Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02907/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERTO RIVERA CASANOVA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

 Case No.: 14-cr-0312-L 

 18-cv-2907-L 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE [DOC. 80] 

 Petitioner Roberto Rivera Casanova, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to Title 28, United States 

Code, § 2255 (the “Petition”). (See Petition [ECF NO. 80].) Respondent United States 

of America opposes. (See Opposition [ECF NO. 82].) For the reasons discussed below, 

the Court DENIES the Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2014, Customs and Border Protections Officers arrested Petitioner 

after 38 kilograms of cocaine, 6.81 kilograms of pure methamphetamine and 1 kilogram 

of heroin were discovered in hidden compartments in his car. Petitioner’s wife and three 

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children under the age of thirteen were also in the car with him. Petitioner was charged 

with importation of cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 

960. 

On November 3, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement for 

knowingly importing methamphetamine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 952 and 960. (See Plea Agreement [Doc. 38].) As part of the plea agreement, 

Petitioner agreed to waive his right to appeal and collaterally attack his conviction and 

sentence. (See id. at ¶ XI.) On April 13, 2015, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 132 

months in custody followed by three years of supervised release. (See Judgment [Doc. 

52].) 

Petitioner appealed his sentence on April 21, 2015, raising two grounds: (1) the 

district court erred by denying his fourth request for a new attorney; and (2) the Court 

erroneously relied solely on the amount of drugs in Petitioner’s possession when it denied 

a minor-role adjustment. (See Notice of Appeal [ECF NO. 53].) The Ninth Circuit 

affirmed Petitioner’s sentence in a memorandum disposition. See United States v. Rivera 

Casanova, 15-50180 (9th Cir. 2016) [ECF NO.76]. Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari 

with the United States Supreme Court which was denied on October 2, 2017. See # 45 

Ninth Circuit Docket. 

Petitioner filed the current motion pursuant to section 2255 on December 24, 2018. 

On February 7, 2019, Respondent filed a response in opposition. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal sentencing court is authorized to discharge or 

re-sentence a defendant if it concludes that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by 

law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

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The remedy available under § 2255 is as broad and comprehensive as that provided 

by a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-85 (1979). 

But this remedy does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing. Id. 

at 187. A mere error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the 

claimed error “resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a proceeding 

inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hamilton v. United States, 

67 F.3d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 

783-84 (1979)). 

A defendant can waive the right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence if 

the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 

672 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). However, a defendant may collaterally attack his sentence via 

§2255 if he raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Abarca,

985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Timeliness and Waiver 

As a primary matter, the government contends that the Petition must be denied 

because it was filed past the one-year statute of limitations that applies to petitions under 

section 2255. (Oppo. at 10). 

Under section 2255: 

(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under 

this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction 

becomes final; 

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion 

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was 

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

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(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

 Petitioner’s case became final when the United States Supreme Court denied his 

writ of certiorari on October 2, 2017, making the deadline to file his section 2255 motion 

October 2, 2018. Petitioner filed the current Petition on December 24, 2018, over two 

months past the statutory deadline. Petitioner has not asserted any defenses for his 

untimeliness, therefore the Petition was not filed within the applicable statute of 

limitations and the Court may dismiss it on this ground. 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). 

 Moreover, the Petition is barred by the plea agreement appellate waiver to the 

extent Petitioner is raising challenges to his conviction and sentence other than 

ineffective assistance of counsel. In the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed that he would 

waive “to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the 

sentence...unless the Court imposed a custodial sentence above the high end of the 

guideline range as recommended by the Government, at the time of sentencing.” (Plea at 

10). The plea agreement was initialed on every page by Petitioner indicating he 

knowingly and voluntarily agreed to its terms. (Id.) Even if Petitioner’s claims were not 

procedurally barred, they fail on the merits as illustrated below. 

B. The Petition Lacks Merit.

Petitioner argues that his attorney provided deficient representation by failing to 

object to the Court’s decision to deny minor role based on drug amount alone, and by 

failing to draw the Court’s attention to the other factors it should have considered. (Pet.

8.) Petitioner contends that counsel should have directed the Court to Amendment 794 of 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines which amended the minor role commentary in 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 note 3 to provide a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by the 

sentencing court when determining if a defendant qualifies for a minor role adjustment. 

