Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00204/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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1

The complaint also invokes the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (Id. at 1). Because these statutes plainly are not in the

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHEN HOWARD SCHOEPFLIN, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0204-WS-M

 )

ROHR AERO SERVICES, L.L.C., )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

(Doc. 40). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their

respective positions, (Docs. 41-42, 45-46, 48), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After

carefully considering the foregoing and other relevant material in the file, the Court

concludes that the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in part and denied

in part.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as operations manager over wire

harness repair. He was terminated in March 2006 following an incident concerning a

wire harness delivered to a customer. The plaintiff alleges that his termination was based

on his age, disability, and/or retaliation for complaining of age and/or disability

harassment. He also asserts that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on

his age and/or disability. (Doc. 19). The complaint alleges that the defendant’s conduct

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“ADEA”).1

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 1 of 17
picture, and because the plaintiff does not argue otherwise, the motion for summary

judgment will be resolved under the ADA and ADEA. The Court rejects the defendant’s

assertion, (Doc. 41 at 25 n.10), that the harassment and retaliation claims were pleaded

exclusively under Title VII and are subject to dismissal on that basis. Though inartful,

the complaint does not purport to limit the source of those claims to Title VII. 

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DETERMINATIONS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACT

The plaintiff was operations manager over the repair of wire harnesses. In

November 2005, customer JetBlue reported to the defendant that it had not received back

two wire harnesses it had shipped to the defendant for repair. A physical search by the

plaintiff and others failed to turn up the harnesses. On or about December 21, 2005,

under the plaintiff’s direction, one of the lost harnesses was replaced with another, using a

formal “exchange” process in which the defendant surrendered title to the replacement

harness and JetBlue surrendered title to the lost harness. 

Rick Blackwell, Scott Rivers, Cindy Culbertson, and Kyle Boling were

subordinate to the plaintiff. On December 29, 2005, the plaintiff wrote an e-mail to them

about the lost JetBlue harnesses, reading in pertinent part as follows: “We lost two, but I

think [Boling] shipped one from stores. If that is correct we need to make one for stores

and one for jetBlue. There should be sufficient material red tagged from other jetBlue

jobs to fill our needs.” (Plaintiff Exhibit 7).

Boling responded that the defendant did indeed owe JetBlue another harness, and

added, “Let me know the serial number for the harness which will be going to jetBlue and

I will offer it up as an exchange.” (Plaintiff Exhibit 7). In another group e-mail, the

plaintiff replied, “Did the one that got lost have a serial number? If so let’s just ID the

replacement with the same serial number and eliminate the hassle of an exchange.” (Id.).

Scrap wire cannot be used on a job. The repair team used scrap wire, fashioned a

replacement harness, and attached the serial number of the missing JetBlue harness. The

harness was shipped to JetBlue without an exchange and without advising JetBlue that the

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 2 of 17
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harness was not in fact the harness JetBlue had presented for repair.

In January 2006, JetBlue discovered in its possession the two harnesses that it had

previously complained had not been returned. It also discovered that it now had two

harnesses with identical serial numbers. JetBlue reported this information to the

defendant, which launched an investigation.

Members of the investigation team were the defendant’s local ethics officer (Tracy

Fleming), its human resources manager (Linda Howser), and its engineering and quality

assurance manager (Ed BeVier). They reviewed the plaintiff’s e-mails, interviewed a

number of witnesses, and reached conclusions concerning the facts, rules violations, and

relative culpability. Due to his friendship with the plaintiff, BeVier did not participate in

the team’s recommendations for sanction. Fleming and Howser discussed their findings

with Stuart Kay, the defendant’s general manager, and recommended that the plaintiff and

Louis Estrada, a quality inspector, be terminated. Kay made the final decision to

terminate the plaintiff and Estrada. 

It is a violation of company rules to make, rather than repair, a harness. It is a

violation of company rules to affix to a piece of equipment the serial number belonging to

another piece of equipment. (Fleming Deposition at 9, 20; Howser Deposition at 8).

