Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08063/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William Timothy Stack, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W Colvin, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-08063-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff William Timothy Stack (“Plaintiff”)’s motion 

for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 15). 

Plaintiff also filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion for attorneys’ fees, 

(Doc. 15-2), and an affidavit detailing the hours Plaintiff’s counsel worked on this case, 

(Doc. 15-5). The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. Background 

On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”)’s denial of his claim for social security benefits. 

(Doc. 1). On October 8, 2015, Defendant filed a stipulated motion to reverse and remand 

the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings. 

(Doc. 13). On October 14, 2015, the Court granted Defendant’s motion and remanded 

this case to the ALJ for further proceedings. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff now moves for an award 

of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA, (Doc. 15), a request that Defendant 

does not oppose, (Doc. 16). 

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II. Legal Standard 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has succinctly stated the 

legal standard for an award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA as follows: 

 EAJA provides that a court shall award to a prevailing party other 

than the United States fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any 

civil action unless the court finds that the position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially 

justified. Substantial justification means justified in substance or in the 

main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. 

Put differently, the government’s position must have a reasonable basis 

both in law and fact. The position of the United States includes both the 

government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving 

rise to the civil action. Thus, if the government’s underlying position was 

not substantially justified, we must award fees and need not address 

whether the government’s litigation position was justified. 

Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted). 

III. Analysis 

 Because it does not oppose or object to Plaintiff’s motion, see (Doc. 16), 

Defendant has not met its burden of proving that its position was substantially justified, 

see Tobeler, 749 F.3d at 832. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of his attorneys’ fees 

pursuant to the EAJA provided that they are reasonable. 

 In this regard, Plaintiff filed an affidavit from his counsel, (Doc. 15-5), and an 

itemized statement of hours, (Doc. 15-6), detailing how many hours that his counsel 

worked on this case. Plaintiff requests $6,638.80 in attorneys’ fees for thirty-five hours of 

work performed by two different attorneys at the applicable maximum statutory hourly 

rate of $189.68. (Doc. 15-6). After reviewing the affidavit and statement of hours, and 

considering the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–

30 & n.3 (1983),1

 the Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested fee award is reasonable. The 

 

1

 In Whitehead v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1464469, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 

2016), the court noted that Hensley had been superseded, in part, by the Prison Litigation 

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Court will therefore grant Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs as set forth in 

the motion, memorandum of law, affidavit, and statement of hours. 

 Plaintiff also requests that the award of EAJA fees be made payable directly to his 

counsel. (Doc. 15-2 at 3). Plaintiff contends that Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 598 

(2010) indicates that this is a permissible payment method “after it is determined that 

[Plaintiff] does not have any outstanding federal debt subject to collection” because 

Plaintiff executed an assignment of all rights to the fee to his counsel. (Doc. 15-7 at 1, 4). 

 In Ratliff, the Supreme Court of the United States construed § 2412(d) and held 

that EAJA fees are payable to litigants and therefore subject to offsets when a litigant has 

outstanding federal debts. 560 U.S. at 598. The Supreme Court noted that the government 

has made direct payments to a litigant’s attorney “only in cases where the plaintiff does 

not owe a debt to the government and assigns the right to receive the fees to the 

attorney.” Id. at 597 (quotations and citations omitted). Since Ratliff, district courts in 

other circuits have ordered fees to be paid directly to a litigant’s attorney provided that 

the government is afforded an opportunity to offset any preexisting debt owed by the 

plaintiff, and the plaintiff has assigned all rights in the fee award to counsel. See Meyer v. 

Astrue, 2011 WL 4036398, at *3 (D. Minn. 2011). In this case, Plaintiff agreed to assign 

all rights to any EAJA fee award to his counsel. (Doc. 15-7). 

 Nonetheless, the Anti-Assignment Act (“the Act”) forbids the assignment of 

claims against the United States unless certain requirements are satisfied. 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3727. Namely, an assignment is permitted only: (1) “after a claim is allowed,” (2) when 

“the amount of the claim is decided,” and (3) when “a warrant for payment of the claim 

has been issued.” § 3727(b). In this case, Plaintiff’s assignment was executed on April 

15, 2015, well before any EAJA claim was allowed or the amount decided. (Doc. 15-7 at 

1). Because the assignment does not meet the Act’s requirements, and Defendant does 

not appear to waive the Act’s provisions, the Court concludes that the assignment is 

 

Reform Act. As this case does not involve prisoner litigation, this statutory change is 

irrelevant. 

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invalid as contrary to the Anti-Assignment Act. In any event, the determination of 

whether to pay Plaintiff’s counsel directly “must be made by the Commissioner after 

confirming that Plaintiff has assigned his right to fees and does not owe a debt that is 

subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program.” Zamora v. Colvin, No. CV-13-

01970-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 4388537, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2014) (citing Ratcliff, 560 

U.S. at 594) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for 

the EAJA fees to be made payable directly to his counsel. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the EAJA 

(Doc. 15) is GRANTED to the extent it seeks $6,638.80 in attorneys’ fees and $400.00 

in costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The motion is DENIED to the extent it requests 

that the fees be made payable directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this award shall be made payable directly to 

Plaintiff and is subject to offset to satisfy any pre-existing debt that Plaintiff owes the 

United States pursuant to Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586. 

 Dated this 5th day of July, 2016. 

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