Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-04950/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-04950-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON C. STEVENSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-11-4950 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS, OR,

ALTERNATIVELY, LESSER

SANCTIONS, FOR SPOLIATION OF

EVIDENCE

Before the Court is the “Motion for Terminating Sanctions, or, in the Alternative,

Lesser Sanctions, Against Defendants for Their Intentional Spoliation of Relevant

Evidence,” filed August 7, 2015, on behalf of plaintiffs Aaron C. Stevenson, Kevin D. Taylor,

Kevin W. Smith, Audry Lee and Kirk W. Richardson. Defendants, City and County of San

Francisco, San Francisco Fire Department, San Francisco Fire Commission, and Civil

Service Commission of San Francisco, have filed opposition, to which plaintiffs have

replied. The matter came on regularly for hearing September 18, 2015. Murlene J. Randle

and Robert William Reed of the Law Offices of Murlene J. Randle appeared on behalf of

plaintiffs. Jonathan C. Rolnick of the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office appeared on

behalf of defendants. Having read and considered the parties’ respective written

submissions, and having considered the parties’ oral arguments, the Court rules as follows.

//

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BACKGROUND

In the instant action, plaintiffs, each of whom is African-American and employed or

formerly employed by the City and County of San Francisco (“the City”) in the Fire

Department, challenge the Fire Department’s decision not to promote them to the position

of H-50 Assistant Chief. In particular, they challenge as racially discriminatory a

promotional examination offered by the City in 2010, the results of which were used by the

Chief of the Fire Department to decide who would receive promotions to the position of H50 Assistant Chief. By the instant motion, plaintiffs argue they are entitled to sanctions

because the City destroyed certain documents, specifically, “scoring keys,” also called

“worksheets,” used by the individuals who rated the examination.

Twenty-three persons took the H-50 examination in 2010, which examination

consisted of two exercises. (See Randle Decl., filed August 7, 2015, Ex. A at 20.)

First, on August 8, 2010, the candidates took the “fire scene simulation exercise”

(“FSSE”), which exercise was intended “to measure how well a candidate can coordinate,

direct, and give orders to crews under his or her command at a fire emergency.” (See id.

Ex. A at 13, 18, 20.) The candidates were given “four different scenarios,” for example, a

“high rise scenario” (see id. Ex. A at 18); as to each scenario, the candidates were provided

with certain “written and visual information,” such as “photos of the fire building,” and each

scenario was presented to the candidate “via a recorded audio narration.” (See id.) Each

candidate “responded orally to the questions,” his/her responses were “recorded via digital

recorder” (see id.), and a “verbatim transcription of the candidate’s verbal responses to the

test questions” was prepared (see id. Ex. A at 24).

Second, on October 30, 2010, the candidates took the “supervision and counseling

exercise” (“S/PCE”), which exercise was intended “to measure specific job-related

knowledge areas and abilities including monitoring, evaluating, and counseling personnel;

ensuring compliance with Department policy; training; information gathering, report writing,

and record keeping; and the interpersonal skills of working with others.” (See id. Ex. A at

13, 19-20.) In the first step of the exercise, a “roleplay,” each candidate played the role of

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1

The “Battalion Chiefs” were “actors trained to perform the role of a battalion chief.” 

(See id. Ex. A at 20.)

2

The individuals who rated the responses to the FSSE were ten “Fire officers in the

rank of Battalion Chief or higher from jurisdictions outside San Francisco” (see id. Ex. A at

23), while four individuals who were “officers” rated the responses to the S/PCE (see id.).

3

“an Assistant Chief, counseling a Battalion Chief,”1 which roleplay was “recorded using a

video camcorder”; in the second step of the exercise, each candidate “document[ed] the

meeting” in writing.” (See id. Ex. A at 19.)

For both exercises, a committee met to “develop the answer (scoring) key” (see id.

Ex. A at 20), which meeting occurred “simultaneously with the administration of the

respective test exercise to ensure that answers could not be leaked prior to the exam

process” (see id. Ex. A at 21). With respect to the FSSE, each committee member

“independently listed the behaviors (anchors) that would appropriately respond to the four

test questions,” and, then, after discussion among all members, the committee determined

“the final product (including point values of the anchors . . .).” (See id.) With respect to the

S/PCE, the committee members “developed a full set of appropriate responses” to both

“the counseling portion” and “the documentation portion” of the exercise, and then

“discussed and determined the point value of each item.” (See id. Ex. A at 22.)

