Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02065/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jamie Flores, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Terry L. Stewart, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 02-2065-PHX-DGC (MS)

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On June 9, 2004, the undersigned submitted a Report and Recommendation

(Doc. # 22) to Judge Campbell on the merits of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1). On October 20, 2004, the R&R was rejected and the

case was referred back to the undersigned for further proceedings (Doc. # 29).

Specifically, the undersigned was directed to consider the issues identified in the

Court's Order. Included in the Order were citations to Ninth Circuit cases which

discuss the duty of counsel to investigate a criminal defendant's mental condition

when information is made known reflecting a possible mental impairment under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984), unless the circumstances

suggest otherwise in the sound exercise of professional December 9, 2005

judgment by counsel. Further, the undersigned was asked to: 

(1) determine whether counsel was on constructive notice of

Petitioner's illegal drug use, mental condition, and prescribed

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medication, and if so, whether counsel's failure to investigate was unreasonable, and 

(2) determine whether Petitioner's mental condition and

counsel's failure to investigate undermines confidence in

Petitioner's guilty pleas and sentence. 

(Doc. # 26). 

The undersigned appointed counsel for Petitioner and required both Petitioner

and Respondents to submit simultaneous briefs "addressing the issue(s) and case

law cited by Judge Campbell in the October 20, 2004 Order." (Doc. # 31).

On September 30, 2005, Petitioner and Respondents filed simultaneous

supplemental briefs. (Docs. # 39 and 40). Petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit

cases articulated in Judge Campbell's Order are relevant to Petitioner's case and

demonstrate that counsel has a duty to make an investigation into a criminal

defendant's mental state. Additionally, Petitioner argues that counsel was on notice

that Petitioner was suffering from a mental condition and as a result of this notice,

counsel's subsequent failure to investigate Petitioner's mental condition constituted

prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner further argues that an

evidentiary hearing is required. 

Respondents' maintain that Strickland does not impose an affirmative duty

upon counsel to investigate a defendant's mental state in the absence of actual or

constructive notice of a mental condition. In the alternative, Respondents' argue

that even if counsel was deficient, Petitioner did not suffer prejudice. 

I. Was Petitioner's Counsel on Actual or Constructive Notice as to

Petitioner's Mental Condition 

As discussed in the undersigned's original Report and Recommendation, the

only evidence of Petitioner's mental condition is as follows: (1) Petitioner's affidavit

avowing, "I also believe that I told Mr. Syme something about my mental condition";

(2) medical records indicating Petitioner was taking psychotropic medication before

and during his change of plea hearing; (3) medical records indicating Petitioner was

housed in the Maricopa County Jail's mental ward for suicidal thoughts before his

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1

 Contra Seidel v. Markle, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1998), where counsel's

handwritten notes in the case file corroborated Seidel's averment that he told

counsel of his mental illness. 

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change of plea hearing; (4) evidence Petitioner had attempted suicide in 1990; and

(5) evidence indicating Petitioner used illegal drugs, including methamphetamine,

cocaine, and marijuana. (Doc. # 1, Ex. C). 

The only purported support of actual notice of Petitioner's mental condition is

the statement in Petitioner's affidavit appended to his Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief. That statement is simply insufficient to constitute actual notice, in the

absence of any other objective indication at the time of entry of his guilty plea that

Petitioner was suffering from a mental condition. First, Petitioner's statement is

equivocal at best and it finds no corroboration in the record.1

 Second, counsel's

affidavit appended to Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief squarely

contradicts Petitioner's assertion: 

3. At the time I represented [Petitioner] I had no indication that he suffered from a mental illness, condition, disease or defect.

I specifically did not know that he was taking anti-psychotic

medications prescribed to him in the jail for psychotic

symptoms.

4. I did not know that he heard and/or talked to voices in his

head, or that he had any paranoia or suicidal thoughts. 

5. If I had seen or been told anything that suggested any of the above, I would have investigated further. Additional steps would have been to inquire of the treating doctor(s) and request a Rule 11 examination.

(Doc. # 13, Exhibit B). 

