Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01496/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01496-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sonja L. Lewis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social

Security Administration,

Defendant. _________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV-06-1496-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Application for Award of Attorney’s Fees

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, filed September 10, 2007. [Doc. No. 22] Defendant

responded on September 28, 2007 [Doc. No. 23], and Plaintiff filed a Reply on October 4,

2007. [Doc. No. 24] After considering the parties' briefs, the Court now issues the following

Order.

Petitioner requests an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act

("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which provides:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a

prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in

addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party

in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings

for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States

in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust. 

Case 2:06-cv-01496-SMM Document 25 Filed 10/26/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Petitioner requested 23.3 (2006-2007) hours x 154.08 hourly fee (plus an additional

2 hours for a reply brief and $350.00 in Court fees) = $4202.00. The Court finds this

calculation to be incorrect.

2

The national CPI-U, rather than the regional CPI-U, is the proper source from which

to determine the COLA in this case, given Ninth Circuit case law and the statutory language

of the EAJA. See Jawad v. Barnhart, 370 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1080-89 (S.D. Cal. 2005)

(examining Ninth Circuit and out-of-circuit case law and concluding that utilizing the

national CPI-U is consistent with controlling case law and the clear language of the EAJA).

- 2 -

More specifically, Petitioner applies for $ 4,248.221

 representing EAJA fees for 25.3 hours

of work and court costs of $ 350.00. Attorney fees shall not exceed “$125 per hour unless the

court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved justifies a higher fee." The fee

award requested in the pending case does not exceed the statutory rate specified in the EAJA,

adjusted for cost of living increases. 

To determine the cost-of-living adjustment ("COLA"), courts multiply the basic EAJA

rate ($125 per hour) by the current consumer price index for urban consumers ("CPI-U")2

, and

then divide the product by the CPI-U in the month the statutory cap ($125 per hour) was

imposed. The quotient is the enhanced hourly rate. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148

(9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the hourly rate adjusted for cost-of-living in this case for 25.3

hours of work performed in 2006-2007 is $154.08, for a total fee of $3,898.22. 

In its Response, the Commissioner did not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

However, the Commissioner requests that the award, if any, be “moderately reduced to reflect

the limited degree of success in the remand...” and that the payment of the EAJA fees be made

to Plaintiff. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for fees is reasonable. First,

Defendant made no determination of the exact number of hours that he considered to be

reasonable. The Commissioner simply asserted that less time should have been spent, and thus

counsel’s fee should be reduced. The Court is not persuaded by this mere conclusory

statement.

Case 2:06-cv-01496-SMM Document 25 Filed 10/26/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Both Gilbrook and Pony construe 42 U.S.C. § 1988 but they are relevant here

because Section 1988 is the state “counterpart” of EAJA, West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc.

v Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 113 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1991), and federal “prevailing

party” fee-shifting statutes should be interpreted consistently. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983).

- 3 -

With regard to the payment of EAJA fees, there are two cases in the Ninth Circuit that

govern the right to collect EAJA fees. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839,

874-5 (9th Cir. 1999)(payment must be directed to Plaintiff in absence of assignment); see

also Pony v. County of Los Angeles, 433 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (right to collect fees

may be assigned) Gilbrook addressed the question of whether the payment of an EAJA award

may be made to counsel rather than the Plaintiff. Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 872. The Plaintiffs’

attorney argued that the district court had erred “by ordering payment of [an EAJA award]

directly to Plaintiffs, instead of directly to counsel.” Id. [W]hile it is undoubtedly true that

Congress expected fee shifting to attract competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of

their [] rights,” it did not “bestow[] fee awards upon attorneys.” Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 873

(citing Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-32, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 89 L. Ed.2d 747 (1986)).

Thus, under current Ninth Circuit precedent, an attorney in this circuit is not entitled to the

direct payment of § 1988 attorney fees.3

Absent a valid assignment, attorney fees awarded pursuant to a federal fee-shifting

statute like the EAJA must be paid to the Plaintiff. See Pony, 433 F.3d at 1145 (while a

Plaintiff “can transfer the right to collect attorney’s fees [under § 1988], she may not transfer

the right to seek or waive them” because seeking or waiving fees is a substantive cause of

action that cannot be assigned) (emphasis in original); see also Gilbrook, 177F.3d at 875

(direct payment to attorney denied in absence of assignment). 

Defendant reiterates that he does not object to delivering payment into the custody of

counsel so long as Plaintiff’s attorney submits a fee agreement with an assignment clause or

Case 2:06-cv-01496-SMM Document 25 Filed 10/26/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

See p. 3 supra.

- 4 -

an affidavit indicating Plaintiff’s intent to assign fees as requested by the Commissioner, who

is willing to waive strict compliance with the Anti-Assignment Act. [Doc. No. 23].

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Application for Award of Attorney’s

Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act [Doc. No. 22] is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED insofar as Petitioner

will be awarded the full amount of fees as calculated by the Court. The Motion is DENIED

insofar as the award will only be paid directly to Petitioner when and if the Commissioner

receives the necessary assignment of the award.4

 Otherwise, payment will be made directly

to Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $3,898.22 in attorney's fees

and $350.00 in court costs for a total award of $ 4,248.22.

DATED this 26th day of October, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-01496-SMM Document 25 Filed 10/26/07 Page 4 of 4