Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04024/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04024-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 California has since replaced the Board of Prison Terms with the Board of

Parole Hearings. See Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT BIBBS,

Petitioner,

 v.

 ANTHONY P. KANE, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-04024 JSW

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Albert Bibbs (“Bibbs”), a state prisoner incarcerated at the California Training

Facility at Soledad, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

Petition is now ripe for consideration on the merits, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History.

On July 16, 1991, Bibbs was convicted by a jury of willful, deliberate and premeditated

attempted murder and was sentenced to a prison term of seven years to life. (Pet. at 13.) Bibbs

does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction or the sentence imposed by the trial

court. Rather, Bibbs’s claims are premised on the Board of Prison Term’s (the “Board”)

decision to deny him parole at the parole suitability hearing held on July 27, 2004 (the “July

2004 Hearing”).1

 (Id. at 12-13, 16.)

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2 At the July 27, 2004 Hearing, the Presiding Commissioner stated that he

would “accept the findings of the court to be true.” Bibbs did not object. (See Pet., App. A,

Ex. M (Transcript of July 27, 2004 Hearing) at 10:9-17.)

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Before the July 2004 Hearing, Bibbs also had appeared before the Board on September

15, 1999, February 27, 2002, and February 25, 2003. After he was denied parole at the July

2004 Hearing, he filed a petition for a write of habeas corpus before the Superior Court of

California, County of Contra Costa (the “Superior Court”). On November 30, 2004, the

Superior Court denied Bibbs’s habeas petition. (See Pet., App. A, Ex. E.) On January 20, 2005,

the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District (the “Court of Appeal”) summarily

denied Bibbs’s petition. (See Pet., App. A, Ex. O.) On April 13, 2005, the California Supreme

Court summarily denied review of Bibbs’s habeas petition. (See Pet., App. A, Ex. P.) 

On October 5, 2005, Bibbs timely filed the instant petition. Respondents filed an answer

on May 4, 2007. On July 16, 2007, Bibbs filed a traverse.

B. Factual Background.

The facts of the offense are pertinent to the resolution of Bibbs’s claims and taken from

the decision of the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District:2

The shooting of Darryl Bedford occurred in the early morning of

August 27, 1990, in a residential subdivision in Brentwood. Bedford was

shot twice with a 12 gauge Mossberg 500 shotgun: once in the chest and once

in the arm. Although Bedford survived the attack, he offered little

information concerning the attack or his attackers at the preliminary

examination, and he did not testify at trial. Bedford was shot in retaliation

for his suspected participation with Tim Wood in the theft of a large amount

of methamphetamine (valued at approximately $400,000) belonging to David

Terry, a large methamphetamine manufacturer and “dealer” in Contra Costa

County. Terry also had a rock band, which defendant, a drummer, had hopes

of joining. Terry routinely supplied defendant with methamphetamine and

in exchange was “willing to do just about anything to help [Terry] out.”

That included helping Terry recover the missing methamphetamine.

When defendant and Bedford arrived to stake out the Wood’s residence on

Bethel Island, Bedford went inside and began to shoot at defendant.

“Wigged out” defendant left and went home. Later that night, Terry

contacted defendant again. According to defendant, he was “tooting” methamphetamine at least 10 times during the 24 hours preceding the shooting.

During the early morning hours of August 27, Terry, Bell and

appellant searched for the thieves dressed in camouflaged clothing that

defendant had purchased earlier. Terry, the driver, was armed with a nine

millimeter assault rifle, Bell, in the passenger seat, had a M-1 military rifle,

and in the back seat with defendant was Terry’s Mossberg shotgun. At some

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28 3 Terry Bell was arrested a few days later: when stopped Bell had a loaded .380

automatic.

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point Terry spotted Bedford and followed him to the Brentwood subdivision.

Bedford parked his car and approached Terry. An argument ensued with

Terry accusing Bedford of “turning on him and . . . playing with the opposite

side . . . .” What happened next is where the factual dispute lies.

