Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-35172/USCOURTS-ca9-19-35172-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN ERNEST DADE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-35172

D.C. Nos.

4:16-cv-00224-BLW

4:01-cr-00196-BLW-1

ORDER

Filed May 22, 2020

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Daniel Paul Collins, Circuit 

Judges, and Jennifer Choe-Groves,

* Judge.

Order;

Amended Dissent by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge for the United States 

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. DADE

SUMMARY**

28 U.S.C. § 2255 / Bail Pending Appeal

The panel filed an order denying John Ernest Dade’s 

motion under Fed. R. App. P. 23(b) for release on bail 

pending his appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence.

The panel held that even assuming arguendo that Dade 

has established a likelihood of success on appeal, he has not 

made the further showing required to warrant his release 

pending appeal. 

The panel explained that in addition to showing a 

likelihood of success on the merits, Dade must make a 

further showing of exceptional circumstances that go beyond 

what would be required to justify his release if this were a 

direct appeal rather than a § 2255 collateral attack. The 

panel wrote that because the standards applicable to 

collateral review are stricter than on direct appeal, a federal 

defendant who would not be entitled to bail pending direct 

appeal under the Bail Reform Act is, for that reason alone, 

not entitled to bail pending resolution of his or her § 2255 

proceedings. The panel held that Dade is not eligible for 

release pending appeal under the Bail Reform Act because 

he makes no showing that he is not likely to flee or pose a 

danger to the safety of any other person or the community if 

released. The panel wrote that without a showing that Dade 

at least satisfies the Bail Reform Act’s standards, the risks of 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. DADE 3

COVID-19 do not entitle him to be released from detention 

entirely.

Dissenting, Judge Berzon wrote that bail pending appeal 

is warranted because Dade has established both a high 

probability of success on the merits and special 

circumstances, namely the COVID-19 pandemic and Dade’s 

particular vulnerability. Judge Berzon wrote that this court 

has unequivocally rejected the application of the Bail 

Reform Act to a motion for bail pending appeal on habeas. 

She would grant bail pending appeal and order a limited 

remand to the district court to hold an immediate bond 

hearing.

COUNSEL

Bart M. Davis, United States Attorney; Syrena C. Hargrove, 

Assistant United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s 

Office, Boise, Idaho; for Defendant-Appellant.

Samuel Richard Rubin, Federal Public Defender; Melissa 

Winberg and Miles Pope, Assistant Federal Defenders; 

Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, Idaho; for 

Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

Appellant John Ernest Dade (“Dade”) moves for release 

on bail pending his appeal of the district court’s denial of his 

motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dade 

contends that three of his five counts of conviction 

impermissibly rely on 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which contains a 

residual definition of “crime of violence” that is facially 

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4 UNITED STATES V. DADE

invalid under Supreme Court precedent made retroactively 

applicable on collateral review. Sessions v. Dimaya, 

138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1257, 1268 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2551 (2015). We express no view of the merits of Dade’s 

appeal, which has not yet been argued. Even assuming 

arguendo that Dade has established a likelihood of success 

on appeal, he has not made the further showing required to 

warrant his release pending appeal. We therefore deny the 

motion.1

Under Rule 23-1 of this court, Dade’s “detention or 

release” pending his appeal of the denial of his § 2255 

motion is “governed by FRAP 23(b), (c) and (d).” Ninth Cir. 

R. 23-1. Because the denial of a § 2255 motion is “a decision 

not to release a prisoner,” the operative rule is Rule 23(b), 

which states that, pending appeal, “the court or judge 

rendering the decision, or the court of appeals, or the 

Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court,” may 

order that the prisoner be “detained in the custody from 

which release is sought,” “detained in other appropriate 

custody,” or “released on personal recognizance, with or 

without surety.” Fed. R. App. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b) does not 

itself set forth any substantive criteria for determining 

detention or release, and our decision is instead governed by 

equitable considerations. See United States v. Mett, 41 F.3d 

1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing, inter alia, Aronson v. 

May, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (Douglas, J., in chambers); United 

States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); cf. 

