Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00375/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 NORTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD CHRISTOPHER ASHE, # 244457, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

) 2:14cv375-WHA 

KARLA JONES, et al., ) (WO)

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by state inmate Richard Christopher Ashe (“Ashe”) on March 12, 2014.1

Doc. No. 1. Ashe presents claims challenging the constitutionality of his 2005 convictions

in the Circuit Court of Crenshaw County, Alabama, on charges of first-degree sexual abuse

and third-degree assault. The respondents (Doc. No. 7) argue that Ashe’s petition is timeAlthough the petition was stamped as received in this court on May 21, 2014, Ashe 1

represents that he delivered the petition to prison officials for mailing on March 12, 2014. Doc. No.

1 at 15. The reason for the delay between delivery of the petition to prison officials and its receipt

by this court is unexplained. The court will assume that Ashe delivered his petition to prison

officials for mailing on March 12, 2014. See Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th

Cir. 2001) (“Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court]

must assume that [the instant petition] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Ashe] signed it.” 

A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison offials for mailing. See

Barbour v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th

Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. 1993). th

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barred by the one-year federal limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Upon review of 2

the pleadings, evidentiary materials, and applicable law, the court concludes that no

evidentiary hearing is required and that Ashe’s petition should be denied as untimely.

II. DISCUSSION

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) states:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

Subsection (d) was added by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 2

(“AEDPA”). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

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Case 2:14-cv-00375-WHA-SRW Document 11 Filed 10/06/14 Page 2 of 6
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

State Court Proceedings

Exhibits submitted by the respondents reflect that in October 2005, in the Circuit

Court of Crenshaw County, Alabama, a jury found Ashe guilty of first-degree sexual abuse

and third-degree assault. Ex. 1-Vol 1 at 2-4. On December 20, 2005, the trial court

sentenced Ashe to 10 years in prison for the sexual abuse conviction and to six months for

the assault conviction. Id. Ashe appealed, and on June 16, 2006, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed by memorandum opinion. Ex. 5. Ashe applied for rehearing,

which was overruled on July 7, 2006. Exs. 6 and 7. Ashe did not petition the Alabama

Supreme Court for certiorari review, and, on July 26, 2006, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals entered a certificate of judgment in the case. Ex. 8. Thereafter, Ashe filed two

petitions for post-conviction relief under Ala. R. Crim. P. 32 – the first on August 1, 2007,

and the second on August 29, 2012. See Exs. 9 and 15. Relief was denied on both petitions.

Application of Federal Limitation Period

Ashe’s conviction became final on July 26, 2006, the date on which the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals entered its certificate of judgment, concluding direct review. See

Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1299-300 (11 Cir. 2006). As a result, Ashe had until July

th

26, 2007, to file a § 2254 habeas petition that would be considered timely under the one-year

federal limitation period, absent any periods of tolling. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) and

2244(d)(2). Ashe’s two state Rule 32 petitions, however, had no tolling effect in his case,

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as the first of those petitions was filed on August 1, 2007, and the second on August 29, 2012

– both dates that are after July 26, 2007, the date on which the one-year federal limitation

period expired. See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000) (Rule 32 th

petition cannot toll the one-year limitations period under § 2244(d)(2) if that period has

expired prior to filing the Rule 32 petition). Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the oneyear federal limitation period expired on July 26, 2007, and Ashe’s § 2254 petition filed on

March 12, 2014, is untimely.

The statutory tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (B) - (D) do not provide

safe harbor for Ashe. There is no evidence that any unconstitutional or illegal state action

impeded him from filing a timely § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). He

presents no claim that rests on an alleged “right [that] has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Finally, he submits no grounds for relief for which the factual

predicate could not have been discovered at a far earlier time “through the exercise of due

diligence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

The limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart fromthose specified

in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances

that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States,

177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 1999). See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631 (2010). “The burden th

of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.” 

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Case 2:14-cv-00375-WHA-SRW Document 11 Filed 10/06/14 Page 4 of 6
Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). Ashe fails to set forth any th

facts that demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” and the exercise of due diligence to

warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. Consequently, Ashe is not entitled to

equitable tolling.

Ashe argues the federal limitation period does not apply to his § 2254 petition because

he raises a “jurisdictional” claim in his petition that the trial court “allowed him to be

convicted of a charge not contemplated within the original indictment.” See Doc. No. 1 at

5; Doc. No. 9 at 2. If this court were an Alabama court, that argument might have some

force. See, e.g., McNeal v. State, 43 So. 3d 628, 629 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (challenge to

allegedly illegal sentence raised in a Rule 32 proceeding not barred by the statute of

limitations in Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c), because if the sentence is illegal, the sentence exceeds

the jurisdiction of the trial court). However, there is no similar exception to the limitations

period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Thus, Ashe’s jurisdictional claim does not entitle him to any

relief from operation of the federal statutory limitations bar.

Under the circumstances set forth above, it is apparent that the one-year limitation

period in § 2244(d) expired on July 26, 2007. Because Ashe did not file his § 2254 petition

until March 12, 2014, his petition is time-barred and this court may not address the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that the petition

for habeas corpus relief be denied and this case be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.

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Case 2:14-cv-00375-WHA-SRW Document 11 Filed 10/06/14 Page 5 of 6
§ 2244(d).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on

or before October 20, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive,

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court; therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 6 day of October, 2014. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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