Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-01865/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-01865-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Hereafter, the amended petition will be referred to as “the petition.”

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNEL M. BAILEY, 

Petitioner,

 v.

ANNE M. RAMIREZ, Warden,

Respondent.

___________________________

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No. C 00-1865 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING MOTIONS FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL;

DIRECTING FORMER COUNSEL TO

RETURN DOCUMENTS TO

PETITIONER

(Docket Nos. 102, 103, 106 & 107)

On May 24, 2000, petitioner Johnel M. Bailey, a California prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 21, 2000, the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit reversed, based on intervening case law, and remanded the matter for further

proceedings. See Bailey v. Ramirez, 25 Fed. Appx. 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2002). On November

12, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition,1

 and, on June 17, 2003, the Court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s

cognizable claims for relief. On September 12, 2003, respondent filed an answer

accompanied by a memorandum and exhibits, to which petitioner, on December 29, 2003,

filed a traverse.

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The Court of Appeal did not include facts pertaining to the assault on Farris, in light

of petitioner’s acquittal of those charges. 

2

Petitioner subsequently obtained counsel, Frank Prantil (“Prantil”), and the Court

granted petitioner’s motion to stay further proceedings until September 15, 2005, to afford

counsel time to review the case and determine whether to move to amend the petition and/or

traverse. On December 23, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the petition,

which motion was denied on February 27, 2006. On April 20, 2006, the Court granted

petitioner’s motion to substitute himself for Prantil and to proceed pro se, and Prantil was

ordered to return to petitioner all documents relating to this action. 

Now before the Court are the petition, petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel

(Docket No. 102), petitioner’s motions for an evidentiary hearing (Docket Nos. 103 & 107),

and petitioner’s motion for a further order directing Prantil to return to petitioner the

documents relating to this action (Docket No. 106).

 BACKGROUND

On December 29, 1995, an information was filed in Alameda County Superior Court

charging petitioner with the murder of Everett Moss (“Moss”), and, in an unrelated incident,

an aggravated assault on Martin Farris (“Farris”). The information further alleged petitioner

intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of both offenses,

and that he personally used a handgun in the commission of the murder. On March 15, 1996,

the jury found petitioner guilty of second degree murder with personal use of a firearm, as

well as inflicting great bodily injury. The jury found petitioner not guilty of the assault on

Farris. On April 12, 1996, petitioner was sentenced to a term of 19 years to life. Petitioner

appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal, which summarized

the facts adduced at trial as follows:2

At about 7:20 p.m. on June 16, 1995, Mary Moss (Mary), the mother of

Everett [Moss, Jr. (Everett)], observed her 32-year-old son standing outside her

home, talking with 19 year-old Troy “Goat” Horton (Horton) and a 16 year-old

minor, Dexter. A short time later, at about 7:30 p.m., Mary noticed defendant

had joined the group. Defendant and Everett were arguing, and she heard her

son tell defendant he did not want to fight because he could “whoop”

defendant. Defendant, who was 17 years-old, and of a slighter build,

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Alteration in original.

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responded if he could not “whoop” Everett, he knew someone who could do so. 

Defendant then left. 

About 10 minutes later, Mary went outside and noticed defendant had

returned; another man, “John-John” or John (John), was also there. She

returned to the house until she heard gunshots. She ran outside and saw her son

running away from defendant, who was holding a gun. According to Mary,

after she yelled at defendant, he looked at her, placed the gun inside his jacket,

and walked away. She called 911. 

Officer Marcus Midyett (Midyett) responded and found Everett

sprawled on the street in a pool of blood. The examining pathologist

determined Everett died of a gunshot wound to his chest; the fatal bullet, fired

from at least 10 inches away. Everett had a .14 percent blood-alcohol level. 

Midyett found a live 9 millimeter round and two 9 millimeter expended

casings near the driveway of the Everett’s residence. Another person recovered

a third spent 9 millimeter casing about 45 feet from the first spatter of Everett’s

blood. Criminalist Lansing Lee determined the three expended casings had

been fired from the same weapon, a 9 millimeter Smith and Wesson

semiautomatic pistol recovered by Midyett during a search of another residence

on October 10, 1995. 

Officers arrested defendant on June 23, 1995, and defendant waived his

rights and gave two tape-recorded statements. Defendant initially denied any

involvement in Everett’s killing, but later admitted shooting Everett.

According to defendant’s confession, Everett “went off on him”

(meaning he wanted to fight) after defendant spit on the ground and the spit hit

Everett. Everett told him to watch where he spit and when defendant replied,

“[s]hut up,” Everett threatened to “beat your little ass.” Everett told defendant

he would not fight him because he was a “youngster.”3

 Defendant stated he left and retrieved a loaded gun from beneath a bush

near an abandoned house. He claimed he was not planning to use the gun, but

wanted to scare Everett.

Defendant told the police when he returned to Everett’s home with the

gun, he argued with Everett again. Everett and defendant agreed to fight in

Everett’s backyard. Everett began walking; defendant followed. As they

walked, defendant pulled out his gun. Everett turned, took a step towards

defendant, and defendant pulled the slide back on the gun and pulled the

trigger. Defendant did not know how many times the gun fired or how often he

pulled the trigger, but admitted the weapon was pointed at Everett, who was

standing six to eight feet away. Defendant insisted he did not intend to kill

Everett. When he heard a woman yell, “hey,” he ran off and threw the gun

over the wall.

