Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02007/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02007-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHANE MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation

Respondent. 

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Civil Case No. 05cv2007 J (NLS) 

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“MTD”). [Doc. No. 12.] Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s MTD. [Doc. No. 14.] 

Petitioner has not filed Objections to the R&R. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS Respondent’s Motion and DISMISSES the Petition with

prejudice as untimely. 

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Introduction

Shane Arthur Miller (“Petitioner”), a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 19, 2005. 

Petitioner challenges his confinement on the basis that (1) the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction

by applying the habitual criminal statute absent sufficient evidence; (2) he received an illegal

sentence due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) he has a right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to have his state habeas petition heard on the merits. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition (“MTD”), arguing that the Petition should be

dismissed with prejudice because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. [Doc. No. 12.] Petitioner did not file an opposition,

nor did he request an extension of time in which to do so. The Court then issued an order to

show cause (“OSC”) as to why the MTD should not be granted. [Doc. No. 13.] Petitioner never

filed a response to the OSC. After a thorough review, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s

Motion and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition.

Background

The Trial:

On July 15, 1996, a jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of assault while using a

deadly weapon, one of which included the infliction of great bodily injury. (Lodgment 2, at 2.) 

Additionally, Petitioner was convicted of one count of robbery while using a deadly weapon and

inflicting great bodily injury. (Id.) The trial court added a consecutive five year term for a prior

serious felony conviction. (Id.)

The Appeal:

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on December 5, 1996. (Lodgment 1, at 4.) The

California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the judgment on September

15, 1998. (Lodgment 4.) On October 26, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition to review the appellate

court's unpublished decision. (Lodgment 5.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

on December 2, 1998. (Lodgment 6.) 

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1

Under the mailbox rule, federal and state habeas petitions are deemed filed at the time

they are delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d

1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001). For the purpose of determining when a petition was filed here, this

Court adopts the date Petitioner signed the declaration of mailing. See Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the petition was deemed filed on the date the

petitioner signed the declaration of mailing). Absent proof of mailing, as is the case for

Lodgment Nos. 15, 17, 23, 25, 27, and 29, the Court adopts the date the petition was signed by

the pro se petitioner. See Bui v. Hedgpeth, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74889 (C.D. Cal. 2007)

(citing Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001); Marsh v. Soares, 223

F.3d 1217, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000)). Despite the relevant authority regarding interpretation of the

mailbox rule, the Attorney General’s Office erroneously cites to the date stamp as the date filed

for the purposes of calculating the tolling period.

3 05cv2007 J (NLS)

State Petitions For Writ of Habeas Corpus:

San Diego Superior Court

Petitioner’s first state petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was deemed filed in San Diego

Superior Court on June 25, 1999.1

 (Lodgment 8.) On August 19, 1999, the San Diego Superior

Court denied the petition in part, and issued an order for Respondent to show cause as to why

Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the grounds of ineffective counsel. (Lodgment 9.) The

court ultimately denied the petition on August 10, 2000. (Lodgment 14.) A second petition with

the superior court was deemed filed on September 4, 2001. (Lodgment 15.) On October 4,

2001, the petition was denied. (Lodgment 16.) A third and final petition with the superior court

was deemed filed on November 13, 2001. (Lodgement 17.) On November 30, 2001, this

petition was also denied. (Lodgment 18.)

California Court of Appeal

Petitioner’s first habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal was deemed filed on

April 13, 2001. (Lodgment 19.) On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeal denied the petition.

(Lodgment 20.) A second petition was deemed filed with the court on November 13, 2001.

(Lodgment 23.) On January 17, 2002, the petition was denied. (Lodgment 24.) A third and

final petition with the court was deemed filed on December 21, 2001. (Lodgment 25.) On

February 28, 2002, this petition was also denied. (Lodgment 26.)

California Supreme Court

Petitioner’s first habeas petition with the California Supreme Court was deemed filed on

August 29, 2001. (Lodgment 21.) On December 19, 2001, the California Supreme Court denied

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the petition. (Lodgment 22.) A second petition was deemed filed with the court on March 20,

2002. (Lodgment 27.) On July 24, 2002, the petition was denied. (Lodgment 28.) A final state

habeas petition was deemed filed with the court on November 5, 2004. (Lodgment 29.) On

September 21, 2005, this petition was also denied. (Lodgment 30.)

U.S. District Court

The Petition to this Court was deemed filed on October 19, 2005. The Court dismissed

the case the following month for failure to pay the filing fee. In January 2007 the Court

reopened the case, after Petitioner notified the Court that he had never received a response from

the Court regarding his Petition.

Legal Standard

I. Statute of Limitations:

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The district court’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth in

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). “When no objections

are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact

and decide the motion on the applicable law.” Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217

(S.D. Cal. 2001). “Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that ‘a failure to file

objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings;

conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.’” Id. (quoting Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d

1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, Petitioner did not file objections to the R&R.

Accordingly, this Court will conduct a de novo review of conclusions of law. 

