Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05083/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 100
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT VE TICARET A.S.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5083

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00888-TCW, Judge Thomas C. 

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: August 17, 2016

______________________ 

SAM GDANSKI, Gdanski & Gdanski LLP, Teaneck, NJ, 

argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

AGATHA KOPROWSKI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM; JAMES D. STEPHENS,

MICHAEL A. REAS, Middle East District, United States 

Army Corps of Engineers, Winchester, VA.

______________________ 

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2 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

Before LOURIE, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Zafer Taahhut Insaat ve Ticaret A.S. (“Zafer”) appeals 

from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’s (“Claims Court”) 

(1) grant of summary judgment that the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (“USACE”) did not constructively change the 

terms of its contract with Zafer; and (2) denial of Zafer’s 

motion to supplement the record with several newspaper

articles. Zafer Taahhut Insaat ve Ticaret A.S. v. United 

States, 120 Fed. Cl. 604, 612 (2015). For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Zafer is an experienced construction contractor located in Ankara, Turkey. In May 2011, USACE entered into 

a firm-fixed-price contract with Zafer, No. W912BU-11-C0017, to construct the MILCON Consolidated Community 

Support Facility at the Bagram Air Force Field in Afghanistan. Under the terms of the contract, Zafer was responsible for delivering construction materials to the project’s

site, and assumed the risk “for all costs and resulting loss 

or profit.” See 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-1. Further, the contract 

incorporated several standard Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) provisions, such as a Changes clause, FAR 

52.243-4, a Default clause, FAR 52.249-10, and an F.O.B. 

Destination clause, FAR 47.303-6. 

The Default clause is of particular relevance here. It 

provides, in pertinent part: 

(b) The Contractor’s right to proceed shall not be 

terminated nor the Contractor charged with damages under this clause, if— 

(1) The delay in completing the work arises from 

unforeseeable causes beyond the control and 

without the fault or negligence of the Contractor. . 

. . ; and 

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ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 3

(2) The Contractor, within 10 days from the beginning of any delay . . . , notifies the Contracting 

Officer in writing of the causes of delay. The Contracting Officer shall ascertain the facts and the 

extent of the delay. If, in the judgment of the 

Contracting Officer, the findings of fact warrant 

such action, the time for completing the work 

shall be extended. . . . 

48 C.F.R. § 52.249-10(b) (2007). 

In June 2011, Zafer received a notice to proceed with 

the contract, with a contract completion date in November 

2012. USACE later recognized that it could not make the 

project site available until June 2012, and it accordingly 

issued a bilateral modification that increased the contract 

price and set a new completion date in October 2013. 

 In November 2011, the government of Pakistan closed

its border from the seaport city of Karachi along the land 

routes into Afghanistan (“the Karachi/Afghan route”) in 

response to a combat incident with the U.S. and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (“U.S./NATO incident”) that 

allegedly killed twenty-four Pakistani citizens. The route 

remained closed for 219 days, until July 2012. 

 By letter dated March 20, 2012, Zafer notified USACE 

that the closure of the Karachi/Afghan route would greatly impact its delivery of materials, as required under the 

contract. See Joint App. (“J.A.”) 29–30. Specifically, Zafer 

noted that the “unexpected closure” of the Karachi/Afghan 

route grossly affected its logistics because a “considerable 

amount of project materials/equipment are stuck at the 

Pakistan border.” J.A. 29. As Zafer indicated, “[n]ineteen 

(19) of [the twenty-four] shipments are already at Karachi 

and have not been allowed to move for a long time.” J.A.

29. Zafer then requested direction on how to proceed, e.g., 

if it should ship via another route with increased shipping 

time and associated costs. J.A. 30. 

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4 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

USACE replied on June 27, 2012, acknowledging the 

difficulties arising from the closure of the Karachi/Afghan 

route. J.A. 31. It informed Zafer, however, that because 

the closure was “purely the act of Pakistan governmental 

authorities,” and the U.S. government was “not responsible for these sovereign acts of a foreign nature,” Zafer was 

nevertheless obliged to deliver the materials and supplies 

by “any means necessary,” without further compensation. 

