Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00908/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00908-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAMROCK MANUFACTURING CO., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

AMMEX CORPORATION, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-10-908 OWW/SKO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND

(Doc. 14), GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

TRANSFER VENUE (Doc. 9), AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT

TO TRANSFER THIS ACTION TO

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE CENTRAL

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

EASTERN DIVISION

On April 9, 2010, Shamrock Manufacturing Co. (“Shamrock”)

filed a complaint for breach of contract, account stated, goods

had and received, and open book account against Ammex Corporation

(“Ammex”) in the San Bernardino County Superior Court.

On May 20, 2010, Ammex removed the action to this Court

rather than to the United States District Court for the Central

District of California on the basis of diversity of citizenship

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

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Shamrock moves to remand the action to the San Bernardino

County Superior Court on the ground that Ammex removed the action

to an incorrect district court. Ammex concedes that the action

was removed to an incorrect district court, but moves to transfer

venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or 28 U.S.C.

§ 1631, to the United States District Court for the Central

District of California, the correct district, to be consolidated

with Ammex Corporation v. Shamrock Manufacturing Co., No. CV-F10-637 RAJ, filed by Ammex on April 14, 2010 in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Washington, either in

California or in Washington.

In opposition to the motion to remand and in support of the

motion to transfer venue, Ammex files the Declaration of H. Troy

Romero, counsel for Ammex:

3. On April 14, 2010, Ammex filed the

Washington Action and served Plaintiff with

the complaint and summons for the same on

April 21. 2010 ... After being served with

notice of Plaintiff’s California State Court

action ... on April 27, 2010, Ammex timely

removed Plaintiff’s California State action

to the federal system ....

4. Based on a clerical error in my office,

Ammex removed the California Action from the

Superior Court in San Bernardino County. My

legal assistant misread a map indicating

which court superior courts were in the

various Federal Districts for California. 

Based on this reading, we removed the

California Action to the Eastern District of

California instead of the Eastern Division of

the Central District ....

5. Late in the afternoon of May 28, 2010 (at

the start of the three day Memorial Day

weekend) - after Ammex’s originial thirty

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days to file a notice of removal had run -

Plaintiff informed Ammex of its mistaken

removal to the Eastern District by facsimile

transmission. Due to the timing of

Plaintiff’s facsimile - the Friday leading up

to the Memorial Day weekend - I was unable to

act until June 1, 2010, the next business

day, when I contacted Plaintiff seeking a

stipulation to have the California Action

transferred to the Central District ...

Plaintiff refused to stipulate. 

At the hearing, Shamrock conceded that the parties are

diverse, but asserted that the amount in controversy was not

established. There is no question that federal subject matter

jurisdiction over this action on the basis of diversity exists. 

Shamrock and Ammex are citizens of different states and

Shamrock’s complaint seeks over $200,000.00 in damages, exclusive

of interest and costs. Shamrock does not seek remand on the

ground that federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action

does not exist. 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by

Act of Congress, any civil action brought in

a State court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction,

may be removed by the defendant or the

defendants, to the district court of the

United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is

pending ....

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) provides:

A defendant or defendants desiring to remove

any civil action ... from a State court shall

file in the district court ... for the

district and division within which such

action is pending a notice of removal ....

Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal

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jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,

108-109 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

Cir.1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal

jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of

establishing that removal is proper. Gaus, id. “The burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking

removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against

removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc.,

167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9 Cir.1999). th

Whether this Court is required to remand the action to the

San Bernardino Superior Court or has the power to transfer this

action to the Western District of Washington or is subject to a

split of authority. There is no binding Supreme Court or Ninth

Circuit authority on point. 

Shamrock cites Maysey v. CraveOnline Media, LLC, 2009 WL

3740737 (D.Ariz., Nov. 5, 2009); Addison v. North Carolina Dept.

of Crime and Public Safety, 851 F.Supp. 214 (M.D.N.C.1994);

Willingham v. Creswell-Keith, 160 F.Supp. 741 (W.D.Ark.1958); and

Gopcevic v. California Packing Corporation, 272 F. 994

(N.D.Cal.1921), as authority that this Court has no power to

transfer the action as requested by Ammex and must remand.

