Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00727/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00727-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The facts are taken from defendants’ motions to dismiss and plaintiff’s April 4, 2006,

verified complaint. All citations to the complaint refer to the pagination assigned by the court’s

Case Management – Electronic Case Filing system. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT TUNSTALL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0727 LKK EFB P

vs.

M. VEAL, Warden, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are defendants Cry, Khoury,

Kotila, and Silbaugh’s unenumerated Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and, in the alternative, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, defendant Grannis’ separately filed motion to dismiss

on the same bases, and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 

I. Summary of Facts1

At all times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the

California Medical Facility at Vacaville (hereafter “CMF”). Complaint (hereafter “Compl.”),

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generally. Defendant Cry was the Inmate Appeals Coordinator, defendant Khoury was the Chief

Deputy of Clinical Services, defendant Kotila was a staff psychologist, defendant Silbaugh was

the Chief Psychologist of the Mental Health Services Delivery Team at CMF. Defendant Cry,

Khoury, Kotila, and Silbaugh’s Motion to Dismiss (hereafter “Defs.’ Mot. to Dism.”). 

Defendant Grannis was Chief of Inmate Appeals. Defendant Grannis’ Motion to Dismiss

(hereafter “Grannis’ Mot. to Dism.”). 

Plaintiff claims that he is developmentally disabled and suffers from Chronic Seizure

Disorder, Short Term Memory Loss, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Compl., ¶ 4

and p. 3. There is an entry in plaintiff’s medical records dated November 10, 2004, signed by

Doctors Capozzoli and Bick, who are not defendants in this action, stating:

Mr. Tunstall is status post neurosurgery and has light sensitivity. I recommend

that he be allowed to wear his photogray or dark glasses in the visiting area when

under the fluorescent lights there. Additionally, I recommend that he be allowed

to use the handicap room because of the lesser degree of overhead glare in that

room. The chrono is valid for one year (through November 9, 2005), subject to

institutional, Custody, and safety requirements, and subject to renewal by the

patient’s primary care physician when needed. 

Compl., at 48.

Doctors Capozzoli and Bick signed an additional chrono on January 18, 2005, stating:

. . . I request this patient be provided with cell-based (not necessarily single-cell)

housing rather than dormitory style housing due to a medical condition this

patient has that results in intermittent lapses of consciousness (partial complex

seizures). In this situation, I feel it would be safer for the patient to live in cellbased housing rather than group living housing. If cell-based housing is not

available at this institution, he can be transferred to a facility that can meet his

clinical needs.

Compl., at 47.

Plaintiff sought the recommended treatment by filing a Request for Reasonable

Accommodation on September 25, 2006. His appeal was reviewed at the informal level by

defendants Cry and Kotila, partially granted at the First Level of Review by defendant Silbaugh,

and denied at the Second and Director’s Levels of Review by defendants Khoury and Grannis,

respectively. Compl., at 31-33, 35, 36.

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2

 Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a motion attacking failure to exhaust is

not a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is a motion in which defendant must raise

and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit in Wyatt

provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the district court looks beyond the pleadings

to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion it necessarily does so under “a procedure

closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14

3

Defendant Grannis investigated plaintiff’s claims before responding to his grievance. 

Grannis’ Mot. to Dism., at 3. In the course of her investigation, she contacted defendant Cry to

inquire about plaintiff’s housing. Id. She was informed that plaintiff’s housing unit was

specifically designed for Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) and

developmentally disabled inmates. Id. At this time, CMF had limited celled housing and, while

celled housing had been recommended for plaintiff, it was not medically ordered. Id. Grannis

confirmed with CMF staff that plaintiff had been appropriately housed. Id. 

Plaintiff seeks PTSD therapy, cognitive therapy, cell-based housing, and 2.5 million

dollars in damages. Compl., at 17.

II. Standards Applicable to this Motion

Defendants Cry, Khoury, Kotila, Silbaugh, and Grannis seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 12(b) is the

proper mechanism for resolving questions arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003), the reason underlying that conclusion has been undermined. The

Ninth Circuit found that failure to exhaust was a matter in abatement which should be raised in a

motion made under “unenumerated Rule 12(b).”2

 Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, the United

States Supreme Court recently clarified that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which

defendant has the burden of pleading and proving. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 910,

921 (2007). Federal courts appropriately consider affirmative defenses on summary judgment. 

Here, defendant’s motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and exhibits

presented for the purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. 

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 On June 7, 2006, the court expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120, n.4, that order also expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a failure

to exhaust motion that is supported by affidavits or declarations and exhibits.

