Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01583/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shahid Millkelller Mutee,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-16-1583-PHX-SRB (JFM)

CR-95-0150-PHX-SRB

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed through counsel a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on May 23, 2016 (Doc. 1). On August 5, 2016 

Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 4). Movant filed a Reply on August 25, 2016 

(Doc. 5).

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned 

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to 

Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. ACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On May 4, 1996, Movant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession 

of a firearm. (CR Doc. 1.) (Docket entries in the underlying criminal case, CR-95-0150-

PHX-SRB, are referenced herein as “CR Doc. ___.”) Movant proceeded to trial and was 

found guilty of the charge. 

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Subsequently, the Government filed a Notice (CR Doc. 63) seeking an enhanced 

sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), in particular 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e). The Government followed with a Sentencing Memorandum (CR Doc. 74), 

arguing that Movant had four prior violent felony and serious drug offense convictions 

which qualified him for enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 

4B1.4. The predicate convictions asserted by the Government were four North Carolina 

state convictions:

1. a violent felony committed on July 19, 1985, namely assault with a deadly 

weapon (to wit: an automobile) upon a law enforcement officer, citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii);

2. a violent felony committed on December 26, 1987, namely felony breaking and 

entering, which the Government argued qualified as a burglary under Taylor v. 

U.S., 495 U.S. 575 (1990);

3. a serious drug offense committed on March 24, 1993, namely possession of 

cocaine with intent to sell/deliver, and sale of cocaine; and

4. a violent felony committed on July 6, 1990, namely felonious escape. 

(Notice, CR Doc. 63 at 4-6 and attached Exhibits 1 through 4.) 

Movant appeared for sentencing on November 21, 1996. The court found that the 

two drug crimes occurred on separate occasions and each constituted a separate 

conviction for purposes of the ACCA. (CR Doc. 91, R.T. 11/21/96 at 66.) The court also 

found that the other three convictions raised by the Government (assault, breaking and 

entering, and escape) all qualified as ACCA predicate “violent felonies,” relying on 

decisions from the Fourth Circuit. (Id. at 66-67.)

The court adopted the reasons set forth in the presentence report and calculated an 

applicable offense level of 33, a criminal history category of VI, and a sentencing range 

of 235 to 293 months, and sentenced Movant to 264 months, to be consecutive to his 

North Carolina and Arizona sentences. (CR Doc. 82, Statement of Reasons; CR Doc. 

84, Judgment.) 

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B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal arguing evidentiary error at trial, insufficient 

evidence to convict, and sentencing error in failing to run his sentence concurrently with 

his undischarged state sentence. On October 24, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals rejected each of his arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. (CR 

Doc. 92, Mem.Dec. 10/24/97.) See also United States v. Moore aka Mutee, 127 F.3d 

1107 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished).1

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was summarily denied 

on October 5, 1998. Moore v. United States, 525 U.S. 917, 119 S. Ct. 266, 142 L. Ed. 2d 

219 (1998). 

C. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion to Vacate – Movant commenced the current case by filing through 

counsel his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 on May 23, 2016 (Doc. 1). Movant’s Motion asserts a single ground for relief:

“Movant contends that his sentence is illegal under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2552 (2015).” (Order 6/8/16, Doc. 3 at 1.) Movant’s core argument is that three of his 

prior convictions required for the sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) did not qualify, including:

1. the North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-34.2, can be committed recklessly, and therefore does not qualify as a 

“violent felony” under the force clause, and because it is not a burglary, arson, 

extortion or use of explosives, it does not qualify under the enumerated offenses 

clause, and after Johnson cannot qualify under the residual clause; 

2. the North Carolina conviction for felony breaking and entering does not qualify as 

 

1 Movant was prosecuted under the name “Alvin David Moore” and his aliases were 

listed in the Indictment (CR Doc. 1) as “aka Shahid Millkeller Mutee, aka Mutee Shadid, 

aka Shadid Mutee, aka David Tully Thomas.” His “true name” reflected in the Judgment 

(CR Doc. 84) was “Shahid Millkeller Mutee.”

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a violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA because it 

extends to buildings other than dwellings; and

3. the North Carolina conviction for felony escape does not qualify as a violent 

felony under the force clause of the ACCA, citing United States v. Hairston, 71 

F.3d 115, 117 (4th Cir. 1995).

