty to contact other experts when he 

reasonably thought those consulted were well-qualified and no duty to ensure the trustworthiness of 

an expert’s conclusions). 

For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court could have found it unlikely that 

Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to call Dr. Markman or another mental health 

expert as a witness. Doing so also might have opened the door to aggravating testimony relating to 

his violent outbursts, alleged substance abuse and his denials of responsibility for his actions

including the self-inflicted wounds. (See e.g., SHCP Ex. 20 at 1-3); Harris, 949 F.2d at 1525 

(counsel not ineffective by choosing not to call psychiatrists to testify when they can be subjected to 

cross-examination based on equally persuasive psychiatric opinions that reach a different conclusion). 

Moreover, the noted evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase was substantial. (See claims O, R 

and S, ante.) 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have found that alleged mental 

state defenses would not have been sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial outcome. See U.S. 

v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986). 

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W7 is denied.

i. Analysis of Claim W8 

Petitioner’s next claim alleges defense counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the penalty 

phase instructional errors alleged in claims R4 and U1-U5, ante, denying him a fair trial and reliable 

sentence determination, violating the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 218.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

The California Supreme Court also considered and denied certain of these allegations on the 

merits on direct appeal. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 341-45.

Petitioner argues that, had defense counsel objected to these instructional errors, they would 

have been corrected, (ECF No. 113 at 218:15), and that it is reasonably probable the result of his 

proceeding would have been more favorable. (Id. at 218:18-19.) 

The Court disagrees. This claim fails for the reasons set forth in Claim R4 and Claims U1 

through U5, ante. There is no cumulative error because there is no individual error. Parle, 505 F.3d 

at 928 (citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643).

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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Claim W8 is denied. 

j. Analysis of Claim W9

Petitioner’s final claim alleges that counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the improper 

comments made by the prosecutor during her penalty phase closing argument, discussed in claim V, 

ante and summarized below, denying him a fair trial and reliable penalty determination, violating his 

rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 218-19.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily rejected on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) Petitioner argues that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s 

improper closing comments that the jury should consider public sentiment; matters outside the record;

sympathy only to the extent of Petitioner’s culpability; and the prosecutor’s personal opinion 

regarding the truthfulness and credibility of defense witness Mary Bolin - all misled the jury as to 

those factors they could properly consider at the penalty phase, impermissibly increasing the 

likelihood of a death sentence. (ECF No. 113 at 218:24-26.) 

But this claim fails for the reasons stated in claim V, ante. Furthermore, “[b]ecause many 

lawyers refrain from objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious 

misstatements, the failure to object during opening statement and closing argument is within the 

‘wide range’ of permissible professional legal conduct.” Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1281 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (finding no ineffectiveness for failure to object to the prosecutor’s 

argument). 

There is no cumulative error because there is no individual error. Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 

(citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643).

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim W9 is denied. 

7. Review of Claims X and Y

In these next two claims, Petitioner alleges that following the penalty phase, the trial court 

erred in denying his request for appointment of separate counsel for the purpose of filing a new trial 

motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 113 at 219-26; SHCP Ex. 47.) He also 

alleges that Cater was ineffective for not filing a new trial motion and not renewing his request for 

separate counsel. (Id.) Petitioner claims these errors denied him the right to counsel, due process, 

and a reliable sentence determination, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Id.)

Petitioner raised these same claims on direct appeal, which the California Supreme Court

denied on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 346-47. Petitioner also raised these claims in his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court ruled that 

Petitioner’s habeas claims were procedurally barred because they were repetitive of claims that had 

been raised and rejected on direct appeal. (See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus [citing In re 

Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 824-29; In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d at 225].) The California Supreme Court also 

summarily denied the habeas claims on the merits without explanation. (See CSC Order Den. Pet. 

Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Legal Standards

A state law error that renders the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the federal

Constitution violates due process. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, 302-03 (due process protects 

defendant from arbitrary deprivation of expectations under state law).

The standard for ineffective assistance is set out in claim C2, ante.

b. Analysis of Claims X and Y 

As grounds for new trial, Petitioner re-argues presumed prejudice arising from counsel Soria’s 

alleged actual conflict of interest including the noted deficiencies relating to investigator Binns, 

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Soria’s failure to ensure guilt phase witnesses were personally interviewed, and the complete 

breakdown of the relationship between Soria and Petitioner. (See claims A, J, ante.) 

1) Independent Counsel 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for appointment of separate 

counsel. (See ECF No. 113 at 219.) 

