Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02389/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02389-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

IN RE: FACEBOOK PRIVACY 

LITIGATION Case No. 10-cv-02389-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART FACEBOOK’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 243, 293

Plaintiffs Katherine Pohl and Wendy Marfeo bring this putative class action against 

Facebook, Inc. for breach of contract and fraud. Facebook moves to dismiss for lack of Article III 

standing. Dkt. No. 243. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Dkt. No. 270. Facebook filed a reply, and 

plaintiffs filed a surreply.1 Dkt. Nos. 281, 293-1. A hearing was held on December 18, 2015. 

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the court grants Facebook’s motion to dismiss for lack 

of standing as to Ms. Pohl and denies Facebook’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing as to Ms. 

Marfeo. 

 

1

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a surreply addressing nominal damages is granted. Facebook is 

correct that plaintiffs do not cite California Civil Code Section 3360 in the Third Amended 

Complaint, but plaintiffs do seek “nominal damages based on Facebook’s breach” in the TAC.

Dkt. No. 227 ¶ 67. Therefore, Facebook could have addressed the issue nominal damages in its 

motion to dismiss.

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I. BACKGROUND

Facebook provides social networking services to its users free of charge. Dkt. No. 227, 

TAC ¶¶ 10, 11. Facebook users must register on the website using their real names. Id. ¶ 12. After 

registering, users may then post other personal information to a Facebook profile page. Id. ¶ 13. 

Facebook generates revenue through advertising. Id. ¶ 18. Facebook is able to target ads to 

particular demographics using the personal information provided by its registered users. Id. ¶¶ 26-

27. Targeted advertising is valuable to Facebook’s advertisers. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 63, 65. According to 

Facebook, the “ad targeting is done entirely anonymously. If advertisers select demographic 

targeting for their ads, Facebook automatically matches those ads to the appropriate audience. 

Advertisers only receive anonymous data reports.” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Facebook’s Privacy Guide). 

Plaintiffs allege that Facebook has “consistently and adamantly promised” not to share any user’s 

specific identity or personally identifiable information (“PII”) with its advertising partners. Id. ¶¶ 

32, 27-31.

According to plaintiffs, Facebook’s business model represents a bargain between Facebook 

and its users: “Facebook users provide their valuable PII to Facebook in exchange for access to 

facebook.com and for Facebook’s promises not to disclose their PII to third parties without 

consent.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 62, 67. Named plaintiffs Katherine Pohl and Wendy Marfeo have been 

registered Facebook users since at least 2008. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Ms. Pohl and Ms. Marfeo claim that 

Facebook violated its own policies and promises by disclosing their “sensitive personally 

identifiable information” to advertisers. Id. ¶¶ 1-5. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that when they 

clicked on Facebook ads, Facebook sent “referer headers” to the advertisers that would allow the 

advertiser to identify the user who clicked the ad. Id. ¶¶ 34-39. 

When an Internet user navigates to a website by clicking a link, the user’s browser may 

send a “referer header” to the destination website’s server. Dkt. No. 245, Jones Decl. ¶ 2. A 

“referer header” typically contains the URL of the website the user was visiting when he or she 

clicked the link. Id. Each Facebook user account is tied to a unique user ID number or username. 

TAC ¶ 14. Before July 2010, “if a Facebook user navigated the Facebook website in a particular 

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way and clicked on a third-party advertisement linked to an external page, the resulting referer 

header may have included a user’s Facebook username or user ID.” Jones Decl. ¶ 5. A referer 

header containing a user ID or username from a referring Facebook profile page is not enough to

identify the Facebook user who clicked on the ad; the same referer header would be generated for 

any user visiting that particular profile page, not just a user visiting his or her own profile page. Id.

¶ 5.

During the same timeframe, however, Facebook may have “included a particular string of 

characters in users’ profile page URLs (‘ref=profile’)” if a “user took certain steps to navigate to 

his or her own profile page.” Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added). As a result, some referer headers sent to 

external advertisers included “both the ‘ref=profile’ string and the user ID or username of the user 

who clicked the ad.” Id. ¶ 7; see also TAC ¶¶ 35-39. Facebook acknowledges that “in theory,” a 

recipient of both the “ref=profile” string and a user ID or username would be able to identify the 

Facebook user who clicked on the ad. Id. ¶ 7; see also TAC ¶ 14. Plaintiffs assert two causes of 

action based on the transmission of these referer headers—breach of contract and fraud. TAC ¶¶

58-73. 

