Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01104/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01104-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD; RICHARD

RIMMER; ROSANNE CAMPBELL;

GWENDOLYN MITCHELL; SAMPATH

SURYADEVARA, M.D.; JUAN JOSE

TUR, M.D.; MUHAMMAD ANWAR,

M.D.; MADERA COMMUNITY

HOSPITAL, a California

Corporation,

Defendants.

1:05-CV-01104-OWW-LJO

1:05-CV-01282-OWW-WMW

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

GENEA SCOTT, REGINA BOYCE, AND

JULIE HOLMES

Plaintiffs,

v.

RODERICK HICKMAN; FRENCHIE

SELLF; JEANNE WOODFORD;

RICHARD RIMMER; ROSANNE

CAMPBELL; PETER SZEKRENYI;

DEBRA JACQUEZ; GWENDOLYN

MITCHELL; SAMPATH SURYADEVARA,

M.D., JUAN JOSE TUR, M.D.;

SHELLY KRUS, M.D.; MUHAMMAD

ANWAR, M.D.; SUSAN HOGELUND,

R.N.; and MADERA COMMUNITY

HOSPITAL, a California

Corporation,

Defendants.

Case 1:05-cv-01104-OWW -GSA Document 109 Filed 12/20/06 Page 1 of 37
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1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs were at all relevant times or continue to be

inmates incarcerated at the Central California Women’s Facility

(“CCWF”) in Chowchilla, California, a facility of the CDC. The

two lawsuits allege that Defendants are collectively responsible,

either in their official or individual capacities, for faulty

surgical procedures performed on each of them by Defendant

Muhammad Anwar, M.D. (“Anwar”). The purpose of the procedures

was to treat infected ingrown hair and boils throughout

Plaintiffs’ bodies (“the medical condition”). Plaintiffs allege

that Anwar’s treatment was invasive and wholly unnecessary,

resulting in severe scarring, disfigurement, and physical

injuries. As a result, Plaintiffs bring federal claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment

against all Defendants. Plaintiffs also assert various state

causes of action against the individual Defendants. 

Anwar moves to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims of Battery,

Gross Negligence, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and

their request for Attorneys’ Fees. In the Allen motion, Anwar

also moves to dismiss Allen’s claim for Negligent

Misrepresentation. 

CDC Defendants move to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims for

Gross Negligence and assert the defense of qualified immunity. 

In the Scott et al. action, CDC Defendants also argue that the

Scott et al. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their

administrative remedies. Lastly, in the Allen action, CDC

defendants argue that Allen has failed to state a federal claim. 

Lastly, Defendant Madera moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim

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for gross negligence. 

On separate motions the court has consolidated both cases

for the purposes of trial. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. SCOTT, et al. v. HICKMAN, et al., 1:05-CV-01282-OWW-WMW

Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on July 17,

2006. (Doc. 17, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).) On August

17, 2006, Defendant Madera filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 23,

Madera Motion to Dismiss.) On August 18, 2006 both the CDC

Defendants and Defendant Anwar each filed motions to dismiss. 

(Doc. 29, Hickman et. al Motion to Dismiss; Doc. 31, Anwar Motion

to Dismiss.) On September 15, 2006 Plaintiffs’ opposed the

motions. (Doc. 35, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to all Defendants

Motion to Dismiss.) On September 25, 2006 all Defendants filed

their reply briefs to Plaintiffs’ opposition. (Doc. 40, Hickman

et. al Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Filed September

25, 2006.; Doc. 42, Madera’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to

Motion to Dismiss, Filed September 25, 2006; Doc. 43, Anwar’s

Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Filed

September 25, 2006.)

B. ALLEN v. WOODFORD, et al., 1:05-CV-01104-OWW-LJO

Plaintiff Allen filed her second amended complaint on July

17, 2006. (Doc. 82, Second Amended Complaint.) On August 17,

2006 Defendant Madera filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 87,

Madera Motion to Dismiss.) On August 18, 2006 both the CDC

Defendants and Defendant Anwar each filed motions to dismiss. 

(Doc. 89, WOODFORD, et. al Motion to Dismiss; Doc. 92, Anwar’s

Motion to Dismiss, Filed August 18, 2006.) On September 15, 2006

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Allen opposed the motions. (Doc. 95, Allen’s Consolidated

Opposition to All Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.) On September

25, 2006 Defendants filed their replies to Allen’s opposition.

(Doc. 101, Madera’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;

Doc. 102, Anwar’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Doc.

105, Woodford et. al’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.)

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that each of them suffered from the same

medical condition of infected ingrown hairs or boils in their

armpits while inmates at CCWF. (Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 15; Doc.

17, Scott, et al. SAC, ¶ 22.) Allen also suffered from the same

problem in her groin and upper buttocks. (Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶

15.) 

Plaintiffs allege that on or around 1996 through the events

alleged in the complaint, Anwar, and his medical group,

negotiated a series of contracts between the CDC Defendants and

Anwar under which the California Department of Corrections agreed

to pay Anwar certain fees for surgeries Anwar performed on the

CDC inmates. (Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 16) According to

Plaintiffs, these contracts provided a specific fee that Anwar

can charge for listed treatments. (Id.) However, where the

contract does not set a specific billing rate for a listed

procedure, the contract guarantees Anwar a minimum reimbursement

of 80% for whatever he invoices the CDC Defendants. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs allege that the contract gave Anwar a financial

incentive to deliberately and repeatedly act against the medical

interests of CDC inmates, because rather than providing the least

invasive and/or medically accepted treatments for common medical

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conditions such as boils, Anwar routinely performed complex,

invasive, and wholly unnecessary surgical procedures to enhance

payment for these procedures. (Id.) Some of these procedures

included abcessectomies, laprospopic surgeries, and portocath

insertions none of which were coded in his contract with the CDC

resulting in, increased fees to the CDC Defendants. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs allege that the surgeries Anwar performed were not

necessary, caused permanent physical and emotional injuries to

patients, and were performed to collect exorbitant fees from the

State regardless of their disastrous effects on CCWF inmates.

