Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02351/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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- PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GEORGIA ANDREWS, ERIN BRETT, ) 

FRANCES E. CASSLE, B. J. DURHAM, ) 

MAUREEN ENGERT, MARY FOX, ) 

MAXINE GRIFFIN, BETTY GRUBB, ) 

RUTH HOLMES, LUCILLE HOPPE, ) 

DOROTHY HOMYAK, SHARON K. ) 

KAISER, CHANDRA K. LILLEMOEN, ) 

CAROLYN O'BRIEN, DELORIS ) 

O'BRIEN, MARY JANE PRYSOCK, ) 

LAURA RUSSELL, LAURA SCHERR, ) 

JOAN SCHICK, BRENDA SCHULZ, ) 

VICTORIA SMITH, KATHRYAN ) 

TOULOUSE, MARGARET WICKHAM, ) 

NORMAN WILDE, and all others ) 

similarly situated, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, of ) 

the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT ) 

EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, ) 

) 

Amicus Curiae. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 819SS 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 85-2351 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. C84-0459-B) 

Don w. Riske, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for PlaintiffsAppellees. 

Peter R. Maier, Appellate Staff Civil Division, U.S. Department of 

Justice (Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, Richard 

Allen Stacy, United States Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Appellate Staff Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with him on 

the briefs), Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellant. 

Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 1 
William·J. Stone, Assistant General Counsel, Mark D. Roth, General 

Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 

Washington, D.C., as Amicus Curiae. 

Before MOORE, ANDER~ON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

The Veterans Administration of the United States of America 

("VA") appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming finding that the VA's disclosure of 

certain personnel records violated the Privacy Act rignts of 

plaintiffs, registered nurses employed at a VA Medical Center 

("Medical Center") in Cheyenne, Wyoming. We reverse. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 4, 1984, Ms. Pat Sanchez, president of the union local which was the exclusive bargaining representative for nurses 

employed at the Medical Center, made a written request to Ms. 

Hazel Gilligan, the Chief of Personnel Service at the Medical 

Center, seeking copies of proficiency reports (essentially job 

performance evaluations) for all registered nurses at the Medical 

Center for the years 1982-84. The request acknowledged that such 

reports would have to be "sanitized" by deleting all information 

that might tend to identify the subjects of the reports prior to 

disclosure. Pursuant to a written inquiry from Ms. Gilligan, Ms. 

Sanchez stated that the proficiency reports were needed in connec-

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tion with a grievance the union would possibly file and to 

facilitate preparation for upcoming labor-management negotiations. 

Certain of the plaintiff nurses, upon learning of the request for 

the reports, asked both orally and in writing that the records not 

be released. 

Ms. Gilligan sougnt the advice of VA personnel in Washington, 

D.C. in determining how to respond to the request. 1 The Labor 

Relations Department cf the VA advised her that the Federal 

Service Labor-Mandgement Relat"~r.s Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7135, 

("FSLRA") required discl8sure ct tne reports, but that they should 

be sanitized prior tc disclosure to preserve the anonymity of the 

subjects of the reports. Accordingly, Ms. Gilligan attempted to 

sanitize the reports by deleting with a black felt-tip pen any 

information which she felt would identify the subjects of the 

reports. 2 She then asked her assistant to further sanitize the 

reports. Finally, Ms. Gilligan asked the head nurse at the 

l The district court, in its findings of fact, stated that "Ms. 

Gilligan had received some training concerning her duties under 

the Priv~cy Act, and was supplied with a Federal Personnel Manual 

which contains guidelines for responses to requests for information contained in personnel files." Andrews v. Veterans 

Administration of the United States, 613 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. 

Wyo. 1985). However, as the district court further found, Ms. 

Gilligan had never before received a "blanket request'' such as was 

made in this case, nor had she ever received a request for disclosure "without the consent of the individual to which the file 

pertained." Id. 

