Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-04201/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-04201-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KETHON TRIGGS,

Petitioner,

 v.

LEA ANN CHRONES, Acting Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C-00-4201-CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Kethon Triggs, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison, has filed a second

amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. Respondent has

filed an answer to the second amended petition and an opposition to

the motion for evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the motion for an evidentiary hearing and

DENIES the second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

I. Summary of the Case

On October 12, 1994, Marin County deputy sheriffs conducting a

drug- and crime-suppression patrol observed a bicyclist stopped on

a footbridge into Marin City, California. Knowing the footbridge

to be a means of traveling into Marin City to purchase drugs, the

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deputies followed the bicyclist to the corner of Bridge Street and

Drake Avenue, where they observed him engaged in conversation with

Petitioner near Hayden's Market, whose parking lot they knew as a

place where drug-related problems occur. The deputies observed

Petitioner run toward Hayden's Market, while the bicyclist

continued on Drake Avenue to a bus stop. A few minutes later, the

deputies observed Petitioner walk to the same bus stop and exchange

something with the bicyclist.

Suspecting the exchange might be a drug transaction, the

deputies radioed another deputy to stop the bicyclist. This deputy

stopped and searched the bicyclist and identified him as Gregory

Miller but did not find any drugs. Nevertheless, observing

Miller's agitation, slurred speech, dilated eyes and tongue covered

in yellowish-whitish residue, the deputy suspected that Miller was

under the influence and arrested him.

Meanwhile, another deputy approached Petitioner. Recalling

that Petitioner was subject to a search and seizure clause as a

condition of his probation, the deputy searched Petitioner and

found in his pocket two rocks of suspected cocaine base weighing

0.29 and 0.38 grams respectively. The deputies therefore took

Petitioner into custody. The rocks tested positive for cocaine.

The Marin County District Attorney charged Petitioner with

possession of a controlled substance in violation of California

Health and Safety Code § 11350(a), and alleged three prior felony

convictions and two prison commitments. On April 25, 1995, a jury

found Petitioner guilty and found true the three prior convictions

and two prison commitments. The court imposed a sentence of

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twenty-five years to life under the three strikes law, California

Penal Code § 667(e), plus two one-year enhancements for

Petitioner's prior prison commitments, for a sentence of twentyseven years to life in prison. 

II. Procedural History

A. Proceedings on Appeal

Petitioner appealed his conviction. On December 24, 1996, the

appellate court reversed his sentence in an unpublished opinion and

remanded for re-sentencing to give the trial court an opportunity

to exercise its discretion to strike one or more of Petitioner's

prior convictions.

On January 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for review

before the California Supreme Court. The court denied the petition

on February 26, 1997.

On June 9, 1997, the superior court, on remand, ordered a

psychiatric evaluation of Petitioner. On August 29, 1997, the

court struck Petitioner's 1987 conviction for robbery because it

was not clear whether he was competent at the time of that trial. 

The court also struck the enhancement based on the 1987 conviction. 

After re-sentencing, Petitioner appealed again, and the appellate

court affirmed his sentence.

B. Proceedings on State Habeas Review

After re-sentencing, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition

raising, among other things, a claim that his 1982 convictions were

unconstitutional because he was incompetent to plead guilty in

1982. The appellate court denied all but the competency claim and

issued an order to show cause as to why Petitioner's 1982

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convictions should not be set aside. The Marin County Superior

Court held an evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause. 

After the evidentiary hearing the court denied the petition.

Petitioner filed two more habeas petitions with the state

courts: one with the California Court of Appeal and one with the

California Supreme Court. Both petitions were summarily denied in

unpublished orders.

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Habeas Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) mandates,

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim -- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless trial error

"'had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946)).

II. Petitioner's Claims for Relief

In his traverse, Petitioner withdraws grounds seven through

eleven without comment.

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A. Competency and Lack of Competency Hearing in 1995

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process at his 1995

trial because the trial court should have held a competency

hearing, and because he was in fact incompetent. Because before

and during Petitioner's trial, sentencing and resentencing no

substantial evidence of any legal incompetence arose, this claim

fails.

A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent. 

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The conviction or

sentencing of a defendant who is legally incompetent at the time of

the proceedings violates due process. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1994); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378

(1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (granting

habeas relief on other grounds).

The test of competence is whether the defendant "has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding –- whether he has a

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him." Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985)

(citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), and

Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981)); see

also United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2004)

(upholding finding of incompetence where defendant's paranoid

schizophrenia did not affect his understanding of the proceedings

against him, but prevented him from working with his attorney to

assist in his defense). The standard for competency to stand trial

is lower than the standard for capacity to commit a crime, such

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that those with mental deficiencies are not necessarily incompetent

to stand trial. Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 938 (9th Cir.

2006).

Courts have found sufficient evidence of incompetence in

lengthy histories of acute psychosis and psychiatric treatment. 

See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir.

1972) (defendant repeatedly hospitalized for acute mental illness

and hallucinations). Courts have also found defendants incompetent

based on extremely erratic and irrational behavior during the

course of the trial. See, e.g., Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056,

1057-58 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant screamed throughout nights,

laughed at jury, made gestures at bailiff, disrobed in courtroom

and butted his head through glass window).

Due process requires a trial court to order a psychiatric

evaluation or conduct a competency hearing if the court has a good

faith doubt concerning the defendant's competence. See Cacoperdo,

37 F.3d at 510; see also Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th

Cir. 2004) (calling a claim of trial court error for failing to

conduct a competency hearing a "procedural incompetence claim"). 

This standard is "clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pate

v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)). 

A good faith doubt about a defendant's competence arises only

if there is substantial evidence of incompetence. See Cacoperdo,

37 F.3d at 510 (denial of motion for psychiatric evaluation did not

render trial fundamentally unfair where petitioner made single

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conclusory allegation that he suffered from mental illness); see

also Davis, 384 F.3d at 645-46 (defendant's decision to wear jail

clothing and to refuse to sit at counsel table during most of

penalty phase of capital trial was not substantial evidence of

incompetence, where defendant acknowledged risks of his behavior

and rationally weighed those risks against likelihood he would

prejudice himself by having an outburst if he sat at the table). 

Several factors are relevant to determining whether a hearing is

necessary, including evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior,

his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence

to stand trial. United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315,

1318 (9th Cir. 1997). Even one of these factors standing alone

may, in some circumstances, be sufficient to create a doubt

regarding the defendant's competence. Id. at 1318-19 (due process

required a hearing to ascertain whether defendant was competent to

stand trial where he attempted suicide on eve of trial). When

considering a claim that the trial court should have held a

competency hearing, the habeas court considers only the information

that was before the state trial court. See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart,

121 F.3d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d

524, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 878 (1993).

The fact that no one questioned a defendant's competence

during extensive pretrial and trial proceedings is entitled to

substantial weight but may not be sufficient to overcome

significant doubt about his competency raised by other evidence. 

Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001).

The in-court behavior that Petitioner points to as "erratic"

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(see generally Pet'r's Second Am. Pet. 13:17-15:15) does not raise

sufficient doubt as to his competence to stand trial. The fact

that he spoke of problems with his attorney, then drifted into

problems with jail staff, and then returned to problems with

counsel does not compel bona fide doubt as to competence. (See

Pet'r's Ex. 153.) Petitioner's religious views, of which he spoke

on cross-examination, were not unconventional, nor was speaking of

them in connection with a religious organization such as Narcotics

Anonymous. (See Resp't's Ex. B, 648:6-24, 651:8-20.) The trial

court warned Petitioner to stop talking when he made some speaking

objections from the witness stand over the court's admonitions. 

