Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05966/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05966-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN HUNT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05966-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL, DENYING IN 

PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

PROTECTIVE ORDER AND

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL

Re: Dkt. Nos. 53, 62, 63, 69, 70

Plaintiff Susan Hunt (“Plaintiff”) has filed a motion to compel the deposition of Defendant 

Continental Casualty Company’s (“CNA’s”) Chairman and CEO, Tom Motamed. Dkt. No. 53. 

CNA objects and seeks a protective order, arguing that the “apex doctrine” shields Mr. Motamed 

from being deposed. Dkt. No. 63 at 1. CNA also filed an administrative motion to seal certain 

deposition excerpts and a declaration by Mr. Motamed submitted in connection with the motion

for protective order. Dkt. No. 62.

Having read and considered the papers submitted by the parties, the Court finds that this 

matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. 

See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7–1(b). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is 

GRANTED, and CNA’s motion for protective order is DENIED except with regard to the length 

of Mr. Motamed’s deposition. CNA’s administrative motion to seal is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART.

I. MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, 

issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

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burden or expense,” including by prohibiting a deposition or limiting its scope. Fed.R.Civ.P. 

26(c)(1)(A) and (B). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of 

showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” In re 

Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05634 CRB, 2014 WL 939287, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Phillips v. GMC, 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–1211 (9th Cir. 2002)). Absent 

extraordinary circumstances, it is rare for a court to disallow the taking of a deposition. See 

Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[A] strong showing is required 

before a party will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition.”) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted); In re Google Litig., No. C 08-03172 RMW, 2011 WL 4985279, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. 2011) (“A party seeking to prevent a deposition carries a heavy burden to show why 

discovery should be denied.”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[I]t is very unusual for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether 

absent extraordinary circumstances.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Powertech 

Technology, Inc. v. Tessara Inc., No. C 11-6121 CW, 2013 WL 3884254, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 

(same).1 

“In determining whether to allow an apex deposition [i.e., the deposition of a high-level 

executive], courts consider (1) whether the deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive 

knowledge of facts at issue in the case and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has 

 

1 CNA claims that under the Central District of California’s decision in K.C.R. v. County of Los 

Angeles, No. CV 13-3806, 2014 WL 3434257, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2014), it is Plaintiff’s burden to 

“establish ‘good cause’ for an order compelling Mr. Motamed’s deposition.” Dkt. No. 71 at 3. 

The Court disagrees for at least three reasons. First, cases in this district make clear that the 

burden remains on the party seeking a protective order when the “apex doctrine” is asserted as a 

basis for limiting discovery. In re Transpacific 2014 WL939287 at *1 (noting there is “no binding 

Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent requiring th[e] result that the burden be shifted to the 

party seeking discovery by deposition of a high level business executive”) (citation omitted); see 

also Powertech, 2013 WL 3884254 at *1 (explaining that “[t]he apex deposition principle is not 

an automatic bar that the party propounding the discovery must overcome by a showing of good 

cause”)(citation omitted); Affinity Labs of Texas v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-4436 CW, 2011 WL 

1753982, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“A party seeking to prevent discovery carries a heavy burden 

to show why discovery should be denied.”). Second, it is unclear whether K.C.R. applied anything 

other than the well-established principles discussed above. See K.C.R, 2014 WL 3434257 at *4 

(acknowledging that “a party opposing a deposition carries a heavy burden to show why discovery 

should be denied”) (quoting Google Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 09-

4436, 2006 WL 2578277, at *3 n. 3)(internal quotations omitted). Third, K.C.R. involved a highranking public official, raising considerations different from those present in this case. Id. at *5.

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exhausted other less intrusive discovery methods.” Apple v. Samsung, 282 F.R.D. at 263. A 

district court has broad discretion to determine whether, on the totality of the record, a party 

seeking a protective order has met its burden of showing good cause to block an apex deposition. 

See Apple v. Samsung, 282 F.R.D. at 262-263 (finding that upon a party’s showing of good cause, 

the court has discretion to limit or preclude an apex deposition, particularly where the discovery 

sought can be obtained from a less burdensome source); In Re Google Litig., 2011 WL 4985279 

at *2 (finding that when a party seeks to pursue an apex deposition, “the court may exercise its 

discretion under the federal rules to limit discovery” by precluding or limiting the deposition). 

The party seeking to take such a deposition does not need to prove conclusively in advance that 

the deponent definitely has unique, non-repetitive information; instead, “where a corporate officer 

may have any first-hand knowledge of relevant facts, the deposition should be allowed.” Grateful 

Dead Productions v. Sagan, No. C 06-7727 (JW) PVT, 2007 WL 2155693, at *1, n. 5 (N.D. Cal. 

