Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00723/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00723-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY DIBBERN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00723-CDB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION 

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 50

(Doc. 135)

21-Day Deadline

Introduction

Trial of this action commenced on September 16, 2024. (Doc. 115). On September 25, 2024, 

the jury returned a note indicating they were “hopelessly deadlocked.” (Doc. 132). Following a 

conference with the parties outside the presence of the jury, the Court conducted an inquiry with the 

jury and thereafter declared a mistrial. (Doc. 124). 

On October 3, 2024, Defendants filed a renewed motion for partial judgment as a matter of law 

pursuant to Rule 50(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Doc. 135). In their motion, Defendants argue they are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on three of Plaintiff’s claims: (1) Violation of the Fourth 

Amendment – Failure to Provide Medical Care; (2) Negligence – Delaying or Interfering with 

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Plaintiff’s Access to Medical Care; and (3) Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights. Plaintiff timely filed 

an opposition and Defendants timely replied. (Docs. 139, 140).

Governing Legal Standard

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for judgment as a matter of law where a party, 

‘fully heard on an issue during a jury trial,’ has not established a ‘legally sufficient evidentiary basis’ 

for its claim, such that no ‘reasonable jury’ could find for that party on the issue.” Nash-Perry v. City 

of Bakersfield, No. 1:18-cv-01512 JLT CDB, 2023 WL 7092293, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2023) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). “When, as here, a jury does not reach a verdict, a party may renew 

the motion post-trial within 28 days of the jury being discharged.” Id. at *4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 

50(b)). “Rule 50(b) permits a renewed motion even if the Court declares a mistrial.” Id. (citing Shum 

v. Intel Corp., 633 F.3d 1067, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (“[A] jury’s inability to reach a verdict does not 

necessarily preclude judgment as a matter of law.”). Accord Headwaters Forest Defense v. Cnty. of 

Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 534 U.S. 801 (2001).1

In its consideration of a posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court “should 

review all of the evidence in the record.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 

150 (2000). The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... 

and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 

(9th Cir. 2006). “The district court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations when 

reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Dees v. Cnty. of San Diego, 960 F.3d 1145, 

1151 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013)). 

“The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion 

is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062.

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1 A proper post-verdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) is limited to the grounds the moving 

party asserted in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion. E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 

951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Defendants only raise arguments in their motion pursuant to Rule 

50(b) that they previously raised in their pre-verdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(a) (see Doc. 118); 

Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. See generally (Doc. 139).

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Summary of Trial Evidence

According to evidence introduced during trial, on December 30, 2021, at approximately 

3:00pm, Plaintiff was involved in a vehicle pursuit with officers of the Bakersfield Police Department 

(“BPD”), including Defendants Kidwell, Duong and Salazar. At one point during the pursuit, Plaintiff 

reversed his vehicle in an apparent attempt to elude officers and struck Defendant Duong’s stationary 

patrol vehicle. A short time later after the pursuit recommenced, Plaintiff stopped his vehicle, exited, 

and began to run near the intersection of Wible Road and White Lane in Bakersfield. Defendant 

Kidwell continued his pursuit of Plaintiff in his patrol vehicle. Plaintiff eventually reached a concrete 

wall that he attempted to hurdle and Kidwell struck Plaintiff with his patrol vehicle. An eyewitness 

testified that Plaintiff subsequently threw himself over the wall and Kidwell pursued on foot, 

ultimately gaining control of Plaintiff near where Plaintiff landed. Duong and Salazar joined Kidwell 

and employed force to gain control over Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that he was struck with the 

officers’ fists, knees and elbows. Kidwell called for medical care and the Defendants transported 

Plaintiff to a nearby patrol vehicle pending arrival of the ambulance.

