Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02288/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02288-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, JR.,

Inmate Booking No. 13719099

Civil

No.

13cv2288 LAB (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS AND

GARNISHING BALANCE FROM

INMATE’S TRUST ACCOUNT

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a); and 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) &

1915A(b)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; BLAIR

SOPER; SAN DIEGO PROBATION;

PUBLIC DEFENDERS, 

Defendants.

Facility, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition,

Plaintiff, David B. Turner, Jr., currently housed at the George Bailey Detention

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [ECF No. 3].

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All partiesinstituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However,

prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows that he has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at

this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3] and assesses no initial partialfiling fee per 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fee mandated shall be

collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss

any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which isfrivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28

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U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§

1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. 

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now

mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own

motion to dismiss before effecting service ofthe Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that failsto state a claim.”);see

also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting

that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

In addition, the Court’s duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important

in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiffseeks monetary damages against Blair Soper,the DeputyPublic Defender

appointed to represent Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings. However, a person “acts

under color ofstate law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the

authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent

a criminal defendant during trial, do not generally act under color of state law because

representing a client “is essentially a private function ... for which state office and

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authority are not needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960

F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when publicly appointed counsel are

performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients, investigating possible defenses,

presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color of state

law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk

County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983

because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his

function,” no matter how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the

state or county.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Soper must be dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

the alleged ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack

on the validity of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has

fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that

“in order to recover damagesfor allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim

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challenging the legality of a conviction orsentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:

when a state prisoner seeks damagesin a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction orsentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new

action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims againstSoper “necessarily

imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration. Heck,

512 U.S. at 487. Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Defendant Soper rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the

invalidity” of his conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984) (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s

errors the result of the trial would have been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956,

958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel is a conditional writ

granting petitioner’s release unless state retries him or allows him to pursue an appeal

with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable time). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings in a criminal case, and

because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been invalidated, a section

1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. 

Plaintiff also names as Defendants the “San Diego County Probation County

Program” and the “County of San Diego Public Defenders.” (Compl. at 1-2.) However,

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an agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983. 

Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Rather, the

county or city itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality cannot be held

liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot

be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation was

caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct.

1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate

indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force

behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835

(9th Cir. 1996); see Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.

Ct. at 1388; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state

a § 1983 claim against the City or County of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts

showing that his injury was caused by individual officers whose conduct conformed to

an official city policy, custom or practice. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against the

City or County of San Diego because he has failed to allege that any individual police

officer’s conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. 

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for all the reasons

set forth above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint

to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court.

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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF

No. 3] is GRANTED. 

2. TheWatchCommander, or his designee,shall collectfromPlaintiff’s prison

trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly

paymentsfrom the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding

month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Watch

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300, San Diego,

California 92158.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from

the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to his previous pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be

considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a Court approved form civil rights

complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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