Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00956/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00956-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 On June 18, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this court’s May 24, 1

2007 order, denying his application to proceed informa pauperis. Because the court has

determined that plaintiff’s May 25, 2007 application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a), the court will deny plaintiff’s motion as moot. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY RAY BROWN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0956 MCE DAD P

vs.

G. MARSHALL, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action seeking

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to this court’s May 24, 2007 order, plaintiff has

filed a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.1

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Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $1.16 will be assessed by this

order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate

agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s prison trust account and forward it to

the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of

twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the

Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in

full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

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355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421

(1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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In the present case, plaintiff has identified as defendants G. Marshall, R. Gore,

Quezada, P. Statti, D.E. Vanderville, T. McDonald, R.K. Wong, D.L. Runnels, and T. Felker.

Plaintiff alleges as follows. On March 15, 2005, he was placed in administrative

segregation, pending an investigation for “conspiracy to assault staff.” On March 24, 2005,

plaintiff appeared before the Institution Classification Committee (ICC), so they could determine

whether he should be retained in administrative segregation. Plaintiff requested staff assistance

to help prepare his defense. The Chief Deputy Warden, R. Barnes, granted plaintiff’s request and

appointed Correctional Officer Ditton to serve as the investigative employee. Ditton interviewed

plaintiff and told him that he would question all of plaintiff’s requested witnesses. Ditton also

said that he would provide plaintiff with a report within 24 hours before the next ICC hearing. 

However, Ditton never issued plaintiff a copy of the report.

On April 6, 2005, plaintiff alleges that Captain Johnson issued plaintiff an

administrative segregation order. Plaintiff’s charge had been enhanced from “conspiracy to

assault staff” to “conspiracy to murder peace officers.” Plaintiff alleges that defendant G.

Marshall falsely reported that confidential informants provided reliable information proving that

plaintiff was part of such a conspiracy. On April 12, 2005, plaintiff received a CDC 115

reflecting the upgraded charge, a CDC 837 crime incident report, and CDC 1030 confidential

disclosure forms. 

On April 14, 2005, plaintiff again appeared before the ICC, and it was determined

that he should stay in administrative segregation, pending the adjudication of his alleged rules

violation. Plaintiff contends that he was unable to present a defense or contest further

administrative segregation placement because he never received the report from Ditton. 

On May 12, 2005, plaintiff appeared at his disciplinary hearing before Senior

Hearing Officer Lieutenant C. Bolls. Lieutenant Bolls found plaintiff guilty of conspiracy to

murder peace officers. Plaintiff was assessed 180 days loss of credit and referred for a security

housing unit (SHU) term. On June 30, 2005, plaintiff received a copy of the final disciplinary

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disposition, reflecting the outcome of the hearing. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff appealed the

decision.

On July 7, 2005, plaintiff appeared again before the ICC for confirmation of the

CDC 115 “conspiracy to murder peace officers” rules violation and the SHU term assessment. 

However, the ICC informed plaintiff at that time that they intended to reissue the CDC 115 and

rehear it. On July 15, 2005, plaintiff received the reissued CDC 115. On July 20, 2005, plaintiff

wrote the chief disciplinary officer and requested staff assistance and another investigative

employee. 

On August 13, 2005, plaintiff appeared at his disciplinary hearing before Senior

Hearing Officer Lieutenant Peery. Plaintiff informed Peery that he had not received staff

assistance or the help of an investigative employee. Notwithstanding, Peery found him guilty of

conspiracy to murder peace officers.

On August 30, 2005, plaintiff received a copy of the final disciplinary disposition,

reflecting the outcome of the hearing. Plaintiff appealed the guilty finding on September 12,

2005. 

On September 15, 2005, plaintiff appeared once again before the ICC for

confirmation of the CDC 115 “conspiracy to murder peace officers” rules violation and SHU

term assessment. At that time the ICC again informed plaintiff that they intended to reissue the

CDC 115 and rehear it. 

Plaintiff alleges that D.L. Runnels granted him a computer voice stress analyzer

test. Runnels instructed the ICC to use the results of the test at the next CDC 115 disciplinary

hearing. 

 On September 20, 2005, plaintiff received the reissued CDC 115, CDC 1030

forms, and the CDC 837 crime report. The report included additional pages, listing new alleged

co-conspirators. On September 27, 2005, Lieutenant Stafford conducted another computer voice

stress analyzer test on plaintiff. On October 16, 2005, plaintiff wrote to Warden D.L. Runnels

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and Chief Disciplinary Officer R.K. Wong, requesting assignment of another investigative

employee. Plaintiff also requested the results of his computer voice stress test. 

