Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05259/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 21, 1998 Decided March 17, 1998

No. 96-5259

TONY ALAMO F/K/A BERNIE LAZAR HOFFMAN, AND 

ALAMO CHRISTIAN CHURCH,

APPELLANTS

v.

JASPER R. CLAY, JR., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv01446)

Harry Kresky argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. Daniel E. Ellenbogen and Tony Alamo, appearing pro se, entered appearances.

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. AttorUSCA Case #96-5259 Document #338288 Filed: 03/17/1998 Page 1 of 9
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ney at the time the brief was filed, was on the brief. Sherri 

E. Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and ROGERS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: In this case, the wrong claim was 

brought by the wrong party in the wrong jurisdiction. Appellant Alamo Church asserts a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act challenging the United States Parole 

Commission's decision denying parole to its pastor. It is well 

settled that a parole decision can be challenged only by the 

individual denied parole through a habeas action brought in 

the jurisdiction in which he is incarcerated. In any case, we 

find that the injuries alleged by the churchloss of the 

services of its pastor and damage to its reputationfail to 

satisfy the requirements for standing under Article III of the 

U.S. Constitution.

I. BACKGROUND 

Tony Alamo is founder and pastor of the Christian Church 

of Alamo ("Alamo Church" or "the church"). In September 

1994, Alamo was sentenced by the Federal District Court for 

the Western District of Tennessee to six years in prison for 

one count of filing a false income tax return and three counts 

of failing to file. He is incarcerated in a federal correctional 

institution in Texarkana, Texas. In June 1995, a parole 

examiner recommended that Alamo be paroled. In March 

1996, the United States Parole Commission ("the Commission") denied Alamo's request for parole. See Bernie Hoffman, Reg. No. 305-112 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Mar. 14, 1996) 

(notice of action on appeal), reprinted in Appendix ("App.") 

29-30 (hereinafter "Comm'n Decision").

Alamo and the church then brought suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 

to -4 (1994) ("RFRA"), claiming that the denial of Alamo's 

parole substantially burdened their exercise of religion and 

was not justified by a compelling government interest. They 

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sought a declaration that the Commission's determination was 

illegal and an order directing Alamo's release based upon the 

parole examiner's recommendation.

The District Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. 

The court reasoned that, although Plaintiffs' complaint was 

framed as an action under the RFRA, the real purpose of 

their claims is to challenge the duration of Tony Alamo's 

sentence, a matter which is delegated solely to the discretion 

of the Parole Commission and cannot be decided by the 

district court. Alamo v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 

96-01446, slip. op. (D.D.C. June 30, 1996). Moreover, the 

trial court held that a federal prisoner challenging the determination of parole eligibility is required to bring his claim as 

a habeas action in the jurisdiction in which he is incarcerated. 

Id. (citing Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-09 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

The church alleges that the Parole Commission's decision 

violated its rights under the RFRA and the Free Exercise 

Clause of the First Amendmentnot just Tony Alamo's 

individual rights. Essentially, the church argues that the 

Commission's decision was significantly influenced by its discriminatory views of Alamo Church, causing the church reputational injury as well as depriving it of the services of its 

pastor. To redress these injuries, the church seeks an order 

directing the Commission to adopt the parole examiner's 

recommendation that Alamo be paroled. Alternatively, it 

requests a declaratory judgment stating that the Commission 

impermissibly based its decision on derogatory views of Alamo Church in violation of the RFRA and the First Amendment and ordering the Commission to reconsider Alamo's 

parole without taint of religious discrimination.

The Government moved for summary affirmance of the 

District Court's decision. A motions panel affirmed the District Court's decision as to Tony Alamo's claim, on the ground 

that the only avenue through which a prisoner can challenge 

the Parole Commission's determination of his parole eligibility is through a habeas action brought in the jurisdiction in 

which he is incarcerated. The motions panel also acknowlUSCA Case #96-5259 Document #338288 Filed: 03/17/1998 Page 3 of 9
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edged that Alamo Church cannot bring a habeas action on 

Alamo's behalf but deferred to the merits panel the question 

of whether the church presents a valid claim under the RFRA 

or the First Amendment for which relief can be granted. See 

Alamo v. Clay, No. 96-5259, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 1997) 

(order granting summary affirmance in part and denying it in 

part).