At all relevant times, the plaintiff has had essential tremor (“ET”). At the time of

his termination, he was 59 years old. Estrada was 48 years old, with no disability.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Venue is proper in this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

 Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material

fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 3 of 17
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E.g., Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998)(“The

district court has discretion to go beyond the referenced portions of these [summary

judgment] materials, but is not required to do so.”); accord Jones v. Sheehan, Young &

Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d

1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989); Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, 725 F.2d 1136,

1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Karlozian v. Clovis Unified School District, 2001 WL 488880 at *1

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Local Rule 7.2.

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court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact

that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.

1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the

nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case

with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving party is entitled to

summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986))(footnote omitted).

The parties have submitted a significant number of exhibits, some of which they

have not referred to in their briefs and some of which they have referred to only in part. 

There is no burden on the Court to identify unreferenced evidence supporting a party’s

position.2

 Similarly, “[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential

argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.”

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly,

the Court’s review is limited to those portions of the exhibits to which the parties have

specifically cited. The Court’s review is similarly limited to those legal arguments the

parties have expressly advanced.

Because the plaintiff does not rely on direct evidence of discrimination, the

shifting burden appropriate for cases resting on circumstantial evidence applies. In Title

VII cases alleging discrimination, the burden is first on the plaintiff to establish a prima

facie case. If he succeeds, the defendant must meet its burden of producing evidence of

one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. 

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This formulation apparently trumps, in disciplinary termination cases, the more

general formulation of the prima facie case in a termination case, where the third element

may be satisfied by a showing that someone outside the protected class replaced the

plaintiff. E.g., Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff

assumes he can utilize the Kelliher formulation, (Doc. 46 at 5), but he offers no

explanation as to how the Court can ignore the controlling precedent cited in text.

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The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reasons

are a mere pretext for illegal discrimination. E.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd.,

295 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). The same burden-shifting paradigm applies to

cases alleging retaliation under Title VII. Sullivan v. National Railroad Passenger

Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999). The same principles apply to cases arising

under the ADEA and the ADA. E.g., Holly v. Clairson Industries, LLC, 492 F.3d 1247,

1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (disability); Walker v. NationsBank, 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (11th Cir.

1995) (age).

I. Termination — Age and Disability.

“To establish discrimination in discipline, ... a plaintiff must first make out a prima

facie case demonstrating: 1) that he belongs to a protected class under Title VII; 2) that he

was qualified for the job; and 3) that a similarly situated employee engaged in the same or

similar misconduct but did not receive similar discipline.” Alexander v. Fulton County,

207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000); accord Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540

(11th Cir. 1989). This formulation has been applied when the discipline meted out is

termination. E.g., Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (11th Cir.

2006); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1366, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999).3

 The defendant

argues that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element. (Doc. 41 at 22-24; Doc. 46 at 3-

5).

“When a plaintiff alleges discriminatory discipline, to determine whether

employees are similarly situated, ... we require that the quantity and quality of the

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4

Burke-Fowler invoked the “prior panel precedent” rule to select the “nearly

identical” standard rather than the seemingly lower standard of “similar[ity]” articulated

in some Eleventh Circuit opinions. Id. at 1323 n.2. 

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comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing

employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Burke-Fowler, 447

F.3d at 1323 (internal quotes omitted).4

 The plaintiff’s sole comparator is Paul Smith, the

operations manager for thruster repair. (Doc. 46 at 26). The plaintiff offers evidence that

someone in Smith’s department attempted to modify a heat shield for a thrust reverser

without engineering authority to do so. A mechanic reported the unauthorized attempt

while it was occurring, and the equipment was not shipped to the customer. (BeVier

Deposition at 26-28). Smith was not terminated as a result of this incident. ( Plaintiff

Affidavit, ¶ f).

The fatal deficiency in the plaintiff’s use of Smith as a comparator is that he lacks

any evidence that Smith was in the remotest way involved in the conduct of his

subordinates. Here, in contrast, the plaintiff’s own e-mails identified him as the instigator

of the incident for which he was terminated. Because the plaintiff’s sole comparator did

not engage in conduct nearly identical to that engaged in by the plaintiff, he cannot make

out a prima facie case of discriminatory termination based on age or disability. For want

of a prima facie case, the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law.

II. Termination - Retaliation.

“To establish a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff

must show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered

an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation between the two

events.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 740 (11th Cir. 2004); accord Weeks v.

