Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03334/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARD CHANG,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

GREATER BAY BANK, GREATER BAY

BANCORP, CHERYL E. HOWELL, KRYSTYNA

MARCINIAK, CATHLEEN COLGAN, ERIC

LEE and DOES 1 to 50,

 Defendants.

__________________________________/

No. C 07-3334 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

Defendants Greater Bay Bank, Greater Bay Bancorp, Cheryl

Howell, Krystyna Marciniak, Cathleen Colgan and Eric Lee have filed

a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pro se Plaintiff Gerard Chang opposes

the motion. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following. As of

April 16, 2001, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Greater Bay Bank

(GBB) as a Vice President and Trust Officer of its trust company,

Greater Bay Trust Company (GBTC). Plaintiff was offered a base

salary of $85,000.00 plus a twenty percent bonus and stock options.

Plaintiff's previous experience is in the administration of

employee benefits retirement plans. GBB hired Plaintiff to be a

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trust account administrator of employee benefits plans and some

individual retirement accounts. All the named individual

Defendants are employees of GBB and GBTC.

Defendant Cheryl E. Howell, an Executive Vice President and

Compliance Officer of GBTC, assigned to Plaintiff a large number of

personal trust accounts, and charitable and non-profit accounts. 

These types of accounts are ordinarily handled by a personal trust

administrator who typically has several years of relevant work

experience and often has a law degree. Plaintiff did not have the

relevant work experience nor a law degree when he was assigned

these accounts. 

On January 26, 2005, Plaintiff resigned from his job on the

ground that he could not perform work that he was unqualified to

do. Defendants wrongfully retaliated against Plaintiff by denying

him the right to collect unemployment insurance benefits. 

Defendants also "robbed" Plaintiff of his bonus payment and stock

options to which he was entitled. Further, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants caused him to suffer a mental breakdown, wrongfully did

not take any action to allow Plaintiff to return to work and

wrongfully failed to offer him disability benefits related to his

diagnosis for bipolar disorder. 

On December 13, 2005, Plaintiff had filed a federal complaint

titled Chang v. Greater Bancorp, Howell, Marciniak, Colman, Lee and

Does 1 to 50, Case No. C 05-5166 CW (2005 complaint). On May 12,

2006, the Court entered an order dismissing many of the causes of

action in the 2005 complaint. On February 16, 2007, Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining causes of

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1Plaintiff was also a plaintiff or defendant in several state

court cases involving individuals who are not parties to this

lawsuit. Two state court judgments have been entered against

Plaintiff.

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action and on, March 14, 2007, Plaintiff filed a statement of nonopposition to Defendants’ motion. On March 19, 2007, the Court

entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants and

judgment was entered against Plaintiff. On April 13, 2007,

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. This appeal is still pending

in the Ninth Circuit. 

On May 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC informed Plaintiff that

the charge was untimely and that it would take no action on it. On

May 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a federal complaint titled Chang v.

Greater Bay Bank, Greater Bay Bancorp, Howell, Marciniak. Colgan,

Lee and Does 1 to 50, Case No. C 07-2437 CW.1 On May 10, 2007,

Plaintiff moved to relate the two cases and on May 17, 2007, the

Court entered an order relating them. On June 7, 2007, the Court

filed an order denying Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismissing the complaint, finding that all of the

claims were barred by res judicata. The Court also noted that

Plaintiff’s ADA claim was deficient because he did not allege that

Defendants were aware of his disability at the time of his

resignation and because he failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies before the EEOC. Further, the Court found that

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was deficient because all of the

Defendants were private actors. The Court granted Plaintiff leave

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to amend the complaint if he could add truthful allegations to

remedy these deficiencies, including the application of res

judicata, and informed him that he must file an amended complaint

along with the full filing fee within thirty days of the date of

the order.

On June 25, 2007, instead of filing an amended complaint,

Plaintiff filed the complaint presently before the Court. As in

the two earlier complaints, Plaintiff asserts numerous causes of

action. He alleges the same causes of action alleged in the May 7,

2007 complaint: (a) violation of the ADA for wrongful termination;

(b) age discrimination based on wrongful termination; (c) violation

of the Fair Labor Standards Act because Defendants demanded that

Plaintiff perform work he was unqualified to do; (d) violation of

the Fair Labor Standards Act based on the hostile work environment

created by Defendants; (e) violation of the Fair Labor Standards

Act based on non-payment of earnings; (f) violation of civil rights

based on wrongful termination; (g) violation of civil rights based

on Defendants' wrongfully withholding disability benefits from

Plaintiff; (h) violation of civil rights based upon Defendants'

denying health benefits to Plaintiff; (i) violation of civil rights

based upon Defendants' actions toward Plaintiff arising out of his

mental breakdown; (j) violation of civil rights based upon

constructive termination; (k) fraud; (l) extortion, coercion and

duress; (m) negligence; (n) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; (o) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (p)

tortious interference with Plaintiff's life and finances; and (q)

negligent interference with Plaintiff's life and finances. In

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addition, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) noncompliance with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); (2)

violation of civil rights based on denial of worker’s compensation

benefits; (3) violation of civil rights based on denial of benefits

under the FMLA; (4) and (5) “constitutional tort in equal

protection” and “breach of contract” based on his constructive

termination; (6) and (7) “constitutional tort in equal protection” 

and “breach of duty” based on the denial of disability benefits;

