Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08110/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Travis Donovan Hiland, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-08110-PHX-PGR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Travis Donovan Hiland (Petitioner) has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an Answer asserting that 

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred or lack merit (Doc. 15), and Petitioner has 

filed a reply and a supplemental reply in support of his Petition.1

 (Docs. 25, 28.) For the 

reasons below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges 

 On June 8, 2007, Petitioner and co-defendants Joseph Hiland (Petitioner’s father), 

Tyson Hiland (Petitioner’s brother), and Stephen Cottrell were indicted by a Yavapai 

County Grand Jury on one count of conspiracy to commit theft (Count One), one count of 

theft (Count Two), one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices (Count Three), and one 

count of participating in a criminal syndicate (Count Four), all class two felonies. 

 

1

 Petitioner also filed an “Erratum” correcting several “misstatements” and 

typographical errors in his reply. (Doc. 26.) 

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(Doc. 15, Ex. A.)2 Petitioner was charged as Travis Donovan Hiland, DBA Engage 

Development Company, LLC, Senior Life Asset Management LLC, and/or XYZ 

Companies 1-10. (Id.) The indictment alleged that, through a Ponzi-type scheme, 

Petitioner and his co-defendants obtained funds totaling $1,658,849.71 from over twenty 

individuals, who were identified as victims in the indictment.3

 (Id.) 

B. Rule 17.4 hearings 

 The case was assigned to Superior Court Judge Thomas Lindberg. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. B.) Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4, Petitioner and his codefendants participated in several plea negotiation conferences before Superior Court 

Judge Robert Brutinel. (Doc. 15, Exs. C, D, KK, LL.) 

 Over the course of those conferences, the State offered to allow the defendants to 

plead guilty to theft and fraudulent schemes in exchange for dismissing the other charges, 

provided that all of the defendants agreed to plead guilty. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 7-8.) The 

State indicated that it would consider recommending a sentencing range of three to 

twelve-and-a-half years’ imprisonment on each charge with the possibility of probation, 

and that it wanted a judge other than Judge Lindberg to conduct the sentencing. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. KK at 12-13.) The State told Judge Brutinel that it “would be looking for 

prison with respect to the two [younger] Hilands, but for Joe Hiland . . . [it] would 

probably” recommend probation because of his poor health. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 9.) For 

Petitioner and co-defendant Tyson Hiland, the State said “[w]e want that range of three to 

12.5 years. . . I don’t know that in the end we would be recommending the maximum, but 

I don’t want to make any promises that anyone relies on as part of the settlement 

negotiations what our position would be.” (Id. at 11.) The State explained that it wanted 

a presentence hearing and for the victims to be able to testify. (Id.) 

 

2

 Exhibits A-SS to Respondents’ Answer are located at docket 15. Exhibits TTBBB are located at docket 16. 

3

 The presentence report details the factual allegations underlying the charges. (Doc. 15, Ex. P.) 

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 Judge Brutinel told Petitioner and his co-defendants that the State was “not willing 

to make a recommendation [about sentencing] one way or the other,” and that they “want 

to attend the presentence hearing and listen to the victims testify before they make a 

recommendation.” (Id. at 11.) Judge Brutinel stated “I don’t see [the State] making a 

specific recommendation. I don’t see them agreeing to a cap.” (Id. at 12.) Judge 

Brutinel further stated “if [the defendants] wanted to take the offer the State’s making, 

you are kind of looking at the range between three and 12-and-a-half with the possibility 

of probation. I mean, that’s the ball park we are talking about.” (Id. at 14.) Judge 

Brutinel reiterated to Petitioner and his counsel that “I don’t see them offering you a 

probation mandatory plea.” (Id. at 18.) After Petitioner’s counsel asserted that Petitioner 

should be sentenced to probation to facilitate his ability to make a good faith effort on 

restitution, Judge Brutinel stated: 

“[T]o be perfectly blunt, with all due respect, sir, there’s no way in the world you are going to make even a token payment on 1.6 million dollars in restitution and neither is 

your brother, neither is your dad . . . I just don’t see any prospects of you being able to do that under the 

circumstances. 

[The State is] not going to agree to a probation mandatory. I 

was amazed they were willing to continue with the probation eligible offer. 

I think there is a reasonable prospect – you’ve got a lot of victims in this case. You’ve got a lot of victims in this case 

which are, to use the term of art as Judge Lindberg refers to it in his minute entry, vulnerable adults. There is going to be a 

considerable amount of sympathy and some public pressure to do something fairly serious and particularly given none of these people are likely to see any of their money back. 

I don’t think it’s likely that Judge Lindberg will stack the sentences in this case, but it’s possible. 

I think he will put you in prison, and I think the prison term is somewhere between the presumptive and maximum in this 

case. Somewhere between five and 12-and-a-half, and I have 

to tell you if I was the sentencing judge, it is likely that I would do the same thing. I probably would not put you on probation in this case. I probably would send you to prison. 

(Id. at 19-20.) 

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 Petitioner, his father, and brother ultimately expressed an interest in accepting the 

plea offer if Judge Lindberg, who was familiar with the case, remained the sentencing 

judge.4

 (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 26.) Petitioner’s counsel stated that “Travis will probably 

take the offer you are making with one change, and that change is that Lindberg does the 

sentencing.” (Id. at 29.) The State agreed to have Judge Lindberg act as the sentencing 

judge. (Id. at 34.) 

 On December 22, 2008, during the final Rule 17.4 conference before Judge 

Brutinel, Petitioner’s counsel argued that it could be considered coercive to “have a group 

of people that are forced to take a unified plea.” (Doc. 15, Ex. LL. at 4.) The State 

argued that, pursuant to State v. Solano, 724 P.2d 17 (Ariz. 1986), package plea deals 

were appropriate so long as the court reviewed the totality of circumstances surrounding 

the plea and ensured it was not coercive. (Id. at 7-8.) Judge Brutinel acknowledged that 

a “package plea offer which purports to offer a benefit to a third party does indeed require 

some extra judicial scrutiny,” concluding that under Arizona law, “package deals are 

okay, but you need to be careful with them.” (Id. at 17-18.) The change of plea was 

scheduled for the following day, December 23, 2008. (Id. at 35.) 

C. The Plea Agreement and Change of Plea Hearing 

 On December 23, 2008, Petitioner, his brother, and father pled guilty to one count 

of theft in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802, a class two felony, and one count of 

fraudulent schemes in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2310, a class two felony. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. F at 1; Ex. MM.) The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. 

(Id. at 3.) 

 Petitioner’s plea agreement provided that “each Class 2 felony carries a 

presumptive sentence of 5 years; a minimum sentence of 4 years (3 years if the court 

finds exceptional circumstances); and a maximum sentence of 10 years (12.5 years if the 

 

4

 Co-Defendant Steve Cottrell wanted to proceed to trial. The State allowed the plea offer to stand, provided all three Hiland defendants entered the plea. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 34.) 

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Court finds exceptional circumstances).” (Id. at 1.) The agreement provided that 

probation was available “for a term not to exceed 7 years.” (Id. at 2.) The plea 

agreement also required the payment of $1,663,849.71 in restitution to the listed victims. 

(Id. at 2.) Petitioner also agreed “to make a factual basis for the change of plea.” (Id. at 

2.) 

 Pursuant to paragraph seven of the plea agreement, Petitioner “consent[ed] to 

judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement 

of sentence.” (Id. at 4.) That paragraph also stated that Petitioner “completely 

understand[s] and agree[s] that by entering into this Plea Agreement . . . any sentence 

either stipulated to or recommended herein [] is not binding on the court.” (Id.) 

Paragraph seven further provided that “[i]n making the sentencing determination, the 

Court is not bound by the rules of evidence.” (Id. at 4.) 

 Paragraph eight reiterated that Petitioner understood that the sentencing 

recommendations in the plea agreement were not binding on the court, and that the court 

was “bound only by the limits set forth in paragraph 1 and the applicable statutes.” (Id.) 

The plea agreement provided that Petitioner had “discussed the case and [his] 

constitutional rights with [his] lawyer.” (Id. at 4.) 

 At the change of plea hearing, Judge Lindberg discussed Petitioner’s sentencing 

exposure and emphasized that the plea agreement permitted it to sentence Petitioner 

within the range provided for in that agreement: 

If I find both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the whole range of sentence is available to the Court, from the 

very minimum to the very maximum. . . . I just want to 

convey to you the whole range of sentence is open if both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. MM at 11.) 

 The court and Petitioner then had the following exchange: 

COURT: Travis did you go over the plea agreement and read it completely before signing? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

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* * * 

COURT: Do you believe you understand the plea agreement, Travis? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

* * * 

COURT: Did [your attorney] explain the plea agreement to you in full before you signed it? Travis? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

* * * 

COURT: Has anybody made you any promises, guarantees or assurances so that you would enter the plea agreement, other than what is contained in the plea agreement itself? Travis? 

* * * 

PETITIONER: No. 

* * * 

COURT: Has anybody threatened you or forced you or coerced you into entering the plea agreement? Travis? 

PETITIONER: No. 

* * * 

COURT: Whether you enter the plea agreement has to be 

your own individual choice. Travis, do you understand that? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

* * * 

COURT: I recognize that this was done as a package deal inclusive of Joseph Hiland, your father. But do you understand that if you did not wish to enter the plea 

agreement, you don’t have to enter the plea agreement? Is that your understanding, Travis? 

PETITIONER: I understand 

* * * 

COURT: So, Travis, are you entering the plea agreement voluntarily of your own free will? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

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* * * 

COURT: Let’s go over the range of sentence that is available. 

Each Class 2 felony can carry prison time. The presumptive sentence is five years. The least I could give is three years. The most I could give is twelve-and-a-half years for each count. Do you understand that,Travis? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

(Id. at 16-21.) 

 The court asked the defendants, including Petitioner, to confirm on the record that 

they entered the plea voluntarily and without any outside influences, and had the 

following exchange with Petitioner: 

COURT: Travis, is that correct? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

COURT: You are doing this of your own volition for the things that you are facing, the potential consequences of going to trial that you are facing, not because the other family member or members may receive benefit from this? 

PETITIONER: That’s correct. 

* * * 

COURT: Is there any other fact, then, other than the plea agreement itself and what you are looking at there, in terms of consequences versus going to trial and the consequences or possible outcome there, that is influencing you to any degree, Travis? 

PETITIONER: No. 

(Id. at 34-35.) 

 Petitioner’s counsel then provided the following factual basis for the plea: 

Both counts covered between January 2nd of 2002 and August 31st of 2005. Travis was selling investments that ranged, but are not limited to, a shrimp farm, resort hotel 

named La Contessa. There was some timber involved. And 

he at some point knew or should have known that Mr. Cottrell 

was having difficulty with the investments. And then 

particular victims. . . not limited to, Wanda Orr and the 

Rutledges alerted his office that they were not getting payments accordingly, and he continued to sell those 

properties, Travis did, despite knowing there [were] material problems with them. 

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And also there were payments being made. Now, those payments were coming from Mr. Cottrell’s office via check to 

where. . . Travis Hiland was working. And they were being converted into withdrawals from the bank. The payments coming were termed loan. And Mr. Hiland had never gone over with his clients that there was going to be commissions coming out of what was paid into them. 

