Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00340/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00340-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 07cv0340

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS GENE MAYFIELD, JR., Civil No. 07cv0340-JLS (WMc)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

vs.

L. E. SCRIBNER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Janis L.

Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Thomas Gene Mayfield, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro

se with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner alleges that his right to due process

under the California and United States Constitutions has been violated by the finding of

unsuitability for parole by the Board of Parol Hearings (hereinafter “Board”), and by the state

courts in denying his claims challenging the finding of unsuitability. (First Amended Petition

[“FAP”] at 6-8.) 

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Respondent L. E. Scribner (hereinafter “Respondent”) has filed an Answer. (Doc. No.

20.) Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because: (1) the majority

of Petitioner’s arguments rely on state law only, and therefore fail to state a claim for federal

relief; and (2) the adjudication of Petitioner’s claims by the state courts was neither contrary to,

nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 9-16.) Petitioner has filed a

Traverse. (Doc. No. 24.) 

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

On May 17, 1985, Petitioner was sentenced to a state prison term of 23 years-to-life

following convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit murder while armed with a firearm

and three counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 1.) Petitioner’s minimum

parole eligibility date was October 10, 2000. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr.

at 1.)

On December 28, 2004, Petitioner was found unsuitable for parole following his second

parole suitability hearing, the hearing at issue in this case. (Id. at 48.) During that hearing, the

presiding commissioner read a summary of Petitioner’s commitment offense into the record,

which Petitioner agreed was accurate. (Id. at 10-12.) The summary is as follows:

The offense was due to a drive-by shooting committed because of gang retaliation.

On 8/27/83, Mayfield and other Elm Street Gang members were at a dance in

Gardena, California, where members of the Southwest Gang were present. One

of the gang members started a fight resulting in the death of one Elm Street Gang

member and Mayfield being stabbed in the arm. On 8/30/83, Mayfield and Elm

Street Gang members Rosales and Montalvo, a minor, met at Rosales’ residence.

Mayfield talked about what happened at the dance and said he wanted to go back

to Gardena to get revenge against the Southwest Gang. The three left in

Montalvo’s car. On route, they passed a car occupied by the four victims, Rosa

and Leticia Hernandez, whose residence is in the Elm Street area, and who lived

with boyfriends, Albert Estrada and Robert Gutierrez, Southwest Gang members.

Unable to catch up with the victims’ car, the three went to a residence where

Rosales got a .3030 rifle. At the residence, Rosales got into the bed of a truck

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belonging to Rodriquez with Rodriquez driving, Montalvo in the middle, and

Mayfield on the right of the cab. As they drove to the Hernandez residence,

Mayfield told Rosales he would tell him when to fire. As they approached the

location at 2647 (indiscernible), South Gate, California, all four victims were in

front. Mayfield yelled, go for it, fire, at which point Rosales fired several shots.

One struck Estrada in the leg causing substantial injury. Another ricocheted and

struck Rosa Hernandez in the hip, puncturing an artery and killing her. The other

victims were fired upon but not hit. Mayfield was identified as a suspect and his

prints were lifted from Rodriquez’ truck. He was arrested inside his residence and

advised of his rights. He denied that he had been with either of the defendants on

8/30/83, nor in or around Rodriquez’ truck. Mayfield agreed to take a polygraph

test, the results of which disclosed he was deceptive in his answers.

(Id.) 

The Board found that Petitioner was not yet suitable for release on parole because he

“would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” (Id. at 48.) The Board rested its decision on several factors. First was Petitioner’s

commitment offense, which the Board found to be dispassionate and calculated, involved several

victims, and had a motive which was extremely trivial and “defies logic.” (Id. at 48-49, 52.)

Other reasons given were Petitioner’s denial of his participation in the crimes at the time he was

arrested, and the fact that Petitioner was a 20 year-old married adult with a child at the time of

the offense who had no business being involved in gang activities. (Id. at 49, 52.) The Board

noted Petitioner has a history of assaultive behavior beginning when he was a juvenile in 1976,

continuing in 1977 when he was arrested for assault with intent to commit murder, and that he

has an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and an unstable social history. (Id.) The Board

found Petitioner had not yet sufficiently participated in self-help programs, and noted he had

received 14 disciplinary violations while in prison, two of them serious. (Id. at 49-50.) A

psychological report placed Petitioner’s risk of violence at a moderate level, but concluded there

was a need for a longer period of observation and treatment because Petitioner attributes the

underlying causes of the offense more to associations and circumstances rather than

acknowledging the pattern which led to his conviction. (Id. at 50, 52.)

