Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03312/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03312-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

RHONDA EZELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/

Cross-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 5135 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 18, 2017

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case returns to us with new controversies arising from Chicago’s response to Heller and 

McDonald,1 the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment deci-

 1 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of 

Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
2 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

sions. Last time we addressed an ordinance banning shooting ranges throughout the city. See Ezell v. City of Chicago

(“Ezell I”), 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). The range ban was 

part of a sweeping ordinance adopted in the wake of

McDonald, which invalidated Chicago’s law prohibiting

handgun possession. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 

742, 791 (2010). To replace the handgun ban, the City established a permit regime for lawful gun possession and required one hour of range training as prerequisite to a permit,

but prohibited firing ranges everywhere in the city. Ezell I,

651 F.3d at 689–90. We held that the range ban was incompatible with the Second Amendment and instructed the 

district court to preliminarily enjoin it. Id. at 710–11.

The City responded by replacing the range ban with an 

elaborate scheme of regulations governing shooting ranges.

Litigation resumed, prompting the City to rewrite or repeal 

parts of the new regime. The district judge invalidated some 

of the challenged regulations and upheld others. Ezell v. City 

of Chicago (“Ezell II”), 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 882–92 (N.D. Ill. 

2014). Three provisions currently remain in dispute: (1) a 

zoning restriction allowing gun ranges only as special uses 

in manufacturing districts; (2) a zoning restriction prohibiting gun ranges within 100 feet of another range or within 

500 feet of a residential district, school, place of worship, and

multiple other uses; and (3) a provision barring anyone

under age 18 from entering a shooting range. The judge

permanently enjoined the manufacturing-district restriction

but upheld the distancing and age restrictions. Both sides 

appealed.

We affirm in part and reverse in part. The two zoning 

regulations—the manufacturing-district classification and 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 3

the distancing rule—dramatically limit the ability to site a 

shooting range within city limits. Under the combined effect 

of these two regulations, only 2.2% of the city’s total acreage 

is even theoretically available, and the commercial viability 

of any of these parcels is questionable—so much so that no 

shooting range yet exists. This severely limits Chicagoans’ 

Second Amendment right to maintain proficiency in firearm 

use via target practice at a range. To justify these barriers, 

the City raised only speculative claims of harm to public 

health and safety. That’s not nearly enough to survive the 

heightened scrutiny that applies to burdens on Second 

Amendment rights.

The age restriction also flunks heightened scrutiny. We 

held in Ezell I that the Second Amendment protects the right 

to learn and practice firearm use in the controlled setting of a 

shooting range. The City insists that no person under age 18 

enjoys this right. That’s an extraordinarily broad claim, and 

the City failed to back it up. Nor did the City adequately 

justify barring anyone under 18 from entering a range. To 

the contrary, its own witness on this subject agreed that the 

age restriction is overbroad because teenagers can safely be 

taught to shoot and youth firearm instruction is both prudent and can be conducted in a safe manner.

I. Background

In Ezell I we held that Chicago’s ban on firing ranges

could not be reconciled with the Second Amendment and 

ordered the district court to preliminarily enjoin its enforcement. 651 F.3d at 710–11. We assume familiarity with that

opinion, though we’ll repeat the key holdings as necessary 

here.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
4 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

Chicago responded to our decision by promulgating a 

host of new regulations governing firing ranges, including 

zoning restrictions, licensing and operating rules, construction standards, and environmental requirements. (Firing 

ranges operated by law enforcement and private-security 

firms are exempt from the regulatory scheme; there are 

currently 11 of these located throughout the city.) The 

plaintiffs returned to court arguing that many of the new 

regulations violate the Second Amendment.2

In the face of this second round of litigation, the City

amended the regulatory scheme four times, Ezell II,

70 F. Supp. 3d at 876, repealing or revising some of the new 

rules. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ruling on the motions, the judge invalidated some regulations and upheld others, id. at 884–93, leaving 

both sides with something to appeal. And appeal they did, 

though many of the judge’s rulings are left unchallenged, 

helpfully narrowing the present scope of the dispute.

Three regulations remain contested. The first two are 

zoning provisions limiting where shooting ranges may 

locate. Section 17-5-0207 of the Chicago Municipal Code 

permits ranges only in manufacturing districts with a 

special-use permit. Section 17-9-0120 is a distancing restriction barring shooting ranges within 100 feet of another 

range or within 500 feet of any district that is zoned for 

 2 The individual plaintiffs are Rhonda Ezell, Joseph Brown, and William 

Hespen, Chicago residents who want access to a firing range within city 

limits. Action Target, another plaintiff, is a leading designer and builder 

of gun ranges. The remaining plaintiffs are the Second Amendment 

Foundation and the Illinois Rifle Association, two nonprofits that 

advocate for Second Amendment rights.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 5

residential use or planned residential use, or any preexisting 

school, day-care facility, place of worship, liquor retailer, 

children’s activities facility, library, museum, or hospital. 

The third contested regulation, section 4-151-100(d), prohibits anyone under age 18 from entering a shooting range.

The judge held that the zoning restrictions severely limit

where shooting ranges can be located and accordingly 

required the City to establish a close fit between the restrictions and the public interests they serve. Id. at 883. The 

City identified several harmful secondary effects that it 

claimed were associated with shooting ranges: gun theft, fire

hazards, and airborne lead contamination. Id. at 883–84. But 

it produced no evidentiary support for these claims beyond 

the speculative testimony of three city officials—Zoning 

Administrator Patricia Scudiero, Police Lieutenant Kevin 

Johnson, and Rosemary Krimbel, the Commissioner of 

Business Affairs and Consumer Protection. Id.

We’ll return to the specifics of their testimony later; for 

now it’s enough to say that the judge found it wholly inadequate to discharge the City’s burden to justify relegating 

shooting ranges to manufacturing districts. Id. Because the 

City failed to establish a connection between this zoning rule

and the public interests it is meant to serve, the judge invalidated the manufacturing-district restriction. Id. at 884.

But the judge rejected the challenge to the 500-foot distancing requirement. She found this restriction “significantly 

less burdensome” when considered “standing alone.” Id. She

likened it “to a ‘law forbidding the carrying of firearms in 

sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,’”

which Heller specifically did not call into question. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)).

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
6 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

Without further analysis, the judge upheld the 500-foot 

distancing restriction. She did not specifically address the

additional requirement of a 100-foot buffer zone between 

firing ranges.

Finally, the judge upheld the age restriction, concluding 

that “minors are not guaranteed Second Amendment 

rights.” Id. at 889. Cross-appeals followed.

