Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08127/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vincent Edward Taylor, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 10-8127-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Vincent Edward Taylor, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

(Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer on September 7, 2010 (Doc. 7), and Petitioner filed

a Reply on September 20, 2010 (Doc. 8). 

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2000, an Arizona State Grand Jury for the County of Mohave charged

Petitioner with one count of molestation of a child, occurring on or between May 1, 2000 and

May 31, 2000, a Class 2 felony and a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1410. (Doc. 7, Exh. A.) On

June 10, 2002, Petitioner entered into an Alford1

 plea with the State to a charge of attempted

kidnapping, a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1304, a Class 3 felony, and a dangerous crime against

children. (Doc. 7, Exhs. B, C.) The plea agreement specified that a Class 3 felony and a

dangerous crime against children was punishable by a “presumptive term of imprisonment

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of 10 years, which the court may increase to 15 years or decrease to 5 years ... .” (Doc. 7,

Exh. B.) On July 8, 2002, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed

Petitioner on probation for a period of 5 years commencing upon the completion of a

sentence Petitioner was serving in La Paz County. (Doc. 7, Exhs. D, E.) The sentencing

minute entry indicates that the trial court advised Petitioner of his rights of appeal/review and

that written notice of those rights were provided. (Doc. 7, Exh. D.)

On March 31, 2005, nearly 3 years later, Petitioner sought the assistance of Mohave

County court personnel to resolve a dispute with the Department of Corrections. (Doc. 7,

Exh. F.) The trial court informed Petitioner that there was no matter pending before it that

would entitle Petitioner to a transcript of the sentencing proceedings. (Doc. 7, Exh. G.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 7, Exh. H.) In response

to the issue raised therein, the trial court issued a minute entry clarifying the terms and

conditions of probation it imposed in 2002. (Doc. 7, Exh. I.) The trial court later dismissed

post-conviction proceedings when a petition was not filed. (Doc. 7, Exh. J.) Petitioner did

not seek review of the court’s order.

On June 8, 2007, Petitioner appeared before the court on a petition that had been filed

to revoke his probation. (Doc. 7, Exh. K.) On August 24, 2007, the court ordered

Petitioner’s probation revoked, and imposed an 8-year, mitigated sentence for the crime of

attempted kidnapping, a Class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children, and a violation

of A.R.S. § 13-1304. (Doc. 7, Exh. L.)

On October 3, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 7, Exh.

M.) Petitioner was appointed counsel, and his appointed counsel filed an Anders Brief.

(Doc. 1, at 4.) On August 6, 2008, without a request for extension filed by Petitioner, the trial

court granted Petitioner a 45-day extension of time until September 19, 2008, to file a pro

per petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 7, Exh. N.) On August 7, 2008, the trial court

dismissed post-conviction relief proceedings after receiving Petitioner’s pro per Motion for

Credit for Time Served, which the Court construed as the pro per petition for post-conviction

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2

 Although the pleading Petitioner submitted to the trial court was not made part of

the record, in his Motion for Credit for Time Served, Petitioner requested that he receive 554

days of presentence incarceration credit for time served in custody since his arrest in La Paz

County.

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relief, denying the relief requested therein on the merits.2

 (Doc. 7, Exh. O.) Petitioner did

not file a motion for rehearing, as permitted by Rule 32.9(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., or any

additional pleading in the trial court dispelling the court of the notion that he had intended

his motion to be treated as a petition for post-conviction. On September 29, 2008, Petitioner

filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 7, Exh. P.) In the petition

for review, Petitioner categorized his claims as follows:

1. Violation of Defendant’s right to a fast and speedy trial under the 6th

Amendment of the United States Constitution and, under Article 2, subsection

24 of the Arizona Constitution.

2. Violation of Defendant’s right to not be put twice in jeopardy under the 6th

Amendment of the United States Constitution, and, under Article 2, subsection

4 and 10 of the Arizona Constitution.

3. Violation of Defendant’s right to be present at all court proceedings under

the 14th Amendment and under Article 2, subsections 4 and 24 of the Arizona

Constitution.

4. Violation of Defendant’s right to file a post-conviction relief (Rule 32)

under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, and, Article 2,

subsections 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution.

5. Violation of Defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel under the

6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and, under Article 2,

subsections 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution.

6. Violation of Defendant’s right to due process of law as outlined in Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure under the 14th Amendment of the United States

Constitution and, under Article 2, subsections 4 and 24 of the Arizona

Constitution.

(Doc. 7, Exh. P.) On December 8, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review

without comment. (Doc. 7, Exh. Q.)

