Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00360/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00360-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1441lb Removal- Libel, Assault, Slander

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TOMMY LANIER, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15CV360-BAS(BLM) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME AND 

COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSE 

[ECF NO. 62] 

 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s February 7, 2017 Motion to Enlarge Time and 

Compel Discovery [ECF No. 62-1 ("Mot.")], Defendants' February 10, 2017 opposition to the 

motion [ECF No. 64 ("Oppo.")], and Plaintiff’s February 13, 2017 reply [ECF No. 65 ("Reply")]. 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is suing Defendants for defamation, unlawful retaliation under the California Fair 

Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”) and under Title VIII 42 U.S.C. sections 2000(e)-3(a), and 

violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act. ECF No. 9, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

Plaintiff, who was an employee of the City of Chula Vista under the federal grant High Intensity 

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Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”) program and Director of the National Marijuana Initiative 

(“NMI”) alleges that he was forced to resign from his position after complaining to Defendant 

McAdam, also an employee of the City of Chula Vista and Director of HIDTA, about Mr. Ralph 

Partridge, the Deputy Director of HIDTA, for “creating an offensive and hostile work environment 

toward one or more female employees who were working under [P]laintiff.” FAC at 4-6. Plaintiff 

further alleges that Defendants McAdam and City of Chula Vista falsely accused him of lying 

about travel expenses in order to justify his forced resignation. Id. at 7-14. 

On March 21, 2016, the Court held a telephonic Case Management Conference (“CMC”). 

ECF No. 40-41. Following the CMC, the Court issued a Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery 

and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings. ECF No. 41. In that Order, the Court set a deadline of 

November 18, 2016 for the close of all fact discovery1 and included language requiring that any 

motions to compel discovery be filed within thirty (30) days of the service of an objection, 

answer, or response which becomes the subject of dispute. Id. at 2-3. Five months after the 

Court issued its scheduling order, Plaintiff took his first deposition. Oppo. at 6; see also ECF No. 

64-1, Declaration of Laurie N. Stayton, ESQ., In Support of Defendant Kean McAdam’s 

Opposition to Plaintiff Lanier’s Motion to Enlarge Time and Compel Discovery Response (“Stayton 

Decl.”) at 3. 

Plaintiff noticed the deposition of Defendant McAdam on September 14, 2016 and on 

October 5, 2016, Defendant McAdam served written objections to the scope of the deposition 

                                                                

1 This deadline provided the parties with 242 days (approximately eight months) in which to 

complete fact discovery. 

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questioning and production of documents.2 Id. at 6-7; see also Stayton Decl. at 3. Defendant 

McAdam also objected to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents No. 7.3 Id. at 7; see 

also Stayton Decl. at 3. Plaintiff did not respond to the written objections. Stayton Decl. at 4.

On October 11, 2016, Defendant McAdam appeared for his deposition and reiterated his 

objections to any questions or the production of documents relating to the October 16, 2013 

closed session meeting. Id. at 5. The parties met and conferred regarding the issue on the 

record during the deposition, at which point Defendant McAdam testified that there are one to 

three emails in existence that are responsive to Request No. 7. Id. at Exh. D (Deposition 

Transcript of Kean McAdam); see also Oppo. at 8-9. Plaintiff continued with additional questions, 

some of which were answered and some of which were not due to claims of privilege. Id. The 

deposition ended when Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. M. Richardson Lynn, Jr., decided to terminate, 

                                                                

2Specifically, Defendant McAdam stated that he “will refuse to answer any deposition questions, 

and will not produce any DOCUMENTS, RELATING to the nature and content of any 

communications that occurred during the October 16, 2013 San Diego-Imperial High Intensity 

Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”) Executive Board’s “Executive Session” – also called the closed

session, without a court order. The communications that occurred during the October 16, 2013 

San Diego-Imperial High HIDTA Executive Board’s closed “Executive Session,” are privileged 

under California Evidence Code section 1040, protected from tort liability under California Civil 

Code sections 47, and not discoverable pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 

2017.010. Oppo. at 6-7; see also Stayton Decl. at 3-4 (emphasis in original). 

3 Request No. 7 sought “All memoranda, reports, emails or other communications issued by you 

to the San Diego/Imperial HIDTA Executive Board relating to the termination of Tommy LaNier 

as NMI Director.” Oppo. at 7; see also Stayton Decl. at 3. Defendant McAdam objected to the 

Request on the basis that it sought documents “protected against disclosure by the attorneyclient, work product privileges and California Evidence Code section 1040” and “irrelevant to the 

subject matter of this litigation and which are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 

of admissible evidence.” Id.; see also Stayton Decl. at 4. Defendant McAdam further objected 

that the “request assumes facts not in evidence and lacks foundation in that it improperly 

assumes that MCADAM recommended, or issued any documents to the San Diego/Imperial 

HIDTA Executive Board relating to the termination of Tommy LaNier as NMI Director.” Id.

