Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02309/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02309-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS GRIMES,

CDCR #V-90377,

Civil No. 06cv2309 BTM (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS 

[ECF No. 169]

vs.

A. FAVILA; S. JUAREZ;

STEVE FRANCIS,

Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dennis Grimes (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility located in Tutwiler, Mississippi, is proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis with a Complaint filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On September 5, 2007, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, the Court: (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities as barred by the

Eleventh Amendment; (2) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for

failing to allege personal acts or omissions; (3) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

equal protection claims; (4) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

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Amendment claims; and (5) denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on

qualified immunity grounds. See Sept. 5, 2007 Order at 14-15. 

Defendants filed their Answer [ECF No. 63] and moved for summary judgment on the

grounds that: (1) no genuine issues of material facts exist to show that Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights; (2) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s

religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et. seq; (3) Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief are moot; and (4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

On March 12, 2009, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. See Mar. 12, 2009 Order at 21. Defendants appealed the Court’s Order

denying Defendants’ claim for qualified immunity to the United States Court of Appeal for the

Ninth Circuit. On July 14, 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the Court’s March 12, 2009

Order and remanded the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. This Court issued an Order directing the Defendants to file

supplemental briefing regarding this issue. On September 6, 2011, this Court denied

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. 

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings

relating solely to Plaintiff’s claims for money damages under RLUIPA [ECF No. 169]. The

Court issued a briefing schedule but Plaintiff has failed to file an Opposition.

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c)

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground Plaintiff cannot seek

money damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities under RLUIPA. (Defs. Ps

& As in Supp. of Mtn for Judg. on the Pleadings at 1.)

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but

early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” FED.R.CVI.P.

12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the

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face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved. Id.; Hal Roach

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the

pleading as true, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Smith v.

National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 125 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1997); George v. Pacific-CSC

Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Yanez v. United States, 63 F.3d 870,

872 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

B. Money Damages under RLUIPA

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Plaintiff cannot obtain

money damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities because “RLUIPA’s

statutory language only allows for a private cause of action against officials for injunctive relief

in their official capacities.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 1.) 

RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, provides a statutory basis for “protect[ing] prisoners and

other institutionalized people from government infringement on their practice of religion.”

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Alameida

v. Mayweathers, 124 S.Ct. 66 (2003) (No. 02-1655).

Specifically, RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution ..., even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person – [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest, and [¶] (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that “States, in accepting federal funding,

do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under

RLUIPA.” Sossamon v. Texas, et al., 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011) (Sossamon II). The Supreme

Court found that Congress enacted RLUIPA “pursuant to its Spending Clause and Commerce

Clause authority.” Id. at 1656. “A State’s consent to suit must be ‘unequivocally expressed’

in the text of the relevant statute.” Id. (citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp v. Halderman,

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 In addition the Fourth Circuit has also issued a ruling agreeing with the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh 1

Circuits. See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Congress did not signal with

sufficient clarity an intent to subject such a person to an individual capacity damages claim under

RLUIPA.”)

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465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). The Supreme Court found that the statutory language in RLUIPA

authorizing “appropriate relief against a government,” § 2000cc-2(a), is not the unequivocal

expression of state consent that our precedents require.” Id. at 1658. Thus, the Supreme Court

held that States did not waive their sovereign immunity under RLUIPA. As a result, this holding

by the Supreme Court precludes any suits against the States or individuals in their official

capacity for money damages under RLUIPA. Id. at 1664. 

However, the issue that remains before this Court is not one that has been decided by the

Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit. That issue is whether RLUIPA permits claims for money

damages against individuals in their individual capacity. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that

the “Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held that RLUIPA does not provide an action for

damages for individual-capacity claims.” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639

F.3d 916, 922, n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316,

329 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Sossamon I”) (“[W]e decline to read Congress’s permission to seek

‘appropriate relief against a government’ as permitting suits against RLUIPA defendants in their

individual capacities.”); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e decline to

read RLUIPA as allowing damages against defendants in their individual capacities.”); Smith

v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that section 3 of RLUIPA - a

provision that derives from Congress’ Spending power - cannot be construed as creating a

private action against individual defendants for monetary damages.”)) The Ninth Circuit went 1

on to state that they have “not ruled on this issue in a precedential opinion and we reserve this

question for another day.” Id.

Like the Ninth Circuit, the First, Second and Third Circuits have declined to rule on this

issue. See Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n. 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[W]e reserve ruling on

the issue of whether personal-capacity claims are available under RLUIPA.”) Hall v. Ekpe, 2011

WL 2600514 (2nd. Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (“Although Sossamon did not address

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 See also San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) 2

(acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit has “upheld RLUIPA as a constitutional exercise of Congress’

spending power.”)

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whether RLUIPA authorizes individual capacity claims for damages, we do not reach that issue

in this case); Brown v. Dep’t of Corrections, 265 Fed.Appx. 107, 111 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2008) (per

curiam) (unpublished) (“We also find it unnecessary to reach the questions whether individuals

may be liable for monetary damages under the RLUIPA.). No Circuit has yet to issue an opinion

finding that prison officials may be held liable for money damages in their individual capacities

under RLUIPA.

The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that RLUIPA was enacted under the Spending

Clause of Article I of the Constitution. See Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070. The Circuits that 2

have held there is no availability of money damages under RLUIPA, have followed the rationale

that legislation enacted pursuant to Spending Clause authority operates like a contract. Because

these individual defendants are not parties to the contract, these defendants should not be held

liable for money damages arising from alleged RLUIPA violations. See Sossamon I, 560 F.3d

at 328-29. (Fifth Circuit holding that under the Spending Clause, RLUIPA functions as a

contract and “individual RLUIPA defendants are not parties to the contract in their individual

capacities.”). These cases also follow the rationale that legislation enacted under the Spending

Clause does not “authorize damage actions against private individuals who are not themselves

recipients of federal funding.” Rendelman, 569 F.3d at 187 (citing Pennhurst State School &

Hospital, 451 U.S. at 17.) As the Fourth Circuit held, Congress did not provide sufficient clarity

of an intent to condition the receipt of funds under RLUIPA to allow for the “creating of an

individual capacity damages action.” Id. 

The Court finds that Spending Clause analysis of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh

Circuits is persuasive. Thus, the Court adopts the rationale of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and

Eleventh Circuits, and finds that Plaintiff cannot seek monetary relief against the defendants in

their individual capacities under RLUIPA. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

is GRANTED. As Defendants point out in their moving papers, the Court has previously

granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under

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RLUIPA. See March 12, 2009 Order at 21. Thus, all of Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to

RLUIPA are dismissed from this action.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims [ECF

No. 169] is GRANTED.

DATED: September 26, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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