Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01408/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01408-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORE DEVINE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FRESNO CO. CPS, et al., )

)

Defendants )

____________________________________)

CV F 05-1408 AWI LJO 

(NEW DJ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER RE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION TO

STRIKE

(Document #18)

This removed action concerns the death of Plaintiff’s infant daughter following her

placement in a foster home. Plaintiff alleges federal constitutional violations and state tort

claims. This court has federal question jurisdiction over the federal causes of action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 25, 2005, Plaintiff Dore Devine (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of California, County of Fresno. Dore Devine v. Fresno Co. CPS, et al., County of Fresno

Superior Court Case No. 05 CE CG 01232 AMS. The complaint featured a claim on an

intentional tort theory and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of

Plaintiff’s civil rights, specifically the “right to life and liberty, freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment, and due process.” On November 8, 2005, Defendants County of Fresno, Fresno

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The court’s order of February 2, 2006, dismissed all claims against Fresno County 1

CPS with prejudice. Nevertheless, Plaintiff listed “FRESNO CO CPS” as a defendant in her

FAC. Because all claims against Fresno County CPS have been dismissed with prejudice, the

court will not address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against it. Plaintiff is directed to omit any

references to Fresno County CPS as a defendant in any future filings with the court.

The other defendants named in the complaint do not appear to have joined in this

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motion. The other defendants are Glynda Maroney, Renee Ballin, Tony Madden, Lorraine

Ramirez, Candis Ryson, and Peggy Thompson.

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County CPS, Gary Zomalt, and Cathi Huerta (collectively “Defendants”) removed the case to this

court. On February 2, 2006, the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim and motion for a more definite statement, directing Plaintiff to file an

amended complaint within 30 days. On March 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed her first amended

complaint (“FAC”), featuring claims under Section 1983 for violations of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, for civil conspiracy, for violations of California Government Code

§ 820.21, for negligence and negligent entrustment, and for wrongful death. On March 13, 2006,

Defendants County of Fresno, Fresno County CPS, Zomalt, and Huerta filed this motion to 1 2

dismiss and motion to strike, along with the supporting declaration of Gregory Borboa. Plaintiff

opposes the motions. On June 12, 2006, this case was reassigned to the undersigned due to the

senior status of Judge Robert E. Coyle.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The FAC alleges that Gary Zomalt is employed as the Director of Fresno County Child

Protective Services. According to the FAC, Cathi Huerta is a social worker. The FAC alleges

that, at some point, the County of Fresno (“the County”) initiated a dependency proceeding in

which Plaintiff was a party. According to the FAC, after the dependency proceeding, on or about

October 24, 2003, Plaintiff’s infant daughter, Lura Devine (“Lura”), was declared a dependant

child under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300. Thereafter, the FAC alleges, Lura

was placed in foster care against Plaintiff’s wishes. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff advised the

County and her social worker that placement in the foster home that they selected would result in

foreseeable harm or injury to Lura. Plaintiff contends in the FAC that Defendants ignored her

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plea and placed Lura in a dangerous setting, which caused her death. The FAC alleges that the

Defendants engaged in perjury and fabrication of evidence, failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence, and obtained evidence by means of undue influence. The FAC also alleges that

Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of her relationship with her children. 

According to the FAC, Lura remained in the foster home of Defendant Glynda Maroney

from October 24, 2003, until April 25, 2004. The FAC alleges that on April 25, 2004, Lura was

the victim of a homicide in the foster home. The FAC alleges that after Lura’s death Defendants

engaged in a cover up to suppress material evidence of their wrongdoing. Plaintiff alleges in the

FAC that customs or policies enacted by the County resulted in Lura’s death.

The FAC alleges that the County failed to oversee the activities of its foster parents. 

