Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01167/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01167-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ronald L. Vertin, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Terry L Goddard, Former Attorney General 

of the State of Arizona; et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-11-01167-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Ninth Circuit’s reversal and remand of this Court’s 

order dismissing Plaintiff Ronald L. Vertin’s action. (Doc. 25-1). For the reasons 

discussed below, the matter is reinstated as to Defendants Jennifer Pinnow, City of 

Avondale, and State of Arizona. Plaintiff is allowed to move for leave to file and serve an 

amended complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 26.) is 

stricken. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Ronald L. Vertin (“Vertin”), pro se, filed his Original Complaint against 

seven defendants on June 13, 2011. (Doc. 1) In his Complaint, Vertin alleges a variety of 

civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the State’s seizure of his property in 

2004 and its subsequent forfeiture in 2008. (Doc. 1 ¶ 27.) On September 19, 2011, Vertin 

filed an Amended Complaint that restated his claims with greater specificity and dropped 

his claim against the former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard. (Doc. 3.) This 

Amended Complaint continues to assert claims against the remaining six defendants: the 

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State of Arizona, Arizona Assistant Attorneys General Nelson and Johnson, the City of 

Avondale, and Avondale Detectives Pinniow (sic) and Smith. Vertin did not serve these 

defendants with either the Original Complaint or the Amended Complaint within the 120 

day period required by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Vertin 

filed, without leave from this Court, a Second Amended Complaint on October 13, 2011. 

(Doc. 4.) 

 On October 27, 2011, this Court issued an order directing Vertin to show, within 

fourteen days, good cause as to why his claim should not be terminated for failure to 

serve the defendants within the time required by Rule 4(m). (Doc. 5.) The Court also 

directed Vertin to show why his Second Amended Complaint should not be stricken for 

failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Arizona Local 

Rule 15.1. On November 10, 2011, Vertin filed six documents in an apparent attempt to 

show good cause. Three of these documents showed that Vertin had successfully served 

defendants Pinnow, City of Avondale, and State of Arizona with his Second Amended 

Complaint on November 7 and 8, 2011. (Docs. 6–8.) The remaining documents showed 

that Vertin had attempted service as to the other defendants, but that service had not been 

executed. (Docs. 9–11.) Finding these six filings insufficient to demonstrate good cause, 

this Court dismissed Vertin’s action without prejudice on November 17, 2011. (Doc. 15.) 

 Vertin then moved to amend the judgment on December 12, 2011, (Docs. 17, 18.) 

which this Court denied. (Doc. 19.) Vertin promptly appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Doc. 

20.), which reversed this Court’s dismissal as an abuse of discretion and remanded the 

case for reconsideration of the decision to dismiss. (Doc. 25.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

 When a plaintiff fails to serve process on a defendant within 120 days of filing the 

complaint, Rule 4(m) provides either that the complaint must be dismissed, or, if the 

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, “the district court must extend time for 

service” for an appropriate period. Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Even if the plaintiff fails to show good cause, the district court may also, in its 

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discretion, “extend time for service upon a showing of excusable neglect.” Id. The court 

is required to engage in this two-step analysis to determine (1) whether there is excusable 

neglect and (2) if that excusable neglect rises to the level of good cause. In re Sheehan, 

253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 The excusable neglect analysis contains at least four factors: (1) the danger of 

prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the 

proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good 

faith.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 394 (1993). 

(adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). A district court must explicitly apply all four of the Pioneer/Briones factors 

when determining whether a plaintiff’s failure to meet a court-ordered deadline 

constitutes excusable neglect. Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1192. As a general rule, excusable 

neglect encompasses negligence and carelessness. Id. However, the court’s analysis 

regarding “what sort of neglect will be considered ‘excusable . . . is at bottom an 

equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s 

omission. Pioneer, 707 U.S. at 396. 

