Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05149/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 2012 Decided April 3, 2012

No. 10-5385

NORTHERN AIR CARGO, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND PENINSULA AIRWAYS,

INC.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 10-5402, 11-5149

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02065)

Amy L. Brown argued the cause for appellants/crossappellees. With her on the briefs were Pierre H. Bergeron and

Jeremy W. Dutra. 

Mitchell P. Zeff, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee United States Postal Service. With him on the brief

were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Elston, Chief Counsel,

United States Postal Service. 

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 1 of 17
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Christopher T. Handman argued the cause for

appellee/cross appellant Peninsula Airways, Inc. With him on

the briefs were Robert E. Cohn, Patrick R. Rizzi, and Mary

Helen Wimberly.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

Concurring opinion filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. This case is a partial

primer as to how not to defend or adjudicate a challenge to

agency action in federal district court. The Postal Service

determined, in two informal adjudications, that Peninsula

Airways (“PenAir”) was qualified to carry (could be “tendered”)

“nonpriority bypass mail” on five Alaska routes. This awkward

term refers to types of freight – not ordinary mail – which are

carried by planes to small communities in that vast state that are

largely unreachable by surface transportation.1 Presumably, by

shipping such goods under the auspices of the Post Office, the

federal government defrays part of the cost. The word “bypass”

is used because the freight is never handled by the Post Office’s

processing facilities. The word “nonpriority” apparently refers

to a slower delivery time than “priority” mail, but since the

parties do not suggest a difference relevant for this case between

priority and nonpriority bypass mail, we will, henceforth, use

only “bypass mail” to refer to the types of freight at issue.

The Postal Service acted pursuant to the Rural Service

Improvement Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which permitted PenAir

1

It does not, however, include all large freight.

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 2 of 17
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to enter the five routes as what is termed a “mainline bypass

mail carrier” (essentially those that fly large planes) only if it

met certain statutory conditions.

Three competing carriers, who presently divide the market,

sued twice to challenge the Postal Service’s determinations as

contrary to the Act. Although it initially issued an extraordinary

injunction preventing the tender to PenAir, the district court 

ultimately concluded that the Postal Service’s position was

authorized. The three competing carriers appealed, and PenAir

cross-appealed part of the district court’s initial determination.

Contrary to the district court, we think that the three

relevant statutory sections are quite ambiguous – indeed one is

hopelessly so – and because we have no authoritative Postal

Service interpretations of the statute before us, we vacate the

district court’s judgment with instructions to remand to the

Postal Service. 

I

The small towns involved in this case, Dillingham, King

Salmon, Aniak, McGrath and Unalakleet, can be accessed only

by plane or boat, and they depend on bypass mail for food,

hospital supplies, generators and other necessities. Although

small towns, these locations are called “hub points” from which

even smaller settlements are reached. All bypass mail sent to

them originates in either Anchorage or Fairbanks. The private

air carriers who deliver bypass mail are compensated by the

Postal Service (with Department of Transportation

involvement), depending on the type of aircraft the carrier

operates and the number of similar carriers serving the same

route. Carriers operating smaller planes whose payload capacity

is less than 7,500 pounds are termed “bush carriers.” Carriers

operating larger planes are called “mainline carriers” and they

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receive slightly lower rates. Under the Postal Service’s

“equitable tender” practice, planes of each type get an equal

share of the relevant category of bypass mail (mainline or bush)

on each route. Thus, each market entrant dilutes the existing

carriers’ shares proportionately. 

