Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00677/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00677-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVELLOUS AMIR WARRIOR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FERNANDO GONZALEZ ET AL.,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-00677 CRB

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Marvellous Amir Warrior (“Warrior”), a California state prisoner formerly

incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”), filed the instant civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 2008. In his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Warrior

sues Defendant Fernando Gonzalez and three unnamed officers for monetary damages,

alleging that they singled out Muslim inmates for unclothed visual body cavity searches

before and after Ramadan ceremonies in 2007. See TAC (dkt. 55) ¶¶ 9-18. Warrior brings

an Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Establishment Clause and Free

Exercise claims under the First Amendment, and a Fourth Amendment claim. See TAC ¶¶

24-38. 

Defendant Fernando Gonzalez now moves for summary judgment, arguing that the

strip searches were reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, did not promote

one religion over another, and were required of all inmates at CCI. See Mot. (dkt. 91) at 

13-18. Gonzalez also claims qualified immunity. See id. at 19-21. 

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 Warrior does not allege that the searches involved physical contact. See TAC ¶¶ 12-13. 

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The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Warrior’s Equal Protection and

Establishment Clause claims because he does not offer any admissible evidence that prison

officials treated Muslim inmates differently than inmates of other faiths.

The Court also GRANTS summary judgment on Warrior’s Fourth Amendment and

Free Exercise claims because, even construing the record in Warrior’s favor, Gonzalez is

entitled to qualified immunity. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Posture

After a dismissal, an appeal, a Ninth Circuit remand to this Court, and several rounds

of screening, Warrior filed his TAC on June 24, 2013, with the aid of appointed counsel. 

Warrior listed only Defendant Fernando Gonzalez and three unnamed officers as defendants

in the TAC. On September 12, 2013, Gonzalez filed a motion to dismiss all claims under

Rule 12(b)(6). See Mot. to Dismiss (dkt. 68). On November 20, 2013, the Court dismissed

Warrior’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim, but allowed his First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims to proceed. See Order re: Mot. to Dismiss (dkt.

72). Gonzalez now moves for summary judgment, so the Court construes the record in

Warrior’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

B. Factual Background

During the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in 2007, Muslim inmates at CCI were

subjected to unclothed visual body cavity searches before they were allowed to attend their

religious programming.1

 See Warrior Depo. (dkt. 91-8) 33:6-34:25; Defendant’s Statement

of Undisputed Facts (“DUF”) ¶¶ 18-26. Warrior heard that prison officials subjected inmates

of other faiths to less invasive searches than Muslim inmates. Warrior Decl. (dkt. 92-2) ¶ 6.

Warrior believes that, during Ramadan, Muslims are called upon to exercise personal

restraint, focus on their faith, and fast from dawn until dusk. See Warrior’s Response to

DUF (“Resp. DUF”) ¶ 16. Warrior left his cell each morning and night during Ramadan to

attend ceremonies with other Muslim inmates in the dining hall. See DUF ¶¶ 21-29; Resp.

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DUF ¶¶ 21-29. To get there, the inmates crossed several common areas and the outside yard

after dark, with CCI’s lighting system illuminating their path. See Gonzalez Depo. 12:9-12;

Warrior Decl. ¶ 8. Correctional officers conducted visual body cavity searches before and

after programming. See DUF ¶¶ 21-29; Resp. DUF ¶¶ 21-29. 

Before programming, CCI required Warrior to strip completely naked in his cell and

hand his clothing to a correctional officer for inspection. Id. The officer then conducted an

unclothed visual body cavity search of Warrior’s person. Id. The officer would typically

order Warrior to open his mouth and visually inspect Warrior’s mouth with a flashlight. Id. 

The officer would then order Warrior to bend over and spread his buttocks apart, visually

inspect Warrior’s rectum with a flashlight, and order Warrior to “drop and cough.” Id.

Warrior then dressed and went to services. Id.; Warrior Depo. at 33:6–34:18. 

After programming, Warrior and other inmates were searched again in the dining hall,

sometimes waiting naked for their turn. See DUF ¶¶ 21-29; Resp. DUF ¶¶ 21-29. The

correctional officer then performed substantially the same search with the aid of a flashlight:

Warrior was ordered to open his mouth for a visual inspection, bend and spread his buttocks

apart for a rectal inspection, and “drop and cough.” See id. On numerous occasions, a

female officer provided aerial coverage from an upper level of the dining hall, where she

could see inmates line up and fully disrobe. See Warrior Decl. ¶ 7; Resp. DUF ¶ 30. One

particular female officer sometimes made sexually suggestive gestures with her rifle while

inmates were being strip searched. See id.; Warrior Depo. at 48:7–14; Resp. DUF ¶ 30. 

