Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00376/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIS BONDS, #215 403, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:12-CV-376-WHA

) [WO] 

WARDEN DAVENPORT, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Petitioner James Bonds on April 19, 2012. Petitioner challenges his conviction for 1

capital murder entered against him by the Circuit Court for Houston County, Alabama. A

jury convicted Petitioner of this crime on October 10, 2002, made a capital offense because

it was committed during a robbery. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended that Petitioner

be sentenced to death. On November 12, 2002, the trial court imposed a death sentence on

Petitioner. Petitioner, by and through counsel, filed notice of appeal on November 26, 2002.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.

Although the present petition was stamped "filed" in this court on April 25, 2012, Petitioner signed 1

the various motions submitted with his petition (dated August 12, 2011) on April 19, 2012. Thus, it is clear

that Petitioner had all these documents within his possession at such time and, therefore, could not have 

submitted them to prison officials for mailing prior to April 19, 2012. A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed

filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988);

Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 th th

Cir. 1993). In light of the foregoing, the court considers April 19, 2012 as the date of filing. 

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551 (2005), which holds that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment the death penalty

may not be imposed on offenders under the age of 18 when they committed their crimes. 

Because of the Roper decision, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals remanded

Petitioner’s case to the trial court directing that court to vacate Petitioner’s death sentence

and resentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because he was

sixteen years of age when he committed his offense and not eligible for the death penalty

under Roper. See Bonds v. State, 937 So.2d 112 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court

subsequently sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On

June 17, 2005, on return to remand, the appeals court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for certiorari review and

entered a certificate of judgment on February 17, 2006. Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX-2.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, Respondents filed an answer in which they argue

that the instant habeas petition is barred by the one-year limitation period applicable to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Respondents contend that because 2

Petitioner’s conviction became final in 2006- after the effective date of the statute of

limitations -- he must have filed his § 2254 petition within a year of his conviction becoming

final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed state post-conviction petition was pending

in the state courts. Respondents concede that Petitioner filed a state post-conviction petition

on February 16, 2007, and a second post-conviction petition on August 26, 2011. They

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the

2

“AEDPA”). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

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maintain, however, that even allowing a tolling of the limitation period during the pendency

of these Rule 32 petitions, the limitation period expired prior to Petitioner filing the present

federal habeas petition. Doc. No. 15 at 26-32; see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256,

1259 (11 Cir.); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333- 1335. n.4 (11 Cir. 2001). th th

Based on Respondents’ arguments, the court entered an order advising Petitioner he

had failed to file the present federal habeas petition within the one-year limitation period

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Doc. No. 20. The order gave Petitioner an

opportunity to show cause why his petition should not be barred from review by this court. 

Id. Petitioner filed no response. Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties and

applicable federal law, the court concludes that Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for writ of habeas

corpus relief is due to be denied as it was not filed within the requisite one-year period of

limitations. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

limitation on petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This limitation period is codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

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conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the conclusion th

of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the case or the time

for seeking review has expired.”). A state court judgment of conviction becomes final under

28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or the time to apply for certiorari

4

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expires. Id.

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder in the Circuit Court for Houston County,

Alabama, on October 20, 2002. Petitioner filed a direct appeal. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on June 17, 2005. Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX1. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari and issued

a certificate of judgment on February 17, 2006. Id., Exh. RX-2. By operation of law,

Petitioner’s 2002 conviction became final on May 18, 2006 -- ninety days after the Supreme

Court of Alabama Court entered its certificate of judgment -- as this is the date on which the

time expired for Petitioner to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not th

become ‘final by the conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking

such review,’ see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity

to review the case or the time for seeking review has expired.”); see also Rule 13.1, Rules

of the United States Supreme Court (a petition for writ of certiorari may only be filed to

review a judgment or order entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed within 90

days of the action undertaken by such state court). Thus, Petitioner's convictions became

final on May 18, 2006, and the one-year limitation period in section 2244(d)(1)(A) began to

run on this date.

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i. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

section.” The court finds that the limitation period ran for 274 days, or eight months and

twenty-nine days, after Petitioner’s conviction became final until Petitioner, with the

assistance of counsel, filed a Rule 32 petition with the trial court on February 16, 2007. Doc. 

