Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00407/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL BLANCO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY J. DUNCAN, MD; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-00407-H (KSC)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and 

[Doc. Nos. 104, 120, 149.]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS

On October 13, 2016, Defendant Gregory J. Duncan filed a motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. No. 104.) On December 8, 2016, Defendants Cheryl Malo-Clines, 

Barbara Fellows, Lansdale J. Peters, Bondoc, Jonathon E. Akanno, Goyal, and P. Karan

also filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 120.) On March 21, 2017, Defendant 

M. Dhah also filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 149.) Plaintiff filed 

oppositions to the respective motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 140, 143, 156.) 

Defendants filed replies. (Doc. Nos. 141, 148, 157.) The Court has taken the matters under 

submission, and the Court has provided Plaintiff with notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 

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154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 

1988) as to each of the motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 108, 133, 153.) For 

the reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

Background

On May 18, 2005, while playing football at Pelican Bay State Prison, Plaintiff 

injured his left shoulder. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. A.) That same day, Plaintiff 

was brought to the emergency room at Sutter Coast Hospital and was seen by Dr. Larry R. 

Schatz. (Id.) Dr. Schatz diagnosed Plaintiff as having a left shoulder dislocation and 

suffering a Bankart lesion,1 and noted that Plaintiff may require surgery in the future. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Gregory J. Duncan on May 25, 2005 

and June 8, 2005. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. B-C.) During the visits, Dr.

Duncan examined Plaintiff’s shoulder, reviewed x-rays, and diagnosed Plaintiff as

suffering a left shoulder dislocation. (Id. Ex. B) Dr. Duncan recommended that Plaintiff’s

shoulder be immobilized for 3-4 weeks and that Plaintiff begin physical therapy after about 

2 weeks. (Id.) 

After Plaintiff suffered further dislocations of his shoulder and was evaluated by 

other practitioners, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Duncan on November 15, 2006. (Doc.

No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. G.) Dr. Duncan recommended performing surgery on the 

shoulder, and Plaintiff consented to the surgery. (Id.) Dr. Duncan performed the surgery, 

a left shoulder capsular shift procedure, on February 20, 2007. (Id. Ex. I.) There were no 

reported complications. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Duncan on March 7, 2007 and May 

2, 2007 for postoperative visits. (Id. Exs. J, K.) At the second visit, Dr. Duncan noted that 

Plaintiff was doing very well with no further episodes of instability and that his range of 

motion was improving. (Id. Ex. K.) Plaintiff was subsequently seen by two other 

 

1 “A Bankhart lesion is a tear in the labrum glenoidale of the shoulder joint.” Dettmer v. Astrue, 

No. 4:10-CV-1329 CEJ, 2011 WL 3904429, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2011); accord Shanda v. Colvin, 

No. CIV. 14-1838 MJD/JSM, 2015 WL 4077511, at *12 (D. Minn. July 6, 2015) (“A Bankart tear is a 

type of tear in the labrum.”).

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practitioners on May 16, 2007 and June 19, 2007 and reported experiencing no pain. (Id.

Exs. L, M.) Despite this, Plaintiff contends that the capsular shift procedure that Duncan 

performed may have failed and that his labrum was reinjured a few days later. (Doc. No. 

140 at 1.) 

Following the surgery, Plaintiff began to complain of pain again in his left shoulder

and was given pain medication by various practitioners over a period of several years. 

(Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. N-W; Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶¶ 8-14, Ex. A at 22-66.) 

Plaintiff contends that the medications these Defendants prescribed were ineffective and 

did not alleviate his pain. (Doc. No. 143 at 4-8; Doc. No. 156 at 2.) 

Eventually, on January 9, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by an Orthopedist, Dr. Roman B. 

Cham, who ordered an MRI. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. Y.) Following his MRI, 

Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Cham on April 10, 2014. (Id. Ex. X.) Dr. Cham noted that 

the interpretation of the MRI was a tear of the anterior inferior glenoid labrum and 

recommended surgery to repair Plaintiff’s labrum and Plaintiff consented. (Id.) Dr. Cham 

performed the surgery on January 14, 2015. (Id. Exs. Z, AA.) Plaintiff asserts that the 

surgery Dr. Cham performed substantially alleviated his pain.2 (Doc. No. 140 at 3; Doc. 

No. 143 at 10; Doc. No. 156 at 3.) 

