Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03008/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03008-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 There are sixteen separate motions to dismiss before the Court. Defendant Eureka Veterans

Clinic joined the motion to dismiss filed by the Eureka Veterans Clinic physicians (dkts. 67, 148).

2

 The federal defendants and defendants represented by the State of California filed oppositions

to Wright’s motion for attorneys’ fees (dkts. 20, 21). Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. joined these

oppositions. 

3

 Various defendants have filed requests for judicial notice that supplement their motions to

dismiss. See Requests for Judicial Notice (dkts. 59, 62, 64, 85, 87, 149). The pending requests for

judicial notice are unopposed, and the Court GRANTS these requests. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA ANN WRIGHT, PRO SE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL., 

Defendants. /

No. 3:14-cv-03008-CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Plaintiff Linda Ann Wright (“Wright”), acting pro se, filed the instant action asserting

approximately thirteen claims against sixty-six named defendants. See generally Compl.

(dkt. 1). All defendants have filed joint or individual motions to dismiss1

 on various grounds. 

Wright also filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees (dkt. 14).2

The Court hereby GRANTS all motions to dismiss raised by defendants and DENIES

Wright’s motion for attorneys’ fees.3

 

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 For example, in a present allegation based on what appears to be a passing reference to a

previous case she filed and a previous case filed against her, Wright states that an unspecified party

“also filed what looked like a Police, Hospital or an ominous commitment; illegally. Violating the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 1961;

42 U.S.C., 21 § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(b)(1)(2)(3)(ii).” Compl. at 33:8–11.

5

 “Made up traits” seems to refer to Wright’s physicians diagnosing her with “herpes in the

buttocks region” instead of why Wright alleges she went into the Emergency Room, which was for

treatment of Deep Vein Thrombosis. Compl. at 12:1–28. 

2

I. BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2014, Wright filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern

District of California, seeking fifty million dollars in damages from an extensive list of

defendants. Throughout her forty-two-page complaint, Wright unsystematically alleges

myriad civil violations in her narration.4

 See Compl. at 1–42. Near the end of her complaint,

Wright lists thirteen specific statutes under the heading, “CLAIMS.” Compl. at 39:1–40:1. 

These claims include constitutional violations, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act violations, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act violations,

and others. Id.

The majority of events in Wright’s complaint seems to focus on allegations that the

United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) has denied her veterans benefits, has

destroyed her medical records, and has placed fraudulent information in her medical

documents. Compl. at 6:2–11. At various points in her complaint, Wright alleges that all

“defendants participated in Corrupting of [her] Files” and “defendants were deleteriously

changing [her] Medical History.” Compl. at 8:14, 8:24–25. Additionally, regarding her

medical history, Wright alleges, “These Defendants created a stereotypical devious woman;

with the use of these made up traits,5

 to show a person of low Character. Not [her]. [Her]

benefits, have been paid to: Doctors whom are corrupt and Others; Whom reaped the benefits

of [her] hard work. Where are the Law Enforcers?” Compl. at 12:21–28. As a final

example of allegations regarding Wright’s medical care, she alleges that one of her doctors

made a “duplicitous statement that ‘patient drinks fifth everyday.’ Was dereliction of his

duties as a Doctor; and Fraud.” Compl. at 16:19–21. 

Wright’s complaint also alleges scattered facts concerning individual defendants other

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than her doctors or entities involved in her medical care. Compl. at 1–42. For instance,

Wright alleges that defendant “Professional Photocopy represented themselves to [her] as

Document Servers, while working with AMEX & County of Humboldt; State of CA;

sabotaged [her] Filings: e.g. dark illegible copies, missing pages.” Compl. at 33:4–6. Wright

further alleges in her complaint that various unlawful actions were taken by various state and

local entities and that her “Cat was poisoned, [her] mailbox was snatched (concrete and

steel), [her] brother died, [her] health failed. Meanwhile Humboldt County Assessor,

Humboldt Cty. Tax Collector, CA Board of Equalization, Superior Court of CA!Humboldt

barraged [her] with fraudulent paperwork and threats; while Case CV11–04492 WHA, was

in progress.” Compl. at 33:20–34:1. As a final illustration of the array of allegations in

Wright’s complaint, she states under the heading, “TSUNAMI QUID PRO QUO,”

apparently against all defendants, “When Federal, State, and Local Governments work

together with Corporations and Others; to destroy an Individual. By violating the U.S.

Constitution, and other laws; while cover-ups and corruption reigns.” Compl. at 38:7–11. 

Several defendants have filed motions to dismiss based on lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. All defendants have cited failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted in their motions to dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Courts presume a lack of jurisdiction until the party

asserting jurisdiction proves otherwise. Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446

F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970). Dismissal of a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997).

