Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00411/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00411-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALBERT HOYER TORRES,

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-411-TUC-CKJ

 

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody filed by Petitioner Albert Hoyer Torres

(“Torres”). Respondents have filed an Answer and Petitioner has filed a Reply.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court of Appeals of Arizona stated the facts as follows:

. . . On September 19, 2003, Torres invited his former girlfriend, R, to his house

for a visit. The two had remained friends after R. had ended their romantic

relationship, and R. agreed to the visit. Shortly after R. arrived, she received a

phone call from her son, asking her to stop by his house after she left Torres’s.

The conversation angered Torres. He pushed R. onto the floor and began punching

her in the face. This caused her left eye to swell shut and the right side of her lip

to be cut, bruised and swollen. 

When R. stated that she needed to go to the hospital, Torres agreed to take her, but

wanted her to first go home and change her shirt so she could tell medical

personnel that her injuries resulted from a fall. Upon arriving at R.’s house, Torres

exited the car, but R. initially remained inside to avoid being seen by a neighbor

in R.’s injured condition. After she exited the car, a passing driver, M., one of her

son’s friends, recognized R. and noticed that something was wrong with her face.

M. stopped and asked if Torres had hit her. When R. responded that he had,

Torres walked away. R. called the police later that night to report the assault, and

Torres was arrested five days later.

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Respondents point out that there was never any allegation that the victim suffered any

kind of fracture.

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Respondents' Ex. C, pp. 2-3. The Court of Appeals further stated:

. . . the jurors received ample information from which they could determine the

nature of the victim’s injuries. R. testified that she had been unable to see through

her eye for five to seven days because it had been swollen shut, and that a mark

remained on her eye for about three months. Officer Rohr, who responded to R.’s

call the night of the assault, testified that she had a swollen eye and lacerations on

her swollen lip. The state provided the jury with photographs of R.’s injuries

taken on the night of the incident. And, Detective Fry interviewed R. four days

after the assault and testified that at the time of the interview her eye was still

swollen, that he could see “a portion of her eye but not very much,” and that she

still had lacerations on her lip, which was also still swollen.

Id., pp. 5-6. These facts are presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a

proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to a judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence."); Wainright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (state court's findings are

entitled to a presumption of correctness); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Torres was indicted on Count 1, aggravated assault involving the use of a deadly

weapon (a knife), Count 2, kidnapping, and Count 3, aggravated assault causing

temporary but substantial disfigurement or a temporary but substantial loss or impairment

of any body part or organ, or a fracture of any body part.1

 Respondents’ Ex. E. The

matter proceeded to trial and a jury found Torres guilty of simple assault, not guilty of

kidnapping, and guilty of aggravated assault involving temporary/substantial

disfigurement or impairment. 

In a separate proceeding, the State proved Torres had two prior felony convictions.

The sentencing court imposed “time served” for the simple assault and the presumptive

10–year prison term for the Class 4 aggravated assault with two priors. See A.R.S. §

Torres filed a direct appeal with the Court of Appeals of Arizona. Torres presented

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the following issues:

I. The statute defining aggravating assault based on temporary but substantial

disfigurement or impairment of any body organ or part is unconstitutionally vague.

II. The trial court erred by refusing to inform the jury that [the victim] refused

a pretrial defense interview.

Respondents’ Ex.G, p. 6. The Court of Appeals rejected the claims in a March 31, 2005,

Memorandum Decision and affirmed Torres’s conviction and sentence. Respondents’s

Ex. C, p. 11. On April 27, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Supreme

Court of Arizona. On October 4, 2005, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review.

Petition, Exhibit. The mandate was issued on December 16, 2005. Respondents’ Ex. I.

On November 3, 2005, Torres filed a Notice of Post–Conviction Relief. An

October 17, 2006, order by the post-conviction court indicates that Torres did not file a

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Respondents’ Ex. K. Further, the court indicated the

post-conviction proceedings would be precluded if Torres did not file a Petition for PostConviction Relief by November 15, 2006.