J.A. 31. USACE then stated that its contract with Zafer

allows for a non-compensable time extension in the event 

of an unforeseeable delay. See J.A. 31 (referencing the 

Default clause, FAR 52.249-10). And, if Zafer “believe[s] 

that [it is] entitled to a non-compensable extension of time 

to perform . . . [, it] may submit a request to the [contracting officer].” J.A. 31. USACE specified that any request

“must fully explain why the delay was unforeseeable” and 

“include documentation of the date when the materials or 

equipment were shipped and when the delay began at the 

Pakistan border.” J.A. 31. 

Soon thereafter, on July 11, 2012, Zafer responded to 

USACE’s letter. Zafer acknowledged that, by July 11, the 

Karachi/Afghan route had reopened, but stated: “We want

to put [USACE] on notice of Zafer’s entitlement to additional time, but also several additional entitlements for 

increased costs occasioned by the border closing.” J.A. 32. 

Zafer then outlined several categories of costs, including 

constructive acceleration costs, port detention and demurrage, and extended overhead. J.A. 32. It finally concluded its letter by challenging USACE’s position that USACE

was not responsible for any additional costs incurred. See

J.A. 33–34. 

USACE did not immediately respond to Zafer’s July 

11, 2012 letter. So, on October 24, 2012, Zafer sent another letter to USACE with an update, indicating that the 

materials and equipment held at the Karachi port “have 

now begun the process of being released back into normal 

distribution,” and that the Pakistan government demands 

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ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 5

“extra payment before [it] will release these shipments.” 

J.A. 36. Zafer asked for payment to cover the additional 

costs, and for direction on how to proceed. J.A. 36.

That same day, October 24, USACE replied, repeating 

its earlier, June 27, 2012 letter. USACE stated that Zafer 

remains responsible for delivering all materials “by whatever means necessary,” and that USACE “will not assume 

responsibility for any increased costs of delivering construction material and equipment.” J.A. 37. USACE last 

noted that, under the terms of the contract, Zafer could 

request a non-compensable time extension, and that any

request should “explain why the delay was unforeseeable” 

and “include documentation of the date when the materials or equipment were shipped and when the delay began.” J.A. 37. 

Zafer replied on October 31, 2012, challenging whether USACE should bear responsibility for increased costs. 

In particular, Zafer argued that the border closure was 

not solely the result of “acts of a sovereign not under the 

control of the US,” but rather a result “of US/NATO firing 

accident.” J.A. 38. It reiterated that it “wishe[d] to put 

USACE on notice of Zafer’s entitlement to additional time 

and also additional entitlement for increased costs.” See

J.A. 39 (“Zafer will, under protest, ship its material from 

Karachi to Bagram expeditiously but reiterates its position more fully outlined in its July 11, 2012, Serial Letter 

23 that it is entitled to additional time and will look to the 

Government to recoup the increased costs occasioned by 

the border closing.”). 

On February 22, 2013, Zafer submitted a request for 

an equitable adjustment to the contracting officer. In its 

request, Zafer “asserted that the Government is liable for 

[the] increased costs of re-procurement, shipping, D&D 

(detention and demurrage) and warehousing” occasioned 

by the Karachi/Afghan route closure. J.A. 41. Zafer again 

reiterated its belief that the U.S. government was responCase: 15-5083 Document: 44-2 Page: 5 Filed: 08/17/2016
6 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

sible for the route closure, and thus for any increased 

costs that Zafer consequently incurred. J.A. 41. On May 

20, 2013, after three months with no response from 

USACE, Zafer resubmitted its request for an equitable 

adjustment, expressly “request[ing] a Contracting Officer’s decision.” See J.A. 46. Zafer included a certification with its request and thus “consider[ed] the proposal a 

Claim.” J.A. 46. On July 25, 2013, the contracting officer 

denied the claim, finding that no evidence supported a 

constructive change claim, and stating that “Zafer made a 

business decision to continue to procure materials and 

ship through Karachi,” despite its knowledge of the closure. J.A. 17–21; see also Zafer, 120 Fed. Cl. at 608. 

Zafer consequently filed a complaint in the Claims 

Court on November 8, 2013, alleging, inter alia, that

USACE constructively changed the terms of the contract. 

