Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00137/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JAMES ABENGOWE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MCM SERVICES, INC., and MARK 

MCINTOSH,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-00137-MHH

MEMORANDUM ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff James Abengowe filed a lawsuit against defendants MCM Services, 

Inc. and Mark McIntosh for racial harassment under section 1981 and for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) under Alabama law.1 The 

defendants in this case have filed a partial motion to dismiss Mr. Abengowe’s 

outrage claim, arguing that Mr. Abengowe’s complaint is insufficient as a matter 

of Alabama law to support a claim for outrage. (Doc. 3).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain, “a short and plain 

 

1

In Alabama, intentional infliction of emotional distress is generally referred to as the tort of 

outrage. See Ex Parte Crawford & Co., 693 So. 2d 458, 460 (Ala. 1997).

FILED

 2016 Apr-22 AM 10:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 1 of 10
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). “Generally, to survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss and meet the 

requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain ‘detailed 

factual allegations,’ but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Maledy v. City of Enterprise, 2012 WL 1028176, at *1 

(M.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 

570 (2007)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations in 

a complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l 

Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). A court must accept well-pled facts 

as true. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Abengowe has been an employee at defendant MCM 

Services, Inc. since July 2015. (Doc. 1, ¶ 9). MCM is a mechanical contractor that 

engages in HVAC services. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). Defendant Mark McIntosh owns 

MCM and is Mr. Abengowe’s direct supervisor. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11).

Mr. Abengowe alleges that Mr. McIntosh has subjected Mr. Abengowe to 

racial harassment and a racially hostile work environment throughout Mr. 

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 2 of 10
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Abengowe’s employment with MCM. (Doc. 1, ¶ 12). The racial harassment and 

discrimination includes racial slurs, racially derogatory comments, and disparate 

treatment on the basis of race. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). The racially harassing slurs and 

“conduct by the owner and supervisors,” includes the repeated and routine use of 

the words “nigger” and “coon.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). Mr. McIntosh allegedly made the 

following remarks and comments: 

“[T]he best place for niggers is in the bottom of a hole.”

“Fuck that stupid nigger. Let him fry. We will get us another coon 

tomorrow.”

“[T]hat stupid nigger not worth nothing anyway. Nobody will miss 

him.”

Mr. McIntosh told Mr. Abengowe that he was “just a nigger with a 

broom.”

Mr. McIntosh repeatedly used the phrase “nigger please.”

Mr. McIntosh repeatedly told Mr. Abengowe that he was “going to 

fire your nigger ass.”

Mr. McIntosh has asked, “[D]o you need more niggers or wetbacks to 

finish the job?”

Mr. McIntosh has told Mr. Abengowe, “I knew you were a stupid ass 

nigger.”

Mr. McIntosh repeatedly refers to Mr. Abengowe as “nigger James.”

Mr. McIntosh has stated, “[N]igger James’ [sic] stupid ass can’t go. 

Send nigger James back. A nigger sitting around looking stupid will 

fuck the money up. You don’t need him. Send nigger James back 

home.”

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 3 of 10
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(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17-20, 24, 29, 34, 36, 37).

Mr. Abengowe also alleges that Mr. McIntosh made numerous other racially 

derogatory comments around and towards Mr. Abengowe. This conduct has 

occurred throughout Mr. Abengowe’s employment and continues to occur. (Doc. 

1, ¶ 39). MCM has had actual and constructive knowledge of the harassment and 

has failed to take prompt and effective remedial action to cure the harassment. 

(Doc. 1, ¶ 42). MCM did not provide Mr. Abengowe with any policy prohibiting 

discrimination or establishing a complaint procedure for harassment. (Doc. 1, ¶

43).

Based on the above conduct, Mr. Abengowe filed this federal lawsuit against 

MCM and Mr. McIntosh, asserting claims for racial harassment under 42 U.S.C. §

1981 and for outrage under Alabama law.

The defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss Mr. Abengowe’s 

outrage claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 3). The 

defendants concede that Mr. Abengowe states a claim for racial harassment under 

section 1981; however, the defendants argue that because mere words do not give 

rise to a claim of outrage under Alabama law, the Court should dismiss Mr. 

