Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00245/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00245-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF

FISHERMEN’S

ASSOCIATION/INSTITUTE FOR

FISHERIES RESOURCES, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARLOS M. GUTIERREZ, in his

official capacity as Secretary

of Commerce, et al., 

Defendants, 

and 

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER

AUTHORITY and WESTLANDS WATER

DISTRICT; CALIFORNIA FARM

BUREAU FEDERATION; GLENNCOLUSA IRRIGATION DISTRICT;

and STATE WATER CONTRACTORS,

et al. 

DefendantIntervenors.

1:06-CV-00245 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION

1. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the coordinated operation of the

federally-managed Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State of

California’s State Water Project (“SWP”)(collectively “the

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 1 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Projects”.) Both projects divert large volumes of water from the

California Bay Delta (“Delta”) and use the Delta to store water. 

Over the past few decades, the Projects have been operated

pursuant to a series of cooperation agreements. Before the court

is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for

relief under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) for

lack of jurisdiction. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on September

11, 2006. (Doc. 69, First Amended Complaint, September 11,

2006.) On February 2, 2007, Federal Defendants and DefendantIntervenors all filed Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 107, Motion to

Dismiss by State Water Contractors and California Farm Bureau

Federation, Filed February 2, 2007.; Doc. 111, Motion to Dismiss

by San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority, Westlands Water

District, Filed February 2, 2007; Doc. 114, Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Jurisdiction by Carlos M. Gutierrez, William T Hogarth,

Gale A. Norton, John W. Keyes, Filed February 2, 2007.) Several

Defendants also joined in the motion to dismiss on that day. 

(Doc. 116, Joinder re Doc. 107 by Glenn-Colusa Irrigation

District, Natomas Central Mutual Water Co., Pelger Mutual Water

Co., Pleasant Grove Verona Mutual Water Company, PrincetonCodora-Glenn Irrigation District, Provident Irrigation District,

Reclamation District 108, River Garden Farms, Filed February 2,

2007.; Doc. 117, Joinder re. Doc. 110-111, by Glenn-Colusa

Irrigation District, Natomas Central Mutual Water Co., Pelger

Mutual Water Co., Pleasant Grove Verona Mutual Water Company,

Princeton-Codora-Glenn Irrigation District, Provident Irrigation

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 2 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

District, Reclamation District 108, River Garden Farms, Filed

February 2, 2007.) 

On March 2, 2007 Plaintiffs filed their opposition to all

motions to dismiss. (Doc. 125, Opposition to Motions to Dismiss,

Filed March 2, 2007.). Defendants filed their respective

replies. (Doc. 126, Reply to Opposition by Intervenor California

Farm Bureau Federation, Filed March 8, 2007.; Doc. 129, Reply to

Response to Motion by Intervenors San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water

Authority and Westlands Water District, Filed March 9, 2007.;

Doc. 130, Reply to Response to Motion by Intervenor Defendants

Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District to California Farm Bureau

Federation’s Reply, Filed March 9, 2007.; Doc. 131, Reply to

Response to Motion by Intervenor Defendants Glenn-Colusa

Irrigation District to San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority

and Westlands Water District’s Reply, Filed March 9, 2007.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Over the past several decades, the state and federal

agencies charged with management of the CVP and SWP have operated

the Projects in an increasingly coordinated manner pursuant to a

Coordinated Operating Agreement (“COA”). The COA, which dates to

in 1986, has evolved over time to reflect, among other things,

changing facilities, delivery requirements, and regulatory

restrictions. The most recent document surveying how the COA is

implemented in light of these evolving circumstances is the 2004

Operating Criteria and Plan (“2004 OCAP” or “OCAP”). 

A. Overview of the 2004 OCAP

The OCAP begins with a “Purpose of Document” section which

states:

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 3 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

This document has been prepared to serve as a baseline

description of the facilities and operating environment

of the Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water

Project (SWP). The Central Valley Project - Operations

and Criteria Plan (CVP-OCAP) identifies the many

factors influencing the physical and institutional

conditions and decision-making process under which the

project currently operates. Regulatory and legal

instruments are explained, alternative operating models

and strategies described. 

The immediate objective is to provide operations

information for the Endangered Species Act, Section 7,

consultation. The long range objective is to integrate

CVP-OCAP into the proposed Central Valley document. 

It is envisioned that CVP-OCAP will be used as a

reference by technical specialists and policymakers in

and outside the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) in

understanding how the CVP is operated. The CVP-OCAP

includes numeric and nonnumeric criteria and operating

strategies. Emphasis is given to explaining the

analyses used to develop typical operating plans for

simulated hydrologic conditions. 

All divisions of CVP are covered by this document,

including the Trinity River Division, Shasta and

Sacramento Divisions, American River Division and

Friant Division. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 4 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

(AR 506.) 

The introductory chapter provides an overview of all of the

physical components of the CVP and SWP (AR 507-520), as well as

all of the relevant legal authorities affecting CVP operations

(508-512). 

Chapter 2, explains, among other things, that water needs

assessments have been performed for each CVP water contractor, to

confirm each contractor’s past beneficial use in order to

anticipate future demands. (AR 521.) Chapter 2 also reviews the

1986 COA and how it is implemented on a daily basis by

Reclamation and DWR. (AR 523-25.) Also provided is a detailed

overview of the “changes in [the] operations coordination

environment since 1986,” which include:

• Changes due to temperature control operations on the

Sacramento River; 

• Increases in the minimum release requirements on the

Trinity River; 

• Implementation of CVPIA 3406(b)(2) and Refuge Water

Supply contracts;

• Commitments made by the CVP and SWP pursuant to the

Bay-Delta Accord and the subsequent implementation of

State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) Decision1641; 

• The Monterey Agreement; 

• The Operation of the North Bay Aqueduct (which was not

included in the 1986 COA). 

