Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01508/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01508-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SHEET

METAL WORKERS LOCAL 104 HEALTH

CARE PLAN, SHEET METAL WORKERS

PENSION TRUST OF NORTHERN

CALIFORNIA, SHEET METAL WORKERS

LOCAL 104 VACATION, HOLIDAY

SAVINGS PLAN, and ANTHONY ASHER,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

JOSE RODNEY VIGIL,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-01508 WHA

ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this ERISA collection action, plaintiffs Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers

Local 104 Health Care Plan, Sheet Metal Workers Pension Trust of Northern California, Sheet

Metal Workers Local 104 Vacation, Holiday Savings Plan, and trustee Anthony Asher seek a

default judgment against defendant Jose Rodney Vigil, who conducted business as Vigil

Mechanical (“Vigil”). For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is

GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs allege that Vigil breached a collective bargaining agreement and certain trust

agreements in violation of ERISA and the National Labor Relations Act of 1947. Plaintiffs are

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trustees of employee benefit plans within the meaning of Sections 3(1) and (3) and Section

502(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(1) and (3) and 29 U.S.C. 1132(d)(1), and a multi-employer

plan within the meaning of Sections 3(37) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(37) and

29 U.S.C. 1145. Defendant Vigil is an employer in Hayward, California. Plaintiffs bring suit

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(2), in the Northern District of California (Compl. at ¶¶ 1–3).

Vigil had signed a written collective bargaining agreement with Sheet Metal Workers

Local Union No. 104. The agreement required that Vigil make contributions to the trust funds

on behalf of his employees and that he abide by all the terms and conditions of the trust

agreements. The trust funds rely on a self-reporting system. Plaintiffs allege that, since

October 2006, defendant breached the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and the

trust agreement by failing to complete and send in monthly reports and by failing to pay the

amounts due on behalf of his employees. The trust agreements provide that, in the event of suit

commenced to enforce payments, the defendant must pay court costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees (id. at ¶¶ 5–8, 12). Plaintiffs also seek the unpaid amounts, liquidated damages,

and interest (id. at 4–5).

On March 15, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Vigil on March 15, 2007, in the

Northern District of California. They alleged that defendant failed to pay contributions in a

timely manner, even after plaintiffs had demanded payment (id. at ¶ 5–12). Vigil never

responded. On September 18, 2007, plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Vigil. 

At plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk entered default against Vigil on October 16, 2007.

ANALYSIS

According to FRCP 55(b)(2), a plaintiff can apply to the Court for a default judgment

against a defendant that has failed to plead or otherwise defend. Default judgments are

generally disfavored. “Courts should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably

possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The trial

court has the discretion to grant the application. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir.

1986). In the Ninth Circuit, a trial court must consider the following factors when deciding

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whether or not to grant a motion for default judgment: (i) the possibility of prejudice to the

plaintiff; (ii) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (iii) the sufficiency of the complaint;

(iv) the sum of money at stake in the action; (v) the possibility of a dispute concerning material

facts; (vi) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (vii) the strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel, 782

F.2d at 1471–72. Here, these factors favor entry of default judgment against defendant Vigil.

1. MERITS AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT.

With respect to determining liability and entry of default judgment, the general rule is

that well-pleaded allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true (except for the

amount of damages). Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Consequently, this order finds that Eitel factors two, three, and five weigh in favor of the entry

of default judgment against Vigil. There is no dispute concerning material facts. The

well-pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint regarding liability are treated as true.

Pursuant to ERISA Section 501(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1132(d)(1), plaintiffs have standing to

sue as an employee benefit plan. The well-pleaded facts establish that Vigil was a California

employer. He was contractually obligated to pay contributions to the Sheet Metal Workers

Local 104 Health Care Plan, Sheet Metal Workers Pension Trust of Northern California,

Sheet Metal Workers Local 104 Vacation, Holiday Savings Plan. Vigil also had the duty to

self-report; he had to complete and send in monthly reports on his contributions. Vigil failed to

do so. He had not paid in a timely manner since October 2006. This order finds defendant

breached his contractual obligations in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002 et seq., and of the

National Labor Relations Act of 1947. Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore, has merit and is

sufficient.

2. REMAINING FACTORS.

This order finds that the remaining Eitel factors likewise favor entry of default

judgment. First, if the motion were denied, the participants and beneficiaries of the health and

welfare, pension and fringe benefits plans would not receive their full benefits. The possibility

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of prejudice to the plaintiffs is great. Second, it is highly unlikely that default was the result of

excusable neglect. Plaintiffs filed the complaint on March 15, 2007. According to the proof of

service of the summons and complaint, Vigil had been personally served on June 16, 2007. 

Third, although federal policy favors decisions on the merits, FRCP 55(b) permits entry of

default judgment in situations, such as this, where the defendant had failed to plead or otherwise

defend.

Fourth, the sum of money at stake in this action is not substantial. In general, default

judgment is disfavored if there were a large sum of money involved. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at

1472 (stating that the fact that three million dollars was at stake, when considered in light of the

parties dispute as to material facts, supported decision not to enter default judgment). 

When plaintiffs filed their motion for default judgment, they sought a total of $9,809.86,

which pales in comparison to the amount mentioned in Eitel. This factor favors entry of default

judgment.

3. AMOUNT OF MONEY AT STAKE.

Plaintiffs request over nine-thousand dollars from Vigil (Prop. Order at 2). They have

sufficiently justified why the payment of such an amount is reasonable. There was $5,283.33 in

unpaid contributions, $2,325.39 in liquidated damages, and $786.14 in interest (Maraia Decl.

Exh. 3 and Exh. 4). ERISA provides that a judgment for unpaid contributions to a multiemployer plan shall include interest on unpaid contributions. 29 U.S.C. 1132. One of the

plaintiffs’ attorneys provided a declaration and other documentation supporting the $740 in

attorney’s fees and $675 in costs (Carroll Decl. at ¶ 2–8, Exh. 5–7).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against defendant

Vigil is GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against defendant Vigil is

GRANTED;

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2. Defendant Vigil shall pay plaintiffs $9,809.86 in unpaid contributions,

liquidated damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.

3. Plaintiffs reserve the right to audit defendant Vigil for any periods not

previously audited, including the period from June 2006 through

December 2006. However, this case and the amount involved will not be

re-litigated or re-opened. Plaintiffs are free to bring a new suit for future

damages accruing after the period covered by the instant action. This

case is closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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