Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN TENNISON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; SAN

FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRENTICE

EARL SANDERS; NAPOLEON HENDRIX; and

GEORGE BUTTERWORTH,

Defendants. _____________________________________

ANTOINE GOFF,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; SAN

FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRENTICE

EARL SANDERS; NAPOLEON HENDRIX; and

GEORGE BUTTERWORTH,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-0574 CW

Consolidated with

No. C 04-1643 CW

AMENDED ORDER

GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO STRIKE

AND PLAINTIFFS’

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

This is a civil rights action arising from the investigation,

arrest and prosecution of Plaintiffs John Tennison and Antoine Goff

by Defendants Prentice Earl Sanders, Napoleon Hendrix (together,

the Inspectors) and George Butterworth. Plaintiffs have filed

motions for partial summary adjudication of their Brady claims

against the Inspectors; the Inspectors oppose and cross-move for

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summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Butterworth moves

separately for summary judgment. The Inspectors move under Civil

Local Rule 56-2(a) to submit a statement of disputed facts. 

Tennison moves to strike certain portions of the Inspectors’

declarations. Goff joins in the motion to strike. The Inspectors

have not filed an opposition to the motion to strike. The matters

were heard on August 12, 2005. Having considered the papers filed

by the parties and oral argument on the motions, the Court GRANTS

in part Butterworth’s and the Inspectors’ motions for summary

judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, Plaintiffs’

motions for summary adjudication and the Inspectors’ request to

submit a statement of disputed and undisputed facts.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 3, 1990, Plaintiffs, whose cases had been

consolidated for trial, were convicted by a jury of first degree

murder and conspiracy to commit murder in the shooting death of

Roderick Shannon. Wong Dec., Ex. V. In the Matter of the Claim for

Compensation by Antoine Maurice Goff and John J. Tennison, November

4, 2004 decision of the California Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board (Matter of Goff and Tennison). Each

Plaintiff individually filed a motion for a new trial, both of

which were denied. Each Plaintiff individually filed a direct

appeal and then a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State

courts denied the direct appeals and the habeas petitions. Each

Plaintiff individually filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this Court. On August 26, 2003, this Court issued an Order

Granting Tennison’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus based upon

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California Penal Code § 4900 et seq. provides the statutory

basis for the filing of a claim for injury sustained as a result of

an erroneous conviction and incarceration. The claimant must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the “crime was not

committed by him, the fact that he did not, by any act or omission

on his part, either intentionally or negligently, contribute to the

bringing about of his arrest or conviction for the crime with which

he was charged. . .” Cal. Penal Code § 4903.

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the suppression of material exculpatory evidence. Purcell Dec.,

Ex. 52, August 26, 2003 Habeas Order. Although the Court had not

ruled on Goff’s petition, both Plaintiffs were released from

custody. The San Francisco district attorney decided not to retry

them. Purcell Dec., Exs. 53, 54; Goff Dec. ¶ 7; Exhibits B and C

submitted with Tennison's Complaint, October 27, 2003 State Court

Order declaring Tennison factually innocent of the murder of

Roderick Shannon. In 2004, Plaintiffs brought claims pursuant to

California Penal Code § 49001

 against the State of California

seeking compensation for alleged wrongful incarceration. Wong

Dec., Ex. V, Matter of Goff and Tennison. The Administrative Law

Judge of the Victims’ Compensation Board ruled that Plaintiffs had

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they

were entitled to compensation and their claims were denied. Id. at

10. Tennison has appealed this decision to the California superior

court. Balogh Dec. at ¶ 42. Tennison’s attorney anticipates that

the losing party will appeal the superior court’s decision to the

California court of appeal. Id.

FACTS

I. Pre-Trial Events -- Masina Fauolo and Pauline Maluina

On August 19, 1989, Shannon was shot and killed in San

Francisco. San Francisco Homicide Inspectors Sanders and Hendrix

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had been assigned to focus on gang-related murders and worked with

the Gang Task Force (GTF) with respect to any gang-related

homicide. The GTF was a group of officers in the San Francisco

police department charged with stopping gang activity generally. 

Sanders and Hendrix headed the Shannon homicide investigation

assisted by GTF members Michael Lewis, Neville Gittens and Leroy

Lindo. 

The evidence indicated that there had been a high-speed car

chase that had ended with Shannon taking the evasive action of

driving his car in reverse and then crashing his car backwards into

a park fence along Visitacion Avenue. One of the chasing vehicles

was a pick-up truck that had gone into reverse to chase Shannon’s

car as it was driving in reverse. Residents in the neighborhood of

the shooting identified several cars involved in the chase, but

could not identify any of the people involved. The morning after

the crash, SFPD Inspector Frank Falzon interviewed the owner of the

car Shannon had been driving during the chase: his cousin, Patrick

Barnett. Balogh Reply Dec., Ex. 91, August 19, 1989 Barnett

Interview at 1. Falzon told Barnett that two cars and a largesized pick-up truck were involved in the chase and asked him to

find a witness to the murder. Id. at 15-16.

On August 22, 1989, Masina Fauolo, an eleven-year old Samoan

girl who lived in the Sunnydale section of San Francisco, called

Hendrix and told him she had witnessed Shannon’s killing. She

later described Shannon and herself as buddies, like brother and

sister. Over the next two months, Hendrix spoke to Masina every

day. 

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The SWP was discontinued in 1992. Tabak Dec. at ¶ 4.

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On October 4, 1989, Hendrix and Sanders submitted the

following memorandum to their supervisor, Lieutenant Gerald J.

McCarthy: “In order to encourage witnesses to come forward [in the

Shannon homicide case], we request a reward of $2,500 from the

Secret Witness Program. We feel this reward will generate

information that will lead to the arrest and conviction of the

perpetrator(s) of the homicide.” Purcell Dec., Ex. 22, October 4,

1989 Memo. The Secret Witness Program (SWP) was a community-based

reward fund that was administered by the San Francisco Chamber of

Commerce (COC) in the 1980s to encourage individuals to provide

confidentially information that would assist the police in solving

crimes in San Francisco. Tabak Dec. at ¶ 4. Individuals could

call the COC’s hotline to provide such information. Id. Also, at

the request of the SFPD, the COC would post rewards for information

leading to the arrest, prosecution and conviction of criminal

suspects. Id. Any reward payment would be made directly by the

COC to the individual who provided the information, not to police

officers. Id. The SFPD did not fund the SWP. Id. A request that

a reward be posted by the SWP had to be approved by the requesting

officer’s superior officers, then forwarded to the COC for its

consideration. Id.2

Hendrix and Sanders’ request for a SWP reward was approved by

three people. An undated copy of a note addressed to McCarthy,

Hendrix and Sanders, which is xeroxed over the October 4, 1989

memo, reads, “Jerry: Per Mary Petrie, this request has been taken

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The Bureau of Investigations of the SFPD maintains an

investigative case file for all cases under investigation. Tabak

Dec., Ex. A at 25 (December 23, 1985 SFPD Memo on Investigative

Case File Management). Each case file must contain a Chronological

Report of Investigation which lists all pertinent facts needed to

document the investigation and to substantiate conclusions or

recommendations, including exculpatory evidence. Id. at 27. The

case file is maintained in the possession of the investigating

officer, in the investigating officer’s desk or in the section case

file cabinets. Id. at 35 (March 7, 1990 SFPD Memo on Processing Of

Cases Referred to Inspectors Bureau). At some point the

investigation file or a copy of it, including all exculpatory

information, is turned over to the district attorney’s office. 

Balogh Reply Dec., Ex. 81, Tabak Depo. at 99-100.

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care of and the reward is in place.” The memo was not turned over

to Plaintiffs’ trial attorneys.

Sanders testified that he didn’t personally give the SWP memo

to Butterworth, the assistant district attorney handling the case,

but that it was in the police case file3 and if Butterworth had

asked for the file, he would have seen it. Purcell Dec., Ex. 51,

Sanders Depo. at 129-31. Asked whether he had informed the

assistant district attorney about his request to the SWP, Hendrix

replied, “I don’t know that I did.” Purcell Dec., Ex. 1, Hendrix

Depo. at 25. Butterworth did not know of this memo and he did not

produce it to Plaintiffs’ defense counsel. Purcell Dec., Ex. 42,

Butterworth Depo. at 100. Plaintiffs’ defense counsel never

learned of this request. Purcell Dec., Ex. 41, Adachi Dec. at ¶ 7;

Melton Dec. at ¶ 5. Masina and Pauline Maluina, the other witness

against Tennison, testified that they did not receive any money for

testifying against Plaintiffs. Wong Dec., Ex. UU, Masina Dec. at ¶

8-10; Wong Dec., Ex. M, Pauline Depo. at 137, 139.

Neither the SFPD nor the COC has been able to locate any

witnesses or records indicating that a reward was ever offered or

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paid to anyone in connection with the Shannon murder investigation.

Tabak Dec. at ¶ 5. No record indicates that any SWP reward funds

were ever paid to Hendrix or Sanders in any case. Id.

On October 11, 1999, Sanders received a check in the amount of

$1,250 from the SFPD’s Contingent Fund B for the purpose of

“witness expenses.” Purcell Dec., Ex. 23, October and December,

1989 Ledger Pages for Contingent Fund B. On December 1, 1989,

Hendrix received a check in the amount of $160 from Contingent Fund

B for the purpose of a “witness agreement.” Id. Contingent Fund B

is a discretionary fund the Chief of Police uses in the

investigation and detection of crime. Goldberg Dec. at ¶ 3. The

Chief of Police or his designee must approve all reimbursements and

advances to police officers paid from this fund. Id. All requests

for payments from Contingent Fund B must be documented and the

documentation must be routed through the chain of command to the

Chief of Police for approval. Id. This procedure was in effect in

1989 and has not changed since then. Id. Defendants’ witness

declares that Contingent Fund B has never been used for rewards,

and that the payments noted in the ledger were for witness expenses

unrelated to the October 4, 1989 memo requesting a reward from the

SWP. Goldberg Dec. at ¶ 5.

In a 2005 declaration, Masina states that she moved to Samoa

shortly after Shannon was killed and that, as far as she knows, her

transportation expenses to fly from Samoa to San Francisco for the

preliminary hearings and trial were paid by the SFPD. Wong Dec.,

Ex. UU, Masina Dec. at ¶ 14.

 The Fiscal Division has worked diligently to try to locate

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all supporting documentation for the October payment to Sanders and

the December payment to Hendrix, but it has only been able to

locate bank statements; the request memos, cancelled checks and any

related receipts could not be found. Id. The documents were

likely destroyed years ago as part of the SFPD’s standard

documentation retention and destruction policy. Id.

The information about the Contingent Fund B disbursements was

not given to Plaintiffs’ trial attorneys. 

In an October 31, 1989 recorded interview with Hendrix and

Sanders, Masina told them the following information. Purcell Dec.,

Ex. 26. After midnight on August 19, 1989, Masina and her friend

Pauline Maluina were parked in the Lovers’ Lane parking lot at the

top of Visitacion Avenue in a stolen car eleven-year old Masina was

driving. Masina said she saw three cars and a truck enter the

parking lot. The drivers and the passengers in the vehicles were

young, African American men. She heard one boy say to another,

“Buck, come here.” After the cars had been parked for about ten

minutes, Shannon’s car went by on Visitacion. Then the three cars

and the truck left the parking lot and began to chase Shannon in

the car he was driving. Masina drove out of the parking lot and

followed the cars down the hill without losing sight of Shannon’s

car. She said she parked the stolen car on the street near where

Shannon had crashed his car and ran to a Super Fair parking lot. 

She got separated from her friend Pauline at this point. At the

Super Fair parking lot, she saw Shannon being beaten by a gang of

boys. Then one boy went to the trunk of his car and got a shotgun. 

Masina heard four or five shots, saw the boy shoot at Shannon, but

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didn’t know whether any of the shots hit Shannon or were shot in

the air. After Shannon was shot, all the boys got back in their

cars and left. Masina then went to Shannon who said, “Get

Patrick.” Then Masina left the scene. 

At the interview, Sanders showed Masina eight photographs. 

From them she picked two, one of Tennison and one of Goff. Masina

said that Tennison was one of the boys who were beating Shannon and

Goff was the person who shot Shannon. 

On November 28, 1989, Hendrix located Masina’s friend,

fourteen-year old Pauline Maluina, at Visitacion Valley High School

and interviewed her in the presence of her father and the

principal. Purcell Dec., Ex. 29, November 28, 1989 Police

Interview with Pauline Maluina. At the interview, Pauline told

Hendrix that she and Masina were walking around and saw some people

beating up somebody. Then Shannon “came out looking all

frightened. All of a sudden there’s a car right next to them. 

Someone got the gun and shot him right there and me and Masina we

just ran and we hopped on a bus. We went down 24th and Mission.” 

Id. at 2. She and Masina were walking and talking slowly. Id. at

4. Right after one shot was fired, she and Masina ran because they

thought the shooter was going to point the gun at them and shoot

them. Id. at 5. 

At the interview, Hendrix showed Pauline eight San Francisco

police ID-type photos. Pauline identified two of the people in the

photos as being at the scene. One of the people she picked was

Tennison. She said he was not the person who was in charge of the

shotgun. Id. at 13. The other person Pauline identified was an

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individual named Wayland Gibson, who was also known as “Buck.” Id.

at 12.

 Hendrix and Sanders brought the case to the San Francisco

District Attorney’s Office, which decided to prosecute Plaintiffs. 

On November 28, 1989, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Goff;

on December 1, 1989, a warrant was issued for the arrest of

Tennison. 

The case against Plaintiffs was originally prosecuted by

Assistant District Attorney Al Giannini. In December, 1989,

Giannini filed a California Welfare and Institutions Code § 707

petition to have Tennison referred to adult court for prosecution

in the Shannon homicide. Kaiser Dec., Ex. B, May 24, 1990

Butterworth Declaration. On February 21, 1990, the case was

transferred to Assistant District Attorney Butterworth. The

section 707 hearing took place on March 27, 1990 and April 2, 1990;

Hendrix and Pauline testified. Tennison’s attorney, San Francisco

Assistant Public Defender Jeff Adachi cross-examined them. The

petition was granted. Tennison was arrested on April 5, 1990. 

Tennison’s preliminary hearing was set for April 23, 1990. Goff

was arraigned on April 9, 1990 and his preliminary hearing was set

for May 1, 1990. 

On April 22, 1990, the day before Tennison’s preliminary

hearing, Pauline arrived from Hawaii, where she was then living, to

meet with Butterworth before she testified at the hearing. Kaiser

Dec., Ex. B, May 24, Butterworth Dec. at 1. Pauline, her mother,

Butterworth and Hendrix were at the meeting. Kaiser Dec., Ex. A,

Butterworth Depo. at 162. Butterworth had asked Pauline to come to

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the meeting to prepare her for her testimony at the preliminary

hearing. Id. Butterworth had Pauline read the testimony she gave

at Tennison’s section 707 hearing and told her there were

discrepancies between what she had testified to and what Masina had

said in her tape-recorded interview with the police. Purcell Dec.,

Ex. 30, April 23, 1990 Police Interview of Pauline Maluina at 2. 

