Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03156/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03156-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

MEGAN SHEEHAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.14-cv-03156-LB 

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 73, 75, 77]

INTRODUCTION

This is a civil-rights case under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. 

Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and California‘s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). (See generally 

Third Am. Compl. (―3AC‖) – ECF No. 40.)1It arises from injuries that plaintiff Megan Sheehan 

suffered after being arrested for public drunkenness on Saint Patrick‘s Day. Ms. Sheehan claims 

that the individual defendants — police officers Nolan Pianta of the Bay Area Rapid Transit 

District (―BART‖) and Michael Stolzman of the Oakland Police Department (―OPD‖) — used 

excessive force while booking her into jail, essentially throwing her to the floor, and so causing 

her injuries. She also sues BART and the OPD directly for governmental-policy liability under 

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

 

1 Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (―ECF‖); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of documents. 

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB) 2

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This order addresses three crossing motions for summary judgment. Ms. Sheehan moves for 

summary judgment on her Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Pianta and her Monell claim 

against BART. (See ECF Nos. 75, 75-1 at 2.) BART and Officer Pianta move the court to dismiss 

all the claims against them (ECF No. 73 at 5), as do the City of Oakland and Officer Stolzman 

(ECF No. 77 at 1). These motions present four basic questions: 1) Did Officer Pianta use excessive 

force when he threw Ms. Sheehan to the booking-room floor?; 2) Was Officer Stolzman an 

―integral participant‖ in Office Pianta‘s act?; 3) Is either defendant entitled to qualified immunity 

from Ms. Sheehan‘s claims?; and 4) Did BART ratify, or have a policy that allowed, Officer 

Pianta‘s conduct?

The court denies Ms. Sheehan‘s motion. The court grants the City of Oakland and Officer 

Stolzman‘s motion. The court partly grants and partly denies BART and Officer Pianta‘s motion. 

The court specifically holds as follows:

 A jury question exists on whether Officer Pianta used excessive force. The record does not 

permit a decision as a matter of law for either Ms. Sheehan or BART and Officer Pianta.

 A genuine dispute of material fact prevents the court from deciding whether Officer Pianta 

is entitled to qualified immunity; the parties‘ summary-judgment motions are therefore 

denied on this issue.

 Officer Stolzman, as a matter of law, was not an ―integral participant‖ in the ―takedown‖ 

that injured Ms. Sheehan.

 BART and the OPD cannot be held liable on a Monell ratification theory merely because 

their post-incident investigations exonerated Officers Pianta and Stolzman.

 There is no evidence that the OPD maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom for 

Monell purposes.

 The plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to raise a triable claim that BART 

maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom for Monell purposes.

 The plaintiff‘s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed with prejudice.

 The plaintiff‘s claim under California‘s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) tracks the 

disposition of her Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.

The court therefore dismisses with prejudice all claims against Officer Stolzman and the OPD. The 

court dismisses with prejudice Ms. Sheehan‘s Monell claims. Her Fourth Amendment and Bane 

Act claims will go forward.

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB) 3

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FACTS

St. Patrick‘s Day 2014 proved to be gravely unhappy for plaintiff Megan Sheehan. She began 

drinking during her lunch break as a bartender at an Irish bar in downtown San Francisco and 

continued after her shift ended; by 6:30 p.m. she was sleeping on a bench in the Lake Merritt 

BART station in Oakland.2 Which is where BART police found her.3There is no dispute that Ms. 

Sheehan was drunk. Given her intended destination of Walnut Creek, for one thing, she should not 

have been on the Lake Merritt line.4Present purposes do not require going into every last detail, 

and it will suffice to say that, throughout the events in question, Ms. Sheehan was less than fully 

cooperative.

Ms. Sheehan fought with the first BART officers who dealt with her at the Lake Merritt 

station, kicking one of them in the shoulder and the side of the face as he tried to handcuff her.5

She was arrested for obstructing a police officer, willfully resisting a police officer, battery on a 

police officer, and public intoxication.

6 Officer Pianta — who had not been involved with Ms. 

Sheehan before this point and who apparently was new enough at BART to be on probationary 

status — was assigned to drive her to the Santa Rita jail.7 Officer Pianta videotaped the drive to 

Santa Rita jail; his interaction with Ms. Sheehan generally was low-key and conversational. 

Among other things, she reported urinating in the back seat. When they arrived at Santa Rita, 

Officer Pianta escorted Ms. Sheehan into the jail‘s booking room. At the jail, Officer Pianta 

searched Ms. Sheehan‘s person and purse.8 Other police officers and their arrestees were already 

there. Among these were Officers Stolzman and Joel Hight, both of the OPD. 

 

2

Sheehan Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 6-12, 23-24 (pp. 18-24, 88-89). Throughout this discussion, citations 

to depositions carry two page numbers; the first, following the ―at,‖ is the ECF-generated page 

number; the second, following the ―p.‖ or ―pp.,‖ reflects the original deposition pagination. The 

citation at the start of this footnote thus refers to document ECF No. 74, ECF pages 6-12 and 23-24, 

and original deposition pages 18-24 and 88-89.

3 Trabanino Decl. – ECF No. 73-4 at 3 (¶ 16).

4

Sheehan Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 12 (p. 24).

5 Carrasco Decl. – ECF No. 73-2 at 1-2 (¶¶ 3-4); Trabanino Decl. – ECF No. 73-4 at 2-3 (¶¶ 13-15).

6 Trabanino Decl. – ECF No. 73-4 at 3 (¶ 16).

7

Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 28, 47 (pp. 60, 98); see ECF No. 83-7 at 224.

8

Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 23 (p. 78). 

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB) 4

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Three video cameras recorded the events in the booking room. One camera was on the booking 

room‘s ceiling; the other two were the respective body cameras of Officers Stolzman and Hight. 

The parties agree that the videos accurately reflect the relevant events. This analysis thus relies 

mainly on those videos. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-79 (2007) (using videotape to 

determine facts in excessive-force case). From her first encounter with the BART officers at Lake 

Merritt, through to her injury, Ms. Sheehan has almost no memory of the evening. She recalls 

nothing about what happened in the Santa Rita booking room.9

The videos show Ms. Sheehan standing uncuffed at the booking-room window (which is much 

like a traditional bank teller‘s station), engaging with the person behind the window as part of the 

booking process. Her purse sits on the counter to her left. Her back is to Officer Pianta, who stands 

a few feet behind, holding his handcuffs. Ms. Sheehan starts to twist her hair into a ponytail, and 

Officer Pianta tells her that Santa Rita won‘t let her take the ponytail holder into the cell. Ms. 

