Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02230/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02230-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMBISHA SHOSHONE TRIBE, EDWARD CASE NO. CV F 09-2230 LJO SMS

BEAMAN, VIRGINIA BECK, CLEAVELAND 

LYLE CASEY, GEORGE GHOLSON, 

MARGARET CORTEZ, and BILL EDDY,

Plaintiffs, O R D E R O N P L A I N T I F F S ’

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MOTION (Doc. 11)

vs.

KEN SALAZAR, Secretary of the Interior, 

LARRY ECHO HAWK, Assistant Secretary of 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs, DALE MORRIS, 

Regional Director, Pacific Regional Office, 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Timbisha Shoshone Tribe (“Tribe”), Edward Beaman (“Mr. Beaman”), Virginia Beck 1

(“Ms. Beck”),CleavelandLyleCasey(“Mr.Casey”), George Gholson (“Mr. Gholson”), Margaret Cortez

(“Ms. Cortez), and Bill Eddy (“Mr. Eddy”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) move for a preliminary injunction,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, against federal defendants Ken Salazar, Larry Echo Hawk, Dale Morris,

The Timbisha Shoshone Tribe is a federally-recognized tribe. 73 Fed. Reg. 18, 553-01. The status of the Tribe,

1

its members, and its Tribal Council are in dispute. Accordingly, the Tribe’s identity as a “plaintiff” is based on the complaint

filed in this action and shall not be construed as this Court’s expression of any view on the status of the Tribal Council or

whether the Tribe authorized this action to be filed in its name.

1

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and the United States Department of the Interior (collectively “the BIA”). Plaintiffs seek an order from

this Court to: (1) require the BIA to recognize one of the two November 10, 2009 Tribe General

Elections; (2) require the BIA to recognize the validity of Plaintiffs’ actions since 2007; (3) enjoin the

BIA from reviewing or making decisions regarding the alleged disenrollment of Plaintiffs from the

Tribe; (4) declare that all pending appeals and proceedings between the Tribe and the BIA are moot; and

(5) declare that the BIA’s failure to decide the administrative appeals in a timely manner constitutes

agencyaction that is unreasonably delayed or unlawfullywithheld. Forthe following reasons, this Court

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

BACKGROUND

The instant action is the third in a series of federal district court actions filed by the Tribe against

the BIA. See, Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kempthorne, Case No. 2:08-CV-0360 MCE DAD. RJN, Ex.

24-25 (“Timbisha I”) (case dismissed voluntarily); Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Salazar, Case No. 2:09-

CV-246 MCE DAD (“Timbisha II”) (case dismissed as moot when BIA decided an appeal bought by

Plaintiffs). A more comprehensive background of the dispute is detailed in Timbisha Shoshone Tribe

v. Kennedy, – F.Supp.2d —, 2009 WL 3615971 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (“Timbisha III”). The Court presents

the facts relevant to this motion here. 

Since 2007, dueling factions have contested the governance of the Tribe fiercely. The last 2

undisputed Tribal Council election occurred in November 2006. The Tribal Council elected in

November 2006 consisted of: Joseph Kennedy (“Mr. Kennedy”), Mr. Beaman, Ms. Casey, Mr. Casey

and Ms. Beck (collectively “Rollback Council”). A dispute erupted at an August 25, 2007 meeting of

the Rollback Council, resulting in the emergence of two competing factions. Plaintiffs are associated

with the faction based out of Bishop, California (“Bishop faction”). The Bishop faction is led by Ms.

Beck and Mr. Beaman. The other faction, based out of Death Valley, California (“Death Valley

faction”), is led by Mr. Kennedy. The Bishop and Death Valley factions have held separate elections,

and run parallel and competing tribal governments, since the August 2007 Rollback Council meeting. 

Each faction disputes the actions and validity of the other, and both have appealed to the BIA.

The battle for tribal governance has spanned more than a decade. A prior dispute in tribal leadership was resolved

2

through arbitration in 2004.

2

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Consolidated Appeals 

Two consolidated and unresolved appeals are ostensibly the subject of this current action. On

June 22, 2009, defendant LarryEcho Hawk, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, consolidated the appeals

from defendant Regional Director Dale Morris’ February and March 2009 decisions, pursuant to 25

C.F.R. §2.18. Director Morris’ February 2009 decision reversed a February 29, 2008 decision to find,

among other things, that the actions at the August 2007 meeting to remove Ms. Beck and Mr. Beaman

violated tribal law. Director Morris’ March 2009 decision reversed an October 17, 2008 decision, and

concluded that the Bishop faction’s removal of Mr. Kennedy was improper. In each decision, Director

Morris concluded that he was unable to establish that any subsequent tribal councils were formed

properly. Accordingly, Director Morris continued to recognize the last undisputed tribal council for

government-to-government purposes; namely, the Rollback Council.

