Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01971/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01971-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COREY J. JOHNSON, SR., No. 2:14-CV-1971-TLN-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION,

Respondent.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s unopposed

motion to dismiss (Doc. 11). Respondent argues that the petition is untimely. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree robbery and a number of

sentencing enhancements were found to be true. Petitioner was sentenced on August 14, 2012, to

a determinate state prison term of 30 years. Petitioner then filed five habeas actions in state court

as follows:

1st Petition California Supreme Court

Filed March 18, 2013

Denied May 15, 2013

2nd Petition Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed May 22, 2013

Denied July 24, 2013

3rd Petition California Court of Appeal

Filed July 3, 2013

Denied July 18, 2013

 4th Petition Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed August 2, 2013

Denied August 26, 2013

5th Petition California Supreme Court

Filed September 27, 2013

Denied January 15, 2014

The instant federal petition was filed on August 19, 2014. 

II. DISCUSSION

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of: 

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

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Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

United States Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where a petition for writ of certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year

limitations period begins to run the day after certiorari is denied or the Court issued a merits

decision. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no petition for

review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40 days following

the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the following day. See

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the Court of Appeal, the

conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the state trial court, and the

limitations period begins running the following day. If the conviction became final before April

24, 1996 – the effective date of the statute of limitations – the one-year period begins to run the

day after the effective date, or April 25, 1996. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th

Cir. 1999).

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2 (2007); Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to a

state’s timeliness bar, time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions

and the failure to comply with those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is

properly filed). A state court application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the

time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to present his

claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered

“pending” after the state post-conviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549

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U.S. 327 (2007) (holding that federal habeas petition not tolled for time during which certiorari

petition to the Supreme Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between

state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as

untimely, the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id.

at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

Petitioner was sentenced on August 14, 2012. Because petitioner pleaded guilty

and did not seek direct review, the one-year limitations period began to run upon the expiration

of the time to seek direct review, or on October 14, 2012. The limitations period then ran for 155

days until petitioner filed his first state petition on March 19, 2013, in the California Supreme

Court, at which point the clock stopped for the 59 days until the first petition was denied on May

15, 2013. 

Six days later petitioner filed his second state petition on May 22, 2013, in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. As respondent correctly notes, there is no tolling of the

limitations period for the time between the denial of his first petition and second petition because

petitioner was not moving to the next highest court. Rather, by filing his first petition in the

California Supreme Court and his second petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court,

petitioner began a separate round of post-conviction proceedings. See Delhomme v. Ramirez,

340 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith, 297 F.3d at 815. Respondent concedes the limitations

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period was tolled again during the time the second state petition was pending, or until July 24,

2013. The third state petition has no effect on calculating the limitations period because it was

filed after and decided before the second petition. 

Once again petitioner began a new round of post-conviction review with the

fourth state petition filed on August 2, 2013, in the Sacramento County Superior Court. 

Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the interval between denial of the third petition

and filing of the fourth petition. As to the time the fourth petition was pending, respondent notes

that the state court denied the petition as untimely. Therefore, the court agrees with respondent

that the fourth petition was not “properly filed” and does not operate to toll the limitations

period. Similarly, the fifth petition was also denied as untimely and, therefore, was not “properly

filed” for purposes of statutory tolling. Following denial of the fifth state petition on January 15,

2014, petitioner waited 215 days before filing the instant federal action. 

Following commencement of the one-year limitations period upon expiration of

the time to seek direct review, 155 days elapsed before petitioner filed his first state postconviction action, which tolled the clock. The clock began to run again upon denial of the first

state petition until the second petition was filed six days later because petitioner began a new

round of state post-conviction review with the second petition. The clock stopped again during

the time the second state petition was pending. Because petitioner once again began a new round

of state post-conviction review with the filing of the fourth petition, and because both the fourth

and fifth petitions were not properly filed, the clock began to run again upon denial of the second

state petition on July 24, 2013. The instant action was filed on August 25, 2014 (with a proof of

service dated August 19, 2014), beyond the one-year limitations period even assuming tolling for

all of the time through the denial of the last properly filed state petition to be decided (the second

petition). The court finds, therefore, that the petition is untimely. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s

unopposed motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 12, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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