Sheehan responds, ―Oh,‖ and throws (in a slightly drunken way) the ponytail holder at Officer 

Pianta, who calmly answers, ―Really?‖ Ms. Sheehan then stands for some seconds more at the 

booking window, still apparently engaging with the person behind the window, and then, with both 

hands, starts rummaging through her purse. Things now move quickly. Officer Pianta tells her to 

stop.10 He steps up from behind and takes hold of either the purse or her left arm (it is hard to tell 

from the video), obviously trying to stop her from going through the purse. Ms. Sheehan resists, 

and Officer Pianta says, calmly, ―Let go, let go.‖ Ms. Sheehan says (somewhat petulantly and 

sardonically but not loudly) ―oh, my god, you are such a strong . . . .‖ Then she says, more loudly 

and animatedly, ―Don‘t touch me like that!‖ as Officer Pianta puts her left arm in a ―pain 

compliance‖ hold, from which she squirms mostly free.11 As she continues to twist in Officer 

 

9

Sheehan Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 14-20 (pp. 26-32).

10 E.g., Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 79 at 9 (pp. 75-76). It is unclear whether Ms. Sheehan‘s purse had been 

searched before her transport to Santa Rita jail. Officer Pianta ―believe[s]‖ that his partner had 

searched it before he drove to the jail, because that is normal procedure, but he was not certain. (See 

Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 79 at 9 [p. 77].) Officer Pianta searched her purse at the jail before the incident. 

(See Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 23 (p. 78).) He does not remember what was in the purse but 

testified that he would have secured any weapon that he found. (Id. at 23-25 (pp. 78-80).)

11 ECF No. 83 at 13 (―pain-compliance hold‖).

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB) 5

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Pianta‘s grasp, Officer Stolzman steps toward the struggling pair. He removes her purse from the 

counter. Then, as Ms. Sheehan turns almost fully around, facing Officer Pianta, Officer Stolzman 

puts the purse on the counter with his left hand while his right hand grips Ms. Sheehan‘s free 

forearm. One second after Officer Stolzman touches her, Officer Pianta executes a ―takedown‖ 

that pulls her from Officer Stolzman‘s grasp and sends her quickly and forcefully to the floor. 

(Two of the nearby officers describe Officer Pianta as having done a ―leg sweep‖ on Ms. 

Sheehan.12 Officer Pianta says that he used an ―arm bar take down‖ by putting his right hand on 

Ms. Sheehan‘s left shoulder and pushing her to the ground while holding on to her left hand with 

his left hand.13) The videos show Ms. Sheehan falling with great speed and landing with an 

audible thud. The fall knocks her unconscious. She was transported to the hospital, where she 

remained for two days with a concussion, a ―blowout‖ fracture of the orbital bone beneath her left 

eye, and other facial injuries.

The main material dispute in all this concerns whether Ms. Sheehan punched or tried to punch 

Officer Pianta. The latter claims that she did.14 Officer Stolzman, too, testified that Ms. Sheehan 

had punched Officer Pianta and explains that he stepped into the tussle to stop her blows.15 Three 

other officers who were in the booking room also testified about what they saw: one described a 

―swing‖ intended to strike Officer Pianta (but couldn‘t tell whether it was closed fist or open 

palm); one described ―the beginning stages of what I could interpret as a punch‖; and one said that 

Ms. Sheehan punched Officer Pianta.16 The videos do not show conclusively whether Ms. Sheehan 

threw any punches. Both parties focus on one frame, from the ceiling camera, in which her arm is 

raised above her head. The police officers contend that this shows her throwing a punch, while Ms. 

Sheehan insists that it does not show this — at least not definitively.17 The video is not conclusive 

 

12 Hight Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 151 (pp. 17-19); Carter Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 163, 167 (pp. 14, 30).

13 Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 60-61 (pp. 127-28.)

14 Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 52, 54, 58 (pp. 108, 110, 118).

15 Stolzman Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 59-60 (pp. 64-66).

16 Philliips Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 96-97 (pp. 15-16); Hight Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 152-54 (pp. 15-17); 

Carter Dep. – ECF No. 74 at 162-63 (pp. 13-14).

17 ECF No. 88 at 9.

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but it looks like Ms. Sheehan‘s arm went up as she pivoted to possibly shake off Officer Pianta; 

the court cannot really tell whether this ―swing‖ is a punch.

18 What is not disputed is that, when 

Officer Stolzman stepped in to help Officer Pianta control Ms. Sheehan, the latter were physically 

struggling with one another.

Other significant facts are undisputed. The videos show that Officer Pianta is visibly a good bit 

larger than Ms. Sheehan: he is 6‘4‖ and 250 pounds, and she appears to be a slender young 

woman.

19 Officer Stolzman did not know whether Ms. Sheehan‘s purse had been searched.20

Officers Pianta and Stolzman did not know each other before these events; they did not 

communicate with each other during the incident; and they did not plan or coordinate with each 

other to subdue Ms. Sheehan.21 Officer Stolzman was unaware that Officer Pianta was going to 

take Ms. Sheehan to the ground.22 The videos show that, during the whole relevant period, there 

were four police officers in the booking room in addition to Officer Pianta; all were within steps of 

Officer Pianta and Ms. Sheehan.

BART and the OPD both investigated the incident. Each department cleared its officer of 

wrongdoing. BART determined that Officer Pianta had acted within BART‘s use-of-force 

guidelines; OPD similarly cleared Officer Stolzman.

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT LAW

The court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material 

facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about 

 

18 See Whent Dep. – ECF No. 91-1 at 20 (p. 56).

19 Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 19 (p. 14). Officer Pianta estimated Ms. Sheehan to be 5‘-9‖ tall and 

to weigh 145 pounds. (See ECF No. 84-2 at 46.)

20 Stolzman Dep. – ECF No. 80 at 10-11 (pp. 33-35).

21 Stolzman Dep. – ECF No. 80 at 7, 11-12, 16 (pp. 19, 34-41, 68); Pianta Dep. – ECF No. 79 at 7 (p. 

60).

22 Stolzman Dep. – ECF No. 80 at 16 (pp. 67-68). 

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ORDER (No. 14-cv-03156-LB) 7

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a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 

basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, ―the moving party 

must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party‘s claim or 

defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element 

to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.‖ Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 

Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000); see Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (―When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party need only point out  ̳that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party‘s 

case.‘‖) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). 

If the moving party meets its initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., 210 F.3d 

at 1103. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse 

party‘s evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue 

of material fact for trial. See Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. If the non-moving party does not 

produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, inferences drawn from the underlying facts are 

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). More precisely, ―[a]t the summary judgment stage, facts 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a  ̳genuine‘

dispute as to those facts.‖ Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

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ANALYSIS

1. Excessive Force — Fourth Amendment — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

1.1 Governing law

―The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount of 

force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.‖ Blankenhorn v. City 

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 

(1985)); accord, e.g., Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 

2001) (―A claim against law enforcement officers for excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment‘s  ̳objective reasonableness‘ standard.‖). Section 1983 provides a private right of 

action for those whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are deprived under color of law. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally, e.g., Monteilh v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 

1089 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

―Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual‘s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake.‖ Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

To do so, a court must evaluate the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including 1) 

the severity of the crime at issue, 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 

the officers or others, and 3) whether she is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 

by flight. Id. ―The  ̳most important‘ factor under Graham is whether the suspect posed an 

 ̳immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.‘‖ Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). ―A 

simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety others is not enough; there 

must be objective factors to justify such a concern.‖ Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (quoting Deorle v. 

Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001)). ―These factors, however, are not exclusive. 

Rather, [the court must] examine the totality of the circumstances and consider  ̳whatever specific 

factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in Graham.‘‖ Bryan, 630 F.3d 

at 826 (quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)). ―In some cases,‖ for 

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example, ―the availability of alternative methods of . . . subduing a suspect may be a factor to 

consider.‖ Smith, 349 F.3d at 701 (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1994)).

―The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.‖ Graham, 490 U.S. 

at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)). ― ̳Not every push or shove, even if it may 

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge‘s chambers,‘ Johnson v. Glick, [481 F.2d 1028, 

1033 (2d Cir. 1973], violates the Fourth Amendment.‖ Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This is because 

―[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.‖ Id.

1.2 Excessive force — Officer Pianta

On the one hand, Ms. Sheehan certainly had a Fourth Amendment interest in not being 

needlessly roughed up and injured, perhaps especially when her obvious drunkenness made her —

uncooperative, yes, but also vulnerable. On the other hand, Officer Pianta had a legitimate interest 

in keeping Ms. Sheehan under control and, more important, ensuring that she presented no danger 

to him, herself, or others. But that is only a rough first pass. The more specific elements of the 

Graham analysis cast a more precise and so more revealing light on the situation.

First, the severity of the crime. The root charge was public intoxication — not necessarily the 

most profound crime — but made worse here by Ms. Sheehan‘s having physically fought with the 

BART officers who initially dealt with her. Second, while in the Santa Rita booking room, Ms. 

Sheehan had not actively resisted Officer Pianta. She was uncooperative but, by the time she was 

at the booking window, this manifested mostly in her tossing a hair tie at Officer Pianta. She 

continued rummaging through her purse after Officer Pianta told her to stop. But that alone would 

not reasonably justify throwing her to the ground. It is only when Officer Pianta twists her arm in 

a ―pain compliance‖ hold that Ms. Sheehan starts to actively resist. Was Officer Pianta then 

reasonably entitled to take her forcefully to the ground? This leads to the ―most important‖ 

Graham factor: whether Ms. Sheehan ―posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 

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others.‖ Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (quotation omitted). The undisputed facts make it hard to see that 

she posed much of a threat. At least not one that reasonably justified the treatment that she 

received. The videos and other evidence show that Officer Pianta was physically a good bit larger 

than Ms. Sheehan. They were moreover in the relative safety of the Santa Rita jail. He had already 

searched her purse. And, during the whole incident, there were at least four other uniformed police 

officers nearby — indeed, within steps of him and Ms. Sheehan. Which raises the question of 

alternatives. A jury could look at the undisputed facts and fairly conclude that Officer Pianta had 

other options to gain control of Ms. Sheehan more safely. He could have allowed Officer Stolzman 

to help him more gradually subdue her. Failing that, he could have asked for help from the 

multiple nearby officers.

The court would emphasize that, in its view, weighing these facts is not to judge by hindsight; 

it is rather to consider the facts that confronted Officer Pianta at the time. It must be remembered 

too that, ―[e]ven where some force is justified, the amount actually used may be excessive.‖ 

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477 (quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). ―The 

question in all cases is whether the use of force was  ̳objectively reasonable in light of the facts 

and circumstances confronting‘ the arresting officer[].‖ Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477 (quoting 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). It may thus be conceded — it probably cannot be denied — that 

Officer Pianta could constitutionally exert some force to bring Ms. Sheehan under control. That 

does not mean that his force might not have been excessive, and that a jury should not be called on 

to settle the question.

Ultimately, the indeterminate issue of the punching and the reasonableness of Officer Pianta‘s 

response prevent the court from ruling for either party as a matter of law. The evidence before the 

court leaves a genuine dispute over whether Ms. Sheehan was punching or trying to punch Officer 

Pianta or if Officer Pianta reasonably perceived that she was trying to punch him. The secondslong encounter on a video does not show a punch (though the court cannot say as a matter of law 

that the video is inconsistent with one either because Ms. Sheehan‘s arm is in the air briefly). 

Officers testify varyingly about what Ms. Sheehan did, and the video evidence does not always 

support their accounts. Also, different officers described Officer Pianta‘s takedown differently than 

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he does (leg sweep versus arm-bar takedown). The court does not mean to suggest anything 

nefarious by this observation: eyewitnesses often give varying accounts; that is normal. But there 

are genuine issues of material fact about what happened. The reasonableness of Officer Pianta‘s 

response is a jury question too — even if the takedown went wrong. Cf. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 

480 (―[I]t is the need for force that is at the heart of the Graham factors.‖). And to the point, 

having transported Ms. Sheehan, Officer Pianta knew more about her risk (or lack thereof) than 

anyone there. His testimony needs to be heard to be credited, given that the video establishes a 

genuine issue about whether the force that Officer Pianta used was reasonable under the 

circumstances.23 The court cannot say as a matter of law that his conduct is either objectively 

reasonable or unreasonable. The court therefore denies both Ms. Sheehan‘s, and BART and Officer 

Pianta‘s, motions for summary judgment on the excessive-force claim.

1.3 Officer Stolzman was not an “integral participant”

The undisputed facts show that Officer Stolzman had only fleeting involvement in the events 

that led to Ms. Sheehan‘s injury. Ms. Sheehan does not contend that Officer Stolzman himself used 

excessive force. She argues instead that Officer Stolzman was an ―integral participant‖ in Officer 

Pianta‘s takedown. (ECF No. 84-1 at 10-13.) She would thus piggyback Officer Stolzman‘s 

otherwise rightful conduct onto the allegedly wrongful force used by Officer Pianta. The court 

does not think that she can do so.

―An officer‘s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is predicated on his  ̳integral participation‘ in 

the alleged [constitutional] violation.‖ Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12 (citing Chuman v. 

Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ―integral participant‖ rule ―extends liability to 

those actors who were integral participants in the constitutional violation, even if they did not 

directly engage in the unconstitutional conduct themselves.‖ Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 

770 (9th Cir. 2009). Integral participation ―does not require that each officer‘s actions themselves 

 

23 Oakland Police Chief Whent, for example, testified that Officer Pianta‘s force was ―problematic,‖ 

noting that while Ms. Sheehan was not compliant, ―there was not sufficient urgency to move to that 

level of the use of force.‖ (Whent Dep. ̶ ECF No. 91-1 at 11 (p. 27.)) 

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rise to the level of a constitutional violation.‘‘ Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12 (quoting Boyd v. 

Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004)). ―But it does require some fundamental 

involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation.‖ Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12 

(citing Boyd, 374 F.3d at 780) (emphasis added).

