Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01961/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01961-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jason R. O’Neill,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-01961-PHX-JAS (LCK)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jason O’Neill, incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison in Florence, 

Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Before this Court are the Amended Petition (Doc. 4), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 14), and 

Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 24). Additionally, Petitioner filed motions to expand the record, 

for discovery and disclosure, and for evidentiary hearing, which have been fully briefed. 

(Docs. 18, 19, 21, 23, 30.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was 

referred to Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate 

Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, deny 

Petitioner’s motions and deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court for burglary in the 

second degree. (Doc. 14, Ex. I at 2.) After finding two prior convictions, the court 

sentenced him to 11.25 years. (Id.)

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The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts in support of Petitioner’s 

conviction:

¶ 3 Ruben L. returned home and saw that his front gate was propped open 

with a suitcase. He heard sounds coming from his laundry room. Ruben 

opened the door and saw O’Neill holding one of his blue bags. O’Neill 

immediately threw the bag into the washing machine. Ruben asked O’Neill 

why he was in his house, and O’Neill said that he thought it was an empty 

apartment. Ruben then asked how it could be empty when stuff was 

everywhere. After arguing, O’Neill walked away and grabbed the suitcase at 

the gate, took a bottle out, and drank from it. Ruben called the police and 

followed O’Neill into the street, updating the police operator as he walked.

¶ 4 Soon after, O’Neill sat at a bus stop, and police officers approached him. 

Officer Chris Lentine arrived and took charge of the investigation. He spoke 

to Ruben, who identified O’Neill as the man who entered his home. He then 

spoke to O’Neill. O’Neill said that he needed to go to urgent care. But Officer 

Lentine did not observe anything about O’Neill that prompted the officer to 

get him medical attention. The officer looked in O’Neill’s suitcase, but found 

no “[e]vidence of a crime,” so he placed it in “safekeeping.”

¶ 5 While other officers detained O’Neill at the bus stop, Officer Lentine 

drove to Ruben’s condo, which looked “like a residential structure, like an 

adobe type style .... [with] several units connected together.” In the laundry 

room, he saw a washer, dryer, shelves, and miscellaneous items. Inside the 

washer was a blue bag that contained power tools and a battery or charger. 

On the washer was a drill bit set.

¶ 6 After examining the scene, Officer Lentine returned to the bus stop. He 

read O’Neill his Miranda rights, and O’Neill agreed to answer questions. 

O’Neill told the officer that he came to Mesa the previous night because he 

had a job interview that day. O’Neill explained that he was going to take the 

bus, but he did not have money. When asked whether he had gone into 

Ruben’s home, he said that he thought it was an urgent care facility. Once he 

realized it was a residence, however, he decided to take the tools. He was 

going to either pawn or sell them for money.

(Id. at 1.) The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Id. at 3.) He 

petitioned for review at the Arizona Supreme Court, but it was denied. (Id., Ex. J.)

Petitioner filed a Notice for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) and counsel filed a PCR 

Petition. (Id., Exs. K, L.) On February 23, 2018, the PCR court dismissed the PCR Petition 

without a hearing, finding all the claims precluded. (Id., Ex. O.) Petitioner filed two 

motions requesting additional time to amend the petition, which the PCR court denied. (Id., 

Exs. P-S.) Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, seeking 

review of the denial of his requests to amend his PCR petition, which was denied as 

untimely. (Id., Exs. T, U.)

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DISCUSSION

The Petition includes six claims: (1) Petitioner’s statements were involuntary and 

taken in violation of Miranda; (2) the destruction of Petitioner’s impounded bag violated 

his right to due process; (3) a juror improperly commented on Petitioner’s right not to 

testify; (4) there was insufficient evidence to find that the victim’s shed was a residential 

structure; (5) Petitioner’s right to due process was violated by the officer’s unreliable 

testimony; and (6) the victim provided false testimony at trial. Respondents argue that part 

of Claim 1 and the entirety of Claims 3, 5, and 6 are procedurally defaulted. The Court first 

reviews these claims for exhaustion and then evaluates the remaining claims on the merits.

EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Standard

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-

78 (1971).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners 

to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. A habeas 

petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. First, a claim may 

be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was raised in state court but found by that 

court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a 

claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court and 

“the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1; 

see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court 

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must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy), 

overruled on other grounds by Apelt v. Ryan, 878 F.3d 800, 827 (9th Cir. 2017). If no 

remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” exhausted 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see also Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Analysis

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges his statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of 

Miranda. Respondent argues that Petitioner did not fairly present a voluntariness claim on 

appeal because, while he cited relevant law, he did not provide a factual basis for the 

challenge. Although an exhaustive discussion of the factual basis is not required, a petition 

must present the operative facts to the state appellate court. See Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 

1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008); Gray, 518 U.S. at 162-63. Petitioner did not include any facts 

in his discussion of voluntariness before the court of appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. H at 37-38.) 

Therefore, Petitioner failed to provide the state court a “‘fair opportunity’ to apply 

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” Anderson, 

459 U.S. at 6. The Court of Appeals issued no ruling on voluntariness. (Doc. 14, Ex. I.)

For this reason, Petitioner failed to fairly present his voluntariness claim in state 

court. If Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate a voluntariness claim it 

would be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona 

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Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, the portion of Claim 1 alleging that 

Petitioner’s statements were involuntary is technically exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted.1 The Court will address the Miranda claim on the merits.

Claim 3

Petitioner alleges that a biased juror sat on the jury panel for his trial, which violated 

his right to an impartial jury. This claim is based on answers provided by juror 14 during 

voir dire. Petitioner alleges that the juror’s answers indicated he would penalize Petitioner 

if he exercised his constitutional right to remain silent. Although Petitioner did not cite a 

specific constitutional provision (other than a general reference to due process), the right 

to an impartial jury flows from the Sixth Amendment. The essence of Petitioner’s claim as

stated before this Court varies substantially from the claim he raised before the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. In his appellate brief, Petitioner argued that the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination clause forbids comment on a defendant’s decision not to testify at trial. (Doc. 

14, Ex. H at 29-33.) He cited Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in support of his 

argument that juror 14’s answers were such that other jurors would naturally take them to 

be a comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. (Doc. 14, Ex. H at 32.) 

Review of Petitioner’s opening appeal brief and the ruling of the court of appeals 

reveals that Petitioner’s impartial jury claim was not fairly presented in state court and the 

appellate court did not rule on it. (Doc. 14, Exs. H, I.) Petitioner also suggests, within Claim 

3, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike juror 14. Petitioner raised this claim 

in his PCR Petition. (Id., Ex. L at 9-10.) However, he did not timely present this claim to 

the court of appeals in a petition for review. (Id., Exs. T, U.) Therefore, Petitioner failed to 

exhaust this claim. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). If 

1

In Claim 1, Petitioner alleged that his statements “were involuntary and taken in 

violation of his Miranda rights, his fifth Amend. right to remain silent, his sixth Amend. 

right to counsel, and his fourteenth Amend. right to due process.” (Doc. 4 at 6.) To the 

extent Petitioner is alleging a violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights separate and apart from his Miranda rights, he did not exhaust those claims before 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 14, Ex. H.) As with his voluntariness claim, these 

claims are procedurally defaulted.

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Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate these claims, they would be found 

waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, to the extent Claim 3 alleges a violation of Petitioner’s 

right to an impartial jury or ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to strike juror 14, 

it is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

The Fifth Amendment jury claim that Petitioner exhausted in state court shares the 

same factual premise as Claim 3 (they are both based on defense counsel’s colloquy with 

juror 14), and there is some overlap in the legal principles presented by Petitioner. For that 

reason, the Court reviews on the merits Petitioner’s claim based on juror 14 to the extent it 

was properly exhausted in state court.

