Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01324/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01324-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 08cv1324  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTER BURNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. DUGAN, MEDICAL DOCTOR;

DR. HAWTHORNE, CMO (RJD);

DR. BARRERAS, CMO (CEN);

DR. FRAZE, MEDICAL DOCTOR;

DR. KHATRI; MEDICAL DOCTOR;

VICTOR ALMAGER, WARDEN;

G.J. GIURBINO, WARDEN;

_______, R.N.

Defendants.

_____________________________________

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Civil No. 08‐cv‐1324‐L(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

1.) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

AMEND THE COMPLAINT;

2.) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS OF FAILURE TO EXHAUST CLAIMS;

AND

3.)GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS.  

(DOC. NOS. 89,88, & 87)

I. Procedural Background

Currently before the Court are three motions: Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental

Complaint (Doc. No. 89); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies (Doc. No. 87); and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment (Doc.

No. 88).

Ester Burnett (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at R. J. Donovan Correc‐

tional Facility, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, Doctors Barreras, Dugan, Fraze, Hawthorne, Khatri, and Victor

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1

Dr. Segal is not a named defendant in this action.

2 All citations to the SAC or Plaintiff’s motions reflect the number assigned by the Court’s e‐ filing stamp.

3

Dr. Griffin is not a named defendant in this action.

2 08cv1324  

Almager (“Defendants”) have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (Doc. No. 87) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. No.

88).  Plaintiff did not directly oppose the motions, but rather filed a Motion For Leave to File a

Supplemental Complaint (Doc. No. 89). Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 94) and

Plaintiff replied (Doc. No. 95).  

The Court, having reviewed the Second Amended Complaint, the exhibits attached

thereto, and all motions and relevant attachments and oppositions, with GOOD CAUSE APPEAR‐

ING, HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint (Doc. No.

89) be DENIED; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to

exhaust (Doc. No. 87) be GRANTED; and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint for failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment (Doc. No. 88) be GRANTED.

II. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint names eight defendants and alleges that each

Defendant violated both the Eighth Amendment and California State Government Code 845.6.

All allegations stem from various accommodations that were denied or delayed despite Plain‐

tiff’s medical diagnosis of degenerative lumbar disk syndrome and resulting back surgery.  

Doctor Segal1 diagnosed Plaintiff with “acute lumbar pain and lumbar disk disease”

while he was housed at the California Men’s Colony (“CMC”).  (See SAC at 4.)2  Plaintiff’s primary

care physician at CMC, Dr. Griffin3

, subsequently recommended further treatment of his medical

condition and that Plaintiff be housed at an institution where he would not have to climb stairs.

(Id.) On July 27, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility

(“Donovan”) along with his entire medical file.  (Id.)  

A. Defendant Dugan

Defendant Dugan became Plaintiff’s primary care physician while he was housed at

Donovan. (Id.) Plaintiff charges Dr. Dugan with awareness that Plaintiff suffered from “chronic

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4

  Defendant Guirbino has not been served with the Second Amended Complaint or notice of this action. See

               III. Unserved Defendants, infra. at p.6.

5 Dr. Collinsworth is not a party to this action.

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benign back pain with possible nerve root irritation” and of Plaintiff’s inability to climb stairs,

requiring a lower tier cell placement and lower bed.  (Id.)  Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Dugan

denied Plaintiff’s request for a lower tier placement stating that his “medical condition did not

warrant the need for him to be housed on the lower tier.”  (Id. at 5.) Furthermore, Plaintiff notes

that Defendant Dugan did not provide him “with a Neurologist for surgery.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that the actions of Dr. Dugan caused him “needless pain and placed him at substantial risk of

serious harm.”  (Id.)

B. Defendant Hawthorne

Plaintiff notified Defendant Hawthorne, Donovan’s Chief Medical Officer, of his

“serious medical need.”  (Id. at 7.)  Defendant Hawthorne “chose to not follow [Dr. Griffin’s] ...

treatment and denied the Plaintiff access to being housed on the lower tier.”  (Id.)  Plaintiff

concedes that Defendant Hawthorne did prescribe a lower bunk. (Id.) However, one sentence

later, Plaintiff confusingly revokes this statement and charges Defendant Hawthorne with failure

to provide a lower bunk, and alleges that the bunk was denied “knowing it would cause

[Plaintiff] further pain and risk further significant injury.” (Id.) Defendant Hawthorne also knew

that Plaintiff needed to be seen by a neurologist for further treatment but “made no effort to

make sure he would be seen thus intentionally interfering with the treatment that had previ‐

ously been prescribed.”  (Id.)

C. Warden Defendants Guirbino4 and Almager

Plaintiff was transferred to Centinela State Prison (“Centinela”). (See id. at 8‐9, 19.) On

August 2, 2007, Plaintiff was also prescribed an extra mattress by Dr. Collinsworth.5  (Id. at 21.)

Plaintiff  names the former Warden of Centinela, Guirbino, as  “implementor and promulgator of

[an offensive] ... policy” from July 2002 that automatically denied any prisoner’s request for an

extra mattress, even if prescribed by a doctor. (Id. at 14, 21.) Plaintiff charges Defendant

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6

Dr. Calvin is not a defendant in this action.

7 This is the method by which Plaintiff identifies this defendant. The Court adopts Plaintiff’s identification of

                  this defendant. Defendant________,RN. has not been served with the Second Amended Complaint or notice

               of this action. See III. Unserved Defendants, infra. at p.6

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Guirbino, with “intentional[ly] deny[ing] and delay[ing] [Plaintiff’s] access to medical care.” (Id.

at 14.)

