Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05107/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05107-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRAN PANDE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION (f/k/a

CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATION), a

Delaware corporation, and CHEVRON

INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION AND

PRODUCTION (f/k/a CHEVRONTEXACO

OVERSEAS PETROLEUM COMPANY), a

division of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-5107 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING IT IN

PART

Defendants Chevron Corporation (f/k/a ChevronTexaco

Corporation) and Chevron International Exploration & Production

(f/k/a ChevronTexaco Overseas Petroleum Company), a division of

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., (collectively Defendants) move for summary

judgment, arguing that there are no triable issues as to any

material fact and, therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Plaintiff Kiran Pande opposes the motion. The

matter was heard on January 5, 2007. Having considered all of the

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1

After the merger with Texaco, Chevron Overseas Petroleum,

Inc. became ChevronTexaco Overseas Petroleum Company, which is now

Defendant Chevron International Exploration and Production. 

2

papers filed by the parties, the evidence cited therein and oral

argument, the Court grants Defendants' motion in part and denies it

in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an American citizen who was born in India,

immigrating to the United States when she was two years old. In

1988, Plaintiff was hired as a research engineer in the Chevron Oil

Field Research Company. In 1995, Plaintiff was transferred to

Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc.,1

 located in San Ramon,

California. Plaintiff received numerous promotions. Her

evaluation for 1999 stated that she was a valued member of the

engineering team. It noted, "She has very good business skills to

compliment her technical ability. Her career interests would be

better served if she were given an opportunity to work in a

Commercial, Planning or Corp. Finance assignment." Pande Dec.,

Ex. A.

In the fall of 2000, Rex Mitchell, the manager of Chevron

Overseas Petroleum's Business and Strategic Planning group, hired

Plaintiff to work in his group. Earlier in the year, he had

interviewed Plaintiff for an open position and, although he had not

selected her for that position, he was impressed with her. Thus,

when another position opened in his group, he sought her out and

offered her a position as a business analyst. Mr. Mitchell states

that his group is demanding and that Plaintiff was assigned to this

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group because she, like other employees in the group, is welleducated, very intelligent and high-achieving. 

In October, 2001, shortly after the merger with Texaco, Mr.

Mitchell selected Plaintiff to fill a vacant Portfolio Analysis

position. Plaintiff states that Mr. Mitchell told her that he

considered the Portfolio Analysis position to be a higher level

than her position at the time and he promised to promote her a

grade. According to Mr. Mitchell, however, he did not commit to

promoting Plaintiff. Mr. Mitchell states that, while he considered

the Portfolio Analyst position to be the most analytically

demanding position in his group, he explained to Plaintiff that, in

part due to the merger with Texaco, accepting this position would

not come with a promotion; all promotion recommendations would be

evaluated in the spring of 2002. He explained that, if Plaintiff

developed in the Portfolio Analyst position as expected, she stood

a good chance of earning a promotion in the spring. 

Plaintiff claims that soon after she became the Portfolio

Analyst, Mr. Mitchell began to harass and discriminate against her

based on her gender and national origin. Mr. Mitchell admits that

he criticized Plaintiff, but contends it was based, not on her

gender or national origin, but rather on her lackluster

performance. He states that, after she expressed her unhappiness

about not being promoted, Plaintiff's performance declined. She

failed to complete several assignments, creating additional work

for her co-workers. 

In March, 2002, Plaintiff complained to Mr. Mitchell's

supervisor, James Johnson, telling him that she felt unfairly

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2

The co-worker denies stating that she overheard Mr. Mitchell

refer to people of Indian origin as "towel heads." She states that

she has never heard him make any kind of racial slur or comment

reflecting negatively on any individual's racial or ethnic

background, nor has she heard him make any negative comments about

women.

