Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07019/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2014 Decided September 12, 2014

No. 13-7019

FREEDOM WATCH, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

(OPEC),

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00731)

Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Carolyn B. Lamm argued the cause for appellee. With her

on the brief were Hansel T. Pham and Anne D. Smith.

Thomas G. Corcoran Jr. was on the brief for amicus curiae

Republic of Austria in support of appellee.

Before: TATEL, SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #13-7019 Document #1512001 Filed: 09/12/2014 Page 1 of 20
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge WILKINS.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Freedom Watch, Inc. filed an

action against the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries alleging that OPEC violates United States antitrust

law by fixing the price of gasoline. The district court dismissed

the complaint for insufficient service of process. The court held

that Freedom Watch had failed to effectuate valid service on

OPEC, and it declined Freedom Watch’s request to authorize

service through alternative means pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). We agree with the district court that the

methods of service attempted by Freedom Watch failed to

satisfy the federal rules. We remand, however, for the district

court to reconsider Freedom Watch’s request under Rule 4(f)(3)

to authorize alternative methods of serving process on OPEC.

I.

OPEC is an intergovernmental organization whose

membership consists of twelve petroleum-exporting nations. As

set out in its governing statute, OPEC’s “principal aim” is “the

coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of

Member Countries and the determination of the best means for

safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.” 

OPEC Stat. art. 2(A) (2000). The organization is headquartered

in Vienna, Austria. Its relationship with its host nation is

governed by a “Headquarters Agreement,” formally entitled the

Agreement Between the Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries and the Republic of Austria Regarding the

Headquarters of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries, Austrian Official Gazette [BGBL] No. 379/1985

(bilateral agreement codified into Austrian law). 

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On May 7, 2012, Freedom Watch filed suit against OPEC,

alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1, and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,

26. The complaint asserts that OPEC and its member nations

engage in an international conspiracy to “raise, fix and stabilize

the price of gasoline and other petroleum products in the United

States” through the use of production quotas and price-fixing

agreements. J.A. 8-9, 12-13. Freedom Watch contends that it

attempted to serve process on OPEC in two ways: (i) by

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint by hand to

OPEC headquarters in Vienna, where an individual ostensibly

accepted service, and (ii) by sending a copy of the documents

via Austrian mail to OPEC headquarters. Freedom Watch filed

a proof of service confirming the first of those methods. 

On August 21, 2012, after successfully moving to bifurcate

its service-of-process objection from the rest of its potential

defenses, OPEC moved to dismissthe complaint for insufficient

service of process. OPEC argued that neither of Freedom

Watch’s attempts at service met the requirements of United

States (or Austrian) law for effective service. It also asserted

that no means of service could be validly effectuated without the

express consent of OPEC’s Secretary General.

In opposing dismissal, Freedom Watch argued that its

attempts to serve process complied with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(f). Freedom Watch stressed that OPEC had

received actual notice of the pending action. Freedom Watch

also requested that, if the court should deem its attempted

methods inadequate, the court then exercise its discretion under

Rule 4(f)(3) to authorize alternative methods of service. 

Freedom Watch suggested, in particular, that service could be

effectuated on OPEC via email or fax, or through OPEC’s

United States counsel.

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On September 4, 2013, the district court granted OPEC’s

motion to dismiss. See Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC, 288

F.R.D. 230, 231 (D.D.C. 2013). The court determined that

Freedom Watch had failed to establish that it validly served

process on OPEC under Rule 4. The court also declined to

authorize any alternative form of service of process on OPEC

pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). Freedom Watch appeals. 

II. 

We review de novo the district court’s determination that

Freedom Watch has failed to effectuate valid service of process

on OPEC. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506,

509 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of discretion the

district court’s denial of Freedom Watch’s request to authorize

alternative methods of service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). See

Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. OPEC, 353 F.3d 916, 921 (11th Cir.

