Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00265/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carman Nicholas King,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0265-PHX-NVW (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Carman Nicholas King’s (“Petitioner”)

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1).1

 

Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 15). Petitioner has filed a “Counter claim to 

respondents [sic],” (Doc. 16), which is deemed to be a Reply. The matter is deemed ripe 

for consideration. 

Petitioner raises three grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned 

finds that the Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1 On March 30, 3015, Petitioner filed a supplement (Doc. 11) to the Petition. The 

undersigned has considered the supplementary information in making the 

recommendations contained herein.

 

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1214.2 It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 19, 2009, Petitioner signed a plea agreement in which Petitioner pled 

guilty to theft of means of transportation, a class 3 felony, in violation of Arizona law. 

(Doc. 15-1 at 38-40). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Id. at 42-43). At 

the March 23, 2009 sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended the imposition of 

sentence and placed Petitioner on a three-year term of supervised probation

“commencing upon absolute discharge from prison for a separate offense.” (Id. at 51-

53). On November 4, 2011, Petitioner was released from prison and Petitioner’s 

probationary term commenced. (Id. at 59). 

On June 1, 2012, the State petitioned the trial court to revoke Petitioner’s 

probation. (Id. at 62-63). The State alleged that Petitioner violated several terms of his 

probation, including the first term that required Petitioner to obey all laws. (Id. at 45-46, 

62-63; 67-68). In a separate Arizona state criminal case filed in 2012, Petitioner was 

convicted for the crime of possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony. (Doc. 

15-3 at 164-65). On October 19, 2012, Petitioner admitted to violating the first term of 

his probation by committing the crime of possession or use of dangerous drugs. (Id. at 

165-66). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s admission and revoked Petitioner’s 

probation. (Id. at 167-68). At the February 4, 2013 sentencing hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to a 3.5 year term of incarceration, which was to run concurrently 

with Petitioner’s sentence for the conviction of possession or use of dangerous drugs. 

(Id. at 186; Doc. 15-1 at 81-84). 

On March 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 15-1 at 87-90). When Petitioner’s appointed PCR counsel was unable to find a 

colorable claim for relief, the trial court ordered Petitioner to file a pro se PCR petition by

2 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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September 9, 2013. (Id. at 92, 104, 109). On September 27, 2013, the trial court 

dismissed the PCR proceeding as Petitioner failed to file a pro se PCR petition. (Id. at 

112). Petitioner filed a second PCR petition in December 2013 and a third PCR petition 

in 2014. (Id. at 124-29, 131-33; Doc. 15-2 at 98, 104-15). As explained in more detail in 

Section III(B)(1) below, the trial court dismissed both petitions. (Doc. 15-2 at 74-75, 

101).

On February 9, 2015, Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) seeking federal habeas 

relief.3

 The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition (Doc. 6). Respondents 

filed their Answer on May 22, 2015 (Doc. 14). Petitioner replied on June 8, 2015 (Doc. 

16).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

A. Statute of Limitations Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within 

one year of the latest of: 

1. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

2. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

3. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

4. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

3 The Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on February 12, 2015. The Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that Petitioner placed the Petition in 

the prison mailing system on February 9, 2015. (Doc. 1 at 11). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used February 9, 2015 as the filing date. Porter v. 

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be filed on the 

date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

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presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

AEDPA provides that the limitations period is tolled during the “time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(limitations period is tolled while the state prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state 

court and state post-conviction remedies are pending) (citation omitted). 

A statutory tolling analysis under AEDPA begins by determining whether the 

collateral review petition was “properly filed.” This is because statutory tolling does not 

apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly 

filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing 

filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing requirements in determining 

whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly filed” application that is 

eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. An untimely state 

collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that 

“time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is 

therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as untimely).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona 

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postconviction rules demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the 

Notice.”). It remains “pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s 

post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes 

“[t]he time between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s 

filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under 

state law.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 191. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered the 

question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.”). 

Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 

(citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014). A petitioner 

must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights diligently and (ii) some 

extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; see also 

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

 D. Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway

If a district court finds that a federal habeas petition is untimely, the untimeliness 

may be excused by an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court held that the 

“actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural bars 

in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway” 

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.” 

To pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish 

his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 

2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

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constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 

S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. 

at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in 

virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 

U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. The Petition is Time-Barred by AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). But here, unlike in many federal habeas cases, there are two judgments 

that could be used to calculate the timeliness of the Petition: (i) the March 2009 

judgment that convicted Petitioner of theft of means of transportation and imposed 

probation and (ii) the February 2013 judgment that revoked Petitioner’s probation and 

sentenced Petitioner to 3.5 years in prison. Another District Court faced with a similar 

issue concluded that:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year statute of 

limitations for challenging any substantive issues relating to a 

trial court judgment which imposes probation begins to run 

when the judgment imposing probation becomes final.

See Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir. 2005). By 

contrast, any claims arising from the revocation of probation 

would begin to run when the judgment that revoked the 

petitioner’s probation became final. See Davis v. Purkett, 296 

F.Supp.2d 1027, 1029-30 (E.D. Mo. 2003).

Williams v. Vasbinder, 2006 WL 2123908, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

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The conclusion in Williams is consistent with cases in the District of Arizona and

other districts. See, e.g., Morgan v. Ryan, 2011 WL 6296763, at *7 (D. Ariz. 2011) 

(analyzing the timeliness of a habeas petition by first determining whether the petitioner 

was challenging his sentence upon original conviction or sentence upon revocation of 

probation), adopted, 2011 WL 6296758 (D. Ariz. 2011); Nost v. Broadhead, 2015 WL 

5446810, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2015) (finding that habeas petition challenging original 

judgment of guilt was time-barred even though the petitioner’s probation was revoked 

after the limitations period had expired), adopted, 2015 WL 5444293 (D. Ariz. 2015); 

Williams v. Smith, 2012 WL 3985609, at *2 (E.D. Va. 2012) (finding that where a habeas 

petition challenges both his original conviction and a probation revocation, it is 

appropriate to separate the claims relating to the original conviction from the claims 

relating to the probation revocation). 

Here, Petitioner lists “3/23/2009” as the date of the judgment of conviction that he 

is challenging. (Doc. 1 at 1). Petitioner’s requested relief is to “overturn the 

conviction[,] give me a new trial, coerced into taking plea.” (Id. at 11). All three 

grounds for relief pertain to the March 2009 judgment. As described in the Court’s 

February 24, 2015 Order:

In Ground One, [Petitioner] alleges that his grand jury indictment

was rendered defective and his due process rights violated when

“police testified to information that was told to them by another

law enforcement agency out of another country.” In Ground

Two, Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated once

again when Pinal County Deputy County Attorney Matthew S.

Long destroyed evidence [on April 17, 2009] that would have been 

favorable to Petitioner’s case. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges

that his $50,000 bail [imposed as a release condition on September 

12, 2008]

4

was excessive, and that it constituted a violation [of] the

Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment.

(Doc. 6 at 2). Petitioner presents no claim arising from the revocation of Petitioner’s 

probation. Neither does Petitioner show that Petitioner could not have challenged his 

4 Doc. 15-1 at 14.

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conviction directly after the March 2009 judgment.5 The undersigned concludes that the 

March 23, 2009 judgment is the appropriate judgment for purposes of calculating the 

timeliness of the Petition.6

1. The Statute of Limitations Commenced on June 23, 2009

To calculate the timeliness of the Petition, the undersigned must first determine 

the date that the March 23, 2009 judgment became “final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). Typically “direct review” means a defendant’s direct appeal following 

his or her convictions and sentencing. But under Arizona law, a defendant in a noncapital case who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See

ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 13–4033(B). A plea-convicted defendant, however, is entitled to an

of-right PCR proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. 

Under Ninth Circuit case law, an Arizona defendant’s of-right PCR proceeding is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers 

v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711, 716–17 (9th Cir. 2007). Hence, when an Arizona 

petitioner’s PCR proceeding is of-right, AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not begin to 

run until the conclusion of review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 

See id.

Pursuant to Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the deadline for 

filing a PCR notice in an of-right PCR proceeding is “ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence . . . .”7

 Here, ninety days from the March 23, 2009 judgment is 

5 As noted previously, the trial court ordered that Petitioner’s probationary term 

was to run consecutively to a term of incarceration imposed on Petitioner in a separate 

state court case. (Doc. 15-1 at 51-53). To the extent that Petitioner may argue that he could not have challenged the conviction prior to the commencement of his probation, the 

Supreme Court has held that prisoners incarcerated under consecutive state- court sentences may seek federal habeas relief from sentences they have not yet begun to 

serve. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).

6 Respondents calculate the timeliness of the Petition by using the February 2013 probation revocation judgment. (Doc. 15 at 15). If the Court adopts Respondents’ position, Section III(B) below shows that the Petition would remain untimely. 

7 Or “within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the 

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June 22, 2009. Petitioner did not file a PCR notice within this timeframe. Therefore, 

Petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on June 22, 2009 and the limitations 

period commenced on June 23, 2009. Consequently, unless statutory or equitable tolling 

applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition expired on June 22, 2010, 

rendering the February 2015 Petition untimely. Summers, 481 F.3d at 717; see Gonzalez

v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon 

the expiration of the time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest 

court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the 

“anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate 

the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations). 

2. Statutory Tolling is Unavailable

All of Petitioner’s PCR petitions were filed in 2013 and 2014—after the 

limitations period had expired. Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent 

collateral review petitions do not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 

(9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

3. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 

Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the petitioner] 

made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the limitations period. 

appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4.

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This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting equitable tolling.”). 

