Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00096/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00096-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Clerk’s record number.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Henry Richardson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Somberg; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-0096-PHX-MHM (GEE)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On January 10, 2005, Charles Henry Richardson, an inmate confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex at Globe, AZ, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2254. (Petition.); [#1]1

 The petitioner asserts the following

grounds for relief: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to submit

to a blood test; (2) counsel was ineffective by failing to defend the petitioner; (3) his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated when he was held without bail and because his sentence was

disparate in comparison to a white person who was similarly situated; and (4) his due process

rights were violated during post-conviction proceedings. Before the court are the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, the respondents’ answer and the petitioner’s reply.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the District

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 16 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 9
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Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. 

Summary of the Case

Richardson pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and aggravated driving while under the

influence (DUI) pursuant to a plea agreement. (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit A.) The court

sentenced Richardson to 7.5 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault and 4 months’

imprisonment as a condition of probation for the aggravated DUI. Id., Exhibit F. 

 On November 9, 2001, Richardson filed a notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ answer, p. 3.) He filed the petition on July 24, 2002. Id. In that petition,

Richardson argued (1) counsel failed to subject the case to meaningful adversarial testing, (2)

counsel did not file any pretrial motions, (3) counsel did not challenge the grand jury indictment

on the issue of intent, (4) the trial judge did not grant him release and counsel failed to file a

motion for a release hearing, (5) counsel failed to examine the van’s power steering, (6) counsel

failed to investigate the illegal blood test, (7) counsel never showed Richardson the state’s

discovery, (8) counsel failed to appear for a probation investigation hearing, (9) counsel failed

to move for a mitigation hearing, (10) counsel failed to inform Richardson of an amended

indictment, (11) counsel was reassigned, was no longer in trial group, and had no incentive to

prepare for trial, (12) the plea was not knowing and voluntary, (13) the sentence was excessive,

(14) the sentence was disproportionate, (15) the sentence did not comply with Solem v. Helm,

(16) the plea offer was disproportionate, (17) the sentence did not comply with Smith v. State,

(18) the sentence was discriminatory citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (19) the sentence was

disproportionate citing Wayte v. United States, (20) the sentence was not proportionate to others

in the state, and (21) counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the element of intent.

(Respondents’ answer, Exhibit C.) The trial court denied the petition on September 25, 2002.

Id., Exhibit D. Unfortunately, Richardson was not mailed a copy of this denial until sometime

the following year. Id., Exhibit F, p. 3; (Petitioner’s reply, Exhibit A.)

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 On August 21, 2003, Richardson filed an “Addendum” to his petition for post-conviction

relief. (Respondents’ answer, p. 4; Exhibit H.) He further argued the state’s blood draw was

improper. Id. The trial court dismissed the petition/addendum on September 4, 2003, pursuant

to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a). (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit I.)

Richardson appealed the trial court’s denial of his original petition for post-conviction

relief on September 6, 2003. (Respondents’ answer, p. 4.) The appeal was not filed within the

30-day statutory deadline because the trial court’s denial was not timely mailed to Richardson.

Id., Exhibit F, p. 3; See Ariz Rules of Crim Proc. 32.9(c). Richardson argued (1) counsel was

ineffective for failing to file pretrial motions and failing to challenge the blood draw, (2) counsel

failed to challenge the nature of the charges, (3) counsel failed to motion the court for discovery,

(4) counsel failed to examine the power steering on the van, (5) counsel failed to file a motion

for a release hearing, (6) counsel failed to challenge the state’s failure to preserve a blood

sample for testing, and (7) counsel failed to subject the case to meaningful adversarial testing.

Id., Exhibit E. The court of appeals denied the petition on September 10, 2004. Id., Exhibit G.

Richardson filed another petition for post-conviction relief on September 9, 2003. Id.,

Exhibit J. He again argued the state’s blood draw was improper. Id. The trial court dismissed

the petition on September 19, 2003, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(b). Id., Exhibit K.

