Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00094/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRINCE L. WILLIAMS, JR., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00094-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Prince L. Williams, Jr. has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 

1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner 

of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for supplemental 

security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, 

et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this 

civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 16, 17).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 12, 13) and those portions of 

the administrative record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in 

lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the issues raised,1 the Court finds 

that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED 

under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with 

 1 With the Court’s consent, the parties jointly waived the opportunity for oral argument. 

(See Docs. 15, 18).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 1 of 20
this decision.

I. Background

On August 13, 2012, Williams filed an application for SSI2 with the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”), alleging disability beginning December 1, 1999.3 

After his application was initially denied, Williams requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication 

and Review, which was held on March 12, 2014. On May 30, 2014, the ALJ issued 

an unfavorable decision on Williams’s application, finding him “not disabled” under 

the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 53 – 63). 

The Commissioner’s decision on Williams’s application became final when the 

Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his

request for review of the ALJ’s decision on January 5, 2016. (R. 1 – 5). On March 1, 

2016, Williams filed this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final 

determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI 

benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title 

to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of 

this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the 

 2 SSI is a general public assistance measure providing an additional resource to the aged, 

blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below the poverty line. 

Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 

1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C).

3 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled 

and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202–03 (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 

F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 2 of 20
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 

irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a 

civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such 

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may 

allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence 

four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).

II. Standards of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper 

legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ 

” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th 

Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the 

evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 

631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 

(11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

[Commissioner]’s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 3 of 20
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. 

Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to 

conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that 

come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a 

reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light 

of all the relevant facts.”). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a 

court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to 

findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the 

[Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper 

standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 

1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 

F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the 

administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’

42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the 

statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 4 of 20
of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption 

of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of 

the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (footnote and some 

citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting 

examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

“‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing 

court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius 

v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of 

Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference 

and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 

245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo

the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting 

decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”).

Eligibility for ... SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. 

§ ... 1382(a)(1)-(2). ... A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § ... 1382c(a)(3)(A) ...

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 5 of 20
Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam) (unpublished).4

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work 

experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-

(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 

405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the 

examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th 

 4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal 

Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).

5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 6 of 20
Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in 

combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves 

that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant 

work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the 

claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging 

in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 

economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the 

burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, 

the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. 

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established 

that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the 

claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is 

responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). 

“This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe 

into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and 

quotation omitted).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 7 of 20
Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied 

review of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the 

Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. “[W]hen the [Appeals 

Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually 

presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the 

applicant attacks only the ALJ’s decision, the Court may not consider evidence that 

was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324. 

III. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Williams had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since the date of his SSI application, August 13, 2012. 

(R. 58). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Williams had the following severe 

impairments: stuttering and epilepsy. (R. 58). At Step Three, the ALJ found that

Williams did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant

Listing of Impairments. (R. 58 – 59). 

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 8 of 20
the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth 

step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Williams had the RFC “to perform medium work as 

defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c)[,]”6 with the following limitations: “[T]he claimant can 

occasionally lift or carry 50 pounds, frequently 25 pounds. He can sit/stand/walk for 

6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He can push/pull as much as he can lift or carry. 

The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can never climb ladders 

or scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He can 

perform jobs not involving complex or frequent verbal communication. He can 

never work around unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, or extreme heat. 

He can never operate a motor vehicle. He is limited to simple tasks and short 

simple instructions. He can occasionally respond appropriately to the public.” (R. 

 6 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the 

national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 

very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations ... Each classification ... has its 

own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. “Medium work involves lifting no more 

than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 

pounds. If someone can do medium work, [the Commissioner] determine[s] that he or she 

can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 9 of 20
59).

The ALJ determined that Williams had no past relevant work. (R. 62). At

Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, found that

there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Williams can 

perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 62 – 63). Thus, 

the ALJ found that Williams was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 

63).

A. Severe Impairments

Williams claims that the ALJ reversibly erred by failing to classify his 

depression and anxiety as “severe impairments” at Step Two.7 The Commissioner 

argues that substantial evidence supports this decision, but the Court need not 

decide whether this is so. Because the ALJ determined at Step Two that Williams 

had other “severe impairments,” any failure to include these additional “severe 

impairments” is harmless. 

“At step two the ALJ must determine if the claimant has any severe 

impairment. This step acts as a filter; if no severe impairment is shown the claim is 

denied, but the finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it qualifies as a 

disability and whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is enough to satisfy the 

requirement of step two.” Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). 

