Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04783/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04783-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALLEN WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOHN SOTO, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 15-cv-04783-YGR 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS 

CORPUS RELIEF

Now before the Court is petitioner Allen Williams’s amended petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. (Dkt. No. 26.) The government answered (Dkt. No. 27) and petitioner filed a traverse in 

reply (Dkt. No. 28). Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. First, petitioner asserts that the trial 

court violated his constitutional right to present a full defense under Chambers v. Mississippi when 

it rejected admission of exculpatory evidence. Second, petitioner claims that his counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Specifically, with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 

petitioner claims that his counsel failed to: (i) obtain admission of certain exculpatory hearsay 

statements; (ii) move to suppress police testimony and photographs of blood inside the house 

obtained through a warrantless search; and (iii) object to admission of certain hearsay statements 

to the paramedic and 911 operator under the Confrontation Clause. 

Based thereon, petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Having carefully considered the 

petition and the papers submitted, and for the reasons stated below, the petition for such relief is 

DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 4, 2013, a San Mateo County jury found petitioner Allen Williams guilty of 

“infliction of corporal injury” on his spouse (“Jane Doe”) and of “assault by means of force likely 

to cause great bodily injury.” People v. Williams, No. A-138275, 2014 WL 1465884, at *1 (Cal. 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 1 of 23
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Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2014), review denied July 23, 2014. The trial court additionally found true 

numerous enhancement allegations, and sentenced petitioner to a prison term of thirty-nine years 

to life. Id. at *2. On April 15, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the 

trial court. Id. at *1. In addressing the petitioner’s claims on appeal, the California Court of 

Appeal summarized the relevant facts as follows: 

On May 6, 2013, defendant’s wife called 9-1-l for help. She told 

dispatchers she had just been attacked by her husband and was 

hiding in her neighbor’s backyard. This information was relayed 

to Officer David Manion who was dispatched to their home in the 

City of San Mateo. 

On his arrival, the door to the house was open but Manion at first 

saw no one. He then observed defendant on the porch and when 

defendant started to enter the home, Manion stopped and 

handcuffed him. Defendant told the officer, “I was going to turn 

myself in” and “I was wrong, I admit it.” Manion noticed 

defendant was bleeding from a cut on the back of his head. 

Defendant told Manion that his wife had hit him with a cane. 

Manion searched inside the home and observed blood on the wall, 

baseboard, carpet, and comforter of the master bedroom. Outside 

the home, in a garbage can located on the sidewalk, he found a 

bloodied wooden cane, a pillow, and a man’s undershirt. 

When defendant’s wife approached, with a swollen face and in 

apparent pain, she was rushed to the emergency room for medical 

attention. On the way to the hospital, she told the paramedic that 

her husband hit her with a closed fist multiple times. She had a 

broken jaw, missing teeth, oral lacerations, multiple fractured ribs, 

and bruising around her eye, chest, and arm. 

Defendant proffered testimony, which was excluded, that a few 

days after being discharged from the hospital, the wife spoke with 

her friend, Anne Savage, and told her “I don’t like what I did, I put 

my husband in jail” and that she “started it.” 

Id. at *1. On July 23, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied review of the Court of Appeal 

decision regarding petitioner’s Chambers due process violation and ineffective assistance of 

counsel (“IAC”) claims. People v. Williams, No. S-218741 (Cal. July 23, 2014). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A federal court can entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

state custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 2 of 23
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Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, section 2254(d)(1), a state prisoner can obtain habeas relief 

regarding a claim adjudicated in state court only if the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court, only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 412–13 (2000). A state court decision is considered an “unreasonable application” of clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if it correctly identifies a governing 

legal principle from a Supreme Court decision but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts 

of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. A federal court reviewing a habeas petition cannot issue the 

writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court 

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, a 

federal court may grant the writ only if they find the state court decision was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of a clearly established federal law. Id. at 412–13. The Supreme Court 

has ruled that the petitioner has the burden of showing that a state court decision is an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 181 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98, 101–03 (2011). 

AEDPA requires a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings and 

“demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 334 n.7 (1997). “[A] habeas court 

must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state 

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] 

Court.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. A federal court should only grant relief due to a 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 3 of 23
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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con

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III. CHA

A.

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fendants “the

ssissippi, 41

amine witne

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tical evidenc

fendant’s rig

so United Sta

und violation

cluded evide

osecution’s c

ating that Ch

culpatory tes

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error of the s

nd injurious e

507 U.S. 619

there is no re

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he claims to 

easonably ap

court decisio

ued on April

HAMBERS CL

Legal Fram

nstitutional r

e right to a f

0 U.S. 284, 

sses and to c

9 (1967). Sp

ce through th

ght to presen

ates v. Evans

ns of the con

ence that was

case) (interna

hambers clea

stimony at tr

preme Court

roposition th

ate or federal

8). The Cham

state court w

effect or infl

9, 623, 638 (

easoned opin

viewing the 

determine w

pplied. Ylst v

on in this cas

l 15, 2014. 

