Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01899/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01899-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:0206 FLSA: Minimum Wage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D’ANGELO FERRERI, on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BASK TECHNOLOGY, INC. (formerly 

named iTOK, INC.), a corporation; and 

FIELD NATION, LLC, a limited liability 

company,,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-1899-CAB-MDD

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Doc. Nos. 66, 67]

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ “Joint Motion for FLSA Collective 

Action Settlement Approval, Final Certification, and Authorization to Effectuate 

Settlement,” and Plaintiff’s unopposed application for attorneys’ fees and costs and 

Plaintiff incentive award. No opposition or objection to the motion was filed, and the Court 

held a hearing on November 18, 2016. For the reasons set forth below as well as those 

stated at the hearing, both motions are denied.

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I. Background

Defendant Bask Technology, Inc., provides remote technical support for homes and 

businesses. According to the SAC, the specific individuals who provided this support for 

Bask’s customers are called Remote Technical Advisors (“RTAs”). In September 2013, 

Plaintiff D’Angelo Ferreri contacted Bask about becoming a RTA. Bask allegedly told 

Plaintiff that he could become an RTA, but that he had to go through Defendant Field 

Nation, LLC. Field Nation is one of several third-parties, referred to as “pods,” that Bask 

used to obtain RTAs to perform the support work for Bask’s customers. Ferreri proceeded 

to apply with Field Nation and eventually became an RTA for Bask, which entailed 

working shifts where he would have to be logged into his computer and ready to respond 

to Bask customers’ calls for technical support, referred to as “tickets.” Bask paid Field 

Nation $18 per completed ticket, and Field Nation would pay Ferreri on a per ticket basis 

after deducting certain fees from the amount received from Bask. Ferreri was classified as 

an independent contractor and paid on a 1099 basis.

The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges that Ferreri and all RTAs who 

performed work for Bask customers were improperly classified as independent contractors 

instead of employees and as a result not paid a minimum wage or overtime. To that end, 

the SAC asserts two FLSA claims and various claims under California’s labor and unfair 

business practices laws on behalf of Plaintiff and one putative FLSA collective and two 

putative Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 classes. In addition to Bask, the complaint 

named Field Nation, LLC, as a defendant. The SAC estimated the existence of “at least a 

few hundred RTAs” as class members and alleged that the amount in controversy exceeded 

$5 million. [Doc. No. 34 at ¶¶ 5, 22.] In or around February 2016, Ferreri settled with 

Field Nation for a payment of $6,000. 

On February 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for conditional certification of a 

collective action for the two FLSA claims consisting of all RTAs who performed worked 

for Bask through any “pod” (not limited to Field Nation) and were classified as independent 

contractors. The motion contained a proposed notice to potential collective members

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which specified that “Plaintiff also asserts claims under California law, but those claims 

are not subject to this notice.” [Doc. No. 32-2 at 2.] The Court granted the motion in part, 

conditionally certifying a significantly narrower collective than the one sought by Plaintiff. 

The collective included:

All persons who contracted with Field Nation, LLC, to perform work for Bask 

Technology, Inc. (formerly named iTOK, Inc.), or Bask/iTOK’s customers, 

as a Technical Advisor, Technical Support Representative, Support 

Technician or in any other similar position that provided remote technical 

services and were classified as an independent contractor within three years 

preceding the date of their decision to opt-in to this action.

On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel, Lindsay David, filed a declaration (the “David 

Declaration”) listing 35 individuals who she claims submitted their consent to join the 

conditional collective action.1

Also on October 14, 2016, Ferreri filed the instant motions seeking approval of a 

“Collective Action Settlement Agreement and Release” and attorneys’ fees. The 

settlement agreement purports to be between Bask and Ferreri, “on behalf of himself and 

all those who opted-in to the conditionally certified collective action by executing a 

Consent to Join Form.” [Doc. No. 66-3 at 1.] The settlement agreement states that 34 

individuals consented to join as collective members. [Id.] Further, the putative collective 

members includes two names not listed on the David Declaration and omits three names 

listed on the David Declaration.