2003); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007,

1014 (9th Cir. 2002). Applying those standards, we agree with

the district court that Freedom Watch has not validly served

process on OPEC. But we vacate the judgment and remand the

case to enable the district court to exercise its discretion under

Rule 4(f)(3) to consider Freedom Watch’s suggestion that

service could be effectuated on OPEC through OPEC’s United

States counsel.

A. 

A federal court may assert personal jurisdiction over a

defendant only if “‘the procedural requirements of effective

service of process are satisfied.’” Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d

368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Gorman, 293 F.3d at 514);

see Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,

104 (1987). Service of process “‘notif[ies] a defendant of the

commencement of an action against him’” and “‘marks the

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court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit.’” Mann, 681

F.3d at 372 (quoting Okla. Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 969 F.2d

940, 943 (10th Cir. 1992)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4

generally “governs the form, issuance, and service of summons

in federal civil actions.” Eades v. Clark Distrib. Co., 70 F.3d

441, 442 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995). If a defendant challenges the

validity of service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden to

“‘demonstrate that the procedure employed to deliver the papers

satisfies the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4.’” 

Mann, 681 F.3d at 372 (quoting 4A Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1083 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012)).

Freedom Watch contends that it satisfied Rule 4 by serving

process on OPEC at its headquarters in Vienna via personal

delivery and Austrian mail. The district court, relying on the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v.

OPEC, supra, concluded that neither of those methods passes

muster under Rule 4. Prewitt, like this case, addressed the

validity of attempted service of process on OPEC. There, the

plaintiff asked the clerk of the court to send a copy of the

summons and complaint to OPEC by international registered

mail, return receipt requested. 353 F.3d at 919. The clerk did

so, mailing the documents to OPEC at its headquarters in

Vienna. Id. The district court granted dismissal for insufficient

service of process. Id. at 920. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,

holding, inter alia, that service on OPEC via international

registered mail, absent OPEC’s consent, was ineffective under

Rule 4. Id. at 919. Here, although Freedom Watch attempted to

serve process on OPEC by means other than the method

specifically addressed in Prewitt—i.e., international mail—the

district court deemed Freedom Watch’s efforts at service invalid

for substantially the same reasons advanced by the Eleventh

Circuit in that case. We agree.

Rule 4(h) governs service of process on OPEC, a foreign

unincorporated association. Under Rule 4(h), “[u]nless federal

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law provides otherwise or the defendant’s waiver [of service]

has been filed,” service abroad on a foreign business entity must

be effectuated “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for

serving an individual, except personal delivery under

(f)(2)(C)(i).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2). Here, because OPEC has

not filed any waiver of service, and because federal law does not

“provide[] otherwise,” we look to Rule 4(f). Freedom Watch

belatedly argues in this court, despite having made no such

argument in the district court, that federal law does “provide[]

otherwise”: according to Freedom Watch, OPEC is a “political

subdivision of a foreign state,” and service on OPEC thus can be

effectuated under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),

28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). But it “‘is well settled that issues and legal

theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will

not be heard on appeal.’” Potter v. District of Columbia, 558

F.3d 542, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting District of Columbia v.

Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In any

event, OPEC is not a political subdivision of a foreign state

subject to service under § 1608 of the FSIA. See Prewitt, 353

F.3d at 922 n.9. OPEC instead is an intergovernmental

organization whose members are foreign sovereign states. Id. at

919. The propriety of Freedom Watch’s efforts to serve process

on OPEC therefore turns on the provisions of Rule 4(f).

Rule 4(f)(1) provides for service of process “by any

internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably

calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial

Documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). As the Eleventh Circuit

explained in Prewitt, there is no “internationally agreed means

of service” applicable in this case. See 353 F.3d at 922. The

evidence submitted by OPEC confirms the point. See Expert

Decl. of Wolfgang Hahnkamper ¶ 12, ECF No. 7, J.A. 143. 

Although Austria is a party to the Hague Convention on Civil

Procedure, the United States is not. Hahnkamper Decl. ¶ 12. 

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Conversely, although the United States is a party to the Hague

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial

Documents, Austria is not. Hahnkamper Decl. ¶ 12; Prewitt,

253 F.3d at 922 n.10. And in a diplomatic note, the Austrian

government confirmed the absence of any treaty between the

European Union and United States that could supersede the

requirements of Austrian law for serving process on OPEC. 