The scoring keys developed by the committees were used during the rating process,

which process occurred after each exercise had been completed.2 The FSSE raters

“assessed a verbatim transcription of the candidate’s verbal responses to the test

questions,” and, consequently, had no opportunity to view any of the candidates. (See id.

Ex. A at 24.) The S/PCE raters “evaluated the counseling session by viewing and listening

to the video recording, and evaluated the written documentation of the meeting.” (See id.) 

The responses were rated by a team of two, each of whom first made an “independent

assessment” (see id. Ex. A at 23-24), after which the two raters “would confer and reach [a]

consensus on the assigned ratings” (see id. Ex. A at 24). In that regard, with respect to the

FSSE, the raters were instructed (1) to “[i]ndependently review the candidate response

while referring to the scoring key to check off the statements that best describe[d] the

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Although the specific instructions provided to the individuals who rated the S/PCE

have not been provided to the Court, neither party has suggested the S/PCE instructions

pertaining to use of the scoring keys and the Record of Scores differed from the FSSE

instructions in any material respect.

4

candidate’s response” and “[t]otal the score for each dimension and enter this number in

the ‘Total’ box” on the scoring key, and then (2) to use together a form titled Record of

Scores, specifically, to place thereon, in addition to the candidate’s “credential number” and

the raters’ “numbers” and signatures, the “point total for each dimension reflecting the

independent rating from each rater” and “[t]he consensus score for each dimension.” (See

id. Ex. 4, Tab 4 at 25.)3 Lastly, each candidate’s score was calculated by the City’s

Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) based on the numbers set forth on the Record

of Scores. (See Johnson Decl., filed August 28, 2015, ¶¶ 1, 10-11, 14.)

On December 20, 2010, the DHR “posted the H-50 eligible list” and plaintiffs

thereafter “filed protests with the Civil Service Commission.” (See id. ¶¶ 15, 17.) On

January 4, 2011, the eligible list was “adopted” and, on January 7, 2011, plaintiffs’ protests

were denied by the Director of the DHR. (See id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

Dave Johnson (“Johnson”), a Manager in the DHR who had “coordinated the

development and administration of the H-50 Assistant Chief Examination” (see id. ¶¶ 1, 5),

“destroyed” the “scoring worksheets” used by the raters (see id. ¶¶ 14, 21). He did so

“sometime during the first week of January 2011 after the adoption of the eligible list and

the denial of plaintiffs’ protest[s]” (see id. ¶ 21), which destruction he understood was

“[c]onsistent with the practice [of the City] at the time” (see id.). According to Johnson,

“once a list is adopted” and the “protest and appeal is over,” the “scoring worksheets” can

be destroyed, as City employees “no longer have to verify the calculation of candidate

scores.” (See Randle Decl. Ex. E at 120:25 - 121:6.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to sanctions, in the form of an order striking

defendants’ answer or an adverse instruction to the jury, in light of the destruction of the

worksheets used by the raters.

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District courts have discretion to impose terminating sanctions where “a party has

engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of judicial

proceedings.” See Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006)

(affirming dismissal of complaint, where plaintiff was “on notice that [certain computer] files”

were “relevant” to his claims and “intentionally destroyed many [such] files” during

pendency of action, causing defendant to be “prejudiced” in its ability to defend against

claims). District courts also have discretion to impose lesser sanctions, such as

“permit[ting] a jury to draw an adverse inference from the destruction or spoliation [of

evidence] against the party or witness responsible for that behavior.” See Glover v. BIC

Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993).

As the parties herein acknowledge, although the Ninth Circuit has not set forth “a

precise standard” for determining when sanctions for the destruction of evidence are

appropriate, district courts “have widely adopted the Second Circuit’s three-part test,” which

test requires the party seeking sanctions to establish the following: “(1) that the party

having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was

destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) that

the evidence was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of

fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” See Apple Inc. v Samsung

Electronics Co., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

With respect to the first of the above-referenced elements, plaintiffs argue that, at

the time Johnson destroyed the scoring worksheets used by the raters, defendants were

under an obligation to preserve them. According to plaintiffs, the obligation arose based on

(1) complaints about the H-50 examination submitted by letter to the Civil Service

Commission and the DHR, (2) a motion for a temporary restraining order filed by a third

party in another action, (3) the DHR’s record retention policy and (4) a state statute and a

federal regulation requiring employers to retain certain employment records.