On or about August 20, 2007, Torres filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for

a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”). Torres has presented

two claims for relief:

1. The aggravated assault statute is unconstitutionally vague and fails to

adequately define its terms and the elements to commit the crime. 

2. Torres’s due process rights were violated by precluding Torres from

conducting a pre-trial interview of the victim. Because Torres was not permitted to

interview the victim, Torres asserts that he did not learn of other witnesses until trial.

Torres also asserts the jury instructions did not cure the due process violation and that he

was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to permit him to cross-examine the victim

regarding her refusal to provide the information pre-trial. 

 Respondents have filed an Answer and Torres has filed a Traverse.

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Statute of Limitations

This Court must review claims consistent with the provisions of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner

must generally file a petition for writ of habeas corpus within one year from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).

Respondents concede that Torres has complied with the statute of limitations. The Court

finds the Petition is timely.

Standard of Review

Federal courts may consider a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner's confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 2296, 129 L.Ed.2d

271 (1994). Indeed, a habeas corpus petition by a person in state custody:

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495,

1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). General improprieties occurring in state proceedings are

cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently violated a

petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See generally, Estelle v.

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McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).

This Court must review claims consistent with the provisions of the AEDPA. 

"The Act limits the ability of federal courts to reexamine questions of law and mixed

questions of law and fact." Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997).

Indeed, the AEDPA creates “an independent, high standard to meet before a federal court

may issue a writ of habeas corpus to set aside state-court rulings.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551

U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007), citations omitted; see also Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 334 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (the amended

statute creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings”). This

Court may only overturn a state court finding if a petitioner shows by clear and

convincing evidence that the finding was erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state

court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it

decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable

application” clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal

principles from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus on the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and we

stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect

one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), citations

omitted.

Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner's claims on the merits, a petitioner

must exhaust his state remedies, i.e., have presented in state court every claim raised in

the federal habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct.

2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct.

1728, 1732, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must

exhaust his claims in the state courts "by invoking one complete round of the State's

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established appellate review process" before he may submit those claims in a federal

habeas petition); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion

of state remedies is required in order to give the "State the opportunity to pass upon and

correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights . . . To provide the State with the

necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state

court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004), internal quotation marks

and citations omitted.

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not

necessary for purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v.

Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are

exhausted by review by the court of appeals). A claim is "fairly presented" if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which his claim is based.

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). In state court, the

petitioner must describe not only the operative facts but also the asserted constitutional

principle. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995). 

Respondents concede that Torres has exhausted his state court remedies. The

Court finds that Torres has exhausted his state court remedies.

Aggravated Assault Statute

Torres asserts that the aggravated assault statute is unconstitutionally vague and

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fails to adequately define its terms and the elements to commit the crime. As to this issue,

the Court of Appeals stated:

Torres first argues that the portion of the aggravated assault statute under which

he was convicted, A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(11), is unconstitutionally vague. The

statute renders an assault a class four felony if it “causes temporary but substantial

disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment of any body organ or

part, or a fracture of any body part.” Id. Torres claims the terms “substantial” and

“disfigurement” are subjective and provide no meaningful distinction between a

misdemeanor and a felony assault. We review de novo the constitutionality of a

statute. State v. McDermott, 208 Ariz. 332, ¶ 12, 93 P.3d 532, 535 (App. 2004).

If possible, we must construe a law in a constitutional manner when it has been

challenged on the basis of vagueness. See State v. McLamb, 188 Ariz. 1, 5, 932

P.2d 266, 270 (App. 1996). And, Torres has the burden of establishing the

invalidity of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

“The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal

offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary persons could understand what

is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary enforcement.”

