Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00134/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00134-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA BLAIR, DIANE DEAL, AND

SHANNON COLLINS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13cv134-MMA (WVG)

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’

ATTORNEYS’ FEES INCURRED

IN RESPONDING TO

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO

DISCOVERY ORDER

[Doc. No. 93]

vs.

THE CBE GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.

On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this putative class action against

Defendant for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §

227, et seq. (“TCPA”). On June 30, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Statement For

Determination of Discovery Dispute regarding Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiffs’

Discovery - Set Two. See Doc. No. 91. On July 2, 2014, United States Magistrate

Judge William V. Gallo issued an order ruling on the discovery disputes. See Doc.

No. 92. Defendant CBE Group objected to Judge Gallo’s order on multiple grounds

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

See Doc. No. 93. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, in which they also sought attorneys’

fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for fees incurred in responding

to Defendant’s objections. 

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On August 15, 2014, the Court found that Judge Gallo’s July 2, 2014

Discovery Order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, and therefore

overruled Defendant’s objections in their entirety. See Doc. No. 107. However, the

Court deferred ruling on the issue of attorneys’ fees and required the parties to file

supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief, and Defendant

responded. See Doc. Nos. 110, 112. For the reasons stated below, the Court

AWARDS reasonable expenses to Plaintiffs in the amount of $6,495.00. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek expenses in the amount of $13,351 for attorneys’ fees incurred

in responding to Defendant’s objection to Judge Gallo’s July 2, 2014 Discovery

Order.1

 Defendant opposes the request, contending that Plaintiffs’ requested

attorneys’ fees are neither warranted nor reasonable. 

The Court first addresses the propriety of awarding expenses under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for attorneys’ fees that Plaintiffs incurred in responding

to Defendant’s Rule 72(a) Objections.

A. Fed. R. Civ. P 37(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) provides that if the court grants a

motion to compel discovery, it “must” order the non-moving party to pay the

moving party’s “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, the Rule recognizes various exceptions, such as

where the court finds the nonmoving party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection

was substantially justified, or an award of expenses would be unjust. See id.

2

 If the

court denies the motion, it “must” order the moving party to pay the non-moving

party’s reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion unless the motion itself

1

 Plaintiffs do not seek to recover any fees incurred for the underlying motion to compel. 

2

 A third exception that is not applicable here is where “the movant filed the

motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i). 

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was substantially justified or an award of expenses would be unjust. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). Finally, where the court grants in part and denies in part a

motion to compel discovery, the court may “apportion the reasonable expenses for

the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). 

“A request for discovery is ‘substantially justified’ under Rule 37 if

reasonable people could differ on the matter in dispute.” United States EEOC v.

Caesars Entm’t, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 435 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing Reygo Pacific

Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also 8B

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2288 (3d ed. 2010) (“Making a motion, or opposing a motion, is

‘substantially justified’ if the motion raised an issue about which reasonable people

could genuinely differ on whether a party was bound to comply with a discovery

rule.”). The non-moving party bears the burden of demonstrating its conduct was

substantially justified. Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., No. 12-53, 2013 WL 5324787,

at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013). 

As an initial matter, Defendant appears to question the propriety of awarding

attorneys’ fees under Rule 37 because the requested fees concern Plaintiffs’ response

to a Rule 72(a) objection—not the underlying motion to compel. This argument is

unavailing. District courts have routinely awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for fees incurred in responding to a Rule 72(a)

objection. See, e.g., Marrocco v. Hill, 291 F.R.D. 586, 590 (D. Nev. 2013) (holding

“reasonable fees incurred in responding to a Rule 72(a) objection are recoverable

under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)”); MAS, Inc. v. Nocheck, LLC, No. 10-13147, 2011 WL

1135367, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2011) (granting the plaintiff’s unopposed

request for attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the defendant’s Rule 72(a)

objection because “such fees and costs were ‘incurred in making the motion’” under

Rule 37); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-1392, 2010 WL 4117416,

*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) (overruling the defendant’s Rule 72(a) objection and

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referring the matter to the magistrate judge to award the plaintiff attorneys’ fees

incurred in connection with the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s objection);

Catapult Commc’ns Corp. v. Foster, 2009 WL 2707040, *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25,

2009) (holding that “under Rule 37, the fees incurred in responding to Defendant’s

motion for reconsideration are compensable”); Brandon v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No.