• The SWP’s commitment to make up for 195,000 acre-feet

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 5 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

of pumping lost to the CVP due to SWRCB Decision 1485;

• Implementation of the Environmental Water Account; and 

• Constraints imposed by various endangered species act

listings, including that of the Sacramento River

Winter-Run Chinook Salmon, the Sacramento River SpringRun Chinook Salmon, the Steelhead Trout, and the Delta

Smelt (which resulted in the issuance of biological

opinions in 1993, 1994, and 1995 concerning CVP/SWP

operations and the South Delta Temporary Barriers

Biological Opinion in 2001)

(AR 525-28.) The OCAP also reviews the regulatory standards

imposed by SWRCB D-1641, which include water quality standards

based on the geographic position of the 2-parts-per-thousand

isohale (otherwise known as “X2”), a Delta export restriction

standard known as the export/inflow (E/I) ratio, minimum Delta

outflow requirements, and Sacramento River and San Joaquin River

flow standards. (AR 530-537.) In addition to imposing

requirements, D-1641 granted the Bureau and DWR permission to use

each project’s capabilities in a coordinated manner. (AR 537-

37.) 

This is not meant to be a complete overview of the material

covered in the OCAP. Numerous regulatory and operational changes

have taken place in recent years. As the OCAP’s “Purpose of

Document” section explains, the immediate objective of the OCAP

is to describe and document all such regulatory and other

operational information so that ESA Section 7 consultation can

proceed to evaluate how project operations will affect the Delta

smelt under various projected future conditions. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 6 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

B. 2004 OCAP Biological Assessment 

Because endangered and/or threatened species, including the

Winter Run Chinook salmon, Spring Run Chinook salmon, and

Steelhead Trout at issue in this case, reside in the area

affected by the CVP and SWP, the 2004 OCAP, administered on

behalf of the federal government by the Bureau of Reclamation

(“Bureau”) must comply with various provisions of the ESA. 

Specifically, prior to authorizing, funding, or carrying out any

action, the acting federal agency (in this case, the Bureau) must

first consult with FWS and/or NMFS to “insure that [the]

action...is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of

any endangered species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species

which is determined...to be critical....” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)

[ESA § 7(a)(2)]. This form of consultation is called “formal

consultation.,” and concludes with the issuance of a biological

opinion. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

Alternatively, under certain circumstances, a federal agency

may pursue “early consultation,” on behalf of an agency or

private party (referred to as a “prospective applicant”) who will

require formal approval or authorization to undertake a project. 

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3). Early consultation may be requested when

the prospective applicant “has reason to believe that an

endangered species or a threatened species may be present in the

area affected by this project and that implementation of such

action will likely affect such species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.11(b). 

The result of early consultation is a “preliminary biological

opinion,” the contents of which are “the same as for a biological

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 7 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

opinion issued after formal consultation except that the

incidental take statement provided with a preliminary biological

opinion does not constitute authority to take listed species.” §

402.11(e). Subsequently, the preliminary biological opinion may

be “confirmed” after the prospective applicant applies to the

federal agency for a permit or licence. Once a request for

confirmation is received, the FWS must either confirm that the

preliminary biological opinion stands as the final biological

opinion or must request that the federal agency initiate formal

consultation. § 402.11(f). 

In order to fulfill its obligations under the ESA,

Reclamation prepared a biological assessment and initiated both

formal and early consultation with the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service (FWS) and NMFS. See Court Order, dated Jan. 3,

2007 at 5. NMFS issued a biological opinion on October 22, 2004

(the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOP), and the FWS issued an amended

biological opinion on February 16, 2005. 

After issuance of the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp, the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) listed as

threatened a population segment of the North American Green

Sturgeon located in the Sacramento Delta region and designated

critical habitat for several species, including Central Valley

spring-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley steelhead and Central

California Coast Steelhead. Following the listing and critical

habitat designation, Reclamation requested reinitiation of ESA §

7 consultation on the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp. Despite the fact that

Defendants have reinitiated consultation on the NMFS 2004 OCAP

BiOp, Plaintiffs are challenging the NMFS 2004 BiOp and the FWS

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 8 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

2005 BiOp under the APA. Those claims are pending in this case

(challenging the 2004 NMFS OCAP BiOp) and the companion case NRDC

v. Kempthorne, 1:05-CV-01207 (E.D. Cal.) (challenging the 2004

FWS OCAP BiOP as to the Delta Smelt).

Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim for Relief, titled “Failure to

Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) on the 2004

OCAP,” alleges a violation of NEPA and the APA. (Doc. 69 FAC, ¶¶

113-115.) In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that

Reclamation’s “approval and implementation of the 2004 OCAP,

including the approval and implementation of changes to project

operations included in the 2004 OCAP, constitutes a major Federal

action,” which triggers Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. Id. ¶ 114.

According to Plaintiffs, “the Bureau was obligated to prepare an

EIS on the 2004 OCAP,” and Reclamation’s decision to not prepare

such an EIS was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

not in accordance with law, and without observance of procedure

required by law, contrary to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).” Id. ¶

115.

This motion is limited to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim for

Relief.

C. Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Relief under NEPA

In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the

following: 

The Bureau’s approval and implementation of the 2004

OCAP, including the approval and implementation of

changes to project operations included in the 2004

OCAP, constitutes a major Federal action significantly

affecting the quality of the human environment within

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 9 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

the meaning of Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.

§4332(2)(C). Under NEPA the Bureau was required to

prepare an EIS, for at least the following reasons: 

a. The San Joaquin River/Sacramento River Delta area

has “[u]nique characteristics . . . such as

proximity to . . . wetlands, wild and scenic

rivers, or ecologically critical areas” within the

meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3); 

b. The effects of the action on the quality of the

human environment are likely to be “highly

controversial” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. §

1508.27(b)(4); 

c. The possible effects on the human environment are

“highly uncertain” and involve “unique [and]

unknown risks” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. §

1508.27(b)(5); 

d. The action is “related to other actions with

individually insignificant but cumulatively

significant impacts” within the meaning of 40

C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7); and 

e. The action “may adversely affect an endangered or

threatened species or its [critical] habitat”

within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. §1508(b)(9). 

Consequently, the Bureau was obligated to prepare an

EIS on the 2004 OCAP. The Bureau’s failure to prepare

an EIS or even an EA before approving and implementing

the 2004 OCAP, including the changes to project

operations contained in the 2004 OCAP, violated and

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 10 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

continues to violate Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). (Doc. 69-1, First Amended

Complaint, ¶ 114.) The Bureau’s decision not to

prepare an EIS for the 2004 OCAP was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance

with law, and without observance of procedure required

by law, contrary to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). (Doc.

69-1, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 115.) 

