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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 12, 2015*

Decided August 14, 2015

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 12‐2094

APRIL DAWN JONES,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

LUMAR GRIGGS,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.  

No. 1:11‐cv‐1034‐TWP‐DML

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Judge.

   

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that these cases

are appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 15-1823 Document: 36 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 5
No. 15‐1823

EARL KEY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH

BLOOMINGTON HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

   

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division

No. 1:14‐cv‐1007‐JMS‐TAB

Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson,

Judge.

O R D E R

In these two appeals (which we consolidate for disposition), Earl Key seeks to

litigate claims on behalf of April Jones, who suffers from early‐onset Huntington’s

disease and was adjudicated incompetent by state and federal courts. (Huntington’s

disease is a neurological disorder that, as a result of brain‐cell deterioration, causes

uncontrollable bodily movements and a decline in cognitive abilities.) In the first suit

(No. 12‐2094), Key, purporting to act as Jones’s “next‐friend,” sued Lumar Griggs,

Jones’s state‐appointed permanent guardian, to challenge state‐court orders finding that

she is legally incapacitated and appointing Griggs as her guardian. In his second suit

(No. 15‐1823), Key sued an array of public and private actors who are involved with

Jones’s care. We affirm the dismissals of both lawsuits.  

We begin with a brief history of the first suit. Purporting to sue on Jones’s behalf,

Key petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus, seeking Jones’s emancipation from

Griggs. The district court construed the suit as a challenge to Jones’s guardianship and

denied relief, concluding that the court lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction under the

domestic‐relations exception to federal jurisdiction. When the appeal first came before

us, we questioned whether Key could litigate on behalf of Jones. We recruited counsel

for Jones and Key to brief that question (along with other questions). Counsel for Jones

then requested and received from us a limited remand for the district court to address

Jones’s competency and to determine whether a guardian ad litem for Jones should be

appointed. The district court held a two‐day competency hearing (which Jones was

physically unable to attend), received evidence from a psychiatrist who evaluated Jones,

conducted an in‐camera proceeding at Jones’s nursing home, and considered the

records from Jones’s state proceedings. Like the state court, the district court concluded

that Jones lacked the capacity to make legal decisions on her own behalf and the court

found that a guardian ad litem should be appointed for Jones. The court did not take

Case: 15-1823 Document: 36 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 5
Nos. 12‐2094 & 15‐1823     Page 3

that final step because it fell outside the scope of the limited remand. But it noted that

Griggs was willing to serve that role and that neither party had identified another

“viable candidate.”

The case has now returned to us, where we must decide whether Key can sue on

Jones’s behalf. Counsel for both Jones and Key have moved to withdraw. Jones’s

attorney asserted that, because no representative had been appointed to make legal

decisions for Jones, he did not have a competent client to represent. We granted that

motion. Key’s attorney also moved to withdraw, citing an irreconcilable breakdown in

communications with Key. We granted that motion, too, but recruited another attorney

for Key. When months later that new attorney asked to withdraw for the same reason,

we released the attorney and ordered Key to show cause why he has standing to pursue

this appeal on behalf of Jones. He has failed to make a persuasive case.

Key asserts that he may act as Jones’s next friend because he has a significant

relationship with her, thus satisfying a requirement for acting as next friend.  

See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990); T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893,

897 (7th Cir. 1997). But even if we assume that Key—who is Jones’s ex‐stepfather—

meets the “substantial relationship” requirement to act as next friend, he is not a lawyer

and thus cannot represent Jones as next friend without counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;

FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining rule

prohibiting next friend from litigating pro se on behalf of another); Navin v. Park Ridge

Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001) (forbidding non‐lawyer parent from

suing without counsel on behalf of child); Lewis v. Lenc‐Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829,

830–31 (7th Cir. 1986) (barring lay advocates). At the outset of this appeal almost three

years ago, we twice warned Key that he needed counsel if he wanted to litigate as a next

friend. He then squandered the chance to proceed with either of the two attorneys

we recruited for him. Because he remains uncounseled, we therefore dismiss Appeal

No. 12‐2094.   

