Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02570/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02570-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Derrick Julius Van,

Petitioner,

v.

Maricopa County Superior Court, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-2570-PHX-JJT (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is on referral to the undersigned pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report and recommendation.

On August 4, 2018,

1 Petitioner Derrick Julius Van (“Petitioner”) filed a pro se Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). (Doc. 1)2 On September 27, 2018, District Judge 

Tuchi dismissed the Petition and the action without prejudice under the abstention doctrine 

set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) because Petitioner’s state criminal 

 

1 The Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on August 13, 2018 (Doc. 1). The 

Petition contains Petitioner’s declaration that he placed the Petition in the Maricopa County 

Jail mailing system on August 4, 2018 (Id. at 3). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the 

undersigned has used August 4, 2018, as the filing date. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 

958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the 

petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

2 Citation to the record indicates documents as displayed in the official Court electronic 

document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No. CV-18-

02570-PHX-JJT (DMF).

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proceedings were ongoing. (Doc. 5) Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal in the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals on October 22, 2018. (Doc. 7) On January 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit 

remanded the case to the District Court to allow consideration of the impact of the Ninth 

Circuit’s decision in Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018), on Petitioner’s 

claims. (Doc. 9) In a January 28, 2019 Order, District Judge Tuchi found that Arevalo 

impacted Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. 10) On January 31, 2019, the Ninth Circuit remanded 

the case “for the limited purpose of enabling the [District Court] to consider whether 

[Petitioner] is entitled to relief from the judgment. (Doc. 11 at 1) On June 3, 2019, District 

Judge Tuchi: (1) directed the Clerk of the Court to vacate the judgment (Doc. 6) and reopen 

the case; (2) construed the Petition as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and (3) denied Petitioner’s Motion for a Release Order (Doc. 13),

among other actions. (Doc. 14) This matter was referred to undersigned for a report and 

recommendation. (Id.)

Counsel entered an appearance for Petitioner. (Doc. 17) Respondents filed their 

response to the Petition on July 11, 2019. (Doc. 22) Petitioner, through counsel, filed a 

reply on August 2, 2019. (Doc. 27) This matter is ripe for decision. As set forth below, 

the undersigned recommends the Petition be denied and that a certificate of appealability 

be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictments, evidentiary hearing, petitions for special action

Petitioner is awaiting trial on three criminal cases in Maricopa County Superior 

Court, CR2017-002060, CR2017-101172, and CR2017-113500. Bail has been set in

CR2017-002060 and CR2017-101172. Petitioner seeks habeas relief in his Petition only 

as to his detention without bail for the charges asserted in CR2017-113500. (Doc. 1 at 1-

3)

1. The three cases

Regarding the earliest case charged, Petitioner was indicted in Case Number 

CR2017-101172 on February 24, 2017, on counts of: (1) threatening or intimidating “by 

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word or conduct to cause physical injury to the Light Rail Apartments, or to cause serious 

damage to the property of the Light Rail Apartments”; (2) knowingly possessing or using 

heroin, a narcotic drug; and (3) knowingly possessing or using an “amount of marijuana 

having a weight of less than two pounds.” (Doc. 22-1 at 4) These charges were based on 

Petitioner’s alleged actions occurring on or about January 6, 2017. (Id.) Importantly, 

before indictment and close in time to the alleged events on January 6, 2017, Petitioner had 

been arrested for the later indicted conduct. (Id. at 30) On January 7, 2017, Petitioner was 

found to be bailable as a matter of right regarding the charged conduct and was released on 

conditions. (Id. at 15-16, 29-30) Release conditions included that Petitioner “refrain from 

committing any criminal offenses.” (Id. at 15) The release conditions also stated, “[a]fter 

a hearing, if the court finds that you have not complied with the conditions of release, it 

may modify the conditions or revoke your release altogether.” (Id.) Petitioner signed the 

release conditions, under the avowal that he understood his conditions and “the 

consequences of violating the release order.” (Id. at 16)

The second case charged resulted from conduct alleged to have taken place on or 

about March 23, 2017. (Id. at 6-7) Petitioner was charged on March 27, 2017, by direct 

complaint in CR2017-113500 on counts of: (1) knowing possession or use of 

methamphetamine; (2) knowing possession or use of less than two pounds of marijuana; 

and (3) use or possession with intent to use “drug paraphernalia, to test or analyze 

marijuana[.]” (Id.) The superior court subsequently found Petitioner to be not bailable in 

CR2017-113500 because Petitioner was on felony release (in Case Number CR2017-

101172) when Petitioner was alleged to have committed the charged crimes in the direct 

complaint (Id. at 18).

