Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03601/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03601-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-03601-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LAURA BARBARINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; 

BOEING SHORT TERM DISABILITY 

PLAN; BOEING LONG TERM 

DISABILITY PLAN, 

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-03601-EJD 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Presently before the Court is Defendants Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”), 

Boeing Short Term Disability Plan, and Boeing Long Term Disability Plan’s (collectively, 

“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Laura Barbarino’s (“Plaintiff”) Second Cause of 

Action. The Court found this matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7–1 (b) and previously vacated the hearing. Having reviewed the parties’ briefing, the 

Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges that in 2008, she was hired by Jeppesen/Boeing as an International Trip 

Planner 3. Dkt. No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 14. Through her employment, Plaintiff enrolled in the 

Boeing Short Term Disability Plan and the Boeing Long Term Disability Plan (collectively, the 

“Plan”). Id. at ¶¶ 3, 15. 

On February 12, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she stopped working at Jeppesen/Boeing 

because of fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue. Id. at ¶ 18. Her related symptoms and conditions 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-03601-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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included: physical impairments, severe and uncontrolled sensitivity in/on her body, cognitive 

disorder, and anxiety. Id. Due to Plaintiff’s inability to perform mentally and physically in the 

workplace, her treating physician removed her from the workplace. Id. Since then, she has been 

permanently disabled. Id. 

On February 26, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she submitted a claim for Short Term 

Disability benefits and produced sufficient proof of her permanent disability. Id. at ¶ 19. In 

March 2013, Aetna allegedly denied Plaintiff’s claim, basing their decision by their clinical 

consultants, claims analysts, and disability professionals, and stating that a Short Term Disability 

claim from a psychological perspective was not supported. Id. at ¶ 21. In April 2013, Plaintiff 

appealed Aetna’s denial of her claim and produced additional proof of her permanent disability. 

Id. at ¶ 22. In May 2013, Aetna allegedly denied Plaintiff’s appeal claiming that that the 

information did not support her disability as of February 2013. Id. at ¶ 23. Moreover, Aetna also 

allegedly denied Plaintiff’s claim for Long Term Disability benefits stating that Plaintiff had not 

met the required waiting period. Id. 

In March 2014, Plaintiff alleges that she sent a letter to Aetna expressing her intent to file a 

claim for Long Term Disability benefits, requesting a copy of Aetna’s claim form, and requesting 

any other documentation necessary to file a claim. Id. at ¶ 26. In April 2014, Aetna allegedly sent 

a letter to Plaintiff denying her claim to Long Term Disability benefits, and setting forth the 

conditions for considering a claimant disabled. Id. at ¶ 27. The letter further stated that Plaintiff 

had not satisfied the required waiting period. Id. at ¶ 29. 

Plaintiff alleges that despite multiple claims for Long Term Disability benefits, at no time 

did Aetna perform an actual or meaningful review of her claims as required by the Plan. Id. at ¶ 

30. She alleges that she has exhausted all administrative remedies under the Plan for both Short 

Term Disability and Long Term Disability benefits. Id. at ¶ 31. 

Plaintiff commenced the instant action in Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, and in 

August 2014, Defendants removed the case to this court. See Dkt. No. 1. Defendants, thereafter,

filed the instant motion. See Dkt. No. 10 (“Mot.). Plaintiff filed an opposition brief, and 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-03601-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Defendants filed a reply brief. See Dkt. Nos. 18 (“Opp.”), 19 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim in the 

complaint with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 

quotations omitted). A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if 

it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is “proper only where there is no cognizable legal 

theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. 

New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 606 F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a 

claim, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual 

allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However, mere 

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action. Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains two claims: (1) violation of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) to recover disability benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B), 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); and (2) violation of ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty and claim for 

equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

1

 See Compl. at 8. Defendants 

challenge only the second claim, based on the sole ground that Plaintiff cannot pursue both claims 

concurrently. See Mot. at 3. 

Through Section 1132, “ERISA provides an exclusive remedial scheme for insureds who 

 

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Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 1132(a)(1)(B) will be used interchangeably, and Section 

502(a)(3) and Section 1132(a)(3) will also be used interchangeably. 

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have been denied benefits.” Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Section 1132 provides: 

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action 

A civil action may be brought—

(1) by a participant or beneficiary—

. . . 

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of 

his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the 

plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 

the terms of the plan; 

. . . 

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin 

any act or practice which violates any provision of this 

subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other 

appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or 

(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms 

of the plan[.]