Movant concedes that that the two drug offenses qualify as two of the three required 

ACCA priors. Finally, Movant argues that under Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 

(2016), Johnson has been made retroactive, and thus his Motion is timely under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).

Response - On August 5, 2016 Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 4). 

Respondent argues that Movant’s sentence is not in conflict with Johnson, because: (1) 

Movant concedes his two drug convictions qualify as two of the three required 

convictions for the ACCA to apply; (2) his conviction in North Carolina for assault with 

a deadly weapon qualifies as a violent felony because its elements match the generic 

definition of assault with a deadly weapon, including the intentional (not just reckless) 

use of force; (3) his breaking and entering conviction categorically qualifies as a 

burglary because the covered structures are limited to those within the generic definition 

of burglary; and (4) the issue regarding the breaking and entering conviction could and 

should have been raised years ago following the decision in Descamps v. United States, 

133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013). Respondent concedes that Movant’s felony escape conviction 

does not qualify as a crime of violence after Johnson. 

Reply - On August 25, 2016, Movant filed a Reply (Doc. 5), arguing that the 

Government has waived any defense of non-retroactivity or the statute of limitations by 

failing to adequately raise them in its Response. Movant argues that the Government has 

failed to show the assault charge was a violent felony, citing State v. Coffey, 259 S.E.2d 

256, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) and State v. Eason, 86 S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1955) to show 

that mere “culpable or criminal negligence” is sufficient mens rea. Movant argues that 

an argument under Descamps would have been futile pre-Johnson because any 

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Descamps error would have been harmless because burglary qualified under the preJohnson residual clause. Movant further argues that the breaking and entering would not 

qualify as burglary because the North Carolina statute would extend to structures not 

intended for occupancy, such as telephone booths.

Supplement – On September 12, 2016, Respondent filed its Supplemental 

Authority in Support of Response (Doc. 6), raising Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

2272, 2280 (2016) for the proposition that reckless offenses can still be classified as 

crimes of violence under the ACCA. Movant has not responded.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND

1. The Armed Career Criminal Act

The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), et seq, forbids 

certain people from shipping, receiving, or possessing firearms, and, in general, punishes 

violators with imprisonment for up to 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). However, if the 

offender has three or more prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent 

felony,” the ACCA increases the prison term to a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence 

and a maximum term of life imprisonment. 

In relevant part, the ACCA defines “violent felony” as follows:

“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year . . . that —

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.”

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Subsection (i) has become known as the 

“force clause.” The emphasized portion subsection (ii) of the definition has become 

known as the “residual clause.” The remainder has become known as the “enumerated 

offenses clause.” 

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2. Johnson and the Residual Clause

Residual Clause Invalid - On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the 

“residual clause” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and struck 

it down as a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson v. 

United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). However, the Johnson holding was 

expressly confined to the residual clause, and the Court was careful to point out that its 

decision “does not call into question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated 

offenses, or the remainder of the [ACCA’s] definition of a violent felony.” Id. at 2563. 

Thus, Johnson does not affect the constitutionality of sentencing enhancements premised 

on § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (the “force clause”) or the first portion of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (the 

“enumerated offenses clause”). 2 

Johnson Retroactive - The Supreme Court subsequently determined, in Welch v. 

United States, ___ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016), that Johnson stated a 

“substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.” Accordingly, 

as a general matter for § 2255 purposes, a § 2255 motion based on Johnson is timely if it 

was filed on or before June 26, 2016, one year from the date on which Johnson was 

decided. See 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(3) (one year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions 

begins to run from the “date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court”); Orona v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (date on 

which Supreme Court recognized new right under Johnson is June 26, 2015).

/ /

/ /

 

2 In addition, several other statutory sentencing schemes incorporate residual clause 

language, including the mandatory consecutive sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). There 

is a current split among federal courts on whether, and to what extent, Johnson and Welch apply 

to other federal statutes. Compare, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375-76 (6th Cir. 

2016) (holding “crime of violence” language in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) is not unconstitutionally 

vague because § 924(c)(3)(B) is “considerably narrower than the statute invalidated by the Court 

in Johnson and because much of Johnson’s analysis does not apply to § 924(c)(3)(B)”); with 

Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying Johnson to the “crime of 

violence” language found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

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3. The Enumerated Offenses Clause, Descamps, and Burglary

The Enumerated Offenses Clause - The enumerated offenses clauses provides 

that four specific types of offenses qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA: 

“burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves the use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining whether a conviction qualifies as one of these 

enumerated offenses, “Congress intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by 

crimes having certain specified elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled 

‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by the laws of the State of conviction. Taylor v. United States, 

495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990). Thus, to make the required comparison of elements, the 

courts utilize either a “categorical approach,” or a “modified categorical approach.”

