Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01124/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCY MAE GRIMES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

YELLOW CAB TAXI COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 10-01124 SI

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

Presently before the Court is pro se plaintiff Lucy Mae Grimes’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) and her motion to vacate the case management conference and ADR deadlines. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DISMISSES the complaint.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has filed a complaint against Yellow Cab Taxi Company and one of its drivers, whom

she has sued as a Doe defendant. This action arises from an injury plaintiff sustained on July 25, 2009,

apparently as a result of falling in the street after exiting a Yellow Cab taxi. Plaintiff alleges that the

taxi driver acted negligently by dropping her off on the opposite side of the street from her home and

by failing to escort her safely to her door. Plaintiff has sued defendants for conspiracy, elder abuse,

negligence, and “vehicular automobile accident personal injury.”

Under the IFP statute, the Court may authorize a plaintiff to proceed in federal court without first

paying a filing fee if the plaintiff demonstrates his or her inability to pay. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Plaintiff has submitted the required documentation and shown to the Court’s satisfaction that her assets

and income are insufficient to enable her to prosecute this action at her own expense. Plaintiff’s

Case 3:10-cv-01124-SI Document 5 Filed 04/02/10 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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application to proceed without prepayment of filing fees is therefore GRANTED.

Where a plaintiff is permitted to proceed IFP, the Court must examine the plaintiff’s complaint

sua sponte to ensure that it states cognizable, non-frivolous claims. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court

must dismiss the complaint “at any time” if it finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim or to

plead a basis for federal jurisdiction. Id.; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.

1995). 

To assert a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff may either bring claims

“arising under” federal law or invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction over state law claims by showing

that the parties are citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Here, plaintiff has asserted primarily state law claims and has not shown

diversity of citizenship. The complaint states that the defendant taxi driver “resides in Northern

California,” Complaint at 1:22, indicating that there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim may potentially be a federal claim, although plaintiff does not

specify whether she brings suit under state or federal law. In any event, plaintiff fails to allege any

coherent facts in support of the conspiracy claim. Plaintiff simply states in a conclusory fashion that

the taxi driver’s actions were “inflicted covertly by one or more persons/perpetrators.” Id. at 3:23-24.

Additionally, the complaint contains allegations that are inconsistent with a conspiracy theory of

liability. See, e.g., id. at 2:27-3:3 (“It would appear that the Defendant #1, Yellow Taxi Cab Driver

(JOHN DOE), made a conspired and/or Coincidental Taxi Cab Transportation Passenger Delivery with

the intent to place [plaintiff] on the opposite side of the street from [her] Destination of Record”)

(emphasis added).

Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the majority of plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff has

pled no factual basis for her conspiracy claim, and it is apparent that these defects cannot be cured by

amendment, the complaint must be DISMISSED in full. The dismissal is without prejudice to refiling

plaintiff’s state law claims in state court. In addition, because a dismissal under the IFP statute “is not

a dismissal on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion . . . , the dismissal does not

prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

25, 34 (1992). However, even a paid complaint which does not allege a basis for federal jurisdiction

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For the Northern District of California

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would have to be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED. The dismissal is without

prejudice to refiling in state court. In addition, plaintiff’s motion to vacate the case management

conference and the ADR deadlines is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2010 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-01124-SI Document 5 Filed 04/02/10 Page 3 of 3