Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00870/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00870-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO VERA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, Warden, 

 Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00870-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER (1) DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND, and (2) DENYING 

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(ECF Nos. 27 & 28)

AMENDED PLEADING DUE IN THIRTY 

DAYS

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing pro se a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court directed the habeas proceeding be converted 

to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action and that Plaintiff proceed in forma pauperis. The 

First Amended Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Before the Court are (1) Plaintiff’s motion for transfer to another facility, and (2) 

the Second Amended Complaint for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the Court 

determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, the action is frivolous or malicious, 

the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief against a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 

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II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that 

a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff suffers unspecified lower body mobility problems and chronic pain. He 

was evaluated and treated by Defendant Reno Orthopedic Clinic (“ROC”). Later while 

incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”), he requested but did not receive his 

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ROC medical records or continuation of the ROC treatment plan. 

He filed a prison appeal which was denied. 

He claims CSP medical staff provided negligent care and denied accommodation 

appliances and medical follow-up. He also asserts that they retaliated against him by 

denying him medication to deliberately inflict cardiovascular disease and by transferring 

him to a facility not suited to his medical needs. 

Defendant Warden Gipson knew of these violations but took no action. 

Defendant DeGuchi falsified a diagnosis. 

The “corporation” fraudulently denied a second MRI. 

Plaintiff requests the Court order proper medical treatment, delivery to him of his

medical records, and an end to the retaliation against him. He also seeks monetary 

damages. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Linking Defendants to Violations

A § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

There must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and 

the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Department 

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

Defendant warden Gipson cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because of 

her status as warden. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Liability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a

showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the

constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Redman

v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff’s allegation that warden Gipson knew his rights were being violated and 

failed to take action fails because it is not supported by any facts. See Starr v. Baca, 

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652 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). “[A] plaintiff may state a claim against a 

supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and 

acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates.” Id. 

The amended pleading similarly lacks allegations against Defendants Neubath, 

Bondoc and Moon. They are not linked to any rights violation.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend he must allege facts linking each named defendant 

to a violation of his rights. 

B. Medical Indifference and Disability Accommodation

1. Medical Indifference

A claim of medical indifference requires (1) a serious medical need, and (2) a 

deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006). The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing (a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused 

by the indifference. Id. Mere indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice is not 

sufficient to support the claim. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.

1980), citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).

Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that any named Defendant 

knowingly denied, delayed, or interfered with treatment of his serious medical needs, or 

knowingly provided medically unacceptable care. He does not describe the nature and 

extent of his mobility and pain condition(s) and how and why they presented a serious 

medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see also Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F.Supp.2d 986, 

999 (W.D. Wis. 2005), citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(“serious medical needs” encompass conditions that are life-threatening or that carry 

risks of permanent serious impairment if left untreated, those that result in needless 

pain and suffering when treatment is withheld and those that have been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment).

The medical records included with the Second Amended Complaint suggest only 

suspected high blood pressure and bronchitis. 

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Even if Plaintiff had alleged a serious medical need, the allegations do not 

demonstrate Defendants failed to respond or responded in a medically unacceptable 

manner. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff does 

not allege when and why he visited ROC; whether he was referred to ROC by CSP; the 

results of ROC’s evaluation, testing, diagnosis and treatment plan; if, when and why he

visited the CSP medical clinic; whether he had a CSP medical treatment plan; and how 

and why the CSP medical staff were indifferent to his needs. 

The allegation Plaintiff was denied follow-up care and medication deliberately to 

inflict cardiovascular disease likewise is unsupported by fact. He does not explain what 

medication and follow-up treatment(s) were denied, when, and the basis for his belief 

this was intended to and did harm him. There is a similar lack of factual support for the 

allegation Defendants “falsified” a diagnosis and “fraudulent[ly]” denied a second MRI.

As noted above, a claim Defendants were medically negligent is insufficient to state a 

federal claim.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend he must allege facts demonstrating named 

Defendants knowingly denied, delayed, or interfered with treatment of his serious 

medical needs, or knowingly provided medically unacceptable care, harming him.

2. Disability Accommodation

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “prohibit[s] discrimination on 

the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). “To 

establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified 

individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise 

discriminated against with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities; 

and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 

F.3d at 1052.

“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove 

intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional 

discrimination is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 

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1138 (9th Cir. 2001). “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that harm to a 

federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” 

Id. at 1139. In the ADA context, a plaintiff must both “identify specific reasonable and 

necessary accommodations that the state failed to provide” and show that defendant's 

failure to act was “a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an 

element of deliberateness.” Id. at 1140.

The “alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a prisoner's] 

disability-related needs in such fundamentals as . . . medical care . . . constitutes 

exclusion from participation in or . . . denial of the benefits of the prison's services, 

programs, or activities.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).

Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating a disability. The statement he 

suffered from unspecified lower body mobility and pain condition(s) does not alone 

demonstrate a disability. See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2011), citing 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 3(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(A (under the 

ADA, a disability is an impairment substantially limiting one or more of the major life 

activities). Significantly he does not claim an accommodation chrono. 

