Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00289/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00289-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 16-CV-00289-LHK

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ANDREW R. DUPREE,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-CV-00289-LHK

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 51

Plaintiff Andrew Dupree brings this action against Defendant Apple, Inc. Before the Court 

is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. ECF No. 51. The Court finds 

this motion suitable for decision without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and hereby 

VACATES the motion hearing set for January 19, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. The case management 

conference set for January 19, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. remains as scheduled. Having considered the 

parties’ submissions, the record in this case, and the relevant law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On February 15, 2011, Plaintiff began working as a retail specialist for Apple, Inc. 

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(“Apple”) at Apple’s retail store at the Millenia Mall in Orlando, Florida (the “Millenia Mall 

store”). Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 36 (“SAC”) ¶ 5. Plaintiff, an African American, 

alleges that a manager at the Millenia Mall store told him that “[b]lacks don’t make management 

in this market.” Id. ¶ 9. “[S]hocked, embarrassed, and humiliated by this comment,” Plaintiff 

requested and was granted a transfer to the Apple retail store in Sydney, Australia (the “Australia 

store”). Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff began working in Australia on July 27, 2012. Id. ¶ 11. 

On July 9, 2013, Plaintiff decided to transfer back to the Millenia Mall store, and contacted 

Millenia Mall store leadership. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff states that Millenia Mall store leadership 

indicated that they would be receptive to Plaintiff’s return, and Plaintiff returned to Florida on July 

28, 2013. Id. ¶ 20. On August 22, 2013, however, Millenia Mall store leadership contacted 

Plaintiff and informed him that he would not be rehired. 

Upon learning this news, Plaintiff sent emails to Apple CEO Tim Cook (“Cook”) and 

Apple Human Resources representatives Brenda Everson (“Everson”) and Susan Pierre-Zilles 

(“Zilles”). Id. ¶¶ 27–28. In response to these emails, Everson informed Plaintiff on October 10, 

2013 that management at Apple’s retail store in Central Florida “would be contacting him 

regarding a possible position.” Id. ¶ 31. On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff was hired at the Central 

Florida Apple retail store (the “Central Florida store”). Id. ¶ 33. 

While working in Central Florida, Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against based 

on his race and national origin. For instance, Plaintiff states that he was disciplined for wearing a 

“baseball cap with a logo on store grounds,” while it was “common for [other] employees to wear 

these types of baseball caps with no disciplinary action taken.” Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff also alleges that 

he was falsely reported as being late, that his work schedule was changed without his knowledge, 

and that he was threatened by his manager. Id.

In September 2015, Plaintiff transferred to the Apple retail store in Los Gatos, California. 

Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 48 (“TAC”) at ¶ 13. During his tenure in Los Gatos, Plaintiff 

alleges that he continues to be subject to racial discrimination both at the Los Gatos store and at an 

Apple store in Cupertino, California to which Plaintiff was occasionally assigned on a temporary 

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basis. Plaintiff points specifically to four incidents of alleged discrimination. First, a corporate 

Apple employee who had asked Plaintiff to help fix her Apple device allegedly called Plaintiff 

“Oakland” because Plaintiff “wasn’t from around here” and “must be from Oakland since he is 

African American.” Id ¶ 19. Second, another Apple employee allegedly asked whether Plaintiff 

was “part of some kind of new diversity program” when the employee became frustrated with 

Plaintiff’s service. Id. ¶ 22. Third, another Apple employee “stated [that] she wanted to work with 

someone more professional looking and not someone who looked like they were part of a gang.” 

Id. ¶ 27. Most recently, in 2016, Plaintiff alleges that one of his coworkers threatened to “punch 

[Plaintiff] in the face,” that another coworker yelled at Plaintiff for no reason, and that Plaintiff’s 

schedule was changed without his knowledge or consent. Id. ¶ 34.

B. Procedural History

On July 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Apple which alleged discrimination on 

the basis of race and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). 

Dupree v. Apple Inc. (“Dupree I”), No. 14-CV-3294 (N.D. Cal.). The complaint was filed in the 

Northern District of California but focused on events occurring at the Millenia Mall store in 

Orlando, Florida. Id. at 6. Accordingly, on March 11, 2015, U.S. District Judge Edward Davila, to 

whom Dupree I was assigned, granted Apple’s motion to transfer Dupree I to the Middle District 

of Florida. Dupree I, ECF No. 46. As Judge Davila noted, “Apple has demonstrated based 

primarily on Plaintiff’s allegations that most if not all of the critical events giving rise to Plaintiff’s 

claims occurred in or around [an] Orlando Apple store.” Id. at 3. 