3 The detention order in CR2017-113500 set forth the procedure to 

request a hearing to challenge the determinations in the detention order. (Id.)

Based on alleged activities on or about January 27, February 5, and March 10, 2016, 

Petitioner was later also charged in Case Number CR2017-002060 on three counts of sale 

 

3 As previously noted, Petitioner seeks habeas release solely for the pretrial detention from 

this direct complaint case, CR2017-113500.

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or transportation of dangerous drugs, each a Class 2 felony, and two counts of sale or 

transportation of marijuana, each a Class 3 felony. (Id. at 11-13) This indictment was 

brought on May 26, 2017. (Id. at 13) Thereafter, Petitioner was released on bond in 

CR2017-002060 on May 31, 2017, although he was then in custody under CR2017-113500 

and has remained in custody under CR2017-113500. (Id. at 20-21)4

2. The hearing regarding detention

On May 22, 2017, through counsel, Petitioner filed in the superior court a “motion 

to modify release conditions/motion to set bond (Simpson motion)” requesting the court 

set a reasonable bond in CR2017-113500. (Doc. 22-1 at 70-75) In the motion, Petitioner’s 

counsel argued that the court should find there was “not proof evident or presumption 

great” that Petitioner had committed the crimes of possession of dangerous drugs, 

possession of marijuana, or possession of drug paraphernalia. (Id. at 71-72) The Maricopa 

County Superior Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion on June 8, 2017.

(Id. at 23-68)

5

At the hearing, the prosecutor inquired whether the superior court would be 

“deciding whether there’s proof evident/presumption great that the new case was 

committed while [Petitioner] was on release and then looking into the dangerousness,” and 

the court responded that it would “be looking at all those factors and deciding.” (Id. at 28)6

The state objected to any finding beyond proof evident and presumption great that the new 

case was committed while Petitioner was on release; the state’s objection to the court 

looking at dangerousness was overruled. (Id. at 29) Petitioner’s counsel was asked about 

any defense objection, and defense counsel stated that the defense had no objection to 

 

4 Petitioner’s custodial status is noted in his address on the second page of the bond release 

conditions. (Id. at 21)

5 Petitioner’s counsel in the state detention/bond proceedings was the same counsel who 

has entered appearance for Petitioner in these proceedings (Docs. 17, 27, 22-1 at 24).

6 See also Doc. 22-1 at 26-27 (the court described the inquiry regarding dangerousness as 

“not inherent dangerousness, dangerousness as to another person of the community and 

that no combination of conditions would protect the community or the other person” at 27).

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proceeding in the manner described by the Court, which included assessing dangerousness.

(Id. at 29)7

The prosecution presented witness Phoenix Police Officer Travis Lachance, who 

participated in Petitioner’s arrest after a traffic stop for a red light violation in Phoenix on 

March 23, 2017. (Id. at 21-23, 49) Officer Lachance testified that Petitioner was found to 

be driving on a suspended license, which led to a search of the vehicle he was driving. (Id.

at 33) Petitioner was in the driver’s seat. (Id.) While searching the car, Officer Lachance 

located in the driver’s side door a cigarette package containing a “small plastic baggie 

containing methamphetamines.” (Id. at 34) He attested he also found two glass jars 

containing marijuana on the floorboard of the passenger seat in a shopping bag, and a 

digital scale in a backpack on the back seat. (Id.) Further testimony included that 

Petitioner’s male relative was riding in the passenger seat. (Id.) Officer Lachance stated 

that the backpack containing the scale also contained Petitioner’s personal documents. (Id.

at 35) Officer Lachance also testified that Petitioner told him that the marijuana and the 

jars belonged to Petitioner. (Id. at 37-38) Officer Lachance further detailed that Petitioner 

advised him he had used marijuana thirty minutes before the traffic stop, that he traded 

marijuana “to support” his heroin habit, and that he used the scale to weigh marijuana so 

that “people know that he’s not ripping them off.” (Id. at 38) The officer declared that 

Petitioner told him he did not know what was in the cigarette pack and that the pack had 

been given to him “by someone after he asked for a cigarette.” (Id.)