No. 15, Exh. RX-3. The trial court denied the petition on December 5, 2007, on the grounds

that the petition failed to state a claim and was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 

3

Petitioner filed notice of appeal on December 12, 2007. Id. On August 29, 2008, the

Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision. Id. RX6. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s Rule 32

petition was time-barred. Id. It further found that a remand was necessary in order to give

Petitioner an opportunityto obtain his appellate record so he could amend his post-conviction

petition. Id. On remand, the trial court entered an order September 8, 2008, directing

appellate counsel to mail Petitioner his trial transcript. Id. RX-7, Part I at 2. On September

28, 2008, one of Petitioner’s trial attorneys sent him a copy of the trial transcript by

Prior to ruling on Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court granted post-conviction counsel’s

3

March 5, 2007, motion to withdraw in which she cited irreparable conflicts regarding her representation of

Petitioner. See Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX-6.

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registered mail. Id. On September 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to continue, a motion

to extend the time to supplement his Rule 32 petition, and a motion to appointment counsel.

Id. A docket entry made by the trial court on October 2, 2008, reflects “motions granted. Id. 

Petitioner filed a request for new counsel on October 22, 2008, which the trial court denied

on October 27, 2008. Id. at 2. On November 25, 2008, the trial court granted Petitioner thirty

days to file an amendment to his petition. Id. at 3. On January 5, 2009, Petitioner filed his

amendment. Id. The trial court denied the petition on July 8, 2010, for the reasons articulated 4

in the State’s response to Petitioner’s petition. Id. at 38. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or

amend judgment on August 13, 2010, which the trial court denied on August 20, 2010. Id.

at 39-41, 44.

On October 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a brief on appeal from the denial of his Rule 32

petition. Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX-8. The Alabama Court of Criminal appeals affirmed the 5

lower court’s decision on January 28, 2011. Id., Exh. RX-9. Following the appellate court’s

denial of Petitioner’s request for a rehearing, Petitioner, by and through his attorney, filed a

petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 2011, with the Alabama Supreme Court. Id., Exh.

RX-10. Petitioner filed a pro se motion to amend the certiorari petition on March 14, 2011.

The certificate of service attached to Petitioner’s amendment was dated December 22, 2008. Doc. 4

No. 15, Exh. RX-7, Part II at 72.

On September 17, 2010, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner on appeal. See Doc. 5

No. 15, Exh. RX-7, Part I at 5, RX-8.

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Id., Exh. RX-11. The Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari on

August 5, 2011, and issued a certificate of judgment the same day. Id., Exh. RX-12.

Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition on August 26, 2011. Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX13. The trial court granted Petitioner’s request to appointment counsel on September 21,

2011. Id., Exh. RX-14 at 1. On September 28, 2011, the trial court granted the State’s request

for summary disposition. Id. at 2. On November 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion in the

trial court requesting that post-conviction counsel be directed to forward to Petitioner his

entire case file and legal documents. Id. at 2. A docket entry made December 9, 2011,

reflects “file returned with no action taken.” Id. Petitioner subsequently moved to alter or

amend judgment and a notice of appeal on January 4, 2012. Id. at 2. On February 17, 2012,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals granted Petitioner fourteen days to show cause why

his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Id., Exh. RX-16. On February 29, 2012, the 6

appellate court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal as untimely filed, and issued a certificate of

judgment the same day. Id., Exhs. RX-17, RX-18. On March 7, 2012, Petitioner filed an

application for rehearing with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Id., RX-20. On

March 12, 2012, the appellate court recalled its February 29, 2012, certificate of judgment.

The record reflects that on February 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his Rule 32 6

petition, a motion to hold in abeyance and reinstate indigent status. Doc. No. 15, Exh. RX-14 at 3. Although

the trial court entered an order on March 12, 2012, granting the motion to withdraw the Rule 32 petition and

granting Petitioner’s request for indigency status, see Id., Exh. RX-19, as noted, the trial court had already

denied the Rule 32 petition on September 28, 2011, from which Petitioner had filed an appeal. 