Plaintiff names Defendant Almager, Warden for Centinela, for his continuance of the

no extra mattress policy.  (Id. at 14.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Almager was responsible to

end any policy that infringed or encroached on inmates’ constitutional rights. (Id.)  Plaintiff

claims that in January and February of 2008, Plaintiff wrote Almager letters concerning the

violations. (Id.)

While at Centinela, Plaintiff was provided a neurologist, Dr. Calvin6, “who specializes in

neurological surgery and pain management.” (Id. at 19.) On December 20, 2007, Dr. Calvin,

recommended Plaintiff undergo surgery and on January 30, 2008, the CDCR Medical Authoriza‐

tion Review Committee approved the recommendation. (Id.)

D. _____________, R.N.7

Plaintiff alleges that _______, a Registered Nurse, was the Specialty Appointment

Scheduler at Centinela State Prison while he was awaiting surgery. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff asserts

that this nurse, “had the personal responsibility to ensure Plaintiff was scheduled for and had

surgery within 14 to 90 days of Plaintiff’s approv[al for] surgery ... and failed to schedule the

surgery within the allotted time frame, ... [leaving] Plaintiff [to] suffer[] 149 days of excruciating

severe pain.” (Id.)

On July 24, 2008, Plaintiff did receive back surgery, performed by Dr. Calvin. (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff contends that prior to surgery, in late June 2008, Dr. Calvin “ordered a raised toilet seat

for Plaintiff to relieve pain post surgery.” (Id.) Following surgery, in September 2008, Plaintiff

further credits Dr. Calvin with recommending that Plaintiff be housed in the Correctional

Treatment Center (“CTC”). (Id.)  Plaintiff reasons that Dr. Calvin prescribed the CTC due to

“Plaintiff not being able to sit straight in a cell in general population ... [as] the upper bunk in all

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cells in general population are not high enough ... for Plaintiff to set(sic) straight” while resting

on a bottom bunk. (Id. at 15.)

E. Dr. Khatri

After surgery, Plaintiff remained at Centinela. Plaintiff alleges that Centinela Primary

Care Physician, Dr. Khatri, informed Plaintiff that Dr. Calvin had stated Plaintiff no longer

suffered from a mobility problem. (Id. at 16.) Consequently, on August 13, 2008, Dr. Khatri

removed Plaintiff from the Disability Placement Program (“DPP”). (Id.) When Dr. Khatri removed

Plaintiff from DPP, Plaintiff was forced to sit with his back arched which caused him severe

pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff later visited Dr. Calvin in October 2008, and Dr. Calvin denied terminating

Plaintiff’s mobility restrictions, instead stating that Plaintiff “would always have a mobility

problem and would never fully recover.” (Id.) Plaintiff further charges Dr. Kahtri with responsibil‐

ity for not receiving the raised toilet seat recommended by Dr. Calvin. (Id. at 17.)

F. Dr. Barreras

Prior to October 2008, Dr. Barreras supervised Dr. Khatri as Chief Medical Officer at

Centinela. (Id. at 9.) In August 2008, Dr. Barreras examined Plaintiff’s grievance and advised that

Plaintiff be admitted back to CTC.  (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also wrote Dr. Barreras a letter “concerning

the denial of a raised toilet seat[, and] extra mattress]...Barreras still denied and delayed the

treatment.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff credits Defendant Barreras’ actions with causing him “significant

and unnecessary wanton infliction of pain.” (Id.) Nonetheless, Dr. Barreras “delayed the

recommendation and ... seriously needed medical care ordered by Dr. Calvin.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff

also notes that “Dr. Barreras did not commit the cruel and unusual punishment ... [rather she]

became responsible for them when she failed to correct them in the course of her supervisory

responsibilities.” (Id. at 10.)

G. Dr. Fraze

While at Centinela, nearly a year after his surgery, Plaintiff was seen by primary care

physician, Dr. Fraze. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff complains that at an examination in July 2009, Dr. Fraze

informed Plaintiff that “there is nothing wrong with him, and it’s all mental.”  (Id.) Defendant

Fraze also refused to order Plaintiff a “raised toilet seat” as recommended by Dr. Calvin and

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consequently “exposed Plaintiff ... to over 77 days of severe needless pain while using [a] toilet.”

(Id.)

III. Unserved Defendants

Plaintiff has named Defendant “________, A Registered Nurse [who] was the Specialty

Appointment Scheduler at Centinela State Prison” in this matter.  (See SAC at 3, 17.)  However,

there is little evidence in the Court’s docket to reflect that Plaintiff has ever attempted to

discover the identify of “_______, a Registered Nurse.” Plaintiff has implicitly suggested that the

anonymous defendant may be identifiable as “Sandoval.” (See Doc. 86.) Plaintiff’s letter identifies

pages and line numbers where “the name of defendant Sandoval” is missing. (Doc. 86.)  The

blanks noted in Plaintiff’s letter at times, but not perfectly, coincide with ________, RN noted in

the Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 86, 83.) However, the letter does not conclusively

indicate that _______, RN should be replaced by Sandoval. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to

serve this Defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) imposes a 120 day time limit in which

Plaintiff must serve a Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended

Complaint on November 10, 2009. Plaintiff provided the Court with no evidence of actual or

attempted service on ________, RN. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant “________,

RN” be DISMISSED from this action.

Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence that he served Defendant G.J. Giurbino,

alleged former warden of Centinela State Prison with notice of this action or the Second

Amended Complaint. Under the 120 day service deadline imposed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m), Plaintiff has far exceeded the 120 day time limit to serve G.J. Guirbino. Accord‐

ingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Guirbino be dismissed from this action.

IV. The Prison Litigation Reform Act Mandates Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Prior to Bringing Suit

A. Arguments

Plaintiff seeks to add to the claims in the Second Amended Complaint by filing a

supplemental complaint describing events that occurred after the date he filed the instant suit.