On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that 

the Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care in violation of his 

constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis. (Doc. No. 3.) On May 29, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP motion, 

declined to screen Plaintiff’s complaint, and ordered the U.S. Marshal Service to effect 

service of the complaint. (Doc. No. 6.)

On July 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants 

Gregory J. Duncan M.D., Barbara Fellows, RN, Cheryl Malo-Clines, FNP, Claire 

 

2 Although Plaintiff states that the 2015 surgery significantly reduced his pain, he also asserts that 

he still experiences pain and his shoulder remains loose and at risk for possible dislocation. (Doc. No. 

156 at 3.)

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Williams, M.D., Linda Rowe, M.D., Lansdale J. Peters, PA-C, Jonathon E. Akanno, M.D., 

P. Karan, M.D., Goyal PTS, Dhah, NP, and Bondoc, NP, alleging causes of action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment; (2) violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment;3 (3) failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment; (4) failure to provide adequate medical care resulting in emotional distress in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment;4 and (5) a claim that Defendants are not entitled to 

qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 12, FAC.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants Duncan, Dhah, 

Malo-Clines, Fellows, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, and Karan filed motions to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. Nos. 14, 16, 35.) On January 15, 2016, the Court issued an order granting in part 

and denying in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 37.) In the order, the Court 

dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action of no qualified immunity, and 

declined to dismiss the remainder of the claims in the FAC.5

 (Id. at 13-14.) The 

 

3 Plaintiff’s second cause of action is alleged against only Defendants Rowe and Goyal. (FAC ¶ 

61.) 

4 The Court notes that in his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Dhah construes Plaintiff’s 

fourth cause of action as a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Doc. No. 

149-1 at 1, 14-15.) Defendant Dhah is incorrect. A review of Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC shows 

that Plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in support of 

this cause of action. (Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶¶ 85-87.) In addition, in support of the cause of action, 

Plaintiff cites to two cases, Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2002), and Allah v. AlHafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000), which both involved the issue of whether a plaintiff can 

recover damages for mental and/or emotion injury for a constitutional violation. (Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶ 

95.) Moreover, neither Plaintiff nor the other Defendants in the action have ever characterized this 

claim as a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Court has previously 

referred to this claim as an Eighth Amendment claim in its prior orders. (See Doc. No. 37 at 4; Doc. No. 

82 at 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is properly construed as a claim for failure to 

provide adequate medical care resulting in emotional distress in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

5 In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Dhah moves for summary judgment of 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action of no qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 149-1 at 15-16.) Because the Court 

has already dismissed Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action with prejudice, (Doc. No. 37 at 14), this aspect of 

Dhah’s motion for summary judgment is moot.

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Defendants subsequently filed answers to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 

41, 42, 43.) 

On July 21, 2016, after reviewing the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims in the FAC 

against Defendant Rowe, the Court sua sponte dismissed Defendant Rowe from the action 

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. No. 82.) On October 11, 2016, 

the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s July 21, 2016 order 

dismissing Defendant Rowe with prejudice. (Doc. No. 103.) By the present motions, 

Defendants Duncan, Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, Goyal, and 

Karan move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (Doc. Nos. 104-1, 

120-1, 149-1.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing 

substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 

Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 

preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving 

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the 

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nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case that 

the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23; Jones v. Williams, 

791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth, by 

affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); 

accord Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). To carry 

this burden, the non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his 

pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 

(1996) (“On summary judgment, . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings.”). 

Rather, the nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence . . . from which a jury 

might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts and draw 

all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court should not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed.” Id. Further, the Court may consider other materials in the record 

not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment against 

all of the Defendants. (Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶¶ 48-59, 72-95.) Defendants Duncan, MaloClines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, Goyal, and Karan move for summary 

judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. (Doc. Nos. 104-1, 120-

1, 149-1 at 5-14.)

A. Legal Standards for Eight Amendment Claims Based on Prison Medical Care

“The government has an ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is 

punishing by incarceration,’ and failure to meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth

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Amendment violation cognizable under § 1983.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976)). “In order 

to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must 

show ‘deliberate indifference’ to his ‘serious medical needs.’” Id.

“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner ‘must satisfy both the

objective and subjective components of a two-part test.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). “To meet the objective element of the standard, a plaintiff

must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066.

“Such a need exists if failure to treat the injury or condition ‘could result in further

significant injury’ or cause ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. To meet 

the subjective element of the standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by 

the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “A prison official 

is deliberately indifferent under the subjective element of the test only if the official ‘knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 

1066.

