Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01664/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01664-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND H. DENTON JR.,

CDC #P-97536, Civil No. 06-1664 WQH (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350 BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

STUART RYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison in Calipatria,

California and proceeding pro se,filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on August 17, 2006. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that prison officials violated his

constitutional rights when they interfered with his legal mail and failed to respond to his

administrative grievances. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as

declaratory relief. Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a),

but has instead submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure

to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners

granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows that he has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281

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F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to

him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

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Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and

(2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S.

637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc).

A. Access to Courts Claim

Plaintiff claims that at various times, prison officials delayed the mailing of his legal mail

and failed to adequately respond to administrative grievances. The Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution provides that: “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed

by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or

property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

223-27 (1976). Thus, to state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the

government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)).

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To the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of CDC inmate grievance

procedures, his Complaint fails to state a due process claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);

Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. This is because the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no

protected property interest in an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due

Process Clause. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a

[prison] grievance procedure”); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (1995);

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that any named Calipatria

official deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison

grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interests can arise from state law or prison

regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if

Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not

expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest

how the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances amounted to a

restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or how they resulted in an

“atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ mailroom procedures have denied

him access to the courts, these allegations fall short of the pleading standards necessary to state

such a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1). Prisoners do “have a constitutional

right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right

of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord

Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977),

the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are

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trained in the law.” Id. at 828. To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts,

however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on

his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2)

he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An

“actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation,

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft

v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989);

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that he has been

precluded from pursuing a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal

conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355

(right to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his]

sentence[], directly or collaterally, and . . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”);

see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in

the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the

litigation.”). 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed” because

he was “so stymied” by Defendants’ actions or grievance processing that “he was unable to even

file a complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351;

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate

claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the

‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, these claims must be

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1).

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B. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff further claims that some of the Defendants are liable based on their supervisory

roles. (Compl. at 18-19.) However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a Defendant may only be held liable for the allegedly

unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff alleges specific facts which show: (1)

how or to what extent this supervisor personally participated in or directed Defendants’ actions,

and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint in no way sets forth facts which might be

liberally construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against the named

supervisory Defendants.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim upon

which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

III. Conclusion and Order

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

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2. The Acting Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount

equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and

forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on James Tilton,

Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P. O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped

“Filed” in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S. D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

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5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a form § 1983 Amended

Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2006

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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