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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PHILIP ORTEGA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross- ) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

'fcnth Circuit 

MAY 311989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) Nos. 87-1475 & 87-1520 

) 

THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, J 

A Municipal Corporation, POLICE ) 

CHIEF ALLAN MEYERS, DETECTIVE ) 

RANDALL MURPHY, LT. RONALD L. ) 

MILLER, DETECTIVE LOUIS JOHNSON, ) 

PATROLMAN JOSEPH WARD, PATROLMAN ) 

DARRELL MARMON, PATROLMAN BERNARD ) 

J. SMITH, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants/Cross- ) 

Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

CIV. NO. 85-2054-0 

Richard T. Merker (Thomas D. Billam with him on the briefs)# of 

Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, Overland 

Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Maurice J. Ryan, Assistant City Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1475 Document: 01019963405 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 1 .. 
Philip Ortega (Ortega) sought damages from the City of Kansas 

City, Kansas (the City), and multiple law enforcement officials 

(the Officials), under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1981) for deprivation of 

extradition rights in connection with his arrest in a sting 

operation. The jury returned a verdict against the City and the 

Officials, and awarded Ortega compensatory damages in the amount 

of $12,500.00 and punitive damages totaling $70,000.00 against the 

individual Officials. The trial court denied the City and the 

Officials' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, New 

Trial and/or Remittitur, and granted Ortega's Motion for 

Attorney's Fees. The Memorandum and Order denying the Motion is 

published in Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 659 F. Supp. 

1201 (D. Kan. 1987). The City and the Officials appeal the denial 

of their motion. Challenging the amount of fees awarded, Ortega 

cross-appeals the trial court's grant of attorney's fees. We 

REVERSE the trial court's ruling on the Motion for Judgment 

Notwithstanding the Verdict, New Trial and/or Remittitur, and hold 

that luring a suspect into the state of Kansas for service of a 

facially valid warrant does not constitute a claim under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983. 

Facts 

In the fall of 1984, the City and its Officials initiated a 

sting operation entitled "Operation Express" to facilitate the 

arrest of a large number of suspects on outstanding warrants. A 

computer operator for the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department 

entered the suspects' names into the computer and obtained an 

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. . 

address for each suspect. The police department mailed notices to 

the suspects telling each of them to claim a package in Kansas 

City, Kansas. One of the outstanding warrants was for a "Philip 

Ortega,'' residing on Indiana Street in Kansas City, Missouri. 

Although the warrant did not so identify the suspect, he was a 

thirty-five-year-old black male. When the computer operator 

entered Ortega's name into the computer, two addresses were 

displayed: one at the Indiana Street address and another at 90th 

Terrace, Kansas City, Missouri. The police department sent 

notices to both addresses. 

Philip Ortega, a sixty-five-year-old white male, received the 

notice at his home on 90th Terrace in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 24, 1984. On December 26, he crossed the Missouri-Kansas 

state line into Kansas City, Kansas, to pick up his package, 

whereupon he was arrested despite his protests that he was the 

"wrong'' Philip Ortega. He was booked at the Wyandotte County 

Jail, taken before a District Judge, and released on bond. 

Several days later, after obtaining counsel,. Ortega convinced the 

judge that he was in fact not the same Philip Ortega sought in the 

warrant. Although the judge told him the charges would be 

dismissed, no entry of dismissal was ever entered into the record. 

Ortega brought a 

Officials under 42 

without due process 

connection with his 

civil action against the City and the 

u.s.c. § 1983 for deprivation of liberty 

and deprivation of extradition rights in 

arrest. At the close of Ortega's evidence, 

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the court directed a verdict on all claims except the claim under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 for a violation of his so-called constitutional 

right to extradition. The trial court instructed the jury that a 

criminal suspect has a right to extradition under Article IV, 

Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and that his 

right is implemented by both state and federal extradition 

statutes, which provide specific procedures for extraditing 

persons charged with crimes. The trial court further instructed 

the jury that they could find the City and the Officials liable 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they found that the City and the 

Officials lured Ortega into Kansas and arrested and detained him 

in violation of the extradition laws. The jury returned a verdict 

in favor of Ortega and awarded him damages totaling $82,500.00. 

Issue 

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial 

court erred in determining that a suspect charged with a crime on 

a facially valid warrant has a constitutional right to extradition 

prior to arrest. We review the trial court's rulings on the 

Motion for New Trial under the abuse of discretion standard. 