In denying relief, the post-conviction court necessarily resolved this factual

dispute in favor of Petitioner's counsel, and against Petitioner, who failed to provide

any evidence of counsel's knowledge. Indeed, Petitioner's appointed counsel even

acknowledged in the post-conviction petition she prepared that the transcripts and

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2

 Petitioner refused to allow post-conviction counsel to file this post-conviction

petition because it did not include all of the claims Petitioner desired to raise.

Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition pro per. 

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record failed to reveal Petitioner's mental condition.2

 (Doc # 13, Exhibit M). This

concession bolsters the conclusion that counsel for Petitioner during the plea

proceeding was unaware of Petitioner's mental condition because there was no

objective indication of it. As a result, it would be error to conclude that counsel was

on actual notice of Petitioner's mental illness when that conclusion is unsupported

by the record. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 981 (9th Cir. 2004)

(overturning the district court's grant of a habeas petition where the district court's

factual conclusions are not supported by the record).

 As to constructive notice, Petitioner concedes that the record on constructive

notice has not been developed. (Doc. # 39, at 2). The only evidence in the record

now as to constructive notice are those records housed in the Maricopa County Jail

detailing Petitioner's prescriptions and overnight stay in the jail's mental ward. (Doc.

# 1, Exhibit C). However, those documents are insufficient to constitute

constructive notice as counsel had no cause to request them. In this regard,

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 186 (9th Cir. 1995), provides a useful comparison to

this case. Hensley asserted that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an

insanity defense. However, the only evidence of Hensley's mental illness was a

collateral police report opining that Hensley was "mentally disturbed and posed a

danger to himself and others." Id. In affirming the denial of Hensley's habeas

petition, the Ninth Circuit held that the police report "is insufficient to put [] counsel

on notice. Notice to counsel that an insanity defense may be appropriate requires

a stronger indication of mental illness in the client's record such as past

institutionalization or highly unusual behavior." In so holding, the court rejected

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3

 See discussion of Evans, infra.

4

 It is important to make a distinction about Petitioner's claims. In Petitioner's

post-conviction petition, he argued that his guilty plea was "not [a] knowing,

intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights" in light of his mental condition,

essentially arguing that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea. This argument

differs from Petitioner's argument in his habeas petition. Here, Petitioner argues

that his attorney was not effective because he failed to investigate Petitioner's

mental condition as a possible defense to the charged offenses or to investigate

Petitioner's competency to plead guilty. 

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Hensley's argument that his case was akin to Evans v. Lewis and others where

counsel had actual knowledge of the defendant's mental illness.3

Moreover, as noted in the original Report and Recommendation, there was

substantial evidence in the record that Petitioner was able to plan and execute

several crimes, further attempted to evade police detection, and did not suffer from

a mental condition that impaired his ability to form the requisite mens rea for the

charged offenses or rendered him incompetent to plead guilty.4 (Doc. # 13, Exhibit

F and Exhibit Z, at 18, 27). 

Further, Petitioner failed to tell anyone about his mental condition, including

the probation officer when preparing his pre-sentence report and the trial judge,

when specifically asked if he had taken medication in the last 24 hours. Petitioner's

own family and friend also failed to make any reference to Petitioner's mental

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5

 As discussed in the undersigned's original Report and Recommendation

(Doc. # 22), Petitioner offers as evidence in his post-conviction petition the proposed

testimony of Dr. Raikhelkar, his Maricopa County Jail healthcare provider, that "[he]

makes it his practice to call the Forensic Unit when he feels an inmate has 'Rule 11'

issues, regardless of whether such a motion has been filed by the attorney [and that

he did not take such action in this case." (Doc. # 13, Exhibit N, at 4–5). The doctor's

averment is yet further proof that there was no objective indication that Petitioner

was suffering from a mental illness of which Petitioner's counsel was made aware.

6

 Other circuits which have dealt with this precise issue. See United States

v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 998–99 (10th Cir. 1990), holding:

The adequacy or reasonableness of an attorney's action

is necessarily conditioned by the defendant's own actions

or inaction. Thus, Miller now faults Calder for failing to

investigate his mental health and behavioral history. But,

Miller has not established that Calder was even aware

until after trial, when the judge ordered a probation report,

that Miller had ever seen psychiatrist. With the exception

of those instances where a defendant's behavior or

demeanor should communicate to his counsel or the

Court that the defendant suffers from a mental disability,

incapacity or impairment, and investigation, such as the

investigation that Miller claims his trial attorney failed to

conduct, cannot be charged as a claim of "ineffective

assistance of counsel" when the essential and

foundational information required to trigger such an

investigation is withheld from the defendant's attorney by

the defendant himself. As this court noted, "[t]he

reasonableness of an attorney's decision not to conduct

an investigation is directly related to the information the

defendant has supplied." 

