Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05015/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JONATHAN I. GUZMAN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JIM ROBERTSON, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 18-05015 EJD (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; DIRECTIONS 

TO CLERK 

 Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

challenging his state conviction. (Docket No. 1.) Finding the petition stated cognizable 

claims, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted.1

 

(Docket No. 5.) Respondent filed an answer on the merits. (Docket No. 10.) Petitioner 

did not file a traverse although given an opportunity to do so. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in Santa Clara County Superior Court of first 

 

1 The matter was reassigned to this Court on December 4, 2018. (Docket No. 8.)

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degree murder, (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187, 189); the jury also found true allegations that he 

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, (Cal. Pen. Code § 

12022.53(d)), and that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang, 

(Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)(C)). (Ans. Ex. 1, Volume 3 Clerk’s Transcript (3 CT) at 

553, 555-557, 560.2

) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years to life for first degree murder and 25 

years to life for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 50 years to life in prison. (3 CT 

589-592; Ex. 2, Volume 7 of Reporter’s Transcript (7 RT) at 1497.) An additional ten 

years for the gang enhancement was stayed. (Id.) 

On April 14, 2015, the California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment of 

conviction. (Docket No. 1-2 at 147-156.3

) Petitioner sought review on the two issues 

raised in this action: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the gang 

enhancement; and (2) whether his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 

(Docket No. 1.) The California Supreme Court granted review on the cruel and unusual 

punishment issue and deferred the case until resolution of other pending cases raising the 

same issue. (Ex. 3, appellate court docket sheet.) The California Supreme Court 

ultimately remanded the case to the appellate court for consideration in light of its decision 

in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284 (2016). (Ex. 3; Docket No. 1-2 at 89.) 

On remand, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief conceding that he did not need to 

be resentenced. (Docket No. 1-2 at 166.) On April 18, 2017, the California Court of 

Appeal issued a new opinion rejecting the gang enhancement issue, finding the cruel and 

unusual punishment issue moot in light of new state legislation, and remanding the case to 

the trial court for a determination of whether Petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity 

to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. 

 

2

 All references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by Respondent in support 

of the answer, unless otherwise indicated. (Docket Nos. 11-1 through 11-4.) 

3 The California Court of Appeal’s opinions on appeal (initial appeal and on remand) were 

attached to the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Docket No. 1-2 at 147-156, Docket No. 

1-2 at 171-181, respectively.)

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(Docket No. 1-2 at 88.) Petitioner again sought review on the gang enhancement issue. 

(Docket No. 1-2 at 69.) On June 28, 2017, the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied review. (Ex. 3 at 5.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on August 16, 2018. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal on 

direct appeal after remand: 

The Shooting

At approximately 5:00 p.m. on January 21, 2011, Hugo Gutierrez 

rode a bicycle on Capitol Expressway in San Jose. Defendant, who was 

also riding a bicycle, followed Gutierrez. Defendant pointed a gun at 

Gutierrez and fired. Gutierrez got off his bicycle, ran toward a restaurant, 

and fell down outside the restaurant. Defendant jumped off his bicycle and 

walked toward Gutierrez. Gutierrez attempted to stand up, but he lost his 

footing. Gutierrez put up his hands in an effort to shield himself, and he 

screamed for help. Defendant began “rapidly firing” the gun at Gutierrez. 

Gutierrez was “just lying there” on the ground, and defendant fired multiple 

shots at him. Defendant then jumped on his bicycle and rode away. 

Gutierrez suffered gunshot wounds on his chest, abdomen, arms, and 

legs. One of the bullets struck Gutierrez’s heart, and it killed him. 

Gang Evidence

At the time of the shooting, defendant was a member of Kollmar 

Vago Trece (hereafter “KVT”), a Sureño street gang. Gutierrez was a 

member of Just Busting Funk (hereafter “JBF”), a Norteño street gang. 

There is a longstanding rivalry between Sureño gangs and Norteño gangs. 

Gang Detective Carlos Garcia testified as an expert in “Hispanic 

criminal street gangs, specifically KVT.” His expertise was based on the 

following: academic training regarding criminal street gangs; four and a 

half years of patrolling the streets of San Jose, including gang areas; contact 

and conversations with 250 gang members and affiliates, including KVT 

members; regular conversations with gang detectives and homicide 

detectives, including conversations regarding the operations of KVT; and 

conversations with agents from other law enforcement agencies. 

