Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-52/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

Jamin S. Soderstrom, Bar No. 261054

jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com

SODERSTROM LAW PC

1 Park Plaza, Suite 600

Irvine, California 92614

Tel: (949) 667-4700

Fax: (949) 424-8091

Counsel for Plaintiffs, Putative Class Members,

and Aggrieved Employees

Joseph W. Ozmer II (SBN 316203)

jozmer@kcozlaw.com

Nathan D. Chapman (SBN 338735)

nchapman@kcozlaw.com

J. Scott Carr (SBN 136706)

scarr@kcozlaw.com

KABAT CHAPMAN & OZMER LLP

333 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2225

Los Angeles, California 90071

Tel: (213) 493-3980

Fax: (404) 400-7333

Counsel for Defendant Charter Communications, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated and all aggrieved 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION, 

CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD OF 

ARBITRATOR, AND ENTERING

JUDGMENT (TURNER ARBITRATION)

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 1 of 53
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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Hassan Turner and Defendant Charter Communications, LLC jointly submitted Notice 

of Final Award of Arbitrator and Joint Stipulation and Motion to Confirm Final Award and Enter 

Judgment (Turner Arbitration), which provides as follows:

WHEREAS, on October 13, 2021, the Court granted Charter’s motion to compel individual 

arbitration of Turner’s claims under the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (also known as the Solution 

Channel Agreement), and stayed his individual claims pending the completion of arbitration 

proceedings. Dkt. 202.

WHEREAS, on June 16, 2023, Arbitrator Ruth V. Glick, who was appointed by the American 

Arbitration Association (AAA) and presided over the arbitration between Turner and Charter, issued 

an Interim Award. Exhibit 1 (Interim Award).

WHEREAS, on July 20, 2023, the Arbitrator issued a Final Award that incorporated the 

Interim Award and concluded the arbitration. Exhibit 2 (Final Award).

NOW, THEREFORE, Turner and Charter stipulate and jointly move the Court to: (1) issue an 

order pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13, confirming the Final Award; (2) 

file such order with the clerk for the entry of judgment thereon; and (3) file the following papers with 

the clerk in accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 13:

a. the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 3;

b. the AAA’s appointment of the Arbitrator, attached as Exhibit 4;

c. the Final Award, attached as Exhibit 2, and the Interim Award incorporated into the 

Final Award, attached as Exhibit 1; and

d. the Court order dated October 13, 2021, attached as Exhibit 5 (also in the Court’s 

record as Docket 202).

Having reviewed the Interim Award and Final Award, and finding no basis to vacate, modify, 

or correct the Final Award pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (the parties 

having raised none), and pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court hereby GRANTS the joint 

motion and confirms the Final Award in full.

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13, the Court attaches the following 

papers and instructs the clerk to file them with this ORDER:

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 2 of 53
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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

a. the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 3;

b. the AAA’s appointment of the Arbitrator, attached as Exhibit 4;

c. the Final Award, attached as Exhibit 2, and the Interim Award incorporated into the 

Final Award, attached as Exhibit 1; and

d. the Court order dated October 13, 2021, attached as Exhibit 5 (also in the Court’s 

record as Docket 202).

The Parties’ joint motion is GRANTED, the Final Award is CONFIRMED, and 

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED. The clerk shall docket this judgment pursuant to Federal Arbitration 

Act, 9 U.S.C. § 13, and it shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all 

the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED. LET JUDGMENT BE FORTHWITH 

ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: August 23, 2023

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 3 of 53
EXHIBIT 1

INTERIM AWARD DATED JUNE 16, 2023

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 4 of 53
American	Arbitration	Association

Employment	Arbitration	Tribunal

In	the	Matter	of	the	Arbitration	between

Hassan	Turner

and	

Charter	Communications, LLC

AAA	Case	#	01-22-0001-5254

INTERIM	AWARD

I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance with the 

personnel manual or employment agreement entered into by the above-named parties and dated 

May 23, 2018, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of 

the Parties, and Claimant, Hassan Turner, being represented by Jamin	Soderstrom	of	

Soderstrom	Law PC,	and	Respondent,	Charter	Communications,	LLC,	being	represented	by	

Nathan	Chapman	of	Kabat	Chapman	&	Ozmer	LLP,	hereby	issue	this	Interim	Award,	as	

follows:	

Procedural	History

Claimant,	Hassan	Turner (“Claimant”	or	“Turner”) filed	his misclassification	and	

wage	and	hour	claims	against	Charter	Communications, LLC	(“Charter”) with	the	American	

Arbitration	Association	pursuant	to	the	Mutual	Arbitration	Agreement	of	Charter	

Communications (“MAA”), which	he	electronically	signed	on	May	23,	2018, and	pursuant	to	

an	Order	from the	Honorable	William	B.	Shubb,	Judge	of	the	U.S.	District	Court,	Eastern	

District	of	California.		Turner’s	individual	arbitration	is	part	of	a	larger	class	and	

representative	Private Attorneys	General	Act	(“PAGA”)	action	that	has	been	pending	

against	Charter	Communications, LLC	since	May	3,	2019.	 Harper	et	al	v	Charter	

Communications,	LLC, Case	No.	2:19-cv-00902	(E.D.	Cal.) Turner is	a	named	plaintiff	and	

proposed	class	representative	in	Harper	et	al	v	Charter	Communications,	LLC, and	his	court	

claims	have	been	stayed	since	the	court’s	October	13,	2021	order	compelling	arbitration.

(JX	65).1		The	arbitration	claims	arise	from	Turner’s	time	working	for	Charter	in 2018	as	a	

Direct	Sales	Rep.	(“DSR”).

1 Turner	was	added	as	a	named	plaintiff	in	the	Harper action	on	April	16.	2021.	He	filed	a	demand	for	

arbitration	with	Charter’s	Solution	Channel	on	February	25,	2022.	(JX74)

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 5 of 53
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A	pre-hearing scheduling	conference for	the	arbitration	was	held	on	June	29,	2022	

and	Claimant’s	Specification	of	Claims,	Contentions	and	Relief	was	filed	on	July	15,	2022.	

Charter	filed	a	Counterclaim	in	this	arbitration	on	June	10,	2022, alleging	a	breach	of	

contract	claim	by	Claimant	for	refusing	to	pay	Respondent’s	attorney	fees	in	an	effort	to

resist arbitration	of	his	claims	pursuant	to	paragraph	K	of	the	MAA.		As	the	arbitrator	in	

this	matter,	I	concluded	that	I	did	not	have	arbitral	jurisdiction	to	determine	a	claim	for	

attorney’s	fees	for	an	action	that	occurred	in	a	federal	judicial	forum well	before	my	

appointment	as	arbitrator.	 I	dismissed	the	counterclaim	on	August	26,	2022	without	

prejudice	so	that	the	Respondent	could	file	its	attorney’s	fee	request with	the	U.S.	District	

Court	for	the	Eastern	District.	

A	series	of	requests	for	motions	in	advance	of	the	arbitration	were filed	by	both

parties.		Claimant	filed	a	Motion	to	Stay	the	proceedings	and	both	parties	requested	leave	

to	file	a	number	of	dispositive	motions	in	advance	of	the	arbitration.		I	denied	Claimant’s	

Motion	to	Stay	as	well	as	both	Claimant’s	and	Respondent’s	request	to	file other dispositive	

motions on	October	27,	2022.	

The	arbitration	hearing	in	the	matter	of	Hassan	Turner	and	Charter	

Communications	was	held	by	Zoom	on	March	28,	2023.		An	exhibit	binder	with	joint	

exhibits	JX1-74,	Claimant’s	exhibits	CX1-3 and	Respondent’s	exhibits	RX	1-2	was	provided	

to	the	arbitrator.		Pre-hearing	briefs	from	the	parties	were	submitted	on	March	20,	2023	

and	Post-hearing	briefs	were	submitted, after	permission	to	postpone	was	granted, on	May	

5,	2023.		The	record	was	closed	on	May	17,	2023.

DISCUSSION

This	case	presents	misclassification	and	wage	and	hour	claims	for	two	weeks	of	

training	that	the	Claimant,	Hassan	Turner,	undertook	prior	to his	employment	as	a	Direct	

Sales	Rep (“DSR”) for	Charter	Communications, where	he	worked	for	three	months	from	

June	15,	2018	to	October	15,	2018.		Turner,	who	had	previously	worked	in	sales, was	hired	

by	Charter	as	an exempt salaried and	outside	sales	employee with	a	commission	plan,	

based	out	of	its Irwindale,	CA office. (JX4).		Turner	was	classified	as	an	exempt	outside	

salesperson	for	his	entire	employment	as	a	DSR.		He	was	paid	a	base	salary,	plus	a	sales	

commission	allowance	for	the	first	five	pay	periods,	commissions	and	other	incentives. (JX	

74).	 The	two-week	training	sessions	included	classroom	training	as	well	as	“ride	alongs”	or	

“shadowing”	an	experienced	DSR	on	their	ordinary	door-to	door-sales	activity	in	the	field.

