Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01833/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01833-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JON BUCHWALD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION

COMMISSION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

CITY OF SAUSALITO, COUNTY OF MARIN,

O.C. JONES AND SONS, INC., U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL

PARK SERVICE, GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL

RECREATION AREA, DOES 2 through

100, inclusive.

Defendants.

 

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No. 04-01833 SC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT

UNITED STATES' MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant United States ("Defendant" or "the government")

moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. For the reasons explained herein, this Court hereby

GRANTS Defendant's motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

In April 1999, the National Park Service commissioned a study

to examine traffic patterns and overall safety of certain areas of
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the Golden Gate National Recreation Area ("GGNRA"), including the

intersection of Bunker Road and Lamoreaux Drive in the Marin

Headlands. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 ("Pl. Mem."). A report issued

following completion of the study ("report") concluded that the

85th percentile speed of traffic traveling westbound on Bunker

Road was 35 miles per hour, in excess of the 25 mile per hour

speed limit posted in that area. Id.; Defendant United States'

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 ("Def.

Mem."). The report further concluded that the stop signs

presently in place at the intersection were an ineffective means

of controlling traffic proceeding through the intersection. Id.

at 3-4. As a means of better controlling traffic at the Bunker

Road/Lamoreaux Drive intersection, authors of the report

recommended removing the stop signs and installing a raised

intersection instead. Id. at 4.

In February 2000, Azteca Construction received a contract to

install asphalt at the intersection of Bunker Road and Lamoreaux

Drive, creating the raised intersection called for in the report. 

Id. Azteca completed the installation of one and one-half

vertical inches of asphalt in the intersection, tapering down to

level with the road over a span of two feet, as was called for by

the plans. Id. at 4-5. As a part of the construction project, a

"BUMPS" sign warning of the raised intersection was installed

approximately 98 feet in advance of the raised portion of the

intersection, and white diagonal lines were painted onto the

surface of the road at the entrance of the intersection. 
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Declaration of Thomas Schultz ¶9 ("Schultz Dec."). A traffic cone

was also present at the intersection, although the parties dispute

whether it was in such a position or posture as to be effective in

warning of the speed bump. Compare id. with Def. Mem. at 15. 

Sometime thereafter, however, the Regional Coordinator for

the Federal Land Highway Program, David Kruse, received a report

indicating that the raised intersection was ineffective in

controlling the speed of traffic traveling through the

intersection. Declaration of David Kruse, ¶10 ("Kruse Dec."). 

Acting on advice from the project manager of the original

study, Kruse produced plans to add an additional one and one-half

inches of asphalt to the raised intersection while increasing the

slope of the intersection to comply with the three inch vertical

rise over one foot horizontal span ("3:1 ratio") originally

recommended by the report. Id. ¶10-11. These plans were executed

in September 2000 by a second contractor, Explore General. Id. 

The new and improved intersection did not meet with the approval

of some motorists, however, and Mr. Kruse began to receive reports

that vehicles traveling through the intersection were experiencing

their vehicles "bottom out" upon passing over the raised asphalt

sections. Id. ¶12. Mr. Kruse then requested and obtained

additional funding to have Explore General remove thin layers of

asphalt from the raised intersection in an effort to achieve some

middle ground between having ineffective speed bumps and speed

bumps that could cause damage to vehicles. Id. ¶13. 

Explore General evidently thought this work was to take place

on Friday, November 2, 2001, because on that day they sent workers
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from a subcontractor to the job site to perform the asphalt

removal. Deposition of David Kruse 53:8-54:2 ("Kruse Depo."). 

However, since there was no National Park Service representative

on site to assist the workers by providing "flaggers" and

sweepers, the work crew was sent home and the removal of asphalt

was not completed until December 13, 2001. Def. Mem. at 5. 

