Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00753/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00753-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jesse Martinez,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-0753-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Douglas, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

April 9, 2012 (Doc. 1). On August 15, 2012 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 9). 

Petitioner has not replied, and the time to do so has expired.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On July 16, 2007, Petitioner was charged in Maricopa County Superior Court 

with one count of acquisition of a narcotic drug (Vicodin), arising out of conduct on 

February 15, 2006. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 9 are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

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Counsel Gouri Nair was appointed, and on October 24, 2007 Petitioner filed a pro 

se Motion for Change of Counsel (Exhibit B), seeking appointment of new counsel. 

Petitioner appeared on November 14, 2007, with counsel Llewellyn who appeared on 

behalf of counsel Nair. Counsel raised the issue of the motion, and the trial court ruled 

that it had not been “properly filed or submitted to the Court to address.” (Exhibit C, 

R.T. 11/4/07 at 4.) Counsel Llewellyn responded “I’ll talk to him and make sure that it 

gets properly filed.” (Id.) Petitioner did not file another motion or raise further 

objections to counsel. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 10/1/9 at 2.) No further action was taken 

on the issue.

Petitioner proceeded to trial on December 10, 2007. During the course of voir 

dire, the State used peremptory strikes on the last two remaining Hispanic jurors, 

numbers 30 and 31. The only other prospective Hispanic juror had been struck for 

cause. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dc. 10/1/9 at 3, and n. 2.) Defense counsel objected, pointing 

out that the prosecution had kept jurors with family members with convictions and jurors 

with technical backgrounds, but struck the two Hispanic jurors whose voir dire revealed 

nothing objectionable. (Exhibit D, R.T. 12/10/07 at 106-107.) The prosecutor described 

his reasoning:

MR. MATSUNO: As to number 30, unmarried and pregnant, 

didn't like it. As to number 31, partly because he was an engineer, 

partly because didn't learn much at all. I learned from him he's 

married and he has one young child. I was uncomfortable going 

with that little information. Frankly, I got a weird vibe and I didn’t

like the way he answered the questions. His voice was very short, 

seemed impatient, seemed staccato, seemed to trike me -- all 

prosecutors fear engineers, someone who is very nit picky and very 

detailed oriented.

THE COURT: Although there are other people technical 

backgrounds that are on this jury.

MR. MATSUNO: Well, there are. I haven't had the --

engineers have a reputation and I don't think it's anything in the 

legal field, that it's a mistery [sic] in the legal field. And while other 

people may have other technical backgrounds, I do believe people 

who become engineers are of a special breed.

(Id. at 107-108.) The trial court overruled the challenge.

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Petitioner proceeded to trial and was convicted on the charge. On January 28, 

2008, Petitioner was sentenced to 11.25 years on the sole count. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit F), and an Opening Brief (Exhibit G) 

raising his Batson challenge to the striking of the two Hispanic jurors, and a claim of 

denial of counsel based on the trial court’s failure to inquire into the basis for his request 

for new counsel. 

In a Memorandum Decision issued October 1, 2009 (Exhibit H), the Arizona 

Court of Appeals rejected both of Petitioner’s claims, and affirmed his conviction and 

sentence. Petitioner did not appeal further, and on January 5, 2010, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals issued its Mandate (Exhibit I).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

In the meantime, on November 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit J). Counsel was appointed, and on September 13, 2010, 

counsel filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit K) evidencing an inability to find a viable 

issue for review.

Petitioner then filed on November 3, 2010, a revised Notice of Post Conviction 

Relief (Exhibit L) and Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit M), raising five 

claims for relief:

(1) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) 

newly-discovered evidence in that he was charged with a 

nondangerous crime but sentenced as a dangerous offender; (3) his 

prior convictions were illegally used to enhance his sentence; (4) his 

sentence was unlawful; and (5) his attorney should not have

represented him due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

(Exhibit N, M.E. 7/26/11.) The PCR court found the claims wither precluded or without 

merit, and summarily dismissed the petition. (Id.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

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D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 9, 2012 (Doc.1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following two grounds for relief:

(1) The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights when it permitted the prosecutor to 

strike the remaining Hispanic jurors without a proper reason; and

(2) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel was violated when the trial court refused to conduct a 

hearing on Petitioner’s request for change of counsel.

