Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00474/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00474-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD DOUGLAS UDALL,

Petitioner,

v.

KAMALA HARRIS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00474 MJS (HC)

ORDER REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, California Attorney General Kamala 

Harris, is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Respondent is represented by John A. Bachman

 

1

The rules governing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 require a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court to name the "state officer having custody" of him as the respondent. OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas 

Corpus Cases Under Section § 2254). This person typically is the warden of the facility in which the 

petitioner is incarcerated. Stanley v. Cal. Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, 

Petitioner is no longer incarcerated. That he is not incarcerated does not moot the petition, see Spencer v. 

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8-12, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998) (courts may presume that a criminal 

conviction has continuing collateral consequences sufficient to avoid mootness), but it does mean that 

there is no warden, jailer, or probation officer who would be a proper respondent. Kamala Harris, the 

(continued...)

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

of the office of the Attorney General. Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 8-9.)

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner was placed in custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following 

his conviction by jury trial on May 19, 2011, of two counts of contacting or attempting to 

contact a minor with intent to commit a lewd act, one count of providing harmful matter to 

a minor for sexual purposes, and two counts of attempting to provide harmful matter to a 

minor for sexual purposes. (Clerk's Tr. at 666-67.) On July 26, 2011, Petitioner was 

sentenced to a determinate term of three years and eight months in state prison. (Id.) 

While not reflected in the record, it appears that Petitioner has since been released from 

confinement. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District. The Court ordered the abstract of judgment to be modified to accurately reflect 

the proper crimes for which Petitioner was convicted, but otherwise affirmed the 

judgment on October 11, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 1-4.) Petitioner sought review from the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The California Supreme Court denied 

review on January 15, 2014. (Id.)

Petitioner did not attempt to file collateral challenges to his conviction in state 

court in the form of petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 

On April 3, 2014 Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. (Pet., ECF No. 

1.) Petitioner presented three claims for relief in the petition: (1) that the trial court 

violated his due process rights by not providing instructions on lesser included offenses;

(2) that Petitioner’s equal protection rights were violated by denying him half-time 

custody credits in prison; and (3) that the crimes of conviction violated his First 

 

(...continued)

Attorney General of California, is hereby substituted as the properly named respondent. See Rule 2(b), 

Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section § 2254, 1975 advisory committee's note (when 

petitioner is not incarcerated or on probation or parole, proper respondent is the Attorney General).

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Amendment rights to free speech. (Id.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 21, 2014. (ECF No. 17.)

Petitioner filed a reply on September 8, 2014. (ECF No. 18.) The matter stands ready for 

adjudication.

II. Statement of the Facts2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

During the relevant time period in 2009, Julia W. was 13 years old 

and living in Fresno County with her grandfather. She met the Udall 

family—defendant, his wife (Wife), and their 11-year-old daughter 

(Daughter)—through church. Daughter and Julia were friends, and Julia 

was "friends" on Facebook with Daughter, Wife, and Udall.

In September 2009, Julia's grandfather reported to the police that 

Julia had received inappropriate messages from Udall. Julia told a police 

officer that she had conversations with Udall through Facebook that made 

her extremely uncomfortable. The police later logged into Julia's Facebook 

account and engaged in Internet communications with Udall while

pretending to be Julia.

As a result of the police investigation, Udall was charged with six 

counts: (1) contacting or attempting to contact a minor with intent to 

commit a lewd act upon the child in violation of section 288.3, subdivision 

(a), on September 18, 2009; (2) violation of section 288.3, subdivision (a), 

on September 19, 2009; (3) arranging a meeting with a minor for the 

purpose of engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior in violation of section 

288.4, subdivision (a)(1), on September 18, 2009; (4) providing harmful 

matter to a minor for sexual purposes in violation of section 288.2, 

subdivision (a), on September 17, 2009; (5) attempting a violation of 

section 288.2 on September 18, 2009; and (6) attempting a violation of 

section 288.2 on September 19, 2009.[fn2]

FN2: The first amended complaint incorrectly describes 

counts 1 and 2 as "arranging meeting with minor for lewd or 

lascivious behavior." These factual allegations describe a 

violation of section 288.4, not section 288.3. The prosecutor, 

however, clarified that counts 1 and 2 allege violations of 

section 288.3—contacting or attempting to contact a minor 

with intent to commit a lewd act—and the jury was correctly 

instructed on the elements of section 288.3 for those counts.

A jury trial began on May 10, 2011. Julia testified that Daughter was 

her good friend and she had spent a lot of time with both Daughter and 

Wife, visiting their house twice and spending the night on one occasion. 

Julia also joined Daughter's family, including Udall, on a trip to Shaver 

Lake on September 7, 2009.

 

2

The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its October 11, 2013 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Julia first communicated with Udall by instant chat to ask about the 

Shaver Lake trip. Julia explained that instant chat on Facebook is a private 

communication that is not posted on one's Facebook page. She began 

having instant chats with Udall almost every night. At first there was 

nothing unusual about her Internet conversations with Udall, but at some 

point, they became inappropriate and sexual. Julia recalled telling Udall 

that she was going to a school dance and he said he used to get kicked 

out of dances for touching girls and he would like to dance with her. Udall 

told her if she had a boyfriend, he would make her break up with him. Julia 

reminded Udall that he was married, and he responded that it did not 

matter and he had cheated before. Udall told Julia she looked like she was 

16 years old in her pictures. He talked about them going on a date when 

Wife would be at a women's retreat organized by their church. He said 

they could have sex at his house and he would lick her wherever she 

wanted. He asked if Julia had had sex before. She said no, and Udall 

responded, "Good. That is the way I like them." He told her he could make 

it not hurt. Udall also said that he could meet Julia before he picked up his 

kids. He said they could meet "in a few days." He talked about meeting 

Julia after his son's soccer games and discussed having sex in his house. 

