Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-03285/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-03285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TH%6 JUL 1 7 AH 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 52 

SOUTHERN DIVISION '1 5. i I:: /i.z i-Z * * 

f;l-! I.-, ; . . . ,* 

LAUREL JULIAN, ) 

PLAINTIFF, 1 

VS. ) 

BEVERLY ENTERPRISES - ) 

ALABAMA, INC., a corporation, 

) 

DEFENDANT. 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

The court has before it the May 1,2006 motion (doc. # 5 1) of defendant 

Beverly Enterprises - Alabama, Inc. ("Beverly") for summary judgment. Pursuant 

to the court's May 3,2006 order, the motion was deemed submitted, without oral 

argument, on June 7,2006. 

I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff Laurel Julian commenced this action on November 23,2004 by 

filing a complaint in this court alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended 29 U.S.C. 5 62 1 et seq. Plaintiff 

contends that defendant terminated her because of her age. Defendant's May 1, 

2006 motion for summary judgment and brief in support of the motion assert that 

FILED

 2006 Jul-17 PM 12:02

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 1 of 30
plaintiff has failed to establish a prima face case for plaintiffs claim, and, in the 

alternative, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for her termination were a pretext for age discrimination. 

Both parties have filed briefs and submitted evidence in support of their 

respective positions. On May 1,2006, defendant submitted a brief (Attachment to 

doc. # 5 1 ) and evidence' (Exs. 1-5 to doc. # 5 1) in support of its own motion for 

summary judgment. On May 3 1,2006, plaintiff filed a brief and evidence2 (doc. # 

54) in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. On June 7,2006, 

defendant filed a brief and evidence3 (doc. # 56) in reply to plaintiffs opposition. 

Before discussing the merits of the motion for summary judgment, the court 

must first address another pending motion. Plaintiff filed a motion (doc. #55) to 

' The defendant submitted the following evidence: excerpts and exhibits from deposition 

of Laurel Julian; excerpts of deposition of Keith Jewell; excerpts of deposition of Hope 

Hickrnan; excerpts of deposition of Bessie Mizelle; excerpts of deposition of Timothy Detary; 

and affidavit of Jayme L. Tucker dated April 28,2006. 

The plaintiff submitted the following evidence: deposition of Laurel Julian; deposition 

of Hope Hickman; deposition of Keith Jewell; excerpts of notes of Laurel Julian; Beverly's 

discipline, supervisory and managerial associates; employee information sheet on Laurel Julian; 

employee information sheet on Katherine Ponder; plaintiffs first set of interrogatories and 

request for production; defendant's responses to plaintiffs interrogatories and request for 

production; declaration of Martha Williams; declaration of Glenda Burns; declaration of Shelby 

Walker; declaration of Mary Alice Edmonds; letter from defense counsel regarding Mike 

McKelvaine; score card summary; e-mail from Hope Hickman to Laurel Julian dated 311 812003; 

e-mail from Judy Pritchard to Laurel Julian dated 411 812003. 

The defendant submitted the following evidence: affidavit of Jayme L. Tucker dated 

June 7,2006. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 2 of 30
strike regarding four pieces of evidence submitted by defendant in support of its 

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the court should strike the 

following: (I) the January 2003 action plan; (2) the March 2003 state survey; (3) a 

comment by an administrative law judge in an unfair labor practices case against 

Beverly regarding plaintiff; and (4) the hotline complaints. Plaintiff argues that 

defendant should not be allowed to use this evidence as justification for her 

termination because they were not disclosed as a part of defendant's initial 

disclosures under Rule 26(a) and because they were not disclosed in response to 

plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production regarding the reasons for her 

termination. 

The motion is due to be denied. The court has already dealt with three of 

the pieces of evidence (the survey, ALJ decision, and hotline complaints), in 

plaintiffs motion for sanctions, which the court deemed borderline frivolous. The 

court will not restate the reasons for allowing defendant to use this evidence, but 

instead, directs the parties to its March 29,2006 order (doc. # 50). As for the 

action plan, the court first notes that there is nothing to strike. Defendant did not 

submit the action plan as evidence, but instead plaintiff testified regarding the 

action plan in her deposition. Second, there seems to be no dispute that Julian was 

placed on an action plan in January 2003. As such, that fact is properly before the 

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court. Moreover, the court disagrees with plaintiffs characterization of this 

evidence as a justification for plaintiffs termination. Instead, the court views this 

evidence as facts surrounding and indicative of her performance problems, which 

ultimately led to her termination. In addition, that the defendant allegedly did not 

inform plaintiff of all the reasons for her termination do not make those reasons 

any less legitimate if they actually occurred. There is no dispute of fact as to 

whether these incidents occurred. For the above reasons, plaintiffs motion (doc. 

