Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-35804/USCOURTS-ca9-07-35804-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE LANDS COUNCIL, a Washington 

nonprofit corporation; OREGON

WILD, an Oregon nonprofit

corporation; HELLS CANYON

PRESERVATION COUNCIL, an Oregon

nonprofit corporation, and SIERRA

CLUB, a California corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KEVIN MARTIN, Forest Supervisor

of the Umatilla National Forest

No. 07-35804 U.S. Forest Service, and the

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, an D.C. No.  agency of the United States CV-06-00229-LRS

Department of Agriculture, OPINION

Defendants-Appellees,

and

AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE

COUNCIL, an Oregon corporation;

BOISE BUILDING SOLUTIONS

MANUFACTURING, L.L.C., a

Washington limited liability

company; DODGE LOGGING, INC., an

Oregon corporation,

Defendants-IntervenorsAppellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding

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Argued and Submitted

March 11, 2008—Portland, Oregon

Filed June 25, 2008

Before: Susan P. Graber, Richard A. Paez, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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COUNSEL

Ralph O. Bloemers, Crag Law Center, Portland, Oregon, for

the plaintiffs-appellants. 

David C. Shilton, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.,

for the defendants-appellees. 

Scott W. Horngren, Haglund Kelley Horngren Jones & Wilder, LLP, Portland, Oregon, for the defendants-intervenorsappellees.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge: 

A forest fire burned thousands of acres of national forest in

southeastern Washington, the United States Forest Service

initiated a salvage logging operation, and we are called upon

to determine whether the Forest Service took the requisite

“hard look” under the National Environmental Policy Act of

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1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, and whether it

complied with the National Forest Management Act of 1976

(“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614. 

Plaintiffs The Lands Council, Oregon Wild, Hells Canyon

Preservation Council, and Sierra Club, which are environmental organizations, appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Defendants United States Forest Service and the

Forest Supervisor of the Umatilla National Forest. American

Forest Resource Council, Boise Building Solutions Manufacturing, L.L.C., and Dodge Logging, Inc., which are a forestry

advocacy organization and logging companies, join Defendants as intervenors. We hold that the Forest Service failed to

include an adequate discussion of the effects of proposed logging on two significant roadless areas. We otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2005, a forest fire named the “School Fire”

burned approximately 51,000 acres in southeastern Washington, including 28,000 acres of the Umatilla National Forest.

Soon thereafter, the Forest Service began preparations for the

School Fire Salvage Recovery Project, to harvest trees located

within the burned areas of National Forest lands. After two

rounds of public comments, the Forest Service released the

final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) and issued a

record of decision. 

The Forest Service chose the alternative in the EIS that permitted salvage logging on 9,423 acres. None of the proposed

logging would occur on land designated as an inventoried

roadless area.1 The proposed logging would occur, however,

1Large areas of land without roads, called “roadless areas,” have been

the subject of congressional and executive study. In the 1970s, the federal

government undertook a comprehensive cataloguing effort of roadless

areas that resulted in the designation of many roadless areas as “inventoried.” See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 46 F.3d

1437, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing this history). 

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on portions of two uninventoried roadless areas, known informally as the West Tucannon roadless area (4,284 acres) and

the Upper Cummins Creek roadless area (966 acres). Both of

those uninventoried roadless areas lie adjacent to, but on different sides of, the Willow Springs inventoried roadless area

(which contains more than 12,000 acres). West Tucannon and

Willow Springs are separated by a road. Upper Cummins

Creek and Willow Springs are not separated by a road; those

areas in combination therefore comprise a contiguous roadless

expanse of more than 13,000 acres. 

Because trees that are damaged or destroyed by fire depreciate in value quickly, the Forest Service Chief issued an

Emergency Situation Determination pursuant to 36 C.F.R.

§ 215.10 in the summer of 2006. That Determination authorized immediate logging in three designated areas, premised

on the prediction that “a delay would result in a potential loss

of value of $1,547,000 to the Federal Government.” 