Several separate actions were originally filed against Facebook, and the cases were 

consolidated on August 10, 2010 under the caption In re Facebook Privacy Litigation. Dkt. No. 

23. The consolidated class action complaint named David Gould and Mike Robertson as putative 

class representatives. Dkt. No. 36. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims and 

entered final judgment on November 22, 2011. Dkt. No. 106, 107. Plaintiff Mike Robertson 

appealed the dismissal. Dkt. No. 116. The Ninth Circuit reversed on two of the eight dismissed 

claims, finding plaintiffs’ damages allegations sufficient to support their breach of contract and 

fraud claims. Dkt. No. 122 at 2. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit cited plaintiffs’ allegations that 

“the information disclosed by Facebook can be used to obtain personal information about 

plaintiffs,” and that plaintiffs were harmed by both “the dissemination of their personal 

information and by losing the sales value of that information.” Id. The case was remanded with 

Mr. Robertson as the sole named plaintiff. 

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Mr. Robertson moved for leave to amend the FAC to add Katherine Pohl as named 

plaintiff and to seek nominal damages and disgorgement. Dkt. No. 138. The court granted leave to 

amend on February 13, 2015. See Dkt. No. 142. The parties then stipulated to Mr. Robertson’s 

voluntary dismissal on March 20, 2015. Dkt No. 146. On March 27, 2015, Ms. Pohl moved for 

leave to file a third amended complaint adding Wendy Marfeo as a named plaintiff. Dkt. No. 148. 

The court granted leave to add Ms. Marfeo on May 22, 2015, treating the motion as a request for

substitution of a named plaintiff following the mooting of a prior plaintiff’s claims. See Dkt. No. 

226. 

Facebook moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing 

that Ms. Pohl and Ms. Marfeo lack Article III standing to bring this suit because they are unable to 

demonstrate that they have suffered injury in fact. Facebook further argues that the court should 

dismiss this case for lack of standing because neither Mr. Robertson nor Ms. Pohl had standing at 

the time Ms. Marfeo was added as a named plaintiff. 

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs have the burden to establish standing. See WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015). “To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) 

he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; 

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable court decision.” Id. (quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. 

Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lujan v. Defender. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992))). Facebook argues that neither Ms. Pohl nor Ms. Marfeo can establish the 

first of these requirements—injury in fact. 

To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a 

legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations omitted). “In class 

actions, the named representatives must allege and show that they personally have been injured, 

not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong 

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and which they purport to represent.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 

1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Because standing is “an indispensable part” of a plaintiff’s case, “each element must be 

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Class discovery is closed, and plaintiffs have moved to certify the class. 

See Dkt. Nos. 236, 261. At this stage, plaintiffs “must show standing ‘through evidentiary proof.’” 

Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 

133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)); see also Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., No. C 11-01078 DMR, 

2012 WL 5877579, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (“On a motion for class certification, 

Plaintiffs must demonstrate, not merely allege, that they have suffered an injury-in-fact to 

establish Article III standing. . . .”) (citing Nelsen v. King Cnty., 895 F.2d 1248, 1249-50 (9th Cir.

1990) (“Standing is a jurisdictional element that must be satisfied prior to class certification.”)). 

A. Plaintiff Katherine Pohl

Ms. Pohl’s claims are dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and 

fraud claims both rely on allegations that Facebook disclosed plaintiffs’ personal information to 

third party advertisers. See TAC ¶¶ 66, 71. Facebook’s ad-click data shows that Ms. Pohl’s only 

ad click during the class period directed Ms. Pohl to the advertiser’s Facebook page, rather than 

the advertiser’s external website. Therefore, the referer header associated with Ms. Pohl’s ad click 

would have been sent to a Facebook server, rather than any third party advertiser’s server. 

