Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03874/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03874-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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14‐3874‐cv

Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue     

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit ________

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 14‐3874‐cv

HENRY R. TERRY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE, INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF

PATCHOGUE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PAUL V. PONTIERI, JR., IN HIS

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, BRIAN EGAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL

AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, STEPHEN J. MCGIFF, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, GERALD J. CREAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JOSEPH P.

DEAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, LORI B. DEVLIN, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, WILLIAM HILTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JOHN A.

KRIEGER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JOHN DOE, IN HIS/HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, PETER SARICH, AND JAMES NUDO,

Defendants‐Appellees.*

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York

________

 

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform

with the caption above.

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SUBMITTED: JUNE 14, 2016

DECIDED: JUNE 23, 2016

________

Before: NEWMAN, CABRANES, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

________

Plaintiff‐appellant Henry R. Terry, proceeding pro se, appeals

a September 10, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York (William F. Kuntz, Judge)

dismissing his action against the Incorporated Village of Patchogue,

the Village’s Board of Trustees, and a host of individuals.  Plaintiff’s

claims, which arise out of events spanning more than a decade,

principally concern the Village’s allegedly wrongful interference

with his business interests and its maintenance of a police force that

plaintiff believes to be unauthorized by law.  Reviewing the District

Court’s dismissal de novo, see Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐,

2016 WL 2956968, at *5 (2d Cir. May 23, 2016), we affirm.

________

Henry R. Terry, Key West, FL, pro se, for Plaintiff‐

Appellant.

Melissa L. Holtzer and Brian S. Sokoloff, Sokoloff

Stern, LLP, Carle Place, NY, for Defendants‐

Appellees.

________

Case 14-3874, Document 81-1, 06/23/2016, 1800187, Page2 of 6
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JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff‐appellant Henry R. Terry (“plaintiff”), proceeding

pro se, appeals a September 10, 2014 judgment of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York (William F.

Kuntz, Judge) dismissing his action against the Incorporated Village

of Patchogue (the “Village”), the Village’s Board of Trustees, and a

host of individuals (jointly, “defendants”).  Plaintiff’s claims, which

arise out of events spanning more than a decade, principally concern

the Village’s allegedly wrongful interference with his business

interests and its maintenance of a police force that plaintiff believes

to be unauthorized by law.  Reviewing the District Court’s dismissal

de novo, see Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐, 2016 WL 2956968,

at *5 (2d Cir. May 23, 2016), we affirm.

To begin, we note that plaintiff’s principal brief fails to

address adequately the merits of most—arguably all—of the claims

dismissed by the District Court.  An appellant’s brief must contain,

among other elements, an argument section setting forth the

“appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to

the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies.”    Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).    Although we accord filings

from pro se litigants a high degree of solicitude, even a litigant

representing himself is obliged to set out “identifiable arguments” in

his principal brief.  Donofrio v. City of New York, 563 F. App’x 92, 93

(2d Cir. 2014) (summary order); see LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71

F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).  Plaintiff’s filing largely fails to do so.  For

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instance, plaintiff’s complaint alleges at length that defendants

committed fraud under state law by wrongfully charging that

properties he owned were in violation of the Village’s zoning and

fire codes, see Verified Am. Comp. at 129‐35, Terry v. Inc. Vill. of

Patchogue, No. 2:09 Civ. 2333 (WFK) (GRB) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2013),

ECF No. 79; if this is mentioned at all in plaintiff’s brief, it is in only

the most general terms, see Pl.’s Br. 9 (“Defendants‐Appellees . . .

made false statements to force Plaintiff to give up his property and

political rights.”).  More is required of even a pro se party.1   

To the extent that plaintiff has adequately argued the merits of

any claims on appeal, those arguments must be rejected.    For a

variety of reasons, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief

can be granted.  For example, even if we were to read plaintiff’s brief

to raise contentions related to his claim that the Village committed

fraud in connection with his attempt to purchase a property referred

to as the “Weinstein Estate,” see Verified Am. Comp. at 138‐41, Terry

v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, No. 2:09 Civ. 2333 (WFK) (GRB) (E.D.N.Y.

Apr. 1, 2013), ECF No. 79, he would be unable to overcome the

barrier of res judicata.   Plaintiff brought an identical fraud claim in

New York state court in 2009, and the court—characterizing

plaintiff’s allegations as “prolix[ ] [and] disjointed”—dismissed it for

failure to state a claim.  Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 886 N.Y.S.2d

72, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2009) (unreported disposition).  “We

 

1 The requirement that a pro se litigant set out identifiable arguments in

his briefing has special salience in this case: the complaint’s allegations run on for

1,627 paragraphs spanning 207 pages, and are not by any means easily

disentangled.

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are required to give [this] state‐court judgment the same preclusive

effect it would have in New York,” EFCO Corp. v. U.W. Marx, Inc.,

124 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 1997), and we think it clear that the New

York courts would deem it a disposition on the merits having res

judicata effect, see Feigen v. Advance Capital Mgmt. Corp., 146 A.D.2d

556, 557‐58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989); Furia v. Furia, 116 A.D.2d

694, 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986) (when a complaint is

dismissed for legal insufficiency, it bars commencement of a new

action for the same relief if the new complaint fails to correct the

defects in the first).

Turning to plaintiff’s next argument, the District Court did not

“abuse its discretion” in implicitly denying plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint by dismissing the action while that motion was

pending.  See Barani v. Dep’t of Defense, 518 F. App’x 48, 49 (2d Cir.

2013) (summary order); see also Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175,

178‐179 (2d Cir. 2007).  Although district judges should, as a general

matter, liberally permit pro se litigants to amend their pleadings,

leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be

futile.  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).  The new

allegations plaintiff wished to assert—for instance, claims that he

suffered discrimination on the basis of national origin and perceived

disability, see S.A. 10‐11; Pl.’s Br. 20—are merely conclusory.  In the

circumstances, the District Court had no reason to permit

amendment.

We are likewise unconvinced by plaintiff’s remaining

arguments.  Plaintiff devotes a good deal of attention, for example,

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to the contentions that his case should have been handled in the

Central Islip courthouse, not the Brooklyn courthouse, and that his

case was not assigned to a judge randomly.    But plaintiff’s

arguments are premised on violations of the Eastern District’s

Guidelines for the Division of Business Among District Judges,

which expressly state that they “shall not be deemed to vest any

rights in litigants or their attorneys.”    See also United States v.

Schlesinger, 261 F. App’x 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order).  

Thus, even if plaintiff were to make out a violation of those

Guidelines—which he has not—it would not entitle him to the relief

he seeks.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of plaintiff’s arguments on appeal and

find them to be without merit. We thus AFFIRM the September 10,

2014 judgment of the District Court.

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