II. Analysis

The City asks us to reinstate its zoning restriction limiting firing ranges to manufacturing districts. The plaintiffs

defend the judge’s decision to strike that rule; they argue as 

well that the distancing and age restrictions fail Second 

Amendment scrutiny. Our review is de novo, so we give 

these issues a fresh look. See Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v. 

Borggren, 799 F.3d 676, 688 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We review the 

district court’s ruling on the cross-motions for summary 

judgment de novo, construing all reasonable inferences from 

the record in favor of the party against whom the motion 

under consideration is made.”).

A. Ezell I

We take as settled what was established in Ezell I. There 

we held that resolving Second Amendment cases usually 

entails two inquiries. The threshold question is whether the 

regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second 

Amendment. Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 701–02. This is a textual and 

historical inquiry; if the government can establish that the 

challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of 

the right as originally understood, then “the regulated 

activity is categorically unprotected, and the law is not 

subject to further Second Amendment review.” Id. at 703.

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 7

“If the government cannot establish this—if the historical 

evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated 

activity is not categorically unprotected—then there must be 

a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s 

justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of 

Second Amendment rights.” Id. This requires an evaluation 

of “the regulatory means the government has chosen and the 

public-benefits end it seeks to achieve.” Id. The rigor of this 

means-end review depends on “how close the law comes to 

the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of 

the law’s burden on the right.” Id. Severe burdens on the 

core right of armed defense require a very strong publicinterest justification and a close means-end fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to the margins of 

the right, are more easily justified. Id. In all cases the government bears the burden of justifying its law under a 

heightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does 

not apply. Id. at 706.

Addressing the “scope” question in Ezell I, we rejected 

the City’s argument that range training is categorically 

unprotected by the Second Amendment. We held that the 

core individual right of armed defense—as recognized in 

Heller and incorporated against the states in McDonald—

includes a corresponding right to acquire and maintain 

proficiency in firearm use through target practice at a range.

651 F.3d at 704. We explained that the core right to possess

firearms for protection “wouldn’t mean much without the 

training and practice that make it effective.” Id. We noted 

that Heller itself supports this understanding. Id. at 704

(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 616, 619). Finally, we held that the 

City had failed to establish that target practice is wholly 

unprotected as a matter of history and legal tradition in the 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
8 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

founding era or when the Fourteenth Amendment was 

ratified. Id. at 704–06.

This holding and these observations control here. Range 

training is not categorically outside the Second Amendment.

To the contrary, it lies close to the core of the individual 

right of armed defense.

The City also failed to carry its burden in Ezell I at step 

two of the analytical framework. We held that banishing 

firing ranges from the city was a severe encroachment on the 

right of law-abiding, responsible Chicagoans to acquire and 

maintain proficiency in firearm use, “an important corollary

to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.” Id. at 708. Accordingly, we applied a 

strong form of intermediate scrutiny and required the City 

to demonstrate “a close fit between the range ban and the 

actual public interests it serves, and also that the public’s 

interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an 

encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights.” Id.

at 708–09. The City did not carry this burden, so we instructed the district court to enjoin the firing-range ban. Id. at 709–

11.

All this is established law. Resisting these settled propositions, the City now asks us to revisit and modify the analytical framework established in Ezell I. In its view only laws 

that substantially or “unduly” burden Second Amendment 

rights should get any form of heightened judicial scrutiny. 

This is an odd argument; we specifically addressed and 

rejected that approach in Ezell I. Id. at 703 n.12; id. at 706. Our

reasoning flowed from Heller itself: The Supreme Court 

explicitly rejected rational-basis review, making it clear that 

burdens on Second Amendment rights are always subject to 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 9

heightened scrutiny. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that 

was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms 

was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be 

redundant with the separate constitutional prohibition on 

irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). In McDonald the 

Court cautioned against treating the Second Amendment as 

a “second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of 

rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” 561 U.S. at 

780. The City’s proposed “substantial burden” test as a 

gateway to heightened scrutiny does exactly that.

We note for good measure that most other circuits have 

adopted the framework articulated in Ezell I and require 

some form of heightened scrutiny when evaluating the 

government’s justification for a law challenged on Second 

Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Jackson v. 

City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 

2014); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); 

Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 

2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 

2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 

2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 

2010). We see no reason to retreat from our settled approach 

and now repeat what we said in Ezell I: If the challenged law 

regulates activity protected by the Second Amendment, the 

government “bears the burden of justifying its action[s]

under some heightened standard of judicial review.” 651 F.3d 

at 706.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
10 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

B. New Regulations, New Challenges

1. Zoning restrictions

This new round of litigation is somewhat different, however; this time we’re reviewing a set of zoning restrictions, 

not an outright ban on shooting ranges throughout the city. 

Still, the record reflects that the zoning regulations at issue 

here severely limit where shooting ranges may locate. The 

combined effect of the manufacturing-district classification 

and the distancing restriction leaves only about 2.2% of the 

city’s total acreage even theoretically available to site a 

shooting range (10.6% of the total acreage currently zoned 

for business, commercial, and manufacturing use). It’s 

unclear how many of these parcels are commercially suitable 

for siting a shooting range catering to the general public.

The plaintiffs presented evidence—including the testimony of two experts—showing that in other jurisdictions 

shooting ranges are treated as commercial uses and are often 

attached to gun retailers, and that banishing them to a tiny

subset of the land zoned for manufacturing reduces their 

commercial viability based on traffic patterns, lack of arterial 

roads, and other impediments. Tellingly, years after Ezell I 

no publicly accessible shooting range yet exists in Chicago.

We therefore agree with the district judge that the challenged zoning regulations, though not on their face an 

outright prohibition of gun ranges, nonetheless severely 

restrict the right of Chicagoans to train in firearm use at a 

range.

We also agree with the judge’s decision to require the 

City to establish a close fit between the challenged zoning 

regulations and the actual public benefits they serve—and to 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 11

do so with actual evidence, not just assertions. 70 F. Supp. 3d 

at 883. The judge’s analysis went offtrack, however, when 

she examined the two zoning regulations separately and 

summarily upheld the 500-foot distancing requirement as a 

“sensitive place” restriction, essentially immune from challenge under Heller.