The facts concerning Officer Stolzman are undisputed. The video footage, in particular, is 

entirely consistent with how Officer Stolzman describes his conduct. Officer Stolzman did 

essentially two things: He held Ms. Sheehan‘s purse and then gripped her forearm. He did not 

know whether her purse had been searched for weapons. And, regardless of whether Ms. Sheehan 

was trying to punch Officer Pianta, there is no dispute that the two were physically tussling. This 

is obvious from the videos. Officers Pianta and Stolzman did not know each other before this 

incident; they had come to the Santa Rita jail from different incidents with different arrestees. 

They did not communicate with each other before Officer Pianta took Ms. Sheehan to the ground. 

Much less did they plan to subdue her — in this or any other way. See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 770 

(reversing denial of summary judgment and holding that police officer was not integral participant 

where, among other things, he did not ―participate[] in . . . planning . . . the unlawful search‖). 

Officer Stolzman was unaware that Officer Pianta was about to take Ms. Sheehan down. See Boyd, 

374 F.3d at 780 (holding that every officer involved in search could be liable because ―every 

officer was aware of the decision to use the flash-bang [grenade] . . . and participated in the search 

knowing the flash-bang was to be deployed‖). Last, but far from least, Officer Stolzman was in 

contact with Ms. Sheehan for approximately one second. He had barely gripped her forearm when 

Officer Pianta sent her to the floor. The videos confirm that only one second passed and, 

qualitatively, they convey how suddenly Ms. Sheehan slams to the floor.

On these undisputed facts no reasonable juror could find that Officer Stolzman ―integrally 

participated‖ in Officer Pianta‘s takedown. His brief contact with Ms. Sheehan‘s forearm was not 

―instrumental‖ to that takedown. Cf. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481-82 n. 12. Nor was his ―physical 

participation in the alleged violation . . . part of a closely related series of physical acts leading to 

the violation.‖ See Monteilh v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 n. 10 (C.D. Cal. 

2011) (cited at Pl. Opp. – ECF No. 84-1 at 13). More precisely, his and Officer Pianta‘s acts were 

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―closely related‖ in time only, only in that they were contemporaneous. Causally, effectively, they 

were so distinct from one another as to be almost two separate events. The undisputed evidence 

shows Officer Stolzman touching Ms. Sheehan for a moment, and then Officer Pianta suddenly 

taking her down.

Given the circumstances that Officer Stolzman confronted — the unknown contents of the 

purse and the physical tussle — the little that he did was constitutionally innocuous, and must be 

deemed so as a matter of law. It would be a dangerous disincentive to police officers if this level of 

conduct could support liability. Police would be dissuaded from taking even minimal steps to avert 

danger to themselves or others. That result would be at odds with established Fourth Amendment 

law, which calls people‘s safety the ―most important factor‖ in judging the constitutional limits of 

force. See, e.g., Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826.

1.3.1 Mendez v. Montour

The decision in Mendez v. Montour, No. 12-cv-04170-WHO, 2014 WL 1218665 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 21, 2014) is analogous to this case. The Mendez court granted summary judgment to a police 

officer in almost the same position as Officer Stolzman. The Mendez court held, as a matter of law, 

that the officer had not integrally participated in his partner‘s tackling an arrestee and slamming 

his head into a patrol car. Id. at *3-4.

The plaintiff in Mendez was injured when two California Highway Patrol officers arrested him 

for driving without a license and under the influence. Id. at *1. The plaintiff sued both officers for 

excessive force. The defendant that we are interested in — Officer Anderson — was sued as an 

―integral participant‖ in his partner‘s use of allegedly excessive force. After being tested for 

sobriety, the plaintiff ―was instructed to place his hands on his head.‖ Id. at 1. He did so. Officer 

Anderson took his left hand and began to handcuff him. Id. When the plaintiff removed his right 

hand from his head, Anderson‘s partner ―swept the [plaintiff‘s] legs from him‖ and tackled him to 

the ground. Id. at 1, 4. The fall broke the plaintiff‘s wrist. Id. The partner then shoved the plaintiff 

into the patrol car, causing him to ―slam his head‖ into it. See id. at *1, *3-4.

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The district court held that Anderson had not integrally participated in his partner‘s use of 

force. Id. at *4. The court reasoned: ―Anderson had control of [the plaintiff‘s] left hand and cuffed 

it, but . . . it was [the partner] who tackled him and attempted to get  ̳control of his hands.‘‖ Id. at 

3. It was also the partner who ―took out Mendez‘s legs, causing Mendez to land on his uncuffed 

right hand (the hand that was broken).‖ Id. Finally, it was again the partner, not Anderson, ―who 

pushed Mendez into the patrol car,‖ where he hit his head on the vehicle. Id. at *4. ―As to 

Anderson‘s  ̳integral participation,‘‖ the court wrote, ―there is no evidence in the record that 

creates a material issue of fact concerning Anderson‘s role in Mendez‘s arrest.‖ Id. at *3. ―[T]here 

is no evidence that Anderson authorized, knew in advance, encouraged, or otherwise helped [his 

partner] take down Mendez or slam Mendez into the patrol car.‖ Id. at 4. ―[T]here was no plan to 

injure Mendez,‖ and no evidence that Anderson himself had used excessive force. Id. at *1. 

Consequently, there was ―simply no evidence that could raise a question of fact that Anderson 

meaningfully participated in [his partner]‘s alleged use of excessive force.‖ 4. The court thus 

granted summary judgment in Anderson‘s favor. Id.

This court agrees that Mendez reached the correct decision on the facts that were before it and 

thinks that the same conclusion must obtain here. Here, too, there was no ―plan‖ to subdue Ms. 

Sheehan. Officers Stolzman and Pianta did not know each other or communicate before Officer 

Pianta suddenly took Ms. Sheehan to the ground. There is ―no evidence‖ that Officer Stolzman 

―authorized, knew in advance, or encouraged‖ Officer Pianta to do what he did. And, while Officer 

Stolzman briefly had hold of Ms. Sheehan‘s one forearm, as in Mendez, it was Officer Pianta alone 

who applied the force that took her to the ground and injured her. The court therefore holds, as a 

matter of law, that Officer Stolzman was not an integral participant in Officer Pianta‘s allegedly 

unconstitutional use of force.24

 

24 This court reached a basically similar decision in Brown v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 2014 

WL 1364931 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2014). The court there held that an officer who had helped to apply 

leg shackles, but otherwise had minimal contact with the prisoner, did not ―integrally participate‖ in 

the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See id. at *2, *10-11.

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1.3.2 The plaintiff’s arguments and analogies

Ms. Sheehan questions the factual correctness and bona fides of Officer Stolzman‘s stated 

reason for gripping her forearm. Officer Stolzman testified that he did this to stop her from 

punching Officer Pianta. Whether or not she punched or tried to punch the BART officer is, again, 

the parties‘ main material factual dispute; as best the court can discern, the videos provide no basis 

for deciding conclusively one way or the other. This question, and the related question of whether 

Officer Pianta acted reasonably, must be left for the fact-finder. At the summary-judgment hearing, 

Ms. Sheehan pointed out that a jury might agree with her and find that she had not punched 

Officer Pianta. Officer Stolzman would be found incorrect in his factual perception; and, 

according to Ms. Sheehan, his ―false allegations‖ about the punches ―suggest a consciousness of 

guilt.‖ (ECF No. 84-1 at 8.) Although she never says so, the structure of her discussion suggests 

that Ms. Sheehan views this point as helping to raise a jury question on whether Officer Stolzman 

participated integrally in the takedown. (See id. at 6-8.)

