Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01395/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01395-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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 “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made afer a

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain judicial review of such decision by a civil action . . .

brought in the district court of the United States . . . . The court shall have the power to enter, upon the

pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of

the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

07cv1395 LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA M. LIND

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 07CV1395 LAB (WMC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(1) TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

(2) TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

I. 

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Cynthia M. Lind

brings her motion under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)1

, seeking judicial

review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying her claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff, Ms. Lind, asks

the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision, and to order initiation of benefits pursuant to the

Commissioner adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, which Plaintiff believes is not

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supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. The Commissioner concurrently seeks

summary judgment to affirm the ALJ’s decision.

The Court finds the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument

pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After careful review of the moving and opposition papers, the

administrative record, the facts, and the law, this Court recommends that the Commissioner’s decision

denying disability benefits be UPHELD, that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and

that Defendant’s cross motion to affirm the ALJ decision be GRANTED.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 24, 2004, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits

alleging disability on October 1, 1999, which she later amended to February 2003. Administrative Record

(“AR”) at 15-16, 251. Her application was denied initially and also on reconsideration. AR at 15. On

August 27, 2004, a request for a hearing was timely filed. Id. The ALJ submitted his decision on January

28, 2005, finding that the claimant was only entitled to benefits starting on October 1, 2003, but not prior

to this date. AR at 16, 22. The decision of the Social Security Administration became final when the

Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s findings in a decision dated June 8, 2007. AR at 3-5. 

On July 31, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant complaint pursuant to §405(g) of the Act in order to

obtain judicial review of a “final decision” from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”) denying her claim for DIB under Title II of the Act. Defendant filed an answer to the

complaint on November 8, 2007. 

On March 20, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “PM”) and

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “DM”) on April 18, 2008. Both motions

were found suitable for decision without oral argument, and the hearing set for June 23, 2008 was vacated

by Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. on May 30, 2008. 

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III.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

A claimant is entitled to disability benefits if, considering her age, education and work experience,

she is unable to perform the work she previously performed and also the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months...” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such

work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists

for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation

process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one

determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If she is, disability benefits

are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If she is not, the decision maker proceeds to step two,

which determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” which provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits

your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have

a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age,

education, and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most

jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 (b), 416.921 (b). Such abilities and aptitudes include “[p]hysical functions

such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities

for seeing, hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions”;

[u]se of judgment”; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations”; and

“[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. 

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If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability

claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines

whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (d), 416.920

(d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed

impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is

conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines

whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work she has performed in the past. If the

claimant is able to perform her previous work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e).

If the claimant cannot perform her previous work, the fifth and final step of the process determines whether

she is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of her age, education, and work

experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if she is not able to perform other work. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (f), 416.920 (f). 

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency

decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited. The

Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or

is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a preponderance. Sandgathe

v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health

& Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th

Cir.1985)). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s

decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is inconclusive,

“questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.”

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

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2

 In reference to this time frame, the phrase, “the relevant time period,” will be used

interchangeably.

3

 Plaintiff has already been awarded benefits based on this finding and we will not consider the

severity of Plaintiff’s ailments after October 1, 2003.

5 07cv1395 LAB (WMc)

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the court

must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence

and reaching his or her decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g)

permits a court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administrator for

further proceedings. Id. 

2. The ALJ’s Decision

After weighing the evidence from the administrative record and listening to the testimony of Plaintiff

and the experts, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled during the period from February 1, 2003

to October 1, 20032. However, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the requirements for disability after October 1,

2003.3

 AR at 16. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet or equal any of the listed

impairments during the relevant time period. Id. From February 1, 2003 to October 1, 2003, the ALJ also

found Plaintiff’s impairments did not prevent her from performing past relevant work (Step 4 Analysis),

leading to his conclusion that she was not disabled. Id. In determining the Plaintiff’s residual functioning

capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s limitations and symptoms are in excess of the objective

medical findings and found them not to be credible under a “clear and convincing” standard. AR at 18-19

(ALJ cites nine reasons supporting his position).

During the hearing, the ALJ listened to Dr. Doren, medical expert, testify regarding evidence of

severe impairments to the Plaintiff’s back, spine, and wrist. AR at 17-18. However, considering the

relevant time period, Dr. Doren made a composite RFC assessment that Plaintiff’s impairment would not

preclude her from lifting 20lbs occasionally and 10lbs. pounds frequently. Id. The majority of Dr. Doren’s

assessment comes from reports and objective findings that were made in 2004. AR at 17. Similarly, Mark

Remas, vocational expert, opined that given Plaintiff’s RFC, she could perform past relevant work during

the relevant time period, which included semi-skilled and light level work. AR at 19. 

