Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00043/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00043-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mayda Nix, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a

GlaxoSmithKline, et al.,

Defendants. _________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 06-43-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Court

on September 19, 2007, and brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (Dkt.

153). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this Court’s Order of September 5, 2007 (Dkt. 147),

whereby the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons given

below, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

GlaxoSmithKline (“Defendant”) manufactures Serevent, a prescription drug used to treat

asthma patients. Christopher Nix was prescribed Serevent by Dr. John Hoehne in July 1998.

Mr. Nix had an asthma attack and died on October 23, 1999.

Plaintiffs are the surviving mother and child of Mr. Nix. Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Nix

died from an adverse reaction to Serevent. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable because it

failed to provide adequate warnings of the risks associated with Serevent. On September 5,

2007, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that

Case 2:06-cv-00043-SMM Document 160 Filed 11/28/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiffs requested oral argument in connection with their motion. Because the parties’

briefs have thoroughly discussed the law and evidence, the Court finds that oral argument will

not aid its decision in this matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d

1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

- 2 -

Plaintiffs provided insufficient evidence on the issue of causation. On September 19, 2007,

Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Reconsideration which is presently before the Court.1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion to reconsider,” but a

litigant subject to an adverse judgment may file a motion to alter or amend the judgment under

Rule 59(e). Under the “law of the case doctrine,” courts do not “reexamine an issue previously

decided by the same or higher court in the same case.” Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v.

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may have discretion to

depart from the law of the case and reexamine an issue where: (1) the first decision was clearly

erroneous; (2) there has been an intervening change of law; (3) the evidence is substantially

different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise

result. United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). A district court abuses

its discretion when it applies the doctrine of the law of the case without one of these five

requisite conditions. Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for

reconsideration may not be used to ask the Court “to rethink what the court had already thought

through – rightly or wrongly.” See Defenders of Wildlife v. Ballard, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1115

(D. Ariz. 1999) (citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court’s application of the Learned Intermediary

doctrine and the Court’s interpretation of cases cited in the Order granting summary judgment.

Plaintiffs’ motion does not identify its basis for reexamining the issues, but the Reply asserts

that reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. The Court disagrees.

//

//

Case 2:06-cv-00043-SMM Document 160 Filed 11/28/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

A. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Plaintiffs first argue that the Order “thwart[s]” the purpose of the Learned Intermediary

Doctrine. (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. 14.) Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Tominaga (Nix’s treating

physician) not Dr. Hoehne (the prescribing physician), should have been treated as a Learned

Intermediary because Dr. Tominaga had a closer relationship to Nix. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiffs

assert that the intent of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine “presupposes” a close relationship

between patient and doctor, and “manifest injustice” would result if Dr. Hoehne was identified

as the learned intermediary. (Pl.’s Reply at 5.) Plaintiffs support their contention with a couple

of law review articles and language from a New Mexico state court opinion, none of which are

binding on the Court, let alone indicative of manifest injustice. 

Regardless of the “intent” of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, Plaintiffs do not dispute

that the learned intermediary is the physician who prescribed the medication at issue. Indeed,

the very paragraphs Plaintiffs cite to illustrate the “intent” of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine

contain the following: “[t]he requirement that only the physician who prescribes an inherently

dangerous drug need be warned (and not his patient), has been explained as follows: . . .

[p]hamaceutical companies . . . are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts

as a ‘learned intermediary’ between manufacturer and consumer.” Jones v. 3M Co., 669 P.2d

744, 760-61 (N.M. App. 1983) (Lopez, J., concurring) (emphases added). Plaintiffs’ allegation

that the intent of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine has been thwarted is therefore insufficient

to show “manifest injustice” in light of the established application of that doctrine.

Plaintiffs also allege that Dr. Hoehne is not a learned intermediary due to the absence of

informed consent, and because he is improperly biased in favor of Defendants. (Pl.’s Mot. for

Recons. 5-9.) Plaintiffs did not raise these issues in their discussion of the Learned

Intermediary Doctrine as it related to the motion for summary judgment, and the issues are not

based on newly-discovered evidence. In similar fashion, Plaintiffs argue that Hoene’s testimony

is equivocal and creates a genuine issue of material fact. (Id. at 9-12.) The Court declines to

address these issues which are raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration. See

389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

Case 2:06-cv-00043-SMM Document 160 Filed 11/28/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

B. Application of Motus and Grenier

Plaintiffs also argue that the facts of this case “render . . . the [C]ourt’s interpretation of

both Motus and Grenier inapposite.” (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. 2.) Plaintiffs do not suggest why

reconsideration is warranted, as “manifest injustice” is first suggested in Plaintiffs’ Reply and

the Reply does not mention the Court’s interpretation of these cases. Nonetheless, the Court

will address why reconsideration of the Motus and Grenier is unwarranted.

The Court relied on Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001) in

construing California failure-to-warn law. Based in part on that case, the Court determined that

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that additional warnings would have caused Dr. Hoehne not to

prescribe Serevent for Nix. (Dkt. 147 at 6.) Summary judgment was appropriate because

Plaintiffs had provided insufficient evidence on the issue of causation. (Id.) Plaintiffs now

argue for an alternative method of proving causation, based on a parenthetical reference in

Motus to “any reasonable physician,” by showing that any reasonable physician would have

acted differently given the same circumstances. (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. 14.) Plaintiffs do not

cite any authority for this alternative interpretation of California law, and a less selective

reading of Motus confirms that causation can be established only by showing that the

prescribing physician would have acted differently. See Motus, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 992

(“[Defendant] may prevail by showing that Plaintiff lacks evidence establishing that an adequate

warning would have affected [the prescribing doctor’s] decision to prescribe [the drug at

issue].”). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ did not raise this argument in response to Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, though Plaintiffs addressed Motus in some depth. (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot.

for Summ. J. 16-17.)

The Order granting summary judgment cites Grenier v. Med. Ing’g Corp., 99 F. Supp.

2d 759 (W.D. La. 2000) for the proposition that objective evidence is irrelevant to the issue of

causation. (See Order Dated Sept. 5, 2007, Dkt. 107, at 6.) Plaintiffs take this reference and

now argue that Fifth Circuit cases “upon which the Grenier court relied” allow causation to be

shown by objective evidence. (Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. 13.) Although a footnote in Grenier cites

a case which permits objective evidence of causation, Grenier also noted that the case had

Case 2:06-cv-00043-SMM Document 160 Filed 11/28/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

applied Mississippi law. Methods of establishing causation under Mississippi law are not at

issue in this case, and California law requires subjective evidence to establish causation. To the

extent Plaintiffs assert otherwise, they are mistaken.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs request that the Court reexamine the Learned Intermediary Doctrine and the

interpretation of Motus and Grenier fails to establish one of the requisite conditions for 

departing from the law of the case. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. (Dkt.

153.)

DATED this 27th day of November, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-00043-SMM Document 160 Filed 11/28/07 Page 5 of 5