Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_98-cv-06264/USCOURTS-caed-1_98-cv-06264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES

CONTROL,

Plaintiff,

v.

WITCO CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

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1:98-cv-6264 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER APPROVING AND

ENTERING CONSENT DECREE

BETWEEN DTSC AND WESTERN

FARM SERVICES

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court for decision is a request for approval of a

consent decree (“Consent Decree” or “Decree”) that would settle

all claims brought by Plaintiff, the California Department of

Toxic Substances Control (“Plaintiff” or “DTSC”) against Western

Farm Services (“Western”). 

II. BACKGROUND

This case concerns two San Joaquin Drum Company (“SJDC”)

industrial drum processing sites located at 3930 Gilmore Avenue

(“Gilmore Property”) and 3213 Gibson Street (“Cady Property”) in

Bakersfield, California. While in business, SJDC cleaned drums

used for various purposes, stripped them of paint, and then

repainted them. SJDC processed drums at the Gilmore Property and

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28 1 Witco Corporation was acquired by Crompton Corporation.

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used the Cady Property for drum storage. During a period of time

from the 1960s through the late 1970s or early 1980s, hazardous

materials were released from the Gilmore and Cady properties. In

the early 1980s, operations at the Gilmore and Cady sites ceased.

After SJDC shut down its operations, the Cady Property was

sold. The subsequent attempted sale of the Gilmore Property

attracted the attention of the DTSC. Upon inspection, DTSC

discovered 800-1,000 drums and two underground sumps filled with

liquid at the Gilmore Property. DTSC found the soil and

groundwater contaminated with hazardous substances within the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 

Defendants in this case are Clifford Pitts (owner of SJDC),

Witco Corporation (“Crompton”)1, Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”),

Western Farm Services (“Western”), Chevron Corporation

(“Chevron”), and Helt Petroleum Corporation (“Helt”), several of

which have made cross-claims against each other. The suit

alleges violations of the Comprehensive Environmental

Responsibility, Compensation & Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42

U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act

(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., and state nuisance law. 

Both CERCLA and RCRA apply to generators and transporters of

hazardous substances, as well as owners and operators of disposal

or treatment facilities (collectively referred to as “Potentially

Responsible Parties” or “PRPs”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 6973, 9607. PRPs

are strictly liable, and jointly and severally liable, for

response costs and remedial action incurred by the government

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2 Western is implicated in this suit through Coberly &

Plumb, a pesticide formulator that is now part of Western, who is

alleged to have sent contaminated drums to SJDC. Doc. 165 at 3. 

Crompton is implicated through a subsidiary of Witco Corporation,

which is now part of Crompton, that allegedly delivered used

drums for cleaning or reconditioning to SJDC. Id. at 3. 

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unless they can prove that the release of hazardous substances

was caused solely by unrelated persons or events. Id.; see also

United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171, 73 (4th Cir. 1988). 

DTSC alleges that the corporate Defendants (or their

predecessors) sent used drums, contaminated with hazardous

materials, to SJDC for processing.2

DTSC filed an initial complaint on October 30, 1998 based on

the Gilmore Property. A first amended complaint, adding Chevron

as a Defendant, was filed on August 5, 1999. Helt was dismissed

without prejudice on September 3, 1999. Through negotiations,

DTSC formulated a global settlement offer on June 12, 2003. DTSC

withdrew the offer before any Defendants had accepted after

determining that the Cady Property had also been used by SJDC and

might also be contaminated. A second amended complaint was filed

on June 25, 2003 to include the Cady Property. 

From 1981 through the present, investigation and cleanup

activities have taken place on the Gilmore Property. DTSC has

incurred $1 million in response costs for the Gilmore Property to

date (including interest but excluding attorney’s fees). Shortly

after the initial filing of this suit in 1998, the case was

stayed to allow for work and further investigation at the Gilmore

Property. These actions included a focused site investigation

undertaken by Defendants in December 1999, a follow-up soil and

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groundwater investigation undertaken by Defendants in May 2001,

emergency removal action undertaken by DTSC in November 2001, and

a geophysical survey and soil sampling undertaken by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency (“US EPA”) in the summer

of 2003. DTSC states that “no investigative or cleanup

activities related to the operation of San Joaqiun Drum Company

have taken place at the...Cady Property.” Doc. 159 at 3. 

