Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01750/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01750-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE R. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MTS OFFICERS R. BERG AND M. 

RINI,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-1750-AJB-JMA

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS, (Doc. No. 17);

and

DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF 

DOCUMENTS, (Doc. No. 21).

Before the Court is Defendants’ dismissal motion. (Doc. No. 17.) Although the Court 

gave Martin several opportunities to amend his complaint, (Docs. No. 4, 11), the Court 

ultimately finds it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, failure to comply with the 

government claims act, and failure to overcome the high bar of qualified immunity. For 

these reasons, the Court DISMISSES without leave to amend Plaintiff’s Complaint and 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Docs. No. 1, 17.) Because Martin’s complaint 

is dismissed, the Court DENIES as moot his recently-filed motion for production of 

documents. (Doc. No. 21.)

I. BACKGROUND

Martin brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendants R. Berg and M. Rini. 

(Doc. No. 8.) Martin alleges that on November 11, 2016, MTS Police Officer R. Berg 

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falsely charged Martin with fare evasion even though he had a valid fare pass provided by 

the San Diego Salvation Army S.T.E.P.S. program. (Doc. No. 8 at 5, 12.) Martin points to 

exhibit B, which is a copy of notice to appear citation from Berg dated November 11, 2016,

for fare evasion. (Doc. No. 8 at 14.) The ticket stated Martin is to appear at the San Diego 

Superior Court Traffic Division on January 11, 2017. (Id.)

Martin also alleges that MTS Police Officer M. Rini, on April 9, 2017, similarly 

checked his fare card, but deliberately kept the scanner in the off position, not pushing the 

button to activate it, subsequently not allowing his card to register that it has sufficient 

funds. (Doc. No. 8 at 7.) Martin alleges Rini ordered him to exit the Trolley and claims he 

“did not feel free to leave while defendant Rini was taking the administrative steps of the 

incident to falsely arrest Plaintiff.” (Id.) Martin alleges Rini then charged him for fare 

evasion and “falsely arrested” him without probable cause. (Id.) Rini also gave Martin a 

notice to appear citation, attached as exhibit F. (Id. at 20.) While this photocopy is difficult 

to read, it is dated April 9, 2017, and appears to be for fare evasion. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss 

a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient 

facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 

88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, a 

complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

In making this determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all 

factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 

975 (9th Cir. 2007). Notwithstanding this deference, a reviewing court need not accept 

legal conclusions as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also 

improper for a court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not 

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alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 

U.S. 519, 526 (1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.

Pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers” because pro se litigants are more prone to making errors in pleading than 

litigants represented by counsel. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that federal courts should liberally construe 

the “‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)). Nonetheless, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short plain statement of 

“the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Even if some claims may not—

on their face—be subject to dismissal under Rule12(b), a court still has discretion to 

dismiss those that fail to comply with the requirement that they be “simple, concise, and 

direct.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(e)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Martin’s first amended complaint should be dismissed for the 

following reasons: (1) Martin fails to state a claim under § 1983; (2) Martin’s state law 

claims are dismissed under the Government Claims Act; (3) Martin’s claims against the 

officers are barred by Qualified Immunity; and (4) Martin’s state law claims do not rise to 

the level of novel or complex to warrant exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

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under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had knowledge 

and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a 

prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a crime.’” 

Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States 

v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1990)).

Martin contends both times the officers cited him for fare evasion he was falsely 

arrested. However, Martin produced no evidence of an actual arrest, only a detention period 

in which the officers gave him a citation. Martin’s FAC fails to provide facts regarding 

how long each officer stopped Martin for or any details surrounding each incident—despite 

the Court previously stating Martin should do so. (Doc. No. 4 at 4.) An officer is permitted 

to detain someone for the purposes of investigating a violation. Rodriguez v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). “A routine traffic stop . . . is a relatively brief encounter and 

is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 

525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment 

requires the length and scope of the detention be “strictly tied to and justified by the 

circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19

(1968) (internal citations omitted). A constitutional violation would arise if an officer 

continued their detention without probable cause after the officer obtained enough 

information to issue a citation. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90–91 (9th Cir. 1973) 

(per curiam) (finding that an individual stopped for jay-walking may be detained “only the 

time necessary to obtain satisfactory identification from the violator and to execute a traffic 

citation.”).

Martin was either the subject of a Terry stop, where the officers briefly detained him 

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to find out if he was evading fare, or he was detained while being ticketed (or both).