At the preliminary hearing, on December 18, 1995, Horton testified that

Dexter, Everett, and he were talking and drinking malt liquor when defendant

arrived. Defendant and Everett were standing close to one another when one of

them accidentally spit in the face of the other. The two argued and Everett

grabbed defendant by the shirt, told him he was a “light weight,” and flung

defendant away. Defendant told Everett he could “whoop” him or he could

find someone who could do so. Defendant left and returned four or five

minutes later. John also joined them. John and Everett began shooting dice. 

Everett and defendant began to argue again; but this time they decided to settle

the argument in Everett’s backyard.

According to Horton, defendant was following Everett when he pulled

out a black gun and cocked it. Everett did not have a gun. When he heard the

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sound of the gun being cocked, Everett turned around and stepped towards

defendant; defendant began firing. 

On February 15, 1996, Horton was served with a prosecution subpoena

to appear at trial on February 22, 1996. Horton did not appear on February 22,

and the court issued “a bench warrant for contempt of court order” and set bail

at $1500.

After hearing pretrial motions on February 26, the court recessed at 3:52

p.m., and ordered the matter continued for jury trial on February 29. At 4:10,

the court was told witness Horton had been arrested for failing to appear and

was now present. Defense counsel was absent, and had presumably left at

about 3:52 p.m. The court ordered Horton to appear on February 29 and

released him on his own recognizance. Horton signed an agreement to appear

in court on February 29, 1996.

On February 29, Horton failed to appear and the prosecution requested

the court to admit his preliminary hearing testimony. The defense objected,

claiming the prosecution did not establish due diligence. The court found

Horton unavailable (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5)), and Horton’s preliminary

hearing testimony was read to the jury. (The court gave CALJIC No. 2.12 on

testimony from an unavailable witness, which is as follows: “Testimony given

by a witness who was unavailable at this trial has been read to you from the

reporter’s transcript of that proceeding. You must consider such testimony as

if it had been given before you in this trial.”)

At trial, Marlon “Poppy” Jefferson (Jefferson) testified he was playing

basketball when defendant approached him and asked him to help “fix” the

gun. Jefferson said he did not know how to fix the gun and defendant

disappeared into the bathroom for two or three minutes. When defendant

reappeared, he began to walk in the direction of Everett’s home. About 15 or

20 minutes later, Jefferson learned Everett had been shot. Jefferson said the

gun he saw in defendant’s possession did not resemble the gun later retrieved

by the police.

At trial, defendant’s testimony differed significantly from his earlier

confession. Contrary to the information he had given the police, he now

claimed he had not left the area to retrieve a weapon. He also maintained he

had never seen Jefferson on the day of the shooting. Instead, he said he had

been carrying a Ruger pistol, rather than the Smith and Wesson the prosecution

contended was used to kill Everett, when he began talking with Everett and the

others. 

He claimed he had previously seen Everett with a gun, and Everett had

threatened to shoot defendant and others. Further, he claimed Everett was

known for fighting and Everett had robbed him a week earlier. 

After Everett and he argued, he left. He ran into John and the two

separately returned to Everett’s residence. Defendant and Everett argued and

Everett suggested they fight in his backyard. As they walked to the backyard,

defendant pulled his gun. Defendant cocked the gun and it jammed. Until he

cocked it, defendant asserted, he did not know if the gun contained any bullets.

Defendant stated Everett then stopped walking and turned to face him. 

Everett was yelling at defendant and unbuttoning his shirt as though he were

“fixing to kill this fool.” Everett made a quick move to grab either defendant

or the weapon. Defendant pulled back the slide thereby ejecting the obstructed

bullet, and then let go of the slide, causing the gun to discharge accidentally. 

The gun continued to fire, although defendant claimed he did not pull the

trigger. Defendant testified he had not wanted to kill Everett, but was afraid

Everett was going to hurt or kill him.

In addition to defendant’s testimony, officers testified they had arrested

Everett for possessing narcotics. Another witness testified about Everett’s

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The parties do not dispute the Court of Appeal’s description of the record.

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involvement with drugs and fighting, and he claimed to have seen Everett with

a weapon some years ago.

In rebuttal, Officer Paul Slivinsky, a firearms expert, explained that the

semiautomatic used to kill Everett would fire only one round each time its

trigger was pulled. Earlier in the trial, criminalist Lansing Lee (Lee) had stated

the trigger pull on the gun used to kill Everett was four pounds on single action

and eleven pounds on double action. Lee stated further that moving the slide

on the weapon back would eject any cartridge in the chamber. 

Prior to jury deliberations, the court instructed the jury to consider

defendant’s prior conviction for possessing cocaine for sale and his possession

of 14 cocaine rocks, as evidence relevant to his credibility.

People v. Bailey, No. A074645, slip op. at 2-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997) (hereinafter

“Slip Op.”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. E).4

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty of first degree murder, but

found petitioner guilty of second degree murder and found true the sentence enhancement

allegations for the use of a firearm and causing great bodily injury. As noted, the trial court,

on April 12, 1996, sentenced petitioner to a term of 19 years to life, which term consisted of

15 years to life for the second degree murder, and 4 years for the firearm enhancement. In

1997, the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence, and the

California Supreme Court, in a summary opinion, subsequently denied the petition for

review. Petitioner thereafter filed a habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior Court,

which petition was summarily denied, and three habeas petitions in the California Supreme

Court, all of which were summarily denied.