There are two problems with this approach. First, the 

manufacturing-district and distancing restrictions stand or 

fall together. The two zoning requirements work in tandem 

to limit where shooting ranges may locate. The impact of the 

distancing rule cannot be measured “standing alone,” as the 

district judge thought; to meaningfully evaluate the effect of 

the buffer-zone requirement, we need to know which zoning 

districts are open to firing ranges. The manufacturingdistrict classification now stands enjoined, and to that extent 

we agree with the judge’s decision, for reasons we’ll explain 

in a moment. That puts the ball squarely in the City’s court 

to decide which districts it will now open to firing ranges

and on what terms. A different combination of zoning 

rules—say, a more permissive zoning classification and a 

less restrictive buffer-zone rule—may well be justified, if 

carefully drafted to serve actual public interests while at the 

same time making commercial firing ranges practicable in 

the city. But the two zoning restrictions—the manufacturingdistrict classification and the distancing requirement—are a 

single regulatory package for purposes of Second Amendment scrutiny. We can’t evaluate the degree to which these 

zoning regulations, standing alone, encumber Second 

Amendment rights and are responsible for the absence of 

commercial shooting ranges in the city. They must be evaluated as a package.

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12 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

Second, the judge summarily upheld the distancing restrictions based on the enigmatic passage in Heller in which 

the Court cautioned that its opinion should not be read as 

casting doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the carrying 

of firearms ... in sensitive places” like schools and government buildings. 554 U.S. at 626–27. The judge apparently 

thought this language effectively immunized the buffer-zone 

rule from constitutional review. Ezell II, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 

884–85.

We’re not sure that’s the correct way to understand the 

Court’s “sensitive places” passage, but we don’t need to 

resolve the matter in order to decide this case. The distancing requirement is not a limitation on where firearms may be 

carried, so it doesn’t fall within the ambit of this language.

Moreover, any suggestion that firearms are categorically

incompatible with residential areas—recall that residential 

districts are included in the City’s buffer-zone rule—is flatly 

inconsistent with Heller, which was explicit that possession 

of firearms in the home for self-defense is the core Second 

Amendment right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36. So the manufacturing-district classification and the distancing requirement must be reviewed together. 

With that point explained, we return to the City’s proffered justification for regulating firing ranges in this way. 

The City claims that confining firing ranges to manufacturing districts and keeping them away from other ranges, 

residential districts, schools, places of worship, and myriad 

other uses serves important public health and safety interests. Specifically, the City cites three concerns: firing ranges 

attract gun thieves, cause airborne lead contamination, and

carry a risk of fire.

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 13

The City has provided no evidentiary support for these 

claims, nor has it established that limiting shooting ranges to 

manufacturing districts and distancing them from the multiple and various uses listed in the buffer-zone rule has any 

connection to reducing these risks. We certainly accept the 

general proposition that preventing crime, protecting the 

environment, and preventing fire are important public 

concerns. But the City continues to assume, as it did in 

Ezell I, that it can invoke these interests as a general matter

and call it a day. It simply asserts, without evidence, that

shooting ranges generate increased crime, cause airborne 

lead contamination in the adjacent neighborhood, and carry 

a greater risk of fire than other uses.

The City’s own witnesses testified to the lack of evidentiary support for these assertions. They repeatedly admitted

that they knew of no data or empirical evidence to support

any of these claims. Indeed, Patricia Scudiero, the City’s 

zoning administrator, conceded that neither she nor anyone 

else in her department made any effort to review how other 

cities zone firing ranges. She conducted no investigation, 

visited no firing ranges in other jurisdictions, consulted no 

expert, and essentially did no research at all.

To shore up its weak defense of the two zoning restrictions, the City submitted a list of 16 thefts from gun

stores and shooting ranges around the country since 2010. 

Only two of these incidents involved thefts from shooting 

ranges, and no evidence suggests that these thefts caused a 

spike in crime in the surrounding neighborhood.

The City’s assertions about environmental and fire risks

are likewise unsupported by actual evidence. In its briefs the 

City relies on a study by the National Institute for OccupaCase: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
14 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

tional Safety and Health explaining that improperly ventilated shooting ranges can release lead-contaminated air into 

the surrounding environment. But the report goes on to 

describe appropriate filtering techniques that prevent this 

danger entirely. As for the concern about fire, the City 

provided no evidence to suggest that a properly constructed 

and responsibly operated commercial shooting range presents a greater risk of spontaneous combustion than other 

commercial uses.

Moreover, and importantly, Chicago has promulgated a 

host of regulations to guard against environmental and fire 

hazards and otherwise ensure that shooting ranges will be 

properly constructed, maintained, and operated. These 

regulations were for the most part upheld, Ezell II, 70 F. 

Supp. 3d at 884–93, and the judge’s rulings are unchallenged 

on appeal.

And if more were needed, the City concedes (as it must) 

that law-enforcement and private-security ranges operate in 

commercial districts throughout Chicago near schools, 

churches, parks, and stores; the City acknowledges that they

operate quite safely in these locations. Common sense 

suggests that law-enforcement ranges probably do not 

attract many thieves, but the City’s theft-protection rationale 

for these zoning rules is so woefully unsupported that the 

distinction between law-enforcement and commercial ranges 

doesn’t carry much weight. The City doesn’t even try to 

argue that commercial ranges create greater fire or environmental risks than law-enforcement ranges.

We explained in Ezell I that the City cannot defend its 

regulatory scheme “with shoddy data or reasoning. The 

municipality’s evidence must fairly support the municipaliCase: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 15

ty’s rationale for its ordinance.” 651 F.3d at 709 (quoting City 

of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)). 

To borrow from the free-speech context, “there must be

evidence” to support the City’s rationale for the challenged 

regulations; “lawyers’ talk is insufficient.” Annex Books, Inc. 

v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, 

as in Ezell I, the City’s defense of the challenged zoning rules

rests on sheer “speculation about accidents and theft.”

651 F.3d at 709. That’s not nearly enough to satisfy its burden. The manufacturing-district and distancing restrictions

are unconstitutional.

2. Age restriction

The City’s primary defense of the age-18 limitation is to 

argue that minors have no Second Amendment rights at all.

To support this sweeping claim, the City points to some

nineteenth-century state laws prohibiting firearm possession 

by minors and prohibiting firearm sales to minors. Laws of 

this nature might properly inform the question whether 

minors have a general right, protected by the Second 

Amendment, to purchase or possess firearms. But they have 

little relevance to the issue at hand.

The plaintiffs do not question the permissibility of regulating the purchase and possession of firearms by minors. 

They challenge only the extraordinary breadth of the City’s 

age restriction. Banning anyone under age 18 from entering a 

firing range prevents older adolescents and teens from 

accessing adult-supervised firearm instruction in the controlled setting of a range. There’s zero historical evidence 

that firearm training for this age group is categorically 

unprotected. At least the City hasn’t identified any, and 

we’ve found none ourselves.