To enter the bypass mail market, carriers must apply to the

Postal Service for equitable tender of bypass mail on a particular

route. The Postal Service then determines whether the carrier

satisfies certain eligibility requirements. The Act places

particular limitations on a carrier’s eligibility for equitable

tender on routes that go from Anchorage or Fairbanks to hub

points. Ordinarily, the Postal Service can only tender bypass

mail on those routes to “existing mainline carriers” (essentially,

carriers who were certified and providing mainline bypass mail

service as of January 1, 2001). But under an exception at issue

here, the Postal Service can also tender to a “new 121 mainline

passenger carrier” if the new carrier provides substantial

passenger service and meets other requirements.2

Appellants Northern Air Cargo, Tatonduk Outfitters

Limited (Events Air Cargo), and Lynden Air Cargo are all

existing mainline carriers who have received equitable tender of

mainline bypass mail on some or all of the five routes from

Anchorage to the hubs of Dillingham, King Salmon, Aniak,

McGrath, and Unalakleet. Though appellants provide bypass

2 See 39 U.S.C. § 5402(a)(4) (defining “bush carrier”); id. §

5402(a)(11) (defining “equitable tender”); id. § 5402(a)(13) (defining

“mainline carrier”); id. § 5402(g)(4)(A) & (5) (identifying restrictions

on eligibility for equitable tender from Anchorage or Fairbanks to hub

points). A “121 passenger carrier” means a carrier that provides

scheduled passenger service pursuant to operating requirements under

part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. Id. § 5402(a)(16) &

(23).

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 4 of 17
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mail and other freight services on these routes several days a

week, none provide regular passenger service.

Until 2009, appellee PenAir served these five routes as a

bush carrier, primarily carrying passengers. Before 2001 – this

becomes controversial – PenAir also carried some bush bypass

mail on these routes. In July and August of 2009, after

upgrading its fleet to include larger planes, PenAir requested

equitable tender of mainline bypass mail on these routes as a

new 121 mainline passenger carrier. PenAir emphasized its

plans to provide daily passenger as well as cargo service, which

would make it the only regular provider of mainline passenger

service on the five routes. The Postal Service granted PenAir

equitable tender on all five routes in two letters written by the

Program Manager of Intra-Alaska Air Transportation Policy in

August and September 2009. The only explanation offered was

that “[h]aving reviewed the matter, we have concluded that your

letters describe service which would make you eligible for the

equitable tender you have requested in those markets.” In

August, PenAir began operating as a mainline carrier, and on

November 9, 2009, the Postal Service began tendering mainline

bypass mail to PenAir on the five routes. 

Appellants sued the Postal Service, arguing before the

district court that the Postal Service had exceeded its statutory

authority. Under appellants’ reading of the Act, PenAir was

ineligible for equitable tender as a new mainline passenger

carrier because it was not a “new” carrier. Even if it were,

appellants argued, a “Prior Service and Capacity Requirement”

applied to PenAir and it had not been satisfied. That

requirement makes mainline carriers eligible for equitable tender

on a route only after they have provided the requisite “scheduled

service,” i.e., two noncontract flights within Alaska per week for

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at least a year.3 PenAir intervened, and the parties cross-filed

motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in part

for the Postal Service and PenAir, holding that the definition of

a “new” carrier was unambiguous and that PenAir qualified. 

But the court also decided in part for appellants, holding that the

Prior Service and Capacity Requirement was also supposedly

unambiguous, applied to PenAir, and had not yet been satisfied. 

To be sure, the district court criticized the Postal Service’s

explanation of its decision as a “vague assertion [which] fails to

reflect any deliberative process.” But, because the court thought

the statute susceptible of only one interpretation, it enjoined the

Postal Service from tendering mainline bypass mail to PenAir

until PenAir satisfied the Prior Service and Capacity

Requirement, in what it called a “final appealable Order.”

Accordingly, the Postal Service ceased tendering mainline

bypass mail to PenAir. Appellants appealed the “new” carrier

ruling, and PenAir, but not the Postal Service, conditionally

cross-appealed the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement

ruling.

PenAir resubmitted its request for equitable tender, arguing

that it had already satisfied the Prior Service and Capacity

Requirement by flying the requisite number of scheduled flights

for the thirteen months between August 2009 (when PenAir

started operating as a mainline carrier) and September 2010

(when the district judge entered its injunction). Appellants

objected that PenAir could not have possibly satisfied the

requirement. According to appellants, no service – passenger or

cargo – provided while PenAir received tender of bypass mail

3

See 39 U.S.C. § 5402(g)(1)(A)(iv). “Scheduled service” refers

to flights available to the general public based on a schedule published

in advance, and appears to include either passenger or cargo service. 

