Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01370/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BERTIN VEGA GOMEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-01370 PHX JWS (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK:

On October 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 16) on December 15, 2006. 

I Procedural History

In 1999 Petitioner was charged by indictment with one

count of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated

assault. Response, Exh. A. On November 9, 1999, a jury found

Petitioner guilty of one count of second-degree murder and one

count of aggravated assault. Id., Exh. B. The jury concluded

the counts of conviction should be classified as dangerous

offenses. Id., Exh. B.

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On January 14, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to a

mitigated sentence of 13 years imprisonment for his seconddegree murder conviction and a concurrent term of six years in

prison pursuant to his conviction for aggravated assault. Id.,

Exh. C. 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner asserted his convictions

should be reversed because the trial court refused to instruct

the jury on the elements of manslaughter as a lesser-included

offense and because the trial court erroneously precluded the

introduction of a testifying detective’s prior statement, in

violation of Petitioner’s right to a fundamentally fair trial.

Id., Exh. D. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted partial relief in

a decision issued December 28, 2000. Id., Exh. F. The Court of

Appeals reversed Petitioner’s murder conviction, concluding the

trial court had erred by denying Petitioner’s request to

instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of

manslaughter. Id., Exh. F. The Court of Appeals remanded the

case to the trial court for further proceedings regarding

Petitioner’s murder conviction, and affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence for aggravated assault. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner was retried on the charge of first-degree

murder in 2001. Id., Exh. G. The second jury found Petitioner

guilty of second-degree murder and concluded the offense should

be classified as dangerous. Id., Exh. G. However, on December

14, 2001, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion for a new

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trial, which motion was premised on an allegation of juror

misconduct during jury deliberations. Id., Exh. G. 

Petitioner’s third jury trial was conducted in February

of 2002. Id., Exh. I. The jury was instructed with regard to

the elements of second-degree murder, manslaughter, and

negligent homicide. Id., Exh. I. The jury found Petitioner

guilty of second-degree murder, and further concluded the count

of conviction should be classified as a dangerous offense. Id.,

Exh. I. On March 4, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

13 years in prison pursuant to his conviction on the charge of

second-degree murder, and given credit for 1,005 days of

presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal of this

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner asserted only

that he was entitled to additional credit for presentence

incarceration. Id., Exh. L. In a decision issued November 21,

2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

sentence and conviction, but ordered Petitioner be given credit

for an addition 106 days of presentence incarceration. id.,

Exh. N. Petitioner attempted to appeal this decision to the

Arizona Supreme Court, but mis-filed his appeal, which was also

untimely, with the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. O & Exh.

P. The Court of Appeals transferred the untimely petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on February 20, 2003. id.,

Exh. Q.

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Petitioner filed an action for state post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on January 28, 2003. Id.,

Exh. R. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

that action. Id., Exh. S & Exh. U. In his action for postconviction relief, Petitioner alleged the trial court erred by

failing to properly instruct the jury, resulting in a trial

proceeding which was fundamentally unfair, in violation of

Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Id., Exh. V. 

On January 5, 2004, the Arizona Superior Court denied

relief, concluding Petitioner’s claim was without merit and,

additionally, that his claim was also precluded pursuant to Rule

32.2, because Petitioner did not raise the issue in his direct

appeal. Id., Exh. X. Petitioner did not seek review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. However, on January

18, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se motion seeking to assert

additional claims for post-conviction relief, i.e., that his

counsel was ineffective. Id., Exh. BB. This motion was denied

on March 8, 2004. Id., Exh. BB.

Petitioner initiated a second action for postconviction relief on April 9, 2004, asserting he had been

deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Id., Exh. CC. The Arizona Superior Court denied relief,

concluding the claim asserted was precluded by Petitioner’s

failure to raise the claim in his first action for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. CC.

Petitioner sought review of the denial of postconviction relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a petition

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filed May 24, 2004. Id., Exh. DD. Petitioner asserted he was

entitled to relief from his convictions and sentences because

the trial court had not properly instructed the jury and because

his counsel was ineffective. Id., Exh. DD. The Arizona Court

of Appeals denied review in a decision issued June 17, 2005.

Id., Exh. EE. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on January 23, 2006.

Id., Exh. GG.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on May 25,

2006. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because the

trial court erred by allegedly not instructing the jury on the

elements of manslaughter and negligent homicide; the trial court

erred by not granting a directed verdict on the charge of

second degree murder; the trial court erred by not reducing the

murder charge to manslaughter or negligent homicide after

Petitioner’s murder conviction was reversed twice; and

Petitioner’s rights were violated by the use of transcripts of

prior testimony at his third trial. 

II Analysis

Exhaustion and procedural default

A state prisoner must “exhaust” a claim in the state

courts before the District Court may grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To

properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must afford the state

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

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1 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

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presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2971 (2005).1

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994

& Supp. 2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060.

If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally

barred pursuant to state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue

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of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a claim in state court and is now barred from doing so

by the state’s procedural rules, including rules regarding

waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at

351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376,

1378 (9th Cir. 1988). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state

claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review

... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v.

Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v.

Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did

present a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did

not address the merits of the claim because the petitioner

failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Insyxiengmay

v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Szabo v. Walls,

313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A state is entitled to treat

as forfeited a proposition that was not presented in the right

court, in the right way, and at the right time--as state rules

define those courts, ways, and times. Failure to comply with

the state’s procedural rules furnishes an independent and

adequate state ground of decision that blocks federal collateral

review.”). 

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The only claim raised by Petitioner in his direct

appeal of his third conviction and sentence for murder was the

degree to which he had been given credit for pre-sentence

incarceration. The only issue raised by Petitioner in his first

Rule 32 action was that the trial court erred by failing to

properly instruct the jury regarding transferred intent.

Petitioner did not present the claim raised in his Rule 32

action to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a timely manner after

the trial court denied relief. When Petitioner sought to raise

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a second Rule 32

proceeding the Arizona courts determined the claim was waived by

Petitioner’s failure to raise it in his direct appeal or in his

first Rule 32 action. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust any of his federal

habeas claims in the state courts by fairly presenting them to

the Arizona Court of Appeals in a direct appeal or in his first

action for post-conviction relief. Because the Arizona rules of

criminal procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion

bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust

his unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted,

but procedurally defaulted his claims. See Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

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2 Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of his claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 1847,

1852 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639,

2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when

a constitutional violation results in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent of the crime of conviction. See Murray, 477 U.S.

at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749

(9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is necessary to trigger

manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage

of justice” standard, Petitioner must establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S.

Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not assert he is actually innocent of the

factual predicate for the charges against him, but asserts the

shooting of the victim was an accident, i.e., that the gun fell from

his pocket and discharged, injuring the victim. Petitioner did not

testify at his trial, presumably because the government filed notice

it intended to use a prior felony conviction to impeach Petitioner’s

testimony. See Petition, Attach. 

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S. Ct. at 2555-56.2 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules.

See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire [criminal proceedings] with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady,

456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Establishing prejudice requires Petitioner to prove that, “but

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for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a

reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crime. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a

procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

 Petitioner never presented any of his claims for

federal habeas relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

procedurally correct manner, either in his direct appeal or in

his first action for post-conviction relief. Accordingly,

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims.

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of his claims. Therefore, relief may not

be granted on the merits of Petitioner’s claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas

claims in the Arizona state courts by not presenting them to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner.

Because Petitioner offers no reason or evidence establishing

cause for, or prejudice arising from his procedural default of

his federal habeas claims, the Court may not grant relief based

on the merits of the claims.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Vega Gomez’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 31st day of January, 2007.

 

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