Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00023/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00023-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MAHMOOD YOONESSI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LETITIA JAMES, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-0023-TLN-SCR 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

Plaintiff Mahmood Yoonessi is proceeding pro se in this action, which was referred to the 

undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 

before the undersigned are Defendants’ four motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 37, 43, 45, and 56), 

Plaintiff’s three discovery related motions (ECF Nos. 54, 61, and 62), Plaintiff’s two motions for 

default judgment (ECF Nos. 37 and 47), and Plaintiff’s three motions to vacate judgments entered 

by other courts (ECF Nos. 66, 67, and 68). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s discovery 

motions are denied, and the Court will recommend that: 1) Plaintiff’s motions for default 

judgment be denied; 2) Plaintiff’s motions to vacate judgment be denied; and 3) Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss be granted and the action dismissed. 

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Background and Procedural History 

 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on January 6, 2023, by filing a 

complaint and paying the applicable filing fee. ECF No. 1. The complaint and attachments were 

over 350 pages. ECF No. 1. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, and on January 17, 2024, 

Magistrate Judge Barnes granted the motions to dismiss, but allowed Plaintiff to file an amended 

complaint. The First Amended Complaint was filed on February 15, 2024. ECF No. 34. 

 The FAC appears to be an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the First, 

Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 34 at 4. The FAC is on a 

seven-page form complaint with scant factual allegations. Plaintiff alleges he was punished “for 

non use of Taxol and Carboplatin at the time they were not approved.” Id. at 5. When asked to 

describe “where” the events giving rise to his claim occurred, Plaintiff writes: “President Steve 

Sample was a Very Powerful, Well connected nationally and Internationally Known ...”. Id. 

He claims Defendants “took over” his medical office in 2001, but that Defendants’ actions 

continue to the present. Id. Plaintiff claims he lost his tenured professorship, medical license, 

and seeks two billion dollars in damages, plus punitive damages. Id. at 6. 

 Plaintiff has been engaged in litigation concerning his medical license for over twenty 

years and across multiple state and federal forums. As set forth by the California Court of Appeal 

in Yoonessi v. Brown, 2010 WL 2636495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), Yoonessi’s license to practice 

medicine in the State of New York was revoked in 2002. In 2003, the Medical Board of 

California revoked his license and in 2008 denied a request to reinstate his license. Id. at 1. In 

2010, the California Court of Appeal stated: “Since 2002, Yoonessi has instituted numerous court 

proceedings stemming from the revocation of his medical license.” Id. 

 Plaintiff was at one point also licensed to practice in the state of Ohio and brought 

litigation in Ohio seeking to have his license restored. The Court of Appeals of Ohio summarized 

the history of Plaintiff’s licensure and litigation this way: 

Yoonessi is originally from Iran and he completed his first obstetric/gynocological 

residency there in 1966. He was licensed to practice medicine in Ohio in 1972, but his 

Ohio license expired in 1974 after he moved to New York. His Ohio license lapsed in 

1976, and he has not practiced in Ohio nor held a medical license in Ohio at any point 

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thereafter. Yoonessi worked as an associate obstetric/gynocological professor at the State 

University of New York—Buffalo, as well as in private practice for many years, but that 

relationship ended in 2002 amid a dispute about whether he was required to comply with a 

work rule regarding employment at certain area hospitals. Around that same time, 

Yoonessi began to be investigated by the New York Medical Board (“NYMB”) for 

negligence and other issues relating to patient care from 1989 through 2000. After a 10-

day hearing, the NYMB issued a 32-page order on June 5, 2002 revoking Yoonessi’s New 

York license. That decision was allowed to remain in place by the New York Supreme 

Court in December 2003. The California Medical Board also revoked Yoonessi’s license 

that same year. Yoonessi applied to have his New York license reinstated in 2005 with 

limited success; but ultimately, in 2013, the New York Board of Regents denied 

restoration of Yoonessi’s New York license at a hearing for which he asserts he did not 

receive notice and did not have the ability to appear. 

Yoonessi v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2024 WL 196096, *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024). 