4

singled out by Mr. Mitchell and that Mr. Mitchell was overburdening her with work. In her declaration, she states that, at

that same meeting in March, she told Mr. Johnson that a co-worker

told her that Mr. Mitchell referred to people of Indian origin as

"towel heads."2 In her deposition, however, Plaintiff stated that,

during her first meeting with Mr. Johnson, she did not tell him

that Mr. Mitchell was harassing her based on her gender and race or

national origin. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Johnson did nothing

to investigate her complaints. Instead, he told her that she had

three choices: (1) leave the company; (2) leave the group; or

(3) stay for twelve to eighteen months and get along with Mr.

Mitchell. 

According to Mr. Johnson, Plaintiff informed him in early

March, 2002, that she was having problems with her supervisor, Mr.

Mitchell, largely because he ranked her a "2" on her review, when

she thought she should have been ranked a "1." A "2" ranking

indicates that the employee "Fully Meets Performance Expectations";

a "1" ranking indicates "Exceptional Performance." Mr. Johnson

contends that it was not until the following month, in late April,

that he learned that Plaintiff's complaint related to her gender

and national origin. 

Mr. Johnson states that he took all of Plaintiff's complaints

seriously and investigated Plaintiff's allegations; he spent hours

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meeting with Plaintiff, Mr. Mitchell and anyone else whom Plaintiff

identified as a potential witness or someone with potential

knowledge of the issues she raised. But he never found anything to

suggest that Mr. Mitchell discriminated against Plaintiff or anyone

else. He informed Plaintiff of the results of his investigation

and urged her to move past her disagreements with Mr. Mitchell and

make a success of her remaining time in his group.

In the spring of 2002, after reporting Mr. Mitchell's conduct

to Mr. Johnson, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint alleging

discrimination and harassment by Mr. Mitchell. She filed it with

Gary Yamashita, the Ombuds individual designated to hear complaints

concerning workplace harassment and discrimination. In her

complaint, Plaintiff also alleged that Mr. Johnson refused to

investigate her earlier complaint of discrimination and harassment.

In April, 2002, Plaintiff met with Mr. Mitchell to discuss her

annual performance review. She told him that his behavior towards

her was inappropriate and constituted harassment. He apologized

and attributed his behavior to stress and informed her that she was

not being promoted. Plaintiff contends that she and the only other

woman in his group were ranked lower than the men in the group and

received lower raises and merit increases than all the men in the

group. This contention, however, is based on hearsay. Mr.

Mitchell states that several male employees who worked under him in

the group were also ranked as "2"s during this time period and that

persons in his group who obtained the lowest pay increases were

male employees, not Plaintiff and the only other female employee. 

His statement is not hearsay, nor is it based on hearsay evidence.

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That same month, Mr. Yamashita held a meeting with Plaintiff,

Mr. Johnson and the other female employee, who also filed a

complaint against Mr. Mitchell. Although the meeting was supposed

to be investigatory, Plaintiff states that it turned into an attack

by Mr. Johnson on her performance. According to the other female

employee, Mr. Yamashita did not redirect the conversation to the

women's complaints against Mr. Mitchell. Plaintiff expressed her

concern about Mr. Mitchell's use of an ethnic slur to refer to East

Indians, but those concerns were essentially ignored. Plaintiff

claims that Mr. Yamashita did not properly investigate her

complaint. Instead, he met with Mr. Mitchell and, when Mr.

Mitchell denied any wrongdoing, Mr. Yamashita ended his

investigation. 

After meeting with Mr. Yamashita, Plaintiff states that Mr.

Mitchell excluded her from work-related meetings. He isolated her

from the work group and, according to Plaintiff, impeded her

ability to advance within the company. She learned that Mr.

Mitchell had been saying negative things about her. An e-mail a

co-worker forwarded to Plaintiff, written by another co-worker,

asked:

What is the problem between Rex and Kiran Pandy [sic]? We

were considering her for a position that will open up in

Fernando Gaggino's group, and Rex told him things like "she's

not a team player", "she pouts", etc. Real career killers.

Thompson Dec., Ex. B.

