Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01598/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01598-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*

The Honorable James B. Loken stepped down as Chief Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on March 31,

2010. He has been succeeded by the Honorable William Jay Riley.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1598

___________

Vance Gillette, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

North Dakota Disciplinary Board *

Counsel, Brent Edison, *

 *

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 10, 2010

Filed: July 9, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge,*

 GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Vance Gillette, a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes and a licensed North

Dakota and tribal attorney, commenced this official capacity action against Brent

Edison, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme

Court of North Dakota (the Board). Gillette seeks declaratory and injunctive relief

preventing the Board from prosecuting a disciplinary action for alleged misconduct

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The HONORABLE DANIEL L. HOVLAND, Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the District of North Dakota.

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arising out of his representation of Native American clients in tribal court litigation.

The district court1

 dismissed the suit, concluding that the federal court should abstain

from interfering in this ongoing state judicial proceeding under abstention principles

first announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and applied to state bar

disciplinary hearings in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). Gillette appeals. Reviewing the district court’s

application of the Younger abstention doctrine for abuse of discretion, we affirm. See

Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review).

Gillette represented five members of the Tribe in wrongful discharge actions

against the Tribe in the Fort Berthold reservation’s tribal court. The cases settled

when the Tribe agreed to pay each plaintiff $35,000. Gillette then sued his clients in

tribal court, seeking a 30% contingent fee. One client filed a written complaint with

the Board, alleging that Gillette had committed ethical violations by unilaterally

altering initial written agreements establishing a 10% contingent fee arrangement.

The complaint concluded: “This man does not deserve a lawyer license, and does not

deserve to represent anyone in court because of his tactics.”

Some months later, the tribal court entered judgment awarding Gillette a 10%

contingent fee on the total settlement amounts paid. Three months after that, Edison

filed a Petition for Discipline with the Board alleging that Gillette violated multiple

provisions of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct by unilaterally

amending contingent fee agreements and attempting to collect never-agreed-upon fees.

Gillette refused to accept service of the Petition. Instead, he commenced this action

in federal court, seeking to enjoin the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the

Three Affiliated Tribes Bar Board has exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct

on the Tribe’s reservation. 

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In Younger, noting its historic reluctance to enjoin pending proceedings in state

court, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not enjoin pending state court

criminal proceedings absent a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual

circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” 401 U.S. at 54. The Court

extended this principle to state court “civil proceedings in which important state

interests are involved,” such as protecting children from child abuse, public nuisance,

enforcement of contempt, and safeguarding public assistance programs. Moore v.

Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979), and cases cited. Then, in Middlesex, the Court held

that a State’s “extremely important interest in maintaining and assuring the

professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses” is an interest that “calls Younger

abstention into play.” 457 U.S. at 434-35. 

Gillette argues that North Dakota “lacks valid interests to regulate conduct in

tribal court.” But the Supreme Court of North Dakota is not purporting to regulate

Gillette’s conduct before the tribal court or on the reservation. Rather, the Board

concedes that any disciplinary action taken by the Supreme Court will not affect

Gillette’s right to practice in tribal court, which is regulated exclusively by the Tribe.

Cf. In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 1998) (state court discipline not binding

on federal court). Thus, this regulation of Gillette’s right to practice in North Dakota

will not “infringe on the Tribe’s right to make and administer its own laws.”

Cournoyer v. Montana, 512 N.W.2d 479, 480 (S.D. 1994). 

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has expressly declared that its interest in

assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses includes subjecting a

lawyer admitted to practice in North Dakota to disciplinary action “even though the

conduct of the lawyer giving rise to the discipline may have occurred outside of this

jurisdiction.” Rule 8.5(a) of the N.D. Rules of Prof. Conduct . The Court applied that

principle in disciplining a North Dakota lawyer not presently licensed who was

disciplined by the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline. In re Discip. Action

Against Hawkins, 623 N.W.2d 431, 435 (N.D. 2001). It again applied the principle

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in unilaterally disciplining a lawyer for misconduct in a federal immigration

proceeding, In re Discip. Action Against Vela, 699 N.W.2d 839, 840 (N.D. 2005), and

another lawyer for misconduct in litigation before a federal court in North Carolina,

In re Discip. Action Against Landon, 600 N.W.2d 856, 857 (N.D. 1999). These

authorities make clear that the “extremely important” state interest recognized in

Middlesex applies in this case as well. When an attorney’s fitness -- and thus the

public interest -- are at stake, the location of the misconduct may be irrelevant. 