2 As the district court found, the proficiency reports are 

prepared on standard forms and include two parts. The first part 

"contains various numerical ratiu3s for factors such as integrity, 

emotional stability, dependability, and interpersonal relations" 

and includes an "overall numerical score" as well as a "rating of 

the individual's capacity for advancement." Andrews, 613 F. Supp. 

at 1407. The second part contains a narrative description of the 

quality of the subject's work during the relevant period. 

-JAppellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 3 
Medical Center to review the reports and make any other deletions 

she felt necessary to protect the identities of the nurses. On 

June 19, she released the sanitized reports to Ms. Sanchez. Ms. 

Sanchez and two other nurse~ reviewed the records but no other 

people obtained access to them. 

On June 20, in response to requests from the nurses that the 

reports not be released, Ms. Gilligan sent a letter to all the 

nurses at the Medical Center stating that the FSLRA required 

release of the reports but that they had been sanitized. To 

demonstrate that the identities of the nurses had been adequately 

protected, Ms. Gilligan's letter included as an attachment a copy 

of the sanitized proficiency report relating to plaintiff Laura 

Scherr. As the district court found, the report regarding Ms. 

Scherr was inadequately sanitized and several co-workers could 

identify her as the subject of the report. 

As it turned out, the reports released were never in fact 

used in connection with any grievance or other union activity.3 

The district court concluded that ~Mrs. Sanchez was on a general 

fishing expedition, which may hdve been motivated by spite or 

anger resulting from her own failure to obtain a requested promotion." Andrews, 613 F. Supp. at 1412. 

The plaintiffs, registered nurses employed at the Medical 

Center, brought this action, seeKing to enjoin the VA and the 

3 Ms. Sanchez testified, however, that she intended to use the 

requested reports in connection with an already filed and pending 

grievance, although she did not in fact do so. R. Vol. II at 32. 

She also testified that she had discussed with other union members 

at a meeting in April the possibility of filing a "class grievance 

in regard to the proficiency reports." Id. at J7. 

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Medical Center from releasing the personnel records of the 

plaintiffs and others similarly situated "in an unsanitized or 

improperly sanitized condition'' and seeking damages for the 

release of the records which, they alleged, was an intentional and 

willful violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 u.s.c. § 552a. 

They alleged that the disclosure cf the reports resulted in 

"injury and damages including, but not limited to, mental distress 

and embarrassment" and they sought damages of $1,000 for each 

plaintiff as well as attorneys' fees. During pretrial discovery, 

plaintiffs sought and obtained production under court seal of the 

records released to the union. When plaintiffs reviewed the 

records, ten of the plaintiffs ~ere recognized by their coplaintiffs from information ccntained in the reports and four 

plaintiffs were able to identify their own reports, although no 

other plaintiffs could so identify them. Three plaintiffs were 

unable to identify their own reports, nor could any other 

plaintiff so identify them. 

Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the Medical Center 

was dismissed as a party and the case was tried to the court. The 

court denied the VA's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, 

for summary judgment. After a two day trial, the district court 

entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found 

that the record established that third parties acquainted with ten 

of the plaintiffs 4 could and did recognize their identity from 

information released in the reports. The court found that 

4 B. J. Durham, Mary Fox, Maxine Griffin, Betty Grubb, Ruth 

Holmes, Lucille Hoppe, Deloris O'Brien, Laura Russell, Laura 

Scherr and Kathryan Toulouse. 

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"[i]ndirect evidence adequately establishes 

that the identity of the following plaintiffs 

could be determined through the information 

released in their proficiency reports, though 

no third party did in fact so identify them: 

Diane Ingle, Carolyn O'Brien, Ada Shader, and 

Victoria Smith. [A] review of the 

reports themselves, as well as the other 

evidence fn the record is adequate to lead to 

a logical inference that persons acquainted 

with such plaintiffs, including their coemployees, could readily identify their 

reports based upon the information released." 

