Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02186/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02186-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 10cv02186 BEN(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED ARRENDELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

WARDEN DOMINGO URIBE, JR.,

OFFICER DIN, OFFICER PEREZ, and

DOES 1-10,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 10cv02186 BEN (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, D. URIBE, A.

DIN, AND S. PEREZ’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [ECF NO. 3]

Plaintiff Alfred Arrendell filed a Complaint on October 20,

2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. The events giving

rise to this suit occurred while Arrendell was incarcerated at

Centinela State Prison (“Centinela”), located in Imperial County,

California. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff contends that the

Defendants, prison officials, violated his Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as his rights protected by the

California Constitution when Defendants allowed three unauthorized

inmates to enter Plaintiff’s assigned prison yard. (Id. at 1, 6.)

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Arrendell alleges these prisoners engaged in an altercation among

themselves and that the Defendants’ response was excessive. (Id.

at 7-9.) In an attempt to break up the altercation, several

correctional officers discharged smoke bombs. (Id. at 7.) The

fight among three inmates continued, and Defendant Din “instructed

officers in the tower to shoot at the inmates.” (Id.) The

Plaintiff maintains that he suffered an assault, battery, severe

injury, and delayed medical treatment after being shot in the eye. 

(Id. at 5.)

On February 23, 2011, Defendants State of California,

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, D. Uribe,

A. Din, and S. Perez’s Motion to Dismiss was filed, along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 3]. Defendants State

of California and California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) argue that they are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-3, ECF

No. 3.) Defendant Uribe alleges he is immune from a lawsuit

seeking damages against him in his official capacity. (Id. at 3.) 

Finally, all Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the

allegations are impermissibly duplicative of Arrendell’s Eighth

Amendment claim. (Id. at 4-5.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was

filed on March 11, 2011 [ECF No. 5]. There, Arrendell agrees that

Defendants State of California and CDCR should be dismissed from

the lawsuit and that his Fourth Amendment claims against all

Defendants should be dismissed as duplicative of his Eighth

Amendment claim. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff disputes,

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however, that Defendant Uribe is immune from damages and that

Arrendell fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(Id. at 2-3.) 

Defendants’ Reply Points and Authorities in Support of Motion

to Dismiss was filed on March 21, 2011 [ECF No. 6]. In light of

Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the reference in his Complaint to

the Fourteenth Amendment is not to attempt to allege distinct

claims, Defendants withdraw their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claims, but they maintain that Warden Uribe is

immune from damages because the Complaint names him in his official

capacity. (Reply 2-4, ECF No. 6.) 

The Court has reviewed the Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss and Attachment, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants’ Reply Points and Authorities. 

For the reasons stated below, the district court should GRANT in

part and DENY in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Arrendell asserts that on February 9, 2010,

while housed in yard one of C yard, building one, he was injured

during the prison officials’ response to an inmate altercation. 

(Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that three inmates,

Martinez, Bivens, and Rios, were improperly allowed to enter his

prison yard from yard two. (Id. at 6.) Arrendell contends that

Centinela separates the prison population into different yards

based on a list of nonexhaustive factors, such as “administrative

findings, prison population, known gang affiliation, gravity of

sentenced offense, inmate demographics, and concerns for safety.” 

(Id. at 5.) According to the Plaintiff, C yard is divided into

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yards one and two by barbed wire fencing, and Centinela officials

do not permit inmates to pass between the prison yards. (Id. at

6.) Inmate Bivens was housed in C yard, building two, and inmates

Rios and Martinez were housed in C yard, building five. (Id. at 5-

6.) 

The Plaintiff alleges that all inmates are required to pass

through security, including metal detectors, prior to entering and

exiting the yard. (Id. at 6.) Inmates Bivens, Rios, and Martinez,

however, were able to carry inmate-manufactured weapons into yard

one from yard two. (Id. at 6.) Arrendell states that upon

entering yard one, these three inmates began to fight among

themselves. (Id. at 7.) At the time the altercation broke out,

Plaintiff argues that he was located between fifty to one hundred

feet away from the fighting. (Id. at 7.) 

