Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02237/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02237-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. ROJO,

CDCR #J-53355,

Civil No. 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 6) 

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

AND 1915A(b)

vs.

R.J. DONOVAN STATE PRISON;

SMITH, Correctional Officer; JONES,

Correctional Officer; D. PARAMO,

Warden; A. HERNANDEZ, Deputy

Warden; DIRECTOR/SECRETARY,

California Department of Corrections,

Defendants.

James E. Rojo (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard

J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California and

proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern

District of California on May 8, 2013. 

On September 17, 2013, United States District Judge William H. Orrick

determined that because Plaintiff’s claims arose at RJD, venue was proper in the

Southern District of California and transferred the matter here pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 1 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§§ 84(d), 1391(b) and 1406(a) (ECF Doc. No. 8). Judge Orrick did not rule on Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. No. 6), nor did he screen Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

or § 1915A prior to transfer.

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the

plaintiff is a prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains

obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy

of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the

account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of

the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding

month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 1

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial

Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1, 2013). However,

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id.

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 2 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement,

as well asthe attached prison certificate issued by RJD’s trust account officials verifying

his available balances, and has determined that Plaintiff has no available funds from

which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means

by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when

payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No.

6) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the

entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the

Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 3 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000);see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while

a plaintiff’s allegations are taken astrue, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where

the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir.

1985)), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

rights violations” are simply not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federalrights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v.

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 4 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Defendant RJ Donovan State Prison

As an initial matter, the Court findsthat to the extent Plaintiff names R.J. Donovan

State Prison as a Defendant, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for both failing to state a claim and for seeking

damages against a defendant who is immune. R.J. Donovan, a state prison within the

jurisdiction of the State of California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”), is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Hale v. State of Arizona, 993

F.2d 1387, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is an

arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). And if by

naming R.J. Donovan, Plaintiff really seeks to sue either the CDCR or the Stare of

California itself, his claims are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama

v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit

against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.”). 

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against R.J. Donovan

State Prison, his Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

C. Respondeat Superior - Director/Secretary of CDCR & Wardens

Plaintiff also names the Director/Secretary of the CDCR, as well as the Warden

and a Deputy Warden at RJD as Defendants, but his Complaint contains virtually no

allegations that any of these individuals knew of or took any part in any constitutional

violation. “Because vicarious liability isinapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009);see

also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646,

649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least me degree of

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). Thus, 

in order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must include sufficient “factual

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 5 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable

for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, including personal acts by each

individual defendant which show a direct causal connection to a violation of specific

constitutional rights. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As currently

pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth no facts which might be liberally

construed to support any sort of individualized constitutional claim against the

Director/Secretary of the CDCR, Warden Paramo, or Deputy Warden Hernandez. 

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any of them

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27;

Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

D. Harassment claims - Defendants Smith and Jones

As to RJD Correctional Officers Smith and Jones, Plaintiff alleges that after he

was released from Ad-Seg on an unspecified date after a charge of battery on a fellow

inmate against him was dismissed, Smith and Jones “harassed” him by “telling inmates

they need to look deeper into [his] past before they do or say anything.” (Compl. at 3.) 

Plaintiff includes no further detail.

Verbal harassment or abuse by prison officials generally does not implicate the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Keenan v. Hall,

83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (harassment does not constitute an Eighth

Amendment violation); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)

(harassment in the form of vulgar language directed at an inmate is not cognizable under

§ 1983); McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (verbal threats and name

calling are not actionable under § 1983). Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s claims that

Jones and Smith verbally harassed him must be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); § 1915A(b);

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

/ / /

/ / /

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 6 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Medical Treatment & Deprivation of Property

Finally, Plaintiff mentions “being denied medical treatment,” and having “11

boxes” of property “kept in the Ad-Seg property room” and not returned to him

immediately after his release from Ad-Seg. (Compl. at 3.) 

As to Plaintiff’s medical care, only “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious

illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

105 (1976). First, he must allege a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure

to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991),

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Second, Plaintiff must include enough

factual content to show that the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately

indifferent. Id. at 1060; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

“This second prong—defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent—is

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to [the] prisoner’s pain or

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” and claims of medical malpractice or

negligence are insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Simmons v. Navajo

County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

As to his property claims, where a prisoner alleges to have been deprived of

property based on the unauthorized negligent orintentional acts of a correctional official,

he cannot state a constitutional claim if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate

post-deprivation state remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of property. 

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, because the CTCA

provides him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy, any claim Plaintiff may wish

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 7 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to pursue based on the negligent or even intentional deprivation of “11 boxes” of

unspecified property is not cognizable under § 1983.

Thus, even if Plaintiff had or could identify the individual persons he wishes to

hold liable under § 1983 for denying him medical care or depriving him of personal

property, his Complaint, as currently pleaded, is clearly insufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (“‘[N]aked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” fail to comply

with FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2) and cannot survive a motion to dismiss) (quoting Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Ph.D., Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515

S Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file

a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. 

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 8 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes

the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (“All

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended

complaint are waived.”).2

DATED: October 24, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Finally, Plaintiff is cautioned that should his Amended Complaint still fail to state a

2

claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and

may hereafter be counted as a “strike” against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner

with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2005). “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” id.

(internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the

prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v.

Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008).

S:\Burns\orders\13cv2237-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 9 13cv2237 LAB (BGS)

Case 3:13-cv-02237-LAB-BGS Document 11 Filed 10/25/13 Page 9 of 9