Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02663/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02663-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY OROZCO,

Petitioner,

v.

E. SILVA, Cal Institution Gang

Investigation Prison Official; M. TAMAYO,

Cal Institution Gang Investigation Prison

Official; L. S. MCWEN, Warden of Cal;

MATTHEW CATE, Acting Director of

CDCR; K. HARRIS, Attorney General of

the State of California,

Respondents.

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Case No. 11cv2663-AJB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR STAY

AND ABEYANCE

[ECF No. 3]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On November 14, 2011, Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). On the same day,

Petitioner filed a request for stay and abeyance so that he may exhaust his administrative

appeal process regarding a claim he believes to be meritorious and directly related to his

Petition. ECF No. 3 (“Mot. Stay”). Pursuant to the Court’s briefing schedule, Respondents

timely filed their opposition to Petitioner’s motion on December 20, 2011. ECF No. 6

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1

 In determining the filing date of pleadings, pro se prisoners generally are entitled to the benefit of

the “mailbox rule,” which dictates that the statutory filing date is the date a document was presented to

prison authorities for mailing to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner presented his reply to prison authorities

on January 3, 2012. See Lopez v. Felker, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (utilizing

petitioner’s signature date as the relevant filing date).

-2- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

(“Opp’n”). Petitioner timely filed his reply on January 3, 2012.1 ECF No. 7 (“Reply”).

The Court has considered the above documents as well as the record as a whole.

Based thereon, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that he was erroneously validated as an associate

of the Mexican Mafia prison gang. Pet. at 8. More specifically, Petitioner contends that

prison officials violated his due process and fundamental liberty interest rights by: 1) failing

to give him a pre-validation hearing; 2) failing to support their decision with the requisite

“some evidence”; and 3) wrongfully imposing an indeterminate SHU term. Id. at 30-31.

Accordingly, in his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests that his validation as an associate of

the Mexican Mafia and his SHU term be canceled. Id. at 32. Petitioner also seeks

restoration of “the good time credits CDCR had taken while Petitioner was placed

administratively segregated (sic) for validation claims.” Id.

In his Motion to Stay, Petitioner contends that on June 30, 2011, the “Calipatria (Cal)

Institution Classification Committee (ICC) unexpectedly increased [his] release date.” Mot.

Stay at 1. Petitioner asserts that this increase was triggered by a recently enacted

regulation which states that:

An inmate who is placed in SHU, PSU, or ASU for misconduct described in

subsection (c) or upon validation as a prison gang member or associate is

ineligible to earn credits pursuant to section 2933 or 2933.05 during the time

he or she is in the SHU, PSU, or ASU for that misconduct.

15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b). Petitioner states that “he hasn’t engaged in any misconduct, to

allow or forfeit the good time credits entirely making him do more time.” Mot. Stay at 3.

Accordingly, Petitioner requests that the Court stay his Petition while he exhausts his

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-3- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

administrative appeals regarding his extended Earliest Possible Release Date (“EPRD”). Id.

at 3-4. Respondents contend that “a stay would serve no purpose and is inappropriate”

because Petitioner’s unexhausted claim is “plainly meritless.” Opp’n at 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, the exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a prerequisite to a

federal court’s consideration of claims presented in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (explaining that a federal court may not consider a petition for habeas

corpus unless the petitioner first has presented his claims to the state courts, thereby

“exhausting” them). The exhaustion requirement is founded on federal-state comity, as only

when the state court has been presented with the claim may it “pass upon and correct

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, exhaustion of

a habeas petitioner’s federal claims requires that they have been “fairly presented” in each

appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review,

and that the petitioner “alert[] [the state] court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). If state remedies have not been exhausted as to any of

the federal claims, the habeas petition typically should be dismissed. Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose, 455 U.S. at 522 (requiring dismissal of petitions that contain

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, commonly referred to as “mixed petitions”); see

also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-78 (2005) (confirming continued applicability of

“total exhaustion” rule even after AEDPA imposed one-year statute of limitations on habeas

claims). 

Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), all federal

habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and claims not exhausted

and presented to the federal court within the one-year period are forfeited. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). If a petitioner presents a mixed petition, the petitioner may seek to stay the

exhausted claims while he pursues the unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S.

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2

 Petitioner’s assertions that his motion is made for “good cause” and without “intentional dilatory

litigation tactics,” as well as his citation to Rhines, further suggest that he is not seeking a stay pursuant to

Kelly. Mot. Stay at 4-5.

-4- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

at 276-78. A petition may be stayed either under Rhines, or under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d

1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th

Cir. 2007). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009).

A stay pursuant to Rhines is available only in the limited circumstances where a

petitioner shows that: (1) there was good cause for the failure to have first exhausted the

claims in state court; (2) the claims at issue are potentially meritorious; and (3) he has not

been intentionally dilatory in pursuing the litigation. 544 U.S. at 274-78. When a petitioner

demonstrates these three requirements, “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a

district court to deny a stay.” Id. at 278. However, even if a petitioner had good cause for

his failure to exhaust, “the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him

a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Id. at 277.

A stay pursuant to Kelly requires compliance with the following three-step procedure:

(1) the petitioner files an amended petition deleting his unexhausted claims; (2) the district

court “stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the

petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims”; and (3)

the petitioner subsequently amends his federal habeas petition “and re-attaches the newlyexhausted claims to the original petition.” King, 564 F.3d at 1135 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at

1070-71). However, the petitioner is only allowed to amend his newly-exhausted claims

back into his federal petition if the claims are timely under the AEDPA or “relate back” to the

exhausted claims in the pending petition. Id. at 1140-43; see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S.

644, 662-64 (2005).

Here, because Petitioner acknowledges that not all of his claims are exhausted, but

makes no offer to withdraw the unexhausted claims, the Court interprets Petitioner’s motion

as a motion for a stay pursuant to Rhines.

2

 See Mot. Stay at 1-4.

///

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-5- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

DISCUSSION

In his Motion to Stay, Petitioner alleges that prison officials erroneously increased his

EPRD based upon a California regulation because Petitioner did not engage in any

misconduct sufficient to bar him from receiving credits. Mot. Stay at 3 (“[R]ecords reflect

that [Petitioner] hasn’t engaged in any misconduct, to allow or forfeit the good time credits

entirely making him do more time.”). Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner “has a

federally protected liberty interest in not having earned credits revoked through prison

disciplinary proceedings without due process,” but point out that Petitioner “does not have

a liberty interest in whether he is entitled to credits or a certain minimum parole date under

state law.” Opp’n at 3. Framing Petitioner’s unexhausted claim as “a state law claim that

[the] CDCR has filed to apply the California Code of Regulations properly,” Respondents

argue that Petitioner’s claim “asserts errors of state law, but fails to state a cognizable

federal habeas question.” Id. (“[Petitioner’s] claim that CDCR is not correctly calculating

his credits and his EPRD under California law does not establish a federal question.”). In

his Reply, Petitioner refutes Respondents’ interpretation of his unexhausted claim. Reply

at 3. 

A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“We have pointed out that the Great Writ

is available only where the Constitution or other federal law specifically protects against the

alleged unfairness or guarantees the procedural right in state courts.”). Thus, to present

a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim under § 2254, a state prisoner must allege both

that he is in custody pursuant to a “judgment of a State court,” and that he is in custody “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). As the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized, “federal habeas corpus relief

does not lie for errors of state law.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (per

curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 131

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-6- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

S. Ct. 13, 14 (2010) (per curiam) (“Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to

state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law.”).

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment,

so Respondents’ argument turns on whether Petitioner has identified a violation of the

federal Constitution, laws, or treaties. To the extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim

alleges only that CDCR officials erroneously applied state law, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s unexhausted claim is plainly meritless and therefore RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED. 

