Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-01045/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-01045-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS D. STRICKLAND, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:04cv1045-T

) (WO)

CITY OF DOTHAN, ALABAMA )

and SYLVIA SUMMERS, )

Officer, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas D. Strickland filed this lawsuit

against defendants City of Dothan, Alabama and Officer

Sylvia Summers, claiming violations of his rights under

the United States Constitution and Alabama state law

resulting from his arrest and detention for driving under

the influence of alcohol. Strickland asserts federal

claims against the city and Officer Summers based on the

due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments and the prohibition against unreasonable

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2

searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment, as

enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Strickland also

asserts state-law claims against Summers for false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. 

Jurisdiction over the federal claims is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal question) and

1343 (civil rights). Supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims is proper under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1367.

This case is before the court on defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the

motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

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3

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

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1. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), Exhibit A, Alabama

Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint (“Traffic Ticket”);

defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14),

Exhibit A, deposition of Thomas D. Strickland

(“Strickland deposition”), p. 18.

2. Strickland deposition, p. 21.

4

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are presented in the light most

favorable to Strickland, the non-moving party. On April

26, 2003, at approximately 1:34 a.m., Officer Summers

stopped a vehicle, which was without headlights and

driven by Strickland in downtown Dothan.1

 Strickland had

been acting as the designated driver for a group of

friends over the course of the evening, one of whom was

a passenger in the car at the time of the traffic stop.

This passenger was intoxicated, and may have had a cup of

beer in the car.2

 Summers called for backup assistance

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 4 of 56
3. Id.

4. Id., p. 22..

5. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), Exhibit K, Report of

5

from Officer Philip Rice, who arrived on the scene

shortly thereafter. 

Under questioning by Summers, Strickland stated that

he had consumed a single alcoholic beverage approximately

four hours earlier; Strickland acknowledges that there

could have been an odor of alcohol in the car.3

 Summers

advised Strickland that she could smell alcohol4

, and then

administered three field sobriety tests: the Horizontal

Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test, a ‘one-leg stand’ test, and

a ‘walk-and-turn’ test. The HGN test is designed to

determine whether a subject is able to follow a moving

object without moving his head, and to determine the

presence of nystagmus, an involuntary jerking of the eye

caused by an inability to maintain a visual fixation as

the eyes are turned to the side that in some

circumstances can indicate impairment due to alcohol.5

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William T. Gaut (“Expert Report”), p. 10; Standardized

Field Sobriety Testing (Appendix A), Development of a

Standardized Field Sobriety Test, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, available online at

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/SFST/app

endix_a.htm. 

6. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

14) Exhibit D, deposition of Sylvia Summers (“Summers

deposition”), p. 39.

7. Id., Exhibit G, deposition of Phillip Rice (“Rice

deposition”), p. 33.

6

While administering the HGN test, Summers also

administered an abbreviated Vertical Gaze Nystagmus test

(“VGN”).6

 The VGN, like the HGN, checks for eye jerking

as a stimulus is moved before the test subject, with the

difference that, as the name suggests, the stimulus is

moved vertically rather than horizontally. Whereas the

HGN tests for impairment caused by alcohol, the VGN can

indicate the presence of some types of drugs.7

 

There is a factual dispute as to whether these tests

were administered properly. It is undisputed that

Strickland put his foot down several times during the

‘one-leg stand’ test. Summers also alleges that, during

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8. Summers deposition pp. 33-35.

9. Summers deposition, p. 40; Rice deposition, p.

33.

10. Rice deposition, p. 33.

11. Id., p. 34.

12. Id.

7

‘walk-and-turn’ test, Strickland failed to start counting

as instructed, did not touch the toe of his rear foot to

the heel of his forward foot while walking, and did not

‘pivot’ correctly during the turn.8

 After administering

these tests, Summers felt that Strickland was

‘borderline’ impaired and asked Rice to conduct further

field sobriety tests.9

 

Rice then administered a ‘finger-to-nose’ test, which

Strickland passed.10 Strickland also passed a ‘fingertouch’ test.11 When asked to recite the alphabet,

Strickland first recited quickly and missed the letter

‘D.’ He correctly recited the alphabet when given an

opportunity to do so more slowly.12 Finally, Rice

administered a second HGN test and saw “some” or “a

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13. Id.

14. Id., pp. 33-34.

15. Strickland deposition, p. 43.

8

little bit” of nystagmus, or eye jerking.13 Strickland

contends that this test was not administered under

appropriate conditions. At the same time, Rice conducted

all or part of a VGN test, observing no indication that

Strickland was under the influence of drugs.14 

Summers then arrested Strickland for driving under

the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), 1975 Alabama Code § 32-

5A-191(a)(2), and issued citations for DUI as well as for

driving without headlights, 1975 Alabama Code § 32-1-4,

and for an ‘open container’ violation, 1975 Alabama Code

§ 32-5A-330.15 

Summers transported Strickland to the Dothan City

Jail, where she administered a Draeger Intoxilizer Test

(or Draeger Alcosensor MK III breath-alcohol test). The

test reported a blood alcohol level of 0.00 %, indicating

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16. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), Exhibit B, Draeger

Alcosensor MK III results.

17. Traffic Ticket.

18. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), Exhibit M, Dothan Police

Department Arrest Report (“Arrest Report”), p. 4.