On cross-examination, Officer Lachance testified that the male passenger in the 

vehicle was Petitioner’s brother who had a history of drug sales, that Petitioner’s purported 

statements had not been recorded, and that the car Petitioner had been driving at the time 

of his arrest did not belong to either Petitioner or his brother, but had been borrowed from 

someone else. (Id. at 40-41) The officer reiterated that Petitioner had said he did not know 

what was in cigarette package and never said anything about doing methamphetamine. (Id.

 

7 The court noted that “[u]sually the defense obviously doesn’t disagree with proceeding 

in that fashion.” (Doc. 22-1 at 28).

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at 41-42, 44) The officer further testified he did not fingerprint the cigarette package, the 

scale, or the glass jars. (Id. at 41, 46) Under further cross examination, the officer agreed

that under the circumstances, Petitioner’s brother could qualify for constructive possession 

of the jars containing marijuana because the jars were on the floorboard of the car, at the 

brother’s feet. (Id. at 47)

After the prosecution rested, the court asked the defense if it had any witnesses or 

testimony. (Id. at 52) Defense counsel replied in the negative and stated she was ready for 

closing. (Id. at 52-53) In closing, the prosecution argued the evidence presented at the 

hearing was “proof evident/presumption great” to support the charges of possession of a 

dangerous drug, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and that at 

the time of his arrest Petitioner was on felony release for two counts in CR2017-101172. 

(Id. at 53) Defense counsel argued instead that the evidence did not support a finding of 

proof evident/presumption great given that Petitioner did not admit knowing about the 

methamphetamine, the marijuana was on the other side of the car between his brother’s 

feet, and there was no proof from the State linking the scales to illegal drug use or sales. 

(Id. at 54) Defense counsel also emphasized that Officer Lachance had failed to record 

Petitioner’s statements. (Id.)

The prosecutor urged the court to consider that Petitioner had been charged in

CR2017-101172 on threatening and intimidating after he made a “threat to blow up 

buildings to security officers who stopped him,” and that he had out-of-state criminal 

history including “approximately 10 felony convictions on separate dates of offense [from 

the] State of Illinois for felony bomb threats or false alarm threats.” (Id. at 56) The 

prosecutor contended that Petitioner had also been indicted under CR2017-002060, 

indicating that he was “committing multiple crimes.” (Id.)

In discussing the evidence, the superior court underscored Officer Lachance’s 

testimony that Petitioner stated the marijuana found in the car was his and that he used the 

scale to assure purchasers of the marijuana that he was not ripping them off. (Id. at 63) 

Referring to the probable cause statement in CR2017-101172, the court noted that 

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Petitioner “stated to the security guard ‘I’m part of ISIS, I’ll blow up your building, I’ll 

blow the downtown buildings up,’ and then he left which is sort of an unusual fact pattern 

for somebody to say, although if you look at Mr. Van’s criminal history, it’s not apparently 

so unusual . . . .” (Id. at 63-64) The court listed Petitioner’s convictions for possession of 

marijuana in 2014, misdemeanor offenses for domestic battery in 2003 and 2004, a 2003 

schedule 1 and schedule 2 drug case, and a 2001 offense for manufacturing a controlled 

substance. (Id. at 64) Addressing Petitioner, the court said:

[I]n this day and age it’s a lot different than many years ago to say I’m a 

member of ISIS and I’m going to bomb things and I’m going to blow things 

up.

Those statements now carry different weight than at other times in our 

history, and I think they probably could subject you to some danger, but also 

certainly the rest of the community in terms of people’s reaction to that. And 

interestingly enough, we have all those misdemeanor counts for making a 

false bomb statement.

(Id. at 65)

Citing Petitioner’s criminal history of bomb threats and domestic violence, his 

statements alleged under CR2017-101172, and his release status when he allegedly 

committed the acts under CR2017-113500, the court concluded that Petitioner posed “a 

danger to the community or to another person” and that there was not “a condition or 

combination of conditions that can be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the 

other person or the community.” (Id.) The court’s minute entry for the hearing 

documented that the court found:

[P]ursuant to Article II, Section 22 of the Arizona State Constitution and 

A.R.S. §13-3961, that [Petitioner] is not eligible for release on bond because 

the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence after a full-blown 

adversary hearing that no condition or combination of conditions of release 

may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or 

the community.

