Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02599/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02599-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

MAR 2 9 1990 

ROBERT L ffOECKEH 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD OBERNDORF; LEO STERN; 

HARRY PAUL WERTHEIMER; CAROL 

BRODIE, Trust Administrator 

for Edith o. Wertheimer Trust; 

DOTTIE HAMMEL; and BLOCK 173 

ASSOCIATES, a Colorado General 

Partnership, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE CITY·AND COUNTY OF DENVER:. ) 

THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY } 

& COUNTY OF DENVER, by its ) 

council members of the City ) 

Council {not as individuals ) 

but as members of the City ) 

Council), T.J. Hackworth, J.L. } 

Sandos, Stephanie A. Foote, ) 

Paul L. Swalm, John J. Silchia, ) 

Nieves Peres Mcintire, Hiawatha ) 

Davis, Jr., Salvadore Carpio, } 

Cathy Donohue, William R. ) 

Roberts, Robert L. Crider, Cathy) 

Reynolds, William A. Scheitler: ) 

THE DENVER URBAN RENEWAL ) 

AUTHORITY~ FEDERICO PENA, as ) 

Mayor of the City and County ) 

of Denver: and BCE DEVELOPMENT ) 

PROPERTIES, INC., a Colorado ) 

corporation fka OXFORD } 

PROPERTIES, INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. -> 

Nos. 88-2599 

88-2928 

, 

.. 

Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 1 
Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. Nos. 86-C-1075 and 86-C-1445 

James A. Clark of Baker & Hostetler (Bruce D. Pringle and Theodore 

Shih of Baker & Hostetler; Kenneth L. Starr and Michael Touff of 

Holmes & Starr, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

David R. Hammond of Davis, Graham & Stubbs (Dale R. Harris and 

Neil Peck of Davis, Graham & Stubbs; Stephen H. Kaplan, City 

Attorney; Robert M. Kelly, Donald E. Wilson, and Karen A. Aviles, 

Assistant City Attorneys; Marlin D. Opperman, William M. Schell 

and Linda A. Surbaugh of Opperman & Associates, P.C., with him on 

the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 2 
Plaintiffs-appellants appeal a summary judgment order which 

dismissed with prejudice all of their antitrust and civil rights 

claims against the defendants. We conclude that the district 

court properly .found that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact in dispute. Because that court correctly applied the 

substantive law, we affirm. 

I. 

This case arises from the proposed Centerstone redevelopment 

project in downtown Denver. The plaintiffs-appellants, the 

Oberndorf family and Block 173 Associates (landowners), opposed 

the project which would have been constructed in part on their 

land. 1 The landowners also objected to the corresponding urban 

renewal plan ad6pted by the Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) 

arid the Denver City Council from which the Centerstone project 

emanates. The defendants-appellees are the City and County of 

Denver (the City), the City Council, Federico Pena, the Mayor of 

the City and County of Denver, Colorado, DURA, (collectively the 

Municipal defendants); and BCE Development Properties, Inc. 

(BCED). Seeking injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and 

damages, landowners claim alleged antitrust violations based on 

§§ l and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 and 

alleged civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district 

court's thorough recitation of the facts of this case obviates 

1subsequent events call into question whether the project will be 

completed, but neither party has suggested this case is 

consequently moot. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 3 
further recitation here. See Oberndorf v. City and County of 

Denver, 696 F. Supp. 552, 554-56 (D. Colo. 1988). Therefore, we 

set out only those facts which are essential for this opinion. 

In early 1983, the City and the Denver Partnership, Inc. 

(DPI), a non-profit civic and downtown business organization, 

began courting national retail developers and department stores in 

an effort to revitalize downtown Denver. City officials and DPI 

determined that some sort of public/private partnership with 

substantial public financing would be necessary to create a 

multiblock retail project on the Sixteenth Street Mall. In the 

summer of 1983, DPI formed the Sixteenth Street Retail Development 

Task Force to assist in forming such a partnership. Although the 

City and DPI contacted several potential developers, only BCED 

demonstrated sufficient interest and capacity to develop such a 

project. BCED proposed a two or three-block project to be 

constructed on Blocks 196, 173, and 206, including the block on 

which an existing department store is now located. 