Because positions in Mr. Mitchell's group were short-term

positions, lasting less than two years, Plaintiff had to find a new

position. She applied for two positions in late 2002: one in the

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Project Resources Company and another in the Strategic Planning

division. She was not selected for either position. Instead, she

claims, she was forced to take a less desirable job as a Simulation

Engineer in the Southern Africa Strategic Business Unit. 

Jack Dunn was Plaintiff's supervisor in the Southern Africa

Strategic Business Unit. Although she was no longer under Mr.

Mitchell's supervision, Mr. Mitchell had input into whether she

would receive a merit pay increase. In April, 2003, Mr. Dunn

informed Plaintiff that she was not receiving a merit pay increase. 

This was the first time since she began working at Chevron that she

did not receive a merit pay increase.

At first, Mr. Dunn was pleased with Plaintiff's work, finding

that she was an asset to the group. In the spring of 2003,

however, Mr. Dunn's opinion of Plaintiff's performance changed

after it was announced that the Southern Africa Strategic Business

Unit was being transferred from San Ramon to Houston, Texas. 

Employees, such as Plaintiff, were offered the opportunity to

relocate to Houston. If an employee declined the offer to work in

Houston, he or she had to find a new position. Employees were

informed that there was no guarantee that alterative employment

would be found. 

In June, 2003, Plaintiff received her relocation offer

package; she did not accept the offer. Rather, she applied for

several openings for positions which would allow her to remain in

San Ramon. She did not get any of the jobs for which she applied. 

She states, however, that Mr. Dunn offered her continued work in

San Ramon on a project which would last through most of 2004 and

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that she agreed to work on the project. Mr. Dunn denies offering

her continued work. 

According to Mr. Dunn, after learning that her job was being

transferred to Texas, Plaintiff was less focused on her work. 

Another employee also testified that, after the move to Houston was

announced, he saw a reduction in Plaintiff's commitment levels and

her work effort. 

In October, 2003, Plaintiff, in consultation with her

physician, decided that she needed surgery, requiring her to take a

medical leave. She filled out all the required paperwork,

including medical release forms. Plaintiff states that she

notified Mr. Dunn that she requested a leave of absence beginning

on November 10, 2003. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Dunn asked what

was wrong with her. When Plaintiff refused to tell him, Mr. Dunn

continued to ask her questions about her condition and symptoms,

including asking if she had cancer and discussing cancer

treatments. Plaintiff contacted human resources regarding Mr.

Dunn's questioning and was assured that Mr. Dunn would be given no

private information about Plaintiff. 

Mr. Dunn denies ever asking Plaintiff, or anyone else, about

Plaintiff's medical condition. According to Mr. Dunn, after he

received an email that Plaintiff was taking a leave, he went to

Plaintiff's office to find out how long she was going to be out. 

When he could not find Plaintiff, he called the number on the email

to find out the expected duration of the leave and to see if

Plaintiff was alright; he did not ask about specifics.

 

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Shortly after learning that Plaintiff was taking medical

leave, Mr. Dunn met with his group to discuss its progress in

preparing for the upcoming move and the group's upcoming review. 

According to Plaintiff, at this meeting, Mr. Dunn started yelling

at her in front of all her co-workers. He shouted that Plaintiff

was going on medical leave and that he wanted to know how her work

was going to get done. Plaintiff states that his behavior made her

cry. Another co-worker complained to Mr. Dunn's supervisor about

Mr. Dunn's behavior during the meeting, stating that Mr. Dunn was

speaking too loudly and pointing his finger at Plaintiff, and it

clearly upset Plaintiff. Mr. Dunn admits to raising his voice

during the meeting, but he denies it was directed only at

Plaintiff. He also denies mentioning that Plaintiff was going on

medical leave; he only stated that Plaintiff was not going to be

there and inquired into what plans she had made to transition her

work to another employee. 

On November 7, 2003, Plaintiff emailed Mr. Dunn to request

that her twenty-eight unused vacation days be carried over to 2004. 