Harden Manufacturing Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (age, disability). The

defendant challenges only the third of these elements. (Doc. 41 at 25-26). 

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 6 of 17
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See Farley v. Nationwide Mutual, 197 F.3d at 1337 (when the plaintiff’s EEOC

charge was filed May 19, 1995, the plaintiff’s supervisors learned of the charge “shortly

after its filing,” and the plaintiff was terminated on July 10, 1995, “[w]e find this

timeframe sufficiently proximate to create a causal nexus for purposes of establishing a

prima facie case.”); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993)

(evidence that the plaintiff was involuntarily transferred three weeks after the mayor

learned of her intent to look into the possibility of filing an EEOC charge “was sufficient

to satisfy [her] initial burden to show a ‘causal link’ between her statements and her

transfer”); Donnellon v. Freuhauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986) (where the

plaintiff was terminated one month after filing an EEOC charge, “[t]he short period of

time ... between the filing of the discrimination complaint and the plaintiff’s discharge

belies any assertion by the defendant that the plaintiff failed to prove causation.”).

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Causal relation, for purposes of the prima facie case, is satisfied by a showing of a

“close temporal proximity” between the decisionmaker’s awareness of the protected

conduct and the adverse employment action. Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,

197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff has testified that he complained to

Linda Howser (the defendant’s human resources manager) of age and disability

harassment three weeks before he was terminated. (Plaintiff Affidavit, ¶ d). The

Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that even longer time gaps satisfy the third element

of the prima facie case without further evidence.5

The defendant ignores this close temporal proximity. Instead, it argues that the

plaintiff’s deposition testimony “belies any causal relation.” (Doc. 41 at 25). 

Specifically, when asked, “What had you done that you are contending that someone

wanted to get even with you about?” the plaintiff responded, “Did a good job, excelled at

what I did.” (Plaintiff Deposition at 19). The question thus asked about a personal

motive to “get even,” not a corporate motive to retaliate, and the plaintiff’s answer cannot

reasonably be read as negating any belief or contention that he was fired in consequence

of complaining of age or disability harassment. The only other testimony to which the

defendant refers is addressed to the relation between jealousy and age/disability

discrimination, not retaliation. (Id. at 23). 

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 7 of 17
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In response to interrogatories, the defendant articulated its legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason as follows: “Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for

violating the company’s business code of conduct, following an investigation into product

integrity issues.” (Doc. 45, Exhibit 8b at 4). The plaintiff complains that this reason is so

subjective as to be incapable of carrying the defendant’s intermediate burden. (Doc. 46 at

21-22). Subjective criteria include such imprecisely measurable things as attitude,

articulateness, enthusiasm, common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty

and tact. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d1012, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 2000). Violation of

a company rule — unless it be a rule to exhibit enthusiasm or exercise tact — cannot

easily be viewed as subjective. 

At any rate, the defendant’s objective reasons are more fully articulated in

Howser’s deposition:

Q. Did you recommend that he be terminated?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was your reasoning?

A. Based on his testimony, he instructed his team to do something — to create a

part which we are not authorized to do and call it the same serial number as a

perceived lost harness and not contact the customer. And he said he would do it

again.

Q. Was that the consensus of the people that were involved in the

recommendation process that eventually got to Stuart Kay who made the final

decision?

A. Yes.

(Howser Deposition at 8). This testimony is unquestionably “clear and reasonably

specific,” Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981),

and it satisfies the defendant’s intermediate burden. The inquiry thus turns to the

plaintiff’s evidence of pretext. The plaintiff offers two types: (1) that his conduct violated

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 8 of 17
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no rule; and (2) that others were treated more leniently. 

“To show that the employer’s reasons were pretextual, the plaintiff must

demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a

reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Cooper v. Southern Co.,

390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted). “If the plaintiff does not

proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is

entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal

quotes omitted). 

The plaintiff first argues that Fleming incorrectly blamed him for the team’s use of

scrap material rather than the red-tagged material to which his e-mail referred them. 

(Doc. 46 at 23). While Fleming testified that the plaintiff so instructed the team, he also

testified that the reasons the plaintiff was terminated were his instructions to fabricate a

replacement wire and to use a serial number from the lost harness — not the use of scrap. 

(Fleming Deposition at 6, 9).

