Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07293/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07293-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

SPT

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 6/18/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MEGAN DEANN ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, ADA

SIFUENTES, ANTONIO SIFUENTES,

LUCILLE HRALIMA, STEVEN SINOR,

KAREN ASHARAH, ELVA MENCIA,

MICHELLE CASSILLAS, PAT MANNION,

and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. C-06-07293 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART COUNTY

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION

TO STRIKE

[Re Docket No. 15]

Defendants County of Monterey, Monterey County sheriff Steven Sinor, and social workers

Lucille Hralima, Karen Asharah, Elva Mencia, Michelle Cassillas, and Pat Mannion (collectively,

"County Defendants") move to dismiss certain claims in plaintiff Megan Deann Allen's ("Allen")

First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). The County Defendants seek to dismiss the second and fifth

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the second, third, and fifth claims for failure to state a

claim, and the eighth, ninth, and tenth claims for failure to name a necessary party. In addition, the

Case 5:06-cv-07293-RMW Document 40 Filed 06/18/07 Page 1 of 17
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1

 These dismissals are per plaintiff's stipulation in the case management conference statement.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

SPT 2

County Defendants move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) to strike the eighth and tenth claims and

certain allegations in the ninth claim. Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss the fourth, fifth and tenth

claims1

 and also to dismiss Karen Asharah but otherwise opposes the motions. The court has read

the moving and responding papers and considered the argument of counsel. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants in part and denies in part County Defendants' motion to dismiss and grants in

part and denies in part County Defendants' motion to strike as follows:

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss the second claim on the basis of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and abstention is denied upon the stipulation that plaintiff's claims

concern events prior to the juvenile court's order of detention;

2. Defendants' motion to dismiss the second claim on the basis that it does not state a

claim for relief is denied;

3. Defendants' motion to dismiss the third claim on the basis that it does not state a

claim for relief is granted without prejudice;

4. Defendants' motion to dismiss the eighth and ninth claims is granted without

prejudice; 

5. Defendants' motion to strike is granted as to the request for punitive damages against

the County based on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and as to the request for

punitive damages for plaintiff's eighth and ninth claims;

6. Defendants' motion to strike is denied in all other respects; 

7. Plaintiff's fourth, fifth and tenth claims are dismissed pursuant to plaintiff's

stipulation; 

8. Defendant Karen Asharah is dismissed from this action pursuant to plaintiff's

stipulation; and

9. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days from the date of this order to amend the dismissed

claims. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Allen formerly lived with her mother and step-father. On December 13, 2004, while Allen

was shopping with A.A., her ten year old daughter, when A.A. disclosed that Allen's step-father had

put on a "dirty movie" and then touched himself and her in "private parts." FAC ¶ 20. Allen

immediately drove home, conferred with her sister, and decided to call 911 to report what A.A. had

told her. Id. ¶ 21. Officers from the Monterey County Sheriff's Department arrived and A.A.

relayed the same disclosure to them. Id. ¶ 22. Following the officer's advice, Allen took A.A. to the

hospital to be examined. Id. ¶ 24. Allen agreed with the nurse at the hospital that, due to the

allegations, Child Protective Services should be contacted. Id. ¶ 25. The medical examination

revealed that A.A. had a rash which was likely caused by poor hygiene, and that there was no

evidence of sexual assault. Id. ¶ 26. Nevertheless, the nurse recommended that A.A. be kept

overnight to be further evaluated. Id. 

The next morning social worker Hralima responded to the call and arrived at the hospital. Id.

¶¶ 26-27. When Allen arrived at the hospital the next morning, she was kept in the waiting room

and not allowed to see A.A. Id. ¶ 27. She later learned that while she was kept waiting, Hralima

was questioning A.A. without the presence of a parent or guardian. Id. When Allen spoke with

Hralima, Hralima agreed that A.A. only had a rash, and that there was no evidence of sexual abuse. 