On August 15, 2006, one day after the issuance of the

record of decision, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of

NEPA and NFMA. The district court denied Plaintiffs’

motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction. A divided three-judge panel of this court denied

Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for an injunction pending

appeal, and a logging operation commenced. This court expedited the appeal and, after hearing oral argument in February

2007, we affirmed in part and reversed in part. Lands Council

v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended). We

reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction

on Plaintiff’s NFMA claim concerning the Forest Service’s

interpretation of the term “live trees” in the Umatilla National

Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (“Forest Plan”).

Id. at 641-43. The term appears in the portion of the Forest

Plan known as the “Eastside Screens.”

2

Id. at 641 & n.5. The

2The Eastside Screens are a set of interim riparian, ecosystem, and wildlife standards for timber sales applicable to public lands east of the CasTHE LANDS COUNCIL v. MARTIN 7389

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Eastside Screens require that the Forest Service “[m]aintain

all remnant late and old seral and/or structural live trees

[greater than or equal to] 21′′ dbh [diameter at breast height]

that currently exist within stands proposed for harvest activities.” Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted). In short, the Forest Plan

prohibits the harvest of old-growth “live trees.” 

Plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service’s proposed logging

of dying trees violated the Eastside Screens because dying

trees are still alive. We agreed: 

We apply the common meaning of the term “live

trees” because neither the NFMA nor the applicable

Forest Plan defines the term. The common understanding of the term “live” is, quite simply, “not

dead.” Accordingly, the common meaning of the

term “all . . . live trees” is all trees that have not yet

died. 

. . . Applying this definition, “live trees” will be

harvested, which is expressly prohibited by the Eastside Screens. 

The Forest Service tries to escape this simple formulation by arguing that the term “live trees” is a

technical term understood by foresters to exclude

dying trees and that we must defer to its technical

expertise. We need not decide whether, in theory, we

must employ a technical definition in a Forest Plan

because there is no evidence in this record that the

Forest Service adopted a technical meaning. Not

cade Mountains, which are set forth in the Forest Service’s

“Environmental Assessment for the Continuation of Interim Management

Direction Establishing Riparian, Ecosystem, and Wildlife Standards for

Timber Sales,” appendix B, June 1995. Lands Council, 479 F.3d at 641

n.5. They were incorporated into the Forest Plan through Umatilla Forest

Plan Amendment #11. 

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only are the NFMA and the Forest Plan silent on the

definition of “live trees,” but neither the Forest Service nor Intervenors have cited any authoritative definition of the term “live trees.” The Forest Service

introduced evidence of a practice of harvesting

dying trees, but that does not establish a technical

definition of the term “live trees.” Foresters very

well may consider dying trees suitable for logging,

but on this record we cannot conclude that they consider dying trees not “live.” . . . The Forest Service

is free, of course, to amend the Eastside Screens to

allow logging of old-growth dying trees, either by

adding a definition of the term “live trees” or by

changing the requirement to maintain all live trees of

a certain size. Unless and until it does so, there is no

basis to adopt its proposed definition. 

Id. at 642-43. 

Plaintiffs also argued that the EIS’ discussion of the West

Tucannon and Upper Cummins Creek roadless areas was

inadequate to meet the requirements of NEPA. Because of the

demanding standard of review on appeal from the district

court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, we affirmed: “Although Plaintiffs may ultimately succeed on the merits, we

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief.” Id. at 639-40. 

On remand, the district court issued an injunction prohibiting the cutting of any live tree 21′′ or more in diameter at

breast height. The salvage logging operation authorized by the

Emergency Situation Determination continued, albeit now

constrained in that one respect. The Forest Service also began

a new public notice and comment process aimed at supplementing the EIS with a new definition of “live trees.” 

On June 11, 2007, the Forest Service released a final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and issued a

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record of decision. The selected alternative amended the Eastside Screens’ prohibition against harvesting old-growth live

trees by adding a definition of “live trees.” The new definition

excluded dying trees, using a predictive method known as the

“Scott Mortality Guidelines.” 

The Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement established certain desirable criteria for the best predictive model

for the School Fire Salvage Recovery Project. In particular,

the Forest Service sought a method that would apply to wildfires, address all of the principal commercial species of trees

within the project area, be valid for the geographic area of the

project, and be operationally practical to potentially evaluate

hundreds of trees per acre, over thousands of acres. The Forest Service rejected a handful of other predictive models and

concluded that, “[i]n the context of the School Fire Salvage

Recovery Project, we believe that the Scott Guidelines are

more appropriate for predicting tree mortality than any of the

alternative models individually.” 