Julia deleted her instant chats with Udall because he told her it would be 

better as "neither of us would get in trouble."

Julia told her grandfather about her Facebook conversations with 

Udall, and he contacted the police. Udall also asked Julia for her cell 

phone number and began sending her text messages; on September 18, 

2009, he sent her more than 50 messages. Julia told her grandfather 

about the text messages, and he again notified the police.

Police Officer Abby Padgett testified that she was dispatched to 

Julia's grandfather's house on Thursday, September 17, 2009, to 

investigate the grandfather's initial report. Padgett spoke with both Julia 

and her grandfather. Julia told Padgett that she had been having instant 

chat conversations with Udall for the previous couple months; initially, they 

talked about school and normal activities. Then, about two weeks earlier, 

Udall told Julia he loved her. The day before Padgett interviewed her, Julia 

had an Internet conversation with Udall that lasted two to three hours and 

they had another long conversation on September 17 as well. Julia told 

Padgett that Udall said he wished he was 14 again so he could dance with 

her. At some point in the conversation, Julia became extremely 

uncomfortable and started responding with "oh" and "okay." Udall told her 

he wanted her really bad and they should see each other alone. He 

mentioned the possibility that they could go to the movies on Saturday. He 

said he could probably get his kids out of the house and they would be 

able to meet. Udall asked Julia if she was alone in her room while they 

were chatting; he said they could get in trouble if anyone found out about 

their conversations and he could lose her.

Padgett also described many of Udall's statements that Julia 

testified about. For example, Padgett testified that Julia told her Udall said 

he had been kicked out of a school dance for touching girls and he would 

make her break up with her boyfriend. He said he had cheated before. He 

told Julia they could have sex at his house and he would lick her wherever 

she wanted and do whatever she wanted. Udall asked her if she had had 

sex before, and when she said no, he said, "Good. That's the way I like 

them." Padgett did not see any of the Facebook conversations that Julia 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

described as Julia told her she had deleted them.

Police Officer Kory Westbury testified that he continued the 

investigation, visiting Julia's grandfather's house the next day. Julia told 

Westbury that Udall had sent her text messages on her cell phone while 

she was at school that day. There had been so many messages that she 

had been sent to speak with a counselor about using her cell phone in 

school. In these text messages, Udall discussed being alone with Julia 

and doing whatever she wanted.

Photographs of Julia's cell phone text messages were admitted into 

evidence. Julia's text messages to Udall were not available, however, 

because she deleted her own outgoing text messages. Udall texted, "I do 

not know yet, but I hope soon," "[f]igure a time and place to be together," 

"find a time and place to be alone," "[j]ust be with you and make you 

happy," and "a full day or more together." Julia sent a text asking Udall 

what they would do, and he texted back, "Anything you ask." He wrote, "I 

love your smile. I could look at it all day long. You make me laugh and that 

makes me happy." He wrote, "This is my first time to want to do this," 

"want to be with you," and "[b]ut I want to so badly." Udall texted that he 

wanted to do whatever Julia wanted, he wanted to know what would make 

her happy, and he wanted "to be with [her] a lot." He texted, "I love talking 

with you. I also want to do the stuff we talked about last night." Julia and 

Udall exchanged texts discussing what they would do together. Julia 

asked what Udall liked, and he responded, "Wow. I love it all so much oral 

and everything."

The police decided to log into Julia's Facebook account and 

conduct an instant chat with Udall using her grandfather's computer. At 

9:15 p.m. on September 18, 2009, Udall attempted to instant chat with 

Julia, and Westbury responded, pretending to be Julia. Westbury saved a 

copy of the chat session, and a transcript of the conversation was 

admitted into evidence.

During the Internet conversation, Udall wrote, "I was just thinking I 

wish my family would go out of town for a weekend." Westbury (as Julia) 

asked why, and Udall responded, "so it would be easier for us to hook up." 

Udall said that Julia could come over and "we could have fun," "maybe 

swim at night." Westbury wrote it would be cold, and Udall responded, 

"there are ways to stay warm" and "share body heat." Westbury suggested 

they could watch movies. Udall said, "we can get anything you want from 

on line." Westbury asked what Udall thought, and he responded, 

"something with sex in it."

Later in the conversation, Westbury asked, "What would you do if 

you saw me right now?"[fn3] Udall responded, "Kiss you and hug you." 

Westbury asked Udall what he would want to do. Udall wrote that he 

wanted to get in bed with Julia, remove her clothes, and "rub my hand all 

over your body kiss you everywhere." He said he would kiss "breast 

tummy a little lower," "between your legs," and "your pussy." Westbury 

asked, "And then do what?" Udall wrote, "If you want, climb on top of you," 

and "maybe put it inside you." Udall continued, "I want to so badly" and "I 

am so crazy for you." He wrote, "I will go very slow[.] I don't want to hurt 

you at all." He also asked, "where do you want me to cum" and said, "if 

you want to take chances in you [otherwise] pull out." Udall said he was "a 

little worked up" and his "you know is hard."