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Id., Exh. RX-21. On May 2, 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order overruling

Petitioner’s application for rehearing and advising that it had dismissed his notice of appeal

because it had not been timely filed and further noting that it had no authority to grant

Petitioner’s request for an out-of-time appeal, a request which must be made in a Rule 32

petition. Id., Exh. RX-22. The appellate court dismissed the appeal and issued a certificate

of judgment on May 23, 2012. Id., Exh. RX-23. 

Petitioner filed a third Rule 32 petition on May 23, 2012. Doc. No. 19, Exh. RX-26.

The State filed a motion for summary disposition on June 15, 2012, which the trial court

granted on June 19, 2012. Id. at 29. On June 28, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s

June 22, 2012, motion to amend his Rule 32 petition and dismissed the State’s motion for

summary disposition. Id. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend judgment on July 5,

2012, which the trial court denied on July 9, 2012. Id. at 39. Petitioner filed notice of appeal

on July 23, 2012. Id. at 40. On September 17, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Petition for

Mandamus Brief oftheAppellant”which the Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals considered

as Petitioner’s brief on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 19, Exh. RX27. It affirmed the lower court’s decision on December 7, 2012, finding that Petitioner’s

claim he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal on a previous Rule 32 petition was properly

dismissed because he failed to meet his burden to plead the full factual basis for the claim.

Id., Exh. RX-28. The appellate court further determined that claims Petitioner had not raised

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on appeal that were raised in his Rule 32 petition were abandoned and that claims he raised

for the first time on appeal were not properly before the court. Id. Petitioner filed an

application for rehearing on January 10, 2013, which the Court of Criminal Appeals denied

on February 1, 2013. Id., Exh. RX-29 at 2. On March 15, 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment. Id.,

Exh. RX-30.

As explained, Petitioner’s 2002 conviction became final on May 18, 2006. He filed

his first Rule 32 petition on February 17, 2007. Filing that petition temporarily tolled the

AEDPA one-year clock after 274 days leaving ninety-one days of the federal limitation 

remaining. On August 5, 2011, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a certificate of judgment

on Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition. The federal limitation period began running again on

August 6, 2011. Although Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition on August 26, 2011, 

Respondents argue it was untimely filed under state law and therefore not “properly filed”

for purposes of tolling the federal limitation period. Doc. No. 15 at 29. The State argued in 

their response to Petitioner’s August 26, 2011, post-conviction petition, among other grounds

for summary disposition, that the petition was successive and barred by the limitation period 

in Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P. Doc. No. 15, RX-15. Even though the trial court, in its 7

Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides “the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a

7

conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed: (1) In the

case of a conviction appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within one (1) year after the issuance of the

certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, Ala.R.App.P.”

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September 28, 2011, order granting the State’s motion for summary disposition, did not

specifically address the arguments presented by the State, Respondents maintain the state

court’s ruling ordering summary dismissal of the Rule 32 petition was an acceptance of their

contention it was untimely filed. See e.g.,Walton v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections,

661 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11 Cir. 2011) (“We cannot, for example, ‘reject [a state’s] time bar th

simply because a court may opt to bypass the [timeliness] assessment and summarily dismiss

a petition on the merits.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1129, 179 L.Ed.2d

62 (2011). . . . When a state court has not addressed the timeliness of an application for

collateral relief, the federal court ‘must itself examine the delay in each case and determine

what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.’ Evans v. Chavis, 546 [U.S.

189] [,] 198, 126 S.Ct. at 852 [(2006)].”); Gorby v. McNeil, 530 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11 Cir. th

2008) (“Even if we were to accept that the [State] Court reached the “merits,”

consideration of the merits cannot alone convert a motion for post-conviction relief that

no one disputes is time-barred under state law into a properly filed motion for tolling

purposes under AEDPA.”). Since Petitioner’s second Rule 32 petition was untimely filed

under State law, it did not toll the federal limitation period and the one year period of

limitations started running again on August 6, 2011. As explained, at that time Petitioner

had 91 days within which to file a timely federal habeas application or until November 5,

2011. The limitation period, however, ran for another 166 days, or five months and

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fourteen days, until Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on April 19, 2012.

