Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01633/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORIANO MILLARE,

Plaintiff, 

v.

G. STRATTON, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No.: 16cv1633-BAS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 16]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Cynthia Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Moriano Millare (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3). On June 24, 2016, Plaintiff 

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filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint sets forth various claims against seventeen individuals alleging 

that they violated his civil rights by retaliating against him in violation of the 

First Amendment, imposed cruel and unusual conditions of confinement in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, violated California Government Code 

§ 19572(f), failed to comply with several California Codes of Regulation and 

failed to enforce the Department of Corrections Operations Manual (“DOM”). 

(Id. at 31-57). On December 19, 2016, Defendants Olsen, Fernandez, Asbury, 

Stratton, Charlton, Vasquez, Moore, Self, Baenziger, Olivarria, Seibel and

Sosa filed this motion to dismiss counts ten through fifteen. (ECF Nos, 16). 

On January 23, 2017, Defendant Shelland joined in the motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s twelfth count for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment and Plaintiff’s thirteenth through fifteenth counts under 

California State law. (ECF No. 21).

Defendants contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s tenth and eleventh counts fail to 

state a claim for retaliation because Plaintiff has not alleged the Defendants 

acted in retaliation; (2) Plaintiff’s eleventh count also fails to state a claim 

because there is no liability for respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(3) Plaintiff’s twelfth count fails to state a claim under the Eighth 

Amendment because he does not allege the loss of a fundamental right; (4) 

Plaintiff’s thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth counts must be dismissed 

because Defendants are immune from liability under state law; and (5) 

counts thirteen through fifteen should be dismissed as to Defendants 

Fernandez, Stratton, Vasquez, Seibel and Shelland because Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies against them. (ECF No. 16-1 at 13-20). 

Defendants also request the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s 

government claims filed with the Victims Compensation and Government 

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Claims Board (“VCGCB”). (ECF No. 16-2).

Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) he has 

sufficiently alleged an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to 

his safety in count twelve because his allegations, in combination, amount to 

a fundamental right; (2) he stated a claim for relief against Defendants 

Stratton and Seibel for failure to supervise appeals coordinators and 

subordinate staff in count eleven because they are causally connected to the 

constitutional deprivation; (3) Defendants are not immune from liability in 

counts thirteen, fourteen and fifteen because they are public employees, and 

therefore, “are required to abide by their own laws;” and (4) he has exhausted 

his remedies under the Government Claims Act. (ECF No. 23 at 11, 15, 16, 

19).

Defendants reply that a combination of conditions of confinement still 

do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, that Defendants 

Stratton and Seibel are not causally related to a constitutional deprivation 

because Plaintiff did not allege adverse action taken to support a retaliation 

claim, that Defendants are immune from liability as public employees 

because they were acting within the scope of employment and that 

Defendants Fernandez, Stratton, Vasquez and Seibel should be dismissed 

because Plaintiff knew their identities and never named them in his 

administrative claims. (ECF No. 24 at 2, 4, 5, 6).

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are not to be 

construed as findings of fact by the Court.

Plaintiff’s claims arise from a series of appeals that Plaintiff filed and 

Rules Violation Reports (“RVR”) filed against him while incarcerated at 

Richard J. Donovan Correction Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. 

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(See ECF No. 1). Plaintiff was given a work assignment in the Facility A 

Culinary Scullery. (Id. at 18). Plaintiff alleges he was not given work boots 

and that all other inmates working in the kitchen were provided work boots. 

(Id.). Plaintiff informed Defendant Limon that he wanted work boots and 

that he would file an inmate appeal if Defendant Limon required Plaintiff to 

work without them. (Id.). Plaintiff was not given work boots. (See id.).

From July of 2014 to May of 2015, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

filed false RVRs against him, alleging that Plaintiff refused to report to work. 

