Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01958/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01958-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rene Ballesteros, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-1958-PHX-ROS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Rene Ballesteros filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for first-degree murder and child abuse, and 

the imposition of concurrent sentences, the longest being 35 years. Ballesteros raises 

eight grounds for habeas relief: (1) the prosecutor failed to disclose his intent to 

introduce evidence of prior bad acts; (2) the trial court failed to give a Willits instruction; 

(3) the trial court admitted expert testimony that did not comply with Frye standards; (4) 

the trial court refused to give a lesser-included offense instruction; (5) the trial court 

improperly admitted hearsay evidence and found an aggravating factor without a jury 

finding; (6) the prosecutor committed misconduct; (7) a significant change in the law was 

not applied to Ballesteros’s case; and (8) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Respondents contend that the grounds raised are either unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted, not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding, or without merit. The Court 

recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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BACKGROUND 

The facts surrounding the convictions are summarized in the court of appeals 

memorandum decision: 

 The State charged Ballesteros with first-degree murder 

and child abuse following the March 2002 death of thirtytwo-month-old Jordan, the son of Ballesteros’s girlfriend, 

Victoria. Ballesteros lived with Victoria and Jordan in 

Victoria’s home. On the afternoon of March 21, 2002, 

Victoria went to work, leaving Jordan and Ballesteros’s fouryear-old daughter, A.B., in Ballesteros’s care. 

 According to Ballesteros, late in the evening he placed 

Jordan and A.B. in the bathtub to give them a bath and let 

them play. Ballesteros eventually took A.B. out of the 

bathtub to put her to bed. When he did so, he left Jordan 

alone in the bathtub, but drained the water level down to 

approximately two inches deep. Ballesteros testified that as 

he put A.B. to bed, he could hear Jordan’s voice and could 

hear him playing in the bathtub. Ballesteros returned to the 

bathroom a few minutes later and found Jordan unresponsive 

and half in and half out of the bathtub with his head hanging 

over the edge. Ballesteros removed Jordan from the bathtub, 

called 911, and then attempted to perform CPR as instructed 

by the 911 operator. The first emergency responder arrived at 

approximately 11:30 p.m. When he arrived, Jordan was not 

breathing. Attempts to resuscitate Jordan at the scene and at 

the hospital were unsuccessful. 

 The medical examiner and other physicians called to 

testify by the State determined that Jordan died of blunt force 

trauma to the head, and that the manner of death was 

homicide. A physician called by Ballesteros testified that in 

her opinion, Jordan drowned. Other physicians called by 

Ballesteros testified that Jordon did not die of a head injury. 

 Ballesteros’s first trial ended in a mistrial and 

dismissal without prejudice. The State subsequently indicted 

Ballesteros on the same charges and tried him a second time, 

resulting in conviction. 

(Doc. 11, Exh B at 2-3). 

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 On direct review, Ballesteros raised three issues: (1) the prosecutor’s failure to 

disclose his intent to use evidence suggesting that Ballesteros had previously inflicted 

head trauma upon the victim deprived Ballesteros of a fair trial; (2) the trial court abused 

its discretion in failing to give a requested Willits instruction; and (3) the trial court erred 

in admitting expert testimony that the victim was in a comatose state two hours before 

Ballesteros called 911 based on a scientific theory not generally accepted and recognized 

in the scientific community. In the alternative, Ballesteros argued that this expert 

testimony should have been excluded because its unfair prejudicial effect substantially 

outweighed any probative value (Doc. 1, Exh A). The Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed the convictions and sentences (Doc. 11, Exh B). Ballesteros petitioned for 

review in the Arizona Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to 

subject the expert testimony regarding the victim’s condition in a comatose state to the 

Frye standard. He also reurged his alternative argument that the trial court erred by 

refusing to exclude the testimony under Rule 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence 

“where the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice” (Doc. 1, Exh C). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Doc. 11, Exh 

C). 

 Ballesteros subsequently filed a notice of post-conviction relief (Doc. 11, Exh E). 

