Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00789/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00789-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES MICHAEL WEST, JR., )

# 264345, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:10cv789-WKW

) (WO)

KENNETH JONES, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 brought by

a person in custody under a judgment of a court of the State of Alabama. The petitioner,

James Michael West, Jr. (“West”), challenges his guilty-plea conviction for trafficking in

cocaine, in violation of § 13A-12-231, Ala. Code 1975, entered against him by the Circuit

Court of Houston County on October 5, 2009. On that same date, the trial court sentenced

West as a habitual felony offender to life in prison.

When pleading guilty, West reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress the State’s evidence. West appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically,

West argued that the police unlawfully stopped and searched his vehicle, discovering drugs

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therein, without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exh. B at 10-18.

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He further argued that his subsequent confession to police was a product of the unlawful stop

and search of his vehicle and that, like the drugs found in his vehicle, his confession was

subject to suppression. Id. at 16-18.

On March 5, 2010, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed West’s

conviction by published opinion, holding that the trial court properly denied West’s motion

to suppress. West v. State, 53 So.3d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). West filed an application

for rehearing with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which that court denied on April

16, 2010. He then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court,

which was denied on June 18, 2010. Exhs. E-G.

On September 17, 2010, West initiated this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action by filing a habeas

petition in which he reasserts his claim, presented in the state courts, that the police

unlawfully stopped and searched his vehicle in contravention of the Fourth Amendment and

that, consequently, the drug evidence found in his vehicle and the statements he made to

police while in custody should have been suppressed. Doc. No. 1 at 5 & 7.

The respondents answer that West’s claim is precluded from review by this court

under the doctrine of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), because West had an opportunity

for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment-related issues in the state courts. This

References to exhibits (“Exh.”) are to exhibits filed by the respondents’ with their answer, 1

Doc. No. 9. Document numbers are those assigned by the clerk of this court. Page references in the

pleadings are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

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court agrees and finds that federal habeas corpus review of West’s Fourth Amendment claim

is barred by the Stone v. Powell doctrine.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

The law directs that a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by “a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the [convicting] State.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by

any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). This exhaustion

requirement is satisfied by seeking review of the claim in the highest state court with

jurisdiction to consider the claim. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838 (1999); 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b) & (c). In Alabama, this may be accomplished by raising certain claims on direct

appeal and by way of post-conviction proceedings. Exhaustion is not required if, at the time

a federal habeas corpus petition is filed, petitioner has no available state remedy. Teague v.

Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 297-98 (1989); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(I) & (ii). West exhausted

his state remedies by presenting his claim on direct appeal.

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In Alabama, the established appellate review process includes an appeal to the Alabama 2

Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,

and an application for discretionary review by the Alabama Supreme Court. See Ala. R.App. P. 4,

39, 40.

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B. Claimed Fourth Amendment Violation

West contends – as he did in his motion to suppress and on direct appeal – that the

police unlawfully stopped and searched his vehicle without probable cause, in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, and that the drug evidence found in his vehicle and the statements

he made to police while in custody should therefore have been suppressed. Doc. No. 1 at 5

& 7. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected West’s claim,

finding, in pertinent part, as follows:

On May 4, 2009, West filed a motion to suppress on the ground that the

warrantless search of his vehicle, in which the police discovered 117 grams of

cocaine, wasillegal because, he said, it was conducted without probable cause.

In the suppression hearing held on October 5, 2009, the State presented the

following evidence. On February 3, 2009, Sergeant Jim Holley and Officer

Ray Mock of the Dothan Police Department were on patrol in the Omussee

Road area of Dothan when they received a confidential tip that a white Nissan

Titan truck being driven by a black male would soon be traveling on Omussee

Road on its way from Georgia and that it was carrying a large quantity of

cocaine. No additional information about the suspect, the vehicle, or the

suspect’s anticipated movements or activities was supplied by the informant.

Officer Mock testified that the person providing the tip was not a known,

reliable informant.

Less than an hour later, the officers saw a truck fitting the description

provided by the informant driving in the opposite direction of the officers at

a high rate of speed. Officer Mock did not use a radar gun to document the

speed of the truck, but guessed that it was traveling approximately 70 miles per

hour, which was above the posted speed limit. The officers began following

the truck and observed the driver run a stop sign as he made a right turn onto

Webb Road. The truck continued to drive over the posted speed limit on

Webb Road, made two more turns, and eventually pulled into a driveway of

a house, later determined to be West’s mother’s house. The officers, who were

driving an unmarked police car, initiated the emergency lights right before the

driver pulled into the driveway of the house. West got out of the truck and

locked it. The two officers made contact with West and began asking him

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about speeding and running the stop sign. Officer Mock testified that West

was breathing heavily and that his hands were shaking as he handed the

officers his driver’s license. Officer Mock also noticed a bulge in West’s

pocket, so Mock conducted a pat-down search for officer safety, but no

weapons were found.

A check of West’s driver’s license indicated that he was on probation.

West told the officers that he was on probation for drug charges. The officers

then asked West if they could search his car, but West would not give his

consent to a search. The officers called Corporal Chad Kinney and asked him

to bring a narcotics-detecting dog to the scene. Corporal Kinney and the

canine arrived soon thereafter, at which point the dog indicated to the officers

that drugs were present in the vehicle. The officers searched the truck and

found four clear, plastic bags filled with a white powder that appeared to be

cocaine between the front passenger seat and the door. A field test indicated

that the substance in the plastic bags was in fact cocaine. The officers detained

West and read him his Miranda rights. West waived those rights and made

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a statement to police admitting that he had purchased the cocaine in another

state for $4,000 with the intention of reselling it.

[n.1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966).]

