Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00207/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct.” 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Lawrence Harvey, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 10-207-TUC-CKJ (JCG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Michael Lawrence Harvey, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State

Prison Complex in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred

to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Amended Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 13) and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc.

20.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the facts giving rise to Petitioner’s

conviction are as follows:1

 

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On November 17, 1999, Petitioner visited an adult entertainment business with

friends. Throughout the evening, Petitioner attempted to befriend one of the dancers. When

the dancer left the business to go home, she experienced car trouble and Petitioner offered

to help her. The dancer declined Petitioner’s offer and asked a male friend to assist her.

After an argument ensued between the male friend and Petitioner, Petitioner retrieved a gun

from his vehicle and ordered the dancer into his car at gunpoint. Once in the car, Petitioner

held the gun to the dancer’s side and throat and threatened to hurt her. At that time, four

police officers were leaving the business after having conducted a random bar check. After

learning of Petitioner’s actions, three of the officers approached and surrounded Petitioner’s

car. Petitioner began to drive very erratically and ultimately drove straight at two of the

officers, who sustained injuries when the car hit them. Petitioner’s car collided with a parked

car and Petitioner attempted to escape on foot; the officers apprehended him. (Answer, Ex.

A, pgs. 1-2.)

Petitioner was convicted by jury of three counts of aggravated assault, unlawful

imprisonment and disorderly conduct. (Answer, Ex. A.) On August 27, 2001, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to a combination of concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment

totaling 27.5 years. (Id.; Answer, Ex. Q.) Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,

which was denied. (Answer, Ex. R.) 

On March 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in which he raised two issues: 

1. The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to admit the outof-court statement of a witness concerning the defense of involuntary

intoxication, and 

2. The trial court denied Petitioner’s right to a fair trial by refusing to

admit expert witness testimony regarding PTSD. 

(Answer, Ex. C.) On December 23, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Answer, Ex. A.) Petitioner petitioned the Arizona

Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, raising the same two issues he

presented in his appeal; the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment on June

29, 2004. (Answer, Exs. D & E.)

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On July 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider in the Arizona Supreme

Court, arguing that in light of the recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), he should be permitted to supplement his petition for review or his case should be

remanded to the appellate court. (Answer, Ex. F.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied the

Motion without comment on September 21, 2004. (Answer, Ex. G.)

On September 30, 2004, Petitioner initiated collateral proceedings pursuant to Rule

32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. by filing his notice of post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. U.) On

September 8, 2006, Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief (“Rule 32 Petition”),

in which he raised seven issues: 

1. Petitioner’s conviction should be reversed pursuant to Rule 32.1(e),

Ariz. R. Crim. P. given new evidence;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective due to his:

a. Failure to investigate potential witness Al Cheney;

b. Failure to rebut accident reconstruction evidence;

c. Failure to adequately investigate PTSD defense;

d. Failure to argue that Petitioner’s due process rights were

violated when insufficient evidence supported his conviction; 

e. Omissions related to the requisite state of mind for a charge of

assault against an officer; 

f. Various evidentiary errors at trial;

g. Failure to request complete jury instructions regarding

recklessness, criminal negligence, alternative theories of assault,

reckless endangerment, reasonable doubt or acquittal;

h. Failure to introduce rebuttal evidence that flight was not

Petitioner’s state of mind; 

i. Various errors made during closing arguments; 

j. Failure to present witness testimony supporting an involuntary

intoxication defense;

k. Failure to maximize the impact of defense witnesses;

3. Appellate counsel was ineffective due to his:

a. Failure to argue that Petitioner’s due process rights were

violated when insufficient evidence supported his conviction; 

b. Failure to argue on appeal that the jury was not properly

instructed as to the requisite state of mind for assault against a

police officer;

4. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because insufficient

evidence supported one charge of aggravated assault on an officer;

5. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the jury was not

properly instructed as to the requisite state of mind for assault against

a police officer;

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6. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the indictment and

grand jury presentation did not specify an underlying assault, an

essential element of the charge of assault on an officer; and 

7. Petitioner’s sentence violated Blakely v. Washington.

(Answer, Ex. H.) On March 8, 2007, the trial court denied relief on several of the issues

raised in Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition and granted an evidentiary hearing on several issues.

