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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2246 

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Donald Greer, 

Appellant, 

v. 

Elaine Chao, Secretary of the 

United States Department of 

Labor, 

Appellee. 

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Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the 

District of Minnesota. 

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Submitted: February 12, 2007 

 Filed: July 9, 2007 

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, O’CONNOR*

, Associate Justice (Ret.), and 

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

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O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.). 

 This case considers the response of the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal 

Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to Donald Greer’s complaint filed under the 

Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (VEVRAA), as 

 *

 The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the United States 

Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a). 

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amended. Because the OFCCP promptly discharged its duty to conduct an 

investigation into Greer’s administrative complaint, we conclude that the Secretary of 

Labor’s response in this case represents a decision committed to agency discretion and 

is, therefore, immune from judicial review. 

 

I. 

 The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (VEVRAA), 

as amended, provides that the federal government shall require its contractors to “take 

affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified covered veterans.” 

 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a). In addition, the statute provides that a covered veteran who 

believes that a government contractor has not complied with VEVRAA “may file a 

complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who shall promptly investigate such complaint 

and take appropriate action in accordance with the terms of the contract and applicable 

laws and regulations.” 38 U.S.C. § 4212(b). The Secretary of Labor has charged the 

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) with investigating 

complaints made against contractors. 41 C.F.R. 60-250.60, 60-250.61(a). After the 

OFCCP receives such a complaint, it is directed to “prompt[ly] investigat[e],” 41 

C.F.R. 60-250.61(d), and determine whether to pursue enforcement proceedings 

against the contractor. 41 C.F.R. 60-250.65, 60-250.66. If the OFCCP determines 

either that the contractor has not committed an infraction or that initiating enforcement 

proceedings is unwarranted, the OFCCP informs the complainant and the contractor, 

usually in a Notice of Results of Investigation. 41 C.F.R. 60-250.61(e)(1). 

 On November 15, 2001, Donald Greer, a covered veteran of the Vietnam era, 

filed a complaint with the OFCCP asserting that his employer, Eaton Corporation, had 

failed to comply with VEVRAA. Among other assertions, Greer contended that Eaton 

had not adequately trained its employees in VEVRAA and had not adhered to the 

affirmative obligations that the statute imposes. On November 27, 2001, less than two 

weeks after Greer filed his complaint, OFCCP began an investigation. Over the 

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ensuing eighteen-month period, OFCCP agents visited Eaton Corporation, reviewed 

Greer’s employment file, interviewed Greer’s coworkers, and discussed employment 

decisions with Eaton managers. On August 29, 2003, OFCCP notified Greer in a 

Notice of Results of Investigation that the investigation had turned up insufficient 

evidence to conclude either that Eaton had discriminated against him or that Eaton had 

violated any of its affirmative obligations. Accordingly, the OFCCP informed Greer 

that it would not seek enforcement action against Eaton. Although Greer asked the 

OFCCP to reconsider its decision, OFCCP’s Regional Director issued a letter 

affirming the agency’s initial findings. 

 Greer filed a lawsuit in district court seeking review of this decision under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., asserting that the agency 

had not complied with the obligations imposed by VEVRAA. The Secretary of Labor 

moved to dismiss the case, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction 

because the agency’s decision to decline enforcement proceedings against Eaton was, 

under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), and related cases, immune from 

judicial review. Greer responded by suggesting that Chaney was irrelevant: “[Greer] 

is not contesting the Secretary’s decision not to take enforcement action against Eaton 

Corporation. He is asking this Court to require the Department of Labor (DOL) to 

conduct an investigation of [Greer]’s claims before making any decision.” Plaintiff’s 

Reply Memorandum to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, at 1-2. The district court avoided resolving the case in light of Chaney, and 

instead granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Labor because Greer’s affidavit 

in support of his motion for summary judgment had not been successfully filed. By 

the district court’s lights, this failure to file meant that Greer had proffered no 

evidence in support of his allegations against Eaton Corporation. 

 This appeal followed. 

 

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II. 

 VEVRAA provides that when a Vietnam Era veteran files a complaint with the 

Secretary of Labor, she “shall promptly investigate such complaint and take 

appropriate action in accordance with the terms of the contract and applicable laws 

and regulations.” 38 U.S.C. § 4212(b). The question we consider today is whether 

this language permits us to review the agency’s conduct in response to Greer’s 

administrative complaint. We hold that it does not. 

