Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06147/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MICHELLE WILLIAMS, for 

Christopher Williams, 

a minor, on the account of 

Cecil Cole, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Fl tED 

Unit <l States Court of Appeals 

·renth Circuit 

OCT 2 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

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No. 90-6147 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., ) 

Secretary of Health and Human} 

Services, } 

Defendant-Appel lee. 

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(D.C. No. Civ-89-1047-T} 

( W. D. Ok la. } 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

f d . . d ** Be ore ANDERSON, BALDOCK an EBEL, Circuit Ju ges. 

Plaintiff-appellant, Michelle Williams, appeals from the 

district court's denial of her application for child insurance 

benefits as authorized by 42 u.s.c. §§ 402(d), 416(h}. In a 

thorough memorandum opinion, the district court sustained the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 1 
decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny 

benefits to Williams as supported by substantial evidence. See 

Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988). Williams 

complains that she did not receive a full and fair administrative 

hearing and thus seeks a remand for further factual development of 

her claim. 

We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal as well as 

the briefs submitted by the parties and have nothing to add to the 

district court's analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court's decision substantially for the reasons set forth in its 

memorandum opinion, attached hereto and made a part hereof. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 2 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

MICHELLE WILLIAMS for 

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, 

a minor, on the account 

of Cecil Cole, deceased, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., 

Secretary of Health and 

Human Savices, 

Defendant. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

CIV-89-1047-T 

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In accordance with the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §40S(g), 

the Plaintiff has filed a complaint, as amended, seeking review of a final decision of the 

Defendant, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), denying a claim on 

behalf of the Plaintiffs son for child's insurance benefits authorized by 42 U.S.C. 

§§402(d), 416(h). On August 22, 1989 the Secretary filed his answer along with the 

administrative record (TR _), the parties have briefed the pertinent issues and the 

Court now concludes as follows: 

Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 3 
I 

On March 20, 1987 the Plaintiff filed an application for child's insurance benefits 

in behalf of her son, Christopher Williams, claiming that he was the natural son of Cecil 

L. Cole who lived with her from January to July, 1986. (TR 27-32). Administrative 

review of the application resulted in denial of the claim for benefits upon initial and 

reconsideration determinations. (TR 33-41). In view of the Plaintiffs request for hearing 

by an Administrative Law Judge, a hearing was conducted on August 24, 1988 at which 

time the Plaintiff and two wimesses testified in summary as follows (TR 16-26): the 

Plaintiff testified that she was the mother of the child, Christopher Williams, that the 

father was deceased, that Mr. Cole was divorced prior to their relationship, and that the 

Plaintiff and Mr. Cole had lived together but had not held themselves our as husband and 

wife. A former wife of Mr. Cole also testified that she was married to him for about six 

years, that one child was born of this marriage, and they were divorced in April of 1984. 

This wimess was unable to offer evidence as to whether Christopher Williams was Mr. 

Cole's child or not. Further evidence was introduced that Mr. Cole died when 

Christopher was two months old and he did not sign the birth certificate or any other 

document evidencing that he was the father of the child for unspecified reasons. 

Additional documentary evidence concerned not only Christopher Williams but also 

Ciara Cole born May 17, 1985. In a Child Relationship Statement (TR 67-68) wherein 

Plaintiff denied having any written evidence of paternity from a lengthy check list, she 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 4 
stated she knew of other written evidence that would show the child's paternity and 

that there were persons to whom Mr. Cole admitted orally that he was the parent of the 

child. This statement also includes the following information: 

Cecil signed a paternity statement at the Baptist Hospital OKC OK when 

Ciara was born. Ciara's B/C [Birth Certificate] was issued under the 

surname of Cole because of the paternity statement. 

I received OK AFDC Case #C-.071850. I do not know if the Welfare ever 

contacted Cecil about Christopher being his child. If they did not I do nor 

know of any other written evidence of paternity. Cecil never saw 

Christopher. 

(TR 68). 

In a letter dated April 20, 1987 (TR 64), the witness verified that the Plaintiff and 

Mr. Cole were living together when Christopher was conceived, that Mr. Cole's desire ro 

"sign" for Christopher was apparently impeded by his institutionalization in a drug 

treatment center, and that Plaintiff and Mr. Cole had picked a name for the baby whose 

sex had been determined by ultrasound diagnosis. Statements of at least five other 

witnesses also confirmed that Plaintiff was living with Mr. Cole when Christopher was 

conceived. (TR 59-63). In an undated statement, Jurline Hogan, the mother of Mr. Cole 

stated that he informed her that he was expecting a child from the Plaintiff. (TR 58). 