Harvey v. General Motors Corp., F.2d (10th Cir. 1989) (No. 

87-2593 filed April 25, 1989). We review the trial court's ruling 

on the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict de nova. 

Guilfoyle v. Missouri, Kan., & Tex. R. Co., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 

(10th Cir. 1987). We agree with the City and the Officials that a 

criminal suspect has no pre-arrest extradition rights, the 

violation of which give rise to a cause of action under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983. 

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. 

Analysis 

The original authority for interstate extradition is the 

United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2, which 

provides: 

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, 

or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be 

found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive 

Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered 

up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of 

the Crime. 

(Emphasis added.) Congress implemented this provision through 18 

u.s.c. § 3182 (1985), which provides for interstate cooperation in 

the apprehension and delivery of fugitives on demand from the 

executive authority of the requesting state, district, or 

territory from which the person fled. The statute implementing 

the constitutional provision provides: 

Whenever the executive authority of any State or 

Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, 

of the executive authority of any State, District or 

Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a 

copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before 

a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the 

person demanded with having committed treason, felony, 

or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor 

or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from 

whence the person so charged has fled, the executive 

authority of the State, District or Territory to which 

such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and 

secured, and notify the executive authority making such 

demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to 

receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be 

delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no 

such agent appears within thirty days from the time of 

the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1475 Document: 01019963405 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 5 
(Emphasis added.) 18 u.s.c. § 3182. By adopting versions of the 

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the states have set forth the 

requirements of interstate rendition. 1 The Kansas Uniform 

Criminal Extradition Act is published at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2701 

through 22-2730 (1988). 

The plain meaning of both Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2, 

and 18 u.s.c. § 3182 convinces us that the constitutional 

dimension of extradition exists only when demand is made by one 

jurisdiction for the surrender of a person in another 

jurisdiction. The classic definition of "extradition" is found in 

Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902): 

Extradition may be sufficiently defined to be the 

surrender by one nation to another of an individual 

accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own 

territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of 

the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, 

demands the surrender. 

Id. at 289. This definition has endured decades of application 

and analysis. Tavarez v. United States Attorney Gen., 668 F.2d 

805, 810 (5th Cir. 1982). The notions of demand and surrender are 

critical to interstate rendition as well. See Innes v. Tobin, 240 

U.S. 127, 133 (1916). Prior to executive demand by the requesting 

1 For discussions of the development of law in this area, see 

Abramson, Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and 

Governmental Discretion, 33 Baylor L. Rev. 793 (1981); Comment, 

Interstate Rendition Violations and Section 1983: Locating the 

Federal Rights of Fugitives, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 1268 (1982). 

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\ 

. l 

jurisdiction, a criminal suspect does not have a constitutional 

right that supports a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Although we find no Supreme Court precedent concerning§ 1983 

claims for the violation of extradition rights, there is ample 

circuit court authority for the proposition that failure to comply 

with the provisions of the Uniform Extradition Act as enact~d by 

the detaining state can support recovery on§ 1983 claims. Draper 

v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (forcible return 

of arrestee from Oregon to Washington without process supported a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of extradition rights); 

Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1981) (allegations 

of violating the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in failing to 

comply with post-arrest extradition procedures constituted a claim 

under 42 u.s.c. 1983); Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481, 483 (5th 

Cir. 1980) (delivery of in-custody plaintiff to another 

jurisdiction while petition for writ of habeas corpus pending 

could entitle plaintiff to relief under 42 u.s.c. § 1983); Brown 

v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 1980) (complaint alleging 

forcible seizure and interstate transportation of arrestee 

sufficiently alleged cause of action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983); 

Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 

435 U.S. 933 (1978) (complaint alleging arrest and transportation 

of fugitive across state line without extradition proceedings 

stated a claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983); Sanders v. Conine, 506 

F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974) (abuse of extradition power by 

noncompliance with applicable extradition law in transporting 

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Appellate Case: 87-1475 Document: 01019963405 Date Filed: 05/31/1989 Page: 7 
arrestee out of state without court proceedings stated a claim 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1983). In each of these cases plaintiff was 

restrained or deprived of his liberty o~tside the jurisdiction of 

the state issuing the warrant and then transported against his 

will. 