Defendant has noted that Park Service maintenance crews do not

work on Fridays, and therefore that they were not available to

assist with the construction on the day work crews first tried to

perform the reduction. Id. On November 18, 2001, before crews

were able to reduce the height of the speed bump, Plaintiff Jon

Buchwald ("Plaintiff") suffered significant injuries when he was

thrown from his bicycle while crossing the raised intersection at

Bunker Road and Lamoreaux Drive. Pl. Mem. at 3. Plaintiff filed

a complaint for damages on November 1, 2002 in the Marin County

Superior Court, and on May 10, 2004, Defendant United States

removed the action to this Court for all further proceedings. 

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, claiming that this Court

is divested of subject matter jurisdiction based on the

discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,

28 U.S.C. §2680(a), and that the California Recreational Use

Statute requires a claimant in Plaintiff's position to prove

willful or malicious conduct on the part of the Defendant, a

burden Defendant claims Plaintiff cannot carry. Def. Mem. at 1-2. 

Although this Court ultimately concludes that Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment based on its argument under the

California Recreational Use statute, the Court will consider both
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of the government's claims in turn. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists when the

non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable trier of

fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). 

Summary judgment is therefore appropriate against a party "who

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex 477 U.S. at 322-

23. The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

opposing party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid

summary judgment, see Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), but "[t]he evidence

of the non-moving party is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in its favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Tort Claims Act

In passing the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C §§ 1346(b),

2671-2680 ("FTCA"), Congress carved out a limited waiver of

sovereign immunity for suits for damages brought against the
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United States where "injury or loss of property or personal injury

or death [was] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his

office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,

if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28

U.S.C. § 2672. This waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by

what has become known as the discretionary function exception,

which expressly prevents the waiver of immunity from applying to

"[a]ny claim...based upon the exercise or performance or the

failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on

the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,

whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. §

2680(a). The exception "restores immunity where [the

government's] employees are carrying out governmental or

regulatory duties." Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426,

1429 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for

determining whether the discretionary function exception applies

to divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Miller v.

United States, 163 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1998). First, a court

must determine whether the challenged actions "involve an element

of judgment or choice." United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,

322 (1991). Where a "federal statute, regulation, or policy

specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to

follow," the inquiry is over and the discretionary function does

not apply, given that the employee had no choice but to obey the
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binding regulation. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536

(1988). 

If, however, the employee was acting with an element of

discretion or judgment, the inquiry moves to the second step and

examines whether "the judgment is of the kind that the

discretionary function exception was designed to shield." 

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23. The exception will protect only

those "actions and decisions based on considerations of public

policy." Id. at 323. Thus, in order to be shielded from

liability, the action must be grounded in "social, economic, [or]

political policy." Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 974

(9th Cir. 1994). The Court will now consider whether Defendant's

allegedly negligent actions are shielded under the discretionary

function exception.

1. Element of Judgment or Choice

The arguments of the parties on the question of whether the

allegedly negligent acts involved an element of judgment or choice

center around two manuals that govern road design on national

highways and in national parks. The first is the Manual on

Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD"), published by the United

States Department of Transportation. The MUTCD contains standards

for "using signs, signals, and permanent markings on roads and

highways." See Def. Mem. at 3 n. 2; Pl. Mem. at 4. The other

manual that provides guidance with respect to road design in

National Parks is the National Park Service Sign Manual, which

Defendant asserts compliments, and, in some cases, supersedes the

MUTCD. Kruse Dec. ¶6 n. 1. 
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Plaintiff argues that the government was obligated to comply

with the MUTCD, which, Plaintiff argues, imposes requirements for

road design that deviate from the scheme implemented by the

National Park Service in the area of the Bunker Road/Lamoreaux

Drive intersection. Pl. Mem. at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff

argues that the MUTCD requires that the "BUMPS" sign be placed 164

feet in advance of the intersection; that the MUTCD requires an

"advisory speed plate" to be posted giving notice of a suggested

reduction in speed; and that the diagonal white line striping was

ineffective because it was "severely deteriorated" and failed to

comply with the markings contained in the MUTCD. Id.; Schultz

Dec. ¶10. 

