Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00253/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

SURESHBHAI PATEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MADISON, ALABAMA,

and ERIC SLOAN PARKER,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:15-CV-0253-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Due to pendency of multiple related criminal cases against Defendant Eric

Sloan Parker (“Mr. Parker”), thisfederal and state law civil action wasstayed on May

4, 2015, by the prior judge to which it was assigned (Doc. 18), and has remained

stayed upon reassignment to the undersigned. (Doc. 19). With Mr. Parker acquitted

of any federal criminal civil rights charges earlier this year in United States v. Parker,

No. 5:15-CR-0055-MHH-HGD,1

currently only a state criminal misdemeanor assault

charge remains pending against Mr. Parker in the Circuit Court of Limestone

County–State of Alabama v. Eric Sloan Parker, DC-15-253.

1

(See Doc. 113 (memorandum opinion granting Mr. Parker’s renewed motion for judgment

of acquittal)).

FILED

 2016 Mar-17 PM 01:14

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 1 of 7
Pending before the court is Plaintiff Sureshbhai Patel’s (“Mr. Patel”) Motion

To Lift Stay (Doc. 30) (the “Motion”) filed on February 26, 2016. The Motion has

been briefed by the parties with both defendants–Mr. Parker and the City of

Madison–expressing their objections to lifting the stay. (Docs. 32, 33, 35, 36).

Because several compelling factors as bolstered by binding as well as persuasive

authorities favor keeping the stay in place, Mr. Patel’s Motion is DENIED.

II. Standard

Regarding orders to stay:

The general rule is wellsettled that, ‘* * * the power to stay proceedings

is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort

for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls

for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and

maintain an even balance.’ Landis v. North American Co., 1936, 299

U.S. 248, 254, 255, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153.

Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1962).2

III. Analysis

Mr. Patel articulates two grounds in support of his Motion. First, Mr. Patel

asserts that the recent retirement of the state court judge presiding over the assault

criminal case and an anticipated appeal of any conviction mean that Mr. Parker’s

2

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

2

Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 2 of 7
“assault charge [] is unlikely to be resolved any time soon.” (Doc. 30 at 1 ¶ 2); (see

also Doc. 30-1 (attaching article announcing assigned judge’s retirement and

observing that before criminal case can proceed the governor will need to appoint

someone to fill the judicial vacancy)). 

Second, Mr. Patel contends that because Mr. Parker has testified twice during

the pendency of the federal criminal case,3no Fifth Amendment basis for continuing

the stay in this civil case exists. Mr. Patel relies upon EMC Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 205

Customz, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00293-RDP, 2015 WL 3554737, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ala.

June 5, 2015),4an insurance declaratory judgment action brought against a defendant

with related arson and insurance fraud changes pending in state district court, id., at

*1, to show that Mr. Parker has waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. 

In EMC, the court “assumed without deciding that[the defendant] ha[d]waived

the privilege against self-incrimination[,]” 2015 WL 3554737, at *2, because of his

prior willingness “to sit for an extensive examination under oath” in an effort to

collect proceeds under the same fire insurance policy that the insurance carrier, by

way of the declaratory action, was contesting. Id., at *1. Thus, unlike the situation

3 Two different juries deadlocked in the federal criminal prosecution of Mr. Parker and

mistrials were declared. (See CM/ECF minute entries in 15-CR-0055-MHH-HGD dated Sept. 11,

2015, and Nov. 4, 2015). 

4 Both Mr. Patel (Doc. 36 at 1-2 ¶ 2) and Mr. Parker (Doc. 35 at 5 ¶ 12) rely upon EMC as

persuasive authority.

3

Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 3 of 7
here which involves a purported waiver resulting from Mr. Parker’stestimony during

a related but, nonetheless, distinct criminal proceeding, the defendant’s (assumed)

waiver of his privilege in EMCsprang fromhis voluntary actions taken in furtherance

of his contractual rights under the same insurance policy that was the subject of the

civil suit. Cf. United States v. Fortin, 685 F.2d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 1982) (“While

the rule [of waiver] being urged by the Government is a valid one, it is generally only

applicable when the ‘disclosure of the details’is being sought in the same proceeding

where the initial ‘criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed.’”) (emphasis

added). 

