Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02170/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02170-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Strouse,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Samuels, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02170-TUC-RCC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) written by 

Magistrate Judge Leslie Bowman. Doc. 32. Magistrate Judge Bowman recommends that 

the Court denies Petitioner James Strouse’s third amended petition on the merits. Strouse 

filed an objection to the R & R. Doc. 33 and Respondent J.T. Shartle filed a response. 

Doc. 34. For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall overrule the objections and adopt the 

R & R. 

I. Standard of Review

The duties of the district court, when reviewing a R & R of a Magistrate Judge, are 

set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). When the parties object to a R & R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is 

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). However, in the 

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absence of a timely objection, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear 

error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

72(b), Advisory Committee Notes (1983); see also United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

II. Background

The factual background in this case is thoroughly detailed in Magistrate Judge 

Bowman’s R & R. This Court fully incorporates by reference the Summary of the Case 

and Discussion sections of the R & R into this Order. Strouse, who is currently 

incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Tucson, Arizona,

challenges three separate disciplinary proceedings that occurred while he was an inmate 

at the FCI in Petersburg, Virginia.

III. Discussion

In his objections to the R & R, Strouse does not raise new issues. Rather, he 

reargues the grounds considered and rejected by Magistrate Judge Bowman. Specifically, 

Strouse argues that he did not receive sufficient due process safeguards during his 

disciplinary proceedings because: (1) prison staff did not recuse themselves from his 

hearing even though they were named defendants in a pending law suit that Strouse 

initiated and (2) he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

With respect to the first claim, prison staff are not required to recuse themselves 

from a disciplinary hearing solely because they are a named defendant in a pending 

lawsuit filed by the Petitioner. “Requiring each staff member who is the subject of a 

separate lawsuit to disqualify [themselves] from sitting in judgment of that inmate would 

heavily tax the working capacity of the prison staff.” Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 

1113 (7th Cir. 1983). “If every named defendant in a prisoners’ rights lawsuit must be 

disqualified from sitting on the [disciplinary] Committee, such a litigation strategy would 

vest too much control in a prisoner to determine the Committee make-up.” Id. As 

Magistrate Judge Bowman notes, Strouse’s bare allegation is insufficient to establish a 

due process violation without specific evidence demonstrating that the Disciplinary 

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Hearing Officer was actually biased. Further, it is sufficient for due process purposes that 

the disciplinary hearing decisions were based on “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 

472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Here, there is sufficient evidence that due process was 

satisfied.

Strouse’s second claim also fails. Strouse admits that he failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies and did not attempt to file a late appeal pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 

542.14(b), 542.15(a).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Bowman’s Report and 

Recommendation is adopted. Petitioner Strouse’s third amended petition is denied. Doc. 

32.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Strouse’s objections are overruled. 

Doc. 33.

Dated this 21st day of March, 2016.

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