Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02552/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The Court had previously ordered additional briefing addressing the merits of

Petitioner’s claims. After further review, and consideration of the Honorable Neil V. Wake’s

November 13, 2012 Order, the Court finds such briefing unnecessary.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan H. Morgal,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et. al,

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-11-2552-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Allan K. Morgal (Petitioner) has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents contend that the Petition should be

dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),

which provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas

corpus relief. (Doc. 10.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that the State court applied a

procedural bar to dismiss Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding and therefore federal

habeas review is also precluded. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner opposes Respondents’ assertions and

argues that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims. (Docs. 13 and 15.) For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Petition timely under the AEDPA, but that Petitioner

is not entitled to relief because his claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus

review or lack merit.1

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2

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” are to exhibits to Respondents’ Limited Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10), which appear at docket 10-1. 

3 Although Elliot Koidin is referred to by name in parts of the record, the appellate court

refers to him as “E.K.” (Respondents’ Ex. B, doc. 10-1 at 10). For consistency, the Court will

refer to him as E.K.

4

 The evidence presented during trial is summarized from the Arizona Court of Appeals’

memorandum decision. (Respondents’ Ex. B, doc. 10-1 at 10); see also State v. Morgal, 2008

WL 3864070 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2008). The state court’s factual determinations are

“presumed to be correct” and Petitioner has not “rebut[ted] the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing

In 2005, Petitioner was indicted in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County, on one

count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, two counts of theft, and one count of money

laundering. (Respondents’ Ex. B, Doc. 10-1 at 12.2

) The evidence presented at the 2006 jury

trial established that Petitioner and Elliot Koidin (E.K.3

) met in 1999 when they were neighbors

in Scottsdale, Arizona.4

 Petitioner told E.K. that he sold furniture to outlets in Phoenix and they

discussed the possibility of a joint business venture in which Petitioner would manage the

business and E.K. would supply the capital. Morgal, 2008 WL 3864070, at *1. On December

12, 2003, Petitioner’s company, AKM Specialties, LLC, entered into an independent contractor

agreement with E.K.’s company, The Import/Export Source, LLC. Under this agreement,

Petitioner’s company would purchase pottery from suppliers in Mexico, specifically Jose

(“Pepe”) Perez and Jorge Arthur, and then sell it to grocery stores in Arizona. Id.

Pursuant to the agreement, E.K. was initially to provide $72,500 in start-up funds to

suppliers Perez and Arthur, with the agreement that the parties would split net profits from the

business on a percentage basis. E.K. expected a full return on his investment, plus a 20%

profit. Id. On December 23, 2003, E.K. sent Perez and Arthur the start-up funds. Id. at *2. In

January 2004, although there was only one order from an Arizona grocery store, Petitioner told

E.K. that he expected more orders, but needed more money to send the suppliers. Id. 

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E.K., however, became concerned when Petitioner offered dubious explanations for the

lack of purchase orders. E.K. contacted his son, who owned a business distributing goods to

retailers, and E.K.’s son arranged for one of his clients, retail chain Tuesday Morning, to

purchase a large amount of the Mexican pottery. Id. “The business entities of E.K., his son, and

[Petitioner] verbally agreed under new terms to sell the merchandise to Tuesday Morning.” Id.

at *1. After E.K. and Petitioner met with suppliers in Mexico about this order, E.K. transferred

additional funds to supplier Arthur, who was to send twenty-two or twenty-three trailers of

merchandise to Tuesday Morning in August 2004. Id. Between December 2003 and August

2004, E.K. made $337,500 in payments to the suppliers, sending $47,500 to Perez and $290,000

to Arthur. Id. Because Arthur only shipped thirteen trailers to Tuesday Morning by the ship

dates and some of the merchandise was damaged, Tuesday Morning cancelled the remainder

of the order. “E.K. received $154,500 from the Tuesday Morning order and $12,504 from one

[grocery store] order.” Id. 

Beginning in December 2003, Petitioner told supplier Perez he was having legal trouble

and directed Perez to transfer some of E.K.’s funds to Petitioner by depositing money directly

into designated bank accounts in the United States. Perez sent over $22,000 of the $47,500 he

had received from E.K. to Petitioner. Id. at *2. Because Perez was returning money to

Petitioner, he did not believe the order was serious, stopped production, and terminated the

relationship in April 2004. Perez only shipped two truckloads of merchandise worth about

$21,000 to Petitioner’s company. Id. 

Petitioner also directed supplier Arthur to transfer some of E.K.’s funds into bank

accounts belonging to Petitioner’s company, AKM Specialties, Petitioner’s then girlfriend, and

several attorneys. Id. Arthur sent approximately $144,900 of the $290,000 he had received

from E.K. to Petitioner. Arthur also concluded that the order was not serious, slowed

production, and could not fill the Tuesday Morning order by the August 2004 deadline. Id.

Petitioner’s former girlfriend testified that he transferred money to her to hide it from his

ex-wife and avoid child support obligations and so he could use the money for his “lavish”

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lifestyle. Id. According to Petitioner’s attorneys, Petitioner transferred money to them to pay

fees for non-business purposes. Id. 

In August 2004, E.K. went to Mexico and met privately with suppliers Perez and Arthur.

After reviewing documents and communications between Perez and Petitioner, and between

Arthur and Petitioner, E.K. discovered that Perez and Arthur had transferred his funds to

Petitioner without his knowledge and consent. Id. at *2. Petitioner saw E.K., Perez, and Arthur

together in Mexico and “there was a bitter confrontation between E.K. and [Petitioner].” Id.

Later, Petitioner filed a lawsuit against E.K., alleging breach of the independent contractor

agreement. After E.K. changed the locks on the warehouse that allegedly contained

merchandise belonging to Petitioner and E.K., Petitioner also sued the landlord of the

warehouse and obtained some of the merchandise in the warehouse, which E.K. claimed

belonged to him. Id. 

