Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01202/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01202-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Donald Dean, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Terry Allred, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1202-PHX-GMS (MEA) 

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Miner’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 52). The parties are familiar 

with the factual background of this case and its procedural history. Miner moves to 

dismiss both the deliberate indifference and negligence claims presented against her. The 

motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

 On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact are assumed to be true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2009). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

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Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To avoid 

dismissal, a complaint need contain only “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The 

principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a complaint does not apply to 

legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. To show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the 

complaint must permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. 

Id. 

 A claim must be stated clearly enough to provide each defendant fair opportunity 

to frame a responsive pleading. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“Something labeled a complaint . . ., yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to 

whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a 

complaint.” Id. at 1180. 

II. Discussion 

 A. Deliberate Indifference 

 Plaintiff pleads the following facts against Miner. Plaintiff was released from the 

hospital and sent back to the Arizona Department of Corrections on September 8, 2012, 

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with instructions to return to the hospital within 7-10 days to undergo surgery. Plaintiff 

advised Miner of the surgeon’s recommendation and she reviewed Plaintiff’s consultation 

records and plan of care form, which indicated that Plaintiff should be returned to the 

hospital within 7-10 days. Miner misrepresented the hospital physician’s discharge 

instruction in Plaintiff’s medical record by indicating that Plaintiff should follow up with 

the surgeon for “possible” surgery despite her knowledge that Plaintiff required surgery 

(Doc. 24, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-35; 56-59). 

 To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted 

with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff 

must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the 

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). A prison official must both know of and disregard an 

excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate 

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a 

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prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the 

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). 

 There are no facts in Plaintiff’s pleading to support a plausible inference that 

Miner intentionally misrepresented the surgeon’s instructions with the intent to deny 

Plaintiff his necessary surgery. Nor are there any allegations that Miner’s use of the word 

“possible” to describe Plaintiff’s need for surgery was the reason he was not timely 

returned to the hospital. And finally, except for making a notation in Plaintiff’s medical 

records, there are no other allegations connecting Miner to Plaintiff’s treatment. 

 To rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the indifference must be 

substantial and the action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. Plaintiff’s claim against Miner simply does not rise to 

the requisite level of intentional conduct and it will be dismissed. 

B. Negligence 

 There is no question, in contrast, that Plaintiff adequately states a plausible 

negligence claim against Miner; the Court has previously indicated as such (Doc. 45 at 

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10). Rather, Miner argues that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-

2603 mandates dismissal of his claim. That statute provides that a plaintiff must provide 

a written certification whether expert opinion testimony is necessary to prove standard of 

care or liability to support a negligence claim. There is also no dispute that Plaintiff has 

not complied with the statute. But Miner offers no support for the conclusion that 

dismissal is the automatic penalty for failure to so certify. The Court will therefore direct 

Plaintiff to file his certification whether or not expert testimony is required within 14 

days. See Amor v. Arizona, 2010 WL 960379 (D. Ariz. March 15, 2010). Plaintiff must 

then disclose his preliminary expert affidavit in accordance with the Court’s Scheduling 

Order and 12-2603(B). If Plaintiff fails to comply, his claims may be dismissed pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 12-2603(D). 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Miner’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 52). All other matters must remain referred to the Magistrate Judge for 

disposition as appropriate. 

 (2) Miner’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 52) is granted in part and denied in 

part. Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Miner in Count I is dismissed. The 

motion is otherwise denied. 

 (3) Plaintiff must file his certification whether or not expert testimony is 

required within 14 days. Plaintiff must then disclose his preliminary expert affidavit in 

accordance with the Court’s Scheduling Order and 12-2603(B). 

/ / / 

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 (4) Miner must file an Answer within 14 days of this Order. 

 Dated this 28th day of February, 2014. 

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