Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00952/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00952-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard R. Day,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-0952-PHX-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 

8, 2013 (Doc. 1). On September 5, 2013 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 9). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on October 9, 2013 (Doc. 10), and has supplemented the record 

with various documents (Doc. 18).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

Appellant, who was forty-three at the time of the trial, had 

lived with his grandparents, Verlin S. and Lois S., since the age of 

eighteen. After Verlin's death on March 26, 2003, Rickey, Nancy P. 

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(Appellant's aunt), and Appellant discussed the welfare of Lois's 

health and the deteriorating condition of her house. Appellant 

became angry when Lois's children discussed the option of having 

Lois live in an assisted living facility. Appellant then visited a 

paralegal who prepared the following: Proposed changes in Lois's 

will, a joint tenancy deed, and a proposed document granting 

Appellant power of attorney to make her financial and personal 

decisions. Appellant presented these documents to Lois for her 

signature, and Lois signed them. Further, Appellant adamantly 

argued to keep Lois at her house in Phoenix; if she moved and the 

house sold, Appellant would have to find another place to live. 

In April 2003, over Appellant's objections, Lois moved to 

Las Vegas to live with her daughter, Nancy. Nancy left a message 

with Appellant, informing him that Rickey would be coming over to 

Lois's house at her request to gather her clothes and other personal 

belongings. When Rickey and other family members arrived, he 

discovered Appellant had changed the door locks; however Rickey 

had a new key and was able to unlock the front door with that key. 

After entering the house, Rickey's wife noticed that a chair had been 

blocking the door and that the inside of the door knob had fallen off. 

While gathering Lois's belongings, no one entered Appellant's room 

or removed any of his property. Later, after Rickey and the others 

had left and after Appellant came home, Officer Tiffany Scott of the

City of Phoenix Police Department responded to a robbery reported 

by Appellant. Despite Appellant stating that Rickey was 

responsible, Officer Scott did not consider him a suspect. 

Two days later, on May 10, Rickey returned to Lois's house. 

Nancy had told him that Appellant was leaving for Las Vegas on 

May 9, with an apparent plan to return with Lois; however, 

unbeknownst to Rickey, Appellant had not yet left. Rickey entered 

the house through a window in the living room, where a muddy 

footprint was later found by Detective Clifton Jewell of the City of 

Phoenix Police Department. Appellant first engaged Rickey in the 

living room, where Detective Jewell later found a bullet hole in the 

wall, and the cartridge casing in the sofa. Appellant's girlfriend, who 

was also in the house at the time, heard noise of the conflict move 

from the hallway to the master bedroom. In the master bedroom, 

Appellant's girlfriend heard Rickey say, "No, don't, don't. Please 

don't kill me. I'm sorry." Appellant's girlfriend then heard a gunshot. 

Appellant called 911 and reported that he had shot his uncle.

Police officers found Rickey in the bathroom between the 

toilet and bathtub, with a linear abrasion on his left forearm and a 

gunshot wound to his left chest. The Chief Medical Examiner for 

Maricopa County testified that a bullet entered Rickey's thorax, and 

caused his death. Rickey also had a "shored" exit wound on the left 

portion of his back, indicating he was shot while against something 

firm, such as a mattress or wall.

(Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. 8/16/07 at 3-6.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

/ /

/ /

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On June 3, 2003, Petitioner was indicted on charges of first degree murder, and 

following remand to the grand jury, was again indicted on September 5, 2003. (Exhibit 

D, Mem. Dec. at 2-3.) 

Petitioner was found incompetent to stand trial, based upon delusional beliefs of a 

widespread conspiracy against him, but on subsequent re-evaluation, was found 

competent to stand trial. (Id. at 3.)

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial, testified on his own behalf in support of his 

defense theory of self-defense, including testifying that he had overheard the victim 

saying “it would be ‘nice’ if [Petitioner] ‘disappeared.’” (Id. at 8.) The Arizona Court 

of Appeals described Petitioner’s description of events on the day of the shooting as 

follows:

On the night of May 9, 2003, Appellant thought he heard 

someone on the roof. At 7:00 a.m. the next morning Appellant heard 

a loud noise but he went back to sleep. Appellant then heard a 

screen door open and got out of bed but again went back to bed. 