Id. § 5402(a)(18).

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 6 of 17
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could be counted toward the requirement, and ten of the thirteen

months should therefore have been excluded from calculations.4

And less than thirty days had elapsed since the district court’s

order, so the requirement could not have been satisfied in the

meantime. Appellants requested an opportunity to participate in

the process. The Postal Service apparently never responded,

although it did seek clarification from the district court as to

whether the injunction precluded the Postal Service from

crediting PenAir’s prior service.5 Instead it granted PenAir’s

request. Its only explanation was that “[t]he Postal Service has

validated that the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement . . .

has been met by PenAir. Additionally, PenAir satisfies the

definition of ‘new’ 121 mainline passenger carrier . . . based on

the Postal Service’s interpretation as well as the [district court’s]

decision.” The letters indicated that the Postal Service was

crediting all thirteen months in which PenAir provided

scheduled mainline passenger service on the five routes toward

the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement. On December 6,

2010, the Postal Service resumed tendering mainline bypass

mail to PenAir on the five routes. 

Appellants again sued the Postal Service, claiming, as they

had before the Postal Service, that PenAir still had not satisfied

the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement. The district court

granted summary judgment to the Postal Service and PenAir,

4

For three of the thirteen months – between August 2009 and

November 2009 – PenAir was providing scheduled service as a

mainline carrier but had not yet received tender of bypass mail. 

Appellants do not dispute that those three months can be counted

toward the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement. 

5

The district court thereafter indicated that this issue was not

addressed by the injunction.

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again finding the statutory language unambiguous. Appellants

also appeal this decision. 

II

We encounter, at the outset, an ostensible jurisdictional

problem. PenAir asserts we have no authority to review the

district court’s determination, in its first decision, that PenAir

qualified as a new mainline carrier, which appellants appealed.

The district court, it is argued, should have remanded the case

after it determined that PenAir qualified as a new carrier but was

obliged to satisfy the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement,

so that the Postal Service could determine whether and how the

requirement was satisfied. It is axiomatic that a private party –

unlike the government – may not appeal a district court’s order

remanding to an agency because it is not final. N. Carolina

Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 19-20 (D.C. Cir.

2008). And under our precedent, if a district court should have

remanded – which, as we point out below, is certainly true here

– for jurisdictional purposes, we treat a private party’s appeal as

if the district court did remand. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala,

192 F.3d 1005, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

But whether the district court’s first decision – which it

unequivocally labeled a “final appealable Order” – was not

actually appealable is a red herring. That is so because we are

not merely faced with an appeal from that decision. The Postal

Service engaged in further proceedings after that decision to

determine whether the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement

had been met. The district court reviewed that determination,

and its second decision, upholding the Postal Service, was

unquestionably a final order; it, too, was appealed. The only

real question is whether we may consider the new carrier issue

in the second appeal, which is undeniably properly before us. 

That is not a jurisdictional matter; it is only a prudential question

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 8 of 17
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as to whether the argument was properly presented. To be sure,

appellants did not fully reiterate the new carrier argument in the

second proceeding before the district court. But they did, in a

footnote, remind the court that they still challenged PenAir’s

status as a new carrier, and that they had appealed that issue

(they certainly presented the argument to us in their brief). 

Moreover, in PenAir’s motion before us to dismiss the first

appeal, it pointed out that appellants had “already filed a new

lawsuit challenging the Postal Service’s recent decision

following” the de facto remand, and that “[a]n appeal from that

decision will allow this court to review not only the new rulings

made in that remand proceeding, but also the rulings made by

the district court in its earlier decision.” PenAir further stated

that it “believes that judicial economy favors having all issues 

– whether from the earlier action or the remand action now back

before the District Court – resolved in a single appeal.” Just so. 

We agree with PenAir’s earlier (if inconsistent) position and,

therefore, take up the new carrier issue, as well as the other two.