Claims 5 and 6

In Claim 5, Petitioner alleged his right to due process was violated by Officer

Lentine’s unreliable testimony at trial. In Claim 6, Petitioner alleged that the victim 

provided false and inconsistent testimony at trial. It appears Petitioner is alleging that these 

errors violated his right to Due Process. In his appellate brief, Petitioner alleged that the 

victim made inconsistent statements. (Doc. 14, Ex. H at 8, 13-16.) He also alleged 

inconsistent testimony by Officer Lentine. (Id. at 16-23.) However, he did not argue a 

federal claim in relation to these alleged inconsistent statements. In turn, the appellate court 

addressed these claims solely as ones alleging prejudice under state law. (Id., Ex. I at 3.) If 

Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate these federal claims, they would be 

found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Claims 5 and 6 are technically exhausted but 

procedurally defaulted.

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Cause and Prejudice and Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Petitioner did not assert cause to overcome the default of any of his claims.2 He did,

however, allege that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice and the errors at trial 

“probably resulted in a conviction of one who is actually and factually innocent.” (Doc. 24 

at 8.) Although Petitioner did not allege it as a means to overcome default, the Court will 

evaluate it for that purpose.

To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse a procedural default, 

the petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). To 

establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. The Supreme Court has characterized the exacting nature of an actual innocence claim 

as follows:

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an 

innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at 

trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of 

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.

Id. at 324; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). Petitioner does not identify 

any new reliable evidence to support such a claim. Therefore, Petitioner has not established 

2 All of Petitioner’s defaulted claims should have been raised, if at all, on appeal. 

Therefore, Petitioner could have alleged as cause for the defaults the ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel. However, before ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may be used to 

establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been presented to the state court as an 

independent claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). Petitioner did not 

exhaust, in a PCR proceeding, a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

fairly present these claims. Ineffectiveness claims regarding counsel are now foreclosed in 

state court by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a). Because the 

Arizona state courts have not had a fair opportunity to rule on ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel, and Petitioner may not exhaust this claim now, it is technically exhausted but 

procedurally defaulted. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Therefore, ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) on appeal cannot operate as cause unless 

Petitioner established cause and prejudice to excuse the default of the appellate IAC claim.

See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (ineffective counsel as cause can 

itself be procedurally defaulted). Petitioner has made no argument that there is cause to 

excuse the default of a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to fairly his 

defaulted claims. Therefore, IAC on appeal cannot operate as cause to excuse the defaults.

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a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if his defaulted claims are not heard on the 

merits.

MERITS

The Court will address on the merits Claim 1 (to the extent based on a Miranda

violation), Claim 2, Claim 3 (as raised in state court), and Claim 4.

Legal Standards for Relief under the AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) created a 

“highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demand[ing] that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). Under the 

AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the 

merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The last relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold test under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule 

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection 

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that 

governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law 

consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court 

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conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 

74 (2006).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1). 

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Under 

the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant 

relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] 

Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or 

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s 

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the 

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Visciotti, 537 

U.S. at 25. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as ‘“fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. 

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). In considering a challenge under 

§ 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner 

bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

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Analysis

Claim 1 (Miranda violation)

Petitioner alleges his statements were taken in violation of Miranda based on the

following factual allegations. He was in custody from the time the first three officers

arrived and detained him in handcuffs. When these officers questioned him, he stated, “I 

plead the fifth amend. and request counsel.” When Officer Lentine arrived, he questioned 

Petitioner without reading him Miranda rights. While Officer Lentine was at the victim’s 

home investigating, he radioed to the other officers to arrest Petitioner. Then, Officer 

Lentine returned and questioned him for a second time. Petitioner contends he was never 

informed of his Miranda rights and never waived them.