Id. ¶ 29. However, Hralima informed Allen that A.A. was now on "3-day CPS hold" and would not

be released. Id. Hralima informed Allen that the hold was necessary in order to do some more

investigation. Id. ¶ 30-31. Allen discovered after reports filed in the later juvenile dependency

proceedings that Hralima claimed A.A. had told her during the interview that her grandparents put

tape on her eyes and mouth and made her eat moldy bread. Id. ¶ 32. Allen alleges that she is

vigilant about protecting her daughter. Id. ¶ 34. A year earlier, A.A. had disclosed that Allen's

sister's boyfriend touched her in private areas. Id. Allen called authorities and moved the next day

after the disclosure. Id. 

With Hralima's assistance, Allen moved out of her parents' house with her other two

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

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children, N.A. and Jaime. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Some days later Hralima contacted Allen and reported that

A.A. was ready to be released to Allen. Id. ¶ 39. When Allen arrived at the hospital, Hralima

informed Allen that all of her children were being taken into custody because of sexual abuse. Id. ¶

41. With the assistance of sheriff Sinor, Hralima insisted that Allen sign the papers acknowledging

notification that her children were being taken into custody. Id. ¶ 43. When Allen refused, Sinor

threatened to arrest her for sexual abuse and disorderly conduct. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Ultimately, Allen

signed the papers. Id. ¶ 44. While Hralima was removing the children, she allegedly told Allen that

"it's not permanent." Id. ¶ 46. Although Allen was not informed of the reasons the children were

being removed, other than that it was for sexual abuse, she allegedly overheard Hralima say to Sinor

that Allen had "chosen her boyfriend over her children." Id. Allen did not discover until she read

court reports in the subsequent juvenile court proceedings that her then-boyfriend was a registered

sex offender for an incident that occurred thirteen years earlier. Id. No warrant had been issued for

the removal of the children. Id. ¶ 47. 

Hralima allegedly then filed reports that Allen had been suspected of drug use. Id. ¶ 51. 

However, according to the complaint, Allen had never even been questioned about drug use. Id. 

On December 20, 2004 the County filed a juvenile dependency petition and on December 22,

2004 a detention hearing was held. Id. ¶ 53. All three children were then removed by court order

pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code § 319 and placed with defendants Ada and Antonio Sifuentes, foster

parents. Id. ¶ 53. During visits with her children at the Sifuentes' home Allen began repeatedly

seeing bruises on her children. Id. ¶ 54. Although she complained numerous times, including to

County personnel supervising those visits, there was allegedly no responsive measure. Id. On a

supervised visit with Jaime, Allen noticed injuries all over Jaime's body, including bruises on the

forehead, hand marks and an elongated "whip-like" mark on his backside, and a large blackened

bruise on his back. Id. ¶ 75. Allen showed these injuries to the social worker supervising the visit,

but the social worker failed to make any further inquiry or investigation into the injuries. Id. ¶¶ 75-

78. The children remained in the Sifuentes home.

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2

 Peritonitis refers to inflammation of the smooth transparent serous membrane that lines the

cavity of the abdomen. Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary (2002), available at

http://www.intelihealth.com/ IH/ihtIH/WSI/9276/9276.html. 

3

 Hemoperitoneum refers to bleeding in the abdominal cavity. Merriam-Webster Medical

Dictionary (2002), available at http://www.intelihealth.com/ IH/ihtIH/WSI/9276/9276.html. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

SPT 5

On November 27, 2005 Jaime, Allen's two year old boy, was taken to the hospital from the

Sifuentes home by paramedics and, within thirty minutes, pronounced dead. Id. ¶ 55. The

immediate cause of death was acute peritonitis2

 and hemoperitoneum3 due to blunt force trauma to

the abdomen which lacerated the small intestine and the supporting tissues of the bowels causing

massive bleeding and infection. Id. ¶¶ 56, 59. According to the pathologist, the injury resulted from

forceful impact by or against a hard, relatively smooth object, less than about two inches wide. Id. ¶

59. The pathologist also indicated that the injury occurred within the last few days of life. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that medical treatment was not sought for Jaime for the few days after his injury and

paramedics were only summoned moments before his death. Id. ¶ 61. He was found lying in the

hallway of the Sifuentes home on the morning the paramedics arrived. Id. ¶ 62.

