Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00794/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00794-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ALFREDO KUBA,

NO. CIV. S-05-0794 WBS JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARINE WORLD JOINT POWERS

AUTHORITY, an unknown business

entity; SIX FLAGS THEME PARKS

INC., d/b/a Six Flags Marine

World, a Delaware corporation;

PARK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

d/b/a Six Flags Marine World, a

California corporation; JOE MECK,

an individual; DALE ARNOLD, an

individual; AARON ARKY, an

individual; CITY OF VALLEJO,

d/b/a Marine World Joint Powers

Authority; VALLEJO POLICE

DEPARTMENT; LIEUTENANT SALINAS,

an individual; OFFICER DOUGLAS

WILCOX, an individual; SERGEANT

SCHROEDER, an individual; OFFICER

THOMPSON, an individual; OFFICER

HAMMRICK, an individual; OFFICER

BAUTISTA, an individual; RAY

MATELA, an individual; CHRIS

NEVASCA, an individual; MICAH

BAKER, an individual; RON

CERVANTEZ, an individual; and

DOES 1 through 96, inclusive,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff Alfredo Kuba filed this lawsuit pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated his civil

rights by arresting him while he was engaged in a peaceful

protest. Presently before this court is the motion of defendants

Police Assistant Joe Thompson, Officer Jerome Bautista, Officer

William Hamrick, Officer Douglas Wilcox, Sergeant Kelly

Schroeder, Lieutenant Joel Salinas, and City of Vallejo (“Vallejo

Defendants”) for summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1997, defendant Six Flags, Inc. contracted to manage

a portion of Six Flags Marine World (“Marine World”) with the

Marine World Joint Powers Authority (“MWJPA”), a public agency

created by agreement between the City of Vallejo and the

Redevelopment Agency of the City of Vallejo. (Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Oiler Decl. Ex. A (Joint Exercise of Powers

Agreement).) MWJPA’s purpose is to accept conveyance of the

assets, assume the liabilities, and protect the City of Vallejo’s

interests related to Marine World. (Id. at 5.) Moreover, MWJPA

bears the “overall responsibility for all activities and

facilities at Marine World.” (Pl.’s Opp’n, Evans Decl. Ex. D

(Amended and Restated 1997 Management Agreement Relating to

Marine World).) 

Defendant Six Flags, Inc. operates the park pursuant to

a long-term lease, paying nominal rent in the amount of one

dollar per year per forty acres of land (id. Ex. I (Parcel Lease)

at 5), and receiving a management fee and 80% of the net cash

flow generated by the combined operations of the park. (Id. Ex.

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F (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K) at 2.) 

Defendant MWJPA receives the remaining 20% of the net revenue. 

(Id. Ex. D (Revenue Sharing Agreement) at 9.) 

The land at Marine World is divided into two

categories: a public parcel and a private parcel. (Id. Ex. D at

3.) The private parcel is leased by Six Flags, Inc., but the

public parcel is, as its name suggests, public land. (Id.) The

public parcel includes parking facilities, the front entrance,

the entry area including ticket sales and admission facilities,

public walkways, paths, restrooms, dining facilities, and other

areas intended for use by patrons. (Id. Ex. J (Reciprocal

Easement Agreement) at 6.)

Plaintiff has been arrested twice for protesting at

Marine World in the “public parcel” section. On March 20, 2004,

plaintiff went to Marine World for the purposes of engaging in a

protest. (Pl.’s Resp. To Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶

1.) While on a sidewalk outside of the Marine World gates,

Marine World employee defendant Ron Cervantez placed plaintiff

under citizen’s arrest for trespass and battery. (Id. ¶ 2.) 

Defendant Officer Bautista, of the Vallejo Police Department, was

dispatched to Marine World to respond to a report of protesters

causing a disturbance. (Id. ¶ 3.) Upon arriving at Marine

World, Sergeant Kelly Schroeder instructed Bautista to accept

Cervantez’s citizen’s arrest, issue the plaintiff a citation for

trespass and battery, and release him at the scene, which

Bautista subsequently did. (Id. ¶ 5-6.) Also at Marine World at

that time were defendants Hamrick and Thompson, who had no

involvement in the arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 7-13.)

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On May 31, 2004, plaintiff again went to Marine World

to engage in protest. (Id. ¶ 14). While on a grassy area

abutting a sidewalk outside of Marine World gates, Marine World

employee defendant Dale Arnold placed plaintiff under citizen’s

arrest for trespass. (Id.) Defendant Officer Wilcox

subsequently accepted Arnold’s citizen arrest, in the presence of

his ranking officer, defendant Lieutenant Salinas. (Id. ¶¶ 14-

15.) Based on these two incidents, plaintiff was charged with

trespass under California Penal Code § 602(o). (Evans Decl. Ex.