Plaintiffs concede that “the information Facebook has produced to date indicates that Pohl’s 

personal information was not transmitted to an advertiser’s external website.” Ms. Pohl, therefore, 

lacks standing and cannot represent the putative class in this case. See Lierboe, 350 F.3d at 1022

(plaintiff without standing to bring claim “cannot represent others who may have such a claim, and 

her bid to serve as a class representative must fail”).

B. Plaintiff Wendy Marfeo

Plaintiffs submit three theories for Ms. Marfeo’s injury in fact: 1) there is a credible threat 

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that Ms. Marfeo will be harmed in the future by the release of her personal information, 2) Ms. 

Marfeo was denied the benefit of the bargain she made with Facebook, and 3) Ms. Marfeo is 

entitled to seek nominal damages for breach of contract.

1. Threat of Future Harm

Plaintiffs have not established injury in fact through threat of future harm. At the hearing, 

plaintiffs alleged injury via a “credible threat of future harm by releasing this information and 

making it available.” Dkt. No. 321 at 13:23-25; 19:12-13. Allegations of “possible future injury” 

are not sufficient to establish injury in fact; the “threatened injury must be certainly impending.”

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 

U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). Plaintiffs do not identify any evidence to show that a release of Ms. 

Marfeo’s personal information is impending. Plaintiffs’ evidence of disclosure is limited to Ms. 

Marfeo’s ad clicks in 2009 and 2010 and the resulting referer headers. See Dkt. No. 270 at 9-10 

(citing Dkt. 245, Jones Decl. ¶ 20). Evidence from more than five years ago, with no suggestion of 

disclosure since then, cannot establish that a release of Ms. Marfeo’s personal information is 

certainly impending. 

2. Benefit of the Bargain 

Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Marfeo suffered injury in fact because she did not receive the 

promised confidentiality for which she bargained. Facebook challenges plaintiffs’ benefit of the 

bargain theory on three grounds: 1) Facebook never agreed to pay users in exchange for consent to 

disclose information, 2) plaintiffs cannot establish harm without evidence of receipt or use by a 

third party, and 3) plaintiffs cannot establish breach without evidence of receipt by a third party.

The court is not persuaded by Facebook’s arguments. Although Ms. Marfeo may have significant 

difficulty proving damages under the benefit of the bargain theory, she has established standing.

The court is not persuaded that plaintiffs’ benefit of the bargain is premised on any

promise by Facebook to pay users for disclosure on per-transaction basis. Plaintiffs confirmed at 

the hearing that plaintiffs are not alleging a promise to pay on a per-transaction basis, emphasizing

that any discussion of what Ms. Marfeo might have received from advertisers in exchange for her 

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consent is relevant only to ascertaining the value of the benefit of bargain that Ms. Marfeo was 

allegedly denied. Dkt. No. 321 at 10:15-11:17(“We absolutely have not said that the contract 

contains a promise to be paid by Facebook if there’s a disclosure. The promise is not to make a 

disclosure absent consent. . . . We have presented expert testimony that explains how the court 

could allow the plaintiffs to establish the value of the consent.”); see also 14:15-15:5. Plaintiffs’ 

representations at the hearing echo the benefit of the bargain theory set forth in the TAC: 

“Plaintiffs and each class member gave up something of value, PII, in exchange for access to 

Facebook and Facebook’s privacy promises. Facebook materially breached the contracts by 

violating its privacy terms, thus depriving Plaintiffs and Class members the benefit of the 

bargain.” TAC ¶ 67. The court is skeptical about plaintiffs’ ability to establish the value of the 

benefit allegedly denied to Ms. Marfeo, but the court is satisfied that plaintiffs have alleged Ms. 

Marfeo received less than she bargained for from Facebook. 

Nor is the court is persuaded that plaintiffs must establish third party receipt or use under a 

benefit of the bargain theory. While plaintiff must establish that Ms. Marfeo was denied a 

“benefit” of the bargain, there is no requirement that the benefit relate to third party receipt or use. 