4

Accordingly, the court finds that a motion for summary judgment is the proper mechanism for

resolving the question of whether plaintiff satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 

III. Rule 56 Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the utility of Rule 56 to

screen which cases actually require resolution of disputed facts over material issues (through

presentation of testimony and evidence at trial) has been clarified and enhanced.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

“genuine issue as to material fact,” if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

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establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

IV. Failure to Exhaust

The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides in relevant part:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

This requirement is mandatory and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001);

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute

making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statue makes

exhaustion a precondition to suit.” (citation omitted)). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of

judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th

Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

Id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

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resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

To “properly” exhaust his administrative remedies, a prisoner must “complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules.” Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006). Compliance with prison grievance procedures,

therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.”

With respect to the level of specificity required in a prisoner grievance, the Supreme

Court recently held that a prisoner need not identify all of the defendants named in his lawsuit

during the administrative grievance process. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 910, 922-23

(2007); see also Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir.2005). Following denial of his

prison grievances for inadequate medical care, the plaintiff in Jones, an inmate of the Michigan

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), filed a Section 1983 action, naming as defendants

several individuals not named during the grievance process. Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 917. The

district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

because he had not identified any of the defendants named in his lawsuit during the grievance

process; the Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling. The Supreme Court, however, held that in the

absence of a prison grievance procedure mandating the naming of each individual, the Sixth

Circuit rule imposing such a prerequisite to proper exhaustion was unwarranted. Id. at 923. The

MDOC grievance form did not require a prisoner to identify a particular responsible party. 

Because the administrative appeals system did not require the prisoner to identify all potential

defendants by name, his failure to do so was not fatal to his attempts to satisfy 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). See id. at 922-23. As stated by the court, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the

PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 923. 

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4

 His appeal was reviewed at the informal level by defendants Cry and Kotila, partially

granted at the First Level of Review by defendant Silbaugh, and denied at the Second and

Director’s Levels of Review by defendants Khoury and Grannis, respectively. Compl., at 31-33,

35, 36. The grievance or 602 form alleged that plaintiff was denied a prescribed course of

treatment for his chronic seizure disorder including PTSD and cognitive therapies, and cellbased housing. See Compl., at 33. Defendants claim that plaintiff never filed grievances

regarding defendants’ conduct; rather, he sought treatments by filing appeals and defendants

reviewed those appeals.

7

V. Analysis

As stated above, defendants Cry, Khoury, Kotila, Silbaugh, and Grannis contend that

plaintiff cannot proceed with this action against him because plaintiff failed to exhaust the

available administrative remedies. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff pursued his

administrative remedies through the third and final level of formal review.4 See Defs.’ Mot. to

Dism., at 4 (citing to Appeals, Log No. CMF 05-2069 and Compl., Ex. A); Grannis’ Mot. to

Dism., at 7. However, defendants argue that plaintiff still failed to exhaust his federal claims

because his administrative grievances did not name all of the defendants presently named in the

complaint. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., at 4; Grannis’ Mot. to Dism., at 5-7. This argument was

specifically rejected in Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 923.

Similar to the grievance form in Jones, the 602 form used to initiate a CDC grievance

does not require an inmate to name or identify specific persons. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3085 .2(a)(1). The 602 form requires an inmate only to describe the problem and the action

that is requested. See id. Thus, because the CDC’s own regulations do not require the prisoner

to identify all potential defendants by name in the grievance, the PLRA cannot impose such a

requirement as a prerequisite to exhaustion. See Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 923. Therefore, defendants’

motions to dismiss are denied on this basis.

VI. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted

In the alternative, defendants argue that the complaint must be dismissed because it fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege an identified defendant

deprived plaintiff of a right secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States while

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Although the Federal

Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. Id. There can be no liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions 

and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but

that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994)). A difference of opinion between medical personnel regarding treatment does

not amount to deliberate indifference, Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989), and

“[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

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 It appears plaintiff is referencing Clark v. State of California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir.

1997), a class action suit brought by state inmates suffering from developmental disabilities

seeking injunctive relief against the states under the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Rehabilitation Act. 

6

 See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (documents not

physically attached to the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss if their

authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies on them). 

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treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim,” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th

Cir.1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances ... and ... that

they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson

v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted).

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges psychiatric staff at CMF failed to provide him with

PTSD and cognitive therapies, and failed to provide him with cell-based housing, as previously

recommended by other treating physicians. Compl., at 4. Plaintiff states that on September 26,

2005, he filed a Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request based on the failure of the

psychiatric department to provide him with these accommodations. In his appeal, plaintiff states

that he is “a particpate [sic] of the Clark v. California, Remedial Plan,”5 and that he has been

“[g]ranted Board of Prison terms 1001 and Psych approval” due to being diagnosed with chronic

seizure disorder, memory loss, light sensitivity, and PTSD. Compl., at 33. He states that he has

doctor recommendations for cognitive rehabilitation and cell-based housing due to light

sensitivity and frequent seizures that render him unconscious and therefore vulnerable to

victimization. Id. 

