Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-07320/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-07320-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-07320-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEPHANIE JENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEARBORN NATIONAL LIFE 

INSURANCE,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:17-cv-07320-EJD 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 29

This is a suit for breach of an insurance contract and breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing under California state law. Plaintiff Stephanie Jensen alleges that 

Defendant Dearborn National Life Insurance unreasonably and without proper cause discontinued 

her long term disability benefits. Presently before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dkt. No. 29. The court has 

reviewed the related documents and pertinent law, and finds that Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

The court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was provided long term disability insurance through her employer, Midpeninsula 

Regional Open Space District. See Def.’s Mem. P. & A. in Supp. Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 1 

(Dkt. No. 29-1 at 5). The Policy is currently funded and administered by Defendant. Id. Plaintiff

applied for long term disability (“LTD”) benefits on June 8, 2003, asserting that she suffered from

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), fibromyalgia, and adrenal insufficiency. Jensen Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 

2. She began receiving LTD benefits in 2003 and continued receiving benefits without 

interruption until October 2013. Stuhr Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C.

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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In early 2013, pursuant to its policy, Defendant requested from Plaintiff updated

documentation, including but not limited to, all medical information. Id. Ex. B. Based on

Plaintiff’s response, Defendant also requested her medical records. Def.’s Mem. P. & A. in Supp. 

Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 2 (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 6). Defendant was not able to secure medical 

records from Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Randy Baker, when it requested them in June 

2013. Dkt. No. 38-1 at 48 (Pl.’s Fact 78). In a letter dated September 30, 2013, Defendant 

informed Plaintiff that her medical records failed to provide proof of continued disability as 

defined by the Policy, and therefore her benefits would be discontinued after October 1, 2013. 

Stuhr Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C. This letter also notified Plaintiff that she could request a review by the 

California Department of Insurance, Claims Service Bureau. Id. 

In mid-October 2013, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter in response to a complaint 

Defendant had received from the California Department of Insurance. Def. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. D (Def.’s 

Fact 5). Defendant provided an analysis of its denial and notified Plaintiff that she could appeal 

the decision. Id. On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff sent her appeal (the “Appeal Letter”) to 

Defendant that stated her grievances against Defendant and accused Defendant of acting in bad 

faith. Id. ¶ 6, Ex. E (Def.’s Fact 6). In discussing bad faith, Plaintiff noted that “[E]RISA does not 

apply (the fairer California law applies).” Id. Ex. E, at 5 (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 26). Defendant

confirmed receipt of Plaintiff’s appeal in November of 2013. Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F (Def.’s Fact 7). 

In January of 2014, Dr. Baker sent Defendant a letter in support of Plaintiff’s Appeal 

Letter. Dr. Baker confirmed that Plaintiff had been his patient since March 1989 and was still 

“totally disabled due to multiple chronic severe medical conditions” including “debilitating 

fatigue,” “fibromyalgia,” and high levels of mercury. Jensen Decl. Ex. 5, at DNL 000329 (Dkt. 

No. 35-4 at 80). He also included his most recent notes from his in-person examinations of her

along with notes from the last five years. Jensen Decl. Ex. 5; Dkt. No. 38-1 (Pl.’s Fact 88). 

Defendant solicited independent medical reviews from Dr. Steven A. Channick and Dr. 

Michael Gross. Stuhr Decl. Ex. G, H (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 32, 37). In a letter dated January 22, 2014, 

Dr. Channick stated there were no objective clinical findings to support Plaintiff’s inability to 

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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perform the material duties of any occupation. Id. Ex. G, at 3 (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 34). Dr. Channick 

also noted that he was unable to reach Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Baker, even after 

several attempts. Id. In a letter dated January 29, 2014, Dr. Gross indicated that there were no 

objective clinical findings to support Plaintiff’s inability to perform the sustained material duties 

of any occupation beyond October 1, 2013. Id. Ex. H at 4 (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 40). Dr. Gross noted

that he had spoken to Dr. Baker, who told him that due to Plaintiff’s overall condition, Plaintiff

was unable to do any work. Id. Ex. H, at 3 (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 39). 

On January 29, 2014, Defendant affirmed its previous decision to discontinue Plaintiff’s 

benefits, noting that this was the final review and all administrative remedies had been exhausted. 

Defendant also notified Plaintiff that she had a right to file suit for benefits under § 502(a) of the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) (the “Response to Appeal Letter”). 

Id. Ex. I (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 42). 

On September 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed suit in Santa Clara Superior Court against 

Defendant alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) bad 

faith. Murphy Decl. Ex. A. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant alleging 

(1) breach of insurance contract and (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. Id. Ex. B. Defendant removed the matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(b). Dkt. No. 1. 