(Id. at 18-20, 68, 76, 77, 100-01, 106-08, 125, 128). The RVRs state that the 

correctional officer in control of opening Plaintiff’s cell door reported that they 

opened Plaintiff’s cell door, but that Plaintiff refused to come out. (Id.). In 

response to the RVRs, Plaintiff began filing appeals against the Defendants 

who authored the reports. (Id. at 18-20, 64-65, 73, 90-97, 96-97, 101-104,115-

17, 186-87). Plaintiff alleges either that his cell door was not opened or that 

he reported to work on the date listed in the RVR. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that 

these appeals were improperly rejected, cancelled or denied. (Id. at 19, 22, 

66, 72-76, 82-83, 86-87, 88, 92-93, 95, 98-99, 114-22, 188).

From June of 2015 to April of 2016, Plaintiff filed inmate appeals 

alleging that Defendants were retaliating against Plaintiff’s previous inmate 

appeals by improperly handling them or otherwise impeding his access to file 

prisoner grievances. (Id. at 135-36, 144-45, 171-72, 183-84). Plaintiff alleges 

that these appeals were also improperly rejected, cancelled or denied. (Id. at 

133, 138-41, 143, 148-53, 170, 173-77, 179-82).

Plaintiff’s alleges that this series of events give rise to the causes of 

action raised in his Complaint. (See ECF No.1). Plaintiff’s Complaint 

describes his claims in fifteen counts as follows:

In counts one through eleven, Plaintiff contends that Defendants 

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Limon, Charlton, Shelland, Corcoran, Fernandez, Vasquez, Brown, Asbury, 

Moore, Olsen, Olivarria, Baenziger, Self, Sosa, Seibel and Stratton violated 

his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by retaliating against him 

for filing inmate appeals. (Id. at 31-51).

In count twelve, Plaintiff contends that all Defendants1 imposed cruel 

and unusual conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

by prohibiting Plaintiff from attending his work assignment, filing false 

RVRs against him and interfering with Plaintiff’s right to file inmate appeals. 

(Id. at 52-53).

In count thirteen, Plaintiff contends that all Defendants violated 

California Government Code § 19572(f). (Id. at 53-54).

In count fourteen, Plaintiff contends that all Defendants violated 

California Penal Code § 5058. (Id. at 54-55).

In count fifteen, Plaintiff contends that all Defendants violated several 

sections of the California Department of Corrections Operation Manual 

(“DOM”). (Id. at 55-56).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The pleader must 

 

1 There are seventeen defendants in this action: (1) G. Stratton; (2) A. Limon; 

(3) G. Charlton; (4) O. Shelland; (5) S. Corcoran; (6) F. Fernandez; (7) T. 

Vasquez; (8) D.R. Brown; (9) H. Asbury; (10) C. Moore; (11) R. Olsen; (12) R. 

Olivarria; (13) B. Baeziger; (14) B. Self; (15) V. Sosa; (16) K.A. Seibel; and 

(17) Doe Correctional Officer 1. See Docket; (see also ECF No. 1).

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provide the Court with “more than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Id. 

“Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of 

the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court is] not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted).

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his complaint that bring 

his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. A court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint 

and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be 

cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 

1987).

IV. DISCUSSION

First, the Court will consider whether Defendants’ request for judicial 

notice in support of their motion to dismiss will be granted. Next, the Court 

will determine whether Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted and 

counts ten through fifteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed.

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of records from the 

VCGCB pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. (ECF No. 16-2 at 1-2). In 

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support, Defendants attach a declaration of Darlene Macias, the Custodian of 

Records for the Government Claims Program. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff does not 

address the request in his opposition. (See ECF No. 23).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may take judicial notice of “matters of 

public record” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, this 

Court takes judicial notice of the documents attached to Darlene Macias’ 

declaration as they are matters of public record. (ECF No. 16-2 at 3-73).

B. Counts Ten and Eleven: First Amendment Violations

In count ten, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Olsen, Olivarria, 

Baenziger, Self and Sosa retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First 

Amendment in five specific incidents. (ECF No. 1 at 47-48). First, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s right to file twelve inmate

appeals.2 (Id. at 48). Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deceived 

Plaintiff regarding the appeals process and improperly rejected and cancelled 

the twelve appeals. (Id.). Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered 

with Plaintiff’s right to access the Court regarding these appeals. (Id.). 