According to the FAC, Defendants failed to adequately train, supervise, assist, and educate social

workers, employees, and foster parents regarding care for foster children. Plaintiff alleges in the

FAC that the policies, customs, and procedures of the County have resulted in the deaths of other

children in the foster care system.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if “it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the

sufficiency of a complaint against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all material

allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The court need not,

however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is a lack of a cognizable legal

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theory or if there are insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The court must determine whether or

not it appears to a certainty under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts

that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48

(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). Where the

complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, leave to amend “shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373

(9th Cir. 1990). A court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend where “the allegation

of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 

B. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to strike from “any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the costs that arise from litigating

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins

Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9thCir. 1983). Immaterial matter is defined as matter that “has no

essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy,

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9thCir. 1993) (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07 (1990)), rev’d on other grounds, 510

U.S. 517 (1994). Impertinent matter is defined as “statements that do not pertain, and are not

necessary, to the issues in question.” Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527. Granting a motion to strike

may be proper if it will make the trial less complicated or if allegations being challenged are so

unrelated to plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that their

presence in the pleading will be prejudicial to the moving party. Id. A motion to strike may be

used to address requested relief, such as punitive damages, that is not recoverable as a matter of

law. Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 172 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

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DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims against Zomalt and Huerta

Defendants ask the court to dismiss the Section 1983 claims as to Zomalt and Huerta

because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently describe the conduct for which they are liable. In its

order issued February 2, 2006, the court noted that

[n]ormal notice pleading requirements are heightened when a

Section 1983 defendant faces personal liability for supervisory

conduct. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998). In such a case, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply

conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved

in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Id.

Doc. 14 at 9:21-10:1. The court found that “Plaintiff’s bald assertions that the Defendants

Zomalt and Huerta ‘ratified and/or condoned’ unconstitutional conduct” were insufficient to state

a claim for personal Section 1983 liability against Zomalt and Huerta. Id. at 10:21-24.

Plaintiff’s FAC does not contain any allegations that Zomalt or Huerta was personally

involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Rather, the FAC merely contains vague and

conclusory claims against “Defendants” generally:

• “Nevertheless, the Defendants, each of them, ignored Plaintiff’s plea and recklessly

placed her baby daughter in a dangerous setting resulting in the death of her daughter.”

FAC 3:5-7.

• “Plaintiff hereby alleges that the Defendants, each of them, engaged in a course of

conduct against the Plaintiff which resulted in a deliberate indifference to her pleas and

their deliberate indifference to her wishes regarding foster care placement which resulted

in the needless and unnecessary death of Plaintiff’s daughter, Lura Devine.” FAC 3:22-

4:2.

• “Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, each of them, so negligently and recklessly failed to

adequately train, supervise, assist and educate the co-defendants, social workers, coCase 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 35 Filed 08/25/06 Page 5 of 19
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employees and foster parents such as to create a reasonable and foreseeable risk of

immediate harm to children under the auspices of the CPS/Foster home system.” FAC

10:11-16.

In her opposition, Plaintiff does not contend that she can allege Zomalt or Huerta’s

personal involvement in the deprivation of her constitutional rights. Rather, apparently ignoring

the order of February 2, 2006, she asserts, “Mr. Zomalt and Ms. Huerta acted with deliberate

indifference in the training and supervision of their staff, such that this led to the death of the

minor child. No further allegation is necessary for [Rule 12(b)(6)] purposes.” Doc. 24 at 6:25-

7:1. The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Zomalt and

Huerta’s personally participated in the constitutional violations. Without such an allegation,

Plaintiff has not stated a claim on which they may be found liable in their individual capacities. 

Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against Zomalt and Huerta in their individual capacities are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

To the extent Zomalt and Huerta are being sued in their official capacities, such claims

are actually claims against the County. See Luke v. Abbott, 954 F. Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal.

1997) (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.