In Gopcevic, California then had two districts, the Northern

and the Southern. The Northern District was divided into two

divisions, the Northern division and the Southern division. The

action was filed in Lake County, one of the counties designated

as within the Northern division of the Northern District. 

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Defendant removed the action to the Southern District. Plaintiff

moved to remand and the District Court, strictly construing the

then applicable statutes, remanded the action to the state court.

In Willingham v. Creswell-Keith, the action was removed to

the wrong district in Arkansas, which “in itself, is sufficient

reason to require the Court to remand the case.” 160 F.Supp. at

744. However, the District Court also ruled that the action was

not removable because there was no basis for subject matter

jurisdiction based on federal question or diversity of

citizenship. Id.

In Addison, the plaintiff filed an employment discrimination

action in state court. When defendants removed the action, they

stated that plaintiff was a resident of Rowan County, which is

within the Middle District of North Carolina and removed the

action to the Middle District of North Carolina, even though the

removed action was pending in the state court within the

boundaries of the Western District of North Carolina. When

plaintiff moved to remand, defendants argued that, even though

they failed to observe the literal terms of the statute, the

District Court should transfer the case to the Western District

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 for the convenience of the parties

and witnesses. The District Court remanded the action:

There is no question that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)

requires that the defendants should have

removed this case to the Western District. 

Defendants argue that they merely saved time

by removing the action to this district

because plaintiff lived here during the

pendency of the cause of action. This

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factual premise is not supported. The

complaint states that plaintiff was a citizen

and resident of Mecklenburg County at the

time of the incident alleged in the

complaint. While defendants contend in their

brief that personnel records show that

plaintiff was assigned to live and work in

Rowan County in this district, there is no

evidence before the Court to support this

assertion.

Even if defendants’ residency argument were

supported, their unilateral action should not

be countenanced. Defendants’ argument that

they merely saved the court and the parties

time by making their unilateral ‘removaltransfer’ decision is not well taken. Time

is rarely saved by purposefully not following

proper procedure. The removal statute

contemplates that the federal court to which

an action is removed may not be one of proper

venue if the action had been originally filed

in it ... Notwithstanding, the removal is

deemed proper and the matter may thereafter

be transferred to correct venue or for the

convenience of the parties and witnesses ....

A party who deliberately removes an action to

the wrong district court has acted

improvidently and outside of the removal

statute, thereby violating removal procedure. 

Defendants were required to file their notice

of removal in the Western District within

thirty days ... Unless all of these

conditions are met, removal is not effective

... While minor or nonconsequential defects

may be cured subsequent to the notice of

removal ..., the instant defect is not such a

one. The error cannot be cured by amendment. 

Rather, the cure is for defendants to file a

proper removal notice in the Western

District. Therefore, the procedural defect

in this case is more in the nature of an

improvident removal ... Such defect normally

should not be overlooked.

851 F.Supp. at 217-218. 

In Maysey, the plaintiff filed an action in the Maricopa

County Superior Court. Defendants removed the case to the

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Central District of California. After being informed by

plaintiff that the removal was to an incorrect court, defendants,

agreeing that the Central District of California was an incorrect

court, refused to withdraw the removal and requested plaintiff

stipulate to an order transferring the case to the Arizona

District Court. Plaintiff refused to stipulate and defendants

filed an ex parte application to transfer the case from the 

Central District to the District of Arizona. The Central

District granted the ex parte application and transferred the

action to the Arizona District Court. The Arizona District Court

remanded the action to the Maricopa County Superior Court. 

Relying on the strict construction standards applicable to

removal and Addison and Willingham, the District Court ruled that

“when a party removes a case to the improper federal court

district, that district court’s appropriate response should be to

remand the case back to state court and not to transfer it under

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).” 2009 WL at *2. 