In addition to subject matter jurisdiction, due process requires federal courts to

possess personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant such that rendering judgment

with respect to that defendant comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A challenge to

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personal jurisdiction is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Personal

jurisdiction requires the court to have either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over a

non-resident defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 411–15 (1984) (“Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the

foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s

subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts

between the State and the foreign corporation.”) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342

U.S. 437 (1952), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 (1984)). 

General jurisdiction arises when a plaintiff demonstrates that a non-resident defendant

maintains continuous and systematic contacts that essentially render the defendant at home in

the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852

(2011). Specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant maintains sufficient minimum contacts

within a foreign jurisdiction. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. “Sufficient minimum

contacts” tests the extent to which a defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and

protections of the forum state in order for the exercise of jurisdiction to be consistent with

fair play and substantial justice. J. McEntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787

(2011). 

A motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Because a Rule 12(b)(6) defense asserts a plaintiff’s failure to

meet the pleading requirements found in Rule 8(a), a claim is properly dismissed when the

pleadings lack a cognizable legal theory or lack sufficient facts to support a cause of action. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). While Rule 8(a)

merely requires a “short and plain statement” of facts showing entitlement to relief, the

pleadings must maintain a level of detail that gives the defendant fair notice of the claims and

the grounds upon which the claims rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Thus, a plaintiff must

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 This number includes the State of California, et al., Michael Morrison and Janssen Malloy

LLP, a group of Wright’s alleged physicians who are represented by Janssen Malloy LLP, Mobility

Specialists Inc., all federal defendants who are represented by the United States Attorney, the State of

California Department of Insurance and Department of Fire and Forestry Protection, who are

represented by the Attorney General of California, and the Disabled Veterans of America.

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make allegations that rise above mere labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action. Id. at 555. Complaints that assert “threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”

under the facial plausibility standard set forth by Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). 

Allegations that are challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be construed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1998). In addition, pro se litigants are entitled to greater leeway in the interpretation of their

pleadings. Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). However, pro

se pleadings must still meet a minimum threshold that provides defendants sufficient notice

of the allegations against them. Id. Put simply, pro se litigants are still bound by the rules of

procedure. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Dismiss Asserting Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Seven6

 of the instant motions to dismiss allege that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Wright’s claims. See Motions to Dismiss (dkts. 15, 44, 56, 63, 67, 78, 127). 

The only possible basis for federal jurisdiction over Wright’s claims is the assertion of a

federal question. Federal question jurisdiction grants federal district courts “original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Cook Inlet Region Inc. v. Rude, 690 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1331). 

Wright alleges thirteen causes of action that can be construed as arising under the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Compl. at 39–40. Although Wright does not

provide heightened explanations of the alleged facts that support federal jurisdiction, she

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does, in her complaint, appear to link certain facts to specific violations that arise under

United States law. Compl. at 1–42. For example, Wright narrates portions of her claims

followed by a statutory citation: “The V.A.: Allowed for and participated in Corrupting of

[her] Files. Under The Color of Law 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242; COINTELPRO.” Compl. at

8:14–16. Wright’s scattered statements might be facially confusing and disjointed, but the

majority of her complaint links alleged facts to the statutory violations she asserts. Taken in

the light most favorable to Wright and applying the liberal construction afforded to pro se

litigants, Wright has adequately pled that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her

alleged claims. See Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54 (acknowledging that while pro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure, courts have an obligation to construe a pro se plaintiff’s

pleadings liberally in order to give the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt) (citing King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Even though Wright generally makes a sufficient showing of subject matter

jurisdiction, she does not do so where her allegations relate to violations committed by the

VA in the handling of her benefits. The majority of Wright’s complaint involves actions

taken by the VA in regards to her medical care and receipt of benefits from the VA. Compl.

at 1–42. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims relating to or affecting

veterans benefits decisions. See 38 U.S.C. §511(a); Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,

678 F.3d 1013, 1023–25 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act

(“VJRA”) “precludes jurisdiction over a claim if it requires the district court to review ‘VA

decisions that relate to benefits decisions’”). 

In the instant case, Wright consistently asserts, albeit in varying verbiage, that the VA

“has continued to Deny this Woman her rightful benefits.” Compl. at 8:1–19. Wright also

alleges that VA physicians and many other defendants participated in “corruption” of her

medical files. Compl. at 4:1–20. Moreover, Wright states that she “fought to receive Full

Benefits; and received PARTIAL BENEFITS through the Board of Veteran Appeals.” 

Compl. at 5:25–27. Finally, Wright claims that after being able to receive partial benefits,

the majority of the “Electronic Medical Records Fraud” took place, wherein all of her VA

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physicians and other VA personnel accessed and altered her files fraudulently, and thus,

affected her ability to receive VA benefits. Compl. at 12–17. 