Correctional officers intervened after several minutes by

deploying five or six smoke bombs. (Id.) According to Plaintiff,

the smoke bombs failed to stop the altercation, and numerous

correctional officers attempted to use batons to subdue the

fighting. (Id.) Defendant Din, however, ordered the officers to

refrain from using their batons and instructed the officers located

in the tower to shoot at the prisoners. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff

alleges that an alarm was sounded, and a command was given for the

inmates to get down. (Id.) During the brawl, Defendant Officer

Perez was positioned in the main tower approximately thirty feet

from the fighting inmates. (Id. at 8.) Arrendell obeyed the order

to get down and huddled alongside other inmates underneath a picnic

table approximately fifty to eighty feet from the altercation and

100 to 120 feet from the tower. (Id.) 

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The Plaintiff contends that Defendant Perez initially fired

four to five rounds from her wooden block gun, one of which struck

the fighting prisoners. (Id.) Officer Perez then switched to a

miniature rifle and discharged approximately three rounds at the

crowd of prisoners huddled under the picnic tables. (Id.) 

Arrendell submits that although he was an innocent bystander, Perez

chose to shoot in the direction of the innocent inmates instead of

toward the fighting prisoners. (Id. at 8-9.) One of these rounds

struck Arrendell in his eye, leaving him permanently blind in his

left eye. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Despite his persistent requests for assistance, Plaintiff

claims that prison officials failed to come to his aid until

“several moments” later. (Id. at 9.) Arrendell believes he was

ultimately transported to a medical facility by ambulance because

the Centinela-issued helicopter was “inoperable.” (Id.) Plaintiff

insists this slower mode of transportation unnecessarily delayed

his medical care, which resulted in permanent blindness in the

injured eye. (Id. at 9-10.)

In count one, Arrendell argues that Correctional Officer Din

and Correctional Officer Perez violated Plaintiff’s Eighth and 

Fourth Amendment rights when they subjected Plaintiff to cruel and

unusual punishment and the excessive use of force. (Id. at 12.) 

Specifically, Arrendell maintains that the officers assaulted,

battered, and summarily punished Plaintiff when responding to the

inmate altercation that caused Plaintiff to be shot in the eye. 

(Id. at 12-15.) Arrendell further contends that Defendants State

of California and Warden Uribe ratified and condoned the officers’

conduct. (Id. at 14.)

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Plaintiff claims in count two that all of the Defendants

violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

failing to prevent harm to Arrendell by acting with deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and by denying

Arrendell due process. (Id. at 15.) Arrendell submits that

Defendants used force in a manner inconsistent with established

Centinela and CDCR guidelines. (Id. at 16-17.) Also, he argues

that the Defendants breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff when

they allowed inmates Martinez, Rios, and Bivens to enter yard one. 

(Id. at 17.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants’ failure to

maintain the security and “proper segregation of inmates” caused

his injuries. (Id.)

Next, in count three, Plaintiff asserts Defendants Din and

Perez violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to

prevent further harm to him and acted with deliberate indifference

to his medical needs. (Id. at 19.) Arrendell contends that he was

not engaged in any conduct that would warrant a delayed medical

response, but the officers failed to immediately procure medical

aid for him after he was shot. (Id. at 20-21.) 

Counts four and five are alleged against Defendant State of

California for “Unconstitutional Customs, Practices and Policies,”

as well as for supervisory liability. (Id. at 22, 26.) In count

four, Arrendell asserts that Defendant engaged in a broad policy of

discrimination against African-American inmates and failed to

enforce CDCR and Centinela guidelines for civil rights infractions. 

(See id. at 23.) Plaintiff bases his fifth cause of action for

supervisory liability on the State’s failure to adequately train,

supervise, discipline, or control the prison guards who responded

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1 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is also labeled his

sixth cause of action, which the Court construes as a typographical

error. (See id. at 33.) The Court will cite to Arrendell’s

supervisory liability allegation against “Defendant Does 6-10" as

constituting his seventh cause of action. (See id.)

