Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00715-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABE BEAUPERTHUY, et al. on behalf

of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

24 HOUR FITNESS USA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness; SPORT AND FITNESS

CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC., a

California corporation d/b/a 24

Hour Fitness,

Defendants.

 

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No. 06-0715 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR

FACILITATED NOTICE

PURSUANT TO

29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a Motion by Plaintiffs John Davidsson et

al. ("Plaintiffs" or "Trainers") for Facilitated Notice to Class

of Personal Trainers and for Bifurcation of Issues for Trial

("Motion"). Docket No. 160. The Motion seeks conditional

certification of a collective action under section 16(b) of the

Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., tolling

of the statute of limitations, approval of the proposed form of

notice, and bifurcation of the trials for the different classes

involved in this matter. See id. Defendants 24 Hour Fitness USA,

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Inc., and Sport and Fitness Clubs of America, Inc., (collectively

"24 Hour Fitness" or "Defendants") opposed the Motion and

Plaintiffs replied. See Docket Nos. 186, 189. 

Having considered all of the parties' submissions, the Court

conditionally certifies the Personal Trainers Class and tolls the

statute of limitations, but does not approve of the proposed form

of notice and denies the request to bifurcate the trial.

II. BACKGROUND

This case has its roots in an action filed in the Southern

District of California on October 29, 2003, Boyce v. Sports and

Fitness Clubs of America, No. 03-CV-2140 ("Boyce"). The

plaintiffs in Boyce originally sought to conditionally certify an

FLSA collective action on behalf of a nationwide class of former

24 Hour Fitness employees. Before the court in Boyce ruled on the

motion to certify the class, the parties reached a settlement

which applied only to former 24 Hour Fitness employees who had

worked in California. Boyce Docket No. 204. Plaintiffs then

brought this suit on behalf of former 24 Hour Fitness employees

who worked in states other than California. See Compl., Docket

No. 1.

Plaintiffs previously moved to conditionally certify an

"omnibus class" containing multiple sub-classes, including a

Managers Class, a Commission-Based Class, and an Hourly Employees

Class. See Docket No. 69 at 1. The Court conditionally certified

the Managers Class, but did not certify the entire omnibus class

or the other two sub-classes. Order Granting in Part and Denying

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1

Plaintiffs originally sought to include the Assistant Fitness

Manager and Fitness Manager Active (nonexempt) in this list, but

agreed in their Reply to remove those two job titles from the

proposed class. Reply at 10-11.

3

in Part Pls.' Mot. for Facilitated Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

216(b) ("First FLSA Order"), Docket No. 124, at 12-13. 

The Plaintiffs now ask the Court to conditionally certify a

class of Personal Trainers. For the purposes of this Motion,

"Personal Trainers" includes the 24 Hour Fitness job titles PT

Trainer, Certified Personal Trainer ("CPT"), CPT I, CPT II, CPT

III, CPT Elite, Trainer Fit Pro ("TFP"), TFP I, TFP II, TFP III,

TFP Elite, FLS, Apex Tech, Fitness Instructor, and Floor

Instructor. Mot. at ii n.1.1

 This proposed class contains the

same job titles as those included in the definition of "Personal

Trainer" in the Boyce settlement, which was approved by the court

in January 2006. Boyce Docket No. 204. The Proposed Personal

Trainers class includes only those who worked for 24 Hour Fitness

outside of California, and excludes anyone who recovered in Boyce.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Conditional Certification

Plaintiffs request that the Court conditionally certify a

class of Personal Trainers. For the following reasons, the Court

finds that conditional certification is appropriate, and GRANTS

Plaintiffs' Motion. 

1. Legal Standard

Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides employees with a private

right of action to sue an employer for violations of the Act "for

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and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees

similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). To join an FLSA

"collective action" as a plaintiff, an employee must affirmatively

opt in by filing a written "consent to join" in the court where

the action is pending. See id.

A majority of courts, including district courts in this

circuit, have adopted a two-stage certification procedure for

collective actions brought under the FLSA. See, e.g., Adams v.

Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 06-5428 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

26881, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007); Gerlach v. Wells Fargo

& Co., No. 05-585 CW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. March 28, 2006); Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224

F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Wynn v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 234 F.

Supp. 2d 1067, 1082-84 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Thiessen v. Gen.

Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001)). At

the first stage, the district court approves conditional

certification upon a minimal showing that the members of the

proposed class are "similarly situated"; at the second stage,

usually initiated by a motion to decertify, the court engages in a

more searching review. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467. 

The FLSA does not define "similarly situated," and the Ninth

Circuit has not spoken to the issue. The Supreme Court, in

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), also left

the term undefined, but indicated that a proper collective action

encourages judicial efficiency by addressing in a single

proceeding claims of multiple plaintiffs who share "common issues

of law and fact arising from the same alleged [prohibited]

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activity." Id. at 170. This has been distilled by lower courts

into a requirement that a proponent for conditional certification

present the court with "nothing more than substantial allegations

that the putative class members were together the victims of a

single decision, policy, or plan." Thiesen, 267 F.3d at 1102

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Gerlach, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823 at *6-7. Given that a motion for

conditional certification usually comes before much, if any,

discovery, and is made in anticipation of a later more searching

review, a movant bears a very light burden in substantiating its

allegations at this stage. See, e.g., Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at

467; Aguayo v. Oldenkamp Trucking, No. 04-6279, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 22190, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (disregarding hearsay

and foundational challenges to declarations submitted in support

of motion for conditional certification); Ballaris v. Wacker

Silttronic Corp., No. 00-1627, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13354, at *8

(D. Or. Aug. 24, 2001) (granting motion for conditional

certification on basis of two affidavits while explicitly refusing

to consider other documentary evidence). 

2. Conditional Certification of the Personal Trainers

Class is Appropriate

The Court begins by correcting an apparent misconception in

Defendants' Opposition. Defendants suggest that the Court, in

ruling on the previous motion, rejected conditional certification

of the Personal Trainers Class. Opp'n at 13-14. Defendants then

assert that Plaintiffs' position has not changed, and that the

Court should therefore reject the certification again. Id. at 14. 

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2"In making this finding the Court explicitly declines to

address whether the putative members of the other two categories

are similarly situated with other putative members of the same

respective category. . . . It thus makes no finding as to whether

it may, or may not, be appropriate for a court to conditionally

certify a collective action consisting of employees which fall in

one or both of these categories." First FLSA Order at 13 n.4

(emphasis added). 

6

The Court did not refuse to certify a Personal Trainers class. 

Rather, the Court refused certification of the proposed omnibus

class including both Managers and Personal Trainers. First FLSA

Order at 12-13. The Court explicitly refrained from addressing

certification of the non-manager classes. See id. at 13 n.4.2

With that in mind, the Court considers, for the first time,

the certification of the Personal Trainers Class. Plaintiffs have

submitted the declarations of ten former employees of 24 Hour

Fitness who worked for the company over a number of years in

several states other than California and who held positions which

are included in the proposed Personal Trainers Class. See

Davidsson Decl., Docket No. 73, ¶ 1; Fennelly Decl., Docket No.

75, ¶ 1; Gabalski Decl., Docket No. 76, ¶ 1; Guy Decl., Docket No.

77, ¶ 2; Matthews Decl., Docket No. 77, ¶ 2; Baumgart Decl.,

Docket No. 162, ¶ 1; Fennell Decl., Docket No. 163, ¶ 1; Fleming

Decl., Docket No. 164, ¶ 1; Kaipi Decl., Docket No. 165, ¶ 1;

Lowry Decl., Docket No. 166, ¶ 1. 

All of the declarants held similar positions and had similar

responsibilities during the time they worked for 24 Hour Fitness. 

Davidsson Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, 9, 13; Fennelly Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 9, 13,

14 ; Gabalski Decl. ¶¶ 4-7, 15-18; Guy Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, 11; Matthews

Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, 10-12; Baumgart Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 9, 10, 13, 15; Fennell

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Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 8-10, 12, 13; Fleming Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 9-10, 13, 15-16;

Kaipi Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 8-10, 13, 15; Lowry Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 8-10, 13,

16. 

Without exception, the declarants assert that they were

classified as "non-exempt" hourly employees, but that 24 Hour

Fitness failed to compensate them for any hours they worked in

excess of 40 hours per week and did not pay any overtime premium,

even though each declarant regularly worked in excess of 40 hours

per week. Davidsson Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6-7, 11, 12; Fennelly Decl. ¶¶ 2,

7-8, 10-15; Gabalski Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8; Guy Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8-9; Matthews

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8-10; Baumgart Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7; Fennell Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7;

Fleming Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7; Kaipi Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7; Lowry Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7. 

