Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03360/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03360-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff’s case involves two instances of alleged disparate treatment: (1) disparate discipline

in response to a 2002 “split switch” incident; and (2) disparate discipline – termination – in response

to a 2003 derailment. Mr. Deely was only involved in the 2003 incident. This motion will therefore

have no impact on the Court’s prior finding that plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact with regard

to plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for disparate discipline arising out of the 2002 incident. See

July 31, 2006 Order at 3:6-16.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C. FAHEEM R. HARDEMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMTRAK/CALTRAIN RAILROAD,

Defendant. /

No. C 04-03360 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Defendant Amtrak/Caltrain Railroad filed a motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration

of the Court’s order granting in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On December 18,

2006, the Court granted in part defendant’s motion for leave to file, with respect to the issue of whether

Joe Deely knew plaintiff’s race at the time he allegedly participated in the decision to terminate plaintiff.

The Court ordered plaintiff to file a response to Section III(A)(2) of defendant’s [proposed] motion for

reconsideration, which addresses this issue. Having considered plaintiff’s response, and for good cause

shown, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion for reconsideration.

The Court previously found that evidence that Mr. Deely was a decision-maker, and evidence

that he had made racist statements in the past, was sufficient evidence of pretext to defeat summary

judgment on plaintiff’s discriminatory termination claim.1

 If, as defendant argues, Mr. Deely had no

knowledge of plaintiff’s race at the time he allegedly made the termination decision regarding plaintiff,

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United States District Court

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then his past statements would be irrelevant. See DeHorney v. Bank of Amer., 879 F.2d 459, 468 (9th

Cir. 1989). Thus in order for the Court’s prior ruling to stand, as issued, plaintiff must present some

evidence that Mr. Deely knew plaintiff’s race.

In response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, plaintiff does not present evidence sufficient

to raise a triable issue as to whether Mr. Deely knew of plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff presents only three

pieces of evidence related to Mr. Deely’s knowledge of plaintiff’s race: (1) that Mr. Deely signed

plaintiff’s “Return From Discipline” form following a fifteen day suspension in January 2003; (2) that

Mr. Deely signed plaintiff’s suspension of service form following the April 2003 derailment; and (3)

that plaintiff filed an internal Amtrak EEO complaint in 1993, and that Mr. Deely is informed every time

a discrimination complaint has been filed. 

Plaintiff fails to explain how the first two pieces of evidence suggest that Mr. Deely knew of

plaintiff’s race. Neither of the forms signed by Mr. Deely indicate plaintiff’s race. See Hardeman Decl.,

Exs. B & C. The Court therefore does not understand how Mr. Deely’s signature on these forms implies

that he knew of plaintiff’s race. 

The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the third piece of evidence. Even if Mr. Deely was

informed of plaintiff’s 1993 internal EEO complaint, nothing in the complaint indicates plaintiff’s race.

See Hardeman Decl., Ex. D. The EEO complaint form allows the complainant to mark a check-box

indicating the “type of discrimination alleged.” See id. Among the choices are a check-box for “Race,”

and a box for “Other (Specify).” On plaintiff’s EEO complaint, the “Race” box is not checked; the

“Other (Specify)” box is. See id. In plaintiff’s narrative description of his complaint, nowhere does he

suggest his race, or that race was involved in the situation giving rise to his complaint. It appears that

the EEO complaint involved a dispute over seniority, and nothing more. Thus, even if Mr. Deely had

read plaintiff’s internal EEO complaint in 1993, doing so would not have given him knowledge of

plaintiff’s race. 

Plaintiff has thus failed to establish a triable issue as to whether Mr. Deely knew of plaintiff’s

race at the time he allegedly participated in the decision to fire plaintiff. Absent such evidence, Mr.

Deely’s alleged racist statements are wholly irrelevant to this case. See DeHorney v. Bank of Amer., 879

F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court relied on Mr. Deely’s alleged racist statements in determining

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that plaintiff had raised an issue as to the reliability of defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason

for terminating plaintiff. The Court therefore must now determine whether, absent evidence of Mr.

Deely’s statements, plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of pretext.

To review, a plaintiff may make a prima facie case of discrimination through direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997).

A plaintiff may also create an inference of unlawful discrimination by meeting the four requirements

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Those requirements are

that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his position, (3) he experienced

an adverse employment action and (4) similarly situated non-class members were treated more

favorably. Id. at 802. Once a plaintiff meets this burden of production, the employer must offer a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Product, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). The plaintiff may rebut the employer’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason by showing that the proffered reason is pretextual. See Collings v. Longview

Fiber Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this circuit, to show pretext on summary judgment, plaintiff must offer “substantial evidence

that the employer’s proffered reasons were not reliable, . . . or direct evidence of discrimination.”

