Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01221/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01221-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ricardo Garza, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01221-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”). The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the Petition be denied. (Doc. 32). 

Petitioner filed objections to portions of the R&R. (Doc. 35). 

I. Review of R&R 

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes 

that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

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[Magistrate Judge=s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). 

 In this case, the Court will review the portions of the R&R to which Petitioner 

objected de novo. 

II. Review of State Court Decision 

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254 because Petitioner is 

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner 

exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must 

deny the Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings 

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 

936 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

III. Petition 

The Petition in this case raises six Grounds for relief, two of which each have four 

distinct factual predicates. (R&R at 6). The Court will address each Ground in turn. 

A. Ground 1 

Petitioner claims that his right to counsel was violated because he was not given a 

 1

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in 

accordance with Supreme Court case law. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 

(2006). 

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mistrial over the prosecutor’s questions and he did not receive a requested jury 

instruction on the prosecutor’s questions. The R&R recommends that this Court deny 

relief on this claim. (R&R at 19-25). Specifically, the R&R concludes that this claim 

was exhausted before the Arizona Courts and that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

was not contrary to nor and unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 21-24). 

 Petitioner does not make a specific objection to this recommendation. 

Nonetheless even if an objection was implied in Petitioner’s filing (Doc. 35), this Court, 

considering this Ground de novo, agrees with the R&R that the state court’s decision was 

not contrary to nor and unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, relief on Ground 1 is denied. 

B. Ground 2 

 In Ground 2, Petitioner claims that he did not received adequate Miranda 

warnings. The R&R concludes that this claim was not fairly presented to the state courts 

and is now procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 13-14). The R&R further finds that 

Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome this procedural default or 

actual innocence. (R&R at 18-19). As a result, the R&R recommends that relief on this 

claim be denied. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that Martinez v. Ryan, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1309 

(2012) is a basis to excuse his default in state court. (Doc. 35 at 15-21). In general, 

Martinez held that a federal court considering a habeas petition could consider the merits 

of a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim if that claim was defaulted in 

state court as a result of the ineffective assistance of first-post-conviction-relief counsel. 

Id. 

 Here, Petitioner is not raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground 

2. He is raising a Miranda claim. Martinez does not provide a basis for excusing the 

failure to properly exhaust a Miranda claim in state court. Thus, the procedural bar to 

this Court considering the merits of this claim applies and Petitioner’s objection is 

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overruled. 

 Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the merits of this claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), relief would be denied. Specifically, for the reasons stated by 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel (R&R at 35), there was no Miranda violation. Thus, even 

if this Court considered the merits of this claim, or re-cast it as an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

C. Ground 3 

 In Ground 3, Petitioner claims the identification procedures used against him 

violated his rights. The R&R concludes that this claim was not fairly presented to the 

state courts and is now procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 14). The R&R further finds that 

Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome this procedural default or 

actual innocence. (R&R at 18-19). As a result, the R&R recommends that relief on this 

claim be denied. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that Martinez v. Ryan, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1309 

(2012) is a basis to excuse his default in state court. (Doc. 35 at 15-21). In general, 

Martinez held that a federal court considering a habeas petition could consider the merits 

of a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim if that claim was defaulted in 

state court as a result of the ineffective assistance of first-post-conviction-relief counsel. 

Id. 

 Here, Petitioner is not raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground 

3. He is raising an identification claim. Martinez does not provide a basis for excusing 

the failure to properly exhaust an identification claim in state court. Thus, the procedural 

bar to this Court considering the merits of this claim applies and Petitioner’s objection is 

overruled. 

 Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the merits of this claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), relief would be denied. Specifically, for the reasons stated by 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel (R&R at 35), there was no constitutional defect in the 

identification procedures. Thus, even if this Court considered the merits of this claim, or 

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re-cast it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief. 

 D. Ground 4 

Petitioner claims four theories of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: 1) trial 

counsel was later disciplined by the bar (unrelated to Petitioner’s case); 2) trial counsel 

failed to locate and interview more witnesses; 3) trial counsel did not impeach the victim 

with a prior criminal record; and 4) trial counsel inadequately questioned the witnesses 

when they identified Petitioner. (R&R at 25). The R&R examined all of these claims 

and determined that none of them entitled Petitioner to habeas relief. (R&R at 25-33). 

 Petitioner filed objections to the R&R in general. (Doc. 35). At pages 8-14 

Petitioner goes on at length about all of the reasons he disliked his counsel. However, 

none of those reasons are specific to the four factual predicates of ineffective assistance 

of counsel that the R&R summarized from the Petition. Thus, effectively, Petitioner did 

not file objections to this portion of the R&R and this Court could accept and adopt it 

without further review. 

