Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02752/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02752-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE WILSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-2752 GEB EFB P

vs.

J. WALKER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this application for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On February 8, 2010, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations

herein which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any

objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty-one days. 

Respondents have filed objections to the findings and recommendations. Petitioner has also

requested appointment of counsel.

Petitioner request for appointment of counsel is denied. There currently exists no

absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d

453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). The court may appointment counsel at any stage of the proceedings “if

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the interests of justice so require.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; see also, Rule 8(c), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. The court does not find that the interests of justice would be served by the

appointment of counsel at this stage of the proceedings.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule

304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire

file, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by

proper analysis.

The magistrate judge found that the petitioner’s habeas petition was timely when

considering periods of statutory tolling. A one-year limitations period applies to federal habeas

corpus petitions, but the limitations period is statutorily tolled for the entire time that properly

filed state post-conviction petitions are “pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). In California, a

properly filed post-conviction application is considered to be “pending” during the intervals

between a lower court decision and filing a new petition in a higher court. Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002). California has no clear rule governing the time for filing a post-conviction

petition; a petition is considered timely if filed within a “reasonable time.” Id. at 221.

The United States Supreme Court has held that, in order to determine whether a

state petition was “pending” for the purpose of statutory tolling, a federal district court must

“determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. 189, 197 (2006). After Chavis was decided, the California Court of Appeal held that as a

matter of California law, an unrepresented prisoner’s unexplained ten-month delay in filing a

habeas petition in the appellate court challenging the denial of his parole was not unreasonable. 

In re Burdan, 169 Cal.App.4th 18, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Citing Burdan, the magistrate judge

found that petitioner, an unrepresented prisoner challenging a parole decision, was entitled to

statutory tolling for the intervals between his state petitions, as the intervals were substantially

less than ten months.

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Respondents’ objections argue that the magistrate judge erred in relying on

Burdan and determining that the petition was timely. They argue that Burdan does not represent

an explication of California law, as Burdan is not a California Supreme Court decision. But

when interpreting state law, a federal court is bound by the decision of the highest state court,

and “in the absence of such a decision, a federal court must predict how the highest state court

would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions . . . .” In re Kirkland, 915

F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1990). Indeed, “‘[I]n the absence of convincing evidence that the

highest court of the state would decide differently,’ ” American Triticale, Inc. v. Nytco Services,

Inc., 664 F.2d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S.

464, (1940)), a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions of the state’s intermediate

courts. See id.” In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d at 1238 (emphasis added). Reliance on the state court

of appeals’ ruling in Burdan is appropriate here.

Respondents also argue that the circumstances under which a federal petition is

deemed “pending” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) is a question of federal law, citing Chavis for the

proposition that a sixth-month delay between state court filings is unreasonable. Respondets

ignore that Chavis ultimately held that the district court’s task was to determine “whether the

filing of the request for state-court appellate review. . . was made within what California would

consider a ‘reasonable time.’” 546 U.S. at 198. Chavis was decided when there was “no

authority suggesting, nor [] any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider an

unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing delay ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 201. A California appellate

court has now addressed the question directly. Burdan has explained that California would,

indeed, consider up to a ten-month filing delay reasonable for state habeas petitions filed by

unrepresented prisoners challenging parole decisions. While Chavis did state that the Court did

not “see how an unexplained delay of [six months] could fall within the scope of the federal

statutory word ‘pending,’” the Court expressly instructed federal courts to look to state law to

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 Respondents note the reference in Chavis to Saffold, which “held that timely filings in 1

California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that

California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i.e., that

California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than

those in States with determinate timeliness rules.” 546 U.S. at 199-200. Burdan explains that in

California, unrepresented prisoners challenging parole decisions are allowed ten months between

post-conviction petitions. Burdan’s holding does not, as respondents suggest, mean that “any

delay is reasonable when a petitioner is challenging a parole denial.” Certainly, if California law

permitted a delay of ten years between petitions, filings that were timely in California would not

fall within the federal tolling provision. But ten months is not substantially longer than the outer

limit of six months previously suggested in Chavis.

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determine timeliness issues. Id. at 201. 1

Respondents also argue that the statute of limitations analysis should not vary

according to whether a parole decision or a conviction is being challenged, or take into account

prejudice to the respondent. While the rule announced in Burdan does create a system whereby

some petitioners are allowed more time than others to file their federal petitions, this court’s task

is not to review and pass judgment on the policies underlying California law, but merely to

follow Chavis’s instructions and determine what California courts would hold with respect to

timeliness.

Finally, respondents claim that the one-year statute of limitations began to run

before the Board of Parole Hearings decision became final. As explained in Solorio v. Hartley,

591 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2008) and Tidwell v. Marshall, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1098,

1010-11 (C.D. Cal. 2009), the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the decision

became final, that is, 120 days after the hearing. Until that date, the denial of parole was merely

a proposed decision, and so did not trigger the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed February 8, 2010, are adopted in full;

2. Respondents’ September 14, 2009 motion to dismiss is denied;

3. Petitioner’s April 20, 2009 request for leave to supplement his habeas petition,

Dckt. Nos. 15, 16, is denied as futile;

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4. Respondents are directed to file and serve an answer, and not a motion,

responding to the application within 60 days from the date of this order, see Rule 4, Fed. R.

Governing § 2254 Cases, and are directed that the answer be accompanied by any and all

transcripts or other documents relevant to the determination of the issues presented in the

application, see Rule 5, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases;

5. Petitioner is directed that his reply, if any, shall be filed and served within 30

days of service of an answer;

6. Petitioner’s February 18, 2010 motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

Dated: March 15, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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