As enacted, the RFRA prohibits any "branch, department, 

agency, instrumentality, [or] official" of federal or state government "or other persons acting under color of [federal or 

state] law" from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion" unless the government can demonstrate that 

the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that ... interest." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2(1) 

(1994). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), 

the Supreme Court held that the RFRA exceeds Congress' 

enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Appellants submit that the RFRA still applies 

to federal agencies. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 28. 

The Government does not contest this claim. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the 

RFRA applies to the federal government, notwithstanding the 

Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne.

II. ANALYSIS 

We review the District Court's dismissal of Appellants' 

complaint de novo. National Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Although the church pleads this case under the RFRA, it is 

essentially challenging the duration of Tony Alamo's sentence. It is well settled that a parole decision can be challenged only by the individual denied parole through a habeas 

action brought in the jurisdiction in which he is incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994); Chapman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (citing 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). In such an action, 

a prisoner may assert the claim alleged herei.e., that the 

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Commission's decision was based upon an impermissible factor. Even if a court considering such a claim were to find 

that the Commission's decision was impermissibly influenced 

by religious discrimination, however, at most it could order 

the Commission to reconsider Alamo's parole in a manner 

that does not violate the RFRA or the First Amendment. 

The sole power to grant or deny parole lies within the 

Commission's discretion; neither this court nor the District 

Court has authority to grant parole. See 18 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 4203(b), 4218(d) (West Supp. 1997); Guerra v. Meese, 786 

F.2d 414, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Billiteri v. United States 

Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976)).

There is a long history of habeas review of parole decisions. 

See Chapman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 807-08. Appellants point to 

nothing in the statutory framework or in case law governing 

the review of parole decisions to demonstrate that a third 

party such as the church can challenge a decision of the 

Parole Commission. Instead, Alamo Church attempts to get 

around this jurisdictional barrier by suggesting that the 

Commission's decision has caused the churchnot just Tony 

Alamocognizable injuries, and that these injuries provide 

the church with a basis for a cause of action under the RFRA. 

However, Appellants do not identify any previous RFRA 

cases involving a third-party challenge to an administrative 

decision or offer argument specifically addressing why the 

RFRA should be construed to provide a cause of action in 

such an unusual posture. Thus, we decline to read into the 

RFRA a congressional intent to upset the long-standing 

framework limiting review of parole decisions.

Even if the RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause could be 

construed to provide a third party with a basis for challenging 

the Commission's decision, however, the complaint would 

nevertheless be dismissed, because the injuries alleged by 

Alamo Church fail to satisfy the well-established requirements for standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 

"In order to satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum of 

standing, a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a 

concrete and particularized injury that is: (1) actual or imminent; (2) caused by, or fairly traceable to, an act that the 

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litigant challenges in the instant litigation; and (3) redressable by the court." Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 

F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotes and 

citations omitted).

Alamo Church lost the services of its pastor as a consequence of Tony Alamo's criminal conduct, for which he was 

convicted and sentenced to jail. A convicted prisoner has no 

absolute right to parole; rather, the issue of parole is delegated to the Commission's discretion. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4206, 

4218(d) (West Supp. 1997). Thus, the church's alleged injury 

was caused by Alamo's criminal conduct for which he was 

convicted, not by the Commission's subsequent decision denying him parole. Accordingly, the church's loss of its pastor's 

services is not fairly traceable to the Commission's allegedly 

illegal parole decision. Florida Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 

663 (in analyzing the "causation" element of constitutional 

standing, this court asks whether the challenged acts of the 

defendantas opposed to the acts of a third partycaused 

the plaintiff's particularized injury).

The church asserts, however, that the continued absence of 

Alamo's pastoral services is a separate, cognizable injury 

following from the Commission's denial of parole. It is true 

that the denial of parole has perpetuated the consequences of 

Alamo's criminal conduct by causing him to remain in custody, whereas a grant of parole would have released him from 

custody. As we have already explained, however, judicial 

review of the Parole Commission's decision is a remedy for 

Alamo to pursue through a habeas action. Casting Alamo's 

continued incarceration in terms of its effect on the church is 

a specious attempt to get around case law limiting the review 

of parole decisions to habeas actions.