The apartment rental lease reflects that Plaintiff was living with Cecil Cole on or 

about February 7, 1986 and also indicates that Plaintiff, Mr. Cole, and Cecil Cole would 

be the only occupants of the apartment. (TR 52-53). The birth certificate of Christopher 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 5 
Williams states he was born December 15, 1986 but there was no name or other 

information listed on the birth certificate in the space provided for "father'' (the 

"informant" was the Plaintiff). (TR 51). 

After review of the record, the Administrative Law Judge entered the following 

findings on November 3, 1988 (TR 8-9): 

1. The wage earner, Cecil Cole, died fully insured on February 

19, 1987, domiciled in the State of Oklahoma. 

2. An application was filed on behalf of Christopher Williams 

(born February 15, 1986) on March 20, 1987. 

3. Christopher Williams is not the "child" of the wage earner 

under Oklahoma State law as required by Section 

216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act. 

4. Christopher Williams is not the "child" of the wage earner 

pursuant to Section 216(h)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act 

as his mother and the wage earner never went through a 

mamage ceremony. 

5. Christopher Williams is not the "child" of the wage earner 

pursuant to Section 216(h)(3)(C) of the Social Security Act 

as the evidence of record does not establish that the wage 

earner was ever decreed by a court to be his father, was ever 

ordered by a court to contribute to his support, or ever 

acknowledged him in writing. Furthermore, the evidence of 

record does not establish that the wage earner was either 

living with him or contributing to his support at the time of 

his death. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 6 
On April 13, 1989 the Appeals Council concluded there was no basis for review of the 

decision of the Administrative Law Judge thereby terminating any further administrative 

consideration of this case. (TR 2-3). 

II 

The Plaintiff acknowledges that her entitlement to surviving child's insurance 

benefits is governed by the laws of μie State of Oklahoma and specifically by statutory 

provisions granting an illegitimate child an inheritance from the deceased wage earner's 

intestate personal property as a deemed dependant. 42 U.S.C. §416(h)(2)(A); 84 O.S. 

§215. Therefore, Plaintiff does not urge that she qualifies for benefits by virtue of a 

ceremonial marriage, or a written acknowledgment of paternity by the deceased father, 

by a court order for child support, or by evidence that the decedent was the biological 

father and was actually living with the child or contributing to his support at the time 

of his death. 42 U.S.C. §416(h). Accordingly, the pertinent provisions of the stare 

statute controlling the Plaintiffs entitlement is as follows: 

"For inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands in the same 

relation to his mother and her kindred, and she and her kindred to the 

child, as if that child had been born in wedlock. For like purposes, every 

child stands in identical relation to his father and his kindred, and the latter 

and his kindred to the child, whenever: . . . (c) the father publicly 

acknowledged such child as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent 

of his wife, if he is married, into his family and otherwise treating it as if 

it were a child born in wedlock, ... " 

84 o.s. §215. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 7 
The Plaintiff proffers very little cogent factual evidence to satisfy the public 

acknowledgment criterion except for arguments rationalizing case authorities and the 

statement made by Mr. Cole's mother, Jurline Hogan, to the Social Security 

Administration that her son told her that the Plaintiff was pregnant with his son. (TR 

57-58). In reviewing Ms. Hogan's statement, the Court observes a single, cryptic 

sentence: "Cecil informed me that he was expecting a child from Michelle." The 

statement is undated, it is unclear whether the "child" was Ciara or Christopher, and the 

Plaintiff has not suggested that there is other evidence that would clarify this statement. 

In a distinguishable case cited by the Plaintiff, In re Estate of LaSarge, 526 P .2d 

930, 933 (Oki. 1974), it was determined that the putative father had "publicly 

acknowledged" the child because of a plea of guilty in a bastardy proceeding which was 

deemed "sufficient" alone to constitute public acknowledgement. The phrase public 

acknowledgement "has been generally employed in the ordinary or commonly understood 

sense of disclosing facts of paternity without concealment to relatives, friends, 

acquaintances, and other third persons. It is generally held that the recognition need not 

be universal or so general and public as to have been known by all." Id. at 932. Also, 

in the LaSarge case the father had acknowledged the child, to many persons including 

the priest who baptized the child, a neighbor, and various other persons. In further 

consideration of §21S(c), no evidence appears or is tendered herein that the putative 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 8 
father "received" the child as his own in the short two month period after Christopher 

was born and prior to his death on February 19, 1987. 

Thus, in analyzing this evidence, the critical issue before the Court is whether the 

substantial evidence standard has been satisfied in the Secretary's decision denying child's 

insurance benefits. The substantial evidence standard is more than a scintilla and is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Broadbent v. Harris. 698 

F .2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983). Cf his standard is generally viewed as requiring 

something less than a preponderance of the evidence where the evidence has some 

substance to it which is not overwhelmed by other evidence. Jozefowicz v. Heckler. 811 

F.2d 1352, 1357 (10th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

The evidence is undisputed that the Plaintiff never entered into a ceremonial 

marriage with Cecil Cole, that he never signed any written document acknowledging 

himself to be the father of Christopher nor is there any inclicia that Mr. Cole contributed 

to the support of Christopher. The statements that were submitted to prove that Mr. 