In February of 2019, Defendant filed this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the 

“bad faith claim”) and her prayer for punitive damages. Dkt. No. 29. Defendant advances two 

main arguments in its Motion. First, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s bad faith claim is timebarred because she filed her complaint after the two-year statute of limitations had run. Second, 

Defendant argues it acted reasonably when it terminated her LTD benefits because it relied on 

independent medical expert opinions.

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and 

identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or 

affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the issue is one on which the nonmoving party must bear the burden 

of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out an absence of evidence supporting the 

claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent’s claim. Id. at 325. 

If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party 

to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific materials in the record to show that there is a 

genuinely disputed fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A “genuine issue” 

for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary 

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

However, the mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as well as conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. 

(“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”); Thornhill Publ’g 

Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Instead, the non-moving party must come 

forward with admissible evidence to satisfy the burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

“If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine 

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party 

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats 

the motion.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s bad faith claim is time-barred because she filed her initial 

complaint after the two-year statute of limitations for bad faith claims provided by California Code 

of Civil Procedure § 339. There is no dispute that Defendant denied Plaintiff’s appeal for benefits 

on January 29, 2014, and Plaintiff filed suit on September 29, 2017. Therefore, Plaintiff’s suit was 

not filed within the two-year statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiff contends that equitable 

estoppel should apply because Defendant repeatedly misrepresented to her that ERISA applied to 

her case and that she relied upon Defendant’s misrepresentations to her detriment.1 

“As a general rule, a defendant will be estopped from setting up a statute-of-limitations 

defense when its own prior representation or conduct have caused the plaintiff to run afoul of the 

statute and it is equitable to hold the defendant responsible for that result.” LaMantia v. Voluntary 

Plan Adm’rs, Inc., 401 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Allen v. A.H. Robins Co., 752 

F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (9th Cir.1985)). In order for estoppel to apply, “(1) the party to be estopped 

must be apprised of the facts; (2) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts, and the 

party to be estopped must have acted so that the other party had a right to believe that the party 

intended its conduct to be acted upon; and (3) the other party relied on the conduct to its 

prejudice.” LaMantia, 401 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 396-97 (9th 

Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiff’s estoppel theory is based upon Defendant’s Response to Appeal Letter which 

stated that Plaintiff had a right to file suit for benefits under § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974. Stuhr Decl. Ex. I. Plaintiff also asserts that she had at least two 

separate conversations with representatives from Defendant who mentioned ERISA.2 During one 

 

1 ERISA does not apply to employee benefit plans that are government plans. 29 U.S.C. § 

1003(b)(1).

2 Defendant objects to these statements as hearsay. The objection is overruled. The statements are 

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telephone call, a representative from Defendant named “Deborah” directed Plaintiff to a federal 

labor law website. Jensen Decl. ¶ 52. During another phone call, a representative of Defendant 

told Plaintiff that ERISA applied. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff contends that she believed and relied on 

Defendant’s representation that ERISA applied, and therefore she did not think she needed to 

comply with California’s two-year statute of limitations. Id. ¶¶ 53, 55, 57, 58. Plaintiff also 

asserts that she believed ERISA suits were subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 57.3

Defendant contends that estoppel does not apply because Plaintiff was never ignorant of 

the true state of facts and was “aware at all times that she had an opportunity to sue for bad faith 

prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations.” Def.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. 

Partial Summ. J. at 5 (Dkt. No. 38 at 8). Defendant reasons that Plaintiff knew her bad faith claim 

was not governed by ERISA because Plaintiff stated in her Appeal Letter that “ERISA Limits do 

NOT Apply Here” and “I am not subject to ERISA.” Stuhr Decl. Ex. E, at 5. Defendant also 

implies that Plaintiff’s purported ignorance is not credible because Plaintiff researched whether 

state or ERISA law governed her claim and that her research ultimately led Plaintiff to file the 

instant suit in pro per under California law, not ERISA.

Moreover, Defendant contends that nothing in the Appeal Letter or the purported oral 

statements by its representatives suggested that California law was inapplicable or that ERISA 

preempted the California statute of limitations for bad faith claims. Def.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of 

Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 7 (Dkt. No. 38 at 10). As such, Defendant contends that there is no 

evidence of Defendant’s “intent to induce [Plaintiff] into missing the statute of limitations on her 

potential bad faith claim.” Id. at 8.

Given the disputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the 

court concludes that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the statute of 

 

not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e. that ERISA applies) and under Federal 

Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(d), an opposing party’s statement is not hearsay. 

3

 There is no federal statute of limitation applicable to lawsuits seeking benefits under ERISA. 

Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Grp. Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 646 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Therefore, courts “look to the most analogous state statute” in the state where the claim 

for benefits arose. Id. In California, the most analogous statute is its four-year statute of 

limitation governing actions involving written contracts. Id. at 648.