“The deliberate indifference doctrine is limited in scope.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060 (“Deliberate 

indifference is a high legal standard.”); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“This is not an easy test for Plaintiffs to satisfy.”). Deliberate indifference “requires 

‘more than ordinary lack of due care.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 

“‘Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not 

violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; see also

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been 

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become 

a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” (emphasis added)); 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“While poor medical 

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treatment will at a certain point rise to the level of constitutional violation, mere 

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not suffice.”). Further, “‘[a] difference of 

opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—

concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.’” 

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014); see Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 

(“[A] mere ‘difference of medical opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to 

establish deliberate indifference.’”).

B. Defendant Duncan

Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that he was first seen by Defendant Duncan, an 

orthopedic surgeon, on May 25, 2005. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. B.) Dr. Duncan 

examined Plaintiff, reviewed x-rays, and assessed Plaintiff as suffering a left shoulder 

dislocation. (Id.) Dr. Duncan’s prescribed plan was to immobilize the shoulder for three 

to four weeks, start physical therapy in two weeks, and for Plaintiff to return in two weeks 

for a follow up with repeat x-rays. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was next seen by Dr. Duncan on June 8, 2005. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody 

Decl. Ex. C.) Dr. Duncan noted that x-rays of Plaintiff’s left shoulder showed a slight 

irregularity that might represent a Hill-Sachs lesion. (Id.) Dr. Duncan advised Plaintiff on 

appropriate rehab exercises and to avoid any high stress activities for at least three more 

months. (Id.) Dr. Duncan also noted that a capsular repair may be necessary. (Id.)

Plaintiff was then seen by various practitioners for shoulder pain on February 14, 

2006, March 24, 2006, and September 11, 2006. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. DF.) On November 15, 2006, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Duncan. (Id. Ex. G.) After

examining Plaintiff, Dr. Duncan recommended surgery for Plaintiff’s shoulder and ordered 

repeat x-rays of Plaintiff’s shoulder. (Id.) Plaintiff consented to the surgery. (Id.) The 

report for the x-rays stated that the impression from the four-view examination of 

Plaintiff’s left shoulder was negative. (Id. Ex. H; see also Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. ¶

17.)

On February 20, 2007, Dr. Duncan performed a left shoulder capsular shift 

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procedure on Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. I.) There were no reported 

complications. (See id.; Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. ¶ 18.) On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff 

was seen by Dr. Duncan for a postoperative visit, and Dr. Duncan ordered physical therapy. 

(Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. J.) On May 2, 2007, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Duncan 

for another postoperative visit. (Id. Ex. K.) At that visit, Dr. Duncan noted that Plaintiff 

was doing very well with no further episodes of instability and that his range of motion 

was improving. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was subsequently seen by other practitioners on May 16, 2007 and June 19, 

2007 and reported experiencing no pain. (Id. Exs. L, M.) On November 13, 2007, Plaintiff 

reported pain again in his left shoulder. (Id. Ex. N.) Plaintiff does not dispute the above 

facts.6 (See Doc. No. 140 at 10-15.)

Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence 

in the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support an Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference against Defendant Duncan. There is no evidence in the record 

showing that Defendant Duncan ignored or failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical needs 

or delayed Plaintiff’s treatment. The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant Duncan 

saw Plaintiff multiple times for his shoulder and provided Plaintiff with medical care and 

treatment, including performing surgery on his shoulder in February 2007. (Doc. No. 104-

2, Peabody Decl. Exs. B, C.) Further, Defendant Duncan has provided the Court with a 

declaration from a medical expert, Dr. Fronek, opining that Defendant Duncan’s course of 

treatment complied with the appropriate standard of care for orthopedic surgeons, 

specifically opining that Dr. Duncan’s examination, impressions and recommendations for 

a capsular shift procedure were appropriate and that the procedure addressed the pathology 

in Plaintiff’s shoulder. (Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. ¶¶ 33-42.) In his opposition brief, 

 

6 The Court notes that Plaintiff disputes whether Dr. Duncan ordered specialized x-rays. (Doc. 

No. 140 at 11.) But this dispute is immaterial. Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Duncan ordered x-rays on 

November 15, 2006 and that those x-rays were interpreted as normal. (Id.) Whether those x-rays were 

“specialized” does not materially affect the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s claims.

