Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06028/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06028-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS A. HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-06028-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. 22)

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 21)

I. Screening Order

Plaintiff Thomas A. Hightower (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on July

29, 2004. On February 24, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

on June 28, 2006, and a motion seeking the appointment of counsel on December 20, 2006.

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent

plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern

District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional

///

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circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section

1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether

“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. Further, at this early stage in the proceedings, the court cannot make a

determination that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record

in this case, the court does not find that plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Id. For the

foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel shall be denied, without

prejudice. 

B. Screening Requirement 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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28 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is forty-nine typewritten pages long. Where practicable, the court has

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identified each section of claims by the defendants involved in those claims. 

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“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

C. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims1

1. Defendants Cobbs, Diaz, Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis 

a. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Cobbs and Diaz intentionally kept plaintiff, a Level III

inmate, at a level IV prison in retaliation against him for filing a lawsuit against staff at Mule Creek

State Prison.

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

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the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against defendants Cobbs and Diaz. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that defendants Cotes, Duvall, Adams,

Rianda, and Grannis also retaliated against him is insufficient to give rise to a claim. It is unclear

what actions these defendants did or did not take which led to the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Further, at least some of these defendants address and resolve inmate appeals. As plaintiff was

already informed by the court in its order of February 24, 2006, involvement in the resolution of an

inmate’s appeal, alone, does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983.

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8,

10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty

interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey

v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty

interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

b. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Cobbs, Diaz, Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis

conspired to retaliate against him. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section

1983, such a complaint must “allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the

defendants.” Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that

defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of

the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy between

defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is not cognizable. 

c. Denial of Access to the Courts Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Cobbs, Diaz, Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis

interfered with his right of access to the courts by delaying resolution of plaintiff’s inmate appeals.

Plaintiff alleges summary judgment was granted against him as a result. 

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Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2177 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354, 2181-82. Claims for denial of access to the courts may

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking

access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking

claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). For

backward-looking claims such as that at issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.”

Phillips v. Hust, No. 04-36021, 2007 WL 446593, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out

of court. Harbury 536 U.S. at 415, 121 S.Ct. at 2187; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180;

Phillips, 2007 WL 446593, at *3. The second element requires that plaintiff show that each involved

defendant proximately caused the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he touchstone . . . [for

which] is foreseeability.” Phillips, 2007 WL 446593, at *3. Finally, the third element requires that

plaintiff show he has no other remedy than the relief available via this suit for denial of access to the

courts. Id. at *6.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983. It is not clear how

defendants caused plaintiff to suffer any actual injury with respect to civil case 2:99-cv-02152-EJGDAD Hightower v. Terhune. It is not at all obvious how delaying a response to an inmate appeal

would cause plaintiff to suffer an actual injury with respect to a pending civil action. Further, the

time period at issue in the amended complaint was May 2002 through December 2002. (Doc. 21,

Amend. Comp., ¶27.) The court takes judicial notice that the motion for summary judgment in

plaintiff’s civil case was filed on December 26, 2001, and plaintiff opposed the motion on March

25, 2002. Defendants filed a reply on April 3, 2002, and the motion was deemed submitted pursuant

to Local Rule 78-231. The Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendations on May 20,

2002, to which plaintiff objected on May 31, 2002. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was

granted on June 20, 2002. 

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Based on the timing of events and on the fact that plaintiff opposed the motion and filed

objections to the Findings and Recommendations, it appears to the court that plaintiff’s assertion

defendants’ caused him to lose on summary judgment by delaying his inmate appeal is disingenuous

and exaggerated. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts. 

d. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions he was subjected to at the Level IV prison endangered

his life and violated the Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions

may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter,

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries

stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they

acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d

1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim,

“[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities

are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

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Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that his life was in danger, that

the conditions at the prison otherwise violated the Eighth Amendment, or that defendants Cobbs,

Diaz, Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial

risk of harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based

on his confinement at a Level IV prison. 

