Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01956/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01956-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLATWORLD INTERACTIVES LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-01956-WHO 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

INTRODUCTION

FlatWorld Interactives LLC (“FlatWorld”) brings this patent infringement suit against 

Apple Inc. (“Apple”), alleging that Apple infringed one of its patents, United States Patent No. 

RE43,318E (“the ‘318 Patent”). The ‘318 Patent is a reissue of United States Patent No. 

6,920,619. Br. (Dkt. No. 168) 4. FlatWorld claims that popular products produced by Apple—

such as the iPhone, iPod, iPad, and other electronic devices—use technology covered by the ‘318 

Patent. In particular, the patent allegedly relates to the touch-based, user-interface technology 

present in those devices.

On October 28, 2013, the Court held a claim construction hearing on the construction of 

disputed terms. Based on the parties’ briefs and other papers filed in the claim construction 

proceeding, and the argument of counsel, the Court construes the disputed terms as below.

LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 

U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1582. In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court begins with the 

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intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent specification, and, if in 

evidence, the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 

see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “A claim term used in multiple claims should be construed 

consistently . . . .” Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 

1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

“The appropriate starting point [ ] is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” 

Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he ordinary 

and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date 

of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “There are only two exceptions to this 

general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when 

the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

“The patentee’s lexicography must, of course, appear with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and 

precision before it can affect the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 

1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of 

claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay 

judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely 

accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.

“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not 

only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of 

the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “Claims speak to those 

skilled in the art,” but “[w]hen the meaning of words in a claim is in dispute, the specification and 

prosecution history can provide relevant information about the scope and meaning of the claim.” 

Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). “[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. 

Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1582. “However, claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only 

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in the specification.” Id. “Thus, although the specifications may well indicate that certain 

embodiments are preferred, particular embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read 

into the claims when the claim language is broader than such embodiments.” Id. “[T]he 

description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms 

used in the claims,” and the “patentee is free to be his own lexicographer,” but “any special 

definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 

989-90. 

On the other hand, it is a fundamental rule that “claims must be construed so as to be 

consistent with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. “The construction that stays true to 

the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, 

in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250.

Finally, the Court may consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence. 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history may “inform the meaning of the claim 

language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor 

limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would 

otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83); see also Chimie 

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the 

prosecution history in construing a claim is to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed 

during prosecution.”) (internal quotations omitted).

In most situations, analysis of this intrinsic evidence alone will resolve claim construction

disputes. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. However, “it is entirely appropriate . . . for a court to consult 

trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent 

file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in 

the pertinent technical field.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 

(Fed. Cir. 1999). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and 

prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. All extrinsic evidence should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic 

evidence, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319, and courts should not rely on extrinsic evidence in claim 

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construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from examination of the claims, the 

written description, and the prosecution history, Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citing Vitronics, 

90 F.3d at 1583). While extrinsic evidence may guide the meaning of a claim term, such evidence 

is less reliable than intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19.

DISCUSSION

I. Term 1: “image”

This language is found in Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, and 20.

FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

A displayed or drawn representation on the 

screen, capable of being manipulated as a unit 

by dragging or removal.

The object that is manipulated in response to 

touch or location inputs.

At the claim construction hearing, Apple stated that it does not oppose replacing “object”

with a “displayed or drawn representation”—language from FlatWorld’s construction. Dkt. No. 

246 (“Tr.”) 16:22-24; 18:12-14. The Court adopts Apple’s construction, as modified.

Accordingly, the Court construes “image” as follows: “a displayed or drawn representation that is 

manipulated in response to touch or location inputs.” 

The Court agrees with Apple that the displayed or drawn representation is one “that is 

manipulated in response to touch or location inputs.” This construction is consistent with the plain 

language of the claims. As Claim 1 states, the invention is “[a] system for manipulating images 

comprising a screen upon which an image is displayed; and a computer coupled to the screen . . . 

causing the images to be manipulated in response to location inputs from a pointing device.” ‘318 

Patent 15:1-6 (emphasis added). The remaining relevant claims (except for Claim 2) then 

specifically discuss a system in which the pointing device is a touch panel. Thus, an “image” is 

properly understood as a representation “that is manipulated in response to touch or location 

inputs.”