Based on the ALJ’s own credibility determination of the Plaintiff, substantive evidence evaluation,

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4

 See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

6 07cv1395 LAB (WMc)

testimony from Dr. Doren (medical expert), and Mark Remas (vocational expert), the ALJ concluded that

prior to October 1, 2003, the Plaintiff is not entitled to DIB under sections 216(I) and 223 of the Social

Security Act. AR at 22.

3. Background/ Analysis of the Issues in Dispute

The main issues in contention deal with step 2 and step 4 of the sequential evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 2 evaluates the “severity” of Plaintiff’s impairments. This evaluation

is crucial in determining whether the combination of impairments would rise to the level of a disability.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Step 4 determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant

from performing past relevant work and this evaluation occurs when the impairment is not conclusively

presumed to be disabling. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e). If the claimant is able to perform her

past relevant work, she is not disabled. Id. 

Plaintiff, in her motion for summary judgment, seeks reversal or remand on the grounds that the

ALJ’s decision of Plaintiff’s disabling pain was not based on substantial evidence and did not comport with

the law. PM at 3. The ALJ must engage in a two step analysis to determine the credibility of Plaintiff’s

pain testimony regarding her subjective symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir.

2007). First, the ALJ looks to the objective medical evidence produced by the Plaintiff and the underlying

impairment to determine whether symptoms could reasonably be produced by that impairment. Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Second, if Plaintiff meets the first test, the ALJ must

offer specific, clear, and convincing reasons to reject the Plaintiff’s testimony. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12

F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In addition, the ALJ must identify “what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible”4

 and

“must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the

extent to which the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities.” Social Security

Ruling, No. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (SSA July 2, 1996). When the Plaintiff’s statements are not

substantiated by objective medical evidence, “the adjudicator must make a finding on the credibility of the

individual’s statements based on consideration of the entire case record,” including but not limited to “the

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 Plaintiff’s brief focuses mainly on bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and chronic right ankle

pain. Our analysis will be limited to those main ailments cited by the Plaintiff.

7 07cv1395 LAB (WMc)

medical signs and laboratory findings, the individual’s own statements about the symptoms, any statements

and other information provided by treating or examining physicians . . . about the symptoms and how they

affect the individual, as well as any other “relevant evidence in the case file.” Id. If additional information

is needed to make a credibility assessment, the adjudicator “must make every reasonable effort to obtain

available information that could shed light on the credibility of the individual’s statements.” Id. at *3.

Additional issues the adjudicator “must consider” are the kinds of evidence identified in 20 C.F.R.

404.1529©) and 426.929©), including factors like: Plaintiff’s daily activities, medications for pain, and

“[a]ny other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restriction due to pain or other

symptoms.” Id. Consistency is “[o]ne strong indication of the credibility of an individual’s statements 

. . . .” Social Security Ruling, No. 96-7p, 1996 WL at *5.

On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff testified at the review hearing that she was born on July 31, 1950, and

that she is a high school graduate. AR at 229. Regarding past relevant work, Plaintiff testified to holding

the following positions since 1990: customer service representative and sales specialist (phone and computer

work), extra for t.v. production business, helper at a children’s gym, phone solicitor (selling candles), and

proofreader/ typist (customer service). AR at 66, 229-231, 236. After Plaintiff left her position as customer

service representative and sales specialist, Plaintiff was unable to maintain a job for more than five months.

AR at 66. Plaintiff stated that she was fired from her last job as a proofreader/ typist position because she

was too slow and had only been working three hours a day, two days a week. AR at 231-232. 

Plaintiff alleges disability from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the

cervical spine, osteoporosis of the spine, and chronic right ankle pain. AR at 115, 231, 233-235; PM at 3.5

 Additionally, she asserted her inability to lift more than 5lbs. with both hands and that she was limited to

sitting and standing for no longer than 5-10 minutes. AR at 232. Due to her ailments, Plaintiff mentioned

that she took pain medication daily (up to three times a day). AR at 235. Regarding her daily activities,

Plaintiff stated: that she is limited in driving mainly to the library and grocery store but has difficulty

pushing a shopping cart because of pain in her hands, she has decreased her walking routine because of back

pain, she is unable to clean the house, she is limited to flower gardening, and that she does not have the

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6

 This scenario takes into consideration the amount of time most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Plaintiff mentions that she last swam approximately one month before the hearing and hired someone to

clean the house about a year before the hearing. AR at 233-35.

7

 Analysis will mainly focus on the ALJ’s reasons in issue 6, 8, and 9 with some supporting

arguments regarding issue 1. 

