Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00857/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00857-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 It is arguable that the relief sought is moot as it would

appear from the record in this matter that the sentence imposed

pursuant to the conviction being challenged has been completely

served. On February 6, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

five years imprisonment and given credit for 215 days of preconviction incarceration. Petitioner was released from prison in

October of 2011 and a “flat time” interpretation of his sentence would

result in expiration of the sentence in July of 2012. The habeas

petition filed on April 24, 2012, records Plaintiff’s address as in

the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections, until May 23,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory J. Korba, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-00857 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Arizona Attorney General, )

Charles L. Ryan, Sheryl Watkins, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

April 24, 2012. Petitioner’s Prisoner Trust Fund Statement was

issued by Transitional Living Communities. See Doc. 3.

Petitioner filed an amended petition on May 21, 2012. On May

23, 2013, Petitioner notified the Court that he had changed his

address.1 Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 1 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2012, at which time Petitioner notified the Court of a change of

address.

In Carafas, the Supreme Court listed a number of

typical consequences that were enough to save a

case from mootness, which included the ability to

engage in certain businesses, to vote in

elections, or to serve as a juror. A judgment of

civil contempt does not threaten any of these

interests. Although we have rejected the

argument that collateral consequences should not

be found when they are of the petitioner’s own

making-in particular, the possibility of

enhancement of a future criminal sentence, when

the petitioner is presumably able to avoid the

consequences by refraining from committing

further crimes-that rule is less helpful when the

underlying conviction itself is wholly avoidable,

as is the case with civil contempt.

Puchner v. Kruziki, 111 F.3d 541, 543-44 (7th Cir. 1997).

-2-

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 22) on November 2, 2012.

Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 34) to the answer to his petition

on April 2, 2013.

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned July 16, 2007, charged

Petitioner with one count of aggravated assault. See Answer,

Exh. A & Exh. B; Exh. K at 163–64; Exh. M at 9–10. Prior to

Petitioner’s trial the state alleged Petitioner had historical

prior felony convictions for possession of dangerous drugs,

first-degree criminal trespass, and aggravated DUI. Id., Exh.

C. The state further alleged aggravating circumstances other

than the existence of prior convictions. Id., Exh. D. 

On October 3, 2007, the state trial court held a

settlement conference regarding the pending aggravated assault

charge. The judge noted Petitioner’s commission of the alleged

aggravated assault while on probation for a misdemeanor offense.

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 2 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 See Arizona v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964)

(involving the proper instruction to the jury when the defendant contends

that the prosecution has lost or destroyed exculpatory evidence, allowing

the jury to presume the evidence was exculpatory).

-3-

Id., Exh. F & Exh. G. The court explained to Petitioner he

faced a possible sentence of fifteen years imprisonment if he

were convicted of aggravated assault, considering his prior

felony convictions. Id., Exh. F at 1–6. The court also

explained a proposed plea offer wherein the state agreed to a

stipulated sentence of five years imprisonment. Petitioner did

not accept the plea offer at that time. Id., Exh. F. 

Petitioner’s two-day jury trial began on December 21,

2007. Id., Exhs. K-L. At trial the state alleged Petitioner

inflicted physical injury on the victim by using a “wooden board

with nails” to strike and jab him. Evidence was presented that

the victim’s injuries were minimal and did not require medical

attention and that the police did not preserve the wooden board

as evidence. The court allowed the state to present the fact of

Petitioner’s prior felony convictions to the jury because

Petitioner testified in his own defense, but ordered the nature

of the convictions to be sanitized for the jury. Id., Exh. K.

at 8; Exh. L at 1–2. 

At the conclusion of the state’s case Petitioner’s

counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was

insufficient evidence Petitioner assaulted the victim or that

the wooden board was a dangerous weapon. Id., Exh. X. The

motion was denied but, at the close of evidence, the judge gave

the jury an instruction regarding self-defense and a “Willits”2

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 3 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted: a violation of

Brady v. Maryland; an improper jury instruction; that a witness (the

victim’s wife) committed perjury; that the police destroyed evidence,

i.e., the board used to strike the victim; that the victim sustained

no physical injury and, accordingly, there was no assault; and that

the board with nails was not a dangerous instrument. 

-4-

instruction. The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. Id.,

Exh. P at 127; Exh. R; Exh. S at 4. 

