Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02396/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Daniel Walker Malmo, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02396-PHX-DGC (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Daniel Walker Malmo has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

On May 2, 2008, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Aggravated Assault (CR2007–

008330) and to Armed Robbery and Assisting a Criminal Street Gang (CR2007–139969). 

On July 29, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15, 15, and 21 years 

imprisonment. Grounds 1-5 and 7-20 are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner has not established cause to excuse the procedural default due to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Further, Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20 are not cognizable, and 

Grounds 18-19 are waived. Finally, Ground 6 fails on the merits. Therefore, the Court 

will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

The Presentence Report includes a summary of the underlying facts of Petitioner’s 

crimes in CR2007–008330:1

 On June 22, 2001, Department of Corrections Criminal 

Investigations Unit Police Officers R. Watson and L. Douchel 

attempted to arrest Daniel Malmo for a parole warrant. Mr. 

Malmo fled on foot and entered his vehicle. In an attempt prevent the defendant from leaving, Officer Watson drove his 

vehicle, with Officer Douchel as his passenger, behind the defendant’s vehicle, Subsequently, Mr. Malmo placed his vehicle in reverse and “rammed” the front passenger side of 

the other vehicle. At one point, the passenger sides of both vehicles were pressed together, endangering Officer Douchel. 

The defendant exited his vehicle and fled the scene in another 

vehicle. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. S, at 70.) The Presentence Report also includes a summary of the 

underlying facts of Petitioner’s crimes in CR2007–139969: 

 On June 15, 2007, Jesse Marquez contacted police and reported that New Mexican Mafia gang members were trying 

to kill him. He indicated that due to his brother’s associations, 

he had become close to several high-ranking members of the gang for more than a six-month period. Mr. Marquez had been directed to engage in fraudulent schemes for the 

organization. After police arrested a high-ranking member for 

whom Mr. Marquez had worked, Mr. Marquez was introduced to the defendant, for whom he was told he now 

worked. Although Mr. Marquez was not a member of the 

gang and had never been to prison, he was “kept around” because of his abilities to engage in fraudulent scenes. Later, 

Mr. Marquez provided police with detailed information that 

he had either been present at or had destroyed evidence in eight homicides perpetrated by the organization. 

 Mr. Marquez reported that on June 14, 2007, the 

defendant had come to Mr. Marquez’s residence with Jose Ortega and Antonia Terrazas. Mr. Marquez directed two females, who were already inside the residence, to wait 

outside the residence. The defendant, who possessed a 

weapon in his waistband, used the bathroom to “suit-up” in all black clothing. Mr. Marquez was alarmed because this was 

customary for New Mexican Mafia members to do before 

committing a homicide. When Mr. Malmo told Mr. Marquez to come to him, Mr. Marquez expressed a need to check on the females. Subsequently, Mr. Ortega pointed a handgun at 1

 Presentence reports are an appropriate source for the facts underlying a defendant’s convictions. See State v. Rose, 297 P.3d 906, 912 (2013). 

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the victim, whose path to the door the defendant then 

blocked. At this point, Mr. Malmo directed Ms. Terrazas to 

take the victim’s computer equipment. The defendant told 

Mr. Marquez that the “Lieutenant,” who was a high ranking member of the organization, wanted Mr. Marquez “smoked” 

(dead). The defendant then told Mr. Marquez that he had “nice kids,” which the victim took as a threat. Before Mr. 

Malmo left with Mr. Ortega and Ms. Terrazas, the defendant 

took money that had been on top of a television. After a 

sleepless night, in which the victim spent peering from his front window, Mr. Marquez decided to contact police. 

 On June 20, 2008, police arrested Mr. Malmo. He 

admitted that during the present offenses, he had possessed a firearm for personal protection but denied handling it at that time. The defendant also denied knowing why Mr. Ortega had pointed a handgun at the victim. Mr. Malmo indicated he did 

not take the victim’s money and that the computer equipment 

had belonged to the defendant. Mr. Malmo acknowledged that he had the “keys to the streets,” as he was the New 

Mexican Mafia’s highest-ranking member who was not 

imprisoned, and that he had told Mr. Marquez that a “hit” had been put on him and his brother. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. S, at 71-73.) 

b. Charges, Convictions, and Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On June 28, 2007, the State charged Petitioner in CR2007–139969 with armed 

robbery, first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, assisting a criminal 

street gang, and misconduct involving weapons. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 2.) The State also 

alleged Petitioner had three prior felony convictions (Doc. 13-1, Ex. B, at 9) and 

committed the offense in furtherance of a criminal street gang (Doc. 13-1, Ex. C, at 12). 