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ability to continue her hobby of swimming. AR at 233-235. The limitations specified by the Plaintiff

according to her pain testimony, manifested approximately one year from the date of the hearing (early

2004).6

 Id. Finally, at the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was scheduled for hand surgery due to her carpal

tunnel syndrome. AR at 237. 

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s pain testimony as it related to the period of February 1, 2003 to October

1, 2003, for the following reasons:

First, during the relevant period, the claimant’s allegations of limitations are not borne out

in her description of her daily activities. For the relevant period, the claimant has not alleged

an inability to care for her personal needs. She testified at the hearing that she was able to

do her house work and other chores, drive, shop, and garden until more recently when she

hired a housekeeper to assist her in her chores. Second, during the relevant period, there is

no evidence the claimant has loss of muscle or atrophy. Third, during the relevant period,

there is no evidence of sleep deprivation secondary to pain. In fact, the claimant is described

as alert, oriented and in no acute distress. Fourth, during the relevant period, there is no

evidence of a severe weight loss due to lack of appetite due to pain. In fact, the claimant is

noted to be well appearing and denies any weight changes. Fifth,, during the relevant period,

there is no evidence the claimant’s medications imposed disabling side effects. Sixth, during

the period February 1, 2003 to October 1, 2003, the evidence establishes the claimant is

capable of light level work, on a sustained basis. Seventh, during the relevant period, no

physician has opined the claimant’s impairments could not be treated with conservative

treatment modalities. Eighth, no physician has opined that during the relevant period, the

claimant is permanently or totally disabled. Ninth, the claimant has allegedly incapacitating

symptoms and limitations. However, during the relevant period, the objective evidence of

record does not reflect the existence of an impairment or combination of impairments which

would have produced the crippling symptoms and limitations alleged by the claimant.

AR at 19 (citations omitted).

Overall, Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s characterization regarding the disabling pain testimony

and ability to perform past relevant work, specifically, reasons 6, 8, and 9.7

 Plaintiff argues that: A) the

ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff could perform the full range of light work activity prior to October 1,

2003; B) the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work prior to October 1, 2003, is

not based upon substantial evidence; C) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff did not suffer from severe

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and chronic right ankle impairment prior to October 1, 2003; D) and the

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8

 Covered in Part B of the analysis.

9

 This is not to say that the Plaintiff’s statements were found to be inconsistent, in actuality, the

Plaintiff’s statements have consistently shown that the severity of her pain symptoms originated after the

relevant time period. Hence, the testimony provided by Plaintiff and the time period do not match up.

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ALJ erred in relying on the testimony of the vocational expert in response to an incomplete hypothetical.

See PM.

A. Whether Plaintiff Could Perform the Full Range of Light Work Activity Prior to

October 1, 2003.

In assessing Plaintiff’s retention of her RFC and ability to perform light work prior to October 1,

2003, the ALJ relied on the testimony of Dr. Doren, medical expert. Shafer v. Barnhart,2005 WL 81637,

at **7 (9th Cir. 2005) (“it is acceptable for the ALJ to rely on a non-treating, non-examining medical

expert's residual functional capacity assessment as long as that opinion is not contradicted by all other

evidence in the record . . . ”) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir.1989). The ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff could perform the full range of light work activity, which the ALJ believed was

further substantiated by the vocational expert8

. AR at 21, 248-49. The expert findings were based on the

objective evidence rendered by both the treating and examining physician’s reports, which the ALJ believed

did not comport with Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. AR at 21. This Court recognizes that Plaintiff has

presented objective evidence, meeting the first part of the subjective pain analysis, however, the objective

evidence combined with the lack of credibility determination9

 made by the ALJ, undermine the second part

of the analysis, which the ALJ has shown by clear and convincing reasons. AR at 18-19, 21. Batson v.

Comm'r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281-82, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

Plaintiff, disagreeing with the ALJ’s assessment, cites a medical report from June 29, 2001, which

shows her pain was rated a 7 out of a 10 point scale and that these symptoms were confirmed by Dr. Cheryl

Patterson when she assessed that Plaintiff had “chronic right wrist and hand pain.” PM at 4. Similarly,

Plaintiff cites progress notes from August 3, 2001 as confirmation of the severity of Plaintiff’s bilateral

carpal tunnel symptoms. PM at 5. Furthermore, Plaintiff concludes that there is a “material conflict”

because the ALJ’s conclusion differs from the medical expert’s opinion and remains unresolved. PM at 8.

Plaintiff suggests that Dr. Doren found lifting of 5 lbs. frequently a reasonable limitation, while the ALJ

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10 Defendant states Dr. Pacelli’s RFC assessment occurred on June 29, 2004 and cites AR at 197-

200. However, the reports are dated September 14, 2004. This inaccuracy however does not undercut

the Defendant’s arguments.