Following a December 1984 announcement by Mayor Pena and BCED 

about the proposed Centerstone project, discussions among the 

City, BCED and others continued, focusing on available forms of 

public financing. It was determined that the best method was 11 tax 

increment financing," a form of public funding that allows sale of 

municipal bonds to raise money for public improvements. Under 

Colorado law, this funding vehicle is available only as part of an 

urban renewal plan. See Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 

1374 (Colo. 1980}. The City began taking actions to adopt an 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 4 
urban renewa l plan as set forth at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-25-101-

115 (1986). 

Critical to the entire project are the provisions of Section 

31-25-107(1) that no urban renewal plan shall be undertaken unless 

the appropriate authority, here the City Counc il , determines tha t 

the area is blighted. In December 1985 , the City Council passed a 

resolution ordering DURA to begin preparing an urban renewal plan 

and conducting a blight study to analyze a fifteen-block area in 

downtown Denver. In March 1986, the ~tudy concl uded, finding 

numerous blight factors existed in the defined space. DURA also 

prepared a proposed urban renewal p lan for the fifteen-block area. 

In May 1986, the City Counc il considered the proposed urban 

renewal plan at a public meeting. Landowners and their 

representatives appeared and opposed the plan, disputing the 

existence of blight in the area. · Enact ing Ordinance 309, the Ci t y 

Council approved the plan. 

In August 1987, DURA issued an Offering Prospectus and 

solicited proposals from prospecti ve developers f or redevelopment 

of all or part of the fifteen-block urban renewal area. Four 

prospective developers submit ted proposals, but only those of BCED 

concerned the blocks on which BCED hoped to build t he Centerstone 

project. DURA selected BCED and Centerstone for Phase I of the 

urban renewal plan. 

Landowners then began this act ion, 

illegally conspired to misrepresent 

blighted so that the property could 

Colorado Urban Renewal Law. They 

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claiming the defendants 

the three-block area as 

be condemned under the 

further claimed the urban 

Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 5 
renewal plan eliminated competition among buyers and developers in 

the three-block real estate market and thus amounted to a 

restraint of trade in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. Landowners also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

that the plan was a regulatory taking of property in violation of 

the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 

Following discovery, all defendants filed summary judgment 

motions which the district court granted, dismissing all of the 

landowners' claims with prejudice. Oberndorf, 696 F. Supp. at 

561. Shortly thereafter, the district court granted defendant 

DURA's motion to dismiss its counterclaims, and final judgment was 

entered for the defendants and against landowners. The landowners 

appeal the summary judgment order. 

III. 

This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo. 

Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 {lOth Cir. 

1988). We review the record in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 

was in dispute; if not, we must determine if the substantive law 

was correctly applied. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988}. 

A. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS 

In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court 

held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the anticornpetitive 

conduct of a state acting through its legislature. Subsequently, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 6 
che Court rejected the proposition that municipalities are 

similarly immune from antitrust liability simply by their status 

as subdivisions of the state. City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana 

Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Rather, to obtain 

exemption, municipalities must demonstrate that their 

anticompetitive activities were authorized by the state "pursuant 

to a state policy to displace competition with regulation or 

monopoly public service." Id. at 413. The municipality need not 

point to a specific, det~iled legislative authorization, but must 

show that it acted in accordance with a "clearly articulated and 

affirmatively expressed • • • state policy" to displace 

competition with regulation. !d. at 410, 415. See also Community 

Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 455 u.s. 40, 51-52 

(1982). "A state policy is considered clearly articulated and 

affirmatively expressed if the statutory provision 'empowering .. the 

municipality•s action plainly shows that 'the legislature 

contemplated the kind of action complained of.'" Town of 

Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 u.s. 34, 44 (1985} (quoting City 

of Lafayette, La., 435 u.s. at 415). 

