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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2582

LEONARD THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NICHOLAS P. WARDELL, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 15-cv-548 — Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 13, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2020

____________________

Before MANION, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Indiana inmate Leonard Thomas

sued state correctional officials, alleging deficient health care, 

inadequate conditions of confinement, and that officers 

treated him with excessive force. The district court found 

Thomas’s pro se complaint deficient and gave him opportunities to remedy its problems but ultimately dismissed his 

case for failure to prosecute. The court also denied three requests by Thomas for appointed counsel. 

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Because Thomas made reasonable attempts to obtain 

counsel and the district court did not assess whether Thomas 

appeared competent to litigate the case given its difficulty, we 

conclude the district court abused its discretion by denying 

Thomas’s requests to appoint counsel. This outcome prejudiced Thomas, so we reverse and remand for an attorney to 

be appointed for him. 

The district court also provided insufficient grounds on 

which to dismiss Thomas’s case for failure to prosecute. 

Therefore we also vacate the dismissal of Thomas’s case, reinstate it, and remand the case to proceed. 

I.

Thomas was convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of 

his uncle and is serving a 40-year sentence at the Westville 

Correctional Facility in LaPorte County, Indiana.1 He has a 

history of mental illness which began before his incarceration;

the symptoms of which include suicidal ideations, paranoia, 

and hallucinations. Thomas has also been diagnosed with epilepsy, antisocial personality disorder, and anxiety, for which 

he has received various medications while incarcerated.

1 Since 2014 Thomas has been housed in isolation at this facility’s 

Westville Control Unit. In June 2015 Thomas was transferred to the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, just south of Terre Haute, Indiana, 

where he was assigned to the special needs unit for inmates diagnosed as 

seriously mentally ill. In January 2016 Thomas was transferred back to 

Westville and its control unit. We do not conclude these transfers impacted Thomas’s litigation of this case. See, e.g., James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 

327 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting transfer of facilities can affect difficulty of pro 

se prisoner litigating a case).

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In late 2015, proceeding pro se, Thomas sued numerous 

correctional officers for a host of claims. He alleged his requests for medical care—especially concerning his mental 

health treatment—were improperly denied or ignored.

Thomas saw a psychiatrist and a psychologist but complained 

about the effects of psychotropic medications which were 

then discontinued. He also alleged correctional officials failed

to protect him from self-harm. Thomas described numerous 

incidents which he believes support his claims, including 

three suicide attempts over about one year and an incident in 

which he was pepper sprayed. 

For about 20 months Thomas’s case traveled a lengthy 

journey which included amendments to his complaint and 

denials of his requests for counsel. Within the first month

Thomas twice asked the district court to appoint him a lawyer

(“2015 requests”). Before ruling on those motions, though, the 

court struck his complaint for containing too many unrelated 

issues and parties but granted him leave to amend. Within a

month Thomas amended his complaint, but the court quickly 

struck that pleading for the same reason and again granted

him leave to amend. 

Shortly after striking the complaint a second time, the district court denied Thomas’s two 2015 requests for counsel. In 

its order the district court cited this court’s familiar decision 

on appointment of counsel, Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (en banc), and concluded that Thomas had not 

made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. While 

Thomas had written 14 attorneys seeking representation, the 

court found those letters did not provide information about 

the claims Thomas was pursuing and some pre-dated certain 

events in his complaint. The court decided that even if 

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Thomas had reasonably tried to find a lawyer, the claims 

Thomas would pursue were unclear given the number of defendants he had listed (26 initially, 9 after amendment). The 

district court noted that Thomas “is seriously mentally ill,” 

had engaged in previous suicide attempts, and had received 

assistance from other inmates. But the court also cited 

Thomas’s medical records that showed average intellect, intact memory, and a logical thought process, as well as 

Thomas’s numerous coherent requests for medical care. On 

this record, the district court concluded that Thomas, even 

without assistance from other inmates, could prepare an 

amended complaint and move for appointment of counsel

again, if necessary.

In March of 2016, Thomas filed a second amended complaint which remained pending for some time until the district court struck it, again for containing too many unrelated 

claims and parties. That version of the complaint predominately alleged that Thomas was denied necessary medical 

treatment for his mental illness by healthcare providers and 

correctional officials. The district court granted Thomas time 

to amend his complaint or face dismissal. The court also directed the clerk of court to send Thomas a prisoner complaint 

form and instructed Thomas how to proceed with his claims. 

