Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE B. NORTON, JR., No. CIV.S-05-0639 FCD DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

McDONALD HAMBURGER CORP.,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

This matter is before the court on defendant Thomas

Teague’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary

adjudication. Jason T. Cooksey appeared on behalf of defendant

Thomas Teague at the hearing on the motion on March 3, 2006. James

F. Waite appeared on behalf of defendant McDonald’s Corporation,

which has joined in the motion. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, did

not appear at the hearing or file written opposition to the motion,

which is therefore unopposed. Having considered all written

materials submitted in connection with the motion, and after hearing

oral argument, for the reasons set forth below the undersigned will

Case 2:05-cv-00639-FCD-DAD Document 62 Filed 03/09/06 Page 1 of 8
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recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted and this

action be dismissed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Owen v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992).

The party moving for summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving

party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material

fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of

Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v.

County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1980). The opposing party must demonstrate

that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty 

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th

Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed,

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor

of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); see

also United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 887

(9th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the

air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was intentionally

discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was accused by

employees of a McDonald’s restaurant in Tahoe City, California of

stealing soda and denied service. As previously observed by the

undersigned in connection with defendants’ motion to dismiss, a

liberal construction of plaintiff’s three-page handwritten complaint

reveals causes of action for defamation and violation of his civil

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which creates a federal remedy for

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patrons who have been denied service by a restaurant on the basis of

race. (Findings and Recommendations filed December 14, 2005 at p.

3.)

Defamation 

Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on August 18,

2004. Defendants persuasively argue that plaintiff’s cause of action

for defamation is barred by the applicable one-year statute of

limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(c). 

In light of the somewhat difficult to decipher nature of plaintiff’s

complaint, the undersigned had suggested in addressing defendants’

motion to dismiss that any attempt by plaintiff to state a defamation

claim based on conduct occurring between the parties on August 15,

2004, may be timely. (Findings and Recommendations filed December

14, 2005 at p. 4-6.)

However, at his deposition plaintiff clarified that his

defamation claim arises solely out of events that took place in

August of 2003. While plaintiff could not recall the precise date,

the police report regarding the incident involving plaintiff at the

McDonald’s restaurant in question reflects that it occurred on August

14, 2003, more than a year prior to plaintiff’s filing of his

complaint. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in this regard and

that plaintiff’s defamation cause of action be dismissed as time

barred. 

Finally, in a letter filed with the court after the hearing

on defendants’ motion, plaintiff reiterates his position that his

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 The court finds the other matters addressed in plaintiff’s 1

letter, including the parties’ apparent settlement negotiations,

irrelevant to the resolution of the instant motion. 

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defamation claim is timely because he mailed his complaint to the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California within

the one-year limitations period. The court again finds that argument

unpersuasive for the same reasons set forth in the court’s previous

findings and recommendations addressing defendants’ motion to

dismiss. (Findings and Recommendations filed December 14, 2005 at p.

4.) As explained therein, the complaint was stamped “received” by

the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of California on

August 18, 2004, beyond the applicable limitations period. (Id.) As

the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[p]apers and pleadings including

the original complaint are considered filed when they are placed in

the possession of the clerk of the court.'" Cintron v. Union Pac. R.

Co., 813 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1987)(quoting C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1153 (1969)). See also Ordonez v.

Johnson, 254 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 2001)(complaint is filed when

placed in actual or constructive custody of clerk despite any

subsequent rejection by clerk for non-compliance with local rules).1

Intentional Discrimination

Turning to the § 1981 cause of action, the required inquiry

is governed by the familiar McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting

framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-

03 (1973); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186

(1989), reversed on other grounds by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

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Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991); Doe v.

Kamehameha, Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1036

(9th Cir. 2005). Under that framework, the plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Lindsey v.

SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 432 F.3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2005); Lowe v.

City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985). If the

plaintiff does so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to

articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged

decision. Lindsey, 432 F.3d at 958-59. If the defendant meets that

burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged reason for

the decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory. 

Id. at 959.

The elements of a prima facie case of intentional

discrimination under § 1981 require plaintiff to show that: (1) he is

a member of a protected class; (2) he attempted to contract for

certain services; (3) he was denied the right to contract for those

services; and (4)(a) he was deprived of services while similarly

situated persons outside the protected class were not and/or (b) he

received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which

a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory. Lindsey,

432 F.3d at 959 (adapting the prima facie elements applicable in

cases involving claims of employment discrimination context to claims

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 The precise contours of the fourth element of the required 2

prima facie case is an open question. See Lindsey, 432 F.3d at 959-

60. Out of an abundance of caution, the court has applied the more

relaxed version of the fourth element here which does not necessarily

require a plaintiff to establish the treatment that was accorded to

other customers of the defendant. Id. at 959.

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of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981 as a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit).2

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff is a member of a

protected class. However, plaintiff has simply presented no evidence

that would satisfy the second, third or fourth elements of a prima

facie showing. For this reason alone, defendants’ motion must be

granted.

Despite plaintiff’s failure to make the required prima

facie showing of intentional discrimination, defendants have

nonetheless articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse action of asking plaintiff to leave their restaurant. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that would even suggest that the

reason provided was a mere pretext for intentional discrimination. 

The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was granted access to

and served at the restaurant in question on a number of occasions

leading up to and including the date in question. The evidence

reflects that plaintiff was told to exit the restaurant on the date

in question only after being suspected of stealing soda and pouring

his beverage at the manager’s feet when confronted with that

suspicion. For these reasons as well, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on plaintiff’s cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 should be granted as well. 

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CONCLUSION

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact on any of

plaintiff’s claims and defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and this action be

dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 8, 2006.

DAD:th

Ddad1/orders.prose/norton0639.f&r.msj

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