Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02058/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02058-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOHN RAYMOND RUELAS, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-02058 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

On or about September 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on November 16, 2010.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. Petitioner

filed a reply (Doc. 15) to the answer to his petition on January

26, 2011.

 I Procedural History

On June 5, 1991, a jury found Petitioner guilty on one

count of kidnapping (Count 1), three counts of sexual assault

(Counts 2, 3, and 4), one count of armed robbery (Count 5), and

Case 2:10-cv-02058-JAT Document 16 Filed 02/01/11 Page 1 of 12
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one count of aggravated assault (Count 6). See Answer, Exh. A

& Exh. B. The jurors also found that Petitioner had previously

been convicted of two felony offenses. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner

was sentenced to aggravated, consecutive terms of 28 years

imprisonment on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and a consecutive term

of 20 years imprisonment on Count 6; the aggregate sentence

imposed is 160 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. A at 27–29 & Exh.

B at 5. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner’s appointed appellate

counsel initially filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, averring he could find no meritorious issues to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. See id., Exh. B. Petitioner then

retained counsel to file a supplemental brief on appeal. In his

direct appeal Petitioner asserted that: (1) his right due

process was violated by a physician’s failure to adequately

collect evidence from the victim; (2) the sentences for

kidnapping and armed robbery could not properly be imposed as

consecutive sentences; (3) the consecutive sentences imposed for

multiple counts of sexual assault violated Petitioner’s right to

double jeopardy. See id., Exh. C. 

In a lengthy memorandum decision issued November 18,

1993, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences. See Doc. 3, App. H. Petitioner did

not seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision by the

Arizona Supreme Court and the appellate court’s mandate issued

on February 28, 1994. Id., App. H.

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Petitioner initiated an action seeking state

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure on February 9, 2007. See Answer, Exh. D. The

Maricopa County Superior Court found that the petition was not

time-barred under Arizona law and appointed counsel to represent

Petitioner in the post-conviction relief proceedings. See id.,

Exh. E. Petitioner’s appointed counsel informed the court that

he had reviewed the record and could find no viable claims to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. See id., Exh. F. 

On August 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro per petition

for post-conviction relief arguing that his sentences were

illegal and that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. See id., Exh. G. On November 5, 2007,

the trial court issued an order summarily dismissing

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, finding the claims raised precluded

and, alternatively, meritless. See Doc. 3, App. O. Inter alia,

the state court determined that the issues Petitioner had

asserted should have been raised in his direct appeal were all

without merit and, accordingly, that Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claims were not only waived and

precluded, but also without merit. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which declined review in a decision

issued October 28, 2008. See id., App. R. Petitioner sought

review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on

April 7, 2009. See id., App. T. The United States Supreme Court

denied certiorari on October 5, 2009. Id., App. V.

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Petitioner initiated a second action seeking postconviction relief on June 9, 2009, seeking only the correction

of his sentences. See id., App. W. On November 9, 2009, the

state trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it

time-barred. See id., App. X. The state trial court also noted

that, to the extent Petitioner was claimed he was entitled to

relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Blakely v. Washington, Blakely was not retroactively applicable

to cases that were final when it was decided in 2004, such as

Petitioner’s case.

In his federal habeas action filed September 17, 2010,

Petitioner contends he is entitled to relief because: (1) he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel; (2) the state court denied his right to due

process of law by denying him an evidentiary hearing in state

court; because of unreasonable determination of facts by the

state courts; and because the state courts denied his “right to

appeal;” (3) he was denied his Sixth Amendment “right to trial

by jury” in “imposing sentencings, and/or punishments; right

against double punishment; due process right to notice”; and (4)

his sentences violate his right to be free of double punishment.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

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convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state

prisoners whose convictions became final before April 24, 1996,

to file their petitions for habeas corpus relief from those

convictions by April 25, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The running of this one-year

statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state convictions

which became final before April 24, 1996, was suspended during

any period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim [was] pending” in any state court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4,

8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d

1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,

327-28 (4th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final in

1994, at the conclusion of his direct appeal. See, e.g., Zepeda

v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner’s

conviction became final prior to the effective date of the

AEDPA. Accordingly, Petitioner had until April 25, 1997, to

file a federal petition for habeas relief regarding his

convictions. 

