Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON SAUNDERS, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

DETECTIVE CYNTHIA KNIGHT, ) 

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-5924 REC LJO 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(Doc. 63)

On Monday, December 19, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (the

“Motion”). Upon due consideration of the written and oral

arguments of the parties and the record herein, the Court GRANTS

the Motion in part and DENIES it in part as set forth herein.

I. Factual Background

Sharon Saunders (“Plaintiff”) was involved in an

organization called the “Constitutional Colleagues,” which is an

“educational organization based on the lawful principles of the

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This passage appears in the FAC entirely in capital letters, 1

as does the majority of the FAC and Plaintiff’s Opposition. The

Court has reproduced all such passages in conventional form for

easier reading. Defendants ask the court to order Plaintiff to

“use lower-case font where appropriate.” Mot. at 2:27-28 n. 1.

Defendants do not cite, nor is the Court is aware of, any authority

that prohibits the use of all capital letters. That said, and in

the interest of clarity, the Court would ask Plaintiffs in the

future to forebear from using all capital letters in their

pleadings. See Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing in Plain English 126

(2001) (“The problem with using all capitals is that individual

characters lose their distinctive features: the strokes that go

above and below a line of text. . . . Capital letters, by

contrast, are designed to be uniform in size. And when they come

in battalions, the eye must strain a little — or a lot — to make

out words and sentences . . . .”)

2

Federal Constitution of the United States of America.” 1st Am. 1

Comp. (“FAC”) at 5:15-18. On January 5, 1999, Fresno County

Sheriff’s Department law enforcement officers entered a meeting

room at the Fashion Fair Mall where a meeting of the

Constitutional Colleagues (hereinafter “CC”) was taking place. 

The officers executed a search warrant and Plaintiff was

arrested. Plaintiff’s vehicle and residence in Clovis were also

searched pursuant to a warrant. Plaintiff alleges that personal

property was seized from her person, vehicle, and home.

Plaintiff was taken into custody on a charge of violating

California Penal Code section 327 (“Section 327”). Section 327

makes an endless chain scheme unlawful. An “endless chain” is

defined as:

[A]ny scheme for the disposal or distribution

of property whereby a participant pays a

valuable consideration for the chance to

receive compensation for introducing one or

more additional persons into participation in

the scheme or for the chance to receive

compensation when a person introduced by the

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 These defendants were District Attorney Edward Hunt, Deputy 2

District Attorney Bob Ellis, and Deputy District Attorney John

Savrnoch.

 These defendants were Detective Cynthia Knight, Sheriff 3

Richard Pierce, Detective Mark Chapman, Sergeant Dadian, Detective

Earl Richardson, Detective Janice Rasmussen, Detective Ken Bowden,

Deputy Dale Bauman, Deputy Mark Severson, Deputy Patrick Hanson,

3

participant introduces a new participant. 

Compensation, as used in this section, does

not mean or include payment based upon sales

made to persons who are not participants in

the scheme and who are not purchasing in

order to participate in the scheme.

Cal. Pen. Code § 327. Endless chains are more commonly known as

pyramid schemes. In addition to Plaintiff Sharon Saunders, three

other people — Blaine William, Peter Plitt and Jerry Thorstad —

were charged with violating Section 327. 

On July 7, 2003, a preliminary hearing on the criminal

charge was held in Fresno County Superior Court. Judge Nunez

dismissed the charges as to all defendants, finding that there

was no probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. 

II. Procedural Background

On July 2, 2004, Plaintiff and her husband Merlin Saunders

filed their initial complaint alleging various causes of action

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section 1983”) and various state

law tort theories. The initial complaint named as defendants the

City of Fresno, the County of Fresno (including the Board of

Supervisors), members of the District Attorney’s Office (“DA 2

Defendants”), and members of the Fresno County Sheriff’s

Department (“Sheriff Defendants”). On May 3, 2005, the Court 3

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issued its Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

51), which dismissed all claims against the City of Fresno and

the DA Defendants and the state claims against the Sheriff

Defendants.

On September 13, 2005, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed

her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging four causes of

action under Section 1983. The claims in the FAC are based on

the the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, respectively. All claims are against

the Sheriff Defendants and the County of Fresno (collectively

“Defendants”). On September 28, 2005, Defendants filed this

Motion.

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v.

Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in

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the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). 