State v. Thompson, 138 Ariz. 341, 344, 674 P.2d 895, 898 (App. 1984). “A statute

is not void for vagueness because it fails to explicitly define a term or because it

can be interpreted in more than one way.” McDermott, 208 Ariz. 332, ¶ 13, 93

P.3d at 536. In interpreting a statute, we apply the plain meaning of its words and

phrases. A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the

common and approved use of the language.”). The term disfigurement has been

defined as “‘[t]hat which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry or appearance

of a person or thing; that which renders unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect, or

deforms in some manner.’” State v. Garcia, 138 Ariz. 211, 214, 673 P.2d 955, 958

(App. 1983), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 554 (Rev.4th ed. 1968); see also

Moreno v. Indus. Comm’n, 122 Ariz. 298, 299, 584 P.2d 552, 553 (App. 1979)

(“To disfigure is to mar the appearance of an object.”). The term has long been

used in Arizona under the definition for “serious physical injury” as related to

aggravated assault. See A.R.S. §§ 13-105(34), -1204(A)(1).

The term “substantial” has a commonly understood meaning. It is defined as

“considerable in amount, value or worth.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 2280 (1971); see also In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 n. 1, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 n.1 (App. 1994); In re

Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-123196, 172 Ariz. 74, 77, 834 P.2d 160,

163 (App. 1992). The term has also been used in, and applied by, numerous

Arizona criminal statutes. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 13-823(A)(3), -1005(D), -1201, -

2508(A)(2), -3961(C), -3987. Torres cites no Arizona criminal cases, and we have

found none, expressing doubt over the meaning of either “substantial” or

“disfigurement.” Both terms can be understood by persons of average intelligence

and therefore, neither term renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. See State

v. Varela, 120 Ariz. 596, 599, 587 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1978).

Torres also claims that the language of the statute fails to adequately preserve a

meaningful distinction between a simple physical injury, which constitutes a

misdemeanor assault, and a temporary but substantial disfigurement, a felony

assault. But the terms “simple physical injury” and “temporary but substantial

disfigurement” are not synonymous. Nor does Torres explain why the public

would be incapable of understanding the difference between those two phrases.

Because we have already concluded that the phrase “temporary but substantial

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disfigurement” can be understood by persons of average intelligence, we reject this

argument as well.

Torres argues that because the state presented no expert medical testimony on what

constitutes a “substantial” physical injury, the statute is vague as applied to the

facts of his case. However, he offers no supporting authority for the contention

that a medical expert was necessary. To the contrary, the jurors received ample

information from which they could determine the nature of the victim’s injuries.

R. testified that she had been unable to see through her eye for five to seven days

because it had been swollen shut, and that a mark had remained on her eye for

about three months. Officer Rohr, who responded to R.’s call the night of the

assault, testified that she had a swollen eye and lacerations on her swollen lip. The

state provided the jury with photographs of R.’s injuries taken on the night of the

incident. And, Detective Fry interviewed R. four days after the assault and

testified that at the time of the interview her eye was still swollen, that he could see

“a portion of her eye but not very much,” and that she still had lacerations on her

lip, which was also still swollen. Clearly, the jury did not need a medical expert

to conclude that these injuries constituted “temporary but substantial

disfigurement” or “temporary but substantial loss or impairment of any body part

or organ” in order to constitute an aggravated assault under § 13-1204(A)(11).

Therefore, we conclude that the statute is constitutional as applied to Torres. 

Respondents’ Ex. C, pp. 3-6.

The appellate court applied the “void for vagueness” doctrine set forth by the

United States Supreme Court. See Thompson, 138 Ariz. at 344, 674 at 895, citing Smith

v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (vagueness

doctrine includes fair notice or warning to defendant and reasonably clear guidelines to

prevent arbitrary enforcement) and Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct.

1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (penal statute is not vague if ordinary person can

understand what is prohibited and it does not impermissibly delegate policy making

authority to police, i.e., the legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law

enforcement); see also Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). The

appellate court determined that the terms “substantial” and “disfigurement” could be

understood by persons of average intelligence and, therefore, the statute was not

unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, in light of the evidence presented to the jury, the

appellate court found that the statute was constitutional as applied to Torres.