See, e.g., Cain v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (E.D. Mich. 2013) 

(plaintiffs sufficiently alleged benefit of the bargain damages by alleging that they suffered 

monetary harm because “a portion of the price of each Redbox rental paid for by Plaintiffs . . . was 

intended to ensure the confidentiality of Plaintiffs’ . . . Personal Viewing Information”). Plaintiffs 

allege that Ms. Marfeo did not receive the full benefit of her bargain because Facebook transmitted 

her personal information to advertisers and that the value of the benefit she was denied can be

ascertained by measuring the value of her personal information. See TAC ¶ 67. The cases cited by 

Facebook for the proposition that actual receipt or use is required for injury are inapposite because 

they do not address allegations of harm under a benefit of the bargain theory. See Fitzhenry v. 

ADT Corp., No. 14-80180, 2014 WL 6663379, at *7 n.9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014) (addressing 

whether message violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act if not heard or recorded by 

answering machine); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 

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F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding plaintiffs lack standing for invasion of privacy claim 

because they do not contend that their “personal information has been viewed nor that their 

information has been exposed in a way that would facilitate easy, imminent access”).

Similarly, the court is not convinced that plaintiffs’ theory of harm is disconnected from 

Facebook’s alleged breach. Facebook argues that a promise not to “share” cannot be breached 

unless the information reaches a third party. However, Facebook notes in its reply brief that “it is 

impossible for [Facebook] to speak to whether advertisers received any referer headers.” Dkt. No. 

281 at 5. By the same reasoning, it is impossible for Facebook to make promises about whether 

advertisers receive referer headers; Facebook can only promise not to transmit the information. 

For purposes of this motion, Facebook does not challenge plaintiffs’ evidence of transmission, and 

it is Facebook’s transmission that plaintiffs allege caused Ms. Marfeo to be denied the benefit of 

the bargain. See TAC ¶ 37 (“Facebook’s system sends this information to advertisers despite 

Facebook’s Privacy Policy and its other representations as to users’ privacy vis-à-vis 

advertisers.”). 

3. Nominal Damages for Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs also argue that Ms. Marfeo has standing because “failure to perform a contractual 

duty is, in itself, a legal wrong that is fully distinct from the actual damages,” for which Ms. 

Marfeo seeks nominal damages. Sweet v. Johnson, 169 Cal. App. 2d 630, 632 (1959); see also

Cal. Civ. Code § 3360 (“When a breach of duty has caused no appreciable detriment to the party 

affected, he may yet recover nominal damages.”). Facebook points out that Article III standing 

requirements do not apply to state court actions and argues that the availability of nominal 

damages does not relieve Ms. Marfeo of the obligation to show injury in fact. See In re Google, 

Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2013)

(rejecting breach of contract as a separate basis for injury in fact because nominal damages are not 

available in California and plaintiffs did not allege any other injury resulting from breach); 

Meneses v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. C-11-03615 DMR, 2012 WL 669518, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

(“Nominal damages . . . do not suffice to show legally cognizable injury.”). This court, however, is 

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persuaded that a California breach of contract claim for nominal damages may support Article III 

standing.

Facebook argues that nominal damages cannot satisfy the injury in fact requirement 

because actual damages are a required element for any California breach of contract claim. 

Facebook cites decisions from the Ninth Circuit, as well as a decision from this court. See Ruiz v. 

Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (“under California law, a breach of contract 

claim requires a showing of appreciable and actual damage”) (quoting Aguilera v. Pirelli 

Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000)); In re eBay Litig., No. 07-CV-2198 

RMW, 2012 WL 3945524, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (noting that the Ninth Circuit rejected

the holding of Sweet in Aguilera). According to Facebook, these cases are consistent with section 

3360 because the statute is designed to compensate plaintiffs who have suffered injuries that 

cannot be quantified, rather than to compensate plaintiffs who cannot show injury at all. See 

Opperman v. Path, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 990-91 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Section 3360 sets forth the 

rule that a plaintiff who has suffered an injury, but whose damages are speculative, is entitled to 

nominal damages. But the statute does not relieve the plaintiff of proving injury.”) (citation 

omitted). 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted dicta from 

Aguilera in deciding Ruiz, which is an unpublished decision.2Specifically, plaintiffs argue that 

Aguilera considered actual damages only in determining whether and when a breach occurred, not 

whether nominal damages are available once breach is established. Therefore, according to 

plaintiffs, there is no Ninth Circuit precedent in conflict with the holding of Sweet that nominal 

contract damages are recoverable in the absence of actual damages. 