The district court found the cited actions of the defendants 

complied 

and were 

with the requirements of the Colorado Urban Renewal Law 

undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and 

affirmatively expressed state policy as embodied in that law. 

Therefore, the district court held that the defendants were immune 

from liability and granted summary judgment. In addition, the 

court found that the evidence of conspiracy produced by the 

landowners did not reach the required threshold level and that the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 7 
undisputed evidence indicated that the defendants' actions were 

consistent with their permissible independent interests in 

pursuing the Centerstone project as an effort to revitalize the 

Denver economy. 

Arguing that the district court refused to consider evidence 

that the legislative record was a sham, landowners contend that 

the district court applied the wrong legal standard by limiting 

consideration to a facial review of the legislative record made by 

the City Council and DURA. We conclude that the district court 

adequately considered all of the.evidence and affirm the district 

court's holding that state action immunity protects the Municipal 

defendants and BCED. 

Under the tests pronounced in City of Lafayette and Boulder, 

supra, we must consider two prerequisites to proper application of 

the· state action exception to municipa-l action. We must first 

determine whether the Colorado General Assembly, through the 

Colorado Urban Renewal Law, authorized the challenged actions of 

the defendants. In addition, we must determine whether the 

legislature intended to displace competition with regulation. See 

P. Areeda & H. Hovencarnp, Antitrust Law 11 212.3a {Supp. 1988). In 

this case, it is undisputed that the Colorado Urban Renewal Law 

represents a clearly articulated and expressly stated policy to 

displace competition. See, e.g., Rabinoff v. District Court In 

and For City and County of Denver, 145 Colo. 225, 234, 360 P.2d 

114, 119 (1961) (describing how the Colorado Urban Renewal Law 

operates by condemnation of private property for public use or 

transfer to private ownership to be used for public purposes); 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 8 
c.f. Scott v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 736 F.2d 1207, 1213 (8th 

Cir. 1984) (discussing how Iowa legislation contemplated that 

competition would be displaced by the operation of the Iowa urban 

renewal law) , cert. denied, 471 u.s. 1003 (1985). Therefore, the 

focus of the inquiry is whether the City's actions were authorized 

by the Colorado Urban Renewal Law. 

To support their contention that the City acted beyond the 

scope of the statute, landowners claim that defendants were not 

attempting to eliminate blight as required by the Colorado Urban 

Renewal Law. Specifically, landowne rs point out that no blight 

was found on the three downtown blocks which would compose 

Centerstone. They allege that defendants expanded the target area 

to fifteen blocks to compensate for the lack of blight in Blocks 

173, 208 and 196. Landowners claim that the larger area was 

needed to generate tax increment "financing . funds necessary to 

deliver the approximately $60 to $80 million subsidy to BCED. In 

addition, landowners contend the Centerstone committee chose the 

larger area to avoid anticipated adverse changes to the tax-exempt 

status of bonds brought about by the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 

Landowners allege the Centerstone committee was counseled that a 

smaller district, directed only at Centerstone, might be declared 

illegal ; hence, it chose to expand the area to be developed. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the lack of blight on 

the Centerstone blocks and the landowners' asserted reasons 

defendants created the fifteen-block area are not sufficient to 

prove the blight study was a sham. We agree with the district 

court that the blight study comported with the statutory 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 9 
definition of "blighted area" as set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 31-25-103(2) (1986). As the district court explained, blight 

need not exist on every block of the area examined. As 

interpreted by the Colorado Court of Appeals, the statutory 

definition of blight "is broad and encompasses not only those 

areas containing properties so dilapidated as to justify 

condemnation as nuisances, but also envisions the prevention of 

deterioration." Tracy v. City of Boulder, 635 P.2d 907, 909 

(Colo. App. 1981). 

