Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00148/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ronald H. Ellis, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Rene G. Garcia, Warden, 

Respondent

1

.

No. 11-0148-TUC-BPV 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition), filed on March 14, 2011. (Doc. 1) Petitioner, Ronald H. Ellis, 

alleges “he was denied due process of law in connection with a prison disciplinary 

finding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits. DHO finding[s] were arbitrary and 

unsupported by evidence.” 

 Before the Court is the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondent’s return with 

accompanying exhibits (Doc. 12) (Answer). No reply was filed. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court enter an order denying the Petition on the merits. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 

1

 Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rene G. Garcia, the 

Warden at FCI-Englewood, is substituted for FCI-Safford, Conrad Graber. 

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 At the time Ellis filed the present Petition he was an inmate at the Federal 

Correctional Institute, in Safford, Arizona (FCI Safford). (Petition, p.1; Answer, Ex. 1) 

Petitioner contends that the was denied due process of law in connection with a prison 

disciplinary finding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits. Petitioner also alleges 

that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) findings were arbitrary and unsupported by 

evidence. (Petition, at 3) Ellis is currently serving a 120-month sentence of incarceration 

for distribution of cocaine, and is projected to complete this sentence on September 1, 

2014, via Good Conduct Time Release. (Answer, Ex. 1, Attachment 2) 

II. DISCIPLINARY HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS

 On August 7, 2009, Officer C. Bailey conducted a housing unit search of Inmate 

Ellis’s and Inmate Honeycutt’s cell assignment in the B run cubicle. (Answer, Ex. 1, 

Attachment 5 “Incident Report”, ¶ 11) Officer Bailey located a cell phone charger under 

the bed in a mesh duffle bag rolled up in a weight lifting belt. (Id.) Unsure as to whom 

the bag belonged to, Officer Bailey placed all the items back in the bag in the same 

manner they were before, took the bag along with all the other items to the Lieutenants 

Complex, and instructed Ellis to take the property that belonged to him and place it in a 

pile. (Id.) Inmate Ellis “immediately grabbed the mesh bag and felt the rolled up weight 

belt and said it was his bag placing it in his pile of belongings.” (Id.) Officer Bailey wrote 

an Incident Report charging the petitioner with possession, manufacturing, or 

introduction of a hazardous tool, in violation of Prohibited Act Code 108. (Id., ¶¶ 9-10) 

Ellis stated that both he and Honeycutt’s bags contained weight belts, and that he didn’t 

check the bags, just “went off the fact that my bag was the new one.” (Id., ¶ 24) 

Lieutenant Peterson concluded his investigation by finding that Petitioner was 

appropriately charged with the prohibited act of Code 108, and Petitioner remained in the 

Special Housing Unit pending a Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) action. (Id., ¶¶ 26-

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27) 

 On August 8, 2009, Lieutenant T. Peterson, delivered a copy of the Incident 

Report to the petitioner, advised Petitioner of his right to remain silent, and conducted an 

investigation of the incident. (Id., ¶¶ 14-16, 22-23) Petitioner commented to the Unit 

Disciplinary Committee (UDC) regarding the incident report, that when asked to choose 

his bag, of two that were found, he picked the newest bag which was his, but had no 

knowledge of the cell phone charger. (Id., ¶ 17) The UDC referred the inmate to the 

Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for further action, and recommended that the 

incident report be expunged “based on inmate Honeycutt’s admission that the cell phone 

and charger belonged to him.” (Id., ¶ 19) 

 On August 19, 2009 Charles Reed, the DHO, conducted a Disciplinary Hearing. 

(Id., Attachment 6) Petitioner requested a staff representative and witness. (Id., ¶ II.B.) 

The witness submitted the following statement: 

[A]ll the inmates in the cube were ordered to leave and go to the 

Lieutenants office and they were searched. The[y] were allowed to go back 

to the cell and get some property and he observed Ellis retrieve pair of 

Tennis Shoes. Counselor Warren then said “We don’t know who’s stuff is 

who’s.” 

(Id., ¶ C.2) 

Petitioner made the following statements: 

It was not mine, I claimed the bag that it was in but the charger was not 

mine. My room mate claimed the charger. 

(Id., ¶ B) 

 In addition to the Incident Report and Investigation, the DHO considered the 

photographs of the telephone. (Id., ¶ D) 

 The DHO found Petitioner committed the prohibited act of possession, 

manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous tool. (Id., ¶ IV.A) The DHO based his 

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findings on the “eyewitness account of the reporting staff member” and, though he 

considered the statements made by Petitioner and his witness, the DHO concluded that 

the Petitioner’s ownership of the cell phone charged was established when he identified 

the bag as his, and though Petitioner stated that his cell mate claimed the charged, 

Petitioner was unable to explain how it got into his bag. (Id., ¶ V) The DHO stated that 

his Petitioner’s witness did not provide credible evidence as he only witnessed Petitioner 

picking out some shoes and could not establish the ownership of the charger. (Id.) The 

DHO further acknowledged that Honeycutt did claim the charger, but when questioned 

about it, could not identify the location of the charger, or where he had hidden it. (Id.) 

The DHO concluded: 

You clearly had the charger in your possession, you identified the bag 

containing the charger as yours you would not respond when asked how the 

charger got into your bag and inmate Honeycutt could not say were [sic] 

the charger was hidden if he had done so and given the wrong location it 

would have clearly implicated you in the offence. 

(Id.) 