On March 16, 2015, Dupree I was officially transferred into the Middle District of Florida 

and was assigned to U.S. District Judge Kendall Sharp. Dupree v. Apple Inc., No. 15-CV-0423 

(M.D. Fla.), ECF No. 47. On April 7, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

amend his complaint. Dupree I, ECF No. 62. Plaintiff’s amended complaint added Cook, Zilles, 

and Everson as Defendants, and alleged causes of action based upon violations of Title VII, the 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

On April 24, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss certain causes of action in Plaintiff’s first 

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amended complaint. On June 30, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Dupree I, ECF No. 69 (“Dupree I MTD”). First, Judge Sharp held that Plaintiff could not move 

forward with Plaintiff’s FEHA claims because FEHA does not apply to conduct occurring outside 

of California. Next, Judge Sharp held that Plaintiff could not bring a Title VII claim against Cook, 

Zilles, and Everson because “individual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate.” Id. at 7 

(alterations omitted). Finally, Judge Sharp determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a cause of 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Cook, Zilles, and Everson. Id. at 9. Judge Sharp also 

concluded that amendment would be futile and therefore granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

with prejudice. Because Defendants did not move to dismiss all causes of action against all 

Defendants in Dupree I, a portion of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint survived dismissal. 

On September 29, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

surviving claims in Dupree I without prejudice, as “Plaintiff wishe[d] . . . to end litigation of this 

matter without incurring further expenses.” Dupree I, ECF No. 84. 

On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the original complaint in the instant action. ECF No. 1 

(“Compl.”). The Court shall refer to all proceedings in the instant action as Dupree II. Plaintiff 

filed a motion for leave to amend on April 11, 2016, which Defendants did not oppose. ECF No. 

23. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend on the record at the April 27, 2016 

initial case management conference. ECF No. 32. 

On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed another motion for leave to amend. ECF No. 33. 

Defendants also did not oppose this second motion to amend. ECF No. 37. Plaintiff referred to the 

proposed amended complaint as the “First Amended Complaint.” ECF No. 36. As the procedural 

history demonstrates, however, Plaintiff’s May 25, 2016 motion in fact sought leave to file a third 

complaint in Dupree II. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s May 25, 2016 motion for leave 

to amend, but stated that it would refer to the “proposed amended complaint as the ‘Second 

Amended Complaint’ or ‘SAC’ in . . . all future Orders.” ECF No. 38 at 2. 

Defendants moved to dismiss certain causes of action from the SAC on June 29, 2016. On 

August 9, 2016, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 39. The Court held that 

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Plaintiff’s Title VII claims arising from his employment at the Millennia Mall, Australia, and

Central Florida stores were time-barred. ECF No. 44, at 6–10. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

FEHA claims arising from his employment at the Millennia Mall, Australia, and Central Florida 

stores because FEHA applies only to actions in California. Id. at 10. The Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because that statute does not provide a 

private right of action. Id. at 10–11. 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress for 

failure to state a claim to the extent that the claim arose from actions before January 19, 2014 or 

arose from Apple’s internal training and discipline systems or from racially charged comments 

directed at Plaintiff. Id. at 11–18. Specifically, the Court found that Apple’s internal training was 

personnel management activity, which under California law does not qualify as intentional 

infliction of emotional address. Id. at 13. The Court also found that Apple was not liable under the 

doctrine of respondeat superior for intentional infliction of emotional distress from racially 

charged comments because the employees who made those comments “substantially deviated 

from the scope of their employment” by requesting repairs to, and assistance with, their personal 

devices. Id. at 16. 

Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment and 

harassment for failure to give sufficient notice of the statutes that Defendants allegedly violated. 

Id. at 18–20. The Court granted leave to amend the complaint, but stated that “Plaintiff[] may not 

add new causes of actions or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”

On September 8, 2016, Attorney Barbara Lawless entered an appearance on behalf of 

Plaintiff. ECF No. 47. Now represented by an attorney, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint 

on September 8, 2016. ECF No. 48 (“TAC”). The TAC alleges eight causes of action—

discrimination under Title VII, discrimination under FEHA, harassment/hostile work environment 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, retaliation under Title VII and FEHA, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, hostile work environment under FEHA, violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, and 

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harassment under Title VII—all of which arise out of Plaintiff’s employment at the Los Gatos and 

Cupertino, California stores. TAC ¶¶ 39–104. Apple answered the TAC on September 28, 2016. 

ECF No. 50.

On October 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended 

Complaint. ECF No. 51. Apple filed an opposition on October 25, 2016. ECF No. 57. Plaintiff 

filed a reply on November 1, 2016. ECF No. 61.

On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for substitution of attorney in which Plaintiff 

stated that he is no longer represented by Barbara Lawless but instead will represent himself pro 

se. ECF No. 69.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . 