AIM

mework 

right of an ac

fair opportun

294 (1973).

call witnesse

pecifically, C

he mechanis

nt a defense a

s, 728 F.3d 9

nstitutional ri

s necessary f

al citation om

arly establish

rial violates a

t’s holding i

hat the defen

l rule exclud

mbers holdin

4

when the erro

uence in det

(1993). 

nion from the

habeas petit

whether or n

v. Nunnemak

se is the Cal

ccused to du

nity to defend

 This right e

es in one’s ow

Chambers he

tic applicatio

and violates 

953, 966 (9th

ight to prese

for the defen

mitted); Cud

hed that the 

a defendant’

n Chambers

ndant is denie

des favorable

ng allows fe

or was not ha

termining th

e highest sta

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ot a clearly e

ker, 501 U.S

lifornia Cour

ue process in

d against the

encompasse

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eld that the e

on of eviden

due process

h Cir. 2013)

ent a defense

ndant to refu

djo v. Ayers, 

“exclusion o

’s due proces

s should be i

ed a fair opp

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ederal courts

armless, that

he jury’s verd

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consult the l

established l

S. 797, 805–

rt of Appeal

n a criminal t

e State’s acc

s the “rights

Id.; see also

exclusion of

ntiary rules u

s. Chambers

 (stating that

e where the t

ute a critical 

698 F.3d 75

of trustworth

ss right to pr

nterpreted n

portunity to d

United Stat

s to defer to s

t is, only if it

dict.” Brech

nsidering the

last state cou

law of the Su

–06 (1991). T

’s unpublish

trial guarant

cusations.” C

s to confront 

o Washingto

f reliable, def

undermines t

s, 410 U.S. a

t the Ninth C

trial court in

element of t

52, 754 (9th 

hy and neces

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defend hims

tes v. Scheffe

state evident

t had a 

ht v. 

e petitioner’s

urt to render 

upreme 

The last 

hed 

tees 

Chambers v.

 and crosson v. Texas, 

fensethe 

at 302; see 

Circuit has 

correctly 

the 

Cir. 2012) 

ssary 

ense”). 

it “does not 

self 

fer, 523 U.S. 

tiary rules in

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 4 of 23
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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crim

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fect” on the v

B.

Petition

al court refus

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kt. No. 4 at 9

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 1

 At tri

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available. 

and was mea

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chanistically

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clusions that

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sed to admit 

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[Doe] was r

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9.) The trial

of Appeal af

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ial, petitione

23-6 at 73–8

rt decision ex

m Graham an

ant to be con

s violated on

poses [the ex

324 (2006) 

(1991). A de

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med, and regu

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ary rule must

a v. Egelhoff

t are without

if a defendan

only if the er

cht, 507 U.S

nd 

 that his con

Doe’s hears

atements thr

remorseful o

hing similar 

jail.” She th

to [Doe], her

offensive. S

m repeatedly 

l court found

ffirmed.1 In 

ssue: 

 

r proffered D

87 (trial trans

xcluding hea

nd Savage).)

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ff, 518 U.S. 3

t “valid state

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e facts and ci

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rule applied

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due process r

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surances of t

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37, 52–53 (1

e justification

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ights under C

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e: 

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ments); see al

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ircumstances

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to present a 

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king, and he

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at 105–06 (tr

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and therefor

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onal right to p

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was on.” 

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avage and Ke

rial transcript

4 at 6–10 (p

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; Michigan v

here the rule 

applied is 

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“critical” to 

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violated, 

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admissible, 

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elly Graham

ts); Dkt. No

proffered 

med 

v. 

. 

. 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 5 of 23
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excluded evidence 

of incriminating statements his wife made to Anne Savage. Days 

after being discharged from the hospital, in a phone conversation 

with Anne Savage, defendant’s wife stated that she “started it” 

after defendant, who had been drinking, said something offensive, 

that she did not like what she had done, and that she put her 

husband in jail. Defendant argues that these statements were 

admissible as statements against his wife’s penal interest and were 

crucial to his self-defense claim. 

Evidence Code section 1230 provides that hearsay statements are 

admissible under the exception for declarations against penal 

interest. The party seeking to admit such evidence must show 

“that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against 

the declarant’s penal interest, and that the declaration was 

sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay 

character.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 585, 607.) “To 

determine whether the declaration passes the required threshold of 

trustworthiness, a trial court ‘may take into account not just the 

words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the 

possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant’s 

relationship to the defendant.’” (Ibid.) Declarant’s statements are 

not sufficiently reliable for admission simply “‘because it 

incorporates an admission of criminal culpability.’” (People v. 

Duarte, 24 Cal. 4th 603, 611.) 

The trial court excluded the proffered hearsay statements of 

defendant’s wife to Anne Savage primarily on the ground that the 

statements were unreliable because of their inconsistency with 

other statements the wife had made. On two separate occasions the 

wife told police officers that defendant punched and kicked her and 

that, in response, she struck him in the head with a wooden cane. 

