Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01920/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01920-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Citations to "Respondents' Exh." are to exhibits attached to Respondents' Answer,

docket # 6. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Valentine Rosi,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et. al,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-06-1920-PHX-JWS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents have filed an Answer arguing that the Petition should be dismissed

as untimely (docket # 6) and, pursuant to the Court's order, a Supplemental Response addressing

the merits of Petitioner's claims. (docket # 8) Petitioner has filed a combined Reply. (docket #

9)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2001, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with one count of fraudulent

schemes and artifices in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2310, Count 1, and three counts of theft in

violation of A.R.S. § 13-1802, Counts 2, 3, and 4. (Respondents' Exh. E1

) The State alleged

that Petitioner had seven historical prior felony convictions. (Respondents' Exh. F) On January

16, 2002, Petitioner filed a motion to proceed pro se. (Respondents' Exh. G) After conducting

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2 The Honorable Frank T. Galati presided over proceedings in the Arizona Superior

Court, Maricopa County. 

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a hearing, on January 28, 2002, the court2 granted Petitioner's motion to proceed pro se and

directed appointed counsel to serve in an advisory capacity. (Respondents' Exh. H) On April

23, 2002, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty

to Count 1, fraudulent schemes and artifices, and to Count 2, theft. Petitioner also agreed to pay

restitution in the amount of $90,050.00. (Respondents' Exh. I) 

During the change of plea hearing, Petitioner admitted that he had "carefully read the

entire plea agreement" and that he voluntarily entered that agreement. (Respondents' Exh. A

at 4-7) He further admitted that he agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $90,050.00 to all

of the victims listed in the attachment to the plea agreement. (Respondents' Exh. A at 7) He also

admitted the factual basis of the charges including that "pursuant to a scheme or artifice to

defraud, . . . he convinced numerous individuals to invest in [his] automobile business by

making numerous misrepresentations including promising to repay victims by certain dates. .

. ." (Respondents' Exh. A at 13-14) 

At a presentence hearing on August 2, 2002, the court found the following aggravating

factors: (a) multiple victims were involved, (b) a substantial amount of money was stolen,

amounting to $90,050 in restitution; and (c) Petitioner's prior felony convictions involving theft

or dishonesty. (Respondents' Exh. C at 88-90) Thereafter, the court sentenced Petitioner to an

aggravated term of 8 years' imprisonment on Count 1. (Respondents' Exh. J) On Count 2, the

court suspended imposition of sentence and imposed five years of probation to be served after

Petitioner's release from prison. (Respondents' Exh. J) The court also ordered Petitioner to pay

$90,050.00 in restitution. (Id.) Counts 3 and 4 were dismissed in accordance with the plea

agreement. (Id.)

Rule 32 "of-right" Proceeding

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law.

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However, he retained his right to seek review in an "of-right proceeding" under Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4. On October 28, 2002, Petitioner sought

review in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Respondents' Exh. K) On November 20, 2002, the

court appointed Petitioner counsel. (Respondents' Exh. L) Counsel filed a notice advising the

court that she was unable to find any colorable claim to raise in a Rule 32 petition.

(Respondents' Exh. M) On September 4, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging that the

trial court had violated the Sixth Amendment by not permitting Petitioner to represent himself

from the time of his arraignment. (Respondents' Exh. N) On December 22, 2003, the trial court

dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding finding that Petitioner had not raised any "colorable claims."

(Respondents' Exh. P) On Petitioner's motion, the trial court granted Petitioner until March 15,

2004 to filed a motion for hearing or a petition for review. (Exhibit E attached to Respondents'

Exh. U)

On March 12, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. Q) Shortly thereafter, on June 24, 2004, the United States

Supreme Court issued Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Thus, Petitioner requested

leave to file a supplemental petition raising a Blakely claim. (Respondents' Exh. R) The

Arizona Court of Appeals construed Petitioner's request as a motion to stay the appeal while

Petitioner returned to the trial court to raise a Blakely claim. (Respondents' Exh. R) Thus, the

Court of Appeals stayed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Superior Court to permit

Petitioner to raise a Blakely claim. (Id.) 

Accordingly, on November 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for postconviction relief in the trial court arguing that his aggravated sentence violated Blakely.

(Respondents' Exh. T) On July 21, 2005, the Honorable Frank T. Galati ruled that Blakely did

not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case which was final before Blakely was decided.