E.K. contacted the Arizona Attorney General’s Office and met with Agent Walsh. Agent

Walsh investigated the case, subpoenaed documents, and verified the transfers of funds between

the parties. He interviewed Petitioner, who claimed that the total amount of money he received

from Perez and Arthur, $120,000, was his portion of the profits from the business. Id. at *3. 

After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged and found the amount of theft

to be $25,000 or more as to each charge. (Respondents’ Ex. A, doc. 10-1 at 2-7.) The jury

subsequently found three aggravating factors for sentencing. (Id.) At the sentencing hearing,

the trial court found that Petitioner had two or more prior felony convictions. (Respondents’

Ex. B, doc. 10-1 at 12.) After considering aggravating factors, including Petitioner’s lengthy

criminal history and financial harm to the victim, and finding no mitigating factors, the court

imposed an aggravated sentence of twenty-two years’ imprisonment for the fraudulent schemes

and artifices conviction, presumptive terms of fifteen-and-three-fourth years’ imprisonment on

each of the theft convictions, and ten-and-one-half years’ imprisonment for the money

laundering conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. (Respondents’

Ex. D, doc. 10-1 at 26-27.) 

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B. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely direct appeal raising two claims. First,

Petitioner argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting inadmissable hearsay

from E.K. during direct examination and by vouching for a witness during closing argument.

Second, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on

the prosecutor’s misconduct. (Respondents’ Ex. C, doc. 10-1 at 16; Ex. D, doc. 10-1 at 19-40.)

On April 3, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims finding that the

prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during direct examination or closing argument and that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. (Respondents’

Ex. B, doc. 10-1 at 10.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. 

C. Post-Conviction Review

While Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, he commenced two separate postconviction proceedings pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which the trial court

dismissed without prejudice to refiling after the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal.

(Respondents’ Exs. E-G, H-J.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence on April 3, 2008. (Respondents’ Ex. B; Morgal, 2008 WL 3864070.) 

On May 16, 2008, after the conclusion of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a third notice

of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32. (Respondents’ Ex. K, doc. 10-1 at 71.) The court

appointed counsel, who filed a notice stating that she had found no claims to raise in a Rule 32

proceeding and requesting additional time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Respondents’

Ex. L, doc. 10-1 at 76.) On December 19, 2008, the trial court granted the extension and

ordered Petitioner to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief within forty-five days of the

court’s order, or by February 3, 2009. (Respondents’ Ex. M.) 

After that deadline had expired, on April 2, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition raising the

following claims: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately

review the State’s disclosures and interview witnesses; (2) the prosecutor failed to disclose

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exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812 (1962); (3) the State

violated Petitioner’s right to due process by failing to hold a restitution hearing; (4) the trial

court erred in failing to hold a hearing pursuant to State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2001); and (5) the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due process by failing to provide him

with trial transcripts. (Respondents’ Ex. N, doc. 10-1 at 83-101; doc. 13, ex. L.) 

On August 28, 2009, the trial court dismissed the petition stating that: “[t]he Court has

received and reviewed the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, each and every claim do not

present a colorable claim. Further, they are precluded as untimely.” (Respondents’ Ex. O, doc.

10-1 at 103-04.) The court “summarily dismiss[ed]” the petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32.6(c). (Id.)

On September 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals and argued that: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to “review

Brady materials [and] witness statements;” (2) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence;

(3) “there was no Donald hearing”; (4) “there was no restitution hearing”; and (5) the State

failed to disclose exculpatory materials in violation of Brady. (Respondents’ Ex. P; doc. 10-1

at 105-113.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review on November 23, 2010.

(Respondents’ Ex. Q.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on August 8, 2011.

(Respondents’ Ex. R.) 

On May 6, 2010, Petitioner filed a fourth notice of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’

Ex. S.) Petitioner argued that the court should permit the “untimely notice based on newly

discovered material facts.” (Respondents’ Ex. T, doc. 10-1 at 126.) On June 23, 2010, the court

rejected Petitioner’s argument, found that he “fail[ed] to state a claim for relief which can be

granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding,” and dismissed the notice as untimely pursuant to

Rule 32.4(a). (Id.)

II. Statute of Limitations

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides a one-year

statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal

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5

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct

review on April 3, 2008. Petitioner had thirty days, or until May 4, 2008, to file a petition for

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not do so;

therefore, his convictions became final on May 4, 2008. 

6 Petitioner’s first and second notices of post-conviction relief were filed and dismissed

without prejudice before the limitations period commenced. (Respondents’ Exs. E-G, H-J.)

Petitioner’s fourth notice of post-conviction relief was dismissed as untimely under Rule 32.4(a)

and therefore was not “properly filed.” (Respondents’ Ex. T.); see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

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court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period generally commences on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents contend that Petitioner’s

pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely because it was not filed within one year

of the date on which his challenged convictions “became final by the conclusion of direct

review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and he has not established a basis for tolling the limitations

period. As set forth below, the Court disagrees and finds the habeas Petition timely. 

Here, Petitioner’s convictions became final on May 4, 2008 and the limitations period

commenced the next day.5 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d

1069, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (direct appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further

appellate review); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). Petitioner,

therefore, had until May 4, 2009 to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner did not file his habeas Petition until December 23, 2011 and,

therefore, it is untimely unless statutory or equitable tolling applies.

A. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, statutory

tolling applies only if Petitioner’s third application for post-conviction relief was “properly

filed.”6

 In their Limited Answer, Respondents rely upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pace

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U.S. 408, 413 (2005). Therefore, only the timeliness of Petitioner’s third notice of postconviction relief is at issue with respect to tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations.

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v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005), and Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3 (2007), to argue that

because Petitioner did not file a timely petition for post conviction relief, his application for

post conviction relief was not “properly filed” and thus did not toll the statute of limitations of

§ 2244(d)(2). (Doc. 10 at 11.) As Respondents assert, these cases establish that a state postconviction proceeding that is untimely is not “properly filed” under § 2244(d)(2) and does not

toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413; Siebert, 552 U.S. at 6. This

is because “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions because they ‘go to the very

initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition.’” Siebert, 552 U.S. at 6

(emphasis in original) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 417).