Specifically, Zafer set forth two grounds for constructive 

change: (1) USACE constructively accelerated the contract when it ordered Zafer to perform despite the delays 

occasioned by the Karachi/Afghan route closure; and (2) 

the delay is the fault of the U.S. government because it 

caused the route closure (the U.S./NATO incident) and it 

ineffectively negotiated with Pakistan to reopen the route

quickly. See Zafer, 120 Fed. Cl. at 610. USACE moved to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, for 

summary judgment. See id. at 608. Zafer filed a response 

and moved to supplement the record. Id. 

The Claims Court granted USACE’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Zafer could not establish 

that USACE constructively changed the terms of the 

contract.1 Id. at 610. First, the court held that Zafer did 

1 The Claims Court noted that USACE’s motion for 

summary judgment more properly disposed of the issue, 

for both parties “submitted and relied upon documentary 

 

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ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 7

not have a valid constructive acceleration claim because: 

(1) Zafer’s claimed costs only arose from shipping and 

storage, not performance; (2) the contract did not specify 

the use of the Karachi/Afghan route, and thus USACE’s

demand to complete the delivery by “whatever means 

necessary” did not require a method of shipping beyond 

that required in the contract; and (3) USACE did not deny 

any request for additional time. Id. The court then held 

that Zafer did not establish that the U.S. government was 

responsible for the delays because: (1) another sovereign, 

not the U.S. government, closed the Karachi/Afghan 

route; and (2) the U.S. government was not acting in its 

“contractual capacity” when it negotiated with Pakistan 

to reopen the route. See id. at 610–11. The court lastly 

denied Zafer’s motion to supplement the record because

the proffered newspaper articles and social media sources 

constituted inadmissible hearsay and were barred by the 

parol evidence rule. See id. at 611–12. 

Zafer timely appealed; we have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

I 

Zafer first challenges the grant of summary judgment 

to USACE of no constructive change. See Oral Argument

at 2:25–2:34 (constructive acceleration claim); Appellant’s 

Br. 7–24 (constructive change, generally). For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. 

We review de novo the Claims Court’s grant of summary judgment, drawing all factual inferences in favor of 

the nonmovant. See Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 

1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is proper 

evidence and pleadings beyond Zafer’s complaint.” Zafer, 

120 Fed. Cl. at 608. 

 

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8 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” RCFC 56(a). 

“A firm-fixed price contract provides for a price that is 

not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing,” 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-1, 

and generally sets forth a fixed scope of work. Nevertheless, a contracting officer may adjust “the work within the 

general scope of the contract” under a Changes clause, id.

§ 52.243-4(a), and the contractor may receive an equitable 

adjustment for changes contemplated by that clause, id.

§ 52.243-4(c)–(e); see, e.g., id. § 52.243-4(a)(4) (“Directing 

acceleration in the performance”). The contracting officer 

typically effectuates such a change by submitting a formal 

change order to the contractor. Id. § 52.243-4(b). 

Even absent a formal order under the Changes clause,

the contracting officer may still constructively change the 

contract, “either due to an informal order from, or through

the fault of, the government.” NavCom Def. Elecs., Inc. v. 

England, 53 F. App’x 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Metric 

Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 804, 817 

n.19 (2008) (“The theory of constructive change developed 

by judicial evolution. In cases where the contract work 

was actually changed but the procedures of a changes 

clause in the contract were not followed, early appeals 

boards found that a change had been ‘constructively’ 

ordered.”) (citation omitted). Zafer invokes both grounds 

for a constructive change, and we address each in turn. 

First, an informal order to accelerate contract performance (constructive acceleration) can effect a constructive 

change to the contract requiring an equitable adjustment. 

Accord Fraser Constr. Co. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1354, 

1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Constructive acceleration often 

occurs when the government demands compliance with an

original contract deadline, despite excusable delay by the 

contractor. See id. at 1361. We have set forth five eleCase: 15-5083 Document: 44-2 Page: 8 Filed: 08/17/2016
ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 9

ments that a contractor must prove to successfully allege

a constructive acceleration claim: 

(1) that the contractor encountered a delay that is 

excusable under the contract; (2) that the contractor made a timely and sufficient request for an extension of the contract schedule; (3) that the 

government denied the contractor’s request for an 

extension or failed to act on it within a reasonable 

time; (4) that the government insisted on completion of the contract within a period shorter than 

the period to which the contractor would be entitled by taking into account the period of excusable 

delay, after which the contractor notified the government that it regarded the alleged order to accelerate as a constructive change in the contract; 

and (5) that the contractor was required to expend 

extra resources to compensate for the lost time 

and remain on schedule. 