Ed. 2d 611 (1978)); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

(“The Court follows other District Courts in holding that if individuals are being sued in their

official capacity as municipal officials and the municipal entity itself is also being sued, then the

claims against the individuals are duplicative and should be dismissed.”). Therefore, the Section

1983 claims against Zomalt and Huerta in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

B. Third Cause of Action: Violation of the Eighth Amendment

In its order of February 2, 2006, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the Eighth

Amendment on the ground that she had not alleged that she had been convicted of a crime. See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977); see also

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Plaintiff’s statement is confusing given that Ingraham did not discuss substantive 3

due process but rather only procedural due process. See id., 430 U.S. at 659 & n.12.

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Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The eighth amendment applies to

‘convicted prisoners.’”); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (pretrial detainee’s

treatment was not properly evaluated under the Eighth Amendment because he had not been

convicted). Plaintiff’s FAC again includes a claim for violation of her Eighth Amendment rights

but does not allege that Plaintiff has ever been a convicted prisoner.

Defendants ask the court to dismiss this claim on the basis stated in the order of February

2, 2006. Plaintiff does not contend that she has stated a claim for violation of her Eighth

Amendment rights. She states instead that she is seeking to recover for corporal punishment by

agents of the state in violation of her “Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process” rights,

citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651. Plaintiff contends in her opposition that Lura died because the 3

Defendants “placed the victim in a place where they knew or had reason to know they provided

inadequate safeguards against corporal punishment that could result in death.” Doc. 24 at 7:19-

21. This allegation does not appear in the FAC. Nevertheless, Defendants do not dispute

Plaintiff’s contention that she can amend her complaint to state a claim based on corporal

punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third cause of action is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

C. Sixth Cause of Action: Civil Conspiracy

In her sixth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a civil conspiracy under 28 U.S.C. § 1983

and 28 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive a person of equal

protection of the laws. A claim under Section 1985(3), requires “‘some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The

conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by

the law to all.’” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971)). Moreover, “[t]o state

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a claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, ‘the plaintiff must state specific facts to

support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.’” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d

916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004).

Defendants argue that this cause of action is subject to dismissal because it alleges

Defendants conspired to deprive Lura, who is not a plaintiff in this action, of her constitutional

rights. Defendants are correct that deprivations of Lura’s constitutional rights are not actionable

in this case. Plaintiff also alleges in the FAC, however, that the conspiracy was to deprive

Plaintiff of her relationship with her children, which appears to be a claim that her own

constitutional rights were violated.

Defendants additionally contend that Plaintiff’s claim fails because she does not allege

that the conspiracy arose for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of equal

protection under the law, as Section 1985(3) requires. Plaintiff does not ascribe any motive to

the Defendants, let alone an “invidiously discriminatory animus.” See Orin, 272 F.3d at 1217. 

Plaintiff merely states that Defendants sought to “deprive the Plaintiff of her relationship with

her children.” FAC 9:13. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations in the sixth cause of action fall

short of the requirement that she set forth “specific facts” supporting a Section 1985(3)

conspiracy claim. See Olsen, 363 F.3d at 929. Plaintiff does not allege any acts by Zomalt,

Huerta, or the County that link them to a conspiracy. See, e.g., Spiegel v. City of Chicago, 920

F. Supp. 891, 900 (N.D. Ill. 1996). She does not allege any facts, such as conversations or

correspondence, that reasonably demonstrate a meeting of the minds among the alleged

conspirators. See id. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conspiracy under Sections 1983 and

1985(3). She does not contend that she can state a claim for conspiracy under any other

provision. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

D. California’s Tort Claims Act

Defendants argue that the state law claims of Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed for

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California Government Code § 910(f) provides that a tort claim must include the 4

following:

The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars

($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the

estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss,

insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the

claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount

claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars

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failure to allege compliance with California’s Tort Claims Act, California Government Code

section 900 et seq. The Tort Claims Act places requirements on those seeking to bring claims

against public entities. Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 699, 705 (1989). The goal is to

“provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and

to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” Id. To further this goal, a

claimant must present a tort claim to the public entity within six months of the accrual of the

cause of action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2; Phillips, 49 Cal 3d at 705. The Tort Claims Act is not

a defense to an action if “the claim as presented complied substantially” with the Act’s

requirements. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910.6(b).