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Plaintiff states that he does not contradict Dr. Fronek’s opinions regarding the capsular 

shift procedure. (Doc. No. 140 at 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate 

indifference against Defendant Duncan fail as a matter of law. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that to prevail on a claim for deliberate 

indifference, the plaintiff must show that “that the course of treatment the doctors chose 

was medically unacceptable under the circumstances”).

Plaintiff argues that there is a possibility that the capsular shift procedure that Dr. 

Duncan performed failed and that his labrum was reinjured a few days later. (Doc. No. 

140 at 1.) Plaintiff further speculates that a capsular shift procedure might not have been 

the most effective surgical option for his injury. (Id. at 2.) Even assuming this is true, this 

does not constitute deliberate indifference. That the capsular shift procedure might not 

have been successful in fully treating Plaintiff’s injury, would at best only constitute mere 

negligence in treating Plaintiff’s medical condition, which is insufficient, as a matter of 

law, to constitute deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (“[I]n the medical 

context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute 

‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of 

mankind.’ Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating 

a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (“‘Mere negligence in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s 

Eighth Amendment rights.’”). 

Further, Plaintiff’s speculation that there might have been a better surgical option 

for his injury, is also insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a claim for deliberate 

indifference. A difference of opinion between a physician and a prisoner “‘concerning 

what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.’” Colwell, 

763 F.3d at 1068. The evidence in the record shows that a capsular shift procedure was an 

appropriate medical option for Plaintiff’s injury. (Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. ¶¶ 35-37.) 

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And Plaintiff does not dispute this opinion evidence. (Doc. No. 140 at 1.) Thus, even 

assuming a different surgical option was available to address Plaintiff’s injury, Dr. 

Duncan’s medical decision to choose the capsular shift procedure, a medically appropriate 

procedure, cannot as a matter of law constitute deliberate indifference. See Jackson, 90 

F.3d at 332 (explaining that to prevail on a claim for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff 

must show that “that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable 

under the circumstances”).

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant Duncan failed to properly diagnosis his HillSachs lesion. (Doc. No. 140 at 2, 5, 7.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant 

Duncan should have ordered an MRI, instead of only ordering x-rays, because Hill-Sachs 

lesions are hard to detect through x-rays. (Id. at 2, 5.) But “Plaintiff’s belief that he should 

have received a MRI is no more than a difference of opinions between plaintiff and the 

defendant[] who provided and/or reviewed his medical treatment. Such a mere difference 

of opinion as to the proper course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment 

claim.” Vaught v. Miranda, No. CIV S-10-1108 DAD P, 2012 WL 525573, at *11 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 16, 2012); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (“A medical decision not to order an Xray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”). Defendant 

Duncan’s decision not to order an MRI is supported by the medical expert opinion in the 

record that given Plaintiff’s history, physical complaints, and the results of his x-rays, an 

MRI was not warranted at the time he was seen by Duncan. (Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. 

¶ 35.) 

Further, the evidence in the record shows that Defendant Duncan did evaluate 

Plaintiff for a Hill-Sachs lesion. Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that in June 8, 2005, 

Dr. Duncan identified a possible early Hill-Sachs lesion based on limited x-rays. (Doc. 

No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Ex. C; see also Doc. No. 104-3, Fronek Decl. ¶ 13.) Later, Dr. 

Duncan ordered further x-rays, but the report for the x-rays stated that the impression from 

the four-view examination of Plaintiff’s left shoulder was negative. (Doc. No. 104-2, 

Peabody Decl. Exs. G, H.) Even assuming Dr. Duncan was incorrect in diagnosing 

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Plaintiff’s injury, any such error would at most be mere negligence in diagnosing a medical 

condition, which is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 105-06; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 

showing that an MRI would have revealed Plaintiff’s Hill-Sachs lesion. Even when 

Plaintiff obtained an MRI from Dr. Cham, Dr. Cham’s notes state that the interpretation of 

the MRI was “a tear of the anterior inferior glenoid labrum” or “a Bankart lesion.” (Doc. 

No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. X, Z.) There is no mention of a Hill-Sachs lesion. (See

id.)

Finally, Plaintiff notes that the procedure Dr. Cham performed in 2015 substantially 

alleviated his pain. (Doc. No. 140 at 3.) But even accepting this as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the fact that Dr. Cham might have been more

successful than Defendant Duncan in treating Plaintiff’s injury, at best, would only mean 

that the Defendant Duncan was potentially negligent in his diagnosis or treatment of 

Plaintiff’s injury. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a claim for violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

Accordingly, Defendant Duncan is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claims. See Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 

358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2004) (“‘[W]here a prisoner has received some medical 

attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally 

reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims that sound in 

state tort law.’”).

C. Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, Karan, and 

Goyal

Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that both before and after his 2007 surgery, he was 

seen at various times by Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, 

Karan, and Goyal for shoulder pain. (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. D-E; Doc. No. 

12, FAC Ex. A at 9-11, 14-17, 22, 40-55, 57-60; Doc. No. 149-7, Sargizian Decl. Exs. F, 

G, H at 6; Doc. No. 120-4, Song Decl. ¶¶ 5-34; Doc. No. 149-4, Newman Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, 

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18, 25-30.) The medical records reflect that in each instance, Plaintiff reported that he was 

experiencing shoulder pain, the Defendant at issue evaluated and examined Plaintiff, and 

the Defendant then recommended a course of treatment and prescribed Plaintiff pain 

medication.7

 (See id.) If Plaintiff reported that a particular pain medication failed to 

alleviate his pain, then the Defendant at issue would prescribe a different pain medication. 

(See, e.g., Doc. No. 149-7, Sargizian Decl. Ex. G; Doc. No. 12, FAC Ex. A at 40-43.) 

Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of these medical records. (See Doc. No. 143 at 16-

19; Doc. No. 156 at 8-9.)

Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence 

in the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support an Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference against Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, 

Akanno, Karan, or Goyal. There is no evidence in the record showing that any of these 

Defendants ignored or failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical needs or delayed Plaintiff’s 

treatment. The undisputed evidence shows that when each of these Defendants saw 

Plaintiff, the Defendant evaluated Plaintiff’s condition, recommended a course of 

treatment, and prescribed Plaintiff medication in an attempt to alleviate his pain. Further, 

these Defendants have provided the Court with declarations and reports from medical 

experts opining that each Defendant’s course of treatment was medically appropriate under 

the circumstances. (Doc. No. 120-4, Song Decl. ¶¶ 5-34; Doc. No. 149-4, Newman Decl. 

¶ 35, Ex. 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference against these 

Defendants fail as a matter of law. See Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332 (explaining that to prevail 

on a claim for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that “that the course of 

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances”).

Plaintiff argues that the medications these Defendants prescribed were ineffective

and did not alleviate his pain. (Doc. No. 143 at 4-8; Doc. No. 156 at 2.) But, even accepting 

 

7 In addition, Defendants Akanno and Karan ordered additional imaging, specifically x-rays, of 

Plaintiff’s shoulder. (Doc. No. 12, FAC Ex. A at 51, 54-55, 58; Doc. No. 120-4, Song Decl. ¶ 21.)

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as true that all of the medications were ineffective at treating Plaintiff’s pain, this at best 

would only constitute mere negligence in treating Plaintiff’s medical condition, which is 

insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 105-06 (“[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 

care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be 

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ Thus, a complaint that a physician has been 

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become 

a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 

1057 (“‘Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does 

not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.’”). There is no evidence in the record 

showing that any of these Defendants would have known beforehand that the medicine

prescribed would be ineffective in treating Plaintiff’s symptoms. Indeed, the evidence in 

the record reflects that when Plaintiff reported that certain medications were ineffective, 

the Defendant at issue would then alter Plaintiff’s prescription. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 149-

7, Sargizian Decl. Ex. G; Doc. No. 12, FAC Ex. A at 40-43.) Thus, the Defendants were 

responsive, rather than indifferent, to Plaintiff’s medical issues.

Plaintiff also argues that the Defendants failed to properly diagnose his Hill-Sachs 

lesion. (Doc. No. 143 at 10-11; Doc. No. 156 at 1-2.) Even assuming these Defendants 

failed to properly diagnose his injury, mere negligence in diagnosing a medical condition 

does not, as a matter of law, constitute deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

105-06; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. 

Plaintiff also argues that these Defendants should have ordered an MRI and referred

him to an orthopedist. (Doc. No. 156 at 2.) But Plaintiff’s disagreement with a Defendant’s

chosen course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference as a matter of law.8

 

 

8 The Court notes that Plaintiff contends that these Defendants refused to refer Plaintiff for an 

MRI or to an orthopedist due to financial considerations. (Doc. No. 143 at 9; Doc. No. 156 at 6.) But 

Plaintiff fails to support this contention with any evidence in the record.