19. Id., p. 2. 

20. Rice deposition, pp. 42, 43. 

9

that Strickland had no alcohol in his body.16 On the

citation for the DUI, Summers marked a box indicating

that Strickland was “driving under the influence of any

substance which impairs the mental or physical

faculties.”17 On the DUI arrest report, Summers marked

that the offense was ‘alcohol related.’18 On the same

report, she checked a box marked IH4,19 indicating that

she believed Strickland to be intoxicated on alcohol or

some other substance that would impair his ability to

drive or walk safely down the street. IH4 stands for

‘In-house four,’ indicating a minimum four-hour stay in

jail.20 

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21. Strickland deposition, p. 38.

22. Id., p. 40-42.

10

Approximately seven hours after taking the breathalcohol test, Strickland was able to post bond and leave

the jail.21 On June 3, 2004, Strickland was found not

guilty of DUI.22

III. FEDERAL CLAIMS

Strickland alleges that his arrest and subsequent

detention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the

Fourth Amendment, as well as a violation of his dueprocess rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection’ against a

particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment,

not the more generalized notion of "substantive due

process," must be the guide for analyzing’ such a claim.”

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The Fifth

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11

Amendment’s due-process clause applies only to the

federal government. Bartkus v. State of Illinois, 359

U.S. 121, 124 (1959). Because Strickland has alleged no

federal participation, summary judgment will be granted

to the extent Strickland relies on the Fifth Amendment.

Relief available under the Fifth Amendment is also

available under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. However, both Strickland’s arrest and

subsequent detention are more accurately analyzed under

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable

seizures. “Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of

a person to walk away, he has seized that person.”

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). An arrest is

the quintessential example of a seizure. California v.

Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Current law does

not precisely define the extent to which a ‘seizure’

cognizable under the Fourth Amendment extends beyond an

arrest. Contrast Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278-

279 (1994) (plurality opinion) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)

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12

(finding that a defendant remains ‘seized’ in a

constitutionally relevant sense even after released from

custody so long as he is bound to appear in court and

answer the state's charges); to Kingsland v. City of

Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that

normal conditions of pretrial release do not constitute

a ‘continuing seizure’ barring a significant, ongoing

deprivation of liberty, such as a restriction on a

defendant’s right to interstate travel). 

However, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition of unreasonable seizures extends for some

time beyond the moment of arrest and, for Strickland’s

purposes, encompasses the approximately seven hours he

was detained after his arrest and prior to posting bail.

See United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1571-72 (11th

Cir. 1992) (upholding a Fourth Amendment jury instruction

in a post-arrest, pre-charge excessive-force case), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d

1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (“once a seizure has occurred,

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it continues throughout the time the arrestee is in the

custody of the arresting officers”); Sweatt v. Bailey,

876 F.Supp. 1571, 1581 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (Thompson, J.)

(discussing trend in case law finding that Fourth

Amendment seizure continues past arrest at least until

pretrial begins). 

Consequently, Strickland’s claims should be

understood as arising from two discrete occurrences--his

arrest and his subsequent detention--both of which

involve a ‘seizure’ and should be analyzed under the

‘objective reasonableness’ standard of the Fourth

Amendment. Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 381 (11th Cir.

1996). Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to

the extent Strickland relies on the Fourteenth Amendment,

and the court proceeds with Fourth Amendment analysis. 

A. Claims against Officer Sylvia Summers

Strickland has sued Summers both individually and in

her official capacity as a Dothan police officer. To the

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14

extent Strickland has sued Summers in her official

capacity, he has essentially sued the City of Dothan.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)

(official-capacity lawsuits are, “in all respects other

than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity”).

While a plaintiff may sue a defendant in her official

capacity, “doing so is usually necessary only when a suit

against the governmental entity itself is barred by the

eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.”

Shows v. Morgan, 40 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1362 (M.D. Ala. 1999)

(Thompson, J.) Here, because no Eleventh Amendment

immunity issues have been presented, there is no need to

maintain suit against Summers in her official capacity.

Summary judgment will be granted on all claims against

Summers in her official capacity.

To the extent she has been sued in her individual

capacity, Summers has raised the affirmative defense of

‘qualified immunity.’ This doctrine insulates

government agents from personal liability for money

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23. The term ‘discretionary authority’ includes all

acts of a governmental official that are (1) undertaken

pursuant to the performance of official duties and (2)

within the scope of the official’s authority. Jordan v.

Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994). Strickland

does not dispute that Summers was on duty, in uniform,

driving a marked patrol vehicle, and working her regular

shift as a patrol officer of the City of Dothan when she

stopped his car and arrested him. Therefore, her acts

were within the scope of her discretionary authority.

15

damages for actions taken in good faith pursuant to their

discretionary authority. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 807 (1982). To be entitled to qualified immunity,

a defendant must establish “that he or she acted within

the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly

wrongful acts occurred.” Sims v. Metropolitan Dade

County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992).23 Once this

is proven, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show

that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Wood v.

Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 2003).

“The threshold inquiry [at the second stage of the

qualified-immunity analysis] is whether plaintiff’s

assertions, if true, establish a constitutional

violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).

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If the court determines that the plaintiff has not

alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right, then the

inquiry ends. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 841 n.5 (1998). However, if the court determines

that the plaintiff has, in fact, alleged a deprivation of

a constitutional right, then further inquiry is needed as

to “whether that right allegedly implicated was clearly

established at the time of the events in question.” Id.

