Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01461/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01461-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM JAY STONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. PFEIFFER, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-01461-ADA-SAB (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SANCTIONS

(ECF No. 107)

Plaintiff Adam Jay Stone is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11, filed July 25, 2023. (ECF No. 107.) 

I.

BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendants B. 

Gonzales, G. Morales, K. Gonzales, and Anderson in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on October 19, 2022. (ECF No. 48.) 

On November 22, 2022, the Court issued the discovery and scheduling order. (ECF No. 

59.) 

On June 5, 2023, Defendant Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to 

Case 1:21-cv-01461-SAB Document 113 Filed 09/11/23 Page 1 of 6
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exhaust the administrative remedies. (ECF No. 91.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 23, 

2023. (ECF No. 100.) 

On June 29, 2023, Defendants requested a twenty-one-day extension of time to respond to 

Plaintiff’s opposition. (ECF No. 102.) On June 30, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ request. 

(ECF No. 103.) Defendant filed a timely reply to Plaintiff’s opposition on July 26, 2023. (ECF 

No. 109.) 

As stated above, on July 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for sanctions against 

Defendants. (ECF No. 107.) Defendants filed an opposition on August 7, 2023, and Plaintiff 

filed a reply on August 18, 2023. (ECF Nos. 110, 111.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts possess broad powers to impose sanctions against parties or counsel for 

improper conduct during litigation. The court derives the power to impose sanctions on parties or 

their counsel from three sources, (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927,1 

and (3) the court's inherent power. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, sanctions may be imposed if a party or their 

attorney submits a pleading to the court which is submitted for an improper purpose, is frivolous, 

has no evidentiary support, or is not warranted by the evidence. A party moving for Rule 11 

sanctions bears the burden to show why sanctions are justified. See Tom Growney Equip., v. 

Shelley Irr. Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 

11 sanctions are “an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.” Operating 

Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988).

When evaluating the imposition of sanctions, Rule 11 requires the court to consider not 

whether the party demonstrated subjective good faith in filing the document, but whether the 

party acted objectively reasonably in doing so. G.C. K.B. Investments v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 

1109 (9th Cir. 2003). “An order imposing a sanction must describe the sanctioned conduct and 

explain the basis for the sanction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(6).

///

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Rule 11(c)(2) provides in part that a motion for sanctions “must not be filed or be 

presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn 

or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.” This 

is referred to as the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Adv. Comm. 

Notes, 1992 Amend.

Federal courts also have the inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for 

improper conduct. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991). In order to impose 

sanctions pursuant to its inherent power, “the court must make an express finding that the 

sanctioned party's behavior ‘constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.’ ” Leon v. IDX Sys. 

Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006). “Because of their very potency, inherent powers to 

sanction must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.

When evaluating whether sanctions should be imposed under Rule 11, courts conduct “a 

two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the [pleading] is legally or factually baseless from an 

objective perspective, and (2) the attorney has conducted a reasonable and competent inquiry 

before signing and filing it.” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citation omitted). The standard is not a high one and an allegation that has “some plausible basis, 

[even] a weak one,” is sufficient to avoid sanctions under Rule 11. United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R&D 

Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001).

III.

DISCUSSION

In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ requests for extensions of time and 

changes in attorney of record are solely to delay this litigation. (ECF No. 107 at 1.) 

A. Safe Harbor Provision

Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” provision, whose purpose is to give the non-moving 

party the opportunity to withdraw the offending pleading. See Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 

(9th Cir. 1998). This provision requires that a motion for sanctions be served on the opposing 

party 21 days before it is filed in court. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th 

Cir. 2001).

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Defendants allege that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the safe harbor provision. 