2. Defendants Klarich, Dunn, Santa Cruz, Grannis, Alameida, and Tilton

Plaintiff alleges that he sought medical treatment for chronic liver disease, severe GI distress,

spinal disease, and respiratory disease. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Klarich, Dunn, Santa Cruz,

Grannis, Alameida, and Tilton refused to provide plaintiff with medical care and treated plaintiff

with only cursory, infrequent examinations and over-the counter medications. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants’ inaction caused him to suffer unnecessarily.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Klarich ordered plaintiff to be fed in his cell due to severe GI

distress. On November 14, 2002, when plaintiff informed defendant Santa Cruz that his

subordinates were refusing to order food trays for plaintiff, defendant became angry and stated in

writing that it was not custody staff’s responsibility to cell feed inmates, berated Dr. White, and

stated plaintiff could either starve or pick up and carry his own food tray. Plaintiff alleges defendant

Santa Cruz acted in this manner in retaliation against plaintiff for filing an inmate appeal over being

denied his in-cell food trays.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Grannis, Alameida, and Tilton were on notice regarding these

unlawful conditions but refused to intervene. 

a. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

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a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant SantaCruz refused to honor the medical order for in-cell

food trays is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff has not

alleged facts supporting a claim that defendant Santa Cruz “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive

risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts

supporting a claim that defendants Klarich, Dunn, Grannis, Alameida, and Tilton acted with

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

With respect to the defendants involved in responding to plaintiff’s inmate appeal, the

resolution of an inmate’s appeal, alone, is an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability under

section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis,

568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

(no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

With respect to defendants Alameida and Tilton, liability may not be imposed on supervisory

personnel under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat

superior. When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley,

607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief undersection 1983 forsupervisory liability,

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plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them;

or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support

claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). The fact that defendants Alameida and Tilton held or hold the position of Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation does not provide a basis upon which to

impose liability under section 1983. Theymust be linked to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.

b. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against defendant Santa Cruz for

retaliating against him, in violation of his First Amendment right to file inmate appeals. However,

plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that defendants Klarich, Dunn, Grannis, Alameida, and

Tilton retaliated against him. 

3. Defendants Allison, Doe, Nguyen, Grannis, Deering, Klarich, and Posner

Plaintiff alleges that Drs. Dunn and Medina recommended plaintiff for a liver biopsy, and

referral to a liver specialist, a neurologist, a pain management specialist, and a dietician. Plaintiff

alleges defendants Allison, Doe, Nguyen, Grannis, Deering, Klarich, and Posner knew plaintiff was

not receiving the recommended services, which constituted a risk to plaintiff’s health.

Plaintiff alleges that he saw defendant Nguyen on October 15, 2002, but defendant refused

to provide any medical care, including providing plaintiff with pain medication at least temporarily

until plaintiff could be seen by a pain management specialist. Plaintiff alleges that these health

concerns were presented to all defendants and met with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges he

would try and address his concerns with facility clinic defendants, who would refer him to the

Correctional Treatment Center, which in turn would refer him back to facility clinic staff. Plaintiff

alleges that during this time, defendant Doe, a pharmacy staff member, would delay or fail to fill

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medications for a seizure disorder, breathing disorders, and GI disorders, which endangered

plaintiff’s health and aggravated his condition. Plaintiff alleges that due to the obvious nature of the

medications, defendant Doe acted with deliberate indifference.

Under federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to

claims for relief under the Eighth Amendment against defendants Nguyen and Doe. However,

plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim against defendants Allison, Grannis,

Deering, Klarich, and Posner for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs. Some of the defendants appear to have been involved in the inmate appeals process, which

is an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983.

