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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1570 

OMAR SAUNDERS-EL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ERIC ROHDE, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. 

No. 10 C 50063 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 30, 2015 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit 

Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Subsequent to his acquittal by a 

jury on burglary charges, Omar Saunders-El sued members of the Rockford, Illinois police department, alleging 

that they planted his blood at the crime scene in an attempt to frame him. His complaint included a 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 claim—contending that by fabricating evidence, 

the officers offended his due process rights—and Illinois 

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state law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court 

granted summary judgment for the officers on the federal 

claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. In the district court’s view, 

fabricating evidence does not violate a defendant’s due 

process rights and cannot support a § 1983 action; such 

an allegation must instead be brought as a state law claim 

for malicious prosecution, the district court reasoned. 

That holding is mistaken. A criminal defendant’s due 

process rights may be violated—actionable by way of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983—when the evidence against him is fabricated. However, due process is not implicated when, as 

here, the defendant is released on bond following his arrest and acquitted at trial. And this rule cannot be circumvented, as Saunders-El attempts to do, simply by reframing such an allegation as a Brady claim—that is, by 

alleging that the police officers who supposedly fabricated the evidence failed to reveal their misconduct to the 

prosecution. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court, but on other grounds. 

I. Background 

Omar Saunders-El was arrested, released on bond, 

charged, and ultimately stood trial for a burglary that occurred on August 10, 2006 at the Sports Dome retail store 

in Rockford, Illinois. Rockford police officers claimed 

that they spotted Saunders-El on the store’s roof, observed him jump off the building, and apprehended him 

following a foot chase. According to the prosecution, 

Saunders-El broke into the Sports Dome by carving a 

hole in the roof and ceiling and, in the process, cut himCase: 14-1570 Document: 33 Filed: 01/30/2015 Pages: 12
No. 14-1570 3

self on jagged metal, leaving his blood at the scene.1

Saunders-El, however, insists that he was minding his 

own business that evening, when a Rockford police officer stopped him on the street to question him about the 

break-in. While they spoke, Saunders-El says, another 

officer bludgeoned him over the head, splitting open his 

skull and knocking him out. While unconscious, he believes, the officers collected his blood in order to smear it 

at the crime scene and frame him for the burglary. Despite the ostensible strength of the evidence against him, 

a jury acquitted Saunders-El. He then sued various Rockford police officers based on his allegations of evidence 

fabrication, asserting a due process claim by way of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Illinois state claims of malicious 

prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

With respect to the § 1983 claim, the district court 

granted summary judgment in the officers’ favor, holding 

that an allegation of evidence fabrication cannot support 

a constitutional tort claim and is only redressable in Illinois as a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The 

district court relinquished jurisdiction over the state law 

claims and dismissed them without prejudice to refiling 

in state court. On appeal, Saunders-El focuses the bulk of 

his attention on the issue of whether a district court 

properly may find in favor of defendants at summary 

judgment on the ground that a plaintiff has not stated a 

legally cognizable claim. In his view, the court may do so 

 

1 The blood purportedly recovered on the roof matched SaundersEl’s DNA profile—a profile that is expected to occur in 1 in 57 quadrillion black individuals.

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only on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and, therefore, impermissibly ruled against him. On the merits, Saunders-El argues that the fabrication of evidence, as well as the failure of police officers to inform the prosecution of that 

fabrication, violates a criminal defendant’s due process 

rights and, as such, that his case should be reinstated. 

II. Discussion 

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Huang v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 754 F.3d 447, 

450 (7th Cir. 2014). We first address Saunders-El’s claim 

of impropriety regarding the district court’s dismissal of 

his case at summary judgment for failing to state a constitutional claim. Summary judgment is appropriate where 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); Bluestein v. Cent. Wisc. Anesthesiology, S.C., 769 F.3d 

944, 951 (7th Cir. 2014). Naturally, then, if Saunders-El’s 

claim had no legal grounding, the district court not only 

was permitted to dismiss it, it was required to do so. 

Where a claim has no legal basis, there can be no genuine 

issue of material fact and the movant, by definition, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Saunders-El suggests that the officers—by arguing 

that his § 1983 claim was legally insufficient—styled 

what should have been brought as a motion to dismiss as 

a motion for summary judgment, and that they did so to 

skirt Rule 12(b)’s requirement that motions to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim be made prior to the filing of an 

answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“A motion asserting 

[failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted] 

must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is 

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allowed.”). But “[a] motion to dismiss made after the filing of an answer serves the same function as a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings and may be regarded as one.” 

Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 

1970). And Rule 12(h)(2) expressly authorizes a party to 

file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(c), which permits the filing of a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are 

closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(c), (h)(2). Therefore, Saunders-El’s effort to characterize defendants’ motion as a motion to dismiss masquerading as a motion for summary judgment is futile. 