Claiming that BCED was 

Centerstone long before the 

contemplated, the landowners 

selected as the developer of 

use of urban renewal was even 

contend the selection procedure 

illustrates how the use of urban renewal was a sham. Landowners 

argue that the usual process of urban renewal requires that a 

developer be selected after cou~cil.adoption of a plan and through 

a competitive bidding process. 

Rejecting this contention, the district court held the fact 

that "defendant BCED may have been identified as the 'first 

choice• developer of the Centerstone Project before the financing 

method was selected and before the blight study was conducted, 

does not violate any statutory provision with respect to 

implementation of an urban renewal plan under Colorado law." 

Oberndorf, 696 F. Supp. at 559. We agree. Following the adoption 

of the urban renewal plan according to the procedures of Colo. 

Rev. Stat. § 31-25-107, DURA sent out a prospectus and conducted a 

competitive bidding process as described in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-

25-106(2) (1986). DURA's selection of BCED does not by itself 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 10 
show that the process was a sham. Furthermore, the realities of 

the urban renewal process require early developer involvement to 

determine whether a public/private partnership is feasible. 

Consultation with BCED and other developers before the adoption of 

the urban plan merely gave the City information whether urban 

renewal and tax increment financing were appropriate mechanisms 

for revitalizing this section of downtown Denver. 

Finally, landowners allege other indications that the 

Centerstone committee accomplished its goals in a dishonest 

manner. They suggest that at least one council member may have 

received financial gain from BCED. In addition, they contend that 

BCED nmisrepresented" to the council its plans for condemnation 

and misled the public by the $60 to $80 million figures identified 

as the City's commitment when, in fact, the subsidy could be as 

much as ·$216.8 ~illion- of-· revenues otherwise a~ailable to the 

City. However, these allegations are not supported by sufficient 

evidence nor do landowners show how these instances of 

misrepresentation relate to their claims that the urban renewal 

plan was not authorized by state law. We agree with the district 

court that the Colorado Urban Renewal Law grants municipal 

officials authority to combat blight and authorizes DURA to 

facilitate redevelopment through urban renewal plans. 

Because we affirm the district court's finding that the 

Municipal defendants were authorized by and acted in accordance 

with this affirmatively expressed state policy, we affirm the 

district court's conclusion that state action immunity applies. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 11 
B. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 

Even assuming that the landowners have shown evidence of 

conspiracy and antitrust injury, the Noerr-Perinington doctrine 

provides immunity to BCED in this case. Based upon the 

protections of the First Amendment, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 

exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the 

political process by private individuals, even if their intent is 

to eliminate competition. United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Pennington, 381 u.s. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents 

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In 

its summary judgment order, the district court implicitly held 

that BCED's activities were "mere solicitation of government 

action" protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. We agree. 

Immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is designed to 

protect the ~ight to petition and . engage in political activity. 

Instructional Systems Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 

F.2d 639, 650 (lOth Cir. 1987}. Noerr-Pennington protects rights 

of association and petition, which would be denied if groups with 

common interests could not, without violating the antitrust laws, 

use the channels and procedures of government agencies to advocate 

their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their 

business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors. 

California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508, 

510-11 {1972). 

In this case, the actions of BCED fall squarely within the 

doctrine. When BCED participated in the Centerstone committee and 

met with City Council members, BCED merely represented its own 

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Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 12 
business and economic interests in the proposed revitalization of 

downtown Denver. BCED's project proposals, models of Centerstone, 

comments on tax increment financing, and meetings with city 

officials were a legitimate use of the political process and the 

very kind of speech protected by Noerr-Pennington. 

In Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 841 F.2d 886 

(9th Cir.}, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 489 (1988), the Ninth Circuit 

considered similar antitrust allegations that a developer and city 

officials had shadowy secret mee tings and covert agreements in 

connection with the ame.ndment of an urban renewal plan. The Ninth 

Circuit held that the conduct was protected by Noerr-Pennington, 

explaining that "[t]he redevelopment process by its very nature , 

allows for ex parte deliberations between decisionmakers and 

advocates of a particular view." Id. at 895. 

