Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06737/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06737-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED

SERVICES COMPANY, INC., a New

York corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

D&A CORPORATION d/b/a

BAKERSFIELD WHOLESALE FOODS, a

California Corporation, ABDO

AEZAH, an individual, MALAKA M. 

AEZAH, an individual, FAHD

AIZAH, an individual, DAVID

AEZAH, an individual, and DOES 1

THROUGH 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:04-cv-06737 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(DOC. 92) PURSUANT TO FED.

R. CIV. P. 55.

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause of action arises out of the alleged non-payment

of approximately $3.68 million in charges to Defendants’ American

Express credit cards. Plaintiff, American Express Travel Related

Services Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “American Express”) moves

for default judgment against two of the named defendants in this

action, D&A Corporation d/b/a Bakersfield Wholesale (“Bakersfield

Wholesale”) and Abdo Aezah (“Abdo”). The other named defendants,

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

against whom American Express does not move for default, include

Malaka M. Aezah, Abdo’s common law wife and David Aezah, Abdo’s

brother or brother-in-law.

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed its original complaint on December 21, 2004. 

(Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on

March 22, 2005. (Doc. 44, First Am. Compl.) Plaintiff’s claims,

as set forth in the First Amended Complaint, are: (1) breach of

contract against Bakersfield Wholesale; (2) account stated

against Bakersfield Wholesale; (3) breach of contract against all

individual defendants; (4) breach of contract on book account

against all defendants except David; (5) unjust enrichment

against all defendants except David; (6) common law fraud against

all defendants except David; (7) piercing the corporate veil;

(8) and fraudulent conveyance against Bakersfield Wholesale,

Abdo, and David.

Plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint on June 3, 2005 (Doc. 94, Minute Order), and filed a

Second Amended Complaint by stipulation and with the permission

of the court on June 8, 2005 (Doc. 96, Second Am. Compl.).

Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale both answered the original

complaint, although neither of these defendants answered the

First Amended Complaint. At a April 4, 2005 hearing unrelated to

the motion for default, at which Abdo was present, Defendants’

counsel stated that his clients Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff moved for an order of contempt against Abdo,

Bakersfield Wholesale, and David on February 23, 2005. (Doc. 30) 

An evidentiary hearing relating to this motion was held on April

4, 2005 at which Abdo testified. An order of contempt was

subsequently entered on April 13, 2005. (Doc. 72) A memorandum

decision in support of that order was entered on May 16, 2005. 

(Doc. 89)

3

did not intend to answer the First Amended Complaint.1

Plaintiff’s counsel stated in his sworn declaration that he spoke

with Defendants’ counsel on April 11, 2005 and that Defendants’

counsel “confirmed that Abdo Aezah and Bakersfield Wholesale

would not be answering...and that they intended to default in

this action.” (Doc. 91, Glauber Decl. ¶ 10)

On May 6, 2005, Plaintiff requested that the clerk of court

enter default against Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale, and default

was entered against each of these defendants on the same date. 

American Express now moves for default judgment against Abdo and

Bakersfield Wholesale in the amount of $3,683,320.97. (Doc. 92,

Pl.’s Mem. 6) 

American Express appears to request default judgment as to

only three of its causes of action against these defendants. 

American Express states in its memorandum that it is entitled to

default judgment against Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale for

breach of contract and against Bakersfield Wholesale for account

stated.

In addition, American Express asserts that the operative

agreement “awards American Express attorney’s fees equal to 15%

of the outstanding balance in the event that litigation is

commenced to collect any amounts due under the agreement.” (Doc.

92, Pl.’s Mem. 2-3) However, American Express only requests the

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

sum of $3,683,320.97 in the conclusion of its brief. (Id. at 6) 

Also, Plaintiff’s counsel waived their right to recover

attorneys’ fees at the July 11, 2005 oral argument on the motion

for default.

Plaintiff alleges in the First Amended Complaint that in or

about May 2004, Abdo applied for and was granted a corporate

credit card account on behalf of Bakersfield Wholesale. Four

credit cards associated with this account were subsequently

issued to D&A Corporation, Malaka Aezah, Fahd Aizah, and Abdo

Aezah. (Doc. 44, First Am. Compl. ¶ 16) The complaint goes on

to state that “[b]y designating Abdo, Malaka, and Fahd to receive

American Express credit cards, Bakersfield Wholesale agreed to be

bound by the terms and conditions of the [agreements]” and that

the agreements “provide[] that Bakersfield Wholesale is liable

for all charges made to the American Express cards issued to

defendants.” (Id. at ¶ 17) The agreements also contained a

guarantee clause that provided that the individual cardholders

are responsible for all charges billed to [their] account.” 