The Death Valley faction requested to extend the briefing deadline on the consolidated appeals

to allow for comments on the administrative record. Plaintiffs Mr. Gholson and Mr. Cortez agreed to

continue the briefing schedule until the BIA considered the parties’ comments to the administrative

record. The parties, including Plaintiffs, then filed numerous objections to the administrative record and

moved to supplement the record. The BIA resolved the motions and objections. In addition, the BIA

undertook to reorganize the administrative record because of difficulties experiences by all parties.

With the administrative record organized and related issues and motions resolved, the BIA set 

a briefing schedule on February 19, 2010. Porter Decl., Ex. B (“Scheduling Order”). Opening briefs on

the appeals are on March 19, 2010. Briefing will close April 30, 2010. Pursuant to 25 C.F.R. §2.20(c),

the BIA will issue its decision within 60 days of receiving the last filing. Accordingly, the BIA expects

to issue a decision on the appeals no later than June 29, 2010.

Post-Appeal Actions

Disenrollment

On December 27, 2008, the 2008 Death ValleyTribal Council purportedlydisenrolled Plaintiffs,

among others, from the Tribe. Plaintiffs do not recognize this disenrollment and seek an order from this

Court to enjoin the BIA from reviewing or making decisions regarding the alleged disenrollment of

Plaintiffs from the Tribe. In the Briefing Order, the BIA acknowledged the purported:

3

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Subsequent to the consolidation of these appeals, information was submitted purporting

to show that 74 members of the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe have been disenrolled. I

acknowledge and support the well-settled presumption that enrollment matters are one

of the most central manifestations of tribal sovereignty, beyond the Federal

Government’sjurisdiction. But the validityof the representatives purporting to represent

the tribe in government-to-government dealings with the United States is a threshold

matter. In light of the fact that the Department does not recognize the Tribal Council that

approved theEnrollment Committee’s disenrollment recommendations,I cannot give any

weight to the disenrollments approved by that Tribal Council.

November 2009 Elections

Pursuant to Tribal law, elections are held each November. On November 10, 2009, the Bishop

faction elected a new Tribal Council, consisting of Ms. Beck, Mr. Casey, Mr. Gholson, Mr. Eddy, and

Ms. Cortez. The Death Valley faction held a parallel election to elect a separate Death Valley Tribal

Council in November 2009. The terms of all members of the Rollback Council have expired.

Instant Action

Plaintiffs contend that the factional dispute “has become a paralytic event due solely to the

[BIA]’s mismanagement, incompetence and bias in handling its duties.” Plaintiffs argue that the BIA

“has haphazardly stymied, stalled, and stopped the Timbisha Shoshone from resolving internal issues

through a series of decisions, reversals, and incomprehensible delays.” Plaintiffs initiated this action

based on the BIA’s “failure to comply with its regulations, breach of trust responsibilities, and failure

to maintain government-to-government relations with a federally-recognized tribe.” Plaintiffs 

December 23, 2009 complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeks the following “claims for

relief:” (1) agencydecisions unreasonablydelayed; (2) breach of trust responsibility, for failure to accept

appeals based on determinable issues of fact or law and failure to decide appeals in a reasonable time;

(3) violation of the Administrative Procedures Act for failure to accept appeals based on a determined

issue of fact or law and failure to decide appeals in a reasonable time; and (4) proposed agency review

of purported disenrollment would violate due process rights.

On January 5, 2010, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, noticing a hearing date for

March 15, 2010. The BIA opposed the motion on March 1, 2010. Plaintiffs replied on March 8, 2010. 

The Court found this motion suitable for a decision without a hearing and vacated the March 15, 2010

hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Having considered the parties’ arguments, declarations, and

exhibits, and the record, this Court issues the following order.

4

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION

Standard of Review

A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct.

2207, 2219 (2008). As such, the Court may only grant such relief “upon a clear showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 375 (2008). 

To prevail, the moving party must show : (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that

the moving party will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (3) that the balance of

equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) than an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 374.3

In considering the four factors, the Court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must

consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 129

S.Ct. at 376 (quoting Amoco Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531 542 (1987)); Indep. Living

Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Likelihood of Success on Merits

Pursuant to Winter, Plaintiffs must demonstrate they are “likely to succeed on the merits.” 129

S.Ct. at 375-76. In this motion, however, Plaintiffs ignore the relevant inquiry–whether they are likely

to prevail on the causes of action they assert in their complaint. As to the likelihood of success on the

merits, Plaintiffs’ argument consists of the following, in full:

As evidenced by the attachments to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on

their claim that they constitute the governing majority of the “Rollback” Tribal Council,

that the BIA has not recognized their authority as the majority of said Council, and that

the BIA has failed to effectively make any decisions regarding the issues presented to

them. Consequently, the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail.