Contrary to FlatWorld’s construction, the plain language of the claims do not support 

including the modifier “as a unit.” As FlatWorld concedes, that phrase appears nowhere in the 

patent. Tr. 20:15-17. Instead, FlatWorld supports including “as a unit” based on the preferred 

embodiment. FlatWorld argues that the preferred embodiment’s source code indicates that an

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image is moved on and removed from the screen as a unit when the system detects a velocity 

exceeding a threshold. Br. 9. Because the code refers to “the target” that is moved around, the 

“target” must be a single unit. Br. 10. FlatWorld states, “In the preferred embodiment, the image 

cannot be partially removed from the screen . . . the [ ]image must be dragged and thrown as a 

unit.” Br. 10 (original emphasis). Relying on the preferred embodiment to limit the claims, 

however, violates the well-established prohibition against doing so. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582

(“[A]lthough the specifications may well indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, 

particular embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read into the claims when the 

claim language is broader than such embodiments.”). For that reason, FlatWorld’s construction is 

incorrect.1

FlatWorld also argues that the manipulations are limited to “dragging and removal” based 

on the claims. As discussed above, however, Claim 1 discloses that the images are “manipulated 

in response to location inputs.” Claim 1 continues on to disclose that the images may be dragged 

and removed, but that does not mean that the “manipulat[ions] in response to location inputs” 

must be limited to dragging and removal because the reference to dragging and removal appears to 

be confined to a particular kind of manipulation in response to location inputs. ‘318 Patent 15:8-

11. FlatWorld’s construction improperly imposes a narrower limitation onto a broader claim.

II. Term 2: “threshold velocity” 

Term 3: “velocity . . . threshold”2

“Threshold velocity” is found in Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 18, and 19. “Velocity . . . threshold” 

is found in Claims 15 and 20. 

FlatWorld’s Constructions Apple’s Constructions

Velocity: The speed of at least one directional 

component of motion.

Threshold velocity: A velocity that, if 

exceeded, is a necessary condition to change 

Velocity: Velocity or, in the alternative, speed.

Threshold velocity: A level or value of 

velocity sufficient to cause the dragged/moved 

 

1

The Court does not think that a juror would be confused about whether or not a representation is 

manipulated “as a whole,” as FlatWorld’s concern seems to be. See, e.g., Tr. 20:18-20.

2

The parties agree that these are two separate terms, but are grouping them together for 

convenience. 

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the semantics of a dragging gesture. image to be removed from the display.

The Court adopts Apple’s constructions for “velocity” and “threshold velocity.” 

A. “velocity”

The Court adopts Apple’s construction because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word 

“velocity” would be apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art, and Apple’s construction 

would not confuse members of the jury. The construction is supported by the patent’s language 

because the patent uses the words “velocity” and “speed” interchangeably, and Apple’s addition of 

“or, in the alternative, speed” does no violence to the term. See, e.g., ‘318 Patent at Abstract, 2:30, 

6:58, 14:41. Indeed, FlatWorld’s construction references “speed” as well.

FlatWorld’s construction states that velocity must have “at least one directional component 

of motion.” While Apple conceded at the claim construction hearing that velocity has a 

directional element, it correctly noted that the claims are silent about “components” of directions. 

Tr. 30:7-15. To the extent that motion can be broken down into components, as FlatWorld argues 

the patent does, Apple also correctly notes that “the claimed threshold is applied to the velocity as 

a whole, rather than to just [‘at least one directional’] component of it.” Response (Dkt. No. 184)

11.

FlatWorld argues that the source code in the preferred embodiment as shown in Figures 12, 

13, and 15 “indicates separate consideration of thresholds regarding the speed of horizontal and 

vertical components of motion.” Br. 12. It points out that the “throw” algorithms contain 

directional components, e.g., “Left” and “Down.” FlatWorld asserts that while Apple cites to ‘318 

Patent 12:18-20 to show that velocity supposedly only references the absolute position change in 

position over time, the next sentence discusses “directional component[s]” in the cardinal 

directions. Reply (Dkt. No. 189) 7. 

Assuming FlatWorld’s description of the preferred embodiment is correct, FlatWorld’s 

argument remains unpersuasive. FlatWorld again seeks to import a limitation from the preferred 

embodiment into the claims, which the Federal Circuit has prohibited. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 

FlatWorld’s reliance on the disclosed figures in this regard is unwarranted, and FlatWorld’s brief

cites to no other intrinsic evidence to support its argument.

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FlatWorld says that it takes the definition of “velocity” from Apple’s operating system’s 

dictionary, which defines velocity as “the speed of something in a given direction,” and argues 

that because nothing in the patent or its file history limits directions or components, “FlatWorld 

has construed this term to take this into account.” Br. 12 (quoting Meyer Br. Decl. Ex. 9). The 

Court concludes that there is no need to rely on extrinsic evidence here.

B. “threshold velocity”

The parties disagree whether exceeding the threshold velocity is a necessary, as opposed to 

a sufficient, condition for “throwing” or removal to occur. The Court adopts Apple’s construction

and finds that exceeding the threshold velocity is sufficient to cause an image to be removed. 