Andrews, 613 F. Supp. at 1409. With regard to three plaintiffs, 

Frances Cassle, Dorothy Honyak, and Margaret Wickham, the district 

court concluded that "[nJo evidence was submitted to show that the 

information in the proficiency reports . . . was such as would 

enable any third party to identify the subject of the report." 

Id. 5 

The district court [held] that each plaintiff "suffered some 

degree of anguish, embarrassment, or other mental trauma" from the 

release of the reports, but that "none suffered any pecuniary 

loss." Id. Finally, the court found that the release of the 

reports adversely affected the Medical Center's entire proficiency 

reporting system "due to fear that the information contained in 

the reports may later be disclosed to third persons," and harmed 

the working environment at the Center, causing increased "tensions 

and antagonism." Id. 

In assessing the culpaDility of the VA, the district court 

found that Ms. Gil.!.1g21n "acted conscientiously, in good faith, 

though inadvertently negligent :.y, in releasing the proficiency 

5 Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of the claims of these 

three plaintiffs. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 6 
reports in an inadequately sanitized condition." She failed to 

balance the privacy interests of the nurses against the interests 

of the union in having the reports, "which interests were 

ambiguous and virtually undefined." Id. The court further held 

that the VA personnel in Washington were "grossly negligent'' in 

failing to adequately train or guide Ms. Gilligan regarding the 

release of information subject to the Privacy Act and in directing 

her in this case that release was required by FSLRA. It found 

that the gross negligence of the Washington VA personnel was a 

willful or intentional violation of the Privacy Act. 

In its conclusions of law, the district court held that where 

identification of the subjects of the reports was possible, as 

here, "a violation of the subject's privacy interests occurs." It 

found that the numerical ratings portion of the reports contained 

sensitive information, but that such sensitive information could 

be deleted and the remainder disclosed without violation of a 

person's privacy interests. On the other hand, the narrative portions of the report..~' c::..1ntainc-:1 identifying information "so inextricably intert~11neJ with Jt.ner materials that segregation is 

not reasonably possible," such that disclosure ''of any meaningful 

part of this portion of the reports" would ''result in an invasion 

of the privacy interests of the subject in the context of a 

relatively small facility such as the Medical Center." Id. at 

1411. 

Having concluded that the VA erred in failing to balance the 

interests of the various parties in this case prior to disclosure, 

the court then conducted its own balancing. It found the 

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violation of the nurses' privacy interests was "substantial" and 

that the union's interest in obtaining the documents was 

"minimal." 6 It therefore concluded that the disclosure of 

inadequately sanitized reports to Ms. Sanchez "constituted a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy interests of the 

subjects" in violation of the Privacy Act. 7 The court denied 

plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief but awarded them $1,000 

per plaintiff, finding that emotional trauma, even without 

pecuniary loss, was sufficient to sustain such an award. Finally, 

the court awarded plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, attorneys' 

fees of $5,000. 

The VA appe~is, dlle0:~0 :h~t the plaintiffs failed t.) show 

that the VA committed ct ·wil~[uL , r intentional violation of the 

Privacy Act. It essentially argues that it was faced with the 

difficult task of reconciling the pro-disclosure mandates of FSLRA 

and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA") with 

the anti-disclosure mandate of the Privacy Act. While it concededly may have been negligent, the VA argues it did not act in an 

intentional or willful manner. The VA also challenges the 

6 The court concluded that the union's interests were minimal 

based on the fact that Ms. Sanchez "was on a general fishing 

expedition" when she requested the reports, and that the information was not needed in connection with any pending grievances and 

was "never used by the Union in representing the interests of the 

nurses employed at the Medical Center." Andrews, 613 F. Supp. at 

1412. 

7 The district court also rejected the VA's argument that disclosure of the reports was permitted under the Privacy Act as a 

"routine use" pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7). While the 

American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, as amicus 

curiae, argues vigorously that the district court decision on this 

point was wrong, the VA does not appeal the routine use issue and 

we therefore do not address it. 