Petitioner, however, asserts that he “has raised fundamental established contentions

with the unexhausted issue. Specifically: U.S. Constitution - due process violation; expost

fact (sic) prohibition; and cruel and unusual punishment.” Mot. Stay at 3. In an abundance

of caution, the Court will address these arguments in turn. 

A. Due Process Violation

Petitioner asserts that he was not given any notice or warning regarding the EPRD

increase, and he further asserts that this increase was not triggered by “any pre-requisite

unlawful acts or acts of misconduct.” Mot. Stay at 1. In his administrative appeals

regarding his increased EPRD, Petitioner asserts that his “due process rights under the CA

and U.S. Constitutions are being violated by the current gang validation process which

provides insufficient procedures to [his] private and liberty interests (release date) now at

stake,” and that he “was not afforded . . . due process for [his] release date to change,

substantially.” Mot. Stay at 15. 

Although Petitioner frames the subject of his Motion to Stay as an unexhausted claim,

the Court finds that the instant claim is simply a restatement of the claims in his Petition.

In his Petition currently before the Court, Petitioner argues against his gang validation and

his indeterminate SHU term. See Pet. at 8, 30-32. Notably, in his Motion to Stay, Petitioner

states that “[t]he newly discovered issue directly stems from the validation and the SHU

term [imposed upon him] . . . .” (Mot. Stay at 3), and describes his increased EPRD as “a

direct and legal collateral consequence” of his gang validation and SHU term (Reply at 1).

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3

 Petitioner’s interpretation of 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b) is unclear. By citing this regulation and

referring to it as a “statute for inmates ‘validated as prison gang member or associates (sic) and placed in

a A.S.U. or S.H.U.” (Mot. Stay at 1), Petitioner seems to understand that his validation as a prison gang

associate triggered his placement in the SHU, which triggered his inability to earn credits. However,

Petitioner also asserts that he “hasn’t engaged in any misconduct, to allow or forfeit the good time credits

entirely making him do more time.” Mot. Stay at 3. Petitioner’s contention that he has not committed any

misconduct may simply be a statement refuting his status as a prison gang associate, but Petitioner’s

emphasis on the word “misconduct” suggests that Petitioner misinterprets 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b). See Mot.

Stay at 2-3 (Petitioner repeatedly puts the word “misconduct” in bold and provides the Court with the

dictionary definition of “misconduct”). The regulation at issue is written in the disjunctive, such that it

addresses inmates who are placed in the SHU “for misconduct described in subsection (c)” or “upon

validation as a prison gang member or associate.” 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b). The regulation then states that

an inmate is ineligible to earn credit during the time he is in the SHU “for that misconduct,” i.e., the

“misconduct described in subsection (c)” or the “validation as a prison gang member or associate.” Id. That

is, placement in the SHU upon validation as a prison gang member results in an inmate’s ineligibility to earn

credits; an inmate need not have committed any other additional “misconduct.” See id. Accordingly, to the

extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim alleges that CDCR officials erred in validating him as a prison gang

associate, the Court finds that this claim is duplicative of the claims in his Petition.

-7- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

Thus, Petitioner seemingly recognizes that his validation as a gang member led to the

imposition of his indeterminate SHU term. See, e.g., Mot. Stay at 1 (“Petitioner[’]s varified

(sic) petition regards 3 grounds for relief, opposing and challenging CDCR labelling (sic) him

a prison gang associate and thereafter placing him in the SHU.”). However, Petitioner

seemingly fails to recognize that the increase in his EPRD is also inextricably linked to these

events, such that attacking the validity of his increased EPRD is redundant.3 Therefore, to

the extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim alleges that CDCR officials violated his due

process rights, the Court finds that this claim is duplicative of the claims in his Petition. 

Regardless, as Respondents point out, “[Petitioner] does not have a liberty interest

in whether he is entitled to credits or a certain minimum parole date under state law.”