(Respondents' Exh. X) The trial court further found that even if Blakely applied, the aggravated

sentence complied with Blakely because Petitioner's prior convictions were sufficient to subject

Petitioner to an aggravated sentenced and did not have to be found by the jury. (Id.)

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Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's supplemental petition for post-conviction

relief. (Id.)

On September 27, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for

review from the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents' Exh.

Y) Petitioner did not seek further review in the State courts. 

Thereafter, on August 7, 2006, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas

corpus alleging that: (1) his aggravated sentence violates the Sixth Amendment pursuant to

Blakely; and (2) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.

(docket # 1)

ANALYSIS

Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely or, alternatively,

because Petitioner's claims lack merit. Petitioner asserts that his Petition is timely and that his

claims are meritorious. 

I. Statute of Limitations 

On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

went into effect drastically altering the time limit imposed on state prisoners filing habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. Before the AEDPA, virtually no time limit restrained the filing

of federal habeas petitions. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.

1997) (Beeler), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), overruled in

part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, cert.

denied, 119 S.Ct. 1377 (1999). The AEDPA established a one-year period in which to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner

filed his Petition after the effective date of the AEDPA, it governs this action. 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(D)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest ofCase 2:06-cv-01920-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/10/07 Page 4 of 10
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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)(emphasis added).

"Final by Conclusion of Direct Review"

To assess the timeliness of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court

must first determine the date on which Petitioner's conviction became "final by conclusion of

direct review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In making this determination, it is significant that

by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. A.R.S. §

13-4033(B). Petitioner, however, retained the right to seek review in an "of-right" proceeding

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4.

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed, as a matter of first impression, the question of

when the conviction of a pleading defendant in Arizona becomes "final by the conclusion of

direct review" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Summers v. Schriro, ___F.3d___, No.

05-16650, 2007 WL 738447, * 4 (9th Cir., March 13, 2007). The Ninth Circuit held that an "'ofright proceeding,' available under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal defendants

who plead guilty, is a form of 'direct review' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)."

Id. at * 1. The Summers court then explained that "[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is

a form of direct review, AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review." Id.

Prior to Summers, numerous courts had followed Isley in which the Ninth Circuit

assumed, without deciding, that an Arizona pleading defendant's conviction becomes final upon

sentencing because the guilty plea waives his right to direct appeal. Isley v. Arizona

Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004); Pettijohn v. Schriro, No. CV06-00948-PCT-NVW (MEA), 2007 WL 162688 (D.Ariz, Jan. 18, 2007); Gutierrez v.

McDaniel, No. CV-06-0085-PHX-SRB (JRI), 2006 WL 3449098 (D.Ariz., Nov. 29, 2006);

Jones v. Schriro, No. CV-05-3831-PHX-SRB (JRI), 2006 WL 2640618 (D.Ariz. Sept. 13,

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2006); Bradford v. Schriro, CV-06-0530-PHX-NVW (MEA), 2006 WL 1722310 (D.Ariz. June

20, 2006);Levya v. Schriro, No. CV-04-1871-PHX-SRB (JRI), 2006 WL 1620301(D.Ariz. June

7, 2006); Bailey v. Schriro, No. 05-0650-PHX-ROS (JRI) 2006 WL 1543983, * 3 (D.Ariz. June

2, 2006); Lusian v. Kimble, No. 05-1399-PHX-DGC (ECV), 2006 WL 1305250 (D.Ariz. May

10, 2006).

Indeed, Respondents relied on Isley in support of their assertion that Petitioner's

conviction became final on August 2, 2002, the date on which the trial court entered judgment

and sentenced Petitioner. After Summers, it is now clear that Petitioner's conviction did not

become final on the date of sentencing. 

Under Summers, because Petitioner pleaded guilty, his conviction became final upon

"the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review." Summers, ___ F.3d___, 2007

WL 738447, * 1. Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced on August 2, 2002 By virtue of

his plea, the only avenue of "direct" review was a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. Under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, Petitioner had ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence within

which to file a notice of review under Rule 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4(a)(stating that "[i]n

a Rule 32 of-right proceeding the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by

the appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.")

Petitioner filed a timely notice of Rule 32 review on October 28, 2002. (Respondents' Exh. K)

On December 22, 2003, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Respondents'

Exh. P) Thereafter, the Court granted Petitioner an extension of time to file a petition for review

to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

On March 12, 2004, Petitioner filed an timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner

requested leave to file a supplemental petition for review raising a Blakely claim. The Court

of Appeals stayed the appeal to permit Petitioner to raise a Blakely claim to the trial court. On

July 21, 2005, the trial court rejected Petitioner's Blakely claim on the ground that Blakely did

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not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case which was final before Blakely was decided.

