Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00510/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00510-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD E. KARR, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

D.K. SISTO, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-00510-RSL-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. SUMMARY 

Petitioner Richard E. Karr is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison, 

Solano in Vacaville, California. He was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in 

Alameda County Superior Court on March 3, 1976, and sentenced to seven-years-to-life with 

the possibility of parole. He has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, together with 

relevant portions of the state court record, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2005 denial 

of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings of the State of California (the “Board”).1 (See

Docket 1 at 1-64.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, and petitioner has filed a 

traverse in reply to the answer. (See Dkt. 6; Dkt. 7.) The briefing is now complete and this 

 1 The Board of Parole Hearings replaced the Board of Prison Terms, which was abolished on 

July 1, 2005. See California Penal Code § 5075(a). 

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matter is ripe for review. The Court, having thoroughly reviewed the record and briefing of 

the parties, recommends that the Court deny the petition, and dismiss this action with 

prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner participated in the murder of the victim, Robert Sweeney, because he 

believed the victim was a “snitch” who had informed police of petitioner’s 

involvement in a large drug trafficking conspiracy involving several co-conspirators. 

(See Dkt. 6, Exhibit 3 at 9-14.) On August 9, 1974, petitioner and his co-conspirators 

interrogated and severely beat the victim, and then bound him with twine and gagged 

him. (See id. at 11-12.) After the victim was placed in the trunk of petitioner’s 

vehicle, petitioner drove to the highest point of the San Mateo Bridge. Although the 

victim was still alive, he was thrown off the bridge into the water below. (See id. at 

12.) His body was found floating in the San Francisco Bay the next day. (See id.) 

When petitioner was arrested a few days later, authorities found in his home a 

thirty-eight caliber revolver, a copy of the Daily Review containing an article about 

the victim’s death, and several copies of a tape the victim made on the day he died. 

(See id. at 12.) The victim apparently suspected that he was about to be murdered by 

petitioner and his co-conspirators, because he began the tape, “This is the story of my 

life.” (Id. at 11.) 

Evidence admitted at petitioner’s trial revealed that petitioner and his coconspirators had previously abducted, beaten, and interrogated another suspected 

informant, Barry Krell, in the same manner as the victim in July 1974. (See id. at 13-

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14.) Tapes of this interrogation were also found at petitioner’s home. (See id. at 14.) 

Although the co-conspirators threatened to throw Krell from the San Mateo Bridge to 

his death, they dumped him out on the bridge instead. (See id. at 13-14.) 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in Alameda County Superior 

Court on March 3, 1976, and was originally sentenced to death. (See id., Ex. 4 at 1; id., Ex. 

2.) In a separate case, however, the California Supreme Court later held that the provisions of 

the death penalty statute under which petitioner had been sentenced were unconstitutional, 

and that the remedy for prisoners like petitioner is commutation to a life sentence. (See id., 

Ex. 2 at 7-10.) Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal modified petitioner’s judgment. 

Petitioner received a sentence of seven-years-to-life with the possibility of parole rather than 

the death penalty. (See id., Ex. 1 at 1-2.) His minimum eligible parole date was set for 

August 14, 1981. (See id., Ex. 3 at 1.) 

The parole denial which is the subject of this petition took place after a parole hearing 

held by the Board on August 2, 2005. (See id.) This was petitioner’s nineteenth parole 

consideration hearing, and the Board denied his application for parole for one year. (See id. at 

57.) As of the date of the 2005 parole hearing, petitioner was fifty-six-years-old and had been 

in custody for approximately twenty-nine years. (See id. at 46 and 51.) 

After denial of his 2005 application, petitioner filed habeas corpus petitions in the 

Alameda County Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court. 

(See Dkt. 1, Ex. P; Dkt. 6, Exs. 8 and 9.) Those petitions were unsuccessful. (See Dkt. 6, 

Exs. 8 and 9.) This federal habeas petition followed. Petitioner contends his 2005 denial by 

the Board violated his federal due process rights. Thus, petitioner does not challenge the 

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validity of his conviction, but instead challenges the Board’s 2005 decision finding him 

unsuitable for parole. 