The court of appeals found that the officers’ interactions with Petitioner, prior to the 

reading of his Miranda rights, occurred while he was in investigative detention. Therefore, 

the court concluded Petitioner’s Miranda rights were not at issue at that time. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. I at 3.)

Trial Testimony

Officer Lentine testified at trial that, upon first arriving at the bus stop, he spoke to 

the victim, who identified Petitioner as the person he had found at his home. (Id., Ex. C at 

97-99.) The officer testified that, during this time, Petitioner was not free to leave because 

he was in investigative detention. (Id., Ex. D at 68-69, 70.) He did not recall whether 

Petitioner was handcuffed at the time. (Id. at 49.) Officer Lentine spoke to Petitioner, who 

provided his name and stated that he needed to go to urgent care; nothing in Petitioner’s 

appearance or behavior led the officer to believe he needed medical attention. (Id., Ex. C 

at 99, 103-04.) Upon questioning, Petitioner stated that he had come to Mesa by light rail 

the prior night for a 2 p.m. job interview. (Id., Ex. D at 10-11.) Petitioner then stated that 

he was looking for an urgent care and trying to get home; he told the officer that he planned 

to take the bus back to Phoenix but did not have any money. (Id. at 11-12.) Petitioner 

acknowledged going inside the courtyard at 948 South Alma School Road (the victim’s 

residential address) because he thought it was an urgent care facility but, once inside, he 

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realized it was not an urgent care. (Id. at 12-13, 79.) After being confronted by the victim, 

Petitioner stated that he intended to leave but waited ten minutes for the police to arrive. 

(Id. at 12-13.) Petitioner stated he then headed north, where the officers contacted him at 

the bus stop. (Id.)

Officer Lentine testified that, after speaking with Petitioner, he drove to the victim’s 

home and investigated the crime scene. (Id. at 14-18.) He then returned to the bus stop and 

read Petitioner his Miranda rights. (Id. at 18-19.) Officer Lentine testified that Petitioner 

indicated he understood the rights and agreed to answer questions. (Id. at 19.) Petitioner 

reiterated that he entered the residence because he believed it was an urgent care, but after 

realizing he was wrong, he looked in the laundry room and noticed some tools. (Id. at 100.) 

Petitioner stated that he could sell the tools for money to use for bus fare or alcohol. (Id. at 

101.)

The first officers arrived on the scene at 5:17 p.m.; Officer Lentine arrived at 

approximately 5:30 p.m.; Petitioner was arrested at 6:14 p.m.; and, Officer Lentine read 

him his Miranda rights at 6:25 p.m. (Doc. 14, Ex. D at 42-43, 99-100.)

Analysis

The Court first looks at the circumstances surrounding Officer Lentine’s initial

questioning of Petitioner and whether he was detained or in custody at that time. A 

determination of whether a suspect is in custody is a question of law. Thompson v. 

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995). If officers have reasonable suspicion that a person has 

committed a crime, they may temporarily detain the individual for an investigation. See 

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). The Court must evaluate the validity of 

the initial stop and whether its duration was reasonable in light of its purpose. Id. As found 

by the court of appeals, when the officers first encountered Petitioner, he had been 

identified in person by the victim, who informed the police that Petitioner had entered his 

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home uninvited. (Doc. 14, Ex. I at 1.) Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

believe Petitioner had committed a crime.

While an investigatory stop may not extend indefinitely (without transforming into 

a de facto arrest), it may last for the reasonable period needed for law enforcement to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86. Here, Petitioner was 

detained for approximately one hour prior to formal arrest. During that time, officers spoke 

briefly to him and the victim, and investigated the scene of the crime a short distance away.

During that period, Petitioner was not transported to a police station or subjected to more 

than initial questioning. By talking to the two relevant witnesses and going to see the crime 

scene, Officer Lentine acted diligently to investigate the reported crime. Detention of a 

suspect for up to an hour may be reasonable if the police did not unreasonably delay their 

investigation. See Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)

(finding no delay unnecessary to the investigation, therefore, the detention did not 

transform into an arrest). It was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude 

that Petitioner was in investigative detention when first questioned, thus, no Miranda

violation occurred.

