Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07228/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07228-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DANIEL RAY LOYD, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

SPEARMEN, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 18-cv-07228-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 

TO EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES; 

REQUIRING PETITIONER TO MAKE 

ELECTION 

Re: Dkt. No. 12 

Petitioner Daniel Ray Loyd, an inmate at High Desert State Prison, in Susanville, 

California, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 

conviction from Lake County Superior Court. Pending before the Court is respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. Dkt. No. 12. Petitioner has filed an 

opposition, Dkt. No. 16, and respondent has filed a reply, Dkt. No. 17. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND 

A Lake County Superior Court jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder (Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a)); assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)); possession of a 

firearm by a felon (Cal. Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)); possession of ammunition by a felon (Cal. 

Penal Code § 12316(b)(1)); and found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder was 

committed during an attempted robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)) and multiple gun use 

allegations. The court found true prior conviction and prior prison term allegations, and sentenced 

petitioner to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole and an additional term of 26 

years, 4 months. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 37. 

On December 5, 2017, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and 

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sentence. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 26-62. 

On January 12, 2018, petitioner submitted a petition for review to the California Supreme 

Court, challenging his convictions and sentence on the following grounds: (1) the trial court’s 

erroneous instructions on felony murder causation and the trial court’s failure to instruct on 

provocative conduct murder deprived him of due process, a fair trial and a jury verdict under the 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser-included 

offenses to first-degree felony murder based on the conflicting evidence as to whether a robbery 

occurred deprived him of a fair trial; (3) the trial court’s refusal to permit the jury to have defense 

counsel’s argument regarding proximate cause reread after the jury instructions had been given 

deprived petitioner of due process and his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel; and (4) the trial court’s erroneous admission of his custodial statement notwithstanding 

his invocation of his right to counsel deprived him of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

to freedom from self-incrimination. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 3-67. On March 14, 2018, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 69. 

On May 4, 2018, petitioner filed a habeas petition, Case No. A154216, in the California 

Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, which was denied on May 16, 2018, without prejudice to 

the petition first being filed in superior court.1 Dkt. No. 12-1 at 73. 

On July 9, 2018, petitioner filed another habeas petition, Case No. A154744, in the 

California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, which was denied on July 12, 2018.2 Dkt. 

No. 12-1 at 75. 

On September 24, 2018,3

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court seeking review of the California Court of Appeal’s July 12, 2018 denial of his state habeas 

 

1

 The May 4, 2018 habeas petition is not part of the record before the Court, so it is unclear what 

claims were raised in this petition. 

2

 The July 9, 2018 habeas petition is not part of the record before the Court, so it is unclear what 

claims were raised in this petition. 

3

 In determining when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the “mailbox” rule applies. A 

petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for 

mailing. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 996 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 

1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005). According to the proof of service, petitioner handed his letter to prison officials for 

mailing on September 24, 2018. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 99. 

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petition. The petition for review challenged his conviction on the following grounds: 

(1) deprivation of due process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel when trial counsel admitted 

that petitioner was guilty of all charges; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel 

acknowledged petitioner’s guilt during closing argument, failed to investigate a potentially 

meritorious defense, and failed to cross-examine witnesses effectively; (3) ineffective assistance of 

counsel where counsel admitted in closing argument that petitioner was guilty of robbery leaving 

the jury with no choice but to find petitioner guilty of felony murder; (4) ineffective assistance of 

counsel where counsel performed an inadequate investigation by failing to obtain an expert 

witness that could testify that petitioner’s pistol could not have shot Ms. Quiett if she were 

standing and by failing to obtain the 911 call log and the CAD log; (5) ineffective assistance of 

counsel where counsel had inadequate knowledge of the law in that counsel failed to understand 

the principle of felony murder; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel effectively 

failed to assert a legal defense when counsel asserted a defense of foreseeability in felony murder 

case while also admitting that petitioner committed the robbery and caused the death of the victim; 

(7) ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel admitted petitioner was guilty of all crimes 

without a tactical reason; (8) ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel refused to assert 

second shooter defense; (9) ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel called petitioner to 

testify regarding a defense that trial counsel chose to abandon; and (10) cumulative error. Dkt. 