Defendant counters by noting that the Ninth Circuit's

decision in Kennewick Irrigation District v. United States held

that a safety standard removes discretion for purposes of the FTCA

only "when it is embodied in a specific and mandatory regulation

or statute which creates clear duties incumbent upon governmental

actors." 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis original). 

The government argues that the MUTCD does not constitute such a

specific and mandatory regulation, especially where the National

Park Service Sign Manual provides an express grant of discretion

to park managers in designing park roads. Def. Mem. at 8-9. 

This Court is persuaded that the MUTCD does not provide the

kind of mandatory regulations contemplated by the FTCA. This

conclusion is based in part on the language of the MUTCD itself,

which, notwithstanding the opinion of Plaintiff's expert that any

use of the word "may" in the manual should be construed as
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"shall," provides for a degree of discretion and choice in

selecting the precise features of road construction. See, e.g.

Schultz Dec. ¶10; Schultz Dec. Ex. B, §3B.27 ("If used, speed bump

markings...")(emphasis added). The Court finds further support

for this conclusion in the fact that the National Park Service

Sign Manual expressly provides that "the MUTCD and this Manual are

utilized by the National Park Service to provide for park managers

recommended standards, specifications and procedures for the NPS

sign system," and that "the individual park manager...has the

responsibility for determining whether or not a sign is necessary

or appropriate at a given location." Kruse Dec. Ex. 1 (emphasis

added). 

Although the National Park Service Sign Manual does not reach

other decisions that Plaintiff claims were negligent and caused

his injuries, such as the decision to construct a dangerously

steep speed bump and the failure to construct a dedicated bicycle

lane, Plaintiff cannot point to any mandatory regulation that

prevents a National Park Service park manager from constructing

speed bumps in the manner of the bump at issue in this case, or

that requires construction of a dedicated bicycle lane. See

Schultz Dec. Ex. C (guidelines for design of speed humps

classified as "a recommended practice"). Accordingly, this Court

finds that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the question of

whether the government's actions were discretionary, and

consequently will now turn to the question of whether these

actions are of the sort Congress intended to shield from liability

in enacting section 2680(a).
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2. Susceptible to Policy Analysis

With respect to the second prong of the discretionary

function exception analysis, the Supreme Court has noted that

"[t]he focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective

intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or

regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether

they are susceptible to policy analysis." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at

325. In order for the exception to apply and shield the

government from liability, the discretionary conduct must be the

product of a weighing of competing public policy concerns. See

Blackburn, 100 F.3d at 1433; ARA Leisure Services v. United

States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1987).

Defendant argues that its decisions with respect to

installation of the raised intersection and the signs warning of

the speed bump are susceptible to policy analysis and are "exactly 

the type of decision Congress sought to protect from judicial

second-guessing." Def. Mem. at 9 citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. 

Although the government attempts to cloak its conduct in the veil

of "safety" decisions, this Court is not persuaded that

Defendant's decisions to install a speed bump with a 3:1 slope

ratio or place a warning sign 98 feet from the intersection

involved the balancing of competing policy concerns. 

Defendant cites ARA Leisure Services for the proposition that

"decisions by the National Park Service concerning the design of

roads are grounded in policy, and therefore protected under the

discretionary function exception...." Def. Mem. at 9. The

government loads more on ARA Leisure Services than it can bear,
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however, given that that case concerned the government's decision

to construct roads in Denali National Park without guardrails

after having balanced social and political policy concerns as well

as considered the Park Service policy requiring roads to be

"esthetically pleasing" and to impose minimal impact on the

surrounding areas. ARA Leisure Services, 831 F.2d at 195. In

this case, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant's decision to

control traffic by installing a speed bump, but rather contends

that the decision to construct a dangerously steep speed bump

without adequate warnings was the direct cause of his injuries. 

Complaint, ¶6. This Court finds that the extent to which an

approach to a raised intersection is gradual or abrupt is simply

not a decision that is subject to social, political, or public

policy concerns, and is therefore not the type of conduct Congress

sought to protect in enacting the discretionary function

exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323. 