Federal Defendants reply that the OCAP and OCAP BiOp

are not the result of the Bureau’s decision-making process

and neither is an “action” from which legal consequences

will flow. 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They

possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute....It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this

limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary

rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)(internal

citations omitted); see also Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a

Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001)(plaintiff

bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction).

A motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds can be “either

facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

2000). In a facial attack, a court must “take all of the

allegations of material fact stated in the complaint as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” See Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir.

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 11 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2002). In a factual challenge, “a court may look beyond the

complaint to matters of public record without having to convert

the motion into one for summary judgment... It also need not

presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ allegations.” White,

227 F.3d at 1243. In this case, Defendants jurisdictional

challenge is facial against Plaintiff’s seventh claim for failure

to prepare an EIS under NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

5. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice 

“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b) (1984). “A court shall take judicial notice if

requested by a party and supplied with the necessary

information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) (1984). Judicially noticed

facts often consist of matters of public record, such as prior

court proceedings, see, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846

F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988); administrative materials, see,

e.g., Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); city

ordinances, see, e.g., Toney v. Burris, 829 F.2d 622, 626-27 (7th

Cir. 1987) (holding that federal courts may take judicial notice

of city ordinances); official maps, see, e.g., Aiello v. Town of

Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (taking

judicial notice of geological surveys and existing land use

maps); or other court documents, see, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor,

220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of a filed

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 12 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

complaint as a public record). Federal courts may “take notice

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct

relation to the matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel Robinson

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248

(9th Cir. 1992).

Defendant-Intervenors San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water

Authority and Westlands Water District request judicial notice of

the CVP OCAP, June 30, 2004. (Doc. 113, Request for Judicial

Notice by San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority, Westlands

Water District, Filed February 2, 2007.)

Defendant-Intervenors California Farm Bureau Federation

(“California Farm Bureau”) also filed a request for judicial

notice. California Farm Bureau Requests that the court take

Notice of a January 11, 2007 letter from Rodney R. McInnis,

Regional Administrator of NMFS to Alan R. Candlish, Regional

Planning Officer of the Bureau of Reclamation. (Doc. 127,

Request for Judicial Notice by State Water Contractors,

California Farm Bureau Federation, re Doc. 126 Reply to Response

to Motion, Filed March 8, 2007.)

Defendants do not object to judicial notice of these

documents. The documents are matters of public record. 

Defendant-Intervenors’ requests for Judicial Notice are

GRANTED. 

B. Nepa and the APA

The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) is the basic

“national charter for protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 1500.1. Its purposes include: “To declare a national policy

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 13 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man

and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or

eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate

the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the understanding

of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the

Nation.” 42 U.S.C. § 4321.” To accomplish these purposes, NEPA

requires all agencies of the federal government, including the

Bureau, to prepare a “detailed statement” that discusses the

environmental impacts of, and reasonable alternatives to, all

“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This statement is

commonly known as an environmental impact statement (“EIS”). 

However NEPA does not provide for a private right of action. 

Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 814 (9th Cir.

2006). Therefore Plaintiffs may obtain relief only by properly

invoking the judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§

701-706. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 882-83 (NEPA

claims must satisfy APA requirements). The APA waives sovereign

immunity and prescribes standards for judicial review of certain

agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (granting standing to

plaintiffs “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statute”). 

The APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity contains several

limitations. See Gallo Cattle Co. v. United States Dep’t of

Agriculture, 159 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). One of those

limitations is the requirement that the challenged decision be a

“final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 14 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

in a court. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added); accord.,

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). 

Conversely, where a plaintiff challenges something other than a

final agency action, judicial review is not authorized. These

requirements have been considered jurisdictional in nature and

absent these elements a reviewing court cannot reach the merits

of a claim. See DRG Funding Corp. v. Secretary of Housing & Urban

Development, 76 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996), reh’g denied,

83 F.3d 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s bear the burden of

proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction which here

includes “identifying specific federal conduct and explaining how

it is final agency action within the meaning of [5 U.S.C. §

551(13).] Colorado Farm Bureau Federation v. United States

Forest Service, 220 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000.) 

The first issue is whether the OCAP is an agency “action” by

Defendants under the APA to trigger NEPA jurisdiction. 

i. “Action” under the APA

The APA authorizes suit by "[a] person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by

agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C.

§ 702.; Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S.

55, 61 (2004). Where no other statute provides a private right

of action, the "agency action" complained of must be "final

agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704l; Norton, 542 U.S. at 62. "Agency

action" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) to include "the whole or

a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or

the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 

An “agency action” falls under one of “five categories of

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 15 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

decisions made or outcomes implemented by an agency--‘agency

rule, order, license, sanction [or] relief.’” Norton, 542 U.S.

at 62.; 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). All of those categories involve

circumscribed, discrete agency actions, as their definitions make

clear: 

1. "[a rule is] an agency statement of . . .

future effect designed to implement,

interpret, or prescribe law or policy; 

2. [an order is] a final disposition . . . in a

matter other than rule making; 

3. [a license is] a permit . . . or other form

of permission; 

4. [a sanction is] a prohibition . . . or taking

[of] other compulsory or restrictive action; 

and 

5. [a relief is] (a) a grant of money,

assistance, license, authority, etc., or (b)

recognition of a claim, right, immunity,

etc., or (c) a taking of other action on the

application or petition of, and beneficial

to, a person.” 

5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (6), (8), (10), (11); see also, Norton, 542

U.S. at 62.

In Oregon Desert the United States Forest Service (“Forest

Service”) issued annual operating instructions (“AOI”) to

permittees who graze livestock on national forest land. Oregon

Natural Desert Association v. United States Forest Service, 465

F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006). One of the issues in Oregon

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 16 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Desert was whether issuance of AOI’s constituted an agency

action. The administrative record showed that prior to the

beginning of a grazing season, the Forest Service issued an AOI

to grazing permit holders. Id. at 980. As with NEPA, the

applicable substantive statute in Oregon Desert did not provide

for a private right of action, requiring the challenge to the AOI

under the APA judicial review provisions. Id. 982. The Forest

Service contested the court’s subject matter jurisdiction by

arguing that the AOI lacked finality and did not constitute an

“agency action” under the APA as interpreted by Norton. Id. at

982. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Forest Service’s argument,

finding that a grazing permit is a license and the issuance of a

grazing permit is an agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) of

the APA. Id. at 983. Under the APA a license “includes the

whole or a part of an agency permit... or other form of

permission.” Id.; see also, 5 U.S.C. § 551(8). 

