Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02343/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02343-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ASBERRY,

NO. CIV. S-01-2343 LKK/PAN

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

CITY OF SACRAMENTO/SANITATION 

DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

 /

This motion relates to the consolidated Asberry II case, No.

Civ. S-04-2467, where plaintiff, Michael Asberry (“Asberry” or

“plaintiff”), alleges that defendant fired him two days before the

jury rendered a verdict in his disability discrimination suit in

retaliation for filing his suit. Defendant alleges the termination

was motivated by Asberry’s failure to list several felonies which

are more than twenty years old, although several similarly-situated

employees who did not list their felonies on their applications

were not terminated. The parties appeared before the court on

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 On November 2, 2005, the parties stipulated to dismiss

plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability

discrimination. The stipulation stated that plaintiff

“failed to exhaust his administrative remedies to this claim

alone,” but explicitly noted that “[p]laintiff still intends

on proceeding to trial on his second claim for retaliation.” 

November 2, 2005 stipulation. Pl.’s Ex. 4.

2

March 6, 2006 for a status conference in both Asberry cases. In

their status reports, both parties acknowledge that the second

lawsuit involves only one claim for retaliation.1 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant has retaliated against him

in violation of both state and federal law. In his status report,

he states that he brings suit pursuant to California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)(Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940), the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)(42 U.S.C. § 12203) and 42

U.S.C. § 1983, respectively. See Pl.’s Pretrial Statement at 2;

Opp’n at 2. Defendant argued at the status conference that no

state law claims of retaliation were alleged. 

The court invited the parties to brief the issue. Defendant

moves to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim based on the

contention that plaintiff did not list the statute on his complaint

and because defendant interpreted plaintiff’s responses to special

interrogatories as dismissing plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Defendant also contends that it would be unduly prejudiced if the

court allowed plaintiff to proceed with the state law retaliation

claim. The court addresses the parties’ contentions below.

////

////

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2 Asberry explains in his March 2006 status report that he

brings his retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well. 

Defendant asks the court to limit plaintiff to a Title VII

retaliation suit , the court will not and cannot do so. Plaintiff

is entitled to bring his law suit under a number of theories of his

choice. See 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 184 (2005)(The "theory of

pleadings" doctrine, under which a complaint must proceed upon some

definite theory, and the plaintiff must succeed on that theory or

not succeed at all, has been all but abolished under federal

rules). Further, defendant has not provided the court with any

legal reason as to why plaintiff cannot assert a retaliation

employment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is indeed a

cognizable claim. See, e.g., Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1439

(9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for retaliatory refusal-to-hire based on his prior lawsuits).

3

I.

ANALYSIS

This motion is before the court due to a number of 

factors that can be attributed to both parties: poor pleading,

poorly-written special interrogatories, and poor responses to these

interrogatories. Defendant brings this motion in an attempt to

limit the legal theories under which plaintiff may bring his

retaliation claim - namely under federal law and only under Title

VII. Below, I explain why plaintiff may rely on both state and

federal law to bring his retaliation claim.2

A. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff’s complaint contains two claims for relief. The

first claim, dismissed in November 2005 by stipulation of the

parties, contained a heading which stated “Discrimination Based on

Disability and/or Perceived Disability 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and Cal.

Govt. Code § 12940 et seq.” Compl. at 4. The second claim is

entitled “retaliation” but there is no specific reference to a

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

federal or state law within that cause of action. 

The complaint contains factual and legal allegations common

to both claims within paragraphs 3 through 14. The legal and

factual allegations related specifically to the first claim for

disability discrimination are contained in paragraphs 15 through

21. The legal and factual allegations related to the second claim

for retaliation are contained in paragraphs 22 through 25 of the

complaint. Notably, the retaliation claim section includes an

“incorporation by reference” clause which incorporates every other

paragraph in the complaint, including paragraph 17, which is

contained within the first claim for relief and states that

“Defendants [sic] conduct violates the American with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., Title 1, and the Fair Employment and

Housing Act.” Based on the complaint and the incorporation clause

at paragraph 22 incorporating paragraphs 16 and 17, it appears that

plaintiff has alleged retaliation under both the ADA and FEHA.

B. SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

Defendant, however, argues that after it propounded special

interrogatories to “flush out plaintiff’s allegations and legal

theories,” plaintiff’s responses on June 9, 2005 disclosed that his

retaliation claim was not being brought under state law. Def.’s

Mot. at 4-3. As defendant notes, the interrogatories asked

plaintiff to identify all facts, witnesses, and documents which

plaintiff contended supported those claims. Plaintiff’s responses

to the interrogatories did little to clarify the legal theories

upon which he would bring suit. Although plaintiff’s responses

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

disclosed that he would not be pursuing his first claim for

disability discrimination, plaintiff stated that he would

nevertheless seek to prove the “loss of earnings capacity” and

“extreme and emotional distress” allegations contained within

paragraphs related to the first disability discrimination claim.

