Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00137/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAYNE ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO: 14-CV-0137 W (KSC)

 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND [DOC. 6]

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et

al.,

Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Dayne

Alexander opposes.

The Court decides the matters on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

GRANTS the motion to dismiss [Doc. 6] and ORDERS the case DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from an injury suffered by Plaintiff Dayne Alexander while

working out at the Olde Gym at the Naval Base San Diego. (Compl. [Doc. 1], ¶11.) 

Alexander contends that while using the Maxicam Squat Rack Stairstep 2020, the

machine collapsed on him resulting in a fracture of the left femur, and later requiring

several surgeries. (Id., ¶ 12.) 

On March 7, 2012, Alexander submitted a claim with Defendant United States

for $850,000 under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Opp. [Doc. 7], 5:14–15.) 

On November 12, 2012, Defendant denied the claim, and on March 8, 2013,

Alexander filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California entitled, Alexander v.

United States of America, Civil Case No. 13cv545 (the “Alexander I”).

Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, on July 3, 2013, Alexander filed a motion

seeking “leave to file a First Amended Claim Form, or in the alternative, to dismiss

[the] complaint and then file a new claim form followed by refilling [sic] of complaint.

. . .” (See Notice of Mt. [Doc 7 in Alexander I], 1:22–25.) According to the motion,

after the government claim was submitted, Alexander learned that he would require

more medical care and periods of recovery during which he would not be able to work. 

(Memo of P&A [Doc. 7-1 in Alexander I], 3:8–10, 6:22–23.) As a result, Alexander

sought to amend his FTCA claim to increase the damages sought from $850,000 to $6

million. (Id., 6:1–2.) 

On December 28, 2013, this Court issued an Order Granting In Part and

Denying In Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend or Dismiss Without Prejudice. (See Order

[Doc. 24 in Alexander I].) With respect to Alexander’s request to amend his FTCA

claim, Alexander failed to identify any authority allowing a claimant to file a motion to

amend an FTCA claim in district court. (Id., 3:9–11, 3:20–26.) 

The Order explained, however, that notwithstanding the lack of authority to

move to amend a claim in district court, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) allowed Alexander to

seek damages in excess of $850,000 in Alexander I if he could demonstrate that “the

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increased amountis based upon newly discovered evidence notreasonably discoverable

at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof

of intervening facts, relating to the mount of the claim.” (Order, 3:28–4:3.) But the

Order further explained that the cases allowing claimants to pursue larger damage

claims made the determination that the increased damages were based on newly

discovered evidence “at trial, not at the start of the litigation before discovery has been

conducted.” (Id., 4:4–6.) Because Alexander I was still in the early stages of discovery,

the Court found that evaluating whether“Alexander’s increased damages are based on

newly discovered evidence at this stage in the litigation would be prejudicial to

Defendant,” particularly given that Alexander’s motion was based on evidence in his

possession. (Id., 4:23–5:3.) The Order, therefore, notified Alexander that as an

alternative to dismissing the case, he could “proceed with this litigation and seek a

determination about whether his increased damage claim is based on newly discovered

evidence at the appropriate time.” (Id., 6:3–5.) Instead, on December 26, 2013,

Alexander filed a request for dismissal without prejudice, which was granted on

December 30, 2013.

Meanwhile, on December 23, 2013, Alexander filed a second or amended

government claim form,which was rejected on January 16, 2014. On January 17, 2014,

Alexander filed this lawsuit, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The FTCA provides, in part, that “a tort claim against the United States shall

forever be barred . . . unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing,

by certified or registered mail, notice of final decision of the claim by the agency to

which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Thus, a claimant “must file suit within

six months of administrative denial of the claim.” Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d

484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984). “Failure to satisfy this requirement deprives a court of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Galvan v. United States, 957 F.Supp.2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

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Here, the United States denied Alexander’s claim on November 12, 2012. Based

on this date, the limitations period expired on May 12, 2013. Because Alexander I was

filed on March 8, 2013, that lawsuit was timely. This case, however, was filed on

January 17, 2014, well beyond the 6-month FTCA limitations period. Accordingly, the

lawsuit is time barred as to the United States.

Alexander, nevertheless, argues that equitable tolling should apply to save his

case. However, Alexander’s argument is notsupported by any authority and is contrary

to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir.

1998).1

In Lehman, plaintiffs filed an FTCA claim after being struck and injured by a

U.S. Postal Service truck. The claim was rejected and plaintiffs filed a timely lawsuit. 

