Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03345/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEVEN W. BIESTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MIDWEST HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 

JAMES A. KLAUSMAN, FLOYD C. 

EATON, JR., DEIDRE G. KLAUSMAN, 

and VIRGINIA I. EATON, 

Defendant-Appellees. 

FILED A ... 

United States Court of A'i'P:r.;.J 

Tentb Circuit 

FEB 2 6 1996 

PATRICKFIShr:R 

Cler!t 

No. 94·-3345 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-2034-GTV) 

Dale L. Ingram of Jolley, Walsh & Hager, P.C. 

Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Ryan E. Karaim of Franke & Schultz, P.C. 

Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant-Appellees 

Before EBEL and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and HOLMES, District Judge.* 

HOLMES, District Judge. 

* The Honorable Sven Erik Holmes, United States District Judge 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 1 
Steven W. Biester appeals from the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to Midwest Health Services, Inc. ("Midwest"), his 

former employer. In the underlying lawsuit, Mr. Biester alleges 

that he was sexually harassed by his supervisor at Midwest. He 

brings this claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e, ~ ~ 

Midwest moved to dismiss Mr. Biester's lawsuit for failure to 

bring suit within 90 days after he received a right to sue letter 

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Title 

VII imposes this 90-day time limitation upon prospective 

plaintiffs. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). In its motion, Midwest 

asserts that Mr. Biester received the right to sue notice on 

October 22, 1993, but that he did not file his lawsuit until 

January 26, 1994, five days after the expiration of the 90-day 

period prescribed by Title VII. Mr. Biester responds that his 

mental incapacity tolled the statute of limitations for a 

sufficient number of days such that the actual commencement of the 

lawsuit was timely. 

Initially, the district court treated Midwest's motion as a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Then, because the parties 

submitted materials outside of the pleadings, the district court 

properly converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Accordingly, the district court allowed 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 2 
the parties reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent 

material. 

Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment to 

Midwest, holding that no basis upon which to toll the 90-day 

limitations period existed in this case. First, Mr. Biester argues 

to this Court that the district court erred when it refused to toll 

the limitations period. Second, he argues that the district court 

applied the wrong standard to Midwest's summary judgment motion and 

improperly drew adverse inferences from the evidence. 

We affirm. 

I. 

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact," Celotex Cor:p. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986); Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership v. 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 805 F. 2d 342, 345 (lOth Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987), and "the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated: 

[t]he plain language of Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

477 U.S. at 322. 

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment must offer evidence, in admissible form, of specific 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 3 
facts, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), sufficient to raise a "genuine issue 

of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247-48 (1986) ("the mere existence of ~ alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 

motion for summary judgment") . "Factual disputes that are 

irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. 

Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is [not] 

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to 

return a verdict for that party." Id. at 250. The Supreme Court 

stated: 

[t] he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 

support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; 

there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the plaintiff. 

.ilL.. at 252. Thus, to defeat a summary judgment motion, the 

nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. y. Zenith Radio Corp., 4 75 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986) ; 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 ("there is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a 

jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely 

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may 

be granted." (citations omitted)). 

In essence, the inquiry for the Court is "whether the evidence 

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury 

or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 

matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In its review, the 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 4 
Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment. Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 

933 F.2d 891, 892 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

This Court reviews the summary judgment determination of a 

district court ~ llQYQ. Housing Authority v. United States, 980 

F.2d 624, 628 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

II. 

Midwest employed Mr. Biester at its Fairlawn Heights facility 

from approximately December 24, 1992 through May 17, 1993. Mr. 

Biester alleges that his female supervisor sexually harassed him 

from January 1993 until March 30, 1993. Mr. Biester subsequently 

filed a complaint with the Kansas Commission on Human Rights. That 

agency forwarded the complaint to the EEOC for dual filing. 

On three different occasions throughout April and May 1993, 

Mr. Biester was hospitalized at a psychiatric care facility with a 

principal diagnosis of major depression. He received outpatient 

treatment until late May 1993. On or about June 1, 1993, Mr. 