To determine whether a past conviction is for one of those crimes, 

courts use what has become known as the “categorical approach”: 

They compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the 

defendant's conviction with the elements of the “generic” crime—

i.e., the offense as commonly understood. The prior conviction 

qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute's elements are the 

same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.

We have previously approved a variant of this method—

labeled (not very inventively) the “modified categorical 

approach”—when a prior conviction is for violating a so-called 

“divisible statute.” That kind of statute sets out one or more 

elements of the offense in the alternative—for example, stating that 

burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile. If one 

alternative (say, a building) matches an element in the generic 

offense, but the other (say, an automobile) does not, the modified 

categorical approach permits sentencing courts to consult a limited 

class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to 

determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant's 

prior conviction. The court can then do what the categorical 

approach demands: compare the elements of the crime of conviction 

(including the alternative element used in the case) with the 

elements of the generic crime.

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Thus, a conviction qualifies 

either if its elements are directly comparable (the “categorical approach”) or if one of the 

divisible alternatives is comparable, and specific portions of the record show that was the 

version for which the defendant was convicted (the “modified categorical approach”). 

“If the state statute is narrower than the generic view...there is no problem, because the 

conviction necessarily implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the 

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elements of [the generic offense].” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.

In utilizing the “modified categorical approach,” the courts are not concerned with 

identifying and comparing specific facts of the offense, only in identifying which version 

of the offense the defendant was convicted under. The purpose is “a focus on the 

elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. In discussing 

why it had adopted an elements focused approach, the Supreme Court has identified 

three reasons:

First, it comports with ACCA's text and history. Second, it avoids 

the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing 

courts' making findings of fact that properly belong to juries. And 

third, it averts “the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a 

factual approach.”

Id. at 2287.

Indivisible Statutes - In Descamps, the Supreme Court held that “sentencing 

courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of which the 

defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements,” 133 S.Ct. at 2282, 

“i.e., one not containing alternative elements—that criminalizes a broader swath of 

conduct than the relevant generic offense,” id. at 2281. Thus, the Court specifically 

rejected an approach which would allow reference to the record regarding an indivisible 

statute, concluding that it “turns an elements-based inquiry into an evidence-based one. It 

asks not whether ‘statutory definitions’ necessarily require an adjudicator to find the 

generic offense, but instead whether the prosecutor's case realistically led the adjudicator 

to make that determination.” Id. at 2287. 

B. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that the portion of Petitioner’s Petition related to the breaking 

and entering conviction could and should have been raised years ago following the 

decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013). 

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

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("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of limitations for all applications for 

motions to vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The statute of limitations 

applicable to habeas proceedings by federal prisoners has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(f), which generally provides that motions to vacate filed beyond the one year 

limitations period are barred and must be dismissed. Id.

2. Conviction Final 

A federal habeas petitioner’s time to file under 28 U.S.C. §2255 generally begins 

to run on “the day on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. 

§2255(f). Although §2255 does not define “final”, the Supreme Court has applied its 

ordinary standard of finality. "Finality attaches when [the Supreme] Court affirms a 

conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or 

when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires." Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 

522, 527 (2003). 

Here, Movant did file a certiorari petition, which was not denied until October 5, 

1998. Moore v. United States, 525 U.S. 917, 119 S. Ct. 266, 142 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1998). 

Thus, his one year did not commence to run until after the denial of certiorari petition 

October 5, 1998.

3

 

Thus, under this provision, Movant’s Motion to Vacate, filed May 23, 2016 (Doc. 

1) would be almost 18 years delinquent under § 2255(f)(1). 

3. New Rule 

Movant argues (and Respondent agrees in part) that his Motion to Vacate should 

be considered timely because it is based on new rules adopted by the U.S. Supreme 

Court in Johnson, and thus governed under the later commencement time provided for in 

 

3

Later commencement times can result from an impediment, and newly discovered 

factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(2) and (4). Movant does not assert 

either of these apply.

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§ 2255(f)(3). That section provides that the limitation period can run from “the date on 

which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review.” 