We rejec t landowners' c6nten~ions that BCED's conduct· falls 

within two exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity. 

1. Co-conspirator exception 

Landowners argue that this court should adopt a "coconspirator" exception to Noerr-Pennington and deny private 

participants protection where government officials or entities are 

co-conspirators in a scheme violative of the antitrust laws. See 

Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1566 

(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986), and Duke & 

Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 , 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1975). 

However, Noerr-Pennington cannot be circumvented by 

alleging that a government official was involved in the 

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merely 

alleged 

Appellate Case: 88-2599 Document: 01019748315 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 13 
conspiracy. Boone, 841 P.2d at 897. 

court's conclusion that the landowners 

We agree with the district 

have not submitted any 

evidence indicating that any ~deal" was made, bribe taken, or 

illegal conspiracy formed between the Municipal defendants and 

BCED. The landowners' allegations of secret meetings and covert 

agreements between the City and BCED are not supported by 

sufficient evidence of ·a conspiracy such that a possible coconspirator exception be considered. Therefore, we need not 

address whether to adopt a "co-conspirator" exception to NoerrPennington. 

2. "Illegal Activity" exception 

In addition, landowners argue that Noerr-Pennington immunity 

should not be extended because BCED engaged in illegal or 

fraudulent activities separate and apart· .. from any lobbying 

activities. Noerr-Pennington does not provide immunity where 

legitimate lobbying efforts are accompanied by illegal or 

fraudulent actions. See Westborough Mall 1 Inc. v. City of Cape 

Girardeau, Mo., 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 

461 U.S. 945 {1983). Landowners allege that BCED entered into 

covert agreements with the City which were unlawful and an abuse 

of the power delegated to the City under the Urban Renewal Law. 

Therefore, they contend that BCED cannot take advantage of NoerrPennington. 

The district court correctly held that the state legislature 

authorized defendants' actions, and, consequently, there was no 

illegal activity. Moreover! alleged violation or misuse of an . 

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urban renewal law does not constitute the kind of illegal activity 

which can deprive a private party of Noerr-Pennington protection. 

See Boone, 841 F.2d at 891, 893-97 (affirming d ismissa l based on 

Noerr-Pennington doctrine despite allegations that the 

redevelopment law was illegally used to redevelop non-blighted 

area). Although bribery, or misuse or corruption of governmental 

processes are outside the protection of the Noerr-Pennington 

doctrine, Instructional Systems Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. 

Co., 817 F.2d at 650, landowners do not allege any of these 

illegal activities. 

C. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

defendants on landowners' civil rights claims, finding that there 

was not enough evidence to support their claim for a violation of 

civil rights and that the City's condemnation of plaintiffs' 

property was rationally related to a public purpose. Relying upon 

Berman v. Parker, 348 u.s. 26 (1954), the district court concluded 

the adoption of an urban renewal plan was a legislative act and 

that in order to establish an unconstitutional "taking," the 

landowners had to establish that no public purpose existed for the 

proposed urban renewal project. Because the district court found 

that the urban renewal plan was rationally related to the economic 

revitalization of downtown Denver, the district court held that no 

unconstitutional ''taking" of landowners' property occurred. 

Landowners appeal this ruling, arguing that the proper 

inquiry was whether the urban renewal plan sought to accomplish 

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the purpose 

Claiming that 

authorized by 

the district 

the Colorado Urban Renewal Law. 

court's ruling ignored legal 

distinctions between states and municipalities, landowners contend 

that state authorization is an essential issue because cities are 

not entitled to the same deference as states. 

We reject these arguments. The district court applied the 

proper standard when it inquired whether a proper purpose existed 

for the urban renewal plan, which was created by the legislative 

acts of DURA and the City Council. Whether the action was 

authorized by state law is a separate issue and is not part of the 

inquiry before the court when it looks for a rational relationship 

to a legitimate public purpose. 

