Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06285/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06285-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLENE MARTINEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

JOHN SNOW, et al. )

 )

)

Defendants )

____________________________________)

CV F-04-6285 AWI

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS

12(b)1 AND 12(e) MOTIONS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 27, 2003, Plaintiff Arlene Martinez (“Martinez”) filed an unfair labor practice

charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”). Her claims were essentially for

breach of the duty of fair representation by the National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”). 

On September 23, 2003, after investigating the claim, the FLRA declined to issue a formal

complaint against the NTEU. 

On September 14, 2004, Martinez filed a complaint in this Court alleging, among other

things, breach of duty of fair representation by the NTEU. On September 16, 2004, this

complaint was dismissed with leave to amend by Magistrate Judge O’Neill. Judge O’Neill found

that the complaint failed to state proper grounds for relief and failed to allege a basis for the

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1

 “Compl.” refers to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on 10-05-2004.

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court’s jurisdiction. See Court’s Docket No. 7 at 4. The dismissal order admonished Martinez

that failure to comply with the court order by correcting these defects would result in dismissal of

the action for failure to obey a court order. See Court’s Docket No. 7 at 4.

On October 5, 2004 Martinez filed her first amended complaint. Multiple Defendant’s

were named in the amended complaint, but the magistrate ordered only John Snow, the IRS, Roy

Arias, and Colleen Kelley served. On December 21, 2004, Martinez filed a second amended

complaint without leave of court. This second amended complaint was stricken by Magistrate

Judge Snyder pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Court’s Docket No. 16. Thus the first

amended complaint submitted October 5, 2004, is the operative complaint. See Court’s Docket

No. 10. The amended complaint is a 23 page 144 paragraph document and has been served on 

Defendants John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, Roy Arias, Colleen Kelley, and Mark Everson,

IRS Commissioner. On March 18, 2005, Defendant’s Roy Arias and Colleen Kelley filed a

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, or in the alternative a 12(e) motion to provide a more definite

statement. On April 14, 2005, Defendant John Snow joined these motions. 

FACTS/FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Martinez’s amended complaint is a detailed narrative that is more akin to storytelling than

a proper pleading. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996). The

statement of the facts of Plaintiff’s case will be at best an interpretation of her 23 page 144

paragraph complaint. If the court has not correctly understood her claims, “Plaintiff has only

[herself] to blame.” Id. at 1174; see Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 226 F.R.D. 395, 396 (C.D. Cal.

2005). 

Martinez was employed by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) during the events

alleged in her complaint. It appears Martinez applied for leave under the Family and Medical

Leave Act (“FMLA”) sometime in August 2002. See Compl. at ¶ 191. Martinez gives some

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indication that her FMLA application involved a mental health issue, specifically chronic

depression. See Id. at ¶ 42. Martinez indicates she was approved for FMLA in October of 2002. 

See Id. at ¶¶ 49, 66. Martinez then alleges she was not informed of her approval by the IRS until

December 10, 2002. See Id. at ¶ 66. She further indicates she was given only 144 hours, despite

being approved by her doctor for 480. See Id. at ¶ 66. 

The amended complaint details various instances of requests for “annual leave”, “advance

sick”, and “temporary tour of duty change”. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 20, 75,

103. Martinez made these requests for reasons including doctor’s appointments, attending a

computer class, court dates, appearing as a witness in an arbitration hearing, receiving

“disturbing” information about her job, and giving blood. She makes no express allegations that

these instances of requested time off are related to the FMLA. Martinez indicates that the IRS

charged her with over 100 hours of being absent without leave (“AWOL”) in response to her

absences from work. See Id. at ¶¶ 29, 33, 37, 44, 46, 51, 59, 69. Martinez also alleges that she

was charged with AWOL after she had been approved for FMLA. See Id. at ¶¶ 51, 69. 

It appears that Martinez made attempts to file a grievance with the NTEU in response to

the charges of AWOL levied against her. See id. at ¶ 36. Martinez then accounts the various

ways in which her NTEU representation failed her. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 40, 64, 71, 107, 127, 136,

138. She claims she was not receiving assistance from the NTEU “because of the president of

NTEU.” Id. at ¶ 64. Martinez claims that the NTEU has “allowed [her] to be harmed again, and

again.” Id. at ¶ 136. She claims her boss was able to “treat [her] any way he wanted to because

he knew the union would not help.” Id. at ¶ 136. Martinez claims the NTEU and her department

head are working in combination with a goal to “get [her] fired.” Id. at ¶ 138.

