Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-08146/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-08146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Housing Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barbara Gammons,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Real Property Investment Services, Inc.,

an Arizona corporation, doing business as

RPI Services, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-8146-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Discharge Claim. (Doc. 8) Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or,

alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant Real Property Investment Services, Inc. (“RPI”)

moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Barbara Gammons’ (“Plaintiff”) constructive discharge

claim because she allegedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The parties have

expressly consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs.

3-4) After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the Court will deny RPI’s Motion.

I. Background

On May 20, 2010, Plaintiffs Barbara Gammons and a co-employee filed a Title

VII discrimination action, alleging, inter alia, claims of hostile work environment from

sexual harassment, and retaliation by their former employer, RPI, in connection with their

employment in maintaining and cleaning RPI’s residential apartments in Flagstaff, Arizona.

Case 2:10-cv-08146-LOA Document 21 Filed 12/30/10 Page 1 of 13
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1

 On August 9, 2010 in CV-10-8081-PHX-LOA, the Court severed the actions due

to improper joinder, directed the Clerk of Court to assign a new case number for Plaintiff

Barbara Gammons (CV-10-8146-PHX-LOA), and ordered Plaintiffs to file Amended

Complaints. (Doc. 26 in CV-10-8081-PHX-LOA)

2

 On July 28, 2010, the Court granted RPI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause

of Action, dismissing Plaintiffs’ State pendent claims of negligent hiring, supervising and

retaining as barred by Arizona’s workers’ compensation scheme. (Doc. 24)

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(Doc. 11

) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 3, 2010, seeking

compensatory and punitive damages for violations of Title VII, the Fair Housing Act, and

an award for her attorneys’ fees and court costs.2

 (Doc. 7) 

Plaintiff alleges that while employed in RPI’s housekeeping department, she

was “subjected to a sexually hostile work environment that was both subjectively and

objectively offensive to a reasonable woman . . . [that] was both severe and pervasive in that

it happened on a near daily basis.” (Id. at 2) The Complaint alleges several specific incidents

allegedly committed by Bruce Trease, a co-worker. Plaintiff alleges “much of the sexual

harassment occurred in the presence of Dina Samora, manager, who did nothing to stop the

conduct. Additionally, sexually offensive and hostile comments were also made in front of

Amy Smith, operations manager, and Gary Wilcox, facilities manager, and nothing was ever

done to stop the severe and pervasive sexual harassment.” (Id. at 3) Further, when Plaintiff

complained about the sexually hostile work environment, RPI allegedly retaliated by

ostracizing her from management and some co-workers, reducing her pay and reassigning

her to work at “a less desirable property, which also necessitated that she give up the rental

unit that was provided as part of her compensation and accept a lesser rental for her place

to live.” (Id.) The Amended Complaint pleads three causes of action: 1) sexual harassment

- hostile work environment, 2) retaliation, and 3) housing discrimination in violation of the

Federal Fair Housing Act. (Id. at 4-5) Plaintiff also alleges that she was “constructively

terminated.” (Id. at 7, ¶ 22)

Defendant RPI’s Motion to Dismiss alleges that Plaintiff was employed by RPI

“from approximately August 20, 2004 to November, 2008.” (Doc. 8 at 2) According to a

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3

 Defendant’s footnotes are very small, difficult to read and do not comply with

LRCiv 7.1(b)(1) (“[A]ll pleadings, motions and other original documents filed with the Clerk

shall be in a fixed-pitch type size no smaller than ten (10) pitch (10 letters per inch) or in a

proportional font size no smaller than 13 point, including any footnotes.”) (emphasis added).

Defendant’s future filings shall comply with LRCiv 7.1(b)(1).

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copy of Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, attached as Exhibit (“Exh”) 1 to RPI’s Motion,

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on April 2, 2007, over 18 months before she submitted a termination

letter. On the EEOC’s Charge of Discrimination form, id., Exh 1, she claimed discrimination

based on age, sexual hostile work environment and retaliation by checking the age,

retaliation, and “other” boxes and writing:

I started work For RPI Sept. 1, 2004[.] Bruce was Transferred to Terrace as

Lead Maintenance[.] The Sexual Talk started Shortly after That[.]