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987) (decision 

under Rule 23(c) whether to stay release pending 

government’s appeal depends on general equitable 

considerations governing stays). Here, Dade has failed to 

1 Judge Berzon would grant the motion and has filed a dissent.

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UNITED STATES V. DADE 5

make a sufficient showing that release is warranted under the 

applicable equitable standards.2

As we explained in Mett, release pending appeal of the 

denial of a § 2255 motion is “reserved . . . for extraordinary 

cases.” 41 F.3d at 1282 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). This requires an appellant to make a 

“heightened” showing beyond what would be required to 

warrant release on a direct criminal appeal. Kelly, 790 F.2d 

at 139. In Mett, we said that the requisite showing would 

involve “‘special circumstances or a high probability of 

success.’” 41 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 

318, 318 (9th Cir. 1989)). To the extent that our use of the 

disjunctive in Mett and Land might be thought to suggest that 

a “high probability of success” might alone be sufficient to 

warrant release, we clarify that a likelihood of success is not 

enough. A contrary rule would be an unwarranted departure 

from traditional equitable standards, see Hilton, 481 U.S. 

at 776 (likelihood of success is merely one factor in 

determining release under Rule 23), and it would lead to the 

anomalous result that release would be more easily obtained 

on collateral review than on direct appeal. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3143(b) (release pending appeal requires both a substantial 

2 We note that Dade failed to seek release pending appeal from the 

district court before filing his motion in this court. Although the text of 

Rule 23(b) does not itself require that relief first be sought in the district 

court, the equitable principles that govern such discretionary requests 

generally require that an applicant “start by making the request to the 

court or judge who rendered the decision under review.” 

16AA CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, EDWARD COOPER, &

CATHERINE STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3969 (4th 

ed. 2008); see also Smith v. Caldwell, 339 F. Supp. 215, 216 (S.D. Ga.) 

(“Requests for release pending appeal” in habeas cases “should 

ordinarily be filed first in the district court.”) (citing Baker v. Sard, 

420 F.2d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), aff’d, 458 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1972).

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6 UNITED STATES V. DADE

showing on the merits and a showing that the defendant is 

“not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 

person or the community”). Moreover, both Mett and Land

drew their articulation of the relevant release standards from 

Justice Douglas’s in-chambers opinion in Aronson, which 

made clear that the prisoner must show that, “in addition to

there being substantial questions presented by the appeal, 

there is some circumstance making this application 

exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the 

interests of justice.” 85 S. Ct. at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, 

in addition to showing a likelihood of success on the merits, 

Dade must make a further showing of exceptional 

circumstances that go beyond what would be required to 

justify his release if this were a direct appeal rather than a 

§ 2255 collateral attack.

Dade has not made this showing. Although the Bail 

Reform Act does not apply on collateral review, see Mett, 

41 F.3d at 1282, it cannot be the case that a prisoner whose 

detention would be required under that Act pending direct 

appeal can obtain release pending appeal on collateral 

review. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, because the 

standards applicable to collateral review are stricter than on 

direct appeal, a federal defendant who would not be entitled 

to bail pending direct appeal under the terms of § 3143(b) is, 

for that reason alone, not entitled to bail pending resolution 

of his or her § 2255 proceedings. Cherek v. United States, 

767 F.2d 335, 337–38 (7th Cir. 1985).3 Here, Dade is not 

3 The dissent is mistaken in contending that Cherek is inconsistent 

with our decision in Mett. Just as we concluded in Mett, the Seventh 

Circuit explicitly stated that “the statute governing bail pending appeal 

from a federal conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), is inapplicable here.”

767 F.2d at 337; see also Mett, 41 F.3d at 1282 (“The Bail Reform Act 

does not apply to federal prisoners seeking postconviction relief.”). But 

as Cherek explained, that does not mean that § 3143 is irrelevant: 

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UNITED STATES V. DADE 7

eligible for release pending appeal under the standards set 

forth in § 3143(b). That statute requires that, in addition to 

making a sufficient showing on the merits, a prisoner must 

also show “by clear and convincing evidence that the person 

is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 

person or the community if released.” Id. Dade’s motion 

makes no such showing, much less a clear and convincing 

one. Moreover, the Government has stated that, if Dade 

prevails on this appeal, it intends to recharge and retry him, 

thereby underscoring the inappropriateness of releasing him 

while his § 2255 appeal remains pending.

