Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05290/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2001 Decided November 6, 2001

No. 01-5290

National Coalition to Save Our Mall, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity as

Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02371)

William T. Mayton argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the pleadings was Andrea C. Ferster.

R. Justin Smith, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the pleadings

were Andrew C. Mergen, Patricia L. Weiss and Sean H.

Donahue, Attorneys.

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Before: Sentelle and Tatel, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Williams.

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge: A group of organizations,

here collectively called the Coalition, filed suit in October

2000 seeking an injunction against the construction of a

proposed World War II Memorial on the National Mall. The

defendants were a variety of agencies--the Department of

the Interior, the National Parks Service, the Commission of

Fine Arts, the National Capital Planning Commission, and

the American Battle Monuments Commission--responsible

either for the construction of the Memorial or for some link in

the chain of permitting and approval. The Coalition asserted

that in approving the design and construction of the Memorial, the defendant agencies violated a variety of statutes: the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

s 4332(2)(C), the Commemorative Works Act, 40 U.S.C.

s 1001 et seq., the National Historic Preservation Act, 16

U.S.C. s 470f et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee

Act, 5 U.S.C. App. II, s 10(a).

In May 2001, while the case was pending in district court,

Congress enacted Public Law No. 107-11, 115 Stat. 19 (2001)

(the "Act"), which appears to exempt construction of the

Memorial from the possible statutory obstacles and to bar

judicial review of agency decisions underlying the construction. The Act's full text is as follows:

Section 1. Approval of World War II Memorial Site and

Design.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the World

War II memorial described in plans approved by the

Commission of Fine Arts on July 20, 2000 and November

16, 2000, and selected by the National Capital Planning

Commission on September 21, 2000 and December 14,

2000, and in accordance with the special use permit

issued by the Secretary of the Interior on January 23,

2001, and numbered NCR-NACC-5700-0103, shall be

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constructed expeditiously at the dedicated Rainbow Pool

site in the District of Columbia in a manner consistent

with such plans and permits, subject to design modifications, if any, approved in accordance with applicable laws

and regulations.

Sec. 2. Application of Commemorative Works Act.

Elements of the memorial design and construction not

approved as of the date of enactment of this Act shall be

considered and approved in accordance with the requirements of the Commemorative Works Act (40 U.S.C. 1001

et seq.).

Sec. 3. Judicial Review.

The decision to locate the memorial at the Rainbow

Pool site in the District of Columbia and the actions by

the Commission of Fine Arts on July 20, 2000 and

November 16, 2000, the actions by the National Capital

Planning Commission on September 21, 2000 and December 14, 2000, and the issuance of the special use permit

identified in section 1 shall not be subject to judicial

review.

Pub. L. No. 107-11. In passing the statute, Congress acted

on its October 2000 resolution to ensure that "the completed

memorial will be dedicated while Americans of the World War

II generation are alive." S. Con. Res. 145, 106th Cong.

(2000); see also Declaration of William B. Owenby, Director

of Procurement and Contracting, American Battle Monuments Commission p 2 (Aug. 27, 2001) ("Of the sixteen million

citizens who served in uniform during World War II only five

million are alive today and these veterans are dying at the

rate of approximately 1,100 per day.").

The district court dismissed the action, explaining that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. National Coalition to

Save Our Mall v. Norton, No. Civ. A. 00-2371(HHK) (D.D.C.

Aug. 16, 2001). On appeal the Coalition argues that the

statute did not effect such a broad exemption for the Memorial, and that, if its language really did so, it encroached on the

powers of the federal courts in violation of the separation of

powers principles of Article III.

We find that the Act withdrew our subject matter jurisdiction over the statutory claims, and therefore that we lack

jurisdiction to entertain them. We further find that it does

not violate Article III.

* * *

The Coalition first contends that the strong presumption

for judicial review of agency decisions, see, e.g., Bowen v.

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670

(1986), requires us to read the Act as not precluding judicial

review of the statutory claims.

But the presumption is only that, and can be overridden by

specific language or by clear and convincing evidence of

legislative intent. Id. at 671-73. It is hard to see how

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Congress could make it clearer than it has here, providing

that "[t]he decision to locate the memorial at the Rainbow

Pool site[,] ... the actions [of the Agencies,] ... and the

issuance of the special use permit ... shall not be subject to

judicial review." Pub. L. No. 107-11, s 3.

Section 3's preclusion of review of the relevant agency

decisions, moreover, tracks s 1's direction that the Memorial

described in those decisions be "constructed expeditiously" in

accordance with the named permits, "[n]otwithstanding any

other provision of law." On its face, the phrase demonstrates

Congress's clear intent to go ahead with the Memorial as

planned, regardless of the planning's relation to pre-existing

general legislation. This would be clear even if we disregarded the classical but sometimes forgotten purpose of such a

non obstante clause, namely, to prevent courts from struggling to harmonize a statute with prior ones in the name of

the presumption against implied repeal. See Caleb Nelson,

"Preemption," 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 237-42 (2000).

To counter the language of the Act, the Coalition relies

chiefly on D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 434

F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There we held that a bridge

construction project of the Department of Transportation

remained subject to pre-existing law despite a statute directing its construction "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of

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law, or any court decision or administrative action to the

contrary." Id. at 437-38. But as we stressed in D.C. Federation, the statute had a savings clause providing that "[s]uch

construction ... shall be carried out in accordance with all

applicable provisions of title 23 of the United States Code."

Id. at 437-38. We found that this left the construction

subject to claims based on that title. Id. at 447. Public Law

No. 107-11, in contrast, contains savings clauses directed

entirely to changes in design or planning that might follow

the specified approvals and permits: "design modifications"

(s 1) (emphasis added), and "[e]lements ... not approved as

of the date of enactment" (s 2).