Petitioner thereafter filed the instant petition, in which he raises the following claims

of constitutional error: (1) he was denied his right to counsel at a critical stage of his criminal

proceedings; (2) he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (3)

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when his attorney failed to investigate

and secure witnesses for his defense; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the

hearing to determine his fitness for prosecution; and (5) he received ineffective assistance of

counsel on appeal. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a district

court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a

claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

(1993)). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at

413. “[A] federal habeas court may nor issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme]

Court’s jurisprudence.” Id. “Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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The record does not indicate whether petitioner himself was present at the hearing,

but petitioner does not assert that he was not present, nor does he claim any violation of his

right to be present at such hearing.

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Court of the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme]

Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. A state

court decision no longer may be overturned on habeas review simply because of a conflict

with circuit-based law, although circuit decisions remain relevant as persuasive authority to

determine whether a particular state court holding is an “unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent or to assess what law is “clearly established.” Clark v. Murphy,

331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2003). “A federal court may not overrule a state court for

simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court]

is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The state court decision to which 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies is the “last reasoned

decision” of the state court, in this case decision of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92

(9th Cir. 2005). 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Right to Counsel

Petitioner claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when, prior to

trial, the trial court decided outside the presence of defense counsel to release prosecution

witness Troy Horton (“Horton) on his own recognizance.5

 As noted above, the California

Court of Appeal described the facts regarding Horton’s failure to appear, and subsequent

arrest and release, as follows:

On February 15, 1996, Horton was served with a prosecution subpoena

to appear at trial on February 22, 1996. Horton did not appear on February 22,

and the court issued “a bench warrant for contempt of court order” and set bail

at $1500.

After hearing pretrial motions on February 26, the court recessed at 3:52

p.m., and ordered the matter continued for jury trial on February 29. At 4:10,

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The record does not include a transcript of the February 26 hearing at which Horton

was brought to court and released on his own recognizance, nor is there any indication that

such hearing was transcribed. 

7

The California Court of Appeal did not reach the question of whether the hearing was

a “critical stage” of the prosecution, but rather denied the claim for want of prejudice. (Slip

Op. at 6-7.) Because the Court, as set forth infra, finds the hearing was not a “critical stage,”

it does not address the prejudice question. Further, where counsel is absent during a critical

stage, the defendant need not show prejudice. See Hamilton, 391 F.3d at 1070, 1071-72

(finding absence of counsel during critical stage to be structural error).

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the court was told witness Horton had been arrested for failing to appear and

was now present. Defense counsel was absent, and had presumably left at

about 3:52 p.m. The court ordered Horton to appear on February 29 and

released him on his own recognizance. Horton signed an agreement to appear

in court on February 29, 1996.

On February 29, Horton failed to appear and the prosecution requested

the court to admit his preliminary hearing testimony. The defense objected,

claiming the prosecution did not establish due diligence. The court found

Horton unavailable (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5)), and Horton’s preliminary

hearing testimony was read to the jury. (The court gave CALJIC No. 2.12 on

testimony from an unavailable witness, which is as follows: “Testimony given

by a witness who was unavailable at this trial has been read to your from the

reporter’s transcript of that proceeding. You must consider such testimony as

if it had been given before you in this trial.”)

(Slip Op. at 4.)6

A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that counsel be present at

all “critical stages” of the prosecution of the defendant. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 

218, 226, 237 (1967); United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the record is not clear as to whether the February 26 hearing at which Horton was

released was part of the prosecution of petitioner, as opposed to a separate contempt

proceeding. The caption of the “Agreement to Appear” that Horton signed following the

hearing identifies the defendant as “Horton Troy Orlando” and not petitioner, although the

case number in the caption of said document is the same as that of petitioner’s case. (Clerk’s

Transcript (“CT”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. B) at 131.) 

Assuming the February 26 hearing constituted part of petitioner’s case, such hearing

did not amount to a “critical stage” of the prosecution and, consequently, the presence of

defense counsel was not required under the Sixth Amendment.7

 “[T]he essence of a critical

stage is not its formal resemblance to a trial, but the adversary nature of the proceeding,

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Petitioner does not argue, nor does the record indicate, defense counsel had evidence

to impeach Horton such that it would have preferred Horton appear at trial.

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combined with the possibility that a defendant will be prejudiced in some significant way by

the absence of counsel.” United States v. Leonti, 326 U.S. 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). A

critical stage is a “trial-like confrontation, in which potential substantial prejudice to the

defendant’s rights inheres and in which counsel may help avoid that prejudice.” Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner cites no authority, and the Court is aware of none, providing that a hearing

as to whether to detain or release a witness constitutes a “critical stage” of the prosecution. 

As discussed above, AEDPA mandates that habeas relief may be granted only if the state

courts have acted contrary to or have unreasonably applied federal law as determined by the

United States Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412 (“Section 2254(d)(1)

restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.”). The

stages of a prosecution that the Supreme Court has found “critical” for purposes of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel include arraignments, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53055

(1961), post-indictment identification lineups, Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37, sentencing,

Membpa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), and court-ordered psychiatric examinations to

determine competency to stand trial and future dangerousness, Estelle v. Smithy, 451 U.S.