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but not conclude the deposition in light of the privilege issues surrounding the October 16, 2013 

closed session meeting. Id.; see also Oppo. at 9. At the time, Mr. Lynn noted that he would 

have “to file a discovery motion, and the Court will rule” if the parties were unable to resolve 

the matter. Id. 

The parties met and conferred again by telephone on October 19, 2016, but were unable 

to resolve the dispute. Oppo. at 11. Nearly three and a half months later (104 days), on January 

31, 2017, Mr. Lynn, Jr., counsel for Defendant City of Chula Vista, Mr. Phillip L. Kossy, and 

counsel for Defendant Kean McAdam, Ms. Laurie N. Stayton, jointly contacted the Court 

regarding a discovery dispute. In regard to the dispute, the Court issued a briefing schedule. 

ECF No. 59. In accordance with that schedule, the parties timely filed their paperwork. See 

Mot.; see also Oppo. and Reply. 

REQUESTED RELIEF 

Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court granting relief from the parties' thirty (30) day 

deadline to bring a motion to compel, and compelling Defendant McAdam to disclose the 

information presented and statements made by Defendant McAdam at the October 16, 2013 

HIDTA Executive Board closed session meeting. Mot. at 7. 

LEGAL STANDARD - MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 

 Once a Rule 16 scheduling order is issued, dates set forth therein may be modified only 

“for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also ECF No. 41 at 

7 (stating that the dates set forth in the CMC Order regulating discovery and other pretrial 

proceedings “will not be modified except for good cause shown”). The Rule 16 good cause 

standard focuses on the “reasonable diligence” of the moving party. Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 

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F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (stating Rule 16(b) scheduling order may be modified for “good cause” based primarily 

on diligence of moving party). Essentially, “the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s 

reasons for seeking modification.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 

(9th Cir. 1992). However, a court also may consider the “existence or degree of prejudice to 

the party opposing the modification . . . .” Id. 

 In addition to being required to establish good cause, a party moving to extend time after 

a scheduling order deadline has passed must demonstrate excusable neglect. Mireles v. Paragon 

Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 575713, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) (citing Weil v. Carecore Nat'l, LLC, 

2011 WL 1938196, at *2 (D. Colo. May 19, 2011)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (stating 

“the court may, for good cause, extend the time on motion made after the time has expired if 

the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”). The following factors are considered in 

determining whether there has been excusable neglect: the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party; the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; the reason 

for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and whether 

the moving party’s conduct was in good faith. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. 

P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). 

MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 

In order to compel Defendant McAdam’s responses, Plaintiff seeks relief under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 6(b)(1)(B) to enlarge the time for him to compel further 

document production and deposition testimony. Id. at 3. Plaintiff recognizes that there is an 

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argument that under the Court’s March 21, 2016, Scheduling Order [see ECF No. 41], Plaintiff’s 

last day to bring a discovery motion was November 11, 2016. The Scheduling Order states: 

All discovery motions must be filed within 30 days of the service of an objection, 

answer or response which becomes the subject of dispute or the passage of a 

discovery due date without response or production, and only after counsel have 

met and conferred and have reached impasse with regard to the particular 

issue. The Court’s procedures for resolving discovery disputes are set forth in 

Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major’s Civil Chambers Rules, which are posted on 

the Court’s website. A failure to comply in this regard will result in a waiver of 

a party's discovery issue. Absent an order of the court, no stipulation continuing 

or altering this requirement will be recognized by the court. 

ECF No. 41 at 3; see also Mot. at 3. However, Plaintiff argues that this language could be 

interpreted to mean that his motion to compel had to be filed “within 30 days plus an undefined 

‘meet and confer’ period” in which case his motion is timely. Mot. at 3, fn 2 (emphasis in 

original). Assuming Plaintiff’s motion was due on November 11, 2016, Plaintiff notes that motion 

to compel deadlines are set at the discretion of the Court and that the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and Local Rules for the Southern District of California do not set any such deadlines. 