The state further alleged Petitioner would be required to serve a life sentence. (Doc. 13-

1, Ex. J, at 35); see A.R.S. § 13–706(A) (mandating life sentence upon conviction of 

three “serious offense[s]” not committed on the same occasion). 

 On September 20, 2007, the State charged Petitioner in CR2007–008330 with one 

count of aggravated assault against a peace officer. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. F, at 24.) 

 On May 2, 2008, Petitioner entered into plea agreements in both cases. Petitioner 

pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault (CR 2007-008330) and Armed 

Robbery and Assisting a Criminal Street Gang (CR 2007-139969). (Docs. 13-1, Exs. OP, at 56-62.) On July 29, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years 

imprisonment (Aggravated Assault), 21 years imprisonment (Armed Robbery), and 15 

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years imprisonment (Assisting a Criminal Street Gang). (Doc. 13-2, Exs. U-V, at 2-10.) 

c. Change of Counsel Motions 

 On February 25, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to change counsel, or in the 

alternative, to represent himself. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. K. at 38.) On March 3, 2008, the trial 

court addressed Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. TT, at 37.) Petitioner stated he was 

concerned about counsel’s ability to adequately represent him at trial in the event he did 

not enter a plea agreement. Petitioner told the judge that “a plea agreement will be 

possible, but in the event it is not, I need to be confident in the attorney that’s defending 

me.” (Doc. 13-5, Ex. TT, at 37.) Petitioner believed his counsel was “a good attorney” 

but he was concerned she was too busy to give his “case the attention” he believed it 

deserved. (Id.) He reiterated that “again, I do believe a plea agreement can be reached. . 

. .” (Id.) The court stated that “[y]ou are entitled to have competent representation, and 

Miss Hindmarch is very competent counsel. I don’t see a -- I understand you may have 

disagreements as to decisions she may make in your representation but that doesn’t 

necessarily mean that that entitles you to new counsel.” (Id. at 38.) The court denied the 

motion for new counsel, and did not expressly rule on the motion for self-representation. 

(Id.) 

 On April 3, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to change counsel or 

represent himself. (Doc. 13-3, Ex. BB, at 2.) On April 7, 2008, the court of appeals 

declined to accept jurisdiction of the special action. (Doc. 13-3, Ex. CC, at 15.) On April 

30, 2008, Petitioner’s request for review was filed the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 13-

3, Ex. DD, at 19.) Meanwhile, on April 17, 2008, Petitioner also filed a motion in trial 

court requesting the trial judge reconsider the denial of his request for new counsel. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. M, at 50.) On April 23, 2008, the court addressed Petitioner’s motion and 

asked Petitioner if he wanted the motion addressed. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. UU, at 46.) 

Petitioner stated “I’ll withdraw at this time.” (Id.) The court stated “[t]hat motion will be 

withdrawn.” (Id.) On May 2, 2008, while his petition for review was pending in the 

Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner pleaded guilty in both cases. (Docs. 13-1, Exs. O-P, 

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at 56-62.) 

d. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On October 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Notice. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. W, at 

12.) On March 17, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. Y, at 20.) Petitioner raised four grounds: 

1. the “trial court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. 

Malmo’s motion to change counsel without addressing his alternative request to be permitted to represent himself” (Doc. 13-2, Ex. Y, at 25); 

2. “it was error for the trial court to deny Mr. Malmo’s motion to change counsel without affording him” a hearing (Id. at 28); 

3. Petitioner was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when 

counsel failed to investigate defenses (Id. at 31-32); 

4. Petitioner was prejudiced by the use of improper aggravating factors at sentencing (Id. at 34-36). 

 On November 12, 2010, the court denied the petition. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. AA, at 64-

66.) On December 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 13-3, Ex. GG, at 47.) On May 15, 2013, the court of appeals summarily 

denied review. (Doc. 13-4, Ex. MM, at 37.) 