Age: I was Told They Took one of my Properties From me because of my

age[.] 

Retaliation: I Also Think They moved me because of my discussion About

The Hostile work environment And made me move to a smaller Apartment and

Take a pay cut. 

(Doc. 8-1, Exh 1 at 3) Attached to Defendant’s Motion is a copy of Plaintiff’s termination

letter, dated November 12, 2008, advising RPI that “[t]hat I am giving my notice to terminate

my employment as of Friday November 21, 2008. Sincerely, Barbara Gammons[.]”3

 (Id.,

Exh 2 at 5) 

Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

“relating to her claim of discriminatory discharge” and, therefore, her constructive discharge

claim should be dismissed. (Doc. 8 at 3) RPI points out that Plaintiff did not amend her

original EEOC charges to include, or file a separate subsequent charge of, constructive

discharge. Recognizing the general rule that claims of discrimination not included in a

timely-filed EEOC charge may not be considered by a district court, RPI also acknowledges

the exception that a “new claim (here, constructive discharge) [may be considered if the new

claim] is ‘like or reasonably related to’ the allegations contained in the EEOC charge[,]”

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citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-5(b),(f)(3) and 16(c); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 276

F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) and Padilla v. Bechtel Construction Company, 2007 WL

1219737, * 4 (D.Ariz. 2007). (Id. at 4) In analyzing whether an unexhausted claim is “like

or reasonably related to” the claims contained in an EEOC charge, RPI correctly indicates

that a district court may consider “such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination,

dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named

in the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Id. at

5 (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100). RPI argues that “[h]ere, these factors indicate that

Plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim is not reasonably related to her EEOC charge.

First, the alleged constructive discharge is not temporally related to the incident alleged in

the charge. Rather, it occurred 18 months after Plaintiff filed the charge. Next, a constructive

discharge is a distinct adverse action from an alleged involuntary transfer[,]” relying upon

Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d, 315, 319-320 (9th Cir. 1981). (Id.) Further, RPI contends that

because “[t]he alleged discharge claim was never before the EEOC and Defendant never had

notice of an alleged claim of wrongful termination until Plaintiff filed her initial complaint

on May 25, 2010, over three (3) years after she filed her EEOC charge[,]” Plaintiff’s

constructive discharge claim should be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her

administrative remedy. (Id. at 5-6)

Plaintiff disagrees with RPI and argues that construing her charges of

discrimination liberally, “Plaintiff’s constructive termination from her employment is

reasonably related to the other instances of retaliation she brought to the attention of the

EEOC.” (Doc. 12 at 2) Arguing “[h]er termination is inextricably intertwined with the facts

relating to the retaliation she suffered when she dared to complain about the harassment she

was receiving[,]” Plaintiff attaches a copy of the EEOC’s December 11, 2009 Determination

letter. (Doc. 12-1, Exh 1 at 2) The Acting District Director Rayford O. Irvin wrote:

I have considered all the evidence obtained during the investigation and find

that there is reasonable cause to believe that there is a violation of Title VII in

that Respondent [RPI] subjected Charging Party [Plaintiff] to verbal and

physical sexual harassment and failed to take immediate appropriate corrective

action in response to her complaints allowing the conduct to continue. I also

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find that Respondent discriminated because of her age in violation of the

ADEA and retaliated against her for complaining about the sexual harassment

when it reduced the properties assigned to her, transferred her and provided

her with a contract that reduced her pay and the size and value of her assigned

apartment.

Id. Without discussing or analyzing the B.K.B. factors to determine whether Plaintiff’s

constructive discharge claim is reasonably related to her EEOC charges, Plaintiff concludes

that “[h]er termination is inextricably intertwined with the facts relating to the retaliation she

suffered when she dared to complain about the harassment she was receiving.” (Doc. 12 at

2) Plaintiff’s Response relies exclusively on Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources,

355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[w]e hold that the district court did not err in finding

that Dr. Gregory's retaliation claim was not administratively barred by her failure to mark the

retaliation space on the EEOC template form.”)