Thomas followed later that year with his third motion for 

appointment of counsel (“2016 request”). He pleaded his 

mental illness and his epilepsy and asked the court to appoint 

a particular attorney who represented him in a different case 

in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

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even if she could only help him amend his complaint.2 The 

following day the district court denied the request concluding

that Thomas himself could ask the attorney who represented 

him in the other case to represent him here. Even more, the 

district court found that Thomas’s failure to approach that attorney showed Thomas had not reasonably attempted to obtain counsel on his own, as Pruitt requires. The court also 

ruled on a motion by Thomas to obtain more time to amend 

his complaint. Rather than rule on serial requests for extensions, the court granted his motion to amend his complaint 

but stayed the case and statistically closed it.3

After not hearing from Thomas for nearly six months, the 

court gave Thomas one month to show cause why this case 

should not be dismissed as abandoned. The court stated:

“[Thomas] is CAUTIONED that if he does not respond by 

that deadline, this case will be dismissed without further notice.” After the deadline passed without word from Thomas,

the district court dismissed this case pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Thomas timely appealed and challenges the district 

court’s dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute, its failure 

2 Our review shows that Thomas filed seven cases in the U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana between April 2012 and March 

2019, all of them now closed.

Thomas has filed three cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of Indiana between November 2015 and now. In addition to this 

case, one other remains open.

3 Administratively closing a case moves it to a court’s inactive docket, 

while the court retains jurisdiction for purposes of future activities on the 

case. See, e.g., American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA v. Schilli Transp. Svcs., 2011 

WL 13352980, *2 (N.D. Ind. 2011).

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to sever claims instead of dismissing his case for including 

unrelated claims, its denials of his request to appoint counsel 

under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1), and its decision to not screen his 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II.

We first consider the question of appointed counsel for

Thomas. Resolution of his other arguments proceeds from 

there.4

We review a decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of 

discretion. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658. The district court does not 

abuse its discretion unless: (1) the record contains no evidence 

upon which the court could have rationally based its decision; 

(2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; 

(3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings; 

or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.” Id. (citing Musser 

v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004)).

A. Appointment of Counsel

A plaintiff such as Thomas does not have a statutory right 

to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation, although 

an indigent litigant5 may ask the court to request an attorney 

to represent him. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment is permissive under this statute, which provides a court “may” request an attorney represent a party. The decision whether to 

4 Because of our resolution of Thomas’s appeal on appointment of 

counsel grounds, we do not reach Thomas’s argument that the district 

court failed to screen his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

5 Early on the district court found Thomas indigent. In this appeal 

Thomas paid the full filing fee, and he has been ably represented by appointed appellate counsel with our sincere thanks and appreciation.

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recruit pro bono counsel is left to the district court’s discretion. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.

That discretion is governed by the legal standard announced in Pruitt:

When confronted with a request under 

§ 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel, the district 

court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has 

the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt 

to obtain counsel ...; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?

503 F.3d at 654–55 (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321–22 

(7th Cir. 1993)).

Pruitt first requires the indigent litigant to reasonably attempt to get a lawyer. When the district court denied 

Thomas’s 2015 requests for counsel, it enumerated the lawyers whom he contacted, when he did so, and what he said to 

them. In its denial of Thomas’s 2016 request for counsel, the 

district court addressed Thomas’s request that his counsel in 

another case be appointed here. In its brief denial order (about 

a single page of text) the court concluded that Thomas could 

ask the lawyer himself and that his failure to do so proves he 

did not reasonably attempt to obtain counsel on his own. 

On this first requirement, the district court satisfactorily 

evaluated the 2015 requests, but the court’s brief order on 

Thomas’s 2016 request for counsel was insufficient. The district court cursorily dismissed Thomas’s 2016 request on the 

grounds that Thomas did not personally reach out to that lawyer. Thomas’s working relationship with that attorney and 

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the district court’s failure to take that relationship into account calls into question the district court’s conclusion that 

Thomas did not reasonably try to get a lawyer.

The second requirement under Pruitt is whether the plaintiff appeared competent to litigate the case in light of its difficulty. 503 F.3d at 654.6 As this court stated in Pruitt: 

[t]he inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the 

difficulty of the case is considered against the 

plaintiff’s litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are examined in light of the challenges 

specific to the case at hand. ... [T]he question is 

whether the difficulty of the case—factually and 

legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the 

judge or jury himself.

Id. at 655. “[B]ecause the decision belongs to the district court, 

we have resisted laying down categorical rules regarding recruitment of counsel in particular types of cases.” Id. at 656. 

“[T]here are no hard and fast rules for evaluating the factual 

and legal difficulty of the plaintiff’s claims,” nor are there 

“fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s competence 

to litigate his own case ... .” Id. at 655. Some of the circumstances that require judicial consideration are the phase of the 

6 Among its rulings, Pruitt clarified that the district court can only decide based on the record when the motion was brought, and that appellate 

review is limited to the record when the decision was made. 503 F.3d at 

656. Pruitt also explained the district court, not this court, is to undertake 

the analysis of the degree of case difficulty as against the plaintiff’s competence to litigate it himself. Id. at 658.

