Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01396/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01396-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Odell Hopson,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-1396-PHX-DJH (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Brian Odell Hopson’s (“Petitioner”) Second Amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Second Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 28). Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 31) and Petitioner has 

filed a Reply (Doc. 42). The matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises six grounds and a number of sub-grounds for habeas relief in the 

Second Amended Petition. The undersigned finds that the Second Amended Petition is 

time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.1

 It is therefore 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

 

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recommended that the Second Amended Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 11, 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty of four counts of aggravated 

assault. (Doc. 18-1 at 19-24). On May 11, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

concurrent twenty-year terms of incarceration for each of the four counts. Those 

sentences are to be served consecutively to the sentences Petitioner received in 

Petitioner’s two prior criminal cases. (Id. at 113-18). 

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on May 12, 2010. (Id. at 120). On August 8, 2011, pursuant to Petitioner’s 

request for dismissal, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the direct appeal. (Doc. 

18-2 at 118-25). After filing the notice of appeal, Petitioner filed four notices of postconviction relief (“PCR”) and two petitions for special action. Those filings are detailed 

in the undersigned’s statutory tolling analysis in Section III(A)(1) below. 

On August 8, 2013,2 Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 7) (the “Original Petition”). The 

Court dismissed the Original Petition with leave to amend for failure to allege the 

particular federal constitutional right violated in each ground for relief (Doc. 6 at 2-3). 

On November 19, 2013,3 Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (Doc. 8). The Court 

required Respondents to answer Ground Two of the First Amended Petition. (Docs. 10 

2 The Original Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on August 12, 2013. The Original Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that Petitioner placed the 

Original Petition in the prison mailing system on August 8, 2013. (Doc. 7-3 at 67). 

Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used August 8, 2013 as the filing date. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be 

filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

3 The First Amended Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on November 21, 2013. The First Amended Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that Petitioner placed the First Amended Petition in the prison mailing system on November 

19, 2013 (Doc. 8 at 11). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used November 19, 2013 as the filing date.

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and 14). On June 4, 2014, Respondents filed their Limited Answer to the First Amended 

Petition (Doc. 18). Petitioner replied on July 31, 2014 (Doc. 26).

In its August 8, 2014 Order (Doc. 27), the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion to 

Amend the First Amended Petition and directed the Clerk to file the Second Amended 

Petition attached as Exhibit I to the Motion to Amend. The Court ordered Respondents to 

answer all six grounds contained in the Second Amended Petition, but allowed 

Respondents to limit the answer to relevant affirmative defenses (Id. at 4). Respondents 

filed their Limited Answer on September 5, 2014 (Doc. 31). Petitioner replied in 

December 2014 (Doc. 42) pursuant to a filing extension. 

Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes that the claims 

in the Second Amended Petition relate back to the claims in the Original Petition. 

Accordingly, the undersigned has used the August 8, 2013 filing date of the Original 

Petition instead of the later filing date of the Second Amended Petition for purposes of 

determining whether this federal habeas action is timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2); Mayle

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within 

one year of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

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presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. The Statute of Limitations Began Running on August 9, 2011 as to All 

Grounds for Relief in the Second Amended Petition

To analyze the timeliness of this proceeding, it must first be determined which of 

the triggering events specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) applies for purposes of 

calculating the start date of the one-year limitations period. More than one triggering 

event may apply to a federal habeas petition. See Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 

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1171 (9th Cir. 2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations “applies to each claim in a habeas 

application on an individual basis”). Respondents assert that the triggering event for all 

of Petitioner’s grounds for relief is the date upon which Petitioner’s conviction became 

final pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner appears to concede to 

Respondents’ position as to all grounds except for Ground One. Petitioner asserts that 

the triggering event for Ground One is the date the factual predicate underlying the claim 

became known pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). (Doc. 42-3 at 1).

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) applies “only if vital facts could not have been known by 

the date the appellate process ended.” Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The date a prisoner recognizes 

the legal significance of facts is irrelevant for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(D). See 

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Time begins when the 

prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the 

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”). 

