Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00209/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH FRITTS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00209-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph Fritts has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 401, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of 

judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 18, 19).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 13, 14, 15) and the 

administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in lowerright corner of transcript])”),1 the Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is 

due to be AFFIRMED.

 1 With the Court’s consent, the parties jointly waived the opportunity for oral argument. 

(See Docs. 17, 20).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 21
I. Background

On September 14, 2011, Fritts filed an application for a period of disability 

and DIB with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), 2 alleging disability 

beginning June 29, 2011. 3 After his application was initially denied, Fritts

requested a hearing, which was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

for the SSA on July 8, 2013. On August 13, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision on Fritts’s application, finding him “not disabled” under the Social Security 

Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 17 – 27). 

Fritts requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the 

SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review and submitted new evidence for 

the Council’s consideration. The Commissioner’s decision on Fritts’s application 

became final when the Appeals Council denied his request for review on March 3, 

2015. (R. 1 – 6). On April 16, 2015, Fritts filed this action under § 405(g) for 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount 

in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced 

 2 The Social Security Act’s general disability insurance benefits program provides 

income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, 

provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(a).

3 “For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates 

disability on or before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 

423(a)(1)(A) (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 21
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such 

further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law 

of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a 

denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).

II. Standard of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper 

legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ 

” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th 

Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the 

evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 

631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 

(11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

[Commissioner]’s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 3 of 21
automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. 

Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to 

conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that 

come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a 

reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light

of all the relevant facts.”). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a 

court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to 

findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the 

[Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper 

standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 

1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 

F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the 

administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’

42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the 

statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings 

of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption 

of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of 

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 4 of 21
the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (footnote and some 

citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting 

examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). 

“‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing 

court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius 

v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of 

Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference 

and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 

245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo

the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting 

decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”).

Eligibility for DIB ... requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. 

§[] 423(a)(1)(E) ... A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§[] 423(d)(1)(A)...

Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 5 of 21
curiam) (unpublished).4

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work 

experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-

(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 

405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the 

examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in 

 4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal 

Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).

5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

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combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves 

that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant 

work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the 

claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging 

in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 

economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the 

burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, 

the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. 

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established 

that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the 

claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is 

responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). 

“This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe 

into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and 

quotation omitted).

“When no new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council and it denies 

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review, then the administrative law judge’s decision is necessarily reviewed as the 

final decision of the Commissioner, but when a claimant properly presents new 

evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new 

evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.

III. Claims on Judicial Review

1. “The ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by 

substantial evidence of record.”

2. “The Appeals Council erred in failing to remand the case for proper 

consideration of evidence submitted to it, consisting of a thorough 

examination by a burn surgeon and a vocational expert. The Appeals Council 

provided no evidence that it had properly considered the evidence.”

3. “The ALJ conducted a flawed credibility determination based on insignificant 

or perceived conflicts in testimony.”

(Doc. 14 at 1).6

IV. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Fritts had “not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since June 29, 2011, the alleged onset date...” (R. 19). At Step Two, 

the ALJ determined that Fritts had the following severe impairments: status post 

30% total body surface area burns to the left arm, lower back, buttocks, bilateral 

 6 Generally, claims of error not raised in the district court are deemed waived. Cf. Stewart 

v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general 

principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in 

the district court.”); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-11567, 2016 WL 3159217, at *4 

(11th Cir. June 7, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying Stewart holding in Social 

Security appeal).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 8 of 21
thighs, bilateral legs, and bilateral feet. (R. 19). At Step Three, the ALJ found that

Fritts did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of 

Impairments. (R. 20). 

