Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01558/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01558-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO URIARTE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1558 W (WMC)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION

(Doc. Nos. 43, 47, 57)

vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et.

al.,

Defendants.

On August 2, 2006 Plaintiff Francisco Uriarte (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, commenced this action alleging various constitutional, common law,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 4, 2008 Magistrate Judge

William McCurine, Jr. issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending

that Defendant Arnold Schwarzenegger et. al.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to

dismiss the complaint be granted in part and denied in part, and that Petitioner’s motion

for “summary judgment” be denied. (Doc. No. 57.) Both Plaintiff and Defendants

submitted timely objections and replies. (Doc. Nos. 59, 60.) The Court decides the

matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES

the parties’ objections, GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendants’

motion to dismiss, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos.

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43, 47, 57).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Francisco Uriarte is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Ironwood

State Prison in Blythe, California. (Report 1.) Defendants are a collection of people

who are responsible or work for the California prison system. The following description

of events is taken from the parties’ pleadings and is not to be construed as findings of

fact by the Court. 

On February 7, 2004 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martinez (“Martinez”) was

working the prison’s Building 13 tower panel, which controlled access into and out of

prisoner cells. (Id. 2.) Plaintiff asserts that while he exited the open threshold of his

cell, Martinez suddenly closed the sliding door, crushing Plaintiff between the cell door

and the door jamb. (Id.) Although Plaintiff’s cell-mate yelled at Martinez to open the

door, Plaintiff contends that Martinez waited until he released all other inmates before

doing so. (Id.) When Martinez finally released the door, Plaintiff alleges that Martinez

“suddenly re-slammed the door against Plaintiff’s body for a second time.” (Id.) Plaintiff

believes that he was seriously injured as the result of the cell door twice closing on him,

and asserts that Martinez and Defendant Hurm refused him medical attention. (Id.)

From February 7 to February 13, 2004 Plaintiff alleges that he requested medical

attention from Defendant Williams, Defendant Jones, Defendant Ramirez, Defendant

Spence, Defendant Reed and Defendant Comaucho, whom all refused. (Id.) On or

about February 13, 2004 Dr. Jenkins examined Plaintiff and ordered an X-Ray of

Plaintiff’s left side. (Id. 2–3.) On February 17, 2004 Plaintiff’s X-Ray showed a healing

fracture on Plaintiff’s left ninth anterior rib. (Id. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not

informed of the X-Ray results or given proper medical attention. (Id.)

On May 5, 2004 Dr. Jenkins ordered additional X-Rays. (Id.) On June 14, 2004

Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Choo, a different doctor, took another X-Ray which confirmed

Dr. Jenkins’ diagnosis. (Report 3.) Plaintiff contends that both Dr. Jenkins and Dr.

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Choo diagnosed injury to his ribs. (Id.)

On August 2, 2006 Plaintiff filed this action alleging, among other claims, federal

and state civil rights violations. (Doc. No. 1.) On July 11, 2007 Defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint. (Doc. No. 47.) On September 4, 2007 Plaintiff opposed, and

on October 1, 2007 Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. Nos. 51, 53.) On February 4, 2008

the Magistrate Judge filed his Report, recommending that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. No. 57.) On February 25, 2008

Defendants filed their objections to the Report. (Doc. No. 59.) On February 28, 2008

Plaintiff followed suit. (Doc. No. 60.) Both parties also submitted timely replies. (Doc.

Nos. 61, 63.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See North Star Int’l. v. Arizona Corp.

Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). All material allegations in the complaint,

“even if doubtful in fact,” are assumed to be true. Id. The court must assume the truth

of all factual allegations and must “construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996).

As the Supreme Court recently explained, “While a complaint attacked by a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). Instead, the

allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 1964–65. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law

either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable

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theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must

also be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). However, at a minimum, even a pro se plaintiff must allege with at least some

degree of particularity over acts which defendants engaged in that support his claim.

Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

III. DISCUSSION

Having read and considered the underlying Complaint, Motion to Dismiss,

Report and Objections thereto, the Court concludes that the Report presents a wellreasoned analysis of the issues raised in the Complaint and Motion to Dismiss. For the

following reasons, the Court finds that the Report correctly concluded that Defendants’

motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

A. Plaintiff Does Not Object to the Report’s First, Second, Fourth,

Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Conclusions Against Him

The Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends, among other things, that: (1)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants sued in their

official capacity be granted; (2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive relief be granted; (4) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim be granted; (8) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy

claim be granted; (9) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims be

granted; and (10) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied. (Report 25–26.)

Plaintiff does not object to these conclusions and specifically concedes these issues.

(Pls.’ Objections 2.) 

A district court’s duties concerning a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation and a respondent’s objections thereto are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When no objections are

filed, the district court is not required to review the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003)(holding that 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(c) “makes it clear that the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,

but not otherwise”)(emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219,

1226 (D. Arizona 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the District

Court had no obligation to review the magistrate judge’s Report). This rule of law is

well established within the Ninth Circuit and this district. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416

F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005)(“Of course, de novo review of a R & R is only

required when an objection is made to the R & R.”)(emphasis added)(citing RenyaTapia, 328 F.3d 1121).

Because neither Plaintiff nor Defendant object to the Report’s first, second,

fourth, eighth, ninth, and tenth conclusions, the Court ADOPTS the Report’s

recommendations on those issues in their entirety, GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss those particular claims and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

and DISMISSES the relevant claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Plaintiff’s Pursuit of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

before bringing this action. (Report 6.) Plaintiff contends that any delay in pursuing

administrative relief is due solely to Defendants’ obfuscation. (Report 8.) The Report

reviewed Plaintiff’s two administrative grievances and found that while his first

grievance’s appeals were unexhausted, the claims arising from his second grievance were

properly before this Court. (Report 11, 12–13.) Plaintiff objects to the Report’s

conclusion, arguing that he was unable to meet his first grievance’s deadlines because

Defendants delayed his mail. (Pl.’s Objections 5–7.) Defendants also object, contending

that Plaintiff still has additional administrative remedies with which to exhaust his

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second grievance, and that Plaintiff’s second grievance is unexhausted against certain

defendants included in his claims. (Defs.’ Objections 4–5.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies is a

matter of abatement not going to the merits of the case and is properly raised pursuant

to a motion to dismiss. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837

F.2d 365, 368–69 (9th Cir. 1988). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact. Id. at 369. 

The Prison Litigation and Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) Exhaustion is required prior to the filing of any

prisoner lawsuit concerning prison life, whether the claims involve general conditions

or specific incidents and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “Even when the prisoner seeks relief not

available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a pre-requisite

to suit.” Id. at 524.

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to

administratively appeal any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived

by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.1(a). Exhausting the administrative appeals process involves several steps: (1)

informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3)

“second level appeal” to the institution head or designee, and finally (4) “third level

appeal” to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle,

985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5).

The third level, or “Director’s Level,” of review shall be final and exhausts all

administrative remedies available in the Department of Corrections. Cal. Dep’t of

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Corrections Operations Manual § 54100.11, “Levels of Review”; Barry, 985 F. Supp. at

1237–38; Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

i. Plaintiff’s First Grievance: RJD-04-979

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first grievance—complaining about Martinez’s

actions—was not appealed in a timely fashion. Specifically, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff received his response to his second level appeal on December 29, 2004 and did

not file a third level appeal until February 15, 2005. (Mot. to Dismiss 10–12.) The

Report agrees with Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the

administrative process because he waited over fifteen days to pursue a third level appeal

after receiving the second level response. (Report 9–12.) Plaintiff objects, arguing that

he actually received his second level response on January 28, 2005, and had fifteen days

until that date to pursue a third level appeal. (Pl.’s Objections 6–8.) 

Under California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3084.6(c) an appellant

must file his appeal within fifteen working days of the decision being appealed or of

receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision. Because the regulation is not

clear on the issue of when the moment of filing has occurred, the Court looks at the

interpretation of similar regulations. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). In

Houston, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner acting pro se will be found to have

“filed” their notice of appeal the moment the notice is handed over to prison authorities

for mailing. Id. at 270–72. 