(See Resp't's Ex. B, 637:9-638:5.) Indeed, Petitioner's objections

-- legally sophisticated for a lay person, even if inappropriate --

spoke to his legal competence rather than incompetence.

It was in the context of Petitioner's failure to obey the

court's directions concerning his speaking objections that the

court said, "I don't want to have to shackle him." (Resp't's Ex.

B, 643:28.) The court's remark does not imply that Petitioner's

behavior suggested incompetence.

Even being "violent and non-compliant with custody staff

instructions" and biting the hand of a jail guard as he was

transferred to a safety cell (Pet'r's Ex. 167) does not rise to the

level of extremely erratic and irrational behavior. Cf. Tillery,

492 F.2d at 1057-58. Prisoners are not infrequently violent or

non-compliant. This incident, even in light of Petitioner's

psychiatric history, is insufficient to compel doubt of legal

competence.

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Petitioner's trial testimony supports a finding that he was

competent:

Q. (by Petitioner's trial counsel): [D]id you have any

conversations with the officers regarding a request

that you were making?

A. (by Petitioner): Yes, I asked for a urine test.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because I knew I didn't have any drugs in my system,

and I knew that that was going to become an issue

for my probation. And I wanted to try to have that

matter, you know, cleared up that I didn't have any

in my system.

Q. Okay. You had not used any drugs before that --

A. No drugs.

Q. –- that evening? All right.

. . . .

Q. Now, Kethon, I'll tell you, the DA is going to have

an opportunity to question you at some point here

and, you know, the jury is going to hear all these

questions and answers from him. You've had problems

in the past with drugs?

A. Yes.

Q. Why should the jury believe you now as opposed to

any other time that you've had problems?

A. Okay. For one reason Officer DeLeo, he stated, he

stated in his testimony that it appeared that I

wasn't on drugs.

THE COURT: Well, I think Yamanoha confirmed that.

THE WITNESS: Right. So that's conclusive right there.

Q. Okay. Thinking back over this situation right now,

that what occurred because I mean, if these drugs,

you don't deny that these drugs came out of the

pocket of the pants you were wearing that night,

right?

A. Yes.

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Q. Can you say that you didn't have those and know

those were in your pocket that afternoon, and that

evening, or that you bought them at that time?

A. I had no knowledge whatsoever.

Q. If you knew those were in your pocket would you have

made contact and been obvious with that guy on the

bicycle?

A. No, I wouldn't have if I had those drugs. If I'd

have found those drugs period, I would have thrown

them away.

Q. Okay. You didn't make any drug deals --

A. No.

Q. –- or anything that evening?

A. Nothing.

Q. Let me show you . . . Exhibit P. Can you recognize

what that is?

A. Yes, this is the letter that I received in the mail

concerning an appointment on the 14th of October.

Q. And who was that with?

A. To see a Richard somebody, a probation officer. It

also stated that to be prepared to give a urine

sample.

Q. If you had done any drugs that evening, would that

have been present on October 14th when you went in

for your drug sample?

A. Two, three days to leave your system from a urine

test.

Q. Just to clarify something we went over also, showing

you Defendant's Exhibit Q, can you state what that

is?

A. Yes, this is the document that I signed when I left

the jail house, the report to the probation officer

that I had been released and any address and

everything.

. . . .

Q. That was September 9, of '93?

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A. '94.

. . . .

Q. Okay. . . . My last question to you, Kethon, did

you knowingly possess those drugs that were in your

pocket when the police officer stopped you that

evening?

A. No, I had no knowledge.

(Resp't's Ex. B, 629:23-633:9.) Petitioner's testimony indicated

consultation with his trial counsel in developing a defense. (This

view was further supported by trial counsel himself when he spoke

of his relationship with Petitioner, stating, "He and I get along

very well. . . . I spent a lot of time with Kethon specifically." 

(Pet'r's Ex. 172, 6001:3-5.)) Petitioner's trial testimony did not

indicate that he lacked sufficient present ability to consult with

his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him. See Boag, 769 F.2d

at 1343. Thus, taken as a whole, Petitioner's conduct, demeanor

and testimony during trial did not render unreasonable the state

court's failure to hold a competency hearing.

As to Petitioner's psychiatric history, the record before the

trial and sentencing court indicated that in 1976, Petitioner had

been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and had received

supplemental security income on the basis of that diagnosis ever

since. (Pet'r's Ex. 163, 1810.) It also showed that in 1981

Petitioner had been admitted to Marin General Hospital for

treatment of acute psychological decompensation and released in

"somewhat improved condition" with a prescription for lithium. 

(Pet'r's Ex. 163, 1811.) The court also saw that in 1982,

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Petitioner had been taken to a safety cell for evaluation under

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150, which provides for

such custody of "any person, as a result of mental disorder, [who]

is a danger" to himself or others. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150. 

The court was aware of the variety of drugs prescribed to stave off

Petitioner's psychotic episodes and of later involuntary

commitments under § 5150.

On the other hand, according to the same records before the

court, Petitioner had been evaluated by therapists and found

"controlled," not "overt[ly] psychotic," "in excellent control,"

"calm, coherent," and "in control . . . [though] somewhat depressed

and paranoid" with no "reported behavior diff[icultie]s." (Pet'r's

Ex. 163, 1813-15.) The court also had before it Petitioner's July,

1994 psychological evaluation, conducted by California Department

of Corrections staff psychologist, Dr. Les Carr. Dr. Carr had

found "strong evidence to emphasize Mr. Triggs [sic] potential to

exhibit psychotic episodes and related symptoms given minimal

stress, for example, dealing with the usual every day problems of

his living an existence in the external community." (Pet'r's Ex.

145, 0975.) Dr. Carr had determined that Petitioner led "a life

poorly rooted in reality." (Id.) But Dr. Carr had also found "no

evidence of organic impairment" and "no indication of a current

psychotic disorder." (Pet'r's Ex. 145, 0975.)

In addition to the evidence discussed above, at resentencing,

the court had before it a psychological evaluation of Petitioner by

Dr. R.K. McKinzey. That evaluation reviewed Petitioner's

psychiatric history, including diagnoses of a schizophrenic

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1 According to the Food and Drug Administration, Stelazine is 

a brand name for trifluoperazine hydrochloride, an anti-anxiety,

anti-psychotic medication. See http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/

2001/11552s112lbl.PDF. 

13

episode, paranoid character disorder in remission, schizoaffective

psychosis, paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar manic, cocaine and

marijuana dependency, and the personality disorders of schizotypal

and antisocial, and noted it "significant for a series of psychotic

breaks 1976-1987." (Resp't's Ex. K, 54-58.) But the evaluation

also indicated long periods of stability –- e.g., May, 1982 to

March, 1983 ("stable" with "no psychotic behavior"); May, 1983 to

February, 1985 ("stable"); March, 1986 to May, 1987 ("stability");

March, 1988 to January, 1990 ("stable" and "stabilized"); and June,

1990 to July, 1997 (no "mental health problems" or "psychiatric

difficulties" but some "medications"). (Id. at 56-57.) Dr.

McKinzey's own mental status examination found Petitioner "anxious,

indignant, . . . unhappy" and "hypervigilant." (Id. at 58.) Dr.

McKinzey predicted, "If Mr. Triggs' current incarceration

continues, he will eventually find himself occasionally on

Stelazine."1 (Id.) None of this renders unreasonable the state

court's failure to require a competency hearing.

