Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02288/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02288-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2288

___________

Donald Jackson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Homechoice, Inc., doing *

business as Rentway of * [PUBLISHED]

Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Rent-Way, *

Inc. *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 30, 2004

Filed: May 21, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this employment discrimination suit, Donald Jackson, an African-American,

appeals from the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment to Homechoice,

Inc. d/b/a Rent-Way (Rent-Way). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Jackson filed his complaint on September 24, 2001, claiming discrimination

(including his March 1999 discharge) based on race and in retaliation for filing a

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charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,

et seq. (Title VII), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

The district court granted Rent-Way’s motion for summary judgment. As to

Jackson’s Title VII claims, the court held that Jackson had not proven that his EEOC

charge was timely filed, and that no EEOC misconduct justified equitably tolling the

limitations period. The court also held that Jackson’s section 1981 claims were

untimely under the statute of limitations found in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act

(ACRA). Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107(c)(3) (Supp. 2003) (employment action shall

be brought within one year after alleged employment discrimination occurred). 

This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

viewing the record in the light most favorable to Jackson. See Shempert v. Harwick

Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1998). The district court did not err by

granting summary judgment on Jackson’s Title VII claims. Although Jackson

attested that he mailed a charge of discrimination to the EEOC in September 1998,

the undisputed evidence showed that the EEOC did not receive the charge until June

2001. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring that Title VII claims be filed with

EEOC within 180 days after alleged unlawful employment practice); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (summary judgment may be granted

if evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative; mere existence of

scintilla of evidence in support of non-movant’s position will be insufficient to avoid

summary judgment). 

Jackson also did not show that the 180-day deadline for filing the charge

should be equitably tolled. See Shempert, 151 F.3d at 797 (requirement of filing

timely charge with EEOC is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling;

equitable tolling is premised on excusable neglect of filing party). Jackson’s

evidence--that he made numerous calls to the EEOC and was always told his file was

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unavailable and the EEOC would get back to him--did not show misconduct by the

EEOC that warrants equitable tolling. Cf. Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc.,

132 F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1998) (failure to file timely charge was excusable

neglect where EEOC mistakenly told plaintiff his unverified charge information form

was valid charge, and EEOC did not complete formal, verified charge until after 180-

day deadline; failure to file timely charge arose from EEOC’s misconduct which was

circumstance beyond plaintiff’s control); Jennings v. American Postal Workers

Union, 672 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff alleged EEOC told her it lacked

jurisdiction over her claim; EEOC did have jurisdiction and court of appeals

remanded to district court for determination of when she attempted to file charge;

“uncounseled plaintiff should not be penalized for the EEOC’s mistakes of law”).

Moreover, Jackson did not explain how the EEOC’s response to his ineffective phone

calls caused him to wait some 27 months after his March 1999 termination before he

demanded a right-to-sue notification. See Shempert, 151 F.3d at 798 (equitable

tolling not justified because at no point were circumstances out of plaintiff’s control;

EEOC did not mishandle plaintiff’s claim or otherwise mislead her into inaction); cf.

Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam)

(individual who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse

lack of diligence).

We conclude, however, that Jackson's section 1981 claims should not have

been dismissed based on ACRA’s one-year statute of limitations. After the district

court's decision, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124

S. Ct. 1836 (2004), that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658 applies to any claim that was made possible by an Act of Congress enacted

after December 1, 1990. Thus, any claim created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

which expanded the scope of section 1981, is governed by a four-year limitations

period.

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Jackson's claims that he was discriminated against and discharged from

employment because of his race, and that he was harassed and terminated in

retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, were not cognizable

under section 1981 prior to 1991. As originally enacted, the statute did not protect

against harassing conduct that occurred after the formation of a contract. See

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989). Claims alleging

wrongful discharge or hostile work environment did not state violations of the

original version of section 1981. Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1840. The 1991 Act, however,

expanded the statute to include the "termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of

all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42

U.S.C. § 1981(b). It is this post-1990 version of section 1981 that Jackson invokes

as the basis for his claims under section 1981. Accordingly, in light of the Supreme

Court's decision in Jones, the applicable statute of limitation is four years, and the

claims should not have been dismissed based on the one-year statute of limitations

in ACRA.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment with

respect to Jackson’s Title VII claims, but remand to the district court for further

proceedings on claims brought under section 1981 that arise within the four-year

limitations period. We deny Rent-Way’s pending motion.

______________________________

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