Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_07-cv-05009/USCOURTS-arwd-5_07-cv-05009-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ROTOWORKS INTERNATIONAL

LIMITED,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRASSWORKS USA, LLC, 

ROBERT D. UMBERSON a/k/a BOBBY

UMBERSON, 

LINDA K. REED, and

METAL WORKS, LLC,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:07-cv-05009

O R D E R

NOW on this the 23rd day of June 2008, in the above-referenced

matter, comes on for this Court’s consideration Plaintiff’s Motion

for Treble Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, and Costs (document #156) and

Defendants’ response thereto (document #160), and the Court, being

well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows: 

1. This action came on for trial on December 3, 2007, before

the Court and a jury, the Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United

States District Judge, presiding. The issues having been duly

tried, and after deliberating thereon, the jury returned a verdict

on December 11, 2007 in favor of Plaintiff Rotoworks International

Limited (hereinafter “Plaintiff”). Specifically, the jury found

Defendants Grassworks, USA, LLC (“Grassworks”), Robert D. Umberson

(“Umberson”), Linda K. Reed (“Reed”), and Metal Works, LLC (“Metal

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Works”) (hereinafter, collectively, “Defendants”) liable for

trademark and trade dress infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§

1114(a)(1) and 1125 (a)(1), respectively, and awarded:

* $75,000 in profits and $25,000 in damages against

Grassworks; 

* $125,000 in profits and $26,000 in damages against

Umberson; 

* $50,000 in profits and $12,000 in damages against Reed; 

and 

* $50,000 in profits and $12,000 in damages against Metal

Works.

2. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Treble Damages,

Costs, and Attorneys’ Fees, wherein it argues that such relief is

appropriate in this case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), (b).

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts:

* that substantial evidence exists in the record to support a

trebling of Plaintiff’s actual damages and that such trebling is

just – given the circumstances of this case; 

* that under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), the award of Defendants’

profits should be trebled;

* that attorneys’ fees should be awarded due to Defendants’

willful infringement and the exceptional nature of this case; and

* that under the provisions of the Lanham Act, costs should be

awarded to Plaintiff as a matter of right.

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Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be held

jointly and severally liable on all amounts assessed. That is,

Plaintiff says that because Defendants prepared a common defense

and counterclaim, it is reasonable to assess the award of

attorneys’ fees and costs on a joint and several basis. Further,

Plaintiff argues that it is common in trademark infringement cases,

particularly where corporate officers personally commit acts of

infringement, to assess any award on a joint and several basis.

In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants argue first that

the jury gave Plaintiff a generous award of actual damages that is

unsupported by the evidence presented by Plaintiff. Particularly,

Defendants say that Plaintiff introduced no evidence that it

suffered actual damages. Moreover, Defendants assert that trebling

damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) is inappropriate here because

that statute relates to damages in cases of counterfeit marks.

This, Defendants say, is not a case which involves the use of a

counterfeit mark. Defendants further argue that the Court should

not make a finding of willfulness as this issue was not submitted

to the jury for consideration and the Court should not now invade

on the province of the jury’s findings. Finally, Defendants say

that because Plaintiff did not request a jury instruction finding

joint and several liability, Plaintiff should not be permitted to

amend the specific findings of the jury as to the appropriate

apportionment of liability among the four separate defendants.

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3. In trademark and trade dress infringement cases such as

this, the relevant statute regarding awards of damages, costs, and

attorney’s fees is 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Section 1117(a) states, in

pertinent part, that,

When a violation of any right of the registrant of a

mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office ...

shall have been established in any civil action arising

under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled,

subject to the provisions of sections 29 and 32 [15

U.S.C. 1111, 1114], and subject to the principles of

equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any

damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs

of the action ... In assessing damages the court may

enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the

case, for any sum above the amount found as actual

damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the

court shall find that the amount of the recovery based

on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court

may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as

the court shall find to be just, according to the

circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the

above circumstances shall constitute compensation and

not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may

award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (emphasis added). Under this section, district

courts are given a great deal of discretion in fashioning the

appropriate monetary remedy necessary to serve the interests of

justice, provided such relief is not awarded as a penalty. Metric

& Multistandard Components v. Metric’s, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714

(8th Cir. 1980).

The Court notes that because this case does not involve the

use of a counterfeit mark, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d),

trebling damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) is not appropriate here.

Thus, the Court will proceed under the provisions of Section

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1117(a), as set forth above.