/ / /

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Petitioner challenged the unsuitability finding in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

filed in the San Diego County Superior Court on August 19, 2005, which was denied in a written

order. (Lodgment No. 8.) On January 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal presenting the same claims raised here. (Lodgment No. 9.) The

appellate court denied the petition on February 2, 2006 in a brief, one-paragraph order.

(Lodgment No. 10.) On May 22, 2006, Petition filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Supreme Court of California, again raising the same claims as are presented here, which was

summarily denied on December 20, 2006. (Lodgment Nos. 11-13.) 

III.

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Petitioner claims that his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution, and under the California Constitution, were violated by:

(1) The Board’s finding of unsuitability for parole because that finding was based on

irrelevant information, misapplied criteria and insufficient evidence; 

(2) The denial of habeas relief by the state courts because the state courts did not consider

all the facts and evidence as required by state law; and,

(3) The Board’s failure to duly consider his application for parole. (FAP at 6-8.)

IV.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

as to any claim presented.

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

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As discussed in detail below, the claims presented in the First Amended Petition here

were adjudicated on their merits in the state courts. As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent: (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. An unreasonable

application may also be found, “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

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Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) (West 2006). In order to satisfy this

provision, Petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court’s

adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

340 (2003). 

B. Clearly established federal law applicable to Petitioner’s claims.

Clearly established federal law provides that Petitioner may demonstrate a procedural due

process violation by showing that: (1) a federally-protected life, liberty or property interest exists

“which has been interfered with by the State”; and (2) “the procedures attendant upon that

deprivation were constitutionally [in]sufficient.” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The Supreme Court has recognized a federally-protected liberty

interest in the expectancy of release on parole arising from state parole statutes. See Greenholtz

v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (recognizing that “the

expectancy of release provided in” a Nebraska parole statute “is entitled to some measure of

constitutional protection,” but emphasizing that the statute “has unique structure and language

and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on

a case-by-case basis.”); see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987)

(holding that mandatory language in Montana parole statute, like the Nebraska statute, created

“a presumption that parole will be granted,” thereby giving rise to a protected liberty interest).

The Ninth Circuit has applied Greenholtz and Allen to find that mandatory language in

the California parole statute “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole,”

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), which is “created, not upon the grant

of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915

(9th Cir. 2003). The liberty interest in a finding of suitability for parole is created by Cal. Penal

Code § 3041, which provides that a parole release date “shall” be set after the prisoner has

served his minimum term, unless the Board “determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

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is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration”

for the prisoner. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902. California has

promulgated regulations establishing criteria tending to show suitability and unsuitability for

parole, the relative importance of which “in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.”

See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)-(d).

Respondent argues that, irrespective of the state statutes and regulations requiring release

on parole unless certain criteria are met, the only clearly established federal law in the context

of a state parole hearing is Greenholtz, which provides that an inmate is entitled to an

opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons denying parole, and nothing more. (Ans.

Mem. at 12.) Respondent is correct that Greenholtz held that when an inmate is afforded “an

opportunity to be heard” at a state parole hearing, and is informed “in what respects he falls short

of qualifying for parole,” the inmate has been given “the process that is due.” Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 16. However, in Superintendent of the Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), the

Supreme Court held that the deprivation of a state-created liberty interest in good-time prison

custody credits comports with the minimum requirements of due process only when the findings

of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. Id. at 455-56.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the “some evidence” standard of Hill is clearly established

federal law for AEDPA purposes applicable to state parole proceedings “because ‘both directly

affect the duration of the prison term.’” Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jancsek v. Oregon Board of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390

(9th Cir. 1987)). 

The Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that Hill’s “some evidence” standard is clearly

established federal law applicable to state parole hearings for AEDPA purposes. Irons v. Carey,

505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007). Respondent contends that the holdings of Biggs, Sass and

Irons have been called into question by the intervening Supreme Court opinion in Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), which Respondent contends clarified that when the Supreme

Court has not addressed a particular issue or applied a test to a particular factual situation, there

is no clearly established federal law applicable to the issue. (Ans. Mem. at 13.) Thus, because

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the “some evidence” standard of Hill has not been applied to parole hearings by the United

States Supreme Court, Respondent contends that AEDPA precludes its application here. (Id.)