07-1256, 2008 WL 2096883, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2008) (awarding the

defendant attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing the plaintiff’s Rule 72(a) objection). 

As another district court explained:

If only the original motion to compel were compensable, the fee-shifting provision of Rule 37 would have little effect. A motion for

reconsideration that attacks the original motion to compel could cost as much or more than the original motion itself; limiting the fees to the

original motion, therefore, would not “deter a party from pressing to a

court hearing frivolous requests for or objections to discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) advisory committee’s note on 1970 Amendments. For

that reason, the Court finds that, under Rule 37, the fees incurred in

responding to Defendant’s motion for reconsideration are compensable.

Catapult, 2009 WL 2707040, *2; see also Marrocco, 291 F.R.D. at 590. Although

Catapult involved a motion for reconsideration, the court’s reasoning is persuasive

in the current context. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s argument, the fact that

Plaintiffs seek only those attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to Defendant’s Rule

72(a) objection does not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 37. 

Defendant next asserts the Court should not award attorneys’ fees because its 

“Rule 72(a) objection was both necessary to preserve Defendant’s interests on

appeal and substantially justified because it raised genuine disputes supported by

evidence and case authority.” Doc. No. 112 at 5. This argument is not well-taken. 

As set forth in detail its August 15, 2014 Order, the Court found Defendant’s

objections were wholly meritless and therefore overruled the objections in their

entirety. See Doc. No. 97. The Court further finds that Defendant’s Rule 72(a)

objections were not substantially justified because there was no “genuine dispute” as

to any of the issues raised, and reasonable people could not differ as to the

appropriateness of the objections. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108

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S. Ct. 2541 (1988). 

Finally, to the extent Defendant asserts that an award of reasonable expenses

under Rule 37 is not appropriate because Plaintiff’s underlying motion to compel

was not granted in full, the Court is not persuaded. Rule 37(a)(5)(C) expressly

authorizes the court to “apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion” where a

court grants in part and denies in part the motion to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(5)(C). Although Plaintiffs move for attorneys’ fees under Rule

37(a)(5)(A)—presumably because Defendant’s objections were overruled in their

entirety—the analysis underlying an award of reasonable expenses pursuant to 

either Rule 37(a)(5)(A) or Rule 37(a)(5)(C) is the same. See Switch Commc’ns Grp.

LLC v. Ballard, No. 11-285, 2011 WL 5041231, *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2011). 

Further, courts have recognized that “the primary difference between these two rules

is that one requires the payment of costs, where the other grants the court discretion

in making such a determination.” Id. at *1. Even assuming the discretionary

standard of Rule 37(a)(5)(C) applies because Plaintiffs’ underlying motion to

compel was granted in part and denied in part, the Court finds that it is appropriate

to apportion reasonable expenses for Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s Rule

72(a) objections. 

B. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek $13,351.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing Defendant’s

Rule 72(a) objection. Defendant opposes the requested amount, asserting that

Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating either the requested

hourly rates or the number of hours are reasonable. 

The parties agree that the Court should apply the lodestar method to determine

reasonable attorneys’ fees in this matter. “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,

363 (9th Cir. 1996). “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

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entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly

rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). To do so, the applicant

“should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Id. 

“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the

award accordingly.” Id.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

The Court first must determine whether the requested hourly rates are

reasonable. “Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that their

requested fees are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services

by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Chaudhry v.

City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). To determine the prevailing market rates, courts should

consider “the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to

that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar

complexity.” Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.

1992), vacated in part on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.

1993). The relevant legal community is “the forum in which the district court sits.” 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2013); see also

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010).

“Importantly, the fee applicant has the burden of producing ‘satisfactory

evidence’ that the rates he requests meet these standards.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at

1206. As both parties in this case acknowledge, the applicant meets this burden by

“produc[ing] satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own

affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984); see

also Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110–11 (“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney[s] and

other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community . . . are satisfactory

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evidence of the prevailing market rate.”) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in

original). Once the applicant carries his burden of providing satisfactory evidence,

the burden then shifts to the opposing party to rebut such evidence. See id. 

Here, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates as follows: $700 per hour for Mr. Campion,

$425 per hour for Ms. Wood, $400 per hour for Ms. Gallucci, and $290 per hour for

Mr. Houchin, a law clerk. Only Ms. Wood has filed a declaration in support of

Plaintiffs’ requested hourly rates.3

 See Doc. No. 110-1. Ms. Wood graduated law

school in 2009 and has been practicing law in California since 2010. Her practice

has focused on consumer advocacy since joining the Law Offices of Ronald A.