Furthermore, the phrase “time limits” refers to the time limit for initiating a postconviction proceeding. See Siebert, 552 U.S. at 6; Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. As the Supreme

Court explained, “an application is properly filed when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings” including “time limits upon

its delivery.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). In their arguments relying upon these

cases, Respondents use the terms “petition,” “application” and “proceeding” interchangeably

and without acknowledging the different state statutes and rules that are discussed in the various

cases and which establish differing procedures for commencing a post-conviction proceeding.

In Pace, the Court addressed statutory tolling under the Pennsylvania post-conviction

statute and procedural rule, and in Siebert, the Court addressed statutory tolling under the

Alabama procedural rule. In Pennsylvania, post-conviction proceedings “‘shall be initiated by

filing’ a verified petition.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 415 (quoting Pa. R. Crim. P. 901) (emphasis

added). The Alabama rule requires the filing of a “petition” within a specified time period to

commence a post-conviction relief proceeding. Siebert, 552 U.S. at 4, n.1 (quoting Ala. R.

Crim. Proc. 32.2(c)) (emphasis added). As set forth below, the procedures for filing a postconviction relief proceeding in Arizona differ significantly from the procedures in Pennsylvania

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and Alabama. Respondents apparently fail to recognize this distinction. Thus, Respondents

mistakenly rely upon Pace and Siebert to argue that because his petition for post-conviction

relief was untimely, Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceeding was not “properly filed” and

did not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

B. Arizona Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

In Arizona, in contrast to both the Pennsylvania and Alabama procedures discussed in

Pace and Siebert, “before filing a petition for relief, a petitioner must first file a ‘Notice of PostConviction Relief’ so that the state guaranteed right to counsel can be enforced.” Isley v.

Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)).

Therefore, in Arizona a post-conviction relief proceeding requires two filings: a notice and a

petition. Under the Arizona post-conviction relief statute and corresponding procedural rule a

“proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court in

which the conviction occurred.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4234(A)

(a post-conviction relief “proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post conviction

relief with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred.”). Thus, the time limit for

filing a notice of post-conviction relief under Rule 32.4(a) “places a limit on how long [an

Arizona] prisoner can wait” before commencing a post-conviction action. See Siebert, 552 U.S.

at 6.

 Arizona prisoners who have filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief, and thereby

initiated a post-conviction action, must also comply with a subsequent deadline for filing a

supporting petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c). The deadline for filing the petition, however,

is not established until after (1) petitioner files a timely notice, (2) the court determines whether

to appoint counsel, (3) counsel reviews the record to identify colorable claims, and (4) if no

such claims exist, notifies the court, which then grants a 45-day extension for petitioner to file

a pro se petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c)(2). In other words, the deadline for filing the

petition is not established until after the post-conviction proceeding has commenced and is

pending for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). 

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In their Limited Answer, Respondents do not address the effect of Arizona’s two-step

procedure for seeking post-conviction relief. They also do not address the Ninth Circuit

precedent that has directly decided whether, in Arizona, a petition for post-conviction relief is

“‘pending’ before the state courts within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) when the Notice was filed

or when the actual petition for relief was filed.” Isley, 383 F.3d at 1055. To make that

determination, the Court in Isley analyzed the Arizona post-conviction process, and found that

a “proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief.” Id. at 1056

(citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)). Thus, in Arizona, the filing of the notice sets “Arizona’s

mechanism for post-conviction relief in motion.” Id. Once the notice is filed, the court

determines whether to appoint counsel and the time limit for filing the petition commences. Id.

(citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c)). 

Relying on the plain language of Rule 32.4(a) and the structure of Arizona’s postconviction scheme, the Court held that when a notice is “filed in conformity with the pertinent

statutory provisions and contains a specific prayer for relief in the form of a request for a new

trial, it is sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.” Isley, 383 F.3d at 1056. Thus, the

Court concluded that petitioner’s state petition for post-conviction relief was “pending” within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was entitled to statutory tolling from the date the

notice was filed. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Isley in Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069

(9th Cir. 2007). In Hemmerle, petitioner filed his first notice of post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32.4(a), and even though the state court granted petitioner numerous extensions to file

a petition for post-conviction relief he did not do so and “because no petition or other

memoranda had been filed, [the post-conviction relief] notice was summarily dismissed.” Id.

Ultimately, petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Although the federal

court determined that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was untimely, it found that

petitioner’s first notice of post-conviction relief, “which under Isley was ‘properly filed,’ tolled

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 Because the petitioner in Hemmerle did not seek further review of the trial court’s

summary dismissal of his first notice of post-conviction relief, that notice was no longer pending

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) after it was dismissed. Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1047; see also

Samaniego v. Ryan, 2011 WL 7109366, *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2011) (petition for post-conviction

relief remained pending until the date the trial court summarily dismissed the proceeding and

because petitioner did not seek appellate review of that dismissal, nothing was pending after the

trial court’s decision, and the statute of limitations began to run the next day).

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the AEDPA one-year limitations period at least until it was summarily dismissed.” Id. at 1074.7

In Stafford v. Ryan, 477 Fed. Appx. 449 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished), the Court

reversed the district court’s holding that because the petitioner failed to file a petition, his postconviction action was not properly filed and thus did toll the AEDPA limitations period. The

Court in Stafford held that the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period was tolled when petitioner

filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief under Rule 32.4(a) and remained tolled until the

state court dismissed that proceeding. The petitioner’s failure to file a petition did not change

the Court’s determination that the notice of post-conviction relief was properly filed and tolled

the AEDPA limitations period because petitioner “did not have to file a petition to commence

a post-conviction relief proceeding because Arizona requires a notice (not a petition) to be filed

to commence post-conviction relief proceedings.” Id.. at 450 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and

32.4). 