The prosecution’s evidence suggested that defendant then lifted the

shotgun and fired at an unarmed Leford at nearly point blank range, hitting

him in the chest. Bedford was pushed back into his car, but he managed to

run to a nearby house where he was refused admittance. Bedford then

staggered toward an intersection where a commuter was sitting in a parked

vehicle. The commuter watched as Bedford, holding his large intestine with

both hands, was shot again (in the arm) by a pursing defendant. At Bedford’s

urging, the commuter placed him in the back of his truck and drove to the

nearest hospital. Bell and Terry fled; defendant ran into a freshly tilled field

where midway through it he buried the shotgun. Defendant attempted to

escape by crawling across the field but was discovered by the police hiding

in tall grass in a ditch near the edge of the field.3

 

In his initial statement to the police defendant denied shooting

Bedford. He claimed to have hitched a ride from two unknown men who had

offered to drive him to Antioch after completing some business. Defendant

watched as Bedford pulled out a black .22 caliber Rueger automatic from his

rear pocket, and the passenger in the front seat responded by shooting

Bedford with a shotgun. Defendant then fled into the field when the

passenger came after him with the shotgun.

In his second statement to the police, defendant admitted shooting

Bedford but said it was in self-defense. After the argument with Terry,

Bedford backed away from the Honda and removed a black Rueger

automatic; defendant responded by shooting him with the shotgun.

While in jail, defendant wrote Bedford a letter in which he apologized

for the shooting and indicated that Terry had forced him at gunpoint to shoot

Bedford. There was no mention of Bedford having been armed.

The defense attempted to establish that defendant had shot Bedford

initially in self-defense (Bedford pulled the gun first) and then as a result of

duress by Terry, who had threatened to kill defendant if he did not kill

Bedford.

Defendant testified that he did not plan to shoot Bedford. He stated

that he saw Bedford back away from the car and pull a small black gun

(identified by defendant as the one found later by neighborhood teen-agers

in a nearby storm drain), from his pocket. Afraid “for [his] life”, defendant

fired. Terry then ordered defendant to “‘get out and finish him or you’re

dead.’” Knowing that Terry had an assault rifle, defendant did as he was told.

Defendant followed Bedford and discharged the shotgun but did not intend

to hit Bedford. When he heard Terry drive away, defendant stopped chasing

Bedford and ran in the opposite direction.

The gun found by neighborhood teen-agers was an antique, rusted,

nickle-plated .38 caliber fully loaded Smith and Wesson revolver. According

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to the teen-agers, they had first observed the gun on February 10, 1991. In

March, one of the youths retrieved the gun from the bottom of the storm

drain and took it home. A few days later he informed his father about the

gun and he summoned the police. But the revolver had not been seen by a

defense investigator, a police officer, or a city employee who had searched

the storm drains in the end of February.

A number of police officers testified to Bedford’s reputation for

violence. Bedford also had multiple prior convictions: two counts of assault

with a firearm, and single counts of shooting at a vehicle, of being a felon in

possession of a concealable firearm, of an unlawful taking of an automobile,

and of the unlawful sale of a noncontrolled substance.

Debbie Orum testified that David Terry also had a reputation in the

community for being “pretty wild, pretty violent . . . always with . . . a gun

[waving] it around. Bragging. Always shooting it off.” About two weeks

after the shooting, she overheard Terry “bragging” to the effect that he would

have shot defendant “then and there” had he not shot Bedford.

(Pet., App. A, Ex. D at 00316-20.) 

At the July 2004 Hearing, the Board reviewed Bibbs’s prior criminal history. The Board

noted that he had no juvenile record and that his first conviction was for carrying a concealed

weapon in a vehicle on December 25, 1986. (Pet., App. A, Ex. M at 11:1-3.) Bibbs’s next

conviction was in April 1987, when he was convicted of occupying property without consent. 

(Id. at 11:20-21.) In January 1989, Bibbs was convicted of obstructing or resisting a public

officer. (Id. at 12:4-8.) 

The Board next reviewed Bibbs’s social history. The Board noted Bibbs’s father passed

away when he was fourteen. (Id. at 13:1-2.) Bibbs’s mother was a homemaker and also owned

and managed apartment buildings. (Id. at 13:11-15.) At the time of the hearing, she continued

to own and manage apartment buildings. (Id.) At about the age of fifteen, Bibbs began using

methamphetamine. (Id. at 14:13.) He also smoked marijuana and drank alcohol. (Id. at 15:4-

5.) Bibbs married in 2003. (Id. at 13:25.) 