Plaintiff has also litigated matters concerning his medical license before at least two 

federal appellate courts. See for example Yoonessi v. Medical Bd. of California, 195 F. App’x 

628 (9th Cir. 2006); Yoonessi v. New York State Bd., 162 F. App’x 63 (2nd Cir. 2006). The 

Second Circuit cautioned Yoonessi in 2006: “Finally, based on our consideration of the record in 

this proceeding and in other suits that Yoonessi has filed related to the same factual circumstances 

at issue here, we take this occasion to serve notice on Yoonessi that additional appellate litigation 

relating to these circumstances may subject him to a requirement that he obtain leave before filing 

appeals, to monetary sanctions, or to other sanctions.” 162 F. App’x at 66 (internal citations 

omitted). Yoonessi was found to be a vexatious litigant by a California state court. See Yoonessi 

v. Brown, 2010 WL 2636495, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“Finally, we note that to the extent 

Yoonessi complains that he should not have been designated a vexatious litigant by the trial court 

on September 14, 2009, that order is not properly the subject of the instant appeal.”). 

 Plaintiff in this lawsuit has sued the Attorney General of New York, attorneys in 

California and Ohio, the Medical Board of California, and a bank. The Court will now address 

the numerous pending motions. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Plaintiff’s Motions for Default Judgment 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 32) on January 22, 2024. At that 

time, there was not even an operative complaint, as the complaint had been dismissed on January 

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17, 2024. The Defendants were not in default, as they had filed motions to dismiss the original 

complaint. Further there had been no clerk’s entry of default. See Bay Area Painters and Tapers 

Pension Trust Fund v. Ventura Finishing Systems, No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB), 2016 WL 

2343019, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (“First, the clerk never entered default, which–under 

the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55—is a prerequisite for a default judgment 

under Rule 55(b)(2). Second, [Defendant] is defending itself in the action and the disputes can be 

resolved on the merits.”). Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s first motion for default 

judgment (ECF No. 32) be denied. 

Plaintiff filed the FAC on February 15, 2024, and again moved for entry of default 

judgment on March 18, 2024. ECF No. 47. Plaintiff’s Motion does not establish the right to 

entry of a judgment by default. Again, Plaintiff has not obtained an entry of default by the Clerk 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). The record does not reflect that Defendants 

are in default, and they have filed motions to dismiss the FAC. Even if some Defendants were 

untimely in filing a responsive pleading, the decision to grant or deny an application for default 

judgment lies within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 

(9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the court will consider the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of 

plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 

disfavored. Id. at 1472. 

 The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motions for Default Judgment (ECF Nos. 32 and 

47) be DENIED. 

II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

A. JPMorgan Chase Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 43) 

Defendants JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”) and Lynnette Antosh have filed a motion to 

dismiss on a variety of grounds including lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of service, and failure 

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to state a claim. ECF No. 43 at 2. Defendants argue the FAC is “unintelligible on its face . . . 

appears to be focused upon the loss of Plaintiff’s medical license,” and makes no specific 

allegations about the conduct of Chase or Antosh. ECF No. 43-1 at 61. 

The FAC fails to state a claim. The only references to Chase or Antosh in the FAC are 

that Antosh’s address is at Chase Bank in Columbus, Ohio and the statement: “Been denied 

Mortgage Loans based on Fraudule [sic] claims of defendant L.Antosch [sic]”. ECF No. 34 at 4, 

7. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim of fraud, such claims must be pled with 

particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiff’s one-sentence bare conclusory statement fails to 

state a claim. 

Additionally, Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition to this motion, and Defendants filed 

a notice of non-opposition on March 22, 2004. ECF No. 48. Failure to submit an opposition may 

be deemed consent to the entry of an adverse order. See Local Rule 230(c) (“A failure to file a 

timely opposition may also be construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.”); 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules 

is a proper ground for dismissal.”). Plaintiff filed a belated opposition on April 1, 2024. ECF No. 

50. 