Fourth, Plaintiff alleges Defendants provided only one level of review in two 

appeals3 instead of the two levels of review typically afforded. (Id.). Fifth, 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants retaliated by failing to process Plaintiff’s 

 

2 The twelve appeals listed in count ten are RJD-A-14-03719, RJD-A-14-

03004, RJD-A-15-01236, RJD A-15-01864, RJD-A-15-02152, RJD-X-15-02713, 

RJD-X-15-03530, RJD-X-15-02726, SRHQ-P-15-00140, RJD-X-15-02830, 

DUI-16-00130 and DUI-X-16-01236. (ECF No. 1 at 47-48)

3 The two appeals listed are appeals RJD-A-14-03004 and RJD-A-15-02152. 

(ECF No. 1 at 47-48).

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appeals and “take corrective action as supervisors” to end the “punitive cycle 

of harassment and malicious prosecution Plaintiff suffered in the form of 

relentless false [RVRs] Defendants placed and attempted to place in 

Plaintiff’s central file.” (Id. at 49). Plaintiff contends this chilled his ability 

to exercise his First Amendment rights. (Id.).

In count eleven, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Seibel and Stratton 

retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment when they 

failed to take corrective action against their subordinates’ retaliatory 

behavior against Plaintiff, allowed subordinate officers to provide only one 

level of review in the two previously mentioned appeals, personally directed 

Plaintiff to seek a third level of review if dissatisfied with a disciplinary 

review when the second level of review exhausted Plaintiff’s remedies and by 

personally interfering with Plaintiff’s right to file a rights and responsibility 

form against subordinate officers. (ECF No. 1 at 50). 

1. Retaliation

Defendants assert that counts ten and eleven must be dismissed 

because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendants Olsen, 

Self, Baenziger, Olivarria and Sosa, and their supervisors, Defendants 

Stratton and Seibel “cancelled, denied, or screened his appeals because of any 

protected activity.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 14).

The First Amendment protects against “deliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of 

grievances. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 

1989). Such conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation because retaliation by prison officials may 

chill an inmate’s exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights. Thomas v. 

Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). A prisoner suing prison officials 

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for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his 

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance 

legitimate penological goals. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 

1995); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo v. 

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

In Rhodes v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit set forth five basic elements of 

a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation: “(1) An assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 

1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 n.11 

(9th Cir. 2005)).

a. Adverse Action Against an Inmate

The first element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff to 

make an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against him. 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that 

“Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by interfering with frustrating and 

obstructing Plaintiff[’s] right to file . . . inmate appeals . . . . in the form of 

undue rejection cancellation and deception.” (ECF No. 1 at 48, 50). Plaintiff 

also alleges that Defendants interfered with, frustrated, and obstructed 

Plaintiff’s right to access the Court and improperly provided Plaintiff with 

only one level of review in two disciplinary appeals. (Id. at 48). Plaintiff 

contends that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff when they failed to 

process Plaintiff’s appeals and take corrective action as supervisors and end 

the punitive cycle of harassment and malicious prosecution Plaintiff suffered 

in the form of relentless false [RVRs] Defendants placed and attempted to 

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place in Plaintiff[’s] central file.” (Id. at 49). Defendants concede that 

Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 16-1 at 14-15) 

(explaining that Plaintiff alleges Defendants cancelled his appeals, but not 

that they cancelled the appeals because of his previous appeals). Therefore, 

Plaintiff satisfies element one of the Rhodes pleading standard. See Coreno v. 