As discussed below, the Court finds plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence to

support a finding that, at the time the scoring worksheets were destroyed, defendants had

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4

In light of such finding, the Court does not consider the other elements of the threepart test.

5

Defendants object, on grounds of lack of authentication, to the Court’s consideration

of the copies of the complaint letters and responses thereto. With respect to plaintiff

Taylor’s complaint letter dated August 16, 2010, plaintiffs have provided sufficient

authentication (see Randle Decl., filed September 4, 2015, Ex. C at 106:10-17), albeit after

the moving papers had been filed, and, as to said document, the objection is

OVERRULED. Plaintiffs seek to authenticate the remaining complaint letters and

responses by stating that plaintiffs received them from defendants “in response to the

[p]laintiffs’ Discovery Request.” (See Randle Decl., filed August 7, 2015, ¶ 13.) Although

there is some ambiguity in the law as to whether it is sufficient to simply identify the party

from whom a document was received or whether it is necessary to additionally identify the

discovery request prompting such production, see, e.g., Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 777 & n.20 (9th Cir. 2002), in this instance, given the nature of the

documents in question and the party from whom they were received, the Court finds a

sufficient foundation has been laid, and, accordingly, the objection as to said documents

likewise is OVERRULED.

6

an obligation to preserve them.4

A. Complaint Letters Submitted to Civil Service Commission/DHR

After the FSSE concluded, but before the results were posted, each plaintiff

submitted a complaint in the form of a letter, and in some instances, two or three letters, to

the Civil Service Commission and/or the DHR, identifying asserted problems with the

administration of the test. (See Randle Decl. Ex. K.) For example, one complaint

challenged a scenario in which the narrator twice announced the arrival of “Rescue Squad

5” (see id. Ex. K at 2), one contended that certain scenarios required the candidates to

perform functions that ordinarily are the responsibility of a Lieutenant or a Captain, but not

of an Assistant Chief (see id. Ex. K at 17), and one claimed the “manuals that the

candidates were directed to study” had “numerous contradictions” (see id. Ex. K at 55). 

After the results of the examination had been posted, each plaintiff submitted a complaint in

the form of a letter to the Civil Service Commission, in which each plaintiff stated that the

“scoring calculation system derived by the exam unit has generated flaws in the scoring of

the exam” and that African-Americans in the “applicant pool have placed well behind over

50% of their peers highlighting the [in]validity of the examination.” (See id. Ex. K at 9-10,

23-24, 35-36, 48-49, 61-62.)5

//

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7

Plaintiffs argue the above-referenced complaint letters put defendants on notice that

plaintiffs would file a lawsuit to challenge the H-50 examination. Defendants respond that,

given the large volume of “protests” the City receives concerning Civil Service

examinations, the City does not consider its receipt of such protests to place it on notice of

litigation. (See Rolnick Decl., filed August 28, 2015, Ex. H (deposition of Jennifer Johnston,

DHR’s Chief of Policy) at 20:8-11, 141:12-21) (testifying she does not consider “protests”

challenging examinations as “put[ting] [the City] on notice” of “litigation,” as the City

receives “hundreds” of such complaints).)

The “obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the

evidence is relevant to litigation — most commonly when suit has already been filed,

providing the party responsible for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion

in other circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the evidence

may be relevant to future litigation.” Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2nd Cir.

1998). “Before litigation begins, courts agree that the receipt of a demand letter, a request

for evidence preservation, a threat of litigation, or a decision to pursue a claim will all trigger

the duty to preserve evidence.” In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems Product Liability

Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 512 (S.D. W.V. 2014) (citing cases). “[I]t is less clear,” however,

“what other occurrences should alert a party to preserve evidence for future litigation.” Id.;

see, e.g., Apple, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (holding duty to preserve evidence “triggered”

when “potential claim is identified”); Hynix Semiconductors, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 591 F.