Even if Petitioner’s August 26, 2011, petition is considered timely filed under state

law, the instant habeas application is still untimely. Following the conclusion of

Petitioner’s initial post-conviction proceedings, the federal limitation period ran for

another twenty days until Petitioner filed his second Rule 32 petition on August 26, 2011.

As explained, the trial court granted the State’s motion for summary disposition on

September 28, 2011. Under Rule 4(b) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Petitioner then had 42 days, or until November 9, 2011, to file timely notice of appeal.

He did not file a notice of appeal until January 4, 2012. The end of the 42–day time limit

within which to appeal ended the tolling period and started the AEDPA clock running again

on November 10, 2011. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219–20 (2002) (an “application

is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’-i.e.‘until

the completion of’ that process.”);Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11 Cir. 2004) (a

th

state post-conviction application is “pending” under § 2244(d)(2) “both when it actually is

being considered by the state habeas court and during the gap of time between the state

habeas court’s initial disposition and the petitioner’s timely filing of a petition for review at

the next level.”). At that time, the federal limitation period had already run for 294 days.

Petitioner had 71 days of the applicable limitation period remaining within which to file a

federal habeas petition. The court, therefore, concludes that, even if Petitioner’s second Rule

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32 petition may be considered properly filed, the time allowed Petitioner for the filing of a

federal habeas petition expired on January 20, 2012, prior to Petitioner’s filing of the instant

§ 2254 petition on April 19, 2012.8

ii. Equitable Tolling of the Limitation Period

The Supreme Court has determined that the one-year limitation period is subject to

equitable tolling when a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th

Cir. 1999) (limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart fromthose specified

in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances

that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.”); see also Steed v. Head,

219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11 Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11 Cir. 2002). th th

As mentioned, Petitioner filed a third Rule 32 petition on May 22, 2012. That petition, however, 8

was filed after the federal limitation period had already expired. The law directs that “even ‘properly filed’

state-court petitions must be ‘pending’ [during the one-year period of limitation] in order to toll the

limitations period. A state court petition ... that is filed following the expiration of the limitations period

cannot toll that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259; Moore

v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11 Cir.2003) (“The plain language of the statute provides for tolling ‘[t]he th

time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is

pending.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction relief tolls the

statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once the limitations period has

expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to revive the one-year limitations period if

such period has expired.”); Tinker, 255 F.3d at 1335 n. 4 (“[A] properly filed petition in state court only tolls

the time remaining within the federal limitation period.”). 

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The diligence required is reasonable diligence, not “maximum feasible diligence”, see

Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565, and the extraordinary circumstance prong requires a causal

connection between the circumstance and the late filing. San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d

1257, 1267 (11 Cir. 2011). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as th

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States District

Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9 Cir.1997). Such tolling applies only in truly extraordinary th

circumstances. Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-619 (3rd

Cir. 1998) (“[E]quitable tolling is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make

[the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair.’ . . . Generally, this will occur when the

petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way . . . been prevented from asserting his or her

rights.’ . . . The petitioner must show that he or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in

investigating and bringing [the] claims.’ . . . Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.”); 

Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (11 Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of th

Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). “The burden of establishing entitlement th

to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see

Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314 (11 Cir. 2001). th

Here, there is no evidence tending to show that Petitioner’s delay in filing the instant

§ 2254 petition was the result of extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his

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control and unavoidable with the exercise of diligence. Thus, this court “cannot say that

[Petitioner] has acted with the ‘conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence’ necessary

‘to call into action the powers of the court.’ This conclusion is based on the longstanding,

firmly rooted principle that a court cannot grant equitable tolling unless it is satisfied that the

party seeking such relief has acted with diligence.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5. 

Consequently, the court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitation period as he has shown neither extraordinary circumstances nor the diligence

necessary to equitably toll the statute. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the one-year period of limitation contained in

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expired prior to Petitioner’s filing of this federal habeas application

and he has not otherwise demonstrated that his application for habeas relief should not be

dismissed as untimely filed. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas relief filed by James Willis Bonds be DENIED as it was

not filed within the one-year period of limitation mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); and 

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before May 30, 2014, the parties may file an objection to the

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Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised this

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 16 day of May, 2014. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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