11 Well outside the relevant time period of February 2003 to October 2003.

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concluded from Dr. Doren’s testimony that Plaintiff was capable of lifting up to 10 lbs. frequently prior

to October 2003. PM at 6-7. Essentially, Plaintiff believes the ALJ has not supported his conclusion with

substantial evidence regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work prior to October 2003. PM at 7.

Defendant contends the ALJ properly relied on the medical expert, Dr. Doren. DM at 5. Here,

Defendant argues Dr. Doren testified that Plaintiff’s condition was benign before September 2003 and that

any diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel made by a treating physician occurred after September 2003. DM

5. Moreover, Defendant asserts that Dr. Doren’s testimony, read in context, reveals his belief that the

medical records were unremarkable prior to September 2003 and that any RFC determination by Dr. Doren

limiting Plaintiff to carrying 5 lbs. was only made in reference to Plaintiff’s abilities after September 14,

2004.10 DM at 6. Finally, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s own admissions of intermittent bilateral hand

tingling and numbness that started in September 2003, and the lack of support in the record to substantiate

the severity of Plaintiff’s ailments during the relevant time period. DM at 5, 7.

The Court’s review of the record finds no additional objective medical evidence to support Plaintiff’s

allegations. See AR. The test for being able to perform light work, stated in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567 (b),

involves lifting no more than 20 lbs. occasionally and up to 10 lbs frequently. No testimony by either expert

revealed that Plaintiff was unable to frequently lift up to 10 lbs. prior to October 2003. Further, the Court

agrees with Defendant’s conclusion that Dr. Doren’s testimony regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitation

of carrying 5 lbs. refers to Dr. Pacelli’s RFC assessment in September 2004.11 DM at 6. Dr. Doren was

directly addressing the ALJ’s question regarding the weight that should be given to Dr. Pacelli’s RFC

evaluation, which stated that Plaintiff could lift 10 lbs. occasionally and frequently. AR at 241-243. This

conclusion is further substantiated by Dr. Doren’s statement that a 5 lb. limitation was appropriate prior to

surgical intervention, which was mentioned by Dr. Pacelli on April 30, 2004. AR at 222, 243. Although

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she could lift no more than 5 lbs., there is no objective medical evidence

that supports her limitation prior to October 2003. AR at 232. 

The opinion of a non-examining, testifying medical advisor may constitute substantial evidence

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12 There is no objective evidence or any indication based on Plaintiff’s own complaints and

testimony that she suffered from severe bilateral carpal tunnel symptoms, tingling and numbness, prior

to October 2003.

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when consistent with, and supported by, other substantial evidence from the record. Morgan v.

Commissioner, 169 F.3d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) (ALJ may rely on

medical expert opinion regarding the severity of a claimant’s impairment). Hence, the Court finds that the

ALJ could reasonably conclude that the medical expert’s testimony regarding Plaintiff’s RFC limitation of

5 lbs. concerned only the time frame after October 2003. Therefore, there is no material conflict between

the opinions of the ALJ and the medical expert. See Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965)

(ALJ’s conclusions, reasonably drawn from the evidence, shall be conclusive if supported by substantial

evidence).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s reliance on her medical assessment on June 2001, followed by progress

notes on August 2001, do not provide enough objective medical evidence to support Plaintiff’s subjective

pain complaints during the relevant time period. Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983)

(ALJ is entitled to rely on what the record does not say). First, these reports occurred 18 months before

Plaintiff testified to the date of onset regarding the debilitating effects of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

AR at 251. Second, there were no objective tests conducted during the relevant time which substantiated

the Plaintiff’s claim. On the contrary, there were reports during the relevant time period that showed

Plaintiff’s upper and lower extremities and joint pain as unremarkable. AR at 168, 172-73. Third, Plaintiff

herself claimed that her numbness and tingling, with occasional shooting pain, started six months prior to

her March 2004 evaluation, when those symptoms were first objectively verified through tests. AR at 156,

160-61, 239-241, 244-45. This fact is further substantiated by Dr. Doren’s statement that people who do

not have neurological findings of numbness can engage in light work under the Social Security rubric.12

See AR at 242-243. 

Nonetheless, in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, an ALJ can use “ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation” in determining whether to accept or reject Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain. Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F.2d at 603 n.5. Clearly, Plaintiff’s own testimony reveals that her limitations manifested after

the relevant time period. AR at 156, 251. Similarly, the “evidence [provided by Plaintiff] did not pertain

to . . . the relevant period and was inconsistent with other substantial evidence that did pertain to the

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28 13 Dr. Doren states that this is an Indicator of the severity of the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. 

