Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02671/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02671-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACOB WRIGHT, KHRYSTYNE 

WRIGHT and JONATHAN WRIGHT, as 

successors in interest of DANIEL LEE 

WRIGHT (deceased); JACOB WRIGHT, 

individually; KHRYSTYNE WRIGHT, 

individually; and JONATHAN WRIGHT, 

individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMBER DUNNE; DR. JOHN PONDER; 

DANA M. KERNAN; DR. SHELDON 

SUSKAUER; DR. PAULA NEWMAN; 

DR. SCOTT A. HEATLEY; DAVID 

SMILEY; JOE A. LIZARRAGA; DOE 1; 

AND DOE 2,

 Defendants.

No. 2-15-cv-02671-TLN-CKD

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 

ON THE PLEADINGS.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Dana M. Kernan (“Kernan”) and Joe A. 

Lizarraga’s (“Lizarraga”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)

(ECF No. 33) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and Defendants Amber 

Dunne (“Dunne”), Dr. John Ponder (“Ponder”), Dr. Sheldon Suskauer (“Suskauer”), Dr. Paula 

Newman (“Newman”), Dr. Scott A. Heatley (“Heatley”), and David Smiley’s (“Smiley”) Motion 

for Judgement on the Pleadings (ECF No.34) under Rule 12(c). Defendants are employees of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). 

(ECF Nos. 33 & 34.) Plaintiffs Jacob Wright, Khrystyne Wright, and Jonathan Wright (together 

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“Plaintiffs”), each in his or her individual capacity and collectively as successors in interest of 

decedent Daniel Lee Wright (“Decedent”) filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 

35) and to the motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 36). Defendants filed 

corresponding replies in support of their respective motions. (ECF No. 38 and 39, respectively.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

Defendants Kernan and Lizarraga’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

Defendants Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley’s motion for judgement on 

the pleadings. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Decedent was a state prisoner at MCSP and died as a result of suicide on November 2, 

2014. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 3.) Decedent’s three children, his successors in interest, brought this 

lawsuit against several California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 

employees for failing to prevent Decedent’s suicide despite Decedent’s history of suicide 

attempts and suicide risk. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs assert that Decedent attempted to hang himself in 

the three months prior to his death and that Decedent had not taken his prescribed medication for 

at least three days prior to his death. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Yet, according to Plaintiffs, no precautions were 

taken by Defendants to prevent Decedent’s suicide and he was allowed to remain alone and 

unmonitored in his cell for at least two and a half hours on November 2, 2014, allowing him the 

opportunity to hang himself. (Id.) Decedent had a long-documented history of mental illness —

including diagnoses of severe depression and bi-polar disorder and a history of multiple suicide 

attempts, self-harming behavior, and suicidal ideations — which was known to MCSP 

correctional, medical, and mental health staff. (Id. at ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges Decedent’s suicide resulted from Defendants’ failure to implement 

“[a]ccepted and proven suicide prevention protocols” and failure to include a psychiatrist or 

physician in the development of Decedent’s mental health treatment plan. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 36.)

Plaintiffs claim the mental health treatment plan put in place for Decedent was inadequate given 

Decedent’s known suicide risk factors and past suicide attempts. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 36–43, 52–55.)

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Plaintiffs name the following defendants, alleged to be acting under color of state law:

(1) Kernan, a CDCR correctional counselor working at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 6.)

(2) Dunne, a CDCR Mental Health Clinician and unlicensed trainee working at MCSP. 

Dunne is also asserted to be “the primary clinician in charge of [Decedent’s] treatment 

plan.” (ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 7, 35.)

(3) Newman, a staff psychologist working at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 8.)

(4) Ponder, a CDCR senior psychologist and/or mental health practitioner working at 

MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 9, 34.)

(5) Suskauer, a CDCR Staff Psychiatrist and mental health practitioner working at MCSP. 

(ECF No. 27 at ¶ 10.)

(6) Heatley, the Chief Medical Officer Executive (“CME”) at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶

12.)

(7) Smiley, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for health care at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at 

¶ 13.)

(8) Lizarraga, the Warden at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 14.)

Plaintiffs claim Decedent’s suicide resulted “directly or substantially” from an inadequate 

mental health treatment plan approved on September 9, 2014, by an interdisciplinary treatment 

team consisting of Ponder, Dunne, and Kernan. (Id. at ¶ 33–43.) Plaintiffs contend an adequate 

mental health treatment plan would have, at a minimum, included suicide precautions preventing 

access to bedding that was not suicide resistant. (Id. at 39.) On information and belief, Plaintiffs 

also assert that Dunne was supposed to be supervised by Newman but Newman failed to exercise 

such supervision. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Plaintiffs assert that the plan should have been, but was not, 

reviewed and approved by a psychiatrist or other physician, despite Decedent being under the 

care of a psychiatrist and taking prescribed psychotropic medication. (Id. at ¶ 36.) As such, there 

lacked a plan to monitor medication adherence and ability to respond to Decedent’s increased 

suicide risk created by his refusal to take medications for three days prior to his death. (Id. at ¶¶

35–37, 40.) 

