Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02099/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02099-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LASONJA PORTER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. CIV S-06-2099 MCE GGH PS

vs.

CITY OF DAVIS POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, et al., ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

__________________________________/

Plaintiffs are proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis. This

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). Previously pending on this

court’s law and motion calendar for September 27, 2007, were motions to dismiss brought by

defendant Superior Court of California, County of Yolo, (“Superior Court”) and defendants

Hyde, Pierce, Anderson, Bevugloz, and Franti, (“Hyde Defendants”) who also bring a motion to

strike the amended complaint and supporting documents, filed February 9, 2007. Plaintiffs

Porter and Jones appeared in pro se. William Krabbenhoft appeared for defendant Superior

Court and John Whitesides appeared for the Hyde defendants. Having reviewed the motions and

responsive papers, the court now issues the following findings and recommendations.

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

I. BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint, filed February 9, 2007. 

Plaintiffs are Lasonja Porter and Christopher Jones, African American residents of Davis. They

bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for violation of their civil rights by the City

of Davis and County of Yolo, due in part to their status as African Americans. They also plead

various state law claims. They allege that they were singled out by the Yolo County Police

Department which targeted them, filed falsified police reports and falsely arrested Chris Jones. 

Am. Compl. at 2. Because the amended complaint is rambling, the court has utilized defendants’

organization of some of the facts by alleged incidents occurring on specific dates as follows. 

July 17, 2004 - Unnamed Davis Police Department officers searched plaintiffs’ home after asking

children if parents were home, and they responded in the negative. Children were gathered in

one room while police searched the house, including Porter’s undergarments in her dresser

drawers. Police later said they had an arrest warrant on Christopher Jones for a traffic infraction. 

After Jones was arrested, he was immediately released. Am. Compl. at 5-6. 

September 23, 2004 - Defendant Bevugloz searched plaintiffs’ residence pursuant to a search

warrant, based on suspected identity theft by Jones. The facts presented to the judge to obtain the

warrant were false in representing that the officer had a CD with Jones’ name on it when it did

not. After the family members left the residence, the officers “rammed down their door.” Am.

compl. at 5. Officers took personal belongings of the family members including clothes and

Porter’s underwear, and spread nude photos of Porter on her bed. Jones was then arrested for

identity theft. Id.

December 20, 2005 - Jones was stopped, harassed, searched and falsely cited for not having a

bike light, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Am. Compl. at 8. Although Jones

showed the officer his bike light, the officer gave him the ticket anyway. Four to six officers

arrived on the scene and searched Jones before he was asked for his I.D. One week before trial

on this ticket, Jones received a letter that the case was dismissed because the officer was

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

unavailable for trial.

September 20, 2006 - Defendant Bevugloz misled Judge Shockely to sign a search warrant based

on a fraudulent account application that supposedly had Jones’ name on it. Defendant Burkely

received evidence against Jones, knowing his name was not on the CD or the application falsely

presented by Bevugloz. Am. Compl. at 7.

Plaintiffs further contend that the Superior Court gave Lasonja Porter a hard time

when she requested documents concerning her juvenile son, and refused to give her a complaint

form. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiffs also claim that Christopher Jones Jr.’s right to privacy was violated

when a transcript involving him was released to defendant Sergeant Anderson. Plaintiffs seek

compensatory and punitive damages.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached

exhibits. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public

record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria

Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). “The court

is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

unwarranted deductions of fact. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972). Unless it is clear that no

amendment can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend

the complaint before dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir.2000) (en

banc); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

III. SUPERIOR COURT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Superior Court brings this motion for failure to state a claim and

because the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types

of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th

Cir.1999) (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)); see also

Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the Eleventh

Amendment bars virtually all suits seeking relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” or its

agencies). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1147 (1979). Accordingly, as a

general rule, states (or arms of the state) cannot be sued in federal court for violating § 1983. A

California Superior Court and its employees are an arm of the state. Simmons v. Sacramento

County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156. 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Amendment

likewise, in general, bars suits for damages against state officials in their official capacities,

because such a suit is in effect one against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.