Armstrong, No. 09-cv-2504-LAB (POR), 2011 WL 4571756, *13 (S.D. Cal. July 

29, 2011) (finding that the plaintiff satisfied element one of the Rhodes

standard where his “pleadings could be construed to indicate [that the 

defendant] took adverse action against him”); Harbridge v. Schwarzenegger, 

No. CV 07-4486-GW(SH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129379, *36 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 

13, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff satisfied element one of the Rhodes

standard where he alleged that his prisoner grievances were not properly 

processed and his complaints were not adequately investigated).

b. Because of

The second element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff 

to make an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate because he exercised his First Amendment right. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

567-68. Defendants contend that Plaintiff “does not allege that [Defendants] 

cancelled his appeals because he filed previous appeals.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 

15).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Limon compelled Plaintiff to work in 

the Facility A Culinary Scullery without work boots, even though other 

inmates assigned to the Facility A Culinary Scullery were provided work 

boots. (ECF No. 1 at 18). Plaintiff told Defendant Limon he was going to 

submit an inmate appeal against him for failing to provide him with work 

boots. (Id.). Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff was not allowed to 

attend his work assignment, culinary officers (Defendants) stopped calling for 

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the Plaintiff’s release to his work assignment and returned the Plaintiff to his 

housing unit when Plaintiff arrived for his assignment.” (Id.). Plaintiff 

further alleges that Defendants filed false RVRs against Plaintiff and that 

Defendants improperly handled his appeals. (Id. at 47-48). Plaintiff 

specifically “alleges [that] in response to his litigiousness the Defendants 

retaliated against Plaintiff by interfering with frustrating and obstructing 

Plaintiff[’s] right to [appeal].” (Id. at 48). Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the 

second element of the Rhodes pleading standard. 

c. Prisoner’s Protected Conduct

The third element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff to 

show he exercised protected conduct. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not allege that he was engaged in “any 

protected activity.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 14).

Plaintiff’s pleadings may be construed to indicate he exercised protected 

conduct. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Plaintiff contends he filed twelve 

appeals, nine of which he attached to his Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 48, 60-

105, 114-27, 133-88). In these appeals, Plaintiff explained he was being 

retaliated against for filing inmate grievances. (See id.). Therefore, Plaintiff 

satisfies the third element of the Rhodes pleading standard. See Rhodes, 408 

F.3d at 567 (“of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment

‘right[s] to file prison grievances’”).

d. Chilled First Amendment Rights

The fourth Rhodes pleading standard element requires Plaintiff to show 

that the harm chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right. Rhodes, 408 

F.3d 567-68. A plaintiff is not required to allege “a total chilling of his First 

Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation in 

order to perfect a retaliation claim. Speech can be chilled even when not 

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completely silenced.” Id. at 568 (emphasis in original). The Court must ask 

“whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

from future First Amendment activities.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted).

The face of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that his First Amendment 

rights were chilled. (ECF No. 1 at 49). Plaintiff specifically alleges that 

“Defendants collectively conspired to chill the effect of Plaintiff[’s] exercise of 

his First Amendment rights through actions that did not advance any 

legitimate penological goals nor are tailored narrowly enough to achieve such 

goals.” (Id.). Further, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants filed false RVRs 

against him and improperly rejected, cancelled, or otherwise handled his 

inmate appeals in retaliation against him for exercising his First Amendment 

right to file a grievance against a correctional officer. (See ECF No. 1 at 47-

49). While the Court “cannot find that a prisoner of ‘ordinary firmness’ would 

be deterred from filing future grievances merely because a previous grievance 

was denied,” the Court can find that improper handling of multiple appeals 

and the filing of false RVRs could have a chilling effect. Gonzalez v. Doe, No. 

07-cv-1962-W (POR), 2010 WL 3718881, *8 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2010); see 

Martinez v. Muniz, No. 14-cv-03753-HSG (PR), 2016 WL 3208398, *13 (N.D. 

Cal. June 10, 2016) (finding that a plaintiff’s continued filing of inmate 

appeals does not negate the existence of a chilling effect). The Court, 

therefore, finds that there was a chilling effect, despite the fact that Plaintiff 

continued to file inmate appeals because the chilling effect need not be so 

great as to totally silence the inmate. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 

(rejecting argument that inmate failed to state retaliation claim where, after 

alleged adverse action, plaintiff nonetheless had been able to file inmate 

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grievances and a lawsuit). Based thereon, Plaintiff satisfies the fourth 

element of the Rhodes pleading standard.

e. Action Did Not Reasonably Advance a Legitimate 

Correctional Goal

The fifth and final element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires 

Plaintiff to make an assertion that Defendants’ actions did not advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 567-68. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that 

Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff’s “litigiousness” by improperly 

handling his appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 47-49). The Court construes Plaintiff’s 

allegations to allege that Defendants conduct was “arbitrary and capricious” 

rather than actions that advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution that were narrowly tailored to achieve such goals. See Rizzo, 778 

F.2d at 532 (finding that the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ actions 

were retaliatory and arbitrary and capricious, showing that they did not 

serve any legitimate correctional goal). Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the 

fifth element of the Rhodes pleading standard. 

