Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00144/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00144-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Weldon Hackman, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. Civ. 05-144-PCT-SMM (MS)

Report and Recommendation

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, CHIEF UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, brought pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, was filed in this Court on January 13, 2005. [Doc. 1]. Respondents'

Answer was filed on May 25, 2005. [Doc. 9]. Petitioner's Reply was filed on June

16, 2005. [Doc. 14]. The Court now Reports and Recommends as follows:

I. Petitioner's Request that Respondents' Answer be Dismissed

In his Reply, Petitioner requests that Respondents' Answer be dismissed or

barred. [Doc. 14 at 14]. Petitioner contends that principles of ethics and fair play

require that the Answer be dismissed because Respondents: (1) knowingly omitted

exhibits from their Answer, and (2) failed to respond to Petitioner's state court

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. [Id.]

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The Court finds no basis for barring or dismissing Respondents' Answer. On

March 8, 2005, this Court ordered Respondents to file an Answer pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). [Doc. 3]. Respondents' Answer complies with this Court's order.

Moreover, any failure to file a response in state court would not bar Respondents

from filing an answer to Petitioner's federal habeas Petition. Accordingly, it is

recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's request to bar or dismiss the Answer.

For the purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court has considered the

Petition, the Answer, and the Reply.

II. Background

At approximately 5:30 a.m. on December 31, 1995, Petitioner entered the home

of his former girlfriend through an open window. [See Doc. 10, Exh. D]. Petitioner

restrained her by wrapping his arms around her from behind, choked her, and then

bound her hands behind her back using a telephone cord. [Id.]. He then penetrated

her orally, vaginally, and anally, using his penis, hands, and carrots. [Id.] In a taped

interview with police and later at trial, Petitioner contended that the encounter was

consensual, and maintained that he and the victim had consensually engaged in

similar activity in the past. [Id.]. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of kidnapping,

burglary, aggravated assault, and five counts of sexual assault. [Id.].

Petitioner appealed, alleging the following claims: prosecutorial misconduct during

opening statements; prosecutorial misconduct arising from the prosecutor's

reference to an excluded exhibit; trial court error in admitting the victim's irrelevant

testimony that Petitioner had spoken of killing other people; trial court error in

admitting evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; trial

court error in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances; trial court error

in imposing consecutive sentences; and ineffective assistance of counsel. [Doc. 10,

Exhs. B, D]. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. [Doc. 10, Exh. D]. The Court

rejected Petitioner's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, finding that the claims were

waived and that the prosecutor's improper conduct did not affect the verdict in any

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event. [Id.]. The Court also rejected Petitioner's evidentiary arguments, denying

Petitioner's relevancy claim on the merits and holding that the trial court's hearsay

ruling was both proper and harmless. [Id.]. The Court found no abuse of discretion

with respect to the trial court's sentencing rulings. [Id.]. The Court did not address

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stating the issues were most

appropriately resolved through post-conviction relief proceedings. [Id.]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief, through counsel, on February

8, 1999. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 66]. Counsel alleged two claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. [Id.]. In a pro se Petition for Post-conviction Relief filed

subsequently, Petitioner contended that it was physically impossible for him to have

assaulted the victim in the manner she described. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 88-88r]. He

maintained that a person of his size could not restrain a person of the victim's size

by wrapping his arms around her from behind while reaching up to choke her. [Id.].

He further asserted that he had a back injury that would have impeded his ability to

engage in the alleged assault. [Id.]. Accordingly, Petitioner reasoned, the victim's

testimony must have been perjured. [Id.]. 

In his pro se Petition, Petitioner asserted multiple instances of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on a failure to investigate and pursue arguments

relating to the veracity of the victim's statements. [Id. at 88d-88l]. In addition,

Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a voluntariness

hearing relating to his initial statement to police, failing to challenge the fact that

Petitioner was not taken to the nearest magistrate upon arrest as required by the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, failing to investigate and pursue arguments

relating to the victim's mental health history and religious beliefs, and failing to

argue that the victim was wearing a thin gold chain in a photograph introduced into

evidence. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 88-88r]. Also considered by the Superior Court was

whether counsel was ineffective for: failing to interview a potential witness; failing to

request a limiting instruction regarding the victim's testimony that Petitioner spoke

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of killing other people; failing to interview the victim's neighbors; failing to pursue the

question whether Petitioner's intoxication vitiated the voluntariness of his statement

to police; failing to present a character defense; failing to properly advise Petitioner

whether he should testify in his own defense; failing to keep irrelevant and prejudicial

material from the jury; and failing to properly advise Petitioner about a plea offer

made by the State. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170a-170b]. 