The question presented by this appeal, however, is not so 

simple. At the time of his arrest, Ortega was within the 

boundaries of Kansas, the jurisdiction which had issued the 

warrant for his arrest. 2 The City and the Officials argue that 

because Ortega was not arrested in his asylum state of Missouri, 

he had no right to be delivered to Kansas under the procedures set 

forth in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. We agree. Because 

Ortega was arrested in Kansas, Kansas authorities did not make a 

demand on Missouri to surrender their resident. Consequently, he 

had no right to extradition proceedings. 

Further, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act does not 

establish· an exclusive procedure by which law enforcement 

officials may arrest non-residents. In its Memorandum and Order 

published in Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 659 F. Supp. 

2 Even though he was the "wrong" Philip Ortega, the warrant was 

facially valid. The manner in which the City and the Officials 

carried out their duties, resulting in the most unfortunate arrest 

of the wrong person, has no bearing on our resolution of the 

dispositive issue in this appeal. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not 

provide a remedy for every wrong; rather, § 1983 provides a remedy 

for persons who, under color of law, suffer deprivation of 

"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws." See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, U.S. , 109 

s.ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). 

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1201, 1210 (D. Kan. 1987), the trial court stated that the Kansas 

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act "clearly provide[s] for the right 

to extradition prior to arrest." We cannot agree. The Kansas 

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act sets forth the procedures to be 

used when Kansas authorities choose to demand surrender of a nonresident whom they have no ability to serve. These state 

procedures do not create federal constitutional rights where 

otherwise they do. not exist. 

We are not persuaded that circumvention of the Kansas Uniform 

Criminal Extradition Act constitutes violation thereof. The trial 

court equated luring with arrest or restraint of liberty: 

Regardless of whether a suspect is 'lured' across 

state lines, or brought over by state authorities after 

arrest in the asylum state, the same damage results to 

the individual. In either case, he is deprived of the 

benefits and procedural protections afforded by the 

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 

Id. at 1210. We cannot endorse the trial court's equation of 

trickery with force. 

The trial court reasoned that our holding in Sanders v. 

Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974), precludes arrest through a 

sting operation such as "Operation Expres~." We cannot agree. In 

Sanders, Wyoming authorities arrested the suspect in Wyoming. 

Without process, they delivered him to Indiana authorities. 

Clearly, when Wyoming authorities assisted Indiana authorities in 

detaining the suspect, he was entitled to the procedural 

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protections of the Wyoming Uniform Extradition Act. 

we stated: 

In Sanders, 

The Wyoming version of the Uniform Extradition Act 

provides ... that a person arrested without warrant upon 

reasonable information that he is charged in courts of 

another state for specified offenses "must be taken 

before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed 

and complaint must be made against him under oath 

setting forth the ground for arrest." 

Id. at 532. We premised our opinion in Sanders on the fact that 

the individual whose rights were violated was detained in an 

asylum state. In creating for non-residents a constitutional 

right to be arrested only through extradition procedures, the 

trial court applied our holding in Sanders far beyond our intent. 

We find nothing in the Constitution or in applicable federal 

statutes which would prohibit a state from luring a person into 

its jurisdiction to effect an arrest. The Constitution requires 

an asylum state to deliver a fugitive to the receiving state upon 

demand. The federal enabling act, 18 u.s.c. § 3182, and the 

various state enactments of the Uniform Extradition Act are 

designed to implement and facilitate this process. Neither the 

Constitution nor the Uniform Acts purport to create an exclusive 

process. In the instant case, Kansas did not: (1) arrest or in 

any way restrain the liberty of the plaintiff outside its 

jurisdiction nor did it cause this to be done; and, (2) transport 

or cause the plaintiff to be transported into its jurisdiction 

against his will. In this case, authorities in Kansas lured 

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' . 

Ortega into Kansas by trickery. No force, threat of force, arrest 

or restraint of Ortega's liberty occurred outside the jurisdiction 

of Kansas. 

Conclusion 

Under the facts of this case, we hold the arrest of a nonresident in the state of Kansas by Kansas authorities does not 

give rise to a claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 for violation of the 

constitutional right to extradition. In this appeal, the City and 

the Officials raise additional issues as follows: Whether the 

trial court erred in determining that the Officials were not 

entitled to qualified immunity; whether the trial court erred in 

failing to reduce the award of actual and punitive damages; and 

whether the trial court erred in failing to strike a certain juror 

from the jury. On cross-appeal, Ortega raised the following 

issue: Whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of 

attorney's fees. awarded. Because we reverse the trial court on 

the dispositive issue before us, we do not address these issues. 

REVERSED. 

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