Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15779/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIFENG WANG, AKA Alice Wang,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

LEON RODRIGUEZ, Director of U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration

Services; ROBIN BARRETT,

Director of the San Francisco Field

Office, U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 14-15779

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-06367-LB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Laurel D. Beeler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 12, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed July 27, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and William A. Fletcher,

Circuit Judges and Stanley Allen Bastian,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

* The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by

designation.

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2 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel reversed and remanded the district court’s

summary judgment for the government in Lifeng Wang’s

petition seeking de novo review of the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Service’s denial of

naturalization based on Wang’s conviction for trafficking in

counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).

The panel held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320

does not necessarily involve fraud or deceit because a

defendant can be convicted of trafficking in counterfeit goods

for conduct that is merely likely to cause “mistake” or

“confusion.” The panel held that therefore Wang’s

conviction could not form the basis for a finding that she

was convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).

COUNSEL

Frank M. Tse (argued), Law Office of Frank M. Tse, San

Francisco, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Sarah L. Vuong (argued), Trial Attorney; Colin A. Kisor,

Deputy Director; Civil Division, Office of Immigration

Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for Respondents-Appellees.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 3

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

LifengWang, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted

of one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). Based on that conviction, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied her

application for naturalization, concluding that Wang had been

convicted of an offense “involv[ing] fraud or deceit” with a

loss to the victim of over $10,000, an aggravated felony under

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). On de novo review, the district

court agreed and concluded that Wang was therefore

ineligible to become a naturalized citizen.

We hold that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 does

not necessarily involve fraud or deceit because a defendant

can be convicted of trafficking in counterfeit goods for

conduct that is merely likely to cause “mistake” or

“confusion.” Wang’s conviction was therefore not an

aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). We

reverse and remand to the district court for further

proceedings.

I. Background and Procedural History

Lifeng Wang has been a lawful permanent resident of the

United States since February 28, 2001. On September 26,

2005, she pled guilty in federal court to trafficking in

counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). The

charges arose from Wang’s operation between 1999 and 2002

of two software distribution companies that purchased and

sold software programs with counterfeit marks of Microsoft

Corporation (“Microsoft”) and other companies. Pursuant to

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4 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

a plea agreement, Wang was convicted and sentenced to two

months imprisonment followed by three years supervised

release, and was subject to eight special conditions of release. 

She and her co-defendants were ordered to pay restitution of

$93,611 to Microsoft. On July 9, 2007, the court found Wang

to be in violation of four conditions of her supervised release. 

She was sentenced to four months incarceration, followed by

a further period of supervised release, which concluded on

February 27, 2009.

In October 2010, Wang filed an application for

naturalization with USCIS. USCIS denied her application on

the ground that her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 was an

aggravated felony—specifically, a crime involving fraud in

which loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). USCIS found that Wang therefore

could not establish good moral character and was

permanently ineligible for naturalization. USCIS also noted

that Wang’s conviction and probation violation showed a

disregard for the laws of the United States. Wang requested

reconsideration and USCIS issued a decision reaffirming its

denial.

Wang filed a timely petition in federal district court

requesting de novo review of the USCIS decision. See

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Both Wang and the government moved

for summary judgment on the question whether her 2005

conviction was for an aggravated felony and whether that

conviction would therefore permanently bar naturalization. 

The district court granted USCIS’s motion and denied

Wang’s. The court held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2320(a) necessarily involves fraud or deceit. The district

court also found that the plea agreement established that loss

to the victim exceeded $10,000, and concluded that Wang

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 5

had been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined by

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Wang timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Univ. Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d

1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). We “review de novo the district

court’s conclusions of law,” United States v. Hovsepian,

359 F.3d 1144, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004), including whether a

particular offense constitutes an aggravated felony. See

Estrada-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir.

2007).

III. Discussion

A. Statutory Framework

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) sets forth

several eligibility requirements for naturalization. An

individual wishing to become a naturalized citizen bears the

burden of showing, among other things, that during the

relevant statutorily-defined period she “has been and still is

a person of good moral character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). 

Although the INA does not define “good moral character,” it

does list individuals who shall not be regarded as having good

moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). As amended by the

Immigration Act of 1990, that list includes “one who at any

time has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined

in [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)]).” Id. § 1101(f)(8). Accordingly,

an individual convicted of an aggravated felony after

November 29, 1990 is ineligible for naturalization. See

Alcozy v. USCIS, 704 F.3d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 2012).

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6 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

The definition of “aggravated felony” includes an offense

that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim

or victims exceeds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)

(“subsection (M)(i)”). To determine whether a particular

offense necessarily involves fraud or deceit, we “employ a

categorical approach by looking to the statute defining the

crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts

underlying the crime.” Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.