Torres argues that the definition of disfigurement would permit a simple physical

injury (e.g., bruise, light scratch, abrasion) to qualify. Torres further argues that the term

substantial does not differentiate between severe, moderate, or slight – therefore, used in

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conjunction with the term disfigurement, there is nothing to distinguish between the

misdemeanor and felony assaults. However, the appellate court considered this argument

and determined that the term substantial had a commonly understood meaning. Although

Torres asserts that the term substantial does not differentiate between severe, moderate,

or slight, Torres fails to acknowledge that the commonly understood meaning of the term

does differentiate this term. Further, when disfigurement is considered in conjunction

with substantial, the meaning of the terms is not vague – the Court agrees with the

appellate court that both terms can be understood by persons of average intelligence.

The Court finds that the appellate court’s determination that the statute is not

unconstitutional was not objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. at 698-99 (habeas court is not to make its own independent judgment, but is to

determine whether state court applied federal authority in an objectively unreasonable

manner). Ordinary people can understand was conduct is prohibited and the criminal

offense is defined in such a manner that it does not encourage arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement. The Court finds Torres is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

Pre-Trial Interview of Victim / Jury Instruction / Cross-Examination of Victim

Torres asserts that his due process rights were violated because he was not

permitted to interview the victim prior to the trial. Torres asserts that, because he was not

permitted to interview the victim, Torres did not learn of other potential witnesses until

trial. As to this issue, the appellate court stated:

Victim’s Refusal to Grant Pretrial Interview to Defense

Torres first argues that it was fundamentally unfair for the victim to decline a

pretrial interview and thereby hide or withhold information about two witnesses,

M. and the neighbor. He contends that a pretrial interview would have allowed

him to establish the identity of the neighbor and to test the truth of the victim’s

story by interviewing the neighbor. We review de novo whether a defendant has

been denied due process rights. State v. Rivera, 207 Ariz. 69, ¶ 7, 83 P.3d 69, 72

(App. 2004).

Torres has provided us with no authority suggesting that he possessed any

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procedural right to conduct a pretrial interview of R. Although defendants possess

a right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront

witnesses against them at trial, the Confrontation Clause does not include an

equivalent right to conduct pretrial interviews of those witnesses. See

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40,

54 (1987). Nor does Torres possess any state procedural right to conduct a pretrial

interview of R. To the contrary, Arizona law specifically authorizes crime victims

to decline a defense interview, a right R. specifically asserted and Torres implicitly

acknowledges in his appellate briefs. See A.R.S. § 13-4433(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P.

39(b)(11), 17 A.R.S.

Torres cites State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 191, 393 P.2d 274, 279 (1964), a case

which stands for the proposition that the state should not be permitted to take

advantage of its own misconduct is destroying or misplacing evidence. But the

record contains no evidence that the state withheld or lost any relevant information

in its possession or violated its disclosure duty in any fashion. Torres overlooks

that the state has no duty to investigate the case on his behalf, see Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337-38, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 290

(1988), and cites no authority supporting that a private citizen possesses such a

duty. Because Torres possessed no procedural right to conduct a pretrial interview

of R., we cannot conclude that he received a fundamentally unfair trial merely

because R. testified to matters that he was unable to independently investigate in

advance of trial.

Denial of Torres’s Requested Jury Instructions

Torres next argues that he was denied due process and a fair trial by the trial

court’s refusal to allow an instruction that the victim refused a pretrial defense

interview. While we generally “review [the] trial court’s denial of a requested jury

instruction for an abuse of discretion,” see State v. Brown, 204 Ariz. 405, ¶ 7, 64

P.3d 847, 849-50 (App. 2003), we review constitutional questions de novo. See

Rivera, 207 Ariz. 69, ¶ 7, 83 P.3d at 72. Before the close of the evidence, Torres

submitted a jury instruction that stated in part, “If you find that a witness was not

available due to the actions of another witness, you may assume that the

unavailable witness would have given evidence unfavorable to the non-disclosing

party.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court ruled that Torres’s proposed jury

instruction was speculative and an improper comment on the evidence, and gave

him a chance to provide supporting authority for the instruction after the court’s

noon recess. Instead, Torres simply revised his instruction and presented it to the

court.