In addition to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner asserted

in his Post-conviction Relief Petition that his right to due process and the 4th, 5th, and

8th Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated when the victim's

perjured testimony was used to establish probable cause, was presented to the

grand jury, was used as a basis for issuing an arrest warrant, and was factored into

the calculation of Petitioner's bond. [Id. at 88m-88o]. Petitioner also argued that a

review of the trial transcript revealed inconsistencies in the victim's testimony that

warranted an evidentiary hearing under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[Id. at 88p-88r]. 

The Superior Court held post-conviction hearings, and ultimately denied and

dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170i].

The Court rejected each ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that none

of counsel's actions were ineffective. [Id. at 170-170h]. The Court further found that,

in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there was no reasonable probability

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [Id.]. The Court

rejected Petitioner's arguments relating to the indictment, arrest warrant and bond

on grounds that the claims could have been presented on direct appeal, and were

therefore precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. [Id. at 170h].

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals in which

he re-alleged many of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims considered by the

trial court in connection with his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [Doc. 15, Exh.

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28 1

 The substance of Petitioner's habeas claims is discussed below.

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1]. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. [Doc. 10, Exh. F].

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court, seeking

consideration of all the issues raised on direct appeal and in Petitioner's Petition for

Review from the denial of post-conviction relief. [Doc. 15, Exh. 3, Item 1 at 1-2, 16,

Item 2]. Petitioner further reasserted constitutional violations arising from the

victim's perjured testimony, several ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and his

claims of prosecutorial misconduct. [Id.]. The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review. [Doc. 10, Exh. G].

Petitioner's federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in January of

2005. [Doc. 1]. Petitioner raises twelve issues.1

 Respondents oppose Petitioner's

Petition, arguing that grounds one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, eleven and

twelve are procedurally defaulted and that claims nine and ten should be denied on

the merits. [Doc. 9]. Alternatively, Respondents contend that grounds four, five, six,

seven and twelve are not cognizable on federal habeas review. [Id.].

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A. Controlling Principles

No writ may be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). Under the exhaustion

doctrine, a petitioner must present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal or

through collateral proceedings before a federal court will consider a habeas corpus

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876,

877 (9th Cir. 1985). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either fairly

present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “except in habeas petitions in capital

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”), or show that no

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state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy the fair

presentation requirement, a petitioner must fairly present the “substance of federal

claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and

to correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). See also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004);

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278

(1971); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2004).

A habeas court will not review a question of federal law if that question has been

decided by a state court and the court’s decision "rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1151 (9th Cir. 2000). The state law ground may be substantive or procedural.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (recognizing that the “independent and adequate state

ground” doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review where a state court “declined

to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a

state procedural requirement”). To be independent, "the state law basis for the

decision must not be interwoven with federal law." LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d

702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002)(stating that "[I]f the state court's decision rested primarily on a ruling on the

merits . . ., its decision would not be independent of federal law."). "To be deemed

adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and

consistently applied." Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999)("A state procedural rule

constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was 'firmly established and

regularly followed' at the time it was applied by the state court")(quoting Ford v.

Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

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2 In most cases, victims of a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" will meet 

the standard for cause and prejudice. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

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When a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims in state court, federal

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for

the default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law, or that

failing to review the claims “will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. "'Cause' is a legitimate excuse for the default; 'prejudice'

is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). If the petitioner fails to establish

cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider whether the petitioner

has shown actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional violations. Smith v.

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). To show a fundamental miscarriage of justice,

a petitioner must make the extraordinary showing that the alleged constitutional

violation probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent person.2

 Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, (1986); Clark v.

