Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00012/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00012-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE GOMEZ,

CDCR # AG-3761 Civil

No. 

11cv0012 BTM (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, [ECF No. 12]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 11] 

AND

(3) DISMISSING ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

& 1915A(b)

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY; ENCINITAS

SHERIFF; JOHN DOE (COUNTY

DISPATCHER); DEPUTY CARPENTER,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison and proceeding

pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.

12], along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF No. 11].

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

Case 3:11-cv-00012-BTM-JMA Document 14 Filed 07/15/11 Page 1 of 6
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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of

whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 12] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [ECF NO. 11]

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,

unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v.

Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may

be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

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827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that his constitutional rights were violated

when he was injured following a high speed car chase by San Diego County Sheriff Deputies.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carpenter, a Sheriff Deputy, intentionally drove his patrol car

into Plaintiff’s car because he believed that Plaintiff “was reaching for a weapon.” (Compl. at

2.) In Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that an excessive force

claim arising in the context of an arrest “is most properly characterized as one invoking the

protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’” 490 U.S. at 394. Accordingly, the Court held

that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force–deadly or not–in the

course of an arrest . . . of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

‘[objective] reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process approach.”

Id.

Determining the “reasonableness” of the force used to effect an arrest or seizure “requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quotations

omitted). Factors to consider include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

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resisting arrest or attempting to evade the arrest by flight.” Id.

Plaintiff provides factual allegations that Defendant Carpenter believed that Plaintiff was

reaching for a weapon. “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase

that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even

when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 386 (2007). Plaintiff does claim that the officers were chasing the wrong car but he does

not appear to dispute that Defendant Carpenter believed Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his pleading, he should clarify his facts surrounding this incident.

There are simply not enough facts alleged to support a Fourth Amendment claim at this time.

Moreover, it is not clear whether Plaintiff was convicted following this incident which

could also potentially cause some of his claims to be not yet cognizable pursuant to the rule

found in Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:

. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness could

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination,

or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. When a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the court must

consider whether a judgment in the prisoner’s favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.

Finally, Plaintiff also names the County of San Diego as a Defendant. “[A] municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where a constitutional deprivation was caused by the

implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690.

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Thus, to plead liability on behalf of the County, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he was deprived

of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind

the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim against the County of San Diego.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF No. 11] is DENIED without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 12]

is GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which

to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S. D.CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in

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the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights Complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: July 15, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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