Unlike Rule 32.4(a), which specifically provides that filing a timely notice commences

the post-conviction proceeding in Arizona, the Pennsylvania and Alabama post-conviction

schemes at issue in Pace and Siebert provide that a post-conviction action commences upon the

filing of the petition. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 415; Siebert, 552 U.S. at 4. Thus, the operative

time limit in those cases was the deadline for filing the petition. In Arizona, the deadline for

filing a notice of post-conviction relief under Rule 32.4(a) is the operative deadline for

determining when a post-conviction action is properly filed and pending for purposes of

§ 2244(d)(2). See Isley, 383 F.3d at 1056; Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074; Stafford, 477 Fed.

Appx. at 450. Because Respondents failed to recognize this distinction, and failed to address

the applicable Ninth Circuit case law, they erroneously argue that because Petitioner did not file

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a timely petition for post-conviction relief, his application for post-conviction was relief was

not “properly filed” and did not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. (Doc. 10 at 11.)

C. Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On May 16, 2008, Petitioner filed his third notice of post-conviction relief, which was

timely under Rule 32.4(a), as Respondents acknowledged in their Objection to the Magistrate

Judge’s Order. (Doc. 19 at 6); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (stating, in pertinent part, that

a notice of post-conviction relief must be filed within thirty days “after the issuance of the order

and mandate in the direct appeal”). Appointed counsel subsequently notified the court that she

could find no claims to raise in a Rule 32 petition and requested an extension of time for

Petitioner to file a pro se petition. On December 19, 2008, the court granted Petitioner a 45-day

extension, or until February 3, 2009, to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did

not file a petition until April 2, 2009 and, on August 28, 2009, the state trial court dismissed the

petition pursuant to Rule 32.6(c) finding that Petitioner failed to raise a “colorable claim,” and

that his claims “were precluded as untimely.” (Respondents’ Ex. O, doc. 10-1 at 103.) 

In their Limited Answer and in their Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order,

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings were not properly filed and did

not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations because “the state court explicitly concluded that,

under state law, Petitioner’s post-conviction petitions were untimely.” (Doc. 19 at 6, see also

Doc. 10 at 11.) The state court however, did not find that the entire post-conviction proceeding

was untimely. Rather, it found that Petitioner’s claims were precluded as untimely.

(Respondents’ Ex. O, doc. 10-1 at 103.) The state court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s

petition for post-conviction relief finding that “they [Petitioner’s claims] are precluded as

untimely.” (Id.) When the state court stated that “they” were untimely, it was referring to

Petitioner’s claims. 

Respondents’ argument suggests that because the state court dismissed the petition for

post-conviction relief, the state court necessarily concluded that Petitioner’s post-conviction

proceeding was not “properly filed.” That argument is not supported by the language of the

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state court’s order nor by its prior order granting Petitioner an extension of time to file a pro se

petition. As the Ninth Circuit explained in similar circumstances, the state court “necessarily

found [petitioner’s] notice timely based on Rule 32.4 and Rule 32.2(b), because it allowed

[petitioner] an extension of time to file a petition pro per and did not summarily dismiss the

notice.” Stafford, 477 Fed. Appx. at 450. Here, as in Stafford, the state court did not summarily

dismiss Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief and it granted Petitioner an extension of

time to file his petition. Thus, by dismissing the petition, the state court did not find that the

notice or the proceeding was untimely. 

Respondents’ argument also fails to acknowledge the significance of the state court’s

dismissal of the petition “per Rule 32.6(c).” (Respondents’ Ex. O, doc. 10-1 at 103.) Rule

32.6(c) provides that “the court shall identify all claims that are procedurally precluded under

this rule.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(c) (emphasis added). Thus, the state court found that

Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred because he did not file a timely petition. As the

Supreme Court explained in Artuz, “[b]y construing ‘properly filed application’ to mean

‘application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,’ petitioner elides the

difference between an ‘application’ and a ‘claim.’ Only individual claims, and not the

application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law pursuant to

our holdings.” 521 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted). Thus, the state court’s order finding that

Petitioner’s claims were “precluded as untimely” and dismissing the petition does not establish

that the application or proceeding was not properly filed. 

In their Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Respondents acknowledge for the

first time that Petitioner’s timely notice of post-conviction relief could be significant in

determining whether his post-conviction relief proceedings were “properly filed” under the

applicable Arizona statute and procedural rule and thus could toll the AEDPA statute of

limitations. (Doc. 19 at 7.) Respondents argue, without citation to authority, that even if the

timely notice of post-conviction relief tolled the AEDPA limitations period, Petitioner’s “failure

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8

 The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief on August 28,

2009, finding that his claims were precluded as untimely. Petitioner sought review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals on September 9, 2009, which was denied on November 23, 2010.

(Respondents’ Exs. P and Q.) Petitioner then sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court,

which was denied on August 8, 2011. (Respondents’ Ex. R.)

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to observe the state court’s deadline of February 3, 2009, in which to file a petition for postconviction relief ceased any applicable tolling.” (Doc. 19 at 7.) 

Apparently, Respondents are arguing that even if the notice of post-conviction relief

tolled the statute of limitations, that tolling expired on the deadline for Petitioner to file his pro

se petition. This argument is contrary to the Ninth Circuit case law recognizing that the filing

of a notice of post-conviction relief initiates a post-conviction action in Arizona, the postconviction action is “pending” when the notice is filed in conformity with Rule 32.4(a), and

statutory tolling begins on that date and continues “‘until the application has achieved final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.’” Hemmerle, 495 F. 3d 1074 (quoting

Carey v. Staffold, 536 U. S. 214, 220 (2002)); see also Isley, 383 F.3d at 1055-56 (limitations

period was not running while state court petition for relief was before the Arizona Supreme

Court).

Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations. See

Isley, 383 F.3d at 1057. Although Petitioner subsequently failed to file a timely supporting

petition, his May 16, 2008 notice was nonetheless “properly filed” and therefore, his postconviction relief action was “pending,” and resulted in statutory tolling, as of that date. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). It remained pending during the time that he sought review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court.8

 Therefore, Petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief was pending as of May 16, 2008 and remained pending for “‘all the time

during which [Petitioner was] attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to

exhaust state remedies with regard to [that] post-conviction application.’” See Nino v. Galaza,

183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th

Cir. 1999)). This period includes the intervals between the disposition of Petitioner’s postCase 2:11-cv-02552-NVW Document 25 Filed 01/18/13 Page 14 of 32
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9

 Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the gap between the

dismissal of his third post-conviction action and the filing of his fourth notice of post-conviction

relief on May 6, 2010. (Doc. 19 at 8; Respondents’ Ex. S). The Court need not resolve that

issue because the AEDPA limitations period was already tolled during that time period.

(Respondents’ Ex. S.) The Court agrees, however, that the fourth notice of post-conviction

relief was not properly filed and did not toll the limitations period. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413.

10 The AEDPA statute of limitations commenced on May 5, 2008 and ran for ten days

until May 16, 2008, when Petitioner filed his third notice of post-conviction relief. The statute

of limitations remained tolled until August 8, 2011, when the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed

Petitioner’s petition for review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The

statute of limitations started running again the next day, ran for 136 days, and had not expired

when Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 23, 2011. 

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conviction petition and the filing of his petitions for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals and

Arizona Supreme Court.9

 Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (statute of limitations is tolled during intervals

between disposition of post-conviction petition and the filing of an appeal and the next state

appellate level); Carey, 536 U.S. at 219 (“Until an application for state post-conviction relief

has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure, it remains ‘pending’

for purposes of the tolling provision at sections 2244(d)(2).”)

Petitioner’s timely notice of post-conviction relief tolled the AEDPA statute of

limitations when it was filed and the limitations period remained tolled during the entire time

that the post-conviction proceeding was pending before the state courts.10 Accordingly,

Petitioner’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus is timely. Because statutory tolling

applies and the Petition is timely, the Court need not consider whether equitable tolling applies.

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

In addition to arguing that the habeas Petition is time-barred, Respondents argue that all

of Petitioner’s claims raised in his habeas Petition are procedurally barred because he failed to

raise them in a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The Court agrees that Petitioner’s

claims asserted in Grounds Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, and Fourteen are barred

on that basis. The Court, however, finds that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One, Two,

Twelve, and Thirteen are procedurally barred on a different basis — because Petitioner failed

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11 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court”

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v.

Knowles , 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

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to raise those claims either on direct appeal or on post-conviction review. In addition, the Court

finds that Petitioner properly exhausted and presented his federal claims asserted in Grounds

Four and Nine to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct appeal. Thus, those claims are

properly before this Court on habeas corpus review. The Court will consider the merits of

Grounds Four and Nine before addressing the procedural issues pertaining to the remaining

grounds for relief. 

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his

federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court11 in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate state

court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”); Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A

“state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond

a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find

material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a

petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, . . . (2) through the

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proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.”

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

B. Grounds Four and Nine

 In Grounds Four and Nine, Petitioner asserts a due process violation based on several

instances of prosecutorial misconduct including improper vouching for a witness, using the

prestige of the Attorney General’s office to bolster the prosecution’s case during closing

argument, eliciting hearsay testimony throughout the entire trial, and referring to evidence

outside the record. (Doc. 1 at 10, 23.) Petitioner “fairly presented” a federal due process claim

based on prosecutorial misconduct to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct review.

(Respondents’ Ex. D, doc. 10-1 at 18-34.); see Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33 (A claim has been

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal

theory on which his claim is based). The appellate court found that these claims lacked merit.

(Respondents’ Ex. B, doc. 10-1 at 10-14.) 

Because Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct were adjudicated on the merits

in state court, federal habeas relief is not available unless he shows: (1) that the state court’s

decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States

Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct.

38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1);

or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record

before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.

770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Id. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, petitioner must show that the

misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of

due process. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The court must examine the

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conduct to determine “whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears

likely to have affected the jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United

States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). A defendant’s due process rights are

violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally unfair.” See Darden

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“[T]he

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness

of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”). Under Darden, the first issue is whether the

prosecutor’s remarks were improper; if so, the next question is whether such conduct infected

the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

The primary factor in determining the prejudicial effects of misconduct is whether the

trial court issued a curative instruction. When the court issues a curative instruction, a

reviewing court presumes that the jury disregarded inadmissible evidence and that no due

process violation occurred. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8. (1987). A petitioner may

overcome this presumption if there is an “overwhelming probability” that the jury would be

unable to disregard evidence and a strong likelihood that the effect of the misconduct was

“devastating” to the petitioner. Id.

1. Eliciting Hearsay Testimony from a Witness

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by continually eliciting

hearsay testimony. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner does not describe the alleged hearsay testimony

or identify the witness from whom the prosecutor allegedly elicited this testimony. Although

Petitioner likely refers to testimony the prosecutor elicited from E.K., which Petitioner

challenged on direct appeal, he has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim of

prosecutorial misconduct was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

On direct examination of E.K., the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding meetings

between E.K. and his attorney and E.K. and Perez. (Respondents’ Ex. B, Doc. 10-1 at 13.)

When E.K. began testifying about what his attorney and Perez said during those meetings,

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Petitioner’s counsel objected. The court sustained defense counsel’s objections and “explained

to E.K. that he could testify about what [Petitioner] said, but not what third parties told him.”

(Id.) Later, E.K. testified about a meeting he had with his son. When he started discussing his

son’s statements during that meeting, defense counsel objected. The trial court “admonished

both the prosecutor and the witness” that “E.K. could ‘not testify as to what someone else told

him’” unless he established an exception to the hearsay rule. (Id.) The trial court also instructed

the prosecutor to “ask better questions” or “spend more time with your witness in preparation.”