Ammex responds that these cases are not controlling: “None

of Plaintiff’s cases stand for Plaintiff’s proffered bright-line

rule of remand and, in fact, the power of the court to transfer

based on the circumstances of the given case is discussed openly

in the relied-upon cases.” Ammex argues:

Modern case law based on protecting the

interests of justice rather than on justicedefeating adherence to procedural

technicalities, including that from the

Supreme Court, clearly outlines that the

Court has the discretionary power to transfer

the California Action, which undisputedly

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belongs in the federal system, to the Central

District rather than remand it to the state

courts. [sic]. 

Ammex, citing Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.

22 (1998), contends that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) places discretion in

the district courts to transfer cases according to “an

individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and

fairness.” Ammex concedes that “this proposition is generally

used to support motions for transfer when party convenience calls

for the transfer,” but contends that “the underlying principles

of fairness, justice, and a case-by-case consideration of the

same, should be applied in this case.”

Stewart Organization does not support Ammex’s contention. 

In Stewart Organization, the plaintiff filed an action based on

diversity of citizenship in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Alabama. The defendant, relying on a

forum-selection clause in the contract between the parties, moved

to transfer the action to the Southern District of New York under

Section 1404(a), which authorizes a district court to transfer an

action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the

interest of justice. The Supreme Court held that federal law

governed a district court’s decision to grant a motion to

transfer a case to a venue provided in a contractual forumselection clause. There was no issue in the case whether the

case was removed to the proper district court and whether that

court has authority to transfer a case.

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Ammex further relies on Section 1406(a): 

The district court of a district in which is

filed a case laying venue in the wrong

division or district shall dismiss, or if it

be in the interest of justice, transfer such

case to any district or division in which it

could have been brought. 

Ammex contends that federal courts have treated the type of

mistake made here as being more akin to an improper venue

situation and allowed transfer pursuant to Section 1406(a).

Ammex cites Goldlwar, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962). 

In Goldlwar, a private anti-trust suit was filed in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania

heard motions to dismiss for improper venue and lack of

jurisdiction as to two of the defendants. The Eastern District

refused to dismiss the action as to those two defendants,

choosing instead to transfer the action to the Southern District

of New York pursuant to Section 1406(a). Defendants appealed and

the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court:

Nothing in that language [Section 1406(a)]

indicates that the operation of the section

was intended to be limited to actions in

which the transferring court has personal

jurisdiction over the defendants. And we

cannot agree that such a restrictive

interpretation can be supported by its

legislative history ... The problem which

gave rise to the enactment of the section was

that of avoiding the injustice which had

often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal

of their actions merely because they had made

an erroneous guess with regard to the

existence of some elusive fact of the kind

upon which venue provisions often turn. 

Indeed, this case is itself a typical example

of the problem sought to be avoided, for

dismissal here would have resulted in

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plaintiff’s losing a substantial part of its

cause of action under the statute of

limitations merely because it made a mistake

in thinking that the respondent corporations

could be ‘found’ or that they ‘transaction

... business’ in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. The language and history of §

1406(a) ... show a congressional purpose to

provide as effective a remedy as possible to

avoid precisely this sort of injustice.

The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad

enough to authorize the transfer of cases,

however wrong the plaintiff may have been in

filing his case as to venue, whether the

court in which it was filed had personal

jurisdiction over the defendants or not. The

section is thus in accord with the general

purpose which has prompted many of the

procedural changes of the past few years -

that of removing whatever obstacles may

impede expeditious and orderly adjudication

of cases and controversies on their merits. 

When a lawsuit is filed, that filing shows a

desire on the part of the plaintiff to being

his case and thereby toll whatever statute of

limitations would otherwise apply. The

filing itself shows the proper diligence on

the part of the plaintiff which such statutes

of limitation were intended to insure. If by

reason of the uncertainties of proper venue a

mistake is made, Congress, by the enactment

of § 1406(a), recognized that ‘the interest

of justice’ may require that the complaint

not be dismissed but rather that it be

transferred in order that the plaintiff not

be penalized by what the late Judge Parker

aptly described as ‘time-consuming and

justice-defeating technicalities.’ It would

at least frustrate this enlightened

congressional objective to import ambiguities

into § 1406(a) which do not exist in the

language Congress used to achieve the

procedural reform it desired. [Emphasis

added]

369 U.S. at 465-467.

Ammex asserts that federal courts have applied Goldlwar to

situations in which the defendant made this mistake by removing

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an action to an incorrect federal district court. Ammex cites

Cook v. Shell Chemical Co., 730 F.Supp. 1381 (M.D.La.1990).

