Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00932/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00932-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK FITZGERALD CHIOINO,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT M. KERNAN, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-932 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Last month, the court granted the habeas petition in this action and entered judgment. 

The court found an Apprendi error in the 22-year sentence imposed and determined that

petitioner's sentence had to be changed from 22 years to 18 years. The court wrote: "Within

120 days of the date of this order, the State of California shall cause Chioino's sentence in

Monterey County Superior Court Case No. SS022872 to be fixed in accordance with this

order. This court leaves it to state officials to determine the appropriate procedure to fix the

unconstitutional sentence, i.e., whether state law requires that Chioino be re-sentenced or

requires an amended abstract of judgment to correct the sentence or requires correction in

another way." Order Granting Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus, pp. 11-12. 

This matter returns for consideration of respondent's motion to alter or amend the

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Such a motion "'should not be

granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with

newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

law."' McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation and emphasis

omitted) (en banc). A district court does not commit clear error warranting reconsideration

Case 3:06-cv-00932-MHP Document 21 Filed 11/16/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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when the question before it is a debatable one. See id. at 1256 (district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying reconsideration where question whether it could enter protective order

in habeas action limiting Attorney General's use of documents from trial counsel's file was

debatable).

Respondent argues that the court committed clear error in "fashion[ing] a new

sentence without remanding to the trial court of a new sentencing hearing." Motion, p. 2.

Respondent relies primarily on two cases, Untied States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and

People v.Sandoval,41 Cal.4 4th 825 (Cal. 2007), but neither supports a conclusion that this

court committed clear error in determining that the sentence had to be changed from 22 to 18

years. 

Respondent relies on a portion of United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that

does not apply to California's determinate sentencing law ("DSL") under which petitioner

was sentenced. Booker is divided into two parts: Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court

concluded that the Apprendi and Blakely decisions applied to the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines. 543 U.S. at 226-244. Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court dealt with the

appropriate remedy for the problem. 543 U.S. at 244-268. In Justice Breyer's part of the

opinion, the Court found the statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory

incompatible with the Court's holding in Justice Stevens' part of the opinion and "conclude[d]

that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one other statutory section

[regarding appellate review standards] which depends upon the Guidelines' mandatory

nature." 543 U.S. at 245. With those modifications, the Guidelines would be "effectively

advisory." Id. Respondent's motion relies on the remedial part of the Booker opinion, but

has not shown that this court has the power to sever and excise parts of California's

sentencing laws in any way comparable to the Supreme Court's handling of the Guidelines. 

Booker's chosen remedy of further sentencing proceedings was based on the Supreme Court's

severance and excision of the problem provisions in the Guidelines, and has no applicability

to California's DSL. That Booker does not dictate the remedy for a petitioner sentenced

under California's DSL is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in

Case 3:06-cv-00932-MHP Document 21 Filed 11/16/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), did not apply the Booker remedial

approach to California's law. Indeed, rather than apply Booker's remedial portion,

Cunningham left it to the state to adjust its sentencing system. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at

871. 

Respondent's other case, People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825 (Cal. 2007), also does

not lead to the conclusion that this court committed clear error in the remedy it chose upon

finding a Sixth Amendment violation in the sentence. As Sandoval recognized, serious ex

post facto concerns are raised in re-sentencing under a newly reformed sentencing scheme. 

See 41 Cal.4th at 853-56. Also, the Sandoval analysis at several points suggests that it

applies to cases on direct appeal, as that one was and petitioner's is not. See id. at 845, 856-

57. 

Respondent contends separately that this court has no authority to appoint counsel in

state court. Motion, p. 4 n.2. The court agrees, but does not believe that it has done so. The

court ordered the clerk to send a copy of the order to the Monterey County Public Defender

and "request[ed] that the Monterey County Public Defender provide representation for

Chioino if he meets the eligibility requirements and if counsel is necessary for the

resentencing." Order, p. 12. Rather than appointing counsel, the court has left it to the

Monterey County Public Defender to decide whether Chioino needs and is eligible for

representation. When the court grants habeas relief in pro se cases, it often (as here) directs

the order to be sent to the public defender to increase the likelihood that the necessary steps

are taken to implement the court's decision – this is done as an alternative to making

respondent's counsel file periodic reports on the progress of that implementation. 

Upon due consideration of respondent's motion, the court is unpersuaded that it

committed clear error. The motion to alter or amend the judgment is DENIED. (Docket #

20.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00932-MHP Document 21 Filed 11/16/07 Page 3 of 3