Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02967/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 7, 2016

Decided July 26, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2967

SHABI Z. HUSSAIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 7693

Thomas M. Durkin,

Judge.

O R D E R

Shabi Hussain, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against her employer, 

Federal Express Corporation (FedEx), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, for 

failing to promote her because of her sex and national origin. The district court granted 

summary judgment in FedEx’s favor. We conclude, however, that Hussain raised 

genuine issues of material fact on both theories, and so we vacate the district court’s order 

and remand.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-2967 Page 2

I

Hussain started working for FedEx in 1996 as a handler; later she became a courier 

at the South Holland station. Under FedEx’s hierarchy, couriers and handlers report to 

operations managers; operations managers report to senior managers; and senior 

managers report to a managing director. This case concerns Hussain’s effort in 2010 to 

secure a promotion to senior manager. That decision lay in the hands of the managing 

director of her district, which covers several stations. At the relevant time, George 

Truesdale was the managing director of the Chicago Metro District.

Hussain worked at FedEx for almost 15 years before she sought a promotion to the 

senior-manager position at issue in this case. Three years after she started at the company, 

in 1999, FedEx promoted her to operations manager at the downtown Chicago facility. In 

2008 she transferred locations. For family reasons and to broaden her management 

experience, she moved to a station in New York. Under her hiring agreement, she had to 

work there for 18 months before she could apply for a new position. Soon after 

transferring, though, Hussain asked to return to Chicago for personal reasons. Because 

the 18 months had not run, FedEx told Hussain to request a hardship transfer, which she 

did and which it granted. FedEx planned to make her an operations manager in 

downtown Chicago. Hussain preferred either the Hillside station (where the pay was 

slightly less than in downtown Chicago, and the workload slightly lighter) or promotion 

to senior manager at the downtown Chicago station.

FedEx allowed Hussain to interview for operations manager at Hillside. She did not 

get the position, and so she remained an operations manager in downtown Chicago. She 

was not, however, eligible for promotion to senior manager there. For one thing, the 

hardship waiver permitted only a lateral placement. In addition, Truesdale had told the 

human-resources department that Hussain “is not ready” to be senior manager. FedEx

hired Erik Miglans for the senior-manager position in downtown Chicago. 

In 2010, some positions for senior manager opened up. First, a position opened at 

Hillside. Hussain’s supervisor, Senior Manager Glenn Girtman, told Hussain not to apply 

because Truesdale already had decided to hire Steve Franzese, the runner-up to Miglans. 

Several months later, Girtman left his position as senior manager, creating another 

opening. Truesdale appointed John Griffith—an evening-shift operations manager in 

downtown Chicago—as acting senior manager for evenings. Truesdale then solicited 

applications for that job.

Including Hussain, 11 employees applied for this position. Michael Rodriguez, from 

Human Resources, recommended that Truesdale interview the one incumbent senior 

manager who had applied and the top four operations managers as ranked by their last 

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-2967 Page 3

three performance reviews. Hussain’s last three scores were 3.6, 3.9, and 3.9 out of 4. This 

average of 3.8 tied Hussain for third highest score. The two candidates she tied with had 

significantly less management experience. (Griffith had a performance review average of 

only 3.23.) Ultimately, Truesdale decided to interview all nine remaining candidates (two 

had withdrawn).

A four-person panel interviewed each candidate. Truesdale created the panel, which 

consisted of Truesdale, two people who reported directly to him—Senior Manager 

Miglans and Senior Manager Marc Morris—and Rodriguez. The panel asked each 

candidate to give a short presentation and answer the same six questions. Each panelist 

scored each candidate from 1 to 5 for each question. After each interview, the panel 

members shared their scores, discussed the candidate’s responses, and formulated a 

“consensus” score for each question. Here is how they ranked candidates based on their 

total consensus scores: Mike Phillips (30), John Griffith (27), Robert Smith (26), Hussain 

(24), Steve Strong (24), Regis Frazier (24), Roy Isaksen (22), Lori Piazzi (19), and Wallace 

Loney (17).

