Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03416/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03416-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carol Pierce,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-03416-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

At issue is the Court’s February 7, 2020 Order (Doc. 15, Order) regarding Plaintiff 

Carol Pierce’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act 

(the Act). The Order reversed the April 30, 2018 decision of the Administrative Law Judge 

(Doc. 8, R. at 17–35) denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits and remanded the case to 

the Social Security Administration for a calculation of benefits. (Order at 10.) Defendant 

Social Security Commissioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 17, Mot.), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 18, Resp.). The 

Court now remands the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance on November 

12, 2014 for a period of disability beginning October 24, 2013. (R. at 20.) Plaintiff’s claim 

was denied initially on December 16, 2014, and upon reconsideration on January 4, 2016.

(R. at 20.) Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge 

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(ALJ) on November 20, 2017. (R. at 20.) On April 30, 2018, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s 

Application. (R. at 30.) On April 3, 2019, the Appeals Council denied a request for review 

of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 1.)

Upon reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the Court found that “the ALJ provided 

insufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the lay witness opinions, 

and Dr. Sy’s [Plaintiff’s treating physician] opinion.” (Order at 9.) The Court based its 

conclusions primarily on the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s vertigo and the testimony and 

medical opinions related to that impairment. After determining that the ALJ committed 

reversible error, the Court found that “the record is fully developed and additional 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose.” (Order at 9.) Next, the Court found that if it 

credited Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and Dr. Sy’s opinion as true, then an ALJ would 

be required to find Plaintiff disabled. (Order at 10.) Finally, the Court found that it had no 

serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled because Plaintiff’s vertigo is well-documented and 

seemingly permanent. (Order at 10.) 

Defendant now argues that the Court “did not properly assess whether the facts of 

this case represented the extraordinary circumstances that justify bypassing the ordinary 

remand rule.” (Mot. at 2.) Specifically, Defendant points to three “manifest errors,” which 

he asserts require the Court to remand this case for further proceedings.1 First, Defendant 

claims that the Court mistakenly reversed the order of the first two steps of the credit-astrue rule. (Br. at 3.) Next, Defendant argues that the Court mistakenly concluded that the 

second element of the credit-as-true rule––whether further administrative proceedings 

would be useful––was met. (Br. at 3.) Finally, Defendant asserts that, contrary to the 

Court’s conclusion, “serious doubt” exists as to whether Plaintiff is actually disabled. (Br. 

at 4–6.) 

...

...

1 Defendant charges a fourth error––that Plaintiff did not request a remand for 

calculation of benefits as a remedy. (Br. at 2.) Defendant is incorrect. Plaintiff requested a 

remand for calculation of benefits in her Complaint. (Doc. 1.) 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) provides that a party may move for an amendment to a judgment within 

28 days of entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). It is appropriate for a court to 

amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) if: “(1) the district court is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision 

that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” 

Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Because the record lacks substantial objective medical evidence documenting the 

severity of Plaintiff’s vertigo, the Court agrees with Defendant that it committed clear error 

in determining that additional proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, it 

is necessary to further develop the record in this case, so the ordinary remand rule applies. 

As for the other errors charged by Defendant, the Court concludes that it did not 

misapply the order of the credit-as-true rule, and Defendant’s argument that there is 

“serious doubt” that Plaintiff is disabled is superfluous. 

A. The Credit-As-True Rule

If the Court finds that the ALJ erred in finding that the Plaintiff is not disabled under 

the Act, the Court employs a three-step test—known both as the Varney rule and the 

“credit-as-true” rule—to determine if the case should be remanded for an award of benefits

or for further administrative proceedings. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 

1100–01 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the Court determines “whether the ‘ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 

medical opinion.’” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

Second, the Court determines “whether the record has been fully developed, whether there 

are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made, and whether further administrative proceedings would be useful.” Id. at 1101 

(internal quotations omitted). Third, the Court determines whether an ALJ would have to 

conclude that the claimant is disabled if the improperly rejected evidence were credited as 

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true. Id. at 1101. If all three elements of the test are met, the Court may remand for an 

award of benefits unless it has serious doubt that the claimant is, in fact, disabled. Id. at 

1101–02.