The court disagrees. First, a police officer‘s subjective intentions are irrelevant to deciding 

whether he used excessive force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397-99 (―[T]he subjective motivations 

of the individual officers . . . ha[ve] no bearing on whether a particular seizure is  ̳unreasonable‘ 

under the Fourth Amendment.‖). Speculating that a (possible) factual error bespeaks a ―guilty 

conscience‖ thus does nothing to raise a triable issue on integral participation. The alleged 

punches moreover are not the only element in play. Even if a jury decided that Ms. Sheehan did 

not punch or try to punch Officer Pianta, there would remain the undisputed facts of the purse, the 

struggle, and the objectively little that Officer Stolzman knew or did. Again, it is undisputed that 

Officer Stolzman did not know whether the purse had been searched; it is undisputed that Ms. 

Sheehan and Officer Pianta were physically tussling (regardless of whether she threw any 

punches); and it is undisputed that Officer Stolzman held her forearm for only one second. Even if 

Ms. Sheehan did not throw punches, in other words, the undisputed facts show beyond plausible 

dispute that Officer Stolzman did not integrally participate in the takedown.

The plaintiff also suggests that, by holding onto her forearm, Officer Stolzman may have 

prevented her from breaking her fall. To support this hypothesis, she cites the testimony of BART 

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Sergeant Szopinki. Sergeant Szopinski was not involved in arresting or booking Ms. Sheehan; he 

is the BART supervisor who investigated Officer Pianta‘s use of force. After reviewing video 

footage of the event (apparently only the jail footage, which is not continuous (unlike the body 

cameras) and instead is composed of still frames),

25 Sergeant Szopinski described Officer 

Stolzman as ―the officer [who] was attempting to help . . . Officer Pianta in taking her down . . . .‖ 

(ECF No. 84-2 at 38 [pp. 82-83].) He continued (in the passage that Ms. Sheehan cites): ―I believe 

if that did not occur [i.e., if Officer Stolzman had not grabbed her forearm], she would have had 

time to protect herself. It‘s human instinct to put your hand in front when you fall.‖ (Id. at 38 [p. 

83].) Further on, he is more qualified: ―Based on the video that I saw, . . . [Officer Stolzman] 

slightly deflected her right arm which may have caused her to prevent her [sic] from breaking her 

fall.‖ (Id. at 38 [p. 84].)

This does not raise a triable issue on whether Officer Stolzman was ―fundamentally involved‖ 

in Officer Pianta‘s takedown. First, Sgt. Szopinski‘s assessment that Officer Stolzman was trying 

to ―assist Officer Pianta in taking her down‖ is just that: his own assessment. It is a characterizing 

inference that goes subtly but crucially past what the undisputed evidence shows. The videos and 

the various officers‘ testimony certainly show Officer Stolzman generally moving to ―help‖ 

Officer Pianta. There is no doubt of that. But the evidence does not imply the critical further step 

that Sgt. Szopinski makes and that Ms. Sheehan accepts: that Officer Stolzman tried to help take 

Ms. Sheehan down. That is a different thing, and it is a difference that is critical to this case. 

Sergeant Szopinski is in no better position than the court or jury to make this extended inference 

from the raw facts. The court has considered Sgt. Szopinki‘s testimony. But in deciding whether 

there is sufficient proof that Officer Stolzman ―integrally participated‖ in the takedown, the court 

cannot be bound by the terms that the sergeant used to describe what he saw or the intentions that 

he reads beneath Officer Stolzman‘s manifest conduct. What the court must assess is Officer 

Stolzman‘s objective conduct — the things that he actually did — and those are undisputed. For 

the reasons already stated, as a matter of law, those minimal acts do not constitute integral 

 

25 The discussion at oral argument was that the frames are every two seconds.

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participation. Furthermore, the ―could have broken her fall‖ theory constitutes backward-looking 

speculation. (See ECF No. 84-2 at 38 [p. 84].) That is a decisional mode that the court is not 

permitted. From Officer Stolzman‘s perspective at the time, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, the little 

that he did — briefly taking her purse and momentarily holding her forearm — did not 

―fundamentally involve‖ him in throwing Ms. Sheehan to the ground.

The plaintiff also argues that Officer Stolzman was ―instrumental‖ to Officer Pianta‘s 

takedown. (ECF No. 84-1 at 11.) In this connection she cites Blankenhorn, in which the Ninth 

Circuit found that an Officer Kayano‘s ―participation was integral to the use of hobble restraints‖ 

— the latter being one of the acts that the Blankenhorn plaintiff claimed was excessive. (Id.) 

(quoting Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481-82 n.12). But Officer Kayano‘s activity in Blankenhorn

was significantly more purposeful, persistent, and forceful than what Officer Stolzman 

undisputedly did here. Upon seeing a group of other officers piled on Blankenhorn, Kayano ran 

over and ―grabbed and held Blankenhorn‘s left arm so it could be handcuffed.‖ Id. at 469 n. 3. 

Kayano ―could not remember‖ whether he or another officer had handcuffed the plaintiff, he ―was 

certain that the handcuffs used were his own.‖ Id. In this situation, Officer Kayano‘s ―own 

declaration indicate[d] that his help in handcuffing Blankenhorn was instrumental in the officers‘ 

gaining control of Blankenhorn, which culminated in [another officer‘s allegedly excessive] 

application of hobble restraints.‖ Id. at 481-82 n. 12. The situation in this case is sufficiently 

different to warrant a different result. Officer Stolzman‘s contact with Ms. Sheehan was not as 

extensive, determined, or as forceful as Officer Kayano‘s appears to have been in Blankenhorn. 

And, unlike Officer Kayano‘s ―own declaration‖ in Blankenhorn, Officer Stolzman‘s testimony 

does not show that he was joining the fray in order to help take her down — that is, to help effect 

the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. To the contrary. Officer Stolzman explained that he gripped 

Ms. Sheehan‘s forearm only to stop her from trying to punch Officer Pianta.

Last in this area, Ms. Sheehan argues that Officer Stolzman‘s physical contact with her alone 

yields integral participation. She writes that being ―hands on . . . constitutes integral participation, 

per se.‖ (ECF No. 84-1 at 11.) To this assertion she attaches a block quote from Green v. City and 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014), in which the Ninth Circuit found a 

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jury question on whether a police sergeant had integrally participated in his colleagues‘ use of 

allegedly excessive force.