 On November 13, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition 

for review. (Doc. 13-4, Ex. NN, at 55.) 

e. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 While Petitioner’s petition for review was pending in the Arizona Supreme Court, 

he filed a second PCR notice in the trial court asserting that his trial lawyer made a 

“significant omission” and that his PCR lawyer’s “failure to raise issues constituted 

deficient performance.” (Doc. 13-4, Ex. PP, at 59.) The trial court dismissed the notice as 

untimely and successive. (Doc. 13-4, Ex. QQ, at 61.) 

f. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On October 28, 2014, Petitioner filed this habeas Petition. (Doc. 1.) On February 

26, 2015, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 13.) On May 26, 

2015, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner raises the following grounds for 

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relief: 

1. Failure to obtain victim’s prior convictions and pending criminal charges; 

2. Failure to provide recordings or transcripts of police interviews with Petitioner and others in armed robbery case; 

3. Waiving time without consent in violation of right to speedy trial; 

4. Failure to advise that plea agreement had parole allegation and that uncharged murder case would be considered by the court at sentencing; 

5. Failure to provide presentence report; 

6. Failure to obtain cellular phone records; 

7. Failure to interview potential police witness to aggravated assault; 

8. Failure to investigate scene of aggravated assault; 

9. Failure to interview armed robbery victim and others; 

10. Failure to investigate Petitioner’s gang status; 

11. Failure to interview officer who witnessed the aggravated assault; 

12. Failure to hire expert regarding aggravated assault; 

13. Failure to hire private investigator; 

14. Failure to investigate Petitioner’s intoxication during police interview; 

15.Failure to object to aggravating factors at sentencing; 

16.Failure to object to dangerous allegation at sentencing; 

17. Failure to object to gang allegation at sentencing; 

18. Error of court to fail to change counsel; 

19. Error of court to deny right to self-representation; and 

20. Error of court to consider uncharged murder case as aggravating 

factor. 

(Doc. 1.)2

 

2

 The Court notes that pages 23 and 24 of the Petition should be switched. 

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. The Petition is Timely. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner’s PCR proceedings were dismissed on September 4, 2013, and 

Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition on December 3, 2013. The Petition is 

timely. 

b. Grounds 1-5 and 7-20 are procedurally barred. 

i. Law 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

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satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . 

(2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

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“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

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ii. Application 

1. Grounds 1-5 and 7-15 

 Grounds 1-5 and 7-15 are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because 

Petitioner did not raise them in the trial court and at the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Ground 12 (failure to retain expert) was the only one of these grounds raised in the trial 

court, but Petitioner did not raise Ground 12 in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner 

did not ‘fairly present’ these claims in each appropriate state court. See Casey v. Moore, 

386 F.3d 896, 915–19 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding petitioner failed to fairly present federal 

claims when he raised them “for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in noncapital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is 

satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

either in a direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The failure to fairly present these grounds has resulted in procedural default 

because Petitioner is now barred from returning to state courts. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a), 32.4(a). See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner failed 

to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

 Petitioner offers no grounds to excuse the procedural default by a showing of 

cause and prejudice. Instead, Petitioner erroneously asserts he raised them in trial court. 

Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause 

that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly 

presenting his claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment 

such as government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” 

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal 

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quotations omitted). Petitioner incorrectly asserts he presented these arguments in the 

state courts. 

2. Grounds 16-20

 Grounds 16-20 are unexhausted because Petitioner presented these claims in state 

court only on state grounds. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. Y, at 21-33.) In Grounds 16 and 17, 

Petitioner challenges the use of a deadly weapon and gang membership as both elements 

of the offense and aggravating factors. (Doc. 1 at 26-28.) In his PCR Petition, these were 

never raised as violations of federal law. As such, the claims are unexhausted, and would 

now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted. 

 Grounds 18 (change of counsel), 19 (self-representation), and 20 (use of murder 

case at sentencing) were not raised as federal constitutional claims in state court. Ground 

18 was raised in Petitioner’s PCR as a failure to hold a hearing to change counsel. 

Assuming this is the same argument, it was not raised as a federal claim in his PCR. 