Marron in September 2012. Mr. Campion has been practicing law since 1977 and is

the sole principal in his law firm, Law Office of Douglas J. Campion. Mr. Campion

has extensive experience in litigation, which includes over 25 years of experience

litigating class actions. Ms. Gallucci graduated law school in 2012 and was

admitted to practice in California in January 2013. Her practice focuses on

consumer fraud cases, including violations of the TCPA as well as food, drug, and

cosmetic cases. Finally, Mr. Houchin is a third-year law student at Thomas

Jefferson School of Law. He has assisted the firm’s attorneys with prosecuting class

action lawsuits involving the TCPA and California Consumer Legal Remedies Act

for approximately two years. 

In support of their request for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs rely on the declaration

of Ms. Alexis M. Wood, various citations to attorneys’ fees awards of Plaintiffs’

counsel in other cases, excerpts from 2010 and 2011 surveys by the National Law

Journal showing rates for various firms throughout California, and a document

entitled “2014 Report on the State of the Legal Market.” See Doc. No. 110-1. Upon

3

 The other attorneys and law clerk did not file declarations in support of their fee request. Without citing any case law in support of its proposition, Defendant insists the Court should not award the requested fees of Mr. Campion, Ms. Gallucci, or Mr. Houchin on this basis alone. The Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention, but will consider the lack of declarations when determining whether Plaintiffs have met their

evidentiary burden. 

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reviewing the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed

to establish that the requested hourly rates are in line with the prevailing rates in the

Southern District of California for work of similar complexity by attorneys with

comparable skill and reputation. See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1206.

Plaintiffs assert that various courts in this district have already approved the

requested hourly rates, specifically the court in Mason v. Heel, No. 12-3056, 2014

WL 1664271 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014) and this Court’s Order in Nigh v. Humphreys

Pharmacal, Inc., No. 12-2714, 2013 WL 5995382 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013). 

However, the Court finds those cases are distinguishable. In both Mason and Nigh,

attorneys’ fees were awarded in the context of an unopposed motion for final

approval of class settlement, and as part of the settlement, the defendants agreed not

to challenge the amount of attorneys’ fee provided the request did not exceed the

common fund benchmark. See Mason, 2014 WL 1664271, at *6; Nigh, 2013 WL

5995382, at *3. Moreover, neither court made a finding that the requested hourly

rates were reasonable. To the contrary, the court in Mason expressly noted the

requested hourly rates were “slightly inflated.” Mason, 2014 WL 1664271, at *9. 

Plaintiffs also cite to other attorneys’ fees awards in the Southern District in which

courts have approved the hourly rate of $500 for an attorney with 7 years of

experience and $350 for an associate of 3 years of experience. Such awards are

inapposite, however, because Plaintiffs do not assert—and there is no evidence to

support—that Plaintiffs’ counsel are of “reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation” as the attorneys receiving those awards. See Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at

1110–11. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ remaining evidence—the NLJ surveys and a citation to a

case from the Northern District of California—is inapposite for the purpose of

determining reasonable rates in the Southern District of California. See Chaudhry,

751 F.3d at 1110 (“[T]he relevant community is the forum in which the district court

sits.”). The survey lists a spectrum of hourly rates for partners and associates of

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firms in Los Angeles, Irvine, and Riverside. See Doc. No 110, Ex. 2. However,

none of the documents even address rates in San Diego or the Southern District of

California, and therefore are not helpful for establishing the prevailing market rate

within the relevant community. See, e.g., Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523

F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding error where the district court neither

identified the relevant community nor explained what the prevailing hourly rate in

that community was “for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation”). In all, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to carry

their burden of providing satisfactory evidence that the requested rates are in line

with the prevailing market rates for similar work by comparable attorneys in the

Southern District of California. 