(See Doc. 89.) Similarly, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint raises claims against Defendants

Doctors Khatri, Fraze, and Barreras, as supervisor of Khatri, for failure to provide a raised toilet

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seat after Plaintiff’s back surgery; Defendants seek dismissal of this claim on grounds that Plaintiff

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to Rule 12(b).

B. Exhaustion Is Mandatory

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  “Once within the discretion of

the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.”  Porter v. Nussle,

534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  Courts have construed exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strictly to

“afford ... corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal case, id. at 525‐26, and to encompass inmate suits about both

general circumstances and particular episodes of prison life.  Id. at 532.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion to File A Supplemental Complaint

Plaintiff moves this court to grant him leave to file a supplemental complaint. (Doc. No.

89.) Plaintiff’s Proposed Supplemental Complaint seeks to add fourteen new defendants and

multiple new claims alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations. However, under the

PLRA “[t]he ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under  §1983 may be

entertained,” “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.”  Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 741 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200‐01 (9th

Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner’s civil rights action must be dismissed without prejudice unless

prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if he fully

exhausts while the suit is pending). The McKinny Court reasoned that “section 1997(e) mandates

that no action shall be brought ... [and that] language clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to

the commencement of an action as an indispensable requirement.”(emphasis in original)

McKinny, 311 F.3d at 1199.  

i. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that a party may “serve a supplemental

pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date

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of the pleading sought to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). However, in a “conflict

between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the PLRA, the rule would have to yield to the

later‐enacted statute to the extent of the conflict.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 982 (11th Cir.

2000). Rule 15 “does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or restriction contained

in a statute (especially a subsequently enacted one).” Id. at 983; see also Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d

422, 428 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Harris for this proposition with favor). Allowing Plaintiff to add

newly accrued claims would allow Plaintiff to thwart the mandate of section 1997e(a), which

requires that claim exhaustion occur prior to filing suit and not during the pendency of the suit.

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199‐1201. Accordingly, this controlling case law bars Plaintiff from filing

the proposed supplemental complaint if all claims alleged within the supplement were unex‐

hausted prior to July 22, 2008, when Plaintiff first brought the instant lawsuit.

ii. Analysis

All claims Plaintiff seeks to add occurred after July 22, 2008, the date on which he filed

his original complaint, and could not possibly have been exhausted prior to Plaintiff bringing the

instant action. Plaintiff’s claims in his proposed supplemental complaint all post‐date July 22,

2008, and occurred primarily in February and March 2009. In February 2009, Plaintiff was

transferred from Centinela State Prison, a level three prison, to Calipatria State Prison, a level

four security facility. Plaintiff was returned to Centinela State Prison within a week. Plaintiff

considers his relocation and return a violation of notice and procedural requirements. Plaintiff

also declares a conspiracy by medical staff and prison officials to deprive him of housing

accommodations prescribed by his back surgeon, Dr. Calvin. A few of Plaintiff’s claims are distinct

from the transfer, however, these claims also do not predate the filing of the instant lawsuit.

a.) Dr. Davenport & Dr. Levin

Plaintiff names J. Davenport as Primary Care Physician at Centinela State prison as a

potential defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Davenport was on notice since February 20, 2009,

that he and other defendants planned to deny Plaintiff medical care. (Proposed Supplemental

Compl. at Claim 2.) Plaintiff further claims against Dr. Davenport for failure to properly accommo‐

date Plaintiff’s housing needs on March 17, 2009.

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Similarly, Plaintiff names M. Levin as Chief Medical Officer and Primary Care Physician

at Centinela. Plaintiff’s earliest claim against Dr. Levin factually arose on February 20, 2009, when

Dr. Levin “conspired ... to deny Plaintiff ... prescribed or recommended treatment” and initiated

Plaintiff’s transfer between Centinela and Calipatria State Prisons. Prior to this, on February 6,

2009, Dr. Levin allegedly informed plaintiff he was seeking a route around Dr. Calvin’s orders.

Plaintiff was further offended by Dr. Levin’s treatment upon his return to Centinela State prison.

(Proposed Supplmental Compl. at Claim 1.)

b.) Dr. Shiller

Plaintiff names Dr. Shiller as Primary Care Physician at Centinela and alleges that on

“March 18, 2009... [Dr. Shiller] denied Plaintiff ... single bed housing. (Proposed Sup. Complaint,

Count 3 at 1.) Plaintiff includes a catch all allegation by noting that “Dr. Shiller and the Centinela

Medical Department from July 24, 2008 to May 11, 2009 ... used deceit and deception to deny

Plaintiff seriously needed medical care.” (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 3.) Plaintiff

alleges further that regarding his brief transfer to Calipatria, that Dr. Shiller planned to deny

Plaintiff medical care in concert with other defendants from February 20, 2009. (Proposed

Supplemental Compl. at Claim 2.)

Plaintiff attributes Dr. Shiller with knowledge of Plaintiff’s housing needs “as far back

as May 14, 2008 [as] it was Dr. Shiller who fist responded to Dr. Calvin’s recommendation.”

(Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 3.) However, Plaintiff notes that on this early occasion,

Dr. Shiller “move[d] Plaintiff to the Correctional Treatment Center to accommodate Plaintiff[‘s]

medical needs.” (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 3.) By Plaintiff’s own admissions no

Constitutional violations arose from Dr. Schiller’s action on this date.

c.) Dr. Hjerper, Dr. Ball, and Jane Doe

Plaintiff charges Dr. Hjerper, Primary Care Physician at Calipatria, for alleged violations

that arise from events on February 26, 2009. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Hjerper “intentionally falsif[ied]

Plaintiff’s medical records by misrepresenting that Dr. Calvin had changed his recommended

accommodations following Plaintiff’s surgery.” (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 4.)