Here, Petitioner’s Ground One challenges the Arizona Supreme Court’s dismissal 

of his “New Petition for Special Action” filed in March 2013. (Doc. 28 at 6). Petitioner 

alleges that this dismissal “den[ied] defendant due relief on the merits of U.S. 

Constitutional Federal and State issues of law.” (Id.). Yet the New Petition for Special 

Action does not present any underlying facts that could not have been known by the date 

Petitioner’s direct appeal ended. To the extent the Arizona Supreme Court’s dismissal 

prompted Petitioner to seek federal habeas relief, the dismissal is the legal predicate, not 

the factual predicate, underlying Petitioner’s claim in Ground One. Hasan, 254 F.3d at 

1154 n. 3. In other words, because Petitioner was aware of the vital facts at the time his 

convictions became final, the triggering event set forth in Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not 

apply. The undersigned finds that the triggering event set forth in Section 2244(d)(1)(A) 

(i.e. the date upon which Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final) applies to 

all grounds for relief in the Second Amended Petition. 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on August 8, 2011—the date 

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the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s direct appeal pursuant to Petitioner’s 

request. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a habeas 

petitioner’s conviction became final on the date he dismissed his direct appeal). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition expired on August 8, 

2012. This means that unless statutory or equitable tolling applies, the Original Petition 

filed on August 8, 2013 is one year late. 

1. Statutory Tolling 

A statutory tolling analysis under AEDPA begins by determining whether the 

collateral review petition was “properly filed.” This is because statutory tolling does not 

apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly 

filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing 

filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing requirements in determining 

whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly filed” application that is 

eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. An untimely state 

collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that 

“time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is 

therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as untimely).

Under Ninth Circuit case law, untimely appeals of a lower state court’s decision 

regarding a collateral review petition are also not “properly filed” for statutory tolling 

purposes. This means that the time between a lower state court’s ruling on a collateral 

review petition and an appeal to a higher state court is not statutorily tolled if the appeal 

is deemed untimely. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 

F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Under Pace, if a state court denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or 

during the court’s consideration of that petition is statutorily tolled.”).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

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determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona 

postconviction rules demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the 

Notice.”). It remains “pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s 

post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes 

“[t]he time between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s 

filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under 

state law.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 191. 

i. First PCR Proceeding

On May 18, 2010, while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a 

notice of PCR (the “First PCR Proceeding”). (Doc. 18-1 at 122). In its February 24, 

2011 minute entry, the trial court dismissed the First PCR Proceeding with leave to re-file 

at any time within thirty days upon the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Doc. 18-

2 at 42). As the First PCR Proceeding was dismissed before the limitations period

commenced on August 9, 2011, the First PCR Proceeding had no statutory tolling effect. 

Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (petition filed in state court before the 

running of the federal limitations period had no effect on the timeliness of the federal 

petition).

ii. Second PCR Proceeding

In March 2011, Petitioner filed a second PCR notice and thereafter filed a PCR 

petition (the “Second PCR Proceeding”). (Doc. 18-2 at 45, 52). On May 19, 2011, the 

trial court dismissed the Second PCR Proceeding with leave to re-file at any time within 

thirty days upon conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Id. at 96). This dismissal was 

before the August 9, 2011 commencement date of the limitations period. The Second 

PCR Proceeding thus had no statutory tolling effect. Waldrip, 548 F.3d at 735. 

iii. Third PCR Proceeding

On September 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a third PCR notice (the “Third PCR 

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Proceeding”). (Doc. 18-3 at 2). Petitioner acknowledged that the trial court had ordered 

Petitioner to file his PCR notice within thirty days after the conclusion of his direct

appeal. (Id. at 5). Petitioner further acknowledged that he did not initiate the Third PCR 

Proceeding within the August 8, 2011 conclusion of his direct appeal. (Id.). Petitioner, 

however, asserted that his untimeliness should be excused because Petitioner did not 

receive notification from his attorney regarding the appeal’s dismissal date until 

September 16, 2011.4

 (Id. at 5-6). The trial court ruled that the Third PCR Proceeding 

“was not filed in a timely manner,” but found that Petitioner had “sufficiently raised a 

colorable claim” to permit the Third PCR Proceeding to move forward. (Id. at 12). Yet 

the trial court explicitly stated that “[t]his allowance does not constitute any expression of 

opinion on the merits of any of defendant’s substantive claims, or that any claims raised 

in the petition are not procedurally precluded.” (Id.). 

