Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00310/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

R I S M E D O N C O L O G Y

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL ESGARDO RANGEL

BARON; ISABEL RANGEL 

BARON; RISMED DIALYSIS

SYSTEMS, CORP. (Alabama);

RISMED DIALYSIS SYSTEMS,

CORP. (Florida); and RISMED

DIALYSIS SYSTEMS, C.A. 

VENEZUELA,

Defendants.

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 Civil Action No. CV-13-S-310-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action is before the court on a motion for relief from judgment filed by

plaintiff, Rismed Oncology Systems, Inc., pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6). Plaintiff commenced this action on February 14,

1

2013, asserting claims against: Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron, a citizen of

Venezuela; Isabel Rangel-Baron, also a citizen of Venezuela; Rismed Dialysis

Systems, C.A., a Venezuelan corporation; Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp.

(Alabama), an Alabama corporation; and, Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Florida),

See doc. no. 7 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief). 1

FILED

 2014 Mar-07 PM 02:06

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 1 of 45
a Florida corporation. Jurisdiction existed under the federal question statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1332, because the first three Counts of the complaint alleged claims based

upon the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(a), (c), and (d). In addition, supplemental state-law claims of fraud and

2

conspiracy to defraud, as well as mail and wire fraud under Alabama Code § 6-5-370,

were asserted in Counts IV and V. 

3

Less than two months after commencing the action, however, and before any

defendant had filed an answer or other responsive pleading, plaintiff moved to

dismiss the case with prejudice, stating as the reason for doing so that “a settlement

has been reached in this action.” An order dismissing the action with prejudice was 4

The attorneys who represented plaintiff at the commencement of this suit represented that 2

jurisdiction also existed “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000.00 and the action is between citizens of different states.” Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 7

(emphasis supplied). The face of the complaint demonstrated that such an assertion was patently

incorrect. The plaintiff is an Alabama corporation, as is one of the defendants, Rismed Dialysis

Systems, Corp. (Alabama). Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Hence, the complete diversity of citizenship that is

absolutely essential to the existence of jurisdiction under § 1332(a) is lacking. 

The statutory provision cited as the basis for the claims asserted in Count V permits a party 3

to commence a civil action to recover damages for an injury resulting from the defendant’s

commission of a felony offense. See Ala. Code § 6-5-370 (1975) (“For any injury, either to person

or property, amounting to a felony, a civil action may be commenced by the party injured without

prosecution of the offender.”). Plaintiff alleged that the defendants, while acting in furtherance of

the conspiracy alleged in Counts I through IV, committed acts that amounted to mail and wire fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, respectively. Cf. Lewis v. Fraunfelder, 796 So. 2d 1067

(Ala. 2000). 

Doc. no. 4 (Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice filed Apr. 4, 2013). See also doc. no. 5

4

(Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice filed Apr. 8, 2013), reading as follows: 

Rismed Oncology Systems, Inc., Plaintiff in this action, Moves [sic] this

honorable court to dismiss this action with prejudice. Plaintiff seeks dismissal with

2

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 2 of 45
entered on April 9, 2013.

5

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 60(b) permits a party orits legal representative

to move for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for, among other

reasons: “(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; . .

. or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (6). 

To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that “the adverse party obtained the verdict through fraud,

misrepresentations, or other misconduct,” and that “the conduct prevented [the

moving party] from fully presenting his case.” Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s

Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration supplied) (citing Frederick

v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

Rule 60(b)(6), on the other hand, has been described by the Eleventh Circuit

as “an extraordinary remedy,” one that may be invoked “only upon a showing of

exceptional circumstances.” Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th

prejudice as a settlement has been reached in this action. 

Consent has been obtained from the domestic parties all of whom have been

served in this matter. The foreign parties have not stated a position with regard to the

dismissal (Rismed Dialysis Systems, C.A. (Venezuela), Daniel Esgardo Rangel

Baron, Isabel Rangel Baron). 

See doc. no. 6. 5

3

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 3 of 45
Cir. 1984) (citing Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950)); see also,

e.g., High v. Zant, 916 F.2d 1507, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The law is well established

that Rule 60(b)(6) affords relief from a final judgment only under extraordinary

circumstances”). A party proceeding under that subdivision of the Rule has the

burden of showing that “an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result” if relief

is not granted. Griffin, 722 F.2d at 680 (alteration supplied) (citing United States v.

Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). Rule 60(b)(6) also is sometimes referred to

as a “catchall provision,” because it applies only to conduct that does not fall into any

of the other categories listed in the first five clauses of the Rule. United States v. Real

Property and Residence, 920 F.2d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Liljeberg

v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11 (1988) (“[C]lause (6)

and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually exclusive.”) (alteration supplied) (citing

Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864 (1973)). 

6

 The full text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) reads as follows: 6

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On

motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from

a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule

59(b); 

4

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 4 of 45
II. IMPORTANT PARTIES, PERSONS, AND ENTITIES

RISMED Rismed Oncology Systems, Inc., an Alabama corporation

with its principal place of business in Huntsville, Alabama.

Jose A. Rodriguez Jose Alfredo Rodriguez incorporated RISMED and is its

President.

IVSS The “Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales,” an entity

of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez The estranged wife of Jose Rodriguez. She and defendant

Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron are the biological parents of

Daniel Rangel. She filed for divorce in June of 2013, and

moved back to Venezuela, allegedly to reunite with her first

husband.

Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron The first husband of Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez, and the

biological father of Daniel Rangel. He resides in Venezuela,

where he was employed from 1999 to 2006 as a salesman for

RISMED. He left that employment to start another company

(“Continental”) with his son, Daniel Rangel.

Daniel Rangel The son of defendant Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron and

Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez, and the step-son of Jose

Rodriguez (who reared Daniel from the age of thirteen). 

Daniel also has been known by such names as Daniel Alberto

Rangel, Daniel R. Di Nardo, and Daniel Alberto Rangel- 7

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 

(4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on

an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it

prospectively is no longer equitable; or 

(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

This is the name used by Daniel Rangel when incorporating and registering “Rismed 7

Dyalysis Systems, Corp. (Florida)” in the State of Florida on July 17, 2008. 

5

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 5 of 45
DiNardo.8

Isabel Rangel-Baron The sister of Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron. She resides in

Venezuela and allegedly was involved in the creation of

“Rismed Dialysis Systems, C.A. (Venezuela).”

Daniel Garlick A fundamentalist minister and “Christian Mediator” who was

instrumental in the negotiation of the agreements discussed in

Parts III(A) through (C) of this opinion, infra.

Continental The company allegedly owned by Daniel Esgardo RangelBaron and his son, Daniel Rangel.

Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp.

(Alabama)

An Alabama entity registered by Daniel Rangel with the

Alabama Secretary of State on April 3, 2006.9

Rismed Dialysis Systems, C.A.

(Venezuela)

An entity registered in Venezuela by defendants Daniel

Esgardo Rangel-Baron (President) and his sister, Isabel

Rangel-Baron (Vice President), on March 19, 2007.

Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp.

(Florida)

An entity incorporated and registered in Florida on July 17,

2008, by Daniel Rangel (using the name “Daniel R. Di

Nardo”), and listing himself as President and Director.

Campobasso, Inc. An Alabama corporation created by Jose Rodriguez and

Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez that owned 27 acres of

farmland at 871 Dug Hill Road in Brownsboro, Alabama.

Campolieto, LLC An Alabama limited liability company created by Jose

Rodriguez, Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez, and DanielRangel

that owned real estate located at 1220 Somerville Road, in

Decatur, Alabama.

D.R. Properties II, LLC A limited liability company created byDaniel Rangel. The

properties owned by Campobasso, Inc., and Campolieto,

LLC, were sold to this entity by Liliana Di Nardo

Rodriguez, allegedly for amounts far below market value.

This is the name used by Daniel Rangel when executing the Mar. 29, 2013 settlement 8

agreement discussed in Part III(C) of this opinion, infra. 

See doc. no. 14 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 5 (affirming 9

that Daniel Rangel “is an officer and shareholder in: Rismed AL and Rismed FL”). 

