Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00283/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00283-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

THOMAS F. LEICHTY,

Petitioner,

vs.

EARL L. HOUSER, Superintendent III,

Goose Creek Correctional Center,

Respondent.

No. 3:19-cv-00283-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Thomas F. Leichty, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Leichty is in the custody of the

Alaska Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and incarcerated at Goose Creek Correctional

Center. Respondent has answered, and Leichty has not replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In August 2003, Leichty was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault in

connection with an attack on B.A., a seventeen-year-old girl, by three men in a vacant field. 

After two of the men had physically and sexually assaulted B.A., the third alerted the others that

the police were nearby, and the three men fled the scene by foot. B.A. flagged down a police

officer, who pursued the three men and eventually detained Leichty. B.A. identified Leichty as

one of the three men involved in the attack, but she was unsure whether he was one of the two

who had raped her. Upon B.A.’s identification, the police transported Leichty to the station for

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an interview. The police were unable to immediately apprehend either of the other men involved

in the attack.

During his interview, Leichty told the police that he and two other men had met a girl

whose description matched that of B.A. Leichty stated that Patrick Shorty had repeatedly

punched B.A. in the face before raping her. Leichty admitted that it was possible that he had

also sexually assaulted B.A. Although Leichty claimed at the beginning of the interview that he

could not clearly remember the events because of alcohol-induced blackouts, the interviewing

officer told Leichty that he did not appear to be very intoxicated, and Leichty’s description of the

events and certain details matched that of B.A.’s. The police eventually arrested Shorty and

obtained DNA material from both Leichty and Shorty. Shorty could not be excluded as a donor

of the sperm fraction contained in the vaginal swab collected from B.A., but Leichty was

excluded as a donor. Shorty’s DNA was also found on Leichty’s penis and shirt.

Leichty and Shorty were each indicted on two counts of first-degree sexual assault. 

Leichty’s two sexual assault counts were later merged for trial, and Leichty and Shorty were

tried together. Prior to trial, Leichty moved to suppress his statements to police on grounds

alleging that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that his waiver of his Miranda1

rights was invalid. The trial court denied the motions. Following a jury trial at which Leichty

denied that he was the second man who had sex with B.A. and Shorty argued that B.A.

consented to have sex with him, Leichty was found guilty of one count of first-degree sexual

assault.2

Through counsel, Leichty appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to law

enforcement should have been suppressed because: 1) they were unlawfully obtained as a result

of an illegal arrest; and 2) his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The

Alaska Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment against Leichty in a reasoned,

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (a suspect has a constitutional right not

to speak to police after he is arrested and given his Miranda warnings).

2 Shorty was also found guilty of first-degree sexual assault.

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unpublished memorandum opinion issued on April 15, 2009. Leichty v. State, No. A-9963, 2009

WL 1039833, at *2 (Alaska App. Apr. 15, 2009). Leichty petitioned for hearing in the Alaska

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on July 28, 2009.

Leichty then filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) under Alaska

Criminal Rule 35.1 in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. According to Leichty,

trial counsel chose an unsound defense because the DNA evidence, which showed that Shorty

was the likely source of the sperm sample found in a penile swab taken from Leichty, suggested

that Leichty was the second man who had sexually assaulted the victim. Leichty contended that

counsel should have chosen a different defense strategy, such as consent, in light of the DNA

evidence and Shorty’s consent defense. The superior court denied the PCR application, and the

Court of Appeals affirmed the denial in a reasoned, unpublished summary disposition issued on

May 22, 2019. It does not appear that Leichty petitioned for review of the PCR denial in the

Alaska Supreme Court.

Leichty then timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court dated

September 3, 2019. Docket No. 1 (“Petition”); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1),(2). Briefing is now

complete, and the Petition ripe for adjudication.

II. GROUNDS/CLAIMS

In his pro se Petition before this Court, Leichty alleges that “APD detective violated my

4th amendment Miranda rights, which was partially unreco[r]ded to incriminate and used to get a

true bill in a grand jury indictment.” Leichty also cites a number of grounds of relief listed in the

Court’s form habeas petition without elaboration: C) conviction obtained by use of evidence

gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure; F) conviction obtained by the

unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to the

defendant; H) conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury which was unconstitutionally

selected and impaneled; and I) denial of effective assistance of counsel.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”

§ 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision” of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives

at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a

common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of

reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearly

established federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating

whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The

more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case

determinations.”).