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A. Defendants Kernan and Lizarraga’s’ Motion to Dismiss 

Kernan and Lizarraga seek to dismiss several causes of action against them for failure to 

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 33.)

Plaintiffs allege that Kernan, as part of the interdisciplinary treatment team with Dunne 

and Ponder, “knew or should have known” that the mental health treatment plan was “woefully 

inadequate” and assert two claims against her: (1) deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious 

medical needs, health, and safety (First Cause of Action); and (2) wrongful death/negligence 

(Third Cause of Action). (ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 45–51, 56–64.) Defendants move to dismiss the 

First Cause of Action on the basis of qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted (ECF No. 33-1 at 12–17, 20–21) and to dismiss the Third Cause of Action 

on the basis that the SAC does not allege facts establishing Kernan owed any legal duty to the 

Decedent or that she breached that duty. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that Lizarraga, as the Warden at MCSP, was responsible for the custody 

and treatment of inmates at MCSP and for training and discipline of all employees under his 

charge. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 14.) Additionally, Lizarraga was responsible for establishing 

operational plans and procedures to provide for the custody and treatment of inmates at MCSP. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Lizarraga, along with Heatley and Smiley, demonstrated an “ongoing 

pattern of deliberate indifference” in their failure to ensure implementation of appropriate mental 

health and psychiatric treatment plans; failure to act upon life-threatening symptoms and suicidal 

impulses or gestures; failure to provide appropriate staffing and training at MCSP for providing 

inmates with adequate mental health or psychiatric treatment; failure to implement a policy to 

ensure staff would contact and summon emergency mental health and/or psychiatric treatment in 

a timely manner; failure to create and/or implement guidelines that must be followed to remove 

inmates from existing suicide precautions; failure to create, implement and/or ensure staff follow 

policies; failure to adequately train and supervise employees; and failure to promulgate 

appropriate policies and procedures. (Id. at ¶ 54.) 

Plaintiffs assert two claims against Lizarraga under 42 U.S.C. §1983: (1) deliberate 

indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (First 

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Cause of Action); and (2) supervisory liability based on customs, practices or policies (Second 

Cause of Action). (Id. at ¶¶ 45–55.) Defendants seek to dismiss the First Cause of Action on the 

basis of qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and 

challenge the Second Cause of Action on the basis of qualified immunity. 

B. Defendants Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Heatley, and Smiley’s Motion for Judgment on 

the Pleadings

Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley seek judgement in their favor on 

specified causes of action against them. (ECF No. 34.)

Plaintiffs allege that Dunne and Ponder were deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s serious 

medical/mental health needs because they participated in the development of the September 9, 

2014 mental health treatment plan which they knew was “woefully inadequate.” (ECF No. 27 ¶¶

34, 38, 43.) Plaintiffs also assert that Dunne should have obtained but failed to obtain a 

psychiatrist’s participation and/or approval of Decedent’s mental health treatment plan. (Id. at ¶

37.)

Plaintiffs allege two claims against Dunne: (1) deliberate indifference to Decedent’s 

serious medical needs, health, and safety under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (First Cause of Action); and (2) 

wrongful death under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §337.60 et seq. (Third Cause of Action). (Id. at ¶¶ 

45–51, 56–64.) Of these, Defendants seek judgment in favor of Dunne on the First Cause of 

Action asserting qualified immunity. (ECF No. 34-1 at 12–15.) They do not seek judgement 

regarding the Third Cause of Action. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege three claims against Ponder: (1) deliberate indifference to Decedent’s 

serious medical needs, health, and safety under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (First Cause of Action); (2) 

wrongful death under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §337.60 et seq. (Third Cause of Action); and (3) 

failure to supervise, investigate, and discipline under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Fourth Cause of Action).

(ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 45–51, 56–68.) Of these, Defendants seek judgement in favor of Ponder on the 

First and Fourth Causes of Action asserting qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 34-1 at 12–19, 21–24.) They do not seek judgment 

regarding the Third Cause of Action. (Id.)

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Plaintiffs allege that Newman was responsible for supervising Dunne but failed to 

competently do so. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 35.) They assert three claims against Newman: (1) 

deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety under 42 U.S.C. 

§1983 (First Cause of Action); (2) wrongful death under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §337.60 et seq. 

(Third Cause of Action); and (3) failure to supervise, investigate, and discipline employee 

conduct under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Fourth Cause of Action). (Id. at ¶¶ 45–51, 56–68.) Of these, 

Defendants seek judgment in favor of Newman on the First and Fourth Cause of Action asserting

qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 34-1 

at 12–19, 21–24.) They do not seek Judgment regarding the Third Cause of Action. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that Suskauer, as the psychiatrist who prescribed Decedent’s psychotropic 

medications, had a duty to review the September 9, 2014 mental health treatment plan for 

Decedent, who was under his care, but negligently failed to do so. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 37.) 