Richardson filed a petition for review on October 22, 2003. Id., Exhibit L. The court of appeals

denied review on September 10, 2004. Id., Exhibit M. 

On January 10, 2005, Richardson filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. (Petition.); [#1] He asserts the

following grounds for relief: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was

forced to submit to a blood test; (2) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because

his counsel was ineffective by failing to (a) file for a bail hearing, (b) file a motion for

discovery, (c) challenge the blood test, (d) give petitioner the state’s discovery related to the

blood test, or (e) ask for a mitigated sentence hearing; (3) his Eight Amendment rights were

violated when he was held without bail and because his sentence was disparate in comparison

to a white person who was similarly situated; and (4) his due process rights were violated during

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post-conviction proceedings. Id. The respondents filed an answer on April 22, 2005.

(Respondents’ answer.) They argue Richardson’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Id.

Richardson filed a reply on June 2, 2005. (Reply.) 

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to prisoners in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If the petitioner is in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ shall not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if the “state court confronted a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and

nevertheless arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent.” Vlasak v. Superior

Court of California ex rel. County of Los Angeles, 329 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003). A

decision is an “unreasonable application” if “the state court identified the correct legal

principles, but applied those principles to the facts of [the] case in a way that was not only

incorrect or clearly erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Id. “It is not enough that our

independent review of the legal question leaves us with a firm conviction that the state court

decision was erroneous.” Id.

If the state court denied the claim on the merits but did not explain its reasoning, this

court must independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred

in its application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003).

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Federal review is limited to those issues that have been fully presented to the state court.

This so-called “exhaustion rule” reads in pertinent part as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This rule permits the states “the initial opportunity to pass upon and

correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picardy v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275

(1971) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971)). 

To be properly exhausted, the federal claim must be “fairly presented” to the state courts.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In other words, the state courts must be apprised

of the legal issue and given the first opportunity to rule on the merits. Id. at 275-76.

Accordingly, the petitioner must “present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the

federal courts.” Id. The state courts have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue

when the petitioner has presented the state court with the issue’s factual and legal bases.

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the petitioner must

explicitly alert the state court that he is raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified

247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). The petitioner

must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal

law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1087 (2000), or by citing state cases

that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d

1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

 If the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by the State of Arizona,

he must present his claims to the state appellate court for review. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). If state remedies have not been

exhausted, the petition may not be granted and should ordinarily be dismissed. See Johnson v.

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2

 Richardson further argues counsel failed to file a motion for discovery regarding the blood

test. This issue is discussed in the court’s analysis of ground two.

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Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, the court has the authority to deny

on the merits rather than dismiss for failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

A claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court declined to address the issue on the

merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear the

state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. A claim

that is procedurally defaulted must be denied unless the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750 (1991)).

As his first ground for relief, Richardson argues his rights under the Fourth Amendment

were violated when his blood was forcibly taken and tested for alcohol content. Habeas Corpus

relief, however, is not available for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation provided the state

afforded the petitioner an opportunity to litigate the issue below. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465

(1976). “The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” Ortiz-Sandoval

v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Richardson was provided an opportunity to

litigate the issue and did so in his first petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, relief

is not available on this issue.

In his fourth ground for relief, Richardson argues irregularities in the state’s Rule 32

proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.2

 They did not. The postconviction review process is not mandated by the federal constitution. Accordingly, any errors

in the process do not violate the constitution, and are not addressable through a federal habeas

corpus proceeding. Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525

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U.S. 903 (1998); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

1012 (1989).