The Court may consider the complaint itself along with any

material properly considered as part of the complaint. 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a court considers documents

beyond the face of the complaint in the context of a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, it should resolve any

ambiguities in the nonmoving party’s favor. Int’l Audiotext

Network, Inc. v. AT&T, 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995). Where the

complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted,

leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373

(9th Cir. 1990). 

//

//

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B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants move the Court to dismiss all claims on the basis

that qualified immunity precludes liability. Plaintiff argues

that dismissal based on qualified immunity is inappropriate at

this stage because it is an affirmative defense. A court can

dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative

defense appears on the face of the complaint. Leveto v. Lapina,

258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001). Therefore, qualified immunity

“‘will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is

established on the face of the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Hafley

v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiffs are not

required to anticipate defenses and to “plead around all

potential defenses.” Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,

372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may however

“plea[d] itself out of court” and be subject to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion if it admits all of the elements of an impenetrable

defense. Id.

An official who violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right

is entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not “clearly

established.” Kennedy v. Ridgefield City, 411 F.3d 1134, 1141

(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121

S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)). A right is clearly

established where the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201). To decide whether a right is clearly established, a court

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should focus on whether a reasonable official would recognize

that his or her conduct violates that right under the

circumstances and in light of the law that existed at that time. 

Id. at 1144. Even if a court decides that the right the official

violated is clearly established, qualified immunity is available

if the official made a reasonable mistake in applying the

relevant legal doctrine. Id. at 1141-42. 

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed because it was not “clearly settled” that the business

scheme Plaintiff operated did not violate Section 327. Mot. at

5:4-5. The allegations of Plaintiff’s FAC do not describe the

business scheme in which Plaintiff engaged. Defendants support

their qualified immunity argument with reference to the exhibits

Plaintiff attached to the FAC, including Ms. Knight’s Statement

of Probable Cause (the “Knight Statement” or the “Statement”)

(FAC Ex. 1) and a transcript of criminal proceedings in the

Fresno County Superior Court (FAC Ex. 7).

Defendants contend that “Knight’s statement also establishes

that [CC]’s scheme included a separate inducement for members of

the public to join and to part with $125: the chance to receive

compensation under the pyramid structure, when additional persons

within the participant’s ‘downline’ also pay $125 to join.” Mot.

at 5:16-19. Defendants point to several portions of the

Statement where Ms. Knight cites evidence that CC violated

Section 327. Mot. at 5:21-28 n. 4. Defendant also cites Judge

Nunez’s statement that “[t]he evidence certainly has some

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hallmarks of a pyramid scheme.” Mot. at 6:1-2 (quoting FAC Ex.

7). Defendants correctly contend that the Court can consider

exhibits to the FAC in the context of a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1555 n.

19. On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes these documents

in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Int’l Audiotext, 62

F.3d at 72. 

Where a plaintiff attaches documents and relies on their

contents to form the basis of a claim, dismissal is appropriate

if the document negates the claim. Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of

Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). In

Thompson, the employee plaintiff claimed that he was transferred

and later removed from his position in retaliation for exercising

First Amendment rights. Id. at 753. The employee attached to

the complaint a document describing the duties of his position in

order to support his claim that he was demoted when he was

transferred. Id. at 754. The court considered the job

description to dismiss the claim, holding that the employment

actions were justified because, based solely on the court’s

reading of the attached description, employee’s position was a

“policymaking” position. Id. at 757-58. By attaching the job

description to show a proposition necessary to his claim — that

he was demoted — the employee thereby asserted that it was “true

and correct” for the purpose of establishing the employer’s

decisive affirmative defense. Id. at 758. 

The passages in the exhibits to the FAC that Defendants cite

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to support their qualified immunity claim are distinguishable

from the exhibit in Thompson. Here, Plaintiff has not relied on

the passages she attached to the FAC as a necessary part of her

claims. Plaintiff is not required to plead facts that show that

a qualified immunity defense fails. See Xechem, 372 F.3d at 901. 

Plaintiff does not rely on the Knight Statement in order to

establish the nature of CC’s business scheme. If Plaintiff had

attached the Statement for the purpose of pleading details of the

scheme, under Thompson the Statement would control over contrary

allegations and could provide a basis for dismissal on the

grounds of qualified immunity. In fact, Plaintiff disputes the

evidence Ms. Knight relies on and the conclusions she makes. 