Ct. 3099 (1985). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also is consistent with the general rule that states

or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment

purposes are not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 131

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.

Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989)). 

Notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity, state officials nevertheless may

be sued for federal violations in their individual capacities for both damages and injunctive relief. 

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S. Ct. 358, 365 (1991); Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67,

105 S. Ct. at 3105-06; see also Ellis v. University of Kansas Medical Center, 163 F.3d 1186,

1196 (10th Cir.1998) (“[A] suit for prospective injunctive relief against a state official acting in

her official or individual capacity may still be brought in federal court . . .”); but see Idaho v.

Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997) ( to “interpret Young to

permit a federal court action to proceed in every case where prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his individual capacity, would be to adhere

to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh Amendment immunity

represents a real limitation on a federal court’s federal-question jurisdiction.”). Moreover, in a

case based on an ongoing violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights, a plaintiff may

obtain prospective injunctive relief by naming a state official in his or her official capacity. Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S. Ct. 441, 452 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

665, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357 (1974). 

As a state governmental entity, the Superior Court of California, County of Yolo,

is immune from suit. Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9

th

Cir. 2003). As state officials, its employees are also immune. Plaintiffs have not alleged any

claims against this defendant that comports with any Eleventh Amendment immunity exceptions. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ amended complaint must be dismissed as to the Superior Court without

leave to amend. 

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff Chris Jones, Sr. was not prosecuted following his arrest on this date; therefore 1

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 444, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), does not apply to this incident.

6

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE BY DEFENDANTS HYDE, PIERCE,

ANDERSON, BEVUGLOZ, AND FRANTI

The Hyde defendants move to strike the amended complaint and supporting

documents because the amended complaint was not signed by plaintiffs, and the supporting

documents constitute an unsworn statement of facts outside the complaint. They move to

dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. July 17, 2004 Incident

This incident involved a search of plaintiffs’ home while their children were home

alone. Defendants claim that claims regarding this incident are time barred. 1

For civil rights actions under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, federal courts apply the statute of

limitations of the state in which the claim arises. See Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d

926, 929 (9th Cir. 1987). State law also determines the application of tolling doctrines. See

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989) (relevant state tolling statutes apply to prisoners’

civil rights suits); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1975) (state

tolling provisions apply unless an important federal policy will be undermined by their

application). 

Section 1983 actions are characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of

identifying the applicable statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia. 471 U.S. 261, 268-71, 276

(1985); Bianchi v. Bellingham Police Dep’t., 909 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990). In California,

the applicable statute of limitations is California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, which

provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues. See

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

While normally the burden of proving that the statute of limitations has expired

falls on the defendant, see Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1161 (3d

Cir. 1989), when the statute of limitations defense shows on the face of the complaint, the burden

of alleging facts which would extend the statute falls upon the plaintiff. Conerly v.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir.1980); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose &

Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir.1978). “[I]f the plaintiff . . . pleads facts and the facts

show that he is entitled to no relief, the complaint should be dismissed. There would be no point

in allowing such a lawsuit to go any further; its doom is foretold.” American Nurses’ Ass’n v.

Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir.1986). See Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 12

F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir.1993) (where affirmative defense of statute of limitations follows

inevitably from facts pleaded in complaint, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be proper), cert. denied, 

511 U.S. 1085, 114 S. Ct. 1837, 128 L.Ed.2d 465 (1994); Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557,

558-559 (7th Cir.1994) (plaintiff choosing “to plead particulars, and they show he has no claim,

then he is out of luck – he has pleaded himself out of court.”) 

It appears that plaintiffs’ claims accrued more than two years before they filed the

instant complaint. The alleged wrongdoing occurred on July 17, 2004 and this action was filed

on September 21, 2006. 