1. Allegation of Compliance 

A complaint alleging state law claims must allege compliance with the claim presentation

requirement or else the state law claims are subject to dismissal. State of California v. Superior

Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (2004). The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s FAC and has found no

allegation of compliance with the claim requirement. Nor does Plaintiff contend that she has

alleged compliance. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to dismissal for failure

to allege compliance with California’s Tort Claims Act.

2. Possibility of Amending to Allege Compliance

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s state claims should be dismissed with prejudice on the

basis that she cannot allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s tort claim failed to include all of the elements required

under California Government Code § 910(f). Section 910(f) requires that a tort claim in excess 4

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($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim.

However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited

civil case.

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of $10,000 need not include a dollar amount, but must indicate whether the claim would be “a

limited civil case.” On November 10, 2004, the County served a “Notice of Insufficient

Information” on Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff had failed to comply with Section 910.

Plaintiff’s FAC seeks damages in excess of $11,000,000. Accordingly, Plaintiff is

required only to state whether the claim would be a limited civil case. In the “Claim for

Damages” Plaintiff filed with the County, she filled in the blank labeled “TOTAL AMOUNT

CLAIMED” with the word “OPEN.” Borboa Decl. Ex. A. On November 10, 2004, the County

served a “Notice of Insufficient Information” on Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff had failed to

comply with Section 910 and that failure to amend within 15 days would result in rejection of the

claim. Borboa Decl. Ex. B. Plaintiff did not amend the claim. Borboa Decl. ¶ 5. 

The “failure or refusal” to amend a claim when a notice of insufficiency issues does not

bar an action so long as the claim presented is substantially in compliance with the Tort Claims

Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910.6. Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to amend is of no significance so

long as her claim substantially complies. In her claim, Plaintiff failed to use the term “limited”

or “unlimited” to describe the case she intended to file. Nevertheless, the indication that the case

is “open” served to notify the County that the case would be unlimited. Plaintiff can amend her

complaint to allege substantial compliance with Section 910(f).

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s tort claim was untimely. The claim was filed

with the County on October 27, 2004. Because of the six-month deadline specified in Section

911.2, the claim was not timely filed if the injury occurred prior to April 27, 2004. The claim

specifies that the injury occurred on April 27, 2004. In at least four places, however, the FAC

refers to the date of April 25:

• “The actions were directed against Plaintiff in Fresno, California on or about

April 25, 2005[sic].” FAC 1:24-25 (emphasis added). 

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• “From approximately October 24, 2003 to the date of Lura’s death, April 25,

2004, Lura Devine was placed in the foster home of Glynda Maroney where the

child became a victim of homicide.” FAC 5:12-14 (emphasis added).

• “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the last overt act in

pursuance of the above-described conspiracy occurred on or about April 25,

2005[sic] on which date Defendants conduct resulted in the death of Lura

Devine.” FAC 9:18-22 (emphasis added).

• “As a proximate cause of the conduct, policies and customs enacted by Defendant

FRESNO CO CPS and the Fresno County foster care system, decedent Lura

Devine died on April 25, 2004.” FAC 11:20-23 (emphasis added).

In her opposition brief, Plaintiff states that the incident occurred on April 27, 2004, as

stated in the tort claim. She does not attempt to reconcile her contention in two places in the

FAC that Lura died on April 25, 2004. 

While leave to amend should be liberally granted, an amended complaint may only allege

“other facts consistent with the challenged pleading.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 297

(9th Cir. 1990). An amended complaint may be dismissed “as false and sham” where allegations

it contains contradict those in earlier complaints. Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 653

F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissing complaint with prejudice under Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on inconsistent allegations in other cases); see also

Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Ellingson, 653 F.2d at

1329-30) (upholding district court’s dismissal of amended complaint based on discrepancies

from the original complaint that exhibited “a transparent attempt to conform the facts to the

requirements of the cause of action”). A court is not required to accept as true allegations in an

amended complaint that are inconsistent with earlier allegations. Bradley, 136 F.3d at 1325-26.