4. Defendants Barbiero, Allison, McCant, Cotes, Appelbaum, Duvall, Arline,

Aguillera-Morrero, Overly, Wu, Poshner, and Does 1-10

Plaintiff alleges that he takes several vital medications, including anti-seizure medication and

inhalers for Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease and emphysema. Plaintiff alleges that his

medications were renewed on December 4, 2002, but plaintiff had still not received his medications

by December 15, 2002, at which time plaintiff filed an inmate appeal due to the danger he might

suffer a seizure.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Barbiero, Allison, and McCant failed to undertake their

duties under state law to act within twenty days and obtain plaintiff’s medications for him, despite

their knowledge of the obvious risk. Plaintiff alleges that defendants delayed the disbursement of

the medications until February 27, 2003, in retaliation against plaintiff for his lawsuit against

CDCR’s medical department. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Cotes, Duvall, Arline, Aguillera-Marrero, and Barbiero failed

to ensure that his Reasonable Request for Disability Accommodations form was resolved within

twenty days, in violation of his right to due process, right to petition the court, and the Armstrong

Remedial plan. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Appelbaum, a Deputy Attorney General, failed to

contact prison officials when notified by the Prison Law Office that defendants’ inaction was in

violation of the Plata and Armstrong Remedial Plans. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to

perform their duties in retaliation against him for his ongoing litigation activities.

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Plaintiff alleges that on February 20, 2003, defendants Overly and Allison denied plaintiff’s

request for accommodations, exceeding the twenty-day deadline by one-hundred twenty days.

Plaintiff alleges the delay was retaliatory, and violated his right to due process, right of access to the

courts, and the Armstrong Remedial Plan.

Plaintiff alleges that he filed an inmate appeal to defendants Barbiero, Wu, Allison, and

Poshner regarding the preceding events. Plaintiff alleges that on March 14, 2003, defendants falsely

stated on the form that they had examined him personally. Plaintiff alleges defendants acted with

deliberate indifference, negligently, and in retaliation in handling his request for accommodations.

Plaintiff alleges he notified defendants Hansen, Grannis, Alameida, and Tilton of the

preceding events on March 20, 2003. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to investigate, correct,

and modify the violation of the Armstrong Remedial Plan by the institution-level defendants. 

a. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which would support a claim that defendants Barbiero,

Allison, McCant, Cotes, Appelbaum, Duvall, Arline, Aguillera-Morrero, Overly, Wu, Poshner, and

Does 1-10 “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. Defendants’ failure to respond to his requests within twenty days and defendant

Appelbaum’s failure to contact prison officials regarding the violation of the remedial plans do not

give rise to a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal

standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not

violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). These defendants were involved in

responding to plaintiff’s requests for accommodation and/or inmate appeals. “Section 1983 . . .

creates a cause of action for violations of the federal Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada

County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). “To the extent

that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches

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beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. No basis

for liability has been stated against them.

 b. Violation of the Plata and Armstrong Remedial Plans

Plaintiff may not pursue any claims in this action based on the alleged violation of the Plata

and Armstrong Remedial Plans. To the extent that plaintiff wishes to seek assistance that he believes

is due pursuant to either remedial plan, plaintiff “must pursue his request via the consent decree or

through class counsel.” Crayton v. Terhune, No. C 98-4386 CRB(PR), 2002 WL 31093590, *4

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002). Plaintiff may not sue for damages in this action solely on the basis that

defendants allegedly violated the remedial plans. Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. 

c. Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for

which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive

right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence,

it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.

Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve

as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

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Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in the inmate appeals process. Therefore,

defendants’ failure to process his appeals or requestsfor accommodation within the applicable time

constraints does not give rise to a claim for relief for violation of the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff’s

claim fails as a matter of law.

d. Denial of Access to the Courts Claim 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is utterly devoid of facts supporting a claim that defendants

violated his right of access to the courts. This claim fails as a matter of law.

e. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that any of these defendants retaliated against

him, in violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff has provided no factual support for his

conclusory allegation that defendants acted as they did in order to retaliate against him for his

litigation, and the courtfinds that failing to respond to plaintiff’s requests for accommodation within

twenty days and failing to contact prison officials (Deputy Attorney General Appelbaum) are not

adverse actions that raise constitutional concerns.