In addition to the injuries that were identified as the immediate cause of death, the coroner

found that Jaime had several traumatic injuries to his head, face, torso, arms, and legs. Id. ¶ 56. He

had five abrasions on his head, a subdgaleal hemorrhage, a subdural hemorrhage, and injuries to the

back of his head, forehead, eyes, cheeks, mouth, lips, and ears. Id. The coroner also identified

injuries to Jaime's forearm, knees, shoulder, lower legs, and shins, and found numerous bruises

covering a significant portion of his back. Id. ¶ 57. There was also a deep scalp abrasion over a

crushed area of scalp causing part of his forehead to be concaved inward. Id. ¶ 58. The postmortem examination identified "extensive, recent, unhealed laceration" in the abdominal cavity,

colon, and intestines. Id. ¶ 60. Sections of perforated small and extensive hemorrhaging were

found. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Jaime's physical status on the day of his death also indicated that he

had been denied adequate nutrition for a lengthy period of time. Id. ¶ 64. 

Plaintiff alleges that Jaime's injuries are consistent with his being "either punched or kicked

in the abdominal area on several occasions over a long period of time, with injuries in various stages

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

C-06-07293 RMW

SPT 6

of healing found internally." Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff further alleges that despite these numerous injuries

while Jaime has been at the Sifuentes' home, including many visible injuries, no report was ever

made by any social workers or by the Sifuentes pursuant to their duties as mandatory reporters. Id. ¶

61. According to the subsequent police investigation of the Sifuentes home, at least eight other

juveniles were in the home and a total of eleven individuals lived there in violation of state law for

placement of children in foster homes. Id. ¶ 66. In addition to not reporting the noncompliant

overcrowding, social workers allegedly failed to make mandatory monthly visits to the foster home. 

Id. ¶ 68. 

Social workers also purportedly failed to adequately address reports of child abuse in the

Sifuentes home including reports that (1) A.A. being held under water in the bathtub; (2) Jaime

being kicked brutally while climbing the stairs; (3) Jaime being whipped by a belt; (4) N.A. being

physically beaten and presenting before the social worker with two black eyes and bruising on his

forehead; (6) failure to provide adequate food and water to the children; (7) the older children being

allowed to punish the younger children; and (8) the children sleeping with the foster parents. Id. ¶¶

69-74. 

On December 11, 2005 Allen gave birth to another baby boy, J.A. Id. ¶ 92. After forty-eight

hours, a nurse removed J.A. from Allen's room and social worker Asharah entered the room and

began questioning Allen. Id. ¶ 95. Asharah then told Allen that she was taking J.A. into custody. 

Id. ¶ 96. 

II. ANALYSIS

The County Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's second claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. They move to dismiss the second and third claims on the basis that immunity bars

those claims. They move to dismiss the eighth and ninth claims for wrongful death on the basis that

Jaime's father, a necessary party to the action, must be joined in the action. Finally, the County

Defendants also move to strike the eighth and portions of the ninth claim.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Second Claim

The County Defendants interpret the second claim to challenge the detention of A.A., N.A.,

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

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and Jaime pursuant to the juvenile court proceedings and, therefore, argue that this court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to collaterally attack that state court proceeding under the RookerFeldman doctrine. Plaintiff agrees that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar such a challenge,

and clarifies that the second claim challenges the continued detention of the children for the period

from the date of removal to the date of the state court proceedings. Thus, she does not challenge the

detention pursuant to the court proceedings. Based on plaintiffs' clarification, it does not appear that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is implicated. 

Defendants continue to argue that unless plaintiff stipulates to combining the second claim

with the first claim which contests the social workers' initial decision to remove the children, that the

second and fifth claims seek to collaterally attack the juvenile court proceedings. The court

disagrees. The styling of the complaint is largely in the hands of the plaintiff. Here, plaintiff has

clarified that the first claim challenges the social workers' decision to remove the children from her. 

The second claim challenges the social workers' decision to keep the children in custody prior to the

filing of a petition with the juvenile court and pending hearing by the juvenile court in violation of

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 309. The second claim is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Based upon plaintiff's clarification, the County Defendants' motion to dismiss the second claim for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied. 