However, the California Supreme Court could have found the trial court’s denial of 

independent counsel to be reasonable in the absence of predicate ineffective assistance. Soria was not 

ineffective or conflicted for reasons discussed in claims A and J, ante. The trial court noted that it 

denied the request for independent counsel because it “did not see anything wrong with Mr. Soria’s 

representation, and . . . [no] more favorable determination would have occurred.” (2/25/91 RT at 16-

17.) The trial court found no colorable claim for independent counsel, and suggested habeas corpus 

was appropriate to pursue ineffective assistance claims. (2/25/91 RT at 17.) 

The California Supreme Court also considered and rejected these allegations, stating that: 

Following the penalty verdict, Defense Attorney William Cater requested the court 

appoint new counsel for the purpose of making a new trial motion that might involve 

issues of ineffective assistance at trial. In camera, Cater indicated he thought the 

investigation for both the guilt and penalty phases had been deficient due to 

inadequacies on the part of the investigative agency retained by prior trial counsel, 

Charles Soria. Because Cater had represented defendant at both the guilt and penalty 

phases, he felt it was inappropriate for him to argue ineffective assistance in the context 

of a new trial motion. Defendant did not express dissatisfaction with Cater during any of 

the proceedings. Relying on the standard set forth in People v. Stewart [Citation], the 

court denied the request because the defense did not present a “colorable claim” the 

assistance of another attorney was necessary for the new trial motion. [Citation] In the 

court’s view, Soria’s representation was adequate, “and I certainly don’t think by any 

stretch of the imagination that any more favorable determination would have occurred.”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 346. 

This Court finds that the California Supreme Court also could reasonably have determined 

Cater was not prevented, by conflict of interest or otherwise from arguing Soria’s ineffectiveness. 

Cater and Soria were each appointed independently. The record does not suggest any conflict of 

interest that might have prevented Cater from arguing ineffective assistance of counsel against Soria, 

at least to the extent based on matters unknown to Cater during the trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690 (counsel’s performance is to be viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct). In fact, the record 

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reflects Cater’s claimed ignorance of certain of the guilt phase issues allegedly mishandled by Soria. 

(See e.g., SHCP Ex. 47, 1/7/91 Marsden RT at 2304-11). Successive representation alone does not 

demonstrate a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (“the 

rather common occurrence of trial counsel [filing a direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel] does not create any obvious prejudice.”). 

It seems that the trial court had sufficient opportunity to consider the reasons for a claim of 

ineffectiveness, having conducted two hearings on that issue. (See 12/13/90 Marsden hearing; 

2/25/91 In Camera hearing.) The trial court found no basis for further evidentiary development of 

these issues. (See 12/13/90 Marsden Hearing RT at 2291-99; 2/25/91 RT at 7, 16-17.) The trial court 

found defense counsel’s performance during the guilt and penalty phases not ineffective. (Id.)

In rejecting these allegations on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court stated:

At the Marsden hearing, defendant had asserted that the shootings were the 

responsibility of several other individuals possibly in confederacy with Mincy and 

Wilson to steal his marijuana and that he himself had been wounded in the incident. 

Although he had given Soria names and addresses of some of the alleged assailants as 

well as names and addresses of persons to whom he had shown his wounds after he left 

Kern County, Soria failed to call any of them to testify at trial. Defendant also 

complained discussions he had with Soria had become known to the prosecutor possibly 

through some breach of confidentiality on the part of the defense investigator. Soria 

responded that he had investigated or attempted to investigate the witnesses provided by 

defendant, with inconclusive results. In particular, medical information indicated 

defendant’s wounds were inconsistent with his description of the events. Soria also did 

not think the investigator had been the source of any leaks. He acknowledged, however, 

that he and defendant were in conflict. The court found no substance to defendant’s 

complaints, but nevertheless determined a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship 

jeopardized defendant’s right to a fair trial and therefore relieved Soria.

On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to appoint new 

counsel to prepare and present a new trial motion. The court originally concluded, and 

later reiterated, that Soria’s representation was not inadequate. Because it was able to 

observe his trial performance, we defer to that assessment absent contrary evidence. 

With respect to Cater’s concern about the adequacy of penalty phase investigation, the

record contains no colorable claim that it was in fact deficient. At best, he offered only

speculation based on hearsay reports, and [Petitioner] added nothing to substantiate the

allegation. Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to replace Cater for a new trial

motion. The court also properly refused to appoint additional counsel for that purpose. 

As we have noted before, no authority supports the appointment of “simultaneous and

independent, but potentially rival, attorneys to represent defendant.”

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 347. 