Neither did Petitioner's conduct at his resentencing hearing,

where, for example, the following exchange took place:

[PETITIONER'S DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I'm going to

just have the Court look at the first page of this August

2nd transcript, and if it's all right, I'm going to have

Mr. Triggs explain this to you. . . .

. . . .

THE COURT: All right. . . . I've read it. What

did Mr. Triggs want to explain?

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THE DEFENDANT: Okay. The judge was aware that I

had those other two convictions, and it also stated that

he –- cuz he –- my attorney asked the judge what he might

do with the other matter, and the Judge said I'm not at

the position to take that into account right now. And

also those cases –- it was alleged that they all happened

within the same week, and I believe the cases should have

been consolidated.

Further in 1983 when I caught that sales and this

case right here, I lacked defense of counsel and the

Public Defender declared a conflict of interest, and

that's when you appointed me a court-appointed attorney. 

So it was documented that I was trying to fight that

burglary right there.

(Resp't's Ex. L, 18:22-19:21.) Petitioner's argument here is

fairly sophisticated. He clearly understood the proceedings

against him and had developed -- likely with assistance of counsel

-- a strategy for mitigating his sentence. A later exchange also

speaks to Petitioner's legal competence:

THE COURT: Okay. So now is the time and place for

sentencing. Is there any legal cause why judgment should

not now be pronounced?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I'd just like to state that in

the doctor's report it states that the drug program might

be successful and –- in keeping me off drugs, but due to

my personality, it might not help. But all my crimes

that I committed were related to my drug uses or on

drugs. So if you eliminated my drug problem the problem

would be resolved, basically.

THE COURT: What is going to eliminate the drug

problem?

THE DEFENDANT: Myself. Well, if I can get on the

program and get help that I need to understand myself and

to learn to stay away from this type of environment, the

problem will be resolved. And I've been down learning

the symptoms and stuff, that I'm afraid and everything,

but I believe I still need some treatment, though.

THE COURT: What have you done?

THE DEFENDANT: I've been going to –- I've been

going to classes. I've been talking to friends. They've

been discouraging me in the way of trying to tell me you

either want this or you want that, and which one you

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want. You want to be stuck here all the time, or you

want your freedom?

(Resp't's Ex. L, 31:2-32:4.) Again, Petitioner's argument here was

a competent attempt to mitigate his sentence. It clearly

demonstrates his factual and rational understanding of the

proceedings. It also suggests again that he was working with his

attorney and assisting in his defense. Petitioner's behavior

therefore raised no doubt as to his legal competence at

resentencing.

Finally, after resentencing, the court queried Petitioner

twice on his understanding of the proceedings.

THE COURT: You do have the right to appeal the

judgment of this Court. If you think the Court has made

an error in sentencing you, you can appeal by sending a

written notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal, and you

must do that within 60 days of today's date.

So do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE DEFENDANT: And do you understand that you do

have a lifetime parole?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Resp't's Ex. L, 40:10-19.) In the context of all the information

on Petitioner's mental capabilities, the above arguments and

affirmations speak to his competence. It was not unreasonable to

assume that Petitioner was competent to be resentenced.

Further, no one involved in the proceedings against Petitioner

questioned his competence. See Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089; Hernandez

v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding significant

that the trial judge, government counsel and Hernandez's own

attorney did not perceive cause to believe Hernandez incompetent). 

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That neither the prosecutor nor the court saw any need for a

competency hearing suggests that Petitioner seemed competent. That

Petitioner's trial counsel did not raise the issue of his

competence suggests so still more strongly. See Torres, 223 F.3d

at 1109 ("[A defendant]'s defense counsel [i]s in the best position

to evaluate [the defendant]'s competence and ability to render

assistance.").

These parties' tacit affirmation of Petitioner's competence,

coupled with his seemingly rational behavior, demeanor and

testimony during the proceedings, overcame any doubts as to

Petitioner's competence that may have been raised by his

psychiatric history. The court was not compelled to find that any

of the mental health problems in Petitioner's past were impeding

his present ability to consult with his counsel and understand the

proceedings against him.

The trial court was aware that, although sometimes Petitioner

was in need of acute psychiatric treatment, he also was capable of

functioning normally much of the time. That he seemed competent to

all involved in the proceedings before and during his trial,

sentencing and resentencing made it reasonable for the trial court

to presume that Petitioner at the time was enjoying one of his

periods of relative stability.

In his traverse, Petitioner argues that Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit precedent shows that psychiatric evidence comparable

to Petitioner's should have raised doubt of Petitioner's legal

competence. However, the cases upon which Petitioner relies are

inapposite to his circumstances. For example, in Rhay v. White,

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385 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1967), the elements suggesting White might

have been incompetent included "White's attitude, actions and other

psychological aspects not shown by the record, when coupled with

and viewed in the light of some of the testimony brought out on the

trial as to his history of chronic mental disturbances, paranoid

traits, violent behavioral explosions and previous institutional

diagnoses." Id. at 884. In trial testimony, a psychiatrist judged

White so paranoid as to be unable to trust anyone. Id. Before the

district court, another psychiatrist who had observed White during

trial deemed his rigidity throughout to indicate that he was barely

in control of himself. Id. From talking with White, the same

psychiatrist concluded that White had become imbued with hatred for

the prosecutor –- not in connection with the trial, but because

White believed the prosecutor was sometimes laughing at him. Id.

White's trial counsel testified as to difficulty communicating with

him. Id. Several times counsel had to request a special recess

because White had said "'he couldn't take it anymore.'" Id. Trial

counsel had informed the judge in chambers that a psychiatrist

observing White in court and checking up on him in the evening

believed White was close to a psychotic break. Id. Counsel also

informed the judge that the defense had noticed White's

deterioration over the previous few days. Id. In light of such

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court was

entitled to conclude that due process demanded a competency

hearing. See id. at 886. Petitioner's circumstances are not

comparable to those in White.

Petitioner also cites Pate, 383 U.S. 375. In Pate, a brick

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had fallen on the defendant Robinson's head when he was a child. 

After this injury, Robinson's conduct had become increasingly

bizarre, eventually leading to hospitalization for audio and visual

hallucinations and acute paranoia. See id. at 379-80. After his

release, his "irrational episodes became more serious." Id. at

380. He argued violently with his wife and tried to burn all her

clothes. Id. After separating from her, he shot and killed his

eighteen-month-old son and attempted suicide twice -- first by

shooting himself in the head and then by trying to drown himself. 

Id. After serving a sentence in prison for killing his son,

Robinson seemed uncontrollably violent, in turn beating people up

and getting beaten up. See id. at 381-82. Finally, in the

restaurant where she worked, he shot and killed the woman he was

living with. Id. at 382.

Four defense witnesses testified that Robinson was insane. 

Id. at 383. The prosecution rebutted by stipulating that a

behavior expert would testify on the basis of a pretrial

examination that "Robinson knew the nature of the charges against

him and was able to cooperate with counsel." Id. However, because

the stipulation lacked a finding of sanity, the prosecutor advised

the court,

[W]e should have Dr. Haines' testimony as to his opinion

whether this man is sane or insane. It is possible that

the man might be insane and [still] know the nature of

the charge or be able to cooperate with his counsel. I

think it should be in evidence, your Honor, that Dr.

Haines' opinion is that this defendant was sane when he

was examined.

Id. at 383-84. But the court replied that there was enough in the

record as it stood, and therefore the expert's testimony was not

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needed. Id. at 384. In summation, Robinson's counsel emphasized,

"'[O]ur defense . . . is as to the sanity of the defendant at the

time of the crime and also as to the present time.'" Id.

