Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00338/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Terry R. Lemley, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Graham County, et al. 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-338-TUC-JGZ

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants 

Graham County, Mark Herrington, James Palmer and Drew John (“Defendants”) on 

November 2, 2012.1

 (Doc. 55.) Plaintiff Terry Lemley (“Lemley”) filed a response to 

the Motion on March 7, 2013.2 (Doc. 66.) Defendants filed a reply on May 23, 2013. 

(Doc. 81.) On May 7, 2013, the Court ordered Defendants to file a controverting 

statement of facts in response to Plaintiff’s separate statement of facts; Defendants filed 

their Controverting Statement of Facts on May 15, 2013.3

 (Docs. 76, 77.) Defendants 

seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of national origin discrimination and 

retaliation. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant the Motion.4

 

1 Defendants Mark Herrington, James Palmer and Drew John are sued only in their 

representative capacities. (Doc. 79, pg. 5.) Individual defendants cannot be held liable under 

Title VII. See Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998). 

2 Both the motion and the response exceed the page limitations set forth in LRCiv 7.2. 

3 Briefing in this matter was delayed by a failed settlement conference. 

4 This case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See L.R. Civ. 7.2(f). 

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FACTUAL / PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is a former employee of Graham County’s Eastern Arizona Regional 

Juvenile Detention Facility (“EARJDF”), a small facility which employees 13-16 staff 

and administrators. (DSOF 1, 6.)5

 Of those employees, at least five were Caucasian. 

(DSOF 9.) Plaintiff is also Caucasian and was born in the United States. (DSOF 2.) 

Plaintiff was hired by EARJDF in August, 2000. (DSOF 2.) In 2001, Plaintiff applied 

for a sergeant position; Fernando Castro, who is Hispanic, was selected for the position. 

(DSOF 24.) In 2003, Plaintiff was promoted to sergeant. (DSOF 3.) In 2005, Plaintiff 

was promoted to lieutenant. (DSOF 3.) 

 Plaintiff claims that Hispanic employees received more favorable treatment at 

EARJDF. According to Plaintiff, from the time he became a sergeant in 2005, whenever 

he dealt with disciplinary issues involving Hispanic employees, Assistant Administrator 

Michael Aranda, who is Hispanic, would interfere and try to lessen the charge or advise 

Plaintiff to disregard the problem. (DSOF 25.) In those situations, Assistant 

Administrator Aranda would also remind Plaintiff that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. 

(DSOF 25.) From August, 2005 until he left the County’s employ, the County would not 

 

5 Defendants’ Statement of Facts (Doc. 56) is abbreviated herein as “DSOF.” Plaintiff’s 

Controverting Statement of Facts (Doc. 67, pgs. 1-3) is abbreviated herein as “PSOF.” 

Plaintiff’s Additional Facts (Doc. 67, pgs. 3-20) is abbreviated herein as “PSSOF.” Defendants’ 

Controverting Statement of Facts (Doc. 77) is abbreviated herein as “DCSOF”. The Court notes 

that PSOF does not comply with the Court’s September 23, 2011 Scheduling Order, which 

advised the parties that pleadings appended with more than one exhibit shall be divided by 

tabbed dividers. (Doc. 10.) PSOF is accompanied by 473 un-tabbed, loose-leaf pages of 

exhibits. In addition, Plaintiff failed to comply with LRCiv 56.1, which provides that “a party 

opposing a motion for summary judgment shall file a statement that sets forth, for each 

paragraph of the moving party’s statement, a separately numbered paragraph indicating whether 

the party disputes that statement and a reference to the specific, admissible portion of the record 

supporting that party’s position.” (emphasis added). LRCiv. 56.1 provides that “Each numbered 

paragraph of the statement of facts set forth in the moving party’s separate statement of facts 

must, unless otherwise ordered, be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary 

judgment if not specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the 

opposing party’s separate statement of facts.” In addition, the Court’s September 23, 2011 

Scheduling Order specifically advised the parties that they were expected to comply with the 

Court’s Local Rules and that the Court would not consider pleadings which did not conform to 

the Local Rules. Accordingly, the Court has considered all of Defendants’ statements of fact 

undisputed for purposes of the Motion. See Rule 56(e)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court finds that 

the motion and supporting materials show that movant is entitled to summary judgment. See

Rule 56(e)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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permit Plaintiff to take comp time for extra hours that he worked. (DSOF 26.) Due to 

staff shortages, it is not always possible for command personnel such as Plaintiff to take 

comp time. (DSOF 56.) Assistant Administrator Aranda was permitted to take comp 

time.6

 (DSOF 26.) When Sgt. Castro left employment with the County, he was paid for 

his unused comp time due to a clerical mistake. (DSOF 27; 59.) Plaintiff did not receive 

payment for his unused comp time when he resigned in September, 2010. (DSOF 27.) 