5. Defendants Figueroa, Zimmerman,Bollard, Ward, Duvall, Adams, Sanchez,

Yates, Cobbs, Dahlberg, Grannis, Alameida, and Schwarzenegger

Plaintiff alleges that he and eight other inmates filed a group appeal concerning law library

issues, retaliation, and interference with the right of access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges he was

required to overcome a motion for summary judgment without current caselaw or federal procedures

due to the library’s deficiencies, and was delayed in bringing this suit due to the deficiencies and to

retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges defendant Florence Cotes refused to log inmate appeals in retaliation against

plaintiff for petitioning the courts for redress. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Figueroa displayed

hostility toward him for petitioning for redress, and began a campaign of retaliation in early 2003.

Plaintiff alleges defendant refusing to copy legal documents and denied plaintiff paging services for

caselaw, services which were available to other inmates. Plaintiff alleges he was also denied access

to the law library despite having court deadlines, and his confidential legal papers were shared with

an inmate clerk, who was asked to threaten plaintiff into withdrawing his grievances.

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants Zimmerman, Bollard, Ward, and E. S. Cotes failed to train,

supervise, investigate and fire defendant Figueroa for his actions, in retaliation against plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Cotes refused to log or route plaintiff’s inmate appeal onto defendants

Zimmerman, Bollard, and Ward. Plaintiff alleges that when the appeal was finally received,

defendants all acknowledged that the library was so lacking in materials that it did not constitute a

library, although other libraries at the prison were fully stocked. Plaintiff alleges that defendants

intentionally deprived him of current materials to lessen his chance of success in his habeas petition

and civil rights action.

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Figueroa retaliated against plaintiff by telling other

inmates that plaintiff had lodged personal complaints against him, which subjected plaintiff to verbal

abuse and threats of violence.

a. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff’s amended complaint sets forth no facts supporting a claim that he was deprived of

a protected interest without due process of law, and therefore fails to state a claim for violation of

the Due Process Clause.

b. Denial of Access to the Courts

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 351 (1996). Law libraries and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access

to the courts. Id. Because inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or

legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s

law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate

claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual

injury. Id. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim that each of the named defendants

caused him to suffer an actual injurywith respect to his habeas petition or civil rights case. The right

of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate wishes to present, and is limited

to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. The State is not

required to enable the inmate to discover grievances or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. 

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c. Retaliation

With respect to defendants Florence Cotes and Figueroa, the actions complained of are

sufficient to give rise to claims under section 1983 for retaliation. However, plaintiff’s allegations

fall short of stating any cognizable retaliation claims against the other defendants. Defendants were

either supervisors over defendant Figueroa or involved in the inmate appeals process. Plaintiff has

not alleged any facts linking them to acts or omissions that rise to the level of an adverse action

within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004) (only retaliatory conduct that would objectively deter a similarly situated individual of

ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an adverse action for

a claim of retaliation; allegations that an officer referred to the plaintiff as an informant and that a

sergeant called the plaintiff a rat to his face do not constitute adverse actions and do not make out

claims of retaliation) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265,

267(9th Cir. 1997) (guards found guilty of charging inmate with a false rules violation and finding

him guilty in retaliation for inmate’s prior use of the grievance system); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d

802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (inmate alleged that he was transferred to a different prison and doublecelled in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866

F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (inmate alleged that officers labeled him a snitch for petitioning

prison and government officials for redress and that, because of this labeling, the inmate was

approached by other inmates and threatened with harm); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530-32

(9th Cir. 1985) (inmate alleged that he was reassigned out of a vocational class and transferred to

a different prison because of his activities as a jailhouse lawyer).

6. Defendants Overly, Barbiero, Allison, Bhatt, Santa Cruz, Cobbs, Duvall,

Alameida, Tilton, Schwarznegger, Does, Nguyen, Wu, Peneda, Bhatt, Ruff,

Allison, Wessel, Stocker, Grannis, Adams, and Cotes

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by Dr. White on December 4, 2002. Dr. White ordered that

plaintiff be brought back within a week for a full medical evaluation and ordered a refill for

plaintiff’s anti-seizure medication. Plaintiff alleges that the pharmacy staff did not refill the

medication. On December 15, 2002, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal requesting his refill and a

follow-up with defendant White. Defendant Overly responded to the appeal on February 10, 2003.

