Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-03864/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-03864-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LOLITA SUTTON, SEQUOYAH

WILDER, CAROLYN HAMMELL,

and ROSA RICHARDSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ADVANCED CORRECTIONAL

HEALTHCARE, INC.,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:12-CV-3864-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil action originally filed by the plaintiffs, Lolita Sutton, Sequoyah

Wilder, Carolyn Hammell, and Rosa Richardson, against the defendant, Advanced

Correctional Healthcare (“ACH”). (Doc. 1). The complaint alleges that the defendant

discriminated against Sutton, Hammell, and Richardson because of their race,

1

African American, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) (Count One). The complaint also alleges that the

defendant discriminated against Hammell and Richardson, because of their age, in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et

 Plaintiff Wilder’s claims were dismissed from this suit on November 1, 2013. (Doc.

1

21). 

FILED

 2014 Mar-11 PM 04:25

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 1 of 36
seq. (“ADEA”) (Count Three). All claims arise out of the plaintiffs’ solicitation of 2

employment from the defendant.

The case comes before the court on the defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. 23), filed on November 27, 2013. For the reasons stated herein, the

motion will be GRANTED and this case will be DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. STANDARD

Under FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the

moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go

 There is no “Count Two.” 2

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 2 of 36
beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324. By its own affidavits – or

by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file – it must

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which

are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor

of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the

entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party’s

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may still be granted. Id. at 249.

How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether

that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v.

City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden

of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on

summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact – that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict

3

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 3 of 36
if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such

an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce

“significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue offact.”

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can

satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16.

First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-movant’s case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance,

the non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains

supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2)

proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on

the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant

may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific

facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). The second method a movant in this

position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence

demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.

Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering

evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought

to be negated. Id.

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 4 of 36
II. FACTS

A. Facts Proffered By the Defendant and Admitted By the Plaintiffs

This court’s summary judgment scheduling order provides:

The first section [of the non-moving party’s brief in response to the

motion for summary judgment] must consist of only the non-moving

party’s disputes, if any, with the moving party’s claimed undisputed

facts. The non-moving party’s response to the moving party’s claimed

undisputed facts shall be in separately numbered paragraphs that

coincide with those ofthe moving party’s claimed undisputed facts. Any

statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving party must be

followed by a specific reference to those portions of the evidentiary

record upon which the dispute is based. All material facts set forth in

the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be

admitted for summary judgment purposes unless controverted by the

response of the party opposing summary judgment.

 (Doc. 3 at 17) (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs’ response to the motion failed

to comply with this requirement. Accordingly, the following facts, set out exactly as

they were offered by the defendant, are deemed to be admitted:

1. ACH is a privately-held, physician-owned Illinois corporation

founded in 2002 for the purpose of providing managed inmate

healthcare services. ACH provides services to over 20,000 detainees in

17 states, and it specializes in delivering inmate healthcare services in

the county jail setting.

2. ACH develops a program customized to each individual facility

it serves, based on the facility’s healthcare system, inmate population,

healthcare concerns and issues, and facility goals. ACH contracted with

the Jefferson County Sheriff and Jefferson County to provide services

at the Jefferson County, Alabama Jail beginning December 1, 2011.

5

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 5 of 36
3. At the time that ACH entered into the Agreement with Jefferson

County, healthcare services at the Jefferson County Jail were being

provided by a different company, Health Assurance, LLC. Lolita Sutton,

Rosa Richardson, and Carolyn Hammell were employed by Health

Assurance at the Jefferson County Jail. Sutton and Richardson were

employed as medical records clerks. Hammell is an R.N., and she

provided mental health services as a psychiatric nurse.

4. Before the December 1, 2011[,] date that ACH began providing

healthcare services at the Jefferson County Jail, it accepted job

applications from the Health Assurance employees at the jail. All of the

employees who applied were interviewed by Shelley Nilsson Nordwall,

who is ACH’s Director of Human Resources, Deborah Ash, who is

ACH’s Director of Medical Operations, and Sherri Miller, who is the

Chief Operations Officer. Sutton, Richardson[,] and Hammell were

among the Health Assurance employees who applied and were

interviewed on October 26-27, 2011. Sutton and Richardson applied for

a position as Medical Clerk. Hammell applied for a position as a mental

health nurse. 

5. The Agreement set forth the duties and obligations of ACH,

including ACH’s obligations with respect to staffing the jail. In order

to be considered for employment with ACH at the Jefferson County Jail

under the Agreement, the qualifications of Health Assurance employees

had to be consistent with the Staffing Plan created by ACH in

accordance with the Agreement . . . (hereinafter referred to as the

“Staffing Plan”). Nordwall, Ash, and Miller were responsible for making

the hiring decisions consistent with the Agreement and the Staffing

Plan. Karen Fowler, a management employee of Health Assurance, who

later became employed by ACH, was not involved in the

decision-making process.

6. With regard to medical records, the Agreement provided that

ACH would provide certified medical assistants and/or medical record

clerks. Based on the Jefferson County Jail’s healthcare system, inmate

population, healthcare concerns and issues and facility goals, ACH and

Jefferson County agreed to utilize Certified Medical Assistants (CMAs)

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 6 of 36
rather than medical records clerks to perform the medical records

function. CMA[]s are certified to be able to assist nurses when

necessary, whereas medical records clerks are not qualified to do so.