In Cook, the defendant removed the case to the wrong

district in Louisiana. The District Court held:

Counsel have failed to address in their

supplemental memoranda whether removing to

the wrong district is procedural or

jurisdictional. If the defect is procedural,

any objection to it has been waived as

untimely. This court has been unable to find

any cases explaining whether removing to the

wrong district is procedural or

jurisdictional. However, it is clear in the

case at bar that this court has subject

matter jurisdiction over the controversy via

28 U.S.C. § 1332. The removal to the wrong

district is more akin to an improper venue

situation. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that

the proper venue for removal is ‘the district

court of the United States for the district

and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.’ Under Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b), the defense of improper venue is

waived if not made timely. Therefore,

removal to the wrong district is a procedural

defect, like improper venue, which was waived

by the failure to object to it timely. 

Plaintiff has therefore waived her grounds

for remand. 

See also Mortensen v. Wheel Horse Products, Inc., 772 F.Supp. 85,

89 (N.D.N.Y.1991), citing Cook. Ammex also cites Ullah v.

F.D.I.C., 852 F.Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y.1994). In Ullah, the

plaintiff filed suit in Queens County, which was within the

Eastern District of New York. Defendant removed the action to

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York. The District Court granted the motion to transfer rather

than the motion to remand, ruling:

Improper removal to this district of a state

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court action pending in the Eastern District

of New York does not compel remand of the

case to the state court so that it can then

be removed to the Eastern District. That

would bring about additional delay and

expense while serving no useful purpose. 

Federal courts have broad authority to reach

a proper result by the most expedient means. 

Where a case can be sent directly to its

proper site, this may be done without resort

to unnecessary intermediate steps. 

852 F.Supp. at 221. 

In Tanzman v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 916 F.Supp.

1013 (S.D.Cal.1996), the plaintiff filed his complaint in the San

Mateo County Superior Court. Defendants’ motion to transfer

venue to the San Diego County Superior Court was granted. After

transfer to the San Diego Superior Court, defendants removed the

action to the Southern District. The Southern District ruled

that the initial transfer from the San Mateo County Superior

Court to the San Diego County Superior Court was a nullity and

that the removal to the Southern District was void and of no

effect: “Since this Court has no pending case before it, there is

nothing to remand.” Id. at 1016. The Southern District rejected

plaintiff’s argument that the case should not be dismissed but,

rather, transferred to the Northern District because there was no

case in the Southern District to be transferred. Id. at 1017.

In Lee v. Thomas Tours & GSA, Inc., 1997 WL 638428

(N.D.Cal., Sept. 29, 1997), the plaintiff filed an action in the

San Francisco County Superior Court for a tort that occurred in

Yosemite National Park. After the action was removed to the

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Northern District, the Northern District, relying on Tanzman and

Ullah, ruled that plaintiff had venued the action in an incorrect

state court and further ruled:

In light of the improper venue, defendants’

removal to this court also venued this case

in the incorrect district. See order of

Judge Wagner [sic] (ED Cal) requiring

defendants to remove this action to the

Northern District. When a case is removed to

the wrong district, a federal district court

can transfer the case to the correct venue

rather than remand the case to state court. 

See also Capretto v. Stryker Corporation, 2007 WL 2462138 at *1,

fn.1 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 29, 2007):

Stryker mistakenly removed the case to the

Northern District instead of the Eastern

District of California. This error does not

require a remand to state court. According

to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), ‘[t]he district court

of a district in which is filed a case laying

venue in the wrong division or district shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest of

justice, transfer such case to any district

or division in which it could have been

brought.’

Shamrock cites Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S.

663 (1953) as authority that Section 1406(a) has no application

to this action. 