Pauline then told Butterworth that she had not been at the scene of

Shannon’s homicide. Id. She said that she had lied “because she

didn’t want to get into any more trouble” and she owed Masina

something. Id. at 2, 4. Pauline said that she had been able to

pick out Tennison’s photo from the photos Hendrix had shown her at

the November, 1989 interview “because Masina told me to pick the

one that looked the biggest, and the largest one out of all the

pictures.” Id. at 3. Pauline also said that she learned all the

details of Shannon’s shooting from Masina before she spoke to

Hendrix in November. Id. at 4. After he heard Pauline’s

recantation, Butterworth sent Pauline and her mother back to their

hotel. Wong Dec., Ex. O, Butterworth Depo. at 178. Then

Butterworth spoke with Hendrix and they decided to bring Pauline

back the next day to see if she would still say that she wasn’t at

the murder scene. Id.

The next day, April 23, 1990, Pauline returned with her

mother. Id. Butterworth told Pauline that, based upon what she

had said the previous day, he wanted to do a follow-up interview

which was going to be tape-recorded. Id. at 190. Butterworth told

Pauline, “Do you understand that based upon what you told Inspector

Hendrix and myself yesterday, that the case against Mr. Tennison

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has been compromised and as a result, uh, we’re not going to be

able to proceed with the preliminary hearing or with the

prosecution at this point? Do you understand that?” Purcell Dec.,

Ex. 30, April 23, 1990 Police Interview of Pauline Maluina at 6. 

Pauline responded that she did understand. Id. Butterworth asked,

“And is the reason you are telling us the information you are

telling us today because that’s the truth or is it just because you

are afraid to testify against Mr. Tennison?” Id. Pauline

responded, “It’s the truth.” Id.

After this interview, Butterworth dismissed the case against

Tennison and then had a conference with other members of the

homicide unit of the district attorney’s office, including the head

of the unit, to decide how to proceed. Wong Dec., Ex. O,

Butterworth Depo. at 192. During that meeting, it was determined

that Pauline would be given a polygraph test. Id. at 194. The

goal of the polygraph was to see if, in the face of the polygraph

examination, Pauline would persist in her claim that she had not

been at the scene of Shannon’s murder. Id. at 194. Another

decision that was made was to talk to Masina. Id. at 197. 

On April 23, 1990, Hendrix called Masina who was then living

in Samoa. Balogh Reply Dec. at ¶ 7, Ex. 59, photocopies of two

audiotapes labeled “Masina Fauolo 4/23/90" and “M. Fauolo 4/23/90." 

These are two copies of an original audiotape of Hendrix and

Masina’s conversation. These copies were not produced to

Plaintiffs’ trial counsel nor were they produced in response to

subpoenas issued in Tennison’s federal habeas case. Balogh Dec. at

¶ 7. They were produced from Butterworth’s files in December,

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Tennison indicates that, because this evidence was only

produced in response to the subpoena in this case, allegations that

the Inspectors suppressed the tape of Hendrix’ April 23, 1990

conversation with Masina is not included in his complaint. 

Tennison argues that he informed the Inspectors of this Brady claim

in his responses to their interrogatories and, because the

Inspectors have not moved for summary judgment on this claim, it

remains for trial. 

13

2004, in response to Tennison’s subpoena in this case. Id. The

original audiotape of Hendrix’ conversation with Masina has never

been produced. Id.4

Plaintiffs employed forensic audio expert Richard Sanders to

enhance the sound quality of the audiotapes because they are

difficult to hear. Richard Sanders Dec. at 1. Only Hendrix’ voice

can be heard on the audiotapes. Id. at 5. Even with the

enhancement, only about one-third of Hendrix’ conversation contains

recognizable words. Id. Richard Sanders made a transcript of the

audible portion of the tape. Id. He states that the only

knowledge he had when making the transcript was the names of the

people who might be involved in the discussion. Id. About ten

minutes into the audiotape, the words, “Can you ever see this

reward?” can be heard. Id., Ex. 2, Transcript of Audiotape at 3,

line 10:58. 

The Inspectors employed audio expert Durand R. Begault to

review Richard Sanders’ declaration and its attached exhibits. 

Begault Dec. at ¶ 5. Begault states that even with enhancement of

the tape, except for an occasional word or phrase such as “OK” or

“JJ,” it is mostly impossible to determine reliably what exact

words Hendrix is saying. Id. at ¶ 14. Begault states that the

word “reward” is not spoken anywhere on the tape and thus Richard

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Sanders’ transcript of the tape is inaccurate. Id. at 18. 

Begault’s best estimate of the phrase Richard Sanders transcribes

as, “Can you ever see this reward” is “Have you ever seen this

before?” Begault’s colleague heard, “Have you ever seen this one?”

On April 24, 1990, Pauline returned to the police station

without her mother and she was given a polygraph test. Kaiser

Dec., Ex. 1, Butterworth Depo. at 202. Butterworth had a few brief

words with Pauline before she was polygraphed, but they did not say

anything of substance. Id. Butterworth did not speak to Pauline

after the polygraph. Id. SFPD Inspector Henry Hunter administered

the polygraph. Purcell Dec., Ex. 33, April 27, 1990 Memorandum

from Henry Hunter to Hendrix and Sanders. Pauline responded to

Hunter’s questions by saying that she had not witnessed the Shannon

murder and that Masina had told her to lie about being there. Id.

Hunter determined that the polygraph results were inconclusive. 

Id. Hunter told Pauline that if she had changed her original story

because of fear of retaliation, she should not do so because the

police would give her protection. Id. Hendrix placed Hunter’s

memo summarizing the results of Pauline’s polygraph in the police

case file which was available to Butterworth. Hendrix Dec. ¶ 22.

Butterworth testified that he never saw the memo. Wong Dec., Ex.

O, Butterworth Depo. at 207. Butterworth testified that he told

Jeff Adachi, Tennison’s defense counsel, about the polygraph. Id.

Butterworth could not remember if he told Barry Melton, Goff’s

defense counsel, about the polygraph. Id. at 208. Adachi declares

that he was not made aware that Pauline was subjected to a

polygraph examination. Adachi Dec. at ¶ 12. 

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After the polygraph, Hendrix put Pauline in a private room and

arranged for her to talk by phone to Masina, who was in Samoa. 

Hendrix Dec. at ¶ 23. Hendrix left Pauline in the room alone to

talk to Masina and did not monitor or record the call. During the

call, Masina got mad at Pauline and told her how stupid she was. 

Purcell Dec., Ex. 31, Pauline’s Trial Testimony at 194. After

Pauline talked to Masina, Pauline retracted her recantation. 

Hendrix Dec. at ¶ 23. On April 24, 1990, Hendrix and Sanders

interviewed Pauline on tape and documented the retraction of her

recantation. Id.; Purcell Dec., Ex. 34, April 24, 1990 Police

Interview with Pauline Maluina. Hendrix and Sanders gave this tape

to Butterworth. Hendrix Dec. at ¶ 23. 

In a declaration dated June, 2003, Pauline states that, during

the phone call, Masina pressured her to return to her earlier,

untrue statements and told Pauline additional details about the

false testimony she wanted Pauline to give. June, 2003 Maluina Dec.

at ¶ 14. At her deposition, Pauline stated that, although Masina

had never hurt or threatened her, Pauline had seen the damage

Masina had done to other people and she didn’t want that happening

to her. Wong Dec., Ex. M, Maluina Depo. at 249-50. Pauline stated

that Masina told her to tell the truth, but Pauline interpreted

Masina as saying “tell my truth.” Id. at 282-83.

Pauline testified that, when Butterworth first heard that she

was recanting her prior testimony, he got upset and yelled, “How

could you say that you weren’t there? You told us that you were

there.” Id. at 79. Later, she clarified that Butterworth got

upset and raised his voice like a parent talking to his child. Id.

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at 77, 88-89. She also said that Butterworth looked frustrated and

then he called in Hendrix. Id. at 78. Pauline said that

Butterworth and Hendrix pushed her toward going back to her

original testimony by not listening to her when she told them she

was not at the murder scene. Id. at 96. She felt that Butterworth

and Hendrix did not protect her in that they did not listen to her. 

Id. at 371-72. Pauline testified that she had asked to take a

polygraph test. Id. at 94.

Tennison’s preliminary hearing was held on June 18, 1990. 

Achiron Reply Dec., Ex. D. Only Masina testified, but the court

heard testimony that Pauline had recanted and that Masina had

spoken to her after she recanted. Id. at 105. Tennison

Preliminary Hearing at 104-05. At Goff’s preliminary hearing,

Butterworth called only Masina, but Goff called Pauline as a

defense witness. Achiron Reply Dec., Ex. C, Goff Preliminary

Hearing at 101-11. Pauline was examined on the discrepancies

between her testimony and Masina’s, her recantation and her

telephone call to Masina regarding her recantation. Id. The

court, in both cases, found probable cause. Id. at 118-19; Achiron

Reply Dec., Ex. D, Tennison’s Preliminary Hearing at 118-19.

Masina and Pauline testified at Plaintiffs’ consolidated

trial. On October 3, 1990, a jury found Plaintiffs guilty of

murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 

II. Pre-Trial Events -- Chante Smith

On January 3, 1990, Chante Smith contacted Sanders. Purcell

Dec., Ex. 45, Sanders’ notes of January 3, 1990 Smith conversation;

Sanders Dec. ¶ 9; Wong Dec. Ex. F, Matter of Goff and Tennison,

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5

Smith used Ricard’s street name, Lavinsta. Apparently, his

true name is Lovinsky.

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Transcript of Administrative Hearing (Transcript of § 4900 Hearing)

at 87. Smith said she had information that she had heard on the

street and she provided Sanders with a list of names of people she

had heard were at the scene of the Shannon murder, including a

person named Luther Blue. Sanders Dec. ¶ 9; Smith Dec. ¶ 8, Wong

Dec., Ex. F, Transcript of § 4900 Hearing at 87. Smith also said

that Sanders had arrested the wrong people and that Lavinsta

Ricard5 had shot Shannon. Smith Dec. ¶ 8. Smith also told Sanders

that the car chase started at the Seven-Eleven store, which is

located east of the Super Fair Market where Shannon was shot,

whereas Lovers’ Lane, where Masina and Pauline had said the car

chase started, is located west of the Super Fair Market. Smith

Dec. ¶ 8; see Purcell Dec., Ex. 20, Map. Smith also described

several of the cars involved in the car chase. Smith Dec. ¶ 8. 

Years later, on July 24, 1992, Smith told Butterworth and Sanders

that she had actually witnessed Shannon’s murder. Purcell Dec.,

Ex. 47, Chante Smith’s July 24, 1992 Police Interview at 2-32. She

said she had not told Sanders that she was a witness to the murder

because she was afraid she would go to jail and that Ricard or Blue

would harm her. Wong Dec., Ex. F, Transcript of 

§ 4900 Hearing at 94-95; Purcell Dec., Ex. 47, Chante Smith’s July

24, 1992 Police Interview at 40, 62. Blue and Ricard were friends

and Smith heard that Blue had paid someone $10,000 to kill her so

that she could not reveal that Ricard shot Shannon. Id. at 40. 

Because of these threats, Smith left the home she shared with her

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6

Coolie was Shannon’s street name. 187 PC refers to

California Penal Code § 187 which provides the definition of

murder.

18

mother in San Francisco and moved to Richmond and then to Daly

City. Id. at 65. Only Smith’s mother knew how to get in touch

with her. Id. 

Sanders made a hand-written note of the Smith interview and

put it in the police case file, which was made available to

Butterworth. Sanders Dec. at ¶ 9; Wong Dec., Ex. I, Sanders’ Note

dated 1/3/90. The handwritten note has the word “Chante” written

at the top left and the top center has the words “Re: ‘Coolie’ 187

PC,”6

 and under this is a telephone number. Id. Under this

heading appear the words, “Luther Blue, ‘Coug Nut’ Lakeview

‘Rapper’, ‘Louie Lou,’ Record Title: ‘Scandelous [sic]’, Laventa or

Vista, Troy Barnes drives a Black Skylark, Mad Hatter, Mark

Anthony, Shardedee, ‘The Ill Mannered Posse,’ and ‘We’re going over

to Sunnydale and start some shit.’” Id.

After Smith’s initial contact with Sanders, Sanders came to

Smith’s house, they sat in the parking lot and Smith told Sanders

about her knowledge of the people and the cars involved in

Shannon’s murder. Purcell Dec., Ex. 47, Smith’s July 24, 1992

Police Interview at 61. Sanders sent three officers from the GTF

to Smith’s house to show her pictures of a truck similar to the one

she had described to Sanders. Id. She was asked to identify the

truck because she had told Sanders that, after Shannon had been

shot, she had seen people involved in the shooting at the Sundial,

a park in Hunter’s Point, and she had seen a truck there. Id. at

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62-63. 

On February 8, 1990, after Smith had spoken to Sanders,

Hendrix and Lewis interviewed Lovinsky Ricard. Purcell Dec., Ex.

37, Transcript of February 8, 1990 Police Interview with Lovinsky

Ricard. Hendrix named the people mentioned by Smith and asked

Ricard if he knew any of them. Ricard denied knowing any of them. 

Id. at 7-12. Hendrix asked Ricard if he was present when Shannon

was shot. Id. at 14. Ricard replied, “No.” Id. Hendrix told

Ricard that someone had told the police that Ricard had shot

Shannon to avenge the death of Cheap Charlie and asked Ricard if he

shot Shannon. Id. at 16-17. Ricard again denied shooting Shannon. 

Id. at 17. Toward the end of the interview Hendrix told Ricard,

“I’m saying your name came up in this investigation, with Cooley. 

Someone says you were there at the scene. Now, I don’t think this

person would have a grudge with you. I don’t think this person

would do it maliciously or try to damage you in any way because it

doesn’t appear to be that type of individual. However, it’s

something that has to be explained, one way or another. And we’d

be less than diligent, sworn to do our duty if we didn’t pursue,

check it out.” Id. at 22-23. 

On February 9, 1990, Sanders and Gittens interviewed Luther

Blue. Wong Dec., Ex. S, Transcript of February 9, 1990 police

interview with Luther Blue. Sanders informed Blue that his name

had come up in connection with the Shannon homicide. Id. at 4. 

Blue said that he had never heard anything about the Shannon

incident. Id. at 5. Later in the interview, Blue stated that he

had heard that Shannon had been shot, but that he was not there. 

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Id. at 10. Sanders stated, 

Now we’re gonna get to the bottom of Roderick Shannon

being shot. Now, we know and its [sic] obvious to you,

or it should be, that somebody has talked to us . . . I

believe you were there, ‘cause I believe the person who

told me. . . . But what I’m saying son the people we

talked to told us exactly what happened. They told us

about the truck. We know who the truck belongs to. We

know about the truck. We know about the chase, we know

that he was -- the person just out drove him, Roderick,

he didn’t know much about drivin’ cars. After he wrecked

the car they chased him and when they made that turn, he

thought behind that market . . . there used to be a lower

fence . . . he thought if he could get over the fence he

could get in the backyard and get away. Only when he got

up there they caught him. There were people standing

around. So, can you tell me . . . why these individuals

would say ‘yeah, Luther was there,’ they didn’t say you

were doing nothing . . .

Id. at 21, 23-24. 

Blue replied, “I don’t know why they’d say I was there.” Id.

at 24. Sanders stated, “I believe the people who talked to me. I

believe you were there. You were there . . . and I can understand

you being afraid, that’s no . . . Son, that is no crime to be

afraid. . . .” Id. at 25. Later, Sanders stated, 

Now tell me, if I were to tell you that on the night of

the incident you were at the 7-11 on Third Street . . .