Plaintiffs claim that the 2004 OCAP and OCAP BiOp are more

than descriptive documents. Plaintiffs allege that when

biologists first reviewed the 2004 OCAP, their draft BiOp found

that CVP operations would jeopardize the continued survival of

some of the salmon species. (Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 2, Filed

September 11, 2006.) Plaintiffs also allege that, under 2004

OCAP, the Bureau and DWR plan to substantially revise and expand

the existing operations of the CVP and SWP. According to

Plaintiffs the revisions will have a significant impact on the

Sacramento River and San Joaquin River watersheds in general,

and, in particular, on the following five salmon and steelhead

evolutionary significant units (“ESUs”) listed under the

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 17 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Endangered Species Act (“ESA”): 

1. winter run Chinook salmon

2. spring run Chinook salmon

3. threatened Central Valley steelhead

4. threatened Southern Oregon/Northern California 

Coast coho salmon (“SONCC coho”); 

5. threatened Central California Coast steelhead 

(“Central Coast steelhead”)

(Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 73.) Plaintiffs therefore argue that the

proposed actions should be subject to NEPA review. 

Before NEPA review of the OCAP and OCAP BiOp is required,

they must constitute final agency action under the APA. 

Plaintiff alleges that the BiOp provides for an “adaptive

management” process under which the Bureau, NMFS and the FWS will

discuss potential changes in water storage and release to benefit

the five salmon and steelhead ESUs. (Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 73.) 

Plaintiffs argue that the BiOp does not provide any assurances of

any particular level of protection for the ESU’s as a result of

this promise of future adaptive management. (Id.). The BiOp

also does not identify reasonably certain, enforceable measures

that will be implemented if changes in operations are necessary

to protect the species. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the BiOp

assumes that only a fraction of the amount of water authorized

for delivery under the long-term renewal contracts will actually

be delivered. (Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 74.) However, Plaintiffs’

argue the Bureau has stated that it intends to deliver the full

amount of water authorized in the contracts. (Id.) By

significantly underestimating the amount of water to be diverted

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 18 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

and exported under contract, the BiOp likewise significantly

underestimates the effects of the 2004 OCAP on listed species and

their habitat. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s therefore contend that the documents incorporate

substantial changes to the CVP and SWP. Plaintiffs, however, do

not dispute that the proposed changes that would allegedly harm

the salmon have not yet to been adopted. Plaintiffs also

complaint does not allege any proposed changes are imminent or

that their adoption is imminent. In their pleadings, Plaintiffs

specifically point to the following proposed actions to support

their argument that the OCAP and OCAP BiOp are final agency

action: 

1. The Bureau proposed to move the temperature 

compliance point on the Sacramento River 19 miles 

downstream, 

2. The Bureau proposed to modify project operations 

in “numerous interrelated ways” so as to further 

impair the ability to meet the 1.9 million acrefeet Shasta Reservoir carryover storage 

requirement established for fish protection, 

3. The proposed increase of the amount of export 

pumping from the Delta to 8,500 cfs. 

There is no dispute that the OCAP BiOp covers the effects of

the proposed OCAP for the CVP and SWP. There is also no dispute

that the OCAP BiOp is considered to be the primary informational

basis for the biological opinion prepared by NMFS. The opinion

itself states, “This document is the biological opinion on [CVP]

and [SWP] long-term operations as described in the Long-Term CVP

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 19 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

and SWP OCAP BiOp.” However, Plaintiffs do not allege in the

complaint that either the 2004 OCAP or OCAP BiOp constitute a

“rule, order, license, permit, sanction, or relief” or taking of

other action such that either document would be considered an

“agency action” for purposes of the APA. 

Because NEPA does not have a citizen suit provision, an

action must be considered an “agency action” under the APA before

triggering a NEPA analysis. That the OCAP or OCAP BiOp is the

informational basis for the NMFS biological opinion is not

sufficient to show that either document is a “rule, order,

license, permit, sanction, or relief” or taking of other action. 

Also, contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the proposed actions in

the OCAP or OCAP BiOp cannot result in harm to the salmon,

because the actions have not yet been adopted or implemented by

the Bureau. 

Plaintiffs also refer to the language of the OCAP BA: 

The OCAP BiOp states, for example, that “[i]n addition to

current-day operations, several future actions are to be included

in the consultation. 

These actions are: 

1. Increased flows in the Trinity River, 

2. Increased pumping at Banks Pumping Plant

3. Permanent barriers operated in the South Delta, 

4. An intertie between California Aqueduct (CA) and 

the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC), 

5. A long term environmental Water Account

6. Freeport Regional Water Project and 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 20 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

7. Various operational changes that are 

identified in this project description. 

Some of these items will be part of early consultation

including increased Banks Pumping to 8500 cubic feet per second

(cfs), permanent barriers and the long-term EWA. These proposed

actions will come online at various times in the future. The

status quo is that the OCAP and OCAP BA describe operation of the

CVP and SWP. The proposed actions and operations are in the

future. see, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the

Interior, Long-Term Central Valley Project and State Water

Project Operations Criteria and Plan Biological Assessment

(2004), available at

www.usbr.gov/mp/cvo/ocap/OCAP_BA_6_30_04.pdf.

However, Plaintiff fails to point out that the OCAP BiOp

specifically states, “The actions listed in the preceding

paragraph are not being implemented at present; however, they

are part of the future proposed action on which Reclamation is

consulting.” (Id.) The BiOp also states that for each proposed

action, the ESA § 7 consultation will be reinitiated. Defendants

have also stated that some of the proposed actions will qualify

as agency action and they will undertake NEPA review for all such

actions. 

Plaintiffs in this case have failed to show how the 2004

OCAP or the OCAP BiOp’s proposed future actions, that may or may

not be implemented, constitute an “action” as defined in 5 U.S.C.

§ 551(13) of the APA. 

Although Plaintiffs seek to have the 2004 OCAP or the OCAP

BiOp treated as “rules” they offer no legal or factual support

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 21 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

that 2004 OCAP or the OCAP BiOp qualifies as “an agency statement

of future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe

law or policy.” Neither is the 2004 OCAP or the OCAP BiOp an

“order.” Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged nor does it

appear that they can establish that either the OCAP or BiOP is “a

final disposition... in a matter other than rule making.” 