(Answer, Ex. J.) On November 1, 2007, after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. M.) 

On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his

Rule 32 Petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals, in which he raised nine issues:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective due to his:

a. Failure to present evidence that Petitioner engaged in “good

driving;”

b. Failure to argue that criminal negligence is a complete defense

to the charge of reckless driving;

c. Omissions related to the requisite state of mind for a charge of

assault against an officer;

d. Failure to present evidence mentioned in opening statements;

e. Various errors made during closing arguments;

f. Failure to object to jury instructions regarding flight and

recklessness;

g. Failure to present witness testimony supporting an involuntary

intoxication defense;

h. Failure to adequately investigate PTSD defense, and

i. Failure to investigate potential witness Al Cheney;

2. Appellate counsel was ineffective due to his omissions related to the

requisite state of mind for a charge of assault against an officer;

3. The trial court erred in denying summarily denying claims raised in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition;

4. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because insufficient

evidence supported one charge of aggravated assault on an officer;

5. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the jury was not

properly instructed as to the requisite state of mind for assault against

a police officer;

6. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the indictment and

grand jury presentation did not specify an underlying assault, an

essential element of the charge of assault on an officer;

7. The trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for change of

counsel;

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8. The trial court erred in refusing Petitioner’s discovery requests related

to his Rule 32 Petition;

9. Petitioner’s sentence violated Blakely v. Washington.

(Answer, Ex. N.) The Court of Appeals denied review on February 26, 2009. (Petition, Doc.

1-5, pgs. 36-48.) Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court; the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment on June 30, 2009. (Answer, Exs.

O & P.) 

Petitioner presented the pending Petition to prison officials for mailing on April 9,

2010. (Doc. 1, pg. 25.) Petitioner presents 12 claims in the Petition:

Ground 1: The trial court violated Petitioner’s right to a fair trial by refusing

to admit a witness statement that allegedly supported Petitioner’s defense of

involuntary intoxication;

Ground 2: The trial court denied Petitioner’s right to a fair trial by refusing

to admit expert witness testimony regarding PTSD;

Ground 3: Petitioner was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington;

Ground 4: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel failed to present evidence that Petitioner engaged in “good driving;”

Ground 5: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel failed to argue that criminal negligence is a complete defense to the

charge of reckless driving;

Ground 6: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel because both attorneys made omissions related to the requisite state

of mind for a charge of assault against an officer;

Ground 7: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel carried an unmanageable caseload and was not adequately prepared

for trial;

Ground 8: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to adequately investigate PTSD defense;

Ground 9: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to rebut accident reconstruction evidence;

Ground 10: Petitioner’s 5th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when the

prosecution amended one of the counts charged during trial;

Ground 11: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to investigate potential witness Al Cheney;

Ground 12: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel: (a) failed to present evidence mentioned in opening statements; (b)

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2

 Respondents acknowledge that this 90-day period is properly included in the calculation of timeliness (Answer, p. 7, citing Bowen v. Roe, supra), however, excluded it in their calculation. 

3

 Although it does not affect the Court’s analysis, the Court notes that Petitioner’s July 8, 2004, Motion to Reconsider was not a “properly filed application

for state post-conviction relief” and therefore did not toll the statute of limitations

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failed to object to most of the defense witnesses appearing in prison uniforms;

(c) failed to object to jury instruction regarding witnesses’ prior felonies; (d)

made various errors during closing arguments and (e) failed to object to jury

instructions regarding flight and recklessness.

DISCUSSION

1. Timeliness

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. The Magistrate disagrees.

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a one-year

statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins

to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date on which

the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner’s judgment became final on September 27, 2004, 90 days after the Arizona

Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on June 29, 2004.2

 See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the period within which a petitioner could have

sought direct review of his conviction includes the ninety-day period within which petitioner

could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court).

