Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02524/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02524-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

---

1

Case No.: 5:14-cv-02524-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

OLGA GORBACHEVA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES EXTENDED 

DISABILITY PLAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-02524-EJD 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 62

Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Dkt. No. 62. 

Based on the unresolved posture of the case and for the reasons explained briefly below, the court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice. 

A. Relevant Background

Olga Gorbacheva (“Plaintiff”) initially filed this action under the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, against Abbott Laboratories Extended 

Disability Plan (“the Plan”) for failure to pay long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits. See Compl., 

Dkt. No. 1. In May 2015, the Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on all claims.

See Dkt. Nos. 46, 49. On June 30, 2015, the court granted the Plan’s motion for summary 

judgment as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action. Dkt. No. 61 at 21. The court 

granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment “only as to her claim that the Plan Administrator 

abused its discretion in denying her request for LTD benefits,” and remanded the case to the Plan 

Administrator “to make an initial determination as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to LTD 

benefits in light of all of the evidence that it should have considered in the first instance.” Id. at 

19, 21. 

On remand, the Plan Administrator upheld the termination of Plaintiff’s extended disability 

benefits, issuing the decision by letter dated December 29, 2016. See Dkt. No.71 at 1. Based on

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 72 Filed 02/15/17 Page 1 of 3
2

Case No.: 5:14-cv-02524-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the Plan’s decision, Plaintiff now reasserts her ERISA claim and challenges the Plan’s denial of 

her LTD benefits. Accordingly, on January 23, 2017, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Remove Administrative Closure (Dkt. No. 68) and reopened the case for further proceedings. 

Dkt. No. 70. 

B. Attorney’s Fees

In light of the case being reopened, as well as the Parties’ suggestion that there remain 

numerous unresolved issues requiring future litigation, the court directed the Parties to address 

whether Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs should be considered at this time, or 

whether that Motion would be more appropriately brought and decided upon final resolution of the 

case. See Dkt. No 70. 

Plaintiff argues that the court should consider the Motion and award fees without any 

further delay because, “regardless of what might happen in the future,” the court’s order 

remanding the case to the Plan Administrator “was a significant success on the merits and 

warrants an award of attorney’s fees and costs.” Joint Statement at 9, Dkt. No. 71. It is Plaintiff’s 

position that “the proceedings that will take place after remand will consider a new record and new 

legal and factual issues, and thus there is no reason to delay resolution of the attorney’s fee issues 

as they pertain to the original dispute.” Id. In contrast, Defendants argue that the Motion would 

be more appropriately and efficiently brought and decided upon final resolution of the case and, 

until such resolution, “the full relative merits of the parties’ positions and the degree of Plaintiff’s 

success on the merits of her claim are unknown.” Id. at 9-10. 

The court agrees with Defendants. First, the Parties identify a variety of contentious and 

ongoing issues to be resolved by way of continuing litigation. It would therefore be inefficient for 

the court to consider the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees when Plaintiff and/or Defendants will 

likely bring additional fees motions at the conclusion of the case. Thus, it is more productive and 

more reasonable for the court to address any such motions upon final resolution of this matter. 

See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. Student, 2013 WL 4012744, at *2 (D. Or. 2013) (granting stay of 

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 72 Filed 02/15/17 Page 2 of 3
3

Case No.: 5:14-cv-02524-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

attorney’s fees motion, explaining that “[a] trial court may exercise its discretion by finding it is 

‘efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before 

it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.’”) (quoting Leyva v. 

Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)); Mediterranean Enter., Inc. 

v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1983) (“The trial court “possesses the inherent 

power to control its own docket and calendar.”)

Second, while it is possible, as Plaintiff argues, for a court to award attorney’s fees even 

where the plaintiff does not prevail on every issue in the litigation, or even without specific

knowledge of the ultimate monetary benefits conferred to a plaintiff, doing so here is unnecessary 

and premature. The current, unresolved posture of the case leaves the court with little guidance as 

to many of the factors relevant to attorney’s fees determinations. See Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff& 

Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980) (outlining the relevant factors as: (1) the degree of the 

opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award 

of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting 

under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all 

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding 

ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions). Thus, final resolution of the case will 

provide a more complete record for the court to evaluate and make any potential fee award. 

C. Order

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 62) is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may again seek attorney’s fees and costs of suit 

upon the conclusion of this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2017

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 72 Filed 02/15/17 Page 3 of 3