Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04992/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04992-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Respondent’s reply was due no later than July 21, 2006. (See Order Vacating

August 4, 2006 Hearing at 1:28.) On August 3, 2006, respondent filed a reply without

providing an explanation for the untimeliness. Thereafter, also on August 3, 2006,

petitioner filed a motion to strike the reply on grounds of untimeliness, and respondent

failed to file an opposition or any other response to said motion to strike. Because

respondent has not offered any cause for its untimely filing, petitioner’s motion to strike the

reply is hereby GRANTED, and the reply is hereby STRICKEN. The Court notes, however,

that the argument made in the reply is premature, to the extent respondent asserts

petitioner will not be able to prove certain facts asserted in his opposition, e.g., that

petitioner has a mental condition that caused petitioner to delay the filing of the instant

petition.

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By order filed July 27, 2006, the Court took the matter under submission.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGEI V. KOROLEV,

Petitioner,

 v.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C-05-4992 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING

PETITION WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

Before the Court is respondent Richard Kirkland’s motion, filed April 14, 2006, to

dismiss petitioner Sergei V. Korolev’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground of

untimeliness. Petitioner has filed opposition.1

 Having considered the papers filed in

support of and in opposition to the motion,2

 the Court hereby rules as follows.

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The Clerk filed the petition on December 2, 2005. Although petitioner is currently

represented by counsel, petitioner filed the instant petition pro se. Under the “mailbox rule,”

a pro se petition “is deemed filed when given to the proper prison authorities and not when

received by the district court clerk.” See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F. 3d 1104, 1106 n. 2. On a

form comprising part of his petition, petitioner wrote the date November 22, 2005. Stapled

to that form, however, is a declaration by petitioner dated December 2, 2005. Under such

circumstances, it is unclear how petitioner could have presented the petition for mailing on

November 22, 2005 or any date before December 2, 2005. According to petitioner’s

counsel, however, petitioner mailed the petition to counsel before December 2, 2005. (See

Corrected Rosenthal Decl. ¶ 6.) If petitioner intends to rely on the mailbox rule, petitioner

must clarify these discrepancies in an amended petition, as well as allege the date on

which he claims to have given the petition to prison authorities for mailing. Further, as

discussed infra, even if petitioner establishes his entitlement to a filing date of November

22, 2005, such date nonetheless is after the expiration of the limitations period.

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BACKGROUND

On March 16, 2001, in Marin County Superior Court, petitioner was sentenced to

state prison for a term of life plus thirty-five years and four months, and judgment was

entered. On April 18, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and, on

July 9, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied review. On October 7, 2004, petitioner

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which denied

the petition on November 2, 2005. On December 2, 2005, the instant petition was filed.3

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that petitioner did not file the instant petition within the

applicable one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In opposition,

petitioner asserts the petition is timely, or in the alternative, that he can establish his

entitlement to an exception to or tolling of the statute of limitations.

A. Timeliness

A habeas petition must be filed within 365 days of “the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where, as here, a petitioner seeks direct

review of a state trial court’s judgment, the judgment is final ninety days after the highest

state court has affirmed the judgment. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding judgment in California becomes final 90 days after entry of California

Supreme Court’s order denying review of California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming

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Relying on Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F. 3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001), petitioner argues the

California Supreme Court’s order became final 30 days after it was filed. In Bunney, the

Ninth Circuit, interpreting a prior version of Rule 29.4, held an order by the California

Supreme Court denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus became final 30 days after

filing. See id. at 974. The current version of Rule 29.4, however, was adopted in 2003,

after Bunney was decided. When a rule is amended, decisions “that rely on the older

versions of the statute [ ] must be reevaluated in light of the amended statute.” See United

States v. McNeil, 362 F. 3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding courts “are not bound by

decisions of prior panels if subsequent legislation has undermined those decisions”). 

Accordingly, petitioner’s reliance on Bunney is unavailing.

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judgment). “The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review . . . is pending,” however, “shall not be counted toward any period of

limitations.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F. 3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999) (holding, as to judgment in California, one-year statute of limitations stops

running “from the time the first state habeas petition is filed” and begins to run when

“California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge”).