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

FN3: The transcript of the chat session shows Westbury typed, "wht wld u 

do if u saw me rt now." Westbury explained that he wanted to make sure 

he responded the same way Julia communicated online. Julia testified that 

she told the police how she typed in a shorthand manner, shortening 

some words and, for example, typing "OIC" for the phrase, "oh, I see."

Westbury told Udall, "My grandpa is leaving tomorrow. We can 

meet at the park, if you want to." Udall responded, "that would be kool I 

will text you when I can get away," "maybe around 4ish." Westbury asked 

what Udall wanted to do. He responded, "kiss you if we are alone." 

Westbury asked where they could go, and Udall wrote, "hmmm we will see 

maybe for a ride." Westbury asked what Udall wanted to do, and Udall 

responded, "everything." Udall continued, "I like you so much I do not want 

this to be just about sex and I am new to doing this," "I looked at your pics 

100 times today," and "I think I love you." He wrote that he had a great 

feeling in him and felt "warm not hot I feel great almost like I am floating." 

Westbury asked, "Like the dance when you were 14?" and Udall 

responded, "yea but way better."

Westbury asked how Udall was going to get away the next day. 

Udall wrote, "I will have to try to work on that," "I will try I promise I will try," 

and "I do not want to make a promise and something go wrong and have 

to break it." He wrote, "it hurts that I just cant run off to see you." Udall 

said he would work on a way to get away from everyone to meet Julia at 

the park. He explained that he was a coach and he would know whether 

he could get away and meet Julia after the second game and he would 

text her. Udall wrote that he would think about Julia just like last night. He 

said he dreamed about her—"I remember you and I were together and 

everyone thought it was a good thing." He said it was a good thing "as 

long as we do not get caught." The instant chat session ended at 11:02 

p.m.

The next day, police set up a surveillance team to observe Udall 

and the park where he discussed meeting with Julia, but Udall did not go 

to the park. Westbury testified that Udall drove by the park. That evening, 

September 19, 2009, Westbury logged into Julia's Facebook account and 

engaged in another instant chat session with Udall while posing as Julia. 

Westbury copied the conversation and a transcript was admitted into 

evidence.

Udall wrote that he had been called in for work that day because a 

drunk driver hit a power pole. He worked for PG&E. He said he hoped 

Wife would go to the women's retreat so Julia and he could see each 

other. He wrote, "this will be my first time cheating." Westbury asked if 

Udall still wanted to see Julia. Udall responded, yes, but he was scared 

that he would want more than he could have; he said, "what if I want to be 

with you more than my family its not like I can leave them and marry you." 

He asked if he should wear protection. Westbury responded that it was up 

to him. Udall wrote that he wanted to wrap his arms around Julia and hold 

her tight and he would take his time and go slow. He said she would learn 

what she liked, such as "kissing your body in def places," "neck breast 

back tummy legs and any other spot you maybe curious about." He 

mentioned "kissing/licking" "breast pussy butt." He suggested that Julia 

spend a night with Daughter and then she could sneak out of her room 

and into his bed.

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Udall asked whether he needed to buy protection. He said he would 

only want Julia to get pregnant "if I thought there was a way for us to be 

married." Later, Westbury wrote that he (as Julia) was scared, and Udall 

wrote, "ok if you want to back out its ok, we are friends and I will not ever 

get mad." He wrote, "lets try for womens retreat." Udall said that, the day 

they went to the lake, he had been scared to look at her because he was 

scared everyone could see what he was thinking—that she was sexy and 

he wanted to kiss her. Again, Udall asked whether Julia wanted him to use 

protection and whether she wanted him to "sho[o]t it in you." This 

Facebook chat session began at 8:48 p.m. and ended at 11:06 p.m.

On September 23, 2009, Westbury arrested Udall. He examined 

Udall's cell phone and confirmed that he had been texting Julia. Westbury 

interviewed Udall in the police department's investigation room. The 

interview was videotaped, and a DVD of the interview was played for the 

jury.

In the interview, Westbury explained there had been a report of 

inappropriate conversations over the Internet. Initially, Udall said that Julia 

started the inappropriate conversations with him on Facebook and he was 

only trying to scare her. He said, "I should [have] gone to her grandfather 

instead of trying to scare the tar out of her." He described Julia as "kind of 

the, I, you know gets in trouble a lot type kid." Udall said Julia did not live 

with parents and he had heard her father was in prison. He told Westbury 

that she asked specific questions about sex and "I said no you don't want 

to do this it hurts." One day Julia told him she loved him and then she 

started to talk about meeting him. She wanted to meet Udall at the park 

but he did not go. He said they had exchanged text messages, "it went 

back and forth ten times each."

Later in the interview, Udall admitted that he told Julia he wanted to 

do things sexually with her. Westbury asked why he would do that if his 

purpose was to scare her, and Udall responded, "Things got twisted 

around." He said he "blew it" and admitted he had sexual conversations 

with Julia on Facebook on the nights of September 18 and 19, 2009, but 

before that, their conversations were not inappropriate. He told Westbury, 

"I got roped in," "[b]ut I, I quickly got out." Westbury asked whether, during 

his conversations with Julia, Udall thought this could be a possibility. Udall 

responded that he "[g]ot into dreamland about it but reality is I knew I 

could never, would never." "I mean in my own mind but not communicated 

it you know but then you stop and say [wait] a minute here we're talking a 

thirteen year old girl no."

