Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REDWOOD CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C-01-4282 SC 

ORDER REGARDING

MOTIONS IN LIMINE

I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 1: To Exclude Evidence of Interests

That are Not Compelling

Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. At trial, Defendants will have

the opportunity to present evidence in support of their arguments

as to why the Planning Commission's denial of the Conditional Use

Permit ("CUP") was in furtherance of compelling interests. If

necessary, it will be up to the jury to determine, in accordance

with the Court's jury instructions, whether Defendants' stated

interests were legitimate and sufficiently compelling to carry

their burden. 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 2: To Exclude Any Evidence of

Defendants' Interests Other Than Those Already Alleged 

Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. There is no law that provides

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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grounds for limiting Defendants in this manner.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 3: To Exclude Evidence That

Defendants Used the Least Restrictive Means to Protect Any of

Their Interests

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. The parties have presented

conflicting evidence as to whether Defendants used the least

restrictive means when denying the CUP. Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants' outright denial cannot meet this standard whereas

Defendants assert that Plaintiff foreclosed less restrictive

options by only allowing a vote on one proposal. If necessary,

the jury will determine which side is correct.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 4: To Exclude Evidence of Other

Properties Redwood Might Have Purchased

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. This evidence would go to the

substantiality of the burden which the denial of the CUP allegedly

caused Plaintiff. If Plaintiff claims it continued searching for

alternative properties and was unable to find anything suitable,

the availability of alternative sites is relevant in response. 

Furthermore, evidence concerning the availability of other

properties may be relevant in the damages phase of trial, if any.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 5: To Exclude Evidence of the

Religious Beliefs of Others 

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion mainly

discusses evidence concerning the Association of Christian Schools

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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International ("ACSI"). The parties agree that the religious

beliefs of others are not relevant to the substantial burden

issue. However, Defendants may present evidence regarding ACSI

for other appropriate purposes.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 6: To Exclude Evidence of Lawyers'

Arguments

Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED as to Mark Gaither's statement

on March 30, 2004: "And unfortunately, because your record is

incorrect in multiple areas, I am going to beat you up before a

Federal Judge." The statement is not relevant evidence.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 7: To Exclude Hearsay Found in the

EIRs or the Administrative Record

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED, the parties should make hearsay

objections on an individualized basis during trial.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 8: To Exclude Evidence of the Fate of

the Application to Build a Subdivision on the Property Later

Purchased by Redwood

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. This evidence is potentially

relevant to several issues, including the Defendants' motivations

for denying Redwood's CUP application. Furthermore, the EARP

application is a proper comparator for Redwood, in the context of

whether Defendants treated Plaintiff in a manner unequal to

similarly situated entities.

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Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 9: To Exclude Evidence of Irrelevant

Information about Redwood's Counsel 

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. It is unnecessary to grant

this motion because the parties should demonstrate civility and

decorum during trial.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 10: To Exclude Expert Testimony About

Matters Not Raised in Expert Witness Reports

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED to the extent this requires the

parties to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 11: To Exclude Evidence of Expert

Opinions That Have No Reliable Foundation

Plaintiff has WITHDRAWN this motion.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 12: To Exclude References to Persons

Who Are No Longer Parties to the Litigation

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. Information regarding a

witness' status as a former party is relevant to issues of his or

her credibility.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 13: To Exclude Evidence of Previous

Causes of Action 

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. The dismissed causes of

action are irrelevant and may not be presented by either side. 

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Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 14: To Exclude Evidence of the

Availability of Attorneys' Fees under 42 U.S.C § 1998

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. This evidence is irrelevant

and would be unfairly prejudicial at trial.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 15: To Exclude Reference to

Taxpayers' Liability for Damages Award

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. This evidence is irrelevant.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 16: To Exclude Evidence of

Defendants' Costs in Defending the Action

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. This evidence is irrelevant.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 17: To Exclude Any Argument that the

Outcome of this Litigation will have an Impact on Future Land Use

Applications

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. Such evidence or argument is

irrelevant to the facts of this case.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 1: To Exclude, Pursuant to C.C.P §

1094.5, All Evidence and Argument regarding Plaintiff's

Constitutional and RLUIPA Theories

Defendants' motion is DENIED. Though the Court's January 6,

2005 Order found that Defendants met the standards of § 1094.5,

that conclusion does not resolve the issues presented by

Plaintiff's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims. 