Moments later Appellant heard a window slide open and he then 

grabbed a gun. As Appellant moved into the living room from the 

hallway he encountered Rickey who told him not to shoot. 

Appellant instructed Rickey to lie on the ground. Appellant saw a 

knife in a sheath in Rickey’s hand, turned his head, and fired one 

shot. After Appellant shot at Rickey, Rickey fell down three times 

and then, surprisingly, rammed him into a bookcase. Appellant and 

Rickey continued to struggle, but Appellant was able to control 

Rickey, until Rickey got away and hid behind a chair in the living 

room.

Appellant further testified that he retreated to his bedroom 

while Rickey ran to hide in the master bedroom. Rickey frantically 

tried to open the arcadia door in the master bedroom; however a 

dowel rod prevented the door from opening. Appellant then pointed 

his gun at Rickey and ordered him to the floor. Rickey threw a 

pillow at Appellant in a failed effort to protect himself. Purportedly 

fearing for his life, Appellant shot Rickey. Rickey apparently got 

off the floor and went into the bathroom, leaving the knife on the 

floor, while Appellant went into a different room to call 911. As 

noted above, Rickey subsequently died as a result of his gunshot 

wounds.

(Id. at 8-9.) 

Petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder, and considering Petitioner’s 

mental health as a mitigating factor the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the 

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possibility of parole after 25 years. (Id. at 10; Exhibit A, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Counsel was unable to find an appealable issue, 

and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state 

cases, asking the court to review the record for error and seeking leave for Petitioner to 

file a supplemental brief. (Exhibit B, Opening Brief.) 

Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Opening Brief (Exhibit C), arguing that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, obtain or present various evidence. 

In a decision issued August 16, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to 

reach Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance, finding that they should properly be 

brought in a petition for post-conviction relief. (Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. at 10.) The court 

searched the record for, and found no reversible error. (Id. at 11.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit E, Order and Mandate.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On November 20, 2007, more than 90 days after the conclusion of his direct 

appeal, Petitioner filed a motion to extend the time to file his petition for post-conviction 

relief (Exhibit F). The PCR court did not rule on this motion, and Petitioner has never 

filed anything further with the PCR court. (Exhibit G, Docket.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 8, 2013 (Doc. 1). The original 

petition was unsigned, and Petitioner submitted a separate certification of the Petition on 

February 18, 2014 (Doc. 25). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following two grounds for 

relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the prosecution withheld potentially 

exculpatory evidence. 

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Response - On September 5, 2103, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 9). 

Respondents argue that the Petition is barred by the habeas statute of limitations, and that 

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his state remedies.

Reply - On October 9, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10). Petitioner argues 

that he was innocent, that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his claims, 

that he abandoned his PCR proceeding due to his depression, lack of work space, and 

lack of legal training and resources. He argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because 

of his mental conditions. He also argued that he has shown cause and prejudice to 

excuse his procedural defaults.

Motions to Expand Record and Conduct Discovery – Petitioner filed a series 

of motions seeking to expand the record to submit additional documents, and to conduct 

discovery to obtain additional documents. The Court initially denied these requests 

without prejudice. (Order 10/31/13, Doc. 13; Order 12/3/13, Doc. 16.) Petitioner raised 

the issues again through a Motion to Reconsider Production of Documents (Doc. 17) and 

Motion for Reconsideration to Submit Additional Exhibits (Doc. 18), filed December 19, 

2013. The former was denied based upon Petitioner’s failure to proffer any basis for 

admission of the additional documents in light of the limited issues arising under the 

procedural defenses, and granted the latter to permit consideration of the additional 

documents submitted with Petitioner’s motion (Doc. 18), Exhibits D-R through O-R.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

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must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).1 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through August 16, 2007, when 

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his direct appeal. (Exhibit D.) Thereafter, 

Petitioner had 30 days to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

31.19(a) He did not do so. Accordingly, his conviction became final on Monday, 

September 17, 2007, 30 days after the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on September 18, 2007, and without any 

tolling expired on September 17, 2008, making his May 8, 2013 Petition more than four 

years and seven months delinquent.