6

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 6 of 45
State Court Complaint An action filed on August 2, 2013 in the Circuit Court of

Madison County, Ala. (Civil Action No. CV-13-901700)

by RISMED, Campobasso, Inc., Campolieto, LLC, and

Jose Rodriguez (who sued both individually, and, in his

representative capacities as President of RISMED, a

shareholder of Campobasso, Inc., and a member of

Campolieto, LLC) against “Daniel A. Rangel a/k/a Daniel

Di Nardo,Liliana Rodriguez a/k/a Liliana Di Nardo, Daniel

Garlick, and D.R. Properties II, LLC.” 

10

III. FACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS BY THE MOVANT

Rismed Oncology Systems, Inc. (“RISMED”), is an Alabama corporation that

“supplies medical equipment to Latin America, principally Venuezuela.” After

11

learning that the Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales(“IVSS”) — an agency

of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that provides dialysis services to the people

of Venezuela — “was searching for a reliable distributor of medical dialysis

supplies,” RISMED’s President, Jose A. Rodriguez, began negotiations to fill that 12

need. The following account of subsequent events is taken from the affidavit Jose

Rodriguez submitted in support of the present motion: 

13

3. From 1999 through 2004, I made several attempts to break into

the dialysis business in Venezuela. I procured dialysis-kit

samples from several of my suppliers to send to the Venezuelan

government. After several meetings and several trialsamples, my

company, RISMED[,] was awarded an official contract with the

See doc. no. 14-2 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “B”). 10

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 1. 11

Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 12

See doc. no. 7-1 (“Rodriguez Affidavit”). 13

7

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 7 of 45
Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales(“IVSS”)(i.e. Social

Security Administration of Venezuela) with a plan to phase

RISMED into being the sole supplier of dialysis products to the

IVSS. 

4. RISMED employee and salesman, Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron

(“Rangel-Baron”) was responsible for the sale of medical

oncology equipment for RISMED in Venezuela, where he

resided. Rangel-Baron had been successful as a salesman in

oncology, thus I entrusted him with the additional responsibility

to overlook the dialysis supply sales. 

5. RISMED’s contract with IVSS began through an initial Purchase

Order (“P.O. 1540/6108”) on June 7, 2004, for 351,780 dialysis

kits. RISMED began supplying dialysis kits to the IVSS, and

started receiving payments for the kits at the end of the first

quarter in 2005.

6. On March 21, 2005, RISMED received its first payment from

IVSS via wire transfer in the amount of $3,899,980.00 to its

Regions Bank account in Huntsville, Alabama. A payment for

$3,900,000.00 followed on June 10, 2005. The last payment of

$5,919,400.00 was made on August 11, 2005, for a total amount

of $13,719,380.00 for the initial Purchase Order. 

[14]

7. A second Purchase Order wasinitiated during the third quarter of

2005, again to be fulfilled by RISMED. Rangel-Baron began

alleging a “postponement” by the Venezuelan government in

providing a copy of the second Purchase Order. He then

represented that the order was “being processed” with the order

and funds expected to be provided to the RISMED bank account

in Huntsville, Alabama, sometime during the fourth quarter of

2005. 

A later paragraph in this same affidavit states: “At the time of the first purchase order, 14

RISMED was supplying 25% of the IVSS needs in dialysis. RISMED was promised a 100%

contract by the time of the second purchase order. . . .” Rodriguez Affidavit ¶19. 

8

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 8 of 45
8. The payment from the second Purchase Order never arrived. 

Rangel-Baron advised me that the IVSS had “cancelled the

contract” with RISMED, and that IVSS was in a new contract

with Continental, a company opened and owned by RangelBaron. 

9. At all times representations were being made that the RISMED

contract had been non-renewed, and that a valid agreement was

in place for IVSS to deal solely with Rangel-Baron and

Continental going forward. 

10. With the IVSS failing to fulfill an additional purchase order with

RISMED, and Rangel-Baron suddenly finding great wealth, I

reasonably believed that the RISMED contract had indeed been

non-renewed and that IVSS intended to place new orders with

Rangel-Baron’s company, Continental. 

11. Rangel-Baron moved his biological son, Daniel Rangel, to

Miami, Florida to “manage the Continental contract with IVSS.” 

Daniel Rangel also began representing to me that he was working

with his biological father at “Continental,” and both RangelBaron and Daniel Rangel continued to represent that the IVSS

had decided to go with their “father-son” operation through

Continental. 

12. In May 2012, a friend of mine residing in Caracas, Venezuela

mentioned to me that he had overheard Rangel-Baron represent

that he wasthe owner of “RISMED,” which my friend knew to be

my company[.] 

13. I then began inquiring deeper into Rangel-Baron’s business

operations, and discovered that Rangel-Baron had opened a

company named “RISMED Dialysis System, C.A., in Venezuela”

on March 19, 2007, [with himself] as President, [and] with his

sister, Isabel Rangel, as Vice-President. 

14. I have now learned that, in 2006, my stepson, Daniel Rangel, had

9

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 9 of 45
also opened a similarly named company in Alabama, “RISMED

Dialysis Systems, Inc.” I of course realized this was near the

same time the contract in Venezuela for RISMED had purportedly

been cancelled or non-renewed. 

15. I also have now discovered that Rangel-Baron incorporated

“RISMED Dialysis Systems Corporation” in Florida on July 17,

2008 under his son’s name, Daniel Rangel, and yet another

corporation in San Jose, Costa Rica under the name “RISMED

Dialysis Systems Corporation, S.A.,” with a partner by the name

of Orlando Araya Amador. 

16. I learned in August 2012 that, in actuality, IVSS had continued to

make purchase ordersfor the dialysis kits under the contract trade

name “RISMED,” and that Defendants had set up bank accounts

in Miami[,] Florida, converting the RISMED funds to their

benefit. 

17. It became apparent to me that “father and son” had opened

separate businesses under the same name, RISMED, in order to

steal the money for the planned purchase orders for the dialysis

kits, which was supposed to go to my RISMED company, and all

the while fraudulently representing to me that the Venezuelan

government had awarded a contract to Continental. The IVSS

had been wiring funds to the sole title of “RISMED,” so there was

never an indication to any vendor or suppliers of a diversion or a

fraud. 

18. Although the original contract with the IVSS was specifically

with RISMED Oncology Systems, Inc., I used the trade name

“RISMED Dialysis System” to distinguish myoncology line from

my dialysis line. I also used the name RISMED Dialysis Systems

for the labeling of the RISMED dialysis products going to the

IVSS. Indeed, all of the vendors for RISMED were notified by

me personally to use the name “RISMED Dialysis Systems” on

the product labeling. In fact, I created the artwork for the labels

10

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 10 of 45
myself, and forwarded it to each of my suppliers. 

15

The gravamen of the five claims alleged in the complaintsubsequently filed by

RISMED in this court is that the defendants had fraudulently diverted wire transfers

of substantial sums paid by IVSS that should have been deposited into RISMED’s

Regions Bank account in Huntsville, Alabama. 

Understandably, the suitstrained the relationship between Jose Rodriguez and

his step-son, Daniel A. Rangel, as well asthe marital union between Jose and his wife

(and Daniel’s mother), Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez. The complaint subsequently 16

filed in state court by Jose Rodriguez and RISMED (among others) — an event that

will be more fully described in Part III(F) of this opinion, infra — alleged that, during

the month following the commencement of suit in this court, Daniel Rangel

(“Rangel”) 

reached out to Rodriguez and expressed interest in repairing their

relationship and building new business partnerships. Rangel

invited Rodriguez to Hong Kong, a sentimental place where

stepson and stepfather had spent lots of time together during the

performance of the [RISMED] contract with the IVSS, texting

Rodriguez “Jose estoy en Miami [i.e., “Jose, I am in Miami”] and

I have to go to HK next week para reunirme con Bain [i.e., “to

meet with Bain”]. Vamos? [i.e., “Want to go?”] Te compro

ticket? [i.e., “I will buy the ticket”]” Rodriguez responded “Like

 Rodriguez Affidavit ¶¶ 3-18 (alterations supplied). 15

See doc. no. 14-2 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “B”: 16

Complaint filed Aug. 2, 2013 in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Ala. as Civil Action No. CV13-901700) (“State Court Complaint”), ¶ 28. 