Plaintiff was permitted to take leave. (DSOF 55.) 

 In October, 2009, Plaintiff countermanded a schedule created by Sgt. Esgardo 

Luzania and Sgt. Robert Pruszynski because it did not assign detention officer Tandy 

Miller to the control room. (DSOF 32.) Also, in October, 2009, Sgt. Luzania, began 

spreading rumors that Plaintiff was having an affair with Miller. (DSOF 15.) Plaintiff 

complained to his supervisor, Assistant Administrator Aranda, but no action was taken. 

(DSOF 16.) On October 21, 2009, Plaintiff conveyed a report by Miller to Assistant 

Administrator Aranda and Administrator Gatwood which alleged misconduct by Sgt. 

Luzania. (DSOF 31.) 

In January, 2010, Miller was assigned to work with Plaintiff preparing for the 

American Correctional Association (ACA) audit. (DSOF 10.) The audit was scheduled 

for August, 2010. (DSOF 11.) Also in January, 2010, Plaintiff ordered Sgts. Luzania 

and Pruszynski to change negative comments about Miller in her evaluation and 

advocated for Miller to receive a pay increase for her work on the ACA audit. (DSOF 

33, 34.) 

 On May, 19, 2010, Plaintiff reprimanded Sgt. Luzania for insubordinate behavior 

after Sgt. Luzania questioned Plaintiff about bathroom inspection procedures during a 

meeting.7

 (DSOF 17; Doc. 77-1, pg. 6.) 

 

6 Administrator Gatwood, who is Caucasian, was also permitted to take comp time. 

(DSOF 29.) 

7 In his response, Plaintiff describes the May, 19, 2010 reprimand as stemming from Sgt. 

Luzania’s allegedly sexist remark that Miller should be responsible for the facility’s laundry. 

(Doc. 66, pg. 13.) However, the letter of reprimand dated May 19, 2010 does not mention the 

laundry incident, nor does the deposition testimony cited by Plaintiff in support of this claim. 

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On May 25, 2010, Plaintiff received a mark of “needs improvement” on his 

evaluation from Assistant Administrator Aranda.8

 (DSOF 18.) Assistant Administrator 

Aranda noted that Plaintiff “needs improvement on maintaining a professional respect for 

all subordinates.” (DSOF 44.) The mark did not affect Plaintiff’s pay or benefits. 

(DSOF 45.) 

 On May 26, 2010, Assistant Administrator Aranda informed Plaintiff that effective 

immediately, Aranda would be taking over Plaintiff’s supervisory responsibilities in 

dealing with sergeants. (DSOF 19.) The decision to allocate supervisory responsibilities 

was made by Administrator Gatwood, who wanted Plaintiff to be able to focus on the 

ACA audit. (DSOF 47; Doc. 56-1, pg. 35.) 

On May 29, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a formal complaint to Administrator Charles 

Gatwood regarding his compensation and the County’s failure to allow him to take comp 

time, but no action was taken. (DSOF 18; 36; 58.) Plaintiff also submitted a complaint 

to Administrator Gatwood alleging that Plaintiff was being subjected to a hostile work 

environment in the form of rumors being spread about Plaintiff and Miller. (DSOF 36.) 

In June or July, 2010, Plaintiff ordered that an inmate survey be conducted for the 

upcoming ACA audit. (DSOF 49.) When he received the completed surveys, Plaintiff 

noted some negative comments about himself.9

 (DSOF 50.) 

 On August 8, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a formal complaint to Graham County 

 (Doc. 77-1, pg. 6; Doc. 67, pg. 17.) 

8 Although the parties do not dispute that this evaluation occurred on May 25, 2010, the 

evaluation form included as an exhibit by both parties is dated January 28, 2010. (Doc. 67-2, pg. 