Contentions

Claimant	maintains	he	was	not	subject	to	the	outside	salesperson	exception	during	

these	training	sessions	which	included	Week	1:		June	15-21,	2018	and Week	2:	June	22-28,	

2018, alleging that	Charter	failed	to	meet	its	affirmative burden	to	prove	that	Turner	was	

plainly	and	unmistakably	exempt	during	that	period.		As	a result,	Claimant files	the	

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 6 of 53
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following	claims: failure	to	pay	minimum	wage	and	overtime	demanding 20 hours2 of	

overtime	wages	(Counts	1	and	2);	failure	to	provide	11	meal	periods and	11	rest	periods

(Counts	3	and	4),	failure	to	provide	a	“training	weeks”	wage	statement	(Count	6);	and	

waiting	time	penalties	for	failure	to	timely	pay	him	all	wages	owed	upon	termination	

(Count	7).		In	addition,	Claimant	asks	for	a	combined	$1,500	for	statutory	penalties,	plus	

costs,	expenses	and	attorney	fees	based	on	Charter’s failure	to	timely	provide	him	with	

copies	of	his	wage	statements	and	personnel	records and	files.	(Count	8).3		

Respondent	maintains	that	the	evidence	shows	Turner	was	properly	classified	as	an	

outside	salesperson,	i.e.,	one	who	customarily	and	regularly	spends	more	than	half	of	their	

working	time	away	from	their	employers’	place	of	business	engaging	in	sales	related	

activities	that	exempt	him	from California’s	minimum	wage,	overtime	and	meal	and	rest	

period	requirements.		Even	if	he	were	to	be	non-exempt,	Respondent	argues	that	Charter	

provided	Turner	the	opportunity	to	take	compliant	meal	and	rest	breaks.		Because	Turner	

was	an	exempt	employee during	the	two	training	weeks,	Charter	contends	that	the	nonexempt	and	derivative	claims	fail.		Charter	also	denies	that	it	failed	to	timely	provide	pay	

and	employment	records	as	alleged	in	Count	8.

After	careful	consideration	of	the	evidence	produced,	the	testimony	given	at	the	

hearing	and	the	case	law,	I	have	concluded	that	Charter	met	the	burden	of	proof	that	

Turner	was	an	exempt	employee	during	the	first	two	training	weeks,	thereby	denying	

Counts	1-4	and	6-7.		However,	I	have	also	concluded that	Charter	did	not	timely	produce	

the	wage	statements	according	to	California	Labor	code	§	226(c)	and	personnel	records	

according	to	California	Labor	Code	§	1198.5(b)	as	alleged in	Count	8.

Misclassification	Based	Claims

Turner’s claims	1-4 and	6-7	are	based	on	Charter’s	alleged	misclassification	of	him	

as	an	exempt	outside	salesperson	during	his	first	two	weeks	of	employment,	the “training	

weeks.”		Turner	demands	include	10	hours	of	overtime	work	during	each	of	the	two	weeks	

or	20	hours	total.		Critical	to	the	issue	of	whether	Turner	was	exempt	from	the	wage	and	

hour	claims	of	this	two-week training	period	is	whether	or	not	he	was	misclassified	as	an	

“exempt”	outside	salesperson	during	that	period.		Turner	claims	that	Charter	required	him	

to	participate	and	complete	two	weeks	of	non-exempt new	hire	orientation	and	training	for	

the	DSR	position	at	the	start	of	his	employment.		Charter	maintains	Turner	was	properly	

classified as	an	outside	salesperson,	or	one	who	customarily	and	regularly	spends	more	

2 In	Claimant’s	post-hearing	brief,	he	changed	the	over-time	wage	claim	to	25	hours instead	of	20	hours. I	

have	used	the	original	claim	of	20	hours	over-time	in	this	analysis. 3 Several	claims	were	withdrawn	prior	to	the	arbitration.		These include (1)	Claimant’s non-monetary	claims	

related	to	signed	commission	plans	and	receipts	and	other	alleged	unlawful	commission	practices	as	set	forth	

under	Count	5	of his Specification	of	Claims,	(2)	the	“inclusive	dates”	violations	related	to	wage	statements	as	

set	forth	under	Count	6	of	the	Specification	of	Claims	and	(3)	his	requests	for non-monetary	injunctive	relief	

under	the	UCL	as	set	forth	under	Count	9	of	his	Specification	of	Claims.		(February	28,	2023	letter	from	Jamin	

Soderstrom,	Counsel	for	Claimant, to	Nathan	D.	Chapman,	Counsel	for	Respondent.)		(JX72)

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than	half	of	their	working	time	away	from	their	employers’	place	of	business	engaging	in	

sales-related	activities,	which	occurred	during	the	training	weeks	as	well.

The	determination	of	whether	an	employee	is	exempt	or	non-exempt	is	the	subject	

of	considerable	reported	and	non-published	federal	and	California	case	law.		The	seminal	

California	case	defining the	outside	salesperson	exemption	is	Ramirez	v	Yosemite	Water	

Company,	Inc., 20	Cal	4th 785	(1999)	in	which	the	California	Supreme	Court examined the	

issue	of	classification	when	an	employee	performs	a	mixture	of	sales	and	non-sales	duties.	

The	Court	concluded	that	an “outside	salesperson”	under	the	Industrial	Welfare

Commission	(“IWC”)	wage	orders	incorporates a	quantitative	method, distinguishable	from	

the	standard	applicable	under	the federal	Fair	Labor	Standards	Act	(“FLSA”).	 As	a	result,	

the	narrower application	of	California	law	must	be	relied	upon	to	make	the	determination	

of	whether	or	not	an	employee	working	in	California	falls	under	the	outside	salesperson	

exemption when	looking	at	the	facts	of	the	case.	

In	Ramirez v	Yosemite,	an	“outside	salesperson”	is	one	who	meets	the	realistic	

requirements	of	the	job	in	spending	more	than	half	of	their	time	away	from	the	employer’s	

place	of	business	selling	or	obtaining	orders	for	products	or	services.		The	Court	refined	the	

meaning	of	the quantitative	nature	by	asking	what	are	the	realistic	requirements	of	the	job

or	how	does	the	employee	actually	spend	his	or	her	time.		Id	at	802.

The	Court then	provides	some	general	guidance,	first	by	following	Wage	Order	No.	

7-80	2(1)	in	defining	“outside	Salesperson’	as	any	person,	18	years	of	age	or	over,	who	

customarily	and	regularly	works	more	than	half	the	working	time	away	from	the	

employer’s	place	of	business	selling	tangible	or	intangible	items	or	obtaining	orders	or	

contracts	for	products,	services	or	use	of	facilities.”4 Id at	795.

In	construing	how	the	half time	selling	to	customers	is	calculated,	the	Court	states	

that

“...a	trial	court,	in	determining	whether	the	employee	is	an	outside	salesperson...by	

inquiring	into	the	realistic	requirements	of	the	job.		In	so	doing,	the	court	should	

consider,	first	and	foremost,	how	the	employee	actually	spends	his	or	her	time.		But	

the	trial	court	should	also	consider	whether	the	employee’s	practice	diverges	from	

the	employer’s	realistic	expectations,	whether	there	was	any	concrete	expression	

employer	displeasure	over an	employee’s	substandard	performance,	and	whether	

these	expressions	were	themselves	realistic given	the	actual	overall	requirements	of	

the	job.” Id at	802.

Claimant’s	counsel	points	to	another	decision	by	the	California	Supreme	Court,	

Duran	v	U.S.	Bank	National	Assn.,	59	Cal, 4th 1	(2014)	asserting (incorrectly) that it	

concluded	that	outside	salespersons	are	properly	classified	as	non-exempt	during	the	

4 This	has	been	codified	in	California	IWC	Wage	Order	No.	4-2001	§	(2M)	providing	that	an	outside	

salesperson	means	any	person,	who	customarily	and	regularly	works	more	than	half	the	working	time	away	

from	the	employer’s	place	of	business	selling	tangible	or	intangible	items	or	obtaining	orders	or	contracts	for	

products,	services	or	use	of	facilities.	

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training	weeks.

5		However, the	Court	in Duran just	refined the	inquiry	by	stating	that	

Ramirez did	not	say	that	the	test	boils	down	to	whether	a	particular	employee	actually	

spends	more	than	50	percent	of	his	or	her	working	hours	on	outside	sales.		Instead,	the	

ultimate	question	is:	what	are	the	realistic requirements	of	the	job?		Duran at	408-09	

quoting	Ramirez, 20	Cal	4th at	802.		Duran concludes	that	the	primary	consideration	that	

informs	this	inquiry	is	“how	the	employee	actually	spends	his	or	her	time.” Ibid.		

Among	other	cases,	Claimant	cites Heyen	v	Safeway,	Inc.,	216	Cal.	App	4th 795,	825-

26	(2013)	claiming	that	the	exempt	nature	can	change	based	on	the	purpose.		According	to	

Heyen, in	rejecting	a	standard	of	concurrent	duties:

“The test to determine whether defendants have met their burden to show that plaintiff spent more than 

50% of her time engaged in exempt tasks is quantitative. The test requires that, first and foremost, you must 

look to the actual tasks performed by plaintiff. Merely because an employee has the duty of managing is 

not sufficient to establish exempt status.” 

“If a party claims that an employee is engaged in concurrent performance of an exempt and non-exempt 

work, you must consider that time to be either an exempt or a non-exempt activity depending on the 

primary purpose for which the employee undertook the activity at that time. The nature of the activity can 

change from time to time.” (Italics added.)” 

In	this	case	the	court	concluded	that	Heyen,	a	Safeway	store	manager,	was	not	an	

exempt	employee	because	she	was	spending	more	than	50%	of	her	time checking,	bagging,	

merchandising	and	bookkeeping,	thereby	providing	non-exempt	duties	that	did	not	diverge	

from	Safeway’s	realistic	expectations.6 This	is	in	contrast	to	Turner	who spent	more	than	

50%	of	his	time out	in	the	field	in	the	“ride	alongs”	for	the	express	purpose	to	learn	and	

make	sales.

The	conundrum	in	determining	the	meaning	of	the	Ramirez opinion	in	

distinguishing	between	exempt	and	non-exempt	was	described	by	Judge	William	Alsup	in	

another	case	cited	by	Claimant,	Stickles	v	Atria,	2021WL	6117702	(U.S.	Dist.	Ct.	N.	Cal)	at	6.