2. Plausibility

Defendants argue that, “even if [Plaintiff] had alleged a retaliatory 

motive, [his] allegations do not pass the plausibility standard under Twombly

and Iqbal.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 16). Defendants contend that “[i]t is simply not 

plausible that despite processing appeals from all inmates, that the appeals 

coordinators would target [Plaintiff] for retaliation because he filed an 

appeal.” (Id.). The Court disagrees. It is reasonable to conclude from the 

entirety of Plaintiff’s factual allegations that Defendants’ retaliated against 

Plaintiff. While the evidence may prove the contrary, at this stage of the 

proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the plausibility standard.

Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts to meet all elements of a First 

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Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

in count ten against Defendants Olsen, Olivarria, Baenziger, Self and Sosa be 

DENIED. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim in count eleven against 

Defendants Seibel and Stratton for their personal involvement be DENIED.

3. Respondeat Superior

Count eleven seeks to hold Defendants Seibel and Stratton liable as 

supervisors for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment for failing to 

prevent the retaliatory acts of their subordinates set forth in count ten of the 

Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 50-51). Defendants Stratton and Seibel assert 

that they must be dismissed because there is no respondeat superior liability 

where the supervisors were not personally involved in or causally connected 

to the constitutional deprivation. (Id. at 17-18). Plaintiff argues he 

sufficiently alleged a causal connection between Defendants Stratton and 

Seibel and the constitutional deprivation to hold them liable for failing to 

supervise appeals coordinators and subordinate staff. (ECF No. 23 at 15).

Only parts of count eleven allege that Defendants Seibel and Stratton 

are liable as supervisors. (See ECF No. 1 at 50-51). Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants Seibel and Stratton retaliated against him by failing to take 

“corrective action as supervisors” against subordinate officers for filing false 

RVRs filed against him, for interfering with Plaintiff’s right to appeal and for 

limiting the levels of review for two of Plaintiff’s appeals. (Id.). As such, 

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Seibel and Stratton “acquiesce[d] 

in the constitutional deprivation.” See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208

(9th Cir. 2011). 

Under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, a defendant cannot be held liable 

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under a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978). However, “a supervisor is liable for the constitutional 

violations of subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. List, 

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

568 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that state officials may be liable under § 1983 if 

“they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional 

rights”). To be liable, “[t]he supervisor must know about the conduct and 

facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he] 

might see.” Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jones v. 

City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)).

Supervisory liability is established where the supervisor reviewed the 

plaintiff’s applicable inmate appeal and failed to take corrective action. See 

Poulson v. Kirkegard, 2015 WL 5943207, *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 16, 2015) (citing 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006)). Supervisors involved in 

reviewing an inmate appeal can be held liable under § 1983 where they deny 

a prisoner’s appeal and had the authority and opportunity to prevent an 

ongoing constitutional violation. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098 (stating that 

prison administrators cannot “turn a blind eye” to constitutional violations 

being committed by subordinates). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must 

allege that the supervisor knew about an existing or impending violation and 

failed to prevent it. Id.; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (supervisory official liable 

under § 1983 if he knew of a violation and failed to act to prevent it).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Seibel and Stratton reviewed appeals 

RJD-A-14-03004, RJD-A-14-03719, RJD-A-15-01864 and RJD-A-15-02152. 

(ECF No. 1 at 62, 84-85, 92-93, 117-19). Defendant Seibel learned of 

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Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation by subordinate officers when he reviewed 

Appeal RJD-A-14-03004, which alleged that officers were retaliating against 

Plaintiff for filing an inmate appeal against Defendant Limon. (Id. at 64-65). 