New Rule – Petitioner argues that his Petition should be considered timely 

because it is based on Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

The habeas limitations statute provides a later commencement date of “the date on 

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if 

the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

However, Maples did not establish a new constitutional right, but simply 

acknowledged that for purposes of finding cause and prejudice to excuse a procedural 

default, a petitioner is not charged with the conduct of an attorney who abandons the 

representation without notice. While Petitioner might rely on Maples as a basis for cause 

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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to excuse a procedural default, he does not assert a claim that is itself based on Maples.

Thus, Petitioner’s claim in his Petition is not founded on a constitutional right 

within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and the finality of his conviction 

remains the proper commencement date for his habeas limitations period.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Here, the only state filings by Petitioner after the denial of his direct appeal were 

his motion for indigent status and his motion to extend the time to file a petition for postconviction relief. (Exhibit F.) Such filings do not, however, constitute an application for 

post-conviction relief. 

It is true that under Arizona law, a petition for post-conviction relief is "pending" 

as soon as the notice of post-conviction relief is filed. Isley v. Arizona Department of 

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 9/13/04) ("The language and structure of 

the Arizona postconviction rules demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing 

of the Notice.") See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). But here, Petitioner did not file such 

a notice, rather only a motion to extend the time to do so.

Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

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To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Discovery of Maples Decision - Petitioner argues in his Petition that he was 

unaware of the decision in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

7.) As noted above, Maples does not justify a delayed commencement of the limitations 

period. Assuming arguendo that it’s adoption could justify equitable tolling (e.g. 

because a petitioner had delayed filing, believing his claims were procedurally defaulted 

until Maples was decided), Petitioner fails to show diligence in acting on Maples. 

Maples was decided in January, 2012, and yet Petitioner contends he did not become 

aware of it until April, 2013, some 15 months later. Petitioner fails to show that his 

belated discovery of Maples was an extraordinary circumstance, as opposed to his only 

dilatoriness in pursing his rights. Moreover, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to 

suggest that he had previously withheld filing his habeas petition believing the claims 

were procedurally defaulted. 

Perhaps most importantly, Maples would not, in any event, apply to Petitioner. 

Petitioner makes no suggestion that any counsel abandoned him without notice. At 

most, Petitioner contends that trial and appellate counsel were deficient in pursuing his 

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claims. Such garden variety negligence was rejected as a basis for cause and prejudice in 

Maples. “Negligence on the part of a prisoner's postconviction attorney does not qualify 

as “cause.” Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 922. Rather, the attorneys in Maples had simply 

stopped working on the case, had obtained other employment, and left the petitioner 

believing he was been represented in the matter. 

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel - In his Reply (Doc. 10), Petitioner 

argues that that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his claims, and that 

he abandoned his PCR proceeding due to his depression, lack of work space, and lack of 

legal training and resources. He argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because of his 

mental conditions. 

Petitioner fails to explain how appellate counsel’s failure to adequately assert his 

claims on direct appeal precluded him from filing his habeas petition on a timely basis. 

Such failure might constitute a defense to a failure to exhaust state remedies, but 

Petitioner fails to show how it is relevant to the filing of his federal habeas petition.2

Moreover, “a ‘garden variety claim’ of attorney negligence” does not establish the kinds 

of extraordinary circumstances that can justify equitable tolling of the habeas limitations 

period. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 652 (2010). 

Mental Conditions – Petitioner argues that he abandoned his state PCR 

proceeding because of depression and that he has “been mentally incapable of dealing 

with everything associated with my wrongful conviction.” (Reply, Doc. 10 at 9.) 

"Where a habeas petitioner's mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to 

meet the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an "extraordinary 

circumstance beyond [his] control," and the deadline should be equitably tolled." Laws 

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). “However....mental incompetence is 

not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations. Rather, the alleged mental 

 

2

In his Exhibit P-R to his Motion for Reconsideration regarding supplementing the 

record (Doc. 18) Petitioner provides copies of correspondence with trial counsel

concerning the actions he wanted counsel to undertake, his requests for records, etc. The 

latest such correspondence, however, was from July, 2005, long before his limitations 

period began to run.