The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1)

“refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon

the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory

power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where

holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, “it

cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’” 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).

To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are

beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.

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Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was

correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary

authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court’s interpretation and

application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state

court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536

U.S. 584 (2002).

In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). A summary denial is an adjudication

on the merits and entitled to deference. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Under

the AEDPA, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner

rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Leichty has not replied to Respondent’s answer. The relevant statute provides that “[t]he

allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a

habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the

judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 U.S.C. § 2248; see also Carlson v.

Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 530 (1952). Where, as here, there is no traverse filed and no evidence

offered to contradict the allegations of the return, the court must accept those allegations as true. 

See Phillips v. Pitchess, 451 F.2d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 1971).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Cursory Citation of Grounds for Relief

As noted above, Leichty cites as grounds for relief in the instant Petition a number of

grounds listed in the Court’s form habeas petition: C) conviction obtained by use of evidence

gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure; F) conviction obtained by the

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unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to the

defendant; H) conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury which was unconstitutionally

selected and impaneled; and I) denial of effective assistance of counsel.

In Ground 1 of the Petition, Leichty refers to ground C of the form petition (conviction

obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure) and

alleges in the fact section that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (a suspect has a constitutional right not to speak to police after he

is arrested and given his Miranda warnings). A review of the state court record submitted by

Respondent reflects that Leichty raised his invalid search and seizure and Miranda claims all the

way to the Alaska Supreme Court, as required for federal habeas review.3

A review of the state court records further indicates, however, that Leichty never

presented to the state courts the grounds for relief he cursorily identified as grounds F

(conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the

defendant evidence favorable to the defendant), H (conviction obtained by action of a grand or

petit jury which was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled), and I (denial of effective

assistance of counsel). Nor does he provide any facts supporting these claims.4

3 The Court notes, however, that Respondent argues that Leichty failed to fully

exhaust his Miranda claim because he did not raise the federal nature of it to the Alaska courts. 

Because, as discussed infra, Leichty is not entitled to relief on the merits of the claim, the Court

declines to address Respondent’s exhaustion argument. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure

of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”)

4 Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that the petition must

“specify all grounds for relief available to the petitioner [and] state the facts supporting each

ground.” This Court would have to engage in a tenuous analysis in order to attempt to identify

the thrust of Leichty’s cursorily-raised claims. Although pro se habeas filings must be construed

liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), such leniency should not

place on the reviewing court the entire onus of ferreting out grounds for relief, and “[c]onclusory

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief,”

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ursory and vague claim[s] cannot support habeas relief.”); Jones v. Gomez,

66 F.3d 199, 204-205 (9th Cir. 1995). Facts must be stated in the petition with sufficient detail

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This Court may not consider claims that have not been fairly presented to the State

courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing cases). Specifically, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (B), before a court may grant a Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, the petitioner must either (A)

exhaust “the remedies available in the courts of the State” or (B) show “there is an absence of

available State corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the applicant.” To satisfy the “fairly present” requirement, the petitioner

actually must present his or her federal claim to “each appropriate court (including a state

supreme court with powers of discretionary review)” so that the each court is alerted to the

federal nature of the claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (per curiam). In Alaska, this means that claims must first be presented

to the Alaska Superior Court. If the petitioner disagrees with that result, the claim should be

raised to the Alaska Court of Appeals, and if he disagrees with that result, the claim should be

raised in a petition for hearing to the Alaska Supreme Court.

The Court allowed Leichty an opportunity to address the lack of exhaustion. Docket No.

11. Specifically, the Court provided three options:

a) voluntarily dismiss the entire Petition without prejudice under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), with the understanding that any later petition may be

time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1);

b) voluntarily dismiss the aforementioned grounds F, H, and I from the current

Petition and elect to proceed only on the Miranda claim; OR

to enable the Court to determine, from the face of the petition, whether further habeas corpus

review is warranted. Because Leichty failed to articulate these claims or cite facts that would

support an inference that his federal constitutional rights may have been violated, Leichty is not

entitled to relief on these claims in any event.

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c) request that the Petition be stayed pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,

277 (2005), if he can show (i) good cause for his failure to earlier exhaust the

unexhausted claims in state court; (ii) the unexhausted claims are not plainly

meritless; and (iii) he has not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional

delay.

Id.