7. Based upon the Agreement and the Staffing Plan, ACH filled its

medical records positions with CMA[]s rather than medical records

clerks. Neither Sutton nor Richardson was a CMA. Because Sutton and

Richardson were not CMA[]s, they did not meet the qualifications for

the medical records positions and were not selected for employment by

ACH. . . . 3

8. The following individuals, who were qualified CMA[]s based

upon their applications and certifications, were hired by ACH to fill the

medical records positions: Tamara Tolbert, a 36-year old African

American female, Vonnie Hedgepath, a 39-year old Caucasian female,

and Devin Pickett, a 33-year old African American female. At the time

of its initial staffing of the jail, ACH did not hire any individuals to

performmedical records [sic], other than CMA[]s. Since ACH has been

providing healthcare services at the Jefferson County Jail, it has

employed no medical records clerks at the jail.

9. Pursuant to the Agreement and Staffing Plan, mental health

services were to be provided by Qualified Mental Health Professionals

(such aslicensed professional counselors or clinicalsocial workers) and

not R.N.s. Hammell is not a licensed professional counselor or clinical

social worker. Because Hammell is an R.N. and not a Qualified Mental

Health Professional, she was not qualified to perform as a mental health

worker under the Agreement and she was not selected for employment. 

. . . 

4

 The court omits the following conclusory language originally offered here by the 3

defendant: “The decision not to hire Richardson and Sutton was unrelated to race or age. It was

also unrelated to the two employee's experience or seniority at Health Assurance. The decision

was based solely on the fact that Richardson and Sutton did not meet the qualifications for the

positions because they were not CMA[]s.”

 The court omits the following conclusory language originally offered here by the 4

defendant: “The decision not to hire Hammell was unrelated to race or age. It was also unrelated

7

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 7 of 36
10. At the time of the staffing decisions, there was another R.N.

working for Health Assurance at the jail as a psychiatric nurse: Christine

Ray, a Caucasian female. Just like Hammell, Ray was not hired by ACH

because she was not a Qualified Mental Health Professional and did not

meet the qualifications to be a mental health service provider.

11. ACH hired two individuals who were qualified for the available

mental health worker positions, Glenda Marzette Campbell, a 55

year-old African-American female, and Matthew Foster, a 53-year old

Caucasian male. Both Campbell and Foster were licensed professional

counselors. At the time of its initial staffing of the jail, ACH did not

hire anyR.N.s as mental health workers. Since ACH has been providing

healthcare services at the Jefferson County Jail, it has employed no

R.N.s as mental health workers.

12. Hammell believesthat it is more likely that ACH failed to hire her

due to her race rather than due to her age. Richardson believes “it was

a little bit of both” race and age that caused her not to be hired.

13. During the pendency of this lawsuit, on July 5, 2013, Hammell

filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Northern District of Alabama bearing case number

13-03042-TOM7. Within the petition, Hammell listed all of her assets.

In doing so, she failed to list thislawsuit or otherwise identify her claims

against ACH. In particular, with regard to the category: “other

contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature,” Hammell listed no

assets. Hammell declared under penalty of perjury that her asset

schedule was true and correct.

14. On October 7, 2103, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court entered an Order

discharging Hammell from bankruptcy.

to her experience or seniority at Health Assurance. The decision was based solely on the fact that

Hammell did not meet the qualifications for the mental health worker position.”

8

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 8 of 36
(Doc. 24 at 2-8) (footnotes and citations omitted).

B. Additional Facts5

1. Lolita Sutton

Lolita Sutton started working in the Jefferson County Jail as a medical records

clerk in approximately 2004, when the health care contract was between the jail and

Cooper Green. Sutton is an African American female.

2. Carolyn Hammell

Carolyn Hammell began working in the jail in the summer of 2006, where she

was primarily employed as the mental health nurse. (Doc. 25-4 at 10(33)). When

6

asked in deposition whether her duties were the same throughout her employment,

she stated:

There were changes from time to time. I was asked to go to booking

from time to time to work, but, basically, my position was mental health

nurse. But I wore a number of hats. As I said, I assisted and sort of

supervised the LPNs, what they were doing as far as making sure that

the inmates were receiving their injections, and also the drug abuse

protocol was given as well.

(Doc. 25-4 at 11(36)). Hammell is an African American female who was over the age

 The court has taken the facts offered by the plaintiffs and, if not disputed, included

5

them here verbatim without citation. Otherwise, the facts have been cast in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and citations have been included.

 When the court cites to travel transcripts, the court notes first the document number 6

(e.g. “Doc. 25-4"), then the specific page of that document number to which the court cites (e.g.

“at 10"), and finally the specific deposition page appearing on the record page (e.g. “(33)”). 

9

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 9 of 36
of forty at the time of the events made the basis of this litigation.

3. Rosa Richardson

Rosa Richardson worked as a medical records clerk in the jail beginning in

2004, when Augmentation was the company contracted by Jefferson County. 

Richardson is an African American female who was over the age of forty at the time

of the events made the basis of this litigation.

4. Karen Fowler

Karen Fowler became the Director of Nursing for Health Assurance during the

plaintiffs’ tenure with Health Assurance, effectively making Fowler the plaintiffs’

supervisor. Fowleris currently employed by ACHas a Health Services Administrator,

and she essentially is responsible for managing the medical staff working in the jail. 

Fowler does not remember the date that she first became aware that ACH was

going to replace Health Assurance. (Doc. 25-5 at 5(12)). She just remembersthatshe

“received a phone call one morning that Health Assurance had lost the contract.” 