Ricketts, 886 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989). The circumstances constituting a

fundamental miscarriage of justice apply in only a "narrow class of cases." Schlup,

513 U.S. at 321. To establish actual innocence, the Petitioner must show that

considering all the evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him." Id. at 327-28.

B. Petitioner's Claims

In this case, Respondents argue that grounds one, two, three, four, five, six,

seven, eight, eleven and twelve are procedurally defaulted. Specifically,

Respondents assert that: grounds one, three, and eleven were never presented in

state court; ground two was not presented as a federal issue; grounds four, five, six,

seven, and twelve were either not raised or were not presented as federal issues;

and ground eight was held to be procedurally barred by the trial court. For the

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3

 See discussion, infra, at § IV, B.

4 Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to present to the state court

all of the issues raised in Petitioner's eleventh ground for federal

habeas relief. It appears, however, that Respondents' argument was

made without the benefit of Petitioner's Petitions for Review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court. Neither Petition

was included with Respondents' exhibits. This Court has reviewed the

Petitions for Review submitted by Petitioner. 

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reasons that follow, the Court finds that grounds nine, ten, and portions of ground

eleven were properly exhausted. Petitioner's remaining claims are procedurally

defaulted.

1. Exhausted Claims (Grounds 9, 10, and part of Ground 11)

Respondents concede that Petitioner's ninth and tenth grounds for relief were

properly exhausted in state court. The record supports this concession.3

Accordingly, grounds nine and ten will be addressed on the merits. 

Additionally, the Court finds that, with two exceptions, all the issues raised in

Petitioner's eleventh ground for relief were properly exhausted.4 In its entirety,

ground eleven alleges that counsel was ineffective for: failing to object to the

prosecutor's use of the words "you" and "yours" during her opening statement, failing

to request a limiting instruction after reserving the right to do so, failing to verify that

a videotape submitted to the jury was redacted, failing to call ask the questions

Petitioner requested and failing to call witnesses, and failing to point out that the

victim was wearing a thin gold chain in a picture submitted to the jury. [Id. at 16]. 

With the exception of whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during opening

statements, each of Petitioner's claims was considered by the Superior Court on

post-conviction review and was presented to the Court of Appeals in Petitioner's

Petition for Review. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170c-170h; Doc. 15, Exh. 1 at 2]. 

The Superior Court explicitly determined that: "Mr. Nielson had a sound basis for

not requesting a limiting instruction... [F]urther, any alleged error could have been

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5

 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170d at ¶ 6. See also Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170a,

 ¶ 6 (stating that Petitioner challenged counsel's failure to request a 

limiting instruction).

6

 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170e, at ¶ 11. See also Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170b,

 ¶ 11 (stating that Petitioner challenged counsel's failure to keep

 prejudicial information from the jury)

7 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170g, at ¶10.

8 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170g, at ¶12.

9 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170a, at ¶¶5 , 7, 170b at ¶9, 170d at ¶¶ 5, 7, 8,

170f at ¶¶ 4, 6, and 170g at ¶ 7.

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resolved in the direct appeal".5 The Court also determined that "the Defendant's

taped statement, which was played to the jurors, did not contain any improper

statement by either the Defendant or Detective Brewer, and again, any alleged

improper statement could have been the subject of an appeal",6

 and that "Mr.

Nielson was not ineffective with regard to the material contained in the tape of

Defendant's interview with Detective Brewer, which was played to the jurors or sent

to the jury room during deliberations".7

 Regarding Petitioner's contention that

counsel should have discussed the fact that the victim wore a thin gold chain in one

of the pictures submitted to the jury, the Superior Court determined that "Mr. Nielson

was not ineffective in his handling of the "necklace evidence."8

 With respect to

Petitioner's broad contention that counsel failed to ask questions and call witnesses,

the Court finds only three issues not raised elsewhere in Petitioner's habeas Petition

that were considered by the Superior Court9

 and that can arguably be construed as

presenting the same claim as ground eleven: whether counsel was ineffective in the

handling of potential witness Calvin Greab, whether counsel was ineffective for

failing to interview the victim's neighbors, and whether counsel was ineffective for

failing to present a character defense. In an abundance of caution, the Court will

liberally construe Petitioner's eleventh ground for relief as containing these three

