Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05319/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05319-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOMANI JAHI BROADNAX,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAVID LIVINGSTON, Contra Costa

County Sheriff,

Defendant. /

No. C 13-05319 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a state prisoner represented by counsel, moves for collateral relief under Section

2254. For the reasons stated below, the petition is DENIED. 

STATEMENT

At the time he filed his petition, Bomani Broadnax was incarcerated at West County

Detention Facility in Contra Costa County. Pursuant to Section 2254 of the United States Code,

he moves for writ of habeas corpus challenging a California state court proceeding. Petitioner is

represented by counsel. Double jeopardy is the issue.

On April 2, 2008, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship

petition against petitioner pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602(a). In count one,

petitioner was charged with attempted murder, in violation of California Penal Code Sections 187

and 664. With respect to count one, the wardship petition also alleged special enhancements of

intentionally discharging a firearm (California Penal Code Section 12022.53) and personally using

a handgun (California Penal Code Section 12022.5(a)(1)). Count two charged petitioner with

assault with a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code Section 245(a)(2). Count two also

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alleged sentencing enhancements of personally using a handgun and personally inflicting great

bodily injury (California Penal Code Section 12022.7(a)). 

On appeal from the conviction, the unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal

stated (Resp. Exh. A at 2–3): 

On January 22, 2008, police responded to shots fired call

near 17th Street in Richmond. At the scene, officers found a

vehicle crashed into a house. Officers noticed the rear window of

the vehicle was shattered and inside found Mable Stallworth sitting

in the front driver seat, disoriented and bleeding from the back side

of her head. Before she was transported to hospital, Stallworth

was able to tell police that she was traveling west on Ohio Avenue,

heard a loud bang, lost consciousness momentarily and woke when

her vehicle crashed. Stallworth’s condition was listed as serious

with bone fragments to her brain. A neighbor informed police he

saw a green Buick racing away from the area where the shots were

fired.

On March 27, 2008, Richmond Police received information

on the shooting in an interview with Alex Joseph. Joseph told

police that on the day of the shooting, he was driving his green

Buick when he saw a blue van with tinted windows. Joseph knew 

the van belonged to a person he was feuding with and noticed the

van had begun to follow his vehicle. After the van pulled behind

Joseph’s vehicle, the passenger in the right front seat of the van

leaned out of the window and began shooting at him. Joseph

stated that the first two shots missed his vehicle and hit the car in

front (Ms. Stallworth’s vehicle), and the second two shots hit the

Buick. After the shooting, the blue van fled the scene. Joseph told

police that he recognized the shooter as Bo Mony. In a second

interview on March 27, 2008, Joseph identified [petitioner] from a

photographic lineup.

On March 30, 2008, police responded to a shots fired call

in the area of 18th Street and Bissell Avenue in Richmond. 

Citizens informed officers that a black male, later identified as

[petitioner], was involved in the shooting and that he ran into a

residence on Chanslor Avenue carrying a long gun. When officers

went into the residence on Chanslor Avenue, the owner,

[petitioner’s] grandfather, told police [petitioner] ran into the

house and then immediately left. [Petitioner’s] grandfather

consented to a search of the premises. Police found ammunition in

[petitioner’s] room and a SKS type 56 rifle in his brother’s

bedroom. 

On March 31, 2008, [petitioner] was stopped for driving

without a license and subsequently placed under arrest for

attempted murder. When questioned by police, [petitioner] denied

any involvement in the drive by shooting on January 22, 2008. 

Later, [petitioner] admitted he was in the van that chased the green

Buick but said that a person named Michael was the shooter. 

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Petitioner pled no contest to assaulting Joseph and Stallworth with a firearm and personally

inflicting great bodily harm on Stallworth (Resp. Exh. A at 4). The state trial court found that

petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pled no contest, reviewed the evidence, and committed

petitioner to the California Division of Juvenile Justice for a term of five years (Resp. Exh. A at 7). 

On January 5, 2011, the Division of Juvenile Justice placed petitioner on juvenile parole

under the supervision of his father. Subsequently, however, petitioner picked up new charges for

carrying a loaded firearm near the funeral of a rival gang member in Contra Costa County Juvenile

Court, all pursuant to a petition under California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 777. The

juvenile court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the Section 777 petition without

prejudice. The prosecutor then brought an amended wardship petition with the same court under

Section 602, which was dismissed without prejudice. Two months later, the prosecutor orally

moved on the record to increase the original 2009 five-year commitment based on new

circumstances (loaded firearm near the funeral of a rival gang) pursuant to Sections 731(c) and

779 (Resp. Exh. C). Section 779 authorizes a court committing a ward to the California Youth

Authority to thereafter change, modify, or set aside the order of commitment. Under Section

731(c), this commitment cannot be increased to an amount of time greater than the maximum

period of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense.