#55) to strike is DENIED. 

11. Standards for Evaluating a Summary Judgment Motion 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper 

"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Chapman v. A1 Transport, 229 

F.3d 10 12, 1023 (1 1 th Cir. 2000). The party asking for summary judgment always 

bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and 

identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323. Once the moving 

party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond 

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the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. 

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are 

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). All 

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in 

favor of the non-movant. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1 1 12, 1 1 15 

(1 lth Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 

judgment may be granted. See id. at 249. 

The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge 

its initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the 

issue at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1 11 5-1 7 (citing United States v. Four 

Parcels of Real Property, 94 1 F.2d 1428 (1 1 th Cir. 199 l)(en banc)). If the moving 

party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can only meet its initial burden on 

summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence demonstrating the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact; i.e. facts that would entitle it to a 

directed verdict if not controverted at trial. & Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1 1 15. Once 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 5 of 30
the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party 

to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. 

If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy 

its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving 

party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus 

demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. 

Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the non-moving 

party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed 

verdict at trial. 

The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the 

burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to 

affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record to support a judgment for 

the non-moving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a 

simple statement that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does 

not require evidence negating the non-movant's claim; it simply requires the 

movant to point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the non-moving party's case. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1 1 1 5- 16. If the 

movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the non-moving party 

may either point out to the court record evidence, overlooked or ignored by the 

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movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the non-moving party may 

come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict 

motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when 

responding, the non-movant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set 

forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Case?, 5 18 U.S. 343,3 5 8 (1 996) 

(citing Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56 1 (1992)). 

111. Relevant Undisputed ~acts~ 

Beverly is engaged in the business of long-term care for the elderly and 

sick. (PI. Dep. at 23-24.) Julian served as the Executive Director of Beverly's 

licensed skilled nursing facility in Oneonta, Alabama, for approximately 28 years. 

(Id. at 19,24,36-37.) As Executive Director, Julian had overall management 

responsibility for the entire facility. (Id. at 38.) She was responsible for budget 

preparation and compliance, human resource issues, census b~ilding,~ compliance 

with state and federal regulations, maintenance and development of positive 

relationships with government regulators, residents, families and the greater 

community, and oversight of Medicare and Medicaid billing and reimbursement. 

If the facts are in dispute, they are stated in a manner most favorable to the non-movant. 

- See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1 1 15. 

Census building means maintaining a sufficient number of residents in the facility. (Pl. 

Dep. at 41.) 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 7 of 30
(Id. at 38-41,45-46, 55-56.) She was responsible for staff recruitment, retention, 

training, and morale. (Id. at 39,47.) Julian also ensured that the needs of the 

residents were addressed. (Id. at 47.) 

A. January 2003 Action Plan 

In October 2002, Beverly conducted an Internal Quality Review of the 

Oneonta facility. (Id. at 82-83.) The review revealed some deficiencies, and 

Julian was directed to correct the problems. (Id. at 8 1, 83.) In December 2002, 

Beverly conducted a Quality Review follow up and discovered that the problems 

at the facility had not been corrected and noted additional problems. (Id. at 8 1, 83- 

84.) As a result of the problems, Julian was placed on an action plan in January 

2003. (Id. at 9 1-92.) Julian understood that Beverly considered the issues as 

serious ones. (u at 93-95.) Julian then placed three of her senior staff members, 

those in charge of the areas with the serious deficiencies, on action plans. (Id. at 

85-91 .) 

B. March 2003 Immediate Jeopardy Tag 

A couple of months later, in March 2003, the state of Alabama conducted a 

survey to ensure that the facility was complying with regulation^.^ (I4, at 104.) 

All skilled nursing facilities are subjected to state and federal operating regulations 

under Medicare and Medicaid. (Pl. Dep. at 170.) The state of Alabama conducts these surveys 

annually or in response to a complaint. (Id. at 171 .) 