(Id.) 

Plaintiffs also claim that for a significant period of time

prior to Plaintiffs’ treatment by Anwar, the CDC Defendants were

aware of Anwar’s misconduct and the substantial risk of harm

associated with his treatment of CDC inmates. (Allen SAC, ¶ 17) 

Plaintiffs allege that Anwar’s misconduct was documented and

expressly noted in written complaints filed by CDC inmates to the

CDC Defendants and in internal communications between CDC

Defendants. (Id.) Based on these complaints, the CDC Defendants

investigated Anwar. (Id.) As a result of their investigation,

the CDC Defendants learned that Anwar routinely prescribed and

performed unneeded surgical treatments on CCWF inmates, with

devastating consequences. (Id.) The CDC Defendants also learned

that Anwar obtained faulty consent from CCWF inmates. (Id.) 

Anwar told them only that he would “lance” their boils, which he

described as posing only minor risks, but intended to conduct far

more serious and invasive surgeries for personal profit. (Id.) 

The CDC Defendants also learned that the procedures Anwar

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performed were not covered by the set fees under Anwar’s contract

with the CDC, allowing Anwar to charge exorbitant fees to treat

relatively minor ailments with unnecessary, complex, and/or

experimental medical procedures. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that

despite this knowledge, and in conscious disregard of inmates’

health and safety, the CDC Defendants continued to refer patients

to Anwar and continued to pay Anwar to perform these unnecessary

and invasive surgeries. (Id.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Madera and its staff were

notified that Anwar was prescribing and performing uneeded

surgical treatments with devastating consequences on CCWF

inmates. (Doc. 17, Scott, et al. SAC, ¶ 25) Despite this

knowledge, and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights,

Madera continued to grant Anwar access to its facilities and

support staff. (Id.)

Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Madera and the CDC

Defendants were on notice of these constitutional violations as

early as 2002. (Id., ¶ 26.) 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

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beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

5. DISCUSSION

A. Scott Has Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies

Against Defendants Campbell, Hickman, Jacquez, Mitchell

Rimmer, Suryadevara, Farber-Szekrenyi, and Woodford.

CDC Defendants move to dismiss Scott’s claims against

Defendants Campbell, Hickman, Jacquez, Mitchell, Rimmer,

Suryadevara, Farber-Szekrenyi, and Woodford (collectively “NonMedical CDC Defendants”) on the grounds that she failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies against them under 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a). This section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative

remedies before bringing suit challenging prison conditions under

§1983:

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”

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24 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

In the Ninth Circuit, “failure to exhaust nonjudicial

remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to a Rule 12(b)

motion rather than a motion for summary judgment.” Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). CDC Defendants

have properly brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The issue is

whether Plaintiff Scott’s failure to include the non medical CDC

Defendants in her 602 complaint will result in the complete

dismissal of her claims. 

Defendants have the burden to prove the absence of

exhaustion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(there is no pleading

requirement under 1997e(a)). Plaintiff is not required to plead

and prove exhaustion of administrative remedies as it is not an

affirmative defense. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. 

“In ruling on an unenumerated Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, ‘the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact’ by, for example,

considering affidavits submitted by the parties.” Hazleton v.

Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2005)(quoting

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20)). Generally, on a motion to dismiss,

a court may consider two types of “extrinsic” material. First,

“a court may consider material which is properly submitted as

part of the complaint on a motion to dismiss without converting

the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee

v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). A court may even

consider materials not physically attached to the complaint if

their authenticity is not contested and the complaint necessarily

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 The complete exhaustion rule stands for the proposition 1

that under the PLRA a prisoner-litigant’s failure to exhaust all

administrative remedies as to all claims subjects his claim to

dismissal. Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000). 

This rule was expressly rejected in the Ninth Circuit in Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th 2005). 

 Defendants cite Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th 2

Cir. 1991) and Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018-1019 (9th

Cir. 1990) that deal with prisoner Bivens actions in support of

their argument for the complete exhaustion rule. These cases do

not apply as they fail to discuss the PLRA or its 1997(e)

provision. Defendants also cite to a litany of cases outside the

Ninth Circuit that are inapplicable and non binding on the court. 

The case of Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) is

more appropriate as it provides a specific analysis of the PLRA’s

1997(e) requirement.

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relies on them. Id. Second, a court may take judicial notice of

matters of public record under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Id. For

example, matters of public record may be considered, including

pleadings, orders and other papers filed with the court or

records of administrative bodies. Id. Conclusions of law,

conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

deductions of fact need not be accepted. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264

F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001). 

CDC Defendants argue that Scott’s entire action should be

dismissed pursuant to the complete exhaustion rule. CDC 1

Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit has recently adopted the

complete exhaustion rule in Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047

(9th Cir. 2006). This is an unacceptable contention not 2

justified by existing law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In Vaden,

Plaintiff prison inmate submitted an administrative grievance

form (“CDC 602 complaint”) alleging misconduct by Defendants

Gower, Chapman, and St. Andre, who were all prison employees. 

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Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1049. While his grievance was still pending,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court against Defendants

Chapman, Gower, St. Andre, but also included Defendants Duncan

and Summerhill in his complaint. Id. It was the district

court’s understanding, based on the agreement by Defendants, that

Plaintiff included Defendants Duncan and Summerhill in his

initial 602 grievance. Id. n.3. However, the Ninth Circuit

reviewed the record and found that Plaintiff did not include

either Defendant Duncan or Summerhill in his 602 grievance and

named them for the first time in his complaint. Id. n.1-n.3. 