The OCAP and OCAP BiOp serve the function of an

environmental consultation on proposed projects rather than

implementing or prescribing law or policy. According to the

purpose statement of the 2004 OCAP: 

“This document has been prepared to serve as a baseline

description of the facilities and operating environment

of the CVP and SWP. The Central Valley Project –

Operations Criteria and Plan (CVP-OCAP) identifies the

many factors influencing the physical and institutional

conditions and decision-making process under which the

project currently operates. Regulatory and legal

requirements are explained, alternative operating

models and strategies described. The immediate

objective is to provide operations information for the

Endangered Species Act, Section 7, consultation. The

long range objective is to integrate CVP-OCAP into the

proposed Central Valley document. It is envisioned that

CVP-OCAP will be used as a reference by technical

specialists and policymakers in and outside the Bureau

of Reclamation (Reclamation) in understanding how the

CVP is operated. The CVP-OCAP includes numeric and

nonnumeric criteria and operating strategies. Emphasis

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 22 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Bennett involved the Klamath Project, a federal 1

reclamation scheme consisting of a series of lakes, rivers, dams,

and irrigation canals in northern California and southern Oregon. 

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158. One of the issues addressed in Bennett

was whether petitioners, two Oregon irrigation districts, had

standing to seek judicial review of a biological opinion under

23

is given to explaining the analyses used to develop

typical operating plans for simulated hydrologic

conditions.”

Nothing in this statement of purpose indicates that the 2004

OCAP is intended to control or govern project operations or to

dictate any activity or action. Unlike the action in Oregon

Desert, the 2004 OCAP or the OCAP BiOp in this case is purely

informational and has the purpose of imparting information and

knowledge to technical specialists and policy makers who seek to

understand how the CVP is operated.. Neither the 2004 OCAP or

the OCAP BiOp qualifies as an “action” as contemplated by 5

U.S.C. § 551(13) of the APA. 

ii. “Final Agency Action” under the APA

For an action to be final under the APA, two conditions must

be met: 

1. The action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the

agency’s decision making process and must not be

of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature, 

and 

2. The action must be (a) “one by which rights or

obligations have been determined,” or (b) “from

which legal consequences flow.” 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). 

1

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 23 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the APA. Id. at 157. The court in Bennett ultimately concluded

that the Biological Opinion was “final” because the Biological

Opinion and accompanying Incidental Take Statement altered the

legal regime to which the action agency is subject, authorizing

it to take the endangered species if (but only if) it complies

with the prescribed conditions. Id. at 178. 

24

Whether an action constitutes a final agency action is

premised on the observation that the action has “no direct

consequences” and serves “more like a tentative recommendation

than a final binding determination.” Id. In other words, if the

agency action is purely advisory and in no way affects the legal

rights of the relevant actors it is not a “final agency action”

under the APA. see, Id. 

In the Ninth Circuit, the core question is whether the

agency has completed its decision making process and whether the

result of that process is one that will directly affect the

parties. Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 982. The Oregon Desert

court articulated three ways in which an agency’s action is

deemed final: 

1. If the action “amounts to a definitive statement

of the agency’s position” or 

2. If the action “has a direct and immediate effect

on the day-to-day operations” of the subject

party, or 

3. If, based on the action, “immediate compliance

with the terms is expected.” 

Id. The focus of the “final agency action” inquiry is on the

practical and legal effects of the agency action: “The finality

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 24 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

element must be interpreted in a pragmatic and flexible manner.” 

Id. 

a. Definitive Statement of Position 

The Oregon Desert court looked to see whether the agency

“has rendered its last word on the matter” to determine whether

an action is final and is ripe for judicial review. Oregon

Desert, 465 F.3d at 984. The administrative record established

the following: 

1. An AOI is the Forest Service’s “last word”

authorizing an individual permit holder to graze

each season. Id. 

2. The Forest Service considers such matters as

changes in pasture conditions, new scientific

information, new rule that have been adopted

during the previous season, or the extent of the

permit holder’s compliance with the previous

year’s AOI. Id.

3. While grazing permits allow grazing on federal

land, the AOI gives the Forest Service the right

to impose additional terms and conditions in light

of its annual assessment of changed pasture

conditions, new scientific information, new rules,

and past compliance by permit holders. Id. at

985. When viewed in this context, the AOI

represents the consummation of the Forest

Service’s annual decision making process regarding

management of grazing allotments. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 25 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Every spring, the Forest Service initiates consultation 2

with the permit holder regarding the issuance of the AOI for the

forthcoming grazing season. Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 985, n.

11. At the end of this consultation process, the Forest Service

sets the terms and conditions for grazing in any particular

allotment. Id. Without the AOI, the permit holder would not

know where within the allotment to graze, when, or any specific

conservation measures that the Forest Service deemed warranted

for the upcoming season. Id. 

26

4. Also, after the Forest Services issues an AOI, the

grazing permit holder is authorized to begin the

new grazing season. Id. The AOI is the only

substantive document in the annual application

process and pragmatically functions to start the

grazing season. Id. 2

Based on the administrative record, the Ninth Circuit

determined the AOI was a critical instrument in the Forest

Service’s regulation of grazing on national forest lands. Id. at

984. The Oregon Desert court found that the AOI was a

consummation of an agency action because it served as a final

decision that set the annual parameters of the grazing program

and which imposes legal consequences on permittees. Id. at 986,

n. 12. 

The OCAP and OCAP BiOp are not the “last word” in

authorizing any action or inaction by the Bureau. They do not

implement any actions or inactions. They are informational. If

any proposed changes are initiated that will have the requisite

effect on the environment, such changes will be agency action

subject to NEPA review. The purpose of the OCAP is “to serve as

a baseline description of the facilities and operating

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 26 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

environment of the CVP and SWP.” It “identifies the many factors

influencing the physical and institutional conditions and

decision-making process under which the project currently

operates.” The OCAP BiOp includes an analysis of the actions

proposed in the OCAP. The OCAP BiOp specifically states that the

proposed actions “are not being implemented at present... [but

rather] a part of the future proposed action on which [the

Bureau] is consulting.” Unlike the AOI in Bennett, neither the

OCAP or the OCAP BiOp give the Bureau the right to implement the

contemplated changes. Neither document consummates the Bureau’s

decision making process regarding proposed changes to the

operation of the CVP and SWP. The documents merely outline

proposed actions and their potential effects if implemented. 