* * * 

[T]he State disclosed that something like 40-percent of the aggregate amount that went in were paid out to the Hilands, 

in general. About $190,000 over the period of three years was paid to Travis Hiland. He knew or should have known 

that the money was inappropriately going to him. That justifies the theft. He didn’t alert any authorities to it, and he accepted the money. And as I said, continued to sell the 

property. 

(Id. at 37-38.) Petitioner confirmed that the factual basis counsel provided was “true.” 

(Id. at 38.) 

 The court then had the following exchange with Petitioner: 

COURT: Travis do you think in connection with your own actions that you were engaged in fraudulent schemes, then, in 

the course of defrauding folks of their money that they 

weren’t going to see their money as a result of these actions, 

once you learned about the co-defendant, Mr. Cottrell’s, 

actions? 

PETITIONER: I believed Cottrell, but there came a time 

where I probably should have known. 

COURT: And after that you continued to invite further 

investment into the products? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

COURT: And that resulted in some benefit to you and loss of 

finances by the investors? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

(Id. at 39-40.) Petitioner then pled guilty to theft and fraudulent schemes, and the court 

accepted his pleas. (Id. at 40.) 

D. Presentence Hearing and Sentencing

 Between January 22 and March 12, 2009, the trial court conducted a presentence 

hearing during which thirty-eight witnesses testified, including sixteen victims and 

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twenty witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 15, Exs. G, NN-SS; Doc. 16, Exs. TTYY.) Retired Detective Anna Cahall testified regarding her investigation of the case, and 

John Fink, a financial expert from the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC), testified 

about his analysis of the money trail of the victims’ payments into the various accounts 

and then to the individual defendants.5

 The State also filed numerous victim impact 

statements, and Petitioner and his co-defendants filed numerous letters attesting to their 

good character. (Doc. 15, Exs. H-J.) 

 1. Letter from Detective Cahall 

 For purposes of sentencing, on March 3, 2009, the State filed a letter from 

detective Cahall. (Doc. 15, Ex. K.) The letter, addressed to Judge Lindberg, stated: 

There were very few times in my career that I gave my 

opinion to a judge regarding the sentencing of defendants, but I would like to take the opportunity in this case. You may remember my first case involving the exploitation of an elder 

that you charged – the victim was Gertrude Medd, and the 

defendants Val Light and Jon Haywood. At that time, such cases were unusual and we struggled with how to charge it, if at all. Unfortunately since that time, these types of cases have become all too common, and in fact were the majority of my 

caseload in my last few years as a Detective. 

As you have heard, the current case involved a long and 

complex investigation and I personally interviewed close to 60 victims (many who were involved in the earlier investment 

schemes, where the products were misrepresented as 

well) . . . . Many of the victims whose investments with the 

defendants were not charged kept in contact with me and during the four years of this investigation I saw many of both groups suffer the effects of their years — recurrences of 

cancer, strokes, heart attacks, and many deaths. It is also 

clear the defendants took advantage of the ages of the victims in the excuses and lies they gave as to why the investments weren’t working. 

I won’t pretend this case hasn’t affected me personally — it has, and in fact played a large role in my decision to retire 

early. But more importantly, these victims — many from the Greatest Generation — a proud and trusting generation who survived the toughest of times and worked hard to save what 

little they had, were consciously targeted and ruthlessly taken 

 

5

 The Securities Division of the ACC also investigated the co-defendants’ business activities and, on March 26, 2002, the ACC issued a cease and desist order 

directed to the co-defendants’ business activities. (Doc. 15, Exs. B, P.) 

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advantage of. To sit in court and hear the defendants try to minimize their roles even after entering pleas of guilty does more than add insult to injury. It confirms to me that they have no remorse for what they have done. To claim 

ignorance is insulting and an unconscionable excuse. Their 

actions since the Corporation Commission’s Cease and Desist 

Order further shows their lack of remorse and certainly a disregard for a court’s order to create the activity and pay 

restitution. 

I hope you will make a statement, through your sentencing, 

that this type of blatant exploitation will not be tolerated in 

our County. Although many of the victims simply asked for their money back, the likelihood of any of these defendants obtaining employment that would provide even minimal reparations to these victims is doubtful. Please demonstrate 

that our system of justice works and if we can’t protect our elders from exploitation, the response after will be certain and 

considerable. 

(Id.) 

 On March 12, 2009, the date of sentencing, Petitioner and his co-defendants filed a 

motion to disqualify Judge Lindberg based, in part, on the Cahall letter. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. N.) Judge Lindberg addressed the motion at the outset of the sentencing proceeding. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ.) He noted that the parties knew he was a prosecutor before he became 

a judge, and made the following statement about the letter: 

I received a copy of a notice of filing that pertained to a letter addressed to me from now-retired Detective Cahall. I will 

say that, like all of the other pleadings that are filed in a case, I began to read that letter, and I will say that I thought it was inappropriate — with no offense intended — but I thought it was inappropriate to raise other cases with me as 

distinguished from alluding to what occurred in this case. So, 

in all honesty, I put it down and didn’t finish reading it. 

I have finished reading it now because it was attached to the 

motion for the Court to disqualify itself. That notice was 

filed on March 2nd. This matter proceeded to additional hearing on March 5th . . . . 

I reviewed the request. I’ll note that there was not a motion 

to strike the letter. I’ll note that the matter proceeded to 

hearing after the notice had been sent and distributed to 

defense counsel. 

I don’t feel particularly, in the manner in which I handled it, 

that it provides a reason why I ought to disqualify myself, so I am declining to disqualify on the case. 

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(Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 3-4.) 

 Judge Lindberg, however, referred the matter to Judge Brutinel to resolve the 

motion for disqualification. (Id. at 6-7.) After conducting a hearing on the motion, Judge 

Brutinel denied it, stating: 

It appears to me that what effectively is disclosed to you is all the things that you already knew, which is that Judge Lindberg was a prosecutor. Judge Lindberg charged cases. That Judge Lindberg was involved in a number of different 

cases, including as it turns out a case such as this one. 

I do not find that it was improper for Judge Lindberg to hear the case having been a member of the prosecutor’s office. It 

is not improper for him to have been the trial judge in this case having worked on a case similar to this one. There is 

nothing in the canons which would mandate disqualification as a result of any of those things, and I frankly do not find anything contained in the letter or as a result of the letter 

which would cause Judge Lindberg to have to be. 

As opposed to — I don’t decide whether there is misconduct 

on the part of the State or misconduct for that matter on the 

part of Detective Cahall, but I simply don’t find that the letter in and of itself creates an appearance of impropriety. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. O; Doc. 16, Ex. AAA at 40.) 

 When the sentencing proceeding resumed before Judge Lindberg, he stated that he 

was striking that Cahall letter and reiterated that he would not consider that letter in 

sentencing any of the defendants: 

I am striking the letter and the notice of filing the letter of 

former or now-retired Detective Cahall. 

My view of it is what I explained earlier this morning, which was, I thought, when one puts on a robe, I think what you need to do is to address each case that you have, each defendant that you have, in an objective and independent fashion, not losing anything that you ever knew in terms of legal experience. . . . In all things, you are trying to be neutral and objective. 

And the reason why I stated that I had only commenced 

reading the letter when it first came in was because I read 

everything that comes in. But I regarded it . . . as going into, in some aspects — not all, but in some aspects, personal history as distinguished from something that was legal precedent or something that pertained to the particular case. And in later reading it, pursuant to the request to recuse, I see in many ways it is talking about this case and this case only. 

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But I think the color of the initial part, with due respect to ringing a bell . . . I think the judges are called upon all the time to ignore. And I tell you that I will ignore the letter. I 

am striking it . . . . 

(Doc. 15, Ex ZZ at 33-34.) 

 2. Other Presentence Motions and Sentencing 

 Before the sentencing proceeding, the co-defendants had also filed a motion to 

dismiss, a motion to disqualify the county attorney’s office, and a motion to compel 

additional discovery pertaining to the case referenced in the Cahall letter and the State’s 

communications with the victims, all of which the trial court denied. (Doc. 15, Exs. L-N; 

O; Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 62.) Petitioner and his co-defendants then moved to stay the 

sentencing proceeding to permit them to file a special action for review of the several 

motions the trial court had denied. The trial court denied that request.6

 (Doc. 6, Ex. ZZ 

at 63.) 

 After denying the co-defendants’ motions, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. 

The State recommended ten-year prison sentences for Petitioner, Tyson Hiland, and 

Cottrell for the first count (theft), to be followed by probation on the second count 

(fraudulent schemes). (Id. at 88.) The State recommended probation for Joseph Hiland 

because his advanced age and poor health would make his incarceration very costly. (Id.) 

In support of its sentencing recommendations, the State noted that Petitioner and his codefendants had had the opportunity, but did not, change their business practices after the 

ACC ordered them to return $16 million to the investors they had misled. (Id. at 70-71, 

76, 83.) The State also emphasized that many of the vulnerable victims had lost their life 

savings. (Id. at 84-88.) 

 

6

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion for disqualification. The Arizona Court of Appeals, held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, noting that the judgment and sentence had been entered pursuant to a plea agreement and that an order denying a motion for a change of judge was not subject to direct appeal, citing Ariz. Rev. Stat § 13-4033(B). (Doc. 15, Ex. R.) 

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 All of the co-defendants minimized their participation in the scheme. Cottrell’s 

counsel argued that he was an unsophisticated dreamer, who did not sell the investments 

and did not know the investors were elderly. (Id. at 91- 92.) The court sentenced Cotrell 

to ten years’ imprisonment followed by a seven-year term of probation. (Id. at 91.) 

Tyson Hiland’s counsel argued that Tyson was only following in his father’s footsteps. 

(Id. at 151-152.) The court sentenced Tyson Hiland to ten years’ imprisonment followed 

by seven years’ probation. (Id. at 163.) Joseph Hiland’s counsel emphasized that after he 

had a stroke in 2003, he quit running the operation. (Id. at 116.) The court sentenced 

Joseph Hiland to seven years’ supervised probation “nearly exclusively on the basis of 

[his] health condition.” (Id. at 122). 

 Finally, Petitioner’s counsel also minimized his participation in the scheme: 

In fact, when you go down the list of these people and heard their testimony, he was really only on the periphery of most of this and only sold directly to a few people, and only did 

that when somebody else wasn’t available. 

Now, that doesn’t make him any less responsible for the fact 

that Wanda Orr or the Rutledges or anybody else that he dealt 

with lost money. That is why he pled guilty. 

* * * 

When I met him he was dead set [against] anything but a trial. The further we got into it, the further we looked at it, he said, 

“You know what? I am guilty,” and he is standing here before 

you. 

(Id. at 130-31.) Petitioner’s counsel also argued that Cottrell came up with the ideas for 

the investments and that Petitioner was only guilty of not doing his due diligence after he 

become suspicious. (Id. at 130-34.) In imposing Petitioner’s sentence, the court said in 

part: 

It also strikes a person in a case such as this where the dollar 

amounts are so high that a knee-jerk reaction to the evidence 

is that kind of loss of money has changed at least the 21 

victims or couples lives in a way that is incapable of realistically being altered. 

I said the same thing before, but it is equally true in Mr. Travis Hiland’s part of the case, about the constant worry 

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and stress and losses that are felt by those people who lost all of the funds. 

* * * 

But I don’t accept that Travis or Tyson or Joe didn’t know that the money wasn’t actually being invested. 

