Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02045/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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Case No. 15-cv-02045-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYBERCSI,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02045-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

TRANSFER VENUE

(Re: Docket No. 7, 9)

At its heart, this case is about who should pay a seven-figure credit card bill. Plaintiff 

CyberCSI alleges that Defendant FIA Card Services, N.A. issued a company credit card to an 

unauthorized CyberCSI employee and then helped her hide nearly $2 million in gambling and 

other expenses over the next two years.1 Defendants Bank of America Corporation and Bank of 

America, N.A., which now own FIA,2urge that CyberCSI can no longer pursue Defendants 

because CyberCSI paid off its bills.

3

 Because a forum selection clause in the credit card 

agreement governs, this court must leave its colleagues in Delaware to reckon with the merits of 

the dispute. Defendants’ motion to transfer4is GRANTED. Their motion to dismiss5is DENIED, 

without prejudice to any renewed motion after the change in venue.

 

1

See Docket No. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 13-54.

2

See id. at ¶¶ 8-9.

3

See Docket No. 9 at 8-20.

4

See Docket No. 7.

5

See Docket No. 9.

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I.

CyberCSI, which “provides IT outsourcing services and solutions to large businesses,” 

obtained its first corporate credit cards from FIA in or around 2000.6 Only CyberCSI’s principals 

could authorize employees to hold company credit cards, and the principals also decided how 

much the credit limits would be.7 In 2007, CyberCSI granted Collette Pulizzi, a bookkeeper who 

had worked at CyberCSI for several years, permission to hold one of these cards, with a credit 

limit of only $2,500.8 Five years later, CyberCSI decided she no longer needed the card and 

withdrew her authorization.9 The card issuer acknowledged the withdrawal and cancelled her 

card.10 And in May 2014, CyberCSI terminated Pulizzi’s employment, for reasons unrelated to 

the company card.11

Just a few days after firing Pulizzi, CyberCSI discovered that she had secretly, and without 

permission, opened a company card in her own name a few months after her authorized card was 

cancelled.12 CyberCSI immediately reported the fraud and began investigating the scope of the 

misfeasance.13 Bank of America informed CyberCSI that it had opened the account “with no 

questions asked” and with only verbal authorization, though Bank of America was unable to find 

any proof of that authorization.14 Pulizzi’s new card had a credit limit of $90,000—far higher than 

CyberCSI’s CEO—and Defendants let Pulizzi exceed even that limit for many of the months that 

 

6 Docket No. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 13-14.

7

See id. at ¶¶ 17, 19.

8

See id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 40; Docket No. 16 at 1.

9

See Docket No. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 21-22.

10 See id. at ¶ 21.

11 See id. at ¶ 23.

12 See id. at ¶¶ 24, 29.

13 See id. at ¶¶ 25-27.

14 Id. at ¶ 32.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

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she held the card.15 Defendants also let Pulizzi set up the card so it was visible only through her 

personal online banking account and would not appear on the list of company credit cards on the 

corporate online banking account.16 With this protection, from January 2013 until May 2014, 

Pulizzi used her secret card for a variety of personal expenses, mostly at casinos.17 She paid off 

her charges directly via online payments from CyberCSI’s bank account, and she used various 

accounting tricks to hide her tracks.18 In total, Pulizzi racked up $1.8 million in charges, for which 

she now faces criminal prosecution.19

In the first few days after discovering the loss, CyberCSI contacted Bank of America 

several times and received repeated assurances that the latter would cover it in its entirety.20 Soon 

afterwards, however, Bank of America began backtracking, denying CyberCSI’s fraud claim and 

then informing CyberCSI about various limitations on the fraud protection program.21 In the 

interim, CyberCSI found that a number of company documents regarding the credit card, 

including the original application and agreement, were missing, and Bank of America failed to 

provide CyberCSI with copies of these documents.22 To add insult to injury, Defendants also seek 

payment of the $30,000 balance that remains on Pulizzi’s card.23 For its part, CyberCSI demands 

reimbursement of all fraudulent expenses, asserting claims under the Truth in Lending Act and 

 

15 See id. at ¶¶ 33-34..

16 See id. at ¶ 35.

17 See id. at ¶¶ 37, 42.

18 See id. at ¶ 38.

19 See id. at ¶¶ 39, 43.

20 See id. at ¶ 44.

21 See id. at ¶¶ 47-48.

22 See id. at ¶¶ 49-52.

23 See id. at ¶ 54.

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various state law causes of action.24 

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332 and 1441. 

The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).25

III.

A district court may transfer any civil action “to any other district or division where it

might have been brought” for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of 

justice.26 The purpose of the statute is to “prevent the waste ‘of time, energy, and money’ and ‘to 

protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.’”27 In 

most cases, a district court considering a motion to transfer must consider various factors related 

to the interests of justice.28 Where a valid forum selection clause is involved, however, “a district 

court should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of 

the parties clearly disfavor a transfer.”

