Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07001/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2006 Decided May 5, 2006

No. 05-7001

JAMEL WHATLEY 

AND ESTHER WILLIAMS,

GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND OF MINOR 

JAMEL WHATLEY,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02961)

Diana M. Savit argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

William J. Earl, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert J. Spagnoletti,

Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney

General.

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Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Jamel Whatley and his

grandmother and guardian, Esther Williams, appeal the District

Court’s denial of their motion for attorneys’ fees in excess of the

limits or “caps” imposed by Congress for actions against the

District of Columbia (“District”) under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2000)

(“IDEA”). In the District’s appropriations acts of 1999, 2000,

and 2001, Congress capped attorneys’ fees the District could pay

parties who prevailed against it in judicial and administrative

IDEA actions. In § 140 of the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2002

(“§ 140”), Congress extended the application of those caps

indefinitely, mandating that no subsequent appropriations act

may fund attorneys’ fees above the caps for actions brought or

work completed during the previously capped fiscal years. 

Appellants argue that despite its plain language, § 140 did

not amend IDEA, because it was included in an appropriations

act. In addition, even if Congress intended to suspend the

courts’ ability to award such fees indefinitely, appellants

contend that § 140 should be construed narrowly so as to avoid

potential constitutional infirmities. According to appellants, if

§ 140 is read to extend beyond fiscal year 2002 (“FY 2002”), it

would unconstitutionally bind future Congresses and violate the

separation of powers doctrine by encroaching on the exclusive

domain of the judiciary. 

The District Court disagreed with appellants, finding that

§ 140 unambiguously amended IDEA and that no serious

constitutional issues were at stake. See Whatley v. District of

Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2004); Armstrong

v. Vance, 328 F. Supp. 2d 50, 61 (D.D.C. 2004). In the District

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Court’s view, § 140 undeniably limited the award of certain

attorneys’ fees indefinitely for actions under IDEA. We affirm.

The language of § 140 makes it perfectly clear that

Congress intended to limit indefinitely the award of above-cap

fees for work performed on actions brought under IDEA from

1999 to 2001. Although there is “‘a very strong presumption’”

that appropriations acts do not substantively change existing

law, see Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2000) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.

Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), that presumption

may be overcome, as it has been here. We also find, in

agreement with the District Court, that § 140 raises no

constitutional issues.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Congressional Fee Caps

In 1998, Congress expressed its dismay over the “growth in

legal expenses and litigation associated with special education

in the District of Columbia.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-670, at 50

(1998). Due to the proliferation of suits brought against the

District under IDEA, Congress believed that the District’s

sizeable annual legal bills began “usurping . . . resources from

education to pay attorney fees.” Id. In an effort to address this

issue, the House Committee on Appropriations added a rider to

the D.C. Appropriations Act of 1999 (“§ 130”) which was

intended to limit the District’s ability to pay opposing parties’

attorneys’ fees for the 1999 fiscal year (“FY 1999”). This rider

stated:

None of the funds contained in this Act may be made

available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a

party who prevails in an action, including an administrative

proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public

Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.) if – 

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(1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney

exceeds [$50]; or

(2) the maximum amount of compensation of the

attorney exceeds [$1,300], except that

compensation and reimbursement in excess of

such maximum may be approved for extended or

complex representation in accordance with section

11-2604(c), District of Columbia Code.

Section 130 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,

112 Stat. 2681, 2681-138-39 (1998). This rider was enacted by

Congress in 1998. Congress enacted similar provisions in 1999

and 2000 for the fiscal years of 2000 and 2001, respectively.

See Section 129 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act

of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (1999);

Section 122 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of

2001, Pub. L. No. 106-522, 114 Stat. 2440, 2464 (2000). 

In early 1999, a group of disabled students and their parents

challenged § 130’s cap on attorneys’ fees. They argued that

§ 130 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

and that it was preempted by IDEA. They also sought a

declaratory ruling that § 130 limited only the District’s ability to

pay attorneys’ fees, not the courts’ authority to award them. In

Calloway v. District of Columbia, this court rejected the group’s

constitutional and preemption claims, but agreed that § 130

“limits only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999

appropriations, not court authority to award fees under IDEA.”

216 F.3d at 9. In so finding, the court noted that there is a

“‘very strong presumption’ that appropriations acts do not

amend substantive law,” and that § 130 did not “unambiguously

express[] an intent to limit court authority to award fees under

IDEA.” Id.

