Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01629/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS R. ABBE, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05cv1629 DMS (JMA)

ORDER (1) GRANTING-IN-PART

AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND (2) DENYING

MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT

[Doc. No. 55]

[Doc. No. 57]

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, and DOES 1 through

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Defendant City of San Diego (“City”) has filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

in Abbe v. City of San Diego, 05cv1629; and a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for a More Definite

Statement in Burkett v. City of San Diego, 06cv538. The Abbe and Burkett cases recently were

consolidated, and therefore the motions are addressed together. Plaintiffs have filed oppositions to

the motions, and the City has filed a consolidated reply. The motions were heard on September 29,

2006, at which time the parties were represented by counsel. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the City’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the

Pleadings, GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the City’s Motion to Dismiss, and DENIES

the Motion for a More Definite Statement.

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the California Labor Code.

- 2 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

I. 

BACKGROUND

These consolidated cases involve similar facts and identical legal theories. Plaintiffs, more

than 1400 individuals, are current and former San Diego police officers. (Abbe Second Amended

Complaint (“Abbe SAC”) at ¶ 7; Burkett First Amended Complaint (“Burkett FAC”) at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs

sue the City asserting statutory and contractual rights to overtime payment and reimbursement of

certain expenses. Both complaints allege claims under: (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),

29 U.S.C. § 207(a); (2) Cal. Labor Code § 226.7, for denial of meal and rest breaks, and failure to

compensate therefor; (3) Cal. Labor Code § 512, for denial of meal breaks; (4) Cal. Labor Code §

2802, for failure to reimburse work-related expenses; and (5) common law breach of contract. The

City, through its pending motions, challenges Plaintiffs’ California Labor Code claims.1

Plaintiffs allege the City violated federal and state labor law by failing to compensate Plaintiffs

for, among other things, time spent in required preshift and postshift activities, including reviewing

and finalizing arrest and investigation reports; time spent getting dressed; and time spent working

during meal, rest break and free-time periods. (Abbe SAC at ¶7; Burkett FAC at ¶7.) According to

Plaintiffs, the City also failed to reimburse them for necessary expenses incurred, including purchasing

and maintaining uniforms, weapons and safety equipment. (Abbe SAC at ¶8; Burkett FAC at ¶8.)

Plaintiffs also allege the City adopted procedures that resulted in the failure to keep accurate wage

records as required by federal and state law. (Abbe SAC at ¶9; Burkett FAC at ¶9.) Further, the

Plaintiffs allege the City breached the employment contract as set forth in a Memorandum of

Understanding (“MOU”) entered into between the City and the San Diego Police Officers’

Association. (Abbe SAC at ¶10; Burkett FAC at ¶10.) Plaintiffs allege they are intended beneficiaries

of the MOU, which sets forth the terms and conditions of their employment. (Abbe SAC at ¶¶13, 15;

Burkett FAC at ¶12.) 

On May 16, 2006, pursuant to stipulation, the Court ordered the respective cases consolidated.

[Abbe Doc. No. 53.] The City now moves for partial judgment on the pleadings in Abbe as to all state

labor code claims. Similarly, the City challenges all such claims in Burkett through its motion to

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In Abbe, Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC), and the City has

answered. In Burkett, Plaintiffs have filed a SAC, adding additional plaintiffs, and the City has not

yet answered. Pursuant to the stipulated order granting Plaintiffs leave to file the SAC in Burkett, the

pending motion to dismiss applies to the SAC.

- 3 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

dismiss. The City also moves for a more definite statement in Burkett as to the FLSA claim.2 Because

the City’s motions to dismiss and for partial judgment on the pleadings are based on the same grounds,

the Court addresses the motions together.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard: Motions to Dismiss and for Judgement on the Pleadings

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). A claim may be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See also Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). In

deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, all material factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as

well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338. Dismissal is proper

only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a

cognizable legal theory. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The court, however, need not accept all conclusory allegations as true; rather, it must “examine

whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.”

Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Benson v.

Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1982) (court need not accept

conclusory legal assertions); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Conclusory

allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil

Rights Act.”); accord Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) (“All well-pleaded facts,

as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true.”). “The plaintiff must allege with

at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s

claim.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The City raised its constitutional argument regarding sections 512 and 226.7 for the first time

in its reply brief. Accordingly, the Court ordered additional briefing on the issue, and Plaintiffs

submitted a supplemental opposition on September 18, 2006. 