45; Doc. 56-1, pg. 47.) Plaintiff claims that Administrator Gatwood falsely backdated the 

evaluation, but cites to an non-existent portion of the record in support of this claim. (PSSOF 

81.) In addition, Plaintiff’s repeated references to this mark as “unsatisfactory” are not 

supported by the exhibit, which indicates that a score of “1” signifies an “unsatisfactory” mark 

and a score of “2,” which Plaintiff received, signifies “needs improvement.” Finally, the actual 

language of the evaluation is not “needs improvement on maintaining a professional respect for 

all subordinates,” it is “the manager reacts appropriately to authority, follows the chain of 

command and exhibits respect for both co-workers and the supervisor.” 

9 Plaintiff claims that he questioned the inmates and they allegedly reported that Sgt. 

Luzania had encouraged them to write negative comments about Plaintiff in the survey. (DSOF 

52; PSOF 52.) The Court has not considered this claim as fact because it is inadmissible 

hearsay. 

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Manager Terry Cooper alleging that he was being retaliated against for opposing 

discrimination against Miller. (DSOF 20; 39.) Cooper initiated an investigation, but 

found insufficient evidence to support the complaint and dismissed it. (DSOF 20.) 

 On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff complained that Miller had been told not to work 

the rest of the week. (DSOF 43.) Plaintiff was told not to return to work for the rest of 

the week because of all the hard work Plaintiff had put in to the ACA audit. (DSOF 44; 

53.) His pay and benefits were not affected by the time off. (DSOF 54.) 

 On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff gave Administrator Gatwood a letter stating his 

intent to resign on September 23, 2010. (DSOF 13.) Plaintiff resigned from his 

employment with Graham County on September 23, 2010. (DSOF 5.) 

 On September 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination based on national 

origin (non-Hispanic) and retaliation. (DSOF 14.) Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected 

to a hostile work environment by Sgt. Luzania because of his national origin. Plaintiff 

further alleges that he was retaliated against for reporting Sgt. Luzania’s harassment 

when he received a “needs improvement” mark on his evaluation and lost his supervisory 

responsibilities. (Doc. 56-1, pgs. 30-31.) 

 On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the instant action, alleging claims 

against Defendants for national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title 

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

10 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. 

Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). 

// 

 

10 Defendants construed Plaintiff’s Complaint as possibly stating a claim for constructive 

discharge, but Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment clarifies that 

Plaintiff is not bringing a constructive discharge claim. 

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 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents 

"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine issue exists if "the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Id. 

 A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party merely needs 

to point out to the Court the absence of evidence supporting its opponent's claim; it does 

not need to disprove its opponent's claim. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

 If a moving party has made this showing, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon 

the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but . . . must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See 

also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 

(9th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "replace conclusory allegations of the 

complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit." Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS / SCOPE OF REVIEW 

Under Title VII, a plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the statute's provisions must 

file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment 

practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If, however, the plaintiff first institutes 

proceedings with a state or local agency “with authority to grant or seek relief from such 

practice,” the period of limitations for filing a charge with the EEOC is extended to 300 

days. Id. Because the limitations period under Title VII operates as a statute of 

limitations, a claim of discrimination under the Act will not be sustained if it is based on 

an event or events that occurred more than 300 days before the filing of a charge. Zipes 

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1982). 

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Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be 

considered by a federal court unless the new claims are “like or reasonably related to the 

allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent 

of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In determining 

whether an allegation under Title VII is like or reasonably related to allegations contained 

in a previous EEOC charge, the court inquires whether the original EEOC investigation 

would have encompassed the additional charges. Id. (citation omitted). 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of national 

origin discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a material issue 

of fact with respect to either claim. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case 

of national origin discrimination and failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reasons for the allegedly retaliatory adverse employment actions were 

pretextual. 

I. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s national origin 

discrimination claim. 

 In order to establish a prima facie case national origin discrimination, Plaintiff 

must show that: (1) he belonged to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, 

(3) he was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals 

outside his class were treated more favorably. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Plaintiff satisfies the initial burden of establishing a prima 

facie case, the burden shifts to Defendants to prove they had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If Defendant meets that 

burden, Plaintiff must prove that such a reason was merely a pretext for intentional 

discrimination.11 Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In 

 

11 Plaintiff suggests that this Court should adopt a modified version of the McDonnell 

Douglas test and infer a prima facie case of discrimination upon a showing that background 

circumstances support the suspicion that the employer is discriminating against the majority and 

that the employer treated similarly-situated employees not belonging to the protected group 

differently. (Doc. 66, pg. 1.) The Ninth Circuit has not adopted that legal standard, and this 

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the present case, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of proof. 

