Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00638/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00638-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1441pd Removal- Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAINT ONGE ORCHIDS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00638-GPC-JLB

ORDER: 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON

THE PLEADINGS 

[Dkt. No. 4]

On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff Saint Onge Orchids, LLC (“St. Onge”) filed a 

complaint against Defendant County of San Diego for destroying St. Onge’s orchid 

plants in order to control a fungus. Dkt. No. 1-2.1 The complaint asserts claims of 

negligence under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1-2. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on 

April 5, 2017, arguing failure to exhaust and state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

Dkt. No. 4. The motion has been fully briefed.

 

1 The complaint was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of 

San Diego. Dkt. No. 1-2. Defendant removed the civil action from state court on February 10, 2017

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Dkt. No. 1.

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For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for failure to 

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND

St. Onge operates two Cymbidium Orchid nurseries in San Marcos, California. 

Compl. ¶ 10. In July 2015, the County of San Diego conducted inspections of Plaintiff’s 

nurseries and took samples of their orchids. Id. ¶ 11. The subsequent testing of St. 

Onge’s orchids revealed that plants in both nurseries contained the fungal infection 

Colletotrichum Cymbidiicola (“C. Cymbidiicola”). Id. 

In response to the infection, the County’s Department of Agriculture, Weights, 

and Measures (“Department”) instructed St. Onge to fumigate the plants held in the 

nurseries. The Department directed Plaintiff to spray the plants with “Pageant” fungicide 

in week one, “Torque” fungicide in week 2, “Pageant” fungicide again in week 3, and 

“Torque” again in week 4. Id. ¶ 12. When re-inspections showed that the spraying had 

not eliminated the fungus, the Department ordered that the entire collection of plants at 

both locations be destroyed. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. An estimated 5,000 plants were affected by 

this order and their cumulative lost value was $500,000. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that other nurseries in the County have similarly failed to eliminate 

C. Cymbidiicola using the “Pageant” and “Torque” rotation prescribed by the 

Department. Id. ¶ 15. At least one grower, however, was able to eliminate the infection 

with a third fungicide. Id. Yet despite knowing that this alternative fungicide had 

successfully eliminated C. Cymbidiicola at another nursery, the Department did not 

inform Plaintiff of the treatment’s existence before taking action against St. Onge’s 

orchids. Id. 

From 2014 to 2016, a number of other Cymbidium orchid nurseries in San Diego 

County became infected with C. Cymbidiicola. Compl. ¶ 16, 38. The complaint alleges, 

however, that the Department responded differently to the fungal infections at these 

similarly situated nurseries because it only ordered that the infected plants be destroyed, 

not the entire collection of orchids. Id. 

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The complaint contains four causes of action. The first three assert different 

theories of state law negligence. The fourth cause of action, and sole federal cause of 

action, asserts that Defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discriminating against 

Plaintiff in violation of its Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Substantive Due 

Process rights. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are 

closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 

the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

The principal difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 

12(c) is the time of filing — a motion for judgment on the pleadings is typically brought 

after an answer has been filed whereas a motion to dismiss is typically brought before an 

answer has been filed. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review 

applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog. Id.; see also Chavez v. 

United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Analysis under Rule 12(c) is 

‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6), because, under both rules, a 

court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the 

plaintiff to a legal remedy.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, when 

deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, “the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted 

as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to

be false.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 

(9th Cir. 1989) (citing Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 

1984); Austad v. United States, 386 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1967)). 

The Court construes all material allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 

2006). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes 

on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that 

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it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550. As 

such, judgment on the pleadings in favor of a defendant is not appropriate if the 

complaint raises issues of fact that, if proved, would support the plaintiff’s legal theory. 

Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist 

Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). 

DISCUSSION

I. Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for having 

discriminated against St. Onge intentionally and without any rational basis, in violation of 

its Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process. 

Plaintiff’s theory of liability rests on the fact that Defendant ordered that all of St. Onge’s 

orchid inventory be destroyed, rather than only directing that the infected plants be 

destroyed, as was the case with other orchid nurseries in San Diego County. 

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that [the 

plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the 

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the 

plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.’” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 

1997) (citing Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.

1992)). 

The purpose of this rule is to ensure that municipalities, who are not in any way at 

fault, are not held liable solely for employing a tortfeasor. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Los Angeles Cnty., California v. 

Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35 (2010). Rather, a municipality may only be held liable for 

“its own violations of federal law,” which arise when “the action that is alleged to be 

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or 

decision officially adopted and promulgated . . . [or amount to a] deprivation[ ] pursuant 

to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal 

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approval . . . .” Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36. Stated differently, a municipality may not 

be held liable solely for the acts of others, but may be held liable “when execution of a 

government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

“In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare 

allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or 

practice.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotations omitted). There must, however, be enough factual allegations to 

establish what the relevant policy is, rather than merely stating that a policy caused the 

violation in question. See Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (finding failure to state claim 

because complaint only asserted that defendant maintained a policy, custom, or practice 

of knowingly permitting the violation, but did not provide additional facts regarding the 

nature of the policy, custom, or practice); Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 

900-01 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding failure to state claim because complaint alleged a policy 

or custom caused the violation without providing supporting factual allegations); Ass’n 

for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 

2011) (finding § 1983 Monell claim was adequate because it specifically explained that 

the policy in question denied “post-suspension hearings to employees resigned after 

suspension”).

Plaintiff’s complaint has failed to plead any factual allegations establishing that 

there was a San Diego County municipal policy or custom that violated its Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. See Plumeau, 130 F.3d at 438. Plaintiff alleges that the relevant 

“policy” was that Defendant personnel, exercising regulatory authority, treated St. Onge 

differently than a number of other orchid growers. Dkt. No. 9 at 8. This assertion, 

however, does not meet the broad definition of a “policy” as stated in Humphries, 

Hernandez or as articulated in Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 

1992), the authority cited by Plaintiff.

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating 

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that the challenged action was carried out pursuant to a municipal “policy or custom” and 

that it was not the result of a Government’s employees tort. Humphries, 562 U.S. at 35. 

The complaint, however, singles out “Defendant personnel” as the perpetrator of the 

constitutional violation and does not allege that the officials acted (1) pursuant to a 

specific and identified municipal “policy or custom,” that (2) they otherwise had final 

policy-making authority, or that (3) an official with final policy-making authority ratified 

a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-47 

(explaining that municipal liability under § 1983 may be demonstrating in one of three 

ways). 

The insufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint is reinforced by the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Hernandez. There, the plaintiff asserted no more than that all of the alleged 

constitutional violations were carried out pursuant to the municipal defendant’s 

regulations, and that the defendant had a policy of knowingly permitting the occurrence 

of these violations. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. The Hernandez court, however, found 

that such allegations were not enough to satisfy Monell’s pleading standards because the 

defendant did not have fair notice of the claim being brought or the policy being 

challenged by the plaintiff’s civil action. Id.

Here, too, Plaintiff’s complaint only states that Defendant’s acts and omissions 

discriminated against it and that the discrimination was intentional or occasioned by

deliberate indifference. The complaint does not, however, provide the Court with any 

factual allegations showing what specific municipal policy led to the acts and omissions

complained of within the complaint. To show that the “Defendant personnel” were not 

tortfeasors acting on their own initiative, but individuals acting pursuant to “policy or 

custom,” the complaint needs to identify a municipal custom or policy that caused those

officials to treat St. Onge differently than the other growers. Absent such factual 

allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for municipal Monell liability under

§ 1983. 

For these reasons and because Plaintiff has failed to identify any theory of how the 

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challenged Fourteenth Amendment violation arose under a municipal “policy or custom,”

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim. 

II. Leave to Amend

In the opposition to Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff 

requests leave to amend its pleading, asserting that Defendant has not alleged that they 

would be prejudiced in any way. Dkt. No. 9 at 8-9. Defendant does not oppose this 

request. Dkt. No. 10 at 14.

Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a “court should freely give leave [to amend] when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts typically look at four factors when 

determining whether it should grant leave to amend: namely, bad faith, undue delay, 

prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. See Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 

F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007). Generally speaking, denying leave to amend is 

improper unless the complaint cannot be saved by an amendment. See Miller v. 

Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004).

For § 1983 claims against municipalities, leave to amend is generally granted when 

dismissal involved the failure to properly assert all of the necessary elements of a 

municipal liability claim. See Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (finding that district court 

abused its discretion in not allowing leave to amend failure to allege a policy or custom). 

Accordingly and because the complaint, here, would be saved by being amended to 

include a municipal “policy or custom,” the Court concludes that leave to amend would 

not be futile.

As such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. 

Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s sole federal cause of action, the Court need 

not reach Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. If and when Plaintiff chooses to amend

its federal cause of action, the Court will revisit the status of Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Plaintiff has 30 days from the day of this order to file a First Amended Complaint. 

/ / / / 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 30, 2017

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