Plaintiffs also generally allege that Suskauer “failed to adequately supervise, investigate, and 

discipline employee conduct.” (Id. at ¶ 66.) Plaintiffs present three claims against Suskauer: (1) 

deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety under 42 U.S.C. 

§1983 (First Cause of Action); (2) wrongful death/negligence under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §337.60 

et seq. (Third Cause of Action); and (3) failure to supervise, investigate, and discipline under 42 

U.S.C. §1983 (Fourth Cause of Action). (Id. at ¶¶ 45–51, 56–68.) Of these, Defendants seek 

judgment in favor of Suskauer on the First and Fourth Cause of Action asserting qualified 

immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 34-1 at 12–19,

21–24.) They do not seek judgment regarding the Third Cause of Action. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Heatley, as CME, was responsible for overseeing the 

examination, diagnoses, prescriptions, and treatment of all inmate patients at MCSP. (ECF No. 

27 at ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs also allege that Smiley, as CEO, was the highest-ranking health care 

authority and responsible for all aspects of delivering health care at MCSP to ensure adequate 

medical and mental health care for all inmates at MCSP. (Id. at ¶ 12.) As detailed supra, 

Plaintiffs allege an “ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference” by Heatley and Smiley (along 

with Warden Lizarraga) for failure to ensure implementation of treatment plans, adequately train 

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staff, and implement policies and procedures to attend to inmates with risk of suicide. (Id. at ¶

54.)

Plaintiffs assert two claims against Heatley and Smiley under 42 U.S.C. §1983: (1) 

deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety (First Cause of 

Action); and (2) supervisory liability based on customs, practices, or policies (Second Cause of 

Action.) (Id. at ¶¶ 45–55.) Defendants seek judgment in favor of Heatley and Smiley on the First 

and Second Causes of Action asserting qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. (ECF No. 34-1 at 12–21.) They do not seek judgment regarding the 

remainder of the causes of action.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A. Motion to Dismiss 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–338 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citations omitted).

A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed 

factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alterations in original) 

(citation omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “Factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555 (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 

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1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating, “the pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement 

of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). Ultimately, a 

court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiffs have alleged “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). While the plausibility requirement “is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement’ but [rather demands] more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully[,] . . . [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (Id.) It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiffs 

“can prove facts that [they have] not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways 

that have not been alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. St. Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend 

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also

Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying 

leave to amend when amendment would be futile). “Although a district court ‘should freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), the court’s discretion to deny 

such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” 

Ecological Rts. Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early

enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for 

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing 

party’s pleadings. E.g. Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 

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(E.D. Cal. 1992). A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim and, therefore, the same legal standard applies. Cafasso v. 

General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011); Dworkin v. Hustler 

Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A motion for judgment on the pleadings 

should only be granted if, accepting as true all material allegations contained in the nonmoving 

party’s pleadings, the moving party “clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to 

be resolved and that he [or she] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Doleman v. Meiji 

Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (1969)); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989).

In reviewing a motion brought under Rule 12(c), the court “must accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the 

pleadings is appropriate when, taking everything in the pleadings as true, the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2007); Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 532 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Courts have discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to 

amend or dismiss the action instead of entering of judgment. Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 

F.Supp.2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 

1038 (6th Cir. 1979), disapproved on another ground in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 

Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lawton v. Cavalry Investments LLC, 2013 WL 3929707, at *1 (C.D. 

Cal. 2013); Kennedy v. Kings Mosquito Abatement Dist., 2013 WL 1129202, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

2013); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 982 F.Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33) claims against Kernan and Lizarraga, and 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 34) to dismiss claims against 

Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley are addressed in turn by the Court. 

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A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of Action against Kernan and Lizarraga for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action alleges that Kernan 

and Lizarraga were deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and 

safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 45–51.) Defendants also move to 

dismiss the Second Cause of Action for Supervisory Liability as asserted against Lizarraga and 

the Third Cause of Action against Kernan for wrongful death based on negligence and 

malpractice under California Code of Civ. Pro. §337.60 et. seq. (ECF No. 33-1.) 

1. First Cause of Action – Deliberate Indifference to Decedent’s Serious Medical 

Needs, Health, and Safety

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not oppose Lizarraga’s motion to dismiss the First Cause 

of Action. (ECF No. 35 at 1.) Therefore, the First Cause of Action as to Lizarraga is 

DISMISSED with leave to amend. In order for the Court to determine if the First Cause of 

Action should be dismissed as to Kernan, it must analyze first whether the facts pleaded are 

sufficient to allege deliberate indifference against her, and second whether Kernan is entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

a. Deliberate Indifference

While prison inmates do have a constitutional right to medical care, liability attaches to 

prison authorities only if the medical care afforded, or lack thereof, is “deliberately indifferent” to 

an inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104(1976); Hutchinson v. 

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must first establish a “serious 

medical need by demonstrating that [the] failure to treat [his] condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s response to the 

medical need was deliberately indifferent. (Id.)