(Doc. 25-5 at 5(12)). She also remembers that she received the call “within a few

days before [she was] introduced to some employees of ACH. It might have been the

same day.” (Doc. 25-5 at 5(12)). Fowler was referring to a meeting she had in the

10

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 10 of 36
Fall of 2011 with Ash, Miller, and another person fromACH named ShelleyNilsson. 

7

(Doc. 25-5 at 5(13)). The three told Fowler that “[t]hey were going to be -- they were

with the new contract company for the medical department at the jail.” (Doc. 25-5

at 5(14)). They did not offer Fowler a job at that meeting. (Doc. 25-5 at 5(14)).

Fowler officially began working for ACH on December 1, 2011. (Doc. 25-5

at 6(17)). She completed an application for employment with ACH which is also

dated December 1, 2011. (Doc. 25-5 at 7(19)). Although she does not know the

exact date, Fowler is sure that she was offered employment with ACH prior to

December 1, 2011. (Doc. 25-5 at 6(18)). She was also sure that the latest possible

date she was offered the job was October 27, 2011. (Doc. 25-5 at 8(24)). Fowler

signed a written Offer of Employment on October 27, 2011, accepting the position

she currently holds. (Doc. 25-5 at 7(20)).

5. The October 26, 2011, Meeting; the October 27, 2011,

Interviews

On October 26, 2011, a meeting was held at the jail during which Sheriff Mike

Hale, Fowler, and three representatives of ACH discussed the new medical services

contract with the Health Assurance employees. Those who wished to work for ACH

 It is not especially clear in the filings, but the parties seem to agree on this date. 7

Regardless, the date is proffered by the plaintiffs and is not specifically disputed by the

defendant.

11

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 11 of 36
were asked at that meeting to complete an application and then were interviewed on

October 27, 2011. Each plaintiff recalls the meetings and interviews somewhat

differently. Accordingly, the court will set out of the cited testimony here.

The following exchange took place in Hammell’s deposition:

Q. You mentioned a second ago some type of meeting where it was

discussed. Do you remember what you were told about the fact that

Health Assurance was no longer going to have a contract?

A. I think the sheriff was in there as well, and I can't recall if he

spoke first or Karen Fowler. He may have spoke first, but we were told

that Health Assurance no longer had the contract. I think the sheriff may

have mentioned it first, but there was another company taking over, and

that all of us would have a position.

Q. And that was Sheriff Hale that said that?

A. That is correct.

(Doc. 25-4 at 15(51-52)). 

The following exchange took place in Richardson’s deposition:

Q. All right. So some point after that first meeting with Dr. Reddix,

some folks from Advanced Correctional appear at the jail one morning,

and they let you know who they are?

A. Right.

Q. And that if you're going to want to work for them, there's a

process, and it involves filling out an application?

A. Right.

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 12 of 36
Q. And you filled out an application?

A. Yes.

. . . 

Q. At some point, did you talk to anybody at Advanced Correctional

about a job at Advanced Correctional?

A. Well, when we went -- after we filled out the application, one by

one they would call everybody downstairs in the conference room and

speak with them, you know. And, you know, they would introduce

themselves and that they would be taking over, you know, from Health

Assurance. 

Q. And so did you have one of those meetings?

A. Yeah. It was a one-on-one.

Q. Okay. And you say one-on-one. Was it just --

A. No, it was three of them.

Q. So there's three people from Advanced Correctional?

A. Right.

Q. And you went down in the basement room and met with them?

A. Right.

. . . 

A. They talked about, you know, of course that they would be taking

over and, you know, about the application. They were going to do

everything they could to, you know, maybe try to employ everybody. So

anyway, and they would be getting back to us and letting us know who

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 13 of 36
was going to leave and who was staying.

(Doc. 25-3 at 11(34-37)).

The following exchange took place in Sutton’s deposition:

Q. Okay. So the first meeting you remember, though, where the idea

of AdvancedCorrectional coming in was discussed, there was a meeting

where Mike Hale was present, Ms. Fowler was present, and some other

people from Advanced Correctional were present?

A. Yes, and all the other employees that was there.

Q. All the Health Assurance employees?

A. Yes, sir, that was working actually at the jail, yes.

Q. And there was basically an announcement that Advanced

Correctional was going to be taking over the contract?

A. Yes. And he said that you all will have y’all’s jobs. That was

Mike Hale. You know, he said all of you all don't worry. All of yaall

[sic] are going to have your jobs.

Q. All right. So you're saying Mike Hale said during this meeting,

you all don't worry, all of y'all will have your jobs?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, but a minute ago you were also telling me about somebody

from Advanced Correctional telling you y'all have to fill out

applications?

A. Right.

Q. Was this in the same meeting?

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 14 of 36
A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you also mention that y'all would have to have

interviews?

A. As they said, well, we've just got to go through a process. You all

are going to have interviews and fill out applications in case we have to

change different shifts.

Q. All right. And while you say Mike Hale said y'all don't have to

worry, all of y’all will have jobs, nobody from Advanced Correctional

said that during that meeting, did they?

A. Well, Ms. Fowler bowed her head and the lady from Advanced

Correctional -- because I don't recall who asked the question -- well, it

may have been me, I don't know -- why we have to fill out these

applications then and go through another interview if that's the case.

And they said -- their response was: Everybody will have their jobs but

we may have to change, you know, shifts. We may have to put people

on different shifts. 