“Although the Ramirez opinion states how courts must determine the number of hours employees spend on 

outside sales activities, the opinion does not give clear guidance on what constitutes a sale. D'Este v. Bayer 

Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009). Neither do the California wage orders, nor our court of appeals 

provide further definitions for what constitutes a sale. Ibid. In Bayer Corp., a class action involving 

misclassification of employees, the plaintiff argued that employees must “consummate their own sales” to 

be considered outside salespersons. Ibid. By contrast, the defendant argued that employees who “engage in 

any part of the multiple-step process of selling or obtaining orders,” regardless of whether they close sales 

or receive orders, are exempt outside salespersons. Ibid. Our court of appeals found that “the plain language 

5 Although	the	subject	matter	was	wage	and	hour,	the	Duran case	was	primarily	focused	on	the	trial	court’s	

statistical	sampling	of	the	class.		The	footnotes	cited by	Claimant	only obliquely	refer	to	outside	salesperson	

trainees	being	nonexempt	in	reference to the trial	court	prohibiting	the	admission	of	timesheets	in	another	

class	action	matter	having	to	do	with the misclassification	of	some	class	members	in	training	positions.	Id at	

21	and	note	14,	the	cite	provided	by	Claimant. 6 In	Batze	v	Safeway,	10	Cal.	App.	5th 440,474	(2017),	the	court again, in determining whether	the	test	for	the	

exemption	was met,	looked	at	“...the	work	actually	performed	by	the	employee...”	(which)	“must	be	

examined,	and	the	amount	of	time	the	employee	spends	on	such	work,	together with	the	employer’s	realistic	

expectations	and	the	realist	requirements	of	the	job	shall	be	considered...”

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of the [outside salesperson exemption] is susceptible to both interpretations.” Ibid. Ultimately, our court of 

appeals declined to rule on the issue of what constitutes a sale and certified the issue to the California 

Supreme Court. Id. at 1124. The California Supreme Court declined to take up the question. D'Este v. 

Bayer Corp., No. S172832 (June 10, 2009), docket available at 

https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0 & docid=1907570 & doc 

no=S172832 & request token=NiIwLSEmTkg9WzBRSCM9XEtIQFQ0UDxfJCI% 2BJzlTUCAgCg% 

3D% 3D.

Claimant	points	to the	2021 Stickles	v	Atria	Senior	Living,	Inc. case	for	the	

proposition	that	an	employee	cannot	be	selling	if	he	needs	another	employee’s	

participation	to	consummate	the	sale emphasizing	that Turner’s	afternoon	and	evening	

“ride	alongs” necessitated	another	employee’s	participation. In	the	2021 Stickles case	

dealing	with	class	certification,	the	Court	quoted another	federal	case,	Barnick	v	Wyeth,	522	

F.	Supp	2d	1257	(C.D.	Cal,	October	25,	2007)	opining that	an	employee	should	be	classified	

as	an	exempt	outside	salesperson	where	he	was	hired	based	on	his	sales	experience,	

received	specialized	sales	training,	solicited	new	business	and	his	pay	was	based	partially	

on	sales	he	generated.		Stickles,	2021	WL	6117702	at	7.		Turner,	who	like	Barnick,	had	prior	

sales	experience,	was	being	paid	on	commission	with	a	special	allocation	for	the	two-week	

sales	training	period,	while	spending	more	than	half his	time	accompanying	an	experienced	

Charter	sales person	on	the “ride	alongs” was,	therefore, also	engaging	in	exempt	activity.

In	a	subsequent	case, Stickles	v	Atria	Senior	Living,	Inc. 2022-WL17178307,	the	same	

judge, determining it	to	be	a	borderline	case,	ruled	that	if	a	person’s	efforts	are directed	

toward	promoting his company,	generally,	rather	than	the	consummation	of	his	own	

specific	sales,	his	activities	were not	exempt.		Stickles 2022 at	6.		But	the	two	Stickles cases	

concern	promoting	and	marketing	nursing	homes and	can	be	distinguished	from	this case	

since	Turner’s job	required	him	to	make door-to-door sales for	Charter	services.

The	employer	bears	the	burden	of	proving	that	the	outside	salesperson	exemption	

applies.	Ramirez,	supra at	794-95.		Each	of	the	many	cases	cited	by	the	parties	has	its	own	

special	circumstances	and	facts	specific	to	the	time	an	employee	spends	on	exempt	and	

non-exempt	duties.		The	inquiry	is	how	Turner	actually	spent	his	time	during	the	two-week	

training	period.		Reviewing	the	facts	and	testimony	of	the	witnesses	in	this	arbitration,	I	

have	come	to	the	conclusion	that	Charter	did	meet	the	narrow	threshold	that	the	outside	

salesperson	exemption	applies	to	Turner’s	two	weeks	of	training	and	that	Turner	was,	

therefore,	exempt	from	the	wage	and	hour	regulations	under	state	and	federal	law.	

How	Claimant’s	Time	was	Actually	Spent During	the Training	Session

To apply	the	Ramirez guidelines to	an	employee	like	Turner	who	was being	trained	

for	an	exempt	position, one	must	look	at	how	he	actually	spent	his	time	during	the	training	

weeks.	 Ultimately,	the	question of	whether	one	was	appropriately	classified	as	an	“outside	

salesperson”	and exempt	from	California	wage	and	hour	laws	is	a	detailed	fact	intensive	

determination. Ramirez at	790.	 Duran re-emphasizes	the	Ramirez focus	on	the	realistic	

requirements	of	the	job and	how	the	employee	actually	spends	his	or	her	time.		Ancillary	

questions	include	“whether	the	employee’s	practice	diverges	from	the	employer’s	realistic

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expectations,	whether	there	was	any	concrete	expression	of	employer	displeasure	over	an	

employee’s	substandard	performance,	and	whether	these	expressions	were	themselves	

realistic	given	the	actual	overall	requirements	of	the	job.	Duran at	26.

The	two-week	training	session	had	two	components:		first	classroom	training	

conducted	virtually,	lasting	about	three	to	four	hours	during	eight	days	of	the	first	two	

weeks,	and	second,	afternoon	and	early	evening	“ride	alongs”	or	“shadowing”	during	which	

the	trainee	would	learn	and	assist	a	more	experienced DSR	on how	to	conduct door-todoor	sales	in	the	field.

Turner	began	work	on	Friday,	June	15,	2018,	which	was	considered	the	first	day	of	

the	Charter	workweek.		He	completed	new-hire	paperwork,	ate	a	lunch hosted	by	the	

manager with	the	group	and	spent	the	afternoon	in	the	field.	 There was	no	classroom	

training	during	the	following	three	workdays.		The	initial	days	of	the	schedule	were

designed	not	to	exceed	8	hours	and	included	a	lunch	break	and	two	duty-free	

uninterrupted	breaks,	half	way	in	the	morning	and	another	two	hours	after	returning	from	

lunch.	 Linda	C. Arnold,	Director	of	Training	and	Development, who	is	responsible	for	

creating	content	for	the	training,	testified	that	the	actual	training	was	designed	to	last	for	

four	hours	maximum per	day.	(TR:	135:16-18,	137:	7-10)	The	new	employees were	hired	

on	Friday	and	spent	time to	get	to	know	their	supervisor,	their	team,	get	uniforms,	cell	

phones and	tablets on	Monday	and	Tuesday.	(TR:	136:5-11)

The	classroom	portion	of	the	training	began	on	the	fifth	day	of	training	

(Wednesday)	at	11:00	a.m.	and	lasted	until	about	3	p.m.	 Approximately	halfway through	

the instruction,	trainers	were	told	to	provide	a	10–15-minute break for	the	participants.		In	

addition,	throughout	the	training,	the	trainees	were	free	to	go	to	a	restroom	or	step	away	

for	any	personal	reason.	(TR 137:13-138:16).		Breaktime	was	also	accounted	for	in	the	

Trainer	Instructions.	(JX	37:	0657	and	Group	Expectations.	JX	50:	010945-46).	 In	addition,	

Raul	Salcedo (“Salcedo”),	Director	of	Residential	Connectivity	Specialists,	testified	that	new	

hires	were	shown	the	break	room on	their	very	first	day	to	see	where	the	vending	

machines	and	quick	meals	were located.	(TR	186:3-8)

After	the	classroom	training	ended,	the	DSR’s	were	expected	to	take	a	meal	break	of	

at	least	30	minutes,	or	as	much	time	as	they	needed before	traveling	to	the	field	to	meet	up	

with a more	senior	DSR	to	learn and	assist	in	door-to-door	sales	for	the	rest	of	the	day and	

evening.	 Even	if	Turner	was	non-exempt,	he	did	not	show	that	he	was	deprived	of	any	

opportunity	to	take	timely	and	compliant	meal	or	rest	breaks.		According	to	the	California	

Supreme	Court,	employers	are	only obligated	to	relieve	the	employee	of	his	duties	and	do	

not	have	to	police	the	meal	breaks in	terms	of	insuring	the	employee	actually	takes	one.		

Brinker	Rest.	Corp.	v	Superior	Court, 53	Cal.	4th,	1004,	1040-41	(2012).	

One	of	Turner’s	contentions is	that	he	should	be	paid	for	time	in	which	he showed

up a	half	hour	before the	11:00	a.m.	training start because	he	was	told	to	be	there	promptly

at	11:00	a.m.		Turner	testified	repeatedly	that	he	arrived	at	10:30	a.m.	for	each	training	

session	in	order	to	set	up	and	be	prepared	for	the	11:00	a.m.	start.		But	the	trainings were	

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virtual,	although	live, which	meant	all	he	had	to	do	was	show up	a	few	minutes	early	to	

connect	his	computer or	tablet,	hardly	a	task	that	takes	a	half	hour.	

According	to	Salcedo,	who	was	responsible	for	hiring	door-to-door	sales	associates	

in	June	2018	in	Irwindale,	CA,	a	new	hire	was	to	show	up	at	11:00	a.m. on	the	first	day and	

call	his	supervisor	and	wait	to	be	picked	up	in	the	lobby.		It	could	not	be	earlier	than	11:00	

a.m.	because	that	was	the	start	time and	they	were	not expected	to	do	anything	before	they	

arrived.	(TR195:11-14,	196:19-24).		Salcedo	also	testified	that	the	employees	always	

started	their	day	at	11:00	a.m.	for	classroom	training.		(TR 200:19-25).		Therefore,	if	Turner	

did show	up	at	10:30 a.m.,	he	was	reporting	for	work	one	half	hour	early and	on	his	own	

time.