Even if a constitutional violation occurred, public

employees are shielded from liability if their conduct

“does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

1. Arrest

a. Probable Cause

“A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates

the Constitution and provides a basis for a section 1983

claim.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226

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24. Paragraph nine of Strickland’s complaint (Doc.

No. 1) also alleges that there was no probable cause for

the initial traffic stop. This claim is not raised in

subsequent filings. Strickland admits to driving without

headlights at the time of the stop. “[L]aw enforcement

may stop a vehicle when there is probable cause to

believe that the driver is violating any one of the

multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations

relating to the operation of motor vehicles.” United

States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998)

(internal citations omitted). Driving without headlights

is a violation of 1975 Alabama Code § 32-5-240. Because

17

(11th Cir. 2004). However, an action for impermissible

arrest is barred if probable cause existed at the time of

arrest. Wood, 323 F.3d at 878. An arrest is supported

by probable cause when it is objectively reasonable based

on the totality of the circumstances. Rankin v. Evans,

133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). “This standard is

met when ‘the facts and circumstances within the

officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably

trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to

believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an

offense.’” Id. (quoting Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,

158 (11th Cir. 1995)).24

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Strickland was admittedly violating a state code

provision governing the operation of motor vehicles,

probable cause existed for the initial stop.

25. Summers does not suggest that Strickland executed

any improper changing of lanes in her motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 14), and Strickland was not issued a

citation nor charged with this alleged offense. 

26. The bottles of beer retrieved from Strickland’s

car were either empty or not open. Although Strickland

disputes that any container of alcohol was open in his

car, the record reflects that a passenger had a cup that

may have contained beer. Strickland deposition, p. 21.

18

In her report filed pursuant to Strickland’s arrest,

Summers describes the totality of the circumstances

supporting her decision to arrest Strickland as

including: (1) Strickland’s driving without headlights;

(2) his improper changing of lanes prior to making a left

turn;25 (3) the presence of several bottles of beer and an

open container of beer in Strickland’s car;26 (4) a smell

of alcohol in the car; and (5) Strickland’s failure to

pass the following field sobriety tests: (a) ‘one-leg

stand’; (b) ‘walk-and-turn’; and (c) HGN. The report

also states that Strickland did not correctly complete

the ‘ABC’ and ‘finger-count’ tests administered by

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19

Officer Rice, although this appears to be a

misrepresentation, since Strickland did pass the ‘fingercount’ test, and passed the alphabet test when given a

chance to recite slowly.

Strickland neglected to turn on his headlights and

possibly changed lanes incorrectly. These are minor

traffic infractions, but clearly gave Summers probable

cause to conduct a traffic stop. Those infractions,

combined with the odor of alcohol in the car and the

presence of bottles of beer (though closed or empty), are

indicia of driving under the influence. Strickland’s

admission that he drank an alcoholic beverage over four

hours earlier does not indicate that he was impaired at

the time of the stop, but all of the factors combined

could cause a reasonable officer to decide to administer

field-sobriety tests. 

In the absence of those tests, however, the indicia

do not offer enough information for a reasonable officer

to conclude that Strickland was driving under the

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20

influence. Longstanding public policy encourages groups

of friends who plan to drink alcohol to designate a

driver who will refrain from drinking in order to safely

transport the others. This is precisely what Strickland

claimed to be doing on the night of his arrest. The

policy will logically result in unimpaired drivers

transporting intoxicated passengers in vehicles that may

smell of alcohol. Summers had reason to suspect

impairment when these factors were combined with minor

traffic infractions, but such suspicions must be verified

through tests of the driver’s motor skills, as Summers

herself apparently understood. 

The court in Hurst v. Finley, 857 F.Supp. 1517 (1994)

(M.D. Ala.) (Dement, J.), reached precisely the same

conclusion in the case of a plaintiff who was stopped by

a police officer after running a stop sign. The

plaintiff was driving a car with three intoxicated

passengers, and the vehicle smelled of alcohol, allegedly

because a beer had spilled inside the car. When asked

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21

whether she had been drinking, the driver confirmed that

she had been, but stated that she was not “drunk.” The

officer arrested the driver for DUI without administering

field-sobriety tests. Hurst, 857 F.Supp. at 1519. The

court found the arrest was not supported by probable

cause: “In charging an accused with the serious offense

of driving under the influence of alcohol, the court

believes that it would be entirely convenient and proper

to administer one or more field sobriety tests.” Id. at

1521. 

The difference, of course, is that Summers did

administer field-sobriety tests to Strickland. The

results of those tests determine the finding of probable

cause. At the scene, Summers determined that Strickland

failed to pass the ‘one-leg stand,’ ‘walk-and-turn,’ and

the first HGN field-sobriety tests. It is undisputed

that Strickland lost his balance and put his foot down

more than once during the ‘one-leg stand’ test. Summers

contends that when Strickland began the ‘walk-and-turn’

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27. Summers deposition, p. 31.

28. Expert Report, p. 21.

22

test, he failed to start counting with his steps, as

instructed. Summers also determined that he did not pass

the test because he did not touch the toe of his rear

foot to the heel of his forward foot while walking, and

because he did not ‘pivot’ correctly during the turn.