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Detective Garcia opined that, as of January 21, 2011, the primary 

activities of KVT were assaults with deadly weapons and firearms 

possession as prohibited by former section 12025. He explained that KVT 

members engaged in those activities “regularly” and on a “consistent 

basis,” not just occasionally. His opinion regarding the primary activities 

of KVT was based on conversations with gang members, conversations 

with other law enforcement officials, and prior police documentation. 

Detective Garcia described prior crimes committed by KVT 

members. On July 15, 2010, two KVT members were in a car, and they 

possessed a sawed-off shotgun and shotgun ammunition. A KVT member 

committed assault with a deadly weapon, a stabbing with a knife, on 

November 20, 2008. Detective Garcia explained that “violence is very 

important in the gang world,” that gang members “must show a reputation 

of being violent and powerful,” and that gangs gain power and respect 

through violence. 

Detective Garcia opined that defendant killed Gutierrez for the

benefit of KVT. He explained that Gutierrez was a Norteño gang member, 

and he was riding his bicycle in KVT territory. Gutierrez’s conduct was the 

“ultimate form of disrespect in gang culture.” Gang members retaliate 

against such disrespect with “public acts of violence.” Defendant’s “very 

public” act of violence increased KVT’s power and influence because it 

showed that KVT members would “do whatever is necessary” to protect 

their territory. 

 

People v. Guzman, No. H039286, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2017) (Docket No. 

1-2 at 171-181) (hereinafter “Op.”). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). The writ may not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly”; rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable. Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Furthermore, the federal habeas court must 

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the 

petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of 

the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a 

state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the 

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be 

“reasonably” applied. Id. 

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 Here, as noted above, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. See supra at 2; (Ex. 3). The California Court of Appeal, in its opinion 

on direct review on remand, addressed all the claims raised in the instant petition. (Docket 

No. 1-2 at 171-181.) The Court of Appeal thus was the highest court to have reviewed 

those claims in a reasoned decision, and it is the Court of Appeal’s decision that this Court 

reviews herein. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192-93 (2018); Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005); Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2013). 

B. Claims and Analysis 

 Petitioner raises the following grounds for federal habeas relief: (1) there was 

insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement; and (2) his sentence constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) 

1. Insufficient Evidence 

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement 

under Cal. Penal Code § 186.22. (Pet. at 5, 9.) Specifically, Petitioner challenges whether 

there was sufficient evidence that KVT members consistently committed crimes for 

purposes of the “primary activities” element of the enhancement. (Id.) 

The state appellate court rejected this claim on direct appeal: 

In order to prove the gang enhancement, the prosecution had to 

present substantial evidence establishing that KVT was a “criminal street 

gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 

1221 (Vy).) Section 186.22 defines that term as “any ongoing organization, 

association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 

having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the 

criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31) to 

(33), inclusive, of subdivision (e), having a common name or common 

identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively 

engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.” (§ 186.22, 

subd. (f).) “Therefore, the ‘criminal street gang’ component of a gang 

enhancement requires proof of three essential elements: (1) that there be an 

‘ongoing’ association involving three or more participants, having a 

‘common name or common identifying sign or symbol’; (2) that the group 

has as one of its ‘primary activities’ the commission of one or more 

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specified crimes; and (3) the group’s members either separately or as a 

group ‘have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.’” (Vy, supra, 

122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) 

Here, Detective Garcia opined that the primary activities of KTV 

were assaults with deadly weapons and firearms possession in violation of 

former section 12025. Defendant does not dispute that those offenses are 

qualifying crimes enumerated in section 186.22, subdivision (e). Rather, he 

contends that there was insufficient evidence that KVT members 

consistently committed those crimes. 

“The phrase ‘primary activities,’ as used in the gang statute, implies 

that the commission of one or more of the statutorily enumerated crimes is 

one of the group’s ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations. [Citation.] That 

definition would necessarily exclude the occasional commission of those 

crimes by the group’s members.” (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 316, 323.) “Sufficient proof of the gang’s primary activities might 

consist of evidence that the group’s members consistently and repeatedly 

have committed criminal activity listed in the gang statute. Also sufficient 

might be expert testimony....” (Id. at p. 324, italics in original.) 