Udall said he and Julia talked about going to Magic Mountain or 

Disneyland, and he mentioned that Wife goes to a women's retreat and 

leaves him with the kids, but he made no set dates. He reiterated that he 

did not meet Julia at the park, stating, "I was at my office and there was no 

way I [was] going to the park." He explained that he planned to work that 

day and "that was kind of a reinforcement to make sure ...." Westbury 

asked, "Were, were you tempted to meet her?" Udall responded, "To be 

honest with you yeah ... [¶] ... [¶] I was but ... [¶] ... [¶] I would not that's 

over an internet not seeing the person .... [¶] ... [¶] I know I would not 

cross that line." He continued, "Sitting on the internet on the couch middle 

of dark you know middle of the night not looking at a picture of the person 

not seeing the person is like a dreamland type thing[,] but to do it[,] no 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

way."

Westbury asked if Udall had had a similar "situation" on the Internet 

with anyone else. Udall responded he had some cybersex-type 

conversations on Yahoo Messenger and "that's been my vice I've been 

trying to break." He said he had "done this stuff before" but he "never ever 

met anybody never will meet anybody." Among other Internet contacts, 

Udall said he had sexually related chats with a 14-year-old girl during the 

summer. He said he had stopped, but "then [Julia] popped up and I made 

a mistake." Westbury eventually told Udall that he had been chatting with 

him, not Julia, the previous Friday and Saturday nights. Later in the 

interview, Udall said, "I admit I was very dumb you know I let this get out 

of control and I should have not done it .... I'm guilty of letting it get out of 

control .... I'm glad nothing physically happened.... And nothing would 

have and I won't."

At the end of the interview, Westbury gave Udall an opportunity to 

write an apology letter. Udall wrote an apology letter to Julia's grandfather, 

which was admitted into evidence. Udall wrote, in part: "Your 

granddaughter and I started off chatting. It was just normal stuff, and then 

went out of control. I made a mistake, and did not stop it. I allowed it, and 

then encouraged it. I am so ashamed right now. At that point in my mind I 

was talking to a fantasy computer, not a person." He wrote that he would 

pray to God that this will never happen again.

Dustin Dodd, a police officer and computer forensic analyst, 

testified that he executed a search warrant of Udall's home and seized two 

computers and an external hard drive. On Udall's laptop computer, Dodd 

found a Yahoo Messenger profile and "images depicting sexual 

exploitation of children" in a folder associated with that profile. There was 

data showing that the Yahoo Messenger profile visited various chat 

groups and engaged in chats with other users whose profiles "were all 

names of people who purported to be younger minors." Dodd explained 

that profile names may include a year of birth. For example, a user profile 

name of "BRIW1996" would imply the user was around 13 years old in 

2009.

Dodd recovered "hundreds and hundreds" of chat logs from before 

June 2009 to August 11, 2009. In the chat sessions, the Yahoo 

Messenger profile associated with Udall's computers would tell others his 

age, sex, location, and sometimes would say he worked for PG&E. 

Typically, within four or five messages, the conversations would become 

sexually explicit. Dodd testified that Udall "would talk about things that he 

would want them to do if they had met up or things he would want to do to 

them; how experienced they were sexually, and things like that." For 

example, Udall engaged in a chat with "Simba," who said he was 13 years 

old and from Georgia. Udall asked Simba, "What do you like to do with a 

guy?" and Simba responded "Be the girl ...." Udall wrote to Simba, "Would 

I get to lick you?" and "I want to suck you and FUCK you." Dodd testified 

there were several hundred chat logs "that were just like this." In one chat 

log, Udall chatted with a person who identified herself as a 14-year-old 

girl. Udall wrote, "I really get turned on by girls your age."

There were also logs showing Udall requesting, offering, 

distributing, and looking at sexual images of minors. Dodd found many 

pornographic images involving children on Udall's computers. These 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

included "a black-and-white photo of roughly an eight-to ten-year-old 

female completely nude with an adult male inserting his penis into her 

vagina," a "color image of a young female, approximately eight to ten 

years old, wearing panties, lifting up her top and pinching her nipples for 

the camera," and an image of a girl approximately 10 to 12 years old with 

semen on her face. On cross-examination, Dodd testified that he found 

more pornographic images of adults than of children on Udall's computers.

Udall's former supervisor, Daughter, and Udall himself testified for 

the defense. James Redman, Udall's former supervisor at PG&E, testified 

that Udall worked four hours of scheduled overtime on Saturday, 

September 19, 2009, from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The work did not involve 

an emergency such as a drunk driver running into a power pole. Redman 

described Udall as "[a] very honorable employee, very conscientious" and 

"truthful and honest."

Daughter testified that she met Julia at church; Julia's grandfather 

was a pastor at the church. She never saw her father look at Julia or any 

of her friends in a weird or inappropriate way. She thinks her father is very 

truthful and "teaches [her] right from wrong ...." Daughter spent about 60 

days or more in the hospital in 2007, and her father would spend the night 

at the hospital with her. She said he was like her best friend.

Udall testified that he began visiting chat rooms in September 2007 

when Daughter, who had first been diagnosed with leukemia in 2005, 

relapsed. At that time, he "really got mad at God." He was told that the 

treatment for Daughter was not working and they had the choice of 

making her comfortable and letting her die or trying radical treatments. A 

nurse at the hospital suggested online chat rooms as a way of dealing with 

Daughter's illness. He explained: "I went to the chat rooms, because I 

wanted [to] escape my reality. When I was in them, I wasn't Todd Udall, 

married, two kids. I was Todd Udall single, no children. I lived in Santa 

Cruz, California.... I was in my 30s; looking for a different life and—

escaping my reality."