In its Response, the State argued that the Third PCR Proceeding should be 

dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 18-4 at 12-15). The State acknowledged that Rule 32.1(f) 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure in some circumstances may allow an 

untimely PCR proceeding to move forward if a defendant failed to timely file a PCR 

notice through no fault on the defendant’s part. The State asserted, however, that Rule 

32.1(f) only applies to of-right PCR notices or to notices of appeal. The State concluded 

that because (i) Petitioner is not entitled to an of-right PCR proceeding5 and (ii) already 

filed a notice of appeal, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(f). The trial 

court dismissed the Third PCR Proceeding on April 9, 2012, explaining that it “agrees 

with the arguments set forth in the State’s Response.” (Doc. 18-5 at 2).

4 Petitioner’s attorney notified him of the dismissal date in a letter dated September 9, 2011. (Doc. 18-3 at 8). The prison’s mail log indicates that Petitioner received the letter on September 16, 2011. (Id. at 9).

5 Under Arizona law, a defendant in a non-capital case who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 13–4033(B). A plea-convicted 

defendant, however, is entitled to a Rule 32 (PCR) of-right proceeding. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. The of-right proceeding must be initiated within ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentencing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. 

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After the Third PCR Proceeding was dismissed, Petitioner filed a Motion for 

Rehearing. (Doc. 18-5 at 4-37). The trial court denied the Motion for Rehearing on May 

14, 2012. (Id. at 42). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief on 

December 9, 2013. (Doc. 18-6 at 119-26). In its order, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

held that “because Rule 32.1(f) is not available to [Petitioner], a non-pleading defendant 

who already had an appeal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 

relief on this ground.” (Id. at 122-23). The Arizona Court of Appeals also held that 

Petitioner was “barred from raising [the claims in the Third PCR Proceeding] in an 

untimely post-conviction proceeding.” (Id. at 123). The Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review on May 8, 2014. (Id. at 128-55, 157). 

“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the end of 

the matter for purposes of [AEDPA’s statute of limitations].” Pace, 544 U.S. at 414. 

As the Third PCR Proceeding was untimely filed under Arizona law, that is the end of

the court’s inquiry as to whether the Third PCR Proceeding was “properly filed” under

AEDPA. See Rudin v. Myles, 766 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a

federal habeas petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling where the Nevada

Supreme Court determined that the petitioner’s PCR petition was untimely). Petitioner’s

untimely Third PCR Proceeding therefore had no statutory tolling effect on AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. 

iv. Fourth PCR Proceeding

After the limitations period had expired, Petitioner filed a fourth PCR notice (the 

“Fourth PCR Proceeding”) that is file-stamped March 18, 2013. (Doc. 18-5 at 91). The 

trial court dismissed the Fourth PCR Proceeding on April 18, 2013 as untimely. (Doc. 

18-6 at 56). The trial court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing on April 30, 2013. 

(Id. at 59-85, 87). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id. 89-112). According to Respondents’ Limited Answer to the First 

Amended Petition (Doc. 18 at 10), the Arizona Court of Appeals had not ruled on the 

petition for review as of June 4, 2014. 

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The current status of the Petition for Review is irrelevant because the Fourth PCR 

Proceeding was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired on August 8, 2012. 

Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do not 

“restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). The Fourth PCR Proceeding thus had no 

statutory tolling effect. (Id. at 76). 

v. Petitions for Special Action

“Petitions for writ of mandate do not toll the limitations period because they are 

not application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claims within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2).” Hardiman v. Galaz, 

58 F.App’x 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 

also Meadows v. Jacquez, 242 F. App’x 453, 455 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that mandamus 

petitions are not petitions for collateral review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2)). In Arizona, a petition for special action is the equivalent of a petition for 

writ of mandate. Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 1, 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. Because a petition 

for special action is not a request for collateral review, it therefore has no tolling effect on 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

On February 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Special Action Petition” in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18-4 at 34-80). The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to 

exercise jurisdiction on March 1, 2012. (Id. at 82). On March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a 

“New Petition for Special Action” in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 18-6 at 2-54). 

