Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01372/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01372-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07cv1372

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENVER KARAFILI,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES TILTON, 

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.07cv1372-BEN(NLS)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

[Doc. No. 10]

Enver Karafili (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner serving a term of life with the possibility of

parole plus twenty-five years after being convicted of attempted murder and assault with a firearm. On

July 26, 2007, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner also filed a

Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing [Doc. No. 3]. Respondent filed a Motion

to Dismiss the Petition [Doc. No. 10], arguing that the Petition is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations and therefore should be dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed an opposition [Doc. No.

11]. Petitioner concedes that his federal petition is untimely, but argues that the Court may consider the

merits of his otherwise time-barred claims because he is entitled to equitable tolling due to mental

incompetency and mental disease. 

After a thorough review, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DEFER ruling on

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10]. The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] be GRANTED and Petitioner be

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 This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating

that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts).

2 07cv1372

appointed counsel for the limited purpose of resolving the issue of whether Petition is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Finally, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

record of this case be augmented and both parties be ordered to file supplemental briefing on the issue of

Petitioner’s mental competency and the timeliness of his habeas petition. 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are summarized from the California state appellate court opinion denying

Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction.1

 [Lodgment No. 1 (People v. Karafili, No. D035415,

(Cal.Ct.App. Aug. 16, 2001)).] 

Petitioner is a refugee from communist Albania. Prior to his conviction, Petitioner lived as a

member of the Albanian community in San Diego, along with an individual named Muhamet Koci. 

Koci worked at the Big Save store on 30th Street in San Diego, for a gentleman named Mazen Abbas,

the store’s owner. Petitioner and Koci were friends until March 1999, when Koci called Petitioner a

“faggot” one day at the store. Abbas overheard the exchange, and witnessed Petitioner become very

angry with Koci since being called a faggot is very offensive in Albanian culture. In the meantime,

Petitioner got a job working at the 88 Cent store across the street from the Big Save. His boss, Deda

Makaj, was also a member of the Albanian community. Petitioner told Makaj that he hated the guys

working across the street, and that he wanted to kill them. However, Makaj did not take Petitioner

seriously. 

On Saturday, September 11, 1999, Petitioner loitered in front of the Big Save store for

approximately one hour, smoking, holding a plastic bag in his hand. Koci, who was working in the store

that day along with Abbas’ brother-in-law, asked Petitioner if he wanted to come into the store and have

a drink. Petitioner declined. On Sunday, September 12, 1999, according to his own testimony at trial,

Petitioner drank alcohol all day. On Monday, September 13, 1999, he woke up at approximately 4:00

a.m. and had several shots of liquor. At approximately 7:30 a.m., he left his home with a gun and went

to the Big Save to speak with Koci. Petitioner encountered Koci in front of the store at approximately

8:00 a.m., and asked Koci why he had called Petitioner a faggot and why he badmouthed him to other

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members of the Albanian community. He and Koci entered the store, at which point Koci telephoned

another Big Save employee, Berenice Garcia, to let her know that he had opened the store for the day. 

Petitioner asked Koci to hang up the telephone so they could continue their conversation. Koci said no,

and referred to Petitioner using a distasteful Albanian slang term, “koqe.” This offended Petitioner, who

drew his gun and demanded that Koci hang up the telephone. According to Petitioner, Koci grabbed the

gun and as Petitioner tried to move away the gun went off, shooting Koci. According to Koci, who also

testified at trial, he never grabbed for the gun; rather, Petitioner laid the gun on the counter, and as Koci

started to stand, Petitioner fired the gun after telling him “goodbye,” shooting Koci in the chest, just

under the sternum. 

Garcia remained on the telephone line while these events unfolded, and testified at trial that she

heard Koci call someone “koqe,” and then she heard a crash. She then heard Koci ask for help and he

told her someone had shot him. Garcia informed their boss, Abbas, who told her to call 911. Abbas

used his own cellular telephone to call 911 and drove to the Big Save. When he arrived, he saw Koci on

the floor, looking very pale. When asked who had shot him, Koci responded that it had been Petitioner. 

