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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13239

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CASSANDRA M. PRUITT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICE, LLC, 

f.k.a. Allied Universal Security Services, 

KRISTEN ARGUS, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13239

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01884-JPB

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Cassandra Pruitt appeals the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment to Universal Protection Service, LLC, formerly known as Allied Universal Security Services (“Allied”), and 

Kristen Argus on her claims of (1) unequal pay under the Equal Pay 

Act (“EPA”) against Allied and Argus, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 

206(d); (2) sex-based wage discrimination against Allied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); and (3) retaliation under Title VII against 

Allied, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

I

Allied contracted with Atlanta Medical Center (“AMC”) to 

provide security services at various AMC hospitals. AMC is owned 

by Wellstar.

In February of 2015, Allied hired Ms. Pruitt as a security 

manager for AMC under Director Richard Westgate. Ms. Pruitt 

primarily managed the operations for security officers’ shifts, did 

scheduling and training, conducted investigations, documented

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incidents and activities, and processed payroll. Ms. Pruitt was primarily responsible for the security management at AMC-Main exclusively. Ms. Pruitt would occasionally go to the AMC-South hospital one or two times a month at Mr. Westgate’s behest. 

Ms. Pruitt’s day-to-day responsibilities as the security manager of AMC-Main all related to the management of the security 

services provided by Allied to AMC-Main. AMC-South was managed by a separate security manager during all times relevant to 

this appeal, first by Tyrone Jacobs and subsequently by Robert Stevens.

Soon after Ms. Pruitt was hired, Mr. Westgate was demoted, 

and his position was eliminated. Ms. Pruitt took on some additional responsibilities and duties relating to AMC-Main’s security, 

but she, and other security managers, did not receive any responsibilities relating to emergency management. Instead, emergency 

management responsibilities were handled at various times by Michael Dunning, Jamey Moore, and Mr. Westgate. Ms. Pruitt complained to her supervisor, Kristen Argus, that even though she had 

increased responsibilities after Mr. Westgate was demoted, she had 

not received additional compensation. She also complained that, 

despite receiving a higher salary, she was being paid at a lower rate 

than Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Stevens.

On April 16, 2019, Ms. Pruitt submitted a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) complaining of sex discrimination and unequal pay. 

Subsequent to Ms. Pruitt’s EEOC complaint, Stuart Downs, the 

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Chief Operating Officer of Wellstar, became aware of a recording 

of a patient Ms. Pruitt produced while working at AMC-South, a 

violation of hospital policy. Mr. Downs requested Allied remove 

Ms. Pruitt from her position as security manager at AMC-South. 

On April 26, 2019, Allied complied with Mr. Downs’ request and 

removed Ms. Pruitt from her position. After her removal, Ms. 

Pruitt filed a second EEOC charge alleging retaliation. Ms. Pruitt

then filed the instant suit. This appeal comes as a result of the district court’s order granting the motions for summary judgment 

filed by Allied and Ms. Argus. 

Ms. Pruitt first argues that the district court erred when it 

granted summary judgment to Allied and Ms. Argus on the ground 

that she failed to establish a prima facie case under the EPA. Second, 

Ms. Pruitt argues that the district court similarly erred when it 

granted summary judgment on the ground that she failed to establish a prima facie case of wage-discrimination under Title VII. Finally, Ms. Pruitt argues that the district court erred when it granted 

summary judgment on the ground that she failed to establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 

II

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standards applied by the district 

court.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 

(11th Cir. 2003). A court must grant summary judgment “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We view the summary judgment record in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Stanley v. 

City of Sanford, Fla., 83 F.4th 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). 

III

We first address Ms. Pruitt’s challenge to the district court’s 

conclusion that she failed to establish a prima facie case under the 

EPA. “The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex 

and ‘forbids the specific practice of paying unequal wages for equal 

work to employees of the opposite sex.’” Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. 

Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Miranda v. B & B 

Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1992)). 

The analysis of an EPA claim follows a two-step 

framework. First, to establish a prima facie case a 

plaintiff must show “that an employer pays different 

wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work 

on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, 

effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 

under similar working conditions.” . . . Second, if an 

EPA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the difference 

in pay is justified by one of the four exceptions in the 

Equal Pay Act.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974); and Brock v. Ga. 

Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1036 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled on other 

grounds by McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988)).

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A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the EPA by 

comparing the jobs held by the female and male employees, and by 

showing those jobs are substantially equal, comparing only the 

skills and qualifications actually needed to perform the primary duties of each job. See Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533. “The plaintiff need 

not prove that the job held by her male comparator is identical to 

hers; she must demonstrate only that the skill, effort and responsibility required in the performance of the jobs are ‘substantially 

equal.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). “The standard for determining whether jobs are equal in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility is high.” Waters v. Turner, Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 

874 F.2d 797, 799 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that an insurance agent 

failed to raise a genuine factual issue that her comparators were 

substantially equal when she failed to rebut evidence that they were 

tasked with seven different important duties). See also Terrell v. Ala. 

State Univ., 700 F.Supp.3d 1015, 1024 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (finding that 

a fellow employee was not a proper comparator in part because he 

only shared broad similarities between a small percentage of the 

comparator’s job and the plaintiff’s job). 

Ms. Pruitt argues that the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to Allied and Argus on her EPA claim because 

she established a prima facie case by showing that she was paid less 

than two distinct sets of male comparators: (1) previous Directors 

of Security and Emergency Management—Messrs. Westgate, 

Moore, and Dunning; and (2) male security managers at AMCMain—Messrs. Jacobs and Stevens. 

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As to the first set of comparators, Ms. Pruitt argues that she 

should be compared to Messrs. Westgate, Moore, and Dunning because she had what she claims to be similar emergency management duties and handled more than one hospital. The record contradicts her assertion. Ms. Pruitt maintains Mr. Westgate could not 

have had emergency management responsibilities because his predecessor, Mr. Moore, had already created all the emergency policies 

and procedures before Mr. Westgate’s arrival and Mr. Moore had

served as incident commander during the only two emergency incidents she is aware of. However, Ms. Pruitt makes no attempt to 

refute Allied’s explanation that emergency management responsibilities encompass a wholly different set of tasks and responsibilities from those she identified, like ensuring emergency preparedness through evaluating and testing existing procedures and systems, managing PPE inventories, or being aware of and anticipating potential needs of emergencies at events in the area that the 

hospital may need to serve. 

Security managers reported directly to the Director of Security and Emergency Management. The responsibilities of Messrs.

Westgate, Moore, and Dunning were substantially different than 

Ms. Pruitt’s because those individuals retained significant emergency management duties that Ms. Pruitt did not handle. Moreover, all three men managed at least two hospitals, while Ms. Pruitt

was only ever primarily responsible for AMC-Main. Mr. Westgate

testified that he spent 60 to 70 percent of his working time on emergency management when he held the title of Director of Security 

and Emergency Management. After Mr. Westgate was demoted to 

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Emergency Manager, he retained responsibility for all emergency 

management functions at both AMC-South and AMC-Main. Mr. 

Moore testified that his emergency management duties took 50 to 

60 percent of his time, and his duties covered two hospital locations. Mr. Dunning also testified that emergency management duties took 60 to 65 percent of his time, and he covered four hospitals. 

Ms. Pruitt alleged she picked up some of Mr. Westgate’s former duties at AMC-Main, such as attending certain meetings, dealing with pay rates, and hiring and firing. Yet Mr. Westgate remained responsible for emergency management at all AMC properties after his demotion. Ms. Pruitt also alleged that she would 

occasionally travel to AMC-South once or twice per month to perform tasks Mr. Westgate was responsible for. But she failed to establish that any of the functions she identified constituted substantial or primary duties of her security manager role such that her 

role was “substantially equal” to that of any of the director comparators she offered. See Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533. Even if Ms. 

Pruitt had occasional emergency management responsibilities, the 

fact that most of her responsibilities were exclusive to AMC-Main

while each of the director comparators offered was responsible for 

more than one hospital is fatal to the comparison. Ms. Pruitt failed

to meet the high standard of showing her job was “substantially 

equal” to those of Messrs. Westgate, Moore, and Dunning and 

could not establish a prima facie EPA claim by relying on them as 

comparators. See Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533; Waters, 874 F.2d at 799.