Q. And who is it that you say said that?

A. Somebody from Advanced Correctional. I don't recall her name.

Q. Before this meeting you've described, had you heard from

anybody that Health Assurance was not keeping the contract?

A. No, sir.

Q. Because before this meeting you didn't know there was any

chance that there was going to be changing of who the employer was

going to be?

A. No, sir, I didn't know there was going to be any change at all.

Q. And when was it that you think this meeting happened?

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A. I’m going to say the early part of November, like November the

1st or something, you know. Or it may have been October the 29th. But

I know it was in that, you know –

Q. In the late October or early November time frame?

A. Yes. Yes, sir.

Q. All right. After that meeting, sometime after that meeting, you did

fill out an application for employment with Advanced Correctional?

A. They passed out the applicationsright then in the meeting and we

had to fill them out right then in the meeting. And we filled them out in

the meeting, they collected applications in that meeting also, and set up

interview times.

(Doc. 25-2 at 21(75)-22(79)).

Each of the plaintiffs filled out an application for employment with ACH. 

Sutton and Richardson applied to be medical records clerks–the same position which

they held with Health Assurance. Hammell applied to work as a mental health

nurse–the same position she held with Health Assurance. Each was interviewed by

the three ACH representatives. None of the plaintiffs were offered a position with

ACH. 

Fowler (who had been the plaintiffs’ supervisor for several years prior to these

interviews) admits thatshe discussed the applicants with the ACH officers, but denies

having any memory of what was discussed. The following exchange took place in

her deposition:

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Q. Okay. Were you questioned by anyone at ACH about these

applicants and whether or not they should be hired?

A. Say that again.

Q. Were you asked about any of these applicants? Was your opinion

on whether or not they should be hired sought by the ACH people?

A. I can’t remember specific questions like -- I don't really know

what kind of questions you’re wanting me to know.

Q. Okay. I’ll give you a hypothetical. If I'm about to hire a whole

bunch of people and I have already offered a job to the person who is

their boss, before I hire these people, I'm going to ask their boss what

their boss thinks of them as an employee. Were you asked for or did you

offer any opinions on the applicants to ACH?

. . . 

A. I don’t remember being asked like – I don't remember a whole lot

about that.

Q. Okay. So you might have? You just don't remember?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Just so we’re clear, it’s your testimony that you do not know

whether or not you gave your opinion of any of these applicants to the

people at ACH?

. . . 

A. Generalizations, we talked about the employees that worked there.

(Doc. 25-5 at 9(28-29)). 

Fowler’s handwriting appears on a document listing the names and original

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Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 17 of 36
hire dates of the Health Assurance employees. (Doc. 26-7 at 1). She wrote, her name, 

“11/03" which is her hire date, and the phrase “offer PT” next to two names on the

list. (Doc. 26-7 at 1). There is no dispute that this phrase means “offer part-time.”

6. November 2011

Sutton stated in her deposition that “sometime in November” Fowler called her

into her office and Sutton met with Fowler and “four employees of Advanced

Correctional.” (Doc. 25-2 at 24). Sutton stated that “[t]hey said that we -- you know,

we would like to -- we went through this and we know that you are very qualified for

everything, but we are not going to be able to keep you because we are not -- we’re

not having this position anymore.” (Doc. 25-2 at 24(88)). She says that she

continued to work for Health Assurance for “a couple of weeks after that meeting.”

(Doc. 25-2 at 25(90). Sutton stated that both before and after that meeting

Advanced Correctional, they would come with like different people, I

guess different people they was going to hire and they would -- you

know, they would come to our office or whatever. And then they would

come around to the medical records area and would tell us, you know,

to train people.

(Doc. 25-2 at 25(91). 

8

ACH representatives also met with Richardson to tell her that she would not

 The plaintiffs cite this section of Sutton’s deposition for the proposition that she and 8

Richardson were asked to train “their replacements.” (Doc. 26 at 6). However, this section of

Sutton’s deposition does not support that these individuals were plaintiffs’ replacements.

18

Case 2:12-cv-03864-VEH Document 28 Filed 03/11/14 Page 18 of 36
be hired. In her deposition, Richardson stated that, at some point after this meeting,

she was at work, 

doing what I do, and [a person from Advanced Correctional] came in

with another lady. I don't remember her name. But anyway, she said she

wanted to know if this lady could spend the day with me and, you know,

to learn my position, what I did, how I did it, and, you know, whatever.

(Doc. 25-3 at 13(42-44)).

Hammell too had a meeting where ACH representatives told her she would not

be hired. At no time, however, did ACH informHammell that the position of “mental

health nurse” was to be eliminated. During Hammell’s October 27, 2011, interview

9

she was asked if she would be willing to work as the “booking nurse,” and she

informed them that she would be. Upon being informed her position had been

eliminated, Hammell inquired specifically about the booking nurse position, but was

told it was unavailable. 

It is undisputed that four RN positions were filled by ACH. (Original fact doc.

26 at 6; admitted doc. 27 at 3). Three of the nurses who filled these positions are

Caucasian.10

 The portion of Hammell’s deposition which was cited does not support the plaintiffs’ 9

additional assertion that “as an RN she is qualified for any RN position in the jail.” (Doc. 26 at 6

(citing 25-4 at 17(58)-18(62)). 