II. Relevant Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Dismissal is appropriate when a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over a claim or lawsuit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). To establish subject matter jurisdiction over

a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must have exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a

timely charge with the EEOC. Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 645-46 (9th Cir.

2003).

Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of a district court to hear the

plaintiff’s claims in the first place and, therefore, imposes upon a district court an affirmative

obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional power. Casillas v.

United States, 2009 WL 735193, * 7 (D.Ariz. 2009); 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1990). Because federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction, it is presumed that an action lies outside the jurisdiction of federal courts

unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists. Tosco Corp. v.

Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001); Thornhill

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Publishing Co. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979).

 “‘A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack

the allegations of the complaint or may . . .’” attack the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction as a matter of fact. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. ESI Ergonomic Solutions,

LLC., 342 F.Supp.2d 853, 861 (D.Ariz. 2004) (quoting Thornhill Publishing, 594 F.2d at

733). “When a motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to

confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Federation of

African Amer. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). Where

the jurisdictional issue can be separated from the merits of the case, the district court may

consider the evidence presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue, resolving factual

disputes if necessary. Thornhill Publishing, 594 F.2d at 733. “When the motion is a factual

attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant may ‘rely on affidavits or any other

evidence properly before the Court.’” National Union, 342 F.Supp.2d at 861 (citing St. Clair

v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)); also see Sommatino v. United States,

255 F.3d 704, 710 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the court may consider

affidavits or any other evidence properly before the Court.”). In the instance of a factual

challenge, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations, and the

existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the court from evaluating the merits of

jurisdictional claims. Thornhill Publishing, 594 F.2d at 733.

B. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.

In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R . Civ.P. 12(b)(6),

the district court considers the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. A complaint should not

be dismissed unless “it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075,

1077 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Parks School of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

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Cir. 1995)). Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either the “lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balistren v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

district court, however, is not required to accept every conclusion asserted in the complaint

as true; rather, the court “will examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the

description of facts alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th

Cir. 1992) (quoting Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 674 F.Supp.

782, 785 (C.D.Cal. 1986)). Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should

provide leave to amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any

amendment. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. The EEOC Administrative Process

Before filing suit for an employment discrimination claim made unlawful by

Title VII, the aggrieved employee must exhaust the employee’s administrative remedy by

filing a timely and sufficient charge with the appropriate administrative agency and obtain

a right-to-sue letter. Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(3), 16(c); Stache v. Int’l Union of

Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). A failure of exhaustion in the form of a failure to timely file an

administrative claim is not jurisdictional and may be raised as an affirmative defense to the

claim. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Thus, a failure to

timely file an EEOC charge is “not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit.

Rather, it is a requirement subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling ‘when equity so

requires.’” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (citing

Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398). 

Generally, once a complainant has filed a verified charge with the EEOC or

equivalent state agency alleging an unlawful employment practice, the EEOC will investigate

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the claim. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists

to support the discrimination charge, it will attempt to reach a voluntary conciliation

agreement acceptable to the EEOC. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). “[I]f the EEOC is unable or unwilling to

resolve the controversy and if no action has occurred after 180 days and the complainant

wishes to withdraw the matter from EEOC jurisdiction, the EEOC issues a so-called ‘right

to sue letter.’ Issuance of this letter terminates EEOC jurisdiction and its ability to act and

‘reactivates’ the individual’s right to bring a civil action under Title VII.” Kirk v. Rockwell

Intern. Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). “If the individual does

not file suit within 90 days, however, the right is extinguished.” Id. (citations omitted).

“[T]he administrative charge requirement serves the important purposes of

giving the charged party notice of the claim and ‘narrow[es] the issues for prompt

adjudication and decision.’” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099 (citations omitted); Garcia v. Los

Banos Unified School Dist., 418 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

“[T]itle VII’s purpose [is] eliminating the effects of discrimination in the

workplace. . . .” Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480

U.S. 616, 630 (1987). In enacting Title VII, Congress intended the statute’s procedural

requirements to be liberally construed in order to remedy discrimination in the workplace and

to preserve a claimant’s federal remedies in discrimination suits. Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel &

Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing EEOC v. Commercial Office

Prods., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988) ( “Title VII . . . is a remedial scheme in which laypersons,

rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process.”)). 

III. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

“Although failure to file an EEOC complaint is not a complete bar to district

court jurisdiction, substantial compliance with the exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional

pre-requisite.” Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122 (citing Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708). “[E]xhaustion

of administrative remedies is central to the purpose of federal anti-discrimination statutes,

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which is to provide the EEOC (or equivalent state agency) with a chance to informally

resolve employment discrimination claims before resort to litigation.” Devereaux v. East Bay

Conservation Corp., 1998 WL 917798, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting, e.g., Ong, 642 F.2d

at 319) . “[T]he charge must at least describe the facts and legal theory with sufficient clarity

to notify the agency that employment discrimination is claimed.” Ong, 642 F.2d at 319. “[A]

claimant’s failure to amend his charge to include a new claim is essentially the same as a

claimant’s failure to file an EEOC charge for the new claim.” Albano v. Schering-Plough

Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).

While specific claims made in district court ordinarily must be presented to the

EEOC, district courts have jurisdiction over any charges of discrimination that are “like or

reasonably related to” the allegations made before the EEOC, as well as charges that are

within the scope of an EEOC investigation that reasonably could be expected to grow out of

the allegations. Mamola v. Group Mfg. Services, Inc., 2010 WL 2643558, * 1 (D.Ariz. 2010)

(citing Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) and Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d

1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff’s claim is reasonably related to the allegations in the

EEOC charge “to the extent that those claims are consistent with the plaintiff’s original

theory of the case.” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099 (finding that plaintiff’s EEOC charge was

reasonably related to claims for both racial and sexual harassment where the incidents of

harassment detailed in her pre-complaint questionnaire related to both race and gender).

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 645-646 (plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies regarding

retaliation for filing a grievance claim because the EEOC charge described the retaliation,

but plaintiff did not exhaust remedies for his claim of retaliation for filing the EEOC charge

because the alleged retaliation was committed by individuals not identified as perpetrators

in the EEOC charge and took place after the EEOC investigation); Nilsson v. City of Mesa,

503 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination

was not related to her EEOC charge for disability retaliation because the EEOC charge

merely claimed that the employer retaliated against her for filing a worker’s compensation

claim, but never alleged disability discrimination). A plaintiff, however, does not sufficiently

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exhaust administrative remedies “by merely mentioning the word ‘discrimination’ in his or

her EEOC administrative charge.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 637

(9th Cir. 2002)

Although district courts must “construe the language of EEOC charges with

utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal

pleading . . . there is a limit to such judicial tolerance when principles of notice and fair play

are involved.” Id. at 636 (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100) (internal quotations omitted).

To determine whether a plaintiff’s civil claim is reasonably related to the allegations in the

EEOC charge, district courts must examine “such factors as the alleged basis for the

discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of

discrimination named in the charge, and any locations” where the discrimination allegedly

occurred. Id. (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100) (quotation omitted).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of raising

and proving. Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities Div./ Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d

1039, 1046 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hether a plaintiff in a Title VII action has timely

exhausted her administrative remedies ‘is an affirmative defense, [so] the defendant bears the

burden of pleading and proving it.’” (quoting Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437

(D.C.Cir. 1997) (modification in original)). 

IV. Retaliation

“Title VII prohibits, among other things, retaliation against an employee for

making a charge or otherwise participating in a Title VII proceeding.” Nilsson, 503 F.3d at

953 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); see also Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Employers may not retaliate against employees who have ‘opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII.”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-3(a)). “To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff

engaged in a protected activity, (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) there was a causal link between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2007).