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth 

step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Fritts had the RFC “to perform less than the full

range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b),” with the following 

restrictions:

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He can lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds 

frequently. He can stand, walk, and sit for a total of about six hours 

each in an eight-hour workday. He can occasionally bend, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, 

wetness, humidity, vibrations, noise, and pulmonary irritants such as 

fumes, odors, dust, and gas. He must avoid all exposure to unprotected 

heights, dangerous machinery, uneven surfaces, large bodies of water, 

and commercial driving. He should be expected to take one 

unscheduled break during an eight-hour workday. He should be 

expected to have one unplanned absence per month. He can 

understand, remember, and carry out no more than simple, short 

instructions and make simple work-related decisions with few work 

place changes.

(R. 20).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Fritts was unable to perform 

any past relevant work. (R. 25). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from 

a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the 

national economy that Fritts can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. (R. 26). Thus, the ALJ found that Fritts was not disabled under the 

Social Security Act. (R. 26).

A. Claim 3 (Credibility Assessment)

In Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1991), [the Eleventh 

Circuit] articulated the “pain standard,” which applies when a 

disability claimant attempts to establish a disability through his own 

testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. 921 F.2d at 1223. The 

pain standard requires

(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) 

objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the 

alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the 

objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity 

that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged 

pain.

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921 F.2d at 1223 (internal citation omitted). If a claimant testifies as to 

his subjective complaints of disabling pain and other symptoms ... , the 

ALJ must clearly “articulate explicit and adequate reasons” for 

discrediting the claimant's allegations of completely disabling 

symptoms. Foote[ v. Chater], 67 F.3d [1553,] 1561–62[ (11th Cir. 1995) 

(per curiam)]. “Although this circuit does not require an explicit 

finding as to credibility, ... the implication must be obvious to the 

reviewing court.” 67 F.3d at 1562 (quoting Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 

F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1983)). The credibility determination does 

not need to cite “ ‘particular phrases or formulations' ” but it cannot 

merely be a broad rejection which is “ ‘not enough to enable [the 

district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her 

medical condition as a whole.’ ” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561 (quoting 

Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588–90 (11th Cir. 1987)).

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 

F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated 

credibility finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 

1562 (11th Cir. 1995).” Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 

(11th Cir. 2014).

The ALJ gave “little weight” to Fritts’s subjective testimony “for a number of 

reasons[,]” explaining as follows:

First, the Claimant’s credibility is undermined by the testimony 

regarding his pain. He testified his pain is a level 7/10 without 

medication and that medication only reduces his pain to a level 6/10. 

However, this stands in sharp contrast to the overall objective 

evidence, which shows he reported his pain was, on average, a level 

4/10 in July 2011. (Ex. 5F.) He also routinely reported his pain was 

well-controlled with pain medication. (Ex. 3F.) In June 2012, he told 

his physical therapist that he had no complaints of pain. (Ex. 7F.) The 

medical evidence of record does not show that the Claimant has 

reported an increase of pain to a level 7/10. It also does not provide 

any objective basis for concluding that the Claimant’s pain would 

increase, particularly after participation in rehabilitative therapy. The 

lack of evidence to support the Claimant’s contention suggests he 

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 11 of 21
exaggerated his pain for secondary gain.

Second, the Claimant’s credibility is diminished by his own statement 

to his therapist in January 2012 that he was looking for employment. 

(Ex. 5F.) This suggests the Claimant subjectively believes he is capable 

of employment. Additionally, it is consistent with his therapist’s 

opinion that he is capable of working.

Third and finally, the Claimant’s credibility is undermined by his 

inconsistent statements regarding his education. When initially 

applying for benefits, the Claimant reported he graduated high school. 

(Ex. 3E.) However, he testified that he did not complete the eleventh 

grade and never obtained his GED. His education records indicate 

that he did not complete high school. (Ex. 1E.) These inconsistencies 

raise further questions regarding the veracity of the Claimant’s 

allegations.

(R. 24 – 25).

Fritts does not claim that the ALJ failed to make a “clearly articulated 

credibility finding,” and the above-quoted passage would easily refute such an 

argument. Thus, the Court’s only remaining duty for Claim 3 is to determine 

whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence. In this regard, Fritts 

largely quarrels with the ALJ’s view of the evidence and asks the Court to adopt his 

own, more favorable interpretation of that evidence, dismissing the inconsistencies 

cited by the ALJ as “insignificant” and “perceived.” However, the “substantial 

evidence” standard of review forbids this Court from deciding the facts anew, 

reweighing the evidence, or substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. 