Dade argues, and the dissent agrees, that this case 

involves the “special circumstance[]” of the COVID-19 

pandemic and the risks to Dade if he contracts it in prison. 

See Land, 878 F.2d at 318. This is indeed a special 

circumstance, and it might warrant a change in the 

conditions of his confinement (including transfer to another 

facility) if those risks are not being adequately addressed. 

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) 

(Government must not be deliberately indifferent to the 

medical needs of prisoners); cf. also Gordon v. County of 

Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (“claims 

for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought 

by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the 

Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an 

objective deliberate indifference standard” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). But we do not have 

that issue before us in this motion. Instead, we have only 

because § 3143 provides “a more favorable standard” than a defendant 

asserting a § 2255 motion is “entitled to,” it follows that “a defendant 

who cannot bring himself within its terms is not entitled to bail” in 

connection with those § 2255 proceedings. Cherek, 767 F.2d at 337. 

Mett did not address this further question.

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8 UNITED STATES V. DADE

Dade’s request that, in light of the risks of COVID-19, he 

should be released from detention entirely. Without a 

showing that Dade at least satisfies § 3143(b)(1)(A)’s 

standards, he is not entitled to that relief. Had he met those 

standards, then Dade’s asserted risks in prison would be a 

factor that we could consider in exercising our overall 

discretion under Rule 23. But whether or not he faces a risk 

from COVID-19 in prison has no bearing on whether he will 

be a danger to the community if released, and that is what 

counts under § 3143(b)(1)(A).

Because Dade’s request for release would fail under 

§ 3143(b) if this were a direct appeal, he can fare no better 

on an appeal in a collateral challenge under § 2255, where 

he must satisfy a more demanding standard. Accordingly, 

Dade’s motion for release on bail pending appeal under Rule 

23(b) is DENIED.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. A § 2255 petitioner is entitled to 

bail pending appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 23 in “extraordinary cases involving special 

circumstances or a high probability of success.” See United 

States v. Mett, 41 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 

Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318, 318–19 (9th Cir.1989)). Bail 

pending appeal in this case is warranted because Dade has 

established both.1

1 Our case law phrases this test as disjunctive, but I agree with the 

majority that both a high probability of success and special 

circumstances are required to grant bail under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 23(b). Mett quotes Land, which in turn cites Aronson v. May, 

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UNITED STATES V. DADE 9

The underlying crimes at issue on appeal—Idaho 

burglary, battery, and assault—are misdemeanors under 

Idaho law that were prosecuted as federal crimes of interstate 

domestic violence (and thus carried a greatly enhanced 

sentence) because Dade traveled from Utah to Idaho to 

commit them. Dade has served eighteen years of his twentyeight-year sentence.

Based on a preliminary review of this case, Dade has a 

high probability of success on the merits under the standard 

in United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 

2017). The jury could have relied on Idaho burglary or 

battery as the basis for his convictions for interstate domestic 

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B)(i) and brandishing 

a firearm in relation to interstate domestic violence under 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As the government recognizes, state 

burglary offenses in 2002 were determined to be crimes of 

violence based on the residual clause of the federal crime of 

violence definition, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). As to harmlessness, 

as to which we rely on current law, see Geozos, 870 F.3d 

at 897, it is clear at least that burglary and battery are now 

not within the force clause categorically.

This case also involves special circumstances, namely 

the COVID-19 pandemic and Dade’s particular 

vulnerability. The government recognizes that Dade’s 

underlying medical condition—a history of respiratory 

85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964), as support for this test. See Land, 878 F.2d at 318–

19. Aronson reasoned that “it is . . . necessary to inquire whether, in 

addition to there being substantial questions presented by the appeal, 

there is some circumstance making this application exceptional and 

deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.” 85 S. Ct. at 5. 

Other circuits have considered these requirements in the conjunctive. 

See, e.g., Anderson v. Napel, No. 17-1740, 2017 WL 5895735 *1 (6th 

Cir. 2017) (citing Aronson, 85 S. Ct. at 5).