Plaintiff’s allegations arise against Dr. Ball, Chief Medical Officer at Calipatria, no earlier than

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February 20, 2009 for Dr. Ball’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s housing needs and participa‐

tion in Dr. Hjerper’s conspiracy to falsify medical records. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. Count

5.) Also charged with the conspiracy is Jane Doe, Registered Nurse ‐ RN at Centinela, for conspir‐

acy to deny housing accommodations and falsify medical records claims arising on February 20,

and February 27, 2009. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 5.)

d.) Dr. Vo & John Doe

Plaintiff charges Dr. Vo with responsibility for failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s

medical needs, and signing papers that resulted in Plaintiff’s transfer back to Centinela State

Prison on February 27, 2009. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Claim 7.) Plaintiff also names

John Doe Primary Care Physician at Centinela for similar violations and failures to accommodate

housing needs arising March 4, 2009 or later. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Count 11.)

e.) Warden Uribe & Warden Smalls

Warden Uribe, Warden of Centinela, is alleged to have conspired on February 20,

2009, with other proposed defendants, to deny Plaintiff housing accommodations. (Proposed

Supplemental Compl. at Count 8.) Plaintiff also believes that Warden Uribe did not properly

follow procedures or notice requirements in transferring Plaintiff from Centinela, a level three

prison, to Calipatria, a level four security prison. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Count 8.)

Similarly, Warden Smalls, Warden at Calipatria is also alleged to have conspired as early as

February 20, 2009, with other proposed defendants, to deny Plaintiff housing accommodations.

(Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Count 9.) Plaintiff also believes that Warden Smalls did not

properly follow procedures or notice requirements when Plaintiff was returned to Centinela from

Calipatria. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at Count 9.)

f.) Dr. Fraze

Plaintiff attempts to bring a new claim against Dr. Fraze, already named in the Second

Amended Complaint as Primary Care Physician at Centinela. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at

Claim 10.) Plaintiff’s new claims against Dr. Fraze mirror the claims alleged against the other

proposed defendants in the supplemental complaint and date back to February 20, 2009.

Although Dr. Fraze is a named defendant already included in the Second Amended Complaint, the

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Excepting Dr. Schiller’s accommodations on May 14, 2008, that Plaintiff admits is not a Constitutional        

                 violation.

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events described in the proposed supplemental complaint are factually distinct from those

described in the Second Amended Complaint. The events described in the proposed supplement

do not relate to the events detailed in the Second Amended Complaint. Judicial economy favors

all claims relating to the same transaction or occurrence to be brought in a single lawsuit and

disfavors allowing Plaintiff to add these claims against Dr. Fraze in the instant suit. Furthermore,

exhaustion requirements clearly bar Plaintiff from adding this claim against Dr. Fraze in the

instant lawsuit.

g.) Keys, Correctional Counselor I, & Pope, Correctional Counselor II

Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaint also alleges claims against Keys, Correc‐

tional Counselor I, at Centinela, and Pope, Correctional Counselor II, Plaintiff brings suit against

Pope and Keys for violations dating back to March 13, 2009. (Proposed Supplemental Compl. at

Count 12 & 13.)

h.) RN Gerardo & RN Gonzalez

Plaintiff’s final defendants are RN Gerardo and RN Gonzalez whose offending actions

date back to December 8, 2008. RN Gerardo in concert with RN Gonzalez allegedly served

Plaintiff’s medications after dinner which upset his stomach, nonetheless, this claim arose after

Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit. While Plaintiff alleges actions distinct from his transfer to

Calipatria and return to Centinela, RN Gerardo’s and Gonzalez’s alleged constitutional violations

do not predate the original complaint in this case.

iii. Conclusion

All claims8 in Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaint arose after Plaintiff filed the

instant lawsuit and could not have been exhausted prior to July 22, 2008. The Ninth Circuit’s clear

interpretation of the PLRA will require the court to dismiss the supplemental complaint without

prejudice if it is allowed to be formally filed, thus filing is futile. Accordingly, in the interest of

judicial economy the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request to file a supplemental

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complaint be DENIED as it is clear from the face of the proposed supplemental complaint that all

claims were unexhausted as of the date the instant lawsuit was brought.

C. Second Amended Complaint Claims Regarding Raised Toilet Seat

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint raises claims against Defendants Doctors Khatri,

Fraze, and Barreras, as supervisor of Khatri, for failure to provide a raised toilet seat after

Plaintiff’s back surgery. Defendants seek dismissal of this claim on grounds that Plaintiff has failed

to exhaust pursuant to Rule 12(b). The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the

right to administratively appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived

by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.”   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a).  In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed

through several levels:  (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate

appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal

to the Director of the California Department of Corrections.  Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235,

1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.5).   The third or “Director’s Level” of

review “shall be final and exhausts all administrative remedies available in the Department [of

Corrections.]”  See Cal. Dep’t of Corrections Operations Manual, § 54100.11, “Levels of Review;”

Barry, 985 F. Supp. at 1237‐38; Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2001.)

i. Standard of Review per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and 42

U.S.C. § 1997e

Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to the

raised toilet seat claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) before bringing this suit, therefore, they

seek dismissal under the “non‐enumerated” provisions of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b).  The Ninth Circuit

has held that “failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter of abatement” not going to the

merits of the case and is properly raised pursuant to a motion to dismiss, including a non‐

enumerated motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).  See Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s

& Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368‐69 (9th Cir. 1988); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a non‐enumerated motion under Rule 12(b) to be “the proper pretrial

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9 In so finding, the Ninth Circuit also made clear that unlike a motion forsummary judgment, “dismissal of an

               action on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits.”  Wyatt, 315 F.3d  

                at 1119 (citation omitted).  Thus, if the court finds that the prisoner has failed to exhaust non‐judicial         

                 remedies, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.”  Id. (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368

               & n.3).