Because Plaintiff has not alleged the details of CC’s conduct, or

otherwise based her claims on the Statement, she is not bound to

the Statement’s details. Plaintiff can conceivably prove a set

of facts that show that Ms. Knight’s characterization of CC’s

conduct is incorrect and that qualified immunity does not apply. 

Nor does Plaintiff rely on Judge Nunez’s statement that the

case against Plaintiff had “some hallmarks of a pyramid scheme.” 

None of Plaintiff’s claims require her to allege the manner in

which the judge in the criminal matter characterized the case

against her. Consequently, her attachment of a document

containing that language does not amount to an assertion that the

judge’s characterization is true. Furthermore, the focus in a

qualified immunity inquiry is based on how a reasonable official

would construe Plaintiff’s conduct. Judge Nunez’s opinion

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Because qualified immunity is not a ground to dismiss the 4

FAC, the Court need not at this stage decide whether the doctrine

of res judicata precludes Defendants from arguing that qualified

immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims.

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regarding CC’s scheme does not establish that no set of facts

could establish that a reasonable official would come to a

different conclusion.

The Court declines at this stage to infer from the documents

Plaintiff attached to the FAC the nature of the CC business

scheme. This is because the facts Defendants point to in those

documents are not analogous to allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC. 

Instead, they are statements of third parties, the contents of

which Plaintiff disputes. Because the details of Plaintiff and

CC’s allegedly illegal conduct are not apparent from the FAC, the

Court cannot determine whether Defendants’ actions in response to

that conduct were contrary to established law. Accordingly, none

of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal on the basis of

qualified immunity.4

C. First Amendment

Count One of Plaintiff’s FAC claims that Defendants’ actions

“violated, denied and deprived Plaintiff Sharon Saunders her

Federal Constitutional rights under the First Amendment of the

Federal Constitution to freedom of assembly, freedom of

association and freedom to contract . . . .” FAC at 30:19-25.

1. Freedom of Association

Defendants claim that Plaintiff fails to state a claim based

on the right of expressive association under the three-part test

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set forth in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 648-56,

120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000). In Dale, the Court’s

first step was to consider whether the group making the claim

engaged in expressive association. Id. at 648. Second, the

Court decided whether the alleged governmental action

significantly affected the group’s ability to advocate public or

private viewpoints. Id. at 653. Finally, the Court balanced the

governmental interest in the action against the burden on the

associational expression to determine whether the burden was

justified in light of the governmental interest. Id. at 656. To

state a claim for violation of its expressive association rights,

Plaintiff must satisfy all three prongs. See Dale, 530 U.S. at

656.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second

prong because she and CC were free to sell the tapes, so long as

they did not use a pyramid-style compensation system. CC and

Plaintiff, Defendants allege, were still free to “continue to

associate, discuss the constitution and sell tapes.” Mot. at

9:5-6. In support, Defendants cite the Knight Statement, which

indicates that Defendants acted only “to preclude pyramid

compensation, not the selling of tapes.” Mot. at 9:3-5. The

Court does not find allegations in the FAC that establish

Plaintiffs engaged in pyramid-style compensation. Nor does the

FAC establish that Defendants’ adverse treatment of CC or

Plaintiff would have ceased if Plaintiff had changed its

compensation scheme. For the reasons discussed above, the Court

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will not accept as true Ms. Knight’s statements attached to the

FAC in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Thompson, 300 F.3d at

754. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “caused the permanent

loss, and destruction of the lawful organization known as

Constitutional Colleagues which Plaintiff was an active member

of, which loss and destruction directly caused denial,

deprivation, violation of said Plaintiffs 1st Amendment Federal

Constitutional rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of

association, and freedom to contract, . . . .” FAC at 26:12-21. 

Plaintiff claims Defendants were motivated not to prevent pyramid

compensation, but rather to “cause the removal or termination of

Fresno County Sheriffs Deputy Peter Plit,” a co-defendant with

Plaintiff in the criminal case in Fresno Superior Court. FAC at

27:10-17. 

Plaintiff’s claim seems to be that Defendants’ wrongful

actions not only harmed CC but caused it to cease to exist

completely. Because CC was destroyed by Defendants’ actions,

Plaintiff and the group lost all ability to meet and advocate

their viewpoints. Plaintiff alleges that, at a meeting on

January 5, 1999, Defendants used “force of arms, verbal and

physical threats and coercive intimidation” to arrest her and

other members of CC and seize personal property. FAC at 5:8-6:7. 