Mr. Dunn responded, "Let's discuss." Although they never did

discuss it, Mr. Dunn states that his concern was that it was not

customary to carry over that many vacation days. 

Three days later, Plaintiff began her medical leave as

scheduled. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Dunn called Plaintiff to let

her know that human resources would be sending her a letter

confirming the effective date of her termination. Plaintiff

received the letter, which stated that, by turning down the offer

to work in Houston, she had, in effect, resigned from the company. 

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If she was not selected for another company position, her last day

of employment would be December 31, 2003. 

On December 8, 2003, Plaintiff sent a letter to the human

resources department, contending that she never voluntarily

resigned her employment. She stated that she was never told that,

if she did not accept the relocation offer, her employment with the

company would continue only until year-end 2003. She also stated

that, before she went on medical disability, she was offered work

through 2004 and planned to return to work. In the letter,

Plaintiff further disclosed that she was subject to harassment by

Mr. Mitchell and while in Mr. Dunn's group. 

That same day, Plaintiff also filed an administrative

complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing. The complaint stated that Plaintiff experienced on-going

retaliation for reporting harassment and discrimination based on

race, gender and national origin as well as harassment and

retaliation for requesting medical leave protected under the Family

Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and California's Family Rights Act (CFRA).

In December, while Plaintiff was still on medical leave, Paul

Vita contacted Plaintiff about two job openings for petroleum

engineers with Chevron's Energy Technology Company; both positions

were located in San Ramon and the supervisor of those jobs was Zuwa

Omoregie. Plaintiff met the job requirements to be considered for

these two openings and applied for the jobs. As part of the

selection process, Mr. Omoregie asked Mr. Dunn about Plaintiff. 

Mr. Dunn responded that Plaintiff had strong technical skills and

was very bright and capable. He noted, however, that her job

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performance had suffered during the last half of the year, after it

was announced that the division was relocating to Houston.

Nonetheless, there was a job in Houston waiting for Plaintiff if

she wanted to move. Mr. Omoregie also learned that Plaintiff's

former supervisors, Jean Camy and David Kennedy, rated her poorly

in terms of teamwork. Mr. Camy, who was on the selection team for

the two open positions, stated that, given his experiences working

with Plaintiff and her negative attitude, he would not work with

her again. Plaintiff was not selected for either position.

On December 31, 2003, Plaintiff's employment was terminated.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

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F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings eight causes of action against Defendants. 

Her first two causes of action allege that Defendants violated the

FMLA and CFRA. Her third, fourth and fifth causes of action claim

that Defendants, in violation of California's Fair Employment and

Housing Act (FEHA), discriminated against her based on her gender

and race or national origin and retaliated against her. 

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy. Her seventh cause of action is for

violation of her right to privacy under the California

Constitution; her last cause of action alleges that Defendants

violated the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. 

Defendants contend that all these causes of action fail as a matter

of law because Plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue of

material fact. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that a reasonable jury

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3Because the "CFRA adopts the language of the FMLA and

California state courts have held that the same standards apply," 

Liu, 347 F.3d at 1132, n.4, the Court analyzes Plaintiff's FMLA and

CFRA claims together, often only referring to the FMLA.

14

could find in her favor with respect to her claims under the FMLA

and CFRA, her claims under FEHA, based on discrimination and

retaliation by Mr. Mitchell, and her claim for wrongful termination

in violation of public policy. She does not, however, oppose

Defendants' motion to the extent it attacks her allegations that

Mr. Dunn discriminated against her based on her gender and race or

national origin. She consents to dismissal of her seventh and

eighth causes of action.

I. FMLA and CFRA Claims

Plaintiff contends that she was terminated, in part, because

she took medical leave. She further claims that Defendants'

policies violate the FMLA and CFRA. Defendants argue that summary

judgment should be granted in their favor on all of Plaintiff's

claims arising under the FMLA and the CFRA.