Salcedo	said	the	company’s	expectations	are	that	trainees	should	be	in	the	office	two	

to	three	hours,	emphasizing,	then	we	want	the	rest	of	the	time	in	the	field.	(TR 197:11-16).

He	confirmed	that	he	personally	sat	in	on	some	of	the	classes	and	stated	they	lasted	no	

more	than	three	to	four	hours.	(TR	201:11-22).		Furthermore,	he	said	the	trainees	were	not	

required	to	complete	any	homework	outside	of	the	classroom.	(TR	202:4-7).

Since	the	actual	determination	of	how	Turner’s	time	was	spent is	critical in	order	to	

calculate	whether	he	spent	50%	or	more of	his	time	in	the	field,	I	tried	to	assess	how	he	

actually	spent	his	time.	But	Turner made	inconsistent	estimates	of	how	his	time	was	spent	

during	the	two	weeks	of	training.		According	to	his	deposition	testimony taken	two	years	

ago	in	2021,	Turner	said	his	classroom	training	ended	between	2	p.m.	and	3p.m.	every	day,	

amounting	to	about	three	to	four	hours	in	class,	as	the	training	class	was	designed.	(Turner	

Dep:	100:7-23).		At	the	arbitration	hearing,	he	testified	that	the	classroom	training	did	not	

end	until	after	3:00	p.m.	and	sometimes	as	late	as 4:30	p.m.	(TR	41:10-13	(4:30	p.m.)	

42:19-20	(4	p.m.)	47:20-21	(4	p.m.)	48:25-49:1(3:30	p.m.).		His	testimony	at	the	hearing	

adjusted the	classroom	hours	to	be	significantly	longer,	and	the	field	work	considerably	

shorter, than	his	testimony	in	the earlier	deposition.

Charter	provided	additional	evidence	of	Turner’s	inconsistent	testimony at	his	

earlier	deposition	and	at	the	arbitration	hearing	to	augment	his	claim.		

1. In	his	deposition	testimony,	Turner	said	he	spent	a	least	four	to	five	hours	in	the	

field. (Turner’s	Dep:	99:16-18.		At	the	hearing,	Turner	said	he	did	not	spend	more	

than	four	hours	in	the	field on	some	days	of	training	(TR	96:3-7)

2. In	his	deposition	testimony,	Turner	said	he	arrived	in	the	field	around	4	p.m.	each	

day	after	classroom	training.	(Turner	Dep	99:7-14.		At	the	hearing,	he	said	he	did	not	

arrive	in	the	field	until	after	5	p.m.	on	several	days.	TR 30:118-21	(after	5:00p.m.,	

39:25-40:4	(between	4:30	and	5:00	p.m.),	57:6-11	(5:30	p.m.)

3. In	his	deposition	testimony,	Turner	said	he	remained	in	the	field	until	8:00	p.m.	or	

9:00	p.m.	(Turner	Dep	99:71-14).		At	the	hearing	he	said	he	was	in	the	field	

shadowing	until	only	7:00	p.m.	or	7:30	p.m.	on	some	days.		(TR	40:11-14, (7:30	p.m.)	

50:15-18	(7:00p.m.	or	7:15	p.m.)

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4. In	his	deposition	testimony,	Turner	said	he	got	to	the	field at	4	p.m.	on	his	first	day	

of	work.	(Turner	Dep.	184:2-8.		At	the	hearing, Turner	testified	that	he	got	in	the	

field	at	5:30	p.m.	(TR	99:24-100:7)

Charter	demonstrated that	Turner’s testimony	at	the	hearing	was	inconsistent	and	

contradictory	to	his	earlier	testimony	in	a	number	of	instances.	(Resp.’s	Exhibit	C	to	Post	

Hearing	Brief).	 The	discrepancy	in	Turner’s	deposition	and	hearing	testimony	shows	that	

his	later	testimony	at	the	hearing	intended to	diminish the	number	of	the	hours	in	the	field	

in	order	to	reduce	outside sales	work	to	less	than	50%, and	maximize	the	classroom	work	

to	over	50%. But	the	evidence	confirms that	he	actually	spent	less	time	in	the	classroom	

and	more	than	50%	of	time	in	the	field	learning	to	sell	or	selling.

Turner	did	testify	that	he	went	into	the	field	everyday	he	worked	during	the	training	

(TR	70:12-17);	that	he	spent	at	least	four	hours	in	the	field	each	day	until	around	9	p.m.	

other	than	the	first	Saturday.	(TR	36:23-37:14	and	Turner	Dep	88:16-18). At	the	end	of	the	

field	training	day, he	spent	10-15	minutes	calling	his	supervisor	to	tell	him	the	sales	he	had	

lined	up, or	what	sales	he	did	not	have, and	what	he	had	been	doing	all	day	(TR	25:16-20,	

80:5-13).	 The	purpose	of	the	call	was	to	report	on	sales	productivity	but	he	later	said	the	

call	was	under	two	minutes.	(TR	189:25-190:23).

The	issue	of	whether	these	“ride	alongs”	were	actually	exempt	sales	activity	was	

also	dispelled	by	the	testimony.		At	the	hearing	Turner	testified	that	his	only	purpose	was	

to	observe	the	senior	DSR	make	sales.	(TR	70:18-22).		But	in	his	earlier	deposition	

testimony,	he	had said	that	his	purpose	was	to	go	door-to-door	and	make	sales	pitches and	

sell	Charter’s	services	to	prospective	customers, even	if	he	did	not	technically	get	credit	for	

the	sale.	(Turner	Dep.	69:3-15).		Moreover,	in	his	previous	deposition	testimony	he	said	

that he	and	his	DSR	sales	partner	would	split	up	houses	on	a	block	and	Turner	would	knock	

on	his	half	and	attempt	to	sell	Charter’s	services	to	prospective	customers.	(Turner	Dep.

70:3-71:5).		At	the	hearing,	he	adjusted	that	testimony	to	say	that	the	only	time	Turner	

knocked	on	his	own	doors	to	sell	services	during	training	was	the	last	couple	days	of	

training	(TR	74:4-21)	and	that	he	“sometimes”	split	a	block	with	his	sales	partner	(TR	76:8-

24).

Turner	confirmed	that	his	intention	while	working	in	the	field	was	“to	try	and	make	

a	sale.”		(TR	78:8-13	and	Turner	Depo	194:5-10).		Before	the	end	of	the	second	week	of	

training,	Turner	had	received	his	own	leads	lists	and	began	selling	on	his	own.		(TR	52:20-

23,	89:	2-4).		The	travel	time	plus	the	four	to	five	hours	spent	on	shadowing	experienced	

DSR’s	and	attempting	his	own	sales	pitches	qualify	for	exempt	work	that	exceeded 50%	of	

his	time	during	the	two	training	weeks.

The	evidence	from	Turner’s	own	testimony	is	that	he	spent	more	than	50%	of	his	

time	during	the	two-week	training	period	away	from	the	office	and	out	learning	and	

participating	in	making	sales.		Even	if	he	spent	50	hours	a	week	during	the	training	weeks	

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as	he	claims,	he	spent	more	than	25	hours	each	week	in	sales	related	activities	including	

one	to	one	and	a	half	hours	each	day	to	reach	his	assigned	DSR. 7

Charter	Realistically	Expected	Turner	to	Engage	in	Sales	Related	Activity

Charter’s	realistic	expectations	were	that	Turner	would	spend	the	majority	of	his	

time	in	the	field	learning	first	hand	sales	related	activities.		Raul	Salcedo	testified	that	

Charter	really	wanted	DSR’s	to	spend	90%	of	the	time	in	the	field	from	2:00p.m.	to	9:00p.m.	

each	weekday	and	9:00	a.m.	to	1:00pm	on	Saturdays	and	wanted	new	hires	like	Turner	to	

spend	most	of	their	training	in	the	field	doing	hands-on	training	with	more	experienced	

DSRs. (TR 183:3-9).		He	also	testified	that	in	the	field,	new	hires	assist	with	the	sales	

process,	engage	with	customers	and	use	the	tablet	assigned	to	them.	“...		pretty	much...	

they’re	learning	the	craft	hands	on.	(TR 196:11-14).

Turner	claimed	at	the	hearing	that he	only	started	spending	most	of	his	time	outside	

the	office	selling	in	his	third	week	of	employment	after	the	training	ended.		However,	for	

this	to	be	true,	he	could	not	have	worked	overtime	as	he	only	had	three-to-four-hour

classroom	trainings eight	out	of	the	14	days	of	the	two-week	training	period. (181:3-9,	

JX12).		It	is	reasonable	to	infer	that	a	company	like	Charter, whose	profits	depend	on	sales,

would	want	to	maximize	the	amount	of	time	a	DSR	is	in	the	field	making	sales	and	would	

emphasize	that	during	the	training	period.

Charter’s classroom training	was	designed	to	be	less	than	50%	of	his	training	week	

time.		During	the	first	three	weekdays,	Turner	was	not	expected	to	be	in	the	office	for	more	

than	two	or	three	hours	filling	out	new-hire	paperwork,	completing	short	self-guided	

orientation	modules	and	completing	minor	onboarding	tasks	before	going	into	the	field.		