Before he was incarcerated, Bibbs worked as a carpenter, a janitor, a tree trimmer, a

general maintenance worker, a carpet layer, a handyman, and a house refurbisher. (Id. at 14:3-

6.) He also has job skills in welding, building maintenance, and carpentry. (Id. at 16:23-26.) 

The Board reviewed Bibbs’s educational programming and vocational advancement

while in prison. (Id. at 32:22-23.) Bibbs completed sixteen units of vocational mill and cabinet

training and also received a certificate of achievement in screen process printing. (Id. at 30:16-

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18-32:2.) Previous to this vocational training, he worked in textiles at the prison for two years. 

(Id. at 31:20-22.) As an inmate, Bibbs also worked in the tool yard, on machine work, in the

yard crew, and as a cook. He consistently received a satisfactory work product ratings in all of

these fields, except in machine work, where Bibbs also received unsatisfactory and poor ratings. 

(Id. at 32:9-18.) Bibbs had not held a job for a year before his July 2004 Hearing. (Id. at 29:3-

18.)

The Board noted Bibbs participated in numerous self-help programs and workshops

including Family Effectiveness, Purpose Driven Life, Impact of Crime on Victims, Growing up

Male, Victims Awareness, Stress Management Training, Anger Management Training, and

Substance Abuse Program. (Id. at 28:5-33:11, 52:26-27.) Additionally, Bibbs read three selfhelp books within the month and a half before the July 2004 Hearing. (Id. at 29:25-30.) Bibbs

participated in Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous biweekly since 1998. (Id. at

33:5-7.) Bibbs also completed fifteen FEMA courses during the course of his imprisonment for

the commitment offense. (Id. at 27:12-13.)

The Board reviewed Bibbs’s prison disciplinary record, finding he received seventeen

California Department of Corrections (“CDC”)-128(a) (“counseling chronos”) violations,

including one on March 24, 2003 and another on April 18, 2003. (Id. at 27:1-2.) He also

received six CDC-115s (“disciplinary infractions”) write-ups. His most recent disciplinary

infraction occurred on January 21, 2003. (Id. at 34:7-8.) 

The Board also discussed Bibbs’s parole plans: his hope to be paroled in Missouri,

where his mother resides and where he also has a job offer. (Id. at 15:20-25, 17:4-8.) If Bibbs

is paroled in California, he intends to live with his wife in Red Bluff. (Id. at 16:2-14.) Bibbs

did not believe he would have any difficulty finding a job if released, particularly because of the

job skills listed above. (Id. at 16:24-26.) 

The Board reviewed letters from friends and family in support of Bibbs’s release, and a

letter from the victim, Darrell Bedford, accepting Bibbs’s apology and forgiving Bibbs for his

crime. (Id. at 18:3-25:1, 49:14-50:6.) 

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A correctional counselor completed Bibbs’s Life Prisoner Evaluation Report for the July

2004 Hearing. (Id. at 39:8-11.) In the report, the correctional counselor upgraded Bibbs’s

degree of threat to the community from the previously reported low degree of threat to a

moderate degree of threat. (Id. at 39:8-11.) The Board also reviewed the Psychological

Evaluation for the Board of Prison Terms produced in January 2003. (See id. at 44:1-47:23.) 

The staff psychologist gave Bibbs an excellent prognosis for maintaining his present gains in

the community. (Id. at 44:1-5.) Further, the psychologist determined Bibbs “does not have a

mental health disorder which would necessitate treatment either during his incarceration or

following parole” and poses “no greater risk of violence than the average person.” (Id. at

47:14-23.) 

The Board found Bibbs unsuitable for parole and that he posed an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. (Id. at 88:17-19.) The

Board found the commitment offense to be “really very callous and obviously also calculated.” 

(Id. at 88:21-22.) They also found that prisoner Bibbs “failed to upgrade vocationally and has

not yet sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help programs.” (Id. at 89:17-18.) 

Additionally, the Board addressed the most recent of Bibbs’s disciplinary infractions and

counseling chronos. (Id. at 89:20-90:10.)