4. As to whether the Court should, in its discretion, treble

Plaintiff’s actual damages and/or the award of Defendants’ profits,

it is paramount that any such increased award must constitute

compensation – not a penalty. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Proceeding

from this guiding principle, the Court must consider whether there

is evidence in the record to support a trebling of damages or

Defendants’ profits. Having reviewed the record and the arguments

of the parties the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence

to justify or support an increase in the jury’s award which would

definitively constitute compensation -- rather than a penalty. The

Court is satisfied that the jury’s award of both actual damages and

Defendants’ profits is consistent with the evidence presented and

that Plaintiff has been compensated appropriately. Thus, under the

circumstances, the Court, in its discretion, declines to increase

either Plaintiff’s award of damages or Defendants’ profits.

5. The Court will next consider whether an award of attorneys’

fees is appropriate in this case. As previously stated, under

Section 1117(a), “the court in exceptional cases may award

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 15 U.S.C. §

1117(a) (emphasis added). 

In the Court’s view, the evidence clearly supports the

conclusion that Defendants, in the instant case, intentionally set

out to deceive or confuse the public as to the source of their

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weedwipers, and that such conduct was deliberate and willful. As

the exclusive United States distributor of Plaintiff’s weedwipers,

Defendants knew that the Rotowiper trademark was federally

registered and protected, and they were uniquely familiar with the

distinctive Rotowiper trade dress. In directly competing with

genuine Rotowiper products, Defendants nevertheless elected to

market and sell their own weedwipers using Plaintiff’s trademark

and trade dress. The Court, therefore, finds that the facts

presented constitute an exceptional case under the Lanham Act and

Plaintiff should be awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees. See 15

U.S.C. § 1117(a); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329,

1341 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that where defendant acted willfully

and in bad faith case was “exceptional”); Metric, 635 F.2d 710 at

716. 

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees seeks to recover fees

in the amount of $223,669.30, and Plaintiff’s attorneys have

submitted an affidavit and itemizations supporting this amount. 

In responding to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants generally deny

that this case is “exceptional” and that Plaintiff should be

awarded any of its attorneys fees. However, Defendants do not

object to the specific fees documented by Plaintiff. 

Attorney’s fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes are

generally calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. City of

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 The Court notes that Mark Henry’s hourly rate is typically

$250.00 per/hour, but that for purposes of this litigation he lowered

that rate and the average hourly billing rate charged by Plaintiff’s

attorneys for this case is $200.00/per hour.

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Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). The resulting figure is

the “lodestar,” and there is a strong presumption that the lodestar

represents a reasonable attorney’s fee. 

What constitutes a reasonable hourly rate is determined by the

prevailing rate, i.e., the ordinary rate for similar work in the

community where the case has been litigated. Moysis v. DTG

Datanet, 278 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2002). The party requesting the

fee award bears the burden of substantiating the requested rate as

well as the hours expended. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424

(1983).

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence as to the prevailing

rate in the community for services similar to what were performed

in this case. While that omission does not serve to either advance

or support the claim, neither does it defeat it since “courts may

draw on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market

rates” in determining a reasonable rate. Warnock v. Archer, 397

F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2005). 

This Court has had similar applications before it in other

cases and, based upon experience, is aware that $200.00 per hour is

not an excessive rate for the type of attorney services provided in

this case. The Court believes that is a reasonable hourly rate 1

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for the services of Plaintiff’s attorney in this case.

As to the hours expended by Plaintiff’s counsel litigating

this matter, the Court recognizes that intellectual property

enforcement litigation is, by its nature, complicated and can be

labor intensive. Moreover, much of the high costs of the instant

case are due to Defendants’ own conduct during the course of this

proceeding. For example, Defendants repeatedly filed motions for

reconsideration, which the Court repeatedly denied, and failed to

comply with court orders and deadlines. This resulted in

protracted litigation and compounded work for Plaintiff’s

attorneys. 

However, having reviewed the itemizations provided by

Plaintiff’s attorneys, the Court notes some duplicative billing.

Specifically, attorneys Mark Henry and Nathan Chaney both charged

for their time spent at hearings, the trial, and certain

depositions. While the Court does not question the employment of

multiple attorneys during the litigation of this case, it does not

believe it proper to assess those duplicative charges to Defendants

unless it be shown that such was necessary -- and here, the Court

does not believe that was the case. Accordingly, the Court will

reduce the attorneys’ fees submitted by Plaintiff by $22,400, which

represents Nathan Chaney’s billing for hearings, trial days, and

certain depositions – where both Nathan Chaney and Mark Henry were

in attendance.

