Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. TOZZI et al., 

Defendants.

______________________________

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1:05-CV-0148 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 104)

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO LATE-FILE AN OPPOSITION

(DOC. 120) AND PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STRIKE THAT

OPPOSITION (DOC. 117) 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

THE COMPLAINT (DOC. 166)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are several related motions: 

(1) Plaintiff Melvin Jones’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

related filings (Docs. 104, 106, 108, 112, 115, 132, 148); (2)

Defendant John Hollenback’s motion to late-file his opposition to

the same (Doc. 120); Plaintiff’s motion to strike the late-filed

opposition (Doc. 117); and Plaintiff’s request for leave to file

a second amended complaint (Doc. 166). Also pending are numerous

motions related to discovery (e.g., protective orders, motions to

compel, etc.). Such motions are to be heard and decided by the

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Plaintiff also points out in his “reply to opposition 1

per hearing on 12-12-2005" that various motions and/or filings

remain pending in this case. (Doc. 148 at 4.) Many of the

filings to which Plaintiff refers are “requests for judicial

notice” in which Plaintiff makes legal assertions and quotes at

length from various court documents and judicial decisions. (See

e.g., Docs. 116, 119, 129.) This is not a proper use of a

request for judicial notice, which is generally used to seek

admission of documents that are judicially noticeable under

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and contains matters not subject to

dispute. Plaintiff’s practice of using a request for judicial

notice for other purposes confuses the record. It is not

necessary for the court to take judicial notice of published

judicial decisions or of documents that are part of the record of

this case. Plaintiff may simply cite to these sources in his

legal papers. 

See Jones v. California, 1:04-CV-065676; Jones v. 2

Strangio, 1:04-CV-06567; and Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-CV-00410. 

2

presiding United States Magistrate Judge.1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. 

The case was first filed in Santa Clara Superior Court, but was

later transferred to Stanislaus County. Additional background

concerning the state proceedings is set forth in various

memorandum opinions in this case and related cases.2

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

(Doc. 1.) Then, prior to the filing of any responsive pleading

by Defendant, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March

3, 2005. (Doc. 7.) The first amended complaint named as

defendants: Michael A. Tozzi, the Executive Officer of

Stanislaus County Superior Court; Superior Court Judge Marie

Sovey-Silveria; and attorneys Leslie Jensen and John Holenback. 

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On April 20, 2005, Defendants Jensen and Hollenback 3

filed a motion to join the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants

Tozzi and Sovey-Silveria. (Docs. 25, 26 & 27.) Their motion was

not set for hearing, however, because it was improperly noticed. 

(See Doc. 30, filed April 20, 2005.)

3

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria moved to dismiss this

complaint on March 9, 2005. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff opposed this 3

motion (Doc. 13, filed Mar. 14, 2005), and moved for default

judgment against defendants Jensen and Hollenback. (Doc. 14,

filed Mar. 14, 2005.) Plaintiff then (improperly) filed an

additional “counter motion” in opposition to Defendants Tozzi and

Silveria’s motion to dismiss, along with a motion to amend the

complaint a second time. (Doc. 16, filed Mar. 24, 2005.) This

motion to amend is still pending. Four days later, on March 28,

2005, Plaintiff lodged yet another “second amended complaint” to

“supercede” the second amended complaint that was attached to his

motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 19, filed Mar. 28, 2005.) 

On March 18, 2005, an order issued dismissing Plaintiffs

related case, Jones v. Strangio. (See Doc. 72, 1:04-cv-06567.) 

In light of that dismissal, the district court ordered Plaintiff

to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as well. 

(Doc. 18, filed Mar. 29, 2005.) Plaintiff responded to the order

to show cause on April 20, 2005. (Doc. 29.) At the same time,

Plaintiff filed yet another (third) proposed amended complaint

intended to supercede the complaint lodged on March 28, 2005. 

(See Proposed “Second Amended Complaint” lodged Apr. 20, 2005.) 

This complaint contained numerous new allegations that Defendants

made racially derogatory remarks to plaintiff as part of a

conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights in contravention

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of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. 

A memorandum opinion and order dated May 11, 2005 dismissed

all claims against Defendants Tozzi and Silveria, denied

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants Jensen

and Hollenback, and denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

the complaint a second time. (Doc. 47.)