It is troubling that Plaintiff does not even attempt to explain her allegations in the FAC

that Lura died on April 25, 2004. In her opposition, Plaintiff merely states, “The Claim alleges

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the incident occurred on April 27, 2004.” Doc. 24 at 4:7-8 (emphasis added). In the opposition

she does not contradict her allegations that Lura died on April 25, 2004.

It is unclear whether Plaintiff can amend her allegations to comply with the six-month

deadline without contradicting the FAC. The court reiterates the warning from Judge Robert E.

Coyle’s order of February 2, 2006:

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are reminded that they are subject

to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b)(3)

provides that by presenting a signed pleading to the court the

pleader represents that the factual contentions therein “have

evidentiary support” or “are likely to have evidentiary support”

after reasonable discovery. Failure to comply with Rule 11 may

result in sanctions, which may include dismissal of this action and

the imposition of monetary sanctions.

Doc. 14 at 6:17-24. The court can conceive of no reason why Plaintiff would fabricate a date of

Lura’s death inconsistent with the date stated in the tort claim. It does not appear to a certainty

that Plaintiff’s attempt to amend her FAC to allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act would

be futile. See Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1401. Accordingly, the court declines to dismiss

the state claims with prejudice on this ground. 

3. Scope of the Claim

Defendants urge the court to hold that a number of the causes of action that Plaintiff

alleges in the FAC fall outside of the scope of the tort claim Plaintiff filed with the County. 

California Government Code § 910(d) requires that a claim contain a “general description of the

indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of

presentation of the claim.” The purpose of this requirement is to “‘reasonably enable the public

entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the

expense of a lawsuit.’” Blair v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 221, 225 (1990) (quoting City

of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 456 (1974)). If a tort claim sufficiently describes

the injury, it is not deficient for failure to specify the injury’s legal cause. Id. at 225. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for “negligence, negligent entrustment, perjury,

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fabrication of evidence, failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence, testimony obtained by

undue influence, fraud or duress, and conspiracy” are not permissible given the scope of her tort

claim. Doc. 18 at 8:15-18. Plaintiff’s tort claim states that her “daughter was shaken in the care

of C.P.S.” resulting in mental, emotional, and psychological injuries. Borboa Decl. Ex. A. To

the extent that Plaintiff’s new claims in the FAC are alternative legal theories of how Defendants

are liable for the death of her daughter by shaking, they are not barred by the Tort Claims Act. 

For the most part, this seems to be the case.

In the fourth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that, in the process of declaring Plaintiff’s

daughter a dependent child, Defendants engaged in perjury and fabrication of evidence, failed to

disclose exculpatory evidence, and obtained testimony by means of undue influence, fraud, or

duress. As a result of this conduct, the child was placed in the foster home where she died. In

her fifth and seventh causes of action, Plaintiff claims that negligent entrustment and negligence,

respectively, resulted in Lura’s death. Plaintiff contends in her sixth cause of action that

Defendants conspired to have Plaintiff’s child placed with the foster home and so caused her

death. Each of these contentions is an alternative legal theory of Defendants’ liability for the

injury in Plaintiff’s tort claim.

One of Plaintiff’s allegations, however, appears to fall outside of the scope of her tort

claim. In her fourth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that, following her child’s death, “a ‘cover

up’ ensued trying to suppress material evidence to evade all liability for their wrongful conduct.” 