The same can be said for Defendant's alleged failure to

provide adequate warnings of the speed bump. Ninth Circuit case

law makes clear that in failure to warn cases, the discretionary

function exception is "limited to those unusual situations where

the government was required to engage in broad, policy-making

activities or to consider unique social, economic, and political

circumstances in the course of making judgments related to

safety." Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.

1995); see also Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th

Cir. 1990)(failure to warn is not grounded in social, economic, or

political policy); Seyler v. United States, 832 F.2d 120, 123 (9th
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1

 The other two exceptions apply where the Plaintiff obtains

permission to enter the land in exchange for consideration, or

where the Plaintiff receives an express invitation to enter the

land from the owner. Cal. Civ. Code §846. Neither of these

12

Cir. 1987) (same). The Court finds that this is not one of those

"unusual" situations, and therefore holds that the discretionary

function exception to the FTCA does not divest the Court of

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. The Court

now turns to Defendant's claims under section 846 of the

California Civil Code.

B. California Recreational Use Statute

The government also argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment because Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for

landowner liability under the California Recreational Use statute,

codified at section 846 of the California Civil Code. Because the

FTCA premises liability on the "law of the place where the action

or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), California tort law

governs Plaintiff's claims. See Yanez v. United States, 63 F.3d

870, 872 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Like the law of most states, California law imposes a duty on

people, including landowners, to use reasonable care under the

circumstances to prevent injury to others. See, e.g., Alcaraz v.

Vece, 14 Cal. 4th 1149, 1156 (Cal. 1997). California's

Recreational Use statute alters this general rule by immunizing

landowners from liability for injuries suffered by people who use

their land for recreational purposes. Cal. Civ. Code §846. 

Section 846 has several exceptions, however, one of which is

potentially applicable to the facts of this case.1 Landowners
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exceptions applies in this case. 

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will not be shielded from liability for injuries suffered by

recreational users of their land where the landowner demonstrates

"willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous

condition, use, structure or activity...." Cal. Civ. Code. §846. 

The Recreational Use statute applies to land owned by the United

States, and the United States is entitled to rely on section 846

as a defense to actions brought against it for injuries occurring

on land owned by the federal government. See Mattice v. United

States, 969 F.2d 818, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1992); Rost v. United

States, 803 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1986); Simpson v. United

States, 652 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff does not

contest that he entered the GGNRA for recreational purposes, thus

focusing the dispute on the question of whether the "willful and

malicious failure to guard or warn" exception applies to the

government's conduct in this case.

Under California law, in order to establish "willful and

malicious failure to guard or warn," a plaintiff "must show that

the defendant: (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the

peril; (2) had actual or constructive knowledge that the injury

was probable, as opposed to possible; and (3) consciously failed

to act to avoid the danger." Mattice, 969 F.2d at 822, citing

Termini v. United States, 963 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The question of whether an actor had constructive knowledge is

measured against an objective standard, and asks whether a

"reasonable man in the same or similar circumstances...would be
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aware of the danger caused by his conduct." Rost, 803 F.2d at 451

(internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff ultimately will

bear the burden of establishing the applicability of this

exception at trial, the government will be entitled to summary

judgment in its favor if it can demonstrate based on the evidence

in the record that Plaintiff cannot prevail on any one of these

three elements at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 323. 

Although Defendant mentions in its moving papers that

"plaintiff cannot prove the existence of any of these three

factors," Def. Mem. at 13, the government does not otherwise argue

that it did not have knowledge of the peril posed by the speed

bump. Indeed, Defendant admits the bump was abrupt, and obtained

funding for a third construction effort to plane off layers of

asphalt so as to render the bump more gradual. The Court

therefore finds that Plaintiffs have at least raised a factual

issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this first point. 

As to the second element of the test for willful or malicious

conduct, Plaintiff argues that "it is Kruse's sole declaration

that the U.S. relies upon for its assertion that there were no

complaints made by bicyclists. The U.S. cannot fulfill the

'ordinary reasonable man' requirement based upon a declarant who

has not even seen the complained of dangerous condition." Pl.