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10 In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner

asked the Court to consider all the issues previously raised. However,

in Arizona, claims are normally exhausted by fair presentation to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. Presenting a

claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which the

merits would not ordinarily be considered does not constitute fair

presentation. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1980). See also,

e.g., Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 31 (state appellate judges need not alter their

ordinary review practices to discover a claim); Roettgen v. Copeland,

33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994)(claims presented through improper

procedures are deemed unexhausted); Kellotat, 719 F.2d at 1030

(invocation of abnormal procedure did not amount to fair presentation);

Nelson v. Sandritter, 351 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965)("a petitioner

cannot exhaust his state court remedies by petitions or motions

addressed to the wrong court"). 

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claims. To the extent Petitioner is attempting to assert additional errors, the claims

fail because they were not fairly presented.

Because Petitioner's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a

limiting instruction, failing to verify that a redacted videotape was submitted to the

jury, and failing to call witnesses were raised in both the Navajo County Superior

Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals, they are exhausted. Accordingly, these

claims will be considered on the merits. By contrast, Petitioner's claims that counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's opening statements and for

failing to point out that the victim was wearing a necklace were not properly fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. As discussed further below, these two

claims are procedurally defaulted.10

2. Claims Defaulted for Failure to Raise or Fairly Present (Grounds 1, 2, 3,

4, 5, 6, 7, 12, and part of Claim 11)

The Court finds that Petitioner's first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and

twelfth claim as well as the portions of his eleventh claim relating to counsel's failure

to object to the prosecutor's opening statement and failure to introduce evidence that

the victim was wearing a necklace were never properly presented as independent

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federal issues in state court. The Court additionally finds that each of these claims

is procedurally defaulted. 

As noted above, to properly exhaust a claim, the substance of a Petitioner's

federal claims must be presented to the state courts to allow them the opportunity

to correct any alleged violations. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Baldwin, 541 U.S. at

29; Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Picard, 404 U.S. at 278; Casey, 386 F.3d at 911. “It

is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” See

Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; see also Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th

Cir. 2004). Here, the Court finds that the allegations alleged in Petitioner's first,

second, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh claims as well as portions of his eleventh and

twelfth claims were not presented in state court under the same legal theory now

alleged in Petitioner's habeas petition. 

In ground one, Petitioner alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial

jury was violated when an unredacted videotape referencing Petitioner's prior

criminal record was submitted to the jury. [Id. at 5]. In ground two, he alleges that

his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated when the prosecutor

engaged in misconduct during opening statements. [Id. at 6]. Although Petitioner

challenged the introduction of the unredacted videotape and discussed the

impropriety of the prosecutor's opening statement in state court, he did not allege

that his federal right to an impartial jury was violated. Because he did not raise the

same issues in state court and federal court, Petitioner's first and second claims

were not fairly presented. Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Castillo, 370 F.3d at 886-87.

In ground eleven, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the prosecutor's misconduct during opening statements. [Id. at 16]. On

direct appeal and in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner

asserted that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. [Doc. 10, Exh. B at 7-10; Doc.

15, Exh. 3, Item 1 at 15-16]. He did not, however, assert that counsel was

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28 11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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ineffective for failing to challenge the misconduct. Again, Petitioner's failure to

allege the same legal theory in both state and federal court precludes a finding of fair

presentation. Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Castillo, 370 F.3d at 886-87. Moreover,

Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to point out that a picture

submitted to the jury depicted the victim wearing a necklace is unexhausted because

it was never fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010; see also footnote ten, supra.

In grounds four, five, six, and seven, Petitioner alleges Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from the conduct of police officers.

Ground four alleges that officers violated Petitioner's rights by arresting him without

a warrant, failing to inform him of the charges against him, and failing to read him his

Miranda11 rights. [Id. at 8]. In grounds five and six, Petitioner alleges that officers

took custody of him without informing him of the cause and nature of his arrest, and

then purposefully delayed his initial appearance before a magistrate in order to allow

questioning by the Showlow Police Department. [Id. at 9-10]. In ground seven,

Petitioner alleges that police officers led him to believe he would be released after

giving a statement, but in fact, they videotaped Petitioner without his knowledge and

continued to detain him. [Id. at 11]. Although Petitioner asserted similar facts in

state court in connection with some of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims,

he did not directly attack the officers' actions under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or

Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, these claims were also not fairly presented.

Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Castillo, 370 F.3d at 886-87. 

In ground twelve of his federal habeas petition, Petitioner similarly asserts that his

federal rights were violated when evidence gathered in connection with an illegal

arrest was improperly introduced at trial. [Doc. 1 at 17]. He maintains that he was

arrested, held, and videotaped without being informed of the nature and cause of his

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12 Having concluded that Petitioner's fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and

twelfth claims were not properly exhausted, this Court need not reach

Respondents' alternative Fourth Amendment argument.

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arrest. [Id.]. He argues that evidence obtained during this process was improperly

used against him. [Id.]. The only similar argument made in state court was

Petitioner's contention in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals that

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence that amounted to "fruit of the

poisonous tree." [Doc. 15, Exh. 3, Item 1 at 9]. The ineffective assistance of

counsel claim Petitioner raised in state court is substantively different from

Petitioner's federal claim challenging the admissibility of evidence. As stated

previously, similarity of underlying facts is not sufficient to meet the requirements of

fair presentation. See Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882,

886-87.

12

Finally, the Court finds that Petitioner's third claim was not fairly presented to the

Arizona state courts. In ground three of his habeas petition, Petitioner alleges that

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated when the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct by filing false affidavits with the state trial court.

[Id. at 7]. In state court, Petitioner asserted prosecutorial misconduct arising from

the filing of false affidavits for the first time in his Petition for Review to the Arizona

Supreme Court. [Doc. 15, Exh. 3 at 15-16]. Thus, the claim was not fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; see also

footnote ten, supra. Moreover, even could the claim be properly raised for the first

time in the Arizona Supreme Court, the claim is unexhausted because Petitioner

failed to fairly present it as a federal issue. He cited neither the Fifth nor the

Fourteenth Amendment in support of his claim, and did not support his argument

with federal authority. Instead, Petitioner's argument was drawn primarily from a

state case, Pool v. Superior Ct., 677 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1984)(en banc). [Id. at 16].

Nothing in Pool would alert the state court to the fact that Plaintiff was attempting to

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13 Petitioner did include a secondary citation to a Second Circuit decision,

Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003). However, Su was cited only

for the proposition that a prosecutor is an officer of the court who has

a duty of honesty. As noted, Petitioner did not specifically allege a

violation of due process under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution.

14 See also footnote ten, supra.

15 An exception to this rule may exist under Rule 32.2(b) for a defendant

who raises claims under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). None of the

claims at issue here were raised under those subsections of Rule 32.1.

16 Petitioner's claims would also likely be precluded pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3), as were the other claims he failed to raise in his initial postconviction relief petition. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (stating that "[A]

defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any

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assert a federal claim, and Petitioner's brief likewise contained no clear indication

that Petitioner was attempting to raise a federal claim. See, e.g.,Casey, 386 F.3d

at 912 n. 13.

13 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the state court was

not fairly alerted to the federal nature of Petitioner's claim.14 Casey, 396 F.3d at 912

n. 13; see also Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (1995); Lyons,

232 F.3d at 670, amended at 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Gray, 518 U.S. at 163.

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,

seventh, and twelfth claims, as well as the portions of his eleventh claim relating to

prosecutorial misconduct and the introduction of necklace evidence, were not fairly

presented to the state courts. Were Petitioner to attempt to return to state court,

however, he would be unable to re-assert his unexhausted federal claims. Rule 32

proceedings must be initiated within ninety days of the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days of the order and mandate affirming the judgment and

sentence on direct appeal.15 See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a).16 Because Petitioner

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ground.... (3) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding"). However, in Cassett v. Stewart, 406

F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit recently held that preclusion

may not always be clear under Rule 32.2(a)(3) in cases of technical

exhaustion and procedural default. In light of Cassett, this Court places

only secondary reliance on rule 32.2(a)(3).

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would be precluded under Arizona law from returning to state court to properly

exhaust his claims, the claims are deemed "technically exhausted" but procedurally

defaulted. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Cassett,

406 F.3d at 621, n. 5 (discussing the concepts of technical exhaustion and

procedural default). Federal habeas review of the merits of Petitioner's procedurally

defaulted claims by this Court is therefore barred unless Petitioner can show cause

for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or that failure to consider his claims

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Griffin

v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2003). 