(Id. at 81-82)

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The court found “the proof is evident or the presumption great that [Petitioner] 

committed the case that we’re here on today when you were on release for the other case.”

(Id. at 66) The court explained to Petitioner:

I do think you were on release. Here’s how the on release works. You were 

released to pretrial services January 7th by Commissioner Popko. The date 

of violation8in that case was January 6. You were released January 7. You 

went, had a not guilty arraignment March 3rd. You were still out.

The date of the violation in the second case is March 23rd of 2017, the case 

that we’re here on. . . . I think he was on release. I do think the proof is 

evident or the presumption great that you committed the case that we’re here 

on today when you were on release for the other case.

So I am going to hold you without bond.

(Id. at 65-66). See also Id. at 67 (“I do think you were pretty clearly on release.”) The 

finding that Petitioner was on release in CR2017-101172 at the time of the charged conduct 

in CR2017-113500 is also expressly set forth in the court’s minute entry. (Id. at 81)9

3. Post hearing matters regarding detention proceedings

At a status conference conducted by the superior court on August 3, 2017, the court 

took argument on, and then denied, Petitioner’s motion to reconsider Petitioner’s motion 

to modify release conditions. (Id. at 84-85) Petitioner apparently filed a subsequent motion 

in superior court for another hearing, which the court denied as moot in an October 5, 2017,

minute entry because a “Simpson hearing [had] been held in this matter on 06/08/2017.” 

(Id. at 87) Petitioner filed a motion for a Simpson II10 hearing on November 20, 2017. (Id.

 

8 The superior court uses the term “violation” to mean the violation of law that is charged 

in the case.

9 The superior court noted at the time of the hearing that it appeared Petitioner “is still out 

on the other case,” CR2017-101172, and, thus, not “getting any credit for the days” in 

CR2017-101172. (Doc. 22-1 at 65-66) Thus, on defense request, the court set a bond in 

CR2017-101172 nunc pro tunc to March 23, 2017. (Id. at 66-67) Thus, Petitioner is held 

without bail only on the CR2017-113500 case.

10 Simpson and Simpson II refer to Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261, 85 P.3d 478 (App. 

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at 89) After the state filed a response, the court issued a ruling on December 1, 2017, 

denying the motion because the issue had “been raised and ruled upon several times during 

this case. See Minute Entries dated November 3, 2017 and October 5, 2017. This motion 

restates the same arguments previously presented.” (Id. at 89)

On November 14, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals arguing his pre-trial custody violated his rights under the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 25-29) The court of 

appeals declined jurisdiction over the special action in December 2017. (Id. at 38) In 

January 2018, Petitioner filed a special action in the Arizona Supreme Court challenging 

his pretrial detention. (Doc. 1 at 18-24) On May 29, 2018, the Arizona Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s petition for special action, which it treated as a petition for review. (Id.

at 5)

As is noted in Judge Tuchi’s Order dated May 31, 2019, after the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s special action, Petitioner filed two state petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus and a motion to modify release conditions addressing CR2017-113500, all 

of which the superior court denied. (Doc. 14 at 4) The superior court also denied 

Petitioner’s oral motions to modify release conditions made in March, June, and July 2018.

(Id. at 4-5)

B. Petitioner’s habeas claim

Petitioner asserts a single ground in the Petition, that his detention without bail in 

CR2017-113500 violates his Constitutional and due process rights because “Federal Law 

has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be 

admitted to bail.” (Doc. 1 at 1-2) He requests this Court to order his release from state 

custody. (Id. at 2)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Challenges to pretrial incarceration may be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

 

2004) and Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341, 387 P.3d 1270 (2017), respectively.

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2241(c)(3), which provides that “the writ of habeas corpus [extends to persons who are] . .

. in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .”

McNeeley v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 824 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Carden v. State of Montana,

626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980) (“district court had jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to 

issue [a] pretrial writ of habeas corpus”). The Ninth Circuit has explained that review 

under section 2241 petitions is not subject to AEDPA deference, holding that

[w]here a petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . 

. see Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2004), we do not

apply the stringent standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), . . . (codified as amended at, in relevant 

part, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), which allows for relief from a state court 

judgment only where a state court decision was “contrary to” or an 

“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. Id. at 888.