Pl. Memo., p. 9. The BIA points out that “[e]ven though establishing a likelihood of success on the

merits is essential to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs make only a few unsupported assertions

on this issue and fail to offer a single argument as to the merits of any of their claims. [citation]. This

Plaintiffs erroneously argue that this Court may apply a lesser standard than that set forth in Winter v. Nat'l Res.

3

Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 375 (2008). In considering preliminary injunctions after Winter, Ninth Circuit cases have

unanimously rejected this notion. See e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.

2009) (“To the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.”);

Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the Winter court rejected the Ninth Circuit

sliding scale test because it was “too lenient”); Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847-849-50 (9th Cir. 2009)

(applying Winter factors rather than former sliding scale test).

5

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

alone is sufficient reason to deny their motion.” Def. Opp., p. 6. This Court agrees. Plaintiffs’

inadequate argument, lacking legal authority and analysis, is insufficient to establish the likelihood of

success on the merits. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ terse argument is unrelated to the claims in the complaint. 

None of Plaintiffs’ claims relates to Plaintiffs’ actions as the governing majority of the Rollback Tribal

Council. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of their

claims.

Moreover, the BIA successfully argues that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of

their claims.

As to Plaintiffs’ APA claims regarding the BIA’s alleged failure to act in a timely manner,

Plaintiffs must show that (1) an agency had a nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) the agency

unreasonably delayed in action on that duty. Norton V. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64

(2004); see also, 5 U.S.C. §§555(b), 701(a)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (providing that courts shall “compel

agency action unlawfullywithheld or unreasonably delayed”). Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the

BIA has delayed unreasonably this action. Plaintiffs’ argue that “[t]aking eight (8) months to reorganize

the administrative record when such record should have already been organized clearly constitutes

unreasonable delay. When it takes 22 months to decide an appeal due to BIA administrative error and

failure to meet regulatory timeliness, this should evince unreasonable delay.” Pl. Reply, p. 3.

Plaintiffs’ unsupported statements that the BIA has caused unreasonable delay are contradicted

by the evidence presented, including evidence attached to the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The parties to the

appeals challenged the conduct in 2007 and 2008. Decisions were issued in a timely manner,

challenged, then reversed. The parties further appealed those decisions. In addition, the parties filed

new challenges with the BIA, federal actions and multiple state court actions. The undisputed evidence

demonstrates that the current appeals were filed in a timely manner March and April 2009. The appeals

were consolidated on June 22, 2009. On July 13, 2009, the briefing schedule was amended to allow for

a comment period–an amendment to which Plaintiffs agreed. The parties, including Plaintiffs, then

submitted numerous comments about the structure of the administrative record andmoved to supplement

the record. “In light of the difficulties experienced by all parties in trying to work with the

administrative record,” James W. Porter, Attorney-Advisor at the Department of the Interior,

6

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“determined to completely restructure the file into a strictly chronological database, and put the resulting

record on compact discs.” Porter Decl., ¶4. Afterresolving the comments and motions, and reorganizing

a large and complicated administrative record, the BIA issued a scheduling order on February 19, 2010. 

Opening briefs are due on March 19, 2010. Thus, while the process has been long, nothing in the record

indicates that the BIA has delayed unreasonably Plaintiffs’ appeals.4

In addition, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider challenges to agency actions that are not

final. 5 U.S.C. §704; Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n. v. U.S. Forest Service, 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir.

2006). Before Plaintiffs can challenge BIA decisions in federal court,“BIA regulations require the

exhaustion of administrative remedies.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677 (9th

Cir. 1988) (citing 25 C.F.R. §2.3(b)); see also, 25 C.F.R. §§2.1-.21; 43 C.F.R. §§4.310-.318. Pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. §704, when an “agency rule dictates that exhaustion of remedies is required, the federal

courts maynot assert jurisdiction to review agencyaction until the administrative appeals are complete.”

Id. at 677. The BIA points out that each of Plaintiffs’ claims challenges an agency action or future

action, but none of the agency’s actions is final.

Plaintiffs concede that they have not exhausted administrative remedies, but argue that

exhaustion may not be required because irreparable injurymay occur without immediate judicial relief. 