As to the ALJ’s finding that Fritts had inconsistently reported his level of 

pain, Fritts complains “there is no ... indication in Exhibit 3F” that he “routinely 

reported his pain was well-controlled with pain medication.” (Doc. 14 at 9). 

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However, as Fritts himself tacitly points out, the ALJ’s citation to Exhibit “3F” 

appears to have been a scrivener’s error, since medical records from multiple dates 

in Exhibit 2F report that Fritts’s “[p]ain is well controlled with” Lortab and 

oxycodone and/or that he “has no serious complaints.” (R. 277, 278, 280, 291). 

Fritts does not challenge the accuracy of the ALJ’s discussion of other evidence on 

this point, which further supports the ALJ’s determination that Fritts’s subjective 

reports of the intensity of his pain were inconsistent with the objective record 

evidence.7

As to the ALJ’s finding that Fritts’s “statement to his therapist in January 

2012 that he was looking for employment ... suggests [Fritts] subjectively believes 

he is capable of employment,” Fritts quibbles that he actually told the therapist “he 

is looking at other jobs to do” (R. 375), claiming that “[t]his is not exactly looking for 

work[, and f]urthermore, looking for work is not the same as performing and 

maintaining work.” (Doc. 14 at 9). However, the ALJ’s paraphrasing of this 

statement is not an unreasonable interpretation; moreover, the ALJ cited the 

statement only as evidence of Fritts’s subjective belief in his ability to do work, thus 

further eroding his credibility in claiming that pain rendered him unable to work. 

 7 Fritts also asserts that Lortab and oxycodone “are narcotic pain medications used to treat 

moderate to severe pain and ... are addictive[,]” and “[t]he fact that these risky medications 

are required to control his level of pain is proof of the severity of the pain.” (Doc. 14 at 9). 

Fritts cites no record evidence or authority to substantiate these medical claims. 

Regardless, the ALJ was not required to accept as true Fritts’s testimony of disabling pain 

merely because he was taking strong pain medication. When evaluating a claimant's 

subjective symptoms, the ALJ considers, inter alia, the “effectiveness” as well as the “type” 

of pain medication a claimant is taking. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv); SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 

374186, at *3 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ found that Fritts’s “pain was well-controlled with 

pain medication,” and substantial evidence supports that finding.

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 13 of 21
The ALJ did not purport to find that Fritts could actually work based on this 

statement.

Finally, Fritts asserts that the inconsistencies cited by the ALJ regarding 

Fritts’s education history are “irrelevant” because “school records show Mr. Fritts 

repeated seventh and eleventh grades, so he was in school at least twelve years.” 

(Doc. 14 at 10 (citing R. 158 – 160)). While likely not a sufficient reason, standing 

alone, to discredit Fritts, the Court disagrees that these discrepancies were 

completely “irrelevant,” as they could reasonably be interpreted as calling into 

question Fritts’s ability to accurately report information to the SSA. Regardless, 

even setting aside the discrepancies in Fritts’s educational history, the ALJ’s other 

two reasons for giving little weight to Fritts’s subjective testimony constitute a 

clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence. 8 

 8 Fritts also complains that “[t]he ALJ never indicated whether Mr. Fritts had an 

underlying medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce his pain.” (Doc. 

14 at 10). While the ALJ did not explicitly make a statement saying “Condition X could 

reasonably be expected to produce pain,” the implication is obvious that he determined such 

a medical condition did exist but that Fritts’s testimony as to the severity of his pain was 

not supported by the record or otherwise credible. At most, any failure to explicitly 

articulate an underlying medical condition was harmless error, as Fritts did not satisfy the 

second half of the “pain standard.”