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In light of this Court’s denial of all the record claims, ante, the noted conclusions of the 

California Supreme Court regarding denial of independent counsel were not unreasonable. See also

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring a trial court to appoint substitute 

counsel whenever a defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of counsel’s incompetence is 

unsupported by case law and would be a “new rule” under Teague).

The record does not demonstrate that the trial court’s denial of independent counsel 

substantially and adversely affected his right to counsel, fair trial and a reliable sentence, or that had 

the trial court granted Petitioner a new trial, it is reasonable to believe that he would have obtained a 

more favorable outcome. The noted evidence supporting Petitioner’s guilt and death sentence 

determination was substantial. (See e.g., claims O, R and S, ante.)

2) New Trial Motion

Petitioner faults Cater for not filing a motion for a new trial following the penalty phase and 

prior to imposition of sentence and claims his failure to do so was itself ineffective assistance. (ECF 

No. 113 at 224.) He speculates that Cater could have supported a motion for new trial by proffering 

then available facts, outside the trial record, included in the state habeas proffer. (See ECF No. 113 at 

224-26.) These facts, according to Petitioner, would have shown the failure of Soria and Binns to 

investigate guilt and penalty phase issues; along with the evidence that appropriate investigation 

would have yielded including the missing pages of the Halfacre letter (see SHCP Ex.’s 9, 16, 25),

statements from Balsamico that it was he, not Petitioner, who assaulted Spencer (see SHCP Ex.’s 12, 

46), and statements from individuals including Sandra Hooten regarding the confrontation between 

Huffstuttler and Petitioner shortly before the murders. (See SHCP Ex. 28.) 

However, the state supreme court could have concluded it was not reasonably probable that 

such extra-record facts, (see ECF No. 113 at 224-26), even if then available and admissible evidence,

would have altered the outcome of Petitioner’s trial. For the reasons stated in the record claims, ante, 

the California Supreme Court reasonably found lacking the claims relating to investigator Binns’s 

incompetence; unspecified mitigating information from family members in Chicago; statements of 

Paula regarding the alleged missing pages from the Halfacre letter; statements of Balsamico regarding 

the Spencer assault; and unspecified mitigating information from Petitioner’s friends in Los Angeles. 

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At bottom, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that an evidentiary proffer 

insufficient to warrant habeas relief would have resulted in granting a new trial. Even if a new trial 

motion had been granted, Petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of a more favorable result for 

the reasons stated in claims I1 through I17 and W1 through W9. Furthermore, the noted evidence 

against Petitioner was substantial. (See claims O, R and S, ante.)

3) Conclusions

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial; that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness; and that absent counsel’s unprofessional errors there was a reasonable probability the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of claim X and Y was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, 

or that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claims X and Y are denied. 

8. Review of Claim Z

Petitioner next claims that the determination of his death sentence was unreliable due to the 

individual and cumulative ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase as alleged in claims R, 

S, T, U, V, and W, ante, violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. constitution. 

(See ECF No. 113 at 226-27.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which that court summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (See CSC

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

Petitioner argues that the above noted penalty phase errors prevented the jury from 

considering exculpatory and mitigating evidence during their sentence selection deliberations, 

rendering their verdict unreliable. (ECF No. 113 at 226:17-227:11.) He claims this denied him the 

jury’s reasoned moral response to all mitigating evidence relevant to his background, character and 

the circumstances of the crime. (Id.) 

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The Court finds that this claim fails for the reasons discussed in claims R, S, T, U, V and W, 

ante. As discussed in those claims, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the jury was precluded from 

considering mitigating evidence, so as to come within Eddings. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Moreover, 

there is no cumulative error because there is no individual error. Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (citing

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643).

For the reasons stated, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish 

that he was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged, that defense counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim Z is denied.

9. Review of Claim AA

Petitioner next claims that the cumulative effect of the above noted guilt, special 

circumstance, and penalty phase errors denied him a fair trial and rendered his conviction and 

sentence unreliable, violating his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 227:14-27.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.)

The Court finds that this claim fails because all the foregoing record claims ante, fail for the 

reasons stated. There can be no cumulative error because there is no individual error. Parle, 505 F.3d 

at 928, citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. As noted, Petitioner was “entitled to a fair trial but not a 

perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.” McDonough Power Equipment, 464 U.S. at 553 (quoting

Brown, 411 U.S. at 231-32). 

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It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim AA is denied. 