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16 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

To the contrary, Heller itself points in precisely the opposite direction. 554 U.S. at 617–18 (“[T]o bear arms implies 

something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle and use them ... ; it implies the right to meet 

for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the 

laws of public order.” (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, 

A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 271 (1868))); 

see also id. at 619 (“No doubt, a citizen who keeps a gun or 

pistol under judicious precautions, practices in safe places 

the use of it, and in due time teaches his sons to do the same, 

exercises his individual right.” (quoting BENJAMIN VAUGHAN 

ABBOTT, JUDGE AND JURY: A POPULAR EXPLANATION OF THE 

LEADING TOPICS IN THE LAW OF THE LAND 333 (1880))).

For the same reason, the City’s reliance on contemporary 

caselaw is entirely misplaced. The few cases it identifies all 

address laws prohibiting minors from possessing, purchasing, or carrying firearms. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. 

v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a state 

law banning 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying handguns in 

public); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012)

(upholding a federal law prohibiting 18- to 21-year olds from 

purchasing a handgun); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 

(1st Cir. 2009) (upholding a federal law prohibiting juvenile 

handgun possession); People v. Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (Ill. 

2015) (upholding a state law banning 18- to 20-year-olds 

from carrying handguns outside the home); People v. Aguilar,

2 N.E.3d 321, 329 (Ill. 2013) (upholding a state law prohibiting those under age 18 from possessing concealable firearms); State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2010) (upholding a 

state law prohibiting those under age 18 from possessing 

firearms).

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 17

Nor can the City find help from our decision in Horsley v. 

Trame, 808 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 2015). Horsley was not, strictly 

speaking, a claim about the Second Amendment rights of 

minors; the case addressed an Illinois law that requires 18- to 

21-year-olds to provide written parental consent to obtain a 

so-called “FOID card,” a prerequisite to lawful ownership of 

a firearm. Horsley discussed but expressly did not decide 

whether minors are categorically excluded from the Second 

Amendment right. Id. at 1131 (“We need not decide today 

whether 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds are within the scope of the 

Second Amendment.”). The panel opted instead to apply 

heightened scrutiny to the Illinois law at step two of the 

Ezell I framework and under that standard upheld the 

parental-consent requirement. Id. at 1132–34. Horsley, like the 

other cases cited by the City, does not speak to the issue 

before us here.

In short, no case has yet addressed a claim comparable to 

this one: A challenge to an age restriction that extinguishes 

even the right of older adolescents and teens to receive 

adult-supervised firearm instruction in the controlled setting 

of a firing range. Because the City has not met its burden to 

establish that no person under the age of 18 enjoys this right, 

we proceed to Ezell I’s second step.

The City staked most of its case on the categorical argument and made little effort to justify prohibiting older 

adolescents and teens from engaging in supervised target 

practice at a range. Its rationale rests largely on an argument 

from “common sense” about public safety and the safety of 

children. Yet even common sense does not lie with the City.

In what must have come as a surprise to the City, Commissioner Krimbel, the City’s own witness on this subject, 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
18 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322

actually agreed with the plaintiffs’ attorney that banning 

anyone under 18 from entering a shooting range goes too far 

and extends beyond legitimate safety concerns. Here’s a 

taste: “I will give you this: I believe [the age restriction] is 

inartfully drafted because it seem[s] clear to me that the 

purpose of it is to not have kids running around unsupervised.” And this: “[Y]ou might want to draft that a little bit 

differently” because shooting ranges are a “good place” to 

teach a youngster “how to fire a rifle.” And this: “In fact, my 

own son took a shooting class when he was 12, so I’m well 

aware of the fact it’s okay to teach a young person how to 

shoot a gun properly.” Commissioner Krimbel also conceded that the City lacked any data or empirical evidence to 

justify its blanket no-one-under-18 rule.

The City is left to rely on generalized assertions about the 

developmental immaturity of children, the risk of lead 

poisoning by inhalation or ingestion, and a handful of tort 

cases involving the negligent supervision of children who 

were left to their own devices with loaded firearms. No one 

can disagree—and we certainly do not—that firearms in the 

hands of young children or unsupervised youth are fraught 

with serious risks to safety. Nor do we question the aim of 

protecting children against lead poisoning. We accept as 

well that the presence of young children at a firing range can 

be a risky distraction during target practice, even for a 

skilled marksman.

But the City has specific regulations aimed at containing 

the environmental risks, as we’ve already noted. And the

remaining public-safety interests can be addressed by a 

more closely tailored age restriction—one that does not 

completely extinguish the right of older adolescents and teens 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 19

in Chicago to learn how to shoot in an appropriately supervised setting at a firing range. As presently written, however, the City has failed to adequately justify its broad age 

restriction.3

III. Conclusion

As we said in Ezell I, Chicago has room to regulate the 

construction and operation of firing ranges to address 

genuine risks to public health and safety. 651 F.3d at 711. 

This includes setting rules about where firing ranges may 

locate and the terms on which minors may enter. But the 

City has not justified the three contested regulations. Accordingly, the judge was right to enjoin the manufacturingdistrict restriction, and to that extent the judgment is affirmed. The distancing and age restrictions are likewise

invalid; to that extent the judgment is reversed and the case 

is remanded with instructions to modify the injunction 

consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED 

IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

 3 The plaintiffs also mounted a First Amendment challenge to the age 

restriction. We do not address this alternative argument. 

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
20 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring

in part.  

It is no secret that the City of Chicago would prefer to re‐

duce the number of guns in Chicago. The City faces enor‐

mous public and political pressure to reduce its gun violence

problem (4,638 shootings in 2016)1, while at the same time

upholding the Second Amendment rights of its citizens as

set forth in the case law emerging from District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 579 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010). Correctly or not, the City reasoned that

reducing the number of guns travelling to and from firing

ranges, reducing the concentration of guns in one area, and

reducing the amount of gunfire in general could help reduce

crime and shootings in Chicago. In my concurrence in the

first appearance of this case before this court, I expressed

sympathy for the City’s difficult path between this Scylla

and Charybdis, but noted that the City had to “come to

terms with th[e] reality” imposed by Heller and McDonald.

And indeed it has. Whether it has come far enough is the

subject of today’s majority and my separate opinion.

The majority opinion reaches conclusions on three mat‐

ters, the constitutionality of limiting firing ranges to manu‐

facturing districts (the zoning regulation), the constitutional‐

ity of requiring firing ranges to be located more than a cer‐

tain distance from other specific uses (the distancing regula‐

tion), and the constitutionality of a ban on minors at firing

ranges. The majority finds all three to be unconstitutional.

