Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00302/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHABONDY LAMAR SIMPSON, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

N. FELTSEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 2:09-cv-00302-MSB

ORDER

This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. (Dkt. #7). Plaintiff Shabondy

Simpson, who is confined in the High Desert State Prison, Susanville, has filed a pro se civil

rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. #1). After screening Simpson’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court will order Defendants Broddrick, Bush, Feltsen,

Packard, and Zaniroll to answer Simpson’s First Amendment retaliation claim and

Defendants Bush, Broddrick, Cannon, Crocker, Ebbitt, Feltsen, Kramer, Packard, Ramacher,

and Zaniroll to answer Simpson’s malicious prosecution claim. The Court will dismiss the

remaining claims without prejudice.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner’s Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

II. Complaint

In his Complaint, Simpson sets forth several claims for relief, alleging violations of

his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution. Specifically, Simpson contends that (1) Defendants Kramer and Packard

retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment by “send[ing] a letter to [his] wife

taking [away] her visitation right’s [sic] . . . without even a good reason” because he refused

to disclose “where he’d gotten the marijana [sic] joint he smoked before his conjugal visit”

(Dkt. #1 at 6); (2) Defendants Feltsen and Packard, with the consent of Broddrick, Bush, and

Zaniroll, retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment by fabricating charges

that he had “threatened [Feltsen]” because he “encouraged his cell partners [sic] wife to take

litigation against Feltsen and Packard” (id. at 16), resulting in his transfer to the High Desert

State Prison, Susanville (id. at 21); (3) Defendants Cade, Cannon, Crocker, and Kramer

violated his First Amendment right to religious expression by “insist[ing] [he] take out

dreadlock’s [sic] they knew could not be taken out” (id. at 17); (4) Packard violated his

Fourth Amendment rights by “searching [his] cell leaving it trashed” (id. at 5); (5) Cade,

Cannon, Crocker, Kramer, and Packard violated his Eighth Amendment rights by “refus[ing]

[him] visitation rights with his wife and family,” which led him to attempt to commit suicide

(id. at 17-18; see also id. at 12, 14); (6) Feltsen, Kramer, and Packard violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process by “hav[ing] [him] locked up in administrative segregation

. . . from July 31[,] 2007 to December 28, 2007” (id. at 17; see also id. at 11); and (7)

Broddrick, Bush, Cannon, Crocker, Feltsen, Kramer, Packard, and Zaniroll engaged in the

“fabrication of evidence” against him with malice, amounting to malicious prosecution (id.

at 18-19).

Simpson also asserts several state law claims for relief. He contends that the

defendants “fabricated legal documents against [him]” in violation of California Penal Code

§§ 118.1, 133, and 134 (id. at 20-21), and prevented him from “assist[ing] other inmates . .

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. without reprisal” in violation of California Code of Regulations §§ 3084.1(d) and 3163 (id.

at 21).

III. Discussion

A. Pleading Standard 

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hains v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading standard set forth in the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must

be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). While Rule 8 does not demand

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. If the pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is

entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-

29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

B. Section 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state

law who have violated rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, not rights guaranteed by

state law. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001); Sweaney v. Ada County, 199

F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). To state a valid claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of a defendant’s specific conduct and

show an affirmative link between his injury and that defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

C. First Amendment Retaliation – Transfer

Simpson contends that (1) Kramer and Packard retaliated against him because he

refused to “snitch,” and (2) Feltsen and Packard retaliated against him because he encouraged

his cell mate’s wife to pursue legal action against them. Simpson’s first retaliation claim,

discussed below in Subsection D, fails to state a claim for relief under the First Amendment.

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 Simpson alleges that Broddrick, Bush, and Zaniroll knew that Feltsen and Packard’s 1

charges against him were false but nonetheless approved findings concluding that Simpson

had threatened Feltsen because they “had to go along with [their] officer.” (Dkt. #1 at 18-

19).

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Simpson’s second claim, however, does state a claim for relief under the First Amendment

for screening purposes. 

 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

2005). 

Simpson alleges that Feltsen and Packard, with the consent of Broddrick, Bush, and

Zaniroll, (1) fabricated charges that he threatened Feltsen, resulting in his transfer to the 1

High Desert State Prison, (2) because he (3) advised his cell mate’s wife to file suit against

Feltsen and Packard. He also alleges that (4) Feltsen and Packard’s actions chilled his First

Amendment rights and (5) were not undertaken to advance legitimate penological purposes.

(Dkt. #1 at 16, 21).