Defendant had also offered to prove that in a conversation with her 

friend Kelly Graham, the wife stated that defendant was 

intoxicated and belligerent, that after an exchange of words he 

pushed her and caused her to fall against a window sill, and that, as 

a response, she grabbed the cane and struck him over the head. 

The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to exclude these 

statements under Evidence Code sections 1230 and 352. The court 

explained its ruling as follows: “From the evidence before the 

court as presented by the proponent, this court finds that the 

offered statements that are attributed to Jane Doe through the 

testimony of Kelly Graham and Anne Savage do not meet the 

required criteria for their admission under the declarations against 

interest exception to the hearsay rule. The two statements offered 

by the defense conflict with one another. In the statement to Kelly 

Graham, Jane Doe allegedly asserts that Allen Williams pushed 

her, causing her to fall to the ground before she picked up a cane 

and struck defendant on the head. In the statement to Anne 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 6 of 23
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United States District Court 

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Savage, Jane Doe purportedly picked up a cane and struck 

defendant repeatedly over the head with her cane; with no mention 

being made to her having been pushed. There are however certain 

similarities in each statement[], including that defendant had been 

drinking and was either belligerent or said something offensive to 

Jane Doe. [¶] This court has also made an analysis under Evidence 

Code § 352. The initial statements made by Jane Doe to the 9-1-1 

dispatcher and responding paramedic were previously found to be 

sufficiently reliable to allow their admission into evidence. Jane 

Doe made other statements in addition to these which contradict 

the statements she purportedly made to Kelly Graham and Anne 

Savage. There is also question as to Jane Doe’s motivation when 

these statements [were] made to the defense witnesses. At some 

point after Allen Williams’ arrest, Jane Doe decided to stop 

cooperating with the prosecution and law enforcement and has 

refused to testify at trial.” 

“We review a challenge to a trial court’s choice to admit or 

exclude evidence under section 352 for abuse of discretion.” 

(People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282.) A trial court’s 

exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 “will not 

be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner 

that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. 

Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) Reversal is required only if 

it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant 

would have been reached had the excluded evidence been received. 

(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) 

If the court’s statement that the wife “decided to stop cooperating 

with the prosecution and law enforcement and has refused to 

testify at trial” was made in explanation of why the court 

considered the wife’s statements not to be trustworthy, reliance on 

that factor was improper. When deciding if incriminating 

statements made by an unavailable witness are reliable, Evidence 

Code section 913, subdivision (a) states that “no presumption shall 

arise because of the exercise of the privilege [to not testify], and 

the trier of fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the 

credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the 

proceeding.” (Italics added.) Nonetheless, reading the court’s 

remarks in context, it is apparent that the court’s conclusion that 

the necessary element of trustworthiness was lacking was not 

based exclusively or even primarily on this factor. As the trial 

court pointed out, the statements defendant’s wife made to Anne 

Savage and Kelly Graham conflict with one another. In one 

version, the wife purportedly picked up a cane and struck 

defendant repeatedly over the head, initiating the physical 

confrontation. In the other version, which is consistent with her 

contemporaneous statements to the police and the paramedic, she 

struck the defendant after he began the confrontation by pushing 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 7 of 23
United States District Court 

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Wi

app

tru

a c

not

vio

spo

Do

stre

a h

Cir

bor

at h

wit

294

the

“vo

lliams, 2014

C.

Under C

plication of e

stworthiness

onstitutional

t harmless. S

olation under

Petition

ontaneously 

oe’s statemen

esses that the

hearsay excep

Petition

rcuit’s decisi

re the requis

hand and the

tness, McDo

4. At trial, M

ereafter barre

oucher rule,”

her to the gr

rely on the w

expressed co

evaluating t

totality of th

in excluding

nor did the e

defense. 

4 WL 14658

Discussion 

Chambers, a

evidentiary r

s” and “was 

l error occur

See Brecht, 

r Chambers,

1. Chambe

a)

ner argues th

made to a cl

nts to anothe

e excluded h

ption. 

ner relies pri

ion in Cudjo

site assuranc

erefore do no

onald, who h

McDonald di

ed from treat

” which did n

round. More

wife’s refusa

oncern over 

the reliability

he evidence 

g the wife’s 

exclusion pr

84, at *2–3.

a defendant’s

rules bars tes

critical to [p

rred pursuan

507 U.S. at 6

 and then wh

ers Violation

Assuran

hat the statem

lose friend s

er friend, Gra

hearsay state

marily on th

o in support o

es of trustwo

ot persuade. 