As the Ninth Circuit explains, "The FMLA provides job security

and leave entitlements for employees who need to take absences from

work for personal medical reasons, to care for their newborn

babies, or to care for family members with serious illnesses." Liu

v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).3 It entitles

qualifying employees to take unpaid leave for up to twelve weeks

each year. An employer violates the FMLA by impermissibly using an

employee's FMLA leave as a factor in the decision to terminate the

employee. Id. at 1135. Nonetheless, when an employee is

terminated for business reasons unrelated to leave status, the FMLA

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is not implicated. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) ("An employee has no

greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions

of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed

during the FMLA leave period.").

A. Termination

Plaintiff argues that she presents evidence that her medical

leave was a factor in Defendants' decision to terminate her

employment, noting that such can be proven through either direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Liu, 347 F.3d at 1136. She points to

the offer to continue working in San Ramon through 2004 that Mr.

Dunn allegedly made before he learned that she was taking medical

leave, an offer revoked after she took the leave. Plaintiff points

out that she asked Mr. Dunn about using her vacation time for 2003

in 2004, suggesting that she planned to continue working in her

position throughout 2004. She also notes that he yelled at her at

a meeting, in front of co-workers, after he learned she was taking

medical leave.

Defendants emphasize that Mr. Dunn denies that he ever made

such an offer and that there is no paperwork to support this

alleged offer. They point out that Plaintiff's own actions suggest

that Mr. Dunn never offered to extend her position. For example,

she continued to look for other positions; and, before she went on

medical leave, she sent an email to human resources inquiring about

severance benefits and stating that if she was not successful in

finding another position she would likely be forced to leave the

company. Although these actions cast doubt on Plaintiff's claim

that she was offered a position, the Court finds that there is a

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triable issue of fact as to whether the medical leave taken by

Plaintiff was a factor in her termination. A reasonable jury could

find Plaintiff credible, believe that Mr. Dunn offered to extend

her position and conclude that he then revoked that offer because

Plaintiff requested and took medical leave.

Plaintiff also contends that, after Mr. Dunn learned that

Plaintiff was taking medical leave, he adversely affected her

ability to find another job. She points to the negative comments

he made to Mr. Omoregie about her performance, which hindered her

chances of being hired for the engineer positions. Defendants

argue that there is no evidence that Mr. Dunn's evaluation of

Plaintiff had any effect on her not being hired. They contend that

Plaintiff was not hired because of comments by Mr. Camy, who told

the selection committee that, given his experiences working with

Plaintiff and her negative attitude, he would not work with her

again. Although this evidence supports Defendants' argument that

Mr. Dunn's negative comments were inconsequential, the Court finds

that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Mr.

Dunn impermissibly considered the medical leave taken by Plaintiff

in evaluating Plaintiff and as to whether his evaluation caused

Plaintiff not to be hired for the two open positions, resulting in

her ultimate termination.

Defendants argue that, regardless, they should be granted

summary judgment because Plaintiff was terminated solely because of

a business decision to relocate her position and that she would

have been terminated even if she had not been on medical leave. 

The decision to relocate Plaintiff's group to Houston was made

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months before Plaintiff requested medical leave. Plaintiff was

offered a position in Houston, but, as noted above, Plaintiff

refused to relocate and rejected the offer. Employees were warned

that, if they did not relocate, they had to find another position

within the company or risk being terminated. Plaintiff attacks

Defendants' argument that her termination was the result of a

business decision, contending that this is an affirmative defense,

which Defendants failed to plead and, therefore, cannot now prove. 

This contention is without merit. Defendants point to their fourth

affirmative defense entitled "Good Faith/Legitimate Business

Reasons." Nonetheless, the Court finds, as discussed above, that a

disputed issue of material fact remains as to whether the medical

leave taken by Plaintiff was an impermissible factor in her

inability to obtain a new position which, in turn, led to her

termination. A jury, not this Court, must determine whether

Plaintiff was terminated solely because of a business decision to

relocate her position to Houston, Texas or whether the medical

leave was a factor in her termination. 

