Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06290/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06290-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID MAURICE GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SADDI, BAILEY, AND GERMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06290-DLB PC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

RENEWED MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION, AND FOR RELIEF

FROM THE SCHEDULING ORDER, WITH

PREJUDICE

(Doc. 121)

I. Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff David Maurice Gomez (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s

amended complaint, filed October 21, 2003, on plaintiff’s remaining claim against defendants

Saddi, Bailey, and German (“defendants”) for failing to protect plaintiff, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. On November 30, 2006, then-Magistrate Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill issued

an order stating:

On November 29, 2006, defendants Saddi, German, Bailey, and Luna filed a

motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

Only defendant Luna may move for dismissal at this juncture, as the pretrial

dispositive motion phase of this litigation is closed with respect to defendants

Saddi, German, and Baily. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Docs. 53, 91, 104. Accordingly,

the motion shall be treated as one by defendant Luna for dismissal of the claim

against her on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim against her. 

(Doc. 107.) Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on December 15, 2006, and on

February 5, 2007, Judge O’Neill, by then a United States District Judge, denied the motion. 

Case 1:03-cv-06290-DLB Document 128 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 6
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(Docs. 110, 112, 114.) On April 6, 2007, defendants renewed their motion for reconsideration on

the ground that Judge O’Neill should not have considered their motion for reconsideration

because he issued the underlying order at issue in their motion. (Doc. 121.) In their renewed

motion, defendants also seek relief from the scheduling order filed on December 17, 2004. 

B. Motion for Reconsideration

Magistrate Judges and District Judges may be called upon to reconsider their underlying

orders if a motion for reconsideration is filed. There is nothing inherently improper about a

judge reconsidering his own order and the situation is in fact unavoidable when it is the District

Judge’s order that is to be reconsidered. Therefore, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that

Judge O’Neill erred in ruling upon their motion for reconsideration simply because he issued the

underlying order. Local Rule 72-303(c) requires that a party seeking to have a Magistrate

Judge’s ruling reconsidered by a District Judge caption the motion “Request for Reconsideration

by the District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling.” Compliance with the Local Rule avoids the

very situation defendants now complain of. Despite the Court’s disagreement with defendants’

position that Judge O’Neill erred in ruling on their motion for reconsideration, the Court will

address defendants’ renewed motion for reconsideration.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment

on grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an

adverse party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in

any event “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” 

Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick

Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th

Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing

nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City

of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other

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28 Defendant Luna has since been dismissed from this action. (Doc.115.) 1

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grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d

214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as

being exclusive of the preceding clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement,

791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th

Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When

filing a motion for reconsideration, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or

different facts or circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon

such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

Defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey contend that while a specific unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion deadline was set for defendant Luna, they were not obligated by a scheduling order,

other order, or statute to file their motion to dismiss by a specified date.

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The scheduling order applicable to defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey was issued on

December 17, 2004. (Docs. 30, 33.) Defendant Luna waived service and filed an answer after

all those scheduling order deadlines had expired and after the Court had resolved defendants

Saddi, German, and Bailey’s motion for summary judgment. If defendant Luna had not been

located and served, this matter would have been set for jury trial following dismissal of the claim

against defendant Luna. When defendant Luna waived service and answered the complaint, a

scheduling order, clearly applicable to plaintiff and defendant Luna only as to plaintiff’s claim

against Luna, was issued on September 20, 2006. (Doc. 104.)

Although the Court set a specific unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion deadline for defendant

Luna on September 20, 2006, but did not set a specific unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion deadline

for defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey on December 17, 2004, the addition of such a deadline

separate and apart from the pretrial dispositive motion deadline was the result of an

administrative change made to orders less than two years ago. The Court is unpersuaded that an

administrative change it made to its orders is grounds for a valid argument that prior to the 

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change, defendants did not have to file a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust by a specific

date. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act was enacted in 1996, and prior to the change in the

Court’s scheduling order, defendants wishing to raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust did so by filing a motion on or before the pretrial dispositive motion deadline. 