 There is a strong presumption that agency action is reviewable by courts. See

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). That 

strong presumption, however, is not an absolute. Indeed, the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA) provides an exception to judicial reviewability where agency 

action is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). And as the 

Supreme Court of the United States observed in Chaney, “review is not to be had if 

the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which 

to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” 470 U.S. at 830. See also Ngure v. 

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2004). 

 In Chaney, the Court held that when an agency declines to initiate enforcement 

proceedings, that decision is not presumptively reviewable. See id. at 831. This is 

true because when an agency decides to seek enforcement actions (or declines to seek 

enforcement actions), it is entitled to the same type of discretion that a prosecutor is 

afforded in bringing (or not bringing) criminal charges. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831 

(“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 

criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 

discretion.”); Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that “when [the 

Federal Aviation Agency’s] prosecutorial discretion is at issue, the matter is 

presumptively committed to agency discretion by law”). 

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Chaney deemed enforcement decisions “general[ly] unsuitab[le]” for judicial 

review because “an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated 

balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.” 470 U.S. 

at 831. In addition to “assess[ing] whether a violation has occurred,” the agency must 

also assess “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, 

whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement 

action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the 

agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.” Id. And Chaney

expressly noted that agencies need not pursue every statutory violation that they may 

encounter. See id. at 831-32 (“An agency generally cannot act against each technical 

violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped 

than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 

priorities.”). 

 Greer styles his lawsuit as contesting the Secretary’s investigation in response 

to his administrative complaint because there can be no question that a direct 

challenge to the Secretary’s enforcement decision would be impermissible. If 

VEVRAA provided a “meaningful standard against which” to evaluate the agency’s 

“exercise of discretion” in this context, then we would be able to review the decision 

declining to pursue enforcement proceedings. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830, 832. But, as 

then-Judge Kennedy found when he entertained a challenge to an enforcement 

decision under VEVRAA, the statute contains no such meaningful standard. See 

Clementson v. Brock, 806 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986). Interpreting the same 

language that we consider today, Clementson observed that the statutory language 

“provides no indication of what ‘appropriate action’ is; it lists no factors for OFCCP 

to consider in making that determination; and it specifies no standards for a court to 

use in cabining the agency’s discretion.” Id. “In short,” then-Judge Kennedy wrote, 

“it leaves us with no ‘law to apply.’” Id. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (declining 

the presumption of reviewability “where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in 

a given case that there is no law to apply”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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 Accordingly, Greer asserts that he is challenging not the agency’s enforcement 

powers, but its supposed failure to investigate certain claims within his complaint. At 

least one district court has previously analyzed objections to agency investigations in 

light of Chaney. In Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1992), Frank 

Giacobbi filed a complaint with the Department of Labor under Section 503 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which directs that the Department “shall promptly 

investigate such complaint and shall take such action thereon as the facts and 

circumstances warrant.” 29 U.S.C. § 793. Subsequently, the OFCCP investigated the 

complaint, concluded that no Section 503 violation had occurred, and notified 

Giacobbi of its conclusions in a Notice of Results of Investigation. In turn, Giacobbi 

filed a lawsuit predicated on the APA in which he contended “it [was] not the decision 

not to take enforcement action that he ask[ed the district court] to review; rather, it 

[was] the . . . manner in which the investigation was carried out.” 780 F. Supp. at 37. 

The court in Giacobbi, however, rejected this contention: “This argument cannot 

succeed because the investigation itself, like the final decision whether or not to take 

enforcement action, is within the ‘enforcement arena’ and therefore, committed to 

agency discretion.” Id. (quoting Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 

1985)). Drawing on Chaney, Giacobbi suggested that the manner in which an agency 

opts to investigate a complaint is largely a matter left to the agency’s discretion: 

“Deciding which claims are facially without merit, which claims merit investigation, 

and the level of investigation desirable, are all enforcement-related decisions.” Id. 