Abengowe’s outrage claim. Mr. Abengowe argues that Alabama law does not 

preclude an outrage claim under the facts in this case and that the Court should 

deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the defendants’ conduct was so 

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 4 of 10
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outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible 

bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 

civilized society. (Doc. 5). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the 

Court’s consideration.

III. DISCUSSION

The tort of outrage requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s 

conduct “‘(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) 

caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to 

endure it.’” Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172 (Ala. 2011) (citing Am. Rd. 

Svc. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980)). “[O]utrage is a very limited cause 

of action that is available only in the most egregious circumstances.” Thomas v. 

BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 1993). As to the second 

element of outrage—which is the only element that the defendants contest—an 

outrage claim is appropriate only when the conduct alleged is so “outrageous in 

character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 

and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” 

Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Inmon, 394 at

365). 

The defendants cite to Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462 (Ala. 2000), in which 

the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it has recognized the tort of outrage “in 

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regard to only three kinds of conduct: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial 

context, Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1987); (2) barbaric methods 

employed to coerce an insurance settlement, National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. 

Bowen, 447 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1983); and (3) egregious sexual harassment, Busby v. 

Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989).”2 Potts, 771 So. 2d at 465. The 

defendants argue that because racial harassment is not among the categories that 

the Alabama Supreme Court has recognized in the outrage context, Mr. 

 

2

The Busby court held that the following conduct—which relates to the defendant’s behavior 

toward four different female employees—was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support an 

outrage claim:

[The defendant]: (1) invited Busby and Money to swim in his pool in the nude 

with him; (2) told Busby that his hands were cold and asked if he could put them 

in her pockets to keep them warm; (3) told the plaintiffs that he would “put a stick 

on their machines” so they could masturbate while working; (4) said that he could 

perform intercourse as fast as one of the machines at the plant could operate; (5) 

said that he wished that the plaintiffs would come to work braless and wear less 

clothing; (6) told one of the plaintiffs that if she had not stayed up all night having 

sex she could do her work properly; (7) told one employee that if she would give 

him 30 minutes with her that he would fill her pants in nine months for her; (8) 

acted as if he was going to pinch one plaintiff’s breasts with a pair of pliers and 

with his hands; (9) said that he should send one of the plaintiffs across the street 

to where a group of men were standing because she stayed sexually aroused all of 

the time; (10) told one of the plaintiffs that he was very tired and asked her if she 

would accompany him to the restroom and hold his penis while he urinated; (11) 

told one of the plaintiffs that her nipples were as large as another employee’s 

entire breasts; (12) attempted to follow one of the plaintiffs into the restroom and 

when she asked him where he was going, said that he was going to help her; (13) 

followed one of the plaintiffs one night; (14) said that a table in his office had 

been damaged when one of the plaintiffs and a male co-employee had sex on top 

of it; (15) openly stared at the plaintiffs’ sexual anatomy; (16) put his arm around 

the plaintiffs, grabbed their arms, and stroked their necks; and (17) made other 

lewd remarks and gestures to the plaintiffs.

Busby, 551 So. 2d at 324. The Alabama Supreme Court made its finding in Busby on a review of 

the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Id.

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 6 of 10
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Abengowe’s outrage claim fails as a matter of law. Mr. Abengowe correctly points 

out, however, that the Potts categories of outrage are not exhaustive and that “the 

success of each case will depend on the extreme and severe nature of the conduct 

found in each case.” (Doc. 5, p. 2). On this point, in Little v. Robinson, the 

Alabama Supreme Court qualified Potts by stating the following:

That is not to say, however, that the tort of outrage is viable in only 

the three circumstances noted in Potts. Recently, this Court affirmed a 

judgment on a tort-of-outrage claim asserted against a family 

physician who, when asked by a teenage boy’s mother to counsel the 

boy concerning his stress over his parents’ divorce, instead began 

exchanging addictive prescription drugs for homosexual sex for a 

number of years, resulting in the boy’s drug addiction. See O’Rear v. 

B.H., 69 So. 3d 106 (Ala. 2011). It is clear, however, that the tort of 

outrage is viable only when the conduct is “‘so outrageous in 

character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible 

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly 

intolerable in a civilized society.’” Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56 

So. 3d 615, 631 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Inmon, 394 So. 2d at 365).

