Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06526/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06526-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. VALOFF,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01-CV-6526-OWW-LJO-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED

(Doc. 36)

I. Findings and Recommendations

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Peter Brown (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s

original complaint, filed August 30, 2000, in the United States District Court for the Central District.

Following service on defendant Valoff (“defendant”), this action was transferred to this court. On

January 27, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 36-38.) Defendant filed

an opposition on March 16, 2006, and plaintiff filed a reply on March 31, 2006. (Docs. 41, 42, 46.)

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

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file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the moving party’s burden to establish that

there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). 

“When the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the issue, he need show only

that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259

(6th Cir. 1986) (quoting from W. Schwarzer,Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining

Issues of Material Fact 99 F.R.D. 465, 487 (1984)). “But where the moving party has the burden -

the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense - his showing must be

sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving

party.” Id. Here, plaintiff must demonstrate there is no triable issue as to the matters alleged in his

complaint. Id. This requires plaintiff to establish beyond controversy every essential element of his

excessive force claim. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s

evidence is judged by the same standard of proof applicable at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 

C. Undisputed Facts

1. At all relevant times, plaintiff Brown was an inmate in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections (CDC), and incarcerated at California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility/State Prison (SATF), Corcoran, California.

2. At all relevant times, defendant Valoff was employed in a position of authority over plaintiff

by CDC as a Correctional Officer and worked at SATF.

3. At all relevant times, defendant was trained by CDC in the use of chemical agent O.C. Spray

(Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3277) and trained in the use of force (Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, §

3279).

4. On February 24, 1999, at approximately 3:40 p.m., there was an incident involving plaintiff

and defendant. 

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 Defendant’s objection to these facts as irrelevant is rejected. The court has observed that in cases

involving claims such as this where the defendants are the moving parties, the state often tenders in support of their

motions undisputed, material facts involving disciplinary violations, hearings, and findings of guilt. For this reason,

the court is disinclined to view defendant’s protestations of irrelevancy with favor. 

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 The court notes that in his complaint, plaintiff alleges that his excessive force claim is brought pursuant to

the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The screening order issued by the

Central District did not specifically identify plaintiff’s claim or mention the legal basis for plaintiff’s claim. The

complaint sets forth a claim based on the use of excessive force. For convicted prisoners, such a claim is brought

pursuant to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment rather than the Due Process or

Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the complaint sets forth only an excessive force

claim and there are no facts alleged which support a due process or an equal protection claim, this action shall be

treated as one brought for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

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5. During the incident, defendant applied a burst of pepper spray to plaintiff’s face and eyes.

6. Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report (CDC-115) for battery on a peace officer.

7. A finding was made that the preponderance of the evidence at the hearing did not

substantiate the charge against plaintiff and the Rules Violation Report was dismissed in the

interest of justice.1

8. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal grieving the incident. The appeal was investigated by the

Office of Internal Affairs, and plaintiff’s allegation of unnecessary force was sustained.

D. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim2

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on February 24, 1999, defendant used excessive force

against him. (Comp., § E; Exhibit B-2.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant assaulted him and used

pepper spray on him, which led plaintiff to develop three spots in his left eye. (Id.)

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause [of the Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is

. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7. 

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“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not

end it.” Id. “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Id. at 8. “The objective component of

an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of

decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make

out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim,” and “deliberate indifference to

medical needs” violates the Eighth Amendment “only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Id. at 9 (citation

omitted). With respect to these types of claims, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty

that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth

Amendment violation.” Id. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted). With respect to excessive force

claims, however, the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary

standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard

examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)).

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his excessive force claim.

Plaintiff argues that no cause existed to use of force against him.

The parties do not dispute that an incident occurred between plaintiff and defendant on

February 24, 1999, which resulted in defendant applying a burst of pepper spray to plaintiff’s face

and eyes. (Undisputed Facts 4, 5.) Following the incident, defendant issued plaintiff a Rules

Violation Report (CDC-115) for battery on a peace officer. (U.F. 6.)

Plaintiff contends that during the incident, defendant closed a distance of approximately ten

to fifteen feet in order to get to plaintiff, and then started poking plaintiff in order to provoke plaintiff

into pushing defendant’s hands away. (Doc. 37, P’s Fact Stmt., ¶¶5, 6.) Plaintiff contends that

defendant sprayed him in the face and eyes with pepper spray without cause while he was sitting on

the floor against a railing in a submissive manner. (Id., ¶¶7, 8.) Plaintiff contends that following

the incident, he developed vision problems, including three spots in his left eye, and must wear

glasses. (Id., ¶¶ 21-23.) 

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Plaintiff contends that defendant falsely charged him with battery on a peace officer, and that

the Rules Violation Report included many false allegations. (Id., ¶¶9, 10.) Subsequently, a finding

was made that the preponderance of the evidence at the hearing did not substantiate the charge

against plaintiff and the Rules Violation Report was dismissed in the interest of justice. (U.F. 7.)

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal grieving the incident. (U.F. 8.) The appeal was investigated by the

Office of Internal Affairs, and plaintiff’s allegation of unnecessary force was sustained. (Id.)