. [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave 

to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 

F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). Of these considerations, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the 

opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the 

remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to 

amend.” Id. (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a proposed amendment may be denied as futile 

“if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a 

valid and sufficient claim or defense.” See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Ordinarily, however, “courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a 

proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is 

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filed.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint adding three new causes of 

action: a claim for disparate impact discrimination based on race and/or national origin, a claim for 

failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, and a claim for assault. Plaintiff claims that he 

has not previously asserted any of these causes of action because Plaintiff only recently obtained 

counsel, who identified the additional causes of action, and because Plaintiff needed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies for two of the three additional causes of action. Mot. at 3. Apple opposes 

the motion and argues that four of the five Foman factors — prejudice to the opposing party, 

undue delay, previous amendments, and futility of amendment — support denying leave to amend. 

Opp. at 2–3.1 Because the Court finds that the factors of prejudice, undue delay, and previous 

amendments are sufficient to justify denying leave to amend, the Court need not address Apple’s 

argument that leave to amend would be futile.

A. Prejudice to the Opposing Party

The Court first considers whether granting Plaintiff leave to amend would prejudice Apple, 

because prejudice to the opposing party carries the “greatest weight” in the leave to amend 

inquiry. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. Prejudice has been found where amendment would 

increase “the burden of necessary future discovery,” Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 

1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990), and where “[e]xpense, delay, and wear and tear on individuals and 

companies” is shown, Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994).

Discovery in the instant case is currently scheduled to close in less than six weeks on 

February 28, 2017. Allowing Plaintiff to amend his pleadings would require continuing this 

deadline. Extending fact discovery would in turn require continuing the close of expert discovery 

scheduled for April 14, 2017, the hearing on dispositive motions scheduled for June 8, 2017, the 

final pretrial conference scheduled for August 10, 2017, and the six day jury trial scheduled for 

 

1 Apple does not argue that Plaintiff has exhibited bad faith.

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Allowing Plaintiff to amend his pleadings to add new causes of action would also 

significantly expand the scope of discovery. Most particularly, addition of a disparate impact 

cause of action would expand discovery because a disparate impact cause of action would “focus[] 

on statistical analyses, [which] requires that the defendant develop entirely different defenses, 

including the job relatedness of the challenged business practice or its business necessity.” 

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, if Plaintiff were 

permitted to amend his pleadings to add such a cause of action, the parties would have to engage 

in extensive new discovery, including the development of statistical evidence.

Additionally, amendment of the complaint would prejudice Apple because it would cause 

further delay in what has already been lengthy litigation. Plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination 

against Apple began on July 22, 2014 with the filing of Dupree I in the Northern District of 

California. No. 14-CV-3294 (N.D. Cal.). Dupree I was transferred to the Middle District of 

Florida. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Dupree I without prejudice. Plaintiff then filed Dupree II 

in the Northern District of California. See Dupree I, ECF No. 46; Dupree II, ECF No. 1. Thus, 

Apple has been litigating Plaintiff’s discrimination claims for two and a half years in different 

courts across the country. Apple has invested significant resources in litigating the instant case and 

narrowing the issues by filing two motions to dismiss. Allowing amendment less than six weeks 

before the fact discovery cutoff and further delaying this case would thus prejudice Apple by 

forcing Apple to engage in further litigation that could have been avoided if Plaintiff had asserted 

his new causes of action earlier. The first Foman factor therefore supports denying Plaintiff’s 

motion.

B. Undue Delay

Undue delay is the next factor a court considers in deciding whether to grant leave to 

amend. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Courts have found that a party unduly delayed when the party 

sought to amend a pleading with previously-known facts, particularly when the delay is 

accompanied by the requisite showing of other Foman factors such as prejudice. See, e.g., Texaco 

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Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of motion for leave to 

amend because of undue delay where, inter alia, moving party sought amendment “eight months 

after the district court granted summary judgment against it, and nearly two years after filing the 

initial complaint,” and “after discovery was over, just four and a half months before the trial 

date”); Jordan v. Los Angeles Cnty., 669 F.2d 1311, 1324 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of 

motion for leave to amend because of undue delay where the proposed amendment would have 

prejudiced the defendant by requiring “extensive, costly discovery in order to respond to the 

amended complaint”), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982); Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1370 

(affirming denial of leave to amend because of undue delay where the moving party sought 

amendment after discovery was completed and trial was only two months away, thereby 

substantially prejudicing the defendant). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that “late 

amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory have 

been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” Allen v. 