3. State Court Application of a Procedural Bar (Ground 8)

In ground eight, Petitioner claims that the victim's perjured statement to police was

unconstitutionally used against him during grand jury proceedings and at trial. [Id.

at 12]. Respondents assert that Petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted because

the state court denied the claim pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. This Court agrees.

An unexhausted claim may be deemed technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted 'if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.' Beaty 303 F.3d at 987

(quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1). A second type of procedural default occurs

when a claim is presented to the state court, but the court determines that the claim

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17 Cassett, 406 F.3d 614, does not require a different result. Cassett did

not involve an actual finding of preclusion by the state court. Here, the

Court clearly found preclusion with respect to the issues presented in

Petitioner's eight ground for relief. 

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is procedurally barred pursuant to an independent and adequate state rule. Id. As

in cases of technical exhaustion and procedural default, federal courts are precluded

from reviewing the merits of claims defaulted pursuant to an independent and

adequate state procedural bar unless the petitioner can show cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id.

Here, Petitioner's eighth ground for relief was presented in his Petition for PostConviction Relief. [Doc. 10, Exh A at 88m-o]. The Superior Court decision, which

was upheld, expressly held that Petitioner's claim was barred from consideration

pursuant Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a)(3). [Doc. 10, Exh A. at

170h]. This rule precludes post-conviction relief for any claim that could have been

raised in a previous collateral proceeding or on direct review, except under limited

circumstances that do not apply here. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

The preclusive effect of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a)(3) is

both independent and adequate.17 Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. at 860 (finding Rule

32.2(a)(3) determinations independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate);

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting argument that Arizona's

reliance on Rule 32.2(c) as a basis for procedural default was "so unpredictable and

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18 Petitioner alleges that he could not have raised this issue on direct

appeal because he did not obtain the requisite information until

November 16, 1999, after his direct appeal was filed. [Id.]. The

statement at issue, however, was allegedly made to police on

December 31, 1995. Petitioner thus had several years to obtain a copy

of the statement prior to his direct appeal. 

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irregular that it does not provide an adequate ground" for disposal of claims).

Petitioner's eighth ground for relief is therefore procedurally defaulted.18

C. Cause and Prejudice

For the reasons set forth above, grounds one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,

eight, twelve, and the portions of ground eleven relating to prosecutorial misconduct

and the introduction of necklace evidence are procedurally defaulted. Accordingly,

the Court may not consider these claims absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Petitioner has not put forth any arguments sufficient to support a finding of cause

or prejudice that would excuse his default with respect to the precluded claims.

Although constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause for

a procedural default, "the mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or

legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not

constitute cause for a procedural default." Murray, 477 U.S. at 486. A prisoner must

ordinarily establish that counsel's assistance was so ineffective that it fell below

constitutional standards or show that an objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's ability to comply with the state procedural rule. Id. The record

does not support such a conclusion here. The Court also finds no impediment to

raising the issues Petitioner now alleges should have been raised. Moreover,

Petitioner's pro se status does not amount to cause sufficient to set aside a

procedural default. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th

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Cir. 1986). Additionally, the Court finds that any failure to consider Petitioner's

claims will not amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner has not

made the extraordinary showing that his case falls within the "narrow class of cases"

in which an innocent person was probably convicted because of an alleged

constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321; Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. 

Federal habeas review of Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims is barred. The

Court therefore recommends that grounds one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,

eight, twelve, and the portions of ground eleven discussed above be dismissed with

prejudice.

IV. Remaining Claims (Grounds 9, 10, 11)

A. Standard of Review

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this

Court shall not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the decision by the state court was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) the decision

by the state court was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Rice v. Collins, No. 04-

52, __ S.Ct.__, 2006 WL 119293, *4 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2006). A state court decision is

"contrary to clearly established precedent" if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or arrives at a different

result than the Supreme Court in a case involving facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 73 (2003). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

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prisoner's case." Id. at 75 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 413

(2000)). State court rulings and factual findings are presumed to be correct where

they are supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioners “have the

burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” Id.