454, 457-59 (1981). Hamilton, 391 F.3d at 1070 (citing cases). 

Unlike those proceedings, the hearing regarding whether Horton should be released or

detained in custody was not adversarial in nature, but, rather, concerned the trial court’s

inherent power to enforce its orders and control the proceedings. Moreover, the parties’

respective positions on the matter were unlikely to have differed. Although the prosecution

certainly wanted its witness to appear at the trial, it is unlikely that it wished to antagonize

him by seeking to have him jailed, and the defense, for its part, had no interest in securing the

attendance of an unfavorable prosecution witness.8

 Similarly, there was no possibility

petitioner would be prejudiced in “some significant way” by defense counsel’s absence from

the hearing. The possibility that the trial court might release on his or her own recognizance

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The California Court of Appeal found the trial court’s release of Horton was proper

under California law because there was insufficient evidence to warrant the”draconian” step

of jailing him. (Slip Op. at 10, 11.)

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a witness unfavorable to the defense does not present the type of risk of prejudice to the

defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial as, for example, the defendant’s appearing in a

suggestive lineup, cf. Wade, 388 U..S. at 228-29 (finding police lineup to be critical stage

because of “innumerable dangers,” including possibility of improper suggestion and

likelihood that issue of identity will be conclusively determined at that stage), or the

admission of evidence that should be suppressed, cf. Hamilton, 391 U.S. at 1070 (finding

pretrial motion to suppress critical because in many cases crucial issue at trial is admissibility

of evidence found as result of search).9

 Consequently, and in the absence of any authority to

the contrary, the hearing at which the trial court decided to release Horton was not a “critical

stage” of the proceedings, and counsel’s absence therefrom did not violate petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Admission of Horton’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Petitioner contends his right to confrontation was violated when the trial court

admitted Horton’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial despite the prosecution’s failure to

exercise due diligence to secure Horton’s appearance to testify in person. Where, as here, the

defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing,

the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony may be admitted at trial without offending the

Confrontation Clause, provided the witness is “unavailable” at trial. See California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation in admitting

declarant’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial where declarant professed loss of memory

at trial); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (finding admission of hearsay

evidence not violation of Confrontation Clause provided witness unavailable and statements

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10Although in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004), the United States

Supreme Court substantially revised the analysis for determining whether the admission of

out-of-court statements violates the Confrontation Clause, Crawford announced a “new rule”

that does not apply retroactively to cases on habeas review. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127

S.Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). Consequently, the

Court applies Roberts and Green, the law in effect prior to Crawford. 

11California Evidence Code § 240(a)(5) provides that a witness is “unavailable” if he

or she is “[a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised

reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court’s

process.” 

12The Court of Appeal distinguished People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 992 (1986),

because the missing witness in Louis, unlike Horton, provided the “only evidence” that the

defendant was the shooter, was facing a sentence on felony charges, and “had a chronic

history of failing to show up for court hearings,” whereas “other than failing to appear when

originally subpoenaed, there was no evidence to suggest Horton would not appear again,

especially since the repercussions for failing to appear again would be more serious.” (Slip

Op. at 11 (emphasis added).) 

11

have “adequate indicia of reliability”).10 A witness is “unavailable” for purposes of the

Confrontation Clause if the witness has not appeared despite the prosecutor’s “good faith

effort” to obtain the witness’s presence. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). 

Prior to admitting Horton’s preliminary hearing testimony, the trial court found the

prosecutor acted with “due diligence” in attempting to secure Horton’s presence at trial. 

(Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. D) at 136.) Based on such finding,

the trial court concluded Horton was “unavailable” under § 240(a)(5) of the California

Evidence Code,11 and admitted Horton’s preliminary hearing testimony. (Id. at 134-36.) The

California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor had exercised

“due diligence” and that Horton was “unavailable” under California Evidence Code §

240(a)(5), reasoning as follows:

We find no error under either standard. In determining whether due

diligence has been shown, a court must consider “[t]he totality of the efforts of

the proponent to achieve presence of the witness . . ..” (People v. Sanders,

[1995] 11 Cal.4th 475, 523.) When a witness is critical or vital to a case,

reasonable precautions must be taken to keep the witness from disappearing. 

([People v.]Louis [(1986)] 42 Cal. 3d 969, 989-91.) 

The prosecutor’s efforts were insufficient, defendant maintains, because

the prosecutor never asked the court to keep Horton in custody as a material

witness though he had been arrested on the bench warrant. He again claims the

facts in this case are analogous to those in Louis. For the reasons already

discussed extensively, the facts in Louis are not applicable.[12] Furthermore, in

this case trial counsel conceded, “I realize since he has failed to appear when

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13The trial court indicated that had the prosecutor requested that Horton be jailed, “I

would not have been inclined to lock him up.” (RT at 135.)

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requested I’m sure the D.A. has done everything in her power to locate him.” 

In contrast, although the witness in Louis stated he was going to spend the

weekend at a friend’s house, the prosecutor never attempted to obtain the

friend’s name or address. As the People point out, defendant points to no fact,

known to the prosecutor, indicating Horton would not appear other than his

failure to respond to the subpoena.

Rather than placing Horton in custody from February 26 until February

29, the court increased the penalty in the event of another nonappearance. We

agree with the trial court’s conclusion: “If the standard for due diligence were

that we have to lock them up once we think they might not show, it would be

an incredible standard as a public policy . . . .” Moreover it would be a policy

in conflict with article I, section 10 of the California Constitution.