These allegations are sufficient for screening purposes to establish a First Amendment

claim against Feltsen, Packard, Broddrick, Bush, and Zaniroll. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255

F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “repeated threats of transfer because of [the

plaintiff’s] complaints about the administration of the [prison] library” were sufficient to

ground a retaliation claim); see also Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569 (“Rhodes’ allegations that his

First Amendment rights were chilled, though not necessarily silenced, is enough to perfect

his claim.”); Mendocino Envtl. Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.

1999) (“[T]he proper inquiry asks whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person

of ordinary firmnessfrom future First Amendment activities.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that prison

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officials may not “transfer an inmate to another prison in retaliation for the inmate’s exercise

of his First Amendment right[s]”).

D. First Amendment Retaliation – Suspension of Conjugal Visits

Simpson alleges that Kramer and Packard violated his First Amendment rights by (1)

temporarily suspending his conjugal visits with his wife (2) because he (3) would not

disclose the source of the marijuana he had purchased in the Folsom State Prison. (Dkt. #1

at 4-9). These allegations do not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Kramer

and Packard. 

Simpson’s failure to disclose his source of drugs is not protected conduct under the

First Amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that prisoners

retain only those First Amendment rights “that are not inconsistent with [their] status as []

prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”).

Moreover, Simpson does not allege that Kramer and Packard’s actions chilled his First

Amendment rights. Indeed, following the temporary suspension of Mrs. Simpson’s conjugal

visits, Simpson did not disclose the source of his drugs and went on to file numerous

complaints. Lastly, Simpson does not allege facts showing that the suspension of Mrs.

Simpson’s visiting privileges or lacked a legitimate penological goal. Simpson tested

negative for marijuana before beginning his conjugal visit on January 27, 2007, and tested

positive after the visit concluded on January 31, 2007. (Dkt. #1, Exh. C). Mrs. Simpson was

Simpson’s only visitor during that time. (Id.). Although Simpson alleges that he purchased

the marijuana prior to the conjugal visit, he did not identify his source. (Dkt. #1 at 4-5).

Thus, Kramer and Packard reasonably could have believed that temporarily suspending

Simpson’s conjugal visits with his wife would help prevent the introduction of controlled

substances into the prison grounds. Accordingly, Simpson fails to state a First Amendment

claim against Feltsen and Packard for their temporary suspension of his conjugal visitation

rights.

E. First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion 

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Simpson claims that Cade, Cannon, Crocker, and Kramer violated his First

Amendment free exercise right by insisting that Simpson remove his dreadlocks. (Dkt. #1

at 17).

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison

door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and

may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison

security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “In order to

establish a free exercise violation, [the prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the

practice of his religion . . . by preventing [him] from engaging in conduct mandated by his

faith.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997).

Simpson does not allege that Cade, Cannon, Crocker, or Kramer actually required him

to undo his dreadlocks; only that they harassed him about his dreadlocks. In addition,

Simpson does not state what conduct his religious practice requires or how defendants

prevented him from engaging in it. Thus, Simpson fails to state a claim under the Free

Exercise Clause.

F. Fourth Amendment

Prisoners have no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in their cells. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (“A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment

terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and

their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.”); Mitchell v. Dupnik,

75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996); Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court, 15 F. 3d 819, 823 (9th Cir.

1994) (per curiam). Accordingly, Simpson’s contention that Packard violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by “searching [his] cell leaving it trashed” does not state a claim for relief.

(Dkt. #1 at 5).

G. Eighth Amendment 

Simpson alleges that Cade, Cannon, Crocker, Kramer, and Packard violated the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by “refus[ing] [him]

visitation privileges with his wife and family” while he was being held in administrative

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segregation from July 31 to December 28, 2007, which led him to attempt suicide. (Dkt. #1

at 17-18). 

Courts have considered constitutional claims pertaining to a prisoner’s denial of

visitation under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Ky. Dep’t of

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (considering the denial of visitation rights under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.

1996) (considering the denial of visitation rights under the Eight Amendment). “[T]here is

no constitutional right of ‘access to a particular visitor.’” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092 (quoting

Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 460-61). Simpson does not allege that he has been denied

visitation altogether. Cf. Thomas v Bierley, 481 F.2d 660, 661 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam);

Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972). Nor does he allege that the denial of his

visitation privileges with his family during his five month administrative segregation

constituted an “atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Cf. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for district court to consider whether § 1983

plaintiff’s two year placement in administrative segregation constituted “atypical and

significant hardship” where the segregated unit was overcrowded and violent, the isolation

severed plaintiff’s ties with his family, and plaintiff was “made a patient of psychiatric

programs” while segregated), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). Accordingly, Simpson

fails to state a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments for the temporary denial

of family visitation.

