Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00497/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00497-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of a rules violation report upon 1

which the complaint relies. Plaintiff does not object. This request should be granted. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WILSON, No. CIV S-07-0497-RRB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. BUTLER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by defendants

Butler, Wiley, Magee, Sandy, Stewart, Rodriguez, Brown, Long, and Carey (Doc. 16). 

Defendants Fonville and Jackson have filed a joinder (Doc. 21) to this motion. Plaintiff has filed

an opposition (Doc. 20), and defendants filed a reply (Doc. 26). Defendants have also filed a

request for judicial notice and the declaration of M. Schafer, the custodian of records (Doc. 27). 

1

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Defendant Valdez has not been served. 2

2

I. BACKGROUND

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. 11) against

Butler, Wiley, Jackson, Magee, Sandy, Stewart, Fonville, Rodriguez, Brown, Long, Valdez, and

Carey. Plaintiff claims violations of his constitutional rights resulting from a rules violation 2

report issued against him which resulted in loss of good-time credits. He states that, on August 2,

2004, he was “hanging out with some religious associates” on the prison recreation yard

alongside a fence which is adjacent to an inmate housing facility. According to plaintiff,

defendant Butler approached the group and told them to “get off the fence.” Plaintiff states that,

when Butler asked for plaintiff’s identification card, he responded that he did not have it with

him because his pants had no pockets. Defendant Butler then ordered plaintiff to “go to the

Center Complex” and plaintiff states that he responded: “I’m not going. I’m off the fence

already.” Plaintiff alleges that defendant Butler than “took unlawful and departmentally

unauthorized measures of confiscating my bag of food items.” Plaintiff states that he

“instinctively” attempted to protect his items by reaching towards defendant Butler to retrieve his

bag. Plaintiff was later issued a rules violation report charging him with battery on a correctional

officer. According to the rules violation report, plaintiff made contact with defendant Butler

when he was attempting to retrieve his items. Plaintiff claims that defendant Butler acted

“maliciously to cause . . . hardship . . . .” 

Plaintiff states that defendant Wiley “designed his report to support a battery on a

peace officer (his friend . . . [defendant Butler]).” Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant

Wiley falsely reported that he witnessed the incident when it is “evident by his report that he did

not witness the incident, but just wanted to support his co-worker.” Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Wiley’s report does not contain any mention of the bag of food items. According to

plaintiff, defendant Wiley’s allegedly false report denied his due process. 

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Plaintiff states that defendant Jackson was responsible for reviewing the rules

violation report submitted by defendant Butler. According to plaintiff, defendant Jackson ratified

the false rules violation report, which did not comply with departmental regulations. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Magee conducted the investigation regarding the

rules violation report. Plaintiff claims that defendant Magee conducted the investigation with a

“predetermination of guilt” and altered witness statements. 

Plaintiff states that defendant Sandy conducted a prison disciplinary hearing on

the rules violation report on September 18, 2004. He states that, although plaintiff’s inmate

witness approached defendant Sandy to inform her that defendant Magee had falsified their

statements, defendant Sandy did nothing to correct the problem. Plaintiff also states that

defendant Sandy stopped the hearing after defendant Magee was caught in a lie in order “to

protect [defendant Magee] from further incriminating himself.” 

Plaintiff claims that defendant Stewart conducted another disciplinary hearing on

the rules violation report on February 4, 2005, and that, in the course of this hearing, defendant

Stewart allowed numerous violations of the regulations to occur. Specifically, plaintiff alleges

that defendant Stewart permitted defendant Butler to be present at the hearing and that, when

plaintiff asked questions, defendant Stewart would inaccurately rephrase them. 

Plaintiff states that defendant Fonville was his correctional counselor and that, on

March 3, 2005, she proposed a maximum security housing assignment as a result of plaintiff’s

being found guilty of the rules violation. Plaintiff claims that defendant Fonville made this

recommendation despite her knowledge of the procedural violations which had occurred during

his disciplinary hearing. 