(Slip Op. at 15.) 

The Court of Appeal’s determination that Horton was “unavailable” under California

Evidence Code § 240(a)(5), based on the prosecutor’s having acted with “due diligence” in

attempting to secure his presence at trial, is a determination of state law binding on this

Court. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). With respect to whether the

prosecutor acted in “good faith” under the Confrontation Clause in attempting to secure

Horton’s appearance, it was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2) for the Court of Appeal to make the factual finding that the prosecutor had acted

with “due diligence.” On February 15, the prosecutor subpoenaed Horton to appear at trial

on February 22; when Horton failed to appear, the prosecutor obtained from the trial court a

bench warrant for Horton’s arrest; and the prosecutor thereafter sought and obtained Horton’s

signature on an “Agreement to Appear,” which set forth enhanced punishment if Horton

failed to appear for trial on February 29. Petitioner points to no facts or evidence concerning

Horton that would lead the prosecutor to reasonably believe the agreement would not be

sufficient, or that jailing Horton would be necessary.13 Indeed, as noted by the Court of

Appeal, defense counsel conceded that the prosecutor “has done everything in her power to

locate him.” (RT at 135.) As the prosecutor acted with “due diligence” in attempting to

secure Horton’s presence at trial, the Confrontation Clause requirement that Horton be

“unavailable,” i.e. that he failed to appear at trial despite the prosecutor’s “good faith effort”

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14This is the fourth claim in the petition, and, like petitioner’s third and fifth claims,

addressed below, it was summarily denied by the state courts in denying petitioner’s state

habeas petitions. As there is no “reasoned” state court opinion with respect to these claims,

the Court conducts “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the state

court’s denial of the claims was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Plascencia v. Alameda, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir.

2006). 

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to ensure his presence at trial, was met in this case. Consequently, the admission of Horton’s

preliminary hearing testimony did not violate petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation

Clause of the federal constitution. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Juvenile Hearing

Petitioner claims his attorney, Alfons Wagner (“Wagner”), failed to investigate and

present mitigating evidence at the juvenile fitness hearing, in violation of petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.14 Petitioner was 17 years old at the

time of the offense, and, on August 28, 1995, a hearing was held in the juvenile court, under

§ 707 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, to determine whether petitioner was a

fit subject to be tried in juvenile court. (See Resp.’s Ex. A.) Following the hearing, the

juvenile court determined petitioner was “not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under

juvenile court law” and referred the matter to the District Attorney for prosecution in the

Superior Court. (See Resp.’s Exs. A1-A2.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to a juvenile court hearing to determine

whether the juvenile should be tried as an adult. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,

554 (1996). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to the effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). To succeed

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s

performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance,

i.e., “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. A habeas petitioner has the burden of

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showing through evidentiary proof that counsel's performance was both deficient and

prejudicial. See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1990); Rios v. Rocha, 299

F.3d 796, 813 n.23 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claims where

petitioner failed to produce evidence of prejudice). In addition, the petitioner must establish

that the state court, in denying petitioner’s claims, “applied Strickland to the facts of his case

in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). 

Under California law, based on petitioner’s age and the charges against him, petitioner

had the burden of overcoming a presumption that he was unfit to proceed in juvenile court. 

See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 707(b)-(c). The following five criteria are to be considered in

a juvenile court’s fitness determination: 

(1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor;

(2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile

court’s jurisdiction.

(3) the minor’s previous delinquent history;

(4) success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor;

(5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have

been committed by the minor.

Id. at § 707(c). The presumption of unfitness stands “unless the juvenile court concludes

based upon evidence, which evidence may be of extenuating or mitigating circumstances,

that the minor would be amenable to care, treatment, and training programs available through

the facilities of the juvenile court . . ..” Id.

Petitioner claims Wagner was ineffective because he failed to interview or call

witnesses who would have provided helpful testimony at the hearing. In order to succeed on

a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call a favorable witness, a federal habeas

petitioner must identify the witness, provide the testimony that the witness would have given,

show that the witness was likely to have been available to testify and would have given the

proffered favorable testimony, and establish that such testimony created a reasonable

probability that the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to the petitioner. See

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d at 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003). Where the petitioner does not

identify the testimony the absent witness would have provided, the claim fails. See United

States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989). Similarly, a petitioner’s mere

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15The alleged witnesses consist of petitioner’s father, his aunt, two “mentors,” five

“juvenile counselors,” and a “head summer employee.” 

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speculation that the witness would have given helpful information if interviewed by counsel

and called to the stand is not enough to establish ineffective assistance. See Bragg v. Galaza,

242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, petitioner identifies 11 witnesses15 whom he claims Wagner should have

interviewed and called, but then says nothing more than they would have provided

“mitigating” testimony; he does not describe what that testimony would have been. In Dows

v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit denied the petitioner’s claim that

counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate and call a witness because the petitioner

provided no evidence, beyond his own “self-serving affidavit,” that the witness would have

provided helpful testimony, such as “an affidavit from the alleged witness.” 211 F.3d at 486-

87; see also Berry, 814 F.2d at 1409 (rejecting, on direct appeal, claim that counsel was

ineffective where defendant did not indicate what testimony excluded witnesses would have

provided); cf. Alcala, 334 F.3d at 872 & n. 3 (distinguishing, inter alia, Dows and Berry;

finding ineffective assistance of counsel where petitioner submitted interviews reflecting

testimony missing witnesses would have provided). Similar to Dows, petitioner here does

not provide affidavits from any of the witnesses, or any evidence other than his own

statements in his traverse, showing what testimony the missing witnesses would have

provided or that such testimony would have been helpful to petitioner at the juvenile fitness

hearing. Nor does petitioner provide any evidence, beyond his own conclusory statements,

demonstrating any such witness was available to testify at the juvenile fitness hearing. Under

such circumstances, petitioner has failed to show counsel was ineffective in failing to call

witnesses. 