 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his 

underlying state court conviction.”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not be granted 

with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner 

demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the [U.S.] Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the U.S. Supreme Court. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See id. at 412-13; Clark v. Murphy, 

 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

 In each case, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state court decision 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine 

whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned 

state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders upholding that judgment are 

presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 

(1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

IV. FEDERAL HABEAS CHALLENGES TO STATE PAROLE DENIALS 

A. Due Process Right to be Released on Parole

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the government 

is prohibited from depriving an inmate of life, liberty or property without the due process of 

law. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. A prisoner’s due process claim must be analyzed in two 

steps: the first asks whether the state has interfered with a constitutionally protected liberty or 

property interest of the prisoner, and the second asks whether the procedures accompanying 

that interference were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 

454, 460 (1989); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether petitioner has a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest in parole. The Supreme Court articulated the governing rule in this area in 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 

U.S. 369 (1987). See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 

“the ‘clearly established’ framework of Greenholtz and Allen” to California’s parole scheme). 

The Court in Greenholtz determined that although there is no constitutional right to be 

conditionally released on parole, if a state’s statutory scheme employs mandatory language 

that creates a presumption that parole release will be granted if certain designated findings are 

made, the statute gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 

12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78. 

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As discussed infra, California statutes and regulations afford a prisoner serving an 

indeterminate life sentence an expectation of parole unless, in the judgment of the parole 

authority, he “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 

Title 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(a). The Ninth Circuit has therefore held that “California’s 

parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion, 

306 F.3d at 902. To similar effect, Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007), held 

that California Penal Code § 3041 vests all “prisoners whose sentences provide for the 

possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole 

release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due 

Process Clause.” This “liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but 

upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (2003). See also 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127. 

Because the Board’s denial of parole interfered with petitioner’s constitutionallyprotected liberty interest, this Court must proceed to the second step in the procedural due 

process analysis and determine whether the procedures accompanying that interference were 

constitutionally sufficient. “[T]he Supreme Court [has] clearly established that a parole 

board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to this interest if the board’s 

decision is not supported by ‘some evidence in the record.’” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (holding the “some evidence” standard 

applies in prison disciplinary proceedings)). The “some evidence” standard requires this 

Court to determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Although Hill

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involved the accumulation of good time credits rather than release on parole, later cases have 

held that the same constitutional principles apply in the parole context because both situations 

directly affect the duration of the prison term. See e.g., Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 

1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (adopting the “some evidence” standard set forth by the Supreme 

Court in Hill in the parole context); accord, Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 

915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

“The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require 

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact,” however. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the “some evidence” standard is not an invitation to examine 

the entire record, independently assess witnesses’ credibility, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. at 

455. Instead, it is there to ensure that an inmate’s loss of parole was not arbitrarily imposed. 

See id. at 454. The Court in Hill added an exclamation point to the limited scope of federal 

habeas review when it upheld the finding of the prison administrators despite the Court’s 

characterization of the supporting evidence as “meager.” See id. at 457. 

B. California’s Statutory and Regulatory Scheme

In order to determine whether “some evidence” supported the Board’s decision with 

respect to petitioner, this Court must consider the California statutes and regulations that 

govern the Board’s decision-making. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under California law, the 

Board is authorized to set release dates and grant parole for inmates with indeterminate 

sentences. See Cal. Penal Code § 3040 and 5075, et seq. Section 3041(a) requires the Board 

to meet with each inmate one year before the expiration of his minimum sentence and 

normally set a release date in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar 

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gravity and magnitude with respect to their threat to the public, as well as comply with 

applicable sentencing rules. Subsection (b) of this section requires that the Board set a release 

date “unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or the 

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration 

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Id., § 3041(b). Pursuant 

to the mandate of § 3041(a), the Board must “establish criteria for the setting of parole release 

dates” which take into account the number of victims of the offense as well as other factors in 

mitigation or aggravation of the crime. The Board has therefore promulgated regulations 

setting forth the guidelines it must follow when determining parole suitability. See 15 CCR 

§ 2402, et seq. 

Accordingly, the Board is guided by the following regulations in making a 

determination whether a prisoner is suitable for parole: 

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life 

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the 

length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable 

for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the 

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 

released from prison. 

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information 

available to the panel shall be considered in determining 

suitability for parole. Such information shall include the 

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present 

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in 

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the 

base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, 

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the 

crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use 

of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be 

released to the community; and any other information which 

bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances 

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for 

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parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of 

unsuitability. 

