Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00060/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00060-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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Jesse M. Furman, District Judge, concurring:

I join the opinion of the Court in full, but I write separately to emphasize

the significance of one check on any potential overreaching by the monitor: the

dispute‐resolution process established by the district court.  Presumably mindful

that a monitorship imposed over Apple’s objection could be a bumpy affair, the

district court established a sensible and effective process to ensure that any

objections to the monitor’s actions could be swiftly resolved.  Specifically, Apple

was (and still is) required to convey any objections to the monitor’s conduct to

the plaintiffs within ten days of the conduct at issue; if the parties could not, in

good faith, resolve the issue among themselves, they could then bring it to the

district court’s attention for prompt resolution.  

Notably, Apple largely failed to avail itself of this process and, to the

extent it did, the district court dealt with the company’s objections promptly and

appropriately.  For example, although Apple took the position that the monitor

could not begin his inquiry within ninety days of his appointment, it did not

raise that issue with the district court until shortly before the ninety‐day mark,

when the issue was nearly moot.  Similarly, although Apple (justifiably) pushed

back on the monitor’s efforts to communicate with its officers and directors

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outside the presence of counsel, it did not bring the issue to the district court’s

attention until much later, at which point the district court promptly (and

correctly) made clear that Apple employees were entitled to have counsel present

during any interaction with the monitor.  And finally, although Apple objected

to the monitor being compensated on an hourly basis, it did not raise its concerns

regarding his rate until nearly two months into the monitorship.  Once the

district court was alerted to the dispute, it referred the parties to a magistrate

judge for mediation (where — as the letter unsealed by the Court today makes

clear — they apparently agreed on a reduced hourly rate).   

The list goes on, but those examples suffice to make the point.  Putting

aside the question of whether Apple has complied with the Injunction’s

requirement to “take no action to interfere with or to impede [the monitor’s]

accomplishment of [his] responsibilities,” it is plain that Apple did not comply in

good faith with the district court’s dispute‐resolution procedures. (D.A. 477).

Instead, the company largely sat on its hands, allowing issues with the monitor

to fester and the relationship to deteriorate, mostly without the district court’s

knowledge.  When attacked, the monitor may well have exercised poor judgment

in sharing his declaration with the plaintiffs and allowing the plaintiffs to file it.  

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But it is hard not to believe that, had Apple timely raised its objections in the

proper fashion instead of silently accumulating grievances and springing them

on the district court en masse, matters might not have gotten to that point.  At a

minimum, the district court certainly cannot be faulted for failing to address

issues of which it was unaware.

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