Plaintiff’s concede that both documents outline only proposed

changes but claim that such changes will harm the salmon. 

In their complaint Plaintiffs assert that the Bureau intends

to move ahead with implementing operational changes which

threaten to jeopardize the five salmon and steelhead ESU’s. 

(Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 78.) These assertions are in futuro. 

Plaintiff’s also allege that the Bureau’s “approval and

implementation of the 2004 OCAP, including approval and

implementation of changes to project operations included in the

2004 OCAP, constitute a major federal action significantly

affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning

of NEPA.” (Doc. 69-1, FAC, ¶ 114.) Plaintiffs argue that the

2004 OCAP makes two changes to project operations: 

1. The 2004 OCAP moves the Sacramento River temperature

compliance point contained in earlier OCAPs 10 miles upstream

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 27 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

from Bend Bridge to Ball’s Ferry. 

2. The 2004 OCAP eliminates the carryover storage requirement for

Shasta Reservoir contained in earlier OCAPs. 

However, on May 11, 2007 at the hearing on this matter Plaintiffs

acknowledged that the 2004 OCAP has not been approved or

implemented, nor is there any real probability that such actions

will be taken.

In response Defendants argue:

1. The 2004 OCAP does not move the Sacramento River 

Temperature Compliance 

2. The 2004 OCAP does not eliminate the carryover 

storage requirement for Shasta Reservoir as 

Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 54 of the FAC. 

It merely describes the operational criteria 

under the NMFS 1993 BiOP. Def’s Ex. 1 at 3-14-

15. 

3. The 2004 OCAP neither impacts the current Red 

Bluff Diversion Dam operations nor proposes or 

authorizes the SDOP as Plaintiff’s appear to 

allege at paragraphs 58-60 of the FAC. 

4. The 2004 OCAP does not discuss, propose, or mandate any

operational change. In addition, the 2004 OCAP does 

not discuss authorize or implement SDIP which is 

proposed for the future. 

After a biological opinion is issued, the action agency may

decide to take certain actions and, if those actions arise to the

level of a “final agency action” under the APA, steps could be

reviewable. While Defendants admit that the 2004 OCAP was the

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 28 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

result of much agency effort, it serves merely as a description

of operational limitations, criteria, and procedures and does not

change any existing legal rights, nor require any action or

inaction. 

The Bureau clearly recognizes that any proposed changes will

be submitted for new § 7 consultation and any NEPA review. Under

these facts the 2004 OCAP or OCAP BiOp is not a “consummation of

an agency action that serves as a final decision setting the

parameters” of the CVP or SWP or resulting in any legal

consequences. See, Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 986, n. 12. 

b. Legal Effects

Even if it is assumed arguendo, that the 2004 OCAP or OCAP

BiOp qualify as “consummation of an agency’s decision making

process,” it must be shown that the action is (a) “one by which

rights or obligations have been determined,” or (b) “from which

legal consequences flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. In Bennett

the Court reasoned that the Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) issued by

the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) was a consummation of FWS’s

decision making process and resulted in legal consequences that

were fairly traceable to the BiOp. Id. at 178. After a formal

consultation with the Bureau, the FWS issued a BiOp which

concluded that the “long-term operation of the Klamath Project

was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Lost

River and Shortnose Sucker fish.” Id. at 159. 

First, while the BiOp served as an “advisory function” in

the case, the accompanying Incidental Take Statement (“ITS”) had

a powerful coercive effect on any agency seeking to “take” the

endangered species by operation of the Klamath Project. Id. The

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 29 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

ITS was a written statement specifying the measures that the FWS

considered necessary and appropriate to minimize an actions

impact on the affected species and the terms and conditions that

must be complied with by the agency to implement such measures. 

Id. at 170. The Court reasoned that the ITS constituted a permit

authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to “take” the endangered or

threatened species so long as it respected the FWS’s terms and

conditions. Id. Legal consequences flowed from the BO and the

ITS because, while an agency was technically free to disregard

the BO and proceed with its proposed action, “any person who

knowingly [“took”] an endangered or threatened species [would be]

subject to civil and criminal penalties including imprisonment.” 

Id. at 170. The BiOp and the ITS at issue in Bennett instructed

that any taking of a listed species [was] prohibited unless “such

taking [was] in compliance with the ITS” and warned that “the

measures described were non discretionary, and must be taken by

the Bureau of Reclamation.” Id. at 170. 

Courts have consistently interpreted Bennett to provide

several avenues for meeting the second finality requirement. 

Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 986-987. “[T]he general rule is that

administrative orders are not final and reviewable 'unless and

until they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal

relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.'"

Id.; see also, Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264

(9th Cir. 1990)(quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman

S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568

(1948)) (emphasis added). The legal relationship need not alter

the legal regime to which the involved federal agency is subject. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 30 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Ninth Circuit found that the AOI had legal force 3

because if a permittee did not comply with its directives, the

Forest Service can issue a Notice of Non-Compliance. Oregon

31

See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S.

461, 482-83, 124 S. Ct. 983, 157 L. Ed. 2d 967 (2004) (holding

that EPA's order under the Clean Air Act prohibiting the Alaskan

Department of Environment from issuing permits to a zinc mining

company was a final agency action because the order effectively

halted construction of the mine through the threat of civil and

criminal penalties, despite lack of alteration of EPA's legal

regime); Cal. Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 833 F.2d 827, 833 (9th

Cir. 1987)(holding that the Department of Education's letter

informing state that interest would accrue was a final agency

action despite lack of alteration of the Department's legal

regime); Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 828

(9th Cir. 2002)(holding that BLM's issuance of grazing permits

constituted final agency action despite lack of alteration of

BLM's legal regime). These cases demonstrate that Bennett's

second requirement can be met through different kinds of agency

actions, not only one that alters an agency's legal regime. 

Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 987. 

In the Ninth Circuit an agency action may be final if it has

a "'direct and immediate... effect on the day-to-day business' of

the subject party." Id.; see also, Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr., 911

F.2d at 264 (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 239). 

