Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00538/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00538-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

“Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “Tr.” refers to the administrative

transcript. A certified copy of the administrative transcript was provided to this Court by the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on September 9, 2011. (See Doc. 11.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla G. Young, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER

Carla G. Young seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), which denied her disability

insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.1

) Young asks this Court to vacate

the Commissioner’s denial. (Doc. 17.) The Commissioner filed his Answering Brief (Doc.

20), and Young filed her Reply (Doc. 26). For all of the reasons that follow, the Court finds

that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and will remand

this case to the Commissioner for further administrative action.

BACKGROUND

Young is a high school graduate. (Tr. 27.) After graduating from high school, she

obtained her respiratory therapy certificate from a vocational school. (Id.) Young’s

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

employment history shows previous work as a respiratory therapist. (Tr. 26-27.) Young

filed for disability insurance benefits due to head injury status post motor vehicle accident,

the severity of her migraine headaches, right knee meniscus tear, and bilateral hip pain status

post industrial injury. (Tr. 14.) 

Young filed for Social Security disability insurance benefits on July 18, 2007, when

she was 56-years old. (Tr. 12, 26, 54.) In her application, Young alleged that she became

disabled as of May 26, 1998. (Tr. 12 (otherwise referred to as “disability onset date”).) Her

application was denied initially on October 13, 2007, and upon reconsideration on April 16,

2008. (Tr. 54-55.) Young sought further review before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

On July 7, 2009, the ALJ held a hearing at which Young and vocational expert Thomas M.

Mitchell appeared and testified. (Tr. 19-53.) On September 11, 2009, the ALJ concluded

that Young was not disabled. (Tr. 14-17.) The ALJ concluded at step two of the sequential

evaluation process that Young did not have a severe impairment or combination of

impairments. (Id.) This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Social

Security Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-5.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Social Security appeal, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and he applied the correct legal standards.

See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton

v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing the Commissioner’s

factual determinations, acting through the ALJ, this Court will affirm if there is substantial

evidence supporting those determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th

Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.

2001). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion based on the entire record. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011;

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If the evidence

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s conclusion, the

Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d

at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for

resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152,

1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo, although

deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. See Edlund, 253

F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

COMMISSIONER’S DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, Young must show that she suffers

from a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents her from

performing her prior work activities and any other substantial gainful employment that exists

in the national economy, and that the impairment “can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Further, Young’s disabled status must have existed on or before

the expiration of her disability insurance, often referred to as the date last insured. See Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Tidwill v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.

1998); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Social Security regulations prescribe a five-step evaluation process for an ALJ to

determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1190, 1194; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ determines if

the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then she is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ moves to step two to determine if the claimant has impairments or

combinations of impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities and are thus “severe” within the meaning of the regulation. See

id. § 404.1520(c). At the third step, the ALJ evaluates if the claimant’s impairment meets

or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment found in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Regulation No. 404. If yes, and the impairment meets the requirements for duration under

20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant fails to meet or equal the

criteria or fails the duration requirement, the ALJ’s analysis moves to step four. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Under step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the continued ability of the claimant to perform

physical or mental work activities despite his impairment or combination of impairments.

See id. The ALJ also determines if the claimant’s RFC allows him to perform past relevant

work. See id. § 404.1520(f). If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the analysis

proceeds to a fifth step where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the

claimant is not disabled by presenting evidence that the claimant retains sufficient RFC to

adjust to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers either in the region where the

claimant lives or in several regions of the country. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g). 

In this case, Young’s last insured date was December 31, 2003. (Tr. 129.) In

determining whether or not Young was disabled, the ALJ first found that Young did not

engage in substantial gainful activity during the period between May 26, 1998 and December

31, 2003. At step two, the ALJ found that Young’s impairments, alone or in combination,

were not severe and therefore she was not disabled. (Tr. 14-17.) The ALJ did not complete

the remaining steps in the sequential evaluation process. Consequently, this Court’s factual

analysis and conclusions focus only on step two.

