Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08125/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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1

 Named defendants are AutoZone Incorporated, a Tennessee corporation, Autozone

Incorporated, a Nevada corporation, and AutoZoners LLC, the entity that employs all

“Autozoners.” See Response at 5 n.2. Defendants are collectively referred to as “Autozone”

or “defendant.”

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael L. Taylor, on behalf of himself

and other persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Autozone, Inc. et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-8125-PCT-FJM

ORDER

We have before us plaintiffs’ motion for conditional class certification (doc. 28),

defendant’s response (doc. 37), and plaintiffs’ reply (doc. 40). We also have plaintiffs’

unopposed motion for judicial notice (doc. 33). 

Plaintiffs Michael L. Taylor, Dilawar Khan, Volena Glover-Hale, and Manuel

Montoya are current or former AutoZone store managers. Defendant Autozone is a retailer

and distributor of automotive parts and accessories, and operates 4,600 stores in the United

States, Puerto Rico, and Mexico.1

 Plaintiffs challenge their exempt status under the Fair

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The FLSA exempts from its minimum wage and maximum

hour requirements “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or

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2

 The FLSA does not define “similarly situated,” and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not interpreted the term. See Bogor v. American Pony

Exp., Inc., 2010 WL 1962465, *2 (D. Ariz. 2010). We follow the majority of courts, which

apply the two-step approach. Id.; see also Stickle v. SCI Western Market Support Center,

L.P., 2009 WL 3241790, *2 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“district courts within the Ninth Circuit

generally follow the two-tiered or two-step approach for making a collective action

determination.”); Saleen v. Waste Management, Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 937, 939 (D. Minn.

2009). 

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professional capacity.” See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a) (defining

“employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity”); 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (defining

“employee employed in a bona fide administrative capacity”). Plaintiffs allege defendant

improperly classifies all store managers (except those in California) as exempt from the

FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. Motion to Certify at 7.

I

A

Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of a class of all “AutoZone store managers

employed anywhere in the United States except California between July 16, 2007 and July

16, 2010.” Section 216(b) of the FLSA allows employees to bring an action on behalf of

themselves and similarly situated employees against their employer to recover wages owed.

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the

preceding sentences may be maintained . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf

of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”); see also Hoffman-La

Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 486 (1989) (collective actions allow

plaintiffs to pool resources and benefit the judicial system by allowing the efficient resolution

in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact). Only employees who consent in

writing may become parties to a collective action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Under the FLSA procedure, certification occurs in two stages.2

 At the first stage, we

determine whether the proposed class members are “similarly situated” employees and

therefore should be notified about the pending action. See Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at

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169, 110 S.Ct. at 486 (court has the discretion to implement the collective action mechanism

by facilitating notice). We base the decision to certify on the pleadings and any declarations.

Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs have the

burden of showing a “reasonable basis” for their claim that members of the proposed class

are similarly situated. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260 (11th Cir.

2008). They must show some “factual nexus which binds the named plaintiffs and the

potential class members together as victims of a particular alleged policy or practice.”

Stickle v. SCI Western Market Support Center, L.P., 2009 WL 3241790, *3 (D. Ariz. 2009)

(citing Bonila v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1138 n. 6 (D. Nev. 1999)). This

is a lenient standard, because the available evidence is limited and the determination may be

reexamined when the action is ready for trial. See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260–61 (“We have

described the standard for determining similarity, at this initial stage, as ‘not particularly

stringent,’‘fairly lenient,’ ‘flexible,’ ‘not heavy,’ and ‘less stringent than that for joinder

under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under 42(b).’”) (internal citations omitted). If

plaintiffs show members of the proposed class are similarly situated, we direct notice to

potential collective action members. The second stage occurs after the completion of

discovery and is triggered by defendant’s motion for decertification, at which point plaintiffs

bear a heavier burden. Id. at 1261.