Biester moved into the residence of his former spouse, Susan V. 

Biester. By affidavit, Ms. Biester states that Mr. Biester "had 

absolutely no concept of time, date, or day" during this period. 

Ms. Biester also testified about a setback suffered by Mr. Biester 

when he was not selected for a job, allegedly because of his 

lawsuit against his former employer. 

former husband's "pattern of 

Ms. Biester believes that her 

behavior" continued until 

approximately mid-December. Dr. William A. O'Connor, Mr. Biester's 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 5 
psychiatric expert, opined that "Mr. Biester continued to suffer 

depression through the winter of 1993 with classic symptomology of 

time disorientation, fatigue, memory loss, and impaired judgment to 

time, future events and consequences." 

On September 21, 1993, Mr. Biester requested a right to sue 

notice from the EEOC. Mr. Biester's attorney sent a letter to the 

EEOC on September 29, 1993, asking that the notice be sent directly 

to him. On October 12, 1993, the EEOC mailed a right to sue notice 

to Mr. Biester, via certified mail. The EEOC failed to send a 

notice to Mr. Biester's attorney. 

Mr. Biester recalls receiving two or three notices informing 

him that he had a certified letter at the post office. He further 

recalls picking up the letter, but he does not remember the date. 

He also recalls delivering the letter to his attorney by hand on 

some unknown date. Mr. Biester's attorney, Dale L. Ingram, 

submitted an affidavit in which he stated that Mr. Biester told him 

"explicitly or implicitly" that Mr. Biester received the notice on 

October 30, 1993. However, Postal Service records reflect that the 

notice was retrieved by Mr. Biester on October 22, 1993. The 

notice informed him that he had 90 days to bring any desired civil 

action. Mr. Biester filed his complaint in the instant lawsuit on 

January 26, 1994, which is within the 90-day period if he received 

the notice on October 30, 1993, but outside the time limit if the 

notice was received on October 22, 1993. 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 6 
III. 

The facts material to the resolution of Mr. Biester's appeal 

are not in dispute. Midwest has presented competent evidence that 

Mr. Biester received the EEOC notice on October 22, 1993. Although 

Mr. Biester previously told his attorney that he received the 

notice on October 30, 1993, no evidence substantiating Mr. 

Biester' s previous statement has been submit ted. Further, Mr. 

Biester now states that he does not know when he received the 

notice. Finally, Midwest does not dispute the fact that Mr. 

Biester was diagnosed with major depression and experienced the 

attendant symptoms through December 1993. Therefore, the Court 

accepts these facts as true. No genuine issues of material fact 

remain to be determined before summary judgment can be entered. 

The first legal issue for the Court is whether, under the 

circumstances presented by this case, Mr. Biester's mental illness 

tolled the applicable statute of limitations such that he commenced 

his lawsuit in a timely manner. 

The Title VII provision at issue states that "a civil action 

may be brought against the respondent named in the charge" within 

90 days after the issuance of a right to sue notice. 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(f) (1) The 90-day period for filing suit generally 

commences on the date that the complainant actually receives the 

EEOC right to sue notice. Williams v. Southern Union Gas. Co., 529 

F.2d 483, 487 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976). 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 7 
It is well settled that the 90-day period for filing a civil 

lawsuit after final disposition of a complaint by the EEOC is "a 

requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to 

waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, " Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines. Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro 

v. GTE Lenkurt. Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (lOth Cir. 1983). Thus, 

the requirement is not jurisdictional but is in the nature of a 

statute of limitations. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. 