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004). “If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 

official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” (Id.) Deliberate 

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indifference can be shown when “prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with 

medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical 

care.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. But “[m]ere indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice will 

not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(per curiam); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The standard applied in the 

Ninth Circuit is even higher than gross negligence — deliberate indifference requires a culpable 

mental state. Green v. County of Sacramento, No. 2:13-CV-00949-TLN-KJN, 2016 WL 374561

at *12 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 1, 2016), (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 898–900 (9th Cir.1996)). 

The state actor must “recognize[ ][an] unreasonable risk and actually intend[ ] to expose the 

plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Id. at 899. In other 

words, the defendant “knows that something is going to happen but ignores the risk and exposes 

[the plaintiff] to it.” Id. at 900. The deliberate-indifference inquiry should go to the jury if any 

rational factfinder could find this requisite mental state. Id.

Defendants argue the SAC alleges no facts demonstrating Kernan was actually aware of a 

substantial risk of serious harm to Decedent and that she disregarded that risk. (ECF No. 33-1 at 

16.) They posit that it is conclusory for Plaintiffs to state that Kernan, along with other members 

of the care team, approved Decedent’s inadequate treatment plan despite knowing he presented a 

risk of suicide. (Id.) As such, they argue Plaintiffs have not met the “extraordinarily high”

standard for deliberate indifference. The Court disagrees. 

The Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that an adequate treatment plan would have 

included input or approval by a psychiatrist given Decedent was taking prescribed psychotropic 

medication and “the role his medication was to play in his treatment” should have been taken into 

account. (ECF No. 27 ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs also sufficiently pleaded that “[a]n adequate mental health 

treatment plan would have included, at a minimum, suicide precautions preventing his access to 

bedding that was not suicide resistant.” (Id. at ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs contend there should have been a 

plan for medication compliance along with participation of a psychiatrist or physician. (Id. at ¶

40.) Plaintiffs also satisfactorily assert that these missing elements directly and proximately led 

to Decedent’s death. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

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Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that Kernan, as a Correctional Counselor at MCSP and a 

member of Decedent’s interdisciplinary treatment team, “knew or should have known” that the 

individualized mental health treatment plan for Decedent was “woefully inadequate.” (ECF No. 

27 ¶ 38.) Plaintiffs claim Decedent’s interdisciplinary treatment team was responsible for 

developing his individualized treatment plan. (Id. at ¶ 34.) In support of the assertion that 

Kernan “knew or should have known” of Decedent’s suicide risks, the SAC states that Decedent’s 

“long documented history of mental illness, including being diagnosed with severe depression 

and being bi-polar” were well known to MCSP correctional and medical and mental health staff. 

(Id. at ¶ 22.) Defendants point out that Plaintiffs have not alleged any Defendant was present on 

the day of Decedent’s suicide nor are any alleged to have had any personal interaction with 

Decedent close to his time of death. (ECF No. 33-1 at 15.) Defendants further argue that in 

alleging Kernan “knew or should have known” the treatment plan was inadequate, Plaintiffs in 

essence concede Kernan was not necessarily deliberately indifferent, but possibly just negligent. 

(Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs respond that they sufficiently allege Kernan had actual knowledge as to the 

inadequacy of the treatment plan as a member of the decedent’s treatment team who knew

Decedent’s risk factors for suicide. (ECF No. 35 at 4–5.) 

Though it is not stated in the SAC whether Kernan specifically knew Decedent had not 

taken his medication for three days prior to his death, based on the pleadings, a rational factfinder 

could infer that as a member of Decedent’s care team, Kernan knew Decedent was at risk for 

suicide, and that she “ignore[d] the risk and exposed” Decedent to it by not taking steps to 

prevent Decedent’s suicide in developing his treatment plan. Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 900. The Court 

therefore finds Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference as 

to Kernan. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue Plaintiffs’ §1983 claims are based on the failure to implement 

adequate suicide prevention policies and protocols, and as such, should be dismissed because 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 33-1 at 12–20.)

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Qualified immunity protects government officers from “liability for civil damages insofar 

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity questions are to be resolved at the 

“earliest possible stage in litigation” because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather 

than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson, 555 U.S. 231–2; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

526 (1985). 

In determining qualified immunity, courts must ask: (1) taken in the light most favorable 

to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 

constitutional right, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); and (2) whether the right was 

“clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223–25. The 

Court may address either prong first. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The inquiry “must be undertaken 

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . and serves to 

advance understanding of the law and to allow officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified 

immunity is applicable.” (Id.) “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 

‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of 

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Qualified immunity protects “all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 

341 (1986).

Defendants argue the alleged constitutional right that is the basis for Plaintiffs’

constitutional claims is the right to adequate suicide prevention policies and protocols. (ECF No. 

33-1 at 14.) According to Defendants, it was not “clearly established” in 2014 — the time of the 

alleged violation and Decedent’s death — that government actors had a duty to implement suicide 

prevention policies and protocols to the degree specified by Plaintiffs in the SAC. (Id.)