You became possed up with a group of other young men and

gave chase to an automobile driven by –- actually you

didn’t know who it was driven by, they thought it was

Patrick’s car. Roderick Shannon was Patrick’s cousin. 

Gave chase to the car. The car, lost it, picked it up

again, chased it until it ran the fence and then the

truck backed down the street –- that was some pretty

skillful driving. And when the witnesses told us about

that –- that took some pretty skillful driving. All the

time, the people that were in the truck, and in the other

vehicles, they all knew each other. Everybody knew

everybody else –- And you were there. You were there

Luther. Tell you what I’m going to do, son . . . I’m

going to give you time to think about it. . . . Meanwhile

we are going to continue our investigation.

Id. at 27. 

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Butterworth testified that Sanders’ January 3, 1990 note was

in his file, but that he would not have known from the names listed

on the note what role these individuals played or why they were

identified. Wong Dec. Ex. O, Butterworth Dep. at 113, 116. 

Butterworth said that this list of names, without any other

information, would be valueless because, in a homicide

investigation, everything is contextual. Id. at 117. Butterworth

learned the significance of the document in the review of the

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. Butterworth has no

personal knowledge whether Sanders’ note was produced to Adachi,

but he testified that it was in the district attorney’s file, and

therefore it would have been turned over to Adachi in the initial

discovery package. Id. at 113. 

Adachi declares that he never received any information or

documentation regarding the information Smith provided to Sanders. 

Adachi Dec. at ¶ 4. Adachi states that he never received a copy of

Sanders’ handwritten note. Id. He states that the first time he

received the note was in June, 2002, when Tennison’s present

attorney gave him a copy of it. Id. at ¶ 5. Adachi states that

had he known that Smith had stated that the car chase started at

the Seven-Eleven, which was inconsistent with Masina and Pauline’s

story, he would have had a legitimate alternative theory for the

case that would have proven the girls were lying, he could have

identified a woman named “Chante” who had information about a list

of potential witnesses or suspects and he would have been able to 

follow up on the dead-end police interviews of Lovinsky Ricard on

February 8, 1990, and of Luther Blue on February 14, 1990. Id.

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Melton declares that he never received any information, oral

or written, about the police interview with Smith in which she

named Ricard. Melton Dec. at ¶ 4.

In Smith’s 1992 police interview, Butterworth and Sanders

questioned her about her interaction with Plaintiffs. Smith stated

that she had gone out with Goff about twice, that they were friends

but that they were not dating. Purcell Dec., Ex. 47, 1992 Smith

Interview at 39, 60. Smith only knew Goff as Antoine or Sodapop,

his street name; she did not know his last name. Id. at 42. 

Before Plaintiffs’ trial, Smith was contacted by some of Tennison’s

and Goff’s friends who told her that Tennison and Goff,

independently, wanted her to testify or talk to their attorneys. 

Id. at 41, 66-67. Smith told Plaintiffs’ friends that she had been

threatened and couldn’t take the risk. Id. at 41. Smith stated

that she had worked as an operator for Pacific Bell in Burlingame

and, after Plaintiffs’ trial, when they were incarcerated in the

county jail, she handled several collect calls placed separately by

Tennison and Goff. Id. at 66. At that time, Smith did not know

Tennison’s name. Id. at 42. When Tennison realized that the

operator was Smith, he asked her to talk to himself or his

attorney, but Smith said she would not come forward because she was

afraid of getting into trouble. Id. at 42, 44. Neither Tennison

nor Goff had Smith’s home number, so they did not know how to find

her. Id. at 45. 

At Tennison’s motion for new trial, Bruce Tennison testified

that Adachi had asked him to find a woman by the name of Chauntey

White to ask her if she knew anything about the Shannon homicide. 

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Wong Dec., Ex. E, Transcript of New Trial Motion at 228. Bruce

Tennison could not find her because he did not have a number for

her. Id.

In her 1992 interview, Smith stated that if Plaintiffs’

attorneys had served her with a subpoena, she would have come in

and talked to them. Purcell Dec., Ex. 47, 1992 Smith Interview at

45. She reiterated this statements in her testimony at the § 4900

hearing. Wong Dec., Ex. F., Transcript of § 4900 Hearing at 163,

165, 167.

At the § 4900 hearing, Goff testified that, before Shannon’s

murder, Goff had gone out with Smith twice. Wong Dec., Ex. F,

Transcript of § 4900 Hearing at 640. Goff testified that a month

or two after the murder, he was among a crowd of people who were

listening to a person named Lovinsky Ricard brag about shooting

Shannon. Id. at 580. Goff heard Ricard mention Smith’s name in

connection with Shannon’s murder, and the next time Goff saw Smith,

he asked her if she knew anything about the murder. Id. at 582-83,

641. Smith told Goff that she didn’t have anything to do with the

murder, and Goff never said anything else about it to her. Id. at

582. Goff believed he told Melton about Smith. Id. at 595, 677. 

Goff did not tell Tennison any of the information he knew about

Ricard and Smith. Id. at 639. After he was convicted, but prior

to being sentenced, Goff had two or three telephone conversations

with Smith and he asked her to talk to his lawyer because his

friend had told him that she may have been at the murder scene. 

Id. at 673-74.

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At her July 24, 1992 police interview, Smith stated that, on

the night of the Shannon murder, she had been driving a convertible

with Ricard and two other passengers. Purcell Dec., Ex. 47, Smith

Police Interview at 3-4, 68.

24

III. Post-Trial Events -- Lovinsky Ricard

On November 7, 1990, shortly after Plaintiffs had been

convicted, Lovinsky Ricard was arrested, on a bench warrant, by

SFPD officers Lewis and Gittens, two members of the GTF who were

working on the Shannon murder with Hendrix and Sanders. Purcell

Dec., Ex. 19, Lewis Depo. at 18, 31; Purcell Dec., Ex. 38, Lovinsky

Ricard’s November 7, 1990 Police Interview at 2. Ricard

voluntarily told them that he had shot Shannon. Id. at 34. Lewis

and Gittens read Ricard his Miranda warnings and questioned him

about the Shannon homicide. Id. at 14. The interview was audiotaped. Ricard stated that, on the night of the murder, he had been

hanging out, drinking with others and riding with friends in a

convertible. Id. at 15.7 Ricard did not want to name the others

who were present, stating that he did not want them to be arrested

or involved in the case. Id. at 17-18. Ricard said that he had

started thinking about his friend Cheap Charlie, who had just been

killed, and he was talking about what he would do about it. Id. at

3. He had a shotgun with him. Id. He went with his friends in

the convertible to a Seven-Eleven store and there he decided to

join other people in the back of a pick-up truck. Id. at 6. He

saw a black car and he recognized the driver as one of the group

who he thought had killed Cheap Charlie. Id. A car chase began

and, from the back of the truck, Ricard shot at the black car. Id.

The driver threw the car in reverse and went backward. Id. Then

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the driver of the truck threw the truck in reverse and drove

backward chasing the car. Id. During the chase, Ricard was

shooting at the car. Id. at 6-7. The driver ran the car up on the

curb and into the fence, and jumped out of the car and started

running. Id. at 7. Some of the people who had been chasing the

black car caught the driver and were beating him in a corner. Id.

Ricard jumped out of the back of the truck with the gun and, when

he pointed the gun at Shannon, everybody cleared back and Ricard

shot him. Id. Then everybody scattered. Id. Ricard jumped back

in the truck and the truck and all the cars drove away. Id. at 7-

8. The gun he used had been stolen, so there was no possibility

that the police would find it. Id. at 8. Ricard stated that he

was confessing because he had been feeling bad that two of his

friends were going down for something he did and now he was trying

to do the right thing. Id. at 13-14, 15. Ricard stated that he

knew Tennison and Goff well and they were not at the scene of the

murder. Id. at 15. Ricard said the convertible he was originally

riding in that evening, before he got into the pick-up truck,

pulled up to the scene after the shooting was over. Id. at 18. 

Several times Lewis asked Ricard for the names of people who could

verify any part of his story; Ricard refused to name other people

because he didn't want to bring them into it. Id. at 25-28. 

At his 2001 deposition, Lewis testified that Ricard's

description of the car chase was consistent with everything else he

had heard about it, that during the course of the chase, the person

being chased had put his car in reverse and gone backwards for some

distance. Purcell Dec., Ex. 19, December 3, 2001 Lewis Depo. at

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65. After Ricard confessed, Lewis believed that Ricard murdered

Shannon. Id. at 82. Lewis testified that he advised Hendrix and

Sanders that Ricard had confessed on tape and “they said they would

consider the information that I gave them through the interview and

it would be determined from there, from others other than myself,

how they would go further.” Id. at 86. Lewis stated that he gave

the Inspectors a copy or the original of the audiotape, but not a

written transcript, so they would have to play and listen to the

tape to determine what was on it. Id. Lewis was sure he gave them

some kind of narrative regarding the content of the tape. Id. at

88. 

At his 2005 deposition, Lewis testified that on November 7,

1990, after he interviewed Ricard, he made a copy of the audiotape

of the interview. Wong Dec., Ex. R, May 10, 2005 Lewis Depo. at

66. Lewis was asked, “Once you concluded the Ricard interview and

you had the audiotape of it, what did you do with that tape?” He

answered:

My recall is that I made a copy of it and either put it

in room 400, which is like the operation center for the

police department, so when the different bureau chiefs or

lieutenants come in they can forward that information to

whomever in their unit needed it. Or I would write a

note -- and I recall having done this on occasion -- I

don’t remember that I did it on this occasion -- and

either put it under the door so that they could get it

first thing in the morning. Because we work

predominantly nights.

Id.

Then the following exchange took place:

Q: When you say “put it under the door,” do you mean the

door to Inspectors Hendrix’ and Sanders’ office?

A: The door to the homicide detail, yes.

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Q: And that was where Inspector Hendrix and Sanders had

their desks, in the homicide detail?

A: Yes.

Q: And is your recollection that you did this immediately

after taking the confession?

A: That evening before I left the building, yes.

. . . 

Q: Do you recall talking to Inspector Hendrix or

Inspector Sanders about what Ricard had said during the

November, 1990 interview?

A: The next day I believe I talked to them.

Q: What did you say?

A: “Did you hear the tape?”

Q: And were you talking to both Inspector Hendrix and

Inspector Sanders or just one of them?

A: I don’t recall, but I think it was Napoleon.

Q: And when you asked him “Did you hear the tape” what

did he say?

A: As I recall, he said, “Yeah, I listened to it, but it

was -- you know, your boy has got to come in and lay it

all out. He has got to do better than -- than this.”

Q: So, he gave you the impression he had listened to the

tape?

A: Yes, as I recall I believe so.

. . .

A: Or maybe I told him about the content of the tape. I

don’t know that he sat and listened to the whole thing. 

Maybe I came away with that impression. But I was

excited about it. I told him why. And he said, you know

--

Q: He made specific suggestions about additional

information that he would like to see Ricard provide?

A: And he said that while it was a good interview, he was

still very vague on specifics. And so he -- as I recall,

he told me that if he was going to do this then 

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-- then he would be -- he would need a gun, named

additional suspects, vehicles, or something tangible to

turn this thing around.

Id. at 66-68.

At his 2001 deposition, Sanders testified that he received the

tape of the Ricard confession within a day or two after it was

made. Purcell Dec., Ex. 40, Sanders Depo. at 126. Sanders stated

that “the first thing I did –- we did -- was compare the two tapes. 

And they were diabolically [sic] opposed. One, he had nothing to

do with it, and on this one he’s -- in this interview, he’s

confessing. Further, in analyzing his statements in the November

7th statement, . . . there were just all kinds of unverifiable,

flawed facts in his case. So with this, we wanted to talk to him

again. And was –- and to talk to Mr. Lovinsky again. But he was

then covered by an attorney, and he didn’t want to talk anymore.” 

Id. In answer to the question whether he withheld the copy of the

tape from Butterworth, Sanders replied, “No, this was something

that was paramount. We got ahold [sic] of him right away and we

had to talk to him about it, told him we were investigating it.” 

Id. 

In his June 2, 2005 declaration submitted in support of his

motion for summary judgment, Sanders states that he learned of

Ricard's taped confession from Butterworth in May, 1991. Sanders

Dec. at ¶ 10. At the time, Butterworth was involved in litigating

Tennison's motion for new trial and asked Sanders to investigate

the statements made by Ricard on the tape. Id. at 10. Sanders

states that he never received a copy of the tape from Lewis and

never had a copy in his possession. Id.

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At his January 18, 2005 deposition, Hendrix testified that he

learned of the Ricard confession from Sanders, but could not

remember when Sanders told him about it. Purcell Dec., Ex. 1,

Hendrix Depo. at 57, 63. Hendrix testified that he never listened

to the audiotape of the confession. Id. at 63. Hendrix testified

that he and Sanders were responsible for turning over evidence

connected to the Shannon homicide to the district attorney because

it was their case. Id. at 64. He testified that he never took any

steps to turn the tape of Ricard's confession over to Butterworth,

because it was never in his possession. Id. He stated that he

felt it was Lewis and Gittens’ responsibility to turn the tape over

to Butterworth because they took the confession and made the tape. 

Id. at 67. Hendrix felt angry at Lewis and Gittens for not calling 

Sanders and himself to conduct the Ricard interview, because the

Shannon case was Sanders’ and Hendrix’ responsibility, and if there

was a development in it, he and Sanders should have been contacted. 

Id. at 67, 70-71. After he learned of the taped confession,

Hendrix didn't care about the tape, he just wanted to find Ricard

and he and Sanders took steps to try to locate him. Id. at 67, 70,

72. They located Ricard's father and a girl who was keeping

company with Ricard and went to the places where Ricard usually

hung out, on the street corners and up in the projects. Id.

Ricard's father told them that Ricard had left town and there was

no sense in them looking for him. Id. at 72-73. Hendrix testified

that he and Sanders tried to locate Ricard over a period of months. 

Id. at 73. During this time Hendrix never informed Butterworth of

their efforts to locate Ricard. Id. 

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In his June 2, 2005 declaration submitted in support of his

motion for summary judgment, Hendrix states that he first became

aware of Ricard's taped confession from Sanders who said that he

had learned of it from Butterworth. Hendrix Dec. at ¶ 10. Hendrix

states that he never had a copy of the Ricard taped statement in

his possession. Id.

Butterworth testifies that he first learned of Ricard's

confession in May, 1991 when he ran into Lewis in the cafeteria in

the Hall of Justice. Butterworth Dec. at ¶ 23. At that time,

Butterworth was in the midst of the hearing on Tennison's motion

for a new trial. Id. Lewis informed Butterworth that he had a

tape-recorded interview with Ricard admitting that he killed

Shannon. Id. Butterworth told Lewis that he did not have a copy

of the audiotape and asked Lewis to give him a copy, which Lewis

did. Id. Butterworth contacted Sanders and informed him of the

taped Ricard confession. Id. Sanders responded that he was not

aware of any statement in which Ricard admitted killing Shannon. 

Id. Butterworth immediately informed Tennison's defense counsel of

the taped statement, and he included it in his new trial motion. 

Id. Butterworth asked Sanders to assist him in responding to the

new trial motion; Hendrix was not available to work on it. Id.

Sanders did some follow-up work to check out some of the statements

Ricard had made on the tape, such as visiting a store mentioned by

Ricard to see what type of shotgun ammunition the store sold. Id.