15 CCR § 2402(a) and (b). Subsections (c) and (d) also set forth suitability and unsuitability 

factors to further assist the Board in analyzing whether an inmate should be granted parole, 

although “the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a 

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.” 15 CCR § 2402(c). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the California Supreme 

Court in In re Lawrence recently held that the proper inquiry for a reviewing court is 

“whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a 

current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence 

of certain factual findings.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008). The Lawrence

court also asserted that the Board’s decision must demonstrate “an individualized 

consideration of the specified criteria,” but “[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of 

suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant 

circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness 

to the public.” Id. at 1204-05, 1212. As long as the evidence underlying the Board’s decision 

has “some indicia of reliability,” parole has not been arbitrarily denied. See Jancsek, 833 F.2d 

at 1390. As the California courts have continually noted, the Board’s discretion in parole 

release matters is very broad. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1204. Thus, the penal code, 

corresponding regulations, and California law clearly establish that the fundamental 

consideration in parole decisions is public safety and an assessment of a prisoner’s current 

dangerousness. See id. at 1205-06. 

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 C. Summary of Governing Principles 

 By virtue of California law, petitioner has a constitutional liberty interest in release on 

parole. The parole authorities may decline to set a parole date only upon a finding that 

petitioner’s release would present an unreasonable present risk of danger to society if he is 

released from prison. Where the parole authorities deny release, based upon an adverse 

finding on that issue, the role of a federal habeas court is narrowly limited. It must deny relief 

if there is “some evidence” in the record to support the parole authority’s finding of present 

dangerousness. The penal code, corresponding regulations, and California law clearly support 

the foregoing interpretation. 

 V. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 

 Petitioner contends that the Board violated his federal due process rights by finding 

him unsuitable for parole without any “evidence demonstrating that Petitioner is currently a 

threat to public safety.” (Dkt. 1 at 2; see id. at 38-60.) He also argues that the Board’s 

consistent denial of parole reflects either a “no parole policy” for life prisoners, or “displays a 

bias and predisposition to find against Petitioner at every hearing” in violation of his due 

process rights. (Id. at 21 and 28-31.) In addition, petitioner claims that his right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment was violated by the Board’s 

failure to “fix a term of imprisonment proportionate to Petitioner’s individual culpability” as 

he asserts is required for prisoners whose commitment offense took place prior to 1977. (Id. 

at 2; see id. at 30-31 and 61-64.) Finally, petitioner argues that his right to be free from ex 

post facto laws was violated by the parole denial, which imposed “a more [harsh] and 

burdensome sentence” by arbitrarily converting his sentence of life with the possibility of 

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parole into life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at 30; see id. at 31.) 

Respondent claims that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in being released on parole, that the “some evidence” standard is inapplicable in this 

context, and that even if he does have a protected liberty interest, the Board adequately 

predicated its denial of parole on “some evidence.” (See Dkt. 6 at 1-12.) Accordingly, 

respondent argues that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the Board’s 2005 

decision, and the Alameda County Superior Court’s Order upholding the parole denial was 

not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (See id. at 12-14.) 

 VI. ANALYSIS OF RECORD IN THIS CASE 

A. State Court Proceedings 

Following the Board’s parole denial, petitioner filed three unsuccessful habeas 

petitions in the state courts. The Alameda County Superior Court denied his habeas petition 

in a reasoned decision, and petitioner’s habeas petitions filed in the California Court of 

Appeal and California Supreme Court were both summarily denied. (See id., Exs. 5-11.) 

Respondent admits that petitioner’s habeas petition was timely, and that petitioner properly 

exhausted each of his claims before the California Supreme Court. (See id. at 4.) 

Accordingly, this Court reviews the Alameda County Superior Court’s Order upholding the 

Board’s decision to determine whether it meets the deferential AEDPA standards, as it is the 

last reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04.

B. Petitioner’s First Due Process Claim 

The Board based its decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole primarily upon 

the aggravated circumstances of his commitment offense, but also cited petitioner’s 

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insufficient psychological evaluation, lack of employment plans, and opposition from the 

Alameda County District Attorney to petitioner’s release on parole. (See Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 53-

59.) Thus, the Board’s findings tracked the applicable suitability and unsuitability factors 

listed in § 2402(b), (c) and (d) of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. See also 

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214 (holding that “the aggravated nature of the crime does not in 

and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record 

also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or 

her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s 

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain 

probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety.”) After 

considering all reliable evidence in the record, the Board concluded that evidence of 

petitioner’s suitability did not outweigh the evidence of his unsuitability for parole. (See Dkt. 

6, Ex. 3 at 53.) 

With respect to petitioner’s commitment offense, the Board found the circumstances 

of the first degree murder to be particularly aggravated, because he “plan[ned], with his 

confederates, to kidnap [the victim], torture him by beating him unmercifully, and then after 

[petitioner and his crime partners had] done that for a period of time, bag him up and take him 

to the top of the bridge and, while he was still alive and [petitioner] knew it, dump him into 

the Bay.” (Id. at 54.) The Board concluded that petitioner’s crime was “extremely egregious. 