FAC 5:18-19. Plaintiff’s allegation of a cover up is not simply an alternative legal theory of

Defendants’ liability for Lura’s death. Rather, it appears to seek recovery based on separate

misconduct, i.e., attempts to evade liability afterward. Because Plaintiff’s tort claim did not

mention misconduct by Defendant following Lura’s death, any attempt by Plaintiff to amend to

state such a claim would be futile. See Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1401. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s allegations of a cover up following the alleged incident are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

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California Government Code § 820(a) provides, in full, as follows: “Except as

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otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury

caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”

California Civil Code § 1714 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 6

(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her

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E. Negligence and Negligent Entrustment Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s negligence and negligent entrustment claims fail because

they lack a sufficient statutory basis. Defendants cite in support California Government Code

§ 815, which provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . (a) A public entity is not

liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a

public employee or any other person.” 

1. Individual Defendants

A public employee is generally liable for an injury caused by his act or omission “to the

same extent as a private person,” except where liability is prohibited by statute. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 820(a); see Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179 (2003). The liability of 5

a public employee acting in the scope of his duties, therefore, “turns on ordinary and general

principles of tort law.” Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 716 (2001). The

requirement under Section 815 that a statute establish the liability of a “public entity” does not

extend to public employees.

The failure to set forth a specific statutory basis is not grounds to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims for negligence or negligent entrustment against Zomalt or Huerta in their individual

capacities. Defendants do not give any other reason why Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of

action for negligence or negligent entrustment against Zomalt or Huerta. 

2. The County

Section 815 precludes direct liability of a government entity in the absence of statutory

authorization. Plaintiff argues that her negligence claims are based on a statute because they are

brought under California Civil Code § 1714. While Section 1714 authorizes a cause of action 6

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willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or

her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her

property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by

want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. 

The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and ammunition

is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is

required by this section.

California Government Code § 820.21 provides, in full, as follows: 7

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the civil

immunity of juvenile court social workers, child protection

workers, and other public employees authorized to initiate or

conduct investigations or proceedings pursuant to Chapter 2

(commencing with Section 200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the

Welfare and Institutions Code shall not extend to any of the

following, if committed with malice:

 (1) Perjury.

 (2) Fabrication of evidence.

 (3) Failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence.

 (4) Obtaining testimony by duress, as defined in Section 1569 of

the Civil Code, fraud, as defined in either Section 1572 or Section

1573 of the Civil Code, or undue influence, as defined in Section

1575 of the Civil Code.

(b) As used in this section, "malice" means conduct that is intended

by the person described in subdivision (a) to cause injury to the

plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on by the person

described in subdivision (a) with a willful and conscious disregard

of the rights or safety of others.

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for negligence, it does not satisfy the requirement of Section 815 for imposing liability on a

public entity. Eastburn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1183. In Eastburn, the Supreme Court of California

concluded, referring to the requirement imposed by Section 815, that “direct tort liability of

public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating

some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714.” 

Id. The court finds that Section 1714 does not itself provide a basis for Plaintiff’s negligence

claims.

Plaintiff also contends that California Government Code § 820.21 exempts its negligence 7

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California Government Code § 815.2 provides, in full, as follows: 8

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act

or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this

section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee

or his personal representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not

liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an

employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from

liability.

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claims from the statutes providing immunity. Section 820.21, by its terms, only abrogates the

civil immunity of “social workers, child protection workers, and other public employees,” and

does not authorize direct liability for public entities. Section 820.21 can serve, for instance, to

limit immunity such public employees may enjoy for actions such as instituting a judicial or

administrative proceeding or for discretionary acts. Parkes v. County of San Diego, 345 F. Supp.

2d 1071, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2004); see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 820.2 (discretionary acts), 821.6

(judicial or administrative proceeding). The court finds that alleging conduct specified in Section

820.21 does not satisfy the requirement of Section 815 of a statutory basis for public entity

liability.

A public entity can be liable for an act or an omission of a public employee in the scope

of her employment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 8

1127 (2002). This liability attaches only where the employee would herself be liable for the act

or omission and does not attach where she enjoys immunity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2.

