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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ualtecl States Court or Appeab UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tentb Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT JAN 0 4 1995 

RANDY WAYNE THOMAS, 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DARELD KERBY; Attorney General of 

the State of New Mexico, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

No. 93-2323 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-584-HB) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Roger A. Finzel, Assistant 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

Federal Public Defender, for 

Tom Udall, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Stone, Assistant Attorney 

General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, SETH, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner Randy Wayne Thomas appeals from an order of the 

district court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 1 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The petition raises three broad grounds 

for relief, all of which were exhausted in the state courts: 

(1) involuntary plea induced by unkept promise regarding sentence; 

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with plea, 

sentencing, and appeal; and (3) violation of double jeopardy 

rights. In dismissing the petition, the district court adopted 

the magistrate judge's twenty-page "Second Amended Proposed 

Findings and Recommended Disposition," issued after an evidentiary 

hearing on some of petitioner's claims. We review the district 

court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for 

clear error, Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (lOth Cir. 

1991), and affirm its judgment in all but one respect: we reverse 

in part the court's rejection of petitioner's double jeopardy 

claim and remand for further proceedings regarding the appropriate 

relief to be afforded. 

Petitioner pled nolo contendere in New Mexico state court to 

two counts of forgery and two counts of knowingly issuing checks 

drawn on insufficient funds. The charging information states that 

on one day in November 1983, petitioner forged two checks from the 

Werner Rabbit Ears-Land & Cattle Co. (for $225 and $315) and 

deposited them into an account with the Routt County National Bank 

of Steamboat Springs. Later the same day, petitioner wrote checks 

for $103.44 and $76.56 on the account in exchange for goods from 

two different retail stores. Ultimately, the forged checks were 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 2 
dishonored, leaving insufficient funds in the account to cover the 

latter checks. Following his plea, petitioner was sentenced to 

four consecutive five-year terms, four years of each consisting of 

habitual offender enhancement, for a total of twenty years' 

incarceration (with some additional parole and suspended time) . 

The bulk of petitioner's habeas allegations center on the 

disparity between this sentence and the seven years petitioner 

contends counsel had told him would be imposed. 

The record2 amply supports the district court's finding that 

there was, in fact, no plea agreement regarding sentencing and no 

representation regarding such an agreement made by petitioner's 

counsel. Counsel may have estimated, and petitioner may have 

expected, a sentence substantially less than the twenty years 

imposed. However, the district court properly held that such 

circumstances do not invalidate a plea or render it involuntary. 

See. e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991); Wellnitz v. Page, 420 

F.2d 935, 936-37 (lOth Cir. 1970). 

We also agree with the district court's rejection of 

petitioner's numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of 

2 We note that the tape recording of petitioner's plea hearing 

on July 26, 1984, has been lost. Several factors attenuate the 

significance of this otherwise troubling occurrence, however. 

First, the tape was part of the district court record when the 

petition was resolved below (and the surviving tape log contains 

nothing to contradict the magistrate judge's summary of the 

hearing) . Second, the parties do not dispute what took place at 

the hearing; they contest the appropriate legal effect to 

attribute to those events. Finally, the public defender reviewed 

the tape while preparing petitioner's appellate brief. Under the 

circumstances, we do not deem the tape's loss a substantial 

impediment to petitioner's appeal or our review thereof. 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 3 
counsel. Many of these lose their footing, on either the 

performance or prejudice prongs of the controlling constitutional 

test, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 u.s. 52, 57-59 (1985), as a result 

of our affirmance of the finding that no sentencing promise or 

misrepresentation was ever made to induce petitioner's plea. 

Thus, petitioner's claims that counsel misinformed him about 

sentencing, failed to apprise the court of the agreed upon 

seven-year sentence, and did not object when the court imposed a 

sentence in excess of seven years, obviously cannot prevail. 

Moreover, although counsel may have been professionally deficient 

in not insisting on a written plea agreement (the state did 

dismiss some worthless-check counts in return for petitioner's 

plea on the remainder), see State v. Lucero, 639 P.2d 1200, 

1205-06 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. gyashed, 644 P.2d 1040 (N.M. 

1982), petitioner cannot show any prejudice from this omission, 

because a document containing no promises regarding sentence would 

simply have confirmed the qualified character of any estimates 

counsel may have suggested with respect to petitioner's probable 

sentence. 