Supp. 2d 1038, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding future litigation reasonably foreseeable when

it is “more than a possibility”).

Neither party has cited to any authority addressing the question of whether

complaint letters of the type on which plaintiffs rely are sufficient to give notice that future

litigation is likely to ensue. The Court thus considers whether the subject communications

are similar in purpose or effect to the types of communications courts have concluded

provide notice of litigation. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d

1060, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding duty to preserve evidence arose when plaintiff’s CEO

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advised defendant that if it did not take certain action, defendant “would be sued”). 

Unlike demand letters, threats of litigation, or other communications in which a party

states an intent to pursue legal action, the subject complaint letters do not implicitly or

expressly threaten litigation. Rather, as plaintiffs acknowledged at the hearing on the

instant motion, the purpose of such letters is to request that the City not use the results of

an examination that has been given and, instead, to offer a new examination. 

Communications that identify a dispute but seek a resolution thereof by means other than

by litigation have been held insufficient to reasonably place the receiver on notice of future

litigation. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feed, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614,

622 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding defendant not on notice when it received letter from counsel for

trademark holder, where letter, although identifying “client’s trademark rights,” did not

“threaten [ ] impending litigation” and stated client was “willing to explore a negotiated

resolution”; citing cases finding communications seeking to resolve identified dispute by

means other than litigation not sufficient to place receiver reasonably on notice of litigation).

Moreover, denials of complaints submitted to the Civil Service Commission are

“final” and not further reviewable. See San Francisco Civil Service Commission Rules,

Rule 311.4 (providing, with respect to challenges to examination, “decision of the Civil

Service Commission is final and not subject to reconsideration”). Consequently, plaintiffs’

complaint letters are unlike administrative claims that must be submitted as a condition of

bringing a lawsuit, which administrative claims courts have found give rise to a duty to

preserve evidence upon notice thereof. See, e.g., Tabon v. University of Pennsylvania

Health System, 2012 WL 2953216, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2012) (holding, with respect to

employment discrimination claim, “duty to preserve arises when the defendant receives

notice of an EEOC charge”); Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg, 591 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819

(E.D. N.C. 2008) (finding defendant’s duty to preserve evidence relevant to employment

discrimination charge arose when it received notice of plaintiff’s “EEOC charge of

//

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6

Each plaintiff herein did submit an administrative charge to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission and/or the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, but the

City received notice of the earliest of those charges on January 14, 2011 (see Bushong

Decl., filed August 28, 2015, ¶ 4), a date after the subject scoring worksheets had been

destroyed.

9

discrimination”; citing cases).6

Lastly, the Court has considered plaintiffs’ argument that emails exchanged between

various City employees, acknowledging receipt of the complaint letters, support a finding

that defendants did, in fact, treat those letters as evidencing a likelihood of litigation. 

Although the emails plainly evidence defendants’ knowledge that plaintiffs had complained

about the H-50 examination (see, e.g., Randle Decl. Ex P (email from Johnson to his

superior) CCSF-AS 019572 (referencing “draft responses” to complaint letters)), nothing in

those exchanges in any manner suggests that any of those employees either anticipated or

should have anticipated any future litigation.

Accordingly, the Court finds the complaint letters were insufficient to place

defendants on notice that future litigation was likely to ensue.

B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Filed in Johnson Case

In 2009, a third party to the instant action, Mark Johnson, filed in district court an

action challenging the results of a different civil service examination given by the City,

specifically, a 2008 examination for the H-40 Battalion Chief position. See Johnson v. City

and County of San Francisco, Civil Case No. 09-5503 JSW. On July 23, 2010, the plaintiff

therein filed an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), seeking to postpone

the date on which the City had announced it would give the H-50 Assistant Chief

Examination, which application was denied by order filed August 5, 2010. Plaintiffs herein

argue the application for a TRO put defendants on notice that the results of the H-50

Assistant Chief Examination would be challenged in court.