B. Motion to Dismiss Second and Third Claims

The County Defendants also move to dismiss the second and third claims on the basis that

plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "provides a cause of action

for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of

the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

1983). Plaintiff's second claim alleges a violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to

familial association because defendants Hralima, Mencia, Cassillas, and Mannion kept A.A., N.A.,

and Jaime in custody without basis prior to the juvenile proceedings. Plaintiff's third claims alleges 

that the removal of her children constituted a violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of

association with her then-boyfriend. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

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1. County of Monterey

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege any County custom, practice, or policy

that resulted in the alleged violations of her constitutional rights. "Municipal liability only attaches

when the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)). "Pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be liable for constitutional torts committed by its officials

according to municipal policy, practice, or custom." Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025,

1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Under Monell, actions by employees do

not create a § 1983 claim against a local government absent a showing that the alleged violation was

a result of official policy: 

[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity

is responsible under § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. "[W]here a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant

respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants . . . such a shortcoming

[can] be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389. 

According to plaintiff's allegations in support of her second claim, the County had a duty to

adequately train and educate social workers as to laws governing the conduct of child abuse referral

investigations, but "grossly failed in providing adequate training and education in this regard as to

result in the kinds of events and circumstances complained of by plaintiff." Id. ¶ 10. According to

the complaint, this failure to provide adequate training and education "exhibit[s] and constitute[s]

deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of the adult residents of the [County], and their

children." Id. Plaintiff also alleges that the County had a policy of failing to investigate the

circumstances leading to the removal of her children in order to determine whether immediate return

to a parent is appropriate under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 309. FAC ¶¶ 107-10. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE—No.

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As the Supreme Court noted in City of Canton, Ohio, "[i]t may seem contrary to common

sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train

its employees." 489 U.S. at 390. However, the Court expressly recognized that the failure to

properly train may give rise to § 1983 liability:

It may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the

need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to

result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the

failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which

the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes

injury.

Id. Here, plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to support an inference that the social workers

failed to adequately investigate the circumstances of the removal of the children from Allen due to

lack of adequate training and supervision. This is so particularly in light of the allegations that Allen

reported her daughter's disclosure of abuse immediately, was not the accused abuser, sought medical

and social services for her daughter and children, and immediately removed her children away from

the home of the accused abuser. 

The duties assigned to social workers include a determination of whether to remove a child

from her homes or parents. Removal of a child without a warrant or a reasonable belief that the

child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury constitutes a violation of both the parent's and

child's constitutional rights:

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be separated from their

children without due process of law except in emergencies. Officials violate this

right if they remove a child from the home absent information at the time of the

seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent

danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably

necessary to avert that specific injury. . . . Officials, including social workers, who

remove a child from its [sic] home without a warrant must have reasonable cause to

believe that the child is likely to experience serious bodily harm in the time that

would be required to obtain a warrant.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1531829, *4 (9th Cir. May 29, 2007). As

alleged, defendant Hralima did not provide any basis for removing the children from Allen. In light

of the duties assigned to social workers, such an omission strongly suggests a lack of proper training 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

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and supervision. Thus, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts as to her second

claim against the County. 

As defendants point out, plaintiff has not alleged any policy, custom, or practice as to third

claim that removal of the children constituted a violation of her First Amendment right to associate

with her then-boyfriend. Although Allen overheard Hralima comment that Allen chose her

boyfriend, who unknown at the time to Allen was a registered sex offender, over her children, such

an allegation is insufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim against the County. Similarly, it fails against

defendant Hralima as there is no allegation that plaintiff's association with her boyfriend was, in fact,

impaired. 

2. Social Workers

Plaintiff's second and third claims are also directed at defendants Hralima, Mencia, Cassillas,

and Mannion. Defendants argue that the second and third claims should be dismissed against the

social workers as social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial

functions related to the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings. "State actors,

including social workers, who perform functions that are 'critical to the judicial process itself' are

entitled to absolute immunity." Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

"Beyond those functions historically recognized as absolutely immune at common law, qualified and

only qualified immunity exists." Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). In determining

whether absolute immunity applies, "we look at the nature of the function performed, not the identity

of the actor who performed it." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 

Defendants rely on Doe to support their argument that plaintiff's claims against them are

barred by absolute immunity. However, Doe does not support that all of defendants' alleged conduct

are entitled to absolute immunity. In Doe, the court held that while the social worker was absolutely

immune for failure to adequately investigate the allegations of abuse and neglect against the

purported abuse and for fabricating evidence in the dependency proceedings, the court held that the

social worker was entitled only to qualified immunity for her actions in maintaining the child outside

the accused abuser's custody pending the detention hearing. See also Meyers v. Contra Costa

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4

 Although defendants frame their motion under Rule 12(b)(6), their arguments suggest that

the motion is more properly a Rule 12(b)(7) motion. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

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County Dep't Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the social worker's

action taken before institution of the juvenile proceedings was not entitled to absolute immunity). 