According to the settlement agreement, Bask has agreed to pay a gross settlement 

amount of $117,969.57, allocated as follows: $39,616.75 to the settlement members for 

their claims; $2,000 as an incentive award for Ferreri; and $75,000 to Plaintiff’s counsel; 

 

1 This declaration does not comply with the opt-in requirement of the FLSA, which states that “[n]o 

employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become 

such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 

(emphasis added); see also Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc., No. 15-cv660-HSG, 2016 WL 4073336, 

at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016). No written consents for the collective members have been filed with the 

Court. Plaintiff may correct this deficiency by filing the returned opt-in forms with the Court.

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and $1,352.82 in costs. The agreement includes an exhibit specifying the amount each 

settlement member would receive under the settlement, but does not specify how those 

amounts were calculated. The median payment to the 34 collective members identified on 

the exhibit to the settlement agreement is $447.75, while the payments to the three highest 

paid collective members (one of which is Ferreri) constitute almost 63% of the total 

collective payment. Only nine collective members receive more than $750.00 under the 

settlement, and six collective members receive just $59.30. In exchange for these

payments, the settlement agreement contains the following release and covenant not to sue:

Conditioned upon Court approval of the settlement and dismissal of the case 

with prejudice, Opt-In Members, individually and in their representative 

capacity, for themselves and their heirs, successors, assigns, personal 

representatives, executors, legal representatives, spouses, agents, insurers, 

and attorneys, do hereby release and discharge Defendant and its current and 

former parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, predecessors, assigns, 

officers, directors, shareholders, associates, employees, agents, insurers, 

attorneys, and representatives (collectively, “the Released Parties”), of and

from any and all claims, rights, demands, charges, complaints, causes of 

action, obligations, or liability of any and every kind (including any and all 

claims or demands for attorneys’ fees and costs), which were or could have 

been asserted in the Action, or arising out of the same or similar factual 

allegations, under the Fair Labor Standards Act or California wage and hour 

laws, of any kind or nature that arose or accrued at any time during the period 

from June 1, 2012, through the date of this Agreement, for any type of wages, 

overtime, hours worked, misclassification as independent contractors, 

premium pay, damages, statutory damages, liquidated damages, unpaid costs, 

statutory penalties, civil penalties, punitive damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, 

litigation costs, restitution, or equitable relief. Opt-In Members further 

covenant not to sue Defendant or the Released Parties for any and all such 

released claims.

[Doc. No. 66-3 at 3.] 

II. Legal Standard

“The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., was enacted ‘to protect all covered workers 

from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.’” Adair v. City of Kirkland, 185 

F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc., 

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450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). “The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions are 

central among the protections the Act affords to workers. Section 6 of the FLSA mandates 

payment of a minimum wage and section 7 sets maximum hours (‘the overtime limit’), 

which, when exceeded, requires the payment of overtime wages.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 

206, 207)). “An employer who violates the FLSA ‘shall be liable to the employee or 

employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime 

compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated 

damages.’” Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 890, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).

“Settlement of an FLSA claim, including a collective action claim, requires court 

approval.” Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc., No. 15-cv660-HSG, 2016 WL 4073336, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016); see also Dunn v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am., No. 

13-cv-5456-HSG, 2016 WL 153266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016) (“Most courts hold 

that an employee’s overtime claim under FLSA is non-waivable and, therefore, cannot be 

settled without supervision of either the Secretary of Labor or a district court.”). Because 

the Ninth Circuit has not established a standard for district courts to follow when evaluating 

an FLSA settlement, California district courts frequently apply the standard established by 

the Eleventh Circuit in Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S. By and Through U.S. Dep’t of 

Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). Dunn, 2016 WL 153266, at *3. Under that 

standard, the relevant considerations are whether the named plaintiff is “similarly situated” 

to the collective members and whether the settlement constitutes “a fair and reasonable 

resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Lynn’s Food 

Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355; see also Ambrosino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 11cv1319 

L(MDD), 2014 WL 3924609, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (“A district court may 

approve an FLSA settlement if the proposed settlement reflects ‘a reasonable compromise 

over [disputed] issues.’”) (quoting Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354). 

