Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02958/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02958-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUFUS DILLARD, Civil No. 12cv2958 BTM (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; and

(2) DISMISSING ACTION

vs.

THE HONORABLE KENNETH K. SO;

ROBERT AMBROSELLI, Director of

California Department of Correction and

Rehabilitation,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a nonprisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not paid the $350 civil filing fee required to

commence this action, but rather has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis(“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Under § 1915(a), the Court may authorize the commencement of a suit without

prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his

assets, showing that he is unable to pay filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff

has submitted an affidavit which sufficiently shows that he lacks the financial resources

to pay filing fees, and the Court accordingly GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis.

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Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by

any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to

a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court to the extent it is

“frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).

Here, the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to

the extent it seeks monetary damages against a San Diego Superior Court Judge and the

Director of the California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from

damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793

F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, as a Superior Court Judge for the State of

California, Judge So has absolute immunity insofar as Plaintiffseeks damages, since the

acts alleged by Plaintiff were performed within Judge So’s judicial discretion. 

Moreover, while judicial immunity “does not extend . . . to actions for prospective

injunctive relief,” id., Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue injunctive relief, since

he has not alleged that he is facing sentencing as a third-strike offender in state court. 

Even if Plaintiff did allege that he was about to be sentenced, this Court would be

barred fromconsideration ofthe claims by the abstention doctrine announced in Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger, federal courts may not interfere with

ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 45-46;see

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)

(stating that Younger “espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal-court

interference with pending state judicial proceedings.”) Furthermore, if Plaintiff had

already been sentenced, his only avenue for relief in federal court would be a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497-99 (1973).

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As to Defendant Ambroselli, the Eleventh Amendment extends sovereign

immunity to state officialssued in their official capacity. See Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). Even where state officials are sued in their personal

capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars such suits “when ‘the state is the real,

substantial party in interest.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

101 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464

(1945)). Such a suit is barred “regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive

relief.” Id. at 102. However, the Supreme Court has recognized a significant exception

to the immunity of state officials, namely that “a suit challenging the constitutionality of

a state official’s action is not one against the State,” id. at 102, since “an official who

acts unconstitutionally is‘stripped of his official or representative character.’” Id. at 104

(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his sentencing enhancement under California’s

Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) was unconstitutional, and therefore Defendant

Ambroselli held him illegally. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff further alleges that his allegedly

unconstitutional confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 

It is unclear from the face of the Complaint whether Defendant Ambroselli is

being sued in his official or individual capacity. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege

that Defendant Ambroselli was the director of the CDCR while Plaintiff was

incarcerated. Regardless, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. If Plaintiff issuing Defendant Ambroselli in his official capacity, the claims are

barred by sovereign immunity. If Plaintiff is suing Defendant Ambroselli in his

individual capacity, Defendant Ambroselli is entitled to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability if ‘their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1069-70

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Under Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the inquiry is twofold. First, do the alleged facts make out

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a violation of a constitutional right? Second, was the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged misconduct? Id.

Here, Plaintiff argues that the DSL is unconstitutional, and that therefore the

sentencing enhancement he received under the DSL was also unconstitutional. Even if

this is the case, it was not clearly established at the time of his sentencing. Therefore,

Defendant Ambroselli is entitled to qualified immunity.

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED

without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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