For several reasons, Ms. Sheehan‘s argument in this regard does not quicken her integralparticipation claim against Officer Stolzman. First, Green does not stand for the proposition that 

being ―hands on‖ with someone ―constitutes integral participation per se.‖ Nothing in Green even 

starts to suggest that that is the rule. See Green, passim. Second, even as a factual description, 

saying that Officer Stolzman was ―hand on‖ leaves too much unsaid. It is accurate only in the most 

superficial way, and leaves out almost every sort of factual detail that case law in this area has 

treated as relevant. It says too little while implying too much. Had Officer Stolzman only touched 

Ms. Sheehan‘s shoulder, and asked her to calm down, he still would have been ―hands on.‖ Would 

that have constituted ―integral participation per se‖? On Ms. Sheehan‘s view it may have, but the 

law does not support that view.

Finally, the relevant defendant in Green, Sergeant Kim, against whom a triable integralparticipation claim was found to exist, was much more involved in the challenged activity than 

Officer Stolzman was here. The Green plaintiff sued for excessive force after being erroneously 

pulled over for driving a stolen car (the police had misread her license plate). She was made to 

kneel, and was handcuffed, while at least four police officers pointed guns at her. Green, 751 F.3d 

at 1042-44. Sergeant Kim argued that he could not be liable as an integral participant ―because he 

was not one of the officers who pointed his gun at [the plaintiff] while she was in handcuffs.‖ See 

id. at 1051. The district court agreed and granted Sergeant Kim summary judgment but the Ninth 

Circuit reversed. Id. at 1044, 1051. The appellate court reasoned that Sergeant Kim had 

―misconstrue[d] the circumstances‖ underlying the plaintiff‘s claim. Id. at 1051. For one thing, 

―[t]he only reason Sergeant Kim was not pointing his weapon at Green while she was restrained is 

that he was the one restraining her.‖ Id. Further, Sergeant Kim had played an ―active‖ role in the 

events leading to her detention. He had followed her car without visually confirming that the 

license-plate number was indeed the one reported stolen. Id. at 1043. He decided that pulling her 

over would present a ―high risk‖ stop and so called for backup. Id. He pulled her over. Id. He 

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―took charge in issuing commands‖ to the other officers. Id. And he handcuffed her. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit concluded: 

Even if Sergeant Kim was not one of the officers actually holding Green at 

gunpoint once she was restrained, he was plainly an active participant in this 

activity and a jury could find that he was an ―integral participant‖ under 

Blankenhorn.

Id. The same cannot be said of Officer Stolzman on the different facts of this case. Green does not 

indicate that Ms. Sheehan‘s integral-participation claim against Officer Stolzman can go to a jury.

Because the court has concluded that Officer Stolzman did not integrally participate in Officer 

Pianta‘s taking Ms. Sheehan to the ground, the court does not reach Officer Stolzman‘s contention 

that he enjoyed qualified immunity.

2. Qualified immunity — Office Pianta

Regardless of whether he used excessive force, Officer Pianta contends that he enjoys 

qualified immunity from suit. (ECF No. 73 at 18-21.) For her part, Ms. Sheehan seeks a summary 

judgment that Officer Pianta is not immune. (See ECF No. 75-1 at 14-15.) The court denies both 

motions.

―Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil damages for performance of 

discretionary functions.‖ Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2009). ―It is  ̳an immunity 

from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost 

if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.‘‖ Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

526 (1985)) (emphasis in original). Qualified immunity will protect an officer from suit ―when he 

or she  ̳makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law 

governing the circumstances.‘‖ Mueller, 576 F.3d at 992 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 

194, 198 (2004)). ―Qualified immunity protects  ̳all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law.‘‖ Mueller, 576 F.3d at 992 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 

341 (1986)). ―The standard is an objective one that leaves  ̳ample room for mistaken judgments.‘‖ 

Mueller, 576 F.3d at 992 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343). The Supreme Court has ―repeatedly . 

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. . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 

litigation.‖ Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).

To determine whether Officer Pianta is immune from suit, the court must answer two 

questions. The court must consider ―whether the official‘s conduct violated a constitutional right, 

and if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the event in question.‖ Mueller, 

576 F.3d at 993) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)); accord, e.g., Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). It is not ―mandatory‖ to address these two prongs in this 

order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232-36. Courts are to ―exercise their sound discretion in deciding 

which prong . . . should be addressed first in light of the particular circumstances of the case at 

hand.‖ Id. at 236; accord Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993-94. Furthermore, ―the [qualified-immunity] test 

is not simply a reiteration of the Graham [excessive-force] test . . . : rather, [the court] must 

determine whether, in using excessive force, the officer made a  ̳reasonable mistake[ ] as to the 

legality of [his] actions.‘‖ Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206).

2.1 First prong: Constitutional violation

The court has already concluded that it cannot determine as a matter of law whether Officer 

Pianta violated Ms. Sheehan‘s Fourth Amendment rights. Following the Ninth Circuit‘s approach 

in the face of a similarly contested key fact, the court will therefore proceed to the second prong of 

the Saucier test. See Mueller, 576 F.3d at 994.

Before doing that, though, it may be worth noting our governing appellate court‘s statement 

concerning the relationship between the underlying excessive-force decision and the first prong of 

the qualified-immunity test. Again in Mueller, supra, the Ninth Circuit explained that cases could 

deny summary judgment to both parties on these points — as the present case does. The Mueller 

court wrote:

We note that summary judgment with respect to the first prong of the test for 

qualified immunity under Saucier[,533 U.S. at 206], on one hand, and summary 

judgment on the merits of whether an officer actually violated a plaintiff‘s rights, 

on the other, are quite different. It does not follow that a denial of summary 

judgment to an officer on Saucier’s first prong of qualified immunity — looking at 

the facts favorably to the plaintiff-necessarily determines that the plaintiff must 

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prevail at summary judgment on this issue on the merits of the claim — looking at 

the facts favorably to the officer. The difference is subtle, but exquisitely important.

Mueller, 576 F.3d at 986 n. 1.

2.1 Second prong: Clearly established

―The dispositive question in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it 

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.‖ Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Put differently, ―[f]or a constitutional right to be clearly 

established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.‖ Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). ―This inquiry  ̳must be undertaken in 

light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.‘‖ Mueller at 994 

(quoting in part Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201); accord, e.g., Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1278-79 (―[T]he court 

must . . . determine whether the right violated was clearly established in a  ̳particularized . . . sense 

. . . .‖).

Facing ―competing motions for summary judgment,‖ moreover, in the qualified-immunity 

assessment, the court reads disputed facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Sheehan. See Mueller, 

576 F.3d at 982, 994; Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477 (―Where [material factual] disputes exist, 

summary judgment is appropriate only if Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the 

facts as alleged by the nonmoving party.‖) (citing Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 

1991)). So, ―assuming without deciding‖ that Ms. Sheehan‘s constitutional rights were violated, 

the court must ―determine whether those rights were clearly established.‖ Id. at 994-95.