The court in Vaden stated that “If, in fact, Vaden sought relief

within the prison grievance system only as to Defendants Gower,

St. Andre, and Chapman, then it would appear that he failed to

exhaust his remedies against Summerhill and Duncan, regardless of

the outcome of this appeal.” Id. n. 3. The Ninth Circuit,

however, refused to resolve that factual question in Vaden and

instead dismissed the action on the grounds that Plaintiff filed

his suit in federal court while his 602 complaint against Gower,

Chapman, and St. Andre was still pending. Id. at 1051. Vaden

does not indicate that the Ninth Circuit has adopted the complete

exhaustion rule. It did say, that under the facts of the case,

Plaintiff had no exhausted and dismissed the case without

prejudice. 

The Ninth Circuit has already expressly rejected the

complete exhaustion rule in Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th

Cir. 2005.) The issue in Lira was whether a suit must be

dismissed when there is presuit exhaustion of one or more of the

claims contained in the complaint or whether a different

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procedure is available to assure that only exhausted claims go

forward. Id. at 1170-1171. The Defendants in Lira made the same

argument as the non medical CDC Defendants in this case, that the

PLRA requires dismissal without prejudice of cases in which there

are “mixed” complaints, no matter the consequences for the

prisoner’s ability to pursue already exhausted claims. Id. at

1171. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this argument. Id. 

Through a statutory construction argument, the court reasoned

that in three respects the 1997e(c) provision of the PLRA

indicates that the district courts need not dismiss an entire

action because there is an unexhausted claim: 

1. In 1997e(c), Congress ordered dismissal of certain

defective suits and claims – those that are

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief, but did not specify that mixed actions

must be dismissed. Id. at 1171-1172. According

to the court, this omission suggests that no

special rule regarding the treatment of non viable

causes of a action was intended. Id. at 1172. 

2. The reference to dismissal of a “claim” in §

1997(e)(c)(2) if there has been a failure to

exhaust, juxtaposed to the reference to dismissal

of an “action” in § 1997e(c)(1), indicates that

claims that have not been exhausted can be treated

independently for dismissal purposes from the

action as a whole. Id. There would be little

point in providing for the dismissal of some non

exhausted claims on the merits if the remainder of

the action would then have to be dismissed,

although exhausted, because of the failure to

exhaust dismissed claims. 

3. Interpreting the word “action” in § 1997(e)(a) and

(c)(1) to indicate that an exhaustion defect in

any claim infects the suit as a whole would render

subsection (c)(2) superfluous. Id. If § 1997e(a)

demands a total exhaustion dismissal rule because

it uses the word “action,” then § 1997e(c)(1),

because it uses the word “action,” must also

require dismissal of the entire case if any claim

is “frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

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upon which relief can be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” Id. Yet, § 1997e(c)(1) must

apply only when all the claims meet the statutory

standard for summary dismissal on the merits, not

when only some of them do. Id. Otherwise, §

1997e(c)(2), contemplating the dismissal of

individual frivolous “claims,” would be

unnecessary. Id. The inclusion of a single

frivolous claim would contaminate the entire

action, mandating dismissal under § 1997e(c)(1). 

Id. 

Ultimately, the court in Lira found that the use of the term

“action” elsewhere in the statute does not support interpreting §

1997e(a) as dictating a total exhaustion-dismissal rule. Id. at

1173. To the contrary, while “action” in the PLRA refers to the

case as a whole, the statute consistently uses the term in a

manner that contemplates dismissing the entire action only if the

entire action fails to meet statutory standards. Id. When some

claims are valid and others are not, the usual procedural norm -

that when a complaint has both good and bad claims, only the bad

claims are “dismissed,” prevails. Id. 

i. Scott’s Administrative Complaints and Appeals

Scott filed three 602 appeals that related to her surgeries

for treatment of the boil under her left arm. (See Declaration of

James Amis, ¶ 4 and Exhibits A-D attached thereto.)

Scott’s first appeal was on June 8, 2005, when she submitted

her first grievance (Log No. CWF-C-05-00704) and described her

problem as not healing properly after the first surgery by Dr.

Anwar. On or about July 28, 2005, Dr. Wilson, Acting Chief

Medical Officer granted her appeal in that he stated Scott had

her second surgery on July 6, 2005, that all issues pertaining to

both surgeries had been addressed, and that she was prescribed

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pain medication since June 13, 2005. This appeal was not pursued

to the second and/or third levels of review. (See Declaration of

James Amis, ¶ 4(A) and Exhibit B attached thereto.)

Scott made her second appeal on July 11, 2005, when she

submitted a second grievance (Log No. X-05-00791) and described

her problem as being a diabetic who often gets boils, that she

was seen by Dr. Cruz (sic) who scheduled her for the February 14,

2005 surgery after unsuccessful treatment with oral medication. 

She further stated in the second grievance that she filed the

first grievance against Dr. Cruz (sic) and Dr. Anwar and that her

602 was granted for a second surgery to remove the boil. She

also stated that Dr. Cruz (sic) scheduled her for the second

surgery on July 6, 2005, with Dr. Anwar and that after the

surgery she had 21 staples, a drainage tube, and no feeling in

her left arm from back down to elbow and is in pain, that she has

been on seven different antibiotics since December 2004 and has

had two unsuccessful surgeries and the boil (lump) under her left

arm pit remains unaltered. Scott requested in her appeal that

she receive therapy for her left arm, pain management control and

the boil removed by Dr. Parvez (sic), financial compensation for

pain and suffering, and to be classified as medically disabled.

