Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02507/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02507-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTON EWING, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

EMPIRE CAPITAL FUNDING GROUP, 

INC., et al., 

Defendants

 CASE NO. 17cv2507-LAB (MDD) 

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS; (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

SERVICE; (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS; (4) DENYING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE 

 

 Serial litigator Anton Ewing sued nine defendants after he received robocalls that 

allegedly recorded him without obtaining his consent. Two of those defendants, Ascend 

Funding and Peter Tafeen, have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure 

to state a claim. Ewing moves for service and sanctions. Collette Stark asks to intervene. 

The Court grants the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but denies the rest. 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

Since neither Ascend nor Tafeen are “essentially at home” in California, Ewing must 

show the Court has specific jurisdiction over these out-of-state defendants. Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014). That means Ewing’s claims must arise out of activity 

they purposefully directed at California and it’s reasonable to ask them to defend in 

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California. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). Defendants argue they didn’t 

personally call Ewing—a lead-generator company called him in October 2017 and then 

transferred him to an Ascend representative. Although the Ascend representative told Ewing 

the lead-generator company was with Ascend, he was wrong. Ascend’s Vice President 

provided an affidavit with perfunctory legal conclusions as support. (For example: “Ascend 

is not in an agency relationship with the third party lead generator”; “Ascend does not have 

any control over the third party lead generator.”) Ewing’s affidavit wasn’t much better, but 

he swears under oath that Ascend employees personally called him in 2017—in addition to 

the lead-generators working on their behalf—knowing he had a California phone number. 

He says Tafeen is the sole officer and director of Ascend, and swears the lead-generator’s 

CEO said Tafeen expressly requested California business. 

“Conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved 

in the plaintiff's favor.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th 

Cir. 2004). It’s a close call here, but resolving the conflict in Ewing’s favor based on his 

sworn affidavit, the Court finds at this stage, he’s met his burden to show a prima facie case 

of personal jurisdiction and Defendants haven’t explained why it’s unreasonable to ask them 

to defend here. See, e.g., Ewing v. McCarthy, 2017 WL 4810098, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 

2017). Defendants may renew their motion after Ewing amends, but at this time, the motion 

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. [Dkt. 10]. 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

Although the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, Ewing’s complaint 

doesn’t contain sufficient factual matter, taken as true, to state a plausible claim to relief. 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007). Among other problems, Ewing failed to 

differentiate his allegations against each Defendant—lumping them all together doesn’t give 

them, or the Court, enough information to evaluate the claims against each one. See U.S. 

v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (insufficient under Rule 9); 

Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., Inc., 926 F.Supp. 948, 960–61 (S.D. Cal. 1996) 

(insufficient under Rule 8). For example, Ewing alleges: “On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff 

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EWING was called by Defendants.” But Ewing is suing nine different defendants. He also 

generally alleges “Defendants” called him repeatedly between April 2016 and December 

2017. This isn’t good enough either. He needs to explain who called him, when, and how 

he was harmed. Additionally, Ewing’s RICO claim fails to comply with Rule 9(b)’s 

heightened pleading standard. He didn’t allege “the time, place, and specific content of the 

false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” 

Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Ewing’s claims against Ascend and Tafeen are dismissed. [Dkt. 10.] But given the 

Ninth Circuit’s extremely liberal amendment policy, he may file an amended complaint by 

August 27, 2018. The Court reminds Ewing he must comply with his obligations under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 11 before filing. 

II. Service 

 Ewing asks the Court to authorize the U.S. Marshals to serve Ascend Funding and 

Tafeen under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b). It’s unclear from his motion, but it appears he asked for 

this relief to establish personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Since the Court finds 

personal jurisdiction exists, this request is denied as moot. [Dkt. 27.] 

 III. Sanctions 

Ewing filed a motion for sanctions against Defendants’ counsel for filing a frivolous 

motion to dismiss. Ewing has more than ten cases pending in this district, and he’s moved 

for sanctions against counsel in at least three of them. The Court recently admonished 

Ewing for this conduct. See Order Granting Mot. to Seal, Ewing v. K2 Property Development 

et al., (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2018) [Dkt. 113]. Filing sanctions against opposing counsel for an 

improper purpose is itself sanctionable, and “the court may take any appropriate measures 

to address violations of the rules.” CivLR 83.4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. What’s more, at the outset 

of this case, the Court noted Ewing’s failings in the K2 Property case and required him to 

file an affidavit attesting he had read the Local Rules. The purpose of that order wasn’t just 

to read them—it was to comply with them. 

/ / / 

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 Despite multiple warnings, Ewing continues to violate the Court’s rules, and this 

motion for sanctions is the latest iteration. The Court orders Ewing to file a two page 

memorandum by August 27, 2018, addressing why he shouldn’t be sanctioned and ordered 

to pay Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs in opposing his frivolous sanctions motion. 

See, e.g., Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). Ewing’s motion for 

sanctions is denied. [Dkt. 55.]

 IV. Intervention 

 The Court “may permit anyone to intervene who” “has a claim or defense that shares 

with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Collette Stark 

asks to intervene because she wants to sue Ascend and Tafeen for similar telemarketing 

calls in violation of the same three causes of action Ewing pleaded. 

 While common questions of law or fact may exist, Stark’s motion hasn’t sufficiently 

alleged her claims. She failed to attach a proposed pleading under 24(c), and while that’s 

only a technical defect, it matters here because her motion doesn’t put Defendants or the 

Court on notice of her claims. She included exhibits from an action by Video Solutions 

against Ascend Funding in state court, but doesn’t offer any explanation for how that case 

relates to this one, or what phone calls form the basis for her action against Ascend and 

Tafeen. Defendants, and the Court, aren’t in a position to evaluate if intervention is 

appropriate. The motion is denied. [Dkt. 57]. If she thinks she can fix the problems the Court 

and Defendants identified, she may file a renewed motion by August 27, 2018. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 30, 2018 

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

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