Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00892/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00892-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Erroneously sued as Manoram Reddy. 

2

 Plaintiff also asserted a conspiracy claim in his First Amended Complaint, which was

dismissed without leave to amend by the Court in an Order dated April 1, 2010. (Doc. No. 38 at 12-

13, n.2.) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD STEVESON MOODY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-0892-LAB (BGS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION TO:

(1) DENY AS MOOT DEFENDANT

REDDY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6); &

(2) DENY DEFENDANT REDDY’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(5) & ALTERNATIVELY

QUASH INEFFECTIVE SERVICE

vs.

PAULETTE FINANDER, Chief Medical

Officer, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Floyd Moody, a California state prisoner currently incarcerated at Pleasant

Valley State Prison (“PVSP”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. On June 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against

Paulette Finander, K. Ball, Richard Butcher, and Manorama Reddy1

, alleging that he received

inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment2

. (Doc. No. 4.) 

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In her motion, Defendant Reddy makes several arguments concerning the statute of limitations

on Plaintiff’s claims against her. In her reply, Defendant Reddy withdraws these arguments in light

of the Court’s order granting Plaintiff an extension of time to serve (Doc. No. 58). (Doc. No. 117 at

2.) 

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Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Reddy’s motion to dismiss the FAC

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to properly serve her with the FAC.3

 (Doc. No.

103.) Defendant Reddy also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against her

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Id.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on February

3, 2011. (Doc. No. 116.) Defendant Reddy filed a reply on February 28, 2011. (Doc. No.

117.) 

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation (R&R). For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) be DENIED and alternatively that

ineffective service on Defendant Reddy be quashed. Additionally, because Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claims were dismissed without leave to amend on April 1, 2010 (Doc. No. 38 at 12-

13, n.2), the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) be DENIED AS MOOT. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on April 20, 2009, and his First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) on June 4, 2009. (Doc. Nos. 1, 4.) Because Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis

status, service of his FAC was to be carried out by a U.S. marshal at the address Moody

provided for each defendant. (Doc. No. 10.) On July 17, 2009, a summons on the FAC was

issued as to Defendant Reddy and was returned unexecuted on August 13, 2009, indicating that

the defendant was out of the country. (Doc. Nos. 11, 14.) On April 1, 2010, the Court

dismissed Defendant Reddy for Plaintiff’s failure to effect service within 120 days pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), dismissed Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against all Defendants without

leave to amend, and ordered Defendants Finander, Ball, and Butcher to answer the FAC. (Doc.

No. 38 at 21.) 

Following the Court’s dismissal of Reddy, Plaintiff filed a request to reserve Reddy.

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(Doc. No. 43.) On June 9, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time

to attempt to serve the FAC and summons upon Defendant Reddy pursuant to Rule 4(m).

(Doc. No. 58 at 6-7.) In its order, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to issue an additional

“IFP Package,” Plaintiff to complete, as accurately and clearly as possible, the new USM

Marshal Form 285 provided to him, and the U.S. Marshal to re-attempt service upon Defendant

Reddy within 30 days of receiving Plaintiff’s new USM Form 285. (Id. at 7.) On June 10,

2010, a summons was again issued as to Defendant Reddy. (Doc. No. 59.) 

On June 28, 2010, what appeared to be an executed summons as to Reddy was filed

with the clerk. (Doc. No. 61.) On the executed summons, the U.S. Marshal or Deputy certified

that at 9:25 a.m. on June 23, 2010, he or she personally served the “individual... at the address

shown above,” namely Manoram Reddy, with the summons and FAC. (Doc. No. 61.) On

October 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of Clerk’s default against Reddy because

Reddy had failed to plead or otherwise respond to the FAC within the time prescribed by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 75.) On October 8, 2010, the Clerk entered default

against Reddy and Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against Reddy. (Doc. Nos. 76,

77.) On October 27, 2010, an executed summons was filed that was identical to the summons

filed on June 28, 2010, except that it instead identified Harris Koenig as the person actually

served. (Doc. No. 83.) On November 1, 2010, Defendant Reddy filed a motion to set aside

default. (Doc. No. 84.) 

On December 1, 2010, the undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation to deny

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and to grant Defendant Reddy’s motion to set aside the

default. (Doc. No. 89.) On January 5, 2011, the Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation to set aside the default judgment and found that Defendant Reddy had not

been properly served under any provision of law. (Doc. No. 102 at 3.) Defendant Reddy now

moves to dismiss the FAC for insufficient service of process. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal

due to insufficient service of process.. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). “A federal court does not have

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jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly [with the summons

and complaint] under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 .... [W]ithout substantial compliance with Rule 4 neither

actual notice nor simply naming the defendant in the complaint will provide personal

jurisdiction.’” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, 840 F.2d 685,

688 (9th Cir.1988) (citations omitted); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986),

amended by, 807 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir.1987); see also Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.

439, 444-45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue

and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party

served.”). Once service of process is challenged, the “plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of

establishing that service was valid.” Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.2004). If

the plaintiff is unable to satisfy its burden of demonstrating effective service, the court has

discretion to either dismiss or retain the action. See Stevens v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 538 F.2d

1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1976).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant Reddy asserts that she has never been properly served pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 and therefore the FAC should be dismissed as to her. The Court agrees that

Plaintiff has not properly served Defendant Reddy with the summons and FAC. 

