Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01244/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERICK DANIEL GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

A. HEDGPETH,

Respondent.

 /

1:12-cv-01244-BAM (HC)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK

OF JURISDICTION

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate judge. 

Local Rule 305(b).

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petition is not entitled to relief." Rule 4

of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

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The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows:

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In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d at 865.

. . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Petitioner raises the following six claims in the petition: (1) prosecutorial misconduct

during closing argument; (2) the trial court improperly responded to the jury’s question; (3) the

trial court erred in denying Petitioner access to juror identifying information; (4) trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to present DNA evidence, failing to call an alibi witness, failure to

present phone records, and failure to present Luz Delgado’s police statements; (5) insufficient

evidence; and (6) prosecutorial misconduct based on knowing use of perjured testimony. 

Petitioner indicates that Grounds 4 through 6 were not presented to the California

Supreme Court. Thus, it appears Petitioner has presented a mixed petition containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. If Petitioner has not presented all of his claims to the

California Supreme Court, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(b)(1). The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an

opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-522. 

However, Petitioner will be provided with an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted claims

and go forward with the exhausted claims, if he so desires.

 ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order Petitioner is directed to

show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust the

state court remedies as to all of the claims and whether he would like to proceed

on the exhausted claims only or dismiss the petition without prejudice; and

2. Petitioner is forewarned that failure to comply with this order will result in

dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 110. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 19, 2012 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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