Discussion

The conviction of a state prisoner who is denied direct review from the state court of last

resort becomes final for purposes of section 2244(d) either upon the expiration of the 90-day

period to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court (if the defendant does

not file a certiorari petition), or when the Supreme Court denies the certiorari petition (if the

defendant files such a petition). Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Here, the California Supreme Court had denied Petitioner’s petition to review the

appellate court’s decision on December 2, 1998. (Lodgment 6.) Petitioner did not file a petition

for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on March 2, 1999, ninety days after the period to seek a writ from the United States

Supreme Court expired. The statute of limitations on his federal habeas petition began to run the

next day, March 3, 1999. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, this Court agrees with Respondent’s assertion that absent tolling periods, the last day

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Petitioner could have timely filed a federal habeas petition would have been March 3, 2000. 

(MTD at 13.)

Respondent concedes that Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling by reason of a properly

filed state petition for collateral review for 411 days, thereby extending the expiration of the

statute of limitations to April 18, 2001. (Id.) However, Respondent argues that because the

instant petition was not filed until October 19, 2005, more than four and one-half years after the

statute of limitations expired, and because Petitioner is not entitled to additional periods of

statutory or equitable tolling to justify the late petition, it should be dismissed as untimely. (Id.

at 13-16.)

However, the Court concludes that by reason of statutory tolling, Petitioner had an

additional 518 days until August 3, 2001, to file a habeas petition in this Court. The Court

agrees, however, that Petitioner is not entitled to any further statutory tolling or to equitable

tolling. Therefore, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, filed over four years after the completion

of the time allotted for him to seek this review, should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Further Statutory Tolling

A petitioner’s statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petition is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Under the holding of Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time

the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s

final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were properly filed and pending that entire

time. However, the time between filings in California courts is not covered under the “pending”

language of Section 2244(d)(2) if the petition is ultimately found to be untimely. Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006) (citing the Court’s previous holding in Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214 (2002)). In an absence of a clear indication that the petition was untimely, the federal

court must examine the case and determine whether the petition was filed within what California

courts would consider a “reasonable time.” Id. In Evans, the Supreme Court concluded that

California would most likely find a 6-month unexplained delay “unreasonable.” Id. at 201.

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In this case, the statute of limitations would have expired on March 3, 2000; however,

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition with the San Diego Superior Court. Pursuant to the

mailbox rule, the petition was deemed filed on the date Petitioner signed it, June 25, 1999. (See

Lodgement No. 8.) Therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled for a period of 422 days until

the San Diego Superior Court denied the habeas petition on August 10, 2000. (See Lodgment

14.) On August 10, 2000, Petitioner had until April 29, 2001, to file a federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. 

 Petitioner filed his second habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal, deemed

filed on April 13, 2001, approximately eight months after judgment on the first petition in the

San Diego Superior Court. (See Lodgment 19.) The California Court of Appeal denied the

petition on July 18, 2001. (See Lodgment 20.) Under Evans, in which the court held that a six

month delay was unreasonable, the eight month delay in this case between the decision on the

first petition and the filing of the second petition in the Court of Appeal would also be considered “unreasonable” despite the Court of Appeal’s silence as to timeliness of the petition. 

Evans, 546 U.S. 189 at 201. Therefore, the time between August 10, 2000, and April 13, 2001 is

not covered under the “pending” language of Section 2244(d)(2). Thus, on July 18, 2001,

Petitioner had sixteen days, or until August 3, 2001, before the statute of limitations expired. 

The next state habeas petition with the California Supreme Court was not deemed filed

until August 29, 2001, after the federal statute of limitations period had expired. (See Lodgment

21.) The Ninth Circuit has held that Section 2244(d) does not allow the reinitiation of the

limitations period when the federal statute of limitations has ended before the state petition was

filed. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 924

(2003). Thus, the subsequent state habeas petition filed on August 29, 2001 does not afford

Petitioner an extension of the limitations period.

Petitioner does not contend that he is entitled to an alternative calculation of the statute of

limitations under Section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), nor, based on the facts before the Court, does one

appear applicable. Consequently, absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition

filed on October 19, 2005 is untimely under AEDPA .

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II. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Equitable Tolling

The one-year period of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling when

“‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time.” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled in part, but

on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (1998)) (citing AlvarezMachain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). Petitioner holds the burden to

prove that equitable tolling is appropriate, and must establish (1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d

1021, 1026 (2005). The determination of whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling is

“highly fact-dependent.” Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026 (citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early,

233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling due to his own

failure to exercise due diligence. (MTD at 16.) Petitioner does not affirmatively state that he is

entitled to equitable tolling in his federal habeas petition, as he did not file an opposition

challenging Respondent’s contentions, and he never responded to the Court’s OSC. And,

nothing in the record indicates that equitable tolling is appropriate here. Therefore, based on the

facts before the Court, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling for this Petition.

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Conclusion

Accordingly, this Court FINDS that Petitioner failed to file his federal habeas petition

within the one-year period of limitation imposed by AEDPA. He has also failed to prove that he

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is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Therefore, this Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES Petitioner’s Petition with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes

 All Counsel of Record

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