The Forest Service limited the scope of the amendment to

the geographic area, and for the duration, of the School Fire

Salvage Recovery Project. The Forest Supervisor stated in the

record of decision: 

My decision amends the Umatilla National Forest’s

Land and Resource Management Plan Eastside

Screens’ wildlife standard at 6d.(2)(a) to read as follows: 

Maintain all remnant late and old seral

and/or structural live trees [greater than or

equal to] 21′′ dbh that currently exist within

stands proposed for harvest activities. Live

trees are defined as trees rated to have a

high probability of surviving the effects of

fire, and trees rated to have a moderate

probability of survival where sampling

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indicates that at least 50 percent of their

basal cambium is alive. Dead trees are

defined as trees rated to have a low probability of surviving the effects of fire, and

trees rated to have a moderate probability

of survival where sampling indicates that

more than 50 percent of their basal cambium is dead. Survival probability is determined using [the Scott Mortality

Guidelines]. 

This amendment applies to, and only for the duration

of, the site-specific project called School Fire Salvage Recovery Project. 

(Italicization omitted.) The Forest Supervisor further

explained that the amendment was chosen because the common meaning of the term “live trees” “does not reflect Forest

Service silvicultural practice and interpretation, and it deters

the Forest Service from achieving the purpose and need of the

School Fire Salvage Recovery Project.” The Forest Supervisor found that the site-specific amendment was not “significant” due to the limited temporal and geographic scope.

Finally, the Forest Service issued a second Emergency Situation Determination. That Determination permitted logging

under the amended Eastside Screens in four timber sales

areas. 

On September 17, 2007, the district court granted summary

judgment to Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs timely

appealed, and the district court issued an injunction pending

appeal. In this appeal, Plaintiffs challenge three aspects of the

School Fire Salvage Recovery Project: the new definition of

“live trees” in the Eastside Screens, the soil analysis in the

EIS, and the discussion of roadless areas in the EIS.3

3Before the district court, Plaintiffs challenged several other aspects of

the Forest Service’s actions, including whether the EIS considered a reaTHE LANDS COUNCIL v. MARTIN 7393

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STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505

F.3d 884, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2007).

Agency decisions that allegedly violate NEPA and

NFMA are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and may be set aside only if

they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law. Although

our review under this standard is deferential, the

agency must nonetheless articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions

made. Moreover, if an agency fails to consider an

important aspect of a problem . . . or offers an explanation for the decision that is contrary to the evidence, its action is arbitrary and capricious. 

Id. at 889 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations

omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. The New Definition of “Live Trees”

Plaintiffs raise a number of challenges to the new definition

of “live trees.” Plaintiffs first argue that the amendment to the

Eastside Screens is arbitrary and capricious because the new

definition of “live trees” represents a change in policy, and

the Forest Service did not provide a reasonable explanation

for this change in policy. Because the result is the same either

way, we assume that the definition reflects a change in policy.

sonable range of alternatives, whether the EIS correctly analyzed the economic costs and benefits of the project, whether the record of decision

contained factual misrepresentations, and whether the EIS complied with

the Forest Plan’s snag retention requirements. Plaintiffs do not appeal the

district court’s rulings on those issues. 

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In Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th

Cir. 2007) (en banc) (as amended), we emphasized that “an

‘unexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an

interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change [in policy].’ ” (Quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X

Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)) (alterations omitted) (emphasis by Morales-Izquierdo). We clarified, however,

that that rule “is reserved for rare instances, such as when an

agency provides no explanation at all for a change in policy,

or when its explanation is so unclear or contradictory that we

are left in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction.”

Id. As we have noted, “Chevron itself involved a 180-degree

reversal in an agency’s position that survived judicial scrutiny.” Id.; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981-82 (observing the

same). 