(Order 5/17/12, Doc. 3 at 1-2.) 

Response - On August 15, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 9). Respondents concede the timeliness of the motion and the exhaustion of state 

remedies. Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of 

Petitioner’s claims was not contrary to nor an unreasonably application of federal law.

Reply – Petitioner was given 30 days from the filing of an answer to reply in 

support of his Petition. (Order 5/17/12, Doc. 3 at 3.) Petitioner has not done so, and the 

time has expired. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 1: BATSON

In Ground 1 of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his rights were violated when 

the prosecutor struck jurors 30 and 31. Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law.

Habeas Standard – While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search 

for violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. “[A] federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. 

S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must 

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be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 

U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Batson Principles - In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the 

Supreme Court held that a defendant is denied equal protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment when tried by a jury from which members of his race have been 

purposefully excluded. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985), the Supreme Court 

addressed the showing required of a defendant when challenging not a systematic 

exclusion of a race (such as the exclusion of all “negroes” at issue in Strauder), but an 

exercise of strikes of individual jurors through peremptory challenges. The Batson Court 

outlined a three step process involving: (1) a defendant showing a prima facie case of 

discrimination; (2) the state proffering a racially neutral explanation for the strikes; and 

(3) the trial court evaluating the circumstances to determine whether the defendant has 

established purposeful discrimination through the strikes.

State Court Decision – Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals reiterated the Batson

process (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 4-5), found that Petitioner had “made a prima facie

showing of discrimination based on race (id. at 5), found “the State’s explanation to be 

facially neutral” (id.at 5-6), and concluded that the trial court “correctly found that the 

State’s responses were not pretexts for purposeful discrimination” (id. at 6).

Other than reiterating the facts, and attacking the conclusions, the only error in the 

state courts’ decisions asserted by Petitioner is his argument that “the prosecutor did not 

offer justification (proper) for striking either juror.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Prima Facie Case – Here, the State conceded and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

found that Petitioner “made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race.” 

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 5). Given the lack of obvious reasons for excluding jurors 30 

and 31, and their status as the sole remaining veniremen of Petitioner’s race, the state 

court’s conclusion was correct. Cf. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991)

(“Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges 

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and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the 

preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes 

moot.”).

Racially Neutral Explanations - The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that 

the prosecutor’s explanations for striking the jurors were racially neutral. (Exhibit H, 

Mem. Dec. at 5.) “A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an 

explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.” Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). Here, the reasons proffered by the prosecution for 

striking jurors 30 and 31 had no connection with their race, and therefore were racially 

neutral within the meaning of Batson.

The appellate court described those explanations as follows:

The State explained that juror number 30 was struck because she 

was pregnant and unmarried...Regarding juror number 31, the State 

explained: (1) he was an engineer; (2) the State did not learn much 

about him from his answers; (3) his voice was short, impatient and 

seemed staccato; and (4) all prosecutors fear engineers for being 

very nit picky and detail oriented.

(Id. at 5-6.) None of those explanations dealt with or were in any way related to the 

jurors’ race. 

Perhaps Petitioner is simply jumping ahead and criticizing the appellate court’s 

acceptance of those explanations given the impact of the decisions, i.e. the exclusion of 

the remaining Hispanic jurors. However, at the explanatory phase of the analysis, the 

impact of the decisions is irrelevant. The court is not tasked to look through the 

explanations to the real reasons for the prosecutor’s actions, but to simply look at the 

nature of the proffered explanations.

A court addressing [the race neutrality] issue must keep in mind the 

fundamental principle that “official action will not be held 

unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 

disproportionate impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or 

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause.” 

