Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_14-cv-00154/USCOURTS-ared-1_14-cv-00154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANDREA L. CANTRELL PLAINTIFF

v. No. 1:14–CV–154-BSM–BD

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner,

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Instructions

The following recommended disposition was prepared for U.S. District Judge

Brian S. Miller. A party to this dispute may file written objections to this

recommendation. An objection must be specific and state the factual and/or legal basis

for the objection. An objection to a factual finding must identify the finding and the

evidence supporting the objection. Objections must be filed with the clerk of the court

no later than 14 days from the date of this recommendation.1 The objecting party must

serve the opposing party with a copy of an objection. Failing to object within 14 days

waives the right to appeal questions of fact.2 If no objections are filed, Judge Miller may

adopt the recommended disposition without independently reviewing all of the

evidence.

1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

2Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure to file objections

waives right to de novo review and to appeal magistrate judge’s findings of fact).

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 1 of 10
Reasoning for Recommended Disposition

Andrea Lori Cantrell seeks judicial review of the denial of her application for

disability insurance benefits and disabled widow’s benefits.3

 Ms. Cantrell worked as a

cashier for a Kroger grocery store for 14 years.

4

 During that time period, she twice

injured her back and underwent back surgery. She claims she has been disabled since

she stopped working in March 2011, due to back pain, with right leg radiculopathy;

spinal fusion, status post laminectomy L5/S1; peripheral artery disease or neuropathy;

diabetes; and Grave’s disease.5

The Commissioner’s decision. After considering the application, the

Commissioner’s ALJ determined Ms. Cantrell had severe impairments — degenerative

disc disease of lumbar spine, status post anterior spinal fusion, status post laminectomy;

diabetes mellitus with neuropathy; pain disorder; and adjustment disorder6—but he

concluded she could do a reduced range of light work, including her past work as a

3Disability is defined in the same way for each of these disability benefits. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (“The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”).

4

SSA record at pp. 160-61, 186, 210 & 410.

5

Id. at p. 185.

6

Id. at p. 29.

2

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 2 of 10
cashier.

7

 Because a person who can do her past work is not disabled under social

security law,8

 the ALJ determined Ms. Cantrell was not disabled and denied the

application.9

After the Appeals Council denied a request for review,10the ALJ’s decision

became a final decision for judicial review.11

 Ms. Cantrell filed this case to challenge the

ALJ’s decision.12 In reviewing the decision, the court must determine whether

substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the ALJ made a legal error.

13

 

7

Id. at p. 33.

8

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If you can still do your past relevant work, we will

find that you are not disabled.”).

9

SSA record at p. 33.

10

Id. at p. 1.

11

See Anderson v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, “the Social

Security Act precludes general federal subject matter jurisdiction until administrative

remedies have been exhausted” and explaining that the Commissioner’s appeal

procedure permits claimants to appeal only final decisions).

12Docket entry # 1.

13

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring the district court to determine whether the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the

Commissioner conformed with applicable regulations); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187

(8th Cir. 1997) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s decision to deny an applicant

disability benefits if the decision is not based on legal error and if there is substantial

evidence in the record as a whole to support the conclusion that the claimant was not

disabled.”).

3

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 3 of 10
Ms. Cantrell’s allegations. Ms. Cantrell challenges the determination that she

could work. She characterizes the ALJ’s decision as error-ridden. She asks for a

remand because the ALJ did not explain why he rejected the mental examiner’s report

that she might be unable to complete work in an acceptable time frame. She maintains

that she could not do her past work because working as a cashier requires timely

customer service. 

Further, she disputes the evaluation of her credibility; she says the ALJ did not

properly consider her work history or her inability to pay for medical treatment. She

complains about the ALJ’s failure to discuss written statements she provided from

friends and family about her symptoms. She argues that the ALJ should have

conducted a function-by-function analysis of her work as a cashier. For these reasons,

she argues, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision.14

Applicable legal principles. For substantial evidence to support the decision, a

reasonable mind must accept the evidence as adequate to show that Ms. Cantrell could

do a reduced range of light work, including that of a cashier. “Light work involves

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time, with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to 10 pounds.”15 The ALJ further limited Ms. Cantrell to light work with

14Docket entry #s 14 & 16.

15

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

4

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 4 of 10
only occasional stooping, crouching, crawling, or kneeling. There is substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Cantrell could work within these limits. 