The court agrees with Ms. Sheehan‘s essential analysis (ECF No. 75-1 at 15 ) on this point: 

Well before the events in question, Ninth Circuit precedent had established that police officers 

cannot constitutionally meet passive or mild resistance with ―non-trivial‖ force. See, e.g., 

Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093 (―The right to be free from the application of non-trivial force 

for engaging in mere passive resistance was clearly established prior to 2008.‖) (discussing cases). 

Ms. Sheehan was not entirely passive, of course; she was trying to twist free of Officer Pianta‘s 

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―pain compliance‖ hold. But the established constitutional framework also embodies some 

principle of proportionate response. Cf. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477 (―Even where some force is 

justified, the amount actually used may be excessive.‖) (quoting Santos, 287 F.3d at 853). Given 

the situation that Officer Pianta confronted (discussed earlier), and viewing in Ms. Sheehan‘s favor 

the disputed points of whether she was throwing punches and whether Officer Pianta‘s reaction to 

perceived events was objectively reasonable, it should have been ―sufficiently clear [to] a 

reasonable official‖ that he could not rightfully slam her to the floor. Put differently (and, again, 

accepting for present purposes that Ms. Sheehan was not punching Officer Pianta — or at least 

that she was noncompliant but not a safety risk), throwing her to the floor in these circumstances, 

in this way, was ― ̳so patently violative of [her] constitutional right that reasonable officials would 

know without guidance from the courts‘ that the action was unconstitutional,‖ which is to say that 

her right to be free from such force was ―clearly established.‖ Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 

1361 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1993)).

3. Monell claim

Local governments can be sued directly under Section 1983 if the public entity maintains a 

policy or custom that results in a violation of plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 

690-91. The Ninth Circuit has explained:

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by 

showing ―a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the  ̳standard 

operating procedure‘ of the local government entity;‖ (2) ―by showing that the 

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking 

authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the 

area of decision;‖ or (3) ―by showing that an official with final policymaking 

authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate.‖

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ulrich v. City and Cnty. of 

San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). The practice or custom must consist of 

more than ―random acts or isolated events‖ and instead, must be the result of a ―permanent and 

well-settled practice.‖ Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1988) 

overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 

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2010); see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Thus, ―a single incident of 

unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell unless‖ there is proof 

that the incident ―was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy . . . .‖ City of 

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985).

Because Ms. Sheehan‘s excessive-force claim against Officer Stolzman fails as a matter of law,

so too does her associated Monell claim against the OPD. Dunklin v. Mallinger, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 51871, 71-72 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013) (citing Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 

(1986)). Furthermore, the plaintiff‘s Monell claim against the OPD rests solely on a theory of 

ratification. (See ECF No. 84-1 at 15.) The plaintiff has not otherwise proffered evidence 

concerning the OPD‘s policies or their alleged infirmity under Monell. Because the court rejects 

the plaintiff‘s ratification theory (see infra), her Monell claim against the OPD fails for this 

additional reason.

3.1 Ratification theory

The plaintiff offers two Monell theories. She first argues that BART ratified Officer Pianta‘s 

conduct when it concluded, after investigating, that he had acted within BART‘s use-of-force 

guidelines. (ECF No. 75-1 at 16; ECF No. 84 at 16.) Put differently, in the plaintiff‘s view, BART 

is guilty under Monell because it cleared its officer of wrongdoing.

This does not state a viable claim. Finding that an officer acted within policy does not alone 

amount to Monell ratification. Dunklin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51871 at 71-72, 80-95; Garcia v. 

City of Imperial, 2010 WL 3911457, *1-*3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (discussing cases); Kanae v. 

Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179, (D. Haw. 2003). ―In other words, in order for there to be [Monell] 

ratification, there must be  ̳something more‘ than a single failure to discipline or the fact that the 

policymaker concluded that the defendant officer’s actions were in keeping with the applicable 

policies and procedures.‖ Garcia, 2010 WL 3911457 at *2 (citing Kanae, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1191) 

(emphasis added). The district court in Kanae expressed a practical aspect of this rule:

The law does not say that, whenever an investigative group accepts an officer‘s 

version over a victim‘s differing version, this acceptance establishes a policy for 

which a municipality may be held liable under § 1983. If that were the law, 

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counties might as well never conduct internal investigations and might as well 

always admit liability. But that is not the law. The law clearly requires ―something 

more.‖

Kanae, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. This ―something more‖ may be an ―obviously flawed 

investigation‖ into an excessive-force complaint. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 

(9th Cir. 1991). It may exist where the final decision-maker ―actively participated‖ in the 

challenged conduct. See Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2004). ―Extreme factual 

situations‖ can also support ratification liability, as in the Fifth Circuit case in which the 

departmentally unpunished police officers had ―poured their gunfire‖ at the perpetrator‘s vehicle 

and ―into the person of an innocent bystander.‖ See Garcia, 2010 WL 3911457 at *2 (discussing 

Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985)).

―Here, there are no extreme facts or special circumstances that support a finding of 

ratification.‖ Garcia, 2010 WL 3911457 at *3. Ms. Sheehan premises her Monell ratification 

argument entirely on the fact that BART‘s post-incident investigations exonerated Officer Pianta. 

That is legally insufficient. See Garcia, 2010 WL 3911457 at *1-*3 (discussing governing law). 

The court grants summary judgment against Ms. Sheehan‘s Monell claim insofar as it embodies a 

ratification theory.

3.2 “Practice or custom” theory

The plaintiff also argues that BART has an unconstitutional ―practice or custom‖ of 

exonerating its officers regardless of the circumstances of a particular excessive-force complaint. 

(ECF No. 84 at 10-13, 16-17.)

BART has submitted evidence explaining the multilayered review processes through which it 

investigates use-of-force incidents. (ECF No. 83 at 15-18; ECF No. 73 at 14-17.) No one disputes 

that these processes exist. Nor does anyone deny that BART followed its normal investigative 

procedures in this case. What Ms. Sheehan argues is that, whatever its processes, in its results 

BART consistently rubber-stamps and approves its officers‘ conduct. In her words: ―BART‘s 

custom and practice is to approve all uses of force as within policy regardless of the circumstances 

and amount of force used.‖ (ECF No. 84 at 10.) This, in the plaintiff‘s view, embodies a custom of 

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sanctioning unconstitutional conduct under Monell. (Id. at 10-13, 16-17.) Has she raised a genuine 

issue on this allegation? The court thinks that she has not. 

Ms. Sheehan and her proposed expert, Richard Ehle, point to two ostensibly critical pieces of 

testimony on this issue: the testimony of BART Deputy Chief Jeff Jennings and that of Lieutenant 

Lance Haight. (See id. at 10-13.) Part of Deputy Chief Jennings‘s responsibility is to review the 

findings of BART use-of-force review board and to ensure that challenged uses of force fall within 

BART policy and the law.26 Lieutenant Haight is a supervisor in BART‘s Internal Affairs 

Department; Ms. Sheehan‘s case was assigned to him.27

The plaintiff argues that Jennings could not recall ―a single incident‖ during his tenure in 

which BART found a use of force outside policy — which is more pointedly to say, that involved 

excessive force. (ECF No. 84 at 10.) This is not quite accurate. Jennings repeatedly said that, 

―[W]e‘ve had some‖ excessive-force determinations and that ―there ha[ve] been some‖; but, he 

said, ―I don‘t recall which ones,‖ and ―I don‘t remember.‖28 What is lacking is specificity in 

Jennings‘s memory, in other words, not the existence of excessive-force conclusions.

