Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02901/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2901

__________

DAVID L. MURRAY,

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL OSTROWSKI, Family Court Judge; DAVID RYAN NUSSEY, Attorney;

ASHLEY BATTAGLIA, Salem County DCP&P Case Worker;

ALLISON E. ACCURSO, Appellate Judge; CATHERINE I. ENRIGHT, Appellate 

Judge; KAYLA OSCAR, Salem County DCP&P Case Worker;

CRAIG JESPERSEN, Salem County DCP&P Case Worker; LAUREN K. BUNN, Salem 

County DCP&P Supervisor; MICHELLE DOAMAN, Salem County DCP&P Supervisor;

KEITH DELOATCH, Salem County DCP&P Supervisor; EDWARD RYER

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00812)

District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 24, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 2, 2025)

___________

OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant David Murray seeks review of several orders of the District Court 

entered in his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm.

I.

At the root of this matter is Murray’s child custody case, presided over by Judge 

Michael Ostrowski, Jr., in the Superior Court – Chancery Division in Salem County, New 

Jersey. At one point in that case, the parties were directed to appear for a pretrial 

conference, during which the court would, inter alia, set a date for the plenary hearing 

and determine whether Murray’s son would be interviewed. The pretrial conference was 

adjourned and, in the weeks that followed, Murray fired his attorney and hired a new one. 

Murray’s new attorney failed to show for the next court date. Judge Ostrowski 

communicated to those present that the case was trial ready, and carried over the 

proceedings until the end of the week. When the parties and counsel all convened at that 

time, Murray’s new attorney expressed surprise: He had thought there were still pretrial 

issues to resolve, but the court was ready to (and did) begin the plenary hearing. That 

day, Judge Ostrowski issued an emergency order indefinitely suspending Murray’s 

parenting and visitation time. According to Judge Ostrowski, Murray appeared unwilling 

or unable to follow court orders or comport himself as a cooperative parent. 

Two months later, Judge Ostrowski issued a final custody order through which 

Murray was given joint legal custody of his son, but was not designated the parent of 

primary residence or the parent in charge of day-to-day medical decisions. In addition, 

Murray’s parenting time was limited to twenty-four hours every other weekend.

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Murray challenged Judge Ostrowski’s rulings, without success, in New Jersey’s 

appellate courts. He then filed suit in federal court against a number of people connected 

in some way to the custody case: Judge Ostrowski; opposing counsel (Nussey); social 

workers (Battaglia, Oscar, Jespersen) with the New Jersey Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency (DCP&P) and their supervisors (Dunn, Doaman, Deloatch); a law 

enforcement officer (Ryer); and two appellate judges (Judges Accurso and Enright). 

Murray’s thrice-amended pro se complaint raised federal due process and other claims. 

The defendants all filed dispositive motions, which the District Court granted in a 

series of orders. First, the District Court entered an order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion filed by Judges Ostrowski, Accurso, and Enright (collectively, the Judicial 

Defendants). The District Court determined that the Judicial Defendants were entitled to 

absolute immunity because the allegedly wrongful conduct was all comprised of judicial 

actions taken within the scope of the judges’ respective jurisdictions. Based on that 

immunity ruling, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Murray’s state law claims against the Judicial Defendants. 

That same day, the District Court entered a separate order granting the Rule 

12(b)(6) motion filed by the DCP&P Defendants (the social workers and their 

supervisors). The District Court determined that these defendants were shielded by 

Eleventh Amendment immunity because they were being sued for actions they allegedly 

took while performing their duties as state employees, i.e., they were being sued as if 

they were the state itself.

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Later that month, the District Court entered an order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion filed by Nussey. The District Court determined that Murray’s claims against 

Nussey were subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 or, alternatively, 

because they were implausible or barred by preclusion principles.

Thereafter, the District Court entered an order granting the dispositive motion filed 

by Ryer. The District Court determined that Ryer, insofar as he was being sued for 

conduct that allegedly occurred while performing his duties with the New Jersey State 

Troopers, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

The District Court also entered an order addressing a motion to seal filed by 

Murray. The District Court granted the motion to the extent it sought a permanent seal of 

certain materials from the custody proceedings, but otherwise denied the motion as 

procedurally defective. Finally, the District Court entered an order denying Murray’s 

motion for reconsideration of two earlier decisions, and directing the Clerk of Court to 

mark the case closed.

II.

Murray has filed a notice of appeal, an amended notice of appeal, and a document 

that was construed by our Clerk as a second amended notice of appeal. Only the second 

amended notice of appeal accomplishes Murray’s aim of securing appellate review of all 

1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923).

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the orders of the District Court described above.2 We have jurisdiction to review those 

orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo orders granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See U.S. ex rel. 

Bookwalter v. UPMC, 946 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2019). A district court’s ruling 

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, see

Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2000), and the same goes for rulings on 

motions to seal, see In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 197 (3d Cir. 2001).

III.

We have carefully considered and liberally construed the arguments made in 

Murray’s opening brief. Many of those arguments misunderstand the permissible scope 

of appellate issues—the scope is shaped by the orders under review—and the governing 

law. That latter point has particular significance in relation to Murray’s frequently errant 

reliance on, for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as a vehicle for appellate 

relief, criminal statutes, and criminal law concepts.

Insofar as Murray improperly views the lower federal courts as the natural next 

phase of appellate review of rulings in his state custody case, some of his arguments only

2 Murray’s original notice of appeal was filed after two of the relevant orders were 

entered, but before entry of the four others. That notice was premature and, after final 

judgment was entered, at best had the capacity to secure appellate jurisdiction over the 

earlier-entered orders only. See Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d

Cir. 1983) (holding that a premature notice of appeal can ripen upon the district court’s 

entry of final judgment); see also Marshall v. Comm’r Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 92, 96 

(3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (explaining that the Cape May Greene doctrine does not 

permit review of “rulings made after the filing of the notice of appeal”).

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serve to buttress the District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “which 

bars district court review of state court judgments.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 

938 F.3d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2019). Other of Murray’s arguments, like the one accusing the 

District Court of bias, are simply unfounded. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v.

Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a 

party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”); see 

also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994).

Ultimately, none of Murray’s arguments persuades us that the District Court 

committed reversible error in this action. The District Court’s immunity rulings, in 

particular, are supported by ample case law and are otherwise sound. See, e.g., P. R.

Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (“Absent 

waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may ‘be subject to suit in 

federal court’ under the Eleventh Amendment”) (citation omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502 

U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (per curiam) (“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a 

judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or 

was in excess of his authority.’”) (citation omitted); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989) (explaining that the State is not a “person” under § 1983);

Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782–83 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A]ction taken pursuant to a 

facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for 

damages[.]”). We reject as without any merit Murray’s argument that he has proven the 

defendant-appellees to be participants in a mass fraud that strips them of immunity from 

suit in federal court or liability under § 1983.

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Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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