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The survey identified numerous deficiencies and resulted an "Immediate 

Jeopardy" tag. (u at 104-05.) This tag was the worst rating the facility could 

receive; the state explicitly determined that the facility's "failures placed the one 

hundred and fourteen current residents in the facility in immediate and serious 

threat of harm, injury, impairment, or death." (Id.; Ex. 9 to PI. Dep. at 8.) Until 

the tag was removed, new residents were not allowed in the facility. (Pl. Dep. at 

105.) It also placed the facility in jeopardy of losing funding from Medicaid and 

Medicare, which would have forced the facility to close. (Id, at 106.) 

As a result of the immediate jeopardy tag, the facility received a statement 

of deficiency from the state surveying agency. (Ih, at 167; Ex. 9 to P1. Dep.) The 

findings included actual harm and abuse of the residents. (Pl. Dep. at 104, 188- 

89.) In addition, Julian, as the administrator of the facility, received an immediate 

jeopardy tag. (Id. at 189.) The surveyors determined that "the facility's Executive 

Director failed to ensure systems were in place for staff to timely report, 

thoroughly investigate, and provide for the resident safety to ensure that residents 

were safe and free from abuse. This had the potential to affect all 1 14 residents in 

the facility." (Ex. 9 to P1. Dep. at 2 1 .) This tag placed Julian's license at risk, and 

she was required to appear before the State of Alabama Board of Examiners of 

Nursing Home Administrators; no action was taken against Julian by the state 

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board.' (Pl. Dep. at 194-95; Ex. 1 1 to P1. Dep.) 

In an attempt to lift the immediate jeopardy tag as soon as possible, the 

facility implemented a correction plan that very day and began significant 

retraining of the employees, including Julian and her management staff. (Pl. Dep. 

at 168-69.) The immediate jeopardy tag was removed after four days. (Hickman 

Dep. at 79-80; P1. Dep. at 290.) The facility did not lose and Medicare hnds 

during those four days. (Id.) One patient was removed from the facility, admitted 

to the hospital during this time, and was not readmitted to Beverly, but not as a 

result of the immediate jeopardy tag. (Id.) 

C. Other Problems 

Julian experienced other problems as Executive Director of the Oneonta 

facility. One of those problems was a fairly severe staffing shortage from the 

middle of 2002 into 2003. (Pl. Dep. at 75.) Julian admitted that the facility had a 

difficult time recruiting and retaining nurses. (Id.) For example, in May 2003, 

there were eight certified nursing assistant openings. (Id. at 158; Ex. 7 to P1. Dep.) 

Also that month, Julian informed her supervisor, Director of Operations, Hope 

Hickman, that she was not going to be able to cover the schedule for licensed 

Julian disagreed with the results of the swey and was appealing the findings. (Pl. Dep. 

at 176; Hickman Dep. at 1 17.) Beverly chose not to pursue an appeal of the findings, even 

though they had appealed other findings in the past. (PI. Dep. at 177; Hickman Dep. at 11 8.) 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 10 of 30
nurses for three days. (u at 152.) Julian informed Hickman that the staffing 

"look[ed] very dicey" and testified that the staffing shortage had become critical. 

(u at 159-60; Ex. 7 to PI. Dep.) 

Julian testified that she believed that the problem with recruitment and 

retention was because the facility was not competitive in the wages that it paid. 

(PI. Dep. at 272-73.) Julian told Hickrnan that this was her belief on several 

occasions. (Hickman Dep. at 136.) In 1999, Julian requested a wage increase that 

was approved in March 2000, but Julian testified that the increase was insufficient 

and that the facility's wages remained below that of other facilities. (PI. Dep. at 

273-77.) Julian also alleges that in 2003, other facilities in the area had similar 

retention and recruitment problems. (Ex. 16 to PI. Dep.) 

Another problem revolved around deficiencies in the medical records 

documentation at the facility. (Pl. Dep. at 69.) Julian testified that the 

administrative nurses were not keeping up with the documentation that needed to 

be completed and filed with Medicare, for example. (Id. at 70-71 .) Without 

completion of that paperwork, Beverly could not submit claims for Medicare 

payment. (U at 7 1-74.) Julian admitted that these deficiencies were serious 

problems within the facility. (a at 74.) 