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 2: To Exclude Plaintiff's Evidence of

Incidental, Not Substantial Burdens

Defendants' motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 

The Court will allow evidence concerning the shortcomings of

Plaintiff's current facilities and Plaintiff's inability to secure

adequate alternative facilities, which may be relevant at trial if

Plaintiff can demonstrate that they constitute a substantial

burden. However, as the Ninth Circuit explained in San Jose

Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, evidence concerning

generally applicable costs, requirements, and political aspects of

the CUP process, as a matter of law, are not substantial burdens

on religious exercise. 360 F.3d at 1035. To demonstrate a

substantial burden concerning the CUP process, Plaintiff will have

to show significant irregularities or discrimination. The

Congressional record reflects that RLIUPA was not intended to

provide religious institutions with immunity from land use

regulation and thus exempt Plaintiff from generally applicable

burdens. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7776.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 3: To Exclude All "Burden" Evidence

Not Shown to the County During the Administrative Process

Defendants' motion is DENIED. There is no legal authority to

limit Plaintiff in this manner. 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 4: To Exclude Evidence Concerning

Improper Comparators

Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court finds that for all of Plaintiff's remaining claims under

RLUIPA and the First Amendment, the proper inquiry is whether

Defendants have treated Plaintiff in a manner unequal to similarly

situated entities. See Ventura County Christian High School v.

City of San Buenaventura, 233 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1246-47 (C.D. Cal.

2002); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter,

326 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2003). 

In its January 14, 2003 Order, the Court noted that public

schools and private schools like Redwood are not similarly

situated in this case. Specifically, public schools go through an

entirely different land use approval process based on state law. 

As a result, certain evidence must be excluded. 

- First, the testimony of James L. Bush must be limited to

discussing whether Redwood's property is an appropriate site

for a school of the size in Redwood's CUP application; Mr.

Bush may not present testimony which uses public schools as a

comparator. - Second, the letter from Robert J. Fisher to Bruce Johnson,

dated September 11, 1997 is excluded because it discusses

public school standards. 

- Third, discussion of the Palomares School, a public school,

is excluded. 

- Fourth, discussion of the Alameda County Juvenile Hall is

excluded, because similar to a public school, this

institution was exempt from local land use laws under state

law. 

- Fifth, discussion of the Mata Amritanandamayi Center is

excluded because it is a religious institution, which cannot

be compared to another religious institution, such as

Redwood, under RLUIPA.

By contrast, evidence concerning the Quarry Lane School,

Stivers Country School, and Stivers Private School is admitted. 

The parties' briefs do not contain sufficient information to

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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allow the Court to rule on the admissibility of evidence for the

Five Canyons subdivision. In particular, the parties need to

inform the Court of the location of the subdivision.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 5: To Exclude Plaintiff's Evidence

and Argument Regarding "Least Restrictive Means"

Defendants' motion is DENIED. As discussed regarding

Plaintiff's motion in limine 3, the parties have presented

conflicting evidence as to whether Defendants used the least

restrictive means when denying the CUP. It will be up to the jury

to determine the issue.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 6: To Exclude Certain Deposition

Testimony of Gerald Wallace

Defendants' motion is GRANTED, the word "crapshoot" may not

be used outside of the context in which it arose. In his

deposition, Mr. Wallace was asked to describe the situation faced

by a hypothetical CUP applicant walking up to the front desk of

the Castro Valley planning department to get an estimate of the

chances of being granted a CUP. Mr. Wallace was describing the

ability of a County official to predict the outcome of the CUP

process prior to a full review of the application. Mr. Wallace

did not directly describe the CUP process as a "crapshoot," rather

he answered in the affirmative when asked whether this was a fair

way to describe the process. Plaintiff is only allowed to present

the entire exchange in which this phrase is contained, Deposition

of Gerald Robert Wallace, page 87:18 to 88:17.

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 7: To Exclude Redwood's Facial

Claims, Constitutional Claims, and RLUIPA "Equal Terms" and

"Unreasonable Limitation" Claims

Defendants' motion is GRANTED with respect to Redwood's

facial and procedural due process claims and DENIED with respect

to all other remaining claims.