Defendant argues that there are triable issues of fact which preclude granting plaintiff’s

motion. Defendant disputes much of plaintiff’s version of events. Defendant contends that he was

on the lower tier retrieving a mattress from a cell when plaintiff began yelling at him from the upper

tier. (Valoff Dec., ¶¶4-7.) Defendant contends that he told plaintiff to come downstairs if plaintiff

needed to speak to him and plaintiff did so. (Id., ¶¶8, 9.) Defendant contends that plaintiff came

within one foot of him, refused to back away when instructed to do so, almost immediately returned

to within one foot of defendant after being pushed away by defendant, and ignored repeated orders

to step back. (Id., ¶¶9-11, 13.) Defendant contends that plaintiff was close enough to strike or headbutt him, and he felt uncomfortable, becoming fearful for his safety when his orders were not having

an effect on plaintiff. (Id., ¶¶10, 12, 14.) Defendant contends that he again pushed plaintiff away

and at no time poked him. (Id., ¶¶14, 15.) Defendant contends that when he pushed plaintiff away,

plaintiff struck his hand sharply. (Id., ¶16.) Defendant contends he stepped back, drew his baton,

sounded his personal alarm, and ordered all the inmates to get down. (Id.) 

Defendant contends that the main purpose in ordering an inmate to get down is to make it

difficult for the inmate to assume a fighting position. (Id., ¶19.) Defendant contends that plaintiff

did not get down as instructed and after repeated instructions to get down, assumed a squatting

position, similar to that of a pitcher in baseball, with clenched fists. (Id., ¶¶17, 18.) Defendant

contends that, believing plaintiff’s squatting position was unsatisfactory, he again instructed him to

get down, but plaintiff remained squatting. (Id., ¶20.) Defendant contends that he did not hear

plaintiff state that he could not get down because he has a bad back, and did not see any other

officers in the building after he sounded his alarm. (Id., ¶¶21, 22.) Defendant contends he felt

vulnerable to attack, warned plaintiff that he would apply pepper spray if plaintiff did not comply,

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and then applied a burst of pepper spray for approximately one second to plaintiff’s face and eyes

after plaintiff failed to comply. (Id., ¶¶22-24.) Defendant contends that plaintiff then laid on his side

and no other force was used. (Id., ¶25.) Defendant contends that he did not strike any blows and

used the minimum force necessary, which he thought was necessary to bring plaintiff under control

and cause him to comply with defendant’s orders. (Id., ¶27.)

In his reply, plaintiff objects to the consideration of defendant’s declaration, contending that

defendant’s declaration is not based on personal knowledge and does not “show” defendant’s

competency to testify. (Doc. 46, Reply, § I.) It is clear from reading defendant’s declaration that it

is based on his personal observation and interpretation of the events at issue. There is no question

that defendant was an eye and ear witness to these events and is competent to testify in that capacity

based on his personal knowledge. Defendant’s declaration meets the requirement of Rule 56(e), and

the court is not persuaded otherwise.

Plaintiff also contends that because the declaration was submitted with an electronic

signature, counsel was required to state that he has the signed original. (Id., § I.) Local Rule 7-

131(f). Plaintiff is correct that defendant’s counsel failed to comply with this particular provision

of the rule. The court’s resources are taxed as it is and this sort of hyper-technical objection serves

only to further tax the court’s resources by requiring defendant’s counsel to cure the deficiency

which has caused no prejudice. If plaintiff had a good faith basis for believing the declaration was

falsified in some manner or submitted without defendant’s knowledge and permission, the court

would view the objection differently. However, the fact that plaintiff disagrees with defendant’s

version of events as set forth in the declaration and believes that defendant is not being truthful in

his declaration does not bring into question the authenticity of the declaration itself. The court

declines to preclude defendant’s declaration. Defendant’s counsel is hereby alerted to the provision

and, in a separate order, shall be directed to cure the deficiency. 

Finally, plaintiff’s objection that defendant’s documentary evidence was not authenticated

is rejected. (Id., § II.) The exhibits are sufficiently authenticated via defendant’s counsel’s

declaration. Regardless, consideration or lack thereof of these documents is irrelevant to resolution

of the pending motion. As set forth in the following paragraph, the denial of plaintiff’s motion is

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compelled by defendant’s declaration alone, regardless of the existence of other evidence in support

of defendant’s position.

The court rejects plaintiff’s contention in his reply that his motion should be granted because

the dispute raised by defendant is not genuine and no reasonable jury could return a verdict for

defendant. (Id., § IV.) The court may not grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because

plaintiff has a larger stack of evidence. Thus, the submission by plaintiff of evidence beyond his

own declaration in support of his motion, such as the dismissal of the Rules Violation Report and

the sustainment of his allegation of excessive force by internal affairs, is not dispositive. Defendant

has submitted evidence bringing into dispute plaintiff’s version of events. The evidence of

defendant, as the opposing party, is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of

defendant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). Defendant’s declaration

creates a triable issue of fact. The court cannot choose to believe plaintiff’s version of events over

defendant’s version of events on summary judgment. It is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence

and make credibility determinations. Accordingly, because there are material issues of fact in

dispute in this matter, plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his excessive force

claim against defendant.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that there exist disputes over material issues of fact

which preclude plaintiff from entitlement to summary judgment. Accordingly, the court HEREBY

RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed January27, 2006, beDENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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