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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

fl' t t !t b 

Unirt?J S.ihH'J11 wur~ of Ap~11fo 1'emh Circuit 

JUL 0 3 19B9 

ROBERT L J.iOECKER ----------- Clerk 

ROBERT VALDEZ, ) 

) 

Plaintif f-Appellee ) 

and Cross-Appellant, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, ) 

a municipal corporation, ) 

J.D. MacFARLANE, Manager of ) 

Safety and Ex-Officio Sheriff ) 

of the City and County of Denver, ) 

and CAPTAIN HERRERA, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

JOYCE NEVILLE, Director of ) 

the Department of Health & } 

Hospitals, City and County } 

of Denver, SEYMOUR SUNDELL, } 

Staff Medicine Coordinator, } 

Denver General Hospital, ) 

and J. SMITH, } 

} 

Defendants-Cross-Appellees, ) 

} 

and ) 

) 

JOHN DOES 1-3, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

Nos. 86-2719 & 86-2771 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86-F-296) 

Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 1 
Peter H. Ney, Littleton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant. 

Theodore S. Halaby (Robert M. Li~chty with him on the brief) of 

Halaby & McCrea, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants and 

Defendants-Cross-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

In this case, we hold that an official charged with the duty 

of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity 

from liability for damages in a suit' challenging conduct 

prescribed by that order. 

I• 

Plaintiff-appellee, Robert Valdez (Valdez), instituted this 

action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City 

and County of Denver, and various law enforcement officials and 

medical personnel employed by the municipality. The record 

reveals that on March 1, 1985, Valdez was present as a spectator 

in state traffic court. When Denver County Court Judge Larry 

Lopez-Alexander said something to a defendant with which Valdez 

disagreed, Valdez exclaimed "bullshit," and the two proceeded to 

exchange words. Judge Lopez-Alexander subsequently held Valdez in 

contempt and ordered him to await sentencing outside the 

courtroom. Captain Herrera and three unidentified deputies from 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 2 
the sheriff's department promptly arrested Valdez. Later that 

day, Judge Lopez-Alexander issued a mittimus directing the 

municipality to retain custody of Valdez. From March 1 through 

14, Valdez was incarcerated pursuant to Judge Lopez-Alexander's 

order in the Denver County Jail under the administrative 

supervision of J.D. MacFarlane. Valdez was originally scheduled 

to appear on the latter date before Judge Lopez-Alexander for 

sentencing on the contempt citation, but because of complications 

in the case, the judge postponed his appearance date until March 

27. Prior to that date, however, Valdez was released from custody 

upon a writ of habeas corpus issued from the state district court. 

In his complaint, Valdez alleges, inter alia, false arrest 

and imprisonment in violation of the fourth and fourteenth 

amendments against defendants~appellants, Captain Herrera and J.D. 

MacFarlane respectively. Upon completing discovery, Herrera and 

MacFarlane moved for summary judgment asserting their entitlement 

to absolute "quasi-judicial" immunity, or in the alternative 

qualified immunity. The district court rejected both grounds and 

denied the motion. Both officers appeal. 1 Our jurisdiction to 

review the denial of an absolute immunity claim arises under the 

"collateral order" doctrine. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 

741-43 (1982). The denial of a qualified immunity claim is 

1 Valdez has cross appealed from the district court's dismissal 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of the various named medical 

personnel who examined him during his confinement. At oral 

argument, however, Valdez' counsel conceded that we do not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction over his client's cross-appeal, and we 

therefore order it dismissed. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 3 
reviewable as a "final decision'' under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. Mitchell 

v. Forsyth, 472 ~.s. 511, 530 (1985). Our review is de novo. 

Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 2 

II. 

The Supreme Court has endorsed a "functional'' approach to 

questions concerning the application of common-law tort immunities 

to individuals in § 1983 actions: "[I]mmunity is justified and 

defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person 

to whom it .attaches." Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542, 

544 (1988) (emphasis in orginal). The extent of government 

officials' immunity depends upon the likely effect their exposure 

to liabillty will have on the operation of ~ffective government in 

a particular context, balanced against the potential for a 

deprivation of individual rights in that context. ~., Doe v. 

McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973); Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 

420, 422 (10th Cir. 1983).3 

2 Although named in the notice of appeal with Herrera and 

MacFarlane, th~ City and County of Denver acknowledges that as a 

municipality sued in its official capacity, it is unable to assert 

the defense of immunity and is therefore not properly a party to 

this appeal. Defendants-appellants' response brief at 7. See 

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-58 (1980) 

(municipality has no qualified immunity from liability under 

§ 1983); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 701 

(1978) (municipality sued under § 1983 is not entitled to absolute 

immunity). 