An additional area where Julian experienced difficulty as Executive 

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Director was with maintenance of the patient census. (Pl. Dep. at 68, 75-76,221, 

227; Ex. 12 to P1. Dep.; Hickman Dep. at 60,77-79, 149-50.) In March 2003, 

after the immediate jeopardy tag, the facility census dropped and continued below 

budget throughout the remainder of Julian's employment. (Hickman Dep. at 79.) 

Hickman questioned Julian about the drop in mid-April 2003. (Ex. 12 to PI. Dep.) 

Julian responded by stating the following reasons for the drop in the census: (1) 

that there had been more deaths of patients that year due to the admission of "a lot 

of higher acuity patients"; (2) that because they "marketed for short-term rehab 

admissions," many patients had been discharged and returned home; and (3) 

several negative rumors in the community regarding the facility. () Julian also 

pointed out that the previous April had also marked a low point in the census. 

(a) In addition, she told Hickman that she planned an open house to dispel the 

rumors, had "extended [the] marketing radius" to other hospitals and medical 

facilities, and was "looking for more traditional long-term admissions to stabilize 

[the] census." (Id.) 

Julian also experienced problems in the form of hot line complaints against 

her. Beverly maintains a confidential hotline that is available for residents, 

families and employees to report any problems or issues that may exist. (PI. Dep. 

at 229.) On January 20, 2003, Beverly received a complaint from a daughter of a 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 12 of 30
resident who complained that Julian had been rude to her on several occasions. 

(Ex. 15 to P1. Dep.) She stated the Julian treated family members like "they are 

not important" and did not "resolve and address concerns." (Id. She also 

complained about the lack of staffing. (Id.) Hickman investigated the complaint, 

but could not verify the complaint because the caller did not reveal her identity. 

(Hickman Dep. at 1 65 .) 

On March 24,2003, another family member of a resident called the hotline 

and complained about the lack of adequate staffing. (Ex. 15 to PI. Dep.) She 

stated that she had attempted to speak with Julian on eight occasions, but was 

turned down each time. (Id.) She remarked that she heard Julian tell her assistant 

to "tell them I can't right now" or "I'm busy, maybe later." (Id.) When Hickman 

questioned Julian regarding the complaint, Julian admitted that the facility was 

understaffed, but that other nurses were working overtime to compensate. (u) 

She also told Hickman that she only turned away family members when she was in 

a meeting or on a conference call. (u; P1. Dep. at 238-39.) 

One more issue plagued Julian in her final years as Executive Director: 

union organization. In July 2000, the Food and Commercial Workers Union filed 

a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 

become the representative of the non-management employees at the facility. (Pl. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 13 of 30
Dep. at 127-28.) Beverly conducted a campaign against union organization, with 

Julian leading the effort to respond to the union's petition. (Id. at 130.) 

The NLRB conducted an election on September 7,2000. (u at 130-3 1 .) 

Although Beverly won the election, the union filed objections to the election and 

several unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, including one against Julian. 

(Id. at 13 1 .) After the NLRB investigated, it issued a complaint against the 

facility, and set the case for a trial. (Ex. 4 to PI. Dep.) In preparation for the trial, 

Keith Jewell, the General Counsel for Labor and Employment, visited the facility. 

(Jewell Dep. at 22.) Jewell testified that during this visit a number of employees 

complained about Julian's management style and indicated that she had a poor 

relationship with her subordinates. (u) He also testified that these employees 

reported that Julian would not associate with them, did not listen to them, was not 

appreciative or them, and that they needed assistance. (u) 

Jewell related his conversations with these employees to Katie Johnston, 

Julian's supervisor at the time. (Id. at 24.) Jewell recommended that Johnston 

become more involved with the facility to improve employee relationships and 

morale, especially because he believed there would be another election after the 

NLRB trial. (Id. at 24-25, 28.) Jewell also informed others of his belief that the 

facility would not win another election because of Julian's poor relationship with 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 14 of 30
her employees. (u at 26-28; Detary Dep. at 30,42-43.) 

The case proceeded to trial, where the administrative law judge ordered a 

new election, finding several violations of labor law. (Pl. Dep. at 135-36, 140; Ex. 

4 to PI. Dep. at 30.) The ALJ found the specific charge against Julian to be 

unsubstantiated, however, and dismissed that charge. (Pl. Dep. at 135; Ex. 4 to PI. 

Dep. at 18.) 