Thus, on at least that occasion, Plaintiff was prevented from

meeting with CC. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that during the

four-and-a-half years before the Fresno Superior Court dismissed

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the charges, she was “under custody of the court and was subject

to constant and ongoing threat of being seized and arrested, and

subject to ongoing searches at will of said Defendants, and

discretion of the court . . . .” FAC at 22:4-10. 

The Court interprets the FAC to allege that until the

criminal court dismissed charges against Plaintiff, she was

forbidden to meet with the CC and engage in the group’s

expressive activities. Viewing these allegations in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ actions deprived her of

her ability to express herself through the meetings with CC. See

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 33 L. Ed. 2d

266 (1972) (placing burden on university to justify denying

student club the right to meet on campus).

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the

third prong because Defendants have an interest in the prevention

of financial crimes and in enforcing the laws of the state. This

argument presents no reason to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim, at this

stage, because the FAC does not establish that Plaintiff or CC

have violated state law. Viewing the FAC and its attachments in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has stated a

claim for a violation of her rights of expressive association.

2. Freedom of Assembly

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not state a claim for

violation of her rights to freedom of assembly because Defendants

acted only to prevent improper pyramid compensation. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff and CC were free to meet for any purpose,

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provided they did not commit a crime. Defendants point out that

the First Amendment only protects lawful, not illegal, assembly,

citing in support De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.

Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937). 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not merit dismissal on the basis

Defendants proffer. Plaintiff does not merely allege that

Defendants wrongfully prevented her and CC from engaging in

pyramid compensation. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants were motivated by a desire to retaliate against Mr.

Plit, not to enforce Section 327. FAC at 27:10-17. She alleges

that Defendants therefore unconstitutionally targeted CC, a

“lawful and legitimate” organization that was “lawfully selling a

product.” FAC at 19:22-28. Defendants allegedly destroyed CC

through arrests, seizure of property, and the ongoing threat of

arrest and seizure. FAC at 5:8-6:7, 22:4-10. At this stage, the

Court will not accept as true statements in documents attached to

the FAC on which Plaintiff does not rely to state a claim. 

Thompson, 300 F.3d at 754. The Knight Statement cannot establish

that Defendants’ actions were justified by law or that their

actions toward CC would have ceased if the alleged pyramid

compensation was absent. Viewing these allegations in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff, she has stated a claim for

violation of her rights to freedom of assembly.

3. Freedom to Contract

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ activities violated her

“rights under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution to

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. . . freedom to contract . . . .” FAC at 30:21-25. The Court

is unaware of any “freedom to contract” under the First

Amendment. The Supreme Court formerly recognized an absolute

right to freedom of contract under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25

S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905); but see W. Coast Hotel Co. v.

Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not

speak of freedom of contract.”). The Contracts Clause of the

United States Constitution provides that “no state shall enter

into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 10. The threshold inquiry is “whether the state

law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a

contractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v.

Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 57 L. Ed. 2d 727

(1978). Plaintiff does not allege that any state law has

affected a contractual obligation.

In her Opposition, Plaintiff characterized her “freedom to

contract” argument as an argument that Defendants’ actions

amounted to an illegal restriction on commercial speech. 

Plaintiff contends that the inducement CC used to attract

customers “is both a ‘commercial solicitation’ and ‘contract’”

protected by the First Amendment. Opp’n at 32:13-21. 

Plaintiff’s erroneous characterization of her claim as one for

violation of “freedom to contract” does not require dismissal of

a claim for violation of her commercial speech rights. Haddock,

777 F.2d at 464 (holding that “a complaint should not be

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dismissed if it states a claim under any legal theory, even if

the plaintiff erroneously relies on a different legal theory”).

Restrictions on commercial speech are subject to

intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L.

Ed. 2d 341 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court

developed a four-part analysis for commercial speech:

At the outset, we must determine whether the

expression is protected by the First

Amendment. For commercial speech to come

within that provision, it at least must

concern lawful activity and not be

misleading. Next, we ask whether the

asserted governmental interest is

substantial. If both inquiries yield

positive answers, we must determine whether

the regulation directly advances the

governmental interest asserted, and whether

it is not more extensive than is necessary to

serve that interest.

Id.

It does not appear from the face of the FAC that Plaintiff’s

speech was unlawful. Nor is there any indication that

Plaintiff’s marketing scheme was misleading. Viewing the

allegations of the FAC in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the marketing activities connected to CC were protected by the

First Amendment. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants prevented her from meeting

with CC and from engaging in certain marketing activities.