San Diego police officer Damon Sherman arrived first at the scene, and found Koci lying on the floor

with blood soaking through his shirt. When Officer Sherman asked Koci who had shot him, Koci

responded “Enver” - Petitioner’s first name. San Diego police officer Frank Pecoraro arrived at the

scene next, and after receiving a description of Petitioner, began to search the neighborhood for him. 

Officer Pecoraro found Petitioner in a nearby park, waving his arms as if trying to attract someone’s

attention. Officer Pecoraro pulled his police cruiser over, and as he exited the vehicle Petitioner laid

face down on the sidewalk with his arms straight out. Petitioner informed Officer Pecoraro that he

“killed a man. The bullets are in my front pocket. The gun is in the plastic bag that is by the tree. 

Arrest me.” Police officers found the plastic bag, which contained clothes and an empty blue steel

revolver with walnut grips and an empty shell casing. Police recovered four .38 caliber shells from

Petitioner’s shirt pocket. When officers informed Petitioner that Koci would survive the gunshot

wound, Petitioner replied that he wished he had killed him, and that “if he doesn’t die, you better kill

me.” [See Lodgment No. 1, 2-6.] 

/ / /

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On March 1, 2000, a jury convicted Petitioner of attempted murder in violation of California

Penal Code sections 664/187(a), as well as assault with a firearm in violation of California Penal Code

section 245(a)(2). [Petition, 2.] Petitioner was sentenced to life in state prison with the possibility of

parole for the attempted murder plus twenty-five years for the firearm enhancement. [Lodgment No. 1,

2.] Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct on attempted

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, and by failing to give

complete jury instructions for the great bodily injury enhancement to the attempted murder count. [Id.

at 2.] On August 16, 2001, the appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. [Id. at 13.] After his direct appeal was completed, Petitioner filed a pro per

Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court. [See Lodgment No. 2.] On October 31, 2001,

the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. [See Lodgment No. 3.] 

In 2006, Petitioner commenced a series of state habeas corpus actions challenging the validity of

his conviction. On August 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the

Superior Court, which was denied on September 27, 2006. [See Lodgment Nos. 4 & 5.] On October 17,

2006, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the Court of Appeal, which was denied on January 17,

2007. [See Lodgment Nos. 6 & 7.] On February 13, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on July 11, 2007. [See Lodgment Nos. 8 & 9.] All three

petitions presented the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to

introduce a mental state defense at trial and failure to call mental health experts to present a mental state

defense; (2) California Penal Code section 12022.53(d), as applied to him, violates the ex post facto

clause; and (3) his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. [See Lodgment Nos. 4, 6 & 8.] His final

petition before the California Supreme Court also presented a fourth claim, alleging that the imposition

of the upper terms for sentence enhancements constitutes error under Cunningham v. California, 541

U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007). [Lodgment No. 8.]

Following the denial of his state petitions, Petitioner filed this federal petition on July 26, 2007,

raising four grounds for relief: (1) the state trial court failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on

manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder; (2) the state trial court failed to correct a defective

jury instruction (CALJIC No. 17.19.5) by failing to define proximate cause and failing to tell the jury

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that the person injured must not be an accomplice; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial

counsel’s failure to introduce a mental state defense at trial and failure to subpoena mental health

experts to testify for his defense; and (4) his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. [Petition, 6-9.] 

Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing that it is untimely, having been filed more than four

years after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. [Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Respondent’s Memorandum”), 4.] Petitioner has filed a

motion seeking appointment of counsel as well as an evidentiary hearing [Doc. No. 3]. Petitioner also

opposes Respondent’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 11]. Petitioner does not dispute the tardiness of his

federal petition, but urges the Court to toll the statute of limitations for equitable cause shown. 

[Petitioner’s Opposition, 2.] 

ANALYSIS

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). A federal habeas court may grant relief under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle

from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. 