City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the instant case, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint 

approximately nine months to a year after the most recent events underlying the new causes of 

action. TAC ¶¶ 116, 126. Specifically, the alleged remarks underlying Plaintiff’s disparate impact 

claim occurred on January 1, 2016, and the alleged assault occurred on January 31, 2016. TAC ¶¶ 

19–34. Additionally, the facts underlying the cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination 

occurred in October 2015. TAC ¶ 116. Thus, Plaintiff had knowledge of the events involved in the 

new causes of action long before he filed the instant motion on October 11, 2016. In fact, the 

Court has granted leave to file an amended complaint three times since the events underlying the 

new causes of action. ECF Nos. 32, 38, 44. Specifically, with the Court’s permission, Plaintiff 

amended his complaints on April 11, 2016, ECF No. 26; on May 25, 2016, ECF No. 36; and on 

September 8, 2016, ECF No. 48. Despite the fact that these amendments occurred after the events 

underlying the new causes of action, Plaintiff did not add the new causes of action in these 

amendments.

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To explain his delay, Plaintiff states that he “was previously self-represented and did not 

initially plead all relevant causes of action” and that he “had to exhaust his administrative 

remedies for two of the three additional causes of action, which he has now done.” Mot. at 3.

However, this explanation is insufficient to justify the long delay in the instant case. 

Indeed, Plaintiff’s suggestion that he needed time to exhaust his administrative remedies is 

misleading. Plaintiff only sought administrative review of his claims on September 6, 2016, when 

Plaintiff requested an “immediate Right to Sue notice” from the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing (“DEFH”). Declaration of Barbara Lawless, ECF No. 51-1, at 43–48. 

The DEFH granted a Right-to-Sue Notice the same day, September 6, 2016.

2 Id.; see also Reply 

at 6 (“Plaintiff has . . . exhausted his administrative remedy by filing a claim of disparate impact 

[and failure to prevent discrimination] with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing for which a Right to Sue notice was issued.”). Thus, because Plaintiff made no attempt to 

exhaust his administrative remedies until September 6, 2016, it is clear that Plaintiff’s delay in 

asserting the new causes of action had nothing to do with his need to exhaust administrative 

remedies.

Additionally, although Plaintiff represented himself until September 2016, Plaintiff 

obtained assistance from the Court’s Federal Pro Se program and was able to identify many 

relevant causes of action throughout the numerous complaints that the Court allowed in the instant 

case. Plaintiff’s pro se status does not justify granting yet another opportunity to amend the 

complaint to add causes of action that Plaintiff inadvertently omitted in his prior complaints.

Indeed, Plaintiff clearly believes that he is competent to represent himself pro se because on 

 

2 Despite having obtained a Right-to-Sue notice from the DEFH, Plaintiff does not state that he 

has ever received a Right-to-Sue notice from the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) regarding his new federal causes of action. See Shek v. Stanford Univ. 

Med. Ctr., 2007 WL 2318904, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[W]hile charges filed with the 

DFEH may be deemed constructively filed with the EEOC, Title VII still requires a right-to-sue 

notice specifically from the EEOC in order to file suit in federal court. Federal-state cooperation 

does not extend to exhaustion of administrative remedies.”). Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to 

have exhausted his administrative remedies for the new federal causes of action Plaintiff seeks to 

add.

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January 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a notice of substitution of attorneys in which Plaintiff indicated 

that he is no longer represented by counsel and instead will again represent himself pro se. ECF 

No. 69. Thus, the factor of undue delay also weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to amend the complaint.

C. Previous Amendments

In deciding whether to grant a party leave to amend, the district court also considers 

“whether the plaintiff has previously amended her [or his] complaint.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (same). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad 

where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” City of L.A. v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 

F.3d 440, 454 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff has already amended his complaint at least four times and as many as six times. 

The first complaint that Plaintiff filed, in Dupree I, was amended once in the Middle District of 

Florida and then voluntarily dismissed. Dupree I, ECF Nos. 62, 84. Plaintiff then filed another 

complaint in Dupree II, which Plaintiff has since amended three times—on April 11, 2016; May 

25, 2016; and September 8, 2016. Thus, the complaint that Plaintiff seeks to file would be the fifth 

complaint in Dupree II and the seventh complaint in this action if Dupree I is included. 

Additionally, the Court already has allowed Plaintiff to amend the complaint three times in the 

instant action. ECF Nos. 32 & 38. It has been almost one year since the time Plaintiff filed Dupree 

II and two and a half years since Plaintiff filed Dupree I. Thus, Plaintiff’s previous four to six

amendments weigh strongly in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.

In short, Apple would be prejudiced by amendment, Plaintiff unduly delayed in asserting 

these new causes of action, and Plaintiff has already amended his complaint at least four and as 

many as six times. Therefore, the Court finds that leave to further amend the complaint is not 

warranted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth 

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Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2017

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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