No. 12-1 at 77-98. 

On September 26, 2018, the Clerk of the California Supreme Court returned the petition 

for review to petitioner unfiled with the following cover letter: “We hereby return unfiled your 

petition for review, which we received on September 26, 2018. A check of the Court of Appeal 

docket shows that an order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus [was] filed on July 12, 2018. 

This court lost jurisdiction to act on any petition for review after August 13, 2018. (See Cal Rules 

of Court, rule 8.500(e).) Without this jurisdiction, this court is unable to consider your request for 

legal relief.” Dkt. No. 12-1 at 101. 

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On November 8, 2018,4 petitioner filed the instant petition in the Eastern District of 

California. Dkt. No. 1. On November 29, 2018, this case was transferred from the Eastern 

District of California to this district. Dkt. No. 3. On January 31, 2019, this Court found that the 

petition stated the following cognizable claims for federal habeas relief: (1) the trial court erred by 

failing to correctly instruct the jury on the causation required for felony-murder and for failing to 

instruct the jury that if the felony-murder rule did not apply, the murder charge was governed by 

the provocative act murder rule; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lesser 

included offenses; (3) the trial court erred in failing to read to the jury defense counsel’s closing 

argument regarding proximate cause as requested by the jury; (4) the trial court erred by admitting 

petitioner’s custodial statement made after he invoked his right to counsel; (5) trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance on multiple grounds; and (6) trial counsel’s errors resulted in 

cumulative error. Dkt. No. 10. 

DISCUSSION 

 Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss this petition as unexhausted, arguing that the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the cumulative error claim are not exhausted. Dkt. 

No. 12. Petitioner argues that the Court should not dismiss this petition as unexhausted because 

he has made a “valiant attempt to follow court procedures and exhaust all claims in accordance to 

rules of court,” and because the cover page of the habeas petition filed in the California Court of 

Appeals was incorrectly labelled. Dkt. No. 16 at 3-4. In the alternative, petitioner requests that he 

be granted leave under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) to “have all claims 

addressed in a[n] original habeas proceeding with properly titled cover page, as petitioner now 

understands that there is a difference from a petition for review, and a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, with different filing timelines.” Dkt. No. 16 at 4. The parties agree that Claim Nos. 1 

through 4 were exhausted by the January 12, 2018 petition for review of the direct appeal. 

A. Legal Standard 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings 

 

4

 According to the proof of service, petitioner handed his letter to prison officials for mailing on 

November 8, 2018. Dkt. No. 1 at 12. 

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either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, 

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by providing the highest state court 

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in 

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). The 

state’s highest court must be given an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is 

discretionary. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (petitioner must invoke “one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”). To comply with the fair 

presentation requirement, a claim must be raised at every level of appellate review; raising a claim 

for the first time on discretionary review to the state’s highest court is insufficient. Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that where petitioner only raised federal 

constitutional claim on appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court, claim not fairly presented). 

The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine reflects a policy of federal-state comity to give 

the state “an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal 

rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

However, a district court may not grant the writ unless state court remedies are exhausted or 

exhaustion there is either “an absence of available state corrective process” or such process has 

been “rendered ineffective.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)–(B). A federal district court must 

dismiss a federal habeas petition containing any claim as to which state remedies have not been 

exhausted. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005). 

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if a federal claim has been “fairly presented” 

to the state courts. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. A federal claim is “fairly presented” to the state 

supreme court if it is raised by a procedural method which complies with the state appellate rules 

and involves a “permissible method of raising an issue in [the state supreme court].” Farmer v. 

Baldwin, 563 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (federal claims fairly presented when petitioner 

“complied with the appellate rules” by referring to brief with attachment containing federal claims 

in his petition for review before Oregon Supreme Court). However, it does not constitute “fair 

presentation” if the claim is raised by a procedural method which makes it unlikely that the claim 

will be considered on the merits. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (presentation 

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by way of petition to state supreme court for allocatur, which under state procedure may be 

considered only when “there are special and important reasons therefor,” insufficient to exhaust); 

Kibler v. Walters, 220 F. 3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (where state habeas petitioner failed to 

satisfy procedural requirements for presentation of his claims to Washington Supreme Court, he 

failed to fairly present his claims for purposes of federal habeas corpus review). 