AR at 242-243.

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relevant period,” hence, “the ALJ was under no obligation to give [medical reports cited outside the relevant

time period] controlling weight.” Freeman v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Cf. Prosch

v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.2000) (applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); see also Freese v. Barnhart,

2004 WL 1920702, at *6 (D. Me. 2004) (“diagnosis from a physician, particularly one who was not the

claimant's treating physician during the relevant time period, may carry less weight if the diagnosis is

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.”) (citing, inter alia, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4)),

Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 774 (2d Cir. 1981); Klett v. Barnhart, 303 F.Supp.2d 477, 484 (S.D.

N.Y. 2004); Peguero v. Massanari, 2001 WL 1029048 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).

As stated previously, there was no finding of numbness and tingling13 in any medical report prior

to October 2003, no finding that Plaintiff’s RFC limited her ability to lifting no more than 5 lbs. prior to

October 2003, and no complaint by Plaintiff in any medical report that would reveal the disabling nature

of her ailments during the relevant time period. Therefore, the reports detailing Plaintiff’s impairments prior

to the relevant time period are afforded little weight because they are unsubstantiated by reports during the

relevant time period. Weidel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 2008 WL 598003, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 2008)

(citing Miller v. Secretary, 843 F.2d 221, 224 (6th Cir.1988).) (“[s]ince [the doctor] offered little objective

evidence during the relevant period to support his conclusion of disability, his opinion need not have been

given any special weight.”). Contrary to Plaintiff’s statement that the ALJ failed to conduct a function-byfunction assessment to determine Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ assessed the treating and examining physicians’

opinions, took into consideration the expert’s opinions, and weighed the Plaintiff’s credibility. See AR at

18, 21, 238-251. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for

concluding that Plaintiff was capable of performing light work prior to October 2003. Craig v. Astrue, 2008

WL 682255, at *1 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996) (“the ALJ

can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and

convincing reasons for doing so.”). 

//

//

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14 Specifically, the ALJ presented the vocational expert with a hypothetical, which took into

consideration Plaintiff’s impairments, and asked the vocational expert to assess her ability to perform

past relevant work. AR at 248-49. The question posed by the ALJ read: 

Q: [A]ssume a hypothetical person with the age, education, and work experience as Ms.

Lind. For purposes of this first hypothetical, assume the hypothetical person can lift 20

lbs. occasionally, 9 lbs. frequently. And is precluded from forceful gross handling. But

can perform frequent gross handling non-forceful, and fine fingering. Can the

hypothetical person perform the past work of claimant?

A: Yes. Within the hypothetical, the past relevant work would be appropriate.

AR at 249.

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B. Whether Plaintiff Could Perform Past Relevant work Prior to October 1, 2003 is

Based on Substantial Evidence.

The ALJ concluded that there was substantial evidence that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant

work prior to October 2003. Past relevant work is defined as work that Plaintiff has “done within the past

15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [Plaintiff] to learn to do it.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). At Step four of the five step sequential evaluation, the ALJ can rely on the

testimony of the Plaintiff, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), or the vocational expert to

determine whether the Plaintiff could perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2); Nolan v.

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 2005 WL 3086568, at **1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the ALJ reasonably relied

on the vocational expert's opinion”); Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir.1993) (ALJ could

solely rely on the Plaintiff’s testimony about past relevant work). Here, the ALJ relied on his own

assessment substantiated by the vocational expert’s testimony14 to conclude that Plaintiff had performed

substantial gainful employment in the past fifteen years. AR 19, 21, 248-250. The ALJ’s finding must be

supported by substantial evidence. Hall v. Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th

Cir.1979). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind finds acceptable to support a conclusion.

 Id. at 1375. Furthermore, Plaintiff bears the burden to prove that she was disabled and incapable of

performing her past relevant work, during the relevant time period. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098

(9th Cir.1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that the: 1) ALJ incorrectly cited the testimony of the vocational expert because the

job of “parts order clerk” was not one of the Plaintiff’s past relevant positions; 2) ALJ incorrectly evaluated

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15 Since the evaluation of Plaintiff’s past relevant work was not only limited to telephone

solicitor and parts order clerk, any error by the ALJ is harmless because even if one of the jobs meets

the requirements for past relevant work, it is enough to support a finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.

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the medical expert’s testimony of Plaintiff’s RFC limitation; 3) ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s work

as a phone solicitor qualified as substantial gainful activity and was past relevant work; 4) ALJ failed to

address conflicts between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT; and 5) ALJ erred by relying on

testimony of the vocational expert in response to an incomplete hypothetical. PM at 9-14, 20-21. With

respect to the second argument, this Court has already found in Part A that the medical expert’s evaluation

that Plaintiff was limited to lifting 5 lbs. was related to the time period after October 2003. Therefore, there

is no error in the ALJ’s assessment regarding Plaintiff’s second argument.