7 10cv02186 BEN(RBB)

to the inmate altercation. (See id. at 26-29.) Arrendell

maintains that the State should be held liable for condoning the

correctional officers’ conduct through its deficient oversight of

Perez, Din, and Uribe, which resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. 

(Id. at 29.)

In count six, Arrendell pleads a claim for supervisory

liability against Warden Uribe for the correctional officers’

actions. (Id. at 29-30.) Warden Uribe breached a duty to train,

supervise, discipline, and control the Defendants. (Id. at 31.) 

Plaintiff states that Uribe, was “chief policy maker” at Centinela

and could have taken preventative action. (Id.) Arrendell

maintains that the warden had knowledge of the correctional

officers’ unconstitutional conduct but failed to take any

corrective action. (Id. at 31-32.) Defendant Uribe knew that his

subordinate officers engaged in the practice of unlawfully when

targeting minority inmates, which Arrendell claims produced an

“atmosphere of lawlessness” at Centinela and led to Defendants’

inadequate security measures, excessive use of force, and

indifference toward institution guidelines. (Id. at 30, 32.) 

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action advances similar supervisory

liability allegations against some of the Doe defendants. (Id. at

33-37.)1

Plaintiff’s remaining claims concern supplemental causes of

action arising under the California Constitution alleging that

Defendants violated the Bane Act, and they are liable for battery,

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negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 37, 40, 42, 44.) 

Arrendell recites his earlier factual and legal allegations in the

state civil rights context. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

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 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

“is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

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Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Fourteenth Amendment

All Defendants move to dismiss the second, fifth, and sixth

causes of action alleging they denied Plaintiff due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4,

ECF No. 3.) Defendants argue that Arrendell’s substantive due

process claim is duplicative of his Eighth Amendment claim and must

be dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff states in his Opposition, however,

that he only includes a Fourteenth Amendment challenge in order to

apply “the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment” to the State of California. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5.) To

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this extent, Defendants indicate that they withdraw their Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Reply

2, ECF No. 6.) 

Generally, a plaintiff may not advance a substantive due

process claim if “a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection’” against government

misconduct. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)

(Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395, (1989)). Courts may limit the inquiry to the

amendment that more specifically addresses a plaintiff’s claim in

lieu of general notions of substantive due process. See id., at

286 (Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (refraining from evaluating

petitioner’s due process claim under § 1983 because his allegations

could be addressed under the state’s malicious prosecution law);

Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (“Any protection that ‘substantive due

process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we

have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth

Amendment.”) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).

Here, for the Defendants’ same conduct, Arrendell alleges

violations of the Eighth Amendment in addition to his claim for

denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the

Eighth Amendment provides an explicit source of protection from the

type of conduct Plaintiff alleges, these claims are preempted by

the Eighth Amendment and should not be analyzed as a substantive

due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolff v.

Hood, 242 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (D. Or. 2002) (finding that

plaintiff could not state a substantive due process claim for

prison officials’ failure to protect him from violence by other

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inmates because the Eighth Amendment provides explicit

constitutional protection). 

The parties agree that the Court should construe Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment challenges only to the extent that they seek

to apply the Eighth Amendment to the State. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5;

Reply 2, ECF No. 6.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s second, fifth, and sixth causes of action under the

Fourteenth Amendment should be DENIED.

B. Fourth Amendment

All Defendants move to dismiss Arrendell’s Fourth Amendment

claims alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference in

counts one, two, four, five, and six. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 4-5, ECF No. 3.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff

concedes that “all Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and

deliberate indifference should be dismissed as duplicative” of his

Eighth Amendment challenge. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5.) 

