Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01175/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01175-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND W. BELLIVEAU, )

) 2:05-cv-1175-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

THOMSON FINANCIAL, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s

claims. Plaintiff opposes this motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)

Complaint of Discrimination with his employer, Defendant, alleging age

discrimination. (Baker Decl. Ex. 4.) On April 16, 2004, Plaintiff

received his right to sue notice. (Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 2.) The right to sue notice stated that any civil

action arising from his complaint of age discrimination “must be filed

within one year from the date of this letter.” (Baker Decl. Ex. 5.) 

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This stipulation is document #5 in case number 2:05-cv-186- 1

GEB-GGH.

The standards for summary judgment are well known and need not 2

be repeated here.

2

On November 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior

Court for the County of Sacramento alleging age discrimination and

unlawful retaliation after reporting the alleged age discrimination

under FEHA (“Action 1"), which Defendant removed to this Court based

on diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal Jan. 28, 2005.) 

Plaintiff subsequently stipulated to a dismissal of all claims without

prejudice on March 24, 2005. (SUF ¶ 3.) On April 21, 2005, 1

Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit in the Superior Court for the

County of Sacramento (“Action 2"), which Defendant removed to this

Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal June 13,

2005, ¶¶ 5-7.)

DISCUSSION2

I. Statute of Limitations for FEHA Claims

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s FEHA claims for age

discrimination, harassment, and unlawful retaliation fail because

Action 2 was filed more than one year after Plaintiff received his

right to sue notice. (P. & A. at 11.) Plaintiff rejoins “28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d) compels tolling [California’s] statute of limitations when a

Federal Court matter is dismissed[,]” indicating that the voluntary

dismissal of Action 1 was under section 1367(d) and therefore,

Plaintiff had a 30 day time period within which to file a second state

action. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) Plaintiff contends since Action 2 was

commenced in state court within this 30 day period, Defendant’s

statute of limitations argument fails. (Id.)

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Accordingly, the issue is whether section 1367(d) applies to

the claims dismissed in Action 1. Section 1367(d) provides:

The period of limitations for any claim asserted

under subsection (a), and for any other claim in

the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at

the same time as or after the dismissal of the

claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while

the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days

after it is dismissed unless State law provides

for a longer tolling period.

The first two clauses make clear that this tolling provision applies

only to those cases in which jurisdiction is premised on

section 1367(a). 

Section 1367(a) states “the district courts shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution.” However, jurisdiction in Action 1 was not

premised on supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(a); it was

premised on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Notice of

Removal Jan. 28, 2005, ¶¶ 3-5.) Since jurisdiction was not based on

section 1367(a), section 1367(d) is inapplicable to the dismissal of

Action 1. See Brengettcy v. Horton, 2006 WL 1793570, at *9 (N.D. Ill.

May 5, 2006) (“Section 1367(d) tolls pending claims (so long as they

are asserted under [s]ection 1367(a)).”). Thus, since Action 1 was

“dismissed without prejudice,” that dismissal “leaves the situation

the same as if [Action 1] had never been brought in the first place.” 

Humphreys v. U.S., 272 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1959). Action 2 was

filed more than one year after Plaintiff received his right to sue

notice; therefore, Plaintiff’s FEHA claims are barred by California’s

one year statute of limitations. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(a). 

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II. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

wrongful termination claim. Defendants assert Plaintiff was neither

fired, nor constructively discharged, and therefore, he cannot

maintain an action for wrongful termination. (P. & A. at 18.) 

Plaintiff rejoins he was constructively discharged. (Pl.’s Opp’n

at 3.) 

To prove constructive discharge, an employee must show

intolerable working conditions under an objective standard, and that

the employer had knowledge of or the intent to allow the intolerable

working conditions to continue. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 7

Cal. 4th 1238, 1246-1248 (1994). Intolerable working conditions must

be “sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal

motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain

on the job to earn a livelihood.” Id. at 1246. 

Plaintiff’s assertion of constructive discharge is premised

on his receipt of a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) that

established expectations for job improvement with which Plaintiff was

required to comply to maintain his employment. (Belliveau Depo.

at 190:6-22.) Plaintiff declares: “I felt I had no choice but to quit

after receiving the PIP. The PIP was based on erroneous/incorrect

sales information. I understood from the way [Defendant] had treated

me after my complaints . . . that [Defendant] was ‘setting me up’ for

termination. I could not work under these conditions.” (Pl.’s Decl.

¶ 11.) However, Plaintiff admits the PIP was reasonable and he was

not concerned about his ability to meet the expectations. (Belliveau

Depo. at 190:6-22; 192:7-20.) Plaintiff’s poor performance rating

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“or . . . demotion, even [if] accompanied by a reduction in pay, d[id]

not by itself trigger a constructive discharge.” Id. at 1247. 

Therefore, merely placing Plaintiff on a PIP is insufficient for

Plaintiff to show the working conditions were intolerable.

In addition, Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show the

working conditions were objectively intolerable. Rather, Plaintiff

presents subjective evidence declaring he “felt [he] had no choice but

to quit,” “could not work under th[e] conditions,” and “resigned

believing [his] ability to remain . . . had been made impossible.” 

(Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13.) Despite his assertion that he felt

constructively discharged, Plaintiff concedes that while working for

Defendant, “no one . . . said anything that was inappropriate to him

and no one acted in an unprofessional manner towards him. No

one . . . harassed him, and no one . . . commented on his age in any

way during this time frame.” (SUF ¶ 34.) Since Plaintiff failed to

produce any evidence that the working conditions were objectively

intolerable, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

constructive discharge claim is granted.

III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Finally, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim, arguing

that this claim fails because personnel decisions “do not constitute

‘outrageous conduct’ as a matter of law.” (P. & A. at 23.) Plaintiff

does not respond to this argument.

Since Plaintiff admits no one acted in an unprofessional

manner during his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s IIED claim

can only be based on his claim of harassment based on use of the PIP

and his contention that he was subject to disparate pay because of his

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age. (SUF ¶ 34.) However, under California law, “[m]anaging

personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human

decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of

society.” Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80

(2d Dist. 1996). Therefore, Plaintiff’s simple “pleading of personnel

management activity is insufficient to support a claim of [IIED], even

if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions

are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer

for discrimination.” Id. 

Plaintiff offers no evidence of extreme or outrageous

conduct by Defendant other than the personnel decision to place him on

a PIP and his earning a disparate wage because of his age. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s IIED claim fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s only

remedy for the alleged action was his claim for age discrimination,

which is barred for untimeliness.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s summary judgment motion is granted on all

claims. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2006

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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