Plaintiff claims that defendants Rodriguez and Brown, as members of the

classification committee responsible for determining plaintiff’s housing status, allowed plaintiff

to be classified to maximum security as a result of the rules violation, despite his knowledge of

“procedural violations and mitigating factors.”

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Plaintiff states that defendant Long was responsible for deciding his appeal of the

guilty finding and, despite the procedural problems, he affirmed the guilty finding. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Valdez “circumvented [his] appeals by

systematically denying [his] appeals.”

Finally, as to defendant Carey, who was the prison warden at the time, plaintiff

claims that he was made aware of all the problems alleged above and did nothing to prevent

violations of plaintiff’s due process rights. Plaintiff claims that defendant Carey failed to

intervene to stop the violations and that he failed to provide an adequate appeals process. 

II. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering a motion to dismiss under this

standard, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true. See Erickson v. Pardus,

127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hospital Bldg. Co. v.

Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.

1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain

more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct.1955, 1964-65 (2007). Allegations of specific facts are not necessary so

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

long as the statement of facts gives the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2197. 

To determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,

the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper

v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or

attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454;

(2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily

lies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice,

see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson

v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under these standards, a statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion

to dismiss. Finally, leave to amend must be granted “. . . [u]nless it is absolutely clear that no

amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

III. DISCUSSION

Based on the factual allegations outlined above, plaintiff complains about the

following: (1) confiscation of bag of food items by defendant Butler; (2) issuance of rules

violation report by defendant Butler; (3) witness report by defendant Wiley; (4) review and

investigation of rules violation report by defendants Jackson and Magee; (5) prison disciplinary

hearings conducted by defendants Sandy and Stewart; (6) maximum security housing

recommendation and classification by defendants Fonville, Rodriguez, and Brown; and 

(7) processing of inmate grievances by defendants Long and Valdez. Plaintiff also claims that

defendant Carey was aware of constitutional violations and is liable as a supervisor.

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

A. Issuance, Review, and Investigation of Rules Violation Report

Plaintiff sets forth various allegations concerning issuance, review, and

investigation of the rules violation report resulting from the August 2, 2004, incident. 

Specifically, he asserts that defendant Butler improperly issued the rules violation report

“maliciously to cause . . . hardship . . . .” Plaintiff also claims that defendant Wiley falsified his

witness report regarding the incident. As to defendants Jackson and Magee, plaintiff claims they

are liable with respect to their review and investigation of the rules violation report. In the

motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims concerning the rules violation report

are not cognizable because success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting prison

disciplinary process. 

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks

is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief

alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s

underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing, such a claim is

not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on

appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 646 (1987) (holding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural

defects and a biased hearing officer implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary

sanction); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 not

cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as an

element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v.

Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

because allegations of procedural defects were an attempt to challenge substantive result in

parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding that § 1983 claim was cognizable because

challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and not to any particular parole determination). 

In particular, where the claim involves loss of good-time credits as a result of an adverse prison

disciplinary finding, the claim is not cognizable. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th

Cir. 1997). If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not

convert the complaint into a habeas petition. See id.; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such

claims must be dismissed without prejudice and the complaint should proceed on any remaining

cognizable § 1983 claims. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Trimble, 49

F.3d at 585.

As defendants note, plaintiff’s claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the prison

disciplinary hearing resulting from the rules violation report. In particular, plaintiff claims in the

amended complaint the he is not guilty of the charged violation. He also alleges that the guilty

finding resulted in the loss of good-time credits and he seeks an injunction ordering the

“restoration of all . . . time loss credits (as if before being found guilty).” Therefore, the court

agrees with defendants that claims relating to issuance of the rules violation report are not

cognizable in a § 1983 action until and unless plaintiff has first obtained reversal or

expungement of the guilty finding by way of habeas corpus. These claims should be dismissed

without prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s opposition to dismiss is based on his repeated contentions that the

guilty finding resulted from defendants’ alleged lies and deceit and that he should be allowed to

seek redress in the context of a civil rights action. The court does not say that plaintiff is

necessarily wrong in this regard. Rather, the question is one of timing. Plaintiff may indeed be

able to seek redress for the defendants’ alleged conduct, but only after first obtaining reversal or

expungement of the underlying disciplinary finding. This § 1983 action is simply not the correct

vehicle for that preliminary determination. 