“[E]vidence of either past or present criminal acts listed in subdivision (e) 

of section 186.22 is admissible to establish the statutorily required primary 

activities of the alleged criminal street gang.” (Id. at p. 323.) The jury may 

“consider the circumstances of the charged crimes on the issue of the 

group’s primary activities.” (Id. at p. 320.) 

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecution presented 

substantial evidence in support of the primary activities element of the gang 

enhancement. Detective Garcia opined that KVT members committed 

assaults with deadly weapons and committed firearms possession in 

violation of former section 12025 “regularly” and “on a consistent basis.” 

He had an adequate basis upon which to base his opinion: his opinion was 

based on conversations with KVT members and members of other gangs, 

regular conversations with other law enforcement officials, and police 

documentation of KVT activities. (See Vy, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1223, fn. 9 [a gang expert may give opinion testimony that is based upon 

hearsay, including conversations with gang members and information the 

expert has learned from colleagues and law enforcement agencies].) 

Detective Garcia’s opinion testimony was sufficient to establish the 

primary activities element of the gang enhancement. Other evidence, 

however, bolstered his opinion. The prosecution presented evidence of 

crimes committed by KVT members between 2008 and 2011: a stabbing in 

2008, possession of a sawed-off shotgun in 2010, and defendant’s use of a 

gun to kill Gutierrez in 2011. Detective Garcia also testified that “violence 

is very important in the gang world,” and he explained that gang members 

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must engage in violence in order to gain power and respect. The evidence 

of KVT’s crimes between 2008 and 2011, combined with Detective 

Garcia’s testimony regarding the importance and necessity of violence in 

gang culture, strongly suggested that KVT members consistently and 

repeatedly committed assaults with deadly weapons and possessed firearms 

in violation of former section 12025. Accordingly, based on the totality of 

the foregoing evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the primary activities element of the gang enhancement. (See 

People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330 [sufficient evidence 

established the primary activities enumerated in section 186.22 and the 

charged offense was consistent with the expert’s testimony].) 

Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

primary activities element because Detective Garcia “offered no evidence 

of the number” of times KVT members committed assaults with deadly 

weapons and possessed firearms in violation of former section 12025. 

Defendant emphasizes that Detective Garcia did not provide “meaningful 

numbers that would allow the jury to reach an informed conclusion.” 

Defendant’s argument is unconvincing. Defendant concedes that no 

authority requires an expert to state the specific number of times a gang has 

engaged in its primary activity. Moreover, although it might have been 

helpful to the jury if Detective Garcia had provided specific numbers, we 

cannot conclude that [] such testimony was necessary here. As explained 

above, we believe that the totality of the evidence provided an adequate 

basis for the jury to conclude that KVT members consistently and 

repeatedly committed assaults with deadly weapons and possessed firearms 

in violation of former section 12025. We therefore must conclude that 

sufficient evidence supported the primary activities element of the gang 

enhancement. 

(Op. at 5-7.) 

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Supreme Court has emphasized 

that sufficiency of the evidence types of “claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (finding that 

the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979)] when it engaged in 

“fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the evidence was insufficient to support 

petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction 

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does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Coleman, 

566 U.S. at 656 (“the only question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s finding of guilt] 

was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality”). The federal court 

“determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338; 

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); Bashor v. 

Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). 

The state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. It first 

reviewed the three elements necessary for proving the gang enhancement under Penal 

Code section 186.22. See supra at 6. Then it reviewed the definition of “primary 

activities” under state law and what type of evidence would be sufficient to establish 

primary activities, which included expert testimony. Id. at 7. Lastly, the state court 

reviewed the evidence in support of the primary activities element: the prosecution’s 

expert witness opined that KVT members committed qualifying crimes “regularly” and 

“on a consistent basis”; the expert’s opinion was credible because it was based on 

conversations with KVT members, members of other gangs, and with other law 

enforcement officials, as well as police documentation of KVT activities; the expert also 

testified that “violence is very important in the gang world” in order for gangs to gain 

power and respect; and lastly, the expert’s testimony was bolstered by evidence of other 

crimes involving assaults with deadly weapons and possession of firearms committed by 

KVT members between 2008 and 2011. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Respondent, it was reasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that, 

