Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08293/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Valerie Tipa, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-08293-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

Plaintiff Valerie Tipa seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i) and 

223(d) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the 

Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. Background. 

On April 13, 2010, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning April 4, 2008. On June 29, 

2012, she appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A 

vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. On July 24, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision that 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals 

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Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s 

decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not affect the 

ultimate nondisability determination. Id. The claimant usually bears the burden of 

showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111. 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

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has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2013, and that she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since April 4, 2008. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the following severe impairments: lumbar back pain/degenerative disc disease statuspost fusion surgery, obesity, and degenerative joint disease of the right hip. At step three, 

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 

Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform: 

[S]edentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) with no 

climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no more than occasional 

balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, climbing 

ramps and stairs; and no concentrated exposure to excessive 

vibrations, moving machinery except motor vehicles, or 

unprotected heights. 

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work as a 

receptionist. At step five, the ALJ concluded that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, 

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work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

IV. Analysis. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “misconstrued” practically all of the relevant 

objective medical evidence and all of the subjective testimony. Plaintiff’s generalized 

arguments appear to boil down to an assertion that the ALJ’s decision is defective for 

three reasons: (1) the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician and a consultative examiner; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s 

credibility; and (3) the ALJ improperly determined that Plaintiff could perform her past 

relevant work. Plaintiff also argues that this matter should be assigned to a different ALJ 

if a remand is necessary because the ALJ assigned to her case is prejudiced against her. 

The Court will address each argument below. 

A. Weighing of Medical Source Evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of the 

following medical sources: treating physician Katherine Metzger, D.O., and consultative 

examiner Mark Brecheisen, D.O. The Court will address the ALJ’s treatment of each 

opinion below. 

1. Legal Standard. 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 

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81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She] must set 

forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. The Commissioner is responsible for determining 

whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and does not give 

significance to a statement by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable 

to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). 

2. Katherine Metzger, D.O. 

Dr. Metzger completed a check-the-box form on May 21, 2012 offering the 

following opinions: Plaintiff could occasionally lift or carry ten pounds and could 

frequently lift or carry five pounds; Plaintiff could stand and/or walk four hours in a work 

day with the use of a cane; Plaintiff needs to alternate standing and sitting to avoid 

stiffening and pain; Plaintiff needs to elevate her legs two to three times per day because 

of swelling; Plaintiff could never climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; Plaintiff 

had no restrictions as to heights, noise, temperature extremes, chemicals, or dust; and 

Plaintiff should not be around moving machinery. A.R. 383-85. The ALJ accorded Dr. 

Metzger’s opinion “partial weight.” A.R. 17. 

Dr. Metzger’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Brecheisen, 

who opined that Plaintiff had greater abilities than those identified by Dr. Metzger. The 

ALJ could therefore discount Dr. Metzger’s opinion for specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ provided four 

reasons for according Dr. Metzger’s opinion partial weight. 

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First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Metzger’s opinion assessed limitations from “5/8/12 

to present” and not from Plaintiff’s alleged onset date. A.R. 17, 385. Dr. Metzger’s 

opinion failed to meet the duration requirement because the assessed impairments had not 

lasted for a continuous period of at least 12 months and Dr. Metzger’s opinion does not 

state that Plaintiff’s limitations are expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 

months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. 

Second, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Metzger’s opinion was inconsistent with her 

own treatment notes. A.R. 17. The treatment notes included reports of “unremarkable 

examinations including no acute distress, ambulation without assistance, no neurological 

abnormalities, a normal range of motion in all areas, an unremarkable back including 

none-to-slight tenderness, and no edema.” A.R. 15, 377-85. The mild impairments 

supported by Dr. Metzger’s treatment notes are not consistent with the severe restrictions 

contained in her medical opinion. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (incongruity between questionnaire responses and medical records provides a 

legitimate reason for discounting opinion). 

Third, the ALJ found that the brevity of Dr. Metzger’s treating relationship with 

Plaintiff strongly suggested that the limitations included in Dr. Metzger’s opinion were 

“regurgitations of the claimant’s self-report.” A.R. 17. By the time Dr. Metzger filled 

out her check-the-box form, the treating relationship had lasted less than one month and 

Dr. Metzger had seen Plaintiff only one time. A.R. 381-85. The ALJ properly relied on 

the short duration of the treatment relationship to discount Dr. Metzger’s opinion. 

Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the duration of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency and nature of the contact relevant in weighing 

medical opinion evidence). The ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Metzger’s opinion is 

buttressed by Dr. Metzger’s notation in her treatment notes that she “filled out the form 

for [Plaintiff’s] lawyers” with Plaintiff’s help. A.R. 379; see Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the ALJ could discount a 

treating physician’s opinion because it was “based on [the claimant]’s subjective 

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descriptions of pain.”); Benton, 331 F.3d at 1038-39. The mild limitations and 

unremarkable findings made by Dr. Metzger further support the ALJ’s belief that Dr. 

