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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 2010 Decided May 28, 2010

No. 08-5424

JAMAL KIYEMBA, NEXT FRIEND, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 08-5425, 08-5426, 08-5427, 08-5428,

08-5429

On Remand from the U.S. Supreme Court

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With her on the motion for

reinstatement and the opposition to appellees’ motion to govern

and for remand were Thomas M. Bondy and Robert M. Loeb,

Attorneys.

Sabin Willett argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the motion to govern and for remand and the opposition to the

motion for reinstatement were Rheba Rutkowski, Neil

McGaraghan, Jason S. Pinney, Susan Baker Manning, George

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Clarke, J. Wells Dixon, Eric A. Tirschwell, Michael J. Sternhell,

Darren LaVerne, Seema Saifee, Elizabeth P. Gilson, Angela C.

Vigil and Cori Crider.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. 

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge

ROGERS.

PER CURIAM: On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court

vacated our judgment in Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kiyemba I), and remanded the case to us to

“determine . . . what further proceedings” in our court or in the

district court “are necessary and appropriate for the full and

prompt disposition of the case in light of the new

developments,” Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235

(2010) (per curiam). We assume familiarity with our Kiyemba

I opinion. The “new developments” the Court identified were

as follows. All seventeen petitioners “received at least one offer

of resettlement in another country,” and twelve accepted an

offer. Id. The remaining five “rejected two such offers and are

still being held at Guantanamo Bay.” Id.

In compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate we held

further proceedings, considered the parties’ motions and heard

oral argument. We now grant the government’s motion to

reinstate the judgment and we reinstate our original opinion, as

modified here to take account of new developments.

The posture of the case now is not materially different than

it was when the case was first before us. On February 19, 2010,

the government informed the Supreme Court that one of the

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original petitioners “had not previously received an offer of

resettlement from any country” before he and his brother

received offers from Switzerland in 2010. Letter from Elena

Kagan, Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the

Court, at 1 (Feb. 19, 2010). The government also told the Court

that the five Uighurs who remain at Guantanamo Bay had

received a total of two offers – one from Palau in September

2009, which they rejected, and then another from an unnamed

country, which they also rejected. See id. at 2; Brief for

Respondents at 10, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)

(No. 08-1234). As the government admitted at oral argument,

this information – on which the Court apparently relied in its per

curiam opinion – was not completely accurate. In fact, shortly

before we issued our opinion in February 2009, the government

filed material under seal stating that each of the seventeen

petitioners had recently received a resettlement offer from a

foreign country. The five petitioners who remain in this case

have thus received and rejected three offers, rather than two. 

Our original decision was made in the light of resettlement

offers to all petitioners, which is why we were confident that the

government was “continuing diplomatic attempts to find an

appropriate country willing to admit petitioners.” Kiyemba I,

555 F.3d at 1029.

We agree with the government that no legally relevant facts

are now in dispute. None of petitioners’ arguments turn on

particular factual considerations. Petitioners want us to remand

the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on

whether any of the resettlement offers were “appropriate.” But

as our original opinion indicated, even if petitioners had good

reason to reject the offers they would have no right to be

released into the United States. In addition, an intervening

opinion of this court precludes the sort of judicial inquiry

petitioners seek; it is for the political branches, not the courts, to

determine whether a foreign country is appropriate for

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resettlement. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514-16 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (Kiyemba II) (discussing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct.

2207, 2225-26 (2008)); see also id. at 516-17 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring). 

Our original opinion in 2009 held that it was within “the

exclusive power of the political branches to decide which aliens

may, and which aliens may not, enter the United States, and on

what terms.” Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1025. At the time of our

decision we had heard only from the Executive Branch. Since

then, the Legislative Branch has spoken. In seven separate

enactments – five of which remain in force today – Congress has

prohibited the expenditure of any funds to bring any

Guantanamo detainee to the United States. See Supplemental

Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123

Stat. 1859, 1920; Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010,

Pub. L. No. 111-68, Div. B., § 115, 123 Stat. 2023, 2046;

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010,

Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 552, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177-78; National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No.

111-84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454-55; Department of the

Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations

Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, Div. A, § 428, 123 Stat. 2904,

2962; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-

117, § 532, 123 Stat. 3034, 3156; Department of Defense

Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 9011, 123

Stat. 3409, 3466-67. Petitioners say these statutes, which clearly

apply to them, violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. 