The issue is "whether the [action] has the status of law or

comparable legal force, and whether immediate compliance with its

terms is expected." Oregon Desert, 465 F.3d at 987. In light of 3

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 31 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Desert, 465 F.3d at 987. Specifically, in Oregon Desert, the

Forest Service’s notification to Defendant Howard Ranch

identified violations of the AOI and imposed a modification of

the underlying grazing permit as the appropriate sanction for the

violation. Id. at 987. Also, the legal effect of an AOI was

demonstrated by the Forest Service’s use using the AOI to

restrict the rights of and confer duties on a grazing permit

holder to standards and habitat objectives for an endangered

species of bull trout. Id. at 989. 

32

these rules, the issue is whether the 2004 OCAP and the OCAP BiOp

have any legal effect that qualify as final agency action under

Bennett's second finality requirement. see, Id. 

The 2004 OCAP BiOp does contain a description of a take

limit for the salmon. Exceeding the take limits could result in

potential criminal consequences. However, in the companion case

of NRDC v. Kempthorne, 1:05-CV-01207 (E.D. Cal.), concerning the

Delta Smelt, the BiOp’s approach to setting incidental take

limits was found to be arbitrary and capricious because, inter

alia, it failed to fully consider the best available scientific

information, did not prescribe enforceable and certain mitigation

measures, and failed to impose take limits that reasonably

assured the survival of the species and its habitat. 

Unlike the biological opinion in Bennett, the 2004 OCAP or

OCAP BiOp does not issue a permit or any other “agency action” as

contemplated in 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) that prescribes standards,

performance, or other action or inaction that result in “effect”

on the environment. Rather, bot the OCAP and OCAP BiOp describe

operations, means, goals, and voluminous data about what must be

considered to operate the CVP. The agency does not prescribe

measures that must be taken by the Bureau which will adversely

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 32 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiffs rely on Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman,

4

469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006.) and argue that the 2004 OCAP OR

OCAP BiOp constitute an “interpretive rule” deemed to be a final

agency action under the APA. However that opinion has been

vacated. 

33

affect the salmon species. Neither document imposes an

obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship as a

consummation of an administrative process. See, Oregon Desert,

465 F.3d at 986-987. Neither document has the status of law, a

comparable legal effect, does not prescribe standards or require

immediate compliance with any of its terms, nor do they prescribe

remedies or penalties for any non compliance. Plaintiffs do not 4

allege in their complaint that there are legal consequences

referable to either the 2004 OCAP or OCAP BiOp. Plaintiffs do

not allege that either document has a “powerful coercive effect”

or that there were “direct and immediate effects on the day to

day business” of the Bureau. Neither document requires or

expects immediate compliance with any of its terms. The OCAP was

prepared to merely serve as a baseline description of current CVP

and SWP operations. The OCAP BiOp also includes reference to

proposed changes which could have potential effects on the

endangered salmon. This is insufficient to establish that either

document result in legal consequences for the Bureau. 

iii. Failure to Conduct a NEPA Analysis as a Final 

Agency Action Under the APA.

Plaintiffs also argue that the Bureau’s decision to not

implement a NEPA analysis is, in itself, a final agency action

under the APA. According to Plaintiffs, the cumulative and

interrelated effects of the proposed 2004 OCAP and OCAP BiOp

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 33 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

actions “may affect and are likely to adversely affect winter run

and spring run Chinook salmon as well as the steelhead.” First,

Plaintiff’s claim that the Bureau must balance its obligations

under water contract provisions, CVPIA, ESA, the CALFED Record of

Decision, the EWA, and the Coordinated Operations Agreement

between the Bureau and DWR. USBR SAR 4892-4901. According to

Plaintiff, the Bureau’s interpretation of those obligations, as

well as its decisions regarding how it will carry out CVP and SWP

operations in order to meet them, is presented in the 2004 OCAP

and OCAP BiOp. USBR SAR 4481-4507 (2004 OCAP description of

project constraints and objectives), 4892-4905. Plaintiffs argue

that the interpretations are so basic to determining the nature

of the CVP and SWP operations that they are included in the

modeling assumptions the Bureau used to analyze the effects of

the CVP and SWP operations in the OCAP BiOp. USBR SAR 5144-98

(OCAP BiOp Chapt. 8, “Hydrologic and Temperature Modeling

assumptions with [CVPIA] 3406(b)(2) and EWA Analyses”) 

Plaintiffs’ concede that the alleged changes to operations

are found in the OCAP BiOp rather than the 2004 OCAP. Plaintiffs

accuse the Bureau of choosing to bifurcate the presentation of

the long-term CVP and SWP operations in order to avoid its

obligation to conduct a NEPA analysis. Plaintiffs also argue

that Defendants cannot show how the 2004 OCAP and OCAP BiOp

constitute an “action” for purposes of the ESA but not for

purposes of NEPA. 

Plaintiffs’ arguments confuse the legal requirements of what

constitutes a “final agency action” under the APA that triggers

the application of NEPA. Plaintiffs argue that the Bureau

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 34 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 As defined in the ESA regulations, “action” means “all 5

activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried

out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United

States or upon the high seas.” (50 C.F.R. § 402.02.) This is much

broader than the definition of “final agency action” under the

APA. Under the APA an action falls under one of “five categories

of decisions made or outcomes implemented by an agency--‘agency

rule, order, license, sanction [or] relief.’” Norton, 542 U.S.

at 62.; 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).

35

clearly understood that the 2004 OCAP was an “action” with

environmental impacts that required consultation under the ESA. 

According to Plaintiffs, no principled reason exists as to why

the 2004 OCAP is an “action” for purposes of ESA environmental

review but not for NEPA environmental review. However, it is the

APA’s requirement of a “final agency action,” not the ESA, which

protects against jeopardy to species, that determines whether

NEPA applies. Once jurisdiction is established under NEPA via

the APA, an EIS is required whenever an action constitutes a

“major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment.” The ESA contains its own standard for

determining what is an “action.” An “action” under the ESA does 5

not necessarily qualify as an “action” under the APA for the

purposes of NEPA and Plaintiffs have not provided legal authority

to support for their contention that these terms are synonymous

under these two laws.

