Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01939/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01939-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Maurice J. Curtis, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Coca-Cola Enterprises Bottling 

Companies, dba. Coca Cola Bottling 

Company of Los Angeles; and DOES 

One through Twenty, inclusive

Defendants. 

__________________________________/

1:13-cv-1939-AWI-BAM

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL

ORDER DECLINING TO IMPOSE 

SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927.

(Doc. 65)

Plaintiff Maurice J. Curtis (“Plaintiff”) has, yet again, filed a motion with this Court 

seeking a jury trial, rather than a court trial. Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

For a more complete procedural background of this case and this issue see generally, Doc 

31 at 1-2 and Doc. 48 at 1-2. It is sufficient background for purposes of resolving the instant 

motion to note: Plaintiff filed his initial employment discrimination case in the Fresno County 

Superior Court without a jury demand. Defendant BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los 

Angeles (“Defendant”) removed this action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on November 

27, 2013. This Court has already determined that the jury demand Plaintiff filed with this Court 

was untimely (Doc. 36 at 4; Doc. 48 at 1; see Doc. 13) and that it would not exercise its 

discretion under Rule 39(b) to order a jury trial (Doc. 36 at 7-8).

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A. Motion for Jury Trial

The instant motion seeks a jury trial pursuant to FRCP 39(b). Plaintiff’s motion 

articulates no basis other than those already considered by the Magistrate Judge and by this 

Court. (Doc. 36; Doc. 48.) Further, as Plaintiff has pointed out, courts in the Ninth Circuit have 

narrow discretion to order a jury trial upon a party’s failure to make a timely jury demand. (Doc. 

65 at 3 (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556-557 (9th Cir. Cal. 1983).) Plaintiff failed 

to articulate the standard applied in the Ninth Circuit, despite the fact that the Magistrate Judge 

had already correctly done so when considering the nearly identical argument from Plaintiff in an 

earlier instance; “[a]n untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some cause beyond 

mere inadvertence is shown.” (Doc. 36 at 7 (citing Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., 

239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001).) The Magistrate Judge also outlined the failures in 

Plaintiff’s prior pleading that led to the denial: 

Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that Counsel’s lack of 

admission to this district hindered Plaintiff’s efforts to provide notice of timely jury 

demand. Plaintiff did not provide evidence of efforts undertaken to gain admission. 

Plaintiff did not provide any supporting evidence establishing when Counsel applied for 

admission to this district and has not alleged that Counsel was diligent in seeking 

admission. Indeed, Admission to the Eastern District of California is not complicated. 

Counsel’s failure to timely apply to practice this district simply does not warrant any

grant of relief by this Court.

Further, Counsel was not precluded from serving Defendant with a jury demand prior to 

her admission to this Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(B)(ii) only requires that a party “serve a 

demand” within 14 days after being served with a notice of removal filed by another 

party. There is no evidence from which the Court can conclude that relief is warranted. 

Accordingly, the Court will not exercise its discretion.

(Doc. 36 at 7.) Here, Plaintiff has abandoned the argument that he was inhibited from making a 

timely jury demand by Counsel’s lack of admission to the district. Rather, he argues that the 

failure to make a timely jury demand did not result “solely from inadvertence or oversight” 

because Counsel “simply did not contemplate that absent effective removal, a state jury trial 

demand would not be honored,” based on the limited caselaw related to the impact of a

defendant’s failure to file a notice of removal. (Doc. 65 at 4.) As the Magistrate Judge correctly 

noted, Rule 81(c)(3)(B) provides that a jury demand must be made after a party is served with a 

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notice of removal. It does not concern itself with whether a notice of removal is filed at the state 

court level. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 81(c)(3)(B)(ii). Plaintiff’s failure to file a jury demand was 

“not caused by inadvertence” only insofar as it was caused by Plaintiff’s ignorance of the law.

Neither is cause for relief. Pac. Fisheries Corp., 239 F.3d 1002-1003 (“A good faith mistake of 

law is no different than inadvertence or oversight.”) Accordingly, this Court will not exercise its 

discretion to grant Plaintiff a jury trial.

B. Sanctions

Because this Court has addressed this issue twice before yet Plaintiff has again brought 

the same question before the Court, Defendant has requested that this “Court consider imposing 

sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.” (Doc. 72 at 3.) Section 1927 

authorizes the Court to require an attorney who multiplies the proceedings unreasonably or 

vexatious to satisfy the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred as a result 

of such conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In addition, pursuant to the Court's Local Rules, this Court 

has the authority to impose any appropriate sanction to curtail abusive or vexatious litigation 

tactics. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110 (“Failure of counsel ... to comply with these Rules or with any 

order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 

authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court.”) Sanctions “are 

available for a variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an 

additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Fink v. Gomez, 

239 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2001); see Gomes v. American Century Companies, Inc., 2010 

WL 1980201 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has required a finding of 

subjective bad faith, which is present when counsel knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous 

argument). Courts have “broad fact-finding powers to grant or decline sanctions” warranting 

“great deference.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Primus Auto. Fin. 

Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

The Court would not be without support to require Plaintiff’s counsel to personally 

satisfy the costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees that Defendant has incurred as a result of 

Counsel’s repeated groundless and untimely attempts to move the Court to grant a jury trial. See

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e.g., Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F.Supp.2d 50, 62 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that a second 

request for a jury trial brought without any change in law or circumstances that had been 

addressed thoroughly by the court in a previous decision warranted sanctions under Section 

1927). However, this Court declines to impose sanctions because it appears that Plaintiff’s 

counsel has not filed the instant motion in bad faith, with recklessness, or for an improper 

purpose. Rather, Plaintiff’s counsel appears – yet again – to have merely inadvertently 

misunderstood the law.

C. Order

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for jury trial is DENIED with prejudice; and

2. This Court DECLINES to impose sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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