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10 UNITED STATES V. DADE

issues—and advanced age put him in the high-risk category 

should he contract the virus. It asserts that the BOP has 

policies in place to ensure the safety of inmates, but those 

policies have been appallingly ineffective in FCI Lompoc 

where Dade is incarcerated. According to the most recent 

reports, nearly seventy-five percent of the inmates at FCI 

Lompoc have now tested positive for COVID. See

https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (reporting on May 11, 

2020, 7:27a.m. that 842 of 1,162 inmates have “confirmed 

active cases” of COVID-19 at FCI Lompoc).2 That BOP’s 

official protocols have not worked—or not been 

implemented—at FCI Lompoc is not surprising. Dade 

describes conditions inconsistent with the BOP’s announced 

new policies in response to the virus: “[H]e has not been 

isolated due to his vulnerabilities and instead is housed with 

hundreds of other individuals, sleeping approximately 

26 inches apart in double bunk beds.” See Emergency 

Motion, Dkt. 83 at 12. And inmates at FCI Lompoc are 

“given two handmade masks, [but] they are able to see 

through them, other inmates do not consistently wear their 

masks, and they have no ability to disinfect or clean them 

other than by washing them in the communal sinks and 

letting them air dry,” Reply, Dkt. 94 at 5; see also id. at 4–6 

(describing other conditions at FCI Lompoc). Dade also cites 

numerous news articles noting the particular risk to inmates, 

practical difficulties in effectuating BOP’s protective 

2 As of May 21, 2020, 2:50 p.m., the BOP website reports 939 total 

inmates at FCI Lompoc and 291 “confirmed active cases” of COVID19. Aside from the apparent sizeable decrease in the total population, no 

explanation is apparent for this dramatic drop in the number of current 

cases since May 11. Notably, the BOP reports only “confirmed active 

cases”; it does not show a cumulative number of inmates who have been 

infected. So it is possible that many infected individuals have been 

transferred or released while the motion before us was pending, and 

others have recovered.

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UNITED STATES V. DADE 11

policies, and BOP’s overall ineffectiveness in controlling the 

spread of the virus. Emergency Motion at 10–13. So the risk 

to Dade both of contracting the virus if he remains at FCI 

Lompoc and of becoming extremely ill or dying is quite 

high.

I note with concern that as recently as April 30, 2020, the 

government assured us that the risk of COVID-19 infection 

at FCI Lompoc was being adequately mitigated by BOP’s 

“aggressive steps to protect inmates’ health [and] to limit the 

spread of COVID-19,” see Response, Dkt. 90 at 16–21, such 

that Dade was at little risk of contracting the virus. Dade’s 

own reports of the on-the-ground situation turned out to be 

exceedingly more accurate, disturbingly so.

I also note that the majority’s conclusion that Dade must 

satisfy the requirements of the Bail Reform Act plainly 

violates this circuit’s precedent. In Mett, we unequivocally 

rejected the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) to a motion 

for bail pending appeal on habeas. See 41 F.3d at 1282. 

“Appellants are collaterally attacking their sentences. The 

Bail Reform Act does not apply to federal prisoners seeking 

postconviction relief.” Id. (citation omitted). “Instead, Fed. 

R. App. P. 23 governs the issue of the release or detention of 

a prisoner, state or federal, who is collaterally attacking his 

or her criminal conviction.” Id. To the extent we should 

consider whether Dade poses a danger to the community as 

part of the equitable consideration of special circumstances, 

any danger Dade poses here can be adequately addressed by 

imposing restrictions on his release. Dade notes that he “is 

amenable to any restrictions the Court is inclined to order” 

on his release, “since his primary concern is surviving to 

learn the resolution of his appeal.” Reply, Dkt. 94 at 11. 

Whether Dade continues to pose a threat and what 

restrictions would be appropriate to mitigate that threat are 

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12 UNITED STATES V. DADE

questions of fact that the district court is better positioned 

than this panel to resolve.

I would grant bail pending appeal and order a limited 

remand to the district court to hold an immediate bond 

hearing. See Rose v. Baker, 17-15009, Dkt. 62 at *3–4 (9th 

Cir. April 9, 2020) (remanding the case “to the district court 

for the limited purpose of conducting a bond hearing to 

determine bond and other appropriate conditions for 

release”). Dade asserts that he has friends that will take him 

in so that he may shelter in place if released, but the district 

court would be better suited to test the truth of those 

assertions, the adequacy of the available housing options, 

and otherwise set bail conditions.

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