The deadline for responding to the Court’s order has now passed, and no submission has

been received. As the Court cautioned, it will therefore adjudicate Leichty’s Petition as

submitted, and deny the cursorily-identified grounds for relief as unexhausted and inadequately

pled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d at 26. Accordingly, the Court will

address the two grounds for relief that Leichty raised all the way to the Alaska Supreme Court,

namely, that his arrest was illegal for lack of probable cause and that the trial court should have

suppressed his statements to law enforcement because they were obtained in violation of

Miranda.

B. Unlawful Arrest (Ground 1)

On direct appeal, Leichty challenged his arrest as unsupported by probable cause and

thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5

 To the extent Leichty re-raises that claim in these

federal habeas proceedings, however, such arguments are precluded by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Under Stone, “where the State has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” federal habeas corpus

relief will not lie for a claim that evidence recovered through an illegal search or seizure was

introduced at trial. The Stone v. Powell doctrine applies to all Fourth Amendment claims,

5 The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

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including claims of illegal stops, arrests, searches, or seizures based on less than probable cause,

and it applies regardless of the nature of the evidence sought to be suppressed. Cardwell v.

Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572-73 (1983) (per curiam).

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that all Stone requires is that the State provide a

petitioner the opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. See Moormann v. Schiro, 426

F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). “The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity

to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly

decided.” Oritz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). Alaska provides such an

opportunity, AK. R. CRIM. P. 37(c); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. Indeed, the record reflects that

the state trial court held a hearing at which defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to be

heard, and the underlying claim was briefed before and thoroughly considered by the Alaska

Court of Appeals, which issued a reasoned decision rejecting the claim on its merits. Any

challenge to Leichty’s arrest is therefore not cognizable here.

C. Miranda Violation (Ground 2)

Leichty also argued on direct appeal that his statements to law enforcement should have

been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Leichty averred

that his waiver of those rights was not knowing or intelligent, and that his statements were not

voluntary, because he was in an alcohol blackout at the time of the interview. The record

reflects that the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Leichty’s suppression motion and

denied it, concluding that the videotaped interview showed that Leichty “was lucid and

responsive and that there was . . . no evidence of alcoholic blackout . . . .” 

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may not use

statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the

privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. Under this rubric, an interrogating officer

must first advise the potential defendant that he or she has the right to consult with a lawyer, the

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right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him or her prior to

engaging in a custodial interrogation. Id. at 473-74. Once Miranda warnings have been given, if

a suspect makes a clear and unambiguous statement invoking his constitutional rights, “all

questioning must cease.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984).

A defendant may waive his Miranda rights so long as the waiver is “voluntary in the

sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception,” and “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 

A valid waiver of Miranda rights depends upon the totality of the circumstances. “The waiver

inquiry ‘has two distinct dimensions’: waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’ and

‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the

consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83

(2010) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Although some earlier Supreme

Court cases had indicated the government had a “heavy burden” to show waiver, Berghuis

explained that the burden is not too onerous. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384. Indeed, the waiver may

be implied by conduct, and need not be explicit or written. Id. at 383.

If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made

an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate “a

valid waiver” of Miranda rights. The prosecution must make the additional showing that

the accused understood these rights. Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda

warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced

statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. . . . As a general

proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his

or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate

choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.

Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384-85 (citations omitted).

In rejecting Leichty’s Miranda claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal explained:

We have reviewed the transcript of the interrogation, as well as the videotape, and

agree with Judge Wolverton’s assessment. During the interview, Leichty appeared alert

and responsive. When Detective Vandervalk told Leichty that he was going to read him

his Miranda rights, Leichty responded that he had “heard ‘em a lot.” Leichty gave his

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date of birth and Social Security number. He described his activities of the evening,

including observing the rape of B.A. Leichty did claim that he had little memory of

many aspects of the rape because he was drunk and had blacked out earlier in the

evening. But, as Judge Wolverton pointed out, there was simply no evidence that Leichty

was in a blackout at the time of the interview. To the contrary, Leichty appeared to be

lucid and responsive. We accordingly conclude that Judge Wolverton did not err in

finding that Leichty knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his

statements to the police were voluntary.

Leichty, 2009 WL 1039833, at *2.

The record amply supports that the state appellate court properly considered the totality

of the circumstances in determining whether Leichty understood and voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights. That conclusion was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the record. Leichty is thus not entitled to relief on this claim either.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Leichty is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) (“To obtain

a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must ‘demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree

with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” (quoting Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 327)). Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); 9TH CIR. R. 22-1.

The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.

Dated: May 1, 2020.

 s/James K. Singleton, Jr. 

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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