As noted hereinabove, a § 2255 motion based on Johnson is timely if it was filed 

on or before June 26, 2016, one year from the date on which Johnson was decided. See

28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(3) (one year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions begins to run 

from the “date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court”); Orona v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (date on which 

Supreme Court recognized new right under Johnson is June 26, 2015). Accordingly, to 

the extent that Movant’s Motion depends upon Johnson, it was filed some 34 days prior 

to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Respondent argues, however, that the portion of the Motion attacking the use of 

Movant’s breaking and entering conviction arises under Descamps, not Johnson, and that 

Descamps was decided in 2013, making Movant’s Motion two years delinquent. Movant 

replies that while the Descamps argument could have been raised earlier, in light of the 

then applicable pre-Johnson law, the argument would have been futile because Movant’s 

other convictions were sufficient to sustain the sentence. 

Indeed, as discussed hereinafter, Movant’s attack on his sentence can only be 

effective under the post-Johnson law. Section 2255(f)(3) applies to a newly recognized 

“right,” not a newly recognized argument. Prior to Johnson, Movant had an argument, 

but no right to seek relief. Accordingly, even though Movant must also rely on the older 

rule in Descamps, his right to relief, if any, really arises under Johnson. 

4. Conclusion re Timeliness

Therefore, the timing of the Johnson case controls the commencement of the 

statute of limitations, and Petitioner’s one year expired on June 26, 2016, making his 

May 23, 2016 Motion timely.

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C. APPLICATION OF THE ACCA POST-JOHNSON

Movant argues that he had only two of the three requisite predicate offenses 

necessary to apply the ACCA because his assault, breaking and entering, and escape 

charges do not qualify as violent felonies.

1. Escape Not Violent Felony

Movant argues, and Respondent concedes (Response, Doc. 4 at 9.) that Movant’s 

North Carolina felony escape conviction is not a predicate offense after Johnson. 

The Offense - Here, Movant was convicted of felony escape under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §148-45(b), committed on July 6, 1990 and sentenced on July 23, 1991. (CR Doc. 

74, Govt.’s Sent. Memo, Exhibit 4, Judgment & Commitment.) 

(b) Any person in the custody of the Department of Correction, 

in any of the classifications hereinafter set forth, who shall escape or 

attempt to escape from the State prison system, shall, except as 

provided in subsection (g) of this section, be punished as a Class J 

felon:

(1) a prisoner serving a sentence imposed upon conviction of

a felony;

(2) a person who has been charged with a felony and who has 

been committed to the custody of the Department of Correction 

under the provisions of G.S. 162-39;

(3) a person who shall have been convicted of a felony and 

who shall have been committed to the Department of Correction for 

presentence diagnostic study under the provisions of G.S. 15A1332(c) or G.S. 148-49.3; 

(4) any person previously convicted of escaping or 

attempting to escape from the State prison system.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-45(b) (1985). See N.C. Sess. Laws 1973, c. 1120, § 1 (available at 

http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1973-1974/SL1973-1120. 

html, last accessed 12/7/16); N.C. Sess. Laws 1975, c. 770, § 2 (available at 

http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1975-1976/SL1975-770. 

html, last accessed 12/7/16); N.C. Sess. Laws 1979, c. 760, § 5 (available at 

http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1979-1980/SL1979-760.

html, last accessed 12/7/16); N.C. Sess. Laws 1983, c. 465, §§ 1-3 (available at 

http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1983-1984/SL1983-465. 

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html, last accessed 12/7/16); and N.C. Sess. Laws 1985, c. 226, § 3 (available at 

http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1985-1986/SL1985-226. 

html, last accessed 12/7/16).

“The elements of felonious escape thus are (1) lawful custody, (2) while serving a 

sentence imposed upon a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere, or a conviction for a 

felony, and (3) escape from such custody.” State v. Miller, 146 N.C. App. 494, 503, 553 

S.E.2d 410, 416 (2001) (citing State v. Malone, 73 N.C.App. 323, 324, 326 S.E.2d 302, 

302–303 (1985)). 

Enumerated Offense – As observed in United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115, 

117 (4th Cir. 1995), “felony escape from custody in North Carolina does not constitute 

one of the specifically named crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),” the enumerated offenses 

clause.4 The Hairston court went on to apply the categorical approach and to conclude 

that felony escape did qualify under the residual clause because “[t]o avoid jeopardizing 

the success of the escape and further punishment upon capture, the escapee may choose 

to dispel the interference by means of physical force.” 71 F.3d at 118. 