[1] Here, the Forest Service explained that it was amending

the Forest Plan because the plain-text definition of “live trees”

“does not reflect Forest Service silvicultural practice and

interpretation, [and] frustrates the ability of the Forest Service

to achieve the purpose and need of the School Fire Salvage

Recovery Project.” Plaintiffs disagree with that explanation

on the merits, but the Forest Service clearly offered a rational

explanation, and we are not “left in doubt as to the reason for

the change in direction.” Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493.

We therefore conclude that the Forest Service’s amendment

to the Eastside Screens is not one of those “rare instances” in

which the agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious for failure to provide an adequate explanation. 

Our conclusion is unchanged by Plaintiffs’ affidavits from

respected scientists in the field, which assert that the new definition of “live trees” is not properly supported by science. In

other words, Plaintiffs dispute the “silvicultural practice and

interpretation” of the Forest Service and prefer their experts’

interpretation over the Forest Service experts’ interpretation.

We are unmoved. “When specialists express conflicting

views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonTHE LANDS COUNCIL v. MARTIN 7395

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able opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more

persuasive.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S.

360, 378 (1989). We have applied that general principle in the

context of a dispute concerning a Forest Plan provision: “We

are in no position to resolve this dispute because we would

have to decide that the views of [the plaintiffs’] experts have

more merit than those of the Forest Service’s experts.” Inland

Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th

Cir. 1993) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Bear Lake Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n,

324 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]lthough a party[ ]

‘has demonstrated that some scientists dispute the Service’s

analyses and conclusions, such a showing is not a sufficient

basis for us to conclude that the Service’s action was arbitrary

or capricious. If it were, agencies could only act upon achieving a degree of certainty that is ultimately illusory.’ ” (quoting

Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1336 (9th Cir.

1992) (as amended)). 

[2] That same principle applies to Plaintiffs’ challenge to

the particular methodology chosen here: the Scott Mortality

Guidelines. “We will not second-guess methodological

choices made by an agency in its area of expertise.” Inland

Empire, 992 F.2d at 981. Plaintiffs urge that this is not a typical dispute about methodology. They argue that the Forest

Service is required to use a scientific methodology, which

requires, at a minimum, peer review or publication. They next

point out that the EIS itself states that “[t]he Scott Guidelines

were apparently not peer-reviewed or published in a credible

source.” 

[3] We find no legal requirement that a methodology be

“peer-reviewed or published in a credible source.” Plaintiffs

cite 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b) and 1502.24, but those regulations contain no such requirements and do not even mention

peer review or publication.4 The Forest Service has explained

4Section 1500.1(b) states in full: 

NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information

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that the Scott Mortality Guidelines are derived from field testing and practical experience. We do not find arbitrary the Forest Service’s choice to rely on those verification techniques in

lieu of peer review and publication when verifying the scientific basis of a relatively new methodology. Cf. Baltimore Gas

& Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,

103 (1983) (holding that, “at the frontiers of science, . . . a

reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential”). 

Plaintiffs next argue that the Forest Service “has manufactured a gap in the Forest Plan.” Under Plaintiffs’ view, the

Forest Service is bound to the common meaning of the term

“live trees.” We disagree. The text of a statute binds an

agency if it unambiguously expresses congressional intent.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But the Forest Service’s action in

this case is amendment of a forest plan, not interpretation of

a statutory term. Congress has expressed no view on the definition of “live trees.” No statute or precedent of which we are

aware suggests that a previously undefined technical term in

a forest plan can never be clarified through amendment simply because the technical definition conflicts with the dictionary definition. 

is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are

made and before actions are taken. The information must be of

high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA.

Most important, NEPA documents must concentrate on the issues

that are truly significant to the action in question, rather than

amassing needless detail. 

Section 1502.24 states in full: 

Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental

impact statements. They shall identify any methodologies used

and shall make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and

other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement. An

agency may place discussion of methodology in an appendix. 

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Plaintiffs’ final arguments concern the procedure that the

Forest Service employed to amend the Forest Plan. The Forest

Service did not amend the entire Eastside Screens with the

new definition of “live trees.” Instead, it expressly limited the

amendment “to, and only for the duration of, the site-specific

project called School Fire Salvage Recovery Project.”

Because of the limited scope of the amendment, the Forest

Supervisor concluded that the amendment was not “significant.” 