As set forth in the district court’s order denying the application for a TRO, see

Johnson v. City and County of San Francisco, 2010 WL 3078635, at *1 (N.D. Cal. August

5, 2010), and acknowledged at the hearing on the instant motion, the plaintiff in Johnson

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sought to postpone the H-50 Assistant Chief Examination not because he had any

complaint about the content of the H-50 Assistant Chief Examination but, rather, because,

as a result of his not having been promoted to the H-40 Battalion Chief position, he was not

qualified to take the examination for the H-50 Assistant Chief position. Indeed, at the time

his application for a TRO was filed and denied, the H-50 examination had not been given

and the content thereof was unknown by the candidates and potential candidates.

Accordingly, given the above-described circumstances, the Court finds the

application for a TRO filed in Johnson was insufficient to put defendants on notice that

candidates who later took the H-50 examination would file a lawsuit challenging the

examination.

C. City’s Retention Policy

Plaintiffs argue that the City was obligated to preserve the scoring worksheets used

by the raters, irrespective of any notice of litigation, in light of the DHR’s record retention

policy. The policy, titled “Department of Human Resources Record Retention and

Destruction Policy,” was “adopted pursuant to Chapter 8 of the San Francisco

Administrative Code, which requires each department to develop policies to properly

maintain records and to create a systematic records retention and destruction schedule.” 

(See Randle Decl. Ex. C, Ex 2 thereto.)

The San Francisco Administrative Code defines “record” to mean “such paper, book,

photograph, film, sound recording, map, drawing or other document, or any copy thereof,

as has been made or received by the department in connection with the transaction of

public business and may have been retained by the department as evidence of the

department’s activities, for the information contained therein, or to protect the legal or

financial rights of the City and County or of persons directly affected by the activities of the

City and County,” see San Francisco Administrative Code § 8.1; such definition is

contained in the DHR’s written policy (see Randle Decl. Ex. C, Ex. 2 thereto at 1.)

The issue before the Court is whether the scoring worksheets used by the raters

constitute “records” within the meaning of the Administrative Code and, by extension, the

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The policy’s sole reference to materials used in connection with Civil Service

examinations is found in a section titled “Categories of Records,” in which the policy gives,

as an example of “records” that may be preserved in an off-site location, “examination

materials that are older than one year but less than five years and no longer necessary for

regular or immediate access.” (See id. Ex. C, Ex. 2 thereto at 2.) The term “examination

materials,” however, is not defined.

8

Kraus testified that his “functional title” is “director of recruitment and assessment

services” and his “official classification” is “assistant deputy director.” (See Randle Decl.

Ex. C at 7:21-25.)

11

DHR’s policy.7

“Courts interpret municipal ordinances in the same manner and pursuant to the

same rules applicable to the interpretation of statutes.” City of Monterey v. Carrrnshimba,

215 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1087 (2013). “Although statutory interpretation is ultimately a

judicial function, the contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative

agency charged with its administration and interpretation, while not necessarily controlling,

is entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly

erroneous or unauthorized.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

In the instant case, Johnson testified at his deposition, as well as stated in a

declaration submitted in opposition to the instant motion, that he destroyed the used

scoring worksheets in conformity with DHR policy, specifically, the policy that, after an

eligibility list is adopted and any protests have been denied, the used scoring worksheets

are to be destroyed. (See Randle Decl. Ex. C at 120:20 - 121:6; Johnson Decl. ¶ 21.) As

explained by Johnson, the Record of Scores is the “official record of a candidate’s

performance on [an] exam,” and is retained by the DHR, whereas the “scoring worksheets”

are considered “non-records” as “they are superseded by the Records of Scores and are

not necessary to the functioning or continuity of DHR operations.” (See Johnson Decl.

¶ 14.)

Plaintiffs argue that Johnson’s supervisor, John Kraus (“Kraus”),8

 has testified,

during two different depositions, that the scoring worksheets used by the raters are

documents that should be retained as “records” under DHR’s policy, and, consequently,

that the Court should defer to Kraus’s, rather than Johnson’s, understanding of the policy. 

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9

From the context in which it appears, the term “note rating form” is a reference to

the scoring key here at issue. (See id. Ex. D at 35:0-25 (describing “scoring key” as “a

rating form”).)

10Indeed, defendants did retain that scoring key form, a copy of which was produced

during discovery and, as set forth above, shown to the witness.