California case law reveals some uncertainty about whether actual damages are a necessary 

 

2 At the hearing, plaintiffs also noted that the Ruiz court reached the damages element of the 

contract claim only after determining that plaintiff had alleged a credible threat of future identity 

theft sufficient to support Article III standing. Dkt. No. 321 at 13:12-20. Whether or not Ruiz was 

correctly decided, it does not hold that a plaintiff must prove actual contract damages in order to 

establish Article III standing. 

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element for a breach of contract claim. Compare Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson 

Const. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 511 (1967) (“A breach of contract without damage is not 

actionable.”), with Sweet, 169 Cal. App. 2d at 632 (“plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal 

damages for the breach of a contract, despite inability to show that actual damage was inflicted 

upon him”). This uncertainty is reflected in Ninth Circuit decisions. Compare Ruiz, 380 F. App’x 

at 692 (affirming summary judgment on contract claim because plaintiff did not adduce evidence 

of actual damage), and Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1015 (“Under California law, a breach of contract 

claim requires a showing of appreciable and actual damage”), with Raiser v. Ventura Coll. of Law, 

488 F. App’x 219, 222 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding dismissal of contract claim improper “because, 

under California law, inability to show actual damages does not preclude recovery for breach of 

contract”), and Haagen v. Saks & Co., 160 F. App’x 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (“when a breach of 

duty has caused no appreciable detriment to the parties affected, they may yet recover nominal 

damages”). The same uncertainty is reflected in the decisions of this court. Compare In re eBay 

Litig., 2012 WL 3945524 at *5 (declining to sustain contract claim “on the basis of nominal 

damages alone”), with Farhang v. Indian Inst. of Tech., Kharagpur, No. C–08–02658 RMW, 2010 

WL 2228936, at * 7 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) (declining to dismiss contract claim for failure to 

state a claim because nominal damages would be available even if plaintiff could not prove actual 

damages); see also Dkt. No. 142 at 4 n.2 (“The court expresses no opinion at this time as to 

whether nominal damages are sufficient to fulfill the damages element of a California state breach 

of contract claim.”). 

While the court continues to find the issue “somewhat troubling,” In re eBay Litig., 2012 

WL 3945524 at *5, the text of section 3360 itself permits recovery of nominal damages even if 

plaintiff suffers “no appreciable damage.” In Patent Scaffolding, cited by the Ninth Circuit in 

Aguilera, the California Court of Appeal examined whether plaintiff could recover for damages 

“not causally connected with the breach of a contract” rather than the availability of nominal 

damages in the absence of actual damage. 256 Cal. App. 2d at 511. Similarly in Aguilera itself, the 

Ninth Circuit examined actual damages with respect to determining breach, rather than the 

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availability of nominal damages. 223 F.3d at 1015. Other California cases provide additional 

support for the view that nominal damages may satisfy the damages element of a contract claim. 

See, e.g., McCarty v. Beach, 10 Cal. 461, 464 (1858) (“For the breach of a contract an action lies, 

though no actual damages be sustained.”); Midland Pac. Bldg. Corp. v. King, 157 Cal. App. 4th 

264, 275 (2007) (plaintiff “has shown a prima facie case for breach of contract” in absence of 

actual damage) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3360 and Sweet, 169 Cal. App. 2d at 632)); Sill 

Properties, Inc. v. CMAG, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 42, 55 (1963) (“appellant unquestionably was 

entitled to recover nominal damages for the breach of the lease, despite his inability to show that 

he suffered actual damage”). The court concludes that Aguilera and Ruiz, which are not binding on 

this court on questions of California law, do not defeat a plaintiff’s ability to recover nominal

damages for breach of contract even in the absence of actual damages. Plaintiffs, therefore, have 

alleged “a legal wrong that is fully distinct from the actual damages.” Sweet, 169 Cal. App. 2d at

632.

