Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01042/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

j «

FILED

1 W JUN 20 PM 12* 19

2

C4.K**. (J 5 STRICT COURT

' 8f&WKW =tAaSNM'W*

3

lAfi m&$$ 4

tt¥*

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ADRIAN MOON, Case No.: 3:17-cv-l042-BEN-AGS

CDCR #AF-0335, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

13

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[ECF Doc. No. 4]; and

v. 14

15

RAYMOND MADDEN, et al.,

16

Defendants.

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

17

18

19

20

21

Plaintiff, Adrian Moon, currently housed at the California Rehabilitation Center,

has filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Doc.

No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated at Centinela State

Prison. See Compl. at 3-7.

Plaintiffhas not prepaid the full civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF Doc. No. 4).

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 l

3:17-cv-l 042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
1 Motion to Proceed IFP

“All persons, notjust prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). “Prisoners” like Plaintiff, however,

“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount

of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams v.

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

... if[a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or

appeal in a court ofthe United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger ofserious physical injury.

I.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,1116 n.l (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter

“Andrews”).

13

14

15

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.”

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[prisoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The

objective ofthe PLRA is to further “the congressional goal ofreducing frivolous prisoner

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310,1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[Sjection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiffwas a prisoner,

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.l (internal quotations omitted), “even ifthe

district court styles such dismissal as a denial ofthe prisoner’s application to file the

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

3:17-cv-1042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
action without prepayment ofthe full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153

(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by

section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show

he is facing “imminent danger ofserious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which

“make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger ofserious

physical injury’ at the time offiling.”).

Application to Plaintiff

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiffs Complaint and has

ascertained that it does not contain “plausible allegations” which suggest he “faced

‘imminent danger ofserious physical injury’ at the time offiling.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d

at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

A court “‘may take notice ofproceedings in other courts, both within and without

the federal judicial system, ifthose proceedings have a direct relation to matters at

issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel.

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Thus, this Court takesjudicial notice that Plaintiff, while incarcerated, has brought

at least three prior civil actions1 which have been dismissed on the grounds that they were

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 II.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 III

23 III

24

25

The Court has reviewed PACER and finds that Plaintiffhas filed thirty eight (38) civil

actions in several District Courts and twenty one (21) appeals in the Ninth Circuit Court

ofAppeals. See https://pcl.uscourts.gov/search (Website last visited May 31, 2017.)

i

26

27

28 3

3:17-cv-1042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
ti

1 They are:

Moon v. Johnson, et al, Civil Case No. 5:12-cv-00632-US-MLG (C.D. Cal.

May 7, 2012) (Order Denying Leave to File Action Without Prepayment of

Full Filing Fee for as “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon

which reliefmay be granted.”) (ECF No. 3) (strike one);

Moon v. Junious, et al., Civil Case No. l:12-cv-00096-GSA (E.D. Cal. Mar.

27, 2013) (Order Dismissing Action for failure to state a claim) (ECF No.

54) (strike two);

Moon v. C. Reece, et al., Civil Case No. l:12-cv-01243-MJS (E.D. Cal. May

22,2013) (Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Magistrate Judge,

Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time to Respond to OSC, and

Dismissing Plaintiffs action for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under § 1983) (ECF No. 39.) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiffhas, while incarcerated, accumulated at least the

three “strikes” permitted pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible

allegation” that he faced imminent danger ofserious physical injury at the time he filed

his Complaint, he is not entitled to the privilege ofproceeding IFP in this action. See

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,1231 (9th Cir. 1984)

(“[Cjourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter ofprivilege and not right.”).

Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

While Plaintiffhas been denied leave to commence this civil action without

prepayment ofthe $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and his case

requires dismissal for that reason alone, the Court also elects to conduct a sua sponte

review ofPlaintiffs Complaint because he was “incarcerated or detained in any facility

2 1)

3

4

5

6 2)

7

8

9 3)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23 II.

24

25

26

27

28 4

3:17-cv-1042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
[and] is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal

law or the terms or conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program” at the time he filed this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A,

enacted as part ofthe Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), requires sua sponte

dismissal ofprisoner complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious,

or fail to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);

Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1764; Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000).

“The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets offrivolous or malicious suits need

not bear the expense ofresponding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903,920 n.l (9th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. WexfordHealth Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir.

2012)).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

The Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint is patently frivolous. A pleading is

“factually] frivolous[]” under § 1915A(b)(l) if “the facts alleged rise to the level ofthe

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts

available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). Plaintiff

alleges that the correctional officers at Centinela State Prison are “members of a

notorious terrorist organized crime syndicate” and they are “actively participat[ing]” in

the “false imprisonment, kidnapping for ransom” ofPlaintiff. (Compl. at 8.)

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact....

[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable

legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not

accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil ofthe complaint’s factual

allegations,” Id. at 327, to determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or]

‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

3:17-cv-1042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims “rise to the level ofthe irrational or the

wholly incredible,” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. As such, his Complaint requires dismissal as

frivolous and without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that if a claim is classified as frivolous, “there is by

definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

(1) DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4) as barred by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(l) and without leave to amend; and

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous and

therefore, could not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548,

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if

appeal would not be frivolous).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 (2)

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

/ HON'rDGER T. BENITEZ

United States District Judge

19 DATED: Jun 2017 T

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

3:17-cv-1042-BEN-AGS

Case 3:17-cv-01042-BEN-AGS Document 10 Filed 06/20/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6