11

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 11 of 45
the old times, [but] this time I will keep my eyes open so you

won’t escape at night.” 

30. Soon thereafter, Rodriguez began receiving phone calls from

[Daniel] Garlick, an evangelical minister whom both Rangel and

Rodriguez knew and who held himself out as an impartial and

experienced mediator of disputes who was “interested only in

resolution.” At the time, Rodriguez was in Venezuela; however,

he agreed to have lunch with Garlick upon his return. 

31. Unbeknownst to Rodriguez at this time was the fact that Rangel

was paying or had agreed to pay Garlick significant sums of

money, ostensibly to cover medical bills being incurred by a child

of Garlick.

32. On or about March 25, 2013, Garlick had lunch with Rodriguez

in Huntsville, Alabama. 

33. At the lunch, Garlick attempted to persuadeRodriguez to drop the

Federal Action. Garlick told Rodriguez that the Federal Action,

was “outside of God’s will” and would forever destroy

Rodriguez’s relationships with his step-son, step-daughter and

wife. Garlick further stressed that the Federal Action was an

impairment [sic] for Rodriguez’s wife to come back home, [and]

he added that should Rodriguez be successful in obtaining a

judgment in the Federal Action “Daniel will end up in jail”

because of Rangel’s ownership interest in the defendant

companies. 

34. Garlick told Rodriguez to join him on a trip to Miami, Florida to

meet and negotiate with Rangel. Garlick instructed Rodriguez

that the meeting was to take place without attorneys. 

35. Garlick and Rodriguez traveled to Miami and had multiple

meetings with Rangel.

36. Following discussions on March 27, 2013, Rangel sent a message

12

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 12 of 45
to Rodriguez in which he expressed “I love you so much! I feel

so happy about all this.” In response, Rodriguez stated “Daniel,

I feel like running on the street telling the world that I got my son

back.”

37. On March 28, 2013, Garlick, Rangel and Rodriguez met at the

Rusty Pelican restaurant in Miami, Florida. At the meeting,

Rangel expressed to Rodriguez that he wanted to restore both

their family and business relations. Both Garlick and Rangel

stressed toRodriguez that “he wouldn’t want to be responsible for

sending his grandchildren’s father to prison” and thus any

agreement between the parties would have to include dismissal of

the Federal Action. 

38. Rangel and Rodriguez formed an agreement that would govern

the parties’ business relationship going forward. In broad terms,

Rangel agreed to make certain payments including to provide

capital to Onco America, a company owned by Rodriguez which

was not part of the Federal Action. Rangel also agreed to provide

to Rodriguez an ownership interest in his “Factory and Dialysis

Business” and provide a salary to Rodriguez of at least $10,000

per month. 

39. Rodriguez agreed to give Rangel an ownership interest in Onco

America and dismiss the Federal Action. 

40. Garlick, who is not an attorney, drafted the terms of the

agreement which both Rangel and Rodriguez executed on March

28, 2013 (the “Miami Accords”). 

17

A. The “Miami Accords” 

The so-called “Miami Accords,” as drafted by Daniel Garlick and executed by

Jose Rodriguez and Daniel Rangel on March 28, 2013 — with all of the document’s

 State Court Complaint, ¶¶ 29-40 (alterations supplied). 17

13

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 13 of 45
grammatical, spelling, and punctuation errors — read as follows: 

As per our verbal agreements, following is a written form of the items

we have agreed upon.

1. Court Case isIrrevocably Closed Documents Will be Drawn and Jose

[Rodriguez] Will Sign deliver by Tuesday March 2, 2013 [sic: 

undoubtedly, April 2 was intended, because the Accords were executed

on March 28.]

2. Jose Will Give Daniel Alberto [Rangel] an Ownership Position in

Onco America Parent Company and The Oncology Business

3. Daniel Alberto Will Provide Capitol To Make Sure That Onco

America Remains Solvent (250k-300k?), this money will take care of

the new installation at Indio Mara and a final payment to the builder that

built the bunker. OncoAmerica is solvent, has a large accounts

receivable.

4. Daniel Alberto Will Provide To Jose An Ownership Position In The

Factory And Dialysis Business 

5. Jose And Daniel Alberto Will Work Together to Grow Both The

Oncology Business And The Dialysis Business 

6. Jose Will Receive Through His Work And Participation In The

Dialysis Business In Addition To His Owners Share Of Profit Enough

To Cover His Monthly Living And Business Expenses in The US

(10,000.00 ?? per month) 

7. A detail description of responsibilities will be developed to assure

success for both the dialysis and the oncology business.

8. Any and all Agreements Made Will Have An Arbitration Clause 

Action Steps to be taken prior to next week’s meeting

14

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 14 of 45
a.) Jose will close court case Monday March 1, 2013 [sic] 

b.) We Will Meet Tuesday March 2, 2013 [sic] In Huntsville 

c.) Enhanced Communication among the parties

d.) Work Out Details Of shared Ownerships (Percentages/Timeline

etc.) 

18

In essence, the marginally-literate document provided that, in return for Jose

Rodriguez’s promise to dismiss the suit filed in this court with prejudice (i.e.,

“Irrevocably Closed”), and, to “Give Daniel Alberto [Rangel] An Ownership

Position” in the parent company of an entity identified only as “Onco America” and

“The Oncology Business,” Daniel Rangel promised (among other things) to provide

Jose Rodriguez “An Ownership Position In The Factory and Dialysis Business” (i.e.,

the sale of dialysis supplies to IVSS by “Continental” and the various domestic and

Venezuelan Rismed corporations created and controlled by Daniel Rangel and his

father and aunt). 

B. Presentation of a Formal Settlement Agreement

In accordance with the act implied in the first numbered paragraph of the

Miami Accords — i.e., that formal “Documents Will be Drawn” to effect the parties’

respective agreements, and that “Jose Will Sign deliver by Tuesday March [sic: 

See doc. no. 14-5 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “E”)

18

(alterations supplied). 

15

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 15 of 45
April] 2, 2013” — Daniel Rangel presented a proposed “Confidential Settlement

Agreement and Mutual Release” to Jose Rodriguez on April 1, 2013. It contained no

reference to the Miami Accords. Jose Rodriguez expressed to both Rangel and

19

Garlick his “concern that the Settlement Agreement contained no reference to the

Miami Accords.” The complaint filed in state court later that year (see Part III(F), 20

infra) outlined the events that occurred after Jose did so: 

43. On April 2, 2013, while in Madison County, Alabama, Garlick

expressed to Rodriguez that he strongly opposed the specifics of

the Miami Accords being included in the Settlement Agreement. 

Garlick further expressed to Rodriguez that inclusion of the terms

would be a source of future legal disputes and he should “trust his

son.” 

44. Later on April 2, 2013, Rodriguez informed Rangel that he would

be meeting with his attorney on the morning of April 3, 2013 to

review the Settlement Agreement. 

45. On the morning of April 3, 2013 Rangel sent to Rodriguez the

following text messages: 

1 Corinthians 13:4-7 

Love is patient, love is kind. 

It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. 

It is not rude, it is not self-serving, it is not easily

angered, it keeps no record of wrongs. 

Love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the

truth. 

See, e.g., State Court Complaint, ¶ 41. 19

Id. ¶ 42. 20

16

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 16 of 45
It always protects, always trusts, 

always hopes, 

always perseveres. 

I love you, thank you for putting everything aside

and helping me restore our relationship... Sorry for

hurting you, nunca fue mi intencion Jose [i.e., “it

was never my intention Jose”], you are my dad an

[sic] I will never disappoint you again. 

46. On April 3, 2013, Rodriguez was advised by competent counsel

that he should not execute the Settlement Agreement without it

including reference to the Miami Accords. 

47. On April 3, 2013, while in Madison County, Alabama, Garlick

instructed Rodriguez to ignore his attorney’s advice, that it was

“God’s will” and that he should “trust in his son and be a good

father.” 