Here, as noted, the California Supreme Court, on July 9, 2003, denied review of the

California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the judgment. The judgment became final

90 days later, specifically, October 7, 2003. See id. On October 7, 2004, the very day the

one-year limitations period would have expired, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court, which petition, as noted, was denied on November 2, 2005. In

light of petitioner’s October 7, 2004 filing of his state habeas petition, the one-year

limitations period did not expire on October 7, 2004. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As of

October 7, 2004, however, no further days remained, and the limitations period thus

expired on the date the California Supreme Court’s order of November 2, 2005 became

final. Because an order by the California Supreme Court denying a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus becomes final “on filing,” see Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 29.4(b)(2)(C), the

one-year limitations period ran on the date the California Supreme Court denied the

petition, specifically, November 2, 2005.4

As noted, the Court deems the instant petition filed with the Clerk on December 2,

2005, 30 days after the limitations period ran. Accordingly, the petition is subject to

dismissal as untimely, absent an exception to or tolling of the statute of limitations.

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B. Leave to Amend

In his opposition, petitioner asserts he is entitled to an exception to the statute of

limitations, based on actual innocence. Further, petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable

tolling. In his petition, however, petitioner does not allege any facts to support either an

exception or tolling. Accordingly, the Court will consider whether it would be futile to allow

petitioner to amend to allege his entitlement to such relief. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F. 3d

1039, 1043-44 and n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding petitioner entitled to amend petition where

petitioner asserted, in motion for reconsideration and affidavit in support thereof, grounds

that might upon “appropriate development of the record” warrant finding petitioner entitled

to equitable tolling).

1. Actual Innocence

A petitioner’s “otherwise-barred claims [may be] considered on the merits . . . if his

claim of actual innocence is sufficient to bring him within the narrow class of cases . . .

implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, petitioner asserts that “[f]acts

exist in the trial record supporting [petitioner’s] actual innocence.” (See Pet.’s Opp. at 17:2-

11.) To establish entitlement to the “actual innocence” exception to the statute of

limitations, however, a petitioner must offer “‘new reliable evidence’” that was not presented

at trial. See Majoy, 296 F. 3d at 776 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). 

Petitioner does not assert he has any such evidence.

Accordingly, leave to amend to allege the “actual innocence” exception to the statute

of limitations would be futile.

2. Equitable Tolling

“AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling.” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F. 3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to establish equitable tolling, a

petitioner must show “he has been pursuing his rights diligently” and “that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F. 3d 1065,

1068 (9th Cir. 2006).

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As discussed above, petitioner, on the 365th day after his conviction became final,

elected to file a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, where that petition

remained under submission for an additional 392 days.

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Petitioner states his counsel informed him, on a date he does not recall, of the

California Supreme Court’s denial. (See Korolev Decl. ¶ 10.)

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Here, petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable tolling based on four different

grounds. The Court next considers whether such grounds, or any of them, could excuse

petitioner’s failure to prepare and complete his federal petition during the 757 days between

the date his state conviction became final and the date he filed the instant petition.5

First, relying on Miller v. Collins, 305 F. 3d 491 (6th Cir. 2002), petitioner asserts he

is entitled to equitable tolling for the period between the California Supreme Court’s denial

of his state habeas petition and his receipt of notice of that denial. See id. at 495-96

(holding pro se petitioner entitled to equitable tolling for period between date state habeas

petition was denied and date petitioner had notice of denial). Unlike the prisoner in Miller,

however, petitioner was represented by counsel on the state petition. (See Corrected

Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). Consequently, the California Supreme Court’s notice to

petitioner’s counsel constitutes notice to petitioner. See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 200.1(9)

(“Whenever under these rules a notice or other paper is required to be served on or given

to a party, such service or notice must be made on the party’s attorney of record if there is

one.”); Kirk v. INS, 927 F. 2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Under our system of

representative litigation, each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is

considered to have notice of all the facts, notice of which can be charged upon the

attorney.”). Here, petitioner’s counsel states he had notice of the denial two days after the

denial was filed. (See Corrected Rosenthal Decl. ¶ 5.)6 Consequently, petitioner would, at

best, be entitled to equitable tolling for two days, specifically, to November 4, 2005. As

noted, the petition was not filed until December 2, 2005. Accordingly, leave to amend to

allege this ground for equitable tolling would be futile.