had previousl

isavowed th

ting McDon

not allow pa

8

eover, althou

al to testify, 

causing her

y of her desc

presented, th

hearsay state

reclude defen

s rights to pr

stimony that

petitioner’s] 

nt to Chambe

637. The Co

hether any su

n

nces of Trus

ments here w

hortly after t

aham, and by

ements were 

he Supreme C

of his argum

orthiness. B

 In Chambe

ly confessed

e confession

ald as an adv

arties to impe

ugh the cour

it could prop

r husband to 

cription of ev

here was no 

ement that s

ndant from p

resent a defe

t “bore persu

defense.” C

ers, reversal 

ourt first add

uch violation

stworthiness

were trustwor

the incident,

y petitioner’

against Doe

Court’s deci

ment that the 

Both, howeve

ers, the defen

d to the same

n while on th

verse witnes

each their ow

rt could not p

perly note h

be jailed in 

vents. Base

abuse of dis

she started th

presenting hi

ense are viol

uasive assura

Chambers, 4

is warranted

dresses whet

n was harml

s

rthy and reli

, and they w

’s injuries. A

e’s penal inte

ision in Cham

statements m

er, are distin

ndant accuse

e murder. C

he stand, and

ss pursuant t

wn witnesse

properly 

er 

d on the 

scretion 

he fight, 

is 

ated when th

ances of 

10 U.S. at 30

d only if suc

ther there wa

less. 

iable because

were corrobor

Additionally

erest thereby

mbers and th

made by Do

nguishable fr

ed of murder

Chambers, 41

d the defenda

to Mississipp

s. Id. at 295

he 

02. Even if 

h error was 

as a 

e they were 

rated by 

y, petitioner 

y falling into

he Ninth 

e to Savage 

rom the case

r called a 

10 U.S. at 

ant was 

pi’s 

5. 

o

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Additionally, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to introduce the testimony of three 

individuals, each of whom would have testified that McDonald had confessed to them that he 

committed the murder. Id. at 298. The Supreme Court held that McDonald’s confessions bore 

sufficient indicia of trustworthiness because they were “made spontaneously to a close 

acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred,” were each “corroborated by some other evidence 

in the case,” and “each confession [] was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and 

unquestionably against interest.” Id. at 300–01. Similarly, in Cudjo, the defense attempted to 

offer hearsay testimony from a witness who had confessed to committing the murder to a close 

friend shortly after the murder occurred. Cudjo, 698 F.3d at 754. 

The statements at issue here do not bear the same indicia of reliability. First, unlike the 

statements in Chambers and Cudjo, which were made shortly after the murders, the statements 

from Doe to Savage were made after she was released from the hospital, approximately eight days 

after the incident. (Dkt. No. 23-8 at 22.) Second, unlike the confession at issue in Chambers, 

which was consistent across the three witnesses to whom McDonald allegedly confessed, Doe’s 

statements to Savage were inconsistent with her statements to another potential witness, Graham. 

Whereas Doe’s statements to Savage alleged that she started the confrontation, her statements to 

Graham indicated that petitioner began the altercation. (See Dkt. 4 at 6 (Graham’s statement 

indicating that following “an exchange of words, [petitioner] pushed [Doe], causing her to fall 

against a window seat” and in response, Doe grabbed a cane and struck petitioner in the head).) 

Third, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to conclude that Doe may have had 

motivation to lie to Savage regarding the incident. In both Chambers and Cudjo, neither of the 

witnesses had an incentive to lie about committing the murders to exonerate the defendant. By 

contrast, Doe herself expressed to Savage her concerns about causing petitioner, her husband, to 

be placed in jail. (Dkt. No. 4 at 9.) Additionally, the gravity of the potential charges in Chambers

and Cudjo made it highly unlikely that the witnesses would lie about murdering someone given 

the potential for lifetime incarceration. Here, the possible penalty for Doe hitting her husband 

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with a cane was miniscule compared to the probable sentence for petitioner’s third strike.2

On balance, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion about the lack of trustworthiness of the 

proffered hearsay statements and the resulting exclusion of those statements was not contrary to or 

an unreasonable application of the clearly established rule presented in Chambers. See Christian 

v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1084–86 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1007 (2010) (rejection of 

purportedly exculpatory hearsay statement did not merit habeas relief where the evidence was less 

reliable than the hearsay evidence in Chambers). The Court of Appeal’s determination that the 

hearsay statements lacked the basic assurances of reliability because of their inconsistencies, the 

surrounding circumstances, and the potential motivation of the declarant was not an unreasonable 

application of the state evidentiary rule. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s decision was not 

contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, any clearly established federal law as 

determined by the United States Supreme Court in Chambers. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

b) Critical to Petitioner’s Defense 

The Court also finds relief unwarranted here on the additional ground that Doe’s 

statements to Savage were not critical to petitioner’s defense. Petitioner argues that the statements 

at issue constituted the only evidence probative of mitigating petitioner’s guilt as they showed that 

Doe initiated the conflict and that petitioner was only acting in self-defense. However, as 

respondent argues, it does not appear that Doe’s statements were critical to petitioner’s defense. 

First, testimony from the arresting officer described petitioner’s injuries and informed the jury that 

such injuries resulted from Doe hitting petitioner on the head with a cane. (Dkt. No. 23-7 at 32–

 2

 Petitioner argues that the trial court misapplied California law in finding that Doe’s 

statements did not fall into the declarations against interest hearsay exception. Such, however, is 

not a ground for obtaining federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (establishing that a 

district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that 

[petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). 