On June 22, 2005, Defendants Jensen and Hollenback’s motion

to dismiss was granted, affording Plaintiff one final opportunity

to amend the complaint. (Doc. 61.) A separate memorandum

opinion, dated June 29, 2005, denied Plaintiffs’ April 9, 2005

motion for sanctions. (Doc. 65.) On July 6, 2005, Plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed Defendant Jensen from the case. (Doc. 66.) 

Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint alleging that

Defendant Hollenback directed racially derogatory remarks at

Plaintiff with the goal of deterring Plaintiff’s participation in

legal proceedings related to Plaintiff’s family law case. (See

Doc. 67, filed July 6, 2005.

Defendant Hollenback then moved to dismiss the second

amended complaint on a variety of grounds. (Doc. 78, filed Sept.

8, 2005.) Defendant Hollenback also moved for sanctions,

alleging that Plaintiff made false statements in his amended

complaint. (Doc. 91, filed Sept. 27, 2005.) Both motions were

denied. (Doc. 103.) 

Plaintiff then filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

104, filed Oct. 31, 2005.) Defendant failed to timely file an

opposition. The court then issued a warning to Defendant about a

litigant’s obligation to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing pursuant

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to Local Rule 78-230(c). (Doc. 118.) Defendant then filed a

proposed opposition along with a request for leave to late-file

the opposition. (Doc. 120, filed Dec. 5, 2005.) Plaintiff

objected to granting Defendant leave to file this opposition and

submits that he is entitled to judgment as a matte of law. 

(Docs. 115, 116, 119, 128 & 129.) 

A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was set for

December 12, 2005. Mr. Jones and counsel for Mr. Hollenback

appeared, but decision on the motion for summary judgment was

delayed to give Mr. Jones an opportunity to conduct discovery

related to Defendant’s assertion that the late-filing of his

opposition was due to excusable neglect. (Doc. 133.)

Ms. Jensen, counsel to Defendant at the time the opposition

was late-filed, submitted a declaration and supporting documents

indicating that she was out of the country on vacation when the

opposition was due and that, in part as a result of her absence,

she and defendant mistakenly failed to file the opposition in a

timely manner. (Doc. 139, filed Dec. 27, 2005.) 

Plaintiff continues to object to the court’s consideration

of this late-filed opposition. (See Doc. 148.)

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The second amended complaint alleges that Defendant

Hollenback became involved with Plaintiff’s family law dispute in

December 2003 as counsel for Ms. Chhay. (Doc. 67 at ¶44.) 

Plaintiff filed contempt charges against Ms. Chhay in early 2004. 

(Id. at ¶ 45.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2004,

Defendant Hollenback told Plaintiff that he “called the

Stanislaus County Housing Authority and told them what a lazy

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low-life black piece of shit you are...you get nigger justice.” 

(Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hollenback

stated that “he would knock the teeth out of his black greasy

face...and rattle them out of his jive-monkey ass if he showed up

for the contempt hearings.” (Id. at ¶48.) Plaintiff asserts

that “as a direct and proximate cause of the defendant’s threats,

[he] withdrew [the] contempt charges....” (Id. at ¶ 51.) The

complaint further alleges that the statute of limitations on the

contempt charges expired in July 2004. (Id. at ¶ 54.) As a

result, “Mr. Jones’ access to the judicial system was deprived.” 

(Id.)

In addition to his own declarations, Mr. Jones presents the

declaration of his mother, Rosalind F. Jones, who states that she

witnessed Defendant Hollenback make the above-described

statements to Plaintiff. (Doc. 106.)

The complaint alleges that Defendant’s alleged conduct

deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 in seven different ways. Specifically, the complaint

alleges that Defendant:

(1) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to sue on

account of his race and ethnicity”;

(2) deprived Plaintiff of his federal right to enforce

contracts on account of his race and ethnicity”;

(3) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to be a party

to proceedings on account of his race and ethnicity”;

(4) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to give

evidence at proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(5) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to full

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benefit of proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(6) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”; and 

(7) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all laws on account of his race and

ethnicity.”

(Id. at ¶64-77 (emphasis added).) 

The parties also make reference to a letter sent by Mr.

Jones to the court presiding over his family law case entitled

“Notice of Withdrawal of Contempt Hearing Without Prejudice.” 