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district court judgment with regard to the four plaintiffs who 

were able to identify their own reports but whose identities 

remained concealed from their co-plaintiffs. For the reasons set 

forth below, we reverse. 

::11 SCJSS I.JN 

A. Relevant ~r~v~s1cns ~t Pr1vacy Act, FOIA and FSLRA. 

Several provisions of the Privacy Act, FOIA and FSLRA are 

relevant to this appeal. 

1. Privacy Act: 

The Privacy Act, 5 u.s.c. § 552a was enacted "'to protect the 

privacy of individuals identified in information systems 

maintained by Federal agencies by pfeventing the 'misuse' of that 

information." Thomas v. United States Dep't. of Energy, 719 F.2d 

342, 345-46 (lOth Cir. l983)(quoting Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 

No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, reprinted in 1974 u.s. Code Cong. 

& Ad. News 2177-78 (congressional findings and statement of 

purpose)). It states in pertinent part: 

"No agency shall disclose any record which is 

contained in a system of records by any means 

of communication to any person, or to another 

agency, except pursuant to a written request 

by, or with the prior written consent of, the 

individual to whom the record pertains, unless 

disclosure would be--

"(2) required under section 552 of this 

t i t 1 e [ FO I A ] ; " 

5 u.s.c. § 552a (b)(2). Thus, in this case, without the consent 

of the nurses who were the subjects of the proficiency reports, 

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the VA was prohibited from disclosing the reports unless disclosure was required by FOIA. 

The Privacy Act further provides: 

"(g)(l) Civil remedies--Wnenever any agency 

"(D) fails to comply with any other provision 

of this section, or any rule promulgated 

thereunder, in such a way as to have an 

adverse effect on an individual, the individual may bring a civil action against the 

agency 

"(4) In any suit brought under the provisions 

of subsection (g)(l)(C) or (D) of this section 

in which the court determines that the agency 

acted in a manner which was intentional or 

willful, the United States shall be liable to 

the individual in an amount equal to the sum 

of--

"(A) actual damages sustained by the 

individual as a result of the refusal or 

failure, but in no case shall a person 

entitled to recovery receive less than the sum 

of $1,000; and 

"(B) the costs of the action together 

with reasonable attorney fees as determined by 

the court." 

5 u.s.c. § 552a(g)(l)(emphasis added). Accordingly, if release of 

the reports was not required by FOIA and had an "adverse effect'' 

upon the nurses, and if the VA's action amounted to an 

''intentional or willful" violation of the Privacy Act, the nurses 

are entitled to damages and attorneys' fees. 

2. FOIA: 

FOIA generally provides for public disclosure of information 

contained in agency files, with specified exceptions. "The 

primary thrust of the Freedom of Information Act is to 'pierce the 

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veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the 

light of public scrutiny."' Wren v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1144, 1145 

(lOth Cir. 1982)(quoting Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 

352, 361 (1976)(quoting Rose v. Dept. of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 

261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)). The FOIA exception relevant to this 

case provides as follows: 

5 u.s.c. 

"(b) This section does not apply to matters 

that are--

"(6) personnel and medical 

similar files the disclosure of 

constitute a clearly unwarranted 

personal privacy; Any 

segregable portion of a record 

provided to any person requesting 

after deletion of the portions 

exempt under this subsection." 

files and 

which would 

invasion of 

reasonably 

shall be 

such record 

which are 

§ 552(b)(emphasis added). As the district court 

acknowledged, an agency must attempt to segregate sensitive from 

nonsensitive material, if a document contains both, and release 

the nonsensitive information. See 5 u.s.c. § 552(b); Dept. of the 

Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). "If the exempt materials 

are inextricably intertwined with the non-exempt materials, the 

entire document is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the 

Freedom of Information Act." Andrews, 613 F. Supp. at 1411 (citations omitted). 

