Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01661/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01661-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARBJIT KAUR d/b/a 

AHLISHAN FASHION FABRICS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS CO., LTD, ; and

DOES 1-10,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-01661 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as preempted under the Warsaw

Convention. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate

for submission without oral argument, and accordingly VACATES the April 21, 2006 hearing. The case

management conference scheduled for April 21, 2006 at 2:00 p.m. remains on calendar. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion and DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2005, plaintiff Sarbjit Kaur, d/b/a Ahlishan Fashion Fabrics, filed a complaint in

Alameda County Superior Court against defendant All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. And Does 1-10. The

complaint alleges that plaintiff hired defendant to move five pieces of cargo from New Delhi, India to

San Francisco, California. Complaint ¶ 5. The complaint alleges that although all five pieces of cargo

were put on defendant’s aircraft in India, two pieces of cargo were lost by the time plaintiff went to pick

up the cargo at defendant’s warehouse in South San Francisco. Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. According to defendant,

Case 3:06-cv-01661-SI Document 18 Filed 04/17/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Notice of Removal states that defendant was served on or about January 31, 2006.

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 Prior to filing the instant motion, defendant met and conferred with plaintiff and requested that

plaintiff stipulate to replace the state law causes of action with a Warsaw Convention cause of action.

Plaintiff refused to do so. See Hutchison Decl. Ex. 3 and 4.

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the warehouse is located within the grounds of San Francisco International Airport. See Motion, Ex.

2 (invoice for Nippon Cargo Airlines showing address in SFO International Airport). The missing cargo

consists of fabric, jewelry, and women’s clothing. Complaint at ¶ 8. The complaint alleges four claims

under state law: (1) breach of contract; (2) conversion; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

On March 3, 2006, defendant filed a notice of removal, on the ground that the Court has original

jurisdiction over the case because plaintiff’s claims arise under the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal

Convention, which are both applicable to international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods

performed by aircraft for hire.1

 Defendant has now moved to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims as

preempted by the Warsaw Convention. Alternatively, defendant requests that the Court deem plaintiff’s

breach of contract claim as a claim for cargo loss under the Warsaw Convention, and dismiss the

remaining claims as preempted state law claims.2

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss

is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer

evidence in support of the claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

In answering this question, the Court must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and

must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d

556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is

remote, the Court must allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. See

United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).

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If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The

Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Formally known as the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air, “the Warsaw Convention is a comprehensive international treaty . . . governing

liability in ‘all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods.’” Carey v. United Airlines,

255 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting note following statute). When the Warsaw Convention

governs a particular claim, the terms of the Convention preempt state and/or local law claims, in the

interest of achieving a uniform application of liability rules with respect to claims arising from

international air transportation. See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999)

(stating “[g]iven the Convention’s comprehensive scheme of liability rules and its textual emphasis on

uniformity, we would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers

to the distinct, nonuniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations”). A party asserting a claim

that is ultimately controlled by the terms of the Warsaw Convention can generally only pursue that claim

pursuant to those terms. See 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, reprinted at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105, Art. 24(1)

(stating “in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only

be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention”).

Article 18 of the Convention addresses air carrier liability with respect to loss of or damage to

baggage or goods, specifically providing that “the carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the

event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence

which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air.” 49 U.S.C.A. §

40105, Art. 18(1). Article 18(3) further provides that,

[t]he period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land,

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by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such transportation takes

place in the performance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of

loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the

contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the transportation

by air.

49 U.S.C.A. § 40105, Art. 18(3) (emphasis added).

Article 18(3) applies “[w]here there is some conflict over whether the damage occurred during

air transportation” and “creates a rebuttable presumption that the damage took place during air

transportation.” Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd., 186 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding that Warsaw Convention did not apply to damage to goods since damage occurred on

the ground, outside London’s Heathrow Airport). A claimant seeking to avoid the reach of the Warsaw

Convention must affirmatively show that the damage to goods did not occur during the course of

international air travel.

Here, plaintiff asserts that the Warsaw Convention does not apply because the loss occurred at

defendant’s warehouse. However, defendant has submitted undisputed evidence that the warehouse is

located within the grounds of San Francisco International Airport. See Motion, Ex. 2. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that the Warsaw Convention covers plaintiff’s loss. See id.; see also Victoria Sales

Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, 917 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s the plain language of Article 18

directs, ‘transportation by air’ would include a loss occurring while the cargo was in the air or on the

ground but within the confines of the airport's boundaries.”) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff also asserts, without citation to any authority, that the Warsaw Convention does not

apply because plaintiff has alleged intentional or gross negligence on the part of defendant. This

contention lacks merit. “The Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive remedy for claims arising out

of a carrier’s intentional misconduct. If a plaintiff establishes wilful misconduct by the carrier, Article

25 lifts the Convention’s limits on liability, but the Convention remains the exclusive source for the

plaintiff’s remedy.” Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Servs., 295 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. If plaintiff wishes to pursue a claim under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiff may file an

amended complaint on or before May 15, 2006.

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United States District Court

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 The Court also notes that plaintiff attached a letter to the opposition that includes a settlement

demand. This disclosure is improper, and plaintiff is cautioned against filing any documents regarding

settlement negotiations.

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2. Defendant’s Evidentiary Objection 

Defendant objects that a statement in the Shah Declaration is inadmissible hearsay. Although

the basis for defendant’s objection is incorrect, the Court finds that the statement – “Items were either

intentionally or negligently misplaced from defendant’s warehouse, by his employees” – is improper

argument contained in a declaration. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES this statement from the Shah

Declaration.3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s

motion to dismiss and provides plaintiff leave to amend. (Docket No. 8).

Dated: April 15, 2006

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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