 In some instances, excusable neglect alone may be sufficient to establish good 

cause. Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198 n.3 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 

(9th Cir. 1991)). But, for the most part courts consider three factors in addition to 

excusable neglect, to determine whether good cause exists. These factors include 

whether: “(a) the party to be served received actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the 

defendant would suffer no prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his 

complaint were dismissed.” Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754,756 (9th Cir. 1991). If the 

court finds that the plaintiff has established excusable neglect, but failed to show good 

cause, the court may dismiss the claim. Upon a showing of good cause, however, relief 

under 4(m) is mandatory. Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198; In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512. 

 Further, in deciding whether to dismiss a claim for failure to comply with a court 

order, the court must determine if certain “relevant factors” weigh in favor of dismissal. 

Pataglunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). The five Pataglunan factors 

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are: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability 

of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 

merits. Id. 

B. Analysis 

Courts must address explicitly each prong of the 4(m) analysis. However, because 

excusable neglect is both a grounds for discretionary extension of time, and potentially 

sufficient grounds for mandatory extension, the two prongs are easy to conflate. See Golf 

Savings Bank v. Walsh, 2010 WL 3222112, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2010). Courts 

generally assume for the purposes of the good cause inquiry the presence of excusable 

neglect and, then, having concluded its assessment of the good cause factors, proceeds to 

the excusable neglect inquiry. See Trueman v. Johnson 2011 WL 6721327 (2011). In the 

interest of simplicity and clarity of analysis, however, this Court will analyze first 

whether excusable neglect exists, and then determine whether Vertin has demonstrated 

any factors raising his excuse to the level of good cause. 

 1. Excusable Neglect 

Upon a showing of excusable neglect, Rule 4(m) permits, but does not require, “a 

district court to grant an extension of time to serve the complaint after th[e] 120-day 

period.” Trueman, 2011 WL 671327 at *5 (quoting Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis omitted). 

 a. Pioneer/Briones Factors 

 i. Prejudice to Opposing Party 

 The lack of prejudice to Defendants weighs in favor of finding excusable neglect. 

Although Defendants would prefer to avoid litigation on the merits by having the claim 

dismissed, Defendants’ loss of a “quick victory is not sufficiently prejudicial to deny [the 

plaintiff] relief.” Trueman, 2011 WL 6721327 at *3 (citing Bateman v. United States 

Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000)). Thus, none of the six Defendants 

would suffer any cognizable prejudice from extending Vertin additional time to serve. 

 ii. Length of Delay and its Impact on Proceedings 

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Both the length of delay and its impact on proceedings are minimal, which 

supports a finding of excusable neglect. Particularly with pro se plaintiffs, an extension of 

time to serve for a few months beyond the required 120-day period is not impermissibly 

lengthy. Compare Trueman, 2011 WL 6721327 at *6 (finding that a two month extension 

has a minimal impact on proceedings in which no defendant has been served) with 

Halloum v. Ryan, 2011 WL 5572622 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2011) (dismissing without 

prejudice where the time for filing expired nine months prior to the order to show cause 

and the case was nearing completion). Moreover, an action that is “in its infancy,” such 

that no defendants have been served and no scheduling orders have been entered, is 

generally not adversely impacted by such a delay in litigation. Id. at *6–7. 

 Here, the period between when the 120-day period expired and when the Court 

dismissed Vertin’s claim was only two months. This relatively short delay is further 

mitigated by the “infancy” of Vertin’s claim, which did not proceed past his filing of a 

Complaint. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding excusable neglect. 

 iii. Reason for Delay 

Vertin failed to offer any reason for his delay in response to this Court’s Order to 

show cause. In support of his motion to amend the judgment, Vertin alleges that he asked 

the process server to delay service until Vertin could file a Second Amended Complaint, 

which would correct some “clerical errors” in the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 17 

¶ 6.) Although ignorance of court rules typically does not constitute excusable neglect, a 

pro se plaintiff’s failure to comply with rules of procedure may be excused by negligence 

if the court finds that plaintiff’s failure to comply resulted from more than just his failure 

to “read and attempt to follow court rules.” Briones, 116 F.3d at 382 (holding that a pro 

se plaintiff’s failure to respond that was partly caused by a communication error with his 

assistants could be considered excusable neglect). In other words, a pro se plaintiff’s 

negligence is excusable if the court also finds that it was the product of a “good-faith 

mistake.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d 1188 at 1197. 