Plaintiff’s police practices expert, Mr. Kelly Couch, testified that Kidwell’s use of a patrol 

vehicle to purposefully strike Plaintiff constituted deadly force because, under the circumstances, the 

collision reasonably could have caused grave bodily injury. Couch also testified that, pursuant to 

standard police practices and training, Kidwell should not have used his patrol vehicle as a control 

weapon and Defendants should not have moved Plaintiff to a patrol vehicle while awaiting arrival of 

an ambulance given the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Discussion

A. Unreasonable Denial or Delay of Medical Care – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Legal Standard

In Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, the Court of Appeals reiterated that suspects have a 

Fourth Amendment right to “objectively reasonable post-arrest [medical] care” until the end of the 

seizure. 441 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). “This means that officers must ‘seek the necessary 

medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended by either 

promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a hospital.’” Est. 

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of Cornejo ex rel. Solis v. City of Los Angeles, 618 Fed. Appx. 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Tatum, 

441 F.3d at 1099) (quoting Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Discussion

Plaintiff’s Claim Lacks A Legally Sufficient Evidentiary Basis

Although Plaintiff concedes that an arresting officer may satisfy the Tatum standard of acting 

reasonably by promptly summonsing necessary medical assistance, he contends “this is not the end of 

the inquiry.” (Doc. 139 at 3-4). Instead, Plaintiff argues that in addition to promptly summonsing 

medical care, officers separately must take reasonable steps to “ensure that [medical care] is in fact 

provided to the patient.” Id. at 4 (citing Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1415 & City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. 

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). Plaintiff argues Defendant Kidwell failed to satisfy this standard 

because, after summonsing medical care, Kidwell continued to apply force to Plaintiff through striking 

him and pulling his legs into a figure four leg lock. Id. at 5. Plaintiff further argues that, contrary to 

the best practices testimony offered by Plaintiff’s expert witness (Kelly Couch), instead of leaving 

Plaintiff in place and monitoring him until medical care arrived, Kidwell handcuffed Plaintiff and 

forcibly moved and secured him in a nearby patrol vehicle. Id. Separately, Plaintiff argues that, by 

securing him in a patrol vehicle, Kidwell delayed arriving medical staff’s ability to render care. Id. at 

5-6. Plaintiff contends that although the delay in medical staff’s attendance to his injuries was “brief,” 

the delay nevertheless was unreasonable in light of the severity of his obvious injuries. Id at 6.

Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence unquestionably establishes that 

Kidwell promptly summonsed medical care within minutes after his patrol vehicle collided with 

Plaintiff. See (DX 803-3; DX 810-1). None of Kidwell’s conduct cited by Plaintiff contradicts that 

Kidwell promptly summonsed medical care following Plaintiff’s sustainment of injuries. Although 

Plaintiff argues that Kidwell was obligated under the Fourth Amendment to do something more than 

just promptly summonsing medical care, none of the authorities he cites either say as much or are 

controlling (see Doc. 139 at 3). Instead, an officer meets the Fourth Amendment standard to 

reasonably provide for a suspect’s medical care so long as he promptly summons or transports the 

suspect to a care provider. See Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1099. See also Krause v. Cnty. of Mohave, 846 

Fed. Appx. 569, 571 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The district court correctly granted summary judgment on 

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Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim because the officers fulfilled their due process obligation by 

calling for medical assistance within one minute of Krause being shot.”). Further, Plaintiff’s argument 

that Kidwell’s securing of Plaintiff in a patrol vehicle pending the arrival of an ambulance somehow 

delayed arriving medical staff from rendering care (Doc. 139 at 5-6) is merely argument unsupported 

by any trial evidence.

Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff’s Claim

Even if a jury could and did find Kidwell’s actions were not objectively reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment, Defendants would be shielded from liability on Plaintiff’s claim for denial/delay 

of medical care under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for § 1983 claims unless they 

violated a federal right and “the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” 

Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). “To be clearly 

established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent,” 

meaning “it is dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust consensus of cases of persuasive 

authority.’” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 

731, 741-42 (2011)). Stated differently, “[a] right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear 

that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” 

Rosenbaum v. City of San Jose, 107 F.4th 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v. 

Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021)) (citation omitted). A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proof that 

the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Hopson v. 

Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 708 (2023) (“There is no analogous burden on § 1983 defendants to find 

factually on-point cases clearly establishing the lawfulness of an officer’s actions. Nor must § 1983 

defendants come forward with precedent showing that the unlawfulness of their conduct was not 

clearly established.”); Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).

As applied here, to defeat Defendants’ claim to qualified immunity, Plaintiff must identify 

controlling authority establishing that the alleged misconduct during and after Kidwell’s summonsing 

of an ambulance clearly violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonably denied or 

delayed medical care such that any reasonable officer would have perceived the unlawfulness. 

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Plaintiff fails to meet this burden because he has not identified any controlling and applicable 

authority for any such proposition. See (Doc. 139 at 6-7). Specifically, the only controlling authority 

cited by Plaintiff is Tatum, but that case plainly does not present analogous facts and Plaintiff presents 

no argument for how that decision would put Defendants on fair notice that their actions of 

summonsing medical care and securing Plaintiff in a patrol vehicle until an ambulance arrived was 

unlawful. The unpublished Court of Appeals opinion in Cornejo and the unpublished district court 

decision in D’Braunstein – the other cases cited by Plaintiff – are not the type of binding authority a 

court may consider in determining whether a right is “clearly established” such that qualified 

immunity does not apply. Cf. Perkins v. Edgar, No. 21-55552, 2022 WL 14476272, at *2 (9th Cir. 

Oct. 25, 2022) (officers entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment denial of 

medical care claim because the unlawfulness of their alleged failure to direct on-scene paramedics to 

attend to plaintiff was not “clearly established” under controlling precedent).

Thus, because Plaintiff has not carried his burden of identifying existing precedent that 

“‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue,” Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See 

Rosenbaum, 107 F.4th at 924 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)) (citation omitted)

B. Negligent Delay or Interference with Access to Medical Care

Legal Standard

In order to establish a claim for negligence, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a 

duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause 

of the resulting injury.” Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629 (2013) (internal alteration 

and citation omitted). Under California law, negligence standards are broader than standards imposed 

under the Fourth Amendment for § 1983 liability. See Mulligan v. Nichols, 835 F.3d 983, 991 (9th 

Cir. 2016); Stoddard-Nunez v. City of Hayward, 817 Fed. Appx. 375, 379 (9th Cir. 2020); Galindo v. 

City of San Francisco, 718 F. Supp.3d 1121, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Discussion

It does not follow from the Court’s holding that no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on 

his claims under the Fourth Amendment for unreasonably denied/delayed medical care that his related 

state law negligence claim likewise fails. That is because the standard for Plaintiff’s negligence claim 

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is less exacting than that under Section 1983. Here, a jury could find that Defendants complied with 

their legal obligations under the constitution to reasonably provide for medical care, but that their 

actions nevertheless fell below the standard of care required of a reasonable police officer under the 

circumstances. For example, a jury could find Defendant Kidwell’s immediate foot pursuit of Plaintiff 

after the vehicle collision without appreciating the need to first call for medical assistance fell below 

the applicable standard of care to reasonably provide for access to medical care. A jury also could 

credit Mr. Couch’s testimony that Defendants had a duty of care to leave a person in Plaintiff’s injured 

condition on the ground without transporting him to a patrol vehicle.

In sum, a reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Plaintiff 

and against Defendants on this claim.

C. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Legal Standard

A conspiracy claim brought under § 1983 requires proof of “an agreement or ‘meeting of the 

minds’ to violate constitutional rights,” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting 

United Steel Workers of Amer. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989) (citation omitted), as well as an “actual deprivation of constitutional 

rights resulting from the alleged conspiracy.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006), 

quoting Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “To be liable, each 

participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at 

least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel 

Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The conspiratorial agreement or meeting of the minds may be inferred on the basis of 

circumstantial evidence, such as the actions of the defendants. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino 

Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). A showing that defendants committed acts that “are 

unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement” may support the inference of conspiracy. Id. 