Petitioner did not file a federal habeas action prior

to expiration of the statute of limitations on April 25, 1997.

Petitioner’s filing of an action pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, on May 22, 1997, could not and did

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not restart the already-expired statute of limitations for

filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson,

234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

In reply to the answer filed by Respondents, Petitioner

asserts that he was sentenced based on aggravating factors not

found in the indictment. Petitioner contends that the presence

of an accomplice could not properly be used as an aggravating

factor because the other perpetrator was not charged.

Petitioner asserts that his trial and appellate counsel were

unconstitutionally ineffective. Petitioner contends that he

diligently pursued post-conviction relief and that extraordinary

circumstances prevented him from “developing, researching, and

advancing his claims because of the denial of legal access to

materials, research, rules and procedures, by the Arizona

Department of Corrections...”

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. “Although the statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling,” Holland v.

Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010), to receive equitable

tolling a petitioner must establish: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993,

997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

See also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807, 1814-15 (2005); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

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1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009).

Additionally, the actual innocence gateway through which

unexhausted claims may be considered is not available to a

petitioner whose section 2254 petition is otherwise barred by

the AEDPA’s limitations period. See Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d

1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding to dismiss

habeas petition as untimely upon concluding “there is no ‘actual

innocence’ exception to the one-year statute of limitations for

filing an original petition for habeas corpus relief”).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). The threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling “is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified

on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner

must establish a causal connection between the alleged roadblock

to his timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the

actual failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th

Cir. 2005).

Equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal

habeas petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances

beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a

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petition on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-

49 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. Equitable tolling is only appropriate

when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely habeas

action. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556

F.3d at 1011; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute an

extraordinary circumstance with regard to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations, but “a garden variety claim of

excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a

lawyer to miss a filing deadline does not warrant equitable

tolling.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (internal citations

omitted). Alleged errors by a petitioner’s appellate counsel

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which frustrate the petitioner’s efforts to file timely state

actions for post-conviction relief do not per se constitute an

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. See

Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom., Randle v. Skolnik, 131 S. Ct. 474 (2010); Ford v.

Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009); Ramirez v. Yates, 571

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Petitioner contends that the repeated ineffective

assistance of his attorneys constitutes extraordinary

circumstances. Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the

extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is not

sufficient that counsel was negligent; only representation that

meets “the extraordinary misconduct standard can be a basis for

applying equitable tolling.” Id. Accordingly, unless

Petitioner’s counsels’ performance was so deficient and

prejudicial that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights, said

performance does not justify equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations.

Aside from Petitioner’s self-serving assertions,

Petitioner presents no evidence that his trial counsel or

appellate counsel’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to

warrant equitable tolling. In denying Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel’s claims the state court

determined that there was no merit to any of the arguments

Petitioner alleged his appellate counsel should have raised.

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Petitioner contends that he diligently pursued postconviction relief, however, Petitioner did not seek any form of

post-conviction relief from February of 1994 through February of

1997. Additionally, upon the conclusion of his state action for

post-conviction relief, Petitioner filed another state action

rather than proceeding to a federal habeas petition.

Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there were

extraordinary circumstances which prevented the timely filing of

a federal habeas petition. Many inmates of the ADOC system have

been able to timely file federal habeas actions notwithstanding

the hindrances to legal research experienced by state prisoners.

III Conclusion

The section 2254 petition was not filed within the

statute of limitations specified by the AEDPA. Petitioner has

not offered the Court a basis for the equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Ruelas’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

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DATED this 31st day of January, 2011.

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