Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02402/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02402-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE BLAKE GREENSPAN, Civil No. 12-cv-2402-AJB(BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENIAL OF HABEAS

PETITION

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, 

Respondent.

Kyle Blake Greenspan ("Greenspan"), a state prisoner proceeding with the assistance of

counsel, seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his July 29, 2008 

convictions of forcible rape and sexual battery in San Diego County Superior Court Case No.

SCD210048. He has served a three year prison term imposed for those crimes and is currently under

a five-year period of parole supervision. (Traverse 1, ECF No. 14.)1

 He is required under California

law to register as a sex offender as a result of those convictions. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion, and his petition for review was summarily denied

by the California Supreme Court. His attempts to obtain collateral relief in the state courts were

unsuccessful. Greenspan filed his federal Petition on October 3, 2012 ("Petition"). Respondent filed

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those

imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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an Answer opposing any relief. Greenspan filed a Traverse. In consideration of the record and

controlling legal authority, it is recommended that the Petition be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In its unpublished decision affirming the judgment, the California Court of Appeal summarized

the facts of the case, observing: "Because Greenspan does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain his conviction, we summarily recite the operative facts in the light most favorable

to the judgment." (Lodg. No. 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Case No. D054840, Mar. 9, 2011), slip op. at 2

(citations omitted).) On federal habeas review, a rebuttable presumption of correctness attaches to

state appellate courts' factual statements. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746,

n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). Greenspan does not dispute the accuracy of the court's summary. 

R.A. was 23 years old at the time of trial and testified that she had known

Greenspan from grade school, but in the years afterwards they had only brief, sporadic

interactions, including once in 2004, when they kissed in a friend's college dormitory.

In June 2007, they renewed contact and exchanged text messages and phone calls. In

the early morning of July 7, 2007, he accepted her invitation to her apartment to watch

a movie with her and her friends. He seemed drunk when he arrived and he drank a

beer there. 

After the movie ended they went upstairs to her bedroom and sat on her bed

reminiscing about grade school. At one point he playfully pushed her chest such that

she lay on the bed, but she immediately came back up. He tried to kiss her but she

turned her head. While he was still fully clothed, he pushed her on the bed, pressed

his weight on her, hooked one of his arms around her shoulder and, with his other

forearm, pushed down on her lower stomach while he kept trying to kiss her. He raped

her. He ejaculated on her shirt. She ran to the bathroom, changed her shirt and ran

downstairs crying. At the time of the incident she was five feet three inches tall and

weighed 130 pounds.

R.A.'s crying woke up one of her roommates at approximately 3:30 a.m., and

R.A told her Greenspan had raped her, and he was asleep on her bed. The roommate

told her to stay in the laundry room while she asked him to leave the house. The

roommate testified that he was lying on R.A.'s bed wearing only his boxer shorts. She

woke him up and repeatedly told him he needed to get dressed and leave. He kept

asking, "What did I do?" She reiterated that he had to leave. She walked him to the

front porch and he asked her if R.A. thought he had raped her. The roommate

responded, "Okay, good. So you do know what you did. You need to leave."

At approximately 4:00 a.m., while R.A. was still in the laundry room, she

telephoned a girlfriend--who did not answer--so she telephoned that friend's boyfriend.

He testified that R.A. was crying and sounded shaken up. His girlfriend spoke to R.A.

and they immediately went to R.A.'s apartment, where she was crying and appeared

"traumatized." They took her to the hospital, where she cried during an interview with

a police officer. In a sexual assault response team (SART) exam, a forensic nurse

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examined her and determined that she had vaginal redness that was consistent with

either consensual or nonconsensual sexual intercourse. The parties stipulated that tests

done on R.A.'s shirt by the San Diego Police Department's Forensic Unit showed that

sperm from the shirt matched Greenspan's DNA.

Greenspan was five feet eleven inches tall and weighed approximately 195

pounds at the time of the incident. He testified at trial that after the movie he and R.A.

talked in her bedroom. According to Greenspan, his sex with R.A. was consensual, he

was not wearing a condom and ejaculated on her chest. She wiped herself with her

shirt. He was shocked that night when R.A.'s roommate woke him and told him he had

to leave. He asked the roommate whether R.A. thought he had raped her, denied doing

so, and asked to speak to R.A. The roommate refused that request. He felt sad that he

was blamed for making R.A. cry, and he telephoned her as he was walking from her

residence, but she did not answer.

The parties stipulated that approximately one week after the incident, a

detective helped R.A. make a pretext telephone call to Greenspan. The jury heard a

recording of the call, in which Greenspan repeatedly apologized to R.A., at one point

stating, "I am so sorry, I know that you don't think that's good enough or I guess I took

it the wrong way and I didn't know." R.A. told him he had raped her and he replied

that he did not feel she had pushed him away. R.A. told him she needed to hear him

say why he was sorry and he replied, "Because I guess I took advantage of you and I

am sorry and I didn't mean to hurt you in any way in that way because, you know, I

would never hurt you." He continued, "I have two older sisters, I would never ever do

that."

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 2-4.) 

The defense theory was that the sexual encounter between Greenspan and R.A. was

consensual. Defense counsel cross-examined R.A. in detail about their prior interactions and

communications, up to and through R.A.'s invitation that Greenspan come to her apartment where she,

her roommates, and friends were hanging out. Counsel emphasized several discrepancies between

R.A.'s preliminary hearing testimony and her trial testimony. (See Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 289-

335.) 

Greenspan testified on his own behalf. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 392- 423.) Consistently

with other testimony, Greenspan testified he knew R.A. from fifth through eighth grade when they

attended the same school. They retained mutual friends but attended different high schools. They had

an encounter in 2004 on the San Diego State campus -- although in his account, the extent of their

physical contact on that occasion was much more extensive than the one kiss R.A testified they had

exchanged at that time. Greenspan subsequently moved out of California, then returned in 2007. He

described the social media and telephone contact he had with R.A. beginning a couple of months

before the incident. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 394-408.) His description of how he ended up at R.A.'s

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apartment essentially coincided with R.A's description. However, Greenspan's description of what

happened after they had gone upstairs together in the early morning hours differed irreconcilably from

R.A.'s testimony in such crucial respects as who instigated their sexual encounter and the extent,

nature, and duration of that contact. (Id. at 408-423, 452-457.) 

B. Procedural Background

The charged rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)) and sexual battery (Cal. Penal Code §

243.4(a)) crimes occurred on July 7, 2007. (Lodg. No 1, Clerk's Transcript ("CT") at 0001-0002.) 

Trial began on July 23, 2008, with a jury sworn by the end of that day. Counsel made their opening

statements and the presentation of evidence began the next day. (Id. CT vol. 2 at 0283-0286.) Both

sides rested after just over two days of trial. (Id. at 0285-0292.) The jury deliberated about two hours

before returning guilty verdicts on both charges. (Id. at 0294-0296.)

On August 25, 2008, the court convened the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel presented

a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion for a continuance of the sentencing to permit

additional forensic investigation into potential grounds for a new trial motion. The court denied the

dismissal motion but granted a 60-day sentencing continuance. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 3 at 650-658.) 

On November 20, 2008, the court reconvened the sentencing hearing and acknowledged a pending

motion for new trial. By that time, Greenspan was represented by new counsel. He had replaced trial

counsel, Bradley C. Patton, with substitute retained counsel Catherine Denevi on October 20, 2008. 

(Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 265.) New counsel moved to compel disclosure of juror identification

information in order to investigate alleged misconduct. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 4 at 660-661.) After

hearing extensive argument, the court denied that motion, finding that there was no new information

and that the issue had been previously reviewed and "fully discussed" with prior counsel on the record. 

(Id. at 661-667.) The court continued consideration of the new trial motion and the sentencing date. 

At the February 25, 2009 hearing of the new trial motion, alleging instances of legal error,

juror misconduct, and evidentiary challenges to the verdict (Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 174-219), the

court accepted as true all the affidavit representations of defense counsel's experts and private

investigator, obviating the need to receive their testimony at an evidentiary hearing. The court also

accepted counsel's representations about what other witnesses would say. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at

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670-682.) Before denying the motion, the court systematically addressed each of the motion grounds

presented and the multiple exhibits, assessed each ground and the significance or insignificance of

each item of evidence, and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and strength of the trial evidence,

concluding with the observation: "[W]hile I think this is a very sad case, I don't think it is a

miscarriage of justice." (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 682, 685: "I agree with probation, I probably

would have put him on probation if that had been an option in this case.") Sentencing in conformity

with the probation report's recommendation immediately followed. The court imposed the lower term

of three years on count one and the lower term of two years on count two, with the latter sentence

stayed, for a total prison term of three years, plus payment of restitution, followed by a period of

parole. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 685-687.) The court further ordered that after his release,

Greenspan would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290.2

 (Id.

at 687.)