It cause[d] one jury to conclude that [petitioner should] be sentenced to death, and that was 

changed by the decision of the Supreme Court, [but] anyone who reads these circumstances is 

going to conclude, as we have concluded in assessing [petitioner’s] suitability, that this is a 

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very horrendous [offense]. . . .” (Id. at 55.) In addition, the Board found that the offense was 

“carried out in a dispassionate and a calculated manner such as an execution style murder. 

The victim was abused, defiled and (indiscernible) during or after the offense. The offense 

was carried [out] in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for 

human suffering. . . .” (Id. at 53.) See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)(B), (C) and (D). Moreover, the 

Board observed that it “was not an isolated incident . . . [petitioner] used this offense for the 

object lesson that [he] wanted to carry forth . . . to anybody who interfered with [his] 

operation at the time.” (Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 55.) 

The second factor cited by the Board was petitioner’s most recent psychological 

evaluation prepared by Dr. Rouse in 2002, which the Board found did not support a finding of 

suitability because it was inconclusive as to petitioner’s current dangerousness. (See id. at 

56.) California law requires the Board to consider “[a]ll relevant, reliable information 

available to the panel,” including a prisoner’s “past and present mental state” and “past and 

present attitude toward the crime.” 15 CCR § 2402(b). In his report, Dr. Rouse asserted that 

petitioner presented a low risk of dangerousness when compared to other inmates at CSPSolano, but he did not compare petitioner’s dangerousness with average citizens in the 

community or discuss how petitioner would fare if released into the community. (See id. at 

56.) The Board asserted that this omission by the psychologist would not “be considered a 

negative in, you know, the final determination for suitability, and certainly, in no way makes 

[petitioner] responsible for what is or is not in the evaluation report.” (Id. at 32.) The Board 

was concerned, however, that in addition to this omission, Dr. Rouse qualified his other 

findings in the report as being “limit[ed by] the information available to the psychologist and 

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the psychologist being unable to assess other positive factors that might otherwise be 

considered in the report.” (Id. at 56.) Furthermore, the Board expressed concern that the 

report was too outdated to provide much support for a suitability determination at the time of 

the 2005 hearing, because it was at least three years old. (Id. at 58.) As a result, the Board 

concluded that the report was “of limited value in confirming [petitioner’s] suitability, and it’s 

questionable, and casts doubt upon [petitioner’s] suitability. . . .” (Id. at 56.) Accordingly, 

the Board recommended that the report “be updated to address [the panel’s] concerns” before 

petitioner’s next parole hearing. (Id. at 57; see id. at 30.) 

This Court finds that the Board’s conclusion that an updated psychological evaluation 

was necessary before petitioner could be found suitable for parole at the 2005 hearing was 

amply supported by evidence in the record. Specifically, although Dr. Rouse found that 

petitioner “expressed culpability for his life offense and expressed an appropriate amount of 

remorse” on the date of his August 2002 psychological evaluation, petitioner declined to 

discuss the circumstances of the commitment offense with the panel and also failed to express 

any remorse regarding the victim’s death during his August 2005 parole hearing. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 

B at 1; see Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 6-7 and 46-52.) See also 15 CCR § 2402(d)(3) (providing that a 

prisoner’s “signs of remorse,” including evidence that he “understands the nature and 

magnitude of the offense” is a factor tending to show suitability for parole). Instead, 

petitioner told the panel that the victim “was my dearest, closest and best friend. What 

happened to him that night will only be between the five of us that were there that night. I 

will not belittle, I won’t besmirch him. We’re not talking about him.” (Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 50.) 

This comment by petitioner in 2005 may indeed reflect a continuing attitude that the law, 

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generally, may not apply to petitioner in situations which are somehow the private preserve of 

the people who are present. In any event, the apparent constraints on Dr. Rouse’s findings, 

coupled with the outdated nature of the report, support the Board’s conclusion. 