B. Analysis 

 The Court agrees that petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies for his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. Petitioner’s September 2018 petition for 

review failed to satisfy the procedural requirements for the presentation of claims to the California 

Supreme Court. Rule 8.500(e) of the California Rules of Courts requires that a petition for review 

be served and filed within ten days after the Court of Appeal decision is final. Cal. R. Ct. 

8.500(e). Under Rule 8.366(b), a Court of Appeal decision in a criminal appeal is final thirty days 

after filing. Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b). Petitioner’s 2018 petition for review sought review of the 

California Court of Appeal’s July 12, 2018 denial of his habeas petition and was filed on 

September 24, 2018, over a month after the appellate court’s decision became final. Petitioner’s 

2018 petition for review therefore failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 

Rule 8.500(e) for the presentation of claims to the California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust should be excused because he made a sincere 

attempt to timely exhaust his state remedies; that he did not understand that the California 

Supreme Court’s statement that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claims meant that his claims 

had not been considered by the California Supreme Court; and that his petition for review would 

have been considered by the California Supreme Court if he had not mislabeled his petition for 

review. Dkt. No. 16. The Court does not have discretion to ignore the exhaustion requirement. 

Federal law and the United States Supreme Court require the dismissal of a federal habeas petition 

that contains a claim (or claims) as to which state remedies have not been exhausted. See Rhines, 

544 U.S. at 273. The only exception to this requirement is where there is an absence of available 

state corrective process or where such process has been rendered ineffective, which is not the case 

here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)-(B). Moreover, generally speaking, a pro se prisoner’s 

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confusion regarding the law does not excuse the failure to exhaust state remedies. See Rose, 455 

U.S. at 520 (exhaustion requirement applies equally to pro se litigants because “[j]ust as pro se 

petitioners have managed to use the federal habeas machinery, so too should they be able to 

master this straightforward exhaustion requirement”); see also Barbarin v. Madden, No. ED CV 

17-00257-VBF-LAL, 2018 WL 6303889, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2018) (“Although petitioner is 

proceeding pro se, that does not excuse his noncompliance with exhaustion and pleading 

requirements.”). While petitioner is correct that state habeas petitions are not subject to Rule 

8.500(e), the record does not support petitioner’s claim that the return of his September 2018 

petition for review was solely due to an error in labelling the pleading. Petitioner clearly stated in 

the body of the pleading that he was seeking review of the July 2018 state appellate court denial of 

his habeas petition. In other words, his pleading clearly petitioned the California Supreme Court 

for review of the state appellate court’s July 2018 decision. The California Supreme Court 

properly considered the pleading as a petition for review and subjected it to the procedural 

requirements set forth in Rule 8.500(e). Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has not 

exhausted his state court remedies for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 

cumulative error. 

C. Rhines Stay 

The instant petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims and therefore is what 

is referred to as a “mixed” petition. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Federal courts are required to 

dismiss mixed petitions. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510 (every claim raised in federal habeas petition 

must be exhausted). Due to a critical one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas 

petitions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), see 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d), the Court is reluctant to dismiss the mixed petition (and possibly cause a laterfiled petition to be time-barred) without giving petitioner the opportunity to elect whether to 

proceed with just his exhausted claims, or to try to exhaust the unexhausted claims before having 

this Court consider all his claims. Accordingly, instead of an outright dismissal of the action, the 

Court will allow Petitioner to choose whether he wants to: (1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and 

go forward in this action with only the exhausted claims, or (2) dismiss this action and return to 

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state court to exhaust all claims before filing a new federal petition presenting all of his claims, or 

(3) file a motion for a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his unexhausted claims in the 

California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner is cautioned that the options have risks which he should take into account in 

deciding which option to choose. If he chooses option (1) and goes forward with only his 

exhausted claims, he may face dismissal of any later-filed petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If he 

chooses option (2), dismissing this action and returning to state court to exhaust all claims before 

filing a new federal petition, his new federal petition might be rejected as time-barred. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). If he chooses option (3), he must file a motion in this court to obtain a stay and 

(if the motion is granted) then must act diligently to file in the California Supreme Court, to obtain 

a decision from the California Supreme Court on his unexhausted claims, and to return to this 

court. And under option (3), this action stalls: this Court will do nothing further to resolve the 

case while petitioner is diligently seeking relief in state court. 