After considering the arguments from both sides, the juvenile court modified the original

commitment to add an additional five years to the commitment for a total of ten years, still less

than the 17-year maximum allowed for the original offense. 

Now comes the double jeopardy problem. On August 16, 2012, petitioner was indicted and

charged as an adult with violating California Penal Code Sections 182(a)(1)/245 (conspiracy to

discharge a firearm), 182(a)(1)/245(b) (conspiracy to commit an assault with a semiautomatic

firearm), 2800.4 (evading a peace officer), and 186.22(a) (criminal street gang terrorism). The

indictment also alleged that petitioner committed the crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. It is

uncontested that these charges stem from the same set of facts as the modification of petitioner’s

2008 commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 779. 

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On June 13, 2013, petitioner moved the Contra Costa County Superior Court to dismiss the

criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds. That motion was denied (Resp. Exh. C). The

California Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate/prohibition and request for stay that raised

double jeopardy grounds for relief (Resp. Exh. D). The California Supreme Court denied the

petition for review (Resp. Exh. H). 

Now, petitioner moves for collateral relief under Section 2254. In addition, petitioner

moves for an evidentiary hearing. In subsequent briefing, petitioner stated that he was convicted

of the offense in Contra Costa County Superior Court and has been released on parole. 

ANALYSIS 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication

of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which both parties agree applies to our

case, imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court decisions. Woodford v.

Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The state court decision to which Section 2254 applies is the last

reasoned state court decision, which in our case is Superior Court Judge John Lattner’s oral

decision on the record. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Under the unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 413. A federal habeas

court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75–76 (2003). 

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1. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION.

Section 2254(a) states that “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” While it is uncontested that petitioner was in custody when he filed his petition, there is a

subject-matter jurisdiction issue as to whether the state court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to

dismiss the indictment, based on double jeopardy grounds, constitutes a state court judgement

under Section 2254. 

Our court of appeals addressed this issue in Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.

1992). There, a superior court jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence,

deadlocked on murder charges, and the judge declared a mistrial. Two weeks later, the judge

dismissed the murder charges on his own motion. The district attorney then re-filed the murder

charges in municipal court. The defendant challenged the charges on double jeopardy grounds,

exhausted her state remedies, and then filed a federal habeas petition. In considering whether there

was subject-matter jurisdiction, our court of appeals stated: “Because full vindication of the right

necessarily requires intervention before trial, federal courts will entertain pre-trial habeas petitions

that raise a colorable claim of double jeopardy.” Id. at 1312. The decision went on to state that

because “Mannes exhausted state remedies on her double jeopardy claim, the district court has

jurisdiction to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254.” Ibid.

Here, there is no dispute that petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. After doing so,

petitioner was convicted on the adult charges. Under Mannes, because he is challenging the

indictment on double jeopardy grounds, this order finds there is subject-matter jurisdiction in our

case.

Respondent argues that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction because petitioner had not

yet been convicted when he filed the instant petition. In support of this contention, petitioner

relies on Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) and Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,

490–494 (1989) (per curiam). These decisions are inapplicable to our case, as neither discussed

double jeopardy. Carafas held that the habeas petition at issue was moot because the petitioner

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had already been unconditionally released from his prison sentence. Maleng similarly held that the

petition at issue was moot because petitioner had already been released. Neither decision

addressed whether a person charged with a crime can challenge the indictment on double jeopardy

grounds, through a Section 2254 petition, once he has exhausted his state remedies.

2. DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

The central issue in our case is whether the state may prosecute a person as an adult for

actions that were previously used to increase his custody time on a prior juvenile commitment

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 731(c) and 779, without running afoul of the

Double Jeopardy Clause. In our case, in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss on double

jeopardy grounds, the state trial court found (Resp. Exh. C at 15–18):

THE COURT: . . . [J]eopardy for the March 9th, 2011,

offense never attached to the juvenile docket. To the extent that

jeopardy could have theoretically attached under Marco A. due to

the section 777 notice, based on the March 9, 2011, events, this

notice was dismissed on March the 14th, 2011. The defendant was

never placed on trial for the section 777 notice. No witnesses were

called. 

While the supplemental section 602 petition based on the

March 9th, 2011, events would have placed the defendant in

jeopardy for the March 9, 2011, events, if the petition had

proceeded to adjudication and the witness or witnesses were

sworn, this did not happen. Instead the supplemental section 602

petition was dismissed on October the 17th, 2011.

