Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01748/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DAVID HERBAUGH,

Booking #18120621,

ANTHONY JEROME SMITH,

Booking #18125428

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEP’T; 

GEORGE BAILEY CENTRAL JAIL 

MEDICAL STAFF,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-1748-BAS-WVG

ORDER: 

(1) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF 

ANTHONY JEROME SMITH;

(2) DENYING SMITH’S MOTION 

TO PROCEED IFP WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE; 

3) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

AND

(4) TERMINATING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IFP AS MOOT

Plaintiffs John David Herbaugh and Anthony Jerome Smith, both currently housed

at the George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, have filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 

No. 1.) Each Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma paupers (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) For the reasons herein, the Court: (1) dismisses 

Plaintiff Smith’s claims under Rule 21, (2) denies his IFP motion without prejudice, (3) 

dismisses Herbaugh’s claims in this action, and (4) terminates Herbaugh’s motion to 

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proceed IFP as moot.

I. DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF ANTHONY JEROME SMITH

This action is brought on behalf of two separate Plaintiffs. Joinder of plaintiffs under 

Rule 20(a)(1) is permissible if “(1) the plaintiffs assert[ ] a right to relief arising out of the 

same transaction and occurrence and (2) some question of law or fact common to all the 

plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)) (emphasis omitted). However, when considering 

the propriety of joinder, district courts in the Ninth Circuit traditionally recognize that 

“[a]ctions brought by multiple pro se prisoners present unique problems not presented by 

ordinary civil litigation which may result in delayed case management, confusion, and 

prejudice to individual plaintiffs.” Jones v. California State Superior Courts, No. 1:17-

CV-00232 LJO BAM PC, 2018 WL 2287952, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2018); Rubino v. 

Hayes, No. C 14-05553 EJD (PR), 2015 WL 13359487, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2015). 

Both Plaintiffs in this case raise inadequate medical care claims that will require an 

individualized analysis and consideration of facts specific to each individual Plaintiff. The 

Court believes that joinder of the Plaintiffs’ claims in one action is thus inappropriate.

Moreover, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Smith has filed a separate 

action in which he is suing the same Defendants in this action and appears to raise identical 

claims found in this action. A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both 

within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation 

to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Although the action 

before this Court provides very few factual allegations regarding Plaintiff Smith, it is clear 

that he alleges denial of adequate medical treatment in both actions. See Smith v. San Diego 

Central Jail, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01872-JLS-KSC (S.D. Cal). The second Smith case 

provides more factual details regarding Plaintiff Smith’s claim and, thus, the Court finds it 

provides a superior vehicle for review of Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes it is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff Smith from this action pursuant to Rule 21 

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and deny his motion to proceed IFP without prejudice to Plaintiff Smith pursuing the claims 

he asserts in the pending Smith v. San Diego Central Jail, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01872-JLSKSC, case. 

II. DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF HERBAUGH’S CLAIMS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Plaintiff Herbaugh has also moved to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 2.) A review of the 

Complaint reveals that the only potentially permissible claims he alleges are duplicative of 

claims he has raised in a previous case as well as other cases which are pending in this 

District. In the particular circumstances of this case1

, the Court finds it is appropriate to 

dismiss Plaintiff Herbaugh’s claims at the outset based on the screening standards 

applicable to an IFP motion and to terminate Plaintiff Herbaugh’s motion to proceed IFP 

as moot.

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and requests IFP status, his Complaint would require

a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

 

1 Plaintiff Herbaugh’s IFP motion would not be subject to denial. In support of the 

motion, he has submitted a prison certificate authorized by a GBDF administrative 

lieutenant attesting to his trust account activity. (See ECF No. 2 at 4); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 3.2. This statement shows Plaintiff Herbaugh has had no 

monthly deposits to his account, has carried no balance over the six month period preceding 

the filing of his Complaint, and that his current available balance is zero. However, because 

Herbaugh’s Complaint is subject to summary dismissal as duplicative, the Court will not 

undertake the idle act of granting IFP status. 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Inadequate Medical Care Claims

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

& 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. 