In this case, if the disclosure of the personnel files at 

issue "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy" such files are not subject to mandatory disclosure under 

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FOIA; as such, they are protected from disclosure under the 

Privacy Act.8 

3. FSLRA: 

Finally,_ FSLRA sets forth the rights and obligations of 

federal employees vis-a-vis the government. 5 u.s.c § 7114 

provides in pertinent part: 

"(b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive 

representative to negotiate in good faith 

under subsection (a) of this section shall 

include the obligation--

"(4) in the case of an agency, to furnish to 

the exclusive representative involved, or its 

authorized representative, upon request and, 

to the extent not prohibited by law, data--

"(B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, 

understanding, and negotiation of subjects 

within the scope of collective bargaining;" 

5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B). See generally Am. Fed'n. of Gov't. 

Employees, Local 1345 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 793 F.2d 1360 

(D.C. Cir. 1986). 

8 It is well settled that, co determine whether files are 

protected from disclosure under FOIA exemption 6, the agency, and 

the court reviewing an agency decision, must "balance the 

individual's right to privacy against the public's right to 

information." Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (lOth Cir. 

1980}(citing Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 

(1976)); ~also Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. 

United States Dept. of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 

1985); Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 

526,528-30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); 

Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 841-42 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979). 

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It embodies important public policies concerning the collective bargaining process. 9 Of course, section 7114 only requires 

disclosure to the extent not prohibited by law. Although there is 

little case law on the subject, no party in this case contends 

that the Privacy Act operates as an absolute bar to disclosure of 

information to union representatives under FSLRA. All parties 

here impliedly concede that the FOIA exemption to the Privacy Act, 

removing Privacy Act protection if disclosure is required by FOIA, 

applies in this case. The dispute centers largely on the alleged 

failure of the VA to do the balancing required under FOIA. 10 

9 As the District of Columbia Circuit has stated, "[i]t is 

well-settled that section 7114 creates a duty to provide 

information that would enable the Union to process a grievance or 

to determine whether or not to file a grievance." Am. Fed'n. of 

Gov't. Employees, Local 1345 v. Fea. Labor Relations Auth., 793 

F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. l986)(footnote omitted); see also Am. 

Fed'n. of Gov't. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Fed. Labor RelatiOns-AUt~ 

811 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, "even if the Union 

chooses not to pursue a particular grievance, the statute creates 

a duty for the Agency to provide information that is relevant to 

the Union's need to understand new policies or the application of 

old policies that may affect members of the bargaining unit." Am. 

Fed'n., 793 F.2d at 1364. 

10 Because of our conclusion that no willful or intentional 

violation of the Act occurred, we need not, in this case, review 

the district court's balancing of the public and privacy interests 

at issue. Nonetheless, we note our concern over whether the 

district court adequately considered the public interest in 

disclosure of personnel information to a union representative in 

the face of a request such as the one in this case. At the time 

the request was made, the VA had no evident reason to doubt the 

legitimacy of the request and certainly there were substantial 

indications that the information requested was within the scope of 

that which employers must furnish to unions under FSLRA. See 

generally Am. Fed'n. of Gov't. Employees, Local 1345 v. Fed. Labor 

Relations Auth., 793 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In enacting the 

statutes at issue in this case, Congress cannot have intended to 

place agencies in the difficult position of having to "second 

guess" the motivations and intentions of an authorized union 

representative who requests information, in sanitized form, 

arguably of the type to which unions are entitled to pursue their 

{Cont'd on next page) 

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Indeed, there are important policy reasons why the Privacy Act 

should not absolutely bar disclosure of relevant information to 

unions. See generally Local 2047, Am. Fed•n. of Gov•t. Employees 

v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481, 485 n.7 (E.D. Va. 

