Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04688/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS MICHAEL COLT, E-63137,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL VENARD, Ph.D., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04688-SK (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Regarding Docket No. 2

Plaintiff, a state prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, has filed a pro se complaint 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief and monetary damages “over the 

preparation and use” of a “fraudulent psychological evaluation in a predetermined decision 

to deny [him] parole” at his October 2014 parole suitability hearing in violation of his 

federal constitutional rights. Dkt. #1 (Compl.) at 5. The complaint is properly before the 

undersigned for preliminary screening because plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of 

a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the 

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be 

liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

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Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid 

by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 

486-87 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence 

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487.

When a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court therefore 

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed 

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated. Id. The same holds true when a state prisoner seeks declaratory and/or 

injunctive relief in a § 1983 suit; if success in the § 1983 suit would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the prisoner’s confinement or its duration, the suit is barred no matter the 

relief sought or the target of the prisoner’s suit. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 

(2005). 

Heck can apply to a prisoner’s § 1983 suit that calls into question the denial of 

parole. In Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held 

that Heck barred a § 1983 suit for damages where the prisoner alleged that defendants 

violated his due process rights by considering false information in his prison file to find 

him ineligible for parole. The court reasoned that a challenge to the denial of parole, 

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whether based upon procedural defects in the parole hearing or upon allegations that parole 

was improperly denied on the merits, directly implicates the validity of the prisoner’s 

continued confinement. Id. And in McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1097 

(9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit similarly held that Heck barred a § 1983 suit for damages 

where two prisoners alleged parole officials “willfully and intentionally conspired to 

inaugurate an illegal ‘underground’ policy . . . to block paroles in perpetuity of term-to-life 

prisoners such as plaintiffs.” The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ damages claims were 

based on deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmakers, and “imply the invalidity of 

their confinement insofar as their prolonged incarcerations are due to the purported bias of 

state officials.” Id. (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., 

concurring) (“I agree that Balisok’s claim is not cognizable . . . to the extent that it is 

‘based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker,’ . . . [and] 

‘necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the punishment imposed.’”). 

But the Supreme Court since has clarified that prisoners challenging state parole 

procedures may be able to proceed under § 1983. In Wilkinson v. Pliler, 544 U.S. 74 

(2005), two Ohio state prisoners challenged the retroactive application of new, harsher 

parole guidelines to their pre-guidelines cases as violative of the Ex Post Facto and Due 

Process Clauses. 544 U.S. at 76-77. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims could 

proceed under § 1983 because their success (i.e., relief rendering the new, harsher parole 

guidelines invalid as to the plaintiffs) would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

the plaintiffs’ confinement or its duration. Id. at 82. Although the prisoners’ ultimate goal 

was to obtain speedier release under more favorable parole procedures, their success in 

obtaining such procedures in their § 1983 suit would not necessarily mean speedier release 

because parole was not guaranteed under the different procedures. Id. 

Unlike the plaintiffs in Wilkinson, plaintiff here does not seek to invalidate the state 

parole procedures used to deny him parole; rather, he seeks to invalidate the decision to 

deny him parole and his subsequent continued incarceration by claiming that defendants 

prepared and used a fraudulent psychological evaluation in a predetermined decision to 

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deny him parole at his October 2014 parole suitability hearing. Put simply, the gravamen 

of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants wrongly denied him parole on the merits on 

October 2014 and caused his “prolonged and unjust incarceration.” Dkt. #1 at 17, 18 & 20. 

But a judicial determination that defendants wrongly denied plaintiff parole on the merits 

on October 2014 and caused his prolonged and unjust incarceration would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s continued incarceration. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82. 

After all, “[f]ew things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than 

the allegedly improper denial of parole.” Butterfield, 120 F.3d at 1024.

Under the rationale of Heck, this court cannot entertain plaintiff’s § 1983 suit 

because a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

plaintiff’s continued incarceration due to a wrongful decision to deny him parole which 

has not already been invalidated. Plaintiff’s suit must be dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 

649 (1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED under the authority of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 

dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff (1) filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

under § 2254 challenging the October 2014 denial of parole (after exhausting state judicial 

remedies), or (2) reasserting his claims in a new § 1983 complaint if the October 2014 

denial of parole is invalidated.

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all pending 

motions as moot (see dkt. #2) and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 26, 2015 _________________________

SALLIE KIM

 United States Magistrate Judge

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