Truesdale hired Griffith. Although the person with the highest interview score is 

typically hired, Mike Phillips’s supervisor told Truesdale that Phillips (who had been 

working in St. Louis) was not ready for a large station. Griffith had the second highest 

interview score, but Truesdale’s notes reflect that the score alone did not drive his 

decision. He also took other factors, some subjective, into account, including experience 

working evening shifts at a large, diverse, inner-city location and “interpersonal skills.” 

He based those evaluations on scores given to the managers by their direct subordinates, 

his observations of the candidates in disciplinary-appeal meetings, and their overall “fit” 

with other senior managers.

Truesdale offered to provide the unsuccessful candidates feedback on how to 

improve, and Hussain accepted. After briefly discussing her performance at the 

interview, Truesdale panned her behavior at an earlier meeting, telling her that she was 

“overly aggressive” in criticizing others, too emotional, and had inappropriate facial 

expressions. He also referred to national origin, telling her to “be more Indian.” When 

Hussain replied that “I am Indian,” Truesdale pivoted and advised, “you should be more 

like an American Indian. You should be stoic. You should be expressionless.”

Disturbed by these comments, Hussain filed an internal complaint that Truesdale 

refused to promote her for discriminatory reasons. FedEx investigated the charge and 

admonished Truesdale for “lack of sensitivity” in his meeting with Hussain. It also 

recommended that senior management modify the promotion process to exclude senior 

managers from participating on hiring panels for other senior managers. And it 

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-2967 Page 4

suggested that the company help Hussain improve her interpersonal skills. Hussain 

found all of this insufficient, and so she sued FedEx under Title VII, alleging that 

Truesdale did not promote her because of her sex and national origin.

The district court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment. It ruled that none 

of the evidence Hussain submitted could support a finding that bias motivated 

Truesdale. Truedale’s “Indian” comments, it said, were not direct evidence of bias. 

Moreover, the court found, Hussain was not qualified for the position for which she 

applied because she had received a lower interview score than three of the other 

candidates. Hussain appeals.

II

Before this court, Hussain argues that the district court failed to view the record in 

the light most favorable to her. She challenges its conclusion that Truesdale’s comments 

in the feedback meeting were not evidence of sex or national origin discrimination. Under 

the direct method Hussain had to present either direct evidence that would prove 

discriminatory conduct, see Deets v. Massman Constr. Co., 811 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 2016), 

or enough circumstantial evidence to allow the trier of fact to infer intentional 

discrimination by the decisionmaker, see Whitfield v. Int’l Truck and Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 

438, 443 (7th Cir. 2013). To prevail under the indirect method, Hussain needed to satisfy 

the oft-cited burden-shifting test. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 

(1973); Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying burden-shifting test to 

promotion claims). The parties discuss both methods, illustrating yet again the 

considerable overlap in analysis and proof they entail—a point we have noted when 

questioning whether a simpler approach would be preferable. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Angels 

Corp., 718 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2013); Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 

2012) (Wood, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Chi. Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 905–06 (7th 

Cir. 2015). We have no need to clean up the law on this point, however, because the 

existence of two avenues of proof does not affect the outcome here. 

We consider first Hussain’s national-origin claim. Truesdale’s advice about how 

Hussain could help her chance at promotion—become “more Indian” or more “stoic like 

an American Indian”—bears two reasonable and equally problematic interpretations. A 

reasonable juror could conclude that, for Truesdale to promote Hussain, she needed to 

embody a trait stereotypically associated with a national origin—American Indian—

different from hers. Alternatively, Truesdale may have envisioned desirable features for 

a person of Indian descent and wanted Hussain to reflect that stereotype—she needed to 

be “more Indian.” Either way, this is evidence of impermissible bias. Title VII forbids an 

employer to base a hiring decision on a candidate’s ability to fit a stereotype of her 

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-2967 Page 5

national origin, or her inability to fit a stereotype of a different national group or gender. 

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when 

an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 

stereotype associated with their group.”)