No matter the label or the rule under which defendants’ 

motion was filed, the district court was required to dismiss any legally untenable claims. 

On the merits, Saunders-El maintains that allegations 

of evidence fabrication can support a due process claim 

under § 1983. We agree with him. In its two-page opinion, the district court did not address our recent case law 

in this area and, instead, focused on our prior decisions 

in Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City 

of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2009); and Newsome v. 

McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001)—interpreting them 

as an edict from this court that evidence fabrication–

based due process claims can never form the basis of a 

constitutional tort. That reading, not uncommon among 

district courts in this circuit it seems, is inaccurate and 

requires clarification. In Newsome, we established that the 

existence of a state law claim for malicious prosecution 

renders unavailable § 1983 as a vehicle for bringing a 

federal malicious prosecution claim. 256 F.3d at 750. In 

Brooks, we affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s allegation 

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that “criminal proceedings were instituted against him 

based on false evidence or testimony,” remarking that 

“such a claim ‘is, in essence, one for malicious prosecution, rather than a due process violation.’” 564 F.3d at 833 

(quoting McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 786 (7th 

Cir. 2003)). Finally, in Fox, we counseled against “shoehorning into the more general protections of the Fourteenth Amendment claims for which another amendment 

provides more specific protection.” 600 F.3d at 841. 

There, we deemed the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants violated his due process rights by causing him 

to be falsely arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted by 

“deliberately fabricat[ing] false statements and . . . obstruct[ing] justice” to be a hybrid of a malicious prosecution claim and a Fourth Amendment claim, rather than a 

due process claim. Id. at 841. 

None of these decisions—individually or as a collection—stands for the proposition that fabricating evidence 

does not violate a defendant’s due process, actionable 

pursuant to § 1983. Instead, they merely establish that 

allegations that sound in malicious prosecution must be 

brought pursuant to state law. To the extent that these 

decisions may have rendered the law in this area uncertain, our more recent decisions have been explicit. In 

Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012), 

we expressly stated that “a police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates 

due process if that evidence is later used to deprive the 

defendant of [his] liberty in some way.” We have reiterated this position several times since then. For instance, just 

two weeks before the district court issued its opinion in 

this case, we decided Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th 

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No. 14-1570 7

Cir. 2014) (“Fields II”), wherein we made clear that fabricating evidence, including witness testimony, violates a 

clearly established constitutional right, such that qualified immunity does not shield the manufacturers of such 

evidence from liability. Id. at 1114; see also Petty v. City of 

Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In Fields II, we 

stated that a prosecutor who falsely creates evidence 

against a defendant violates the defendant’s due process 

right.”). Accordingly, the district court erred in holding, 

categorically, that a claim of evidence fabrication cannot 

form the basis of a due process claim under § 1983 and 

must instead be brought as a state law malicious prosecution claim. 

Not every act of evidence fabrication offends one’s 

due process rights, however—a point we elucidated in 

Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2012). 

There, the plaintiff, who had been acquitted by a jury in 

his criminal case, alleged that the prosecutor and investigators conspired “to manufacture false evidence and 

bring trumped-up charges.” Id. at 554. We held, though, 

that the plaintiff’s acquittal foreclosed his claim: 

[In Whitlock] we held that a prosecutor acting in an investigatory capacity who fabricates evidence that is used to obtain a 

wrongful conviction violates a convicted 

defendant’s clearly established due process 

rights. There, the plaintiffs, Whitlock and 

Steidl, alleged that police officers and prosecutors used fabricated evidence, such as 

pressuring witnesses to concoct stories of 

having witnessed the crime, to convict the 

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two of a high-profile double homicide. 

Whitlock and Steidl spent the next seventeen and twenty-one years in prison, respectively . . . . In both [Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 

F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000), a case highlighted 

by Alexander] and Whitlock, the alleged liberty deprivation came not from the initial 

arrest, but from the time spent in confinement after arrest—the eight months Zahrey 

spent in jail after having his bail revoked 

and the numerous years Whitlock and 

Steidl spent in prison after being wrongfully convicted. Zahrey and Whitlock are inapposite because the only liberty deprivation 

Alexander alleges stems from his initial arrest—he was released on bond that same 

day. 

Id. at 557 (citations omitted). We added: “Nor does the 

burden of appearing in court and attending trial, in and 

of itself, constitute a deprivation of liberty. It would be 

anomalous to hold that attending a trial deprives a criminal defendant of liberty without due process of law, 

when the purpose of the trial is to effectuate due process.” 

Id. at 557 n.2 (citations omitted). 