(See Declaration of James Amis, ¶ 4(B) and Exhibit C attached

thereto.) On August 29, 2005, the first formal level of review

was partially granted by Dr. Suryadevara on her second appeal in

that she was scheduled for physical therapy, that Dr. Pervais

performed the requested surgery on August 22, 2005, and that she

has received medication for pain management. She was advised

that financial compensation cannot be granted by the medical

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department, and was also advised that Dr. Anwar was no longer

performing surgery on patients at CCWF. (See Declaration of James

Amis, ¶ 4(B) and Exhibit C attached thereto.) On or about

September 1, 2005, Scott appealed to the second formal level of

review stating that due to the incomptin (sic) of the contract

doctor employed by CCWF, she has been in extreme pain, that CCWF

has tried to accommodate her with pain management, but failed to

address other issues in her 602. On or about September 20, 2005,

the second grievance was partially granted at the second formal

level of review by S. Brewer and Dr. Sampath Suryadevara, Chief

Medical Officer/Health Care Manager who interviewed Scott. The

problem was described as Scott having three surgeries for an

abscess between her left breast and left auxiliary and that she

felt Dr. Anwar was negligent in performing two unsuccessful

surgeries and that she is requesting therapy for her left arm,

pain management, boil removal, financial compensation and to be

medically unassigned. 

The response stated that she was seen by the physical

therapist on September 8 and 15, 2005, and was recommended for

six weeks of therapy, she has received pain management post

operatively, and an accommodation chrono was written limiting her

physical activity. She was advised that she cannot be

financially compensated and was also advised that Dr. Anwar was

no longer working with CCWF. (See Declaration of James Amis, ¶

4(B) and Exhibit C attached thereto.) On or about October 5,

2005, (complaint filed 10/11/05) the Inmate Appeals Branch

received Scott’s appeal at the third level of review (Director’s

Level). The Director’s Level Appeal Decision dated January 3,

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2006, denied the appeal at the final level of review.

Scott made her third appeal on July 20, 2005 when she filed

a Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request (ADA) wherein

she requested to be classified as “medically disabled” describing

her problem as having a second surgery on her boil that was

unsuccessful and she was left with numbness and constant pain. 

On or about August 31, 2005, the appeal was granted by D. Bravo,

CCII. Mr. Bravo interviewed Scott and she explained to him that

she was requesting that she be removed from her current

assignment due to a medical condition because she had numbness in

her left hand and could not be a participant in the classroom. 

The response also stated that her central file was reviewed and

revealed that a CDC Form 7410 dated August 16, 2005, reflected

that no lifting, pushing, or pulling with her left arm. Also, a

comprehensive accommodation chrono stated she was unable to wear

a bra due to a recent surgery. Scott’s case was reviewed and a

medical committee elected to remove her from her current

assignment as requested. This appeal was not pursued to the

second and/or third levels of review. (See Declaration of James

Amis, ¶ 4(C) and Exhibit D attached thereto.) 

In this case plaintiff Scott has pled claims that are non

administratively exhausted as to non medical CDC Defendants. 

None of the defendants are mentioned by name or description in

any administrative appeal filed by plaintiff. Here, the Second

Amended Complaint contains allegations of wrongful conduct

against Roseanne Campbell, Roderick Hickman, Debra Jacquez,

Gwendolyn Mitchell, Richard Rimmer, Sampath Suryadevara, M.D.,

Peter Farber-Szekrenyi, and Jeanne Woodford. Nevertheless,

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plaintiff made no grievance or other administrative charge

against any of them before filing suit. Plaintiff’s only

grievance was against CDC defendant Dr. Kruse and Dr. Anwar. 

Plaintiff cannot exhaust her administrative remedies against Dr.

Kruse, and then proceed with suit against the non medical CDC

Defendants Roseanne Campbell, Roderick Hickman, Debra Jacquez,

Gwendolyn Mitchell, Richard Rimmer, Sampath Suryadevara, M.D.,

Peter Farber-Szekrenyi, and Jeanne Woodford. 

The non medical CDC Defendants had no notice that Plaintiff

was making claims against them for violation of her civil rights

until suit was filed. CDC Defendsants’ motion to dismiss non

medical CDC Defendants from Plaintiff Scott’s action is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged a Claim Under 42.

U.S.C. § 1983 Against Non Medical CDC Defendants. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must ensure

that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and

medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994)(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984); 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 283 (1991); Estelle, 429 U.S. at

103; Willis v. Terhune, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (E.D. Cal.

2005). The CDC asserts that Allen’s FAC, at most, states a claim

for negligence because Allen fails to show subjective awareness

on the part of medical and nonmedical staff. 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective

and a subjective prong. Willis, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

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“sufficiently serious.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 

Second, the prison official must “know of and disregard an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Id. Thus a prison

official may be liable under the Eighth Amendment only if he

knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards

that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 

Id. 

The CDC claims that neither Allen nor Scott allege facts to

show non medical CDC Defendants personally participated in their

surgery. CDC argues that they have each failed to allege the

deliberate conduct and subjective awareness required by non

medical CDC defendants for a showing of deliberate indifference. 

Non medical CDC Defendants cannot be found liable under the

Eighth Amendment unless they knew of and disregarded an excessive

risk to her health and safety. Plaintiffs would have to allege

“deliberate indifference” on behalf of Non medical CDC Defendants

by stating facts that show each defendant was subjectively aware

of the risk Anwar posed to her as a patient. Plaintiffs must

allege that the non medical CDC Defendants were both aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and that they drew such an

inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiffs are not required to show that non medical CDC

defendants acted or failed to act believing that harm would

actually befall them. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Section 1983

contains no state of mind requirement independent of that

necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional

right. Id. at 841. It merely provides a cause of action. Id. 

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It is enough that non medical CDC defendants acted or failed to

act despite their knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. Id. 