Although plaintiffs must show that class members are all victims of a particular

alleged policy of practice, we do not review the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims in

determining whether to conditionally certify the proposed class. See, e.g., Gieseke v. First

Horizon Home Loan Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1166 (D. Kan. 2006) (in making the

similarly situated determination, “the court does not reach the merits of the plaintiff's

claims”); Stanfield v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC, 2006 WL 3190527, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2006)

(“the Court will not evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims under the FLSA at this point in

the litigation”). The focus of the inquiry “is not on whether there has been an actual violation

of law but rather on whether the proposed plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ under 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b) with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.” Guillen v.

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3

 The employees include one regional manager, one district manager, six store

managers, two assistant store managers, and two sales managers. 

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Marshalls of MA, Inc., 750 F.Supp.2d 469, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that members of the proposed class are similarly situated because

“they are all classified as exempt employees, have the same job description, are subject to

the same corporate policies and procedures, perform nearly identical job duties, and have

consistently worked more than 50 hours per work week while employed as store managers

by AutoZone.” Motion to Certify at 6–7. In support of their allegations, plaintiffs cite their

exempt status, the declarations of three plaintiffs, defendant’s 2009 Annual Report filed with

the Securities and Exchange Commission, and store manager job postings from defendant’s

stores in different states. In response, defendant has submitted company policies as well as

the declarations of eleven employees. See Response, exs. A–M.3

 Declarants describe the

responsibilities of managers and the daily operations of the stores. 

B

All members of the proposed class are classified as exempt from FLSA overtime

requirements. Their common classification supports the conclusion that all class members

are similarly situated. See Bogor v. American Pony Exp., Inc., 2010 WL 1962465, *3 (D.

Ariz. 2010) (defendants’ classification of all airport drivers as exempt is evidence that

plaintiffs are similarly situated); Kane v. Gage Merchandising Services, Inc., 138 F.Supp.2d

212, 215 (D. Mass. 2001) (defendants’ treatment of at least some of a discrete class of

employees as exempt “is sufficient for this Court to determine that a ‘similarly situated’

group of potential plaintiffs exists given the adopted lenient standard for court-facilitated

notice.”). Clearly, defendant is correct that this common classification alone is not sufficient

to justify certification. See Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 914, 927 (D. Ariz. 2010)

(“As a matter of both sound public policy and basic common sense, the mere classification

of a group of employees-even a large or nationwide group-as exempt under the FLSA is not

by itself sufficient to constitute the necessary evidence of a common policy, plan, or practice

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4

 Plaintiffs explain that they did not submit a declaration from the fourth plaintiff,

Michael Taylor, due to medical problems that have prevented him from offering deposition

testimony. See Motion at 7 n.1. 

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that renders all putative class members as ‘similarly situated’ for § 216(b) purposes.”).

However, plaintiffs do not rely solely on proposed class members’ common status as exempt.

They also include the declarations of three of the four plaintiffs,4

 as well as company

policies. 

C

The three declaring plaintiffs have worked for defendant for at least nine years each,

in a total of at least five states and Washington, DC. They allege: (1) all AutoZone

employees work under the same set of policies, procedures, expectations, and job

classifications; (2) AutoZone never audited or analyzed job activities to determine whether

the exempt classification was correct; (3) the district manager makes all management

decisions; (4) the majority of store manager’s time is spent performing routine sales tasks;

(5) daily operations are laid out by defendant’s policies and enforced through the district

manager’s daily phone calls; and (6) the district manager made hiring and firing decisions.

See Declaration of Volena Glover-Hale (doc. 30); Declaration of Dilawar Khan (doc. 31);

Declaration of Manuel Montoya (doc. 32). 

Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ beliefs about the similarity of their experiences to

other store managers is insufficient to justify nationwide notice. See Monger v. Cactus Salon

& SPA’s LLC, 2009 WL 1916386, *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (plaintiffs’ belief that other

locations’ employees are subject to the same policies is insufficient evidence of their similar

situation); Bernard v. Household Intern., Inc., 231 F.Supp.2d 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 2002)

(plaintiffs’ beliefs that experience of employees in other offices is similar to theirs not

sufficient to extend class). They further argue that the alleged universality of plaintiffs’

descriptions is contradicted by the declarations of the eleven employees provided by

defendant. 