L.) The Superior Court found that the entire park, including the

land on which plaintiff had been protesting, was open to the

general public. (Id.) Accordingly, the case was dismissed on

February 15, 2005. (Id.)

On May 11, 2005, plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”) alleging the following twelve causes of

action relating to his two arrests: (1) violation of the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution (free speech and

abuse of process); (2) violation of the California Liberty of

Speech Clause, Article I, Section 2(a) of the California

Constitution and California Civil Code §§ 52.1 and 1708 (free

speech and abuse of process); (3) violation of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution (unlawful seizure);

(4) violation of Article I, Sections 1 and 13 of the California

Constitution (unlawful seizure); (5) violation of California

Penal Code Sections 602.1, 837 and 847 (false arrest); (6)-(7)

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

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Amendment to the United States Constitution; (8) conspiracy; (9) 1

assault and battery; (10) abuse of process; (11) false

imprisonment; and (12) violations of California Civil Code

Sections 51.7 and 52.1 (interference with constitutional rights

through coercion). 

On May 17, 2006, this court granted plaintiff’s motion

for a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from enforcing

their Public Assembly Policy as it pertained to plaintiff’s

planned protests on the following Memorial Day Weekend. Vallejo

Defendants now move for summary judgment, contending that

defendants Hamrick and Thompson were not involved in the arrests,

that defendants Bautista, Schroeder, Wilcox, and Salinas are

entitled to qualified immunity, and that defendant City of

Vallejo has no official policy in place that caused a violation

of plaintiff’s rights.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

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Defendants object to much of plaintiff’s proffered 2

evidence, contending that many of the submitted facts are

“irrelevant” and/or constitute “conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual detail.” (Defs.’ Objections to Pl.’s

Evidence 3 & 4.) This court finds these objections to be

spurious, and believes defendants would be well served to give

attention to the court’s prior rulings. See Burch v. Regents of

Univ. of Ca., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (noting

that “objections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant,

speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an

improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary

judgment standard itself; yet attorneys insist on using

evidentiary objections as a vehicle for raising this point. A

court can award summary judgment only when there is no genuine

dispute of material fact. It cannot rely on irrelevant facts, and

thus relevance objections are redundant.”)

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(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ [and] designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the 2

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

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the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Timely Filing of Opposition

Defendants, in their motion for summary judgment, argue

that because plaintiff filed his opposition on October 3, 2006,

one day later than the October 2 deadline, the court should not

consider the opposition. “When a party opposing summary judgment

fails to comply with the formalities of Rule 56, a court may

choose to be somewhat lenient in the exercise of its discretion

to deal with the deficiency.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citing Scharf v. United States Att’y Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 1243

(9th Cir. 1979)). The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a

motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because the

non-moving party violated a local rule.” Couveau v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2000). “Cases

should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” 

Jones v. Tozzi, 2006 WL 355175, *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2006)

(citing Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1985)). It is true that plaintiff’s motion was indeed

filed at 2:17am on the morning of October 3, 2006. However, as

in Jones, defendant has shown no actual prejudice or

inconvenience resulting from the two hour delay, and this court

thinks it unlikely that any exists. Id. (overlooking a two day

delay in filing an opposition, due to a finding of no prejudice

or inconvenience). Therefore, the court will consider

plaintiff’s opposition.

///

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Plaintiff contends that defendant Wilcox did not 3

properly notice his motion for summary judgment, as a result of

his inserting his name into an amended notice of summary

judgement filed after a court-ordered deadline. As noted above,

however, there is a strong presumption in favor of hearing cases

on the merits whenever possible. See Pena, 770 F.2d at 814. In

this case, the court would find it difficult to believe that the

plaintiff was inadequately noticed, given that the arguments put

forth in the accompanying motion explicitly named Officer Wilcox. 

Moreover, even if this had not been the case, the arguments made

against Officer Wilcox regarding immunity under California Penal

Code Section 847 are identical to those made against Officer

Bautista, and the arguments against Officer Wilcox regarding

general qualified immunity are identical to those made against

all other defendant officers. Therefore, in briefing all of the

issues against the properly noticed defendants, plaintiff also

briefed all issues relating to Officer Wilcox. Plaintiff was

thus effectively put on notice as to the substance of all issues,

so as to avoid any undue inconvenience or prejudice. This court

will therefore consider defendant Wilcox’s motion for summary

judgment. 

8

C. Defendants Hamrick and Thompson

Plaintiff concedes that defendants Hamrick and Thompson

had no involvement in either of plaintiff’s arrests. (Pl.’s Resp.

To Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts 8), and has therefore

stipulated to the granting of defendants Hamrick and Thompson’s

motions for summary judgment on all claims. (Pl.’s Opp’n 5.)