Whether defendants had the requisite knowledge of a substantial

risk is a question of fact “subject to demonstration in the usual

ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. If

Plaintiffs present evidence showing that Anwar posed a

substantial risk which was “longstanding, pervasive, well

documented, or expressly noted by defendants in the past and the

circumstances suggest that defendants... had been exposed to

information concerning the risk enough so that they ‘must have

known’ about it, such evidence could be enough to permit a

finding of actual knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842. Plaintiffs also have to allege facts that speak to the

specific role that non medical CDC Defendants had in the decision

to refer her to Anwar for treatment of her medical condition.

After such proof, non medical CDC Defendants may prove that

they were unaware even of an obvious risk to health or safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Defendants charged with “deliberate

indifference” can show, for example, that they did not know of

the underlying facts which indicated a sufficiently substantial

danger or that they knew the underlying facts but believed

(albeit unsoundly) that the risk was insubstantial or

nonexistent. Id. If defendants had actual knowledge of a

substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety, they may still

avoid liability if they responded reasonably to the risk. Id. 

This is true even if the harm ultimately was not averted. Id. 

Whether viewed in terms of duty or deliberate indifference,

prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under

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the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 845. 

i. Non Medical CDC Defendants Assertion of Qualified

Immunity

CDC raises the issue of Eleventh Amendment Immunity as an

affirmative defense. Plaintiffs’ complaints sue non medical CDC

defendants in their official and individual capacities. The

distinction in capacities is critical. 

Suits against an official in his or her official capacity

are treated as suits against the entity on whose behalf that

official acts. In such suits, the real party in interest is the

entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages against an

individual state official acting in his official capacity is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action

against a State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab.,

131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a §1983 or §1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

To recover under §1983 against non medical CDC officials

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acting in their individual capacities, Plaintiffs must make an

inquiry into causation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th

Cir. 1988). This inquiry must be individualized and focus on the

duties and responsibilities of each non medical CDC defendant

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused the

constitutional deprivation. Id. Plaintiffs must prove some

degree of individual culpability by non medical CDC defendant

under the “deliberate indifference” standard. Id. Plaintiffs

are not required to show an express intent by the individual

official to punish. Id. 

When the Plaintiffs seek to hold individual defendants

personally liable for damages, the causation inquiry focuses on

whether each individual defendant was in a position to take steps

to avert the incident but failed to do so intentionally or with

deliberate indifference. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. In order to

resolve this causation issue, Plaintiffs must specifically plead

the knowledge, participation, or deliberate indifference for each

named CDC defendant. Id.

ii. Allen and Scott Have Identical Allegations Against

Non Medical CDC Defendants Woodford, Rimmer,

Campbell, Mitchell, and Suryadevara

a. Allegations Against Woodford

Both Allen and Scott allege the following against Woodford

as Director of the CDC:

1. That Woodford had authority to review and cancel

Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Woodford was responsible for Plaintiffs’

health and well being

3. That Woodford had knowledge of Anwar’s faulty

surgical procedure

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4. That Woodford conducted an investigation into

Anwar’s surgical procedure

5. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Woodford continued to allow CDC Defendants to

refer CCWF inmates to Anwar 

6. That Woodford had deliberate indifference to

Plaintiffs’ medical needs as evidenced by her

unwillingness to cancel Anwar’s contract and

continuing to allow Anwar to operate on CCWF

inmates 

7. That Woodford continued to allow the operations

even after she received Boyce’s 602 appeal, after

the CDC initiated an investigation into Anwar’s

mistreatment, and after the CDC confirmed that

Anwar was performing needless surgeries for his

own financial gain 

(Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 33) 

b. Allegations Against Rimmer 

Both Allen and Scott allege the following against Rimmer as

Acting Director of the CDC:

1. That Rimmer had authority to review and cancel

Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Rimmer was responsible for Plaintiffs’ health

and well being

3. That Rimmer had knowledge of Anwar’s faulty

surgical procedure

4. That Rimmer conducted an investigation into

Anwar’s surgical procedure

5. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Rimmer continued to allow CDC Defendants to refer

CCWF inmates to Anwar 

6. That Rimmer had deliberate indifference to

Plaintiffs’ medical needs as evidenced by her

unwillingness to cancel Anwar’s contract and

continuing to allow Anwar to operate on CCWF

inmates 

(Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 34) 

c. Allegations Against Campbell

Both Allen and Scott allege the following against Campbell

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as Deputy Director of Health Services:

1. That Campbell had authority to review and cancel

Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Campbell was responsible for Plaintiffs’

health and well being

3. That Campbell had knowledge of Anwar’s faulty

surgical procedure

4. That Campbell conducted an investigation into

Anwar’s surgical procedure

5. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Campbell continued to allow CDC Defendants to

refer CCWF inmates to Anwar 

6. That Campbell had deliberate indifference to

Plaintiffs’ medical needs as evidenced by her

unwillingness to cancel Anwar’s contract and

continuing to allow Anwar to operate on CCWF

inmates 

(Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 35) 

d. Allegations Against Mitchell

Both Allen and Scott allege the following against Mitchell

as the Warden of CCWF:

1. That Mitchell’s decided or acquiesced to continue

to authorize patient referrals to Anwar and his

medical group 

2. That Mitchell signed individual patient

authorizations for treatment by Anwar,

demonstrating a deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s rights. 

3. That Mitchell received Boyce’s 602 appeal

describing Anwar’s conduct and lack of consent

4. That Mitchell knew about the CDC initiating an

investigation against Anwar due to his

mistreatment of prisoners

5. That Mitchell knew the CDC confirmed Anwar did, in

fact, mistreat CCWF prisoners by performing

needless surgeries for his own financial gain. 

6. That Mitchell knew these surgeries resulted in

wonton disfigurement of multiple inmates

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7. That despite this knowledge, Mitchell continued

inmate referrals to Defendant Anwar and his

medical group. inmates 

(Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 36) 

e. Allegations Against Suryadevara

Scott alleges the following against Suryadevara as the Chief

Medical Officer of CCWF: 

1. That Suryadevara continued to refer patients to

Anwar and his medical group despite his personal

review of patients, including Boyce, Allen, Wyatt,

Holmes, and Scott, and their records following

botched treatments by Anwar. 