Id. (citations omitted).

Zafer first argues that USACE’s repeated “by whatever means necessary” statement required Zafer to perform 

work beyond that required in the contract, which implicitly required all shipping to occur exclusively via the Karachi/Afghan route. Appellant’s Br. 13–20 (invoking Appeal 

of Dougherty Overseas, Inc., 68-2 B.C.A. P 7165, ENGBCA 

2625, 1968 WL 445 (May 2, 1968), and Appeal of AlleyCassetty Coal Co., 89-3 B.C.A. P 21964, ASBCA No. 

33315, 1989 WL 74890 (May 10, 1989), for support). Zafer 

next challenges the Claims Court’s determination that the 

claimed costs arose exclusively from storage and shipping, 

and that USACE did not deny a request for a time extension.2 E.g., id. at 15–16, 18. 

2 The Claims Court indicated that “Zafer received a 

reasonable time extension due to the border closure,” and 

 

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10 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

USACE responds first that Zafer failed to present any 

evidence showing that USACE demanded additional work 

because the contract did not specify a particular transportation route, and USACE, at most, insisted on compliance 

with the express terms of the contract. See Appellee’s Br. 

13–18. USACE then contends that Zafer likewise did not 

present any evidence showing that it spent additional 

resources to stay on track, id. at 19–20, did not submit a 

request for an extension of time, id. at 20–22, and did not 

establish that USACE denied its request for an extension 

of time, id. at 22–24. 

As we set forth in Fraser, a contractor must prove all 

five elements to allege a successful constructive acceleration claim. 384 F.3d at 1361. Thus, an entry of summary 

judgment is appropriate against a contractor “who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

essential element to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). That is so, for “a complete failure of 

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Because Zafer failed to designate specific 

facts sufficient to establish that USACE denied a request 

for a time extension, we affirm the Claims Court’s conclusion that Zafer failed to establish a constructive acceleration claim. 

thus there was no improper denial by USACE. Zafer, 120 

Fed. Cl. at 610. Zafer argues that the extension granted 

in bilateral modification P00004 was not because of the 

route closure. See Appellant’s Br. 13. USACE concedes 

as much. See Appellee’s Br. 22. Although we agree that 

the Claims Court erred in this respect, we still affirm its 

ultimate conclusion that USACE did not deny a request 

for a time extension, for the reasons that follow.

 

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ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 11

As described above, Zafer and USACE had significant 

correspondence concerning the route closure. Zafer first 

alerted USACE to the associated complications in March 

2012. USACE acknowledged the difficulties and informed 

Zafer that, pursuant to the contract, Zafer could request a 

non-compensable time extension. Most notably, USACE 

requested Zafer “fully explain why the delay was unforeseeable” and provide all “documentation of the date when 

the materials or equipment were shipped and when the 

delay began at the Pakistan border.” J.A. 31. Those 

demands are entirely consistent with the contracting 

officer’s duty to make specific factual determinations 

regarding the delay, such as whether a time extension is 

proper and, if so, how much time should be awarded. 48 

C.F.R. § 52.249-10(b)(1)–(2). Indeed, though not required, 

contractors requesting a time extension for an excusable 

delay regularly ask for a specific time frame to ameliorate 

the harms of delay. See, e.g., Azure v. United States, 129 

F.3d 136, 1997 WL 665763, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) 

(table) (“In a letter dated July 15, 1993, Azure requested a 

time extension of seventeen calendar days.”); Appeal of 

Trepte Constr. Co., Inc., 90-1 B.C.A. P 22595, ASBCA No. 

38555, 1990 WL 101600 (Jan. 4, 1990) (asking for a 150-

day time extension); Stroh Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 

96-1 B.C.A. P 28265, GSBCA No. 11029, 1996 WL 154494 

(Mar. 29, 1996) (asking for a 130-day time extension). 

 In response, Zafer set forth the reasons for the delay, 

proclaimed its “entitlement to additional time,” and asked 

for compensation for all “increased costs occasioned by the 

border closing.” J.A. 32–34. Notably, however, Zafer did 

not ask for a specific amount of time. J.A. 32–34; see also

Oral Argument at 3:16–3:28 (When asked if Zafer asked 

for a specific time extension, its counsel responded “no.”). 