A review of the trial court docket indicates that appointed counsel reviewed the record 

and informed the court that he was unable to find any colorable claims. Ballesteros 

subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing six grounds for 

relief: (1) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to give lesser-included 

instructions; (2) the trial court erred in considering hearsay at sentencing; (3) the trial 

court considered aggravating factors not submitted to the jury; (4) he was denied a fair 

trial by prosecutorial misconduct, including the submission of opinion evidence without a 

Frye hearing; and (5) the trial court allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence that the 

victim had vomited on previous occasions while in Ballesteros’s care as evidence of prior 

bad acts. He also argued that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his 

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attorney failed to act as follows: (1) object to the admission of evidence of the victim’s 

prior vomiting while in Ballesteros’s care as evidence of prior bad acts; (2) adequately 

argue issues regarding the lesser-included jury instructions; (3) request a Willits

instruction; (4) produce evidence comparing Ballesteros’s hand prints to the bruising 

found on the victim; and (5) subpoena the victim’s grandmother to testify at trial (Id., 

Exh E). The trial court summarily dismissed Ballesteros’s petition, finding that claims 

one through five were precluded because they could have been or were raised on appeal. 

 In addition, the trial court denied his ineffective assistance claims on the merits 

(Id., Exh G). In doing so, the trial court issued the following ruling: 

 In order to raise a colorable claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel a defendant must present evidence that 

the attorney’s representation fell below that of the prevailing 

objective standards, and some evidence of a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different, i.e., 

prejudice. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, ¶ 23, 987 P.2d 

226, 268 (App. 1999). Mere generalizations and 

unsubstantiated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do 

not require evidentiary hearings. State v. Borbon, 146 Ariz. 

392, 706 F.2d 718 (1985). 

Introduction of Evidence Regarding Vomiting episodes: 

 A review of the record indicates that defense counsel 

made a tactical decision to introduce evidence of the child’s 

past incidents of vomiting to show no prior head trauma and 

to support his claim of accidental drowning. He introduced 

evidence that the child’s doctor had never found evidence of 

head trauma during the prior visits in which the child was 

alleged to have vomited in Defendant’s care. Tactical 

decisions will not support a finding of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals noted, the 

introduction of this evidence was not prejudicial. (See Memo 

dec. at 10). Defendant has failed to demonstrate a colorable 

claim regarding defense counsel’s decision to present this 

evidence. 

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Failure to argue against Lesser-Included Instructions: 

 Because Defendant was convicted of the greater 

offense, he can show no prejudice from the trial court’s 

decision to provide lesser-included instructions on reckless 

and negligent child abuse. As a result, his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel must also fail. 

Failure to Request a Willits Instruction: 

 The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the trial on appeal, 

found that the trial court did not err in failing to give a Willits

instruction and found that lack of such instruction was not 

prejudicial. As such, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a 

colorable claim regarding the defense counsel’s alleged 

failure to request such an instruction. 

Failure to Introduce Evidence of Hand and Finger 

Measurements: 

 Defendant next asserts that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present evidence of his hand/finger 

measurements for comparison to the bruises found on the 

child. However, Defendant’s assertion, without more is 

insufficient to raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. He presents no affidavits, records, or other 

evidence that would support his claim that such evidence 

would have changed the outcome of the trial or that counsel’s 

actions fell below what is generally required. As such, 

Defendant again fails to raise a colorable claim that would 

require a hearing on this matter. 

Failure to Subpoena Lenora Rader: 

 Lastly, Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to subpoena the victim’s grandmother who would 

have testified that the child had fallen and hit his head prior to 

the day the child was left in Defendant’s care. Once again, 

this Court need not review counsel’s actions or inactions as a 

review of the record shows that this evidence was presented 

to the jurors through the child’s father’s testimony as well as 

a hospital nurse who confirmed that the child’s grandmother 

had confirmed the fall. Defendant cannot show prejudice and 

has failed to raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

(Id.). 

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EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

 A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of 

habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To 

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's 

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 839-846 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal 

process or through appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has 

been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the 

federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 

F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 

F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th

Cir. 2001). A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process or a fair 

trial, is insufficient to achieve fair presentation. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 

(9th Cir. 2000). The exhaustion requirement will not be met where the Petitioner fails to 

fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. 

 If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the 

federal court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 

(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the 

federal court may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state 

remedies. Id. However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy 

were he to return to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th

Cir. 1989). The federal court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner 

can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his 

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noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

 Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state 

court, but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court 

opinion contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground 

"that is both 'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the 

court's decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is 

"independent" unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits 

of the federal claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856 (2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or 

regularly followed.'" Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn 

v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted 

his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, just as in cases involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal 

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage 

of justice or cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750-51. 