(Id. at 140-41.) The court noted that, although the last sale Petitioner was involved in 

occurred in 2004, he continued receiving money from the fraudulent scheme well after 

that point. (Id. at 141.) 

 The trial court also acknowledged that Petitioner was an Eagle Scout and a 

missionary, and that it had received letters from many individuals attesting to Petitioner’s 

integrity and character. (Id.). The court also considered the degree of Petitioner’s 

culpability, stating: 

But I look at the list of victims and granting that Travis’ main responsibility was marketing and not the direct sales like 

Tyson and others had, the marketing had a fair share of the fraud activities, and I will grant that the information was 

coming from Joe . . . and from Stephen Cottrell. But I don’t 

think it negates the responsibility that Travis Hiland himself 

had to do the due diligence, to follow through, to not falsify or misrepresent anything to these folks about the safety of 

their investment. 

(Id. at 142.) The court also stated that: 

The value of just what he received was over $100,000. You 

say it is only $65,000 a year. But it’s $65,000 a year that he is 

imputed with knowledge is coming from the investments. 

There isn’t going to be a return on the investments, and he 

kept selling or working in the sales of it after a point where he knew there wasn’t going to be a sufficient outcome. 

(Id. at 143.) The trial court further explained that it did not consider the ACC decision as 

an aggravating factor, but considered it as “background information” about what 

Petitioner should have known about how an investment company should be run, and 

stated that the ACC decision undermined Petitioner’s claims that he relied on the word of 

his co-defendants. (Id. at 144.) 

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 Finally, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: 

I think the value of the property taken, even the value of just what Travis himself received, would be an aggravating factor. Ignoring the 1.6 million total, but just what he received out of it. The others that were involved that meet the definition of 

an accomplice, the receipt of the pecuniary value, I think those are all legitimate aggravating factors. The emotional 

and financial harm caused to the people that invested, even if you only include the ones that Travis himself dealt with, and 

even if you only include the ones that Travis dealt with that 

were over 65. All of those are substantial aggravating factors that the Court finds. And I find that the aggravating factors preponderate. 

(Id. at 144-45.) 

 The court also noted that, despite the prosecutor’s argument that all the defendants 

were similar he had “some regard for Travis being a bit distinct from the others, but not 

in a substantial way.” (Id.) The court sentenced Petitioner to nine years’ imprisonment 

followed by seven years’ supervised probation. (Id.) The court also ordered the 

restitution of $1,663,849.71 to be paid jointly and severally by the co-defendants. (Id.) 

E. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

On January 10, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 

trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.7

 (Doc. 15, 

Ex. X.) Petitioner claimed that the trial court’s bias and prejudice, and the prosecution’s 

misconduct, violated his rights under the federal Due Process Clause. (Id.) Petitioner’s 

co-defendants, Tyson Hiland and Cottrell, also filed individual petitions for postconviction relief raising numerous claims. (Doc. 15, Exs. CC, DD.) As discussed below, 

the trial court issued a joint ruling addressing the claims that applied to all defendants and 

 

7

 Petitioner and his codefendants also requested a change of judge for the post- conviction proceeding and asked the court to order the preparation of transcripts of the settlement conferences and aggravation/mitigation hearings, the trial court denied these 

requests. Petitioner and his codefendants filed a special action challenging these rulings. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted relief on Petitioner’s request for transcripts because he and his codefendants were indigent, but denied relief on the request for a change of judge. (Doc. 15, Exhibits T-W.) 

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a separate supplemental ruling addressing Petitioner’s specific claims. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA, 

BB.) 

 1. Joint Ruling on Claims Affecting all Defendants 

 The post-conviction court noted that the co-defendants raised several of the same 

claims, specifically: (1) whether the trial court was biased by the Cahall letter and the 

presentation of evidence during the presentence hearing; (2) whether the plea 

negotiations complied with Solano, 724 P.2d 17; (3) whether the court properly imposed 

consecutive sentences, properly considered pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor, 

properly considered mitigating factors, and whether there was improper sentencing 

disparity; and (4) whether the defendants entered the plea agreement free of duress and 

with a full understanding of their sentencing exposure. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 2.) The postconviction court denied relief on these claims. 

 a. Presentence Hearing 

 The court rejected the claim that the trial court was biased based on events related 

to the presentence hearing. (Id. at 2-3.) Specifically, the court found “no basis in the 

record to find that Judge Lindberg was biased due to the ‘Cahall letter.’” (Id. at 2.) The 

court also concluded that Judge Lindberg was not biased by the prosecutor’s arguments at 

the pre-sentence hearing. The post-conviction court also found that evidence of the ACC 

ruling did not bias the trial court because it considered the ACC evidence only as 

background information. (Id.) The post-conviction court also concluded that the trial 

court had “clearly considered all the mitigating and aggravating factors and specifically 

applied them to each of the defendants.” (Id. at 2-3.) The post-conviction court found no 

evidence that the prosecution had manipulated the witnesses and victims who testified at 

the presentence hearing. (Id.) In summary, the post-conviction court found “nothing in 

the record to support the allegations that the State acted inappropriately.” (Id.) 

 b. Plea Negotiations and Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas 

 The post-conviction court next found that the plea negotiations did not violate the 

standards articulated in Solano, 724 P.2d 17, and that the guilty pleas were voluntary in 

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compliance with the Due Process Clause. The court explained that Solano requires the 

trial court to scrutinize any “package deal” to ensure the plea is not induced by a favor 

offered to one of the co-defendants. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 3-4.) However, the court noted 

that the trial court is not required to make specific findings as to each factor articulated in 

Solano. (Id.) The court then discussed the Rule 17.4 conferences that led to the plea 

agreement and noted that the “State was careful to emphasize that the possible 

recommendation of probation for Joseph Hiland was not made to induce the remainder of 

the defendants to plead guilty,” but was based Joseph Hiland’s poor health. (Id.) The 

court also noted that the range of possible penalties under the plea agreement was 

discussed in detail with all of the defendants and their attorneys. (Id. at 3.) 

 The post-conviction court also discussed the trial court’s detailed inquiry to ensure 

that each defendant entered the plea deal voluntarily and not to benefit another defendant. 

(Id. at 4-7.) The post-conviction court found that: 

[T]he plea offers in the instant case were not entered into 

contrary to law as there was no leniency promised to any Defendant if another Defendant entered into the plea, only an acknowledgement of the possible mitigating factors for the State to consider regarding Joseph Hiland. Each of the plea agreements were probation eligible. This is not a case where 

only Joseph Hiland’s plea agreement was probation eligible. 

(Id. at 7.) 

 The post-conviction court also found that there was a factual basis for the pleas. 

(Id. at 8.) The court further found that, “[e]ven assuming that there was some 

psychological pressure placed on [Petitioner] and Tyson Hiland regarding the possibility 

of their father’s sentence,” that pressure did not make the plea involuntary, especially 

considering the trial court’s efforts to ensure the voluntariness of the pleas. (Id.) The 

court concluded that “[t]here are no other relevant factors that impermissibly influenced 

Tyson or Travis’s plea. The transcript is clear. Judge Lindberg labored to ensure that 

both Defendants were entering into the plea agreements of their own volition and not 

because of any outside promises or coercion.” (Id.) 

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 The post-conviction court further found that the defendants entered the plea 

agreements voluntarily and with full understanding of their sentencing exposure. (Id. at 

11-12.) The court noted that, during the plea negotiations, while the State agreed that 

probation was possible, the State refused to indicate the particular sentences it would 

recommend for Petitioner, Tyson Hiland, and Cottrell. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, the full 

range of sentencing was discussed with all of the defendants during the Rule 17.4 

conferences. (Id.) The post-conviction court also noted that at the change-of-plea 

hearing, Petitioner and his codefendants affirmed several times that they entered their 

pleas voluntarily and that they were not based on any promise or agreement with the 

State that was not memorialized in the plea agreement. (Id.) 

 The post-conviction court also noted that the plea agreements did not contain any 

guarantees as to the State’s sentencing recommendations and accurately stated the 

sentencing ranges. (Id. at 11-12.) The post-conviction court concluded that “Tyson and 

Travis Hiland and Steven Cottrell were fully advised as to the range of possible 

sentencing and that all three Defendants indicated that they understood the range of 

sentencing and answered several times that they were not entering into the plea 

agreement under any type of duress or coercion.” (Id. at 12.) 

 c. Consecutive Sentences 

 The post-conviction court next concluded that the consecutive sentences did not 

violate the prohibition against double punishment. (Doc. 15, Ex. Aa at 8.) The court 

conducted the analysis required under State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989), to 

determine whether the crimes constituted one act or multiple acts that could be punished 

separately. (Id. at 9.) The court concluded that “the act of the fraud scheme is separate 

from the act of the actual taking of the funds for their own use.” (Id.) The court 

explained that the defendants knowingly obtained a benefit by misrepresenting that they 

had actual investment opportunities for the victims and that they would benefit from the 

investments. (Id.) The Defendants then received money from the victims and kept the 

money for their own gain. (Id.) Because fraud and theft were separate acts, the court 

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held that“[c]onsecutive sentencing under Gordon is not contrary to law in this case.” 

(Id.) 

 The post-conviction court next found that the trial court did not err by considering 

pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. (Id. at 10.) The court noted that pursuant 

to State v. Germain, 723 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz. 1986), if the state legislature has 

specifically identified an aggravating factor in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702, it may be used 

to enhance a sentence, even if it is an element of the charged offense. Because § 13-702 

specifically identified pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor, the court concluded that 

the trial court properly considered pecuniary gain an aggravating factor. (Id. at 9-10.) 

 The post-conviction court next found that the trial court properly considered the 

mitigating factors for each defendant and there was no improper sentencing disparity. 

(Id. at 10-11.) The court noted that, at sentencing, each defendant and his counsel 

addressed the court and the trial court reviewed each defendant’s particular role in the 

events “even to the point of naming the particular victims that each of them had contact 

with and that victim’s personal situation.” (Id. at 10.) The court also noted that the trial 

court had reviewed numerous letters written on behalf of the individual defendants. (Id.) 

 The post-conviction court also discussed the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances the trial court considered for each defendant. (Id. at 10-11.) The postconviction court noted the trial court’s conclusion that although Petitioner differed from 

other defendants, it was not in a substantial way. (Id. at 11.) The post-conviction court 

stated that “[t]he record shows that Judge Lindberg went to great lengths to avail himself 

of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each individual case. There is nothing 

in the record that shows that Judge Lindberg failed to consider mitigating factors in this 

case. Aggravated sentences were not improper under law in this case and any disparity in 

sentencing was considered and explained on the record.” (Id. at 11.) 

 2. The Supplemental Ruling on Petitioner’s Claims 

 In the supplemental ruling on Petitioner’s specific claims, the post-conviction 

court found that Petitioner “entered into a plea agreement of his own accord and 

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repeatedly asserted that he understood both the voluntary nature of that plea and the range 

of sentencing.” (Doc. 15, Ex. BB at 2.) The court further found that “there is no 

evidence in the record that reflects that Judge Lindberg was biased, that the presentation 

was impermissibly distorted by the prosecution or that the prosecution was favored by the 

Court during the presentence hearing.” (Id.) The court also noted that it had reviewed 

the entire file and record in the case and found no basis to grant relief under Rule 32. (Id.) 