Nevertheless, after the defense's closing argument, the court found

Robinson guilty and sentenced him to life in prison. Id.

Assessing Robinson's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled "that the evidence introduced on Robinson's

behalf entitled him to a hearing" on the issue of whether he was

competent to stand trial. Id. at 385. Again, Petitioner's

situation is not comparable.

Petitioner also relies on Odle, a case in which the "personal

observations" of Odle by those interacting with him at trial could

not "overcome the significant doubt about Odle's competence raised

by the clinical evidence." 238 F.3d at 1087. But the clinical

evidence in Odle's case –- Odle's temporal lobectomy and radical

behavior change thereafter; doctors' testimony that Odle probably

suffered from organic brain disorder; a psychiatrist's testimony

that Odle's injury could cause seizure disorders affecting

behavior; and electroencephalogram results revealing brain

abnormalities consistent with an epileptic seizure disorder that,

according to a doctor's testimony, would probably cause behavioral

disturbances beyond Odle's control –- was likewise of an order

distinctly more severe than that before the court in Petitioner's

case.

Petitioner further relies on Drope, in which the Supreme Court

held, "Although a defendant's demeanor during trial may be such as

to obviate the need for extensive reliance on psychiatric

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prediction concerning his capabilities, . . . this reasoning offers

no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of a

history of pronounced irrational behavior." 420 U.S. at 179

(alteration, citation and ellipsis omitted). In Drope, the

evidence of such a history included Drope's trial counsel's request

for a continuance in part because Drope -- accused of raping his

own wife -- was "not a person of sound mind" and should "have a

further psychiatric examination before the case should be forced to

trial." Id. at 165. Drope's psychiatric report, also before the

trial court, diagnosed him with "(1) Sociopathic personality

disorder, sexual perversion[,] (2) Borderline mental deficiency

[and] (3) Chronic Anxiety reaction with depression." Id. n.1. 

Drope's wife testified that when Drope was upset he would roll down

the stairs and that he had tried to choke her to death the night

before his trial began. Id. at 166. Finally, Drope intentionally

shot himself after the first day of trial. Id. Petitioner's

conduct and history, unlike Drope's, did not rise to the level of

pronounced irrationality compelling a doubt of his competence to

stand trial.

For the above-stated reasons, the state court's failure to

hold a competency hearing was not unreasonable. Therefore, the

Court denies Petitioner's claim for relief on these grounds. For

the same reasons, the Court denies Petitioner's habeas petition to

the extent it is based on the grounds that he actually was

incompetent.

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B. Validity of Petitioner's 1982 Convictions

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the convictions

used to enhance his current sentence, asserting that he was

incompetent and denied effective assistance of counsel during the

1982 proceedings. Respondent argues that because Petitioner is no

longer in custody on his prior convictions, he may no longer

challenge them.

It is true that a federal writ of habeas corpus is only

available to persons "in custody" at the time the petition is

filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391

U.S. 234, 238 (1968). But, a habeas petitioner challenging the

validity of an expired conviction that he maintains is being used

as a predicate or enhancement to his current confinement or

sentence satisfies the custody requirement even if he is no longer

in custody for the prior conviction. See Lackawanna County Dist.

Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401-02 (2001); Maleng v. Cook, 490

U.S. 488, 493-94 (1989); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019-20

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that "a habeas petitioner is in custody

for the purposes of challenging an earlier, expired rape

conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply with a

state sex offender registration law[,] because the earlier rape

conviction is a necessary predicate to the failure to register

charge") (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a challenge is

construed as an attack on the petitioner's current confinement or

sentence. See Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 401-02 (challenge to

constitutionality of 1958 expired conviction construed as challenge

to current 1978 sentences enhanced by 1958 conviction); Feldman v.

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Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenge to

expired state court sentence used to deny parole in current federal

sentence construed as attack on federal sentence). The federal

courts are required to construe liberally a challenge to a prior

conviction. See Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir.

1994) (challenge to expired 1974 assault conviction must be

construed as challenge to current civil confinement predicated upon

prior conviction); see also Allen v. Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046, 1048-49

(9th Cir. 1998) (challenge to prior state convictions must be

construed as collateral attack on current federal sentence enhanced

by prior state convictions). 

Petitioner is currently serving a sentence for his 1995

offense. Because he is challenging his 1982 convictions as an

attack on his 1995 sentence, he is deemed to be "in custody" for

the 1982 offenses for the purposes of § 2254. See Lackawanna, 532

U.S. at 401-02; Maleng, 490 U.S. at 494. His 1987 conviction was

stricken, however, so he is not deemed to be in custody for that

conviction, and it may not be challenged.

Petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of his 1982

convictions fails for a different reason. His challenge rests on

the grounds that he was denied due process of law and effective

assistance of counsel. 

The Supreme Court held in Lackawanna:

Once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or

collateral attack in its own right because the defendant

failed to pursue those remedies while they were available

(or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the

conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If

that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal

sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the

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enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the

ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally

obtained.

532 U.S. at 403-04; see also United States v. Martinez-Martinez,

295 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2002) (bar against collateral

attacks on prior convictions also applies where sentencing court

declined to reduce sentence based on circumstances of prior

conviction). 

The only exception to this rule is for a claim that the prior

conviction was unconstitutional because there was a failure to

appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 

See Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404; Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S.

374, 382 (2001).

Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed and collaterally attacked

his 1982 convictions in the California Court of Appeal and

California Supreme Court. Therefore, his 1982 convictions are no

longer open to direct or collateral attack. In addition, the

Lackawanna exception does not apply. Petitioner does not allege

that there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel as set forth in Gideon. 

Petitioner was represented by counsel during the 1982 proceedings;

his claim is one for ineffective assistance of that counsel.

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Lackawanna by noting that

the Supreme Court's holding was premised on a need "for finality of

convictions and ease of administration." 532 U.S. at 402. 

Petitioner argues that the State waived any interest in the

finality of the prior convictions by failing to object to the state

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court's review of Petitioner's 1982 conviction and that ease of

administration is not an issue because the records of state court

trials are available and accessible. Petitioner cites no authority

to support this argument. 

Petitioner further maintains that Lackawanna is inapplicable

because this petition is, as a practical matter, Petitioner's first

and only opportunity for review of his 1982 convictions. 

Petitioner relies on Part III-B of the Lackawanna opinion, in which

Justice O'Connor, joined by only two additional Justices, observed

the following: 

[A]nother exception to the general rule precluding

habeas relief might be available. . . . The general rule

we have adopted here . . . reflects the notion that a

defendant properly bears the consequences of either

forgoing otherwise available review of a conviction or

failing to successfully demonstrate constitutional error. 

It is not always the case, however, that a defendant can

be faulted for failing to obtain timely review of a

constitutional claim. For example, a state court may,

without justification, refuse to rule on a constitutional

claim that has been properly presented to it. 

Alternatively, after the time for direct or collateral

review has expired, a defendant may obtain compelling

evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for

which he was convicted, and which he could not have

uncovered in a timely manner.

In such situations, a habeas petition directed at

the enhanced sentence may effectively be the first and

only forum available for review of the prior conviction.

532 U.S. at 405-06 (citations omitted). Because a majority of the

Supreme Court did not recognize this additional exception, it does

not represent controlling law. But, even if the Court were to

recognize such an exception, it would not apply to Petitioner's

case. As Petitioner admits, he challenged the validity of his 1982

convictions in the course of his challenges to his three-strikes

conviction and sentence. (Pet'r's Reply at 53.) He received an

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2

 As of the date of this order, neither the United States

Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has decided whether Lackawanna

should be retroactively applied.