Respondent acknowledges that this argument has been rejected by a panel of the Ninth Circuit,

but argues that because that decision is currently pending before an en banc panel, this Court is

free to hold that Musladin overruled Biggs, Sass and Irons. See Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d

536, 542-38 (9th Cir. 2008), rehearing en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. May 16, 2008).

The Court need not determine the exact contours of federal due process protections afforded to

state prisoners in parole hearings. As will be seen, even under the holdings of Irons, Sass and

Biggs that the “some evidence” standard of Hill represents clearly established federal law

expounding the due process requirements to which Petitioner is entitled, his due process rights

were not violated in connection to his parole hearing. 

The Sass Court, interpreting Hill, held that due process requirements are satisfied if “some

evidence” exists in the record to support the parole board’s decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128.

“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The Ninth

Circuit has also held that “the evidence underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia

of reliability.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (quoting Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390).

C. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Petitioner claims his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution, and under the California Constitution, were violated by: (1) The

Board’s finding of unsuitability for parole because that finding was based on irrelevant

information, misapplied criteria and insufficient evidence (claim one); (2) the denial of his

claims by the state superior and appellate courts because those courts did not consider all the

facts and evidence in the manner required by state law (claim two); and, (3) the Board’s failure

to duly consider his application for parole (claim three). (FAP at 6-8.)

To the extent any aspect of these claims rest solely on the application of California’s

Constitution, laws or regulations, without implicating federal due process, Respondent is correct

that they do not present a cognizable claim. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)

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(holding that federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law). However, as set forth

above, Petitioner has a state-created, federally-protected liberty interest arising from the

expectancy of release on parole created by state law. Many of the arguments presented by

Petitioner in support of his claims, both here and in the state courts, necessarily rely on the

allegedly improper application of the state laws and regulations which inform and constrain the

Board’s discretion in making a finding of parole suitability. It is in fact these very constraints

which create the federally-protected liberty interest at stake. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Allen,

482 U.S. at 377-78. However, Petitioner’s federal due process rights are adequately protected

if “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [parole]

board.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). As set forth in detail below,

Petitioner argued in the state courts, as he does here, that the “some evidence”standard was not

met by the Board’s decision, and the state courts erred in finding the “some evidence” standard

was satisfied. Because those claims were denied on their merits, Petitioner is entitled to federal

habeas relief only if the adjudication of his claims by the state courts was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Petitioner presented his claims to the California Supreme Court in a habeas petition in the

same manner as they are presented here. (Lodgment No. 11.) That petition was denied in an

order which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment No. 13.)

Petitioner presented the same claims to the appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No.

9.) The appellate court denied that petition in an order which stated in full:

The court has read and considered the petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed January 13, 2006. The petition is denied. The record submitted reflects

some evidence to support the decision of the Board of Prison Terms. Accordingly,

that decision is supported, and the superior court correctly denied the habeas

corpus petition filed in that court. (In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061,

1071, 1080; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 664-665.)

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Mayfield, Case No. B188415, order at 1.)

The superior court found there was “some evidence” to support the Board’s six findings

indicating unsuitability for parole. (Lodgment No. 8, In re Mayfield, No. BH003552, order at

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1

 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(1) provides that “Circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability

include: (1) Commitment offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner. The factors to be considered include: (A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same

or separate incidents. (B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder. (C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense. (D) The

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” 

-10- 07cv0340

1-3.) Specifically, the court found the record contained sufficient evidence to support the

findings that: (1) the crime was carried out in a dispassionate manner; (2) involved multiple

victims; (3) the motive was trivial; (4) Petitioner had a previous record of violence; (5) Petitioner

had an unstable social history; and (6) Petitioner could benefit from additional self-help

programming. (Id. at 2-3.) The superior court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the Board

failed to consider factors tending to favor suitability for parole. (Id. at 3.)

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Court adopted a presumption which

gives no effect to unexplained state court orders but “looks through” them to the last reasoned

state court decision. The appellate court order denying the claims on the merits in effect adopted

the reasoning of the superior court, and the two courts essentially relied on the same reasoning,

that “some evidence” supports the Board’s findings. Thus, the Court will look through the silent

denial by the state supreme court to the appellate and superior court orders.