21

C. Signing the Settlement Agreement

Jose Rodriguez ignored his attorney’s advice and signed the Settlement

Agreement on April 3, 2013. He executed the document in both his individual and

representative capacities, as President of RISMED. He and RISMED are collectively

referred to as either the “RODRIGUEZ PARTIES” or the “RODRIGUEZ

RELEASED PARTIES.” 

Daniel Rangel also signed the agreement in his individual and representative

capacities, as President of Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Alabama), and Rismed

 State Court Complaint, ¶¶ 43-47 (alterations and emphasis supplied). 21

17

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 17 of 45
Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Florida). Rangel is identified in the agreement as “Daniel

Alberto Rangel Di Nardo.” He and the two Rismed defendants are referred to as

either the “DINARDO PARTIES” or the “DINARDO RELEASED PARTIES.”22

Daniel Rangel’s payment of $10.00 to JoseRodriguez (the stated consideration

for the agreement) was witnessed by Daniel Garlick, who had “remained with

23

Rodriguez at nearly all times” during the first three days of April 2013, “until

Rodriguez executed the Settlement Agreement.” 

24

1. The release language

General Release. For and in consideration of one payment to the

RODRIGUEZ PARTIES in the total sum of TEN AND NO/100

DOLLARS ($10.00) inclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs, the receipt

and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged and in consideration

of the mutual release of the parties, 

THE RODRIGUEZ PARTIES, on behalf of themselves and

their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, attorneys, representatives,

successors, assigns and any person subrogated to their rights, having any

See doc. no. 14-1 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “A”: 22

“Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release”), at ECF 8-12. “ECF” is the acronym for

“Electronic Case Filing,” a system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically. See

Atterbury v. Foulk, No. C-07-6256 MHP, 2009 WL 4723547, *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009). 

Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 permits citations to the “page numbers generated by the ECF header.” Wilson

v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 257 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing The Bluebook: A Uniform System

of Citation R. B. 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al., 19th ed. 2010)). Even so, the

Bluebook recommends “against citation to ECF pagination in lieu of original pagination.” Wilson,

772 F. Supp. 2d at 257 n.5. Thus, unless stated otherwise, this court will cite the original pagination

in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will,

as here, precede the page number with the letters “ECF.” 

Id. at ECF 13. 23

 State Court Complaint, ¶ 48. 24

18

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 18 of 45
rights of representation by or through them, and/or claiming through

them, hereby covenant not to sue, and release, acquit and forever

discharge Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Alabama), Rismed Dialysis

Systems, Corp. (Florida), Daniel Alberto Rangel Di Nardo . . .

(collectively the “DINARDO RELEASED PARTIES”) of and from:

Any and all past, present or future claims, actions, causes

of action, rights, damages, costs, losses, expenses,

judgments, demands, obligations, interest and

compensation, of every kind and nature whatsoever, known

or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, in law or in equity,

including, but not limited to, any and all claims arising out

of, involving or relating to: (1) the business relationship

between any of the RODRIGUEZ PARTIES and any of

the DINARDO PARTIES; (2) contracts with the Instituto

Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (“IVSS”); (3) the

supply of dialysis kits and other services performed for the

IVSS; (4) use of the “Rismed” name; and (5) any claim

which was or could have been asserted in the lawsuitstyled

Rismed Oncology Systems,Inc. v.Rismed Dialsyis Systems,

Corp. (Alabama) et al., United States District Court for the

Northern District of Alabama, Civil Action No. 5:13-cv310-CLS (the “Lawsuit”). 

THE DINARDO PARTIES, on behalf of themselves and their

heirs, executors, administrators, agents, attorneys, representatives,

successors, assigns and any person subrogated to their rights, having any

rights of representation by or through them, and/or claiming through

them, hereby covenant not to sue, and release, acquit and forever

discharge Jose Rodriguez, Rismed Oncology Systems, Inc., . . .

(collectively the “RODRIGUEZ RELEASED PARTIES”) of and

from: 

Any and all past, present or future claims, actions, causes

of action, rights, damages, costs, losses, expenses,

judgments, demands, obligations, interest and

compensation, of every kind and nature whatsoever, known

19

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 19 of 45
or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, in law or in equity,

including, but not limited to, any and all claims arising out

of, involving or relating to: (1) the business relationship

between any of the RODRIGUEZ PARTIES and any of

the DINARDO PARTIES; (2) contracts with the Instituto

Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (“IVSS”); (3) the

supply of dialysis kits and other services performed for the

IVSS; (4) use of the “Rismed” name; and (5) any claim

which was or could have been asserted in the lawsuitstyled

Rismed Oncology Systems,Inc. v. Rismed Dialsyis Systems,

Corp. (Alabama) et al., United States District Court for the

Northern District of Alabama, Civil Action No. 5:13-cv310-CLS (the “Lawsuit”). 

The RODRIGUEZ PARTIES AND THE DINARDO

PARTIES (together “RELEASORS”) acknowledge and agree that this

Mutual Release is a general release of all released parties. 

RELEASORS expresslywaive and assume the risk of any and all

claims for damages which exist as of this date, but of which the

RELEASORS do not know or suspect to exist, whether through

ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if

known, would materially affect RELEASORS’ decision to enter into

this Release. The RODRIGUEZ PARTIES further agree that they

have accepted payment of the sum specified herein along with the

mutual release from the DINARDO PARTIES as a complete

compromise of matters involving disputed issues of fact. 

25

2. The merger clause

As previously noted, the Miami Accords were not explicitly referenced in the

Settlement Agreement, but they arguably were implicit in the following clause: 

See doc. no. 14-1 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “A”: 25

“Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release”), at ECF 2-4 (all emphasis in original,

alterations supplied). 

20

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 20 of 45
Entire Agreement. This Settlement Agreement contains the

entire agreement between the undersigned parties and supercedes any

other agreements and covenants, whether written or oral, and the terms

and conditions of this Settlement Agreement are contractual and not a

mere recital. 

26

3. The “no representations” clause

The Settlement Agreement also contained the following statement: 

No Representations by Released Parties. RELEASORS

declare that no representation made by any employees, agents or

attorneys of, any of the RELEASED PARTIES, if any, concerning the

validity or merit of any claims has induced them to make this Settlement

Agreement and that they are acting upon their own judgment, belief and

knowledge of the nature of all claims or potential claims against the

RELEASED PARTIES in making this Settlement Agreement. 

27

4. The advice of counsel clause

Finally, the agreement contained a provision stating that each party had relied

upon the advice of independent counsel: 

Advice of Counsel and Understanding of Release. 

RELEASORS warrant and declare that they are acting only after

securing the advice and consultation of legal counsel of their choice. 

RELEASORS further acknowledge that they are over eighteen (18)

years of age and that they have carefully read this Settlement Agreement

and fully understand and know the terms thereof, and sign the same

voluntarily as their own free act and upon recommendation of legal

counsel of their choice. RELEASORS further warrant that this

settlement agreement is not being made for any other reason than the

Id. at ECF 6 (boldface and underscored emphasis in original, italicized emphasis supplied). 26

Id. at ECF 6-7 (boldface and underscored emphasis in original). 27

21

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 21 of 45
consideration expressed in this Settlement Agreement. 

28

Of course, the statement emphasized by italics — i.e., the representation that Jose

Rodriguez had signed the agreement “upon recommendation of legal counsel of [his]

choice” — was not true. Jose Rodriguez acted contrary to the advice of his attorneys

when executing the Settlement Agreement. 

29

D. Dismissal of the Federal Action

Jose Rodriguez caused his attorneys to file two motions to dismiss this action

with prejudice: the first on April 4, and the second on April 8, 2013. The latter

motion was identical to the former one, save for a paragraph stating that both

domestic defendants consented to the dismissal, and that the foreign defendants had

not stated a position. Indeed, service then had not been perfected on the three 30

foreign defendants. 