Id. (citing Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Riley

v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 305–306 (3rd Cir. 2001) ("[Petitioner] has not argued that

counsel in a capital case must always seek a mental examination of the defendant,

and cases from other circuits reject that proposition. Instead, they hold that a caseby-case determination must be made and that counsel is not ineffective if he or she

has no reason to think that a mental examination would be useful."). 

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illness.5

 Under these circumstances, therefore, counsel's failure to investigate

cannot be considered ineffective assistance.6

 

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 See discussion, infra.

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Strickland mandated that "every effort [must] be made to eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the

time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In that vein, based on the circumstances of

Petitioner's case, it would be unreasonable to determine that counsel should have

inquired further into Petitioner's mental condition, when there was no actual or

constructive notice thereof. Therefore, counsel's actions did not contravene

Strickland. Further, the absence of any objective indication of Petitioner's mental

illness is what separates Petitioner's case from the body of Ninth Circuit case law

cited in the Court's Order of referral,7

 and inferentially supports the conclusion that

there is no affirmative duty to sua sponte investigate a criminal defendant's mental

state in the absence of any indication of a basis for doing so.

A. The Ninth Circuit Cases

The Order of referral for further proceedings states that a number of Ninth

Circuit cases "hold that counsel has an affirmative duty to throughly investigate a

defendant's mental state if there is any available evidence indicating that the

defendant is impaired." See Order filed October 20, 2004 at 5, citing Evans v.

Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1988). As explained below, neither Strickland

nor the Ninth Circuit cases mandate investigation of a client's mental state in the

absence of notice thereof, save for capital habeas cases where counsel's

responsibilities are undeniably greater, at least with respect to the penalty phase of

the trial.

The cases referenced in the Court's Order are distinguishable from

Petitioner's. To begin, in Evans, evidence of a capital defendant's mental illness

was known by trial counsel prior to his sentencing. Evidence included: a statement

by the trial judge declaring that "Defendant is in need of psychiatric treatment" and

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documentation in the pre-sentence report that Evans had been incarcerated at a

mental facility for inmates and had attempted suicide. Evans, 855 F.2d at 636.

 Deutscher presents a "virtually identical case [to Evans]," Deutscher v.

Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989), where counsel had specific

knowledge about his client's mental illness, including knowledge that Deutscher had

been hospitalized for mental problems in the past, and of a medical report from a

psychiatrist. Id. More egregious in Deutscher, however, was counsel's argument

during the penalty phase of his client's capital trial, that the defendant "must have

had some sort of mental problem," but counsel failed to present any of the available

evidence of a mental illness. Id. Consequently, he admitted that his conduct in this

instance was deficient. Id. 

Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2003), reveals another example

where a capital defendant's counsel was aware of his mental illness and still failed

to present any evidence of that illness during mitigation. 

Again, the evidence known by Douglas' counsel was significant: "trial counsel,

George Peters, recognized that a psychiatric defense might be an option. Early in

the case, he had a psychiatrist, Dr. Sharma and a psychologist, Dr. Rogers,

appointed to help. . . . Peters had a difficult time getting him to concentrate on his

defense, and initially engaged the mental health experts to assist in this problem."

Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1085. Based on that knowledge, the court found, it was then

incumbent on counsel to investigate further. Id. at 1086. Counsel did request the

file of Douglas' offense, but incredibly failed to discover overwhelming evidence in

the file regarding Douglas' mental illness. Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found

that counsel's failure constituted deficient performance. Id.