 Alternatively, even if Petitioner’s objections could be construed as specific 

objections to the R&R’s findings on these factual predicates to ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and the Court reviews this Ground de novo, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

As the R&R correctly states: 

 ... [C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed 

pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to 

prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - 

counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for 

reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's 

performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. 

Id. at 697. 

(R&R at 26). 

 1. trial counsel’s later bar discipline 

The fact that bar counsel was disciplined after Petitioner’s case for matters 

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unrelated to Petitioner case in no way meets the standard for ineffective assistance of 

counsel set forth in Strickland. See (R&R at 27-29); United States v. Ross, 338 F.3d 

1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, relief on this claim is denied. 

 2. trial counsel’s failure to locate witnesses 

Petitioner’s assertions that other witnesses exist or that such witnesses would have 

helpful testimony is speculation. (R&R at 29-31). Moreover, to the extent the Petitioner 

identified certain witnesses and those witnesses would have inculpated Petitioner further, 

Petitioner’s trial counsel exercised reasonable strategy to not call them. (Id.). Thus, trial 

counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland. Therefore, relief on this claim 

is denied. 

 3. trial counsel failure to impeach the victim 

Petitioner complains that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim with the 

victim’s prior criminal record. (R&R at 31). There is no evidence that the victim had a 

prior criminal record. (Id.). Accordingly, counsel’s performance was not deficient under 

Strickland and relief is denied. 

 4. trial counsel’s examination of witnesses 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to examine the witnesses. (R&R at 31-

33). However, counsel did examine the witnesses and Petitioner makes no argument or 

showing that the examination was deficient under Strickland. (Id.). Moreover there was 

substantial evidence against Petitioner; thus, Petitioner did not suffer any prejudice as is 

required by Strickland. (Id.). Therefore, relief is denied. 

E. Ground 5 

In Ground 5, Petitioner claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising 

four additional claims on appeal. (R&R at 33). The R&R concludes that counsel made a 

reasonable strategic choice as to which claims to raise, and those choices were not 

deficient performance under Strickland. (R&R at 33-36). 

Petitioner objects and argues that he told counsel what to raise on appeal and that 

counsel was obligated to argue the claims Petitioner requested be raised. (Doc. 35 at 21). 

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As the R&R states, appellate counsel has no duty to raise particular claims just because a 

client asks that such claims be raised. (R&R at 34). Thus, Petitioner’s objection that 

counsel did not have the authority to limit the claims raised on appeal is overruled. 

Further, the Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner’s appellate counsel made 

reasonable strategic choices to pursue only the claims counsel thought had the greatest 

likelihood of success. (R&R at 33-36). Thus, appellate counsel’s performance was not 

deficient under Strickland and relief on this claim is denied. 

F. Ground 6 

In Ground 6, Petitioner claims that his sentence violates due process and his right 

to a jury trial. The R&R concludes that this claim was not fairly presented to the state 

courts and is now procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 14-15). The R&R further finds that 

Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome this procedural default or 

actual innocence. (R&R at 18-19). As a result, the R&R recommends that relief on this 

claim be denied. 

Petitioner objects and argues that Martinez v. Ryan, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1309 

(2012) is a basis to excuse his default in state court. (Doc. 35 at 15-21). In general, 

Martinez held that a federal court considering a habeas petition could consider the merits 

of a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim if that claim was defaulted in 

state court as a result of the ineffective assistance of first-post-conviction-relief counsel. 

Id. 

Here, Petitioner is not raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground 

6. He is raising a sentencing claim. Martinez does not provide a basis for excusing the 

failure to properly exhaust a sentencing claim in state court. Thus, the procedural bar to 

this Court considering the merits of this claim applies and Petitioner’s objection is 

overruled. 

Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the merits of this claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), relief would be denied. Specifically, for the reasons stated by 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel (R&R at 35-36), Petitioner’s sentence was not illegal. 

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Thus, even if this Court considered the merits of this claim, or re-cast it as an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

IV. Request for Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner concludes his objections by seeking an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 35 at 

25-26). Petitioner makes no showing as to what he would offer at an evidentiary hearing. 

Instead, he cites a state rule of procedure claiming that the rule requires an evidentiary 

hearing. (Doc. 35 at 26). First, this Court is not bound by the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. Second, Petitioner has not alleged any facts which, if true, would entitle him 

to relief; thus, no evidentiary hearing is necessary. See West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 485 

(9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied 

and dismissed with prejudice; the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) is accepted and 

adopted; Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 35) are overruled; the Clerk of the Court shall enter 

judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies 

issuance of a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right on any Ground raised in the Petition. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 Dated this 24th day of August, 2016. 

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