Moreover, under Johnson, that clause is not enforceable. 

Thus, Movant’s felony escape conviction does not qualify under the enumerated 

offenses clause.

Force Clause – Conversely, the Hairston court concluded “that felony escape 

from custody in North Carolina does not have as an element of the crime the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another.” Hairston, 71 F.3d at 

117. 

Similarly, in United States v. Simmons, 782 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that the Hawaiian “offense of escape from custody” did not qualify as 

 

4

In United States v. Bethea, 603 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 2010), the Fourth Circuit 

declined to apply Hairston’s analysis under the residual clause to a South Carolina 

escape offense committed by failure to return from furlough. But North Carolina’s 

provision for failure to return from furlough is separately defined under subsection (g) of 

N.C. Gen. Stat. 148-45. Movant’s conviction was specifically based on subsection (b). 

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a violent felony because it “does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of force.” Id. at 518. Rather, the only elements to the Hawaiian escape 

offense were “first, that the defendant escaped from custody; and second, that he or she 

did so intentionally.” Id. Similarly, North Carolina’s § 148-45(b) has no element 

requiring the use of force, only lawful custody, on a felony, and escape. Miller, 553 

S.E.2d at 416. 

Conclusion – Accordingly, Movant’s conviction for felony escape does not 

qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, and at least one of his assault or burglary 

charges must qualify to sustain his sentence under the ACCA.

2. Assault as Violent Felony

Movant was convicted in North Carolina of assault with a deadly weapon against 

a law enforcement officer, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.2. Movant argues this offense 

can be committed recklessly, and therefore does not qualify as a “violent felony” under 

the force clause, and because it is not a burglary, arson, extortion or use of explosives, it 

does not qualify under the enumerated offenses clause, and after Johnson cannot qualify 

under the residual clause.

Respondent argues that this conviction qualifies as a violent felony because its 

elements match the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon, including the 

intentional (not just reckless) use of force.

Movant replies that the Government has failed to show the assault charge was a 

violent felony, citing State v. Coffey, 259 S.E.2d 256, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) and State 

v. Eason, 86 S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1955) to show that mere “culpable or criminal 

negligence” is sufficient mens rea. 

Respondent filed a Supplement (Doc. 6), asserting that the Supreme Court 

rejected an exception for “reckless” offenses in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 

(June 27, 2016). Movant has not responded.

The Offense – Movant committed his assault offense on May 31, 1980, and was 

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sentenced on July 19, 1985. (Government’s Sentencing Memo, CR Doc. 74 at Exhibit 1, 

Judgment and Comitment). North Carolina General Statue § 14-34.2, as in effect on 

May 31, 1980, provided: 

§ 14-34.2. Assault with a firearm or other deadly weapon upon law 

enforcement officer or fireman. — Any person who shall commit an 

assault with a firearm or any other deadly weapon upon any law 

enforcement officer or fireman while such officer or fireman is in 

the performance of his duties shall be punished as a Class I felon.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-34.2; N.C. Session Laws 1977, c. 829 (available at 

http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1977-1978/SL1977 

-829.html, last accessed 12/5/16); and N.C. Session Laws 1979, c. 760, § 5 (available at 

http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1979-1980/SL1979 

-760.html, last accessed 12/5/16.) 

The Enumerated Offense Clause – Movant’s assault charge was not for any of 

the offenses in the enumerated offenses clause in § 924(e)(2)(B). Under Johnson, it 

cannot be qualified under the residual clause of that subparagraph.

The Force Clause – Movant argues this offense does not qualify under the force 

clause because it can be committed recklessly, citing State v. Jackson, 327 S.E.2d 270, 

272 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), and United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. April 12, 

2016).