The searches conducted during Ramadan were more intrusive than those typically

conducted when inmates left the Facility IVA housing unit to go to the dining hall. See

Warrior Decl. ¶¶ 3–6; TAC ¶ 18. During a typical search, inmates were permitted to leave

their boxer shorts and undershirts on, briefly lower their boxers, and “drop and cough,” in a

way that “limited the ability of officers stationed at the table to see [the inmates’] genitals.” 

See id. ¶ 3; see also Warrior Depo. at 56:15–57:20. During Ramadan, CCI personnel

conducted fully unclothed visual body cavity searches, see Warrior Decl. ¶ 6, much like they

did when any inmate left the unit/dining hall area to receive medical services, TAC ¶ 18. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment “is to

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323–24 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the admissible evidence on the record “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict” for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law. Id. at 248–49 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288 (1968)). To determine whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id. at 255,

but need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,” Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, it may rely on the

nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment.” Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. 

III. DISCUSSION

Time and again, the Supreme Court has stressed that prison officials – not the courts –

should make “the difficult judgments” about day-to-day prison operations. Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). And while inmates retain constitutional protections, those rights

are necessarily circumscribed in the prison context. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545

(1979). Even when a prison regulation or practice impinges on an inmates’s constitutional

rights, the regulation will pass constitutional muster so long as it is “reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Those interests include

“deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.” O’Lone v. Estate

of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). 

So for Warrior’s claims to survive summary judgment, he must demonstrate two

things. First, he must show that the unclothed visual body cavity searches before and after

Ramadan services were not reasonably related to a valid penological interest. Second, he

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 It is also hard to argue that Muslim inmates, whose Ramadan services happened before dawn

and after sunset, are similarly situated to inmates of other faiths whose services happened during

daylight hours. See DUF ¶¶ 31, 39.

3

 In fact, the Court allowed Warrior to file additional declarations to substantiate these claims.

See Hr’g Mins. Tr. (dkt. 96) at 2:2-5. Warrior did not file any additional declarations and now must rely

on the existing record. See Warrior Notice Re: Supplemental Evidence (dkt. 97).

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must also show that clearly established law put any reasonable prison official on notice that

the searches fell short of this low bar. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)

(describing qualified immunity analysis). On summary judgment, Warrior may rely only on

admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of Ameica, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Establishment Clause & Equal Protection Claims

Warrior alleges that prison officials subjected Muslim inmates – but not those of other

faiths – to unclothed visual body cavity searches before and after religious programming. He

argues that doing so violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as those inmates were similarly

situated, he would probably be right.

But Warrior has only hearsay evidence to support his allegation of disparate

treatment.2

 Warrior remained in his cell throughout Ramadan and emerged only to attend

nightly religious services. He did not see how prison officials searched non-Muslim inmates. 

Instead, he claims only that some Jewish and Catholic inmates told him that did not have to

undergo unclothed visual body cavity searches to attend religious services. See Warrior

Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6; Warrior Depo. at 24:2–30:24. And while Warrior could testify about what he

himself saw and experienced, he may not rely on hearsay statements from unnamed inmates

to survive summary judgment.3

 Orr v. Bank of Ameica, 285 F.3d 764, 774. Because Warrior

does not have any admissible evidence that different faiths were treated differently, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment on his Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims.

B. Fourth Amendment & Free Exercise Claims

Warrior also alleges that the Ramadan searches were different from his own usual

experience. Although “inmates were routinely subjected to visual body cavity strip searches”

when they traveled outside the “area containing the inmate cells and [dining] hall,” prison

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officials usually conducted less-invasive searches when inmates moved about within this

area. See TAC ¶ 18. But because the Ramadan services happened in the dining hall, Warrior

argues that the more invasive searches were unnecessary and therefore violated his Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable searches and his First Amendment right to religious

Free Exercise. TAC ¶ 18, 24-27, 36-38. 