The Board recommended that Bibbs gain additional programming, including self-help

programming and substance abuse programming. (Id. at 92:2-6.) Also, the board would like

Bibbs to upgrade vocationally and become disciplinary-free. (Id. at 92:6-10.) 

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review.

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see

also Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1971). The Ninth Circuit has applied § 2254(d) to

review of parole suitability decisions. See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007);

Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

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F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the petition in this case was filed after the effective date

of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), AEDPA’s

provisions apply. Jeffries v. Wood, 103 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Under AEDPA, this Court may grant the petition with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Courts are not required to address the merits of a

particular claim but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground that relief is precluded

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). It is the habeas

petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief by § 2254(d). Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of

the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005) (“clearly established” federal law determined as of the time

of the state court’s last reasoned decision); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir.

2001). “Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme]

Court’s jurisprudence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Supreme Court has explained

repeatedly that AEDPA, which embodies deep-seated principles of comity, finality, and

federalism, establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing state-court determinations. 

See id. at 436. Thus, “[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view

different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per curiam).

Under the “contrary to” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ

only if the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme

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Court] cases, ‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision’ of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the “unreasonable

application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at

413.

A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.

at 412. The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 75-76; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968

(2003). After Lockyer, “[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our determination, a state

court’s application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the ‘objectively

unreasonable’ standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of

deference to the state courts than [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them.” Clark,

331 F.3d at 1068.

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the

highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If the highest state court has summarily

denied a petitioner’s claim, the habeas court may “look through” that decision to the last state

court addressing the claim in a reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072,

1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)).

In this case, the Superior Court denied Bibbs’s petition in a reasoned decision. (Pet.,

App. A, Ex. E.) The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court then summarily denied review of

Bibbs’s petition. (Pet., App. A, Ex. O; Pet., App. A, Ex. P.) Accordingly, this Court will “look

through” the California Supreme Court’s and Court of Appeal’s decisions to the Superior

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Court’s decision in deciding whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law.

B. Legal Standards Applicable to Parole Suitability Determinations.

California’s parole scheme is set forth in California Penal Code § 3041, et seq. Section

3041(a) provides, in pertinent part:

In the case of any inmate sentenced pursuant to any provision of law ... [o]ne

year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release date a panel of two

or more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again meet with the

inmate and shall normally set a parole release date as provided in Section

3041.5. ... The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform

terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat

to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of

parole release dates.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). 

Penal Code section 3041(b) provides, in pertinent part:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity

of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b).

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations section 2402 (hereinafter “Section

2402”) sets forth the criteria used to determine whether an inmate is suitable for release on

parole. The opening paragraph of Section 2402(a) states:

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner

will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). 

Section 2402(b) provides:

All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered

in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall include the

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct

which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses,

including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present

attitude toward the crime; any considerations of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

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firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in a finding of unsuitability.

Id. § 2402(b).

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder. 

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation

to the offense. 

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the

prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct

in prison or jail.

Id. § 2402(c).

Circumstances supporting a finding of suitability for parole are:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting

others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm

to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable

relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate

the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking

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4 One axis of the matrix concerns the relationship between an attempted

murderer and victim and the other axis of the matrix concerns the resulting injury from the

crime. The choices on the axis for the relationship of an attempted murderer and victim are

“participating victim,” “prior relationship,” “no prior relationship,” and “threat to public

order or murder for hire.” The choices on the axis for the resulting injury of the action are

“minor injury,” “victim assaulted,” “major injury,” and “torture.” Each of the choices are

further defined in the matrix. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(d). 

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help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands

that nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as a result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long

period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime,

the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, as defined in section

2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior was a result of that

victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the possibility of recidivism. 

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced

ability to function within the law upon release.

Id. § 2402(d). 

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the murder

degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three choices of

suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See id. § 2403. For attempted willful,

deliberate and premeditated murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of seven,

eight, or nine years, to a high of thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years, depending on some of the

facts of the crime.4

 

Although the matrix is used to establish a base term, an inmate’s base term is set only

when he or she has been found suitable for parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1087

(2005). Thus, the statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s

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expectancy in an early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Id. at 1070-71.