In the Ninth Circuit, "a facial challenge to the

constitutionality of a statute is a question of law." United

States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2003). To violate

RLUIPA or the First Amendment, the County's ordinances must treat

religious assemblies and institutions "on less than equal terms

with non-religious assemblies and institutions." Guru Nanak, 326

F.Supp.2d at 1155 (quoting RLUIPA). The ordinances at issue in

this case allow, as permitted uses, family dwellings, field crops,

orchards, gardens, and small numbers of animals. Alameda County

General Code § 17.08.030, 17.26.030. The specified conditional

uses, which require a CUP, include a "community facility" and a

"community clubhouse." Id. at § 17.08.040. Any entity that

qualifies as a conditional use in these districts requires a CUP,

regardless of its status as a religious or non-religious

institution. As such, there is no basis for a challenge that the

regulations on their face discriminate against religious

assemblies and institutions. Therefore, Plaintiff's facial

challenges under RLUIPA and the First Amendment are DISMISSED. 

Plaintiff's as-applied challenges will proceed to trial.

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Upon further review of the legal standards and evidence

presented, the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiffs' Twelfth Cause of

Action, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause

under a procedural due process theory. Plaintiffs recently

notified the Court that they were no longer pursuing relief under

a substantive due process theory, leaving procedural due process

as the only remaining theory under the Twelfth Cause of Action. 

Procedural due process claims require (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a

denial of adequate procedural protections. Hufford v. McEnaney,

249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In the zoning context, the protected property interest

requires Plaintiff to demonstrate a "legitimate claim of

entitlement to the zoning for commercial use created by an

independent source such as state law." Buckles v. King County,

191 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has not

demonstrated that it has a legitimate claim of entitlement to

build the school on its property. In order to build a school on

the property, which was not zoned for that purpose, Redwood

requires a CUP, which may be granted by the County subject to

various factors. 

Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate a legitimate claim of

entitlement, it has not shown a denial of adequate procedural

protections. The procedure necessary to satisfy due process is

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Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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guided by the three-part balancing test described in Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Mathews requires

consideration of: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be

affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest." Id. at 334. 

In this Court's January 6, 2005 Order, it found that Defendants

acted within the scope of their jurisdiction and held the proper

hearings in considering Plaintiff's CUP application. Plaintiff

has not presented sufficient evidence to show that these

procedures, which are generally applicable zoning regulations,

violate procedural due process. Plaintiff still has the ability

to raise related issues in the context of its RLUIPA claims. As

discussed, Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, the Twelfth

Cause of Action is DISMISSED.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 8: To Exclude Certain Damages

Evidence

Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

RLUIPA states that "[a] person may assert a violation of this

chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain

appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)

(emphasis added). While courts agree that declaratory and

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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injunctive relief are available under RLUIPA, the issue of damages

is an open question. See Guru Nanak, 326 F.Supp.2d at 1162. 

In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60,

70-71 (1992), the Supreme Court held, in the context of a Title IX

claim, that damages are available when a federal statute is silent

as to their availability. However, in the Ninth Circuit, Franklin

has been construed narrowly, to allow damages only for intentional

violations when the statute is silent as to their availability. 

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, "[a]bsent other reference, the only possible

interpretation [of "appropriate relief"] is that the relief is to

be 'appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act." School

Committee of Burlington, Mass. v. Department of Education, 471

U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (discussing the Education of the Handicapped

Act). The Congressional Record indicates that the purpose of

RLUIPA is to alleviate discrimination against religious

institutions in land use proceedings. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01

(Joint statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy). This purpose is

served by empowering the courts to step in and correct the zoning

process when it improperly discriminates against religious

institutions. In an analogous situation involving the term

"appropriate relief" in the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the Ninth Circuit held that

damages were not available because the statute was designed "to 

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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enforce and supplement the administrative procedures." Witte v.

Clark County School District, 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Analogously, in light of the text and purpose of RLUIPA, this

court finds that compensatory damages are only available upon a

finding of an intentional violation of RLUIPA by the jury. 

Otherwise, the appropriate remedy for a violation will be

injunctive or declaratory relief.

As for Defendants' other requests, evidence of damages

allegedly flowing from Measure D are excluded. This is because

the County cannot be responsible for any damages caused by others

and Measure D was passed by the voters of Alameda County, and thus

involved no action by Defendants. Defendants also argued that

allowing damages related to the increased cost of building a

school would amount to double recovery if Redwood could also

recover damages from Measure D. As damages from Measure D are

excluded, there is no chance of double recovery. Therefore,

evidence of the allegedly increased cost of building a school is

hereby admitted for the damages phase of trial.

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Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

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Finally, as discussed in reference to Defendants' motion in

limine 2, the generally applicable costs that Redwood incurred in

pursuing the CUP are inappropriate under RLUIPA. See Guru Nanak,

326 F.Supp.2d at 1162.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 26, 2007 ____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:01-cv-04282-SC Document 351 Filed 01/26/07 Page 14 of 14