 The plaintiffs also cite Richardson’s deposition for the proposition that “[o]f the four 10

RN positions filled by ACH . . . all are younger than Hammell.” (Doc. 26 at 6-7 (citing 25-3 at

“page 70"). There is no page 70 to the Richardson deposition. The plaintiffs have cited no

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7. Miscellaneous Facts

According to Fowler, it is possible to work in medical records without any sort

of certification or degree in the field. Fowler’s unlicenced administrative assistant

currently handles a large portion of the medical records responsibility, as ACH

currently employs no Certified Medical Assistants at the jail.

On December 17, 2013, Hammell, through her bankruptcy attorney, filed a

Motion to Reopen her bankruptcy estate, and an amended schedule of assets listing

this litigation as an unliquidated claim.

III. ANALYSIS 

A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework

The plaintiffs’ allege violations of Title VII and the ADEA. “Title VII prohibits

employers from discriminating against any individual with respect to the terms of

employment on the basis of race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).” Phillips v.

Aaron Rents, Inc., 262 Fed. Appx. 202, 207 (11th Cir. 2008). “The ADEA prohibits

11

employers from discharging an employee who is at least 40 years of age because of

that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a).” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d

additional support for this allegation.

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

11

persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.

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1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013). When those claims are based, as they are here, on

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the court analyzes them using the familiar

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327,

1331-33 (11th Cir. 2013) (ADEA); Dominguez v. Lake Como Club, 520 Fed. App’x.

937, 940 (11th Cir. 2013) (Title VII) . Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 

a plaintiffmust first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which

the defendant can rebut by offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the allegedly discriminatory act. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147

L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). “In other words, the defendant must produc[e]

evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred,

for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75

L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It

is important to bear in mind ... that the defendant's burden of rebuttal is

exceedingly light.... At this stage of the inquiry, the defendant need not

persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the

defendant's burden is merely one of production, not proof.” Perryman

v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.1983) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

If the defendant successfully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie

case, “the presumption of discrimination is eliminated.” Chapman v. AI

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). To survive

summary judgment, the plaintiff must then “come forward with

evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the

prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude

that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the

adverse employment decision.” Id. (quoting Combs v. Plantation

Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir.1997)); see also Reeves, 530

U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. at 2106; Perryman, 698 F.2d at 1142. To show

that the employer's reasons were pretextual, the plaintiff must

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demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate

reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them

unworthy of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. “If the plaintiff does

not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether each of the defendant employer's articulated reasons

is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the

plaintiff's claim.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024–25; see also Combs, 106

F.3d at 1529 (explaining that the plaintiff must present “sufficient

evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact asto the

truth of each of the employer's proffered reasons for its challenged

action”).

Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004). 

B. The Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish A Prima Facie Case of Race

or Age Discrimination

1. The Plaintiffs Have Failed To Inform the Court or the Parties

which Elements Form the Basis of Their Claims

The defendant argues first that the plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case

of race or age discrimination. The plaintiffs have not cited any set of prima facie

elements to consider. It is important for the plaintiffs to set this out because, as the

12

 They do cite one case, writing: 12

Defendant also misses the fact that “eliminating” a position by changing

the title or shifting duties gives rise to a different standard.

A variant of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case applies

where a position is eliminated; namely, (1) that the plaintiff was in

a protected age group and was adversely affected by an

employment decision; (2) that she was qualified for her current

position or to assume another position at the time of discharge or

demotion; and (3) evidence by which a fact finder might

reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate on

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Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases,”

cautioning that not every such case will have the same elements. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 802, n. 13. For example, one version of the prima facie elements for both

Title VII and ADEA claims requires the plaintiff to show that “(1) she was a member

of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for an available position;

(3) she was rejected; and (4) the defendant filled the position with a person outside

the protected class.” Childress v. Caterpillar Logistics Servs., Inc., 369 F. App'x 95,

96 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Walker v. Prudential Prop. And Cas.

Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 (11th Cir.2002). By contrast, in McDonnell

13

Douglas, the court noted that the plaintiff in a failure to hire race discrimination case

the basis of age in reaching the decision at issue. Earley v.

Champion Int'l. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.1990).

“Where a particular job position is entirely eliminated for

nondiscriminatory reasons, for a plaintiff to prevail against his

employer he must show that he was qualified for another available

job with that employer; qualification for his current position is not

enough.” Id.

Archie v. Home-Towne Suites, LLC, 749 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2010).

(Doc. 26 at 10). However, the only forms of discrimination addressed in Archie are age and

gender discrimination. The case does not address race discrimination. Also, the plaintiffs cite

these elements only to show that the defendant has somehow referred to the wrong elements of

the prima facie case. (Doc. 26 at 10) (“Defendant also misses the fact that “eliminating” a

position by changing the title or shifting duties gives rise to a different standard.”). They make

no attempt to prove each of these elements once they cite them. Still, the court addresses the

Earley elements in this section and the next.

 The defendant cites to the same formulation used in Childress. (Doc. 24 at 9). 13

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could establish a prima facie case “by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;

(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking

applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he wasrejected; and (iv) that, after his

rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants

from persons of complainant's qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.

at 802 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, “[t]he elements of a prima-facie case of discrimination under the

ADEA will vary depending on what theory the employee uses to prove his case.” 

Israel v. Sonic-Montgomery FLM, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 

Either the Childress or the McDonnell Douglas elements could apply as well in the

context of an age case. Childress, 369 F. App'x at 96 (Title VII and ADEA); Eskra

v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting a

formulation of the prima facie case under the ADEA requires a showing that “the

position [for which the plaintiff applied and was qualified] remained open or was

filled by a person outside the protected class.”).14

Further, in Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1990), the

Eleventh Circuit articulated a third test applicable to so-called “reduction-in-force”

 “In an ADEA action, the plaintiff is not required to show that the replacement 14

employee was under the age of 40, and outside the protected class.” Eskra v. Provident Life &

Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997).