Id. Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner carries

the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

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(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Respondent contends the statute of limitations began to run when the judgment became final at

the conclusion of direct review as defined in § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondent further contends that because

there is no basis for tolling, the instant action was filed more than four years late. [Respondent’s

Memorandum, 4.]

a) The Statute of Limitations began to run on January 30, 2002

Following the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the California Supreme Court denied

further review on October 31, 2001. [See Lodgment No. 3.] Thus, Petitioner’s case became final on

January 29, 2002, when the ninety-day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court

expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations as calculated

under § 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run the next day, January 30, 2002. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner had until January 29, 2003, absent applicable statutory or

equitable tolling, within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Petitioner does not argue, and the Court finds nothing in the record, to support an alternative

calculation of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(B). Petitioner does not appear to have been

hampered in any manner in challenging his conviction due to state action. Petitioner also has not

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alleged the applicability of a newly asserted constitutional right, and the Court therefore finds nothing to

support an alternative calculation of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(C). The record also

does not support, and Petitioner makes no argument regarding, an alternative calculation of the statute of

limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations began to run as to Petitioner’s claims

on January 30, 2002, the day after his conviction became final. Absent tolling of the statute of

limitations, therefore, the last day Petitioner could have filed a timely federal habeas petition would

have been January 29, 2003. Petitioner initiated this action on July 22, 2007, the date he handed his

federal habeas petition to the prison authorities for mailing to the Court. (See Certificate of Service

attached to Petition, Doc. No. 1; see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)(holding that for

statutory tolling purposes, a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” in determining the

filing date of a pro se petition, which is the date the petition was presented to the prison authorities for

mailing to the court).) Absent tolling, the instant action was commenced over four years late.

b) Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This

statutory tolling will apply if a state habeas petition has been properly filed. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S.

4, 8 (2000) (holding that a properly filed state application complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations). In Carey v. Saffold, the

Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing

post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court’s disposition

of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536

U.S. 214 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); Welch v. Newland, 267

F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state

court petition and the filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the “AEDPA’s one-year grace period is tolled

during the pendency of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue.”); cf.

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Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001) (court found no tolling between consecutive filings at

the same level); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (holding that the interval

between a motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition in the

superior court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

Here, Petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition challenging his conviction and sentence

until August 1, 2006, approximately three and a half years after the one-year limitations period for filing

a federal habeas petition expired. [See Lodgment No. 4.] Petitioner filed his second state habeas

petition on October 17, 2006, and the Court of Appeal denied the petition in part due to its untimeliness. 

[See Lodgment No. 6; Lodgment No. 7, 2.] Petitioner filed his third state habeas petition on February 13,

2007, approximately four years after the statute of limitations for filing a federal petition had expired. 

Petitioner embarked on collateral review in the state courts after the statute of limitations for filing his

federal habeas petition had expired (absent equitable tolling during the first year the limitations period

was running), and he therefore is not entitled to statutory tolling for the time the lower state court

petitions were pending. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

c) Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). Petitioner bears the burden of

alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. 408; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th

Cir. 2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations may be appropriate.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001), the

Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the

but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness.” More recently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule

in Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Court

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pointed out that the determination vis-a-vis equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent” and that the

petitioner “bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.” Id. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is

entitled to equitable tolling because at the time Respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss,

Petitioner had not stated any grounds for equitable tolling. [Respondent’s Memorandum, 6.] However,

in his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to have the

statute of limitations for filing his federal habeas petition tolled for equitable reasons. Petitioner states

that he is proceeding in this matter with the assistance of another inmate due to a mental disorder which

renders him incapable of litigating on his own. [Petitioner’s Opposition, 6.] Specifically, Petitioner

claims that his mental incompetency and mental disease prevented him from filing his federal habeas

petition in a timely manner. [Id. at 4.] Petitioner asserts that he suffers from major depressive disorder,

paranoia, chronic stress, and alcohol dependency, and takes various psychotropic medications for

treatment of his mental disease. [Id. at 5.] As a result, Petitioner argues that he has not been able to

understand the nature of his post-conviction proceedings, and based on applicable case law in the Ninth

Circuit, qualifies for equitable tolling. [Id., citing Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922-24 (9th Cir.