 This is a close call. Vertin has not alleged that his failure to timely serve the six 

Defendants was caused by anything but his desire to amend his Complaint for a second 

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time. In fact, Vertin’s references to the “120th day” and asking the process server to 

“hold service” suggest that he was at least aware of Rule 4(m)’s service requirements and 

time constraints. Further, Vertin was never given leave to file the Second Amended 

Complaint, and never provided any justification as to why it should not be stricken. 

Vertin was given notice by this Court that he should provide a reason why the Second 

Amended Complaint should not be stricken before he actually served it on those 

Defendants that he did serve. He never did so, although he did subsequently serve three 

of the Defendants with the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 17 ¶ 6.) However, in 

light of Vertin’s pro se status and because he was apparently acting in good faith, Vertin 

has provided an adequate reason for his delay. 

 iv. Good Faith 

There is no evidence that Vertin acted in bad faith. Delays resulting from 

“deviousness or willfulness” on the part of the plaintiff may be bad faith, but delays 

caused by pure negligence typically are not. Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225. While he was 

wrong about the procedural requirements for filing and serving a complaint in federal 

court, Vertin, a pro se plaintiff, did not demonstrate any evidence of bad faith. Like the 

previous three factors, the final Pioneer/Briones factor also weighs in favor of a finding 

of excusable neglect as to the three defendants he did in fact serve. Because Vertin 

entirely failed to serve the remaining three defendants and failed to demonstrate any 

good-faith attempts to achieve proper service (or explain his neglect), this court cannot 

find excusable neglect as to the three un-served defendants. Thus, only Vertin’s failure to 

serve Defendants Jennifer Pinnow, City of Avondale, and State of Arizona within the 

120-day required by Rule 4(m) constitutes excusable neglect. 

 2. Good Cause 

 The good cause analysis is always conducted on a case-by-case basis. In re 

Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512. However, the Ninth Circuit has generally “interpreted ‘good 

cause’ to exclude mistakes of counsel and the desire to amend a complaint before 

service.” Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985). Vertin alleged in his 

Motion to Amend Judgment that he had failed to timely serve because he intentionally 

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delayed service in order to file his Second Amended Complaint, which also was filed 

without leave from this Court.1

 (Doc. 17 ¶ 6.) As this Court has previously indicated in its 

Order denying Vertin’s motion (Doc. 19.), his desire to amend his complaint in the final 

days of the 120-day period allotted under Rule 4(m) was insufficient to overturn the 

dismissal for failure to show good cause. Thus, assuming for the time being the existence 

of excusable neglect, the court must examine whether Vertin has alleged any of the three 

additional Boudette factors that would raise his (presumed) excuse to the level of good 

cause. See Boudette, 923 F.2d at 756. 

 a. Actual Notice 

 Actual notice requires that defendants who have not been served with process 

demonstrate in some way that they personally received actual notice of the complaint 

during the 120-day period. Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 

F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). Typically, defendants who have appeared in or in some 

way contacted the court sufficiently demonstrate that they have personally received 

actual notice of the lawsuit. Trueman, 2011 WL 6721327 at *3. None of the defendants 

contacted this Court during or after the 120-day period between June and October 2011. 