A. The Chevron Settlement 

On January 29, 2004 a final settlement agreement was signed

between DTSC and Chevron. The settlement agreement was approved

by the court on March 15, 2004. Doc. 146. Chevron agreed to (1)

perform emergency response actions identified by the US EPA as

necessary to address imminent dangers at the Gilmore Property;

(2) remove all underground structures and attendant soil that

cause contamination; (3) monitor the quality of the groundwater;

and (4) pay any DTSC and US EPA response costs incurred after

October 31, 2003 that are spent in overseeing Chevron’s actions. 

All work performed by Chevron (both planning and actual

implementation) must be reviewed by DTSC or the US EPA. DTSC

estimates that Chevron has made total expenditures of

approximately $542,000 - $642,000 (including $400,000 - 500,000

for work performed at the Gilmore site and $142,000 in oversight

costs). Doc. 188, filed Aug. 9, 2005, at 2.

In addition to the work Chevron has agreed to perform at the

Gilmore site and the $1 million in costs already incurred by DTSC

to date, DTSC estimates that it will incur additional costs to

remedy remaining soil contamination at the Gilmore site. DTSC

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estimates that the additional cleanup and oversigth costs for the

Gilmore site will be between $432,500 and $632,000. Id. at 3. 

B. The Proposed Consent Decree Between DTSC and Western 

After Chevron’s settlement was revealed to the other

Defendants, Western approached DTSC to open settlement

negotiations. A Letter of Intent was signed in April 2004,

whereby Western would investigate the Cady Property. Initially,

Crompton and Dow objected to the terms on the basis that Western

had misrepresented its involvement with SJDC in its discovery

responses (unduly minimizing its potential liability). Western

supplemented its discovery responses on May 7, 2004, prompting

DTSC to withdraw from the April Letter of Intent. Further

negotiations ensued and a new Letter of Intent was signed on June

3, 2004. The June Letter of Intent was substantively the same as

the April Letter of Intent with an added requirement that Western

make an additional payment of $200,000 to $300,000 depending upon

the results of the investigative work at the Cady Property. 

Under the terms of the settlement between DTSC and Western,

Western will complete a set of tasks designed to investigate and

characterize the contamination, if any, at the Cady Property.

Doc. 161, Ex. 3, at 1. Western will undertake these tasks in

Phases, as paraphrased below:

Phase 1: Western will collect and analyze soil samples from

40 locations distributed evenly in a grid pattern

across the Cady Property. If any samples contain

concentrations of hazardous chemicals exceeding

specified limits, further investigation will ensue

in Phase 2. 

Phase 2: In Phase 2, Western will collect and analyze

samples in the vicinity of any Phase 1 location

where soil screening levels are exceeded. Samples

will be taken from deeper depths than the Phase 1

samples to determine the vertical extent of

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contamination. If the Phase 2 sampling shows that

soil contamination appears to extend to

groundwater, Phase 3 will be required.

Phase 3: In Phase 3, Western will collect groundwater

samples. Western will also provide lithographic

information for evaluation of potential

contaminant migration. If Phases 1, 2, or 3 of

the investigation indicate that groundwater is

contaminated by “constituents of concern” (“COCs”)

at concentrations above applicable regulatory

levels, Phase 4 will be required.

Phase 4: In Phase 4, Western will conduct additional

groundwater monitoring to assist in determining

the extent of contamination and groundwater flow

direction. Western will install and develop three

shallow groundwater monitoring wells, and will

sample water for all COCs for two calendar

quarters.

Id. at 1-5. Western will also pay DTSC’s oversight costs

associated with the work set forth above. Doc. 161 at 5.

In addition, Western agrees to make an additional payment

toward DTSC’s response costs. The amount of the additional

payment will be as follows:

(1) If the investigation of the Cady Property ends at

Phase 1..., [Western] will pay $300,000 toward

DTSC’s Response Costs.

