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Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

STEPHEN E. EBERHARDT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

PATRICK J. WALSH, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 20 C 1171 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge, and 

Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED DECEMBER 5, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and PRYOR, Circuit 

Judges. 

PRYOR, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Attorney Stephen 

Eberhardt challenges the district court’s decision to sanction

him under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

its denial of his motion to reconsider. Seeing no abuse of 

discretion in either decision, we affirm. 

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2 Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

I. BACKGROUND

Eberhardt has a history with the Village of Tinley Park and 

its officials. At last count, he has filed more than 25 lawsuits, 

14 ethics complaints, and 150 Freedom of Information Act 

requests since 2014, the vast majority of which have been 

dismissed. In one of those dismissed cases, the judge “put[] 

Eberhardt on notice” that his litigation strategy was nearly

sanctionable, as Eberhardt seemingly did not “appreciat[e] 

the need for substantive legal support for his claims.” 

Eberhardt v. Seaman, No. 17 L 11231 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. Sep. 

28, 2018) (Dkt. 153-4, Ex. C, at 19–20). Undeterred, Eberhardt 

continued filing frivolous lawsuits. 

A. Eberhardt’s Underlying Lawsuit 

In early 2020, Eberhardt, an attorney who represented 

himself pro se, filed a 102-page, 19-count complaint against 11 

defendants in federal court, including the Village, its officials, 

attorneys, and residents. Most of the complaint focused on an 

alleged scheme by the Village to prevent Eberhardt from 

making public comments at Village board meetings and on 

Village-related Facebook pages, in violation of his 

constitutional rights. Eberhardt also brought two claims 

against the Village’s outside counsel, Patrick Walsh, and his 

law firm, Walsh Law Group, P.C., under the Illinois Open 

Meetings Act. Eberhardt alleged that Walsh was unlawfully

appointed to this role. 

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the 

district court granted the motion without prejudice pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The district court noted

that the complaint was “so lengthy, repetitive, and jumbled” 

that it was “impossible for Defendants or the court to 

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Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 3

ascertain which facts [were] relevant to which claims and to 

which [D]efendants.”

A few days later, Eberhardt filed an amended complaint, 

which he slimmed down to 39 pages and 16 counts, but it still 

contained many of the same wide-ranging allegations against 

the Village and Walsh.

All of the Defendants again filed motions to dismiss, 

which the district court granted. The court then entered final 

judgment. 

B. District Court Rule 11 Sanctions Order and Award

Following judgment, Walsh’s attorney filed a Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11 motion for sanctions against Eberhardt

for attorneys’ fees and costs.1 Walsh’s attorney argued that 

Eberhardt’s filings against Walsh—two claims that Walsh 

was unlawfully appointed to serve as outside counsel for the 

Village—violated Eberhardt’s ethical duties under Rule 11.

These filings, in Walsh’s view, arose from a bad-faith desire

by Eberhardt to harass Walsh and demonstrated Eberhardt’s 

lack of due diligence to ensure that his claims were supported 

by existing law. To provide context for the alleged 

harassment, Walsh attached a table of Eberhardt’s numerous

lawsuits, Freedom of Information Act requests, and ethics 

and disciplinary complaints against the Village and its elected 

1 The motion for sanctions was brought under both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1927, a statute that allows courts to impose costs and attorneys’ fees on 

“[a]ny attorney ... who ... multiplies the proceedings in any case 

unreasonably and vexatiously.” Because the district court sanctioned 

Eberhardt under Rule 11, it did “not address whether sanctions pursuant 

to § 1927 are applicable.” 

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10
4 Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

officials, employees, attorneys, and citizens. Eberhardt

responded and requested a hearing. 

The district court denied Eberhardt’s hearing request and 

granted Walsh’s Rule 11 motion, ordering Eberhardt to pay 

Walsh $26,951.22 in attorneys’ fees. The district court found 

Eberhardt’s claims were “frivolous” and “brought with 

inadequate investigation into the relevant law and facts.” The 

district court explained that Eberhardt’s claims had three 

fundamental legal flaws: a lack of facts establishing the 

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; a lack of injury-in-fact 

based on Walsh’s appointment; and a lack of evidentiary 

support that Walsh was appointed in violation of the Village’s 

Purchasing Ordinance.2 At bottom, the district court found 

“Eberhardt sued Walsh, alleging little action and no injury, 

for violations of Village ordinances that were not violations at 

all.” 