1. Treatment controlled Ms. Cantrell’s symptoms. Symptoms that can

be controlled by treatment are not disabling under social security law.16

Ms. Cantrell complained primarily about low back pain radiating to her

hips and right leg, and neuropathic foot pain.17 She claimed pain

prevented her from walking, standing, lifting, and sitting. Treatment

records, however, show that Ms. Cantrell’s pain was controlled with

treatment.

In May 2011, a couple of months after she stopped working, Ms. Cantrell

underwent a second back surgery.18 In September 2011, she had a limited

range of motion in her back, but was weaning herself off pain

medication.19 According to her surgeon, Ms. Cantrell had “decreased the

use of medications considerably.”20 Decreasing pain medication indicates

pain had subsided. By October 2011, Ms. Cantrell had met her short-term

physical therapy goals; she reported “an overall improvement in mobility

and function,” although she still had pain.

21

16Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d

722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002).

17

SSA record at p. 48-49 (testifying about limitations she attributed to back and

foot pain), p. 197 (reporting back, leg, hip, and foot pain) & p. 622 (stating on May 3,

2012, that leg and foot pain prevented her from working).

18

Id. at p. 422.

19

Id. at p. 558.

20

Id.

21

Id. at p. 533.

5

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 5 of 10
After that, Ms. Cantrell settled a worker’s compensation claim22

and

moved to Arkansas. She no longer had medical insurance, so she

established care at a Christian medical clinic,23 where she received

treatment for a thyroid condition, diabetes, and problems with sleeping. 

The clinic referred her to a pain specialist for opioid pain medication. 

According to Ms. Cantrell, the prescribed medication made her back pain

tolerable.24 The pain specialist recommended epidural steroid injections. 

The pain specialist prescribed a medication for neuropathic pain.25

According to Ms. Cantrell, the medication was very effective in controlling

her pain.26 The pain specialist’s recommendations and reports of pain

control show that Ms. Cantrell’s symptoms could be controlled with

treatment. A reasonable mind would accept the evidence as adequate to

support the decision because Ms. Cantrell’s symptoms could be controlled

with treatment.

2. The mental examiner’s report supports the decision. The ALJ

assigned considerable weight to the mental examiner’s report.27

22

Id. at p. 176 (reflecting receipt of workers compensation until Oct. 1, 2011).

23

Id. at p. 643.

24

Id. at p. 666 (July 31, 2012, independent with activities of daily living because

pain medication makes pain tolerable), p. 662 (Oct. 2, 2012, she could do housework and

yard work with pain medication), p. 672 (Feb. 5, 2013, opioid pain medication makes her

nauseous but helps with pain; leg and back pain has not changed significantly but is

manageable with medication) & p. 703 (May 7, 2013, opioid pain medication causes

nausea, but it’s bearable).

25

Id. at p. 668 (prescribing a trial of Lyrica).

26

Id. at p. 681 (reporting on Aug. 16, 2012 that Lyrica helps her pain quite a lot),

p. 675 (reporting on Dec. 4, 2012 that Lyrica helped her leg pain greatly), p. 270

(reporting in pre-hearing agency pleading that she’s trying to get assistance to get back

on Lyrica because it worked well) & p. 47 (testifying on May 8, 2013 that Lyrica worked

really good).

27

Id. at p. 32.

6

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 6 of 10
According to the examiner, Ms. Cantrell had the capacity to cope with the

mental demands of basic work tasks, but she “may not be able to complete

work tasks within an acceptable timeframe due to pain issues.”28

Ms. Cantrell says the latter statement shows she could not work as a

cashier because the job requires timely customer service. She asks the

court to remand the case for an explanation about why the ALJ discredited

the statement.

The ALJ discussed the examiner’s report in a fair amount of detail,

including the relied-upon statement.29 The ALJ did not explicitly explain

why he discredited the statement, but an ALJ does not have to discuss

every piece of evidence.30 The ALJ’s discussion of the medical evidence

shows why he discredited the statement. The examiner’s statement

flowed from a complaint of disabling pain, but the ALJ determined that

surgery reduced symptoms and medication controlled residual pain. 

These findings show that the ALJ discounted the statement because he

discredited the allegation of disabling pain. Ms. Cantrell’s complaint

provides no basis for a remand.