2003); Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), overruled

in unrelated part by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003)).] 

Based on his mental disorder, Petitioner requests that the Court deny Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. Petitioner also requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this matter and hold

an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his equitable tolling claim. [Id. at 6; Petitioner’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing, 2.] Petitioner asserts in support of his request for

appointment of counsel that he “barely speaks English and does not understand most of the English

language” because he is Albanian and originally from Europe. [Id.] As such, he did not understand the

events surrounding his trial or his appeals and writs. In support of his request for equitable tolling,

Petitioner cites the Calderon case, in which the Ninth Circuit held that mental incompetency may be an

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. Calderon (Kelly V), supra, 163 F.3d at 541.

When a petition is otherwise untimely but the record creates a “genuine basis for concern” about

the petitioner’s mental state, id., a district court must consider whether mental illness during the

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operative time period made it “impossible” for the petitioner to file a timely petition. See Calderon,

supra; see also Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001). A mere showing of mental

illness is insufficient, however. A petitioner who asserts entitlement to equitable tolling on grounds of

mental illness must show that his illness actually rendered him unable to file his federal habeas petition

before the limitation period expired. See e.g., United States v. Sayetsitty, 2006 WL 1722300, at *4 (D.

Ariz. June 19, 2006) (no equitable tolling for physical illness and mental incompetency because the §

2255 movant failed to present any evidence that the alleged infirmity and incompetence prevented him

from filing a timely motion); Shafer v. Knowles, 2003 WL 22127878, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Aug.14, 2003)(no

equitable tolling where the prisoner was in a mental health facility, had twice attempted suicide, had

several brief crisis bed stays, and was taking medication for his mental illness but failed to show that he

was mentally incompetent for purposes of attending to his legal affairs); Howell v. Roe, 2003 WL

403353, at *3-4 (N.D.Cal. Feb.20, 2003) (no equitable tolling where the prisoner had been suicidal

and/or depressed and was taking medications to treat his mental illness but did not provide evidence of

incompetence); Austin v. Ramirez-Palmer, 2001 WL 1167553, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2001) (no

equitable tolling where the prisoner had a mental illness and was taking several psychotropic

medications but was well enough to hold a prison job and failed to show he could not tend to his legal

affairs during the relevant time period); Ross v. Hickman, 2001 WL 940911, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 10,

2001) (no equitable tolling where the prisoner was enrolled in a prison mental health program and was

receiving psychotropic medication but was not mentally incompetent and failed to show that his history

of schizophrenia and substance abuse prevented him from filing a habeas petition on time); United

States v. Hill, 2000 WL 1389594, at *2 (D.Or. Sept.18, 2000) (no equitable tolling where the prisoner

asserted diminished mental capacity but was examined and found competent to proceed at the time of

his guilty plea and was examined again in a subsequent prosecution in another state and was found to be

suffering from no mental illness or psychotic disorder). The determination of a prisoner’s entitlement to

equitable tolling “turn[s] on an examination of detailed facts.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th

Cir. 2002); see also Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Accordingly, the undersigned shall carefully consider the evidence concerning Petitioner’s entitlement

to equitable tolling.

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2 The medical records submitted by Petitioner do not contain any reports or documents from the years 2001-2004. 

11 07cv1372

Petitioner currently resides at California Medical Facility (“CMF”) which is located in Vacaville,

California, and houses a general acute care hospital, correctional treatment center, licensed elderly care

unit, in-patient and out-patient psychiatric facilities, a hospice unit for terminally ill inmates, housing

and treatment for inmates identified with AIDS/HIV, general population, and other special inmate

housing. (See California Medical Facility Mission Statement, available at

http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/Facilities/CMF.html, last accessed 2/14/08.) Additionally, the

Department of Mental Health operates a licensed, acute care psychiatric hospital within CMF. 

The current record of this case contains some evidence of Petitioner’s mental condition. 