After he reviewed Ricard's statement with Sanders, Butterworth

concluded that Ricard's confession was not credible. Id.

Butterworth helped Sanders prepare a declaration regarding Ricard's

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confession, which he submitted to the court. Id. 

Very soon after the jury verdict against Tennison, Tennison

heard from friends that Ricard might be implicated in the Shannon

murder. Wong Dec., Ex. E., Transcript of New Trial Motion at 132. 

Tennison gave this information to Adachi. Id. at 142-43. Adachi, 

eventually found Ricard and convinced him to make a videotaped

confession, which he did anonymously with a hood over his head. 

Purcell Dec., Ex. 41, Adachi Dec. at ¶ 4. Because the Public

Defender's Office was representing Ricard in a separate matter,

Adachi's supervisors informed him that he was required to withdraw

from representing Tennison, with the new trial motion pending. Id.

While he was representing Tennison, no one from the district

attorney’s office or the SFPD informed him of Ricard’s November 7,

1990 taped confession to police. Id. at 6. On March 1, 1991,

Adachi was replaced as Tennison's counsel by LeRue Grim. On May

17, 1991, the second-to-last day of the hearing on Tennison's new

trial motion, Butterworth informed Grim of the Ricard tape. 

Melton, Goff's attorney, was not informed by anyone from the

district attorney’s office or the SFPD of the November 7, 1990

Ricard taped confession. Melton Dec. at ¶ 6.

Tennison’s motion for a new trial was based, in part, on the

tape of Ricard’s anonymous confession that Adachi had made. Wong

Dec., Ex. GG, October 8, 1990 California court of appeal decision

in People v. Tennison, appeal no. A054353 at 5. At the hearing on

the motion, Adachi, based on his attorney-client obligations to

Ricard, refused to disclose the identity of the videotaped

interviewee, but testified that he made the tape in conjunction

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with Tennison’s case and he provided the tape to Tennison’s new

counsel. Wong Dec., Ex. E, Transcript of New Trial Motion at 16

passim, 91-94, 102-03. In order to authenticate the video-tape of

the anonymous confession, Tennison and Adachi testified about how

they found out that Ricard was involved in the Shannon murder. Id.

at 47-48, 133 passim. Grim, Tennison’s attorney at the new trial

proceeding, explained that the testimony was not offered for the

truth of the matter, but to show a cumulative, causal chain that

led to Tennison’s discussion with Adachi regarding Ricard. Id. at

132. Tennison stated that in the beginning of October, 1990, about

a week after he was convicted, his friends, who thought he would be

acquitted because they knew that he was not involved, told him that

two people, Lavista Ricard and Luther Blue, were involved in the

murder. Id. Tennison called Ricard from the county jail. Id. at

133. Ricard told Tennison that he had been among the people who

had chased Shannon and that he had fired a shot at him. Id. at

136. Tennison asked Ricard to come forward and admit to being the

shooter and Ricard agreed to speak to Tennison’s lawyer. Id. at

138. About a week later, Tennison told Adachi about his

conversation with Ricard. Id. at 140. In November, 1990, Adachi

told Tennison that he’d called Ricard several times, but hadn’t

received an answer. Id. at 141-42. Tennison also asked his

brother, Bruce Tennison, to speak to Adachi about tracking down

Ricard. Id. at 142. Tennison met with Adachi later in November,

1990, and Adachi told him he had talked to Ricard over the phone

and Ricard had admitted to the crime. Id. at 142-43. Adachi set

up a meeting with Ricard, but Ricard failed to show up. Id. at

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143-44. In about December, 1990, Tennison met Luther Blue, who was

also in jail. Id. at 144. Blue told Tennison that he had

witnessed the Shannon homicide and that he was willing to testify

to help Tennison, but when Adachi questioned Blue, he denied

knowing anything about the shooting. Id. at 145-46. Tennison

stated that Blue told him that homicide inspectors had interviewed

Ricard who made a taped statement admitting that he shot Shannon. 

Id. at 170. Blue also mentioned that a person named Chauntey White

was connected with the murder. Id. Tennison testified that in

November or December, 1990, his brother, Bruce Tennison, told him

that he had talked to Ricard and Ricard told Bruce that Ricard had

made a statement to the police admitting to the crime. Id. at 205. 

Adachi testified that Tennison had given him Ricard’s name, address

and telephone number very soon after the verdict or even during the

trial. Id. at 75. 

The trial court denied Tennison’s motion on the grounds that

the tapes of the two Ricard confessions were legally inadmissible

and, even if they were admissible, Ricard’s statements contained so

many inconsistencies that they could not be considered to be

trustworthy. People v. Tennison, appeal no. A05453 at 6. The

appellate court affirmed. Regarding the admissibility of Ricard’s

confessions, the court stated that Tennison had “made no showing

that he had diligently attempted to obtain Ricard’s attendance at

the hearing on the motion for new trial, or that he would be

legally unavailable to testify at a new trial, a prerequisite for

application of the declaration against interest exception [to the

hearsay rule].” Id. at 7. Regarding the trustworthiness of the

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confession, the court stated, 

Ricard’s refusal to provide the police or Adachi any

names and his inability to account for the whereabouts of

the gun undermine his credibility because his version of

the incident cannot be corroborated. Likewise the

inconsistencies between his two statements, between his

statements and the evidence at trial, and between his

statements and appellant’s testimony cast doubt on their

trustworthiness. For instance, Ricard stated that he

fired once, but the medical evidence established two

shots to the victim’s body and witnesses referred to

multiple gunshots. . . . Ricard stated that he came

forward because ‘two of my friends’ were going down for

the crime, but appellant testified he did not know

Ricard, had never seen him, and had only first spoken

with him on the telephone after the verdict. Given such

inconsistencies, the court did not err in determining

Ricard’s statements were untrustworthy and thus

inadmissible.

Id. 7-8.

At the § 4900 hearing, Goff testified that, about three to

four weeks after Shannon was shot, he heard rumors on the street

that Ricard may have had something to do with the murder. Wong

Dec., Ex. F, Transcript of § 4900 Hearing at 579. Goff had also

heard rumors that the chase started at a Seven-Eleven store. Id.

at 578. Goff testified that a month or two after the murder, he

had been among a crowd of people who were listening to Ricard brag

about shooting Shannon. Id. at 580. Goff assumed that Ricard was

lying because he didn’t think the real shooter would brag about it

on the street. Id. at 582. Goff knew Ricard because they lived in

the same neighborhood, but they weren’t friends. Id. at 636. 

About a month after he was charged with committing the Shannon

murder, Goff told Melton that he had heard Ricard brag about

shooting Shannon and Melton replied that he would look into it. 

Id. at 595.

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IV. Plaintiffs' Claims

In their complaints, Tennison and Goff allege that Butterworth

participated in the suppression of material, exculpatory evidence,

and manufactured evidence by pressuring Pauline to retract her

recantation. Tennison and Goff allege the following claims against

the Inspectors: (1) they participated in the suppression of

material, exculpatory and impeachment evidence that probably would

have led to Tennison's and Goff’s acquittal; and (2) they actively

solicited perjured testimony while deliberately ignoring and

failing to investigate exculpatory evidence. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

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1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party support its

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.;

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990);

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the moving party shows an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

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showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party's prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's

"burden of contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not

negligible." Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." Id.

II. Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of action for the

'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must

allege two elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citations omitted). 

An individual defendant is liable for money damages under 

§ 1983 only if the defendant personally participated in or

otherwise proximately caused the unconstitutional deprivations of

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which the plaintiff complains. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634

(9th Cir. 1988). To establish individual liability, a plaintiff

must allege one of the following: (1) the defendant personally

participated in or ordered the constitutional violation; (2) the

defendant, acting in a supervisory capacity, failed to train

properly or supervise personnel, resulting in the violation; 

(3) the defendant was responsible for an official policy or custom

which caused the violation; or (4) the defendant knew of the

violation and failed to prevent it. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home, 723

F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1984).

PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL MATTERS

I. Motion To Strike

Citing Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th

Cir. 1991), Foster v. Arcata Assocs., 772 F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir.

1985) and Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543-33

(9th Cir. 1975), Plaintiffs move to strike Hendrix' and Sanders'

declaration statements that they did not learn of the November 7,

1990 Ricard confession until May, 1991, on the ground that these

statements contradict their prior deposition testimony. 

In Radobenko, the Ninth Circuit held that a party who had been

examined at length by deposition could not create an issue of fact

on a motion for summary judgment by submitting an affidavit

contradicting his own prior testimony because this would greatly

diminish the utility of summary judgment as a method for screening

sham issues of fact. Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266 (citing Radobenko,

520 F.2d at 543-44)). In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit clarified that

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the rule enunciated in Radobenko does not automatically dispose of

every case in which a contradictory affidavit is submitted to

explain portions of prior deposition testimony and that, before

striking a declaration, the district court must make a factual

finding that the contradiction was actually a sham. Id. at 266-67. 

After having considered the Inspectors’ July 1, 2006 motion

for relief from this order, the Court concludes that none of the

Inspectors’ statements will be stricken.

II. Request To Submit Statement of Facts

In their reply brief, the Inspectors request leave to submit a

statement of disputed and undisputed facts with citations to

evidence, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 56-2(a). They argue that

this is necessary because there are many misstatements of facts in

Plaintiffs’ briefs. A separate statement of facts is unnecessary:

the Court looks at the evidence cited by the parties to support

their arguments and determines the accuracy of the statements of

fact in the briefs. Therefore, the Inspectors’ request to submit a

separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts is DENIED.

III. Evidentiary Objections

The Inspectors object to statements in Plaintiffs’ briefs as

mischaracterizations of the evidence and object to various pieces

of evidence. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections

and has not relied on any inadmissible evidence. The Court will

not discuss each objection individually. To the extent that the

Court has relied on evidence to which the Inspectors object, such

evidence has been found admissible and the objections are

overruled. 

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IV. Effect of Habeas Corpus Order

Citing Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty,

Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 877 (9th Cir. 2000), the Inspectors argue that

the Court’s August 26, 2003 Habeas Order has no preclusive effect

in this action because the Inspectors were not parties to the

habeas case and were not in privity with the respondent in the

habeas case or the State of California. Plaintiffs do not respond

to this argument.

The Inspectors are correct that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel that precludes the relitigation of issues previously

decided requires that the parties in the second action be the same

as or in privity with the parties in the prior proceeding. The

Inspectors also are correct that they were not in privity with the

respondent in the habeas case and that the habeas respondent did

not present a good deal of the evidence submitted by the Inspectors

or make some of the arguments that the Inspectors make here. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that the findings and

conclusions in the Habeas Order do not have any preclusive effect

on the issues in this case. However, in certain instances, the

facts and arguments addressed in the Habeas Order are identical to

those presented here. In those instances, the Court may reach the

same conclusions it did in the Habeas Order.

DISCUSSION

In their separate motions, Tennison and Goff move for partial

summary adjudication on the liability and causation elements of

their claims that the Inspectors suppressed three pieces of

material, exculpatory evidence: (1) Ricard’s taped confession; 

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(2) Smith’s statements corroborating Ricard’s confession; and 

(3) the Inspectors’ request for $2,500 from the SFPD’s SWP to pay a

witness in the Shannon murder case. Butterworth moves for summary

judgment on the grounds that he is absolutely or qualifiedly immune

from liability on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Inspectors move

for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action on the

grounds that: (1) there is no evidence that they violated

Plaintiffs’ rights by suppressing material information; (2) there

is no evidence that they fabricated witness testimony; and (3) they

are either absolutely or qualifiedly immune from liability for all

alleged constitutional violations. 

I. Butterworth's Motion for Summary Judgment

Butterworth argues that he is entitled to summary judgment 

because at all relevant times he was acting in the role of a

prosecutor and thus is entitled to absolute immunity. He argues,

in the alternative, that he is entitled to qualified immunity on

all claims. Tennison's opposition addresses only Butterworth's

conduct in questioning Pauline on April 22, 23, and 24, 1990. 

Goff's opposition addresses only Butterworth's failure to disclose

the Ricard confession to him. Therefore, the Court grants

Butterworth's motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’

other claims.

A. The Questioning of Pauline

1. Absolute Immunity

"An official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of

showing that such immunity is justified for the function in

question." Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.

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2005) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). The

presumption is that qualified, rather than absolute, immunity is

sufficient to protect government employees in the performance of

their official duties. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87).

A prosecutor performing an advocate's role is an officer of

the court entitled to absolute immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993). Prosecutors therefore are absolutely

immune from liability for their conduct as "advocates" during the

initiation of a criminal case and its presentation at trial. Id.;

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (prosecutor

entitled to absolute immunity from suit alleging that he knowingly

used perjured testimony and suppressed material exculpatory

evidence at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 490-91 & n.6 (prosecutors

absolutely immune for their conduct before grand juries and in

presenting evidence at probable-cause hearings for a search

warrant).

Prosecutors are entitled only to qualified, not absolute,

immunity when they perform administrative or investigatory, rather

than advocacy, functions. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122-31

(1997). Thus, in determining immunity, the court examines the

nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it. Id. at 127. Absolute immunity requires that the

activities at issue be “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. 

Prosecutors are not acting as advocates, and therefore are not

entitled to absolute immunity, before they have probable cause to

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have anyone arrested. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274; Herb Hallman

Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, even after probable cause has been established,

prosecutors are absolutely immune only for quasi-judicial

functions, not investigatory or administrative actions. Broam v.

Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003); Genzler, 410 F.3d at

638. 

Activities in preparation for trial, such as the interview of

witnesses, may be investigatory or advocatory in nature. Genzler,

410 F.3d at 638. The timing of the prosecutor's conduct is a

relevant, but not determinative, factor. Id. at 639-40.

Tennison presents several grounds for his contention that

Butterworth was acting as an investigator when questioning Pauline

and thus is not entitled to absolute immunity. First, citing

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, Tennison argues that Butterworth did not

have probable cause to believe that Tennison was involved in the

Shannon homicide when he questioned Pauline. Tennison bases this

on the fact that the November 28, 1989 warrant for Tennison’s

arrest was predicated upon Hendrix’ affidavit in which Hendrix

swore that Pauline corroborated Masina’s account of the shooting

incident. See Balogh Reply Dec., Ex. 57, Arrest Warrant for

Tennison and Hendrix Affidavit. Tennison argues that Hendrix’

affidavit was false because Pauline’s statement to the police was

inconsistent with Masina’s story. 

Pursuant to Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, if at the time

Butterworth interviewed Pauline probable cause to arrest Tennison

was lacking, Butterworth was acting as an investigator, and not as

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an advocate. 

The Court concludes that on April 22, 1990, there was probable

cause to arrest Tennison. As noted by Butterworth, the information

in Hendrix’ affidavit regarding Pauline’s corroboration of Masina’s

story, which Tennison states was false, was presented to the court

in both Tennison’s and Goff’s probable cause hearings. See Achiron

Reply Dec., Ex. D, Tennison Preliminary Hearing; Ex. C, Goff

Preliminary Hearing. At Tennison’s preliminary hearing only Masina

testified, but the court heard testimony that Pauline had recanted

and that Masina had spoken to her after she recanted. At Goff’s

preliminary hearing, Butterworth called only Masina, but Goff

called Pauline as a defense witness. Pauline was examined on the

discrepancies between her testimony and Masina’s, her recantation

and her telephone conversation with Masina regarding her

recantation. The court, in both cases, found probable cause. 