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In direct response to Calloway, Congress sought to fortify

its fee-cap regime in the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2002

(“2002 Appropriations Act”). Rather than simply incorporating

another fee cap, Congress mandated:

Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C. 1988, 29

U.S.C. 794a, or any other law, none of the funds

appropriated under this Act, or in appropriations Acts for

subsequent fiscal years, may be made available to pay

attorneys’ fees accrued prior to the effective date of this Act

that exceeds a cap imposed on attorneys’ fees by prior

appropriations Acts that were in effect during the fiscal year

when the work was performed, or when payment was

requested for work previously performed, in an action or

proceeding brought against the District of Columbia Public

Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.).

Section 140(a) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act

of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923, 958 (2001)

(“Section 140(a)”). Congress subsequently returned to its pre2002 fee-cap framework in the District’s appropriations acts of

2003, 2004, and 2005. See Section 144 of the Consolidated

Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.

11, 131-32 (2003); Section 432 of the Consolidated

Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3,

141 (2004); Section 327 of the District of Columbia

Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat.

1322, 1344 (2004).

B. Jamel Whatley & the District of Columbia Public Schools

In 1995, Esther Williams became increasingly concerned

about her grandson Jamel’s lack of progress at school. He was

in the process of repeating first grade, although the D.C. Public

Schools (“DCPS”) had not undertaken a formal evaluation of his

academic development. On February 15, 1996, Williams filed

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a “Form 6,” which triggers DCPS’s evaluation and possible

placement of students that may have special academic needs.

DCPS thereafter began an assessment of Jamel that lasted

approximately two years. As a result of this delay, on February

18, 1998, Williams requested that the DCPS Student Hearing

Office conduct a due process hearing in accordance with IDEA.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

DCPS failed to act on Williams’ hearing request. On

December 4, 1998, Williams filed an action on Jamel’s behalf

in the District Court. She sought an order directing a due

process hearing on DCPS’s alleged failure to provide special

education services to Jamel. By this time, Jamel was 10 years

old and in the process of repeating third grade.

Not long after Williams filed suit, DCPS completed its

original assessment and developed an Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”) for Jamel. The IEP identified Jamel as both

learning disabled and speech/language impaired. DCPS

proposed that Jamel enter the Prospect-Goding Learning Center

(“Prospect”). He enrolled at Prospect in March 1999, where he

was placed in a full-time special education class and received

counseling and speech/language therapy.

Jamel’s due process hearing was finally held on October 27,

1999. On November 2, 1999, the hearing officer concluded that

DCPS demonstrated that the program at Prospect implemented

Jamel’s IEP and conformed with the requirements of IDEA.

However, she also found that DCPS’s “delay in determining

eligibility and initiating services [wa]s extensive,” and that the

“impact [of the delay on Jamel wa]s significant, particularly

[since he] entered special education at the highest intensity level

short of residential placement.” Hearing Officer’s

Determination (Oct. 27, 1999) at 6, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 69.

To remedy the damage caused by the District, the hearing

officer ruled that Jamel was entitled to compensatory relief.

This relief included a reading diagnostic evaluation, tutoring in

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reading, language arts, and math, and new evaluations after the

end of the 1999-2000 school year and prior to the 2001-02

school year. 

Based on their success in the administrative proceeding,

appellants sought from the District attorneys’ fees and costs.

IDEA authorizes federal district courts to award such fees and

costs to a “prevailing party” in any action or proceeding brought

under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The District

complied with appellants’ fee request, paying all of their

expenses (which were not subject to the cap) and as much of the

fees as were permitted by § 130.

Despite the apparent resolution of appellants’ complaints,

Williams believed that DCPS was not fully complying with the

hearing officer’s determination and that Jamel was making little

academic progress at Prospect. Thus, on April 4, 2001, she

requested a second due process hearing. This action was

rendered moot, however, as the parties reached a settlement on

May 8, 2001. DCPS agreed, inter alia, to pay for the

independent testing already completed, send out new placement

packets on Jamel’s behalf, and set up an expedited hearing

process should the terms of the agreement be violated. The

District again paid all expenses associated with appellants’

administrative action and as much of the attorneys’ fees as

permitted under the applicable appropriations cap. 

C. District Court Proceedings

On November 27, 2002, appellants filed a motion seeking

above-cap fees allegedly owed for work done in conjunction

with the two administrative proceedings. Specifically, they

requested $12,590.36 for work done on the two administrative

actions, and $11,687.50 in fees and $90.86 in expenses for

preparing the motion filed with the District Court and for other

“recent” administrative work for Jamel. Appellants asserted that

they are entitled to recover these above-cap fees, because

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construing § 140 to apply indefinitely would be unconstitutional.