Plaintiff’s opposition does not address the defects with his FAC. Instead, he argues that 

he will present evidence at trial, discusses the other Defendants and non-parties, and concludes by 

stating that he has submitted substantial evidence to the board about his medical knowledge. ECF 

No. 50 at 2-6. He contends that the “fabrications” of Defendants Chase and Antosh present 

questions of fact to be decided by the jury (ECF No. 50 at 6-7), but the FAC does not assert any 

specific facts as to the substance of the alleged fabrications. Federal pleading standards require 

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint that offers “labels and conclusions or a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual 

1

 The page references herein, including this one, are to the page number designated by the 

Court’s CM/ECF header. 

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enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). The FAC 

here does not even include a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and is 

devoid of factual allegations. The Court recommends the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 43) be 

GRANTED. 

B. Kyle Wilcox Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) 

Defendant Kyle Wilcox moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing there are no allegations in the FAC concerning him, 

and that he is only mentioned on page 3. Wilcox additionally argues that the Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over him because he is an Ohio citizen without sufficient minimum contacts with 

California. ECF No. 37 at 7-8. Wilcox additionally argues that as an Assistant Attorney General 

of Ohio he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity, and that the Rooker Feldman doctrine should 

preclude this court from reviewing the Ohio state court’s action in revoking Plaintiff’s medical 

license. Id. at 8-10. 

 Wilcox’s motion to dismiss was filed on February 29, 2024, and was taken under 

submission on April 29, 2024. ECF No. 53. Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition to the 

motion. On May 22, 2024, an opposition brief is docketed as directed to all the pending motions 

to dismiss, but it is difficult to follow and does not clearly respond to Defendants’ arguments. 

ECF No. 57. Plaintiff’s failure to timely oppose the motion may be taken as non-opposition to 

the motion. See Local Rule 230(c) (“A failure to file a timely opposition may also be construed 

by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.”). 

 The Court finds that the FAC clearly fails to state a claim against Defendant Wilcox. 

Wilcox is mentioned in the caption and listed as a Defendant on page 3 of the FAC, but there are 

no factual allegations against him. The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 

37) be GRANTED and the claims against Defendant Wilcox be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim. 

C. Letitia James Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 45) 

Defendants Letitia James, State University of New York at Buffalo, and Merryl Tisch 

move to dismiss based on: 1) lack of personal jurisdiction; 2) the FAC violating Rule 8, and 3) the 

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FAC failing to state a claim. ECF No. 45 at 3-4. Defendants argue they do not have continuous 

and systematic contacts with the forum state. Id. at 4. Further, Defendants argue that specific 

personal jurisdiction in California is lacking because there are no allegations in the FAC that 

Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of California law. Id. at 5-6. 

Defendants also argue that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 8 because the FAC 

contains no factual allegations against them, and for the same reasons the FAC fails to state a 

claim. Id. at 7-8. Additionally, Attorney General James argues she is immune from suit for 

litigation related activities. Id. at 8. She contends that the allegations against her stem from her 

defending SUNY Buffalo in a 2022 state court action. Id. Defendant SUNY Buffalo argues it 

has sovereign immunity. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has the burden of pleading facts sufficient to establish a 

basis for jurisdiction. ECF No. 45 at 4. When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack 

of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is 

appropriate. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Id. In such cases, the 

Court inquires only into whether the plaintiff’s “pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie 

showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 

128 (9th Cir.1995). Plaintiff’s FAC does not demonstrate a basis for personal jurisdiction over 

these New York state defendants as it pleads no facts about them. Plaintiff also did not offer 

affidavits in opposition to the motion that establish jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff again failed to timely oppose this motion. The motion was filed on March 1, 

2024, and taken under submission on April 29, 2024. ECF No. 53. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition brief on May 22, 2024, which briefly mentioned these three Defendants and did not 

specifically respond to the arguments raised. Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing 

of personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. Additionally, the FAC fails to plead sufficient 

facts to state a claim against these Defendants. As explained above, the pleading standards 

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require “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 555 

U.S. at 678. 

In summary, three independent grounds support dismissal: 1) lack of personal jurisdiction; 

2) failure to state a claim; and 3) failure to timely respond. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”). 

The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 45) be GRANTED and the claims 

against these Defendants be dismissed. 