There is no indication in the claims that anything additional is necessary for an image to be 

removed—indeed, the term “threshold” strongly suggests that it constitutes a sufficient condition, 

if not demands such an understanding. More importantly, as Claim 1 states, “when the image is 

being dragged . . . and the system detects that the velocity . . . exceeds a threshold velocity, the 

system responds by removing the image.” ‘318 Patent 15:8-11. The claims do not disclose any 

other requirement for the system to “respond by removing the image” other than for the velocity to 

exceed the velocity threshold. FlatWorld’s counsel concedes as much. Tr. 25:25-26:1.

Similarly, the specification does not contain any indication that exceeding the threshold 

velocity is insufficient to remove an image. For example, the Abstract states that one possible 

manipulation of the system is “removing an image from the screen by ‘throwing’ it, i.e., moving it 

above a threshold speed.” ‘318 Patent at Abstract. The “i.e.” shows that the inventor equates 

exceeding the speed (or velocity) threshold with removal. Thus, exceeding the velocity threshold 

is sufficient for removal. Similarly, the Summary of the Invention states, “If the image is dragged 

at a speed above a threshold velocity, the image is ‘thrown away from’ the display . . . .” ‘318 

Patent 2:29-31 (emphasis added). In addition, the preferred embodiment states, “In this 

embodiment, the velocity threshold is a distance of 2 . . . . If the distance between the variables is 

greater than that, a throw has occurred.” ‘318 Patent at 12:16-20. The language in the two 

preceding excerpts forms an if-then relationship, which is a sufficient condition. Finally, the 

Conclusion of the specification states that the system allows for “moving [an] object at a speed 

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faster than a threshold velocity to get rid of it”—there is no evidence that any condition other than 

moving faster than the threshold velocity is required. ‘318 Patent 14:41-42 (emphasis added). 

FlatWorld argues that “[t]he claims are all open-ended ‘comprising’ claims,” so the recited 

elements, such as exceeding a threshold velocity, “do not exclude embodiments having additional 

elements.” Br. 16 (citing Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 

Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed.

Cir. 2001)). “Thus, the claims’ recital of a threshold velocity for removing an image cannot be 

read to exclude other factors from the algorithm for image removal." Br. 16. It cites Gillete Co. v. 

Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005), as stating, “The word 

‘comprising’ transitioning from the preamble to the body signals that the entire claim is 

presumptively open-ended.” Br. 12. It also cites Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech 

Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001), as supporting the same 

proposition and stating that “[t]he transition ‘comprising’ creates a presumption that the recited 

elements are only a part of the device, that the claim does not exclude additional, unrecited 

elements.” Reply 5 (citing Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1347). Accordingly, FlatWorld 

claims that the threshold velocity is a “necessary condition,” but not a sufficient one (though it 

could be), for throwing or removing an image from the screen. Br. 12. 

While FlatWorld correctly states what these cases hold, the principle they establish does 

not support FlatWorld’s argument. As FlatWorld points out, the term “‘comprising’ creates a 

presumption that the recited elements are only a part of the device, that the claim does not exclude 

additional, unrecited elements.” Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1347. However, Apple’s 

construction merely says that exceeding the threshold velocity is itself sufficient for an image to 

be removed—it does not say that the device may not contain other “unrecited elements.” While 

other elements may later be added, that does not mean that what the patent already discloses 

cannot or should not perform the function it contemplates. 

FlatWorld’s argument makes an unwarranted leap of logic from the proposition that the 

recited elements are not exclusive to the conclusion that they are insufficient for some previously 

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disclosed result to take place. As the Federal Circuit stated, “The presumption raised by the term 

‘comprising’ does not reach into [the] steps to render every word and phrase therein open-ended . . 

. .” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron 

Corp.—a case FlatWorld cites in support of its argument—states, “‘Comprising’ is a term of art 

used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential,” 112 F.3d. 496, 501 

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added), but FlatWorld has cited no case to suggest that named 

elements cannot be construed to be sufficient.

FlatWorld argues that the prosecution history supports its construction. It quotes the 

prosecution history as stating, “The ‘throwing’ operation . . . is a modification of the dragging 

operation . . . that takes the speed as well as the direction of the dragging into account. The 

particular semantic of the operation is that when the speed is above a threshold velocity, the image 

being dragged is removed from the display.” Br. 13 (quoting Meyer Br. Decl. Ex. 8 at 

FWAPP1023 (FlatWorld’s emphasis)). While dragging images on a screen was known at the time 

of the invention, the patent introduces “a threshold velocity, above which the semantic of the 

operation changes from a drag to a ‘throw,’ and removes the image from the display.” Br. 13. For 

these reasons, FlatWorld argues, threshold velocity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 

throwing. Br. 13.

FlatWorld’s conclusion does not follow from the prosecution evidence it cites. All that the 

prosecution history reveals is that the inventor allegedly introduced the concept of a threshold 

velocity; there is nothing to suggest that there was more that the inventor thought was needed for 

an image to be removed. Indeed, as the passage quoted by FlatWorld states, “The particular 

semantic of the operation is that when the speed is above a threshold velocity, the image being 

dragged is removed from the display.” Meyer Br. Decl. Ex. 8 at FWAPP1023 (emphasis added). 