Note Verbale from the Austrian Fed. Ministry for European &

Int’l Affairs, to OPEC 2 (June 21, 2012). Because Freedom

Watch’s attempts to serve process on OPEC cannot be sustained

under Rule 4(f)(1), we turn to Rule 4(f)(2).

Rule 4(f)(2) states that, “if there is no internationally agreed

means, or if an international agreement allows but does not

specify other means,” process may be served “by a method that

is reasonably calculated to give notice”:

(A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for

service in that country in an action in its courts of

general jurisdiction;

(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a

letter rogatory or letter of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law,

by:

(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of

the complaint to the individual

personally; or

(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk

addresses and sends to the individual and

that requires a signed receipt . . . .

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OPEC’s unchallenged evidence of Austrian law

demonstrates the inapplicability of Rule 4(f)(2)(A) here. 

Austrian law considers service of process to be a sovereign act. 

Hahnkamper Decl. ¶ 13. In Austria, unlike the United States,

“service of a complaint (regardless of the sender) is a judicial

act that may be exerted only by a court . . . unless an

international convention provides specifically for the opposite.” 

Id. ¶ 13; see also id. ¶ 15; Austrian Service of Documents Act

§§ 1, 12(1). Here, no such international convention exists. 

Hahnkamper Decl. ¶ 15. And because Austrian courts had no

involvement with either of Freedom Watch’s attempts to serve

OPEC in Austria, those efforts were not “prescribed by”

Austrian law governing service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(f)(2)(A). Freedom Watch’s attempts in fact violated Austrian

law. Austria prohibits service of process on an international

organization holding privileges and immunities under

international law (which OPEC does) without the involvement

of the Austrian Federal Ministry. Hahnkamper Decl. ¶ 16;

Austrian Service of Documents Act § 11(2). In addition, the

OPEC Headquarters Agreement, a part of Austrian law, bars

service of legal process within the headquarters seat without the

express consent of OPEC’s Secretary General. Prewitt, 353

F.3d at 925. Freedom Watch does not contend that it sought the

involvement of the Austrian Federal Ministry or received

consent from OPEC’s Secretary General.

The remainder of Rule 4(f)(2) is equally unhelpful to

Freedom Watch. Freedom Watch makes no suggestion that

there was any “letter rogatory or letter of request” here—or any

response thereto—as would be required for service under Rule

4(f)(2)(B). As for Rule 4(f)(2)(C), its provisions are

inapplicable to methods of service, like those attempted by

Freedom Watch, “prohibited by the foreign country’s law.” In

any event, personal delivery under Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i) is

unavailable for an unincorporated association like OPEC. See

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2). And there is no evidence of compliance

with the requirements of 4(f)(2)(C)(ii)—i.e., that a clerk of the

court addressed and dispatched the mailing or that it required a

signed receipt. 

The final provision of Rule 4(f) allows service “by other

means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court

orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (emphasis added). To validly

effectuate service under Rule 4(f)(3), a plaintiff therefore must

affirmatively seek and obtain the district court’s authorization

for a particular means of service. See, e.g., Rio Props., 284 F.3d

at 1013. Here, however, Freedom Watch neither sought nor

secured the district court’s authorization to serve OPEC through

personal delivery or Austrian mail. As a result, Freedom

Watch’s attempts to effectuate service of process on OPEC

through those means failed to satisfy Rule 4(f)(3), or Rule 4(f)

more generally. 