Courts have narrowly construed equitable exceptions to the 

time limitations set out in Title VII. ~' ~' Baldwin County 

Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150-52 (1984) ("Procedural 

requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the 

federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague 

sympathy for particular litigants."); Earnhardt v. Puerto Rico, 691 

F.2d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 1982). In this case, the court below 

properly acknowledged that: 

[t]he Tenth Circuit has generally recognized equitable 

tolling of Title VII time limitations only if the 

circumstances of the case "rise to the level of active 

deception which might invoke the powers of equity to toll 

the limitations period." Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency 

Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838-39 (lOth Cir. 1979). "For 

instance, equitable tolling may be appropriate where a 

plaintiff has been 'lulled into inaction by her past 

employer, state or federal agencies, or the courts. ' " 

Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1984) 

(quoting Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 

F.2d 981, 986 (lOth Cir. 1981)). "Likewise, if a 

plaintiff is 'actively misled,' or 'has in some 

extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or 

her rights,' we will permit tolling of the limitations 

period." Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Wilkerson 

v. Sie~fried Ins. Agency. Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (lOth 

Cir. 1982) ) . 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 8 
Mr. Biester argues that the district court erred when it 

determined that his mental condition did not prevent the timely 

filing of his lawsuit. While we have held that the limitations 

period may be tolled where a claimant has been "actively misled," 

~' ~' Richardson v. Frank, 975 F.2d 1433, 1435-37 (lOth Cir. 

1991), the Tenth Circuit has never held that mental incapacity 

tolls the statute of limitations. 1 We believe that, under the 

facts presented by this case, it is unnecessary to reach that 

issue. 

The few courts which have recognized an exception for mental 

incapacity have limited the application of this equitable doctrine 

to exceptional circumstances. ~' ~' Lopez v. Citibank. N.A., 

808 F.2d 905, 906-07 (1st Cir. 1987) (where the plaintiff was able 

to pursue his claim despite illness, equitable tolling was not 

warranted); Moody v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 664 F. Supp. 232, 236 

(E.D.N.C. 1987) (panic disorder suffered by plaintiff did not 

constitute "exceptional circumstances" such that she was prevented 

from pursuing her claim). In Bassett v. Sterling Drug. Inc., 578 

F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the court stated that 

1 However, other courts have recognized this possibility. 

cr..._ Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1993) 

(mental illness is an appropriate basis for tolling 30-day filing 

period set forth in Civil Service Reform Act); Moody v. Bayliner 

Marine Corp., 664 F. Supp. 232, 235 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (recognizing 

that mental incapacity may toll Title VII limitations period "in 

rare circumstances"); Bassett v. Sterling Drug. Inc., 578 F. Supp. 

1244, 124 7-48 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (recognizing exception to ADEA 

limitations period if plaintiff adjudged mentally incompetent or 

institutionalized during filing period) . 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 9 
.. equitable tolling for mental incapacity should be limited to "the 

objective standard of adjudication or institutionalization . 

[to] protect[] defendants against specious allegations of mental 

incompetence advanced in desperate efforts to save time-barred 

claims ... Further, some courts which do recognize mental illness as 

a reason for equitable tolling have refused to toll the statute of 

limitations when the plaintiff is represented by counsel during the 

90-day limitations period. Lopez, 808 F.2d at 907; Moody, 664 F. 

Supp. at 236. 

Under the circumstances presented by this case, we decline to 

toll the statute applicable to Mr. Biester's case based upon his 

claim of mental illness. First, Mr. Biester has not alleged the 

"exceptional circumstances" required by most courts to toll the 

statute. For example, there is no claim here that Mr. Biester was 

adjudged incompetent or institutionalized. Second, we agree with 

the district court that the evidence demonstrates that, in spite of 

his mental condition, Mr. Biester "was capable of pursuing his own 

claim." He wrote to the EEOC on September 21, 1993 to request a 

right to sue notice. Subsequently, Mr. Biester told his attorney 

he had received the notice and delivered the notice to his 

attorney's office. Thus, his mental condition simply does not rise 

to the level of the mental incapacity contemplated by the courts 

that have tolled the 90-day limitations period as a result of such 

incapacity. 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 10 
Third, Mr. Biester was represented by counsel throughout the 

entire 90-day period. It is undisputed that his lawyer had 

adequate time to file his action against Midwest. We agree with 

the district court that: 

[c]ounsel knew well in advance of the 90-day time limit 

that plaintiff had received the right to sue notice. 