 3. Petitions for Review by Higher State Courts 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15, Exs. EE-GG.) On 

August 14, 2012, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief, adopting the trial 

court’s rulings. (Doc. 15, Ex. HH.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, which the court denied on December 12, 2012. (Doc. 15, Ex. II.) 

F. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

 On May 6, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending habeas Petition raising the following 

grounds for relief: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because 

it was part of a coerced package deal in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Ground 

One); (2) his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment (Ground Two); (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 

in violation the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Ground Three); (4) he did not 

receive fair hearings or a fair sentence because the trial court was biased and prejudiced 

against him in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (Ground Four); (5) his 

consecutive sentences violated the double punishment clause of the Fifth Amendment 

(Ground Five); and (6) the trial court improperly considered aggravating and mitigating 

factors in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Ground Six). 

(Doc. 1.) 

 Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, and that the Court set aside his guilty 

plea or remand this matter to the state court for resentencing. (Id. at 13.) Respondents 

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argue that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground Two are procedurally barred from 

federal habeas corpus review and that his remaining claims lack merit. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.8

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). “A 

claim has been ‘fairly presented’ if the petitioner has described both the operative facts 

and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A 

“state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read 

beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in 

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum, . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

 

8

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the highest court requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct appeal or on post-conviction relief. Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar 

does not depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state 

court’s application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly 

followed.” See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court 

occasionally excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its 

procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). 

“The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in 

correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of 

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comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-

32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

A. Federal Habeas Review of Ground Two is Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his “guilty plea was the product of 

ineffective assistance of counsel,” and cites several instances of the alleged 

ineffectiveness. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Petitioner did not present these claims of ineffective 

assistance to the state court in his petition for post-conviction review, and the state court 

did not address these claims in the joint order that applied to Petitioner and his codefendants. (Doc. 15, Exs. X, AA.) Thus, Petitioner did not exhaust available state 

remedies for his claims in Ground Two. 

 It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to exhaust his claims 

asserted in Ground Two because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be 

untimely, and the claims would be precluded from Rule 32 review because they could 

have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also See State v. Shrum, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178 (Ariz. 2009) 

(stating that “[r]ule 32.2(a) precludes collateral relief on a ground that either was or could 

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have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous PCR proceeding.”); State v. Bennett, 

146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been 

raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed 

waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation omitted). 

 Because Petitioner cannot return to state court to exhaust the claims asserted in 

Ground Two, they are technically exhausted and barred from federal habeas corpus 

review. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99 (claim was procedurally defaulted where it was 

“clear that collateral relief would be unavailable to [the] petitioner” if he returned to the 

state courts); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2013) (Arizona prisoner’s 

unexhausted claim was procedurally barred because he would be barred from raising it in 

state court pursuant to Rules 32.2(a) and 32.4). Accordingly, the claims asserted in 

Ground Two are procedurally defaulted, and are not subject to federal habeas corpus 

review unless Petitioner establishes a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” or “cause and 

prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague, 

489 U.S. at 297-98. As discussed in Sections II.B and II.C, Petitioner has not established 

either basis to excuse the procedural default of Ground Two. 

B. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

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at 327. Petitioner does not argue, and the record does not indicate, that failure to consider 

Petitioner’s defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Accordingly, this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

C. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982) (emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

If a petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether the petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 1. Lack of Legal Representation and Legal Knowledge 

To the extent that Petitioner argues “cause” based on his pro se status and lack of 

legal knowledge, including his lack of knowledge of the Arizona Rules of Criminal and 

Appellate Procedure, his arguments are unavailing. A petitioner’s lack of legal 

knowledge, status as an inmate, and limited legal resources do not constitute cause to 

excuse the procedural bar. See Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers 

did not constitute cause); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrs., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th 

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Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance was not cause to excuse 

a procedural default). 

 2. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 

 To establish “cause” to overcome the procedural bar to habeas corpus review of 

his claims, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on 

post-conviction review. (Doc. 1 at 16; Doc. 25 at 8-12.) Generally, any errors of counsel 

during the post-conviction proceedings cannot serve as a basis for cause to excuse a 

petitioner’s procedural default of other claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. However, 

in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the Supreme Court 

established a limited exception to this general rule. The Court held that the ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings” — 

while not stating a constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to excuse procedural 

default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a post-conviction 

proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to litigate such 

claims. Id. at 1315. “Cause” is established under Martinez when: 

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a 

“substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review 

proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and 

(4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral 

review proceeding. 

Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1318-19, 1320-21). 9 In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit held that “the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth Amendment 

ineffective-assistance claims, both to trial and appellate, that have been procedurally 

defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding.” 

 

9

 The third and fourth prongs of the Martinez test are not at issue in this case 

because an Arizona petitioner cannot bring a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or 

appellate counsel until the “initial-review state court collateral proceeding . . . .” See 

Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1294-95. 

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 The Martinez exception applies only to the ineffectiveness of post-conviction 

counsel in the initial post-conviction review proceeding. It “does not extend to attorney 

errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a 

claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1320. Rather, Martinez is concerned that, 

if ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not brought in the collateral proceeding 

that provided the first occasion to raise such claims, then the claims could not be brought 

at all. Id. at 1316. Therefore, a petitioner may not assert “cause” to overcome the 

procedural bar based on attorney error that occurred in “appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for 

discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.” Id. at 1320. 

 To establish cause under Martinez, a petitioner must demonstrate that postconviction counsel’s failure to raise the defaulted claim was itself ineffective under the 

standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and that the underlying 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was “substantial.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1318. A “substantial” claim “has some merit.” Id. Like the standard for issuing a 

certificate of appealability, to establish a “substantial” claim, a petitioner must 

demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2013) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, a claim is “‘insubstantial’ if it does 

not have any merit or is wholly without factual support.” Id. Determining whether an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial requires a district court to examine 

the claim under the standards of Strickland. 

 a. Establishing an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

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Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 689. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

The court need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of 

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course 

should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

“[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the 

other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 b. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim 

 Petitioner claims that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

on post-conviction review the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that 

Petitioner asserts in Ground Two of his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 7, 15.) In Ground Two, 

Petitioner argues that his guilty plea “was the product of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”10 (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

 

10 In his Reply, Petitioner raises additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel that he did not raise in his Petition and that he never presented to the state courts. 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to challenge the charging document (Doc. 25 at 17, 18-19, 26), (2) failing to retain experts (Id. at 17, 22, 24 ); (3) failing to conduct a pretrial investigation (Id. at 17, 22-23, 26); 

(4) presuming that the state court “made the showing of the mens rea to deprive the 

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The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ 356, 

___, (2010)). If counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea 

negotiation, or improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s 

performance may be found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1384 (2012) (counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction that 

led to rejection of plea offer constituted deficient performance). “If a plea bargain has 

been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering 

whether to accept it.” Id. at 1387. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong when a 

petitioner has pleaded guilty, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). 

To support his claim that he received ineffective assistance during his plea 

negotiations, Petitioner argues that trial counsel “was anxious for [him] to enter into the 

package plea deal.” (Doc. 1 at 15.) Petitioner asserts that counsel told him “he would not 

win at trial because a jury would be prejudiced by the emotional dynamics of the case, 

but that [his counsel] was able to specifically negotiate probation eligibility for Petitioner 

 victims of their property (Id. at 17-18); (5) failing to move for severance (Doc. 25 at 20-

22); (6) failing to provide Petitioner with discovery, including investigative reports and witness statements,(7) failing to advise Petitioner that he was presumed innocent and that his guilt had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt (Id. at 28); (8) permitting Petitioner to enter a coercive package plea (Id. at 28); (9) failing to challenge the presentence report (Id. at 31); and (10) broadening the scope of the charging document by allocuting that Petitioner converted funds (Id. at 31). He also argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors was prejudicial. (Doc. 25 at 17.) 

For the reasons set forth in Section II.A, these claims are technically exhausted and procedurally barred. Additionally, because Petitioner did not present any of these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Petition (Doc. 1), the Court will not 

consider them in determining whether the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes cause to excuse the procedural bar. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 

997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(stating that “[t]he district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a 

reply brief.”). 

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because Judge Lindberg understood that Petitioner was in a different class as the other 

defendants as far as culpability was concerned.” (Id.) 

Petitioner claims that he objected to the terms of the plea agreement because they 

“potentially subjected him to serving a lengthy prison sentence,” but asserts that counsel 

told him “this was just a technicality, and that the reason the terms of the plea included 

the possibility of prison was that it was based on a package deal and it had to include 

provisions that applied to the other defendants.” (Id.) Petitioner alleges that trial counsel 

told him that he “would not be treated [as] harshly under the plea as the other defendants 

would be, and it was on this basis that Petitioner entered into the agreement.” (Id. at 15-

16.) Petitioner asserts that “had [he] been aware that there was no such understanding 

with Judge Lindberg, and moreover, that he could not have [] fared worse at trial, he 

never would have entered into the plea agreement.” (Id. at 16.) 

 i. Trial Counsel’s Assessment of the Case 

 A central part of an attorney’s job is “to assimilate and synthesize information 

from numerous sources and then advise clients about what is perceived to be in their best 

interests.” Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1214 (10th Cir. 2002). Counsel’s “negative 

assessment of the chances of prevailing at trial does not invalidate a subsequent guilty 

plea.” Johnson v. Woodford, 2010 WL 5313310, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010). Trial 

counsel was not deficient for telling Petitioner that he did not think he would not win at 

trial because of the facts of the case and because the jury would be sympathetic to the 

elderly victims who lost significant amounts of money. See Fields, 277 F.3d at 1214 

(affirming denial of habeas corpus relief on ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 

because “[a]dvice — even strong urging by counsel does not invalidate a guilty plea” 

(internal quotations marks and citation omitted)); see also United States v. Crank, 438 

F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir.1971) (finding no coercion when counsel “frankly stated to the 

appellant that he did not have ‘a leg to stand on’ and should enter a plea of guilty”); 

Johnson, 2010 WL 5313310, at *9 (“The mere fact that counsel may have advised 

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petitioner that he should accept the plea offer because a more favorable outcome at trial 

was unlikely does not show counsel gave ineffective advice or coerced the plea.”). 

 ii. Ability to Negotiate Probation-Eligible Plea 

 Additionally, trial counsel was not deficient for telling Petitioner that he could 

negotiate a probation eligible plea because the record reflects that he was able to 

negotiate such a plea offer. As discussed in Section I.B, the record reflects that the State 

made a plea offer that included the possibility of probation. (Doc. 15, Ex. KK at 12-13.) 

During the plea negotiations, Judge Brutinel told Petitioner that he did not think the State 

would agree to a “probation mandatory” plea agreement, and that he was surprised the 

State was willing to make a probation eligible offer. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 19-20.) Based 

on the record, counsel was not deficient for advising Petitioner that he could negotiate a 

probation eligible plea offer. 

 iii. Plaintiff’s Culpability 

 Further, it was not deficient performance for trial counsel to tell Petitioner that 

Judge Lindberg understood that Petitioner was less culpable than the other defendants. 