Fritts also argues that consideration of other factors identified in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3) (and restated in SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3) renders his testimony 

more credible. This argument, however, lacks any citation to specific portions of the 

administrative record and simply invites the Court to reweigh those factors. The ALJ’s 

decision sufficiently demonstrates that he considered Fritts’s medical condition as a whole

in making his credibility determination. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782 (“[C]ontrary to 

Mitchell’s contention that the ALJ ignored evidence favorable to Mitchell, ‘there is no rigid 

requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long 

as the ALJ’s decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing 

court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.’

Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted). The ALJ’s decision in this case 

was not a broad rejection and was sufficient to enable the district court and this Court to 

conclude the ALJ considered Mitchell's medical condition as a whole. See id.”).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 14 of 21
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Fritts’s assertions of reversible error in 

Claim 3.

B. Claim 1 (Substantial Evidence Supporting the RFC)

Fritts asserts that, because the “evidence of record before the ALJ contained 

only raw medical evidence,” without any “functional abilities” assessment by a 

treating physician, the ALJ had a duty to either “order a consultative examination 

or seek testimony by a medical expert.” (Doc. 14 at 4). Relatedly, he argues that 

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC assessment because it is based 

on his own uninformed view of the “raw medical evidence” and “is not supported by 

the opinion of any treating physician, consultative examiner, reviewing DDS 

physician or medical expert.” (Id. at 5).

“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair 

record.[9] Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is 

disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of 

his claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 

(citations omitted). An ALJ “is not required to order a consultative examination as 

long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the administrative law judge to 

make an informed decision.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269. See also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1519a(b) (“We may purchase a consultative examination to try to resolve an 

inconsistency in the evidence, or when the evidence as a whole is insufficient to 

 

9 Fritts devotes a paragraph of his brief to explaining that this duty is heightened for 

unrepresented claimants. (See Doc. 14 at 5). However, the record reflects that Fritts was 

represented by an attorney (who is also his present counsel) at his hearing before the ALJ 

and at the time of the ALJ’s decision.

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 15 of 21
allow us to make a determination or decision on your claim.”).

In his decision, the ALJ considered in detail the treatment notes from 

“Steven Thomas, M.D., [Fritts’s] treating physician.” (See R. 21 – 23). Fritts does 

not dispute the ALJ’s classification of Dr. Thomas as a treating physician, and he 

makes no effort explain why he could not himself obtain an opinion from Dr. 

Thomas (indeed, Fritts’s brief omits any specific mention of Dr. Thomas). He also 

does not identify any specific deficiencies in the record evidence that prevented the 

ALJ from reaching an informed decision, apart from his conclusory assertion that 

the ALJ was required to obtain a medical opinion in order to formulate the RFC. 

This assertion, however, is meritless. “[T]he task of determining a claimant’s 

residual functional capacity and ability to work rests with the administrative law 

judge, not a doctor.” Moore v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, No. 15-15213, 2016 WL 

2909170, at *3 (11th Cir. May 19, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1546(c) (“If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level ..., the 

administrative law judge ... is responsible for assessing your residual functional 

capacity.”)). The ALJ carries out this task by assessing “all of the relevant medical 

and other evidence[,]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3),10 which “may contain medical 

opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added). See also Green v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 223 F. App'x 915, 923 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(“Although a claimant may provide a statement containing a physician’s opinion of 

 10 20 C.F.R. § 4014.1545 was amended in 1991 to delete language defining an RFC as a 

“medical assessment.” See Langley v. Astrue, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1252-53 (N.D. Ala. 

2011).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 16 of 21
her remaining capabilities, the ALJ will evaluate such a statement in light of the 

other evidence presented and the ultimate determination of disability is reserved 

for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1513, 404.1527, 404.1545.” (emphasis added)).11

Here, the ALJ’s decision sufficiently indicates that he reached his RFC 

determination after considering the ample objective medical evidence of record, as 

well as opinions from Fritts’s physical therapist, a consultative examining 

psychologist, and a non-examining State agency psychological consultant. The ALJ 

acted within his authority in doing so. See Kent v. Acting Comm’r of the Social 

Security Administration, No. 15-15059, 2016 WL 3159582, at *3 (11th Cir. June 7, 

2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“There is no merit to Kent's claim that the ALJ 

conducted his own ‘psychiatric analysis’ using Dr. Marchese’s treatment notes. The 

ALJ properly considered all of the relevant medical and other evidence, including 

Dr. Marchese’s treatment notes, and assessed Kent’s RFC, a determination reserved 

to the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c).”); Castle v. 

