Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01715/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-01715-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARRIEM MOHAMMED-EL

Plaintiff, No. C 10-1715 PJH

v. ORDER OF DISMISSAL

RICHARD LINDNER, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff Karriem Mohammed-El filed this action on April 22, 2010, alleging breach of

contract, fraud, and possibly other claims against defendants Richard Linder (Chief

Financial Officer of defendant AT&T), Randall Stephenson (Chief Executive Officer of

AT&T), and AT&T. Also on April 22, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court has reviewed the complaint, and finds that the action

must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The court may authorize a plaintiff to file an action in federal court without

prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is

unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). When a complaint

is filed IFP, it must be dismissed prior to service of process if it is frivolous or malicious,

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United States District Court

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fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from defendants who are immune from

suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (9th Cir.

1984). 

A complaint is frivolous for purposes of § 1915(e) if it lacks any arguable basis in fact

or in law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328- 30 (1989). A complaint lacks an

arguable basis in law only if controlling authority requires a finding that the facts alleged fail

to establish an arguable legal claim. Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1990). 

When a complaint is dismissed under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave

to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from

the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Cato v.

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal of complaint as frivolous). 

B. Analysis

The basis of plaintiff’s claims appears to be that AT&T has terminated some service

that plaintiff was receiving from AT&T. Plaintiff seeks damages in an amount approaching

$25 million. However, the court finds that the complaint must be dismissed because it is

incomprehensible. 

As an initial matter, plaintiff unaccountably asserts admiralty jurisdiction under the

“savings to suitors” clause, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). The “saving to suitors” clause

does not provide an independent source of federal admiralty jurisdiction, but rather, is a

statement that state courts may adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings where

the defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation. See Ghotra

v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997). The “savings to suitors”

clause also permits a plaintiff with a maritime claim to bring an action “at law” in the federal

district court, provided that the requirements of diversity of citizenship and amount in

controversy are met. Id. 

However, plaintiff pleads no facts to support an admiralty or maritime claim. The

fundamental interest giving rise to admiralty jurisdiction is the protection of maritime

commerce. See Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991); Ventura

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Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine Kathleen, 305 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002). As noted above,

the basis of plaintiffs’ claims appears to be some interruption or termination of a service

provided by AT&T, and there are no facts alleged that show any connection to an admiralty

claim.

Plaintiff refers to himself as “third-party plaintiff,” who is “not appearing generally.” 

However, he cannot be a third-party plaintiff, as he is not alleged to be a defendant who

has filed a third-party complaint against a third party. In addition, he asserts that he is

“standing in [his] unlimited commercial liability as a Secured Party Creditor” and he

“request[s] that the officers of the court do the same.” This appears to be intended as a

reference to some status under the Uniform Commercial Code, but the reference is entirely

unclear.

Second, the allegations supporting the three causes of action are insufficiently pled. 

In his breach of contract claim, plaintiff refers to defendant Richard Lindner as “the debtor,”

and to AT&T as “the co-conspirator.” He claims that he himself “is not the debtor,” and that

by interrupting his service, “the debtor” and “the co-conspirator” breached “that binding

contract.” He alleges further that neither “the debtor” nor “the co-conspirator” has “a written

instrument to back its demand instrument; and that “the debtor” has “no antecedent

contract obligation that requires me to perform.” He claims that he has “gained a security

interest in the instrument against the debtor.”

Plaintiff asserts that he, “on a number of occasions,” remitted to defendant Richard

Lindner an executed “naked acceptance of the submitted ‘formatted coupons’” that were

“accepted for value” (or “A4V”) and “returned for value.” He adds that “[i]t is the retention of

the A4V formatted presentment that is the basis for a binding contract,” and that “[s]ince

there is no pledge to support the instrument, it was issued and transferred for value.”

Plaintiffs’ allegations of breach of contract are gibberish and do not state a claim. To

state a claim for breach of contract under California law, a plaintiff must allege facts that

show the existence of a contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for non-performance,

defendant's breach, and damages to plaintiff. Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc., 171 Cal. App.

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 Moreover, in a case with multiple defendants, “Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint

to merely lump multiple defendants together but requires plaintiffs to differentiate their

allegations when suing more than one defendant and inform each defendant separately of the

allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d

756, 764-65 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted).

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4th 1305, 1352 (2009). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of such factual allegations, and the

breach of contract claim must therefore be dismissed.

 The allegations of fraud in the second and third causes of action are equally

deficient. In California, the essential elements of a claim for fraud are a misrepresentation

(false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”);

intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; justifiable reliance; and resulting damage. In re

Estate of Young, 160 Cal. App. 4th 62, 79 (2008). 

In addition, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, the facts supporting a claim of

fraud must be pled with particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The party alleging fraud

must include an account of the “time, place, and specific content of the false

representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Edwards

v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). “To comply with Rule 9(b),

allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular

misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against

the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Bly-Magee v. California,

236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted).1 

Here, plaintiff simply alleges in a conclusory fashion that “the debtor” willfully

conspired to commit fraud in collusion with “the co-conspirator” and “the racketeer”

(defendant Randall Stephenson). He pleads no facts showing the existence of any of the

elements of a claim of fraud, and no facts showing the time, place, or specific content of the

alleged false representations, or the identities of the parties to the specific

misrepresentations. Accordingly, the fraud claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The court notes that in the third cause of action, plaintiff also alleges that “the

debtor,” the “co-conspirator,” and “the racketeer” conspired to commit “dishonor in

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commerce,” “collusion,” “conspiracy,” “racketeering,” “extortion,” “coercion,” “abuse of

power,” “denial of due process,” and “theft.” As with the breach of contract and fraud

claims, plaintiff pleads no facts to support any of these allegations. Moreover, in California,

conspiracy is not an independent tort – “[a] complaint for civil conspiracy states a cause of

action only when it alleges the commission of a civil wrong that causes damage.” Okun v.

Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 454 (1981).

Finally, plaintiff asserts a “counterclaim,” which pleads no facts and states no cause

of action, and which, in any event, is improperly included as part of the complaint herein. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e). Although amendment is unlikely to correct the deficiencies in the

complaint, the court will permit plaintiff one opportunity to amend the complaint to state a

valid basis for the court’s jurisdiction, and to allege facts to support his causes of action. 

Any amended complaint must be filed no later than June 11, 2010, and will be

subject to review under § 1915. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by this

deadline, the court will dismiss the action. 

In the alternative, plaintiff may withdraw the IFP application, pay the filing fee, and

serve the defendants with the summons and complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2010 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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