Specifically, when the threshold velocity is exceeded, the image is dragged—not “may be

dragged” or “can be dragged.” Had those other phrases been used instead, then FlatWorld might 

be right, but the prosecution history does not say that.3

 

3

In rebutting FlatWorld’s reliance on Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 

1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013), to support its argument based on prosecution history, Apple misleadingly

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FlatWorld argues that “Apple’s construction would improperly exclude the preferred 

embodiment.” Br. 14. FlatWorld argues that the preferred embodiment’s code discloses that the 

preferred embodiment “must first detect that the user’s touch has ended, then [it] process[es] both

velocity and direction before an image can be removed from the screen, in language any nonprogrammer can understand.” Br. 14 (original emphasis). The dragging portion of the source 

code allegedly allows for an image to be dragged across the screen as long as the touch has not 

ended—it does not determine whether a throw has occurred until it detects that the user is no 

longer touching the screen. Br. 14-15. So long as the touch remains on the screen, an image will 

never be thrown no matter how fast it is dragged. Br. 15. “[C]onsequently, there is no instance in 

which exceeding the threshold velocity is sufficient to remove an image.” Br. 16 (original 

emphasis).

FlatWorld correctly says that any construction of the claims in a patent should not exclude 

a preferred embodiment. Br. 16. However, FlatWorld has not adequately explained why Apple’s 

construction would exclude the preferred embodiment. As discussed above, the preferred 

embodiment states that if a change in a stored position exceeds the velocity threshold, “a throw 

has occurred.” ‘318 Patent 12:9-20. The preferred embodiment’s description supports the 

conclusion that a velocity threshold is a sufficient condition for throwing to occur. Even if the 

code disclosed in the preferred embodiment is incompatible with this construction, the Court 

cannot impose a limitation from the preferred embodiment onto clear claim language.

Although the parties cite to extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries and inventor testimony, 

because the Court finds the intrinsic evidence sufficient, it need not address the parties’ arguments 

based on extrinsic evidence. 

 

quotes from that case to attempt to undermine FlatWorld, stating, “Rather, the Federal Circuit in 

Accent Packaging specifically noted that the ‘prosecution history . . . impart[s] no special meaning 

to the phrases’ at issue.” Response 13-14 (quoting Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1325 (original 

brackets and ellipses)). While Accent Packaging literally contains the words quoted by Apple, the 

Federal Circuit was merely repeating the arguments of one of the parties. Indeed, the court was 

repeating the arguments of the party against which it ruled, yet Apple quoted that statement as if it 

were a controlling principle of law. 

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III. Term 4: “representative thereof” and “representative of the removed image”

“Representative thereof” is found in Claims 1 and 7. “Representative of the removed 

image” is found in Claim 15.

FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

A depiction of at least a portion of the removed 

image.

A portrayal or symbol [thereof/of the removed 

image].

The Court adopts FlatWorld’s construction. Looking to the claim language, a person of 

ordinary skill in the art would understand that “representative,” read in context, refers to a portion 

of a particular image that is being removed rather than a “portrayal or symbol” of the removed 

image that may not bear any visual similarity to the removed image, which Apple’s counsel 

conceded its construction allows. Tr. 36:11-22. Claim 1 contemplates that “when the image is 

being dragged . . . [and] exceeds a threshold 10 velocity, the system responds by removing the 

image from the display without leaving any representative thereof in the display.” Claim 2 then 

states that “the removed image is automatically replaced by another image.” Claim 7’s language 

is similar to Claim 1. Claim 8 is identical to Claim 2 except that it references Claim 7. Claim 15 

states that the system responds to a removed image “by replacing the image with a replacement 

image that is not a representative of the removed image.” 

Because the main occurrence disclosed in the relevant claims is that the image is removed, 

the most natural understanding of the disputed terms is that no portion of the removed image 

remains—the removal occurs “without leaving any representative thereof.” As Apple’s counsel 

concedes, the patent’s language contains no support for including “a portrayal or symbol” in 

construing it. Tr. 34:5. Adopting Apple’s construction of “representative” does little to help 

understand the patent and appears to broaden the scope of the patent more than warranted. 

FlatWorld’s construction makes clear that a removed image means that the entire image is gone as 

opposed to having it partially visible on the screen.

Apple contends that the prosecution history supports its construction and specifically 

allows an image, “such as a line or dot,” to be a “representative.” Response 15. At oral argument, 

Apple’s counsel stated that “it’s pretty hard to see why you would limit the representation to a 

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literal representation.” Tr. 33:20-21. In particular, Apple cites to FlatWorld’s attempt to 

distinguish the ‘318 Patent from prior art—United States Patent 5,463,725 (“Henckel”)—

involving an electronic reader displayed as an image of an open-faced book. When a page is 

“turned,” the page that was turned appears as a line corresponding to the page’s edge in a book. 