Thus, the Court must determine what constitutes reasonably hourly rates for

Plaintiffs’ counsel in this proceeding. In making this determination, the Court

considers the relevant Kerr factors.4 See Davis, 976 F.2d at 1546 (finding that

district courts may consider the Kerr factors in determining an appropriate market

rate). Here, while Plaintiffs’ briefs were well-written and thorough, Plaintiffs

acknowledge that the issues raised in Defendant’s Rule 72(a) Objection were not

complex or novel, but frivolous in nature. See id. at 1545 (“[T]he complexity of

legal work affects the determination of the reasonable rate.”). Further, Plaintiffs’

counsel had ample time to oppose Defendant’s Rule 72(a) Objections, and they were

not substantially precluded from other employment based on this proceeding. Upon

considering these factors, as well as the requested rates, the rates awarded in other

cases, and the Court’s own knowledge and experience of prevailing rates within this

4

 These factors are as follows: 

[T]he novelty and difficulty of the issues involved in a case, the skill

required to litigate those issues, the preclusion of other employment, the customary fee, relevant time constraints, the amount at stake and the

results obtained, the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, the nature and length of their professional relationship with the client, the ‘undesirability’ of a case, and awards in similar suits. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir. 1975). 

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District,5 the Court finds the following hourly rates are in line with the prevailing

market rates in the Southern District of California for attorneys of comparable skill,

level, and experience for work on matters of similar complexity: $400 for Mr.

Campion; $275 for Ms. Wood; and $225 for Ms. Gallucci; and $75 for Mr. Houchin.

2. Reasonable Hours Expended

Plaintiffs request fees based on 34.5 hours of work among three attorneys and

one law clerk. Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that this time was reasonably necessary to

successfully respond to Defendant’s Rule 72(a) objections. Defendant seeks a

reduction in the number of hours reasonably expended, contending many of

Plaintiffs’ entries are duplicates, impermissibly “block” billed, or for clerical work. 

First, Defendant contends Ms. Gallucci billed excessively for spending 3.5

hours drafting the factual background section. The Court disagrees and finds this

entry reasonable. Next, Defendant asserts that Ms. Gallucci and Ms. Wood have

claimed duplicate entries for various tasks, such as reviewing Defendant’s Rule

72(a) Objection, reviewing and editing Plaintiffs’ Opposition, and citation checks. 

Upon extensively reviewing the billing records, the Court finds the entries at issue

are reasonable. In addition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ counsel impermissibly

“block billed” 3.2 hours of time. While the Court recognizes that block billing may

make it difficult to delineate how much time was spent on certain tasks, the entry at

issue does not raise such concerns. See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942,

948 (9th Cir. 2007). Ms. Wood appears to have grouped multiple aspects of a single

task—drafting the argument section—and the Court finds the entry is not excessive

or unreasonable. See Sunstone Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Alameda Cnty. Med. Ctr.,

646 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (recognizing block billing is

5 See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Other circuit courts have held that judges are justified in relying on their own knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper fees. . . . We agree. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion either

by relying, in part, on its own knowledge and experience, . . .”) (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). 

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permissible where it “involves the grouping of highly related tasks that rarely cover

more than a few hours”); see also Campbell v. Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp., 718 F.

Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Lastly, Defendant asserts that the Court should eliminate billing entries that

are for purely clerical tasks. The Court agrees. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d

906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (“When clerical tasks are billed at hourly rates, the court

should reduce the hours requested to account for the billing errors.”); Davis, 976

F.2d at 1543 (“It simply is not reasonable for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly

rate, for tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could perform at a much lower

cost.”). Upon reviewing counsels’ billing records, the Court finds Ms. Wood

performed 0.5 hours of clerical work, Ms. Gallucci performed 1.2 hours; and Mr.

Houchin performed 0.5 hours. The Court therefore reduces the above hours from

counsel’s respective accounts. 

3. Lodestar Calculation6

Taking into account the reductions set forth above, the lodestar calculations

are as follows:

Reasonable

Hourly Rate Hours ReasonablyExpended

Lodestar

Mr. Campion $400 1.7 $400 x 1.7 = $680.00

Ms. Wood $275 11.3 $275 x 11.3 = $3,107.50

Ms. Gallucci $225 8.4 $225 x 8.4 = $1,890.00

Mr. Houchin $75 10.9 $75 x 10.9 = $817.50

Upon summing the individual lodestar amounts, the Court awards Plaintiff

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,495.00. The Court finds that the resulting

$6,495.00 figure is a fair and reasonable apportionment of expenses for Plaintiffs’

6

After making its initial lodestar calculation by multiplying an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, a “court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a ‘multiplier’ based on factors not

subsumed in the initial calculation of the lodestar.” Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Neither party seeks a multiplier, and therefore the Court respectfully declines to apply one. 

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Opposition to Defendant’s Rule 72(a) Objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court AWARDS Plaintiffs $6,495.00 in

attorneys’ fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 16, 2014

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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