Finally, Summers determined that, during the HGN test,

Strickland exhibited a lack of ‘smooth pursuit,’ meaning

that he did not follow a light stimulus with his eyes

without involuntary jerking in the eyes, and that he

exhibited ‘distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation,’

meaning that his eye clearly jerked when it followed the

light stimulus as far to the side as possible.27 These

results, if accurate, could indicate impairment caused by

alcohol.28

 However, Strickland has introduced compelling and

undisputed evidence that Summers failed to administer

these tests correctly. Through the report of an expert

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29. Strickland correctly asserts that the result of

a HGN test is inadmissible in Alabama courts to prove

intoxication. Sides v. State, 574 So. 2d 859, 859 (Ala.

1991). “Alabama courts, however, do allow the results of

a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to support an officer's

determination of probable cause.” Babers v. Tallassee,

152 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1306 (2001) (Albritton, J.).

Therefore, this court will consider the effect of the HGN

test in determining whether the officer had probable

cause for a DUI arrest.

30. Expert Report, p. 3.

31. Id., p. 22.

23

witness, Strickland contends the following facts, which

the court is compelled to view in the light most

favorable to him:

HGN test:29 NHTSA standards for this test require a

minimum administration time of 32 seconds for accurate

results.30 NHTSA standards warn that use of a flashlight,

rather than a penlight, can result in unreliable results

because flashlights can cast shadows and cause artificial

blinding. “The officer is trained to have the suspect

look into a quiet background, away from the police

cruiser overhead lights and traffic passing in close

proximity.”31 Summers administered this test to

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32. Id., p. 3.

24

Strickland over the course of 19 seconds using a six-cell

high-intensity flashlight as Strickland looked towards

the high-intensity strobe lights of the police vehicle.

As part of this test, it appears that Summers also

briefly administered a VGN test, which could indicate the

presence of drugs. NHTSA standards require a minimum

administration of 12 seconds for this test, while Summers

tested only for 3.5 seconds.32

One-leg stand test: During the administration of this

test, Summers did not instruct Strickland to hold his

arms at his sides or to watch his raised foot at all

times. Both instructions, and verbal acknowledgment of

understanding on the part of person suspected of

intoxication, are required by NHTSA standards. Summers

also instructed Strickland to hold his raised foot over

the toes of his stationary foot, creating a center of

balance such that an average unintoxicated person would

be unable to maintain her balance. She instructed

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33. Id., p. 29.

34. Id., p. 26.

25

Strickland to point his toes up, rather than out, as

required by the standards. Finally, Summers and Rice

moved about during the administration of this test.

NHTSA standards advise officers to remain as motionless

as possible in order to avoid interfering with the test.33

Walk-and-turn test: NHTSA standards require an

officer to give verbal instructions and a complete

demonstration of this test, which involves walking heelto-toe for nine steps, turning on a pivot, and walking

back using a visible straight line. The standards warn

that “[i]f the officer does not follow training and

procedure during [the instruction] stage, it may affect

the validity of the entire test.”34 Summers failed to

give complete verbal instructions, and failed to make a

proper turn during her demonstration. Additionally, she

had Strickland walk along an imaginary line, rather than

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35. Id.

36. Id., p. 9.

26

a visible one, and she moved about during the test

administration in violation of the standards.35 

After these tests were administered, Summers asked

Rice to perform additional tests on Strickland. As noted

above, in Rice’s opinion, Strickland passed the ‘fingerto-nose’ test, the ‘finger-touch’ test, and the ‘ABC’

test (on the second try, after skipping a letter during

his first recitation). Finally, Rice saw ‘a little bit’

of nystagmus, or eye jerking, during his administration

of a second HGN test to Strickland, and no nystagmus in

a VGN test. 

This record raises serious questions about the

competency of Summers’s administration of the fieldsobriety tests. Plaintiff’s expert states that “the

tests were administered in such a way as to prevent a

reasonable person [who was not intoxicated] from

passing.”36 Strickland argues that no reasonably

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37. In her motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14),

p. 11, Summers does note that “[b]oth officers at the

scene felt there was sufficient probable cause to arrest

the Plaintiff for DUI.” Summers appears to be suggesting

27

competent officer would have administered the tests in

the way Summers did, and consequently no reasonably

competent officer could have relied on the results of

those tests in finding probable cause for an arrest. 

Surprisingly, Summers does not respond to this

allegation or produce evidence suggesting that the tests

were, in fact, administered competently. Based on the

evidence in the record, the court must find that they

were not administered competently. It is imperative that

police officers--who are expected to interact with, and

potentially arrest, individuals who may be intoxicated--

have correct knowledge of how to demonstrate and

interpret the field- sobriety tests on which the liberty

of those individuals may depend. It is not objectively

reasonable to rely on a performance in a field- sobriety

test for a finding of probable cause for a DUI arrest

when the test has been administered incompetently.37

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 27 of 56
that her judgment could not be unreasonable if another

officer reached the same conclusions about Strickland’s

sobriety, and that Officer Rice’s presence at the scene

provides another ground for a finding of probable cause

in the totality of the circumstances. However, the

record does not support this conclusion. Rice did not

see the administration of the first HGN test. Rice

deposition, p. 26. While Rice felt that Strickland did

not adequately perform the second two sobriety tests

administered by Summers, Summers’s incorrect instructions

could have precipitated this result. For example, Rice

asserts that Strickland did not pivot correctly in the

‘walk and turn’ test, Rice deposition, p. 29, but

Strickland has presented evidence that Summers

incorrectly demonstrated the pivot in that test. Finally,

Rice asserts that the decision to arrest Strickland was

Summers’s alone. Rice deposition, pp. 36-37, ln. 14.

