Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00836/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILBUR NORRIS; MICHAEL G.

DODDER; AUSTIN L. FOWERS;

MICHAEL NIGHSWONGERK; CHRISTIE

M. EVERTON; SHERRY ALEXANDERMAYS; ROBIN L. MAYS; QUINTON R.

TANNER; and PEGGY B. TANNER,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12cv0836 JM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

REMAND

vs.

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS

LP; ASTRAZENECA, LP; MCKESSON

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), Plaintiffs move to remand their products liability action to

state court. Defendants AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and AstraZeneca LP (collectively

“AstraZeneca”) oppose the motion to remand and separately move to dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim, to change venue, and to sever and transfer the claims of the individual Plaintiffs. 

Defendant McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”) has not responded to the motions; and Plaintiffs

oppose AstraZeneca’s motions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters

presented appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court

grants the motion to remand and denies all other motions as moot. The Clerk of Court is instructed

to remand this action to state court.

/ / /

- 1 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

BACKGROUND

On March 19, 2012, Plaintiffs commenced this products liability action in the Superior Court

for the County of Imperial, alleging seven causes of action for (1) strict liability; (2) negligence; (3)

breach of express warranty; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) fraud; (6) fraudulent concealment; and

(7) loss of consortium. The nine Plaintiffs are alleged residents and citizens of either California,

Nevada, Utah, and Washington. (Compl. ¶¶1-7). AstraZeneca LP and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals

LP are business entities domiciled in the State of Delaware with their principal place of business in

that state. (Comp. 8). McKesson is incorporated in the State of Delaware with its principal place of

business in California. (Compl. ¶9).

In broad brush, Plaintiffs allege that AstraZeneca manufactured Crestor, a cholesterol lowering

medication, and McKesson distributed the drug to Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-24). Plaintiffs allege that

“Crestor has been linked to such serious side effects as cardiomyopathy, heart attacks, heart muscle

deterioration, sudden cardiac death, rhabdomyolysis (muscle deterioration), kidney and liver damage,

and diabetes.” Id. Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants did act together to design, sell, advertise,

manufacture and/or distribute Crestor, with full knowledge of its dangerous and defective nature,” and

that Plaintiffs suffered cognizable injuries. (Compl. ¶14). 

On April 5, 2012 Defendants removed the action, alleging both diversity and federal question

jurisdiction. (Ct. Dkt. 1). In order to assert diversity jurisdiction, Defendants contend that McKesson

was fraudulently joined to defeat federal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs now move to remand the action and to stay all proceedings pending resolution of the motion

to remand, and Defendants to dismiss certain claims, to change venue, and to transfer and sever. All

motions are opposed.

DISCUSSION

Diversity Jurisdiction

A civil action brought in state court may be removed to federal court by a defendant when

federal courts have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Where jurisdiction is based

upon diversity of citizenship, joinder of a non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the

defendant’s presence in the lawsuit is ignored, for purposes of determining diversity “[i]f the plaintiff

- 2 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the

settled rules of the state.” McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987);

Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Corp., 494 F.3d 1203,1206 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he question

is simply whether there is any possibility that plaintiff will be able to establish liability against the

party in question.” Briano v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 126 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The

party who invokes federal removal jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating the existence of

federal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc. 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); B., Inc. v. Miller

Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981). In determining whether joinder is fraudulent, the court

considers the complaint, facts identified in the Notice of Removal and any pertinent affidavits or

declarations submitted by the removing party or in rebuttal. See Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139

F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Any doubts regarding removal jurisdiction are construed against

removal and in favor of remanding the case to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

AstraZeneca contends that McKesson is not a proper party because (1) there is no liability for

distributors of pharmaceuticals and (2) there is no support for Plaintiffs’ allegation that McKesson

actually distributed the drug at issue to Plaintiffs. Neither argument is persuasive. Virtually every

court that has considered the issue now before the court has concluded that California state law

recognizes a products liability claim against a distributor. The general rule in California is that both

manufacturers and distributors are strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product. Maher v.

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist Lexis 58984 at *7-8 (citing Bostick v. Flex

Equipment Co., 147 Cal.App.4th 80, 88 (2007)); Black v. Merck & Co. Inc., U.S. District LEXIS

29860 at*10 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (strict liability for failure to warn extends beyond manufacturers to

retailers and wholesalers); Andrews v. Bayer Corp., Case No. CV 09-08762 DDP (FFMx); Holland

v. Bayer Corp, CASE No. SACV 09-1350 DOC (RNBx) (finding that Bayer fails to demonstrate that

McKesson is fraudulently joined); Mandernach v. Bayer Corp, Case No. 5:09-cv-02306 JHN (Opx)

(same); Grove v. Bayer Corp, Case No. SADV 09-1509 AG (MLGx).