Even if he had alleged a disability, Plaintiff fails to explain what medical 

accommodation he was denied. A lack of treatment for a medical condition is not a 

basis for an ADA claim. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005)

(medical treatment decisions not basis for ADA claims).

Any ADA claim against the individually named Defendants must relate to their 

“official” rather than “individual” capacity. See e.g., Heinke v. County of Tehama 

Sheriff’s Dept., No. CVI S-12-2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug.

1, 2013). An official capacity claim is one in which CDCR system-wide decision making 

authority or policy or practice was the moving force behind the alleged rights violation. 

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The Second Amended Complaint does not allege 

Defendants acted in an official capacity. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend he must allege facts demonstrating named 

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Defendants, in their official capacity, intentionally discriminated against him because of 

his qualifying disability. 

C. Health Care Appeal and Medical Records

1. Appeals

Prison staff actions in responding to Plaintiff's prisoner grievance alone cannot 

give rise to any claim for relief under § 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] 

grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right 

upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993), citing Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (D.C. Ill. 1982). A prisoner does not have a claim of 

entitlement to a grievance procedure. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988); Ramirez v. Galarza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff may not assert a constitutional violation based solely on a claim 

Defendants improperly handled and disposed of his health care grievance. 

2. False Records

Plaintiff claims falsification of medical records. However, he offers no facts to 

suggest that such actions were the result of anything other than the exercise of 

professional judgment or that that judgment was medically unacceptable. He does not 

state why and how his medical records were false.

He does not have an independent right to an accurate prison record, Hernandez 

v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff may not assert a constitutional violation based solely on claimed falsity of

medical records.

D. Retaliation

This claim requires: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate's protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Plaintiff claims Defendants retaliated by denying medication and by an adverse 

transfer. However, he does not allege facts demonstrating protected conduct motivated 

such adverse actions. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009), citing 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568); see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 

1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a “substantial” 

or “motivating” factor behind the defendant's conduct).

If Plaintiff chooses to amend he must allege facts demonstrating named 

defendants took adverse action against him because he undertook constitutionally 

protected conduct. 

E. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a 

cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish 

the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests 

may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 

U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983). Liberty interests created by state law are limited to freedom 

from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Prison officials are generally required to provide certain procedural notice and 

hearing safeguards before taking adverse action in the classification and transfer 

process. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3375.

Assuming a liberty interest is implicated in Plaintiff's classification status, see 

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997), his claim that he was adversely 

transferred without the procedural due process protections guaranteed by federal law is 

not factually supported. 

If Plaintiff amends this claim, he must allege facts demonstrating that he was 

adversely classified and transferred without due process. 

F. State Law Claims

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The pleading makes reference to violation of California Penal Code §§ 206, 471, 

673, 2652-2653, and 2656. Plaintiff does not show individual standing to enforce the 

state criminal code. Even if standing were assumed, Plaintiff does not allege facts 

demonstrating a basis for civil claim under these provisions and compliance with the 

California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). Under the CTCA, a plaintiff may not maintain an 

action for damages against a public employee unless he has presented a written claim 

to the state Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board within six months of 

accrual of the action. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. 

California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff also claims 

violation of prison regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3335, 3375.2, 3379. However, an 

inmate does not have an independent claim under § 1983 for violation of prison 

regulations. See Chappell v. Perrez, 2011 WL 2296816, *2 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2011); 

Lamon v. Cate, 2011 WL 773046, *9 (E.D. Cal. February 28, 2011); Vasquez v. Tate, 

2012 WL 6738167, at *9 (E.D. Cal. December 28, 2012).

If Plaintiff amends this claim, he must allege facts showing an independent right 

to enforce violation(s) of state law which violations were harmful to him. And he must 

also show he has complied with state claims filing requirements. 

G. Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, 

never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008). To prevail, the party seeking injunctive relief must show either “(1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the existence of 

serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in [the 

moving party's] favor.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Company, Inc., 

762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985), quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula 

International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983) (plaintiff must show “real and immediate” threat of injury).

Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking transfer to a 270 status facility. 

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Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief where, as here, no underlying federal claim

is stated. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 101-02 (plaintiff must show a “case or 

controversy” and “real and immediate” threat of injury). His underlying Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim against Defendants, for the reasons 

stated. Additionally Plaintiff’s motion is entirely conclusory. It includes no facts

suggesting he suffered hardship or threaten injury from an improper classification. 

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Second Amended Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. Plaintiff has 

not demonstrated a need for and entitlement to injunctive relief. 

The Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended 

complaint consistent with this Order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir.

1987).

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78, consistent with 

this Order. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Further, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his Second Amended Complaint filed 

June 12, 2014, 

2. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28) is DISMISSED for 

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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

3. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 27) is DENIED without 

prejudice, 

4. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint within thirty (30) days from 

service of this Order, and 

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Order, 

the undersigned will recommend this action be dismissed, with prejudice, 

for failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute, subject to the “three 

strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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