See also Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[W]e have recognized that step two requires only 

 7 Williams’s claims of error have been reordered for flow.

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 10 of 20
a finding of ‘at least one’ severe impairment to continue on to the later steps. See 

Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. Further, the regulations state that the only consequence 

of the analysis at step two is that, if the ALJ finds no severe impairment or 

impairments, he should reach a conclusion of no disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Here, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments and 

accordingly proceeded to step three of the evaluation. Based on our precedent and 

the regulations, therefore, it is apparent that there is no need for an ALJ to identify 

every severe impairment at step two. Accordingly, even assuming that Tuggerson–

Brown is correct that her additional impairments were ‘severe,’ the ALJ's 

recognition of that as a fact would not, in any way, have changed the step-two 

analysis, and she cannot demonstrate error below.”). Moreover, the ALJ’s decision 

adequately demonstrates that she considered depression and anxiety at both Step 

Three (see R. 58 (stating that the ALJ considered Williams’s impairments 

individually and in combination)) and Step Four (see R. 60 (noting “diagnostic 

impressions of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder” but 

giving them “little weight ... given the claimant’s lack of any mental health 

treatment and the lack of any significant signs of anxiety or depression during the 

October 2013 psychological consultative examination...”).8

 8 See Freeman v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 593 F. App'x 911, 914–15 (11th Cir. 2014) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“Although the ALJ found that Mr. Freeman's back pain was not a 

severe impairment, the record demonstrates that she considered and discussed these 

symptoms at subsequent steps of the sequential analysis. Accordingly, any error in failing 

to find that Mr. Freeman’s lower back pain was severe was harmless because the symptoms 

were nonetheless considered in the subsequent steps of the ALJ’s analysis.”); TuggersonBrown, 572 F. App'x at 951-52 (“While the ALJ did not need to determine whether every 

alleged impairment was “severe,” he was required to consider all impairments, regardless of 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 11 of 20
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Williams’s claim of error in the ALJ’s 

determination of “severe impairments” at Step Two.

B. Testimony of Williams’s Mother

Williams next argues that the ALJ reversibly erred because her decision “is 

devoid of any mention of the testimony offered by [Williams’]s mother regarding 

[his] seizure disorder” and that “[n]o explanation is provided for failing to consider 

the lay witness testimony.” (Doc. 12 at 6). This claim is contradicted by the ALJ’s 

decision, which expressly noted that Williams’s “mother testified to more seizures” 

but found more credible Williams’s own testimony that he had only experienced 

“one seizure in the last month and none for the previous 12 months[,] as it is 

consistent with the medical record.” (R. 61- 62).9 Williams does not argue that this 

finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 

 

severity, in conjunction with one another in performing the latter steps of the sequential 

evaluation. Despite Tuggerson–Brown's arguments to the contrary, it is apparent from the 

face of the ALJ's decision and the RFC report relied upon by the ALJ that the ALJ did, in 

fact, consider all medical evidence in combination in concluding that Tuggerson–Brown was 

not disabled. In performing his analysis, the ALJ stated that he evaluated whether 

Tuggerson–Brown had an ‘impairment or combination of impairments’ that met a listing 

and that he considered ‘all symptoms’ in determining her RFC. Under our precedent, those 

statements are enough to demonstrate that the ALJ considered all necessary evidence. See 

Wilson[ v. Barnhart], 284 F.3d [1219,] 1224–25[ (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)]. The ALJ 

went beyond those statements in his analysis, specifically discussing evidence of 

Tuggerson–Brown's depression, diabetes, leg, neck, and back pain, and mild degenerative 

disc disease. The RFC report likewise addressed many of the same symptoms. Accordingly, 

the record sufficiently demonstrates that the ALJ properly considered all of Tuggerson–

Brown's impairments, even those not specifically found to be severe, in reaching a 

conclusion that she was not disabled. Tuggerson–Brown does not specifically challenge or 

assert that the ALJ's ultimate conclusion was not based on substantial evidence in some 

other regard, and therefore we affirm the denial of disability benefits.”).

9 This claim of error also conclusorily references the ALJ’s alleged failure to consider the 

testimony of Williams’s “aunt, who testified at the hearing.” (Doc. 12 at 6). This appears to 

have been included in error, as only Williams, his mother, and a vocational expert gave 

testimony at the ALJ hearing.

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 12 of 20
1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“A clearly articulated credibility finding with 

substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing 

court.”).