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cases to be proved by circumstantial evidence. In such cases

a plaintiff in a job-reduction case can establish a prima facie case by

demonstrating (1) that he was in a protected age group and was

adversely affected by an employment decision; (2) that he was qualified

for his current position or to assume another position at the time of

discharge or demotion; and (3) evidence by which a fact finder might

reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate on the

basis of age in reaching the decision at issue. 

Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 1990) (ADEA claim).

The same reduction-in-force analysis can apply in Title VII cases. Standard v.

A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998).

By citing to the Childress, McDonnell Douglas, and Earley formulations, the

court does not mean to imply that these are the only possible methods to prove a

prima facie case. The court merely cites alternative approaches which, in addition to

others, were available to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff always has “the burden of [first] proving by the preponderance of

the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). The

plaintiffs set out no elements for this court to consider on either claim. “‘There is no

burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made

based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onusis upon the

parties to formulate arguments.’” McIntyre v. Eckerd Corp., 251 F. App'x 621, 626

25

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(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599

(11th Cir.1995). If the plaintiffs chose not to set out, or prove, the elements of their

prima facie case of race and age discrimination, then the court will not guess at the

proper elements, or what proof supportsthem. For thisreason alone, the race and age

discrimination claims must fail.

2. The Plaintiffs Did Not Apply for a Job for which the Employer

Was Seeking Applicants

If this court used the Childress or McDonnell Douglas formulations of the

prima facie case, the plaintiffs’ claims would still fail because those formulations

require the plaintiffs to show that they applied for a position that was available. As

noted above, the plaintiffs applied for the same positions they held with Health

Assurance. Sutton and Richardson applied to be medical records clerks. Hammell

is an R.N. who applied to work as a mental health nurse. However, these positions

were not available at ACH. ACH agreed with the County to utilize CMAsrather than

medical records clerks to perform the medical records function. It is undisputed that

“ACH filled its medical records positions with CMA[]s rather than medical records

clerks.” (Doc. 24 at 5). Mental health services were to be provided by Qualified

15

 Despite the fact that no CMAs are currently employed at the jail, and that at this time

15

“a large portion of the medical records responsibility” is handled by “Fowler’s unlicensed

administrative assistant” (proffered fact at Doc. 26 at 7; admitted at doc. 27 at 4), at the time the

CMAs were hired, and the plaintiffs were not, the CMAs handled these functions.

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Mental Health Professionals (such as licensed professional counselors or clinical

social workers) and not RNs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not apply for any

available positions.

3. There Is No Evidence that there Were Other Positions at ACH

for which the Plaintiffs Were Qualified

In response to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs applied for positions

which were not available, the plaintiffs state

[b]ecause the plaintiffs were all basically instructed to apply for the

positions they currently held with HA, they were not given the

opportunity to compete for any other position for which they may have

been qualified. The defendant’s misrepresentation to the plaintiffs that

they would be keeping their jobs should not operate as an escape from

liability after the fact.

(Doc. 26 at 11). They state that “Sutton and Richardson did apply to be medical 16

records clerks, because that is what they were led to believe they should do.” (Doc.

26 at 9). The plaintiffs also state that “[n]one of the plaintiffs were informed that 17

their designated positions would be eliminated, and all therefore ‘applied’ for the

 The plaintiffs cite to no evidence in support of this statement. 16

 To support this statement, they merely write “(Exhibit A, pp. 76-78)” without 17

specifically setting out the relevant evidence therein. The citation is to Sutton’s deposition where

she, among other things, states that at the October 26, 2011, meeting, Hale “said all of you all

don't worry. All of y'all are going to have your jobs.” (Doc. 25-2 at 21(76)). Sutton also testified

that at that same meeting “they said, well, we've just got to go through a process. You all are

going to have interviews and fill out applications in case we have to change different shifts.” 

(Doc. 25-2 at 21(77)). Sutton testified that “the lady from [ACH]” said “[e]verybody will have

their jobs but we may have to change, you know, shifts. We may have to put people on different

shifts.” (Doc. 25-2 at 21(77)-22(78)).

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position they held at the time.” (Doc. 26 at 10). In other words, but for the

18

 In support of this statement, they again merely write “(Exhibit A, pp. 84-85) (Exhibit 18

B, pp. 58-61) (Exhibit C, p. 38)” without specifically setting out the relevant evidence therein. 

The first part of the citation is a portion of Sutton’s deposition where she discusses her interview

on October 27, 2011, at which representatives from ACH asked her what she did in medical

records, and whether she would be willing to change her shift. (Doc. 25-2 at 23(84)). The

following exchange took place in Sutton’s deposition:

Q. So your testimony is that one of the women who was there from Advanced

Correctional said: Thank you, we'll be letting you know what shift you'll be on?

A. Yes. But two of them was asking, you know, questions. One of them was

asking me, well, are you willing to change to another shift, and another one will

ask you, you know, even a night shift. And then both of them said: Okay, we'll be

letting you know what shift you'll be on and whether or not you'll be still in

medical records or not. And I said: Okay.

Q. Say that last part again. Whether or not you'll still be in medical records?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any discussion during the interview about whether they would

have medical records clerks?

