Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02656/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02656-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID M. TUTTELMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, ANTHONY LUISI

AND RONALD BAYS,

Defendants. /

No. C 02-02656 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this civil-rights action, defendant police officer Ronald Bays moves for summary

judgment on plaintiff David M. Tuttelman’s claim of battery and unreasonable force arising out

of his arrest in San Jose. Defendant argues that the claim is barred because plaintiff did not

satisfy the prerequisite of filing a proper administrative tort claim with the City of San Jose. 

Plaintiff, however, filed a claim that complied substantially with the statutory requirements. 

The motion therefore is DENIED. Defendants have withdrawn their motion for summary

judgment on the issue of the city’s liability. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiff, who represents himself but is a licensed attorney, alleges in his second

amended complaint that he was battered, suffered the use of unreasonable force and

unconstitutionally searched and seized during a traffic stop on the night of June 28–June 29,

1998. He contends that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned, was deprived of due process of

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law, was maliciously prosecuted and suffered intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress. He also accuses defendants of conspiracy and negligence. These claims invoke the

Constitution and state law.

Defendant filed an administrative claim with the City of San Jose for his damages

arising out of these incidents. The claim alleged that he was detained unlawfully by Officers

Bays and Anthony Luisi. Plaintiff further asserted that both men demanded that he submit to a

search of his person and vehicle. He claims that when he demanded an explanation for the

officers’ actions, defendant Luisi kicked him, put him into a headlock, bent his wrist, placed

handcuffs on him, slammed him into the side of a patrol car and threw him into its back seat. 

Both officers allegedly then subjected him to a search, arrested him and took him to jail

(Plaintiff’s Claim ¶¶ 4–5, Req. for Judicial Notice by Defs., Exh. G). 

After filing the claim, the City of San Jose investigated. It obtained a copy of the

relevant crime report, reviewed the case file for the criminal action against Mr. Tuttelman and

interviewed Officers Bays and Luisi (San Jose Police Dep’t Prof. Standards & Conduct Unit,

Report, PSCU Case No. 99060029, Tuttelman Decl., Exh. 1 (Jan. 20, 2006). The police report

contained narratives by both defendants Luisi and Bays. Luisi stated that “officer Bays placed

S[uspect]/Tuttleman [sic] in a wrist lock. Officer Bays and I then handcuffed S/Tuttleman [sic]

behind his back” (Luisi, Police Report at 4, Case No. 98-179-1420 (June 29, 1998), Tuttelman

Decl., Exh. 1). Bays stated “I assisted Ofc. Luisi by placing a dept. approved wrist lock on

Tuttleman [sic] after I pried his arms apart. After I applied the wrist lock to Tuttleman’s [sic]

right wrist, he complied to Ofc. Luisi’s instructions and was handcuffed” (Continuation of

Report at 3, Tuttelman Decl., Exh. 1). 

The final report by the Professional Standards and Conduct Unit examined whether

“Officers Luisi and Bays use[d] unnecessary force during the arrest.” It stated that “[t]he

complainant was lying face down and had his arms underneath his body. . . . Officer Bays said

he pulled an arm from underneath the complainant and placed him in a wristlock.” The unit

concluded its report by stating that it had exonerated Officer Bays and Officer Luisi of the

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accusations of unlawful force (Confidential Report at 5–7). The report was approved by the

chief of police (Tuttelman Decl, Exh. 1). 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, declarations, attached

documents and other evidence “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c), (e); 28 U.S.C.

1746 ( allowing substitution of declaration made under penalty of perjury for sworn affidavits). 

A nonmoving party who bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. On summary judgment, the

“evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 255 (1986). 

1. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 

Defendants and plaintiff both request judicial notice of certain items. Under Federal

Rule of Evidence 201, a court must take judicial notice of adjudicative facts if a party requests it

to, if it is supplied with the necessary information to decide the request and if the facts are “not

subject to reasonable dispute” because they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

The time has passed for parties to object to the requests. They have not done so. All but

one of the items are either not adjudicative facts — and thus not subject to judicial notice — or

irrelevant given the withdrawal of the motion for summary judgment on the city’s liability. No

notice therefore is taken of any item except plaintiff’s administrative tort claim (see Defs.’ Req.

for Judicial Notice, Exh. G). 