Unable to demonstrate compliancewith Rule 4(f), Freedom

Watch principally defends its attempted methods of service on

the ground that OPEC gained actual notice of the action, as

evidenced by OPEC’s participation in the litigation. It is well

established, however, that “before a court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to

the defendant.” Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104. Although

notice is “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due

process,” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314 (1950), it “cannot by itself validate an otherwise

defective service.” Entm’t Grp. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988

F.2d 476, 492 (3d Cir. 1993); accord Prewitt, 353 F.3d at 925;

LSJ Inv. Co. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Rather, “the procedural requirement of service of summons

must be satisfied,” and “[t]oday, service of process in a federal

action is covered generally by Rule 4.” Omni Capital, 484 U.S.

at 104; see Mann, 681 F.3d at 372 (“[C]ourts have uniformly

held . . . a judgment is void where the requirements for effective

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service have not been satisfied.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). In certain circumstances in which service of process

was “in substantial compliance with the formal requirements of

the Federal Rules,” courts have considered actual notice in

sustaining the adequacy of service despite a minor,

nonprejudicial defect. Prewitt, 353 F.3d at 924 n.14 (collecting

cases). But there was no substantial compliance with the

requirements of Rule 4 here. We therefore affirm the district

court’s determination that Freedom Watch failed to effectuate

valid service of process on OPEC.

B.

There remains the question whether the district court

abused its discretion in declining to authorize alternative means

of service on OPEC. Rule 4(f)(3) permits service of process

“by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as

the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). The parties agree that

“[t]he decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving

process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the ‘sound discretion

of the district court.’” Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 805

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016). 

Rule 4(f)(3) contemplates a district court “order[]”

authorizing alternative means of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). 

Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

applicable local rules, a party seeking a district court order

would file a formal motion and include a proposed order

apprising the court of its request and specifying the relief

sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (“In General. A request for a

court order must be made by motion.”); D.D.C. R. 7(c) (“Each

motion and opposition shall be accompanied by a proposed

order.”). Here, however, Freedom Watch did not file a motion

or submit a proposed order. Instead, it requested the district

court to authorize alternative means of service in its

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memorandum in response to OPEC’s motion to dismiss. But

insofar as Freedom Watch should have perfected its request

through a separate motion and proposed order, OPEC made no

objection in the district court to the manner in which Freedom

Watch sought authorization under Rule 4(f)(3). OPEC instead

fully engaged on the merits of Freedom Watch’s request. And

the district court, following OPEC’s lead, squarely addressed

(and rejected) Freedom Watch’s Rule 4(f)(3) request in its

opinion. OPEC waited until oral argument in this court to

object to the manner in which Freedom Watch made its Rule

4(f)(3) request, but “oral argument is too late to raise an

objection for appellate consideration.” Robertson v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499, 504 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In light

of the absence of any timely objection by OPEC and of the

district court’s consideration of Freedom Watch’s request on the

merits, we likewise address the merits of Freedom Watch’s

request for authorization of alternative means of service.

Freedom Watch proposed three alternative methods of

serving process on OPEC: email, fax, and service through

OPEC’s United States counsel. For each of those methods,

Freedom Watch expressly invoked the district court’s power

under Rule 4(f)(3) to authorize alternative means of service. 

See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (“Email and fax

have frequently been approved to effectuate service pursuant to

Rule 4(f)(3).”); id. at 8 (“Another common method of service

pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) is service on a defendant’s United

States-based attorney.”). Yet in addressing Freedom Watch’s

request that the court “permit alternative methods for service of

process pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3),” the district court appeared to

focus solely on the initial two methods. Freedom Watch, 288

F.R.D. at 233 (citing page in Freedom Watch’s opposition in

which it proposed service via email and fax, but not page in

which it proposed service through counsel). Recognizing that

the plaintiff in Prewitt had made “identical arguments”

concerning those two methods, the court saw no reason “to stray

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from Prewitt’s reasoning here.” Id. (citing Prewitt, 353 F.3d at

928).

We perceive no basis for disturbing that conclusion. The

plaintiff in Prewitt did suggest that service could be effectuated

on OPEC via the alternative means of email and fax. 353 F.3d

at 927. The Eleventh Circuit rejected those arguments, noting

that the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 4(f)(3) state that

“‘an earnest effort should be made to devise a method of

communication that is consistent with due process and

minimizes offense to foreign law.’” 353 F.3d at 927 (emphases

added by the Eleventh Circuit). In the view of the Eleventh

Circuit, service on OPEC via email or fax, without OPEC’s

consent and in violation of the OPEC Headquarters Agreement,

“would constitute a substantial affront to Austrian law.” Id. As

a result, “the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Prewitt’s motion to authorize alternative means of

service.” Id. at 928. The district court here, while engaging in

no extended discussion of the matter, considered Freedom

Watch’s request for service on OPEC via email and fax and

rejected it for the reasons set forth in Prewitt. We see no abuse

of discretion in that ruling.