[4] Under the relevant statute and regulation, the correct

procedure depends on the scope of the amendment: “Significant” amendments require a lengthy and detailed amendment

process; otherwise, a simpler notice and comment process

suffices. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(4); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f) (2000).5

Specifically, the statute provides that, if the Forest Service

chooses to amend a forest plan, the forest plan “shall . . . be

amended in any manner whatsoever after final adoption after

public notice, and, if such amendment would result in a significant change in such plan, [after procedures in addition to

public notice have taken place].” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(4). 

[5] The “regulations leave to the discretion of the Forest

Service the question of whether any given amendment is significant.” Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d

886, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f)

(2000) (“[T]he Forest Supervisor shall determine whether a

proposed amendment would result in a significant change in

5The 2000 version of the regulations applies to the amendment in this

case. The regulations governing the correct procedure for plan amendments have changed over the years. Current regulations establish a “transition period” between January 5, 2005, and January 7, 2008. 36 C.F.R.

§ 219.14(b). “Plan amendments initiated during the transition period may

continue using the provisions of the planning regulations in effect before

November 9, 2000 . . . .” Id. § 219.14(d)(2). The Forest Service initiated

the amendment to the Eastside Screens in the spring of 2007, within the

transition period, and chose the option of applying the 2000 version of the

regulations. No party contends that this choice was improper. 

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the plan.”). Here, consistent with other significance determinations and the Forest Service Handbook, the Forest Supervisor considered the four factors listed in the Forest Service

Handbook: timing; location and size; goals, objectives, and

outputs; and “management prescription” (defined as whether

the change applies only to a specific situation or will affect

future decisions as well). Forest Service Handbook 1909.12,

ch. 5.31; see also Prairie Wood Prods. v. Glickman, 971 F.

Supp. 457, 463 (D. Or. 1997) (observing that “[t]he Forest

Service Handbook . . . provides guidelines for determining

whether a forest plan amendment is significant” and listing

the four factors); Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1033 (10th Cir. 2002)

(“Although the Forest Supervisor has wide discretion in

deciding whether an amendment is significant, the [Forest

Service Handbook] outlines factors the Supervisor must consider when assessing the significance of a proposed amendment, including [the four factors].”). We therefore reject

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Forest Supervisor’s conclusion that

the amendment is not significant, to the extent that Plaintiffs

simply disagree with the Forest Supervisor’s conclusion. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service arbitrarily

enacted a site-specific amendment, particular to this salvage

project, rather than a general amendment, applicable to all

parts of the forest. In Native Ecosystems, we addressed a similar argument. The forest plan at issue in that case restricted

road density to ensure sufficient elk habitat. Native Ecosystems, 304 F.3d at 890-91. Rather than close roads, the Forest Service passed a site-specific amendment that exempted

the challenged timber sale from the road-density requirement.

Id. at 891. The Forest Service concluded that the requirement

was not necessary to ensure sufficient elk habitat and that the

requirement was not reasonable as applied to the given timber

sale. Id. at 898. Although identical site-specific amendments

were planned for other timber sales in the forest, we held that

the Forest Service’s decision to analyze each amendment separately was “reasonable.” Id. at 900. 

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We recognized that the Forest Service’s decision to limit

the scope of an amendment to a particular site could be arbitrary. Id. We concluded, however, that waiver of the particular requirement, due to site-specific characteristics and based

on the Forest Service’s expertise, was reasonable, even

though waiver of the same requirement appeared likely in

other timber sales. Id.

Similarly, in Wyoming Sawmills Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2004), the Forest Service concluded that only 18,000 acres of land would be

affected by its amendment and determined that the amendment was not “significant.” The plaintiff argued that the Forest Service’s significance determination was flawed because,

in fact, the affected area was much greater. Id. at 1251-52.

The Tenth Circuit recognized that a significance determination could be arbitrary but held that the plaintiff’s arguments

on the size of the affected area failed to overcome the Forest

Service’s expertise on this issue. Id. at 1252. Again, sitespecific characteristics and Forest Service expertise were the

lynchpins of the deference afforded the Forest Service’s significance determination. 