3 In Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855-56 (10th Cir. 1981), 

we recognized this balancing test while noting that "[i]mmunity 

which derives from judicial immunity may extend to persons other 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 4 
Courts have long recognized that a litigant dissatisfied with 

the outcome of judicial proceedings will oftentimes accupe his 

"adversaries" of constitutional infirmities. See, ~., Bradley 

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348 (1871). Because 

"'controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are 

not easily capped by a judicial decree' the common law 

provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for 

all persons--governmental or otherwise--who were integral parts of 

the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 46b U.S. 325, 335 (1983) 

(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)) (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized not only 

the absolute civil immunity of judges for conduct within their 

judicial domain, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967), but 

also the "quasi-judicial" civil immunity of prosecutors, Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976), grand jurors, id. at 423 

n.20, witnesses, Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46, and agency 

officials, Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-13, for acts intertwined with the 

judicial process. 4 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

than a judge where performance of judicial acts or activity as an 

official aide of the judge is involved." Because of an 

undeveloped factual record in that case, however, we were unable 

to determine the precise scope of immunity to be afforded a clerk 

of court charged with denying plaintiff access to the courts. 

4 In Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization 

Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. 

C't'-:-755 (1988), we relied on these .authorities and extended 

absolute immunity to probation officers who purportedly made false 

statements in pretrial bond and presentence reports. Because 

their reports were "intimately associated" with the judicial 

decision-making process, the probation officers were absolutely 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 5 
Recognizing that the power to execute judicial decrees is no 

l~ss an important and integral part of the judicial process than 

the roles of those officials previously afforded absolute 

immunity, we held in T & W Inv. Co., Inc. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801, 

802-03 (10th Cir. 1978), that a receiver named as a defendant in a 

corporation's civil rights action was a court officer who shared 

the judge's immunity to the extent he carried out the orders of 

his appointing judge. Our sister circuits addressing the question 

likewise agree with virtual unanimity that court officers sworn to 

execute court orders are shielded by absolute immunity in the 

performance of their duty. ~., Coverdell v. Department of 

Social and Health Serv., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(social worker accorded absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit 

arising out of worker's apprehension of child pursuant to court 

order); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 

(7th Cir. 1986) (sheriff acting pursuant to court order directing 

enforcement of judgment entitled to absolute immunity for 

allegedly wrongful conduct); Property Management & Invs., Inc. v. 

Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 602-04 (11th Cir. 1985) (receiver of 

corporation protected by judicial immunity in carrying out orders 

of appointing judge); Tymiak v. Omodt, 676 F.2d 306, 308 (8th Cir. 

1982) (sheriff who evicted plaintiff from home in compliance with 

court order was absolutely immune from suit for damages); Tarter 

v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (court clerks have 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

immune from a civil suit for damages. Id. at 348; accord Hughes 

v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 6 
absolute immunity in actions for damages based upon ministerial 

conduct required by court order); Slotni9k v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 

163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980) (court clerk and state hospital 

superintendent acting at behest of judge enjoyed judicial 

immunity); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 & n.6 (3d Cir. 

1975) (judicial immunity extends to police officers engaged in 

ministerial functions under court's direction); Fowler v. 

Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1973) (sheriff and jailer 

who confined plaintiff in executing a court order were absolutely 

immune from suit); Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72-

73 (2d Cir. 1968) (court-appointed receiver enforcing explicit 

order of court was immune from liability). 

Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically 

associated with a judicial proceeding. Henry, 808 F.2d at 1239. 

If losing parties were free to challenge the will of the court by 

threatening its officers with harassing litigation, the officers 

might neglect the execution of their sworn duties. As the Ninth 

Circuit aptly reasoned: "The fearless and unhesitating execution 

of court orders is essential if the court's authority and ability 

to function are to remain uncompromised." Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 

765. Absolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a 

judge's orders is necessary to insure that such officials can 

perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal 

counsel. A lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial 

process. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 7 
Despite Valdez' contrary assertion, a qualified immunity for 

officials following court orders will not protect the judicial 

process by permitting the dismissal of insubstantial claims prior 

to trial. Even with the adoption of the objective qualified 

immunity standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 

(1982), the applicability of the defense turns on the factspecific question of whether reasonable officers could have 

believed their conduct to be proper in light of the "clearly 

established" law. Factual disputes would require discovery if not 

a trial. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 s. Ct. 3034, 3040, 3042 

n.6 (1987). Moreover, in most instances what· is "clearly 

established" would be subject to differing views. See Garcia v. 

Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 

S. Ct. 1220 (1988). Interlocutory appeals would inevitably 

follow. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "even the 

processing of a complaint that is dismissed before trial consumes 

a considerable amount of time and resources." Briscoe, 460 U.S. 

at 343. The expense of litigation which officials like the 

defendants Herrera and MacFarlane would incur, the diversion of 

their attention from more socially productive obligations and the 

deterrence of qualified individuals from accepting public 

employment are not insignificant considerations. 5 

5 As this case illustrates, officials may need the benefit of 

discovery to establish their absolute immunity from suit where the 

plaintiff claims their actions were inconsistent with court 

orders. This, however, is the exception, not the rule. 

