Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05313/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05313-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

COBBLER NEVADA, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANTHONY INGLESIAS, 

Defendant. 

Case No.15-cv-05313-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND 

ENTER JUDGMENT; ORDER 

REASSIGNING CASE 

Before the Court is Plaintiff Cobbler Nevada LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for default 

judgment in a copyright infringement case against Defendant Anthony Inglesias (“Defendant”). 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be GRANTED. 

The case is hereby reassigned to a District Judge. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of the copyright to The Cobbler, a motion picture 

released in theaters in March 2015, and that Defendant illegally downloaded and distributed The 

Cobbler. Plaintiff originally sued a Doe defendant identified only by IP address. The Court then 

granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve Rule 45 subpoenas on Comcast Cable, which 

identified Defendant as the internet subscribers associated with the IP address. The Court 

thereafter granted Plaintiff’s request to conduct deposition by written questions pursuant to Rule 

31 to confirm that Defendant was the alleged infringer. Plaintiff served Defendant with written 

questions on May 3, 2016, but Defendant failed to respond by the June 3, 2016 deadline. 

On July 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming Anthony Iglesias as 

Defendant. Dkt. 33. It filed the certificate of service on August 15, 2016, Dkt. 36, which shows 

that a process server named Clarence E. Randolph served Defendant on July 19, 2016 at 5:57 p.m. 

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by leaving the summons at Defendant’s residence or usual place of abode with a Jane Doe 

(approximately 60 years old) who refused to identify herself. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B) 

(authorizing service by “leaving a copy of [the summons and complaint] at the individual’s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there”). 

Defendant’s responsive pleading was due 21 days from July 19, 2016, or August 9, 2016. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). He did not file by the deadline. 

On August 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to default. Dkt. 37. The notice stated 

that Defendant had been served but not appeared, and that if he did not appear, Plaintiff would 

seek a default; the notice also attached the certificate of service of the notice. On September 30, 

2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order of default with the clerk, and the clerk entered default on 

October 5, 2016. Dkt. 39. On October 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present motion for default 

judgment. Dkt. 40. Plaintiff served the motion and attachments on Defendant by mail on that 

same date. See Dkt. 40-4. Defendant’s opposition was due on November 10, 2016, and Plaintiff’s 

reply was due on November 17, 2016, but neither was filed. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

After entry of a default, a court may grant a default judgment on the merits of the case. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). As a preliminary 

matter, “the Court must assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom 

default judgment is requested.” Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Vuong Tran, No. 12-5030 SC, 2013 

WL 1832563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013). If the Court determines that service was sufficient, 

it should consider whether the following factors support the entry of default judgment: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986). In considering the above factors, the 

Court must take all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, except for those relating to 

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damages. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir.1987). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Procedural Requirements 

Before the Court may consider whether to exercise its discretion to enter default judgment, 

it must be satisfied that the procedural prerequisites, including adequate service of process, have 

been met. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 

2002). Here, Plaintiff properly served Defendant on July 19, 2016 by leaving a copy of the 

summons and complaint at his usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion 

who resides there. Dkt. 36; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff served 

Defendant with its motion for default judgment on October 27, 2016. Dkt. 40-4; see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Defendant did not respond to the original service or the present motion. 

A court may not enter a default judgment against an unrepresented minor, an incompetent 

person, or a person in military service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 50 U.S.C. App. § 521(b)(1). 

There is no indication in the record that Defendant falls into any of these categories, and Plaintiff’s 

motions for default judgment and accompanying declarations state that, upon information and 

belief, neither defendant is an active member of the military (although Plaintiff does not know 

Defendant’s dates of birth and social security numbers, so cannot confirm). Because Defendant is 

a resident of Antioch, CA, the Court has personal jurisdiction over him. 