The revised instruction stated in part,

If information has been introduced by the victim which has not been

previously disclosed to the State or other State’s witnesses, defense counsel

has not been given an opportunity to investigate it and you may therefore

assume that defense counsel would have provided rebuttal evidence had this

information been provided in advance of trial.

(Emphasis added.) The court reaffirmed its earlier ruling and refused to allow the

instruction. Torres then moved to reopen his case and recall the victim in order to

establish that she had refused a pretrial interview. In the alternative, Torres was

willing to stipulate to a jury instruction that the victim had the right to refuse an

interview and she had exercised that right. The trial court denied both requests.

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In instructing the jury, the court “may not discuss certain inferences which may or

may not be drawn from the evidence and instruct the jury as to which inferences

they should adopt.” State v. Wallen, 114 Ariz. 355, 359, 560 P.2d 1262, 1266

(App. 1977). “The [Arizona C]onstitution prohibits the sort of judicial comment

upon the evidence that would interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of

that evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, ¶ 29, 961 P.2d 1006, 1011

(1998); see Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27. Both of Torres’s proposed instructions

improperly set forth inferences that the jury should draw from the evidence if it

found certain facts. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Torres’s

request to give the jury either of these instructions.

Denial of Torres’s Motion to Recall R. for Cross-Examination

Torres argues that even if he was not entitled to a pretrial interview with R., he

should have been allowed to cross-examine R. about her refusal to grant a pretrial

defense interview. “We review a trial court’s decision to limit the parameters of

a defendant’s cross-examination under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v.

Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 333, 942 P.2d 1159, 1165 (1997).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct.

1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965). Nonetheless, trial judges retain latitude

within the confines of the Confrontation Clause “to impose reasonable limits on

such cross-examination based on concerns about . . . interrogation that is repetitive

or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106

S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986). When a defendant seeks to crossexamine an alleged victim regarding her refusal to conduct a pretrial witness

interview, a trial judge must thus determine whether the questioning “bears either

on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness.” Riggs, 189 Ariz. at

331, 942 P.2d at 1163, quoting State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125, 571 P.2d 268,

271 (1977).

Here, R. was the exclusive witness to the actual acts of violence perpetrated upon

her by Torres. Accordingly, Torres could not hope for an acquittal unless he could

successfully challenge her credibility. Once R. testified regarding the existence

of two potential witnesses who could have corroborated portions of her testimony,

her refusal to speak with Torres’s counsel in advance of trial became relevant.

Only by cross-examining R. on that topic could Torres alert the jury that he had no

prior opportunity to investigate those witnesses and what they might have

observed. Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, the trial

could would have erred had it prohibited Torres from cross-examining R.

regarding her refusal to conduct a pretrial interview with Torres.

However, Torres asked no such questions during his cross-examination of R. and

the trial court prohibited no such line of questioning. Instead, Torres sought to

recall R. the day following her testimony after the close of evidence to question

her regarding the topic. We review a trial court’s ruling on a party’s request to

recall a witness and reopen evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Delvecchio, 110 Ariz. 396, 404, 519 P.2d 1137, 1145 (1974).

In assessing Torres’s request to reopen, the trial court was entitled to consider

whether Torres had already achieved all the relevant purposes of his crossexamination during his previous encounter with the witness. Id. (“‘A party has

no right to use further cross-examination to repeat or re-emphasize matters already

covered on direct or cross-examination.’”), quoting State v. Loftis, 89 Ariz. 403,

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405-06, 363 P.2d 585, 587 (1961). During his examination of R., Torres

questioned R. regarding M.’s identity and why R. had been unable to provide law

enforcement with any identifying information about M. That line of questioning,

and R.’s responses, implicitly alerted the jury that Torres did not know M.’s last

name and could not have investigated him in advance of trial. Because Torres was

able to probe R. regarding her inability to secure M.’s last name, and because

neither the state nor the trial court prohibited Torres from asking R. further

questions about the other “neighbor” who R. claims may have seen her in the car

with Torres, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to allow

Torres to reopen the evidence and recall R. as a witness.