Plaintiff’s exhibit to his complaint, which is part of the complaint for purposes of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion6

, shows that defendant Silbaugh reviewed plaintiff’s grievance at the first level

on November 21, 2005. Compl., Pl.’s Exs. at 36. Defendant Silbaugh stated: 

You have requested the enrollment in a Post-traumatic therapy group within the

CCCMS program which you attended last year. Unfortunately, this particular

therapy group is no longer offered by the CCCMS program. Coupled with this

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request is your report of memory deficits and your request for cognitive therapy to

assist with your memory loss issues. To that end, you have been enrolled in the

CCCMS Coping Skills Therapy group and should receive a priority ducat to

attend within the next two (2) or three (3) weeks. Lastly, it is noted that a timelimited single cell chrono was issued and signed by medical staff. The

compliance with this chrono, issued by medical staff, will need to be address [sic]

by you with the custodial staff and the medical staff person who created the timelimited single cell chrono. 

Based on a review of the issue involved, it is persuasive that your request for

continuing group therapy is partially granted. In that CCCMS program no longer

offers a Post-traumatic therapy group however, CCCMS program does offer

group therapy to assist with developing coping and memory strategies. 

Consequently, you have been enrolled in a Coping Skills therapy group and

should receive a priority ducat to attend in two (2) or three (3) weeks. Your

request for compliance with the time-limited single cell chrono is an issue to be

discussed between you, custodial staff, and the issuing medical staff.

Id. Plaintiff argues that defendant Silbaugh also “avoided the issue of Plaintiff also being

developmentally disabled.” Compl., at 12. 

Defendant Khoury denied plaintiff’s appeal at the Second Level of review, stating: 

A thorough review of your appeal reveals that these issues were addressed

thoroughly and appropriately at the first level. Your mental health status has

recently been described as stable, and you are not prescribed psychiatric

medications. The CCCMS treatment team offers you supportive services

including case management and weekly group therapy. Based on a thorough

review of the issue, it is persuasive that your mental health needs are being met

appropriately by the CCCMS team. Some of the specific neurological / memory

treatment you request is beyond the scope of the CDCR MHSDS mission. 

Compl., at 35. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support his contention that defendants Silbaugh and

Khoury were in any way personally involved in depriving him of the services he requested. 

Defendant Silbaugh partially granted plaintiff’s appeal, stated that the PTSD group was

discontinued but that the current CCCMS program offered cognitive and coping therapies, and

advised plaintiff on how to appropriately address his housing concerns. Defendant Khoury

points out in her decision that plaintiff’s mental health status was stable and his needs were being

met appropriately. In his complaint, plaintiff has failed to assert facts that would show “that the

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . .

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and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s

health.” Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against either of these

defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Cry told defendant Grannis that plaintiff’s housing is

specifically designed for CCCMS and developmentally disabled inmates. Compl., at 13. 

Plaintiff does not allege that the statement was patently untrue or how that statement may

otherwise amount to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has not stated a claim against defendant

Cry.

Plaintiff states that defendant Kotila denied plaintiff’s first level appeal on November 18,

2005. The court notes that the Reasonable Accommodation Request that plaintiff submitted on

September 26, 2005, was first reviewed by defendants Kotila and Cry. Compl., at 33. Under

“Discussion of Findings,” that review states, “See memo: Nov. 21, 2005.” Id. There is no memo

with that date among plaintiff’s exhibits. Without more information, plaintiff has failed to

establish that defendants Cry or Kotila were in any way deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that Cry or Kotila

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted

under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Defendant Grannis denied plaintiff’s appeal at the Director’s Level. Compl., at 31-32. In

her denial, defendant Grannis stated that she investigated plaintiff’s housing classification and

learned that it was “specifically designated for CCCMS inmates and Developmental Disability

Program (DDP) inmates.” Id., at 31. She further stated that “[w]hile Dr. Bick did recommend

celled housing for [plaintiff], CMF has very limited celled housing . . . Dr. Bick’s

recommendation was noted; however, it was not a medical order and CMF staff state that

[plaintiff] is housed appropriately . . .” Id. Further, Grannis reasoned that plaintiff had been

classified as “DDI (able to function successfully in a general inmate population setting in a DDP

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institution and usually does not require prompts to initiate activities of self-care and daily living,

but may need supervision when under stress),” and that plaintiff was receiving, as a CCCMS

inmate, “prompt access to mental health professionals for diagnosis and treatment . . . [and]

continuity of care by the tracking of his progress and linkage to accessory services available to

GP inmate (i.e. work assignments, school, and vocational educational programs.)” Id. Plaintiff

has failed to allege how defendant Grannis’ denial of his appeal demonstrates that she “[knew] of

and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff has not adduced evidence that contradicts defendant Grannis’ reasoning in denying his

appeal. In fact, plaintiff concedes that he is receiving continuity of care. Compl., at 8. Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim against defendant Grannis.