The district court concluded that Eberhardt’s legal 

theories were “not objectively warranted by existing law or a 

good faith argument for its extension.” The court also 

determined, based on Eberhardt’s history with the Village 

and his actions in the present case, that Eberhardt had 

brought these claims to be “a nuisance.” In support, the 

district court noted the vast number of suits that Eberhardt 

had filed against the Village and its officials. Additionally, 

Judge Norgle pointed to Eberhardt’s hyperactive motions 

practice in this case, which consisted of sixteen motions—

2 As Eberhardt points out on appeal, the district court cited to a 

superseded version of this Purchasing Ordinance. (App. Dkt. 36 at 8 n. 2). 

But the operative language of the correct version is identical to the 

previous version, so that does not undermine the court’s analysis. 

(Compare Dkt. 153-9 at 6–9, with Dkt. 194-3 at 10–12). 

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10
Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 5

including several made on an emergency basis—that were, 

other than two minor motions, all denied. This, the court 

determined, all “scream[ed] bad faith.” 

C. Denial of Reconsideration of the Sanctions Order

Eberhardt moved for reconsideration of the Rule 11 

sanctions order.3 The district court denied the motion finding 

the sanctions order “amply justified.” In denying 

reconsideration, the court also found that the lack of a hearing 

before the sanctions order did not violate due process because 

Eberhardt could not explain what purpose would have been 

served by such a hearing. 

II. ANALYSIS

Eberhardt now appeals both the sanctions order and the 

order denying reconsideration. We address each argument 

in turn. 

A. Legal Summary 

The purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 

sanctions is to deter baseless filings in the district court. 

Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2013). As a result, 

Rule 11 imposes certain duties on attorneys and pro se parties. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 

1983 Amendment (“Rule 11 ... appl[ies] to anyone who signs 

a pleading, motion, or other paper.”). One duty is to not make 

filings “for any improper purpose,” like harassment. Id. at 

11(b)(1). Another duty is to make “an inquiry reasonable 

under the circumstances” and then submit only “claims” and 

3 After this motion was filed, Judge Charles Norgle took inactive senior 

status, and the case was transferred to then-Chief Judge Rebecca 

Pallmeyer. 

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10
6 Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

“legal contentions” that “are warranted by existing law.” Id. 

at 11(b)(2). If a district court finds that a lawyer or party has 

breached either of those duties, it “may impose an 

appropriate sanction.” Id. at 11(c).

There must be due process before Rule 11 sanctions are 

issued, including notice and an opportunity to respond. Kapco 

Mfg. Co. v. C & O Enterprises, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1494 (7th Cir. 

1989); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). But the right to a hearing is 

“obviously limited to cases where a hearing could assist the 

court in its decision.” Id. at 1494–95. When a party’s 

sanctionable conduct is apparent from the record, the district 

court does not need to conduct a hearing because “there are 

no issues that a hearing could illuminate and hence the 

hearing would be pointless.” Id. at 1495. 

B. Discussion 

1. Order Granting Rule 11 Sanctions

Eberhardt maintains that the district court erred both 

substantively and procedurally in ruling on Walsh’s Rule 11 

motion. We review a Rule 11 sanctions order for an abuse of 

discretion. Cooper v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 42 

F.4th 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2022). 

a. Whether the district court abused its discretion 

in sanctioning Eberhardt

The district court found that Eberhardt violated Rule 

11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in bringing his 

claims against Walsh. First, the district court found that 

Eberhardt filed suit to harass Walsh. This determination is 

supported by the record. This suit is but one of an incredible 

number of cases that Eberhardt has brought against the 

Village of Tinley Park and its officials, attorneys, and 

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Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 7

residents. In this case alone, Eberhardt filed over a dozen 

motions—including three motions for a preliminary 

injunction and two motions for a temporary restraining 

order—which were almost entirely denied. We agree the 

district court made a reasonable determination that 

Eberhardt’s tactics, as informed by his past practice, were 

designed to harass Walsh. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank 

N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 931–32 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“A paper 

‘interposed for any improper purpose’ is sanctionable 

whether or not it is supported by the facts and the law ... .”). 

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding Eberhardt’s conduct to be in violation of Rule 11(b)(1).

Second, the district court determined that Eberhardt failed

to conduct “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” 

and bring only claims “warranted by existing law.” Because 

Eberhardt brought claims that he knew were meritless and 

that suffered from “fundamental” jurisdictional defects, the 

district court did not err in concluding Eberhardt violated 

Rule 11(b)(2). Both reasons are supported by the record. See 

Berwick Grain Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of Ag., 217 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 

2000) (“[L]egally unreasonable arguments ... may incur 

penalty.”).