Each declarant provides the same explanation for 24 Hour Fitness's

failure to pay these wages. Personal Trainers were paid one

hourly rate for time spent in one-on-one training sessions with

clients ("Personal Training" or "PT Hours"), and a different rate

for time spent on all other tasks, such as cleaning equipment,

calling clients, selling nutritional supplements, attending staff

meetings, and walking the floor of the fitness club to provide

general assistance to customers ("Floor Time" or "FIT Hours"). 

See, e.g., Davidsson Decl. ¶¶ 8-10. According to the Trainers, 24

Hour Fitness tracked PT Hours and FIT Hours in two separate

payroll systems and set strict quotas on the number of FIT Hours

each employee could record so that the total hours per week never

exceeded 40. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11, 12. Despite the cap on FIT

Hours they could record in the payroll system, the Trainers were

informed that numerous tasks were part of their job and had to be

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completed, even if they were done "off the clock". See, e.g., id.

 ¶¶ 8-13. Finally, the Trainers assert that the limits on how

many FIT Hours they could record were the result of a corporate

policy, and that district managers set the payroll limits for each

club. See, e.g., Fennelly Decl. ¶ 11; Guy Decl. ¶ 12; Matthews

Decl. ¶ 11.

The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees one and

one-half times the employees' regular hourly rate for any hours

worked in excess of forty hours in one week. 29 U.S.C. §

207(a)(1). The Trainers' allegations described above, if true,

demonstrate that the policies and practices of 24 Hour Fitness as

they relate to payment of wages and overtime to Personal Trainers

are in violation of the FLSA. 

Defendants argue that the Trainers' declarations fail to

describe a common corporate decision or policy applicable to all

Personal Trainers, while incongruously asserting in the same brief

that the declarations are so similar as to lack credibility. See

Opp'n at 11, 13. How are Plaintiffs to allege that they all

suffered the same injury as a result of the same corporate policy

if they cannot make the same factual allegations? The notion

borders on the absurd. 

All of Defendants' challenges are equally unpersuasive. The

Court addresses each. First, Defendants assert that there was no

corporate policy preventing the Personal Trainers from recording

all of their hours or receiving overtime. Opp'n at 3-6. In

support of this argument, Defendants offer employee handbooks from

1998, 2000, 2005, and 2007, each of which states that the company

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policy is to "record all time worked" by employees, and to pay any

non-exempt employee who works overtime the appropriate overtime

pay. See Bolding Decl., Docket No. 188, Exs. A, C; Picciolo

Decl., Docket No. 100, Exs. VVV, WWW. The employee handbooks also

say employees are to record their hours in a system called "Time

and Labor," rather than the dual tracking systems for FIT Hours

and PT Hours the Trainers describe. See id. 

An employer's responsibility under the FLSA extends beyond

merely promulgating rules to actually enforcing them. See Chao v.

Pac. Stucco, Inc., No. 04-CV-0891-RCJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

59162, at *17-18 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. §

785.13). The Trainers allege that, in practice, 24 Hour Fitness

refused to pay them in full for all of the hours they worked. 

That Defendants published a handbook cannot immunize them against

an FLSA action where there is substantial evidence that they did

not follow their own guidelines. Defendants do not offer a single

declaration from a 24 Hour Fitness employee stating that the

company followed these rules, or otherwise contradicting the

Trainers' declarations. By contrast, a number of the Trainers

also worked at various times in managerial roles, and acknowledge

that as managers, they had to limit the FIT Hours recorded at each

club, and that they understood this to be necessary to comply with

corporate policies. See, e.g., Davidsson Decl. ¶ 19; Fennelly

Decl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 26. The Court is satisfied that the allegations

in the Trainers' declarations adequately establish, for the

purposes of conditional certification, a 24 Hour Fitness corporate

policy.

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Defendants also attempt to attribute the alleged requirements

that certain trainers work off-the-clock to "rogue managers"

rather than corporate policy. Opp'n at 6. Based on the available

testimony, it would appear that all 24 Hour Fitness managers are

rogues and that 24 Hour Fitness encouraged this rogue behavior. 