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limitations defense. A reasonable jury could find, as Plaintiff argues, that a representative told her 

ERISA applied, and that she reasonably believed and relied upon that representation in concluding 

that she did not need to comply with the two-year statute of limitations. Conversely, a reasonable 

jury could find that Plaintiff was never ignorant of the true facts based upon the emphatic language 

and tone of Plaintiff’s Appeal Letter. A reasonable jury could also disregard evidence of the 

telephone calls as not credible. A reasonable jury could also find that Defendant did not intend for 

Plaintiff to act upon the alleged misrepresentations, and further that Plaintiff did not rely on 

Defendant’s conduct. “At the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to 

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-55. 

B. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant contends that it did not unreasonably withhold benefits because it paid 

Plaintiff’s Policy benefits for ten years before discontinuing payments when Plaintiff failed to 

provide evidence of her ongoing disability. Def. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 

7. Additionally, Defendant contends that it did not act in bad faith because it reasonably relied on 

two expert opinions to ultimately deny Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff counters that Defendant acted 

unreasonably because, among other things, Defendant conducted only a cursory investigation, 

relied on deficient expert opinions, and changed Plaintiff’s disability status without proof that her 

medical condition had improved. 

Every insurance contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Jordan v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 148 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1071 (2007). “To fulfill its implied obligations, an 

insurer must give at least as much consideration to the interests of the insured as it gives to its own 

interest.” Id. at 1072. “The insurer’s duty to give as much consideration to the insured’s interests 

as it does to its own obligates it to investigate a claim thoroughly.” Id. at 1074. The insurer 

cannot “reasonably and in good faith” deny payments without a full investigation into the grounds 

for denial and is subject to liability in tort if it “unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment 

of the claim of its insured.” Id. (quoting Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 42 Cal.3d 208, 214-

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15 (1986)). Moreover, an insurer “may not ignore evidence which supports coverage.” Id. 

A court may be inclined to adjudicate a bad faith claim in the insurer’s favor if the insurer 

relied on advice and opinions of independent experts. Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. 

Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 348 (2001). Such reliance, however, does not 

automatically insulate an insurer from a bad faith claim based on a “biased investigation.” Id. 

There are several circumstances where a biased investigation claim should go to the jury, 

including, but not limited to, when an insurer’s experts were unreasonable and the insurer failed to 

conduct a thorough investigation. Id. at 348-49. 

Here, there are triable issues as to whether Defendant’s reliance on its medical experts was 

reasonable. Dr. Gross and Dr. Channick opined that there were no objective clinical findings to 

support Plaintiff’s inability to perform work. There are, however, no objective laboratory tests to 

diagnose Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (“CFS”) and fibromyalgia. Salomaa v. Honda Long Term 

Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 677 (9th Cir. 2011). In the context of ERISA, courts have 

concluded that it is unreasonable for an insurer to require objective medical evidence of 

complaints that are inherently subjective in nature. See e.g. Montour v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. 

Co., 588 F.3d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating “[i]t would probably have been unreasonable for 

Hartford to require Montour to produce objective proof of his pain level”); Cook v. Liberty Life 

Assur. Co. of Boston, 320 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring objective documentation of CFS is 

unreasonable); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433 (3rd Cir. 1997) (same); Hagerty v. 

Am. Airlines Long Term Disability Plan, No. C09-3299 BZ, 2010 WL 3463620, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 3, 2010). 

In Salomaa, an insured individual worked for over twenty years before being diagnosed 

with CFS. 642 F.3d at 667, 669. The Ninth Circuit held that the insurer’s decision to deny 

coverage was “illogical, implausible, and without support in inferences that could reasonably be 

drawn from the record” because (i) the doctors who personally examined the insured concluded 

that he was disabled; (ii) the plan administrator demanded objective tests to establish the existence 

of a condition for which there are no objective tests; and (iii) the experts that the insurer relied 

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upon only examined his paper file and not the insured. Id. at 676. 

Like the insured in Salomaa, Plaintiff is diagnosed with CFS and fibromyalgia—

conditions for which there are no objective tests. Id. at 677. Defendant’s experts only reviewed 

the paper files of Plaintiff. The experts never performed a physical examination, despite 

Plaintiff’s willingness to undergo any necessary examination and tests. Jensen Decl. Ex 1, Section 

F at 23, ¶ 41. Additionally, the experts did not even state that Plaintiff was no longer disabled;

they simply stated that there were no objective clinical findings to support Plaintiff’s inability to 

perform the sustained material duties of any occupation beyond October 1, 2013. Under these 

circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted unreasonably by relying 

exclusively on its experts, failing to conduct a physical examination of Plaintiff, and disregarding 

the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. Jordan, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 1072.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant acted in bad faith because Defendant changed her 

disability status without proof that her medical condition had improved. In Saffon v. Wells Fargo 

& Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2008), the insured suffered from 

degeneration of her cervical spine, a condition confirmed by repeated MRI scans and x-rays, and 

had been diagnosed with chronic headaches, chronic pain syndrome, cervical spondylosis, cervical 

strain and sprain. After paying long term benefits for a year, the insurer, MetLife, informed the 

insured that she no longer met the definition of disability and terminated her benefits. Id. at 866. 