Both the language of s 3, the Act's purpose as shown in

s 1, and its overall structure evince an unequivocal intent to

cut off judicial review of all the defendant agencies' past

actions regarding the Memorial. Barring some constitutional

infirmity, we lack jurisdiction over the Coalition's statutory

claims.

The Coalition contends that if the Act's language withdrew

jurisdiction over their statutory claims, then it infringes on

judicial power under Article III. We find no such infringement.

First we note that the Act does not purport to bar our

consideration of its own constitutionality. See Steel Company

v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 98-101

(1998) (holding that, absent special circumstances, a court

may not reach a merits issue without having first found that

it has jurisdiction). Here, s 3 withdraws jurisdiction only

over the "decision to locate the memorial" and "the actions by

[various agencies]." Thus, just as Congress's withdrawal of

jurisdiction over "decision[s]" of the Veterans' Administration

left the courts free to adjudicate constitutional claims against

the VA's enabling statute, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,

366-74 (1974), so the Act here does not touch our jurisdiction

over its own constitutionality.

The Coalition argues that s 3 violates the principles in

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). That decision

dealt with a suit for the proceeds of property seized and sold

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by the army in the Civil War. The administrator of the

deceased prior owner's estate sued under legislation allowing

recovery by such owners under proof of loyalty, which the

Supreme Court had held was satisfied by receipt of a presidential pardon. After the plaintiff recovered in the Court of

Claims, Congress passed another statute, denying such pardons any effect in showing loyalty and providing that acceptance without protest of a pardon referring to the recipient's

participation in the rebellion would affirmatively prove disloyalty. Congress further directed that on proof of such a

pardon or its acceptance, the Court of Claims and Supreme

Court should dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. Id. at

141-44. The Supreme Court found the purported limit on its

jurisdiction invalid and ineffective.

Klein's exact meaning is far from clear. One sure precept

is that a statute's use of the language of jurisdiction cannot

operate as a talisman that ipso facto sweeps aside every

possible constitutional objection. Richard H. Fallon, Daniel

J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The

Federal Courts and the Federal System 368 (4th ed. 1996).

In Klein itself, the Court noted that the statute was "liable to

just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus

infringing the constitutional Power of the Executive." Klein,

80 U.S. at 147. As the Coalition poses no constitutional

objection to the substance of Public Law No. 107-11, this

element of Klein is of no concern.

There remains the following language of Klein:

It is evident from this statement that the denial of

jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of

Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of

decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.

The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point;

but when it ascertains that a certain state of things

exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to

dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.

It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the

acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and

prescribe regulations to the appellate power.

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Id. at 146; see also id. at 147 ("Can [Congress] prescribe a

rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself

the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its

decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to

the government and favorable to the suitor? This question

seems to us to answer itself.").

These passages cannot be read as a prohibition against

Congress's changing the rule of decision in a pending case, or

(more narrowly) changing the rule to assure a progovernment outcome. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514

U.S. 211 (1995), while holding that Congress may not legislate

to require federal courts to reopen suits for money damages

after final judgment, id. at 240, distinguished between pending cases and final judgments, saying that "[w]hen a new law

makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must

apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that

were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the

outcome accordingly," id. at 226 (citing United States v.

Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)). A further

distinction to the advantage of Public Law No. 107-11 is

between damage awards and injunctions. Miller v. French,

530 U.S. 327 (2000), held that although an injunction may be a

final judgment for purposes of appeal, it is not the "last word

of the judicial department" because any provision of prospective relief "is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered according to

subsequent changes in the law." Id. at 347; see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge, 59 U.S. 421 (1855)

(upholding a statute declaring as lawful a bridge that had

been previously adjudicated as an unlawful obstruction of

navigation). If Congress has the power to impose new standards for final judgments in the form of injunctions, it must

have the power to impose new substantive rules on suits such

as the Coalition's, which sought injunctive relief and had not

been resolved on the merits when Congress acted.

Further, to the extent that Klein can be read as saying that

Congress may not direct the outcome in a pending case

without amending the substantive law, a proposition on which

we express no view, Public Law No. 107-11 presents no more

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difficulty than the statute upheld in Robertson v. Seattle

Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), as Public Law No.

107-11 similarly amends the applicable substantive law. See

id. at 441.

Finally, the Coalition suggests that Public Law No. 107-11

is too "narrow," as it affects only the Memorial. In making

this argument, the Coalition cites a passage in Seattle Audubon in which the Court refused to address the belatedly

raised claim that "a change in law, prospectively applied,

would be unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications at

issue in the pending cases." Id. There Congress had responded to ongoing spotted-owl litigation relating to 13 national forests with legislation directing that the various statutes invoked against forestry decisions on the specified areas

must be deemed satisfied by compliance with the new statute's provisions. Id. at 433-35 & nn. 1-2, 440. Here too

Congress's direction addresses a specific problem, namely,

whether specified government decisions about the Memorial

complied with prior general legislation.

We find the level of specificity to be unobjectionable.

There is no independent objection that this Memorial-specific

legislation violates some substantive constitutional provision

limiting Congress's power to address a specific problem, such

as the ban on Bills of Attainder or (in some instances) the

Equal Protection clause. Indeed, the Coalition at oral argument conceded that the legislation would be constitutional

had it been passed prior to their bringing suit. In view of

Plaut, Miller v. French and Wheeling Bridge, we see no

reason why the specificity should suddenly become fatal

merely because there happened to be a pending lawsuit.

This seems particularly sound where Congress is addressing

a unique public amenity (or disamenity, depending on one's

viewpoint), such as the Memorial or the bridge at issue in

Wheeling Bridge.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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