Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02124/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mowana Pruett,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-02124-PHX-KML

ORDER 

Plaintiff Mowana Pruett seeks review of the Social Security Commissioner’s final 

decision denying her disability insurance benefits. Because the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on 

harmful legal error, it is affirmed. 

I. Background

Pruett protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits on July 23, 

2020, and for disabled widow’s benefits on July 29, 2020.1(Administrative Record (“AR”) 

35.) The ALJ determined her severe impairments were cervicalgia and degenerative disc 

disease of the lumbar spine. (AR 38.) Pruett does not allege she had any other severe 

impairments. (See Docs. 11, 14.)2

The ALJ denied Pruett’s claim (AR 48) and the appeals council denied her request 

for review. (AR 1.) Pruett then appealed to this court. 

1 Pruett concedes that she is not raising a claim as to the disabled widow’s benefits decision 

here. (See Doc. 11 at 2.)

2 Pruett’s opening brief does not contain an ECF-generated header, so citations to her 

opening brief are to that document’s internal pagination.

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II. Legal Standard

The court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance” of evidence and is such that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005)). The court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. 

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. Discussion

A. The ALJ’s Five-Step Disability Evaluation Process

Under the Social Security Act, a claimant for disability insurance benefits must 

establish disability prior to the date last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. 

A claimant is disabled under the Act if she cannot engage in substantial gainful activity 

because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted, or can 

be expected to last, for a continuous period of twelve months or more. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined by a five-step sequential process. See 

Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (summarizing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 1999). At step three, the claimant must show that her impairment or combination of

impairments meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart 

P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At step four, the claimant must 

show her residual functional capacity (“RFC”)—the most she can do with her 

impairments—precludes her from performing her past work. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If 

the claimant meets her burden at step three, she is presumed disabled and the analysis ends. 

If the inquiry proceeds and the claimant meets her burden at step four, then at step five the 

Commissioner must determine if the claimant is able to perform other work that “exists in 

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significant numbers in the national economy” given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, 

and work experience. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

Here, at step three the ALJ determined Pruett had the RFC to perform “light work”

with additional limitations given her impairments. (AR 41.) The ALJ used this RFC to 

conclude at step four that Pruett could perform her past relevant work as a waitress which 

“does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by” her RFC. (AR 

47.) These conclusions were based, in part, on the ALJ discounting some of Pruett’s 

symptom testimony. (See AR 765–779.) Pruett only argues that the ALJ failed to articulate 

clear and convincing reasons to find her testimony about the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of her symptoms unpersuasive. According to Pruett, properly accounting 

for her symptom testimony would result in an RFC limiting her to sedentary jobs rather 

than jobs requiring light exertion, thereby also calling into question the ALJ’s step-four 

finding.

3

(Doc. 11 at 3.) 

B. Pruett’s Symptom Testimony

The ALJ stated he gave “reasonable consideration” to Pruett’s symptom testimony 

and determined her impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause [her] alleged 

symptoms,” but found her statements about their “intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects . . . not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record.” (AR 47.) Pruett contends the ALJ improperly relied on her daily activities, her 

alleged pain relief from medication, and the objective medical evidence as reasons to 

discredit her symptom testimony. (Docs. 11 at 6–8, 14 at 3–4.) 

When a claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms 

alleged and there is no evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only reject subjective 

symptom-severity testimony by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing 

so.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 

3 The Commissioner says Pruett argued in her opening brief that “the ALJ should have 

found [she was] limited to less than sedentary work as opposed to less than light work.” 

(Doc. 13 at 2.) Pruett clarifies in her reply brief that she is arguing she is limited to 

sedentary work. (Doc. 14 at 1.)

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759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). Such findings are sufficiently specific when they 

permit a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ “did not arbitrarily discredit [a] claimant’s 

testimony.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (simplified), 

superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R § 404.1502(a). The ALJ did not find that Pruett 

was malingering. So, the ALJ could only discredit her symptom testimony by providing 

“specific, clear and convincing” reasons for doing so. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655.

Contradictions between a claimant’s symptom testimony and her daily activities 

provide a valid ground for discounting her symptom testimony. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where [daily] activities suggest some difficulty 

functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent 

that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment”), superseded on other 

grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). But in considering daily activities to discount a 

claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ must conduct a “transferability” and 

“substantiality” analysis. That analysis requires an ALJ consider whether a claimant is able 

to spend a “substantial part” of her day “engaged in pursuits involving the performance of 

physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphases 

added). The ALJ did not conduct such an analysis here. (See AR 38–48.)