Douglas also confirms that counsel has no duty to uncover potential mitigating

evidence when nothing has put him on notice that it exists. Id. at 1088 ("[C]ousel

[is] not ineffective for failing to uncover a family history of mental illness where

counsel's investigators spoke with family members and friends who might have had

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such information, but none of them reported any history of illness) (citing Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Likewise in Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), there was

ample notice to counsel of Jennings' mental defect. Jennings' counsel did not

review volumes of medical records, except to determine whether his client had

undergone a vasectomy. Had he reviewed those records, counsel would have

discovered a wealth of mental illness documentation. Moreover, the Jennings court

makes clear that counsel was not simply on notice, but had substantial knowledge

of his client's mental problems:

Mr. Oliver knew, for example, that Mr. Jennings was a longterm methamphetamine addict who had used the drug on the

night of the homicide. Mr. Oliver knew his client had told police he had been "strung out" on the drug for over a year. And that he had attempted suicide. And that his ex-wife told police he

was "crazy" and had been diagnosed as schizophrenic. And

that he had a long history of injuring himself intentionally and pouring liquids in the resulting wounds, thereby causing

gangrene. And that he had been involuntarily committed by a judge for psychiatric evaluation. And that he appeared to have been coming off drugs during his videotaped interview with

police. And that the newly-minted paralegal Mr. Oliver had hired thought there was something "seriously wrong" with Mr. Jennings. And that friends and co-workers agreed.

Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1015.

Further distinguishing Evans, Deutscher, Douglas, and Jennings from

Petitioner's case is the context in which they arose. These cases demonstrate that

the legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is different in the context of

a capital case. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 843 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Our

holdings in Ainsworth, Bloom, and Hendricks are illustrative but not exhaustive of

the breadth of a criminal defendant's constitutional protection against his attorney's

failure to investigate mitigating evidence when defending his client against a capital

sentence."). 

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8

 Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Evidence of

mental problems may be offered to show mitigating factors in the penalty phase [of

a capital trial], even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction

in the guilt phase.")

9

 Indeed, Justice Scalia regularly remarks on the Supreme Court's adoption

of a "death is different" jurisprudence when it comes to direct and habeas criminal

appeals. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting),

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I fear

we have read today the first page of a whole new chapter in the 'death-is-different'

jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of

composing. It adds to our insistence that state courts admit "all relevant mitigating

evidence[.]"). In that regard, the Supreme Court has imposed a duty on counsel to

ensure that all possible mitigating evidence is presented during the penalty phase

of a capital trial. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Eddings v. Okalhoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett

v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

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As a result, it would be far from conclusive to view Petitioner's case through

the lens of capital habeas jurisprudence.8

 The Supreme Court has solidified this

heightened duty in both Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Wiggins v.

Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding counsel unconstitutionally ineffective for failing

to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of defendants' capital trials).

Evans, Deutscher, and Douglas, and Jennings acknowledge what Wiggins and

Williams have reaffirmed: that courts must be "especially cautious in protecting a

defendant's right to effective counsel at a capital sentencing hearing. The

Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration

of factors which might evoke mercy." Deutscher, 844 F.2d at 1161.9

The remaining four cases cited in the referral order are equally factually

dissimilar. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994), presents a scenario

where counsel had knowledge of a murder confession from the defendant's brother,

but counsel failed to even interview the confessor. The court noted that "these

confession were not belated efforts designed to save a brother who had been

convicted. They were made from the very inception of [these] proceedings, and

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[were] all internally consistent." Counsel's inexplicable failure to investigate his

client's arguably meritorious claim of actual innocence is what prompted the Ninth

Circuit to grant Sanders' habeas petition. Id. at 1456, 1460. 

Likewise in Seidel v. Markle, 146 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998), there was ample

evidence in the trial record to alert counsel of his client's mental illness, including

Seidel's bail report, which reflected prior hospitalization for his mental problems.

More telling were counsel's own personal notes which corroborated Seidel's

testimony that he told counsel of his mental illness. Even with this knowledge,

counsel still failed to conduct any investigation into his client's mental condition, and

the Ninth Circuit found deficient performance. Id. at 756–57. 

United States v. Burrows also presents another situation where the

defendant's attorney had actual knowledge of his client's stay in a mental hospital

and subsequent treatment for chronic paranoid schizophrenic disorder, yet failed to

investigate a possible insanity defense. The defendant, according to doctors, could

not differentiate between right and wrong and "could not carry on a logical

conversation". United States v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915, 916–18 & n.2. As a

consequence, the Ninth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether the proffered psychiatric evidence would have changed the result of the

trial. 