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. But the statutes suspend nothing:

petitioners never had a constitutional right to be brought to this

country and released. Petitioners also argue that the new

statutes are unlawful bills of attainder. The statutory

restrictions, which apply to all Guantanamo detainees, are not

legislative punishments; they deprive petitioners of no right they

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already possessed. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.

425, 475, 481 (1977).

We therefore reinstate the judgment and reinstate our

opinion, as modified here to take into account these new

developments.

So Ordered.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: As this

case returns to the court on remand from the Supreme Court,

petitioners’ original habeas claim has been overtaken by events,

and it is no longer necessary to opine as broadly as the majority

does by reinstating its opinion of February 18, 2009. That

opinion was overbroad to begin with, as pointed out in my

separate concurrence, which must, as a result, also be reinstated,

acknowledging certain new developments. See Kiyemba v.

Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1032–39 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Rogers, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (“Kiyemba I”).

These five Uighur petitioners sought certiorari review of

this court’s reversal of the district court’s grant of the writs of

habeas corpus on the ground that their “Executive detention is

indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into the

continental United States is the only possible effective remedy.” 

Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) (quoting

petition for certiorari) (emphasis added). The district court had

granted the writs and ordered release into this country under

these circumstances, when indefinite detention at Guantanamo

was the only alternative. In re Guantanamo Bay Litig., 581 F.

Supp. 2d. 33, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2008). Since our decision in

February 2009 reversing the district court, the United States has

identified several countries willing to receive petitioners for

resettlement.1

 One offer of resettlement was made shortly

before our February 18, 2009 decision, although the United

States “had not made and did not make an independent

determination that [the country] was otherwise appropriate for

resettlement.” Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 6 (lines 17–19). After our

1

 Twelve of the original seventeen Uighur petitioners have

accepted resettlement offers: four in Bermuda, six in Palau, and two

in Switzerland. See Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion

to Govern and for Remand and Cross-Motion for Reinstatement of

Judgment (“Respts’ Opposition”) at 2–3; Respondents’ Letter of Mar.

24, 2010 to Mark J. Langer, Clerk of the Court, at 2.

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decision, however, the United States determined that two other

countries represent “appropriate” places for petitioners’

resettlement, including Palau where six other Uighur petitioners

have since been resettled.2 Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 6 (lines 24–25)

– 7 (line 1); see Respts’ Opposition at 10. Those countries

conditioned resettlement on petitioners’ “willingness to go

there.” Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 7 (lines 3–4).

Petitioners have rejected the offers of resettlement in

countries the United States has independently determined are

“appropriate” for their resettlement. See Respts’ Opposition at

10. Oral argument on April 22, 2010 confirmed, however, as is

implied in petitioners’ post-remand filings in this court, that

petitioners do not claim they feared torture or other oppression

or harm, including return to China, were they to have accepted

resettlement in either of the countries determined “appropriate”

by the United States. See Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 18 (lines 14–17);

see also id. at 34 (lines 16–17) (counsel for respondents); id. at

35 (line 25) – 36 (line 1) (same). Moreover, petitioners

acknowledge the United States’ efforts to identify a country for

resettlement have been “strenuous” and “in good faith.” 

Petitioners’ Reply on Motion to Govern and for Remand and

Opposition to Respondents’ Cross-Motion for Reinstatement of

Judgment (“Petrs’ Reply”) at 10.

2

 The United States’ determination that a country is

“appropriate” for resettlement addresses at least whether there is a

possibility that petitioners would “face harm in any proposed country

of resettlement.” Respondents’ Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for

Reinstatement of Judgment (“Respts’ Reply”) at 5. This includes

assurance that they would not be returned to China and would be

resettled in countries deemed to be “safe.” Id.; Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 33

(line 9). As a matter of policy, the United States will obtain

petitioners’ consent prior to resettlement. See id. at 34 (lines 1–2).

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 In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229,

2266 (2008), the Supreme Court held that “the habeas court

must have the power to order the conditional release of an

individual unlawfully detained — though release need not be the

exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in

which the writ is granted.” Notably, the Court observed that

“common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable

remedy,” and that “when the judicial power to issue habeas

corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have

adequate authority to make a determination in light of the

relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate

orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the

prisoner’s release.” Id. at 2267, 2271. On the same day, in

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008), the

Court emphasized the distinction between the habeas court’s

power to issue the writ and order release and its judgment

whether to do so “[u]nder [the] circumstances.” See also id. at

2221 (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 201 (1830)

(Marshall, C.J.)). So understood, the United States’ position —

that the writ of habeas corpus is effective, even without the

habeas court issuing the requested “extraordinary judicial order”

releasing petitioners into the continental United States while

awaiting resettlement, because the seventeen original petitioners

have either been transferred from Guantanamo to another

country or been offered “appropriate” resettlement elsewhere,

Respts’ Opposition at 17; see Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 32 (lines

20–21) — has force, at least for now. 