Plaintiffs and their counsel who fail to make reasonable inquiry 

into the facts before proceeding against officers for enforcing 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 8 
To force officials performing ministerial acts intimately 

related to the judicial process to answer in court every time a 

litigant believes the judge acted improperly is unacceptable. 6 

Officials must not be called upon to answer for the legality of 

decisions which they are powerless to control. We explained in 

Kurtz, 588 F.2d at 802, that it is simply unfair to spare the 

judges who give orders while punishing the officers who obey them. 

Denying these officials absolute immunity for their acts would 

make them a "lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at 

judicial orders." Id. And such suits, the large portion of which 

would be frivolous, would be certain to arise repeatedly. At a 

time when the federal district courts are burdened with increasing 

amounts of simply unwarranted litigation, this court will not 

permit a defendant to "transform his resentment at being 

prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions" 

on the part of judicial officers merely performing their assigned 

functions. Imbler, 414 U.S. at 425. 

Tension between trial judges and those officials responsible 

for enforcing their orders inevitably would result were there not 

absolute immunity for both. Kurtz, 588 F.2d at 802. Officials 

employed to implement facially valid court orders could choose: 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

court orders subject themselves to the real possibility of 

monetary sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

6 Of course, an official performing ministerial tasks with less 

than due care may be liable for damages because such a rule does 

not measurably impair the effective functioning of government. 

Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1977) (en bane). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 9 
They may disregard the judge's orders and face discharge, or worse 

yet criminal contempt, or they may fulfill their duty and risk 

being haled into court. Judge Learned Hand recognized years ago 

that the fear of suit will "dampen the ardor of all but the most 

resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge 

of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 

1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). Officials such as the 

defendants must not be required to act as pseudo-appellate courts 

scrutinizing the orders of judges. Henry, 808 F.2d at 1239. The 

public interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees. The 

Supreme Court has stated that ·"[p)ublic officials ••• who fail 

to . • • implement decisions when they are made do not fully and 

faithfully perform the duties of their offices." Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974). Absolute immunity will 

ensure the public's trust and confidence in courts' ability to 

completely, effectively and finally adjudicate the controversies 

before them. 

To be sure, absolute immunity always comes at a price. The 

individual wrongly deprived of liberty or property by a judge's 

decision will be unable to pursue a remedy under the civil rights 

statute. But the public interest in the enforcement of court 

orders that is essential to the effective functioning of our 

judicial process far outweighs the benefit to be gained by 

providing the defendants Herrera, MacFarlane and others like them 

with only limited immunity. Judges, all of whom take an oath to 

uphold the constitution and are bound by codes of judicial 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 10 
conduct, are not often likely to act maliciously from the bench. 

Moreover, μnscrupulous judges are not totally insulated from the 

public will. Even judges are subject to professional discipline, 

constitutional or statutory removal, or in more egregious cases, 

criminal prosecution under 18 u.s.c. § 242 for willful 

deprivations of constitutional rights. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. 

Nor is an aggrieved party usually without recourse to forms of 

relief other than § 1983. In most cases, the defendant should 

appeal: "The proper procedure for a party who wishes to contest 

the legality of a court order enforcing a judgment is to appeal 

that. order and the underlying judgment, not to sue the official 

responsible fot its execution." Henry, 808 F.2d at 1239. These 

and other safeguards are sufficient to decrease the necessity of 

civil rights actions against those officials who have no control 

over a judge's conduct. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (insulation of 

judges from political influence, importance of precedent in 

resolving controversies, adversary nature of the process, and 

correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many 

checks on malicious action by judges). 

We believe precedent, notions of fairness based upon 

individual responsibility, a desire to preserve the effective and 

independent operation of the judiciary, and the great wealth of 

common law experience all support our decision. Because the 

record viewed as a whole indicates that every action of the 

defendants Herrera and MacFarlane to which Valdez objects was 

taken under the direction of a state court judge, the judgment of 

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Appellate Case: 86-2719 Document: 01019569340 Date Filed: 07/06/1989 Page: 11 
d 

\ 

the district court is reversed and this cause remanded with 

instructions to dismiss the complaint as to Herrera and MacFarlane 

in their individual capacities on the basis of absolute immunity.7 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

7 The decisions in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and 

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto.) 168 (1880), are 

inapposite. In those cases, the Court held that the immunity 

provided legislators under the Constitution's speech and debate 

clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, was unavailable to certain 

legislative employees who implemented the legislators 

unconstitutional orders and resolutions. In Gravel v. United 

States, 408 U.S. 606, 620-21 (1972), the Court explained that 

these decisions did not adopt "the simple proposition that 

immunity was unavailable to congressional .•. employees because 

they were not Representatives or Senators." Rather, because no 

threat to the legislative function was present, the speech and 

debate clause protections did not attach. The case at bar is 

markedly different because failure to provide the defendants with 

aboslute immunity would directly threaten the effective and 

independent operation of the judiciary. A contrary holding not 

only might "coloi a court's judgment in some cases," Kurtz, 588 

F.2d at 802, but also would jeopardize the entire decision-making 

process. 

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