The third factor relied upon by the Board was petitioner’s insufficient plans for 

employment, because “it wouldn’t be right for [the panel] to simply assume that [petitioner is] 

. . . going to get a job in the optical areas” if released on parole. (Id. at 35 and 57.) See also 

15 CCR § 2402(d)(8) (providing that a prisoner’s “realistic plans for release or [development 

of] marketable skills that can be put to use upon release” constitutes a factor tending to 

indicate suitability for parole). The Board acknowledged petitioner’s strong residential plans 

for parole, which would involve petitioner moving in with his current wife, Nancy, in 

Vacaville. (See Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 17.) It also noted his substantial experience, training, and 

certifications in the optical and construction fields, including his 2004 certifications from the 

Electronics Technicians Association and “PIA Optical.” (See id. at 25-28.) When the Board 

specifically asked petitioner about his employment plan, however, petitioner admitted, “I 

really haven’t – really, I don’t know what jobs are presented to me or what I would have to 

do. You know, I’m willing to do anything that it would take to get me employed.” (Id. at 36-

37.) He also stated, “So, you know what, excuse me, for me the [optical] field is wide open 

. . . I can become a teacher, a trainer or – do anything.” (Id. at 38.) The Board ultimately 

disagreed, finding that petitioner needed to “become more aggressive in being more specific 

about where [he] might be employed on release prior to [his] next hearing.” (Id. at 57.) 

Especially in light of the Board’s broad discretion to attach importance to any “information 

which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release,” the Board could reasonably conclude 

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that petitioner needed to establish firm employment plans before his parole plans could be 

considered realistic. 15 CCR § 2402(b); see id. § 2402(d)(8). 

Petitioner argues that the Board erred by considering a letter of opposition to 

petitioner’s release on parole from the Alameda County District Attorney during his parole 

hearing. (See Dkt. 1 at 21.) Specifically, the District Attorney asserted that “on behalf of 

Alameda County, we object to parole in the strongest possible terms. Inmate Karr is a sick 

sadistic (indiscernible) murderer who has no remorse for his victim and will never ever be 

safe enough to be released. Parole for this prisoner should be denied now and forever.” (Dkt. 

6, Ex. 3 at 20.) Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, however, in making its suitability 

determination the Board must “take into account all pertinent information and input about the 

particular case from the inmate’s victims, the officials familiar with his or her criminal 

background, and other members of the public who have an interest in the grant or denial of 

parole to this prisoner.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1086 (2005). California law 

affords a prosecutor the opportunity to “comment on the facts of the case and present an 

opinion about the appropriate disposition.” See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.7; 15 CCR § 2030. 

Because the Board relied upon other reliable evidence of petitioner’s unsuitability for parole, 

in addition to its consideration of opposition by law enforcement, its consideration of the 

District Attorney’s opinion did not render the Board’s conclusion arbitrary and capricious. 

(See Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 18-20.) See also Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1080 

n.14 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

In addition, contrary to petitioner’s argument that the Board failed to consider or give 

appropriate weight to the parole suitability rules which favored petitioner, the Board did not 

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rely upon petitioner’s numerous disciplinary violations in prison as a basis for finding him 

unsuitable for parole because they were committed at least fifteen years before the hearing. 

(See Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 21-22 and 55-56.) See also 15 CCR § 2402(c)(6) (providing that a 

prisoner’s serious misconduct in prison or jail constitutes a factor indicating unsuitability for 

parole). A “CDC 115” documents a prisoner’s misconduct believed to be a violation of law 

or otherwise not minor in nature. See 15 CCR § 3312(a)(3). The Board noted that 

petitioner’s “initial behavior in the institution was far from exemplary, and [he was] subject to 

. . . eight different serious 115s, the last one was in ’89.” (Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 55.) Specifically, 

petitioner received 115s in “June ’79, [for] assault on an inmate; May 1980, possession of a 

hypodermic kit; May 1981, possession of inmate manufactured alcohol; May 1982, 

possession of inmate manufactured stabbing instrument; October ’81, possession of 

hypodermic needles and syringes; January of 1983, [possession of] stimulants and sedatives; 

and the other two [115s] were relatively minor.” (Id. at 21.) Based upon these serious 

disciplinary violations, the Board observed that “some 15 years ago, to say or to describe you 

as a disciplinary problem, wouldn’t address accurately the situation.” (Id.) When petitioner 

was initially incarcerated, he “continued to be the person [he was] perceived to be when [he] 

came in here. Hot shot drug kingpin, outlaw, don’t mess with me type of guy.” (Id. at 55-56.) 

The Board acknowledged, however, that petitioner later made “a substantial change” 

in his behavior “from very, very serious 115s to none at all.” (Id. at 21.) “Obviously 

[petitioner] started making different kinds of decisions.” (Id. at 21-22.) Petitioner explained 

that he modified his behavior after a group of life term prisoners “took me under their wing. 