Plaintiffs concede they filed a late claim application regarding this incident;

however, they argue that they should be excused from the statute of limitations because when

they requested a copy of the police report, they were informed none was made, and because

defendants never advised them to file a complaint. These reasons are not sufficient to toll the

statute of limitations. 

2. September 23, 2004 Incident 

This incident pertains to a search by Defendant Bevugloz of plaintiffs’ residence

pursuant to a search warrant, based on suspected identity theft by Jones. This search underlies an

ongoing criminal prosecution of plaintiff Jones. 

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Heck was based on the premise that no cause of action has accrued until the conviction 2

has been vacated or expunged. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489, 114 S.Ct. 2373. Until Wallace, Heck was

seen as barring any defendant/prisoner tort claim which might impugn the criminal judgment. 

The conceptual bases of Heck and Wallace seem irreconcilable. Wallace does not answer the

situation where a cause of action might be accruing, but not expired when the entry of final

judgment in a criminal action is entered. If Heck is to be followed, the cause of action which

8

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), an Indiana state

prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for damages. Claiming that state and county

officials violated his constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the

investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial

(“illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter

charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief or release from

custody. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the

complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly held that a cause of action for

damages under § 1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id.

Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages in regard to the September 23, 2004 search

on grounds that the search and seizure were illegal, involve a criminal prosecution that is

currently ongoing. However, Heck did not speak to the situation involving an ongoing criminal

proceeding. The Supreme Court recently addressed such a situation and held that the statute of

limitations commences to run when it would normally commence to run. However, given the 2

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

once commenced running would then be deemed never to have accrued. Even more confusing

would be the situation where a cause of action had expired during the pendency of the criminal

action, but according to Heck would not have even accrued upon entry of final judgment. 

Confusing, to say the least. Perhaps Heck now only applies to suits which sound in malicious

prosecution.

9

pendency of the criminal action, the Supreme Court recommends that the action be stayed “until

the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, ___ U.S. ___,

127 S. Ct. at 1098 (2007). 

The court will not recommend staying the entire action at this time, but will await

further amendment of the complaint as outlined below. After it is determined from the second

amended complaint whether the September 20, 2006 incident, (discussed infra), is related to

Jones’ pending criminal case, the court will be able to make a determination as to what claims

are affected by Wallace v. Kato.

3. December 20, 2005 Incident 

Jones claims he was stopped, harassed, searched and falsely cited for not having a

bike light, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Although Jones claims he did have a

bike light, the officer gave him a citation anyway, which was later dismissed.

This claim is not time barred and it does not appear to be related to pending

criminal proceedings against plaintiff Jones. Based on the facts provided, however, it is not clear

whether the claim can go forward. One of the problems with the amended complaint is that

plaintiffs have set forth no less than 18 claims for relief in regard to the three separate incidents,

two of which are to be dismissed on the instant recommendation. See Am. Compl. at 14-23. It is

unclear which of these 18 theories pertain to the December 20, 2005 bike incident. Therefore, on

amendment, plaintiff Jones must specify the legal theories of recovery which pertain to this

event, and must only allege legal theories which are viable. 

To state a § 1983 claim for relief, plaintiff must identify the specific constitutional

or other federal right allegedly infringed. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S. Ct. 2689,

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 These alleged violations appear more likely related to the search of plaintiff Porter’s

3

bedroom on September 23, 2004, which are implicated by Wallace v. Kato and Heck. To the

extent that a Heck bar does not apply to plaintiff Porter, as there is no criminal prosecution

pending against her, her claims of invasion of privacy as pled do not arise to a constitutional

level.

10

2692 (1979) (“The first inquiry in any section 1983 suit is to isolate the precise constitutional

violation with which [the defendant] is charged”). Section 1983 does not protect rights

established by state statute or state constitution. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700, 96 S. Ct.