Defendant argues that the ALJ’s misidentification of “parts order clerk” instead of “sales

representative job” constitutes harmless error because the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff could perform

other past relevant jobs, thereby, resulting in harmless error. DM at 9 (citing See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679)

(“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.”). Moreover, Defendant argues

that the vocational expert’s testimony was consistent with the DOT and that the ALJ’s failure to question

the vocational expert about any possible conflicts with the DOT was harmless error. DM at 10 (citing See

Renfrow v. Astrue, 2007 WL 2296409, at *3 (8th Cir. 2007). Finally, Defendant notes that an ALJ may

properly limit a hypothetical to those restrictions supported by substantial evidence. DM at 9 (citing

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 56-757 (emphasis added); see also Light v. SSA, 199 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997).

This Court concludes that the ALJ erred in his finding that Plaintiff had past relevant work

experience as a telephone solicitor and parts order clerk. However, this error is harmless because Plaintiff

was found to have performed past relevant work as a customer service representative.15 AR at 16, 19, 21,

248-49. When looking at the test for establishing past relevant work, substantial gainful activity under 20

C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2), ©)(1), ©)(3) is not met when Plaintiff’s earnings are reduced below the substantial

gainful activity earning level (less than $700/ month not adjusted for inflation) or when Plaintiff worked

three months or less because of her impairment. Such a situation will constitute an unsuccessful work

attempt and cannot be considered past relevant work. Id. Recognizing that Plaintiff held a position as a

telephone solicitor for less than three months (approximately 2 1⁄2 weeks) and earned an income totaling

$564.00, the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s position as a telephone solicitor qualifies as substantial

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16 That Dr. Doren limited Plaintiff’s RFC to lifting 5 lbs.

17 Plaintiff, citing Social Security Ruling No. 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 (SSA December 04,

2000), maintains that the ALJ has an “affirmative responsibility” to ask the vocational expert about any

possible conflict. However, the Court in Massachi was even more direct, holding for the first time that

an ALJ may not “rely on the vocational expert’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular

job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” 

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-1154 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ did not, as a threshold

question, ask the vocational expert about any potential deviations or conflicts with the DOT. Under

Massachi, this would lead to a remand so the ALJ could make the appropriate inquiries. Id. at 1153-54. 

However, there are two reasons why this court finds remand unnecessary in this instance. First, the

hearing where the ALJ questioned the vocational expert occurred on January 10, 2005. Hence, the ALJ

could not be held to have erred based on the Massachi 2007 decision. Second, even if remand were

granted on this issue, it would serve no purpose because the procedural error was harmless and the

vocational expert “provided sufficient support for [his] conclusion” because he based his assessment on

Plaintiff’s limitations, as given by the ALJ, and Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a customer service

representative. Id. at 1154 n.19. 

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gainful activity, and hence, past relevant work. AR at 16, 21. Moreover, the ALJ’s position is further

undermined by Mr. Navarrete (SSA interviewer) who reported Plaintiff had not performed substantial

gainful activity since 1999. AR at 81.

Nevertheless, this Court is confronted with the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff’s past

relevant work as a customer service representative constituted both light work and was within the RFC of

the Plaintiff. AR at 248-259. Since the ALJ had convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff capable of

performing light work prior to October 2003 (supra Part A), the hypothetical given to the vocational expert,

which was based on her ability to lift 20 lbs. occasionally and 9 lbs. frequently with the ability to “perform

frequent gross handling non-forceful, and fine fingering,” was sufficient to make an assessment about

whether Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. Id. Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical given

to the vocational expert conflicted with the testimony of the medical expert. However, the conflicting

testimony cited by Plaintiff16 was only referencing her RFC for the period after October 2003. See supra

Part A. Therefore, no conflict exists and the hypothetical submitted to the vocational expert was within the

ALJ’s discretion.17 

 Looking at the record, the ALJ clearly laid out each of the Plaintiff’s limitations when positing the

hypothetical to the vocational expert. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir.1984) (in

constructing a hypothetical the ALJ must lay out all Plaintiff’s impairments supported by the record). The

ALJ relied on the medical expert who stated that Plaintiff’s RFC would be limited to “no constant grasping,

fingering, feeling . . . [b]ut frequent in terms of simple grasp, simple fingering and feeling” with gripping

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and fine fingering limited to one-third to two-thirds of a day as required by light work. AR at 243.