(TR 186:9-15,	200:2-8).	 The	virtual	classroom	training	did	not	begin	until	the	fifth	day	of	

his	training	on	June	20,	2018.		The	classroom	training	was	designed	not	to	exceed	four	

hours	so	that	the	new	hires	could	spend	the	majority	of	the	day	in	the	field.		In	addition,	

there	was	no	homework	assigned,	even	if Turner	claims	he reviewed instructions outside	

of	the	classroom.		Turner	did	not	complete	any	of	the	workbooks	Charter	provided to	him	

during	the	classroom	training	and	Charter	did	not	reprimand	him	for	failing	to	do	so.	(TR	

208:15-214:3 and JX	30-47)

Charter	did	not	express	displeasure	with	Turner’s	performance	because	it	

anticipated	that	Turner,	who	had	prior	sales	experience,	was	spending	his	time	in	the	field	

perfecting	a	pitch for	the company’s	products	and	services.		As	a	result,	according	to	the	

Ramirez factors,	the	evidence	has	shown	that	Turner	spent	more	than	50%	of	his	time	in	

the	field	learning	and	selling;	the	company’s	expectations	for	its	specially	designed	training	

7 Ramirez v	Yosemite	states	that sales	related	activities that	fall	within	the	scope	of	the	

exemption consist	not	only	of	the	discrete	act	of	making	sales,	but	among	other	things	the	

preparation,	travel	time and	paperwork	necessary	to	perform	these	functions.	–supra at	

801. (Emphasis	added)

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program	was	that	he	would	be	out	in	the	field	substantially	more	than	in	the	office,	and	

they	expressed	no	displeasure	in	his	efforts	to	prepare	himself	for	his	exempt	sales	

position.		The	ancillary	guidelines of Ramirez and Duran have	been	satisfied.

For	the	reasons	expressed	above,	I	have	concluded	that	the	Claimant	was	an	exempt	

employee	during	his	two-week	training	sessions.		Therefore, the	claims	for	failure	to	pay	

minimum	wage	and	overtime	demanding	20 hours	of	overtime	wages	(Counts	1	and	2);	

failure	to	provide	11	meal	periods	and	11	rest	periods	(Counts	3	and	4), and	derivative	

claims	of failure	to	provide	a	“training	weeks”	wage	statement	(Count	6);	and	waiting	time	

penalties	for	failure	to	timely	pay	him	all	wages	owed	upon	termination	(Count	7)	are,	

hereby,	denied.

Count	8- Wage	Statements	and	Personnel	Records	and Files

Claimant	is	asking	for	statutory	penalties	for	failing	to	give	Turner	a	copy	of	his	

wage	statements	within	21	days	of	his	request, and	for	failing	to	give	him	a	complete	copy	

of	his	personnel	records	and	files	within	30	days	of	his	request,	plus	costs	and	attorney’s	

fees	pursuant	to	Labor	Code	§§	226(b)-(c) and 1198.5	(a)-(b).		Claimant	has	shown	that	

Charter	did	not	meet either	the	21-day	or the	30-day	requirement.

Charter	argues	that	Turner	has	no	proof	that	his	request	was	ever	delivered	to	his	

employer,	as	opposed	to	a	law	firm	representing	Charter	in	an	unrelated	matter.		However,	

Charter	did	receive	the	request	because	the	Charter	law	firm’s	paralegal	responded	to	the	

request	on	May	20,	2020,	producing	some	of	the	records	and	a	copy	of	the	request.		(JX63.)		

Turner correctly	claims	that	his	wage	statements	were	produced	21	days	after	the	

statutory	deadline	and	the	personnel	records/files,	12	days	after	the	statutory	deadline.		In	

addition,	he	maintains	that	the	personnel	records	and	files	were	incomplete	because	his	

commission	plan	documents	(JX	51-55),	training	transcript	(JX23),	arbitration	agreement	

(JX60-61)	and	several	other	policies	that	he	was	required	to	acknowledge	(JX	48,	56,	58)	

relating	to	his	performance	were	missing.		For	these	reasons,	the	Claimant	prevails	on	

Count	8.

Charter	was	required	to	give	Turner	a	copy	of	his	wage	statements	within	21	days	of	

receiving	a	reasonable	request	and	his	personnel	records	and	files	within	30	days	of	

receiving	the	request.		Labor	Code	§§	226(b)-(c)	and	1198.5	(a)-(c).		Turner,	through	his	

attorney,	requested	his	wage	statements	and	personnel	records	on	April	8,	2020.		(JX	62).	

The	statutory	deadline	for	the	wage	statements	was	April	29,	2020	and	for	the	personnel	

records,	May	8,	2020.		These	records	were	belatedly	provided	on	May	20, 2020.	(JX63).		As	

a	result,	Turner’s	claim for	$1,500 ($750	penalty	for	each	infraction) in	statutory	penalties,	

plus	costs	and	reasonable	attorney	fees is	granted.

Therefore,	Respondent	shall	pay	Claimant	$750	in	penalties	as	provided	for	in	Labor	

Code	§	226	(f)	and	$750	in	penalties	as	provided	for	in	Labor	Code	§	1198.5(k).		Counsel

shall	meet	and	confer	and	Claimant	shall	provide	Respondent	with	a	detailed	schedule	of	

any	costs	and	attorney	fees,	including	fees	and	hours,	for	the	infractions	of	these	two	codes	

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 15 of 53
12

by	June	23,	2023.		If	there	is	any	disagreement	regarding	the	amount	requested,	the	

parties	must	inform	the	arbitrator	by	June	30,	2023 with	a	letter	brief	in	order	for	a	final	

determination	to	be	made.

INTERIM	AWARD

For	the	foregoing	reasons,	Counts 1-4,	6-7	are	denied	and	Count	8	is	granted.		

Charter	is	to	pay	Turner	a	total	of	$1,500	in	statutory	penalties,	plus	costs	and	reasonable	

attorney	fees.

This	Interim	Award	shall	remain	in	full	force	and	effect	until	such	time	as	a	Final	

Award	is	rendered.

I,	Ruth	V.	Glick,	do	hereby	affirm	upon	my	oath	as	Arbitrator	that	I	am	the	individual	

described	in	and	who	executed	this	instrument	which	is	my	Interim	Award.

Dated:	June	16,	2023

				Ruth	V.	Glick,	Arbitrator

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 16 of 53
EXHIBIT 2

FINAL AWARD DATED JULY 20, 2023

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 17 of 53
American Arbitration Association

Employment Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

Hassan Turner

and 

Charter Communications LLC

AAA Case # 01-22-0001-5254

FINAL AWARD

I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance with the 

personnel manual or employment agreement entered into by the above-named parties and 

dated May 23, 2018, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and 

allegations of the Parties, and Claimant, Hassan Turner, being represented by Jamin 

Soderstrom of Soderstrom Law PC, and Respondent, Charter Communications, LLC, being 

represented by Nathan Chapman of Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, hereby AWARD, as 

follows:

The Interim Award dated June 16, 2023 denying Counts 1-4, 6-7, and granting Count 

8, awarding a total of $1,500 in statutory penalties under California Labor Code sections 

226(f) and 1198.5 (k), is hereby incorporated (Attachment 1). The parties have stipulated 

to Hassan Turner’s claim for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection 

with granting the Labor Code violations referred to above (Attachment 2). 

Therefore, the following is hereby Awarded:

1. Counts 1-4 and 6-7 are DENIED.

2. Count 8 – Violation of Labor Code sections 226(f) and 1198.5(k) awarding a 

statutory penalty of $750 for each violation or a total of Fifteen Hundred Dollars 

($1,500), which Charter shall pay Turner for statutory penalties, is GRANTED.

3. In accordance with the parties’ Joint Stipulation, Charter shall pay a total amount of 

Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) to resolve Turner’s claim for costs and reasonable 

attorney fees incurred by the Labor Code violations.

The administrative fees of the American Arbitration Association, totaling $2,950.00, 

and the compensation of the arbitrator, totaling $54,775.00, shall be borne by Charter.

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 18 of 53
This Final Award, which incorporates the Interim Award, dated June, 16, 2023, is in 

full and complete settlement and satisfaction of any and all issues submitted by the parties. 

Any claim not specifically addressed is herein deemed denied.

I, Ruth V. Glick, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual 

described in and who executed this instrument, the Final Award. 

Dated: July 20, 2023 Ruth V. Glick, Arbitrator

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EXHIBIT 3

MUTUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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EXHIBIT 4

AAA APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 26 of 53
 

Southeast Case Management Center

Charles Dorsey

Assistant Vice President

2200 Century Parkway

Suite 300

Atlanta, GA 30345

Telephone: (404)325-0101

Fax: (877)395-1388

June 8, 2022

Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.

Soderstrom Law PC

1 Park Plaza, Suite 600

Irvine, CA 92614

Via Email to: jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com 

J. Scott Carr, Esq.

Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP

171 17th Street NW, Suite 1550

Atlanta, GA 30363

Via Email to: scarr@kcozlaw.com 

Re: Case Number: 01-22-0001-5254

Hassan Turner v. Charter Communications, LLC

Dear Parties:

Inasmuch as there were no objections to the appointment of Ruth V Glick, Esq., his appointment is hereby

confirmed by the American Arbitration Association (the AAA).

Accordingly, a telephonic Arbitration Management Conference needs to be scheduled. Please confer with the

other side and provide mutually agreeable dates and times from June 22 - 29, 2022.

The parties are requested to advise the undersigned of their availability on or before June 15, 2022.

We look forward to working with you and should there be any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the 

undersigned.

Sincerely,

/s/ Karen D. Smith, on behalf of

Erik Goss

Manager of ADR Services

Direct Dial: (678)686-6009

Main Dial: (404)320-5147

Email: ErikGoss@adr.org

Fax: (877)395-1388

Enclosure

cc: Nathan D. Chapman, Esq.; Ruth V. Glick, Esq.

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 27 of 53
EXHIBIT 5

OCTOBER 13, 2021 ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS 

TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 

----oo0oo---- 

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” failed to pay them overtime wages, failed to 

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provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages in lieu 

thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. (See

generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 147).) 

Charter now moves to (1) compel arbitration of plaintiff Harper’s 

claims and stay the action and (2) compel arbitration of 

plaintiff Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims and dismiss them 

from the case. (Mots. to Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 

165).)1

I. Facts & Procedural History

Much of this case’s factual background is set forth in 

the court’s accompanying Order Re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify 

the Scheduling Order and for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint. Accordingly, the court will not repeat it here except 

where relevant to the instant motions.

A. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiff Harper worked for Charter from September 2017 

to March 2018. (SAC at ¶ 5 (Docket No. 147).) Upon hire, Harper 

signed an agreement to arbitrate “any and all claims, disputes, 

and/or controversies between [Harper] and Charter arising from or 

related to [Harper’s] employment with Charter,” designating JAMS 

1 The parties have requested that the court take judicial 

notice of two filings in Harper’s related FEHA case, other 

documents filed in this litigation, the American Arbitration 

Association’s rules and procedures, and two unpublished Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions addressing Charter’s motions to 

compel arbitration in other cases. (See Docket Nos. 171, 184, 

185.) Plaintiffs object to Charter’s request as to the Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions. (See Docket No. 191.) Because 

the court does not find these materials relevant to this matter 

or helpful in deciding any of the issues currently before the

court, however, the court declines to take judicial notice of 

these materials.

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as the arbitration provider and stating that JAMS rules, 

procedures, and policies would govern arbitrations under that 

agreement (the “JAMS Agreement”). (Order re Mot. to Compel Arb. 

at 2 (Docket No. 24).) The JAMS Agreement included a waiver of 

representative, collective, and class actions (the “Waiver”) and 

a severance and so-called “poison pill” provision. (Id. at 2.) 

The severance provision stated that if any part of the agreement 

was found to be void or unenforceable, that part would be severed 

and the remainder enforced. (Id. at 2-3.) It went on to state 

one exception (the “poison pill”): that if a dispute involved a 

representative, collective, or class action claim, and the Waiver 

were found to be invalid or unenforceable, “then th[e] entire 

Agreement . . . shall be null and void and the dispute will not 

be arbitrable.” (Id. at 3.)

In October 2017, while Harper was still employed by 

Charter, Charter adopted a new arbitration agreement requiring 

arbitration of claims via “Solution Channel,” Charter’s 

employment-based legal dispute resolution program, which provided 

for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration 

Association (the “Solution Channel Agreement”). (Id. at 3.) 

When announcing the change, Charter notified employees that they 

would be bound by the Solution Channel Agreement unless they 

opted out within thirty days. (Id.) Harper did not do so. 

(Id.)

In November 2018, Harper filed a Demand for Arbitration 

and Request for Rulings as to Inarbitrability with JAMS, seeking 

a ruling on whether his employment-related grievances against 

Charter could be arbitrated under the JAMS Agreement. (Id. at 5-

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6.) Charter consented to and participated in the ensuing 

arbitration process with JAMS, and in April 2019 an arbitrator 

issued an award finding that Harper’s wage-and-hour claims were 

inarbitrable and dismissing the arbitration. (Id. at 6; see Mot. 

to Confirm Arb. Award, Ex. 16 (“Order of Dismissal”), at 157-66 

(Docket No. 9-1).)

Specifically, the arbitrator determined that because 

pre-dispute waivers of representative claims brought under PAGA 

are unenforceable under California law, the JAMS Agreement Waiver 

could not be enforced. (Order of Dismissal at 159-61 (Docket No. 

9-1) (citing Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A. LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 

384 (2014)).) The arbitrator accordingly determined that this 

activated the poison pill, nullifying the entire agreement. 

(Id. at 163-65.) The arbitrator rejected Charter’s argument that 

the poison pill be limited so as to nullify the agreement only as 

to the representative, collective, or class action claim at issue 

as contrary to the JAMS Agreement’s plain text, which included no 

such limitation. (Id.)

In May 2019, after Harper had initiated this action in 

state court, Charter sought to enforce the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper, who refused. (Order re Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 6-7 (Docket No. 24).) In August 2019, this court 

confirmed and entered judgment pursuant to the JAMS arbitration 

award. (Id. at 19.) Further, the court found that there had 

been a novation as a result of Charter’s acquiescence to 

arbitration under the JAMS Agreement rather than the Solution 

Channel Agreement, held that any rights Charter had as against 

Harper under the Solution Channel Agreement with respect to his 

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wage-and-hour claims were thus “dead and extinguished,” and 

denied a motion by Charter to compel arbitration under the 

Solution Channel Agreement. (Id. at 18-20.)2

In May 2021, Harper again sought employment with 

Charter via an online application. (Fries Decl. at ¶ 16, Ex. D

(Docket No. 162-1).) When proceeding through Charter’s online 

application, applicants are presented with a webpage featuring 

information about Charter’s Solution Channel Agreement, with 

links to the agreement itself and to Solution Channel Program 

Guidelines, both of which applicants may save and print. (Id. at 

¶¶ 7-10.) To proceed with their application, applicants are 

required to affirmatively agree to be bound by the Solution 

Channel Agreement by clicking an “I Agree” button. (Id. at 

¶ 11.) They are informed that if they do not agree, they will be 

removed from consideration for employment; their application is 

not submitted, and they are given the option to begin the 

application process again. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) On May 23, 2021, 

Harper consented to the Solution Channel Agreement and submitted 

an online application to Charter. (Id. at ¶ 16, Ex. D.)

2 In late 2019, the court also adjudicated a separate, 

related action between Harper and Charter brought under 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). See

Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 

6918280 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019). There, Harper had also sought 

to arbitrate his FEHA claims under the JAMS agreement, but this 

time Charter did not participate. Id. at *2. The court held 

that because “Charter did not engage with [Harper’s] FEHA claims” 

in the manner it had with his wage-and-hour claims, there had 

been no novation of arbitration agreements with respect to the 

FEHA claims. Id. at *3. After determining that the Solution 

Channel Agreement applied to Harper’s FEHA claims and was valid, 

the court granted a motion by Charter to compel arbitration of 

those claims under that agreement. Id. at *3-6.

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B. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

In addition to consenting to the Solution Channel 

Agreement in order to complete Charter’s online application, 

individuals who accept offers of employment from Charter are 

again required to consent to the same agreement, or else they 

cannot become a Charter employee. (Fries Decl. re Turner at 

¶¶ 9-18 (Docket No. 165-2).) Plaintiff Turner submitted an 

online application on May 23, 2018, consenting to the Solution 

Channel Agreement, and subsequently completed Charter’s employee 

onboarding process, consenting to the agreement again. (Id. at 

¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Vazquez did the same, 

submitting his application on October 9, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Vazquez at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Abascal did as well, 

submitting his application on November 5, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Abascal at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.)

C. The Solution Channel Agreement

The Solution Channel Agreement contains several

provisions currently at issue. It requires parties to the 

agreement to resolve “all disputes, claims and controversies that 

could be asserted in court or before an administrative agency for 

which you or Charter have an alleged cause of action related to 

pre-employment, employment, employment termination or postemployment-related claims,” including wage-and-hour-related 

claims, through binding arbitration. (Fries Aff., Ex. C 

(“Solution Channel Agreement”), at §§ A, B(1) (Docket No. 165-

2).)

The agreement specifically excludes certain claims from 

arbitration, including “[a]ny claims that have already been filed 

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in federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Id. at § C(14).) It also includes a 

merger clause, providing that the Solution Channel Agreement 

represents the complete agreement between parties on the 

resolution of covered disputes, but noting that “this Agreement 

will not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.) Finally, like the JAMS Agreement, the Solution Channel 

Agreement includes a waiver of representative, class, or 

collective action claims. (Id. at § D.)

II. Analysis

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that a 

written provision in a “contract evidencing a transaction 

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 

thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, 

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. 

§ 2. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, “the central 

. . . purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to 

arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen 

S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 

483, 490 (1987) (under the FAA, arbitration agreements “must be 

rigorously enforced”) (internal quotations omitted, alterations 

adopted).

The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion 

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by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 

shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as

to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). Accordingly, 

“the FAA limits courts’ involvement to determining (1) whether a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether 

the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Cox v. Ocean 

View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotations omitted).

“[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning 

the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 

arbitration, whether the problem at hand is a construction of the 

contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or 

like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); see Poublon v. 

C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 

Upon a showing that a party has failed to comply with a valid 

arbitration agreement, the district court must issue an order 

compelling arbitration. See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble Cooke, Inc., 

841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988).

The primary exception to courts’ obligation to enforce 

arbitration agreements under the FAA comes from the Act’s “saving 

clause,” which “allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 

agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 

the revocation of any contract.’” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 

S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Such “generally 

applicable contract defenses” most frequently include “fraud, 

duress, or unconscionability,” but do not include “defenses that 

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apply only to arbitration.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 

U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).

A. Applicability of the Solution Channel Agreement

Charter seeks to compel plaintiffs Harper, Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal to submit their California Labor Code and 

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claims to arbitration on an 

individual basis. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Harper at 1 

(Docket No. 162); Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 1 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs contend that to do 

so, Charter must prove that (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exists and (2) the agreement encompasses the claims Charter seeks 

to arbitrate. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-17 (citing 

Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000)) (Docket No. 172); Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 

14 (same) (Docket No. 173).)

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal acknowledge that they each 

executed the Solution Channel Agreement both when applying for 

employment with Charter and when accepting their jobs, (see Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9-11 (Docket No. 173)), and Harper 

acknowledges that he did when re-applying for employment with 

Charter in May 2021, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 

(Docket No. 172)). On this basis, plaintiffs concede that a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See id. at 17; Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 (Docket No. 173).) Accordingly, the 

question becomes whether the agreement applies to plaintiffs’ 

Labor Code and UCL claims, of which Charter seeks to compel 

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arbitration.3

The Solution Channel Agreement provides that “[y]ou and 

Charter mutually agree that . . . any dispute arising out of or 

relating to your pre-employment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that relationship, except as 

specifically excluded below, must be resolved through binding 

arbitration.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § A (Docket No. 

165-2).) This is followed by a section titled “Covered Claims,” 

(id. at § B), which specifies that such disputes include “wage 

and hour-based claims including claims for unpaid wages, 

commissions, or other compensations or penalties (including meal 

and rest break claims, claims for inaccurate wage statements, 

[and] claims for reimbursement of expenses),” (id. at § B(1)). 