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evidentiary hearing on those convictions. The Marin County

Superior Court and the California State Court of Appeal have each

determined that Petitioner's argument regarding the

constitutionality of his 1982 convictions lacks merit, and have

denied his multiple petitions for habeas corpus. (Pet'r's Second

Am. Pet. 7-8.) Because these courts did not refuse to rule on

Petitioner's claims and there is no compelling evidence of his

innocence, Petitioner cannot be found to fall within the terms of

the further exception contemplated by Justice O'Connor.

Finally, Petitioner maintains that it would be fundamentally

unfair to apply Lackawanna retroactively to bar review of the 1982

convictions.2 Petitioner correctly notes that Lackawanna was

decided after he filed his initial petition with this Court. 

However, Petitioner has cited no authority for the proposition that

the Court may apply the rule of decision as it existed at the time

the petition was filed. Indeed, this is contrary to the principle

that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders

its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or

there is statutory direction or legislative history to the

contrary." Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711

(1974). Lackawanna settled an unresolved issue of law concerning

the limits of the court's power on habeas review. There is no

basis for departing from the rule in Bradley, and Lackawanna

therefore prevents Petitioner from challenging the validity of his

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3

Even if Lackawanna did not bar Petitioner's challenges, his

substantive claims of invalidity fail as well. Petitioner has not

made a sufficient showing that he was incompetent during the 1982

proceedings or that his counsel was ineffective. Plaintiff

ultimately received a competency hearing and was found to be

competent at the time of the 1982 proceedings.

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1982 convictions.3

C. Other Trial Court Errors

1. Errors Related to Admission of Evidence Regarding

Prior Convictions

a. Denial of Adequate Opportunity to Investigate

Petitioner's Competency at the Time of His

Prior Convictions

Petitioner argues that the trial court in 1995 erroneously and

prejudicially denied his trial counsel an adequate opportunity to

investigate and present evidence about Petitioner's competency at

the time of his 1982 and 1987 prior convictions.

On May 9, 1995, Petitioner moved to strike his prior

convictions. In furtherance of that motion, Petitioner requested

funds to hire an expert to analyze his medical records to determine

if he was competent at the time of his prior convictions. (Pet'r's

Ex. 163, 1809.) Petitioner requested $1000, but the trial court

granted him only $500. (Pet'r's Ex. 176.) At an August 1, 1995

sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner's request for

a continuance to further develop his motion to strike. (Pet'r's

Ex. 177, 4950.) The court rejected counsel's reasons for seeking

the continuance: that the court's grant of only $500 forced him to

locate another expert than the one originally located and that it

took over a week to find another expert. Id. at 4951-52. The

California Court of Appeal, the highest state court to address the

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merits of Petitioner's claim in a reasoned decision, affirmed. 

(Resp't's Ex. C, 7.)

Indigent defendants do not have the right to receive funds to

hire the psychiatrist of their choice. Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d

815, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83

(1985)). The state appellate court concluded that the amount of

funds granted by the trial court was sufficient because

Petitioner's counsel admitted that he was able to hire an expert,

just not the one he had chosen. (Resp't's Ex. C, 7.) The court

also concluded that the continuance was properly denied because

Petitioner had been given enough time for his expert to analyze the

medical records relevant to Petitioner's motion. (Id.) 

The state court's analysis was not an unreasonable application

of federal law. In any event, the 1987 conviction was eventually

stricken, and Petitioner's argument that the admission of evidence

of his 1987 conviction had a prejudicial impact on his credibility

is not persuasive. In a later evidentiary hearing, the state court

found that Petitioner was competent in 1982. Accordingly, this

claim of trial court error does not warrant habeas relief.

b. Confrontation Clause Violation Related to

Evidence of 1982 Convictions

Petitioner claims a Confrontation Clause violation in

admission of the 1982 preliminary hearing transcript to prove the

facts of his 1982 convictions. The evidence was admitted on the

issue of whether Petitioner's prior convictions qualified as

strikes under California's three-strikes law. Petitioner contends

that the transcript could only be introduced if he had a motive and

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4

Petitioner may not rely on the Supreme Court's decision in

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which narrowed the

realm of exceptions to the right of confrontation. Crawford does

not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings such as this one. 

Whorton v. Bockting, U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).

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opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in 1982 and the

prosecution made a showing that the witnesses were unavailable.

Petitioner has not established that the admission of the

evidence was erroneous. Under California law, the trier of fact

may look to the entire record to determine the substance of the

prior conviction. See People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 355

(1988). People v. Reed, 13 Cal. 4th 217, 229-30, cert. denied, 519

U.S. 873 (1996), expanded Guerrero to hold that preliminary hearing

transcripts could be used to prove that a prior conviction was for

a serious felony within the meaning of California's three strikes

law (California Penal Code §§ 667 and 1192). The Reed court held

that the testimony recorded in the preliminary hearing transcript

could be admitted to prove the substance of the prior conviction

under California's hearsay exception for former testimony, even

though that hearsay exception required that the witness be

unavailable. Id. The witnesses who testified at the preliminary

hearing "were legally unavailable because, under the rule announced

in [Guerrero], the prosecution was precluded from presenting any

evidence outside the record of conviction to prove the

circumstances of the prior crime." Id. at 225 (emphasis in

original). Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause was not violated

by the use of the preliminary hearing testimony.4 Id. at 228.

Petitioner also argues that he was not allowed to confront and

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cross-examine the witnesses even at the 1982 hearing because he was

hidden behind a screen. However, the screen was used at his

attorney's request to prevent the witnesses from viewing Petitioner

until his counsel had cross-examined them. At the conclusion of

each cross-examination, when the witness was asked to identify

Petitioner, the screen was removed. Accordingly, these facts do

not support his Confrontation Clause claim.

c. Failure to Redact 1982 Preliminary Hearing

Transcript

Petitioner claims the trial court erred in admitting the 1982

preliminary hearing transcript without redacting from it

prejudicial information such as (1) references to Petitioner's

juvenile record, (2) Petitioner's psychiatric conservatorship and

(3) comments by the judge about Petitioner's behavior. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by

the trial court's failure sua sponte to redact the transcript. A

state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to

federal habeas review unless the ruling violated federal law,

either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). The due process inquiry

on federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was

arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. See id.; Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).

The prosecution relied on the transcript to establish that the

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1982 burglary and attempted burglary convictions qualified as

strikes because they involved inhabited dwellings. Even if the

allegedly prejudicial facts listed by Petitioner were redacted from

the transcript, the jury would have still been able to determine

that the 1982 burglary and attempted burglary convictions involved

inhabited dwellings. Because Petitioner has not established that

the admission of this evidence rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair, this claim of trial court error does not warrant habeas

relief.

d. Cross-Examination Concerning Dismissed Charges

Petitioner argues that the 1995 trial court erroneously and

prejudicially allowed the prosecution to cross-examine him about

criminal charges that had been dismissed in connection with his

1982 and 1987 priors. Specifically, the court permitted the

prosecutor to question Petitioner about whether he received a

benefit for pleading guilty to the 1982 burglaries. (Pet'r's Ex.

172, 5591.) The court then allowed the prosecutor to ask

Petitioner whether "as a result of that disposition two other

burglaries were dismissed." Id. at 5592. Finally, the court

permitted the prosecutor to ask Petitioner about charges that had

been dropped in connection with Petitioner's 1987 convictions for

robbery and the sale of drugs. Id.