Not only did the ALJ not conduct a “transferability” and “substantiality” analysis, 

but he also did not sufficiently identify inconsistencies between Pruett’s daily activities 

and her testimony. (See AR 41–47.) Pruett argues “her activities of daily living are 

consistent across her description to the consultative examiner (AR 1470–71), in her 

function reports (AR 1121–29), and in her hearing testimony (AR 768–74).” (Doc. 11 at 

7.) In discounting Pruett’s symptom testimony, the ALJ considered Pruett’s ability to live 

alone, drive, take care of her mother (who suffered a stroke two years prior to Pruett’s 

alleged onset date), care for a dog, attend to her own personal care needs, prepare meals, 

do housework, and walk 45 minutes without needing rest. (AR 42, 45.) But the ALJ merely 

listed those daily activities without discussing how they were inconsistent with any of 

Pruett’s testimony or whether those activities constituted a “substantial” part of her day or 

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were “transferable” to a work setting. (See AR 42.) 

Pruett is right that an ALJ “may not arbitrarily list activities without explaining why 

the activities listed are either equivalent to [support] full-time employment or are 

inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations” as the ALJ did here. (Doc. 14 at 3 (citing 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016).) And, as Pruett points out, the Commissioner does not 

meaningfully respond to these arguments or specify where the ALJ conducted the required 

daily activities analysis. (See Docs. 11 at 6–7, 13 at 5, 14 at 3.) For these reasons, it was 

legal error for the ALJ to use evidence of Pruett’s daily activities to discount her symptom 

testimony. See Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that 

because the ALJ did not explain inconsistencies between the claimant’s daily activities and 

symptom testimony, the daily activities were “not a specific, clear, and convincing reason” 

to discount the testimony).

The ALJ, however, also used objective medical evidence and evidence of Pruett’s 

pain management to discount her symptom testimony, making any error on the dailyactivities front harmless. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(simplified) (an ALJ’s error is harmless when it is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.”). He cited medical records at length to support his 

nondisability determination and to discount Pruett’s symptom testimony (see AR 42–47),

far exceeding the “mere scintilla” required by the substantial evidence standard. Orn, 495 

F.3d at 630. Pruett cites purportedly contrary medical records, but the relevance of those 

records is not obvious and even if they could support a disability determination, that is not 

the standard here. Rather, if “the evidence [in the record] is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation” the court “will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 

at 1039. 

Seemingly challenging the ALJ’s reliance on objective medical evidence, Pruett 

faults the ALJ for not “find[ing] any of the opinions of record completely convincing.”

(Doc. 11 at 7.) But the ALJ did find one doctor’s opinion “persuasive” and others “partially 

persuasive” (AR 45–47) and Pruett cites no cases holding an ALJ must find at least one 

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medical opinion completely persuasive to support a nondisability finding. The ALJ 

properly weighed the objective medical evidence against Pruett’s symptom testimony and 

Pruett does not persuasively argue otherwise. 

Pruett argues the ALJ improperly considered her pain relief in response to 

medication. (Doc. 14 at 2–3.) The ALJ “considered that treatment was effective at 

controlling” Pruett’s pain in part because she got “good pain relief with medication.” (Doc. 

13 at 4–5 (citing AR 42–45, 1128, 1279, 1288, 1293, 1343, 1350, 1406–07, 1508, 1532–

33).) The effectiveness of treatment is indeed an important consideration when weighing a 

claimant’s allegations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv); 404.1529(c)(4);

416.929(c)(3)(iv); 416.929(c)(4); SSR 16-3p, available at 2017 WL 5180304, at *8. “But 

to reject a claimant’s testimony, it is not enough for the ALJ to show that the pain was 

responsive to treatment; the ALJ must show that the pain was ‘controlled,’ i.e., no longer 

debilitating.” Lopez v. Colvin, 194 F. Supp. 3d 903, 911 (D. Ariz. 2016) (quoting Warre v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006) (9th Cir. 2016)).

Pruett’s argument fails because the ALJ did conclude her pain was controlled. (AR 

38 (Pruett’s “impairments are controlled by compliant use of medication and ongoing 

medical management”); AR 42 (Pruett “reported substantial pain control from her 

medications allowing her to engage in her activities of daily living”); AR 44 (even “her 

back pain was well controlled” by medication).) Because the ALJ did “show that [Pruett’s] 

pain was ‘controlled,’” he did not err by considering her pain management as a reason for 

discounting her symptom testimony. Id. 

Although the ALJ erred in using Pruett’s daily activities in the testimony rejection 

analysis, the error was harmless because the discrediting was otherwise supported by the 

objective medical evidence and Pruett’s pain relief from medication. Those respective 

analyses provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discrediting Pruett’s 

symptom testimony and were also sufficiently specific to conclude the ALJ “did not 

arbitrarily discredit” her testimony. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at

1014–15); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. Thus, the ALJ’s decision to discredit Pruett’s

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testimony was supported by substantial evidence. See Marsh, 792 F.3d at 1173.

IV. Conclusion

Pruett’s contention that it was error for the ALJ to discount her symptom testimony 

fails. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on harmful 

legal error, so it is affirmed. 

IT IS ORDERED affirming the August 18, 2022, decision of the ALJ. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case.

Dated this 3rd day of January, 2025.

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