D. Julian 's Termination 

In mid-May 2003, Hickman informed Julian that a group of people from the 

regional office would be coming to her facility on May 16,2003. (PI. Dep. at 

2 1 6.) The group included Hickman, the Regional Vice President, Chris Landers, 

the Senior Professional Service Consultant for Alabama, Jenny Scott, a Medicare 

Payment Specialist, Trish Carruth, the Regional Environmental Specialist, Bessie 

Mizelle, and a Professional Service Consultant, Melanie Burch. (Id. at 2 17.) The 

group was visiting the facility to evaluate its performance regarding progress made 

since the state survey, census potentials, recruitment and retention issues, and 

Medicare documentation. (Hickman Dep. at 53 .) 

On the morning of May 16,2003, the group began their evaluation with a 

tour of the facility. (Pl. Dep. at 249; Hickman Dep. at 55.) The consultants left 

the tour to evaluate each of their respective areas, but Hiclunan and Landers 

15 

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continued their tour of the facility. (Hickman Dep. at 55.) The tour was generally 

uneventful, although they did see items in the shower room that were not supposed 

to be there. (Id, at 55-56.) Hickrnan and Landers informed Julian of the situation 

and she had the shower room cleaned. (Id. at 56.) The consultants then rejoined 

Hickman and Landers, and the group discussed issues with staffing, which was 

low but met minimum requirements, and issues regarding the census. (a at 57.) 

The group then left the facility and went to lunch. (Id. at 59.) While at 

lunch, they talked about the findings in the various departments. (a at 60.) The 

discussion centered on the overall problems of staffing, the census, and Medicare 

documentation. (Id, at 60-6 1 .) The consensus was that the facility was not 

making progress. (Id. at 61 .) Landers asked Hickman what she was going to do 

about the situation, and Hickman stated that she needed to terminate Julian and 

begin anew with another administration head. (& at 6 1-62.) Hickrnan testified 

that she did not consider any other alternatives to termination, considering the 

staffing issues, immediate jeopardy tag, census problems, "NL,RB decision 

hanging over [their] heads," and the other action plan. (u at 63.) She "just felt 

like it was because of all those thing and they weren't - we weren't seeing any 

improvements that [termination] was the only alternative ." (Id.) 

After lunch Hickman and Jenny Scott met with Julian in Julian's office. 

----------------------- 

- - - - - - 

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16 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 16 of 30
(Id.; PI. Dep. at 66.) Hickman informed Julian that "it had not been a good visit, it 

had not been a good year, and that the [employment] relationship was being 

severed." (Pl. Dep. at 66.) Julian asked why she was being terminated, and 

Hickman told her that "the census was below budget, [the facility] was unable to 

recruit and retain staff, and things were getting behind." (Id. at 67.) Julian told 

Hickman "that it was not a fair assessment," left her keys on the desk, picked up 

her purse, and left the facility. (Id. at 68.) Julian rejected the severance package 

offered by Beverly. (Id. at 67; Detary Dep. at 36; Ex. 1 to Detary Dep.) 

E. Julian 's Replacement 

After Julian's termination, at the suggestion of Landers, Hickman 

approached Katie Johnston, Julian's former supervisor, and asked that she come 

out of retirement to temporarily replace Julian as Executive Director of the 

Oneonta facility. (PI. Dep. at 22-25.) Johnston agreed and began work a week 

later on May 23,2003. (Tucker Aff. 7 3.) Johnston was 67 years old at the time. 

(Id.) Two weeks later, on June 6,2003, Kitty Ponder transferred from the facility 

in Pel1 City, Alabama, and replaced Johnston as Executive Director. () Ponder 

was 56 at the time of the transfer. (Id.) 

1V. Applicable Substantive Law 

The analysis of the plaintiffs claims will be determined not only by the 

17 

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nature of the allegations but also by the quality of the evidence offered in support 

of those claims. & Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 16 1 F.3d 13 18, 1330 (1 1 th 

Cir. 1998) ("[t] he analytical framework and burden of production var[y] 

depending on the method of proof chosen"). In general, a plaintiff may attempt to 

establish a claim of illegal employment discrimination through the use of direct 

evidence, circumstantial (indirect) evidence, or statistics. See id.; see also 

Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (1 1th Cir. 1999). A plaintiffs ability 

to proceed through the use of circumstantial evidence of discrimination is 

necessarily important because direct proof of discrimination is uncommon. See 

Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 15 19, 1537 (1 lth Cir. 1997); Griesby v. 