MetLife’s decision was based in part on the fact that the insured’s MRI showed no progression in 

degeneration. Id. at 871. The Ninth Circuit rejected the proffered justification because MetLife 

did not explain why further degeneration was necessary to sustain a finding that the insured was

disabled. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that MetLife had been paying long-term disability 

benefits for a year, which suggested that the insured was already disabled, and that in order to find 

the insured no longer disabled, one would expect the MRIs to show an improvement, not a lack of 

degeneration. Id. Like the insurer in Saffron, Defendant in this case did not consider whether 

there was any evidence that Plaintiff’s condition had improved before terminating her benefits. A

reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s failure to do so constituted bad faith. Defendant’s 

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motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim is denied.

C. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are only allowed in certain cases as a punishment for the defendant and 

should be granted sparingly with the “greatest caution.” Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 

Cal.3d 809, 828 (1979) (citing Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 726-27 (1958)). It is not 

sufficient to prove that there was spite or ill will, negligence or even gross negligence. Id. “Mere 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is insufficient to support a finding of intent 

necessary to justify an award of punitive damages.” Id. Rather, punitive damages are appropriate 

only where a party is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. Id. at 825. 

Here, Plaintiff contends the same set of facts supporting her bad faith claim also support 

her prayer for punitive damages. In addition to the arguments already discussed above, Plaintiff 

argues that Defendant began to make an earnest effort to “intimidate” her. Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s 

Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 10 (Dkt. No. 38 at 14). The alleged intimidation took two forms. First, 

Plaintiff contends that in the ten months leading up to termination of her benefits, Defendant’s 

Senior Claim Advocate, Diane Eirich (“Eirich”), routinely withheld or delayed benefit payments. 

Dkt. No. 38-1 at 45-46 (Pl’s fact 70, 71). Second, in February 2013 Eirich sent Plaintiff a letter

notifying Plaintiff that she had been overpaid $237,403.10 over the past ten years. Dkt. No. 38-1 

at 44 (Pl’s fact 66, 67), Ex. 9-10. According to Defendant’s calculations, Plaintiff was eligible for 

Social Security Disability Income (“SSDI”) Benefits from 2003 through 2013, and Defendant was 

entitled to reduce Plaintiff’s LTD benefits by that amount. Eirich told Plaintiff she must 

immediately repay Defendant; that Plaintiff would not receive any LTD benefits until Defendant 

had been repaid in full; that in the meantime, any LTD benefits becoming payable would be 

applied to reduce the amount of the purported overpayment; and that Defendant may charge 

Plaintiff interest if Plaintiff did not repay Defendant within thirty days. Id. Plaintiff contends that 

the threatening and abusive letter was sent in bad faith because Plaintiff’s claim file contained 

clear documentation of Plaintiff’s ineligibility for SSDI benefits. Dkt. No. 38-1 at 44 (Pl.’s fact 

66, 67), Ex. 9-10.

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“Determinations related to assessment of punitive damages have traditionally been left to 

the discretion of the jury.” Amadeo v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1165 (9th Cir. 

2002). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find

Defendant’s conduct malicious, oppressive or fraudulent. Defendant’s motion is denied as to 

Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. 

IV. OBJECTIONS

Both parties raise several objections. The court either declines to rule on them or overrules 

them as follows. Plaintiff objects to portions of Defendant’s Statement of Facts (Dkt. No. 29-2). 

However, the court does not find any of the challenged evidence to be material, and the challenged 

evidence does not factor into the court’s reasoning. Therefore, the court declines to rule on the 

Plaintiff’s objections. 

Defendant objects to nearly all of the facts included in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of 

Additional Material Disputed Facts (“Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts”). Dkt. No. 38-1. Defendant’s 

hearsay objection to facts 10, 18, 66, 67, 70, 71, 76, 77, and 80 are overruled. The court declines 

to rule on the remaining objections because the challenged evidence is immaterial to the 

disposition of the instant motion.

Defendant also objects to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts because it violates the court’s 

Standing Order by adding more than five pages to the Moving Separate Statement. See 2019 Civil 

Standing Order § V.B.2. Plaintiff is admonished for violating the court’s standing order. 

Plaintiff’s sixty-six page Statement of Facts far exceeds the five page limit.

V. CONCLUSION

Because there are genuine disputes of material fact, Defendant’s motion for partial summary 

judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:17-cv-07320-EJD Document 46 Filed 08/02/19 Page 11 of 11