Greenspan appealed his conviction. He alleged trial error in three particulars related to the

court's handling of a juror's note, potential juror misconduct, and the giving of one jury instruction. 

(Lodg. No. 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Case No. D054840), Opening Brief.) In February 2010, while his direct

appeal remained pending, his attorney also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal. (Lodg. Nos. 12, 13, Case No. D056822.) In that petition, Greenspan alleged

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to accurately convey a pre-trial offer, failure to

investigate and present impeachment evidence in the form of R.A.'s conduct as depicted on a

videotape, and failure to present character witnesses favorable to him. (Lodg. No. 12, Petition at i-ii.) 

The petition was accompanied by a request that the court consolidate the habeas petition with the

direct appeal. A March 24, 2010 docket entry in the habeas case states: "The petition for writ of

habeas corpus In re Greenspan, No. D056822, will be considered at the same time as the pending

appeal People v. Greenspan, No. D054840." (Lodg. No. 13.)

The next docket entry in Greenspan's habeas case, dated June 25, 2010, memorializes the

2

 California’s Sex Offender Registration Act requires certain convicted sex offenders to register with

law enforcement officials in the communities in which they reside. Cal. Penal Code §§ 290(c) (a section which

enumerates various sex offenses under California law), 290.005(a). California’s Sexual Predator Punishment

and Control Act of 2006—also known as Jessica’s Law or Proposition 83—imposes several requirements that

apply to parolees who, as sex offenders, are subject to that duty to register.

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appellate court's order to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted and

instructing, in pertinent part, that "the order to show cause is made returnable before the superior

court," authorizing the People, "[i]n addition to the briefing previously filed . . . [to] file a return to

the order to show cause," authorizing Greenspan to "file a traverse, both of which shall be filed in the

superior court," and directing the superior court "to hear and determine the matter." (Lodg. No. 13,

Docket in Case No. D056822 at 1.) That additional briefing is provided here as Lodgment Nos. 14

and 15. The referral and the disposition of Greenspan's habeas petition concluded as described in a

November 4, 2010 docket entry in Case No. D056822:

On June 25, 2010, this court issued an order to show cause returnable in

superior court in this matter and directed the superior court to notify this court in

writing of its determination. The superior court issued an order denying the petition

for writ of habeas corpus on October 18, 2010. . . . On November 1, 2010, petitioner

filed a "Motion for Limited Remand to the Superior Court with Directions to Conduct

an Evidentiary Hearing in Compliance with the Order to Show Cause issued June 25,

2010, and to Order the Writ in this Case to be Returnable to This Court." This court

no longer has jurisdiction in this matter and will not act on the motion filed on

November 1, 2010.

(Lodg. No. 13 at 2.)

The October 18, 2010 reasoned decision from the superior court denying Greenspan habeas

relief reached and rejected on the merits each of the three instances of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel Greenspan had alleged, adding: "Because of the discussion and decision set forth below, this

Superior Court has determined that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing because the issues

presented are resolved."3

 (Lodg. No. 16 at 2 (Cal. Superior Court, Case No. HC20063, Oct. 18, 2010),

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).) 

 In a reasoned decision filed March 9, 2011, the appellate court decided Greenspan's direct

appeal on the merits, affirming the judgment and denying him relief on any of his alleged trial errors. 

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op.) Greenspan presents no jury-related ground for relief here. In his April 19,

3

 Greenspan also complains of purported state law procedural defects in the process used by the state

superior court in deciding his habeas petition after referral from the court of appeal. The superior court elected

not to hold an evidentiary hearing, observing that it had ample evidence in the form of multiple sworn

declarations that made an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. Although Greenspan cites Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447

U.S. 343, 346 (1980) for the proposition that the "California Courts [failed] to follow their own procedure and

denied Mr. Greenspan Due Process of Law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" in this regard (Traverse

2, ECF 14; Traverse 3, ECF 14-2), the Hicks case decided an inapposite question associated with jury

instruction error affecting the imposition of criminal punishment. The state law evidentiary hearing procedure

and state court decision at issue in Greenspan's case raise no federal constitutional concern.

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2011 Petition For Review to the California Supreme Court, Greenspan presented only one issue: 

"Whether the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the exclusion under Evidence Code §§ 352 and 782,

[of] photos of the complainant in a rape prosecution posted on her Facebook page showing her

partying in Las Vegas days after she claimed she had been raped?" (Lodg. No. 8, Petition For Review

at 1-2.) By docket entry dated June 8, 2011, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition. (Lodg. No. 9 (Cal. Supreme Ct, Case No. S192405, Jun. 8, 2011).) Greenspan sought relief

from the United States Supreme Court in a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to challenge the California

Court of Appeal's application of the state's "rape shield" law in denying him "the right to confront and

cross-examine the complainant with conduct that directly contradicted her testimony at trial that her

encounter with the petitioner [was] traumatic and by inference non-consensual." (Lodg. No. 10,

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at i.) The Supreme Court summarily denied certiorari on October 3,

2011. (Lodg. No. 11, Greenspan v. California, 132 S.Ct. 277, 80 USLW 3188.)

Greenspan also presented his various instances of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel

in a habeas petition to the California Supreme Court in October 2011. (Lodg. No. 17.) That court

summarily denied the habeas petition on December 12, 2012. (Lodg. No. 18 (Cal. Supreme Ct., Case

No. S205815, Dec. 12, 2012).)

 Greenspan's October 3, 2012 federal Petition, filed before his habeas petition to the state's

highest court was decided, presents two grounds for relief. Ground One alleges he was denied his

"right to confront and cross-examine the complaining witness, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, by the trial court's ruling" excluding certain Facebook

photos from the victim's Las Vegas trip a few days after the incident. (Pet 5, ECF No. 1.) Ground

Two alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment for

three alleged performance deficiencies: (1) failure to convey a pre-trial plea offer; (2) failure to

investigate and present evidence of the victim's conduct captured on videotape; and (3) failure to

interview and present character witnesses on Greenspan's behalf.4

 (Id. at 7.) The Petition was

4

 Greenspan's Traverse introduces a claim heading not identified as a discrete ground for relief in his

Petition: "The California Court of Appeal's rejection of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the case." (Traverse 24, ECF No. 14-2.) That

contention suggests a variation on his IAC claim for alleged failure to convey a plea offer. However, among

other things, he cites no federal authority controlling the issue of prosecutorial misconduct he contends is

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accompanied by a Motion for Stay and Abeyance to exhaust his IAC claims because his habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court remained pending. That Motion was denied as moot in a

January 24, 2013 Order, by which time the state high court had denied Greenspan's habeas petition. 

(ECF No. 6.) Respondent concedes that all the Petition claims are exhausted. (Ans. 2, ECF No. 10.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards For Federal Habeas Relief

"[H]abeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)

(Stevens, J., concurring). A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."5

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Federal habeas courts may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); see Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, (2005) ("[A] state

court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus"). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs review of Greenspan's

claims because he filed his federal habeas petition after that statute's 1996 effective date. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a " 'highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings,' " requiring "that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7. "AEDPA prevents

defendants -- and federal courts -- from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to secondguess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866

contravened by the state court result rejecting his plea offer challenges, he did not identify in his Petition any

specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct in a manner that would have permitted Respondent to address the

issue as such in its Answer, the state courts found, in connection with resolving his IAC claims, that the

prosecutor never made the plea offer Greenspan describes, and there is no evidence that he exhausted any

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in this or in any other regard. Accordingly, the Court deems it to be a

new and inchoate claim and does not address that theory here. 

5

 A state parolee is "in custody" for purposes of the federal habeas statute. Jones v. Cunningham, 371

U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 

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(2010). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification

that there

 was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

"By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court,

subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784. Federal habeas

relief is available under the first exception if the state court result "was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76 (2003); see

also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

"contrary to" test from its "unreasonable application" test). To be found an "unreasonable application"

of the precedent, the state court decision must have been "more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must

have been 'objectively unreasonable.' " Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citations

omitted); Renico, 130 S.Ct. at 1866. A lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue

presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006);

see Moses, 555 F.3d at 754 ("[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not 'squarely address[]' the issue

in the case it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is 'clearly established' Supreme Court precedent

addressing the issue," and a federal habeas court "must defer to the state court's decision"), citing, inter

alia, Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 123 (2008). Section "2254(d) mandates that only Supreme

Court precedential holdings clearly establish a right, [but] our circuit precedent may provide

persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent." Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, relief is available only if the state court based its result

"on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2);

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ("Factual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated

on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

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grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)"). The question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's

\\

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher

threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 

Federal habeas courts reviewing prisoners' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "must assess the

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 'substantial and

injurious effect' standard set forth in" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 121 (2007); see Baines v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (the Ninth Circuit

applies the Brecht harmless error standard "uniformly in all federal habeas cases under § 2254"). 