(Doc. 91, Glauber Decl. at Ex. 7, Samuelson Decl. at Ex. A,

Agreements)

Plaintiff does not attach agreements signed by Abdo or by an

agent of Bakersfield Wholesale, but instead attaches standard

form agreements and asserts these are the agreements that

governed its relationship with Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale. 

(Doc. 91, Glauber Decl. at E. 7, Samuelson Decl. at Ex. A,

Agreements) Furthermore, the agreements are attached to the

declaration of Mr. Samuelson, American Express’ risk management

director, which, in turn, is attached to the declaration of

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff’s counsel. In other words, Mr. Samuelson’s declaration

is not submitted as a separate document in support of the motion

for default, but as an exhibit to Mr. Glauber’s declaration. Mr.

Samuelson’s declaration is was filed on December 21, 2004 and was

submitted earlier in this litigation in support of American

Express’ request for a writ of attachment.

Plaintiff alleges that American Express sent monthly

statements to Bakersfield Wholesale and the individual defendants

requesting they pay the amounts charged to their accounts. (Id.

at ¶ 22) As of the end of October 2004, there was a balance of

$109,762 owed with respect to the card issued in the name of

Defendant Abdo; $46,834.26 owed with respect to the card of

Defendant Malaka; and $35,033.75 owed with respect to the card of

Defendant Fahd. (Doc. 44, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-27) On

November 5 and 7, 2004, American Express received electronic

payments by computer of those amounts for each account. However,

approximately one month later, on December 4, 2004, the bank that

issued these payments to American Express reversed the payments

due to insufficient funds, resulting in nonpayment. American

Express closed the accounts on December 2, 2004. American

Express does not explain why the accounts were closed on December

2, 2004, even though the bank did not inform it of the reversal

until two days later, on December 4, 2004. During the time

between early November and December 2 (when the accounts were

closed), Abdo and the other defendants continued to use their

cards and proceeded to charge an additional $2,278,972.11 to the

cards. (Id. at ¶ 27)

In support of the $3,683,320.97 total amount claimed as

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

damages, Plaintiff again refers to Mr. Samuelson’s declaration. 

Mr. Samuelson’s declaration attaches credit card statements from

the corporate credit cards issued to Abdo individually, Abdo on

behalf of D&A Corporation, Malaka, and Fahd. As stated in

Mr. Samuelson’s declaration, the amounts owed on each account are

as follows:

Name on Card Account Number Amount Due

Abdo Aezah 3794-793179-41002 $ 219,773.33

Abdo Aezah 3785-913780-01004 $ 131,611.05

Malaka Aezah 3794-793189-41001 $ 144,044.87

Fahd Aizah 3794-052859-81006 $3,187,891.72

TOTAL $3,683,320.97

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth a two-step

process for obtaining a default judgment. Rule 55(a) requires

the plaintiff to first seek an entry of default from the clerk of

court. The entry of default by the clerk conclusively

establishes the liability of the defendant. Adriana Int’l Corp.

v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the

entry of default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to

judgment in the amount of damages claimed. Taylor Made Golf Co.,

Inc. v. Carsten Sports, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 658, 660-1 (S.D. Cal.

1997) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.

1978)). In cases where the amount of damages sought is a sum

certain and the defendant has failed to appear, the plaintiff may

seek entry of judgment from the clerk by submitting documentation

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

supporting the amount. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). In all other

cases, the plaintiff must request default judgment from the

court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In cases where the defendant

has also made an appearance in the case, the plaintiff must give

the defendant at least three days’ notice of the hearing

regarding default judgment. Id.; see also In re Roxford Foods,

Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1993); LG Elec., Inc. v. Advance

Creative Computer Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1175 (N.D. Cal.

2002). 

The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for default

judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Elektra

Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D.

Cal. 2005) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th

Cir. 1980)). The allegations in the complaint relating to

liability are taken as true. Taylor Made Golf, 175 F.R.D. at

661. The allegations relating to damages, however, are not taken

as true, and the district court may require the submission of

supporting evidence or a full evidentiary hearing. See id. (“In

assessing damages, the court must review facts of record,

requesting more information if necessary, to establish the amount

to which plaintiff is lawfully entitled upon judgment by

default.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (“[T]he court may conduct

such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and

proper....”). Additionally, the court may determine the amount

of attorney’s fees to which the plaintiff may be entitled. James

v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1993); Fair Housing of Marin

v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 907-8 (9th Cir. 2002); Taylor Made Golf,

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

175 F.R.D. at 663-4.

The following factors are considered on a motion for default

judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff[;]

(2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim[;] 

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint[;] 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 

(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material

facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable

neglect[;] and

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-2; see also Elektra Entertainment, 226

F.R.D. at 392-3 (applying Eitel factors).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Entry of Default by the Clerk.