III

We should note, preliminarily, that the Postal Service is

exempt from review under the Administrative Procedure Act,

but its actions are reviewable to determine whether it has acted

in excess of its statutory authority. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v.

U.S. Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

The new carrier dispute turns primarily on the interpretation

of 39 U.S.C. § 5402(a)(15), which defines a “new” carrier as,

inter alia, one that “began providing nonpriority bypass mail

service on a city pair route in the State of Alaska after January

1, 2001”(emphasis added). Although PenAir, as noted, operated

as a bush carrier on at least some of the relevant routes before

that date, it and the Postal Service assert that the term “bypass 

mail service,” used in determining whether PenAir is a “new

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121 mainline passenger carrier,” means only mainline bypass

mail service, not any bypass mail service. Of course, appellants

contend that the term refers to both mainline and bush bypass

mail service, and since PenAir carried bush bypass mail service

prior to 2001, it could not be considered “new.” It would appear

that, examining the language, either interpretation is plausible.

The second question, assuming PenAir qualifies as a new

carrier, is whether it is obliged to meet the Prior Service and

Capacity Requirement when it is the only carrier on a route

providing passenger service. That depends on the proper

interpretation of one of the most extraordinary pieces of

statutory language we have ever encountered. Ordinarily, under

the so-called “Incumbent Provision,” a new mainline passenger

carrier who seeks to enter a route where an existing mainline

carrier already provides passenger service is eligible for

equitable tender only if it meets the Prior Service and Capacity

Requirement and satisfies certain passenger carriage thresholds. 

However, there is an exception – the wondrous paragraph

entitled “No Incumbent Provision” – at issue here. It states, 

“Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) and paragraph (1)(B), a

new 121 mainline passenger carrier, otherwise qualified under

this subsection, may immediately receive equitable tender of

nonpriority mainline bypass mail to a hub point in the State of

Alaska if”: (1) “the carrier meets the requirements of

subparagraphs (A), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1) and subsection

(h)(2)(B)”; and (2) no mainline carrier currently provides

passenger service on the route.6

 “Subparagraph (A)” refers to

the Incumbent Provision, and, by reference, the Prior Service

and Capacity Requirement. 

6

39 U.S.C. § 5402(g)(5)(A) (“Incumbent Provision”); id. §

5402(g)(5)(C) (emphasis added) (“No Incumbent Provision”). As

noted, no other mainline carrier is providing passenger service.

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Appellants argue with a straight face that the phrase “the

carrier meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A), (C), and

(D) of paragraph (1)” unambiguously makes the Prior Service

and Capacity Requirement applicable. Similarly, PenAir argues

that the contradictory earlier words “Notwithstanding

subparagraph (A)” clearly waive that requirement, and that the

phrase “immediately receive equitable tender” confirms that

Congress did not insist that carriers provide twelve months of

scheduled service before being eligible for equitable tender to

communities in need of passenger service. It should be 

obvious, however, that the No Incumbent Provision is dreadfully

ambiguous, indeed, self-contradictory. It refers to a provision

– subparagraph (D) – that does not exist, and, more directly

relevant, it simultaneously exempts and imposes the Prior

Service and Capacity Requirement. The No Incumbent

Provision requires one to read out one clause in favor of another;

to claim that the section’s meaning is plain, as the opposing

carriers do, borders on the absurd. 

The third issue, relevant only if the Prior Service and

Capacity Requirement applies, is whether Pen Air “ha[d]

provided scheduled service” for “at least [2] flights each week

. . . between 2 points within the State of Alaska for at least 12

consecutive months with aircraft . . . over 7,500 pounds payload

capacity before being selected as a carrier of nonpriority bypass

mail at the intra-Alaska mainline service mail rate” in December

2010.7

 The precise question is whether the Postal Service can

count the ten consecutive months of scheduled service that

PenAir provided after the Postal Service initially selected

PenAir for equitable tender in November 2009, but before the

district court enjoined the carriage of bypass mail. Appellants

argue that the phrases “have provided scheduled service” and

“before nevertheless being selected” preclude the Postal Service

7

Id. § 5402(g)(1)(A)(iv) & (B).