The plaintiff next argues that he did not instruct anyone not to tell JetBlue what the

team was doing and that it was the responsibility of Boling, as customer service

representative, to communicate with JetBlue. (Doc. 46 at 18-19). Assuming without

deciding that this is correct, and assuming without deciding that the defendant could not

reasonably have found otherwise, it contradicts at best only one of the findings of

violation articulated by Howser, which is insufficient under Cooper.

The plaintiff next argues that red-tagged material can be used for repair under

certain conditions. (Doc. 46 at 19, 24). Assuming without deciding that this is correct, it

is immaterial, since the plaintiff was not terminated for instructing the team to use redtagged material.

The plaintiff next argues that the business code of conduct addresses only the

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 9 of 17
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concealment or cover-up of an ethics violation and that there is no evidence he concealed

or covered up anything. (Doc. 46 at 22-23). Because he has submitted only the fourth

page of the document, the plaintiff has not shown that it fails to address conduct other

than concealment or cover-up. On the contrary, the very paragraph to which he cites

reflects (as one would expect) that there are ethical violations and concealment of ethical

violations and that both are governed by the code of conduct. (Doc. 46, Exhibit 16).

The plaintiff next argues that he did not instruct anyone to create a harness. (Doc.

46 at 23). That, however, is precisely the import of his direction to “make” a harness for

JetBlue. (Doc. 7). The plaintiff offers no explanation to the contrary.

In his final attack on the defendant’s articulated reasons, the plaintiff notes that

BeVier testified that using the same serial number on a replacement harness is “not a

general practice.” (BeVier Deposition at 24). The plaintiff extrapolates that “a nonpreferred method is not a business code violation.” (Doc. 46 at 24). What is a code

violation, however, is determined by the code itself, not by theorizing, and the plaintiff’s

failure to introduce the code in its entirety precludes him from raising any question as to

whether it covers his conduct. Because the query to which BeVier responded did not call

on him to state whether use of the same serial number is a code violation, his answer in no

way indicates that it is not.

As noted, it is uncontroverted that it is a violation of company rules to make, rather

than repair, a harness, and it is a further violation of company rules to affix to a piece of

equipment the serial number belonging to another piece of equipment. The plaintiff’s

own e-mails reflect that he instructed others to do precisely these things, the investigation

committee so found, Howser and Fleming recommended termination on the basis of these

violations, and Kay followed their recommendation. The plaintiff’s evidence and

arguments may draw into question any reliance by the defendant on his failure to contact

JetBlue, but it leaves intact and undamaged both the factual predicate of the two

violations described above and the defendant’s reliance on those violations in terminating

Case 1:07-cv-00204-WS-M Document 50 Filed 03/31/08 Page 10 of 17
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his employment. 

“Even when good reasons — the factual bases for which are not rebutted — are

proffered by an employer, a plaintiff can, in some circumstances, still show

discrimination. To do so, however, a plaintiff must show that [non-protected] employees

with employment histories like the plaintiff’s were not subject to the same adverse

employment action as the plaintiff.” Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.

2002). 

In an effort to show differential treatment, the plaintiff notes that, while three

departments were implicated in the harness episode, he was the only department manager

to be fired. (Doc. 46 at 18). The reason for this is pretty obvious — the plaintiff was the

only department manager involved. He offers no evidence to the contrary. The plaintiff

also points to Smith as one who was treated more favorably in a similar situation. (Id. at

26-28). As noted in Part I, however, the plaintiff has no evidence that Smith (as opposed

to his subordinates) was in any way involved in that incident. Finally, the plaintiff

complains that Boling was not terminated even though, as customer service

representative, it was up to him to communicate with JetBlue about what was being done. 

(Id. at 22-23). Boling, however, was a junior employee, not a department manager, and

he did not instruct others to violate company rules.

 In sum, the plaintiff’s evidence and arguments create no genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether the defendant’s articulated reasons are a pretext for

retaliation.

III. Hostile Work Environment - Age and Disability.

Before reaching the merits of the claim, the Court addresses the defendant’s

argument that the plaintiff is not protected by the ADA.

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This is the only definition on which the plaintiff relies. (Doc. 46 at 5).

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A. Disability - Existence.