Ground 19 was not raised as a federal claim in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ground 20 

was raised as a violation of state law in both state courts. These claims are unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted. 

3. Ground 6 

 Petitioner raised Ground 6 in his state proceedings and Ground 6 is reviewed 

below on the merits. 

iii. Martinez v. Ryan

Petitioner asserts, at the end of his Reply, that his claims “should not be dismissed 

with prejudice” as “the recent Martinez ruling set new precedent that post-conviction 

counsel IAC claims should not in fact be time-barred as the state asserts.” (Doc. 16 at 

22.) Pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), a petitioner may 

establish cause for the procedural default of an ineffective assistance claim “by 

demonstrating two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial review collateral proceeding, where 

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the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland3 . . .’ 

and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, 

which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook 

v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318). See 

also Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We therefore read Martinez

to allow new claims of trial-counsel IAC, asserted for the first time on federal habeas . . 

.”). 

 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674. To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that 

(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that 

(2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. The inquiry under Strickland is 

highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. With respect to 

Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. The 

Strickland test applies to a federal habeas petitioner’s challenge to a conviction entered 

upon a guilty plea. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985); Washington v. 

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005). In such a context, “the ineffectiveness 

inquiry probes whether the alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the [petitioner’s] 

ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert, 393 F.3d 

at 980. 

 In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted the two-part Strickland standard to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that a defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) 

3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

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his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S.Ct. 366. 

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Petitioner does not assert that post-conviction counsel was ineffective. Petitioner 

asserts that “[i]f this petitioner were to contest post-conviction counsel was ineffective . . 

.” then Martinez would apply. (Doc. 16 at 22.) But Petitioner does not present argument 

that his PCR counsel was ineffective. This would be sufficient for the Court to conclude 

that Petitioner has not established grounds to excuse the procedural default of Grounds 1-

5 and 7-20. 

 Nonetheless, below, the Court addresses whether Petitioner established cause for 

the procedural default due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Brown v. Roe, 

279 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pro se habeas petitioners are to be afforded the 

benefit of any doubt . . .”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005) (a 

federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits when it is “perfectly clear” 

that the petitioner does not raise a colorable federal claim). 

1. Martinez Review of Grounds 1-4 and 6-14 

 Petitioner’s arguments in Grounds 1-4 and 6-14 concern trial counsel’s conduct 

prior to Petitioner’s plea of guilty. Petitioner challenges his guilty plea by alleging that it 

resulted from the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner contends that 

defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to provide information 

regarding the victims, witnesses, records, transcripts, the scene, the plea agreement, 

Petitioner’s gang status, and Petitioner’s intoxication during his post-arrest interview. 

 Petitioner fails to establish there is a reasonable probability that he would have 

insisted on proceeding to trial if he had additional information. Petitioner and his counsel 

negotiated two plea agreements that had ranges of 10 to 21 years of imprisonment. The 

plea agreements mandated that all sentences run concurrently. Petitioner’s plea 

agreements dismissed an allegation that would have required a lifetime term of 

imprisonment. His agreements dismissed the allegation of prior felony convictions and a 

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statutory enhancement that his crimes were in furtherance of gang activity. The state also 

agreed not to file charges in an unrelated murder case. Petitioner, through counsel, 

requested a total sentence of 10.5 years imprisonment. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. WW, at 81.) The 

record demonstrates that Petitioner negotiated favorable agreements in light of the facts 

of his cases. Moreover, Petitioner would have had to prevail in both of his cases to 

achieve a result better than his plea offer. Petitioner faced up to 28 years imprisonment 

for the most serious charges in each case. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. SS, at 7.) 

 Ultimately, Petitioner received double the sentence he hoped for, and now asserts 

that it was due to his counsel’s performance prior to his plea. Although Petitioner would 

have preferred more information, Petitioner had sufficient information of his cases “to 

enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980. At 

the settlement conference for these two cases, Petitioner was present when the prosecutor 

outlined the strong evidence arrayed against the Petitioner. Regarding the Aggravated 

Assault, the parties agreed Petitioner attempted to flee the scene, although Petitioner 

denied he had intent to place officers in reasonable apprehension of fear of injury. (Doc. 

13-5, Ex. SS, at 16-18.) Petitioner had pictures from the scene of the Aggravated Assault. 