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 11 of 17
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from counting any scheduled service – passenger or cargo – that 

PenAir provided after it was “selected”; in other words, after it

received the disputed tender in November 2009. PenAir and the

Postal Service counter that “before being selected” refers to the

Postal Service’s second December 2010 selection of PenAir for

equitable tender. So long as PenAir provided twelve

consecutive months of scheduled service before then, the

requirement is satisfied. Again, either interpretation of that

language is plausible.

Opposing counsel also heroically, if unpersuasively, 

present all sorts of structural and policy arguments to show that

the statute can only be interpreted in accordance with their

respective positions. We do not think it is at all necessary to

recount those arguments.8 Suffice it to say that they hardly

establish a plain meaning of the statutory sections. Nor are we

faced with the necessity of deciding, in the first instance, what

the statute meant. 

* * * *

The government argues in the alternative that the Postal

Service’s interpretation of all the disputed language is entitled

to deference, preferably under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but at

least under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 

The difficulty with the government’s argument is that the Postal

Service never actually advanced any interpretation, let alone an

authoritative one. As we noted, the two informal adjudication

letters were simply conclusory; no attempt was made to parse or

reconcile the ambiguous statutory language. At oral argument,

faced with judicial concerns about the lack of an agency

8

They do show that prominent law firms, let loose, can do an

exhaustive job trying to turn a statutory sow’s ear into a silk purse.

USCA Case #11-5149 Document #1366915 Filed: 04/03/2012 Page 12 of 17
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interpretation, government counsel (for the first time) pointed to

a December 2010 declaration by a “network operations

specialist” introduced in the federal district court, which

repeated the conclusory statements in the letter (as well as

adding an irrelevancy).9

Although, as we have observed, the Postal Service is

exempt from APA review, that only means, essentially, that

procedural restraints placed on agencies by that statute, which

went beyond pre-existing administrative law requirements, do

not apply. Long before passage of the APA, the Supreme Court

had held in the seminal case of SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80

(1943), that agency action – in that case apparently an informal

adjudication – can be upheld only on the basis of a

contemporaneous justification by the agency itself, not post hoc

explanation of counsel.10 And we have held that that proposition

applies to statutory interpretations. See, e.g., City of Kansas

City v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C.

9

One might have thought government counsel would have

forthrightly conceded that the Postal Service failed to advance an

interpretation of the statutory language.

10In Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States

Department of Agriculture, 876 F.2d 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1989), we

held that an APA exception exempting rules on public benefits from

553(c), the statement of basis and purpose requirement of rulemaking,

meant that an agency could justify such a rule first when challenged

in litigation. That, however, was a highly specific exemption specific

to 553, not, as here, a general exemption from the APA; we think it

clear that the former applies more strongly. Additionally, a rule’s

purpose is, in a sense, self-evident, whereas an unexplained decision

in an informal adjudication based on an ambiguous statute is another

matter. Congress would have to specifically excuse an agency from

providing the Chenery-required contemporaneous explanation to

clearly allow post hoc explanations by counsel in such a situation.

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Cir. 1991). As Chevron held, the reconciliation of statutory

ambiguity is itself laden with policy implications. 467 U.S. at

844-45. 

Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office, defending the Postal

Service, has offered an interpretation of at least two of the three

disputed sections of the Act, we are not willing to accept those

as authoritative Postal Service statutory interpretations; that

would be quite inconsistent with Chenery’s teaching. And it is

unnecessary to decide whether the Postal Service could have

successfully submitted an authoritative interpretation after it was

sued, because it has not done so even to date. As should be

apparent from what we have said, we think the proper course is

to direct the district court to remand to the Postal Service to gain

authoritative and careful interpretations of the disputed

provisions. 