B. Eitel Factors 

1. Prejudice Against Plaintiff 

The first factor considers the possibility of prejudice against the plaintiff if default 

judgment is not entered. Because Plaintiff may be without recourse for recovery if default 

judgment is not entered, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. See J & J Sports Prods., 

Inc. v. Leger, No. 13-CV-02071-SC, 2013 WL 6492114, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 

2. Plaintiff’s Allegations State a Claim 

The second and third Eitel factors require that a plaintiff’s allegations state a claim upon 

which it can recover. Here, Plaintiff requests default judgment on its copyright claims, and thus 

must state a claim for copyright infringement. To do so, it must establish ownership of a valid 

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copyright and unauthorized copying and distribution by Defendant. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 

Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

Plaintiff alleges that it is the exclusive owner of the copyrighted work, Registration No. 

Pau 3-744-688, 2014, under the Copyright Act. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 5-9. It also 

alleges that its investigator, through direct TCP/IP connection with Defendant’s computer, 

observed Defendant regularly distributing Plaintiff’s copyrighted work over the course of several 

months using the Bit Torrent network. FAC ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, without 

Plaintiff’s permission or consent, copied and distributed Plaintiff’s copyrighted work. FAC ¶¶ 25-

29. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim for copyright infringement. 

3. The Amount of Money at Stake 

As to the fourth Eitel factor, the Court must consider “the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 

Requests for large sums of money generally counsel against entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. “The Court considers Plaintiff’s declarations, calculations, and other documentation 

of damages in determining if the amount at stake is reasonable.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar 

Tea Corp., No. 06–CV–03594, 2007 WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 

In its motion for default judgment, Plaintiff asks for $10,000 in statutory damages from 

each defendant. This would probably impose a substantial burden on Defendant, who is an 

individual; however, as discussed below, the Court recommends adjusting Plaintiff’s requested 

damages to $750, which weighs in favor of default judgment. 

4. Likelihood of Dispute over Material Facts 

The fifth Eitel factor considers whether the material facts of the instant case are reasonably 

likely to be subject to dispute. Here, the main material fact that might be in dispute is the 

association between the infringing IP address and Defendant. As discussed above, Plaintiff 

identified Defendant as the individual associated with the infringing IP address by subpoenaing 

Comcast Cable for this information. Prior to amending its complaint to add Defendant, Plaintiff 

attempted to serve him with deposition by written questions in order to confirm that he was the 

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infringer. 

Plaintiff was ultimately required to seek leave to serve Defendant with the written 

questions by certified mail. Dkt. 29. It filed a declaration demonstrating that, on five occasions, 

its process server went to Defendant’s last known address and was unable to complete personal 

service, either because no one answered the door or because Defendant was not there or was 

otherwise “unavailable.” Dkt. 29-2 ¶ 6. On one occasion, the process server saw “someone 

continuously look[ing] through the blinds” and overhead “male voices in the house talking, saying 

don’t answer the door.” Id. 

Accordingly, although there is some likelihood of dispute over the infringer’s identity, it is 

not clear what more Plaintiff could have done in order to resolve this dispute. Plaintiff’s motion 

should not be denied on this basis. 

5. Excusable Neglect 

For the sixth Eitel factor, there is no support for finding that Defendant’s default is due to 

excusable neglect. Defendant was served with the Complaint and Summons in this action over 

four months ago and has yet to enter an appearance. Plaintiff also served Defendant with the 

motion for entry of default judgment and accompanying papers. In such circumstances, default 

cannot be attributed to excusable neglect. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 

F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001). This factor supports entry of default judgment. 

6. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. However, this policy is not dispositive, and “Defendant’s failure to answer 

Plaintiff’s Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 

F.Supp.2d at 11. Termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed when a defendant 

fails to defend an action. Id. Therefore, in this case, this factor does not weigh against default 

judgment. 

7. Summary of Eitel Factors 

Considered together, the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment. 

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C. Remedies 

1. Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continues to illegally copy and distribute its copyrighted 

work through Bit Torrent. Defendant’s failure to respond to the suit, alongside Plaintiff’s 

pleadings, suggests that Defendant’s infringing activities will not cease absent judicial 

intervention. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In such 

circumstances, the Court is authorized to issue a permanent injunction to prevent or restrain 

further infringements. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 

940 (N.D. Cal.1996) (“Generally, a showing of copyright infringement liability and the threat of 

future violations is sufficient to warrant a permanent injunction.”). 