He told the settlement conference judge that “if the pictures and the police reports are 

looked at a little bit more closely the skids marks are from the police vehicle – my 

vehicle was the one that was damaged on the side.” (Doc. 13-5, Ex. SS, at 15.) Petitioner 

had sufficient information to determine his likelihood of success at trial on the issue of 

his intent. Petitioner also knew whether he had the intent to commit this crime, and he 

told the court at the change of plea hearing that he intended to commit the offense. 

Petitioner’s representations at the plea hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge 

accepting the plea, constitute a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). “Solemn declarations in 

open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id.; see also Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 

815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Petitioner’s statements at the plea colloquy carry a strong 

presumption of truth.”). 

 Similarly, in the Armed Robbery/Assisting a Criminal Gang case, Petitioner had 

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sufficient information regarding that case. Petitioner was aware of the government’s case, 

which was described during the settlement conference. After his arrest, Petitioner told 

police that he went to the victim’s residence, he was with others, his group brought a 

firearm that was used during the incident, and that the victim’s property was taken. (Doc. 

13-5, Ex. SS, at 19-21.) Petitioner reviewed reports regarding the Armed Robbery. He 

told the court that “the victim didn’t call the police until the following day” and told the 

Court he did not want to discuss his trial strategy. (Id. at 21.) The conduct of Petitioner’s 

counsel did not impinge upon Petitioner’s ability to knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily plead guilty. 

2. Martinez Review of Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20

 Petitioner’s arguments in Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20 concern trial counsel’s 

conduct prior to sentencing. These claims are not cognizable in federal habeas review 

because the Supreme Court of the United States has not clearly established a right to 

effective assistance of counsel at a non-capital sentencing. See Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 

1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (habeas relief unavailable for claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel at sentencing in non-capital cases); Cooper–Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 

1236, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (because no Supreme Court precedent applies to 

ineffective assistance of counsel in ordinary sentencing hearings, state court’s denial of 

this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law). 

 Petitioner’s claims are also insufficient. Petitioner alleges trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to provide a presentence report (Ground 5), failing to object to 

aggravating factors (Grounds 15-17), and failing to object to the court’s consideration of 

the uncharged murder facts (Ground 20). Petitioner fails to demonstrate counsel was 

ineffective. 

 In Ground 5,4

 Petitioner asserts counsel failed to provide him a presentence report 

so that Petitioner could “go over the report to point out any defects therein.” (Doc. 1 at 

 

4

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17. The Court reviews these additional issues under the subsequent Grounds. 

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12.) Petitioner asserts that this allowed the court to consider the victim’s impact 

statement “when no victim impact report was done nor the victim’s testimony given to 

the impact of the crime.” (Id.) The court was required to consider the victim’s statement 

at sentencing, so counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the victim’s 

statement. In Grounds 15 (use of a fourth prior felony conviction, parole status, 

vehicle as aggravating factor), 16 (vehicle as aggravating factor), and 17 (gang status as 

aggravating factor), Petitioner alleges trial counsel should have objected to the court’s 

use of these facts. (Doc. 1 at 25-28.) Counsel was not deficient when the trial court 

considered Petitioner’s four prior convictions and parole status. The plea agreement 

stated only that the plea was “not binding on the State” until the State confirmed 

Petitioner’s avowal “that he has no more than 3 felony convictions” or was “on 

parole/community supervision at the time of this offense.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. O-P, at 57, 

61.) This provision allowed the State to withdraw from the plea agreement, it did not 

preclude the trial court from considering Petitioner’s criminal history and parole status. 

The State did not allege Petitioner’s prior felony convictions to increase the statutory 

sentencing ranges for his offenses and the plea agreement does not stipulate that the trial 

court was precluded from considering Petitioner’s criminal history. The State dismissed 

the allegation that Petitioner’s offenses were committed in furtherance of gang activity, 

which would have increased Petitioner’s sentencing range by three years. See A.R.S. § 

13–604(T). The plea agreement does not preclude the trial court from considering 

Petitioner’s gang status. 