Apple rejects FlatWorld’s arguments that those lines are “literal” depictions of a full page. 

Response 18. Rather, it says they are symbolic. This, Apple argues, is supported by the 

deposition testimony of the ‘318 Patent’s inventor. Response 18 (citing Pieja Response Ex. J at 

106:2-7).

The Court is persuaded that the claim language is itself sufficient to support FlatWorld’s 

construction.4 Prosecution history “often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less 

useful for claim construction purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Here, the prosecution history 

is ambiguous, and the parties appear to recognize this. Tr. 36:3-4; 40:5-7; 41:10-12. The 

evidence cited by Apple does not clearly support its argument that a “representative” can be “any

symbol that stands for” an image. Response 15 (emphasis added). The prosecution history 

emphasizes that the prior art’s displayed image is “similar to a printed book or magazine.” Pieja 

Response Decl. Ex. S at 7. In addition, the display on the electronic reader “emulates the behavior 

of a printed book.” Id. The prosecution history’s language suggests at the very least that a 

“representative” cannot merely be any “symbol” of the removed image. Rather, it must bear some 

connection with the removed image: this contradicts Apple’s assertions. 

Apple argues that extrinsic evidence from dictionaries supports its construction. Response 

16. Because the Court finds that FlatWorld’s construction is sufficiently supported by intrinsic 

evidence, there is no need to appeal to extrinsic evidence.

IV. Term 5: “image is being dragged” and “image was dragged”

“Image is being dragged” is found in Claim 1. “Image was dragged” is found in Claim 18.

 

4 As Apple’s counsel stated, “So the issue here really is just, what does the claim say?” Tr. 41:22-

23. 

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FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

The image is or was caused to move with the 

touched point, or to track location inputs.

The touched point is or was moved within a 

selected image, causing the image to move 

with the touched point.

Alternatively: The touched or selected point is 

or was moved within a selected image, causing 

the image to move with the point.5

The Court construes these terms as follows: “the touched or selected point within the 

selected image is or was moved in response to location inputs, causing the image to move with the 

point.”

Claim 1 discloses a computer that “caus[es] the images to be manipulated in response to 

location inputs from a pointing device” and that “the image is being dragged in response to the 

location inputs.” ‘318 Patent 15:4-9. This language shows that the image’s dragging occurs “in

response” to “location inputs,” suggesting a causal connection. Any construction must reflect the 

relationship between the dragging and the location inputs. Because the claims do not define 

“dragged,” it is appropriate to look to the specification to understand what the patent means by 

“dragged” because, as the Federal Circuit said, the specification “is the single best guide to the 

meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Consistent with the Court’s 

construction, the Summary of the Invention states that “moving the touched point within a selected 

image causes the image to move with the touched point, thus permitting the image to be dragged.” 

‘318 Patent 2:22-24. 

While the Court’s construction is closer to Apple’s alternative construction, both parties’ 

constructions contain shortcomings. FlatWorld’s construction allows the image to be caused to 

either “move with the touched point” or “to track location inputs.” But that severs the causal 

connection by stating that the image “is or was caused to move with” either the touched point or to 

“track” location inputs, but does not make clear that the image is being dragged directly “in 

response to the location inputs,” as Claim 1 states. In addition, the Court finds that the term 

“track,” which is not used anywhere in the patent, is vague and may confuse a juror. 

Apple concedes that its previous construction, which only referenced a “touched point,” 

 

5 Apple proposed this alternative in its Responsive Brief to resolve concerns FlatWorld raised.

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may be too narrow of a construction and proposed allowing for a “selected point” in addition to a 

“touched point.” Response 25. However, Apple’s construction fails to make clear that the 

dragging occurs “in response to the location inputs.” ‘318 Patent 15:8-9. The Court’s 

construction resolves the issues in both parties’ constructions.

FlatWorld argues that Apple’s construction should be rejected because “it impermissibly 

reads touch limitations from claims 5-7 and 15 into claims 1, 2 and 28.” Br. 20; see also Reply 

14. Because Claims 1, 2, and 18 do not mention a touch screen, they should be understood to 

reference systems with a touch screen and systems having conventional displays, e.g., those that 

use a mouse as a pointing device. Br. 20-21. On the other hand, Claims 5, 6, 7, and 15 explicitly 

use touch panels and are therefore limited to them. Br. 21. “Thus, the dragging of an image term 

recited in claims 1, 2 and 18 cannot be construed to require a ‘touched point,’ as Apple urges.” 

Br. 21. In addition, FlatWorld argues that Apple is inappropriately using the written description of 

“dragged” at 2:20-24 to limit the terms. Reply 14-15.