The Supreme Court has held that the adoption of an urban 

renewal plan is a legislative act which must be upheld if there is 

any·public purpose underlying-it: "'But the means of executing the 

project are for [the legislature and the legislature] alone to 

determine, once the public purpose has been found." Berman v. 

Parker, 348 u.s. at 33. In Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New 

York State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986), the Second Circuit affirmed the 

dismissal of a civil rights suit that 

condemnation of plaintiffs' land under an 

Claiming that their property was in no 

sought to enjoin the 

urban renewal plan. 

way blighted, these 

plaintiffs alleged that a private real estate developer, an urban 

renewal agency, and various city officials violated plaintiffs' 

civil rights by wrongfully including plaintiffs' land in an urban 

renewal plan. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 

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complaint, holding that so long as the urban renewal legislation 

was "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,n the plan 

was valid and did not viola te plaintiffs' civil rights . Rosen thal 

& Rosenthal Inc., 771 F.2d at 46. The Ninth Circuit reached t he 

same conclusion in Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 841 

F.2d at 892-93, rejecting equal protection and due process 

challenges to an urban renewal plan: 

[Plaintiffs] have not alleged that the interest of the 

city and agency in urban redevelopment is illegitimate. 

Such a claim would be patently frivolous . Moreover, the 

municipality's regulation of parking is facially 

"rationally related" to the ends of urban renewal. Thus 

we find no violation of the [plaintiffs'] equal 

protection or substan tive due process rights. 

Accord Scott v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 736 F . 2d at 1 216 

(affirming summary judgment on substantive due process and equal 

protection claims because there was a public purpose for the 

cha1lenged urban renewal ordinance). 

The district court also properly concluded tha t elimination 

of urban blight and economic revitalization of Denver were 

legitimate public purposes underlying the plan. In reviewing 

whether legislative power is exercised for a public purpose, this 

court exercises narrow authority. "It is not for the court to 

oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on 

the size of a particular project ar e a." Berman, supra, 348 U.S. 

at 35-36. Colorado has long recognized that the acquisition of 

property for the planned elimination of urban blight constitutes a 

public purpose. Rabinoff v. District Court, 1 45 Colo. at 234, 360 

P . 2d at 119 . Similarly, in Thornton Development Authority v. 

Upah,. 640 F. Supp. 1071 (D. Colo. 1986) , the court upheld the 

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condemnation of the plaintiff's land for urban renewal because 

statutorily recognized public purposes were the stated basis for 

the Thornton Development Authority 's action. The court explained, 

"In this case such public purposes as increasing revenues, sales, 

commerce and employment cannot be gainsaid. The wisdom of 

decisions made in effectuating such purposes is not a matter given 

to the courts in our system to consider ." 640 F . Supp. at 1081. 

Landowners also argue that the district court improperly 

concluded that the landowners' claims that the defendants violated 

the Colorado Urban Renewal Law belong in state court and not in 

federal court. The district court ruled that whether defendants' 

actions complied with every detailed provision of the Urban 

Renewal Law in this instance was not properly before it in the 

context of the federal claims asserted. We agree with the 

district coutt that ·the viola tion of state law, if any , does not 

necessarily constitute a violation of the plaintiffs' 

constitutional claims. Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc., 605 F. Supp. 

at 618 {S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1018 {1986). Similarly, we agree that the 

defendants "do not forfeit their immunity (under antitrust laws] 

merely because t heir execution of the powers granted to them under 

the redevelopment act may have been imperfect in operation." 

Boone, 841 F.2d at 892; see also P. Areeda & H. Hovencamp, supra, 

at ~ 212.3b. 

Although landowners allege that the public purposes set 

forth for the plan are fraudulent and that the Plan favored BCED, 

we do not find sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

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landowners' clai m for a violation of civil rights or their claim 

of conspiracy . The district court's order granting summary 

judgment is AFFIRMED~ 

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