On February 6, 2008, the trial court declined to follow

the recommendations of the probation officer and the prosecutor

that Petitioner receive the presumptive sentence. The state

trial court sentenced Petitioner to a mitigated term of five

years imprisonment, i.e., the same term provided in the rejected

plea agreement. Petitioner received credit for 215 days of preconviction incarceration. Id., Exh. U at 14–15; Exh. V at 2.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. Petitioner’s appointed appellate

counsel informed the state court that she could find no arguable

basis for an appeal and asked the court to review the record for

fundamental error. Petitioner filed pro se pleadings in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. Y.3 In a memorandum

decision filed April 16, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. Z.

Petitioner sought review of the appellate court’s decision,

which was summarily denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on

September 3, 2009. Id., Exhs. AA–DD. 

On September 22, 2009, Petitioner initiated an action

for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. EE. Petitioner filed two

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 4 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

pleadings arguing his claims for relief. Id., Exhs. GG–HH.

After docketing these pleadings, on July 14, 2010, Petitioner

was transferred from the custody of the Arizona Department of

Corrections to a prison in Oklahoma. On July 27, 2010, the

trial court denied post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. LL. 

On August 12, 2010, Petitioner filed an Inmate Letter

with the Arizona Department of Corrections. In the letter

Petitioner stated that a box of his legal work became lost

during his transport from one unit of the Florence prison to a

different unit of that prison, then to Tucson, and then to

Oklahoma. Petitioner asked that his missing legal materials be

located or replaced as soon as possible. Id., Exh. MM. 

On August 31, 2010, the Arizona state trial court

granted Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time in his Rule

32 action and set a new deadline for filing a petition. Id.,

Exh. NN. 

On September 17, 2010, Petitioner filed another motion

for an extension of time in the trial court, stating that he

could not continue with the litigation until his records were

replaced. Id., Exh. OO. On October 11, 2010, the trial court

denied Petitioner’s simultaneously-filed Request for Preparation

of Record, stating “[b]efore the defendant is entitled to

consideration of whether to provide any documents or transcripts

for a Rule 32 petition, the defendant must file a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief”. The trial court reasoned that “[t]he

defendant is not entitled to copies of transcripts at the

court’s expense to make him aware in the first instance of

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 5 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

events which might constitute grounds for collateral attack

under Rule 32.” Id., Exh. QQ.

On December 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, asking for review of the

trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. RR.

On December 27, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition for review as untimely, and noted that the decision

regarding whether to excuse the untimeliness is made by the

trial court. Id., Exh. SS. 

On June 27, 2011, Petitioner initiated what was

construed as a federal habeas proceeding by filing a motion for

an extension of the statute of limitations with regard to a

section 2254 petition in the United States District Court; the

action was docketed as CV 11–1272 PHX SRB (MEA). On June 30,

2011, the Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to

entertain the motion in the absence of a contemporaneously filed

petition for habeas relief and dismissed the matter.

On October 4, 2011, Petitioner was released from

prison. See Doc. 8. 

On March 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion in the

state trial court styled as seeking to quash an order of

restitution imposed as part of his sentence. In denying the

motion on April 16, 2012, the state court found nothing in the

record indicating an order of restitution had been imposed.

Id., Exhs. YY–ZZ. 

 On April 24, 2012, Petitioner initiated the pending

federal habeas action. On May 4, 2012, the Court dismissed the

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 6 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

petition for Petitioner’s failure to name his community

supervision officer as a respondent, but allowed Petitioner

thirty days to amend the petition. On May 21, 2012, Petitioner

filed an amended habeas petition.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief

because:

1. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because the state lost or suppressed exculpatory evidence.

2. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because the state’s loss of evidence was not cured by the

“Willits” instruction.

3. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because the prosecutor suppressed evidence and used

perjured testimony to obtain a conviction.

4. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because he was convicted and he is actually innocent, and

because state and federal rules of criminal procedure were

violated by the trial court.

5. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because state and federal rules of criminal procedure were

violated by the trial court when it gave an improper jury

instruction.

6. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because the trial court did not declare a mistrial when

the prosecutor used a police report to refresh a witness’

recollection, which report, Petitioner contends, was not

disclosed.

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 7 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

7. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because the prosecutor introduced evidence to the jury

which had been “suppressed.”

Respondents contend the petition was not filed within

the statute of limitations and that Petitioner’s claims can be

denied on the merits. 

II Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A).

Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about

December 3, 2009, when the time expired for seeking certiorari

from the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision denying relief in

Petitioner’s direct appeal on September 3, 2009. At that time,

Petitioner had initiated a state action for post-conviction

relief, which tolled the statute of limitations with regard to

Petitioner’s federal habeas action. 