By the time Eberhardt filed his amended complaint, he 

should have known that his claims relating to Walsh’s 

appointment were groundless. A reasonable inquiry under 

the circumstances would have revealed that the Village’s 

Purchasing Ordinance squarely permitted the type of 

appointment at issue here: engaging a lawyer for services 

worth less than $20,000. Indeed, Eberhardt didn’t need to do 

much homework—Walsh’s attorney told him about the 

Purchasing Ordinance in his Rule 11 notice that predated the 

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10
8 Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

amended complaint. Armed with this information, Eberhardt 

should not have pressed these claims against Walsh. By 

pursuing these claims anyway, Eberhardt violated Rule 

11(b)(2) and (b)(3). See Flaherty v. Gas Rsch. Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 

459 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming Rule 11 sanction issued after 

attorney filed complaint despite being apprised that claims 

were clearly subject to dismissal). 

Eberhardt’s claims against Walsh also contained serious 

jurisdictional flaws. First, the district court plainly lacked 

supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, because they had 

no factual overlap with the federal claims that provided 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing supplemental 

jurisdiction for “claims that are so related to claims in the 

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of 

the same case or controversy”). Second, Eberhardt lacked 

standing to sue over these claims because the allegations 

concerning Walsh’s appointment were nothing more than 

generalized grievances that are insufficient to confer standing 

in federal court. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) 

(no Article III standing based on “generalized grievance 

shared ... by all or a large class of citizens”). 

To be sure, not every jurisdictional misstep justifies Rule 

11 sanctions. But here, the district court reasonably found that 

Eberhardt—an attorney acting pro se—should not have made 

these claims given the fundamental errors underlying them. 

Viewed in context, this decision was not an abuse of 

discretion. See Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939, 958 

(7th Cir. 2020) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions based on “legally 

frivolous” arguments); Orange Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Frontline 

Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming Rule 

11 sanctions when party filed a complaint “which it must 

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10
Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 9

have known completely lacked a factual foundation for 

subject matter jurisdiction”); Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 

1320–23 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions when 

lawyer “ha[d] no objectively reasonable basis for asserting 

standing to sue”).4

b. Whether the district court needed to hold a 

hearing

Regardless of the propriety of the sanctions order, 

Eberhardt’s main argument on appeal is that he was denied 

due process because the district court declined to hold a 

hearing before sanctioning him. 

It is true that there must be due process before Rule 11

sanctions are issued. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & O Enterprises, Inc., 

886 F.2d 1485, 1494 (7th Cir. 1989). But a hearing is not 

required unless it “could assist the court in its decision.” Id. at 

1494–95. Indeed, if the “record [i]s adequate to determine 

whether sanctions [a]re necessary,” hearings are discouraged. 

Teamsters Loc. No. 579 v. B & M Transit, Inc., 882 F.2d 274, 279 

(7th Cir. 1989). 

There was no need for a hearing here. The district court 

sanctioned Eberhardt on two independent grounds: (1) his 

legal claims were objectively frivolous, and (2) his claims 

were subjectively brought in bad faith simply to harass 

Walsh. By Eberhardt’s own admission, however, the purpose 

of a hearing would have been only to undermine the second 

grounds for sanctions: Walsh’s argument that this suit was 

4 Eberhardt argues—for the first time in his reply brief—that Walsh failed 

to substantially comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision before 

moving for sanctions. An argument made for the first time in a reply brief 

is waived, Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897, so we do not consider it. 

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10 Nos. 22-2623 & 23-1770 

brought in bad faith. The district court was under no 

obligation to hold a hearing as Eberhardt challenged only one 

of the two independent grounds for imposing sanctions. 

See Kapco Mfg. Co., 886 F.2d at 1494–95 (“Whether an attorney 

who is being sanctioned acted in good faith is not material if 

his conduct was objectively unreasonable.”).

2. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

Eberhardt also argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to reconsider the sanctions 

order. He contends that Chief Judge Pallmeyer erred in 

agreeing with the findings in Judge Norgle’s sanctions order

and that the district court should have granted his request for 

a hearing. We apply an “extremely deferential” abuse of 

discretion standard when evaluating a denial of a motion to 

reconsider. Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 

2009). 

“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function; to 

correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly 

discovered evidence.” Hicks v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 531 F.3d 

467, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Here, 

there was no “error[] of law or fact” to correct, given that the 

court appropriately ruled on the sanctions issue. Moreover, 

Eberhardt points to no newly discovered evidence he 

provided the district court. Thus, it was not an abuse of 

discretion to deny Eberhardt’s motion to reconsider. 

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

sanctions order and denial of the motion to reconsider.

Case: 23-1770 Document: 29 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 10