Plaintiffs later voluntary dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, relying on an

agreement with the government’s attorney that the action “‘would be voluntarily

dismissed until Ms. Lehman’s medical condition had stabilized, at which point

settlement negotiations’ would resume.” Id. at 1012. According to plaintiffs, defense

counsel later repudiated the agreement and refused to settle. Plaintiffs then filed a new

lawsuit, more than a year after the Postal Service denied plaintiffs’ FTCA claim, and

the government moved to dismiss the new case as time barred. The district court

granted defendant’s motion. 

On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably

tolled based on the government’s agreement to allow plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the

original lawsuit in order to engage in settlement negotiations. Lehman, 154 F.3d at

1015. Plaintiffs also argued that equitable tolling was justified because defense counsel

Alexander’s primary argument in opposition is that equitable tolling should apply. He also 1

suggests that the Court should deem his December 23, 2013 FTCA claim as the operative claim for

evaluating the 6-month FTCA limitations period, but he provides no supporting authority. (Opp.,

10:2–4.) Moreover, Alexander’s argument is unpersuasive because it would create a large loophole

in the 6-month limitations period by allowing a claimant to restart that period by simply filing a second

claim within two years after the original claim accrued.

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never advised plaintiffs’ counsel that the lawsuit would need to be re-filed within 6

months of the denial of the original FTCA claim. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit explained that equitable tolling is applied sparingly, for

example, “when the statutes of limitations was not complied with because of defective

pleadings, when a claimant was tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire,

and when the agency’s written notice of the statutory period was clearly inadequate.” 

Lehman, 154 F.3d at1016 (quoting Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267–268 (9th

Cir. 1992)). However, “the doctrine is not available to avoid the consequences of one’s

own negligence,” such as “when a late filing is due to claimant’s failure ‘to exercise due

diligencein preserving his legal rights.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Nor is opposing counsel 

obligated to advise his or her adversary about the statute of limitations. Because

defense counsel did not make any misrepresentations regarding the statute of

limitations or the effect of plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, the Ninth Circuit found that

plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their “ignorance of the limitations period was excusable”

and affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 1016.

Here, the argument for equitable tolling is even less compelling than in Lehman. 

Unlike Lehman, there is no question that Alexander’s decision to dismiss Alexander

I was solely the result of his or his attorney’s strategy. Alexander I was not dismissed

because of any agreement between the parties, but instead was the direct result of

Alexander’s motion requesting that the Court allow him to dismiss the case without

prejudice. In fact, Defendant opposed Alexander’s request, and this Court’s Order in

Alexander I provided him with an alternative to dismissing the case:

Alexander may proceed with this litigation and seek a determination

about whether his increased damage claim is based on newly discovered

evidence at the appropriate time. 

(Order, 6:3–5.) Thus, unlike Lehman, where plaintiff was arguably encouraged by

defense counsel to dismiss the case, Alexander’s decision to dismiss Alexander I was

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based on his or his counsel’s strategy. Accordingly, equitable tolling does not apply to

this case.

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III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,the Court GRANTS Defendant United States’ motion

to dismiss [Doc. 6], and ORDERS this case DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. In light of this order, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend [Doc. 12] is

TERMINATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: May 5, 2014

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Alexander also appears to suggest that the delay in deciding his motion to amend in 2

Alexander I somehow contributed to his procedural problems. But Alexander’s FTCA claim was

denied on November 12, 2012, and Alexander I was filed on March 8, 2013. Thus, the 6-month

FTCA limitations period expired well before the motion was even filed, and any “delay” in deciding

the motion did not contribute to or cause his statute of limitations problem. 

Additionally, Alexander appears to assert that Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied

because his dismissal of Alexander I and attempt to amend his claim form was approved or sanctioned

by this Court: “Plaintiff requests this court recognize Plaintiff’s December 23, 2013 claim form as the

‘operative’ claim form filed consistent with and per this court’s December 18, 2013 order.” (Opp.,

4:19–21.) This assertion lacks merit. The Court’s responsibility is to decide motions filed by the

parties. Here, Alexander’s motion in Alexander I requested an order amending his claim form or,

alternatively, allowing him to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. Based on the applicable

law, this Court determined that it could not grant a motion to amend, but Alexander was entitled to

dismiss the case without prejudice. The Court was not asked, and did not determine, whether

dismissal was wise or would create procedural problems for Alexander. 

Alexander’s opposition also requests that the Court set aside his voluntary dismissal in 3

Alexander I. Because Alexander’s request is more appropriately decided in Alexander I, the Court

need not address that issue here. 

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