The Trainers' uncontested declarations sufficiently allege that,

rogue or otherwise, the managers were following corporate policy

in violation of the FLSA.

Defendants next argue that there is no evidence to support a

"dual timekeeping system" as alleged by the Trainers. Id. Again,

Defendants rely on the employee handbook, which is as insufficient

to support this argument as it was for the previous argument. 

Moreover, even if 24 Hour Fitness only used one system for

tracking employees' time, that would not overcome the Trainers'

allegations that, based on corporate policy, they were prevented

from entering all of the hours they worked into the timekeeping

system. Defendants also claim that all of Plaintiffs' knowledge

regarding the timekeeping system is out of date. Id. at 6-7. 

However, the Trainers' allegations cover time that falls within

the class period, as defined below, and are therefore relevant. 

Without evidence from Defendants regarding the actual means for

recording time used in the clubs, the Court cannot discount the

Trainers' testimony simply because they stopped working at 24 Hour

Fitness a few years ago.

 According to Defendants, the proposed Personal Trainers

Class is also deficient because it includes both exempt and nonexempt employees. Id. at 7-8. First, Defendants point out that

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the proposed class included Assistant Fitness Managers, a position

that 24 Hour Fitness claims is exempt from the FLSA overtime

requirements. As noted previously, Plaintiffs have agreed to

withdraw the Assistant Fitness Managers from the proposed class. 

Defendants also claim that they treated some Personal Trainers as

exempt. Id. at 7. Defendants offer no evidence whatsoever in

support of this claim. The Trainers' declarations uniformly state

that as Personal Trainers, they were classified as non-exempt. 

This is sufficient at the conditional certification stage.

Defendants' next argument is that there is an internal

conflict in the class between the Assistant Fitness Managers and

Fitness Manager-Actives on the one hand, and Certified Personal

Trainers and Trainer Fit Pros, on the other, because the former

supervised the latter. Id. at 8-9. This is a moot point because

both the Assistant Fitness Managers and the Fitness ManagerActives have been withdrawn from the class.

The next in Defendants' litany of unpersuasive arguments is,

or appears to be, that Plaintiffs have not offered enough

declarations to support conditional certification. Defendants do

not offer any suggestion about what number of declarations would

be sufficient, assuming such an arbitrary cutoff exists. In

support of their argument, Defendants cite to a list of various

district court decisions denying certification, but provide no

explanation about how those cases are applicable. See id. at 10-

11. The brief parenthetical descriptions Defendants include show

a number of reasons that other courts refused to certify classes,

but shed no light on how the Court should rule here. The Court

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3The Court notes that Defendants included the exact same pagelong string citation in their opposition to conditional

certification of the omnibus class, even though the issue before

the Court at that time was distinct from the present Motion. See

Docket No. 89 at 9. Cutting and pasting a legal standard from one

brief to another may be efficient, but it does not obviate the need

for meaningful analysis and reasoned argument in the application of

that standard.

12

will not endeavor to read every order denying certification from

every district court in the country, and will not do Defendants'

work for them.3 

It must suffice to say that the Court finds the collection of

declarations submitted by the Trainers here to be more than

sufficient to satisfy the minimal requirements for conditional

certification. Defendants' protests regarding the number of

declarations, the time period covered by those declarations, and

the geographic regions covered by those declarations, are all

equally meritless. The ten declarations in question are from

employees who worked in seven of the states at issue and cover the

entire class period. In attempting to minimize the time period

described in the declarations, Defendants ignore the fact that

some of the Trainers eventually became managers, but describe the

continued denial of overtime to Trainers during the time that they

were managers. See, e.g., Davidsson Decl.; Fennelly Decl.;

Matthews Decl. Additionally, the Court notes that the

declarations on which it relied in certifying the Managers Class

covered only six of the relevant states (Colorado, Washington,

Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, and Missouri), and, as the Trainers'

declarations do, excluded Texas. See First FLSA Order at 15;

see also Beauperthuy Decl., Docket No. 71, ¶ 2; Davidsson Decl. ¶

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1; De Soto Decl., Docket No. 74, ¶ 1; Fennelly Decl. ¶ 1; Guy

Decl. ¶ 2; Hudson Decl., Docket No. 78, ¶ 2; Matthews Decl. ¶ 2;

Newcomb Decl., Docket No. 81, ¶ 1; Sherrill Decl., Docket No. 88,

¶ 1; Struble Decl., Docket No. 83, ¶ 2. In opposing the first

certification, Defendants complained of the limited geographic

reach of the supporting declarations to no avail. See Docket No.

