Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01125/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01125-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON ALEXANDER No. 2:11-cv-1125 JFM (PC)

FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

ORDER AND

CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF CORR., 

et al., FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff opposes the

motion. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed July 13, 2011, plaintiff

alleges that on June 7, 2009 he suffered a painful injury to his left hand “ring” finger while

playing basketball at California Correctional Center in Susanville, California (“CCCSusanville”). Plaintiff immediately sought medical attention, but was told by medical staff that

the medical office was closed for the day and that he should “come back tomorrow.” Plaintiff

returned the next day and filled out a medical request form, but was not seen that day and did not

receive a medical ducat. When plaintiff returned to the medical office 10-12 days later to check

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on the status of his medical request, he was informed that his medical request form was lost and

that he needed to fill out another form, which plaintiff filled out. Plaintiff eventually received a

medical ducat on this second medical request form, which was deemed “Routine,” two weeks

later. Finally, over one month after the injury date, on July 10, 2009, plaintiff was seen by a

doctor. 

On July 15, 2009, an x-ray was taken of plaintiff’s finger, which showed a fresh,

partially-healed broken finger. The doctor examining the x-ray told plaintiff that because of the

delay in treatment, the finger had started to heal on its own and there was nothing to be done. 

On July 28, 2009, plaintiff was sent for an orthopedic consultation and was told

that he may need surgery. Plaintiff was referred to a specialist in Reno, Nevada. 

On August 27, 2009, after having not received any update on the treatment for his

finger or medication for pain management, plaintiff filed a third medical request form asking for

the status of his treatment. 

Plaintiff claims that he was ultimately transferred to High Desert State Prison

(“HDSP”) in retaliation for filing grievances related to the delay in treatment. While at HDSP,

plaintiff did receive treatment for his finger and for the first time received medication for pain

management. On October 27, 2009, plaintiff was seen by a doctor who informed him that, in

light of the fact that the finger has already healed, surgery could possibly cause further problems. 

Plaintiff’s finger is now permanently disfigured.

 Plaintiff names as defendants CCC-Suanville’s Chief Medical Officer Andrew

Pomozal, whom plaintiff claims was directly responsible for ensuring that plaintiff’s medical

request forms were processed and not lost; CCC-Susanville Warden R.E. Barnes, who failed to

provide a facility that could provide adequate medical health care and who failed to guarantee

that inmates would have their medical request forms processed on time to ensure their safety;

and Mathew Cate, Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, for

his role in the institution’s overcrowding problem, which resulted in inadequate medical care.

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Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages.

STANDARDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to

dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197 

(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint

must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must

contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). However, “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quoting Bell

Atlantic at 554, in turn quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

On August 20, 2012, plaintiff received the notice required by Wyatt v. Terhune,

305 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.2002), for opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seeks dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff’s First

Amendment retaliation claim fails for failure to exhaust and failure to state a claim; that

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails as to Cate and Barnes; and that plaintiff’s request for

monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities fails pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment.

A. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim

Defendants first seek dismissal of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. In his opposition, plaintiff asserts that he is not making a First

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Amendment claim in this suit. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied as

to this ground.

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

Defendants next seek dismissal of the complaint to the extent it purports to state

claims against defendants Barnes or Cate. 

In this court’s June 27, 2011 screening order, plaintiff was advised that, in order

to establish liability against a supervisor, he must allege facts demonstrating (1) personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895,

915 (9th Cir. 2001); Wesley v. Davis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (C.D. Cal. 2004). The sufficient

causal connection may be shown by evidence that the supervisor implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights. Wesley, 333 F. Supp. 2d

at 892 (internal quotations omitted). However, an individual’s general responsibility for

supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Id.

(internal quotations omitted). 

Supervisor liability under Section 1983 is a form of direct liability. Munoz v.

Kolender, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2002). Under direct liability, plaintiff must

show that each defendant breached a duty to him which was the proximate cause of his injury. 

Id. “‘The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts

by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

However “where the applicable constitutional standard is deliberate indifference, a plaintiff may

state a claim for supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and

acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by others.” Star v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.

2011).

Here, plaintiff has failed to allege personal involvement of these defendants in the

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acts giving rise to the alleged constitutional violation. He does not allege, for example, that

either Barnes or Cate was personally aware of the loss of plaintiff’s first medical request form or

the delay in treatment of plaintiff’s broken finger. Furthermore, there is nothing in the FAC that

connects plaintiff’s general claim that defendants Barnes and Cate oversee poor medical care in

California’s overcrowded prisons with his specific claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated because he received a delay in treatment. Plaintiff's allegations regarding overcrowding

are simply too conclusory to support a claim for relief.1

Accordingly, defendants’ motion should be granted as to this ground.

C. Monetary Damages Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff may not request monetary damages from

defendants in their official capacities. Plaintiff has declared non-opposition with respect to this

argument.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by its own citizens or citizens

of other states in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98

(1984). The Eleventh Amendment bars all suits against states, irrespective of the relief

requested. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996). Additionally, suits

brought against state officials in their official capacities are essentially suits brought against the

state. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, the Eleventh

Amendment also bars suits for monetary damages against state officers in their official

capacities. See id.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s request for monetary damages against any of

the named defendants in their official capacities fails as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a district judge be assigned to this

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 To the extent plaintiff believes he has suffered harm as a result of a violation of an order

issued in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005), he must assert his

claim in Plata via a class representative or obtain permission to intervene. See Eberle v. Doe, 2009

WL 4017130, * 1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2009).

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case; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ April 9, 2012 motion to dismiss be partially granted;

2. Defendants Barnes and Cate be dismissed from this action; and 

3. Plaintiff’s request for monetary damages against defendants in their official

capacities be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 24, 2013.

/014;fern1125.mtd

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