The Ninth Circuit had held that under the ACCA, “to qualify as defining a violent 

felony, a state statute must require that the physical force be inflicted intentionally, as 

opposed to recklessly or negligently.” United States v. Lawrence, 627 F.3d 1281, 1284 

(9th Cir. 2010). See also United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 982 n. 5 (9th Cir. April 

12, 2016). Lawrence had its roots in Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 

(9th Cir.2006) (en banc), where the court had construed the term “crime of violence” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which supplied a definition of “crime of violence” that is 

materially identical to the force clause of the ACCA. See Lawrence, 627 F.3d at 1284 

n.3. In Fernandez-Ruiz, the court observed that the “subjective awareness of possible 

injury” which underlies a reckless offense “is not the same as the intentional use of 

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physical force against the person of another” which would constitute a “crime of 

violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1130. That reasoning 

flowed from a line of cases, starting with Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), holding 

that the definition required the active use of force against someone, and that “accidental” 

applications of force would not suffice, and Fernandez-Ruiz concluded that “the reckless 

use of force was not sufficiently ‘intentional’ to prevent an offense from being 

accidental.” Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129. 

However, in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (June 27, 2016), decided 

after all the foregoing Ninth Circuit cases, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning 

underlying Fernandez-Ruis in the course of applying the definition of a “misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence” to prohibit possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(9). The Court concluded:

A person who assaults another recklessly “use[s]” force, no less 

than one who carries out that same action knowingly or 

intentionally.

Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the 

suggestion that its decision in Leocal (on which Fernandez-Ruis and its progeny relied) 

precluded reliance upon “reckless” offenses.

And contrary to petitioners' view, nothing in Leocal [ ] suggests a 

different conclusion—i.e., that “use” marks a dividing line between 

reckless and knowing conduct. In that decision, this Court addressed 

a statutory definition similar to § 921(a)(33)(A): there, “the use ... of 

physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16. That provision excludes “merely accidental” conduct, Leocal

held, because “it is [not] natural to say that a person actively 

employs physical force against another person by accident.” 

...Conduct like stumbling (or in our hypothetical, dropping a plate) 

is a true accident, and so too the injury arising from it; hence the 

difficulty of describing that conduct as the “active employment” of 

force. But the same is not true of reckless behavior—acts 

undertaken with awareness of their substantial risk of causing injury 

(in our contrasting hypo, hurling the plate). The harm such conduct 

causes is the result of a deliberate decision to endanger another—no 

more an “accident” than if the “substantial risk” were “practically 

certain.” 

Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279–80 (citations omitted). 

Because the undersigned finds that the potential of a reckless offense is irrelevant, 

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and the offense thus qualifies, the undersigned does not reach Respondent’s contention 

that the requirement for knowledge about the status of the victim as a law enforcement or 

fire official supplies the intent requirement. 

Conclusion – Based on the foregoing, Movant’s conviction for assault qualifies 

as an ACCA predicate under the force clause.

Although that, together with Movant’s drug convictions, is sufficient to support 

Movant’s sentence under the ACCA, the undersigned nonetheless addresses his breaking 

and entering offense.

3. Breaking and Entering as Violent Felony

Movant argues that his North Carolina conviction for felony breaking and 

entering does not qualify as a violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause of the 

ACCA because it extends to buildings other than dwellings. In his Reply, Movant 

argues that the North Carolina’s application to a “structure” would extend to a telephone 

booth, which lies outside the generic definition which is limited to buildings and 

structures designed for occupancy. (Reply, Doc. 5 at 4.) 

The Offense – Movant committed his breaking and entering offense on 

December 26, 1987, and was sentenced on February 28, 1989. (Government’s 

Sentencing Memo, CR Doc. 74 at Exhibit 2, Judgment and Commitment). North 

Carolina General Statue § 14-72(b0(2), as in effect on December 26, 1987, prohibited 

larceny pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51, 14-53, 14-54, or 14-57. See 1991 North Carolina 

Laws Ch. 523 (H.B. 180). Of those, section 14-54 governed “breaking or entering” and 

applied to “any building,” and defined “building” to “include any dwelling, dwelling 

house, uninhabited house, building under construction, building within the curtilage of a 

dwelling house, and any other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity 

or property.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(c). See N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 1969, c. 543, § 3 

(1969) (available at http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/1969-

1970/SL1969-543.h tml, last accessed 12/6/16.) Thus, the offense of breaking and 

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entering extended not just to buildings, but to other structures “designed to house or 

secure within it any activity or property.” 

Enumerated Offense – In Taylor, the Court discussed at length alternative 

definitions for the crime of burglary before reaching the following conclusion: “a person 

has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted 

of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of 

unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent 

to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.