Cole "publicly acknowledged" Christopher as his child fall short of the mark since they 

establish only that the Plaintiff and Mr. Cole lived together when the child was 

conceived, but Mr. Cole never saw the child and the only public acknowledgement is an 

isolated statement by Mr. Cole's mother that is inconclusive and ambiguous. Accordingly, 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 9 
the Court finds that the substantial evidence standard has been satisfied and the 

Secretary's decision is a proper adjudication of the evidence in the record. 

However, the Plaintiff further submits that the evidence in the record is deficient 

and that this deficiency is the legal fault of the Administrative Law Judge. To support 

this proposition, the Plaintiff points to the brevity of the hearing and the fact that the 

Plaintiff was not represented by counsel. In reviewing the record, the Court notes an 

expositive statement attached to the Notice of Hearing which explicates the rights of the 

Plaintiff to a hearing, to be represented, and the right to submit evidence. (TR 13-14). 

In addition, the record includes advice to the Plaintiff of her right to be represented by 

an attorney or other representative of her choice to assist her in preparing evidence 

including witnesses and documents. (TR 15). 

At the initiation of the hearing on August 24, 1988, the Administrative Law Judge 

informed the Plaintiff of her right to be represented by an attorney or a qualified nonlawyer and she indicated her desire to proceed without representation. (TR 19-21). The 

record reveals that the Administrative Law Judge identified the Plaintiffs witnesses and 

defined the issues concerning whether Christopher Williams is the child of Cecil Cole 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The record further shows the Plaintiff 

testified in response to questions by the Administrative Law Judge that she lived with Mr. 

Cole although they did not claim to be husband and wife, that his name was not placed 

on the birth certificate by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has one other child by Mr. Cole (Ciara) 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 10 
and that Mr. Cole was able to "sign for her" and, finally, Plaintiff agreed that upon the 

submission of the documentary evidence and testimony that the case was ready for 

decision. (TR 18-25). The Plaintiffs claim of paternity is inconsistent with her decision 

to give Christopher her own surname and her failure to identify the father on the binh 

certificate. See 63 O.S. 1981 §1-311(d)(2) requiring the consents of the father and 

mother where the mother was not n:iamed at conception or birth to enter the name of 

the father on the birth certificate. 

As additional reasons for challenging the sufficiency of the hearing, the Plaintiff 

states that the Court should not pretermit the submission of evidence regarding the 

grandparents acceptance of the child or Mr. Cole's contribution to Plaintiffs suppon. The 

legal issue submitted by the Plaintiff concerns only whether the father publicly 

acknowledged the child as his own and treated it as such. The grandparents care and 

acceptance of the child would be insufficient to establish paternity. Further, there is 

evidence in this record that the putative father did not contribute to the support of the 

child or to the mother, either before or after the child was born. (TR 56, 6 7). Evidence 

of Mr. Cole's support of Christopher would be de minimis since the parties do not 

disagree that the child is a deemed dependent if qualified under Oklahoma's intestacy 

law. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510-516 (1976). A remand is inappropriate 

where the decision would not be different in light of new evidence which would not 

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Appellate Case: 90-6147 Document: 010110064912 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 11 
directly support the controlling public acknowledgement issue. Cagle v. Califano, 638 

F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1981). 

It is the Court's opinion that the Secretary satisfied the requirements of advising 

the Plaintiff of her right to representation both before and during the hearing, that she 

voluntarily and intelligently waived this right, and that the Secretary has fairly developed 

the narrow issue concerning child's insurance benefits, although the hearing was not 

lengthy. Garcia v. Califano. 625 F.2d 354, 356-357 (10th Cir. 1980); [A plaintiff fully 

advised of the right to anomey and non-anomey representation who proceeds on her 

own in a full and fair hearing, is not entitled to have the cause remanded for further 

proceedings.]; Dixon v. Heckler. 811 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1987). Therefore, since 

the Court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence or to exercise its discretion in 

evidentiary analyses, and the record fairly develops the evidence pertinent to the issue 

to be decided, the decision of the Secretary must be AFFIRMED. 

Accordingly, judgment will issue dismissing the complaint and denying the 

- .,.; Plaintiffs application for child's insurance benefits this / J day of February, 1990. 

) 

1 · ' 

~£ -<___,."fl',- ) _j,. • • •. Q.;_ ...... ·- -~ 

RALPH G. THOMPSON 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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