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless [the

Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing

in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a

continuing public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original). In sum, “the Board, exercising

its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by considering

the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” Id. at 1071. The

California Supreme Court’s determination of state law is binding in this federal habeas action. 

See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17

(1979).

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime alone

can support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum, even if everything else about the

prisoner is laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of

the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002) (“[t]he nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can

constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but might violate due process “where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than

the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense”).

C. The Board’s Decision to Deny Bibbs Parole Did Not Violate Due Process.

1. Legal Standards.

Bibbs asserts that the Board’s decision to deny him parole at the July 2004 Hearing

violated his Due Process rights. “In analyzing the procedural safeguards owed to an inmate

under the Due Process clause, [a court] must look to two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of

a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural

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5 Respondent denies that Bibbs has a federally protected liberty interest in

parole. (Answer at ¶ 11.) However, this argument is foreclosed by controlling Ninth Circuit

authority. See, e.g., Irons, 505 F.3d at 850 (“California Penal Code section 3041 vests ... all

... California inmates whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty

interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.”); Sass v.

Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We hold that California

inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061

(2005).”).

13

safeguards.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2003).5

 The second prong of this

test is satisfied if: (1) the inmate has been afforded an opportunity to be heard and, if denied

parole, informed of the reasons underlying the decision; and (2) the Board’s decision is

supported “some evidence” or is not otherwise arbitrary. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536,

542 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 and Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461

F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006)); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390

(9th Cir. 1987). 

Bibbs does not argue that he was denied an opportunity to be heard or that the Board

failed to inform him of its reasons for the decision. Rather, he contends the Board’s conclusion

that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released is both arbitrary and

not supported by “some evidence.” Respondent argues that the “some evidence” standard is

not clearly established federal law. That argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit authority. 

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Respondent further argues, that even if the “some evidence”

standard applies, the Board’s decision that Bibbs posed an unreasonable danger to society was

supported by “some evidence.”

“To determine whether the some evidence standard is met ‘does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion’ reached by the parole board.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128

(quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S., 445, 455-56 (1985)). “Hill’s “some evidence”

standard is minimal and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings

of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Id. at 1129 (quoting

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). Further, in order to determine whether the Board’s decision to find

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Bibbs unsuitable for parole is supported by “some evidence,” this Court must focus not on

whether “some evidence” “that a particular factor or factors indicating unsuitability exist,” but

on whether there is “some evidence” to conclude that “a prisoner’s release will unreasonably

danger public safety.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543 (citations omitted). 

2. Analysis.

At the July 2004 Hearing the Board, and in turn the Superior Court, found Bibbs

unsuitable for parole and an unreasonable risk or danger to others if released based on the

following findings: (1) the commitment offense was carried out in an especially calculated and

callous manner; (2) his previous criminal record demonstrated that Bibbs had an escalating

pattern of criminal conduct; (3) Bibbs is not free of institutional disciplinary infractions; and

(4) Bibbs had not yet sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help programming and

vocational training.

a. The Nature of the Offense.

The first section 2402 factor on which the Board relied to find Bibbs unsuitable for

parole is that he committed the offense in an “especially callous manner.” 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 2402(c)(1)(B). “A prisoner’s commitment offense may constitute a circumstance tending to

show that a prisoner is presently too dangerous to be found suitable for parole, but the denial of

parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s commitment offense only where the Board can ‘point

to factors beyond the minium elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed’ that

demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if

released.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 852 (quoting Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071) (emphasis

added).

In Goldsby v. Kane, 2008 WL 619022 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008), the court found that

the circumstances of a murder and an attempted murderer constituted “some evidence.” The

petitioner shot one victim multiple times at close range and shot the other victim as he was

running away and thus posed no threat. Id. at *4. The Court further noted the petitioner drove

around looking for the victim who ran away, presumably to kill him. Id. Moreover, the

petitioner shot at the fleeing victim in a public place, thus demonstrating a callous disregard for

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human suffering in that the petitioner created a potential for serious injury or death to persons

other than the intended victims. Id. The Court found that such circumstances provided “some

evidence” that the petitioner was not suitable for parole. 