Although the standard for approving FLSA collective actions may be nominally 

different from the standard for approving class actions under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 23, “many courts begin with the well-established criteria for assessing whether 

a class action settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate under [Rule] 23(e) and reason by 

analogy to the FLSA context.” Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-1821-

AWI-EPG, 2016 WL 3077710, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2016) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Otey v. Crowdflower, Inc., No. 12-cv5524-JST, 2014 WL 1477630, at 

*11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (“[T]he factors that courts consider when evaluating a 

collective action settlement are essentially the same as those that courts consider when 

evaluating a Rule 23 settlement.”).2 Those Rule 23 criteria include:

the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 

duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status 

throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery 

completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of 

counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the 

class members to the proposed settlement.

Otey, 2014 WL 1477630, at *4 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 

(9th Cir. 1998)).

III. Discussion

The proposed settlement in this case contains numerous deficiencies that preclude a 

finding that the settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over 

FLSA provisions. In short, the inconsistencies among (1) the terms of the proposed 

settlement agreement, (2) the identity of the opt-in collective members, (3) the extent of 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of the opt-in members, and (4) the claims in the SAC

as compared with the claims being released in the settlement agreement, make it impossible 

to determine what the settlement encompasses and what is happening to the claims in the 

complaint that are not included in the settlement, if any. Moreover, the agreed upon 

 

2 But see Selk v. Pioneers Mem. Healthcare Dist., 159 F.Supp. 3d 1164, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (evaluating 

an FLSA settlement using a totality of the circumstances approach “that replicates the factors relevant to 

Rule 23 class actions where appropriate, but adjusts or departs from those factors when necessary to 

account for the labor rights at issue.”)

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distribution of Bask’s settlement payment includes a grossly unreasonable share for 

Plaintiff’s counsel. Any one of these deficiencies precludes approval of the settlement.

A. Settlement and Release of California Claims

First, though labeled a “collective action” settlement, the settlement action includes 

a release of state law claims and, according to the approval motion, includes payment to 

three individuals specifically for their California state law claims. These state law claims 

are ostensibly Rule 23 class action claims based on the complaint, but they do not qualify 

for class action certification here because with only three individuals receiving payment to 

release their claims, the numerosity requirement is not satisfied. More importantly, neither 

Ferreri nor Plaintiff’s counsel represents any of the opt-in collective members with respect 

to the California claims and did not have authority to enter a settlement of those claims on 

the individuals’ behalf.3 If these three individuals (the motion papers do not identify the 

names of the individuals receiving a payment from Bask for California claims) want

Ferreri’s counsel to represent them on their California claims as well, they are free to retain 

them as counsel, and are also free to settle their claims with Bask. However, such a 

settlement would not be on a class-wide basis and would not be subject to court approval. 

Alternatively, Ferreri and Bask are free to settle the California law claims on a class-wide 

basis and then follow the procedures under Rule 23 for approval of such a settlement. Otey, 

2014 WL 1477630, at *10 (“When an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action 

are proceeding in the same case, courts require the parties to show that the certification 

requirements for a Rule 23 class action are satisfied.”). Either way, as things currently 

stand, neither Ferreri nor Plaintiff’s counsel have authority to bind the three individuals 

receiving a payment for their California claims, or any of the opt-in collective members, to 

a release of any California claims absent certification of a Rule 23 class action to which 

they are class members.

 

3 As discussed above, the opt-in notice to the FLSA collective specified that it only concerned the FLSA 

claims.

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Along the same lines, the settlement agreement purports to release California claims 

of all but the three California collective members in exchange for no consideration 

whatsoever from Bask. However, neither Ferreri nor counsel represent these individuals 

either with respect to non-FLSA claims. Indeed, the SAC arguably did not even assert any 

claims under California labor laws on behalf of these non-California RTAs because they 

did not fall into the SAC’s definition of “California Class.” Settlement agreements with 

broad releases going beyond the FLSA violations are frequently rejected. See Kempen, 

2016 WL 4073336, at *9; see also Dunn, 2016 WL 153266, at *5 (“Courts in this district 

routinely reject FLSA settlements when the scope of the release goes beyond the overtime 

claims asserted in the complaint.”). Moreover, “[n]o one should have to give a release and 

covenant not to sue in exchange for zero (or virtually zero) dollars.” Daniels v. Aeropostale 

West, Inc., No. C 12-5755 WHA, 2014 WL 2215708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014); Selk 

v. Pioneers Mem. Healthcare Dist., 159 F.Supp. 3d 1164, 1178 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“Only 

when opt-in plaintiffs receive independent compensation, or provide specific evidence that 

they fully understand the breadth of the release, will a broad release of claims survive a 

presumption of unfairness.”). Yet, that is exactly what Plaintiff’s counsel asks the Court 

to approve here as all but three of the collective members are releasing California claims 

in exchange for no consideration. Accordingly, because the release goes far beyond the 

FLSA claims asserted in this lawsuit, the settlement is not fair and reasonable.