Although the ALJ erred in his determination that Plaintiff’s telephone solicitation work constituted

substantial gainful activity, that error is harmless because both the ALJ and the vocational expert found

Plaintiff’s customer service representative job as substantial gainful activity that was within the range of

Plaintiff’s RFC. AR at 19, 21, 548-550. Hypothetically, if the ALJ had only questioned the vocational

expert about the telephone solicitation job or parts order clerk, there would be an unresolved conflict that

the ALJ would be obligated to resolve before he could rely on the vocational expert. Social Security Ruling

No. 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (SSA December 04, 2000). However, in this case, any conflict is

mitigated by the vocational expert’s consideration of Plaintiff’s light work as a customer service/ sales

representative, which the ALJ relied upon to conclude that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past

relevant work. AR 19, 248-249. Considering the specific circumstances, failure by the ALJ to ask the

vocational expert about any possible conflicts was harmless error, since the eventual outcome would remain

unchanged even if the vocational expert was asked to reconcile the conflict between his testimony and the

DOT. See Renfrow v. Astrue, 2007 WL 2296409, at *3 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d,

1149, 1152 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Similarly, an inaccurate reference by the ALJ regarding Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a “parts

order clerk” constitutes harmless error. AR at 19. The Plaintiff is obviously correct in showing that the ALJ

did not show substantial evidence that Plaintiff could return to her previous position as a “parts order clerk”

because she never held that position. PM at 10. Nonetheless, since the ALJ found Plaintiff’s previous

history as a customer service representative to be evidence of a substantial gainful activity that Plaintiff

could perform prior to October 2003, the ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert’s answer to his

hypothetical:

Q: [A]ssume a hypothetical person with the age, education, and work experience as Ms.

Lind. For purposes of this first hypothetical, assume the hypothetical person can lift 20 lbs.

occasionally, 9 lbs. frequently. And is precluded from forceful gross handling. But can

perform frequent gross handling non-forceful, and fine fingering. Can the hypothetical

person perform the past work of claimant?

A: Yes. Within the hypothetical, the past relevant work would be appropriate.

AR at 248-249. This hypothetical did reference Plaintiff’s position as a customer service representative,

for which Plaintiff was gainfully employed full time for 15 years. AR at 66, 229-30, 248. Therefore, this

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Court finds that any error that occurred in mischaracterizing Plaintiff’s past relevant work was harmless

because the evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had the requisite RFC to perform past

relevant work. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.2005) ( “A decision of the ALJ will not be

reversed for errors that are harmless.”) 

C. The ALJ Reasonably Found Plaintiff’s Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome or Chronic

Ankle Pain were Not Severe Impairments Prior to October 1, 2003.

The ALJ found Plaintiff did not suffer from severe bilateral carpal syndrome or chronic ankle pain

during the period from February 2003 to October 2003. AR at 17-19. The ALJ’s findings are conclusive

if supported by substantial evidence. Hall, 602 F.2d at 1374 (citing 42 U.S.C. s 405(g); Benitez v. Califano,

573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978); Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976)). As stated

previously, substantial evidence means a finding that is supported by “more than a mere scintilla . . . [and]

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cox v. Califano,587 F.2d 988, 989-

90 (9th Cir.1978). 

In applying the substantial evidence test, we are obligated to look at the record as a whole and not

merely at the evidence tending to support a finding. Id. at 990. Furthermore, an assessment with respect

to “severity” (Step 2 analysis) depends on whether Plaintiff’s impairments significantly limit her physical

or mental ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137

(1987). This court finds Plaintiff did not carry her burden of providing evidence that would support a

finding of severe impairment for either Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome or ankle pain prior to

October 2003. 

Plaintiff argues her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and ankle pain were severe impairments prior

to October 2003. PM at 15, 18. Plaintiff cites Dr. Doren’s testimony concerning the September 25, 2001

report, which details the association between her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome being associated with her

back and neck pain. PM at 15. Focusing on this connection, Plaintiff attempts to link the medical expert’s

testimony that bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome has always been a primary severe impairment to her

functional limitations prior to October 2003. Id. Further, in support of her position, Plaintiff cites progress

notes listing bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and chronic ankle pain (June 29, 2001), complaints of bilateral

carpal tunnel syndrome (August 3, 2001), and the medical expert’s acknowledgment that Plaintiff “had a

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twenty year history of numbness and tingling in the bilateral upper extremities.” PM at 14-18 (citing AR

at 238). 

Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing the severity of Plaintiff’s

conditions. DM at 11. Defendant points to the absence of reports during the relevant time period which

show the functional limitations associated with Plaintiff’s wrist or ankle impairments. Id. Specifically,

Defendant argues the only reports that exist for the relevant time period show Plaintiff’s joint pain (ankle

and wrist) to be unremarkable. Id. 