The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the New Petition for Special Action on June 27, 

2013. (Id. at 114-15). The Court explained that pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules of 

Procedure for Special Actions, the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding a petition for 

special action shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon a petition for review. 

(Id.).

 Petitioner explicitly stated that he was filing the Special Action Petition and New 

Petition for Special Action in accordance with the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special 

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Actions. (Doc. 18-4 at 43; Doc. 18-6 at 13). Both petitions sought an order from a 

higher Arizona court to compel action by a lower Arizona court. The undersigned 

concludes that the Special Action Petition and New Petition for Special Action are not 

applications for PCR or collateral review with respect to Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. Consequently, this federal habeas proceeding is time-barred unless Petitioner 

is entitled to equitable tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

The standard for equitable tolling of the one-year habeas limitations period is a 

very high bar, and is reserved for rare cases. Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075 

(9th Cir. 2014); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’”) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 

(7th Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, such as 

“abandonment” by the petitioner’s counsel, the unavailability of a prison library, or a 

petitioner’s mental disability, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely habeas action. See Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 886–87; Sossa v. Diaz, 729 

F.3d 1225, 1236 (9th Cir. 2013). It is a petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable 

tolling is warranted.6

 Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

6 Petitioner appears to assert that under Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2566 

(2010), there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling. (Doc. 42-5 at 1). 

Yet the presumption applied in Holland was not one that equitable tolling should be 

found in an individual case, but that a presumption that a given statute of limitations was 

subject to equitable tolling at all. After considering the presumption, the U.S. Supreme 

Court held that AEDPA’s statute of limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons. 

Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2550.

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As mentioned, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that: (i) he or 

she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and (ii) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his or her way. A petitioner must also show that the 

“extraordinary circumstances” were the “but-for and proximate cause of his [or her] 

untimeliness.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see also 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Liberally construing the Second Amended Petition and Reply, Petitioner primarily 

bases his equitable tolling argument on (i) the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

for failing to timely notify Petitioner of the date his direct appeal was dismissed; (ii) 

Petitioner’s pro se status and lack of legal knowledge; and (iii) inadequate legal 

assistance in prison. Petitioner states that:

Petitioner did not waive [the] right to counsel or effective 

assistance of counsel at critical closing stage of appellate 

procedure, where such counsel had the ability to help 

Petitioner avoid being untimely in filing related notice of 

PCR . . . and thereby avoid prejudice from such filing 

proceedings, as to being denied the right to pursue any 

constitutional claims, pursuant to Rule 32.4(a)/32.1(a), but 

that Petitioner was reliant on appellant counsel, in good faith, 

to facilitate dismissal of the direct appeal, thereby putting 

Petitioner in a position to pursue unfettered PCR 

proceedings/remedies.

(Doc. 42-5 at 10, 42-6 at 1).

. . . .

Hence, Petitioner being a layperson in the law, with limit[ed] 

legal access. . . . (note: at the relevant time period Petitioner 

was being confined at a close-custody [sic] facility, which 

operates on control inmate movement, while legal access was 

occasioned one mourning [sic] or afternoon a week) . . . .

(Doc. 42-6 at 3).

Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify 

equitable tolling or demonstrated that an external impediment hindered the diligent 

pursuit of his rights. First, while attorney misconduct may constitute an extraordinary 

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circumstance warranting equitable tolling, it is only warranted where the conduct is 

“sufficiently egregious.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800, 801 (9th Cir. 2003)

(equitable tolling warranted where attorney was hired nearly a full year in advance of the 

deadline but completely failed to prepare and file a petition, was contacted by petitioner 

and his mother numerous times by telephone and in writing, and retained the file beyond 

the expiration of the statute of limitations). A “garden variety claim of excusable neglect

. . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline . . . does

not warrant equitable tolling.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-52; see also Lawrence v. 

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (attorney miscalculation of limitations period 

insufficient to warrant equitable tolling); Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1057-58 

(9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claim for equitable tolling based on counsel’s alleged 

negligence in failing to perfect appeal).