The injury alleged is “concrete” in that plaintiffs specify the contractual terms to which 

Ms. Marfeo agreed and the manner of breach by Facebook. The breach is “particularized” in that it 

involves disclosure of Ms. Marfeo’s own personal information and “actual” in that plaintiffs claim 

the breach has already occurred. Facebook does not challenge plaintiffs’ evidence that Facebook

had a contractual duty not to share plaintiffs’ personal information, at least for purposes of this 

motion. See TAC ¶¶ 27-32 (citing Facebook representations). Nor does Facebook challenge 

plaintiffs’ evidence that Ms. Marfeo’s personal information was transmitted to third parties. See

Dkt. No. 243 at 5 n.5. Therefore, plaintiffs have established injury in fact through Ms. Marfeo’s 

breach of contract claim for nominal damages.

C. Plaintiffs Mike Robertson and Katherine Pohl at Time of Substitution

Facebook argues that this court lacked jurisdiction to allow the substitution of Ms. Marfeo 

as a named plaintiff on May 22, 2015. Facebook’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing at the 

time of Ms. Marfeo’s substitution is denied. 

Facebook’s assertion that both Ms. Pohl and Mr. Robertson lacked standing one year ago 

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does not provide a basis for dismissal at this juncture. The court now determines that Ms. Pohl 

lacks standing, but that Ms. Marfeo has standing. The court is not aware of any authority 

permitting retroactive dismissal for lack of standing where a currently named plaintiff—Ms. 

Marfeo—has standing. Such a dismissal would conflict with the Supreme Court’s guidance that 

standing should be evaluated in accordance “with the manner and degree of evidence required at 

the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Ms. Pohl and Mr. Robertson may

or may not have been able to satisfy the requirements for Article III standing before the 

substitution of Ms. Marfeo3—the court notes that Facebook’s standing arguments are the same 

with respect to Mr. Robertson and Ms. Marfeo in the instant motion—but in any case, today’s 

dismissal of Ms. Pohl does not require dismissal dating back to May 2015.

The court also declines to reconsider its previous order granting leave to amend to add Ms. 

Marfeo as a named plaintiff. Facebook argues that, even if Mr. Robertson previously had standing,

the court lacked jurisdiction to permit Ms. Marfeo’s substitution once Mr. Robertson mooted his 

own claims by voluntarily dismissing with prejudice. Facebook made the same argument in 

supplemental briefing in opposition to Ms. Pohl’s motion for leave to amend. See Dkt. No. 221 at 

1 (“Finally, even if Robertson’s standing were accepted, his voluntary dismissal with prejudice 

mooted his claim, eliminating any subject-matter jurisdiction the Court previously had.”). The 

court found that “the case need not be dismissed on this basis” because Mr. Robertson’s 

“voluntary dismissal rendered his claims moot,” and treated Ms. Pohl’s motion for leave to amend 

as a motion to substitute Ms. Marfeo as a named plaintiff following the mooting of Mr. 

Robertson’s claims. Dkt. No. 226 at 7. Any motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order

 

3

Facebook’s motion to dismiss Mr. Robertson’s claims for lack of standing at the pleading stage

was denied. Dkt. No. 91. Facebook did not move to dismiss Ms. Pohl’s claims for lack of standing 

until filing the instant motion. In opposition to Ms. Pohl’s motion for leave to amend, Facebook 

argued that this case should be dismissed based on Ms. Pohl’s lack of standing and Mr. 

Robertson’s failure to establish his standing before his voluntary dismissal. See generally Dkt. 

Nos. 219 (hearing transcript), 221 (Facebook’s supplemental briefing). The court, however, 

explicitly declined to address standing, treating Ms. Pohl’s motion for leave to amend as a motion 

to substitute Ms. Marfeo as a named plaintiff following the mooting of Mr. Robertson’s claims. 

See Dkt. No. 226 at 7. 

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10-cv-02389-RMW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

FC

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must be made in accordance with the requirements of Civil Local Rule 7-9.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Facebook’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing as to Ms. Pohl is 

granted. Facebook’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing as to Ms. Marfeo is denied. Facebook’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of standing as to Ms. Pohl and Mr. Robertson at the time of substitution 

is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 5:10-cv-02389-RMW Document 343 Filed 06/28/16 Page 13 of 13