The statute of limitations ran for three days, until it was tolled by the filing of Petitioner’s

Rule 32 Petition on September 30, 2004.3

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (when a properly filed

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28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

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state post-conviction relief request is pending, the proscribed one year statute of limitations

is tolled). The statute remained tolled until the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

June 30, 2009. The statute then ran for 283 days, until Petitioner filed the pending Petition

on April 9, 2010. In total, the 286 days that passed between the date Petitioner’s judgment

became final and the date the pending Petition was filed were within the one-year statute of

limitations set by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2. Exhaustion

a. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

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4

 Respondents contend that Petitioner exhausted Grounds 5 and 10 by raising them for the first time in his petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals of the

trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 Petition. However, claims presented for the first time

in a petition for discretionary review are not exhausted. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d

896, 916-18 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Respondents also mistakenly describe Ground 10 as a “non-unanimous jury verdict”

claim.

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may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

b. Grounds 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) were not presented in the

necessary state courts.

Petitioner failed to present Grounds 7, 10, 12(b) and 12(c) in either his direct appeal

or his Rule 32 proceedings. Petitioner presented Grounds 4, 5 and 12(a) only in his petition

for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals of the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 32

Petition. Petitioner presented Ground 9 only in his Rule 32 Petition. Consequently,

Petitioner has not fairly presented Ground 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) and cannot

raise those claims for the first time in federal court.4

 See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 (stating that

a petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest court,

either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will consider

the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Petitioner is now

precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief

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on Grounds 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) in state court absent an applicable

exception, which Petitioner does not assert. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). 

Thus, Grounds 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) are technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. 

c. Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice or made a colorable

showing of actual innocence.

A federal court may only grant review of a procedurally defaulted claim if petitioner

makes a showing of cause and prejudice, Netherland, 518 U.S. at 162, or a colorable

showing of actual innocence amounting to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Sawyer

v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner

must show an external impediment which rendered Petitioner unable to comply with the

procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To show prejudice, the

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the error worked to his substantial

disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with constitutional error. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. If

petitioner cannot meet one of the requirements, it is unnecessary for federal courts to address

the other requirement. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). Petitioner may also

be granted federal review if he can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A

fundamental miscarriage of justice results when the petitioner can demonstrate that a

constitutional error caused the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Carrier, 477 U.S.

at 496.

Petitioner has not alleged cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Accordingly,

Grounds 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) were not properly exhausted and the Court

need not consider the merits of those claims.

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5

 Respondents contend that Petitioner failed to present Ground 2 as a federal claim on direct appeal. The Magistrate disagrees. Petitioner repeatedly invoked the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and cited to federal

law in his direct appeal. (Answer, Ex. C, pgs. 59-70.)

6

 Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Blakely argument (Ground 3) was found precluded under state law by the trial court and was therefore procedurally defaulted. 

The Magistrate disagrees with Respondents’ interpretation of the trial court’s decision. 

The trial court held: “To the extent [Petitioner] attempts to assert a significant change

in the law pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the trial court correctly disagreed. As the trial court noted, once it found one Blakely-compliant or - exempt aggravating factor, it was entitled to find and consider additional aggravating

factors.” (Answer, Ex. B.)

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d. Exhausted claims

Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds 1 and 2 by fairly presenting them in his direct

appeal.5

 Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds 3, 6, 8, 11, 12(d) and 12(e) by fairly

presenting them in his Rule 32 Petition and in his petition for review by the Arizona Court

of Appeals of the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 Petition.6

 Accordingly, the Court will

consider the merits of these claims.

3. Merits

a. Legal Standard

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

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state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1158. The Supreme

Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) govern this case and pose special burdens. Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA, when reviewing a state

criminal conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court

proceeding "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme

Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradictsthe governing law set forth"

in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a result

different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state

court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision "but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

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b. Ground 1

In Ground 1, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to a fair

trial by refusing to admit a witness statement that allegedly supported Petitioner’s defense

of involuntary intoxication. According to Petitioner, the trial court erroneously denied

Petitioner’s counsel’s motion to admit the out-of-court statements of Theodore Johnson, who

reportedly added LSD to Petitioner’s drink on the night of the offense.