Hoyle v. Ada County, 501 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded “that the traditional pre-AEDPA standard of review applies—we review factual 

findings with a presumption of correctness and conclusions of law de novo. See Allen v. 

Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Stow, 389 F.3d at 888.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s detention without bond does not violate due process

The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno upheld a provision of 

the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III) allowing “a 

federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear 

and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will 

reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.’” U.S. v. Salerno, 

481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). The Supreme Court explained that in passing the Act, Congress 

“hoped to ‘give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give 

appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released.’” Id. at 742. 

The Court further noted that section 3142(e) of the Act provided that ‘“[i]f, after a hearing 

pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no condition or 

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combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 

and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the 

person prior to trial.’” Id.

The Court listed considerations Congress had identified as relevant to the judicial 

officer’s detention determination and which circumscribed the officer’s discretion. Id. at 

742-43. The factors included: (1) “the nature and seriousness of the charges”; (2) the 

“substantiality of the Government’s evidence against the arrestee”; (3) “the arrestee’s 

background and characteristics”; and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger posed 

by the suspect’s release.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). The Court also described 

procedural safeguards provided by section 3142(f) to arrestees, including the ability to 

request counsel at the detention hearing, to testify and present witnesses and proffer 

evidence, and to cross-examine other witnesses. Id. at 742. The Court further observed 

that “[i]f the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably 

assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in

writing, § 3142(i), and support his conclusion with ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ § 

3142(f).” Id.

The Salerno Court rejected arguments that the Act: (1) exceeded limitations on the 

federal government pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) 

contravened Eighth Amendment protections against excessive bail. Id. at 746. The 

Supreme Court concluded that “the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act 

is regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation of the 

Due Process Clause.” Id. at 748. The Supreme Court indicated that the Bail Reform Act

narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in which the Government 

interests are overwhelming. The Act operates only on individuals who have 

been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(f). Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more 

likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest. See

S.Rep. No. 98–225, at 6–7. Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt 

to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious crimes. The 

Government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the 

charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In 

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a full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral 

decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release 

can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(f). While the Government's general interest in preventing crime is 

compelling, even this interest is heightened when the Government musters 

convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a 

serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under 

these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its 

greatest.

Id. at 749-50. The Court discussed the “fundamental nature” of an “individual’s strong 

interest in liberty.” Despite this interest, the Court concluded that “[w]hen the Government 

proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and 

articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the 

Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.” Id. at 

751.

After addressing its precedent opinion in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951),

involving the Excessive Bail Clause and the determination that ‘“[b]ail set at a figure higher 

than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is 

“excessive” under Eighth Amendment[,]’” the Salerno Court declared that “[n]othing in 

the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to 

questions of flight.” Id. at 754. Instead, the Court instructed that “[t]he only arguable

substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of 

release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.” Id. The Court 

concluded that “when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling 

interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not 

require release on bail.” Id. at 754-55.

Respondents indicate that the superior court’s denial of bail for Petitioner was 

authorized under Article II, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution. (Doc. 22 at 8) Section

22 of the Arizona Constitution addresses generally bailable offenses. In relevant part, this 

section provides:

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Section 22. A. All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient 

sureties, except:

. . .

2. For felony offenses committed when the person charged is already 

admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where the proof is evident 

or the presumption great as to the present charge.

3. For felony offenses if the person charged poses a substantial danger to 

any other person or the community, if no conditions of release which may be 

imposed will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the 

community and if the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the 

present charge.

. . .

A.R.S. Const. Art. 2, § 22(A)(2)&(3). Arizona statutes further require:

Except as provided in subsection A of this section, a person who is in custody 

shall not be admitted to bail if the person is charged with a felony offense 

and the state certifies by motion and the court finds after a hearing on the 

matter that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person charged 

poses a substantial danger to another person or the community or engaged in 

conduct constituting a violent offense, that no condition or combination of 

conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety 

of the other person or the community and that the proof is evident or the 

presumption great that the person committed the offense for which the person 

is charged. For the purposes of this subsection, “violent offense” means 

either of the following: (1) A dangerous crime against children[;] (2) 

Terrorism.

A.R.S. § 13-3961(D).