“Q: Okay. Now, what did you do after

you administered the field sobriety

tests.

“A: I believe I spoke with Officer

Summers again.

“Q: And what did ya’ll discuss?

“A: She was talking about, at that

point, maybe an option of calling a

cab or calling somebody to come

pick him up, at that point.

“Q: And did she do that?

“A: Either that or make an arrest on him.

“Q: And what did you tell her about

28

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 28 of 56
that?

“A: It’s her call.”

29

The incompetency of the administration of the fieldsobriety tests distinguishes this case from Babers v.

Tallassee, 152 F.Supp.2d 1298 (2001) (Albritton, J.),

where the court found probable cause for an arrest based

on circumstances similar to the ones here: the

plaintiff’s erratic driving, an odor of alcohol, an

intoxicated passenger, plaintiff’s admission that she had

“a couple” of wine coolers, and her performance in the

same field-sobriety tests that were administered to

Strickland (‘one-leg stand,’ ‘walk-and-turn’ and HGN

tests). Like Summers, the arresting officer in Babers

contended that the plaintiff failed the tests because she

touched the ground several times during the ‘one-leg

stand,’ because she lost her balance and failed to touch

heel to toe during the ‘walk and turn,’ and because the

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 29 of 56
30

officer observed ‘some but very little’ eye jerking

during the HGN. 

The plaintiff in Babers contended that the HGN test

could not be relied upon because the arresting officer

failed to ask whether she wore contact lenses during the

pre-test screening, a condition that the NHSTA manual in

existence at the time of the arrest stated could have “a

very slight chance” of interfering with the HGN test.

The manual in existence at the time of the court’s

decision stated that “contact lenses ... do not affect

the [HGN] test in any way.” Babers, 152 F.Supp.2d at

1306 and n. 5. The plaintiff did not contend that the

other two field tests were administered incorrectly. By

contrast, as discussed above, Strickland asserts that

Summers misadministered all the tests in ways that NHSTA

standards acknowledge could completely undermine their

reliability. 

 The court finds that, absent Strickland’s

performance in the field-sobriety tests, no probable

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 30 of 56
31

cause would have existed for an arrest. Because the

court finds that the sobriety tests were administered

incompetently, Strickland’s arrest was unsupported by

probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

b. Arguable Probable Cause 

Once a plaintiff has successfully alleged a

deprivation of a constitutional right against a public

official, he must still overcome the barrier of qualified

immunity in order for his claim to survive. In order to

do so, he must show that the implicated right was

“clearly established at the time of the events in

question.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

841 n.5 (1998). In determining whether a right was

clearly established, courts can examine whether case law

existing at the time of the violation would put a

reasonable officer on notice that the officer’s conduct

violates constitutional rights. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311

F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002). In the context of an

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 31 of 56
32

arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals frames this

inquiry as whether an officer had “arguable probable

cause.” Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir.

1997). 

It is well settled that “even law enforcement

officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that

probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.”

Wood, 323 F.3d at 878 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 227 (1991)). Because only arguable probable cause is

needed, “the inquiry is not whether probable cause

actually existed, but instead whether an officer

reasonably could have believed that probable cause

existed, in light of the information the officer

possessed.” Montoute, 114 F.3d at 184. The stripping of

qualified immunity is an “exceptional” remedy that does

not require government agents always to err on the side of

caution, Lassiter v. Alabama A&M University, 28 F.3d 1146,

1149 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); but the doctrine will not

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 32 of 56
33

protect a “plainly incompetent officer or one who was

knowingly violating the law.” Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149;

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1986). 

Although the court finds that Summers’s administration

of the field sobriety-tests was incompetent, her decision

that probable cause existed for a DUI arrest, while

mistaken, was not unreasonable in light of the information

she possessed at that time. Strickland was driving

without headlights in darkness, he made a minor error in

the alphabet test (which he agrees was correctly

administered) and both Summers and Rice detected some (if

slight) nystalgia or eye-jerking. These indicia of

intoxication suggest that Summers had arguable probable

cause for the arrest, given the totality of the

circumstances. For that reason, Summers is entitled to

qualified immunity on Strickland’s claim arising out of

the arrest. 

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34

2. Detention

Strickland also asserts that Summers violated his

constitutional rights by detaining him after administering

a Draeger Intoxilizer Test that reported a blood alcohol

level of 0.00 %. “[F]ollowing a lawful warrantless

arrest, a police officer has an affirmative duty to

release an arrestee if he ascertains beyond a reasonable

doubt that the probable cause which formed the basis of

the arrest was unfounded.” Babers, 152 F.Supp.2d at 1309.

This standard, adopted by the district court in Babers,

was articulated in Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552 (1st

Cir. 1986) (announcing the standard in the context of a

state-law claim of false imprisonment), cert. denied, 480

U.S. 908 (1987), and followed by the Fifth Circuit in

McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989)

(applying the standard to constitutional claims arising

out of a warrantless arrest) and Duckett v. Cedar Park,

950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying the standard

to arrests made pursuant to a warrant if officers fail to

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 34 of 56
35

release an arrestee after receiving information upon which

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the warrant had

been withdrawn).