Martinez also makes generalized allegations of discrimination at the hands of Roy Arias,

the local NTEU chapter president. See id. at ¶ 142. She claims that in January of 2002 she

noticed that Arias had started “giving [her] a really hard time.” Id. at ¶ 142. She details various

incidents where Arias somehow caused her to not receive assistance, including an occasion

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where she was forced to sweat to near exhaustion before someone was allowed to help her carry

in office supplies. See id at ¶ 142. Martinez alleges that Arias is responsible for her removal

from her employee e-mail account. See id. at ¶ 142. Martinez further claims that beginning in

February 2002 she was required to get permission from Arias for “anything [she] did.” Id at ¶

142. Martinez describes all of these events as “discriminatory.” Id at ¶ 142. At no time does she

indicate the basis of Arias’s discrimination against her. However her complaint in its entirety

may be interpreted as a hostile work environment claim as she expressly mentions hostile work

environment at the beginning of her complaint. See id. at p. 1. Martinez also states that she

appealed the actions of Arias to Defendant Colleen Kelley, the NTEU national president. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction, and that limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The plaintiff has the burden to

establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for this court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the

action. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1). Because subject matter jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged, courts will not infer

allegations supporting federal jurisdiction. See Watson v. Chessman, 362 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194

(S.D. Cal. 2005); see also Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495,

499 (9th Cir. 2001); Century Southwest Cable Television, Inc. V. CIIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068,

1071 (9th Cir. 2004).

When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially” all material allegations in the

complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal

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2Defendants move the Court to take judicial notice of Martinez’s unfair labor charge and

the subsequent decision of the FLRA; no objections to this request have been made. A court

shall take judicial notice of an appropriate fact if requested by a party and supplied with the

necessary information. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Judicially noted facts often involve matters of

public record and proceedings in other courts, either State or Federal. See United States v.

Southern Cal. Edison Co., 300 F.Supp.2d 964, 974 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Defendant’s motion for

judicial notice is granted.

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jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F. 3d 590, 593 (8th

Cir.1993); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F. 2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977);

Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal.1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F. 2d

229 (9th Cir.1992). A defendant may also attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart

from the pleadings. Mortensen, 549 F. 2d at 891. In such a case, the court may rely on evidence

extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction.2 St. Clair v. City of

Chico, 880 F. 2d 199, 201 (9th Cir.1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th

Cir.1987); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1983).

DISCUSSION

I. BREACH OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

The Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) provides that a labor organization which holds

the exclusive right of representing employees is responsible for representing the interests of all

employees without discrimination. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1). The CSRA also provides that

failure to represent an employee shall be considered an “unfair labor practice.” 5 U.S.C. §

7116(b)(8). Any charge against a labor organization of engaging in an “unfair labor practice”

must be presented to, investigated, and adjudicated by the FLRA. See 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(1).

The Congressional intent behind the CSRA is to “channel the grievances of federal

employees to the Federal Labor Relations Authority.” Karahalios v. Defense Language Institute,

821 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 489 U.S. 527 (1989). The Karahalios court held that

the CSRA created both an express duty of fair representation and a remedy in the FLRA, thus

precluding any parallel right to sue in federal courts. See id. In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the

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Supreme Court confirmed that placing responsibility to the district courts to review such cases

would “seriously undermine what we deem to be the congressional scheme [of the CSRA].” 

Karahalios v. National Federation of Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1987).

Defendants Arias and Kelley argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in part

because Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than a claim that Defendants breached the duty

of fair representation which is preempted by the CSRA. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at

7. Martinez’s claims, due to deficiencies in her pleadings, are ambiguous at best and Martinez

has not refuted Defendants’ interpretation of her claims. Defendants’ interpretation appears to be

reasonable. Thus, the Court will construe her complaint to allege breach of the duty of fair

representation.

Even though Defendants are the moving party on the motion to dismiss, Martinez bears

the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d

1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither in her complaint nor her opposition to the motion to dismiss

does Martinez establish any basis for federal jurisdiction over this claim. Martinez has already

unsuccessfully filed a charge of breach of duty of fair representation with the FLRA. Defs. Mot.

Dismiss Attach. 2. Any appeal of the FLRA’s decision must be made to the proper court of

appeals, and not a federal district court. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Such an appeal must be filed within

sixty days of the FLRA’s order, see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a), and the FLRA order is dated September

23, 2003. Defs. Mot. Dismiss Attach. 2. 

To the extent Martinez alleges a breach of the duty of fair representation, this Court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction. The statutory scheme created by the CSRA provides a

remedy for such claims through the FLRA and bypasses the district courts. See Karahalios, 489

U.S. at 533. The Supreme Court has ruled that in “the absence of strong indicia of contrary

congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the

remedies it considered appropriate.” Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Sea Clammers,

453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981). Any claims of breach of duty of fair representation are dismissed for lack

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of subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION

To establish subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.

2003); Macy v. Dalton, 853 F.Supp. 350, 357 (E.D. Cal. 1994). To exhaust administrative

remedies, a plaintiff must first file a charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment

Commission (“EEOC”), or the appropriate state agency, giving the agency an opportunity to

investigate the charge. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). A plaintiff need not list each and every allegation of

discrimination in the EEOC charge. See id. at 1099. However, “Allegations of discrimination

not included in the plaintiff’s administrative charge may not be considered by a federal court

unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC

charge.” Id. at1100 (citations omitted). In such a case, subject matter jurisdiction will extend

over all allegations that either “fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an

EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted). An employment discrimination charge need not be

plead with legal precision, it must, however, be sufficient to notify the agency that discrimination

is being charged. See Sommantino v. U.S., 255 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2001). Mere verbal

complaints are not enough to engage the administrative process. Id. at 710. 

