Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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5:13-cv-00228-RMW

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADIL K HIRAMANEK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD LOFTUS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:13-cv-00228-RMW 

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

REASSIGNMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 229

Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek (and apparently not plaintiff Roda Hiramanek) requests 

reassignment of his case to another district court judge. This litigation arises out of plaintiff’s 

interactions with the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. There are currently five claims 

pending in the litigation. See Dkt. No. 201 at 2-3. Plaintiff’s purported bases for recusal can be 

grouped into three categories: (1) the undersigned’s prior employment as a state court judge; (2) a

purported financial interest in the case; and (3) the undersigned’s rulings in this case, which 

plaintiff characterizes as biased or based on ex parte communications with defendants. Plaintiff 

presents no sufficient basis for recusal. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff moves for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144. Section 455 provides that a 

judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a “timely and sufficient 

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5:13-cv-00228-RMW

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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affidavit” averring that the judge before whom the case is pending “has a personal bias or 

prejudice” either against the party or in favor of any adverse party. If a judge finds a § 144 motion 

timely and the affidavit legally sufficient, the judge must proceed no further and another judge 

must be assigned to hear the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 144; United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 

(9th Cir. 1980). 

“Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking disqualification bears 

a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C 07–

00915 JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 

158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021–22 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). “The test for creation of apparent bias 

sufficient to require dismissal under [Section 455] is an objective one: ‘whether a reasonable 

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.’” Herrington v. Sonoma Cnty., 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). In this context, the 

“reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather a 

“well-informed, thoughtful observer” who “understand[s] all the relevant facts” and “has 

examined the record and law.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir.2008) 

(citations omitted). This standard does not mandate recusal upon the mere “unsubstantiated 

suspicion of personal bias or prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition, Section 455(a) is 

“limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal 

something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course 

of [proceedings].” Id. at 913–14.

Plaintiff’s motion here does not provide a legally sufficient basis for recusal. Accordingly, 

the court did not ask that the matter be reassigned.

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1As an additional basis for denying the motion to recuse, it is untimely. This case has been 

pending before the undersigned for 16 months, without objection from plaintiff. See Preston v. 

United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Prior Service as a State Court Judge 

Plaintiff asserts that his case must be reassigned because the undersigned was previously a 

state court judge in Santa Clara County.2 However, plaintiff has not shown that the undersigned 

was involved in any of plaintiff’s litigation before the Santa Clara County Superior Court. See, 

e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295 (1963) (California Supreme Court 

Justice recused from hearing case he previously heard while sitting as a judge on a lower court). 

There is no general requirement that “federal judges to recuse themselves from cases heard by 

other judges on the state courts where they sat previously.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Vann, No. 

C 13-1148 YGR, 2013 WL 1409880, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2013). Thus, the undersigned’s 

prior judicial service on the Santa Clara County Superior Court does not provide a basis for 

recusal here.

B. Financial Interest in the Litigation 

Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned and the undersigned’s spouse “derives 

financial/retirement benefits from his ex-employer/state defendant, and is substantially interested 

in/affected by the outcome, on Plaintiff’s billion dollar damage claim.” Dkt. No. 229 at 11. Even 

accepting this allegation as true, which it is not, the receipt of unspecified “financial/retirement 

benefits” is wholly separate from the issues in this case. The case has nothing to do with financial 

payments, or eligibility thereto, from the state or county. Any judgment reached in this case will have 

no plausible effect on either the undersigned or the undersigned’s spouse’s receipt of financial benefits 

from the state or county. Accordingly, the (nonexistent) “financial/retirement benefits” do not provide 

a basis for recusal. 

C. Bias and Ex Parte Communications 

Finally, the remainder of plaintiff’s assertions can be characterized as complaints with the 

substance of the rulings made in this case. Specifically, plaintiff suggests that the undersigned is 

relying on ex parte communications to rule on matters and that the rulings evidence a “lack of 

 

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The undersigned served on the Santa Clara County Superior Court from 1989 to 1992. 

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impartiality,” “ongoing advocacy for state defendant,” and engage in “bizarre reasoning, devoid of 

facts, law or merits.” Dkt. No. 229 at 21. 

First, plaintiff’s declaration contains no legally sufficient allegations of any ex parte 

communications. The allegations are entirely conclusory and not supported by facts relevant to 

the conclusion plaintiff seeks to draw. For example, plaintiff states that “CASAs [Court 

Appointed Special Advocate, a.k.a. Child Advocate, including [the undersigned’s spouse] 

participated in 57% of [juvenile dependency cases].” Dkt. No. 229-1 at ¶ 18.

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That may be true. 

Plaintiff then concludes that “Some of extra judicial knowledge procured by [the undersigned], as 

expressed in his written orders in this litigation, comes from sources outside the litigation, 

including apparently [the] spouse.” Id. The fact that unspecified CASAs participate in juvenile 

dependency cases suggests absolutely nothing about ex parte communications regarding plaintiff’s 

case. 

Second, none of plaintiff’s remaining allegations, even if taken as true, constitute grounds 

for recusal, insofar as they are all covered by the “extrajudicial source” doctrine, which requires 

“as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the 

judge during the course of [proceedings].” Holland, 519 F.3d at 914.

III. ORDER

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s request that the undersigned be recused from 

acting on this case is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for a hearing is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request 

for the undersigned to produce his Senate confirmation record is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

 

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The court notes that plaintiff’s declaration does not comply with Civil Local Rule 7-5(b), which 

requires that “[a]n affidavit or declarations may contain only facts, must conform as much as 

possible to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), and must avoid conclusions and argument.” 

(emphasis added). The declaration is largely additional conclusions and argument, in excess of the 

25 page limit on motions. Civ. Loc. R. 7-2(b). 

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