Defendants rely on a Supreme Court case, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015), in which the 

Court concluded that “no decision of this Court establishes a right to the proper implementation 

of adequate suicide prevention protocols.” Id. The Court held defendants were entitled to 

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qualified immunity because such a right was not clearly established at least up to the decision in 

Taylor. Id. at 2043–45. Defendants argue that since Decedent’s death occurred in November of 

2014, the holding in Taylor should apply. (ECF No. 33-1 at 15.) 

Plaintiffs respond that the alleged constitutional right at issue is the right to be free from 

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious risk of suicide, which was clearly established at the 

time of decedent’s death. They point to NeSmith v. County of San Diego, No. 15CV629 JLS 

(JMA), 2016 WL 4515857 at *6 (S.D. Cal. 2016), which draws a distinction between “an 

individual being deliberately indifferent to the suicidal ideations of a particular inmate and a 

government entity acting with deliberate indifference toward potential inmate suicides on a policy 

level.” Id. 

Plaintiffs also cite to several cases in which the acts or omissions of prison staff 

constituted deliberate indifference where staff members knew of and disregarded an excessive 

risk to an inmate’s health (citing to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97 (1976)), as well as cases that acknowledged a clearly established constitutional right 

to mental health treatment, including suicide prevention, while in custody (citing to Van Orden v. 

Downs, 609 F. App’x 474, 475 (9th Cir. 2015); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 

1232, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010)). (ECF No. 35 at 2.) Plaintiffs argue that the “clearly established”

prong of the Saucier test is thus met, and all that is left to decide is whether the particular 

defendant’s conduct violated that right. The Court agrees that there exists a clearly established 

right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs, including risk of 

suicide. And as set forth above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating that

Kernan violated this right given her role on Decedent’s mental health treatment team and 

knowledge of Decedent’s risk of suicide.

Defendants acknowledge the distinction set forth in NeSmith and concede that Taylor

speaks to a “broader duty for government entities to implement a suicide prevention policy that 

must meet certain unspecified standards,” as opposed to “government actors” acting with 

deliberate indifference to a particular inmate’s suicidal ideations. (ECF No. 33-1 at 15 citing 

NeSmith at *7.) However, they assert that Taylor is the proper authority here because “none of 

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the named Defendants is alleged to have been present on the day of the Decedent’s suicide” nor 

did any Defendant have personal interaction with Decedent for weeks. (ECF No. 33-1 at 15.) As 

such, they assert this is not a case as described in NeSmith in which a particular defendant knew 

of an imminent risk of suicide and disregarded that risk in a show of deliberate indifference. (Id.)

The Court finds Defendants’ reasoning unpersuasive because it seeks to paint all named 

Defendants in the same broad stroke rather than have the Court consider each individuals’ actions 

or inactions as detailed in the pleadings. But the Court must consider the facts as they are 

asserted against each Defendant in order to determine whether the claims asserted pertain to a

failure to implement suicide prevention protocols at a “policy level” or deliberate indifference to 

the Decedent’s health, medical needs, or health and safety by individual government actors.

Nesmith, 2016 WL 4515857 at *6.

Here, the allegations against Kernan, given her participation on Decedent’s 

interdisciplinary care team and involvement in the development of Decedent’s individualized 

mental health treatment plan, are sufficient to allege deliberate indifference to Decedent’s health, 

medical needs, or health and safety by an individual government actor. The relevant 

constitutional right – to be free of deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs, including 

risk of suicide – was clearly established at the time of Decedent’s death. As such, Kernan is not 

entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

First Cause of Action as to Kernan is DENIED. 

2. Second Cause of Action – Supervisory Liability based on Customs, Practices,

or Policies 

Plaintiffs allege the acts and/or omissions of Defendants in being deliberately indifferent 

to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety were the direct and proximate result of 

customs, practices, or policies, or lack thereof, of Warden Lizarraga, CEO Smiley, and CME 

Heatley. (ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 53–54.) The Court previously found that Plaintiffs made sufficient 

pleadings to allege supervisory liability based on customs, practices, or policies. (ECF No. 21). 

Defendants now seek dismissal of this cause of action based on qualified immunity. (ECF No. 

33-1 at 12–16.)

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Plaintiff’s allegations against Lizarraga, along with Heatley and Smiley include: a failure 

to ensure implementation of appropriate mental health and psychiatric treatment plans; failure to 

act upon symptoms and reports of suicidal impulses; failure to provide appropriate staffing and 

training at MCSP for providing inmates with adequate treatment; failure to implement a policy to 

ensure staff timely contact and summon emergency mental health and/or psychiatric treatment;

failure to create and/or implement guidelines that must be followed to remove inmates from 

existing suicide precautions; failure to create, implement and/or ensure that staff follow policies;

failure to adequately train and supervise employees; and failure to promulgate appropriate 

policies and procedures to prevent the constitutional violations alleged. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 54.) As 

Defendants point out, the claims asserted by Plaintiffs against Lizarraga are based on his failure 

to ensure “the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols.” Taylor, 135 S. 