(2) If the investigation of the Cady Property ends at

Phase 2..., [Western] will pay $250,000 toward

DTSC’s Response Costs.

(3) If the investigation of the Cady Property

continues through Phase 3, [Western] will pay

$200,000 toward DTSC’s Response Costs.

(4) If the investigation of the Cady Property

continues through Phase 4, [Western] will pay

$200,000 toward DTSC’s Response Costs.

Id. at 12-13.

Lastly, upon Court approval and entry of the Consent Decree,

all claims against Western with regard to the San Joaquin Drum

Company Properties will be dropped, and Western will be protected

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3 These figures do not include the $25,000 to $50,000

estimated costs for DTSC’s oversight of Western’s activities. 

Doc. 169 at 3 n.2. This cost is factored into the analysis of

substantive fairness below. 

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against any claims for contribution to the extent permitted by

law. Id. at 13-14.

Western estimates that the cost of each phase of the work it

has agreed to perform would fall within the following ranges: 

Pre-phase work: $28,992 - $80,782

Phase 1 work: $125,219 - $186,698

Phase 2 work: $116,749 - $415,958

Phase 3 work: $48,366 - $93,351

Phase 4 work: $85,080 - $153,015 

See Doc. 168 at 3. Therefore, in a “best case” scenario, where

western only had to complete Phase 1 of the work, Western would

expend between $154,211 and $367,480 (the sum of the low and high

ends of the ranges of costs for the Pre-phase work and the Phase

1 work) plus $300,000 toward DTSC’s response costs, for a total

cost figure of between $454,211 and $667,480. In a “worst case”

scenario, Western would expend between $404,406 and $929,804 (the

sum of the low and high ends of the costs for all phases of work)

plus $200,000 toward DTSC’s response costs, for total cost of

between $604,406 and $1,129,804. Accordingly, the range of

Western’s potential exposure from this settlement is between

$454,211 (the low end of the estimate if the investigation ends

at Phase 1) and $1,129,804 (the high end of the estimate if the

investigation ends at Phase 4).3 

In addition to the costs Western has agreed to cover, DTSC

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4 DTSC notes that there may be additional PRPs connected

to the Cady site, apart from the parties to this case. Doc. 188

at 4. 

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estimates that it may spend $200,000 to perform additional

remedial work at the Cady site.4 Doc. 188 at 4. 

DTSC formally moved for judicial approval of the Western

Consent Decree on July 9, 2004. Doc. 157. The proposed order

was erroneously signed on July 15, 2004, but rescinded on July

20, 2004 to allow for completion of preliminary investigatory

work by Chevron at the Gilmore Property. See Doc. 181. On

August 2, 2004, Crompton and Dow filed a joint opposition to

DTSC’s motion for approval of the Decree. Doc. 165. DTSC filed a

reply on August 9, 2004. Doc. 168. Western joined in DTSC’s

reply and filed a reply brief of its own on August 9, 2004. Doc.

169. Oral argument was heard on August 16, 2004. On May 4,

2005, after Chevron’s preliminary data from the Gilmore Property

was evaluated, Crompton and Dow withdrew opposition. Doc. 185. 

DTSC now submits an unopposed motion for approval of the Consent

Decree between DTSC and Western. Doc. 186, filed May 24, 2005.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed

Consent Decree pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A), which

provides that whenever a settlement is entered into with a PRP

with respect to remedial action under 42 U.S.C. § 9606, except as

otherwise provided in 42 U.S.C. 9622(g)(concerning de minimus

settlements), “the agreement shall be entered in the appropriate

United States district court as a consent decree” for approval. 

Venue is appropriate in this district pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9613(b).

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A consent decree is “essentially a settlement agreement

subject to continued judicial policing.” See Williams v.

Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983). When reviewing a

consent decree, a district court must independently scrutinize

its terms and avoid “rubber stamp approval.” United States v.

Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 50 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1995);

see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). Court approval of a consent

decree is not a decision on the merits or a process designed to

achieve the optimal outcome for all parties. United States v.

Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990). Rather, it is “an

amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations, and rough

justice.” Id. at 581. Nevertheless, a district court can abuse

its discretion if it fails to consider certain types of

indicators of fairness. See Montrose Chem., 50 F.3d at 747

(holding that the district court abused its discretion in

determining that a CERCLA consent decree was substantively fair,

absent consideration of any estimate of projected total damages).

In evaluating a consent decree, a court should consider

whether the consent decree is: (1) fair (both procedurally and

substantively), (2) reasonable, and (3) consistent with the

purposes of CERCLA and RCRA. Montrose Chem., 50 F.3d at 747

(citing United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84

(1st Cir. 1990)).

B. Fairness

Fairness, in the context of CERCLA and RCRA, “has both

procedural and substantive components.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at 86.

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1. Procedural Fairness

To measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily

look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor,

openness, and bargaining balance. Id. After nearly six years of

negotiations, site investigations, and litigation, Western and

DTSC came to an agreement. Doc. 169 at 1. Western and DTSC

negotiated and executed the agreement after considering the

universe of evidence and the risks associated with litigation. 

Doc. 161 at 6; Doc. 169 at 1. Both Parties concluded that “the

payment of response costs and performance of the work encompassed

by the Consent Decree was fair, reasonable, and consistent with

the goals of CERCLA.” Doc. 169 at 1. The Consent Decree appears

to have been negotiated in good faith and through a procedurally

fair process. 

2. Substantive Fairness

Substantive fairness flows from procedural fairness. “To

the extent that the process was fair and full of adversarial

vigor, the results come before the court with a much greater

assurance of substantive fairness.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at 87 n.4;

see also United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d

1409, 1433 (6th Cir. 1991). A consent decree that is

substantively fair incorporates concepts of “corrective justice

and accountability: a party should bear the cost of the harm for

which it is legally responsible.” See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 87. 

In conducting that evaluation, a court should determine the

proportional relationship between the amount to be paid by the

settling defendant and the government’s estimate of the projected

total cost of cleanup. See Montrose Chem., 50 F.3d at 747. An

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amount paid is fair if it roughly mirrors the settling

defendant’s proportional liability of the projected total costs. 

Cannons, 899 f.2d at 87. The measure of proportional liability

calculated by the government “should be upheld unless it is

arbitrary, capricious, and devoid of a rational basis.” Id.

The parties estimate that Western’s payment to DTSC will

range from a minimum of $454,000, plus payment of DTSC’s

oversight costs, to a maximum of $1,129,804, plus payment of

DTSC’s oversight costs. Doc. 185 at 4. Western estimates these

costs to be between $25,000 and $50,000. Doc. 169, at 3 n.2. 

DTSC has provided sufficient evidence to reasonably establish

approximate proportional liability among Defendants without

prompting judicial intervention. See Doc. 168 at 10-11.

According to the representations of the parties, the total

estimated cost of the cleanup is estimated to be as follows: 

Low Estimate High Estimate

Range of Costs

likely to be

incurred by Chevron

$542,000 $642,000

Cost previously

incurred by DTSC

$1,000,000 $1,000,000

Costs likely to be

incurred by DTSC in

the future at

Gilmore site

$432,500 $632,000

Costs DTSC may incur

at Cady Site.

$0 $200,000

Investigative costs

likely to be

incurred by Western

at Cady site.

$154,211 $929,804

Oversight costs

likely to be

incurred by Western. 

$25,000 $50,000

Total $2,128,711 $3,403,804

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5 $642,000 (the high end of the costs likely to be

incurred by Chevron) + $1,000,000 expended by DTSC to date +

$200,000 DTSC may have to expend at Cady + $154,211 (the low end

of the investigatory costs Western may incur) + $25,000 (the low

end of the oversight costs Western may incur). 

6 $542,000 (the low end of the costs likely to be

incurred by Chevron), +$1,000,000 expended by DTSC to date + $0

(assuming DTSC expends no additional funds at Cady) + $929,804

(the high end of the investigatory costs Western may incur at

Cady) + $50,000 (the high end of the oversight costs Western may

incur).