In this case, the timeliness issue turns on when Plaintiff actually received the

results of his second level review, when Plaintiff actually submitted his appeal for third

level review, and whether the two dates were within fifteen working days of each other.

Establishing the dates Plaintiff received and submitted his appeals is difficult—Plaintiff

contends that the prison delayed delivering his mail, Defendants’ policies and mail logs

assume (but do not prove) prison guards promptly deliver and pick-up inmate mail, and

each party has an incentive to allege the other’s idleness. 

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1

For instance, Plaintiff submits a purported affidavit from “C/O G. Snyder” which allegedly proves that Plaintiff received the results from his second level appeal on January 28, 2005, and not December 29, 2004 as listed on Form 602. (Compl. Ex. K at 34.) Attempting to prove the affidavit as genuine, Plaintiff urges the court to “compare signatures” with an unrelated piece of correspondence also purportedly signed by Snyder. (Pls.’ Objections Ex. B.) Although Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se and deserves every benefit of the doubt, the Court cannot find “Snyder’s” informal, misspelled, and unsworn affidavit credible evidence and

worthy of serious consideration.

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While Plaintiff submits a crude affidavit allegedly proving receipt of his second

level results on January 28, 2005, Defendants point to Section G on Form 602 showing

receipt on December 29, 2004. (Compare Compl. Ex. K at 34 with Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss

11.) And while Plaintiff points to Section H on Form 602 showing that he submitted

his appeal for third level review on February 15, 2005, Defendants argue that the Inmate

Appeals Board received Plaintiff’s submission on February 22, 2005. (Compare Compl.

Ex. K at 26 with Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 11, T. Emigh Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Because both parties had access to Form 602 and could amend or correct any

incorrect dates thereon, for the sake of consistency the Court will use Section G and

Section H on Form 602 in determining whether Plaintiff timely submitted his appeal for

third level review. The additional affidavits and declarations both parties provide are

simply not credible or rely on questionable assumptions.1

 Here, Section G shows that

Plaintiff received the results of his second level appeal on December 29, 2004. Section

H, signed by Plaintiff, is dated “February 15, 2005" as the date Plaintiff submitted his

appeal for third level review. Because Section H shows submission for third level review

well past fifteen working days from receipt of his second level results, Plaintiff has not

properly exhausted the administrative review process for his first appeal. See Woodford

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (holding that the exhaustion requirement cannot be met by

filing an untimely or otherwise defective administrative grievance or appeal). 

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s

objections, GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims arising

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2

Plaintiff also urges the Court to follow Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit precedent holding that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied where prison officials fail to

timely respond to an inmate’s written grievance. (Pls.’ Objections 9.) However, Plaintiff’s authority does not control where an inmate’s submission is not initially timely.

3

Plaintiff only objected to the Report’s fifth and seventh conclusions to the extent they depended on an unexhausted administrative appeal for RJD-04-979. (Pl.’s Objections 9–10.) Because the Court has adopted the Report’s recommendation that RJD-04-979 is unexhausted, the Court further adopts the Report’s reasoning for granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Monell claim and Eighth Amendment claim on Respondeat Superior grounds. 

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from grievance RJD-04-979.2 In overruling Plaintiff’s objections, the Court also adopts

the Report’s related fifth and seventh conclusions, that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on Respondeat Superior grounds and Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim be GRANTED.

3

ii. Plaintiff’s Second Grievance: RJD-04-1615

Although Defendants’s motion does not specifically address Plaintiff’s second

grievance, the record indicates Plaintiff submitted another grievance alleging lack of

proper medical care after Martinez’s actions. (Compl. Ex. L.) Like Plaintiff’s first

grievance, the second grievance was rejected at third level review on the ground that

it was not filed within fifteen working days of Plaintiff’s receipt of his second level

response. (Id. Ex. P.) 

The Report found that the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) improperly rejected Plaintiff’s third level appeal on timeliness

grounds, and concluded that Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies for

claims arising from the events undergirding his second grievance. (Report 11–13.)