 Plaintiff alleges four factual bases for his national origin claim: (1) in 2001, 

Plaintiff applied for a Sergeant position and an Hispanic, Fernando Castro, was selected 

instead; (2) from the time Plaintiff became a sergeant in 2005, whenever he dealt with 

disciplinary issues involving Hispanic employees, Plaintiff believed that Assistant 

Administrator Michael Aranda, who is Hispanic, would interfere and try to lessen the 

charge or advise Plaintiff to disregard the problem; (3) Administrator Aranda was 

permitted to take comp time, and Fernando Castro was paid for comp time, but Plaintiff 

was not permitted to take comp time or paid for it when he resigned; and (4) Plaintiff was 

essentially demoted in May, 2010 when he was stripped of his supervisory authority.12 

None of these allegations satisfies Plaintiff’s burden of proof. 

First, Plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against in 2001 when Fernando 

Castro was hired as Sergeant is untimely, given that Plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge on 

September 30, 2010. See Zipes 455 U.S. at 393–94 (a claim of discrimination under the 

Act will not be sustained if it is based on an event or events that occurred more than 300 

days before the filing of a charge). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s claim that the 2001 

failure to promote was part of a continuing practice of discrimination that Plaintiff did not 

discover until September 2010. Plaintiff did not mention the 2001 failure to promote in 

his EEOC Charge and has not presented any evidence to support his claim that he did not 

suspect a discriminatory motive until nine years later.13

Second, Plaintiff’s allegation that Assistant Administrator Aranda interfered with 

 Court declines to do so. See Hannon v. Chater, 887 F.Supp. 1303 n.41 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on an incorrect legal standard renders much of his Response to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment unpersuasive. 

12 Plaintiff also makes several irrelevant allegations in support of his national origin 

discrimination claim, which the Court has not considered in granting the Motion for Summary 

Judgment. For example, Plaintiff discusses the demographics of Greenlee and Graham County 

and the firing of an employee named Bernice Brown. (Doc. 66, pgs. 5-6.) In addition, the Court 

notes that Plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment discrimination claim in his EEOC Charge 

but alleges a disparate treatment discrimination claim in the pending action. 

13 The Court notes that Administrator Gatwood, who is Caucasian, possessed the ultimate 

decision-making authority concerning the promotion of Fernando Castro. (DSOF 9, 57.) 

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Plaintiff’s discipline of Hispanic subordinates is not an adverse employment action.14 As 

a threshold matter, Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific incidents in which the 

Assistant Administrator effectively interfered with Plaintiff’s discipline of Hispanic 

employees. The only evidence presented by Plaintiff in support of this claim is his 

testimony that Assistant Administrator Aranda would “step in and attempt to either lessen 

the charges of disciplinary action or tell me to disregard.” (Doc. 56-1, pg. 8.) It is 

Plaintiff’s opinion that Assistant Administrator Aranda only supervised him in this 

manner when Plaintiff was attempting to discipline Hispanic subordinates. “Mere 

personal beliefs, conjecture and speculation are insufficient to support an inference of 

unlawful discrimination.” Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 

1986). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not cite to, and this Court is not aware of, any case 

law holding that undermining an employee’s intent to reprimand subordinates amounts to 

an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s suspicion that Assistant Administrator Aranda 

was interfering with Plaintiff’s attempts at discipline, or his perception of Assistant 

Administrator Aranda’s management style, do not amount to interference with the terms 

and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (defining 

adverse employment action as one which affects the terms, conditions or privileges of 

employment); see also Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

62 (2006) (distinguishing the narrow definition of adverse employment action in Title VII 

discrimination cases from the broader construction relied on in retaliation cases). In 

addition, Plaintiff does not allege that similarly-situated Hispanics were not supervised in 

the same manner by Assistant Administrator Aranda. 

