Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00240/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roberta Lynn Bromley, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-00240-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Roberta Bromley, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 17.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates that decision and remands for further 

administrative proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

 In August 2007, Bromley applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging a 

disability onset date of January 20, 2005. (R. at 17.) Bromley’s date last insured (“DLI”) 

for disability insurance benefits, and thus the date on or before which she must have been 

disabled, was December 31, 2009. (Id. at 19.) Bromley’s claim was denied both initially 

and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 17.) Bromley then requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 9, 2008. (Id.) The ALJ conducted a hearing 

on the matter on December 7, 2009. (Id.) 

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 In evaluating whether Bromley was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (Id. at 17–19.) At step one, the ALJ 

determined that Bromley had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. (Id. at 19.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Bromley suffered from the 

severe impairments of status post left Achilles tendon transfer, fibromyalgia, chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) / asthma, and low back pain. (Id.) At step three, 

the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, met 

or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments. (Id. at 21.) 

 At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Bromley’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that Bromley could perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.15676(b) in that she was able to lift and/or carry at least twenty pounds 

 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

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occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand and/or walk six hours during an eight-hour 

workday, and sit six hours during an eight-hour workday. (Id.) However, the ALJ 

determined that Bromley had limited pushing/pulling ability in her upper and lower 

extremities and that she could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and could only 

occasionally climb ramps or stairs, crouch, or crawl, and that she should avoid 

concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold, and even moderate exposure to fumes, 

odors, dust or gases, and industrial hazards. (Id.) The ALJ thus determined at step four 

that Bromley retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work as a retail sales worker 

and house cleaner. (Id. at 23.) The ALJ therefore did not reach step five. (Id.) Given this 

analysis, the ALJ concluded that Bromley was not disabled. (Id. at 24.) 

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 1.) The Council 

accepted the ALJ’s statements of the law, the issues in the case, and the evidentiary facts, 

as well as the ALJ’s findings and ultimate conclusions regarding whether Bromley was 

disabled. (Id. at 1–2.) The Council thereupon agreed that Bromley was not disabled. (Id.) 

Bromley filed the complaint underlying this action on February 3, 2012, seeking 

this Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Doc. 1.) The matter is now fully 

briefed before this Court. (Docs. 17, 19, 26.) Bromley asserts three grounds of error for 

reversing the ALJ’s decision: (1) the ALJ wrongly applied a Step 3 analysis at the Step 2 

stage and failed to consider non-severe impairments in evaluating Bromley’s RFC, (2) 

the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the opinion of Dr. Mertins, Bromley’s treating 

physician, and (3) the ALJ wrongly discounted Bromley’s subjective testimony of her 

own symptoms. (Doc. 17 at 14–26.) 

II. Factual Background

 Bromley asserts that she suffers from fibromyalgia, COPD, left Achilles tendon 

transfer, back and neck pain, and depression and anxiety. (Doc. 17 at 1.) Bromley 

 3

Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (AAny individual, 

after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to 

which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .@). 

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testified at the hearing that she felt an “irritating, aching” pain all over her body. (R. at 

34.) She also testified that she was depressed, and that while medication helps to a 

degree, she still suffers from depression symptoms. (Id. at 35.) However, she testified that 

she no longer sees a therapist because she thinks “they’re all quacks.” (Id. at 36.) She also 

testified that she frequently gets panic attacks, causing her to have to lie down, and that 

she took medication for the attacks, but only when it was “really bad enough.” (Id. at 37.) 

However, once she took the medication, it “help[ed] a lot.” (Id. at 38.) She testified that 

she had COPD which caused her to walk more slowly, and that she smoked a pack of 

cigarettes a day. (Id.) She also testified about her ankle pain, for which she underwent 

surgery, and stated that she could only stand for fifteen minutes and walk for half an 

hour. (Id. at 40.) She further stated that because of her back and shoulder pain, she could 

only sit for about twenty minutes and could not lift more than ten pounds. (Id. at 40–41.) 

