Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05275/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS DUDNEY,

Petitioner,

v.

E.S. ALAMEIDA, JR., et al.,

Respondents.

 /

CV F 04-5275 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a conviction in the Merced County Superior Court for

felony evasion of officers and car theft. (CT 322-331.) The judgment on February 16, 2001,

imposed a sentence of thirty-two months in state prison, calculated on the “three strikes”

recidivist sentencing law because of Petitioner’s 1974 conviction for assault with a deadly

weapon. (CT 322-331.) 

On September 18, 2001, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On November 26, 2002, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit C, attached to Answer.)

On January 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court, which was denied on February 11, 2003. (Exhibits D & E.)

Case 1:04-cv-05275-AWI-DLB Document 20 Filed 09/26/05 Page 1 of 8
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28 As Respondent submits, because Petitioner’s claims involve only legal issues, the facts underlying his 1

current offense need only be briefly addressed and are taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing.

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On February 6, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was

denied on September 17, 2003. (Exhibits F & G.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 8, 2004. 

Respondent filed an answer on October 25, 2004, and Petitioner filed a traverse on January 24,

2005.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

While driving a stolen Thunderbird, Petitioner evaded officers in a chase which

proceeded from Merced to Livingston at speeds which exceeded a hundred miles per hour. 

When stopped, he misidentified himself, providing the name of a state prison inmate, and was in

possession of ammunition. Within hours of the stop, officers found a stolen Llama nine

millimeter firearm along the path of the pursuit. (CT 43-76.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Merced County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

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(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

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110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Due Process - Use of Prior Conviction

Petitioner contends that the trial court denied his right to due process by enhancing his

current sentence by the use of his prior conviction as a “strike.” As Respondent submits,

Petitioner claim in essence is that his 1974 plea agreement to delete the weapons use

enhancements was breached by the sentencing court’s 2001 consideration of the 1974

preliminary hearing transcript in finding that the prior conviction for assault with a deadly

weapon constituted a strike, for purposes of the three strikes recidivist statute.

In his 1974 strike prior, Petitioner was charged by information in the Tulare County

Superior Court with assault with a deadly weapon upon Jimmie Cox on or about December 7,

1973, a violation of California Penal Code section 245. In addition, the information specifically

alleged as follows, “At the time of the commission of the above stated offense, defendant was

armed with and used a firearm to wit: a pistol.” (CT 183.) 

After discussions in a settlement conference on February 7, 1974, Petitioner entered a

plea of guilty to assault with a deadly weapon as charged; however, the additional paragraph for

sentencing enhancement purposes, that Petitioner was “armed with and used a firearm, to wit, a

pistol” was stricken. (CT 183-185.)

In the instant offense, Petitioner’s 1974 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was

alleged, for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. On October 17, 2000, pursuant to a negotiated

disposition, Petitioner entered a plea consistent with the terms set forth on the record on April 12,

2000. One condition of the plea was that the court would conduct a trial on the truth of

Petitioner’s 1974 felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. (CT 141, 294-304.) 

To the extent that Petitioner argues that the alleged breach renders his current sentence

unconstitutional, his claim must fail. When a plea agreement rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 22 (1971). 

Here, there is no indication that any promise not to use the 1974 conviction was made during the

plea negotiations, nor does Petitioner make any such allegation. Although Petitioner claims that

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the enhancement allegation was stricken pursuant to the plea bargain, it in no way follows that a

future court determination for purposes of the three strikes law, cannot use the factual basis in

determining whether the prior is a strike offense. Accordingly, as there is no basis for finding

that such a promise was included in the 1974 plea agreement, the agreement was not violated by

virtue of the current enhancement. Moreover, the sentence imposed under Three Strikes is not

additional punishment for the prior convictions, but rather a stiffened penalty for the latest

crimes. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998). 

To the extent that Petitioner alleges that he had no knowledge at the time of his 1974 plea

of the possibility that it could later be used to enhance a sentence, his claim must also fail. Due

process requires that a defendant be informed of all the direct consequences of a guilty plea. 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). There is no due process violation where a trial

court fails to inform the defendant of collateral consequences, such as the potential for

enhancement in the future. United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64, 65-66 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus,

Petitioner’s lack of knowledge that the 1974 conviction could later be used to enhance a future

sentence does not violate due process. 