[6] Here, as in Native Ecosystems and Wyoming Sawmills,

the Forest Service’s decision to limit the scope of the amendment was informed by site-specific characteristics and Forest

Service expertise. In particular, the Forest Service chose a

definition that assesses the effects of a wildfire on the species

of trees found in the affected forest. Evidence in the record

suggests that the chosen definition may not be appropriate to

assess trees affected by prescribed burning, flooding, disease,

insect infestation, or any number of other causes of tree mortality. We therefore hold that the Forest Service “articulated

a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001)

(as amended) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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B. Soil Analysis in the EIS

[7] Plaintiffs next challenge three aspects of the soil analysis in the EIS. Plaintiffs first contend that the Forest Service

did not conduct an on-the-ground soil analysis as required by

Ninth Circuit precedent.6See Lands Council v. Powell, 395

F.3d 1019, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended) (holding

that the Forest Service’s reliance on a spreadsheet model for

soil conditions violated NFMA because “[t]he Forest Service

did not walk, much less test, the land in the activity area”);

Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir.

2005) (applying Powell). We are not persuaded. The EIS contains a 15-page analysis of soils, in which there are several

references to field verification and observation. See, e.g., EIS

at 3-8 (“It was evident during field assessments that some of

the existing condition estimates will overstate the existing

[detrimental soil conditions] in some cases.” (emphasis

added)); EIS 3-9 (“Soil characteristics were field verified by

the Forest Soil Scientist at the harvest unit scale.” (emphasis

added)); EIS 3-10 (“Units for School Fire Salvage Recovery

Project were assessed for the extent and degree of previously

effected soil using field observation starting in the fall of

2005, the soil inventory (SRI) with field verification by the

Forest Soil Scientist. . . .” (emphases added)). Those statements in the EIS, representing that field verification actually

occurred, distinguish this case from Ecology Center and Powell. See Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 472 F.3d 587, 591-92 (9th Cir.

2006) (distinguishing those cases on the basis of reports of

field verification). 

6This court recently granted en banc review of the continuing vitality of

the on-the-ground rule cited by Plaintiffs. Lands Council v. McNair, 494

F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.

2008); see also id., 494 F.3d at 780-86 (M. Smith, J., specially concurring)

(criticizing the rule announced in Powell and Ecology Center). Because

we hold that the soil analysis in the EIS is sufficient even under the current

rule, we need not defer submission until en banc resolution of McNair. 

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Plaintiffs make a number of technical arguments purporting

to demonstrate that, despite the assertions contained in the

EIS, the Forest Service must not have actually performed onthe-ground soil analysis. Their arguments constitute sophisticated speculation, but nothing in the record proves that the

Forest Service did not do the on-the-ground analysis that it

reported. 

Plaintiffs next argue that the Forest Service improperly

interpreted the term “severe burning” in a provision of the

Forest Plan. The provision requires the Forest Service to

“[p]lan and conduct land management activities so that reductions of soil productivity potential caused by detrimental compaction, displacement, puddling, and severe burning are

minimized.” Also, the Forest Service Manual contains a relevant provision: 

Leave a minimum of 80% of an activity area in an

acceptable soil quality condition. Detrimental conditions, as defined below, also include landings and

system roads. Detrimental soil quality conditions and

the accompanying criteria for determining when and

where these conditions occur include: 

a. Compaction, Displacement, Puddling,

Severely Burned.

. . . . 

(4) Detrimental Burned Soil. Soils are considered

to be detrimentally burned when the mineral soil surface has been significantly changed in color, oxidized to a reddish color, and the next one-half inch

blackened from organic matter charring by heat conducted through the top layer. The detrimentally

burned soil standard applies to an area greater than

100 square feet, which is at least five feet in width.

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The EIS interprets those provisions to apply only to

management-induced burns, not forest fires. Its soil analysis

therefore did not account for the burning effects of the forest

fire. 

[8] Plaintiffs argue that the provisions should be read to

include both artificially induced and naturally occurring

effects. We are unpersuaded. Especially given the context of

the provisions, aimed at “land management activities” and

“activity areas,” it is plausible to read the quoted provision as

limited to management-induced effects. In any event, we cannot say that the Forest Service’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or otherwise inconsistent. See Forest Guardians v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[J]udicial

review of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is

limited to ensuring that the agency’s interpretation is not

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). 