As for petitioner's claim that counsel did not respond to 

requests for assistance in filing an appeal, the district court 

considered the pertinent, conflicting evidence and found that 

petitioner had not made any such requests during the period 

allotted for appeal. Consequently, the court held no 

constitutional deficiency had been shown. See generally Laycock 

v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (lOth Cir. 1989). Upon 

review of the evidentiary record, we cannot say the court's 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 4 
factual finding is clearly erroneous, nor do we discern any error 

in the legal conclusion drawn therefrom. 

Petitioner also complains that counsel did not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the state to establish 

the factual basis for his plea. We have considered the pertinent 

facts, including petitioner's own testimony strongly implying a 

pre-plea admission to counsel that he had committed the charged 

offenses--indeed, had done so out of "[p]ure greed." R. Vol. II 

at 43. We agree with the district court that, under the 

circumstances, petitioner failed to demonstrate counsel was 

unreasonable in electing not to spotlight the state's case during 

the plea proceedings. 

Petitioner's last objection to counsel's performance concerns 

the quality of the short presentation made on behalf of the 

defense at sentencing. Once again, we agree with the district 

court that counsel's strategy--foregoing a character-evidence 

review for an admitted multiple/habitual felon in favor of a 

simple, straightforward explanation of the options for leniency 

still available under the applicable mandatory-sentencing 

scheme--reflects the exercise of professionally acceptable 

judgment. 

Finally, petitioner contends the double jeopardy clause was 

violated by the imposition of a separate (enhanced) sentence for 

each of the two forgery and two worthless checks counts. In our 

view, the only colorable issue raised in this regard is whether 

the four counts must collapse into two, one for each type of 

offense. We see no problematic overlap between the forgery and 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 5 
worthless-check counts, nor do we consider improper the 

consecutive sentence enhancement imposed for each count based on 

petitioner's status as a habitual offender. 

The double jeopardy clause prohibits both successive 

prosecutions for the same offense and multiple punishments for a 

single offense. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2855 

(1993). Multiple-punishment claims are controlled by the intent 

expressed in the criminal statute(s) violated, i.e., if the 

legislature provided for multiple offenses under the 

circumstances, there is no premise for a double jeopardy claim. 

See United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1150 (lOth Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 1695, 1705 (1992); see United States v. 

Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1450 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 1580 (1993). In this regard, although we are not bound by 

state court rulings on ultimate constitutional questions, we 

"should defer to a state court's interpretation of state law in 

determining whether an incident constitutes one or more than one 

offense for double jeopardy purposes," Mansfield v. Champion, 992 

F.2d 1098, 1100 (lOth Cir. 1993); see Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 

1518, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1993) (looking to state law "to determine 

whether [petitioner] committed one or more than one offense for 

double jeopardy purposes"). Significantly, then, the New Mexico 

courts have established a principle relating to the delimitation 

of separate state criminal offenses that has a direct bearing 

here. 

In a line of cases that stretches some 

Mexico has recognized and developed 

6 

eighty years, New 

the "single-larceny 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 6 
doctrine,"3 under which a single taking at one time or place from 

several victims, or a series of takings from one victim, may be 

treated as a single crime. See State v. Brooks, 877 P.2d 557, 

559-61 (N.M. 1994). While this ordinarily raises a factual issue 

regarding criminal intent for the jury to decide under proper 

instructions at trial, the pertinent circumstances may be such 

that, as a matter of law, only one offense could be involved. Id. 

at 560. Thus, for example, Brooks held that the jury should have 

been instructed on the single-larceny doctrine with respect to 

multiple counts involving funds embezzled from several sources 

over a seven-week period, and also that three of the counts, 

alleging embezzlement of different cash amounts from a single 

day's deposit, constituted a single offense as a matter of law. 

Id. at 558, 561. Two earlier cases relied on by Brooks for the 

latter holding provide additional illustrations of the sort of 

circumstances that legally require prosecution as a single 

offense. See State v. Boeglin, 559 P.2d 1220, 1223 (N.M. Ct. App. 

3 While the or1g1ns of this doctrine are reflected in the 

nominal reference to larceny, its application is not limited to 

that particular offense. See State v. Pedroncelli, 675 P.2d 127, 

129-30 (N.M. 1984) (applying single-larceny doctrine to 

embezzlement charges, despite legal distinctions between larceny 

and embezzlement); see also State v. Brooks, 877 P.2d 557, 559 

(N.M. 1994) (same). Given the basic similarity between larceny/ 

embezzlement and the taking of funds by transfer of a forged or 

worthless instrument, there is no reason to suppose the doctrine 

would not be applied in the present context. See Pedroncelli, 675 

P.2d at 130 (noting that both larceny and embezzlement [like the 

passing of forged or worthless checks] "encompass the requirement 

that the taking or conversion occur contemporaneously with an 

intention to deprive the owner of the property"); cf. State v. 