Plaintiff argues incorrectly that the safe harbor provision does not apply “because there 

was no correction or withdraw to be done on the defendants’ part.” However, Plaintiff 

misinterprets the safe harbor provision as he does not indicate that he served Defendants with the 

motion for sanctions prior to filing with this Court. Thus, there is no evidence that Defendants 

received 21 days under the safe harbor provision to withdraw the offensive pleadings. Plaintiff's 

October 19, 2020 letter fails to comply with the safe harbor provision because it was sent, at the 

earliest, sixteen days prior to his filing the instant motion for sanctions. Accordingly, the court 

finds that plaintiff has failed to comply with the safe harbor provision and thus the court cannot 

impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

B. Bad Faith

Plaintiff argues that defense counsel has filed seven extensions of time and changed 

attorneys of record four times to delay the proceedings. (ECF No. 107 at 1.) 

Here, Deputy Attorney General (DAG) David Goodwin originally represented 

Defendants.1 DAG Kandice Jung became Defendants’ counsel of record when DAG Goodwin 

transferred to a different section of the Attorney General’s Office. (ECF No. 72 at 2.) On June 

23, 2023, DAG Lauren Sanchez became Defendants’ attorney of record and requested a twentyone-day extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant Anderson’s 

exhaustion motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 101, 102.) On June 30, 2023, the Court 

granted Defendants’ request. (ECF No. 103.) 

“Before awarding sanctions under its inherent powers ... the court must make an explicit 

finding that the conduct ‘constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.’ ” Primus Automotive 

Financial Services, Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Roadway Express, 

Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). The term bad faith “includes a broad range of willful 

improper conduct.” See Fink, 239 F.3d at 992. Sanctions are therefore “available for a variety of 

1 On June 6, 2022, SDAG Bragg specifically appeared for Defendants to request an extension of time to file a waiver. 

(ECF No. 33.) On July 5, 2022, SDAG Bragg appeared again to request an extension of time to respond to the 

complaint. (ECF No. 37.) In his request, counsel explained that he could not assign the case to a DAG because of 

staffing shortages and the demanding workload of the section. (Id. at 3.) Despite Plaintiff’s contention, SDAG 

Bragg was never the DAG assigned to this case. 

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types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as 

frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Id. at 994. “Willful misconduct” or “conduct 

tantamount to bad faith” is “something more egregious than mere negligence or recklessness.” In 

re Lehtinen, 564 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 

abrogated on other grounds by Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015). Sanctions should 

be reserved for “serious breaches,” Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 

1989), “[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and 

discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.

Examples of bad faith include “knowingly or recklessly rais[ing] a frivolous argument, or 

argu[ing] a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” In re Keegan 

Management, 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996). A party may also demonstrate bad faith by 

“delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.” Hutto v. 

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978). Recklessness, when combined with an additional factor 

such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose, may support sanctions, Gomez v. 

Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001); Fink, 239 F.3d at 994, but mere negligence or 

recklessness will not suffice, In re Lehtinen, 564 F.3d at 1058.

Plaintiff concludes that Defendants have intentionally engaged in delaying tactics by the 

number of requests to extend the time and change of counsel of record. Initially, to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks Rule 11 sanctions for Defendants’ formal and informal requests for extensions in 

discovery, Rule 11 does not apply to the discovery process. In addition, Plaintiff offers no 

evidence to support his assertion that Defendants have acted with improper purpose or in bad 

faith. As noted in the Court’s orders, Defendants’ extensions of time were granted based on good 

cause. (ECF Nos. 34, 39, 44, 73, 83, 103.) Indeed, Defendants provided declarations, signed 

under the penalty of perjury, wherein they confirmed that each request was made in good faith. 

(Declaration of Kandice Jung at 6:7-8, ECF No. 82 (“This request is brought in good faith and not 

sought for any improper purpose, such as for delay or harassment.”); Decl. of Lauren Sanchez at 

3:22, ECF No. 102 (“I bring this request in good faith and not for any improper purpose.”).) In 

addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of granting the extensions of 

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time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is substantively and procedurally defective it 

shall be denied.

IV.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, 

filed July 25, 2023 (ECF No. 107) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2023 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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