We reach a contrary conclusion concerning the district

court’s consideration of Freedom Watch’s third proposed

method: service through OPEC’s United States counsel, the law

firm of White & Case. As the district court noted, Prewitt gave

no consideration to that alternative means. The district court

examined it under the criteria set out in Rule 4(h)(1), making no

reference to Rule 4(f)(3) in its analysis. The former provision

allows for service of process on an unincorporated association

in the United States “by delivering a copy of the summons and

of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or

any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive

service.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). The district court ruled

that OPEC “could not have been validly served through its

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counsel” under Rule 4(h)(1). The court reasoned that White &

Case had not been “authorized by appointment or by law to

receive service on [OPEC’s] behalf,” and also observed that

Freedom Watch had not filed proof of service on OPEC’s

attorneys. Freedom Watch, 288 F.R.D. at 233 (citing Williams

v. GEICO Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2011)); see

Williams, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (“Delivering a summons and

complaint to a corporate representative who is not an officer, a

managing or general agent, or an agent authorized to accept

service fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(h)[(1)].”).

Although there is no basis for questioning the district

court’s conclusion as a matter of interpreting Rule 4(h)(1),

Freedom Watch relied solely on Rule 4(f)(3)—not Rule

4(h)(1)—in seeking authorization to serve OPEC through its

United States counsel. And the district court’s stated reasons

for rejecting service through counsel would not preclude

authorization of such service under Rule 4(f)(3). The

requirements of Rule 4(h)(1) do not carry over to Rule 4(f)(3). 

A number of courts thus have sanctioned service on United

States counsel as an alternative means of service under Rule

4(f)(3) without requiring any specific authorization by the

defendant for the recipient to accept service on its behalf. See

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Aliaga, 272

F.R.D. 617, 619-20 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (authorizing service on

foreign defendants through local counsel who stated that “he is

not authorized to accept service of process on behalf of either

defendant”); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 667 F. Supp. 2d 907,

931-32 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (permitting substituted service on U.S.

attorneys retained by Russian defendants without requiring

specific authorization); LG Elecs., Inc. v. ASKO Appliances,

Inc., No. 08-828 (JAP), 2009 WL 1811098, at *4 (D. Del. June

23, 2009) (similar); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, No. 06 CIV.

11512(DLC), 2007 WL 2295907, at *1-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,

2007) (similar); Brookshire Bros. v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, No.

USCA Case #13-7019 Document #1512001 Filed: 09/12/2014 Page 13 of 20
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05-CIV-21962, 2007 WL 1577771, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 31,

2007) (similar).

Additionally, while the district court relied on Freedom

Watch’s failure to file proof of service on OPEC’s attorneys, the

absence of proof of service poses no inflexible barrier to the

prospective authorization of such service under Rule 4(f)(3). As

a general matter, “[f]ailure to prove service does not affect the

validity of service. The court may permit proof of service to be

amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(3). Freedom Watch, moreover,

volunteered to re-serve OPEC through any of the methods it

proposed in its brief. Courts disagree on whether alternative

means of service undertaken without court order may be

authorized retroactively under Rule 4(f)(3). Compare

Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 806 (Under Rule 4(f)(3), plaintiffs

“must obtain prior court approval for the alternative method.”),

with Marks v. Alfa Grp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379-80 (E.D. Pa.

2009)(retroactivelyauthorizing plaintiffs’ attempted service via

FedEx). Here, in light of Freedom Watch’s failure to file proof

of service on OPEC’s counsel, there was no reason for the

district court to authorize such service retroactively. But as a

prospective matter, the district court presumably could have

elected to grant Freedom Watch’s Rule 4(f)(3) request by

ordering service on White & Case within a specified time period

and requiring proof of that subsequent service. See Kaplan v.