D. Defendants Bautista, Schroeder, Wilcox and Salinas 3

1. Qualified Immunity

As an affirmative defense, defendants Bautista, Wilcox,

Salinas and Schroeder assert that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. Qualified immunity protects “government officials

performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitution rights of which a

reasonable person should have known.” Romero v. Kitsap County,

931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

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457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal quotations omitted). The

test for qualified immunity thus “necessitates three inquires: 1)

the identification of the specific right violated; 2) the

determination of whether that right was so ‘clearly established’

as to alert a reasonable officer to its constitutional

parameters; and 3) the ultimate determination of whether a

reasonable officer could have believed lawful the particular

conduct at issue.” Id. 

A right is clearly established when “the contours of

the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)) (internal quotations

omitted). In making that assessment, the plaintiff must offer

more than general conclusory allegations that the defendants

violated a constitutional right. Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho,

119 F.3d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). He must show “that the

particular facts of his case support the claim of a clearly

established right.” Id. (citing Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d

1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, a plaintiff need not show

that the exact action challenged was previously held unlawful,

but merely that “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness

[is] apparent.” Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir.

1994) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640); see also Sweaney, 119

F.3d at 1389 (“The absence of any authority directly on point is

not fatal to a section 1983 claim. A right is clearly

established ‘[i]f the only reasonable conclusion from binding

authority were that the disputed right existed.’”) (citing

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“Public fora are places, such as streets and parks, 4

that have traditionally been devoted to expressive activity. . .

. Designated public fora are areas that the government

affirmatively has opened to expressive activity. . . . Nonpublic

fora [are] areas that have not traditionally or explicitly been

open to expressive activity.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.

Defendants object to the general references to 5

plaintiff’s video, claiming that it does not constitute a

designation of sufficiently specific facts. (Defs.’ Objections

to Pl.’s Evidence 1.) This court had no difficulty, however,

identifying the relevant portions of the video cited to by

plaintiff, and will therefore consider this evidence.

10

Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.1997)). 

The basic right that plaintiff asserts in this case is

his right to peacefully protest on specific public parcels of

land near the Marine World property without being subject to

arrest. This is couched in terms of both First and Fourth

Amendment violations. Under federal law “[p]ublic property,

depending on its character, falls within one of three main

categories for purposes of First Amendment analysis.” Preminger

v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Perry

Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45

(1983)) (discussing the categories of traditional public fora,

designated public fora, and nonpublic fora). In this instance, 4

the videotape submitted by plaintiff clearly shows members of the

public walking through both the sidewalk and the grassy area, the

two sites where plaintiff was arrested. (Kuba Decl. B.

(Video).) Moreover, there do not appear to be any signs or 5

fences marking off these areas or indicating that the land was

not generally open to the public. Thus, these two areas appear

to be, in the very least, designated public fora, i.e., property

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As noted in this court’s order on plaintiff’s 6

preliminary injunction, under California law, this parcel of land

is public as well. (May 17, 2006 Preliminary Injunction at 10.)

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“which the state has opened for use by the public.” 

6

For a designated public forum, as long as the state

holds the property open to the public, “it is bound by the same

standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Perry Educ.

Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. It is beyond dispute that “public

sidewalks, streets, and ways . . . are ‘quintessential’ public

forums for free speech.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000);

see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 

Nonetheless, the state may enforce “regulations of the time,

place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are

narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and

leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. 

Thus, plaintiff’s right to protest is “clearly established” in

law so as to satisfy the second step of the Romero analysis. 

The final step in analyzing qualified immunity requires

an objective analysis of whether the officers’ conduct in this

instance was reasonable. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

641 (1987). The relevant inquiry is whether a “reasonable

officer” in the defendant’s position could have believed that the

conduct at issue was lawful. Id. Indeed, while the first two

inquiries in Romero present pure questions of law, the third may

require factual determinations. Romero, 931 F.2d at 628 (citing

Gooden v. Howard, 917 F.2d 1355, 1361 (4th Cir. 1990)). Thus,

once plaintiff has established that his right is clearly

established, the burden of production shifts to the officers to

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prove that their conduct was reasonable. DeNieva v. Reyes, 966

F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Romero, 931 F.2d at 627).

 Defendants claim that they “did not arrest the

Plaintiff for trespass. They simply accepted the citizen’s

arrest, in compliance with the law, and are therefore entitled to

qualified immunity.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 9:15-16.) A

police officer, however, is not entitled to hide behind a

citizen’s arrest in place of making a determination of whether

probable cause exists. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a

warrantless misdemeanor arrest “must be supported by probable

cause to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.”)

(citing Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 236 (9th Cir.

1995)).