2. BATTERY AND UNREASONABLE FORCE CLAIM. 

Defendant Bays does not contend that plaintiff failed to file a claim. He claims instead

that, because the claim described only violence by Officer Luisi, it was insufficient to exhaust

the administrative-claim requirement as to the battery and unreasonable force now alleged

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against him. Defendant Bays argues that because the claim did not name him as an assailant, it

cannot be maintained now (Br. 7). Because the tort claim is only a requirement under

California law, this motion does not apply to any of plaintiff’s federal claims. 

Submission of a tort claim to a California public entity is a prerequisite to bringing a tort

lawsuit for money damages against that entity and its employees. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 945.4,

950.2, 950.4, 950.6. The claim must include the “date, place and other circumstances of the

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim, . . . [a] general description of the

. . . injury, damage or loss . . . and [t]he name or names of the public employee or employees

causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 910 (c)–(e). 

The claim does not need to be a masterwork of detail: 

The purpose of these statutes is to provide the public entity sufficient

information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them,

if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. Consequently, a claim

need only fairly describe what the entity is alleged to have done. As the

purpose . . . is to give the government entity notice sufficient for it to

investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious actions, the

claims statute should not be applied to snare the unwary where its purpose

has been satisfied. . . . “The claim . . . need not to specify each particular

act or omission . . . . A complainant’s fuller exposition of the factual basis

beyond that given in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not

based on an entirely different set of facts. Only when there has been a

complete shift in allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil

liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by different

persons than those described in the claim, have courts generally found the

complaint barred.

Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 446–47

(2004). “If the claim satisfies the purpose of the act without prejudice to the government,

substantial compliance will be found.” Elias v. County of San Bernardino, 68 Cal. App. 3d 70,

74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 

In the instant case, plaintiff substantially complied with the act. Not only did the claim

put the City of San Jose adequately on notice of the alleged facts, but the city actually

investigated whether defendant Bayes had used unreasonable force. Any reasonable

investigation of plaintiff’s claim would have included a review of the police report by officers

Luisi and Bays. Indeed, the city’s first step was just that. The report disclosed, in both officers’

narratives, that officer Bays had used “wrist lock” on plaintiff. Officer Luisi’s narrative stated

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that Bays helped to handcuff plaintiff. Officer Bays’s himself recounted that he pried plaintiff’s

arms apart. Bays’s use of force was not overlooked as the city investigated the claim. It noted

that Officer Bays had pulled plaintiff’s arm from underneath plaintiff and put him in a wrist

lock. The city specifically exonerated officer Bays for the conduct now alleged to undergird the

battery and unreasonable force claim against him. 

The claim did not need to describe that officer Bays used force on plaintiff. It is unclear

whether plaintiff knew of that fact when he filed the claim. As the wrist lock was applied, Mr.

Tuttelman was lying face down, making it difficult to see who was applying it (see

Continuation of Report at 3, Tuttelman Decl., Exh. 1). The complaint is not “based on an

entirely different set of facts” than the claim. There has not been “a complete shift in

allegations.” See Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447. Although the complaint alleges that an additional

person engaged in the battery and unreasonable use of force, that person (officer Bays) did not

go unnamed in the tort claim. He was treated in the claim as a major player. On these facts, the

purposes of the statute were satisfied, the city suffered no prejudice and the claim therefore

cannot be barred on this motion. 

Before this case was transferred from Judge Jeremy Fogel, he denied plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment as to defendants’ affirmative defenses that the complaint was barred for

failure to comply with the tort claims act and because it exceeds the scope of the tort claim

presented to the City of San Jose. Judge Fogel stated that because plaintiff’s tort claim

“provided no indication that Tuttelman’s injuries were alleged to arise from any battery or use

of force by Bays . . . Tuttelman has failed to demonstrate substantial compliance with either the

requirements of or the purposes underlying the tort claims act.” Order (Sept. 2, 2005). 

It is unclear whether the parties presented the same evidence to Judge Fogel as they

have given this Court. The current evidence shows that the city in fact investigated alleged

battery by defendant Bays, thus demonstrating that the purposes of the Tort Claims Act were

fulfilled, that defendants were not prejudiced and that the city had adequate notice. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendant Bays’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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