Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00414/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00414-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

The Armored Group, LLC, a Nevada

Limited Liability Company, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Supreme Industries, Inc., a Delaware

corporation; Supreme Corporation of

Texas, a Texas corporation; Black and

White Business Entities 1 through 5, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-414-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Supreme Industries, Inc. and Supreme Corporation

of Texas’s motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 9(b). 

(Doc. ## 9, 10.) Plaintiff The Armored Group, LLC (“Armored Group”) alleges that

from 2004 to 2006 it contracted to be the exclusive sales representative of Supreme

Corporation, an Indiana corporation. Upon termination of that contract, Armored Group

alleges that it entered into an oral agreement with Defendants to continue performing

their sales and marketing on a non-exclusive basis. Armored Group alleges that

Defendants breached that oral agreement, committed fraud, tortiously interfered with

Armored Group’s business relationships, violated their covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, and have been unjustly enriched.

Case 2:09-cv-00414-NVW Document 25 Filed 05/15/09 Page 1 of 5
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Defendants challenge this Court’s personal jurisdiction. They argue that they lack

the “minimum contacts” with Arizona necessary for the Court to assert personal

jurisdiction. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). When a

defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction by motion, the plaintiff bears the

burden to make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts through its pleadings,

affidavits, and written discovery materials. Davis v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 861

F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988). “Although the plaintiff cannot ‘simply rest on the bare

allegations of its complaint,’ uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as

true.” Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). No

federal statute specifically defines the extent of personal jurisdiction in this case, so

Arizona law controls. Arizona’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal

jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the due process clause of the United States

Constitution. Under the due process clause, “[u]nless a defendant’s contacts with a forum

are so substantial, continuous, and systematic that the defendant can be deemed to be

‘present’ in that forum for all purposes, a forum may exercise only ‘specific’ jurisdiction

— that is, jurisdiction based on the relationship between the defendant’s forum contacts

and plaintiff’s claims.” Id.

Armored Group has not shown that Defendants’ contacts with Arizona are so

substantial, continuous, and systematic to give rise to general jurisdiction. Neither

Defendant is an Arizona corporation, and neither has its principal place of business in

Arizona. Neither Defendant is licensed to do business in the state, and neither has any

registered agent in Arizona for service of process. Neither maintains any offices or

employees in Arizona. Armored Group’s CEO, Robert Pazderka, testifies that

Defendants have sold vehicles to various corporations in Arizona and have at least 11

authorized dealers in Arizona. Although these examples weigh in favor of general

jurisdiction, they do not by themselves establish that Defendants’ are present in the state

for all purposes. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 570 (2d

Cir. 1996) (holding that relationships with independent authorized dealers “when taken

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together” with a variety of other evidence established sufficient contacts to assert general

jurisdiction). Armored Group has not demonstrated that Defendants’ contacts with

Arizona have the “[l]ongevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence,

and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets” that amount to a general

presence in the state. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

The Court therefore only has personal jurisdiction if this suit “‘arises out of’ or is

related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the defendant ‘purposefully avails

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Arizona], thus invoking the benefits

and protections of its laws.’” Id. at 1169 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471

U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). Armored Group’s core allegation is that Defendants breached the

terms of an oral agreement following the termination of the written agreement with

Supreme Corporation. However, Defendants have submitted affidavits stating that

Supreme Corporation is a separate corporation not party to this suit and they deny having

ever contracted with Armored Group themselves, orally or otherwise. Neither Armored

Group’s complaint nor its evidentiary materials identify the individual that entered into

the alleged oral agreement with Armored Group, much less demonstrate that the

individual was the Defendants’ agent, as opposed to an agent of Supreme Corporation or

some other corporation. Having failed to provide any evidence that an agent of the

Defendants participated in the alleged oral agreement, Armored Group cannot rely on that

agreement to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Armored Group has

similarly failed to provide any evidence that an employee of the Defendants tortiously

interfered with its business relationships. 

Furthermore, Armored Group’s bald assertion that Defendants and Supreme

Corporation are all the same entity, or that Defendants are successors-in-interest to

Supreme Corporation, is not enough to withstand the motion to dismiss. Defendants have

contested those allegations, so Armored Group may not rely upon the bare allegations in

its complaint. Armored Group has the burden to make a prima facie showing of

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jurisdictional facts. Menken, 503 F.3d at 1056. Armored Group has provided no

evidence that the Defendants lack independent corporate identities or that they assumed

Supreme Corporation’s liabilities. See Patrick v. Mass. Port Auth., 141 F. Supp. 2d 180,

185–86 (granting a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff offered no evidence that the

defendant was the successor-in-interest of a company over which the court had personal

jurisdiction); Alves v. Players Edge, Inc., NO. 05CV1654 WQH (CAB), 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 98184 at *17 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (“A corporation’s contacts with a forum

may be imputed to its successor if forum law would hold the successor liable for the

actions of its predecessor.” (quoting Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d

1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991))).

Armored Group has also failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

The complaint provides no basis for collectively referring to Defendants as “Supreme.” It

never identifies any of the individuals involved in the alleged events except for one, and

even then it does not allege specifically for whom that individual worked. The complaint

provides none of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the alleged oral

agreement; it simply states that such an agreement exists. (Doc. # 1, Ex. A, Compl. ¶ 18.) 

These deficiencies are especially problematic for the fraud count, which must be plead

with specificity under Rule 9(b). See Misc. Serv. Workers, Drivers, & Helpers v.

Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he pleader must state the time,

place and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the

parties to the misrepresentation.”). The tortious interference counts of the complaint are

nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of [the] cause of action.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Armored Group’s complaint will

therefore be dismissed with leave to amend to correct its jurisdictional and substantive

defects. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Assuming a

substantive or jurisdictional defect in the pleadings, ‘[d]ismissal without leave to amend is

proper only if it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by

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any amendment.’”) (quoting McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund,

Inc., 339 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003))). 

If Armored Group chooses to amend its complaint, it may not collectively accuse

Defendants of committing misdeeds through the expedience of a fictional collective title

like “Supreme.” Armored Group must allege the identities and affiliations of the persons

involved in the alleged events so that it is clear which Defendant must answer each of its

allegations. If Armored Group wishes to allege that Defendants lack distinct corporate

identities, or that a particular Defendant is the successor-in-interest to Supreme

Corporation, it must do so explicitly and provide the basis for its accusation. It must also

be prepared to meet Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prima facie evidence of the truth

of its allegations or explain why jurisdictional discovery and an evidentiary hearing are

necessary and proper under the circumstances.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Supreme Industries, Inc. and

Supreme Corporation of Texas’s motions to dismiss (doc. ## 9, 10) are granted and

Plaintiff The Armored Group, LLC is granted leave to amend its complaint by May 29,

2009.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case will be dismissed without prejudice if

Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by May 29, 2009. 

DATED this 14th day of May, 2009.

 

 

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