Id. at 3. Plaintiff further argues that he has demonstrated that he meets the excusable neglect 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b)(1) since any “delay in the case will be minimal and there will 

be no delay of the trial” and his counsel was acting in good faith, when he simply failed to 

remember the deadline contained in the scheduling order. Id. at 5. Finally, Plaintiff argues that 

the Court should permit his motion to compel as the “area of inquiry goes to the very heart of 

[Plaintiff’s] claims in this case.” Id. at 6. 

Defendant McAdam contends that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied on procedural 

grounds alone as non-expert discovery closed on November 18, 2016 and Plaintiff failed to 

request a modification of the Court’s scheduling order. Oppo. at 4, 12. Defendant McAdam 

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objects noting that Plaintiff was required to file a motion modifying the scheduling order and not 

a motion to enlarge time since almost three months have passed since non-expert discovery 

closed. Id. Defendant McAdam further contends that even if the Court were to consider 

Plaintiff’s motion to enlarge time, the motion should be denied as the Court’s scheduling order 

is quite clear and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for his failure to file a 

timely motion to compel. Id. at 4, 12-15. In addition to the lack of excusable neglect, Plaintiff 

has shown a complete lack of due diligence in waiting over three months to seek relief regarding 

the motion to compel filing deadline and a lack of good faith. Id. at 5, 17. Defendant McAdam 

notes that Plaintiff has been aware of the motion to compel deadline since March 29, 2016, 

when the deadline was set and that he raised the issue of the motion to compel as far back as 

November 28, 2016 in his opposition to Defendant McAdam’s motion for summary judgment. 

Id. at 17. Finally, Defendant McAdam contends that allowing Plaintiff to reopen discovery would 

be highly prejudicial as Defendant McAdam specifically delayed the filing of his motion for 

summary judgment until after Plaintiff’s deadline to file a motion to compel related to the 

October 16, 2013 closed session had passed. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff replies that the language in the Court’s Scheduling Order is ambiguous and that 

allowing only thirty days from the service of an objection for meeting and conferring, complying 

with the Court’s requirement of a telephonic meet and confer with Chambers, and filing a motion 

to compel, presents “an extremely tight time frame” and “would promote giving mere lip service 

to the meet and confer requirement due to the time pressure.” Reply at 2-3. Plaintiff further 

replies that he was in the process of meeting and conferring when Defendants filed motions for 

summary judgment that were long and complex and required him to “put everything else aside.” 

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Id. at 3. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant McAdam would not be prejudiced by the 

extension permitting a very narrow amount of additional discovery and that he has not acted in 

bad faith. Id. at 4. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect sufficient to support 

an order from the Court resetting the discovery deadline. Plaintiff’s deadline for filing a motion 

to compel with respect to the claimed Official Information Privilege was November 4, 2016. The 

standard language contained in the Court’s Scheduling Order is quite clear. 

All discovery motions must be filed within 30 days of the service of an objection, answer 

or response which becomes the subject of dispute or the passage of a discovery due date 

without response or production, and only after counsel have met and conferred and have 

reached impasse with regard to the particular issue. 

ECF No. 41. at 3. Plaintiff received written objections to his deposition notice for Defendant 

McAdam and request for documents on October 5, 2016. The objections were specific to the 

closed HIDTA session and the Official Information Privilege. Oppo. at 6-7; see also Stayton 

Decl. at 3-4. Thirty days from October 5, 2016 was November 4, 2016. Defendant McAdam 

reiterated his objections one week later on October 11, 2016 at the deposition. Oppo. at 5. The 

parties immediately met and conferred on the record, but could not resolve the issues. Id. 

Thirty days from October 11, 2016 was November 10, 2016. The parties again met and 

conferred on October 19, 2016. Id. at 11. Thirty days from October 19, 2016 is November 18, 

2016. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s Order is ambiguous and could be read to mean that he 

had thirty days “plus an undefined ‘meet and confer’ period” in which case his motion is timely. 

Mot. at fn 2 (emphasis in original). This interpretation of the Court’s Order is both incorrect and 

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unpersuasive. According to Plaintiff, a party could receive an objection or response to its 

discovery request, decide not to meet and confer on the issue for a full year, finally meet and 

confer, and then have an additional thirty days to file a motion to compel. That is not the Court’s 

intent and contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, thirty days is a sufficient amount of time to review 

discovery objections and responses, meet and confer with opposing counsel, and have a 

conference call with the Court’s chambers in order to receive a motion filing or hearing date. If 

a party is unable to comply with the thirty day deadline, the party should file a motion to extend 

the deadline before the deadline passes and not wait nearly three months after the deadline 

passed before taking action. 