Respondents assert that the superior court’s reliance on section 13-3961 was 

constitutional because the “circumstances are indistinguishable” from those at issue in 

Salerno, that is, “following a full, adversarial hearing, the superior court found clear and 

convincing evidence that [Petitioner’s] release would endanger the community in a way 

that no release conditions could ameliorate.” (Doc. 22 at 9) They further contend that 

Petitioner is unable to argue that Article II, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution and 

A.R.S. § 13-3961 are punitive or fail heightened scrutiny because these provisions “track 

the Bail Reform Act, upheld by Salerno, in every way that matters[,]” including the 

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safeguards of an adversarial hearing, the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, 

and consideration of the arrestee’s present offense. (Id. at 10)

Petitioner argues that Respondents improperly sought a no-bond pretrial detention 

and that: (1) he was not provided an adversarial evidentiary hearing on the question of 

whether he was a danger to the general public; (2) because he was bonded in CR2017-

002060 and CR2017-101172, his charges under CR2017-113500 do not warrant a nonbondable status; and (3) his drug possession charges are not among the enumerated charges 

subject to a determination of no-bond status under Arizona law. (Doc. 27 at 2) Petitioner 

asserts that his Simpson hearing was incomplete because the court “heard no testimony 

predicting [Petitioner’s] future dangerousness.” (Id. at 5) Petitioner additionally states that 

his hearing was “only about the new charges which are simple drug possession charges” 

and that he was not permitted to be heard and present evidence. (Id. at 6) He declares that 

he has never actually had a bomb and that his numerous past charges in Illinois were for 

“merely threatening to have a bomb, a charge which is typically seen as a misdemeanor in 

Arizona.” (Id.)

In Simpson v. Miller, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the procedure 

identified under A.R.S. § 13-3961(D) “is essentially the same as the one upheld in 

Salerno.” Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341, 349, 387 P.3d 1270, 1278 (2017). The 

Superior Court commissioner conducting Petitioner’s Simpson hearing concluded 

Petitioner “pose[d] a danger to the community or to another person.” (Doc. 22-1 at 65) 

Addressing Petitioner’s characteristics and criminal history, the court discussed 

Petitioner’s encounter with the security guard at the Light Rail Apartments who said 

Petitioner threatened to blow up the apartment building and buildings downtown, and then 

mentioned Petitioner’s history of “about 25 counts of making a false bomb threat of some 

sort.” (Id. at 63-64) The court also mentioned Petitioner’s marijuana possession conviction 

in 2014, domestic battery charges in Illinois in 2003 and 2004, a Schedule I or II drug case 

in 2003, and a 2001 charge of manufacturing a controlled substance. (Id. at 64)

Addressing Petitioner directly, the court said:

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[I]n this day and age it’s a lot different than many years ago to say I’m a 

member of ISIS and I’m going to bomb things and I’m going to blow things 

up. Those statement now carry different weight than at other times in our 

history, and I think they probably could subject you to some danger, but also 

certainly the rest of the community in terms of people’s reaction to that.

(Id. at 64-65) The court relied in part on this evidence to further explain that there was not 

“a condition or a combination of conditions that can be imposed that will reasonably assure 

the safety of the other person or the community . . . particularly [considering] those 

statements and in light of your prior misdemeanors . . . .” (Id. at 65) The court also 

determined the evidence supported the conclusion that Petitioner was on release for 

CR2017-101172 when he allegedly committed the acts underlying the charges under 

CR2017-113500. (Id. at 65-66) When Petitioner directly asked the court if there was some 

way “to lift the bond status” in CR2017-113500, the court replied, “No. So based on the 

[s]tate’s evidence, based on your past, based on your criminal history, based on some of 

the things that have happened in both your cases, and I do think you were pretty clearly on 

release.” (Doc. 22-1 at 67)

As noted, Petitioner argues his due process rights were violated because he did not 

receive an evidentiary hearing specifically about whether he posed a danger to society and 

why he should be deemed non-bondable “after a simple drug possession case, when he was 

bondable before.” (Doc. 27 at 6) He further contends that no testimony or actual evidence 

was given about his potential dangerousness and that therefore he was not provided an 

evidentiary hearing on this issue. (Id. at 8) The record, however, indicates that Petitioner

addressed questions bearing on dangerousness at the hearing.

In closing argument at the detention hearing, defense counsel urged the court to 

consider that Petitioner had been charged merely with personal possession charges which 

were not “a danger to the community.” (Doc. 22-1 at 55) Defense counsel further 

discussed other issues pertinent to a decision on whether Petitioner should be bondable, 

including whether he had a history of failing to appear, that he had family support, and his 

own willingness to be subject to an ankle monitor and pretrial services supervision. (Id.) 