Saunders-El, released on bond following his arrest 

and acquitted at trial, falls squarely within our holding in 

Alexander, and, accordingly, cannot make out an evidence 

fabrication–based due process violation. He may have an 

Illinois state law malicious prosecution claim, the elements of which are: (1) the defendants commenced judicial proceedings, (2) for which there was no probable 

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cause, (3) the proceeding were instituted or continued 

maliciously, (4) the proceedings were terminated in the 

plaintiff’s favor, and (5) the plaintiff sustained an injury. 

Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1998). But, 

as outlined above, that claim must be brought in state 

court. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750. 

At oral argument, counsel for Saunders-El clarified 

that—despite the opaque presentation of the issue in his 

briefing and the district court’s contrary interpretation of 

the complaint—Saunders-El’s due process claim is dualpronged: he alleges both that the fabrication of evidence 

violated his constitutional rights and, separately, that the 

police officers’ failure to admit their misdeeds to the 

prosecution amounts to a withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963). A criminal defendant’s Brady right is one that “the 

Constitution provides as part of its basic ‘fair trial’ guarantee.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 626 (2002). “A 

Brady violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused.” Mosley v. City of Chicago, 614 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 2010). The 

Supreme Court has said that to demonstrate a Brady

claim, a plaintiff must make a “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 

case in such a different light as to undermine confidence 

in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); 

see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999). For that 

reason, at least the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 

Circuits have held that a trial that results in an acquittal 

can never produce a valid Brady claim. See Mosley, 614 

F.3d at 397 (collecting cases); Poventud v. City of New York, 

750 F.3d 121, 156 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). We have yet to 

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definitively decide that issue in this circuit (see Mosley, 

614 F.3d at 397–98; Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 

644–45 (7th Cir. 2008)), although we have expressed our 

doubt “that an acquitted defendant can ever establish the 

requisite prejudice for a Brady violation.” Carvajal v. 

Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290). We need not address that issue today, 

however, because our case law forecloses Saunders-El’s 

theory of Brady. 

Saunders-El’s Brady claim is premised on the police 

officers’ silence following their alleged fabrication of the 

evidence—the absence of which would have altered the 

prosecutor’s decision to go to trial at all, Saunders-El 

suggests. We have dealt on several occasions with similar 

Brady claims concerning accusations of police dishonesty. 

In Gauger v. Hendle, for instance, we rejected the plaintiff’s 

argument that Brady requires police to disclose truthful 

versions of statements made during interrogations, finding “the proposed extension of Brady . . . difficult even to 

understand,” since “[i]t implies that the state has a duty 

not merely to disclose but also to create truthful exculpatory evidence.” 349 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled 

in part on other grounds by Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 

F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2006). Later, in Sornberger v. City of 

Knoxville, we determined that Brady cannot “serve as the 

basis of a cause of action against [police] officers for failing to disclose [the circumstances surrounding a coerced 

confession] to [a] prosecutor . . . .” 434 F.3d 1006, 1029 

(7th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). As we said, “[t]he Constitution does not require 

that police testify truthfully; rather ‘the constitutional rule 

is that the defendant is entitled to a trial that will enable 

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jurors to determine where the truth lies.’” Id. (quoting 

Buie v. McAdory, 341 F.3d 623, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

Consequently, in Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th 

Cir. 2007), we upheld the dismissal of a Brady claim 

premised on an argument “that an officer is ‘suppressing’ 

evidence of the truth by making [a] false statement” to a 

prosecutor,” noting that “[t]his court has already foreclosed this extension” of Brady. In the end, Saunders-El 

seeks to charge the officers with a Brady violation for 

keeping quiet about their wrongdoing, not for failing to 

disclose any existing piece of evidence to the prosecution. 

But our case law makes clear that Brady does not require 

the creation of exculpatory evidence, nor does it compel 

police officers to accurately disclose the circumstances of 

their investigations to the prosecution. Accordingly, 

Saunders-El’s Brady claim is more appropriately characterized as a claim for malicious prosecution—that is, a 

claim that the officers commenced his prosecution without probable cause—which cannot form the basis of a 

constitutional tort. 

In any event, it would be entirely incongruous for us 

to endorse Saunders-El’s Brady theory, in light of our 

holding in Alexander. Since, as Alexander holds, a police 

officer does not violate an acquitted defendant’s due process rights when he fabricates evidence, it would defy 

any semblance of logic to conclude that the same officer 

subsequently violates the defendant’s constitutional 

rights simply by remaining silent about that fabrication 

(and thus, without taking any additional affirmative action). In essence, Saunders-El’s so-called Brady claim is 

simply a recast of his evidence fabrication claim, and our 

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precedent establishes that such a claim is not cognizable 

on account of his acquittal. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of 

the district court, although on grounds different from 

those relied on below. 

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