Hezbollah, 715 F. Supp. 2d 165, 167 (D.D.C. 2010) (refusing to

authorize previous attempt at service retroactively, but

authorizing prospective service via publication); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(m) (120-day time limit for service of process “does

not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule 4(f)”).

The district court’s apparent consideration of service

through OPEC’s United States counsel under Rule 4(h)(1)—in

lieu of Rule 4(f)(3)—is understandable: it was fully in keeping

with OPEC’s approach to the issue. OPEC treated Freedom

Watch’s service-through-counsel argument as entirely distinct

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from Freedom Watch’s request for Rule 4(f)(3) authorization. 

And when it addressed the counsel argument, OPEC focused

exclusively on Rule 4(h)(1) and cases interpreting that provision. 

The district court understandably followed suit. Nonetheless,

because Freedom Watch specifically relied on Rule 4(f)(3), and

because the district court invoked Rule 4(h)(1) instead of its

discretionary authority under Rule 4(f)(3) in rejecting Freedom

Watch’s request, we remand to enable the district court to

exercise its discretion under the latter provision. See Avocados

Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (on

review for abuse of discretion, remanding for the district court

to exercise its discretion when it was “not so clear” that “the

district court thought it had discretion”).

On remand, the district court retains discretion under Rule

4(f)(3) to authorize service even if the alternative means would

contravene foreign law. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014 (“[A]s

long as court-directed and not prohibited by an international

agreement, service of process ordered under Rule 4(f)(3) may be

accomplished in contravention of the laws of the foreign

country.”); cf. Prewitt, 353 F.3d at 928 n.21. In contrast to the

Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 4(f)(2), which state that

“[s]ervice by methods that would violate foreign law is not

generally authorized,” the Rule 4(f)(3) Advisory Notes state

only that “an earnest effort should be made to devise a method

of communication that is consistent with due process and

minimizes offense to foreign law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 Notes of

Advisory Comm. on Rules – 1993 Amendments (emphasis

added). Accordingly, even if service cannot be effectuated on

OPEC through United States counsel without violating Austrian

law, the district court could still authorize such service if it

would “minimize” offense to Austrian law. And while Rule

4(f)(3) addresses service only “at a place not within any judicial

district of the United States,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), arguably,

when a court orders service on a foreign entity through its

counsel in the United States, the attorney functions as a

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mechanism to transmit the service to its intended recipient

abroad. The parties do not address that issue and we have no

occasion to resolve it.

Our decision to remand should not be mistaken for

agreement with Freedom Watch that the district court must

authorize some method of serving process on OPEC as a matter

of due process, public policy, or enforcement of United States

antitrust law. Freedom Watch identifies no authority obligating

a district court to authorize an alternative method of service

under Rule 4(f)(3) when there is no other available method to

serve the defendant without its consent. Indeed, this court has

made clear that, insofar as the formal requirements of service of

process give rise to a “loophole” enabling a defendant to evade

service of process, “the legislature can, of course, remove it by

amending [the statute] to provide an alternative method of

service.” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506,

516 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). But the district court

must at least exercise its discretion under Rule 4(f)(3), which it

can now do on remand.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s

order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. Freedom Watch also raises arguments entirely

unrelated to OPEC’s service-of-process objections. Those

arguments are not properly before this court at this time. The

district court established a bifurcated briefing schedule under

which OPEC initially submitted a motion to dismiss addressing

only service of process. If the district court authorizes

alternative service of process on remand, briefing on OPEC’s

other defenses may properly proceed in the district court in the

first instance. See Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 89 (D.C. Cir.

1985) (“When the issue has, through no fault of the parties, not

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17

been briefed or argued in any forum, the appropriate disposition

is typically to remand the case to the district court.”).

So ordered.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part: With one exception, I join the Court’s fine explication 

and application of Rule 4. I concur that the service attempted 

by Freedom Watch was defective. 