Similar to Goldsby, Bibbs dressed in camouflage and spent the morning looking for

the victim. (Pet., App. A, Ex. E at 00368; Id., Ex. D at 000316-17.) When he found the

victim, Bibbs shot him twice at point blank range, severely injuring him. (Pet., App. A, Ex. E

at 00368.) As the victim was running away and holding his intestines with both hands, Bibbs

pursued him and shot him again. (Pet., App. A, Ex. D at 000317.) This occurred in a

residential neighborhood. (Id. at 000316-17.) In fact, a commuter, who was sitting in a parked

vehicle observed Bibbs shoot the fleeing victim. (Id. at 000317.) Such facts provide evidence

for the Board’s decision to deny parole based on the nature of the offense. It is not this Court’s

province to independently assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. As such, the Court concludes that the Superior Court’s

decision to affirm the parole denial based on the facts of the offense is supported by “some

evidence.”

b. Bibbs’s Disciplinary Infractions.

Another factor in the analysis of parole suitability is the petitioner’s institutional

behavior. If the state court finds “the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison,” it

tends to show unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code. Regs. § 2402(c)(6). The Board noted that

Bibbs had a total of seventeen counseling chronos while incarcerated, receiving two since the

previous parole hearing in February 2003. (Pet., App. A, Ex. M at 34:10.) More importantly,

Bibbs accumulated a total of six disciplinary infractions. (See id. at 34:7.) The most recent of

these disciplinary infractions occurred in January 2003 for obstructing a peace officer. (Pet.,

App. A, Ex. E at 00367.) Bibbs’s previous disciplinary infractions included one for aggressive

behavior. (Id.) At the parole hearing, Bibbs acknowledged the relation of his disciplinary

infractions to his attitude by stating that he had a “real attitude problem” and seemed to “buck

authority.” (See id. at 00368.)

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6 Because the Court finds the commitment offense and institutional disciplinary

violations meet the “some evidence” standard to find Bibbs unsuitable for parole, the Court

need not address the remaining factors considered by the Board and Superior Court. 

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Bibbs argues that his counseling chronos and disciplinary infractions were not

“disciplinary.” In support of this assertion, he relies In re Mark Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th 489

(2003). Bibbs’s reliance on In re Mark Smith is misplaced. The court in In re Mark Smith

merely held that receiving counseling chronos does not support denying parole because

counseling chronos document “minor misconduct, not discipline.” Id. at 504. Here, Bibbs

received CDC-115 disciplinary infractions in addition to counseling chronos. Other courts

have held that reliance on such prison disciplinary infractions constituted some evidence

supporting parole denials. Robles v. Solis, 2006 WL 2934086, *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2006);

Lomas v. Curry, 2008 WL 787176, *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008). Therefore, the Court finds

the Superior Court reasonably relied on Bibbs’s institutional disciplinary record to support its

determination that Bibbs poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society.

When the Court looks to the record as a whole, the Court finds that the Superior

Court’s determination that there was “some evidence” to support the Board’s decision to find

Bibbs unsuitable for parole was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Bibbs’s petition is DENIED on

this basis.6

c. The Concerns Articulated in Biggs v. Terhune Are Not Implicated

In this Case.

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit stated that,

[o]ver time, ... , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior

and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of

the nature of his offense would raise serious questions involving his liberty

interest. ...

A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17; cf. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1094 (“sole reliance on the

commitment offense might, in particular cases, violate” section 3041(a)’s “provision that a

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7 See, e.g., McCullough v. Kane, 2007 WL 1593227 at *6, *9 (N.D. Cal. June 1,

2007) (finding due process violation in Governor’s reversal of the Board’s decision to grant

parole after petitioner had served twenty-one years of fifteen years to life sentence for second

degree murder and met circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole); Brown v.

Kane, 2007 WL 1288448 at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007) (finding due process violation in

Governor’s reversal of the Board’s decision to grant parole at tenth parole suitability hearing

after petitioner had served twenty-four years of fifteen years to life sentence for second

degree murder and met circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole); Pirtle v. Cal.

Bd. of Prison, 2007 WL 1140817 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007) (finding due process

violation in Board’s denial of parole based on petitioner’s commitment offense, criminal

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parole date ‘shall normally be set’ under ‘uniform term principles, and might thus also

contravene the inmate’s constitutionally protected expectation of parole”); Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal. 4th at 682-83 (“[t]he nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient

basis for denying parole” but might violate due process “where no circumstances of the offense

reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to

sustain a conviction for that offense”).