10Plaintiff’s original title classification for his exhibit.

13 08cv1324  

motion for establishing nonexhaustion” of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).9

Wyatt also holds that non‐exhaustion of administrative remedies as set forth in 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) is an affirmative defense which defendant prison officials have the burden of raising and

proving.  Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.  However, unlike under Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and

decide disputed issues of fact.”  Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369).

ii. Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to Plaintiff’s Case

To support their claim that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with

respect to his Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide a raised toilet seat following back

surgery, Defendants provide the declaration of D. Foston, the Acting Chief of Inmate Appeals

Branch, and D.J. Degeus, the Appeals Coordinator at Centinela State Prison.  D. Foston declares

claims that there is no record of any Third Level Inmate Appeal from Centinela State Prison Log

Number CEN‐M‐08‐1165. (See Defs.’ Mot, D. Foston Declaration at ¶¶ 7 ‐ 9.) Similarly, D.J. Degeus

has reviewed the records of inmate appeals at Centinela State Prison, and it is clear Plaintiff only

appealed his post surgery accommodations to the first level. (See Defs.’ Mot, D. J. Degeus

Declaration at ¶¶ 6‐7.)

Plaintiff claims that he did exhaust all administrative appeals regarding the raised toilet

seat. (See Pl.’s Motion at 6.)  In support, Plaintiff points to his Exhibit Brown10 and Exhibit C.

However, while Plaintiff’s Exhibit Brown demonstrates exhaustion of his extra mattress grievance,

(see Pl.’s Motion, Ex. Brown), Exhibit C clearly illustrates that Plaintiff’s raised toilet seat grievance,

was not exhausted. (See Pl.’s Motion, Ex. C.) Page nine of Exhibit C is a memorandum from

Centinela State Prison; it notes that the issue of a raised toilet seat, “will not be addressed herein,

as th[is] appeal issue[] was addressed in prior appeals.” (Id. at Ex. C, p. 9.) The memorandum then

cites to the appeal number, CEN‐M‐08‐1165, that is noted in the declarations of D. Foster and D.J.

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Degeus, as unexhausted because it was never appealed beyond the first level of review. (See id.;

Defs.’ Mot, D. Foston Declaration at ¶¶ 7 ‐ 9; D. J. Degeus Declaration at ¶¶ 6‐7.)

The Supreme Court has made clear that Plaintiff must “properly exhaust” his adminis‐

trative remedies before filing a prison conditions action.  In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006),

the Supreme Court held that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s

deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function

effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”  Woodford,

126 S.Ct. at 90‐91.  The Court further held that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must

complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules ...

as a precondition to bring suit in federal court.”  Id.

iii. Conclusion

The exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint, together

with the Declarations submitted by the defendants, demonstrate that the appeal regarding the

raised toilet seat is unexhausted. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendants’ showing that

he failed to properly exhaust his administrative grievances with respect to these claims. Further‐

more, because Plaintiff did not submit a first formal level appeal within fifteen days of his informal

level response, any attempt to file the grievance now is untimely and no exceptions apply. See

Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95‐96; see also Booth, 532 U.S. at 741

(exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are limited) (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s raised toilet seat claim be DISMISSED for Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

V. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

A. Defendants’ Arguments

All Defendants seek dismissal under 12(b)(6) on grounds that Plaintiff can not base a

claim for violation of constitutional rights against Defendants on a theory of vicarious liability or

respondeat superior and because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any of

them acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

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Amendment.  (See Defs.’ P. & A. at 1, 9‐10, 18.) Defendants further argue that the Court should

subsequently decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. (Id. at 24‐25.)

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’”  Johnson v. Riverside

Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121‐22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).  In other words, the Plaintiff’s complaint must provide a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.”  Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007).   “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ‐‐‐‐, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) . However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice ... [the

Court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at

1950.

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519‐20 (1972).  Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt.  See Karim‐Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

Nevertheless, and in spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to any factual

allegations made, it is not proper for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts

which [he or she] has not alleged.”  Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).  Nor must the court “accept as true

allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit” or those which

are “merely conclusory,” require “unwarranted deductions” or “unreasonable inferences.”

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), amended on

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other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th

Cir. 2003) (court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusions of law cast in the

form of factual allegations). Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se plaintiff “must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support [his]

claim.”   Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

C. Defendants Cannot Be Liable Under the Theory of Vicarious Liability or

Respondeat Superior

Defendants seek dismissal of some of Plaintiff’s claims on grounds that Plaintiff cannot

allege respondeat superior liability under section 1983. (See Deft’s. P. & A. at 11.) To hold a person

“liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights

deprivation.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).  A supervisory official may be

liable only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.  See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). The doctrine of

respondeat superior and vicarious liability do not exist under § 1983. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Causation may be established only by showing that the supervisor set in motion a series of acts by

others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict

the injury.  Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998).  

D. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Treatment Claims

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on grounds that he has failed to

plead facts to show the deliberate indifference required to support an Eighth Amendment

violation.  (See Defs.’ P. &A. at 9 ‐10.)

i. Standard of Review

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).  A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’”  Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)).  Before it can be

said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs

must be substantial.  Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support

this cause of action.”  Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105‐06 (1976)).  “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.  Medical malpractice does not become a constitu‐

tional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also

Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny,

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison

physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc).  Where a prisoner alleges delay in receiving medical treatment, he must show that the

delay led to further harm.  Id. at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).  “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1060.  “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must

also draw the inference.’”  Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).  “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

ii. Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations

a. Claims against Defendant Dugan

Plaintiff makes claims against Defendant Dugan as his primary care physician at RJ

Donovan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dugan defied previous doctor’s recommendations and

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denied him access to lower tier housing. (Doc. 83 at 4‐5). Plaintiff charges Defendant Dugan with

knowledge that, “Plaintiff could not climb stairs and that he needed to be housed on the lower

tier, and have a lower bed, and that he had been sent to RJD because it was a level terrain

facility.” (Doc. 83 at 4‐5.) Plaintiff claims that these actions exposed Plaintiff to “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of chronic pain.” (Doc. No. 83 at 5.)

Defendants accurately point out that documents attached to the Second Amended

Complaint establish that on September 11, 2006, Defendant Dugan physically examined Plaintiff

and determined that Plaintiff’s housing request was not justified based on the examination and a

review of the DPPV form which did not list a “no stairs” housing restriction, medical records, and

internal prison standards that must be met for a no stairs assignment. (Doc. 83‐2 at 3‐4, 11, 15‐16,

20‐22, 52.) Defendant Dugan did provide plaintiff with the alternative of a lower bunk, pain

medication, and a physical therapy referral. (Doc. 83‐2 at 20‐21.)  

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Dugan do not rise to the Eighth Amendment’s

“deliberate indifference” standard. Defendant Dugan accommodated Plaintiff’s medical needs by

recommending Plaintiff be placed in a lower bunk, prescribing pain medication, and referral for

physical therapy. (Doc. 83‐2 at 20‐21.) A prisoner’s simple disagreement with his physician’s

treatment does not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding

that even medical malpractice is not an automatic constitutional violation.) The facts set forth in

the Second Amended Complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, do not establish that

Defendant Duran wantonly and unnecessarily inflicted plain upon Plaintiff.  Rather the facts

alleged, coupled with the attached documents, demonstrate that Defendant Duran attempted to

accommodate Plaintiff’s chronic pain and prescribe adjustments that were intended to treat his

condition and lessen his pain. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the claims against

Defendant Duran be DISMISSED.

b. Claims against Defendant Hawthorne

Plaintiff alleges that “Dr. Hawthorne chose not to follow the previous doctor’s

prescribed treatment and denied the Plaintiff access to being housed on the lower tier. But, did

give him a lower bunk.” (Doc. No. 83 at 7.) Plaintiff also claims that Dr. Hawthorne “knew of

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plaintiff’s need to be seen by a neurologist, for further treatment of his medical condition and

made no effort to make sure that he would be seen thus intentionally interfering with the

treatment that had been previously prescribed and intentionally denied and delayed plaintiff

access to medical care once prescribed.” (Doc. No. 83 at 7.)

Defendants correctly contend that the documents attached to the Second Amended

Complaint establish that Defendant Hawthorne acted as a supervisor who conducted the second

level review of Plaintiff’s appeal for failure to provide no stairs housing. (Doc. 83‐2 at 11,22.)

Defendant Hawthorne reviewed Defendant Dugan’s recommendations, Plaintiff’s physical exam

results, and medical records. (Doc. 83‐2 at 11, 15, 22.)

Defendants persuasively argue that all claims against Defendant Hawthorne should be

dismissed because Defendant Hawthorne acted only in a supervisory role and cannot be liable

under section 1983 and additionally because Plaintiff fails to satisfy the “deliberate indifference

standard of the Eighth Amendment.” (Deft’s P. & A. at 12‐13.)  A supervisory official may be liable

only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.  See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Upon review of

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and the attached documents, Defendant Hawthorne is

conclusively established as the second level reviewer. (See Doc. 83‐2 at 11, 22.)  It is clear that

Defendant Hawthorne did not personally meet with Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Hawthorne’s denial

of the second level review clearly expresses Defendant Hawthorne’s supervisory role. (Id.)

Specifically, Defendant Hawthorne notes that he has “reviewed ... [Plaintiff’s] health record” and

that Plaintiff’s “primary care provider has evaluated ... [Plaintiff’s] condition.” Defendant Haw‐

thorne’s letters consistently reference the Primary Care provider’s active role. (Doc. 83‐2 at

11,22.) Plaintiff’s allegations do not state Defendant Hawthorne’s active role in the alleged

constitutional violations nor do they set forth a chain of events related to Defendant Hawthorne’s

actions. At best Plaintiff credits Defendant Hawthorne as “aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical

need.” (Doc. 83 at 7.) Plaintiff accuses Defendant Hawthorne to have “intentionally denied and

delayed plaintiff access to medical care once prescribed.” (Doc. 83 at 7.) However, Plaintiff does

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not state how other than by denying him housing on the lower tier. (Doc. 83 at 7.) It is clear, based

on a cumulative review of the allegations in the complaint, and the documents attached thereto,

Defendant Hawthorne did not personally participate or cause any constitutional violations against

Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff cannot base his claims on respondeat superior liability or vicarious

liability, the claims against Defendant Hawthorne ought to be dismissed.

Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard

against Defendant Hawthorne. In fact, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint states that Defen‐

dant Hawthorne did accommodate Plaintiff’s needs by giving him a lower bunk. (Doc. 83 at 7.)