Apple argues that its proposed modification should resolve any objections FlatWorld may 

have. Response 25. The Court agrees and adopts Apple’s alternate construction to make clear that 

the claims should not be limited to only a touch screen where the patent does not so intend. 

However, as discussed above, referencing the specification to construe the term “dragged” is 

appropriate since the specification helps to show what the patentee meant by using that word.

V. Term 6: “a system for manipulating images”; “a system for manipulating a moveable 

image”; and “image to be manipulated in response to location inputs”

“A system for manipulating images” is found in Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 18. “A system for 

manipulating a moveable image” is found in Claims 7, 8, and 19. “Image to be manipulated in 

response to location inputs” is found in Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 18, and 19.

FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

Manipulating images includes any one or more 

of the following: selecting an image, dragging 

the selected image, dropping the image, 

moving a selected image, removing an image 

from the screen, or modifying the image.

A set of operations comprising at least 

selecting, moving, removing, and modifying.

The Court adopts Apple’s construction. The claims and specification reflect that the 

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invention must be able to do at least the four operations in Apple’s construction. Claim 1 

discloses that it is “a system for manipulating images,” and that the images may be “dragged” and 

“remov[ed] . . . from the display.” As previously discussed, for an image to be dragged, it must be 

selected and moved. Similarly, Claim 7 discloses that “the image to be manipulated” is 

manipulated by touch, and touching “selects the image for moving.” Further, the image can be 

“removed” if it is moved above a threshold velocity. 

While only Claims 11 and 12 discuss modification, the specification supports the 

conclusion that the invention must perform all four functions identified by Apple because nearly 

all mentions of “manipulations” in the specification detail all those functions. As the Federal 

Circuit noted, “claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1314; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (stating that the specification “is the single best 

guide to the meaning of a disputed term”). The Abstract of the patent states that it discloses “[a] 

digital system” for which “[a] child may manipulate [ ] images,” and the “[m]anipulations include 

selecting an image . . . moving a selected image . . . removing an image . . . and modifying the 

image.” The Summary of the Invention similarly states that the “system is based on manipulating 

an image,” and discloses that: “[i]f an image is movable, touching the . . . image selects the image 

for moving”; moving (or “dragging”) the image above a velocity threshold removes (or “throws”) 

the image; and “[i]f an image is tapped twice in short succession . . . the image is selected for 

modification.” ‘318 Patent 2:19-40. The Conclusion also provides that a “consequence” of the 

principles behind the patent “is a graphical user interface which permits [a] child to manipulate 

objects on the screen” by “touching an object to select it for moving . . . moving the object at a 

speed faster than a threshold velocity to get rid of it, and modifying the object by touching it twice 

and then moving the finger within the object to change its size.” ‘318 Patent 14:36-44. None of 

the examples speak of any particular operation in isolation, nor is there any evidence that the 

invention is sufficient if it only performs one operation.

FlatWorld argues that Apple unjustifiably “singles out” these four operations and that the 

manipulations recited in the patent are “non-exclusive.” Br. 22. However, FlatWorld provides no 

persuasive argument about why the manipulations listed should be non-exclusive or why a system 

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that only performs one form of manipulation is sufficient for the invention to be realized. 

FlatWorld is correct that the word “includes” may sometimes be followed by a non-exclusive list. 

But the terms here, read in context within the patent, do not support that understanding. For 

example, it makes no sense for the patent to cover a system that only allows for “selecting” an 

image and nothing more—such an understanding is contrary to the entire purpose of the patent and 

what it discloses. On the other hand, references to “manipulations” in the patent strongly indicate 

that the patentee intended the more comprehensive list of operations Apple proposes.

FlatWorld’s contorted attempt at parsing nouns and verbs in arguing that the mere fact that 

the patent discloses a system for “manipulating” images means that one method of “manipulation” 

is sufficient is belied by the specification. Reply 13. The same is true of FlatWorld’s argument 

that “[n]o one would think that a system that provides for only [three operations] is not a system 

for manipulating images, but that a system that provides for [four operations] is a system for 

manipulating images,” Reply 13—the issue is not simply what any person would “think,” but what 

the patent discloses. 

FlatWorld’s assertion that Claim 1 only recites two of the operations while Claim 7 only 

recites three, and thus “manipulating” cannot encompass the four operations identified in Apple’s 

construction is unpersuasive. The inventor is not required to reiterate the full scope of every word 

each time a word is used in separate claims. More importantly, FlatWorld attempts to import 

limitations from one clause in a claim into the remainder of the claim without justification, as it 

does with moving (“dragging”) and removing in the third clause of Claim 1 to modify 

“manipulating” in the first clause and “manipulated” in the second clause. Here, the specification 

strongly supports Apple’s understanding of the claim language.