Plaintiff has certainly suffered from poor health, yet he fails to demonstrate how the care

he was receiving at CMF was “medically unacceptable” under the circumstances. His complaint

does no more than argue that doctors who previously treated him made certain recommendations

and that the defendants in this case did not follow those recommendations. Plaintiff does not

allege facts demonstrating that the decisions not to follow the doctors’ recommendations

evidence disregard of a known and excessive risk to his health. He does not indicate how the

course of treatment he was receiving, which was held by defendants to be adequate, was

constitutionally deficient. He does not allege facts that defendants Silbaugh, Khoury, Cry,

Kotila, or Grannis are personally responsible for the harm he claims he has suffered, were

responsible for determining which therapeutic treatments would be available at the institution, or

even capable of exerting some influence in that regard. Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint does not

state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to amend his pleading in order to name

defendants and make factual allegations that give rise to a cause of action. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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 The court notes that a previous motion for injunctive relief was filed on September 6,

2006, by Carl D. McQuillion as “next friend” on behalf of plaintiff. The court finds that

plaintiff’s motion sufficiently presents his request for relief. McQuillion’s motion differs from

plaintiff’s in two aspects: in addition to seeking adequate medical treatment, it also seeks an

order directing defendants to provide him adequate and effective access to his legal materials and

materials sufficient to allow him to effectively prosecute this case, including access to the prison

law library and an order directing Warden Mendoza-Powers to explain in detail precisely why he

has been placed in Administrative Segregation, and upon which institutional security grounds his

continued placement in segregation is justified. The court notes that, since the filing of this

motion, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants’ September 13, 2006, motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 7, 2007. This late filing was not challenged by

defendants, and the court deems it timely filed. Since then, plaintiff has also filed additional

requests for the appointment of counsel (December 7, 2006, and December 21, 2006), a response

in opposition to another motion to dismiss (June 14, 2007), and a response to defendants’ reply

to his opposition (July 12, 2007). Therefore, the court declines to entertain Mr. McQuillion’s

request for “next friend” status as it is unnecessary to decide that issue at this time. 

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

VII. Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief

At the time plaintiff filed his motion for injunctive relief, on September 14, 2006,7

 he was

being held in Administrative Segregation. In his motion, he claims that he has been denied all

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the medication necessary to treat his chronic seizure condition and seeks an order directing

defendants to (1) provide him with adequate and effective access to his legal materials and any

other materials necessary to prosecute this case; (2) explain in detail why he has been placed in

administrative segregation; (3) provide plaintiff with outside medical treatment, including a

comprehensive medical evaluation and to administer such treatment and medications as are

recommended, without delay, and he asks the court to (4) stay these proceedings until he has

been released from administrative segregation. 

A preliminary injunction will not issue unless necessary because threatened injury would

impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v.

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871

F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction represents the exercise of a very far reaching

power never to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter,

Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). To obtain a prohibitory preliminary injunction, plaintiff

must demonstrate either probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,

or serious questions regarding the merits of his claims and a balance of hardships tipping sharply

in his favor. Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1979). If the balance

of harm tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, then the plaintiff need not show as robust a

likelihood of success on the merits as when the balance tips less decidedly. Benda v. Grand

Lodge of the International Association of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1978). The

threatened injury must be immediate. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National

Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). The remedy is equitable in nature and

there must be no adequate remedy at law. Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320

(9th Cir. 1994). If the relief sought is mandatory rather than prohibitory, the balance must more

clearly favor the applicant. Dahl v. HEM Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief seeks adequate medical treatment. He states that

he has attempted suicide and continues to suffer from suicidal ideation due to being denied

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treatment for his serious medical and psychiatric needs. He claims that lack of treatment is

causing him to suffer seizures almost daily. He further states that he has been placed in

Administrative Segregation “due to defendant’s failure to treat” him, yet also states that was due

to his “final decision not to continue take [sic] this medication.” Plaintiff’s motion seeks an

order directing defendants to arrange for an examination and a plan of treatment by a qualified

specialist. Plaintiff does not adequately explain his “final decision” not to take the medication

prescribed to him or what alternative treatment he feels is warranted for his condition. Plaintiff

has not alleged that the treatment he is refusing is inadequate. He only alleges that the side

effects of his prescribed medications are undesirable. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that there is a likelihood he will succeed on

the merits of his case and that he requires injunctive relief to avoid irreparable harm. The court

therefore recommends that plaintiff’s motion be denied. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ September 13, 2006 and June 4, 2007, motions to dismiss are granted for

plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and

2. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date this order is served in which to file an

amended complaint that states a cause of action against defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see

also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (indigent prisoner proceeding without

counsel must be given leave to file amended complaint unless the court can rule out any

possibility that the plaintiff could state a claim). 

Further , it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s September 6, 2006, motion for

injunctive relief be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

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to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 29, 2007.

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