Brown, 830 P.2d 183, 186 (N.M. Ct. App.) (suggesting robbery might 

be treated .differently, at least in multiple-victim cases, given 

unique element regarding use or threat of force against victim) , cert. denied, 830 P.2d 553 (N.M. 1992). 

7 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 7 
1977) ("a taking of two or more articles of property from the same 

owner at the same time and place shall be prosecuted as only one 

larceny"); State v. Klasner, 145 P. 679, 680 (1914) (holding that 

indictment alleging theft of nineteen cattle from various owners 

on same day and from one area legally charged only one offense) . 

Thus, petitioner argues persuasively that the two checks forged 

and deposited on the same day gave rise to only one offense, and, 

rather less persuasively, that the worthless checks written on the 

same account and on the same day but at different stores likewise 

should have constituted only one count. 

At this juncture, we must incorporate an important federal 

principle into the analysis. In United State v. Broce, 488 U.S. 

563 (1989), the Supreme Court discussed the extent to which a 

voluntary guilty plea4 precludes a subsequent collateral attack on 

double jeopardy grounds. "By entering a plea of guilty, the 

accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts 

described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a 

substantive c~ime." Id. at 570. Thus, "a defendant who pleads 

guilty to two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses 

concede[s] that he has connnitted two separate crimes," id. 

(emphasis added), and is consequently barred from later 

4 For purposes of the case in which it is entered, a nolo plea 

in New Mexico amounts to a confession of guilt, State v. Baca, 683 

P.2d 970, 972 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Apodaca, 452 P.2d 

489, 492 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969), and has the same legal consequences 

as a guilty plea, see State v. Ball, 718 P.2d 686, 693 (N.M. 

1986). Accordingly, we treat petitioner's nolo plea as a guilty 

plea for purposes of the federal waiver principles discussed 

above. See. e.g., United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 416 

(6th Cir. 1991); Cook v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 

1987) . 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 8 
challenging his multiple conviction on double jeopardy grounds, 

id. at 569, 571, 573. The underscored phrase reflects an 

important qualification on the waiver rule announced in Broce, 

however. Specifically, if a double jeopardy violation is apparent 

on the face of the indictment and/or the record existing at the 

time the plea was entered, it is not waived. Id. at 575-76; 

United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1992) (collecting 

cases), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2332 (1993). 

Application of this qualified waiver rule leads us to 

divergent conclusions regarding the viability of the two 

multiple-punishment claims raised here. First, we hold that the 

charging information and state record establish as a matter of law 

the unitary nature of the offense prosecuted as two separate 

forgery counts, compare Brooks, Boeglin, and Klasner, and, 

therefore, that the resultant double jeopardy violation warrants 

collateral relief. As to the worthless-check counts, however, the 

information and record do not conclusively demonstrate a single 

offense but, rather, raise at most a question of fact that might 

have been resolved in petitioner's favor if he had disputed the 

matter at a trial. Admittedly, the distinction drawn in Broce 

between (unwaived) double jeopardy claims established by the state 

record and (waived) ones requiring resort to extrinsic evidence is 

not exactly coterminous with the distinction drawn here between 

legally established multiple-punishment claims and ones raising 

factual issues unresolved due to the formal admission of guilt. 

Nevertheless, the analogy is a close one, and the underlying 

considerations of finality and respect for the plea process are 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-2323 Document: 01019290315 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 9 
fundamentally the same. We therefore deem it appropriate to 

invoke Broce and hold that petitioner's conviction for 

transferring worthless checks involved "counts with facial 

allegations of distinct offenses," and, consequently, that his 

plea to those counts constituted a binding concession "that he had 

committed two separate offenses." Broce, 488 U.S. at 570. 

We thus conclude that only petitioner's multiple forgery 

convictions violate double jeopardy protections, though we do not 

direct any particular, immediate action on the writ. Instead, we 

remand the action to permit the district court to designate the 

particular form of relief appropriate to implement our holding. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District 

of New Mexico is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and the cause 

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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