In any case, if we construe the continued absence of 

Alamo's pastoral services following the Commission's denial 

of parole as a separate injury, this injury still fails to satisfy 

the requirements of Article III. As we asserted earlier, this 

court has no power to grant parole, and, moreover, even if the 

Commission were to grant Alamo's request for parole, it has 

no control over whether, following his release, Alamo would 

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return to his former role as pastor of Alamo Church. Although it is plain that Alamo's conviction initially disrupted 

his pastoral relationship with Alamo Church, the church 

simply presumes (and implicitly asks the court to presume) 

that a grant of parole would restore it. See Appellants' Reply 

Brief at 3. The burden rests on the plaintiff to "allege 

specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged 

practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a 

tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). The church has failed to meet this 

burden here. Because it is purely speculative whether, following his release on parole, Tony Alamo would return as 

pastor of Alamo Church, a third-party causation problem 

remains. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) 

(parents of black public school children charging that the IRS 

had not fulfilled its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to 

racially discriminatory schools lacked standing because "it is 

entirely speculative ... whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to 

change its policies"); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976) (indigents injured by 

denial of hospital services challenging an IRS decision to 

exempt hospitals from taxation without regard to whether 

they provided care to indigents lacked standing because the 

connection between plaintiff's injuries and the IRS ruling was 

"speculative" where the hospitals' denials of service could 

"result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard 

to the tax implications"). Even if we had specific information 

addressing Alamo's intentions after his release from prison, 

we doubt that this would amount to cognizable injury sufficient to overcome jurisdictional objections to the church's law 

suit. We need not tarry on this point, however, for it is clear 

here that the church has failed to cite specific, concrete facts 

to support its claim.

Alamo Church also asserts that it was stigmatized by the 

Commission's decision denying Tony Alamo parole. Although 

injury to an organization's reputation is sufficient in some 

circumstances to support standing, see, e.g., Southern Mut. 

Help Ass'n, Inc. v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 

1977), the church's claim of reputational injury fails, on 

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several grounds, to provide a basis for Article III standing in 

the instant case. First, we cannot find anything in the 

Commission's actions supporting the church's claim that the 

Commission's decision stigmatized the church. The Commission expressly stated that its decision was "made without 

regard to the issue of whether or not [Tony Alamo's] religious 

organization is accurately described as a 'cult'." Comm'n 

Decision, App. 29. Indeed, the Commission distinguished 

between the church itself and Tony Alamo's exploitation of 

the church and its members in furtherance of the criminal 

conduct for which he was convicted, holding that "[a]lthough 

the religious organization [Tony Alamo] headed was clearly 

genuine, and provided a real benefit to the community," its 

decision was warranted "because of [Tony Alamo's] corrupt 

conduct in the exploitation (financial, personal, and sexual) of 

[his] religious followers, and [his] sophisticated effort to use 

this religious organization as a cover to defraud the IRS." 

Id.

Not only does the challenged decision appear to lack any 

stigmatizing content on its face, but the church has failed to 

show that any stigma which might be read into the Commission's decision would actually have any detrimental consequences for Alamo Church. Purely speculative or conclusory 

assertions of the consequences of the alleged stigma do not 

satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement for specific, concrete facts demonstrating a particularized injury. See Block 

v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Warth v. 

Seldin, 422 U.S. at 508).

In addition, the Supreme Court has made clear that reputational injury "accords a basis for standing only to those 

persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the 

challenged discriminatory conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 

U.S. at 755-56 (internal quotes and citation omitted). Under 

this rule, only Tony Alamo, whom Appellants argue was 

denied parole due to the Commission's allegedly discriminatory decision, could assert reputational injury as a basis for 

standing. Alamo Church's suggestion that any stigmatization 

of Tony Alamo's relationship to his church also stigmatizes 

the church itself and all of its members by virtue of their 

relationship or common membership in the same group does 

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not provide the church with a basis for standing to challenge 

the Commission's purportedly discriminatory treatment of 

Tony Alamo. "If [such an] abstract stigmatic injury were 

cognizable, standing would extend" beyond all reasonable 

limits. Id. at 755-56.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, the District Court's decision dismissing the complaint is

Affirmed.

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