Pl.’s Responses at Response 6, 11 and 13. Plaintiff also disclosed

that he would not seek to prove allegations that he suffered “a

substantial loss in earnings and job benefits” or that he suffered

“humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and

discomfort” even though those allegations were contained within

paragraphs related to his remaining retaliation claim. Id. at

Response 14 and 15. As defendant points out, plaintiff’s answer

to Special Interrogatory Number 10 could be viewed as a dismissal

of any FEHA claim. Interrogatory 10 asks plaintiff to provide

further information “If YOU contend YOUR termination “violates the

Americans with Disabilities Act, . . . , and the Fair Employment

and Housing Act as alleged in paragraph 17 of YOUR complaint 

. . . .” Plaintiff responded that he “is withdrawing this claim

because he did not exhaust him [sic] administrative remedies.” 

Based on plaintiff’s pleadings and his answers to the

interrogatory, defendant argues that despite the liberalized

pleading rules, plaintiff should not “be allowed to wait until the

last minute before ascertaining or disclosing the theories on which

he intends to build his case.” Def.’s Mot. at 4. While the court

agrees that plaintiff’s pleadings and responses to the

interrogatories are less than pellucid, as explained further below,

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

because defendant will not be prejudiced if plaintiff is allowed

to pursue his state law claim, defendant’s request to dismiss

plaintiff’s FEHA claim must be DENIED.

C. DEFENDANT SUFFERS NO PREJUDICE IF PLAINTIFF’S RETALIATION

CLAIM IS BROUGHT UNDER FEHA.

Plaintiff’s responses to the interrogatories leave unclear

which legal theories plaintiff intends to pursue. Given the

incorporation clause and that the only statutes even mentioned in

the complaint are FEHA and the ADA, it is fair to assume based on

the pleadings that plaintiff brings his retaliation claim pursuant

to these two statutes. Defendant relies heavily on Special

Interrogatory 10 which referred to ¶ 17 of the complaint and which

contained a reference to both FEHA and the ADA and to plaintiff’s

response that he agreed to dismiss that particular claim.

Plaintiff, however, explains in his opposition that he responded

to the question with the understanding that the question was

“limited to the disability claim.” All in all, the court finds the

pleadings to be confusing, as are the special interrogatory

questions and the responses to these interrogatories. The court

cannot accept defendant’s contention that Special Interrogatory 10

disposed of plaintiff’s state law retaliation claim.

Although defendant claims it would be prejudiced if plaintiff

is allowed to proceed on the state law claim, the contention is

unpersuasive. As plaintiff points out, he perfected his

retaliation claim by exhausting administrative remedies and filing

charges with the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3 As plaintiff points out, the only difference is that under

federal law there are caps on general damages which do not exist

under state law, and multipliers for attorney fee awards are only

recoverable under state law.

7

(“DFEH”) and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). The charge was served on defendant in 2004, prior to the

suit being filed (Telfer Decl. ¶ 3, Pl.’s Ex. 1). The complaint,

as described above, identifies the claims as being based on the ADA

and FEHA. Thus, defendant has been on notice for over a year that

there is a strong likelihood that plaintiff would pursue recovery

under FEHA for his retaliation claim. Moreover, the factual basis

and theory of retaliation under both state and federal law is the

same. Under both federal and state law, plaintiff must still prove

that he engaged in protected activity, that defendant took an

adverse action against him, and that there was a causal connection.

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 (citing Flait v. North American Watch Corp.,

3 Cal.App.4th 467 (1992); Ostand v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ.,

327 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2003)). The prima facie elements of

the retaliation claims under both state and federal law are the

same and the same evidence would be required to prove each case.3

Finally, most courts have held that under notice pleading

plaintiff need only plead the operative facts in the litigation and

that the federal rules do not require the complaint to include a

theory of a case, much less the statutory basis for recovery.

Daniels v. USS Agri-Chem., 965 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1992)

(citation omitted); Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th

Cir. 1978); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515,

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4 Defendant relies heavily on Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab

Ltd., 99 F.3d 217 (7th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a

district court may limit plaintiff to his original theories in his

complaint. Vidimos, however, actually assists plaintiff’s

position. The Seventh Circuit explained that the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead legal theories.

The court also noted that only in two circumstances can and should

a district court hold a plaintiff to his original theory - where

the complaint explicitly or implicitly disclaims certain legal

characterizations, or where by tacit agreement of the parties a

possible interpretation may not be pursued. Id. at 222. Despite

the ambiguity generated by a less than clear complaint and by the

interrogatories and their responses, neither of these two

circumstances exist in the case at bar. 

8

523 F.2d 569, 581 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963, 96

(1976); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974);

Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir.

1955); cf. New York State Waterways Assn. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419,

421 (2d Cir. 1972) (court's duty to read pleading liberally to

determine whether facts alleged justify taking jurisdiction on

grounds other than those most artistically pleaded). As the

Supreme Court has explained, the “simplified notice pleading

standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment

motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of

unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

512 (2002). Through discovery and through the course of this

litigation, the court finds that defendant has been on notice that

plaintiff would proceed under FEHA to bring his retaliation claim.4

////

////

////

////

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

Defendant’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s retaliation claim

based on state law is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 28, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:01-cv-02343-LKK -KJM Document 253 Filed 05/01/06 Page 9 of 9