A plaintiff must base a claim for relief on a specific

amendment if a certain amendment “provides an explicit textual

source of constitutional protection.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 

“[A] convicted prisoner is protected from excessive force by the

Eighth Amendment and a citizen being arrested or investigated is

protected from excessive force by the Fourth Amendment.” P.B. v.

Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 394); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Arrendell was a convicted prisoner at the time of the

Defendants’ alleged excessive force and deliberate indifference. 

(Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Both parties agree that the Eighth

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Amendment is the only proper avenue for redress of these claims. 

(Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5; Reply 2, ECF No. 6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and deliberate

difference in counts one, two, four, five, and six should be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1. Defendants State of California and CDCR

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Seven Up Pete Venture v.

Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008); Henry v. County of

Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d

1372 (9th Cir. 1998). A state has immunity from “suits brought in

federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of

another State.” Pittman v. Oregon, 509 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974)). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to agencies and

departments of the state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“In the absence of consent a

suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is

named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”);

Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). 

This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under § 1983;

thus, an inmate cannot recover damages from the state unless the

state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th

Cir. 1994).

Here, Defendants State of California and CDCR assert all of

Arrendell’s claims against them are barred by the Eleventh

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Amendment. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem P. & A. 2, ECF No. 3.) 

These Defendants note that CDCR is a branch of the State of

California, and both Defendants are absolutely immune from

liability. (Id. at 2-3.) Arrendell concedes that these Defendants

should be dismissed from this lawsuit. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 5.) 

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant State of California in counts two, four, five, ten, and

eleven, and his claims against Defendant CDCR in counts two, ten,

and eleven should be GRANTED with prejudice.

2. Defendant Uribe

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in federal court in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S.

at 71 (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit

against the official’s office.”); Seven Up Pete Venture, 523 F.3d

at 952-53. A state official sued in his official capacity is not a

“person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. 

But, a state officer is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity, when the officer is sued in his individual capacity only. 

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999); see Smith v. Kitzhaber, No. CV-00-326-

ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6998, at *6-7 (D. Or. Mar. 20, 2000);

AIDS Healthcare Found. V. Belshe, No. CV97-3235LBG(MCx), 1998 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 21367, at *31 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1998). “[S]tate

officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’

within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar

such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal

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liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature of

their acts.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. 

The parties dispute whether the Eleventh Amendment bars

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for damages against Warden Uribe. 

In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Uribe asserts that because he

is sued in his official capacity as warden of Centinela, he is

immune from damages under the Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 3.) Warden Uribe cites to

allegations in the Complaint to contend that Arrendell is suing him

in his official capacity as warden. (Id.) The Defendant relies on

the fact that Plaintiff describes Uribe as “at all relevant times”

being the “Warden and “chief policy maker” of Centinela. (Id.) The

warden submits that Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant became

aware of the alleged unconstitutional conduct through “his

supervisory position” further evidences that he is sued in his

official capacity. (Id.) Because the Complaint seeks only damages

against him and no injunctive relief, Uribe asserts he should be

dismissed from the lawsuit. (Id.) 

In response, Plaintiff insists that his Complaint properly

alleges claims against Defendant Uribe in his individual capacity. 

(Opp’n 2-3, ECF No. 5.) Arrendell attempts to clarify his position

by maintaining that his sixth cause of action implicates Uribe’s

deliberate indifference toward constitutionally deficient

practices. (Id.) He cites Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.

1989), and York v. San Pablo, 626 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985), to

argue that a claim for supervisory liability is cognizable under §

1983. (Opp’n 2, ECF No. 5.) Although Plaintiff generally states

that Defendant is not immune from damages, he only explicitly

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opposes Uribe’s Motion to Dismiss as it applies to count six. (Id.

at 2-3); see also S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1 (f)(3)(c) (stating that the

failure to oppose a motion may constitute consent to it). 