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4

 The dearth of information provided the Court makes it sheer speculation whether

Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim would naturally have been investigated as a part of

the EEOC investigation of Plaintiff’s original EEOC claims. The “scope of investigation”

doctrine provides that “the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC

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V. Constructive discharge 

Constructive discharge claims are cognizable under Title VII when an

employee’s decision to resign is an objectively appropriate response to intolerable working

conditions. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004). Constructive

discharge of an employee occurs “when an employer, rather than directly discharging an

individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work environment that forces an employee to

quit involuntarily.” Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.

2000). 

VI. Discussion

Because Plaintiff’s constructive discharge allegation can not be separated from

the merits of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment and retaliation claims, the Court takes all

Plaintiff’s allegations of material fact as true and construes them in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff. Federation of African Amer. Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1207. 

The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the hostile work environment and retaliation claims

she asserted in her EEOC charge. Examining the B.K.B factors, Plaintiff’s constructive

discharge claim is consistent with her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. B.K.B., 276

F.3d at 1100. No meaningful dates on this issue have been provided the Court except the

dates Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge (April 2, 2007), the date she submitted her termination

letter (November 12, 2008), and the date (December 11, 2009) of the EEOC issued its

determination letter. If true, Plaintiff’s constructive discharge occurred substantially before

the EEOC completed and issued its December 11, 2009 determination letter. (Doc. 12-1, Exh

1 at 2) Perhaps no other dates, relevant information, or the scope of the EEOC’s

investigation4

 have been provided to the Court because the record was not fully developed

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investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Tisdale v.

Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005). 

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at the time RPI filed its motion, viz., on September 22, 2010. In fact, discovery in this case

does not close until June 30, 2011. (Doc. 20 at 5) RPI provides no information on, or

contrast to, the alleged perpetrators and locations involved in all Plaintiff’s claims that

warrant an exhaustion finding on Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim. Additionally, RPI’s

reliance on Ong is not helpful to the analysis of the issue and facts sub judice because the

Ong court found that Ong’s constructive discharge claim differed substantially from his

claim of discrimination in promotion presented to the EEOC. Ong, 642 F.2d at 320. RPI’s

argument that a constructive discharge is a distinct adverse action from an alleged

involuntary transfer adds little to the analysis of whether Plaintiff’s constructive discharge

claim is “like or reasonably related to” the allegations Plaintiff made to the EEOC. Further,

the Court declines RPI’s invitation to assume that Plaintiff’s alleged constructive discharge

is temporally unrelated to the allegations made to the EEOC because, as Plaintiff argues,

RPI’s unlawful acts continued beyond the April 2, 2007 EEOC filing date.

While there are cases that go both ways on whether a constructive discharge

claim not presented to the EEOC was properly exhausted, the Court is persuaded that RPI

has failed to meet its burden of proof on its affirmative defense (exhaustion) and, under the

facts of this case, it is not unfair to RPI to defend a constructive discharge claim on the

merits. Dunbar v. County of Saratoga, 358 F.Supp.2d 115, 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (plaintiff’s

constructive discharge claim is not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedy

because it is based upon, at least in part, allegations that plaintiff was subjected to “obscene,

offensive and degrading behavior,” which fairly describes the allegations contained in her

EEOC complaint.). Contra, Diefenderfer v. Peters, 2009 WL 1884419 (W.D.Wash. 2009);

Lybarger v. Potter, 2009 WL 2407735 (W.D.Mo. 2009). 

The Court is unable to determine that “it appears beyond doubt that [P]laintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of [her constructive discharge] claim which would entitle

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[her] to relief.” Vignolo, 120 F.3d at 1077. In an abundance of caution, the Court will

conclude Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim is properly before the Court.

VII. Conclusion

Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not allege a constructive discharge

claim at the time she filed her EEOC charge, or amend her charge at or after the time she

submitted her termination letter, the Court nonetheless finds that RPI failed to prove that

Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim is unrelated to her claims of sexual harassment and

retaliation. Construing, as it must, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge with “utmost liberality,” the

Court concludes that Plaintiff has not failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with

regard to her constructive discharge claim. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Discharge

Claim, Doc. 8, is DENIED. 

DATED this 30th day of December, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-08146-LOA Document 21 Filed 12/30/10 Page 13 of 13