2. That Suryadevara received Boyce’s 602 appeal

3. That Suryadevara knew of the CDC’s investigation

into Anwar’s mistreatment 

4. That Suryadevara knew CDC’s conclusion that Anwar

was performing needless surgeries for his own

financial gain 

5. That Suryadevara continued to refer CCWF inmates

to Anwar despite knowledge of these facts

(Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 37.)

iii. Scott Also Alleges Federal Claims Against Hickman,

Jacquez, Suryadevara, and Farber-Szekrenyi

a. Allegations Against Hickman

Scott alleges the following against Hickman as the Secretary

of the CDC: 

1. That Hickman had authority to review and cancel

Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Hickman was responsible for Plaintiffs’

health and well being

3. That Hickman had knowledge of Anwar’s faulty

surgical procedure

4. That Hickman conducted an investigation into

Anwar’s surgical procedure

5. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Hickman continued to allow CDC Defendants to refer

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CCWF inmates to Anwar 

6. That Hickman had deliberate indifference to

Plaintiffs’ medical needs as evidenced by her

unwillingness to cancel Anwar’s contract and

continuing to allow Anwar to operate on CCWF

inmates 

7. That Hickman continued to allow the operations

even after she received Boyce’s 602 appeal, after

the CDC initiated an investigation into Anwar’s

mistreatment, and after the CDC confirmed that

Anwar was performing needless surgeries for his

own financial gain 

(Doc. 17, Scott et al. SAC, ¶ 43.) 

b. Allegations Against Jacquez

Scott alleges the following against Jacquez as acting Warden

of the CCWF: 

1. That Jacquez had authority to review and cancel

Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Jacquez was responsible for Plaintiffs’

health and well being

3. That Jacquez had knowledge of Anwar’s faulty

surgical procedure

4. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Jacquez continued to allow CDC Defendants to refer

CCWF inmates to Anwar 

5. That Jacquez continued to allow the operations

even after she received Boyce’s 602 appeal and in

spite of Anwar’s history of performing disfiguring

surgeries on CCWF inmates. 

(Doc. 17, Scott et al. SAC, ¶ 10.) 

e. Allegations Against Farber-Szekrenyi

Scott alleges the following against Farber-Szekrenyi as

Director of Correctional Health Care Services of the CDC: 

1. That Farber-Szekrenyi had authority to review and

cancel Anwar’s contract with the CDC

2. That Farber-Szekrenyi was responsible for

Plaintiffs’ health and well being

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3. That Farber-Szekrenyi had knowledge of Anwar’s

faulty surgical procedure

4. That despite this knowledge and investigation,

Farber-Szekrenyi continued to allow CDC Defendants

to refer CCWF inmates to Anwar 

5. That Farber-Szekrenyi continued to allow the

operations even after she received Boyce’s 602

appeal and in spite of Anwar’s history of

performing disfiguring surgeries on CCWF inmates. 

(Doc. 17, Scott et al. SAC, ¶ 48.) 

iv. Analysis Of Allegations Against Defendants in

their Official Capacities

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a

claim that non medical CDC Defendants knew the CCWF inmates faced

a substantial known risk of harm to Plaintiffs at the hands of

Defendant Anwar and disregarded that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. Willis, 404 F. Supp. 2d at

1230. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.) Plaintiffs allege that

non medical CDC Defendants were all responsible for Plaintiffs

health, and well being, and specific medical needs, that they had

knowledge of the various complaints against Anwar, that they had

knowledge of the investigation that resulted from the complaints

and that they had knowledge that Anwar’s surgeries resulted in

the disfigurement of CCWF inmates. Plaintiffs argue as to each

defendant that despite this knowledge Defendants referred or

continue to allow inmates to be referred to Anwar. Further, in

an accompanying motion to consolidate the cases, Plaintiffs

requested and the court granted judicial notice of a letter dated

November 18, 2005 from Chrisman Swanberg, Senior Staff Counsel

for the CDC to Michael Ball, Counsel for Dr. Anwar. The CDC

letter to Defendant Anwar, that the court has taken judicial

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notice of lists nine inmates who lodged formal complaints against

Anwar. This is evidence showing knowledge that Anwar posed a

substantial risk which was “longstanding, pervasive, well

documented, or expressly noted by defendants in the past and the

circumstances suggest that Defendants... had been exposed to

information concerning the risk enough so that they ‘must have

known’ about it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

In response to Plaintiffs’ allegations, non medical CDC

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not allege non medical CDC

defendants personally participated in her medical care or that

they personally participated in any of the acts, omissions, or

incidents giving rise to Plaintiffs’ complaints. However,

allegations of personal participation are not required to state a

cause of action under § 1983. It is enough that non medical CDC

defendants acted or failed to act to prevent medical services

which were necessary or deficient with knowledge of a substantial

risk of harm in the face of known medical needs. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 842.

Defendants also argue that there are no allegations that non

medical CDC defendants had the medical expertise necessary to

have knowingly subjected Plaintiffs’ to a substantial risk of

serious harm. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations, at

most, claim that non medical CDC defendants had a general

knowledge about Anwar’s faulty procedure and that this general

knowledge is insufficient to allege a federal claim. However,

Plaintiffs are not required to show that non medical CDC

defendants acted or failed to act believing that harm would

actually befall them. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. As alleged,

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Plaintiffs’ complaints against non CDC Defendants sufficiently

alleges that Plaintiffs must have known that Anwar posed a

substantial risk and that his risk was longstanding, pervasive,

well documented, or expressly noted by non medical CDC

Defendants. 