Plaintiff claims that Zomalt and Huerta, employees of the County, face liability under a

negligence theory. To the extent Plaintiff can allege that the County is vicariously liable for the

acts and omissions of Zomalt and Huerta under Section 815.2, those claims are not barred by

Section 815. On the other hand, any claims based on the County’s direct liability are

impermissible unless supported by “a specific statute declaring [it] to be liable.” See Eastburn,

31 Cal. 4th at 1183. 

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F. Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of Government Code § 820.21

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action based on Section 821.21 should

be dismissed as overly vague. At the outset, the court recognizes that Section 820.21 does not

itself provide a cause of action, but rather is an exception to certain immunities that public

employees often enjoy. The substantive basis is for this cause of action is unclear to the court. 

At this stage, however, Plaintiff is not required to identify the substantive law on which her claim

is based. Cf. Bryson v. Bank of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 1306, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding in the

context of a motion for a more definite statement that plaintiff’s legal theory need not be

apparent on the face of the complaint). In any event, Defendants do not contend that this claim

lacks a basis in substantive law.

1. The County

As discussed above, Section 820.21 does not authorize liability for public entities. 

Plaintiff does not state any other statutory basis for County’s liability under this cause of action. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim under this cause of action based on the County’s direct

liability. The County may properly face vicarious liability under Section 815.2, however, to the

extent that Plaintiff can allege that individual employees are liable under this cause of action for

their own acts or omissions in the scope of their employment. 

2. Individual Defendants

Defendants contend that the allegations are vague as to which Defendants the claim

refers. They also contend that Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support the claims

under Section 821.21.

A plaintiff need not set forth sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, but “must at

least set forth enough details so as to provide defendant and the court with a fair idea of the basis

of the complaint and the legal grounds claimed for recovery.” Self Directed Placement Corp. v.

Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should apply pleading standards 

in a common-sense fashion that accounts for plaintiffs’ excusable lack of detail concerning

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California Government Code § 820.21 provides, in full, as follows: 9

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not

liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code

or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by

way of punishing the defendant.

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supervisors’ interactions with employees. McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227 (D.

Ariz. 2003). The fourth cause of action clearly indicates that “the Defendants, each of them,”

engaged in the alleged misconduct. The fourth cause of action is not vague as to which

Defendants it encompasses: it alleges participation by all of them. Defendants have not

identified any basis for requiring Plaintiff to allege specific facts regarding Zomalt and Huerta’s

alleged perjury, fabrication of evidence, and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Compare

Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (requiring a plaintiff alleging personal liability of a supervisor under

Section 1983 to allege facts showing the individual defendant was personally involved in causing

a constitutional violation). 

Plaintiff has alleged that over a finite period of time, from October 24, 2003, to April 25,

2004, Defendants engaged in specific activities—perjury, fabrication of evidence, and failure to

disclose exculpatory evidence—that resulted in Lura’s placement in a foster home. The court

finds that the allegations in the fourth cause of action are sufficiently detailed.

G. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the County

under Rule 12(f). Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. 

Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981); Larez v.

Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1991). California Government Code § 8189

exempts public entities from punitive or exemplary damages on claims under California law. 

Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139, 146 (1991). The court finds that, as a matter of

law, none of Plaintiff’s causes of action provide a basis for punitive damages against the County. 

Accordingly, the court strikes Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the County pursuant

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to Rule 12(f). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated in the above Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that:

1. The first and second causes of action in the FAC are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as to Gary Zomalt and Cathi Huerta in their official capacities;

2. The first and second causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

as to Gary Zomalt and Cathi Huerta in their individual capacities;

3. The allegations of a cover up following Lura Devine’s death in the fourth cause of

action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

4. The remainder of the fourth cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

5. The third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

6. Defendants’ motion to STRIKE is GRANTED;

7. Any amended complaint SHALL BE FILED within thirty days of this order’s date

of service and failure to do so will result in dismissal of the action; and

8. Any answer or responsive pleading SHALL BE FILED within twenty days of the

date on which Plaintiff files her amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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