Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00158/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00158-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEBRHATO TSEHAI,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, WARDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00158-REC-LJO-P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING ACTION BE DISMISSED,

WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF

MAY BE GRANTED UNDER SECTION 1983

(Doc. 10)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Amended Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Mebrhato Tsehai (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

February 4, 2005. On August 8, 2005, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to

amend, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint on September 6, 2005.

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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 It is unclear if plaintiff was slammed on the wall once and then three more times later, or if he was

slammed on the wall three times total.

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

C. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the California State PrisonCorcoran, where plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names Correctional Officer T. Bauer

as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2003, defendant Bauer slammed him “on the wall”

three or four times.1 (Amend. Comp., § IV.)

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

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deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause [of the Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is

. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7. “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not

end it.” Id. 

Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at

9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s

chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,

1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of

a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10.

Plaintiff was previously informed that the “conclusory allegation that he was slammed into

the wall three times is insufficient to support a claim that defendant Bauer used excessive force

against him, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment rights.” (Doc. 13, 3:8-10.) Whether plaintiff

was slammed on the wall three or four times, plaintiff’s allegation is insufficient to support a claim

for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the court shall

recommend dismissal of this action. 

///

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D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under section 1983 against defendant Bauer. Plaintiff was previously provided leave

to amend to cure the deficiency in his claim, but failed to do so. Accordingly, based on the

foregoing, itis HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure

to state a clam upon which relief may be granted under section 1983.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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