B. Uncertainty About Rule 23 Class Claims and PAGA Claim

The settlement also ignores the Rule 23 class action claims in the SAC for 

individuals who did not opt-in to the FLSA collective action as well as the claim for 

penalties under California’s Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Labor Code § 2699 et seq

(“PAGA”). The SAC asserts class claims on behalf of much broader classes than the 34 

or 35 individuals who opted-in to the FLSA collective action or who would receive 

payment from Bask in this settlement. The settlement agreement and the instant motion, 

meanwhile, imply that this case should be dismissed in its entirety upon approval of the 

settlement. It is unclear from the record what the parties intended with respect to the 

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California class claims and whether counsel reached this settlement to the detriment of 

absent putative class members. Cf. Daniels, 2014 WL 2215708, at *5 (“The Supreme 

Court has warned of the problems with an attorney who currently represents another class 

against the same defendant. This is because defendants have an incentive to settle all claims 

at once, if it settles at all, thereby creating opportunities for counsel to manipulate the 

allocation of settlement dollars to the detriment of absent class members.”) (internal 

citation omitted). For example, the Court is concerned that Plaintiff’s counsel settled the 

California claims of the three opt-in FLSA members to the detriment of the other 31 optin members who are nevertheless releasing their California claims in the settlement 

agreement. 

Likewise, it is unclear whether the parties are settling the PAGA claims as well and 

whether any such settlement is reasonable. PAGA claims are unique because “where 

plaintiffs bring a PAGA representative claim, they take on a special responsibility to their 

fellow aggrieved workers who are effectively bound by any judgment.” O'Connor v. Uber 

Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 

2016). “The Court must be cognizant of the risk that despite this responsibility, there may 

be a temptation to include a PAGA claim in a lawsuit to be used merely as a bargaining 

chip, wherein the rights of individuals who may not even be members of the class and the 

public may be waived for little additional consideration in order to induce the employer to 

agree to a settlement with the class.” Id. Thus “in reviewing a settlement that includes 

both a Rule 23 class and a PAGA claim, the Court must closely examine both aspects of 

the settlement . . . . [T]he Court must evaluate the adequacy of compensation to the class 

as well as the adequacy of the settlement in view of the purposes and policies of PAGA.” 

Id. Here, the settlement possibly results in a waiver of all PAGA claims in exchange for 

no compensation. Such a settlement would not be a reasonable and fair resolution of FLSA 

claims.

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C. The Identity of the Opt-In Members is Not Clear

Next, the identity of the settlement class members listed in the attachment to the 

settlement agreement is not identical to the list of opt-in members identified in Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s declaration. James Keenan Lake and Ronald Terry are identified on Exhibit 1 to 

the settlement agreement but not on the David Declaration. Rachel Patterson, Nikki 

Raeburn, and Ronald Toney are identified on the David Declaration but not on Exhibit 1 

to the settlement agreement. This discrepancy is not explained and leaves unclear who is 

a member of the collective action and whose claims are being released in the settlement 

agreement. Moreover, it could lead to the unfair result that Patterson, Raeburn and Toney 

would be bound by the settlement as opt-in collective members, but not receive any 

compensation. Accordingly, this is yet another reason why the Court cannot approve of 

the settlement.

D. Attorney’s Fee Request

The attorney’s fee component is possibly the most glaring deficiency that renders 

the settlement unreasonable for the opt-in members. Pursuant to the FLSA, the court “shall, 

in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable 

attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 

“The ‘case law construing what is a “reasonable” fee applies uniformly’ to all federal feeshifting statutes.” Haworth v. State of Nevada, 56 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). “Under Ninth Circuit law, the 

district court has discretion in common fund cases to choose either the percentage-of-thefund or the lodestar method” to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee. Vizcaino v. 

Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942

(“Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts 

have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery 

method.”). Thus, courts frequently use the percentage-of-recovery method either by itself 

or in conjunction with confirming that the lodestar is consistent with the 25% percentageof-recovery benchmark to determine the reasonableness of fees for FLSA common fund 

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settlements. See, e.g., Selk, 159 F.Supp. 3d at 1180 (evaluating FLSA settlement fee award 

using percentage-of-recovery method); Jones v. Agilysis, Inc., No. C 12-03516 SBA, 2014 

WL 2090034, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) (approving fee award as consistent with the 

25% “benchmark”); Otey, 2014 WL 1477630, at *7-8 (analyzing fees using lodestar and 

percentage of recovery methods). 

Here, the settlement agreement allocates $75,000 of the $116,616.75 gross 

settlement amount to Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel argues that a $75,000 fee 

award is reasonable in part because it was negotiated with and agreed to by Bask separately 

from the payment to the collective members. However, the terms of the settlement 

agreement along with the minute entry on the docket indicating that the case settled at a 

settlement conference with the Magistrate Judge implies that the fee amount was little more 

than one component of the overall settlement of the case.4In any event, “[t]hat the 

 

4 Negotiation of attorneys’ fees simultaneously with the settlement payments to the plaintiffs “raises the 

specter of collusion because it suggests that Plaintiffs’ counsel may have been motivated to undercut their 

clients’ (and the putative class’s) recovery in order to quickly generate higher attorneys’ fees for 

themselves.” Dunn, 2016 WL 153266, at *8; see also 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 6.4 (12th ed. 

revised 2015) (“Courts also have identified a special danger of collusiveness when the attorney fees, 

ostensibly stemming from a separate agreement, were negotiated simultaneously with the settlement.”) 

(internal citation and quotation omitted). Although the involvement of the Magistrate Judge weighs 

against the likelihood of collusion, considering the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel are asking for almost twice 

as much in fees as the opt-in members are receiving in total, Plaintiff still must do a better job 

demonstrating “that the settlement is ‘not [] the product of collusion among the negotiating parties. 

Bluetooth., 654 F.3d at 947 (quoting In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 458).

Indeed, the agreement here appears to include several indicia of subtle collusion identified by the 

Ninth Circuit, including:

(1) “when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when 

the class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded,” Id. 

(quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021);

(2) “when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment 

of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class funds, which carries ‘the potential of 

enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel 

accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class,’” Id. (quoting Lobatz v. U.S. W. 

Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)); and

(3) “when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than 

be added to the class fund,” Id. (citing Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 

(7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)).

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defendant in form agrees to pay the fees independently of any monetary award or injunctive 

relief provided to the class in the agreement does not detract from the need carefully to 

scrutinize the fee award.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). “If fees 

are unreasonably high, the likelihood is that the defendant obtained an economically 

beneficial concession with regard to the merits provisions, in the form of lower monetary 

payments to class members or less injunctive relief for the class than could otherwise have 

obtained.” Id. The requested fee award is unreasonably high here and warrants particularly 

careful scrutiny. 

Plaintiff’s counsel also argues that its requested fee is reasonable because it equals 

75% of the lodestar which is consistent with the collective members’ recovery of 75% of 

their total possible damages in this case.5 This argument is disingenuous considering that 

counsel were largely unsuccessful on the overwhelming majority of the claims alleged in 

the SAC. The SAC asserts claims on behalf of one collective and two putative classes of 

several hundred members and claimed that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. 

A settlement where an opt-in collective of 34 or 35 receives a total payment of $41,616.75 

hardly constitutes a successful result of such a lawsuit. Further, the much larger intended 

scope of the litigation at the outset as compared with the narrow proposed settlement 

necessarily means that many of counsel’s hours were unrelated to the FLSA claims being 

settled. Counsel nevertheless counted all of their hours in this litigation when calculating 

their lodestar. Thus, the number of hours used for Plaintiff’s lodestar calculation is grossly 

inflated rendering counsel’s lodestar total of over $100,000 in fees of little assistance to 

the Court in determining a reasonable fee. Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 439 

(1983) (holding that when determining what constitutes a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in a 

federal civil rights action “where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district 

 

5 Counsel’s representation that the collective members are receiving 75% of their total possible recovery 

in this lawsuit is difficult to reconcile with the allegations in the SAC that over $5 million is in controversy. 