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 8 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

Using a very generous application of the law to the

facts, the statute of limitations was tolled until October 27,

2010, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s

petition for review of the trial court’s denial of Rule 32

relief, finding the petition for review was not timely filed.

Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of the Court of

Appeals’ decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, further tolling

the beginning of the statute of limitations until November 27,

2010. Using this scenario, the statute of limitations on

Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run on November 28,

2010, and expired on November 28, 2011. Accordingly, the

petition filed April 24, 2012, was filed approximately five

months after the statute of limitations expired.

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 769 (2012); Porter v. Ollison,

620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke,

556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme

Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for determining extraordinary

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 9 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

circumstances, while endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case”

approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other similar cases

for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011;

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable

tolling is also available if the petitioner establishes their

actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v.

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 10 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In reply to the response to his petition, Petitioner

contends his legal materials were not in his possession after

his transfer to a prison in Oklahoma until his release from

prison on October 4, 2011. Petitioner argues that, therefore,

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas petition

should not begin to run until October 4, 2011.

Petitioner did diligently pursue post-conviction

remedies, including filing a motion for an extension of the

statute of limitations with regard to a section 2254 petition in

the United States District Court on June 24, 2011.

Additionally, although the pleadings in this matter indicate

that Petitioner was released from prison on October 4, 2011,

when this matter was initiated in April of 2012 Plaintiff was

again or still in the custody of the Arizona Department of

Corrections.

It is arguable whether Petitioner has stated an

adequate basis for equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Compare Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620

F.3d at 961 (noting the circumstances of cases determined before

and after Holland). Allowing that the Court may find the

petition is timely based on the doctrine of equitable tolling,

i.e., that Petitioner dutifully pursued his remedies and that

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 11 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

-12-

his failure to timely file a federal habeas petition was due to

the unavailability of his legal documents, the Magistrate Judge

will discuss Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief.

III Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).4 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 12 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a

claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a

statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. The federal claim is

fairly presented if raised in the petition

itself, an accompanying brief, or another

similar document filed with that court.

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 2013)(internal

citations and quotations omitted).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 13 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-

93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 14 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -15-

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Hurles v. Ryan, 706 F.3d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Arizona’s

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 15 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -16-

waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for denying

relief.”); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012);

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar).

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the

constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules

designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism.”

Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1316[](2012). One such rule is the

doctrine of procedural default, according to

which a federal court is barred from hearing

the claims of a state prisoner in a habeas

corpus proceeding when the decision of the

last state court to which the prisoner

presented his federal claims rested on an

“independent and adequate state ground.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546, [](1991). However, federal courts

are to “presume that there is no independent

and adequate state ground for a state court

decision when the decision ‘fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law, and when the

adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face

of the opinion.’” Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546

(quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, [](1983)). A state

court may overcome the above presumption

simply by stating “clearly and expressly that

its decision is based on bona fide separate,

adequate, and independent grounds.” Id. at

733, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Long, 463 U.S.

at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

 A state court judgment rests on an

independent and adequate state procedural

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 16 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -17-

ground when the “state court decline[s] to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because

the prisoner ... failed to meet a state

procedural requirement.” Id. at 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546 (emphasis added).

 “For a state procedural rule to be

‘independent,’ the state law ground for

decision must not be ‘interwoven with the

federal law.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Long, 463

U.S. at 1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, and citing

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct.

1038,[](1989) (applying Long to federal

habeas cases)). “A state law ground is so

interwoven if ‘the state has made application

of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent

ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’”

Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, [](1985)) (alteration in

original). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [](2002) (per

curiam) (noting that, although the rule at

issue there “does not require a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits, if the

state court’s decision rested primarily on a

ruling on the merits nevertheless, its

decision would not be independent of federal

law”). A review of pertinent Supreme Court

caselaw illustrates that a state court

ruling, even on a state procedural issue,

that necessarily or actually depends on an

antecedent ruling on the merits of a federal

claim is interwoven with federal law and

therefore not independent.

Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 450 (2012).

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 17 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -18-

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

A petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to

excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Alleged

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish

cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas claim in the

state courts unless the specific Sixth Amendment claim providing

the basis for cause was itself properly exhausted. See Edwards

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money,

391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004). “Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error rising to the

level of an independent constitutional violation (in the form of

ineffective assistance of counsel) does constitute cause.”

Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2012).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 18 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -19-

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 19 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -20-

IV Standard of review regarding exhausted claims 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544

U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004);

Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies a

governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in a way

that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to

extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. McNeal v.

Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

131 S. Ct. 3066 (2011).

For example, a state court's decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 20 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -21-

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419

(2009); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–25, 128 S. Ct.

743, 746–47 (2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v.

Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An

unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect

one. See id.; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir.

2005). “That test is an objective one and does not permit a

court to grant relief simply because the state court might have

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.”

Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011).

A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 21 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -22-

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140,[ ] (2004).

And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

129 S.Ct. 1411, 1413–14, [ ] (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” of the Supreme Court's decisions “as

of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495 [ ] (2000). A state

court's decision is “contrary to” this body

of law if it applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law articulated by the Supreme

Court or arrives at a result different than

that reached by the Supreme Court in a case

with materially indistinguishable facts. Id.

at 405–06, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, [].

 A decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal

law if it “identifies the correct governing

legal principle ... but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct.

1495 []. The Supreme Court has emphasized

that “an unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Id. at 410, 529

U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, []. Accordingly,

“a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495.Instead, the court must determine

whether the state court's application of

Supreme Court precedents was objectively

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 22 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -23-

unreasonable. Id. at 409, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495, []. Although the Supreme Court’s

decisions are the focus of the

unreasonable-application inquiry, we may look

to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court

law.” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000).

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed a

specific issue in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication

of the issue cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9,

10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006). Stated another way, if the

issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ

of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the precise

claim presented by the petitioner. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016;

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). The

United States Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that

it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific

legal rule that has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. at

124-25, 128 S. Ct. at 746-47.

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 23 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -24-

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003);

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson

v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of

fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303,

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court

has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits

in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court's decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

otherwise requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,

953–54, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858–59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro, 653

F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 24 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -25-

V Petitioner’s claims for relief

 1. Petitioner contends he was denied his right to due

process and a fair trial because the state lost or suppressed

exculpatory evidence.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

state appellate court reviewed the claim for fundamental error.

Petitioner alleged that the state’s failure to “disclose” the

board Petitioner used to touch the victim (according to

Petitioner’s own testimony at his trial), a steering-wheel lock

that Petitioner asserts the victim used to threaten Petitioner,

and a disposable beverage cup, constituted constitutional error.

The appellate court concluded that the prosecutor could

not have disclosed evidence which was not preserved by the

police and, accordingly, there was no error pursuant to Brady v.

Maryland. The appellate court also concluded that Petitioner

could not prove he was prejudiced by the absence of the evidence

because the trial court gave the jury a Willits instruction,

allowing the jury to infer the evidence would be exculpatory.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that

Petitioner’s rights pursuant to Brady were not violated was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal

law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

on this claim. 

2. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to due

process and a fair trial because the state’s loss of evidence

was not cured by a “Willits” instruction.

To the extent that Petitioner properly exhausted this

claim in the state courts, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not

err in determining that the police or prosecution’s “failure” to

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 25 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -26-

“preserve” the board used in the assault did not violate

Petitioner’s right to due process of law or a fair trial. 

Under certain circumstances, the state’s failure to

collect or preserve potentially exculpatory evidence constitutes

a due process violation. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

51, 58 (1988); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625-26 (9th

Cir. 1997); Schad v. Schriro, 454 F. Supp. 2d 897, 914-15 (D.

Ariz. 2006).

The duty to preserve evidence is limited to

material evidence, i.e., evidence whose

exculpatory value was apparent before its

destruction and that is of such nature that

the defendant cannot obtain comparable

evidence from other sources. California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528,

2534, [](1984). “[U]nless a criminal

defendant can show bad faith on the part of

the police, failure to preserve potentially

useful evidence does not constitute a denial

of due process of law.” Youngblood, 488 U.S.

at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337.

Grisby v. Blodgett,130 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1997).

Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of

the police, “failure to preserve potentially

useful evidence does not constitute a denial

of due process of law.” Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333,

[] (1988). [The petitioner] makes no

colorable showing, or indeed any showing at

all, that the State destroyed the Ranchero to

prevent disclosure of evidence favorable to

the defense, nor is there any reason to

believe that the exculpatory value of the

Ranchero was apparent prior to its

destruction. “The mere failure to preserve

evidence which could have been subjected to

tests which might have exonerated the

defendant does not constitute a due process

violation.” United States v. Hernandez, 109

F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997). Phillips has

not met the requirements for an evidentiary

hearing on this claim.