 Bromley was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 1999 or 2000. (Id. at 33.) She 

testified that she suffers the most pain in her lower and middle back, but she also feels it 

in her hands, arms, neck, and head. (Id.) Dr. Thomas Mertins was Bromley’s primary 

treating physician throughout her period of disability. (Id. at 35.) Medical notes from the 

Union Hills Family Medicine, where Dr. Mertins and other physicians treated Bromley, 

assess her as having fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, COPD and asthma, 

and knee pain. (Id. at 203, 211–212, 215, 222, 228, 309, 311.) Dr. Mertins prescribed 

Bromley a variety of medications to alleviate her mental and physical ailments, including 

muscle relaxers, pain medication, and anti-depressants. (Id. at 35.) The notes show that 

Bromley’s reactions to medication were varied—some appeared to be working well for a 

period, but Bromley would then experience a negative reaction and have to stop the 

medication and switch to a new one. (Id. at 306–07, 309, 313, 316, 320.) Dr. Mertins 

twice opined that Bromley was unable to work a full workweek in June 2008 and 

September 2009. (Id. at 413–14, 494–46.) Both times he indicated that her back and arm 

pain prevented her from working. (Id.) 

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 Bromley was also treated by several mental health specialists for her depression 

and anxiety. Bromley saw Dr. Shelley Kaufman for a month from June 2007 to July 

2007. (Id. at 452–63.) Dr. Kaufman diagnosed Bromley with depression (dysthymic 

disorder) and panic disorder. (Id. at 462.) She prescribed a course of individual therapy 

for Bromley, which Bromley apparently followed for a month. In July, however, Bromley 

chose to end the treatment, stating that her treatment goals had been met. (Id. at 452.) 

Bromley returned to Dr. Kaufman in October 2008, describing a “severe episode of mood 

disturbance.” (Id. at 567.) By December 2008, Dr. Kaufman reported that Bromley had 

made “emotional gains” and was “very happy that her son ha[d] moved into her home.” 

(Id. at 571.) 

 At approximately the same time that Bromley initially saw Dr. Kaufman for her 

depression, Bromley also saw Dr. Richard Schaeffer, a psychiatrist, in the middle of 

2007. Dr. Schaeffer noted Bromley’s anxiety, panic attacks, and depersonalization. (Id. at 

271.) Bromley continued to see Dr. Schaeffer for a few months until August 2007. (Id. at 

268.) He prescribed her several medications. (Id.) Unfortunately, much of Dr. Schaeffer’s 

records consist of illegible handwritten notes, and thus cannot be taken into consideration 

on review of the ALJ’s decision. (See id. at 268–73.) 

 At the request of the Social Security Administration, Bromley saw Dr. William 

Chaffee for a physical consultative examination on October 17, 2008. (Id. at 251.) Dr. 

Chaffee diagnosed Bromley with probable COPD, chronic depression, polymyalgias, and 

chronic foot pain. (Id. at 254.) Given these diagnoses, Dr. Chaffee opined that Bromley 

would be able to stand and walk up to six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit up to six 

hours in an eight-hour workday, and lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty 

pounds frequently. (Id.) He found that Bromley did not need an assistive device and that 

she had no manipulative limitations, but found that she had environmental limitations due 

to her COPD, requiring that she avoid dust and fumes and extreme temperatures. (Id.) 

However, he qualified his analysis by stating that Bromley “has a chronic depression 

which makes evaluation of her physical limits difficult.” (Id. at 255.) 

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DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 Harmless errors in the ALJ’s decision do not warrant reversal. Stout v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006). Errors are harmless if they are 

“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 

1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)). Thus, for example, an error is harmless if the record shows 

that “the ALJ would have reached the same result absent the error” or “it was clear [the 

errors] did not alter the ALJ’s decision.” Id. “[T]he burden of showing that an error is 

harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. 

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). 