2. Damages 

Pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Copyright Act, an infringer is liable for either the 

plaintiff’s actual or statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). If a plaintiff chooses to recover 

statutory damages, he need not prove actual damages. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 

Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). 

“[S]tatutory damages are to be calculated according to the number of works infringed, not the 

number of infringements.” Synopsys, Inc. v. ATopTech, Inc., No. C-13-02965-MMC (DMR), 

2015 WL 1197705, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may recover 

between $750 and $30,000 in statutory damages per infringed work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 

When awarding statutory damages, the Court has broad discretion within the range 

provided by statute. “In determining a proper statutory damages award, courts generally consider 

the expenses saved and profits reaped by the defendants in connection with the infringements, the 

revenues lost by the plaintiff as a result of the defendants’ conduct, and the infringers’ state of 

mind.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. N. Lights, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). If 

“infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 

statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” Id. § 504(c)(2). Allegations of 

willfulness are deemed to be true on default. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 

F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant willfully infringed one copyrighted work, and the 

Court must take these allegations as true. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. 

Accordingly, available statutory damages range from $750 to $150,000. Plaintiff maintains that 

the Court should award at least $10,000 in order to deter Defendant and the general public from 

both infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights, as well as ignoring court proceedings. However, courts in 

this Circuit have held that $750 in statutory damages “is more than sufficiently punitive to deter 

others from illegally downloading free movies on the BitTorrent network.” Glacier Films (USA), 

Inc. v. Gallatin, No. 3:15–cv–01632–SB, 2016 WL 3148401, at *3 (D. Or. May 12, 2016), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CV-01632-SB, 2016 WL 3176583 (D. Or. June 2, 2016). 

“With knowledge that it will now cost $750 to watch a single movie on the BitTorrent network, 

consumers should be motivated instead to spend a few dollars to rent the same movie legally.” Id. 

Moreover, statutory damages are intended to deter copyright infringement, not default. 

There are many reasons why an individual might choose not to defend against a BitTorrent 

copyright infringement actions, including indigence. See id. “[S]ome individuals may choose to 

default merely due to the cost of federal court litigation, not for any nefarious reason that would 

support the award of enhanced statutory damages.” Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that an 

award of $750 in statutory damages is proper. 

Because the Court awards minimum statutory damages, it need not hold an evidentiary 

hearing. A hearing is required when the damages claimed are not capable of mathematical 

determination. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(b)(2) (“The court may conduct hearings . . . when . . . it needs to . . . determine the amount of 

damages”). Here, a hearing would serve no constructive purpose because Defendant, through his 

default, admitted infringing Plaintiff’s copyrighted work, thus rendering him liable for no less than 

$750 in statutory damages. See Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 394 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005) (awarding minimum statutory damages without a hearing in copyright infringement 

case); cf. Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinct court did not abuse 

discretion by awarding statutory damages without an evidentiary hearing). 

Accordingly, an award of $750 is appropriate, and an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. 

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Cf. Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Shaffer, No. 3:15-CV-01233-SB, 2016 WL 6821145 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 

2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CV-01233-SB, 2016 WL 6824375 (D. Or. 

Nov. 17, 2016) (awarding $750 to Plaintiff Cobbler Nevada LLC without evidentiary hearing); 

Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Ronne, No. 3:15-CV-01230-SB, 2016 WL 6821144 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 

2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CV-01230-SB, 2016 WL 6824378 (D. Or. 

Nov. 17, 2016) (same); Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Osier, No. 3:15-CV-00828-SB, 2016 WL 

6211735 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-0828-SB, 2016 WL 

6211270 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2016) (same). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that judgment be entered in 

Plaintiff’s favor and against Defendant in the amount of $750. Any party may serve and file 

specific written objections to this recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Civ. L.R. 72-3. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 16, 2016 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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