Metzger’s medical opinion was based on Plaintiff’s self-report rather than on Dr. 

Metzger’s medical observations. A.R. 377-85. 

Fourth, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Metzger’s opinion was inconsistent with reliable 

medical evidence of record. The ALJ based this assertion on two sources: (1) physical 

examinations performed by Dr. Metzger herself and described above, and (2) physical 

therapy records submitted by a therapist from whom Plaintiff received treatment 

following her surgery. A.R. 265-88. The physical therapy records include multiple 

clinical tests establishing Plaintiff’s range of motion, strength, reflexes, gait, mobility, 

and recuperation. The records also include multiple statements made and documents 

submitted by Plaintiff indicating that her pain had significantly abated, she relied less on 

her cane, she no longer wore her back brace, she could satisfactorily perform all of her 

tasks of daily living, and her mobility had improved. A.R. 266-67, 71-72. The records 

even contain a statement by Plaintiff asserting that she felt ready to return to work in an 

office position so long as she did not have to lift more than 20 pounds. A.R. 267, 272. 

See Orn, 495 F.3d 631 (explaining that consistency with the medical record as a whole is 

a relevant factor when evaluating a medical opinion). 

Plaintiff argues that it was error for the ALJ to rely on records submitted by the 

physical therapist because the therapist is not an acceptable medical source as defined by 

Social Security Rulings. Doc. 13 at 8; SSR 06-03p. Plaintiff is incorrect. Although the 

therapist is not an “acceptable medical source” as defined by Ruling 06-03p, the ruling 

clearly indicates that the therapist is an “other source” from whom the ALJ may gather 

evidence that sheds light on the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments and how the 

impairments affect Plaintiff’s ability to function. Thus, the ALJ could rely on the 

physical therapist’s records to discount Dr. Metzger’s medical opinion. SSR 06-03p. 

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The ALJ relied on specific, legitimate, and permissible reasons to discount Dr. 

Metzger’s opinion, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. The Court 

concludes that the ALJ did not commit legal error. 

3. Mark Brecheisen, D.O. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mischaracterized the report submitted by consultative 

examiner Mark Brecheisen, D.O., by stating that he opined that Plaintiff was capable of a 

sedentary lifting level of “no more than 10 pounds,” when Dr. Brecheisen actually found 

that Plaintiff was capable of “less than 10 pounds both occasionally and frequently.” 

Doc. 13 at 9-10. Plaintiff is correct that these two standards are different and that the 

ALJ incorrectly summarized Dr. Brecheisen’s finding. But this error had no impact on 

the ALJ’s ultimate decision because the ALJ discounted Dr. Brecheisen’s lifting 

requirement, noting that it was based on Plaintiff’s self-report. A.R. 16; Batson, 359 F.3d 

at 1195. The Court concludes, therefore, that the ALJ did not commit legal error. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if so, and if there is no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony 

about the severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons 

for the rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The ALJ complied with this two-step analysis. The ALJ first found that Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms. The ALJ then found Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. In other words, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements not credible to the extent she claims she is unable to 

perform in a competitive work environment. 

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At the hearing Plaintiff testified the she has not worked since April 2008, when 

she “herniated [her] back.” A.R. 33. Plaintiff stated that she uses a cane to walk at all 

times. A.R. 33-34. She asserted that she needs to recline and shift her weight when 

sitting and alternate between sitting and standing in order to alleviate her pain. A.R. 34, 

36. She testified the she experiences “excruciating” pain in her back and right hip that 

has worsened since her October 2008 back surgery and which is not alleviated with pain 

medication. A.R. 38, 41. Plaintiff testified that she experiences intensely painful muscle 

spasms in her legs a few times a day that prevent her from driving and require two hours 

or so of recovery time. A.R. 40-41. Plaintiff asserted that she has endured migraines 

three times a week since 2008, which last twelve hours and require her to “go to a dark 

room, put ice on [her] head, turn off the lights, [and hear] no sound.” A.R. 42-43. The 

only medication she has taken to combat her migraines is Tylenol. A.R. 43. She testified 

that her right kneecap pops out of place several times a week, requiring her to “push[] it 

back in.” A.R. 43-44. She stated that she can lift “maybe ten pounds.” A.R. 44. She 

asserted that she has trouble concentrating, which causes her to randomly forget what she 

was talking about or doing several times per day. A.R. 45. As to activities of daily 

living, Plaintiff testified that her disabled, quadriplegic husband does most of the 

housework and that she remains in her bed some days because of her pain. A.R. 45-46. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney brought attention to the fact that Plaintiff elevated her 

legs on a second chair while she was testifying, used a cane, brought a “grabber” to the 

hearing in order to demonstrate that she could not stoop, and alternated between standing 

and sitting during her testimony. 