The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against “a qualified individual

with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The defendant does not dispute that the

plaintiff is a “qualified individual” as defined in Section 12111(8), but it argues that he is

not someone “with a disability.” A “disability,” while defined several ways, is most often

“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities” of the individual. Id. § 12101(2)(A).6

 The defendant concedes that the

plaintiff’s ET is an impairment, but it denies that the ET substantially limits one or more

major life activities. (Doc. 41 at 18-20).

According to the plaintiff, “[b]ecause of my shaking I am unable to perform major

life activities like other people; for example, caring for myself and performing manual

tasks, with my hands shaking, I can hardly shave, wash with soap - I drop it, comb my

hair, brush my teeth, eat soup with a spoon, hold a fork, drink without spilling it on

myself, pouring a drink, button my shirt without several tries, tying my shoes, unzipping

my pants to go to the bathroom, going to the bathroom, driving a car, writing on paper,

mowing the lawn, etc.” (Plaintiff Affidavit, ¶ a). In a motion to strike, the defendant

argues that the affidavit should be disregarded because it represents a sham in the mold of

Van T. Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984). 

(Doc. 47 at 2-3). 

“When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the

existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an

issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given

clear testimony.” Van T. Junkins, 736 F.2d at 657. “This rule is applied sparingly because

of the harsh effect [it] may have on a party’s case.” Allen v. Board of Public Education,

495 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotes omitted). “[T]o allow every failure

of memory or variation in a witness’ testimony to be disregarded as a sham would require

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7

See Collado v. United Parcel Service, 419 F.3d 1143, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2005)

(driving a car is not itself a major life activity); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250

F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001) (same; limitations on driving relevant only to the

major life activity of working).

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far too much from lay witnesses and would deprive the trier of fact of the traditional

opportunity to determine which point in time and with which words the ... affiant ... was

telling the truth.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). Thus, there must be an “inherent

inconsistency” between affidavit and deposition before the former may be disregarded as

sham. Id. Otherwise, “the general rule allowing an affidavit to create a genuine issue

even if it conflicts with earlier testimony in the party’s deposition ... governs.” Rollins v.

TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotes omitted). 

The defendant has not shown the plaintiff’s affidavit to be a sham under this

stringent test. In deposition, the plaintiff was asked about his ability to care for himself,

and he responded, “It’s difficult, but I manage to get by.” (Plaintiff Deposition at 154). 

He was asked what he finds difficult, and he responded, “Button buttons; pour drinks

from one – like pouring coffee, you’ve got to use both hands; you got to use both hands to

shave.” (Id.). He was not asked if there was anything else. He was not asked about

driving or yard activities, and he testified that his “handwriting is terrible, especially

when I’m in a hurry.” (Id. at 156). The defendant notes that the plaintiff referred to, or

hinted at, driving, (Plaintiff Deposition at 311, 317-18), but nowhere did he testify that

driving was not made difficult by the ET. The Court concludes that the plaintiff’s

affidavit is not inherently inconsistent with his deposition testimony and that it goes

beyond the deposition only where the defendant’s questioning failed to seal off the

plaintiff from subsequent elaboration. 

The plaintiff’s affidavit reflects that he considers himself substantially limited with

respect to the major life activities of caring for himself and performing manual tasks. See

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (identifying these as major life activities under the ADA). These

two categories eliminate from consideration any limitation on his ability to drive a car7

 or

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8

See Bardwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 32 Fed. Appx. 127, 127 (5th Cir. 2002)

(mowing the lawn is not a major life activity); Moore v. J.B. Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d

944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1999)

(same); Coldwell v. Suffolk County Police Department, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2nd Cir. 1998)

(yard work is not a major life activity).

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mow the lawn.8 

While the defendant insists that the plaintiff is not substantially limited with

respect to either caring for himself or performing manual tasks, (Doc. 41 at 20; Doc. 48 at

2-3), it has engaged in no meaningful analysis of either the evidence or relevant legal

principles, and the Court will not undertake such an analysis in this subtle area on the

defendant’s behalf. On the present record and argument, the Court cannot conclude that

the plaintiff is not disabled.