A few months later, USACE responded and reiterated its 

earlier request for “documentation of the date when the 

materials or equipment were shipped and when the delay 

began” so that it could assess whether a time extension 

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12 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

might be warranted. J.A. 37. Zafer replied, asking again 

for additional monies, yet failing again to describe a time 

frame. See J.A. 39. At most, Zafer “put USACE on notice 

of [its] entitlement to additional time,” generally. J.A. 39. 

Soon thereafter, Zafer submitted a request for an equitable adjustment and initiated the proper procedures under 

the Contract Disputes Act. See J.A. 41, 46. 

On the facts as they have been alleged, and after construing them all in the light most favorable to Zafer, we 

must conclude that there is no genuine factual dispute 

indicating that USACE improperly denied a request for a 

time extension. To the extent that Zafer’s repeated “notice of entitlement to additional time” amounts to a “timely and sufficient request for an extension” under Fraser, 

384 F.3d at 1361, no facts indicate that USACE denied 

the request. The submitted correspondence simply reflects an ongoing conversation between the contractor and 

the U.S. government, an ongoing conversation aimed at 

resolving the obvious issues presented by the Karachi/Afghan route closure. None of the letters reveal an 

express or even an implied statement by USACE that a 

request for a time extension was denied. Compare Appeal 

of Cont’l Heller Corp., 84-2 B.C.A. P 17275, GSBCA No. 

7140, 1984 WL 13283, at ¶ 22 (Mar. 23, 1984) (“Until the 

requirements noted above are met . . . , your request for a 

contract time extension is denied.”). Rather, the contracting officer repeatedly asked for more information so that 

it could make a proper determination, a request that 

Zafer repeatedly failed to comply with. We decline to 

accept that remarks made by a contracting officer in an

ongoing conversation such as this amount to a denial of 

an extension of time for purposes of a constructive acceleration claim. Zafer failed to allege any facts beyond the 

above-mentioned conversation to establish that USACE 

improperly denied its request. Accordingly, Zafer’s constructive acceleration claim fails. 

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Next, a constructive change may result through the

fault of the government that warrants an equitable adjustment to the contract. NavCom, 53 F. App’x at 900. 

Zafer argues that the U.S. government is at fault for the 

delay because the U.S./NATO incident led to the route 

closure, and the U.S. government prolonged the delay 

when it acted in its contractual capacity during negotiations with Pakistan to reopen the route. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 8 (“The US and Pakistan engaged in long 

arduous and at times contentious negotiations for reparations and other payments to Pakistan, and most likely 

individuals, businesses and other affected parties.”). In 

support of its argument, Zafer relies only on newspaper 

articles and social media sources detailing the closure and

negotiation. See, e.g., id. at 11 (referring to a New York 

Times article and e-mails from a shipping agent discussing the hold-up of cargo at the port of Karachi); id. at 29 

(referring to a New York Times article suggesting that the 

U.S. “withdrew a team because negotiations were stalemated after trying to obtain the opening of the border”). 

We find neither of Zafer’s arguments to be persuasive. 

First, the U.S. government was not responsible for the 

route closure. As both parties have acknowledged, the 

Pakistan government alone closed the route, Zafer, 120 

Fed. Cl. at 610–11, and the U.S. government is not responsible for the sovereign acts of a foreign nation. Zafer 

has failed to proffer any evidence suggesting otherwise. 

Second, the U.S. government is typically not responsible for any “obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a 

sovereign.” See Conner Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Geren, 

550 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 

385 (1865) (“[T]he United States as a contractor cannot be 

held liable directly or indirectly for the public acts of the 

United States as a sovereign.”). An exception, however, to 

this “sovereign acts defense” is that the government may 

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14 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

be responsible for an act “specifically directed at nullifying contract rights.” Id. at 1374–75; see United States v. 

Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) (“The sovereign 

acts doctrine thus balances the Government’s need for 

freedom to legislate with its obligation to honor its contracts by asking whether the sovereign act is properly 

attributable to the Government as a contractor.”); Conner, 

550 F.3d at 1374 (“[C]ourts addressing the sovereign acts 

doctrine have looked to the extent to which the governmental action was directed to relieving the government of 

its contractual obligations.”); City Line Joint Venture v. 