In the Reply, Defendant stresses that the Court need only look

to the capacity of the actor being sued rather than the actions

complained of, and suggests that pleading a claim for supervisory

liability does not equate to suing Warden Uribe in his individual

capacity. (Reply 3, ECF No. 6.) Uribe concedes the Complaint

“does not state whether Warden Uribe is sued in his individual or

official capacity.” (Id.) He reiterates, however, that Arrendell

alleges Uribe was “at all relevant times herein the Warden of CSP,

. . . possessed the power and authority and [was] charged by law

with the responsibility to enact policies and to prescribe

practices concerning the operation of CSP.” (Reply 3, ECF No. 6.) 

This, he contends, describes Uribe as an “agent of the state” and

demonstrates Plaintiff’s Complaint sues him in his official

capacity. (Reply 3-4, ECF No. 6.) Thus, Arrendell’s allegations

against Warden Uribe may survive this Motion to Dismiss only if the

Complaint names Uribe in his individual capacity. (See id. at 3.) 

Courts have made clear that the distinction between an

individual and official capacity suit is not “a mere pleading

device.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. To determine whether the

plaintiff’s complaint sues the defendant in his individual or

official capacity, the court must examine the “capacity in which

the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer

inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26 (emphasis

added); Romano, 169 F.3d at 1185; Ashker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,

112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). State officers are not entitled

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to immunity simply because a plaintiff alleges they injured him

while acting in their official capacities as employees of the

state. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26-27. 

a. The Face of the Complaint

When the Complaint fails to specify the capacity of an

official actor being sued, the court looks beyond the caption to

the “basis of the claims asserted and the nature of the relief

sought.” Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Central Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158,

1161 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish &

Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994). Although “[i]t is

obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first

instance to avoid any ambiguity,” courts in the Ninth Circuit

presume that plaintiffs bring damage actions against named state

officials in their individual capacities. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 24

n.*; Romano, 169 F.3d at 1186; Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at

1284. “Any other construction would be illogical . . . , since a

claim for damages against state officials in their official

capacities is plainly barred.” Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at

1284; see also Price, 928 F.2d at 828 (finding plaintiff stated a

claim against defendants in their individual capacities because he

sought monetary damages under § 1983).

Even if a plaintiff seeks damages, the presumption in favor of

an individual capacity suit will not apply if there is a

discrepancy between the caption and the body of the complaint that

could deceive the defendants in preparing their defense. 

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1285 (“[W]here the plaintiff

fails to specify in the body of the complaint the capacity in which

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suit is brought against the defendants, we hold that what is, and

is not, expressly stated in the caption controls.”). 

Here, when read together, the caption and the body of

Arrendell’s Complaint are ambiguous as to the capacity in which

Defendant Uribe is sued. But despite the lack of clarity, the

Complaint should benefit from the presumption that Plaintiff is

suing Warden Uribe in his individual capacity. See Romano, 169

F.3d at 1186; Shonshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1284. The

caption does not specifically state the capacity in which any

Defendant is sued. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) In the body of the

Complaint, however, Arrendell expressly sues the Doe defendants

“individually and in his/her official capacity,” but omits this

detail with respect to any of the named Defendants. (Id. at 1, 3-

4, 29.) Plaintiff’s claim, which centers on the “atmosphere of

lawlessness” created by Warden Uribe’s policies, attacks Uribe’s

execution of his official duties. (Id. at 3, 30.) Notably,

however, Arrendell articulates in count six that Defendant Uribe

“is personally liable for damages.” (Id. at 33.) To construe the

Complaint as Defendant Uribe urges this Court to do would ignore

the basis for Arrendell’s asserted claim and relief requested. See

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (recognizing the distinction between an

individual and official capacity suit is not merely a pleading

device). Also, the presumption in favor of individual capacity

applies when the caption is not misleading and specifically lists

the official as a named defendant. Romano, 169 F.3d at 1186;

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1284-85.

//

//

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b. Claims Asserted and Relief Requested

The substantive allegations Arrendell makes against Warden

Uribe further indicate Uribe is sued in his individual capacity. 