With respect to Lieutenant Haight, the plaintiff writes that, of the approximately 100 cases in 

which Internal Affairs investigated a force complaint during his tenure, ―only one investigation . . . 

, [that] did not involve the use of Tasers or . . . a firearm, concluded‖ that a use of force was 

outside policy — and this was a violation only because the officer failed to report it, not because 

the force was deemed excessive. (ECF No. 84 at 11.) But this, too, is distorted. Haight testified: 

―[T]here have been a number of cases where officers‖ were found to have used force that was 

―objectively unreasonable and outside of policy.‖29 He estimated that there were ―more than five, 

[but] less than 10‖ such cases.30 That is to say, ―approximately‖ four to five such cases when you 

 

26 Jennings Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 102 (pp. 26-27).

27 Haight Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 112 (pp. 62-64).

28 Jennings Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 102 (pp. 26-27).

29 Haight Dep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 114 (pp. 78-79)).

30 Id. (p. 78).

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include incidents involving Tasers and guns.31 It is unclear why those incidents should be excluded 

from consideration. They are, after all, excessive-force cases that implicate BART‘s review 

process. The plaintiff has given no principled reason for ignoring them in assessing BART‘s 

customs and practices.

Finally, there is the opinion of Ms. Sheehan‘s proffered police-practices expert, Mr. Ehle. Ms. 

Sheehan cites the following passage from Ehle‘s report: 

Both Deputy Chief Jennings and Lieutenant Haight stated during their depositions 

that they were not aware of the BART Police Department having sustained, or 

found staff out of compliance, in any of the 780 use of force investigations received 

over the last three years. 

With over 780 use of force investigations within the last three years, it is 

inconceivable to me that the BART Police Department has not found a single

incident out of compliance with policy, or sustained a single complaint of excessive 

or unnecessary force since 2013. A policy compliance rate of 100% for this volume 

of use of force investigations appears to be extremely high and not consistent with 

―industry standards‖ for metropolitan police agencies in California.

(ECF No. 84 at 12) (citing Ehle Supp. Rep. – ECF No. 84-2 at 123) (footnote omitted). This claim 

is not supportable. Again, both Jennings and Haight said that there were some cases in which 

BART found its officers to have used excessive force. There is no support for Ehle‘s zero in this 

regard and hence none for the 100% compliance rate that he finds damning — and which is meant 

to buttress the plaintiff‘s specific argument that ―BART‘s custom and practice is to approve all 

uses of force.‖ (See ECF No. 84 at 10, 12-13.) The court thus disregards this part of Ehle‘s 

testimony as insufficient to support a jury question under Rule 56. See, e.g., Rebel Oil v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995) (―When an expert opinion is not supported by 

sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or 

otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury‘s verdict‖) (quoting Brooke 

Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993)); see also Fed. R. 

Evid. 702(b) (expert opinion must be ‖based on sufficient facts and data‖).

What, then, are we left with on the issue of BART‘s ―policy or custom‖? First, the undisputed 

description of BART‘s investigative processes. Second, the uncontested proof that BART followed 

 

31 See id. at 112-15 (pp. 75-83).

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those procedures in this case. Third, and last, two witnesses who testified that, in the past few 

years, and contrary to the plaintiff‘s depiction, BART has occasionally concluded that its officers 

used excessive force. This evidence does not raise a triable issue on the Monell claim that BART 

has a custom of always exonerating its officers.

4. Fourteenth Amendment

Ms. Sheehan advances a claim against Officers Pianta and Stolzman under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution based on the same facts that inform her Fourth Amendment 

excessive-force claim. (3AC – ECF No. 40 at 5 [¶¶ 32-34].) Ms. Sheehan does not specify, but the 

court presumes that this is a substantive due-process claim. In any event, it is not clear that Ms. 

Sheehan‘s claim is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Allegations of excessive force in 

the course of an arrest generally are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth 

Circuit has said in this general vein: ―[T]he seizure that constitutes arrest  ̳continues throughout 

the time the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officers‘ and thus any use of excessive force 

during this extended arrest period is subject to the Fourth Amendment‘s constraints.‖ Pierce v. 

Multnomah Cnty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 10-42-43 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 

1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10 (explaining that Fourth 

Amendment protects against excessive force during arrest). Furthermore, Ms. Sheehan‘s 

Fourteenth Amendment claims are rooted in the same facts as her Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claim; she alleges no conduct that is unique to her Fourteenth Amendment claim. Moreover, 

the parties argue only the Fourth Amendment in their respective briefs. (See ECF Nos. 73 at 17-18, 

84 at 14-15.) The court thus dismisses the plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment claims with 

prejudice. 

5. Claim — Bane Act § 52.1

The plaintiff also claims that, by violating her federal constitutional rights, BART and Officer 

Pianta also violated her rights under California‘s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). (3AC – ECF 

No. 40 at 6-7 [¶¶ 41-43].) Because the court denies summary judgment on Ms. Sheehan‘s 

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underlying excessive-force claim, it also denies summary judgment on the Bane Act claim. See

Ayala v. City of South San Francisco, No. C 06-02061 WHA, 2007 WL 2070236, *13 (N.D. Cal. 

July 13, 2007); Bass v. City of Fremont, No. C12-4943 TEH, 2013 WL 891090, *5-6 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 8, 2013); Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 823, 842 (2004); see also Bender 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 (2013) (―[W]here an arrest is otherwise lawful, 

a Bane Act claim based on excessive force ―also requires violation of some right other than the 

plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights.‖).

Because Ms. Sheehan‘s excessive-force Bane Act claim survives against Officer Pianta, so too 

does her claim against BART, which can be vicariously liable. See Martinez v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 

No. 15-cv-01953-JST, 2015 WL 5354071, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015) (recognizing 

availability of respondeat superior liability under the Bane Act); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 

54 Cal. 3d 202, 215 (1991) (―[A] governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a police 

officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or engages in assaultive 

conduct.‖).

CONCLUSION

The court denies Ms. Sheehan‘s motion. The court grants the OPD and Officer Stolzman‘s 

motion. The claims against the OPD and Officer Stolzman are dismissed with prejudice. The court 

partly grants and partly denies BART and Officer Pianta‘s motion. The plaintiff‘s Monell claims 

against BART and the OPD and Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Pianta are dismissed 

with prejudice. The plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment and Bane Act claims will go forward against 

Officer Pianta consistently with the preceding analysis. The Bane Act claim survives against 

BART.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 29, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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