In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the “futility of the BIA process warrant[s] exception to the exhaustion

requirement.” Plaintiffs arguments are unpersuasive. As discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs fail to

establish irreparable injury will occur without immediate judicial relief. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to

establish that the completion of the administrative process would be futile. See White Mountain Apache

Tribe, 840 F.3d at 678; United States v. Litton Industries, Inc., 462 F.2d 14, 18 (9th Cir. 1972)

(administrative review not futile because plaintiffs’ allegations of bias purely speculative). Because the

BIA raises series questions as to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs

fail to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.

Plaintiffs cite 28 U.S.C. §1651 to support each of their claims for relief in the complaint. This

provision allows this Court to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate.” Id. “The Supreme Court has

Although they BIA actions were timely, the decisions were oftentimes confusing and unreliable. Timbisha III, –

4

F.Supp.2d. —, 2009 WL 3615971,*2-4, 13.

7

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concluded that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power will justify

the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” United States v. Romero-Ochoa, 554 F.3d 833, 839 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted). “The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked

only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. U. S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). The writ

“traditionally has been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise

of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Will

v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). In determining whether to grant this extraordinary relief, the

Court considers five factors:

(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to

attain the relief he or she desires. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a

way not correctable on appeal. . . . (3) The [inferior court]’s order is clearly erroneous as

a matter of law. (4) The [inferior court]’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a

persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The [inferior court]’s order raises new and

important problems, or issues of law of first impression.

Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).

In this motion, Plaintiffs disregarded their burden to demonstrate “a clear and indisputable right

to the issuance of a writ.” U.S. v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, Plaintiffs’

memorandum contains no references to the statute or the factors required to warrant relief. In

considering the factors sua sponte, the Court finds that they are not met. As to the first factor, Plaintiffs

have a pending appeal that may grant the relief Plaintiffs desire. Briefing has not begun and Plaintiffs

do not explain why they cannot request relief from the BIA through that process. As discussed below,

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate irreparable harm. Because there is no final agencyaction, this Court cannot

determine whether the agency’s actions are clearly erroneous. Nothing indicates that Plaintiffs raise an

issue of first impression. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to establish the likelihood of success on their

mandamus claims. 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs fail to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their

claims.

Irreparable Injury Absent an Injunction

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction. 

“Preliminary injunctive relief is available only if plaintiffs ‘demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely

8

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in the absence of an injunction.’” Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Winter, 129 S.Ct. At 375) (noting that the Supreme Court in Winter rejected the Ninth Circuit’s

“possibility of irreparable harm” test). Plaintiffs charge that the BIA’s failure to process the appeals in

a timely manner, repeated reversal of decisions, unwillingness to make decisions effective, and biased

participation with one faction over another has caused the following irreparable harm to: (1) Plaintiffs’

ability to govern the Tribe; (2) Plaintiffs’ ability to operate sovereign governmental functions of the

Tribe; (3) members of the Tribe, who in some instances have lost their primary sources of income; (4)

Plaintiffs, in the form of economic loss caused by third parties that have erroneously relied on the BIA’s

decisions concerning leadership of the Tribe; (5) the Tribe’s reputation; and (6) the welfare and safety

of the members of the Tribe. 

Some of the harm Plaintiffs claim is irreparable. “Typically, monetary harm does not constitute

irreparable harm.” Cal Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“Economic damages are not traditionallyconsidered irreparable because the injurycan later be remedied

by a damage award.” Id. at 852 (emphasis in original). However, “intangible injuries, such as damage

to...goodwill qualifyas irreparable harm.”Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television&ApplianceRental,

Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Although Plaintiffs are suffering harm, they do not establish that the harm is caused by the BIA’s

actions or that the harm is likely to result in the absence of a preliminary injunction. As set forth in

Timbisha III, the Bishop and Death Valley factions are causing each other harm, some of which is

irreparable. Timbisha III, – F.Supp.2d–, 2009 WL 3615971, *1-7, 14-15. The financial hardships

suffered by the Tribe members are caused by the constant battle of bank accounts between the two

factions. Plaintiffs present no evidence to suggest that the BIA has acted to prevent any monies from

being administered to the Tribe’s members.

Considering the record, this Court is not persuaded that the harms of the Tribe are based “solely

[on] the [BIA]’s mismanagement, incompetence and bias in handling its duties.” The BIA has issued

timely decisions on the questions properly presented, and has followed the procedures as set forth in the

federal regulations. As noted in the Briefing Order and Timbisha III, – F.Supp.2d–, 2009 WL 3615971,

*1-7, 14-15, questions presented by the factions “are most central manifestations of tribal sovereignty,

9

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

beyond the Federal Government’s jurisdiction.” The BIA has only been involved in this factional

dispute to the extent that one faction challenges the actions of the other. While the BIA has attempted

to identify a legitimate tribal council, the actions of the factions have made this task nearly impossible. 