The case for national-origin discrimination was thus one for a trier of fact. It is hard 

to imagine a blunter application of national-origin stereotyping than Truesdale’s advice 

to Hussain to “be more Indian.” A jury would not have to consider his immediate 

“clarification”—be more like an American Indian—as a believable description of his 

meaning, and even if it were, it just shifts the problem from bias against one group (South 

Asian Indians) to another (American Indians, often referred to as Native Americans).

Hussain also met her burden of production with respect to sex discrimination. The 

evidence, including Truesdale’s comments that Hussain was “overly aggressive,” “too 

emotional,” and showed too much facial expression, reasonably suggests that Truesdale 

did not promote her because of her sex, or at least a trier of fact could so conclude. See

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 

woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”); 

Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224–25 (1st Cir. 2012) (“A gender-stereotyping 

claim arises when an individual suffers an adverse employment action because she either 

conforms or fails to conform to some stereotype or stereotypes attributable to her 

gender.”).

The reasonableness of construing Truesdale’s comments as reflecting sex bias is 

bolstered by two other pieces of evidence. First, Rodriguez, who was present at the 

meeting where Truesdale thought Hussain’s behavior was inappropriate, testified that 

he saw nothing wrong with Hussain’s conduct. The second, collectively, are Hussain’s 

performance reviews. In 2007-08, her supervisor portrayed her leadership and ability to 

manage her direct reports as “outstanding.” The review also said that Hussain “can stand 

up for what she feels is right and also knows how to accept corrective criticism when 

needed. This will help in her development into a senior manager.” Hussain’s review from 

the next year reveals similar enthusiastic feedback.

Beyond these comments, Hussain has provided evidence that Truesdale has a 

troubling pattern of promoting only men to senior management. Cf. Turgeon v. Premark 

Int’l, Inc., 87 F.3d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[E]vidence of a tendency to employ and 

promote individuals in the protected groups can be relevant evidence of a company’s 

motivations.”). We see in the record that out of seven positions for senior manager that 

Truesdale filled during his six years as managing director of the Chicago Metro District, 

he never promoted a woman, despite eligible women applying for each opening. He made 

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6
No. 15-2967 Page 6

a woman a senior manager once, but she already was a senior manager at a different 

location and did not need a promotion. When Truesdale retired in 2013, of the twelve or 

so senior managers reporting to him, none was a woman. In addition, FedEx chastised 

Truesdale in 2008 for transferring management responsibilities away from a female to a 

male senior manager so that he could receive a promotion. When Truesdale later tried to 

demote that female, FedEx overruled him and chastised him “for allowing his frustration 

... to impair his judgment when issuing discipline” to her.

FedEx counters that, despite any insinuations from all this evidence, Truesdale had 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Hussain. Truesdale says that 

Hussain’s lower “consensus” score, determined by the entire panel, cost her the 

promotion. When a hiring decision is made by a committee that is untainted by the bias 

of one of its members, “the causal link between that prejudice” and the adverse 

employment action is severed. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); see 

Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 2003). But this record permits a finding 

that Truesdale did not rely solely on the “consensus” scores; he relied on subjective 

factors (including, importantly, his observations and assessment of “fit”) evaluated in his 

sole discretion. A rational juror also could conclude that Truesdale’s bias infected the 

committee’s “consensus” scoring. Two of Truesdale’s direct subordinates were on the 

panel, a practice that calls into question the independence of their judgments, and one 

that FedEx disallowed after it discovered that it had occurred in this case. Truesdale’s

score for Hussain was lower than the score Hussain received from both of these direct 

reports. FedEx replies that these two subordinates said that Truesdale did not “influence 

or pressure me directly or indirectly to score any applicant in a particular manner.” But 

one of them later admitted that he had very little recollection of the interview process or 

the scoring decisions. So the “no influence” disclaimer need not be believed.

Because Hussain presented evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that 

FedEx failed to promote her because of her sex, her national origin, or both, we VACATE 

the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.

Case: 15-2967 Document: 41 Filed: 07/26/2016 Pages: 6