Petitioner also argues that he was neither informed of his Miranda rights nor waived 

them prior to being questioned a second time. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that, 

after Petitioner was arrested, Officer Lentine read Petitioner his Miranda rights, and 

Petitioner agreed to answer questions. (Doc. 14, Ex. I at 1.) Those findings were not 

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Thus, they are entitled to a presumption of correctness, which Petitioner can rebut only 

with a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner’s 

denials of those facts, standing alone, is insufficient. Based on the state court findings that 

Petitioner was informed of, and waived, his Miranda rights, it was not objectively 

unreasonable to deny Petitioner’s claim that his Miranda rights were violated with respect 

to the post-arrest questioning.

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Claim 2

Petitioner alleges the police destruction of the bag he was carrying at the time of his 

arrest was a Brady violation. Petitioner argues that Officer Lentine took his bag at the time 

of his arrest, failed to inventory the contents, and the bag was destroyed. Petitioner argues 

that the contents of the bag would have shown he had a home address, money, a bus pass, 

and employment, which would have undermined the prosecution’s theory that he was 

burglarizing the victim’s property to get money. Because the contents of the bag were 

favorable to Petitioner and would have changed the outcome of the trial, he argues that its 

suppression amounted to a Brady violation.

The Arizona Court of Appeals found this claim waived because Petitioner failed to 

identify the withheld evidence. (Doc. 14, Ex. I at 3.) Therefore, this claim is procedurally 

defaulted. See Quintero v. Stewart, 121 F. App’x 203, 206-07 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 

Brady claim procedurally defaulted based on state appellate court’s ruling that the claim 

was waived). However, because Respondents did not argue it was defaulted and Petitioner 

did not have an opportunity to address that argument, the Court also addresses the merits 

of the claim.

The prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due 

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment regardless of the 

prosecution’s good or bad faith. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). To establish a 

Brady violation, the defendant must show that the evidence was favorable to the accused 

either as exculpatory or impeaching, the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution either 

willfully or inadvertently, and resulting prejudice has occurred. Strickler v. Greene, 527 

U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Here, evidence was not suppressed because Petitioner was always 

aware of the contents of his bag and its destruction was known at the time of trial. See United 

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 709 (1985) (explaining that Brady applied to evidence 

known to the prosecution but not known to the defense prior to trial). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

Brady claim fails.

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Petitioner’s claim is more properly classified as one alleging destruction of evidence, 

which was not exhausted before the state court. Regardless, such a claim is governed by

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), in which the Court held that absent a 

showing of bad faith on the part of the police, “failure to preserve potentially useful evidence 

does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” The duty to preserve evidence is limited 

to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense,”

which requires that the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent 

before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be 

unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California v. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984). The bad faith requirement of Youngblood hinges 

on whether the government had knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence before 

its destruction. See United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner 

has not alleged nor demonstrated that the exculpatory value of the evidence was known to 

the government prior to its destruction; therefore, he cannot establish the necessary bad 

faith. To the extent this claim should have been brought under Youngblood, it is without 

merit.

Claim 2 is procedurally defaulted as a Brady claim or Youngblood claim. 

Alternatively, either claim is without merit.

Claim 3 (as raised in state court)

As presented in state court, Petitioner alleged juror 14’s statements during voir dire 

were a statement on Petitioner’s right to remain silent. Juror 14 stated that, if he were 

innocent, he would testify to that and he was unsure if he would hold it against the 

defendant if he chose not to testify; he subsequently concluded he would have an open 

mind. (Doc. 14, Ex. B at 90-93.) Petitioner argued that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either 

comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such 

silence is evidence of guilt,” citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). He 

contended that juror 14’s comments would be naturally taken by the jury as a comment on 

his failure to testify. He also argues the court allowed the error to stand uncorrected. The 

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court of appeals denied this claim finding that juror 14 had not commented on Petitioner’s 

decision not to testify because, at that time, the juror did not know whether Petitioner would 

choose to testify; therefore, the answers responded only to a hypothetical situation. (Doc. 