D. Medical Board of California Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 56) 

Defendants Medical Board of California and William Prasifka move to dismiss on several 

grounds: 1) failure to effect service; 2) res judicata; 3) qualified or absolute immunity; and 4) 

failure to state a claim. ECF 56 at 1-2. Defendants argue they were never timely served and the 

claims against them should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 

Defendants argue the FAC should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim because there are 

no factual allegations against either Prasifka or Medical Board of California. 

 Failure to state a claim is the most straightforward basis for dismissal. Although the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the 

defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each 

claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it 

tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancements.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S.662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at 

least some degree of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the 

plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

There are no specific allegations in the FAC against Prasifka or the California Medical 

Board. ECF No. 34. Plaintiff complains of the loss of his California medical license, but there 

are not allegations as to what the Board did, or when, or how the Board’s actions violated 

Plaintiff’s rights. And, as set forth supra, Plaintiff has been litigating issues concerning the loss 

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of his medical license for approximately 20 years. See for example Yoonessi v. Medical Bd. of 

California, 195 F. App’x 628 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of Yoonessi’s civil rights 

claims against the medical board and agreeing with the district court’s conclusions “that it lacked 

personal jurisdiction over many of the defendants, and that Yoonessi failed to state a claim with 

respect to others.”). It is exceedingly likely that Yoonessi’s claims against the Medical Board are 

precluded by the judgments in prior actions, but the most straightforward basis for dismissal, 

given the dearth of factual allegations in the FAC, is failure to state a claim. The Court 

recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 56) be GRANTED and the claims against 

these Defendants be dismissed. 

III. Plaintiff’s Discovery Motions (ECF Nos. 54, 61, & 62) 

 On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel (ECF No. 54) and attempted to set it 

for hearing on May 2, 2024, in violation of the requirements of Local Rule 251. The motion, with 

attachments, is 81 pages long and does not seek clear relief. Judge Barnes issued an order that the 

motion was “defective as filed,” and directed Plaintiff to notice the motion in accord with the 

Local Rules. ECF No. 55. The motion was never reset for hearing. The motion (ECF No. 54) is 

DENIED. 

 On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion, Subpoenas to compel full disclosure” (ECF 

No. 61) and attempted to set it for hearing on June 21, 2024. This was again in violation of Local 

Rule 251(a) concerning notice of hearing for discovery motions. Plaintiff was again informed the 

motion was defective as filed and told to re-notice the motion in accordance with the Local Rules. 

ECF No. 63. Plaintiff did not re-notice the motion. The motion consists of a caption page 

followed by 108 pages of various attachments. There is no legal memorandum portion of the 

motion, or clear relief requested. It is a mishmash of legal documents from this and other 

litigation, including what purports to be a “Stipulation of Settlement” between Plaintiff and the 

State of New York in which SUNY-Buffalo School of Medicine agree to pay Plaintiff $75,000. 

ECF No. 61 at 18-20. That agreement was purportedly executed in 1996. Id. at 21. Plaintiff 

includes other documents that are marked as “attorney/client privilege work product” Id. at 59. 

Plaintiff includes documents concerning the revocation of his medical license by the State of New 

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York in 2002, and denial of reinstatement in 2013. Id. at 88. Plaintiff also attaches documents 

pertaining to state court proceedings in Ohio. Id. at 93-102. The motion makes no cogent 

argument concerning discovery in this case, and contains no clear request for relief. The motion 

(ECF No. 61) is DENIED. 

 Also on June 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed another discovery motion (ECF No. 62). Again, a 

minute order was issued that the motion was “defective as filed,” and not properly noticed for 

hearing. ECF No. 63. The motion states that Defendants have “produced no evidence” and they 

“ignored subpoenas submitted in 2002/2003”. ECF No. 62 at 3. The motion also contains 

allegations of cybercrime on May 4, 2024, against Chase Bank. Id. at 10. This allegation is not 

part of the FAC, as the FAC was filed in February 2024. The concluding paragraph of the motion 

does not seek relief pertaining to discovery, but instead asks for compensatory and punitive 

damages. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 62) once again does not seek clear relief and 

is DENIED. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motions to Vacate (ECF Nos. 66, 67, & 68) 