Thus, even if constitutional error occurred, the petitioner must still demonstrate that the error "had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637-38 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Federal courts apply AEDPA standards to the "last

reasoned decision" by a state court. Campbell, 408 F.3d at 1170); see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803 (1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim [are presumed to] rest upon

the same ground").

B. Ground One: Evidentiary Ruling Excluding Las Vegas Photographs

Greenspan argues he was "denied his right to confront and cross-examine his accuser, as

guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . where the trial court prohibited him from

cross-examining the complaining witness with postings on Facebook that showed her partying in Las

Vegas days after she claimed the petitioner raped her." (Pet. 5, ECF No. 1, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 308, 317-18 (1974) and Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1986).6

 The Van

6

 Although the Davis and Van Arsdall Courts articulated the objectives and scope of the Confrontation

Clause and provide controlling United States Supreme Court authority on the violation standards, both cases

were deciding writs of certiorari and applied the prejudice standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967), rather than the Brecht prejudice standard applicable in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings. See Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 ("an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may

confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). 

Federal habeas courts reviewing state court decisions instead must decide whether an identified constitutional

error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." See Fry, 551 U.S.

at 127; see also Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept., 421 F.3d 1027 (2005) (granting a state prisoner

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Arsdall Court summarized the scope of the Confrontation Clause and interpretive jurisprudence.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an

accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal

criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), "means more than being

allowed to confront the witness physically." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S., at 315. 

Indeed, " '[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.' " Id., at 315-316 [citation omitted]. 

Of particular relevance here, "[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness'

motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally

protected right of cross-examination." Davis, supra, at 316-317 (citing Greene v.

McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)). 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79 (parallel citations omitted).

The Constitution's due process guarantees protect only a meaningful opportunity to present a

defense, not an unfettered right to present all relevant evidence. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.

37, 42 (1996) (citing examples of proper restrictions on the introduction of relevant evidence). 

Nevertheless, while "state and federal lawmakers have broad latitude to establish rules excluding

evidence from criminal trials," that latitude "has limits under the Constitution." Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). The Confrontation Clause provides one of those constitutional

limits to ensure that criminal defendants have "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). 

The right to cross-examination protects the opportunity to "expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Davis,

415 U.S. at 318. "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the

evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

proceeding before the trier of fact." Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999), quoting Maryland

v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990); see Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (finding a Confrontation Clause

violation when the trial court's ruling had "prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [a key

prosecution witness] would be biased as a result of the State's dismissal of his pending public

drunkenness charge") (emphasis in original).

federal habeas relief from his sex crime conviction on grounds the trial court's exclusion of certain proffered

cross-examination of the victim about two prior incidents when she had alleged other men had molested her

was an "objectively unreasonable" application of Davis and Van Arsdall, the exclusion denied the defendant

his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and the error was not harmless under the Brecht standard).

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A defendant carries his burden of establishing a Confrontation Clause violation by showing

that "[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [a witness's]

credibility had . . . counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination." Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680; see Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the

defendant was denied his confrontation rights when the trial court prevented defense counsel from

cross-examining a key prosecution witness about his probation status, a provable fact that would have

established he had likely lied under oath, because that impeachment could have given a reasonable

jury a "significantly different impression" of the witness' credibility). Nevertheless, the Van Arsdall

Court emphasized that even in circumstances where the evidence goes to the issue of a witness'

possible motivation to lie, "[i]t does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the

potential bias of a prosecution witness." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678.

On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause

is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79 (parallel citations omitted); see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.

303, 308, 315 (1998) (A defendant's right to present evidence in his defense is "not unlimited, but

rather is subject to reasonable restrictions"; a trial court's exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional

only where it "significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense"); see also

Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149, 151-153 (1991) (discussing the Sixth Amendment implications

of a particular rape shield statute's codified procedures and preclusion of certain evidence).

The Davis Court found a violation of the defendant's confrontation right when the trial court

precluded defense counsel from developing the record on the issue of the reliability of a key

prosecution witness' testimony. That Court determined that "defense counsel should have been

permitted to expose to the jury the facts [of the witness' probation status] from which jurors, as the sole

triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the

witness," notwithstanding a state policy protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders upon which

the trial court had relied for its exclusionary ruling. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-19 ("The claim of bias

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which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue

pressure because of [the witness'] vulnerable status as a probationer . . . as well as of [the witness']

possible concern that he might be a suspect in the investigation," because "[t]he accuracy and

truthfulness of [the witness'] testimony were key elements in the State's case against petitioner"). 

Nevertheless, " 'the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,

not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might

wish.' " Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 684, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per

curiam) (emphasis in original). "As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution

entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Id. at 681, citing United States v.

Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-509 (1983), Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). 

The issue of the Las Vegas photographic evidence in Greenspan's case first arose in pretrial

discussions among counsel and the trial court on July 21, 2008. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 2-24.) The

photos at issue are described as depicting R.A. participating in suggestive partying behavior within

a few days of the rape, apparently not unlike other photos R.A. and her friends previously posted on

social media sites. Defense counsel argued that the Las Vegas photos were relevant to impeach

statements R.A. made to Greenspan during the pretext telephone call staged by police a week after the

charged rape, where R.A. represented that "she has been worrying and in solitude for a week" and

could not call before because she was "just so disturbed by all of this." (Id. at 8.) Defense counsel

argued in support of admitting the photos:

She is in Las Vegas with her girlfriends and she is kind of doing the same type of stuff. 

It puts into context ultimately what we are dealing with in the pretext call and shows 

that the statements that are being made here simply aren't true. So those [photos] are

in there to impeach based upon the fact that this information is coming in by way of

the prosecution.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 8.) 

The trial court distinguished the relevance of photographs posted on social media sites before

the incident from the photographs taken in Las Vegas a few days thereafter. The court found that the

former related to a period of time when R.A. and Greenspan were reconnecting and admitted them as

relevant to reveal their relationship and their perspectives about their relationship, including inferences

going to Greenspan's consent theory of defense. The court also observed that "the prejudicial value

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is not enormous" and "frankly, the probative value is not enormous," ranking the photos "relatively

low" on both those scales. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 13-14.) "But it is of some significance when

you are talking about this was my relationship with her." (Id. at 14.) In contrast, the court explained:

\\

On the trip to Las Vegas [photographs] I feel differently. I just don't see what

the relevance is unless she takes the stand and says I was devastated and I couldn't go

out for several weeks, well, then, as far as attacking credibility. [Sic.] I think the

pretext call is a pretext call and people say all sorts of things in a pretext call to try to

get a defendant to say something. I am not sure he can attack her credibility in the

pretext call. And I think people react all different ways to traumatic events in their

lives and the fact that someone went out and partied afterwards doesn't necessarily

have any relevance one way or the other what happened to them. I just don't see the

relevance and I think that the prejudicial value is strong. And so I do really think the

probative value being nonexistent is outweighed by the prejudice of putting it in as to

what she is doing and I think people react differently. I don't see what the relevance

is of putting those photos in or anything she did afterwards as I see it.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 14-15, 16: "So I think the photographs that she posted are relevant and I

will allow them in" but the "communications unless they are between the two of them, I don't think

are admissible.") After additional discussion about how social media postings occur, the court added:

If you are saying here are photographs of what her friends say she is doing and how

she is partying, now we are getting to not communication between her and Mr.

Greenspan but this is her character evidence, this is what she is like and I don't think

that's admissible. The reason I think it is admissible is if she is posting something on

the website and then communicating with someone on that website then that is a form

of communication between her and Mr. Greenspan. That's why anything she posted

on her website I would allow and anything that others have posted I don't think is

relevant.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 19, 21: "So I will not allow the photographs from Las Vegas or anything

that happened afterwards at this point in unless something happens during the trial that convinces me

otherwise.") The pretrial discussion of this issue concluded with the clarification:

[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . Just a quick question, Your Honor. You excluded

the photographs of Las Vegas. I just wanted to make sure it was also excluding any

mention of –

THE COURT: Partying in Las Vegas.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Depending upon direct.

THE COURT: Depending upon direct. Before you ask her about it, however,

I would request that you bring it up outside the jury's presence to me and I can see if

it looks like things have changed.

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(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 24.)