For the following reasons, the Court finds there is “some evidence” in the record to

support the findings of both the Board and the state courts that Petitioner would pose an

unreasonable risk to the public safety if released and that this evidence has sufficient indicia of

reliability. First is Petitioner’s commitment offense. The Board found the offense involved a

premeditated shooting of multiple victims on Petitioner’s command, which the Board

characterized as very dispassionate and very calculated. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Hr’g Tr. at

48, 52.) Further, the Board found the reason for the shooting “defies logic,” and was trivial

because it was gang-related, despite the fact that Petitioner was a 20 year-old adult at the time

with a wife and child to care for with no excuse for still engaging in gang-related activities. (Id.

at 49, 52.) These findings satisfy the criteria under California law for a finding of unsuitability

for parole based on the commitment offense. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(1).1

 

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Petitioner acknowledges that the California regulations provide that a finding of

unsuitability can be predicated on a finding that the commitment offense was “especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel,” and he acknowledges that, in making such a finding, the Board can

consider whether the offense was carried out “in a dispassionate and calculated manner,”

“involved multiple victims,” and “whether the motive for the crime was inexplicable or trivial

in relation to the offense.” (Pet. Mem. at 11.) He argues, however, that the Board cannot

independently rely on the findings of multiple victims, trivial motive and dispassionate acts to

make the ultimate conclusion he is unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 12.) Rather, the Board must use

those factors to make an independent judgment that Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk

to the public safety if released. See In re Lee, 142 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408 (Cal.Ct.App. 2006)

(noting that ultimate determination is whether, after weighing the factors tending to show

suitability and unsuitability, the Board determines whether the prisoner would pose an

unreasonable risk to pubic safety), citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 686 (2002).

The Board’s finding that the facts of Petitioner’s commitment offense tend to demonstrate

unsuitability are supported by “some evidence” in the record. Petitioner admitted during the

parole hearing that he and other members of his gang, at Petitioner’s behest, drove to the

residence of two members of another gang for the purpose of retaliating because a member of

the other gang had stabbed Petitioner on a prior occasion. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole

Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 10-12, 38.) When they arrived at the residence, the two gang members

were standing out front with their girlfriends. (Id.) Although Petitioner was childhood friends

with one of the women, he nevertheless directed his fellow gang member to shoot at the four

people, seriously injuring one of the rival gang members and killing one of the women, his

childhood friend. (Id.) Although Petitioner told the Board his intent was for his fellow gang

member to shoot over the heads of their victims and to just scare them (id. at 38-39), the Board

did not find Petitioner’s explanation to be credible. (Id. at 52-53.) In any case, the act of

directing a fellow gang member to shoot a rifle at a group of people in retaliation for being

stabbed, even with the intent just to scare them, is a dispassionate and calculated act of violence

against multiple innocent victims. This is particularly true in light of the undisputed fact that

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Petitioner was in a position at the time he ordered his fellow gang member to shoot to see that

innocent victims were in the line of fire, including his own childhood friend.

The findings by the Board that the crime was dispassionate and calculated, that multiple

victims were involved, and that the motive was inexplicable or trivial, are all supported by

evidence in the record. Petitioner argues such findings are inherent in all second degree murders,

and are not relevant to the current risk he poses to the safety of the public if released. (Pet. Mem.

at 11-12.) However, the factors relied on by the Panel are not irrelevant to Petitioner’s current

safety risk, particularly the dispassionate and calculated nature of the murder and the assault on

innocent victims for a trivial reason. Neither are they inherent in all second degree murders,

because not all second degree murders involve the death of an innocent bystander during a

retaliatory drive-by shooting where the defendant ordered a confederate to shoot into a group of

people which contained one of the defendant’s childhood friends. The Board clearly was within

its discretion to find such a crime dispassionate beyond other types of second degree murders,

and to find such a calculated and dispassionate act especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and has

some nexus to Petitioner’s current risk to society. Further, Petitioner admitted to the facts upon

which these findings were based, they have sufficient indicia of reliability. These findings

provide “some evidence” Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk to the public safety if

released on parole, particularly in conjunction with the other findings by the Board discussed

below.

