Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03346/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03346-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-03346-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JEFFERSON ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRANSUNION, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:16-cv-03346-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 18

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jefferson Robinson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants 

TransUnion, LLC (“TransUnion”) and The Best Service Company, Inc. (“Best”) for alleged 

violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), and the California 

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), California Civil Code § 1785.25(a). 

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Best now moves to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, 

moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dkt. No. 18. 

Plaintiff filed a response to the motion. Dkt. No. 23. Having carefully considered the pleadings 

filed by the parties, the court has determined the Motion to Dismiss should be denied. However, 

the Motion for Summary Judgment, which is unopposed, will be granted for the reasons explained 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-03346-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

The factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such 

that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556-57. A complaint that falls short of the Rule 

8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. 

Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally accept as 

true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court 

must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United 

States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a 

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Also, the court generally does not consider any material beyond the pleadings for a Rule 

12(b)(6) analysis. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 

(9th Cir. 1990). Exceptions to this rule include material submitted as part of the complaint or 

relied upon in the complaint, and material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-03346-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion 

and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 

or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the issue is one on which the nonmoving party must bear the 

burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out an absence of evidence supporting 

the claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent’s claim. Id. at 325.

If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party 

to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific materials in the record to show that there is a 

genuinely disputed fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A “genuine issue" 

for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary 

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

However, the mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as well as conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. 

(“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”); Thornhill Publ’g Co. 

v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Instead, the non-moving party must come 

forward with admissible evidence to satisfy the burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine 

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party 

produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats 

the motion.” Id.

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Statutory Framework

i. FCRA

Although the FCRA generally prohibits “[a] person” from furnishing information “relating 

to a consumer” to any consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) “if the person knows or consciously 

avoids knowing that the information is inaccurate,” a consumer cannot sue a furnisher based 

simply on the communication of inaccurate information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a); see Nelson v. 

Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, a consumer has a 

private right of action against a furnisher if, after receiving notice that information is disputed, the 

furnisher fails to reasonably undertake one of the following duties: “conduct an investigation with 

respect to the disputed information,” “review all relevant information provided by the consumer 

reporting agency,” “report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency,” and 

“if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to 

all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that 

compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).

Consequently, “[t]o state a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he found 

an inaccuracy in his credit report; (2) he notified a credit reporting agency; (3) the credit reporting 

agency notified the furnisher of the information about the dispute; and (4) the furnisher failed to 

investigate the inaccuracies or otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 

1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E).” Corns v. Residential Credit Solutions, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1233-GMN-VCF, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27864, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2016).

For the first element, the plaintiff must dispute facts underlying the purported inaccuracy; 

the presentation of legal defenses to payment will not suffice. See Chiang v. Verizon New Eng. 

Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[J]ust as in suits against CRAs [under § 1681i], a plaintiff’s 

required showing [under §1681s-2(b)] is factual inaccuracy, rather than the existence of disputed 

legal questions” because “[l]ike CRAs, furnishers are ‘neither qualified nor obligated to resolve’ 

matters that ‘turn[] on questions that can only be resolved by a court of law.’”); see also Carvalho 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

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v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 615 F.3d 1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the FCRA’s 

reinvestigation provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, does not on its face require that an actual inaccuracy 

exist for a plaintiff to state a claim, many courts, including our own, have imposed such a 

requirement.”). “The inaccuracy requirement comports with the purpose of the FCRA, which is 

‘to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them.’” Carvalho, 

615 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 

2009)). Notably, however, “a credit entry can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ within the meaning of 

the FCRA ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such 

an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 

(quoting Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998)). 

ii. CCRAA

Similar to the FCRA, the CCRAA provides that “[a] person shall not furnish information 

on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person 

knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate,” and imposes liability on 

furnishers who, after receiving notice of a dispute, fail to complete a reasonable investigation with 

respect to the disputed information and report the results to a CRA. Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a), 

(g). The CCRAA also provides for a private right of action: “[a]ny consumer who suffers 

damages as a result of a violation of this title by any person may bring an action in a court of 

appropriate jurisdiction against that person . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31(a). 

“The CCRAA mirrors the provisions of the FCRA.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. 

Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995). And “because the CCRAA ‘is substantially based on the 

Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, judicial interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive 

authority and entitled to substantial weight when interpreting the California provisions.’”

Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 889 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Olson v. Six Rivers Nat’l Bank, 111 Cal. App. 

4th 1, 12 (2003)). 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-03346-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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B. The Motion to Dismiss

The court first examines Best’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Looking at the Complaint, the same allegations underlie both the FCRA claim and the 

CCRAA claim. Plaintiff alleges he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on March 31, 2014, 

and that a financial reorganization plan was confirmed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1327 on November 

10, 2014. Compl., Dkt. No. 1, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff then ordered a “three bureau” credit report on July 

15, 2015, and “noticed several tradelines all reporting misleading and inaccurate account 

information.” Id. at ¶ 7. Specific to Best, Plaintiff alleges it was reporting his account “beginning 

in 1154, as in collections, despite a Bankruptcy Court Order stating the $0.00 is owed and that the

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee’s accounting indicates that $0.00 is owed.” Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff 

disputed the purported inaccuracy with the CRAs and “is informed and believes” that notification 

was sent to furnishers. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10. He contends that Best failed to conduct a reasonable 

investigation of the inaccuracy and continued to report the information falsely to TransUnion, or 

that TransUnion failed to perform its own reasonable investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12. 