Third, Defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not 

permitting Plaintiff to take comp time and not paying Plaintiff for unused comp time 

 

14 The Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff failed to present this claim in his 

EEOC Charge. The EEOC Charge alleges that Plaintiff reprimanded Sgt. Luzania, who is 

Hispanic, and then received an unsatisfactory mark on his evaluation from Assistant 

Administrator Gatwood. (Doc. 56-1, pg. 31.) Although Plaintiff does not allege those facts in 

support of his national origin discrimination claim in this case, his claim that Assistant 

Administrator Aranda unfairly supervised him is somewhat related to his EEOC claim that 

Assistant Administrator Aranda unfairly evaluated him. 

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when he resigned.15 County policy requires that leave be taken within the period in 

which it was earned or no later than the following pay period. Plaintiff was often not 

permitted to take comp time because he was part of the command staff and EARJDF was 

required to maintain adequate staffing of command personnel. Due to severe budget 

restrictions, there were often staff shortages. Finally, Fernando Castro was paid comp 

time due to a clerical error when he left the County’s employment. The County does not, 

as a rule, pay for unused comp time. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of these 

stated reasons are pretextual. 

Fourth and finally, Defendants have stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

taking away Plaintiff’s supervisory authority in May, 2010. Administrator Gatwood, who 

is Caucasian, testified that he made the decision to re-assign Plaintiff’s supervisory 

responsibilities so that Plaintiff could focus on the ACA audit. Plaintiff did not lose any 

pay or benefits as a result of this action. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this stated 

reason was pretextual.16 

Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of proof with respect to his 

national origin discrimination claim, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to 

this claim. 

II. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the employee must 

allege and prove that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) his employer subjected 

him to an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the 

protected activity and the employer's action. See Payne v. Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 

 

15 In addition, this claim is without merit because: (1) Plaintiff did dispute that he was at 

times given leave, which he used (DSOF 55; PSOF 55); (2) Plaintiff did not allege a claim 

related to comp time in his EEOC charge; (3) Administrator Gatwood is Caucasian and therefore 

his ability to take comp times undercuts Plaintiff’s claim; and (4) Administrator Gatwood and 

Assistant Administrator Aranda were not similarly-situated to Plaintiff. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d 

641 (employees in supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be similarly situated to 

lower level employees). 

16 In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to allege discrimination by 

Administrator Gatwood, but instead argues that Assistant Administrator Aranda deprived him of 

his supervisory duties. There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. 

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1080 (9th Cir. 1997). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts 

to the employer to present legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse 

employment actions. Once the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by the 

employer was a pretext for retaliation. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 

928 (9th Cir. 2000). Only then does the case proceed beyond summary judgment. Id. 

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision does not make actionable retaliation against an 

employee that is not engaged in “protected activity” within the meaning of Title VII. 

Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (The “opposed conduct 

must fairly fall within the protection of Title VII to sustain a claim of unlawful 

retaliation.”); Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[U]nder the clear 

language of the ‘opposition’ clause ..., a case of retaliation has not been made out unless 

the ‘retaliation’ relates to the employee's opposition to a [Title VII] violation.”); Shipley 

v. Hawaii, Dept. of Education, 2007 WL 188029 (D. Haw. 2007). 

Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in the following protected activity: (1) from 

October 2009 to January 2010, Plaintiff opposed gender discrimination against Miller by: 

relaying to Administrator Gatwood and Assistant Administrator Aranda that Sgt. Luzania 

was discriminating against Miller on the basis of her gender; taking over scheduling in 

order to ensure that Miller was fairly scheduled; and correcting an unfair evaluation of 

Miller; (2) in January, 2010, Plaintiff recommended adjusting the evaluation of Mona 

Lucero, a Hispanic, female-corrections officer, because he believed Lucero was highlyrated simply because she was Hispanic; (3) in January, 2010, Plaintiff recommended 

Miller for a pay increase and sometime thereafter told Gatwood that the failure to provide 

Miller with a pay increase was gender discrimination; (4) on May 29, 2010, Plaintiff 

submitted a complaint to Administrator Gatwood alleging that Plaintiff was being 

subjected to a hostile work environment in the form of rumors being spread about 

Plaintiff and Miller; (5) on September 1, 2010, Plaintiff objected when Miller was told 

not to return to work for the rest of the week; and (6) on August 8, 2010, Plaintiff 

submitted a formal complaint to Graham County Manager Terry Cooper alleging that he 

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was being retaliated against for opposing discrimination against Miller. (DSOF 20; 39.)17