The DHO sanctioned Petitioner to a loss of 40 days good conduct time, 60 days of 

disciplinary segregation, and loss of commissary privileges for 30 days. (Id., ¶ VI) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction 

 A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Writ of habeas corpus relief 

extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if the petitioner 

can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) & (3). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez,, 204 F.3d at 864, and must file the petition in 

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the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 

677 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 In the instant case Petitioner is seeking relief with respect to disciplinary 

proceedings that, in part, resulted in the loss of good time credit while incarcerated at 

FCI-Safford. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is 

being executed. Thus, Ground One is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. §2241. 

B. Exhaustion 

 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging 

any circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. 

Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The evidence demonstrates that 

Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the disciplinary action. 

(Answer, Ex.1, ¶ 4; Attachment 4, Administrative Remedies) 

C. Merits 

1. Ground One: Due Process Claim 

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. 

Accordingly, they have a due process interest in the disciplinary proceedings that may 

take away those credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). "Due process 

in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the 

charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials and the reasons 

for disciplinary action." Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66.). "The inmate has a limited right to call witnesses and to 

present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would not unduly threaten 

institutional safety and goals." Id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.) Once these Wolff

procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal court is to review the 

statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its findings to 

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determine if the decision is supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent. Mass. Corr. 

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984) (“The requirements of due process are satisfied if 

some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.”) 

 The Court has reviewed the incident report and the DHO report and finds that the 

due process requirements of a prison disciplinary hearing, as established by Wolff, supra, 

were met in this case. As Respondents assert, The Petitioner received notice well in 

advance of the hearing. He was allowed to call witnesses (Inmate Vasquez). He had a 

staff representative (Ms. Brown)2

. He received a written copy of the DHO’s findings, 

which he attached to his administrative remedy (BP-10). The Disciplinary Hearing 

Officer, Charles Reed provided the Petitioner an impartial DHO in this matter. DHO 

Reed did not participate in the investigation of the Incident Report. The matter was 

investigated by Lt. Peterson. There is no evidence that DHO in this matter was anything 

but an impartial decision-maker under the definition set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 

supra. The Petitioner received the limited due process required by the Supreme Court in 

all disciplinary matters. 

 Petitioner asserts that the DHO findings were arbitrary and unsupported by the 

evidence. (Petition, at 4) Petitioner describes the living area as “dormitory setting,” a 

cubicle of eight inmates in which the charger was found in the area of inmate Ellis and 

Honeycutt. (Petition, Attachment Exhibits, ¶ 5) Petitioner argues that “[t]he evidence in 

this case was that the cell phone was found in another inmate’s possession and the cell 

phone charger was found under a bunk bed in which inmate Honeycutt and Ellis live. 

 

2

 Though Petitioner contends that during the hearing Ms. Brown made no attempt in defending him, this bare allegation is inconsistent with Ms. Brown’s statement that she 

had discussed the case with Petitioner, and had obtained a witness statement for use at the 

hearing. There is no right to effective assistance of counsel in a prison disciplinary hearing. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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However, the bunk bed was in a eight man cubicle in a dormitory setting; thus, the 

administrators could not validly rel[y] on evidence that inmate Ellis was found in 

possession of the cell phone charge[r] after inmate Honeycutt claimed responsibility for 

both the Samsung phone and the Samsung charger. The statement made by inmate 

Honeycutt and the recommendation of UDC recommending that the incident report be 

expunge[d] should have had some effect on the finding. The[re] was no evidence of 

actual constructive possession to support a finding of violating § 108, when no evidence 

was presented to prove ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband or the 

premises in which the contraband was found.” (Petition, Attachment) See, e.g., Broussard 

v. Johnson, 253 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2001) (Where “the only evidence linking 

Broussard to the bolt cutters is that they were found in an area in which he worked, but to 

which approximately one hundred inmates had access,” the “some evidence” standard 

was not met.); but see Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (Where 

weapons were found in a cell that housed the plaintiff and three other inmates, the “some 

evidence”standard was met.). 

 In the absence of direct evidence pointing to a defendant’s guilt, the “some 

evidence” standard of Hill may be satisfied by application of the constructive possession 

doctrine. Petitioner argues the DHO’s decision violated due process because there was no 

evidence of actual constructive possession to support a finding of violation of § 108, 

when no evidence was presented to prove ownership, dominion, or control over the 

contraband or the premises in which the contraband was found. The court does not agree. 

The DHO did not rely on a constructive possession theory to support his findings. This 

case is different from Broussard and Hamilton, because the petitioners in those cases had 

equal access to the common area, shared with other inmates, whereas in this case, the 

DHO found Petitioner possessed the cell phone charger, not because he lived in the 

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dormitory in which the weapons were found, but because the charger was found wrapped 

up in Petitioner’s weight belt, which was found in Ellis’s cell, in a mesh bag Petitioner 

admitted was his. (Answer, Ex.1, Attachment 4) These facts directly connected Ellis to 

the charger. The DHO relied on sufficient reliable evidence to satisfy the “some 

evidence” test. That another inmate admitted possession of the charger, and the 

Committee recommended expungement of the charge is irrelevant. Due process only 

requires that there be “some evidence” supporting the disciplinary decision. It does not 

require that the supporting evidence outweigh the evidence to the contrary. Hill, 472 U.S. 

at 455. The petition should be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, enter an order Dismissing the Ground One and the Petition in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: No. CV11-148-TUC-JGZ. 

 Dated this 7th day of March, 2012. 

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