Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01400/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01400-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE AVERY, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1400 FCD KJM P

vs.

C. PAZOS, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed a request for the U.S. Marshal to serve a subpoena duces tecum,

a motion to dismiss defendant Dunn from the action, a motion for an extension of the discovery

deadline and a motion for injunctive relief.

Defendant Pazos has requested a clarification of the court’s order of December 5,

2007 and has also filed a response to that order, addressing plaintiff’s September 20 and

November 13, 2007 requests for entry of default. 

I. Motion To Dismiss Defendant Dunn

As defendants have no objection to plaintiff’s request, the action is dismissed as

to defendant Nancy Dunn.

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II. Request For Service Of A Subpoena Duces Tecum

Plaintiff has requested the court to direct the U.S. Marshal to serve a subpoena

duces tecum on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), to have

the materials delivered to the court. He also asks the court to review the material so produced to

determine its authenticity or to direct the CDCR’s custodian of records to authenticate the

material. He further asks the court’s advice as to appropriate service of the subpoena. 

The court will not determine the authenticity of any materials plaintiff secures nor

will it advise him as to the appropriate service of the subpoena. In addition, in the absence of

any suggestion that there will be problems with materials provided, the court will not direct the

CDCR to process the request in a particular fashion. 

In the order of December 5, 2007, the court denied plaintiff’s request because

plaintiff had not made a showing of relevancy. Plaintiff has attempted to fill this lacuna in his

most recent filing. 

In his declaration in support of the request, plaintiff explains he needs several

categories of the material sought in order to respond to interrogatories that ask him to name

documents that show the defendants violated his constitutional rights. He also asserts, with little

explanation, that the policy statements he seeks will allow him to prove his claim. Neither of

these justifications establishes relevance for discovery purposes. 

Plaintiff also seeks a copy of his medical file, but has not explained why it is not

available for his inspection at his institution, without the court’s intervention. 

Finally, plaintiff seeks copies of any recorded interviews and documents

generated during defendant Joseph’s investigation of plaintiff’s staff complaints. He has made

an adequate showing of relevance. 

III. Extension Of Time To Conduct Discovery

Plaintiff seeks an additional ninety days “to start with” in order to conduct

discovery in this case, alleging that he is hampered in his efforts because he is housed in

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 In a declaration attached to the motion, plaintiff alleges that the records are “true copies

of the originals and should be viewed as authentic.” This is not sufficient to comply with the

Federal Rules of Evidence. 

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administrative segregation and is provided only limited law library access. Although an

extension is appropriate to allow plaintiff to complete service of the subpoena duces tecum,

plaintiff has not tied his limited law library access to his failure to pursue discovery during the

discovery period set by the court’s order. 

IV. Motion For Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

directing defendant Sahota to provide him Fentanyl, a medication previously prescribed to treat

the pain plaintiff alleges he suffers as the result of degenerative problems in his lower back. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Sahota, the Chief Medical Officer of CSP-Sac, has refused to

approve Dr. McAlpin’s request that plaintiff be given Fentanyl because it is not on the list of

available medications for CDCR. Plaintiff requests several forms of relief, including the

assignment of a special doctor to his treatment and the resumption of his prescription for Fetanyl. 

He has supported his request with a series of unauthenticated medical records, some of which are

difficult to decipher and interpret.1 Defendants have opposed the request. 

The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo

pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a

temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the

hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent, however, that requests for temporary

restraining orders that are ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general

standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch.

Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting);

Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 

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The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well

established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122

F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374,

1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal

point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under

any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id. In addition, when “a

party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the status quo

pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing a preliminary injunction.” 

Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994). A mandatory

injunction is disfavored and should be denied unless “the facts and law clearly favor the moving

party.” Id. at 1320 (internal quotations omitted). 

In this case, plaintiff seeks to alter the status quo by having the court direct a

special doctor be assigned to treat him and that he be administered a particular medication,

which he no longer receives. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a temporary restraining order.

 Nor has plaintiff made a sufficient showing that he will succeed on the merits of

his underlying claim so as to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that

inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under

section 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference” to serious

medical needs. A difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate

indifference nor does a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or

extent of medical treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung,

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 The court notes, however, that discovery, not the entire action, was stayed. 

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391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). In

light of this Eighth Amendment standard, plaintiff has not established that the law clearly favors

his position.

V. Motion For Clarification; Motion For Default Judgment

As defendant Pazos has responded to plaintiff’s motions for default judgment, the

motion for clarification is denied as moot.

Although his argument is not entirely clear, it appears defendant Pazos is arguing

that he was not served because CDCR forwarded the waiver of service form to him after the

form had already expired. The waiver of service form, however, contains defendant Pazos’

signature and his agreement to waive service; moreover, the February 5 date on the form has

been crossed out and May 21 written in. Docket No. 31.

Nevertheless, the court declines to grant plaintiff’s request for the entry of a

default judgment. Defendant Pazos has explained his confusion about the nature of the service

and his obligation while a stay was in place.2 He has now answered and plaintiff has

demonstrated no prejudice from any delay. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is dismissed as to defendant Dunn;

2. Plaintiff’s request that the court direct the U.S. Marshal to serve a subpoena

duces tecum is granted only as to plaintiff’s request to secure the materials generated by

defendant Joseph’s investigation but denied as to all other requests;

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a blank form for a civil

subpoena duces tecum; within thirty days of the date of this order, plaintiff should return the

form properly filled out as allowed by paragraph 2 above so that the court may forward it to the

Marshal; 

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4. Plaintiff’s request to continue the dates for conducting discovery is granted

only insofar as he requests additional time in which to secure the subpoena duces tecum allowed

by this order; if he returns the form within the thirty days specified by this order, it will be

deemed timely;

5. Defendant Pazos’ motion for clarification is denied as moot;

6. Plaintiff’s September 20 and November 13, 2007 motions for the entry of

default are denied; and

7. Plaintiff’s December 19, 2007 request for a temporary restraining order is

denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s December 19, 2007 motion for

a preliminary injunction be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 17, 2008. 

2

aver1600.ord

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