Appellants claimed, in particular, that by binding Congress in

perpetuity, § 140 would violate Congress’s future right to amend

a statute. Appellants also argued that § 140 raises separation of

powers concerns, because (1) by effectively removing from the

courts discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees under

IDEA, Congress would be encroaching on the judiciary’s

exclusive domain; and (2) if the court reads § 140 as indefinitely

precluding the District’s payment of fees, the result would

improperly nullify this court’s decision in Calloway, which, in

appellants’ view, held that IDEA plaintiffs would be entitled to

above-cap fees if and when the caps expired. Finally, appellants

claimed that § 140 would also violate the takings clause of the

Fifth Amendment. 

 The District Court found no merit in appellants’ claims.

Citing Calloway, the District Court maintained that, although

there is a “presumption . . . that appropriation statutes generally

do not amend substantive law, it is only a presumption.”

Whatley, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 19. The District Court held that

Congress overcame that presumption with the plain language

and unequivocal legislative history of § 140. Id.; see also

Armstrong, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (stating that “in light of the

plain language of the prospective provision of Section 140

(2002), defendants cannot pay – and will never be required to

pay – [above-cap fees]”).

The District Court also rejected appellants’ separation of

powers arguments. The court found that Congress “‘did not use

[the fee cap] to limit the power of federal courts to award fees

under IDEA’. . . . It only limited defendants’ ability to pay

them.” Whatley, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (quoting Calloway, 216

F.3d at 12) (alteration in Whatley). Addressing appellants’

claim that Congress in effect unlawfully nullified Calloway, the

District Court found that, “[w]hile the decision in Calloway does

not prohibit parties from seeking future payments of past fees,

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it by no means requires payment if the cap is lifted.” Id. at 20

(emphasis added). The District Court noted that the issue of

“whether plaintiffs have a right to obtain past fee amounts from

subsequent years’ appropriations . . . was expressly left open in

Calloway.” Id. 

The District Court additionally rejected appellants’ takings

claim, holding that § 140 “permanently caps the amount of fees

counsel may collect for pre-2002 Appropriations Act efforts, but

it does not rise to the level of a taking.” Id. The trial court

found that, even when taken in conjunction with the

“temporary” nature of the annual fee caps imposed in 1999-

2001, Calloway “is not sufficient to create a property interest in

the excess fees.” Id.

Finally, the District Court held that, even if their

constitutional claims were viable, appellants were not entitled to

“any fees sought for their efforts in connection with the second

due process hearing request and the attendant settlement

agreement because they were not ‘prevailing parties’ under the

IDEA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon

[Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of

Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)].” Id. at 18.

The court determined that appellants could not be prevailing

parties by virtue of their settlement agreement, because they did

not “obtain a subsequent court order enforcing the settlement

agreement.” Armstrong, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 58.

Whatley and Williams now appeal the District Court’s

rejection of their claims. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Role of § 140 in IDEA

As the District Court found, there is little doubt that, in

enacting § 140, Congress intended to amend IDEA. Appellants’

counsel conceded as much during oral argument. See Recording

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of Oral Argument at 25:45 (agreeing that if § 140 was not a part

of an appropriations act, then Congress’s “obvious intent would

be to amend the IDEA”). The question raised by appellants,

then, is whether such an amendment is permitted in an

appropriations act. We review this question de novo, see

Calloway, 216 F.3d at 5, and hold that the unequivocal answer

here is yes. The normal presumption is that appropriations acts

do not amend substantive law, “and that when they do, the

change is only intended for one fiscal year.” Martin, 961 F.2d

at 273. However, when an appropriations act contains

“language [that] clearly indicates that it is intended to be

permanent,” its reach extends beyond the fiscal year for which

it was originally enacted. See id. at 274. 

The statutory language of § 140 unmistakably demonstrates

Congress’s intent to make the 1999-2001 fee caps permanent.

Unlike § 130 – the provision at issue in Calloway – § 140

mandates that the District is never to pay fees for work done or

fees requested in the relevant years:

[N]one of the funds appropriated under this Act, or in

appropriations Acts for subsequent fiscal years, may be

made available to pay attorneys’ fees accrued prior to the

effective date of this Act that exceeds a cap imposed on

attorneys’ fees by prior appropriations Acts . . . .