E. Events Following Dismissal of this Action 

Daniel Rangel made several payments to Jose Rodriguez during the months of

April and May, 2013, ostensibly in accordance with the promises referenced by the

Miami Accords. Even so, plaintiff alleges that Rangel did so only as a guise, to retain

the trust of Jose Rodriguez until such time as he, Rangel, could successfully

Id. at ECF 7 (boldface and underscored emphasis in original, italicized emphasis supplied). 28

See State Court Complaint, ¶ 46. 29

See supra note 4. 30

22

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 22 of 45
consummate fraudulent conveyances of the so-called “Campobasso” and

“Campolieto” properties. The complaint later filed in state court described events 31

following dismissal of the present action in the following manner: 

51. Through the month of April and the start of May 2013, Rodriguez

and Rangel continued to work on the joint business projects

specified in the Miami Accords. 

52. On multiple occasions through April and the start of May 2013,

Rangel reaffirmed his commitment to the Miami Accords both in

words and deeds. 

53. On May 2, 2013[,] Rangel gave Rodriguez $32,000.00 as part of

his commitment under the Miami Accords. 

54. On May 13, 2013, Rangel gave a $5,000 check to Rodriguez as

part of his commitment under the Miami Accords. 

55. On May 17, 2013, Rangel wired $95,000.00 to Rodriguez as part

of his commitment to under [sic] the Miami Accords. 

56. Through mid-May 2013 Rodriguez and Rangel continued to have

Enhanced Communications as called for in the Miami Accords. 

Pursuant to this, and the continued promises of the joint business

relationships in the Dialysis Business, [sic] On May 14, 2013

Rangel presented to Rodriguez a deed for his execution as well as

two corporate resolutions. The deed purportedly was to transfer

the Dug Hill Road Property [i.e., 27 acres of farmland located at

871 Dug Hill Road, in Brownsboro, Alabama, the title to which

was held by “Campobasso, Inc.,” an Alabama corporation with

two shareholders: Jose Rodriguez and his wife, Liliana DiNardo

Rodriguez] to D.R. Properties [i.e., D.R. Properties II, LLC: an

Alabama limited liability company created by Daniel Rangel, its

sole member]. And the Corporate resolutions were to give

 Doc. no. 7 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 6. 31

23

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 23 of 45
permission to Liliana Di Nardo to make property transfers. 

57. Unknown to Rodriguez was that the Dug Hill Road Property,

along with the Decatur Property [i.e., family real estate located at

1220 Somerville Road in Decatur, Alabama, the title to which

was held by “Campolieto, LLC,” an Alabama limited liability

company with three members: Jose Rodriguez, Liliana Di Nardo

Rodriguez, and Daniel Rangel], had already been transferred to

D.R. Properties and the new papers were simply an attempt to

paper over the fraud. Had Rodriguez known about the prior

frauds or the intent of Rangel to not honor the Miami Accords,

Rodriguez would not have executed the deed and corporate

papers. 

58. Also on May 14, 2013[,] Rangel presented Rodriguez a check for

$30,000.00. 

. . . .

60. There were insufficient funds in the account to cover the

$30,000.00 check. 

61. On May 23, 2013, Rangel promised to Rodriguez in a text

message: “I will give you a new 30k check over the weekend,

sorry about that.” 

62. To date, Rangel has not presented a new check or the $30,000.00

funds. 

63. In May 2013, Rangel delivered to Rodriguez a Bentley [i.e., an

English automobile] that he owned that had been in a car

accident, for which Rangel had no insurance. Rangel contracted

with Rodriguez to repair the car. 

64. Repairs were made to the vehicle totaling $6,990.58. 

65. To date, Rangel has not paid for repairs to the vehicle. 

24

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 24 of 45
66. On or about June 7, 2013, Liliana Di Nardo filed a complaint for

Divorce against Rodriguez [and returned to Venezuela ]. 32

67. Rangel has failed to make the payments or fulfill his other

obligations indicated under the Miami Accords. Rangel has

ceased all communications with Rodriguez.33

Jose Rodriguez alleges that he did not learn of the sale of the Campobasso and

Campolieto properties by Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez to her son at a preferential,

below-market-value price until July 9, 2013, when he drove by the Campobasso

property on Dug Hill Road and noticed a “For Sale by Owner” sign listing the cellular

telephone number of Daniel Rangel. 

34

F. The State Court Suit

As a result of the foregoing events, a suit was filed in the Circuit Court of

Madison County, Alabama, on August 23, 2013, by RISMED, Campobasso, Inc.,

Campolieto, LLC, and Jose Rodriguez (who sued both individually, and, in his

representative capacities as President of RISMED, a shareholder of Campobasso,

Inc., and a member of Campolieto, LLC). The persons and entitiessued in that action

were an entirely different cast of characters from those named as defendants in the

present action: i.e., the state court defendants were “Daniel A. Rangel a/k/a Daniel

See doc. no. 7 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 8. 32

 State Court Complaint, ¶¶ 51-58, and 60-67 (alterations supplied). 33

See doc. no. 7 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 8. 34

25

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 25 of 45
Di Nardo, Liliana Rodriguez a/k/a Liliana Di Nardo, Daniel Garlick, and D.R.

PropertiesII, LLC.” Even though the claims alleged in the state court complaint were

based upon the same nucleus of operative facts discussed in the previous parts of this

opinion, they were entirely different from those that had been asserted in the present

action. Specifically, the state court complaint alleged the following claims:

Count I “Fraud and Misrepresentation by Rangel”: i.e., Daniel Rangel made

false representations that induced Jose Rodriguez to dismiss the

Federal Action, and to execute deeds and corporate resolutions

concerning the Campobasso and Campolieto properties. 

Count II “Fraud and Misrepresentation by Garlick”: i.e., Daniel Garlick made

false and misleading representations regarding his status as the

parties’ mediator and, thereby, caused Jose Rodriguez and RISMED

to dismiss the Federal Action. 

Count III “Conspiracy”: i.e., defendants engaged in a malicious combination

to defraud plaintiffs, and cause the dismissal of the Federal Action

and the execution of papers concerning the Campobasso and

Campolieto properties. 

Count IV “Breach of Contract (The Miami Accords)”: i.e., Daniel Rangel

breached the Miami Accords by failing to make all payments

required under the terms of that agreement. 

Count V “Breach of Contract (Bentley)”: i.e., Jose Rodriguez agreed to pay

for the cost of repairs to an uninsured English Bentley automobile

owned by Daniel Rangel that had been damaged in an accident, in

return for Rangel’s promise to reimburse him for the cost of the

repairs, but Rangel breached the agreement. 

26

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 26 of 45
Count VI “Breach of Fiduciary Duties”: i.e., Liliana Di Nardo Rodriguez and

Daniel Rangel breached the fiduciary duties owed to Campolieto and

Campobasso when the properties owned by those entities were sold

to Daniel Rangel’s company, D.R. PropertiesII, LLC., for pricesthat

were below market value.

Count VII “Rescission of Property Transfers”: i.e., plaintiffs sought rescission

of the Campobasso and Campolieto transactions on the grounds of

fraud. 

Count VIII “Violation of [Alabama Code] § 6-5-285”: i.e., Daniel Rangel

violated this statute when he tendered Jose Rodriguez a worthless

check. 

35

Count IX “Negligence”: i.e., Garlick was negligent for failing to disclose his

conflicts of interest during the mediation. 

The state-court defendants moved to dismiss the foregoing claims. Their 36

motion relied primarily upon the terms of the April 3, 2013 Settlement Agreement.

After reviewing briefs and hearing oral argument, the state court judge dismissed the

 The statute cited provides that: 35

The holder of a worthless check, draft, or order for the payment of money

shall have a right of action against the person who unlawfully made, uttered or

delivered the same to him or to his endorser; and such action may be maintained

though there has been no prosecution, conviction, or acquittal of the defendant for

his unlawful act. Such action must be commenced within one year from the date of

the unlawful act. The plaintiff in such action may recover such damages, both

punitive and compensatory, including a reasonable attorney fee, as the jury or court

trying the case may assess. 

Ala. Code § 6-5-285 (1975). 

See doc. no. 14-3 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “C”: 36

Motion to Dismiss filed Sept. 11, 2013 in the Cir. Ct. Mad. Co., Ala., Civil Action No. CV-13-

901700) (hereafter, “State Motion to Dismiss”). 