B. Defendants' policies

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the FMLA and CFRA by

implementing an across-the-board policy of certifying leave only in

thirty-day increments. A FMLA regulation, for example, provides,

"If the minimum duration of the period of incapacity specified on a

certification furnished by the health care provider is more than 30

days, the employer may not request re-certification until that

minimum duration has passed unless one of the conditions set forth

in paragraph (c)(1), (2) or (3) of this section is met." 29 C.F.R.

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§ 825.308(b)(1). To support this claim, she cites a letter sent to

her from UnumProvident, Defendants' Disability Management Program

Administrator. Merely citing this letter, however, does not

support Plaintiff's claim that Defendants' policy violates the FMLA

and CFRA. 

The letter provides, in part, "You may be required to provide

periodic medical re-certification of the serious health condition

if you request an extension of your absence or as otherwise

permitted by law" and "during your protected absence, you will be

required to furnish the FMLA Unit at UnumProvident with periodic

reports once every thirty days of your status and intent to return

to work." Pande Dec., Ex. B. As Defendants point out, there is

nothing contrary to the law in these provisions. It is not illegal

to require an employee to provide updates on his or her status and

intent to return to work. The FMLA specifically provides, "An

employer may require an employee on FMLA leave to report

periodically on the employee's status and intent to return to

work." 29 C.F.R. § 825.309(a). Plaintiff's claim that Defendants'

policy contained in the letter violates the FMLA and CFRA is

without merit.

Plaintiff further claims that Defendants' policies violated

her rights, under the FMLA and CFRA, to confidentiality and privacy

in her medical records. Defendants acknowledge that the FMLA and

CFRA limit the amount and type of information that an employer can

require for purposes of determining FMLA and CFRA eligibility. 

But, as they note, an employer can require more information for

purposes of assessing eligibility for temporary disability

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4In their reply, Defendants, for the first time, argue that 

Plaintiff has no evidence of discriminatory animus and, therefore,

her discrimination claims fail on the merits as a matter of law. 

As recognized in this district, "It is well settled that new

arguments cannot be made for the first time in reply." Contratto

v. Ethicon, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 304, 309 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, the

Court does not consider these arguments. The Court pointed out at

the hearing, however, that Plaintiff's discrimination claims are

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benefits. Here, the information sought and releases Plaintiff

signed were for disability benefits, not FMLA and CFRA eligibility. 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show that Defendants violated

any privacy provision in the FMLA or the CFRA. 

C. Summary

Because there are disputed issues of material fact, the Court

denies summary judgment in Defendants' favor as to part of

Plaintiff's FMLA and CFRA claims: Plaintiff's claims that she was

denied new positions and terminated because she took a medical

leave. However, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendants'

favor as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants' policies are

inconsistent with the FMLA and CFRA and that Defendants violated

Plaintiff's right to confidentiality and privacy in her medical

records. 

II. FEHA Claims

As Plaintiff makes clear in her opposition, she contends that

Mr. Mitchell discriminated against her on the basis of her gender

and race or national origin and then retaliated against her after

she reported the discrimination. Defendants argue that these

claims are time-barred and, therefore, the Court should grant

summary judgment in their favor on all of Plaintiff's claims

arising under the FEHA.4

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based on hearsay evidence. Unless Plaintiff identifies a relevant

hearsay exception, which she was unable to do at the hearing, that

evidence would not be admissible at trial. 

20

 Under the FEHA, a complainant must file an administrative

charge within one year of the alleged unlawful act. See Cal. Govt.

Code § 12960. Here, Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination

on December 8, 2003. The last day she worked under Mr. Mitchell's

supervision, however, was December 6, 2002, one year and two days

before she filed her complaint. Defendants contend that,

therefore, her claims are barred as a matter of law. Plaintiff

responds that her claims based on Mr. Mitchell's actions are saved

by the continuing violation doctrine. She contends that his

adverse actions continued into 2003, when she was denied a merit

pay increase based, in part, on his evaluation of her performance. 