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litigation, if the prisoner has been transferred between facilities, if the claims involved the state of mind of the defendant 

such as those involving deliberate indifference, and if the case 

involves complex medical evidence, including expert testimony. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327–28 (7th Cir. 2018).

The district court’s assessment of Thomas’s 2015 requests 

for counsel did not expressly consider “competency,” 

although it did note Thomas’s mental illness and cited to particular records on Thomas’s mental condition. The court also 

ruminated on what types of motions and filings Thomas 

might make due to his mental illness. 

Such consideration is absent, however, from the order 

denying Thomas’s 2016 request for counsel. That order does 

not consider, or even mention, Thomas’s competence to litigate this case himself, as required by Pruitt. 503 F.3d at 655. In 

the order on the 2015 requests the court at least cited 

Thomas’s intellectual capacity and psychological history. But 

both denial orders fail to cover relevant topics, such as 

Thomas’s literacy, communication skills, and litigation experience. Id. For example, Thomas’s lack of a high school education should have been considered but was not. See Navejar v. 

Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013).

Thomas’s claims also involve complex medical evidence. 

His suit includes claims against a psychologist for denial of 

necessary medical treatment, which raises questions about 

the standard of care. See James, 889 F.3d at 328 (acknowledging 

that cases involving complex medical evidence are typically 

more difficult for pro se litigants). Thomas also alleges he received prescription medications inconsistently and he was not 

properly treated for his conditions. Further, Thomas has been 

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diagnosed with serious psychological and medical conditions, including schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, anxiety, and epilepsy. His psychological and medical 

diagnoses are relevant to determinations of whether prison 

officials satisfied their standard of care. 

But neither of the district court’s orders denying counsel 

contend with the complexities of this medical evidence, or 

grapple with Thomas’s allegations that certain defendants deviated from the standard of care. Id. (and citations thereat).

The district court did not show awareness of this complex 

medical evidence or the standard of care, as required. Id.

Under Pruitt the district court was required to weigh the 

difficulty of Thomas’s claims against his competency to litigate those claims. 503 F.3d at 655. That did not happen here. 

The district court did not consider the factual and legal complexity of this case given Thomas’s capabilities as required by

Pruitt and this court’s case law since. See, e.g., James, 889 F.3d 

at 329–30. Thomas’s history of mental illness, in particular, 

should have been relevant to the district court’s evaluation of 

his competency. See Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 762 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (“[P]sychological history, to the extent that [it] [is] 

known, [is] relevant.”); Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 940 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (“Not every cognitive limitation will require the 

district court to recruit a lawyer, but the court should have 

considered how [the plaintiff]’s mental health history would 

affect his ability to think on his feet.”). On this point, we ask 

“not whether [the judge] was right, but whether [the judge] 

was reasonable.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659. The absence of such 

reasoning in the district court’s orders means that the reasonableness standard was not satisfied here.

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As noted above, the decision whether to appoint counsel 

is a discretionary call. Exercise of discretion requires a court 

to consider those factors described in Pruitt. The district court 

here fell short of that mark. We conclude that the district 

court’s rulings on the two requirements from Pruitt are arbitrary, and that on some requirements the record contains no 

evidence upon which the court could have rationally based its 

decisions. So the district court abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s request for appointed counsel.

“Even if a district court’s denial of counsel amounts to an 

abuse of its discretion, we will reverse only upon a showing 

of prejudice.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659. “[A]n erroneous denial 

of pro bono counsel will be prejudicial if there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation.” Id. 

Appointment of counsel here would have significantly 

changed the outcome of this case. The advice and counsel of 

an attorney—which the record reveals Thomas wanted very 

much—most likely would have resulted in Thomas responding to the court’s order to show cause why this case should 

not be dismissed. This would have allowed Thomas’s claims 

to proceed, so necessarily the lack of an attorney had a substantial impact.

Further, a plaintiff’s deficient pretrial performance can establish prejudice. James, 889 F.3d at 331. This court can consider a plaintiff’s inability to state a claim at the pleading stage 

when ruling on a motion to appoint counsel. Armstrong v. 

Krupiczowicz, 874 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2017). On three occasions Thomas was unable to comply with the district court’s 

pleading requirements. The district court did not include this 

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factor in its decisions, even as it ruled repeatedly that Thomas 

had failed to meet the pleading requirements.

