Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08337/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sharon Ray,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-08337-PCT-DLR

ORDER 

Plaintiff applied for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income in May 2015. After her applications were denied by state 

agency reviewers, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). Following a December 2017 hearing at which Plaintiff, her representative, and a 

vocational expert (VE) testified, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. This became the Commissioner’s 

final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Plaintiff now seeks judicial 

review.

The Court does not review the ALJ’s decision anew or otherwise determine whether 

Plaintiff is disabled. Rather, the Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it 

“contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

Case 3:18-cv-08337-DLR Document 19 Filed 03/05/20 Page 1 of 3
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

preponderance, and “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

Having considered the parties’ briefs and the administrative record, the Court 

concludes that this case must be remanded for further proceedings. This is so because in 

Social Security disability cases, the ALJ has a special duty to further develop the record 

when inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence—even when the claimant 

is represented by counsel. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 45-60 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1983). Here, the record was inadequately 

developed as to Plaintiff’s physical impairments of cervical spondylosis and osteoarthritis 

of the right shoulder.

In fact, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding concerning 

Plaintiff’s physical limitations is not based on a single medical opinion. The ALJ rejected 

the August 2015 opinion of state agency medical consultant Neil Sapin, who concluded 

that the evidence was insufficient to evaluate Plaintiff’s physical functionality, especially 

related to her neck and shoulder. (Doc. 11-4 at 8.) The ALJ also rejected the December 

2015 opinion of state agency medical consultant Yosef Schwartz because it was “rendered 

before most of the medical evidence of record was submitted.” (Doc. 11-3 at 25.) Finally, 

the ALJ rejected the only remaining medical opinion submitted by an acceptable medical 

source addressing Plaintiffs’ physical functionality—a February 2016 check-the-box form 

from Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Welly. (Doc. 11-8 at 170-72.) The ALJ rejected 

the opinion because she determined that it was inconsistent with the objective evidence and 

because Dr. Welly did not explain the basis for his findings as to Plaintiff’s limitations.

However, the ALJ could not substitute her lay interpretation of the objective evidence for 

that of Plaintiff’s treating physician without any support from other medical opinions in 

the record. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); Trevizo v. 

Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2017); Kelly v. Berryhill, 732 F. App'x 558, 561 

(9th Cir. 2018). And “[i]f the ALJ thought [s]he needed to know the basis of [the treating 

physician’s] opinions in order to evaluate them, [s]he had a duty to conduct an appropriate 

Case 3:18-cv-08337-DLR Document 19 Filed 03/05/20 Page 2 of 3
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or submitting further questions to 

them. [She] could also have continued the hearing to augment the record.” Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The ALJ did not further 

develop the record, but instead improperly relied on her own interpretation of the medical 

evidence in order to craft Plaintiff’s RFC. 

For these reasons, the Court directs a remand for further development of the record 

with regard to Plaintiff’s physical impairments and for further appropriate proceedings in 

light of that additional development. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk’s Office to enter judgment and 

close the case.

Dated this 4th day of March, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-08337-DLR Document 19 Filed 03/05/20 Page 3 of 3