After the required twenty day period, on November 7 and 8, 2011, Plaintiff served what 

purports to be his Second Amended Complaint on Defendants Pinnow, Avondale, and 

Arizona. Nevertheless, the service came after the required 120-day period, and the 

Second Amended Complaint was not operative because, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(1)(B), Plaintiff was required to obtain leave of this Court prior to filing this Second 

Amended Complaint which he never sought nor received. Thus, although the Pinnow, 

Avondale and state Defendants may have been aware that Plaintiff desired to file a 

lawsuit against them, they did not personally receive actual notice within the 120 day 

period required under 4(m), which expired on October 11, 2011. The remaining 

defendants were, to the Court’s knowledge, never properly served. (Docs. 9–11.) 

 

1

 Vertin’s Motion to Amend Judgment was not filed within the 14 day period required by the Court in its Order to Show Cause. However, in keeping with the Ninth 

Circuit’s implicit urgings to give Vertin, a pro se plaintiff, the benefit of the doubt, this 

Court will consider any allegations and explanations contained in Vertin’s Motion. 

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Because the defendants did not demonstrate personal receipt of actual notice during the 

relevant period, this factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of good cause. 

 b. Prejudice to Defendants 

As discussed previously in the excusable neglect context, the absence of prejudice 

to the defendants in this case supports a finding of good cause. Nonetheless, a “[l]ack of 

prejudice by itself is not sufficient to establish good cause.” United States v. 2,164 

Watches, More or Less, Bearing a Registered Trademark of Guess?, Inc., 366 F.3d 767, 

773 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the only prejudice to the Defendants is their loss of a 

‘quick victory,’ and, while Defendant’s loss of a quick victory is insufficient to deny 

relief to the Plaintiff, it is also insufficient to definitively establish good cause. 

 c. Prejudice to Plaintiff 

 “A dismissal for untimely service is required to be a dismissal without prejudice.”

2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d at 773. However, a dismissal that is nominally “without 

prejudice” can become prejudicial to the plaintiff when the statute of limitations would 

bar refiling. See Trueman, 2011 WL 6721327 at *4 (finding severe prejudice to plaintiff 

where the statute of limitations would prevent refiling of his § 1983 claim). 

 As indicated in this court’s two previous orders (Docs. 5, 19.), there appears to be 

some question as to whether the statute of limitations had already run on Vertin’s various 

civil rights claims at the time he filed his original Complaint. (Doc. 19.) According to 

Vertin’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants committed the alleged constitutional 

violations prior to the superior court’s Order of Forfeiture, apparently dated September 3, 

2009. (Doc. 3 ¶ 41.) Moreover, the bulk of Vertin’s First Amended Complaint focuses on 

events between 2002 and 2004. (Doc. 3 ¶¶ 8–35.) Assuming that Vertin has accurately 

stated the relevant dates, the statute of limitations appears to have run on his § 1983 

claims. If Vertin’s claims were already untimely when he filed his first Complaint in June 

2011, then dismissing his claim for failure to serve, inflicts no additional prejudice on 

Vertin. 

 Even presuming that the statute of limitations had not expired when Vertin filed 

his first Complaint in June 2011, Vertin also fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim 

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under § 1983 or any other federal or state law that he has cited in his First Amended 

Complaint. 2 (Doc. 3.) Vertin alleges that defendants conspired to take his property and 

did so using search warrants obtained through “innuendo and distortions of fact.” (Doc. 3 

¶¶ 7–8, 20.) However, Vertin also concedes that search warrants were obtained, the State 

of Arizona filed a seizure action in Maricopa County Superior Court, which issued an 

Order of Forfeiture in September 2009. (Doc. 3 ¶¶ 20, 34, 41.) The validity of the 

State’s seizure of Vertin’s property should have been litigated in the superior court 

action. Besides vague references to his constitutional rights to apportionment and 

compensation (Doc. 3 ¶¶ 8, 39–40.), Vertin fails to allege with any specificity which of 

his federal rights Defendants violated, and how. Without a meritorious claim, dismissal 

of Vertin’s claim for failure to serve would not cause him undue prejudice. Thus, like the 

actual notice requirement, the potential for undue prejudice to the plaintiff is not so great 

as to warrant mandatory extension for good cause. 