This issue resurfaced during the trial, at the conclusion of the prosecution's direct examination

of the victim and before her cross-examination. Defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its prior

ruling on the Las Vegas photographs, "based upon the prosecution's case" which had included several

exhibits authenticated by R.A. from her social media sites. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 267.) Defense

counsel stated, "I have only three of them," and argued:

MR. PATTON: The issue as I see it is several fold. Number one, the

prosecution has now presented this person and two witnesses to suggest that she is

traumatized, deeply traumatized, right after this event occurs. We are over a year or

year later now. She is crying on the stand. Although, quite frankly at the preliminary

hearing she didn't cry at all and she just testified about the pictures that she is posting

through July relative to what she is presenting. . . . And I don't know this for sure

because I have never asked Ms. Aguilera the question, but Detective Burger first

interviews Ms. Aguilera on the 10th in the afternoon. These are posted within the

week. So friends have posted them.

 It is my belief . . . that she goes to Las Vegas between the 7th and the 10th. .

. . But I think that those show an important part to this jury in deciding how much

trauma this girl really was involved in based upon what she said here as opposed to

what she is doing a day or two later in Las Vegas with her girlfriends apparently with

a guy dancing and having a good time. Obviously she can offer an explanation if she

wishes, but it seems to me it is now relevant because the prosecution has basically put

that issue of her emotional status at or about the time of the offense now into issue.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 267-268.)

In response, the prosecutor argued:

MS. CANO: I think trauma is not relevant in this case. Having dealt with

victims of rape for 15 years I know that all victims react in different ways. Going to

Las Vegas for a weekend several days after an assault has absolutely nothing to do

with whether or not there is consent which is the issue in this case. The issue is not

whether or not she is traumatized, how she was traumatized and how she compares to

others being traumatized.

What I had presented is the facts immediately surrounding the time period

where she still would have been intoxicated, where it was a time period where the

witnesses saw her traumatized when she would have been half an hour within the time

period of having been a[ssaulted?]. The defense is going to talk about where she

appeared sober but traumatized and it seems for that purpose that is all coming in

because it is relevant for that purpose. What she did the day after, two days later, two

weeks later is not relevant.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 268-269.)

The court reaffirmed its decision to exclude the Las Vegas photos.

THE COURT: Okay. I will go ahead and lodge these pictures. I am not going

to allow them to be put into evidence. It appears to me that the probative value is very

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slight. The prejudice of Las Vegas and everything that is implied by Las Vegas is very

great. So I do find that the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value at this point

but we can lodge them so they are part of the record so it is clear what I looked at.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 269; see also id. at 270-271, where defense counsel's proffer of additional,

apparently more explicitly suggestive photographs of R.A. and her friends posted on her social media

sites about a month after the incident met a similar fate ("THE COURT: We'll keep those with the Las

Vegas photos" because the court found they were similarly not relevant, the prejudicial value exceeded

the probative value, and they depict conduct "after the fact" which "is not relevant on the issue of

whether it was [sic] consent at the time.").)

This issue resurfaced a third time, also on the second day of trial. The prosecutor had nearly

completed her cross-examination of Greenspan. She had thoroughly examined him about his failure

at any point during the pretext call conversation to express his belief that the sexual encounter was

consensual or to remind R.A. of her purportedly initiating contact that he testified led to that event. 

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 471-472.) After the court excused the jury, defense counsel renewed his

effort to have the Las Vegas photos admitted into evidence, objecting that the prosecutor had not used

the pretext call in her case in chief but used it as a focal point of her cross-examination of Greenspan. 

THE COURT: The second side bar we just had and the reason I excused the

jury had to do with the fact that Mr. Patton now having heard the testimony and the

fact that Ms. Cano has gone in great detail into the pretext call which he did not believe

she was going to be putting in and she did not put in in her case in chief and is now

questioning Mr. Greenspan, Mr. Patton had indicted that he may want to recall Rainah

on the issue of her reaction after the event in question and he wanted to have a chance

to explain why the Las Vegas photos are now relevant and that is sort of your segue

putting whatever you want to put on the record, Mr. Patton. 

MR. PATTON: Yes, Your Honor. Here's my concern, I mean, it bothers me

that we had the transcripts [of the pretext call]. We went through the transcripts. I

mean, I spent a long time trying to get these worked out back and forth to counsel. We

get to opening statement. She makes her opening statement. I get up, I am in the –

that portion of my opening statement where I am about to address the pretext calls [sic]

and as I am doing that Ms. Cano objects and then I kind of approached her and I asked

are you not going to put the stuff in and she said no. And so then I took a step back

and kind of had to reorganize and then move on.

I did not ask my client questions about that during the direct examination based

upon her representations as well. So all of a sudden we are now in her crossexamination. I did not have the opportunity to lay this out for the jury in my opening. 

I did not have the opportunity to address it with my client because I was led to believe

that she was not going to bring the stuff in and now all of a sudden it is like being blind

sided. . . .

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And then secondarily I indicated to the court my continuing belief and concern

that this [pretext call] tape and the arguments that she is going to make in closing

argument is how what [sic] a traumatic impact this event has had on Rainah Aguilera

and we have photographs of her partying in Las Vegas within days of this occurring. 

And it seems to me that those are relevant to the degree that she is going to put in this

tape because they at least give perspective to whether this woman is a drama queen or

not and the arguments that are going to be made I would assume are going to be, you

know, all of this trauma, Katy came and Chris came, she was crying hysterically and

all this, she is crying on the stand and this is why would a person do this if she wasn't

raped.

It seems to me that I should have that opportunity to confront her while she is

sitting here, of course, in court which I was hoping she wouldn't be. In any event,

confront her with, hey, I went to Vegas and these are pictures and I am with a guy and

I am dancing with my girlfriends and apparently having a great old time a couple days

after this occurred . . . 

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 474-476.)

The prosecutor responded that she had not planned to use the tape and transcript of the pretext

call in her case and chief because "there are many self-serving statements on the pretext call". (Lodg.

No. 2, RT vol. 2 at 476.) Only after Greenspan testified did she "believe some of the statements that

he made on the tape become much more relevant for cross-examination of him" for impeachment

purposes. (Id. at 476-477.) Regarding defense counsel's renewed argument about the Las Vegas

photo evidence, the prosecutor stated: "I think that the court has heard this twice and so I am just

going to submit." (Id. at 477.) After reviewing the pretext call transcript, the court ruled it was

appropriate for the prosecutor to use it for impeachment purposes, then revisited the Las Vegas photos

ruling in light of that transcript, concluding: "I don't see, Mr. Patton, there is anything in here that

would open the door on [R.A.'s] state of mind after the fact and so I still feel under 352 that the

probative value is little, if any, and the prejudicial value is great" so "I am not going to allow any

questions about the Las Vegas trip." (Id.) The jury deliberated about two hours before convicting

Greenspan on both charged counts. (Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 285-294.)

Greenspan does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Rather,

he argues exclusion of the Las Vegas photographs posted on R.A.'s Facebook page foreclosed defense

counsel's opportunity to impeach her testimony that she was traumatized by the July 7, 2007 incident. 

The only state court to have reached the merits of this claim in a reasoned decision is the California

Court of Appeal affirming the judgment on direct review in its March 9, 2011 unpublished decision. 

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(Lodg. No. 7.) The appellate court summarized this claim:

Greenspan contends that under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court

abused its discretion in excluding from evidence three photos on R.A.'s Facebook page

showing her with her roommates in Las Vegas posted approximately 11 days after the

incident. Comments on the page, attributed to R.A.'s girlfriends, include statements

like, "If [R.A.] and I only knew that this picture embodied the rest of our night . . .;"

"Damn, hike your skirt up a little more, slut" and "This is a thank you to [R.A.] for

making me wear underwear!!!!!" Specifically, Greenspan contends that the photos

"directly undercut [R.A.'s] testimony and demeanor at trial that the incident with [him]

was traumatic, by showing that she was partying and placing herself in potentially the

same situation as she had when she invited him to her residence on July 7, 2007." He

also contends the trial court's ruling denied him the right to confront and cross-examine

R.A. regarding the Las Vegas photos, in violation of the federal Constitution.

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 4-5)

The court rejected Greenspan's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in that regard.

The pictures were taken and posted after the rape incident, and therefore were not

relevant on the issue of whether R.A. consented to sexual intercourse with Greenspan. 

Whatever claimed probative value the photos had – specifically regarding Greenspan's

claim that they undermined R.A.'s credibility because they contradicted her demeanor

at trial – was minimal, and outweighed by the prejudice they would have caused in

terms of confusing the issues for the jurors, and misleading them into focusing on

R.A.'s conduct after the incident in Las Vegas.

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 9-10.)