In doing so, the Court eschewed a common law definition that would limit 

burglary to an entry to dwellings. “An armed burglary of an occupied commercial 

building, in the daytime, would seem to pose a far greater risk of harm to persons than an 

unarmed nocturnal breaking and entering of an unoccupied house.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 

594. The Court went on to distinguish state formulations that “define burglary more 

broadly [than the generic definition], e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry 

be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other 

than buildings.” Id. at 599. 

The Fourth Circuit and First Circuit have long concluded that North Carolina’s 

offense of breaking and entering qualifies as an enumerated offense of burglary under 

Taylor. See United States v. Thompson, 588 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2009) (violation of 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54); United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080, 1085 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(“convictions under North Carolina law for breaking or entering under N.C.G.S. § 14-54 

qualify as generic burglaries under the Taylor case”); and United States v. Anderson, 921 

F.2d 335, 340 (1st Cir. 1990) (“North Carolina conviction for breaking and entering 

clearly qualifies as a predicate offense under the Taylor definition”).

However, Movant cites United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) for 

the proposition that to qualify as burglary under the ACCA enumerated offenses clause, 

the building entered must be a dwelling. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5.) But Grisel makes no 

such requirement. Instead, it observed that although the common law required that the 

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building be a dwelling, the Court in Taylor adopted the broader definition which 

extended to other buildings or structures. 488 F.3d at 849. What Grisel did conclude is 

that the generic definition of burglary did not extend to structures that “could be 

described loosely as structures but that are either not designed for occupancy or not 

intended for use in one place.” Id. In contrast, the Oregon statute under consideration 

extended to “non-buildings,” i.e. a “booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft,” and had been applied 

to a semi-truck trailer, and a fishing vessel. 488 F.3d at 850. 

In his Reply, Movant shifts gears and asserts that the North Carolina statute is too 

broad because it does not mandate that a structure be intended for occupancy. (Reply, 

Doc. 5 at 4.) But Movant proffers no basis to distinguish between the “structures...

designed for occupancy” referenced in Grisel, and a “structure designed to house or 

secure within it any activity or property,” referenced in the statutory definition in § 14-

54(c). Clearly the occupancy permitted under Taylor and Grisel is not limited to 

residential occupancy. 

Movant argues that, as an example, the statute could extend to a telephone booth. 

Movant does not clarify whether he is referencing an enclosed room containing a phone, 

or an unenclosed cabinet on a post or wall in which a telephone has been hung. The 

former would clearly fit within Taylor’s requirement of a “building or structure.” 

Arguably, the latter might not. 

Although Grisel did exclude from its generic definition “non-buildings” such as a 

“booth,” 384 F.3d at 850, the North Carolina statute requires that what is entered be a 

“structure.” In contrast, the Oregon statute in Grisel expressly extended past the 

ordinary meaning of a “building” to include “any booth, vehicle, boat,” etc. Grisel, 489 

F.3d at 850. The Grisel court’s concern was that the inclusion of vehicles, boats, etc.

extended beyond a “building,” or “constructed edifices intended for use in one place.” 

No discussion was made of a “booth.” Movant points to no logical basis to expand the 

North Carolina reference to a “structure” to include something not intended for 

occupancy or not intended for use in one place. Moreover, the statute limits its 

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structures to those “designed to house or secure within it any activity or property.” 

Further, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that under the principle of 

ejusdem generis, the kinds of structures governed under § 14-54(c) are limited to the 

common definition of “building,” and thus would not extend to structures not capable of 

occupancy, e.g. fences or monuments. State v. Gamble, 286 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1982). 

Similarly, it would therefore not extend to a cabinet holding a telephone. 

Conclusion – Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Movant’s conviction 

for felony breaking and entering is a violent felony under the enumerated offenses 

clause, without reliance on the residual clause invalidated in Johnson, and thus also 

satisfies the requirements to establish the propriety of Movant’s sentence. 

D. SUMMARY

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Movant’s sentence under 

§ 924(e) was adequately supported by at least three qualifying predicate offenses, to wit: 

his two drug convictions, his assault conviction (under the force clause), and his 

breaking and entering conviction (under the enumerated offenses clause, as a burglary). 

Accordingly, his Motion to Vacate must be denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 

challenges Movant’s federal criminal judgment or sentence. The recommendations if 

accepted will result in Movant’s Motion being resolved adversely to Movant. 

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Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, jurists of reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed May 23, 2016 (Doc. 1) 

be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

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VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 8, 2016

16-1583r RR 16 11 16 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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