(Id.) The appellate court found that the prosecutor’s direct examination of E.K. did not

constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, the court found that the “prosecutor was at times

inartful in framing questions that would prevent E.K. from giving testimony that contained

inadmissible hearsay.” (Id.) The court further found that E.K. did not following the trial court’s

instructions, “despite defense counsel’s objections and the court’s admonitions.” (Id.) 

In support of his claims in Grounds Four and Nine, Petitioner asserts that the “prosecutor

continually elicited hearsay testimony from the alleged victim as to matters he heard from other

sources,” and “highlight[ed] false testimony,” even after the court admonished him, but does

not address why the appellate court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, federal law. (Doc. 1 at 10, 23.) Moreover, the record reflects that

defense counsel made objections to the improper questions, which the trial court sustained, and

there is no evidence that the prosecutor’s challenged direct examination of E.K. “affected the

jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799,

806 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

2. Improper Vouching

Petitioner also argues that “the prosecutor improperly vouched for the witness” by

placing the prestige of the government behind its case and by referring to “evidence outside the

record” in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner does not identify “the

witness” or describe how the prosecutor allegedly vouched for that witness. Even assuming

Petitioner is referring to Agent Walsh and the prosecutor’s closing arguments pertaining to

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Walsh’s testimony, which he challenged on direct appeal, Petitioner has not shown that the state

court’s resolution of that claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor improperly vouched for its

witnesses by placing the prestige of the government behind its case. During closing argument,

Petitioner’s defense attorney argued that the case was not criminal in nature, but was a “breach

of an alleged business agreement . . . [that] is better left in a civil courtroom” and told the jury

that it would “see nothing in [its] instructions where the breach of an agreement amounts to a

crime.” (Doc. 10-1 at 13.) To rebut this argument, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel

“‘alluded to something else which is one of the fundamental things of our office. We don’t take

civil . . . ,’ [defense] counsel objected, the court sustained the objection and told the prosecutor

‘what your office does is not evidence, so please argue the evidence on the record. Let’s not

talk about what offices do.” (Respondents’ Ex. B, Doc. 10-1 at 13.) 

Petitioner also argued that the prosecutor engaged in improper vouching by suggesting

that evidence outside the record supported Agent Walsh’s testimony. (Id.) On direct

examination, Agent Walsh testified about money the suppliers returned to Petitioner. On crossexamination, defense counsel inquired about inconsistencies between testimony Agent Walsh

gave during a prior proceeding on August 16, 2005, and his trial testimony regarding money that

remained from E.K.’s investment, which was relevant to determining the amount of E.K.’s loss.

(Id.; Doc. 10-1 at 25.) Defense counsel asked Agent Walsh if he had previously testified that

the amount was $101,000, not $166,000 as he had testified at trial. Agent Walsh stated that he

did not recall making that statement in 2005. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Agent Walsh

to explain the inconsistency regarding the amounts of money. Agent Walsh responded that in

2005 he was not aware of certain property that was still in Mexico and that he did not know the

specific amounts of money involved at that time. (Respondents’ Ex. D, Doc. 10-1 at 13.) 

During closing argument, defense counsel argued that, based on Agent Walsh’s August

16, 2005 statement and other factors, E.K. suffered no monetary loss, but had received sufficient

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money from the sales and still had the right to possess the unsold pottery. (Respondents’ Ex.

D, Doc. 10-1 at 26.) He further argued that the correct figure was $ 101,000. (Doc. 10-1 at 13-

14.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the $101,000 figure was based on incomplete

information that Agent Walsh had in 2005, and that the evidence at trial showed that E.K.

suffered a greater monetary loss. (Id.) Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s arguments

regarding the amount of loss that E.K. sustained. The court sustained the objections, told the

prosecutor to “‘[s]tick to what the facts are in evidence” and, when the prosecutor again made

arguments regarding the $101,000 figure, struck the prosecutor’s comment. (Id.) After closing

arguments, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s remark that his office

does not handle civil cases and his comment that the $101,000 figure underestimated E.K.’s loss

because the government “didn’t have all the information.” (Respondents’ Ex. B, Doc. 10-1 at

14.) The trial court denied the motion. (Id.)

The appellate court found no prosecutorial misconduct and no due process violation

noting that the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections to the prosecutor’s comments,

told the jury to disregard the challenged comments, “and instructed the jury to disregard any

questions or answers provided to questions [to] which the court sustained an objection.” (Doc.

10-1 at 14.) The court further “instructed the jury that what the lawyers said in opening and

closing statements is not evidence.” (Id.) 

Although Petitioner challenges the prosecutor’s alleged improper vouching by relying

on the prestige of the government and referring to evidence outside the record to support its

case, he does not address why the appellate court’s resolution his claims of prosecutorial

misconduct was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Moreover, even if

the prosecutor made improper statements and arguments, the court gave curative instructions

to the jury. Thus, the jury presumably disregarded any inadmissible evidence or arguments and

no due process violation occurred. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n. 8. Petitioner has not offered

any arguments to overcome this presumption. See id. Because Petitioner has not established

that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that gave rise to a due process violation, he cannot

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show that the state court’s rejection of this claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief on Grounds Four and Nine. 

 C. Procedural Bar

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes comity

by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged violations of a state

prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require federal courts to respect

state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32.

Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review

in two situations. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning to

state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or

preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If no state

remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raises a claim in state

court, but the state court finds the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v.

Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to

meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at

731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion

relies on a procedural ground “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and

an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). A state

procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not depend on an

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antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s application of the

procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally excuses non-compliance with a

procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489

U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). “The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that

the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a

matter of comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at

729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction,

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the

court may dismiss plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly

exhausted in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is

inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to

dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

D. Grounds One, Two, Twelve, and Thirteen

The record reflects that Petitioner never presented his federal claims asserted in Grounds

One, Two, Twelve, and Thirteen to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct appeal or on

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12 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that because the crimes took place in Mexico, the

trial court lacked jurisdiction and his prosecution violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to

due process. (Doc. 1 at 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated because he was “convicted under the Intangible Rights

Theory” and that Arizona Revised Statute § 13-105.2, § 13-2301.E.12, and § 13-2310.E are

unconstitutional. (Id. at 7.) In Ground Twelve, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was

ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment for failing to explain “any plea offers,” failing

to explain the “merits and/or non-merits of going to trial,” and giving “erroneous advice to

reject the plea officer.” (Id. at 26.) In Ground Thirteen, he alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the verdict form and for failing to request a verdict form that

included “interrogatories” regarding the victim’s financial loss. (Id. at 27.)