We do not believe, however, that the decisions of the Postal

Service should be vacated. The appropriateness of vacating an

inadequately explained agency action depends on whether (1)

the agency’s decision is so deficient as to raise serious doubts

whether the agency can adequately justify its decision at all; and

(2) vacatur would be seriously disruptive or costly. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146,

150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Here, we think it at least likely – in light of the deference

we owe to the Postal Service’s interpretations of the Act – that

on remand, the Postal Service will be able to advance reasonable

interpretations of the provisions at issue. Although the Postal

Service acted through informal adjudication which, under Mead,

is not presumptively entitled to Chevron deference, the Postal

Service does enjoy broad authority to issue regulations and, of

even more importance in indicating that Congress expressed

particular trust in the Postal Service, is the exemption Congress

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granted from the APA. That means to us that if the Postal

Service were to offer on remand an authoritative interpretation

of the disputed provisions, that interpretation would be entitled

to Chevron deference. And it is because we perceive that such

an interpretation supporting the determination to tender bypass

mail to PenAir is probably achievable that we decline to direct

the district court to vacate the Postal Service’s determination. 

The record also suggests that the price of vacating the

Postal Service’s equitable tender of the five routes to PenAir in

the interim could be high. Though PenAir is one of many

nonpriority bypass mail carriers on the five routes, on several it

is the only carrier of priority mail. The Postal Service estimates

that if PenAir no longer received equitable tender of bypass mail

on these routes, the costs of priority mail rate transportation

would increase by at least 40%. The record further indicates

that PenAir can afford to be the lone provider of regular daily

passenger service on the five routes only as long as it receives

revenues from carrying bypass mail. Under these

circumstances, vacatur is unwarranted. 

From our discussion, it should be apparent that we disagree

with the district court’s disposition of this dispute. The district

court should have remanded the case, at the outset, to the Postal

Service for a complete and authoritative agency interpretation of

the statute because it is quite obviously ambiguous. See City of

Kansas City, 923 F.2d at 192; Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880

F.2d 1325, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As the district court noted,

the agency’s decision, although applying the statute, lacked any

careful analysis or explanation. Such an explanation is needed

to satisfy Chenery (and, as an interpretation, to merit Chevron

deference). Indeed, even if the court was correct in concluding

the statute was not ambiguous as to the new carrier issue and the

applicability of the Prior Service and Capacity Requirement,

remand, as we have observed, would have been called for so the

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agency could determine whether the Prior Service and Capacity

Requirement was met. It was quite anomalous to issue an

injunction. When a district court reverses agency action and

determines that the agency acted unlawfully, ordinarily the

appropriate course is simply to identify a legal error and then

remand to the agency, because the role of the district court in

such situations is to act as an appellate tribunal. See, e.g., PPG

Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

In this case, the district court’s injunction caused considerable

confusion; appellants initially, if unsuccessfully, claimed that

the Postal Service’s second determination was in contempt. 

So ordered.

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SENTELLE, Chief Judge, concurring: I fully concur in the

judgment of the court, and in the reasoning in the opinion that

supports that judgment. I do not join the last paragraph, which

I think gratuitously addresses questions not before us and

proceeds from a misapprehension of law. First, whatever

question there was as to the district court’s first disposition is

now moot. The second disposition has intervened, and it is the

consequence of that disposition that we must now address. See

Maj. Op. at 8-9. I therefore do not join the court’s comments on

that first disposition. Secondly, in that paragraph, the court

states, “The district court should have remanded the case, at the

outset, to the Postal Service for an agency interpretation of the

statute because it is quite obviously ambiguous . . . .” Maj. Op.

at 15. This reasoning seems to presuppose that the court cannot

construe an ambiguous statute in an agency case but must

always remand for the agency’s interpretation in the first

instance. I know of no such rule of law. The Chevron principle,

arising from Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), compels us to accept

reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes where

the agency has made such an interpretation. I know of nothing

in Chevron or its progeny that renders courts impotent to

perform their traditional function of statutory interpretation

where the agency has not entered an interpretation.

For these combined reasons, I respectfully decline to concur

in the last paragraph of the court’s opinion. I reaffirm that I join

the judgment and the balance of the opinion.

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