Despite the fact that the notice was dated October 12, 

1993, counsel chose to merely rely on plaintiff's 

representation that the notice was received on October 

30, 1993, and then chose to wait until the 88th day of 

the presumed filing period before filing the complaint in 

this court. Under these circumstances it can hardly be 

said that plaintiff's mental condition prevented the 

timely filing of this suit. 

Even if, during some days of this crucial time period, Mr. 

Biester was not able to appreciate the significance of the date he 

received the right to sue notice, the evidence shows that he was 

not so incapacitated that he was unable to pursue his lawsuit. 

Further, because he notified his lawyer within 90 days of October 

22, 1993, the true date on which he signed for the letter, his 

mental condition did not in fact prevent the timely filing of his 

lawsuit. Under the circumstances presented by this case, equitable 

tolling of the 90-day period is not appropriate. 2 

2 Mr. Biester also claims that he has been prevented from 

asserting his rights "in some extraordinary way" and that this 

prevention justifies tolling. To that end, Mr. Biester argues that 

Midwest caused his mental illness and that the EEOC violated its 

own regulations by failing to send a copy of the right to sue 

letter to Mr. Biester's attorney. However, we conclude that these 

facts do not constitute the "extraordinary" circumstances necessary 

to justify equitable tolling under established Tenth Circuit 

precedent. 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 11 
IV. 

Appellant also argues that the district court applied the 

wrong standard of review to Midwest's summary judgment motion and 

improperly drew inferences adverse to Mr. Biester from the 

evidence. 

First, the district court applied the proper standard when it 

granted Midwest's motion for summary judgment. Midwest met its 

burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts prove that Mr. 

Biester's complaint was untimely. Indeed, Mr. Biester concedes 

this point. The court properly held that, to avoid summary 

judgment, Mr. Biester had the burden of establishing a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether the 90-day time period should 

be tolled. ~Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties. Inc., 627 F.2d 

1036, 1041 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1980). Applying the legal standard for 

equitable tolling in this Circuit, Mr. Biester has failed to 

establish a fact question that would prevent summary judgment. 

Second, the district court did not draw improper inferences 

from the evidence. Mr. Biester argues that the district court 

erred when it used the letter he sent to the EEOC on September 21, 

1994 as evidence that he was capable of pursuing his own claim. 

Mr. Biester claims that the text of the letter shows that he was 

confused and unable to understand what was required to commence his 

lawsuit. The letter states that "I am writing in reference to a 

suit I have filed against Fairlawn Hts. nursing center." (emphasis 

added). However, the fact that Mr. Biester may have thought that, 

12 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 12 
'· through the filing of his complaint with the EEOC, he had already 

filed his lawsuit, does not demonstrate that he was mentally 

incapacitated. This could easily be a layperson's reasonable 

mistake. ~, ~, Richardson, 975 F.2d at 1436 ("EEO complaints 

are often, as in this case, presented initially by persons without 

the benefit of counsel or the information to be technically 

knowledgeable."). 

Mr. Biester argues further that the trauma he experienced when 

he failed to get the position he applied for reduces the 

evidentiary value of his letter. However, the district court also 

based its finding that Mr. Biester was capable of ~ursuing his 

claim on the fact that he told his attorney that he had received 

the right to sue letter. This act indicates that, after the 

traumatic event, Mr. Biester had sufficient capacity to act in 

furtherance of his lawsuit. Therefore, the district court did not 

draw unwarranted inferences from Mr. Biester's evidence. 

v. 

In conclusion, this lawsuit, filed more than 90 days after Mr. 

Biester received his right to sue notice from the EEOC, was not 

timely. In responding to Midwest's motion for summary judgment, 

Mr. Biester did not present sufficient evidence to merit the 

equitable tolling of the 90-day limitations period. Further, the 

district court applied the proper summary judgment standard and did 

not draw improper inferences from the evidence. For those reasons, 

we affirm the order and judgment of the district court. 

13 

Appellate Case: 94-3345 Document: 01019276439 Date Filed: 02/26/1996 Page: 13