At the time of the December 5th, 2011, proceedings, there

was no accusatory pleading before the juvenile code—court, which

would have allowed the juvenile court to try the defendant for the

March 9th, 2011, offenses. No witnesses were sworn. The

sanctions the defendant faced at that time did not include either an

adult criminal conviction or a juvenile adjudication for the March

9th, 2011, offenses. At no time during the juvenile proceedings

did jeopardy ever attach for the March 9, 2011, offenses.

The law recognizes that when a criminal activity that the

defendant is not currently being prosecuted for is considered by a

judge at a sentencing proceeding, the defendant can subsequently

be prosecuted for that criminal conduct without violating the bar

on double jeopardy. See, for example, Witte v. United States, 1995, Supreme Court case at 515 U.S. 389.

With jeopardy for the March 9th, 2011, offenses having

never attached in the juvenile court proceedings, the defendant was

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never informed of jeopardy, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss

on double-jeopardy grounds is, therefore, denied.

In Witte v. United States, which the state trial court relied on, the Supreme Court held that

“where the legislature has authorized such a particular punishment range for a given crime, the

resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for

purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry. Accordingly, the instant prosecution for the cocaine

offenses is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second attempt to punish petitioner for

the same crime.” Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 403–04 (1995). Essentially, Witte held

that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when uncharged relevant conduct is considered at

sentencing in one proceeding, and then after that sentence is handed down, the relevant conduct

that increased a sentence is later charged as a separate crime.

Here, the prosecutors moved to modify petitioner’s commitment under Sections 731(c) and

779 and the juvenile court added five additional years to petitioner’s 2008 commitment (Resp.

Exh. C). The resulting modified commitment was ten years. This is similar to Witte, in that

relevant conduct was used to increase a defendant’s sentence in a prior crime, and then later

became the basis of a new charge. While the facts of our case do not align perfectly with Witte,

the state trial court was not objectively unreasonable in its application of Witte to the instant

action. 

In response, petitioner relies on Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537–38 (1975). There, the

Supreme Court held that a juvenile is put in jeopardy within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy

Clause if he is subjected to a proceeding that may result in an adjudication that he has committed

criminal acts, and that may put his liberty and reputation at risk. In Breed, the defendant was

adjudicated in a juvenile proceeding and then transferred to adult court to be charged for a new

crime based on the same underlying conduct. The state court, however, found that in the instant

case, there was no adjudication in juvenile court. Rather, the juvenile court merely considered the

conduct in modifying petitioner’s sentence, as it was permitted to do under Section 779. 

Furthermore, petitioner argues that the state trial court erred in finding that the juvenile

court did not adjudicate the issue of petitioner’s alleged offenses. Petitioner contends that the

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following colloquy, increasing petitioner’s original sentence, qualifies as an adjudication for

double jeopardy purposes (Trav. Exh. C 2(G), 9:16–10:6):

Court: Well, it doesn’t look good.

Prosecutor: And so I want to make sure.

Court: I mean he’s out there with a loaded gun after he’s just been

released. It doesn’t look good. He’s up to no good. There is no

reason. He’s not hunting, I suppose, any animals with a loaded

pistol. So what are you asking or on the modifying on the

commitment on the seven – and I have to read it.

Prosecutor: I would ask the Court to extend his maximum time

pursuant to 731(c) to seven years — I’m sorry — to add an

additional seven years.

Court: And Mr. Gendreau.

Defense: We’re submitting, your Honor, on my earlier statements.

Court: Okay. Then pursuant to 731(c) the 779 I’ll add five.

Prosecutor: Okay.

Court: Five years are added. 

This order finds that during this colloquy, the prosecution requested that petitioner’s

juvenile sentence be enlarged by seven years based on the conduct at issue. Petitioner’s lawyer

did not challenge the accuracy of the prosecutor’s recitation and “submitted” without further

argument. The juvenile court judge then added five years to petitioner’s juvenile sentence. While

petitioner’s lawyer did not contest the judge’s ruling, this order finds that it was an adjudication

based upon the implicit concession regarding petitioner’s conduct by his lawyer.

Nevertheless, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Witte, the state court’s ruling on the

double jeopardy issue was not an objectively unreasonable interpretation of the law, as troubling

as it seems to be. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking

in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “If

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this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Ibid. The state court’s ruling

simply does not meet this high standard.

This order also points out that it is common in our own federal practice for new criminal

conduct to not only be the subject of a Form 12 proceeding, but also the subject of a new

indictment (each of which can add time consecutively). In our federal practice, defense lawyers

are sensitive to this problem and normally try to roll in both dispositions in a single agreement. 

That did not happen in this case. The colloquy in question left the prosecutor free to seek a new

indictment based on the same conduct. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2015. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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