2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429 and Anderson v. Air West, Inc.,

542 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1976)). See also Powertech, 2013 WL 3884254 at *2 (noting 

that the party seeking deposition “was not required to prove that [deponent] certainly has 

[relevant] information”). Nor has formal “exhaustion” been viewed as an absolute requirement; 

instead, exhaustion of other discovery methods is an important, but not dispositive, consideration 

for a court to take into account in deciding how to exercise its discretion. In re Transpacific, 2014 

WL 939287 at *5 (noting that exhaustion of other discovery routes is an “important consideration” 

but not a necessary precondition to the taking of an apex deposition).

B. Analysis

Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that CNA has not met its burden of 

showing that extraordinary circumstances are present here which warrant an order precluding Mr. 

Motamed’s deposition altogether. First, Plaintiff has proffered a substantial basis for concluding 

that Mr. Motamed may have unique first-hand knowledge regarding the facts at issue in this case. 

“[W]hen a witness has personal knowledge of facts relevant to the lawsuit, even a corporate 

president or CEO is subject to deposition.” In re Transpacific, 2014 WL 939287 at *2 and *5

(allowing an apex deposition to go forward based on finding that witness might have “unique, 

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firsthand knowledge relevant to [the] case”); WebSideStory v. Netratings, Inc., No. 06cv408 

WQH(AJB), 2007 WL 1120567 at, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (allowing deposition of former CEO based 

on adequate showing that he had “unique, personal knowledge” of facts regarding the litigation).

Here, Plaintiff’s gender and age discrimination claims include direct allegations regarding 

actions taken by and statements made by Mr. Motamed. Dkt. No. 3, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 18-24, 83; see 

also Declaration of Susan H. Hunt, Dkt. No. 53-1. Plaintiff’s claims rest not only on information 

and belief, but on a number of direct interactions with Mr. Motamed. Id. For example, Plaintiff 

describes comments made by Mr. Motamed at one meeting she attended in which he discussed 

“turning over” Branch Vice Presidents, and at another meeting at which he pointed out 20 people 

he had been responsible for hiring (19 of whom were men). Dkt. No. 70 at 5; Dkt. No. 53-1. In 

addition, witnesses who have been deposed have testified regarding conversations with Mr. 

Motamed about Plaintiff and about Mr. Motamed’s visit to the San Francisco branch office in 

2011. Dkt. No. 70 at 9-10. A December 2011 email regarding the San Francisco branch discussed 

at one of those depositions reflects an executive’s characterization that “[w]e are also five months 

further along and Thomas’ visit independently confirmed the situation is no better.” Id. at 10. A 

deponent also confirmed that Mr. Motamed made the decision to hire two Zone Officers who 

Plaintiff alleges were placed in branches after female Branch Vice Presidents were demoted. Id. at 

11-12. Plaintiff alleges that she was a Branch Vice President over 50 years old when she was 

compelled to resign, and that a male Zone Executive was then appointed in the San Francisco 

branch after she left CNA. Dkt. No. 3, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 24, 54-55. In short, the areas of factual inquiry 

Plaintiff identifies are plainly relevant to her discrimination claims. 

CNA’s repeated assertions that the issues Plaintiff seeks to explore are “irrelevant” or 

“lack probative value,” are not persuasive factually or legally. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 71 at 4-9. To 

take one example, there is no legal requirement that a deponent must have formally “evaluate[d] 

Plaintiff’s performance” (Dkt. No. 63 at 10-12) before a deposition will be permitted in an 

employment discrimination case. And the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Mr. Motamed’s 

declaration does not establish that he has no relevant first-hand knowledge on this or any other 

point. Without a doubt, CNA has a very different view than Plaintiff regarding the facts that will 

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ultimately be proven and the inferences to be drawn from them, but that is not a basis for 

precluding Mr. Motamed’s deposition entirely. 2 Mr. Motamed’s declaration presents CNA’s 

version of events, but that declaration is not a substitute for Plaintiff’s entitlement under the 

Federal Rules to ask questions in person and obtain answers under oath. Nor is this a case like 

Affinity Labs in which the sole asserted basis for deposing Apple’s CEO was a number of 

statements he made in press releases and other entirely public settings. Affinity Labs, 2011 WL 

1753982 at *16 (plaintiff’s argument that CEO had relevant first-hand knowledge was based “only 

on Mr. Jobs’ public statements regarding Apple products or other patents or lawsuits”). In short,

the Court agrees with Plaintiff that this is not a case in which the “high-level executive” sought to 

be deposed had “little or no contact with the plaintiff” or knowledge of the issues in the case. Dkt. 

No. 70 at 6-7. Instead, Plaintiff has made a plausible prima facie showing that Mr. Motamed may 

have first-hand knowledge of relevant matters as a percipient witness, and CNA has not met its 

burden of showing an entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of precluding the requested 

deposition.

CNA also has not shown that Mr. Motamed’s information would be cumulative. On the 

points Plaintiff has identified, other witnesses have testified that they did not know of, did not 

recall or were not involved in communications and decisions allegedly made by Mr. Motamed. 