Where the state court summarily denies relief without providing rationale, this

court "review[s] the record to determine whether the state court's decision

contravened, or unreasonably applied, clearly established law." Wilson v. Czerniak,

355 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,

981-82 (9th Cir. 2000)). See also Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002),

amended at 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). In such cases, this Court does not

independently decide the contested legal question, but instead determines whether

§2254(d) mandates reversal of the state court decision. Greene v. Lambert, 288

F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

B. Discussion

Petitioner's remaining claims assert various instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel. A federal Petitioner must satisfy a two-pronged test to prevail on an

ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. He must show both that counsel's

performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficiency was prejudicial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). To establish that counsel's

performance was deficient, a petitioner is required to show that, "counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687-688. To establish prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Under the prejudice

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prong, the question is whether "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687.

1. Ground 9

In ground nine, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the validity of Petitioner's arrest on grounds that Petitioner was improperly

videotaped by police and was not informed of the cause or nature of his arrest. [Id.

at 13]. In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner maintained that counsel

should have argued that Detective Brewer induced Petitioner's statement by

promising that release would be recommended if Petitioner provided a statement.

[Doc. 10, Exh. A]. In his Petition for Review, Petitioner elaborated on the claim,

emphasizing that he was not informed of the nature of his arrest before being

videotaped. [Doc. 15, Exh. 1 at 21]. The Superior Court found that Detective Brewer

made no improper promises to induce Petitioner's statement, and held that counsel

was not ineffective for failing to make a suppression argument. [Doc. 10, Exh. A, at

170c, 170f]. The Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court denied

review. [Doc. 10, Exhs. F, G].

Petitioner has not rebutted the presumption that the state court's factual findings

were correct. Petitioner's claim hinges on his contention that Detective Brewer

made inducements in order to secure a statement. However, Petitioner has not

offered any evidence, other than his own statements, to support his contention.

Indeed, Petitioner's own Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals

acknowledged that Detective Brewer denied making any promises to Petitioner.

[Doc. 15, Exh. 1 at 19]. 

Moreover, the Superior Court applied the correct legal standards to Petitioner's

claim. Consistent with Strickland and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court

considered whether counsel's performance fell below the required level of

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competence and whether the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

[Doc. 10,Exh. A at 170]. The Court's rejection of Petitioner's ineffective assistance

of counsel claim was appropriate in light of the determination that Petitioner's

statement was not improperly induced. Even assuming that Petitioner told counsel

that Detective Brewer induced his statement, Petitioner cannot show prejudice in the

absence of proof of such inducement. For these reasons, the Court finds that

§2254(d) does not mandate reversal of the state court decision. See Greene, 288

F.3d at 1089; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. See also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73, 75; 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

2. Ground 10 

In ground ten, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and employ several theories offered by Petitioner, including: whether

Petitioner had a back injury that would have prevented him from assaulting the victim

in the manner she described, whether the victim had religious beliefs that might have

had bearing on the case, and whether several character witnesses who were not

called might have been able to assist the defense. [Id. at 14-15]. 

The Superior Court rejected each of Petitioner's claims. The Court found that

counsel made an appropriate strategic decision in rejecting Petitioner's "bad back

defense" which was inconsistent with Petitioner's consent defense. [Doc. 10, Exh.

A, at 170c]. The Court further found that the evidence presented at an evidentiary

hearing demonstrated that Petitioner did not have a bad back that would have made

it impossible to commit the offense. [Id.]. Similarly, the Court stated that "any

decision regarding the presentation of character evidence was proper trial strategy."

[Id. at 170g]. The Court also concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing

to challenge Plaintiff's religious beliefs. 

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A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Jennings v. Woodford, 290

F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th

Cir. 1995); United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985). However,

a habeas corpus petition must state facts which point to a real possibility of

constitutional error. Id. The determination whether a failure to investigate prejudiced

the petitioner depends on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have

changed the outcome of a trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A petitioner's conclusory

allegations that counsel should have done more to establish his case are insufficient

to prove that counsel was ineffective. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161

(9th Cir. 1989); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating

that a defendant cannot satisfy the Strickland standard by "vague and conclusory

allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have established

his defense").