Best argues these allegations are “nothing more than a recitation of the elements” and fail 

to establish that it was reporting inaccurate information about Plaintiff’s account, even after 

Plaintiff obtained confirmation of a reorganization plan in his bankruptcy case. The court

disagrees. Though they are certainly minimal, Plaintiff has included just enough factual 

information to state a claim under the FCRA and, by virtue of doing that, has also stated a

CCRAA claim. Best’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 

Best contends the information it furnished was not inaccurate or misleading because 

reporting a debt during the pendency of a bankruptcy is not actionable under the FCRA or 

CCRAA. It is true that courts in this district have held that it is not misleading or inaccurate to 

report delinquent debts not yet discharged in bankruptcy. See Mortimer v. JP Morgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., No. C 12-1936 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108576, at *9, 2012 WL 3155563 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“While it might be good policy in light of the goals of bankruptcy protection 

to bar reporting of late payments while a bankruptcy petition is pending, neither the bankruptcy 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

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code nor the FCRA does so.”); see also Mortimer v. Bank of America, N.A., No. C-12-01959 JCS, 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51877, at *16-18, 2013 WL 1501452 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013) (finding 

that the FCRA does not prohibit the accurate reporting of debts that were delinquent during the 

pendency of a bankruptcy action, even after those debts have been discharged, so long as the 

bankruptcy discharge is also reported); see also Giovanni v. Bank of America, N.A., No. C 12-

02530 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178914, at *14-16, 2012 WL 6599681 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 

2012). Indeed, relying on this exact authority, the undersigned recently dismissed an arguably

comparable FCRA claim because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege why reporting an account as 

past due was inaccurate, even though a reorganization plan was confirmed the plaintiff’s pending

bankruptcy case. Biggs v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-01507-EJD, slip. op. at 5 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016). 

But Plaintiff’s allegations are different. Here, the information Best allegedly furnished to 

the CRAs - that Plaintiff’s account was in collections - suggests something more than just an 

account status. Indeed, it suggests that Best or a designee can actively collect on the debt despite

Plaintiff’s reorganization plan, under which Plaintiff contends Best is entitled to nothing. Such 

collection activity would be barred by § 1327(a), which provides that “[t]he provisions of a 

confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is 

provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has 

rejected the plan.” In essence, that statute prohibits “a creditor from asserting, after confirmation, 

any other interest than that provided for it in the confirmed plan.” In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916, 925 

n.9 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). Thus, because the information Best furnished implies some interest 

that conflicts with Plaintiff’s § 1327 plan, the court finds the information Best furnished is 

“misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit 

decisions.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163. 

Best also challenges the Complaint’s allegations as inconsistent because, on the one hand, 

Plaintiff states Best failed to investigate the information it was reporting after being notified of the 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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dispute, and on the other, states that TransUnion did not “send all relevant information to the 

furnishers.” To the extent these allegations are contradictory, the characterization is not fatal to 

Plaintiff’s claims at this point because Rule 8(d)(3) expressly permits the pleading of inconsistent 

claims. The rule advocated by Best, which is to “permit[] one claim to be invoked as an 

admission against an alternative or inconsistent claim would significantly restrict, if not eliminate, 

the freedom to plead inconsistent claims provided by Rule 8[].” Molsbergen v. United States, 757 

F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1985). Best’s argument is rejected on that basis. 

In sum, the Complaint alleges facts that satisfy the requirements of the FCRA and the 

CCRAA. Plaintiff identifies the “in collections” inaccuracy, states that he disputed the 

designation with the CRAs, alleges that to his knowledge the CRAs communicated the dispute to 

furnishers likes Best, and claims that Best failed to then undertake a reasonable investigation of 

the information it was reporting. Since these allegations are enough to render Plaintiff’s claims 

plausible, the motion to dismiss will be denied. 

C. The Motion for Summary Judgment

The court now turns to Best’s motion for summary judgment. Though Plaintiff did not 

submit opposition to this motion, the court must nonetheless determine whether Best met the

burden of showing its entitlement to judgment under Rule 56. See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 

1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Best argues there is no dispute of material fact that it was never notified of the dispute 

Plaintiff allegedly submitted to the CRAs. “Since a private right of action against furnishers exists 

only for duties imposed by § 1681s-2(b), notice from the CRA to the furnisher is an essential 

allegation for a prima facie case under the FCRA.” Venugopal v. Digital Fed. Credit Union, No. 

5:12-CV-06067 EJD, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43829, at *6-7, 2013 WL 1283436 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

27, 2013) (citing Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154). Notice to the furnisher as a precursor to liability is

also required under the CCRAA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(g). 

In support of its argument, Best has submitted the declaration of its Legal Department 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Manager, Gary Condon, in which he states that Plaintiff’s account with Bank of the West was 

assigned to Best for collection in 2013, and that Plaintiff’s account was paid in full in 2014. Dkt. 

No. 18-3, at ¶¶ 3-5. Condon also states that Best’s corporate policy is to investigate all indirect 

disputes received from CRAs and update any account that is found to be misleading or inaccurate, 

but did not receive an indirect dispute regarding Plaintiff’s account. Id. at ¶ 7. In addition, 

Condon states that Best never received a dispute directly from Plaintiff, and did not receive notice 

of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy, which was notably filed after Plaintiff’s account with Best had been 

satisfied. Id. at ¶¶ 8-10. 

Best has successfully shown that Plaintiff lacks evidence to support the notice elements of 

his claims. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff produce evidence upon which a jury could find in 

his favor. He has not done so by not opposing the motion, leaving Best’s evidence

uncontroverted. Thus, Best is entitled to summary judgment on both claims asserted against it. 

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Best’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 18) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion 

to Dismiss is DENIED, but the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

Judgment will be entered in favor of Best on the claims asserted against it. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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