These are guys that were lifers at the time . . . They got me interested in other things other 

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than what I was doing.” (Id. at 22.) Petitioner also stated, “A psychiatrist in San Quentin told 

me there’s two outcomes. He said you’re either going to be institutionalized or make a 

change.” (Id.) As a result, the Board’s observed that petitioner has “in essence been 

discipline free, programming successfully, since that period of time.” (Id. at 56.) 

Furthermore, the Board did not base its decision that petitioner was unsuitable for 

parole upon petitioner’s juvenile or adult pre-conviction criminal record. See 15 CCR 

§ 2402(b) (requiring the Board to consider a prisoner’s “past criminal history, including 

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented”); id. § 2402(d)(1) 

(lack of juvenile history of assaulting others or committing crimes with a potential of personal 

harm to victims may tend to indicate suitability for parole). Specifically, the Board noted that 

petitioner had “no juvenile record, and [although he was] arrested in 1966 for possession of 

marijuana . . . the State would not prosecute. And on June 8, 1972, [petitioner] deserted from 

the United States Army. Disposition noted was that the Army did not prosecute that action.” 

(Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 14.) Although petitioner admitted to smoking a lot of marijuana and 

experimenting with methamphetamine prior to his incarceration, petitioner asserts that he has 

refrained from using drugs since approximately 1979 when he ingested an unknown substance 

that made him psychotic and impaired his motor skills for a month while he was incarcerated 

at San Quentin. (See id. at 16.) 

It is therefore an inaccurate characterization of the record to say that the Board failed 

to consider evidence that favored petitioner, or found him unsuitable for parole based solely 

upon the commitment offense without any evidence of current dangerousness. (See Dkt. 1 at 

2, 20, and 57-60.) As stated above, it is beyond the authority of a federal habeas court to 

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determine whether evidence of suitability outweighs the circumstances of the commitment 

offense, together with any other reliable evidence of unsuitability for parole. The Board has 

broad discretion to determine how suitability and unsuitability factors interrelate to support its 

conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212. 

Although the Board praised petitioner’s progress in prison, it ultimately found that the 

aggravated circumstances of petitioner’s offense, psychological evaluation, lack of 

employment plans, and opposition from the Alameda County District Attorney indicated that 

petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if 

released from prison. (See Dkt. 6, Ex. 3 at 53.) Based upon the information discussed above 

and the record before this Court, the Board’s conclusion that petitioner was unsuitable for 

parole at the time of the 2005 hearing was properly supported by “some evidence” of current 

dangerousness. 

C. Petitioner’s Second Due Process Claim 

Petitioner argues that the Board’s denial of parole at his 2005 hearing reflects a “no 

parole policy” for life prisoners with indeterminate sentences, or alternatively, “displays a 

bias and predisposition to find against Petitioner at every hearing, and thus violates the basic 

fundamentals of due process of law.” (Dkt. 1 at 21; see id. at 28-31.) Although petitioner has 

a due process right to parole consideration by a neutral, impartial decision-maker, his claim of 

bias must be supported by the record. See O'Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 

1990) (an inmate is “entitled to have his release date considered by a Board that [is] free from 

bias or prejudice”); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[c]onclusory 

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas 

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relief.”). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Board was biased, or motivated by any 

improper consideration such as a “no parole policy.” See Bettencourt v. Knowles, 2009 WL 

4755403, *17-18 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (unpublished) (holding where petitioner has offered no 

evidence to support claim of parole bias his claim should be denied). As discussed above, 

petitioner’s case received individualized consideration by the Board during his 2005 parole 

hearing, and the Board’s decision was careful, thorough, and factually specific. Accordingly, 

petitioner’s contention should be denied. 

D. Petitioner’s Cruel & Unusual Punishment Claim

Petitioner committed his first degree murder offense in 1974, when the Indeterminate 

Sentencing Law (“ISL”) was still in effect in California, and he received an indeterminate 

sentence of seven-years-to-life with the possibility of parole. (See Dkt. 6, Ex. 1 at 1-2.) 

Petitioner asserts that the Board is required to “fix a term of confinement and . . . set a parole 

release date for all ISL prisoners,” including himself. (Dkt. 1 at 27.) Specifically, petitioner 

claims that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment was violated by the Board’s failure to set a parole release date for him, because 

his term of imprisonment was disproportionate to his offense. (Id. at 2 and 30-31.) Because 

petitioner’s contentions are based upon a misunderstanding of California’s repealed ISL and 

relevant case law, they are unavailing. 