14, Ex. I at 2.)

The cases cited by Petitioner involve comment by the prosecutor on a defendant’s 

silence, not juror responses to voir dire questions. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615 (noting that 

comment on a defendant’s refusal to testify operates as “a penalty imposed by courts for 

exercising a constitutional privilege”); United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045 ,1052 (9th 

Cir. 1993); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme 

Court has never held that juror answers could violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right 

to remain silent. Because there is no clearly established federal law on point, Petitioner 

cannot obtain relief under the AEDPA. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74-77 (denying relief 

because, although the Court had opined on the constitutionality of certain governmentsponsored courtroom practices it had not passed on spectator conduct in the courtroom).

Also, Petitioner’s argument that the trial court allowed the juror’s comments to stand 

uncorrected is false. In the final instructions to the jury, the court included the following

summary of a defendant’s right to remain silent:

The defendant has pled not guilty. This plea of not guilty means the 

State must prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. The 

defendant is not required to produce evidence of any kind. The decision on 

whether to produce evidence is left to the defendant acting with the advice 

of an attorney. The defendant’s decision not to produce any evidence is not 

evidence of guilt.

. . . .

The State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 

evidence. You must not conclude that the defendant is likely to be guilty 

because the defendant did not testify. The defendant is not required to testify. 

The decision on whether to testify is left to the defendant acting with the 

advice of an attorney. You must not let this choice affect your deliberations

in any way.

(Doc. 14, Ex. E at 22, 24-25.)

The state court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable.

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Claim 4

Petitioner alleges the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable person to find that 

the victim’s shed was a residential structure. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the 

victim’s condominium was a residential structure, within which the victim found Petitioner

uninvited in his laundry room. (Doc. 14, Ex. I at 2.)

The jury was instructed that a “residential structure” for purposes of the burglary 

statute was defined as: “any structure, moveable or immoveable, permanent or temporary, 

adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not. An attached garage 

is part of a residential structure.” (Id., Ex. E at 29.) A structure was defined as “any vending 

machine, building, object, vehicle, railroad car or place with sides and a floor separately 

securable from any other structure attached to it and used for lodging, business, 

transportation, recreation or storage.” (Id. at 30.) At trial, the victim testified that he lived 

in a 2-bedroom condominium with his wife and daughter. (Id., Ex. C at 20-21.) To enter, a

person would first go through a gate into a walled patio area, belonging solely to that condo,

off of which were two doors, one to the condo and one to the laundry room. (Id. at 21, 36; 

Ex. D at 15.) In the laundry room was a washer and dryer, boiler, and family belongings, 

such as tools, Christmas items, and bikes. (Id., Ex. C at 24, 25, 38-40.) He also testified 

that the wall behind the washing machine was shared with his apartment. (Id. at 41, 42.)

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court applies a doubledeference standard under the AEDPA:

The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction whenever, “after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 

61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). And a state-court decision rejecting a sufficiency 

challenge may not be overturned on federal habeas unless the “decision was 

‘objectively unreasonable.’” 

Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 

(2011)). Because the laundry room could be secured with its own door and was attached to 

the victim’s condominium, where he lived with his family, it was part of a residential 

structure (just as a garage would be under the definition). At a minimum, a rational trier of 

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fact could have found the definition was met by the laundry room. And, the court of 

appeals’ denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence and 

the definition of a residential structure. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this 

claim.