1155, 1160 (1976) (holding that: “Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal

rights have been invaded. . . . Congress should not be understood to have attempted 

to make all torts of state officials federal crimes.”). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

332, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986) (noting “the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned federal and

state courts against enlarging the “commodious” contours of section 1983 and the Fourteenth

Amendment so as to displace state tort law. . . . Thus, the mere fact that the allegedly tortious

conduct was performed by a state actor does not support its characterization as a constitutional

wrong.”).

Although many of the legal theories currently pled have no merit, the court will

only review a few of them by way of example. Plaintiffs’ claims for libel, slander or invasion of

privacy “false light,” fail because libel, slander, and false light are state law tort causes of action

which do not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. To the extent that plaintiffs’ claims for

invasion of privacy and holding in a false light stem from the bicycle stop, any asserted violations

are beyond the purview of § 1983, as any injury alleged by plaintiff is not one of constitutional

magnitude. Plaintiffs’ libel and slander claims are clearly barred by the no constitutional 3

defamation holding of Paul v. Davis, supra. In order to escape this proscription, plaintiff Jones

would have to allege that the bicycle stop, search, and citation somehow stigmatized him. 

However, the allegations herein would never measure up to the requirements for stigma. See,

Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 115 (2nd Cir. 1999); Bollow v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1981). Also, plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy-false light claim also fails under

Paul v. Davis because it is the substantial equivalent of defamation. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors

Co., 157 F.3d 686, 694 (9th Cir. 1998).

Another example of an asserted legal theory that will fail is plaintiffs’ allegation

of a right to privacy under the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment states that “[t]he

enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.” This amendment does not independently create a constitutional

right for purposes of stating a claim. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9 Cir. th

1991). “The ninth amendment is not a source of rights as such; it is simply a rule about how to

read the Constitution.” Reno, 98 F.3d at 1125, quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American

Constitutional Law 776 n. 14 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original). 

Defendants argue that the California Tort Claims Act precludes the state law

claims because they were not presented within six months of accrual of the cause of action. The

state law claims for relief set forth in the amended complaint are negligence, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, malicious

prosecution and “malicious institution of adult proceeding,” violation of California constitutional

right to privacy, “common law and statutory failure to protect private information,” defamation, 

due process and equal protection violations under the California constitution, California

constitutional right to be free unreasonable seizures and excessive force, Civil Code § 52.1(b),

and Civil Code § 51.7A. Am. Compl. at 14-20.

Defendants argue that the claims have not been pled within six months of accrual,

pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act. The amended complaint states, 

[t]he next day [after the bicycle stop] Chris Jones and Lasonja

Porter, filed a complaint against all involved parties and went to

the store to get a copy of the surveillance tape. The store manager

informed Chris Jones that a Davis Police officer, named Sergeant

Gina Anderson, came and took it.

Deprived of this evidence, still Chris Jones proceeded to

fight and filed a complaint against the officers and sent a copy to

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

the City manger [sic] office. Chris Jones Sr. received a letter from

Sergeant Gina Anderson which stated his complaint was

unfounded and the officers were not in the wrong.

Am. Compl. at 8:10-18.

“The [California] Tort Claims Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an

injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute’ (Gov.Code, § 815). ( Zelig v. County of Los

Angeles (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1127, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.) The purpose of

the Tort Claims Act is not to expand the grounds for public entity liability, but to restrict those

grounds to ‘“rigidly delineated circumstances.”’ ( Id. at p. 1127, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 45 P.3d

1171.) Under the Tort Claims Act, public employees generally are liable for injuries caused by

their acts or omissions to the same extent as private persons. (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a.)). A

public entity is vicariously liable for an injury proximately caused by an act or omission of its

employee within the scope of employment if the act or omission would give rise to a cause of

action against the employee. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) But a public entity is not

vicariously liable if the employee is immune from liability. ( Id., subds. (a), (b)).” Richards v.

Department of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 139 Cal. App. 4th 304, 317, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782,

790 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2006).

The Act provides in pertinent part that “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for 

... injury to person ... shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915)

not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2(a).