Under the ISL, which was California’s pre-1977 sentencing regime, “almost all 

convicted felons received indeterminate terms, often with short minimums and life 

maximums. Within this broad range, the parole authority was given virtually unbridled 

statutory power to determine and redetermine, after the actual commencement of the 

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imprisonment, what length of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned,” and when to 

allow them to be released on parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1088 (2005) 

(internal citations omitted). The unbridled discretion afforded to the parole authority by the 

ISL attracted criticism by reformers, and would eventually lead to the enactment of the 

Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”) in 1977. While the ISL was still in effect, however, 

“[c]ontemporaneous court decisions and administrative developments, addressing problems in 

the indeterminate sentencing law,” attempted to respond to some of these criticisms. Id. at 

1089. For example, petitioner cites the Chairman’s Directive 75/20, which was issued by the 

parole authority in April 1975 to create “a structure for setting parole dates based on listed 

ranges and factors. Following this directive, numerous hearings were conducted . . . to 

establish fixed parole dates for almost all inmates.” Id. (See also Dkt. 1 at 24.) The 

California Court of Appeal later invalidated Directive 75/20, however, because it failed to 

base prisoners’ parole release dates upon all factors relevant to their suitability for parole, 

such as post-conviction behavior. See In re Stanley, 54 Cal.App.3d 1030, *8-9 (1976). 

In People v. Wingo, the California Supreme Court held that in some instances, a lifemaximum sentence may be so grossly disproportionate, given the particular circumstances of 

an offense, as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 14 

Cal.3d 169, 175-80 (1975). In addition, the Wingo court held that if an actual parole release 

date has been set for a prisoner by the Board, the proportionality of the prisoner’s sentence 

should be measured by that date. See id. at 183. 

The California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Rodriguez, which was issued only 

two months after Wingo, further explained the Board’s term-fixing responsibilities under the 

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ISL. 14 Cal.3d 639 (1975). Specifically, Rodriguez held that a sentence of one-year-to-life 

for a single incident of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of fourteen 

was so disproportionate to the prisoner’s individual culpability under the circumstances as to 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 653-54; Dannenberg, 24 Cal.4th at 1089. 

In addition, the Rodriguez court asserted that the ISL must be construed as requiring the 

parole authority to set maximum terms for all prisoners that are proportionate to their 

individual culpability, although this duty is clearly distinct from the parole authority’s power 

to decide if and when the prisoner is ready for parole. Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d at 652. Finally, 

Rodriguez held that where the Board has failed to set a term for a prisoner with an 

indeterminate sentence, for the purposes of assessing the term’s constitutionality under the 

Eighth Amendment, the term will be presumed to be the maximum sentence for the prisoner’s 

offense. See id. at 654 n.18. 

In other words, although Wingo and Rodriguez held that prisoners’ maximum 

sentences must be proportionate to their culpability, these decisions did not create an 

enforceable right for ISL prisoners to have parole release dates set by the Board. See Wingo, 

14 Cal.3d at 184. Rather, these decisions established that the Board should set a term for ISL 

prisoners “as a means to the end of doing a cruel and unusual punishment analysis and not as 

an end to itself.” Johnston v. Ayers, 2009 WL 1621904, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (unpublished). 

Thus, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the Board does not have a “mandatory duty to set a 

release date for all indeterminate life inmates, or any particular such prisoner,” because “an 

inmate must be found suitable before a release date is set. . . .” Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 

1087-88 and 1093. In a particular case, if no term has been explicitly set by the Board 

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because the prisoner has not yet been found suitable for parole, the prisoner’s term is 

presumed to be the statutory maximum of his sentence for the purposes of cruel and unusual 

punishment analysis. See Wingo, 14 Cal.3d at 184; Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d at 654 n.18. 

Here, the Board has not set a term of imprisonment or set a release date for petitioner 

because he has never been found suitable for parole. Accordingly, in order to assess 

petitioner’s claim that his sentence is so disproportionate to his first degree murder offense as 

to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, this Court must presume that petitioner’s term is 

the statutory maximum for his offense, life imprisonment. 

To the extent that petitioner is arguing his life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment under the California Constitution, his claim is not cognizable in this federal 

habeas proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Furthermore, 

petitioner’s claim that his life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution also fails because the U.S. Supreme Court has 

held that a life sentence is constitutional, even for a non-violent property crime. See Rummel 

v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (upholding a life sentence with the possibility of parole, 

imposed under a Texas recidivist statute, for a defendant convicted of obtaining $120.75 by 

false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for two to ten years); 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-64 (1990) (upholding a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, 

although it was his first felony offense). As a result, a life sentence for a first degree murder 

such as that committed by petitioner is not so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Banks v. 