Opp’n at 3. In fact, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that “[t]here is no right under

the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid

sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” Swarthout,

131 S. Ct. at 862 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.

1, 7 (1979)); see also Cal. Penal Code § 2933(c) (West 2011) (“Credit is a privilege, not a

right.”). Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim alleges that CDCR

officials violated his due process rights, the Court finds that this claim is plainly meritless and

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED.

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-8- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

B. Ex Post Facto Violation

Petitioner claims that the California regulation at issue violates the Ex Post Facto

Clause because it is “being applied to [Petitioner] whose state criminal court conviction and

sentencing occurred nearly 10 years before the new statute was enacted,” and the new

statute “extend[s] the amount of time [he] spend[s] in prison due to the inability to

maintain and earn good conduct time credits.” Mot. Stay at 15. 

“[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that retroactively increase the penalty for

a crime.” Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995)). Thus, “[a] law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it

is 1) retroactive–it applies to events occurring before its enactment; and 2) detrimental–it

produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered

crimes.” Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Notably, the focus of the inquiry “is not on whether a legislative

change produces some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, nor on whether an amendment

affects a prisoner’s opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release.” Moor,

603 F.3d at 663 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner is correct that the current version of 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b) was not in

existence at the time of his criminal conviction, however, this regulation does not apply to

the crime(s) for which Petitioner was convicted. Rather, this regulation applies to

Petitioner’s recent validation as a prison gang associate, an event that occurred after the

regulation’s enactment. Thus, despite Petitioner’s assertions to the contrary, the state

regulation at issue here was not retroactively applied to him. Moreover, the regulation at

issue does not increase any criminal penalties. See Cal. Penal Code § 2933(c) (West 2011)

(“Credit is a privilege, not a right. Credit must be earned and may be forfeited . . . .”)

Although 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b) determines when Petitioner is ineligible to earn credits, this

regulation does not extend the term of imprisonment to which Petitioner was originally

sentenced. See 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b). Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument regarding the

impact of 15 C.C.R. § 3043.4 (b) on his ability to earn credits does not establish the requisite

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-9- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

“retroactive” and “detrimental” effect on the duration of his confinement to constitute an ex

post facto violation. See, e.g., Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862 (“There is no right under the

Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence

. . . .”). Although Petitioner may have lost the opportunity to earn good time credits while

in the SHU, the effect of this, if any, on the duration of his confinement is speculative.

Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim alleges that the California

regulation at issue violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court finds that this claim is plainly

meritless and RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED.

C. Eighth Amendment Violation

Petitioner claims that he is not a prison gang associate and that he has not

committed any misconduct. Mot. Stay at 15. Petitioner therefore alleges that it is “cruel

and unusual punishment to make [his] sentence more, for nothing.” Id.

The Supreme Court has held that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002).

Simple placement in segregated housing, even for an indeterminate period, does not by

itself constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494

n.6 (9th Cir. 1984).

Petitioner contends that the increase in his EPRD violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, but he offers no binding or persuasive

authority to support his argument. Notably, even if Petitioner argued that his mere

placement in the SHU constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, his argument would fail. See Toussaint, 722 F.2d at 1494 n.6 (“Even an

indeterminate sentence to punitive isolation does not without more constitute cruel and

unusual punishment.”). Any argument regarding guaranteed early release or the loss of a

parole date would be similarly unsuccessful. See Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862.

Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner’s unexhausted claim alleges that his

placement in the SHU and/or ineligibility to earn credits violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court finds that this claim is plainly

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-10- 11cv2663-AJB (BLM) 

meritless and RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED.

Because Petitioner’s unexhausted claim is plainly meritless, or, in the alternative,

duplicative of the claims in his Petition, he has not demonstrated his entitlement to a stay

under Rhines. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and

Abeyance be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and

(2) denying Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 21, 2012, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than March 12, 2012. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 30, 2012

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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