In view of the adaptability of the habeas writ, petitioners’

claim of constitutional entitlement to release in the continental

United States pending resettlement abroad, see, e.g., Petrs’ Reply

at 14, cannot presently succeed. Pretermitting the question of

whether a habeas court ordering petitioners’ release from the

courthouse could overcome statutory barriers, see infra note 6;

cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 & n.8 (2005); id. at

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387–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring), the relief petitioners seek —

release from indefinite and unlawful Executive detention at

Guantanamo, see Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235 — is theirs upon

consent. Petitioners have received offers of resettlement abroad

in countries determined by the United States to be “appropriate”

for their resettlement. As a result, petitioners hold the keys to

their release from Guantanamo: All they must do is register their

consent. See Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 7 (lines 8–9). The habeas

court thus is no longer confronted with the choice between either

releasing petitioners into the continental United States or

dooming them to indefinite detention at Guantanamo. The

United States has acknowledged it will not deem a country

“appropriate” for resettlement if petitioners would be subject to

torture, see id. at 2, 5; see also Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1033 n.3

(Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the United

Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman

or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the United

States is a signatory). Petitioners neither allege nor proffer

evidence of this or other harm as would occasion the need for a

remand3

 so the habeas court could devise a meaningful additional

3

 Petitioners’ request for a remand to the district court focused

predominantly on the fact that all of “the facts surrounding purported

offers of resettlement abroad” developed after the petition for

certiorari was filed are not a part of the record, other than through

letters submitted to the Supreme Court by counsel. Motion to Govern

and for Remand (“Petrs’ Motion”) at 2, 3. Of the matters petitioners

identify, none affect their entitlement claim: Petitioners do not deny

that they received two offers of resettlement in countries the United

States determined “appropriate,” and they do not challenge that

determination in any way relevant to their claim of entitlement to

release into the continental United States pending resettlement. 

During oral argument their counsel spoke instead of the desire for

citizenship, ownership of property, cultural affinity, and employment,

Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 20 (lines 24–25) – 22 (line 4), while

acknowledging petitioners’ “biggest issue is, are you going to be

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remedy.4

 The United States has advised that, were petitioners to

express an interest, it is prepared to pursue resettlement in Palau,

an “appropriate” country that remains receptive to their

consensual resettlement. See Respts’ Opposition at 10, 24; Tr.

Apr. 22, 2010 at 32 (lines 23–25). 

Petitioners had not argued prior to this remand that they

were entitled to release in the continental United States even if

they had offers of resettlement elsewhere, only that they were

entitled to be brought and released here because they had

nowhere else to go. See Brief for Petitioners at 35–36, Kiyemba

kicked back to China. That’s the big risk,” id. at 25 (lines 20–21).

4

 The majority overreads both Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213, and

this court’s most recent opinion in Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Kiyemba II”). See Maj. Op. at 3–4. In Munaf the

Supreme Court limited its holding, stating that “[u]nder circumstances

such as those presented here,” habeas corpus provided no relief. 128

S. Ct. at 2213. The Court did state, in discussing the State

Department’s evaluation of the risk of torture and prisoner

mistreatment in a foreign country’s legal system, that “[t]he Judiciary

is not suited to second-guess such determinations,” id. at 2226

(emphasis added), but went no further. Noting that the petitioners

there “allege only the possibility of mistreatment in a prison facility,”

the Court left open the question whether, in “a more extreme case in

which the Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be

tortured but decides to transfer him anyway,” the writ would provide

relief. Id. So too in Kiyemba II, this court declined to consider the

likelihood of torture and prosecutions under the foreign legal system

on grounds of comity and separation of powers, 561 F.3d at 514–16

(citing Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2225–26). Neither case stands for the

broader proposition that the habeas court has no role to play whenever

a petitioner challenges an Executive Branch determination. See

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).