Reynolds Metals Co., 82 1 F.2d 590, 595 (1 1 th Cir. 1987). Direct evidence is 

"[sluch evidence [which], if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue 

without inference or presumption." Bums v. Gadsden State Community College, 

908 F.2d 1512 (1 lth Cir. 1990). Cf. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 

1293-94 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (per Tjoflat, J.) (defining direct evidence as "evidence 

from which a reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal 

link between an adverse employment action and a protected personal 

characteristic" and finding the outcomes reflected in prior case law consistent with 

that definition); see also Bass v. Board of County Commissioners. Orange County, 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 18 of 30
Florida, 242 F.3d 996, 10 10 (1 1 th Cir. 200 1) (discussing meaning of "direct 

evidence" in the context of a Title VII race discrimination claim; "direct evidence" 

refers to a type of evidence which, if true, would require no inferential leap in 

order for a court to find discrimination."). 

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff has presented only circumstantial 

evidence of age discrimination. "In evaluating [discrimination] claims supported 

by circumstantial evidence, [the courts of this circuit] use the now-familiar 

framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 

Cop. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792,93 S. Ct. 1817,36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1 973), and Texas 

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 

L. Ed. 2d 207 (1 98 I)." Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527. Under the McDonnell Douglas 

and Burdine framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of establishing a prima 

facie case of discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the 

employer acted illegally. See id. at 1527-28. The methods of presenting a prima 

facie case, as well as the exact elements of the case, are not fixed; rather they are 

flexible and depend to a large degree upon the facts of the particular situation. 

See, u, Nix v. WLCY RadioRahall Communications, 73 8 F.2d 1 1 8 1, 1 1 85 

(1 1 th Cir. 1984); Lincoln v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 697 F.2d 928,937 

(1 lth Cir. 1983). In general, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 19 of 30
treatment employment discrimination by showing that he or she was a qualified 

member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action 

but that otherwise similarly situated employees outside the plaintiffs class were 

treated di~similarly.~ See McDonnell Douelas, 41 1 U.S. at 802 (hiring); Holifield 

v. Reno, 1 15 F.3d 1555, 1562 (1 1 th Cir. 1997) (discipline); see also Nix, 738 F.2d 

at 1 185 (discipline); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Se arate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 

107 1, 1074 (5th Cir. 198 1) (wages). 

After the plaintiff has shown a prima facie case and, thereby, has raised the 

presumption of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action^.^ See Rojas, 285 

F.3d at 1342; Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. The employer "need not persuade the 

court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. 

at 254-55; see Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. If the employer satisfies that burden 

by articulating one or more such reasons, then the presumption of discrimination 

falls and the burden of production again shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence 

See also McDonnell Doualas, 41 1 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessary will vary in 

Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is 

not applicable in every respect in different factual situations."). 

9 

- See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1032 (A subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis 

upon which the employer based its subjective opinion.). 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 20 of 30
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer's supposedly 

legitimate reason is merely a pretext for illegal discrimination.1° Where the 

defendant articulates multiple, reasonable, legitimate and nondiscriminatory 

reasons, plaintiff must rebut each of defendant's proffered reasons. & Chapman, 

229 F.3d at 1024-25. Although the prima facie case is irrelevant once the employer 

has offered a legitimate reason for its actions, the evidence of pretext may include 

the same evidence offered to establish the prima facie case. See Combs, 106 F.3d 

at 1528. 

Despite this shifting of the burden of production between the plaintiff and 

the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework, "[tlhe 

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 

450 U.S. at. 253. Given that the ultimate burden of persuasion always lies with 

the employee, a plaintiff may prevail on an employment discrimination claim and 

may also defeat a summary judgement either by proving that intentional 

discrimination did indeed motivate the defendant or by producing sufficient 

evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to disbelieve the employer's proffered 

10 If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff 

cannot recast the reason but must meet it head on and rebut it. Simply quarreling with that 

reason is not sufficient. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 21 of 30
legitimate reasons, thus permitting but not compelling the trier of fact to make a I 

finding of illegal discrimination. & Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbinn Prods.. Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000) (pointing out that the production of the necessary 1 

sufficient evidence by plaintiff will not always prevent the employer from I 

prevailing on a Rule 50 motion and suggesting that the strength of plaintiffs 

prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation 

is false, and any other properly considered evidence that supports the employer's 

case are among other factors to take into account in evaluating a Rule 50 

motion);" St. Mary's Honor Ctr, v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Abel v. Dubberly, 

210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (1 1 th Cir 2000); Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1 

1303, 1336 (1 lth Cir. 2000); Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529-38 (interpreting Hicks and 

the post-Hicks case law); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920- 

21 (1 1 th Cir. 1993). 