Defendants object, and while they apparently concede that CDCR improperly rejected

Plaintiff’s appeal, they argue that additional administrative remedies existed to challenge

Plaintiff’s administrative denial. (Defs.’ Objections 3.) Furthermore, Defendants argue,

the claims stemming from Plaintiff’s second grievance improperly include claims against

six Defendants who did not appear in the administrative appeals process. (Id. 4–5.) 

As mentioned above the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner acting pro se will

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4

Defendants’ Reply also introduces—for the first time—the prison’s mail log and policies for sending and delivering inmate mail. (Defs.’ Reply 4–5.) According to Defendants’ mail log, Plaintiff either placed his appeal in the drop box or handed it to a correctional officer no earlier

than January 19, 2005. (J. McNeil Decl. ¶ 9 (emphasis added).) The Court finds Defendants’ self-serving arguments and declarations unconvincing in light of Plaintiff’s insistent contention that prison staff was regularly delaying the delivery and submission of his mail. For the sake

of consistency, and for the same reasons mentioned in the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s first

grievance, the Court will continue to calculate Plaintiff’s reception and submission dates by Sections G and H on Form 602. 

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be found to have “filed” their notice of appeal the moment the notice is handed over to

prison authorities for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 270–72. In this case, Section G on

Form 602 indicates that Plaintiff received his second level results on December 16,

2004. (Compl. Ex. L 37.) Section H indicates that Plaintiff submitted his third level

appeal on January 6, 2005—thirteen working days later. (Id.) Although Defendant

Grannis rejected Plaintiff’s third level appeal as untimely under section 3804.6(c),

(Compl. Ex. P), the Court finds this rejection erroneous because Plaintiff submitted his

appeal for third level review within fifteen working days. Thus, Plaintiff has exhausted

the administrative process for his second grievance.4

Although Defendants concede that Grannis improperly screened out Plaintiff’s

complaint, they argue that Plaintiff could have, and should have, pursued other

administrative remedies in addition to the adminstrative procession laid out in Barry,

985 F. Supp. at 1237. (Defs.’ Objections 3.) The law does not require as much. Because

Plaintiff has attempted to appeal the prison officials’ inaction regarding his treatment

to every level of the prison grievance system, Plaintiff has not failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See Barry, 985 F. Supp. at 1237. Defendants have provided

no authority to suggest Plaintiff must re-submit his appeal, pursue informal relief, or file

an extraordinary writ to perfect this Court’s jurisdiction.

Defendants second objection concerns Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims

against Defendants Hurm, Jones, Ramirez, Reed, Spence and Williams. (Defs.’ Objection

4.) Because, Defendants contend, Plaintiff submitted his second grievance against Drs.

Jenkins and Ritter only, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claims

against the six Defendants mentioned above. (Id.) 

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The Court finds Defendants’ arguments unconvincing. Although Plaintiff

specifically complains of Drs. Jenkin’s and Ritter’s diagnosis and care, Plaintiff’s

grievance also generally alleges wholesale dissatisfaction with the prison’s response to

his medical requests. (Compl. Ex. L. 38.) In doing so, Plaintiff’s grievance alleges that

each of the six Defendants performed an act or omission which delayed his receiving

medical attention. (Id.) The Court refuses to so narrowly read Plaintiff’s second

grievance as to preclude Eighth Amendment claims against the six Defendants on

administrative exhaustion grounds. Simply, Plaintiff’s second grievance gave

Defendants enough information to be put on notice and an opportunity to take

corrective action; this fulfills the purpose of the administrative process. Accordingly,

the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies for claims arising out of the second grievance. Because Defendants only object

to the Eighth Amendment claims against the six Defendants on exhaustion grounds, the

Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Defendants’ objections, and DENIES

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim arising out of the

second grievance. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, and the reasons expressed in the Report and herein

incorporated by reference, the Court finds that the Report presents a well-reasoned

analysis of the relevant issues. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report in its

entirety, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ objections, and GRANTS IN

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 43, 47, 57.)

Specifically:

1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against all Defendants sued in their official capacity.

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief.

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3. The Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

4. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

5. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment Claim on Respondeat Superior grounds.

6. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim.

7. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell

claim.

8. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy

claims.

9. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims.

10. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No.

43.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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