Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08203/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08203-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The Court has construed the grounds for relief contained in the two pleadings as

constituting a single petition. See Doc. 7, n. 1.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dean Benally, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-8203-PCT-FJM (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Dean Benally filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 14, 2011,

and an amended petition1

 on December 28, 2011, challenging his convictions pursuant to a

plea agreement for felony shoplifting and sexual abuse, and the trial court’s imposition of

consecutive terms totaling 6.75 years. Benally raises seven grounds for habeas relief: (1)

the sentence imposed pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604 violated his due process rights; (2) he

received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) he was subjected to double jeopardy and

double punishment in violation of his due process rights; (4) the sentencing statute should

have been cited in the plea agreement; (5) the prosecutor did not inform the trial court that

the plea was a “package deal” with his co-defendant; (6) the sentence imposed was

disproportionate in violation of the eighth amendment; and (7) § 13-703 is not cited in the

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plea agreement or commitment papers. Respondents contend that all claims are unexhausted

and procedurally defaulted. The Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

In Benally’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, counsel raised two claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) failing to seek suppression of the shoplifted

merchandise; and (2) not challenging the validity of the two prior shoplifting convictions

(Doc. 16, Exh F, G). The trial court summarily denied relief, finding both claims without

merit (Id., Exh I). Benally filed a pro se motion for reconsideration raising new claims,

including two raised in his federal habeas petition: (1) the use of a historical prior felony

conviction to enhance his sentences violated the prohibition against double-jeopardy/doublepunishment; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to sufficiently communicate with

Benally (Id., Exh J). The trial court agreed with the State’s response that newly presented

claims were not cognizable in a motion for reconsideration and denied the motion (Id., Exh

K, L). In doing so, the trial court also rejected several of the claims on the merits, including

the double punishment claim.

On November 23, 2009, Benally petitioned for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, raising grounds that were not raised either in his original post-conviction petition

or in the motion for reconsideration, and are not raised in his federal habeas petition. Benally

maintained that (1) he had not been informed of his right to a jury determination on any

potential aggravating factors; (2) the lack of a jury determination on any potential

aggravating factors violated his right to a jury trial; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to object to the lack of a jury trial on aggravating factors; (4) the trial court’s imposition of

presumptive sentences was improper because Benally was not on release from confinement

at the time of the present offenses; (5) the State violated the terms of the plea agreement by

objecting to Benally’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (6) the police lacked

sufficient grounds to stop Benally for the traffic violation that led to his arrest for shoplifting

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(Id., Exh M). On May 5, 2011, the court of appeals denied review without comment (Id.,

Exh N). On June 17, 2011, Benally sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, reurging

the claims contained in his petition for review in the court of appeals. In addition, he added

three issues “not decided by the court of appeals as trial court errors.” These issues included

(1) the failure to consider the shoplifting offense as a “package deal” with a co-defendant;

(2) imposing a presumptive sentence for sexual abuse using an element not relevant to sexual

abuse; and (3) not considering the consecutive sentencing statute, which should have been

listed on the indictment (Id., Exh O at 30). On November 19, 2011, the supreme court denied

review (Id., Exh. O, P). Benally filed his federal petition on December 14, 2011.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999).

In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

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(O’Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground “that is both

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s

decision.” See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is “independent”

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state’s application of the bar is “adequate” if it is “‘strictly or regularly followed.”’

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

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DISCUSSION

In Ground II, Benally argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to sufficiently

communicate with him. In Ground III, he argues that the use of the historical prior felony

conviction to enhance his sentences violated the prohibition against doublejeopardy/punishment. Both claims were raised for the first time in his motion for

reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction petition. The trial court ruled

that newly presented claims were not cognizable in a motion for reconsideration and denied

the motion. In addition to not raising these two claims in his original post-conviction

petition, Benally also failed to raise them in his petitions for review in the court of appeals

and the supreme court. Therefore, he has not fairly presented these claims in state court in

a procedurally appropriate manner, and the claims are therefore unexhausted. Roettgen. In

addition, the Court finds that Benally would have no state remedy were he to return to the

state court, and his claims are therefore considered procedurally defaulted. Teague.

In Grounds I and VI, Benally argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to an

enhanced, presumptive sentence on the sexual abuse conviction based on a historical prior

felony conviction that did not involve sexual abuse. He raised these claims for the first time

in his petition for review in the court of appeals. Therefore, he has not fairly presented these

claims in state court in a procedurally appropriate manner, and the claims are therefore

unexhausted. Roettgen. In addition, the Court finds that Benally would have no state remedy

were he to return to the state court, and his claims are therefore considered procedurally

defaulted. Teague.

In Grounds IV and VII, he argues that the plea agreement and commitment order

should have included references to the consecutive-sentencing statute. In Ground V, he

argues that the State failed to inform the trial court that his plea agreements and his codefendant’s plea agreement were a “package deal.” Similar claims were raised for the first

time in Benally’s petition for review in the supreme court, except in the supreme court

petition Benally faulted the trial court and not the prosecutor. Benally specifically notes in

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To the extent Benally raises the ineffective assistance of counsel as “cause” to excuse

the default, it does not aid his case. The trial court determined that all the claims raised in

his motion for reconsideration were untimely, but also rejected the merits of the claims, so

even if counsel had initially raised them in the post-conviction proceedings, he would have

been unsuccessful.

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the petition for review that these were “issues not decided by the court of appeals” (Doc. 16,

Exh O). Therefore, he has not fairly presented these claims in state court in a procedurally

appropriate manner, and the claims are therefore unexhausted. Roettgen. In addition, the

Court finds that Benally would have no state remedy were he to return to the state court, and

his claims are therefore considered procedurally defaulted. Teague.

Certain sections of his habeas claims contain legal arguments that were not raised in

the state courts at any stage. Benally argues in Ground I for the first time that A.R.S. § 13-

604, the repetitive offender statute under which he was sentenced, is overly broad. As part

of Grounds I and VI, he argues for the first time that his sentences were disproportionate and

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. He argues in Ground II that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to inform him that the offense of sexual abuse requires a knowing or

intentional mental state and that PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the pro se

claims that he raised in the PCR action. In Ground IV, he argues for the first time that the

sentencing judge erred by failing to explain to Benally why he was receiving consecutive and

presumptive sentences. These claims were not fairly presented, and are therefore

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Finally, Benally has not alleged cause or prejudice

to excuse the default.2

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Dean Benally’s Writ of Habeas

Corpus and Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice (Doc. 1, 6).

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 1st day of November, 2012.

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