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incompetence must somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas 

petition.” Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). “[M]ental illness tolls a statute of 

limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and 

thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them. Any other conclusion 

would perpetuate the stereotype of the insane as raving maniacs or gibbering idiots.” 

Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 -192 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying equitable tolling to 

Rehabilitation Act).

A habeas petitioner must allege more than the “mere existence of physical or 

mental ailments” to invoke the equitable tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations. 

Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F.Supp.2d 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Instead, a habeas 

petitioner has the burden of showing that mental health problems rendered him or her 

unable to file a habeas petition during the one year limitations period. Id. It is not 

sufficient to show that filing was rendered difficult, but rather Petitioner must show that 

it was rendered impossible. 

Petitioner proffers nothing besides vague descriptions of depression and 

despondency, emotional states not at all uncommon among those serving a life sentence. 

It is true that Petitioner had initially been found incompetent to stand trial. But that was 

based on delusions, not depression. The problem was sufficiently resolved for Petitioner 

to be found competent to proceed to trial. And, Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest 

that such condition had reoccurred.

Moreover, the ability to file petitions during the limitations period is evidence that 

Petitioner’s mental illness did not prevent him from filing a habeas petition. See Gaston 

v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 

1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because [petitioner] was capable of preparing and filing state 

court petitions [during the limitations period], it appears that he was capable of preparing 

and filing a [federal] petition during the time in between those dates.”).

Not only had Petitioner managed to file his Supplemental Opening Brief (Exhibit 

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C) in May, 2007, a year and a half after his conviction, and just three months before his 

one year began to run, but in November, 2007 (while his one year was running) he was 

able to file his Motion for Indigent Status and Motion for 60 Day Extension (Exhibit F). 

Each of these documents contained well reasoned, articulate arguments. Petitioner 

proffers nothing to show any variation in his mental capacity between that time and 

when he finally filed his habeas petition.

Nor does Petitioner proffer anything to show his diligence in the face of any 

incapacity. For example, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that the fog of his 

depression lifted only shortly before he filed the instant Petition, and had not lifted at any 

time earlier. Ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient

for a diligent petitioner to file his habeas petition. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 

1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).

Pro Se Status – Petitioner complains that he is untrained in the law. A prisoner’s 

pro se status is not an extraordinary circumstance. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th 

Cir. 2000). And, "ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, 

generally does not excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th 

Cir.1999). Moreover, Petitioner proffers no evidence of any diligent efforts despite such 

limitations to timely file.

Lack of Legal Resources – Petitioner complains that he lacked adequate space 

and legal resources to pursue his petition. 

This circuit has found that a lack of access to legal resources may be an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., Whalem/Hunt v. 

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that unavailability of a 

copy of the AEDPA in a prison law library could be grounds for equitable tolling). 

However, in cases where courts have found that an extraordinary circumstance might 

exist, the petitioner always pointed to specific materials to which he did not have access. 

See, e.g., Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access 

to AEDPA materials and Oregon law books may be an extraordinary circumstance); 

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Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to Spanish 

language legal materials or assistance could entitle habeas petitioner to equitable tolling). 

Here, Petitioner points to no specific deficiencies, nor does he explain how they 

precluded him from filing on time. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims had already 

been largely spelled out by him in his supplemental opening brief on direct appeal. He 

does not suggest that additional legal resources were needed to present them, or his

prosecutorial misconduct claims, to this Court. Petitioner’s habeas petition does not turn 

on novel points of law, and indeed contains almost no legal references. 

Nor does Petitioner explain how limitations on the space available to him 

precluded a timely filing. The undersigned is aware the Arizona Department of 

Corrections routinely limits prisoners to the volume of materials they can maintain in 

their cell at a given time. But they also permit prisoner’s to rotate their materials in and 

out of storage, and despite these limitations other prisoners routinely file timely state and 

federal briefs and petitions. See Arizona Department of Corrections Departmental Order 

902.10 (Legal Property), available at http://www.azcorrections.gov/Policies/900/ 

0902.pdf, last accessed 2/20/14.