In issuing the note of caution in Biggs regarding continued reliance on unchanging

factors, the Ninth Circuit gave little guidance to district courts as to how they should evaluate

such a claim. In Irons, however, the court noted that when it had determined that “a parole

board’s decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment

offense comport[ed] with due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the

minimum number of years required by his sentence.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. The court

concluded that “[a]ll we held in [Biggs and Sass,] and all we hold today, therefore, is that,

given the particular circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due process was not violated

when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their

minimum terms.” Id. at 853-54. The Irons court further “expressed its hope that the Board

will come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s

commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate

due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes.” Id. at 854.

The lessons this Court draws from Biggs, Sass, Irons, Dannenberg, Rosencrantz, and

various district court opinions that have applied the principles articulated therein,7 are as

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record, unstable social history, failure to upgrade vocationally, and need for further therapy

to cope with stress), report and recommendation adopted 2007 WL 15446620 (E.D. Cal.

May 29, 2007); Thomas v. Brown, 513 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding due process

violation in Governor’s reversal based on petitioner’s commitment offense, his failure to

accept responsibility, his need for further therapy, and his criminal history). 

8 Bibbs also alleges that his incarceration has become disproportionate to

offenses committed under similar circumstances. (Pet. at 62-66.) However, the Board has

not yet found Bibbs suitable for parole. Pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s decision

in Dannenberg, a determination of suitability precedes a determination of the appropriate

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follows: (1) that the Board may properly consider the nature of the commitment offense to

determine whether or not a prisoner is suitable for parole; (2) that in certain instances the

nature of the offense alone may support a finding that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole; and

(3) at some unspecified point, the nature of the offense will no longer be of sufficient

predictive value in determining whether or not a prisoner poses too great a risk of danger to be

considered suitable for parole. 

In his Petition, Bibbs challenges the Board’s actions at his fourth suitability hearing,

which occurred fourteen years into a seven years to life sentence. At the fourth suitability

hearing, the Board did not solely rely on “unchanging factors.” In addition to citing the

“unchanging factors” of Bibbs’s commitment offense, the Board also relied on Bibbs’s

disciplinary infractions while in prison. (Pet., App. A, Ex. M at 34:7-10, 89:17-90:10.) 

Similarly, in Montue the court found the Board relied on 

more than the ‘unchanging factor’ of petitioner’s commitment offense and

criminal history in denying him parole. Although the callous nature of

petitioner’s commitment offense and criminal history weighed heavily in the

Board’s determination, his unstable social history, his prison disciplinary

history, and his limited programming in prison, also counseled against parole.

Montue v. Schwartz, 2008 WL 906440, *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2008); see also Webb v. Kane,

2008 WL 787182, *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008) (finding the petitioner’s disciplinary

infractions in prison reflected an unwillingness to follow rules and conform to societal norms

and thus supported the decision to deny parole). Because the Board, and in turn the Superior

Court, did not rely solely on “unchanging” factors to deny parole, the concerns implicated in

Biggs are not implicated in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds that this claim is without

merit and DENIES the Petition on this basis as well.8

 

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on that basis as well.

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D. Bibbs’s Claim That the Board Operates Under a No-Parole Policy is Moot.

Bibbs contends that, under former Governor Gray Davis’s administration, the Board

implemented a policy in which it denied parole to prisoners who had been sentenced to

indeterminate terms. Even if, as Bibbs asserts, a policy existed under the former Governor’s

administration, the proper relief would be to grant him a new hearing before a Board

unaffected by the policy. See, e.g., Rush v. Kane, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89259 at *25 n.5

(N.D. Cal. 2007); Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29929 at *12-

13 (E.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 228 Fed. Appx. 673 (9th Cir. 2007). Bibbs has received at least

two additional hearings under Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s administration. Thus,

because there is no evidence that suggests the alleged “no parole” policy carried over into

Governor Schwarzenegger’s administration, Bibbs already has been provided additional fair

hearings. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED AS MOOT. Rush, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

89259 at *25. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A

separate judgment shall issue, and the Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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