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II. Analysis 

 Bromley argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) failing to consider the combined effect 

of her mental impairments with her other impairments (Doc. 17 at 14–20), (B) failing to 

properly weigh medical evidence and opinion evidence (id. at 20–23), and (C) failing to 

properly weigh subjective complaints (id. at 23–26). The Court will address each 

argument in turn. 

A. Failure to Consider Mental Impairments

 Bromley’s argument on this prong is two-fold: she contends that the ALJ (1) 

wrongly determined that her mental impairment was not severe by mistakenly applying 

the Step 3 analysis at the Step 2 stage, and (2) failed to take her mental impairment into 

account when determining her RFC. 

 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4) differentiates between the second and third steps of the 

disability determination. At issue in the second step is “the medical severity of [the 

claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The ALJ must determine 

whether an impairment is severe before moving onto the next step. She may “find an 

impairment not severe ‘only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no 

more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” Wick v. Barnhart, 173 F. 

App’x 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 

2005)). If none of the claimant’s impairments are severe, then she is not disabled. 20 CFR 

§ 404.1520(c). If an impairment or combination of impairments is severe, however, then 

the analysis proceeds to the third step, where the ALJ determines whether the severe 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the specific impairments described in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing 20 CFR § 404.1520(d)). 

 Here, the ALJ found that Bromley suffered from multiple severe impairments, but 

that her mental impairments of anxiety and bipolar/depression were not severe. (R. at 20.) 

In determining that her mental impairments were not severe, she relied on the functional 

areas set out for evaluating mental disorders in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

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(Id.) Thus, the ALJ applied the Step 3 analysis to determine, at Step 2, whether 

Bromley’s mental impairments were severe. However, this error is harmless if the ALJ 

would have reached the determination that Bromley’s mental impairments were nonsevere even without relying on the functional areas in Appendix 1. See Molina, 674 F.3d 

at 1115. The evidence provided by the ALJ in discussing Step 2 shows that the ALJ 

would, in fact, have reached the same determination that Bromley’s mental impairments 

were not severe. 

 Aside from the Step 3 analysis, the ALJ also stated that Bromley “responded well 

to treatment” and that “her symptoms abated within months of treatment” as reasons for 

finding that her mental impairments did not cause more than minimal limitation on her 

ability to perform basic mental work activities. (R. at 20.) The record indicates that, in 

July 2007, Bromley’s treating psychologist stated that her “treatment goals had been met” 

and that Bromley was thus terminating her therapy sessions. (Id. at 567.) Dr. Kaufman’s 

later notes in 2008 also indicate that Bromley was stable with “emotional gains.” (Id. at 

571.) 

 In addition, though the ALJ erroneously applied the framework of Step 3 in Step 

2, the facts on which she relied in that analysis support her finding that Bromley was not 

severely impaired by her anxiety and depression. For example, Bromley was able to 

perform daily activities like housework, caring for the pets, and making supper. (Id. at 

128, 160.) She also looked after her husband, went shopping, went out for coffee, 

attended social functions, and volunteered weekly at a store. (Id. at 129, 131–32.)4

 

 Bromley argues that that the ALJ incorrectly found that she did not suffer any 

mental health issues after February 2008. (Doc. 17 at 16.) Bromley cites to portions of the 

 

4

 The Commissioner cites to a host of other records which he claims also support the ALJ’s finding that Bromley’s mental impairments were not severe. (Doc. 19 at 11– 12.) However, an ALJ’s decision may not be justified by “post hoc rationalizations that 

attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking” on appeal. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009). There is no indication 

that the ALJ relied on any of the evidence cited by the Commissioner. As such, the Court 

will not consider it on review. 

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record which she claims show that she continued to manifest symptoms of depression and 

anxiety after February 2008. (Id.) However, none of the evidence to which she cites 

actually addresses her depression or anxiety. Even if the ALJ was wrong to conclude that 

Bromley did not suffer mental health issues after February 2008, it would not preclude a 

finding that Bromley’s mental impairments were not severe. The records discussed above 

from Bromley’s treating psychologist and of Bromley’s unhampered household and 

social activities are enough that a reasonable person could accept them as sufficient 

evidence for supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. Moreover, the ALJ found that Bromley 

had other severe impairments, namely, her Achilles tendon transfer, fibromyalgia, COPD, 

and low back pain. (R. at 19.) As such, the ALJ was precluded from making a finding 

that Bromley was not disabled on this step. Thus, though the ALJ erred in applying a Step 

3 analysis at the Step 2 stage, the error was harmless and not grounds for reversing the 

ALJ’s decision. See Gray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 365 Fed. App’x. 60, 61 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that an ALJ’s determination that certain impairments were nonsevere 

is harmless if the ALJ concluded that other medical problems were severe impairments). 

 However, Bromley also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider her mental 

impairments in determining her RFC. In making the RFC determination, the ALJ is 

required to consider both severe and non-severe impairments. 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(2). 

However, the ALJ did not mention Bromley’s mental impairments at all. (R. at 21–23.) 

The ALJ made no attempt to explain her failure to take Bromley’s depression and anxiety 

into consideration. Because there is “simply nothing in the record for the [C]ourt to 

review to determine whether the ALJ’s decision was adequately supported,” this cannot 

be said to be harmless error. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008). As such, the ALJ’s failure to take Bromley’s mental 

impairments into account in making the RFC determination is grounds for remanding the 

ALJ’s determination. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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B. Failure to Accord Adequate Weight to Treating Physician Opinion

 “The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is entitled to special 

weight.” Walter v. Astrue, No. CV-09-1016-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 1511666 at *7 (D. 

Ariz. Apr. 15, 2010) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989)) 

(internal quotations omitted). This is because the treating physician “is employed to cure 

and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 1995). If the treating physician’s opinion is 

supported by the record and not inconsistent with other evidence, it is accorded 

controlling weight. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[w]here 

the opinion of the claimant's treating physician is contradicted, and the opinion of a 

nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from those of the 

treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be substantial 

evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict.” Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) 

 Here, the ALJ accorded lesser weight to Dr. Mertins’ opinion that Bromley was 

unable to work due to her back, arm, and foot pain and inability to sustain prolonged 

standing. (R. at 23.) The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Mertins’ opinion were that it was 

contradicted by (1) the opinion of Dr. Chaffee, an examining physician, (2) Bromley’s 

“activities of daily living,” and (3) “other evidence including [Bromley’s] 2007 recovery 

from surgery.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted that, while Bromley was diagnosed with 

fibromyalgia in 1989, she continued working until January 2005, the alleged disability 

onset date. (Id.) 

 As stated above, Bromley saw Dr. Chaffee in October 2008 for a one-time 

consultative examination at the request of the Social Security Administration. (R. at 251.) 

Dr. Chaffee performed an independent physical examination on Bromley and assessed 

that her general physical condition was normal and that her range of motion was within 

normal limits. (Id. at 253–54.) He concluded that she was capable of working a normal 

eight-hour work day subject to some limitations. (Id. at 254–55.) His findings contradict 

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the opinion of Dr. Mertins, who twice concluded that Bromley was unable to work, and 

found much more severe limitations on Bromley’s ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, or carry 

things during an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 414, 494.) Thus, the ALJ set out sufficient 

reason for not according controlling weight to Dr. Mertins’ opinion. Furthermore, Dr. 

Chaffee’s conclusion was based on “independent clinical findings that differ from those 

of the treating physician.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. While Dr. Mertins found that 

Bromley was limited due to her back and arm pain, Dr. Chaffee’s independent 

examination found that Bromley’s shoulder, elbow, and wrist joints were all within 

normal limits of their range of motion. (R. at 254.) In addition, Dr. Chaffee concluded 

after “extensive examination” that Bromley could stand for up to six hours at a time and 

had no limitation on the number of hours she could sit in a normal eight-hour workday. 

These independent clinical findings are sufficient substantial evidence to justify the 

ALJ’s decision to accord less weight to Dr. Mertins’ opinion. 