Ct. at 2044. As the Supreme Court noted in Taylor, “[n]o decision of this Court establishes a 

right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols.” Id. Consequently,

Plaintiffs have not established a clearly established right, and therefore, Lizarraga is entitled to 

qualified immunity. Under the qualified immunity analysis, which differs from the standards the 

Court analyzed in its previous order denying the motion to dismiss this cause of action (ECF No. 

21), Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this cause of action as to Lizarraga is GRANTED with 

prejudice. 

3. Third Cause of Action – Wrongful death: Negligence / Malpractice under Cal. 

Code Civ. Proc. §377.60 et. seq. 

Lastly, Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action as to Kernan. Plaintiffs do 

not oppose the dismissal of Kernan from the Third Cause of Action. (ECF No. 35 at 1.)

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the Third Cause of Action against Kernan

with leave to amend.

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Dunne, Ponder, Newman, Suskauer, Heatley, and Smiley move for judgment on the 

pleadings with regard to the following: (1) the First Cause of Action against Dunne, Ponder, 

Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley on the basis of qualified immunity and for failure to 

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state a claim as to Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley; (2) the Second Cause of Action 

against Heatley and Smiley on the basis of qualified immunity and failure to state a claim; and (3) 

the Fourth Cause of Action against Ponder, Suskauer, and Newman on the basis of qualified 

immunity and failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 34-1 at 8.) Plaintiff does not oppose the motion 

as it is “directed to Defendants Heatley and Smiley in the first cause of action and as it is directed 

to Suskauer in the fourth cause of action.” (ECF No 36 at 1.)

1. First Cause of Action – Deliberate Indifference to Decedent’s Serious Medical 

Needs, Health, and Safety 

In similar fashion to the argument supporting qualified immunity for Kernan and 

Lizarraga, Defendants argue that Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley are 

entitled to qualified immunity because the duty to implement adequate suicide prevention policies 

or protocols was not a clearly established constitutional right at the time of Decedent’s death per 

Taylor, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). (ECF No. 34-1 at 12.) As the Court discussed supra, however, 

where individual government actors’ actions or omissions are at issue, the Court finds, pursuant 

to NeSmith, No. 15CV629 JLS (JMA), 2016 WL 4515857, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 2016) that the right to 

be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, including risk of suicide, was a 

clearly established right at the time of alleged infractions by Defendants. Therefore, in order to 

determine if each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must turn to the second 

prong of the qualified immunity test, namely, whether it is sufficiently alleged that each 

individual violated Decedent’s clearly established right. This requires the Court to examine the 

facts alleged as to each Defendant.

a. Defendant Dunne

Defendants do not make particularized arguments in their motion for why Dunne’s actions 

or inactions do not meet the “extremely high” deliberate indifference standard. The Court makes 

its assessment based on the face of the pleadings in the SAC. 

Plaintiffs allege Dunne was an unlicensed trainee mental health clinician who served as 

the primary clinician in charge of Decedent’s treatment plan. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 6.) Dunne 

participated on Decedent’s interdisciplinary treatment team, along with Kernan and Ponder. (Id.

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at ¶ 34.) The treatment team allegedly developed an inadequate mental health treatment plan, 

failed to include required clinical team members, and failed to obtain necessary approvals from a 

psychiatrist. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Medical staff knew Decedent was depressed, bi-polar, and presented a

low acute and high chronic risk of suicide. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs allege that as the primary 

clinician in charge of Decedent’s treatment plan, Dunne should have obtained a psychiatrist’s 

participation and/or approval but failed to do so. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the 

treatment team developed a “woefully inadequate” mental health treatment plan and as a member 

of that treatment team, Dunne was deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s serious medical/mental 

health needs. (Id at ¶¶ 34, 38, 43.)

The Court finds the SAC pleads sufficient facts, when taken as true, to establish that 

Decedent had serious medical needs and that Dunne knew of those needs. A trier of fact could 

therefore find the requisite intent that Dunne’s actions and omissions arising from her role on 

Decedent’s care team were “deliberately indifferent” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Consequently, Dunne is not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants do not argue that 

the SAC otherwise fails to state a claim. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 

the First Cause of Action against Dunne is DENIED. 

b. Defendant Ponder

Defendants also seek judgment in favor of Ponder on the First Cause of Action asserting 

qualified immunity. (ECF No. 34-1 at 8.) 