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Williams’s claim of error as to the 

ALJ’s consideration of Williams’s mother’s testimony.

C. PRTF Technique

Finally, Williams argues that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to evaluate 

his mental impairments using the technique required by the Social Security 

regulations. “Agency regulations require the ALJ to use the ‘special technique’

dictated by the [Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”)] for evaluating 

mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(a) ... The ALJ is required to 

incorporate the results of this technique into the findings and conclusions. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520a-(e)(2).” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213–14.

The PRTF technique requires rating the degree of a claimant’s 

functional limitations in four broad areas: “[a]ctivities of daily living; 

social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of 

decompensation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). The regulations provide 

the first three factors (activities of daily living; social functioning; and 

concentration, persistence, or pace) are rated on a five-point scale of 

“[n]one, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme” while the “fourth 

functional area (episodes of decompensation)” is rated using “the 

following four-point scale: [n]one, one or two, three, four or more.” 20 

C.F.R. 404.1520a(c)(4).

Mills v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-12818, 2016 WL 4361933, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 

16, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). “[W]here a claimant has presented a 

colorable claim of mental impairment, the social security regulations require the 

ALJ to complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 13 of 20
analysis into his findings and conclusions. Failure to do so requires remand.” 

Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213–14.

The Commissioner does not deny that the ALJ failed to utilize the PRTF 

technique but argues that this claim is “unavailing, because the ALJ specifically 

explained why she found that Plaintiff had no medically determinable psychological 

impairments.” (Doc. 13 at 7). However, only a “colorable claim of mental 

impairment” is needed to trigger the requirement to apply the technique. As the 

Commissioner points out in her brief, the ALJ discussed and analyzed evidence 

concerning Williams’s mental impairments. Specifically, the ALJ noted “diagnostic 

impressions of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder” from a 

November 5, 2012 psychological consultative examination but gave them “little 

weight” due to Williams’s “lack of any mental health treatment and the lack of any 

signs of anxiety or depression during [an] October 2013 psychological consultative 

examination...” (R. 60). The ALJ also gave “great weight” to the report from the 

October 2013 psychological consultative examination, noting that it was “detailed” 

and “included psychological testing, a clinical interview, and observations.” (R. 61). 

The ALJ expressly noted that Williams “was assigned a GAF of 67” at the October 

2013 examination, “indicative of mild mental limitations.” (R. 61). The ALJ’s 

discussion of the psychological evidence of record indicates an implicit finding that 

Williams had made a “colorable claim of mental impairment.”10 Thus, the ALJ was 

 10 See Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *1 (“The ALJ did not make a specific finding regarding 

whether Mills presented a colorable claim of mental impairment ... However, because the 

ALJ analyzed and discussed Mills’ evidence of mental impairment including complaints of 

depression and a bipolar diagnosis, we infer from that analysis and discussion that the ALJ 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 14 of 20
required “to complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode 

of analysis into h[er] findings and conclusions.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214.

It is undisputed that the ALJ did not complete a PRFT and append it to her 

decision; the decision also does not specifically reference the PRTF technique. The 

Commissioner has made no effort to show that the ALJ’s decision otherwise 

adequately accounts for the technique, and the Court’s own review finds that it does 

not. Cf. Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *2 (“The ALJ's decision does not specifically 

reference the PRTF technique. The ALJ discusses some of the functional areas in 

analyzing Mills' claim, however, so we must determine whether the ALJ's reasoning 

was enough to comply with the PRTF requirement.” (citing Moore, 403 F.3d at 1214) 

(ALJ must “complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its 

mode of analysis into his findings and conclusions” (emphasis added))).

The ALJ’s decision notes that at the October 2013 evaluation Williams 

“reported the ability to feed, bathe, groom and dress himself without assistance[,]” 

as well as the ability to “use a phone, count money, prepare meals, shop for 

groceries, and meet basic transportation needs.” (R. 61). The ALJ also gave “great 

weight” to the 2013 consultative evaluator’s opinion that Williams had “adequate 

ability to ... work independently...” (R. 61). These findings are arguably relevant 

 

determined that Mills' claim was at least colorable. See Richardson v. United States, 468 

U.S. 317, 326 n.6, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1984) (‘A colorable claim, of course, 

presupposes that there is some possible validity to a claim.’) ... Because the ALJ implicitly 

found that Mills presented a colorable claim of mental impairment, our precedent and the 

Social Security regulations require the ALJ to complete a Psychiatric Review Technique 

Form (PRTF) or incorporate the analysis of a PRTF into the decision. Moore, 405 F.3d at 