In his motion for an evidentiary hearing, petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing

regarding the alleged witnesses Wagner failed to interview or call at the juvenile fitness

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16In his two requests for an evidentiary hearing, petitioner seeks, respectively, an

evidentiary hearing as to (1) the witnesses he alleges Wagner failed to investigate and call at

the juvenile fitness hearing, and (2) the witnesses he alleges his trial counsel, Deborah Levy,

failed to investigate and call at trial (discussed infra). 

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hearing.16 A federal habeas petition may be denied without an evidentiary hearing where it

consists solely of conclusory statements unsupported by any proof or offer thereof. See

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, petitioner makes only

conclusory allegations in support of his claims. He makes the conclusory allegation that the

witnesses would have provided “mitigating” testimony, and speculates that if Wagner had

interviewed them they “could have helped counsel to further investigate and document all

available, community resources and devise a rehabilitative program” for petitioner. 

Petitioner does not describe or make any offer of proof as to the testimony that any of the

witnesses would have given, or of what information they would have provided to counsel

with respect to a “rehabilitative program” for petitioner. As petitioner’s allegations with

respect to the testimony the witnesses would have provided and the information counsel

could have gained from them are conclusory and speculative, petitioner fails to establish

grounds for holding an evidentiary hearing with respect to this issue. 

In addition, an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

not warranted if the petitioner has failed to present sufficient grounds for relief under

Strickland. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 641, (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding denial of

evidentiary hearing as to five ineffective assistance claims where petitioner did not

“demonstrate[ ] that he [was] entitled to relief on any claim”). Here, petitioner has not

demonstrated he is entitled to relief on his claim, in that he has not shown Wagner’s failure to

interview and call the witnesses at the juvenile fitness hearing was prejudicial. There was

strong evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that petitioner was not a fit subject for 

juvenile court, using the five criteria in § 707(c) of the California Welfare and Institutions

Code. If the case against a petitioner is strong, there is a significantly lesser likelihood that

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s errors. See Greene v. Henry, 302 F.3d 1067, 1072-74

(9th Cir. 2002). In this instance, the evidence of petitioner’s unfitness was summarized in the

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probation report17 as follows:

This minor has been involved in criminal activities for several years. His first

finding was for selling rock cocaine. He has continued this activity to the

present time. His closest friend is a cousin, who has an extensive criminal

history and is presently in jail for an attempted murder. This crime was

premeditated. This all shows an obvious failure of criteria #1. His delinquent

history consists of findings or admissions for three felonies and one

misdemeanor. This has all occurred within a three year period. Therefore, he

fails criteria #3. There have been several rehabilitative attempts by the

Juvenile Court. All have failed. Hence, he fails criteria #4. The crime is

obviously grave. The minor’s threats to the community at large may be high

since he admits an explosive temper. It should be noted that his comment on

October 5, 1993 to the police was “I’ll be out, everyone knows how juvenile

courts work. They don’t do shit. I’ll keep selling ‘til I’m 18 then I’ll start

shooting fools and you cops.” This all expresses a failure for criteria #5. It is

only criteria #2 that he may not obviously fail. But, given his past criminal

history, and the above comment, it is highly uncertain he can pass criteria #2. 

Because 707(c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code clearly states that

the minor is to be “fit and proper under each and every one of the above

criteria,” this probation officer recommends that this minor be remanded to the

Adult Court and proceed therein. 

(Resp. Ex. A at 12.) Petitioner does not describe the allegedly favorable testimony the

missing witnesses would have provided at the fitness hearing. As such, there is no basis for a

finding that a reasonable probability exists that, had Wagner interviewed the witnesses, their

testimony would have overcome the strong evidence that petitioner was not a fit subject to be

dealt with under juvenile court law. See Berry, 814 F.2d 1409 (finding no reasonable

probability that witness’s testimony would have made difference in outcome of hearing

where defendant did not describe what testimony witness would have given). Consequently,

petitioner has failed to set forth a prima facie case that he was prejudiced, as defined in

Strickland, by Wagner’s failure to interview or call witnesses in connection with petitioner’s

juvenile fitness hearing. As such, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief or an evidentiary

hearing with respect to this claim. 

Petitioner also claims that Wagner was ineffective in failing to seek a psychological

evaluation of petitioner and present expert testimony regarding such an evaluation at the

juvenile fitness hearing. Where the evidence does not warrant it, the failure to call an expert

does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986,

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990 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding decision not to consult psychiatric expert for trial not

unreasonable where evidence did “not raise the possibility of strong mental state defense”). 