On July 19, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

raising six grounds for relief. In Ground One, he alleges violation of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights based on delays in bringing him to trial. (Doc. 1 at 6.) In

Ground Two, he alleges violation of his Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights. (Doc. 1

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at 7.) In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to

present at all phases of the criminal proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 8.) In Ground Four, he alleges

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to file a post-conviction petition. (Doc. 1 at 9.)

In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to receive

credit for time served. (Doc. 1 at 10.) In Ground Six, he alleges violations of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1 at 11.)

Respondents filed an Answer on September 7, 2010 (Doc. 7), and Petitioner filed a

Reply on September 20, 2010 (Doc. 8).

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that the claims presented in Petitioner’s habeas

petition are procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue that because Petitioner cannot

establish the requisite cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, he is not

entitled to federal habeas review of these procedurally defaulted claims.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

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when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations

omitted), amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32

(2004) (claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief

... that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

Additionally, under the independent state grounds principle, a federal habeas court

generally may not review a claim if the state court’s denial of relief rests upon an

independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32.

The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without

the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

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3

 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

4

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.”

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-53 (1982)).

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Id. at 730-31. A petitioner who fails to follow a state’s procedural requirements for

presenting a valid claim deprives the state court of an opportunity to address the claim in

much the same manner as a petitioner who fails to exhaust his state remedies. Thus, in order

to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion requirement by failing to follow state

procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner is

deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

Claims may be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon a variety

of factual circumstances. If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner

attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both

“independent”3

 and “adequate”4 – review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court

is barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default

prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily

not be reviewed in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977)

and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively address

the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of

a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and

independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is

a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on

federal law. ... In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its

interests in finality, federalism, and comity.”) (citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322

F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not

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undermined where, as here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”)

(citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10).

Furthermore, a subsequent “silent” denial of review by a higher court simply affirms

a lower court’s application of a procedural bar. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803 (“where ... the last

reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that

a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the

merits”).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either direct appeal

or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to

state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for

which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h) & 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief, except

for narrow exceptions); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 (time bar). Because Arizona’s preclusion rule

(Rule 32.2(a)) is both “independent” and “adequate,” either its specific application to a claim

by an Arizona court, or its operation to preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim,

will procedurally bar subsequent review of the merits of that claim by a federal habeas court.

See Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule

are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly followed [“adequate”] in

several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

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856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (rejecting argument that Arizona

courts have not “strictly or regularly followed” Rule 32 of Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules

strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the “cause and

prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him from

following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing

of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s procedural rules

or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a petitioner’s mental

condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s failure to fairly

present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

B. Grounds One through Six

Having reviewed that record, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted

and procedurally defaulted. As previously indicated, Petitioner filed a notice of postconviction relief on October 3, 2007. (Doc. 7, Exh. M.) The trial court dismissed postconviction relief proceedings on August 6, 2008, after receiving Petitioner’s pro per Motion

for Credit for Time Served, which the Court construed as the pro per petition for postconviction relief, and denying the relief requested therein on the merits. (Doc. 7, Exh. O.)

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 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court pursuant to Rule

32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Any attempt to return to state court to

properly exhaust his claim would be futile.

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On September 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals

alleging six new grounds for relief. (Doc. 7, Exh. P.)

Presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals for the first time is not sufficient to

exhaust an Arizona state prisoner’s remedies. “Submitting a new claim to the state’s highest

court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special

circumstances does not constitute fair presentation.” Roettgen, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994)

(citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th

Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to properly exhaust a claim, “a petitioner must properly

raise it on every level of direct review.” Id. at 916.

In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of

Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies that

review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (issues

first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial court not subject to review).

In his Reply, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in construing his Motion for Credit

for Time Served as a petition for post-conviction relief. Regardless of the trial court’s

treatment of Petitioner’s request for presentence incarceration credit, Petitioner failed to

utilize the State’s procedural rules to preserve the claims for appellate review. Thus,

Petitioner’s failure to present claims to the trial court before presenting them to the Arizona

Court of Appeals precludes a finding that they have been fairly presented. Moreover,

Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the state court.5

 As a result, his

claims are procedurally defaulted. Although a procedural default may be overcome upon a

showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman, 501

U.S. at 750-51, Petitioner has not established that any exception to procedural default

applies.

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Accordingly, Grounds One through Six set forth in Petitioner’s habeas petition are

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has not established cause for his failure to raise his

claims in state court, actual prejudice, or demonstrated that a miscarriage of justice would

result if these issues are not addressed. Thus, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011.

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