Based on the foregoing, the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

D. Double Jeopardy Claim

Petitioner contends that he was denied due process by use of his 1974 conviction for

assault with a deadly weapon as a strike, including the weapons use enhancement stricken in his

plea, thereby placing him in double jeopardy.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held double jeopardy implications inapplicable to

sentencing proceedings because the determinations at issue doe not place a defendant in jeopardy

for an offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 726, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2249 (1998) (citing

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994) (noting that

repeat-offender laws "‘penaliz[e] only the last offense committed by the defendant’")). The U.S.

Supreme Court has held that recidivist statutes do not violate double jeopardy because "the

enhanced punishment imposed for the [present] offense ‘is not to be viewed as ... [an] additional

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penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is

considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’" Witte v. United States, 515

U.S. 389, 400, 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995) (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct.

1256 (1948)); see, also, Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S.Ct. 179 (1895) (under

recidivist statute, "the accused is not again punished for the first offence" because "‘the

punishment is for the last offense committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of

the situation into which the party had previously brought himself’"). 

Here, as Respondent submits, and the state court emphasized, Petitioner had not entered a

plea of guilty to a “simple assault,” noting that the plea was to “assault with a deadly weapon.” 

(Respondent’s Exhibit C, at 4.) The dismissal of the special allegation did not negate the validity

of the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. The record of the prior conviction was a

proper source, the court found, for determining whether the Petitioner had personally used the

deadly weapon. As the Court of Appeal noted the sentencing court could “look beyond the four

corners of a prior judgment to determine the substantive facts involved in the prior offense, even

when an enhancement based upon the alleged facts relating to the prior offense was stricken

under a plea bargain.” (Respondent’s Exhibit C, at 3.)

 The double jeopardy and due process clauses prevent the state from (1) retrying final

verdicts of guilt or innocence (including lesser included and greater inclusive offenses), (2)

exacting multiple punishments for the same offense, and (3) relitigating for criminal purposes

any facts finally resolved in defendant’s favor in a prior criminal proceeding (the “collateral

estoppel” rule). United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-128 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale,

447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-446 (1970). 

However, this prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital

sentencing. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. at 734. As Respondent submits, if retrial of prior

convictions is not barred by double jeopardy considerations, the consideration of a court record

to determine the underlying facts for recidivist sentencing purposes would not violate that

prohibition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

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To the extent Petitioner argues that he has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury trial

determination on the truth of the firearm enhancement under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466, 490 (2000), as stated by the Court of Appeal, it is without merit. As the Court of Appeal

observed:

The court in Apprendi carved out facts relating to prior convictions as an

exception to Apprendi’s holding that the jury must decide any fact which, if true

would increase the defendant’s sentence for the charged crime.

(Respondent’s Exhibit C, at 3-4.) 

The state court’s reading of Apprendi is an objectively reasonable application of that

decision. Thus, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

To the extent Petitioner contends that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

barred the sentencing court from determining that the prior conviction constituted a strike

because he used a deadly weapon, it is without merit. First, res judicata and collateral estoppel

do not apply to habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Clifton v. Attorney General, 997 F.2d 660, 663 n. 3

(9th Cir.1993); Burnside v. White, 760 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir.1985) ("While a plaintiff in a §

1983 action may, in a proper case, be bound by a determination on the merits by another court, a

decision in another case is not res judicata as to a habeas proceeding.") (quotations and citation

omitted); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1977) ("[T]he doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable in habeas proceedings."). Second, there was

no previous determination that Petitioner utilized a deadly weapon during the assault, rather it

was the plea agreement that struck the weapon enhancement. Subsequently, for purposes of

determining whether the prior assault conviction constituted a strike within the Three Strikes law,

the Court can look to the prior actions and transcript to make that determination. See People v.

Visciotti, 2 Cal.4th 1, 68 n.36(1992); People v. Shirley, 18 Cal.App.4th 40, 47 [fact that

enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury was stricken in prior proceeding did

not preclude a finding that prior was serious felony based on personal infliction of great bodily

injury]; People v. Leslie, 47 Cal.App.4th 198, 204 (1996) [although serious felony enhancement

was stricken in prior case, sentencing court free to look at record and conclude prior was a

serious felony because the defendant personally used a firearm]; People v. Blackburn, 72

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Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527 (1999) [court may look to see if there was personal use of firearm, even

though personal use enhancement allegation was struck in prior trial]. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 26, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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