Mem. at 19. Plaintiff has not bothered to cite any authority to

support this proposition, and the Court is not aware of any case

that precludes considering evidence proffered by an individual who

is in a position to know of complaints made with respect to a

dangerous condition, but who has not personally inspected the
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condition. In fact, it seems that personal familiarity with an

allegedly dangerous condition is less relevant to this second

prong of the willfulness inquiry than a witness's position as

someone to whom complaints regarding the dangerous condition would

be directed. 

Nonetheless, the Court is aware of several facts that, taken

together, militate in favor of the Plaintiff on this point. 

First, the government was aware that over 20% of the users of the

GGNRA were bicycle riders. See Declaration of Stephen Purtill,

Ex. A ("Purtill Dec."). Second, Plaintiff has proffered the

deposition testimony of Matthew Harrison, an employee of the

National Park Service who was working as an officer with the

National Park Police in November 2001. Deposition of Matthew

Harrison, 11:14-15, Purtill Dec. Ex. D ("Harrison Depo."). Mr.

Harrison testified that in July 2001, prior to Plaintiff's

accident, the Park Service was aware that the raised intersection

was potentially dangerous for vehicles and bicyclists in the

absence of a speed advisory sign, and that one motorist

experienced damage to his vehicle while traveling through the

intersection. Harrison Depo., 15:17-17:16, 20:22-21:6, 14:12-18. 

Mr. Harrison also testified that on July 6, 2001, at the request

of his lieutenant, he authored a hazardous condition report on the

raised intersection indicating what the nature of the potential

dangers of the intersection were and recommending safety

improvements. Id. at 21:7-10.

The government contests this second point on two grounds: (1)

that since the danger of the raised intersection was readily
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apparent to anyone, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the

government had knowledge that Plaintiff's injury was probable, and

(2) that the absence of prior similar accidents demonstrates that

the government cannot be deemed to have had knowledge that

Plaintiff's accident was probable. Def. Mem. at 13-14. 

As to Defendant's first argument, it seems somewhat curious

that Park officers would discuss the dangers presented by the

raised intersection in meetings and would go so far as to prepare

a hazardous condition report if the danger were truly as obvious

as Defendant contends. As to the second argument, the Court

declines to endorse Defendant's position, which seems to be that,

as a matter of law, no constructive knowledge of probable injury

can be found until several similar accidents occur as a result of

the same dangerous condition. In fact, California courts have

rejected that very proposition. See Lostritto v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)

("the matter of probability is not to be assessed solely by the

number of prior accidents, which adventitiously may have been few,

but by all the circumstances."). Instead, this Court finds that,

while the facts in this case present a close call as to the second

prong of the willfulness inquiry, Plaintiff's proffered evidence

and the inferences drawn therefrom demonstrate the existence of a

factual issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this point. 

Finally, the third prong of the willfulness inquiry requires

the Court to consider whether Defendant "consciously failed to act

to avoid the peril." Mattice, 969 F.2d at 822. Although there is

no precise test defining what constitutes a "conscious failure to
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act," cases indicate that a defendant will avoid liability under

section 846 where he takes some measures to avoid harm, even where

more effective measures could or should have been taken. See id.

at 823 (two warning signs and reflectors on a guardrail were

sufficient to avoid liability); Grippo v. United States, 911 F.

Supp. 437, 441 (D. Nev. 1995) (government did not consciously fail

to act where it posted general warnings and erected yellow-tape

barricades around a portion of a hazardous condition); Hannon v.

United States, 801 F. Supp. 323, 328 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (several

warning signs were sufficient to defeat liability even where

defendant considered more effective measures of preventing harm

but chose not to implement them); see also Alden v. United States,

No. C-92-1052, 1993 WL 219286 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1993)(no

conscious failure to act where defendant posted general, as

opposed to specific, warning signs). In contrast, defendants have

been found to demonstrate a conscious failure to act where

absolutely no measures are taken to prevent the harm. See Soto v.

