Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02789/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02789-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN L. M. DOBSHINSKY,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE RUNNELS,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2789 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Allen M. Dobshinsky, a prisoner currently in custody at High Desert State Prison,

filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before

the court for consideration are petitioner's motions to appoint counsel and respondent's

motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The court denies the motions for appointment of

counsel, finds that the petition was not timely filed, and dismisses the action.

BACKGROUND

Dobshinsky was convicted in Sonoma County Superior Court of inflicting corporal

injury on a cohabitant or spouse and resisting an executive officer. In February 2000, he was

sentenced to ten years and eight months in prison. He appealed. The California Court of

Appeal affirmed his conviction. The California Supreme Court denied his petition for review

on May 2, 2001.

Dobshinsky filed three state habeas petitions before filing this action. His petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Sonoma County Superior Court was filed on July 16, 2002, and

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denied on August 8, 2002. His petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal was filed on March 17, 2003 and denied on March 28, 2003. His petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court was filed on August 3, 2004 and denied on

June 22, 2005. 

The current action is Dobshinsky's third federal habeas petition challenging the same

conviction. Dobshinsky v. HDSP, Case No. C 02-2684 MHP, was filed on June 5, 2002 and

dismissed on June 28, 2002 because state court remedies had not been exhausted and he had

not identified any violation of the federal constitution, laws or treaties. Dobshinsky v.

HDSP, Case No. C 04-781 MHP, was filed on February 25, 2004 and dismissed on July 7,

2004 for failure to exhaust state court remedies. 

The current habeas petition was stamped "filed" on April 24, 2006 and was mailed to

the court in an envelope postmarked April 12, 2006. The court will use April 12, 2006 as the

date on which this action was deemed filed because there is no evidence Dobshinsky gave

the petition to prison officials for mailing before that day. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d

1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when

prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other

grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002).

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's Motions For Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner's motions for appointment of counsel are DENIED. (Docket # 15, # 18.) A

district court may appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever "the court

determines that the interests of justice so require and such person is financially unable to

obtain representation." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint counsel is

within the discretion of the district court. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). Appointment is mandatory only when the

circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due

process violations. See id. The interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel in

this action.

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B. Respondent's Motion To Dismiss

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences

must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an

impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if

such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

For cases in which the convictions became final before the April 24, 1996 enactment of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the petitioners had a one-year

grace period so that their petitions were due by April 24, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 978 (2001). 

The first step is to determine when the limitations period began. The one-year

limitations period for Dobshinsky started on July 31, 2001, when his judgment became final

after the 90-day period for him to petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court

expired following the denial of his petition for review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (direct review period includes the 90-day

period during which the petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari, regardless

of whether he did so). The presumptive deadline for the federal petition was July 31, 2002.

 The next step is to consider whether there is any statutory tolling of the limitations

period for the "time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). Tolling is available for the intervening period between state habeas petitions

when a petitioner files the later state habeas petition “within what California would consider

a 'reasonable time.'” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 220 (2002). 

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Dobshinsky filed his first state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sonoma

County Superior Court on July 16, 2002. By the time he filed that petition, 350 days of his

one-year limitations period had passed. After the Sonoma County Superior Court denied his

petition on August 8, 2002, another 220 days passed before Dobshinsky filed his petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal on March 17, 2003. Dobshinsky's

unexplained 7-month delay was beyond what California would consider a reasonable time to

file at the next level court and therefore does not support tolling for the gap between the

pendency of the first and the second petitions. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 201 (6-

month delay between the denial of a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal and

the filing of a new habeas petition in the California Supreme Court was unreasonable and,

consequently, tolling was not available during that period); Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165,

1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (“gap tolling” denied during periods of ten, fifteen and eighteen months

between California habeas petitions). Likewise, the unexplained delay of 493 days after the

California Court of Appeal denied his petition before he filed his habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court was beyond what California would consider a reasonable time to

file at the next level court and therefore does not support tolling for that gap. 

Statutory tolling is not available for Dobshinsky's two earlier federal habeas petitions

because an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an "application for State postconviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2001). The Supreme Court left open the question whether

the limitations period can be equitably tolled during that time, however. See id.; see also id.

at 2130 (Stevens, J., and Souter, J., concurring). Even if the pendency of the two earlier

federal petitions supported equitable tolling, they were pending for such a short amount of

time (i.e., 23 days and 132 days) that they would not toll enough time to aid Dobshinsky. If

tolling was allowed for the 155 days during which he had earlier federal petitions on file,

Dobshinsky still missed the deadline by many months. 

The last step is to decide whether the limitations period should be equitably tolled. 

Equitable tolling of the limitations period is available upon a showing of extraordinary

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circumstances beyond a petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the

petition. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997) (equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time

should only be granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond prisoner's control make it

impossible for him to file petition on time), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061, 1099 (1998),

overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

Dobshinsky appears to argue for equitable tolling based on his limited access to his

personal property and legal materials while he was in administrative segregation. 

See Docket # 15, 4th page. He does not, however, state how long or when he was in

administrative segregation. Additionally, although he alleges he had limited access to his

legal materials, he does not allege a complete denial of access to his legal materials. The

record shows that Dobshinsky made repeated, but intermittent efforts, to have his conviction

set aside after it became final: filing petitions in June 2002 (federal court), July 2002 (state

superior court), March 2003 (state court of appeal), February 2004 (federal court), August

2004 (state supreme court), and April 2006 (federal court). He paused for lengthy periods of

time between several of these petitions. He has not shown where in the time-line the

administrative segregation placement occurred, or how and why it impacted his ability to

timely file his federal petition. He has not satisfied his burden to show that the limited access

to legal materials supports equitable tolling. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153

(9th Cir. 2006). The limitations period will not be equitably tolled for the alleged limitations

on his access to legal materials while he was in administrative segregation.

Dobshinsky filed this action too late even taking into account statutory tolling for the

time each state petition was pending (but not for the gaps in between the state court petitions)

as well as equitable tolling for the pendency of his earlier federal petitions. His limitation

period began on July 31, 2001. He filed this action 1,715 days thereafter, but had only 881

days (365 days in limitations period plus 516 days of tolling) to do so. He therefore missed

the deadline by about 834 days, or more than two years. Dobshinsky's petition was not filed

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before the expiration of the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The petition

therefore will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's motions for appointment of counsel are DENIED. (Docket # 15, # 18.) 

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 13.) The petition is

dismissed because it was not timely filed. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 19, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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