The Board next made findings regarding Petitioner’s previous record of violence. The

Board noted Petitioner has an extensive and escalating history and pattern of criminality and

assaultive behavior beginning when he was a juvenile. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration

Hr’g Tr. at 49, 52.) Petitioner admitted he joined a gang at age twelve or thirteen, and spent a

year in a juvenile detention facility, when he would otherwise have been attending eleventh

grade, for assault with intent to commit murder after stabbing someone during a gang altercation.

(Id. at 14-18.) This finding is consistent with the applicable regulations, which provide that a

circumstance tending to show unsuitability exists when: “The prisoner on previous occasions

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

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demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(2).

Because Petitioner admitted the facts underlying these findings, they have sufficient indicia of

reliability.

Petitioner argues his most recent prison disciplinary infraction was defensive in nature,

not assaultive, and that although he arguably “had” an escalating pattern of assaultive behavior

when he was younger, he no longer “has” such a pattern. (Pet. Mem. at 13-15.) He contends

that, although he was arrested many times before the commitment offense, those arrests took

place thirty years ago and there is no nexus between his past assaultive behavior and his current

risk to society. (Id.; Traverse at 14-15.) As set forth above, the applicable California regulations

provide discretion to the Board to take into consideration assaultive behavior at an early age,

which Petitioner admits he exhibited. California has indicated through its regulations that such

behavior is a factor to consider in determining his current risk. In addition, it is undisputed that

Petitioner’s assaultive behavior continued to escalate, not just after his juvenile offenses, but

even after he was sent to prison as a result of the current offense, in that he admitted engaging

in gang activity while in prison. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 33.)

Although Petitioner seeks to have such behavior characterized as defensive rather than assaultive

due to the nature of gang life in prison, which he contends sometimes requires proactive

measures to protect oneself, his history of assaultive behavior is a relevant and acceptable factor

for the Board to consider in determining Petitioner’s current risk to public safety. His argument

that he no longer “has” an increasing pattern of assaultive behavior is unpersuasive.

The Board next found Petitioner had an unstable social history marked by unstable

relationships and gang affiliation. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 49, 52.)

Petitioner admitted he joined a gang at a young age and continued to give loyalty to the gang

over his responsibility to his wife and child even as an adult. (Id. at 20.) He also admitted he

continued his gang activity for at least another five years while incarcerated on the instant

offense. (Id. at 33.) He explained he “felt disloyalty to where he came from,” which included

his family, and noted that his father was an alcoholic and a bad man. (Id. at 16.) The Board’s

finding is supported by the record and is grounded in the regulations, which provide that a

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circumstance tending to show unsuitability exists when: “The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(3). Because

Petitioner admitted these facts, they have sufficient indicia of reliability.

Petitioner argues he in fact has maintained a stable social history throughout his life, and

has strong and stable relationships with his fiancé, his mother, two sisters, a cousin and his own

son. (Pet. Mem. at 15-16; Traverse at 16.) Petitioner submits letters from these individuals

espousing their support and their willingness to maintain a relationship with him. (FAP Exs. 5-

10.) Even assuming, however, the Board put too much emphasis on Petitioner’s past social

history, including his gang membership and his unstable relationships with his father, wife and

son at the time of the murder, and not enough emphasis on his current social situation, there

remains “some evidence” in the record to support the Board’s ultimate finding of unsuitability

based on the factors discussed above.

The Board next found Petitioner had received 14 disciplinary violations while in prison,

the last one in 1994, eleven years before the parole hearing. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole

Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 50.) Petitioner admitted he has suffered 14 disciplinary violations

while incarcerated on his commitment offense. (Id. at 25.) Two of the violations were for

serious misconduct, including possessing a stabbing instrument in 1992 and fighting in 1994.

(Id. at 35-36, 50.) This finding is supported by some evidence which has sufficient indicia of

reliability and is grounded in the regulations. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c)(6)

(identifying a circumstance supporting a finding of unsuitability where: “The prisoner has

engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail.”). Petitioner argues this factor actually works

in his favor as it shows he has remained disciplinary free for the past fourteen years. (Pet. Mem.

at 18-19; Traverse at 15.) He contends he entered prison with an initial classification score of

112, that it reached as high as 204 due to his institutional misconduct, and its level of 105 at the

time of the parole hearing, and its current level of 81, show a drastic decline and a complete

termination of criminal conduct since 1994 due to his successful rehabilitation. (Id.) 