There is no genuine issue of material fact supporting Plaintiff’s claim that he 

believed that he was observing gender or national origin discrimination against Miller or 

that he raised concerns about gender or national origin discrimination. Neither Plaintiff 

nor Miller’s testimony supports an inference that Plaintiff believed he was defending 

Miller against discrimination or engaging in other activity protected by Title VII between 

October, 2009 and January, 2010.18 The evidence in the record demonstrates only that 

Plaintiff advocated for Miller between October, 2009 and January, 2010. Notably, Miller 

herself testified that she did not suspect gender discrimination until sometime after 

January, 2010. (Doc. 77-1, pg. 16.) Miller testified that in October, 2009, she felt 

mistreated by Sgt. Luzania but “had no idea where it was coming from,” and “had no idea 

why he was treating [her] that way.” (Doc. 77-1, pgs. 16 & 18.) 

Similarly, the only evidence Plaintiff presents in support of his claim that he 

opposed gender discrimination when he recommended adjusting the evaluation of Mona 

Lucero is his affidavit testimony that he believed Lucero was highly-rated simply because 

she was Hispanic. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s 

 

17 Plaintiff also claims that he engaged in protected activity when he reprimanded Sgt. 

Luzania for an allegedly sexist remark regarding Miller taking responsibility for the facility 

laundry. As stated on page 3, footnote 7, there is no evidence to support that such a reprimand 

occurred. In addition, the comment made by Sgt. Luzania to Miller was arguably not a sexist 

comment: Miller was criticizing how the laundry was being done and Sgt. Luzania responded by 

stating that Miller should do the laundry herself. (Doc. 56-1, pg. 25.) 

In addition, Plaintiff claims that he engaged in protected activity on July 26, 2010, when 

he expressed concern to County Administrator Terry Cooper about Miller’s reassignment to the 

night shift and the rumors being spread about Plaintiff and Miller. (Doc. 66, pg. 16.) There is no 

evidence in the record demonstrating that Plaintiff made this statement. Defendants initially 

treated this as a statement of fact, based solely on citation to the Complaint (DSOF 37), but 

Plaintiff, as the party opposing the motion, may not rest upon allegations in his pleadings to 

defeat the motion. Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988); Frederick S. Wyle Professional Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 764 

F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1985) (nonmoving party cannot rest on the hope of disproving the 

moving party's evidence at trial). 

18 No issue of material issue of fact is created by Miller’s self-serving affidavit that 

contradicts the deposition testimony taken in this matter. As a general rule, an affidavit 

submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment which contradicts earlier sworn 

testimony without explanation of the difference does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 

Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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suspicions were based on a reasonable good faith belief or that he conveyed those 

suspicions to his supervisors. See Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 

271 (2001) (upholding summary judgment for employer where no reasonable person 

could have believed single incident violated Title VII); Chappell, 803 F.2d at 268 

(“[m]ere personal beliefs, conjecture and speculation are insufficient to support an 

inference” of unlawful discrimination). To the contrary, a plain reading of Plaintiff’s 

affidavit suggests that Plaintiff recommended adjusting Mona Lucero’s evaluation 

downward because she was Hispanic. This is not protected activity under Title VII. 

Plaintiff’s claim that he engaged in protected activity on September 1, 2010 when he 

objected to Miller being told not to return to work also lacks support; nothing in the 

record indicates that Plaintiff stated or claimed that Miller was being discriminated 

against at that time. (PSSOF 96.) Accordingly, the only potentially protected activity 

articulated by Plaintiff are his claims that: (1) in January, 2010, he recommended Miller 

for a pay increase and sometime thereafter told Gatwood that the failure to provide Miller 

with a pay increase was gender discrimination, (2) on May 29, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a 

complaint to Administrator Gatwood alleging that Plaintiff was being subjected to a 

hostile work environment in the form of rumors being spread about Plaintiff and Miller; 

and (3) on August 8, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a formal complaint to Graham County 

Manager Terry Cooper alleging that he was being retaliated against for opposing 

discrimination against Miller. 