Petitioner does not describe any information of which Wagner could or should have been

aware that would have led counsel reasonably to believe such an evaluation would have been

helpful. Moreover, petitioner simply asserts Wagner should have sought psychological

evaluation; he does not indicate what information such an evaluation would have revealed, or

what expert testimony could have been given based on such evaluation. In the absence of

any indication that a psychological evaluation would have been helpful to petitioner, there is

no basis for a finding that Wagner performed deficiently in failing to seek such an evaluation

or present expert testimony based thereon, nor is there any basis for a finding that the

outcome of the hearing would have been different had Wagner done so. 

Lastly, petitioner claims Wagner failed to seek review, by a juvenile court judge, of

the juvenile court referee’s fitness order. Petitioner, however, fails to indicate the basis on

which Wagner could have sought such review, or what errors, if any, the referee made in

finding petitioner unfit for juvenile court. Cf. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th

Cir. 1989) (holding petitioner, to show ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, must

show nonfrivolous claims counsel could have raised, and reasonable probability that had

claims been raised, he would have prevailed on appeal). Moreover, in light of the

particularly strong evidence, described above, that petitioner did not meet the criteria for

fitness, there is no indication a juvenile court judge, in reviewing the referee’s decision,

would have reached a different conclusion. Consequently, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate Wagner was deficient in failing to seek review of the referee’s decision, or a

reasonable probability that such review would have lead to a different outcome. 

Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. 

///

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///

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18Levy replaced Wagner as petitioner’s attorney for trial. This is the third claim in the

petition.

19Petitioner does not supply a last name for “Dexter,” who was a minor at the time of

the incident, and his last name is not contained in the record. “John Gadue” appears to be a

reference to the individual identified elsewhere in the record as “John Gadeau” or “JohnJohn.” 

20The jury was given instructions on self-defense and imperfect self defense. (CT at

200.) 

19

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial

Petitioner claims his trial counsel, Deborah Levy (“Levy”),18 was ineffective in failing

to investigate and interview several witnesses that would have been helpful to his defense. 

According to petitioner, “Corey Burts, John Gadue, Dexter, Crystal McElroy, Janice Diggs

and Rhonda Iles” were willing to provide “mitigating evidence in support of petitioner[‘s]

imperfect self-defense” theory.19 Petitioner presented the defense that he shot Moss

accidentally or, in the alternative, that he did so either in self-defense or in “imperfect” selfdefense. In particular, petitioner testified at trial that he shot Moss accidentally when the gun

jammed and discharged. Petitioner also testified, however, that he feared Moss, and that,

when petitioner took out his gun, Moss took a step toward him and made a gesture as if to

grab the gun; in his confession to the police, which was admitted at trial, petitioner stated that

Moss took a step towards him before petitioner pulled the trigger. In closing argument, Levy

argued petitioner shot Moss by accident, but also argued, in the alternative, that petitioner

shot Moss either in self-defense or in “imperfect” self-defense.20 

Petitioner claims he told Wagner the names of the above witnesses, and that Wagner

told petitioner the defense investigator, Clarick Brown (“Brown”), would interview them. 

Petitioner further alleges Levy received Wagner’s files, which included the names of said

witnesses, as well as a summary of the case by Brown and Brown’s report of an interview of

one of the witnesses, Corey Burts (“Burts”). (Traverse, Exs. A-B.) Petitioner also alleges

the witnesses were “willing” to testify at trial and that they would have provided “mitigating”

evidence of petitioner’s “fear” of Moss in order to bolster his imperfect self-defense theory. 

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21There is no statement or indication in this summary, or anywhere else in petitioner’s

papers or the record, that Brown interviewed any of the other witnesses petitioner identifies.

Petitioner attaches to his traverse a “Factual Summary” of the case, which petitioner states

was prepared by Brown and turned over to Levy, and which mentions two of the other

alleged missing witnesses, Dexter and Gadeau. (Traverse, Ex. B.) The “Factual Summary”

states only that Burts could help locate Dexter and Gadeau, however; there is no description

of what testimony they would have provided. 

20

As discussed above, in order to obtain habeas relief on his claim that counsel was

ineffective in failing to interview or call witnesses, or to obtain an evidentiary hearing on this

issue, petitioner must make more than conclusory allegations that the witnesses were

available and would have provided helpful testimony. See Dows, 211 F.3d at 482-83

(denying habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed to

present any evidence, such as affidavits, as to what helpful testimony such witnesses would

have provided); Berry, 814 F.2d at 1409 (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective where

petitioner did not indicate what testimony excluded witnesses would have provided); see also

Phillips, 267 F.3d at 973 (finding evidentiary hearing not warranted when petitioner provided

only conclusory allegations); Davis, 384 F.3d at 641-43, 647-50 (finding evidentiary hearing

not warranted where prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel not established). 

Petitioner makes only a conclusory allegation that the witnesses were “willing” to testify, but

does not provide any evidence, or make any offer of proof, to demonstrate they would have

been available to testify at the trial. Further, with the exception of Burts, who is discussed

infra, petitioner does not describe or provide any evidence, such as affidavits from the

witnesses, as to what testimony they would have provided, but instead provides only the

conclusory allegation that they would have provided “mitigating” evidence in support of an

imperfect self-defense theory. 

With respect to Burts, petitioner provides a report from Wagner’s investigator, Brown,

describing an interview of Burts at which Burts described what he knew about the shooting. 