 The trial court found as additional aggravating factors, among others, that 

Petitioner was “on parole at the time of the offense” and that he was “an admitted 

member of a street gang.” (Doc. 13-5, Ex. WW, at 83-84.) The court was permitted to 

consider his parole status. See A.R.S. § 13-701 (d) (24) (allowing the court to consider 

“[a]ny other factor that the state alleges is relevant to the defendant’s character or 

background or to the nature or circumstance of the crime”). Petitioner was convicted of 

assisting a criminal street gang, an offense that did not require membership in a gang. 

During his guilty plea, Petitioner avowed only that he assisted the New Mexican Mafia, 

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not that he was a member of the gang. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. VV, at 59.) The court did not err in 

considering that Petitioner was also in gang, a fact that was not admitted by Petitioner as 

an element of the gang-assistance offense. 

 The court also found Petitioner used his car as a dangerous weapon. (Id. at 84.) 

Even if this was error,5 the court finds it was harmless. Here, in all three counts, the court 

found numerous aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.6

 Petitioner was sentenced 

to 15 years imprisonment in the Aggravated Assault case, and 21 years imprisonment in 

the Armed Robbery case. There is no indication the court would have given a lesser 

sentence for this offense had it not improperly considered a single aggravating factor, 

thus there is no prejudice and resentencing is unnecessary. See State v. Olmstead, 145 

P.3d 631, 633 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to find error because “the court 

considered the individual circumstances of the defendant and . . . imposed a sentence well 

within its discretion”); State v. Ruggiero, 120 P.3d 690, 695–96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 

(concluding that defendant did not carry burden to show prejudice where the court 

improperly considered aggravating factor). 

 Regarding Ground 20 (consideration at sentencing of murder incident), the trial 

court was permitted to consider facts of Defendant’s character. See A.R.S. § 13-701 (d) 

(24). Trial counsel “took issue with the State asking the Court to consider arrests that Mr. 

Malmo may have been involved with.” (Doc. 13-5, Ex. WW, at 80.) Counsel told the 

court it was inappropriate for the court to consider “something the State is summarizing 

in terms of what they want to consider as aggravation.” (Id.) Thus, trial counsel was not 

 

5 See A.R.S. § 13–701(D)(2) (Supp. 2013) (stating that a court can consider use of a dangerous instrument as an aggravating factor “except if this circumstance is an essential element of the offense . . . or has been utilized to enhance the range of punishment under [A.R.S.] § 13–704 [ (Supp. 2013) ]”). 

6

 The court found the following aggravating factors for the Aggravated Assault: “previous felony convictions” and the “assault on a police officer with a car was 

essentially a dangerous weapon, multiple victims who feared for their life.” (Id. at 84.) 

The court found the following aggravating factors for the Armed Robbery: “there were accomplices involved, the trauma to the victim involved, the fact that there are four 

previous felony convictions, you were on parole at the time of the offense, the offenses 

were for pecuniary gain and that you are an admitted member of a street gang.” (Id. at 

83.) 

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ineffective regarding this information. Moreover, the court found numerous aggravating 

factors at sentencing, and the uncharged conduct was not listed by the court as one of 

them. 

3. Martinez Review of Grounds 18-19

 Petitioner’s arguments in Grounds 18 (denial of change of counsel) and 19 (failure 

to rule on request for self-representation) were waived upon entry of Petitioner’s guilty 

plea after Petitioner withdrew his motion on this issue. Because the arguments were 

waived, post-conviction counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue them. Generally, 

it “is well-settled that an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to 

appeal all nonjurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent constitutional 

defects.” United States v. Lopez–Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). As the 

Supreme Court has explained: 

A guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which 

had preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Petitioner’s claim regarding change of 

counsel (Ground 18) is waived. See United States v. Foreman, 329 F.3d 1037, 1038–39 

(9th Cir. 2003) (precluding pre-plea motion for substitute counsel claim), overruled on 

other grounds by United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007) (en 

banc); United States v. Somoza, 458 F. App’x 592, 593 (9th Cir. 2011) (“By pleading 

guilty, Somoza waived his claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

substitute counsel.”). 

 The Court reviews Petitioner’s claim regarding self-representation. See United 

States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 626–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding denial of request for 

self-representation reviewable despite guilty plea). Here, the trial court did not expressly 

deny Petitioner’s request for self-representation. The court ruled that “[a]t this point in 

time I am going to deny the motion for change of counsel.” (Doc. 13-5, Ex. TT, at 28.) 