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Plaintiff alleges that it took him two monthsto get an appointment with Dr. White and to get a refill

of his medication, in violation of the Plata Remedial Plan. 

Plaintiff alleges that he had a medical condition which prevented him from swallowing well

and required that he be fed in his cell. Plaintiff alleges that as early as November of 2000,

defendants Barbiero, Allison, Bhatt, Santa Cruz, Cobbs, Duvall, Alameida, Tilton, and

Schwarznegger were aware of his condition. Plaintiff alleges that he had to file an inmate appeal in

order to get a “cell feed” chrono, which was issued three months later, on January 2, 2003, by

defendant Barbiero. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Santa Cruz and Cobbs intercepted the chrono

and cancelled the doctor’s orders, saying it was not staff’s responsibility to feed plaintiff. Plaintiff

alleges that on April 5, 2003, defendant McCant interviewed him and acknowledged it was an

ongoing problem.

Plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2003, he was seen by defendant Wu, who denied plaintiff

an extra mattress and a pillow for pain management, necessitated by plaintiff’s painful spinal disease,

arthritis, and bulging discs. Plaintiff alleges that his request was denied because custody staff would

not allow defendant Wu to make the recommendation until plaintiff was completely paralyzed.

Plaintiff alleges that either custodystaff was interferingwith medical decisions or defendant Wu was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s severe pain. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Wu also denied him

wrist braces or medical “unassignment” even though he had carpal tunnel syndrome and arthritis in

both hands. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Wu also retaliated against him by pushing him out of

Wu’s office when plaintiff asked Wu to check on the specialists whom it was recommended plaintiff

see.

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen on April 22, 2004, by a prison neurosurgeon, who

determined that plaintiff suffered from acute pain necessitating the use of a wheelchair, extra

mattresses, and a pillow for spinal disease, placement on permanently “unassigned” status, and

placement on chronic care pain management with Vicodin and epidural injections. On May 15, 2

2003, plaintiff was seen by defendant Dr. Peneda, who examined plaintiff and contradicted what the

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neurosurgeon recommended, stating that plaintiff needed no medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that

up to 2006, this report was used by staff to deny plaintiff’s obvious medical need for chronic pain

management and referrals.

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by defendant Dr. Nguyen on July 18, 2003, for review of

the GI specialist’s report, and to revisit the issues of wheelchair use, pain management, medical

disability status, extra mattress and pillow, and referrals to a orthopedist, dietician, and pain

management clinic. Plaintiff alleges that defendant refused to look at any of the specialists’ reports,

and told plaintiff his routine blood work was acceptable and to get out of his office.

Plaintiff alleges that he went to see defendant Nguyen in August of 2003 for a renewal of his

prescriptions, including for anti-seizure medication and interferon. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

refused to see him and he did not get his prescriptions renewed or a new appointment for weeks,

despite MTA Green informing defendant that plaintiff’s anti-seizure and interferon prescriptions had

expired.

Plaintiff alleges that on September 15, 2003, he saw defendant Nguyen regarding the side

effects of Rebetol, which was prescribed for plaintiff’s Hepatitis C and was causing plaintiff to be

bedridden. Plaintiff alleges that defendant became hostile, refused to open his medical file, berated

him for reducing his dosage on his own, and ordered plaintiff out of his office.

Plaintiff alleges that despite numerous complaints about defendant Nguyen from the entire

facility, supervisory personnel refused to train, counsel, or remove him.

a. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

1) Cell Feeding Chrono - Defendants Overly, Barbiero, Allison,

Bhatt, Santa Cruz, Cobbs, Duvall, Alamedia, Tilton,

Schwarznegger, and Does

As previously set forth, “[d]eliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391

F.3d at 1060. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

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290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff’s allegations relating to the defendants’ failure to

honor and/or interference with his chrono for cell feeding do not support a claim that defendants

Overly, Barbiero, Allison, Bhatt, Santa Cruz, Cobbs, Duvall, Alamedia, Tilton, Schwarznegger, and

the Does “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837 (emphasis added).