Section 140(a), Pub. L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923, 958

(emphasis added). The language chosen by Congress could not

be more straightforward.

Appellants argue that we should reject the District’s claim

that § 140 applies indefinitely, because, before the District

Court, the District “conceded” that § 140 was only meant to

apply for FY 2002. In appellants’ view, the District Court

should have ruled in their favor, because the parties did not

disagree over the meaning of § 140. We reject this argument,

for the District Court certainly was not obliged to adopt an

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interpretation of the statute that was patently wrong. “When an

issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not

limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties,

but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply

the proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper

Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). In this case, the

District’s initial interpretation of § 140 was simply incorrect,

because § 140’s limit on fee awards was unquestionably

designed to extend beyond FY 2002. Indeed, the District

reversed its position on this issue in this court. See Br. for

Appellee at 15-16, 18-19 (“[T]he district court determined that

the proposed interpretation of Section 140 initially submitted by

the District was not legally sound and chose not to apply it.

That decision was appropriate . . . .”). 

We find no ambiguity in § 140. In adopting this provision,

Congress intended to amend IDEA indefinitely to make it clear

that none of the funds appropriated under the 2002

Appropriations Act, or in appropriations acts for subsequent

fiscal years, may be used to pay attorneys’ fees accrued prior to

the effective date of the 2002 Appropriations Act if the fees

sought exceed the caps imposed on attorneys’ fees by prior

appropriations acts that were in effect during the fiscal year

when the work was performed, or when payment was requested

for work previously performed, in an action or proceeding

brought against DCPS under IDEA. In short, § 140 means what

it says and we are obliged to enforce its terms.

B. Constitutional Challenges to § 140

Appellants contend that the court should do everything

possible to read § 140 more narrowly in order to avoid the

allegedly unconstitutional implications of a permanent bar on

above-cap fees. They argue that an expansive reading would

unlawfully bind future Congresses and would violate separation

of powers principles. We review these claims de novo, see

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that

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pure questions of law are reviewed de novo), and find them

unavailing. 

First, appellants assert that § 140 “cannot be given effect

beyond the year for which it was enacted because it attempts,

impermissibly, to bar future Congresses from revisiting the issue

of paying the accumulated fees awarded under . . . Calloway.”

Br. for Appellants at 20. In other words, appellants maintain

that “a future Congress is free to repeal, modify or otherwise

invalidate a prior Congress’s legislative act.” Id. Appellants are

correct in this assertion. Their argument fails, however, because

nothing contained in the 2002 Appropriations Act prohibits

Congress from amending IDEA in the future. Indeed, the lone

case appellants cite for support, Lovett v. United States, 66 F.

Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945), illustrates this point. Similar to the

case at bar, the provision at issue in Lovett was “statutory, not a

part of the Constitution,” and therefore it “may or may not turn

out to be permanent legislation.” 66 F. Supp. at 147. Thus,

while § 140 bars payment in “subsequent fiscal years,” Congress

may, as it sees fit, change course and amend this directive.

We also find no merit in appellants’ argument that § 140

violates separation of powers principles by “impermissibly

interfer[ing] with the judiciary’s prerogative to regulate the bar

and attorney-client relationships.” Br. for Appellants at 16. The

“judiciary’s prerogative[s]” do not allow the courts to disregard

congressional enactments setting the parameters for the award

of attorneys’ fees. As we noted in Calloway, Congress

undoubtedly may “limit the power of federal courts to award

fees under IDEA.” 216 F.3d at 12. In this case, the contested

fees are plainly authorized by statute, see 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B), so the courts may award fees under the statute

only as directed by Congress.

Two arguments raised by appellants before the District

Court elude consideration here. First, since we find that § 140

bars the award – beyond that which plaintiffs have already

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obtained – of fees for work done and fees sought during the

fiscal years of 1999, 2000, and 2001, we decline to reach the

issue of whether appellants were “prevailing parties” within the

meaning of IDEA as a result of the settlement reached in the

second administrative action. Appellants are not entitled to

additional fees under the statute, so therefore their prevailing

party status is currently of no moment. Second, we need not

consider whether § 140 amounts to a taking, because appellants

failed to raise the issue on appeal. See United States ex rel.

Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(“Ordinarily, arguments that parties do not make on appeal are

deemed to have been waived.”).

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court is hereby affirmed for

the reasons given above.

So ordered.

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