B. Harassment.

According to the plaintiff, throughout his employment he was called “Shaky,” “ol’

Shaky,” “Shakster,” “old fart,” and variations on those terms. He says he was called

these things by Kay, Smith, BeVier, Howser, Fleming, Blackwell, Estrada, Boling, Jim

Shiver, Brenda Kaiser, and Charmaine Hudson. At team meetings throughout his

employment, other team members joked about the plaintiff’s age and disability. (Plaintiff

Affidavit, ¶¶ b, c, e). 

The defendant has moved to strike these portions of the affidavit as sham. (Doc.

47 at 3-5). In deposition, the plaintiff was asked if he had ever heard Linda Howser or

Stuart Kay use any type of offensive name for him, and the plaintiff unequivocally

responded that he had not. (Plaintiff Deposition at 34-35). With respect to his inherently

conflicting affidavit testimony that Howser and Kay used these names, the motion to

strike is due to be granted.

The defendant also seeks to strike the affidavit to the extent it reflects that

individuals other than Paul Smith made the comments. The deposition reflects that the

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9

Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, (Doc. 47 at 10), it is not significant to the

Van T. Junkins analysis that the plaintiff named additional persons in his affidavit without

having recovered his lost notes, since he did not testify that he would never remember

additional individuals until and unless he reviewed the notes, only that he could not do so

at deposition.

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plaintiff identified by name only Smith and Danny Fell as persons who had made such

comments, but it also reflects that the plaintiff: asserted that “a whole lot of people”

made the comments; that he had kept a list of who said what; that he had left the list at the

office when he was terminated; and that he could not name anybody else in his deposition

“without my notes.” (Plaintiff Deposition at 24, 28-29). The plaintiff’s affidavit is not

inherently inconsistent because his deposition was clear that other individuals made the

comments but that he could not think of them at the moment.9

 

“To prove sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that she

belongs to a protected group; (2) that she has been subjected to unwelcome sexual

harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on her sex; (4) that the harassment was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and

create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that a basis for holding

the employer liable exists.” Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th

Cir. 2004); accord Dockery v. Nicholson, 170 Fed. Appx. 63, 66-67 (11th Cir. 2006)

(disability - Rehabilitation Act); Apodoca v. Secretary of Department of Homeland

Security, 161 Fed. Appx. 897, 901 (11th Cir. 2006) (age). The defendant challenges only

the plaintiff’s ability to prove the fourth element. (Doc. 41 at 28-30; Doc. 48 at 10-12).

The fourth element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case contains both an objective

and a subjective element. Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999)(en

banc). “[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” Id.

(internal quotes omitted). The objective test “is somewhat fact intensive.” Id. However,

the Supreme Court has identified, and the Eleventh Circuit has routinely employed, a

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four-factor analysis: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3)

whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job

performance.” Id. The Court is required to “examine the conduct in context, not as

isolated acts, and [to consider] the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 

The defendant argues that the plaintiff can establish neither the objective nor the

subjective component of the fourth element. With respect to the objective element, the

defendant assumes its motion to strike will be granted and thus fails to address the

evidence of harassment presented in the plaintiff’s affidavit. For this reason alone, the

defendant has failed to meet its initial burden on motion for summary judgment. Nor

does the defendant make any effort to apply the four-factor analysis to the plaintiff’s

evidence of harassment.

Subjectively, the defendant notes that the plaintiff felt he was doing a good job,

that he loved his job and liked the people he worked with, that he continued to make

presentations despite discomfort generated by the comments, and that a subordinate didn’t

notice the plaintiff react negatively to the comments. (Doc. 41 at 30). The defendant

offers no analysis or authority for its dubious conclusion that these circumstances prevent

the plaintiff from establishing that he subjectively considered the comments to create an

abusive working environment, and the Court will not perform the task for the defendant’s

benefit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

granted with respect to the plaintiff’s claims of wrongful termination based on age,

disability and/or retaliation and denied with respect to the plaintiff’s claim of hostile

work environment based on age and/or disability. The defendant’s motion to strike

portions of the plaintiff’s affidavit is granted with respect to the affidavit’s claim that

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Stuart Kay and Linda Howser made offensive comments based on his age and/or

disability and denied in all other respects. The defendant’s motion to strike portions of

the affidavit of Richard Edgeworth, (Doc. 49), is denied as moot.

DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2008.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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