Summary re Equitable Tolling – Petitioner fails to meet his burden of showing 

that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control made it impossible to file a petition 

on time, and has failed to show that he acted diligently in the face of whatever 

limitations he faced.

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

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513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Schlup requires a petitioner “to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” The 

habeas court then “consider[s] all the evidence, old and new, 

incriminating and exculpatory,” admissible at trial or not. On this 

complete record, the court makes a “ ‘probabilistic determination 

about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.’ ” 

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Respondents have not provided the complete record at trial. However, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the evidence from trial, including Petitioner’s 

defense. Petitioner does not suggest any deficiency in those summaries, but merely 

contends they represent “the states one sided and inacurate (sic) view.” (Reply on Mot., 

Doc, 22 at 5.) Given the nature of the new evidence suggested by Petitioner, the 

undersigned finds that a review of the transcripts themselves is unnecessary to disposing 

of Petitioner’s assertions of actual innocence.

Petitioner’s briefs do not explicitly assert his actual innocence as a basis to avoid 

the statute of limitations bar. (See Petition Doc. 1 at 7; Reply, Doc. 10, generally.) 

Petitioner does continue to argue that he shot his uncle in self-defense (albeit after 

admittedly following his uncle from room-to-room, while he was armed with only a 

sheathed knife, and ultimately shooting him while he was seated. (See Reply, Doc. 10 at 

5-7.) However, Petitioner proffers no new reliable evidence in support of his selfdefense claim.3

In his Motion for Reconsideration regarding Submitting Additional Exhibits 

 

3

In his Motion for Reconsideration regarding Production of Documents (Doc. 17) 

Petitioner sought the production of various documents which he contended were 

“paramount in proving [his] innocence.” (Id. at 2.) However, Petitioner offered no 

explanation how the requested information would show his actual innocence, but merely 

speculated that it would do so. Consequently, the motion was denied.

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(Doc. 18), Petitioner supplemented the record with a variety of documents which 

Petitioner conceded “doesn’t prove innocence; however it shows intent to deceive by all 

parties, jelousy [sic] and hatred by Ricky/deceased,” etc. (Doc. 18 at 4.) 

However, the bad blood between the family members was already plainly before 

the trial jury. (See Exhibit D, Mem.Dec. at 4-5, 7-8.) Indeed, the vast majority of 

information now proffered by Petitioner revolves around his attempts to paint his 

relatives as the malfeasors in their relationships. In particular, Petitioner provides a 

transcript of an interview of Petitioner’s uncle, Richard Perlotto, Sr. (Motion, Doc. 18 

Ex. D-R), which solely relates to the family dealings. Similarly, his Exhibit E-R is a 

narrative and a transcript of an interview of Petitioner’s cousin, Carla Perlotto relating 

various reasons for a poor relationship between Petitioner and the victim, as well as 

family dealings. Petitioner’s Exhibit F-R is a transcript of an interview with Petitioner’s 

aunt, Nancy Perlotto, again addressing family dealings. His Exhibit G-R is a transcript 

of an interview with Petitioner’s grandmother, Lois Stephens, on family dealings. 

Exhibit H-R is a copy of the report from Adult Protective Services concerning their 

investigation of the complaints of abuse against Petitioner. Exhibit I-R.is the police 

report on the Petitioner’s against the victim for breaking into the home. Exhibit K-R is a 

transcript from the grand jury including testimony about the burglary report and the 

dispute over the care of Petitioner’s grandmother. Exhibit L-R is a grand jury transcript 

with testimony concerning Petitioner’s financial condition and dealings with his 

grandmother, the victim’s access to the home and the purported burglary. Exhibit N-R is 

two transcripts of conversations between Petitioner and his grandmother concerning her 

leaving the home to go to his aunt’s house, and the family dealings. Exhibit O-R is 

several emails and letters from the victim accusing Petitioner of various misdeeds and 

regarding the family dealings.