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Immediately following, the prosecution asked the court to consider Petitioner’s threats to 

blow up buildings in Phoenix and his Illinois misdemeanor convictions for bomb threats 

or false alarm threats. (Id. at 56, 64) When the court announced its decision and asked for 

any other record, Petitioner’s counsel said she had nothing else. (Id. at 67)

The superior court’s minute entry and transcript documented that the court 

concluded there was clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of proof evident 

or presumption great that Petitioner had committed the acts underlying the charges in 

CR2017-113500, and that he had been on release in CR2017-101172 when he committed 

those acts. (Doc. 22-1 at 66, 81) In addition, the court expressly concluded Petitioner

posed a danger to the community or to another person and conditions could not be set to 

reasonably assure safety. (Id. at 65, 81-82)

The superior court provided Petitioner with the process constitutionally due as set 

forth in Salerno, including conducting an adversarial hearing, finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a substantial danger to another person or the 

community, and finding there was no condition or combination of conditions of release 

available that would reasonably ensure the safety of the person or the community. See 

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-52. The court also found Petitioner was on release on a prior 

felony charge when he committed the acts on which he was charged in CR2017-101172. 

(Doc. 22-1 at 65-66) Although Petitioner, through counsel, did not object during the June 

8, 2017, hearing that the court had not received witness testimony on Petitioner’s 

dangerousness, he contends here that the hearing was not completely adversarial and that 

no evidence or testimony was provided on the issue of dangerousness. However, at a 

detention hearing conducted pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, the government and 

defendant may both proceed “by proffer or hearsay.” United States v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 

755, 756 (9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner further argues that four of the five enumerated crimes 

for which bail could be denied pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-3961(A) 

have been determined to be bondable. This argument has no application to Petitioner, 

because none of these four crimes was charged in his case.

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Petitioner also appears to argue that because he had been bonded on other charges, 

the court should not have found him to be not bondable on charges of simple drug 

possession, and that the court was impermissibly “punishing” him by denying him bail. 

(Doc. 27 at 6) In Salerno, the Bail Reform Act was deemed by the Supreme Court to not 

constitute punishment before trial but rather was a regulatory “potential solution to a 

societal problem” in preventing crime by arrestees. 481 U.S. at 748-50. Similarly, the 

Arizona Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes section 

13-3961(D), which the superior court found applicable to Petitioner, were constitutional 

assuming future dangerousness is proven as to the specific defendant. Simpson, 241 Ariz. 

at 349-50, 387 P.3d at 1278-79.

Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the constitutionality 

of Article 2, Section 22(A)(2) (the “on-release” provision) of the Arizona Constitution

which, as noted above, precludes bail “[f]or felony offenses committed when the person 

charged is already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where the proof is 

evident or the presumption great as to the present charge.” Morreno v. Brickner, 243 Ariz. 

543, 545, 416 P.3d 807, 809 (2018). The state supreme court held that this provision on 

its face satisfied heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. Id. The Morreno court declared that the state’s ‘“interest in preventing crime by 

arrestees is both legitimate and compelling’” and concluded that Article 2, Section 

22(A)(2) “implicates that interest.” Id. at 550, 416 P.3d at 814 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. 

at 749). The Arizona Supreme Court found that the on-release provision was narrowly 

focused to “ensure that the provision’s reach does not extend beyond the government’s 

legitimate and compelling interest in preventing arrestees from committing additional 

felonies while on release from prior felony charges.” Id. at 551, 416 P.3d at 807.

After de novo review, the undersigned concludes that the evidentiary hearing 

conducted by the superior court on June 8, 2017, comported with due process protections 

identified in Salerno.

. . .

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IV. CONCLUSION

As is discussed above, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner received a 

constitutionally adequate evidentiary hearing supporting the withholding of bail and 

defendant’s commensurate detention pending trial on his charges in CR2017-113500. 

Undersigned finds that the Petition lacks merit and should be denied. Further, undersigned

finds that a Certificate of Appealability should be denied because Petitioner has not “made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and 

jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims 

“debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Derrick Julius Van’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) construed as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 14) be 

denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment 

of Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

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determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 6th day of September, 2019.

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