In any event, for the reasons stated above, it was not unreasonable for the trial court or the Court 

of Appeal to find that Doe’s statements at issue did not fall under the hearsay exception. Under 

California law, a hearsay statement falls into the declarations against interest hearsay exception 

where the “statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary 

interest, or so far subjected [her] to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable 

[woman] in [her] position would not have made the statement unless [s]he believed it to be true.” 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1230. The Court of Appeal reasonably found that Doe could have had several 

motivations for fabricating the story she provided Savage to protect petitioner. 

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33.) Second, unlike in Chambers where the excluded statements, if true, would have exonerated 

the defendant, here, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that Doe’s statements, 

even if admitted and believed to be true, would not have established a viable case for self-defense. 

(See infra.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that 

the state court decision is an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.3

2. Harmless Error

Even assuming, arguendo, that the exclusion of Savage’s testimony was a Chambers 

violation, habeas relief would still be inappropriate in this case because any such error would be 

harmless. The Supreme Court has held that unless the error at issue “had substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” a trial court’s constitutional error does not 

permit habeas relief. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38. Under Brecht, a petitioner must show not just a 

“reasonable possibility” that the error affected the verdict, but that the error resulted in “actual 

prejudice.” Id. at 637–39 (holding that the error was harmless because the prosecution’s 

“evidence of guilt was, if not overwhelming, certainly weighty.”) 

Here, petitioner argues that the excluded evidence was critical to his claim that he attacked 

Doe in self-defense. Petitioner asserts that Savage’s testimony provides evidence that Doe 

initiated the altercation. Thus, petitioner argues, a jury could have determined that petitioner’s 

reaction was not necessarily greater than what a reasonable person would deem necessary to 

ensure their safety given the circumstances. With regards to this issue, the California Court of 

Appeal held: 

Even if there was any error in excluding the wife’s statements, the 

error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of 

defendant’s guilt. The undisputed evidence of the nature and 

 3

 Petitioner also argues that it was error for the trial court to rely on the fact that Doe had 

stopped cooperating with the prosecution and law enforcement and refused to testify at trial in 

making its reliability determination. However, the California Court of Appeal agreed that it was 

improper for the trial court to do so, but held that the trial court had sufficient other bases upon 

which to find Doe’s statement to Savage unreliable. As discussed above, the Court agrees. 

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gravity of his wife’s injuries makes clear that even if the jury were 

to have believed that his wife initiated the confrontation, 

defendant’s response went far beyond anything necessary to 

defend himself. 

The right to self-defense extends only to the degree of force that a 

reasonable person would employ under similar circumstances. 

(People v. Clark (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 235, 250.) Only force 

that a reasonable person similarly situated would deem necessary 

to insure their safety is permissible. (Ibid.) “For acts done in selfdefense to remain lawful, the force that one uses must be only such 

as appears reasonably necessary, in view of the circumstances, to 

prevent the impending injury.” (19 Cal.Jur.3d (2014) Criminal 

Law: Defenses, § 51.) “Thus, under a charge of assault with a 

deadly weapon, the probable danger of a lesser degree than great 

bodily injury will not justify the exercise of the right of selfdefense.” (Ibid.) 

Here, even if the wife attacked defendant first and struck him three 

times in the back of the head with a cane, it is evident that 

defendant responded with significantly greater force than 

necessary. The wife was not wielding a knife or anything other 

than an apparently light-weight cane not likely to cause serious 

injury. The defendant could not reasonably have believed it was 

necessary, to ensure his own safety, to beat and kick his wife 

enough to break her jaw in three places, break seven of her ribs, 

knock teeth out, and bruise her in the eye, chest, and arm. Indeed, 

the futility of the self-defense defense in this case is highlighted by 

the evidence that when the police arrived at the scene, defendant 

spontaneously acknowledged, “I was wrong, I admit it” and “I was 

going to tum myself in.” 

Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *3–4. 

Unlike in Chambers where the hearsay testimony was a confession from another person 

that he had committed the murder, Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298, the hearsay testimony here would 

only confirm that Doe hit petitioner with a cane, with the additional fact that she may have 

initiated the physical altercation, Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *2. It was not unreasonable for 

the Court of Appeal to find that, given the “nature and gravity” of Doe’s injuries in comparison to 

petitioner’s injuries, a jury would still find that petitioner’s response was “beyond anything 

necessary to defend himself.” Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *5–6 (explaining that in defending 

one’s self, “[o]nly force that a reasonable person similarly situated would deem necessary to 

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Petitioner must establish that counsel’s errors were so severe as to dispossess the petitioner of a 

fair trial and reliable verdict. Id. at 692. When a petitioner is challenging a conviction, the 

pertinent question is “‘whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’” Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 

1081, 1089 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). For petitioner to show prejudice due to 

counsel’s failure to file a motion, petitioner has to prove that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, 

it is reasonably probable that motion would have been granted, and (2) had the motion been 

granted, it is reasonably probable that the result of the trial would have been more favorable to 

him. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 

For a federal court reviewing IAC claims in a habeas proceeding, the question “is not 

whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination” under Strickland “was incorrect[,] 

but whether [that determination] was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citations omitted). Under section 2254(d), a federal 

habeas court reviewing Strickland claims should apply a decidedly deferential standard to state 

court decisions. See Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 

(2003)); see also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202 (holding that a federal habeas court applies a “doubly 

deferential” standard of review in analyzing IAC claims under section 2254). In examining a 

habeas IAC claim, if petitioner cannot prove the deficient performance prong, a federal court does 

not need to explore Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 

(9th Cir. 1998). Inversely, it is unnecessary for a federal habeas court to decide whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient before examining whether petitioner was prejudiced due to the 

purported deficient performance of his counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams v. 

Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court’s refusal to 

contemplate whether counsel deficiently performed after already deciding that petitioner could not 

show prejudice). 

The pronounced deference in Strickland for reviewing a defense counsel’s effectiveness 

provides state courts with more flexibility in reasonably applying the rule, consequently 

“translat[ing] to a narrower range of decisions that are objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” 

Case 4:15-cv-04783-YGR Document 29 Filed 10/26/16 Page 14 of 23
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d

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this evidence was considered outside the presence of the jury and it 

was unquestionably in defendant’s interest to cast doubt on the 

credibility of what the wife told the officers and the paramedic. 

Nonetheless, even if counsel was deficient in failing to seek 

admission of this evidence under Evidence Code section 1202, 

there was no prejudice. (See In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 150 

[“If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be determined 

on the ground of lack of prejudice, a court need not decide whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient.”].) For the reasons discussed 

above, even on the assumption that consideration of this evidence 

for the limited permissible purpose would have caused the jury to 

doubt whether defendant was the original aggressor—a dubious 

assumption—the extent of the wife’s injuries, coupled with 

defendant’s spontaneous acknowledgement of guilt, leaves little 

room to believe that admission of this evidence would have 

affected the outcome of the trial. 

Id. 

For the reasons discussed above, and in light of the undisputed evidence indicating the 

injuries inflicted on Doe, it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to decide that 

there was no reasonable probability of Doe’s statement to Savage changing the jury verdict. 

Therefore, the Court of Appeal did not contravene or unreasonably apply the standard for IAC set 

forth in Strickland in finding no prejudice due to defense counsel’s deficient performance. 

2. Failure to Move to Suppress Police Testimony and Photographs of Blood 

Inside the House 

Petitioner next argues that his counsel’s failure to suppress police testimony and 

photographs of blood inside the house was IAC. Specifically, petitioner argues that his counsel 

should have moved to exclude the testimony of Officer Manion and the introduction of 

photographs taken by Officer Manion based on his warrantless search of petitioner’s house. With 

regards to this issue, the California Court of Appeal explained: 

Defendant also contends his attorney’s performance was deficient 

because he failed to move to suppress evidence obtained as a result 

of Officer Manion’s warrantless entry into his home. Manion 

entered the home after placing defendant in handcuffs and before 

locating his wife. Manion testified to his observation of blood in 

the master bedroom and photographs of the bedroom were 

admitted into evidence. Defendant claims that a warrantless entry 

was not justified because there were no exigent circumstances and 

a protective sweep was not warranted. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizure inside a home 

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without a warrant are presumptively unconstitutional. (Groh v. 

Ramirez (2004) 540 U.S. 551, 552.) However, warrantless entries 

are allowed during exigent circumstances (Minnesota v. Olson 

(1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100), and for purposes of a limited protective 

sweep (Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 335-337). Exigent 

circumstances are defined as “an emergency situation requiring 

swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage 

to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or 

destruction of evidence.” (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 

276.) When emergency situations arise, “[o]fficers do not need 

ironclad proof of a ‘serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the 

emergency aid exception.” (Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 

45, 49.) “ ‘[A]n objectively reasonable basis for believing’ 

[citation] that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate 

aid’ ” is sufficient. (Id. at p. 47.) 

In the present case, defendant’s wife had told the police dispatcher 

that she was hiding in her neighbor’s backyard. When police 

officers arrived at the scene, Officer Manion spotted only the 

defendant on the porch of his home. The whereabouts of 

defendant’s wife’s was unknown, but the door to the home was 

open and defendant made an attempt to enter. Under the 

circumstances it was eminently reasonable, and responsive to the 

9-1-1 emergency call for assistance, for the officer to determine 

whether the wife had returned to her home and was in immediate 

need of aid. Because a motion to suppress evidence of what was 

observed inside the home was doomed to fail (e.g., Michigan v. 

Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. 45), the attorney’s failure to bring such a 

motion was neither a deficiency nor prejudicial. 

Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, *4–5. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches of a home are presumptively 

unconstitutional, however, that presumption may be overcome if exigent circumstances exist. 