Although I agree that the City failed to present sufficient ev‐

                                                 

1

   Chicago Tribune, Chicago shooting victims, http://crime.chica gotrib‐

une.com/chicago/shootings/, Last updated Jan. 11, 2017.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 21

idence to support its manufacturing district requirement, I

do not agree that the distancing requirement fails as well. I

also write separately to note that although a total ban on mi‐

nors at firing ranges does not withstand a constitutional

challenge on this record, the City has a strong interest, and

therefore wide latitude, to enact regulations that will protect

children from, as the majority states, “serious risks to safety”

from the inherent dangers of firearms.

As the majority describes, the test that this circuit has

elucidated for Second Amendment cases is a means‐ends

test in which a court must evaluate the regulatory means the

government has chosen to regulate firearms and the public‐

benefit end the regulation seeks to achieve. Ezell v. City of

Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (2011) (“Ezell I”). It is a sliding

scale test—the greater the burden, the greater the justifica‐

tion needed. Or, as the majority panel described more com‐

pletely in Ezell I,  

a severe burden on the core Second Amend‐

ment right of armed self‐defense will require

an extremely strong public‐interest justification

and a close fit between the government’s

means and its end. Second, laws restricting ac‐

tivity lying closer to the margins of the Second

Amendment right, laws that merely regulate

rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the

right may be more easily justified. How much

more easily depends on the relative severity of

the burden and its proximity to the core of the

right.

Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 708.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
22 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

In Ezell I, the majority described the right at issue here—

the right to participate in range training—as “an important

corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right to pos‐

sess firearms for self‐defense.” Id. In my concurrence in Ezell

I, I described it as “an area ancillary to a core right.” Id. at

713 (Rovner, J., concurring). For the moment we can ignore

whether there is a difference in these two descriptions and

assume that the right is an important one; although not part

and parcel of the core right, close to but subordinate to it.

How far subordinate is yet unknown. It carried much import

in Ezell I, in part, because the City required all gun owners to

obtain training that included one hour of live‐range instruc‐

tion, and then banned all live ranges within the City limits.

In Ezell I, the majority held that the outright ban on firing

ranges in the City imposed a severe encroachment and re‐

quired an exacting test. Id. at 708–09. In other words, in Ezell

I, range training unlocked access to the core right. I con‐

ceived of the requirement as a ban on only one type of train‐

ing and therefore did not believe that the regulation required

as rigorous a showing as the majority required. Id. at 713.

The majority construction prevailed, of course. In the case

before us now, however, the majority and I agree, that “[t]his

new round of litigation is somewhat different; ... this time

we’re reviewing a set of zoning restrictions, not an outright

ban on shooting ranges throughout the city.” Ante at 10. In

other words, we are reviewing the City’s regulation of

where, when, and how firing ranges may operate.2 As the

                                                 

2  I could refer to it as a “time, place, and manner” regulation but that

term is heavily loaded with attachments to a particular level of scrutiny

under First Amendment jurisprudence—a quagmire better to avoid in

this case. See, e.g., U.S. v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010).  

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 23

district court noted, “[b]ecause some of the provisions entail

a greater burden on Second Amendment rights than others,

[a] Court [should] not apply a uniform level of scrutiny

across the board.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871,

882 (N.D. Ill. 2014). I agree.  

The majority opinion combines the zoning and distanc‐

ing regulations together and states, without any rationale,

that the manufacturing and distancing restrictions stand or

fall together.3 In this case they both fall—in my colleagues’

view. I disagree. These are two separate regulations with

two separate government rationales and two separate effects

on the public interest of Chicago citizens. The zoning regula‐

tion makes a categorical assessment of where a particular

land use belongs based on the character of the area and

broad similarities and distinctions with other uses. The dis‐

tancing regulation makes a much more focused determina‐

tion of how close a particular use (which may have unique

impacts) may be to other uses that have vulnerabilities for

one reason or another. Under the sliding‐scale standard,

they must be evaluated separately. This is all the more true

when we take into account the fact that it is our obligation to

evaluate legislation, when possible, in a manner which

avoids substantial constitutional questions. United States v.

X‐Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994). There is no ba‐

                                                 

3  I adopt the vernacular of the majority and refer to M.C.C. § 17‐5‐0207,

which relegates all firing ranges to manufacturing districts in the City, as

the “zoning regulation” and M.C.C. § 17‐9‐0120, which requires firing

ranges to be built more than 500 feet from hospitals, places of worship

and places where children routinely gather; and 100 feet from other fir‐

ing ranges, as the “distancing regulation.”

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
24 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

sis, therefore, for the two regulations to survive or falter as

one.

To see why, I will briefly explore why the City failed in

its proof on the means‐end test vis‐à‐vis the zoning regula‐

tion. Then I will demonstrate the substantial differences be‐

tween the means (the government regulation and its pur‐

pose) and the end (the public interest benefit it seeks to pro‐

tect) in the zoning regulation versus the distancing regula‐

tion.

I turn first to the zoning regulation and its purpose.

Manufacturing districts within the City of Chicago are “in‐

tended to accommodate manufacturing, warehousing,

wholesale and industrial uses outside the Central Area. The

district regulations are intended to: (A) promote the econom‐

ic viability of manufacturing and industrial uses; (B) encour‐

age employment growth; and (C) limit the encroachment of

unplanned residential and other non‐industrial development

within industrial corridors.” M.C.C. §17‐5‐0101. Residential

districts, on the other hand, are “intended to create, maintain

and promote a variety of housing opportunities for individ‐

ual households and to maintain the desired physical charac‐

ter of the city’s existing neighborhoods.” Id. at 17‐2‐0101.

Business and Commercial districts are “intended to accom‐

modate retail, service and commercial uses and to ensure

that business and commercial‐zoned areas are compatible

with the character of existing neighborhoods.” Id. at § 17‐3‐

0101. They are divided into further categories depending on

the character and use of the surrounding area. Id. at 17‐3‐

0100.

The City’s representative testified before the district court

that its purposes for the zoning regulations were as follows:

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 25

the City imposes zoning restrictions because

the transportation and use of guns and ammu‐

nition could have an impact on the health, safe‐

ty, and welfare of individuals surrounding a

gun range. (Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 16). As a result, the

City considers firing ranges to be “high im‐

pact,” and restricting range locales to manufac‐

turing districts offers “a distance away from

the residential communities in most areas of

the city.”  

Ezell, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 877. The parties agreed that firing

ranges are compatible with industrial use, but the plaintiffs

argued that the ranges were compatible with commercial use

as well. Id.  

Before the district court, the City further explained that it

had restricted firing ranges to manufacturing districts, as

opposed to allowing them in some commercial use zoning

districts, to avoid two secondary effects associated with the

health, safety, and general welfare of Chicago residents—

thefts targeting firearms and lead contamination. Id. at 883.