1166, 1172 (2012). Under the categorical approach, we

“presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than

the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether

even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal

offense.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684

(2013). In other words, an individual has been convicted of

an aggravated felony under subsection (M)(i) only if the

elements of the offense for which she was convicted

“necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.” 

Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172. We use a “circumstancespecific” approach to assess whether the loss to the victim

exceeded $10,000. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39

(2009).

Wang was convicted of one count of trafficking in

counterfeit goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). At the time of

her offense, § 2320(a) provided that a person could be guilty

of that offense by “intentionally traffic[king] or attempt[ing]

to traffic in goods or services and knowingly us[ing] a

counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or

services.” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2000). (The statute has since

been amended several times, but the elements and relevant

language remain the same.) The term “counterfeit mark” was

defined, in relevant part, as:

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 7

(A) a spurious mark —

(i) that is used in connection with

trafficking in goods or services;

(ii) that is identical with, or substantially

indistinguishable from, a mark registered

for those goods or services on the

principal register in the United States

Patent and Trademark Office and in use,

whether or not the defendant knew such

mark was so registered; and

(iii) the use of which is likely to cause

confusion, to cause mistake, or to

deceive[.]

18 U.S.C. § 2320(e) (2000). The elements of the offense are

that the defendant: (1) trafficked in goods or services;

(2) intentionally; (3) used a “counterfeit mark” on or in

connection with these goods or services; and (4) knew the

mark was counterfeit. See United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d

1247, 1249 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Sultan,

115 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1997)); accord United States v.

Hamamoto, 232 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished

disposition).

B. Mistake and Confusion

The plain language of § 2320 makes clear that a crime

under the statute is not limited to conduct involving fraud or

deceit. Rather, to qualify as a “counterfeit mark,” a

defendant’s use of the mark must be “likely to cause

confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 18 U.S.C.

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8 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

§ 2320(e) (emphasis added). Used together in a disjunctive

list, the terms “confusion,” “mistake,” and “deceive” each

must be read to have a distinct meaning. See Gustafson v.

Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will

avoid a reading [of a statute] which renders some words

altogether redundant.”). Some defendants will be guilty

under § 2320(a) because they used counterfeit marks to

“deceive,” for example, by cheating buyers who believed they

were purchasing the item for which the mark was registered. 

See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172 (defining “deceit” in

subsection (M)(i) as “the act or process of deceiving (as by

falsification, concealment, or cheating)”). But the inclusion

of the terms “mistake” and “confusion” indicates that at least

some defendants may be guilty for conduct that would not

constitute “deceit.”

The legislative history of the statute supports this

conclusion. Section 2320 was enacted as part of the

Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 (“TCA”), and added

criminal penalties for acts of trademark counterfeiting that

had previously only been subject to civil liability. See Pub.

L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 1837, 2178. As the Eleventh

Circuit has explained, early versions of the TCA made a

defendant criminally liable only if she used the counterfeit

mark with the intent to defraud or deceive. See United States

v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987)

(citing S. 875, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 22, 1983) and H.R.

2447, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 7, 1983)). However,

Congress specifically omitted this language from the final

enacted bill. Id.; see also United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d

130, 132 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding no clear error in jury

instruction that the prosecution “is not required to prove that

the defendant ever had an intent to deceive or defraud

anyone”). By eliminating the heightened mens rea

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 9

requirement, Congress made clear that neither fraud nor

deceit is a necessary element of § 2320. Rather, a defendant

need only have had knowledge that the use of a particular

mark was likely to cause mistake or confusion.

Further, the mistake or confusion need not be on the part

of the buyer of the counterfeit goods. Courts have long held

that the confusion requirement in § 2320 is satisfied by “postsale confusion.” Under this doctrine, a seller of imitation

items has violated trademark law if disinterested members of

the general public would be confused were they to encounter

the goods after sale. A seller can be convicted even though

the direct buyer knows the goods are knock-offs. For

example, in Torkington, the defendant sold replica Rolex

watches at a flea market for $27. Although the low price

made it clear to buyers that the watches were not actually

made by Rolex, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the indictment,

concluding that non-purchasers would likely be confused

“should they encounter the allegedly counterfeit goods in a

post-sale context.” Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1352; see also

United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]

casual observer viewing a counterfeit watch, on the wrist of

a friend, for instance, could easily be confused.”). Other

courts have approved convictions under § 2320 even when

the seller explicitly informed the buyer that the item was a

knock-off. See United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1243

(10th Cir. 2005) (upholding conviction of seller who

advertised goods as “reproductions of brand-name products”);

United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987)

(upholding a conviction where the defendant “told the

undercover agent that the watches were copies”). The same

rationale applies to post-sale mistake.

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10 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

In many post-sale confusion and mistake cases, the

defendant will not have deceived or defrauded anyone at all. 