In contrast to the evidence cited by Plaintiffs, Defendant cites documents containing objective

medical evidence during the relevant time period which support its position. First, Defendant argues the

April 2, 2003 report shows Plaintiff denies any “back pain, joint pain, or stiffness.” Id. (citing AR at 172).

Second, the report from June 2, 2003 reveals nothing abnormal about Plaintiff’s upper and lower extremities

(including her wrist and ankle). AR at 168. Third, there were no diagnostic tests revealing Plaintiff’s

functional limitations during the relevant time period in either her upper or lower extremities. See AR at

118-224. Fourth, Plaintiff’s complaints of tingling and numbness, a strong indicator of the severity of

Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, all occurred after September/ October 2003, with an actual

objective (nerve conduction study) finding on March 23, 2004. AR at 144, 242-243. It is important to note

that the ALJ’s findings can take into consideration the absence of evidence in the record. Dumas v.

Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983) (the ALJ “is entitled to rely not only on what the record says,

but also on what it does not say.”) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d at 63; Berry v. Schweiker, 675

F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.1982) (per curiam)).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s own testimony undermines her position that she was severely impaired

during the period from February 2003 to October 2003. She testified that: 1) she currently drives to the

library and to the grocery store, although she is limited in pushing the grocery cart; 2) she stopped

swimming approximately one month before the hearing; 3) she has stopped walking/ jogging and taking her

dog for a walk because of back pain; 4) she performs a little flower gardening but has had to hire workers

for other gardening chores; and 5) she stopped doing household chores sometime in 2004. AR at 233-235.

From Plaintiff’s own descriptions, it is reasonable to conclude that her ailments have prevented her from

doing normal chores and activities that range from one month to one year. If we project backward from the

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28 18 On February 10, 2004, Plaintiff denied any numbness and complained of pain and tingling “for

approximately two months.” AR at 163. 

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hearing date and take into consideration the time frame most beneficial to the Plaintiff, going back one full

year, the evidence still shows that Plaintiff’s impairments only began limiting her daily activities in or

around January 2004. 

Looking at Plaintiff’s testimony in combination with her complaints to her treating and examining

physicians, one is hard pressed to find any objective evidence that Plaintiff was severely impaired prior to

October 2003. Instead objective evidence refutes Plaintiff. 

On March 12, 2004, progress notes indicated that the severity of Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel

symptoms had been ongoing for the previous six months. AR at 161. Additionally, a February 10, 2004

report indicated that Plaintiff’s symptoms had been ongoing the previous two months.18 AR at 163. These

findings further substantiate the ALJ’s finding of no disability prior to October 2003. AR at 19, 21. 

Finally, Plaintiff believes it was legal error for the ALJ to ignore the June 29, 2001 diagnosis of right

ankle pain and a report by two State consultants who found the right ankle pain was a severe impairment.

PM at 18-20. The Ninth circuit is clear that an ALJ has to consider all evidence, however, he does not have

to discuss every piece of evidence. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984).

Nonetheless, the ALJ cannot abstractly choose evidence in support of his position while ignoring evidence

favorable to the Plaintiff. Id. Here, the ALJ focuses his discussion on the relevant time period, giving

greater weight to reports that discuss plaintiff’s ailments or lack thereof during this period. The reports that

Plaintiff relies upon are all outside the relevant time period. For example, the report by the State consultants

are from April 27, 2004. AR at 126-127. Although the consultants recognize Plaintiff’s chronic right ankle

pain, there is no specific mention of whether and when the pain constituted a severe impairment. See Id.

District courts have recognized the difficulty of cases where “medical evidence on the record does not

include any medical opinions produced during the relevant time period.” Keller v. Astrue, 2008 WL

2367094, (W.D. Wash. 2008). However, the ALJ does not err when he determines such evidence to have

little weight or probative value. Such a determination is not indicative of a failure to consider the relevant

evidence. Mullins v. Astrue, 2008 WL 360793, at *10 (S.D. Ind. 2008). This court finds that the ALJ

considered the record as a whole and relied on substantial evidence to support his conclusion that Plaintiff

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did not have severe impairments of the wrist or ankle prior to October 2003.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The ALJ presented nine reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s disabling pain testimony. Plaintiff

opposed three of the nine reasons put forth by the ALJ. The ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff could perform

light work, perform past relevant work, and that Plaintiff did not have severe impairments to the wrist

and ankle prior to October 2003, are each supported by substantial evidence. After a thorough review of

the record, the papers submitted and the authorities cited therein, and for the reasons set forth above, this

Court recommends that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s motion for reversal and/or remand be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 4, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than August 18, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 14, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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