In Polizzi, a libel action filed in the Florida state court

was removed to the Southern District of Florida and then

dismissed for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)

because defendant was not at the time of service of the summons

doing business in the Southern District of Florida. The Supreme

Court addressed whether the District Court correctly dismissed

the action for lack of jurisdiction:

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Both courts below held that the District

Court lacked jurisdiction but they reached

that conclusion by deciding that Respondent

was not ‘doing business’ in Florida within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. ... § 1391(c) ...

Section 1391 is a general venue statute. In

a case where it applies, if its requirements

are not satisfied, the District Court is not

deprived of jurisdiction, although dismissal

of the case might be justified it a timely

objection to the venue were interposed ... 28

U.S.C.A. § 1406. But even on the question of

venue, § 1391 has no application to this case

because it is a removed action. The venue of

removed actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. ...

§ 1441(a) ..., and under that section venue

was properly laid in the Southern District of

Florida ... Section 1391(a) limits the

district in which the action may be

‘brought.’ Section 1391(c) similarly limits

the district in which a corporation may be

‘sued.’ This action was not ‘brought’ in the

District Court, nor was Respondent ‘sued’

there; the action was brought in a state

court and removed to the District Court. 

Section 1441(a) expressly provides that the

proper venue of a removed action is ‘the

district court of the United States for the

district and division embracing the place

where such action is pending.’ The Southern

District of Florida is the district embracing

Dade County, the place where this action was

pending ....

Therefore, the question whether Respondent

was ‘doing business’ in Florida within the

meaning of § 1391(c) is irrelevant, and the

discussion of that question is beside the

point. The District Court based its holding

that it lacked jurisdiction on a statute

which has no application to the case, and the

Court of Appeals affirmed on the same

reasoning. 

345 U.S. at 665-666.

Cases have construed Polizzi as precluding reliance on

Section 1406(a) as authority to transfer venue of a removed

action on the theory that venue is the defendant’s privilege and

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defendant chose to remove the action to the District Court under

Section 1441(a). See, e.g., Western Showcase Homes, Inc. v.

Fuqua Homes, Inc., 2010 WL 1838364 at * 3 (D.Nev., May 6,

2010)(“[A] party in a removed action may not challenge venue as

being improper under § 1406, but may only challenge it as being

more convenient under § 1404"); Maysey, supra, 2009 WL 3740737 at

* 2 (“The transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), is a general

venue statute and provides no authority to transfer the venue of

removed actions”); Prestar Financial Corp. v. Infraegis, Inc.,

2009 WL 3425348 at *1 (C.D.Cal., Oct. 19, 2009).

Ammex argues that Polizzi has been superceded by Goldlwar,

making Section 1406(a) applicable authority to transfer this

action to the Central District of California. Goldlwar did not

involve a removed action and cannot be read as superseding

Polizzi, which did involve a removed action. Nonetheless,

analyzing Section 1406(a) Polizzi makes little sense because

Ammex removed the action to an incorrect district court.

Shamrock argued at the hearing that Mr. Romero’s averment

that the case was removed to this Court as a result of a mistake

in reading a map is conclusory and should not be considered. 

Shamrock complains that Mr. Romero provides no details of the

steps that led to the mistake. Mr. Romero’s averment suffices to

establish that a mistake was made. The Eastern District of

California has no interest in this action and both parties agree

that the action should not have been removed to the Eastern

District of California, but to the Central District of

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California, Eastern Division. 

Although the removal statutes are strictly construed, in the

absence of controlling Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority, 

the better view supports the transfer of this action to the

Central District of California, rather than remanding it to the

San Bernardino Superior Court. A mistake was made; there is

nothing before the Court from which it may be inferred that Ammex

removed the action to the Eastern District of California in a

deliberate attempt to bring the case before this Court. Federal

subject matter jurisdiction over the action existed when it was

removed, making the underlying concern one of venue.1

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED;

2. Defendant’s motion to transfer this action to the

Central District of California, Eastern Division is GRANTED;

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to transfer this

action to the Central District of California, Eastern Division.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This conclusion makes unnecessary resolution of Ammex’s 1

argument that transfer of the action is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §

1631.

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