For example, imagine a vendor selling imitation Gucci

handbags on a street corner. The vendor attaches a tag to

each handbag stating “not a real Gucci.” The vendor may be

convicted under § 2320 on the ground that a hypothetical

third party, even one who never intends to purchase the real

item, could be confused or mistaken when seeing the handbag

on a buyer’s arm weeks after the sale. See Yamin, 868 F.2d

at 132. As this example demonstrates, the seller need not

conceal the truth, and the third-party observer need not act on

any mistaken belief, in order for there to be a valid conviction

under § 2320. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed. 2004)

(defining “fraud” as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the

truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to

act to his or her detriment”). Indeed, the third party need not

even actually be confused or mistaken. See Yamin, 868 F.2d

at 133 (rejecting defendant’s argument that there must be

“actual confusion” and finding the evidence sufficient for a

jury to determine that imitation goods, once sold, “had the

potential to deceive or to cause confusion or mistake”

(emphasis added)). In short, because a defendant may violate

§ 2320 without engaging in fraudulent or deceitful conduct,

a conviction under the statute cannot categorically qualify as

an aggravated felony under subsection (M)(i). See

Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172.

C. Tall v. Mukasey

Our conclusion is not foreclosed by our prior opinion in

Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2008). In Tall, the

panel considered whether California’s criminal trademark

counterfeiting statute, Cal. Penal Code § 350, was a crime

involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Id. at 1117. The

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 11

California statute prohibited “willfully manufactur[ing],

intentionally sell[ing], or knowingly possess[ing] for sale any

counterfeit of a mark,” and defined counterfeit mark as “a

spurious mark that is identical with, or confusingly similar to,

a registered mark and is used on or in connection with the

same type of goods or services for which the genuine mark is

registered.” Id. at 1119 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 350(a),

(e)(2)). The panel held that the California statute was a

CIMT because it was an “inherently fraudulent crime,” which

we had previously defined as a crime “involv[ing] knowingly

false representations made in order to gain something of

value.” Id. at 1119–20 (citing Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales,

503 F.3d 1063, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J.,

concurring for a majority)). We wrote that a violator of Cal.

Penal Code § 350 “necessarily defrauds the owner of the

mark, or an innocent purchaser of the counterfeit items, or

both.” Id. at 1020.

The government concedes that Tall does not control this

case. The wording of the state statute at issue in Tall is

different from the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2320. Further, the

question in Tall was whether a conviction under the state

statute was a CIMT, not whether it was an aggravated felony. 

The government nonetheless argues that Tall’s reasoning is

“instructive.” But the differences just noted make the

reasoning in Tall inapposite. Tall stated that a person

convicted under the California trademark counterfeiting

statute has necessarily “defraud[ed]” the owner of the mark. 

Tall, 517 F.3d at 1119. But “fraud,” as used in subsection

(M)(i), is an act in which a victim has “voluntarily

surrendered his property because of an intentional perversion

of truth, or otherwise acted upon a false representation to his

injury.” Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Black’s Law

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12 WANG V. RODRIGUEZ

Dictionary 788 (4th ed. 1951)); see also id. (“[F]raud occurs

with consent that has been unlawfully obtained.”). Under this

definition, a trademark owner has not necessarily been

“defrauded” by a seller of counterfeit goods, because the

owner has not consented to the seller’s use of the registered

mark or taken any action in reliance on the seller’s

representations.

Even were we to apply the broader definition of

“inherentlyfraudulent crime” that we have previouslyapplied

in CIMT cases, the federal trademark counterfeiting statute

would not satisfy that definition. As cases applying § 2320

make clear, the federal crime encompasses situations where

the defendant did not make “knowingly false

representations.” That is, a seller can be convicted of the

offense even though she honestly and forthrightly disclosed

that the goods for sale were unauthorized by the trademark

owner. See Foote, 413 F.3d at 1243; Gantos, 817 F.2d at 43. 

At the time Tall was decided, no reported California case had

applied the state trademark counterfeiting statute in a similar

situation. The panel in Tall was therefore not directly

confronted with the question that faces us here. A recent

unpublished California Court of Appeal decision upheld a

conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 350 in such a case. See

People v. Navarrete, 2015 WL 5445926, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.

Sept. 16, 2015) (noting that defendant told the buyer that the

handbags with counterfeit marks were “pretty good

replicas”). We express no opinion as to whether Tall’s

conclusion that the California trademark counterfeiting

statute requires “knowingly false representations” remains

sound in light of this subsequent case law.

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WANG V. RODRIGUEZ 13

Conclusion

We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2320 does not “necessarily

entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.” Wang’s conviction

under this statute, pursuant to a categorical analysis, therefore

cannot form the basis for a finding that she has been

convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172. We

need not address whether the loss to the victim from Wang’s

convicted conduct exceeded $10,000.

The district court granted summary judgment to the

government on the sole ground that Wang had been convicted

of an aggravated felony and therefore could not establish

good moral character. We reverse and remand to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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