1214 ...”).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 15 of 20
to “activities of daily living.”11 The ALJ also gave “great weight” to the 2013 

consultative evaluator’s opinions that Williams’s “stuttering would likely create at 

least mild problems with communicating and interpersonal relations” and that 

Williams had “adequate ability ... to work with others, although his stuttering 

might prove troublesome.” (R. 61). These findings are arguably relevant to “social 

functioning.” 12 The ALJ also gave “great weight” to the 2013 consultative 

evaluator’s opinions that Williams had “good ability ... to understand, remember 

and carry out simple/concrete instructions” and “adequate ability to deal with work 

 11 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Section 12.00(C)(1) (“Activities of daily living 

include adaptive activities such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking public 

transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for your 

grooming and hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office. In the

context of your overall situation, we assess the quality of these activities by their 

independence, appropriateness, effectiveness, and sustainability. We will determine the 

extent to which you are capable of initiating and participating in activities independent of 

supervision or direction. []We do not define ‘marked’ by a specific number of different 

activities of daily living in which functioning is impaired, but by the nature and overall 

degree of interference with function. For example, if you do a wide range of activities of 

daily living, we may still find that you have a marked limitation in your daily activities if 

you have serious difficulty performing them without direct supervision, or in a suitable 

manner, or on a consistent, useful, routine basis, or without undue interruptions or 

distractions.”).

12 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Section 12.00(C)(2) (“Social functioning refers to 

your capacity to interact independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis 

with other individuals. Social functioning includes the ability to get along with others, such 

as family members, friends, neighbors, grocery clerks, landlords, or bus drivers. You may 

demonstrate impaired social functioning by, for example, a history of altercations, evictions, 

firings, fear of strangers, avoidance of interpersonal relationships, or social isolation. You 

may exhibit strength in social functioning by such things as your ability to initiate social 

contacts with others, communicate clearly with others, or interact and actively participate 

in group activities. We also need to consider cooperative behaviors, consideration for others, 

awareness of others’ feelings, and social maturity. Social functioning in work situations 

may involve interactions with the public, responding appropriately to persons in authority 

(e.g., supervisors), or cooperative behaviors involving coworkers.”).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 16 of 20
pressures[,]” findings which are arguably relevant to “concentration, persistence, or 

pace.”13

Assuming, without deciding, that the foregoing constitutes sufficiently 

specific findings as to the degrees of limitation for the first three areas of the PRTF 

technique, the ALJ’s decision omits any discussion of the fourth area, “episodes of 

decompensation.” 14 Failure to include specific findings on any of the PRTF 

technique’s four areas mandates reversal. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(e)(4) (“The 

decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the 

functional areas described...” (emphasis added)); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14 

 13 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Section 12.00(C)(3) (“Concentration, persistence, 

or pace refers to the ability to sustain focused attention and concentration sufficiently long 

to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings. 

Limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace are best observed in work settings, but 

may also be reflected by limitations in other settings ... In psychological tests of intelligence 

or memory, concentration is assessed through tasks requiring short-term memory or 

through tasks that must be completed within established time limits. []In work evaluations,

concentration, persistence, or pace is assessed by testing your ability to sustain work using 

appropriate production standards, in either real or simulated work tasks (e.g., filing index 

cards, locating telephone numbers, or disassembling and reassembling objects). Strengths 

and weaknesses in areas of concentration and attention can be discussed in terms of your 

ability to work at a consistent pace for acceptable periods of time and until a task is 

completed, and your ability to repeat sequences of action to achieve a goal or an objective.”).

14 “Episodes of decompensation are exacerbations or temporary increases in symptoms or 

signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive functioning, as manifested by difficulties in 

performing activities of daily living, maintaining social relationships, or maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Section 

12.00(C)(4). While the ALJ’s decision contains some discussion of Williams’s history of 

seizures, which might arguably constitute “episodes of decompensation” in certain 

circumstances, there is no indication that they are the kind relevant to evaluating mental 

disorders. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Section 11.00(H)(1) (“There are various 

types of generalized and ‘focal’ or partial seizures. However, psychogenic nonepileptic 

seizures and pseudoseizures are not epileptic seizures for the purpose of 11.02[, concerning 

neurological disorders]. We evaluate psychogenic seizures and pseudoseizures under the 

mental disorders body system, 12.00. In adults, the most common potentially disabling 

seizure types are generalized tonic-clonic seizures and dyscognitive seizures (formerly 

complex partial seizures).”). Indeed, at Step Three, the ALJ classified them as “motor 

seizures” and evaluated them under “Listing 11.02.” (R. 58 – 59).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 17 of 20
(finding reversible error where the “ALJ failed to even analyze or document [the 

claimant’s] condition in two of the PRTF's functional areas: social functioning and 

prior episodes of decompensation”); Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *3 (finding 

reversible error where “the ALJ’s opinion incorporated analysis of three of the four 

functional limitations[ but] does not reference social functioning”).

