Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06302/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

• • 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GEORGE RONALD FULLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

PILED 

Uoitoo Statefi Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

FEB 141991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-6302 

JACK COWLEY, Warden, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D.C. No. CIV 90-1041-T) 

(W. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

We grant the appellant's application for certificate of 

probable cause and to proceed in forma pauperis. 

The appellant, George Fuller, appeals from the district 

court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Fuller 

raises two issues for this court to consider: (1) that his 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 1 
constitutional rights were abridged when the District Court of 

Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, erroneously sentenced him as a 

recidivist based upon a remote, twice-removed conviction that had 

been held unconstitutional; and (2) that he was denied his right 

to counsel when his attorney advised him to plead guilty to the 

instant recidivist charges. The United States District Court for 

the Western District of Oklahoma denied Fuller's petition. We 

affirm. 

FACTS 

In 1973, Fuller was convicted in Oklahoma of felonious 

possession of a narcotic. In 1976, Fuller was charged with and 

plead guilty to the commission of two narcotics and one weapons 

felony. He was sentenced as a recidivist based upon his prior 

1973 conviction. In 1983, Fuller once again committed a number of 

felonies and plead guilty to and was sentenced for their 

commission. He was sentenced in 1983 as a recidivist based upon 

the 1976 convictions. His 1973 conviction was later deemed 

unconstitutional because it involved a juvenile certification 

process .that had been held by this court to be unconstitutional. 

See Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972). 

Fuller filed a number of applications for post-conviction 

relief in the state courts of Oklahoma arguing that the 1976 

recidivist sentences were invalid because they were based upon the 

unconstitutional 1973 conviction, and that in turn, the 1983 

recidivist sentences were similarly invalid because they were 

based upon the 1976 sentences. The only relief he obtained 

through the state post-conviction process was that one of his 1976 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 2 
convictions was vacated and the sentence stemming from a second 

was reduced. The sentence stemming from the third 1976 conviction 

was not affected. Likewise, the state courts refused to adjust 

the sentences stemming from the 1983 felonies. 

Fuller then filed his petition for habeas relief with the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 

The district court held that the Oklahoma state procedural rules 

barred it from considering Fuller's federal habeas petition. The 

district court held that Fuller could have raised his claim on 

direct appeal to the Oklahoma appellate courts, but that he 

"deliberately bypassed" his direct appeal rights. However, the 

district court failed to point to any evidence in the record 

supporting its finding that Fuller deliberately bypassed his right 

to appeal. Fuller, of course, contends that there is no evidence 

in the record that he "deliberately bypassed" his direct appeal 

rights. 

The district court also held that Fuller's failure to appeal 

the Oklahoma district court's denial of his post-conviction relief 

in 1987 to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals resulted in a 

procedural default of his claims. 1 We are not convinced that 

Fuller's failure to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals for 

1 Fuller first petitioned for state habeas relief with the 

Oklahoma district court in 1986. The court addressed the merits 

of his claim. In 1989, Fuller once again raised the same issues 

before the same Oklahoma district court. The Oklahoma district 

court dismissed his petition as being repetitive and as being 

barred by res judicata. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed in 1990. Arguably, none of the post-conviction judgments 

rendered by the Oklahoma courts dismissed Fuller's petition on the 

grounds that it was barred on procedural grounds. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 3 
post-conviction relief resulted in a procedural default of his 

claims. 

The district court held in the alternative that Fuller was 

not entitled to relief--procedural bar notwithstanding. Because 

we are not completely satisfied that Fuller's petition for federal 

habeas relief is barred under state procedural default rules, we, 

likewise, will address the merits of his claims. 

ANALYSIS 

Fuller's claim that his 1983 guilty pleas were invalid 

because they were somehow tainted by the unconstitutional twiceremoved 1973 felony conviction is without merit. See Carbray v. 

Champion, 905 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 1990 

WL 253167 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1981). In Carbray, we were confronted 

with identical facts. The appellant in Carbray had been convicted 

of a felony in 1957 under the same constitutionally defective 

juvenile statute that impacted Fuller's 1973 felony conviction. 

The 1957 felony was allegedly linked to sentences stemming from 

four subsequent felony convictions which in turn were used to 

enhance a sentence stemming from an even later felony conviction. 

We denied the appellant's request for relief holding that "[a]ny 

connection between the 1957 conviction and the subsequent guilty 

plea conviction used to enhance appellant's present sentence is 

too attenuated to amount to constitutional error." Id. 

Therefore, we dismiss Fuller's claim that his constitutional 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 4 
rights were violated as a result of the possible taint stemming 

from his twice-removed and later vacated 1973 felony conviction. 2 

We now turn to Fuller's second claim that his right to 

counsel was violated when the counsel who represented him when he 

plead guilty to the 1983 felonies failed to attack the validity of 

the 1976 convictions on the basis that they were somehow tainted 

by the unconstitutional 1973 conviction. 

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim involving a guilty plea, the appellant must fulfill two 

requirements: (1) he must show that the service rendered by the 

attorney was not reasonable; and (2) he must show that but for the 

allegedly ineffective assistance, he would not have pled guilty. 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). Fuller's ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim fails the first requirement because 

his attorney's failure to attack the 1976 convictions based upon 

the 1973 conviction was not unreasonable. Fuller argues that his 

attorney should have attacked the 1976 guilty pleas because they 

were tainted by the unconstitutional 1973 conviction. Fuller's 

attorney would still have based his argument on the effect of the 

twice-removed unconstitutional 1973 conviction upon the subsequent 

guilty pleas to the 1976 felonies and their effect upon the 1983 

felony charges. The fact that Fuller could have attacked the 1976 

2 We note that we do not read Malenq v. Cook, 109 s. Ct. 1923 

(1989) (per curiam), as forbidding us from reviewing the "taint" 

of Fuller's 1973 conviction upon his later convictions even though 

he is not currently in custody for the 1973 conviction. See 

Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117, 118-19 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 212 (1990). We simply hold that under Carbray, any 

effect the 1973 conviction may have had upon his later convictions 

is too attenuated for us to consi der on habeas review. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 5 
' . .. 

guilty pleas before he pled guilty to the 1983 felony charges 

instead of trying to undo the 1983 sentences post-conviction, does 

not render the attack on the 1976 convictions any less attenuated. 

We simply cannot hold that Fuller's attorney's failure to raise a 

claim that we now deem meritless under Carbray was unreasonable. 

Therefore, we deny Fuller's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim as well. 

The district court's decision to deny the appellant's 

petition for habeas relief is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-6302 Document: 010110099970 Date Filed: 02/14/1991 Page: 6