Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03071/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03071-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:2651 Medical Care Recovery

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KENNETH L. CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARACK OBAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03071-BLF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL OR GUARDIAN AD LITEM

(ECF 147); DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR A MEDICAL 

EXAMINATION (ECF 153); AND 

LIFTING STAY

Plaintiff Kenneth L. Campbell, proceeding pro se, sues Barack Obama, President of the 

United States, and many others for a variety of claims which include a constitutional challenge to 

Medicare’s statutory 100-day limitation on skilled nursing care; a request to abolish the State Bar 

of California on the ground that all attorneys are dishonest; and claims of elder abuse and 

disability discrimination against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

This order addresses Campbell’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad 

Litem (ECF 147) and Campbell’s Motion for Medical Examination (ECF 153). For the reasons 

discussed below, those motions are DENIED. The stay of litigation entered by the Court pending 

disposition of Campbell’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem, see Minute 

Entry (ECF 203), is LIFTED.

 I. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL OR GUARDIAN AD LITEM

Campbell filed this action on July 7, 2014, at which time it was assigned to Magistrate 

Judge Paul S. Grewal. After several defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, Campbell filed a 

motion for appointment of counsel. On October 6, 2014, Judge Grewal issued an order denying 

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Campbell’s motion for appointment of counsel and granting Campbell an extension of time to 

reply to one of the pending motions to dismiss. See Order Denying Motion to Appoint Counsel 

and Granting Motion to Extend Time, ECF 63. Approximately one year later, following 

significant motion practice and reassignment of the case to the undersigned judge, Campbell filed 

the present motion in which he again requests appointment of counsel or appointment of a 

guardian ad litem. See Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem, ECF 147. 

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Campbell requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this case. “Generally, 

a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 

2009). “However, a court may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent 

civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Id. In making a determination whether 

exceptional circumstances exist, the court must consider both the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims pro se and the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. Id. “Neither of 

these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id.

Campbell has filed numerous motions, briefs, and other documents articulating his claims 

in this case. Those claims are not a model of clarity, but they do set forth Campbell’s theories of 

relief. Thus this factor does not weigh heavily for or against appointment of counsel. 

However, Campbell’s claims are not likely to succeed on the merits. As discussed in the 

concurrently filed order dismissing all of Campbell’s claims without leave to amend and 

dismissing this action with prejudice, Campbell has failed to cure the defects identified by Judge 

Grewal in his prior dismissal order or to show that he might be able to allege a viable claim if 

given further leave to do so. 

Campbell’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.1 

The Court notes that Judge Grewal’s order denying Campbell’s first motion for 

appointment of counsel referred Campbell to the Court’s Federal Pro Se Program (previously 

 

1

To the extent that Campbell’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel may be viewed as a 

motion for reconsideration of Judge Grewal’s prior order denying appointment of counsel, 

Campbell has not complied with the requirements of Civil Local Rule 7-9. See Civ. L.R. 7-9 

(setting forth requirements for seeking reconsideration in this district).

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

called “Federal Legal Assistance Self Help Center” or “FLASH”), a free program that offers 

limited legal services and advice to parties who are representing themselves. See Order Denying 

Motion to Appoint Counsel and Granting Motion to Extend Time at 2 & n.11, ECF 63. The 

record does not reflect any effort on Campbell’s part to obtain legal assistance through the Court’s 

program.

B. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem

Campbell requests that the Court appoint a guardian ad litem under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 17(c), which provides in relevant part that:

A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed 

representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must 

appoint a guardian ad litem--or issue another appropriate order--to protect a minor 

or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that when “a substantial question” exists 

regarding the mental competence of a pro se litigant, the district court should conduct a hearing to 

determine competence so that a guardian ad litem may be appointed if appropriate. Allen v. 

Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005); Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Other circuits have held that a district court’s duty of inquiry under Rule 17(c) is 

triggered by “verifiable evidence” of incompetence. See, e.g., Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 

307 (3rd Cir. 2012); Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, 323 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 

2003). 

The Ninth Circuit found a “substantial question” regarding competence where a pro se 

prisoner litigant submitted a letter from the prison psychiatrist stating that the litigant was under 

his care, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was taking psychotropic medications, see 

Allen, 408 F.3d at 1152, but it found no substantial question where a pro se litigant merely 

asserted that the district court should have conducted a competency hearing, see Day v. Sonoma 

Cnty., 1997 WL 686016, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997). The Third Circuit found “verifiable 

evidence” of incompetence where one co-plaintiff was adjudicated incompetent in a simultaneous 

criminal proceeding and the other co-plaintiff submitted a letter from a mental health professional. 

See Powell, 680 F.3d at 308-09. The Second Circuit has indicated that “verifiable evidence” could 

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

take the form of records from a court or public agency or evidence from a mental health 

professional, but that bizarre behavior, standing alone, is not sufficient to trigger a district court’s 

duty of inquiry under Rule 17(c). See Ferrelli, 323 F.3d at 201-02. 

In this case, Campbell relies upon the following evidence of incompetence. First, he cites 

to his certificate of honorable discharge from the United States Navy, dated April 28, 1960, which 

is attached as an exhibit to his SAC. See Discharge, ECF 126. Campbell contends that his 

discharge was “for medical reasons” but the document itself does not state the reasons for 

Campbell’s discharge.

Campbell next claims that he suffered traumatic head injury at birth, which resulted in 

significant functional impairment. However, he provides no evidence of the claimed injury.

