Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00780/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00780-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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09cv780

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL P. KOBY, an individual, et.

al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARS NATIONAL SERVICES, INC., a

California Corporation, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv0780 JAH (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

RECERTIFY ORDER GRANTING

PERMISSION TO APPEAL

[Doc. No. 28] AND DENY

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION [Doc. No.

35]

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to recertify the order granting

permission to appeal and Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Modify Order to Reinstate Claim for

Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).” The motions are fully briefed. After a thorough

review of the parties’ submissions, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to recertify

and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to modify construed as a motion for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking relief for violations of Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act on April 15, 2009, naming ARS National Services, Inc. and Does 1 through

25 as defendants. See Doc. No. 1. On May 20, 2009, Defendant filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. See Doc. No. 6. The Court granted in part and denied in part

the motion. The motion was granted as to the claim that the voice mail message left with

Plaintiff Simmons violated section 1692e(11) of Title 15 of the United States Code and

denied as to the remaining claims. See Doc. No. 19.

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28 1

Defendant maintains it withdrew the petition because it was one day late. See Topor Decl. ¶ 5 (Doc. No. 28-1).

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On July 21, 2010, the parties filed a joint motion to certify the Court’s order for

appeal which this Court granted by order filed July 27, 2010. See Doc. Nos. 24, 25.

Defendant filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

on August 9, 2010, and later withdrew the petition.1

 See Doc. Nos. 26, 30. 

On August 18, 2010, Defendant filed the pending motion to recertify the order for

appeal. See 28. Plaintiff filed the pending motion to correct the Court’s order and filed

an opposition to Defendant’s motion to recertify on September 13, 2010. See Doc.

Nos. 35, 36.

Defendant filed its reply in support of its motion to recertify on September 20,

2010 and filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to correct the Court’s order on October

4, 2010. See Doc. Nos. 27, 38. Plaintiff filed a reply in support of its motion to correct

the Court’s order on October 8, 2010. See Doc. No. 39. The motions were taken under

submission without oral argument.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify

Plaintiffs seeks an order modifying this Court’s previous order granting in part

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order

reinstating the claim asserted by Plaintiff Simmons. Plaintiffs maintain their counsel

became aware of a Ninth Circuit case which establishes the appropriate analysis with

respect to whether Plaintiff Simmons message is a communication under the FDCPA.

They maintain pursuant to this Ninth Circuit precedent and utilizing the purpose-andcontext analysis discussed therein, the Simmons message was a communication because

the message was left for a consumer by a debt collector and the purpose of the call was to

collect a debt. Plaintiffs contend the late filing of Defendant’s petition with the Ninth

Circuit gives this Court the opportunity to re-analyze the issue prior to appellate review.

Citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), Plaintiffs

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request this Court modify its order and reinstate the claim brought on behalf of Plaintiff

Simmons pursuant to a “purpose and context” analysis.

Defendant argues the motion to modify is untimely because it was filed six months

after the order was filed, well beyond the 28 day deadline permitted by the local rule for

seeking reconsideration of orders. Defendant further argues the motion is meritless

because the three cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their motion are irrelevant

and not binding precedent.

In reply, Plaintiffs suggest the Court should reconsider its ruling in spite of the fact

the motion was not timely filed. Plaintiffs also argue Romine is binding upon this Court.

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to relieve a

party from an order for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct; (4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or (6) any other reason that

justifies relief. However, “no motion or application for reconsideration shall be filed more

than 28 days after the entry of the ruling, order or judgment sought to be reconsidered.

CivLR 7.1.i.2. Plaintiffs’ request filed almost six months after the order was filed is

untimely.

Even if the Court addresses the merits of the request to modify its prior order,

Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the decision in

Romine does not demonstrate this Court’s prior ruling was in error. In Romine, the Ninth

Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Western Union from the FDCPA action

upon finding Western Union’s conduct amounted to a direct or indirect attempt to collect

a debt and therefore Western Union was a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. In the

instant matter, the Court made a determination as to whether a message left by a debt

collector was a “communication” under the FDCPA. As such, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis

and holding surrounding whether a defendant was a debt collector subject to the FDCPA

is not directly relevant to the issue involved with the case at bar. Furthermore, although

Romine does not require a “purpose and context” analysis as suggested by Plaintiffs, the

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Court applied such an analysis when making its determination that the message left for

Plaintiff Simmons did not directly or indirectly convey information regarding a debt. See

Order at 4-5. 

