Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 The court notes that on February 17, 2006, petitioner,

personally, filed with the undersigned a request to withdraw his

motion for a competency hearing. Therein, petitioner accuses his

counsel of forcing him to “claim incompetence.” The undersigned

is aware that the magistrate judge has repeatedly cautioned

petitioner that his personal filings to the court would not be

considered as he is represented by counsel. As such, the

undersigned does not moot the motion based on petitioner’s

(continued...)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JEANNIE WOODFORD,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on petitioner Gerald F.

Stanley’s (“petitioner”) objections to the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge, filed December 21, 2005

(“F&R”), denying petitioner’s request for a competency hearing.1

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1(...continued)

filing.

2

In the F&R, the magistrate judge denied petitioner’s request

finding it another “manipulation” of these habeas proceedings and

“counter-productive” to resolution of this ten year old case on

the merits. (F&R at 2:14.)

The F&R was served on the parties and contained notice that

any objections thereto were to be filed by January 3, 2006. Per

an extension of time, petitioner filed his objections on January

20, 2006. On January 26, 2006, respondent filed a “notice of

intent to rely on the magistrate judge’s [F&R] in place of filing

[a] opposition.”

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C) and Eastern District Local Rule 72-304, this court

has conducted a de novo review of this matter. Having carefully

reviewed the entire file, the court finds the F&R to be supported

by the record and by proper analysis.

In particular, with respect to petitioner’s argument that

the magistrate judge employed an incorrect legal standard in

determining whether to grant petitioner a competency hearing, the

court emphasizes the following:

Rohan ex rel Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 819 n. 11 (9th

Cir. 2003) does not answer the question presently before the

court, namely, “what showing a petitioner must make to warrant a

competency determination.” Indeed, to date, the Ninth Circuit

has not answered this question. In denying petitioner a hearing,

the magistrate judge acknowledged that fact and decided the

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2 Petitioner agrees that Rohan provides the “most

authoritative reasoning to govern this Court’s decision.” 

(Objs., filed Jan. 20, 2006, at 2:7-8.) In Rohan, the Ninth

Circuit held that the statutory right to counsel in federal postconviction relief proceedings in capital cases implies a

statutory right to competence in those proceedings. Id. at 817.

3 Petitioner does not dispute that this is the applicable

standard. (F&R at 7:24-25.)

3

question in the first instance, using Rohan for guidance.2

Ultimately, the magistrate judge found that:

[N]othing less than a prima facie case of incompetency

must be set forth before the habeas court should order

a competency hearing.

(F&R at 7:8-9.) The standard for competency, the magistrate

judge held, was “an ability to comprehend the nature of the

proceedings and an ability to rationally consult with counsel.”3

(F&R 8:2-3.).

As support for his findings, the magistrate judge properly

considered the peculiar context of habeas proceedings. As

opposed to a competency determination at trial, where the trial

judge and counsel can observe the defendant’s behavior nearly

daily, the habeas judge rarely, if ever, sees the petitioner and

is only able to glean facts about competence from secondary

sources. Additionally, the magistrate judge correctly focused on

a capital prisoner’s “incentive to malinger and manipulate” in

habeas proceedings, as delay will serve well a petitioner already

sentenced to death “almost as [much] as a victory.” (F&R at

6:20, 7:1.) Based on these primary considerations, this court

agrees with the magistrate judge that to “permit such a de minis

standard [as urged by petitioner of “bona fide doubt as to

competency” would] invite wholesale manipulation of already

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complex and lengthy habeas proceedings.” (F&R at 7:2-3.) As

such, the standard should require more than a “mere doubt” as to

competency.

Assessing petitioner’s showing here under the above

standard, the magistrate judge only considered petitioner’s

ability to rationally communicate with counsel, as he found that

petitioner had presented “no facts that [he] is unable to

understand the nature of these proceedings.” (F&R at 5:9-10.) 

The magistrate judge found that “the record of this case

indicates that [petitioner] understands it only all to well.” 

(F&R at 5:10-11.) A contrary conclusion cannot be reasonably

reached. Petitioner’s most recent filing of February 17, 2006,

discussed above, aptly demonstrates this point. Indeed,

petitioner continues to understand how to undertake filings with

the court and thereby request specific relief with regard to the

current proceedings before the court. (Docket # 651.) 

Accordingly, the undersigned likewise has considered petitioner’s

showing only with respect to his alleged inability to rationally

communicate with counsel.

On this issue, the court again concurs with the magistrate

judge’s assessment of petitioner. In many respects, petitioner’s

motivations are most clearly revealed, despite his counsel’s

protestations, from his own writings to the court. Those

writings reveal, as described in detail by the magistrate judge

(e.g., F&R at 8:23-9:12), that petitioner “has not lost the

ability to communicate for a desired purpose.” (F&R at 8:23-24.) 

In this case, the desired purpose clearly appears to be a

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4 On October 11, 2005, petitioner wrote: “Well, doctors

at Corcoran said three days after my arrival I should not be

here. Will you answer this? Can we delay evidentiary hearing

and start competency proceedings. I do not feel after what S.Q.

[San Quentin] did moving me, taking everything I own I am in my

right frame of mind.” (F&R at 8:25-9:2.)

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transfer back to San Quentin from Corcoran.4 

The Ninth Circuit emphasized in Rohan: “the mere fact that

[a petitioner] does not communicate rationally does not mean he

is incapable of doing so.” Rohan, 334 F.3d at 819. Such is the

case here. Petitioner appears capable of communicating with his

counsel when and for whatever purposes he deems warranted. That

he refuses to communicate with counsel on some occasions does not

render him incapable of doing so. In sum, considering the

lengthy history of this case and petitioner’s own actions in it,

including numerous calculating attempts to withdraw his petition,

then reinstate it, to work with his counsel, then refuse to do

so, to seek to terminate his court-appointed counsel’s services

and rehire his own counsel, etc., the court cannot find that

petitioner is unable to communicate rationally with his counsel. 

More likely, as found by the magistrate judge, he is simply

presently refusing to do so. (F&R at 11:16-23 [concluding,

“Thus, in the final analysis, the court views petitioner’s latest

tirade as one in which he again attempts to manipulate the system

in order to obtain some short term goal, and/or to rail against

the system which keeps him in prison.”]). This case should not

be delayed any further by petitioner’s “probable manipulative

actions (F&R at 12:8);” it should be decided on the merits.

///

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

The F&R, filed December 21, 2005, is adopted in full. No

competency hearing shall be held at this time.

DATED: March 1, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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