Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02309/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02309-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MAHAD AHMED, 

Petitioner,

v. 

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-02309-H-JLB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 8] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

Marilyn L. Huff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Petitioner Mahad Ahmed (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging 

his San Diego Superior Court jury conviction for murder in the second degree and assault 

by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (ECF No. 1.) Now before the Court is 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition. (ECF No. 8.) Respondent contends that the 

Petition should be dismissed with prejudice as untimely and, alternatively, should be 

dismissed without prejudice due to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies 

as to one of his seven claims. (Id.) The Court has reviewed the Petition, the motion to 

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dismiss, and the lodgments. For the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS

that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 On June 14, 2014, Petitioner and a group of friends were walking in the Gaslamp 

area of downtown San Diego. (ECF No. 9-1 at 3-4.) The group came across brothers 

Michael and Phillip Beaver and their friend Dan Devito. (Id.) Petitioner and his group 

approached the Beavers and Devito. (Id.) After Michael Beaver engaged with members 

of Petitioner’s group, Petitioner punched Michael Beaver in the head causing him to fly 

backwards and hit his head on a metal railing. (Id. at 4-5, 8.) Petitioner and his friends 

left, and Michael Beaver was taken to the hospital by ambulance where he was pronounced 

dead. (Id. at 5-6, 8.) 

 Petitioner was arrested on June 15, 2014. (Id. at 6.) At trial, the People of the State 

of California (“the People”) proceeded on a second degree murder theory that Petitioner 

acted with implied malice. (Id.) The People presented evidence that Michael Beaver’s 

death was caused by blunt force injury to the head and introduced evidence of three 

uncharged acts of violence involving Petitioner. (Id. at 6-9.) Petitioner denied ever being 

in a fight in which he had seriously injured anyone. (Id. at 8.) 

On May 15, 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of murder in the second degree (Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a)) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Cal. Penal 

Code § 245(a)(4)). (Id. at 2; see also ECF No. 9-5 at 1.) As to the assault, the jury found 

true allegations that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury, and inflicted great 

bodily injury causing a coma due to brain injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a), (b)). (Id.) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years to life for the murder and stayed execution 

of a four-year upper term for the assault and also stayed five- and three-year enhancements 

for the Section 12022.7(a) and (b) allegations. (Id.) 

 Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal. (Id.) In his 

appeal, Petitioner raised the following grounds for reversal: (1) the trial court prejudicially 

erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 520 on implied malice without stating 

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that implied malice requires that the act causing death be one that has a high degree of 

probability it would result in death; (2) the deficiency in the implied malice jury instruction 

makes the implied malice standard void for vagueness as applied to him in violation of his 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process; (3) the trial court erred by 

admitting uncharged acts to show his conduct in the present case was dangerous to human 

life; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to prove his acts were sufficiently dangerous to 

constitute implied malice. (Id.) On December 23, 2016, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 

judgment in a reasoned opinion. (Id. at 2-35.) 

On January 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California 

Supreme Court. (ECF No. 9-2.) Petitioner raised the same grounds for relief that he raised 

before the Court of Appeal. (Id. at 7-8.) On March 1, 2017, the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition for review. (ECF No. 9-3.) 

 On February 21, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively1

 filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior Court. (See ECF No. 9-4 at 13-14.) In his 

petition, Petitioner asserted the following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel for failing to submit a peremptory challenge to the assigned trial judge on a 

good faith belief of prejudice; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a 

writ of mandate/prohibition before the Court of Appeal challenging the trial judge’s denial 

of a request for mistrial; and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to 

raise trial counsel’s ineffective assistance with regard to her failure to file a writ of 

mandate/prohibition. (Id. at 3-11.) On April 5, 2018, the Superior Court denied the petition 

on the merits. (ECF No. 9-5.) 

                                               

1

 “Under the mailbox rule, a prisoner’s pro se habeas petition is ‘deemed filed 

when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing to the relevant court.’” Campbell 

v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). “The mailbox 

rule applies to federal and state petitions alike.” Id. (citing Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 

1199, 1201 (9th. Cir. 2003); Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813, 816 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

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 On April 16, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, raising the same grounds for relief 

contained in his Superior Court petition. (ECF No. 9-6.) The Court of Appeal denied the 

petition on April 27, 2018, reasoning that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief 

because he had filed his petition “more than two years after he was sentenced and 16 

months after the judgment was affirmed on appeal without any explanation for the delay,” 

and therefore the petition was barred as untimely. (ECF No. 9-7 at 2.) The Court of Appeal 

added that “[e]ven if the petition were not procedurally barred, it would be denied for 

failure to state a prima facie claim for relief.” (Id.) 