If the parties file a new motion for approval of a settlement, they will need to provide evidentiary support 

for any representations as to the percentage recovery being obtained by the collective.

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court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results 

obtained.”); see also Otey, 2014 WL 1477630, at *9 (noting that a settlement representing 

approximately 50% of the back wages owed to “102 out of millions of class members [was 

a] significant limitation on the relief Plaintiffs originally sought, which may warrant a 

reduction in the fees requested”).

Further, likely because the requested fee award is so excessive and inconsistent with 

the amounts awarded in other FLSA collective actions or wage and hour class actions, 

counsel does not acknowledge the cross-check with the percentage-of-recovery method

typically performed when evaluating the reasonableness of a lodestar fee award in the 

context of a common fund settlement. Plaintiff’s counsel argues that this is not a common 

fund settlement, but the plain language of the settlement agreement states that Bask is 

paying $116,616.75 as the “gross settlement amount” from which the $75,000 attorney fee 

award will be paid. Moreover, whether Plaintiff is technically correct is immaterial. Even 

assuming the settlement payment “is represented as two separate payments, one to the class 

members, and one to Plaintiffs’ attorneys . . ., the Court considers all payments that 

Defendants will make as coming out of one constructive common fund.” Otey, 2014 WL 

1477630, at *9

The requested fee award is almost two-thirds of the total settlement amount being 

paid by Bask.6 The Court was unable to find any case where the fees equaled even close 

to such a large proportion of the total settlement payment.7 Such an award is not reasonable 

 

6

In reality, the portion of the settlement payment to the collective for the individual state law claims of 

three collective members should not be considered when calculating the percentage-of-recovery for the 

FLSA collective as a whole, meaning the fee award constitutes an even larger percentage of the overall 

recovery. 

7

See, e.g., Millan, 2016 WL 3077710, at *3 (awarding $50,000 in fees from a $150,000 gross settlement 

amount in case that was litigated for almost four years and where the lodestar was $68,190); Jones, 2014 

WL 2090034, at *2 (approving fee award of 25% of the gross settlement amount of nationwide FLSA 

collective action while noting that the lodestar was over three times the requested amount); Otey, 2014 

WL 1477630, at *9 (denying motion for approval of settlement where counsel would receive $435,000 

of a $585,507 gross settlement amount, noting that the requested 74.3% of the total recovery “grossly 

exceed[ed] the 25% benchmark”).

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considering the narrow settlement and general lack of success by Plaintiff’s counsel. 

Accordingly, if the parties are able to re-work their settlement, Plaintiff must explain how 

it is reasonable for any attorney’s fees to constitute more than 25% of any total settlement 

payment by Bask, let alone two-thirds.

E. Incentive Award to Ferreri

Finally, Ferreri asks for an incentive award of $2000. “Although incentive awards 

are not specifically authorized under the FLSA, they are generally authorized as a matter 

of the court’s discretion.” Jones, 2014 WL 2090034, at *3. Considering the early stage of 

litigation at the time of settlement and the minimal value obtained for the collective, the 

incentive award requested for the named plaintiff is excessive. Although the motion does 

not specify how much of the settlement payment to the collective is attributable to state 

law claims, it appears likely that the total settlement payment attributable to the FLSA 

claims is less than $30,000, of which Ferreri is already receiving a significant portion, in 

addition to his separate $6,000 settlement with Field Nation. Ferreri claims he spent 20 

hours on this case, but based on his description of that work in his declaration, much of it 

was unnecessary to the prosecution of the case. Moreover, there is no explanation as to 

why Ferreri’s time should be compensated at $100 per hour or why the incentive award 

should be substantially more than all but two of the collective members are receiving in 

the settlement. Thus, based on the information before the Court, the requested incentive 

award is not reasonable.

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those discussed at the hearing, the motion 

to approve the settlement and the motion for attorney’s fees and incentive award are both 

denied. The parties are free to file a new motion for approval of a settlement that addresses 

the deficiencies identified in this order on or before December 19, 2016. In addition, the 

parties shall contact Magistrate Judge Dembin’s chambers within two days of the date of 

this order to request a case management conference for a time he is available in early 

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January 2017. If a new motion for settlement approval is filed by December 19, 2016, the 

parties may request that Magistrate Judge Dembin vacate the case management conference.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

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