Further, Defendant Stratton had knowledge of Plaintiff’s allegations of 

retaliation by subordinate officers when he reviewed appeal RJD-A-14-03719, 

which stated that Plaintiff was subject to “reprisal by way of . . . falsification 

of [RVR].” (Id. at 73). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges in RJD-A-15-02152, an 

appeal Defendant Stratton reviewed, that subordinate officers “securely 

locked [Plaintiff] in a malicious punitive cycle” in retaliation for his filing of 

inmate appeals. (Id. at 116). Plaintiff’s allegations of a “punitive cycle” and 

repeated retaliation by way of improperly handling inmate appeals is 

sufficient, at this stage of the proceedings, to show an ongoing constitutional 

violation that Defendants Seibel and Stratton had knowledge of and could 

have stopped or prevented. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 

1045. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Defendants Seibel and Stratton under supervisory liability in count 

eleven be DENIED.

C. Count Twelve: Eighth Amendment Violation

Plaintiff contends that all Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they “refused to 

allow [Plaintiff] to attend his (work) [sic] assignment and (while 

simultaneously) relentlessly onslaughted [sic] Plaintiff[’s] central file with 

false [RVRs] accusing Plaintiff of refusing to attend his assignment . . . . [and] 

when [Plaintiff] attempted to file appeals regarding the issues, [D]efendants 

frustrated, interfered with, obstructed and denied Plaintiff’s (Administrative) 

rights to file appeals while other inmates’ rights were not interfered with 

obstructed and denied.” (ECF Nos. 1 at 52-53; 23 at 10). Plaintiff asserts 

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Defendants acted with deliberate indifference because they “had full 

knowledge” of Plaintiff’s allegations and “took no measure to investigate why 

the officers continued writing these false [RVRs] nor did they order the 

activities stopped.” (ECF No. 23 at 10). He states that Defendants were 

“objectively cruel” at the “expense of Plaintiff’s personal safety.” (Id. at 12).

Defendants assert that count twelve must be dismissed because 

Plaintiff “does not allege that he was deprived of a fundamental right” and 

therefore “cannot state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 

(ECF No. 16-1 at 13). Specifically, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff’s 

allegations do not allege that Defendants denied him the ‘minimal civilized 

measures of life’s necessities.’” (Id. at 14) (citation omitted). Defendants 

explain that writing disciplinary reports, screening or cancelling appeals, 

filing inmate appeals and having a prison job are not fundamental rights 

under the Eighth Amendment. (Id.). Plaintiff concedes that filing false RVRs

and filing inmate appeals are not a fundamental rights on their own, but 

instead argues that “in-concert the issues rise to the level of a fundamental 

right, and that this right relates to [Plaintiff’s] personal safety.” (ECF No. 23 

at 11). Defendants reply that the Ninth Circuit rejects Plaintiff’s “in-concert” 

argument. (ECF No. 24 at 2-3). 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners against cruel and unusual 

conditions of confinement. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Prison conditions do 

not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they amount to “unquestioned and 

serious deprivations of basic human needs” or the “minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991). “After incarceration, only the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment. . . .” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (internal 

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citations and quotations omitted).

To prove an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane 

conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and 

subjective requirement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen 

v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). The objective prong requires the 

prisoner to allege facts sufficient to show that the prison official’s acts or 

omissions deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The institution provides the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities if it “furnishes sentenced prisoners with 

adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal 

safety.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. To meet 

the subjective prong, a prisoner must allege facts showing that the 

defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302; 

Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. Deliberate indifference exists where a prison official 

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the 

official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the objective 

requirement of an Eighth Amendment violation because he has not alleged 

he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 

Plaintiff lists three conditions of his confinement that he alleges are cruel and 

unusual: (1) Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to attend his work 

assignment; (2) Defendants filed several false disciplinary reports against 

Plaintiff and refused to remove them from his central file; and (3) Defendants 

interfered, frustrated, obstructed and denied Plaintiff’s right to file inmate 

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appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 52-53). None of these reasons is a deprivation of the 

minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities under the Eighth Amendment.