10. Review of Claim BB

Petitioner next alleges multiple subclaims asserting that California’s then-effective death 

penalty scheme was unconstitutional, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 228-30.) These subclaims are considered separately 

below. 

a. Clearly Established Law

As noted, Supreme Court cases have established that a state capital sentencing system must: 

“(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a 

reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, 

personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.” Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74. If the 

“state system satisfies these requirements,” then the “State enjoys a range of discretion in imposing 

the death penalty, including the manner in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances are to be 

weighed.” Id. (citing Franklin, 487 U.S. at 179, and Zant, 462 U.S. at 875–876 n.13). 

A state may narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty by defining degrees 

of murder. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 342. A state may further narrow the class of murderers by finding 

“beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of a list of statutory aggravating factors.” Id.; see also Gregg, 

428 U.S. at 196-97.

b. Review of Claim BB1

Petitioner alleges that California’s death penalty scheme “fails to account for differing degrees 

of culpability attendant to different types of murder, enhancing the possibility that a death sentence 

will be imposed arbitrarily, without regard for the blameworthiness of the particular defendant or the 

acts at issue.” (ECF No. 113 at 228:5-8.)

Petitioner raised these same allegations in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

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California Supreme Court, which that court summarily denied on the merits without explanation.

(See CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) That court also generally denied these allegations on 

direct appeal. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345-46. 

Petitioner alleges that California’s death penalty scheme then in effect was unconstitutional 

because it was unpredictable, failing to genuinely narrow the class of murders eligible for the death 

penalty. He cites to a separate California capital case, People v. Sanchez, No. S007780, in which 

“counsel analyzed published opinions in murder appeals over a period of five years, and 

demonstrated that 93% of defendants convicted of first degree murder in California committed their 

offenses under circumstances creating death-eligibility.” (ECF No. 113 at 228:9-19.) This, he 

claims, demonstrates that “the California sentencing scheme does not provide a meaningful basis for 

distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is 

not.” Id.; Furman, 408 U.S. 238. He argues that, to be constitutional, the death penalty “must be 

reserved for those killings which society views as the most grievous . . . affronts to humanity.” Id.; 

Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 n.15. 

Here, the California Supreme Court considered and denied Petitioner’s claim regarding the 

narrowing effect of its death penalty statute. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345. That court’s rejection of this 

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court. Nor was the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Court finds that this claim fails for the reasons stated in claim U5. California’s death 

penalty scheme, which narrows the class of death eligible offenders to less than the definition of first 

degree murder and permits consideration of all mitigating evidence, has been approved by the United 

States Supreme Court, Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972-79; Harris, 465 U.S. at 38, and this Court, see BenSholom, E.D. Cal. Case No. CV-F-93-5531, ECF. No. 421 at 122, 124-25.

Claim BB1 is denied. 

c. Review of Claim BB2 

Petitioner next complains that under the California death penalty scheme then in effect “an 

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individual prosecutor had complete discretion to determine: 1) whether to charge a special 

circumstance; and 2) whether to seek the death penalty in a case in which one or more special 

circumstances are charged.” (ECF No. 113 at 228-29.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which that court summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (See CSC

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) These allegations relating to prosecutor’s discretion to seek the 

death penalty were also denied on direct appeal. See Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345. 

Petitioner complains of “unbounded discretion” in the prosecution that creates a “substantial 

risk of arbitrariness” because offenders with similar characteristics may or may not be chosen as 

candidates for the death penalty depending on the individual prosecutor, or because the prosecutor 

may rely on impermissible characteristics such race and economic status. (ECF No. 113 at 229:3-9.) 

He claims this unconstitutionally expanded death penalty eligibility under Penal Code § 190.2. 

Petitioner relies in large part on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), a voting rights case, to support his 

claim that California’s death penalty law should be struck down because of a lack of statewide 

uniform standards as to when a prosecutor should seek the death penalty, analogizing the fundamental 

right to vote to the fundamental right to life. (See ECF No. 178 at 356.) 

However, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of 

prosecutorial discretion over charging decisions does not render a capital punishment scheme 

unconstitutional. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Prosecutorial discretion “is essential to the criminal justice 

process,” and does not violate the federal Constitution. Id. at 297. Instead, the Constitution forbids 

only “purposeful discrimination” in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, id. at 292-93, and in 

order to prevail in that regard, the Supreme Court emphasized that “we would demand exceptionally 

clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.” Id. at 297. That California’s 

statutory scheme gives the prosecutor discretion does not alone violate the Constitution. See Gregg,

428 U.S. at 225. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that Bush v. Gore is authority otherwise, and courts have held 

that it is not. See Coleman v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding Bush v. Gore

inapplicable in context of criminal procedure); Black v. Bell, 181 F. Supp. 2d 832, 879 (M.D. Tenn. 