The parties do not dispute that the claims of which Charter seeks 

to compel arbitration clearly fall into this category.

However, that section is followed by another, titled 

“Excluded Claims,” which lists a variety of claims to which the 

“Covered Claims” section does not apply. (See id. at § C.) 

Notably for purposes of the instant motions, these include “[a]ny 

claims that have already been filed in federal or state court at 

the time you execute this Agreement, provided that such claims 

were not previously subject to any arbitration agreement.” (Id.

3 Although at oral argument the parties briefly discussed 

whether questions of arbitrability should themselves be submitted 

to an arbitrator, neither party raised this issue in their 

briefing. Accordingly, this court will decide whether 

plaintiffs’ claims are arbitrable rather than submit the issue to 

the arbitrator. See also Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (gateway issues of arbitrability are presumptively 

reserved for the court).

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at § C(14).) The aforementioned merger clause, which appears 

later in the agreement, also provides that “this Agreement will 

not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.)

Plaintiffs argue that these two provisions operate to 

exclude plaintiffs Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from mandatory 

arbitration under the agreement. Specifically, they argue that 

because plaintiff Harper had already filed this action by the 

time Vazquez and Abascal executed the agreement, their claims 

qualify as having “already been filed in . . . court” and having 

“been filed with a[ ] . . . court before the Effective Date of 

th[e] Agreement” under these provisions.4 (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 15-19 (Docket No. 173).) 

They argue the same as to Harper, given that he 

executed the operative agreement in May 2021, after bringing this 

action, and contend that his claims “were not previously subject 

to any agreement” pursuant to section C(14) because the 

agreements he previously signed were no longer in effect by May 

2021. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-22 (Docket No. 

172).) In light of the differing arguments put forward with 

respect to Harper and to the other plaintiffs for whom Charter 

seeks to compel arbitration, the court will address the two 

4 Plaintiffs do not make this argument with respect to 

plaintiff Turner, as he had already executed the agreement when 

this litigation began, and therefore they concede that sections 

C(14) and P do not apply to him. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 17 n.6 (Docket No. 173).)

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groups separately.

1. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

Charter argues that Vazquez and Abascal improperly seek 

to avoid arbitration by, in essence, piggybacking off of Harper’s 

already-filed claims, which they did not join until well after 

executing the agreement. (See Def.’s Reply at 5-10 (Docket No. 

182).) It contends that because section C creates exceptions to 

section B’s requirement that various claims be arbitrated, the 

two sections must be read together, and that because section B by 

its terms applies to “claims . . . for which you or Charter have 

an alleged cause of action,” the exclusion contained in section 

C(14) is properly read to exclude only already-filed claims 

between the signing party and Charter, rather than any alreadyfiled claims to which Charter is a party. (Solution Channel 

Agreement at § B(1) (emphasis added) (Docket No. 165-2); see id.

at 5-6.) The court agrees.

Because, as a general matter, contract interpretation 

is a matter of state law, the court looks to California law in 

construing these provisions. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 

U.S. 47, 54 (2015) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 

of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). 

Three provisions of the California Civil Code, governing the 

interpretation of contracts, are relevant here. First, “[t]he 

language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the 

language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an 

absurdity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1638. Second, “[a] contract must 

be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of 

the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as 

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the same is ascertainable and lawful.” Id. at § 1636. Third, 

“[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give 

effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause 

helping to interpret the other.” Id. at § 1641.

Under these provisions, it is clear that section C(14) 

of the agreement cannot be read to prevent arbitration of Vazquez 

and Abascal’s claims by virtue of Harper’s previously filed 

claim. Because section C specifically lists exclusions to 

section B, the two must be read together. See also id. Per 

section B’s clear language, claims covered under that section —

and thus excluded under section C — are those between “You” 

(i.e., the individual signatory) “and Charter.” This clearly 

signifies an intention to require arbitration of claims — and

thus, under section C, exclude from arbitration — only claims 

that might arise as between the signatory and Charter. See id.

at §§ 1636, 1638. To allow signatories to avoid arbitration of 

otherwise-covered claims by joining suits filed by individuals 

not party to the contract would plainly frustrate this intention.

For similar reasons, section P likewise does not 

exclude Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from arbitration. As noted 

above, the Solution Channel Agreement’s core provisions specify 

that it applies to disputes between “You and Charter.” Although 

section P does not directly incorporate this language in the 

manner that section C does, to apply it in plaintiffs’ preferred 

manner would run counter to the contract’s central purpose, which 

is to require arbitration of disputes. See id. at § 1636. And 

to the extent that this omission creates a conflict between 

sections P and C(14), “in a contract, when a general and 

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particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to 

the former,” meaning that “a particular intent will control a 

general one that is inconsistent with it.” Karpinski v. Smitty’s 

Bar, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th 456, 464 (1st Dist. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

For these reasons, together with the FAA’s mandate that 

any doubts as to an arbitration agreement’s applicability be 

resolved in favor of arbitration, see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 

460 U.S. at 24–25; Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1259, the court concludes 

that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to compel arbitration 

of Vazquez and Abascal’s claims. Plaintiffs do not contest that 

the agreement applies to Turner’s claims, and sections C(14) and 

P clearly do not exclude them, as this action had not yet been 

filed at the time he executed the agreement. Accordingly, the 

court concludes that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to 

Turner’s claims as well.

2. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiffs also contend that section P of the agreement 

excludes Harper’s claims from its coverage. (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 18-19 (Docket No. 172).) They further argue that, 

because this court confirmed the JAMS arbitrator’s award finding 

that the JAMS agreement was “null and void,” and because it 

subsequently held that Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration effected a novation of Harper’s first Solution 

Channel contract — rendering it “dead and extinguished” —

Harper’s claims do not qualify as “previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement” under section C(14). (See id. at 20-22.) 

Accordingly, they argue that section C(14) excludes Harper’s 

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claims from coverage under the agreement as well. (See id.)

As noted above, section C(14) provides that the 

agreement excludes “[a]ny claims that have already been filed in 

federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § C(14) 

(Docket No. 165-2).) Thus, because it is undisputed that 

Harper’s claims had already been filed in court when he executed 

the agreement, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 

172)), the only question is whether those claims “were . . . 

previously subject to any arbitration agreement,” (Solution 

Channel Agreement at § C(14) (Docket No. 165-2)). The court 

concludes that they were.

While Harper was employed by Charter, he consented to 

the JAMS Agreement, and later to the Solution Channel Agreement. 

Plaintiffs argue that the JAMS arbitrator’s determination that 

the JAMS Agreement was invalid means that Harper’s claims were 

never “subject to” that agreement, contending that claims are

only “subject to” an arbitration agreement if they are validly 

required to be arbitrated under that agreement. (See Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 172).)

The court assumes, for these purposes, that plaintiffs’ 

construction of “subject to” is correct, such that Harper’s 

claims were not “previously subject to” the JAMS Agreement. Even 

so, it is clear that they were nonetheless “previously subject 

to” the Solution Channel Agreement. Although this court 

determined that there was a subsequent novation, extinguishing 

that agreement, the fact remains that for a period of time --

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beginning when Harper first executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement and ending with Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration -- Charter could have asserted the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper with respect to any wage-and-hour claims 

he had. Under the plain meaning of “previous” -- earlier in time 

-- Harper’s claims, at the time he executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement in May 2021, were “previously subject to” the earliersigned copy of the same agreement. As such, Harper’s claims are 

not excluded from arbitration under section C(14).5

To the extent that Harper challenges Charter’s ability 

to compel him to arbitrate his individual claims arising out of 

his prior employment because his latest execution of the Solution 

Channel Agreement occurred when he applied for another position, 

(see id. at 14), at least one other district court in California 

has already held that the Solution Channel Agreement applies in

such circumstances. In Durruthy v. Charter Communications, LLC, 

like in this case, the plaintiff was hired by Charter, was later 

terminated, subsequently reapplied for employment, and in doing 

so executed the agreement, which Charter then sought to enforce 

against her. Durruthy, 20-CV-1374-W-MSB, 2020 WL 6871048, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2020). As the court in the Southern District 

5 Plaintiffs contend that to find that Harper’s claims 

were previously subject to the initial Solution Channel 

Agreement, the court would need to reconsider whether that 

agreement was extinguished by the previously mentioned novation, 

which they argue the court is precluded from doing under the law 

of the case doctrine. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 

(Docket No. 172).) However, plaintiffs are mistaken in their 

logic, as finding that an applicable agreement had terminated is 

not the same as concluding that it was never applicable in the 

first place. Although the court did the former, it did not do 

the latter.

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of California observed:

The Agreement covers “any dispute arising 

out of or relating to [an applicant’s] 

preemployment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that 

relationship . . . .” The Agreement does 

not limit its application to future 

employment, nor does it exclude claims from 

prior employment periods. Therefore, an 

objective reading supports that “employment” 

reasonably means any employment period 

between the two parties of the agreement. 

. . . . Plaintiff’s alleged lack of consent 

to arbitrate claims from her prior 

employment period with Defendant are absent 

from the Agreement, and “unexpressed 

subjective intentions are irrelevant 

. . . .”

Id. at *4-5 (quoting Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc., 51 Cal. 

App. 5th 962, 970 (2020)) (alterations in original). This court 

agrees with the Durruthy court’s analysis of this issue.6

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the 

Solution Channel Agreement applies to Harper’s claims.

B. Unconscionability

Plaintiffs also argue that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is unconscionable. (See id. at 22-38; Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 19-34 (Docket No. 173).) If true, this would mean

that the contract was not validly entered into in the first 

instance, allowing the court to invalidate the agreement pursuant 

to the FAA’s saving clause. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.

“Unconscionability under California law has ‘both a 

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on 

oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the 

6 This court’s agreement with the Durruthy court’s 

evaluation of the Solution Channel Agreement, however, does not 

extend to its unconscionability analysis.

