Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01450/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Declaratory Judgement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 19).1 For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will grant the motion and remand this case to state court. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC and Defendant Stevens 

Transport Incorporated are commercial trucking service providers. On May 23, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CV2014-008283, 

alleging one cause of action for declaratory judgment. (Doc. 1-1.) In its complaint, 

Plaintiff seeks a court order declaring that its hiring practices does not amount to tortious 

interference with any employment contract between Defendant and Thomas Constant, 

Robert Davis, or other similarly situated truck drivers. 

 On June 26, 2014, Defendant removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), 

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 The request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Swift Transportation Company of 

Arizona, LLC, 

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Stevens Transport Incorporated, 

Defendant. 

 

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No. CV-14-01450-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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claiming diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff moves to remand this 

action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and seeks an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

II. Legal Standard 

 Any civil action brought in state court over which the federal district courts have 

original jurisdiction may be removed to the federal district court for the district where the 

action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, there is a “strong presumption” against 

removal and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The 

“defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper,” id. at 566, and 

“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), “[w]here the 

complaint does not demand a dollar amount, the removing defendant bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 

[$75,000].” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Under this burden, the defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is ‘more 

likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Sanchez v. 

Monumental Life Insurance Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. Discussion 

 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks declaratory judgment and no dollar amount is 

demanded. Therefore, to determine the amount in controversy, the Court looks to “the 

value of the object of the litigation.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 

333, 347 (1977). In determining this value, the Court considers “‘either viewpoint,’” in 

other words, “the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly 

produce.” In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), NA, 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (citing Ridder Bros. Inc., v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1944)). 

 Here, Defendant first argues that the value of student tuition satisfies the $75,000 

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threshold. Defendant cites that Constant and Davis have outstanding tuition balances in 

the amount of $4,014.40 and $3,826.52, respectively. (Doc. 21 at 4.) Defendant maintains 

that because Plaintiff also seeks declaratory judgment against “other similarly situated 

Drivers,” the amount of lost tuition at stake “is therefore, limitless and endless.” (Doc. 21 

at 5.) This purported amount does not satisfy Defendant’s jurisdictional burden. The 

calculation of “limitless” past and future tuition loss is not only mere conjecture, but is 

not “in controversy.” The contract submitted by Defendant provides that each 

participating trucking student is liable for payment of tuition, including any interest on 

amounts financed, irrespective of subsequent employment. (See Doc. 1-2 at 12.) The 

underlying employment contracts and the instant dispute therefore have no bearing on 

Defendant’s ability to recoup any outstanding tuition payment. 

 Defendant next advances that the amount of lost revenues and profits meets the 

jurisdictional amount. Referencing an affidavit of a company director (Doc. 1-3), 

Defendant proffers that Davis generated revenues of approximately $4,332.00 during a 

six-week period of employment, which would equate “to $722.00 per week or $37,544.00 

over one year.” (Doc. 21 at 5.) Defendant highlights however, that this amount “is just for 

one driver” and “[g]iven the numbers of drivers involved, it is abundantly clear (and 

certainly more likely than not) that the objective of this case is to avoid potential liability 

reaching into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.” (Doc. 21 at 5-6.)2

 The Court 

disagrees; Defendant has offered nothing that makes it “abundantly clear” that the 

amount in controversy meets or exceeds $75,000. Defendant’s calculation of “hundreds 

of thousands of dollars” is factually deficient and unduly conclusory. Defendant offers no 

facts or evidence regarding actual employee salary, annual revenue, or lost profit 

stemming from the cessation of students who are now employed by Plaintiff, information 

that presumably would be in Defendant’s custody and control. Consequently, Defendant 

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 Defendant cites, among other cases, Mahoney v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2007 

WL 3341389, *5-6 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 2007) (noting that in an action for injunctive relief, the amount in controversy can be based on plaintiff's prior compensation and sales revenue for the year immediately preceding litigation). 

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has not overcome the presumption against removal jurisdiction, and fails to meet its 

burden to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

IV. Attorneys’ Fees 

 Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 

because Defendant did not have an “objectively reasonable basis” for removal. The Court 

agrees remand is warranted, but does not find there was no objectively reasonable 

argument for removal. The complaint does not request a specific amount of damages and 

it is objectively reasonable to argue that lost profits and revenues could satisfy the 

jurisdictional requirement. Thus, although Defendant appears to have failed to conduct a 

reasonable investigation into the case’s value prior to removal, the Court does not 

conclude that attorneys’ fees should be awarded. 

V. Conclusion 

 Finding Defendant fails to satisfy its burden to establish that it is “more likely than 

not” that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court will remand this case to 

state court. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If the 

district court determines that it is sufficiently doubtful that the amount-in-controversy 

requirement has been met and thus that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the 

district court should . . . remand to state court”). Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 19) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is 

denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remand this case to 

Maricopa County Superior Court and terminate this action. 

 Dated this 8th day of September, 2014.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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