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v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234).5

 The fact that

an offer of resettlement in an “appropriate” country remains

available, however, means petitioners’ release from Guantanamo

is available without the need for further action by the habeas

court. That a habeas court may have the authority to order

release is a separate question from whether that court is obligated

to order release, cf. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2220–21, much less

release into the continental United States. Sustaining petitioners’

objection to “exile” to “a distant island” (Palau), Petrs’ Reply at

13–14, would imply that their claim of constitutional entitlement

under the Suspension Clause to release in the continental United

States applies no matter where “appropriate” resettlement is

offered, until they give their consent to be resettled abroad. 

During oral argument petitioners disclaimed such a broad

contention, see Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 24 (line 23) – 25 (line 4); id.

at 25 (lines 20–21), presumably because Boumediene and Munaf

reaffirmed that circumstances influence the nature of the

meaningful remedy a habeas court should provide. See

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266–67; Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213,

2220–21. 

Petitioners’ reliance on Fifth Amendment due process and

the Geneva Conventions in support of their claim of entitlement

5

 In their merits brief to the Supreme Court, petitioners stated:

Petitioners did not seek admission [under the immigration

laws]. They asked only for release from a prison to which

they were brought in chains. If U.S. release is the only way

to achieve that release, Petitioners are not responsible for the

dilemma. Transfer to a safe haven abroad would have been

welcome, and still would be welcome if initiated from the

continental United States. Petitioners prefer U.S. release only

to U.S. prison.

Id. (emphasis added).

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to release in the continental United States pending resettlement

fails for similar reasons. Petitioners seek writs of habeas corpus

grounded in their claims of unlawful Executive detention at the

Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. See Amended Petition for Writs

of Habeas Corpus, filed Oct. 21, 2005, at 10, 31. Whatever role

due process and the Geneva Conventions might play with regard

to granting the writ, petitioners cite no authority that due process

or the Geneva Conventions confer a right of release in the

continental United States when an offer of resettlement abroad

in an “appropriate” country is made in good faith and remains

available. In Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266–67, the Supreme

Court reaffirmed the adaptability of the habeas remedy,

regardless of the reason the underlying detention is unlawful. 

The adaptable nature of the habeas remedy is intrinsic to the writ

itself, and petitioners’ current circumstances undermine their

claim that the habeas remedy, even accounting for the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause and the Geneva Conventions,

requires their release into the continental United States pending

resettlement abroad.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the United States has not

argued that their rejection of resettlement offers means they have

permanently waived their right to seek habeas relief. See Petrs’

Reply at 13, 14; Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 19 (lines 10–12), 25 (lines

13–16), 26 (lines 5–6). That a habeas court declines to provide

a preferred remedy does not render a meaningful remedy forever

unavailable, for circumstances can change, see Boumediene, 128

S. Ct. at 2267. But petitioners’ circumstances differ from those

of Guantanamo detainees who were designated enemy

combatants, are now held at Guantanamo as enemies under the

laws of war, and are seeking release by writ of habeas corpus. 

See Tr. Apr. 22, 2010 at 32 (lines 12–13); see also Brief for

Respondents in Opposition to the Grant of Certiorari at 5,

Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234). 

Petitioners face no opposition by the United States to their

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release from Guantanamo for resettlement in countries abroad. 

Indeed, the United States has taken the position that

“[p]etitioners are indisputably entitled to release from military

detention under the Authorization for Use of Military Force,” 50

U.S.C. § 1541 note. Respts’ Opposition at 17. Further, the

United States has identified “appropriate” countries for

petitioners’ resettlement and resettlement in one such country

remains available. Petitioners’ claim of constitutional

entitlement to release in the continental United States pending

resettlement abroad has thus been overtaken by events: 

Petitioners hold the keys to their release from Guantanamo for

resettlement in an “appropriate” country.6

 

6

 It is unnecessary, therefore, to decide whether Congress

unconstitutionally suspended the writ or enacted a bill of attainder

when it barred the use of appropriated funds to release or transfer

detainees at Guantanamo into the continental United States for

purposes other than trial and attendant detention. See, e.g.,

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 532,

123 Stat. 3034, 3156 (2009) (providing that, except for prosecution

and detention during legal proceedings, “[n]one of the funds made

available in this or any other Act may be used to [transfer or] release

an individual who is detained, as of June 24, 2009, at Naval Station,

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into the continental United States, Alaska,

Hawaii, or the District of Columbia . . . .”).

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