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60. The aim of this phase of the analysis seems modest in 

light of our current sensitivities. It is simply to enforce the principle that an explanation 

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based on race, no matter how reasonable it may seem, is never acceptable - - a concept 

that was novel to many not so long ago in our history. “But the prosecutor may not rebut 

the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged 

jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they 

would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 

Determination of Purposeful Discrimination – The final and most challenging 

stage of the process requires that the court “determine whether the defendant has carried 

his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. “[T]he 

trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a 

finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Hernandez v. New York, 

500 U.S. at 364. In the context of a habeas proceeding, the deference is even higher

under the limitations on habeas relief. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

State Court findings of fact are entitled on habeas review to a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) Moreover, federal courts are authorized to grant 

habeas relief on the basis of mistaken factual determinations only where the state-court 

decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004). 

Here, Petitioner proffers no explanation why the state court’s factual 

determination was unreasonable. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals properly considered “the credibility of the State’s 

justifications, considering ‘the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable or how 

improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis 

in accepted trial strategy.” (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 6 (citations omitted).) Indeed, the 

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Supreme Court has held that “the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the 

prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, 

among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, 

the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted 

trial strategy.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003).

The court evaluated not only the reasons proffered, but noted approvingly that the 

trial court had inquired into the justification for relying on juror 31’s engineering 

profession when other persons with technical backgrounds were excluded, and had 

obtained the explanation that “engineers are of a special breed.” (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 

at 6.) Indeed, engineering could readily be seen as branch of science that requires a 

particular attention to detail, and a particular commitment to mathematical certainties 

that other technical endeavors do not face.

In fact, Petitioner complains that “Defense counsel demonstrate that other jurors 

had similar characteristics as members #30 and #31.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) However, 

there is nothing in the record to suggest that the specific factors cited by the prosecutor 

were present in the other members, namely juror 31’s status as an engineer, and juror 

30’s pregnant and unmarried status. 

It may seem that the striking of juror #30 based on her unwed pregnancy reflects a 

certain level of judgmentalism that may seem out of step with the realities of modern 

society.1 But it reflects what remains an engrained judgment about the detrimental effect 

of such pregnancies2 which would suggest an implication that an unmarried pregnant 

woman might hold views that would make her less inclined to promote traditional 

societal views on behavior. In the context of a prosecution for drug possession, such 

views could be expected to be disagreeable to a prosecutor. 

 

1

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that in 2010 some 40.8% of all 

births in the United States were had by unmarried women. See

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm, last accessed 12/6/12.

2

The Pew Research Center reported in 2010 that despite the pervasiveness of unwed 

mothers, 69% of respondents said “the trend toward more single women having children 

is bad for society.” See http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-newfamilies, last accessed 12/6/12.

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Similarly, as noted above, the exactitude which might be presumed from an 

engineer could be expected to be disagreeable to a prosecutor with the burden of proof.

Other than the happenstance of jurors 30 and 31’s race, there is nothing in the 

record to suggest that the prosecution struck these jurors for racially discriminatory 

reasons, rather than for the reasons proffered. As noted by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, the trial court had (in reaching its conclusion) the advantage not only of the 

cold record, but of evaluating the demeanor of the prosecutor at the time. 

The undersigned finds nothing to suggest that the state court’s conclusion was an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, Ground 1 is without merit, and 

should be denied.

B. GROUND 2: CHANGE OF COUNSEL

For his Ground 2, Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated when the trial court failed to investigate Petitioner’s motion to appoint new 

counsel, and incorrectly denied his motion as not properly filed. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.)

Respondents argue that the Supreme Court has not recognized any obligation on a 

criminal trial court to investigate a request for the appointment of new counsel. 

(Answer, Doc. 9 at 17.)

State Court Ruling – The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, holding: 

(1) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not guarantee counsel of a defendant’s 

choice or a meaningful relationship with counsel (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 7); (2) under 

Arizona law, when a defendant raises a colorable claim of an irreconcilable conflict with 

counsel, the court has a duty to inquire (id. at 8); (3) Petitioner made no factual 

allegations in his motion, and thus failed to make a colorable claim (id.); and (4) any 

error in the trial court denying the motion as improperly filed was waived by Petitioner 

failing to file a second motion (id. at 8-9).