Because the Court already has issued a scheduling order and the deadline at issue has 

passed, Plaintiff must demonstrate good cause and excusable neglect in order to have the 

deadline amended. Plaintiff has failed to do so. As stated, good cause turns on the reasonable 

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1174 n.6. Here, Defendant 

McAdam objected to the evidence and testimony on October 5th and 11th, Plaintiff stated on 

the record that during the October 11th deposition that he was going to file a motion to compel, 

and Plaintiff knew (or should have known) that fact discovery ended on November 18, 2016. 

ECF No. 41 at 2. Despite all of these facts, Plaintiff failed to file the anticipated motion for 119 

days. This does not constitute reasonable diligence. Plaintiff argues that this lengthy delay was 

reasonable because he had to postpone the requirement of good faith meeting and conferring 

in order to properly respond to the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant McAdam 

and Defendant City of Chula Vista. Reply at 3. However, those motions were filed on November 

8, 2016 and January 6, 2017 respectively, after Plaintiff’s deadline to file the motion to compel 

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already had passed. See ECF Nos. 42 and 53. Plaintiff’s other proffered reason for missing the 

deadline, that he simply forgot there was a deadline, also fails to demonstrate reasonable 

diligence. Plaintiff argues that the information he seeks is “material and important” and “goes 

to the very heart of” Plaintiff’s case, but his lengthy and unjustified delay in challenging 

Defendant McAdam’s objections does not support this claim. Reply at 2; see also Mot. at 6. 

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not established good cause or reasonable diligence 

for the lengthy delay. 

In determining whether or not to modify a Rule 16 Scheduling Order, a Court also may 

consider the “existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification . . . .” 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is very little prejudice, in [sic] any, to 

McAdam” as any delay will be minimal and the current trial date will not be affected. Mot. at 5. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that if he is permitted to file a motion to compel and that motion is 

granted, the only prejudice or delay would be a 45 minute deposition of Defendant McAdam and 

the production of the few emails or memorandums that he previously testified he provided to 

the Board members in conjunction with the closed session meeting. Reply at 3-4. Plaintiff’s 

attempt to downplay the prejudice that Defendant McAdam would suffer is not persuasive and 

the Court finds that Defendant McAdam would be significantly prejudiced if Plaintiff is permitted 

to file a late motion to compel which is ultimately granted. Defendant McAdam waited to file 

his motion for summary judgment until after fact discovery closed and the deadline for Plaintiff 

to file a motion to compel had passed. Oppo. at 17; see also Stayton Decl. at 8. Granting 

Plaintiff’s motion would result in Defendant McAdam having to prepare for and attend a 

deposition, produce the documents at issue, and potentially amend or refile his motion for 

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summary judgment depending upon the information that is found. In addition, given the issues 

and arguments surrounding the privilege claims and HIDTA, Defendant McAdam may have to 

expend considerable time and effort attempting to obtain authorization from the proper entities 

to testify about the October 2013 closed session. Moreover, if the law enforcement entities or 

individuals who participated in HIDTA and were present during the closed session objected to 

the production of the emails or to Defendant McAdam’s deposition testimony, the dispute could 

lead to new or protracted litigation. 

Even if Plaintiff had established good cause for missing the deadline to file, he has not 

demonstrated excusable neglect. Mireles, 2014 WL 575713, at *2 (citing Weil, 2011 WL 

1938196, at *2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). As stated above, the risk of prejudice to 

Defendant McAdam is high. Additionally, the length of the delay, almost three months after the 

deadline to file a motion to compel has passed, and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, 

such as the pending motions for summary judgment and possible additional motion practice, do 

not support a finding of excusable neglect. Furthermore, the reason for the delay, that Plaintiff 

forgot about the deadline set in the Court’s scheduling order, was completely within the 

reasonable control of Plaintiff. The Court will give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and assume 

his actions were undertaken in good faith. However, in conjunction with the other factors 

discussed above, that alone is not sufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. 

Serv. Co., 507 U.S. at 395. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect for missing 

the November 2016 deadline to file a motion to compel, Plaintiff’s motion to enlarge time is 

DENIED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel “further testimony and production 

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concerning what transpired in the meeting in which the fate of [Plaintiff] was discussed and 

ultimately decided” is also DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/10/2017 

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