27

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 27 of 45
action, but did not state any reason for doing so in his single-paragraph Order.37

Nevertheless, the dismissal was not appealed, and the time for filing an appeal in the

state-court system lapsed on November 20, 2013. Two days later, RISMED filed

38

the motion that is addresed in this opinion. 

IV. DISCUSSION

The first issue that must be confronted is defendants’ contention that, because

RISMED voluntarily dismissed its complaint with prejudice, there is no “final

judgment, order, or proceeding” within the meaning ofRule 60(b); and, therefore, this

court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate its Rule 60(b) motion. 

39

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) addresses the subject of voluntary

dismissals by a plaintiff “without a court order,” and it reads as follows: 

(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2,

and 66 and any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an

action without a court order by filing: 

See doc. no. 14-4 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief, Ex. “D”: Order

37

entered Oct. 9, 2013 in the Cir. Ct. Mad. Co., Ala., Civil Action No. CV-13-901700) (providing

“This matter came before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the above named Defendants. 

The Court heard arguments on said motion on October 3, 2013. All parties were represented by and

through their respective counsel. After review of the pleadings, the arguments of counsel[,] and the

applicable law[,] this Court finds that [the] motion is due to be and the same is herebyGRANTED.”)

(alterations supplied). 

See Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (“[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 38

the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order.

. . .”) (alteration supplied); see also doc. no. 14 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Relief), at 11 (same). 

See doc. no. 14 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 14-22. 39

28

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 28 of 45
(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves

either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or 

(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have

appeared.

(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the

dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed

any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim,

a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (emphasis added to (i) and (ii), all other emphasisin original).

Sub-section (a)(2) of that same Rule addresses the circumstances under which

a plaintiff’s dismissal of an action requires the entry of a court order, and it reads as

follows:

(2) By Court Order; Effect. Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1),

an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order,

on terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a

counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss,

the action may be dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the

counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless

the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is

without prejudice. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (emphasisin original). As the Sixth Circuit observed in D.C.

Electronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1975), Rule 41(a)(2)

“contemplates the exercise of judicial discretion and the issuance of a court order in

response to a motion by plaintiff . . . .” 

The facts of this case do not fit neatly into either sub-section (a)(1) or (a)(2) of

29

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 29 of 45
Rule 41. 

Defendants focus upon the fact that both of plaintiff’s motions to dismiss were

filed before any of the defendants had served “either an answer or a motion for

summary judgment”; and, for that reason, they argue that plaintiff’s two motions to

dismiss should, nevertheless, be construed as “notices of dismissal” under Rule

41(a)(1)(A)(i). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he fact that a notice of

dismissal is styled ‘motion to dismiss’ rather than ‘notice of dismissal’ is without

consequence.” Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (alteration

supplied). Even so, defendants’ argument overlooks the fact that plaintiff’s second

motion to dismiss stated that:

Consent has been obtained from the domestic parties[,] all of

whom have been served in this matter. The foreign parties have not

stated a position with regard to the dismissal (Rismed Dialysis Systems,

C.A. (Venezuela), Daniel Esgardo Rangel Baron, Isabel Rangel Baron)

[indeed,the foreign defendants had not then been servedwith process].40

Thus, it might also be argued under those circumstances that plaintiff’s second

motion effectively amounted to a stipulation for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 

In either event, defendants’ point is that plaintiff’s motions to dismiss its

complaint with prejudice were “effective immediately upon the filing of a written

 Doc. no. 5 (emphasis and alterations supplied); see also note 4, supra. 

40

30

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 30 of 45
notice of dismissal, and no subsequent court order [was] required.” In that regard,

41

four Circuits — the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth — have held that the filing of

a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) does not require court approval. In 42

like manner, two Circuits — the Third and Eighth — have held that the filing of a

stipulation for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) “is effective immediately and

does not require judicial approval.” Perhaps the point of all such decisions was best 43

stated by the former Fifth Circuit in a case discussing the effect of filing a notice of

Doc. no. 14 (Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 18 (quoting 41

Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis and alteration supplied, citation

omitted). 

See Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 581 F.2d 137, 141 (7th Cir. 1978) 42

(observing that the predecessorto the present Rule “‘is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits

of no exceptions that call for the exercise of judicial discretion by any court’”) (quoting D.C.

Electronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1975) (observing, id. at 296, that the

predecessor to the present Rule “provides for dismissal of an action upon the unilateral filing of a

notice of dismissal with the Clerk of Court and without the necessity of . . . [an] order of the court”)

(ellipses and alteration supplied). See also, e.g., Scam Instrument Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 458

F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the filing of a notice of dismissal “automatically

terminated the action upon the filing of the dismissal with the clerk. No order of court was

required.”) (citing Miller v. Reddin, 422 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1970)(same)); HydeConstruction

Company v. Koehring Company, 388 F.2d 501, 507 (10th Cir. 1968) (“The purpose of that rule is

to provide a means for terminating an action automatically by filing with the clerk a notice of

dismissal. That notice closes the file; no order of the court is needed.”) (emphasis supplied, citation

omitted).

United States v. Altman, 750 F.2d 684, 696-97 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Gardiner v. A.H. 43

Robins Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984)). See also First National Bank of Toms River,

N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969) (same); 130 F.2d 185, 186 (3d Cir. 1942)

(observing that “the parties themselves may by stipulation . . . dismiss the action”); Ajiwoju v.

Cottrell, 245 F. App’x 563, 564, 2007 WL 2323972, at *1 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“A

voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) is effective upon entry and does not require judicial

approval.”) (citing Gardiner, supra); Scher v. Ashcroft, 960 F.2d 1053 (Table), 1992 WL 83547, at

*1 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“A voluntary dismissal by stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) . . .

is effected without order of court. . . .”) (citing Altman, supra). 

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Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 31 of 45
dismissal under the predecessor to present Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). According to the

panel in American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963), that Rule

isthe shortest and surest route to abort a complaint when it is applicable. 

So long as [the] plaintiff has not been served with his adversary’s

answer or motion for summary judgment he need do no more than file

a notice of dismissal with the Clerk. That document itself closesthe file.

There is nothing the defendant can do to fan the ashes of that action into

life and the court has no role to play. This is a matter of right running

to the plaintiff and [it] may not be extinguished or circumscribed by

adversary or court. There is not even a perfunctory order of court

closing the file. Its alpha and omega was the doing of the plaintiff

alone. . . .

Id. at 297 (alterations and emphasis supplied). 

Based upon such rulings, defendants argue that RISMED’s voluntary dismissal

of its complaint with prejudice did not constitute a “final judgment, order, or

proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b); and, therefore, that this court lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s motion for relief. 

The only cases that support defendants’ bottom line, however, are two Eighth

Circuit opinionsthat addressed the effect of voluntary dismissals by stipulation under

the predecessor to present Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Ajiwoju v. Cottrell, 245 F. App’x

563, 565 (8thCir. 2007) (per curiam); Scher v. Ashcroft, 960 F.2d 1053 (Table), 1992

WL 83547 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Both cases held that, because a dismissal by

stipulation “is effected without court order, ‘there is no final order or judgment from

32

Case 5:13-cv-00310-CLS Document 24 Filed 03/07/14 Page 32 of 45
which a party may seek relief under Rule 60(b).’” Ajiwoju, 245 F. App’x at 565

(quoting Scher, 1992 WL 83547, at *1). Notably, however, neither Ajiwoju nor Scher

was published. Hence, the opinions do not possess binding authority in even the

Circuit of their origin. 

In contrast, plaintiff focuses upon the terms “final” and “proceeding” in Rule

60(b)’s prefatory paragraph, and asks this court to follow the rationale of the Fifth 44

Circuit’s opinion in Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2013),

and hold that a voluntary dismissal by either notice or stipulation is “a final . . .

proceeding” for purposes of that Rule. The Yesh Music Court held that a plain

reading of the term “final” supports defining it as something that is practically

“finished,” “closed,” or “completed.” Id. at 360 (citing Gillespie v. United States

Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (“[T]he requirement of finality is to be given

a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’”) (alteration supplied)). Thus, the

Yesh Music Court held that, “unless a plaintiff acts to re-file her claim in the future,

a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal terminates, closes, and ends her cause of

action, and, therefore, can rightly be considered ‘final.’” Id. (citing Devino v.