 “Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may 

establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at 

trial.” Martinez v. Ryan, ____U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). A prisoner may 

show cause for default of an ineffective assistance claim by demonstrating that this claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is a substantial one, that the claim has merit. 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. 

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DISCUSSION 

Procedurally Defaulted Claims 

 In Ground Four, Ballesteros contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

refusing to provide lesser-included offense jury instructions. In Ground Five, Ballesteros 

alleges that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence and by finding an 

aggravating factor without a jury determination. In Ground Six, he argues that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct, including the admission of opinion evidence without a 

Frye hearing. He raised each of these claims for the first time in his post-conviction 

proceedings, and the court found the claims precluded because they could have been 

raised on appeal. In addition, Ballesteros did not file a petition for review in the court of 

appeals. Because the court found the claims precluded, and because Ballesteros did not 

present the issues to the court of appeals, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Swoopes, 

196 F.3d at 1010. In addition, Ballesteros cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or 

cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. 

 In Ground Seven, Ballesteros argues that a significant change in the law was not 

applied to his case in violation of his fourteenth amendment rights. In his petition for 

post-conviction relief, he placed a check-mark on the pre-printed statement that relief was 

based on ‘[t]he abridgment of any other right guaranteed by the constitution or the laws 

of this state, or the constitution of the United States, including a right that was not 

recognized as existing at the time of the trial if retrospective application of that right is 

required.” Assuming this constitutes a fair presentation of the claim, he never petitioned 

for review, making the claim procedurally defaulted. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. In 

addition, Ballesteros cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual 

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. 

 In Ground Eight, Ballesteros alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of 

counsel. He raised this specific claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, but failed 

to raise the claim in a petition for review, making it procedurally defaulted. Swoopes, 

196 F.3d at 1010. Ballesteros argues in his reply that Martinez should apply in this case 

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as an excuse for his default because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel “at 

trial and in the first phase of his state collateral proceedings.” See Doc. 14 at 9. The 

Court finds that Martinez does not excuse the default in this case. The holding in 

Martinez is limited to attorney errors in the initial-review collateral proceedings. The 

holding in Martinez “does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, 

including . . . petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.” Martinez, 

132 S.Ct. at 1320. Ballesteros cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and 

actual prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. 

Merits Discussion 

 In Ground One, Ballesteros contends that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by 

failing to disclose that she intended to present evidence that Ballesteros had previously 

inflicted head trauma on the victim. On direct review, the court of appeals ruled that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial or grant a new trial 

based on an alleged violation of Rule 15.1(b)(7) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. This Court’s review is limited to federal constitutional issues. A claim that 

the admission of evidence violated state procedural rules is not reviewable in a federal 

habeas proceeding. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Thus, the Court’s 

review is limited to whether the admission of the evidence violated Ballesteros’s due 

process rights. 

 The Court concludes that the admission of the evidence did not result in a 

violation of Ballesteros’s due process rights. As the court of appeals pointed out, 

Ballesteros first raised the issue of prior vomiting incidents in his opening statements, and 

again in his cross-examination of the victim’s mother. He also elicited testimony from 

the victim’s pediatrician that she had not received any report of vomiting at a January 

visit. She also testified that at both the January and February visits, she diagnosed the 

victim with ear infections, and that nothing in her examinations indicated that the victim 

suffered head injuries. The court of appeals went on to state that even if the State had 

violated Rule 15.1(b)(7) by not disclosing its intent to introduce the evidence, Ballesteros 

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could not have been surprised by it because he knew from police reports that the victim’s 

mother had claimed that the victim was in Ballesteros’s care both times the prior 

vomiting had occurred. Therefore, the court concluded that nothing would have 

prevented Ballesteros from moving in limine to preclude the introduction of the evidence. 

Finally the court of appeals noted that Ballesteros had not shown any prejudice because 

the pediatrician’s testimony effectively negated any implication that the victim had 

suffered a head injury while in Ballesteros’s care, which he also emphasized in closing 

argument. 

 In Ground Two, Ballesteros argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

refusing to provide a Willits instruction regarding a bottle of vodka and a beaker of blood. 