Here, Petitioner argues nothing but garden variety negligence or malpractice with 

respect to his appellate counsel. Appellate counsel’s failure to promptly notify Petitioner 

of the date his appeal was dismissed does not approach the kinds of extreme misconduct 

that courts have found to establish grounds for equitable tolling. See, e.g. Holland, 560 

U.S. at 652-53 (attorney’s repeated failures to respond to a client’s inquiries over a period 

of years, and demands for timely action, might establish equitable tolling); Gibbs v. 

LeGrand, 767 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2014) (grounds for equitable tolling where counsel 

failed, despite the petitioner’s repeated inquiries, to inform that the state court had denied 

the appeal state post-conviction petition, with habeas limitations period expiring in the 

interim). At most, any deficiency in appellate counsel’s performance might suggest 

potential cause for a failure to properly exhaust his state remedies. To this end, Petitioner 

cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (Doc. 

42-5 at 2-3 & 42-6 at 1). 

The Martinez decision impacts cases where claims are otherwise procedurally 

defaulted, but the decision has no bearing on Petitioner’s obligation to file a federal 

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habeas petition within the limitations period.7 While federal habeas law required 

Petitioner to exhaust his state remedies, Petitioner does not show how his counsel’s 

performance precluded a timely federal habeas filing. In Pace, 544 U.S. at 416, the 

Supreme Court instructed that, if a state prisoner is uncertain about whether a state PCR 

petition is timely, he or she should “file a protective petition in federal court and ask the 

district court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 

exhausted.” See also Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2011) (Pace advised 

state prisoners to file a protective federal petition to avoid a possible timeliness bar). 

Here, Petitioner had notice that the Third PCR Proceeding was untimely when the trial 

court dismissed it as untimely on April 9, 2012 and denied Petitioner’s Motion for

Rehearing on May 14, 2012.8

 As AEDPA’s limitations period had not yet expired, 

Petitioner should have filed a protective petition in federal court while pursuing further 

state review. See Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015) (because state 

courts had denied two previous state petitions as untimely, petitioner should have filed a 

protective petition in federal court, as suggested in Pace). Petitioner does not 

7 Under Martinez, “cause” to excuse a petitioner’s procedural default may be

found where:

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was

a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there

being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the

state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral

review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in

respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”;

and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of

trial counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review

collateral proceeding.”

Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318–19,

1320–21) (alterations in original). 

8 To the extent Petitioner is challenging the Arizona state court’s dismissal of any of his PCR proceedings, “[f]ederal habeas courts lack jurisdiction to review state court 

applications of state procedural rules.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 

1998); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

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demonstrate any extraordinary circumstance that precluded Petitioner from filing a 

protective petition.

Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, and alleged ignorance 

of the law alone do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. 

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.”); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) 

(“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an 

excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”); 

Waldron–Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1012 n. 4 (“[W]e have held that a pro se petitioner’s

confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”). Petitioner’s State court filings during the limitations period show that 

Petitioner had access to legal resources and was capable of analyzing and presenting legal 

arguments.

As Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances 

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal petition, it is not necessary to address 

the diligence element of his equitable tolling claim. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1153 (“We 

need not address the diligence element [of petitioner’s equitable tolling claim] because 

we conclude that no extraordinary circumstance stood in [the petitioner’s] way.”). For 

the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

B. Because the Statute of Limitations Expired on August 8, 2012, this Federal 

Habeas Proceeding Initiated on August 8, 2013 is Untimely

To summarize the preceding sections, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final on August 8, 2011 and AEDPA’s statute of limitations began running on 

August 9, 2011. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies. Accordingly, the statute 

of limitations expired on August 8, 2012, which means that the Original Petition filed on 

August 8, 2013 is one year late. 

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C. The Petition’s Untimeliness is Not Excused by the Actual Innocence 

Gateway/Miscarriage of Justice Exception 

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway” 

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.” 