The first step in obtaining default judgment is to request

entry of default from the clerk of court. The clerk can enter

default when the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise

defend” the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Here, Abdo and

Bakersfield Wholesale have failed to answer the operative First

Amended Complaint. At the April 4, 2005 evidentiary hearing on

Plaintiff’s motion for contempt, counsel for Bakersfield

Wholesale and Abdo informed the court that his clients did not

intend to file an answer. Also, Plaintiff’s counsel stated in

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

his sworn declaration that he spoke with Defendants’ counsel on

April 11, 2005 and that Defendants’ counsel “confirmed that Abdo

Aezah and Bakersfield Wholesale would not be answering...and that

they intended to default in this action.” (Doc. 91, Glauber

Decl. ¶ 10) Plaintiff subsequently moved for entry of default

against Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale on May 6, 2005, and the

clerk entered default against each of these defendants on the

same date. (See Docs. 87, 88) Plaintiff has fulfilled the first

step of the default judgement process. 

B. Motion for Default Judgment.

Entry of default by the clerk conclusively establishes the

liability of Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale. Adriana Int’l, 913

F.2d at 1414. Entry of default, however, does not automatically

entitle American Express to judgment in the amount it seeks. 

Taylor Made Golf, 175 F.R.D. at 660-1. The allegations of fact

relating to liability are deemed admitted, although the

allegations relating to damages are not. Id. at 661. There are

two ways in which a plaintiff may obtain entry of default

judgment for an award of damages. The first, which does not

apply here, is to apply to the clerk of court for an entry of

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). A plaintiff may employ this

procedure when the amount of damages sought is a sum certain and

where the defendant has made no appearance in the case. In cases

where the defendant has made an appearance, or where the amount

of damages sought is not a sum certain (i.e., capable of precise

mathematical calculation), the plaintiff must apply to the court

for entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Here, Abdo and

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Bakersfield Wholesale answered the original complaint, thereby

making an appearance in the case and triggering the application

of Rule 55(b)(2). American Express has moved the court for entry

of default judgment pursuant to this provision.

1. Notice.

One technical requirement of Rule 55(b)(2) is that plaintiff

notify the party against whom default judgment is being sought of

the hearing at least three days before the hearing takes place. 

See In re Roxford Foods, 12 F.3d at 881. Plaintiff here served

Defendants’ counsel with the motion for default and supporting

papers, although it did not separately serve the parties

themselves. Where a party has appeared through counsel, service

on counsel in the manner prescribed by law is sufficient notice.

2. Eitel Analysis.

In its motion, American Express requests default judgment

“for breach of contract and account stated.” (Doc. 92, Pl.’s

Mem. 2). Other claims American Express brings against

Bakersfield Wholesale include breach of contract on open book

account (a common count), unjust enrichment, common law fraud,

piercing the corporation veil, and fraudulent conveyance. 

The following factors are considered on a motion for default

judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff[;]

(2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim[;] 

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint[;] 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material

facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable

neglect[;] and

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-2.

(a) Prejudice to Plaintiff.

First, Plaintiff makes no argument and provides no evidence

that it would be prejudiced if a default judgment is not entered. 

Nevertheless, if a default judgment is not entered, prejudice

would result to the Plaintiff because they would “be denied the

right to judicial resolution of the claim presented, and would be

without other recourse for recovery” for money owed, at least as

to Defendants Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale. Elektra

Entertainment, 226 F.R.D. at 392. Plaintiff would not be denied

the opportunity of judicial resolution of its claims against

Malaka and David, as these defendants have not defaulted.

(b) Sufficiency of Allegations and Merit of

Claims.

Plaintiff’s complaint states claims for breach of contract

and account stated. These claims also appear to have merit,

despite several evidentiary problems with Plaintiff’s

submissions. 

First, the elements for breach of contract are the existence

of a valid contract, breach of the contract, and resulting

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

damages. Although Plaintiff has not provided the signed

contract, Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale have admitted their

liability as to the breach of contract claim by virtue of their

default as to the credit plaintiff advanced. As to Bakersfield

Wholesale, Plaintiff alleges that a contract existed and that

Bakersfield Wholesale breached that contract by failing to pay

the outstanding amount on its corporate charge account. (Doc.

44, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-52) These allegations relate to

liability and are therefore deemed admitted and considered true

for purposes of the motion for default. Plaintiff has

established its claim for breach of contract against Bakersfield

Wholesale.