29

 “In other words, where there is a valid forum selection 

clause in a contract between the parties, ‘the interest of justice’ is best served by giving effect to 

the parties’ bargain.”30

The critical question, then, is whether a valid forum selection clause exists. In this context, 

 

24 See id. at ¶¶ 53, 55-82.

25 See Docket Nos. 11, 13.

26 28 U.S.C. §1404(a).

27 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 

364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)).

28 See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986).

29 Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013).

30 T & M Solar & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Lennox Int’l Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 855, 868 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (quoting Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581).

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“pleadings need not be accepted as true, and facts outside the pleadings may be considered.”31 If 

facts material to the enforceability of a forum selection clause remain in dispute, the court may 

order an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues.32 “[A]bsent such hearing, any facts in genuine 

dispute must be viewed in a light favorable to . . . the non-moving party.”33

Defendants cite a forum selection clause in a 2010 credit card agreement.34 CyberCSI does 

not dispute that, if operative, this clause would require transfer to Delaware.35 Nevertheless, 

CyberCSI raises a number of evidentiary objections to this document.

36

 Several of these 

objections do not affect the enforceability of the forum selection clause. For example, CyberCSI 

contends that “[t]here is no evidence that these are copies of the actual agreements sent to and 

accepted by CyberCSI.”37 However, Defendants have offered a declaration from BANA’s 

custodian of records stating that the document “is a true and correct copy of FIA’s February 25, 

 

31 Cream v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., Case No. 15-01208, 2015 WL 4606463, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 

31, 2015) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009)); see Argueta v. 

Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing “the district court to consider 

facts outside of the pleadings” when “resolving forum selection clause cases”); T & M Solar, 83 F. 

Supp. 3d at 869-71.

32 See T & M Solar, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 870-71 (citing Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 

1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004)). The T & M Solar court acknowledged that Murphy involved a 

motion to dismiss for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), but found that the same 

procedure could apply to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See id. at 870.

33 Murphy, 362 F.3d at 1144.

34 See Docket No. 8 at ¶ 4; Docket No. 8-2 at § 3. The clause specifies that “any litigation brought 

by [CyberCSI] against [FIA] arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement or any prior 

Agreement or your Account (whether under a statute, in contract, tort, or otherwise and whether 

for money damages, penalties or declaratory or equitable relief) shall be brought in a court located 

in the State of Delaware.” Docket No. 8-2 at § 3.

35 See Docket No. 17 at 1-3.

36 See Docket No. 18.

37 Id. at 2.

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2010 Business Card Agreement with CyberCSI.”38 CyberCSI does not suggest that the physical 

version of the agreement that CyberCSI received and accepted differed materially from the copy 

that Defendants have provided. And though CyberCSI argues that Defendants’ document is 

incomplete because it does not include supplemental documents that also may form part of the 

agreement, CyberCSI makes no claim that these supplemental documents affected the forum 

selection clause in any way.

More substantively, CyberCSI maintains that the clause should not apply because 

Defendants later amended the agreement to remove it. Specifically, an amendment that took effect 

on October 1, 2014 “removed in its entirety” the section of the agreement containing the forum 

selection clause.

39

 But a separate clause of the agreement—which stayed “in full force and effect” 

after the amendment40—provided that “any New Term shall apply to [CyberCSI’s] Account’s 

unpaid balance and to new activity on [its] Account.”41 Implicitly, balances already paid before 

October 1, 2014, as well as activity predating October 1, 2014, remained subject to the forum 

selection clause. Because the alleged unauthorized card use occurred between January 2013 and 

May 2014,42 the claims at issue here accrued before the new term took effect. “[A]ny litigation 

brought by [CyberCSI] against [Defendants] arising from or relating in any way” to those claims 

must “be brought in a court located in the State of Delaware.”43

CyberCSI urges the court to give the amendment retroactive effect, but the authority it 

relies on is not persuasive. For one thing, each case that CyberCSI cites involved an amendment 

 

38 Docket No. 8 at ¶ 3.

39 Docket No. 8-3 at 88.

40 Id.

41 Docket No. 8-2 at § 10. The clause defined “New Term” as “amend[ment] [to] this Agreement 

by changing, adding or deleting any term, condition, service or feature.” Id.

42 See Docket No. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 24-26, 29.

43 Docket No. 8-2 at § 3.

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with far broader language.44 For another, each of those cases construed a forum selection or 

arbitration clause to give it wider effect—the opposite of what CyberCSI seeks here. The Second 

Circuit observed in its TradeComet.com opinion that “a ‘special interest in limiting the fora in 

which [a party] potentially could be subject to suit’ . . . warrant[ed] finding the forum selection 

clause reasonable.”45 Similarly, the In re Verisign court noted that “[d]oubts or ambiguities must 

be resolved in favor of and not against arbitration.”46 Analogous concerns weigh against 

CyberCSI’s interpretation of the amendment. The forum selection clause applies to this dispute.