 Vertin has not alleged, nor could this court uncover, sufficient facts to support a 

finding of good cause. Because this court’s analysis of the three factors does not clearly 

support a finding of good cause, extension of time to serve is not mandatory. 

 C. Pagtalunan Factors 

When a court finds that excusable neglect exists, but that good cause does not, 

dismissal is discretionary. The Ninth Circuit has laid out five additional (but somewhat 

duplicative) factors that a court should consider when deciding whether to dismiss a case 

for failure to comply with a court order. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “The court must weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in 

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 

of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and 

(5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Id. 

 Because public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits, the Ninth Circuit 

 

2

 “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must [allege] that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). 

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has held that this factor always weighs against dismissal. Hernandez v. City of El Monte,

138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir.1998). Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has previously held that 

“[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 

Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.1999). Thus, these two 

factors are essentially a wash. 

 The second factor, docket management, weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. The 

Ninth Circuit has left this determination to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (“The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the 

delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest.”). 

The current caseload of federal district court judges absolutely requires expeditious and 

efficient resolution of cases. (Doc. 19.) 

 As previously discussed under the good cause and excusable neglect analyses, the 

fourth factor, risk of prejudice to the defendants, is not at issue here. Vertin’s failure to 

timely serve process did not interfere with any of “the defendant’s ability to proceed to 

trial or threaten[] to interfere with the rightful decision of the case” because, as 

previously stated, defendants had no actual knowledge of the suit. See Pagtalunan, 291 

F.3d at 643 (citing Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 

1987)). The lack of prejudice to defendants also weighs, if at all, in favor of dismissal. 

 The third factor, relating to the availability of less drastic alternatives, weighs just 

slightly against dismissal. The crux of this requirement is that the court, in addition to any 

leniency already shown, considers less drastic alternatives after the plaintiff has 

disobeyed the court’s order. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992. In this way, this factor 

correlates closely to the third factor of the good cause analysis, namely, prejudice to the 

plaintiff. See Trueman, 2011 WL 6721327 *7-8 (discussing prejudice to plaintiff). As 

previously discussed, dismissal of the claim presents some possibility of prejudice to 

Vertin, who would be unable to litigate on the merits if the underlying claim was timebarred. While this Court has some doubt that Vertin has alleged facts sufficient to state a 

claim under § 1983, having determined that Vertin showed excusable neglect in his 

failure to timely serve, the Court finds that the Pataglunan factors weigh against dismissal 

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in this case. 

D. Vertin’s Third Amended Complaint 

 In the period between the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate (Doc. 25.) and this Order, 

Vertin filed another amended complaint, again without leave of court. (Doc. 26.) While 

this complaint is named “First Amended Complaint,” it is in fact Vertin’s third amended 

complaint to date, and his second consecutive complaint that he has filed without leave. 

Because Vertin filed this complaint without first moving for leave to amend as required 

by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Arizona Local Rule 15.1, the 

(third) First Amended Complaint is stricken. 

CONCLUSION 

Because this Court finds that Vertin has demonstrated excusable neglect in his 

failure to timely serve three of the six named defendants with a valid complaint, the 

Court, in its discretion, hereby reinstates Vertin’s claim against the three defendants who 

were served: Jennifer Pinnow, City of Avondale, and the State of Arizona. Vertin will be 

granted leave to file an amended complaint. In so doing, Vertin is advised to pay close 

attention to the filing and service requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and the Arizona Local Rules. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Ronald L. Vertin’s claim be 

reinstated as to Jennifer Pinnow, City of Avondale, and the State of Arizona. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to strike Vertin’s 

“First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 26.). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Vertin shall have fourteen (14) days from the 

date of this Order to move for leave to file a (third) amended complaint. 

 Dated this 8th day of May, 2013. 

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