Again, Petitioner has not established that the crossexamination rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. When viewed

in light of Petitioner's overall criminal record, the crossexamination likely had a de minimis impact on the jury's evaluation

of his credibility or criminal predisposition. Accordingly, this

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claim of trial court error does not warrant habeas relief.

e. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner argues that his right to be free from double

jeopardy was violated when his sentence was enhanced based upon his

1982 convictions.

To support his claim, Petitioner cites Monge v. California,

524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998). In Monge, the Supreme Court held that

increasing a convict's non-capital sentence based on a prior

conviction does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth

Amendment. See id. at 734. The case offers no support for

Petitioner's claim. 

Moreover, enhanced punishment imposed for a later offense "is

not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for

the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the

latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense

because a repetitive one." Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,

400 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the use

of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent

convictions does not violate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy

clause. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) (upholding

use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent

convictions even if in a sense defendant must relitigate in

sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was already tried).

Accordingly, Petitioner's double jeopardy claim does not merit

habeas relief.

2. Recusal of the Trial Judge

In 1994, Petitioner was convicted for selling cocaine. As

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 The condition required Petitioner "to submit [him]self to

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property under [his] control at any time of the day or night by any

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and without a warrant."

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part of Petitioner's probation, the judge imposed a search

condition.5 (Pet'r's Ex. 147, 6044-46.) The judge who imposed the

search condition also presided over Petitioner's 1995 trial. 

Before the 1995 trial, counsel moved to suppress the cocaine by

arguing that Petitioner was not subject to the search condition

because he had never expressly consented to it. (Pet'r's Ex. 160,

1279-83.) Petitioner argues that the judge should have recused

herself on the ground that she was being called upon to decide the

validity of a condition that she had imposed.

Petitioner has failed to establish error or prejudice. Under

federal law, a judge's alleged bias, to be disqualifying, must stem

from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits

on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation

in the case. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,

583 (1966). Thus, the moving party must demonstrate that the

alleged bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature and

origin. See United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 501 (N.D.

Cal. 1976).

The question presented by Petitioner's motion to suppress was

a legal issue: whether Petitioner's express consent to the

conditions of probation at sentencing or in a written document was

required for the conditions to be valid. Petitioner's claim fails

under federal law because he has not alleged that the judge had

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bias from an extrajudicial source. See Zagari, 419 F. Supp. at

501. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that another judge

would have decided differently; he has not cited any authority for

the proposition that his consent was necessary. Therefore, this

claim of trial court error does not warrant habeas relief.

3. Cumulative Error

Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of the above

errors resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. In

some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently

prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several

errors may prejudice a defendant to such a degree that his

conviction must be overturned. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862,

893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where multiple

constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to challenge

every important element of proof offered by prosecution). 

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the

government's case is weak. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d

1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). However, where there is no single

constitutional error, nothing can accumulate to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939,

957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir.

1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). As set

forth above, Petitioner has failed to establish any constitutional

error in the underlying state court proceeding. Therefore, his

claim of cumulative error does not warrant habeas relief.

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D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of

trial counsel on a number of grounds. Many of his challenges to

counsel's performance overlap with his claims of trial court error

discussed above.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The benchmark for judging

any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. 

Id. 

 In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim, a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id. However, "strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690. The Strickland framework

for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

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considered to be "clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

404-08 (2000).

It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas

ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even establish

incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133

F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not

determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of

the alleged deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697;

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995)

(approving district court's refusal to consider whether counsel's

conduct was deficient after determining that petitioner could not

establish prejudice), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996). 

1. Counsel's Failure to Investigate and Raise the Issue of

Petitioner's Competency in 1995

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing adequately to investigate and raise with the trial court

the issue of Petitioner's competency at the time of his 1995 trial

and sentencing, and at his resentencing. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that particular

investigations are unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691;

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1998). Strickland

directs that "'a particular decision not to investigate must be

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directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,

applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.'" 

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 491); see Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d

504, 508 (9th Cir. 1994) (decision whether to introduce medical

evidence largely question of professional judgment), cert. denied,

514 U.S. 1026 (1995).

As discussed above, the test for competence to stand trial is

whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult

with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding

-- whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of

the proceedings against him." Boag, 769 F.2d at 1343.

Petitioner contends that trial counsel's investigation was

inadequate because he did not obtain copies of Petitioner's mental

health records. However, Petitioner does not discuss what sort of

additional information trial counsel would have uncovered by

examining more records. Based on his declarations, trial counsel

already knew a great deal about Petitioner's past and present

mental capacity. Despite this knowledge, counsel did not seek

expert evaluation of Petitioner's current mental capacity because,

as counsel stated, "It was my judgment that I did not need to have

Mr. Triggs examined by a mental health expert to determine whether

he was mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced." 

(Pet'r's Ex. 235, 5.) Counsel's judgment carries significant

weight, because, as noted above, "[d]efense counsel will often have

the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in

his defense." Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992).

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In light of the heavy deference the Court must afford

counsel's judgments under Strickland, the Court finds that

counsel's investigation into Petitioner's competency was sufficient

to support a reasonable professional judgment that no further

investigation was warranted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 491. 

Petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise his competency with the trial court. Petitioner

argues that had the court held a competency hearing, there was a

reasonable likelihood that it would have determined that he was

incompetent to stand trial or be sentenced. 

Based on what he knew about Petitioner, Petitioner's counsel

could have reasonably believed that Petitioner was competent. 

Therefore, counsel could have reasonably concluded that a

competency hearing would have been futile. See James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.1994) ("[F]ailure to make a futile motion does

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.").

The cases Petitioner cites in support of his arguments are

inapposite. In Douglas v. Woodford, the court found Douglas'

attorney's performance deficient for, among other things, failing

adequately to investigate a mental health defense at the guilt

phase of the trial. 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). Douglas' trial

counsel had several doctors examine him. Id. at 1085. One of them

had suggested further tests, but Douglas had refused to

participate. Id. The court found counsel deficient for failing to

discover a doctor who had conducted a similar evaluation of Douglas

when he was on trial for a prior offense. Id. The court held that

"'if a client forecloses certain avenues of investigation, it

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arguably becomes even more incumbent upon trial counsel to seek out

and find alternative sources of information and evidence,

especially in the context of a capital murder trial.'" Id. at 1086

(quoting Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 847 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002)). Here, Petitioner's counsel chose not

to pursue additional sources of information relating to

Petitioner's competency because, unlike Douglas' counsel, he

thought his client was competent.

In United States v. Howard, Howard plead guilty one hour

before his trial was to begin while he was under the influence of a

prescribed narcotic painkiller. 381 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Howard argued that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for

permitting him, while incompetent, to acquiesce in the plea

agreement he had seen for the first time just before he agreed to

plead guilty. Id. at 875. The court held that the late timing of

the proffer of the plea, combined with Howard's uncontroverted

allegations of drug use, justified an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether counsel was ineffective. Id. at 881. This case

is inapposite.

Petitioner's counsel's performance did not fall below an

"objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Accordingly,

this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not warrant

habeas relief.

2. Counsel's Failure to Investigate or Challenge

Petitioner's 1982 and 1987 Convictions

Petitioner contends that counsel rendered ineffective

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Lackawanna, discussed above in connection with Petitioner's

present challenge to the validity of his 1982 convictions, extended

Custis to apply to federal habeas proceedings.