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2001) (Bush v. Gore is not authority that unbridled prosecutorial discretion is unconstitutional). The 

claim that California’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional by virtue of prosecutorial discretion 

is foreclosed by precedent. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 982, (9th Cir. 2007). 

The California Supreme Court reviewed these allegations and arrived at the same conclusion, 

“[t]hat the breadth of the prosecutor’s discretion in choosing to seek the death penalty does not render 

it unconstitutional.” Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345. That court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court. Nor was the state court’s ruling based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim BB2 is denied. 

d. Review of Claim BB3 

Petitioner next claims that the then effective California death penalty statute “fails to meet the 

minimum standards necessary to assure rational and consistent application of the death penalty”, 

denying him due process, equal protection and a reliable and fair penalty determination, violating the 

Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 229:20-25.) 

Petitioner raised this same claim on direct appeal, which the California Supreme Court denied 

on the merits. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345-46.

Petitioner alleges that the death penalty statute is infirm because it does not require the jury to 

make written findings or require the jury’s selection of a death sentence be based on the reasonable 

doubt standard. (ECF No. 113 at 229-30.) He points out that the Georgia death penalty scheme 

upheld in Gregg required written findings beyond a reasonable doubt of the aggravating 

circumstances. 428 U.S. at 165, 196-97. 

This claim is unpersuasive. The Constitution does not require written findings by the jury 

regarding imposition of the death penalty. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48; Williams, 52 F.3d at 

1484-85. 

Additionally, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never stated that a beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard is required when determining whether a death penalty should be imposed.” Harris, 

692 F.2d at 1195. All that is constitutionally required is an “adequate basis for appellate review.” Id.

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The California death penalty scheme provides for the trial court’s express reasons for its findings

when ruling on the automatic motion for modification and this provides the “adequate basis” for 

appellate review. Id.; see People v. Diaz, 3 Cal. 4th 495, 571-573 (1992). Petitioner does not 

demonstrate that clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires more. See Williams, 52 F.3d 

at 1484 (California’s statute “ensures meaningful appellate review”) (citing Brown, 479 U.S. at 543).

Petitioner’s citation to Ring, 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (see ECF No. 178 at 

359-60), does not suggest otherwise. Apprendi, which requires that any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 490, is not implicated by California’s death penalty scheme. As 

discussed previously, this is because once a California jury convicts of first degree murder with a 

special circumstance “the defendant stands convicted of an offense whose maximum penalty is 

death.” Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th at 454; see also Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th at 263 & n.14.

Ring is inapposite for the same reasons Apprendi is inapplicable. Ring invalidated Arizona’s 

capital sentencing scheme because death could be imposed only after the judge, sitting as sentencer 

without a jury, found at least one specifically enumerated aggravating factor to be true. 530 U.S. at 

588-89. Because death was not the maximum penalty that could be imposed based solely on the 

jury’s conviction of first degree murder, the aggravating factors in Arizona “operate as the ‘functional 

equivalent of an element of a greater offense.’” Id. at 609.

Petitioner’s citation to Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), for the proposition 

that the capital sentence determination must be by the jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, also fails 

to persuade the Court. (See ECF No. 178 at 361.) The Apprendi error in that case arose from trial 

court findings of fact in a determinate sentencing law case that served to increase the criminal penalty 

beyond the statutory maximum; such findings must be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288-89. As discussed above, this is not the case here. 

Petitioner also claims the constitutional arguments in this claim were not adjudicated by the 

state supreme court. (ECF No. 113 at 15-16.) However, the California Supreme Court adjudicated 

these allegations by rejecting them on direct appeal on the merits, stating that:

The jury need not make express findings with respect to circumstances in aggravation 

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[Citation], or find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty 

[Citation]. 

Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 345-46. 

For the reasons stated, that court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

Nor was the state court’s ruling based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Claim BB3 is denied. 

11. Review of Claim DD

Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by failing to raise, on direct 

appeal, all of the claims asserted in his federal proceeding, causing the California Supreme Court to 

reject claims B1, J, L1-L4, P1-P3, P5-P10, Q, R1-R4, U1, U2, U6, U7, V, X. Y, Z, AA, BB1-BB2 

and FF as improperly presented on habeas corpus, violating his rights to due process and meaningful 

appellate review under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 113 at 235-

36; cf., ECF No. 178 at 365 [citing same claims plus claim A but minus claims L1 and L2].)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court), which the California Supreme Court summarily denied on the merits without 

explanation. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

a. Clearly Established Law

The Strickland standard (see claim C2 ante) applies to appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259, 285 (2002). However, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every 

non-frivolous issue, even if requested by the appellant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) 

(holding that an attorney need not advance every colorable argument on appeal). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that “since time beyond memory” experienced advocates 

“have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on 

one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Id. at 751-52; cf. Banks v. Reynolds, 54 

F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (failure to raise a “dead-bang winner” - an issue obvious from the 

record which would have resulted in reversal - is ineffective).