If petitioner chooses to request a stay, he may seek a stay pursuant to either Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005), or Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). A 

petitioner seeking a stay pursuant to Rhines is required to show (1) “good cause” for his failure to 

exhaust his claims in state court; (2) that his unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; and 

(3) that he has not engaged in “intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

A petitioner seeking a stay pursuant to Kelly is not required to show good cause as under Rhines, 

but rather must show that the amendment of any newly exhausted claims back into the petition 

satisfies both Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005), by sharing a “common core of operative 

facts,” and Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), by complying with the statute of limitations. 

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding district court’s dismissal of 

unexhausted claims was improper because petitioner was not required to show good cause to avail 

himself of the Kelly three-part procedure but affirming the dismissal as harmless because the 

unexhausted claims did not relate back to the claims in the original petition that were fully 

exhausted at the time of filing). “Pursuant to the Kelly procedure, (1) a petitioner amends his 

petition to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, 

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fully exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust 

the deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and reattaches the newly 

exhausted claims to the original petition.” King, 564 F.3d at 1134 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-

71). 

In discussing Rhines stays, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned district courts 

against being too liberal in allowing a stay because a stay works against several of the purposes of 

the AEDPA in that it “frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a 

petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceeding” and “undermines AEDPA’s goal of 

streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his 

claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A stay and 

abeyance “is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the 

petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court,” the claims are not meritless, and there 

are no intentionally dilatory litigation tactics by the petitioner. Id. at 277–78. Any stay must be 

limited in time to avoid indefinite delay. Id. Reasonable time limits would be 30 days to get to 

state court, as long as reasonably necessary in state court, and 30 days to get back to federal court 

after the final rejection of the claims by the state court. See id. at 278; Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d at 

1071. If Petitioner moves for a stay, he must show that he satisfies either the Rhines criteria or the 

King/Kelly requirements. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows. 

1. The Court GRANTS respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies. 

2. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this order, Petitioner must file a 

notice with the Court in which he states whether he elects to: (1) dismiss the unexhausted claims 

and go forward in this action with only the remaining claims, or (2) dismiss this action and return 

to state court to exhaust all of his claims before returning to federal court to present all of his 

claims in a new petition, or (3) move for a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his state 

court remedies for the unexhausted claims. 

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If he chooses Option (1) or Option (2), his filing need not be a long document; it is 

sufficient if he files a one-page document entitled “Election By Petitioner” and states simply: 

“Petitioner elects to proceed under Option ___.” Petitioner would have to insert a number in place 

of the blank space to indicate which of the first two options he chooses. 

If he chooses Option (3), Petitioner must file within twenty-eight (28) days of this order, a 

motion for a stay in which he explains whether he is seeking a Rhines stay or a King/Kelly stay. If 

he seeks a Rhines stay, he must explain why he failed to exhaust his unexhausted claim(s) in state 

court before presenting them to this court, and show that his claims are not meritless and that he is 

not intentionally delaying resolution of his constitutional claims. If he wants to file a motion 

under King/Kelly to amend his petition (to delete the unexhausted claim(s)) and to stay this action 

while he exhausts state court remedies for the unexhausted claim(s), he must do so show that the 

amendment of any newly exhausted claims back into the petition would share a common core of 

operative facts and comply with AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

If petitioner does not choose one of the three options or file a motion by the deadline, this 

action will proceed solely on the exhausted claims – Claim Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. 

This order terminates Dkt. No. 12. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/15/2020 

______________________________________ 

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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