29 U.S.C. § 1132. 

Under Section 1132(a)(1)(B), “[a]n insured may sue to recover benefits due to him under 

the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 

future benefits under the terms of the plan.” Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 845-46 (internal 

quotations omitted). Under Section 1132(a)(3), an insured “may also seek an injunction or other 

appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of ERISA or of the plan.” Id. at 846. Section 

1132(a)(3) “is a ‘catchall’ or ‘safety net’ designed to offer appropriate equitable relief for injuries 

caused by violations that [Section] 1132 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” Wise v. Verizon 

Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Varity 

Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996)). Consequently, where there is adequate relief provided 

elsewhere in the statute, an insured cannot resort to the catchall provision to seek the same relief. 

Id. 

When evaluating the sufficiency of the allegations at the pleading stage, courts in this 

district have found that a plaintiff may concurrently assert a Section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim and a 

Section 1132(a)(3) claim if the plaintiff alleges different theories of liability and seeks alternative 

remedies. See Bush v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., ---F. Supp. 3d.---, 2015 WL 54418, at*6 (N.D. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-03601-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Cal. Jan. 2, 2015) (Gonzalez Rogers, J.) (collecting cases); Wit v. United Behavioral Health, 2014 

WL 6626894, at*10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (Spero, J.) (same). However, the Section 

1132(a)(3) claim will be dismissed if it merely “repackages” the claim asserting the denial of 

benefits. See Wit, 2014 WL 6626894, at *10 (collecting cases). 

Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Section 1132(a)(3) claim is improper because 

Plaintiff is already seeking relief that is available under Section 1132(a)(1)(B). Mot. at 5. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff seeks redress for the alleged wrongful denial of Short Term 

Disability and Long Term Disability claims. Id. at 6. They believe that since Plaintiff has 

appropriate redress for this alleged wrongful denial under Section 1132(a)(1)(B), it is improper for 

her to rephrase her request for payment to also allege a violation of Section 1132(a)(3). Id. In 

opposition, Plaintiff argues that each of her claims are separate and distinct, and thus her second 

claim alleging violation of Section 1132(a)(3) is not improper. Opp. at 4. 

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following under her first claim for violation of 

Section 1132(a)(1)(B): Plaintiff was entitled to Short Term Disability and Long Term Disability 

benefits under the Plan, and Defendants violated the terms of the Plan by denying Plaintiff’s claim 

for benefits. Compl. at ¶ 36. For relief, Plaintiff requests payment of past benefits due to her, 

payment of future benefits, and a declaration that Plaintiff is permanently disabled and Defendants 

violated the terms of the plan. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff alleges the following under her second claim for violation of Section 1132(a)(3): 

Defendants breached their fiduciary duty under the ERISA Plan because they failed to make a 

reasonable inquiry, failed to weigh the medical evidence, and made a fallible determination of 

Plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits. Compl. at ¶ 42. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 

conduct of refusing to fairly consider subjective complaints of a beneficiary and discrediting the 

weight of treating physicians’ opinions is part of a pattern or practice of evaluating claims 

adversely against the interests of the beneficiaries. Id. For relief, Plaintiff requests enjoining

Defendants’ denial of benefits, enjoining Defendants from inadequately affording participants 

with a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-03601-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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decision denying the claim, and removing Aetna as administrator of Plan benefits. Id. at 11. 

Plaintiff also requests a declaration that Defendants’ non-payment of benefits is a violation of the 

Plan and a declaration that Defendants failed to afford Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity for a full 

and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. Id. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that her allegations under each claim are separate and 

distinct. Under her first claim, Plaintiff’s allegations focus on the denial of her claim for benefits, 

and consequently requests payment of past benefits due to her. Under her second claim, however, 

Plaintiff’s allegations focus on Defendants’ alleged failure to provide an adequate process to 

evaluate claims, and consequently requests injunctive relief that includes enjoining Defendants 

from continuing with its alleged inadequate process and removing Aetna as administrator. 

Therefore, to the extent that Defendants sole challenge to Plaintiff’s second claim is that 

Plaintiff cannot pursue both claims concurrently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.2 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of 

Action is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

 

2 Defendants’ reply brief include arguments challenging the specificity of Plaintiff’s allegations in 

her second claim. See Reply at 4 (“[Plaintiff] has failed to state sufficient facts under a cognizable 

legal claim and has, in fact, failed to state any facts at all in support of her breach of fiduciary duty 

claim except for her allegation—on information and belief—that Aetna’s alleged conduct in 

Plaintiff’s case was ‘part of a pattern and practice of evaluating claims adversely against the 

interests of the beneficiaries.’ She has provided absolutely no facts upon which to base this 

allegation.”). However, Defendant’s seven-page motion focused solely on the impropriety of 

pursuing both claims. See Mot. at 3 (“Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for breach of fiduciary 

duty under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(3) because she is already seeking relief available under 29 

U.S.C. section 1132(a)(1)(B).”). Since Defendants did not challenge the specificity of Plaintiff’s 

allegations in its motion, this argument is not considered here. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 

990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time 

in a reply brief.”). 

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