Duncan, 215 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417 (S.D. N.Y. 2002)). 

“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from 44

a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

(emphasis supplied). 

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While [the terms] judgments and orders might imply the involvement of

a judicial action, a “proceeding” does not necessarily require any such

action. Rather, “[t]he term ‘proceeding’ is indeterminate,” and may be

used to describe the entire course of a cause of action or any act or step

taken in the cause by either party. See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363,

368 (4th Cir. 2004).

Yesh Music, 727 F.3d at 360 (first alteration and emphasissupplied, second alteration

in original). 

Plaintiff also asserts that “the great weight of caselaw from other circuits

supports the conclusion that a dismissal, either with or without prejudice, is

considered a ‘final’ proceeding for purposes of Rule 60(b),” and cites decisions

45

from five circuits holding that a voluntary dismissal is a “final proceeding” for

purposes of Rule 60(b). 

46

Even though it does not appear that the Eleventh Circuit has decided the

precise issue argued by the defendants, the panel that decided State Treasurer of the

 Doc. no. 17 (Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief), at 31. 45

Id. at 31-36. See Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We agree that 46

there may be instances where a district court may grant relief under Rule 60(b) to a plaintiff who has

voluntarilydismissed the action.”); In re Hunter, 66 F.3d 1002, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

a voluntary dismissal “is a judgment, order, or proceeding from which Rule 60(b) relief can be

granted”); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989) (“‘[A]n unconditional dismissal

terminates federal jurisdiction except for the limited purpose of reopening and setting aside the

judgment of dismissal within the scope allowed by [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 60(b).’”) (first alteration

supplied, second alteration in original) (quoting McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th

Cir. 1985)); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Association v. Fairfax County, Virginia, 571 F.2d 1299,

1302-03 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that the court retains the ability to vacate a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

stipulated dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6)); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th

Cir. 1976) (same). 

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State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999), addressed the analogous

question of whether there had been a “final decision” in a case in which the district

court had entered partial summary judgment on some claims, and the parties had

agreed (“stipulated”) to a dismissal of the remaining claimwithout prejudice, in order

to confer appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Among other issues

discussed in the Barry opinion, the Court observed that “a Rule 41 voluntary

dismissal without prejudice is a final decision.” Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). 

Based upon the analogous opinion in Barry, the number of circuits holding

contrary to defendants’ position, and the superior rationale of those decisions, this

court predictsthat the Eleventh Circuit will, when squarely faced with the same issue,

adopt the majority position and hold that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal by

a plaintiff constitutes a “final order, judgment, or proceeding” for purposes of Rule

60(b). 

47

Accordingly, this court concludes that it does possess subject matter

jurisdiction to address plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. 

A. The Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Assertion of the Subject Motion 

“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time — and for

Due to this holding, it is not necessary to address plaintiff’s alternative arguments: i.e., the 47

motions to dismiss were only requests for the court to enter an order dismissing the case, and not

notices of dismissal; and, the court’s order of dismissal amounted to a consent decree that may be

reviewed as a final order. See doc. no. 17 (Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Relief), at 38-40.

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reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order

or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). This action was dismissed

in April 2013, and plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order of dismissal was filed

seven and a half months later, on November 22, 2013. Hence, it is timely. 

B. Plaintiff’s Standing to Assert the Motion 

Defendants argue that the misrepresentations alleged as the inducement for

Jose Rodriguez’s execution of the Settlement Agreement and subsequent dismissal

of this action were — even if they occurred — not directed to the plaintiff, RISMED,

but to Jose Rodriguez, a nonparty. 

Even so, “a nonparty may seek relief from a judgment procured by fraud if the

nonparty’s interests are directly affected.” Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp., 25

F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Kem Manufacturing Corp. v. Wilder, 817 F.2d

1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1987)). Several courts also have allowed relief where the

48

moving nonparty was in some form of privity with a party to the prior proceeding. 

See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 940 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Eyak

Several courts also have allowed a nonparty to seek relief under Rule 60(b) where the 48

nonparty’s interests were directly or strongly affected by the judgment. See Bridgeport Music, Inc.

v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 940 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 443 F.3d 180,

188-89 (2d Cir. 2006); Binker v. Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992); Dunlop v. Pan Am.

World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also In re Lawrence, 293 F.3d

615, 627 n.11 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that “several circuit courts have permitted a non-party to bring

a Rule 60(b) motion or a direct appeal when its interests are strongly affected, and we have permitted

such a motion on at least one occasion”). 

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Native Village, 25 F.3d at 777). Fundamentally, however, Rule 60(b) explicitly

permits a court to “relieve a party or [its] legal representative from a final judgment,

order or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (alteration and emphasis supplied). As

the Eleventh Circuit has observed, 

[t]he cases make clear that the term legal representative was

intended to reach only those individuals who were in a position

tantamount to that of a party[,] or whose legal rights were otherwise so

intimately bound up with the parties that their rights were directly

affected by the final judgment. 

Kem Manufacturing, 817 F.2d at 1520 (alterations and emphasis supplied) (citing

Dunlop v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1982);

Western Steel Erection Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1970);

Mobay Chemicals Co. v. Hudson Foam Plastics Corp., 277 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.

N.Y. 1967)). 

Jose Rodriguez incorporated RISMED, and he isits President. Hislegal rights

were inextricably entwined with RISMED’s rights under the IVSS dialysis supply

contract. He was directly affected by the dismissal of RISMED’s complaint. 

Accordingly, JoseRodriguez possesses standing to raise on behalf ofRISMED a Rule

60(b) challenge to this court’s order. 

C. Rule 60(b)(3)

1. Fraud “by an opposing party” 

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Defendants next contend that plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 60(b)(3)’s

requirement for a movant to show that the order dismissing all claims was obtained

through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct “by an opposing party.” 

Defendants focus upon the fact that the frauds, misrepresentations, and misconduct

alleged by plaintiff were, even if they occurred, committed by non-parties, Daniel

Rangel and Daniel Garlick. That argument is not persuasive. Daniel Rangel

incorporated Rismed Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Alabama), and registered it with the

Alabama Secretary of State. He also was named as the incorporator of Rismed

Dialysis Systems, Corp. (Florida). He is President of both corporations. Both of

those corporate entities were parties to this action. “When a corporation is involved,

of course, it may act only through people as its [officers, agents, servants, attorneys,

or] employees; and, in general, a corporation is responsible under the law for the acts

and statements of its [officers, agents, servants, attorneys, or] employees that are

made within the scope of their duties as [officers, agents, servants, attorneys, or]

employees of the company.” Both of the domestic Rismed defendants were 49

controlled by Daniel Rangel, and both were instrumental to the diversion of IVSS

funds that should have been deposited to RISMED’s Regions Bank account in

Huntsville, Alabama. Furthermore, Daniel Garlick allegedly was not a neutral party,

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Basic Instruction No. 3.2.2 49

(2013) (alterations supplied). 

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but acted on behalf of Daniel Rangel, who either “was paying or had agreed to pay

Garlick significant sums of money, ostensibly to cover medical bills being incurred

by a child of Garlick.” It is Black Letter law that “[a] principal isliable for the fraud

50

of its agent, committed in the course of his employment, where others rely on the

fraudulent misrepresentations to their detriment.” Thus, any fraud or 51

misrepresentation by Daniel Rangel and Daniel Garlick is attributable to “opposing

parties.” 

2. The reasonableness of reliance 

Alabama law is clear that a party claiming to have been induced to commit a

detrimental act by a fraudulent misrepresentation must establish, in addition to the

other elements of a prima facie case, that his reliance upon the falsehood was 52

reasonable when viewed in the light of all of the facts and circumstancessurrounding

the transaction in question. The Alabama Supreme Court framed the standard as

follows in Torres v. State Farm & Casualty Co., 438 So. 2d 757 (Ala. 1983): 

Because it is the policy of courts not only to discourage fraud[,]

but also to discourage negligence and inattention to one’s own interests,

the right of reliance comes with a concomitant duty on the part of the

 State Court Complaint, ¶ 31. 50

Arkel Land Co. v. Cagle, 445 So. 2d 858, 862 (Ala. 1984) (per curiam) (alteration 51

supplied) (citations omitted). 

