Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-08121/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-08121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1446pl Petition for Removal - Product Liability

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SONIA DUNN-RUIZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, 

INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 19-cv-08121-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND AND VACATING HEARING 

Re: Dkt. No. 13 

 Before the court is plaintiff Dunn-Ruiz’s motion to remand. The matter is fully 

briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for 

February 12, 2020 is VACATED. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully 

considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, 

the court hereby rules as follows. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard 

Removal jurisdiction is based entirely on federal statutory authority. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441–55. A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of 

which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal 

district court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) 

(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 

between . . . citizens of different States”). “The amount in controversy includes claims for 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 1 of 7
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

general and special damages (excluding costs and interests), including attorneys fees, if 

recoverable by statute or contract, and punitive damages, if recoverable as a matter of 

law.” Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 

1998). 

“To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a defendant must file in 

the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for removal.’ When removal is based on diversity of citizenship, an amount-incontroversy requirement must be met. . . . If the plaintiff's complaint, filed in state court, 

demands monetary relief of a stated sum, that sum, if asserted in good faith, is ‘deemed 

to be the amount in controversy.’ When the plaintiff's complaint does not state the 

amount in controversy, the defendant's notice of removal may do so.” Dart Cherokee 

Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(a) & (c)(2)) (citing § 1446(c)(2)(A)). 

“[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant's amount-incontroversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or 

questioned by the court.” Id. at 87. “If the plaintiff contests the defendant's allegation, 

§ 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs: ‘Removal . . . is proper on the basis of an amount in 

controversy asserted’ by the defendant ‘if the district court finds, by the preponderance of 

the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 

88. “[W]hen a defendant's assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged[,] . . . 

both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. 

Once confronted with a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibarra v. Manheim 

Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he removing defendant, has 

the burden of proof on this. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, if the 

evidence submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federalcourt jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 2 of 7
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking 

removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.”) 

(citations omitted). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, 

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Both “parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or 

declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 

controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants cannot rely simply upon “conclusory allegations.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). “As with other important areas of our 

law, evidence may be direct or circumstantial.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. 

If a defendant has improperly removed a case over which the federal court lacks 

diversity jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the case to state court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

B. Analysis 

 Plaintiff argues that the complaint states a claim for breach of warranty for a single 

vehicle, the value of which is below $75,000—a 2016 Audi A7 diesel. She argues that 

she seeks “actual damages” limited to $25,000, additional damages for pain and suffering 

limited to $25,000, and an unspecified quantity of punitive damages. Separate from the 

complaint, plaintiff has “reserve[d] the right to seek punitive damages in the amount of 

$24,999.00” in a default judgment proceeding. See Dkt. 1-5. Moreover, plaintiff states in 

her motion that she would not seek any damages that would exceed “the $75,000 

threshold.” Mot., Dkt. 13 at 3 (“The value of this action is well below $75,000 in total. 

Moreover, by way of this additional notification, Plaintiff commits to damages, in total, not 

to [exceed] $75,000.”). 

Defendant argues that California prohibits a plaintiff in a personal injury suit from 

specifying the amount of damages being sought (California Code of Civil Procedure, 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 3 of 7
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

§ 425.10(b)), such that plaintiff could not in her complaint set forth the amount of 

damages she is seeking. However, her complaint did specify that she is seeking 

damages for personal injuries, intentional tort, product liability, fraud, and breach of the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Suits prevailing on similar legal theories have 

resulted in damages awards exceeding $75,000. See Winterman Decl., Dkt. 15; RJN, 

Dkt. 16. 

Defendant argues that, as a matter of California law, plaintiff’s separate statement 

of reservation regarding punitive damages (Dkt. 1-5) is not binding. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 425.115(c) (“If the plaintiff seeks punitive damages pursuant to Section 3294 of 

the Civil Code, and if the defendant appears in the action, the plaintiff shall not be limited 

to the amount set forth in the statement served on the defendant pursuant to this 

section.”). 

Plaintiff responds that, because she paid $57,000 for the used automobile at issue 

in this action, “Defendant’s allegation that the case value can reach above $75,000 is 

incorrect due to impossibility.” Reply, Dkt. 17 at 1. She also argues that, because this is 

a “recall issue, it is quite certain the value of this case shall not reach $75,000.” Id. at 2. 

Finally, she argues that, given that the nature of the case is “small” (or perhaps, a 

“smell”), the total recovery for the suit “would not reasonably be expected to” exceed 

$75,000. Id. Plaintiff also speculates that she may not prevail on the punitive damages 

question. 

The initial pleading does not specify the quantity of damages the court can “deem[] 

to be the amount in controversy,” (28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)), other than indicating that the 

case is an unlimited civil case, where the amount demanded “exceeds $25,000.” Compl., 

Dkt. 1-2 at 1. Accordingly, defendant now bears the burden of demonstrating the amount 

in controversy, and it “must support [its] allegations by competent proof”—not mere 

allegation. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010). 

Defendant first points to plaintiff’s “statement of damages” indicating the she seeks 

$25,000 in costs for repairing her vehicle and $25,000 in damages for pain and suffering. 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 4 of 7
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

Dkt. 1-4. This satisfies defendant’s burden to show, by a preponderance, that at least 

$50,000 is at stake in the litigation. Additionally, the parties agree that plaintiff “reserve[d] 

the right” to seek $24,999 in punitive damages in the event of default judgment. Dkt. 1-4. 