VI. Term 7: “when the point being touched is being continually moved” 

Term 8: “responding to a continuing touch that moves the image”

“When the point being touched is being continually moved” is found in Claims 7, 8, and 

19.

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FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

Moving the touched point within a selected 

image causes the image to move with the 

touched point, thus permitting the image to be 

dragged.

When the point being touched is moving 

without interruption.

“Responding to a continuing touch that moves the image” is found in Claims 15 and 20.

FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

A touch that permits the image to be dragged. A touch [that moves the image] that remains in 

existence without interruption.

The Court adopts Apple’s constructions. This is a situation in which “the ordinary 

meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent 

even to lay judges, and claim construction in such [a] case[ would] involve[] little more than the 

application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 

at 1314. The Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “being 

continually moved” is the same as “moving without interruption” and “continuing touch” is the 

same as “a touch that remains in existence without interruption.” The plain meaning of “continue” 

is synonymous with “without interruption,” and there is nothing in the intrinsic evidence to 

suggest otherwise.

FlatWorld’s constructions must be rejected because there is nothing in either of its 

constructions that relates to the plain meaning of the words “continually” or “continuing,” nor has 

FlatWorld shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a different understanding. 

As the Federal Circuit has said, claim terms must be understood according to their “ordinary and 

customary meaning” unless the patentee acts as his own lexicographer or makes a disavowal 

during prosecution. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Neither happened here. The mere fact that an 

image might “move with” a touched point or “be dragged” does not suggest any relationship with 

the ordinary and customary meaning of “continue,” and FlatWorld provides no evidence that the 

inventor intended “continually” or “continuing” to be understood that way.

FlatWorld argues that the specification “discloses two ways to move an images on the 

screen”—dragging and a double touch. Br. 23. “The term ‘continuing’ is used in the claims to 

distinguish between these two” ways, and “FlatWorld’s proposed construction reflects this 

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rationale.” Br. 23. However, FlatWorld provides no support for its argument that the term 

“continuing” was intended to do what FlatWorld claims. Elsewhere in the patent, the inventor was 

able to make the distinction between the two ways to move an image, and FlatWorld provides no 

reason why the inventor did not do so here. The Court will not presume to connect concepts that 

the inventor did not connect himself.

FlatWorld argues that Apple’s construction “makes no sense” because “[a]ll touches on the 

invention’s touch screen must eventually be interrupted, in the sense that none are perpetual.” Br. 

23. FlatWorld points to the preferred embodiment’s source code as an example, which recites a 

repeated looping of a touch location’s logging until “the mouse is up,” i.e., the touch has ended, 

only after which the system “runs through a series of algorithms to identify whether a drag or a 

throw or some other gesture is intended.” Br. 23-24. Apple’s construction, it argues, would 

exclude the preferred embodiment “because the touch that is followed by gesture-recognition 

algorithms does not move or remain in existence ‘without interruption’” and must end before the 

algorithms are run. Br. 24. Apple’s construction “require[s] that determining whether the image 

will be removed from the screen must take place at the time that the touch is ‘continuing.’” Reply 

3.

FlatWorld’s argument is ultimately unpersuasive. The relevant claims appear to require 

the touch to be continuing when throwing or removing occurs even though the preferred 

embodiment appears to require the touch to end before running the algorithm to determine whether 

throwing has occurred. Compare Claims 7 and 15, with ‘318 Patent 11:64-66 and Figure 13.

While there may be some merit to FlatWorld’s argument that Apple’s construction, when read into 

the relevant claims, may exclude the preferred embodiment6—an issue the Court does not 

decide—the Court cannot ignore the plain language of the claims. As the Federal Circuit has 

stated, “we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single 

embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” 

 

6

Even Apple appears to allow the possibility that FlatWorld’s argument may be valid. Tr. 61-62. 

However, Apple also points out that Claim 1 does not have a “continually” or “continuing” 

limitation. Tr. 62:2-4. 

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Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The Court must be guided primarily by what the claims disclose and 

not a particularized set of source code in the one embodiment found in the patent. Because 

FlatWorld’s arguments in favor of its construction rely almost exclusively on the preferred 

embodiment, its construction cannot be credited in the face of the plain and ordinary meaning of 

the claim language.

VII. Term 9: “when”7

“When” is found in Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, and 20.

FlatWorld’s Construction Apple’s Construction

In view of the fact that. When the image is dragged faster than the 

threshold velocity, the semantics of the drag 

operation change: instead of simply moving 

faster, the image vanishes.

Alternatively: At the time that.8

Reading the disputed term “when” in the context of the claim language, the Court is 

persuaded that Apple’s alternative construction that “when” means “at the time that” most 

accurately captures what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term to mean. 