On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Vacate Ny July 24 Judgment” (ECF 

No. 66) which consists of 236 pages of exhibits. The motion does not contain a legal 

memorandum or section in which Plaintiff advances legal arguments, it is rather just a filing of 

various exhibits from his many years of litigation. There is no clear relief requested. The final 

page of the ‘motion’ is one page of the syllabus from the Presidential immunity ruling by the 

Supreme Court in Trump v. United States. ECF No. 66 at 236. If Plaintiff’s motion is intended to 

request this Court to vacate a New York state court judgment, he presents no authority for doing 

so. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower 

federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”) (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). The Court recommends the motion (ECF No. 66) be DENIED. 

 On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent J of Riverside Aug 

2024” (ECF No. 67). It appears that Plaintiff seeks to set aside a $1.6 million judgment against 

My Montecito Inc. ECF No. 67 at 4. This motion is 197-pages long and again consists primarily 

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of exhibits. However, this motion also contains a Statement of Facts (ECF No. 67 at 178-194) 

and what may be intended as legal argument in support (ECF No. 67 at 2-16). However, it is not 

clear that the opening portion is legal argument for this case, as opposed to excerpts from other 

matters/litigation. The concluding paragraph states: “It is respectfully submitted that there is 

substantial evidence before the board to conclude that petitioner has remained updated and has 

improved/advanced his knowledge of medicine, in general, and gynecologic oncology, in 

particular.” ECF No. 67 at 16. This argument appears directed at a medical board, not the Court. 

Similarly, the Statement of Facts complains of the decision of the medical boards of California, 

New York, and Ohio. Id. at 179. The Court recommends the motion (ECF No. 67) be DENIED. 

 Plaintiff’s third motion to vacate is entitled “Motion to Vaate [sic] Fraudulent J of NY 

July 2024” (ECF No. 68). In support of this motion Plaintiff alleges facts concerning a real estate 

transaction that occurred in July 2014. ECF No. 68 at 7. Plaintiff does not attach a copy of the 

July 2024 Judgment that he seeks to vacate. The legal argument portion of his brief is convoluted 

and conclusory. He sets forth no authority for this Court vacating a New York state court 

judgment. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 460, supra; see also Demos v. U.S. Dist. Court For Eastern 

Dist. of Washington, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (“to the extent that [plaintiff] 

attempts to obtain a writ in this court to compel a state court to take or refrain from some action, 

the petitions are frivolous as a matter of law”). It is also unclear how this real estate transaction is 

related to the claims concerning medical licensing. The Court recommends the motion (ECF No. 

68) be DENIED. 

V. Leave to Amend

 The undersigned has carefully considered whether Plaintiff could amend the complaint to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Valid reasons for denying leave to amend 

include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. 

Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n 

v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to 

amend shall be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). 

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 Plaintiff was previously granted leave to amend and Judge Barnes’ order advised Plaintiff 

of the deficiencies with his Complaint. ECF No. 31. Despite Judge Barnes’ order granting leave 

to file an amended complaint that “cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Plaintiff has filed a FAC that is almost entirely devoid of any 

factual allegations. Plaintiff has amassed significant litigation experience over the last two 

decades, and is well aware of the pleading requirements. See Yoonessi v. Khansari, 2016 WL 

4728114 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, like his Complaint, is rambling 

and nonsensical. It does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 which requires a 

‘short and plain’ factual statement of what each defendant allegedly did wrong and the legal 

theories asserted against each.”). The Court finds that allowing further leave to amend would be 

futile. 

CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 54) is denied; 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 61) is denied; and 

 3. Plaintiff’s motion for discovery (ECF No. 62) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT: 

4. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 37, 43, 45 and 56) be GRANTED and the 

action dismissed without further leave to amend. 

5. Plaintiff’s Motions for Default Judgment (ECF Nos. 32 and 47) be DENIED. 

6. Plaintiff’s Motions to Vacate (ECF Nos. 66, 67, and 68) be DENIED. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 13, 2025 

 

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