Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06002/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06002-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION 

JACQUELINE HOLLOWAY;

JUSTIN HOLLOWAY;

JASMINE HOLLOWAY;

CANDICE DODSON, individually and on

behalf of SHYLAH LEE, JAMEA GRAVES

and STARR DODSON PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 06-6002

CITY OF HOT SPRINGS, ARKANSAS;

BRIAN KECK; and RICHARD NORRIS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOW on this 15 day of March, 2007, the above referenced th

matter comes on for this Court’s consideration of the City of Hot

Springs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (document #38). The Court,

having reviewed the pleadings of the parties, and all other

matters of relevance before it, and being well and sufficiently

advised, finds and orders as follows:

1. The plaintiffs, Jacqueline Holloway, Justin Holloway,

Jasmine Holloway, and Candice Dodson, individually and on behalf

of Shylah Lee, Jamea Graves, and Starr Dodson, commenced this

action on January 31, 2006. The plaintiffs then filed an amended

complaint on March 10, 2006, and a second amended complaint on

July 12, 2006 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the

“complaint”). According to the complaint, the plaintiffs claim

that their constitutional rights were violated when the defendants

searched a residence, located at 421 South Street, Hot Springs,

Arkansas, “in violation of plaintiffs’ collective rights to be

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free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the 4 Amendment th

to the U.S. Constitution.” (Document # 1, ¶ 4). 

Separate defendant the City of Hot Springs (“Hot Springs”)

filed its motion for summary judgment with this Court on February

7, 2007. The plaintiffs responded to the motion for summary

judgment on February 16, 2007; and, Hot Springs filed a reply

brief with respect to the plaintiffs’ response on February 20,

2007. 

2. The standard to be applied to a motion for summary

judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and provides for the entry of summary judgment on a

claim

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847 (8th

Cir. 2001); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256 (8 Cir. th

1996). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence

is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Accordingly, all evidence must be viewed in the light

“most favorable to the non-moving party.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106

F.3d 258, 263 (8 Cir. 1997); see also Bailey v. United States th

Postal Service, 208 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2000). 

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Where a movant makes and properly supports a motion for

summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, the non-movant

must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving

party must "make a sufficient showing on every essential element

of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial."

Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.

1995). 

3. For the purpose of considering the motion for summary

judgment and based upon the pleadings submitted by the parties,

the Court believes the following material undisputed facts appear:

* On July 2, 2003, Investigator Brian Keck prepared and

signed an affidavit in support of an application for a search

warrant for the premises described in the affidavit and

subsequently in the warrant as the “ . . . property known as 621

South Street Hot Springs, Arkansas, described as a white single

dwelling with a grey shingled roof and red brick base with a

partial screened in porch facing north on the south east corner

of the intersection of Fifth and South Street.” 

* A search warrant was issued based upon the Affidavit for

Warrant. 

* On July 2, 2003 at approximately 9:15 p.m. the search

warrant was executed at the home of Jacqueline Holloway. Druing

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the course of the search, the occupants of the residence were

moved to the screen porch by members of the SWAT team. The

occupants included, but were not limited to, Jacqueline Holloway,

Justine Holloway, and Candice Dodson. 

* While on the porch, Sergeant Gregor ordered Jacqueline

Holloway, who was positioned in a wheelchair, to move out of the

way of the entrance of the house. At some point, Jacqueline

Holloway exited her wheelchair. 

* Upon arriving at the location described in the warrant,

police officers Brian Keck and Richard Norris discovered that the

numeric street address of the premises was 421 rather than 621.

* Richard Norris contacted the Garland County prosecuting

attorney with that information and was advised to proceed with the

search. 

* Keck and Norris then proceeded to carry out a search of

the interior of the premises and an automobile in the rear

thereof.

4. Separate defendant the City of Hot Springs has moved for

summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to set

forth a basis for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Alternatively, Hot Springs argues that no violation of a

constitutional right has occurred. 

Political subdivisions may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

only where the municipality’s policy or custom deprives persons

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of their constitutionally or federally protected rights. Monell

v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In this context,

a plaintiff must establish the existence of an unconstitutional

policy or custom and a sufficient causal link between the policy

or custom and the constitutional deprivation. Id. at 690–94.

Unconstitutional policies or customs can take essentially three

forms: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a

constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that,

although not authorized by written law or express municipal

policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a

“custom or usage” with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that

the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final

policy-making decision. Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565, 571-72

(7 Cir 1999)(citations omitted). th

A municipal policy may be evidenced by a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by the municipality’s governing body. St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). To be actionable, the challenged

action or inaction must have been taken pursuant to a policy

adopted by the official responsible under state law for making

policy in that area of the municipality’s business. Id. at 123.

A municipal custom may be established by showing: (1) the

existence of a continuing widespread, persistent patter of

unconstitutional misconduct by the municipality’s employees; (2)

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deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct

by the municipality’s policymaking officials after notice of that

misconduct; and (3) that the custom was the “moving force” behind

the constitutional violation suffered. Jane Doe A v. Special

School Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8 Cir. 1990); see also Board of th

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997). A single incident

normally does not suffice to prove the existence of a municipal

custom. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24

(1985)(plurality opinion). 

The plaintiffs have failed to assert or argue that a policy

or custom of the City of Hot Springs caused a constitutional

violation. Instead, they argue that Hot Springs is liable,

vicariously, for the actions of its “agents.” The Court rejects

that contention because “it is well settled that § 1983 does not

impose respondeat superior liability.” Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454

F.3d 791, 798 (8 Cir. 2006)(citing Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d th

1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997)). For that reason, Hot Springs is

entitled to summary judgment.

 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of Hot Springs’

Motion for Summary Judgment (document #38) should be, and it

hereby is, granted for the reasons stated herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the foregoing ruling,

plaintiffs’ complaint against Hot Springs should be, and it hereby

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is, dismissed. By separate order of even date herewith, judgment

will be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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