2) Treatment for Chronic Pain and Medical Issues - Defendants

Nguyen, Wu, Peneda, Bhatt, Ruff, Allison, Wessel, Stocker,

Grannis, Adams, Cotes, Alameida, Tilton, and

Schwarzenegger

Although the court is mindful that “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and

prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim,” Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted), and a difference of opinion

between medical personnel regarding treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference, Sanchez

v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989), under federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants Nguyen, Wu, and Peneda

for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court finds that plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged

a link between defendant Bhatt and the conditions complained of. However, plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations concerning defendants Ruff, Allison, Wessel, Stocker, Grannis, Adams, Cotes, Alameida,

Tilton, and Schwarzenegger are insufficient to support a claim of deliberate indifference under the

Eighth Amendment. 

7. Defendants Alameida, Tilton, Schwarzenegger, Orth, Holmes, Duvall,

Adams, Grannis, Henry, Frost, Lee, Puguese, Gomez, Mendoza, and Aguilar

Plaintiff alleges that defendants refused boxes of religious books sent to him directly by the

publisher on more than one occasion. Plaintiff appealed the issue but was informed that officials had

authority to deny receipt of anything they chose to and that no process was due prior to destruction

of the material. Plaintiff alleges he was told Seventh Day Adventist material must come through a

Seventh Day Adventist prison chaplain but there was none. Plaintiff alleges that although it was

conceded there was a five book limit for material received by Seventh Day Adventist stores and

publishers, he has not received any compensation for the material destroyed. Plaintiff alleges that

following defendant Orth’s concession regarding the five book limit, he paid $150.00 for an order

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of religious books, but they were destroyed without notification to him, and the publisher’s letter to

him was returned as unauthorized correspondence. Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of the First

Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the

Rehabilitation Act.

a. First Amendment Right to Receive Mail

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are

analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91

(1987). Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the

reasonableness of the regulation, court must consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a

“valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward

to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the impact that the

“accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,” and (4)

“the absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not allowed to receive any religious publications is

sufficient to support a claim for relief under section 1983. However, plaintiff has not set forth

sufficient facts linking the named defendants to the deprivation. Section 1983 plainly requires that

there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation

alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466

F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he

‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal

participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by others which the

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actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id.

(quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff may not list numerous defendants and then assert in conclusory fashion that

“defendants” were responsible for violating his rights. Section 1983 requires linkage between the

actions or omissions complained of and the individual defendant. If plaintiff is asserting a

regulation, policy, or procedure is constitutionally deficient, he should (1) identify the regulation,

policy, or procedure, (2) identify who was involved in promulgating or enforcing the regulation,

policy, or procedure, and (3) identify which actions or omissions the defendant made that establish

the requisite link. Instead, plaintiff fills pages unnecessarilyargumentative and repetitive facts. This

will be plaintiff’s final opportunity to amend, so plaintiff is encouraged to focus on his claims, set

them forth simply and succinctly, and link the named defendants to the claim clearly and specifically.

b. RLUIPA Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants

substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,

994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff meets his burden, defendants must demonstrate that “any

substantial burden of [plaintiff’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of

protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. 

Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim for violation of RLUIPA and has not

set forth sufficient facts linking actions or omissions of named defendants to the alleged violation

of his rights under RLUIPA.

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c. Property Possession Regulation - Rehabilitation Act and First

Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the regulation restricting inmates to six cubic feet of property in their

cells violates his rights under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) because it limits his access to learning

material that will allow him to grow and be productive in the world, and violates his rights under the

First Amendment because it infringes on his right to own rehabilitative material.

“[Section] 504 of the RA . . . prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability,” Lovell

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), and provides that “no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ,” 29 U. S. C. § 794. “To establish a violation of

§ 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped within the meaning of the RA;

(2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the benefit or

services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit or services

receives federal financial assistance.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that the regulation permitting inmates only six cubic feet of property in

their cells violates his rights under the RA is patently frivolous.