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(Id.) Because drug quantity is only one factor to be considered under the amended 

commentary, Petitioner contends defense counsel erred in failing to object to the Court’s 

denial of minor role based solely on drug quantity. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner is impermissibly attempting to raise the same 

substantive challenge to the Court’s refusal to grant him a minor role reduction as he raised 

in his direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit, but section 2255 may not be used to relitigate 

questions which have already been adjudicated on direct appeal. (Oppo. at 12). To the 

extent the claims are correctly pled as ineffective assistance of counsel, Respondent 

contends Petitioner has failed to establish a valid claim because his attorney’s performance 

was not deficient and he did not suffer prejudice as a result of counsel’s performance. 

(Oppo at 14.) 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a 

two-prong test to determine whether counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require 

reversal of a conviction. First, petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Id. at 687. In order to prove deficient performance, petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. In other words, 

petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness, considering all the circumstances presented in a particular case. Id. at 

688. The Supreme Court further elaborated that there is a “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . .” 

Id. at 699. 

To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland, petitioner must prove that counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In order to 

prove prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s errors were so serious as to 

deprive the defendant of a fair and reliable trial. Id. Otherwise stated, the petitioner must 

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demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s defective 

assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. 

The Court finds no merit to Petitioner’s claim that counsel provided deficient 

performance by failing to challenge the Court’s reliance on drug quantity to deny a minor 

role adjustment. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly “recognized that possession of a 

substantial amount of narcotics is grounds for refusing to grant a sentence reduction,” 

noting that it is unlikely that such large amounts of drugs would be “entrusted to a minor 

player.” United States v. Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, Petitioner had 38 kilograms of cocaine, 6.81 kilograms of pure 

methamphetamine and 1 kilogram of heroin hidden in compartments in his car. The Court 

stated that the “combined total value of all these drugs is $913,480,” and held, “I cannot 

give the defendant a minor role for this amount of drugs that he has in his vehicle.” The 

Ninth Circuit upheld the Court’s denial of a minor-role adjustment noting that the “stated 

rationale for rejecting Rivera Casanova’s request” was adequate. United States v. Rivera 

Casanova, 671 Fed. Appx. 594 (9th Cir. 2016)(unpublished). It would have been futile 

for defense counsel to challenge the Court’s reasoning to deny minor role based on the 

quantity of drugs because the Court’s determination was supported by controlling 

authority. See United States v. Shah, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir.) (failure to raise a 

meritless legal argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel). 

Yet despite denying minor role, the Court considered memoranda filed by the 

parties, including defense counsel’s request for minor role departure based on his status 

as a courier and a recommendation that Petitioner serve a sentence of 60 months. The 

Court weighed this request against the aggravating factors raised in the Government’s 

sentencing papers such as the complexity of the hidden compartments, the fact that 

Petitioner brought his minor children along as “cover,” and the fact that he had crossed 

the border via the SENTRI lanes 35 times leading up to the time of the offense. After 

evaluating the various section 3553 factors, the Court departed downward significantly 

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from the applicable guideline range of 210-262 months custody, to impose a sentence of 

132 months custody. 

The Court further finds that there is no merit to Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel 

erred by failing to argue that he was entitled to the benefit of Amendment 794 of the 

sentencing guidelines. In 2015, the Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to 

§ 3B1.2, the mitigating role sentence reduction, to add a non-exhaustive list of factors to 

be considered when a court is determining if a defendant qualifies for a minor role 

reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2; supp. to app. C amend. 794. The Amendment may be 

applied retroactively. 

Petitioner’s sentencing took place almost six months before the Amendment was 

enacted, therefore his attorney did not provide deficient performance for failing to call the 

Court’s attention to changes in the guidelines that weren’t in effect at the time of 

sentencing. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that even if the Amendment commentary 

was applied retroactively to Petitioner’s claim, he was not entitled to resentencing, 

holding the Court was “satisfied that the district court’s stated rationale for rejecting 

Rivera Casanova’s request for a reduction remains adequate under the revised 

commentary.” 671 F.App’x 594, 595 (9th Cir 2016). For these reasons, the Court finds 

no merit to Petitioner’s claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and 

DENIES the Petition.1

 

                                               

1

 Petitioner requests that the Court construe his petition as a motion for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(2) if the Court determines that these claims are not properly considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

(Pet. at 11). Section 3582(c) authorizes a court to reduce the term of imprisonment of a defendant 

whose sentencing range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 994(o), after considering the factors enumerated in section 3553(a) to the extent they apply. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Although the Court may sua sponte grant a motion under section 3582, the 

Court declines to do so in the absence of briefing by both parties in light of the circumstances of this 

case. 

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the above, the Court DENIES the Petition and further, finds that the 

issues presented in the Petition were neither debatable among jurists of reason, nor would 

another court resolve the issues in a different manner. Accordingly, a Certificate of 

Appealability is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 10, 2020 

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