Simpson’s allegation that the temporary denial of his visitation privileges with his

family lead him to attempt suicide does not remedy his failure to state a claim. “Prison

officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse.”

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F. 2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982). To establish a violation of this

duty, however, Simpson must establish that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent”

to serious threats to his safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). But

Simpson’s complaint provides no information about his alleged suicide attempt, and Simpson

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fails to allege that serious threats to his safety existed or that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to such threats. Thus, Simpson fails to state a claim relating to his

attempted suicide. 

H. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

“[S]tate law may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting.” Ky. Dep’t

of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 461. But “administrative segregation in and of itself does not

implicate a protected liberty interest” under the Due Process Clause. Serrano v. Francis, 345

F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In order “to give rise to protection by

the Due Process Clause,” administrative segregation must “impose[] atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S.

at 484.

Assuming, without deciding, that Simpson’s five-month administrative segregation

constituted an atypical and significant hardship for him in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life, Simpson fails to state a claim because he was not deprived of procedural due

process in connection with his administrative segregation. In his complaint, Simpson states

that he was granted a hearing soon after he was placed in administrative segregation. (Dkt.

#1 at 5). The hearing was nonadversarial, Simpson was informed of the charges against him,

and he was given the opportunity to make a statement, submit information, and request the

presence of witnesses. (Id., Exh. D). Simpson therefore fails to state a claim under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,

1100 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that placement in administrative segregation requires only

notice to the prisoner, an opportunity for the prisoner to submit information, and a

non-adversary review of information supporting placement), abrogated in part by Sandin,

459 U.S. at 476; Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a

prison’s failure to meet its own guidelines regarding hearing deadlines does not constitute

denial of due process).

I. State Law Claims

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Simpson asserts several state law claims for relief based on the same allegations that

underlie his federal constitutional claims. (Dkt. #1 at 21-22). In particular, he contends that

the defendants (1) “fabricated legal documents against [him]” in violation of California Penal

Code §§ 118.1, 133, and 134 (id.), and (2) prevented him from “assist[ing] other inmates .

. . without reprisal” in violation of California Code of Regulations §§ 3084.1(d) and 3163 (id.

at 21).

Where a federal court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court may

exercise “pendent” or “supplemental” jurisdiction over closely related state law claims

asserted in the complaint. See Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). “[A] plaintiff’s pendent state law claims against a state or state

employees are barred unless the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the

California Tort Claims Act (‘CTCA’) before commencing the civil action.” Wayne v. Leal,

2009 WL 2406299, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Ortega v. O’Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 707

(9th Cir. 1985), rev’d in part on other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)); see Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of pendent

state law claims against public employee where plaintiff failed to allege compliance with the

CTCA). The CTCA applies to claims brought against state employees “for injury resulting

from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee,” Cal. Gov’t

Code § 950.2, and requires that tort claims against state employees be presented to the

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly known as the

State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues, Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 910, 911.2. 

Here, Simpson alleges that he presented his claims to the State Board of Control. See

Dkt. #1 at 2. 

i. California Penal Code §§ 118.1, 133, & 134

Simpson claims that Defendants Feltsen, Packard, Crocker, Cannon, Ebbitt, and

Kramer “fabricated legal documents against [him]” and filed administrative charges against

him in violation of California Penal Code §§ 118.1, 133, and 134. (Dkt. #1 at 21-21).

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California Penal Code §§ 118.1, 133, and 134, however, are criminal statutes providing

criminal penalties for peace officers preparing false reports, persons preparing false

documentary evidence, and persons deceiving witnesses, respectively. Those statutes do not

provide a civil remedy against the defendants. See Michael R. v. Jeffrey B., 205 Cal. Rptr.

312, 318 (Cal. App. 1984) (“[A] statute that provides solely for a criminal penalty does not

create a civil liability . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); Parra v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 3818376,

at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing a prisoner’s state law claim brought under a provision of

the California Penal Code imposing criminal penalties on persons for lack of a private right

of action). 

In the alternative, Simpson claims that Defendants Bush, Broddrick, Cannon, Crocker,

Ebbitt, Feltsen, Kramer, Packard, Ramacher, and Zaniroll, engaged in malicious prosecution.