“based on the totality of the foregoing evidence,” there was sufficient evidence to support 

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the primary activities element of the gang enhancement. Id. at 8. Furthermore, it matters 

not that the prosecution’s expert witness did not present “meaningful numbers that would 

allow the jury to reach an informed conclusion.” Id. This Court need only determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. On this record and weight of 

evidence, the Court is not persuaded that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a due process violation. See Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner’s second claim is that his sentence of 50 years to life constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Pet. at 5.) Respondent 

asserts that although Petitioner fairly presented the Eighth Amendment issue in his first 

petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which granted review and remanded 

the case to the appellate court for consideration in light of Franklin, (Op. at 7-10), he did 

not re-raise the issue in his second petition for review after the appellate court issued its 

second opinion. (Ans. at 7, fn. 7.) While it is somewhat unclear whether the claim is 

exhausted, Respondent asserts that it clearly may be denied as meritless for the reasons 

explained in their answer. (Id., citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).) Petitioner has filed no 

traverse in response. 

As discussed by the state appellate court, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), that a mandatory sentence of life without possibility 

of parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of the crime violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (Op. at 8.) In 

response to Miller, the California Legislature passed new legislation, including Cal. Penal 

Code § 3051, which requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender 

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parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration, at 

which the juvenile’s diminished culpability due to youth shall be given great weight. (Id.) 

Accordingly, in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th at 276-277, the California Supreme Court 

held that the new laws rendered moot any claim that a lengthy sentence for a juvenile 

violates Miller. (Op. at 8-9.) On remand, the state appellate court in Petitioner’s case 

followed Franklin in finding the cruel and unusual punishment claim moot and remanded 

the case to the trial court to ensure that Petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to 

make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. (Id. 

at 9-10.) 

Respondent first asserts that habeas relief is unavailable because the Supreme Court 

has not clearly established that a juvenile sentence other than life without the possibility of 

parole violates the Eighth Amendment. (Ans. at 8.) The Court agrees. The Supreme 

Court’s holding in Miller was narrow, and specifically found that only “mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” 567 U.S. at 464 

(emphasis added). Therefore, as Respondent asserts, for this Court to find that Petitioner’s 

sentence of 50 years to life is the “functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence” as 

Petitioner contends, (Ex. 3 at 36), would amount to an extension of clearly established law 

in Miller, which is unavailable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004) (“if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to 

the facts at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the statecourt decision.... Section 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas courts introduced 

rules not clearly established under the guise of extension to existing law.”) This 

conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 

F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016), which rejected a claim that two consecutive terms of 25 years to 

life violates Miller because the sentence was the functional equivalent of mandatory lifewithout-parole sentence. Rather, the Ninth Circuit determined that there was a reasonable 

argument that petitioner’s sentence, which was not a life-without-parole sentence, was not 

contrary to Miller because it still allowed for the possibility of parole. Id. at 1076-77. 

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Secondly, the state appellate court reasonably determined that this claim was 

rendered moot since the passage of § 3051 effectively converted Petitioner’s life sentence 

to one with the possibility of parole. Since Demirdjian,4

 the Ninth Circuit has specifically 

recognized that states may remedy a Miller violation with legislation permitting a juvenile 

offender to be considered for parole, and that § 3051(b)(4) “effectively moots a Miller 

claim by converting a juvenile’s LWOP sentence into one for life with the possibility of 

parole after 25 years.” Bunn v. Lopez, 740 Fed.Appx. 145, 147 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, 

Petitioner conceded in his post-Franklin brief that resentencing was unnecessary in light of 

the new California laws. (Docket No. 1-2 at 166.) 

Based on the foregoing, the state court’s rejection of this Eighth Amendment claim 

as moot was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief on this claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the 

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED. 

 Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may 

not appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a 

 

4 In Demirdjian, the appellate court noted the recent enactment of § 3051 but found that 

because the new authority would not change its holding, the court would neither rely on it 

nor decide whether § 2254(d)(1) permits it to do so. 832 F.3d at 1077, fn. 13.

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of 

Respondent, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

P:\PRO-SE\EJD\HC.18\05015Guzman_denyHC 

10/31/2019

Case 5:18-cv-05015-EJD Document 12 Filed 10/31/19 Page 13 of 13