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assistance by failing (1) adequately to investigate and present

evidence about Petitioner's competence at the time of his 1982 and

1987 prior convictions; and (2) to challenge Petitioner's prior

convictions on the grounds that he should have had a competency

hearing. However, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was

prejudiced by these alleged deficiencies.

a. Availability of Collateral Challenge

At the time of Petitioner's 1995 trial, California law was

unsettled about whether Petitioner could have challenged his prior

convictions on the grounds he now claims. In 1994, the United

States Supreme Court decided Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,

493-97 (1994), holding that, in the context of a federal sentencing

proceeding, the Constitution does not require that a defendant be

permitted to attack collaterally the constitutionality of a prior

state court conviction used to enhance the federal sentence. The

only exception to this rule is a challenge on the grounds of

failure to appoint counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment.6

Id. In 1997, after Petitioner's 1995 trial, California adopted the

Custis rule in all non-capital cases. Garcia v. Superior Court, 14

Cal. 4th 953, 956, 963-65 (1997).

In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366 (1993), the Supreme

Court held that a defendant suffers no cognizable prejudice where

counsel fails to make a legal argument that was supported by legal

authority at the time of the trial, but subsequently overruled. 

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Even though counsel could have challenged Petitioner's prior

convictions at the time of his trial, this type of challenge was no

longer permitted after Garcia. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot

demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the

1982 convictions.

b. Petitioner's Competency Claim

Petitioner eventually received an evidentiary hearing

regarding whether he was competent at the time of his 1982

conviction and was found to have been competent. On remand, the

trial court struck his 1987 conviction. Petitioner has not

established a reasonable probability that the result of his 1995

trial would have been different had his 1995 trial counsel

challenged his competency at his 1982 and 1987 proceedings.

Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does

not warrant habeas relief.

c. Petitioner's Conflicted Counsel Claim

Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge his 1982 and 1987 prior convictions on the

grounds that the Marin County Public Defender did not provide

constitutionally effective assistance at those times because it had

a conflict of interest. This claim lacks a showing both of merit

and of prejudice.

3. Counsel's Failure to Object to Evidence Proving

Petitioner's Prior Convictions

a. Failure to Raise Confrontation Clause Claim

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective because

counsel failed to argue that the admission of the 1982 preliminary

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hearing transcript to prove Petitioner's prior strikes violated his

right under the Confrontation Clause. As discussed above,

Petitioner asserts that the prosecution made no showing that the

witnesses from the 1982 hearing were not available and that

Petitioner had no real opportunity or motive in 1982 to crossexamine the preliminary hearing witnesses about a fact that was not

an element of the offenses at the time but that qualified the 1982

prior convictions as strikes in 1995.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel's inaction in

this respect prejudiced Petitioner. On direct appeal, the state

court rejected Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim, finding his

case indistinguishable from Reed, 13 Cal. 4th 217. As discussed

above, under Reed such transcripts may be admitted. See id. at

225.

Because the state court of appeal has rejected Petitioner's

argument, Petitioner has failed to establish that, had counsel

raised this argument, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

b. Failure to Seek Redaction of Transcript

Petitioner contends that counsel should have argued that the

1982 preliminary hearing transcript should be redacted because it

contained irrelevant and highly prejudicial information, as

discussed above.

For the reasons set out there, Petitioner has failed to

establish that, had counsel successfully moved for the allegedly

prejudicial facts to be redacted, there is a reasonable probability

that the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel does not warrant habeas relief.

4. Counsel's Failure to Seek Recusal of the Trial Court

Judge

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because he

failed to move to recuse the trial judge. The facts surrounding

this claim are discussed above. Counsel did not err. Under

California law, it is not grounds for disqualification if a judge

"[h]as in any capacity expressed a view on a legal or factual issue

presented in the proceeding." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 170.2(b). 

The trial court's decision on a legal issue is not grounds for

disqualification under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 170.2(b). Further, Petitioner has failed to establish the

prejudice prong of Strickland. As discussed above, Petitioner has

not shown that another judge would have decided differently. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

does not warrant habeas relief.

5. Counsel's Failure to Investigate or Present

Testimony from Gregory Miller

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective because he

failed to investigate a man named Gregory Miller. Petitioner

alleges that Mr. Miller was the only non-law-enforcement percipient

witness to the alleged offense. Petitioner argues that Mr. Miller

would have testified that he and Petitioner did not exchange drugs,

thereby supporting Petitioner's defense that he did not know that

any cocaine base was in his pants pocket.

The duty to investigate and prepare a defense does not require

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that every conceivable witness be interviewed. Hendricks v.

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). A defendant's mere

speculation that a witness might have given helpful information if

interviewed is not enough to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087, amended by 253

F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner offers no evidence to support his contention that

Miller would have testified that he and Petitioner did not exchange

drugs. Because a defendant's mere speculation is not enough to

establish ineffective assistance, counsel's failure to investigate

Miller is not deficient. Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1087.

Moreover, to establish prejudice caused by counsel's failure

to call a witness, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance

of the evidence that the witness could have been called upon to

testify, what the witness' testimony would have been, and that the

witness' testimony would have had a reasonable likelihood of

weakening the prosecution's case. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner cannot establish that Miller would have testified,

because Miller was deceased at the time of Petitioner's trial. 

Even assuming that Miller would have testified that there had been

no drug deal between himself and Petitioner, Petitioner fails to

establish that such testimony would have had a reasonable

likelihood of weakening the government's case against him. The

evidence against Petitioner was, first and foremost, the base

cocaine in his pocket. Testimony that a drug deal did not take

place would not have had a reasonable likelihood of weakening the

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government's case because it would not have altered the fact that

Petitioner was in possession of base cocaine. Given the strength

of the government's case against Petitioner, there is no reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

different had Miller testified. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

For these reasons, Petitioner cannot establish ineffective

assistance by counsel's failure to call Miller to testify.

The cases that Petitioner cites for support are

distinguishable from his own. In Riley v. Payne, the petitioner

Riley sought habeas relief by arguing that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel for his counsel's failure to interview or

call a witness who was present at the scene of Riley's alleged

crime. 352 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 2003). The witness filed a

declaration with the court stating that he would have testified in

a way that would have supported Riley's claim of self-defense. Id.

at 1317. The court held that counsel's failure to interview the

witness rendered his performance below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 1319. Here, in contrast, Petitioner offers

no evidence to support his contention that Miller would have

testified in a way that would have supported his defense.

Petitioner also relies on Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441 (5th

Cir. 2004). In that case, Soffar had been sentenced to death for

robbing a bowling alley with another man, during which robbery

three victims were shot to death and one was injured. Id. at 443-

44. He sought habeas relief on grounds including that his counsel

had been ineffective for failing to investigate the surviving

victim. Id. at 471. The victim had provided the police with four

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statements and a post-hypnotic interview concerning the crime. Id.

at 474. Soffar claimed that those statements would have undermined

the reliability of his confession to the police. Id. at 471. 

There was evidence to support the contention that the victim could

have provided helpful testimony. The victim's account of the

robbery and the ballistic evidence were substantially consistent,

whereas Soffar's confessed version of events conflicted with both. 

Id. These inconsistencies were thus powerfully exculpatory. This

case, too, is inapposite to Petitioner's claim.

Because Petitioner has failed to establish either prong of the

Strickland test, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

does not warrant habeas relief. Nor do all of counsel's claimed

errors combined warrant relief.

E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner contends that his sentence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it

is grossly disproportionate to the crimes for which he has been

convicted.

Petitioner's current sentence is twenty-seven years to life in

prison for third-strike possession of a controlled substance in

violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11350(a). This

sentence includes two one-year enhancements for Petitioner's 1982

convictions for burglary and attempted burglary, in violation of

California Penal Code §§ 459 and 664. In addition, Petitioner has

seven other adult convictions: three for vandalism, in violation

of California Penal Code § 594(a); one for assault, in violation of

California Penal Code § 240; one for battery, in violation of

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California Penal Code § 242; one for possession of drug

paraphernalia, in violation of California Health and Safety Code

§ 11364, and one for sale of a controlled substance, in violation

of California Health and Safety Code § 11352.