Defendants allegedly imposed a restriction on her speech by

arresting her when she engaged in the protected speech at the CC

meeting, by confiscating CC materials, and by threatening to

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arrest her or seize property if she were to engage in similar

activities in the future. The government potentially has an

interest in prohibiting certain harmful speech that, for example,

comprises an illegal pyramid scheme, or that otherwise victimizes

consumers. The face of the FAC does not reveal that Plaintiff’s

speech was in any way harmful. Thus, the Court cannot determine

on this motion to dismiss that Defendants’ actions against CC or

Plaintiff served any important interest. Plaintiff has stated a

claim for violation of her commercial speech rights.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiff’s Count One.

D. The County

In its Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

51), the Court held that municipalities may not be held liable

for the unconstitutional acts of their employees absent a “direct

causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of

N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 611 (1978). 

Plaintiff included “County of Fresno California” as a defendant

in her FAC. FAC at 1:17. Defendants argue that the FAC fails to

allege that the County of Fresno has engaged in conduct that

satisfies Monell. In her Opposition, Plaintiff states, “As to

the naming of the COUNTY OF FRESNO in the 1st Amended Complaint,

this act was inadvertent on Plaintiff[’s] part, and Plaintiff

will request that the Court disregard and Strike out the

Count[y’s] Name from the Complaint.” Opp’n at 5:26-6:4 

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The Court need not decide whether to dismiss the claims for 5

punitive damages against County of Fresno, as all claims against it

have been dismissed.

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Accordingly, all claims against the County of Fresno are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.5

E. Delay of the Preliminary Hearing

Plaintiff claims that Defendants unreasonably delayed a

preliminary hearing on the charge that she violated Section 327. 

The FAC does not contain any allegations specifying actions that

the Defendants took to delay the preliminary hearing. Plaintiff

merely states: “Defendants had a clear and known duty under the

Federal Constitution under the 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amendments 

thereto, to refrain from delaying the required preliminary

hearing . . . . Said Defendants caused the delay in question,

and are therefore liable . . . .” FAC at 22:25-23:8. At oral

argument, in response to the Court’s questioning, Plaintiff

merely reiterated her claim that the delay was unreasonably long. 

She did not identify any action by the Defendants remaining in

this action that caused the delay of Plaintiff’s hearing.

The government has the duty to ensure a prompt inquiry into

criminal charges. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S. Ct.

2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). The prosecutor, the court and its

staff, and even defense counsel may bear the responsibility to

expedite proceedings in criminal cases. Hodges v. United States,

408 F.2d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 1969); Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d

1257, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing dismissal of a complaint

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It is unclear under which cause of action Plaintiff makes 6

this claim. The best candidate is Count Two, which seeks recovery

under the Fourth Amendment, because Plaintiff characterizes the

delay as a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The text of

Count Two, however, does not itself appear to state a claim for the

delay of Plaintiff’s hearing. 

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seeking monetary and injunctive relief against stenographer and

court reporter alleged to have failed to comply with plaintiff’s

request for a trial court transcript). Following the dismissal

of the County of Fresno, all remaining Defendants appear to be

members of the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department. The Court is

unaware of, and the Plaintiff fails to cite, any authority that

creates an affirmative duty on the part of law enforcement

officials to cause a preliminary hearing to occur expeditiously. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts that indicate Defendants

acted in a manner inconsistent with a speedy initial hearing. 

Cf. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-53, 112 S. Ct.

2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992) (government investigators violated

Sixth Amendment where for six years they “made no serious effort

to test their progressively more questionable assumption that

[defendant] was living abroad, and, had they done so, they could

have found him within minutes”). 

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that establish that

Defendants caused a delay in Plaintiff’s hearing. Accordingly,

the FAC is DISMISSED to the extent it incorporates Plaintiff’s

claim for relief for “Unreasonable Delay from Arrest to

Preliminary Hearing in Violation of the 4th Amendment of the

Federal Constitution” (FAC at 21:17-23:8). Leave to file a 6

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second amended complaint is GRANTED.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. All claims against Defendant County of Fresno are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiff’s claim for relief for “Unreasonable Delay from

Arrest to Preliminary Hearing in Violation of the 4th

Amendment of the Federal Constitution” is DISMISSED against

all Defendants.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to all

other claims.

4. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30

days of the issuance of this order. Failure to comply will

result in dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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