Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10760/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10760-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10760

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cv-00102-RS-GRJ

MATTHEW BARKER,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BAY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

 Defendant,

W. FRANK MCKEITHEN, 

ROBERT LEE GARRISON, 

Individually, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(November 19, 2015)

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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Robert Garrison, a deputy with the Bay County Sheriff’s Department, used 

Florida’s Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID) to access information 

about Matthew Barker. Barker sued Garrison and Garrison’s boss, Sheriff Frank 

McKeithen, alleging among other things that Garrison and McKeithen violated his 

rights under the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §2721 

et seq., by accessing his information for an impermissible purpose. The district 

court granted summary judgment to Garrison and McKeithen, concluding that 

Barker had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Garrison’s use 

of DAVID had been for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. That conclusion is 

correct.

The district court summarized the facts underlying this case as follows:

[Barker] alleges that in the summer of 2012 [he] found in his 

possessions certain items belonging to [ ] Garrison’s wife from when 

[Barker] and M[r]s. Garrison dated nearly ten years earlier. After 

[Barker] shipped the items to Mrs. Garrison, without an explanatory 

note or a return address, his mother, Ms. Parcell, received a call at her 

unlisted home phone directing her and [Barker] to stop contacting 

Mrs. Garrison. The call was purportedly made by a local law 

enforcement officer, but [Barker] and his mother believe that the 

caller was [] Garrison.

Subsequent to receiving the phone call, in August 2013, 

[Barker] made a public records request and determined that [ ] 

Garrison had used [DAVID] to conduct inquiries regarding [Barker’s] 

information six times on January 5, 2011, and January 6, 2011. 

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According to [Barker], [ ] Garrison had no legitimate law enforcement 

or official purpose for accessing [Barker’s] or his mother’s DAVID 

information in January 2011. As support, [Barker] claims that neither 

of them lived in the jurisdiction [where] Garrison worked as a law 

enforcement officer.

On the contrary, [ ] Garrison alleges that on January 5, 2011, 

his wife, Rhonda, contacted him while on duty to advise him that she 

thought she had seen a person that looked like her former boyfriend, 

[ ] Barker. Then, when she returned home, Mrs. Garrison saw a 

vehicle that resembled the last vehicle she knew [Barker] to drive 

parked across the yard from their home. According to [ ] Garrison, 

his wife was terrified of [Barker]. Therefore, she asked him to contact 

the deputy, who was on duty in the zone in which they resided, to 

make a check of the neighborhood.

[ ] Garrison believed [ ] Barker was stalking or otherwise 

engaging in threatening behavior toward Mrs. Garrison, so [he] 

conducted an inquiry of the DAVID system on January 5, 2011 to 

ascertain [Barker’s] physical description and the type of vehicle he 

drove. According to [ ] Garrison, he communicated the information 

obtained to the deputy on duty in the zone where the Garrisons lived 

and asked that he check the area. He repeated the DAVID inquiry the 

following morning, January 6, 2011, to confirm the information so it 

could be provided to the zone deputy for the following shift to check 

the area as well. Although the checks were completed, the presence 

of [Barker] was never confirmed.

Barker v. Bay Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 5:14-cv-102-RS-GRJ, 2015 WL 300431, 

*1–2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015).

Barker alleged that Garrison violated the DPPA by accessing his personal 

information for an impermissible purpose, and that McKeithen, in his official 

capacity as Garrison’s boss, was vicariously liable for Garrison’s DPPA 

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violations.1 Garrison and McKeithen moved for summary judgment. In support of 

the motions, Garrison submitted a sworn affidavit attesting that he had accessed 

Barker’s information on DAVID for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Barker 

opposed the motions, attaching to his response a copy of Garrison’s affidavit, 

records documenting Garrison’s use of DAVID to access Barker’s information, 

and an unverified version of his complaint. 

The district court granted summary judgment to Garrison and McKeithen. It 

correctly noted that the DPPA allows the disclosure of DAVID information “[f]or 

use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in 

carrying out its functions,” id. at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1)), and that the 

DPPA puts the burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant obtained his 

personal information “for a purpose not permitted under the act,” id. at *8 (quoting 

Thomas v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, King and Stevens, P.A., 

525 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2008)). None of Barker’s supporting evidence, the 

court explained, carried that burden or rebutted Garrison’s sworn statement about 

his permissible reasons for using DAVID.

 

1 Barker’s complaint contained two other counts not relevant to this appeal. Count II 

alleged that, by accessing Barker’s information on DAVID, Garrison had violated Barker’s 

privacy rights as protected by the DPPA and the Fourth Amendment. Count III alleged that 

McKeithen, in his official capacity, was vicariously liable for Garrison’s alleged violations of 

Barker’s privacy rights. Barker does not argue that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment to Garrison and McKeithen on either count, and “a legal claim or argument that has not 

been briefed before th[is] court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” 

Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).

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Barker maintains that Garrison’s sworn account of events is not believable, 

but he hasn’t identified evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to reach that 

conclusion. His whole argument is that Garrison lied about his reasons for 

accessing Barker’s DAVID profile, and that Garrison’s dishonesty is evidence that 

his real reason for accessing Barker’s profile was improper. According to Barker, 

a jury could reasonably infer that Garrison lied in his affidavit because a normal 

person in Garrison’s shoes would not respond to a frantic call from his spouse by 

pulling up information on DAVID and relaying it to the police. To adopt that 

particular argument, a reasonable jury would need at least some evidence 

suggesting that Garrison’s response to his wife’s call was, in fact, atypical. Barker 

hasn’t provided any such evidence. He’s offered only sweeping assertions and 

unsubstantiated conjecture that “most reasonable people would likely” not do what 

Garrison says he did upon receiving the call from his wife. Conjecture and 

conclusory statements won’t defeat a properly supported summary judgment 

motion unless they’re supported by specific facts. See Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. 

Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2014); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 

1352 n.20 (11th Cir. 2002). Because Barker hasn’t identified any specific facts 

supported by admissible evidence showing that Garrison lied in his affidavit, he 

hasn’t met his burden at summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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