Udall admitted that he chatted online with people who purported to 

be 14 years old and as young as 11 and 12 years old. People would 

sometimes send him pornographic pictures of children, but he would 

delete them. He was not looking for photos; he "was seeking chat." He 

admitted that he wrote, "I really get turned on by girls your age" to a 

person who said she was 14 years old. He joined chat groups that had 

names such as "youngnudegirlsonly," "1800gotlolitas," and 

"schoolgirlcuties." Udall admitted that his chats were about having sex 

with children, but he denied that it was his fantasy to have sex with 

children.

Udall's church suggested all the members become Facebook 

friends, and that was how Julia became his friend on Facebook. Julia's 

grandfather also approached Wife and asked the family to befriend Julia 

because she had a rough childhood and she needed good friends.

Udall testified that his first Internet conversation with Julia of a 

sexual nature occurred on Thursday, September 17, 2009. That night, 

Udall and Wife had a "pretty big argument over finances ...." They had one 

particular medical bill that was $124,000 and their insurance companies 

did not want to pay it. Other bills were also stacking up. Udall began 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

chatting with Julia on Facebook and told her about the fight. Julia said if 

she were his wife, they would not have fights like that. Udall wrote that he 

was old, and Julia told him he looked young. He testified, "She started 

saying things just kind of making me feel good." He admitted that he 

talked about going to the movies, asked Julia if she were a virgin, and 

started talking about having sex. He viewed his conversations with Julia 

like his Yahoo Messenger chats, as an escape from reality. Udall said it 

was Julia who asked him to text her, but he admitted that he sent her texts 

about sex on Friday, September 18, 2009, and specifically texted about 

finding a time and place to meet. Asked why he would text a 13-year-old 

girl about sex, Udall responded, "Wish I wasn't. I just got caught up in the 

moment."

Udall discussed meeting Julia at a park, but he had no intention of 

meeting her. He only wrote that he would try to meet her, and he never 

planned to meet her. Udall testified that, during all the Facebook 

conversations and text messages of September 17, 18 and 19, 2009, he 

never intended to meet Julia for the purpose of having a sexual 

relationship. On cross-examination, Udall said he knew the women's 

church retreat was sometime in October 2009 at Hume Lake.

The jury found Udall guilty of counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. The jury 

found Udall not guilty of count 3, arranging a meeting with a minor for the 

purpose of engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior.

The trial court sentenced Udall to state prison for a total term of 

three years eight months, consisting of the middle term of three years for 

count 1, plus a concurrent middle term of three years for count 2, plus a 

consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term of two years) 

for count 4. The court stayed the sentence for counts 5 and 6 pursuant to 

section 654.

People v. Udall, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7325, 2-23 (Cal. App. 2013).

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, 

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). 

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

///

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

IV. Review of Petition

A. Claim One – Instruction on Lesser Included Offenses

Petitioner contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to 

instruct the jury regarding lesser included offenses of sending harmful material to a 

minor that did not require a showing of intent to seduce. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-6.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05, 111 S. Ct. 

2590, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 & n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" 

presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms 

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining 

whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

II. Jury instructions

Udall contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte

on section 313.1, subdivision (a), as a lesser-included offense of section 

288.2, subdivision (a), the charged offense of counts 4, 5, and 6.

Section 288.2, subdivision (a), makes it a crime for a person to 

knowingly send, distribute, or exhibit any harmful matter[fn4] to a minor 

"with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions 

or sexual desires of that person or of a minor, and with the intent or for the 

purpose of seducing a minor ...."

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

FN4: "Harmful matter" is defined in section 313, subdivision (a), as 

"matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying 

contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is 

matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently

offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious 

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."

Section 313.1, subdivision (a), makes it a misdemeanor to 

knowingly sell, rent, send, distribute, or exhibit harmful matter to a minor.

We assume section 313.1, subdivision (a), is a necessarily included lesser 

offense[fn5] of section 288.2, subdivision (a). (See People v. Jensen

(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 244 [§ 313.1, subd. (a), is lesser-included 

offense of § 288.2, subd. (b), sending harmful matter by electronic mail, 

Internet, or online service to minor with intent to seduce] (Jensen); People 

v. Nakai (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 499, 507 [assuming without deciding that 

§ 313.1, subd. (a), is necessarily included offense of § 288.2, subd. (a)] 

(Nakai).)

FN5: "Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a 

greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or 

the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the 

elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed 

without also committing the lesser." (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 

108, 117-118.)

A trial court must give an instruction on a lesser-included offense 

sua sponte if the evidence warrants the instruction. (People v. Cook

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 596.) The evidence warrants the instruction if there 

is substantial evidence which, if accepted, would absolve the defendant of 

the greater offense, but not the lesser. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 690, 733.) We review de novo the court's instructions on lesserincluded offenses. (People v. Cook, supra, at p. 596.)