 The ALJ also cited Bromley’s daily activities as evidence contradicting Dr. 

Mertins’ opinion. (Id. at 23.) The evidence on which she relied is the same as the 

evidence she considered in Step 2, i.e., evidence that Bromley could do housework, care 

for the pets, make supper, look after her husband, go shopping and out for coffee, attend 

social functions, and volunteer once a week. (Id. at 128, 129, 131–32, 160.) These 

activities are indicative of Bromley’s ability to perform light work. For example, 

Bromley filled out a Function Report for the SSA stating that she was able to do laundry, 

ironing, dusting, cleaning bathrooms, and light vacuuming on a weekly basis. (Id. at 130.) 

She also wrote that she volunteered “at a store” once a week for three hours at a time, 

though she stated that when she did this she was “not working hard.” (Id. at 132.) This 

evidence tends to show that Bromley’s abilities were not as severely limited as set forth 

by Dr. Mertins. The ALJ’s decision to place less emphasis on Dr. Mertins’ opinion was 

thus also supported by this evidence of Bromley’s day-to-day activities. 

 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Mertins’ opinion because it was contradicted by “other 

evidence including [Bromley’s] 2007 recovery from surgery.” (Id. at 23.) The ALJ’s 

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general reference to “other evidence” does not constitute “specific and legitimate 

reasons” for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion. See Orn, 496 F.3d at 632. However, 

Bromley’s 2007 recovery from surgery does contradict Dr. Mertins’ opinion. Bromley 

underwent surgery for her ankle pain in 2006. (R. at 263–65.) Bromley reported feeling 

50% to 60% better after her surgery. (Id. at 429.) This evidence tends to undermine Dr. 

Mertins’ assessment that Bromley was unable to work due to foot pain. Thus, this is also 

a legitimate reason for the ALJ to give less weight to the limitations set out by Dr. 

Mertins on Bromley’s ability to work. 

 Finally, in rejecting Dr. Mertins’ opinion, the ALJ noted that though Bromley was 

diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 1989, she continued to work until January 2005. (Id. at 

23.) Bromley asserts that her disability began in January 2005. (Id. at 17.) Evidence that 

Bromley’s fibromyalgia, by itself, was not a limitation before the beginning of her 

disability is not evidence that contradicts the opinion of her treating physician regarding 

her combination of ailments after disability onset. Thus, Bromley’s ability to work prior 

to January 2005 is not substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision to give less 

weight to Dr. Bromley’s opinion. 

 Nevertheless, the ALJ relied on sufficient other evidence to justify her rejection of 

Dr. Mertins’ opinion. The ALJ’s decision to accord lesser weight to Dr. Mertins’ opinion 

is supported by substantial evidence in the record and does not constitute grounds for 

vacating her ruling. 

C. Failure to Properly Weigh Bromley’s Subjective Complaints

 The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding her subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 

504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must first “determine whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 

1036. If she has, and the ALJ has found no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may 

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reject the claimant’s testimony “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.” Id.

 The Commissioner disagrees that the appropriate standard for the ALJ in rejecting 

claimant testimony is one that requires clear and convincing reasons. (Doc. 19 at 17.) He 

relies on Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), where the Ninth 

Circuit set out to “determine the appropriate standard for evaluating subjective 

complaints of pain in Social Security disability cases.” (Id. (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 

342).) The Bunnell Court opined that once there has been objective medical evidence of 

an underlying impairment, the ALJ must make specific findings, supported by the record, 

for why he rejected the claimant’s testimony on the severity of the pain. 947 F.2d at 345–

46. This is to ensure that the ALJ “did not ‘arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony 

regarding pain.’” Id. (quoting Elam v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 

1991)). Thus, the Commissioner claims that the standard governing credibility is a 

specific finding standard, which it claims is more in line with the overall “substantial 

evidence” standard that governs these cases. 