The Ninth Circuit takes an expansive view of adverse employment actions in 

retaliation claims, defining an adverse employment action as “any adverse treatment that 

is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or 

others from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 

(1998)). The EEOC test focuses on the deterrent effects of the action. Id. at 1243. 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered the following adverse employment actions: (1) Plaintiff 

was subjected to false rumors about an inappropriate relationship with Miller; (2) on May 

25, 2010, Plaintiff received a mark of “needs improvement” on his evaluation; (3) on 

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May 26, 2010, Plaintiff’s supervisory responsibilities were re-assigned to Assistant 

Administrator Aranda; and (4) on September 1, 2010, Plaintiff was told not to return to 

work for the rest of the week. Starting rumors does not amount to an adverse 

employment action, see E.E.O.C. v. Parra, 2008 WL 2185124, n.6 (D. Or. 2008), nor 

does ostracism by co-workers. See Strother v. Southern California Permanente Medical 

Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996). The other incidents described by Plaintiff 

arguably could be adverse employment actions. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (noting that 

the EEOC definition of adverse employment action includes lateral transfers, unfavorable 

job references, and changes in work schedules). 

Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate a causal connection between his protected 

activity and the adverse employment actions he suffered, Defendants have articulated 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the allegedly adverse employment actions.19

On May 25, 2010, Assistant Administrator Aranda noted that Plaintiff “needs 

improvement” in his relationships with supervisors and co-workers because Plaintiff’s 

supervisors were attempting to encourage Plaintiff to improve his relationships with coworkers. (DSOF 44.) The mark did not affect Plaintiff’s pay or benefits, and Plaintiff 

received the highest possible rating in the other 19 areas evaluated. Plaintiff’s 

supervisory responsibilities were re-assigned to Assistant Administrator Aranda in order 

to provide Plaintiff with more time to work on the ACA audit. Plaintiff did not lose pay 

or benefits as a result of this decision. On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff was told not to 

return to work for the rest of the week because of all the hard work Plaintiff had put into 

 

19 The proximity of time between a protected activity and an adverse action may support 

an inference of causation. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244; Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). In the present case, Plaintiff received his evaluation and lost his 

supervisory responsibilities before he filed a formal complaint of discrimination against Miller or 

a formal complaint of retaliation. At best, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that: (1) he 

suffered adverse employment actions in May and September, 2010 because sometime after 

January, 2010 he told Gatwood that he believed Miller was denied a pay raise due to gender 

discrimination, and/or (2) he was told not to return to work on September 1, 2010 because he had 

complained of gender discrimination in May and August, 2010. 

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the audit. Plaintiff did not lose pay or benefits as a result of this decision.20 See Jordan 

v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment in favor 

of employer where employer delayed employee’s promotion papers, increased her duties 

without amending her job description, denied her requests to attend management courses, 

undermined her position by taking away higher level duties, gave her several poor 

performance appraisals, put derogatory memos in her file, designed a means of reviewing 

later performance unfavorably, directed her work to other employees, and limited her to 

clerical work; the actions did not have an adverse impact, were not caused by protected 

activity and appeared to the court to be more a reaction to a problem of clashing 

personalities than acts in retaliation for the filing of a discrimination complaint). Plaintiff 

has failed to demonstrate that any of Defendants’ stated reasons were pretextual.21 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim. 

// 

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// 

 

20 Administrator Gatwood testified that Plaintiff’s pay and benefits were not affected by 

the time off given to him in September, 2010. (DSOF 54.) Plaintiff claims that Administrator 

Gatwood required him to use annual leave, which affected his pay and benefits. (Doc. 66, pg. 

17.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites to his own affidavit, which does not include any 

documentation demonstrating a reduction in annual leave. To defeat a motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence; he cannot rely solely on his own 

unsupported allegations. 

21 Plaintiff makes only two arguments related to pretext. He claims that an evaluation 

stating that he needs improvement in relationships with co-workers was disingenuous given that 

he was deprived of his supervisory responsibilities. (Doc. 66, pg. 15.) The Court rejects this 

argument because Plaintiff was not deprived of supervisory responsibilities until after the 

evaluation was complete, and regardless of his supervisory authority, he still had co-workers. He 

also claims that he did not consider being given the rest of the week off to be a reward. (Doc. 66, 

pg. 17.) He does not cite to any admissible portion of the record to support this assertion, and 

regardless, how Plaintiff perceived the time off does not alter how it was intended. 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment filed on November 2, 2012 (Doc. 55) is GRANTED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

in favor of Defendants and close the file in this matter. 

 Dated this 23rd day of September, 2013. 

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