Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02056/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02056-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983ed Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL ANTONIO GONZALEZ,

CDCR #T-42888,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DR. MALHOTRA; DR. ZHANG,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-2056-JLS-AHG

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Manuel Antonio Gonzalez, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a 

civil action at the time he submitted his original complaint. (See ECF No. 5.) In addition

to the original complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 

(“TRO”), a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI”), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel

(ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4.). Plaintiff has not requested that the Clerk issue a summons, “present[ed] 

a summons to the clerk for signature and seal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b), and has yet 

to executed service of his Complaint, TRO or PI upon any of the named Defendants. 

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On December 3, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and PI, denied 

his Motion to Appoint Counsel, and dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (See ECF No. 6 at 10–11.) The Court granted Plaintiff 

leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified 

in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 11.) 

On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a forty-eight page First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”), as well as over seventy pages of exhibits. (See generally FAC, ECF No. 7.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

A. Legal Standard 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed this action. “As used in this section, 

the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused 

of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or 

the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 

U.S.C. § 1915A(c); see also Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 

(9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 

Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 

practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 

Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of 

§ 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 

446–47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any 

portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose 

of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the

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expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).1

Section 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure 

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 

680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009).

B. Rule 8

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to comply with Rule 

8. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a claim for

relief, the pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 

jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) & (2). As stated above, Plaintiff’s FAC is fortyeight pages but contains very few specific factual allegations. The Court concludes that 

the FAC does not meet the Rule 8 standard. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was 

“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, United 

 

1 A similar screening would be required if Plaintiff were proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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States ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

cases upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” 

“distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of 

“incomprehensible rambling,” while noting that “[o]ur district courts are busy enough 

without having to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern 

a plaintiff’s claims and allegations.”). Although dismissal is appropriate on this ground 

alone, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s allegations meet the Rule 12 plausibility 

standard. 

C. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff was “subjected” to a “head injury” which resulted in a 

“concussion, post concussion syndrome, long term memory loss, short term memory loss, 

off balance, loss of coordination, constant pressure in head.” (FAC at 13.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Malhotra, a neurologist, failed to provide him medical 

care which later “resulted in high blood pressure in eyes, damage[ed] eyesight, [and] 

irreparable nerve damage.” (Id.) As a result of the purported failure by Malhotra, Plaintiff 

“will have to take prescription eye drops . . . for [his] lifetime to reduce high blood pressure 

in eyes.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims Malhotra never “ordered E.M.G. test for nerve damage” 

which he alleges is the “appropriate test for high blood pressure in eyes.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that he has “nerve damage and optic nerve damage” discovered by a neuroophthalmologist and this damage was due to Malhotra’s “failure to provide medical care.” 

(Id. at 14.) Plaintiff alleges Malhotra “became aware of the serious medical condition” on 

June 7, 2018, but he “did not order necessary test to review cause of constant pressure to 

head.” (Id. at 20.) Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that Malhotra “knew serious damage 

could result” by not referring Plaintiff to a “specialist for necessary test.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims Defendant Zhang, his “Primary Care Provider,” denied him adequate 

medical care when Zhang purportedly failed to “re-schedule return follow up with 

appointment with ‘Neuro Ophthalmologist,’ as “requested by ‘Neuro-Ophthalmologist’ in 

February 2019.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff claims the Neuro-Ophthalmologist “ordered ‘return 

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appointment follow up’ specifically [to] monitor high blood pressure in eyes and the effects 

of prescription eye drops, and monitor damage eyesight.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the 

failure to schedule the follow up visit caused him to be “subjected to blindness, losing 

eyesight without specialist monitoring high blood pressure in eyes.” (Id. at 25.) 

Plaintiff seeks twenty-one (21) million dollars in compensatory and punitive 

damages. (Id. at 41.) 

D. Inadequate Medical Care Claims

To the extent that Plaintiff contends Defendants Malhotra and Zhang failed to 

provide him with adequate medical care, he fails to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment 

claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care also does not constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires 

prisoners plead facts sufficient to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was 

deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

“Serious medical needs can relate to ‘physical, dental and mental health.’” Edmo v. 

Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 

1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 

(1995)). But prison officials do not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless they 

“know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

The Court will presume that Plaintiff’s factual allegations describing his medical 

condition are sufficient to plausibly suggest he suffered from an objectively serious 

medical need. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (“serious medical 

needs” include “a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

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activities,” and “the existence of chronic and substantial pain”) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted).

To support a claim of deliberate indifference, however, Plaintiff must allege 

additional facts which plausibly show the course of treatment Defendants Malhotra and 

Zhang chose in response to his need was “medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances,” and that they “chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk 

to the plaintiff’s health.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (citations omitted). “Deliberate 

indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 

(9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is present only 

in cases where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 

possible medical need” and where that indifference is alleged to have caused harm. Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096. 

The alleged indifference to medical needs must also be substantial; inadequate 

treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional 

violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

As to Defendant Malhotra, Plaintiff alleges only that Malhotra purportedly never 

“ordered E.M.G. test for nerve damage,” which he alleges is the “appropriate test for high 

blood pressure in eyes.” (FAC at 13.) As to Defendant Zhang, Plaintiff alleges only that 

he purportedly “fail[ed] to reschedule return follow up appointment with ‘neuro 

ophthalmologist.” (Id. at 24.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support a deliberate 

indifference claim. Plaintiff has merely alleged a difference of opinion regarding his need 

for medical care, which is not sufficient to raise a claim of deliberate indifference. See 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing 

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under 

the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation 

merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); id. at 107 (noting that “the question whether an 

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x-ray . . . is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment,” and that 

provider’s failure to order “an x-ray or additional diagnostic techniques” does not 

constitute deliberate indifference); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (“A difference of opinion 

between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—concerning 

what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.”) (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment 

claim against either Malhotra or Zhang upon which relief can be granted. 

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court:

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and for violating Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8. 

2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is 

electronically docketed in which to file an amended complaint which cures the deficiencies 

of pleading noted. The amended complaint must be complete by itself without reference 

to his original pleading. Any Defendant not named and any claim not re-alleged in the

amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged 

in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 45 days, the Court will dismiss 

this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance 

with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, 

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a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire 

action.”).

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2020

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