Plaintiff contradicts this statement one sentence later, however. Regardless, the documents

attached to the Second Amended Complaint make clear that Defendant Hawthorne reviewed and

agreed with Defendant Dugan’s recommendations for medication, a lower bunk, and physical

therapy. (Doc. 83‐2 at 11,22.) The review letters also express Defendant Hawthorne’s “sympath[y]

to the issue of ... back pain.” (Doc. 83‐2 at 11.) Further, the letters explain in detail why Plaintiff’s

request for lower tier housing or no stairs housing cannot be accommodated pursuant to well

established prison procedures and regulations. (Doc. 83‐2 at 11, 22.)  Plaintiff fails to allege any

actions by Defendant Hawthorne that demonstrate both Plaintiff’s deprivation of minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities and Defendant Hawthorne’s deliberate indifference in doing so. See

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). At the very least, Defendant Hawthorne’s

courteous and detailed reviews establish that he was not indifferent, but simply that Plaintiff’s

request for lower tier housing was not justified based on his health records and condition.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that this claim be DISMISSED.

c. Claims against Defendant Barreras

Plaintiff alleges that “Dr. Barreras did not commit the cruel and unusual punishment ...

she became responsible for them(sic) when she failed to correct them in the course of her

supervisory responsibilities.” (Doc. 83 at 10). Dr. Barreras’ liability arises from her review of

Plaintiff’s grievances and failure to correct Dr. Khatri’s decision that Plaintiff be placed in a general

housing assignment. Plaintiff also notes that Dr. Barreras received a letter from Plaintiff regarding

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the denial of a raised toilet seat and extra mattress and “Dr. Barreras still denied the treatment.”

(Doc. 83 at 10.)

Defendants maintain that all claims against Defendant Barreras should be dismissed

because Defendant Barreras acted only in a supervisory role and cannot be liable under section

1983 and additionally because Plaintiff fails to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard of the

Eighth Amendment. (Deft’s P & A at 21‐22.) Defendants further assert that Plaintiff’s allegations

with respect to Defendant Barreras are in response to her policies and Plaintiff does not “allege

any facts stating how Defendant Barreras failed to provide adequate medical care or failed to

adequately respond to Plaintiff’s requests for accommodations.” (See Defs. P. & A. at 22.)

Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant Barreras’ involvement in constitutional deprivations

as more than a supervisor. A supervisory official may be liable only if he or she was personally

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between

the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.  See Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff clearly states that “Dr. Barreras personally

reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal... in this case she personally reviewed and signed Exhibits Gray and

Brown (Plaintiff’s appeals).” (Doc. 83 at 10.) Plaintiff further clarifies that “Dr. Barreras did not

commit the cruel and unusual punishment... she became responsible for them when she failed to

correct them in the course of her supervisory responsibilities.” (Doc. 83 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges

neither factual grounds on which Defendant Barreras was personally involved nor stating a

sufficient causal connection to a constitutional violation. At best, Plaintiff provides conclusory

statements such as, Defendant Barreras’ “failure to follow a surgeons prescribed treatment

caused Plaintiff significant and unnecessary wanton infliction of pain.” (Doc. 83 at 9.)  The Second

Amended Complaint does not provide any factual insight into what Defendant Barreras did, other

than supervisory actions, such as deny Plaintiff’s appeals, to participate in a constitutional

violation. Because Plaintiff cannot base his claims on respondeat superior liability or vicarious

liability, the claims against Defendant Barreras ought to be dismissed.

Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard

against Defendant Barreras because he merely attributes Defendant Barreras with delaying his

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treatment. (Doc. 83 at 9.) A mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth

Amendment, unless the delay or denial was harmful.  See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley,

766 F.2d at 407; Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[D]elay in providing a

prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation.”); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Certainly, not every twinge

of pain suffered as the result of delay in medical care is actionable.”).  And while the harm caused

by delay need not necessarily be “substantial,” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 & n.2, the Eighth

Amendment is violated only if the delay “occurred to patients with problems so severe” that the

failure to act quickly would cause an obvious or excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety.

Hallett, 287 F.3d at 1206; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Barreras.  Plaintiff

details that Defendant Barreas recommended Plaintiff be admitted to the Correctional Treatment

Center but “delayed the recommendation.” (Doc. 83 at 9.) Plaintiff’s other allegations against

Defendant Barreras are conclusory and without a factual support. See Council v. Watt, F.2d 618,

624 (9th. Cir. 1981) (Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or formulaic recitation of elements need not

be credited by the Court). Plaintiff not only fails to allege Defendant Barreras’ personal role, but

also fails to provide facts that amount to deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court recommends

that the claims against Defendant Barreras be DISMISSED.

d. Claims against Defendant Fraze

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim as to

Defendant Fraze as the documents attached to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint demon‐

strate that Defendant Fraze was responsive to Plaintiff’s concerns about accommodating his

medical condition and Defendant Fraze provided Plaintiff with pain medication.  (See Defs.’ Mot.

at 17‐18.)  

Plaintiff claims in his Second Amended Complaint that Defendant Fraze told him that

there was “nothing wrong with him” and his medical complaints are “all mental.”  (Doc. 83 at 12.)

The crux of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Fraze are based on Fraze’s alleged refusal to

provide Plaintiff with a raised toilet seat as prescribed by Doctor Calvin.  (Id.) As noted above, this

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issue is unexhausted and should be dismissed from the Second Amended Complaint. It is clear

from the face of the Second Amended Complaint that none of the factual allegations against

Defendant Fraze arose prior to Plaintiff’s filing of this suit. Plaintiff states that all of Defendant

Fraze’s violations are for “post‐operative care” from Plaintiff’s back surgery which occurred in late

June 2008. (Doc. 83 at 12.) Plaintiff also cites a July 24, 2009 examination at which Dr. Calvin

ordered the toilet seat, from which Defendant Fraze’s violations accrue. (Doc. 83 at 12.) However

even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, that Defendant Fraze did not believe that Plaintiff had a

serious medical condition, Fraze still accommodated his concerns by recommending that Plaintiff

be housed in the infirmary and continued to provide Plaintiff with pain medication.  (Doc. 83‐2 at

40, 58, 60‐62 .) These allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim.  Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS the Claims against Defendant Fraze be

DISMISSED. e. Claims against Defendant Khatri

Plaintiff alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that Defendant Khatri removed him

from the disability placement program (“DPP”) based on Defendant Khatri’s representations that

he had consulted with Dr. Calvin whom Khatri claimed stated that Plaintiff no longer had a

mobility problem.  (See SAC at 16.)  Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Khatri was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to provide a raised toilet seat. (Id.) Defendant

Khatri ordered that Plaintiff be housed in general population without accommodation for his

medical condition.  (Id.)  As a result of his housing, Plaintiff was unable to sit on his bed properly

which forced him to “sit with his back arched which caused him severe pain.”  (Id.)