On May 11, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, raising the same grounds for relief 

stated in his prior habeas petitions. (ECF No. 9-8.) The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition on September 12, 2018. (ECF No. 9-9.) 

On October 1, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively filed his Petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (ECF No. 1 at 19-21.) In the Petition, Petitioner 

raises the following seven grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 

failing to object to the use of jury instruction CALCRIM No. 520; (2) instructing the jury 

with CALCRIM No. 520 on implied malice without stating that implied malice requires 

that the act causing death be one that has a high degree of probability it would result in 

death in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; (3) introducing uncharged acts to show Petitioner’s conduct in the present 

case was dangerous to human life in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights and right 

to a fair trial; (4) insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction of second degree 

murder; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to peremptorily challenge the 

trial judge; (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a writ of 

mandate/prohibition before the Court of Appeal challenging the trial judge’s denial of a 

request for mistrial; and (7) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise 

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trial counsel’s ineffective assistance with regard to her failure to file a writ of 

mandate/prohibition. (Id.) 

On February 22, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition and a notice 

of lodgment. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) Petitioner’s opposition to the motion was due March 28, 

2019, but no opposition was filed. (See ECF No. 5 at ¶ 3.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 2254(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides the scope of review 

for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in [sic] behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

In addition, federal habeas corpus claims filed after April 24, 1996, such as those 

here, are subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

326-27 (1997) (holding that federal courts reviewing any habeas petition filed in federal 

court after the April 24, 1996 enactment of AEDPA will apply its provisions). Under 

AEDPA, a petitioner must overcome a high threshold to obtain relief: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 

the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). 

/// 

/// 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that it is time-barred 

pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (ECF 

No. 8.) Respondent argues in the alternative that the Petition should be dismissed because 

Petitioner failed to exhaust one of his seven claims and has not requested a stay. (Id.) 

A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) 

 1. Legal Standard 

AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on all habeas petitions filed by 

persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period begins to run from the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on 

which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on 

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date 

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Once a petitioner is notified that his petition is subject to dismissal based on 

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the 

limitation period is sufficiently tolled under statutory and/or equitable principles. Smith v. 

Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

 2. Analysis 

Petitioner has not alleged any facts or claims in his Petition to suggest the application 

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). Accordingly, the Court will apply Section 

2254(d)(1)(A). In order to determine whether a petition is untimely under Section 

2254(d)(1)(A), the Court must first determine when the state court judgment became final. 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of direct review concludes when the time 

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court expires. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to 

Supreme Court Rule 13, the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment 

entered by a state court of last resort expires 90 days after entry of the judgment. Sup. Ct. 

R. 13; see also Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159. 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on March 1, 

2017. Petitioner did not thereafter file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Therefore, the statute of limitations period began to run 

90 days later, on May 30, 2017, and the limitations period expired under Section 

2254(d)(1)(A) on May 30, 2018. The present Petition was constructively filed on October 

1, 2018, over four months after the limitations period expired. (See ECF No. 1 at 19-21.) 

As a result, the Petition is untimely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), unless Petitioner can 

establish that he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

The one-year statute of limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, Petitioner constructively filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, his first application for State post-conviction review, in 

the Superior Court on February 21, 2018. (See ECF No. 9-4 at 13-14.) The Superior Court 

denied the petition on April 5, 2018. (ECF No. 9-5.) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to 

statutory tolling of 44 days while his petition was pending before the Superior Court. (See 

ECF No. 8-1 at 4.) 

On April 16, 2018, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with the Court of Appeal. (ECF No. 9-6.) The Court of Appeal denied the petition on 

April 27, 2018, stating as follows: 

Ahmed is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. His petition, filed more than 

two years after he was sentenced and 16 months after the judgment was 

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affirmed on appeal without any explanation for the delay, is barred as 

untimely. (In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703; In re Swain (1949) 34 

Cal.2d 300, 302.) “[T]he filing of untimely claims without any serious 

attempt at justification is an example of abusive writ practice.” (In re Reno

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460.) Ahmed’s “failure to affirmatively address the 

applicability of procedural obstacles to consideration of the claims raised in 

[his] habeas corpus petition justifies summary denial without the court’s 

consideration of the merits.” (Id. at p. 511.) 

(ECF No. 9-7 at 2.) The Court of Appeal added that “[e]ven if the petition were not 

procedurally barred, it would be denied for failure to state a prima facie claim for relief.” 