With respect to the First Amendment, plaintiff has supplied no basis for such a claim. The

fact that plaintiff is required to exercise discretion in choosing which property he keeps with him in

his cell does not offend the Constitution.

8. Due Process Claim Arising from Resolution of Inmate Appeal

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal concerning the rejection of his publication orders and alleges

a due process claim stemming from the consideration of his appeal. This claim fails as a matter of

law because plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in his inmate appeal. Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). The resolution of plaintiff’s inmate appeal provides no

basis for the imposition of liability against defendants under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997

F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). 

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9. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ position that religious publishers must be pre-approved

vendors violates the Equal Protection Clause. “The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).

“Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s

protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City

of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). “Where the challenged

governmental policy is ‘facially neural,’ proof of its disproportionate impact on an identifiable group

can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory

purpose underlies the policy.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 687 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (264-66) (1977) (internal citations omitted)). “The mere fact that

[a] facially neutral polic[y] had a foreseeably disproportionate impact on an identifiable group does

not mean that [it] violated the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 687. 

Plaintiff has set forth no facts that support a claim that he was intentionally discriminated

against on the basis of being a Seventh Day Adventist.

10. Miscellaneous Religious Claims

Plaintiff’s final “claim” involves a myriad of subclaims, all relating to religion. Once again,

plaintiff attempts to draw in as defendants the individuals who responded to hisinmate appeal. This

is not a sufficient basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983. The fact that an

individual reads and responds to plaintiff’s appeal of a problem does not work to place that

individual in the shoes of the person who allegedly directly violated plaintiff’s rights. If there is a

regulation, policy, or practice that is leading to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

plaintiff should identify the regulation, policy, or practice, identify who was responsible for creating

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or enforcing the regulation, policy, or practice, and briefly describe the culpable defendant’s

involvement.

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states some cognizable claims for relief under section 1983.

However, plaintiff’s amended complaint sets forth many deficient claims, largely due to plaintiff’s

failure to adequately link the violation of his rights to specific acts or omission of individual

defendants. Plaintiff will be provided with one final opportunity to amend. 

Between this order and the order filed on February 24, 2006, plaintiff has been provided with

all of the applicable legal standards. Plaintiff is reminded that he should not rely on legal citations

or legal argument to support his claims. Plaintiff is required to clearly, plainly, and briefly set forth

his legal claims, and then set forth sufficient supporting facts to link specific acts or omissions of the

named defendants to the violation of his rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The claims found to be

cognizable by the court exemplify the type of information necessary to state a claim (e.g., plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment medical care claims against defendants Nguyen, Wu, and Peneda). Plaintiff’s

final claim, beginning at paragraph sixty-five, exemplifies what plaintiff should avoid - paragraphs

devoted to legal argument and legal citations with many extraneous, immaterial facts, and lacking

in a focused explanation as to what violation occurred and who caused the violation to occur. For

example, if plaintiff’s religion mandates Saturday worship as a major tenant of plaintiff’s religion,

and plaintiff was not provided with the opportunity to participate in any Saturday worship services,

in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and/or RLUIPA, what was the basis

for the denial or the lack of availability of Saturday services? Is there a written policy or regulation,

or is someone like the prison warden responsible for providing an equal opportunity to worship for

all religions but has not done so? 

Critical to plaintiff’s ability to proceed in this action on his claims is plaintiff’s willingness

to describe, simply and in a straightforward manner, the basis of the violation and the involvement

of the each named defendant. The fact that plaintiff separated his claims and made an attempt to

identify the involved defendants at the outset of each claim was helpful in allowing the court to 

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screen his complaint and plaintiff should stick with that format or a similar one that makes it clear

what the claims are and who the involved defendants are.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, filed December 20, 2006, is

DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a complaint form;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint that complies with the directives in this order; and

5. If plaintiff failsto file a second amended complaint within thirty days, this action will

be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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