When applying the AEDPA and reviewing whether a state court decision is contrary

to federal law, this court must look to the state's last reasoned decision as the basis for its

judgment. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, this Court

must consider whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ December 23, 2003 decision involved

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. 

The Court of Appeals correctly applied clearly established federal law. The Court of

Appeals properly relied on United States Supreme Court precedent, Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (U.S. 1973), which holds that “where constitutional rights

directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be

applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” (Answer, Ex. A.) The Court of

Appeals then noted that the hearsay statements at issue in Chambers, unlike those at issue

in Petitioner’s case, were offered under circumstances that provided considerable assurance

of their reliability. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Mr. Johnson’s statements

were properly excluded as unreliable, the trial court’s decision did not violate Chambers. 

The Court of Appeals’ application of federal law to the facts before it was reasonable.

The Court of Appeals noted that Johnson’s purported statements were not corroborated by

other evidence. No witness testified that Petitioner had acted as if he were hallucinating, and

Petitioner’s statements during and after his arrest did not contain any claim that he was under

the influence of drugs. Even if Petitioner’s actions on the night of the offense appeared to

be drug-induced, they could have been attributed to the cocaine and alcohol that the evidence

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showed Petitioner possessed. In addition, Johnson offered contradicting statements, first

claiming that he put LSD in Petitioner’s drink, then claiming that he put LSD in his own

drink but Petitioner accidentally drank it. Johnson was also friends with Petitioner, a factor

which weighs against the reliability of his statement. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim with

respect to Ground 1 is without merit.

c. Ground 2

In Ground 2, Petitioner alleges that the trial court denied Petitioner’s right to a fair

trial by refusing to admit expert witness testimony regarding PTSD. Petitioner claims that

he should have been permitted to present testimony from Dr. St. Germaine regarding PTSD

suffered by Petitioner as a result of an event that occurred in June 1999. The trial court

excluded the evidence, considering it evidence of diminished capacity (short of insanity) and

therefore not relevant as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea of the crime

charged. (Answer, Ex. A.)

The Court of Appeals decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law.

The Court of Appeals did not rely on federal law in its decision, and instead relied on State

v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997), which holds that “[b]ecause the legislature has

not provided for a diminished capacity defense, we have since consistently refused to allow

psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent.” The holding in Mott has been upheld by the

United States Supreme Court. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

The Court of Appeals’ application of federal law to the facts before it was reasonable.

Petitioner sought to admit testimony from Dr. St. Germaine that Petitioner suffered from

PTSD as a result of witnessing a friend’s homicide, and that Petitioner’s PTSD was triggered

on the night of the offense during the argument between Petitioner and the dancer’s friend.

The appellate court correctly concluded that this testimony constituted evidence of a mental

disorder short of insanity and that it was therefore not relevant as either an affirmative

defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime.

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d. Ground 3

In Ground 3, Petitioner contends he was sentenced in violation of Blakely v.

Washington. This argument was presented to the trial court in Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition

and to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s petition for review; thus the Court looks

to the Arizona Court of Appeals’ February 26, 2009 decision as the state's last reasoned

decision and the basis for its judgment. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 & n. 6 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Petitioner contends that his sentence violated Blakely because the trial court

considered facts not determined by a jury when enhancing Petitioner’s sentence. The Court

of Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s sentence did not violate Blakely because aggravation

of a sentence by a prior conviction is Blakely-exempt, and once an aggravating factor is

found which is Blakely-exempt, the Sixth Amendment allows the Court to find additional

factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to federal law, as it correctly recited

the legal standard set forth in Blakely v. Washington. In Blakely, the United States Supreme

Court reaffirmed its holding, first expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000), that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 542 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). Thus, Blakely excludes

prior convictions from its holding that aggravating factors must be found by a jury in order

to be considered during sentencing. The United States Supreme Court also permits a trial

court to consider other aggravating factors once proof of a prior conviction is established.