As discussed in Section I.D, the record reflects that Judge Lindberg considered Plaintiff 

less culpable than his codefendants (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 145), and he sentenced Petitioner 

to nine years’ imprisonment on the theft count, which was one year less than the ten-year 

prison sentences he imposed on co-defendants Cotrell and Tyson Hiland. (Id. at 105, 

145, 163.) 

iv. Promise that Plaintiff would not be Treated 

Harshly 

 Petitioner further argues that he told trial counsel that he opposed the potentially 

lengthy prison sentence included in the plea agreement. (Doc. 1 at 15.) He alleges that 

trial counsel told him that the plea agreement included the possibility of a longer prison 

sentence as a “technicality” because the package plea agreement included provisions that 

applied to Petitioner and to other defendants. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that trial counsel 

told Petitioner he “would not be treated[as] harshly under the plea as the other defendants 

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would be, and it was on this basis that Petitioner entered into the agreement.” (Id. at 15-

16.) Petitioner further states that had he known that he “could not have fared worse at 

trial, he never would have never would have entered into the plea agreement.” (Id. at 16.) 

 The record, however, does not support Petitioner’s claims, which are supported 

only by his self-serving statements. As discussed in Section I.B, the record reflects that, 

during the Rule 17.4 plea negotiations, Petitioner was fully advised of the range of 

potential sentences. (Doc. 15, Exs. KK, LL at 14, 19-20.) Judge Brutinel stressed, in 

Petitioner’s presence, that he did not think the State would make a specific sentencing 

recommendation at trial. (Doc. 15, Ex. LL at 14.) He also advised Petitioner that, if he 

accepted the State’s plea offer, he faced a sentencing range of three to twelve-and-onehalf years’ imprisonment with the possibility of probation. (Id.) He emphasized that the 

trial court would likely sentence Petitioner to prison for between “five to 12-and-a-half 

years,” based on the number of “vulnerable adults” who were victims. (Id. at 19-20.) 

 The plea agreement also included the range of sentencing and provided that 

Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of theft (Count One) and one count of 

fraudulent schemes (Count Two), both class two felonies. (Doc. 15, Ex. F at 1.) The 

plea agreement further provided that each class two felony “carrie[d] a presumptive 

sentence of 5 years, a minimum sentence of 4 years (3 years if the Court finds 

exceptional circumstances), and a maximum of 10 years (12.5 years if the Court finds 

exceptional circumstances.).” (Id.) 

 During the change of plea hearing, the trial court discussed the charges and the 

range of sentencing in detail and Petitioner affirmed that he understood his sentencing 

exposure. (Doc. 15, Ex. MM at 61, 63.) Specifically, the following exchange took place: 

COURT: Let’s go over the range of sentence that is available. 

Each Class 2 felony can carry prison time. The presumptive sentence is five years. The least I could give is three years. The most I could give is twelve-and-a-half years for each count. Do you understand that Travis? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

* * * 

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COURT: It appears that probation that is available for each 

[defendant] for a term not to exceed seven years. Do you understand that . . . Travis? 

PETITIONER: Yes. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. MM at 63.) 

 In his Petition, Petitioner claims that trial counsel indicated that he had a separate 

agreement with Judge Lindberg pursuant to which Petitioner would be sentenced only to 

probation. (Doc. 1 at 15-16.) The record, however, does not support this claim. During 

the change of plea hearing, the trial court specifically asked Petitioner whether any 

agreements, other than those contained in the plea agreement, influenced his decision to 

enter the plea agreement: 

COURT: Has anybody made you any promises, guarantees or assurances so that you would enter the plea agreement, other than what is contained in the plea agreement itself? Travis? 

PETITIONER: No. 

(Id. at 59.) 

 Petitioner also affirmed that he had not been threatened, forced, or coerced to enter 

the plea agreement. (Id.) In summary, Petitioner acknowledged under oath that he faced 

up to twelve-and-a-half years’ imprisonment on each count of conviction. He also 

affirmed that there were no agreements outside of the plea agreement that influenced his 

decision to accept the plea agreement. 

 Petitioner’s contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea 

agreement and his potential sentences carry substantial weight. See Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 

presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations 

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the 

face of the record are wholly incredible.”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“We attach substantial weight to contemporaneous on-the-record statements 

in assessing the voluntariness of pleas.”) Because Petitioner stated at the time he entered 

his guilty plea that his plea was knowing and voluntary, and that it was not based on any 

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promises other than those contained in the plea agreement, the record does not support 

his assertion that he entered his plea based on trial counsel’s representation that he had 

some sort of a sentencing agreement with Judge Lindberg. 

 v. Conclusion 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was deficient for the reasons 

alleged in Ground Two of the Petition. See Timmons v. Schriro, 2009 WL 440210, at *3 

(D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2009) (denying petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on counsel’s alleged failure to inform him of the right to have aggravating factors 

found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because the plea agreement set forth that 

petitioner waived this right, and the petitioner “told the trial court that he understood the 

sentence he was facing and agreed to waive his right to have a jury determine aggravating 

factors.”). Accordingly, the Court does not need to reach Strickland’s prejudice prong. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

 Because Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for the reasons 

alleged in Ground Two, he cannot show that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise those claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review 

and, therefore, he has not met the Martinez standard. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 840-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (appellate counsel’s failure to raise issues on direct appeal 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when claim would not have provided 

grounds for reversal); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(appellate counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a weak issue). Accordingly, Ground 

Two is barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Remaining Claims 

Petitioner’s claims asserted in his pending habeas petition in Ground Three 

(prosecutorial misconduct), Ground Four (judicial bias), and Ground Six (improper 

consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors) were raised in Petitioner’s petition 

for post-conviction relief and in his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 15, Exs. Z, EE.) Accordingly, Petitioner properly exhausted those claims and they 

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are properly before the Court on habeas corpus review. Petitioner did not explicitly raise 

the issues contained in Ground One (voluntariness of guilty plea) and Ground Five 

(consecutive sentences) in his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. X.) 

 Respondents nonetheless assert that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One, 

Three, Four, Five, and Six are properly before the Court because they were either raised 

in Petitioner’s separate petition for post-conviction relief, or by his co-defendants, and 

they were addressed by the post-conviction court in a joint ruling that applied to 

Petitioner, and that was later adopted by the court of appeals. (Doc. 15 at 34, Ex. X; 

Doc. 15, Ex. AA.) Therefore, Respondents assert that those claims are properly before 

this Court on federal habeas corpus review citing Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger 

Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992) 

(“Our practice ‘permit[s] review of an issue not pressed so long as it has been passed 

upon’ . . . .”)). 

 In its joint ruling on the co-defendants’ petitions for post-conviction relief, the 

post-conviction court identified four “shared” issues that it considered raised in the 

separate petitions filed by Tyson and Travis Hiland. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 1-2.) Those 

shared issues were: (1) judicial bias, (2) whether the package plea deal was coercive 

under state law, (3) whether the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, 

considering pecuniary gain an aggravating factor, and whether the court properly 

considered aggravating and mitigating factors and sentencing disparity, and (4) whether 

the guilty pleas were voluntarily entered. (Doc. AA at 1-2.) It appears that the state court 

liberally construed Petitioner’s petition as including all four of the shared issues 

(compare Doc. 15, Ex. X, with Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 1-2), Petitioner challenged the postconviction court’s joint and supplemental orders on appeal of the denial of postconviction review (Doc. 15, Ex. EE), and Respondents state that these claims are 

properly before the Court and do not argue failure-to-exhaust or procedural default as to 

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Grounds One, Three, Four, Five, and Six. Therefore, the Court will review those 

claims.11 

 A. Federal Habeas Review of State Court Decisions 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

 

11 Although the exhaustion requirement must be expressly waived by the State, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3), the same is not true of the procedural default defense. Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d at 1230 (rejecting argument that § 2254(b)(3) precludes the application of ordinary implicit waiver rules to the habeas procedural default doctrine); 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that government waived procedural default argument by contending only that the petitioner had failed to exhaust 

remedies, which is “quite a different argument, of course, from asserting procedural default”). 

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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. “The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas 

review of an error with respect to sentencing, in other words the test is whether such error 

had a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the sentence.” Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 

WL 2411441, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (citing Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 

141, 145-57 (1998) (finding sentencing error harmless because even if the evidence of 

three prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s 

consideration of those convictions because it found four other prior convictions that 

would have supported the petitioner’s sentence)). The Court will consider Plaintiff’s 

claims under the applicable standard of review.12

 

12 Because, as discussed in Section III, it is not entirely clear whether Petitioner properly exhausted and thus whether the state court adjudicated on the merits the claims 

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B. The Lack of a Hearing on Post-Conviction Review 

 In several places in his Petition, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court 

erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 15, 17, 19, 21.) Petitioner’s 

assertion that the post-conviction court erred by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing 

is a matter of state law that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See 

Valencia v. Ryan, 2012 WL 1681991 at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2012) (“[T]o any extent that 

Petitioner’s claim is directed to the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing during 

the PCR proceeding, it is well settled that a habeas petition ‘alleging errors in the statepost conviction review process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.’”) 

(quoting Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

 Petitioner also asserts that because the state court did not hold an evidentiary 

hearing, its factual findings are not entitled the deference normally afforded a state 

court’s factual findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner’s assertion lacks merit 

because an evidentiary hearing is not a prerequisite to deference under the AEDPA. See

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We decline to accept [the 

petitioner’s] proposal to inject an ‘evidentiary hearing’ requirement as a prerequisite to 

AEDPA deference.”). 

C. Ground One — Voluntariness of Guilty Plea 

 In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was “not knowing, intelligent 

and voluntary” because it resulted from a coerced “package deal” in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.13 (Doc. 1 at 6, 14.) Petitioner states that the prosecution 

 asserted in Grounds One and Five, the Court reviews those claims de novo and under the 

more deferential standard of § 2254(d). See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) 

(reviewing de novo because the “[state] courts did not reach the merits of [the petitioner’s constitutional claim.”). “A decision ‘as a matter of state law only’ perforce does not constitute an ‘adjudication on the merits’ of a federal claim, and therefore § 2254(d) 

[does] not apply.” Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 663 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014). 

13 Petitioner also claims that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that the trial court considered all of the factors outlined in Solano, 724 P.2d 17 for a package plea offer. Whether the state court correctly determined that the plea agreement and the trial 

court’s colloquy satisfied the requirements of Solano is a question of state law that is not 

cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (a writ of habeas corpus is 

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“offered a plea deal in which it recommended probation for Joseph Hiland because he 

had suffered a massive stroke . . . and had other health issues. But the State required as a 

condition of the plea that all of the other defendants sign on to the plea as a package 

deal.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that he initially opposed the plea agreement because it 

“pitted the love of father against his son,” but says he “ultimately accepted the plea, 

fearing for his father’s helplessness if he were to have to go to prison.” (Id.) 

 The post-conviction review court held that Petitioner “entered into a plea 

agreement of his own accord and repeatedly asserted that he understood both the 

voluntary nature of that plea and the range of sentencing.” (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 2; BB at 

2.) The post-conviction court also held that Petitioner was “fully advised as to the range 

of possible sentencing and . . . indicated that [he] understood the range of sentencing and 

answered several times that [he was] not entering into the plea agreement under any type 

of duress or coercion.” (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 12.) Petitioner’s challenge to the 

voluntariness of his guilty plea lacks merit. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that 

the state court’s resolution of his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts or that is was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. United 

States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A guilty plea must represent a voluntary and 

intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to a defendant. Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). A plea is “involuntary” if it is the product of threats, 

improper promises, or other forms of wrongful coercion. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. 