But I part ways with the Court in its remand ordering the 

District Court to exercise its discretion under Rule 4(f)(3) 

with respect to the prospective authorization of service 

through counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). In my view, 

Freedom Watch did not invoke the exercise of that discretion 

in the District Court proceedings and so no question about it 

is properly before the Court here. 

Under the governing rules of civil procedure, such 

alternative service is available “as the court orders,” id., and 

“[a] request for a court order must be made by motion.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (emphasis added). As is apparent from the 

record and as its counsel conceded at oral argument, Oral Arg. 

Tr. at 5-6, Freedom Watch did not file a motion with the 

District Court on fashioning prospective authorization, 

pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3), for service on counsel in the United 

States. Freedom Watch did not even explicitly raise the issue 

in its opening brief to this Court. I disagree with the Court 

that the District Court ruled on a deemed motion for 

prospective authorization of service under Rule 4(f)(3) 

through one paragraph of the opinion on the motion to 

dismiss. To the extent that question is debatable, I would 

resolve the uncertainty by assuming, particularly where the 

plaintiff was represented by counsel, that the District Court 

did not deem something a motion where no motion was made 

in a form that complies with the rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

7(b)(1) (“The motion must: (A) be in writing unless made 

during a hearing or trial; (B) state with particularity the 

grounds for seeking the order; and (C) state the relief 

sought.”); Benoit v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 608 F.3d 17, 21 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that a suggestion in opposition to a 

motion to dismiss does not constitute a motion). I do not 

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2 

believe we should conclude that once the District Court 

considered some of the plaintiff’s improperly raised 

arguments, it was an abuse of discretion not to consider all of 

the improperly raised arguments. Such an approach validates 

the adage that “no good deed goes unpunished.” More 

importantly, it threatens to encourage indifference to the rules 

and to hinder district courts in their work securing the “just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 

proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 

The problem with Freedom Watch’s mode of litigating is 

reflected in its opening brief, where it maintains that “OPEC 

was properly served,” and alternatively, that “the Court 

[should] remand this case with instructions to the lower court 

to determine and devise the method for Plaintiff to effectuate 

service of process upon Defendant through an alternative 

method of service, to alleviate any uncertainty.” Appellant Br. 

28 (emphasis added). Freedom Watch actually asked us to 

order the District Court to “determine and devise” how the 

Defendant can be effectively served. In our adversarial 

system, litigation does not proceed along such lines. Instead, 

Freedom Watch must identify for itself the appropriate course 

of action, file a motion seeking its favored relief, and allow 

the other side to respond. Only that way does the trial court 

have an explicit request and a reasonably developed record 

upon which to base a ruling. Freedom Watch’s litigation 

approach is even more inexcusable given that (as OPEC 

pointed out to the District Court) this is its second federal 

lawsuit against OPEC and its second try at correctly 

effectuating service. See Order, Freedom Watch, Inc. v. 

OPEC, 08-21630-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008), J.A. 586-87. 

The ruling on appeal decided OPEC’s motion to dismiss, 

which the District Court granted without prejudice to refiling. 

Even without this appeal, Freedom Watch was free to refile 

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3 

the case and properly move the District Court for alternative 

service under Rule 4(f)(3). To the parties, this may be a 

distinction without a difference (except for the filing fee). 

But appeals involve rights to review of specific decisions in 

the court below; they are not lifelines for lawyers to ask an 

appellate bench for help charting a path across the seas of 

civil procedure—even when traversing rough waters such as 

these in seeking to serve an international organization with 

headquarters in a foreign country. 

This Court has previously stated that insufficiency of 

service of process warrants dismissal without prejudice. See 

Simpkins v. Dist. of Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997). Where, as here, a plaintiff has not raised any 

special circumstances of the dismissal that would have 

prevented filing of a new lawsuit, this Court “cannot regard 

the dismissal as an abuse of discretion.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 

F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reviewing dismissal of case 

without prejudice under abuse of discretion standard). 

I would stop there and simply affirm. 

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