In Babers, the court found that an officer had

probable cause to effectuate an arrest for driving under

the influence of alcohol, but that the probable cause

dissipated when a test revealed that the plaintiff had a

blood alcohol level of 0.00 %. Applying the Thompson

standard, the court found that the officer lacked probable

cause to continue to detain and charge the plaintiff with

driving under the influence. Babers, 152 F.Supp.2d at

1309. The court further found that the officer lacked

probable cause to charge and detain the plaintiff with the

“closely related offense” of driving under the influence

of a controlled substance. Id. at 1311; see also United

States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971)

(“When a crime under which the arrest is made and a crime

for which probable cause exists are in some fashion

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 35 of 56
38. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted

as binding precedent all decisions rendered by the former

Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981.

36

related, then there is no question but that there is a

valid arrest.”)38 

However, the court found that the officer was

protected by qualified immunity because “arguable probable

cause” existed to arrest the plaintiff for driving under

the influence of a controlled substance; a reasonable

officer, observing deficient performance on field sobriety

tests, but knowing that the driver was not under the

influence of alcohol, could have believed probable cause

existed for an arrest. The court noted that the plaintiff

did not show that “pre-existing law dictated the

conclusion for every like-situated reasonable government

official” that the officer’s actions were in violation of

federal law. Babers, 152 F.Supp.2d at 1311-1312.

Summers, unlike the officer in Babers, is not

protected by the total absence of pre-existing law. She

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37

makes no argument that Strickland’s continued detention

was not a constitutional violation; she does not argue

that any arguable probable cause for arresting and

detaining Strickland persisted after she received the

results of the blood alcohol test; nor does she argue that

the test was invalid, or that a reported blood alcohol

level of 0.00 % should not lead to the automatic

conclusion that Strickland was not under the influence of

alcohol. Strickland’s continued detention was apparently

the direct result of Summers’s decision to check the “IH4”

box on the DUI arrest report, indicating that she believed

Strickland to be intoxicated on alcohol or some other

substance that would impair his ability to drive or walk

safely down the street, and which mandated a detention of

at least four hours. 

In the filings before the court, the only explanation

--direct or indirect--offered for Summers’s decision to

mark the IH4 box is her statement in deposition that

“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, I felt he

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 37 of 56
39. Summers deposition, p. 39.

40. Summers deposition, p. 40; Rice deposition, p.

30.

38

was under the influence of something. ... I wrote the

ticket for any substance that impairs, based on the

alcohol--open containers in the car, the alcohol in the

cup, and also on what I smelled, the tests, and on the

vertical nystagmus.”39 This is the only place in her

filings that Summers mentions the VGN test that she

partially administered. Other than asserting that this

test, which she administered for 3.5 seconds, formed part

of her decision, she advances no evidence or argument as

to what circumstances might have lead to a conclusion that

Strickland was under the influence of some substance other

than alcohol. 

Both Summers and Rice concede that the purpose of

their testing was to determine alcohol intoxication.40 The

VGN was the only test performed that would have detected

impairment caused by drugs. Summers’s administration of

the test was insufficient, as noted above, and more

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39

importantly, she never asserts that she felt Strickland

failed this portion of the test. The VGN test

administered by Rice provided direct evidence that

Strickland was not impaired by a non-alcohol substance.

When asked in deposition why, if she suspected impairment,

and after the results of the blood alcohol test revealed

no alcohol in Strickland’s system, she did not administer

other tests for controlled substances, Summers responded:

“I just didn’t.” 

The court finds that no evidence exists to establish

that Summers had actual probable cause to arrest or detain

Strickland for driving under the influence of any nonalcohol substance. The court also finds that no arguable

probable cause existed because the one administered test

that could have indicated that Strickland was impaired by

a substance other than alcohol provided direct evidence

that he was not so impaired. No officer “reasonably could

have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the

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40

information the officer possessed.” Montoute, 114 F.3d at

184. 

In sum, Summers had no evidence, and offers none, to

support her decision to check the IH4 box on the arrest

report. To the extent that Strickland’s detention was

mandated by that choice, it was unsupported by arguable

probable cause. As in Babers, Summers had actual

knowledge of Strickland’s innocence of the DUI charge

after receiving the results of the blood alcohol test, and

an affirmative duty to release him. Strickland’s

continued detention was a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right, and Summers is not protected by qualified

immunity. Summary judgment is denied with respect to

Strickland’s claim against Summers arising out of his

detention. 

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 40 of 56
41

B. Claims against the City of Dothan

A municipality “may not be held liable for

constitutional deprivations on the theory of respondeat

superior.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978). Rather, liability may attach to the

municipality only if the constitutional violation resulted

from a “policy or custom.” Id. In certain situations,

the failure to train officers may constitute a ‘policy’

upon which governmental liability may rest. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). However, “the

inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for

§ 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts

to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. A

finding of ‘deliberate indifference’ requires evidence

that the municipality was ‘on notice’; in other words, a

plaintiff “must present some evidence that the

municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in

a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 41 of 56
41. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), p. 18.

42

choice not to take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami,

151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).

Strickland argues that the constitutional violations

arising from his arrest and detention resulted from

policies or customs of the City of Dothan, and that the

violations were attributable to the city’s failure to

train or supervise Officer Summers. 

1. Arrest

Strickland presents no evidence that the City of

Dothan has a policy of effecting DUI arrests without

probable cause. He does argue that Summers “received

absolutely no training in making a proper DUI arrest.”41

Strickland offers no specific evidence to support this

contention. The City of Dothan asserts that Summers

received DUI investigation and arrest training as part of

the Dothan Police Department Basic Course (160 hours) and

in her police academy training (480 hours), as well as

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 42 of 56
42. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

14), Exhibit B, Affidavit of Sylvia Summers, pp. 1-2.

43. Plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 19), Exhibit R, Summers’s

personnel file.

44. Id.

43

during her five weeks of field training with the Dothan

Police Department.42 

Strickland suggests that incidents in Summers’s

personnel records should have put the City of Dothan on

notice that further training was needed. The personnel

records reflect that one complaint--involving a parking

citation--was lodged against Summers with the police

department’s Internal Affairs Division.43 The records also

reflect that Summers issued a warrant in a personal matter

in October 2002 and attempted to effect an arrest without

probable cause.44 Neither of these incidents involved a

DUI arrest. Consequently, the City of Dothan was not on

notice that Summers was in need of further training or

supervision in conducting DUI arrests. Summary judgment

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 43 of 56
45. Id., Exhibit I, Deposition of Stacey Simmons, pp.

6-7.

44

is granted on Strickland’s claims against the City of

Dothan arising out of his arrest.

2. Detention

The court must now determine whether the

constitutional violation arising from Strickland’s

continued detention resulted from a policy or custom of

the City of Dothan or from the city’s failure to train or

supervise Summers. The City of Dothan is silent on this

question in its filings before the court, and there is

contradictory evidence regarding the city’s actual

detention policy following an arrest for DUI when the

probable cause for that arrest disappears. The jailer for

the city at the time of Strickland’s arrest believed the

length of detention was scaled to the results of the

blood-alcohol test.45 The Chief of Police during the same

period believed that a person arrested for DUI would be

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46. Id., Exhibit H, Deposition of John C. White, p.

20.

45

detained for four hours no matter the result of the bloodalcohol test.46 

The court does not have to resolve these contradictory

assertions because in this case it is undisputed that

Strickland’s continued detention after the blood alcohol

test was the direct result of Summers’s decision to mark

the IH4 box on the arrest report. The city’s mandatory

policy of detaining individuals for four hours when an

officer marks the IH4 box does not reflect deliberate

indifference to the rights of those individuals. Rather,

it reflects the reasonable idea that a person should not

be permitted to walk or drive home from the jail when an

officer believes that person to be impaired. The policy

does depend upon the ability of officers to make a

determination of impairment based upon probable cause.

The fact that Summers’s decision to mark the box was not,

in this case, based upon probable cause, does not render

the policy invalid. Strickland has not presented evidence

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 45 of 56
47. 1975 Code of Alabama § 6-5-338(a) reads: 

“Every peace officer, except constables,

who is employed or appointed pursuant to

the Constitution or statutes of this

state, whether appointed or employed as

such peace officer by the state or a

county or municipality thereof, or by an

agency or institution, corporate or

otherwise, created pursuant to the

Constitution or laws of this state and

authorized by the Constitution or laws

to appoint or employ police officers or

other peace officers, and whose duties

46

suggesting that Summers’s decision was the result of a

lack of training or supervision. Therefore, summary

judgment is granted on Strickland’s claims against the

City of Dothan arising out of his detention. 

IV. STATE-LAW CLAIMS

A. False Arrest

Summers asserts that Strickland’s claim of false

arrest under Alabama state law is due to be dismissed

because the arrest was supported by probable cause and

because she is entitled to discretionary-function immunity

pursuant to 1975 Alabama Code § 6-5-338(a).47 Probable

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prescribed by law, or by the lawful

terms of their employment or

appointment, include the enforcement of,

or the investigation and reporting of

violations of, the criminal laws of this

state, and who is empowered by the laws

of this state to execute warrants, to

arrest and to take into custody persons

who violate, or who are lawfully charged

by warrant, indictment, or other lawful

process, with violations of, the

criminal laws of this state, shall at

all times be deemed to be officers of

this state, and as such shall have

immunity from tort liability arising out

of his or her conduct in performance of

any discretionary function within the

line and scope of his or her law

enforcement duties.”

47

cause is analyzed under the federal standard: “Probable

cause exists if facts and circumstances known to the

arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a person of

reasonable caution to believe that the suspect has

committed a crime.” Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903, 906

(Ala. 1991) (citing United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933, (1983)); see also

Walker, 140 F.Supp.2d at 1262 (finding no probable cause

existed for purposes of state-law false-imprisonment or

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48

arrest claims since court had already found sufficient

evidence to suggest that no probable cause existed for an

arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). Because the

court has already found that Strickland’s arrest was not

supported by probable cause, his state-law claim for false

arrest is not defeated on that ground. 

1975 Alabama Code § 6-5-338(a) grants statutory

immunity from tort liability to municipal police officers

for “conduct in performance of any discretionary function

within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement

duties.” However, the immunity does not protect conduct

that is “so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious

conduct or conduct engaged in bad faith.” Couch v. City

of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 153 (Ala. 1998). To apply

discretionary-function immunity, the court must first

determine whether the police officer was performing a

discretionary function when the alleged wrong occurred.

If so, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate

that the defendant acted in bad faith, with malice or

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49

willfulness in order to deny [him] immunity.” Scarbrough

v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.9 (11th Cir. 2001)

(alteration in original) (applying Alabama law and quoting

Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 1998)

(per curiam)). Under both federal qualified-immunity and

state discretionary-function-immunity analyses, “the core

issue is whether a defendant violated clearly established

law.” Sheth, 145 F.3d at 1239.

In this case, Summers was acting within her

discretionary function when she arrested Strickland.