- 4 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

“After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may

move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is governed by the

same general standard as that applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: i.e., judgment on the pleadings is

properly granted when, taking all of the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The City advances three principal arguments in its challenge to Plaintiffs’ state Labor Code

claims: (1) the claims are barred by the home rule provisions of the California Constitution; (2) certain

Wage Orders promulgated by the California Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) exempt Plaintiffs

from the application of the Labor Code sections in question; and (3) Plaintiffs lack standing to bring

suit under the Labor Code because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.3

 The Court

addresses only the first two arguments as the City concedes the exhaustion argument in its Reply.

(Reply at 9.)

B. The California Constitution and its Home Rule Provisions

The California Constitution, through its home rule provisions, grants charter cities and counties

autonomy to “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject

only to [the] restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters . . .” Cal. Const. art. XI,

§ 5, subd. (a). The California Constitution further provides that “municipal affairs” shall include such

matters as the “compensation, method of appointment, qualifications, tenure of office and removal”

of charter city and county employees. Id. It is undisputed the City of San Diego is a charter city.

In County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.4th 278, 285 (2003), the California Supreme

Court held that the home rule provisions are an express limitation on the Legislature. Where charter

entities “provide for the compensation of [their] employees,” the Legislature “does not have . . .

authority” to regulate such matters. See id. “It has long been settled that, insofar as a charter city

legislates with regard to municipal affairs, its charter prevails over general state law.” Sonoma County

Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal.3d 296 (1979). 

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

In addition, the State is permitted to override a charter city’s regulation of municipal affairs

only on matters of “statewide concern.” Baggett v. Gates, 33 Cal.3d 128, 136 (1982). What

constitutes a municipal affair as opposed to a matter of statewide concern “is often a difficult

question.” Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees, 23 Cal.3d at 316. Where a state law

regulates compensation, it is generally barred by the home rule provisions. County of Riverside, 36

Cal.4th at 289 (“[T]he determination of the wages paid to employees of charter cities . . . is a matter

of local rather than statewide concern.”). If, however, a state law regulates only the process by which

compensation is determined, it is deemed to regulate a matter of statewide concern that does not

conflict with the home rule provisions. In County of Riverside, the court addressed the issue as

follows:

We have ‘emphasize[d] that there is a clear distinction between the substance of a

public employee labor issue and the procedure by which it is resolved. Thus there is

no question that ‘salaries of local employees of a charter city constitute municipal

affairs and are not subject to general laws.’ Nevertheless, the process by which the

salaries are fixed is obviously a matter of statewide concern . . . .’

30 Cal.4th at 289 (original emphasis)(citations omitted). 

1. Municipal Affairs and Labor Code Sections 226.7, 512 and 2802

The question presented here is whether sections 226.7, 512 and 2802 regulate matters of

municipal affairs or matters of statewide concern. The City advocates a broad reading of the home

rule provisions, arguing: “this exemption broadly prohibits any state regulation of the terms and

conditions of employment that have been established by charter cities . . .” (Reply at 2)(emphasis

added). Specifically, the City argues it is “exempt from all Labor Code provisions regarding wages,

compensation, overtime, as well as closely related provisions, including meal and/or rest breaks.” (Id.

at 5.) But case law does not support such a broad reading of the home rule provisions. In fact, the

relevant case law closely tracks the language of section 5 of the Constitution, granting charter cities

and counties autonomy regarding matters of “compensation,” but not all terms and conditions of

employment. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue without citing authority that “case law clearly indicates that

[the labor issues in question] are statewide concerns and the Legislature is well within its rights to pass

regulation that impinges on home rule [provisions]. . . .” (Supplemental Opposition at 7.) A review

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Section 226.7 provides, “[n]o employer shall require any employee to work during any meal

or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission. If an employer

fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of

the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay

at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not

provided.” § 226.7 (a) - (b). 

5

 Several California Courts of Appeal have addressed whether payment under section 226.7

is compensation or a penalty for purposes of determining the appropriate statute of limitations. There

is no consensus on the question, and the issue is presently before the California Supreme Court. See

National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th 1072 (2006) (review granted

April 12, 2006) (holding payment under section 226.7 “is in the nature of a statutory remedy to

employees,” and not a penalty on employers); cf. Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 134

Cal.App.4th 728 (2006) (review granted Feb. 22, 2006) (holding payment imposed by section 226.7

is “not overtime pay for an allowed work period, but a penalty for violating the law that prohibits work

during those times.”) For purposes of evaluating section 226.7 in the context of the home rule

provisions, this Court finds persuasive the National Steel court’s holding that “Section 226.7 has the

dual function of deterring employers from requiring their employees to work through mandated meal

and rest periods and compensating employees required to work through these periods.” National

Steel, 135 Cal.App.4th at *8.