The Notice states:

I Melvin Jones hereby declare that I am the Plaintiff

and moving party and Kea Chhay is the Defendant. I

hereby request that the amended contempt charges #23-25

be withdrawn without prejudice for the following

reasons:

1.) Due to the matter(s) set-forth in my letter to the

Honorable Judge Wray Ladine dated 4-23-04, sent

regular mail on 4-23-04 and sent via Express mail

#ER 899883487 US. 

2.) To allow appropriate time for formal investigation

by the Commission on Judicial Performance

regarding matters set forth in said letter and my

detailed formal complaint. 

3.) My overwhelming concern for the safety of myself,

and my perspective witness’ [sic] appearing on my

behalf.

4.) Due to my concern that further violation(s) of my

Civil and Constitutional Rights will occur. 

I declare under the penalty of perjury and under the

Laws of the State of California that the foregoing is

true and correct. 

Dated this 7th Day of May, 2004

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/s/ Melvin Jones 

Melvin Jones, Jr. 

Plaintiff

(Doc. 87, Attachment E.)

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Leave to Late-File Opposition.

Defendant Hollenback concedes that his opposition was due

November 21, 2005. He asserts that the papers were “completed

and ready to be filed and served,” but that Defendant’s attorney,

Leslie F. Jensen, “had gone out of the country on vacation during

the Thanksgiving week. Her first day back at her office was

Monday, November 28, 2005.” Defendant apparently prepared the

responsive papers himself, but did not feel it was “appropriate

to send documents to the court that would carry Ms. Jensen’s

‘electronic signature’ until she had been afforded an opportunity

to review such documents.” (Doc. 120 at ¶4-5.)

Of course, this does not explain why Defendant did not file

the previously-prepared documents on November 28 or thereabouts. 

Rather, Defendant waited until just after the court issued a

notice warning Defense counsel of her obligation under the local

rules to file either an opposition or a statement of nonopposition. (Doc. 118.) Where a party fails to timely oppose a

motion, Local Rule 78-230(c) provides that the party will not “be

entitled to be heard in opposition to a motion at oral

arguments....” It is the practice of the court to inquire of a

party that does not file opposition to a dispositive motion

whether the party intended to respond or does not oppose the

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motion. 

However, Defendant has requested leave to late-file the

opposition. The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a motion

for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because the

non-moving party violated a local rule.” Couveau v. American

Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2000). Cases

should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible. 

See Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has shown no actual prejudice or

inconvenience resulting from the two day delay. Defendant

presents a plausible, albeit weak, excuse for his oversight. In

view of the strong preference of the law that cases be tried on

their merits and lack of prejudice to plaintiff, the motion for

leave to late-file Defendant’s opposition is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the opposition is DENIED. Defendant

is warned, however, that future failures to comply with court

deadlines will not be countenanced.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment.

1. Standard of Review.

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Even in an

unopposed motion for summary judgment, the moving party

nevertheless bears the burden of showing it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. 

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2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint relies exclusively upon

42 U.S.C. § 1981 to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1981 provides: 

(a) Statement of equal rights. 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and

enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected

against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination

and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981. This provision prohibits private individuals

as well as state actors from discriminating against an individual

on the basis of his or her race with respect to that individual’s

right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws...” See General Bldg. Contractors

Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). 

“Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription

of racial discrimination... for it expressly prohibits

discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts.” 

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176

(1989)(emphasis added); see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,

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791 (1966) ("The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly

indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of

rights").

In this respect, [Section 1981] prohibits

discrimination that infects the legal process in ways

that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by

reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this

discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to

existing practices. It also covers wholly private

efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct

nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the

force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination

by private entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing

the terms of a contract.

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177 (1989). 

Here, Plaintiff suggests that bringing a contempt proceeding

in state court against Ms. Chhey was an effort to enforce the

family law visitation contract he and Ms. Chhey signed. But, as

previously noted in the order on Defendant’s motion to dismiss,

Doc. 103, neither party offers any legal authority supporting or

refuting the proposition that such a contract is protected by

section 1981. Some authority suggests that a wide range of

contracts are covered by the provision. See Runyon v. McCrary,

427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 1981 reached discrimination in

private education where private schools denied admission to

minority children thereby interfering with parents’ right to

contract for educational services). The court has been unable to

locate any cases imposing liability under § 1981 in circumstances

that are even remotely comparable to the facts of this case. 