(8) and (9) “constitutional tort in equal protection” and “breach

of duty” based on denial of health benefits; (10) and (11)

“constitutional tort in equal protection” and “breach of duty”

based on the denial of worker’s compensation benefits; (12) and

(13) “constitutional tort in equal protection” and “breach of

contract based on the denial of benefits under the FMLA. 

In the May 7, 2007 complaint, Plaintiff alleged that in

December, 2006, during the pendency of the appeal of the judgment

on the 2005 complaint, Plaintiff's doctor diagnosed him with

bipolar disorder. Plaintiff communicated this fact to Defendants'

attorneys. Plaintiff now alleges that in December, 2006, he was

informed that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2003

and that he had been hospitalized, diagnosed and treated for his

mental disability during the time he was employed by Defendant

Great Bay Bank. 

Based upon the causes of action listed above, Plaintiff

requests reinstatement of his employment “with seniority and

benefits and within the scope of his work experience and skills,”

an injunction “barring Defendants from engaging in actions that

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contravene federal laws, state laws and government regulations, or

actions that are not in the public interest,” compensatory damages

based on his loss of compensation and benefits, general damages for

emotional distress and mental anguish and punitive damages in the

amount of $10,000,000. 

In its order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss in the

2005 case, the Court summarized Plaintiff's allegations as follows: 

On April 16, 2001, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant

Greater Bay Bancorp (GBB) as a Vice President and Trust

Officer of its Trust Company, Greater Bay Trust Company

(GBTC). Plaintiff was offered a base salary of

$85,000.00 plus a twenty percent bonus and stock options. 

Defendant GBB hired Plaintiff to be the trust account

administrator of its employee benefits plans and of some

individual retirement accounts. Plaintiff's professional

experience is in the administration of employee benefit

retirement plans. In connection with 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (the Patriot Act),

GBB and GBTC had to implement and comply with certain

stringent procedures. When Defendant Cathleen Colgan,

Vice President and Senior Trust Officer responsible for

the administration of Personal Trust accounts, resigned

from her job, Defendant Cheryl Howell, Executive Vice

President of GBB and head of GBTC, assigned Defendant

Colgan's trust accounts, charitable accounts and nonprofit accounts to Plaintiff. Under Patriot Act

regulations, Defendant Howell should have transferred

those accounts to people with relevant experience. 

Plaintiff did not have the experience to administer such

accounts, and Defendant Howell failed to provide to

Plaintiff any program or tools to handle those accounts. 

Defendant Eric Lee, Trust Administrative Assistant at

GBTC, failed to support Plaintiff in the administration

of client accounts as his job required. Defendant

Krystyna Marciniak, Vice President of Operations and

Compliance Officer of GBTC, failed to act in her capacity

as Compliance Officer to prevent this non-compliance with

regulations and sound business principles.

On January 26, 2005, Plaintiff resigned from his job with

GBTC on grounds that he was being asked to perform acts

that contravene banking regulations and the Patriot Act. 

Defendant GBB later refused Plaintiff's claims

for unemployment insurance benefits, and also refused to

pay Plaintiff's bonus. Plaintiff filed complaints with

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the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and

the California Labor Commissioner. Both agencies denied

Plaintiff's claims.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts sixteen

causes of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty,

violation of the Patriot Act, violation of fair labor

standards, and violation of civil rights. The first

eight counts claim that Defendants breached their

fiduciary duty under 12 U.S.C. § 92(a), in their

assignment of accounts to Plaintiff without properly

training him to handle the accounts. Counts nine and ten

claim that Defendant Howell failed to comply with the

Patriot Act by assigning Plaintiff to accounts he did not

know how to manage . . . 

Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring GBB from engaging

in actions that contravene the laws of the United States

and the public interest, reinstatement to his position

with seniority and benefits commensurate with his

experience, lost wages, punitive damages, legal fees, and

other relief the Court deems proper.

May 12, 2006 Order in No. 05-5166 at 2-3.