MOTIONS

Petitioner filed motions for discovery, to expand the record, and for an evidentiary 

hearing. (Docs. 18, 19, 21.) These motions seek to place before the Court two documents: 

Officer Lentine’s pretrial defense interview and Officer Lentine’s personnel file. Petitioner 

contends there is a reasonable probability that the information in these documents would 

have changed the outcome of his trial because Officer Lentine testified falsely and has 

placed his integrity in question. As an initial matter, Petitioner states that he has a copy of 

Officer Lentine’s defense interview in his possession. (Doc. 19 at 1.) Despite alleging that 

the interview establishes the officer’s false testimony at trial, Petitioner did not cite a single 

inconsistency between the interview and the trial testimony. (See Doc. 18.) Next, Petitioner

contends the record should be expanded to include this evidence because it would impeach 

Officer Lentine’s trial testimony, and Petitioner’s “confession” to Officer Lentine was not 

voluntary and violated the state’s corpus delecti rule. Petitioner challenged Officer 

Lentine’s testimony as being so unreliable as to violate due process (Claim 5); however, 

the Court found that claim to be procedurally defaulted. Similarly, Petitioner challenged 

the voluntariness of his confession (Claim 1, in part), which the Court also found to be 

defaulted. Because the Court is not reviewing these claims on the merits, there is no basis 

to consider additional evidence related to them.3

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing for the Court to “determine the sufficiency 

of the evidence upon the expanded record.” (Doc. 21 at 2.) Petitioner did not raise a claim 

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole but, in Claim 4, he challenged the 

3 Petitioner spends almost the entirety of his Motion to Expand the Record 

discussing voluntariness and other alleged constitutional violations that are not before this 

Court on the merits. (See Doc. 18.) The Court evaluates Petitioner’s motions for evidentiary 

development solely as to the four claims (or portions thereof) that it found to be exhausted.

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sufficiency of the evidence as to one element of the charge on which he was convicted. 

However, such a claim is necessarily decided on the record before the trial court. See 

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Whether the evidence was 

sufficient to support the verdict must be determined from a review of the evidence in the 

record in the state proceedings.”); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 322 (noting that sufficiency of the 

evidence claims almost always can be determined on the written record without a hearing).

Therefore, no evidentiary development is warranted to evaluate Claim 4 or a general claim 

of insufficient evidence.

To establish a right to either discovery or an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must 

demonstrate that, if allowed to fully develop the facts he alleges, he will be entitled to relief. 

See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-

13 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited 

by § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner fails to identify how the requested evidence would establish his 

entitlement to relief on Claims 1 to 4, the only claims the Court reviews on the merits. The 

Court’s alternative merits ruling on Claim 2 was premised on insufficient allegations to 

establish a Brady or Youngblood violation. The Court resolved Claim 3 solely by reviewing

the voir dire colloquy with Juror 14 and Claim 4 solely by reference to the victim’s 

uncontested trial testimony. Officer Lentine’s testimony and credibility had no bearing on 

the allegations underlying Claims 2-4 or their disposition. In contrast, Officer Lentine’s 

trial testimony was relevant to evaluating Petitioner’s alleged Miranda violation in Claim 

1. However, Petitioner has not identified anything in Officer Lentine’s defense interview 

or personnel file that would demonstrate Petitioner’s Miranda rights were violated. Even 

if Petitioner could prove, with the requested evidence, that some unspecified portion of 

Officer Lentine’s testimony was false, that would not demonstrate his right to relief on 

Claim 1. For these reasons, the requested evidentiary development is not warranted. See 

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (no hearing required when the 

allegations, if proven, would not entitle the petitioner to relief).

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted (Claim 1 based on voluntariness,

Claim 2, Claim 3 based on the Sixth Amendment, and Claims 5 and 6), or without merit 

(Claim 1 based on Miranda, Claim 2 (in the alternative), Claim 3 as pled in state court, and 

Claim 4). Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Further, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s motions for 

discovery, expansion of the record, and an evidentiary hearing (Docs. 18, 19, 21).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-1961-TUC-JAS.

Dated this 27th day of January, 2020.

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