 The court in Giacobbi understood the plaintiff’s disagreement with the agency’s 

handling of his matter to hinge on two different problems with the agency 

investigation: (1) the Department’s “investigation was not reasonably thorough” in 

light of “inaccuracies in DOL findings” and “factually erroneous conclusions,” id. at 

38-39; (2) Giacobbi “claims that his complaint of retaliation was not investigated at 

all.” Id. at 39. As to the first contention, Giacobbi reasoned: “This Court’s only 

function is to ascertain whether an investigation did take place. A review of the 

DOL’s findings makes clear that the complaint was investigated.” Id. As to the claim 

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regarding the absence of investigation regarding the retaliation claim, Giacobbi stated: 

“It is true that the word ‘retaliation’ does not appear in the DOL findings. It would 

appear, however, that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was investigated.” 

Id. In addition, Giacobbi rejected the contention that the Department is required to 

address “each of the complaint’s claims individually.” Id. at 39, n.2. Noting that 

Giacobbi appeared to be requesting “a more formal and detailed set of findings than 

he received,” the court found that “[s]uch findings are not required.” Id. 

 In this case, Greer’s efforts to attack the agency’s investigation do nothing to 

remove his lawsuit from the “enforcement arena.” There is no question that the 

Secretary of Labor conducted an investigation into Greer’s complaint. Indeed, Greer’s 

filings in district court acknowledge that the OFCCP investigated his administrative 

complaint. See Amended Complaint ¶ 8 (“After the Department of Labor undertook 

an investigation of plaintiff’s complaint, . . . ”). 

 None of Greer’s claims regarding the instant investigation distinguish this case 

from Giacobbi. While one paragraph of Greer’s Amended Complaint discusses the 

Secretary’s failure to conduct “a full, fair, and thorough investigation,” Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 30, we find that the “level of investigation desirable” is fundamentally 

an “enforcement-related decision[].” Giacobbi, 780 F.Supp. at 39. Accord Office of 

Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(“The scope of investigation . . . is very much dependent on the agency’s 

interpretation and administration of its authorizing substantive legislation concerning 

which the agency may enjoy interpretative deference.”). Moreover, at oral argument 

in district court, Greer’s attorney said: “[The Department of Labor] investigated the 

ultimate claims. They did not investigate the building blocks that led to them.” 

1/25/06 Oral Arg. Tr. at 11. This sounds to us like an objection to the manner in 

which the investigation was carried out. 

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 Although Greer styles his lawsuit as an objection to the Secretary’s failure to 

investigate certain aspects of his larger complaint, it is clear that at bottom Greer 

objects to the Secretary’s decision not to initiate enforcement proceedings against 

Eaton. Indeed, there are portions of Greer’s filings in district court that strongly 

indicate that he did not object to the Secretary’s investigation so much as its decision 

regarding enforcement. See Amended Complaint ¶ 24 (“The materials provided 

plaintiff do indicate that defendant has not even attempted to perform its legal duty to 

enforce [VEVRAA], . . . . ”) (emphasis added); id. at ¶ 25 (“A measure of defendant’s 

indifference to its enforcement responsibilities is its failure to rule on plaintiff’s 

complaints of retaliation.”) (emphasis added). When it comes to the agency’s 

discretionary enforcement powers, courts do not usually interfere. Chaney, 470 U.S. 

at 834 (“The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with 

sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the most 

appropriate body to police this aspect of their performance.”). We can find no reason 

to depart from that standard practice here. 

 While an agency’s investigation might, at least conceivably, be so anemic that 

its decision to decline enforcement proceedings would be suspect, we have no 

occasion to pass on that scenario here. As then-Judge Kennedy wrote in Clementson, 

“We express no opinion about reviewability in cases where an agency had adopted a 

general policy so extreme as to amount to an abdication of statutory responsibility, for 

no such claim is present in this case.” 806 F.2d at 1405 (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 

833 n.4). See Giacobbi, 780 F. Supp. at 39 (rejecting the argument that “the 

investigation was so cursory or wholly unreasonable that the Court should view it as 

not having been made”). We do not encounter anything resembling such an anemic 

investigation on the facts before us. Among other actions, OFCCP officials visited 

Eaton, discussed conditions with coworkers, and interviewed managers. These 

investigatory steps are sufficient to indicate that the Secretary discharged her statutory 

obligations. 

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While we do not rely on the reasoning of the district court, we nonetheless find 

that it reached the correct result in granting summary judgment to the Secretary of 

Labor. In light of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

 

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