In the order dismissing the May 7, 2007 complaint, the Court

found that “except for the allegation that Plaintiff suffered from

bipolar disorder, the 2005 complaint and the instant complaint

contain the same allegations against the same Defendants.” June 7,

2007 Order in No. 07-2437 at 7. Except for the allegation that

Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with

bipolar disorder in 2003, the allegations in Plaintiff’s current

complaint are the same as those in the prior two complaints. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Doctrine of Res Judicata

A. Legal Standard 

As discussed in the order dismissing the May, 2007 complaint,

res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the re-litigation of

any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior

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action. Western Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189,

1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v.

Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). The purpose of the doctrine is

to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple law suits,

conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent

decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Marin v. HEW,

Health Care Financing Agency, 769 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985)

(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Res judicata

operates where there is “1) an identity of claims, 2) a final

judgment on the merits, and 3) identity or privity between

parties.” Western Radio, 123 F.3d at 1192 (citing Blonder-Tongue

Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324 (1971)). 

The federal rule on the preclusive effect of a judgment from which

an appeal has been taken is that the pendency of an appeal does not

suspend the effect of a final judgment for res judicata purposes. 

Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1985),

superseded on other grounds, 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Two claims or causes of action are the same, for purposes of

the first prong of the res judicata test, if they arise from the

same transaction or series of transactions. Two events are part of

the same transaction or series of transactions where the claims

share a factual foundation such that they could have been tried

together. Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir.

1992). “Different theories supporting the same claim for relief

must be brought in the initial action.” Id. Likewise, all

evidence pertinent to a particular claim must be raised in the

initial action because “when a court of competent jurisdiction has

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entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the

parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound not only

as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or

defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter

which might have been offered for that purpose.” Commissioner of

Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

B. Application

A review of the allegations in the 2005 complaint, the May 7,

2007 complaint and the instant complaint reveals that, except for

the allegations that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder

in 2003 and Defendants were aware of this, the three complaints

have identical allegations against Defendants. 

The first two prongs for the application of res judicata are

easily met because there was a judgment on the merits in the 2005

complaint and the parties are the same in both actions. Plaintiff

argues that the FMLA and workers compensation claims added in the

new complaint are different. However, the causes of action in the

complaints arise from the same transactions or series of

transactions, as described in the law discussed above.

 The only new factual allegation in the instant complaint, that

Plaintiff was first diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2003 and

Defendants were aware of the diagnosis, fails for two reasons. If

Plaintiff was aware of his diagnosis in 2003, he should have made

any allegations related to that diagnosis in his 2005 complaint. 

Further, this allegation conflicts with the allegation in the May

7, 2007 complaint that Plaintiff was not diagnosed with bipolar

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disorder until December, 2006. 

It appears that Plaintiff has attempted to cure one of the

defects of his ADA claim in the May 7, 2007 complaint by making the

new allegation that Defendants were aware of his bipolar disorder. 

However, Plaintiff may not remedy defects by making conflicting

allegations. Thus, even if the Court considered this complaint as

the amendment allowed in the June 7, 2007 order dismissing the May

7, 2007 complaint, it is subject to dismissal because it does not

cure the defects noted in that order. 

All of Plaintiff's causes of action are dismissed based upon

the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Defendants request that the Court issue an order pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, prohibiting Plaintiff from

“filing additional lawsuits against Defendants regarding his

employment and resignation.” Motion at 10. 

 Federal courts have the inherent power "to regulate the

activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored

restrictions under the appropriate circumstances." DeLong v.

Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990). As noted by the

Ninth Circuit, district courts "bear an affirmative obligation to

ensure that judicial resources are not needlessly squandered on

repeated attempts by litigants to misuse the courts." O'Loughlin

v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit has established four guidelines "to maintain

this delicate balance between broad court access and prevention of

court abuse." Id. at 617. Before a court enters a vexatious

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2

Defendants' request for judicial notice of filings and orders

in the 2005 and May 7, 2007 cases, which Plaintiff does not oppose,

is also GRANTED (Docket No. 7).

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litigant order: (1) the plaintiff must be given adequate notice to

oppose entry of the order; (2) the court must present an adequate

record by listing the case filings that support its order; 3) the

court must make substantive findings of frivolousness or

harassment; and (4) the order must be narrowly tailored to remedy

only the plaintiff's particular abuses. Id.; DeLong, 912 F.2d at

1147-49.

Based on the record before it, the Court will not enter such

an order at this time. However, the Court reminds Plaintiff that

the doctrine of res judicata precludes him from again raising

against Defendants any claims arising out of the termination of his

employment, even if those claims are based on new legal theories. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons noted above, the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 6).2 This matter is dismissed with

prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of the Court shall

enter judgment and close the file. Each party shall bear its own

costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANG et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GREATER BAY BANK et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-03334 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on September 21, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Gerard Chang

1247 Vicente Street

San Francisco, CA 94116

Dated: September 21, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:07-cv-03334-CW Document 17 Filed 09/21/07 Page 12 of 12