 Many panels of the Ninth Circuit have subsequently held, however, that if there is 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, “and there is no evidence of 

malingering, then the ALJ must give ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ in order to 

reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1112 (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also, e.g., 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The Commissioner claims that these cases have overruled 

the standard articulated in Bunnell in violation of the Ninth Circuit rule that only en banc 

panels can overrule existing precedent. (Doc. 19 at 17 (citing United States v. Camper, 66 

F.3d 229, 232 (9th Cir. 1995).) That is not the case. Bunnell articulated a general standard 

for dealing with claimant testimony. The many subsequent cases have addressed a subset 

of cases where there is no evidence of claimant malingering. They have articulated a 

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“clear and convincing” standard for those situations. Thus, the Court will apply that 

standard to the ALJ’s determination. 

 Here, the ALJ found at the first step that Bromley’s “medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (R. at 23.) 

However, the ALJ rejected her statements concerning “the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of [her] symptoms” as “not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with the . . . residual functional capacity assessment.” (Id.) This general statement does 

not constitute “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting Bromley’s 

testimony. Indeed, the ALJ is required to consider Bromley’s symptom testimony in 

making the RFC assessment. 20 CFR § 416.945(a)(3). “Dismissing a claimant’s 

credibility because it is inconsistent with a conclusion that must itself address the 

claimant’s credibility is circular reasoning” that cannot be sustained by this Court. 

Leitheiser v. Astrue, No. CV 10-6243-SI, 2012 WL 967647 at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2012). 

 Though the ALJ analyzed extensive medical records and written statements from 

Bromley regarding her daily activities, she did not explain how those activities 

contradicted Bromley’s subjective symptom testimony. Though inconsistencies may exist 

in the record that justify the ALJ’s rejection of the symptom testimony, it is the ALJ’s job 

to offer “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for doing so. Without any indication of 

what part of the RFC assessment the ALJ relied on in determining that Bromley’s 

testimony was inconsistent, the Court cannot be sure that the ALJ did not “arbitrarily 

discredit” Bromley’s statements regarding her pain. 

 The Commissioner points to other evidence in the record which he claims supports 

the ALJ’s finding that Bromley’s subjective complaints were not credible. (Doc. 19 at 

18–19.) However, the ALJ did not rely on this evidence in making her decision. The only 

rationale cited by the ALJ was that Bromley’s complaints were inconsistent with her RFC 

determination. (R. at 23.) The Court must rely on “the reasoning and factual findings 

offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the 

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adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225. The reasoning offered by 

the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence, so the determination of non-disability 

will be vacated on this ground. 

III. Remedy

Having decided to vacate the ALJ’s decision, the Court has the discretion to 

remand the case either for further proceedings or for an award of benefits. See Reddick, 

157 F.3d at 728. The rule in this Circuit is that the Court should: 

credit[] evidence and remand[] for an award of benefits where 

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting [certain] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding 

issues that must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that 

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were 

such evidence credited.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. 

 Here, the ALJ did not provide any legally sufficient reason for her failure to 

consider Bromley’s non-severe mental impairment in determining Bromley’s RFC. She 

also failed to give a legally sufficient reason for rejecting Bromley’s subjective 

complaints regarding the intensity and limiting effect of her impairments. However, there 

are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made. The ALJ’s consideration of Bromley’s non-severe mental impairments in making 

an RFC determination would not necessarily lead to a finding that Bromley is disabled. In 

addition, Bromley’s subjective complaints regarding her symptoms must be weighed 

against contradictory evidence in the record, like the opinion of Dr. Chaffee and her own 

reports of her daily activities. 

 As such, it is not “clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled were such evidence credited,” and there remain “outstanding issues that 

must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1292. Under these circumstances, the Court will remand for further proceedings. 

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CONCLUSION

 The ALJ erred in failing to discuss Bromley’s mental impairments in making the 

RFC determination and failing to set forth specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

Bromley’s subjective complaint testimony.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is VACATED and this 

case is REMANDED for further proceedings. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter 

judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 8th day of April, 2013. 

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