Here, as noted in supra § A, plaintiff's second claim challenges the social workers' retention of

custody over her children without basis prior to the detention hearing before the juvenile court. 

Thus, the social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity with respect to plaintiff's second

claim. 

C. Motion to Dismiss Eighth and Ninth Claims

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's eighth and ninth claims for failure to name a

necessary party. Defendants argue that under Cal. Code Civ. P. § 377.60, plaintiff has a mandatory

duty to join all known omitted heirs in a single action for wrongful death, but plaintiff has failed to

name Antonio Mendoza Ceballos ("Ceballos"), Jaime's father, as a party. Plaintiff argues that

Ceballos is merely an "alleged" father, was determined to not be entitled to reunification services or

custody under California law, and has not been established as Jaime's father via a paternity test. 

Plaintiff appears to contend that absent discovery resulting in a clear basis for concluding Ceballos

is Jaime's father, Ceballos need not be joined pursuant to § 377.60. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7)4

 provides that a claim may be dismissed for failure to join a party

under Rule 19. "To find that a person who is not joined is 'indispensable,' the absent person must

first be deemed necessary as a 'person to be joined if feasible' under Rule 19(a)(1) and (2)." 

Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2002). Rule 19(a) provides: 

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the

court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in

the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among

those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the

action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or

(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed

interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)-(2). 

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The question the court must consider in a Rule 19(a)(1) analysis is "whether the absence of

the party would preclude the district court from fashioning meaningful relief as between the parties." 

Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 879 (9th Cir. 2004). Rule

19(a)(2) considers whether the absent party's participation is necessary to protect its legally

cognizable interests or to protect existing parties from a significant risk of incurring multiple or

inconsistent obligations because of those interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i) & (ii). If the party

is "necessary" pursuant to Rule 19(a) and cannot be joined, "the court shall determine whether in

equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it or should be

dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." Schnabel, 302 F.3d at 1029-30;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 

Section 377.60 provides that a wrongful death cause of action can be asserted by, among

other parties, the decedent's parents. Thus, under California law, Ceballos has a legally cognizable

interest in the alleged wrongful death of Jaime. Although plaintiff contends that Ceballos has not

been established as a "parent," plaintiff provides no legal authority that requires an adjudication that

an individual is a father for reunification purposes or that a paternity test establishes an individual is

the natural father in order for him to be a "parent" under § 377.60 or a necessary party in a wrongful

death action. Here, Jaime's birth certificate names Ceballos as his birth father and plaintiff does not

assert that Ceballos's name is incorrectly included on the birth certificate. Moreover, Ceballos has

already separately filed a wrongful death action in state court. There is nothing indicating Ceballos

may not be joined in this action or that joinder of Ceballos would deprive this court of jurisdiction. 

Under these circumstances, Ceballos is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence

may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect his interest or leave defendants

subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by

reason of Ceballos's legally cognizable interest. 

Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiff's eighth and ninth claims. Plaintiffs may amend

those claims to join Ceballos as a party. 

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D. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike various claims and portions of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) provides:

Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive

pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days

after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at

any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally not granted unless it is clear that

the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the

litigation. Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs in favor of

denying the motion to strike." White v. Hansen, 2005 WL 1806367, *14 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (internal

quotes and citation omitted). 

Defendants move to strike the eighth and portions of the ninth claim in plaintiff's complaint. 

Plaintiff's eighth claim alleges wrongful death against the County and the social workers based on

their negligence in placing Jaime at the Sifuentes' home and for failing to supervise that placement. 

Plaintiff's ninth claim alleges wrongful death against the Sifuentes, the County, and the social

workers for violating Jaime's rights pursuant to state laws protecting children in foster care,

including health and safety requirements, provision of food and shelter, proper foster placement, and

proper training and certification of foster parents and foster homes. 