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for

which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (sentence of life

imprisonment without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent

felony violates Eighth Amendment). But "outside the context of

capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of

particular sentences will be exceedingly rare." Id. at 289-90. 

For the purposes of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it is

clearly established that "[a] gross proportionality principle is

applicable to sentences for terms of years." Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). But the precise contours of the principle

are unclear and "applicable only in the exceedingly rare and

extreme cases." Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

"[T]he principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the

extraordinary case." Id. at 76. 

In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Chief Justice

Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in a two-justice plurality to

conclude that Solem should be overruled and that no proportionality

review was required under the Eighth Amendment except with respect

to death sentences. See id. at 961-985. A three-justice

concurrence made up of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter

concluded that Solem should not be rejected and that the Eighth

Amendment contains a narrow proportionality principle that is not

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7 Because no majority opinion emerged in Harmelin on the

question

of proportionality, Justice Kennedy's view -- that the Eighth

Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime -- is considered the holding of the

Court. See United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 858 (1992); see also United States v.

Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1998).

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confined to death penalty cases, but that forbids only extreme

sentences which are grossly disproportionate to the crime. See id.

at 997-1001.7 After Harmelin, only extreme sentences that are

grossly disproportionate to the crime violate the Eighth Amendment. 

United States v. Carr, 56 F.3d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1995).

In determining whether the sentence is grossly

disproportionate under a recidivist sentencing statute, the court

looks to whether such an "extreme sentence is justified by the

gravity of [an individual's] most recent offense and criminal

history." Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding sentence of twenty-five years to life on petty theft with

prior conviction was grossly disproportionate to crime where

previous two strikes were the result of one negotiated plea

resulting in a single county jail sentence). In considering the

relevance of the recent offense and criminal history, a court must

consider the "factual specifics" of an individual's priors to

determine whether the conduct involved violence or was particularly

serious. Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that the record before the district court was not

sufficiently detailed to make such a finding and remanding for

further development of the record).

 Relying on People v. Ayon, 46 Cal. App. 4th 385, 396-401

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(1996), the state appellate court affirmed Petitioner's sentence

because it determined that it was not grossly disproportionate to

the offense committed. (Resp't's Ex. C, 9.) In Ayon, the court

had applied the standards of Solem and Harmelin to conclude that a

sentence of 240 years to life for a recidivist thief did not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Ayon, 46 Cal. App. 4th at

396-97. 

The appellate court noted that Petitioner's criminal history

spanned twenty years and included convictions for robbery, battery,

burglary and drug dealing. (Resp't's Ex. C, 9.) The court also

noted that Petitioner was arrested for his third-strike offense

just thirty-three days after he was released on probation for his

drug dealing conviction. Id. The appellate court concluded that

Petitioner's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id.

 Because the appellate court properly applied controlling

Supreme Court authority, its judgment was not contrary to federal

law. Emphasizing Petitioner's recidivism and the nature of his

crimes, the appellate court's comparison of Petitioner's

circumstances with those in Harmelin and Solem indicates that it

reached a holding on the proportionality of Petitioner's sentence

consistent with controlling Supreme Court authority. Accordingly,

this Eighth Amendment claim does not warrant habeas relief.

Petitioner also contends that his sentence constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment because it is impermissibly based on his

status as a mentally ill drug addict. He alleges that he has been

using drugs since he was fifteen and that all of his felony

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convictions and parole violations were either for drug possession

or motivated by the need to obtain drugs. Petitioner attributes

his drug use to the need to self-medicate for his psychiatric

condition. Petitioner alleges that he was not able to seek drug

treatment because there are no programs that address his need for

interlocking mental health and substance abuse treatment.

The cases Petitioner relies on for this argument are

distinguishable from his own. In Robinson v. California, Robinson

was convicted under a statute which made addiction to narcotics a

criminal offense. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). Although there was

evidence that Robinson had used narcotics, the jury was instructed

that it could convict him even if it disbelieved that evidence. 

Id. at 665. The Supreme Court held that the statute impermissibly

made the "status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, thereby

rendering Robinson's sentence cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at

667.

In the instant case, Petitioner was convicted under California

Health and Safety Code § 11350(a). Because this statute makes the

act of possessing cocaine illegal, it does not run afoul of the

Supreme Court's decision in Robinson. Petitioner was punished for

the act of possessing cocaine, not for his status as a drug addict.

In United States v. Kidder, Kidder was indicted for conspiracy

to distribute cocaine and possession, with intent to distribute, of

more than 500 grams of cocaine. 869 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Kidder argued that his imprisonment deprived him of necessary

medical treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1330. The court held

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 8 Although the right to the effective assistance of counsel at

trial is guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Sixth

Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth

Amendment, the Sixth Amendment does not address a defendant's

rights on appeal; the right to effective state appellate counsel is

derived purely from the Fourteenth Amendment's due process

guarantee. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 392.

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that because Kidder was seeking to void his sentence, he had to

show not just that his treatment was inadequate, but that it could

not be made adequate. Id. at 1331.

Petitioner has not made such a showing. He has not presented

any evidence to support his allegation that the California

Department of Corrections told the trial court that effective drug

treatment is generally not available in its institutions. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that there is no way for him to

receive adequate treatment while incarcerated.

F. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. The due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant's right to the effective

assistance of counsel on his first appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey,

469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985).8 Claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in

Strickland. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A

defendant therefore must show that counsel's advice fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would

have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.9 (citing

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, and Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

It is important to note that appellate counsel does not have a

constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by

the defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983);

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller,

882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. 

See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Appellate counsel therefore will

frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and

have caused his client no prejudice simply because he declined to

raise a weak issue. Id.

Petitioner contends appellate counsel did not raise all of the

aforementioned issues on appeal or did not raise them adequately

and effectively. However, for the reasons previously discussed,

the issues that Petitioner alleges appellate counsel should have

raised would not likely have succeeded. Therefore, Petitioner has

failed to meet his burden in proving either prong of the Strickland

test. He has not established that appellate counsel's performance

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms, nor has he established that "there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. Thus, Petitioner's claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not entitle him to

habeas relief.

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III. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing if this Court does

not grant his petition on the current record.

A federal evidentiary hearing is mandatory if (1) the

petitioner's allegations, if proven, would establish the right to

relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full

and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts. Williams v.

Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1124 (1996); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994). Circumstances under

which an evidentiary hearing is not required include: (1) where the

petitioner fails to make out a “colorable claim” for relief,

Williams, 52 F.3d at 1484; (2) where there are no disputed facts

and the claim presents a purely legal question, id.; (3) where the

issues presented can be resolved by reference to the state court

record, Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998); 

(4) where the petitioner seeks to present the same evidence heard

by the state court in state habeas proceedings, Villafuerte v.

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1997); and (5) where the

facts were developed in state proceedings, but the expanded claims

relying on such facts were procedurally defaulted by the

petitioner’s failure properly to present them to the highest state

court for review, Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.

1995).

 Petitioner provides no evidence of disputed facts, which, if

resolved in his favor, would result in habeas relief. Thus, no

evidentiary hearing is required. Accordingly, the motion for an

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evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the petition

for writ of habeas corpus. Judgment shall enter accordingly. 

Each party shall bear his or her own costs. The Clerk shall

close the file.

 

Dated: 12/14/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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