6

 Section 2802 requires an employer to “indemnify his or her employee for all necessary

expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her

duties, or his or her obedience to the directions of the employer . . .” 

- 6 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

of the Labor Code sections in question and the relevant case law indicates the City has the better

reasoned argument as to sections 226.7 and 2802, but not section 512. 

a. Section 226.7

Section 226.7 involves matters of municipal affairs because it regulates compensation. It

requires employers to provide rest periods, or to “pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the

employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not

provided.” Id. (emphasis added).4

 Section 226.7 clearly regulates the substance of employment

compensation and, as such, it encroaches on matters of municipal affairs and may not be applied to

the City without violating the home rule provisions.5

 See County of Riverside, 36 Cal.4th at 289

(“[T]he determination of the wages paid to employees of charter cities . . . is a matter of local rather

than statewide concern.”). 

b. Section 2802

Section 2802 also involves matters of municipal affairs because it regulates compensation by

requiring employers to indemnify employees for “necessary expenditures.”6 California case law

supports this conclusion, holding that section 2802 cannot be applied to charter cities because

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 Plaintiffs also argue the City’s failure to reimburse them for work-related expenses

“constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” (Plaintiffs’ Opposition

to Mot. to Dismiss at 10-11.) The problem with this argument is that Plaintiffs have not alleged a

violation of their Fifth Amendment rights. Whether or not the City’s conduct violates the Fifth

Amendment is irrelevant to the analysis of whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim under section 2802.

8

 Section 512 states, “[a]n employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more

than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes

. . . .”

- 7 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

indemnification for expenditures such as work uniforms constitutes compensation. In re Work

Uniform Cases, 133 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (2005) (“payment to employees for work uniforms is a part

of the employee’s compensation.”). Similarly here, indemnification for work-related expenses such

as the purchase and maintenance of uniforms, weapons, safety equipment and related items constitutes

compensation. Plaintiffs may not therefore bring a claim against the City under section 2802.

Plaintiffs argue that since their terms of compensation are governed by the MOU, “to

determine if the holding of Work Uniform is applicable [], the Court must determine if each item

claimed by Plaintiffs under Section 2802 constitutes an item of ‘compensation.’” (Plaintiffs’d

Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that the City pays them $900 for

“unspecified equipment.” (Id. at 9.) “Consequently, the specific equipment for which Plaintiff[s] are

allegedly compensated is a question of fact that cannot be resolved summarily on Defendant’s

motion.” (Id.) Plaintiffs’ arguments, however, conflate their breach of contract claim with their

statutory 2802 claim. Whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim under section 2802 is a legal question

(see In re Work Uniform Cases, 133 Cal.App.4th at 340) that may be decided on a motion to dismiss.

The question of whether the City’s payment of $900 is sufficient to meet its alleged obligations under

the MOU is a different question and relevant only to the breach of contract claim. Because section

2802 conflicts with California’s home rule provisions, it may not be applied to the City.7

c. Section 512

Section 512 is different from section 226.7 in one material respect: while sections 512 and

226.7 require employers to provide rest and meal breaks,8

 section 512 does not require employers to

compensate their employees in the event such breaks are not provided. The City nonetheless contends

section 512 is preempted by the home rule provisions because it is a “substantive regulation” of the

terms and conditions of employment. (Reply at 7.) In support, the City cites Work Uniform Cases,

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

133 Cal.App.4th 328, and Kim v. Regents of the University of California, 80 Cal.App.4th 160 (2000).

Work Uniform Cases and Kim, however, are distinguishable because they address state law provisions

that regulate employee “wages” and “compensation,” matters that are clearly municipal in nature. See

Work Uniform Cases, 133 Cal.App.4th at 338 (“we conclude that payment to employees for work

uniforms is a part of the employee’s compensation and should be considered like any other payment

of wages, compensation or benefits.”); Kim, 80 Cal.App.4th at 167 (“the issue here pertains to the

determination of the amount of wages to be paid to individual employees.”) Here, in contrast, section

512 does not provide for wages or compensation in any manner; rather, it focuses solely on the

requirement of meal breaks. Therefore, section 512 does not conflict with the home rule provisions

because it regulates matters unrelated to compensation.

