Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04562/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04562-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PETER LEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE 

GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04562-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STAY

[Re: ECF No. 13]

Defendants Hertz Corporation and its subsidiary, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, move 

to stay this matter pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 

1892 (2015). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs Peter Lee and Latonya Campbell filed a putative class action complaint in 

California Superior Court, County of San Francisco, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated 

persons against Defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 

U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. See generally Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1, Exh. 1). Lee and 

Campbell each allege that, in the course of the hiring process, Defendants failed to give them a 

consumer credit disclosure statement “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure,” as 

required under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Id. ¶¶ 107–10. They also allege that Defendants 

rescinded their conditional offers of employment following the results of a criminal background 

check, without giving Plaintiffs notice prior to taking “adverse action,” as required under 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). Id. ¶¶ 100–06. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek only 

statutory and punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) for willful violations of the FCRA. Id.

Prayer for Relief. Defendants removed the case to the Northern District of California on the basis 

of federal question jurisdiction, and now request to stay the matter pending the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Spokeo. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1); Motion to Stay Action Pending Resolution 

Case 5:15-cv-04562-BLF Document 35 Filed 02/26/16 Page 1 of 5
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of Spokeo by U.S. Supreme Court (ECF No. 13). 

In Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that the 

plaintiff there had sufficiently alleged Article III standing by merit of his claims for willful 

violations of the FCRA, regardless of whether he had sufficiently alleged actual harm. Id. at 414. 

The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the following question: 

“Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, 

and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a 

private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 13-

1339, “Question Presented,” available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01339qp.pdf. 

Defendants request that the Court stay the matter because the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo

could deprive Plaintiffs of standing and could therefore deprive this Court of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The Court agrees that staying the matter would be appropriate in this circumstance.

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). A district 

court’s decision to grant or deny a Landis stay is a matter of discretion. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 

398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254). The moving party has the 

burden of proving such a stay is justified. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). 

Determining whether to grant a motion to stay requires the district court to weigh the 

competing interests affected by either granting or denying the motion. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 

F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). The court may “find it is 

efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before 

it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Dependable 

Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Levya v. 

Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Among these competing 

interests are (1) the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, (2) the hardship 

or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and (3) the orderly course of 

justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law 

Case 5:15-cv-04562-BLF Document 35 Filed 02/26/16 Page 2 of 5
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which could be expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. 

Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court finds that the Landis factors weigh in 

favor of staying this action pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo. Contrary to 

Plaintiffs’ assertions, the outcome of Spokeo may have a determinative effect on this Court’s 

jurisdiction over the case. Spokeo will address whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have 

standing to bring this claim, and therefore, whether this Court may continue to hear the matter. 

Should the Supreme Court reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Spokeo, such a decision may 

have serious implications not only for Plaintiffs’ own individual standing, but also for the 

predominance and superiority requirements necessary for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. See

Larson v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2015 WL 3945052, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 

26, 2015). 

Plaintiffs argue that Spokeo bears little on this case because Defendants rescinded their 

conditional offers of employment following the outcome of their criminal background checks. 

Opposition (“Opp.,” ECF No. 15) at 5–7. However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs do not allege 

that the decision to rescind those conditional offers would have been different but for Defendants’ 

non-compliance with the FCRA. For instance, they do not allege that their respective criminal 

background reports contained inaccurate information, nor do they allege that Defendants’ proper 

disclosure and notice would have preserved their conditional offers. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claims 

hinge on the statutory violation of notice and disclosure procedures set forth in the FCRA, Compl. 

¶¶ 100–10, and seek statutory and punitive damages available only under the FCRA, id. Prayer for 

Relief.

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Furthermore, the Court finds that the possible damage which may result from granting the 

stay is minimal. Plaintiffs argue that in the period of months between now and when the Supreme 

 

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Plaintiffs also argue that granting a stay amounts to rewarding Defendants’ efforts at 

“jurisdictional gamesmanship,” since Defendants had removed this case from California Superior 

Court to this Court. This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs, as “the master of the complaint,” 

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002), could have 

avoided federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law, but chose not to do so. See

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Instead, they initiated a cause of action in 

state court based on federal law. See generally Compl. Defendants had simply exercised their 

right to defend Plaintiffs’ federal claim in a federal forum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a). 

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Court decides Spokeo, “such a long period of time” may degrade evidence, as “memories fade, and 

defense witnesses . . . may leave Hertz’s employ or become otherwise unfindable.” Opp. at 10. 

The Court finds this argument unconvincing. The allegations in this litigation primarily concern 

documents regarding Defendants’ compliance or non-compliance with the FCRA. Such 

documentary evidence can be preserved and may be discovered in the due course of litigation. 

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs expect to rely on witnesses, the Court finds that the period of 

several months from now until Spokeo is decided is not substantial, and is unlikely to cause 

material harm. See, e.g., Larson, 2015 WL 3945052, at *8 (staying FCRA litigation pending 

Spokeo, and explaining that “it is implausible that a one-year delay will cause” “witnesses [to] 

become difficult to locate, or [that they] will forget their testimony as their ‘memories fade’”). 

The potential prejudice to Plaintiffs and the putative class is minimal. Plaintiffs seek only 

statutory and punitive damages stemming from Defendants’ conduct. Because this case is in its 

early stages, the deadlines affected by any such stay are few. And, because the Supreme Court 

will likely issue Spokeo within the next several months, the stay would be of a definite and limited 

duration. On the other hand, the potential prejudice to Defendants is significant. If this case were 

to continue, Defendants would be made to defend a nationwide putative class action that could be 

rendered moot. Doing so would require Defendants to undertake significant time, effort, and 

expenses to engage in discovery and potential class certification briefing. Moreover, continuing 

the matter in spite of Spokeo would be an inefficient use of limited judicial resources, as the Court 

would have to review the adequacy of pleadings, resolve discovery disputes, and consider class 

certification in a case that it may not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain. 

For these reasons, the Court agrees with the decisions from courts in this and other districts 

finding that a stay was appropriate pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo. See, e.g., 

Larroque v. First Advantage Lns Screening Sols., Inc., No. 15-CV-04684-JSC, 2016 WL 39787, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016) (staying FCRA matter pending Spokeo); Larson, 2015 WL 3945052, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015) (same); Eric B. Fromer Chiropractic, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. & 

Annuity Corp., No. CV 15-04767-AB (JCX), 2015 WL 6579779, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015)

(same); Stone v. Sterling InfoSystems, Inc., No. 2:15–cv–00711–MCE–DAD, 2015 WL 4602968, 

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at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2015) (same). 

For the foregoing reasons, further proceedings in this Court are hereby STAYED pending 

the Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015). Defendants are 

ORDERED to inform this Court of the status of this case no later than ten (10) days after a 

decision is reached in Spokeo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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