Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04051/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04051-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

HOWARD D. KISNER, JR. PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-4051

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Howard Kisner, appealed to this Court from the denial of disability

insurance benefits (hereinafter "DIB"), by the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Introduce

New Evidence, seeking to have his case remanded for the consideration of this evidence

(Doc. #7 & 8). On November 15, 2005, the Commissioner responded to the motion (Doc.

#9). By Memorandum and Order entered August 10, 2006, the undersigned remanded the

instant case to the Commissioner, pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to allow

her to consider the additional evidence (Doc. #10). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Greg Giles, filed a Plaintiff’s Application and Affidavit for 

Attorney’s Fees Under 28 U.S.C. §2412 The Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the

"EAJA"), on August 16, 2006 (Doc. #12). The Commissioner responded on August 29,

2006 (Doc. #13). 

Sentence six of § 405(g) provides in full:

“The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown

before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further

action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence

to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is

new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

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to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the

Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such

additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or

his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and

modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional

record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming

was based.”

Thus, the sixth sentence of § 405(g), as the United States Supreme Court explained

in Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617,626, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990),

“describes an entirely different kind of remand” than a remand pursuant to sentence four of

the statute. The district court does not affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's

decision; it does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative determination. 

Rather, the court remands because new evidence has come to light that was not available to

the plaintiff at the time of the administrative proceeding and that evidence might have

changed the outcome of the prior proceeding. Ibid. The statute provides that following a

sentence six remand, the Commissioner must return to the district court to “file with the court

any such additional or modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the

additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.” 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) provides:

"A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within

thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an

application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a

prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this

subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement

from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf

of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees

and other expenses were computed." (Emphasis added.) 

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Shalala v. Schaefer 509 U.S. 292, 295-296, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2628 (1993). Here,

plaintiff’s counsel is not entitled to EAJA fees, at this point in time, because no “final

judgment” has been entered. 

This case was clearly remanded pursuant to sentence six, as opposed to sentence four,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In sentence six cases, the filing period for fee petitions under the EAJA

does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are completed, the Commissioner 

returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal period runs. Shalala v.

Schaefer 509 U.S. at 292, 113 S.Ct. at 2629. Accordingly, immediate entry of judgment (as

opposed to entry of judgment after postremand agency proceedings have been completed and

their results filed with the court) is in fact the principal feature that distinguishes a sentencefour remand from a sentence-six remand. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan,111 S.Ct., at 2164-

2165.

Based upon the foregoing, it is considered, ordered and adjudged that Plaintiff’s

Application and Affidavit for Attorney’s Fees Under 28 U.S.C. §2412 The Equal Access to

Justice Act (Doc. #12), is premature. Accordingly, the application is denied.

ENTERED this 21 day of September, 2006. st

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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