Defendants had the same opportunity to file a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust as does

every litigant subject to a scheduling order. The fact that at that time the Court did not set a

separate deadline is immaterial. Defendants were bound by the Court’s scheduling order, which

set a date for filing pretrial dispositive motions. Defendants have set forth no explanation why a

motion to dismiss filed prior to trial is not, by definition, a pretrial dispositive motion.

Defendants next argue that exhaustion is foundational and should be resolved prior to

trial. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 912 (2007), and as

such may be waived. The failure to exhaust is raised in a motion to dismiss pursuant to the

unenumerated portion of Rule 12(b). Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The deadline for filing pretrial dispositive motions was July 19, 2005. Clearly and unequivocally

included within the definition of pretrial dispositive motion is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12

filed pretrial. 

Finally, defendants argue judicial economy concerns. A scheduling order may be

modified only upon a showing of good cause, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), and a showing of good cause

requires a showing of diligence in complying with the deadline, Zivkovic v. Southern California

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheduling order applicable to

defendants Saddi, German, and Bailey provided that the pretrial dispositive motion deadline was

July 19, 2005. (Docs. 30, 33, 53.) Defendants opted to file a motion for summary judgment,

which was granted in part and denied in part. Defendants may not make an end run around the

Court’s scheduling orders and Rule 16(b) by seeking reconsideration on the suggestion that they

were not required to file a pretrial motion to dismiss by the pretrial dispositive motion deadline. 

Defendants’ argument is rejected. 

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C. Motion for Relief From Scheduling Order

In the alternative to the arguments set forth above, defendants seek relief from the

scheduling order. Defendants cite to Rule 60(b) and do not mention Rule 16(b), despite the

Court’s earlier order referring Rule 16(b), which governs scheduling orders. Relief from the

scheduling order requires a showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at

1087-88. Defendants have made no such showing.

Defendants argue that their counsel believed they were not subject to a court-ordered

deadline regarding unenumerated 12(b) motions, and that their failure to timely file a motion

constitutes “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Doc. 121, 7:9-11 & 15-16.) 

Defendants have submitted no evidence in support of this argument, and the Court finds the

argument to be untenable in any event. 

Defendants were represented by Deputy Attorney General Michael Lee until April 10,

2006, well past the expiration of the pretrial dispositive motion deadline of July 19, 2005. (Docs.

26, 93.) On April 10, 2006, Supervising Deputy Attorney General Monica Anderson notified the

Court that she was now defendants’ counsel of record and on August 1, 2006, counsel filed, on

behalf of defendant Luna only, a motion seeking an extension of time to investigate whether

plaintiff exhausted his claims against Luna. (Docs. 93, 98.) On August 31, 2006, Ms. Anderson

sought a second extension of time on behalf of defendant Luna. (Doc. 101.) An answer was

filed by Ms. Anderson on September 19, 2006, and on November 29, 2006, Deputy Attorney

General Michelle Angus filed a motion to dismiss. (Docs. 102, 106.) 

Mr. Lee and Ms. Anderson are seasoned, experienced attorneys of able reputation. There

is simply no argument presented that convinces the Court that Mr. Lee did not know the

significance of a pretrial dispositive motion deadline, or that Ms. Anderson was unaware of the

expiration of the prior scheduling order and did not mean to move on behalf of defendant Luna

only for two extensions of time. That plaintiff ’s current counsel, Ms. Angus, would have

defended this case differently is not good cause to modify the scheduling order, which expired

more sixteen months before current counsel attempted to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of all 

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of her clients without leave of court. There has been no showing of due diligence and therefore,

no showing of good cause.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Judge O’Neill did not err in issuing an order clarifying that defendants’ motion to

dismiss would be treated as one filed by defendant Luna only, and defendants’

renewed motion for reconsideration, filed April 6, 2007, is DENIED, with

prejudice; and

2. Defendants’ motion for relief from the scheduling order, filed April 6, 2007, is

DENIED, with prejudice, on the ground that defendants failed to show good

cause.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 12, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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