The descriptions against the non medical CDC Defendants were

sufficient to show that they knew of the underlying facts which

indicated a sufficiently substantial danger or that they knew the

underlying facts but unreasonably believed, in reckless disregard

of known facts, that the risk was insubstantial or non existent. 

CDC Defendants’ motion to dismiss non medical CDC Defendants

for Plaintiffs’ failure to state a federal claim is DENIED.

v. Analysis of Defendants’ Defense of Qualified

Immunity

Qualified immunity shields governmental officials performing

discretionary functions from civil trial and liability if their

conduct violates no “clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes that “where an

official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly

established rights are implicated, the public interest may be

better served by action taken with independence and without fear

of the consequences.” Siegert v. Gilley 500 U.S. 226, 231-33

(1991). The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of

resolving questions of immunity early in the case because

qualified immunity is not a mere defense. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

supra 457 U.S. at 818. In a Federal Civil Rights Action under

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Section 1983, a government official acting pursuant to

discretionary duties is entitled to qualified immunity from civil

liability for damages when the conduct “does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Id. To determine qualified

immunity, the court must determine if, at the times of the

alleged occurrence, the official could have believed their

behavior was lawful. Osolinski v. Kane 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th

Cir. 1996).

The only argument Defendants offer to support their claim

for qualified immunity is that it would not be clear to a

reasonable government official, who lacked medical expertise,

that failing to preclude a doctor from performing surgeries based

on allegations that the doctor was performing faulty and

unnecessary surgeries would violate the Eighth Amendment. 

However, the issue of qualified immunity is a fact intensive

inquiry. The need for reasonable medical care to redress known

medical needs is law known to prison officials responsible for

providing such needs. Whether failing to act to prevent delivery

of unnecessary or deficient medical care in the face of known

risks, raises issues not reasonable as a matter of law for the

qualified immunity defense. Under the liberal rule 8 pleading

standards for a 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiffs’ allegations are

sufficient to withstand Defendants’ argument for qualified

immunity. 

CDC Defendants’ motion to dismiss non medical CDC Defendants

on qualified immunity grounds is DENIED.

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 Rule 9(b) provides: In all averments of fraud or mistake, 3

the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated

with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other

condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 

29

D. State Law Claims and Supplemental Jurisdiction 

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

“In any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district court shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

are so related to the claims in the action within such

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution.” 

Plaintiffs allege 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for Eighth

Amendment violations. Plaintiffs’ state law claims invoke

supplemental jurisdiction and arise from the same controversy as

their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. 

i. Allen’s Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Against

Anwar

Allen’s claim for Negligent Misrepresentation in her first

amended complaint was granted with leave to amend. Allen again

brought a claim against Anwar in her second amended complaint for

negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation is a

separate and distinct tort of deceit. Friedman v. Merck & Co.,

107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The tort of

fraud or deceit must comply with the particularity requirements

of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). U.S. Concord, Inc v. Harris Graphics 3

Corp., 757 F.Supp. 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1991). To meet the

rule’s requirements, plaintiff must allege the time, place, and

contents of the alleged fraud. Where the defendant makes false

statements, honestly believing that they are true, but without

reasonable ground for such belief, he may be liable for negligent

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misrepresentation. Friedman, 107 Cal. App. at 475. The elements

of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: 

1) defendant’s representation is to a past or

existing material fact 

2) the representation must have been untrue

3) the representation was made without any reasonable

ground for believing it to be true

4) the representation was made with the intent to

induce plaintiff’s reliance

5) the plaintiff, unaware of the falsity of the

representation, acted in reliance upon the truth

of the representation and was justified in this

reliance 

6) the plaintiff sustained damages 

Id. To state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation

plaintiff must allege facts establishing that defendants owed a

duty to communicate accurate information. Id. California courts

have recognized a duty to communicate accurate information where

providing false information poses a risk of and results in

physical harm to the person. Id. 

Allen has not facially pled a negligent misrepresentation

claim against Anwar under Rule 9(b). Allen specifically alleges

that “immediately prior to the July 21, 2004 surgery Anwar

misrepresented to Allen that the surgery he would perform was an

appropriate treatment option. (Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 64.) This

alleges an intentional deceit inconsistent with negligence. 

Allen’s claims throughout her second amended complaint that Anwar

led Allen to believe his surgical treatment was an appropriate

option when instead the treatment was dangerous and wholly

unnecessary. Allen also alleges that “in seeking [her] consent,

Anwar... misrepresented to [her] that the surgery only consisted

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of lancing of boils without any reasonable grounds to believe

this was true.” (Id., ¶ 71.). No negligent conduct is

described. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Allen’s seventh cause of

action for negligent misrepresentation is GRANTED.

ii. Plaintiffs’ Gross Negligence Claims Against

Defendants

A number of California cases define the term “gross

negligence” as "the want of even scant care or an extreme

departure from the ordinary standard of conduct." See, e.g. Franz

v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 31 Cal.3d 124, 138, 181

Cal.Rptr. 732, 738 (1982); DeVito v. State of California, 202

Cal.App.3d 264, 272, 248 Cal.Rptr. 330, 335 (1988), both quoting

Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 110 Cal.App.3d 184,

196, 167 Cal.Rptr. 881, 887 (1980). The cases, however,

interpret the meaning of the term “gross negligence” when

utilized in the text of a statute and not in the terms of a

common law right of action in gross negligence. See also

Continental Ins. Co. v. American Protection Industries, 197

Cal.App.3d 322, 329, 242 Cal.Rptr. 784, 788 (1987) (stating that

numerous California cases have discussed gross negligence, but

the holdings were based upon interpretation of a statute

referencing “gross negligence”).

In Continental, at issue was whether there was a recognized

cause of action for “gross negligence.” Id. at 325, 242

Cal.Rptr. at 786. The Continental court found that no cause of

action existed and that the trial court properly denied

plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint to add a cause of

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action for “gross negligence.” The court stated, “[I]n light of

the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in

California, any attempt to categorize gross negligence separately

from ordinary negligence is unnecessary.” Id. at 330, 242

Cal.Rptr. at 789.

