Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00189/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00189-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSHUA DIMMING, a single man, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

PIMA COUNTY, et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-189-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 42]. Plaintiff filed

his response [Doc. 56] and Defendants replied [Doc. 58].

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise from an incident on March 29, 2007. Defendant deputies

responded to a disturbance involving Plaintiff near Vail, Arizona. Plaintiff was arrested, and

in the process of being taken into custody Defendant deputies employed a Taser to subdue

him. While Plaintiff was immobilized from the taser, a Pima County Sheriff’s patrol car

rolled over him and dragged him for some distance. Plaintiff allegedly suffered serious

abrasions, and while he was pinned under the car and his clothes caught fire resulting in third

degree burns.

Plaintiff alleges that the deputies displayed deliberate indifference by allowing him

to be run over and then by using the car as a means to restrain him. Plaintiff was transported

to a burn unit in Maricopa County for surgery and treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that

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Defendant Sheriff Dupnik and the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, as a matter of policy,

custom, and practice has failed to properly train, supervise, direct or control his deputies

concerning the rights of citizens. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Sheriff Dupnik and

the Pima County Sheriff’s Department failed to properly investigate, sanction or discipline

his deputies.

Plaintiff’s allegations implicate both the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United

States Constitution in violation of his civil rights pursuant to § 1983, 42 U.S.C. Plaintiff also

asserts a cause of action for negligence under Arizona state law. Plaintiff asserts respondeat

superior liability against Defendant Sheriff Dupnik and the Pima County Sheriff’s

Department, and has also named the spouses of the Defendant deputies.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint [Doc. 1] on April 1, 2009. Later that same day,

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [Doc. 2]. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. 23] on May 5, 2009. Defendants sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law negligence

claim because it had been brought in Pima County Superior Court and was dismissed because

of his failure to comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim Statute. On February 1, 2010, this

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law negligence claim based on res judicata. On February

5, 2010, Defendants filed their Answer [Doc. 28].

On March 22, 2010, this Court held a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference. On April 30,

2010, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 40]. On May 10, 2010,

Defendants filed their second Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 42]. The Court held oral argument

regarding the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 42] on February 4, 2011.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint is to contain a "short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ.

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P. While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S. –,

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal is

appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule

12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Further, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Negligence Claim

Defendants aver that this Court’s February 1, 2010 Order [Doc. 27] dismissed

Plaintiff’s negligence claims. Plaintiff agreed and withdrew the negligence claim in his

Motion to Strike [Doc. 44] filed on May 19, 2010.

B. Claim Based on Policy, Custom and Practice

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims “based on policy, custom and practice

should be dismissed as being wholly conclusory, unsupported by any factual allegations, and

insufficient to withstand dismissal under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S. –, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dupnik and the Pima County

Sheriff’s Department, “as a matter of policy, custom and practice, has with deliberate

indifference failed to properly train, supervise, direct or control his deputies concerning the

rights of citizens, and has failed to investigate, sanction or discipline his deputies, including

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the deputies in this case, for violations of the constitutional rights of citizens, thereby causing

the deputies in this case to engage in unlawful conduct, including the actions complained of

in this case, and violating the Plaintiffs [sic] rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments to

the United States Constitution.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In his Complaint,

Plaintiff relies solely on the facts averred as to the March 29, 2007 incident to assert his

claims against the Sheriff and Pima County.

“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

its employees or agents. Instead it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible

under § 1983.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct.

2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Moreover, “‘bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to

nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination

claim,’ for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss are not entitled to an assumption of

truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, – U.S.

–, 129 S.Ct. at 1951). “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states:

Defendant Sheriff Clarence W. Dupnik and the Pima County Sheriff’s

Department, as a matter of policy, custom, and practice, has with deliberate

indifference failed to properly train, supervise, direct, or control his deputies

concerning the rights of citizens, thereby causing defendant deputies to engage

in the unlawful conduct described above.