Two published cases addressing this issue are instructive. In 

Jensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 224, the defendant engaged in many 

sexually explicit chat sessions with, and sent pornographic pictures to, 

"Scotty" and "Ryan," the online profiles for two fictitious 13-year-old boys 

that had been created by two police officers. (Id. at pp. 227-234.) At trial, 

the defendant's attorney argued that, for the defendant, this was fantasy 

and entertainment but "there 'was no indication whatsoever that he ever 

intended to meet these boys.'" (Id. at p. 238.) The defendant was 

convicted of nine counts of attempted distribution or exhibition of harmful 

matter to a minor over the Internet with intent to seduce (§§ 664, 288.2, 

subd. (b)). (Jensen, supra, at p. 226.) On appeal, he argued the trial court 

should have instructed the jury on the lesser offense of misdemeanor 

distribution of harmful matter in violation of section 313.1, subdivision (a). 

(Jensen, supra, at p. 243.) The Court of Appeal agreed, explaining:

"The evidence presented at trial raised a substantial 

question as to whether defendant actually harbored the 

specific intent to seduce 'Ryan' or 'Scotty.' Defendant 

essentially admitted all of the other elements of the offenses. 

Reasonable jurors could have concluded that defendant 

distributed harmful matter to 'Ryan' and 'Scotty' believing that 

they were minors and harbored the intent to arouse himself 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

or them but lacked the intent to have any physical contact 

with them. Such a conclusion is consistent with guilt of only 

[section 313.1, subdivision (a)] rather than [section 288.2]." 

(Jensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244-245.)

In Nakai, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pages 501-502, the defendant 

engaged in sexual online chats with Colleen, a woman posing as a 12-

year-old girl living in Riverside, California. He sent her a picture of his 

erect penis and, among other things, asked her if she would suck his dick 

and if she would like to "ride on it." (Id. at p. 502.) Colleen told the 

defendant he could come to her house that Saturday at 6:00 p.m. He 

asked for her address, and she gave him the address of a house where 

the Riverside County Sheriff's Department was planning an "'Internet 

decoy sexual predator sting.'" (Id. at pp. 505-506.) That Saturday, the 

police found defendant sitting in his car near the sting house at around 

3:00 p.m. (Id. at p. 506.) He was charged with two counts of attempting to 

send or exhibit harmful matter to a minor with the intent of seducing the 

minor.

At trial, his attorney requested instructions on the lesser offense, 

section 313.1, subdivision (a). (Nakai, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) 

The trial court denied the request, reasoning that defendant's chat 

sessions showed his sole intention was to seduce the purported 12-yearold girl with whom he thought he was communicating. The trial court noted 

that no evidence was presented that defendant harbored a different intent. 

(Id. at p. 507.) The Court of Appeal "agree[d] with the trial court's 

conclusion that there is no evidence that a reasonable jury could find 

persuasive that, if accepted, would absolve defendant from guilt of the 

greater offense but not the lesser, because the evidence only 

demonstrates defendant's combined intents to arouse and seduce." (Id. at 

p. 508.)

Udall argues that this case is similar to Jensen, as there was 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he had no intention 

to seduce Julia. The Attorney General responds that this case is more like

Nakai because Udall's messages to Julia "were tailored toward seducing 

the victim and getting her to meet him." For example, he talked about 

going on a date with Julia when Wife was away at a women's retreat. He 

said he wanted her really bad and he was "so crazy for [her]." He told her 

he would go slow and not hurt her. He sent her text messages saying he 

wanted to know what would make her happy. He told her he dreamed 

about her and wrote, "I think I love you."

We agree with the Attorney General that Udall's own words are 

persuasive evidence of his intent to seduce Julia. We cannot, however, 

ignore Udall's own testimony that he never intended to meet Julia for the 

purpose of having a sexual relationship. This was arguably evidence from 

which a jury could find that Udall committed the lesser offense of sending 

harmful material, but not the greater offense of doing so with the intent to 

seduce. For this reason, we hesitate to conclude that no instruction on 

section 313.1, subdivision (a), should have been given in this case.

Even so, Udall's contention fails because we find no prejudice. In a 

noncapital case, failure to instruct sua sponte on lesser-included offenses 

that are supported by the evidence is reviewed for prejudice under 

Watson.[fn6] (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178.) Thus, "[a] 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this 

form of error only if, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the 

evidence' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears 'reasonably probable' the 

defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error 

not occurred." (Ibid.) Here, the evidence of Udall's intent to seduce Julia 

was overwhelming. The only counterevidence was Udall's testimony that, 

while he enjoyed the fantasy, he never intended to have sex with Julia. 

Obviously, the jury was not swayed by this testimony.

FN6: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

The jury received its final instructions on the afternoon of May 17, 

2011, and deliberated for fewer than 30 minutes. The next day, the jury 

resumed deliberations at 1:25 p.m. and submitted a question to the court 

at 4:25 p.m. The jury adjourned for the day at 4:35 p.m. The question 

related to count 3, arranging a meeting with a minor for the purpose of 

engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior in violation of section 288.4, 

subdivision (a)(1).

The next day, the court addressed the jury's question first thing in 

the morning. The jury resumed deliberations at 9:04 a.m. and notified the 

clerk it had reached a verdict at 9:35 a.m. In addition to finding Udall guilty 

of three counts involving section 288.2, subdivision (a), the jury found him 

guilty of two counts of violation of section 288.3, subdivision (a), 

contacting or attempting to contact a minor with intent to commit certain 

felonies (in this case, lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor). This 

means the jury determined that Udall intended to commit acts with Julia, 

rejecting Udall's testimony that he had no intention of ever meeting Julia. 