V. Discussion 

Plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendant terminated her because of her 

age, in violation of the ADEA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment asserts 

that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima face case for plaintiff's claim against 

" The court in Chapman modified the statement in Combs contrary to this holding in 

Reeves after noting that the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for 

judgment as a matter of law. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1025, n. 1 1. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 22 of 30
defendant. Even if she did establish a prima facie case, defendant argues that 

plaintiff has failed to rebut its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her 

termination. As such, defendant contends it is entitled to summary judgment on 

plaintiffs complaint. 

A. Prima Facie Case 

The ADEA makes it "unlawfid for an employer to fail or refhe to hire or to 

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. 5 623(a)(1). As outlined in detail 

above, the Eleventh Circuit uses the framework established in McDonnell Douglas 

and Burdine to evaluate ADEA claims that are based upon circumstantial evidence 

of discrimination. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024 (citations omitted). Under that 

framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1527-28 (citations omitted). One method a plaintiff can 

use to establish a prima facie case for an ADEA violation is by showing that she 

(1) was a member of the protected age group, (2) was subjected to adverse 

employment action, (3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by or 

otherwise lost a position to a younger individual. Benson v. Tocco. Inc., 113 F.3d 

1203, 1207-08 (1 1th Cir. 1997). 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 23 of 30
The first three elements of her prima facie case are undisputed: she is a 

member of the protected class at the age of 64; she was subjected to an adverse 

employment action, termination; and she was qualified to do the job. Defendant 

contends, however, that Julian failed to establish the fourth element of her prima 

facie case because Julian's immediate replacement, Katie Johnston, was 67 years 

old, or three years older than Julian. In addition, Beverly argues that Johnston's 

replacement, Kitty Ponder, who was 56 at the time of her transfer to Julian's 

former position, was not substantially younger than Julian. 

Julian admits that her immediate replacement was older than she. However, 

Julian argues that the court should not apply a rigid test under McDonnell 

Douglas; instead, because of the nature of age discrimination claims, Julian 

contends that the court should allow more flexibility in the presentation of her 

prima facie case. 

The Eleventh Circuit has warned about the strict application of the prima 

facie case in situations similar to the one presented here: 

A mechanistic application of the McDonnell prima facie test is 

especially dangerous in the context of age discrimination. Seldom 

will a sixty-year-old be replaced by a person in the twenties. Rather 

the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a fifty-five-year-old, who, in 

turn, is succeeded by a person in the forties, who also will be replaced 

by a younger person. Eventually, a person outside the protected class 

will be elevated but rarely to the position of the one fired. McCorstin 

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v. United States Steel Cop., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Pace v. Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1387 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Keeping in 

mind the directives from the Eleventh Circuit, the court agrees with Julian 

regarding her replacement. Although Johnston may have immediately assumed 

Julian's position, Johnston did not actually replace Julian; she was only a 

temporary replacement. Johnston came out of retirement for a short, two-week 

period to run the facility while Beverly found a permanent replacement. The court 

would not be faithful to the spirit of the law if it were to accept Beverly's 

argument that Johnston actually replaced Julian. Instead, the court finds that 

Julian's permanent replacement was Ponder. 

Anticipating this conclusion, Beverly argues that Julian still did not 

establish a prima facie case because Ponder was not "substantially younger" than 

Julian. The court disagrees. Ponder was born on May 1 1, 1947, and was 56 at the 

time she replaced Julian. (See Ponder Employee Information Sheet; Tucker Aff. 7 

3.) Julian was 64 at the time of her termination. The Eleventh Circuit has held 

that a replacement who was only five years younger was sufficient to establish a 

prima facie case. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla, 196 F.3d 13 54, 1360 

(1 lth Cir. 1999). Here, there is a eight year age difference between Julian and 

Ponder. As such, Julian established a prima facie case of age discrimination. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 25 of 30
B. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasonsfor Termination 

Beverly articulated multiple reasons for Julian's termination, including, but 

not limited to, recruitment and retention problems, employee morale problems, 

documentation deficiencies, census problems, and receipt of an immediate 

jeopardy tag on a state survey. (Hickman Dep. at 42,63.) The sum of all the 

specific reasons is that Beverly terminated Julian for unsatisfactory work 

performance. (Id.) Julian herself testified that the facility, of which she was 

Executive Director, had serious problems and was not performing satisfactorily. 