Because the accuracy of the information contained in Hendrix’

arrest warrant affidavit was tested in court and the court found

probable cause, Tennison’s argument that Hendrix’ affidavit was

insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest is unpersuasive.

Tennison next argues that, even if there was probable cause

for his initial arrest, there was no probable cause after Pauline

recanted on April 22, 1990. Tennison cites Butterworth’s

deposition at p.p. 327-328 to establish that, after Pauline

recanted, Butterworth conceded that he needed Pauline to establish

probable cause. However, Butterworth did not concede this at his

deposition. Butterworth stated that he had to cancel the

preliminary hearing scheduled for April 23, 1990 because Pauline’s

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recantation “raised some question in my mind as to how valuable a

witness she was going to be and whether I wanted to rely upon her

for a probable cause finding. And if she were to testify at a

preliminary hearing and recant, the only way I would have gotten a

holding would be to have impeached her with her prior inconsistent

statement. And I wasn’t comfortable doing that, given the record

of the 707 hearing. . . . I know that I wasn’t comfortable

proceeding in the face of her recantation. And I didn’t have any

other witnesses who were in a position to make an identification,

so it wasn’t really a difficult call at that point [to cancel the

preliminary hearing].” Wong Dec., Ex. O, Butterworth Depo. at 327-

328. Thus, Butterworth did not cancel the preliminary hearing

because he believed probable cause was lacking, but because Masina

was unavailable as a witness. When Masina was available as a

witness, she alone testified at Tennison’s rescheduled probable

cause hearing. Tennison’s argument that probable cause was

extinguished by Pauline’s recantation is not persuasive. 

Tennison argues that even if probable cause did exist during

Butterworth’s questioning of Pauline, Butterworth was acting as an

investigator because his purpose in interviewing Pauline was to

persuade Pauline to change her story so that it would be consistent

with Masina’s. 

As discussed in Gensler, 410 F.3d at 639, timing is an

important element in determining whether the prosecutor is engaging

in investigatory police activity or acting as a prosecutor. Here,

the timing weighs in favor of concluding that Butterworth was

acting as a prosecutor rather than an investigator. When Pauline

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came to meet with Butterworth on April 22, 1990, the judicial

proceedings against Tennison were underway. The section 707

hearing regarding Tennison was held in March and April, 1990, with

Pauline as a witness. Tennison was arrested on April 5, 1990 and

his preliminary hearing was set for April 23, 1990. That

Butterworth met with Pauline immediately before Tennison’s

preliminary hearing indicates that Butterworth was meeting with her

in his role as a prosecutor marshaling evidence, not as an

investigator looking for clues and evidence to establish probable

cause. 

Tennison argues that after Pauline recanted and Butterworth

continued interviewing her, his questioning was investigative in

nature and coerced her to change her testimony. 

Intimidating and coercing a witness to change her testimony

are not advocacy and are not entitled to absolute immunity. Moore

v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoted with approval

in Gensler, 410 F.3d at 638). Intimidating a witness to change

testimony is “a misuse of investigative techniques legitimately

directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful and

complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating

evidence.” Id.

Although Pauline testified that Butterworth, as well as

Hendrix and Masina, told her what to say at the trial, she

explained that Butterworth communicated this to her by not wanting

to hear her recantation, by not listening to her. Although she

stated that Butterworth yelled at her, she also indicated she

interpreted Butterworth’s behavior toward her to be like a parent

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talking to a child. Pauline’s testimony does not provide evidence

that Butterworth coerced or intimidated her. 

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact

that Butterworth was not acting in his capacity as prosecutor at

all times during his interaction with Pauline on April 20 through

April 22, 1990 and thus is entitled to absolute immunity. 

Therefore, Butterworth’s motion for summary judgment on Tennison’s

claim regarding Pauline’s interviews on April 20 through April 22,

1990 is GRANTED. Nonetheless, the Court discusses whether, even if

Butterworth was not acting as a prosecutor, but was acting as an

investigator, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

2. Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

threshold question is whether, if all factual disputes were

resolved in favor of the party asserting the injury, the evidence

would show the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “If no constitutional

right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Id. On the other hand, if a violation could be made

out on the allegations, the next step is to ask whether the

constitutional right in issue was clearly established. Id. The

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question here is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id.

If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would

be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity

is appropriate. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit engages in a two-part test to determine if

the right was clearly established at the time of the allegedly

impermissible conduct. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 (9th

Cir. 2002). First, it must be determined if the law that governs

the official’s conduct was clearly established. Id. It is not

necessary that a prior decision rule "the very action in question"

unlawful for a right to be clearly established. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Indeed, some wrongs are selfevident and a “right can be clearly established on the basis of

‘common sense.’” Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir.

2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the right

was clearly established at the time of the allegedly impermissible

conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th

Cir. 1992). 

The next question is whether, under that clearly established

law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was

lawful. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir.

1993). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that his or

her actions were reasonable, Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54

F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), and the defendant's good faith or

subjective belief in the legality of his or her actions is

irrelevant. Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Thus, the Court must decide first whether, if the facts

Plaintiffs allege are true, Butterworth committed a constitutional

violation. If so, the Court must then decide if the law was clearly

established at the time of the conduct at issue, and if so, whether 

Butterworth’s conduct was objectively reasonable. 

Tennison contends that Butterworth’s conduct in regard to

Pauline violated his constitutional right to be free from criminal

charges based on deliberately fabricated false evidence.

Individuals have a constitutional due process right to be free

from criminal charges based upon deliberately fabricated false

evidence. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir.

2001) (en banc). To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff, at a

minimum, must show that (1) the officer continued his investigation

despite the fact he knew or should have known that the suspect was

innocent or (2) the officer used investigative techniques that were

so coercive and abusive that he knew or should have known that they

would yield false information. Id. at 1076; Cunningham v. Perez,

345 F.3d 802, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (that officer continued to

interview suspected child sex abuse victims after they initially

denied abuse not so coercive or abusive that he knew or should have

known he would receive false information). There is no

constitutional right to have witnesses interviewed in a particular

manner or to have the investigation carried on in a particular way. 

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1075. Therefore, suggestive interview

tactics alone do not amount to a constitutional violation. Gausvik

v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (officer’s continued

questioning of alleged sexual abuse victims after victims initially

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denied abuse and telling alleged victim she could not leave until

she admitted abuse not so coercive and abusive that officer knew or

should have known that he would receive false information).

In regard to the first Devereaux prong, after Pauline recanted,

it was incumbent upon Butterworth to gather information to determine

whether Pauline or Masina was being truthful. Furthermore, although

Pauline recanted, it does not necessarily follow that, on this

basis, Butterworth knew or should have know that Tennison was

innocent. As noted above, Butterworth dismissed Tennison’s case

after Pauline’s recantation because Masina, the only other witness,

was in Samoa, and thus was not available to testify at Tennison’s

preliminary hearing, which was scheduled for the next day. Because

Pauline never stated that she saw Goff at the crime scene, she was

not needed as a witness at Goff’s preliminary hearing, and her

recantation was not relevant to his case. Plaintiffs have produced

no evidence to demonstrate that Butterworth knew or should have

known that Tennison was innocent at that point and should not have

continued investigating. Thus, the first Devereaux prong does not

apply.

In regard to the second Devereaux prong, the evidence shows

that when Pauline recanted, Butterworth raised his voice and

confronted her. However, Pauline testified that Butterworth’s

frustration with her reminded her of how a parent would reprimand a

child and that Butterworth never told her what to say. Furthermore,

Butterworth’s contact with Pauline was relatively brief. He met

with her for approximately half an hour on April 22nd, half an hour

on April 23rd and a few minutes on April 24th. Almost the entire

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interview on April 23rd was recorded and nothing in the interview

was coercive. Therefore, assuming the facts Tennison alleges are

true, and taking them in the light most favorable to Tennison, the

Court finds that Tennison has failed to show that Butterworth

violated his constitutional right to be free from being charged on

the basis of deliberately fabricated evidence. Therefore,

Butterworth is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of

qualified as well as absolute immunity on this claim. 

Even if Tennison had established a constitutional violation,

Butterworth would be entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of

the events at issue, the law was clearly established. However, a

reasonable person could have believed that the actions taken by

Butterworth, under the circumstances, were lawful.

Thus, summary judgment is GRANTED in Butterworth’s favor on

Tennison’s claim on the basis of qualified as well as absolute

immunity.

D. Failure to Provide Ricard Confession to Goff

Butterworth argues that he is entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity for his failure to turn Ricard’s confession

over to Goff after Goff’s conviction. Relying on Houston v. Partee,

978 F.2d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1992), Goff argues that Butterworth is

not shielded by absolute immunity because he was no longer involved

in Goff’s prosecution when he learned of the Ricard confession

A prosecutor may be absolutely immune for post-conviction

conduct, but only if the conduct is an exercise of prosecutorial

discretion, and is not purely investigatory or administrative. 

Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030-31; see Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th

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Cir. 1994) (upholding absolute immunity for prosecutor who withheld

exculpatory evidence while handling defendant's post-conviction

motions and direct appeal). 

Butterworth argues that, on May 17, 1991, the date he became

aware of the Ricard confession, he was opposing Tennison’s motion

for a new trial and therefore was acting as a prosecutor. This may

be true in regard to Tennison’s post-conviction proceedings, but it

does not establish that Butterworth was acting as a prosecutor in

regard to Goff’s post-conviction proceedings. The cases against

Tennison and Goff were consolidated for trial, but the post-trial

proceedings were litigated separately: Goff’s post-conviction new

trial motion was filed on October 19, 1990; it was denied on October

31, 1990; on August 9, 1991, he filed an opening brief in his direct

appeal of his conviction. Because no post-conviction proceedings

were pending in the trial court in Goff’s case at the time

Butterworth received the tape of Ricard’s confession, Butterworth

was not acting as a prosecutor in regard to Goff. Because the

Attorney General represents the people of the State on appeal, even

though Goff’s appeal was pending, Butterworth would not have been

involved in it. 

In Houston, the plaintiffs were convicted of committing the 

gang-related murder of Ronnie Bell. Houston, 978 F.2d at 363. 

While the plaintiffs’ appeals were pending, certain State and

federal prosecutors, including the one who had prosecuted the

plaintiffs, learned during an investigation of the gang’s activities

that the Bell murder had been committed by three other individuals,

not by the plaintiffs. Id. at 364. None of the prosecutors

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disclosed this information to the plaintiffs or their attorneys,

even though they knew it was relevant to the plaintiffs’ pending

appeals. Id. Four years after the plaintiffs’ conviction, the

plaintiffs’ attorneys found out about the exculpatory evidence on

their own and filed post-conviction petitions which were granted. 

Id. at 363, 365. The plaintiffs sued the prosecutors. The

defendant prosecutors had not been involved in the plaintiffs’

appeals. Id. at 366. The prosecutors asserted absolute immunity on

the plaintiffs’ civil § 1983 claims against them on the ground that

absolute immunity attached during the plaintiffs’ prosecution and

continued indefinitely. Id. at 365-66. The court rejected this

argument and concluded that, at the time the defendant prosecutors

learned about the exculpatory evidence, they were functioning as

investigators, not as prosecutors, and thus were not entitled to

absolute immunity. Id. at 367. 

Butterworth argues that Houston is distinguishable because the

prosecutors in that case were involved in a new investigation that

led to the exculpatory information. Butterworth points out that he

was not acting as an investigator, but learned of the exculpatory

evidence in his role as prosecutor in Tennison’s case. 

This argument is unavailing because, even if he was not acting

as an investigator, neither was he acting as a prosecutor on Goff’s

case. Accordingly, Butterworth’s motion for summary judgment based

upon absolute immunity is DENIED. Butterworth does not move for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

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II. Plaintiffs’ and Inspectors’ Cross Motions for Summary 

 Judgment on § 1983 Claims Based on Brady Violations

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary adjudication

that the Inspectors deprived them of due process by violating their 

Brady rights, and that this caused them damage. The Inspectors

argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the ground that

there is no evidence that they violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights and, if they did, they are absolutely or qualifiedly immune

from liability. 

A. Legal Standard for § 1983 Claims Based on Brady Violation

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court

held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. The government

has a duty to disclose Brady material even if the defense fails to

ask for it. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The

duty under Brady encompasses impeachment evidence as well as

exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676

(1985). The government’s promise of a benefit to a witness must be

disclosed under Brady. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154

(1972). 

In the criminal context, “[t]here are three components of a

true Brady violation: [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to

the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,

either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

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Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Evidence is

material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 682. The evidence need not be

sufficient affirmatively to prove the defendant innocent; it need

only be favorable and material. Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 912

(9th Cir. 2004). Materiality is measured in terms of the collective

effect of the suppressed material, not item by item. Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).

If the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that

did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been

committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated

in the context of the entire record. If there is no

reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional

evidence is considered, there is no justification for a

new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already

of questionable validity, additional evidence of

relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create

reasonable doubt.

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13.

The obligation to disclose under Brady “is the obligation of

the government, not just the obligation of the prosecutor.” United

States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 393 (9th Cir. 2004). The

prosecution has a duty to learn of any exculpatory evidence known to

others acting on the government's behalf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995). A prosecutor’s duty under Brady

necessarily requires the cooperation of other government agents who

might possess Brady material. Blanco, 392 F.3d at 388. Exculpatory

evidence cannot be kept out of the hands of the defense just because

the prosecutor does not have it, where an investigating agency does. 

Id. at 393-94. 

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In the criminal context, there is no intent requirement to

establish a Brady claim; whether non-disclosure was negligent or by

design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. Brady, 373 U.S.

at 87.

The parties agree that to establish a civil rights claim based

upon a Brady violation, the plaintiff must establish that the

defendant intended to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right. 

However, they disagree on the level of intent that must be

established. Citing Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802,

812 (9th Cir. 2003), the Inspectors argue that bad faith must be

shown and Plaintiffs argue that intent to violate a constitutional

right is all that is required. 

Cunningham was a civil rights case based, among other things,

on the defendants’ failure to preserve and gather evidence that

might have exonerated the plaintiff in his criminal case. Id. The

Inspectors argue that Cunningham addressed a Brady claim, pointing

to the court’s cursory summary in the beginning of the opinion that

the complaint alleged that the defendants concealed exculpatory

evidence. See id. at 806. However, in its analysis of this claim,

the court described it as the defendants’ failure to preserve and

gather potentially exculpatory evidence by failing to document

interrogations, failing to keep a record of witnesses’ statements

and failing to gather physical evidence. Id. at 812. The court

then analyzed the claim under Arizona v. Youngblood, not Brady. Id.

 The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988),

distinguished the claim before it, that the government lost evidence

that could have been exculpatory, from a Brady claim, concluding

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that a Youngblood claim, unlike a Brady claim, requires a showing of

bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. The Supreme Court

explained:

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as

interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the

State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the

defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the

Due Process Clause requires a different result when we

deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary

material of which no more can be said than it could have

been subjected to tests, the results of which might have

exonerated the defendant.

Id. 

Therefore, Cunningham does not support the Inspectors’

contention that the Ninth Circuit requires bad faith to establish a

§ 1983 claim based on a Brady violation. 

The Inspectors also rely on Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

(1986), which held that “the Due Process Clause is simply not

implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss

of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 328 (emphasis

in original). However, Daniels did not require bad faith for a due

process violation, it simply required more than negligence. 