The district court concluded that the City had not sufficient‐

ly substantiated a connection between these interests and the

ordinance. Id. The City did not present data or other empiri‐

cal evidence that the presence of a firing range would in‐

crease crime or that the problem would be diminished by

limiting firing ranges to manufacturing districts. The City

did provide a list of sixteen thefts (involving the theft of 482

firearms) from gun stores and firing ranges around the coun‐

try since 2010, but did not provide any rationale for why lo‐

cating the ranges only in manufacturing zones would reduce

theft or other criminal activity. No one from the City re‐

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
26 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

searched zoning ordinances on firing ranges in other cities.

Id. at 884.

Likewise, the City did not supply robust, reliable evi‐

dence to support its claim that lead contamination from the

firing range with sufficient ventilation systems, as the ordi‐

nance requires, would cause environmental effects that

make the ranges suitable only for manufacturing districts.

The City did supply a report from the National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health entitled ”Preventing Occu‐

pational Exposures to Lead and Noise at Indoor Firing

Range.”4 That document informs workers, including federal

law enforcement officers, that they might be exposed to haz‐

ardous lead concentrations at firing ranges, but did not help

the court evaluate what the environmental impact of lead

would be in a range with the ventilation requirements im‐

posed by the City in this ordinance.5 Of course, it is beyond

                                                 

4  The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC, Dept.

of Health and Human Serv’s., “Preventing Occupational Exposures to

Lead and Noise at Indoor Firing Range.” (2009).

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ docs/2009‐136/pdfs/2009‐136.pdf. Last visit‐

ed January 16, 2017. R. 227‐3, Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Material

Facts, Ex. 24 PageID 3731–3762.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is part of the

United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the De‐

partment of Health and Human Services. https://www.cdc.gov/

niosh/about/default.html. Last visited January 16, 2017.

5 There is no doubt that lead exposure is a known and continuing issue

for firing ranges. See Beaucham, Catherine, “Indoor Firing Ranges and

Elevated Blood Lead Levels—United States, 2002–2013,” Center for Dis‐

ease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 25, 2014 /

63(16); 347–351.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 27

question that the City must ardently regulate any possible

lead contamination of its citizens; the story of Flint, Michi‐

gan, among others, teaches us that. And the Municipal Code

of Chicago is chock full of regulations pertaining to lead. See,

e.g., M.C.C. § 7‐4‐010 through 7‐4‐160. But as the majority

notes, when laws stand to encroach upon Second Amend‐

ment rights, a rational basis for the law is no longer suffi‐

cient support for the law. The City needed more evidence

that its regulations would not be sufficient to prevent lead

contamination and came up short.  

The district court concluded that the City’s generalized

propositions that firing ranges pose a danger—in terms of

both crime and environmental impact—did not justify re‐

stricting them to manufacturing districts only, as opposed to

other industrial zones. And, like the majority opinion, on

this record, I must agree.  

The distancing requirement, as I noted above, however,

is different. The zoning and distancing regulations together

reduced the land available in the City to about 10.6% of

available parcels. The distancing rule alone has a much less‐

er effect. We do not know the precise number because the

City’s expert created its map of available parcels using the

combined criteria from both regulations. See Def.’s Rule 56.1

Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 19, R. 227‐1, PageID 3567,

and attached as an exhibit to this opinion. Nevertheless,

from the map it is clear that an expansion into business dis‐

tricts would increase the availability of sites for firing ranges

appreciably. See Id. The distancing requirement therefore

imposes a significantly lighter burden on the placement of

firing ranges. And as Ezell I’s sliding scale dictates, a lighter

burden requires a lesser justification. Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 708.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
28 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

Although the zoning regulation is a blanket prohibition

against firing ranges in all but the manufacturing areas of

the City, the distancing regulation is a precise and targeted

approach to protecting particular populations and activities

that the City routinely singles out for protections—places

where children and the sick are gathered, for example. It is

the difference between a carpet bomb and a surgical strike.

And the factors that enter into an evaluation of the public

benefit of prohibiting firing ranges from business and com‐

mercial districts are not the same as the factors that enter in‐

to an evaluation of the benefit of keeping shooting ranges

away from schools, day care facilities, hospitals and the like.

Not only do the regulations not stand or fall together, but

the evaluation of the two is dissimilar on both sides of the

means‐end analysis.  

Moreover, the distancing requirements focus on protec‐

tions for a category of “sensitive places” that the Supreme

Court tells us have been subject to longstanding historical

protections from firearm dangers. As the Court stated in Hel‐

ler,

The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast

doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons and the men‐

tally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of

firearms in sensitive places such as schools

and government buildings, or laws imposing

conditions and qualifications on the commer‐

cial sale of arms.  

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (emphasis supplied). This language

could be construed as removing from Second Amendment

protection prohibitions on the possession of firearms by fel‐

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 29

ons and the mentally ill, in sensitive places and the like just

as we have noted that “[t]he Court has long recognized that

certain ‘well‐defined and narrowly limited classes of

speech’—e.g., obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement—are

categorically ‘outside the reach’ of the First Amendment.”

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702. I leave that for another day. For now, it

is enough to note that if the Supreme Court has declared that

the need to protect sensitive places is an important enough

need to allow for an outright prohibition on the carrying of

firearms within them, then it is certainly a sufficiently strong

public interest to justify regulations distancing similar places

from firing ranges. The burden here is not severe (without

the zoning regulation, many more parcels are available), the

public interest is great, and the rules do not implicate the

heart of a core right, but rather, at the very most, “an im‐

portant corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right

to possess firearms for self‐defense.” Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 708.

The majority asserts that firearms could not possibly be

incompatible with residential uses because the main premise

of the Heller decision, from which the “sensitive places” lan‐

guage comes, was to allow law abiding citizens to keep fire‐

arms in their residences for self‐defense. Ante at 12. But own‐

ing, keeping or even carrying a firearm for self‐defense pos‐

es a substantially different risk than does creating a public

accommodation where large numbers of people will gather

with firearms loaded with lead‐contaminated, explosive‐

filled ammunition and fire them. Firing a gun poses signifi‐

cantly greater risks than the mere keeping or carrying of a

gun, in terms of potential accidents, attractiveness to crimi‐

nals, and environmental lead exposure. From a practical

standpoint, Illinois state law all but rules out the possibility

of legally firing a gun in a residential area of the City of Chi‐

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
30 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

cago. 720 ILCS §§ 5/24‐1.2, 5/24‐1.2‐5, 5/24‐1.5. And so the

risks associated with legal firearm discharge will arise al‐

most always at firing ranges. Moreover, firing ranges can

become attractive nuisances, beckoning to thieves looking

for large caches of firearms, or places where people will be

coming and going while carrying weapons. In short, the

City’s interests in preventing gun theft and other crime, and

reducing lead contamination cast a heavy weight on the

public interest side of the scale.