Finally, in Turner v. Douglas, counsel's own case file contained a substantial

amount of evidence of Turner's mental history, researched and investigated by

Turner's first attorney. The Ninth Circuit noted that, "[o]n the day that the court

granted Turner's motion for substitution of counsel, Wilensky [the first attorney]

turned over to [new counsel] 'all subpoenas, psychiatric letters, the police reports,

[and] the results of [her] discovery,' and promised to also forward to him a summary

of her investigation reports." Turner, 158 F.3d at 452–53. Even after receiving all

of this material, "[counsel] did almost nothing . . . failing to perform even the most

basic investigative tasks." Moreover, "[counsel] admit[ted] that his only preparation

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10 Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) ("While circuit law

may be 'persuasive authority' for purposes of determining whether a state court

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme

Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.") (quoting Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

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for trial consisted of reviewing the transcript of the preliminary hearing and spending

between twenty and forty five minutes interviewing Turner." Id. Accordingly, the

Ninth Circuit determined that counsel's failure to: (1) present any defense to the

murder charge; (2) investigate the wealth of material provided to him by the first

attorney; and (3) investigate the state's case constituted ineffective assistance.

To summarize, counsel in Evans, Deutscher, Douglas, Jennings, Sanders,

Seidel, and Burrows all had actual knowledge of their client's mental illness, but

failed to investigate at all for a possible affirmative defense or for presentation

during the penalty phase of a capital trial. In Turner, counsel's predecessor

compiled a significant amount of research into Turner's mental state, but counsel

simply failed to read it. Those scenarios are not comparable to Petitioner's case.

These cases do not demonstrate that Petitioner is entitled to relief where counsel

had no knowledge of Petitioner's mental illness, where it is reasonable to believe

that information of such an infirmity would have been disclosed to counsel or the

court by relatives and a close friend of the Petitioner, and where the Petitioner,

when asked by the judge who presided over the guilty plea proceeding whether he

was taking medication, the Petitioner stated that he was not.

 Moreover, apart from being factually distinguishable from Petitioner's case,

it has not been demonstrated that the state court's denial of Petitioner's postconviction petition "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States."10 Because there is no Supreme Court

precedent imposing a duty on counsel to investigate a defendant's potential mental

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11 Evidence includes Petitioner's lead role in the charged offenses, his lack

of remorse, and his attempt from jail to cover up the crime (Doc. # 13, Exhibits E,

F). 

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illness in the absence of any notice thereof, Petitioner's habeas petition should be

denied.

II. Do Petitioner's Mental Condition and Counsel's Failure to Investigate Undermine Confidence in Petitioner's Guilty Plea and Sentence

The final question from Judge Campbell is whether counsel's failure to

investigate and this Court's knowledge of Petitioner's mental condition undermine

confidence in Petitioner's guilty plea and sentence. This analysis goes to whether

Petitioner suffered prejudice on account of counsel's action. However, as discussed

above, because counsel was not ineffective, the undersigned finds that Petitioner

suffered no prejudice and that the failure to investigate the circumstances presented

does not undermine confidence in Petitioner's guilty plea and sentence. 

As articulated in the original Report and Recommendation, where a Petitioner

has plead guilty, ineffective assistance of counsel will be considered prejudicial if it

caused the Petitioner to plead guilty rather than go to trial, and the discovery of

evidence would likely have led counsel to change his recommendation regarding

the plea. Whether counsel would have change his recommendation depends on

whether the evidence likely would have altered the outcome of a trial. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 

Nothing in Petitioner's claims supports the notion that counsel would have

changed his recommendation in view of evidence of Petitioner's mental illness.

Moreover, Petitioner's claims do not support the contention that the outcome of a

trial would have been different from Petitioner's guilty plea. The evidence of

Petitioner's guilt was substantial.11 The consequence of the evidence against

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12 Petitioner argues that counsel should have investigated a possible

diminished capacity defense. (Doc. # 1 at 5). However, Respondents correctly note

that Arizona does not recognize a diminished capacity defense. State v. Mott, 931

P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) ("[T]his court considered and rejected the defense of

diminished capacity[.]" As a result, counsel's conduct cannot be considered

prejudicial if it would not have changed the outcome. 

13 While Petitioner claims that he was experiencing symptoms of his mental

condition, there is no corroboration of this claim in the record. Rather, there is direct

evidence in the record to contradict Petitioner's claim, specifically where the jail

psychiatrist noted that Petitioner's symptoms were controlled by medication. (Doc.