In addition, a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must be predicated on a viable underlying 

constitutional claim. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“However, the evidence adduced must demonstrate more than the mere fact that two people did or said 

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the same thing; the evidence must actually point to an agreement.” Myers v. City of Hermosa Beach, 

299 Fed. Appx. 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) 

& Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1991)). In short, “[t]he defendants must 

have, by some concerted action, intended to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of 

harming another which results in damage.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301.

Discussion

Although Plaintiff’s conspiracy to violate civil rights claim as pleaded is premised on 

Defendants’ violation of his rights to be free from both excessive force and unreasonably denied or 

delayed medical care (see Doc. 50, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 55), because the Court has found 

there is insufficient evidence to proceed on Plaintiff’s medical care claim, the conspiracy claim can 

proceed only on an excessive force theory. See Hart, 450 F.3d at 1071 (conspiracy requires “actual 

deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from the alleged conspiracy”).

Plaintiff argues that a jury reasonably could find that Defendants entered into a conspiratorial 

agreement to violate his constitutional rights based on the following evidence:

- Defendants observed Plaintiff was clearly injured and in need of immediate medical care

- Defendants had no medical purpose to move Plaintiff following the collision and to 

secure him in a patrol vehicle

- Plaintiff’s expert testified that Defendants moved Plaintiff to a patrol vehicle because it 

was not a good look for officers to be standing over an injured suspect

- Defendant Duong’s testimony that he did not see Defendant Kidwell’s patrol vehicle 

collide with Plaintiff nor hear the patrol vehicle’s engine rev during Kidwell’s 

acceleration is not consistent with Kidwell’s testimony that he did, in fact, fully depress 

his accelerator prior to colliding with Plaintiff

(Doc. 139 at 10-11). Thus, according to Plaintiff’s argument, any conspiracy among Defendants to 

violate Plaintiff’s civil rights was formed after Plaintiff already was injured. The Court agrees that no 

evidence was introduced at trial that there was any preexisting agreement among Defendants at the 

moment Defendant Kidwell collided with Plaintiff to violate his constitutional right to be free from 

excessive force – thus, for instance, there was no trial evidence of radio traffic evincing coordination 

among the Defendants in that regard prior to Kidwell’s striking Plaintiff with his vehicle.

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Even accepting the evidence identified by Plaintiff in the light most favorable to him, it is 

insufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find Defendants did or even could have had a 

“meeting of the minds” to violate Plaintiff’s rights to be free from excessive force. While under certain 

circumstances an agreement can be found from the very fact and nature of the coconspirators actions, 

no such facts or circumstances suggesting a meeting of the minds exist here. That Defendants were 

aware of Plaintiff’s injuries and nevertheless moved him to be secured in a patrol vehicle – even 

assuming as Plaintiff argues such was done for an improper purpose (e.g, to conceal Plaintiff’s injuries 

from any bystanders) – does not even inferentially provide a basis for a jury to find the Defendants 

agreed among themselves to engage in excessive force upon Plaintiff.

Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ renewed motion 

pursuant to Rule 50(b) (Doc. 135) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:

(1) Defendants’ motion is GRANTED on Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for Violation of the Fourth Amendment – Failure to Provide Medical Care and for 

Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights, and judgement shall enter on these claims in favor 

of Defendants; and

(2) Defendants’ motion is DENIED on Plaintiff’s state law claim for Negligence –

Delaying or Interfering with Plaintiff’s Access to Medical Care. 

And it is FURTHER ORDERED that within 21 days of entry of this order, the parties shall file 

a joint report setting forth their intentions for continued prosecution of this action, including proposed 

dates of mutual availability to appear for pretrial conference and retrial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2025 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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