That brings us to Appeal No. 15‐1823, where most of Key’s claims fail for similar

reasons. Key brought 25 claims against 13 defendants, principally alleging that the

defendants unlawfully interfered with his ability to protect Jones’s legal interests. The

district court dismissed his claims largely for lack of standing and failure to state a

claim for relief. As discussed above and observed by the district court, as a non‐lawyer

Key cannot litigate claims on behalf of Jones. So we address only those claims that allege

harm to Key personally.

Case: 15-1823 Document: 36 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 5
Nos. 12‐2094 & 15‐1823     Page 4

Key generally alleges that, by caring for Jones, the defendants have interfered

with his constitutional right to associate freely with her. The Constitution prohibits the

government from barring one’s right to “enter into and maintain certain intimate

human relationships.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).

Protected relationships are limited to “those that attend the creation and sustenance of a

family.” Id. at 619. Even if we assume that Key’s and Jones’s relationship fits that

description, Key appears to object only to his inability to make decisions for Jones; he

does not plausibly allege that the defendants have prevented him from maintaining his

own relationship with her. The district court correctly concluded that Key failed to state

a claim for relief.  

Key also presses a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, alleging that the defendants engaged in a

pattern of fraudulent conduct, including attempts to intimidate him and to interfere

with his proceedings in federal court. But to maintain a civil RICO claim, Key must

allege an injury to his business or property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Fiala v. B & B Enters.,

738 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2013). He has not and thus fails to state a claim for relief.    

Lastly, we address Key’s state‐law claims for negligent infliction of emotional

distress and invasion of privacy. Key alleges that he suffered extreme emotional distress

after visiting Jones at her nursing home and observing that, at some time during his

absence, Jones had suffered “horrendous injuries” as a result of neglect and drugging

allegedly at Griggs’s direction. And when he visited Jones, Key adds, employees at the

nursing home insisted on remaining in the room, thereby, he contends, invading his

privacy.  

Indiana provides relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress under two

theories: the modified‐impact rule and the bystander rule. Johnson ex. rel. Ind. Dep’t of

Child Servs. v. Marion County Coroner’s Office, 971 N.E.2d 151, 159–60 (Ind. Ct. App.

2012). Key fails to state a claim for relief under either theory. Key cannot succeed under

the modified‐impact rule because he has not alleged or argued on appeal that he was

“present at the scene of the injury‐producing event” from which he was “directly

impacted in a physical manner.” Perkins v. Stesiak, 968 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. Ct. App.

2012). The bystander rule, on the other hand, allows a plaintiff to recover if he “actually

witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with

a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent,

grandchild, or sibling caused by the defendant’s negligent or otherwise [tortious]

conduct.” Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000). But even if we assume that

Case: 15-1823 Document: 36 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 5
Nos. 12‐2094 & 15‐1823     Page 5

Key’s relationship with Jones meets the relationship standard, Key has not alleged or

suggested on appeal that he visited Jones at or “soon after” the moment of any alleged

tortious conduct. See Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ind. 2007). Key has therefore

not alleged a claim for relief under either theory.  

As for invasion of privacy, Indiana recognizes four injuries that may be alleged,

the only one relevant here being intrusion upon seclusion. See J.H. v. St. Vincent Hosp.

& Health Care Ctr., Inc., 19 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But this tort is actionable

only if there is an intrusion into the plaintiff’s private physical space, like his home or

body. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991); Curry v. Whitaker, 943 N.E.2d

354, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Key’s inability to visit Jones alone without supervision at

her nursing home does not meet that standard.   

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments in Appeals Nos. 12‐2094 and 15‐1823.

We also DENY Key’s motion to intervene in Appeal No. 12‐2094.  

Case: 15-1823 Document: 36 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 5