Plaintiffs voluntary concede in their opposition brief to

dismiss their fifth cause of action for gross negligence. 

Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ gross negligence

claim is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

iii. Civil Battery

A civil battery claim requires that plaintiff show 1)

defendant intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or

offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, 2) plaintiff did

not consent to the contact, and 3) the harmful or offensive

contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff. 

Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (Cal. Ct. App.

2004)(internal quotations omitted). A battery is any

intentional, unlawful, and harmful contact by one person with the

person of another. Id. A harmful contact, intentionally done is

the essence of a battery. Id. A contact is unlawful if it is

unconsented to. Id. 

When a physician obtains a patient's consent to a particular

treatment and administers that treatment but an undisclosed

inherent complication occurs, the patient has a claim for

negligence, not battery. Piedra, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 1495-1496. 

The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances

when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not

consented. Id. at 1496. When the patient gives permission to

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 The language for the claim of civil battery against Anwar 4

is identical in both complaints. 

33

perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another,

the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the

consent given is present. Id. However, when the patient

consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that

treatment but a complication arises, no intentional deviation

from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining

consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose

pertinent information. In that situation the action should be

pleaded in negligence. Id. (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d

229, 240-241(Cal. 1972))

a. Plaintiffs’ Battery Claims Against Anwar4

In their respective complaints, Plaintiffs allege that Anwar

performed a dangerous and wholly unnecessary surgery on them

without accurately explaining to her the procedure he intended to

perform. (Doc. 82, Allen SAC, ¶ 57; Doc. 17, Scott et al. SAC, ¶

74.) Plaintiffs claim that Anwar referred to the procedure as a

simple “lancing” of boils with little or no danger. (Id.) Allen

alleges that Anwar never received Allen’s consent for the actual

surgery he intended to, and did, perform. (Id.) Allen proceeds

to argue that by subjecting her to the surgical treatment Anwar

committed or caused to be committed a civil battery in the form

of harmful contact to which Allen did not consent. (Id.) As

alleged, Allen claims that she gave her permission for Anwar to

perform the minimally invasive “lancing” of boils but instead was

subjected to an entirely different, more invasive surgical

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treatment. These allegations are sufficient to claim that Anwar

deviated from the consent given and performed an operation on

Allen that Allen did not consent to. 

Anwar’s motion to dismiss Allen’s fourth cause of action for

civil battery is DENIED.

iv. Plaintiffs’ Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress Claims Against Anwar

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress requires that a plaintiff show 1) serious emotional

distress, 2) actually and proximately caused by 3) wrongful

conduct 4) by a defendant who should have foreseen that the

conduct would cause such distress. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). It is well settled that negligent

infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort;

rather it is the tort of negligence to which the duty element

applies. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc.,

48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (Cal. 1989); Friedman, 107 Cal. App. 4th at

464. 

Where injury such as mental and emotional distress is caused

by the constitutional violation, that injury is compensable under

§1983. Anderson v. Cent. Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.2d 505, 508

(9th Cir. 1984); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978). 

Plaintiffs’s emotional distress claims are properly alleged under

their §1983 claim. Plaintiffs’ agreed to dismiss this claim at

the hearing at the December 11, 2006 hearing held on this matter. 

Anwar’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action

for negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED. 

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v. Anwar’s Motion to Strike Attorney’s Fees 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[Only] pleadings are subject

to motions to strike.” See Qarbon.com, Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315

F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048-1049 (N.D. Cal. 2004). However, a “motion

to strike” materials that are not part of the pleadings may be

regarded as an “invitation” by the movant “to consider whether

[proffered material] may properly be relied upon.” United States

v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Monroe v.

Bd. of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641, 645 (D. Conn. 1975)).

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. 

Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (C.D. Cal.

2003). Motions to strike should not be granted unless it is

clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible

bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. Id.

Successful plaintiffs in civil rights suit may seek

attorney’s fees from the losing defendant. Pony v. County of

L.A., 433 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006). Under 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b), “in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

cost.” Id. 

Anwar moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees

under Plaintiffs’ state causes of action arguing that there are

no statutes which support the award under state law. Defendants

request that the court strike attorneys fees for Plaintiffs’

claims of civil battery, gross negligence, intentional

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misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 

Plaintiffs on the other hand argue that attorneys fees for

their state law claims are supported by Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. §

1021.5 which provides: 

“Upon motion, a court may award attorney’s fees to a

successful party against one or more opposing parties

in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of

an important right affecting the public interest if: 

(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or

non pecuniary, has been conferred on the

general public or a large class of persons

(b) the necessity and financial burden of private

enforcement, or of enforcement by one public

entity against another public entity, are

such as to make the award appropriate, and 

(c) such fees should not in the interest of

justice be paid out of recovery if any” 

It remains to be seen whether § 1021.5 attorneys fees can be

proved. The claim cannot be eliminated as a matter of law.

Anwar’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees for

their state law claims is DENIED. 

6. CONCLUSION

• CDC Defendsants’ motion to dismiss non medical CDC

Defendants from Plaintiff Scott’s action is GRANTED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.

• CDC Defendants’ motion to dismiss non medical CDC Defendants

for Plaintiffs’ failure to state a federal claim is DENIED.

• CDC Defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds is DENIED.

• Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ gross negligence

claim is GRANTED. 

• Defendant’s motions to dismiss Allen’s seventh cause of

action for negligent misrepresentation is DENIED.

• Anwar’s motion to dismiss Allen’s fourth cause of action for

civil battery is DENIED.

• Anwar’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action

for negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.

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• Anwar’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees for

their state law claims is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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