Little, 72 So. 3d at 1172-73. Thus, the relevant question is not whether the alleged 

conduct falls within one of the Potts categories, but whether the alleged conduct is 

“so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible 

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 

civilized society.”

“Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and 

egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a 

question of law.” McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., No. 14-13404, 

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 7 of 10
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2016 WL 1105394, at *11 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2016). The defendants argue that 

even if racial harassment were an actionable vehicle for this tort, mere words, no 

matter how crude, do not give rise to a cause of action for outrage. A survey of the 

relevant case law indicates that the defendants’ proposition is too broad. Namely, 

the fact that alleged conduct contains only words does not necessarily preclude a 

claim for outrage. A more appropriate characterization of the defendants’ 

proposition is that “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 

oppressions, or other trivialities” are insufficient to create liability for outrage. 

Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So. 2d 1097, 1105-06 (Ala. 1986) (citing Restatement 

(Second) of Torts, § 46, Comment (d) (1965)).

The Court finds that the allegations in Mr. Abengowe’s complaint are 

sufficient to state a claim for outrage under Alabama law. The language that Mr. 

Abengowe describes in his complaint is deeply offensive. Mr. Abengowe alleges 

that Mr. McIntosh frequently used the words “nigger” and “coon” in a vile and 

disparaging manner and that Mr. McIntosh directed the words towards Mr. 

Abengowe, his subordinate employee. Mr. Abengowe asserts that these verbal 

assaults have occurred for at least seven months and are ongoing. A jury 

reasonably could conclude that the conduct, if proven, goes beyond all bounds of 

decency and may be fairly regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 

civilized society. There is no meaningful distinction between the conduct alleged 

Case 5:16-cv-00137-MHH Document 12 Filed 04/22/16 Page 8 of 10
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in the complaint and egregious sexual harassment, a mode of conduct that often 

involves derogatory language and is designed to disparage and belittle the target of 

the speaker’s remarks. See, e.g., Livingston v. Marion Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. 

Supp. 3d 1285, 1324 (N.D. Ala. 2014); see also Jones v. Kent Sales & Serv. Corp., 

2012 WL 4226125 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 2012); Allen v. Cypress Village, LTD, 2011 

WL 2559614, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2011).

3

The defendants argue that because Mr. Abengowe’s outrage claim presents a 

novel issue of state law, the Court should exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(1) in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Abengowe’s 

outrage claim. The Court declines the invitation. As the Busby, Livingston, and 

Jones decisions indicate, there is nothing particularly novel about Mr. Abengowe’s 

outrage theory. 

 

3

Like the defendants in Allen, the defendants in this case rely on a case that was decided at the 

summary judgment stage, Burden v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local No. 1410, 510 F. Supp. 

2d 618 (S.D. Ala. 2007). The defendants’ conduct in Burden is distinguishable from Mr. 

McIntosh’s conduct. The evidence supporting the plaintiff’s outrage claims in Burden was as 

follows. On one occasion, one defendant picked up the plaintiff, firmly pressed his body against 

hers, and made a sexual statement. A different defendant twice told the plaintiff that “he heard 

that she had a million dollar fuck;” “made a statement about twenty dollar women;” and “said a 

man could give her twenty dollars for sexual privileges.” Id. at 626. The court in Burden 

viewed each defendant’s conduct separately and determined that the defendants’ respective 

conduct was insufficient to support an outrage claim against either defendant. The conduct in 

Burden was limited to one incident with respect to the first defendant and four incidents with 

respect to the second defendant. Mr. McIntosh, on the other hand, is alleged to have made many 

more offending statements (according to Mr. Abengowe’s complaint, Mr. McIntosh has used the 

word “nigger” more than 25 times and has done so frequently throughout Mr. Abengowe’s 

employment at MCM). 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the allegations in the complaint, which the Court views in the light 

most favorable to Mr. Abengowe on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court 

is satisfied that Mr. Abengowe has adequately alleged conduct that forms the basis 

for a colorable outrage claim under Alabama law. Therefore, the Court denies the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss.

DONE and ORDERED this April 22, 2016.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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