1976), ("Disclosing "relevant information to recognized unions may 

easily be seen to advance the nation•s federal labor-management 

relations policy by providing the union with data necessary to 

pursue its representational duties."), aff•d, 573 F.2d 184 (4th 

Cir. 1978} (per curiam). 

As the foregoing discuss1cn of the relevant statutes 

indicates, if the reports in this case were "personnel ••. files 

the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy•• under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) of FOIA, the 

Privacy Act prohibited their disclosure absent the consent of the 

nurses. And if the Privacy Act thus prohibited disclosure in this 

case, they could not be disclosed to Ms. Sanchez pursuant to 

FSLRA. 

B. Standard for Privacy Act Liability. 

As previously indicated, even if the Privacy Act is violated, 

no punishment may be imposed unless the agency acted in a manner 

which was intentional or willful. In this case the district court 

equated "intentional or willful•• with gross negligence. The 

(Cont•d from previous page) 

representational functions. 

We note findings by the district court which suggest that Ms. 

Sanchez was abusing her position of authority and misusing her 

rights under FSLRA for personal reasons. Such conduct, if proven, 

would be reprehensible and would presumably invite potentially 

severe consequences. 

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district court founded the VA's gross negligence, and therefore 

its willful or intentional viola~ion of the Privacy Act, on its 

failure to adequately train or guide Ms. Gilligan on the Privacy 

Act and in directing ner that F'SLRA mandated release in this case. 

We hold that the district court erred as a matter of law when it 

equated gross negligence with a willful or intentional violation 

of the Privacy Act. 

In Parks v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 

677 (lOth Cir. 1980), a widely cited decision of this circuit on 

the Privacy Act, this court attempted to elucidate the meaning of 

"willful or intentional." While noting that something more than 

negligence is required, the court rejected the view that "premeditated malice" is required. It called it "noteworthy" that the 

Privacy Act's legislative history states: 

"In a suit for damages, the [compromise] 

amendment reflects a belief that a finding of 

willful, arbitrary or capricious action is too 

harsh a standard of proof for an individual to 

exercise the rights granted by this legislation. Thus the standard for recovery of damages was reduced to 'willful or intentional' 

action by an agency. On a continuum between 

negligence and the very high standard of willful, arbitrary, or capricious conduct, this 

standard is viewed as only somewhat greater 

than gross negligence." 

Id. at 683 (citing Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act, reprinted in 120 Cong. Rec. 

40405, 40406 (1974))(emphasis added). 

Thus, the legislative history suggests that something more 

than gross negligence is required. Some courts have explicitly so 

stated. See Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); Moskiewicz v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 791 F.2d 

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561, 564 (7th Cir. 1986} ("Evidence of conduct which would-meet a 

greater than gross negligence standard, f~cusing on evidence of 

reckless behavior and/or knowing violation of the Act on the part 

of the accused, must be advanced ... "); Hill v. Dept. of Air 

Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(per curiam)(citing 

Parks); Doe v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 544 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Md. 

1982); South v. FBI, 508 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (D. Ill. 1981). 

Other courts have suggested that gross negligence is sufficient, some of them citing Parks for that proposition. See, 

~, Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir. 

1984) (citing Parks); Chapman v. Nat'l. Aeronautics and Space 

Admin., 736 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. )(per curiam)(equating gross 

negligence with willfulness), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984). 

However, some of these courts, as well as others, have grappled 

with further definitions of willful or intentional. See, ~, 

Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 

1987)(intentional or willful means "so 'patently egregious and 

unlawful' that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it 

'unlawful'")(quoting Wisdom v. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 713 

F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 u.s. 1021 

(1984)); Albright, 732 F.2d at 189 (willful or intentional 

requirement met "by committing the act without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly disregarding others' rights 

under the Act."); Moskiewicz, 791 F.2d at 564 (7th Cir. 1986)(acts 

meeting greater than gross negligence standard require evidence of 

"reckless behavior and/or knowing violations of the Act."); 

Chapman, 736 F.2d at 243 (5th Cir. 1984)(court looks for evidence 

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Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 16 
of "unlawful intent" or "ulterior motive"); Wisdom v. Dept. of 

Hous. & Urban Dev., 713 F.2d at 425 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 

465 U.S. 1021 (1984) (willful or intentional means "patently 

egregious and unlawful"). 