Petitioner makes no equitable tolling claim. Petitioner has not proffered any 

extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitable tolling. Nor has Petitioner shown

that an external impediment hindered the diligent pursuit of his rights. The undersigned 

finds that equitable tolling is unavailable. Accordingly, because the limitations period 

was not statutorily or equitably tolled, the Petition is untimely. 

4. Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway

In his “Counter claim to respondents [sic]” (Doc. 16 at 4), Petitioner states that 

“Petitioner only signed plea because attorney was not effective but to this day he still 

states he is innocent of said crime.” This conclusory statement is insufficient to establish 

an actual innocence/Schlup gateway claim.

8

 See Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s 

evidence of innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to 

overcome otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). The undersigned does not find that the 

record and pleadings in this case contain “evidence of innocence so strong that [the 

Court] cannot have confidence” in the outcome of the proceedings. McQuiggin, 133 

S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). The undersigned recommends that the 

Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway to 

excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding.

8 Moreover, it is unclear “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners who plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“We are aware of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual innocence gateway announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or no contest) pleas. . . . For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume without deciding that the actual innocence gateway is available to [the plea-convicted habeas 

petitioner].”). Decisions in which the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme Court have considered gateway claims of actual innocence in a plea context involved subsequent 

case law that arguably rendered the defendant’s acts non-criminal. See, e.g. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-23 (1998); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F .3d 1131, 1134-35 

(9th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Avery, 719 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2013).

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B. Alternative Timeliness Analysis Using the February 2013 Probation 

Revocation Judgment

Respondents have used the trial court’s February 2013 judgment revoking 

Petitioner’s probation as the relevant judgment for calculating the timeliness of the 

Petition. The analysis below shows that the Petition would remain untimely even if the 

Court found that the probation revocation judgment is the relevant judgment for purposes 

of the statute of limitations. 

The probation revocation judgment was issued on February 4, 2013. (Doc. 15-1 at 

81-85). On March 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of PCR. (Id. at 89). The 

undersigned will assume arguendo that Respondents are correct in treating this notice as 

initiating a timely “of-right” PCR proceeding. (Doc. 15 at 15). On September 27, 2013, 

the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding. (Doc. 15-1 at 112). Petitioner had 35 days 

from September 27, 2013 (until November 1, 2013) to petition the Arizona Court of 

Appeals for review of the trial court’s order. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c), 1.3(a); State v. 

Zuniga, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (Ariz. 1990); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1978). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review. The probation revocation judgment therefore 

became final on November 1, 2013 and the limitations period commenced on November 

2, 2013. Accordingly, unless tolling applies, the limitations period expired on November 

1, 2014. Summers, 481 F.3d at 717; see Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 654; Patterson, 251 F.3d 

at 1246.

1. Statutory Tolling

On December 6, 2013, Petitioner filed a second PCR petition. (Doc. 15-1 at 124-

29, 131-33) After briefing, the trial court issued an April 4, 2014 ruling dismissing the 

PCR petition. (Doc. 15-2 at 74-75). Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals 

for review of the trial court’s ruling. (Id. at 85-89). On July 28, 2014, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 15-3 at 3-5). The court stated that 

the second PCR petition was untimely and affirmed the trial court’s ruling dismissing the 

petition. (Id. at 4). On January 20, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

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request for further review. (Id. at 98). Because the state court deemed the second PCR 

petition untimely, it was not properly filed and has no statutory tolling effect. Pace, 544 

U.S. at 417. 

On March 13, 2014, the trial court’s clerk of court received a letter from Petitioner 

enclosing his third PCR petition. (Doc. 15-2 at 98). On May 22, 2014, the trial court 

issued an order noting that it received a third PCR petition and ordered that the clerk of 

court file it. (Id. at 101). The trial court found that Petitioner was precluded from raising 

the claims presented in the third PCR petition and summarily dismissed the petition. 

(Id.). The trial court implicitly held that the third PCR petition did not fit within one of 

the exceptions provided in Rule 32.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure that 

allow an untimely PCR petition to proceed. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 198 (on habeas 

review, “the Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the 

state courts would have held in respect to timeliness”). Accordingly, the undersigned 

finds that the third PCR petition was not properly filed and could not statutorily toll the 

limitations period. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. 

2. Equitable Tolling and Actual Innocence/Schlup Equitable Exception

As explained in Section III(A)(3) above, equitable tolling does not apply. Thus, 

the Petition is untimely as it was filed after the statute of limitations expired on 

November 1, 2014. As explained in Section III(A)(4), Petitioner does not satisfy the 

actual innocence/Schlup equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

C. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

On the first page of the Petition, Petitioner states “Evidentiary hearing requested.” 

(Doc. 1 at 1). Petitioner, however, does not articulate why he believes an evidentiary 

hearing is needed. The undersigned finds that the record is sufficiently developed and 

that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. 

Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss with prejudice the Petition on the basis that it is time-barred. The 

undersigned also recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Petitioner’s request 

for an evidentiary hearing. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 19th day of January, 2016. 

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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