Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01359/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01359-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 With respect to the remaining claim, Claim 1, alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel at sentencing, the Court deferred ruling until the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 35 (2006). The Supreme Court handed

down its ruling on May 14, 2007. Schriro v. Landrigan, --- S. Ct. ----, 2007 WL 1387923.

Petitioner requests fourteen days to complete supplemental briefing addressing the impact

of the ruling on Claim 1. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Van Adams, )

) CV-04-1359-PHX-MHM

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

Dora Schriro, et al., ) 

)

Respondents. )

)

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 122) regarding the

Court’s Order of March 30, 2007, which denied as procedurally barred or meritless all but

one of Petitioner’s habeas claims (Dkt. 116).1

 

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and appropriate only if the court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling

law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,

5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not a forum for the

moving party to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs, Northwest Acceptance

Case 2:04-cv-01359-MHM Document 123 Filed 05/24/07 Page 1 of 4
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Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir. 1988), nor is it the time

to ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through,” United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation omitted).

Alleging that this Court committed clear error, Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the

Court’s denial of Claim 2 as procedurally barred. In Claim 2, Petitioner alleges that his

waiver of the presentation of mitigation evidence at sentencing was not knowing or voluntary

because counsel did not perform an adequate mitigation investigation prior to the waiver and

because the court failed to engage Petitioner in an adequate waiver colloquy. (Dkt. 48 at 65.)

This Court found that the claim was procedurally barred based upon the PCR court’s

determination that Petitioner’s “claim that his waiver was invalid because he was not fully

informed of the consequences of the waiver is precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because it

could have been raised on direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.” (Dkt. 116 at 28

(quoting ME 1/6/03 at 4.)) Petitioner now contends that this Court and the PCR court erred

because the “gravamen” of the claim was the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”), and that such an allegation could not have been raised on direct appeal because it

required the introduction of additional evidence through an evidentiary hearing and because

Petitioner was represented on direct appeal by the same office that represented him at trial.

The Court disagrees.

In Claim 2 Petitioner challenges the result of counsel’s failure to investigate

mitigation evidence, contending that, combined with the failure of the trial court to “engage

in a meaningful colloquy” (Dkt. 48 at 65), counsel’s performance rendered Petitioner’s

waiver of mitigation involuntary and uninformed. It was this “inadequate waiver” claim that

was denied by the PCR court on independent and adequate state grounds when it determined

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2 It is clear – and Petitioner does not contend otherwise – that claims challenging

the validity of a defendant’s waiver of a right are appropriately raised on direct appeal. See,

e.g., State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 498-99, 910 P.2d 635, 649-50 (1996) (defendant argued

on direct appeal that he was inappropriately allowed to represent himself without a valid

waiver of his right to counsel); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 174-75, 800 P.2d 1260,

1282-83 (1990) (defendant challenged validity of his waiver of right to be present at

aggravation/mitigation hearing).

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that Petitioner could have challenged the validity of his waiver on direct appeal.2

 (ME 1/6/03

at 4.) To the extent Petitioner alleges IAC in Claim 2, the allegation is indistinguishable

from the IAC allegation in Claim 1 – i.e., that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to

conduct an adequate mitigation investigation. That claim was the subject of an evidentiary

hearing in state court, when Petitioner was no longer represented by the Maricopa County

Public Defender’s Office, and will be addressed on the merits by this Court following the

supplemental briefing ordered below.

In addition, based upon the Supreme Court’s statement in Landrigan that “[w]e have

never imposed an ‘informed and knowing’ requirement upon a defendant’s decision not to

introduce evidence,” 2007 WL 1387923 at *9, it is clear that Claim 2 is without merit.

Because there is no Supreme Court precedent requiring a knowing and informed waiver of

mitigation evidence, Petitioner’s assertion in Claim 2 that his waiver was uninformed and

involuntary cannot provide a basis for relief. See Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653-54

(2006) (denying habeas relief in absence of clearly established federal law). 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 122)

is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that supplemental briefing concerning the impact of

the holding in Schriro v. Landrigan, --- S. Ct. ----, 2007 WL 1387923, on Petitioner’s Claim

1, shall occur as follows:

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Petitioner’s memorandum shall be filed not later than fourteen (14) days from the date

of this Order.

Respondents’ response shall be filed within ten (10) days of Petitioner’s

memorandum.

Petitioner’s reply shall be filed within five (5) days of Respondents’ response. 

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2007.

Case 2:04-cv-01359-MHM Document 123 Filed 05/24/07 Page 4 of 4