12

As set forth below, however, the Court finds Kraus’s deposition testimony does not support

a finding that Kraus’s interpretation differs from that of Johnson.

During his first deposition, Kraus testified that the form the raters use to memorialize

their “consensus” is the “official rating” that would be retained, i.e., the Record of Scores,

whereas “anything prior to that,” specifically, “their note rating form, the one they took

initially,” would not be retained. (See Randle Decl. Ex. D at 36:6 - 39:18.)9

 The testimony

on which plaintiffs rely was given during Kraus’s second deposition, at which he was shown

a blank version of the scoring key and asked whether it was a document that needed to be

retained under the DHR’s retention policy, to which he responded “there should be a copy

of the scoring guidelines . . . somewhere.” (See id. Ex. C at 61:2-8, 62:3-23.)10 Given the

particular exhibit shown the witness, i.e., a blank form, the testimony is, at best,

ambiguous. Moreover, any ambiguity was thereafter clarified when the witness was asked

“should the form that was completed by the rater be somewhere,” to which the witness

responded, “what I expect to see is their consensus rating” (see id. Ex. C at 62:24 - 63:22),

and further clarified when read in the context of testimony he gave earlier in the same

deposition, in which he explained that the “official record” is the “document” that “reflect[s]

the individual ratings of the two raters and the consensus score of the two raters,” i.e., the

Record of Scores (see id. Ex. C at 58:21 - 59:24.)

In sum, Kraus’s testimony as to the DHR’s interpretation of “records” is wholly

consistent with Johnson’s understanding that the scoring worksheets used by the raters are

not “records,” and plaintiffs have not shown any other employee has either interpreted or

applied the DRH’s policy differently. Under such circumstances, the Court finds it

appropriate to defer to the DHR’s interpretation of “records.”

//

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Accordingly, the Court finds the “Department of Human Resources Record Retention

and Destruction Policy” did not obligate defendants to retain the scoring worksheets used

by the raters.

D. State and Federal Statutory Duties

Pursuant to California state law, “[i]t shall be an unlawful practice for employers . . . 

to fail to maintain and preserve any and all applications, personnel, membership, or

employment referral records and files for a minimum period of two years.” See Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12946. Additionally, a federal regulation requires that “[a]ny personnel or

employment record made or kept by a political subdivision . . . shall be preserved . . . for a

period of 2 years.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31. Plaintiffs argue that the above-quoted statute

and regulation obligated the City to retain the scoring worksheets used by the raters of the

H-50 examination. Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive.

With respect to the state statute, plaintiffs rely on Irion v. County of Contra Costa,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2005), which appears to be the sole

decision in which a court has considered the question of what types of documents fall

within the scope of § 12946. In that case, the district court found an employer had violated

§ 12946 by destroying “score sheets” on which the raters who had interviewed candidates

for a position had given each candidate a score, where those scores were then used by the

employer to determine which candidate would be hired. See id. at *37-38. Here, however,

unlike the situation in Irion, the City did retain the document on which the raters recorded

the scores that were used to determine where each applicant would be placed on the

eligibility list, namely, the Record of Scores.

With respect to the federal regulation, the Seventh Circuit, the only court to have

considered an issue in any manner analogous to that presented in the instant case,

concluded that “ranking sheets, manager’s notes and evaluations notes” made by raters,

who met to determine a ranking to be given to each employee for purposes of effectuating

a reduction-in-force, did not constitute “employment records” under § 1602.31. See

Rummery v. Illinois Bell Telephone, 250 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, the

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Seventh Circuit found that the document that had been retained by the employer,

specifically, “one summary sheet averaging out the ratings for each individual,” was the

“actual employment record” the employer was required to retain under § 1602.31. See id.

As the Seventh Circuit put it, “[it] is sufficient that the employer retains only the actual

employment record, not the rough drafts or processes which may lead up to it.” See id. at

559. Here, as discussed above, the City did retain the Record of Scores, the document on

which the individual scores of each rater, as well as the consensus score of both raters, are

formally recorded, and which document was used to determine the candidate’s placement

on the eligibility list.

Accordingly, the Court finds neither § 12946 nor § 1602.31 obligated defendants to

retain the scoring worksheets used by the raters.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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