2. The Home Rule Provisions and Fundamental Fairness

In response to the City’s argument that the home rule provisions bar the application of the

subject labor code provisions, Plaintiffs assert it is “contrary to the concepts of fundamental fairness

and common sense,” that private employees are entitled to the benefits of the Labor Code sections in

question, but not public employees. (Supplemental Opposition at 3.) Plaintiffs’ claim of unfairness

is unfounded for several reasons. First, public employees of non-charter cities and counties, in

addition to private employees, benefit from the protections of sections 512, 226.7 and 2802. Second,

the home rule provisions of the California Constitution implicitly reflect the democratic judgment that

charter cities ought to have autonomy to regulate their own municipal affairs. Plaintiffs, as employees

of a charter city, are not without protection, as such protection is inherent in the political process;

officials in charge of setting wage standards are accountable to the electorate. Third, consistent with

section 5 of the California Constitution, the Legislature may require charter cities to comply with

regulations regarding matters of statewide concern. See County of Riverside, 30 Cal.4th at 288

(requiring charter counties to comply with certain procedural safeguards for “resolving disputes

regarding wages, hours and other conditions of employment”); see Seal Beach Police Officers Assn.,

36 Cal.3d 591 (requiring charter cities to comply with meet-and-confer requirements set out in

Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code § 3500 et seq.)). Finally, federal oversight through the FLSA

applies to all concerned. 

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 Although the IWC was defunded by the Legislature effective July 1, 2004, its wage orders

remain in effect. Huntington Memorial Hospital v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App.4th 893, 902, n. 2

(2005).

- 9 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

For these reasons, the Court finds sections 226.7 and 2802 do not apply to the City because

they impermissibly regulate employment compensation, a matter of municipal affairs. Section 512,

on the other hand, does not regulate compensation and thus, does not conflict with the home rule

provisions. Because section 512 is not barred by the home rule provisions, the question remains

whether section 512 – as implemented by certain Wage Orders – applies to Plaintiffs.

C. The Industrial Welfare Commission and Relevant Wage Orders

The City contends Wage Order 4-2001 exempts Plaintiffs from the application of sections 512

and 226.7. Because section 226.7 does not apply to the City, the question presented is whether section

512 applies to the City under the Wage Orders. A brief overview of the history of the IWC, the

relevant Wage Orders, and section 512 is helpful to this analysis. 

Established in 1913, the IWC is a five-member “state agency empowered to formulate

regulations (known as Wage Orders) governing employment in the State of California.”9

 Morillion

v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 581 (2000) (citations omitted). In exercising its quasilegislative authority, the IWC has promulgated 17 Wage Orders, following a similar format, with each

applying to separate industries or occupations. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11000 et seq.; see also

Collins v. Overnite Transportation Co., 105 Cal.App.4th 171, 174-175 (2003) (citing Morillion, 22

Cal.4th at 581). Wage Orders 1 through 16, including Wage Order 4-2001, regulate the wages, hours

and working conditions for specific occupations, while Wage Order 17 governs the same for

miscellaneous employees. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11000 et seq. 

Section 512 was enacted in 1999, as a part of the Eight-Hour-Day Restoration and Workplace

Flexibility Act of 1999 (“Act”) (stats. 1999, ch. 134, codified at Labor Code §500 et seq., and

commonly referred to as “AB 60"). Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc., 138 Cal.App.4th 429, 434 (2006).

The Legislature enacted the Act, in part in response to the IWC’s 1997 amendment of its Wage Orders

to eliminate the “state’s daily overtime rule in favor of the less restrictive weekly overtime rule of the

federal FLSA.” Collins, 105 Cal.App.4th at 176. Among other things, the Act declared null and void

the IWC amendment and reinstated earlier Wage Orders that were in effect in 1997, thereby restoring

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 “No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without

a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6)

hours will complete the day’s work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of employer

and employee.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §11040, subd. (11)(A) [Wage Order 4-2001]; Cal. Code Regs.,

tit. 8, §11170, subd. (9)(A) [Wage Order 17].

- 10 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

the daily overtime rule. Id.; Bearden, 138 Cal.App.4th at 434; see also § 510. “Other portions of the

Act established a new statutory scheme governing hours of labor and overtime compensation for all

industries and occupations, which codified certain provisions of the IWC Wage Orders, [and] amended

other provisions . . .” Collins, 105 Cal.App.4th at 176. Section 512 codified the meal break

provisions set out in existing Wage Orders. See Wage Order 4-89, amended 6-29-93, subd. (11)(A).