Defendants assert that the documents attached to the Second Amended Complaint

establish that Defendant Khatri examined Plaintiff August 4, 2008 and noted that there was no

medical indication that Plaintiff should be provided his ADA accommodation. (Doc. 83‐2 at 40.)

The documents do establish as such, and that Defendant Kahtri noted Plaintiff “was walking with

no difficulty and not using a cane or crutches.” (Doc. 83‐2 at 40, 43‐44,46‐47, 50.) On August 13,

2008, Defendant Khatri removed Plaintiff from the DPP because he determined that Plaintiff  was

“recovered” and suffered “no mobility problem.” (Doc. 83‐2 at 53.)  On August 26, 2008, Defen‐

dant Khatri reexamined Plaintiff and recommended a 90 day no work restriction, prison tennis

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shoes, an extra mattress, extra mattress, and bottom bunk lower tier housing assignment. (Doc.

83‐2 at 58.) As part of a second level appeal review regarding the lower bunk assignment, Plaintiff

was transferred to CTC to accommodate his medical issues.” (Doc. 83‐2 at 74‐75, 80.) The second

level appeal also notes that Plaintiff’s was seen by his surgeon, Dr. Calvin, on July 24, 2008, and

that the post operative prognosis indicated that he was “doing well” and that “the progress is very

good.” (Doc. 83 at 43, 50.)

Defendants argue that the documents attached to the Second Amended Complaint

establish that Defendant Khatri was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s condition.  (See Defs.’

Mot. at 20.)  However, the allegations of disagreement in medical opinion appear to be between

the doctor that was making a variety of medical decisions related to Plaintiff’s condition, Dr.

Calvin, and Defendant Khatri.  While documents attached to the Second Amended Complaint

establish that Plaintiff was removed from the DPP, (doc. 83‐2 at 53) the other documents reveal

that Defendant Khatri’s decision was based on Plaintiff’s positive progress and improved health

condition. The records indicate that Defendant Khatri met with Plaintiff and evaluated his

condition several times and within two weeks of removal from DPP, Defendant Khatri provided

Plaintiff with accommodations, allowing for a 90 day no work restrictions, tennis shoes, extra

mattress, and pain medication. The Court does not find that Defendant Khatri’s actions rise to the

level of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.  Thus, the Court recommends that

the claims against Defendant Khatri be dismissed.

f. Claims against Defendant Almager

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Almager arise from his continuation of a policy

initially issued by his predecessor that refused to allow any prisoner to have an extra mattress

regardless of whether a doctor ordered an extra mattress for medical reasons.  (See Doc. 83 at

14.)  As the Court stated above, deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1060.  “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must

also draw the inference.’”  Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).  

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Here, there are no facts alleged that Defendant Almager was, in any way, knowledge‐

able about Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.  Plaintiff asserts that he mailed notifications to

Defendant Almager. (Doc. 83 at 14.) However, there is no indication that Defendant Almager

receives or reads letters from prisoners. Rather, as Warden, Almager would likely not read letters

from prisoners, but rather would rely on internal prison procedures and personnel to notify him of

a prisoner who needed attention. Plaintiff alleges no personal interaction with Defendant

Almager. There are no facts from which an inference could be drawn that Defendant Almager

should have known that there was a “substantial risk of serious harm” to Plaintiff if he was denied

an extra mattress.  Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior.  Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d

1433, 1437‐38 (9th Cir. 1993).  Therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, a

causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.  See

Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978).  To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,

Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisor either:  personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them, or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is

a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which show Defendant Almager personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care,

that he actually knew of any constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent them, or that he

promulgated or implemented a policy so deficient that it repudiated Plaintiff’s constitutional right

to adequate medical care or was “the moving force” behind any Eighth Amendment violation.

Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Furthermore, the policy of which Plaintiff complains clearly was not

enforced as Plaintiff was assigned an extra mattress following his back surgery. (See Doc. 83‐2 44,

49, 51, 58.)  Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts

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sufficient to show that Almager was actually aware of his serious medical needs or that he

deliberately failed to act to prevent an excessive or serious risk to Plaintiff’s health.  Hansen, 885

F.2d at 645; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  The Court RECOMMENDS that all claims against Defendant

Almager be DISMISSED.

E. State Law Claims

The Court has recommended dismissal of all constitutional claims over which it

possesses original jurisdiction. Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Court may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

DISMISSAL of all Plaintiff’s state law claims.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court, having reviewed the Second Amended Complaint, the exhibits attached

thereto, and all motions and relevant attachments and oppositions, with GOOD CAUSE APPEAR‐

ING, HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint (Doc. No. 89)

be DENIED as futile; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to

exhaust (Doc. No. 87) be GRANTED; and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint for failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment (Doc. No. 88) be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 20, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties.  The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

///

///

///

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than September 10, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order.  Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED:  July 23, 2010

    Hon. William V. Gallo

    U.S. Magistrate Judge

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