# 13, Exhibit N). 

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Petitioner is that other defenses, including lack of the requisite mens rea and

incompetency to stand trial or plead guilty, were foreclosed.12

Petitioner further argues that if counsel had investigated Petitioner's mental

impairment he could have requested a competency hearing pursuant to ARIZ. R.

CRIM. P. 11. However, the record does not support the claim that the outcome

would have been different had counsel investigated Petitioner's mental infirmity. As

articulated above, the psychiatrist at the Maricopa County Jail would have referred

Petitioner to the Forensic Unit for Rule 11 testing if he felt it was appropriate. More

importantly, the record does support the conclusion that Petitioner was able to

consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of understanding, and had an

understanding of the proceedings against him.13

The trial judge's colloquy and the matters discussed at sentencing soundly

demonstrate that Petitioner was able to understand the proceedings against him as

required by Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398–402 (1993). Petitioner lucidly

answered all of the court's questions during the plea colloquy, provided an

acceptable factual basis for the charges, and explicitly informed the court that he

had not taken drugs or medication in the past 24 hours. (Doc. # 13, Exhibit G, at 4).

Moreover, the trial court never raised the issue of Petitioner's competence sua

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14 As discussed in Part I.A., supra, neither Petitioner's father nor his close

friend made any reference to Petitioner's mental condition during their testimony.

15 See discussion Part III, infra.

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sponte, which it is required to do if it appears to the court that competency is in

question. Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23, 26 (Ariz. 1986).14

Moreover, Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate that a trial would have

produced an outcome different from the sentence received in the plea agreement.

The plea agreement lowered Petitioner's maximum sentence from multiple

consecutive 28 year sentences to five concurrent sentences between 8 and 16

years. Even if Petitioner's counsel had discovered evidence of Petitioner's mental

condition, it appears unlikely that he would have counseled Petitioner to go to trial

in the face of the overwhelming evidence against Petitioner. See United States v.

Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1990) (articulating the requirement that a

prejudice inquiry under Strickland when counsel failed to pursue a potential defense

depends largely on whether the defense would have been successful). 

Finally, Petitioner has not proffered any evidence or corroboration to his bare

assertions that the outcome of a trial would have been different if counsel had

investigated and discovered evidence of Petitioner's mental condition.15 Because

there is no indication that counsel would have changed his recommendation to

Petitioner to plead guilty, or that any of the evidence of Petitioner's mental condition

would have changed the outcome of a trial, the Court cannot conclude that counsels

failure to investigate undermines confidence in Petitioner's guilty plea and sentence.

 III. Evidentiary Hearing

The Court has also considered whether to grant Petitioner an evidentiary

hearing. However, on the record before the Court Petitioner's allegations do not

establish the right to relief. Petitioner has not alleged facts which if true would show

that counsel was on actual or constructive notice of his mental illness. As a

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16 Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994) ("An evidentiary

hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court

record."). 

17 As articulated in note 5, supra, the psychiatrist at the Maricopa County Jail

did not believe Petitioner to be incompetent to plead guilty.

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consequence, as discussed above, counsel was not ineffective for failing to

investigate Petitioner's mental state sua sponte. Moreover, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that a hearing would shed new light on the question of whether

counsel's actions were deficient under Strickland. See Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d

1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In his supplemental brief, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). However, the only

allegation, if true, that would entitle Petitioner to relief is if he actually told counsel

of his mental illness.16 However, Petitioner offered no potential corroboration of that

allegation in his petition for post-conviction relief. Indeed, Petitioner did not even

allege that corroboration existed, and would be subsequently developed in an

evidentiary hearing. Most telling is the weakness of Petitioner's allegation, "I also

believe that I told Mr. Syme something about my mental condition." (Doc. # 1,

Exhibit C). Petitioner is not even certain he told his counsel about his mental

condition. No unequivocal statement has been made by Petitioner that he told his

attorney about his medication or other circumstances described in his postconviction petition. Also absent from the record is any post-conviction report of a

psychologist or psychiatrist to the effect that Petitioner was not mentally competent

to plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.17 Under these circumstances, an

evidentiary hearing is simply not warranted. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons,

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IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Petitoner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the

Court. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2005.

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