Colvin, 557 F. App'x 849, 853-54 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(“Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, the ALJ did not ‘play doctor’ in 

 11 Fritts argues that an “ALJ is simply not qualified to formulate a residual functional 

capacity on his own” where, as here, the ALJ did not find the claimant “could perform a full 

range of light work” but instead “added specific limitations to the RFC.” (Doc. 14 at 5 – 6). 

“This detailed analysis of medical records[,]” Fritts submits, “is not within [the ALJ’s] 

purview[;] such specificity can only be reached by a physician.” (Id. at 6). Fritts cites no 

authority to support this argument, and the Court is not aware of any provision in the 

Social Security regulations imposing a heightened burden of evidentiary support for RFCs 

providing for less than a full range of a certain category of work.

Fritts’s point is not proven by the fact that a physician’s “post-hearing examination” 

contradicted parts of the ALJ’s RFC determination, as this argument erroneously presumes 

that the ALJ would have been required to accept this evidence as true had it been 

presented to him. See, e.g., Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983)

(The Commissioner “may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a 

contrary conclusion.”).

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 17 of 21
assessing Mr. Castle’s RFC, but instead properly carried out his regulatory role as 

an adjudicator responsible for assessing Mr. Castle’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(3) (‘We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the 

relevant medical and other evidence.’). Indeed, the pertinent regulations state that 

the ALJ has the responsibility for determining a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1546(c).”); Ramos v. Barnhart, 119 F. App'x 295, 296 (1st Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“To the extent appellant suggests that the ALJ should have 

obtained the testimony of a medical expert to resolve any apparent conflicts 

between the treating physicians' assessments and the opinions of the state agency 

physicians, her argument is unavailing because RFC is not a medical assessment, 

but is instead an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(e).”); Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished) (“ ‘The ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any 

medical expert, but may weigh the evidence and draw his own inferences.’ McCain 

v. Dir., OWCP, 58 Fed. Appx. 184, 193 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Underwood v. Elkay 

Mining, 105 F.3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 1997)).”).12 Thus, the Court OVERRULES 

 12 Fritts asserts that an “ALJ cannot act as both judge and physician.” (Doc. 14 at 5). 

The (non-binding) authority he cites in support of this statement, however, stands for the 

proposition that an ALJ “abuses his discretion when he substitutes his own uninformed 

medical evaluations for those of a claimant's treating physician [and] arbitrarily 

substitute[s] his own hunch or intuition for the diagnosis of a medical professional.” 

Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 840-4 (11th Cir. 1992) (Johnson, J., concurring). See 

also Jiles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action No. 05-G-0861-S, 2006 WL 4402937, at *4 

(N.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2006) (“It is an ALJ's ‘uninformed medical evaluations’ that are 

prohibited.” (citing Marbury, 957 F.2d at 840-41 (Johnson, J., concurring)). In other words, 

these cases simply amplify the unremarkable observation that, when presented with the 

opinions of medical professionals, an ALJ may not simply disregard them without a valid 

explanation. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the 

weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor” to permit “a reviewing 

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Fritts’s assertions of reversible error in Claim 1.