Circuit courts are divided on the question of whether a

plaintiff must show bad faith to establish a civil rights claim

based on a Brady violation. Compare McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d

1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (in a § 1983 action, holding that

investigators have a duty to disclose under Brady, irrespective of

good or bad faith) with Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (in a § 1983 action, affirming, by an equally

divided court, district court dismissal of complaint on ground that

it merely alleged negligent conduct on the part of defendants and

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that bad faith was required to hold police officers liable for due

process violations); and Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980

(8th Cir. 2004) (in a § 1983 action, holding that bad faith required

in Brady claims against law enforcement officials other than

prosecutor). 

Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has

addressed this issue, this Court must decide whether police

investigators are civilly liable for Brady violations only if they

act in bad faith. 

Based upon the fact that Brady makes the non-disclosure of

exculpatory evidence a violation of the Due Process Clause

irrespective of the good or bad faith of the non-disclosing officer,

this Court concludes that bad faith is not required to establish a

civil Brady violation. Based upon Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331, which

held that a due process violation requires only a deliberate

decision on the part of a government official to deprive a person of

life, liberty or property, the Court concludes that, to prove a §

1983 claim based on Brady against the Inspectors, Plaintiffs must

establish only that they deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence

from Butterworth.

B. Suppression of Ricard Confession

There is no dispute that the November 7, 1990 Ricard confession

was exculpatory. The Inspectors argue that Plaintiffs’ Brady claim

based on the Ricard confession fails because the Inspectors lacked

the requisite intent to deprive Plaintiffs of a constitutional

right, because Plaintiffs knew of Ricard’s involvement and because

the confession was not material in that it was inadmissible.

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1. Inspectors’ State of Mind

Questions involving state of mind are generally issues of fact

that are inappropriate for summary judgment. Braxton-Secret v. A.H.

Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985).

The Inspectors point out that there is no dispute that they

first learned about Ricard’s confession second-hand, after

Plaintiffs’ convictions, not as a result of their own investigation,

and that there is no evidence that they took any action to hide the

confession. They argue that this establishes that they had no

intent to deprive Plaintiffs of a fair trial by failing to inform

Butterworth of the confession. Plaintiffs contend that the

Inspectors’ knowledge of the Ricard confession and their failure to

inform Butterworth of it is sufficient to show that the Inspectors

intentionally withheld it. 

Disputed issues of material facts regarding whether the

Inspectors acted intentionally prevent the granting of summary

adjudication of this issue to either party. In Plaintiffs’ favor is

(1) Sanders’ 2001 deposition in which he testified that he learned

of the Ricard confession soon after it was made and did not turn it

over to Butterworth and (2) Hendrix’ 2005 deposition in which he

stated that, after they learned of the confession, the Inspectors

spent months investigating it. 

However, the Inspectors’ failure to turn over the tape to

Butterworth may have been a negligent, rather than an intentional,

act. There is some evidence that the Inspectors did not intend to

deny Plaintiffs the use of the tape. The Inspectors may have

thought, as Hendrix stated in his deposition, that Lewis or Gittens

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would deliver the tape to Butterworth. Further, the Inspectors

investigated the confession, which could be found inconsistent with

an intent to conceal it. Finally, there is no evidence that the

Inspectors took any affirmative acts to conceal the confession. 

Sanders’ 2005 statements that he did not know about Ricard’s

confession until Butterworth told him about it and Hendrix’

statement that he only learned about the confession from Sanders, if

believed, would establish that Lewis did not inform the Inspectors

of the confession and thus they could not have disclosed it to

Butterworth. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Knowledge of Ricard’s Involvement

Citing United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1502 n.5 (9th

Cir. 1985) and United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.

1991), the Inspectors argue that Plaintiffs’ knowledge of Ricard’s

alleged involvement in the Shannon murder precludes their Bradybased § 1983 claim. 

“Where defendants had within their knowledge the information by

which they could have ascertained the supposed Brady material, there

is no suppression by the government.” Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1502 n.5;

Aichele, 941 F.2d at 764 (same). If the government provides to the

defense the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence, there is no

Brady violation. Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1502, n.5. A defendant cannot

claim a Brady violation if his counsel was "aware of the essential

facts enabling him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." 

United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1986); see,

e.g., United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1995)

(where government discloses all information necessary for defense to

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discover alleged Brady material on its own, government is not guilty

of suppressing evidence). “Any allegation of suppression boils down

to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in comparison to

the knowledge held by the defense.” Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1502, n.5

(quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J.,

concurring)). 

However, the availability of particular information through the

defendant himself does not negate the government's duty to disclose. 

United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 2000). 

"Defendants often mistrust their counsel, and even defendants who

cooperate with counsel cannot always remember all of the relevant

facts or realize the legal importance of certain occurrences." Id.

Therefore, defense counsel is entitled to plan trial strategy on the

basis of full disclosure by the government, regardless of the

defendant's knowledge or memory of the disclosed information. Id.

The Inspectors point to statements made by Tennison at the

hearing on his motion for new trial and statements made by Goff at

the § 4900 hearing showing that Plaintiffs knew of Ricard’s

involvement in the murder before the Inspectors did. 

Tennison’s testimony at the hearing on his motion for new trial

indicates that, at least five months before the hearing, he had

heard of Ricard’s involvement with the Shannon murder and shortly

thereafter heard that Ricard had made a taped confession to the

police. Tennison testified that he told Adachi that he knew Ricard

had committed the crime, but it is not clear that he told Adachi

that he had heard that Ricard had confessed to the police on tape. 

Goff’s testimony at the § 4900 hearing indicates that he had heard

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Ricard brag about shooting Shannon and had told Melton this very

soon after he had been charged with the murder. There is no

evidence that Goff or Melton knew that Ricard had given a taped

confession to the police.

Thus, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs and their attorneys

suspected that Ricard was the shooter, before the trial in Goff’s

case and before the new trial proceeding in Tennison’s case. 

However, it is not clear whether the attorneys knew of Ricard’s

taped confession to the police. The evidentiary value of Ricard’s

taped confession to the police, after being Mirandized, surpasses

any evidence that Plaintiffs could have given about their knowledge

of Ricard’s involvement.

Disputed issues of material facts prevent summary adjudication

for either side on the issue of whether the extent of Plaintiffs’

attorneys’ knowledge of Ricard’s involvement excused the prosecution

from disclosing the tape. 

3. Admissibility of the Ricard Confession

The Inspectors move for summary adjudication that, even if they

intentionally failed to inform Butterworth of Ricard’s confession,

the confession was not material because it was inadmissible hearsay.

To support a claim under Brady, the withheld information must

be material. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To be material, the withheld

information, or evidence acquired through it, must be admissible. 

United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The Inspectors point out that the confession was not admitted

at the hearing on Tennison’s motion for new trial because the

confession was hearsay and Tennison’s attorney did not establish

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that Ricard was unavailable to testify, as required for the

declaration-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule. The

Inspectors further argue that, even if Tennison’s attorney had been

able to show Ricard was unavailable, the court of appeal found that

Ricard’s confession was not sufficiently trustworthy to have

qualified as a declaration against interest.

Plaintiffs respond that the trial court and the court of appeal

found Ricard’s confession to be inadmissible and untrustworthy

because the courts did not have a full factual record before them. 

In favor of Plaintiffs’ argument, at the time the trial court

and the court of appeal made their decisions that Ricard’s

confession to the police was inadmissible and unreliable, Smith’s

corroborating statements were not part of the record. In addition,

if the confession had been turned over to Plaintiffs in a timely

manner, Adachi’s interview of an anonymous person would not have

been introduced into evidence to confuse matters. However, as noted

by the Inspectors, Ricard’s confession suffered from internal

inconsistencies and, therefore, the courts might have found it

inadmissible even with Smith’s statements and without the anonymous

confession. 

The Court finds that disputed issues of material fact preclude

a determination of whether the State courts would have found

Ricard’s confession admissible if all relevant facts had been timely

disclosed. Therefore, the cross-motions for summary adjudication of

the issue of admissibility of the confession are DENIED.

In summary, based upon disputed issues of material facts as

discussed above, the cross-motions for summary adjudication of

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whether the Inspectors violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights under

Brady are DENIED. 

The Inspectors argue that even if they committed a

constitutional violation, they are absolutely or qualifiedly immune

from liability.

4. Absolute Immunity

Peace officers and other investigators are protected by

absolute immunity when performing prosecutorial or quasi-judicial

functions, typically by assisting the prosecutor to prepare the case

after probable cause for arrest has been established. KRL v. Moore,

384 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003). As noted above, the absolute

immunity inquiry is focused on the nature of the function performed,

not the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).

The Inspectors argue that they were not acting in an

investigative capacity in November, 1990, when Ricard confessed,

because the investigation had long ended, the Inspectors’ only role

at that time was to assist Butterworth in his duties as a

prosecutor, and Plaintiffs had already been convicted. However,

these facts do not end the inquiry. As stated in Gensler, 410 F.3d

at 639, timing is relevant, but is not dispositive of the

classification of the defendant’s activity. 

At his 2001 deposition, Sanders testified that he received the

Ricard confession within a day or two after it was made, immediately

began investigating it and informed Butterworth of the

investigation. At his 2005 deposition and in his 2005 declaration,

Sanders testified that he did not learn of the confession until

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Butterworth told him about it in May, 1991. At his 2005 deposition,

Hendrix testified that he learned of the Ricard confession from

Sanders, that they immediately took steps to locate Ricard, and that

he never informed Butterworth of the confession. In his 2005

declaration, Hendrix stated that he did not investigate the Ricard

confession. Butterworth testified that he never learned about the

Ricard confession from the Inspectors; instead he was informed about

it by Lewis, whom he happened to meet accidentally in the cafeteria,

months after it had been given. 

If the Inspectors learned of the Ricard confession soon after

it was made in 1990 and then investigated it, they were acting in an

investigative capacity. Accordingly, absolute immunity would not

shield them from Brady liability for withholding the Ricard

confession. The Inspectors’ motion for summary judgment on this

ground is DENIED.

(2) Qualified Immunity

(a) Clearly Established Law

At the time the Inspectors learned of Ricard’s November, 1990

confession to the police, the law regarding the constitutional duty

of law enforcement officials to turn over exculpatory evidence was

clearly established. The seminal Supreme Court cases establishing

this duty were decided in 1963 and 1976. See Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. at 87; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.

Citing Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), the

Inspectors argue that there was no clearly established law that a 

police officer has a legal duty to investigate and provide postconviction, second-hand information to the prosecution or the

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defense. 

In Broam, the court stated that once probable cause to arrest

has been established, a law enforcement officer has no

constitutional duty to investigate independently every claim of

innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or lack

of the requisite intent. Id. However, the court did not hold, as

the Inspectors argue, that a law enforcement officer has no

constitutional duty to turn over to the prosecution material

exculpatory evidence in his possession. In fact, Broam indicated

the opposite, that “an officer is not entitled to a qualified

immunity defense, however, where exculpatory evidence is ignored

that would negate a finding of probable cause.” Id. The Ninth

Circuit has also stated:

There is no ambiguity in our law. The obligation under

Brady and Giglio is the obligation of the government, not

merely the obligation of the prosecutor. . . .

‘Exculpatory evidence cannot be kept out of the hands of

the defense just because the prosecutor does not have it,

where an investigating agency does.’

Blanco, 392 F.3d at 393-94 (internal citations omitted). 

Relying on Villasana, 368 F.3d at 979 (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)), the Inspectors next argue that,

because only the prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence to the

defense, Plaintiffs cannot seek § 1983 damages for an alleged Brady

violation from non-prosecutors who do not have absolute

prosecutorial immunity.

The Inspectors mischaracterize the holding of Villasana. 

Villasana did not hold that investigators cannot be civilly liable

for a Brady violation; it addressed the standard that should apply

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to such claims. Id. at 980. Courts have held investigators liable

for failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the

prosecutor. See McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir.

1996) (although investigators have no Brady obligation to turn over

exculpatory evidence to the defense, they have a duty, under Brady,

to turn over such evidence to the prosecutor); Newsome v. McCabe,

256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001) (under a qualified immunity

analysis, concluding that it was clearly established in 1979 and

1980 that police could not withhold from prosecutors exculpatory

information); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir.

1988) (in § 1983 case, upholding jury verdict against defendant

police officers on ground that jury could have found defendants

concealed from prosecutors facts material to decision whether to

prosecute plaintiff).

Thus, clearly established law would inform a reasonable officer

that Ricard’s confession should have been turned over to the

prosecutor, who in turn would be responsible for providing it to

defense counsel. 

(b) Reasonable Conduct

Again relying on Villasana, 368 F.3d at 978, the Inspectors

argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they

reasonably believed that Butterworth was responsible for providing

any exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, and they were not. As

discussed above, this argument is a mischaracterization of wellestablished law regarding the duty of law enforcement officials to

turn over all exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor; the Inspectors

fail to explain how Butterworth could have disclosed Ricard’s

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confession to Plaintiffs if the Inspectors never told him about it. 

The Inspectors argue that because they never had possession of

the tape of the Ricard confession, they could not have suppressed

it. Furthermore, they argue that “a reasonable officer could have

believed that Lewis, the SFPD officer who actually took Ricard’s

confession, would have advised Butterworth of the confession.”

The Inspectors cannot avoid responsibility for their obligation

by assuming that a subordinate fulfilled it. At his deposition,

Hendrix testified that he and Sanders were responsible for turning

over evidence connected to the Shannon homicide to the district

attorney because it was their case and that it was Lewis and

Gittens’ responsibility to get the tape of the Ricard confession

either to the district attorney or to Sanders or himself. Lewis

testified that he did get the tape to the Inspectors. He testified

that, immediately after he took Ricard’s confession, he informed the

Inspectors of it by putting a copy of the taped confession in a

place where the Inspectors would receive it, and that he spoke to

Hendrix about the confession the next day. Sanders testified that

he received the tape of Ricard’s confession within a day or two of

November 7, 1990, the date it was made. Years later, Sanders

testified that he did not receive the tape of the confession from

Lewis in 1990 but that he learned of it from Butterworth in May,

1991.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

it was the Inspectors’ responsibility to inform Butterworth of the

confession, and they did not have reason to believe that Lewis or

Gittens did so. Therefore, these facts do not demonstrate the

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Inspectors acted reasonably under the circumstances.

Next, the Inspectors argue that they are protected by qualified

immunity because Butterworth learned of the confession and provided

it to Plaintiffs’ defense attorneys in sufficient time for it to be

considered by the trial and appellate courts and the failure to 

inform Butterworth of the confession earlier did not violate clearly

established law of which a reasonable officer would have been aware. 

Due process requires the disclosure of exculpatory material in

sufficient time to permit the defendant to make effective use of the

material. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1987). In

determining whether the timing of the disclosure satisfied due

process, a court considers the prosecution’s reasons for late

disclosure and whether the defendant had an opportunity to make use

of the disclosed material. Id.

In its August 26, 2003 Habeas Order, the Court explained why

the delay in turning over the Ricard confession was prejudicial to

Tennison. Purcell Dec., Ex. 52, August 26, 2003 Order at 100-102. 