On October 19, 2005, plaintiff appeared at his disciplinary hearing before Senior

Hearing Officer Lieutenant P. Statti. Plaintiff informed Statti that the assigned investigative

employee, R. Gore, did not question all of plaintiff’s witnesses even though he provided Gore

with a 28-page written statement and witness questionaire. Plaintiff also informed Statti that the

staff assistant assigned to his case, Quezada, would not assist plaintiff with preparation of his

defense. Plaintiff explained that no one had questioned any of his newly alleged co-conspirators. 

Plaintiff also explained that he had not received the formal results of his voice stress test. 

Plaintiff requested postponement of the hearing and new staff assistance. Lieutenant Statti

denied plaintiff’s requests and found him guilty of the charge. Plaintiff was assessed 180 days

loss of credit.

On October 25, 2005, plaintiff wrote Chief Disciplinary Officer R. K. Wong and

Warden D.L. Runnels. He explained that his due process rights had been denied because no one

had interviewed his witnesses or afforded him access to all non-confidential reports. 

On November 17, 2005, plaintiff received a copy of the final disciplinary

disposition. Plaintiff appealed the guilty findings on November 21, 2005. 

On November 23, 2005, plaintiff appeared yet again before the ICC for

confirmation of the CDC 115 “conspiracy to murder peace officers.” Plaintiff was assessed 180

days loss of credit and a 48 month SHU term. However, on January 19, 2006, plaintiff received

an administrative segregation order, stating that a classification staff representative found

insufficient information in the CDC 115 to warrant a guilty finding. 

On January 26, 2006, plaintiff made another appearance before ICC and was

informed that the prison had appealed the decision by the classification staff representative to the

Departmental Review Board and that the Board’s decision would be final. Plaintiff alleges that

/////

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D.E. Vanderville had sought the Board’s review. Plaintiff also alleges that Vanderville falsified

information about the results of the voice stress test that was administered to plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges that Vanderville intentionally referred two of his alleged coconspirators’ cases the Board. Plaintiff further alleges that, before the Board could rule, the

classification service unit took over the case. The unit’s chief, T. McDonald, reviewed one of the

two cases. Plaintiff alleges that McDonald adopted the ICC findings in that case, and his

decision was then applied to all of the other inmates, including plaintiff, even though the

circumstances in plaintiff’s case were different. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his due process rights. Plaintiff seeks

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, costs of the suit, and any additional relief the court

deems proper and just.

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims for relief

against defendants Marshall, Gore, Quezada, Statti, Vanderville, McDonald, Wong, and Runnels. 

If the allegations of the complaint are proven against the defendants, plaintiff has a reasonable

opportunity to prevail on the merits of this action. The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does

not state a cognizable claim against defendant Felker. Plaintiff has failed to allege any specific

causal link between the actions of Felker and the claimed constitutional violations. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s May 25, 2007 application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s June 18, 2007 motion for reconsideration is denied as moot.

3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $1.16. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

4. Service of the complaint is appropriate for the following defendants: Marshall,

Gore, Quezada, Statti, Vanderville, McDonald, Wong, and Runnels.

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5. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff 8 USM-285 forms, one summons,

an instruction sheet, and a copy of the complaint filed May 21, 2007.

6. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the

attached Notice of Submission of Documents and submit all of the following documents to the

court at the same time:

a. The completed, signed Notice of Submission of Documents;

b. One completed summons;

c. One completed USM-285 form for each defendant listed in number 4

above; and

d. Nine copies of the complaint filed May 21, 2007.

7. Plaintiff shall not attempt to effect service of the complaint on defendants or

request a waiver of service of summons from any defendant. Upon receipt of the abovedescribed documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to serve the above-named

defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 without payment of costs. 

DATED: September 20, 2007.

DAD:9

brow0956.1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY RAY BROWN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0956 MCE DAD P

vs.

G. MARSHALL, et al., NOTICE OF SUBMISSION

Defendants. OF DOCUMENTS

 /

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court’s

order filed :

 one completed summons form;

 eight completed USM-285 forms; and

 nine true and exact copies of the complaint filed May 21, 2007.

DATED: .

 

Plaintiff

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