Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03182/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES 

TENTH 

UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS R. SHANLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

COURT OF APPEALF I L J 

CIRCUIT United St.tel Coμrt of Appeal!' Tenth C1-rr.u\t 

DEC 1 O 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No . 92-3182 

(D. Kan., Nos. 92-3066-R and 

89-40006-01-R) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal of the district court's denial of habeas 

corpus relief under 28 U. S.C. §2255 . In 1989, the petitioner was 

convicted and sentenced in the United States District Court for 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3182 Document: 010110151551 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
• 

the District of Kansas for possession of methamphetamine with 

intent to distribute, and for carrying a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime. He raises three issues on 

appeal: (1) whether his due process rights were violated when he 

was prosecuted in federal rather than state court; (2) whether his 

due process rights were violated when evidence was admitted at 

trial that was the fruit of an allegedly pretextual stop and 

search of his vehicle; and (3) whether his due process rights were 

violated when he was sentenced for possession of a Schedule II 

drug under 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq. We find these claims to be 

without merit and affirm the district court's denial of habeas 

relief. 1 

The petitioner first contends that he was denied due process 

when the state police officers who arrested him referred his case 

to the federal prosecutor. The law regarding the referral of 

cases by law enforcement officials to prosecutors is now well 

established in this circuit. "'In the absence of proof that the 

1 In order for a petitioner to maintain a successful §2255 

action he must show cause and prejudice as to why he did not raise 

those issues on direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 167-68 (1982). Here we find that the petitioner failed to 

meet his burden under Frady. The issues of cause and prejudice 

were only argued with respect to the claim of a pretextual search 

of the petitioner's vehicle. We find that the mere allegations 

that the petitioner was unaware of the case law supporting his 

claim and that he would not have been prosecuted without the 

evidence is insufficient to show cause and prejudice under Frady. 

However, in the instant case, neither the government nor the 

district court addressed the Frady bar. According to Hines v. 

United States, this court in its discretion can raise the issue 

sua sponte where the "transcendent interests served by that 

defense warrant it." 971 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1992). In this 

case, we chose not to raise the matter sua sponte but instead 

proceed to the merits. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3182 Document: 010110151551 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 2 
choice of forum was improperly motivated or based on an 

impermissible classification as a matter of constitutional law,' 

prosecution in a federal rather than a state court does not 

violate due process despite the absence of guidelines for such 

referral." United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337, 1342 (10th 

Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Maxwell, 966 F.2d 545, 549 

(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1498 -

99 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Anderson, 940 F.2d 593, 597 

(10th Cir. 1991). This is equally true where referrals are made 

by state police not acting as part of a task force. Maxwell, 966 

F.2d at 546, 549. In the instant case the petitioner has not 

alleged that an improper motive or classification was the basis of 

the decision to prosecute in federal court, nor has he offered any 

tangible evidence which questions the independence of the 

prosecutorial decision. Therefore, we find the claim to be 

without merit. 

The petitioner's second contention is that the police made a 

pretextual stop and search of his car in violation of his due 

process rights. He claims that because he was never given a 

ticket for his traffic offenses, the stop was pretextual. 

However, the record reveals that the officer issued him warnings 

for speeding and failure to signal. The petitioner also asserts 

that when the officer searched his car for alcohol, the officer 

merely engaged in a "fishing expedition." The record does not 

support the petitioner's contention; it reveals that alcohol was 

detected on the petitioner's breath. Moreover, the petitioner 

signed a consent form for the search of his vehicle. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3182 Document: 010110151551 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 3 
The petitioner would also have us consider the voluntariness 

and scope of his consent. However, Shanley's car was searched 

after he was lawfully arrested for driving without insurance, a 

valid ground for arrest under Kansas law. See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 

22-2401 (c) (2), 40-3104 (e) (1988 & 1989 Supp.). Therefore the 

evidence was admissible irrespective of Shanley's consent, or the 

scope of that consent, because it was the result of a search of 

the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful 

arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1980). 

The petitioner's third contention is that his due process 

rights were violated when he was sentenced for possession of 

methamphetamine, which the petitioner alleges was erroneously 

considered to be a Schedule II drug under 21 u.s.c. §801 et seq. 

Methamphetamine was reclassified as a Schedule II drug in 1971 

following a lawful delegation of the Attorney General's powers set 

out in 21 U.S.C. § 8ll(a). 28 C.F.R. § 0.100 (1971). This 

included methamphetamine in liquid and powder form. United States 

v. Kendall, 887 F.2d 240, 241 (9th Cir. 1989). All forms of 

methamphetamine were clearly classified as a Schedule II drug when 

Stanley was arrested in 1988. See United States v. Zamora, 784 

F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. 

Kinder, 946 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1991). Therefore, the 

petitioner's argument is without merit. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3182 Document: 010110151551 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 4 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's Memorandum and 

Order of May 7, 1992 denying the petitioner's motion for habeas 

corpus relief. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-3182 Document: 010110151551 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 5