12

Assuming Western’s best case scenario, it will expend

$154,211 on work at the Cady site, contribute $300,000 to cover

DTSC’s previously incurred costs, and pay $25,000 in oversight,

for a total expenditure of $454,211. Assuming all other costs

run to the high end of their ranges, the total expenditures by

all parties would reach $2,653,211.5 Under this scenario (with

Western expending at the low end of its range and all other

parties expending at the high end of their ranges), Western will

pay approximately 18 percent of the total estimated costs of

cleanup. On the opposite end of the spectrum, if Western expends

at the high end of its range, it will pay out $929,804 in

investigatory work at the Cady site, $200,000 to cover DTSC’s

previously incurred costs, and $50,000 in oversight costs, for a

total expenditure of $1,179,804. Assuming all other parties

expend at the low end of their ranges, the total cost of cleanup

will be $2,944,304.6 Under this scenario (Western expending at

the high end of its range and all other parties expending at the

low end of their ranges), Western will pay approximately 40

percent of the total estimated cost of cleanup. 

Whether a settlement that requires Western to pay between 18

and 40 percent of the total estimated cleanup costs is fair

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7 If Chevron pays at the low end of its range ($542,000)

while all other parties pay at the high end of their ranges

13

depends on Western’s comparative contribution to the

environmental problem. DTSC maintains that 

In light of the existing evidence against each

defendant, it is not unreasonable that Crompton and Dow

together be held to answer for more work and more

response costs than Western Farm Services, and for

response costs that might be related in some respect to

pesticide contamination. First, Crompton by all

accounts was the biggest customer of SJDC as far as

number of drums reconditioned. While DTSC does not

have precise numbers, because SJDC kept no records, by

all accounts Golden Bear Refinery (the company on which

Crompton’s liability is based) was a large, if not the

largest customer of SJDC, using the company on a

regular basis. Discovery against a former Dow employee

also establishes that it was a customer, though likely

a much smaller one in number of drums serviced as

compared to Crompton.

Second, while Crompton has taken the position that

its predecessor, Golden Bear Refinery, sent only

petroleum drums to the site, petroleum contamination is

in fact part of what makes the pesticide contamination

more of a problem. As DTSC has noted, the presence of

other chemicals and substances, including petroleum

products and solvents, can make pesticides more mobile

in soil and cause them to enter groundwater. 

Finally, Crompton ignores that Golden Bear

Refinery may in fact have been responsible directly for

pesticide contamination at SJDC. Jude Hupp, a former

employee of Golden Bear Refinery, testified that the

drums Golden Bear Refinery sent to SJDC were not

limited to drums that had contained its own product. 

According to Mr. Hupp, the refinery would take back

Golden Bear product drums for credit, but it would also

accept non-Golden Bear drums as a courtesy to the

customer, “drums that [the customer] had no other way

of getting rid of legally, lawfully. Golden Bear

Refinery’s customers included a wide range of

businesses, including agricultural enterprises; it is

therefore reasonable to assume that the drums that SJDC

picked up from Golden Bear Refinery likely included

used pesticide drums. 

Under the terms of the previously approved Chevron-DTSC

settlement, Chevron agreed to pay anywhere between 16 and 28

percent of the total cost of cleanup.7 If the Western-DTSC

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($542,000 + $1,000,000 + $632,000 + $200,000 + $929,804 + 50,000

= $3,353,804), Chevron will pay 16 percent of the total cost of

cleanup. If Chevron pays at the high end of its range ($642,000)

while all other parties pay at the low end of their ranges

($642,000 + $1,000,000 + $432,000 + $0 + $154,211 + $25,000 =

$2,258,211), Chevron will pay approximately 28 percent of the

total cost of cleanup.

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settlement is approved, Western will pay anywhere between 17 and 

39 percent of the total estimated cost of cleanup. Accordingly,

together, Chevron and Western will roughly cover between 34 (16

from Chevron + 18 from Western) and 68 (28 from Chevron + 40 from

Western) percent of the total estimated cost of cleanup. This

would leave as much as 65 or as little as 32 percent of the

cleanup to be shared by Dow and Crompton together. Given DTSC’s

assessment of the comparative fault of Dow and Crompton, and its

rough estimate that “it is not unreasonable that Crompton and Dow

together be held to answer for more work and more response costs

that Western Farm Services,” the allocation of costs under the

Western Consent Decree is substantively fair. 