Prosecutors, however, have wide latitude in negotiating plea deals unless there is “no 

 available “only on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States”); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 

1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (whether jury instructions were consistent with state law was 

“purely an issue of state law” and was “not cognizable on federal habeas.”). 

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probable cause to believe the accused committed an offense defined by statute.” 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 

 As discussed in Section I.C, at the change of plea hearing, the trial court 

conducted an extensive inquiry to confirm that Petitioner entered his guilty plea 

voluntarily and without coercion. (Doc. 15, Ex. MM.) Petitioner affirmed that he read 

and understood the plea agreement and that his attorney had explained the agreement to 

him. (Id. at 16.) He affirmed that, other than what was contained in the plea agreement, 

no promises, guarantees, or assurances had been made to induce him to enter the plea 

agreement. (Id.) He also affirmed that he had not been threatened, forced, or coerced to 

enter the plea agreement, and that he entered the plea voluntarily for his own individual 

benefit, and not because a co-defendant would benefit from the plea agreement. (Id. at 

17-18, 34-35.) Petitioner also affirmed that he understood that he was not required to 

enter the plea agreement just because his co-defendants, including his brother and father, 

were entering that agreement. (Id. at 17-19, 34-35.) The record reflects that the trial 

court recognized that the plea agreement was a package deal, and therefore, it conducted 

a more extensive inquiry into the voluntariness of Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Id. at 33-35.) 

 Petitioner argues that the plea agreement was coercive because the prosecution 

promised to recommend probation for Petitioner’s father if Petitioner also agreed to plead 

guilty. (Doc. 1 at 14-15.) Although the Supreme Court recognizes that plea offers that 

include lenient treatment for someone other than the defendant may “pose a greater 

danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant 

must consider,” the Court has not addressed the constitutional implications of such 

package plea agreements. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365 n.8 (declining to consider 

“constitutional implications of a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or 

lenient treatment for some person other than the accused” when evaluating the 

voluntariness of a guilty plea). It has also declined to define the “breadth of [the 

prosecutor’s] discretion in fashioning plea agreements.” Id. at 365. The Ninth Circuit 

has found that package-deal plea bargains do not violate the Constitution and can be a 

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valuable tool. See United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 658-660 (9th Cir. 1993) (if the 

sentencing court is aware that co-defendants are entering into a package deal arrangement 

and conducts a more careful examination of the voluntariness of the pleas, contingent 

plea agreements are permissible). The Ninth Circuit has held that a prosecutor’s promise 

to treat a third party with leniency during plea bargaining is not per se coercive. Id. at 

659. 

 The recommendation of probation for Petitioner’s father, as part of the package 

plea offer in this case, did not render Petitioner incapable of making an individual 

decision regarding whether to accept the plea and there is no evidence that it was 

coercive. See Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 572 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have no doubt 

that the decision to plead guilty is a difficult one for many defendants, but the fact that 

one struggles with the decision, and might later even come to regret it, does not render it 

coerced.”); United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (“being 

forced to choose between unpleasant alternatives is not unconstitutional.”). The trial 

court was aware that the plea agreement was a package deal and, therefore, conducted a 

more extensive voluntariness inquiry. (Doc. 15, Ex. MM at 18, 33.) Petitioner affirmed 

that he knew he did not have to accept the plea offer just because his co-defendants, 

including his father, accepted the offer, and that he entered the plea agreement for his 

own benefit and not to benefit any of his co-defendants. (Doc. 15, Ex. MM at 17-19, 34-

35.) Petitioner also affirmed that there was nothing other than “the plea agreement itself 

and what [he was] looking at there, in terms of the consequences versus going to trial and 

the consequences or possible outcome there, that [was] influencing [him] to any degree” 

to enter the plea agreement. (Id. at 35.) 

 Petitioner’s counsel also affirmed that Petitioner was not entering the plea 

agreement “so that another member of his family [received] a favorable plea.” (Id. at 34.) 

Counsel also explained that the parties omitted “the accomplice language and the 

conspiracy language” from the plea agreement “because [Petitioner was] entering the 

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plea agreement for his own actions, it is his own decision.” (Id.) Petitioner affirmed that 

he agreed with counsel’s statement. (Id.) 

 Based on the record, Petitioner has not shown that his guilty plea was involuntary 

and has not established a Due Process violation. Accordingly, this claim lacks merit. 

Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this claim was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

D. Ground Four — Judicial Bias 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that he was denied “fair hearings” and a fair 

sentencing because the trial court was biased against him.14 (Doc. 1 at 9, 17.) The court 

denied this claim on post-conviction review, holding that “there [was] no evidence in the 

record that reflects that Judge Lindberg was biased.” (Doc. 15, Ex. BB at 2.) As set forth 

below, this claim lacks merit. Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was and was contrary, or 

based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Doc. 1 at 19.) 

 1. Detective Cahall’s Letter 

 To support his claim of judicial bias, Petitioner asserts that the Cahall letter 

“invoke[ed] a past personal relationship with Judge Lindberg and ask[ed] him to sentence 

Petitioner harshly based on this prior relationship” and required Judge Lindberg to recuse 

because of the appearance of impropriety, which Petitioner asserts was sufficient to 

establish judicial bias under Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1987). (Doc. 1 at 17-18.) 

The post-conviction court rejected this claim stating that there was “no basis in the record 

to find that Judge Lindberg was biased due to the Cahall letter.” (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 2.) 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an 

 

14 The Court considers Ground Four before Ground Three because the challenge to the Cahall letter asserted in Ground Four is relevant to Ground Three. 

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unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Although Taylor provides that the appearance of bias can require recusal, the 

Supreme Court has established three situations in which the appearance of bias, rather 

than actual bias, requires recusal. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2007) (alterations and citations omitted). “First, due process requires recusal of a judge 

who “has a direct personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against 

one of the litigants.” Id. “Second, due process requires recusal if a judge becomes 

‘embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one of the litigants.’” Id. “Third, due 

process requires recusal if the judge acts as ‘part of the accusatory process.’” Id. 

 The Cahall letter does not fit within any of these categories. Moreover, the trial 

court struck the letter and stated it would not consider that letter in sentencing Petitioner 

or his co-defendants. (Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 33-34.) Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the 

state court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable determination of 

the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law and he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on this claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 2. The Trial Court’s Denial of Motions 

To support his claim of judicial bias, Petitioner also asserts that Judge Lindberg’s 

denial of various motions evidences his bias and prejudice against Petitioner.15 (Doc. 1 at 

18.) On the day of sentencing, Petitioner and his codefendants filed several motions 

seeking to postpone sentencing, disqualify the court and the county attorney’s office, and 

 15 In addition to challenging Judge Lingberg’s denial of motions during the sentencing proceeding, Petitioner argues that Judge Lindberg’s denial of his “indigent request for transcripts” to file a petition for post-conviction relief evidences Judge Lindberg’s bias against him. (Doc. 1 at 18.) Petitioner asserts that the denial of his 

request for transcripts was contrary to the “universal[]” practice of allowing a defendant to obtain such transcripts. (Id.) To the extent that Petitioner argues that Judge Lindberg’s denial of his request for transcripts violated Arizona law governing post- conviction proceedings, that claim is a matter of state law and is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26. 

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obtain discovery. (Doc. 15, Exs. L-N.) For the most part, these motions were based on 

the Cahall letter. (Id.) Judge Lindberg referred the motion to disqualify to Judge 

Brutinel. (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 6-9; Ex. O.) After Judge Brutinel denied the motion, Judge 

Lindberg denied the remaining motions and proceeded to sentencing. (Doc. 15, Ex. AAA 

at 39-40; Ex. ZZ at 62.) 

 A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, free from judicial bias. In re Murchison, 349 

U.S. 133, 136 (1955). There is a presumption that judges are unbiased, honest, and have 

integrity. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 

U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Judicial bias may be shown by demonstrating the judge’s actual bias, 

or by showing that the judge had an incentive to be biased sufficiently strong to 

overcome the presumption of judicial integrity. Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th 

Cir. 1994). 

 Judicial rulings alone, however, almost never constitute a valid basis for 

establishing judicial bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citing 

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). “The mere fact that [the 

court] ruled against [a petitioner] . . . does not constitute a basis for bias.” Weller v. 

Montana, 2012 WL 681545, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan.17, 2012). Plaintiff has not shown that 

the trial court’s denial of motions that Petitioner and his co-defendants filed immediately 

before sentencing was based on bias. The record reflects that the trial court considered 

arguments from counsel on the motions. (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 30-62.) Although the trial 

court did not elaborate on its rulings, it apparently determined that the Cahall letter, 

which the trial court struck and did not consider at sentencing, did not warrant further 

discovery, continuing the trial, or disqualifying the county attorney’s office. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. ZZ at 62.) The court also determined that no inquiry into the State’s communications 

with the victims was necessary. (Id.) 

 The trial court’s adverse rulings cited by Petitioner were based on the facts or 

events that arose during the course of the proceedings before the court and do not 

evidence bias. See Edwards v. Sisto, 2011 WL 1599632 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011). 

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Similarly, Petitioner has not shown that Judge Lindberg’s denial of Petitioner’s request 

for transcripts in relation to the post-conviction proceeding amounted to bias. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of his claim of 

judicial bias was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim of 

judicial bias. 

 3. Favoritism toward the Prosecution 

 To support his judicial bias claim, Petitioner also asserts that Judge Lindberg had 

“different standards of treatment” for the prosecution and defense during the presentence 

hearing. (Doc. 1 at 18.) To support this claim of bias, Petitioner points to the trial court 

urging the defense to pick up the pace of it presentation of its case and to the court’s 

statement that defense witnesses could become cumulative. (Id.) Petitioner also asserts 

that the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to read from a letter, did not allow 

defense counsel to ask certain questions, and allowed one of the prosecution’s witnesses 

to read from an exhibit that was not admitted into evidence. (Doc. 1 at 19.) 

 These incidents do not establish judicial bias. The trial court’s request that 

defense counsel increase the pace of their presentation (Doc. 16, Ex. WW at 131-33, 

Ex. XX at 292), its concern about cumulative witnesses (Doc. 16, Ex. WW at 133), and 

its rulings on the formulation of questions to the witnesses (Doc. 16, Ex. OO at 62) were 

part of the trial court’s management of a lengthy pre-sentence hearing that included 

twenty witnesses who spoke on behalf of Petitioner and his codefendants. (Doc. 15, 

Exs. NN-SS; Doc. 16, Exs. TT-YY.) Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are insufficient 

to establish that the trial court’s management of the presentencing hearing was biased 

against Petitioner or to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. See James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Conclusory allegations which 

are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

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 Additionally, the record reflects that the trial court permitted one of the 

prosecution’s witnesses to read from an exhibit that was not admitted into evidence 

because the court ruled that the exhibit could only “be used for refreshing recollection 

purposes.” (Doc. 15, Ex. RR at 59-60.) Although the trial court later precluded 

Petitioner’s counsel from reading a letter from Terrell Hiland after the State objected on 

the basis of lack of foundation, it permitted the witness to read the letter and allowed 

defense counsel to ask questions about the contents of the letter. (Doc. 16, Ex. WW at 

90-95.) Again, these incidents do not show that the trial court was biased against 

Petitioner. 

 Thus, the trial court’s management of the pre-sentence hearing does not show 

judicial bias. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of 

this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, or that it was contrary to, 

or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

E. Ground Three — Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the State engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 16.) 

