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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 10, 2016*

Decided March 11, 2016 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2119 

MIYKAEL MUHAMMAD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al. 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:13–cv–02916 

John Robert Blakey, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Miykael Muhammad sued the City of Chicago and others for allegedly violating 

his civil rights during a traffic stop when a police officer forced him to take a field 

sobriety test. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During discovery Muhammad failed repeatedly to 

answer fully the defendants’ interrogatories, even after the district court ordered him 

twice to do so. To sanction his obstinacy, the district court dismissed his suit with 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-2119 Page 2 

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Because we conclude that 

the sanction was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

Discovery in this case did not go smoothly. Muhammad objected to most of the 

defendants’ interrogatories, so the defendants moved the district court to compel 

answers. Among other requests, the defendants wanted Muhammad to disclose some 

biographic facts: all the names “by which [he] ha[s] been known,” his “current and past 

driver’s license number(s),” and whether he has previously been “pulled over, stopped, 

or arrested.” The district court ordered Muhammad to answer the interrogatories within 

two weeks. It reasoned that the interrogatories do not “seek to inquire into privileged 

subjects,” created no “undue burden,” and were relevant to the suit. 

 Muhammad responded nearly a month after the deadline, but the defendants 

believed that his answers were incomplete, so they sought further relief. Muhammad 

said that “Miykael Farad Muhammad” was the name that “Allah-Jahovah-God” gave 

him “before” he was born in “the aboriginal year of 15062.” He failed to say whether he 

was known by other names. He also failed to acknowledge a driver’s license, asserting 

that he does not “own” any “government numbers” because God has endowed him with 

the “right to travel the planet.” And he refused to discuss any past traffic stops and 

arrests, proclaiming that he disagreed with “the meaning of the Defendant’s language.” 

The defendants filed a second motion to compel, which the district court referred (along 

with general discovery supervision) to a magistrate judge. That judge ordered 

Muhammad to explain why she should not recommend sanctions under Rule 37(b). 

Muhammad responded that he had never been served with the second motion to compel 

and that the defendants’ interrogatories violated his rights. The defendants countered 

that Muhammad’s suit should be dismissed for his intransigence. 

 The magistrate judge granted the defendants’ second motion to compel and 

ordered Muhammad to provide complete answers in 10 days. She reiterated the district 

court’s prior ruling that the interrogatories were relevant and not unduly burdensome 

and admonished that, by filing his suit, Muhammad had accepted the obligation to 

respond to discovery requests. As for sanctions, she concluded that because dismissal is 

a drastic remedy and Muhammad is proceeding pro se, she would permit a final 

opportunity to comply. She warned, however, that she would “view further 

noncompliance as willful and done in bad faith.” 

Eventually the court lost its patience. Muhammad refused to amend his 

responses, instead remonstrating that he did not consent to proceed before a magistrate 

judge and disputing the conclusion that his previous answers had been inadequate. The 

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No. 15-2119 Page 3 

magistrate judge recommended that the district judge dismiss the suit. She reasoned that 

Muhammad had squandered his opportunities to answer the interrogatories, and his 

repeated non-compliance—causing a five-month delay—was willful and in bad faith. 

She also observed that, because Muhammad was proceeding in forma pauperis, 

monetary sanctions would be ineffective. Two weeks later the district judge, noting that 

Muhammad had not objected to the recommendation, adopted it in its entirety and 

dismissed the case with prejudice. Muhammad moved the district court to reconsider 

the sanction, asserting that he had not received the recommendation. But the district 

court concluded that Muhammad offered no new reason to reconsider its dismissal of 

the suit and denied the motion. 

On appeal Muhammad first argues that dismissal of his suit was improper 

because he did not consent to a magistrate judge. Consent was not needed because a 

district judge, not the magistrate judge, dismissed his case. And no consent was 

necessary for the magistrate judge to supervise discovery and recommend sanctions to 

the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Egan v. Freedom Bank, 659 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 

2011). 

Muhammad next argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 

the suit. He contends that the harsh sanction of dismissal was unwarranted given his 

lack of legal expertise. True, a dismissal under Rule 37 is a severe sanction; it requires a 

finding of willfulness, bad faith, or fault. See Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 467 

(7th Cir. 2003). But the district court reasonably found that, by twice disobeying orders 

to provide the names that he’s been known by, his driver’s license numbers, and traffic 

stops and arrests, Muhammad displayed willful, bad-faith conduct. The requests were 

simple and easy to answer. And they were relevant because they sought basic data about 

Muhammad’s identity, and his criminal history, which could affect his credibility. The 

district court thus permissibly concluded that Muhammad evaded these requests out of 

an uncooperative lack of candor, rather than an absence of legal skills, so sanctions were 

needed. See e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 

weigh not only the straw that finally broke the camel’s back, but all the straws that the 

recalcitrant party piled on over the course of the lawsuit.”); Long v. Steepro, 213 F.3d 983, 

986 (7th Cir. 2000). And the district court considered lesser sanctions, see Maynard, 

332 F.3d at 468, but reasonably found that a monetary sanction would be ineffective 

because Muhammad lacked funds; therefore deterrence required a dismissal. 

Muhammad also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for 

reconsideration, arguing that he had provided evidence that he was not notified of the 

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No. 15-2119 Page 4 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. But Muhammad’s motion did not raise 

any objections to the recommended dismissal, other than repeating the baseless protest 

to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. In any case, we have considered all of his 

arguments raised on appeal, and they are unavailing. The district court therefore 

properly concluded that Muhammad had not presented any new basis warranting 

reconsideration of the dismissal. See Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 

2014). 

AFFIRMED. 

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