DISCUSSION

A. Step Two of the Sequential Evaluation Process

In reaching a decision at step two, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the

claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment must be (1)

medically determinable and (2) have lasted or be expected to last for at least twelve

continuous months. Id. The ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s

impairments without regard to whether each impairment individually was sufficiently severe.

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B);

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Social Security Regulation (“SSR”) 86-8). A severe impairment is one that limits a plaintiff’s

ability, physical or mental, to conduct basic work activities. Celaya, 332 F.3d at 1180; see

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The phrase “basic work activities” is defined as “the abilities

and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” SSR 85-28 (1985). 

Step two of the sequential evaluation process is regarded as “a de minimis screening

device used to dispose of groundless claims.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290). An ALJ may find an impairment or combination of

impairments “not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no

more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Id. at 686-87 (quoting

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 and citing Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988))

(emphasis added). Such a finding at step two must be “clearly established by medical

evidence.” SSR 85-28. Commissioner rulings have established that “if an adjudicator is

unable to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on

the individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation should not end

with the not severe evaluations step.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 687; SSR No. 85-28 (“If such a

finding is not clearly established by medical evidence . . . adjudication must continue

through the sequential evaluation process.”). This Court reviews the ALJ’s findings to

determine if “the ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that the medical evidence clearly

established that [Young] did not have a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments.” See Webb, 433 F.3d at 687; see also Yuckert, 841 F.2d at 306.

B. ALJ Rationale

The ALJ concluded that although Young had medically determinable impairments,

those impairments did not sufficiently limit Young’s ability to do basic work activities for

a continuous twelve month period. (Tr. 15-17.) The ALJ gave significant weight to the

findings made by state agency medical consultants that Young was not severely disabled.

(Id.) The ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Young’s treating physicians and other

third-party witnesses who found that Young had significant limitations to her ability to

perform basic work activity. (Id.) Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments,

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision at step two is not supported by substantial evidence.

See Webb, 433 F.3d at 687; see also SSR 85-28. 

1. Young’s Impairments 

As the Court has already summarized, step two of the sequential evaluation process

is regarded as “a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims.” Webb

v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290); see also

Yuckert, 841 F.2d at 306 (“Despite the deference usually accorded to the Secretary’s

application of regulations, numerous appellate courts have imposed a narrow construction

upon the severity regulation applied here.”). An ALJ may find an impairment or

combination of impairments “not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality

that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Webb, 433 F.3d

at 686-87. That was all Young needed to show the ALJ to prove severity at step two. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290.

In 1991, Young was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, where her vehicle

rolled three (3) times end-to-end on an interstate highway in Montana. (Tr. 28.) Young

suffered a serious head injury, a broken wrist and ankle injuries. (Tr. 28.) Subsequent to the

car accident, Young began experiencing post-traumatic migraine headaches. (Tr. 477.) At

the disability hearing the vocational expert contracted by the Social Security Administration

testified that if Ms. Young’s testimony regarding her migraine headaches were found

credible, her migraine impairment would be considered severe and she could not work. (Tr.

52.) 

Following the motor vehicle accident, after Young did not obtain relief through

migraine headache medication, she sought and received cranial manipulation treatments.

(Tr. 318.) Although the cranial manipulation treatments initially decreased the frequency

of her headaches, the benefit was of short duration (Tr. 314), and her migraine headaches

gradually increased in frequency and severity. (Tr. 312.) The headaches described by

Young, and as indicated in the medical records, produce great pain, are triggered and

aggravated by light, and cause nausea. (Tr. 390.) 

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

At the hearing, Young testified that she stopped work in 1998 because of her daily

migraines that increased in frequency and severity. (Tr. 31.) Young indicated that she can

not tolerate light, as it can trigger the onset of a migraine headache. (Id.) When a migraine

headache begins, she is incapacitated; she takes her prescription medication and lies down

hoping that it will dissipate. (Tr. 31-34.) Her home is always dark. (Tr. 33.) She owns pets

but they largely care for themselves. (Id.) She does not go outside in order to do yard work.

(Tr. 34.)