The court also analyzed the application of California Evidence Code §§ 1103 and 782

(addressing the exclusion of evidence of sexual conduct of a complaining witness in prosecutions for

sexual offenses under California's rape shield statute). (Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 6-9.) Greenspan does

not challenge those rules as themselves infringing any federal constitutional right. Rather, he argues

they are not applicable because the Las Vegas photos did not involve R.A.'s sexual activity with

others. Therefore, he contends, the court of appeal erred in finding "that R.A.'s activities in Las

Vegas, which involved 'suggestive poses,' was evidence of sexual conduct that was covered by the

Rape Shield Law" because "there was no claim that the sexual nature of R.A.'s actions in Las Vegas

indicated that R.A. consented to have sex with him." (Traverse 21, ECF No. 14-2.) "Instead, the

conduct was offered to attack her credibility by showing that she was willing to 'party hard' and

possibly expose herself to more sexual activity days after she claimed she had been raped and

traumatized by Mr. Greenspan." (Id.) The appellate court rejected his argument. 

We disagree. "[S]exual conduct, as that term is used in [Evidence Code] sections 782

and 1103, encompasses any behavior that reflects the actor's or speaker's willingness

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to engage in sexual activity. The term should not be narrowly construed." (People v.

Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 334, footnote omitted.) Therefore, we conclude

that the Las Vegas photos, which showed R.A. and her friends in suggestive poses, was

evidence of sexual conduct with the broad definition of Evidence Code sections 1103

and 782.

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op at 9.)

 A federal habeas court may not revisit state court rulings on state law issues, as they are not

cognizable grounds for federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. In

both his Petition and his Traverse, Greenspan revisits at length the details of the trial testimony in an

attempt to undercut the state court findings on this issue, but relies on no controlling United States

Supreme Court authority directly or by extension on point in these circumstances. Rather, he

implicitly urges this Court to adopt and substitute his interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial

court issuing the evidentiary rulings as well as for the analysis and rationale of the court of appeal

affirming his conviction under that state law authority. This Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 does not extend so far. Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76.

The court of appeal disposed of the federal Confrontation Clause component of this claim by

finding that even if the trial court ruled in error, the error did not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. " '[T]he application of ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not implicate the federal

Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the 'reasonable probability' standard of 

Watson [People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (1956)].' (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197,

227.)."7 (Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 10.) After a thorough analysis of the record applying that legal

authority, the court denied Greenspan relief, concluding: "It is not reasonably probable that

Greenspan would have obtained a more favorable verdict if the Las Vegas photos had been admitted

into evidence." (Lodg. No. 7 at 11.)

In the 21 pages of argument Greenspan devotes to this claim in his Traverse, the only federal

7

 "Even assuming error, we reject the claim. Greenspan argues we should apply the prejudice standard

under Chapman v. California (1967) to his claim he was denied his confrontation rights. We disagree. The

applicable standard is that of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. In general, if a trial court

erroneously excludes evidence, the defendant must show on appeal that it is reasonably probable he or she

would have received a more favorable result had that evidence been admitted. (Ibid.; People v. Rodrigues

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1125.) . . . . Therefore, the erroneous exclusion of evidence having only slight probative

value on a minor or subsidiary issue does not violate a defendant's federal constitutional rights. (People v.

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999.)" (Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 10.) 

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authority he cites in support of this claim, besides the Davis and Van Arsdall cases, is the United

States Supreme Court authority of Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam), reviewing

a kidnapping, rape, and sodomy prosecution. (Traverse 3-24, ECF No. 14-2.) He relies on Olden for

the proposition: "Under clearly established federal law as interpreted by the United States Supreme

Court, Rape Shield laws per se may not violate the right to confrontation, but they cannot [be] applied

to exclude relevant evidence that impeaches the testimony of the complainant." (Traverse 22-23, ECF

No. 14-2.) However, the Olden case is distinguishable. 

Deciding a petition for writ of certiorari, the Olden Court reversed a judgment on grounds the

trial court's refusal to permit a black defendant to cross-examine the white complainant regarding her

cohabitation with her black boyfriend was based on mere speculation as to the potential effect of such

evidence on jurors' racial biases. "While a trial court may, of course, impose reasonable limits on

defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such

factors as 'harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that

[would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant,' . . . the limitation here was beyond reason." Olden,

488 U.S. at 232, quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. The Olden Court found a violation of the

defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right because the excluded evidence had impeachment

value to support the witness' motive to lie about the forcible nature of defendant's conduct, and the trial

court had excluded that evidence "without acknowledging the significance of, or even adverting to,

petitioner's constitutional right to confrontation" on the unreasonable ground that "petitioner's right

to effective cross-examination was outweighed by the danger that revealing [the complainant's]

interracial relationship would prejudice the jury against her." Id. (holding "[s]peculation as to the

effect of jurors' racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential

to demonstrate the falsity of [the complainant's] testimony"). The Olden Court identified the

complainant's motive to lie about the consensual nature of the charged sex crimes as fear of

jeopardizing her relationship with the boyfriend she was living with at the time. 

" '[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was

prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical

form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors

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. . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' " Olden, 488 U.S.

at 231, quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 

In the instant case, petitioner has consistently asserted that he and [the woman]

engaged in consensual sexual acts and that [she] -- out of fear of jeopardizing her

relationship with [her live-in boyfriend] -- lied when she told [the boyfriend] she had

been raped and has continued to lie since. It is plain to us that "[a] reasonable jury

might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness'] credibility

had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross

examination."

Olden, 488 U.S. at 232, quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

Defense counsel in Greenspan's case suggested a potential boyfriend angle as a motive for R.A.

to lie about the nature of the incident, but that inference and its probative value are vastly more

tenuous and attenuated than in Olden.

8

 Counsel suggested that R.A. might have lied about the

consensual nature of her sexual encounter with Greenspan to avoid jeopardizing her potential future

reconciliation with a prior boyfriend. However, unlike in Olden, and contrary to the "significantly

different impression" of R.A.'s credibility on the issue of consent required under Davis and Van

Arsdall to establish a Confrontation Clause violation, a review of the trial record reveals that the

primary purpose Greenspan's attorney argued for seeking admission of the Las Vegas photos was not

to establish a motive for R.A. to lie about the forcible nature of the encounter. Rather, counsel wanted

to use that evidence to undermine her testimony on the tangential issue of the purported severity of

her post-incident trauma. As set forth above, the trial court reasonably feared the Facebook photos

of her partying in Las Vegas could be interpreted as depicting her character and based their exclusion

on grounds they had no probative value on the issue of consent and only speculative value to show

R.A. was not traumatized by her sexual encounter with Greenspan and therefore it must have been

consensual rather than forcible. The court of appeal reasonably concurred with the trial court's ruling.

The question on federal habeas review is limited to whether the challenged state court result

8

 Greenspan argues in his Traverse: "It was Mr. Greenspan's defense . . . that R.A. was lying when she

testified that the sex with Mr. Greenspan was without her consent. It was Mr. Greenspan's defense that she

realized her actions with Mr. Greenspan would have gotten back to her on again/off again boyfriend Gabe, with

whom she had broken up but was getting back together in Spring and Summer of 2007 [Lodgment 2, 2RT 257-

258, 303]." (Traverse 23-24, ECF No. 14-2.) He speculates expansively: "In which case, she would have felt

it was necessary to convince all her friends and roommates she had been raped as soon as possible, and the

Facebook posting would have been critical in showing from her actions and demeanor a few days later that she

cried rape as an act meant to convince those around her that she had been forced to have the sex even though

it looked like, and R.A. knew it had been, consensual." (Id. at 24.)

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conforms to United States Supreme Court authority and is based on an objectively reasonable

determination of the facts from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Defense counsel was

denied the opportunity to use the proffered Las Vegas photos to suggest R.A.'s testimony exaggerated

or belied the severity of her claimed consequent trauma. Greenspan does not identify any controlling

federal authority directly on point which the state court unreasonably applied or to which the state

court result is contrary. Absent controlling authority, he cannot satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Carey, 549 U.S. at 77; Moses, 555 F.3d at 754. In addition, whether as an evidentiary ruling

proposition or as a Confrontation Clause violation, that court reached an objectively reasonable

conclusion based on the trial record: "It is not reasonably probable that Greenspan would have

obtained a more favorable verdict if the Las Vegas photos had been admitted into evidence,"

foreclosing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 11.)

Contrary to Greenspan's assertion that this case was merely a credibility contest

between R.A.'s and his testimonies, there was strong evidence other than their

conflicting testimonies to support the jury's verdict. R.A.'s roommate testified that

R.A. was curled up on the laundry room floor crying because of what had happened

to her. The jury could reasonably infer it was unlikely she would have been so

emotionally distraught had she engaged in consensual sex with Greenspan. The friends

she spoke to by phone after the incident reported she was shaken up, and when they

picked her up to take her to the hospital she was crying. R.A. also was crying while

she talked to police immediately following the incident. She reported to the SART

nurse regarding the nature and extend of her injuries, and the nurse concluded the

redness was consistent with R.A.'s account, although the nurse did not rule out

nonconsensual [sic] sex. Finally, the jury could easily have viewed both Greenspan's

question to the roommate regarding whether R.A. thought he had raped her and his

comments in the pretext call as implied admissions of his guilt. Based on this

accumulated evidence, and taking into account Greenspan's contrary claim that they

had consensual sex, the jury had abundant basis for the convictions.

(Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 10-11.)

Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined R.A., suggesting potentially impeaching

interpretations of her conduct based on her prior relationship with Greenspan, their interactions in the

days leading up to the July 7, 2007 incident, and her prior statements. As recently observed by the

United States Supreme Court, evaluating the effect on the defendant's right to present a complete

defense of a trial court's exclusion of impeachment evidence in a rape prosecution: 

The admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness' conduct to

impeach the witness' credibility may confuse the jury, unfairly embarrass the victim,

surprise the prosecution, and unduly prolong the trial. No decision of this Court

clearly establishes that the exclusion of such evidence for such reasons in a particular

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case violates the Constitution.

Nevada v. Jackson, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1993-94 (2013) (reversing a Ninth Circuit grant of

habeas relief on grounds the manner of its application of AEDPA review standards "defeated the

substantial deference that AEDPA requires"). 

On this record, it is recommended that the Court defer to the state court's determination that

exclusion of the three Las Vegas photos did not deny Greenspan any right arising under the

Confrontation Clause. Even if the exclusion of the photographs rose to the level of a constitutional

violation, Greenspan has not demonstrated that the evidentiary ruling had a substantial and injurious

effect upon the jury's verdict. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710). For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended relief on Ground

One be DENIED because the state court's resolution of this claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the

facts from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

C. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel (IAC)

Greenspan argues his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial

counsel was denied in three ways. First, he contends his attorney failed to convey a plea offer that

would have allowed him to avoid the sex offender registration consequence of his conviction. Second,

he argues counsel failed to investigate and present a particular videotape to impeach the victim's trial

testimony. Third, he argues counsel failed to interview and call character witnesses to testify that he

is not a combative or assertive person. The San Diego County Superior Court is the only state court

to have addressed Greenspan's IAC claims on the merits in a reasoned decision. (Lodg. No. 16.) In

its October 18, 2010 order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that court summarized:

The instant Petition is based upon the ground that Petitioner's trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to accurately convey to Petitioner the

People's pre-trial plea offer; (2) failing to present evidence of the victim's conduct after

the subject incident; and (3) failing to interview and present character witnesses.

The short resolutions regarding each of these grounds are (1) that there has

been strong evidence presented that the People never made the offer that Petitioner

alleges was never conveyed to him; (2) there is evidence that counsel made the

reasoned tactical decision that a video did not discredit the victim as Petitioner

contends; and (3) there is also further evidence that proposed character evidence would

have only been marginally effective and would not have overcome the strength of the

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prosecution's case.

(Lodg. No. 16 at 1-2.)

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1. Legal Standards Controlling Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims

A defendant claiming IAC must show both (1) deficient performance under an objective

standard of reasonableness and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

To demonstrate deficient performance, "[t]he challenger's burden is to show 'that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.' " Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate

prejudice, the petitioner must show that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors," there is a reasonable

probability "the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694

("A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"); see

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792 ("The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable"). "Because failure to meet either [Strickland] prong is fatal to [an IAC] claim, there is

no requirement that we 'address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient

showing on one.' " Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697; see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) ("Without proof of both deficient performance

and prejudice to the defense . . . the sentence or conviction should stand") (citation omitted).

Reviewing courts must apply a "strong presumption" that "counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (same). "[H]indsight cannot suffice for relief when counsel's

choices were reasonable and legitimate based on predictions of how the trial would proceed." Premo

v. Moore, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 733, 745 (2011), citing Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 770. Federal habeas

courts must ask "whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's

deferential standard," not "whether counsel's actions were unreasonable." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785,

788. "[I]t is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state

court decision applied Strickland incorrectly." Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th

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Cir. 2003), quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 699. "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state

court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786.

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2. Failure To Convey Plea Offer

Greenspan alleges his trial attorney "failed to convey to [him] the prosecution's pre-trial offer

to allow him to plead guilty to a reducible felony that did not require sex offender registration pursuant

to California Penal Code § 290" in violation of his federal constitutional right to effective assistance 

of counsel. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) Remarks by the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing, where

Greenspan was represented by new counsel he retained after his conviction, created the ambiguity

underpinning this claim. She stated:

MS. CANO: Your Honor, I think that that this was a sad case for all parties

and I think that is why Mr. Patton who is an excellent attorney tried to persuade me to

accept an offer 236, 237 which would have been a felony. Could have been reduced

to a misdemeanor and would have had no 290 or sex offender registration for the rest

of his life. Reluctantly I agreed to that. Within five minutes Mr. Patton called me back

after speaking to the family and it was the arrogance of the family that now ties the

court's hands. It is the family that decided, no, we are going to go forward. And I

think . . . the only option for this court is to give him the three years that is mandated

by law.

(Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 683.) New defense counsel stated in response to those remarks: "I think

there might have been a little confusion about what offer Ms. Cano alluded to earlier. . . ." (Id. at 684.) 

The superior court framed this claim as an allegation that counsel "fail[ed] to accurately

convey to Petitioner the People's pre-trial plea offer. . . ." (Lodg. No. 16 at 2.) According to

Greenspan, that offer was for "a lesser offense coupled with the stipulation that a lifetime requirement

to register as a sex offender would not be included." (Id. at 3.) The court concluded that contrary to

Greenspan's claim, "This did not occur." In making that determination, the court considered evidence

submitted by the parties in connection with the habeas proceeding, including the People's "detailed

declaration from Petitioner's original trial counsel, Bradley Patton" and a declaration from the

prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Cano, that "verifies" defense counsel's claim in his declaration

"that the People never presented the offer" Greenspan argues counsel failed to convey to him. (Id. at

2-3.) 

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Mr. Patton included the following paragraph in his declaration, which was

signed under penalty of perjury, and that must be taken at face value. It leaves little

doubt as to what occurred. . . . [¶] Said Mr. Patton: "My suggested resolution was for

Kyle to plead guilty to a reducible felony (PC 237) with no PC 290 registration. At no

time did the District Attorney's Office extend an offer of settlement of PC2[3]6/237

with no PC 290 registration. Ms. Cano . . . never indicated to me that her office would

agree to this resolution. Nor did Kyle or his family give me the authority to make that

specific offer of settlement in this case." (Patton Declaration, page 4:9-13.)

(Lodg. No. 16 at 3.)

Ms. Cano's Declaration, also signed under penalty of perjury, "indicates that Patton asked if

she would consider a reduction to a misdemeanor after 18 months." (Lodg. No. 16 at 3.)

She told him she would not consider that, but did state she would consult her

supervisor about an offer of a plea to a PC 236/237 charge, although she did not recall

any mention of the registration requirement. [¶] Deputy Cano then states in her

declaration: "I went back to my office with the intention of discussing the counter

offer with [her supervisor] but[] stopped in my office before going to her office. 

Within minutes of reaching my office, Mr. Patton called me and told me not to bother

running the offer by my supervisor because Mr. Greenspan was not interested in

pleading guilty to any charge. I never discussed Mr. Patton's counter offer with my

supervisor because I considered it withdrawn." (Cano Declaration, page 3:20-24.)

(Lodg. No. 16 at 3.)

 The court observed that "[t]he problem in this case is not with the above quotations that

clearly indicate no offer was made and thus, there can be no claim of failure to convey an offer that

did not exist," but rather arises from the prosecutor's statement at the sentencing hearing, reproduced

above. (Lodg. No. 16, p. 3.) The court accepted the prosecutor's clarifying explanation in her

declaration addressing the ambiguity created by her remark at sentencing.

. . . Deputy Cano readily admits that she made an "off the cuff" reference

during the sentencing hearing "to the readiness conference in which Mr. Patton

suggested that I accept a plea to Penal Code sections 236 and 237. I quickly stated,

'reluctantly I agreed to that.' I failed to be more precise about the fact that I agreed to

discuss it with my supervisor. But, I was intercepted by Mr. Patton before I had a

chance to do so. I never agreed to any offer made by Mr. Patton." (Cano Declaration,

page 4:26-5:1. Emphasis in original.)

Petitioner continues to focus on the one phrase – "reluctantly I agreed to that" --

to incorrectly verify that the People made the offer but then Petitioner's trial counsel

failed to convey it to him. [¶] However, the evidence presented by the People simply

does not justify that conclusion and this Court declines to accept the contention that

a favorable offer was made by the prosecution but trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to convey it to Petitioner to give him the opportunity to accept it.

(Lodg. No. 16 at 4.)