According to the SAC, Ponder was a Clinical Psychologist and mental health practitioner 

who was one of three participants on Decedent’s interdisciplinary treatment team. (ECF No. 27 

at ¶ 9.) Ponder, as part of the treatment team, developed Decedent’s mental health treatment plan, 

which Plaintiffs claim, “failed to address his known mental health needs.” (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiffs 

assert that “[a]n adequate mental health treatment plan would have included, at a minimum, 

suicide precautions preventing access to bedding that was not suicide resistant.” (Id. at ¶ 39.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent’s suicide resulted directly or substantially from the inadequate 

mental health treatment plan approved, in part, by Ponder. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

///

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The Court finds Plaintiffs have stated sufficient plausible factual allegations supporting 

the claim that Ponder acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take actions to address 

Decedent’s risk of suicide despite knowing of this risk. The Court therefore finds that Ponder is 

not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs have otherwise failed 

to state a claim against Ponder. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as 

to the First Cause of Action against Ponder is DENIED. 

c. Defendant Newman

Defendants next seek judgment in favor of Newman on the First Cause of Action asserting 

qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 

34-1 at 8.) 

Newman was a staff psychologist working at MCSP. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs 

allege that Newman was responsible for supervising Dunne in the preparation or execution of 

Decedent’s mental health plan but failed to do so despite knowing such supervision was crucial 

and legally required. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Defendants move for judgement in favor of Newman 

regarding this cause of action, arguing that these allegations support the supervisory liability 

claim in the Fourth Cause of Action but do not support the deliberate indifference claim in the 

First Cause of Action. (ECF No. 34-1 at 18.) Plaintiffs oppose arguing that as a staff 

psychologist, Newman knowingly allowed an unlicensed and unqualified individual to provide 

treatment to Decedent and was therefore deliberately indifferent. (ECF No. 36 at 5.)

 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating 

Newman’s deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs. The SAC is devoid of 

allegations that Newman was even aware of medical or suicide risks to the Decedent, much less 

that he intentionally ignored those risks. The only allegations present are that he failed to 

supervise Dunne. Therefore, based on the facts alleged, Newman is entitled to qualified 

immunity. If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend 

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (citations omitted).

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the First Cause of Action against 

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Newman is GRANTED with leave to amend.

d. Defendant Suskauer 

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the First Cause of Action against 

Suskauer asserting qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. (ECF No. 34-1 at 8.) 

Suskauer was a CDCR staff psychiatrist and mental health practitioner working at MCSP. 

(ECF No. 27 at ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that Suskauer, as the prescriber of Decedent’s 

psychotropic medication, had a duty to review the September 9, 2014 mental health treatment 

plan for Decedent, who was under his care, but negligently failed to do so. (Id. at ¶ 37.) 

Plaintiffs also claim that a psychiatrist or other physician’s participation or approval was “notably 

absent” from the Decedent’s mental health treatment plan, which meant “there could be no and 

there was no proper assessment of the role his medication was to play in his treatment” and “no 

plan, or ability to implement a plan, to appropriately respond to a further increase in his acute 

suicide risk created by his refusal to take medications.” (Id. at ¶ 36.)

Defendants argue that the pleadings do not allege facts demonstrating that Suskauer was 

aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Decedent or that he disregarded that risk. (ECF No. 

34-1 at 17.) Rather than deliberate indifference, Defendants argue the pleadings support a 

negligence cause of action. (Id. at 17–18.) 

Plaintiffs’ opposition argues that Suskauer is inferred to know about Decedent’s 

depression, suicidal ideation, and history of suicide attempts, given he was the doctor who 

prescribed psychotropic medication. (ECF No. 36 at 4.) 

While the Court fails to see how Suskauer, as a psychiatrist, could have requisite control 

over the full range of suicide prevention actions that could have been taken, such as issuing tear 

resistant clothing and bedding or frequent observations by staff (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 27), Plaintiffs 

have nonetheless sufficiently stated a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Suskauer for 

his alleged failure to review and approve Decedent’s treatment plan (id. at ¶ 37), failure to 

consider how medication should fit into Decedent’s treatment (id. at ¶ 36), and failure to 

implement a plan to respond to heightened risk of suicide when his patient refuses to take 

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prescribed psychotropic medication (id.). Because the Court finds the allegations are specific to 

Suskauer’s individual conduct and not to implementation of suicide prevention policies at an 

institutional level, Taylor does not apply. Instead, the constitutional right to be free from 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is clearly established and Plaintiffs have alleged 

sufficient facts that Suskauer violated that right. As such, Suskauer is not entitled to qualified 

immunity. Further, the facts discussed above are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate 

indifference against Suskauer. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in 

favor of Suskauer on this cause of action is DENIED.

e. Defendants Heatley and Smiley 

Defendants argue that Heatley and Smiley are medical administrators and that Plaintiffs 

have alleged no facts demonstrating these Defendants had actual knowledge of a serious risk to 

Decedent’s health and safety and disregarded that risk. (ECF No. 34-1 at 19.) Defendants argue 

the SAC does not allege that either Defendant was aware of Decedent’s mental health condition, 

much less his risk of suicide. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ motion as it is directed 

to Heatley and Smiley in the First Cause of Action. (ECF No. 36-1.) If a complaint fails to state a 

plausible claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (citations omitted). Therefore, Defendants’ motion for judgement 

on the pleadings on the First Cause of Action as to Heatley and Smiley is GRANTED with leave 

to amend. 