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Additionally, a review of the fee itemizations reveals

numerous hearing and trial days where Mark Henry billed well above

the full eight-hour days spent in court. And, while the Court does

not question the time spent by counsel on this matter, it does not

find it appropriate -- in a fee-shifting determination -- to tax

the opponent for such extensive hours absent more documentation

evidencing the necessity of such hours. Therefore, the Court will

reduce the attorneys’ fees submitted by Plaintiff an additional

$2,625. This amount represents hours charged by Mark Henry for

hearing and trial days where he billed for time beyond the eight

hours spent in court. 

The Court further notes non-trial days throughout the

litigation of this matter where Plaintiff’s attorneys billed for

extensive hours. Again, the Court does not take issue with the

hours worked by Plaintiff’s counsel. However, as previously

stated, in making a fee-shifting determination, the Court will not

assess extensive billing days to Defendants absent a showing as to

the necessity of or justification for those long days. The days

for which such a showing would be necessary are as follows:

* On February 15, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 13.3 hours for

research and drafting a reply in support of Plaintiff’s motion for

preliminary injunction;

* On February 19, 2007, both Mark Henry and Nathan Chaney

billed twelve hours (totaling 24 hours) for their work on a motion

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for preliminary injunction;

* On September 10, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 10.2 hours

related to the preparation and organization of evidence;

* On September 12, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 11.4 related to

drafting discovery responses;

* On September 24, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 12 hours for

correspondence with Defendants’ attorney and hearing on subpoena in

Oklahoma;

* On November 19, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 13.3 hours for

work related to motions in limine;

* On November 27, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 11.3 hours for

work related to motions in limine and briefing;

* On November 29, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 13.3 for trial

preparations;

* On November 30, 2007, Mark Henry billed 12 hours in

preparation for trial; and

* On December 2, 2007, Nathan Chaney billed 16.7 hours

preparing for trial.

For the above-detailed billings, Plaintiff has provided only

a general itemization in support of its fees. Thus, the Court

cannot determine whether these particular items represent actual

legal work, only, or whether they may be “portal-to-portal” time

records which could include travel time or other charges which,

although properly billable to a client, may not be properly

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recoverable from an opponent in a fee-shifting situation. Given

the long hours reflected by these billings, the Court finds that

the general itemizations provided by Plaintiff are insufficient to

support a shifting of all these fees to Defendants. The Court

will, therefore, reduce the attorneys’ fees by $6,945. This amount

reflects the Court’s belief that, without more documentation than

has been presented, it cannot conclude that it is reasonable to

shift fees to an opponent for more than a regular eight-hour day

for drafting pleadings, trial preparation, and similar work.

Apart from the above-detailed reductions, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has adequately supported its request for attorneys’ fees

and the hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel on the preparation and

trial of this matter are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds

that Plaintiff should recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $191,699.30, which sum will be included in the Judgment

to be entered in this case.

6. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), Plaintiff is clearly

entitled to recover the “costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

Regarding which costs of this action are recoverable, the Court is

guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the following costs are

recoverable:

* Filing fee of $350.00;

* Court reporter fees for the depositions of witnesses in the

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 sum of $8,595.31;

* Court reporter fees for transcripts, necessarily obtained 

 for use in the case, of $834.20;

* Witness fee of $157.86; and

* Copy fees, necessarily obtained for use in the case, of 

 $1,908.99.

The remaining costs claimed -– for electronic research, longdistance telephone charges, postage and delivery expenses,

certified copy expenses, and service of process and subpoenas -–

are not recoverable as costs and will be disallowed. The total

costs award is therefore $11,846.36.

7. Finally, as to the issue of joint and several liability,

the Court first notes that in the complaint Plaintiff never made an

allegation of joint liability. Moreover, this case was tried on

the theory that the damages caused by each defendant were separate

and apart from those caused by the other defendants. The jury

instructions and verdict form support this conclusion.

Particularly, the verdict form -– to which Plaintiff did not object

-– asked for separate findings as to each Defendants’ liability.

And, indeed, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in which it

assessed liability among the individual Defendants as it deemed

appropriate. The Court will, therefore, deny Plaintiff’s request

as it relates to damages and those assessments will remain as fixed

by the jury’s verdict.

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However, the Court finds that Defendants are jointly and

severally liable for all attorneys’ fees and costs assessed herein.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Treble

Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, and Costs is hereby granted in part and

denied in part. It is granted in that Plaintiff is awarded the sum

of $191,699.30 in attorneys’ fees and $11,846.36 in costs, which

sums Defendants shall be held jointly and severally liable. These

attorneys’ fees and costs will be included in the Judgment to be

entered in this matter. Plaintiff’s motion is denied insofar as it

seeks an award of treble damages and a finding of joint and several

liability as to damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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