In the habeas proceeding, the respondent had not explained why the

Inspectors did not inform Butterworth of the confession. The only

explanation the Inspectors make here, that it was Lewis’

responsibility, is insufficient when viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs. Although the Court’s ruling in the

habeas case has no preclusive effect on the issues in this case,

because the facts are the same, the Court adopts the reasoning in

the August 26, 2003 Habeas Order regarding prejudice to Tennison due

to the delay in receiving Ricard’s confession. Furthermore, Goff

was similarly prejudiced by the delay in his receipt of the

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8

As discussed previously in relation to Butterworth’s motion

for summary judgment, Butterworth did not turn over the Ricard

confession to Goff. However, Butterworth's actions are not

relevant to whether the Inspectors are protected by qualified

immunity. Therefore, for this discussion, it is assumed that the

Inspectors would have fulfilled their responsibilities if they had

turned the tape over to Butterworth.

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confession, because he could have immediately used it as the basis

of his State appeals and habeas petitions.8 As discussed

previously, although the State courts found the confession to be

unreliable, they did so without the benefit of all of the withheld

Brady material and they compared it to the anonymous Ricard

confession obtained by Adachi that would not have been submitted if

the taped Ricard confession to the police had been timely turned

over to both Plaintiffs.

Therefore, the fact that eventually Butterworth learned of the

confession from Lewis and then informed Tennison of it does not

excuse the Inspectors from their duty to turn the tape over in

sufficient time for Plaintiffs to make use of it. These facts fail

to demonstrate that the Inspectors acted reasonably under the

circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the cross-motions for summary

adjudication of this claim and DENIES the Inspectors’ motion for

summary judgment of absolute or qualified immunity.

B. Suppression of Smith’s Statement

The Inspectors argue that Plaintiffs’ Brady claim based on

Smith’s information fails because the information is not

exculpatory, the Inspectors lacked the requisite intent to deprive

Plaintiffs of a constitutional right and Plaintiffs’ knowledge of

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Smith’s involvement means the Inspectors did not suppress the

confession.

(1) Exculpatory Information

The Inspectors argue that Smith’s information is not

exculpatory on the ground that, before 1992, Smith did not tell the

police that she had witnessed Shannon’s murder. They argue that her

January 3, 1990 phone call to Sanders was mysterious because she

only identified herself as “Chante” and provided only a contact

phone number. They point out that they interviewed the five

individuals who she had heard were present at the murder and learned

nothing about the murder. The Inspectors, pointing to Sanders’ note

as evidence, also argue that Smith did not say that Tennison and

Goff were not at the murder scene.

In her 1995 declaration, Smith states that she told Sanders in

1990 that he had arrested the wrong people for the Shannon murder

because she had heard that Ricard had shot Shannon and that Tennison

and Goff were not present at any point during the homicide. Smith

Reply Dec. at ¶ 8. The fact that Sanders did not write this

information in his note does not prove that Smith did not provide

it.

Furthermore, the Inspectors’ characterization of Smith’s call

as mysterious is inconsistent with the evidence that the Inspectors

knew Smith and her friends before the Shannon murder. For instance,

at Smith’s 1992 interview, Sanders asked her how long she had known

himself and Hendrix, and Smith replied that she had known them for a

couple of years, from before the Shannon murder. Purcell Dec., Ex.

47, 1992 Smith Interview at 76. Sanders stated, “We know all of

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your, a lot of your buddies, and people who hang out with you on the

street, is that correct?” Id. Smith replied, “Yes.” Id. At his

2001 deposition, Sanders testified that he and Hendrix knew Smith,

just as they knew many of the young people in her neighborhood, and

that they had questioned her about a number of the gang-related

murders that had occurred in her neighborhood. Balogh Reply Dec.,

Ex. 63, 2001 Sanders Depo. at 143-44. 

Further, the Inspectors’ follow-up interview of Luther Blue

after Smith disclosed his name to Sanders indicates that she told

Sanders that the car chase started at the Seven-Eleven. This was

exculpatory because it cast doubt on Masina’s testimony that the car

chase started at Lovers’ Lane. Finally, if Smith’s information had

been disclosed, she could have testified at Tennison’s motion for

new trial, and important parts of Ricard’s confession would have

been corroborated, which would have been a significant factor in the

trial judge’s analysis of whether Ricard’s confession was

trustworthy. It is reasonable to infer that, after Ricard

confessed, Smith would have no reason to fear retaliation from

Ricard or Blue if she testified that she had been an eyewitness to

Shannon’s shooting.

Therefore, the information Smith relayed to Sanders in 1990 was

exculpatory. 

(2) Intent

The Inspectors argue that Sanders’ January 3, 1990 note about

the Smith interview was in Butterworth’s file and this negates any

inference that Sanders intended to bury information connected to

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The Inspectors actually argue that the facts show that

Sanders did not act in bad faith. As discussed above, Plaintiffs

must show that the Inspectors deliberately intended to withhold

Brady material; it is not necessary to show they acted in bad

faith. 

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Smith.9 Also, according to the Inspectors, the fact that they

interviewed the five individuals Smith named and put notes of those

interviews in the file demonstrates that they had no intention to

withhold any of Smith’s information. Lastly, to support their claim

that Sanders’ note was sufficient to fulfill his Brady obligation,

the Inspectors point to Adachi’s and Melton’s testimony that, had

they seen Sanders’ note, they would have been alerted to Smith and

her information.

Plaintiffs respond that they never saw Sanders’ note and, even

if they had, it was insufficient to alert anyone to Smith’s identity

or the substance of her statements because it omitted Smith’s last

name, and her statements that Ricard had committed the murder, that

Plaintiffs were not at the murder scene, and that the car chase

started at the Seven-Eleven store. As evidence that Sanders’ note

was insufficient under Brady, Plaintiffs cite Butterworth’s

testimony that he could not ascertain its significance. Plaintiffs

also argue that Sanders’ intent to suppress Smith’s information is

demonstrated by the fact that he made no notes of his further

contacts with Smith which would have alerted Plaintiffs to the

significance of her information, nor are there notes that members of

the GTF interviewed Smith regarding her knowledge of the truck that

was thought to be involved in the car chase. 

Because Butterworth testified that Sanders’ note was in his

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file and therefore it would have been turned over to Plaintiffs’

attorneys, but Plaintiffs’ attorneys testified that they did not

receive the note, there is a dispute about whether Sanders included

the note in the file he gave Butterworth. And, even if Sanders gave

the note to Butterworth, it was cryptic and failed to disclose

significant details. The fact that Adachi and Melton thought the

note was important does not mean the note was sufficient as written. 

The Inspectors’ insistence that they did not know Smith or the

people she mentioned is belied by other testimony where the

Inspectors admit they knew Smith before the Shannon murder, knew the

people with whom she associated and knew that she said that the car

chase started at the Seven-Eleven store instead of Lovers’ Lane. 

The Inspectors do not address Plaintiffs’ argument that Sanders made

no notes of his further contacts with Smith or of the interviews of

Smith by members of the GTF. Therefore, Sanders’ note did not

fulfill his Brady obligations. However, a fact-finder could infer

that Sanders thought the note was sufficient. As noted above,

questions involving state of mind are generally inappropriate for

summary judgment. Therefore, there are disputed issues of material

fact regarding intent and the cross-motions for summary adjudication

of this issue are DENIED.

(3) Plaintiffs’ Knowledge of Smith

The Inspectors argue that they are not liable for a Brady-based

§ 1983 violation because Plaintiffs independently knew of Smith and

that she might have information about the Shannon murder, and thus

Plaintiffs’ attorneys could have discovered the alleged Brady

material on their own. 

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(a) Tennison’s Knowledge of Smith

Citing Smith’s 1992 police interview, the Inspectors claim that

Tennison knew Smith because she talked to him before his trial and

he asked her to be a witness for him at his trial. The Inspectors

argue that Tennison or Adachi could have found Smith and learned of

her information before trial. This argument is unpersuasive. At

her 1992 interview, Smith stated that she barely knew Tennison and

that she only spoke with him coincidentally when she worked as an

operator and Tennison placed a telephone call from jail. Although

Tennison asked her to speak to his attorney about the Shannon

homicide, she declined because she feared that she would be killed

by Ricard or Blue if she did so. She explained that, because she

feared for her life, she asked her family not to give her telephone

number or address to Plaintiffs and that she moved from her former

address to ensure that her whereabouts would be secret. Smith’s

statements are corroborated by the testimony at the hearing on

Tennison’s motion for new trial. At the time of the hearing, the

only information known to Tennison was that a person named Chauntey

White may have witnessed the Shannon murder; even though Tennison’s

brother searched for her, he was unable to locate her. 

This evidence establishes that Tennison had some vague

information about Smith, that he diligently searched for her, but

that the search was unsuccessful. On the basis of this evidence,

the Court cannot find that Tennison’s attorney had the knowledge and

means to obtain Smith’s information on his own. 

(b) Goff’s Knowledge of Smith

The Inspectors cite Goff’s deposition and his testimony at the

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§ 4900 hearing to show that he had a close romantic relationship

with Smith before the Shannon murder, that after the murder he heard

she might have been involved and that he told Melton this. The

evidence shows that Goff was not romantically involved with Smith; 

they just knew each other from the neighborhood, they had gone to

the movies together once or twice, but Smith did not even know

Goff’s last name. A few weeks after the murder but before he was

arrested, Goff heard Ricard mention Smith’s name in connection with

the murder. Goff asked Smith about her involvement, but when she

denied knowing anything, he did not pursue the subject. Goff had

also heard that the car chase started at the Seven-Eleven. After he

was arrested, Goff gave his attorney this information. After the

trial, Goff coincidentally had a brief conversation with Smith in

her role as operator when he was placing a call from jail. Goff

asked Smith to talk to his attorney and Smith refused. 

Unlike Tennison, Goff had heard immediately after he was

arrested about Smith’s connection to the murder and that the car

chase started at the Seven-Eleven and he informed his attorney of

this. On the basis of this evidence, the Court finds that there are

disputes of material fact regarding whether Goff’s attorney had

sufficient information to have found Smith and her exculpatory

information on his own.

In summary, based upon disputed issues of material facts, the

cross motions for summary adjudication on liability are DENIED.

(4) Absolute Immunity

Although the Inspectors make a blanket argument that they are

absolutely immune from all of Plaintiffs’ claims, they do not

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specifically argue that absolute immunity applies to Plaintiffs’

Brady claim regarding Smith and the information she provided. 

Therefore, absolute immunity is DENIED in regard to this claim.

(5) Qualified Immunity

The Inspectors argue that, even if they committed a

constitutional violation, they are qualifiedly immune from

liability. As discussed above, the law regarding the duty of police

to turn over exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor was clearly

established at the time these events occurred. Thus, the Court

addresses whether the Inspectors’ conduct was reasonable under the

clearly established law.

As discussed above, the Court has found that the information

Smith told the Inspectors was exculpatory and that Sanders’

handwritten note of his first interview with Smith was insufficient

to fulfill his Brady obligation. For all the reasons stated above,

the Inspectors’ failure to alert Butterworth to this information so

that he, in turn, could have informed Plaintiffs of it, cannot be

summarily adjudicated to be objectively reasonable under clearly

established law. Therefore, the Inspectors’ motion for summary

adjudication of qualified immunity is DENIED.

C. Request for Money From Secret Witness Program

(1) Exculpatory Evidence

The Inspectors argue that there is no constitutional violation

for failing to disclose the SWP memo to Butterworth because the

information is not exculpatory in that no one received any reward

money. Plaintiffs argue that the memo is exculpatory because it had

impeachment and investigative value. They argue that the

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exculpatory nature of the memo is reinforced by the April 23, 1990

conversation between Hendrix and Masina, which shows that Hendrix

discussed a reward with Masina, and by the two entries from the

ledger of Contingent Fund B indicating payments to Sanders and

Hendrix in the total amount of approximately $1,400. 

Although Masina declares that she was not offered a reward and

did not receive one, the enhanced tape of the April 23, 1990

conversation between Hendrix and Masina is evidence that Hendrix may

have discussed a reward with Masina. As acknowledged by Hendrix, a

reward taints a witness’ testimony at trial. Purcell Dec., Ex. 15,

Hendrix Depo. at 124. The audio experts’ disagreement about whether

the word “reward” is mentioned by Hendrix raises a factual issue for

a jury to decide. 

Also, the Inspectors do not explain the whereabouts of the

original audio tape nor how copies of the audio tape came to be in

such poor condition. 

Spoliation of evidence, defined as “the destruction or

significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve

property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably

foreseeable litigation,” supports an inference that the evidence was

unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. Byrni v.

Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2nd Cir. 2001). 

An inference of spoliation, in combination with some evidence for

the plaintiff, can allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment. 

Medical Lab Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,

306 F.3d 806, 825 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the fact that the audio tape was not disclosed, and the

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10The withdrawals from Contingent Fund B might contribute to

this finding. On the other hand, a fact-finder could credit

Goldberg’s testimony that the money was used for witness travel. 

The ledger entry of the $1,250 payment indicates it was for witness

expenses and the payment was made in early October, 1999 when

Masina traveled from Samoa to the United States to provide an inperson taped statement of her account of Shannon’s homicide. See

Masina Dec. and Wong Dec., Ex. LL, Tennison’s Preliminary Hearing

at 54 (Shortly after the Shannon homicide, Masina left the United

States to live in Samoa).

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original was not preserved, for use as evidence in Plaintiffs’

criminal case or their future habeas petitions, which were

reasonably foreseeable to the Inspectors, raises an inference that

the conversation on the audio tape was unfavorable to the Inspectors

and the criminal case against Plaintiffs. This, in conjunction with

the evidence of the SWP memo, contributes to the inference that, at

the very least, a reward was discussed with Masina.10 Thus, the SWP

memo could be found to be exculpatory. The Inspectors’ argument

that the SWP memo is inadmissible hearsay is unpersuasive; armed

with the memo, Plaintiffs’ trial counsel could have asked the

Inspectors about it at trial and used it to impeach them if they

denied making the request from the SWP. 

The Court concludes that there are disputed issues of fact

regarding whether the SWP memo was exculpatory. 

(2) Intent

The Inspectors argue that they did not intend to withhold the

SWP memo, as evidenced by the fact that they placed it in the police

case file where Butterworth could access it and turn it over to

Plaintiffs.

Officer Tabak, San Francisco’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness on police

procedures, testified that it is standard procedure for the police

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11The Inspectors do not argue that absolute immunity applies to

this claim.

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to turn over everything to the district attorney’s office. The

district attorney discloses everything to the defense. Balogh Dec.,

Ex. 81, Tabak Depo. at 48. Tabak also stated that it is not SFPD’s

policy for the investigator who is aware of exculpatory evidence to

leave it in the police case file and assume that if the district

attorney is interested, he would come to the SFPD where the file is

located and look at it. Id. at 99. Instead, Tabak stated, the

investigator should make an effort within a reasonable amount of

time to reveal that exculpatory information to the district

attorney. Id.

Tabak’s testimony is sufficient to raise a dispute of fact

regarding whether the Inspectors negligently or intentionally

withheld the memo by placing it in the police case file instead of

turning it over to Butterworth. 

Because there are disputes of material fact regarding whether

the SWP memo was exculpatory and whether the Inspectors intended to

withhold it, the cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of

liability are DENIED.

(3) Qualified Immunity11

The Inspectors argue that even if they committed a

constitutional violation, qualified immunity protects them from

liability.