Claim 1 discloses that “when the image is being dragged in response to the location inputs and the 

system detects that the velocity with which the image is being dragged exceeds a threshold 

velocity, the system responds by removing the image.” Claim 7 discloses that “when the point 

being touched is being continually moved and the system detects that the velocity at which the 

point is moving exceeds a predetermined threshold velocity, the image being continually moved is 

removed.” Claim 15 discloses that “when the computer detects that the velocity of the touch 

exceeds a predetermined threshold, the computer responds by removing the image from the 

screen.” FlatWorld acknowledges that the patent does not define the term, Br. 12; Tr. 65:2-3, and 

Apple provides no evidence to the contrary. 

The term “when” as used in the relevant claims contains a temporal dimension. This is 

 

7

The parties have agreed that the disputed term “when” does not comprise the entirety of their 

dispute; rather, the parties dispute the meaning of the relevant claims as a whole, but focus on 

“when” for purposes of claim construction. Dkt. No. 142-1 at 40 n.6; Tr. 69:6-11.

8 Apple proposed this alternative construction at the claim construction hearing. Tr. 72:10.

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another situation where “the ordinary meaning of claim language . . . may be readily apparent even 

to lay judges, and claim construction . . . involves little more than the application of the widely 

accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. The claims speak 

in the present tense, suggesting an ongoing event. The patentee could have said “has been 

dragged” or “when the computer has detected” and used other similar language, but did not. 

The specification also uses “when” in a temporal sense. For example, the Abstract states, 

“When a proximity sensor senses someone in the neighborhood of the system, it displays images 

on the display.” ‘318 Patent Abstract. This suggests a temporal dimension—the invention would 

not make sense if the images were displayed after a period of time. More revealingly, the 

specification also states, “When the child taps the object twice and doesn’t raise its finger after the 

second tap, the object is surrounded by a red outline. If the child then moves its finger up or down 

on the screen, the object changes size in the vertical direction . . . .” ‘318 Patent 7:2-5 (emphases 

added). The excerpt shows that the patentee knew how to distinguish “when” from conditional 

terms like “if.” Read in context, the “when” in the excerpt appears to be temporal because the red 

outline appears if the child does not raise its finger. The language indicates that there is no 

possibility that the red outline does not appear. Similarly, the relevant claims disclose that a throw

occurs “at the time that” the image or touch exceeds the threshold velocity, and there is no 

suggestion that other conditions must be met.

FlatWorld argues that “when” is used in the conditional sense. Br. 24. But FlatWorld does 

not explain how “the term is . . . used consistently with its conditional sense throughout the 

specification and prosecution history.” Reply 22. As mentioned above, the patentee knew how to 

use commoner words signifying a condition, such as “if,” if he wanted to do so—the patentee did

so repeatedly throughout Claim 18. 

FlatWorld also argues that the fact that the system must “detect” velocity while dragging 

occurs means that Apple’s construction is wrong. Tr. 66-67. However, as Apple correctly notes, 

there is no reason why detection cannot occur at the same time as dragging since the system is 

already detecting that the touched point or image is being dragged. Tr. 74:4-15. The patentee’s 

decision to use the term “when” should be decisive here given that there is no indication that the 

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patentee intended for any other definition for the term other than its plain and ordinary meaning.

FlatWorld points out that Apple’s own Dictionary defines “when” to mean “in view of the 

fact that.” Br. 24 (quoting Meyer Br. Decl. Ex. 9). Apple, in turn, argues that FlatWorld’s own 

citations to dictionaries contain definitions which support the proposition that “when” is not 

merely conditional. Response 22. The Court need not address these arguments since there is 

enough intrinsic evidence to construe the term.9

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court construes the disputed terms as follows:

 “Image” is “a displayed or drawn representation that is manipulated in response to touch or 

location inputs.”

 “Velocity” is “velocity or, in the alternative, speed.”

 “Threshold velocity” is “a level or value of velocity sufficient to cause the dragged/moved 

image to be removed from the display.”

 “Representative thereof” and “representative of the removed image” are “a depiction of at 

least a portion of the removed image.”

 “Image is being dragged” and “image was dragged” are “the touched or selected point 

within the selected image is or was moved in response to location inputs, causing the 

image to move with the point.”

 “Manipulating” is “a set of operations comprising at least selecting, moving, removing, 

and modifying.”

 “Being continually moved” is “when the point being touched is moving without 

interruption.”

 “Continuing touch” is “a touch that moves the image that remains in existence without 

interruption.”

 “When” is “at the time that.”

 

9

FlatWorld also argues that Apple’s constructions would exclude the preferred embodiment and 

its source code. For the reasons discussed elsewhere in this Order, the Court must look first to the 

claim language and cannot construe terms solely to take account of a preferred embodiment.

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***

The Court will hold a status conference on Tuesday, February 4, 2014, at 2 p.m., in 

Courtroom 2, 17th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which the parties 

should be prepared to discuss case scheduling and any other matters that may require the Court’s 

attention.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2014

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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