Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_24-cv-05118/USCOURTS-arwd-5_24-cv-05118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

AGNES MOSE PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:24-CV-5118 

NORTHWEST ARKANSAS 

REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES 

and JESSICA ABRAMSON, 

in her official as well as individual capacity DEFENDANTS 

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants Northwest Arkansas Rehabilitation 

Associates (“NWARA”) and Jessica Abramson’s Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) 

and Brief in Support (Doc. 13). Plaintiff Agnes Mose filed a Response in Opposition (Docs. 

15 & 16), and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 23). For the following reasons, the Motion 

is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff Mose, a Black woman originally from Kenya, was a nurse technician 

employed by NWARA, and supervised by NWARA employee Abramson. Moses alleges 

that during her employment, she was subjected to a hostile workplace and racial 

harassment. She further alleges that after nearly three years on the job, she was fired in 

retaliation for complaining about the discriminatory treatment she experienced. She 

asserts the following causes of action: Count 1, a violation of her right to free speech 

under the Arkansas and United States Constitutions because she was terminated for 

“sp[eaking] honestly about conditions at work that were unfavorable to being productive,” 

(Doc. 2, ¶ 62); Count 2, a violation of the equal protection clauses of the Arkansas and 

United States Constitutions due to “explicit[ ] and implicit[ ] discriminat[ion] against Mrs. 

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Mose on the basis of her race,” id. at ¶ 71, and “targeting Mrs. Mose’s behavior [at work] 

for disparate treatment,” id. at ¶ 70; and Count 3, a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights 

Act (“ACRA”) for “race and national origin [discrimination] based on [Mose’s] accent and 

skin color,” id. at ¶ 75. 

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the 

Court must accept all the complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 

favor. See Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). The 

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Defendants argue that Counts One and Two, alleging violations of the Arkansas 

and U.S. Constitutions, must be dismissed because Defendants are not state actors, state 

entities, or arms of the state. In response, Mose claims NWARA “is a partner of the 

Washington Regional Medical System of Northwest Arkansas,” which “is the only not-forprofit, community-owned, and locally governed healthcare system located in Northwest 

Arkansas.” (Doc. 19, p. 2). Therefore, Mose reasons that NWARA as “partner of 

Washington Regional Medical System” acts under color of state law. This is incorrect. 

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that NWARA is a non-profit corporation 

and not a state entity. See Doc. 23-1; see also Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., Ltd. 

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Liab. Co., 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008) (filings made with the Secretary of State are 

public records which can properly be considered on a motion to dismiss). Private entities 

and individuals who do not act under color of state law cannot violate the First Amendment 

or its counterpart in the Arkansas Constitution. Hudgens v. N. L. R. B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 

(1976); Aclin Ford Co. v. Cordell, 274 Ark. 341, 345 (1981). Likewise, the Equal Protection 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Equality Before the Law provision of the Arkansas 

Constitution only apply to “such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.” 

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 

U.S. 1, 13 (1948)); Brandt v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 287 Ark. 431, 434 (1985). It is a matter 

of public record that NWARA is not a state entity, and Mose has failed to allege any facts 

indicating that Defendants were otherwise acting under color of law. There is no factual 

content on which the Court can reasonably infer that the alleged violations were 

attributable to state action. Therefore, Counts One and Two fail to state a claim for relief. 

Count Three is also subject to dismissal because Mose’s ACRA claim is untimely.

An employment discrimination claim under ACRA must be brought within one year of the 

alleged discrimination or with ninety days of receipt of a “Right to Sue” letter from the 

EEOC, whichever is later. Ark. Code § 16-123-107(c)(4). However, federal law imposes 

a 180-day statute of limitations for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(e)(1). And a plaintiff cannot rely on an untimely EEOC charge to support the 

timeliness of their ACRA claim. Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472 (8th 

Cir. 2010). Here, Mose attempts to do just that. 

Mose alleges that she was terminated on March 31, 2022. Her Charge of 

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Discrimination with the EEOC is dated December 11, 2023, well over a year after she 

was terminated and outside the 180-day statute of limitations for EEOC charges. Doc.

13-2; see Blakley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 931 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n 

EEOC charge is a part of the public record and may be considered on a motion to 

dismiss.”). She received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC the next day, December 

12, 2023, and this lawsuit was filed within 90 days on March 8, 2024. However, because 

her EEOC charge was untimely, she cannot rely on the right-to-sue letter to establish the 

timeliness of her ACRA claim. Further, her ACRA claim was brought nearly two years 

after the alleged discrimination, so it is well outside the alternate one-year statute of 

limitations. Therefore, her ACRA claim is time-barred. 

For the reasons above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED on this 15th day of September, 2024. 

_____________________________

TIMOTHY L. BROOKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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