Plaintiffs also rely on the holding of Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d

380 (7th Cir. 2010). Initially, the Court notes the case is not binding precedent as it is

from the Seventh Circuit. Additionally, it does not demonstrate this Court’s previous

order was in error. In Gburek, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that

a letter sent by a debt collector that did not contain an explicit demand for payment was

not a communication made in connection with the collection of any debt under the

FDCPA. In reaching its decision, the court recognized that the FDCPA did not apply to

every communication between a debt collector and a debtor and the absence of a demand

for payment is just one of several factors in determining whether the communication falls

under the FDCPA. Id. at 384-85, 386. Looking to the context and content of the letters,

the court found the fact the plaintiff was in default on her mortgage, the letters offered to

discuss alternatives to foreclosure and asked for her financial information were sufficient

to bring the communications within the scope of the FDCPA. Id. at 386. As discussed

above, this Court did consider the context and content of the message in making its

determination, and specifically found the message left for Plaintiff Simmons included no

information regarding the debt and therefore was not a communication for purposes of the

FDCPA.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ reliance on a district court order outside this Circuit is unavailing.

The court in Hutton v. C.B. Accounts, Inc., 2010 WL 3021904 (C.D.Ill. 2010),

specifically discussed and disagreed with this Court’s reasoning in its order dismissing the

claim based upon the message left Plaintiff Simmons in determining a message similar to

the one left Plaintiff Simmons was a communication. Disagreement with this Court by

another district court outside this circuit is insufficient to support reconsideration of the

order.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration styled as a motion to modify the

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Court’s order is DENIED.

II. Defendant’s Motion to Recertify

Defendant requests this Court recertify the order granting in part and denying in

part Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for immediate appeal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). Defendant maintains the reasons that prompted the parties

to jointly seek certification still exist and recertification will advance the purposes of

section 1292(b). Specifically, Defendant argues the action involves questions of law about

which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and immediate appeal will

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Defendant further maintains Plaintiffs

previously agreed to certification, they will not be prejudiced by recertification and

Defendant is not seeking to delay or harass Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They argue there are no substantial grounds for

difference of opinion and judicial economy will not be promoted by an immediate appeal.

Plaintiffs maintain there is no dispute amongst the circuits and no bona fide dispute

amongst the district courts, as only one court, the Western District of Oklahoma, found

a voice mail message conveyed no information regarding a debt. Relying on the reasoning

of Hutton, Plaintiffs maintain a message left for the purpose of attempting to collect in the

context of a debt collector-consumer relationship is information regarding a debt and

therefore a communication. As such, they argue there is no basis to conclude substantial

grounds for difference of opinion. They further argue only a complete reversal of the

Court’s order would short circuit the case and complete reversal is unlikely given the

weight of authority. So, an interlocutory appeal will likely delay resolution of this case and

permitting the case to proceed in ordinary course will allow for a more complete record.

In reply, Defendant argues none of the cases cited by Plaintiff help them, in fact,

they argue the cases confirm that substantial grounds for a difference of opinion exists.

Defendant maintains allowing the Ninth Circuit to resolve the issues will bring guidance

and clarity and will materially advance the litigation by possibly avoiding an expensive

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2 Section 1292(b) states, in its entirety:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise

appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves

a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may

materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation, he shall so

state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeal which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it

within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That

application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district

court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(emphasis in original). 

3

 See Biggs v. Credit Collections, Inc., 2007 WL 4034997 (W.D.Okla.); Berg v. Merchants Ass’n Collection Div., Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1336 (S.D.Fla. 2008); Berlin v. Litton Loan Serving, LP, 2006 WL 1992410 (M.D.Fla. 2006); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Associates, Inc., 387

F.Supp.2d 1104 (C.D.Cal. 2005).

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class action.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)2

 permits a district judge to certify an issue for interlocutory

appeal where the issue (1) involves a controlling question of law; (2) to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Certification of interlocutory orders

under Section 1292(b) requires exceptional circumstances to be present to “justify a

departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a

final judgment.” In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.

1982). 

The parties do not dispute the fact the issue constitutes a controlling question of

law. A reversal of this Court’s order as to whether the messages were communications

subject to the FDCPA would materially affect the outcome of the litigation by possibly

terminating all or portions of the litigation and, therefore, constitutes a controlling

question of law. See id. Additionally, the lack of controlling precedent as to when a

message qualifies as a “communication” subject to the provisions of the FDCPA and the

various district court decisions3 demonstrate substantial grounds for a difference of

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opinion exists. Finally, the interlocutory appeal may materially advance the litigation in

that a decision by the Ninth Circuit will likely simplify the issues to be tried and may

determine the appropriateness of a class action or limit the class. The Court finds

exceptional circumstances exist to support certification under section 1292(b).

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. The Court further finds a stay of the proceedings

pending the outcome of the appeal is appropriate.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration styled as a motion to modify the

Court’s order is DENIED;

2. Defendant’s motion to recertify is GRANTED;

3. Further proceedings in this matter are STAYED pending the completion of

the interlocutory review process in the Ninth Circuit.

DATED: December 22, 2010

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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