//

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Second, petitioner asserts he is entitled to tolling under the principles set forth in 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F. 3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2005). In Espinoza-Matthews,

the Ninth Circuit, acknowledging “it is unrealistic to expect [a habeas petitioner] to prepare

and file a meaningful petition on his own within the limitations period without access to his

legal file,” held a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if, despite his diligence in seeking

his legal file, he is not provided access thereto during the limitations period. See id. at

1027-28 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, petitioner does not assert he

lacked access to his legal file at any time during the 757-day period between the date his

state conviction became final and the date the statute of limitations ran; rather, petitioner

asserts that, for various reasons, it was difficult during some portions of the limitations

period for petitioner to contact and retain counsel for the instant action. (See Pet.’s Opp. at

13:27 - 15:13.) Petitioner cites no authority, however, and the Court has located none,

holding difficulties in retaining counsel constitute an “extraordinary circumstance,” see

Mendoza, 449 F. 3d at 1068, warranting equitable tolling. Further, as noted, petitioner,

through counsel, filed his state habeas petition during the one-year federal limitations

period, (see Corrected Rosenfeld Decl. ¶ 2), thus demonstrating he was capable of hiring

counsel to represent him for purposes of filing a federal habeas petition at that time. 

Consequently, assuming, arguendo, an inability to obtain counsel during the limitations

period could under some circumstances constitute an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling, here, petitioner cannot in good faith allege he was unable to

retain counsel during the limitations period. Accordingly, leave to amend to allege this

ground for equitable tolling would be futile.

Third, petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable tolling because of language

barriers. Petitioner avers that his first language is Russian, that he speaks and writes

English as a second language, and that it takes him “a long time” to translate “legal mail”

using a dictionary. (See Korolev Decl. at ¶ 4.) Petitioner states it can take him “as long as

a week” to translate legal mail, and that it is “difficult” for him to understand and translate

his legal mail “accurately.” (See id.) Petitioner does not expressly assert that, due to

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language difficulties, he was unable to prepare and complete his federal petition during the

above-referenced 757-day period. Given that petitioner admits he can translate English,

albeit slowly, it is unclear how petitioner can state, in good faith, that he was unable to

translate, during the 757-day period, the documents that contained information relevant to

the claims asserted herein. More importantly, given that petitioner has offered evidence

demonstrating his counsel prepared and wrote the instant petition, (see Corrected

Rosenthal Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 6), a causal connection between petitioner’s delay and any

language barrier would appear to be lacking. Nevertheless, the Court will afford petitioner

leave to amend his petition to allege such ground if petitioner can, in good faith, do so. See

Mendoza, 449 F. 3d at 1068-69 (holding “combination of (1) a prison law library’s lack of

Spanish-language legal materials, and (2) a petitioner’s inability to obtain translation

assistance before the one-year deadline, could constitute extraordinary circumstances” as

to Spanish-speaking prisoner with “limited” English skills).

Fourth, and lastly, petitioner asserts he is entitled to tolling because his delay is the

result of mental disorders. According to petitioner, he is housed in a prison psychiatric unit,

where he has been diagnosed with “bipolar disorder and depression.” (See Korolev Decl.

¶¶ 2, 6.) Petitioner further asserts that, although he takes medications for the bipolar

disorder, some days he “cannot do a thing but sleep and worry.” (See id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner

does not expressly state that as a result of such claimed conditions, he was unable to

prepare and complete his federal petition during the 757 days between the date his state

conviction became final and the date his state petition was denied. Again, because

petitioner concedes his counsel prepared and wrote the instant petition, a causal

connection between petitioner’s delay and any mental disorder appears to be lacking. The

Court nonetheless will afford petitioner leave to allege such ground if petitioner can, in good

faith, do so. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding where

petitioner can establish delay in filing was caused by mental incompetence, petitioner

entitled to equitable tolling).

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS respondent’s motion to

dismiss.

Petitioner is hereby afforded leave to file a First Amended Petition to allege, in

conformity with this order, a cognizable basis for equitable tolling. Any such First Amended

Petition must be filed no later than December 15, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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