(Dkt. #1 at 21). To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of an administrative

proceeding, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the prior action was commenced by or at

the direction of the defendant and was pursued to termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor; (2)

was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Sheldon Appel Co.

v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, (Cal. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Nicholson v. Lucas, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 781 (Cal. App. 1994) (“A malicious

prosecution action may be based on a proceeding before an administrative board or

agency.”). Simpson alleges that a November 18, 2007 rules violation report was maliciously

initiated against him. (Dkt. #1, Exh. H). The resulting administrative proceeding appears

to have been terminated in his favor as he was found “Not Guilty.” (Id.). Accordingly,

Simpson states a state law malicious prosecution claim against the defendants for screening

purposes.

 ii. California Code of Regulations §§ 3163 & 3084.1(d)

Simpson claims that the “defendants” prevented him from providing legal assistance

to his cell mate and his cell mate’s wife in violation of Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations §§ 3163 (providing that “[a]n inmate will not be barred from giving . . . legal

assistance [to another inmate] for violations of regulations and procedures [that] are unrelated

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to providing or receiving legal assistance”) & 3084.1(d) (providing that “[n]o reprisal shall

be taken against an inmate . . . for filing an appeal”). (Dkt. #1 at 21). Simpson does not

specifically identify the defendants that allegedly violated these regulations, however. See

Dkt. #1 at 21. Additionally, while Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations governs

the conduct of prison employees, it does not provide a cause of action against them. See,

e.g., Chappell v. Newbarth, 2009 WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that there is

no private right of action under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulation); Parra, 2009

WL 3818376, at *2, 8 (same). In any event, the Court notes that Simpson is already pursuing

a civil remedy for the defendants’ alleged retaliation against him for providing legal

assistance to his cell mate and his cell mate’s wife through his retaliation claim under section

1983.

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Simpson must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83-182(f) and 83-183(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Simpson must not include

a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in

dismissal of this action.

B. Copies

Simpson must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5-133(d)(2). Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further

notice.

C. Amended Complaint

An amended complaint entirely supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the original complaint is treated as

nonexistent. Id. Any cause of action that was raised in the original complaint is waived if

it is not raised in a first amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987).

D. Possible Dismissal

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If Simpson fails to timely comply with every provision of this order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

(1) Plaintiff’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s free exercise claim is also dismissed

without prejudice. 

(2) Defendants Broddrick, Bush, Feltsen, Packard, and Zaniroll shall answer

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim concerning his transfer to the High Desert State

Prison. Defendants Bush, Broddrick, Cannon, Crocker, Ebbitt, Feltsen, Kramer, Packard,

Ramacher, and Zaniroll, shall answer Plaintiff’s state law claim concerning malicious

prosecution.

(3) Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to state a free exercise of

religion claim and an Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of his visitation rights

that are sufficiently concrete to warrant judicial intervention. Within 30 days of the date of

this order, Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint on the form provided with this order.

Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended

Complaint.” The amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the form

provided with this order and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by

reference.

(4) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Dkt. #1), this order, a Notice of Submission of Documents form, an instruction

sheet, and copies of summons and USM-285 forms for Defendants Broddrick, Bush, Feltsen,

Packard, and Zaniroll.

(5) Within 30 days of the date of filing of this order, Plaintiff must complete and

return to the Clerk of the Court the Notice of Submission of Documents. Plaintiff shall

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submit with the Notice of Submission of Documents: a copy of the Complaint for each

Defendant, a copy of this order for each Defendant, a completed summons for each

Defendant, and a completed USM-285 for each Defendant. 

(6) Plaintiff shall not attempt service on Defendants and must not request waiver

of service. Once the Clerk of the Court has received the Notice of Submission of Documents

and the required documents, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to seek waiver

of service from each Defendant or serve each Defendant.

(7) If Plaintiff fails to return the Notice of Submission of Documents and the

required documents within 30 days of the date of filing of this order, the Clerk of Court

shall, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without

prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

DATED this 9th day of April, 2010.

/s/ Marsha S. Berzon 

MARSHA S. BERZON

United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation

Case 2:09-cv-00302-MSB Document 8 Filed 04/09/10 Page 13 of 14
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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIMPSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FELTSEN, et al.

Defendant.

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2:09-cv-00302-MSB

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF

DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance 

with the court’s order filed ______________:

______ completed summons form

______ completed USM-285 forms

______ copies of the _______________

Complaint/Amended Complaint

DATED:

___________________________________

Plaintiff

Case 2:09-cv-00302-MSB Document 8 Filed 04/09/10 Page 14 of 14