A reasonable juror could be fully convinced that Petitioner’s relatives were 

completely in the wrong in their dealings with Petitioner, and yet still have convicted 

Petitioner of first degree murder. The evidence at trial, even Petitioner’s own version of 

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the facts as presented in his testimony at trial, were consistent with the prosecution’s 

theory that rather than acting in self-defense, Petitioner repeatedly shot his uncle as the 

uncle retreated through the house and tried to escape. The jury was already presented 

with evidence that the uncle had broken into the home. Additional information that the 

uncle or other family members were behaving badly toward Petitioner or his 

grandmother prior to the time of the shooting would not cause the undersigned to view 

the events at the time of the shooting differently so as to lose confidence in the outcome 

of the trial. Indeed, to the contrary, such evidence could be viewed as lending credence 

to the prosecution’s theory that Petitioner did not act in self-defense, but out of animosity 

toward his uncle.

Petitioner suggests that his newly proffered evidence indicates conflicts with the 

testimony or other statements by witnesses, and thus reduces their credibility. However, 

most of these purported inconsistencies similarly focus on events prior to the shooting 

such as the various relationships and dealings among the family, and would not alter the 

jury’s view of the critical events at the time of the shooting.

Petitioner’s Exhibit J-R is the transcript of an interview of Officer Knowles who 

was involved in the homicide investigation, which Petitioner purports shows that the gun 

had been moved at the scene and had unknown DNA on it and no prints from Petitioner 

or the victim. Conversely, Exhibit K-R is a transcript from the grand jury including 

testimony that nothing at the scene had been touched before photographs were taken. 

However, Petitioner fails to suggest how any of that shows actual innocence. At best, he 

argues that his information reveals “[d]eliberate concealing, altering and destroying 

evidence, perjuries, threatening witness...are a reflection of how weak the states case 

[was]. Sloppy forensics, cataloging evidence problems, perjured testimony by police, 

forensics.” (Motion, Doc. 18 at 3.) Here, however, there was no dispute that Petitioner 

had shot the victim, or about the weapon he had used. Mishandling of the gun might 

have been unprofessional, but it does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence.

Exhibit L-R is a grand jury transcript with testimony concerning the pillow in the 

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master bedroom with the bullet hole through it. Exhibit M-R is a transcript of an 

interview of the criminalist concerning the gunshot through the pillow. In his Reply, 

Petitioner argues that given the angle of trajectory through the pillow, he would have had 

to have been standing on a ladder at the time he shot through the pillow. (Doc. 10 at 6.) 

Petitioner’s logic is unclear. He testified at trial that the victim “threw a pillow at 

Appellant” resulting in Petitioner again shooting. (Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. at 9.) He does 

not argue that he did not shoot the pillow. It is unclear how Petitioner would purport to 

calculate the angle of a shot going through a pillow being thrown, which could have been 

intercepted by the bullet at any number of angles of rotation. More importantly, 

Petitioner does not suggest how, in light of his own testimony, the precise angle of the 

shot would establish his actual innocence.

In sum, Petitioner, at best, asserts various perceived weaknesses in the 

prosecution’s evidence. A finding of "actual innocence" is not to be based upon a 

finding that insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but rather 

upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 

2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a federal bank robbery case, without evidence 

that insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). Moreover, an 

actual innocence analysis does not invite a simple reconsideration of the evidence at trial, 

but requires consideration of new evidence. “To meet this standard, [the Petitioner] must 

first furnish ‘new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.’ ” Griffin v. 

Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

Petitioner fails to meet his burden of providing this Court with new “exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence,” Lee,

653 F.3d at 938, showing his actual innocence. 

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period commenced running on September 

18, 2007, and expired on September 17, 2008, making his May 8, 2103 Petition more 

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than four years and seven months delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis for statutory 

tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his 

delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s state remedies were not properly 

exhausted and are procedurally defaulted. Because the undersigned finds the Petition 

plainly barred by the habeas limitations period, the undersigned does not reach this 

defense.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

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on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed May 8, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report and Recommendation is accepted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

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findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 21, 2014

13-0952r RR 14 02 06 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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