The foregoing allegations all concern the alleged denial of VA benefits or relate to VA

benefits decisions generally. Reviewing the claims that relate to Wright’s medical care in

connection with her veterans benefits is precisely what the VJRA precludes. See 38 U.S.C.

§511(a); Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1023–25 (citing Zuspann v. Brown, 60

F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a district court does not have jurisdiction

over a claim even where the defendant dresses his claim as a constitutional violation because

the veteran “was ultimately ‘complaining about a denial of benefits’”)); see also Larrabee by

Jones v. Derwinski, 968 F.2d, 1497, 1498 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court

lacked jurisdiction where “[t]he gravamen of the amended complaint [was] that the VA ha[d]

failed to provide [the veteran] with adequate care”); Weaver v. United States, 98 F.3d 518,

519–20 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no jurisdiction where the claimant sued for conspiracy,

fraud, and misrepresentation, claiming that VA employees concealed his medical records);

Price v. United States, 228 F.3d 420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that “courts have

consistently held that a federal district court may not entertain constitutional or statutory

claims whose resolution would require the court to intrude upon the VA’s exclusive

jurisdiction”). 

Thus, because the VJRA precludes jurisdiction if the claim requires review of

decisions relating to VA benefits, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of

Wright’s claims regarding her benefits and her VA medical care and records that relate to her

VA benefits or benefits decisions. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES these claims WITH

PREJUDICE. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that leave to amend

should be freely given when justice so requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the Court has

discretion to deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile. See Leadsinger Inc. v.

BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). Here,

any amendment by Wright pertaining to her claims involving VA benefits would still be

subject to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. See Saul v. United States, 928 F. 2d 829, 843

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(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the district court’s denial of leave to amend because an

amendment could not change the fact that a statute precluded the litigation of the claims

asserted); Leadsinger Inc., 512 F.3d at 532 (upholding the district court’s denial of leave to

amend in a copyright suit because the plaintiff could not remedy the fact that its device did

not fall within specific statutory definitions that applied to its claims); Pisciotta v. Teledyne

Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that

any additional amendment would not be able to allege a necessary element of promissory

estoppel in ERISA litigation). 

B. Motions to Dismiss Asserting Lack of Personal Jurisdiction under Federal 

 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

Defendants Kirkland Court Health and Rehabilitation Center (“Kirkland”),

The Arbors, and Mobility Specialists, Inc. have filed motions to dismiss based on

lack of personal jurisdiction. See Motions to Dismiss (dkts. 55, 64, 127). The Court

agrees that these Texas-based defendants lack sufficient contacts with California to

make them amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the Court. See, e.g., Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 466 U.S. at 414–15. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES all claims against Kirkland, the Arbors, and Mobility Specialists, Inc.,

for lack of personal jurisdiction WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

C. Motions to Dismiss Asserting Failure to State a Claim upon Which 

 Relief Can Be Granted and Failure to Plead a Proper Claim for Relief 

 Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a)

All defendants seek to dismiss Wright’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a). Defendants contend correctly that Wright’s

pleadings are inadequate and that they fail to state a claim for which relief can be

granted. Although federal courts are required to construe the pleadings of pro se

litigants liberally, Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 161 (9th Cir. 1992), no

plausible federal claim can be drawn from Wright’s allegations. Not even the most

generous reading of the complaint reveals a claim upon which relief can be granted.

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570 (holding that a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face”). Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a), the Court GRANTS all defendants’ motions to dismiss

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

D. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Wright filed a motion for attorneys’ fees approximately two months after

filing her complaint. Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees at 1. Wright cites the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) as the basis for her motion. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et

seq. In her motion, it is unclear whether she is seeking accommodations in

connection with the Court’s hearing or actual attorneys fees for representing herself. 

Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees at 1–2. Regardless, § 12205 of the ADA provides for an

award of attorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. At the present

point in time, Wright cannot establish that she is the prevailing party for purposes of

this motion. Wright also fails to set forth any allegations of ADA violations in her

pleadings. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wright’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) GRANTS all requests for judicial notice; 

(2) GRANTS the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

 with respect to Wright’s claims involving VA benefits WITH 

 PREJUDICE;

(3) GRANTS the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction for the 

 following defendants: Kirkland, the Arbors, and Mobility Specialists, Inc. WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(4) GRANTS all defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) 

 and 8(a) WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

(5) DENIES Wright’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

For the reasons stated above, all defendants’ motions to dismiss are

GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty days of the date of

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this order. An amended complaint must be a clear and concise statement showing

entitlement to relief and must address the legal deficiencies stated herein, or be

subject to dismissal with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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