We disagree. At this stage, plaintiffs need only demonstrate a reasonable basis for

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their contention that other store managers are similarly situated. Their personal employment

experience is sufficient to do so. Moreover, plaintiffs’ beliefs about the ubiquitousness of

their experiences are strengthened by both the duration and breadth of their work for

defendant. Each plaintiff has worked for defendant for many years, in different positions and

store locations. In addition, plaintiffs support their allegations with company policies that

suggest operations are largely the same across stores. 

D

In arguing that their experiences are universal among store managers, plaintiffs cite

the job description used for all store managers nationwide and managers’ identical job duties.

See Copley Declaration, ex. B (doc. 29-2) (examples of identical job descriptions for store

managers in several states). Plaintiffs argue that the standardized store layout and

regimented operations illustrate the similar employment experience across stores and deprive

plaintiffs of any decision-making. See Copley Declaration, ex. A, “Autozone 2009 Annual

Report” at 3–4 (doc. 29-1) (“Substantially all AutoZone stores are based on standard store

formats, resulting in generally consistent appearance, merchandising and product mix. . . .

All store support functions are centralized in our store support centers located in Memphis,

Tennessee and Mexico.”). Plaintiffs allege that in order to promote uniformity, corporate

policy dictates “physical layout, signage, products, prices and promotions.” Motion to

Certify at 8. According to plaintiffs, this system insures that all store managers perform the

same duties: (1) opening and/or closing the store; (2) entering product shipments into

AutoZone’s computer system; (3) stocking merchandise; (4) arranging products pursuant to

AutoZone’s plan-o-grams; (5) cleaning the store; (6) operating the cash register; (7) serving

customers; (8) attending mandatory conference calls; (9) scheduling staff using AutoZone’s

computer system; and (10) visiting customers with the Commercial Accounts Manager.

Motion to Certify at 8–9. According to plaintiffs, this level of automation and conformity

ensures all positions are the same and leaves managers little room to manage. 

Defendant argues that their store manager policies actually describe exempt

managerial responsibilities, and therefore, any misclassification could only be the result of

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managers performing duties not contemplated by defendant’s policies and job postings.

Response at 14–15; see Sandoval Declaration, ex. 1, “Job Description” at 15 (doc. 37-1)

(describing manager’s responsibilities, including supervising personnel, addressing employee

concerns, hiring and firing, and training personnel). Defendant argues that to state a claim,

plaintiffs would have to show an actual company-wide policy of denying managerial

responsibilities in the face of official policy to the contrary. See Guillen, 750 F.Supp.2d at

476–77 (plaintiff must show that he is similarly situated to the proposed class members with

respect to allegation that he spent most of his time performing non-managerial tasks).

Defendant further claims that to the extent that any individual plaintiff does not

predominantly perform exempt duties, defendant will show that he is not fulfilling job

expectations, and that this kind of fact-intensive inquiry renders plaintiffs’ claims

inappropriate for class treatment. Response at 17–18. 

We do not reach defendant’s contentions about managerial job descriptions and actual

responsibilities because we do not consider the merits of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims at this

stage. See Colson, 687 F.Supp.2d at 926 (in determining whether to conditionally certify a

proposed class, “courts do not review the underlying merits of the action.”). We consider the

company policies not for their substance, but rather for their illustration of the consistency

of operations across defendant’s thousands of stores and the minimal professional discretion

allegedly left to plaintiffs. While defendant argues that the store manager job description and

company policies require plaintiffs to perform managerial responsibilities, defendant does

not dispute that it uses the same job description for all store managers, that its detailed

policies govern all stores, and that all managers have similar responsibilities. See Response

at 8–9. Defendant’s description of the store manager position corroborates plaintiffs’

assertions that class members share uniform duties, responsibilities, compensation incentives,

training, and evaluation criteria. See Response at 6–8. The parties’ agreement about the

consistent role and responsibilities of the manager position across stores suggests that if any

store manager is misclassified as exempt, many other store managers may also be

misclassified. See Aros v. United Rentals, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 176, 183–84 (D. Conn. 2010)

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(plaintiff has sufficiently shown a factual nexus between all managers to justify conditional

certification through evidence indicating that all managers “nationwide are subject to the

same job description, perform the same essential duties and responsibilities, and are required

to have the same job qualifications.”). 