But that reservation of rights—which is unlikely to be applicable given defendant’s active 

litigation efforts—is not particularly relevant in evaluating the amount in controversy. That 

declaration is not a statement of the quantity of damages that plaintiff will seek; rather, it 

is a reservation of rights merely in the event of default, as outlined by California Code of 

Civil Procedure § 425.115. Defendant is correct in arguing that the reservation “is of no 

force and effect in terms of limiting the amount of damages that can be awarded.” Opp., 

Dkt. 14 at 4. It is also not particularly strong evidence that $24,999 of punitive damages 

is actually in controversy. 

Defendant makes a single additional argument. It argues that it has found 

summaries of proceedings in two other cases about odors in cars which have resulted in 

judgments exceeding $75,000.1 The court is not surprised to learn that defense counsel 

was able to identify descriptions of two actions alleging violations of the Song-Beverly 

Consumer Warranty Act that resulted in judgements exceeding $75,000.2 That is where 

defendant’s analysis begins and ends—“there are California state court automotive 

lemon law verdicts reported in LEXIS involving allegations of unusual odors/smells in 

vehicles,” and two have resulted in verdicts over $75,000. Defense counsel makes no 

attempt to argue that this action is analogous in any relevant way to those two cherry1

 Defendant’s request for judicial notice claims to attach “[t]he verdict rendered” in two 

actions, although no verdict forms, docket entries, or other materials from any court 

proceeding are attached. Dkt. 16 at 1 ¶¶ 1–2. Rather, the defendant attaches two 

summary descriptions of proceedings from a website called “verdictsearch.com” 

apparently sourced through LexisNexis. Plaintiff has not challenged these materials, and 

the court has considered them. 

2

 The court also notes that defendant describes the Hounslow action as resulting in a 

$149,439 verdict (Opp. at 3), although defendant fails to note that “[a]s part of the verdict, 

the Hounslows returned the vehicle,” which was originally purchased for $143,998. See 

Dkt. 16-2 at 4–5. That said, it appears that the $149,439 figure does not include the 

approximately $100,000 in attorneys’ fees granted to the Hounslows. See id. 

Defendant’s briefing does not address these points at all, and the summary descriptions 

defendant has filed with the court are not entirely clear on these points. 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 5 of 7
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

picked cases, other than to argue that each concerns a smell in the plaintiff’s car. 

Defendant does not explain, for example, that the Hounslow case awarded total 

damages within $6,000 of the purchase price of the car. See Dkt. 16-2 at 4–5. Nor does 

defendant explain that the Doppes case awarded $215,400 in breach of warranty 

damages for a car purchased for $192,000—about 12% more than the purchase price of 

the car. If analogized to this action, the Doppes verdict would suggest that this action 

has an amount in controversy under $64,000. Nor does plaintiff make any attempt to 

explain why the $100,000 in damages awarded for general personal injury damages in 

Doppes (separate from the breach of warranty claim) is analogous in any respect to this 

case. See MIC Philberts Investments v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., No. 1:12-CV0131 AWI-BAM, 2012 WL 2118239, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (defendant “made no 

effort to compare the facts of those cases with the alleged facts of this case.”). 

But even if this guesswork about Doppes and Hounslow suggested that the 

present action would concern damages totaling $75,000, the court would still be left to 

wonder why it should expect this action to resemble those actions. Other than the fact 

that each concerns a smell in a car, defendant has offered the court no reason to believe 

that this case would resemble the two that it cites in terms of the quantum of damages 

and fees.3 In particular, defendant offers no discussion at all about the facts underlying 

the requests for punitive damages in any of the three cases. 

In short, defendant has done no more than rely on “conjecture, speculation, or star 

gazing” to establish the requisite amount in controversy. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, 

Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2010). “[I]t would be inherently speculative for this 

Court to conclude that the amount in controversy requirement can be met by simply 

asserting that large punitive damage awards have been awarded in the past against 

insurance companies” for claims based on fouls smells in cars. See Conrad Assocs., 

994 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Haisch v. Allstate Insurance Co., 942 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 

3

 Defendant has not made any argument with respect to attorneys’ fees. 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 6 of 7
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

(D. Ariz. 1996)). Defendant has not met its burden to show by a preponderance that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 by simply pointing to two cherry-picked cases 

where verdicts exceeded $75,000—one of which may not even have had such a 

verdict—and making no attempt to explain whether or how those cases are analogous to 

the present action, or why the court should otherwise consider them instructive as to the 

amount in controversy. “Defendant has also not provided a sound basis for this Court to 

estimate a potential award of damages, and the Court will not speculate. The evidence 

offered by Defendant is too vague to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” MIC Philberts 

Investments, 2012 WL 2118239, at *6; accord Conrad Assocs., 994 F. Supp. at 1201 

(“Defendant’s burden cannot be met simply by pointing out that the complaint seeks 

punitive damages and that any damages awarded under such a claim could total a large 

sum of money, particularly in light of the high burden that must be met in order for a 

plaintiff even to be eligible for receipt of discretionary punitive damages.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED and the court 

REMANDS this action to the Contra Costa County Superior Court. The hearing 

scheduled for February 12, 2020 is VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 3, 2020 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton 

Case 4:19-cv-08121-PJH Document 18 Filed 02/03/20 Page 7 of 7