(Traverse, Ex. A.)21 According to that report, Burts told Brown the following. At the time of

the shooting, Burts was about a block away with Gadeau. (Id.) They heard shots, and went

to investigate, finding Moss’s body on the ground, but no one else around. (Id.) Later that

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night, he and Gadeau saw petitioner, who seemed frightened and told them the shooting was

accidental. (Id.) Petitioner also told them Moss had been harassing and threatening

petitioner, and they were about to get into a fight when Moss “discovered” petitioner had a

gun. (Id.) Petitioner further told them that Moss reached for the gun to take it from

petitioner, and in the ensuing struggle it discharged several times. (Id. at 2.) According to

Burts, Moss has a reputation as a dangerous man and was known to carry a gun and beat

people up. (Id.) Burts frequently saw Moss drunk, harass people, and pull out a gun to

intimidate them. (Id.) 

Even assuming Burts and the other witnesses were available to testify at trial, that

Burts would have testified consistently with his interview as reported by Brown, and that the

other witnesses testified in some fashion that petitioner feared Moss, there is no reasonable

likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different. As noted, petitioner

claims the witnesses’ testimony would have bolstered his “imperfect” self-defense theory. 

Under the concept of “imperfect” self-defense, “‘[a]n honest but unreasonable belief that it is

necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice

aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is

reduced to manslaughter.’” In Re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773 (Cal. 1994) (quoting

People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 674 (Cal. 1979)). Voluntary manslaughter based on

imperfect self-defense is a lesser-included offense of the crime of murder. See People v.

Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 200-01 (Cal. 1995) (holding imperfect self-defense is “not a true

defense; rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter”; further

holding “voluntary manslaughter, whether it arises from unreasonable self-defense or from a

killing during a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, is not a defense but a crime; more

precisely, it is a lesser offense included in the crime of murder”). 

Under California law, however, there is a limitation on the availability of imperfect

self-defense that is critical to this case. Self-defense, whether reasonable or unreasonable,

may not be invoked when a defendant through his own wrongful conduct has created the

circumstances under which he fears his adversary's attack. See In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th

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at 773. Here, petitioner testified he pulled his gun before Moss took a step towards him and

allegedly made a gesture that suggested he would try to take the gun from petitioner. 

Similarly, in his confession, petitioner admitted he had taken out his gun before Moss took a

step towards him. Petitioner does not suggest there is any evidence, nor is there any in the

record, disputing the fact that petitioner had pulled out the gun before Moss appeared to try

to take it from him. Similarly, petitioner stated in both his trial testimony and his confession,

and there is no evidence to the contrary, that petitioner had voluntarily agreed to enter into a

fight with Moss. When petitioner pulled out a gun after agreeing to fight Moss, he created

the very circumstances under which it became possible for Moss to take the gun and kill him. 

The proffered testimony by Burts, and any testimony from the other witnesses that

petitioner feared Moss, at most corroborates the other evidence that Moss was a

neighborhood bully who was known to possess a gun and harass people, and that he had

threatened petitioner in the past. Neither Burts’s potential testimony, nor the alleged

testimony by the other witnesses, would have contradicted the undisputed evidence that on

the day in question petitioner pulled out a gun before Moss took a step towards him or made

any other gesture to cause petitioner to believe Moss might take the gun away from him and

shoot him. Consequently, their testimony would not have altered the fact that petitioner,

according to both his own testimony and his confession, created the circumstances under

which he feared Moss might kill him, which evidence, under California law, precluded

petitioner from relying on imperfect self-defense. As the testimony of Burts and the other

witnesses would not have enabled petitioner to succeed on a theory of imperfect self-defense,

petitioner cannot make a prima facie showing under Strickland that his counsel’s alleged

failure to interview Burts and the other witnesses was prejudicial. Under such circumstances,

there is no need for an evidentiary hearing on this claim, and petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief. See Davis, 384 F.3d at 641-43, 647-50 (finding evidentiary hearing not

warranted and denying habeas relief where petitioner failed to establish prima facie case of

ineffective assistance of counsel).

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5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal

 Petitioner claims his appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance with respect to

his appeal because he did not raise therein the issues discussed above, specifically, that

petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the alleged failure to investigate

and call witnesses at the juvenile fitness hearing and at trial. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel

on his first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in

Strickland. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). A petitioner thus must

show that counsel's failure to raise claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688, 694). In that regard, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of

the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Id. at 1434. Consequently, appellate counsel

frequently will remain above an objective standard of competence and have caused his client

no prejudice where he declines to raise a weak issue. Id. 

As discussed above, petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

without merit. Consequently, counsel could reasonably have decided not to raise these

claims, and, even if counsel had raised them, there is no reasonable likelihood they would

have succeeded. Accordingly, the failure to raise them on appeal was neither deficient nor

prejudicial, and petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby

DENIED; the motions for an evidentiary hearing are hereby DENIED; and, as an evidentiary

hearing is not warranted, the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel and

petitioner’s motion for such appointment is hereby DENIED. Petitioner’s motion for a

further order directing Prantil, his former counsel in this action, to return to petitioner the

documents relating to this action is hereby GRANTED, and Prantil is directed to return to

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petitioner forthwith any documents pertaining to this action. 

This order terminates Docket Nos. 102, 103, 106 and 107.

The Clerk shall close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 21, 2007 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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