Petitioner correctly states the California regulations provide that suitability for release can

be shown by positive institutional behavior. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(d)(9)

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(identifying a circumstance tending to show suitability for release where: “Institutional activities

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.”) However, the regulations

also provide for discretion regarding the weight the Board gives such factors. See Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c) (“the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.”) The Board in fact

considered Petitioner’s classification score as a positive factor. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole

Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 51.) The psychological report noted Petitioner has exhibited his recent

crime-free behavior in a controlled, custodial setting, and recognized as a risk factor his return

to his old neighborhood and associations. (Id. at 28.) Petitioner has not shown the Board failed

to take into consideration his recent disciplinary-free institutional behavior, and has failed to

show this factor was considered only in a negative light or given too much negative weight by

the Board. In any case, in light of the other factors discussed above, Petitioner has not shown

he would have been found suitable for release had the Board given more weight to his more

recent prison disciplinary record. “Some evidence” exists to support the Board’s ultimate

finding that Petitioner poses a current risk irrespective of the weight given by the Board to this

factor.

Finally, the Board found Petitioner “has not yet sufficiently participated in beneficial

self-help” programs. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. at 49.) Petitioner argued

to the Board that he has made progress in his self-help programming. (Id. at 40-42.) However,

the Board’s finding is supported by the psychological report, which concluded Petitioner

attributes the underlying causes of the offense “more to associations and circumstances rather

than acknowledging the pattern which led” to his conviction, and encourages him to do more

self-exploration. (Id. at 50.) Thus, there is “some evidence” to support the finding that

Petitioner would benefit from additional self-help programming.

Petitioner argues the psychological report merely “encouraged” him to do more self-help

programming, and he lists the numerous self-help programs he has completed and states he has

participated in every self-help program available to him. (Pet. Mem. at 17-18; Traverse at 16-

17.) He provides numerous exhibits supporting this contention, including laudatory chronos and

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certificates of participation in various programs. (FAP Exs. 14-69.) However, as with his

contentions regarding his social history and recent institutional behavior, even assuming this

factor is not supported by sufficient evidence in the record, the remaining factors, which include

the dispassionate and calculated nature of the commitment offense, the multiple victims, and his

escalating assaultive behavior beginning at an early age, are adequately supported by the record.

Petitioner argues it is now clear the Board is relying on static factors to deny him parole,

particularly in light of the fact that he has remained disciplinary free for nearly fourteen years

yet is still considered a risk to society. (Traverse at 15-16.) He argues that the psychological

report placed his risk of dangerousness at a low level, and that he cannot at this time be

considered to pose an unreasonable right of danger to society if released. (Pet. Mem. at 37-38.)

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the “continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, [such as] the circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915-17. However, as discussed above, the Board here

did not rely on the static and unchanging factors arising before to Petitioner’s incarceration.

Rather, it considered the undisputed fact that Petitioner had engaged in gang activity and

criminal behavior while incarcerated. Moreover, the Board considered factors after Petitioner’s

fourteen-year disciplinary-free period. The psychological report, for example, did not place

Petitioner’s risk of violence at a “low” level (as characterized by Petitioner), but at a “moderate”

level. The report noted that Petitioner’s recent demonstration of greater self-control was

exhibited in a confined setting, but that risk factors included his return to Los Angeles County

and the resumption of his old friendships. (Lodgment No. 7, Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. at

28.) Although Petitioner indicated he would not seek to resume his old friendships, he said he

intended to return to his old neighborhood, which the psychological report concluded could lead

to “a cycle of acting out” with possible negative outcomes. (Id.) The Board took these

considerations into account along with Petitioner’s parole plans, the recommendation in the

psychological report that he continue his self-help programming, and the finding that Petitioner

has not yet been forthright when he says he only intended for his fellow gang member to shoot

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over the heads of the victims to scare them. Thus, Petitioner is incorrect that the Board relied

only on static factors.

Because there is “some evidence” in the record to support the Boards’ findings and the

evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the

record to support the Board’s determination that Petitioner’s release unreasonably endangers

public safety. Therefore, no due process violation occurred. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. Accordingly, the Court finds

the appellate court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s due process claim, on the basis that the parole

board’s unsuitability determination was supported by “some evidence,” is neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to habeas relief as to any claim presented in the

First Amended Petition.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 5, 2009, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than January 26, 2009. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 3, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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