Two Wage Orders are at issue: 4-2001 and 17. Wage Order 4 (currently 4-2001; formerly 4-

89) was adopted prior to the Act, while Wage Order 17 was adopted to implement “changes in the law

as a result of the Legislature’s enactment of the [Act].” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §11170, subd. (1).

Both Wage Orders include the substantive provisions of section 512, thereby implementing the

mandates of that section.10 Plaintiffs argue Wage Order 17 regulates the wages, hours and working

conditions of miscellaneous employees, including police officers, and therefore they are entitled to

meal breaks. The City disagrees, asserting police officers are subject to Wage Order 4-2001, which

includes a provision specifically exempting public employees. Therefore, even though both Wage

Orders include the substantive provisions of section 512, Plaintiffs may benefit from section 512 only

if they are covered by Wage Order 17, and not by Wage Order 4-2001. 

The City argues the language of Wage Order 17 does not apply to police officers. The

introduction to Wage Order 17 indicates it applies to: 

Any industry or occupation not previously covered by, and all employees not specifically

exempted in, the Commission’s wage orders in effect in 1997, or otherwise exempted by law,

are covered by this order. 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §11170, subd. (1)(A). To determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the

benefits of section 512, the Court must first determine whether police officers were previously covered

by, or exempted in, the “wage orders in effect in 1997.” The City argues that Wage Order 4-2001 was

in effect in 1997 (then Wage Order 4-89), and that it implicitly covers police officers. In support, the

City cites section 2(O) of the wage order, which identifies among numerous other occupations the

following: “dispatchers; guards; interviewers; investigators; process servers; and ‘other related

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

occupations.’” (Mot. for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 3.) The City contends police officers

fall within the category of “other related occupations.” 

The City further argues that Plaintiffs may not benefit from the meal breaks set out in Wage

Order 4-2001 because subsection 1(B) of the wage order specifically exempts city employees: “the

provisions of this order shall not apply to any employees directly employed by the State or any

political subdivision thereof, including any city, county, or special district.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,

§ 11040, subd. (1)(B) (emphasis added). Therefore, the City argues that even though Plaintiffs are

covered by Wage Order 4-2001, the city employee exception prevents them from enjoying the benefits

of the meal break provisions. 

Contrary to the City’s argument, however, Wage Order 4-2001 (and similarly Wage Order 4-

89), does not cover police officers. The list of over 80 occupations identified in Wage Order 4-2001,

set forth in section 2(O), does not mention police officers. Instead, the list includes among others:

guards, investigators, and “other related occupations.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. 2(O).

The City argues, without citing any authority, that “other related occupations,” includes police

officers. Given the lack of authority supporting the City’s position, this Court declines to hold that

police officers are covered by Wage Order 4-2001. See Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry, 1 Cal.4th

976, 985 (1992) (statutes governing conditions of employment are construed broadly in favor of

protecting employees). Because police officers are not covered by Wage Order 4-2001, the public

employee exception therein also does not apply to them. Instead, this exception applies only to public

employees whose occupations are identified in the Wage Order. 

Accordingly, this Court finds persuasive Plaintiffs’ argument that “peace officers are covered

by Wage Order 17 because peace officers were not ‘previously covered’ by a Wage Order.”

Therefore, Plaintiffs are not exempt from the meal breaks under section 512, and may allege claims

based on that section against the City. 

D. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only where the complaint is so “vague or ambiguous that a party

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). In such cases,

defendant cannot reasonably be expected to frame a proper response. See Famolare, Inc. v. Edison

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 05cv1969 DMS (JMA)

Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc.,

189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Motions for more definite statement are viewed with disfavor,

and are rarely granted. In re American Int’l Airways, Inc., 66 B.R. 642, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief in Burkett alleges a violation the FLSA § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. §

207(a). The City claims it is unable to determine in good faith whether to plead the statute of

limitations as an affirmative defense to that claim, as the complaint is filled with allegations that the

City engaged in unlawful conduct “[a]t all times relevant to this Complaint.” The City moves for an

order directing Plaintiffs to specify the time period during which the conduct allegedly occurred.

The complaint is not so vague that the City cannot determine whether to allege the statute of

limitations as an affirmative defense. The City had no problem doing so in Abbe.

III. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the City’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings in Abbe; GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the City’s

motion to dismiss in Burkett; and DENIES the motion for a more definite statement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 19, 2006

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

cc: all parties

Judge Brooks

Case 3:05-cv-01629-DMS-RBB Document 71 Filed 10/19/06 Page 12 of 12