(Pl. Dep. at 68-75, 99- 100, 104-06, 148-52, 158-60, 167-69, 188-89,205, 22 1 .) 

Beverly, therefore, satisfied its burden of production under McDonnell Douglas. 

C. Pretext 

Julian has failed to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her 

termination were a pretext for age discrimination. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1025 

n. 1 1. The bulk of Julian's arguments regarding pretext boil down to explanations 

and excuses for her and the facility's poor performance in the last months of her 

employment. Such arguments do not come close to establishing pretext in the 

Eleventh Circuit. "A plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant's 

employment decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by" age. 

26 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 26 of 30
- Lee, 226 F.3d at 1253. The role of the court "is to prevent unlawful hiring 

practices, not to act as a super personnel department that second-guesses 

employers' business judgments." Id. at 12%. The court's "sole concern is 

whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment 

decision." Damon, 196 F.3d at 136 1. Whether the poor performance was Julian's 

fault is not an issue for the court to consider. 

Julian's four remaining arguments regarding pretext are equally unavailing. 

First, Julian cites the March 2000 wage increase as evidence of age discrimination 

in her termination. The court is baffled by this argument. Julian does not make 

any logical link between the alleged age discrimination in May 2003, and a wage 

increase for nurses three years earlier. Age had nothing to do with the wage 

increase, and the increase had nothing to do with Julian's termination. As such, the 

existence of the increase does not support Julian's claim of age discrimination. 

Second, Julian contends that the alleged forced resignation of Mary Alice 

Edmonds in May 2003 supports Julian's claim that she was terminated because of 

her age. Edmond's declaration falls short of providing Julian with evidence of 

pretext in her termination. Although Edmonds testified that she was forced to 

resign at the age of 67 and was replaced by a woman in her fifties, she does not 

allege any sort of age discrimination in her resignation. (Edmonds Decl. 77 3-4.) 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 27 of 30
That both she and Julian were replaced by someone younger does not establish a 

pattern of age discrimination. In addition, the bare-bones declaration does not 

provide the court with nearly enough information to adequately compare the 

situations with Julian's facility to the one run by Edmonds. Edmonds's 

declaration does not aid Julian in any way in establishing her burden that her 

termination was because of age discrimination. 

Third, Beverly's termination policy does not establish that Julian was 

terminated because of her age. Julian contends that Beverly violated its policy 

regarding her termination and that these violations are evidence of age 

discrimination. Julian points to paragraph C of the policy that requires alleged 

misconduct to be investigated before termination and contends that because no 

such investigation occurred, Beverly violated its policy when it terminated her. 

This argument misses the mark. Julian was not terminated for misconduct; she 

was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. As such, paragraph C of Beverly's 

policy regarding misconduct is completely irrelevant. 

Finally, that Hickman did not inform Julian of all the reasons for her 

termination in no way permits a trier of fact to infer that she was terminated 

because of her age. See Tidwell v. Carter Prods., 135 F.3d 1422, 1428 ("at most, 

the jury could find that [plaintiffs] performance was an additional, but 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 28 of 30
undisclosed, reason for the [termination] decision; the existence of a possible 

additional non-discriminatory basis for the plaintiffs termination does not, 

however, prove pretext."). Moreover, Julian does not allege that the reasons were 

false; instead she repeatedly admitted in her deposition that all of the problems 

existed at the time of her termination. As such, this final effort by Julian to 

establish pretext also fails. 

Julian has not offered any evidence that her termination was because of her 

age. Although she did establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Julian 

failed to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that 

Beverly's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were a pretext 

for age discrimination. As such, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor 

of Beverly. 

VI. Conclusion 

In summary, the court finds that no material issues of fact remain and that 

defendant Beverly Enterprises - Alabama, Inc. is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law as to all claims asserted by plaintiff. 

Case 2:04-cv-03285-JHH Document 59 Filed 07/17/06 Page 29 of 30
A separate order will be entered. 

DONE this the 

& 1 day of July, 2006. 

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