Respondents’ Ex. C, pp. 6-11.

Torres has not pointed to a “clearly established” United States Supreme Court

precedent to support this claim. Rather, the Supreme Court has determined that a

criminal defendant has no pre-trial right to interview the witnesses against him;

confronting adverse witnesses is a trial right. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53,

107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (ability to question adverse witnesses “does not

include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might

be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony”); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725,

88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (right to confrontation a “trial right”). In

determining whether the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” the phrase “Federal law”

refers exclusively to United States Supreme Court precedent. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S.63, 71-72; 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S.

156, 165–66, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071 (9th

Cir. 2009); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While circuit law

may be ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision

is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law . . . only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably

applied.”), citations omitted. Federal habeas relief is not available on this claim. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Reed, 512 U.S. at 347; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

Moreover, a claim of instructional error does not raise a cognizable federal claim

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Indeed, the Court notes that the appellate court relied on state law in resolving this issue.

3

The Court notes that Torres, in his Traverse, asserts that he was prevented from eliciting

the substance of the evidence at trial. This assertion fails to acknowledge that Torres was

permitted to cross-examine the witness. 

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unless the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct.

1730, 1736-37, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct.

396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). In determining whether a constitutional violation has

occurred, the alleged instructional error must be viewed in the light of all the instructions

given, as well as the trial record, taken as a whole. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Where,

as here, a defendant does not have a pre-trial right to interview the witnesses against him,

a defendant’s assertion that the jury instructions did not cure the alleged due process

violation is without merit. Federal habeas relief is not available on this claim.2

 See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Reed, 512 U.S. at 347; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

Torres also asserts that the trial court violated his federal rights in not permitting

the victim to be recalled for further cross-examination after the close of evidence. The

appellate court considered this claim under Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (trial judges

retain latitude within the confines of the Confrontation Clause “to impose reasonable

limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about . . . interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant”), and determined that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying further cross-examination, i.e., the appellate court determined

there was no error. See also Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). The

appellate court considered that Torres had questioned the victim regarding the witness’

identity, why the victim had not been able to provide law enforcement with identifying

information about the witness, and the victim’s inability to secure the witness’ last name.3

The appellate court also considered that Torres was not prohibited from asking the victim

further questions about the other neighbor. 

This Court does not find that the state court rulings were objectively unreasonable

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in light of the cross-examination that had already been conducted. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 698-99 (habeas court is not to make its own

independent judgment, but is to determine whether state court applied federal authority

in an objectively unreasonable manner). The Court finds Torres is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim.

Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the

“district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning detention

arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Here,

the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention pursuant

to a State court judgment. This Court must determine, therefore, if a COA shall issue.

The standard for issuing a COA is whether the applicant has “made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy

§ 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching

the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. In the

certificate, the Court must indicate which specific issues satisfy the showing. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).

The Court determined that the appellate court’s determination that the aggravated

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assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement or a temporary but substantial

loss or impairment of any body part or organ statute is not unconstitutional was not

objectively unreasonable. Similarly, the Court determined that the state courts’ rulings

regarding Torres’s request to reopen and conduct further cross-examination of the victim

was not objectively unreasonable. The Court also determined that federal habeas relief

is not available to Torres on his claim that he was prohibited from interviewing the victim

prior to trial. The Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find this Court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. A COA shall not issue as to

these claims.

Any further request for a COA must be addressed to the Court of Appeals. See

Fed. R.App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Torres’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by

a Person in State Custody is DENIED;

2. This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice;

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in

this matter, and;.

4. A Certificate of Appealability shall not issue in this case.

DATED this 12th day of February, 2010.

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