Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01267/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01267-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Sy Lee Castle, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

M. Knowles, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 1-08-01267-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants Fisher, Knowles, and Phillips’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. # 32); and Plaintiff’s Motion To File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 41).

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and denies

Plaintiff’s request to file a second amended complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). Plaintiff

alleges that he has a permanent mobility impairment in his lower extremities. Plaintiff is a

participant in the Disability Placement Program at KVSP. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

violated the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) when they failed to install wheelchair

accessible table and exercise equipment on the KVSP yard at the same time similar

equipment was installed for non-handicapped inmates.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 5, 2006, he sent request for interview forms to

Defendants Knowles, Fisher, and Phillips about the lack of tables, benches, and exercise

Case 1:08-cv-01267-JAT Document 52 Filed 06/03/10 Page 1 of 7
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equipment for disabled inmates. Plaintiff also sent similar requests to Defendants Sather and

Starr on October 10, 2006. Plaintiff also filed a request for accommodation/administrative

appeal. In November 2008, Plaintiff received a first level response that partially granted his

appeal by informing Plaintiff that accommodating tables and exercise equipment would be

ordered and installed. Plaintiff then appealed and received a second level response on

February 21, 2007, wherein Plaintiff was informed that the tables had already been installed,

and that his appeal was granted in that a modification order would be generated to ensure the

placement of accessible exercise bars. Plaintiff then appealed and received a Director’s

Level Appeal Decision on April 11, 2007. Plaintiff’s appeal was denied because the exercise

equipment was installed and the equipment was accessible for wheelchair inmates.

In August 2008, Plaintiff filed the present action. Defendants now seek to have

Plaintiff’s amended complaint dismissed.

II. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts

alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States,

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234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has pronounced a “policy

of liberal construction in favor of pro se litigants.” Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th

Cir. 1998). This Court must construe Plaintiff’s complaint liberally and afford Plaintiff the

benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

However, the status of pro se “does not relieve the party of the burden of alleging sufficient

facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based. Bald assertions and conclusions of

law will not suffice.” Kerr v. Wanderer & Wanderer, 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D. Nev. 2002)

(citation omitted). As such, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege sufficient facts to

support a claim for violation of the ADA. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on

the basis of an individual’s disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.

2002). A state prison is a “public entity” within the meaning of the ADA and, as such, Title

II is applicable to state prisons. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). In

order to state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is

an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is qualified to participate in or receive the

benefit of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services,

programs, or activities; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by

reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not properly alleged that he has a qualifying

disability. In the context of the ADA, Congress has defined the term “disability” as “(A) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of

such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff alleges that he has a mobility impairment

of his lower extremities, that he has been placed in the disability placement program at

KVSP, and that he is a full-time wheelchair user. “Major life activies” under the ADA

include walking, standing, lifting, and bending, among others. The Court finds that, given

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the liberal construal of pro se pleadings, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the

first element of a Title II claim.

Defendant next argues that he has failed to allege that he was personally deprived of

access to a governmental service, program, or activity. Personal participation is required to

sustain a Title II claim, and Plaintiff’s pleadings satisfy this requirement. While Plaintiff

may not include a draconian allegation along the lines of “I was personally deprived of

access to a governmental service, program, or activity,” it is clear that the lack of

accommodations Plaintiff complains of stem from his personal participation; or, perhaps

more accurately, his inability to participate because of the alleged violations of Title II. It

is clear from Plaintiff’s amended complaint that he was personally deprived of access within

the meaning of the ADA.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of the

ADA because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.

The Court agrees. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he seeks only monetary damages against

Defendants for their alleged ADA violations. In order to recover monetary damages under

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the

defendant. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to

prove intentional discrimination under Title II, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted

with deliberate indifference. “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm

to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the

likelihood.” Id. at 1139. In order to satisfy the second element of the deliberate indifference

test, a failure to act cannot result from conduct that is mere negligence; rather, it must involve

an element of deliberateness. Id.

Here, even assuming Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the deliberate

indifference test, Plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the requirement that Defendant, with

deliberateness, failed to act. Plaintiff sought, through the administrative appeal process, the

installation of tables, dip bars, and pull up bars on the yard that would be accessible to the

disabled. Each of these requests were granted, and as Plaintiff recognizes, KVSP now has

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1

 Although from the record it appears that Defendant Sather has yet to be properly

served and, hence, has not moved to dismiss, the Court finds Defendant Sather is in a similar

position to the moving Defendants, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Sather suffers

the same infirmities as discussed above. As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant Sather. Abigninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir.

2008) (“A [d]istrict [c]ourt may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to

defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar

to that of moving defendants.”). Defendant Stark has also moved to join in the motion to

dismiss (Doc. # 47). Thus, the Court will dismiss this action against all Defendants. Further,

the Court has learned that the subpoenas used to obtain the address for Defendant Sather

have been misplaced. However, in light of the Court dismissing this action in its entirety and

against all Defendants, the Court shall vacate its February 2, 2010 Order (Doc. # 49) and

April 30, 2010 Order (Doc. # 51) to the extent they require the Marshals to return the

subpoenas decus tecum and serve Defendant Sather. The Court will also vacate the

requirement that the Marshals file a status report concerning the subpoenas.

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tables and exercise equipment on the yard for the disabled. At each stage of the appeal

process, Plaintiff’s complaints were investigated. Although Plaintiff’s requests regarding the

tables and exercise equipment were not instantaneously granted, the timing of Defendants’

responses to Plaintiff’s requests were not unreasonable. Plaintiff filed his request for

accommodation in October 2006. As of at least February 2007, the tables were installed; and

as of at least April 2007, the exercise equipment had been installed, along with the laying of

decomposed granite around the exercise equipment to make such equipment accessible for

wheelchair inmates. The administrative appeals process demonstrates a steady effort on the

part of Defendants to bring about Plaintiff’s requested changes. Based upon Plaintiff’s own

allegations, at no time did Defendants fail to act, much less with the deliberateness that is

required to recover monetary damages under Title II. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim for monetary damages under Title II.1

Therefore, because the only relief Plaintiff seeks is monetary damages under Title II,

and Plaintiff having failed to allege deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants, the

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Title II.

III. Motion to Amend Complaint

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff seeks leave to add

additional Defendants to this action, and does not substantively alter his allegations made in

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the first amended complaint. Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so

requires.” FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2). Whether to grant a motion to amend depends on the

following factors: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4)

futility of amendment, and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. W.

Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court finds that

the first, third, fourth, and fifth factors weigh against allowing the amendment. Nearly

fifteen months elapsed from the filing of the original complaint until the filing of Plaintiff’s

motion to file a second amended complaint. Moreover, Defendants will suffer prejudice

from this undue delay, and they will also be prejudiced by having to file yet another round

of motions to dismiss on a complaint that only adds new Defendants. As discussed above,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a viable claim. Plaintiff’s proposed second

amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies discussed above. Finally, Plaintiff has

already amended his complaint. For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to file

a second amended complaint.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 32) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall dismiss this case with

prejudice against all Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion To File Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. # 41) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Permission to File

Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response to the Opposition Motion (Doc. # 43), which

appears to be a request to file a sur-reply, is denied. The Court does not ordinarily permit the

filing of a sur-reply, and Plaintiff states no basis for deviating from this practice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for a Nunc Pro Tunc

Extension of Time to File Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File A Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. # 44) is denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating those portions of the February 2, 2010 Order

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(Doc. # 49) and April 30, 2010 Order (Doc. # 51) to the extent they require the Marshals to

return the subpoenas decus tecum, serve Defendant Sather, and file a status report concerning

the subpoenas.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in

favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and close this case.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2010.

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