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff Herbaugh sues 

the “entire medical staff” of the “Sheriff’s Department” and alleges that he has been 

“denied a walking implement” and he has been “forced to walk without help from crutch, 

cane, or other source resulting in complications to pre-existing condition.” (Compl. at 3.) 

Plaintiff Herbaugh also alleges that he has been denied “proper medication for level of pain 

experienced.” (Id.) The Court takes judicial notice that these claims are identical to claims 

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that Plaintiff Herbaugh has previously brought in Herbaugh v. 3970 ARJIS, et al., No. 3:18-

cv-01316-AJB-BLM, (S.D. Cal.) (“Herbaugh I”) and is currently litigating in two other 

cases.

2

 In Herbaugh I, Plaintiff Herbaugh alleges that he was denied “walking 

implements” and was “forced to walk with extreme pain.” (Id., ECF No. 1 at 3.) He further 

claimed that he only received “tylenol without any means of proper care.” (Id. at 4.) Those 

allegations are reiterated in the two other pending actions against several defendants. 

Because Plaintiff Herbaugh’s inadequate medical care claims are duplicative of claims that 

he has raised in a previous action and is currently litigating in two other actions, the Court 

deems his inadequate medical care claims in this case as “frivolous.” Accordingly, the 

Court dismisses these claims.

C. The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department (“SDCSD”) is Not a Proper 

Section 1983 Defendant

Although Plaintiff Herbaugh’s claims against “medical staff” in this case are subject 

to dismissal as frivolous, the Court also finds that Plaintiff Herbaugh fails to state a claim 

upon which Section 1983 relief may be granted insofar as he asserts a claim against 

SDCSD. Because Plaintiff Herbaugh’s other pending cases do not name SDCSD as a 

defendant, the Court specifically addresses his claims against this Defendant. 

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “Persons” who may be sued under Section 1983 are 

state and local officials sued in their individual capacities, private individuals and entities 

which act under color of state law, and/or the local governmental entity itself. Vance v. 

Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995–96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Departments of municipal 

entities, however, are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983 and, therefore, a 

 

2 Plaintiff Herbaugh also appears to allege similar claims in Herbaugh v. 3089 

ARJIS, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01578-AJB-MDD, ECF No. 4 (S.D. Cal.), and Herbaugh v. 3970 

ARJIS, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01806-GPC-MDD, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal.).

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local law enforcement department is not a proper party. Id. at 996 (“Naming a municipal 

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against 

a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. 

Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s 

constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”). 

The SDCSD is managed by and/or a department of the County of San Diego, but it 

is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. See e.g., United States v. Kama, 394 

F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[M]unicipal police departments and bureaus are 

generally not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983.”); Rodriguez v. 

Cty. of Contra Costa, 2013 WL 5946112 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Hervey v. 

Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“Although municipalities, such as cities and 

counties, are amenable to suit under Monell [v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 

(1978)], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as the police departments, are 

not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.”); Nelson v. Cty. of 

Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing Sacramento 

Sheriff’s Department from section 1983 action “with prejudice” because it “is a subdivision 

of a local government entity,” i.e., Sacramento County). Accordingly, the Court dismisses

SDCSD as a defendant with prejudice.3 Because the only claims Plaintiff Herbaugh can 

properly assert are those which duplicate his claims in pending cases and would therefore 

be subject to dismissal as frivolous even if amended, the Court declines to grant leave to 

amend those claims. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff Anthony Jerome Smith from this action and DENIES 

 

3 To the extent Plaintiff Herbaugh intends to bring a claim against the County of San 

Diego based on the conduct of particular medical staff at the facility, the Court finds that 

this case is not the appropriate vehicle to do so. 

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Plaintiff Smith’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) without prejudice to proceed in Smith 

v. San Diego Central Jail, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01872-JLS-KSC4

,

2. DISMISSES WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff Herbaugh’s 

Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and

3. TERMINATES AS MOOT Herbaugh’s motion to proceed IFP in this case. 

(ECF No. 2.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2018

 

4 Plaintiff Smith is cautioned that this action is subject to sua sponte screening 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A.

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