United States, 503 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that legislation abrogating the option of low-income 

apartment owners to prepay their mortgages was not a 

sovereign act because it was “aimed at the contract rights 

themselves in order to nullify them”). 

In this case, Zafer has not alleged any facts indicating 

that the U.S. government’s negotiations with Pakistan to 

reopen the route were “specifically directed at nullifying 

contract rights.” For example, it does not allege that the 

governmental action at issue “applie[d] exclusively to the 

contractor” rather than “more broadly to include other 

parties not in a contractual relationship with the government.” See, e.g., Conner, 550 F.3d at 1375 (citing Yankee 

Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1576 

(Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Horowitz v. United States, 267 

U.S. 458, 461 (1925) (“Whatever acts the government may 

do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be 

public and general, cannot be deemed specifically to alter, 

modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into 

which it enters with private persons.”). Instead, Zafer 

made broad and unsubstantiated allegations that the U.S. 

“contractually interfered, hindered, delayed, [sic] resolution of the border clos[ure] [issue].” See Zafer, 120 Fed. 

Cl. at 611 (alterations in original) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). That is insufficient to survive a motion 

for summary judgment. 

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ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US 15

For the reasons set forth above, Zafer failed to designate specific facts to establish a constructive change claim 

based on either a constructive acceleration theory or on a 

government fault theory. We therefore affirm the Claims 

Court’s grant of summary judgment to USACE. 

II

Zafer next challenges the Claims Court’s denial of its 

motion to supplement the record with several newspaper 

articles and social media sources. See Appellant’s Br. 23, 

25–33. Zafer contends that the articles and sources show 

that its contract necessarily contemplated only the Karachi/Afghan route, see, e.g., id. at 26–28, and that the U.S. 

government acted in its contractual capacity when it was 

negotiating with Pakistan to reopen the route, see, e.g., id.

at 8, 10–12, 29.

We review evidentiary determinations by the Claims 

Court for an abuse of discretion. See Axiom Res. Mgmt., 

Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1346 

(Fed. Cir. 2005)). An abuse of discretion is found when (1) 

the court’s decision is “clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

fanciful,” (2) the court’s decision is “based on an erroneous 

conclusion of the law,” (3) the court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous, or (4) the record contains no evidence “upon 

which the [court] rationally could have based its decision.” 

See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 172 F.3d 

1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We find no abuse of discretion in the Claims Court’s decision here to deny Zafer’s 

motion to supplement the record. 

The Claims Court denied Zafer’s motion to introduce 

several newspaper articles and social media sources into 

the record for two reasons: hearsay and the parol evidence 

rule. Zafer, 120 Fed. Cl. at 612. Zafer does not meaningfully challenge either determination now on appeal. First, 

Zafer invokes Federal Rule of Evidence 902 (evidence that 

is self-authenticating), alleging that the Claims Court did 

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16 ZAFER TAAHHUT INSAAT v. US

not consider the self-authenticating nature of the articles 

and sources when it dismissed them as hearsay. See, e.g., 

Appellant’s Br. 27. But that invocation entirely misses 

the point of the hearsay determination. Compare Fed. R. 

Evid. 801(c), 802, with Fed. R. Evid. 902. Authentication 

and hearsay are two separate requirements, and Zafer’s 

conflation of the two does not provide a meaningful basis 

for finding that the Claims Court abused its discretion. 

Zafer’s challenge to the Claims Court’s application of 

the parol evidence rule similarly fails. The parol evidence 

rule “renders inadmissible evidence introduced to modify, 

supplement, or interpret the terms” of a fully integrated, 

unambiguous agreement. See Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. 

United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Zafer 

does not contend that its contract was ambiguous or not 

integrated. Instead, Zafer simply assumes the conclusion 

and contends that the articles and sources highlight what 

the parties “clearly” contemplated. E.g., Appellant’s Br. 

32. Because Zafer fails to provide a meaningful basis for 

finding that the Claims Court abused its discretion, we 

affirm the court’s denial of Zafer’s motion to supplement

the record.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Zafer’s remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth above, 

we affirm the Claims Court’s grant of summary judgment 

and its denial of Zafer’s motion to supplement the record. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-5083 Document: 44-2 Page: 16 Filed: 08/17/2016