Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00955/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00955-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 113, filed October 30, 2006. 

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The Court recognizes that Plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in accordance

with Civil Local Rule 7-3(a). However, considering Defendant has not filed a reply or otherwise alleged any prejudice caused

by Plaintiff’s untimely opposition, the Court will recognize Plaintiff’s opposition as valid. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C05-00955 MJJ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant United States’ (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss.1 Pro se

Plaintiff Richard George (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.2

For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court. On March 7, 2005, the

case was properly removed to this Court. By letter dated June 30, 2005, Plaintiff made a Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). In response to

Plaintiff’s request, the Department of Treasury’s (“Treasury”) timely response indicated that the

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As of the October 3, 2006 hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

denies receiving the requested FOIA material from the Treasury. 

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The Court previously recognized Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the lack of substantive reply to his FOIA request

despite his “inability to clearly plead it in his operative complaint.” (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss and Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 8:20-21.) 

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Treasury would not be able to immediately comply with Plaintiff’s request.3

On September 8, 2005, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). The TAC’s

“First Cause of Action” alleged a new claim (not present in Plaintiff’s previous complaints)

regarding Defendant’s failure to comply with Plaintiff’s FOIA request under 5 U.S.C. § 522. 

On June 15, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment. 

On October 5, 2006, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the TAC’s first

cause of action as to the substantive content of Defendant’s substantive FOIA production, but

granted the Motion to Dismiss with regards to the TAC’s first claim as to the timeliness of

Defendant’s initial FOIA response. The Court also granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s second and third claims. As a result, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the

substantive FOIA request is the only remaining claim. 

As alleged in the TAC, Plaintiff maintains he has exhausted his administrative remedies

under 5 U.S.C. § 522 and filed a notice of pending suit with the IRS. (TAC ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges

that the Treasury has not substantively complied with his FOIA request and Plaintiff requests from

the Court an order compelling the Treasury to deliver the requested materials to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 55-

57, e.)4

 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; thus, the Court presumes lack of

jurisdiction, and the party seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that

subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). A party challenging the court's jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so by raising either

a facial attack or a factual attack. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A facial attack is one where “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

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complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack to jurisdiction, the Court

must accept the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). For a factual attack, in contrast, the Court may consider extrinsic

evidence. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, the court does

not have to assume the truthfulness of the allegations, and may resolve any factual disputes. See

White, 227 F.3d at 1242. Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a

factual motion by presenting affidavits or evidence properly before the court, the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.

2003). 

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s FOIA Cause of Action Treated as Supplemental Pleading

Before addressing the substance of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court must first

address the issue of supplemental pleading. When Plaintiff filed the operative complaint titled,

“Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Equitable Relief, Injunctive Relief, and

Damages,” Plaintiff added the FOIA claim as a new cause of action alleging relevant facts that

occurred after the original pleading was filed. Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff properly added

such a claim under the title “Third Amended Complaint.” 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 outlines the procedure for amending pleadings as well as

filing supplemental pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (d). Generally, a pleading should be

“amended” when the pleader wishes to insert allegations concerning events that took place before

the original pleading was filed. Hon. William W. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before

Trial, 8:360 (2006). A pleading should be “supplemented” when the pleader wishes to insert

allegations concerning relevant events which took place after the original pleading was filed. Id. at

8:361, 8:490. Because there is an addition of allegations that occurred after the initial filing of the

complaint, a supplemental pleading is only fair upon reasonable notice and just terms. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(d). Normally, a party requests leave of the court to file a supplemental pleading. Id. 

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However, “when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the

parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(b); see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998). “The

erroneous characterization of the corrected pleading as an ‘amended complaint’ rather than as a

‘supplemental pleading’ is immaterial.” United States ex rel. Wulff v. CMA, Inc. 890 F2d 1070,

1073 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States ex. rel. Atkins v. Reiten, 313 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir.

1963)); Cabrera,159 F.3d at 382. Unless the opposing party would be prejudiced, it is within a

court’s discretion to ignore that misguided designation and proceed as if it had been correctly

named. See, e.g., Id.; Atkins, 313 F.2d at 674; Cabrera,159 F.3d at 382; Lynam v. Livingston, 257 F.

Supp. 520, 523 (D. Del 1966); Georgia Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332,

336-337 (D. Ga. 1975). 

Plaintiff’s FOIA cause of action in his TAC asserts allegations occurring after Plaintiff filed

his original complaint. Plaintiff first filed his complaint on February 14, 2005 and Plaintiff’s FOIA

request took place June 30, 2005. With leave of the Court, Plaintiff filed his “Third Amended

Complaint” on September 18, 2005, including the FOIA claim. Thus, the FOIA cause of action in

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should have been filed as supplemental pleading and labeled as such. 

Considering Plaintiff is representing himself as a pro se litigant and Defendant has not alleged

surprise or unfair prejudice by Plaintiff’s FOIA claim, the Court will recognize Plaintiff’s FOIA

cause of action in his TAC as a “supplemental pleading” under Rule 15(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(d); Wulff, 890 F2d at 1073; Atkins, 313 F.2d at 674. 

B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s FOIA cause of action should be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s TAC should relate back to the date of

the original complaint, February 14, 2005. Defendant points out that, as of that date, Plaintiff had

not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, if the TAC is related back to the date of

the original complaint, then, the Court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

unexhausted and then non-existent FOIA request. In making these arguments, Defendant initiates a

“facial attack” for purpose of a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff generally denies that this claim lacks

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jurisdiction. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 instructs that the Federal Rules “shall be construed and

administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive destination of every action.” Rule 15(c)

allows for an amended complaint to “relate[] back to the date of the original pleading” under certain

circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The “relation back doctrine” serves the remedial purpose of

“protecting claims raised in amended pleadings from the statute of limitations.” Wilson v.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 838 F.2d 286, 290 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Security Insurance

Co. v. United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1964). 