Walker, 140 F.Supp.2d at 1263 (“Actions by an officer in

executing an arrest are generally considered discretionary

functions for purposes of § 6-5-338.”); see also Sheth,

145 F.3d at 1238-39; Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.

2d 565, 569-71 (Ala. 1999);. Strickland has presented

evidence that his arrest was the result of incompetence;

not malice, willfulness, or bad faith. Summers is

immunized from suit under the discretionary-functionimmunity doctrine for the same reasons that gave rise to

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50

arguable probable cause sufficient to immunize her under

the qualified-immunity doctrine. Summary judgment is

appropriate on Strickland’s state-law false arrest claim.

B. False Imprisonment 

Strickland has presented evidence that he was detained

long after Summers had actual knowledge that he was not

intoxicated, and he contends that the continuing detention

constituted false imprisonment. “False imprisonment

consists in the unlawful detention of the person of

another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of

his personal liberty.” 1975 Alabama Code § 6-5-170.

Summers offers no evidence or argument that Strickland’s

continuing detention should not be attributed to her

actions (which include marking the IH4 box on the arrest

report) or why those actions should be protected by

discretionary-function immunity. In fact, defendants’

brief in support of their motion for summary judgment

contains no discussion of the continuing detention when

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 50 of 56
48. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

14), p. 31.

51

addressing Strickland’s state-law claims. The brief

simply refers to the original arrest, stating: “Officer

Summers was exercising her discretionary judgment when she

arrested Plaintiff for DUI based on the facts she had

before her at the time of the arrest, and she is entitled

to discretionary function immunity.”48 

In Burdeshaw v. Snell, 350 F.Supp.2d 944, 953 (M.D.

Ala. 2004) (McPherson, M.J.), the court denied a motion to

dismiss state claims of false arrest and malicious

prosecution, finding that the arresting officer “may have

forfeited his entitlement to discretionary function

immunity” because he had been presented at the scene of

the arrest with exonerating information which he failed to

investigate. Here, Summers was not required to

investigate exonerating information: it was presented to

her in the form of a test result indicating that

Strickland had no alcohol in his system. Because Summers

does not respond to Strickland’s allegations of false

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52

imprisonment in the complaint, she has not met her burden

of informing the court of the basis for her summary

judgment motion. 

Because Strickland is entitled to prove the malice,

willfulness, or bad faith he alleges exempts Summers from

the protection of discretionary function immunity, summary

judgment will be denied on the false-imprisonment claim.

C. Malicious Prosecution 

In order to survive summary judgment on his malicious

prosecution claim, Strickland must present “substantial

evidence of the following elements: (1) that a prior

judicial proceeding was instituted by the present

defendant, (2) that in the prior proceeding the present

defendant acted without probable cause and with malice,

(3) that the prior proceeding ended in favor of the

present plaintiff, and (4) that the present plaintiff was

damaged as a result of the prior proceeding.” Delchamps,

Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 831-832 (Ala. 1999).

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53

Factors one, three and four are not in dispute in this

case. By showing that Summers had affirmative proof that

he was not under the influence of alcohol after the bloodalcohol test, Strickland has presented substantial

evidence that he was prosecuted without probable cause. 

The remaining factor is malice. Personal ill will is

not required for a finding of malice. Delchamps, Inc. v.

Larry, 613 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Ala. 1992). Malice may be

inferred from a lack of probable cause, or from

carelessness, if carelessness is coupled with knowledge

that the conduct at issue is “wrong and unlawful.”

Bryant, 738 So. 2d at 833 (holding that the plaintiff

presented sufficient evidence of lack of probable cause,

coupled with a lack of good faith, from which malice could

be inferred). Such an inference of malice can be rebutted

by a showing of good faith. Id. at 832; Walker, 140

F.Supp.2d at 1264. 

Again, Summers relies entirely on the idea that

probable cause for the original arrest (which this court

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54

has found did not exist) precludes the finding of malice

necessary to sustain a claim of malicious prosecution

under Alabama state law. Even if the arrest had been

supported by probable cause, Summers offers no reason why

the charge should not have been dropped once Strickland’s

blood-alcohol test showed he had no alcohol in his system.

Strickland has produced evidence, including Summers’s

affirmative knowledge of his innocence, that could suggest

the lack of probable cause--or carelessness coupled with

knowledge of wrongdoing--from which a jury could infer the

element of malice. Summers fails to argue that any of her

decisions, other than the original arrest, were made in

good faith. As a result, summary judgement will be denied

on Strickland’s claim for malicious prosecution.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

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55

(1) Defendants City of Dothan and Sylvia Summers’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 13) is granted

in favor of defendants on the following claims: 

(A) All claims arising out of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments; 

(B) All claims against defendant Sylvia Summers

in her official capacity; 

(C) The claim arising out of the Fourth Amendment

(arrest) against defendant Summers in her

individual capacity; 

(D) The claims arising out of the Fourth

Amendment (both arrest and detention) against

defendant City of Dothan; and

(E) The state-law claim of false arrest against

defendant Summers. 

(2) Said motion for summary judgment is denied on the

following claims:

Case 1:04-cv-01045-MHT-CSC Document 49 Filed 11/08/05 Page 55 of 56
(A) The claim arising out of the Fourth Amendment

(detention) against defendant Summers in her

individual capacity; and

(B) The state-law claims of false imprisonment

and malicious prosecution against defendant

Summers. 

DONE, this the 8th day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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