As discussed above, at the time this conduct took place the law

regarding the Inspectors’ duty to turn over to the prosecutor

exculpatory information was well-established. If the SWP memo was

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exculpatory, a reasonable officer would know that it was necessary

to turn it over directly to the district attorney. Therefore,

disputed facts regarding the memo’s exculpatory value preclude

summary judgment on whether the Inspectors’ conduct was reasonable

under the circumstances. The Inspectors’ motion for summary

judgment of qualified immunity for failure to disclose the SWP memo

is DENIED.

D. Luther Blue’s Interviews and Pauline’s Polygraph

Only the Inspectors move for summary judgment on these claims. 

They argue that they fulfilled their Brady obligations by providing

the video tapes of each of their two interviews with Luther Blue to

Butterworth, that Butterworth himself ordered Pauline’s polygraph

and that they informed him of the results. Tennison concedes that

the Inspectors’ conduct in regard to the Blue interviews and

Pauline’s polygraph are not independent grounds for liability under

Brady. Tennison Opp. at 57. Goff does not address the Blue

interview. Goff argues that the polygraph was material exculpatory

evidence, but doesn’t address how the Inspectors could be liable for

failure to disclose it to Butterworth given that Butterworth knew of

it. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Inspectors’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ Brady claims to the extent they are based on 

suppression of the Blue interviews and Pauline’s polygraph.

E. Materiality

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on

the element of materiality on all of their Brady claims.

As discussed above, in the context of a Brady violation,

evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had

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the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

In the Habeas Order, the Court undertook an extensive review of

the case the prosecution presented against Tennison to the jury and

concluded that it was weak. Habeas Order at 72-80. The Inspectors

do not present additional evidence on this issue nor do they argue

that the prosecution’s case was strong. Therefore, the Court adopts

here the finding that the prosecution’s case against Tennison was

weak. The Court also finds the prosecution’s case against Goff was

weak because there was only one eyewitness who identified Goff,

instead of two eyewitnesses who identified Tennison. 

However, because materiality is to be considered in terms of

the collective effect of the suppressed evidence, it is premature to

determine materiality before a jury resolves the disputed factual

issues as to what evidence is suppressed and who is liable for it. 

Therefore, even though the case against Plaintiffs was weak, the

Court will not summarily adjudicate the materiality of the

suppressed evidence. 

F. Causation

The parties cross-move for summary adjudication as to whether

the Inspectors’ alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to

the prosecutor caused Plaintiffs’ injury.

To establish a civil rights violation, the plaintiff must show

that the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct was the actual and

proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. White v. Roper, 901

F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92

F.2d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996); Arnold v. Int’l Business Machines

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Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). The defendant’s conduct

is the actual cause of the injury only if the injury would not have

occurred “but for” that conduct. White, 901 F.2d at 1505. If it is

established that the conduct was one of the causes of the

plaintiff’s injury, the next question is whether the conduct is the

proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 1506. The defendant’s

conduct is not the proximate cause of the injury if another cause

intervenes and supercedes the defendant’s liability for the

subsequent events. Id.; Van Ort, 92 F.2d at 837 (traditional tort

law defining intervening causes that break the chain of proximate

causation applies in § 1983 actions); Arnold, 637 F.2d at 1355

(same). Whether the conduct of another person is an intervening

cause of the plaintiff’s injuries depends upon what was reasonably

foreseeable to the defendant at the time. White, 901 F.2d at 1505. 

Foreseeable intervening causes will not supersede the defendant’s

responsibility. Id.

The Inspectors offer many reasons for their argument that they

are not the legal or the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries: 

witnesses were untruthful during the investigation, Plaintiffs’

defense counsel failed to investigate and present an adequate

defense, the courts ruled adversely on the allegedly suppressed

Ricard confession and Plaintiffs failed to use their own knowledge

of the alleged facts to defend themselves.

Plaintiffs respond that the Habeas Order provides the best

template for analysis of causation. However, in the habeas case the

issue of causation was not addressed.

As discussed above in the context of liability, the Court has

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12Sanders was not present at the interviews and Pauline did not

testify about Goff.

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found disputed issues of material facts in regard to many of the

same arguments the Inspectors raise here. The factual dispute is

compounded here because the Inspectors’ ability to foresee any of

the alleged intervening events must be determined. Therefore, the

Court finds that disputed issues of material facts preclude summary

adjudication for either side of the issue of causation.

III. The Inspectors’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Fabrication of 

Evidence and Continued Investigation Claim

Only the Inspectors move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

claim that the Inspectors fabricated evidence in their interviews of

Masina and Pauline and continued their investigation of Plaintiffs

even though they knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were

innocent.

 (A) Absolute Immunity

The Inspectors argue that Hendrix is absolutely immune from

Tennison’s claim that he allegedly coerced Pauline into committing

perjury during the April, 1990 interviews.12 

As discussed in relation to Butterworth’s motion for summary

judgment, the Court has found that Butterworth acted as a prosecutor

and not as an investigator during the April 20 through April 22,

1990 interviews of Pauline about her recantation. At these

interviews, Hendrix was working primarily at Butterworth’s

direction. However, Butterworth testified that he did not direct

Hendrix to arrange the telephone conversation between Pauline and

Masina after Pauline took the polygraph examination. Hendrix has

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not pointed to any contrary evidence. Therefore, Hendrix was not

under Butterworth’s direction when he arranged the phone call and

cannot claim that he was acting as a prosecutor in doing so. Thus,

Hendrix is absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ claim regarding his

actions during the April 20 through April 22, 1990 interviews of

Pauline, except for his conduct in setting up the phone call between

Masina and Pauline. 

(B) Constitutional Violation

As discussed above, to prevail on a fabrication of evidence

claim, a plaintiff, at a minimum, must show that (1) the officer

continued his investigation despite the fact he knew or should have

known that the suspect was innocent or (2) the officer used

investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that he

knew or should have known that they would yield false information. 

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. Suggestive interview tactics alone do

not amount to a constitutional violation. Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817.

(1) Phone Call Between Pauline and Masina

Plaintiffs argue that it was coercive for Hendrix to allow

Pauline to participate in an unmonitored conversation with Masina,

the person Pauline said had pressured her to lie. As evidence, they

point to Hendrix’ deposition testimony that good interview

techniques require witnesses to be interviewed separately and that

he himself never put witnesses in a room together allowing them to

talk over their respective testimony. Wong Dec., Ex. B, 2005

Hendrix Depo. at 37-40. 

In his declaration, Hendrix states that, after the polygraph,

Pauline asked him if she could speak to Masina, who was then living

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in Samoa. Hendrix states he arranged the call and didn’t monitor it

because he “believed the girls were friends, and did not see

anything improper in allowing two witnesses who had already given

statements about the murder to speak.” Hendrix Dec. at ¶ 23. 

Butterworth testified that he was not concerned that Pauline spoke

with Masina over the telephone because Masina was in Samoa at the

time so it was unlikely that she would be able to pressure or coerce

Pauline. Wong Dec., Ex. O, Butterworth Depo. at 334-35. 

Butterworth also stated that Hendrix had told him that Pauline had

asked to speak to Masina and Butterworth thought it was unlikely

that Pauline would make such a request if she felt threatened by

Masina. Id. at 335. Pauline stated that it was not her idea to

speak to Masina, that Hendrix just handed her the phone and said

that there was a phone call for her from Masina. Wong Dec., Ex. M,

Pauline Depo. at 98-99. 

Thus, there is a dispute of fact regarding whether Pauline

asked to speak to Masina. However, even if Pauline had requested to

speak to Masina, it can be inferred that Hendrix knew or should have

known that this unmonitored phone call could yield false

information. Thus, a jury could find that Hendrix committed a

constitutional violation. However, Tennison has not carried his

burden of showing there is clearly established law regarding

allowing witnesses to talk to each other. Thus, even if a

constitutional violation was committed, a reasonable officer in

Hendrix’ position would not have been aware that he was violating

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Inspectors’ motion for

summary adjudication that Hendrix is qualifiedly immune on this

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claim is GRANTED.

(2) Continued Investigation

Opposing the Inspectors’ motion for summary adjudication that

they did not commit a constitutional violation in this regard,

Plaintiffs argue that, because it was obvious that Masina and

Pauline were lying, the Inspectors knew it. No other credible

evidence tied Plaintiffs to Shannon’s murder and thus, Plaintiffs

argue, the Inspectors continued their investigation of Plaintiffs

despite the fact that they knew that Plaintiffs were innocent.

 The Inspectors argue that no evidence shows that they knew

Plaintiffs were innocent and point to a great deal of evidence that

shows that they reasonably believed, based on the statements of

Masina and Pauline, that Plaintiffs were guilty. The Inspectors

point out that there were sufficient reasons for them to believe

that Masina was credible because: (1) her account of the murder

never changed; (2) she had no motive to make up this story; 

(3) neighborhood witnesses corroborated the chase route and vehicles

she described; (4) she admitted to having been in a stolen car, even

though she could have faced criminal liability; (5) other witnesses

corroborated aspects of her story; (6) the forensic evidence

established that Shannon received two shots from a shotgun,

consistent with what Masina described; (7) police found Shannon’s

body in the corner of the parking lot as Masina had described it;

(8) Masina did not benefit from testifying against Plaintiffs; 

(9) Masina put herself and her family at risk by testifying; and

(10) a neighborhood witness indicated that she saw a Filipina girl

matching Masina’s description who did not look like she belonged

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with the rest of the individuals who were near the scene of the

shooting. The Inspectors argue that there were sufficient reasons

for them to believe Pauline because: (1) during her first police

interview, she identified Tennison from a photo line-up; (2) at that

same interview, she identified an individual named Wayland Gibson,

whose street name was “Buck,” as having been present at the murder

and Masina had said she heard someone say, “Buck, come here,” just

before the car chase began; (3) Pauline’s story that Masina forced

her to lie did not add up because shortly after the murder Pauline

moved to Hawaii and Masina moved to Samoa and it was not reasonable

to believe Masina could have exerted influence from thousands of

miles away; (4) Pauline’s denial that she was in a stolen car before

the murder did not mar her credibility because she may have been

afraid this would get her into trouble; and (5) she may have

recanted her original story because she was afraid of retaliation.

As Plaintiffs point out, some of the reasons the Inspectors

give for believing Masina and Pauline are questionable. For

instance, as the Court noted in the October 26, 2003 Habeas Order,

the Inspectors’ theory that neighborhood witnesses corroborated

Masina’s story is weak given that some neighborhood witnesses

contradicted aspects of her statement and that Masina’s and

Pauline’s stories were inconsistent with each other. See Purcell

Dec., Ex. 52, August 26, 2003 Habeas Order at 72, 77-79. 

Nonetheless, even if Pauline and Masina were lying, that is not

sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs were innocent to compel a

conclusion that the Inspectors continued their investigation of

Plaintiffs when they knew or should have known them to be innocent. 

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Plaintiffs have cited no case in which a claim like this one

prevailed. Although Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074-75, held that there

is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be

criminally charged on the basis of false evidence deliberately

fabricated by the government, it found that the defendants had not

violated such a right. Id at 1077, 1079. The plaintiff in

Devereaux had based his constitutional claim on the first Devereaux

prong: coercive interview techniques. The Court has found only

three cases addressing the second Devereaux prong of continued

investigation, and all those cases have held the defendant did not

commit a constitutional violation. See Cunningham, 345 F.3d at 811-

12 (continued investigation not unconstitutional); Milstein, 208 F.

Supp. 2d at 1123-24 (defendants entitled to qualified immunity due

to insufficient evidence to support claim that they knew or should

have known plaintiff was innocent); Guerrero v. City and County of

San Francisco, 2003 WL 22749099, *10 (N.D. Cal 2003) (no reasonable

juror could find that defendant knew or should have known that

plaintiff was innocent).

Although the information the Inspectors uncovered in their

investigation was contradictory and somewhat inconsistent, no

evidence supports Plaintiffs’ claim that the Inspectors knew or

reasonably should have known that Plaintiffs were innocent. In

Milstein, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1123, the plaintiff had been indicted

by a Grand Jury and later held to answer after a preliminary

hearing. The court relied on these facts for its conclusion that

there was evidence to support the defendants’ belief that the

plaintiff was guilty of the crimes charged. Id. Here, too,

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Plaintiffs were held to answer after preliminary hearings on the

crimes charged. Significantly, at Goff’s preliminary hearing, the

court found probable cause even though Pauline testified to her

recantation. Furthermore, although this Court granted Tennison’s

habeas petition, it did so based on Brady violations; the Court did

not address the issue of Tennison’s guilt or innocence. 

The Court concludes that the Inspectors did not violate

Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to be free from being charged with

fabricated evidence by continuing their investigation of Plaintiffs. 

Furthermore, even if the Inspectors’ conduct constituted a

violation, a reasonable officer in their position would not have

known that they were violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Therefore, the Inspectors’ motion for summary adjudication based on

their continuing investigation of Plaintiffs is GRANTED. 

F. Punitive Damages

The Inspectors move for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’

demand for punitive damages.

Punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit "when the

defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or

intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the

federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,

56 (1983). In Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807-08 (9th Cir. 2005),

the Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages may be awarded in

federal civil rights cases when the defendant’s conduct is

oppressive or malicious or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s

rights. Malicious conduct is accompanied by ill will or spite or is

done for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 809 (citing

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Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 7.5). Reckless conduct

in conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights reflects complete

indifference to the plaintiff’s safety or rights or is done in the

face of a perceived risk that the conduct will violate the

plaintiff’s rights under federal law. Id. (citing same jury

instruction). Conduct is oppressive if it injures or damages the

plaintiff or violates the plaintiff’s rights with unnecessary

harshness or severity as by misuse or abuse of authority or power or

by taking advantage of the plaintiff’s weakness, disability or

misfortune. Id. at 809-10. Although the standard for compensatory

and punitive damages is overlapping, the distinction is that

compensatory damages are mandatory once a violation is found, but

the award of punitive damages requires a discretionary moral

judgment that the conduct merited the particular punitive award

imposed in addition to the compensatory award. Larez v. City of Los

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Smith, 461

U.S. at 52). 

Relying on the same arguments discussed above, the Inspectors

contend that there is no evidence that they acted recklessly or

maliciously in regard to Plaintiffs’ right to a fair trial.

Because the award of punitive damages turns on the intent of

the Inspectors, it, like other questions where motive is at issue,

cannot be resolved on summary judgment. If the jury were to find

for Plaintiffs on the disputed facts and draw inferences in

Plaintiffs’ favor, such findings could support an award of punitive

damages. Plaintiffs have raised a disputed issue of fact regarding

whether the Inspectors acted oppressively, recklessly or with

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callous disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Therefore,

the Inspectors’ motion for summary adjudication on the request for

punitive damages is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Butterworth’s motion for summary

judgment (Docket # 201) is GRANTED in part, the Inspectors’ motion

for summary judgment (Docket # 215) is GRANTED in part, Plaintiffs’

motion to strike (Docket # 298) is DENIED and Plaintiffs’ motions

for partial summary adjudication (Docket ## 152, 155) are DENIED. 

The Inspectors’ request to file a separate statement of disputed and

undisputed facts is DENIED (Docket # 215). The only remaining claim

against Butterworth is Goff’s Brady claim for suppression of the

Ricard confession. The claims remaining against the Inspectors are

Plaintiffs’ Brady claims based on the suppression of Ricard’s

confession, Smith’s statements, the SWP memo and Hendrix’ April 23,

1990 phone call with Masina. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/22/06

Dated 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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