As the City of Madison correctly points out (Doc. 32 at 2-4 ¶ 3), the Eleventh

Circuit’s rule regarding the scope of a witness’s right to assert the Fifth Amendment

privilege when that same person is called upon to testify in more than one case is

much broader than Mr. Patel contends:

[T]he privilege (against self-incrimination) attaches to the witness in

each particular case in which he may be called on to testify, and whether

or not he may claim it is to be determined without reference to what he

said when testifying as a witness on some other trial, or on a former trial

of the same case, and without reference to his declarations atsome other

time or place.

United States v. Fortin, 685 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)

(quoting In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1953)); see also Ballantyne v. United

4

Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 4 of 7
States, 237 F.2d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1956) (citing with approval the holding from Neff

that “waiver of the privilege before the Grand Jury did not carry through to the

subsequent trial”). Mr. Patel offers nothing to refute these Fifth Amendment

“hornbook”

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principles, and this court is bound by them. Therefore, Mr. Parker’s

privilege against self-incrimination remains intact in this civil lawsuit, despite his

testimony provided in his defense during the federal criminal case. 

Additionally, turning back to Mr. Patel’sreliance upon EMC, even though that

court found that the factor of defendant’s waiver supported denying the request to

stay, ultimately it determined that staying the case wasthe appropriate action to take.

As the EMC court summarized its reasons for staying the civil litigation, “the

significant overlap between this case and its criminal counterpart counsel in favor of

conserving judicial resources and sparing the parties from potentially inconsistent

rulings.” EMC, 2015 WL 3554737, at *5. Here, the overlap between the assault

criminal case (which apparently applies a recklessness standard (Doc. 33 at 1 ¶ 3))6

and this civil action which incorporates several state law claims, including an

allegation that the City of Madison is liable for assault and battery “[t]o the extent

5 Fortin, 685 F.2d at 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Cain,

544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1976) (“It is hornbook law that the waiver is limited to the particular

proceeding in which the witness appears.”)).

6 Mr. Patel does not dispute Mr. Parker’s characterization of the criminal standard applicable

to the pending assault charge.

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Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 5 of 7
that the conduct of PARKER was negligent or careless” (Doc. 2 at 7 ¶ 50)

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is

similarly “significant” and favors keeping the stay in place to conserve judicial

resources and avoid potentially inconsistent rulings.

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, while the court is not unsympathetic to Mr. Patel’s efforts to lift the

stay of this civil case on account of the still pending but indefinitely delayed state

criminal proceeding against Mr. Parker, the weight of the authorities relied upon by

the parties,

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the significant overlap between the criminal and civil proceedings, and

Mr. Parker’s still viable Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination lead

this court to DENY his Motion.

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See also Ala. Code § 11-47-190 (“No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury

done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or

suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of

the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty . . . .”).

8 Noticeably absent from Mr. Patel’s filings is any authority that even persuasively shows

why the court should grant his Motion and lift the stay. Instead, Mr. Patel’s case-related focus is

almost entirely limited to EMC, which decision misses the mark in furthering his cause for the

reasons explained above. The only other opinion that Mr. Patel cites to–United States v. Argomaniz,

925 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1991)–is an IRS civil summons enforcement action. Mr. Patel relies upon

Argomaniz, for the proposition that “[a] court must make a particularized inquiry” when addressing

claims of Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingUnited

States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir.1976)); (Doc. 36 at 3 ¶ 7). While the district

court in Argomaniz did stay enforcement of the IRS summons pending the defendant’s appeal, 925

F.2d at 1352, the decision sheds no light on whether a stay is appropriate given the criminal versus

civil trial priorities and Fifth Amendment privilege conflicts that are present here.

9 Mr. Patel suggests, without explaining, that all the remainingEMCfactors favor him. (Doc.

36 at 3 ¶ 8). The court disagrees. However, even assuming that Mr. Patel is correct, the combined

strength of these less compelling factors does not overpower those more critical ones relied upon by

the EMC court when it decided to stay that case. See, e.g., EMC, 2015 WL 3554737, at *2

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Case 5:15-cv-00253-LCB Document 37 Filed 03/17/16 Page 6 of 7
DONE and ORDERED this the 17th day of March, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

(“Although no factor is necessarily dispositive, ‘[t]he degree to which the issues in the simultaneous

civil and criminal proceedings overlap is the most important threshold issue in deciding whether the

court should stay the civil proceeding.’” (quoting Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., 7 F. Supp.

2d 523, 527 (D.N.J. 1998))).

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