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 post-conviction review.12 (Respondents’ Ex. D, N.) Accordingly, although these claims are

technically exhausted, they are subject to the doctrine of procedural default. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (discussing technical exhaustion principle that when state-court

remedies are no longer available, those remedies are technically exhausted); Souliotes v.

Hedgpeth, 2012 WL 3205433, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (stating that “recent Supreme

Court authority requires [a district court on habeas corpus review] to consider claims that were

not exhausted and no longer capable of review in state court as technically exhausted.”).

Petitioner cannot return to state court to properly present his claims asserted in Grounds

One, Two, Twelve, and Thirteen because no state remedies are available. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

Petitioner can no longer present his claims on direct appeal because he already pursued direct

review, and Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct

appeal. See generally Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31. 

Additionally, Petitioner can no longer seek review of his claims in a subsequent postconviction action. Rule 32.4 requires that a state prisoner file a petition for post-conviction

relief “within ninety days after entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in direct appeal, whichever is later.” See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); State v. Pruett, 912 P.2d 1357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Rule 32.4

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13 Petitioner explains that he did not present the claim asserted in Ground Two in the

state courts because the “U.S. Supreme Court decided case after [his] remedies were exhausted.

This applies retroactively.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner does not identify the “U.S. Supreme

Court” decision which invalidates his convictions or provide any other factual or legal support

for his claim. Even assuming Petitioner’s claims in Ground Two were properly before this

Court, his unsupported, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for federal

habeas corpus relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory

allegations with no reference to the record or other evidence do not warrant habeas relief).

14 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. (Doc. 1 at 8). In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts

that he was convicted of crimes committed by E.K. whose “lawyers used their contact with the

Attorney General to create a synthetic crime.” (Id. at 11). In Grounds Six and Fourteen, which

are identical, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to adequately

investigate the case; (2) failing to object to the prosecution’s investigator testifying without

being sequestered; (3) failing to request a jury instruction regarding witnesses’ inconsistent

statements; (4) failing to prepare for and failing to meaningfully cross-examine the State’s

witnesses; and (5) failing to obtain an accountant to testify as an expert. (Doc. 1 at 12-21 and

28-36). In Ground Seven, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give

appellate counsel, post-conviction counsel, or Petitioner his case file. (Id. at 21.) In Grounds

Eight and Ten, Petitioner reiterates his claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1)

adequately investigate, (2) sufficiently review the State’s case, (3) sufficiently prepare for trial,

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to successive petition). The time for filing a notice for post-conviction relief expired long ago.

Although Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fit within the category of claims

provided in Rules 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not specifically asserted that any of these

exceptions apply to his claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, Twelve, or Thirteen.13 Nor does

it appear that any of the exceptions in Rule 32.1 would apply to these claims. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds One, Two, Twelve, and Thirteen are

procedurally defaulted and, unless Petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” habeas corpus review is barred. As discussed below in

Section F, Petitioner has not made either showing. 

E. Grounds Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, and Fourteen

Petitioner raised his federal claims asserted in Grounds Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight,

Ten, Eleven, and Fourteen for the first time in his third petition for post-conviction relief.14

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(4) interview and call all relevant witnesses, (5) meaningfully cross-examine witnesses, and (5)

discuss the State’s case with Petitioner. (Id. at 22, 24.) In Ground Eleven, Petitioner asserts a

due process violation based on the post-conviction court’s refusal to provide him with

transcripts of the July 19, 2006 morning trial sessions, which Petitioner argues were essential

to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 25.) 

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(Respondents’ Ex. N, doc. 10-1 at 82-99.) The trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s

petition for post-conviction relief finding that his claims lacked merit, and alternatively, that

they were precluded as untimely based on Petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Ex. O, Doc. 10-1 at 103.) The Arizona Court of Appeals and

Arizona Supreme Court summarily affirmed this ruling. The higher courts’ subsequent “silent”

denials of review affirm the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) ( when “the last reasoned opinion on the claim

explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim

did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits”). Thus, federal habeas corpus review

is precluded if the procedural ground upon which the state court relied, is “both ‘independent’

of the merits of the federal claims and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has established a burden shifting analysis to determine the adequacy

of a state procedural bar. See Bennett v. Moeller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003). Once

the government asserts “the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground

as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.” Id.

at 586. Petitioner “may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule.” Id. The burden then shifts back to the government, which

bears the “ultimate burden of proving the adequacy” of the relied-upon ground. Id. Petitioner

does not argue that the state procedural ground — a timeliness rule — was inadequate and thus,

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has not met his burden of placing it at issue. Id. Moreover, as set forth below, the procedural

rule is “independent” and “adequate.” 

After Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief and the court appointed counsel

who notified the court that she found no “colorable claims” to raise on Petitioner’s behalf, the

court granted Petitioner an extension of “45 days from the date the notice [was] filed” to file a

petition “in propria persona.” (Respondents’ Exs. L, M); see Ariz. R. Crim.P. 32.4(c)(2). The

state court’s ruling that the petition was untimely because it was filed after the deadline, is not

based on the merits of the claims asserted in the petition, and thus is “independent” of federal

law. See Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (procedural rule is independent if its application does not

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim). 

The procedural rule is “adequate” because Arizona courts routinely dismiss postconviction proceedings based on a petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition for relief. See

Pollard v. Schriro, 2006 WL 3512037, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2006) (post-conviction court

dismissed Rule 32 proceeding based on petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition); State v.