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this motion, § 1981 is applied

to a private party accused of interfering with an individual’s

efforts access a state court to enforce a private child custody

settlement contract. 

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In order to establish a claim under § 1981, it must be shown

that “(1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an

intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and

(3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities

enumerated in the statute (i.e., the right to make and enforce

contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).” Mian v.

Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d

Cir. 1993); see Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086

(5th Cir. 1994). 

It is not disputed that Plaintiff is African American,

satisfying the first element. Plaintiff alleges that on April

22, 2004, Defendant Hollenback told Plaintiff that he “called the

Stanislaus County Housing Authority and told them what a lazy

low-life black piece of shit you are...you get nigger justice.” 

(Id. at ¶47.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hollenback

stated that “he would knock the teeth out of his black greasy

face...and rattle them out of his jive-monkey ass if he showed up

for the contempt hearings.” (Id. at ¶48.) Plaintiff asserts

that “as a direct and proximate cause of the defendant’s threats,

[he] withdrew [the] contempt charges....” (Id. at ¶51.) This

evidence arguably satisfies Plaintiff’s prima facie burden.

Beyond the prima facie case requirement, Plaintiff suggests

that the court should apply the familiar McDonnell Douglass

burden shifting approach, whereby defendant would be required to

respond to a prima facie showing by presenting a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly wrongful treatment. 

This approach has been applied in § 1981 cases concerning

employment discrimination. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 416

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F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). However, no authority is offered that

suggests the burden shifting approach is appropriate for a denial

of court access for contract enforcement. The McDonnell Douglass

burden shifting approach is designed to assist in the analysis of

cases where direct evidence of discrimination is absent. Vaughn

v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Here, Plaintiff complains that Defendant uttered racial

slurs and threats against him in an effort to dissuade Plaintiff

from accessing the court system. Plaintiff relies upon direct

evidence of discriminatory intent. See Brown v. E. Miss. Elec.

Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1993) (direct evidence

existed where employer used the term “nigger” to refer to

plaintiff). 

Direct evidence, such as the use of racial slurs, does not

necessarily entitle Plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law. 

The essential question is whether Plaintiff can establish that

Defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of

race to deprive Plaintiff of contract rights enforcement or

access to the courts. This burden “remains with plaintiff at all

times.” Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1038. 

There are several ways a Defendant may be able to avoid

liability. For example, in an employment discrimination case

where direct evidence is present, the employer can counter “by

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have

acted as they did without regard to the plaintiff's race.” 

Vaughn, 918 F.2d at 521. Modifying this test for the

circumstances of this case, Defendant may counter by showing that

Plaintiff would have withdrawn the contempt proceedings anyway. 

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Alternatively, Defendant may escape liability by convincing a

jury that, as he maintains, the allegedly discriminatory actions

never took place at all. This appears to be the approach taken

by Defendant at this stage in the proceedings. Defendant has

“categorically denied” making any racially derogatory statements

to Plaintiff. (Doc. 120 at ¶8). This creates a dispute as to a

material fact as to the racial animus element of the claim.

 Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be DENIED. 

C. Motion to Amend.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint again, to

add twenty-one (21) state law tort claims (5 counts of

intentional interference with a contractual relationship; 15

counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and one

count of slander). (Doc. 166.)

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Plaintiff insists that the current trial date, of April 26,

2006, will “remain un-affected” by any amendment. Plaintiff

grossly underestimates the potential impact of an amended

pleading. Defendant insists he will require additional time to

respond to the claims. Plaintiff may amend his complaint, but,

as a condition of amending the complaint, the case schedule will

be amended accordingly. A status conference will be held March

2, 2006 at 8:45 a.m.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Defendant’s request to late-file his opposition (Doc.

120) is GRANTED. 

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Opposition

(Doc. 117) is DENIED. 

(3) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 104) is

DENIED. 

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to amend the complaint

(Doc. 166) is GRANTED.

(5) A status conference will be held March 2, 2006 in

Courtroom Three at 8:45 a.m. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2006

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

_____________________________ 

 Oliver W. Wanger

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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