Duty to Inquire on Motion for New Counsel – Petitioner’s motion for new 

counsel proffered no basis for substituting counsel. To the extent that Petitioner might 

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challenge the motion’s denial as a matter of procedure, that claim would sound in state 

law, and would not provide fodder for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62 (1991).

Otherwise, the denial of the motion on the merits would have been proper, no 

cause having been shown, absent some duty of the trial court to inquire on the basis of 

the unsubstantiated motion.

Petitioner points to no authority for his proposition that every request for new 

counsel must be investigated by the trial court. More particularly, Petitioner points to no 

Supreme Court authority establishing such a requirement. Indeed, in making his 

argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner relied on state authorities, and 

several federal circuit court opinions, but no Supreme Court authority. (Exhibit G, 

Open. Brief at 22-26.) 

It is true that in Martel v. Clair, 132 S.Ct. 1276 (2012), the Court recently 

observed: “As all Circuits agree, courts cannot properly resolve substitution motions 

without probing why a defendant wants a new lawyer.” 132 S.Ct. at 1288.

3

 However, 

Martel dealt specifically with appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 in a 

federal habeas proceeding challenging a state death sentence. The case was not decided 

on constitutional grounds, and 18 U.S.C. § 3599 has no application to Petitioner’s 

counsel in his state court criminal trial. Moreover, Martel was not decided until some 3 

years after the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision in Petitioner’s direct appeal. 

Thus, whatever credence Martel might lend to Petitioner’s claim, it was not “clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), at the time the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled. 

This habeas court is constrained to apply “precedent existing at the time the defendant's 

conviction became final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (quoting Teague 

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).

 

3

The Martel Court also indirectly quoted 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Judicial Discretion in 

Selecting Appointed Counsel, Criminal Procedure § 11.4, p. 36 (1984), which reveals no 

Supreme Court authority mandating an inquiry. 132 S.Ct. at 1288. 

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It is also true that in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Supreme 

Court held that a presumption of prejudice arises when a court fails to investigate when 

counsel asserts he has a conflict of interest. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), 

the Court expanded Holloway to circumstances where the court knows or has reason to 

know that counsel is proceeding under a conflict of interest. However, in Mickens v. 

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), the Court held that a failure to inquire did not mandate 

automatic reversal, but the defendant remained obligated to show that the conflict 

adversely affected counsel’s performance. 

The Holloway line of cases is inapposite because Petitioner has never asserted, 

and certainly did not assert to the trial court, that counsel was laboring under a conflict of 

interest, but simply that their relationship was flawed. 

Moreover, to the extent that these conflict of interest cases could be shoehorned to 

apply, Mickens instructs that the duty to inquire arises only when there is some 

knowledge by the court that gives a reason to know that substitution is required. Apart 

from the knowledge that Petitioner wanted new counsel, Petitioner’s bare request for 

new counsel offered the trial court no reason to inquire further. A defendant may seek 

new counsel for any number of reasons that don’t involve a conflict of interest, and/or 

that don’t require substitution.4 

In sum, Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court’s rejection of the motion 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the 

Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant relief on Petitioner’s Ground 2, 

and the ground must also be denied.

/ /

 

4

Petitioner does not in his Petition proffer any indication that had the court inquired it 

would have discovered reason to substitute counsel. In his PCR Petition, Petitioner did 

assert that his relationship with counsel was broken, resulting in an irreconcilable 

conflict. However, Petitioner offers only bald assertions of a break down, bolstered only 

by after-the-fact complaints about the course of trial. (Exhibit M, PCR Pet., Attach. A at 

2-3.) Those alleged subsequent failings by counsel do not establish that there was a 

breakdown in communications at the time of Petitioner’s motion, such that further 

inquiry would have shown cause for substitution. 

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, the underlying constitutional claims are plainly without merit, and 

reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, filed April 9, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 11, 2012

12-0753r RR 12 12 04 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:12-cv-00753-NVW Document 10 Filed 12/11/12 Page 13 of 13