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th 

Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “‘must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.’” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

In his Reply (Doc. 42-7 at 9), Petitioner cites Schlup. To the extent Petitioner 

argues that the miscarriage of justice exception should be applied if the Court finds that 

the Petition is time-barred, Petitioner does not proffer any new evidence to support actual 

innocence. Petitioner instead makes statements such as “Petitioner’s . . . claim supports 

defendant’s innocence: revealing victim’s pressured statements establishes that such 

information that would have changed the verdict . . . .” (Doc. 28-1 at 18). Petitioner 

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also seems to intertwine his Schlup claim with allegations of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. For instance, Petitioner states:

[A]nother miscarriage of justice exists here, whereby trial, 

PCR, nor direct appeal counsel pursued the manifest error of 

there being no ARS statutory sufficient evidence or testimony 

warranting the box cutter inclusion in the indictment as an 

alleged weapon of the related offense, thereby tainting the 

related jury instruction, thus; such rosed [sic] to an 

impermissible, mandatory conclusive presumption.

(Doc. 42-7 at 5).

Petitioner’s speculative and conclusory statements are insufficient to establish a 

Schlup gateway claim. See Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (“we 

have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of innocence was 

merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome otherwise convincing 

proof of guilt”). The undersigned does not find that the record and pleadings in this case 

contain “evidence of innocence so strong that [the Court] cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass 

through the Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this proceeding.

D. Petitioner’s Additional Requests

1. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim of actual innocence. 

(Doc. 28 at 13; Doc. 28-1 at 33). The undersigned liberally construes this request as a 

request for an evidentiary hearing as to the application of the Schlup gateway. However, 

the undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary because Petitioner “has 

failed to show what more an evidentiary hearing might reveal of material import on his 

assertion of actual innocence.” See Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir.

2002) (evidentiary hearing on actual innocence claim not necessary where both the 

affidavits of the “new” witnesses and the trial record “speak for themselves and do not 

support [the petitioner’s] claim of actual innocence”). 

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The undersigned also liberally construes Petitioner’s request as a request for an 

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s equitable tolling claim. The Ninth Circuit has 

held that a habeas petitioner “should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a

good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy, 465

F.3d at 969 (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in 

original). For the reasons discussed in Section III(A)(2) above, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would warrant equitable tolling for a 

period of time that would render the Original Petition timely. See Roberts v. Marshall,

627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “a district court is not obligated to hold 

evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record” when the record is “amply 

developed”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Request for Appointment of Counsel 

Petitioner renews his request for the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 42-8 at 13). 

As the Court’s prior orders in this case have explained, there is no constitutional right to

counsel in a habeas proceeding. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to appointed

counsel unless the circumstances indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent

due process violations.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). However, pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, “[i]f an evidentiary hearing

is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner who

qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” Even if an evidentiary 

hearing is not warranted, a district court has discretion to appoint counsel for a habeas 

petitioner when “the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 

The undersigned does not find that the interests of justice require the appointment 

of counsel in this untimely case. Petitioner has failed to show that the complexities of the 

case are such that denial of appointed counsel would amount to a denial of due process. 

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Moreover, Petitioner’s filings with the Court indicate that Petitioner understands the 

issues and is capable of presenting his arguments to the Court. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 

F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of the appointment of counsel where a 

petitioner’s pleadings demonstrated a good understanding of the issues and an ability to 

present contentions “forcefully and coherently”). In addition, the record is adequately 

developed and the undersigned does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. 

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request 

for appointment of counsel.

3. Motion to Supplement (Doc. 49)

On July 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Supplement (Doc 49). The Court 

denied Petitioner’s prior Motions to Supplement as the proposed supplementation 

pertained to the merits of Petitioner’s grounds for relief, not to the affirmative defenses 

asserted in Respondents’ Limited Answer. Petitioner’s July 2015 Motion to Supplement

(Doc. 49) pertains to Respondents’ affirmative defenses. Respondents have not 

responded and the time to do so has passed. The Motion to Supplement (Doc. 49) is 

therefore granted. The information contained in the Motion to Supplement has been 

considered by the undersigned in reaching the recommendations contained herein.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss with prejudice the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 28) on the basis that it is 

time-barred. It is also recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s requests for the 

appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement (Doc. 49).

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 28) be 

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s requests for the 

appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing be denied.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 22nd day of September, 2015. 

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