United States, 748 F. Supp. 727 (C.D. Cal. 1990); McLeod v. United

States, No. C-91-3652, 1994 WL 860798 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1994) 

 It is on this final point that Plaintiff's evidence and

argument fail, and therefore, on this final point that this Court

awards summary judgment to the Defendant. For instance, in his

opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that "the fact that the U.S.

failed to appear for the grinding of the bump on November 2, 2001,

in and of itself raises a triable issue of fact as to the U.S.'s

intent or motive." Pl. Mem. at 20. Plaintiff further states that

the "BUMPS" sign, faded diagonal striping, and traffic cone
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For the Northern District of California

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government's actions to avoid the peril should not be viewed as a

whole, but rather through a narrow lens focusing on actions taken

after issuance of the hazardous conditions report in July 2001. 

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warning of the raised intersection constitute "willfully

misleading and willfully inadequate" steps to avoid the danger,

conduct Plaintiff deems "willfully and intentionally and morally

unacceptable...." Id. Plaintiff neglects to provide citations to

legal authority that would support these propositions, and in the

absence of any evidence of bad faith by the government, this Court

declines to interpret Defendant's failure to cause a reduction in

the height of the speed bump by the time of Plaintiff's accident

as evidence of a suspect motive or malicious design. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244 (C.D. Ca.

1985)(parties are obligated to provide a factual predicate from

which inferences can be drawn). Similarly, the Court rejects

Plaintiff's assertion that the government's attempts to warn users

of the raised intersection constitute evidence that the government

intended to mislead users of the GGNRA with respect to the perils

associated with the speed bump. There is simply no evidence in

the record to support such a conclusion, and the Court will not

engage in wild speculation in order to create some phantom issue

of fact that would preclude summary judgment. See id.; see also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (court is obligated to draw justifiable

inferences in favor of non-moving party)(emphasis added). 

Rather, the Court notes several salient factors that

demonstrate the government's attempts, however ham-handed, to

mitigate the danger posed by the intersection.2 First, it is
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However valid this argument may be in a situation where the danger

to the plaintiff is different from the danger posed to other users

of a defendant's land, in this case the nature of the peril was

virtually identical--a potential for personal injury or property

damage. Thus, the steps taken by the government to avoid the peril

prior to receiving explicit, written notice of potential danger to

bicyclists were precisely the kinds of warnings that would have

been appropriate after receiving written notice. Therefore, in

deciding whether the government consciously failed to act, the

Court finds that it is appropriate in this situation to consider

all action taken by the government in attempting to prevent harm. 

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undisputed that the government installed a sign warning of the

bump as a part of the initial construction at the intersection. 

Second, although the parties dispute the effectiveness of the

diagonal white lines painted onto the road's surface, the parties

do agree that the government put some sort of marking on the

asphalt in front of the speed bump, and Plaintiff admits having

seen the markings prior to entering the intersection. See

Deposition of Jon Buchwald, 65:4-11, Saltiel Dec. Ex. 2 ("Buchwald

Depo."). Third, although the parties again dispute the

effectiveness of the placement and posture of a traffic cone

located at the intersection, they do not dispute that a traffic

cone was indeed present in the general area of the speed bump. 

Id. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the government

procured funding for a third construction project at the

intersection and selected a contractor to perform the work that

would ultimately render the speed bump safe yet effective. 

Although the work was unfortunately not performed in time to

prevent Plaintiff's injuries, the lack of coordination between

Park Service employees and construction crews is, at most,

evidence of negligence, and therefore insufficient as a basis for
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liability under section 846. 

V. CONCLUSION

In this case the Court grants Defendant's motion because

Plaintiff simply has made no showing that the government

consciously failed to act to avoid harm to users of the Golden

Gate National Recreation Area. In fact, the government has made a

strong showing that it did act to avoid the peril. The

government's efforts are sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff

cannot prevail on the third prong of the willfulness inquiry under

the California Recreational Use statute. Accordingly, the Court

hereby GRANTS Defendant United States' motion for summary

judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

August 15, 2005 ____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE