Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02387/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02387-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U

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States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TED PAUL INIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2387 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING STAY AND

DENYING HABEAS PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Ted Paul Iniguez filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. This action is now before the court for consideration of Iniguez’s motion for a

stay and abeyance as well as for a consideration of the merits of the habeas petition. For the

reasons discussed below, the court denies the motion for a stay and abeyance and denies the

petition on the merits.

BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

The evidence of the several crimes of which Iniguez was convicted was recited in

respondent’s exhibit 4, the California Court of Appeal’s opinion (hereinafter “Cal Ct. App.

Opinion”). The facts are only briefly summarized because they are largely irrelevant to the

claims asserted in the federal petition.

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Iniguez was convicted of two counts of unlawfully driving or taking of a vehicle. A 2001

Toyota 4-Runner and a 1997 Acura LR were stolen from a car dealership. Police were called

by Henriette Agredano, who thought that Iniguez had stolen the Toyota and parked it near her

home. Iniguez, who was a friend of one of Agredano’s sons, was apprehended hiding in

Agredano’s home. Fingerprints were taken from the Toyota and the Acura that matched

Iniguez’s fingerprints. Agredano suspected Iniguez was stealing cars when she saw him

working with tools on a car in her driveway and observed little metal boxes (perhaps lock boxes

for keys) on her driveway and was told they came off a stolen vehicle. Another witness had seen

Iniguez prying a key lock box off a vehicle. 

Iniguez also was convicted of two counts of dissuading or attempting to dissuade a

witness by threat of force and one count of making a criminal threat. Iniguez had sent a letter

to Agredano that suggested that harm would befall her if she didn’t recant her statements to

police, sent another letter to her (written by him but bearing the name “Frank Mendez” as the

sender) that threatened to harm or kill her and another witness as well as to destroy her property,

and had telephone conversations with his brother and girlfriend in which he instructed them to

threaten and cause harm to Agredano, her family and home. 

B. Procedural History

Following a jury trial in Santa Clara County, Iniguez was convicted in 2001 of two counts

of unlawfully taking a vehicle, two counts of dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness by

threat of force, and one count of making criminal threats. See Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a), Cal.

Penal Code §§ 136.1(c)(1), 422. Sentence enhancement allegations that Iniguez had sustained

a prior strike conviction and served two prior prison terms were found true. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 667, 1170.12. Iniguez was sentenced to 25 years in state prison. On July 24, 2003, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded for further

proceedings on a sentence enhancement allegation and resentencing. The proceedings took

place on September 19, 2003, and Iniguez was again sentenced to 25 years in state prison. The

California Supreme Court later denied Iniguez’s petition for review. 

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Iniguez then filed this action. The court found that the habeas petition stated two claims

cognizable in federal habeas: (1) his rights to due process and a jury trial were violated when the

trial court failed to instruct on auto tampering and malicious mischief to a vehicle as lesser

included offenses to unlawful taking and driving of a motor vehicle, and (2) his right to due

process was violated by the lack of notice of the factual basis for the charge of making a criminal

threat. The court dismissed several other claims for state law errors. The court issued an order

to show cause. Respondent filed an answer and Iniguez filed a traverse.

After the petition was fully briefed, Iniguez moved for a stay and abeyance so that he

could exhaust state court remedies and present claims concerning the sentence enhancement he

received as a result of his conviction of vehicle theft with a prior conviction for vehicle theft.

Respondent opposed the motion. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion For Stay

Iniguez filed a motion for stay and abeyance so that he could return to state court to

exhaust state court remedies as to claims he wanted to present about the sentence enhancement

he received under California Vehicle Code §§ 666.5/10851 for being convicted of unlawful

taking or driving a vehicle after having a prior conviction for vehicle theft. The details

concerning that enhancement and the background that led to the motion for a stay and abeyance

are described in the court’s February 21, 2006 order and will not be repeated here. Respondent

opposed the motion and argued that a stay was inappropriate because the claims sought to be

exhausted were meritless. The court agrees with respondent’s position.

A district court may stay a mixed habeas petition to allow the petitioner to exhaust his

unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). In Rhines,

the Court discussed the stay-and-abeyance procedure for mixed habeas petitions. Rhines

cautioned district courts against being too liberal in allowing a stay because a stay works against

several of the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA") in that it "frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality by allowing a

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petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings" and "undermines AEDPA's goal of

streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his

claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A stay and

abeyance "is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the

petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court," the claims are not plainly meritless,

and there are no intentionally dilatory litigation tactics by the petitioner. Id. at 277-78. Iniguez’s

motion falters on the requirement that the unexhausted claims not be plainly meritless. 

Iniguez wants a stay to exhaust claims that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated because the state failed to plead and prove his prior vehicle theft conviction.

He urges that the sentence enhancement violated his constitutional rights because “the District

Attorney never independently alleged in [the] accusatory pleading with respect to dates or time

when the allegation set forth in Penal Code section 666.5 was committed by petitioner.” Motion

For Stay And Abeyance, p. 2. This claim is plainly meritless because the fact of the prior vehicle

theft conviction triggers § 666.5 and that was adequately alleged in the indictment. See CT 156

(alleging “within the meaning of Penal Code section 666.5 that prior to” the commission of the

current theft charged, Iniguez previously was convicted of a violation of California Vehicle

Code § 10851 in Santa Clara County Case No. 176808). The identification of the prior

conviction by county of conviction, case number, and Vehicle Code section violated provided

sufficient notice for the sentence enhancement allegation. The particulars of that crime, e.g.,

where and when Iniguez stole a vehicle, did not have to be pled or proven at a proceeding to

determine the truth of the sentence enhancement allegation based on the conviction for the

crime. A sentence enhancement allegation that a defendant has suffered a prior conviction does

not open the door to relitigating the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime leading to the

conviction. There was no constitutional violation based on the absence of allegations about the

particulars of how and when Iniguez committed the prior vehicle theft. 

Iniguez also alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because a trier of fact

never found true the prior conviction and it wasn’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Motion

For Stay And Abeyance, pp. 2-3. The claim has no possibility of succeeding under the

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circumstances. The proceedings on remand concerning the prior vehicle theft conviction

allegation occurred as ordered by the California Court of Appeal, thus making moot any claims

concerning the original proceedings with regard to proof of the sentence enhancement allegation.

At the proceedings on remand, Iniguez waived his rights to a jury trial, to have the prosecution

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront and cross-examine witness, to present a

defense, to testify and to avoid-self incrimination. Resp. Exh. 6, 9/19/03 RT 4-6. After waiving

those rights, he admitted the truth of the allegations that he had suffered a prior vehicle theft

conviction. Id. at 6. Having waived all his constitutional rights and admitted the truth of the

sentence enhancement allegation, Iniguez has no chance at all of prevailing on his constitutional

claims. Cf. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses consideration

of pre-plea constitutional deprivations).

The motion for stay and abeyance is DENIED because the claims for which a stay is

sought are plainly meritless. (Docket # 9.) The court now turns to the merits of the two

exhausted claims in the petition. They are ready for review because the motion for stay and

abeyance was filed after those two claims were fully briefed on the merits. 

B. The Petition

1. Jurisdiction, Venue And Exhaustion

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

conviction occurred in Santa Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 84, 2241(d).

The parties do not dispute that state court remedies have been exhausted for the two

claims the court found cognizable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 

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2. Standard Of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or

if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may nor issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

3. The Claims

a. Failure To Instruct On The Lesser-Included Offenses

Iniguez claims that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct on auto tampering

and malicious mischief to a vehicle as lesser-included offenses to unlawful taking and driving

of a motor vehicle. The jury was instructed on unlawful taking and driving of a motor vehicle,

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and returned guilty verdicts on those two counts. No one sought, and the trial court did not

give, instructions on the lesser-included offenses. 

The state court of appeal rejected Iniguez’s claim of instructional error. See Cal. Ct.

App. Opinion, pp. 10-13. The appellate court stated that auto tampering (see California Vehicle

Code § 10852) and malicious mischief (see California Vehicle Code § 10853) are lesserincluded offenses to unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code §

10851. However, the lesser-included offenses instructions were not necessary under state law

because there was not enough evidence at trial to support them: 

Here, the evidence of unlawful taking or driving of the Toyota and the Acura indicated

that defendant, if he was guilty at all, was guilty of the greater offense. Furthermore,

reversal would not be required here even if we accepted defendant’s claim of error.

Agredano’s testimony that she saw defendant driving each of the two vehicles

was strengthened by other evidence. Paxson testified to seeing defendant on Agredano’s

driveway trying to remove the key lockbox from a newer Acura or Honda. The Toyota

was parked on the street near Agredano’s house and defendant was in her backyard when

police responded to the report of a stolen vehicle. Defendant’s fingerprints linked him

to the stolen vehicles. In addition, evidence of defendant’s initial flight and efforts to

suppress Agredano’s testimony by intimidation indicated his consciousness of guilt.

(See Evid. Code, § 413.) The instructions, as a whole, clearly directed the jury to find

defendant not guilty if it did not believe defendant had driven or taken the vehicles as

alleged. Under all these circumstances, even assuming error, there is no reasonable

probability that the jury would have convicted defendant of vehicle tampering or

malicious mischief, instead of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, had the court

instructed on those lesser offenses. 

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 12-13. The California Court of Appeal rejected the federal

constitutional claim without discussion. 

There is no clearly established rule that a trial court must instruct on all lesser included

and lesser related offenses. Although instructions on lesser included offenses must be given in

capital cases, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), "[t]here is no settled rule of law on

whether Beck applies to noncapital cases such as the present one. In fact, this circuit, without

specifically addressing the issue of extending Beck, has declined to find constitutional error

arising from the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case." Turner v.

Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998), overruled on

other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The failure of

a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included offenses in a non-capital case does not present

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a federal constitutional claim. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 839 (2001); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1998). The

failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of auto tampering and malicious mischief to

a vehicle did not violate any constitutional right Iniguez possessed. 

In his traverse, Iniguez shifted the focus of his constitutional claim a bit and argued that

his right to due process was violated because he had been deprived of a state-created liberty

interest in having the jury instructed on lesser-included offenses. See Traverse, p. 6. The shift

in focus did not help him because the state appellate court explicitly determined he was not

entitled to the instructions under state law. This court generally will not, in a habeas case, revisit

a determination of state law by the state appellate court. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-

30 (1988) (court is not free to review state court's determination of state law); cf. id. at 630 n.3

(quoting West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1940)

(determination of state law made by an intermediate appellate court must be followed and may

not be "'disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the

highest court of the state would decide otherwise'")). Once one accepts that Iniguez was not

entitled under California law to the lesser-included offenses instruction , as the California Court

of Appeal determined, the result for Iniguez’s habeas claim is inevitable. The trial court's failure

to sua sponte instruct on the lesser-included offenses was not an error under California law, did

not deprive him of any state-created liberty interest in such instructions and therefore did not

violate Iniguez’s right to due process. 

b. Notice Of The Charge Of Making A Criminal Threat

Iniguez contends he was not given sufficient notice of the charge of making a criminal

threat. The indictment charged him with violating California Penal Code § 422 by making a

threat against Agredano on or about November 1, 2000. See CT 157, 211. He urges that the

accusatory pleading was deficient in that it “did not describe the nature, content, or means of

communication of the threat, except conjunctively in the statutory language” and he never

received notice of the specific factual basis of the criminal threat charge. See Petition, p. 30.

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1That court also rejected an argument made by the prosecution concerning the criminal

threat charge, determined that the “Frank Mendez” letter was the act that supported the criminal

threat conviction, and determined that the telephonic statements were factually inadequate to

support a guilty verdict on the criminal threat charge. Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 24.

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Iniguez urges that the lack of specificity harmed him in that he was required to negate three

possible theories of liability as he had made several potentially qualifying statements, i.e., his

telephonic statements to his girlfriend about harming Agredano, his telephonic statements to his

brother about harming Agredano, and the “Frank Mendez” letter he sent to Agredano. See Cal.

Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 5-10.

The California Court of Appeal considered and rejected Iniguez’s arguments that the

indictment violated Iniguez’s rights under California law, the California constitution and the

federal constitution.1 Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 17-19. That court noted that the federal and

state constitutions required that a defendant be given notice of the charges adequate to give a

meaningful opportunity to defend against them and not be taken by surprise by the evidence

offered at trial. Id. at 17. Under state law, it was sufficient to state the charge in the statutory

language. Id. The appellate court further stated: “Due process does not require that [an]

accusatory pleading provide the particular factual circumstances of a charged offense.

[Citations.] Greater detail of the charge is given to defendant by the evidence adduced in the

preliminary examination or in grand jury proceedings.” Id. at 17-18. The court explained that

in a case prosecuted by indictment, such as Iniguez’s, the defendant is entitled to a complete

transcript of the proceedings before the grand jury. Id. at 18 n.4. Iniguez “does not argue or

show that the evidence supporting the filing of the indictment, which charged him with making

a criminal threat against Agredano, failed to provide notice adequate to permit him to

meaningfully defend against the charge.” Id. at 18. The state appellate court also concluded

that the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury of the factual basis for the charge. Id. 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to be clearly

informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. See Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d

1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995). To determine whether a defendant has received fair notice of the

charges against him, the court looks first to the charging document, e.g., the information or

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indictment. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 (1994). The

principal purpose of the charging document is to provide the defendant with a description of the

charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare a defense. See id. It is not

constitutionally defective if it states "the elements of an offense charged with sufficient clarity

to apprise a defendant of what to defend against," Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.)

(quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986), even if it does

not state the method by which the crime was committed, Calderon, 59 F.3d at 1009. See, e.g.,

Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 925 (2004) (charging

a defendant with the crime of three or more acts of sexual abuse in a specified time period,

without identifying the precise dates when the abuse occurred, did not clearly violate clearly

established Supreme Court law). The right to notice of the charge does not include a

constitutional right to notice of the evidence the state plans to use to prove the charge. See Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168-69 (1996).

There was no constitutionally deficient notice in Iniguez’s case. The charging document

followed the statutory language, identified the victim, and gave an “on or about” date on which

the crime occurred. The fact that Iniguez had done three things in that time period that he

thought might qualify did not mean that he had a constitutional right to have the prosecution

identify which particular act it thought amounted to making a criminal threat. The prosecutor

amalgamated several different acts and argued for conviction based on the Frank Mendez letter

and the phone conversations with Iniguez’s girlfriend and brother – an erroneous legal theory,

it turns out, see Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 19-24 – but that does not mean that Iniguez did not

have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charge against him The language of the indictment

was sufficient to encompass notification to him that the Frank Mendez letter he sent to Henriette

Agredano was a factual basis for the charge. Iniguez was not blind-sided during trial by the

factual basis of the charge against him; for example, more than two weeks before the trial

started, his attorney wrote a motion in limine identifying the letters (rather than the telephonic

statements) as the basis for the criminal threat charge. See CT 184. 

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Finally, the California Court of Appeal specifically pointed out the lack of factual support

for Iniguez’s lack-of-notice claim and Iniguez thereafter did nothing to develop the record to

prove his point. The state appellate court wrote that Iniguez had not shown that the evidence

failed, such as the grand jury transcripts that were by law available to him, failed to provide

adequate notice to meaningfully defend against the charge. Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 18.

Nonetheless, Iniguez stuck with his argument; he did not seek rehearing, did not seek to augment

the record on appeal (which did not include the grand jury transcripts), and did not otherwise try

to show how the grand jury proceedings would not have provided him notice if he had looked

at them. See, e.g., Petition For Review, pp. 5-6. 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Iniguez’s claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme

Court. He is not entitled to the writ on this claim. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for a stay and abeyance is DENIED and the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 19, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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