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Kramer, 2009 WL 256449 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (unpublished) (holding that a Board’s refusal to 

release a prisoner who was sentenced to sixteen-years-to-life for murder does not constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment). Accordingly, petitioner’s contentions are unavailing. 

E. Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto Claim 

Petitioner also contends that “the Board’s policy of denying parole to Petitioner at a 

denial rate of 100% of the time with over 33 real years of imprisonment thus far served is by 

far a more harsh and burdensome sentence” than he was entitled to, because the Board has 

“arbitrarily convert[ed] his sentence of life with parole to that of life without parole.” (Dkt. 1 

at 2 and 30-31.) This Court construes petitioner’s argument as a claim that the Board’s parole 

denial violated petitioner’s right to be free from ex post facto laws, because the Board 

imposed a more severe penalty, a determinate life sentence, in place of petitioner’s 

indeterminate life sentence. 

Petitioner’s claim fails for multiple reasons. First, Article I of the United States 

Constitution provides that neither Congress nor any state shall pass an ex post facto law. 

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, Art. I, §10, cl. 1. The Ex Post Facto Clause therefore applies to 

the Legislative Branch, not to the courts or an administrative body, such as the Board of 

Parole Hearings. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (holding “[t]he 

Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms, does not apply to courts”); Marks v. United States, 

430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the 

Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.”) 

(citations omitted)); Lagrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.) (“The Ex Post Facto 

Clause does not apply to court decisions construing statutes.”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 

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(1998). 

Moreover, the Board has not increased petitioner’s punishment. The Ex Post Facto 

Clause prohibits the retrospective application of criminal statutes that change the definition of 

a crime or enhance the punishment for a criminal offense. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 

U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (“Although the Latin phrase ‘ex post facto’ literally encompasses any law 

passed ‘after the fact,’ it has long been recognized . . . that the constitutional prohibition on ex 

post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by 

them.”) Petitioner was sentenced to seven-years-to-life with the possibility of parole. (See

Dkt. 6, Ex. 1 at 1-2.) While petitioner might have had a subjective expectation that he would 

be released from prison sooner, the Board’s decision to deny him a parole release date 

because he presents an unreasonable risk of danger to society has not enhanced or otherwise 

“converted” petitioner’s punishment. Accordingly, the Board’s decision denying petitioner a 

parole release date did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and petitioner’s contention fails. 

F. Alameda County Superior Court Decision

In a reasoned decision denying petitioner’s request for habeas relief, the Alameda 

County Superior Court asserted that the Board’s 2005 decision was supported by “some 

evidence.” (See Dkt. 1, Ex. P.) The superior court held that “[e]ven though Petitioner has 

submitted numerous documents in support of his Petition, review of the transcripts provided 

and documents pertaining to the August 2, 2005 hearing indicate that there was no abuse of 

discretion by the Board. . . .” (Id. at 1.) Specifically, “[t]he record presented to this Court for 

review demonstrates that there was certainly some evidence, including, but not limited to the 

committing offense, which in Petitioner’s case was significant, the BPT’s concern about the 

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applicability of the present psychology report and how useful it was for Petitioner’s situation 

and Petitioner’s need to have more specific plans for employment upon his release.” (Id.) As 

a result, the superior court concluded, “There is nothing in the record that indicates that the 

Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, nor that Petitioner’s . . . due process rights 

were violated.” (Id.) 

Finally, this Court is aware that Hayward v. Marshall, a case pending for decision 

before a limited en banc panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presents 

issues sufficiently similar to those in this case that it seems likely the en banc decision will 

have significant implications for the resolution of petitioner’s case. 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 

2008), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). If Hayward is decided while this 

Report and Recommendation is pending before the presiding U.S. District Judge, he will be 

able to take that decision into account in ruling upon this case. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Given the totality of the Board’s findings, there was “some evidence” that petitioner’s 

release as of the date of the Board’s decision, August 2, 2005, would have posed an 

unreasonable risk to public safety. As a result, petitioner’s constitutional rights were not 

violated by the Board’s parole denial. I therefore recommend the Court find that the Alameda 

County Superior Court’s Order upholding the Board’s decision was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable 

determination of facts. In addition, I recommend the Court enter an Order approving and 

adopting this Report and Recommendation, denying the petition (Dkt. 1), and directing that 

judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days of being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Either party may 

then respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen (14) days of being served a copy 

of such written objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 22nd day of March, 2010. 

A 

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