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Chuang v. University of

California Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff can prove pretext in

two ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of

credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing

that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.”) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit

has held that “there will always be a question for the factfinder once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie

case and raises a genuine issue as to whether the employer’s explanation for its action is true. Such a

question cannot be resolved on summary judgment.” Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th

Cir. 1993). “Once a prima facie case is established either by the introduction of actual evidence or

reliance on the McDonnell Douglas presumption, summary judgment for the defendant will ordinarily

not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is the

‘elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.’” Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1148

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(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 784

F.2d 1407 (1986) (citation omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has also noted, however, that

in deciding whether an issue of fact has been created about the credibility of the

employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons, the district court must look at the evidence

supporting the prima facie case, as well as the other evidence offered by the plaintiff to

rebut the employer’s offered reasons. And, in those cases where the prima facie case

consists of no more than the minimum necessary to create a presumption of

discrimination . . . , plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Wallis v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoted with approval in Lindsey, 447 F.3d

at 1148.

Here, as an initial matter, it is necessary to clarify precisely what treatment or actions by

defendant should be analyzed for signs of disparity. Plaintiff repeatedly compares his termination with

the short suspension waivers received by other employees for allegedly similar infractions. In doing so,

plaintiff ignores the fact that his termination occurred only after he refused a suspension waiver, and

proceeded through the full disciplinary hearing process. For purposes of establishing disparate impact,

the Court must compare either the suspension waivers offered plaintiff to the suspension waivers offered

similarly situated employees, or plaintiff’s termination to the treatment of other employees who went

through the entire disciplinary hearing process. 

As compared with employees who engage in the entire disciplinary hearing process, plaintiff has

presented no evidence of disparate treatment. Plaintiff presents no evidence of any employee who had

a disciplinary hearing for similar conduct and was treated more favorably than plaintiff. His treatment

by the disciplinary panel therefore cannot serve as the basis for his disparate treatment claim. Absent

the evidence regarding Mr. Deely, plaintiff has thus failed to establish a prima facie case of

discriminatory termination.

Nonetheless, with respect to the 2003 incident, plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim may survive,

based solely on the suspension waiver he was originally offered. To do so, plaintiff must establish that

the suspension waiver he was offered after the 2003 derailment was more harsh than the discipline given

to others for similar infractions, and that the discrepancy was motivated by race. The Court finds that

plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in

relation to the 2003 derailment. In response to the derailment, defendant offered plaintiff a 15 day

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suspension waiver. Plaintiff has presented evidence that a non-African-American employee responsible

for a derailment, engineer Martin Jaeger, was not disciplined at all. See Gallo Decl. ¶ 26; Campbell

Decl. ¶ 6. 

The burden thus shifts to defendant to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

offering plaintiff a 15 day suspension waiver, and not disciplining Martin Jaeger at all. First, defendant

provides evidence that the person in charge of determining the length of plaintiff’s suspension waiver,

Charlie Miller, considered plaintiff’s extensive disciplinary record in doing so. See Miller Decl. ¶ 10.

Furthermore, defendants present evidence that the 15 day suspension waiver offer fell in the middle of

the range of suspension waivers offered for derailments between November of 1999 and October of

2003. See Shim Decl., Ex. B (“Chart of Derailment Discipline”). At least one of the individuals who

was offered a longer suspension waiver, Ryan Peterson, is caucasian. See id., Price Decl., Ex. F, Exs.

10 & 12. With this evidence defendant sufficiently explains why plaintiff was offered a fifteen day

suspension waiver. 

Defendant fails, however, to present evidence explaining why Martin Jaeger was not disciplined

at all for a similar incident. Though Jaeger’s derailment was due to a faulty switch, see Gallo Decl. ¶

26; Campbell Decl. ¶ 6, there is evidence that plaintiff’s derailment was also due, at least in part, to

faulty equipment. See Price Decl., Ex. E at 56:17-23, 57:24-25. Defendant’s failure to explain the

discrepancy between the punishment arising out of the two incidents casts sufficient doubt on

defendant’s proffered explanation for plaintiff’s punishment to defeat summary judgment. 

Furthermore, plaintiff presents evidence of non-derailment rules violations for which caucasian

conductors and engineers were not punished. For example, Robert Castiglioni was not disciplined at

all for running a train through a station without stopping. See Hardeman Decl. ¶ 14. Similarly, Mike

Cecconi was neither investigated nor disciplined for seriously damaging an engine while executing a

“drop” at an excessively high speed. See Gallo Decl. ¶¶ 18-23. Mike Cecconi also was not punished

for splitting a switch in February 2003. See id. ¶¶ 7-16. Mike Shanahan was not disciplined for

allowing a non-licensed individual to operate an engine. See Price Decl., Ex. D at 133:10-20. Though

these incidents did not involve a derailment, there is some evidence that they were of comparable

seriousness, and should have warranted discipline. Failure to discipline the caucasian individuals

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involved in these incidents therefore also casts doubt on the credibility of defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory justifications.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion for

reconsideration. Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue as to whether his termination was the result

of disparate treatment. Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim survives, however, with respect to the

suspension waivers he was offered in response to the 2002 “split switch” incident and to the 2003

derailment. (Docket No. 210)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12 , 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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