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 26 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -27-

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 987 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying this

claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal did not violate any clearly

established Supreme Court precedent because none of the evidence

at issue had exculpatory value that was apparent before it was

destroyed and because the Arizona Court of Appeals determined

that, as a matter of fact, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the

alleged “failure” to preserve the evidence.

3. Petitioner argues he was denied his right to due

process and a fair trial because the prosecutor suppressed

evidence and used perjured testimony to obtain a conviction.

In his third habeas claim Petitioner alleges that the

prosecution suppressed a police report and then knowingly used

perjured testimony to convict him. Petitioner contends that the

trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to

preclude the submission of the actual police report into

evidence, which Petitioner argues allowed the victim and his

wife to testify inconsistently with their alleged statements in

that police report.

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted that the

victim’s wife gave perjured testimony. The Arizona Court of

Appeals found that the witness had been disclosed to the defense

and that the defense was aware of the likely content of her

testimony. The appellate court also determined that the issue

of this witness’ credibility was for jury to decide. The state

appellate court also noted that, although Petitioner alleged

this witness had given contradictory statements to police and on

the witness stand as the basis for his assertion that her

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 27 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -28-

testimony was perjured, the appellate court found no support for

in the record. 

To the extent Petitioner exhausted this claim in the

state courts, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not err in

determining that Petitioner’s right to due process of law was

not violated by the evidentiary ruling or by the testimony of

the victim’s wife. 

4. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to due

process and a fair trial because he was convicted and he is

actually innocent.

Petitioner argues that he is innocent of aggravated

assault because there was insufficient evidence the victim

sustained serious physical injury, as Petitioner contends the

term “physical injury” is defined by Arizona law. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied the claim on the merits,

concluding the victim’s injuries satisfied the requirements of

Arizona law because although minimal, they were the result of

wrongful acts committed by physical force.

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to

habeas relief on the merits of this claim. Federal habeas

relief does not lie for alleged errors of state law. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991).

5. He was denied his right to due process and a fair

trial because state and federal rules of criminal procedure were

violated by the trial court when it gave an improper jury

instruction.

In his fifth habeas claim, Petitioner asserts that an

improper jury instruction expanded the elements of the offense

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 28 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -29-

and eased the state’s burden of proof. Petitioner argues that

the prosecution “created an additional element of the aggravated

assault statute” in that the final jury instructions included

the following element of the crime: “the use or threatening

exhibition of a wooden board with nails.” 

Petitioner did not raise this claim in his direct

appeal. The claims raised in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action were

not addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which found the

claims contained in the Rule 32 action precluded by Petitioner’s

failure to timely present the claims to the appellate court.

Accordingly, Petitioner procedurally defaulted his fifth claim

for relief. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claim, nor has

Petitioner established that manifest injustice will occur absent

consideration of the merits of this claim. Accordingly, the

Court should not consider the merits of the claim. 

6. Petitioner maintains he was denied his right to due

process and a fair trial because the trial court did not declare

a mistrial when the prosecutor used a police report to refresh

a witness’ recollection, which report, Petitioner contends, was

not disclosed to the defense.

 Petitioner argues that the police officers’ testimony

should have been stricken, or a mistrial declared, because the

trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to “suppress” the

police report, but then allowed the prosecution to offered the

report to the testifying police officers to refresh their

recollection.

This claim was not presented to the state courts in a

procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not established

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 29 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -30-

cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of

this claim. Accordingly, the Court may not grant relief on the

merits of the claim and should not consider the merits of the

claim.

7. Petitioner was denied his right to due process and

a fair trial because the prosecutor introduced evidence to the

jury which had been “suppressed.”

In his seventh habeas claim, Petitioner argues that the

prosecutor introduced suppressed evidence, i.e., a police

report, to the jury.

This claim was not presented to the state courts in a

procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not established

cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of

this claim. Accordingly, the Court may not grant relief on the

merits of the claim and should not consider the merits of the

claim.

VI Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Although

Petitioner diligently pursued relief, it s arguable whether

Petitioner has established that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Some of Petitioner’s

claims were exhausted in the state courts; these claims were not

improperly decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Petitioner’s other claims for relief were not properly exhausted

in the state courts and Petitioner has not established cause

for, nor prejudice arising from his default of these claims. 

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 30 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -31-

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Korba’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 31 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -32-

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2013.

Case 2:12-cv-00857-SRB Document 35 Filed 04/23/13 Page 32 of 32