In Maher v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 07cv0852 WQH (JMA), Judge Hayes granted

the plaintiff’s motion to remand an action commenced against a pharmaceutical manufacturer and its

distributor, McKesson. The court noted the general rule in California that distributors and other

- 3 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“participants in the chain of distribution” are strictly liable in defective products cases. Bostick v.

Flex Equipment Co., 147 Cal. App.4th 80, 88 (2007). The court then noted:

This court has been unable to find, nor has either party cited, a case under California

law which creates an exception in strict liability for distributors in prescription drug

cases. This court cannot conclude that it is obvious that the general rule of distributor

liability does not apply under the allegations of this case.

LEXIS U.S. Dist., Lexis 58984 at *12. Accordingly, the court concludes that the complaint

adequately establishes that a distributor of pharmaceuticals may be liable under California law.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that McKesson distributed the

Crestor allegedly ingested by Plaintiffs. The Complaint alleges, upon information and belief, that

“McKesson did distribute the Crestor Plaintiffs ingested, which give rise to the causes of action, and

the injuries sustained as a direct and proximate result of such ingestion.” (Compl. ¶19). Plaintiffs also

come forward with evidence to show that McKesson promotes itself as involved in the risk

management, marketing, and distribution controls of the pharmaceuticals it distributes and sells. 

(Finson Decl. ¶K). AstraZeneca establishes that from November 2008 through the present, Crestor

was distributed through 35 different distributors throughout the Untied States. (Callahan Decl. ¶2,

Exh. B Notice of Removal). Defendants do not inform the court whether McKesson distributed

Crestor in the states of Plaintiffs’ residence (California, Nevada, Utah, and Washington) and, if so,

the market share of McKesson. As Plaintiffs may not have purchased Crestor from McKesson,

AstraZeneca concludes that McKesson is not a proper defendant. Based upon the complaint’s

allegations, the Notice of Removal, the evidence submitted by the parties and construing the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995),

cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996), accepting as true all material undisputed allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d

1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992), the court cannot conclude that it is “obvious” that McKesson did not

distribute the Crestor ingested by Plaintiffs. Moreover, given the doubts concerning McKesson’s role

in distributing Crestor to Plaintiffs, any doubts concerning diversity jurisdiction are construed against

the exercise of jurisdiction and in favor of remand. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

In sum, the court concludes that AstraZeneca fails to meet its burden to show that McKesson

is improperly joined as a party. While discovery in the state court action may ultimately reveal that

- 4 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McKesson did not distribute the Crestor at issue, the court notes that nothing in this order prevents

AstraZeneca from seeking to remove the action in the event there is complete diversity jurisdiction. 

Federal Question Jurisdiction 

 Federal question removal jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint as it existed

at the time of removal. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979); Rivet

v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (whether a claim arises under federal law is

determined by the “well-pleaded complaint rule”). Defendants, as the parties who invoke federal

removal jurisdiction, have the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Gaus.

980 F.2d at 566. Any doubts regarding removal jurisdiction are construed against Defendants and in

favor of remanding the case to state court. Id.

In the Notice of Removal, Defendants argue that there is a strong federal interest in resolving

Plaintiffs’ state law claims, as demonstrated by extensive FDA regulation of product labels and

warnings. (Notice of Removal ¶¶28-37). This argument is not persuasive. The district court has

original federal question jurisdiction where a state law claim is an “inherently federal claim”

articulated in state law terms and “the right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial,

disputed federal question.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1044

(9th Cir. 2003). To determine the existence of a substantial disputed federal question, the court asks

whether “the federal question [is] ‘basic’ and ‘necessary’ as opposed to ‘collateral’ and ‘merely

possible.’” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims for (1) strict liability; (2) negligence; (3) breach of express warranty;

(4) breach of implied warranty; (5) fraud; (6) fraudulent concealment; and (7) loss of consortium do

not implicate the existence of a substantial federal question. These state law claims are not preempted

by federal law even if approved for sale by the FDA and potentially implicate the FDA’s drug labeling

regulations. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570-71 (2009). Accordingly, the court lacks federal

question jurisdiction over the action.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

- 5 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In sum, the court grants the motion to remand, denies all other motions as moot, and instructs

the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2012

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

- 6 - 12cv0836

Case 3:12-cv-00836-JM-BLM Document 22 Filed 05/30/12 Page 6 of 6