Petitioner cites several incidents related to the presentence hearing and sentencing as 

evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, including the prosecution’s (1) submission of the 

Cahall letter, (2) use of a display board, (3) references to the ACC ruling, (4) alleged 

victim manipulation, and (5) references to the defendants jointly as “the Hilands.” 

(Doc. 1 at 16-17.) Petitioner asserts that these alleged instances of misconduct were part 

of the prosecution’s strategy to “compromise Judge Lindberg’s ability to proceed with 

sentencing in an unbiased manner.” (Id. at 16.) 

On post-conviction review, the court found that “nothing in the record [] 

support[ed] the allegations that the State acted inappropriately.” (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 3.) 

The post-conviction court also found there was “no evidence in the record that reflects. . . 

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that the presentation [of evidence during the presentence hearing] was impermissibly 

distorted by the prosecution.” (Doc. 15, Ex. BB at 2.) 

 The appropriate standard for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow 

one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, a petitioner must prove that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and that 

they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 

due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974); see also Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.”). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief in the absence of a due 

process violation, even if the prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even 

universally condemned.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. 

 When evaluating a petitioner’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the court 

“must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [conduct] on the jury’s ability to 

judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). To make such 

an assessment, the court must consider the prosecutor’s [conduct] in context. See Boyde 

v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 

1998). The Supreme Court has assessed the fairness of a petitioner’s trial by considering, 

among other circumstances, whether the prosecutor manipulated or misstated the 

evidence, whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and “the weight of the 

evidence against the petitioner.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. 

 1. The Cahall Letter 

 Petitioner characterizes the Cahall letter as an improper ex parte communication 

between the prosecution and Judge Lindberg because it “invok[ed] their personal 

relationship that derived from their joint efforts in prosecuting a case with similar 

charges.” (Doc. 1 at 16.) The record reflects that the Cahall letter was not an ex parte 

communication. Rather, the prosecution filed the letter with the trial court and delivered 

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a copy to Petitioner and his co-defendants. (Doc. 15, Ex. K.) Additionally, although the 

Cahall letter referred to a prior, similar case in which Judge Lindberg and Detective 

Cahall had participated when Judge Lindberg was a prosecutor, as Judge Lindberg noted 

during sentencing, the letter made a sentencing recommendation based on the 

circumstances of the case against Petitioner and his co-defendants. (Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 

33-34.) 

 The prosecution filed the Cahall letter a few days before the sentencing hearing. 

At the outset of that hearing, the trial court struck the Cahall letter and stated that it would 

not consider the letter during sentencing. (Id. at 33-34.) Thus, even if the prosecution’s 

submission of the Cahall letter constituted prosecutorial misconduct, that misconduct did 

not so infect the proceeding with unfairness as to render Petitioner’s sentencing a 

violation of due process. See Maravilla v. Rimmer, 2009 WL 1689599 at *19 (C.D. Cal. 

Jun. 12, 2009) (holding that because the court struck an improper comment by 

prosecutor, it could not be considered to have so infected Petitioner’s trial with unfairness 

as to render his conviction a violation of due process). Accordingly, this claim lacks 

merit and Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 2. Reference to the ACC Ruling 

 To further support his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner asserts that the 

prosecution committed misconduct by referring to the 2001 cease-and-desist order issued 

by the ACC, which ordered Petitioner and his co-defendants to stop their business 

operations. (Doc. 1 at 17, Doc. 1, Ex. B.) The post-conviction court rejected this claim, 

noting that the trial court indicated that it viewed the ACC documentation as background 

information for purposes of sentencing. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 2.) The court also found 

that the prosecution’s presentation during the presentence hearing was not improper and 

did not bias the trial court. (Id., Ex. BB at 2.) 

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 Before trial, the trial court precluded the admission of portions of the ACC ruling. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. B.) Although the trial court’s ruling only precluded portions of the ACC 

ruling, Petitioner does not identify the prosecution’s references to the ACC ruling to 

which he objects. (Doc. 1 at 17.) Rather, he asserts that the prosecution “presented all of 

the ACC findings.” (Id.) Even assuming the prosecution presented the entire ACC 

ruling, that conduct was not prosecutorial misconduct because the trial court’s pretrial 

ruling regarding the ACC ruling did not apply to sentencing. Specifically, under the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party at the presentence hearing “may 

introduce any reliable, relevant evidence, including hearsay, in order to show aggravating 

or mitigating circumstances . . . .” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.7(b). Thus, the prosecution’s 

reference to the ACC ruling during the presentencing hearing was not prosecutorial 

misconduct. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (a sentencing judge has 

wide discretion in determining what sources and types of information can be used to 

assist in determining the proper sentence). 

 Moreover, even if the prosecution’s references to the ACC ruling was improper, 

the trial court indicated that it gave this information little weight, stating that, “my view 

of the ACC stuff is that it provides kind of a background for where we are. I don’t think 

it is — despite its allegation as an aggravating factor, I am not considering it as an 

aggravating factor.” (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 143-44.) Thus, even assuming the prosecution’s 

references to the ACC ruling constituted misconduct, that conduct did not so infect the 

sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to make the resulting sentencing a denial of due 

process. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. 

 3. Victim Manipulation 

 Petitioner also alleges that the prosecution committed misconduct by manipulating 

the victims and by “soliciting” the victims who testified in the presentence hearing to 

make separate impact statements and sentencing allocutions in the form of written letters. 

(Doc. 1 at 16.) Petitioner asserts that the “letters were highly improper and were only 

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meant to have a negative emotional impact on the judge.” (Id.) The post-conviction 

court rejected this claim. (Doc. 15, Exs. AA, BB.) 

 Petitioner asserts that the majority of victims who testified at the presentence 

hearing testified only that they wanted to recover their money. However, the victims’ 

letters requested that the trial court sentence Petitioner and his co-defendants to prison. 

(Doc. 1 at 16.) Petitioner suggests that the prosecution manipulated the victims to request 

prison in their victim letters. (Id.) However, he does not provide any support for this 

assertion and his conclusory, speculative claim does not warrant habeas corpus relief. 

See Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s denial of 

this claim of prosecutorial misconduct was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 4. Use of Display Board 

 Petitioner also asserts that the prosecution’s use of a display board during the 

presentence hearing constituted prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 17.) Petitioner 

argues that the prosecutor used the display board as a visual aid to link the victims to 

defendants “in a manner that was arbitrary and often inaccurate.” (Id.) Petitioner claims 

that the display board misled the trial court and the witnesses who were in the courtroom, 

but who had not yet testified, regarding the scope of the alleged scheme and Petitioner’s 

involvement in that scheme, and suggested the existence of a conspiracy to which 

Petitioner had not pleaded guilty. (Id.) The court rejected this claim on post-conviction 

reviewing finding no evidence that the presentation at the presentence hearing “was 

impermissibly distorted by the prosecution.” (Doc. 15, Ex. BB at 2.) 

 The prosecutor used a visual aid to illustrate the financial transactions in a case 

involving four defendants and over twenty victims. (Doc. 15, Ex. A.) Petitioner 

generally asserts that the prosecution used the display board to link the victims to the 

defendants in an arbitrary and inaccurate manner. However, he does not identify the 

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inaccuracies allegedly depicted on the display board. (Doc. 1 at 17.) Petitioner’s 

conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas corpus relief. See Jones, 66 F.3d 204. 

 Additionally, even if the manner in which the prosecutor used the display board 

was misconduct, Petitioner has not shown that the misconduct so infected the sentencing 

proceeding as to violate due process. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. Petitioner does not 

deny his involvement with the Rutledges or Wanda Orr, the victims to whom the court 

and his counsel specifically referenced at sentencing. (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 130-131, 145.) 

Nor does he deny that he engaged in marketing for the fraudulent scheme in which he 

participated, another factor the court considered in sentencing Petitioner. (Id. at 141-42.) 

Thus, the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecution’s use of the 

display board violated his due process rights. Accordingly, this claim lacks merit and 

Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 5. Reference to the Defendants as “the Hilands” 

 Finally, Petitioner argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by referring 

to him and his co-defendants — his brother Tyson Hiland, and his father Joseph Hiland 

— as “the Hilands.” (Doc. 1 at 17.) Petitioner claims that this misled the court and the 

witnesses as to each defendant’s individual culpability and suggested a conspiracy that 

did not exist. (Id.) Petitioner does not cite any specific portion of the record in which the 

prosecutor made an allegedly misleading reference to “the Hilands.” (Id.) 

 However, to the extent that the prosecution referred to Petitioner, his brother, and 

his father as “the Hilands,” it was not improper because Petitioner and the co-defendants 

are members of the Hiland family, and the record reflects that they all had a role in the 

business operations. Additionally, they were indicted, pleaded guilty, and sentenced 

together. (Doc. 15, Ex. A, Ex. MM; Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ.) 

 Regardless of whether the prosecution referred to the defendants as the Hilands, 

the record also reflects that the trial court considered Tyson’s, Joseph’s, and Petitioner’s 

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culpability separately during the sentencing proceedings. (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 116, 122-

23, 130-34, 140-41, 151-52, 163.) The court also acknowledged that Petitioner did not 

have the same level of culpability as the other defendants, and imposed a prison sentence 

that was one-year shorter than the prison sentences imposed on Tyson and Cotrell. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 142-145, 163.) Accordingly, even if the prosecution’s reference to 

the Hilands collectively was misconduct, it did not so infect the sentencing proceeding as 

to deny Petitioner due process. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. 

 Petitioner has not established a due process violation based on the alleged 

instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, this claim fails on the merits and 

Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s denial of his claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct, individually or cumulatively, was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief based on his claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

F. Ground Five — Double Punishment 

 In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment 

right against double jeopardy by imposing consecutive sentences of probation for 

fraudulent schemes and imprisonment for theft. (Doc. 1 at 19, Doc. 28.) Petitioner also 

cites state law to support his challenge to his consecutive sentences. (Doc. 1 at 20.) 

Petitioner claims that the consecutive sentences violated his right against double jeopardy 

“because the two offenses were based on identical operative facts — they both involved 

obtaining the same money through the same instance of material misrepresentation — yet 

the Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive sentences.” (Doc. 1 at 19.) 

 1. Consecutive Sentences 

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against: (1) a second prosecution 

for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after 

conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 

U.S. 493, 498 (1984) (citations omitted). “The applicable rule is that, where the same act 

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or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 

applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 

provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United 

States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Thus, a defendant may not be convicted or punished 

for both an offense and its lesser included offense, because they are considered the “same 

offense” for double jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) 

(concluding that a conviction for both greater and lesser included offense violated the 

double jeopardy under Blockburger test).16 

 However, even if two statutes proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger

test, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition, in a single trial, of 

cumulative punishments so long as it does not contradict legislative intent. See Missouri 

v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); see also Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014, 

1015 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368–369); Clem v. Schriro, 2007 WL 

3231957 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2007) (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-369). Therefore, 

“[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy 

Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 

punishment than the legislature intended.” Hunter, 459 U.S. at 365. This is because 

“[l]egislatures, not the courts, prescribe the scope of punishments.” Id. at 368. 

 Arizona Revised Statute § 13-116 provides that “[a]n act or omission which is 

made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punishable 

under both, but in no event may the sentences be other than concurrent.” Accordingly, 

Arizona law authorized multiple punishments in this case, if fraudulent schemes and theft 

are multiple acts. 