However, the Supreme Court in Middlesex also held that Younger abstention

is only proper if state disciplinary hearings “constitute an ongoing state judicial

proceeding,” and if there is “adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise

constitutional challenges.” Id. at 432. And the Court again noted that “bad faith,

harassment, or other extraordinary circumstance . . . constitute an exception to

Younger abstention.” Id. at 429. 

Here, as in Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-434 & nn. 12 & 13, it is clear that

Gillette is seeking to enjoin an ongoing state judicial proceeding. The North Dakota

Constitution vests in the Supreme Court of North Dakota authority to “promulgate

rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct, disciplining and

disbarment of attorneys at law.” Art. VI § 3. Exercising this authority, the Court has

promulgated the North Dakota Rules for Lawyer Discipline. Rule 3.5 declares that

“disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal but are quasi-judicial

proceedings.” Rule 3.1(E) provides that the Petition filed and served by Disciplinary

Counsel Edison in this case initiated “a formal disciplinary proceeding” which is then

assigned to a hearing panel of the Board. Rule 3.3 provides for reciprocal discovery

and the subpoenaing of witnesses. Rule 3.5(B) provides that the North Dakota Rules

of Civil Procedure and North Dakota Rules of Evidence generally apply in

disciplinary proceedings. Finally, Rule 3.1(F) provides that counsel for the Board, the

complainant, or the attorney sought to be disciplined may petition the Supreme Court

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Gillette’s assertion that the disciplinary proceedings were not ongoing when

he commenced this action because he refused service of the Petition borders on the

frivolous. Compare Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 428-29. 

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for review of the hearing panel’s decision, where briefing and oral argument “will be

as provided in the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.” 

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has declared that the Board is “an arm of

this court” and that the Court has an obligation to ensure that disciplinary proceedings

“are conducted fairly and consistently with their purpose.” Lashkowitz v.

Disciplinary Bd., 410 N.W.2d 502, 504 (N.D. 1987). Given this decision and the

governing Rules, we have no doubt that this case involves an ongoing state judicial

proceeding for purposes of Younger abstention.2

 This is consistent with Supreme

Court decisions recognizing that state disbarment proceedings are “adversary

proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature” and are therefore subject to constitutional

procedural due process protections. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). 

Gillette concedes that the Supreme Court of North Dakota’s disciplinary

proceeding “affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions presented.”

Norwood, 409 F.3d at 903. Accordingly, the three prerequisites to Younger

abstention are present in this case -- (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding that (2)

implicates an important state interest and (3) affords an adequate opportunity to raise

federal statutory and constitutional challenges. 

Gillette nonetheless argues that Younger abstention does not apply because,

absent an authorizing federal statute, North Dakota’s assertion of disciplinary

jurisdiction is regulation of conduct in Indian country that infringes “on the right of

reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Williams v. Lee,

358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), followed in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386

(1976). But in these cases, the Supreme Court directly reviewed by writ of certiorari

exercises of jurisdiction by state supreme courts, not abstention decisions by lower

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federal courts. If the three prerequisites to Younger abstention are present, a lower

federal court may not consider the state court’s jurisdiction in the ongoing judicial

proceeding, absent extraordinary circumstance. Having decided that the three

prerequisites to Younger abstention are present, the only pertinent question raised by

this argument is whether the issue of competing tribal sovereignty constitutes an

“exceptional circumstance” warranting an equitable exception to Younger abstention.

See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 429, 437. Gillette does not raise this issue on appeal. He

argues only that the Supreme Court of North Dakota has no jurisdiction and may not

infringe on the Tribe’s authority. But he concedes that these questions may be raised

in the Supreme Court of North Dakota proceeding, and cases such as Williams and

Fisher demonstrate that the Supreme Court of the United States will exercise its

certiorari jurisdiction to protect tribal court authority from improper state court

encroachment. In these circumstances, the district court properly abstained. 

Finally, Gillette argues that Edison and the Board acted in bad faith and violated

his right to equal protection of the laws by commencing this disciplinary proceeding

without consulting the Tribe, whereas the Board’s normal practice is to wait until

reciprocal discipline has been imposed by the jurisdiction in which the alleged

misconduct occurred, as in Hawkins. The short answer to the equal protection claim

is that it can be raised in the ongoing state court proceeding. The short answer to the

suggestion of bad faith is that none has been shown and, in applying Younger

abstention, we will not presume bad faith or harassment by the Supreme Court of

North Dakota adjudicators. See Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir. 1997).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 ______________________________

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