The non-pleading parties in Wilson and Security Insurance made similar arguments to that of

Defendant in this case. 838 F.2d at 289; 338 F.2d 445. In both cases the courts were confronted

with plaintiffs who filed supplemental pleadings, adding allegations occurring after the original

complaint was filed. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289; Security Insurance, 338 F.2d 445. On appeal, in both

cases, the non-pleading party argued that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction

over the added claims/allegations. The non-pleading parties asserted that, if the supplemental

pleadings were “related back” to the date of the original complaint, the respective claims would have

had a jurisdictional defect requiring the court to dismiss them. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289; Security

Insurance, 338 F.2d at 447. Recognizing the “remedial purpose” of the “relation back” doctrine,

both courts refused to apply the doctrine to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in each

case. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 290; Security Insurance, 338 F.2d at 448. The courts recognized that a

strict application of hyper-technical procedural pitfalls would not serve justice as commanded by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 1. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 290; Security Insurance,

338 F.2d at 448; Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 382; see also ISC–Bunker Ramo Corp. v.

Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1308, (N.D. Ill. 1990); Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, et al., 191

F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2002). 

Here, the Court similarly rejects Defendant’s argument. The cases Defendant cites all relate

to the general notion that an individual must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a

FOIA claim in federal court. However, the cases fail to address the issues that Defendant raises in

this motion. Similar to the non-pleading parties in Wilson and Security Insurance, Defendant is

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attempting to misuse the “relation back” doctrine to defeat subject matter jurisdiction in Plaintiff’s

cause of action. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 290; Security Insurance, 338 F.2d at 448. By definition, a

supplemental pleading includes facts that occur after the original pleading was filed. See Hon.

William W. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 8:360 (2006); Cabrera,159

F.3d at 382; Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289. If a party’s supplemental pleading, which made allegations or

claims that occurred after the complaint was filed, automatically “related back” and assumed the

date of the original complaint, the opposing party would always be able to argue that, as of that date,

the Court lacked jurisdiction because no case or controversy was ripe on the issue. If this were

always the case, then all supplemental pleadings of this nature would be defeated for lack of

jurisdiction – this “procedural mousetrap” would render all supplemental pleadings void. See

Security Insurance, 338 F.2d at 449 (“we are not required to apply the doctrine of relation-back so

literally as to carry it to a time. . . so as to prevent the maintainence of the action in the first place.”). 

The “relation back doctrine” serves the remedial purpose of “protecting claims raised in amended

pleadings from the statute of limitations,” not as a tool for the opposing party to defeat claims. 

Wilson, 838 F.2d at 290; Security Insurance, 338 F.2d at 448. Defendant is asking the Court to use

the “relation back” doctrine for this latter, improper purpose with respect to its exhaustion of

remedies argument. The Court refuses to apply the doctrine contrary to established Ninth Circuit

case law. Cabrera,159 F.3d at 382; Security Insurance, 338 F.2d at 448; Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d

467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988). As such, for the purposes of this motion, the Court rejects Defendant’s

claim that the Plaintiff’s FOIA cause of action relates back to the date of the initial complaint in

order to defeat this Court’s jurisdiction over the matter. 

Defendant fails to show that Plaintiff had not exhausted his FOIA administrative remedies by

the time of the TAC. In fact, Defendant only alleges that Plaintiff had not exhausted his

administrative remedies before the time of the original complaint. Also, Plaintiff’s TAC alleges that

he did exhaust all administrative remedies. (TAC ¶ 33.) In a facial attack motion to dismiss, the

Court accepts the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, for the purpose of this motion, the Plaintiff’s allegations

are taken to be true that he has in fact sufficiently exhausted his remedies as of September 18, 2005,

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the date the TAC was filed.

C. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Facts Not in Existence at Initial Complaint 

Defendant also argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had

not made a FOIA request at the commencement of suit. Specifically, Defendant argues that the facts

Plaintiff alleges in support of his FOIA cause of action did not exist when the lawsuit was initiated. 

Additionally, Defendant argues that the Court is prohibited from curing this jurisdictional problem

by looking to Plaintiff’s post-complaint activity. Plaintiff generally denies that this claim lacks

jurisdiction.

A plaintiff can make allegations or claims in the supplemental pleading that did not exist at

the time of the original complaint. Fed. R.. Civ. P. 15(d); Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 382. As long as

there is “some relationship. . . between the newly alleged matters and the subject matter of the

original action, they need not all arise out of the same transaction.” Keith, 858 F.2d at 474. In

addition, the claims cannot surprise or unfairly prejudice Defendants and must be just. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(d); Hon. William W. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 8:498 (2006);

see also Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289. 

Here, the cases and reasoning cited above defeat Defendant’s argument. Plaintiff’s FOIA

claim is a supplemental pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Plaintiff’s FOIA claim has “some

relationship” with the underlying tax claims because the FOIA request arises out of Plaintiff’s

ongoing tax dispute with the IRS; Plaintiff requests documents relevant to his other claims. See

Keith, 858 F.2d at 474; Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 382; Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289. As discussed above,

Defendant has not alleged surprise or unfair prejudice by Plaintiff’s FOIA claim. Because all of

these elements are met, Plaintiff was allowed to add new claims and allegations in his supplemental

pleading without defeating the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. See Keith, 858

F.2d at 474; Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 382; Wilson, 838 F.2d at 289. Therefore, Defendant’s argument

fails. 

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2006. 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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