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The second set of comparators, Ms. Pruitt’s male security 

manager counterparts at AMC-South, are also not appropriate 

comparators to establish a prima facie case under the EPA. Ms. 

Pruitt was always paid a higher salary than either of them. Even 

though Ms. Pruitt was paid more than both Messrs. Jacobs and Stevens, she argues that she was paid less than them because her pay 

rate was lower based on a difference that emerges when their respective salaries are divided by the total amount of hours of supervised security services that AMC had contracted for Allied to provide at the respective AMC hospital. 

Ms. Pruitt relies on non-binding reasoning from the Sixth 

Circuit—Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1027–1028 (6th 

Cir. 1983) (finding that a plaintiff could state a prima facie case under 

the EPA despite receiving a higher total compensation than their 

comparators, if she was paid at a lower rate than their comparators). Bence, however, is distinguishable from the present case, and 

we decline Ms. Pruitt’s invitation to apply its legal principle here. 

The plaintiff’s pay in Bence was determined by commissions based 

on gross sales, whereas here Ms. Pruitt, Mr. Jacobs, and Mr. Stevens 

were all paid a flat salary. See id. at 1025-28. Ms. Pruitt offered no 

evidence that any other payment structures were used or that any 

security manager salaries were determined by reliance on the metric Ms. Pruitt suggests we rely on now. This substantially differs 

from the scenario in Bence, where part of the employees’ compensation was calculated from a pay rate that was explicitly different 

based on the employee’s gender. Ms. Pruitt’s suggested denominator had no connection to how she or her comparators’

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compensation was actually determined, unlike the denominator 

relied on in Bence. As a result, Ms. Pruitt failed to show she was 

ever paid less total compensation than Messrs. Jacobs or Stevens or 

that there was any difference in the calculation of those salaries by 

Allied such that Ms. Pruitt was paid at a different rate.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when 

it granted summary judgment to Allied and Argus on Ms. Pruitt’s 

EPA claim because she failed to establish a prima facie case.

IV

We now move to Ms. Pruitt’s similar Title VII claim. Under 

Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

We have held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Tex. Dep’t of 

Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), “provide ‘the appropriate 

framework for evaluating [a] claim of gender-based wage discrimination’ under Title VII.” Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 

1013, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528). “Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach, a female Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

sex discrimination by showing that she occupies a job similar to 

that of higher paid males.” Id. “Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant must articulate a ‘legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the pay disparity.’” Id. (quoting Miranda, 975 F.2d 

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at 1529). “Once such a justification is advanced, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer 

had a discriminatory intent. In other words, the plaintiff must show 

that ‘a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the 

employer] to pay her less.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1529). 

“Title VII incorporates a more relaxed standard of similarity 

between male and female-occupied jobs, thus [a] plaintiff is not required to meet the exacting standard of substantial equality of positions set forth in the Equal Pay Act.” Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1529 

n.15. Nevertheless, even under a relaxed standard, we have held 

that employees held up by plaintiffs as comparators for purposes of 

establishing a prima facie case under Title VII must be “similarly 

situated in all material respects” to the plaintiff. See Lewis v. City of 

Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Under this standard, “[a] plaintiff needn’t prove . . . that she and her 

comparators are identical save for their race or gender.” Id. at 1227. 

Rather, “a plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be distinguished.’” Id. at 1228 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 

U.S. 206, 231 (2015)). 

Ms. Pruitt argues that the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to Allied on her Title VII wage-discrimination 

claim because she established a prima facie case by showing that she 

was paid less than male employees who were similarly situated to 

her in all material respects. However, we find that under Title VII’s 

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more relaxed standard, Ms. Pruitt cannot establish a prima facie

case.

As to the director comparators, Ms. Pruitt did not establish 

that Messrs. Westgate, Moore, and Dunning are “similarly situated 

in all material respects” to her responsibilities because her comparators all had substantial emergency management duties she never 

had. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1226. Messrs. Westgate, Moore, and 

Dunning also had primary duties covering multiple hospital locations, while Ms. Pruitt’s primary duties related to only one hospital. 