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On April 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a subsequent motion for reconsideration of his motion 

for change of counsel and self-representation. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. M, at 50.) On April 23, 

2008, the court addressed Petitioner’s motion and asked Petitioner if wanted the motion 

addressed. (Doc. 13-5, Ex. UU, at 46.) Petitioner stated “I’ll withdraw at this time.” (Id.) 

The court stated “[t]hat motion will be withdrawn.” (Id.) On May 2, 2008, Petitioner 

pleaded guilty in both cases. Because Petitioner withdrew his motion for selfrepresentation, he cannot complain that counsel was ineffective. If post-conviction 

counsel had raised these claims, they would have been rejected. “[T]he failure to take a 

futile action can never be deficient performance.” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th 

Cir. 1996). 

 Petitioner does not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective. Because the 

underlying ineffective assistance claims are without merit, Petitioner’s PCR counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to raise them. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1319. And, thus, 

Petitioner cannot show his claims are “substantial” in order to satisfy his burden under 

Martinez. Petitioner, therefore, has failed to present reasons to excuse his procedural 

defaults. The Court will recommend that Grounds 1-5 and 7-20 be denied and dismissed. 

c. Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20 are not cognizable.

 Petitioner’s arguments in Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20 regarding sentencing are not 

cognizable in federal habeas review because the Supreme Court of the United States has 

not clearly established a right to effective assistance of counsel at a non-capital 

sentencing. See Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (habeas relief 

unavailable for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing in non-capital 

cases); Cooper–Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (because no 

Supreme Court precedent applies to ineffective assistance of counsel in ordinary 

sentencing hearings, state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law). This Court concludes that § 

2254(d)(1) bars habeas relief because there is no clearly established law from the U.S. 

Supreme Court on point. 

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 Assuming, arguendo, that these claims were reviewable, the state court’s 

adjudication of Petitioner’s claims was not an unreasonable application of the Strickland

standard. See Daire v. Lattimore, 780 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding Davis 

and Cooper–Smith binding and also finding state court’s determination was not 

unreasonable). Here, the trial court found: 

 The affidavit submitted by the Petitioner does not 

contain specific information as to how counsel failed to 

inform Petitioner of the merits of the case. Other than 

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel failed to provide him access to information, there is no indication how counsel 

failed to advise him on the merits of the taking the plea versus going to trial. Without more than the Petitioner’s assertion, 

the Court is being asked to speculate that counsel failed to 

inform Petitioner of the merits of the plea and/or trial and that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e. that Petitioner would have rejected the plea.) Furthermore, the transcript does not support 

Petitioner’s position. The Petitioner had discussions with the 

prosecutor and the court about the charges against him and the strengths and weaknesses of the cases against him, 

including his defenses. (See transcript of proceedings February 29, 2008.) It is clear that Petitioner had has the 

information he now claims to be lacking. 

 The Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by 

a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness or that he was in any way prejudiced. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

 As to the claims of error by the Court in sentencing, the Petitioner waived these claims by failing to object at the time of sentencing to the information contained in the 

presentence report as to Petitioner’s prior felony convictions 

or parole status or the Court’s reliance on the information or, 

alternatively, if there was any error, it was harmless and the outcome would not be any different. 

(Doc. 13-2, Ex. AA, at 65.) For the reasons outlined in section III.b.iii.2 above, the state 

court’s rejection of these claims was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established United States Supreme Court law. 

d. Grounds 18-19 were waived. 

Although Grounds 18 and 19 are procedurally defaulted, they are also waived by 

Petitioner’s guilty plea. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 

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975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (a guilty plea generally waives all claims of a constitutional 

nature occurring before the plea). For the reasons outlined in section III.b.iii.3 above, 

Grounds 18 and 19 are waived. 

e. Ground 6 lacks merit. 

i. Standard of Review 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 

2244. 

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this 

Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as a 

condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

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White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a 

formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 

S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to 

meet”—and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s 

criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. 

Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 

S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an 

incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 

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(9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief 

simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a 

certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also 

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

AEDPA otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not 

harmless: “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not 

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations 

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omitted). 

ii. Petitioner’s claim in Ground 6 lacks merit. 