First, “inmates have no constitutional right to be assigned to a 

particular job.” Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing 

Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1984); Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8th 

Cir. 1981)); see also Walker v. Gomez, 101 Fed. App’x 200, 203 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(stating that “[t]here is no constitutional right to a work assignment”). Thus, 

a work assignment does not constitute a basic human need, and being 

deprived from working does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 

See Barno v. Ryan, 399 Fed. App’x 272, 273 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

possible loss of a prison job did not violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 

rights); Cox v. Pacholke, No. C12-5421 BHS/KLS, 2012 WL 5877513, *4 (W.D. 

Wash. Oct. 9, 2014) (finding that “[t]here is no constitutional right to receive 

and retain a particular prison job assignment” so termination from 

employment does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Williams v. Meese, 926 

F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991) (removing a prisoner from a job does not rise to 

the level of cruel and unusual punishment).

Second, there is no constitutional protection for prisoners where false 

disciplinary charges are filed and prosecuted. Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 

2d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 1997); Dickson v. Valenzuela, No. cv 14-6954-DOC 

(GJS), 2016 WL 7628, *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016); see e.g. Sprouse v. Babcock, 

870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that claims based on the falsity 

of charges and impropriety of the defendant’s involvement in the grievance 

procedure, “standing alone, do not state constitutional claims”); Smith v. 

Albee, No. 2:15-cv-1598 KJN, 2016 WL 6094471, *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016) 

(the “falsification of disciplinary reports does not state a stand-alone 

constitutional claim,” because “[t]here is no constitutionally guaranteed 

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immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result 

in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest”); Williams v. Foote, No. CV 

08-2838-CJC (JEM), 2011 WL 6968033, *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) (there is 

no Eighth Amendment right to be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary 

reports), adopted by 2012 WL 71747 (Jan. 5, 2012). 

Third, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not guarantee vindication for 

Plaintiff’s inmate appeals.” Saenz v. Spearman, No. 1:09-cv-00557-GSA-YNP 

(PC), 2009 WL 2365405, *6 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009). Screening-out, 

cancelling, rejecting or denying an inmate appeal “does not result in the 

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, even if the 

justification for the screen-out[, cancellation, rejection or denial] is 

illegitimate.” Id. A prison grievance procedure is a procedural right and does 

not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 

F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 

(N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 

2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on 

prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 

“[t]here is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure”). 

Thus, actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as 

the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Plaintiff argues that these three conditions of confinement in concert 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 23 at 11). Courts may 

consider conditions in combination “when they have mutually enforcing effect 

that produces the deprivation of a single identifiable human need . . . .” 

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05. However, “[c]ourts may not find Eighth 

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Amendment violations based on the ‘totality of conditions’ at a prison. . . . A 

number of conditions, each of which satisfy Eighth Amendment 

requirements, cannot in combination amount to an Eighth Amendment 

violation.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47 (quoting Wright v. Rushen, 642 

F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Court finds that each of the three 

conditions Plaintiff lists meets Eighth Amendment requirements and they do 

not have mutually enforcing effect producing deprivation of a single human 

need. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Count twelve of the Complaint be GRANTED and count twelve be 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

4

D. Counts Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen

In count thirteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that all Defendants 

violated California Government Code § 19572(f), which states that dishonesty 

is cause for discipline of a state government employee. (ECF No. 1 at 53-54); 

Cal. Gov. Code § 19572(f). In count fourteen, Plaintiff alleges that all 

 

4 The Court has declined to grant Plaintiff leave to amend count twelve of the 

Complaint because they are more properly considered under a First 

Amendment violation and counts one through eleven, which each allege 

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, survive the Motion to 

Dismiss. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding 

cognizable First Amendment/retaliation claim based on theory that guard 

filed false disciplinary charge in retaliation for prisoner’s use of prison 

grievance system); see also Deadmon v. Grannis, No. 06cv1382-LAB (WMC), 

2008 WL 595883, *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (observing that “an inmate can 

state a cognizable claim for violation of his federal constitutional rights 

associated with an allegedly false disciplinary report” through two means: 

first, by alleging the false report was retaliatory; and, second, by alleging he 

was not afforded procedural due process in connection with the issuance of 

that report).