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Williams’s claim of error that the ALJ 

failed to properly evaluate his mental impairments using the PRTF technique 

required by the Social Security regulations. Thus, the Court will remand to the 

Commissioner with the instruction to perform “an evaluation of [Williams]’s mental 

impairments that complies with the applicable regulations.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 

1214; Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *3.15

 15 Like the panel in Mills, this Court “express[es] no opinion on the ultimate results of 

the PRTF, only that the technique must be utilized as mandated by the regulations.” 

Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *3 n.6.

Williams requests that the Court remand with instructions that he be found 

disabled, and only requests a remand for further proceedings in the alternative. Generally, 

remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings “is warranted where the ALJ has 

failed to apply the correct legal standards.” Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 

1993). This Court may enter an order “awarding disability benefits where the 

[Commissioner] has already considered the essential evidence and it is clear that the 

cumulative effect of the evidence establishes disability without any doubt.” Id. See also 

Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The credibility of witnesses is for 

the Secretary to determine, not the courts...The decision of the Secretary here, however, 

rests not so much on the credibility of the ‘history of pain; presented by Carnes, as on the 

adoption of a legal standard improper under Listing 10.10(A). []The record in this case is 

fully developed and there is no need to remand for additional evidence. Based on the facts 

adduced below and after application of the proper legal standard, we hold that claimant 

met the requirements of Listing 10.10(A) as early as 1982.”). Here, remand is being ordered 

because the Commissioner failed to apply the correct legal standards, and the cumulative 

effect of the evidence currently does not establish disability without any doubt. Cf.

Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“Though we have 

found that the ALJ erred in his application of the legal standards, at this time we decline to 

enter an order requiring entitlement to disability benefits. While it is true that the opinions 

of Drs. Todd and Raybin provide strong evidence of disability, it is at least arguable that 

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 18 of 20
IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s final decision issued January 5, 2016, denying Williams’s 

application for SSI is REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g), applicable to SSI applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), see 

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with 

this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Williams a 

prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, 

see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court’s 

jurisdiction over this matter.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Williams be 

awarded Social Security benefits on the subject application following this remand, 

the Court hereby grants Williams’s counsel an extension of time in which to file a 

motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of 

 

the report of Dr. Morse is to the contrary. Consequently, it is appropriate that the evidence 

be evaluated in the first instance by the ALJ pursuant to the correct legal standards.”); 

Hildebrand v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:11-CV-1012-ORL-31, 2012 WL 1854238, at *7 

(M.D. Fla. May 4, 2012) (“The errors noted here compel a return of the case to the 

Commissioner to evaluate the evidence and make findings in the first instance. For the 

reasons set forth above, the Court finds that certain of the conclusions of the ALJ were not 

made in accordance with proper legal standards and are not supported by substantial 

evidence. The Court does not find that only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence; 

but that the conclusion that was drawn did not meet the standard of review. Under such a 

circumstance, it would not be appropriate for this Court to substitute its opinion of the 

weight to be given the evidence for that of the Commissioner. While the Court has the 

power to do just that in an appropriate case, the Court finds this is not such a case.”), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 6:11-CV-1012-ORL-31, 2012 WL 1854249 (M.D. Fla. May 

21, 2012).

Case 1:16-cv-00094-N Document 19 Filed 11/15/16 Page 19 of 20
a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.16 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), 

“the date of receipt of notice ... shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such 

notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.” If multiple award 

notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of 

receipt of the latest-dated notice.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 15th day of November 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 16 See Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 

(“Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) applies to a § 406(b) attorney's fee claim.”); Blitch v. Astrue, 261 F. 

App'x 241, 242 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“In Bergen v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006), we suggested the best practice for avoiding 

confusion about the integration of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) into the procedural framework 

of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is for a plaintiff to request and the district court to 

include in the remand judgment a statement that attorneys fees may be applied for within 

a specified time after the determination of the plaintiff's past due benefits by the 

Commission. 454 F.3d at 1278 n.2.”).

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