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009); United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1192–93 

(9th Cir. 2002). “[E]xigent circumstances are present when a reasonable person [would] believe 

that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 

destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly 

frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotations omitted); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 462, 471–72 (2011) (exception to 

prevent destruction of evidence). The Fourth Amendment also permits police officers to enter a 

home without a search warrant to provide emergency aid to a wounded inhabitant or to defend an 

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inhabitant from impending harm. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45, 47. This “emergency aid” exception 

requires only that the officer had an “objectively reasonable” foundation for thinking that someone 

in the house was in need of urgent care. Id. 

Here, when the officer reached petitioner’s home, Doe had told the dispatcher that she was 

in her neighbor’s backyard. Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *5. However, when the officer 

arrived, he saw petitioner on the front porch, and he was not certain as to the victim’s location, as 

it was not clear whether or not she remained in her neighbor’s yard. Id. 

The officer’s testimony on this issue is instructive: 

Q: What happened when you first arrived at 723 Cypress? 

A: I noticed that the front door of the home was wide open. 

Q: Did you initially see anybody? 

A: Not initially. 

Q: At some point, did you see someone at 723 Cypress? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Can you describe who you saw? 

A: I saw Mr. Williams standing at the front porch. 

. . . 

Q: What was the defendant doing when you saw him standing at the 

porch? 

A: He was just standing there. 

Q: What did you do? 

A: I asked him to come down to me. He was standing on the sidewalk in 

front of the house. 

Q: What was his reaction or response when you asked him to come 

toward you? 

A: He turned around and started to walk inside the house. 

Q: What did you do? 

A: I went in the front door and handcuffed him. I didn’t want him to go 

into the house, have possible weapons, make the situation dangerous for 

me and fellow officers. 

. . . 

Q: And at the time when you first saw the defendant standing on the 

porch, did you have any idea where the possible victim might be? 

A: Possibly in the back yard of the neighbor’s house. 

Q: But you weren’t sure at that time? 

A: I did not know. 

(Dkt. No. 23-7 at 29–31.) 

Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that the 

officer had an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house [was] in 

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need of immediate aid.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47; see also United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding search justified where police feared that victim could have been 

inside the apartment). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that it was not outside the 

scope of professional conduct for petitioner’s trial counsel to decide not to bring a motion to 

suppress such evidence was also reasonable and subject to this Court’s deference. 

Additionally, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that counsel’s failure 

to move for suppression did not prejudice petitioner. Even if petitioner’s counsel had moved to 

suppress such evidence and succeeded, the prosecution also presented photographs and medical 

testimony of Doe’s actual injuries. (See Dkt. No. 23-7 at 118–35.) As respondent argues, the 

“emotional impact that could have arisen from the photographs of the bedroom were already 

independently evoked by the photographs of the victim’s face and body.” (Dkt. No. 27-1 at 36.) 

Thus, there is no “reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 

reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 

3. Failure to Move to Suppress Hearsay Statements to Paramedic and 911 Operator 

Petitioner further argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense 

counsel’s failure to object to the admission of Doe’s statements to the 911 operator and paramedic 

as a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The California Court of Appeal 

rejected petitioner’s argument: 

[D]efendant argues that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance 

in failing to object to the admission of the statements made by his 

wife in her 9-1-1call for help and to the attending paramedic, on 

the ground that these hearsay statements were testimonial and their 

admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 

(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.) Defendant asserts 

that by the time his wife made the 9-1-1 call, the emergency had 

already ended, so that the operator’s line of questioning (“what’s 

going on?”) had evolved into an interrogation in which she told the 

authorities that “her husband” “had beat [her] and kicked [her].” 

Likewise, defendant asserts that by the time the paramedic arrived 

the emergency was no longer in progress, so that when the 

paramedic asked his wife “if she was struck with any weapons or 

how she was struck,” her response “that she had been kicked 

multiple times and all over her body” was testimonial in nature. 

Defendant relies on Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 822 

to support his argument that statements become testimonial “when 

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the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 

interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 

relevant to later criminal prosecution.” However, “a 911 call, and 

at least the initial questioning by the operator, are not primarily 

designed to prove some past fact, but to elicit current 

circumstances requiring police assistance.” (People v. Cage 

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 982.) 

Here, after the wife told the 9-1-1 dispatcher “I need help please,” 

the dispatcher asked “what’s going on” in order to determine if 

police assistance was needed. Likewise, the paramedic was 

eliciting information in order to determine appropriate medical 

treatment. At trial, the paramedic explained that it is general 

procedure to ask trauma patients a series of questions to ascertain 

if they are alert and oriented. One of those questions is “if they 

know what happened to them.” The purpose of these questions is 

to “make sure that when they answer questions what they are 

saying is going to make sense.” If the responses do not make 

sense, the paramedics “wouldn’t take what they are saying” and 

instead “go by what [they] see.” Additionally, these questions help 

paramedics “find out where the injures could be, and pretty much 

line up for the hospital so they can know what to expect, what 

areas to look at.” Thus, these questions and the wife’s answers 

were made primarily to deal with an ongoing emergency situation. 

The statements were not elicited to establish facts for use in a later 

criminal prosecution, and their admission was not a violation of 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as construed in Crawford v. 

Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36 and its progeny. 

Deference is ordinarily due to tactical decisions by defense 

counsel, including particularly decisions on whether to object to 

the introduction of evidence. This decision is inherently tactical 

and seldom establishes a counsel’s incompetence. (People v. 

Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106; see generally, Douglas v. 

Woodford (2003) 316 F.3d 1079.) In the present case, the failure 

to raise this meritless objection clearly was neither deficient nor 

prejudicial. 

Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *5–6. 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause affords the accused in criminal cases the 

right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The goal of the 

Confrontation Clause is to guarantee due process and the trustworthiness of evidence. Crawford 

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). The clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 

Crawford demands that the reliability of evidence be tested by the adversarial process’ hallmark of 

cross-examination. Id.; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974). 

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The Confrontation Clause applies to all “testimonial” statements, whether made in court or 

out of court. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51. A statement is testimonial hearsay subject to the 

Confrontation Clause when the main purpose of presenting the out-of-court statement is to create 

an out-of court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011); see, 

e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 655–59 (2011) (finding that a lab report prepared 

in connection with a criminal investigation and certifying that petitioner’s blood alcohol level was 

above limit for aggravated DUI was testimonial); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 

310, 329 (2009) (concluding a certificate from a crime lab analyst identifying a controlled 

substance qualified as testimonial evidence because it was produced for the purpose of proving a 

fact in trial and was basically identical to other in-court testimony). 

Where an investigation or preparation for trial is not the primary purpose of garnering a 

statement, “the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, 

not the Confrontation Clause.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358. The relative formality of the questioning, 

or the lack thereof, may aid a court’s inquiry as to its “primary purpose.” Id. at 366. The primary 

purpose of a statement is determined objectively. United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 

1267 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, “‘the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of 

the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable 

participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and the 

circumstances in which the encounter occurred.’” Id. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360). 

“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 

circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 

police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 

(2006). Statements are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 

such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 

past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 814, 822. Testimonial 

hearsay statements are prohibited under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses are 

unavailable, and (2) the defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 

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Here, the statements of concern involved, like Davis, a 911 call occurring in an ongoing 

emergency: Doe’s request for medical help and rescue from the neighbor’s backyard. In Davis, 

the Supreme Court held that the statements were not testimonial because the nature of “what was 

asked and answered . . . was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve 

the present emergency.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 817, 827 (discussing that the operator asked “What’s 

going on?,” “Are there any weapons?,” and “What’s his . . . name?,” to which the victim answered 

“He’s jumpin’ on me again,” “No. He’s usin’ his fists,” and “Davis . . . Adrian”). The questions 

asked by the 911 operator in the instant matter are indistinguishable from those asked by the 911 

operator in Davis. (See Dkt. No. 23-5 at 42–43 (transcript of 911 call where operator asked Doe 

what happened, whether her husband had any weapons, and what her husband’s name was). 

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Davis by arguing that here, Doe informed the 911 operator that 

she had been attacked forty-five minutes prior to making the call. However, in the same breath, 

Doe also informed the operator that she had just been “able to slip away” from petitioner, which 

could have implied that she remained in danger. (Dkt. No. 23-5 at 42.) Thus, it was not 

unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to determine that the statements made to the 911 operator 

were not testimonial and that therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object was not deficient. 

Petitioner’s arguments with respect to Doe’s statements to the paramedic are equally 

unavailing. Petitioner argues that the paramedic’s questions went beyond what was necessary to 

provide treatment but rather were intended to obtain information for a future prosecution. 

Specifically, petitioner takes issue with the paramedic asking Doe what happened, how she 

received her injuries, and whether she was struck with an open hand, closed hand, or kicked. 

These questions, petitioner argues, were not necessary for Doe’s diagnosis or treatment. However, 

at trial, the paramedic testified that such questions help them determine “where the injuries could 

be, and pretty much line up for the hospital so they can know what to expect, what areas to look 

at.” (Dkt. No. 23-15 at 12.) The Ninth Circuit has held similar questioning from a physician to be 

non-testimonial. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that state 

court’s determination that emergency room physician’s questions about what happened to assault 

victim was not testimonial was not an unreasonable application of Crawford). Thus, it was also 

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not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to determine that Doe’s statements to the paramedic 

were non-testimonial and that defense counsel’s failure to object to such statements was not 

deficient. Williams, 2014 WL 1465884, at *5. 

In any event, even if the Court were to find that counsel’s performance with respect to this 

issue was deficient, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that petitioner was not 

prejudiced by any potential error. Id. As discussed above, the evidence of Doe’s severe injuries, 

coupled with petitioner’s admission of guilt would likely not have been outweighed or even 

compromised by the exclusion of the statements at issue here. Additionally, Doe’s medical 

records and contemporaneous photographs amply document the extent of the injuries inflicted on 

Doe. Hence, no reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different if defense counsel had objected to the admission of the statements at issue here. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, petitioner has not met his burden to show that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, and his petition is hereby DENIED. A 

certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the [Court’s] 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2016 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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