E

Defendant contends that certification will not serve the intended purposes of collective

actions: conservation of parties’ resources and the efficient resolution of common issues of

law and fact. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170, 110 S.Ct. at 486. Defendant notes

that plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $33,000 each and that the FLSA authorizes feeshifting, so plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees and costs if successful. Defendant further

argues that collective treatment is not efficient because adjudication will require a case by

case evaluation of each plaintiff’s daily duties. 

We disagree and conclude that conditional certification will likely promote the

preservation of the parties’ resources and the efficient resolution of the members’ FLSA

claims. Some variation in the working routines of individual plaintiffs is inevitable, and if

that alone were sufficient to defeat certification, few employee groups could ever be granted

class treatment. Even if the exemption inquiry is fact-intensive, many relevant circumstances

may be similar among class members. Courts have conditionally certified classes of retail

managers. See, e.g. Aros, 269 F.R.D. at 178 (conditionally certifying class of “operations

managers” of defendant’s 500 equipment rental branches). Additionally, while plaintiffs’

alleged damages might justify individual proceedings, other potential class members may

have FLSA claims for much smaller amounts. 

Plaintiffs have shown a reasonable basis “to conclude that questions common to a

potential group of plaintiffs would predominate a determination of the merits in this case.”

Mike v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 274 F.Supp.2d 216, 220 (D. Conn. 2003). Their

declarations and other exhibits show that all class members are classified as non-exempt,

perform similar duties pursuant to identical job descriptions, and that there exists a high

degree of uniformity of operations across stores. Because plaintiffs have shown that they are

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similarly situated to store managers throughout the United States with respect to their FLSA

claim, we grant conditional collective action status.

II

Plaintiffs request that we order defendant to provide addresses, phone numbers, and

social security numbers for all potential class members. The production of addresses is

appropriate, but in the interest of protecting class members’ privacy, we will not order

defendant to provide telephone numbers and social security numbers. Such information is

sensitive, and putative class members may have provided personal data to defendant with the

expectation of confidentiality. See Stickle, 2009 WL 3241790, *7 (supplying “the phone

numbers of thousands of Defendants’ current and former employees seems like a needless

intrusion into the privacy of these individuals and their families. . . . Similarly, Plaintiffs are

not entitled to any social security numbers.”) (citations omitted).

Defendant requests that we order a third party administrator to send notice to potential

class members. Response at 19. However, defendant points to no deficiencies in the form

of plaintiffs’ proposed notice, nor any reason to believe plaintiffs will distribute misleading

communications. Accordingly, there is no reason to impose this additional expense. 

We also agree with defendant that a sixty-day opt-in period is sufficient. This is

enough time to locate potential plaintiffs. 

III

Plaintiffs move for judicial notice of three court-approved notices and consent to sue

forms sent to prospective members in other FLSA actions, and the courts’ orders approving

the notices. See Motion for Judicial Notice (doc. 33). The motion is unopposed. We may

take judicial notice of documents that are part of an official federal court record. Service

Employees Intern. Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1357 n.3 (9th

Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (permitting judicial notice of facts “capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.”). These documents are properly subject to judicial notice, and plaintiffs’ motion

is granted. 

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IV

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiffs’ motion for conditional FLSA class

certification (doc. 28). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is conditionally

certified as a representative collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all

AutoZone store managers employed anywhere in the United States except California between

July 16, 2007 and July 16, 2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall produce in Microsoft Excel

format the names and addresses for all AutoZone store managers employed anywhere in the

United States except California between July 16, 2007 and July 16, 2010 within thirty (30)

days of this order 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within forty-five (45) days of the date of this

order, plaintiffs shall mail notice of the FLSA action to all potential opt-in plaintiffs in the

form of the proposed notice and consent to sue form (docs. 29-3 & 29-4), except that the

notice shall be modified so as to give potential class members sixty (60) days to return the

consent to sue form. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all potential plaintiffs may “opt-in” to the

collective action within sixty (60) days of the mailing of the notice of collective action by

sending the consent to sue form to plaintiffs’ counsel.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice

(doc. 33).

DATED this 24th day of May, 2011.

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