Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00942/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00942-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMAL AUSTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00942-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND DENYING 

MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE 

STATEMENT

Docket No. 36

Previously, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants‟ motion to dismiss and 

granted Defendants‟ motion for a more definite statement. See generally Docket No. 21 (order). 

More specifically, the Court held that, as to the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff had adequately 

pleaded claims for relief, whether under federal or state law, for excessive force and deliberate 

indifference to medical needs. The Court, however, held that such claims were not adequately 

pled against the County under federal law (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983), although they were adequately 

pled under state law. The Court gave Plaintiff leave to amend to address the deficiency in the 

federal claim against the County. The Court also allowed an amendment to address the need for a 

more definite statement – e.g., because it was not clear whether Plaintiff intended to bring a race 

discrimination claim. See Docket No. 21 (Order at 15).

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a “Short Statement” along with a first amended complaint 

(“FAC”). See Docket Nos. 34-35 (“Short Statement” and FAC). Defendants have now filed a 

motion to dismiss the FAC and a motion for a more definite statement. Having considered the 

papers submitted, including Plaintiff‟s filing of September 21, 2015, which the Court deems an 

opposition to the motion to dismiss, see Docket No. 40 (Plaintiff‟s filing), the Court hereby 

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to dismiss and further DENIES the motion for 

Case 3:15-cv-00942-EMC Document 44 Filed 11/16/15 Page 1 of 5
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United States District Court

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a more definite statement. The hearing on the motion to dismiss and/or for a more definite 

statement is hereby VACATED.

1

I. DISCUSSION

A. Claims for Excessive Force and Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need.

1. Eighth Amendment Theory

To a large extent, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is an attempt to clean up Plaintiff‟s 

pleading. For example, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has adequately pled – against the 

Individual Defendants at least – a claim for excessive force or a claim for deliberate indifference 

to medical need (as the Court previously concluded). They simply assert that such claims are 

viable under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment. This is consistent with 

the Court‟s prior order, see Docket No. 21 (Order at 7, 9), and therefore, to the extent Defendants‟ 

seek dismissal of the § 1983 claim based on the Eighth Amendment alone (and not the Fourteenth 

Amendment), the motion to dismiss is granted. The § 1983 claim based on the Eighth 

Amendment alone is dismissed as to all Defendants (i.e., not only the Individual Defendants but 

also the County) and with prejudice.

2. County Liability

As to the Fourteenth Amendment-based claims for excessive force and deliberate 

indifference to medical need, Defendants argue that the County cannot be held liable because 

Plaintiff has failed to plead municipal liability.

“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of 

S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). “„[I]t is only when execution of a government‟s 

policy or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality as an entity is responsible.‟” Waggy v. 

Spokane County Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). “Under an „inaction‟ policy claim, „a 

plaintiff can allege that through its omissions the municipality is responsible for a constitutional 

violation committed by one of its employees.‟ In Canton, the Supreme Court held that a 

 

1 Because the Court is vacating the hearing and ruling on the papers, Plaintiff‟s request for a 

continuance of the hearing because of medical problems is moot. Plaintiff‟s request was made in a 

letter received by the Court on November 12, 2015.

Case 3:15-cv-00942-EMC Document 44 Filed 11/16/15 Page 2 of 5
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United States District Court

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municipality's failure to train its employees is one such claim of omission or inaction by the 

municipality.” Id.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to make sufficient allegations in his FAC to give 

rise to a plausible claim of municipal liability. Plaintiff has, in essence, claimed that, because 

there have been widespread complaints by inmates about constitutional violations, the County had 

a custom or policy and/or failed to train. See, e.g., FAC at 2. But there are many different kinds 

of constitutional violations. Absent, e.g., allegations that there were complaints about excessive 

force and/or deliberate indifference to medical need similar to the circumstances at issue here or 

by the same individuals, one cannot reasonably infer a custom or policy or failure to train. 

Compare, e.g., Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that 

“a jury might have been able to reasonably infer from prior complaints that the Long Beach Police 

Department was aware that [the defendant] had previously used excessive force when making 

arrests, but had taken no steps to curb his propensity”).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims for excessive force and/or deliberate 

indifference to medical need, as asserted against the County. The dismissal is without prejudice. 

If, as this case proceeds, Plaintiff uncovers a basis for municipality liability, then he may move to 

amend to reintroduce these claims against the County. 

B. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation

In his FAC, Plaintiff makes passing references to the First Amendment – e.g., in the 

caption of the pleading and in his excessive force claim. It is not clear whether Plaintiff intended 

to implicate the First Amendment in his claim for deliberate indifference to medical need as well. 

The Court shall assume such, particularly given Plaintiff‟s pro se status. Defendants have moved 

to dismiss any § 1983 claim based on the First Amendment.

To the extent Plaintiff asserts First Amendment retaliation based on the allegation of 

excessive force, the Court agrees with Defendants that dismissal is appropriate. There are no 

allegations in the FAC to suggest that Plaintiff was subjected to force of any kind because he had 

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. See generally Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, “[w]ithin the prison context, a viable claim of First 

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Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal”). Dismissal is with prejudice.

However, the Court concludes that there is a viable First Amendment retaliation claim

based on the allegation that the Individual Defendant Mr. Nagy was deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff‟s medical need. Most notably, the FAC contains allegations that, at or about the time Mr. 

Nagy exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‟s medical need (indeed, even going so far as to 

slam him against a cell door), Mr. Nagy told Plaintiff that he “„remembers all the trouble‟ Plaintiff 

„caused‟ . . . in his 34/33 housing units, writing grievances.” FAC at 14. Thus, it is a reasonable 

inference that Mr. Nagy took action against Plaintiff, or failed to take action to assist Plaintiff, 

because Plaintiff had previously filed inmate grievances. The act of filing inmate grievances is 

conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Rhodes, 380 F.3d at 1130 (stating that “[o]f 

fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment „rights to file prison grievances‟ and to 

„pursue civil rights litigation in the courts‟” as, “[w]ithout those bedrock constitutional guarantees, 

inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices”).

The Court notes, however, that, at this juncture in the proceedings, a First Amendment 

retaliation claim is viable against Mr. Nagy only and not the County. The FAC contains 

insufficient allegations to establish municipal liability with respect to First Amendment retaliation.

C. Claim for Equal Protection Violation

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss any § 1983 claim based on an equal protection 

violation. The Court finds dismissal proper.

First, there are no allegations to make plausible the claim that excessive force was used 

against Plaintiff because of his race. 

Second, while there are allegations that Plaintiff‟s medical need was ignored because of his 

race, see FAC at 10 (alleging that a white detainee received more favorable treatment), those 

allegations have not been made against either Individual Defendant – i.e., a person other than the 

Individual Defendants is alleged to have treated a white detainee more favorably. To the extent 

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Plaintiff seeks to hold the County liable for that differential treatment, there are insufficient 

allegations to support a theory of municipal liability.

The Court notes, however, that it is addressing here only a § 1983 claim based on an equal 

protection violation. 

D. More Definite Statement

To the extent Defendants have moved for a more definite statement as alternative relief, 

see Mot. at 11, it is denied as moot. To the extent Defendants have moved for a more definite 

statement where its motion to dismiss has been denied, the former motion is denied on the merits. 

Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim against Mr. 

Nagy.

E. Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has renewed his request for appointment of counsel. That request is denied 

without prejudice. 

The case management conference set for November 20, 2015, shall be continued to 

January 21, 2016, at 9:30 a.m.

This order disposes of Docket No. 36.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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