Defendant Sheriff Clarence W. Dupnik and the Pima County Sheriff’s

Department, as a matter of policy, custom, and practice, has with deliberate

indifference failed to properly investigate, sanction or discipline his deputies,

including the defendants in this case, for violations of the constitutional rights

of citizens, thereby causing deputies, including the defendants in this case, to

engage in unlawful conduct, including the actions of the deputies complained

of herein.

Pl.’s First Amended Compl. [Doc. 40] at ¶¶ 15-16. These allegations against Defendant

Sheriff Dupnik and Pima County without any factual content to support it, “is just the sort

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of conclusory allegation that the Iqbal Court deemed inadequate.” Moss, 572 F.3d at 970

(finding allegations of systemic viewpoint discrimination at the highest levels of the Secret

Service without any factual support similarly inadequate). “[P]roof of random acts or

isolated events are insufficient to establish custom.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885

F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that his case

was not based upon this incident alone; however, he could not point to any other situations

in which the Defendant County or Sheriff failed to “investigate, sanction or discipline”

giving rise to the instant case. Pl.’s First Amended Compl. at ¶ 16. Indeed, no facts have

been alleged to suggest “a ‘permanent and well-settled’ practice” by Defendants to support

a § 1983 claim based on policy, custom, and practice. See Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444.

“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review,

that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun

Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.2004). Although Plaintiff stated the legal

elements of a cause of action against the Defendant County and Sheriff under a theory of

failure to train and investigate, he has failed to plead any facts that could support such a

claim. Furthermore, during oral argument Plaintiff averred that he was not relying solely on

the March 29, 2007 incident, but could not point to any facts, specific or otherwise, that

would support such a claim. See Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Nevada

System of Higher Education, 616 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff conceded that there were

no new facts that she would include, and therefore the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying leave to amend). This Court has already allowed Plaintiff to amend his

Complaint once, and based on the lack of facts in support of Plaintiff’s claims, it is reticent

to allow further amendments. As such, this Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based upon

policy, custom and practice.

 . . .

 . . .

 . . .

 . . .

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C. Claim Against Defendant Sheriff Dupnik in his Individual Capacity

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to sustain Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Sheriff in his individual capacity. Plaintiff disagrees, without any

concrete argument as to why the claim should not be dismissed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has clearly stated that, “[i]n a section 1983 claim,

‘a supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in or

directed the violations, or knew of the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent

them.’” Corrales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

Further, “[s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his individual

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint

is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). Finally, “[t]he requisite causal connection may be established

when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Id. (internal

citations omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to state any facts to support an individual claim against Defendant

Sheriff Dupnik. The Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts to support that

Defendant Sheriff Dupnik either knew of, supported or acted indifferently regarding the

actions of his subordinates. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Sheriff Dupnik in

his individual capacity should be dismissed.

D. Claims Against Spouses

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against spouses of the individually

named deputies. At oral argument, Plaintiff indicated that he would withdraw this claim.

As such, this Court will dismiss the individual spouses.

 . . .

 . . .

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The Court notes that Plaintiff has already withdrawn his negligence claims, as well

as his claims against the spouses of the individual deputy defendants.

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E. Scheduling Order

During the February 4, 2011 hearing, the Court amended its previous Scheduling

Order [Doc. 34]. In light of the passing of one of the deadlines set and in its discretion, the

Court will extend the dates set during that hearing. Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher

Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The court has broad discretion in fashioning

appropriate scheduling orders.”).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 42] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims based

upon policy, custom and practice, and against Defendant Sheriff Clarence Dupnik in his

individual capacity are dismissed;1

2. Plaintiff’s expert witness disclosure shall occur on or before April 11, 2011.

Defendants’ expert witness disclosure shall occur on or before June 10, 2011. Rebuttal

expert disclosure shall occur on or before July 11, 2011;

3. Dispositive motions shall be filed on or before September 1, 2011; and

4. A Joint Proposed Pretrial Order shall be filed on or before October 3, 2011, or

within thirty (30) days of the Court’s ruling on any pre-trial motion.

DATED this 10th day of March, 2011.

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