Prior to and during both arrests of plaintiff,

plaintiff repeatedly pointed out to the police officers that the

land he was on was open to the public, the truth of which was

clearly observable in plaintiff’s video. (Kuba Decl. B.) People

can be seen freely coming and going both on the sidewalk and the

grassy area, and there is not anything indicating that the

apparently public land was in fact private. (Id.) Defendants

have not put forth any evidence, nor referred to any facts, to

demonstrate probable cause for either arrest. To the contrary,

under some intense interrogation by the court at oral argument,

defendants’ counsel was unable to identify a single provision of

the California Penal Code which had reason to believe was

violated by plaintiff’s conduct. 

From a review of the video it appears that defendants

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were attempting to justify their actions on the ground that they

were required to accept a citizen’s arrest. Such an attempt to

delegate to a private citizen the officers’ own duty to

investigate probable cause is contrary to clearly established

Ninth Circuit law. Arpin, 261 F.3d at 924. On the evidence

currently before it, taken in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the

evidence before the court fails to show why it was objectively

reasonable for defendants officers to arrest plaintiff while he

was on the public land and not violating any criminal statutes. 

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and defendants have

failed to meet their requisite burden. DeNieva, 966 at 486. At

this point the defense must fail, and defendants motion for

summary judgement on plaintiff’s federal claims based on

qualified immunity must be denied.

2. State Law Claims

Plaintiff has stipulated that his state law claims

against the Vallejo Defendants should be dismissed. The second,

fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes

of action will therefore be dismissed as against defendants

Bautista, Schroeder, Wilcox and Salinas.

E. Defendant City of Vallejo

A city may only be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when

“the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” 

Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). Such a policy can either be an official city policy or

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Defendants object to plaintiff’s characterizations of 7

defendants’ deposition testimony. (Defs.’ Objections to Pl.’s

Evidence 2.) This court, however, need not adopt plaintiff’s

characterizations, but will instead rely directly on the

defendants’ deposition testimony.

14

merely a pervasive custom. Los Angeles Police Protective League

v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 889 (9th Cir. 1990). In the alternative,

the city may be liable if it “made a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’

choice to fail to train its employees adequately.” Boyd v.

Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 784 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Plaintiff argues that there “is evidence that the

Vallejo Police Department had a policy of mandating the taking of

citizen’s arrests when requested by a citizen, without regard to

whether there was probable cause. . . .” (Pl.’s Opp. 24). 

Indeed, in depositions taken of Officers Bautista and Wilcox,

both defendants admit that at the time of the arrest, it was

their understanding that they were obligated to accept a

citizen’s arrest. (Bautista Dep. 20:2-21:9; Wilcox Dep. 12:7-

11.) This evidence is corroborated by statements made by 7

defendants Salinas and Bautista on the video tape, to the same

effect. (Kuba Decl. B.)

To impute liability at the city level, however, the

practice in question must go beyond mere “random acts or isolated

events,” but must be the result of “a permanent and well settled

practice.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 888 F.2d 1439, 1444

(9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). Here, defendants

have submitted Vallejo Police Department Special Order 2003-1, an

internal memo sent to all police officers on January 1, 2003,

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informing them that going forward, they were required to assess

probable cause before accepting citizen’s arrests. (Decl. of

Robert Nichelini Ex. B.)

This evidence does not resolve the question, however,

for it is still entirely possible that despite this memo, police

practice continued to consist of accepting citizen’s arrests

without assessing probable cause. Indeed, the two incidents at

issue in this case at the very least raise an inference that such

a custom might have continued to exist. If in fact there was

such a custom, pervasive throughout the police department,

obviating the officers’ obligation to make an independent

determination of probable cause for an arrest, then that custom

would be improper. Arpin, 261 F.2d at 925 (“In establishing

probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a

citizen witness that he was the victim of a crime, but must

independently investigate the basis of the witness’ knowledge or

interview other witnesses.”); see also Corcoran, 160 F. Supp. at

1091-92 (holding that a policy permitting officers to arrest

persons pursuant to a citizen’s arrest without probable cause was

unconstitutional). 

Further, from the officers’ statements on the video

tape, they did not appear to have a clear and consistent

understanding of the rights of individuals on public property,

such as that on which plaintiff was arrested. Thus, although

certainly not dispositive of the question, the evidence before

the court demonstrates genuinely disputed issues of material fact

as to whether the officers’ lack of knowledge was the result of

deliberate indifference on the part of the City of Vallejo. The

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Because plaintiff has stipulated to the dismissal of 8

all state law claims against all Vallejo Defendants, the state

law claims against the City of Vallejo will be dismissed.

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City’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s federal claims

must accordingly be denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).8

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants Hamrick and Thompson’s motion for

summary judgment on all causes of action be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED;

(2) defendants Bautista, Schroeder, Wilcox, Salinas,

City of Vallejo and Vallejo Police Department’s motion for

summary judgment on the second, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth,

tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED; and

(3) with respect to all other defendants and claims,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby

is, DENIED.

DATED: October 23, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-00794-WBS -JFM Document 108 Filed 10/24/06 Page 16 of 16