Plaintiffs’ final argument is that the Forest Service impermissibly used the “long-term average annual prediction”

method instead of Plaintiffs’ preferred “return period analysis

for soil erosion” method. As stated above, “[w]e will not

second-guess methodological choices made by an agency in

its area of expertise.” Inland Empire, 992 F.2d at 981. In addition, Plaintiffs concede that Dr. Elliot is the premier expert in

this area of soil analysis, and the record contains a declaration

by Dr. Elliot that Plaintiffs’ preferred method is “seldom

used” and tends to produce incorrectly high results. 

[9] In summary, we affirm the district court’s holding that

the EIS’s soil analysis violates neither NEPA nor NFMA. 

C. Roadless Area Analysis in the EIS

Citing Smith v. United States Forest Service, 33 F.3d 1072

(9th Cir. 1994), and National Audubon Society v. United

States Forest Service, 46 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1993), Plaintiffs

argue that the EIS violates NEPA because it does not contain

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an adequate discussion of the effects of the proposed logging

on the roadless character of two substantial roadless areas.

West Tucannon roadless area is a bounded uninventoried

roadless area that contains 4,284 acres. Upper Cummins

Creek roadless area is an uninventoried roadless area that contains 966 acres but, when combined with the adjacent Willow

Springs inventoried roadless area, forms a “roadless expanse”

of more than 13,000 acres. See Smith, 33 F.3d at 1078 (referring to a contiguous area comprised of an uninventoried roadless area and an inventoried roadless area as a “roadless

expanse”). 

[10] In Smith, 33 F.3d at 1078-79, we held that there are at

least two separate reasons why logging in roadless areas is

environmentally significant, so that its environmental consequences must be considered. First, roadless areas have certain

attributes that must be analyzed. Those attributes, such as

water resources, soils, wildlife habitat, and recreation opportunities, possess independent environmental significance. Second, roadless areas are significant because of their potential

for designation as wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act

of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136. Lands Council, 479 F.3d at

640; Smith, 33 F.3d at 1078-79. 

[11] Plaintiffs do not challenge the EIS’s discussion of the

attributes of the roadless areas. Instead, they argue that the

EIS does not comply with the requirement in Smith that the

roadless areas be discussed in the context of their potential for

wilderness designation. In Smith, we held that “the possibility

of future wilderness classification triggers, at the very least,

an obligation on the part of the agency to disclose the fact that

development will affect a 5,000 acre roadless area.” 33 F.3d

at 1078. Defendants respond that the EIS is sufficient

because, unlike the roadless area at issue in Smith, each roadless area here is uninventoried and contains less than 5,000

acres. We hold that those characteristics do not provide a

meaningful legal distinction from the roadless area in Smith.

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[12] The Upper Cummins Creek roadless area is indistinguishable from the roadless area at issue in Smith. In Smith,

we considered an uninventoried roadless area of approximately 4,000 acres that was contiguous to an inventoried

roadless area of approximately 2,000 acres. 33 F.3d at 1077.

Logging was scheduled to occur only in the uninventoried

land, but we concluded nevertheless that the area must be analyzed as one combined roadless area of more than 6,000 acres.

Id. at 1077-78 & n.3. Here, the Upper Cummins Creek roadless area contains approximately 1,000 acres of uninventoried

land and is contiguous to an inventoried roadless area of

approximately 12,000 acres. Following Smith, we consider the

Upper Cummins Creek roadless area not in isolation, but in

combination with the contiguous inventoried roadless area. It

is undisputed that this “roadless expanse” contains more than

5,000 acres. 

[13] Additionally, the Wilderness Act does not limit the

potential for wilderness designation to roadless areas 5,000

acres or larger. The Act states that an area is suitable for wilderness designation if it meets several requirements, including

that the area “has at least five thousand acres of land or is of

sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use

in an unimpaired condition.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (emphasis

added). As we explained in the original appeal, “[t]he Wilderness Act does not require an absolute minimum of 5,000

acres; it also allows for designation where the area ‘is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an

unimpaired condition.’ ” Lands Council, 479 F.3d at 640

(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)). 

