Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01699/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01699-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1699

___________________________

Robin K. Magee

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Hamline University; Donald Lewis; Jon Doe; Jane Roe; Trustees of the Hamline

University, Minnesota

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

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 Submitted: December 11, 2014

 Filed: January 7, 2015

[Published]

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Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Robin Magee appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim under 42 1

U.S.C. § 1981 against Hamline University and Dean Donald Lewis arising from her

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Minnesota.

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termination as a professor at Hamline University School of Law. The district court

dismissed Magee’s § 1981 claim on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of

res judicata. We agree and therefore affirm.

2

I. Background

In 1990, Magee was hired as a professor at Hamline University School of Law

in St. Paul, Minnesota. She became tenured in 1994. In September 2009, Magee was

charged with various felony state tax violations. While her case was pending,

Hamline placed her on a leave of absence and relieved her of teaching

responsibilities. In February 2011, a jury found Magee guilty of four misdemeanor

counts of failure to file state tax returns. The convictions were upheld on appeal. See

State v. Magee, 2012 WL 1253071, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2012).

In April 2011, Magee filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter

“Magee I”) against Donald Lewis, then Dean of Hamline University School of Law;

the Trustees of Hamline University; and David Titus, a police officer with the City

of St. Paul. Magee alleged that these defendants had “worked in concert” to

terminate her from her position at Hamline in violation of her constitutional rights. 

Magee also brought claims for intentional interference with employment contract

against Lewis and breach of employment contract against Hamline.

In May 2011, Dean Lewis issued charges to remove Magee as a faculty

member. Magee invoked her right to a hearing and a faculty committee ultimately

voted in favor of discharge. Magee was terminated on July 21, 2011.

In April 2012, Titus and Hamline moved to dismiss Magee’s § 1983 claimwith

prejudice. The district court granted the motion with respect to all defendants. The

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

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court further declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Magee’s two

remaining state law claims. We affirmed the dismissal of Magee I. See Magee v. Trs.

of Hamline Univ., 747 F.3d 532 (8th Cir. 2014).

In May 2013, Magee served a second lawsuit (hereinafter “Magee II”) against

Hamline and Lewis alleging, among other claims, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

which “offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual

relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual

relationship,” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). The

defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for dismissal based on the

doctrine of res judicata. The district court granted the motion in February 2014. The

court concluded that because Magee’s § 1983 claim in Magee I and § 1981 claim in

Magee II “arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions,” the § 1981

claim should have been raised in Magee I and is therefore barred by the doctrine of

res judicata. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Magee’s remaining state law claims. 

Magee filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

The issue before us is whether the district court’s dismissal of Magee II was

proper. We review de novo the dismissal of a case on res judicata grounds. See

N.A.A.C.P. v. Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1997). Dismissal on the

basis of res judicata at the pleading stage is appropriate if the defense is apparent on

the face of the complaint. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758,

763-64 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Res judicata incorporates the related concepts of issue preclusion and claim

preclusion. Sandy Lake Band of Miss. Chippewa v. United States, 714 F.3d 1098,

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1102 (8th Cir. 2013). Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an

action precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could have been

raised in that action.” Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2010)

(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To

establish that a claim is barred by claim preclusion, a party must show: “(1) the first

suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper

jurisdiction; (3) both suits involve the same parties (or those in privity with them);

and (4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes of action.” Yankton

Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 533 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the

“same claims or causes of action” element of claimpreclusion—the only element that

Magee challenges—we have held that “whether a second lawsuit is precluded turns

on whether its claims arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior

claim.” Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 1998)

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jefferson Smurfit

Corp. v. United States, 439 F.3d 448, 454 (8th Cir. 2006).

After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court that the

gist of the § 1983 claim in Magee I and the § 1981 claim in Magee II is that the

defendants’ conduct leading up to the termination of Magee, in addition to the

ultimate decision to terminate her, violated her constitutional rights. In other words,

the federal claims in each suit are based on Magee’s termination from employment

as well as the series of events precipitating that termination. Thus, we conclude that

the § 1981 claim in Magee II is barred by res judicata because it arose “out of the

same nucleus of operative facts” as the § 1983 claim in Magee I. See Costner, 153

F.3d at 673.

Moreover, while it’s true that “claim preclusion does not apply to claims that

did not arise until after the first suit was filed,” Baker Grp., L.C. v. Burlington N.

Santa Fe Ry. Co., 228 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original), this case

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does not present such a scenario. Magee contends that her § 1981 claim was

unavailable to her at the time she filed her initial complaint in Magee I because she

had not yet been terminated. But her argument is contradicted by the pleadings. The

April 2011 complaint in Magee I alleges that Dean Lewis “intentionally induced

Hamline to suspend and terminate [her]” which “caused the suspension and then the

termination of Magee’s employment contract and tenure.” (Emphasis added). 

Furthermore, as part of her § 1981 claim, Magee alleges several instances in which

the defendants breached her employment contract prior to her termination, including

the decision to suspend her from teaching in September 2009 and failing to engage

in good faith informal discussions leading up to her termination. Thus, Magee’s §

1981 claim was based at least in part on conduct that the defendants had engaged in

at the time she filed her complaint in Magee I. For the reasons stated, we reject

Magee’s argument that her § 1981 claim could not have been brought in Magee I.

III. Conclusion

Because the doctrine of res judicata bars Magee from bringing her § 1981

claim, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim.

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