Defendants argue all or parts of the eighth and ninth claims should be stricken because (1)

the claims set forth the same bases for liability and are therefore redundant, (2) the County and

social workers are immune from suit for their discretionary acts in the supervision of minors in

foster care in the absence of a violation of a mandatory duty, and (3) that plaintiff cites to statutes

that do not give rise to a duty or prevent the harm alleged. The court disagrees. As noted above,

plaintiff's eighth and ninth claims set forth different theories for their wrongful death allegations. 

Although there is some overlap of facts and applicable statutes, this does not render the claims

redundant. Defendants' claims that they are immune and that plaintiff has not articulated a duty or

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statute that prevents the harm are not contentions properly raised in a motion to strike. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f). 

Defendants also argue that plaintiff's request for punitive damages in her first through third

claims should be stricken because punitive damages are not recoverable against a government entity

or against individuals acting in their official capacities under § 1983. The court agrees that punitive

damages may not be recovered from the County. See City of Newport Beach v. Fact Concerts, 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981) ("we hold that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983"). However, the court declines to strike the request for punitive damages against the

individual social worker defendants which, as defendants concede, plaintiff alleges are also sued in

their individual capacities. That defendants believe that plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim

against the social workers in their individual capacities or that the claims are not sufficient to give

rise to an award of punitive damages is not a proper basis for a motion to strike. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f). 

Citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 377.61, defendants move to strike plaintiff's request for punitive

damages for her wrongful death claims on the basis that California's wrongful death statute does not

permit recovery of such damages. While a representative or successor-in-interest of a decedent's

cause of action may recover, inter alia, punitive damages that the decedent would have incurred had

he lived, under § 377.61, "[p]unitive damages are not awardable to the heirs on their own cause of

action for wrongful death." Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573, 616 (2001). Because a request

for punitive damages by Allen in her California wrongful death actions for Jaime's death are barred

by § 377.61, such request is immaterial to the present action. Accordingly, the court grants

defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's request for punitive damages as to the eighth and ninth claims. 

Defendants also request that the court strike references to Jaime in plaintiff's first and second

claims for wrongful detention as moot. Defendants argue that since Jaime has now died, the court

does not have the ability to redress the alleged injuries. The court disagrees. As noted above,

plaintiff's allegations of wrongful detention relate to violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights due

to the removal and decision to retain custody of her children prior to the juvenile proceedings. It

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represents a past injury suffered and further does not seek redress in the form of returning the

children to plaintiff. Therefore, defendants' motion to strike is denied as to this request. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the court grants in part and denies in part County Defendants'

motion to dismiss and grants in part and denies in part County Defendants' motion to strike as

follows:

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss the second claim on the basis of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and abstention is denied upon the stipulation that plaintiff's claims

concern events prior to the juvenile court's order of detention;

2. Defendants' motion to dismiss the second claim on the basis that it does not state a

claim for relief is denied;

3. Defendants' motion to dismiss the third claim on the basis that it does not state a

claim for relief is granted without prejudice;

4. Defendants' motion to dismiss the eighth and ninth claims is granted without

prejudice; 

5. Defendants' motion to strike is granted as to the request for punitive damages against

the County based on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and as to the request for

punitive damages for plaintiff's eighth and ninth claims;

6. Defendants' motion to strike is denied in all other respects; 

7. Plaintiff's fourth, fifth and tenth claims are dismissed pursuant to plaintiff's

stipulation; 

8. Defendant Karen Asharah is dismissed from this action pursuant to plaintiff's

stipulation; and

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9. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days from the date of this order to amend the dismissed

claims. 

DATED: 6/18/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Robert Ross Powell rpowell@rrpassociates.com

Dennis R. Ingols dingols@rrpassociates.com

Douglas D. Durward Doug@durwardlaw.com

Counsel for Defendants:

Elizabeth Mary Kessel EMKessel@kesselaw.com

Scott Edward Boyer SEBoyer@kesselaw.com

Alison Yew yew@lbbslaw.com

Irene Takahashi takahashi@lbbslaw.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 6/18/07 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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