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See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1068 (“‘A difference of opinion between a physician and the 

prisoner—or between medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate 

does not amount to deliberate indifference.’”); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“At most, [plaintiff] has raised a difference of medical opinion regarding his 

treatment. A difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate indifference to 

[plaintiff’s]serious medical needs.”); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (“A medical decision 

not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”).

Further, there is no evidence in the record showing that an MRI would have revealed 

Plaintiff’s Hill-Sachs lesion. Even when Plaintiff obtained an MRI from Dr. Cham, Dr. 

Cham’s notes state that the interpretation of the MRI was “a tear of the anterior inferior 

glenoid labrum” or “a Bankart lesion.” (Doc. No. 104-2, Peabody Decl. Exs. X, Z.) There 

is no mention of a Hill-Sachs lesion. (See id.)

Finally, Plaintiff notes that he was eventually seen by Dr. Kornbleuth, who referred 

Plaintiff to see an orthopedist for his shoulder pain. (Doc. No. 143 at 10; Doc. No. 156 at 

6.) But even accepting this as true, the fact that Dr. Kornbleuth, unlike the above 

Defendants, referred Plaintiff to an orthopedist is, at best, a difference of medical opinion, 

which is insufficient to constitute deliberate indifference.9

 See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242; 

Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1068. Plaintiff also notes that after Dr. Cham ordered an MRI for his 

shoulder and subsequently performed surgery on him in 2015, his pain was significantly 

reduced. (Doc. No. 143 at 10; Doc. No. 156 at 3.) But even accepting this as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the fact that Dr. Cham was more 

successful than these Defendants in treating Plaintiff’s injury, at best, would only mean 

that the Defendants were potentially negligent in their diagnosis and/or treatment of 

 

9 The Court notes that this particular argument is inapplicable to Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows 

and Goyal because, as Plaintiff concedes in the FAC, Malo-Clines and Goyal did refer Plaintiff to an 

orthopedist, and the medical records reflect that Defendant Fellows did refer Plaintiff to see a doctor. 

(Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶¶ 7, 21, Ex. A at 11, 22, 59.) Further, in his opposition, Plaintiff explains that he is 

not alleging a claim for deliberate indifference against Defendant Goyal. (Doc. No. 143 at 8.)

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Plaintiff’s injury. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a claim for violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

Accordingly, Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, Karan, 

and Goyal are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 241-42 (affirming a district court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of the defendants where the plaintiff was seen by “a 

physician’s assistant, prison doctors, and outside physicians on numerous occasions” and 

“received substantial treatment and medication for his ailments” although the plaintiff’s 

symptoms continued to recur); see also Graham, 358 F.3d at 385 (“‘[W]here a prisoner has 

received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, 

federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to 

constitutionalize claims that sound in state tort law.’”).

D Defendant Williams

In the FAC, Plaintiff also alleges Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant 

Williams, but she has not appeared in the action. Nevertheless, the Court notes that it may 

review the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Williams pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 

A complaint is sufficient if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for 

failure to state a claim is proper where the claim “lacks a cognizable legal theory or 

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sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. 

Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

In determining whether a plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief, a district 

court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 

Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). But, a court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, it is improper for a court to assume 

the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated 

the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. 

v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In the FAC, the only allegations related to Defendant Williams are that Plaintiff was 

seen by Defendant Williams for shoulder pain on December 18, 2007. (Doc. No. 12, FAC 

¶ 8.) The medical records referenced in the FAC and attached as exhibits to the FAC show 

that Plaintiff saw Defendant Williams on December 18, 2007 and reported pain in his 

shoulder when he would sleep on that side and when he would work out.10 (Id. Ex. A at 

27-28.) The records reflect that Defendant Williams evaluated Plaintiff, instructed him to 

stop performing exercises which caused him pain “(push ups)”, changed Plaintiff’s 

prescription from Naprosyn to Ibuprofen 800 mg, and instructed Plaintiff to follow up if 

his symptoms persisted. (Id.)