That finding does not end the inquiry, though. Even in the presence of a valid forum 

selection clause, the court still may deny a motion to transfer “under extraordinary circumstances 

unrelated to the convenience of the parties.”47 However, “as the party defying the forum-selection 

clause, . . . the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not transfer the case 

to the forum to which the parties agreed.”48 “[A] district court may consider arguments about 

public-interest factors only.”

49 Even the fact that a transfer will deprive the plaintiff of an 

 

44 See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 435 F. App’x 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (analyzing the 

plain language of an agreement and finding that “[t]he forum selection clause is . . . not limited to 

claims arising from or related to the . . . agreement itself; it broadly includes any claim arising 

under or related to the ‘Google Programs,’ irrespective of whether it arose prior to or subsequent 

to the acceptance of the . . . agreement”); Trujillo v. Gomez, Case No. 14-cv-02483, 2015 WL 

1757870, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) (applying an arbitration clause retroactively because 

it”[did] not include any temporal limitations and [was] not limited to claims arising under the 

Agreement itself”); In re Verisign, Inc. Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1224 (N.D. Cal. 

2007) (giving retroactive effect to an arbitration clause that “cover[ed] not just services provided 

under the agreement, but also ‘any other services provided by KPMG,’ and disputes and claims 

involving ‘any entity for whose benefit the services in question are or were provided”).

45 435 F. App’x at 36 (quoting Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991)).

46 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 

U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).

47 Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct at 581.

48 Id. at 581-82.

49 Id. at 582.

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otherwise viable claim “is insufficient to invalidate [a] forum clause on public policy grounds.”50 

Whether the forum selection clause is part of a contract of adhesion also is irrelevant if the clause 

is unambiguous.51

CyberCSI has not carried its heavy burden. It first argues that the transfer effectively 

would deprive CyberCSI of its day in court because the substantive law binding courts in the 

District of Delaware is less favorable to CyberCSI. Indeed, as Defendants have argued, Third 

Circuit law appears to foreclose CyberCSI’s claims under the federal Truth in Lending Act,

52 and 

Delaware law may not recognize CyberCSI’s state law causes of action.53 Nevertheless, the court 

cannot consider these factors in deciding whether to honor a forum selection clause.54 CyberCSI 

also contends that the forum selection clause is unconscionable because its “place and manner” 

restrictions are “unduly oppressive”55 and because the contract was one of adhesion. But forcing

an established and relatively sophisticated corporation56 to litigate in a different federal court is a 

 

50 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atl., 131 F.3d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1997); see Besag v. 

Custom Decorators, Inc., Case No. 08-cv-05463, 2009 WL 330934, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 

2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “[t]he elimination of her claims . . . would deprive her of 

her day in court”); see also Swenson v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 

2006) (refusing to consider the effects of a transfer on the merits of the dispute because doing so 

would render “forum selection clauses . . . largely meaningless as it would depend on who filed 

first and whether that forum’s law was more favorable to them”).

51 See Fireman’s Fund, 131 F.3d at 1338-39.

52 See Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, 601 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1643) 

(holding that “Section 1643 does not provide the cardholder with a right to reimbursement” of 

money already paid to the card issuer).

53 See Docket No. 9 at 15-20.

54 See Besag, 2009 WL 330934, at *4 (“[A] party challenging enforcement of a forum selection 

clause may not base its challenge on choice of law analysis.”).

55 Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1287 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bolter v. Superior 

Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 900, 909-10 (2001)).

56 See Docket No. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 13 (“[CyberCSI] was formed as a corporation in 1995. [It] 

provides IT outsourcing services and solutions to large businesses.”).

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far cry from dragging an individual consumer or “one-woman franchisee” into a “prohibitively 

costly” arbitration proceeding.57 And even assuming that CyberCSI is correct that the credit card 

agreement was an adhesion contract, the forum selection clause was entirely clear and thus 

enforceable.

58

 CyberCSI has failed to show the “extraordinary circumstances” required for the 

court to set aside the forum selection clause.59

IV.

Defendants’ motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is GRANTED. Their motion to 

dismiss is DENIED without prejudice. This lawsuit shall be transferred to the District of 

Delaware.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 24, 2015

_________________________________

PAUL S. GREWAL

United States Magistrate Judge

 

57 Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1289-90.

58 See Fireman’s Fund, 131 F.3d at 1338-39 (“As we find no ambiguity in the forum clause, 

whether or not the bill of lading is a contract of adhesion is of no relevance to the result we reach 

in this matter.”); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593 (upholding a “nonnegotiated 

forum-selection clause in a form ticket contract” even though “it [was] not the subject of 

bargaining”).

59 Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.

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