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The appropriate inquiry is not whether raising a particular issue on appeal would have been 

frivolous, but whether raising it would have led to a reasonable probability of reversal. Miller v. 

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a petitioner had only a remote chance of 

obtaining reversal based upon an issue, neither of the Strickland prongs is satisfied. Id.

b. Analysis of Claim DD

 Petitioner alleges that his appointed appellate counsel, Mr. Gilman, was ineffective by failing 

to appropriately raise the noted claims on direct appeal, causing the California Supreme Court to deny 

the claims on habeas review pursuant to In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). (ECF No. 113 at 

235:21-236:11.) He claims prejudice to the extent this Court sustains Respondent’s Dixon defense to 

these claims. (Id.) 

Petitioner alleges the constitutional arguments in this claim were not adjudicated by the state 

court. (See ECF No. 113 at 236:6-7.) However, the state supreme court denied this habeas claim for 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on the merits. (CSC Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

This claim denial is sufficient as an adjudication of the claim. See Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1094-96.

The record reflects that appellate counsel filed a 181-page opening brief raising 21 issues of law 

with numerous sub-issues. (See Appellant’s Opening Brief lodged June 11, 1999.) Appellate counsel 

also filed a reply brief (see Appellant’s Reply Brief lodged June 11, 1999) and a petition for rehearing 

(see Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing lodged June 11, 1999). The appeal was disposed of by the 

noted lengthy merits opinion by the California Supreme Court. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297. 

Petitioner asserts for the first time in his brief in support of the amended petition that his 

appellate counsel failed to raise claim A (relating to whether the trial court improperly denied Soria’s 

pretrial motion to withdraw) on direct appeal. (See ECF No. 178 at 365 n.249.) This allegation is not 

included in the amended petition and appears to be unexhausted. Even if this allegation were properly 

before this Court, it fails for the reasons discussed in claim A, ante. 

Petitioner concedes that claims L1 and L2, not raised in the state opening brief on appeal, were 

raised in a supplemental appeal brief and that Petitioner was not prejudiced by this method of 

presentation. (See ECF No. 178 at 365 n.249.) Claim Q (cumulative error in the guilt phase), was 

raised by appellate counsel on appeal and no deficiency is apparent as to this claim. (See Appellant’s 

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Opening Brief lodged June 11, 1999.) 

Furthermore, the Court finds this claim fails because all the noted claims, having been 

adjudicated in state court, are denied on the merits under the § 2254(d) standard for reasons stated,

ante. Even if appellate counsel was deficient as alleged, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. 

Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel “failed to prepare transcript notes, failed to 

perfect the record on appeal, failed to timely communicate with federal counsel, abandoned his client 

when the State threatened to set an execution date, and failed to fulfill his obligations as appointed 

counsel in a capital case.” (ECF No. 113 at 235-36.) However, Petitioner has not made a showing on 

the evidentiary record that appellate counsel did not do so. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

prejudiced in these regards, for the reasons stated. 

Accordingly, a fair-minded jurist could have found that Petitioner failed to establish that he 

was denied a fair trial, or to the extent alleged that appellate counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors there is a 

reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-98.

It does not appear that the state supreme court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

that the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Claim DD is denied. 

12. Review of Claim EE

Petitioner’ next alleges that to execute him following his lengthy confinement pursuant to his 

February 25, 1991 conviction and sentence of death, which became final on March 8, 1999, would be 

cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 

international law. (ECF No. 113 at 236-37.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which that court summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (See CSC 

Order Den. Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

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Petitioner argues that to execute him after such a lengthy incarceration is cruel and unusual 

punishment and subjects him to double jeopardy of multiple ex post facto punishments not accurately 

described at the penalty determination. He cites to People v. Ochoa and argues that delay in 

determining whether a death sentence is valid may, if prolonged, have the effect of increasing the 

penalty imposed for the commission of capital crimes. 26 Cal. 4th at 463. 

Petitioner claims that he has been confined in a “concentration camp” of the condemned (ECF 

No. 178 at 389:14) causing him psychological injuries and damages. He analogizes incarceration 

pending state review of the validity of his death sentence to “pretrial detention,” apparently arguing 

for the more favorable conditions of confinement to which the latter are entitled. (ECF No. 178 at 

416:21-22.) 

However, Petitioner does not cite any clearly established authority from the United States 

Supreme Court addressing a prolonged detention claim. See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[t]he Supreme Court has never held that execution after a long tenure on death row 

is cruel and unusual punishment. . . . Allen cannot credibly claim that there is any clearly established 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court, which would support this . . . claim”); accord Lackey v. 

Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). In McKenzie v. Day, the 

Ninth Circuit rejected such a Lackey claim involving a twenty-year delay, stating that “[a] defendant 

must not be penalized for pursuing his constitutional rights, but he also should not be able to benefit 

from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights.” 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court in Ochoa concluded that “execution notwithstanding the delay associated with 

defendant’s appeals was not unconstitutional and furthered both the deterrent and retributive 

functions; and that shielding defendant from execution solely on this basis would frustrate these two 

penological purposes.” 26 Cal. 4th at 464.

For the reasons stated, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Since the U.S. 

Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the state supreme court’s decision could not be contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Carey, 549 U.S. 76; see

also White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (“White has benefitted from [the] careful and 

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meticulous [review] process and cannot now complain that the expensive and laborious process of 

habeas corpus appeals which exists to protect him has violated other of his rights.”).

It reasonably appears that the duration of Petitioner’s appeal, as well as his collateral review 

proceedings, “is a function of the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore 

exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that might save someone’s life.” Johns v. 

Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d at 570).

Petitioner’s further allegation that execution after prolonged incarceration violates 

international human rights law and jus cogens theories (citing Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 

4 All. E.R. 769 (Privy Council) 1993; Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 E.H.R.R. 439, ¶ 111 [Euro. Ct. 

of Human Rights]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), article 7; Torture 

Convention, articles 1 and 16; and the American Convention on Human Rights, article 5), fails for the 

reasons discussed in claim FF, post. 

Additionally, Petitioner concedes that the ICCPR and the Torture Convention are not selfexecuting, and that the ICCPR does not create a private cause of action, (see ECF No. 178 at 401-02 

n.266), suggesting he may lack standing to raise claims thereunder.

Claim EE is denied. 

13. Review of Claim FF 

Petitioner’s final claim is that the individual and cumulative errors alleged in all the above 

claims denied him a fair trial and reliable sentence under various international laws, covenants, and 

declarations. (ECF No. 113 at 237-38.) He cites to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

ICCPR article 6, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration)

articles 1, 26, and customary international law. (ECF No. 178 at 429:25-431:15.)

Petitioner raised this same claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on the merits without explanation. (CSC Order Den. 

Pet. Habeas Corpus.) 

Petitioner’s essential argument appears to be that imposition and execution of a death sentence 

for what he characterizes as “a single-victim felony murder, against a defendant who did not inflict 

the injuries resulting in death” violates customary international law and article 6, section 2, of the 

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ICCPR, which limits the death penalty to only “the most serious crimes.” (ECF No. 113 at 238: 8-

11.) 

He argues that “the United States is bound by customary international law, as informed by 

such instruments as the ICCPR and the American Declaration,” and that these international laws are 

instructive in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis. (ECF No. 178 at 431:5-6)

(citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005)). 

He points out that the Ninth Circuit has looked to the Universal Declaration as an exposition 

of customary international law, Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 

1998), and that the American Declaration is comparable to the Universal Declaration. Alejandre v. 

Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 

The Court is unconvinced by this claim. On March 8, 1999, when Petitioner’s conviction 

became final, no clearly established Supreme Court law held that capital punishment was illegal in 

the United States based on international law. It appears that challenges to imposition of the death 

penalty based on international law have regularly been rejected. See e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 

337, 370-76 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting challenge to death sentence based international laws such as 

the American Declaration, the ICCPR, and customary international law norms); Brewer v. Hall, 378 

F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal law 

relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner raised in state court, the state court’s decision cannot 

be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”)

This Court finds that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that 

Petitioner may not rely on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration 

as freestanding authority. Though 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) limits the scope of these proceedings to 

alleged violations of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights is not a law or treaty within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) - it 

“does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.” Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004); see Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 

1992) (international law rests on consent of states). Similarly, the American Declaration is not a 

treaty. See Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 767 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (international law does 

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not preclude the state of Ohio from establishing and carrying out a capital punishment scheme). 

Petitioner concedes that the Universal Declaration and the American Declaration are not treaties. 

(See ECF No. 178 at 430:25-431:2.)

Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated standing on this claim and thus cannot invoke 

the jurisdiction of international law in this proceeding. The principles of international law apply to 

disputes between sovereign governments and not between individuals. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan 

Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C. 1981). Petitioner suggests no basis for the Court to 

find that the international law he cites is self-executing and provides an individual right of action. 

See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (disavowed in part by Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 884) (2d Cir. 1980) (it is only when a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes 

rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of 

such rights). The ICCPR is not self-executing. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734-35; Jamison, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 

766.

To the extent Petitioner argues that the noted international law is at least instructive as to 

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, nothing in his argument suggests an 

available basis for federal habeas relief for him, a convicted multiple first degree murderer. Even if 

Petitioner had standing to argue international law, the United States ratified the ICCPR subject to 

reservation of the right to impose capital punishment subject only constitutional constraints. See 138 

Cong. Rec. S-4781-01, S4783 (1992). 

Petitioner does not demonstrate that the other international law and custom to which he cites 

precludes capital punishment in his case. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief.

Claim FF is denied. 

VIII. FURTHER EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND RECORD EXPANSION

The Court reserved ruling on Petitioner’s December 22, 2008 motion for record expansion and 

evidentiary hearing relating to claims A, B2, D, F, G, I, J, K, W, Y, BB, DD, and EE of the amended 

petition. (ECF Nos. 214, 271.) 

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Petitioner, in post-hearing briefing, argues that “Mr. Soria’s testimony on claim C2, insofar as it 

manifests the comprehensive and wide-ranging inadequacy of his representation of [Petitioner], bolsters 

[Petitioner’s] argument that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his other claims of ineffective 

assistance [i.e., claims B2, D, F, G2, I, W and Y] should relief not be granted on claim C2.” (ECF No.

343 at 16 n.10.) 

However, the Court shall deny further record expansion and evidentiary hearing. The record 

claims that were adjudicated in state court do not survive 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis for reasons 

discussed above. “[R]eview under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181; accord Stokely v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 

802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011). Any attempted “relitigation” is “bar[red],” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98, no matter 

what semantics Petitioner employs to avoid being “limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits,” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. To this extent, new evidence in 

federal court simply cannot assist Petitioner. Id. at 185.

The record claims that were not adjudicated in state court, reviewed by the Court de novo, do 

not survive 28 U.S. C. § 2254(e)(2) analysis for the reasons discussed above. These claims are not 

entitled to record expansion and evidentiary hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(B).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s December 22, 2008 request for further record expansion and 

evidentiary hearing as to claims A, B2, D, F, G, I, J, K, W, Y, BB, DD, and EE of the amended 

petition (ECF No. 214), shall be denied. 

IX. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Because this is a final order adverse to the Petitioner, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases requires this Court to issue or deny a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). Accordingly, 

the Court has sua sponte evaluated the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a 

COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller–

El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a COA is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district 

judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for 

the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity 

of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person 

charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such 

person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal 

may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of 

arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific 

issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

The Court may issue a COA only “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s 

resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate 

to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; accord Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must 

demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his

. . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that, with respect to the following claims, reasonable 

jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution or conclude that the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further:

1. Claim C2: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the change of

venue motion following voir dire of the jury. 

2. Claim I13: whether trial counsel was ineffective because of irregularities and 

improprieties that occurred during the jury’s view of the crime scene and related 

locations. 

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3. Claim L (L1-L4): whether the jury view of the crime scene violated Petitioner’s state 

and federal rights. 

4. Claim W2: whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move for a further 

continuance at the penalty phase.

Therefore, a certificate of appealability is granted as these claims.

As to the remaining claims and further requests for record expansion and evidentiary hearing, 

the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is 

not entitled to relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has 

not made the required substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the 

Court hereby declines to issue a COA as to the remaining claims and further requests for record 

expansion and evidentiary hearing. 

X. ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise on 

appeal claim A is DISMISSED without prejudice as unexhausted, 

2. Claim C2 is DENIED following limited evidentiary hearing,

3. Further record expansion and evidentiary hearing for claims A, B2, D, F, G, I, J, K, W, 

Y, BB, DD, and EE are DENIED, 

4. Record based claims A, B, and D through FF, are DENIED, 

5. The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 113) is DENIED, 

6. A COA is ISSUED as to the Court’s resolution of claims C2, I13, L (L1-L4), and W2, 

and DECLINED as to the remaining claims and further requests for record expansion 

and evidentiary hearing, 

7. Any and all scheduled dates are VACATED, and

///

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8. The Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute RON DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin 

State Prison, as the Respondent warden in this action, and to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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