Even accepting these allegations as true and construing them in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, these allegations are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim

for deliberate indifference against Defendant Williams. The medical records attached to 

the FAC reflect that Defendant Williams responded to Plaintiff’s complaints of shoulder 

pain and attempted to treat his pain by instructing him to refrain from certain exercises and 

by altering his pain medication prescription. Plaintiff may allege that the pain medication 

 

10 In determining whether a plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief, a court may consider 

documents attached to the complaint. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Defendant Williams prescribed was ultimately ineffective, (Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶ 8), but, 

even accepting this as true, it would at best only constitute mere negligence in treating 

Plaintiff’s medical condition, which is insufficient to state a claim for deliberate 

indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. Accordingly, 

the Court dismisses Defendant Williams from the action with prejudice pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

III. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Rowe and Goyal. (Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶¶ 60-

71.) On July 21, 2016, the Court sua sponte dismissed Defendant Rowe from the action 

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. No. 82.) In his opposition, 

Plaintiff explains that he named Defendant Rowe as a defendant to this cause of action by 

accident and that he instead meant to allege this cause of action against Defendant Karan. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment of this claim because it is 

premised on state law. (Doc. No. 120-1 at 16-17.)

Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that on July 29, 2013, Defendant Karan prescribed 

Plaintiff ibuprofen and oxcarbazepine for his pain, and on October 15, 2013, Defendant 

Goyal prescribed Plaintiff nortriptyline for his pain. (Doc. No. 12, FAC Ex. A at 57-62.) 

Plaintiff argues that in prescribing these medications, Defendants failed to provide him 

with notice that these medications were antipsychotic drugs as required by California Penal 

Code § 2602. (Doc. No. 143 at 3, 7-8, 13; see also Doc. No. 12, FAC ¶ 61.) But “Section 

1983 requires [a plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.” Galen 

v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish 

a violation of the due process clause by simply attempting to show that Defendants Karen 

and Goyal failed to comply with California Penal Code § 2602.11 See id.; Ove v. Gwinn, 

 

11 In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367 over his state law claim for violation of California Penal Code § 2602. (Doc. No. 143 at 13.) But 

there is no claim for violation of California Penal Code § 2602 in the FAC, the operative pleading. (See 

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264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a liberty interest 

in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. (Doc. No. 143 at 11 (quoting United States 

v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004)).) The Supreme Court and the Ninth 

Circuit have recognized that “[b]oth convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees ‘possess[ ] 

a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Williams, 356 F.3d at 1053 

(quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990)). Thus, the Due Process 

Clause will permit a State to treat “‘a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with 

antipsychotic drugs against his will’” only if “‘the inmate is dangerous to himself or others 

and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.’” United States v. Loughner, 672 

F.3d 731, 746 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 227); accord United States v. 

Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 2008).

But there is no evidence in the record showing that Plaintiff was ever given 

antipsychotic drugs against his will. Even assuming that oxcarbazepine and nortriptyline

qualify as antipsychotic drugs, there is no evidence showing that Plaintiff was forcibly 

given these medications. The evidence in the record merely shows that Defendants Karan 

and Goyal prescribed the medications at issue, not that they ordered that the medication be 

forcibly administered. (See Doc. No. 12, FAC Ex. A at 57-62.) Indeed, in his briefing, 

Plaintiff states that he began refusing the oxcarbazepine. (Doc. No. 143 at 7; see also Doc. 

No. 12, FAC ¶ 40, Ex. B at 6-7, Ex. E at 25.) Accordingly, Defendants Goyal and Karan 

 

generally Doc. No. 12, FAC.) Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff had pled such a state law cause of 

action in the FAC, because the Court has either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all of 

Plaintiff’s federal claims in this action, see infra, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for violation of California Penal Code § 2602 and dismiss that claim 

without prejudice. See Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1998) (“[I]n the usual 

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered 

under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Bryant v. Adventist 

Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002).

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are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s due process claims.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court grants Defendants Duncan, Malo-Clines, Fellows, 

Dhah, Peters, Bondoc, Akanno, Goyal, and Karan’s motions for summary judgment.12 In 

addition, the Court dismisses Defendant Williams with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court has resolved all of Plaintiff’s claims against all of the

Defendants. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Defendants and against 

Plaintiff and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 2, 2017

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

12 In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Dhah, Peters, 

Bondoc, Akanno, Goyal, and Karan also move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claims on the 

grounds that the claims are barred as a matter of law by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 

120-1 at 13-16; Doc. No. 149-1 at 5-8.) In addition, Defendants Malo-Clines, Fellows, Peters, Bondoc, 

Akanno, Goyal, and Karan also move for summary judgment on the grounds that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 120-1 at 17-22.) Because the Court holds that these Defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail as a matter of law on the 

merits, the Court declines to address these additional grounds for summary judgment. 

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