Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07015/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2014 Decided June 17, 2014

No. 13-7015

3D GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

MVM, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-00722)

Haytham Faraj argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant. Bradley P. Moss entered an appearance.

Herbert S. Rosenblum argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellee.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge, 

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wilkins. 

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 1 of 6
2

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises out of a 

contract dispute between 3D Global Solutions, Inc. (“3D 

Global”) and MVM, Inc. (“MVM”). In early 2005, MVM 

won a contract with the United States government to provide 

security forces in Kabul, Afghanistan. To fulfill its 

obligations under the contract, MVM entered into a recruiting 

agreement with 3D Global, pursuant to which 3D Global was 

retained to recruit and deploy third country nationals as 

security personnel for the United States embassy in Kabul. In 

April 2006, 3D Global filed a lawsuit against MVM in the 

district court for the District of Columbia, alleging, inter alia, 

breach of the recruiting agreement. MVM filed 

counterclaims, alleging that 3D Global breached the recruiting 

agreement by failing to provide third country nationals with 

the required English proficiency levels. The recruiting 

agreement contained a choice-of-law provision stating that the 

agreement will be governed by Virginia law. 

The case went to trial on September 10, 2012. Before 

providing final instructions to the jury, the court held a 

conference with the parties to discuss the jury instructions. 

Counsel for 3D Global requested an instruction regarding 

“interest on damages.” The following colloquy ensued: 

COUNSEL FOR 3D GLOBAL: I provided to the court a 

case from Virginia regarding interest on damages, and I 

would ask that the court include that in the instruction. I 

believe the statutory rate is 6 percent unless they 

contract—

THE COURT: Why should that be included in an 

instruction? Why wouldn’t that simply be after the 

verdict comes in, why wouldn’t it, as a matter of law, 

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 2 of 6
3

simply be added to whatever amount the jury came up 

with? 

COUNSEL FOR 3D GLOBAL: It can. There is nothing 

that prevents the court from doing that. 

THE COURT: The less that the jury has to focus on the 

easier their task will be. 

COUNSEL FOR 3D GLOBAL: I agree. And based on 

my reading of the three or four cases—I’m not a Virginia 

lawyer, but it didn’t appear that the court is precluded 

from doing that post verdict. 

[JA-115-16] Counsel for MVM remained silent during the

exchange between the court and counsel for 3D Global. The 

district court’s final instructions to the jury did not mention 

prejudgment or post-judgment interest. 

On September 20, 2012, the jury returned a verdict for 

3D Global in the amount of $138,565. The jury did not award 

any incidental, consequential or nominal damages. After the 

verdict, counsel for 3D Global moved for an award of 

prejudgment interest at the Virginia statutory rate of six 

percent. Counsel for MVM objected, arguing that the 

awarding of prejudgment interest is discretionary with the 

finder of fact. The court granted 3D Global’s motion on the 

basis that the issue was waived by the parties’ failure to 

submit it to the jury on the verdict form. [JA-180-82] 

On September 25, 2012, MVM filed a motion for 

reconsideration, renewing its argument that the jury, rather 

than the court, has discretion to award prejudgment interest 

under Virginia law. 3D Global opposed, claiming that the 

parties had agreed to have the trial court decide the issue 

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 3 of 6
4

during the conference. The trial court reversed its earlier 

decision and granted MVM’s motion, and this appeal 

followed. 

On appeal, 3D Global argues that the district court had 

discretion to award prejudgment interest under Virginia law. 

Appellant Br. at 20-21. 3D Global further argues that MVM 

did not object to the court’s initial ruling and was therefore 

foreclosed from raising the issue post-verdict. Id. at 18-19, 

22-26. MVM, on the other hand, disputes 3D Global’s claim 

that the parties agreed to have the district court decide the 

issue. Appellee Br. at 14-17. 

As an initial matter, we accept, without deciding, the 

parties’ assertion that abuse of discretion is the appropriate 

standard of review. Appellant Br. at 20; Appellee Br. at 7. 

Applying that standard, we do not find an abuse of discretion 

in this case.

The Virginia Code provides in pertinent part, “[i]n any 

Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.) action or 

action at law or suit in equity, the final order, verdict of the 

jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree of the court, may 

provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part 

thereof, and fix the period at which the interest shall 

commence.” VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382. Thus, under the 

statute, the decision to award prejudgment interest falls within 

the discretion of the trier of fact. See McClung v. Smith, 89 

F.3d 829 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The Virginia Code allows a jury or 

a court sitting without a jury to award prejudgment interest in 

an action at law or a suit in equity.”); Gill v. Rollins 

Protective Servs. Co., 836 F.2d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 1987). 

Thus, 3D Global’s argument that the district court had 

discretion to award prejudgment interest in this instance fails 

as matter of law. 

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 4 of 6
5

Moreover, when the district court initially ruled that it 

would decide the issue of prejudgment interest, 3D Global 

failed to advise the court that the issue is one for the jury 

under Virginia law. Instead, counsel for 3D Global

erroneously informed the court that “[t]here is nothing that 

prevents the court from doing that.” [JA-116] 3D Global 

therefore invited the error. See Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 

596, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“It has long been settled that on 

appeal a litigant cannot avail himself of an error that he 

induced the court under review to commit.”) (citations 

omitted); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 

Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 380 F.2d 605, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967), 

cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967); Barone v. Williams, 199 

F.2d 189, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1952). We see no abuse of 

discretion in the district court’s decision to change its earlier 

ruling after it had a more fulsome opportunity to consider the 

relevant Virginia law. 

Nor do we find that the district court erred in concluding 

that the parties did not reach an agreement to submit the issue 

of prejudgment interest to the court. When counsel for 3D 

Global initially asked the district court to instruct the jury on 

prejudgment interest, counsel for MVM remained silent.

1

 In 

 1 MVM argued in its brief that it had no reason to object during 

the initial discussion between counsel for 3D Global and the district 

court because it was not clear whether 3D Global was seeking 

prejudgment or post-judgment interest. Appellee Br. at 15. 

MVM’s counsel reiterated the claim during oral argument. See 

[Oral Arg. Recording at 13:07-14:10, 17:03-18:47]. We are 

dubious of this contention. Nonetheless, the trial court was in the 

best position to assess whether gamesmanship or sharp practice was 

at play here, and if so, how that should affect the outcome. Thus, it 

is quite significant that the trial court not only invited MVM to file 

a motion for reconsideration, but also granted the motion, for “the 

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 5 of 6
6

the absence of a stipulation or express agreement by MVM’s 

counsel, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court 

to conclude that no such agreement existed, particularly since 

“[c]ourts will ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against 

waiver’ of a jury trial.” Rodenbur v. Kaufman, 320 F.2d 679, 

683 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 

U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. 

So ordered.

 

 

district judge is in the best position to assess whether or not ‘justice 

requires’ [reconsideration].” Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (cited in 

Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 

217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

USCA Case #13-7015 Document #1497953 Filed: 06/17/2014 Page 6 of 6