A. No. They asked me what I did in medical records, no.

(Doc. 25-2 at 23(84-85)). The next portion of the citation is to Hammell’s deposition where she

states that, in her October 27, 2011, interview she was asked 

would I be willing to work in booking. . . . I said, yeah, I would be willing to work

in booking from time to time, because I’ve done it before. But I had no idea that

my job as mental health was about to be terminated. I said, but, you know, I'm the

mental health nurse, and that's all. They didn't give me an option of saying, well,

the mental health nurse is going to be -- we're going to not have a mental health

nurse, and we're going to use someone else. That was never told to me. So I think

they were just really trying to -- I think that was their way of being really

underhanded, for lack of a better word. . . . Because they could have told me at

that point, Ms. Hammell, we will no longer – we're going to phase out the mental

health position, and so the booking nurse’s job will be open. Are you willing to

take that as your full-time position now? It was not given to me that way. It was

not proposed to me that way.

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representations that they “would have a job,” and that the application process was a

mere formality, the plaintiffs would have applied for other positions that were

actually available.

The court assumes that a formulation of the prima facie case which includes

being tricked into applying for positions which did not exist would be similar to the

formulation in Earley, which deals with the scenario where a reduction-in-force

eliminatesthe plaintiff’s position. In that case, the plaintiffs still must show that there

was some position which existed and for which each plaintiff was qualified. Earley,

907 F.2d at 1082. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs were not qualified for the new

positions which encompassed their old responsibilities. The plaintiffs have 19

produced no evidence that any other positions existed for which they were qualified.

a. Sutton and Richardson

The plaintiffs write that it is “undisputed that each of the plaintiffs had been

working in her particular position without incidentfor several years,” and that “[b]oth

Sutton and Richardson had all the qualifications needed to work as medical records

(Doc. 25-4 at 17(60-61)). Hammell also states that she “was led to believe that I was going to get

a position.” (Doc. 25-4 at 17(59)). The final part of the citation is to Richardson’s deposition

where she states that she was applying for a medical records position. (Doc. 25-3 at 12(38)). 

 Neither Sutton nor Richardson was a CMA and so did not meet the qualifications for 19

the medical records positions. Hammell is not a licensed professional counselor or clinical social

worker, and so she was not qualified to perform as a mental health worker.

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clerks in the jail. They had, in fact, been performing these duties (as well as assisting

in other ways if needed) since 2004, and maintained these positions through at least

one contract change.” (Doc. 26 at 8-9). These statements demonstrate only that the

20

plaintiffs may have been qualified to perform their old positions. However, “[w]here

a particular job position is entirely eliminated for nondiscriminatory reasons, for

plaintiff to prevail against his employer he must show that he was qualified for

another available job with that employer; qualification for his current position is not

enough. Earley, 907 F.2d at 1082-83.

As the defendant notes in its reply brief, “ACH does not dispute that Sutton and

Richardson are capable of performing the duties of a medical records clerk. 

However, it is undisputed that, at the time ACH took over the contract at the Jefferson

County Jail, it hired no medical records clerks.” (Doc. 27 at 6). In the absence of

evidence, or even an argument, that Sutton and Richardson were qualified to perform

some other job at ACH, those plaintiffs’ claims must fail.

b. Hammell

The plaintiffs also state: “Hammell is a licensed Registered Nurse who is

qualified to hold any RN position in the jail.” (Doc. 26 at 9). While it is undisputed

 The plaintiffs also state that “Sutton and Richardson were even asked by ACH 20

representatives to train their replacements.” (Doc. 26 at 9). As noted above, while the evidence

shows that they were asked to train individuals, there is no evidence that these persons were 

“their replacements.” 

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that ACH filled four RN positions at the jail, the plaintiffs provide no evidence as to

the nature of the positions, or the qualifications for each. The court does not accept

that somehow all RN positions are the same. While being an RN may have been one

qualification for the other positions, without evidence as to the nature of the other

positions (positions for which Hammell did not apply), the court cannot say that she

was qualified just because she was an RN. The other positions may have had

specialized requirements beyond merely being an RN.21

4. There Is No Evidence that any of the Plaintiffs Were Replaced

by Someone outside of their Protected Class. Nor Is there

Evidence from which a Fact Finder Might Reasonably

Conclude that the Employer Intended To Discriminate Against

the Plaintiffs in Reaching the Decision at Issue. 

Because the plaintiffs’ positions were eliminated, they cannot satisfy the fourth

element of the prima facie case as stated by Childress–evidence that the defendant

filled the position with a person outside the protected class. 

The McDonnell Douglas formulation requires the plaintiff to show “that, after

his rejection, the position [for which the plaintiff was qualified and applied] remained

open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's

qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant’s brief

 The plaintiffs also note that Hammell “has on occasion worked in booking and other 21

positions.” (Doc. 26 at 9). This vague statement does not identify a position at ACH for which

Hammell was qualified.

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seems to implicate the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case when it states that 

the specific positions Plaintiffs applied for were not filled. Sutton and

Richardson both applied to work as medical records clerks. It is

undisputed that ACH did not hire any medical records clerks on

December 1, 2011[,] and has not employed any medical records clerks

since that date. Similarly, Hammell applied for employment as a mental

health nurse. It is undisputed that ACH did not hire any mental health

nurse on December 1, 2011[,] and has not employed a mental health

nurse since that date.

(Doc. 24 at 10) (emphasis added). There is a difference between the plaintiffs

applying for a non-existent position, and a position that existed, but just has not yet

been filled. The defendant’s wording in this paragraph implies the latter scenario. 