As I noted above, the lower burden and the significant

public interest decrease the City’s burden to justify the regu‐

lation. The majority borrows from the free‐speech context

and asserts that “there must be evidence” to support the

City’s rationale for the challenged regulations. Ante at 15,

citing Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460,

463 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). In the First

Amendment context, however, the Supreme Court has re‐

jected the idea that the government must always prove

“with empirical data, that its ordinance will successfully

lower crime.” City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 

U.S. 425, 439, (2002). As the City points out, studies showing

the effect of crime in the surrounding community are partic‐

ularly helpful to the courts in First Amendment cases be‐

cause it is not readily apparent that the sale of adult books

and media have the ability to endanger the surrounding

community. Guns, on the other hand, are inherently danger‐

ous. See Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 404

(1990) (“Guns are inherently dangerous instrumentalities,

and the mere occurrence of other explosions does not, with‐

out more, establish outrageous misconduct or some other

basis sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive dam‐

ages.”). The amount and type of evidence needed to demon‐

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 31

strate a danger, therefore, must be less. The City’s evidence

was sufficient to justify its rationale for the distancing regu‐

lations.

It is not at all uncommon within the Chicago municipal

code to create a buffer zone between businesses that have a

high impact on their surroundings and facilities that might

serve children or other vulnerable populations such as hos‐

pitals, day care facilities, schools, and churches. See e.g.,

M.C.C. § 4‐224‐011 (“No machine shops shall be conducted

or operated on any lot or plot of ground of which any por‐

tion shall be within 200 feet of any lot occupied by a public

or parochial school, hospital or church.”); M.C.C. § 4‐232‐120

(“No person shall construct, conduct or operate any motor

vehicle salesroom within 200 feet of any building used as a

hospital, church, or public or parochial school, or the

grounds thereof.”); M.C.C. § 15‐28‐900 (“It shall be unlawful

for any person to store or manufacture nitrocellulose prod‐

ucts in any building which is situated within 100 feet of any

building occupied as a school building, hospital, institution‐

al [sic], or any other place of public assembly”); M.C.C. § 17‐

9‐0119 (“No retail food establishment that sells live poultry

or other live fowl at retail, or that slaughters or causes to

be slaughtered for sale live poultry or other fowl at retail,

shall be located within 200 feet from any place or structure:

... (2) is used for residential purposes; or (3) is used as a

place of religious assembly, primary or secondary school,

library, hospital, public park or public playground”); M.C.C.

§ 10‐36‐400 (b)(10) (“no person shall operate any small un‐

manned aircraft in city airspace: ... (10) over any open air

assembly unit, school, school yard, hospital, place of wor‐

ship, prison or police station, without the property owner’s

consent, and subject to any restrictions that the property

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
32 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

owner may place on such operation”). Of course none of

these restrictions impose on Second Amendment rights, and

therefore they require no more than a rational basis, but the

vast number of these laws (I have singled out only a very

few) support the City’s argument that its purpose in passing

the legislation was to protect these sensitive areas, as it does

in so many other contexts.  

In short, the distancing regulations do not rise or fall

along with the zoning regulations. And when separated

from them, given the lighter burden imposed by the distanc‐

ing regulations, the strong public interest in protecting resi‐

dential areas and sensitive areas from the risks associated

with firing ranges, these regulations pass constitutional mus‐

ter.  

As for the ban on minors at firing ranges, I do not disa‐

gree with the majority that the City has failed to come forth

with evidence to support the exclusion of all minors from

firing ranges in all circumstances. To the extent that McDon‐

ald and its progeny allow for firearm ownership within the

City of Chicago, the practical argument that parents who

have guns within the City limits might also wish to teach

gun safety to their children is not without merit. (Although,

as I noted in my concurrence in Ezell I, “[t]here is no ban on

training with a simulator and several realistic simulators are

commercially available, complete with guns that mimic the

recoil of firearms discharging live ammunition. It is possible

that, with simulated training, technology will obviate the

need for live‐range training.” Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 712 (internal

citations omitted)). And the legal argument that the outright

ban is unconstitutional has merit as well.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 33

I write separately on this point to note the limited rights

of minors under the Second Amendment. Importing the

concepts from First Amendment jurisprudence into this Sec‐

ond Amendment context, as courts have come to do (see Id.

at 706–07), it is worth noting that the First Amendment

rights of minors are limited—in some contexts far more than

others. Although minors do not “‘shed their constitutional

rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse

gate’ ... the First Amendment rights of students in the public

schools are ‘not automatically coextensive with the rights of

adults in other settings.’” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,

484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra‐

ser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). And First Amendment rights are

particularly limited when the interest balanced on the other

side is the health and safety of minors. See Morse v. Frederick,

551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (upholding school’s discipline of

student who displayed pro‐drug banner noting that deter‐

ring drug use by schoolchildren is an “important—indeed,

perhaps compelling interest” given the potential severe and

permanent damage to the health and well‐being of young

people); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 

(1975) (“[i]t is well settled that a State or municipality can

adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials

available to youths than on those available to adults.”); Gins‐

berg v. State of N. Y., 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (government can

prohibit sale to minors of sexually explicit material that

would be available to adults).  

Outside of the First Amendment context, it goes without

saying that the government may restrict the rights of minors

for purposes of protecting their health and welfare. A state’s

interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety

of protective measures. Every jurisdiction in the country pro‐

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
34 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

tects the health, safety, and welfare of minors by prohibiting

them from purchasing alcohol and cigarettes, by restricting

at what age they may drive and with what limitations, when

they may enlist in the military and work, when they may

marry, when they may gamble, how long they must attend

school, and when they can enter into binding contracts.

Some of these regulations, like those surrounding marriage

and pregnancy, burden fundamental rights and yet have

been upheld regardless of the increased scrutiny given to

such laws. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).

In addition to the general protections noted above, states

and municipalities impose laws and regulations that protect

the health and safety of children in myriad specific ways,

many of which interfere fairly significantly with the funda‐

mental right of parents to make decisions concerning the

care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Gran‐

ville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“we have recognized the funda‐

mental right of parents to make decisions concerning the

care, custody, and control of their children.”); see also Prince

v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to guard

the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens

patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school

attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and

in many other ways.”).  