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Defendants violated California Penal Code § 5058 by failing to enforce, 

monitor and abide by the terms of the California Code of Regulations. (ECF 

No. 1 at 54-55). California Penal Code § 5058 permits the director of 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to 

“prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the 

prisons.” Cal. Pen. Code § 5058(a). In count fifteen, Plaintiff alleges that all 

Defendants violated the DOM. (Id. at 55-56). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts 

that his claims are based “upon the combination of: (a) preventing Plaintiff 

from attending his [work] assignment; (b) the succeeding action of failing to 

process his appeals regarding the false disciplinary reports that accused 

Plaintiff of refusing to attend his [work] assignment; and (c) failing to process 

appeals filed against those whose responsibility it was to process appeals.” 

(ECF No. 23 at 17-18). 

Defendants argue that they are immune from liability under counts 

thirteen, fourteen and fifteen because they plead state law claims involving 

“instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administration proceeding.” (ECF 

No. 16-1 at 19). Defendants state that even if Plaintiff “could plead state law 

claims, he failed to file a government claim against Defendants Fernandez, 

Stratton, Vasquez, and Seibel,” thereby barring his claims under the 

Government Claims Act. (Id. at 20). Plaintiff contends that Defendants are 

not immune from liability under state law and that he did comply with the 

Government Claims Act. (ECF No. 23 at 16-26). In light of the Court’s 

decision on the applicability of California Government Code § 821.6 

immunity, the Court declines to analyze Defendants’ Government Claims Act 

argument.

Government Code § 821.6 reads: “A public employee is not liable for 

injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative 

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proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously 

and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6. “California courts 

construe section 821.6 broadly in furtherance of its purpose to protect public 

employees in the performance of their prosecutorial duties from the threat of 

harassment through civil suits.” Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 

4th 1033, 1048 (2d Dist. 2007) (citing Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 

1280, 1293 (6th Dist. 1999)). The statute is designed to provide immunity 

where a public employee “initiates or procures an arrest and prosecution 

under lawful process but with malicious motive and without probable cause.” 

Id. at 1043 (emphasis in original). The statute immunizes both the formal 

acts of filing or prosecuting a judicial or administrative action and actions 

taken in preparation of such formal proceeding. Id. at 1048. This immunity 

bars state-law causes of actions against prison officials in connection with 

administrative disciplinary proceedings, such as the inmate appeals process. 

See Baker v. Schwarzenneger, 2008 WL 5068937, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 

2008) (applying Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6 to bar state-law causes of action 

against prison officials in connection with an allegedly false RVR); see also 

Miller v. Catlett, No. 08-cv2428 DMS (PCL), 2010 WL 444734, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 

Feb. 1, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s state law claims with prejudice 

pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6).

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated California Government 

Code § 19572(f), California Penal Code § 5058 and various sections within the 

DOM when they prevented Plaintiff from attending his work assignment, 

filed false RVRs against him and improperly handled his inmate appeals. 

(ECF Nos. 1 at 53-56; 23 at 17-18). Thus, counts thirteen, fourteen and 

fifteen raise only state law claims in connection with administrative 

disciplinary proceedings and Defendants are entitled to immunity under 

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California Government Code § 821.6. See Baker v. Schwarzenneger, 2008 WL 

5068937, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2008); see also Miller v. Catlett, 2010 WL 

444734, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010). Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants Motion to Dismiss counts thirteen, 

fourteen and fifteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint be GRANTED and the claims be 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Olsen, Olivarria, 

Baenziger, Self and Sosa (count ten).

2) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Seibel and Stratton (count 

eleven).

3) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants (count twelve).

4) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to 

Plaintiff’s state law claims against all Defendants (counts thirteen, fourteen 

and fifteen).

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the court and

serve a copy on all parties by March 22, 2017. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be served and filed by March 29, 2017.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

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Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2017

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