However, the plaintiffs have not argued this theory, and, even if they had, they have

presented no evidence that the defendant continued to seek applicants for the

positions for which the plaintiffs applied.

Finally, using the Earley formulation, the court would look to see if there was

evidence by which a factfinder mightreasonably conclude that the employer intended

to discriminate on the basis of age or race in reaching the decision at issue. Again,

although the plaintiffs refer to this requirement in their brief, they make no attempt

to satisfy it.

22

 Indeed, in this case, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Sutton and 22

Richardson were not hired to be CMAs--a position for which they were not qualified and did not

apply. However it is undisputed that two out of the three CMA positions were filled by African

Americans. Hammell was not hired as a mental health worker–a position for which she was not

qualified. However, one of the two individuals hired to fill these positions was African

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The plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 

Accordingly, their claims must fail.

C. Pretext

Even if the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination (and

they have not), and thereby created a presumption of discrimination, “the employer

may rebut the resulting presumption of discrimination by articulating at least one

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Mitchell v. City of LaFayette,

504 F. App'x 867, 870 (11th Cir. 2013). “Once the employer articulates a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

produce evidence that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” 

Mitchell, 504 F. App'x at 870.

1. The Plaintiffs Have Not Shown that the Reasons that Sutton

and Richardson Were Not Hired Were Pretextual

The plaintiffs argue:

Defendant alleges that plaintiffs Sutton and Richardson were not

hired because it chose to employ “certified medical assistants” instead

American. Further, it is undisputed that a Caucasian psychiatric nurse, Christine Ray, was, like

Hammell, also not hired because she did not meet the requirements to be a mental health services

provider at the jail. (Doc. 24 at 6). As to the age claims, although Hammell and Richardson

state that they were “over the age of [f]orty at the time of the events made the basis of this

litigation,” they do not specify their exact age so the best the court can do is say that they were at

least forty. The individuals hired for the two mental health worker positions were ages 53 and

55. Based on the evidence presented, the court cannot say that these individuals were

substantially younger (or even younger at all) than Hammell and Richardson.

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of medical records clerks. However, ACH no longer employs any

certified medical assistants to manage medical records at the jail, and it

appears that Fowler’s secretary does the bulk of it. (Exhibit D, pp.

48-50). No certification is required to work in medical records, and

ACH belies its own alleged reason by using an unlicenced individual to

perform these tasks currently. (Exhibit D, pp. 36, 48-50).

(Doc. 26 at 11). However, the defendant does not argue that CMAs were required

because “certification” is necessary to do the plaintiffs’ old job. The defendantstates

that it hired CMAs to handle records because “CMA[]s are [also] certified to be able

to assist nurses when necessary, whereas medical records clerks are not qualified to

do so.” (Doc. 24 at 4). The defendant states that CMAs were hired because they

“could perform dual functions of patient care of medical records.” (Doc. 24 at 12). 

As the Eleventh Circuit has said:

A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer's proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that

of the employer. Provided that the proffered reason is one that might

motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason

head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply

quarreling with the wisdom of that reason. See Alexander v. Fulton

County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir.2000) (Title VII case) (“[I]t

is not the court's role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer's

decisions as long as the decisions are not racially motivated.”); Combs,

106 F.3d at 1541–43. We have recognized previously and we reiterate

today that:

[f]ederal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department

that reexamines an entity's business decisions. . . .”

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (footnotes omitted). The plaintiffs have not successfully

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identified, much less met head on and rebutted the defendant’s reason for not hiring

Sutton and Richardson.

2. The Plaintiffs Have Not Shown that the Reason that Hammell

Was Not Hired Was Pretextual

The defendant states that Hammell was not hired because it did not hire any

pyschiatric nurses, and instead hired only Qualified Mental Health Professionals to

work in the mental health position. (Doc. 24 at 12). In response, the plaintiffs argue:

Hammell was obviously qualified to fill any RN position at the

jail, even if the position of “mental health” nurse no longer existed.

ACH readily admits that it still has several Registered Nurses on staff

there, but alleges that Hammell could not be hired simply because there

is no longer a “mental health” nurse. She was not given one of the

booking nurse positions, for which she was clearly qualified, at it

appears that ACH refused to even consider her. 

(Doc. 26 at 12). As the court has noted, there is no evidence that Hammell was

qualified to fill “any RN position” in the jail, including the booking nurse position,

despite the fact that she was asked about it in her interview. Regardless, the fact that

Hammell is qualified for another position is not evidence that the reason she was not

hired is false, much less that discrimination was the real reason. See, Brooks v. Cnty.

Comm'n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A reason is

not pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and

that discrimination was the real reason.’” (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). Indeed, the evidence

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indicates that discrimination was not the reason as it is undisputed that a Caucasian

psychiatric nurse, Christine Ray, was, like Hammell, also not hired because she did

not meet the requirements to be a mental health services provider at the jail. (Doc.

24 at 6). The plaintiffs have not shown pretext.23 24

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

will be GRANTED, and this case will be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

DONE this 11th day of March, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

 The plaintiffs also try to establish pretext by arguing that Fowler was involved in the 23

hiring process, and that she had discriminatory motive. However, it is undisputed that Fowler

“was not involved in the decision-making process.” (Doc. 24 at 4).

 Since the court finds that the plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case, or 24

shown pretext, the court will not discuss the argument that Hammell’s claims are subject to

judicial estoppel.

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