In his third ground for relief, Richardson argues his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated when he was held without bail and because his sentence was disparate in comparison

to a white person who was similarly situated. These issues were raised in Richardson’s first

state post-conviction petition and denied by the trial court. (The court assumes arguendo they

were “fairly presented.”) Richardson did not, however, raise these issues before the court of

appeals. Accordingly, he failed to properly exhaust these issues. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232

F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.2000), as modified 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001). Moreover, if Richardson

returned to state court and attempted to appeal these issues, the court of appeals would refuse

to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. See Ariz. R. Crim. Pro. 32.9(c) (30-

day time limit to file petition for review); State v. Pope, 635 P.2d 846, 849 (Ariz. 1981) (in

banc) (Failure to comply with “the strict time limits” in Rule 32.9 will not be excused by “mere

inadvertence or neglect.”). These issues are procedurally defaulted. See Franklin v. Johnson,

290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.2002); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.1989). The

issues should be dismissed unless Richardson can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. He cannot.

In his reply brief, Richardson argues generally that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s

failure to promptly send him its decision denying his first post-conviction petition. It is not

clear why the trial court’s failure prevented him from exhausting these issues. Richardson

eventually filed an appeal. In that appeal, Richardson raised a number of issues relating to his

claim that counsel was ineffective. He does not explain why he could not also have raised his

Eighth Amendment claim in this appeal, and nothing in the record indicates any possible cause

for this omission. Richardson has not shown cause for his procedural default. 

Richardson further argues failure to excuse this procedural default would result in a

miscarriage of justice. Under this gateway, Richardson must show that, “in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). 

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3

 The elements of aggravated assault include “recklessly causing any physical injury to another

person” while “using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” A.R.S. § 13-1203; State v. Pena, 104

P.3d 873, 875 (Ariz. App. 2005). The elements of aggravated DUI include “driv[ing] any vehicle”

“[w]hile under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . if the person is impaired to the slightest degree”

if “the person’s driver’s license . . . is suspended . . . .” State v. Brown, 986 P.2d 239, 241 n. 1 (Ariz.

App. 1999).

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Richardson argues the blood alcohol evidence against him was flawed, and no reasonable

juror would convict him without it. The court does not agree. Even without the blood alcohol

evidence, there was evidence that (1) Richardson’s van collided with another vehicle while he

(Richardson) was driving on the wrong side of the road at 4:30 a.m., (2) Melvin Collemen was

injured in the accident, (3) Richardson had the odor of alcohol on his breath, and (4) Richardson

was aware his license to drive had been suspended. (Petitioner’s reply, Exhibit H.) A

reasonable juror could conclude from these facts that Richardson was guilty of the charges

against him.3

 Richardson has not shown cause for the default and actual prejudice or that he is

actually innocent. Id. at 622. This ground for relief therefore should be dismissed. 

In the second ground for relief, Richardson argues his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated because his counsel was ineffective by failing to (a) file for a bail hearing, (b) file a

motion for discovery, (c) challenge the blood test, (d) give petitioner the state’s discovery

related to the blood draw, or (e) ask for a mitigated sentence hearing. Issues (d) and (e) were

presented in Richardson’s first post-conviction action but were not raised before the court of

appeals. (The court assumes arguendo they were “fairly presented” before the trial court.)

They are now procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed. See above. 

Issues (a), (b) and (c) were presented to the court of appeals and are properly exhausted.

The trial court and the court of appeals denied relief, but they did not explain their reasoning.

Accordingly, this court must independently review the record to determine whether the state

court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002). The court concludes the state courts’ denial of relief on these issues was

not clear error.

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In issues (a), (b) and (c), Richardson argues counsel was ineffective in his conduct of the

case prior to Richardson’s guilty plea. These arguments, however, may not be raised in a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). A

guilty plea constitutes a “break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal

process.” Id. The defendant admits guilt and thereby loses the right to object to any errors

which preceded his guilty plea. Id. In other words, the plea of guilty “constitutes a waiver of

the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent

constitutional defects.” United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1117 (2001). Accordingly, counsel’s failings prior to the plea (assuming

there were any) cannot become independent grounds for a subsequent federal habeas petition.

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. The state courts’ denial of relief on these issues was not clear error.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order 

DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [#1]

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 05-0096-PHX-MHM.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 10th day of November, 2005.

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