However, under either a Terry stop or a detention to issue a citation, there was not an 

unlawful arrest under § 1983. While the Court is required to construe Martin’s pleadings 

liberally, as he is a pro se plaintiff, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Martin provided only conclusory statements 

that Berg and Rini “falsely arrested” him for fare evasion. (Doc. No. 8 at 5–8.) There are 

no supporting facts or evidence proving Martin was arrested or detained for an 

unreasonable amount of time on either occasion. 

Martin was already granted leave to amend in order to provide more information 

regarding the timeline of incidents or any other pertinent details. However, Martin’s FAC 

fails to meet the pleading requirements under Iqbal. This FAC contains the type of bare 

legal assertions without supporting facts that the Ninth Circuit directs the court to dismiss 

as frivolous. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. Thus, the Court DISMISSES WITH 

PREJUDICE the § 1983 claim.

B. State Law Claims are Dismissed Pursuant to the Government Claims Act

The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 (as amended and now referred to as the 

Government Claims Act) provides public entity immunity. Section 815 of the Government 

Claims Act prohibits holding a public entity liable “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

statute.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. Section 818.8 specifically immunizes public entities from 

liability “for an injury caused by misrepresentation by an employee of the public entity, 

whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 818.8.

Defendants are entitled to statutory immunity for the state law claims under the 

Government Claims Act. Martin alleged that in both instances with Berg and Rini,

(November 11, 2016, and April 9, 2017, respectively), the Defendants were in uniform 

performing their official duties on behalf of San Diego Metropolitan Transit System. 

Additionally, both Defendants utilized a Hand-Held Device as part of their official 

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compacity as Code Compliance Inspectors to read Plaintiff’s Compass Card. Defendants, 

after utilizing the Hand-Held Device, reasonably believed Plaintiff to be in violation of 

Penal Code section 640(c) and issued the appropriate misdemeanor citation. Thus, the 

Defendants are immune from civil liability for the state law claims and the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE these claims pursuant to the Government Claims Act. 

C. Even If Plaintiff Could Succeed Under § 1983 or the Government Claims 

Act, Plaintiff is Unsuccessful Under the Federal Qualified Immunity 

Doctrine

“In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we consider (1) 

whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was 

clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” C.V. by & through 

Willegas v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lal v. 

California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Supreme Court has often stressed 

the importance of deciding qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage in litigation” 

in order to preserve the doctrine’s status as a true “immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (internal citations 

omitted). Additionally, “courts are now empowered to address the two prongs in whichever 

order would expedite resolution of the case.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 

2017).

Even assuming he can state a claim, Martin cannot overcome qualified immunity 

because he cannot show the officers violated a clearly established right. “The relevant, 

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would 

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Quiroz v. Short, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Here, Martin

does not—and cannot—show that the officers’ actions violated a clearly established right. 

On both occasions, the officers approached Martin, inquired about his trolley ticket, and 

cited him for fare evasion. Issuing a ticket for failure to produce a valid fair does not violate 

a clearly established right, and neither does being reasonably questioned by an MTS

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officer. 

Thus, the Court finds that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity against 

Plaintiff’s claims and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims against Defendants 

Officer Berg and Officer Rini. 

D. Finally, the Court is Not Exercising Supplemental Jurisdiction Over The 

Remaining State-Law Claims 

The Supplemental Jurisdiction statute states:

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if--

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims 

over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 

original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling 

reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).

Here, although Martin’s case does not present any novel or complex issues of state 

law and his state law claims do not predominate over his § 1983 claim, the Court did 

dismiss his claim in which it had original jurisdiction: his § 1983 claim. “When the balance 

of . . . factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law 

claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, 

the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without 

prejudice.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citations omitted). 

Here, the case is still in its infancy. Discovery has not commenced and the lawsuit is in 

pleading stages of litigation. Thus, the Court finds on a balance, the case belongs in state 

court and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

III. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). However, “[u]nder Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to 

grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant 

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leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 

(9th Cir. 2000). Here, Martin has filed two complaints and was already given an

opportunity to amend. (Docs. No. 1, 4, 8). However, the Court finds any further amendment 

would be futile as Martin’s core set of facts simply fail to state a federal claim. Accordingly, 

the Court DECLINES granting leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss 

in its entirety. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court DISMISSES Martin’s case without leave to 

amend. The Court also DENIES as moot Martin’s motion for production as documents. 

(Doc. No. 21.) The Court Clerk is instructed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2019

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