We are aware that appointment of counsel is a difficult decision, James, 889 F.3d at 330–31, and that district courts deserve substantial leeway in such a fact-bound decision. Id. at 

327; Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658-59. But the governing legal standard from Pruitt is not met here because the district court failed 

to weigh the difficulty of Thomas’s claims against his competency to litigate his allegations. Thus, the district court abused 

its discretion in denying Thomas’s motions for counsel, and 

this erroneous denial prejudiced Thomas because it most 

likely resulted in his case being dismissed. So we reverse and 

remand for counsel to be appointed for Thomas.

B. Dismissal of Thomas’s Case

Thomas has also appealed the district court’s dismissal of 

this case for failure to prosecute and the district court’s handling of the misjoinder issues in his complaint. We begin with 

the district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute, which we 

review for an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Chicago Bd. of 

Educ., 718 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2013).

District courts generally have broad authority to dismiss a 

case for failure to prosecute, and this includes failure to comply with valid orders. See Wilson v. Bruce, 400 Fed. App’x 106, 

108 (7th Cir. 2010). In its dismissal order the district court 

listed one reason for terminating the case: Thomas had missed 

the court-imposed deadline to contact his attorney in the 

other case and to amend his complaint. 

When dismissal is based on a failure to prosecute, a court 

is required to show a record of delay, contumacious conduct, 

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or that lesser sanctions proved unavailable, as well as the prejudice that the delay caused the defendant. Kasalo v. Harris & 

Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court 

did not make any such findings, and we do not see the record 

supporting such findings. The record does not reveal delay by 

Thomas or obstinately disobedient conduct. While Thomas 

failed to comply with the May 2017 order to show cause, 

Thomas otherwise showed diligence in advancing his case. 

He requested counsel when he first filed the case as well as a 

month later. He amended his complaint about a month after

its initial dismissal; the same with a second amended complaint. He updated the court numerous times on his change 

of address. When review of his second amended complaint 

took some time, he twice requested a status hearing. And 

when his second amended complaint was struck, Thomas 

filed his third request for counsel. Against this backdrop—a 

history of compliance with other deadlines—dismissal with 

prejudice for one missed deadline is harsh. See Sroga v. Huberman, 722 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 2013).

This dismissal was with prejudice under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b), and dismissal for failure to prosecute is 

a tough sanction. Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3d 1297, 1299 (7th 

Cir. 1998). Lesser sanctions than dismissal were available. For 

example, the district court could have issued Thomas a second warning or dismissed allegedly nonviable claims. Those 

steps did not happen here.

Prejudice is another factor when considering whether dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate. Sroga, 722 F.3d 

at 982. Courts have found dismissal for failure to prosecute 

more fitting if the delay caused prejudice to the defendant. See 

Kasalo, 656 F.3d at 561. The correctional officials have not cited 

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any prejudice to themselves that would warrant dismissal.

Thomas’s case was dismissed before any defendants were 

served, so they could have not suffered any prejudice. Id. at 

983.

In dismissing this case the district court cited to a single 

missed deadline. No doubt, the district court here was patient 

with Thomas, granting him numerous opportunities to 

amend his complaint, as well as time to approach his counsel 

in his other case and to amend his complaint yet again. But 

viewing this case in its entirety, dismissal with prejudice due 

to one missed deadline “clearly appears arbitrary,” Pruitt, 503 

F.3d at 658, and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, while 

Thomas failed to comply with the district court’s order to 

show cause why the case should not be dismissed, we can 

reasonably conclude this failure followed from Thomas proceeding without counsel. Reversal of the dismissal and reinstatement of Thomas’s case follows from our decision that 

counsel should have been appointed. 

On appeal Thomas also objects on the ground that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint for misjoinder. 

He argues the court should have severed or dismissed unrelated claims and then screened his complaint. But as the 

correctional officials point out, the orders memorializing the 

district court’s two-step dismissal process did not list misjoinder as a ground for case termination. So we find no reversible 

error here. To the extent joinder issues exist in this case, 

Thomas’s appointed counsel can address these difficulties on 

remand.

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III.

Thomas was indigent and made reasonable attempts to 

obtain counsel. The district court did not evaluate whether 

Thomas appeared competent to litigate his claims in light of 

the case’s difficulty. The district court abused its discretion to 

Thomas’s prejudice in denying his request for counsel. So we 

REVERSE the decision not to appoint counsel and ORDER that 

counsel be appointed in the district court.

At oral argument we asked Thomas’s appellate counsel if 

she had interest in representing Thomas on remand, which 

she did. On remand the district court can consider appointing 

Thomas’s appellate counsel as his counsel in the district court.

On this case’s facts and its procedural history, dismissal 

for failure to prosecute as a result of one missed deadline is 

arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. So we also VACATE the 

district court’s dismissal of this case, reinstate this case, and 

REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings.

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