Additionally, counsel's tactical decisions about how to present a defense are not

subject to an ineffective assistance of counsel attack. Wildman v. Johnson, 261

F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-90 (recognizing

that mere criticism of trial tactics is not sufficient to support a charge of ineffective

assistance of counsel); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980)

("Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of

inadequate representation"). The Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel

blindly abide by Petitioner's myriad diverse suggestions and instructions about the

conduct of his case. United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990).

Nor does counsel's failure to raise all the issues Petitioner himself would have

chosen to raise establish ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[I]n many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise

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19 As discussed above, the Court construes this claim as containing three

issues: whether counsel was ineffective in the handling of potential

witness Calvin Greab, whether counsel was ineffective for failing to

interview the victim's neighbors, and whether counsel was ineffective

for failing to present a character defense.

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an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue;

indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy"); Morris v. State of Cal., 966 F.2d 448,

456 (9th Cir. 1992)(recognizing that a petitioner has no Sixth amendment right to

determine what witnesses counsel must call at trial). 

Here, Petitioner makes broad allegations that counsel failed to employ the tactics

Petitioner would have chosen with respect to witnesses, evidence, and strategy.

The trial court found that counsel had valid reasons for not presenting the defenses

Petitioner would have liked, and stated that the evidence was so overwhelming that

there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The Court finds that the

state court's conclusions were consistent with, not contrary to, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. Further, there is no indication that applying Supreme

Court precedent to the facts of this case would warrant a different result than that

reached by the state court. Finally, Petitioner has not presented any clear and

convincing evidence that would rebut the courts factual findings. Therefore, the

Court recommends that ground ten of Petitioner's habeas petition be denied.

3. Ground 11

In ground eleven, Petitioner raised three non-precluded arguments. Petitioner

asserts that counsel was ineffective for: failing to request a limiting instruction after

reserving the right to do so, failing to verify that a videotape submitted to the jury was

redacted, and failing to call the witnesses or raise the issues Petitioner requested.19

[Id. at 16]. The Superior Court determined that trial counsel had a sound reason for

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20 See Doc. 10, Exh. A, 170a, at ¶¶5 , 7, 170b at ¶9, 170d at ¶¶ 5, 7, 8,

170f at ¶¶ 4, 6, and 170g at ¶ 7.

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not requesting a limiting instruction, that the videotape submitted to the jury did not

contain any improper statements, and that counsel did not act improperly in

presenting witnesses. [Doc. 10, Exh. A at 170c-h]. The Court further observed that

Petitioner could have, but did not, raise any issues relating to the limiting instruction

and videotape evidence on appeal. [Id. at 170d-f]. Regarding Petitioner's claims

that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise sufficient issues or call witnesses, the

state court concluded that counsel was not ineffective in connection with the

interviews of Calvin Greab, was not ineffective for failing to interview the victim's

neighbors and was not ineffective for failing to present a character defense.20

Additionally, as noted above, the Court found that any error that might have occurred

would not be prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The state court's decision to was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law. As with Petitioner's other ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that the state court's factual

findings were incorrect or that the state court's decision was an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2),

(e); Rice, 2006 WL 119293, *4. Further, the trial court's decision to uphold counsel's

strategic decisions and give weight to the overwhelming evidence of guilt was

consistent with federal law. As explained at length above, strategic decisions fall

within the province of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-90; Wildman, 261 F.3d

at 839; Gustave, 627 F.2d at 904. Similarly, counsel is not bound to follow

Petitioner's suggestions about the conduct of his case. Robinson, 913 F.2d at 716;

Morris, 966 F.2d at 456. Additionally, where the outcome of the proceedings would

not have been different were the arguments advanced by a petitioner made, the

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requisite prejudice to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has not

been shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court therefore recommends that

Petitioner's eleventh ground for relief be denied.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that grounds one through eight,

twelve, and parts of claim eleven are procedurally defaulted. The Court further finds

that grounds nine, ten, and the remainder of ground eleven lack merit.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Petitioner's request to

bar or dismiss Respondents' Answer [Doc. 14];

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Doc. #1] be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2006.

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