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain “cell phone 

records for two his own phones and a cell phone belonging to a company his live-in 

girlfriend was employed by.” (Doc. 1 at 14.) Petitioner asserts that the victim had the 

girlfriend’s company phone “for the sole purpose of concluding the property transaction 

the alleged victim would later claim he was robbed of.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that the 

victim was not in fear for his life and “that things were fine between them.” (Id.) Thus, 

Petitioner asserts the phone records would show the Petitioner and victim had an amiable 

relationship and also made “arrangements” for “future transactions.” (Id.) In his Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner asserted counsel was ineffective because he 

“wanted counsel to subpoena the cell phone records to show that the victim had phoned 

him repeatedly even after the alleged robbery” but counsel failed to do so. (Doc. 13-2, 

Ex. Y, at 32.) In his Petition for Review, Petitioner asserts he would not have pleaded 

guilty except for counsel’s failure to investigate, including a failure to obtain “requested 

subpoenas of cell phone records.” (Doc. 13-3, Ex. GG, at 59.) 

 The trial court found, as quoted above: 

 The affidavit submitted by the Petitioner does not 

contain specific information as to how counsel failed to 

inform Petitioner of the merits of the case. Other than 

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel failed to provide him access to information, there is no indication how counsel 

failed to advise him on the merits of the taking the plea versus going to trial. Without more than the Petitioner’s assertion, 

the Court is being asked to speculate that counsel failed to 

inform Petitioner of the merits of the plea and/or trial and that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e. that Petitioner would have rejected the plea.) Furthermore, the transcript does not support 

Petitioner’s position. The Petitioner had discussions with the 

prosecutor and the court about the charges against him and the strengths and weaknesses of the cases against him, 

including his defenses. (See transcript of proceedings February 29, 2008.) It is clear that Petitioner had has the 

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information he now claims to be lacking.7

 The Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by 

a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness or that he was in any way prejudiced. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

(Doc. 13-2, Ex. AA, at 65.) 

 Petitioner does not satisfy his burden of establishing “the state court acted contrary 

to Strickland or was unreasonable in concluding that Petitioner suffered Strickland

prejudice, i.e. a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different—at the 

guilt and/or penalty phase—but for the constitutionally deficient performance by counsel. 

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 940 (9th Cir. 2013). Petitioner does not deny that he 

was present in the victim’s residence and does not deny that Mr. Ortega threatened the 

victim with a firearm. Petitioner does not dispute property was taken from the victim. The 

issue in dispute was whether the property was stolen by force (i.e. the threat of a deadly 

weapon). Phone records would not document whether the victim was robbed by 

Petitioner and others. At best, the records might corroborate that the victim and the 

Petitioner communicated before or after the event. Whether Petitioner can prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate a potential defense 

depends in large part on whether the potential defense “likely would have succeeded at 

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 982 (“Where the alleged error is 

counsel’s failure to investigate a potential defense, the salient inquiry is whether 

discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the 

plea. In turn, the result of this inquiry may depend on whether the defense would have 

likely succeeded at trial.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). 

 The value of the phone records, if they were available, would have been minimal 

and the records would not have changed the outcome of a trial. The state court’s decision 

7

 At the settlement conference, the prosecutor summarized the testimony of the Petitioner and the victim. “Defendant admits to having a gun and having agreement with the victim. The victim is going to say that everybody was yelling at him and pointing a gun at him and he had to kind of maneuver his way out of there. The victim is available.” 

(Doc. 13-5, Ex. SS, at 20.) Petitioner agreed the evidence would show he was there, but 

he argues that “whatever property was taken from the house was paid for.” (Id.) 

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was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. Nor was the state 

court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Cf. Lambert, 393 F.3d at 982 (“Courts 

have generally rejected claims of ineffective assistance premised on a failure to 

investigate where the record demonstrates that the defendant would have pled guilty 

despite the additional evidence and where the additional evidence was unlikely to change 

the outcome at trial.”). 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s Grounds 1-5 and 7-20 are procedurally defaulted; Grounds 5, 15-17, and 20 

are not cognizable; Grounds 18-19 are waived; and Ground 6 fails on the merits. The 

Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of January, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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