Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00136/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN DION ROSS,

Inmate Booking No. 18172404,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY; SAN DIEGO 

POLICE DEP’T; UNDERCOVER

OFFICERS,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-0136-BAS-LL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT SUA 

SPONTE FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF 

CAN BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & § 1915A

Sean Dion Ross (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the George Bailey Detention 

Facility (“GBDF”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages against the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) and 

several unknown SDPD officers. (See ECF No. 1, Compl. at 1–2.) Plaintiff claims officers

violated his Fourth Amendment rights during his July 11, 2018 arrest and he spent “3 days 

for no reason” in the San Diego County Jail. (Id. at 3.) He seeks $30,000 in both general 

and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a) to commence a civil action when he filed his Complaint. Instead, he has filed a 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF

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No. 2.) For the reasons herein, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and 

dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a claim.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of 

$50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, 

§ 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

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month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate authorized 

by a San Diego County GBDF Facility Commander. (See ECF No. 2 at 4); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate attests 

that Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of $45.36 and had average monthly 

deposits of $174.00 to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the 

filing of his Motion. At the time of filing, Plaintiff had an available balance of $90.72.

(See ECF No. 2 at 4.) Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses 

his initial partial filing fee to be $34.80 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the Court will direct the Facility Commander of GBDF, or his designee, 

to collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the 

time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall 

a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to sua 

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sponte dismissal if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 

(holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 

permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 

state a claim.”). 

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of 

misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “When there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states 

a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those 

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 

1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Although the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is 

pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.

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of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discussion

1. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff claims he was approached on July 11, 2018 by a “young lady and a young 

man” who asked Plaintiff if he was selling drugs. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges the “young 

man” told Plaintiff “he was looking to purchase 20 dollars’ worth of methamphetamine.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff asked him for identification but the man refused and “walks off down the 

street” followed by the “young lady.” (Id.) Plaintiff continued to walk to his “destination 

when [he] was pulled over by the San Diego Police.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he was told 

by the unnamed SDPD officer that he was being arrested for a “drug deal that [Plaintiff] 

was involved in.” (Id.) The “arresting officer found targeted mark money on the young 

lady.” (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to the “San Diego Police Station where [Plaintiff] waited 2 

to 4 hours in the back of a police car.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the “young lady was 

questioned about [Plaintiff’s] involvement in the drug deal and she told the officer what he 

already knew, that [Plaintiff] had nothing to do with her selling the undercover drugs.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was transported to the San Diego County Jail where he “stayed 3 days for no 

reason and released with no charges.” (Id.)

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

First, to the extent Plaintiff names the SDPD as a Defendant, he fails to state a claim 

upon which Section 1983 relief may be granted. Departments of municipal entities are not 

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“persons” subject to suit under Section 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement department 

(like the SDPD) is not a proper party. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 

993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an 

appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); 

Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes 

liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ 

Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”).

“Persons” under § 1983 are state and local officials sued in their individual 

capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, and/or the 

local governmental entity itself. Vance, 928 F. Supp. at 995–96. The SDPD is managed by 

and/or a department of the City of San Diego, but it is not a “person” subject to suit under 

§ 1983. See e.g., United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[M]unicipal 

police departments and bureaus are generally not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning 

of section 1983.”); Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 2013 WL 5946112 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“Although 

municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell [v. Dep’t of 

Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as 

the police departments, are not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of 

§ 1983.”); Nelson v. Cty. of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(dismissing Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from section 1983 action “with prejudice” 

because it “is a subdivision of a local government entity,” i.e., Sacramento County); 

Gonzales v. City of Clovis, 2013 WL 394522 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that the 

Clovis Police Department is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983); Wade v. Fresno 

Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 2353525 at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (finding the Fresno Police 

Department to not be a “person” under section 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue 

any Section 1983 civil rights claims against the SDPD. See Boone v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l 

Tr. Co., No. 2:16-CV-1293-GEB-KJN-PS, 2017 WL 117966, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 

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2017) (“Because the Solano County Sheriff’s Department is not a ‘person’ within the 

meaning of Section 1983, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claims against it under that statute 

as a matter of law.”).

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against the County or City of San 

Diego itself, his allegations are also insufficient. A municipal entity is liable under Section 

1983 only if Plaintiff alleges his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting 

pursuant to the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. 

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic 

Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). The County and City of San Diego may 

not be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 simply based on allegedly 

unconstitutional acts of its employees. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] a municipality cannot be held liable solely 

because it employs a tortfeasor.”); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Instead, the municipality may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. 

Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010).

3. Fourth Amendment Claims – Unidentified Officers

Plaintiff also claims that several unidentified SDPD officers violated his 

constitutional rights when they arrested him and subjected him to “unlawful detainment” 

on July 11, 2018. (Compl. at 3.)

2

 

2

 Plaintiff also invokes his right to “freedom from cruel and unusual punishment,” (Compl. at 3), 

but claims relating to police conduct during an arrest must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 

its reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989); Estate of Lopez ex rel. 

Lopez v. Torres, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2015); see also Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 

1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fourth Amendment “sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the 

treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to 

be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest.”); Nuno v. Reyes, No. 1:18-cv-0263-DADSKO, 2018 WL 1795982, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2018).

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The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and 

“reasonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.” Birchfield v. 

North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016). Reasonableness is generally assessed by 

carefully weighing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify 

the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Cty. of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017); Zion v. Cty 

of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 368, 

388 (1989)). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts to show how or why 

the unidentified SDPD deputies he seeks to sue lacked probable cause for his seizure. His 

pleading offers no further “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference” that any individual person acted unlawfully under the circumstances. See Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (noting that while Plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations,” in 

order to state a plausible claim for relief, he must provide “more than . . . unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.”) (citation omitted).

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dubner v. City & Cnty. of 

San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Probable cause exists when there is a 

fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” United States v. Patayan 

Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]he determination of probable cause is 

based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time” of the arrest. 

Id.; see also Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). “If an 

officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor 

criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest 

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the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

Plaintiff alleges no facts to plausibly suggest Defendants lacked probable cause to 

arrest him on July 11, 2018. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 918; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The validity 

of an arrest, “does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere 

fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to 

the validity of the arrest.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (citations 

omitted); Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[W]here probable 

cause does exist civil rights are not violated by an arrest even though innocence may

subsequently be established.”); see also Sanchez v. Arpaio, No. cv-09-1150-PHX-LOA, 

2010 WL 3938353, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[T]he fact that the disorderly conduct 

charge against Plaintiff was later dismissed ... [is] not relevant to determining the existence 

of probable cause at the time of arrest.”).

Finally, before he can state any Fourth Amendment violation against the SDPD

officers he seeks to sue under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify them by name. An effective

summons cannot issue in an IFP proceeding for use by the U.S. Marshal who may be 

charged with effecting its service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d) until and unless Plaintiff’s pleading survives the initial screening required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and it names the individual persons whom he claims are liable. See

Aviles v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Doe defendants must 

be identified and served within [90] days of the commencement of the action against them); 

Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, No. cv 18-00249 DKW-KJM, 2018 

WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25, 2018).

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua 

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which Section 1983 relief can be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Rhodes, 

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621 F.3d at 1004.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Facility Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $34.80 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available at 

the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Facility 

Commander, George F. Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300, San Diego, 

California 92158.

4. DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim upon which Section 1983 relief 

can be granted.

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. 

Plaintiff must file this amended pleading no later than March 18, 2019. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

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If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint by the foregoing deadline, the Court 

will enter a final Order closing this case based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and his failure 

to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 

427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the 

opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint 

into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2019

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