In December 1994, while working at a hospital as a respiratory therapist, Young

suffered an industrial injury to her right knee for which she received workers’ compensation

benefits. (Tr. 562.) Following right knee surgery in 1995, Industrial Commission records

establish a 15% permanent disability to her right leg from the injury. (Id.) In August 2003,

she again had right knee surgery to repair torn knee cartilage. (Tr. 444-45.) In late 2003,

due to persistent post-surgery knee pain, Young underwent a series of Supartz injections

(joint fluid therapy). (Tr. 436-41.) In January 2004, the treating doctor noted ongoing knee

pain. (Tr. 528.) Young remained in treatment for right knee pain and went on to require

additional surgeries on that knee. (Tr. 514-27, 223-244.) Prior to her date last insured,

Young had surgeries on her right knee in 1974, 1995 and 2003. (Tr. 35.) 

In September 1996, Young suffered another industrial injury to her left hip while

working at the hospital. Young was working on paperwork and attempting to sit in a chair.

The chair broke and she hurt her hip in the fall. Subsequently, in June 2001, Young was

treated by Dr. Michael Brennan for complaints of constant pain. She complained of

migraines, pain at the hips, and pain at the knees. She advised Dr. Brennan that she cried

from the pain and was unable to work. He diagnosed her with chronic pain. (Tr. 310.)

Based on the objective medical evidence, Young’s treating physicians, Dr. William

Gabbert and Dr. Daniel Manzanares provided the Commissioner with their opinion that

Young’s disabilities were severe and had more than a minimal effect on her ability to engage

in basic work activities. (Tr. 281-83, 560-61.) The ALJ acknowledged that if she were to

accept the opinion of Young’s treating physicians then her opinion would come down in

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Young’s favor. (Tr. 50-51.) 

Dr. Gabbert opined that as of December 31, 2003, Young could sit and stand less than

two hours each in an 8-hour work day, walk less than one hour in an 8-hour work day, lift

and carry less than ten pounds. (Tr. 281.) Gabbert opined that Young suffers limitations that

are moderately severe to severe. (Tr. 282.) He demonstrated a familiarity with her medical

history that one would expect from a treating physician, noting her near-fatal car accident

in 1991, two industrial accidents in 1994 including a torn meniscus in her right knee and

injury to her left hip in 1996. He opined to the debilitating nature of her migraine headaches.

(Tr. 283.)

Dr. Manzanares is Young’s current treating physician. (Doc. 17 at 10.) He agreed

with Dr. Gabbert that Young’s headaches and pain symptoms limit her ability to engage in

full-time work-related activity. Based on her ailments, he concluded that Young’s degree

of restriction was severe as of December 31, 2003. (Tr. 560-61.) In a letter to the

Commissioner, Dr. Manzanares clarified that even though he did not treat Young until after

her last insured date, the weight of his opinion regarding Young’s inability to engage in

full-time work-related activity as of December 31, 2003, was also based on the fact that he

personally knew and worked with Young from 1993 to 1996 at Phoenix Baptist Hospital,

where she was a respiratory therapist and he was a resident physician. (Tr. 209-11.) He

knew of and understood her problems with migraines and the work injury that she suffered

to her right knee in 1994. The Court observes that Dr. Manzanares’ familiarity with Young

strengthens his opinion as her treating physician that as of December 31, 2003, Young’s

medically determinable impairments significantly limited her ability to perform basic work

activities for the required durational period. 

2. ALJ’s Findings Regarding the Opinions of the Medical Experts

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat

the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3)

non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

physician than to the opinions of non-treating physicians. Id. A treating physician is

employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an

individual. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a treating

physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for

“clear and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected without

“specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. Social Security Rules expressly require that a treating doctor’s opinion on

an issue of a claimant’s impairment be given controlling weight if it is well-supported by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent

with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). 