Finally, Campbell cites to a 1975 decision of the California Court of Appeal addressing the 

trial court’s competency determination in criminal proceedings against him on a charge of armed 

robbery. See People v. Superior Court (Campbell), 51 Cal. App. 3d 459 (1975). The trial court 

found that there was substantial evidence that Campbell was incompetent to stand trial, suspended 

the proceedings, and ordered Campbell committed to the Department of Health. Id. at 463. The 

Court of Appeal held that Campbell had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of his 

competence to stand trial and that the trial court had erred in accepting a waiver of that right from 

Campbell’s counsel over Campbell’s objection. Id. The Court of Appeal also suggested that the 

trial court had been confused as to the applicable legal standard, stating that the test “is 

competency to cooperate, not cooperation,” and that Campbell’s uncooperativeness with his 

attorney did not provide a basis for committing him. Id. at 464. The Court of Appeal reversed the 

trial court’s commitment order and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of competence. 

Id. 

The cited decision vacated the trial court’s competency determination. Therefore, it is 

doubtful that the decision would be sufficient to raise a substantial question regarding Campbell’s 

competence even if it were recent. However, the decision is forty years old, and thus does not 

raise a substantial question regarding Campbell’s current mental state.

At the hearing, the Court explained to Campbell that it needed some evidence of 

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

incompetence, and it granted Campbell until February 16, 2016 to submit a doctor’s letter 

regarding his mental condition. See Minute Entry, ECF 203. Campbell submitted two letters 

dated February 12, 2016 which were filed by the Clerk on February 17, 2016. The Court accepts 

those letters as timely. One of the letters, directed to the undersigned, states that Campbell was 

unable to obtain a psychiatric examination. The other letter, directed to the Court Clerk, does not 

address the competency issue. Thus neither letter raises a substantial question as to Campbell’s 

competence.

At the hearing, the Court inquired whether Campbell had received any mental health 

treatment. He indicated that he had not, but that he was on a psychiatric hold at some time in the 

last year or so. The Court presumes that Campbell was referring to an involuntary psychiatric 

hold pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 5150. However, Campbell presented no 

evidence that he was found to be gravely disabled at that time or diagnosed with any mental health 

condition.

The Court has considered whether Campbell’s behavior during this litigation could be 

considered sufficient to raise a substantial question regarding his competence. Some of 

Campbell’s filings indicate that he might be contemplating suicide, either medically assisted or 

otherwise. For example, an email chain between Campbell and his doctor, attached to his 

Amended Notice regarding his Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem, shows 

that Campbell asked his doctor whether starvation would be a painful death. See Emails, ECF 

180. While that behavior might be thought to suggest some mental instability, this Court has not 

discovered any decision in which such behavior has been held to warrant even a Rule 17(c) 

inquiry, let alone a finding of incompetence. Additionally, in light of California’s recently enacted

End of Life Option Act, Health & Safety Code § 443 et seq., the Court concludes that discussion 

with a physician about end of life choices is not, alone, evidence of incompetence.

Thus, on this record, the Court has no verifiable evidence of incompetence. Campbell’s 

motion for a guardian ad litem is DENIED.2

 

2 Although not mentioned in the caption of Campbell’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel or 

Guardian Ad Litem, the body of the motion contains a request for a “protective order” prohibiting 

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

 II. MOTION FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Shortly after filing his Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem, 

Campbell filed a Motion for Medical Examination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. 

In the motion, Campbell indicates that he is seeking a medical examination of himself and that he 

“selects and designates” his primary care physician, Dr. Kurt Andrew Vandervort. Motion for 

Medical Examination at 3, ECF 153. However, in a footnote, Campbell indicates that he expects 

that Dr. Vandervort will make a referral to a qualified psychiatrist. Id. at 3 n.1. 

The purpose of Rule 35 is to compel an unwilling party to submit to a medical examination 

where his or her medical condition is at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 Advisory Comm. Notes. 

“Typically . . . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 35 is invoked when one party (usually a 

defendant) seeks to have an opposing party (usually a plaintiff) submit to a mental or physical 

examination.” Cottle v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:12–cv–00645–MMD–WGC, 2013 WL 

5773845, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2013). Rule 35 may not be used “to secure either medical 

treatment for the plaintiff or to obtain expert witness testimony to advocate on the plaintiff’s 

behalf.” Id. (collecting cases). 

Campbell’s reliance on Rule 35 is misplaced. It is the responsibility of each litigant to 

obtain the evidence needed to support his own case. “[P]ro se litigants in the ordinary civil case 

should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.” See Jacobsen v. 

Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).

Campbell’s Motion for Medical Examination is DENIED.

//

//

//

 

MP Shoreline Associates from commencing or prosecuting any unlawful detainer action against 

Campbell in state court. Campbell has not presented facts suggesting that MP Shoreline 

Associates has or intends to file an unlawful detainer action against him. Moreover, Campbell in 

essence seeks injunctive relief against MP Shoreline Associates, but he has not addressed the 

factors that must be established in order to obtain such relief. See Winter v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (setting forth factors that must be established to 

obtain preliminary injunctive relief). Thus Campbell’s request for a protective order is DENIED.

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

 III. ORDER

(1) Campbell’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem (ECF 147) 

is DENIED; 

(2) Campbell’s Motion for Medical Examination (ECF 153) is DENIED; and

(3) The stay of litigation entered by the Court pending disposition of Campbell’s 

Motion for Appointment of Counsel or Guardian Ad Litem, see Minute Entry 

(ECF 203), is hereby LIFTED.

Dated: March 18, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-03071-BLF Document 207 Filed 03/18/16 Page 7 of 7