Plaintiff correctly identifies that Defendant overstates the significance of the order 

of the first two steps of the credit-as-true rule. Defendant is correct that the first step is to 

determine whether the ALJ has committed reversible error. However, Defendant does not 

identify how considering the first two steps in a particular order could affect the ultimate 

analysis. Moreover, the Court only performs a credit-as-true analysis after it has identified 

reversible error. So, the first step is a formality because if the ALJ has not “failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [] evidence,” then the Court will not perform a 

credit-as-true analysis. Here, the Court determined in pages 3 through 9 of its Order that 

the ALJ committed reversible error, and Defendant does not challenge that determination. 

(Br. at 2.) Thus, the Court did find that the ALJ erred before it concluded that additional 

proceedings would not be useful. 

B. Further proceedings would be useful because there are outstanding 

issues regarding the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments. 

Although the ALJ erred in rejecting symptom testimony and medical opinions, the

credit-as-true rule does not apply. There are still outstanding issues to be resolved in this 

case, most importantly determining what true limitations are caused by Plaintiff’s vertigo. 

Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for further development of the 

record. 

Importantly, Plaintiff’s vertigo is clearly documented in the record and thus it is 

clear that she suffers at least some limitations because of that impairment. (R. at 57, 63–

64, 21, 257, 260, 339, 511.) Nevertheless, an outstanding issue remains because the record 

is not clear as to the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations due to vertigo and her other 

impairments. Defendant points to numerous medical records that identify normal findings 

that appear to be inconsistent with disabling vertigo. (Br. at 4–5.) Similarly, the entire 

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record lacks significant objective medical evidence documenting the debilitating effects of 

Plaintiff’s vertigo, rather than merely its existence. 

Moreover, Defendant also points to other evidence in the record that he asserts is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged completely disabling symptoms, including Plaintiff’s 

daily activities, the lack of objective diagnostic tests identifying serious issues, and 

conflicting medical opinions between treating and reviewing physicians. (Br. at 5–6.) The 

Court agrees with Defendant that these outstanding issues constitute “conflicts, 

ambiguities, or gaps” in the record, which the ALJ must resolve. (Br. at 3.) Dominguez v. 

Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, it is the ALJ’s duty to resolve conflicts, 

gaps, or ambiguities in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th 

Cir. 1995)

Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s response, which emphasizes that the 

existence of Plaintiff’s vertigo is clearly established in the record. Plaintiff highlights that 

her vertigo is permanent, and the Court agrees. (Resp. at 4.) Nevertheless, there is an 

outstanding issue regarding how limiting her “chronic, episodic vertigo” actually is. (Resp. 

at 4.) Similarly, Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ improperly concluded that Plaintiff’s 

activities of daily living were inconsistent with her vertigo. (Resp. at 4.) Though her daily 

activities do not appear to be inconsistent with her symptoms, it is still necessary to 

determine how functionally limiting her symptoms are. A conflict exists between 

Plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms and the dearth of objective medical evidence 

substantiating those limitations. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1104. While a mere lack of 

objective medical evidence is not a permissible reason for an ALJ to disregard a claimant’s

symptom testimony, it supports a conclusion that there are outstanding issues under the 

credit-as-true rule. Accordingly, remand for further proceedings is appropriate to allow for 

further development of the record and proper analysis of Plaintiff’s residual functional 

capacity consistent with her true limitations. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend 

Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 17). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED amending the Court’s prior Order (Doc. 15) to the 

extent it is inconsistent with this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter for further consideration 

consistent with this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter an amended 

judgment accordingly. This matter shall remain closed.

Dated this 2nd day of April, 2020.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

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