Defendants acknowledge that the continuing violation doctrine can

operate to extend the statute of limitations in FEHA cases, but

they argue that the doctrine does not apply here.

The California Supreme Court instructs that the continuing

violation doctrine applies when “the employer's unlawful actions

are (1) sufficiently similar in kind -- recognizing . . . that

similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of

harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may

take a number of different forms; (2) have occurred with reasonable

frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence.” 

Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1059 (2005)

(quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 823 (2001)).

In Richards, the California Supreme Court explained that, when

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an employer engages in a continuing course of unlawful conduct

under the FEHA and this course of conduct does not constitute a

constructive discharge, 

the statute of limitations begins to run, not necessarily when

the employee first believes that his or her rights may have

been violated, but rather, either when the course of conduct

is brought to an end, as by the employer's cessation of such

conduct or by the employee's resignation, or when the employee

is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct

will be in vain. 

26 Cal. 4th at 823 (emphasis in original). The California Supreme

Court recognized that a strict approach to the statute of

limitations could encourage early litigation. Id. at 819.

Therefore, it instructed that, to minimize the filing of unripe

lawsuits and to promote the conciliatory resolution of claims, the

FEHA statute of limitations should be interpreted liberally to

allow employers and employees an opportunity to resolve disputes

informally. Id.

Applying those factors and interpreting the FEHA statute of

limitations liberally, the Court finds that the continuing

violations doctrine may apply here. As noted above, Plaintiff

presents evidence that Mr. Mitchell's alleged discrimination

continued in 2003, when she was denied her merit pay bonus based,

at least in part, on his evaluation of her performance. Mr. Dunn

stated that the raise, or lack thereof, "in early 2003 would have

been related to her performance prior to her coming on my team." 

Dunn Dep., 21:24-25. A trier of fact could find that, it is at

that point, within the statute of limitations, that Mr. Mitchell's

allegedly discriminatory conduct against Plaintiff ended and the

statute of limitations began to run. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for

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5

Both parties submitted objections to the other parties'

evidence. To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to

which there is an objection, the parties' objections are overruled. 

To the extent that the Court did not rely on such evidence, the

parties' objections are overruled as moot. The Court has not

relied on any inadmissible evidence in deciding this motion. 

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discrimination may not be time-barred.

Nor is Plaintiff's retaliation claim under FEHA time-barred as

a matter of law. As discussed above, Plaintiff provides evidence

that Mr. Mitchell continued to retaliate against her after December

6, 2002. Although she no longer worked under him, Mr. Mitchell

allegedly influenced whether Plaintiff would receive a merit pay

bonus in April, 2003. She did not. 

The Court denies summary judgment in favor of Defendants on

Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims, finding that

they are not time-barred as a matter of law and, therefore, there

are triable issues of fact concerning Plaintiff's FEHA claims. 

III. Wrongful Termination Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails as a

matter of law because her other claims fail. The Court, however,

has found that there are triable issues of fact as to Plaintiff's

FEHA claims and part of her claims brought under the FMLA and CFRA. 

Therefore, the Court finds that there is also a triable issue of

fact as to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination and denies

Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket No. 35) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.5

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Specifically, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Defendants'

favor as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants' policies are

inconsistent with the FMLA and CFRA and that Defendants violated

Plaintiff's right to confidentiality and privacy in her medical

records, but DENIES summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims,

under the FMLA and CRFA, that she was denied new positions and

terminated because she took medical leave. The Court DENIES

summary judgment as to Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation

claims under FEHA. The Court also DENIES summary judgment on

Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim, but GRANTS summary judgment

in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's seventh and eighth causes

of action for violation of her right to privacy under the

California Constitution and violation of the California

Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/17/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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