Plaintiffs argue that the very fact that both NMFS and FWS

agreed to the Bureau’s request for initiation of consultation

demonstrates that those agencies believed that the 2004 OCAP was

much more than merely a “descriptive” document but rather

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 35 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs almost entirely rely on Kandra v. United States 6

of America, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (Or. 2001.). Kandra is

distinguishable. In Kandra there was no dispute that the 2001

annual operation plan at issue was a final agency action under

the APA. There was also no dispute that the plan was adopted and

to be implemented. Id. at 1196. In this case, the 2004 OCAP and

OCAP BiOp has not been formally adopted and its implementation is

not imminent. The 2004 OCAP merely describes ongoing operations

and the OCAP BiOp outlines proposed actions. NEPA does not apply

retroactively and an EIS is not necessary where a proposed

federal action would not change the status quo. see, Upper Snake

River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 234 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

36

constituted an action with legal and environmental consequences

that triggered the need for consultation.6

However, “action” under the ESA has a different, broader

definition, not focused on effects. That an activity or program

is authorized, funded, or carried out for which a biological

assessment under the ESA is required, does not mean such

activities are NEPA reviewable agency actions. A biological

assessment is a condition precedent for the eventual issuance of

a biological opinion, if a biological opinion is needed. See 50

C.F.R. § 402.12(k)(2) (2006) (stating, inter alia, that a

biological assessment may be used in “(I) determining whether to

request the Federal agency to initiate formal consultation or a

conference, (ii) formulating a biological opinion, or (iii)

formulating a preliminary biological opinion”). If, as a result

of preparing a biological assessment, the action agency concludes

that the proposed action is likely to adversely affect listed

species or adversely destroy or modify critical habitat, then

formal consultation under the ESA is required. See 50 C.F.R. §

402.14 (2006). If listed species are present and likely to be

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 36 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Since there was a final agency action in the cases cited 7

by Plaintiffs, the court’s jurisdiction under the APA was never

in question. e.g, Save the Yaak Comm. v. J.R. Block, 840 F.2d

714 (9th Cir. 1988) (reconstruction of road); Churchill County v.

Norton, 276 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2001) (approval of certain land

and water right purchases); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th

Cir. 2000) (authorization and promotion of Makah whaling

proposal); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630

(9th Cir. 2004) (issuance of multi-year special-use permits to

commercial packstock operators); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr.

v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006) (amendments to a

comprehensive forest management plan, which “changed the resource

management plans substantially”); Pitt River Tribe v. USFS, 469

F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (extension of leases and approval of a

geothermal plant).

37

affected by the described action, the consulting agency must

prepare a formal biological opinion, which details how the action

will affect the listed species and whether the proposed action is

likely to “jeopardize” the species or adversely destroy or modify

critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (2006).

The several cases upon which Plaintiffs rely that address

either the timing of preparation of NEPA documents or whether an

EA or an EIS is required under NEPA are distinguishable. Each of

the cases involved an undisputed final agency action and the

courts in those cases had no cause to question the jurisdictional

issue presented here. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief cites the 7

same cases to support a lengthy argument that NEPA review is

required for “proposed actions that may impact the environment.” 

The entire discussion presupposes that there is some final agency

action to be implemented and is therefore based on the premise

that the 2004 OCAP and the OCAP BiOp are final agency actions

under the APA. They are not. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 37 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

According to the record, the Bureau noted that NEPA was not

implicated in the absence of a final agency action:

Development of an OCAP which describes operation of the

CVP, development of an associated biological assessment

to identify species effects of the operation, and the

subsequent ESA consultations are not decision-making

processes and thus are not subject to NEPA. Completion

of the OCAP ESA consultation does not authorize

implementation or make decisions on any new

projects/action.

USBR AR 02660-02661.

The Bureau also recognized in the 2004 OCAP that

implementation of any new actions would be accomplished through

two processes:

The first of these is the programmatic documents

developed by Reclamation for the CVPIA, and by

Reclamation and others for the CALFED program. The

second is that NEPA compliance is being accomplished on

all new projects or actions that may change CVP/State

Water Project operations such that there is a

significant effect on the environment. 

Id. at 02661. It is explicit that if and when Reclamation

ultimately decides to take a new action that is not within the

scope of historical operations that could have a significant

impact on the environment, Reclamation will undertake NEPA

analysis. Accord USBR AR 02649 (email regarding OCAP and NEPA,

dated October 7, 2004).

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 38 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh claim for

relief under NEPA is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

C. Challenge to Early Consultation On The OCAP BiOp

The California Farm Bureau also argues that Plaintiffs are

bringing a challenge to the early consultation aspects of the

NMFS 2004 BiOp. 

Early consultation is “designed to reduce the likelihood of

conflicts between listed species or critical habitat and proposed

action.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.11(a) Early consultation by the Fish

and Wildlife Service usually results in a preliminary opinion,

the contents of which are the same as for biological opinion

issued after formal consultation. In either event, early

consultation and a preliminary opinion do not, without more,

carry the weight of final agency action, as they do not fix any

rights or obligations under the law. 50 C.F.R. § 402.11(f) 

According to the California Farm Bureau, the complaint

specifically alleges that the results of the 2004 OCAP and OCAP

BiOp’s early consultation are arbitrary and capricious and

generally states causes of action that allege that all

conclusions in the NMFS 2004 BiOp, whether the product of formal

or early consultation are arbitrary and capricious. (Doc. 69,

First Amended Complaint, Filed September 11, 2006.) The

California Farm Bureau therefore request that the Court narrow

this case to focus only on claims subject to judicial review by

issuing an order which states that Plaintiffs’ claims will not be

reviewed with respect to the preliminary opinion and early

consultation aspects of the 2004 OCAP and OCAP BiOp. 

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 39 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

According to Defendants, it bears emphasis that, under the

regulation, the only options following an early consultation are

either 1. rejection of the preliminary opinion and initiation of

formal consultation, or 2. follow-on agency action to confirm the

preliminary biological opinion as a final biological opinion. In

either event, early consultation and a preliminary opinion do

not, without more, carry the weight of final agency action, as

they do not fix any rights or obligations under the law. 

This issue was clarified at the May 11, 2007 hearing on this

matter. Plaintiffs informed the court that they do not intend to

bring a challenge to the early consultation of the OCAP BiOp . 

Defendants motion to dismiss any challenges to the early

consultation portion of the 2004 OCAP BiOp is GRANTED. 

6. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for

relief under NEPA is GRANTED. Any amendment shall be filed

within 10 days following the service of this decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 150 Filed 06/15/07 Page 40 of 40