Courts consider the “basis of the claims asserted and the nature of

the relief sought” when determining capacity. Price, 928 F.2d at

828. Arrendell seeks damages from each Defendant, which suggests a

personal capacity suit. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at

1284; Price, 928 F.2d at 828; (Compl. 46, ECF No. 1.) The thrust

of Defendant’s argument is that because Arrendell repeatedly

describes Uribe as the warden of Centinela, Uribe is sued in his

official capacity only. (Reply 3, ECF No. 6.) As Plaintiff fails

to specify Uribe’s capacity and describes him as occupying an

official post, the Defendant asserts that he is impermissibly sued

in his official capacity. (Id.)

Defendant Uribe’s argument that Eleventh Amendment immunity

bars a supervisory liability claim is unpersuasive. Section 1983

of the Civil Rights Act does not authorize a plaintiff to bring a

cause of action based on respondeat superior liability. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“[T]he fact that

Congress did specifically provide that A’s tort became B’s

liability if B ‘caused’ A to subject another to a tort suggests

that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such

causation was absent.”); see also Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072,

1081 (9th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, state officials are subject to

suit in their personal capacity if “they play an affirmative part

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987). Consequently, a cause

of action for supervisory liability requires a plaintiff to allege

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“a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation,” or that “the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182

(9th Cir. 2007); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989). 

Stating a supervisory liability claim under § 1983 will

typically involve alleging conduct by the defendant pursuant to his

authority as an official. See Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1182;

see, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“Supervisory liability exists . . . if supervisory

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself

is a repudiation of constitutional rights.’”). But it does not

follow that a suit against an individual as a supervisor is

necessarily indicative of an official capacity suit. See Starr v.

Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that a

supervisor may be found liable in his individual capacity); Romano,

169 F.3d at 1186 (“We also have presumed that officials necessarily

are sued in their personal capacities where those officials are

named in a complaint.”); Redman, 942 F.2d at 1447 (“[Supervisory]

liability is not a form of vicarious liability. Rather, it is

direct liability.”). An official’s personal involvement in the

alleged constitutional deprivation is the touchstone of individual

liability under § 1983. See Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1182;

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Arrendell’s sixth cause of action alleges that Uribe had

knowledge of his subordinate officers’ unconstitutional conduct and

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that he failed to act in the face of this knowledge. (Compl. 31-

32, ECF No. 1.) Because Plaintiff seeks damages and claims that

Uribe was personally involved in the violation of Arrendell’s 

constitutional rights, Plaintiff alleges supervisory liability

against Warden Uribe in his personal capacity. The Defendant has

not questioned the legal or factual basis of the Plaintiff’s claim

for supervisory liability; consequently, the Court only addresses

the arguments raised by the Defendant. The district court should

DENY Defendant Uribe’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of

action against him for damages. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s second, fifth, and

sixth causes of action under the Fourteenth Amendment should be

DENIED. Plaintiff may only assert these allegations to apply the

Eighth Amendment to the State of California. Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference

alleged in counts one, two, four, five, and six should be DISMISSED

with prejudice because they are subsumed by the Eighth Amendment.

Defendants State of California and CDCR are immune from suit under

the Eleventh Amendment. For this reason, the Motion to Dismiss the

State of California in counts two, four, five, nine, ten, and

eleven should be GRANTED with prejudice. Likewise, the Motion to

Dismiss Defendant CDCR in counts two, ten, and eleven should be

GRANTED with prejudice. Finally, Defendant Warden Uribe’s Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s monetary claims against him in count six

should be DENIED. All other claims for monetary damages against

Uribe, however, should be DISMISSED.

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2 The federal rules of civil procedure do not provide for the

use of fictitious defendants. Graziose v. American Home Products

Corp., 202 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Nev. 2001). If Arrendell learns of

the participation of other individuals and their identities, he may

move to amend the Complaint. Id.

22 10cv02186 BEN(RBB)

Finally, the district court should also dismiss the Doe

defendants from the Complaint.2 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 18, 2011. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before July 29, 2011. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: June 28, 2011

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Benitez

All Parties of Record 

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