[14] The roadless area in Smith, of course, contained more

than 5,000 acres, so naturally we discussed the issues by reference to “a 5,000 acre roadless area.” But the foundation for

the rule—the potential for wilderness designation under the

Wilderness Act—demonstrates that the rule applies with

equal force to roadless areas “of sufficient size as to make

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tion.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). In particular, we hold that “the

possibility of future wilderness classification triggers, at the

very least, an obligation on the part of the agency to disclose

the fact that development will affect a 5,000 acre roadless

area,” Smith, 33 F.3d at 1078, or will affect an area of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an

unimpaired condition. We need not explore the smallest possible area that would be “sufficient” under the statute; we are

confident on this record that the 4,284-acre West Tucannon

roadless area is of sufficient size to fall within the rule. 

[15] In summary, the Forest Service was required to discuss

the effects of the proposed logging on the roadless character

of both roadless areas. Smith held that the size of an uninventoried roadless area must be considered in combination with

the size of any contiguous inventoried roadless area. The size

of Upper Cummins Creek combined with the size of contiguous Willow Springs is more than 5,000 acres. We make clear

today that the rule in Smith applies to roadless areas that are

either greater than 5,000 acres or of a “sufficient size” within

the meaning of 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). The West Tucannon

roadless area falls within the scope of that rule. 

Defendants next argue that, even if the Forest Service was

required to include a discussion of the roadless areas, the EIS

in fact includes such a discussion. The EIS does contain a

three-page analysis on “roadless character,” but the cursory

nature of the discussion and legal errors in it render it insufficient to meet the requirements of NEPA. 

In three separate passages, the EIS erroneously declares

that 5,000 acres is an absolute minimum size criterion for

potential designation as a wilderness area. See EIS at 3-270

(“There are no other areas within the School Fire Salvage

Recovery Project area that meet or exceed the 5,000 acre size

criteri[on] for roadless.”); id. (“There are no large blocks of

land where the undeveloped character of the area meets the

minimum criteri[on] of 5,000 acres or greater that might make

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them potentially designated as an [inventoried roadless area]

or wilderness area.”); id. at 3-271 (“There would be no direct,

indirect, or cumulative effects to alter the undeveloped character of any land because there are no large blocks that meet

the minimum criteri[on] of 5,000 acres or greater.”). The EIS

erroneously adds that “[n]or are there areas of undeveloped

character adjacent to an existing [inventoried roadless area] or

wilderness area suitable for consideration.” Id.; see also id. at

3-270 (nearly identical statement). 

Wholly apart from those errors, we conclude that the EIS’s

discussion fails to meet even the bare minimum requirement

discussed in Smith and analyzed above: “the possibility of

future wilderness classification triggers, at the very least, an

obligation on the part of the agency to disclose the fact that

development will affect a 5,000 acre roadless area.” Smith, 33

F.3d at 1078 (emphasis added). Upper Cummins Creek, combined with the contiguous inventoried roadless area, comprises one roadless area much larger than 5,000 acres. That

fact is nowhere revealed in the EIS. As in Smith, “nowhere

has the agency disclosed that the inventoried and uninventoried lands together comprise one 5,000 acre roadless area.” Id.

at 1079. Similarly, the West Tucannon roadless area contains

nearly 5,000 acres (i.e., is “of sufficient size”) but the EIS

never discloses that fact.7

[16] In conclusion, we reverse the district court’s holding

that the EIS’s discussion of the effects of the proposed log7

It is true, of course, that the EIS contains a map and other data describing where the proposed logging will occur. From that information, it is

possible (as Plaintiffs have done) to piece together where logging will

occur, where roadless areas are located, and where the two intersect. But

such data are always present, as they were in Smith. Smith requires that the

agency disclose that significant roadless areas will be affected and take the

requisite “hard look” at the environmental consequences of that fact. The

bare data that allow the public to discover that, contrary to the assertions

in the EIS, significant roadless areas will be affected is insufficient. 

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ging in the roadless areas complied with the requirements of

NEPA. We affirm the district court in all other respects. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs on

appeal. 

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