The hours her comparators worked on emergency management 

duties, as well as their consistent responsibilities with respect to 

multiple hospital locations, sufficiently distinguishes their jobs 

from Ms. Pruitt’s job to defeat her Title VII claim with respect to 

them. See Young, 575 U.S. at 231.

As to her second set of comparators, Ms. Pruitt does not assert any new arguments regarding Messrs. Jacobs and Stevens. As 

discussed above, she did not present any evidence that she was actually paid less than them: the record evidence shows that Ms. 

Pruitt in fact was paid a higher salary than the manager comparators she offers.

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Allied on Ms. Pruitt’s Title VII wage-discrimination claim 

because she failed to establish a prima facie case.

V

Finally, we address Ms. Pruitt’s Title VII retaliation claim. 

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate 

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against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 

subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

“A Title VII retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence . . . is ordinarily analyzed under the . . . burden-shifting 

framework” stated in McDonnell Douglas. See Tolar v. Bradley Arant 

Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). “Pursuant to that framework, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie 

case of retaliation by showing that: (1) she engaged in statutorily 

protected conduct—that is, conduct protected by Title VII; (2) she 

suffered an adverse action; and (3) ‘there issome causal relationship 

between the two events.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 

948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020)). “The burden then shifts to 

the employer to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for 

the adverse action.” Id. “Assuming the employer’s burden is met, 

‘the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the reason 

offered by the [employer] was not the real basis for the decision, 

but a pretext’ for retaliation.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325).

“We have explained that ‘very close’ temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse action can create an inference of causation.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 

1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 

506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, “the intervening 

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discovery of employee misconduct can sever the causal inference 

created by close temporal proximity.” Id. It is the causal chain necessary for the third element of a prima facie retaliation claim that is 

at issue here.

Ms. Pruitt argues that the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to Allied on her Title VII retaliation claim because she established a prima facie case by submitting evidence establishing a close temporal proximity between her removal from 

AMC-Main and her EEOC complaint. We disagree.

Ms. Pruitt established that she (1) engaged in statutorily protected conduct—her first EEOC claim she filed on April 16, 2019, 

and (2) that she suffered an adverse action—her removal from her 

position as security manager on April 26, 2019. See Tolar, 997 F.3d 

at 1289. But Ms. Pruitt failed to meet the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework because she did not establish that there is 

“some causal relationship” between her EEOC complaint and her 

removal. See Tolar, 991 F.3d at 1289. Ms. Pruitt relied entirely on 

the temporal proximity of the adverse employment action and her 

EEOC complaint to establish the causal chain. Although the causal 

connection can be established by temporal proximity, that same 

causal connection can be severed by the intervening discovery of 

misconduct. See Tolar, 997 F.3d at 1289; Berry, 84 F.4th at 1309. Despite the “very close” temporal proximity between the two events

in this case, in the intervening period Allied was made aware that

Ms. Pruitt violated an AMC-Main policy when she recorded a patient without consent. It does not matter that the recording 

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occurred before she filed the EEOC complaint—the operative timing is when discovery of the misconduct occurs. See Berry, 84 F.4th 

at 1309. Here, Allied was made aware of the conduct by Mr. 

Downs only after Ms. Pruitt’s EEOC complaint. Mr. Downs requested Ms. Pruitt’s removal because of that discovery. Ms. Pruitt’s 

allegation that another AMC employee instructed her to produce 

the recording in contravention of hospital policy does not change 

the analysis. Allied still only became aware of the alleged misconduct, as well as Mr. Downs’ request that Ms. Pruitt be removed 

from AMC-Main, after her EEOC complaint had already been

made. The intervening discovery of prior misconduct was sufficient to sever the causal chain where causation was unsupported 

by any evidence other than temporal proximity. See Berry, 84 F.4th 

at 1309. Without the essential causation element established, Ms. 

Pruitt did not establish a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim. 

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Allied on Ms. Pruitt’s Title VII retaliation claim because 

Ms. Pruitt failed to establish a prima facie case.

VI

The district court’s summary judgment order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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