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latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.’” Kilgore v. 

KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 

83, 99 (2000)). While courts “use a ‘sliding scale’ in analyzing 

these two elements . . . . [n]o matter how heavily one side of 

the scale tips . . . , both procedural and substantive 

unconscionability are required for a court to hold an arbitration 

agreement unenforceable.” Id. (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 

99).

This court previously assessed whether the Solution 

Channel Agreement is unconscionable in the related action between 

plaintiff Harper and Charter. See Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 

2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

18, 2019). There, the court determined that the agreement was 

not procedurally unconscionable, relying in large part on the 

fact that when Harper was first confronted with the Solution 

Channel Agreement, it was via an email notifying employees of 

their ability to opt out of the agreement within thirty days. 

Id. at *1, 5 (citing Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 

1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (deeming an arbitration 

agreement not procedurally unconscionable because it noted the 

option to opt out within sixty days of signing)). Here, on the 

other hand, there is no indication that plaintiffs were given the 

same option to opt out; indeed, they assert that they received 

none, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 24 (Docket No. 172); 

Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 (Docket No. 173)), which 

Charter does not contest, (see Def.’s Reply at 15-17 (Docket No. 

182); Def.’s Reply at 16-18 (Docket No. 183)).

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The Ninth Circuit has previously held that an

arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable where it 

was presented to employees “on an adhere-or-reject basis,” with 

no opportunity to opt out. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 

Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v. Am. 

Mortg. Mgmt. Servs., 2:12-cv-00085 WBS JFM, 2012 WL 5349511, at 

*4-5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (holding pre-employment 

arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it did 

not contain an opt-out clause). Conversely, it has also held 

that an arbitration agreement that included an opt-out provision 

was not procedurally unconscionable. See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., 

Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Thus, an arbitration agreement that individuals are 

required to sign as a condition of employment, with no ability to 

opt out, is procedurally unconscionable, though Ninth Circuit 

precedent also establishes that this form of procedural 

unconscionability is “low” on California’s sliding scale 

analysis. See Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1261. In such a situation, 

if “there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, then 

the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of 

substantive unconscionability is high.” Id.

Regardless of the particular degree of procedural 

unconscionability present here, however, in order for their 

unconscionability defense to succeed, plaintiffs must also show 

that the agreement is substantively unconscionable. See Kilgore, 

673 F.3d at 963. And as this court previously held in the

related action between Harper and Charter, in which Charter 

sought to enforce the Solution Channel Agreement against him with 

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respect to claims not present in the current litigation, the 

agreement is not substantively unconscionable. See Harper, 2019 

WL 6918280, at *5-6.7 Because the agreement at issue in this 

litigation is the same as the one upon which the court ruled in 

the separate litigation, and plaintiffs do not allege that it has 

changed,8 the court again concludes that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is not substantively unconscionable.

Because the Solution Channel Agreement is not 

substantively unconscionable, plaintiffs’ unconscionability 

defense must fail.

C. California Labor Code Section 432.6

7 Specifically, the court determined that (1) the 

Solution Channel review process was not one-sided, as Harper 

contended, but rather its requirements applied equally to 

employees and to Charter; (2) the agreement did not enable 

Charter to conclusively decide whether a claim is arbitrable, 

instead providing claimants the ability to proceed with 

arbitration on this and other issues; and (3) a provision of the 

agreement requiring “each party [to] bear its own attorney’s fees 

regardless of the action brought,” although unenforceable under 

California law, could be severed pursuant to the agreement’s 

severability clause in light of the court’s determination that 

the agreement was “not otherwise permeated by unconscionability.” 

See Harper, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (citing Serpa v. Cal. Sur. 

Investigations, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 4th 695, 709-10 (2d Dist. 

2013)).

8 Although plaintiff Harper refers to the Solution 

Channel Agreement to which he consented the first time as the 

“Old SC Agreement” and the one to which he consented when reapplying as the “New SC Agreement,” his bases for these 

differences in nomenclature are that the former was included in 

an email informing him that he could opt out, whereas the latter 

was not — not that the agreement itself had changed. (See Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9 n.1 (Docket No. 172).)

Moreover, the Solution Channel Agreement is dated 

September 25, 2017 — well before plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and 

Abascal first applied for employment with Charter — further 

indicating that it had not changed between when plaintiff Harper 

first signed it and when they did. (See Solution Channel 

Agreement (Docket No. 165-2); supra Section II.B.)

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Finally, in supplemental briefing, plaintiffs argue 

that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce 

of the United States v. Bonta, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 4187860 (9th 

Cir. Sept. 15, 2021), precludes enforcement of the Solution 

Channel Agreement against Harper. (See Not. of Supp. Auth. at 2

(Docket No. 196).) That decision upheld part of California Labor 

Code section 432.6, which prohibits employers from “requir[ing] 

any applicant for employment or any employee to waive any right, 

forum, or procedure” established under the Labor Code or 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act as a condition of 

employment, on the basis that it was not preempted by the FAA.9 

See id. at *4-10; Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(a).

Plaintiffs contend that under Chamber of Commerce, 

Charter’s use of the Solution Channel Agreement violates section 

432.6 because Harper’s consent to the agreement was a mandatory 

condition for consideration of his application and for any 

subsequent employment, with no ability to opt out. (See Not. of 

Supp. Auth. at 2 (Docket No. 196).) Per Chamber of Commerce’s 

clear language, however, whether this requirement violated

section 432.6 has no effect on the court’s present decision to 

enforce the Solution Channel Agreement: “§ 432.6 does not make 

invalid or unenforceable any agreement to arbitrate, even if such 

agreement is consummated in violation of the statute.” 2021 WL 

4187860, at *7 (emphasis added); see also 2021 WL 4187860, at *6 

9 Because section 432.6 came into effect after Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal executed the Solution Channel Agreement, but 

before Harper did in May 2021, plaintiffs only contend that the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision applies to Harper. (See Not. of Supp. 

Auth. at 2 n.1 (Docket No. 196).)

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(“§ 432.6 cannot be used to invalidate, revoke, or fail to 

enforce an arbitration agreement . . . .”).

The most that Chamber of Commerce does to aid employees 

who seek to challenge arbitration agreements is to simply 

reaffirm the applicability of the FAA’s saving clause to 

arbitration agreements under section 432.6. See id. at *6 

(citing Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(f) (“Nothing in this section is 

intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is 

otherwise enforceable under the [FAA].”)) (other citations

omitted). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit observed, in dicta:

[A]n employee may attempt to void an 

arbitration agreement that he was compelled 

to enter as a condition of employment on the 

basis that it was not voluntary. If a court 

were to find that such a lack of 

voluntariness is a generally applicable 

contract defense that does not specifically 

target agreements to arbitrate, the 

arbitration agreement may be voided in 

accordance with saving clause jurisprudence.

Id. at *9. However, here the court has addressed Harper’s

“generally applicable contract defense[s]” and determined that 

they do not apply here. Chamber of Commerce thus has no impact 

on this decision.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant 

Charter’s motions to compel arbitration of plaintiffs Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

D. Motions to Dismiss or Stay Judicial Proceedings

In its motion to compel arbitration of Harper’s Labor 

Code and UCL claims, Charter requests that, should the court 

grant that motion, the court stay this case -- including Harper’s 

PAGA claim -- pending arbitration of the other claims. (See Mot. 

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to Compel Arb. re Harper at 23-24 (Docket No. 162).) Charter 

suggests that although it has not sought arbitration of the PAGA 

claim, staying proceedings as to the PAGA claim would avoid 

conflicting rulings between this court as to the PAGA claim and 

the arbitrator as to the other claims. (See id. at 24.) 

Plaintiffs oppose this request, pointing out that because this 

court will not be bound by any rulings the arbitrator might make, 

staying Harper’s PAGA claim would not in fact avoid conflicting 

rulings. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 38-39 (Docket No. 

172).) They further argue that proceedings as to the PAGA claim 

should not be stayed because of the distinct nature of a PAGA 

claim, which belongs to the state rather than to Harper. (See

id. at 39.)

Further, in its motion to compel arbitration of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims, Charter also requests that, should 

the court grant that motion, the court dismiss those plaintiffs 

from the case. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 20-21 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs oppose this 

request and instead request that the court stay proceedings as to 

these plaintiffs pending arbitration of their individual claims. 

(See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 35 (Docket No. 173).) In 

response to the court’s questioning at oral argument, counsel for 

plaintiffs indicated that they preferred a stay of plaintiff 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration of the other 

plaintiffs’ individual claims.

The FAA provides that, where a suit presents “issue[s] 

referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 

arbitration,” the court “shall on application of one of the 

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parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 

been had.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Further, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “[i]n some cases, it may be advisable to stay litigation 

among the nonarbitrating parties pending the outcome of the 

arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983).

Because plaintiffs have requested a stay of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims, the court will stay 

those claims pending arbitration. Additionally, because Charter 

has requested that the court otherwise stay this case pending 

arbitration of Harper’s individual claims, because plaintiffs’ 

counsel supported a stay of Sinclair’s individual claims at oral 

argument, and because the court agrees that a stay of Sinclair’s 

claims pending arbitration is “advisable,” the court will stay 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration as well. 

However, because a stay would impede vindication of 

California’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code through 

representative PAGA actions, discussed above, and because the 

PAGA claim represents a distinct “action” in this case, the court 

will not stay Harper’s PAGA claim. See Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto 

Grp., 53 Cal. App. 5th 539, 557 (1st Dist. 2020) (“Because a PAGA 

claim is representative and does not belong to an employee 

individually, an employer should not be able dictate how and 

where the representative action proceeds.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Charter’s Motions to 

Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 165) be, and the same hereby 

are, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to the claims presented 

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in Counts One through Nine of the Second Amended Complaint only,

this action is STAYED pending arbitration of plaintiff Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

Dated: October 12, 2021

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 202 Filed 10/13/21 Page 25 of 25 Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 325 Filed 08/24/23 Page 53 of 53