We reiterate "Parks' conclusion that premeditated malice is 

not required to establish a willful or intentional violation of 

the Privacy Act. Nonetheless, the term "willful or intentional" 

clearly requires conduct amounting to more than gross negligence. 

We are persuaded by the District of Columbia Circuit's definitions 

of willful or intentional that contemplate action "so 'patently 

egregious and unlawful' that anyone undertaking the conduct should 

have known it 'unlawful,'" Laningham, 813 F.2d at 1242 (quoting 

Wisdom, 713 F.2d at 425 (8th Cir. 1983)), or conduct committed 

"without grounds for believing it to be lawful" or action 

"flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the Act," Albright, 

732 F.2d at 189, and we adopt those definitions, and add the view 

expressed in Moskiewicz, 791 F.2d at 564 (7th Cir. 1986), that the 

conduct must amount to, at the very least, reckless behavior. 

Those, and similar definitions, describe conduct more extreme than 

gross negligence. 

Applying that standard to this case, our review of the record 

convinces us that the VA's CJnduct falls far short of a "willful 

or intentional" violation of tne Privacy Act. Indeed, we find 

that it falls short of even the gross negligence standard applied 

by the district court to that conduct. 

More specifically, given the interpretation of FSLRA in other 

cases, we would not view the advice that FSLRA required release of 

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Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 17 
the reports in sanitized form as even grossly negligent in the 

circumstances of this case. Furthermore, we do not view the 

evidence as supporting the conclusion that the VA was grossly 

negligent in failing to provide Ms. Gilligan with training or 

guidance. As the district court specifically found, "Ms. Gilligan 

had received some training concerning her duties under the Privacy 

Act, and was supplied with the Federal Personnel Manual which 

contains guidelines for responses to requests for information 

contained in personnel files." Andrews, 613 F.Supp. 1408. While 

neither Ms. Gilligan nor the Washington personnel specifically 

went through a balancing process denominated as such to determine 

whether the public interest in disclosure of the files outweighed 

any privacy interests the nurses had in such files, Ms. Gilligan's 

efforts to sanitize the files, pursuant to directions from the 

Washington VA personnel, themselves indicate some attempt to 

reconcile the two competing interests. See Sullivan v. Veterans 

Admin., 617 F.Supp. 258, 262 (D.D.C. 1985) ("While the VA was not 

completely successrul in deleting all the personally identifiable 

references to plaintiff, its attempt to do so demonstrates that 

agency's consideration of and concern for plaintiff's privacy 

interests.") While Ms. Gilligan testified that she had received 

no formal training in sanitization of records, her efforts to 

sanitize the reports were substantial. We view the inadequacy of 

those sanitization efforts as indicative of negligence, at most, 

on the part of the VA, not the higher level of culpability necessary to establish liability under the Privacy Act. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 18 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLIE"K 

llnih·~ ,States OLourt of ~ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFfiCE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

March 4, 1988 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 85-2351; Andrews vs. Veterans Administration, et al 

Filed January 28, 1988 by Judge Stephen H. Anderson 

Attached is page 19 which should be appended to the 

original opinion which was sent to you on January 28, 1988. 

RLH:pf:mt 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

By: 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TELEPHONE 

13031 844·3157 

IFTSl 564·31!57 

Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 19 
For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE the decision of the 

district court finding the VA liable for a violation of the 

Privacy Act and awarding to plaintiffs damages and attorneys' 

fees. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2351 Document: 01019290417 Date Filed: 01/28/1988 Page: 20