(Id.) 

A habeas petition that is untimely under state law is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 

U.S. at 413-14. As such, none of the time before or during the state court’s consideration 

of an untimely petition is tolled for purposes of AEDPA’s limitations period. See Curiel 

v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 197 

(2006)); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 439 F.3d 993 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

On May 11, 2018, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Supreme Court, raising the same grounds for relief stated in his prior 

habeas petitions. (ECF No. 9-8.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the 

petition on September 12, 2018. (ECF No. 9-9.) Applying the “look through” doctrine,2

the Court finds that because the Court of Appeal dismissed Petitioner’s petition as 

                                               

2

 The “look through” doctrine provides that “[w]hen at least one state court has 

rendered a reasoned decision, but the last state court to reject a prisoner’s claim issues an 

order ‘whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment,’ 

we ‘look through’ the mute decision and presume the higher court agreed with and adopted 

the reasons given by the lower court.” Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870 (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797, 802-06 (1991)). “That doctrine has universally been applied in cases where 

the court rendering a reasoned decision and a later court making a summary determination 

were facing precisely the same issue.” Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 

2019). 

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untimely, his California Supreme Court petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA. 

See Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148-49, 1148 n.13 (looking through unexplained decisions of the 

California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court to a California Superior Court 

decision holding that a petition was untimely to conclude that the petition was untimely 

and the prisoner was not entitled to statutory tolling). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled 

to any additional statutory tolling. See Valdez, 918 F.3d at 690 (“[I]f a prisoner timely files 

his or her first state habeas petition but does not timely file a second petition, then the 

prisoner is not entitled to tolling for the period following the denial of the first petition.”).3

The fact that the Court of Appeal stated that “[e]ven if the petition were not 

procedurally barred, it would be denied for failure to state a prima facie claim for relief” 

and discussed the merits does not change the outcome. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

225-26 (2002) (holding that state court alternative rulings did not make petition timely, and 

thus “properly filed,” under state law); Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148-49 (finding “the fact that 

the superior court also denied [the] petition on the merits [does not] save [the] petition” for 

purposes of AEDPA where the superior court dismissed it as untimely).4

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling of only 44 days, 

thereby extending the deadline to file his federal habeas petition to July 13, 2018. Because 

                                               

3

 See also Paul v. Kernan, No. CV 15-07399 CJC (AFM), 2016 WL 8504497, 

at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016), adopted by 2017 WL 1025166 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017) 

(finding that the petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling for any of the time before or 

during the California Court of Appeal’s and California Supreme Court’s consideration of 

his habeas petitions because the Court of Appeal found the petition untimely and the 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition). 

4

 See also Gonzales v. Santoro, No. CV 15-1941 MRW, 2016 WL 2586357, at 

*3-4 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2016), aff’d, 735 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that the 

petitioner was not entitled to additional statutory tolling where the California Court of 

Appeal addressed the merits and found the petition to be untimely and the California 

Supreme Court denied relief without comment or citation).

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Petitioner did not constructively file his petition until October 1, 2018, the petition is barred 

as untimely under AEDPA, unless equitable tolling applies. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

Petitions filed under Section 2244(d) may be subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-49 (2010) (holding that § 2244(d) 

is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases). “If a prisoner can demonstrate that he 

is entitled to equitable tolling for a certain period of time, that period will be subtracted 

from the total number of days that have passed.” Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 

(9th Cir. 2017). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of 

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The grounds 

for equitable tolling ‘are highly fact-dependent.’” Grant, 862 F.3d at 918 (quoting Sossa 

v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1237 (9th Cir. 2013)). They do require, however, the occurrence 

of an “extraordinary circumstance.” Id. (citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 

1999)). 

Here, Petitioner has not alleged, nor does the record suggest, that any extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way of filing a timely petition. Petitioner “bears the burden of 

proving that the statute of limitation was tolled.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 967 (9th 

Cir. 2010); see also Valdez, 918 F.3d at 691. He has not done so here. Therefore, equitable 

tolling does not apply, and the Court recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss on 

the grounds that it is untimely under AEDPA be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

5

 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

                                               

5

 As the Court finds that the Petition is untimely, the Court does not address 

Respondent’s second argument that the Petition should be dismissed without prejudice 

because Petitioner failed to exhaust state court remedies as to one of his claims. (See ECF 

Nos. 8; 8-1 at 5-7.) 

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Marilyn L. Huff under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and 

adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that the motion to dismiss be 

GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written objections 

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than July 16, 2019. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 30, 2019. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: June 25, 2019 

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