Even if that were so, Warrior cannot overcome qualified immunity. The Supreme

Court has “repeatedly” told courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of

generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). In an excessive force case, for

example, it is not enough to say that the Supreme Court has long held that “deadly force is

only permissible where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a

threat of serious physical harm.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam)

(citation omitted). The critical question is instead “whether the violative nature of particular

conduct is clearly established.” Id. Here, Warrior argues that the Court should deny

qualified immunity because the Supreme Court has long held that “prison policies that

infringe upon constitutionally protected rights must be [reasonably] related to legitimate

penological interests.” Opp’n at 15. That will not do. 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), directs courts to apply the same test to both

Fourth Amendment and Free Exercise claims in the prison context. Any action by a prison

that impinges on a constitutional right – under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, or

otherwise – will be valid so long as it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Id. at 89. Courts therefore look to “1) the existence of a valid, rational

connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put

forward to justify it; 2) the existence of alternative means of exercising the right that remain

open to prison inmates; 3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right

will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;

and 4) the absence of ready alternatives as evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation.” 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts confronted with Fourth

Amendment claims must also consider “(1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the

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manner in which it is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating it, and (4) the place in

which it is conducted.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir.

2011) (citations omitted). 

Doctrinal intricacies aside, the bottom line for qualified immunity here is simple:

unclothed visual body cavity searches in prison are almost always “reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests” in discovering hidden weapons and contraband. See

Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 336. For example, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), allowed

a prison to require inmates “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a

strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution”

because prisons are “fraught with security dangers.” See id. at 558-60. Florence v. Bd. of

Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), allowed a jail to require arrestees headed to the

jail’s general population “to remove their clothing” and then “lift [their] genitals, turn

around, and cough in a squatting position.” Id. at 1513-14. The Court had no problem that

the searches occurred “regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or

the detainee's behavior, demeanor, or criminal history.” Id. at 1514. And, most relevant

here, Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988), allowed prison officials to

conduct strip searches “every time” an inmate left or returned from the high-security unit

housing inmate cells, or moved within the unit under escort. Id. at 329-30; see also May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (1997). It also held that “exposing unclothed male inmates” to

female guards posed no constitutional problem. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 329-30.

Against this array of green lights, Warrior has Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept.,

629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). There, a female prison guard frisked a male inmate in his

boxer shorts, which required her to move his “penis and scrotum out of the way” and apply

pressure to search the surrounding area. Id. at 1137. She then “placed her hand at the bottom

of Byrd’s buttocks,” “ran her hand up to separate the cheeks while applying slight pressure,

to search for contraband inside his anus.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that this search was

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1147. And while other circuits agree that

cross-gender body cavity searches are unconstitutional, see id. at 1144-46 (collecting cases),

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 However deplorable it was for the female guard to make sexually suggestive gestures during

these searches, that conduct cannot be attributed to Defendant Gonzalez. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500

F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007). So, even if her actions made otherwise reasonable searches unreasonably

“harassing” under the Fourth Amendment, see Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332, it makes no difference

here. 

5

 At bottom, Warrior simply alleges that prison officials used an objectively reasonable search

to discriminate against Muslim inmates. But subjective intentions – however nefarious – play “no role”

in the Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). And, whatever

their role otherwise, a “naked assertion” of nefarious intent – without more – will not survive a motion

to dismiss, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007), let alone summary judgment.

That is all Warrior has left. See supra at 5.

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they have little bearing on this case. Warrior complains of non-contact body cavity searches

performed by male guards, with some “casual observation” by female guards – searches that

courts regularly uphold, see, e.g., Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 334.4

 And even if Byrd were

on-point, the Ninth Circuit decided it in 2011, well after the events at issue here.

In short, a reasonable prison official could arguably have concluded that unclothed

visual body cavity searches conducted by male guards every time male inmates left their cells

were constitutional – at least in a high security facility like Warrior’s. Clearly established

law in 2007 under Bell and Michenfelder gave no hint that limiting such searches to when

inmates would be out after-hours would transform an otherwise reasonable search into an

unreasonable one – however bright the prison’s lights, Opp’n at 10, and whatever the

disparate impact on inmates whose religious accommodation required “twice traversing

multiple common areas and the outside yard” at night, see Gonzalez Depo. 12:9-12. This is

all the more true given that Warrior went through the same search to pray that all inmates

went through to see a doctor. TAC ¶ 18.5

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on Warrior’s Fourth

Amendment and Free Exercise claims on the basis of qualified immunity. As to both claims,

the Court expresses no opinion about whether a constitutional violation occurred. See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Fernando Gonzalez’s

motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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