In the present case, Martinez seems to be alleging a Title VII hostile work environment

claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). While she makes no “concise or direct” Title VII claim,

her complaint may be liberally construed as such. See, e.g., Compl. at p.1; ¶¶ 136, 142. Martinez

does indicate that she consulted with the EEOC, but was told she must first file an internal claim. 

See Compl. at ¶ 142. Martinez offers no allegations of further action with regard to her

discrimination claim. Such a verbal complaint to the EEOC is not sufficient to notify the agency

that discrimination is being claimed. See Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 710 (holding that four detailed

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e-mails to the EEOC office was not enough to meet presentment requirements).

Because Martinez has failed to present her claim of discrimination to the appropriate

agency, she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. See B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099;

Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 710; Macy, 853 F.Supp. at 357. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims

are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Congress enacted the FMLA in response to the “serious problem with the discretionary

nature of family leave” that occurs “when ‘the authority to grant leave and to arrange the length

of that leave rests with individual supervisors.’” Lie v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Nevada Dep’t if Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)). In

furtherance of the FMLA’s objectives, it is unlawful for an employer to “interfere with, restrain,

or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” by the law. 29 U.S.C. §

2615(a)(1); Bachelder v. American West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001). An

employer may “interfere” with FMLA rights if the employer uses the taking of FMLA leave “as a

negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.” 29

C.F.R. 825.220(c); Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122. 

 Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, affording the petitioner the

benefit of any doubt. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); Bretz v. Kelman,

773 F.2d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985). Under such a liberal interpretation, it appears Martinez is

alleging denial and/or interference with FMLA rights, under 29 U.S.C. § 2615, against John

Snow/the IRS. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 49, 51, 66, 69. Defendant Snow has joined Defendants

Arias and Kelley’s motions. See Court’s Docket No. 36. Arias and Kelley posit their motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction around Martinez’s claims of breach of duty of fair

representation and discrimination. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at i. Arias and Kelley,

as union representatives, are not Martinez’s employers and thus, did not address FMLA issues. 

See 29 U.S.C. § 2615. As there appears to be a possible FMLA claim, this Court would have

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federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dismissal as to John Snow/the IRS under

12(b)(1) is inappropriate at this point as to an FMLA claim. 

IV. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 

“Neither the court nor the defendants should be compelled to cull through pages of

rambling narrative, argument and needless digression to discover the factual bases for the

plaintiff’s claims.” Jacobson, 226 F.R.D. at 397. “If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a

responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a

responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake, 314 F. Supp. 2d

1017, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Rule 12(e) motions “are not favored by the courts ‘since pleadings

in the federal courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the

claim.’” Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 163; Resolution Trust Corp., 854 F. Supp. at 649 (quoting A.G.

Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 736 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Ariz. 1989)).

Martinez’s complaint cannot be said to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the

claim. This notion is supported by both an examination of the document itself and Defendant

Snow’s failure to address the issue of denial/interference with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights. Neither

Snow nor this Court can be held responsible for culling through the pages of Martinez’s narrative

to discover the basis for her claims. While Rule 12(e) motions are not favored by the courts, the

present case is an example of why the rule is necessary. 

Martinez has already been afforded leave to amend. See Court’s Docket No. 7. In Judge

O’Neill’s order to dismiss with leave to amend, Martinez was admonished that failure to properly

amend her complaint would result in a recommendation to dismiss for failure to obey a court

order. See Court’s Docket No. 7 at 4. In that order, Judge O’Neill carefully detailed the

deficiencies in Martinez’s original complaint, noting the proper format for pleadings, the need to

allege jurisdictional facts, and the federal rules that would guide Martinez in drafting an amended

complaint. See Court’s Docket No. 7 at 4. 

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Defendant Snow’s motion to provide a more definite statement is granted. Martinez will

have one more opportunity to properly allege her claims. Martinez allegations must be limited to

her FMLA claims. In the event Martinez’s amended complaint alleges a claim of breach of fair

representation or discrimination, or includes excessive extraneous or irrelevant facts, her

complaint will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Arias and Kelley’s 12(b)(1) motion is GRANTED;

2. Defendant Snow’s 12(b)(1) motion with respect to claims under the CSRA is 

GRANTED;

3. Defendant Snow’s 12(b)(1) motion with respect to claims under Title VII is 

 GRANTED; 

4. Defendant Snow’s 12(b)(1) motion with respect to potential FMLA claims is

DENIED;

5. Defendant Snow’s motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED;

6. Plaintiff is ordered to file an amended complaint in conformity with Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 8(a), 8(e), and 10, alleging only an FMLA cause of action

within 20 days of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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