 

16 In Brown, the Court explained that Ohio law defined joyriding as a lesser included offense of auto theft. 432 U.S. at 167-68 (“Joyriding consists of taking or operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and auto theft consists of joyriding with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession.”). In contrast, the Arizona legislature has not defined theft as the lesser included offense of fraudulent schemes, see

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2310 and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802, even though in some instances 

a conviction for fraudulent schemes could also support a conviction for theft. See State v. 

Johnson, 880 P.2d 132, 135 (Ariz. 1994). 

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 Consistent with Blockburger, the Arizona courts determine whether a defendant’s 

conduct is a single act by applying the identical elements test, which requires the court to 

consider “the facts of each crime separately, subtracting from the factual transaction the 

evidence necessary to convict on the ultimate charge — the one that is at the essence of 

the factual nexus and that will often be the most serious of the charges. If the remaining 

evidence satisfies the elements of the other crime, then consecutive sentences may be 

permissible under A.R.S. § 13-116.” State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Ariz. 1989). 

When applying this analytical framework, the court “then considers whether, given the 

entire ‘transaction,’ it was factually impossible to commit the ultimate crime without also 

committing the secondary crime. If so, then the likelihood will increase that the 

defendant committed a single act under A.R.S. § 13–116.” Id. Finally, the court 

considers “whether the defendant’s conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the 

victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime. If 

so, then ordinarily the court should find that the defendant committed multiple acts and 

should receive consecutive sentences.” Id. As long as two of the three prongs result in 

favor of the crimes being separate acts, then consecutive sentences are permissible. State 

v. Uriquidez, 138 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). 

 Here, the post-conviction court applied the Gordon test. The court concluded that 

fraudulent schemes was the “ultimate crime” because the level of manipulation required 

to commit this crime made it more serious than theft. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 9.) The court 

further found that Petitioner violated the fraudulent schemes statute by inducing the 

victims to trust in the existence of valuable investments, thus obtaining a benefit for 

purposes of Ariz. Stat. § 13-2310(A). (Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 9.) Petitioner then received 

money from the victims and kept that money for his own gain in violation of the theft 

statute. (Id.) Thus, the post-conviction court concluded that the fraud schemes and theft 

were separate acts. (Id.) Accordingly, § 13-116 authorized consecutive sentences. To 

the extent that Petitioner challenges the state court’s application of § 13-116 and Gordon, 

and argues that his consecutive sentences violate Arizona law (Doc. 1 at 20, Doc. 28), his 

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claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 

107, 119 (1982). 

 Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that theft and fraudulent schemes are the same 

act under the Blockburger test. Under Arizona law, to prove that a defendant committed 

the crime of theft, the state must prove that a defendant knowingly and without lawful 

authority “(1) control[led] the property of another with the intent to deprive the other 

person of such property; or (2) convert[ed] for an unauthorized term or use” another 

person’s property which was entrusted to him; or “(3) obtain[ed] services or property of 

another by means of any material misrepresentation with the intent to deprive the other 

person of such property or services.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802A(1)-(3). 

 To prove that a defendant committed the crime of fraudulent schemes, the state 

must prove that the defendant acted “pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud,” and 

“knowingly obtained any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 

representations, promises, or material omissions . . . .” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2310(A) 

(emphasis added). A “‘scheme or artifice’ is some ‘plan, device or trick’ to perpetrate a 

fraud. The scheme need not be fraudulent on its face but ‘must involve some sort of 

fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of 

ordinary prudence and comprehension.’” State v. Henry, 68 P.3d 455, 458 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The statute is broadly construed “to cover all of 

the varieties made possible by boundless human ingenuity.” Id. A “benefit” is defined as 

“anything of value or advantage, present or prospective.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-105(3). It 

includes more than just money or property. Henry, 68 P.3d at 459. 

 Thus, to establish theft, the prosecution must prove that a defendant controlled, 

converted or obtained the services or property of another, but these elements are not 

required to convict a defendant of fraudulent schemes. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1802A(1)-(3) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2310(A). To be guilty of fraudulent schemes the 

defendant must have acted pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, which is not an 

element of theft. See Arizona v. Johnson, 880 P.2d 132, 38 (Ariz. 1994) (stating that “the 

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fraud statute explicitly requires an additional element — a false pretense — that is not 

necessary to prove theft.”) Additionally, because a defendant may violate the fraudulent 

schemes statute by obtaining “any benefit,” not just property or a service, a defendant 

who violates the fraudulent schemes statute does not necessarily violate the theft statute. 

 Thus, theft and fraudulent schemes do not constitute the same offense for double 

jeopardy purposes. See State v. Harper, 868 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) 

(noting that, although defendant stole the money he subsequently laundered, he could 

have committed either offense without committing the other); State v. Rigdeley, 2008 WL 

5244943, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2008) (concluding that theft and fraudulent 

schemes were considered multiple acts and could be punished by consecutive sentences). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s consecutive sentences do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause 

and he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. See Hunter, 459 U.S. 359. 

2. Consideration of Pecuniary Gain as an Aggravating Factor 

 Petitioner also claims that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right 

against Double Jeopardy by considering pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance 

because “insofar as pecuniary gain is an element of both offenses, the court’s double use 

of it as an aggravator violated the Double Jeopardy [Clause].” (Doc. 1 at 20.) 

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, under Arizona law pecuniary gain is not 

necessarily an element of either theft or fraudulent schemes. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1802A(1)-(3) (defining theft and referring only to “property” or services); Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-2310(A) (defining fraudulent schemes and referring to “any benefit”); see also 

State v. Fagnant, 839 P.2d 430, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) vacated on other grounds, 860 

P.2d 485 (Ariz. 1993) (“‘pecuniary gain’ is not an essential or irreducible element of [the 

Arizona fraudulent schemes statute], since a ‘benefit’ may be ‘anything of value’ either 

pecuniary or non-pecuniary.”). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that “the 

Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by the Government’s pursuit of a statutory 

aggravator because ‘[a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses.’” 

Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986) (holding that “the Double Jeopardy Clause 

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is not implicated by the Government’s pursuit of a statutory aggravators because

‘[a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses’”).

 Accordingly, the trial court’s consideration of pecuniary gain as an aggravating 

factor did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Additionally, Petitioner has not 

shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

G. Ground Six — Consideration of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 

 In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly considered 

aggravating and mitigating factors in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 20.) Petitioner asserts that he was only a “salaried employee 

who had received $70,000/year both prior to and during the indictment period” and “[h]e 

received no pecuniary gain as a result of his actions” and, therefore, he argues that the 

trial court improperly determined that he received a pecuniary gain. (Id.) Additionally, 

because the trial court gave Petitioner a prison sentence that was only one year shorter 

than the sentences imposed on Tyson and Cottrell, Petitioner argues that the trial court 

“failed to properly consider Petitioner’s minor role in the scheme.”17 Petitioner raised 

these claims on post-conviction review, and the court held that: 

The record shows that Judge Lindberg went to great lengths to avail himself of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each individual case. There is nothing in the record that shows that Judge Lindberg failed to consider mitigating factors in this case. Aggravated sentences were not improper under law in this case and any disparity in 

sentencing was considered and explained on the record. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. AA at 10.) As discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that the state 

court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

 

17 Petitioner also asserts that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-701(E)(4) required the court to mitigate his sentence because his participation in the scheme was minor. The 

interpretation and application of Arizona’s sentencing laws is a matter of state law that is 

not amenable to federal habeas corpus review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

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or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable determination of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 State “[s]entencing courts must have wide latitude in their decisions as to 

punishment,” and federal courts generally may not review a sentence that falls within 

statutory limits. Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the 

habeas court may vacate a sentence that violates due process. Id. The plea agreement 

provided that Petitioner could be sentenced to as little as probation or as much as twelveand-one-half years’ imprisonment for each offense. (Doc. 15, Ex. F at 1-2, 4.) The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to nine years’ imprisonment for theft and to a seven-year term 

of probation for fraudulent schemes. (Doc. 15, Ex. Q.) These sentences were consistent 

with the plea agreement and were authorized by Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-

1802, 13-701, 13-702, 13-702.01, 13-801 and Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2310, 13-303. 

 By asserting that the trial court did not properly consider his allegedly minor role 

in the scheme, or treat his pecuniary gain as a “salary,” Petitioner may be claiming that 

the trial court did not properly individualize or mitigate his sentence. The Supreme 

Court, however, has declined to hold that the Constitution requires individualized 

sentencing outside of the context of capital sentencing, even when a defendant is 

sentenced to life in prison without parole. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 951, 995 

(1991) (refusing to extend the “individualized capital-sentencing doctrine,” outside of the 

capital context, “because of the qualitative difference between death and all other 

penalties.”). 

 Moreover, the trial court considered whether Petitioner deserved leniency because 

of his lesser role in the scheme, but concluded that he was still responsible for victims’ 

losses. The court stated: 

I look at the list of victims and granting that Travis’ main responsibility was marketing and not the direct sales like 

Tyson and others . . . , the marketing had a fair share of the fraud activities, and I will grant that the information was 

coming from Joe [] and from . . .Cottrell. But I don’t think it 

negates the responsibility that [Travis] himself had to do the 

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due diligence, to follow through, to not falsify or misrepresent anything to these folks about the safety of their investment. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ at 142.) 

 The trial court determined that Petitioner’s involvement in marketing, rather than 

direct sales, warranted making his prison sentence for theft one year less than that of 

Stephen Cotrell and Tyson Hiland. (Doc. 15, Ex. Q; Doc. 16, Ex. ZZ at 91, 161.) 

 The trial court also considered and rejected Petitioner’s claim that the money he 

obtained amounted to a reasonable “salary.” The court stated: 

The value just of what he received was over $100,000. You 

say it is only $65,000 a year. But it’s $65,000 a year that he is imputed with knowledge is coming from the investments. 

There isn’t going to be a return on the investments, and he 

kept selling or working in the sales of it after a point where he knew there wasn’t going to be a sufficient outcome. 

(Id. at 143.) 

 The record reflects that the trial court considered Petitioner’s role in the scheme 

and his argument that the money he received was a salary, as opposed to a pecuniary 

gain. The record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that the trial court’s imposition 

of sentence violated the Due Process Clause. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that 

the state court’s rejection of the sentencing claims raised in Ground Six was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on this claim. 

IV. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2), a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents a 

“meritorious claim” and he exercised reasonable diligence in developing the factual 

record in the state proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434-37 (2000). A 

petitioner exercises the diligence necessary to preserve a claim if “the prisoner made a 

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reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and 

pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435. 

 Thus, to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: “(1) allege facts 

which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full 

and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral 

proceeding.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). No hearing is 

necessary, however, if this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the 

allegations are without credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a new 

trial . . . .” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir.1991); cf. 

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 1994) (In a capital case, a habeas 

petitioner who asserts a colorable claim to relief, and who has never been given the 

opportunity to develop a factual record on that claim, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

in federal court.). 

 Based on its review of Petitioner’s claims, as set forth above, the Court finds that 

Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would warrant habeas relief, and 

finds that his allegations (particularly his allegations related to the voluntariness of his 

guilty plea asserted in Grounds One and Two, ), are without credibility. Accordingly, an 

evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 

V. Conclusion 

 The Petition should be denied because Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted and barred from review or lack merit. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

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procedural ruling debatable or because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of January, 2015. 

 

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