The ALJ gave the following reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not fully 

credible: (1) the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of total 

disability; (2) Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with statements made to healthcare 

providers immediately after her surgery; (3) Plaintiff’s testimony about the intensity of 

her back and hip pain is not consistent with her failure to seek treatment for nearly two 

and a half years; (4) once Plaintiff did seek care for her pain, she received conservative 

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treatment and over-the-counter medication only; (5) Plaintiff’s activities of daily living 

were inconsistent with her allegations of pain; (6) the record contains several inconsistent 

statements from Plaintiff regarding both her degree of limitations and other matters 

indirectly related to her functioning and overall credibility; and (7) Plaintiff’s hearing 

testimony was exaggerated. A.R. 15-16. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court 

finds that each of the reasons cited by the ALJ for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not fully 

credible is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assertion that her condition improved post-surgery 

is baseless. Doc. 13 at 10, 15-16. To the contrary, multiple relevant sources indicate that 

Plaintiff’s mobility and level of pain improved over time after her surgery, including her 

physical therapist (A.R. 266-87) and a radiologist who found “less prominent” disc 

bulges and a decrease in right-sided narrowing when comparing an April 2012 MRI of 

Plaintiff’s back to a March 2008 MRI (A.R. 374). Substantial evidence therefore 

supported that ALJ’s assertion that Plaintiff’s condition improved over time. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding her less credible based on the 

assertion that Plaintiff collected unemployment benefits after the alleged onset of her 

disability. Doc. 13 at 11. Plaintiff correctly observes that she failed to collect 

unemployment benefits during the relevant time period. A.R. 204-05. In addition, while 

there may be an inconsistency between Plaintiff’s decision to file for unemployment 

benefits, which requires an attestation of Plaintiff’s ability to work, and her decision to 

file for disability benefits, which requires an attestation of Plaintiff’s inability to work, 

the record here does not establish whether Plaintiff held herself out as available for fulltime or part-time work. Only the former is inconsistent with her disability allegations. 

Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, 

the ALJ’s reliance on this potential inconsistency in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility 

was error. Because the ALJ provided many other reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

credibility, however, the Court concludes that the error was harmless. 

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Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that she only takes “over-the-counter 

pain medication.” Doc. 13 at 16. Plaintiff bases this assertion on the fact that she also 

takes multiple prescription medications, including Tramadol, Gabapentin, and Ropinirole. 

A.R. 245. While it is true that Plaintiff was prescribed these medications approximately 

three months prior to her hearing before the ALJ, throughout the majority of the relevant 

time period Plaintiff only reported taking over-the-counter medications for her pain. 

A.R. 226, 244, 245, 311, 349-50. Thus, while the ALJ’s statement is not entirely correct, 

it accurately captures the fact that Plaintiff medicated her “excruciating pain” with 

Tylenol and other over-the-counter pain medications until just before her administrative 

hearing. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff used a cane that was 

not prescribed or medically necessary. Doc. 13 at 8-9. Plaintiff asserts that both Drs. 

Metzger and Brecheisen testified that the cane was prescribed and medically necessary. 

Id. Plaintiff is correct. A.R. 312, 384. This error, which eliminates the ALJ’s conclusion 

that Plaintiff used a cane that was not prescribed, does not render the ALJ’s other 

findings legally erroneous. 

Plaintiff contends that it was error for the ALJ to discount her testimony based on 

contradictory evidence of her activities of daily living. Doc. 13 at 14. Plaintiff bases her 

contention on the existence of evidence in the record that tends to support her testimony 

regarding her activities of daily living. Plaintiff similarly contests the ALJ’s conclusions 

that Plaintiff engaged in physical exercise and that she made inconsistent statements 

regarding marijuana use during the administrative process because other evidence exists 

in the record supporting an alternate interpretation of the record. The Court may not, 

however, re-weigh the evidence. “If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial 

evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. 

The Court will not second-guess the ALJ’s conclusions because they are supported by 

substantial evidence. 

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C. ALJ’s Determination the Plaintiff Could Perform Past Relevant Work. 

Plaintiff argues that it was error for the ALJ to conclude that she was capable of 

performing her past work as a receptionist. Doc. 13 at 16-17. Plaintiff asserts that the 

ALJ stated that her former occupation as a receptionist was found in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) number 237.367-010 with a sedentary exertion level and 

skill level of three, when it is actually found under DOT number 237.367-038 with a 

sedentary level and skill level of four. Id. Plaintiff is simply incorrect. The transcript 

from the hearing makes clear that the relevant occupation is listed under DOT number 

237.267-010 with a sedentary exertion and skill level of three. A.R. 56. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ ignored certain testimony from the vocational 

expert. Doc. 13 at 17. The vocational expert testimony that the ALJ ignored, however, 

was responding to a hypothetical posed by Plaintiff’s attorney and was based on an RFC 

not adopted by the ALJ. The ALJ, therefore, properly disregarded the testimony. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

Dated this 11th day of September, 2014. 

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