Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01614/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01614-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MISTY DAWN REITZ AND NICHOLAS 

IVEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE 

COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation 

registered to do business in 

the State of California, and 

DOES 1 through 200, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-CV-01614-GEB-EFB 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS AND ITS IN LIMINE 

MOTION

Defendant Progressive Direct Insurance Company moves 

for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c), contending “[P]laintiffs’ claims for 

extra-contractual damages . . . are not recoverable in contract 

and are barred by this Court’s August 27, 2014, Order dismissing 

Plaintiffs’ tort-based claim for breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing.” (Def. Mot. J. Pleadings 2:3-5, 

ECF No. 26.) Defendants also move in the alternative for an order 

excluding “any evidence [from] trial related to [Plaintiffs’] 

claims for extra-contractual damages... on relevance grounds.” 

(Def. MTE 2:2-4, ECF No. 27.) 

Case 2:14-cv-01614-KJM-EFB Document 32 Filed 07/10/15 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiffs argue as follows concerning Defendant’s Rule 

12(c) motion: 

The motion under Rule 12(c) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure depends upon the 

pleadings[,] and paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of 

the complaint plead an implied contract to 

investigate claims fairly and in good faith 

and further plead a breach of that implied 

contract by [Defendant]. Read collectively 

with paragraph 19, these paragraphs allege 

that the breach of this promise proximately 

resulted in damage to [Plaintiffs] . . . of a 

nature that was not only contemplated 

by the parties at the inception of the 

agreement, but that was specifically 

understood by the parties to be a likely 

result of a breach by [Defendant] and 

constituted substantial bargained for 

consideration on the part of [Plaintiffs]. 

Those pleadings cannot be read to allow 

[Defendant] judgment on them . . . under 

California contract law.

(Mem. Opp’n MIL & Mot. Partial J. (“Opp’n”) 11:17-12:2, ECF No. 

29.)

Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical to 

[a motion under] Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . the same standard of 

review applies to motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, 

U.S. ex. rel. v. Generay Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 

n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted)). “To survive [a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings], a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. 

Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendant does not challenge the plausibility of 

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations; rather it argues: “[b]ecause 

this Court has already determined that Plaintiffs may only 

proceed with their claim for breach of the implied covenant 

sounding in contract, Plaintiffs are foreclosed from seeking any 

Case 2:14-cv-01614-KJM-EFB Document 32 Filed 07/10/15 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

damages over the limit of liability specified in the policy of 

insurance,” and therefore “Plaintiffs’ allegations of extracontractual damages . . . are not recoverable.” (Def. Mot. 6:7-9; 

6:14-16.) However, Defendant has not shown that the Court’s 

referenced prior ruling addressed the contractual damages claim 

Defendant asserts it now challenges. 

Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that they “entered 

into a[] written insurance contract” with Defendant stating 

Defendant “would indemnify [Plaintiffs] from any damage that they 

may sustain by reason of fire to or theft of [their vehicle;]” 

however, after their vehicle was stolen and destroyed in a fire, 

Defendant “refused to indemnify [Plaintiffs on the grounds that] 

. . . it [had] probable cause to believe [Plaintiffs] . . . 

deliberately procured the removal of the [vehicle] from their 

residence and . . . caused [the fire that destroyed it].” (Compl. 

¶¶ 4, 14-15.) Plaintiffs allege the following resulted from 

Defendant’s conduct:

[They] suffered damages contemplated by the 

Policy, in that they were unable to replace 

the [vehicle], they were accused of and 

prosecuted for criminal activity, they were 

subjected to arrest and detention, they lost 

past and future income, and lost the 

bargained for peace and security of knowledge 

that their financial losses covered by the 

Policy would be indemnified by [Defendant], 

all to their damages in the sum of nine 

million, nine hundred fifty thousand dollars 

($9,950,000.00,) or according to proof.

(Compl. ¶¶ 18-19) (emphasis added.)

The core of Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion concerns 

whether Plaintiffs can seek what Defendant characterizes as 

“extra-contractual damages.” California Civil Code section 3300,

Case 2:14-cv-01614-KJM-EFB Document 32 Filed 07/10/15 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the statute under which Plaintiffs’ damages claim is analyzed, 

states: 

[f]or the breach of an obligation arising 

from contract, the measure of damages, except 

where otherwise expressly provided by this 

code, is the amount which will compensate the 

party for all the detriment proximately 

caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary 

course of things, would be likely the result 

therefrom.

Further, the California Supreme Court states in Weaver 

v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 434 

(1963), that in contract actions “[w]hile the causal extent of 

damages may be more limited than in tort, nevertheless, damages 

actually contemplated, or within the reasonable contemplation of 

the parties, are recoverable.” 

In light of this authority, Defendant has not shown it 

prevails on its Rule 12(c).

Plaintiffs also oppose Defendant’s alternative motion 

to exclude from trial any evidence related to Plaintiff’s claim 

for extra-contractual damages, arguing the motion seeks an unripe 

in limine ruling that would prevent evidence from being used at 

trial. (Opp’n 4:5-9.) Defendant’s alternative motion is not 

concrete enough for a judicial ruling, and is therefore denied.

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion

and its alternative motion are DENIED.

Dated: July 9, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-01614-KJM-EFB Document 32 Filed 07/10/15 Page 4 of 4