Carillo, 2007 WL 5600602, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2007) (post-conviction court

summarily dismissed Rule 32 proceeding based on petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition).

The statutory authority for post-conviction proceedings, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4234, provides

that “[t]he time limits are jurisdictional, and an untimely filed notice or petition shall be

dismissed with prejudice.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–4234(G). The Ninth Circuit has held that

Arizona’s procedural rules, including its timeliness rules, are “clear” and “well-established.”

Simmons v. Schriro, 187 Fed. Appx. 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner has not cited any authority demonstrating that Arizona courts inconsistently

apply the deadlines set forth in Rule 32.4 for filing a petition or that the rule is inadequate. (See

docs. 13 and 15.) Accordingly, Petitioner has not met his threshold burden, and the state court’s

dismissal of his petition as untimely under Rule 32.4(c)(2), is an adequate and independent bar

to federal habeas relief. The state court’s alternative ruling on the merits does not vitiate the

procedural bar. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds

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15 In his fourth notice of post-conviction relief, Petitioner again raised the Brady

violation that he asserts in Ground Three. (Respondents’ Ex. S.) The post-conviction court

dismissed the notice as untimely under Rule 32.4(a). Thus, this claim is still precluded pursuant

to the state court’s application of an adequate state procedural rule that is independent from the

merits of the claims. 

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Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, and Fourteen are procedurally barred from federal

habeas corpus review unless Petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.”15 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. As discussed in Section F,

Petitioner has not made either showing. 

F. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten,

Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal

habeas corpus review unless he establishes either “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995). 

1. Cause and Prejudice

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S.

at 298. The Supreme Court “‘has not given the term ‘cause’ precise content.’” Harmon v.

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13). The Supreme

Court has suggested, however, that cause ordinarily turns on some objective factor external to

petitioner, such as a showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). 

To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged

constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

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16 Petitioner also asserts that the trial court demonstrated bias against him by holding offthe-record meetings regarding the admissibility of evidence outside of Petitioner’s presence.

(Doc. 13 at 14.) The Court will not consider these assertions because they pertain to the

underlying criminal matter, not to Petitioner’s efforts to exhaust his federal claims on direct

appeal or post-conviction review. Moreover, Petitioner has not exhausted an independent claim

of judicial bias and it is not properly before the Court on habeas corpus review. 

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trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)

(emphasis in original); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Although

petitioner must show both “cause” and “prejudice” to excuse a procedural default, when

petitioner fails to establish “cause,” the court need not consider whether petitioner has

established prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Smith v. Murray,

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982).

 Here, to establish “cause,” Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in failing to rule on

his motion for extension of time to file his petition for post-conviction relief.16 (Doc. 13 at 14;

Doc. 15 at 2.) Petitioner, however, does not explain how the court’s failure to rule on his

motion for extension of time prevented him from presenting his claims to the state court on postconviction review. After counsel notified the court that she could find no claims to raise, the

court granted Petitioner a 45-day extension until February 3, 2009 to file a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief. On January 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the court

extend the deadline for him to file his petition for “90 days after he received discovery.” (Doc.

15 at 9, 30-34, 55-56.) On the existing record, the Court cannot determine whether the court

ruled on the motion for extension of time. (Id.) Nonetheless, Petitioner was aware of the

February 3, 2009 deadline, and the court’s failure to rule on a motion for extension of time did

not excuse noncompliance with that deadline. Additionally, Rule 32.4(c)(2) provides that “any

extensions beyond the 45 days shall be granted only upon a showing of extraordinary

circumstances,” and nothing in the Rule suggests that Petitioner could unilaterally suspend or

extend the deadline for filing his petition. Thus, even assuming the court failed to rule on a

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motion for extension of time, Petitioner has not shown that the court’s failure prevented him

from filing a timely petition for post-conviction relief raising all of his claims for relief. 

Petitioner also argues that the “State’s withholding of exculpatory evidence at trial

constitutes cause for his failure to present evidence to support his federal claim in state court.”

(Doc. 15 at 5.) He asserts that counsel’s failure to give Petitioner his “trial file” exacerbated this

issue and that his petition for post-conviction relief would have been more “detailed and

complete if the court enforced its order for trial counsel to supply . . . his trial file.” (Doc. 13

at 12; Doc. 15 at 5.) Petitioner, however, states that he attached “105 exhibits” to his petition

for post-conviction relief and does not identify or describe any missing documents or materials

that prevented him from timely presenting his federal claims to the state courts. 

Finally, Petitioner argues “cause” based on his limited access to legal materials due to

his status as an inmate. (Doc. 15 at 7.) Petitioner’s status as an inmate and limited legal

resources do not constitute cause to excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d

1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance

upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Petitioner has not presented any basis

sufficient to establish “cause” to overcome the procedural bar, therefore, the Court need not

reach the prejudice issue. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n.43 (1982).

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his defaulted claims will

result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A federal court may review the merits of a

procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the

merits of his claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at

327. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). This gateway “actual innocence” claim is a less stringent

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standard than a substantive claim of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16; see also

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner

asserting a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt

and must affirmatively prove that he is innocent.”). 

The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of

cases” in which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was

probably convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. “To establish the

requisite probability,” the petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. New evidence presented in support of a fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice claim

may include “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S.

518, 538 (2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve

“evidence the trial jury did not have before it”). 

Petitioner has not identified any new and reliable evidence that was not presented at trial.

Petitioner argues that he “hired a private investigator who obtained some of the hidden Brady

material” (Doc. 15 at 2), but he does not identify that evidence, explain why it constitutes

“newly discovered” evidence, or establish that in light of the allegedly newly discovered

evidence “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. 

IV. Conclusion

In summary, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of his claims of

prosecutorial misconduct asserted in Grounds Four and Nine is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, he is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief on those claims. Petitioner’s remaining claims are defaulted and

barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by

a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable and because

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen

days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific

written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file

timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

District Court’s acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2013.

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