89 at 10. The Court finds it no more persuasive now than before,

but apparently must make this determination explicit to avoid

Defendants raising it again in the future.

Were it simply a question of the number of declarations

submitted or the number of states addressed, the Court would

likely find for Plaintiffs anyway. Looking beyond mere numbers to

the substance of the Trainers' declarations, however, confirms

this conclusion. The Court is convinced that the allegations are

sufficient to demonstrate that "the putative class members were

together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan." 

Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. The Court therefore GRANTS

Plaintiffs' Motion and conditionally certifies the Personal

Trainers Class.

B. Tolling

The Trainers request that the Court toll the statute of

limitations for the Personal Trainers Class as it did for the

Managers Class, and allow notice to be sent to individuals who

worked as Personal Trainers from December 31, 1998 to the present. 

See Mot. at 20; First FLSA Order at 17-18.

Defendants offer no argument why the Court's previous

analysis is not applicable here, or any basis for distinguishing

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4

Defendants argue that the Court's prior ruling "is not

consistent with that of the Boyce court — a result that should be

reconsidered in light of the principles of comity and estoppel." 

Opp'n at 18. Defendants previously moved the Court to reconsider

its ruling on this issue, and the Court denied that motion at the

time. See Docket Nos. 129, 135. The Court will not revisit this

question.

14

the treatment of the Personal Trainers Class from the treatment of

the Managers Class.4 The Court therefore incorporates its

analysis on this issue from the First FLSA Order, and tolls the

statute of limitations. 

The decision to toll the statute of limitations for the

Managers Class was based on the desire to give the Plaintiffs from

outside of California the same treatment the California plaintiffs

received in Boyce. First FLSA Order at 17-18. The claims of

Personal Trainers Class for lost wages due to failure to pay

overtime and off-the-clock work are most comparable to the claims

of the Hourly Class certified in Boyce. The Court therefore tolls

the statute of limitations to allow members of the Personal

Trainers Class to sue for failure to pay overtime occurring any

time after October 29, 1999. See Boyce Docket No. 84.

C. Discovery, Form of Notice, and Bifurcation

The Court agrees with Defendants that, with the Personal

Trainers Class now conditionally certified, it would be

appropriate for the parties' counsel to meet and confer regarding

discovery needs and the form of notice. See Opp'n at 18. The

Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for approval of the

proposed form of notice and for limited discovery. The Court

further finds that bifurcation of the trial is premature at this

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juncture, and will be best addressed after the form of notice is

finalized.

The Court urges the parties to engage the meet and confer

process in a meaningful manner, and to consider all of the Court's

previous rulings regarding the form of notice and discovery for

the Managers Class.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Facilitated Notice Pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The FLSA collective class consisting of persons who

worked for 24 Hour Fitness outside of California as

Personal Trainers (including the titles: PT Trainer,

Certified Personal Trainer ("CPT"), CPT I, CPT II, CPT

III, CPT Elite, Trainer Fit Pro ("TFP"), TFP I, TFP II,

TFP III, TFP Elite, FLS, Apex Tech, Fitness Instructor,

and Floor Instructor) and who were classified as nonexempt is CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIED.

2. The statute of limitations is EQUITABLY TOLLED to allow

members of the Personal Trainers Class to sue for

failure to pay overtime occurring any time after October

29, 1999.

3. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer regarding the

form of the opt-in notice and any necessary discovery. 

No later than thirty days following the date of this

order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed opt-in

order and a joint plan for related discovery and the

process of notification. If any relevant differences

cannot be resolved through the meet and confer process,

each party may submit a brief of no more than 5 pages

addressing the outstanding issues.

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Case 3:06-cv-00715-SC Document 190 Filed 03/24/08 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4. The parties shall appear for a further Status Conference

at 10:00 a.m. on June 13, 2008, seven days before which

the parties are required to file with the Court a joint

status statement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2008.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-00715-SC Document 190 Filed 03/24/08 Page 16 of 16