This Court agrees with defendant Larry Echo Hawk, as he wrote in his February 2010 Briefing Order: 

The hardships being suffered by the Timbisha Shoshone people because of the internal

dissension and divided government are very troubling to me. Ultimately, the only

meaningful resolution to this problem must come from the Timbisha Shoshone people

themselves. As the interested parties recognize, a final agency decision on the appealed

questions is unlikely to result in the identification of a Tribal Council that can be

acknowledged by the Federal Government. Therefore, I urge the contesting government

factions to overcome the obstacles to cooperation to hold a unified tribal election. It

would be my expectation that the tribal members purportedly disenrolled be allowed to

vote; and I would encourage the use of an agreed neutral facilitator to ensure the validity

of the election process and results. My staff and I will provide support as needed and

requested to accomplish the important goal of putting a functioning, recognized

government in place.

Pursuant to this letter, the BIA makes clear that its interest is in helping to lessen the harms of the Tribe

by encouraging the factions to work together. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they will

suffer harm that is “immediate, direct, and significant” unless this Court postpones or dispenses with

the BIA’s current appellate review as scheduled. Colwell v. Department of Health Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 

1128 (9th Cir. 2009).

In addition, the purpose of a a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance

of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to secure the

positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451

U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830 (1981). However, a “preliminary injunction can take two forms:”

A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action and "pre-serve[s] the status

quo pending a determination of the action on the merits." Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court, 840

F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333, 104 S.

Ct. 10, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1431 (1983) (a prohibitory injunction "freezes the positions of the

parties until the court can hear the case on the merits"). A mandatory injunction "orders

a responsible party to 'take action.'" Meghrig v. KFC Western., 516 U.S. 479, 484, 116

S. Ct. 1251, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1996). A mandatory injunction "'goes well beyond

simply maintaining the status quo [p]endente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.'"

Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Martinez v.

Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976)).

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs request a mandatory injunction to require the BIA make specific determinations on issues

10

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

currently pending. In general, mandatory injunctions "are not granted unless extreme or very serious

damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of

compensation in damages." Anderson, 612 F.2d at 1115. As it is doubtful whether Plaintiffs will

succeed on the merits of their claims in this action, and many of the harms may be compensated, a

mandatory injunction is improper.

Harm to Defendants

The BIA would be harmed if this Court were to issue a mandatory injunction on issues that are

not final, have not been exhausted, and are not ripe for review. Exhaustion of remedies serves the

purpose of giving the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and also promotes efficiency.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Furthermore, the agency has an interest in developing a full

record and using its expertise to consider administrative questions. Id. These interests would be harmed

if this Court were to grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief. 

Public Interest

As a final factor, the Court considers the public interest. “In exercising their sound discretion,

courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary

remedy of injunction.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376-77 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.

305, 312 (1982)). “The public interest analysis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires [the

Court] to consider whether there exists come critical public interest that would be injured by the grant

of preliminary relief.” Indep. Living, 572 F.3d at 659.

The public interest is promoted if this Court exercises restraint in issuing the type of preliminary

injunction requested by the Plaintiffs. Although the Tribe and its members would be benefit if the

dispute between the factions ended, tribal self-determination and self-governance are important to the

public interest. The Court’s refusal to meddle in the internal affairs of the Tribe benefits the public. In

addition, the public has an interest to promote and preserve a judicial system that adheres to the rule of

law. Plaintiffs seek an order from this Court to require the BIA to act without allowing the department

to first consider the issue or to issue a decision that is final. To allow Plaintiffs’ to ignore the wellsettled rules of finality and exhaustion would cause confusion in a judicial system that thrives on

consistency and predictability. 

11

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Conclusion

As set forth above, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the

merits of their claims. Although they seek an “extraordinary measure,” Plaintiffs neglect to establish

that they are entitled to such relief. In addition, the BIA raises serious jurisdictional issues to Plaintiffs’

claims, further demonstrating that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. 

Although Plaintiffs establish that they are suffering harm, Plaintiffs fail to establish that the harm is

caused by the BIA or that harm will occur unless this Court intervenes in the current appellate process. 

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction that go beyond preserving the status quo to require the BIA to

act on issues that the BIA has not yet had an opportunity to develop fully. The public interest in

protecting the well-settled law of the exhaustion of administrative remedies favors this Court’s restraint. 

Having considered the aforementioned factors, the balance of equities tips in favor of the BIA’s

opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

Case 1:09-cv-02230-MCE -DAD Document 25 Filed 03/16/10 Page 12 of 12