2. Second Cause of Action – Supervisory Liability based on Customs, Practices,

or Policies 

Plaintiffs allege that the acts and/or omissions of Defendants in being deliberately 

indifferent to Decedent’s serious medical needs, health, and safety, were the direct and proximate 

result of customs, practices, or policies, or lack thereof, of Warden Lizarraga, CEO Smiley and 

CME Heatley. (ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 53–54.) The Court has previously found that Plaintiffs 

sufficiently alleged supervisory liability based on customs, practices, or policies. (ECF No. 21). 

Defendants now seek judgment in favor of Smiley and Heatley on this cause of action asserting

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qualified immunity. (ECF No. 34-1 at 14–15.)

As discussed supra with regard to Lizarraga for this same cause of action, the claims 

asserted by Plaintiffs against Heatley and Smiley are based on their failure to ensure “the proper 

implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols,” which was not a clearly established 

right at the time of Decedent’s death. Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. Consequently, Heatley and 

Smiley are entitled to qualified immunity and Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 

as to the Second Cause of Action against these Defendants is GRANTED with prejudice. 

3. Fourth Cause of Action – Failure to Supervise, Investigate, and Discipline

A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his 

or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). “A 

supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; his acquiescence in the constitutional 

deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 (citing Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

A plaintiff is not required to allege that a supervisor was physically present when the injury 

occurred. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205. 

i. Defendant Ponder

Defendants seek judgement on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of Action against 

Ponder on the basis of qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. (ECF No. 34-1 at 8.) 

As discussed supra, Ponder is not entitled to qualified immunity based on his personal 

involvement in the creation of the individualized treatment plan. However, Defendants argue that 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action names Ponder on a failure to supervise, but that Plaintiffs have 

not alleged any facts demonstrating whom Ponder failed to supervise, or how he failed to 

supervise them. (ECF No. 34-1 at 22.) Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts 

demonstrating how such failure resulted in Decedent’s suicide. (Id.) After thoroughly examining 

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the SAC, the Court agrees with Defendants that the SAC fails to allege any action or inaction by 

Ponder as a supervisor. Indeed, the Fourth Cause of Action does not mention Ponder in any 

capacity except to list him under the heading. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We do not find such facial plausibility 

met here given the dearth of relevant facts. 

Consequently, the motion for judgement on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of Action 

against Ponder is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

ii. Defendant Newman

Plaintiffs also allege under the Fourth Cause of Action that Newman failed to adequately 

supervise, investigate, and discipline employee conduct. (ECF No. 27 at ¶ 66.) In particular, the 

SAC alleges that Newman was responsible for supervising Dunne, the unlicensed trainee and 

“primary clinician” on Decedent’s treatment team but failed to competently do so. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiffs allege Newman failed to exercise any supervision over Dunne in the preparation or 

execution of the Decedent’s mental health treatment plan, even though Newman knew that such 

supervision was critically and legally required. (Id. at ¶ 35.) 

In order for Newman to be liable under § 1983 as a supervisor she must have personally 

been involved in the constitutional violation or there must be a sufficient causal connection 

between Newman’s alleged wrongful action and the constitutional deprivation. As discussed 

supra, the SAC does not allege facts indicating that Newman was personally involved in any 

deliberate indifference to Decedent’s risk of suicide. While the SAC alleges that Newman had 

some responsibility in supervising Dunne in her duties, it does not allege facts sufficient to meet 

the required causal connection between Dunne’s deliberate indifference to Decedent’s medical 

needs and Newman’s action or inaction as a supervisor. As such, Newman is entitled to qualified 

immunity based on the facts alleged. However, the Court does not find that amendment would be 

futile. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of 

Action against Newman is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

///

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iii. Defendant Suskauer

Finally, Defendants seek judgement on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of Action 

against Suskauer. Plaintiffs explicitly do not oppose this motion. (ECF No. 36 at 1.) As such, 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss Suskauer from this Cause of Action 

is GRANTED with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants

Kernan and Lizarraga’s Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants 

Dunne, Ponder, Suskauer, Newman, Heatley, and Smiley’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings, as follows:

(1) The Motion to Dismiss the First Cause of Action is DENIED as to Kernan and 

GRANTED with leave to amend as to Defendant Lizarraga;

(2) The Motion to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action against Defendant Lizarraga is 

GRANTED with prejudice;

(3) The Motion to Dismiss the Third Cause of Action against Defendant Kernan is 

GRANTED with leave to amend;

(4) The Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings as to the First Cause of Action against 

Defendants Dunne, Ponder, and Suskauer is DENIED; it is GRANTED with leave to 

amend as to Defendants Newman, Heatley, and Smiley;

(5) The Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings as to the Second Cause of Action against 

Defendants Heatley and Smiley is GRANTED with prejudice; and

(6) The Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of action against 

Defendants Ponder, Newman, and Suskauer is GRANTED with leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 27, 2020

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