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied West’s motion

to suppress. The Court explained:

“THE COURT: I think, with the traffic violations, that gives

them their reasonable suspicion to stop him. And then I think

that they’re entitled to a reasonable period of time in which to

get a drug dog out to further investigate the stop, which is what

they did.

“I agree you can’t use the reliability of this informant to

make this case. That’s for future potential cases, not this case.

Can’t use the fact that he declined to consent to a search against

him, either. But, for the other reasons, I’ll deny the motion.”

(R. 81-82.) After reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to

suppress, West pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, West argues that the trial court erroneously denied his

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motion to suppress the evidence found in West’s truck and the statements he

made to police while in custody. Specifically, West contends that the police

conducted a warrantless search of his truck without probable cause.

In State v. Landrum, 18 So.3d 424 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), this Court

explained:

“‘This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision

on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in

dispute. See State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1996);

State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 952 (Ala. Crim. App.1999).’

State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). In

State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201 (Ala. 1996), the trial court granted

a motion to suppress following a hearing at which it heard only

the testimony of one police officer. Regarding the applicable

standard of review, the Alabama Supreme Court stated, in

pertinent part, as follows:

“‘“Where the evidence before the trial court was

undisputed the ore tenus rule is inapplicable, and

the Supreme Court will sit in judgment on the

evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in

favor of the trial court’s application of the law to

those facts.” Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794

(Ala. 1980) (citations omitted). The trial judge’s

ruling in this case was based upon his

interpretation of the term “reasonable suspicion”

as applied to an undisputed set of facts; the proper

interpretation is a question of law.’

State v. Hill, 690 So.2d at 1203–04.”

18 So.3d at 426. Because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing

is not in dispute, the only issue before this Court is whether the circuit court

correctly applied the law to the facts presented at the suppression hearing, and

we afford no presumption in favor of the circuit court’s ruling.

This Court has recognized that a traffic stop is “‘“more analogous” to

the brief investigative detention authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)’” than to custody traditionally associated

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with a felony arrest. Sides v. State, 574 So.2d 856, 858 (Ala. Crim. App.

1990), quoting Pittman v. State, 541 So.2d 583, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989),

quoting in turn Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82

L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). In stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation, a police

officer has, in Fourth Amendment terms, seized the driver, Cains v. State, 555

So.2d 290, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968)], law-enforcement officers may stop a vehicle for investigatory

purposes based on a traffic violation. State v. Rodgers, 903 So.2d 176, 178

(Ala. Crim. App. 2004).” J.T.C. v. State, 990 So.2d 444, 447 (Ala. Crim. App.

2008).

Furthermore, in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160

L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), the United States Supreme Court stated:

“[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog – one that

‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would

remain hidden from public view,’ [United States v.] Place, 462

U.S. [696] at 707 [(1983)] – during a lawful traffic stop,

generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this

case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of

respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic

violation. Any intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations

does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable

infringement.”

543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834. See also Seeley v. State, 669 So.2d 209, 212

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“Likewise, the ‘sniff test’ by the narcotic detection

dog did not come within the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.”).

Here, the relevant inquiry is whether an investigatory detention was

justified and whether the detention was unreasonably long. West was lawfully

detained by the police officers who witnessed him commit various traffic

violations; thus, the officers were justified in carrying out an investigatory

detention. The record does not indicate that the detention was so prolonged

that it became unconstitutional. Officer Mock testified that Officer Kinney

arrived on the scene with a narcotics-detecting dog shortly after he was

contacted by Officers Holley and Mock. Once the dog indicated the presence

of narcotics, the officers then had probable cause to search West’s truck. See

State v. Montgomery, 968 So.2d 543, 552 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (“[A]n alert

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by a trained drug-sniffing dog provides probable cause to search without a

warrant.”). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied West’s motion to

suppress.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

West v. State, 53 So.3d 990, 991-94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

This court need not belabor its discussion of West’s Fourth Amendment claim. Under

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976), “where the State has provided an opportunity for

full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that

a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” This rule applies to all

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claims arising under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572

(1986). Here, for purposes of Stone, West clearly had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate

his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. He was afforded an evidentiary hearing in

the trial court on his motion to suppress, followed with a direct appeal to the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals and an application for discretionary review by the Alabama Supreme

Court. The transcript of the hearing on West’s motion to suppress (see Exh. A - Part 1 at 41-

66 & Part 2 at 1-56) and the appellate opinion by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

make plain that both the trial court and the appellate court fully and fairly considered the

The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Stone is applicable despite legal or factual 3

error in the state court, and does not require a federal court to review the state court’s factfinding

or its application of Fourth Amendment law. See Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1272-73 (8th

Cir. 1994) (federal courts “are not to consider whether full and fair litigation of the claims in fact

occurred in the state courts, but only whether the state provided an opportunity for such litigation.”

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Fourth Amendment claim raised by West. Under the principle set forth by the United States

Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, this court is precluded from reviewing the state court’s

determination.

The rule of Stone v. Powell applies to both the drug evidence found in West’s vehicle

and his subsequent custodial statements to the police. In the state courts, and in his habeas

petition, West did not rely on the involuntariness of the statements made – a concern under

the Fifth Amendment – but on whether there was a causal link between the statements and

a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. at 572-73. The state

courts determined that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the stop and search of

West’s vehicle; thus West’s statements were not obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. Because West had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth

Amendment-related issues in the state courts, the claim in his federal habeas petition is

precluded from review by this court under the doctrine of Stone v. Powell. See Peoples v.

Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1225 (11 Cir. 2004); Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052, 1057–58 (11

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Cir. 1996); Morgan v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 934, 940 (5 Cir. 1979).

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by West be DENIED.

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further

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ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before September 11, 2012. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See

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Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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Done this 27 day of August, 2012.

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/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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