In order to be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must prove both that the State 

failed to preserve exculpatory, material, accessible evidence, and resulting prejudice. See

Arizona v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 503 (1999). The Willits instruction is based on 

state law, and the court of appeals found as a matter of state law that Ballesteros was not 

entitled to a Willits instruction. Thus, the decision is not reviewable in a federal habeas 

proceeding. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). In addition, there is no clearly 

established federal law requiring a Willits instruction. To establish a due process 

violation when the State fails to preserve evidence that is only potentially exculpatory, 

Ballesteros must demonstrate that the State acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 

488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988). 

 Ballesteros told police during his initial interview that he had heard a noise in the 

kitchen the night before, and later saw an open bottom cupboard with a bottle of soda, a 

bottle of Kahlua, and a bottle of vodka. That is the only mention he made to the police at 

that time about alcohol. When the police searched the house that day, they had no reason 

to suspect that the victim had ingested alcohol. It was not until the autopsy report was 

issued several weeks later that it was revealed for the first time that the victim had a 

blood alcohol level of .04. Ballesteros then requested that the State obtain and preserve 

the alcohol bottles observed in the cupboard. The State eventually obtained the Kahlua 

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bottle and other items, but the vodka bottle was no longer there. When the State first 

learned about the potential materiality of the bottle, it did not have the bottle in its 

possession. For this reason, the court of appeals could not say that the State had failed to 

preserve material evidence, thus entitling Ballesteros to a Willits instruction. The court 

also was not persuaded that the presence of a child’s fingerprints on the bottle would 

have tended to exonerate Ballesteros. Finally, the court of appeals ruled that Ballesteros 

had failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. There was no evidence that either of 

the children had opened the bottle or drank from it. Testimony from the victim’s mother 

indicated that the victim was unable to get his own drink, could not pour a drink, and 

could not pour anything into a cup. Ballesteros corroborated this testimony. Ballesteros 

has not established any due process violation. 

 Ballesteros never requested a Willits instruction regarding the beaker of blood 

containing blood from the victim’s skull. Therefore, the court of appeals reviewed the 

trial court’s ruling to determine if it was fundamental error. There was conflicting 

evidence about whether the blood was fresh, as the State’s experts opined, or from an old 

hemorrhage, as the defense experts contended. The court of appeals concluded that the 

experts did not need to conduct independent tests on the blood in order to render their 

respective opinions. The defense experts were able to use slides of the victim’s tissue to 

support their conclusion that the blood was old. The court of appeals concluded that the 

trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to sua sponte give a Willits

instruction, and that Ballesteros suffered no prejudice from the absence of the instruction. 

 In Ground Three, Ballesteros argues that the trial court improperly admitted 

certain expert medical testimony that Jordan was in a comatose state two hours before 

Ballesteros called 911, based upon “neuronal changes” observed in the victim’s tissue 

and “gastric emptying.” He argues that the opinion is based on a novel scientific 

principle not generally accepted in the scientific community, and that it should have been 

excluded because its unfair prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative 

value. The court of appeals initially noted that Frye was inapplicable because the opinion 

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was based upon the expert’s own observation, experience, and study, and therefore the 

validity of such an opinion is tested by interrogation of the witness, quoting Logerquist v. 

McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 490 (2000). 

 The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court properly permitted the jury 

to determine the weight to be given this evidence, having heard contradicting opinions 

from other witnesses, including two witnesses called by the State. Finally, the court of 

appeals found that Ballesteros had not suffered prejudice from the admission of this 

particular part of the expert’s opinion. The court reasoned that his opinion regarding the 

timing of the victim’s injury was not based solely on neuronal changes and gastric 

emptying, but also on the presence of a fresh subdural hematoma, fresh injury sites, and 

the fact that the victim had been reported to have been functioning normally on the night 

of the injury. 

 As with Grounds One and Two, the court of appeals analyzed the issue based on 

state evidentiary law. Thus, the decision is not reviewable in a federal habeas 

proceeding. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780, unless the ruling “offends some principle of justice 

so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 

197, 201-202 (1977)). The Court concludes that the admission of such testimony did not 

violate due process. It was offered primarily to establish the credibility of the witnesses, 

including Ballesteros, who testified at trial. In addition, the expert’s own credibility was 

challenged through cross-examination. Moreover, other physicians, including other 

experts testifying for the State, also challenged the expert’s opinion. Ballesteros has not 

established that the admission of this evidence violated any fundamental right. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Rene Ballesteros’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied either because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

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ruling debatable, or because Ballesteros has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 9th day of April, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-01958-ROS Document 15 Filed 04/09/14 Page 13 of 13