Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01259/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 09:1 U.S. Arbitration Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Galva-Foam Marine Industries, Inc., a

Missouri corporation; 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Antelope Point Holdings, LLC, an Arizona

limited liability company, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 08-1259-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Respondent Antelope Point Holdings LLC (“Antelope”) operates a luxury marina

at Lake Powell in Arizona. In 2002, Antelope entered into a contract with Petitioner

Galva-Foam Marine Industries Inc. (“Galva-Foam”) regarding a dock system for the

marina. A dispute has arisen concerning the nature and extent of the parties’ obligations

under the contract. Galva-Foam now petitions to compel arbitration of this dispute under

the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4.

The contract contains a section entitled “Conflict Provisions.” This section reads

in part as follows: 

A) Mediation: Any controversy or claim arising out of this agreement that

cannot be resolved is subject to arbitration with an arbitrator of mutual

agreement.

B) Attorney Fees: If either party becomes involved in litigation arising out

of this agreement, the court shall award cost [sic] /expenses including

attorney fees to the party justly entitled to them.

Case 2:08-cv-01259-NVW Document 17 Filed 09/10/08 Page 1 of 4
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1

 The court is mindful that “Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a

congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,

notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone

Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). However, the policy favoring

arbitration “does not disregard the intent of the contracting parties as evidenced by their

agreement.” Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. 2005) (quoting

Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 169 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Buckeye

Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (stating that the Federal

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Antelope admits that the contract contains these two provisions, but denies that these

provisions require the court to compel arbitration. 

The Federal Arbitration Act provides that in any written contract “evidencing a

transaction involving commerce,” an arbitration provision “shall be valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “By its terms, the Act ‘leaves no place for the exercise of

discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the

parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been

signed.’” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.

2000) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)). If a valid

agreement to arbitrate exists and the agreement covers the dispute at issue, “then the Act

requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id.

The petition to compel arbitration stands on firm footing. Both parties agree that

the contract contains the dispute resolution language. Both parties agree that this dispute

arises out of the agreement. The only question presented for decision is whether the

dispute resolution language mandates arbitration as a matter of contract interpretation. 

The plain language of the contract shows that it does.

“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts

generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of

contracts.” Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 514 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because the agreement in question specifies that Missouri law governs its interpretation,

we apply the law of that state.1

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Arbitration Act “places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts”).

Whether the parties agreed to arbitration at all is a question of Missouri contract law. State

ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Mo. 2006); cf. United Steelworkers of

Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (construing arbitration

agreement broadly when the existence of the arbitration agreement was not at issue). 

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Antelope contends that the heading “Mediation” conflicts with the language

concerning arbitration, and that the parties therefore did not agree to arbitration. This

heading is general, however, and the arbitration language is specific. Under Missouri

law, “language which deals with a specific situation prevails over more general

provisions if there is ambiguity or inconsistency between them.” A & L Holding Co. v. S.

Pac. Bank, 34 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Mo. App. 2000). The plain language of the dispute

resolution provision mandates arbitration. See id. (favoring interpretations that give “a

reasonable meaning” to each phrase and clause of the contract). While the word

“mediation” in its technical sense connotes something different than arbitration, it is here

used in a lay sense, to refer to alternative dispute resolution generally. See The Compact

Oxford English Dictionary 545 (1991) (defining “mediation” to include “action as an

intermediary”); State ex rel. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 256 S.W. 737, 739 (Mo. 1923)

(language may be inaccurate without being ambiguous); Baker Smith Sheet Metal, Inc. v.

Building Erection Serv. Co., 49 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. App. 2001) (“mere disagreements

as to construction” do not amount to ambiguity). The text of the provision merely

specifies what type of dispute resolution is intended. 

Because the language is plain, there is no merit to Antelope’s claim that the

contract is ambiguous and must therefore be construed against Galva-Foam, its drafter,

under Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W. 3d 772, 776 (Mo. 2005). To the extent

that the meaning of “mediation” is in doubt, the arbitration language removes that doubt. 

Neither party has presented any parol evidence to the contrary, and even if they had done

so, Missouri law forbids the court to “create an ambiguity by using extrinsic or parole

evidence.” City of St. Joseph v. Lake Contrary Sewer Dist., 251 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Mo.

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App. 2008). In this case, it is clear that the parties intended for the “mediation” clause to

provide for arbitration.

 Similarly, to give effect to the arbitration language does not, as Antelope claims,

rob the attorney fee provision of all force. As this very dispute shows, the arbitration

clause does not foreclose all litigation warranting an award of attorney fees.

Therefore, the petition to compel arbitration will be granted. Under the terms of

the contract, the parties will mutually agree upon the selection of an arbitrator to conduct

the arbitration. If the parties are unable to reach agreement, the court will select an

arbitrator pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 5 upon the request of any party.

As provided in the contract, appropriate costs and attorney fees relating to this

petition will be awarded to Galva-Foam and may be claimed as provided in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 54 and LRCiv 54.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Galva-Foam Marine Industries,

Inc.’s petition to compel arbitration (doc. # 1) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Antelope Point Holdings LLC is

ordered to arbitrate in accordance with Contract No: 2930-2. If the parties have not

agreed upon an arbitrator by October 10, 2008, any party may then apply to the Court to

appoint an arbitrator.

Dated: September 9, 2008.

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