Dkt. No. 70 at 9-13. Mr. Motamed’s testimony regarding his own statements and decisions will 

thus be non-duplicative. For similar reasons, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has attempted less 

intrusive discovery methods. Plaintiff has deposed other CNA executives, but those depositions 

have not rendered Mr. Motamed’s deposition redundant, for the reasons discussed above. 

Finally, the Court notes that CNA points to no specific undue burden or expense that the 

deposition would create, beyond asserting generally that Mr. Motamed has a very full calendar and 

that the close of the first quarter is approaching. See Dkt. No. 71 at 4 (citing Motamed Declaration 

at ¶ 11). The Court does not doubt that Mr. Motamed is a busy person with substantial 

 

2 Obviously, in evaluating the record at this stage, the Court is not reaching any conclusions 

regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations, or the likelihood that she ultimately will be able to 

prove them.

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responsibilities. But that fact does not control where, as here, there is a substantial basis to believe 

that he may have relevant information to which Plaintiff is entitled under the Federal Rules. In re 

Transpacific, 2014 WL 939287 at *3 (“that the apex witness has a busy schedule is simply not a 

basis for foreclosing otherwise proper discovery”); In re Google Litig., 2011 WL 4985279 at *2 

(permitting the deposition of Google CEO Larry Page despite his busy schedule). 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion 

for Protective Order precluding Mr. Motamed’s deposition in its entirety is DENIED.

However, the Court ORDERS that Mr. Motamed’s deposition shall be limited to three 

hours, which should be ample time for Plaintiff’s counsel to cover the targeted issues identified in 

Plaintiff’s filings. See In re Transpacific, 2014 WL 9239287 at *6 (limiting airline executive’s 

deposition to two hours); Apple v. Samsung, 282 F.R.D. at 259 (limiting deposition of Samsung 

executive to two hours); In re Google Litig., 2011 WL 4985279 at *2 (limiting deposition of 

Google CEO to three hours); Google Inc., 2006 WL 2578277 at *3 (limiting deposition of Google 

CEO to three hours).

II. DEFENDANT’S ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL

In conjunction with the filings in this matter, Defendant has requested that this court seal 

the following pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5: (1) the declaration of Thomas F. Motamed;

(2) designated excerpts from the deposition of Stephen Stonehouse; and (3) designated excerpts 

from the Deposition of Elizabeth Aguinaga. 

Because the motion to compel and motion for protective order are non-dispositive motions, 

the “good cause” standard (rather than the “compelling reasons” standard) applies to CNA’s 

motion. Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Under the “good cause” standard, the Court may grant a protective order “to protect a party or 

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Pintos v. Pac.

Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(c). This can include an order sealing portions of the court record. See Kamakana, 477 F.3d at 

1179-80 (noting that a particularized showing of “good cause” justifies a district court acting to

preserve the “secrecy of a sealed discovery material attached to a non-dispositive motion”); Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 26(c) (allowing the court to seal deposition transcripts and otherwise prevent the 

disclosure of discovery items such as trade secrets, confidential research, or commercial 

information “for good cause shown”). To obtain such an order, CNA must make a “particularized 

showing” of good cause. See Kamakana, 477 F.3d at 1178, 1180 (citations omitted). This

standard presents a lower burden for the party wishing to seal documents than the “compelling 

reasons” standard, because “[t]he cognizable public interest in judicial records that underlies the 

‘compelling reasons’ standard does not exist for documents produced between private litigants.” 

Id. 

The Court finds that CNA has met its burden with respect to its request to seal specified

portions of Mr. Stonehouse’s and Ms. Aguinaga’s deposition transcripts. Those excerpts were 

designated as confidential under the parties’ stipulated protective order, and contain detailed 

internal financial, strategic and operational information, as well as a description of a confidential 

internal employment investigation conducted by CNA. 

The same cannot be said for Mr. Motamed’s declaration. CNA’s concern that the 

declaration might be “used (or misconstrued) by the public, including the media, for some 

improper purpose,” Dkt. No. 62 at 4, does not satisfy the good cause standard. Further, CNA’s 

supposed concerns regarding the “confidential content” of Mr. Motamed’s declaration are hard to 

square with CNA’s decision to reference the contents of the declaration in detail throughout its

brief, which it does not seek to file under seal. Dkt. No. 71. Because CNA has not shown good 

cause to seal the Motamed Declaration, its motion to seal that declaration is DENIED. CNA’s 

motion is GRANTED with respect to the specified deposition excerpts. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant’s 

Motion for Protective Order is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Mr. Motamed’s 

deposition shall proceed on a date mutually agreeable to the parties before the discovery cutoff in 

this case and shall be limited to three hours. 

Defendant’s Administrative Motion to File certain documents under seal is DENIED IN 

PART and GRANTED IN PART. The Court will allow the filing of the deposition excerpts, but 

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not Mr. Motamed’s declaration, under seal. CNA shall comply with Local Rule 79-5(f) consistent 

with the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/3/2015

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