For example, Illinois law requires adults to secure chil‐

dren under the age of eight in an approved child safety re‐

straint while riding in vehicles. 625 ILCS § 25/4. It prohibits

children under the age of fourteen from being left without

supervision for “an unreasonable period of time without re‐

gard for the mental or physical health, safety, or welfare of

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 35

that minor.” 705 ILCS § 405/2‐3. The Illinois Administrative

Code even prohibits a day care facility from placing a baby

to sleep in any position other than on her back, regardless of

the parent’s request. Ill. Admin. Code § 407.350(i)(1)‐(3).  

Sometimes the encroachments can be severe even when

the risk is low. Parents have been charged with neglect for

allowing their children to walk to a park,6 or walk to school,7

or play unsupervised in a back yard.8 This is true despite the

fact that the rate of occurrence of the main concern, stranger

abduction, is quite low (approximately 60–100 per year) and

continually declining.9  

In short, statutes, regulations, law enforcement and social

services resources are employed to protect children from

harm even where the risk of harm is slight or negligible. And

as the majority states, “No one can disagree—and we cer‐

tainly do not—that firearms in the hands of young children

or unsupervised youth are fraught with serious risks to safe‐

ty.” Ante at 18. I would add that firearms even in the hands

                                                 

6 http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/free‐range‐parents‐found‐responsible‐

child‐neglect‐allowing/story?id=29363859. Last visited January 16, 2017.

7 http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2016/apr/01/ mother‐

charged‐neglect‐making‐children‐walk‐s/358210/. Last visited January

16, 2017.

8 http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/06/14/florida‐parents‐charged‐felony‐

neglect‐after‐11‐year‐old‐son‐plays‐backyard‐90‐minutes. Last visited

January 16, 2017.

9  David Finkelhor, Heather Hammer, and Andrea J. Sedlak, “Nonfamily

Abducted Children: National Estimates and Characteristics, ”United

States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juve‐

nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, October 2002.  

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
36 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

of older children, even while they are supervised by trained

instructors, can have deadly consequences. In one highly

publicized incident on an Arizona shooting range, a nine‐

year‐old girl accidentally killed her instructor, Charles Vacca,

when the Uzi she was firing became too difficult for her to

control, jumping out of her hand and firing a bullet into the

brain of her instructor.10 But other recent shootings by and of

children on ranges have slipped by without as much atten‐

tion. In many cases the accidents did not involve high pow‐

ered weapons or even a child as the shooter. In some inci‐

dents, the child at the range was killed by an adult.11

                                                 

10 http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/26/us/arizona‐girl‐fatal‐shooting‐

accident/

11   The following are incidents of shootings at firing ranges since 2012

found through a review of news stories and may not be a complete list:

October 2016, North Dakota, 14‐year‐old girl killed at shooting range

http://www.kbzk.com/story/33418822/north‐dakota‐teen‐killed‐in‐

accidental‐shooting‐at‐gun‐range. Last visited January 16, 2017.

August 2016, Iowa, 10‐year‐old shot at shooting range

http://nbc4i.com/2016/08/19/boy‐10‐dies‐after‐being‐shot‐at‐shooting‐

range/. Last visited January 16, 2017.

July 2016, Florida, Father kills 14‐year‐old son at shooting range

http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/04/us/florida‐father‐shoots‐son/   

March, 2016, Florida, 21‐year‐old at shooting range misfires and hits four

children ages 8, 10, 14 and 15 http://wfla.com/2016/03/12/four‐children‐

two‐adults‐injured‐in‐gun‐range‐accident‐in‐ocala/. Last visited January

16, 2017.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322 37

                                                                                                             

February 2016, Idaho, 12‐year shot at shooting range (non‐fatal)

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/02/25/girl‐12‐accidentally‐shot‐at‐

idaho‐gun‐range.html. Last visited January 16, 2017.

December 2015, Indiana, 12‐year‐old shot (non‐fatal) at shooting range

http://cbs4indy.com/2015/12/26/shooting‐range‐accident‐injures‐12‐year‐

old/. Last visited January 16, 2017.

December 2015, Arizona, 13‐year‐old girl shot by adult at shooting range

http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/pinal/2015/12/01/gun‐range‐

accident‐serves‐safety‐reminder/76610904/. Last visited January 16, 2017.

December 2014, Ohio, 14‐year‐old shot by adult at shooting range

http://www.wlwt.com/article/teen‐wounded‐in‐accidental‐shooting‐at‐

gun‐range/3550107. Last visited January 16, 2017.

December 2014, California, 12‐year‐old shoots man in leg at shooting

range (non‐fatal) http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/man‐injured‐

shooting‐range‐accident. Last visited January 16, 2017.

August 2014, Arizona, 9‐year‐old kills instructor with Uzi at firing range  

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post‐nation/wp/2016/08/26/two‐

years‐after‐9‐year‐olds‐fatal‐uzi‐shooting‐instructors‐family‐files‐

wrongful‐death‐suit/?utm_term=.7072f20994eb. Last visited January 16,

2017.

January 2014, Florida, 14‐year‐old shoots herself in leg at shooting range

(non‐fatal) http://www.wesh.com/article/girl‐14‐accidentally‐shot‐at‐

gun‐range‐in‐merritt‐island/4430493. Last visited January 16, 2017.

November, 2012, Tennessee, 13‐year‐old shot by adult at firing range

http://www.wsmv.com/story/20177364/13‐year‐old‐shot‐at‐gun‐range‐

cheatham‐county. Last visited January 16, 2017.

October, 30, 2012, Iowa, 8‐year‐old shot by 5‐year‐old sister at shooting

range http://www.kwwl.com/story/19956702/accidental‐shooting‐of‐8‐

year‐old‐brings‐safety‐reminder. Last visited January 16, 2017.

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
38 Nos. 14‐3312 & 14‐3322

In sum, while I concur that the outright ban on all chil‐

dren under the age of eighteen entering a firing range is im‐

permissible, I suspect that, given our long history of protect‐

ing minors, even where fundamental rights are in play,

stringent regulations for minors in firing ranges will with‐

stand much scrutiny when supported by appropriate evi‐

dence.  

For the reasons above, I dissent from the conclusion that

the zoning regulation is unconstitutional, and concur with

the majority regarding its conclusions as to the distancing

regulation and the ban on minors. The City’s gun violence

problem requires urgent, well‐researched, and comprehen‐

sive action. But those actions must be taken within the evolv‐

ing parameters of Second Amendment jurisprudence.  

Case: 14-3312 Document: 47 Filed: 01/18/2017 Pages: 39
Case l:10-cv-05135 Document 227-1 Filed 12/05/13 Page 49 of 146 PagelD 3567

Case; 14-3312 Document: 11-14 Filed: 11/17/2014 Pages: 327

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