C. Claim 2 (New Evidence Considered by Appeals Council)

In denying Fritts’s request for review, the Appeals Counsel considered 

“additional evidence from Dr. Novack, Dr. Dimick, and Mr. Gurley” submitted by 

Fritts but determined “that this information does not provide a basis for changing 

the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (R. 1 – 2). Fritts argues that remand is 

appropriate because the “Appeals Council did not demonstrate that it adequately 

evaluated the new evidence, as required.” (Doc. 14 at 7). This argument is 

foreclosed by Mitchell v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 771 F.3d 

780, 782-85 (11th Cir. 2014). Recently, in Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration, 783 F.3d 847 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit, 

applying Mitchell, rejected an identical argument that the Appeals Council “erred 

because it failed to make specific findings of fact about the evidence that it added to 

the record when it denied [a] request for review[,]” explaining as follows:

“The Appeals Council may deny or dismiss [a] request for review....” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.1467. But the Appeals Council is not required to make 

specific findings of fact when it denies review. It need only “consider 

the additional evidence” that is new, material, and chronologically 

relevant. Id. § 416.1470(b). The Appeals Council stated that it 

 

court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and 

supported by substantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)). These cases in no way stand for 

the proposition that an ALJ is not competent to consider medical evidence and render an 

RFC determination without a medical opinion.

Fritts also asserts that “the ALJ failed to link the evidence to the RFC 

determination by describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” (Doc. 14 at 7). 

His argument on this point, however, consists solely of quotes from various district court 

cases followed by a conclusory assertion of error. Other than a doctor’s report produced one 

day after the ALJ’s decision, Fritts fails to cite anything in the administrative record (e.g., 

inconsistencies in the ALJ’s reasoning; probative record evidence available to the ALJ that 

was not considered) that calls the ALJ’s RFC determination into question.

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 19 of 21
considered the new evidence that Parks submitted, and the Appeals 

Council added the evidence to the record. The Appeals Council was 

not required to do more.

Our Court recently decided Mitchell v. Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, which controls this question. 771 F.3d 780. In 

Mitchell, we held that there is no requirement that “the Appeals 

Council ... provide a detailed discussion of a claimant's new evidence 

when denying a request for review.” Id. at 783. We explained that, 

where “the Appeals Council expressly stated in its letter to [the 

claimant] that it had considered his additional evidence, ... we ha[d] no 

basis ... to second-guess that assertion.” Id. Parks’s situation is 

indistinguishable from that of the claimant in Mitchell. Parks 

submitted additional evidence to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals 

Council added the evidence to the record, stated that it considered the 

evidence, and denied review. As in Mitchell, nothing suggests that the 

Appeals Council failed to consider Parks's new evidence.

Parks’s reliance on Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir.1980), and 

Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629 (11th Cir. 1984), is misplaced. In Epps,

our predecessor court found that the Appeals Council had not 

“adequately evaluate[d]” new evidence. 624 F.2d at 1273. But as we 

explained in Mitchell, the decision in Epps “arose in a different 

procedural context,” where the Appeals Council affirmed the decision 

of the administrative law judge. Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 783. Epps has 

little bearing on a denial of a request for review. Bowen is inapposite 

too. In Bowen, our Court “concluded the record established that the 

Appeals Council did not adequately evaluate additional evidence 

submitted to it because it viewed each of the claimant's impairments in 

isolation and did not consider their combined effect.” Mitchell, 771 F.3d 

at 784. “Bowen requires the Appeals Council to apply the correct legal 

standards in performing its duties,” but it does not require that the 

Appeals Council include with every denial of review a “detailed 

rationale for why each piece of new evidence submitted to it does not 

change the [administrative law judge]’s decision.” Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 

784.

783 F.3d 847, 852-53 (emphasis added).

“If [Fritts] had asked [the Court] to reverse the denial of review on the 

merits, [the Court] could have examined the new evidence that she presented to the 

Appeals Council and reviewed its decision.” Id. at 853. However, Fritts “challenges 

Case 2:15-cv-00209-N Document 21 Filed 06/24/16 Page 20 of 21
only the failure of the Appeals Council to make detailed findings of fact. Because 

the Appeals Council is not required to make detailed findings, [the Court] need 

examine its decision no further.” Id. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Fritts’s 

assertions of reversible error in Claim 2 and finds that the Commissioner’s final 

decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s March 3, 2015 final decision denying Fritts’s application for a 

period of disability and DIB benefits is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of June 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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