In addition to the declarations from the prosecutor and defense counsel, the superior court

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considered in support of this claim the evidence Greenspan provided in the form of his own

declaration and declarations from family members, post-trial defense counsel Denevi, and Denevi's

assistant. None substantiates that a specific offer containing terms that included avoidance of sex

offender registration was ever formalized or extended by the prosecutor in a manner that Greenspan

could have

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accepted to resolve the criminal charges. The state court, relying on competent evidence in the record,

thus resolved this claim in an objectively reasonable manner. 

In his federal Petition, Greenspan relies on Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012)

to support this IAC claim. The Frye Court addressed the question "whether defense counsel has the

duty to communicate the terms of a formal offer to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may

result in a lesser sentence, a conviction on lesser charges, or both." Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1408. That

Court held: "as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the

prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused." Frye, 132

S.Ct. at 1408-09 (emphasis added) (finding IAC for allowing a prosecutor's written plea bargain offer

containing a fixed expiration date to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to consider

it, and prejudice to the defendant as a result of that deficient performance). 

Greenspan characterizes trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance on this issue as a

"mistake" of constitutional magnitude for purported "failure to accurately convey a possible offer"

or "a potential pre-trial offer" he would have accepted. (Traverse 24, ECF No. 14-2 (emphasis

added).) In contrast to Frye, the record reflects that Greenspan's prosecutor extended no formal plea

offer, written or even verbal, containing the no sex offender registration term. Although Greenspan

may well have accepted a plea offer that provided for avoidance of the sex offender registration

consequence, as he now represents, the record reflects his attorney's attempt to secure such an offer

never came to fruition. Unless the prosecutor formally extended that offer, Frye is distinguishable on

material facts, and its holding does not control the resolution of this claim. Greenspan identifies no

controlling United States Supreme Court authority for the proposition that an inchoate bargain

proposed by defense counsel during plea negotiations, even one a prosecutor may have agreed to 

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propose to his or her supervisor, can support an IAC claim on this theory when there was no resulting

offer that defense counsel could have communicated to the defendant. He accordingly has not shown

that the state court reached an unreasonable result under the deference exceptions of 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) or (d)(2), and he identifies no clear and convincing evidence on which this Court could rely

to disturb the state courts' rejection of this IAC claim. For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended

relief on

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this theory be DENIED, as the state court result is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Strickland, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts from the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

3. Failure To Present Videotape Evidence Of Victim's Conduct

Greenspan argues "trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of the complainant's

conduct subsequent to the incident that contradicted her testimony at trial" in alleged violation of his

federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) The superior court

addressing this claim on habeas review summarized the evidence at issue:

Approximately one year after the subject rape, the victim and some friends

went to a bar where Petitioner worked. There was a surveillance tape showing the

victim standing outside that bar, appearing to talk to the bouncer at the door. The tape

indicates the victim never entered that bar and a friend came out, there was a hug, and

the victim left.

(Lodg. No. 16 at 4 (emphasis in original).)

Greenspan describes in greater detail the images captured on the videotape and the basis for

his IAC claim on this theory:

A surveillance video taken at the Bar on June 14, 2008, while Mr. Greenspan was

working there, shows Rainah A. standing outside the front door of the First Street Bar

for several minutes, clearly visible to those inside the bar [Petitioner's Exhibit P, ¶ 6,

p. 42]. Mr. Greenspan informed Mr. Patton of this surveillance video, which showed

R.A. had gone out of her way to make her presence known to the petitioner at his place

of employment, despite several no contact orders. [Petitioner's Exhibit E, ¶¶ 14-16, pp.

13-14, Petitioner's Exhibit Q, pp. 43-45.)

(Pet. 12, ECF No. 1.) Although Greenspan's references to "Petitioner's Exhibits" do not correspond

to any attachments to the federal Petition where he provides none (see ECF No. 1), based on his

Traverse references, it appears he may be referring to the exhibits to his habeas petition filed in the

California Supreme Court, provided here as Lodgment No. 17.

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 Trial counsel are accorded broad latitude in the assessment and conduct of a case. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct 1388, 1400-01 (2011); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. For purposes of

resolving IAC claims predicated on failure to investigate, "a particular decision not to investigate must

be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of

deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable

professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words,

counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

Greenspan challenges his trial attorney's tactical decision not to use the videotape to rebut

R.A.'s contention in the pretext telephone call "that she was so devastated by the incident that it had

taken her a week to call him." (Traverse 36, ECF No. 14-2.) He argues: "Similarly [to the rebuttal

value of the Las Vegas photos], the conduct of . . . R.A., by going to Mr. Greenspan's place of

employment despite a no contact order, was conduct, albeit post-offense conduct, that was showed

[sic] directed to him that showed she was not traumatized." (Id.: "Evidence that R.A. attempted to

contact, or at least make her presence know to Mr. Greenspan despite non-contact orders from the

court, would have been relevant to undercut her version of events at trial that she had been taken

advantage of by him, whom she had known since grade school, whom she invited over to her

residence in the early morning hours of July 7, 2007, and invited up to her bedroom.") The superior

court characterized as "pure speculation" Greenspan's "flawed" argument by noting that there was no

sound on the tape to support his claim R.A. exhibited "taunting behavior" and by observing that the

remote timing after the rape of her appearance at the bar undermined his arguments that the incident

could support a finding that "there was no rape" and that the tape shows she "was not traumatized by

the encounter." (Id. at 5-6.) 

The even greater remoteness in time of the videotape from the rape than the Las Vegas

photographs, and the fact that the videotape would have been offered solely for the same purpose as

the excluded photographs, suggest virtually no likelihood that the trial court would have admitted that

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evidence. Like the photographs, the videotape depicted post-event conduct having no direct bearing

on a defense of consent, even though Greenspan summarily argues R.A.'s appearance outside the bar

as "clearly directed to the petitioner," unlike the Facebook postings. The superior court rejected the

claim, relying on the sworn declarations from trial counsel and from the victim. Counsel's

explanations support his considered decision not to attempt to introduce the videotape as trial evidence

after he satisfied his duty to investigate. Counsel was aware of how R.A. would likely explain the

videotape. The court relied on quotations from Mr. Patton's declaration in support of its findings:

"Based on what Kyle said about the situation [as depicted in the abovereferenced video tape], I believed that it had potential negative value. If presented at

trial, the alleged victim would have to be confronted with it. I believed that she would

explain that when she got there, she learned Kyle was present. So, she stayed outside

and soon left. In my view, the alleged victim was playing the 'poor me' card and there

was nothing to impeach her with after explaining away the video. Rather than

supporting any defense, I believed that the video could hurt Kyle at trial since it could

be interpreted that she did not want any contact with him and went there with the hope

that he was not working. Based on what Kyle told me, all of the facts of the case, and

my trial experience, I decided not to investigate the video further. ¶ On August 2,

2010, I watched a copy of the video, which was provided to me by Deputy District

Attorney, Bryn Kirvin. I watched the full length of the video. After having viewed it

and after having tried the case, there is no change in my opinion about the evidentiary

value of the video. It does not change my mind about how I would investigate this

case, nor the way I would prepare and present the defense for the jury." (Patton

Declaration, page 4:22-6:6.)

(Lodg. No. 16 at 5.)

In her declaration, provided in opposition to Greenspan's habeas petition, as summarized by

the superior court R.A. represented "she did not want to go to that bar at that time and only went

because her friends wanted to go. Moreover, because she did not want to discuss the rape incident –

of which the friends were not aware – she reluctantly went along." (Lodg. No. 16 at 6.) That

explanation of her presence at the bar as well as her decision not to go in, carried greater potential for

inferences harmful to Greenspan's defense than for favorable inferences. Applying Strickland

standards, the superior court concluded not only that Greenspan failed to satisfy the deficient

performance prong of an IAC analysis, but also he "presented nothing more than speculation that

investigation and potential use of this tape at trial would have produced a different result than the

guilty verdict," failing the prejudice prong as well. (Lodg. No. 16 at 6.)

Greenspan's statement here of hypothetical uses a jury might have made of the videotape

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vastly overstates its evidentiary value to undermine R.A.'s credibility and totally ignores the more

plausible contrary inferences discernable from the declarations reflecting how the evidence would

likely have been presented, explained, and perceived to his disadvantage by the jury.9

 Even if

counsel's decision rose to the level of unprofessional error, the record substantiates "that counsel made

the reasoned tactical decision that a video did not discredit the victim as Petitioner contends" and

Greenspan suffered no prejudice that decision. (Lodg. No. 16 at 2.) 