The rule announced in Apprendi and reaffirmed in Blakely applies to fact-finding that

increases the penalty for a crime “beyond the statutory maximum.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.

As the Apprendi Court explained, “nothing in [the history of the right to jury trial] suggests

that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion--taking into consideration various

factors relating both to offense and offender--in imposing a judgment within the range

prescribed by statute.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added). The Court reinforced

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this conclusion two years later in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002). In a

plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court stated that while a jury must find

those facts that establish the outer limits of a sentence, facts that limit a judge's sentencing

discretion within the prescribed statutory range, such as those that compel imposition of a

mandatory minimum sentence, may be found by judges rather than juries. Harris, 536 U.S.

at 567. Thus, “[j]udicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the

authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt

components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 558. Justice Kennedy specifically

noted that precedent permitted judges to make factual findings regarding a victim’s

characteristics, including age and relationship to the defendant. Id. at 567-68. 

The Court of Appeals reasonably applied the appropriate federal law to the facts

before the court. Petitioner admitted to a prior conviction during his sentencing/mitigation

hearing. (Answer, Ex. Q.) Petitioner’s prior conviction was Blakely-exempt. Because

Petitioner admitted to a prior conviction, his conviction for unlawful imprisonment,

aggravated assault, aggravated assault on a peace officer and disorderly conduct carried

sentencing ranges of 0.33-2 years, 5-15 years, 7-21 years and 0.33-2 years, respectively. See

A.R.S. §§13-702 and 13-704. Petitioner’s terms for each offense were all within statutory

range; Petitioner received a combination of concurrent and consecutive terms of

imprisonment totaling 27.5 years. Thus, to the extent that the sentencing judge aggravated

Petitioner’s sentence based on Petitioner’s danger to the community, harm to the victim,

Petitioner’s drug use and Petitioner’s failure to rehabilitate himself, the application of those

aggravating factors was within the sentencing range and therefore did not violate Blakely.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the Petition with respect to Ground

3.

e. Ground 6

In Ground 6, Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel because both attorneys made omissions related to the requisite state of

mind for a charge of assault against an officer. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his

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 “Assault” is defined as “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to another person.” See A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1).

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counsel should have argued that Petitioner could not be convicted of aggravated assault on

a police officer because he did not know that one of the officers hit by Petitioner’s car was

a police officer. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument on the ground there

was no legal merit to Petitioner’s “state of mind” argument and therefore counsel was not

deficient for failing to raise the argument.

The Court of Appeals applied the correct federal law, relying on Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), clearly established precedent regarding claims for

ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The

Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant

must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a

defendant must show that the mistakes made were "prejudicial to the defense," that is, the

mistakes created a "reasonable probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. at 694. Counsel's performance is

strongly presumed to fall within the ambit of reasonable conduct unless Movant can show

otherwise. Id. at 689-90. 

The Court of Appeals reasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Petitioner’s case.

Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault on a peace officer pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

1204(A)(2) and (C). Subsection (A)(2) provides: “A person commits aggravated assault if

the person commits assault7

 ... [using] a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” Petitioner

was charged with using his vehicle as a deadly weapon in violation of this provision. Section

13-1204(C) provides that aggravated assault under subsection (A)(2) is a class two felony

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if “committed on a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the execution of any official

duties.” Petitioner was not charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(8)(a), which aggravates

a charge of assault based on a defendant “knowing or having reason to know that the victim

is ... [a] peace officer, or a person summoned and directed by the officer while engaged in

the execution of any official duties.” Accordingly, the prosecutor was not required to prove

that Petitioner knew he was injuring a police officer when he drove his car into the officer.

There was no legal merit to Petitioner’s argument concerning his knowledge of the officer's

identity; counsel was not deficient for failing to present such argument. See Rupe v. Wood,

93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure to take futile action can never be deficient

performance). 

f. Ground 8

In Ground 8, Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

because trial counsel failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s PTSD defense.

Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel should have interviewed Dr. St. Germaine

and obtained police reports and photographs related to the incident that caused Petitioner to

suffer from PTSD. For the reasons stated in Section 3(c) above, evidence of PTSD was not

admissible at trial. Accordingly, Petitioner’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to

investigate a possible PTSD defense. 

g. Ground 11

In Ground 11, Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

because trial counsel failed to investigate potential witness Al Cheney. Petitioner claims that

if Al Cheney had been called to testify, he would have admitted that he lied when he told a

bouncer at the nightclub that Petitioner was carrying a gun and would have provided

testimony challenging the credibility of the victim. 

The Court of Appeals considered this claim within the context of Strickland; its

application of the Strickland standard was reasonable. The Court noted that Petitioner's

argument relies on an unsworn letter purportedly written by Cheney. During an interview

with Petitioner’s Rule 32 counsel, Cheney stated that the letter was false, that he wrote it

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8

 Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel provoked objections by trying to explain why certain defenses were not presented, and failed to summarize trial

testimony demonstrating that: (i) Petitioner did not realize police had arrived on the

scene because the officers did not activate their overhead lights; (ii) Petitioner could not

hear; (iii) one officer testified that he did not think Petitioner meant to hit the officers;

(iv) one officer's testimony regarding whether Petitioner was steering the vehicle was

speculation; (v) evidence suggesting that officers happened to be standing in the way as

the vehicle moved in a circle; and (vi) one officer suffered from "auditory shut-down." 

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because he had been threatened, and that he would not testify consistently with it. Also

during the interview, Cheney offered testimony consistent with the victim’s trial testimony.

Even if trial counsel had investigated Cheney, it does not appear that Cheney would have

offered reliable or exculpatory testimony. Accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient for

failing to investigate Cheney as a potential witness.

h. Ground 12(d)

In Ground 12(d), Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective due to various

errors made during closing arguments.8

 Of these alleged errors, only two were raised in both

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition and his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals: (1)

that trial counsel provoked objections by trying to explain why certain defenses were not

presented, and (2) trial counsel failed to summarize trial testimony demonstrating that

Petitioner did not realize police had arrived on the scene because the officers did not activate

their overhead lights.

The Court of Appeals considered this claim within the context of Strickland; its

application of the Strickland standard was reasonable. The Court of Appeals correctly

concluded that while Petitioner has noted points that he believes would have been persuasive

during closing argument, Petitioner offers nothing to show that the omissions constituted

deficient performance or that counsel’s failure to argue the points mentioned affected the

outcome of the case. Based on the significant incriminating evidence presented against

Petitioner at trial, the Court cannot conclude that but for trial counsel’s alleged omissions

during closing argument, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

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i. Ground 12(e)

In Ground 12(e), Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to jury instructions regarding flight and recklessness. The Court of Appeals

considered this claim within the context of Strickland; its application of the Strickland

standard was reasonable. There was no legal basis for Petitioner’s counsel to object to a jury

instruction regarding flight. Some evidence presented at trial suggested that Petitioner

attempted to flee the scene. Although there may have been other evidence negating an

inference of flight, under Arizona law “a party is entitled to an instruction on any theory of

the case reasonably supported by the evidence.” State v. Shumway, 672 P.2d 929, 932 (Ariz.

1983). Counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make an argument that has no legal

merit. 

Similarly, Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request

a jury instruction on negligence or criminal negligence is also without merit. In order to

prove the aggravated assault allegations, the state was required to show that Petitioner acted

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. See A.R.S. § 13-1203. Negligence or criminal

negligence is not a defense to a charge of reckless assault, it is merely a less culpable mental

state than the “recklessness” mens rea required for a conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1203.

While trial counsel may have argued that the state failed to prove that Petitioner acted only

negligently, and not with the requisite intent, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to

request a jury instruction on a mental state inapplicable to the charges at issue. Accordingly,

Ground 12(e) is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the

parties should use the following case number: CV-10-207-TUC-CKJ.

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The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2011.

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