In light of these proceedings, it is not reasonably probable that Udall would 

have obtained a more favorable outcome had the trial court given 

instructions on section 313, subdivision (a).

People v. Udall, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7325 at 23-30.

2. Analysis

To the extent Petitioner alleges the instructional claim violated state law, 

Petitioner's claim is not cognizable in this proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that 

a challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

A claim that an instruction was deficient in comparison to a state model or that a trial 

judge incorrectly interpreted or applied state law governing jury instructions does not 

entitle one to relief under § 2254, which requires violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, to the extent 

that Petitioner raises state law claims, his claims should be dismissed.

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Although the Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on lesser included 

offenses can constitute constitutional error in capital cases, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 

625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980), it has reserved decision on whether such 

an omission in non-capital cases constitutes constitutional error, id. at 638 n.7. When the 

Supreme Court has expressly reserved consideration of an issue, there is no Supreme 

Court precedent creating clearly established federal law relating to a petitioner's habeas 

claim. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a petitioner 

cannot rely on circuit authority, and there is no basis for relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) 

for an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Alberni v. McDaniel, 

458 F.3d at 864; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, there is no clearly established federal law within the meaning of § 

2254(d) concerning a state court's rejection of a claim that Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights in a non-capital case were violated by a failure to instruct on a lesser 

included offense. Thus, such a claim is not cognizable in a proceeding pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 and is subject to dismissal. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1105-06 

(9th Cir. 1998).

Further, the absence of the instruction did not result in any fundamental 

unfairness. The only basis for federal collateral relief for instructional error is that an 

infirm instruction or the lack of instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72; Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973); see Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974) (it must be 

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even "universally 

condemned," but that it violated some right guaranteed to the defendant by the 

Fourteenth Amendment). The Court in Estelle emphasized that the Court had very 

narrowly defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness, and that 

beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process 

Clause has limited operation. 502 U.S. at 72-73.

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

However, when habeas is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a failure to instruct on 

the defense theory of the case constitutes error if the theory is legally sound and 

evidence in the case makes it applicable. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 

2006); see Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 

(1988) (reversing a conviction and holding that even if a defendant denies one or more 

elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, and the 

defendant requests such an instruction).

Petitioner contends that he had no intention in meeting with the victim, and 

therefore the lesser included offense of sending harmful matter to a minor under Cal. 

Penal Code. 313.1(a) which did not require a showing of intent to seduce or arouse was 

applicable. 

The state court noted that it took into consideration Petitioner’s testimony that he 

never intended to act on the conversations and attempt to meet with the victim. 

However, the Court of Appeal concluded that even assuming that the state court erred in 

failing to give the instruction, there was no prejudice. The Court noted that the jury 

deliberated and convicted Petitioner of sending harmful materials with the intent to 

seduce, along with other charges including two counts of contacting or attempting to 

contact a minor with intent to commit a lewd act. Based on all the convictions, the state 

court held that the jury necessarily discredited his comments that he did not intend to 

act, but instead found that he did have the requisite intent to meet with the victim and 

commit lewd and lascivious conduct. 

In his traverse, Petitioner’s main contention is that he did not actually attempt to 

meet with the victim at the arraigned time, and therefore there was no evidence of intent. 

Under California law intent is viewed at the time the harmful material was sent, not 

whether there was intent to seduce at the time of the arraigned meeting. See People v. 

Nakai, 183 Cal. App. 4th 499, 508 (2010). The fact that Petitioner did not attempt to 

meet the victim does not negate the jury’s finding of intent that occurred at the time 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Petitioner was engaged in his internet communication with the victim. Based on the 

frequency, duration, and detail of Petitioner’s conversations, it was reasonable for the 

state court to find that Petitioner did not suffer any fundamental unfairness or that the 

omission of the instruction had any substantial or injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner's claim concerning 

the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of Cal. Penal Code 313.1(a).

B. Claim Two – Equal Protection and Custody Credit Calculation 

Petitioner, in his second claim, contends that his equal protection rights were 

violated when he was denied a more generous rate of custody credit calculation. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1-6.) Because the California Supreme Court's 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804-05.

In denying Petitioner's claim, the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained:

IV. Presentence conduct credit

The trial court sentenced Udall on July 26, 2011. He received 

conduct credit calculated at the rate of two days for every four days 

served, the accrual rate provided under former section 4019. (Stats. 2010, 

ch. 426, § 2; see People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1549.) 

Section 4019 was amended effective October 1, 2011, to provide for 

accrual of conduct credit at a day-for-day rate. (Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53.) 

Although Udall was sentenced before the current section 4019 came into 

effect, he claims he is entitled to its more generous rate of conduct credit 

accrual based on equal-protection principles. After Udall filed his opening 

brief, our court rejected this argument in People v. Ellis, supra, at page 

1552. We decline to revisit Ellis and, as a consequence, Udall's equalprotection claim fails.

People v. Udall, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7325 at 45-46.

///

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

2. Analysis

The Equal Protection Clause essentially requires that all persons similarly situated 

be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. 

Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). "States must treat like cases alike but may treat 

unlike cases accordingly." Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 

2d 834 (1997) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 

(1982) and Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S. Ct. 879, 84 L. Ed. 1124 (1940)). 

The Fourteenth Amendment "guarantees equal laws, not equal results." McQueary v. 

Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 

U.S. 256, 273, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979)). Moreover, "a mere 

demonstration of inequality is not enough... There must be an allegation of 

invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme before a cognizable claim arises." 

McQueary, 924 F.2d at 835. A habeas petitioner has the burden of alleging facts 

sufficient to establish "a prima facie case of uneven application." Id.

In People v. Lara, the California Supreme Court explained:

Today local prisoners may earn day-for-day credit without regard to 

their prior convictions. (See § 4019, subds. (b), (c) & (f), as amended by 

Stats.2011, ch. 15, § 482.) This favorable change in the law does not 

benefit defendant because it expressly applies only to prisoners who are 

confined to a local custodial facility "for a crime committed on or after 

October 1, 2011." ( § 4019, subd. (h), italics added.)

Defendant argues the Legislature denied equal protection (see U.S. 

Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) by making this change in the 

law expressly prospective. We recently rejected a similar argument in 

People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328-330, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824, 

278 P.3d 1182 (Brown). As we there explained, "'[t]he obvious purpose'" 

of a law increasing conduct credits "'is to affect the behavior of inmates by 

providing them with incentives to engage in productive work and maintain 

good conduct while they are in prison.' [Citation.] '[T]his incentive purpose 

has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it. The very concept demands 

prospective application.'" (Brown, at p. 329, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824, 278 P.3d 

1182, quoting In re Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906, 913, 196 Cal.Rptr. 

293.) Accordingly, prisoners who serve their pretrial detention before such 

a law's effective date, and those who serve their detention thereafter, are 

not similarly situated with respect to the law's purpose. (Brown, at pp. 328-

329, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824, 278 P.3d 1182.)

54 Cal.4th at 906, n.9. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was treated 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

differently from other similarly situated prisoners without a rational basis. This is 

because, as explained in Lara, Petitioner is not similarly situated with prisoners who 

committed their crimes after the revision of the conduct credit provisions of the 

Realignment Act. Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate "invidiousness or illegitimacy 

in the statutory scheme." McQueary, 924 F.2d at 835.

The decision of the California Court of Appeal denying petitioner's Equal 

Protection claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

C. Claim Three – Violation of First Amendment Rights 

In claim three of the petition, Petitioner asserts that the various sections of Cal. 

Penal Code § 288 for which he was convicted violate the First Amendment. (See Pet. at 

9-12.) Petitioner did not present this claim on review to state court, and it is therefore 

unexhausted. However, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on 

the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available 

in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(2).

The Ninth Circuit recently stated, "In the case of a habeas petition implicating the 

First Amendment, we first 'must, as a reviewing court, conduct our own independent 

review of the record. In so doing, we must exercise independent judgment as to the legal 

issue of whether [the habeas petitioner]'s speech and association were protected." See

Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCoy v. Stewart, 282 

F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir.2002) (conducting an independent review prior to analyzing a 

habeas claim implicating the First Amendment)). However, Petitioner’s speech is not 

protected by the First Amendment. Petitioner's First Amendment challenge lacks merit

because Cal. Penal Code § 288, which proscribes lewd or lascivious acts against 

minors, criminalizes conduct rather than speech. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 

285, 297, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008) ("Offers to engage in illegal 

transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.").

In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to a 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which had been used to prosecute a 

defendant for knowingly inducing a minor over the internet to engage in illegal sexual 

acts. See United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 561-62 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth 

Circuit reasoned that the statute limited only conduct outside the First Amendment's 

protection (i.e., the targeted inducement of minors for illegal sexual activity). See id.

Based on the same reasoning, § 288 is not facially overbroad because it criminalizes 

conduct, such as the touching or attempted touching of a minor's body with sexual intent,

rather than speech. See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(finding no First Amendment protection where "speech is merely the vehicle through 

which a pedophile ensnares the victim."); see also United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 

1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Speech attempting to arrange the sexual abuse of children 

is no more constitutionally protected than speech attempting to arrange any other type of 

crime."); United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Defendant 

simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage 

in illegal sexual acts.").

To the extent Penal Code § 288 might otherwise chill a substantial amount of 

protected speech, its intent requirement eliminates that possibility. Section 288 requires

intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or victim; in other 

words, there must be an intent to sexually exploit a minor. See People v. Martinez, 11 

Cal. 4th 434, 444 (1995) ("[C]ourts have long indicated that section 288 prohibits all 

forms of sexually motivated contact with an underage child. Indeed the 'gist' of the 

offense has always been the defendant's intent to sexually exploit a child, not the nature 

of the offending act.") (citation omitted); see also Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639 (finding no 

overbreadth problem where "[t]he statute only applies to those who 'knowingly' persuade 

or entice, or attempt to persuade or entice, minors. Thus, it only affects those who intend 

to target minors.").

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is without merit, and it would 

not have been an objectively unreasonable determination of the state court to conclude 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

that § 288 does not violate the First Amendment. Petitioner is not entitled to relief with 

regard to his third claim.

V. Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to the claims presented in the instant 

petition. The Court therefore orders that the petition be DENIED. 

VI. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to 

appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain 

circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute 

in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which 

provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, 

by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to 

test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person’s detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained 

of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under 

section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 

required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the 

merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or 

the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find the 

Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief wrong 

or debatable, nor would a reasonable jurist find Petitioner deserving of encouragement 

to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

VII. Order

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00474-MJS Document 25 Filed 12/20/16 Page 25 of 25