C. Reasonableness

Evaluation of a consent decree’s reasonableness is a

multifaceted exercise. A court should take into consideration

(1) “any reasonable discounts for litigation risks, time savings,

and the like that may be justified.” Montrose Chem., 50 F.3d at

747. It is also appropriate to consider (2) whether the decree

is technically adequate to accomplish the goal of cleaning the

environment, and (3) whether it will sufficiently compensate the

public for the costs of remedial measures. See Cannons, 899 F.2d

at 89-90. 

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iii. Reasonable Discounts

If DTSC is forced to continue litigation against Western, it

will incur additional costs. Doc. 168 at 11. In addition,

potential litigation risks associated with trying this case

against Western are also substantial, given that there are only

two witnesses linking Western to SJDC–-one is dead, and the other

is out of state and has been uncooperative. Id. at 11. Finally,

DTSC also points out that “there is always a risk that Western []

could extract itself from this case completely.” Id. at 11. 

Approval of the Decree will allow the cleanup process to move

forward without inherent delays from a trial on the merits. The

Consent Decree reflects reasonable discounts for the strength of

the government’s case against Western, litigation risks, and time

savings. 

i. Technical Adequacy

The settlement calls for the hazardous waste investigation

to be conducted under the direction and supervision of either a

licensed professional engineer or registered geologist. The

agreement also calls for the implementation of potentially four

Phases of investigation, depending on the level of contamination

found. Each Phase subsequent to the first Phase is contingent on

the results of the Phase preceding it–-i.e., if the results of

the first Phase show contamination, the second Phase will be

instituted. Doc. 161 at 8. DTSC approval is required for

Western’s “Workplan,” which will set forth in detail all

technical and operational plans for implementing the

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investigation. Id. The Consent Decree is technically adequate

to accomplish the goal of cleaning the environment. 

ii. Compensation of the Public for Costs of

Remedial Measures 

Western will complete a set of tasks designed to investigate

and characterize the contamination, if any, at the Cady Property.

Id. at Ex. 3, 1. Additionally, Western will make an additional

payment of $200,000 to $300,000 depending upon the results of the

investigative work. Id. at 12. In sum, Western has agreed to

cover between 18 and 40 percent of the total costs of cleanup. 

Alongside the Chevron settlement, even if DTSC recovers no

additional funds from any other PRP, at least 34 percent and as

much as 68 percent of the total estimated cost of cleanup will

have been covered by two parties that are not solely responsible

for site contamination. 

D. Consistency With Purposes of CERCLA and RCRA

The first inquiry is whether the consent decree is

consistent with the public purposes of CERCLA and RCRA. See Akzo

Coatings, 949 F.2d at 1435.

CERCLA’s primary purpose is “to facilitate government

cleanup of hazardous waste discharges and prevent[] future

releases.” Exxon v. Hunt Corp., 475 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1986). 

CERCLA also has a strong policy of encouraging early settlements. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)(immunizing settling PRPs from

liability in claims for contribution); see also Montrose Chem.,

50 F.3d at 746.

“RCRA's primary purpose is to reduce the generation of

hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and

disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to

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minimize the present and future threat to human health and the

environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483

(1996)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).

Here, the Consent Decree between Western and DTSC

facilitates the progress of cleanup at the Cady site by ensuring

prompt assessment of the environmental damage and cleanup needs. 

Western guarantees that the assessment process will be completed

promptly if the Decree is approved. Doc. 168 at 12. The cash

payment Western has also agreed to make will reimburse DTSC for a

portion of the work previously performed at the Gilmore property. 

Id. The Consent Decree furthers the public interests CERCLA and

RCRA are intended to serve. 

In sum, the Consent Degree is consistent with the policies

underlying CERCLA and RCRA, is both procedurally and

substantively fair, and is reasonable. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Consent

Decree between Western and DTSC is APPROVED and ENTERED. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 30, 2005 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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