As to Abdo, Plaintiff alleges that a Abdo was party to the

agreement governing use of the corporate credit cards and that

Abdo breached the agreement by “bouncing” payments to American

Express. (Doc. 44, First Am. Compl. ¶ 61) The agreements

provided that the individual cardmembers are liable for all

charges billed to their accounts. Plaintiff has established its

claim for breach of contract against Abdo.

Second, the common law cause of action for “account stated”

is as follows:

An account stated is an agreement, based on the prior

transactions between the parties, that the items of the

account are true and that the balance struck is due and

owing from one party to another. [citations] When the

account is assented to, it becomes a new contract. An

action on it is not founded upon the original items,

but upon the balance agreed to by the parties. 

Gleason v. Kramer, 103 Cal. App. 3d 782, 786-7 (1980). A cause

of action for account stated is therefore like a cause of action

for breach of contract, where the element requiring a valid,

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

existing contract is fulfilled by the existence of an assent,

either explicit or implicit, that the amount owed, as stated on

the account, is accurate. 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for account stated is only

brought against Defendant Bakersfield Wholesale. As to

Bakersfield Wholesale, Plaintiff alleges that it received

American Express monthly statements of account and, by not

objecting to the amounts on the statements, acknowledged the debt

owed to American Express. (Doc. 44, First Am. Compl. ¶ 56) 

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Bakersfield Wholesale failed

to pay the amount due. (Id. at ¶ 51). Plaintiff attaches credit

card statements in support of the merits of its account stated

claim. The statements are again attached to Mr. Samuelson’s

declaration, which was submitted on an unrelated motion. Despite

this evidentiary problem, Plaintiff satisfies the second and

third elements of the Eitel analysis. Plaintiff’s allegations,

taken as true, establish a claim for account stated against

Bakersfield Wholesale. 

Plaintiff does not allege a cause of action for account

stated as to Abdo.

(c) Amount of Money at Stake and Possibility of

Dispute over Material Facts.

The allegations in the complaint relating to liability

(i.e., that there was a contract and that it was breached) are

taken as true. The allegations relating to the total amount of

damages, however, are not taken as true. Plaintiff argues in its

brief that it “respectfully requests the court to enter this

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

default judgment because [Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale] have

not filed a response to the first amended complaint.” (Doc. 92,

Pl.’s Mem. 5) While Plaintiff does cite to facts alleged in its

complaint (see id. at 2-4), it makes no effort to explain its

basis for damages or cite to the record to support its claim for

damages. Instead, it asserts that Defendants’ admissions by

their default alone are sufficient to establish that

$3,683,320.97 is the amount owed. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55 and precedent applying Rule 55, however, are clear

that on a motion for default, Plaintiff is required to submit

sufficient evidence to substantiate the claimed amount of

damages. See Taylor Made Golf, 175 F.R.D. at 661.

Although Plaintiff’s showing is tenuous, Plaintiff has

submitted some evidence to support its claim for damages. 

Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of its counsel, which in

turn, attaches a declaration prepared for a different motion. 

Mr. Samuelson’s declaration, filed December 21, 2004, was

prepared in support of a writ of attachment; it does set forth

the amounts owed on each of the charge cards issued for

Bakersfield Wholesale’s account as of that time. The court is

left to infer that there has been no payment on these accounts.

Abdo signed a guarantee that he would be personally liable

for the amounts charged to the cards. Abdo is jointly and

severally liable to American Express in the total amount

$3,683,320.97 based on his guarantee. Bakersfield Wholesale is

jointly and severally liable to American Express in the total

amount charged on all credit cards issued under its corporate

account, or $3,683,320.97.

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

(d) Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.

This issue is not a factor in this case since counsel for

Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale informed the court that his

clients intended to default.

(e) Policy in Favor of Resolution on the Merits.

Where two parties intend a resolution by default, the factor

in favor of resolution on the merits does not weigh against

entering judgment by default. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees.

Plaintiff does, however, state in the “preliminary

statement” of its brief that the governing agreement awards

American Express attorneys’ fees equal to 15% of the outstanding

balance in the event that litigation is commenced to collect any

amounts due under the agreement. (Doc. 92, Pl.’s Mem. 2-3) 

However, Plaintiff does not request attorneys’ fees in the

conclusion of its brief. Also, Plaintiff’s counsel waived their

right to recover attorneys’ fees during oral argument. 

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request for

default judgment in the amount of $3,683,320.97 is

GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of

Plaintiff and against Defendants Abdo Aezah and D&A

Corporation, d/b/a Bakersfield Wholesale, a California

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

corporation. Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a

judgment in conformity with this decision within five

(5) days following the date of service of this

decision.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July _15__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06737-AWI-JLT Document 103 Filed 07/15/05 Page 16 of 16