The Ninth Circuit also generally holds that greater weight is to be given to the opinion

of an examining physician over and above the opinion of a non-examining physician. See

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. As with a treating physician, the ALJ may reject the opinion of

an examining physician, even if contradicted by a non-examining physician, only by

providing specific, legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Application

The ALJ concluded that the opinions of Young’s treating physicians, Dr. Gabbert and

Dr. Manzanares, were entitled to little weight because these doctors did not treat Young

between the onset of disability and the date last insured. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ concluded that

the opinions of the non-examining state agency medical consultants were entitled to

significant weight that Young’s impairments were not severe. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ treated

their opinions as “expert opinion evidence from a non-examining source.” (Id.) 

Young asserts that the ALJ legally erred in rejecting the opinions of her treating

physicians, Dr. William Gabbert and Dr. Daniel Manzanares. (Doc. 17 at 16-21.) Young

argues error because the ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons that were

supported by substantial evidence for discounting the opinions of her treating physicians and

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

relying on the opinions of the non-examining medical consultants. (Id.; Tr. 265, 420.) 

The ALJ concluded that little weight should be given to the opinion of a treating

physician who did not treat the claimant until after the date last insured. The Court finds that

this was not a legitimate reason based on substantial evidence for discounting the opinions

of Young’s treating physicians. The Commissioner supports the ALJ’s holding, relying on

Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). Macri is not controlling here. In Macri,

the claimant tried to add an additional mental impairment, depression, to his disability

application after the ALJ had already issued its ruling. In support of his additional

impairment, the claimant submitted a treating psychiatric evaluation that was completed long

after his date last insured had expired. The Ninth Circuit discounted the evaluation because

a treating psychiatric evaluation conducted prior to the claimant’s date last insured did not

find that he was depressed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the claimant failed to establish

the additional mental impairment, depression.

Macri did not hold that an ALJ may outrightly discount a treating physician’s opinion

merely because the treatment and diagnosis are rendered after the date last insured. Rather,

in contrast to Macri, the facts here are inapposite. The facts in this case do not show that the

ALJ compared Drs. Gabbert and Manzanares against a treating doctor’s severity evaluation

conducted contemporaneous with Young’s date last insured. As of Young’s date last

insured, the objective medical evidence in her file already established her impairments. It

was the severity of those impairments that was being discussed by her treating physician

after her date last insured. The Court finds the ALJ legally erred in discounting the opinions

of Young’s treating physicians. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040-41.

Moreover, Young’s treating physician’s opinions were discounted in relation to the

opinions rendered by non-examining state agency medical consultants. The Court has

already set forth the applicable legal standard,

Where, on the other hand, a nontreating source’s opinion contradicts that of

the treating physician but is not based on independent clinical findings, or

rests on clinical findings also considered by the treating physician, the opinion

of the treating physician may be rejected only if the ALJ gives specific,

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

record.

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. In this case, the state agency medical consultants were asked to

review the file to determine the severity of Young’s impairments. (Tr. 265, 420.) These

experts did not examine Young nor did they undertake any independent testing prior to

rendering their opinions; they simply reviewed the medical evidence in the file. In fact, even

if the Court assumes that the state experts had all of the medical evidence that Young’s

treating doctors had, which is clearly not certain, the Ninth Circuit requires that the ALJ

provide specific legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Young’s treating physicians

and giving weight to the non-examining opinions of the agency experts. The ALJ

discounted the treating physicians opinions only because they became Young’s treating

physician and rendered their opinions after Young’s date last insured. This was not a

legitimate reason for rejecting their opinions. The medical evidence shows that these

treating physicians were completely familiar with Young’s medical condition and were

attempting to treat all of her impairments. Their opinions were not inconsistent with the

symptoms described in Young’s medical records prior to December 31, 2003. The evidence

in the record shows that neither Young’s medical impairments nor her condition had

significantly changed since the date last insured. 

Further, Young is correct that opinions of the state agency medical consultants could

not constitute substantial evidence for rejecting the opinions of her treating physicians. (Tr.

265, 420.) The ALJ failed to provide any explanation why she was crediting the evaluation

of the non-examining medical consultants beyond stating that their opinions on severity were

given significant weight. (Tr. 16.) Thus, the ALJ did not meet her burden of laying out

“specific, legitimate reasons” by providing “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts

and conflicting clinical evidence, stating her interpretation thereof, and making findings.”