3. The ALJ properly evaluated credibility. Ms. Cantrell also challenges

the ALJ’s evaluation of her credibility. Here, the ALJ followed the

required two-step process and considered the required factors.31

 The

dispositive question is whether substantial evidence supports the

credibility evaluation. Here, the ALJ’s evaluation is supported by

substantial evidence. An ALJ may discount subjective complaints “if there

28

Id. at p. 622.

29

Id. at pp. 32-33.

30Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 896 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000) (ALJ’s failure to describe

claimant’s entire medical history does not mean ALJ disregarded certain evidence);

Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) ( “[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss

every piece of evidence submitted.”).

31

SSR 96-7p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in

Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements.

7

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 7 of 10
are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole.”32

 In this case, there were

inconsistencies.

Ms. Cantrell’s testimony demonstrated inconsistencies. She testified that

she stopped working because she could not stand up or lift things, but the

record shows she improved with treatment. After settling her workers

compensation claim and moving to Arkansas, she applied for disability

benefits. She alleged she was unable to work, but she also testified that

she did not look for work because she did not know what she could do.33

Alleging that she was unable to work is inconsistent with not knowing

what work she could do.

She testified that pain prevented her from washing her hair or doing

household chores,34 but she told her pain specialist that medication

allowed her to perform personal grooming, housework, yard work, and

shopping.35 Her testimony is inconsistent with reports to her doctor. She

testified that she spent 10 days per month in bed,36 but her pain specialist

prescribed regular exercise and advised against bed rest.37

 A doctor’s

recommendation for physical exercise is inconsistent with a claim of

physical limitation.38

“As is true in many disability cases, there is no doubt that the claimant is

experiencing pain; the real issue is how severe that pain is.”39 The record

32Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).

33

SSA record at p. 46.

34

Id. at p. 48.

35

Id. at pp. 662 & 666.

36

Id. at p. 51.

37

Id. at pp. 663, 668-69 & 676.

38Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013).

39Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

8

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 8 of 10
shows that Ms. Cantrell’s pain could be controlled with treatment. Pain

that can be controlled with treatment is inconsistent with an allegation of

disabling pain. She complains about the ALJ’s failure to discuss

statements provided by family and friends, but an ALJ is not required to

discuss every piece of evidence. The statements40 support Ms. Cantrell’s

allegations, but are inconsistent with the record as a whole.

4. Vocational evidence supports the decision. According to agency

medical experts, Ms. Cantrell could do light work involving occasional

stooping and crouching.41 The ALJ included those limitations, but also

added other limitations, finding that Ms. Cantrell could only occasionally

crawl and kneel. The ALJ asked a vocational expert about work for a

person with all of those limitations.42

 According to the vocational expert, a

person with those limitations could work as a cashier.

43

 Ms. Cantrell

worked as a cashier for 14 years. A person who can do her past work is

not disabled under social security law.44

Ms. Cantrell also argues that the ALJ erred by not conducting a functionby-function analysis of her past work. According to Ms. Cantrell, her

previous work required her to lift heavy things. Her point is not well

taken because light work requires lifting no more than 20 pounds. Ms.

Cantrell points to the ALJ’s erroneous reference to past work,45

 but this

40

SSA record at pp. 237, 239 & 654.

41

Id. at pp. 610, 615 & 649.

42

Id. at pp. 55-56.

43

Id. at p. 56.

44

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If you can still do your past relevant work, we will

find that you are not disabled.”).

45

SSA record at p. 33 (“Consistent with testimony given by the vocational expert,

a person with the claimant’s vocational profile and residual functional capacity could

perform the past relevant work as a construction worker and a cardboard cutter and

wiping down tables.”). Cantrell never worked as a construction worker, cardboard

cutter, or table wiper.

9

Case 1:14-cv-00154-BSM Document 17 Filed 08/06/15 Page 9 of 10
error constitutes a scrivener’s error and provides no basis for relief. The

mistake had no practical effect on the outcome of the case.46 A reasonable

mind will accept the vocational evidence as adequate to support the

decision.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ made no legal error. 

For these reasons, Judge Miller should DENY Ms. Cantrell’s request for relief (docket

entry # 2) and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.

Dated this 6th day of August, 2015.

____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

46Senne v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1999) (deficiency in opinion-writing

is insufficient reason to set aside administrative finding where deficiency had no

practical effect on outcome); Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992)

(arguable deficiency in opinion-writing does not require setting aside administrative

finding if deficiency had no bearing on outcome).

10

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