Alternatively, the court found that Petitioner's aggravated sentence complied with Blakely.

(Respondents' Exh. X)

On September 27, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for

review from the trial court's denial of his Rule 32 petition. (Respondents' Exh. Y) Petitioner did

not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, AEDPA's one-year limitations

period commenced on or about September 28, 2005 and Petitioner had until September 28, 2006

to file a federal habeas petition. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001)(adopting the "anniversary" rule). Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on August 7, 2006. Therefore, contrary to Respondents' assertion, it is timely and the Court will

consider the merits of Petitioner's claims. 

III. Merits of Petitioner's Claims

A. Blakely Claim 

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner asserts that his aggravated sentence on Count I

violates the Sixth Amendment because the trial court, rather than a jury, found the factors upon

which the aggravated sentence is based in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). 

Petitioner presented this claim to the state courts arguing that his aggravated sentence

violates Blakely. (Respondents' Exhs. S, T) The trial court denied Petitioner's Blakely claim

finding that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases, such as Petitioner's, that were final

before Blakely was decided. (Respondents' Exh. X) In view of Summers, Petitioner's case was

not final on direct review until September of 2005 well after Blakely was decided. See, supra

discussion at pages 4-6. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner's conviction

was final before Blakely was decided. However, the State court alternatively addressed the

merits of Petitioner's Blakely claim. 

Specifically, the trial court found that Petitioner's aggravated sentence complied with

Blakely because prior convictions "may be found by the court and need not be found by the

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jury." (Respondents' Exh. X) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. As

discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that the state-court decision is contrary to, or based

on an unreasonable application of, federal law. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas relief

based on his Blakely claim. 

The rule announced in Blakely, does not apply to prior convictions. United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has "held that enhancing a defendant's

sentence based on a prior conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by

Blakely . . .or Booker." United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005). In other

words, prior convictions are not required to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rather, judges may find prior convictions. Ladwig, 432 F.3d at 1006 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly,

the trial court may impose an aggravated sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on

"facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.

In this case, the trial court properly found Petitioner's prior convictions based on the

record. The trial court also properly found that facts admitted by Petitioner constituted

aggravating factors. Specifically, the trial court relied on Petitioner's admissions in term 2.B

of the plea agreement and Petitioner's admissions during the change of plea hearing that there

were multiple victims, as listed in the plea agreement, and that Petitioner would pay restitution

of over $90,000 to those victims. (Respondents' Exh. I at 88-90) Under Blakely, facts admitted

by a defendant may be used to support aggravating factors. Indeed, the Blakely Court clarified

that the trial judge may impose an aggravated sentence beyond the statutory maximum based

on "facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 542 U.S. at 303-04.

Petitioner's admission in the plea agreement that there were multiple victims and that he owed

more than $90,000 in restitution to those victims was sufficient to establish the facts used to

enhance Petitioner's sentence. Id. As a result, in this case, all of the facts supporting the

aggravating factors were properly found in compliance with Blakely. 

B. Sixth Amendment Right to Self-Representation 

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Petitioner further argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation. This claim lacks merit because, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the trial court

granted Petitioner's request to proceed pro se. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to represent himself.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). To exercise that right, a defendant "must

make an unequivocal request to represent himself." Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th

Cir. 1989). On January 16, 2002, Petitioner filed a motion to proceed pro se. (Respondents'

Exh. G) On January 30, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and granted

Petitioner's request. (Respondents' Exh. H) Appointed counsel's role was reduced to that of

"advisory counsel." (Respondents' Exh. H at 2) On April 23, 2002, Petitioner and the State

entered into a plea agreement, signed by Petitioner, the prosecutor, and advisory counsel.

(Respondents' Exh. I at 2) Thereafter, Petitioner represented himself at the sentencing hearing.

 (Respondents' Exh. J) The record reflects that the trial court did not deny Petitioner his Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation. To the contrary, the trial court granted Petitioner's

request to proceed pro se and Petitioner represented himself during plea negotiations and at

sentencing. (Respondents' Exhs. H-J) In view of the foregoing, Petitioner's claim that he was

denied his right to self-representation fails. 

IV. Conclusion

As discussed above, Petitioner's claims lack merit and do not provide a basis for § 2254

relief. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket # 1) DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The parties shall

have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

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specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2007.

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