Although it is alleged that a complaint was filed and denied, it is not clear that a

complaint in compliance with the California Tort Claims Act was filed within the statutory

period. Therefore, on amendment, plaintiff Jones shall plead whether he filed a claim that

comports with the California Tort Claims Act, and when it was filed. 

Because plaintiff Porter was not involved in the bike incident, and other claims

she might have had should be dismissed, it is recommended that she be dismissed as a plaintiff. 

On amendment, the only plaintiff permitted should be Christopher Jones, Sr. 

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

On amendment plaintiff Jones must specify which defendants stopped, harassed,

searched, and cited him for lack of a bicycle light. If any of the named defendants were not

involved in this incident, plaintiff must drop them from this action or they will be dismissed.

4. September 20, 2006 Incident

Plaintiff alleges he was informed by his attorney that defendant Bevugloz misled

Judge Shockely to sign a search warrant based on a fraudulent account application that

supposedly had Jones’ name on it. Defendant Burkely received evidence against Jones, knowing

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

his name was not on the CD or the application falsely presented by Bevugloz. Am. Compl. at 7.

This allegation is not time barred, but it is unknown whether it relates to Jones’

pending criminal case. Therefore, on amendment, Jones must state whether these allegations

relate to his underlying criminal prosecution. The second amended complaint must state which

legal theories plaintiff Jones relies upon to support this allegation.

Plaintiff Jones is informed the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to

make an amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the

original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original no longer serves any function in the case. 

Therefore, “a plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not

alleged in the amended complaint,” London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir.1981), and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

At the hearing, plaintiffs asked the court whether they could include claims of

ongoing harassment which are not part of the current action. Because this case was filed over a

year ago, and is still not past the pleading stage, the court will not permit further amendment to

include later incidents. 

B. Motion to Strike

Because defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, defendants’ motion to strike is

denied as unnecessary. Plaintiff Jones is informed, however, that his second amended complaint

must be signed. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all pleadings shall

be signed either by an attorney, or, if the party is proceeding in propria persona, by the party. The

Rule further provides that signature by the attorney or party constitutes certification by the signer

that the document is grounded in fact and brought in good faith. 

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Christopher Jones, Jr. was eliminated from the amended complaint because the court

4

previously informed plaintiffs that minors had to retain their own counsel.

15

The second amended complaint must allege civil rights violations against Lasonja

Porter and Christopher Jones, Sr. only, and may not allege such violations against Christopher

Jones, Jr. Further, the second amended complaint may not contain exhibits as the second 4

amended complaint must be complete in and of itself. E.D. Local Rule 15-220. This is because,

as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the

original no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, “a plaintiff waives all causes of

action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint,”

London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.1981), and defendants not named in

an amended complaint are no longer defendants. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262.

Lasonja Porter is the only plaintiff who completed an in forma pauperis

application in this case. Plaintiff Jones has not filed an application to proceed without

prepayment of fees, and has not paid the fee ordinarily required to file an action in this court. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). Plaintiff Jones will be provided the opportunity to submit either

the appropriate affidavit in support of a request to proceed in forma pauperis or the appropriate

filing fee.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff Jones shall submit, within twenty days from the date of this order,

either a completed application and affidavit in support of his request to proceed in forma

pauperis on the form provided by the Clerk of Court, or the appropriate filing fee; plaintiff Jones'

failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed as

to this plaintiff; and

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff Jones an Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Superior Court’s motion to dismiss, filed June 21, 2007, be granted,

and this defendant dismissed.

2. Motion to dismiss and to strike by defendants Hyde, Pierce, Anderson,

Bevugloz, and Franti, filed July 13, 2007, be granted in part.

3. The Hyde defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff Porter be granted.

4. The amended complaint be dismissed, and plaintiff Jones only be granted leave

to file a second amended complaint in accordance with the findings and recommendations herein.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiffs may file

written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiffs are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 12/14/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS,

GGH:076 - Porter2099.mtd.wpd UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-02099-MCE -GGH Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 16 of 16