 According the requisite "double deference" to the reasonable decisions of trial counsel and

to the state court's reasonable factual determinations from this record, it is recommended the Court

DENY habeas relief on this theory, as the result is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Strickland nor predicated on an unreasonable determination of the facts from the record presented. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

4. Failure To Present Character Witness Testimony

Greenspan argues "trial counsel failed to interview witnesses and present character witnesses

on behalf of the petitioner" in purported violation of his federal constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) 

Prior to trial, the petitioner gave Mr. Patton the names of several character

witnesses, including two friends he had known since high school. . . . Neither of those

witnesses were [sic] contacted by Mr. Patton prior to Mr. Greenspan's trial. Both of

these witnesses would also have testified Mr. Greenspan was very athletic, but that in

his general dealings with people he appeared passive and would often admit to being

at fault just to make other people feel better. 

(Pet. 13, ECF No. 1 (exhibit citations omitted).)

Greenspan complains that the prosecutor used his own trial testimony that he was good in

sports and was employed as a security guard against him in closing argument, "to show he was capable

of forcing Rainah to have sex with him." (Pet. 13, ECF No. 1, citing 3 RT 545, 548.) He also

contends the prosecutor used the evidence of his having called R.A. to apologize for his conduct to

9

 Ignoring R.A.'s sworn explanation for her presence outside the bar a year after the rape, Greenspan

expansively speculates: "In the context of this case, however [contrary to the last reasoned state court decision

rejecting this claim], such evidence would have undermined the portrayal of R.A. as someone who had been

overwhelmed and intimidated by a former trusted friend, and shown her as seeking out Mr. Greenspan even

when warned not to. This would have raised the reasonable probability that she manufactured the rape charge

so as to keep open a possible rapprochement with her estranged boyfriend Gabe, despite her willingness to have

had sex with Mr. Greenspan." (Traverse 37, ECF No. 14-2.)

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infer consciousness of guilt. He argues his character witnesses "would have been helpful . . . to show

he was not the kind of person who would take sexual advantage of a woman and that he would often

apologize to people during an argument even though he did not believe he was [at] fault [Lodgment

17, Petitioner's Exhibit N, ¶ 3, p. 37; Petitioner's Exhibit O, ¶ 4, p. 39.]" (Traverse 38, ECF No. 14-2.) 

The superior court summarized his argument: 

Petitioner argues that these character witnesses, had they testified, would have related

to Petitioner's character and his lack of assertiveness when confronted. Petitioner

maintains that these witnesses would have told the jury that despite Petitioner's size

and 'athletic prowess,' he was not confrontational and assertive and would have

attempted to mollify the victim by not contradicting her during a pretext call instead

of confronting her directly.

(Lodg. 16 at 6.) 

In denying relief on this theory, the court relied on defense counsel's sworn declaration

explaining his decision not to present character evidence at trial:

Again, under penalty of perjury, Mr. Patton explained that "Both Kyle and the

alleged victim were very intoxicated [at the time of the rape]. Kyle was a young male

and, for lack of a better word, he worked in a 'party' environment. I believed that a

jury would not be influenced by this type of testimony under these circumstances and

would only provide the prosecution with more opportunities to argue the facts in front

of the jury through cross examination. Therefore, I made a calculated decision not to

present character evidence in this case." (Patton Declaration, page 5:23-28.)

(Lodg. No. 16 at 6-7.)

The court found "that proposed character evidence would have only been marginally effective

and would not have overcome the strength of the prosecution's case." (Lodg. No. 16 at 2.) Like his

other IAC allegations, the court characterized this claim as "based upon speculation without much

more." (Lodg. No. 16 at 7.)

Petitioner has provided a declaration from one of the potential witnesses not called to

testify at trial to indicate Petitioner's character, but it really does little more than

explain certain pictures that Petitioner placed on the very public Facebook website. 

However, there is absolutely no evidence provided that the testimony of these

witnesses would have convinced the subject jury to return with anything but the guilty

verdict.

(Lodg. No. 16, at 7 (emphasis in original).)

 Although Greenspan contends that testimony from his friends "would have bolstered Mr.

Greenspan's credibility with relevant character evidence" (Traverse 39, ECF No. 14-2), as reasonably

found by the state court, he fails to make the case that but for the absence of that evidence, the

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outcome of his trial would have been more favorable to him, defeating the element of prejudice

required to prevail on an IAC theory. Moreover, it is unlikely that witnesses whose only contribution

to the defense would have been to vouch for Greenspan as ordinarily an unassertive person could

offset the large role his significant intoxication played in the unfolding of events on July 7, 2007. The

trial court suggested as much, observing at sentencing: "I think alcohol played a huge role in this case

and I think that I hope that [sic] Mr. Greenspan can recognize that because I think it is very clear to

me that he had a lot to drink that night, too much to drink. And the fact that he denies that, that's a

problem. It troubles me." (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 685.) Greenspan cites no controlling federal

authority for the proposition that defense counsel must present all witnesses identified by the

defendant or pursue any particular trial strategy merely because the defendant desires it. The United

States Supreme Court "has never required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, regardless

of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for success," Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123

(2009), let alone tangential character witness testimony with no exonerating content.

The question on federal habeas review is "whether there is any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard," not "whether counsel's actions were unreasonable." 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788, 785. For all the reasons discussed above, applying the "double deference"

federal habeas courts owe to state court IAC determinations, the Court should find that Greenspan

received effective trial representation and that there is no reasonable probability the result of his

prosecution would have been more favorable if only his attorney had performed as Greenspan argues

he should have. Accordingly, it is recommended the Court DENY relief on Ground Two.

D. No Evidentiary Hearing Warranted

Greenspan requests an evidentiary hearing associated with the plea bargain issue. (Traverse

35, ECF 14-2; see also Traverse 2, ECF 14: "The petitioner agrees that the facts in the state court

proceedings as presented in case no. D054840 are sufficient to review the claim of the denial of Mr.

Greenspan's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation as a result of the trial court's refusal to admit

postings by the complainant on her Facebook Page; but he disputes that the state court record is

sufficient to decide the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [on the "failure to convey a potential

pre-trial offer"], because Mr. Greenspan was denied an evidentiary hearing to determine the

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determinative issue of credibility, in violation of Due Process of Law.") 

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal habeas courts must approach the factual record

and "substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing." Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct," with the petitioner having "the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Section

2254(e)(2) limits "the discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary

hearing." Cullen, 131 S.Ct at 1400-01. "If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim" unless

the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law "made retroactive on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable," or "a factual predicated that

could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A). In the latter circumstance, the petitioner must also demonstrate that "the facts

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Greenspan attempts no such showings.

Moreover, "[b]ecause a federal court may not independently review the merits of a state court

decision without first applying the AEDPA standards, "a federal court may not grant an evidentiary

hearing without first determining whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable determination

of the facts." Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005), citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

71; see Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 ("Because the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control

whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding

whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate"). "If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a

state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that

was before that state court." Cullen, 131 S.Ct at 1400-01 ("[E]vidence introduced in federal court has

no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review"). If a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) does not satisfy that

statutory requirement, it is "unnecessary to reach the question whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a

[federal] hearing on th[at] claim." Id. at 1400 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1400 n.7 (noting that

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an unreasonable determination of fact under § 2254(d)(2) must be unreasonable "in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding," and stating that "[t]he additional clarity of §

2254(d)(2) on this point . . . does not detract from our view that § 2254(d)(1) also is plainly limited

to the state-court record") (emphasis added). "In practical effect, . . . this means that when the

state-court record 'precludes habeas relief' under the limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is 'not

required to hold an evidentiary hearing.' " Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1401, 1399 (citation omitted).

\\

After Cullen, the Ninth Circuit has held that a federal habeas court may consider new evidence

only on de novo review, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2). See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802,

808 (9th Cir. 2011). AEDPA review when a state court decision has reached the merits of a federal

claim is not de novo but rather is highly deferential. This Court is accordingly limited to consideration

of only the evidence that was before the state court in determining whether § 2254(d) is satisfied in

Greenspan's case. He does not satisfy any of the exacting prerequisites to an evidentiary hearing on

federal habeas review. For the reasons discussed above, this Court recommends a finding that none

of Greenspan's claims satisfies the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and by its express

terms, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) restricts federal habeas review to the record that was before the state

court. Accordingly, the Court should find that an evidentiary hearing is neither warranted nor

permissible under the AEDPA restrictions and should DENY his request. 

For all the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that the state

court decision on none of Greenspan's federal claims is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

controlling federal authority and that the state courts made objectively reasonable factual

determinations from the record in reaching their results. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, neither

AEDPA exception to the deference federal habeas courts owe to state court results is satisfied here,

and federal habeas relief is foreclosed. As Greenspan is not in custody in violation of federal law, the

Court should DENY the Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Anthony

J. Battaglia under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

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for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that

this habeas Petition be DENIED in its entirety as the petitioner is not in custody in violation of any

federal right, and that petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation and (2) directing that judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than September 24, 2013, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any

Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than October

1, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 4, 2013 _______________________________________ HON. BERNARD G. SKOMAL

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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