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

B. Prison Disciplinary Hearings

As to the prison disciplinary hearing which resulted from the rules violation

report, plaintiff claims that the result was based on false information and various procedural

violations. To the extent plaintiff’s claims would imply the invalidity of the guilty finding, they

are not cognizable for the reasons discussed above. 

As to procedural protections, due process requires prison officials to provide the

inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing that includes

the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate, and an explanation for the

disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses,

unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and (3) legal assistance where

the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 536-

70 (1974). Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in

the record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is

satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” 

Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result

of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by

way of habeas corpus. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997).

In this case, plaintiff states that defendant Sandy stopped the disciplinary hearing

after defendant Magee was caught in a lie in order “to protect [defendant Magee] from further

incriminating himself.” He also claims that defendant Stewart, who conducted a second

disciplinary hearing, permitted defendant Butler to be present at the hearing and that, when

plaintiff asked questions, defendant Stewart would inaccurately rephrase them. These allegations

go to the validity of guilty finding and do not implicate the procedural protections guaranteed by

due process. In particular, plaintiff does not allege that he was denied notice, assistance, or an

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

opportunity to be heard. Again, to the extent plaintiff’s claims challenge the validity of the guilty

finding, the claims are not cognizable. 

C. Confiscation of Property

Plaintiff appears to assert a due process violation based on defendant Butler’s

confiscation of his bag of food items. Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of a liberty or

property interest caused by the unauthorized action of a prison official, there is no claim

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533

(1984). A state’s post-deprivation remedy may be adequate even though it does not provide

relief identical to that available under § 1983. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531 n.11. An available

state common law tort claim procedure to recover the value of property is an adequate remedy. 

See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29.

Defendants are correct that plaintiff cannot state a due process claim based on the

allegedly unauthorized deprivation of his property because adequate post-deprivation remedies

exist. Specifically, plaintiff can pursue state law tort claims to redress the deprivation of

property. In fact, plaintiff states that he sought such remedies by filing a claim with the

California Board of Control. 

D. Housing Recommendation and Classification

Plaintiff cannot state any cognizable claim based on being housed in maximum

security. The Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution itself provides no liberty

interest in good-time credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; in remaining in the general population,

see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995); in not losing privileges, see Baxter v.

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 323 (1976); in staying at a particular institution, see Meachum, 427

U.S. at 225-27; or in remaining in a prison in a particular state, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461

U.S. 238, 245-47 (1983). Because there is no liberty interest in remaining in the general

population or in retaining privileges, it follows that there is also no liberty interest in remaining

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

in a lower security housing unit. 

E. Inmate Grievances

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Long and Valdez are liable with respect to their

handling of plaintiff’s inmate grievances. Prisoners, however, have no stand-alone due process

right to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no

liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Therefore, the court agrees

with defendants that plaintiff does not state any cognizable claim against defendants Long and

Valdez. 

F. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Carey – the prison warden – knew of constitutional

violations and did nothing to prevent them. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under

§ 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only

liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or had actual knowledge of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See

id. When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff has not stated any

cognizable claim of a constitutional violation. Therefore, there is no basis for supervisory

liability. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that dismissal of this action,

without prejudice, is appropriate. This findings is not inconsistent with the court’s August 16,

2007, order in which the court merely stated that, upon initial screening of the amended

complaint, the action “appears” to state cognizable claims. That order never operated to

foreclose defendants’ right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleading by way of a motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (Doc. 27) be granted;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docs. 16 and 21) be granted; 

3. This action be dismissed without prejudice; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment of dismissal and

close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 27, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00497-JAM-CMK Document 28 Filed 03/28/08 Page 11 of 11