See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600-01. This prevents the Court from finding that the opinions of

the non-examining consultants constituted substantial evidence for rejecting the opinions of

Young’s treating physicians.

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

3. Weight Assigned to Third-Party Reports

The disregard of the testimony of friends and family members is contrary to 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1513(e)(2) (1991). Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); Sprague v.

Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). According to § 404.1513(e)(2), the

Commissioner is required to consider observations by nonmedical sources about how

impairments affect a claimant’s ability to work. More specifically, the Commissioner’s

Rulings require the ALJ to consider lay witness testimony in certain types of cases. SSR

88-13 states that where a claimant alleges pain or other symptoms that are “not supported

by medical evidence in the file, the adjudicator shall obtain detailed descriptions of daily

activities by directing specific inquiries about the pain and its effects to . . . third-parties who

would be likely to have such knowledge.” SSR 88-13. The ruling then requires the ALJ to

give “full consideration” to such evidence. Id. Having been directed to consider the

testimony of lay witnesses in determining a claimant’s disability, the ALJ can reject the

testimony of lay witnesses only if she gives reasons germane to each witness whose

testimony she rejects. See Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. The fact that a lay witness is a family

member cannot be a ground for rejecting his or her testimony. To the contrary, testimony

from lay witnesses who see the claimant every day is of particular value, see id. (“[a]n

eyewitness can often tell whether someone is suffering or merely malingering . . . this is

particularly true of witnesses who view the claimant on a daily basis. . . .”); such lay

witnesses will often be family members.

The ALJ rejected most of the third-party evidence, summarily finding that the thirdparty reports were inconsistent with medical evidence submitted prior to the date last

insured. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ rejected outright the third-party evidence that was based on

observations of Young post-December 31, 2003. (Id.) Young asserts that it was error for

the ALJ to reject the third-party reports of lay witnesses that she provided in support of her

claim without providing a germane reason for rejecting the evidence. (Doc. 26 at 12.)

Although the Court agrees with the ALJ that third-party evidence regarding Young’s

condition post-December 31, 2003 was irrelevant (Tr. 189), the ALJ committed legal error

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

in failing to properly consider and rejecting the third-party evidence submitted in support of

the severity of Young’s impairments. (Tr. 190-201.) The ALJ was under a duty to fairly

consider this evidence. Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232. In Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511-12

(9th Cir. 2001), the ALJ properly considered third-party reports and accepted parts that were

consistent with the record and rejected the portions that were not. Here, the ALJ did not

engage in such careful parsing of the record. Instead, she summarily dismissed all seven

reports. (Tr. 190-201.) The bar to dismiss third-party reports is not a high one. However,

the ALJ failed to clear even the low standard required to do so here by claiming, without

explaining her reasons for disregarding the lay witness testimony, that all of the reports

conflict with the objective medical record. At a minimum, the ALJ was legally required to

reference those portions of the medical record that were inconsistent with the third-party

reporting in order to be able to reject such reports as inconsistent with Young’s documented

medical history. See also Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918 (refusing to allow the ALJ to summarily

dismiss third-party reports merely on the basis that the reports agreed with the claimant’s

complaints and the claimant was found not credible, and remanding for the ALJ to articulate

specific findings for rejecting the testimony of the third-party witnesses). On remand, based

on the record, the ALJ is required to articulate specific findings for rejecting the testimony

of the noted third-party witnesses. (Tr. 190-201.) 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ to reject Young’s disability

application at step two is based on legal error and not supported by substantial evidence. The

decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for immediate payment of benefits is

within the discretion of the court. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).

The issue turns on the utility of further proceedings. Here, outstanding issues remain to be

resolved before it can be determined that Young is entitled to an award of benefits.

Therefore, pursuant to sentence 4 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court

remands this action to the Commissioner for further administrative action in accordance with

this decision.

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is hereby REVERSED and

REMANDED to the Commissioner.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 13th day of June, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 27 Filed 06/13/12 Page 14 of 14