See generally ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS –CIVIL § 18.01 (Intentional False 52

Statement) (3d ed. 2013); Jenelle Mims Marsh, ALABAMALAWOFDAMAGES § 36:32, at 902-03 (6th

ed. 2012). 

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plaintiffs to exercise some measure of precaution to safeguard their

interests. In order to recover for misrepresentation, the plaintiffs’

reliance must, therefore, have been reasonable under the circumstances. 

If the circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person who

exercised ordinary care would have discovered the true facts, the

plaintiffs should not recover. Bedwell Lumber Co. v. T & T

Corporation, 386 So. 2d 413, 415 (Ala. 1980).

“If the purchaser blindly trusts, where he should not, and

closes his eyes where ordinary diligence requires him to

see, he is willingly deceived, and the maxim applies,

“volunti [sic] non fit injuria” [i.e., a person who knowingly

and voluntarily risks danger cannot recover for any

resulting injury]. 

Munroe v. Pritchett, 16 Ala. 785, 789 (1849). 

Torres, 438 So. 2d at 758–59 (alterations supplied, footnote omitted). 

53

Among other considerations, the “reasonable reliance” standard imposes upon

a plaintiff a “general duty . . . to read the documents received in connection with a

particular transaction.” Foremost Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409, 421

(Ala. 1997) (overruling Hickox v. Stover, 551 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 1989), the case that

established the so-called “justifiable reliance” standard under which a plaintiff in a

fraud action was required to prove only that he or she had “justifiably relied” on the

defendant’s misrepresentations, even if the plaintiff had been in possession of

The omitted footnote observed that the Latin maxim recited in the quote from Monroe v. 53

Pritchett is correctly spelled “volenti non fit injuria,” and defined it as standing for “[t]he principle

that a person who knowingly and voluntarily risks danger cannot recover for any resulting injury.” 

Torres, 438 So. 2d at 759 n.3 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (8th ed. 2004)). 

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documents that, if the plaintiff had read them, were inconsistent with the statements

on which the plaintiff alleged that he relied, and replacing Hickox with the

“reasonable reliance” standard represented by cases such as Foremost and Torres,

supra). 

Thus, under the “reasonable reliance” standard, a person has no right to

“blindly rely on an agent’s oral representations or silence to the exclusion of written

disclosuresin a policy” or other documentsreceived in connection with a transaction. 

Ex parte Carver, 742 So. 2d. 168, 172-73 (Ala. 1999). Indeed, 

[w]hen reviewing a plaintiff’s actions pursuant to the

reasonable-reliance standard, [the Alabama Supreme] Court has

consistently held that a plaintiff who is capable of reading documents,

but who does not read them or investigate facts that should provoke

inquiry, has not reasonably relied upon a defendant’s oral

representations that contradict the written terms in the documents. . . .

AmerUS Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 5 So. 3d 1200, 1208 (Ala. 2008) (alterations

supplied). 

Here, JoseRodriguez read the “Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual

Release” presented to him on April 1, 2013, and noted the omission of any reference

to the mutual promises contained in the “Miami Accords.” He not only expressed his

“concern” over that omission to Daniel Rangel and Daniel Garlick, but took the draft

agreement to the attorneys who had filed the present action. He was advised by those

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attorneys to “not execute the Settlement Agreement without it including reference to

the Miami Accords.” He, nevertheless, ignored the advice of counsel, executed the

54

agreement, and subsequently directed his attorneys to file motions to dismiss this

action with prejudice. There is no evidence that Jose Rodriguez then was unable to

comprehend words written and spoken in the English language, or that he suffered

from any infirmity that affected his comprehension of the documents that precipitate

the dismissal of this action. Indeed, all evidence tends to show that Mr. Rodriguez

was an experienced businessman. 

It clearly appears that Jose Rodriguez was motivated to reach a settlement of

the claims asserted in this action by a combination of considerations: appeals based

upon his familial love and affection to heal the discord within his family; entreaties

to spare his step-son from a criminal prosecution for wire fraud; and, appeals to his

deeply religious nature. Even so, Mr. Rodriguez failed to exercise a reasonable

degree of caution to safeguard his own, and RISMED’s, interests. Instead, he ignored

the advice of counsel, and blindly trusted oral advice to “trust his son” to fulfill the

promises contained in the Miami Accords when the typewritten text of the Settlement

Agreement explicitly stated that it superceded “any other agreements and

 State Court Complaint, ¶ 46. 54

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covenants.” In short, Jose Rodriguez closed his eyes where ordinary diligence

55

required him to see, and he thereby was willingly deceived. See Torres, 438 So. 2d

at 758–59. As the Alabama Supreme Court observed long ago, the maximvolenti non

fit injuria applies. Munroe v. Pritchett, 16 Ala. at 789. 

D. Rule 60(b)(6)

Plaintiff makesthree argumentsfor setting aside the dismissal of this action on

the basis of Rule 60(b)(6): Jose Rodriguez executed the Miami Accords and

Settlement Agreement without knowledge that his wife already had executed deeds

in an attempt to transfer title to the Campobasso and Campolieto properties to her

son’s company, D.R. Properties II, LLC, at preferential, below-market-value prices;

Jose Rodriguez subsequently executed “Unanimous Written Consents” to complete

the transfer of title to those properties (and a quitclaim deed for the Campobasso

property) as part of the resolution of this case, without knowledge that those

properties “had already been fraudulently transferred”; and, defendants attempted 56

to “cover up” the fraudulent transfers through “backdated documents.” 

As defendants note, however, neither the complaint filed in this action, nor the

two agreements that precipitated plaintiff’s motions to dismiss, referred to the

Doc. no. 14-1 (Exhibit “A” to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief: 55

“Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release”), at ECF 6. 

 Doc. no. 7 (Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal), at 6. 56

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Campobasso and Campolieto properties. Instead, both properties were “part of an

unrelated and isolated transaction.” Further, the veracity of Jose Rodriguez’s 57

allegation that, on the dates he signed the Miami Accords (March 28, 2013) and the

Settlement Agreement (April 3, 2013), he knew nothing about his wife’s prior

attempts to transfer the properties to her son’s company is undermined by his act of

recording on March 7, 2013 — i.e., prior to either agreement — a deed purporting to

transfer title to the Campobasso property to himself. 

58

Fundamentally, however, plaintiff’s arguments pertaining to the Campobasso

and Campolieto properties hinge on contentions of fraud and deceit by his estranged

wife and step-son, or by the attorneys who represented them. Therefore, such

arguments are misplaced as a basis for affording relief under Rule 60(b)(6). As

explained in Part I of this opinion, that portion of the Rule applies only to conduct

that does not fit within the first five clauses of Rule 60(b). See, e.g., United States v.

Real Property and Residence, 920 F.2d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 1991) (observing that

Rule 60(b)(6) “applies only to cases that do not fall into any of the other categories

listed in parts(1)-(5) of Rule 60(b)”); Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,

486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11 (1988) (“[C]lause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually

 Doc. no. 21 (Defendants’ Sur-Reply), at 8. 57

Id. ¶ 12; see also doc. no. 21-5 (Ex. “C”). 58

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exclusive.”) (alteration supplied). 

59

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

It is a gross understatement to say that the conclusions of law recorded in this

opinion are not satisfying. The deceits practiced upon Jose A. Rodriguez by his wife

and step-son (aided by their agents, Daniel Garlick, Daniel Esgardo Rangel-Baron,

and attorneys) are far more than simply reprehensible. Some of their actions, such as

the diversion of wire transfers of funds that should have been deposited into

plaintiff’s Alabama bank account, are probably criminal. 

Ultimately, however, RISMED must be denied relief under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b) because its President, Jose Rodriguez, has not demonstrated

that his reliance on the frauds that led him to dismiss this action with prejudice was

reasonable under the circumstances. 

Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment is DENIED. 

60

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2014. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

See supra note 6 for the text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 59

 Due to this holding, it is not necessary to address defendants’ alternative arguments. 60

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