Service of an individual within a judicial district of the United States is governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), which states that process my be served by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of

general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following: 

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally; 

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of

abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or

by law to receive service of process.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e). 

As the Court previously found, Defendant Reddy was not properly served pursuant to

Rule 4(e)(2). (See Doc. No. 89 at 4; Doc. No. 102 at 3.) The U.S. Marshal initially filed a

return of service on June 28, 2010 indicating that Reddy was personally served. The U.S.

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The corrected summons includes an attachment of a photocopy of Harris Koenig’s business

card.

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Marshal then filed a corrected summons with the name of the person actually served, Harris

Koenig. (Doc. No. 83; Doc. No. 84-3, Tsumura Decl. ¶5.) The corrected summons makes

clear that Defendant was not personally served under Rule 4(e)(2)(A).4

 (Id.) 

The Court also previously found Plaintiff did not properly serve Defendant Reddy under

Rule 4(e)(2)(B). (Doc. No. 102 at 2-3.) The Court noted that Reddy and Koenig worked at

Alvarado Hospital, but there was no appearance that either one lived there. (Id. at 3.)

Therefore, the Marshal’s service on Koenig at the hospital was not leaving a copy at Reddy’s

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who also resides

there. 

The Court also previously noted that Koenig was not an “agent authorized by

appointment or law” capable of accepting service on Defendant’s behalf pursuant to Rule

4(e)(2)(C). (Doc. No. 89 at 4; Doc. No. 102 at 3.) The “agent” referred to in the rule is not

just an employee or business agent of some kind, rather, he or she must be an agent specifically

designated to receive the service of process. See Gerritsen v. Escobar Y Cordova, 721 F.Supp.

253, 256 (C.D.Cal, 1988). Defendant’s motion to set aside the default explained that Koenig

is CEO of Alvarado Hospital. (Doc. No. 84-1 at 2; see also Doc. No. 83 at 2.) In her

declaration made in connection with the motion to set aside default, Defendant avers that she

is a certified internist at the hospital, she is not an employee of the hospital, she does not

regularly interact with Koenig, and she was never notified by Koenig of the service. (Doc. No.

84-1 at 2; Doc. No. 84-4, Reddy Decl. ¶4.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that Koenig

and Reddy have an agency relationship of any kind. (Doc. No. 116.) In fact, Reddy declares

that she did not learn of the lawsuit until nine days after default was entered when she was

contacted by a co-defendant’s insurance adjuster. (Id.)

The Court also previously found that service was not proper under Rule 4(e)(1). (Doc.

No. 89 at 4-5.) In California, an individual may be served by delivering the summons and

complaint to someone authorized to accept service on his or her behalf. See CCP § 416.90.

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Similar to the federal rule, being a person’s agent for purposes other than to accept service is

not enough to establish actual or implied authority to accept service of process “even if their

relationship makes it highly probable that defendant will receive actual notice of the lawsuit.”

Summers v. McClanahan 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 414 (2006). Again, there is no evidence to

suggest that Koenig had been designated by Reddy to receive service on her behalf. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating valid

service upon Defendant Reddy within the extension of time under Rule 4(m) permitted by the

Court. Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant Reddy has actual knowledge of the allegations in

the FAC and this lawsuit is insufficient to defeat a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). Direct

Mail Specialists, Inc., 840 F.2d at 688. 

Upon a finding that service was not proper, the court in its discretion may dismiss the

action or quash service of process. Stevens, 538 F.2d AT 1389. Under Rule 4(m), the court

must extend the time for service if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to timely serve

and has discretion to either dismiss the action or extend time for service even if plaintiff cannot

establish good cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). The Court finds there is a good cause for the failure

to serve Defendant Reddy properly and within the time permitted by the Court. Plaintiff

provided the U.S. Marshal with Defendant’s work address and he reasonably relied on the

initial return of service indicating that Defendant Reddy was personally served by the Marshal

on June 23, 2010. (Doc. No. 61.) Plaintiff had until July 9, 2010 to return the USM Marshal

Form 285 to the U.S. Marshal, and the Marshal had 30 days from the receipt of Plaintiff’s

USM Form 285 to re-attempt service of Defendant Reddy. (Doc. No. 58 at 7.) At the latest,

the U.S. Marshal had until August 8, 2010 to serve Defendant Reddy. Plaintiff reasonably

believed service was made within this time period and had no basis to believe service was not

properly and timely effectuated until the corrected summons was filed on October 27, 2010.

(Doc. No. 83.) The Court also notes there is no reason to believe Plaintiff could not properly

execute service upon Defendant Reddy by personally serving her. Therefore, the Court

recommends denying Defendant Reddy’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5),

quashing the ineffective service of process upon Defendant Reddy, and allowing Plaintiff an

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extension of time under Rule 4(m) to attempt to effectuate proper service on Defendant Reddy.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends:

1. Defendant Reddy’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be DENIED AS MOOT;

2. Defendant Reddy’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) be

DENIED, and instead the ineffective service on Defendant Reddy be

QUASHED; and 

3. Granting Plaintiff an extension of time under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) to effectuate

proper service on Defendant Reddy and directing the U.S. Marshal, pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3), (m) and 28 U.S.C. §1915(d), to re-attempt service of the

FAC and summons upon Defendant Reddy within 30 days of the date of the

District Judge’s Order on this Report and Recommendation. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than September 9, 2011, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than September 23, 2011. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 26, 2011

 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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