Petitioner attached as Exhibit “C” to his petition two orders of the San Diego Superior Court which

permitted psychologists to examine and interview Petitioner prior to his trial, in October and November

1999, respectively. Petitioner also attached as Exhibit “D” to his petition his post-conviction prison

medical records, including mental health reports. These records indicate the following. On April 11,

2000, prison staff referred Petitioner for mental health services based on his history of psychiatric care,

his need for a reassessment of his psychiatric condition, and for pyschotropic medication review. (See

Petition, Ex. “D,” 2.) On December 21, 2005,2 a prison staff clinician prepared a Mental Health

Interdisciplinary Progress report after evaluating Petitioner. (Id. at 5-8.) The clinician found Petitioner

to be an intelligent man, able to care for his basic needs, but isolated due to his language barrier. (Id.) 

In October and November 2005, prison staff placed Petitioner on “single cell status” due to mental

instability after he was assaulted and reported anxiety, paranoia, and nightmares. (Id. at 4.) Also

included in Exhibit D are multiple Case Manager Progress Notes, dating from July 21, 2005 through

June 6, 2006, chronicling Petitioner’s ongoing treatment for severe major depressive disorder with

psychotic features. (Id. at 10-26.) During this time period, staff physicians have prescribed and

Petitioner has taken various doses of Risperidone (used to treat schizophrenia and symptoms of bipolar

disorder and manic depression). (Id. at 3.) 

Exhibits C and D, attached to the petition and summarized above, constitute the sum of

Petitioner’s evidence to support his claim for equitable tolling. No expert medical declarations have

been submitted attesting to the likelihood of Petitioner’s having been so cognitively impaired that he

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was unable to file his petition in a timely manner. Furthermore, Petitioner has presented no medical

evidence detailing his psychiatric condition during the time period in which the statute of limitations

was running, between January 30, 2002 and January 29, 2003. Exhibit D contains records of

Petitioner’s treatments only for the years 2005 and 2006, with only several pages of the exhibit relating

to events prior to that time. To the extent that Petitioner offers evidence that psychologists examined his

mental state prior to his trial in 2000 in Exhibit C, he only attached the declaration of his trial counsel

and the subsequent Court orders allowing the psychologists access to visit him and examine him; he

does not present evidence of their diagnoses or conclusions. Presumably, the state psychologists found

him competent to stand trial, as well as testify in his own defense, since he did both. Even if Petitioner

presented the Court with evidence of his competency prior to and during trial, that evidence would still

be irrelevant to the time period during which he needed to file his federal habeas petition, which came

several years later. 

The prison staff’s clinic progress notes from the 2005-2006 period reflect that Petitioner

participated in group therapy during that time period, and had frequent one-on-one meetings with mental

health staff, was assessed regularly by a treatment team, and was seen in the mental health clinic from

time to time. During the period, Petitioner was regularly assessed as stable psychiatrically, and all

aspects of his mental health were found to be within normal limits throughout that time. Staff

repeatedly found Petitioner stable on his medications with no side effects and recorded that Petitioner’s

sleep, appetite, and energy level were good. (See Petition, Exhibit “D,” 13-26.) 

Based on the current record, the Court cannot find that extraordinary circumstances beyond

Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a federal habeas petition on or before January 29,

2003. Petitioner has not carried his burden of showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling. However,

Petitioner has submitted evidence which substantiates his claim of mental disorder, and as such, the

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003), controls this case. In Laws,

the court held that when a petitioner submits an un-rebutted allegation in a verified complaint that he

was mentally incompetent during the AEDPA statute of limitations period, the district court is required

to “allow[ ] discovery or order[ ] expansion of the factual record.” Id. at 924. The court reaffirmed that

equitable tolling is available in this circuit only when “‘when extraordinary circumstances beyond a

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prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary circumstances

were the cause of his untimeliness.’” Id. at 922, citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.

2003). The Laws Court, id., also noted that grounds for equitable tolling under § 2244(d) are “highly

fact-dependent,” quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). The court held

that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Laws’ petition, where he claimed he was

mentally ill during the period he was entitled to equitable tolling, without the court having ordered

development of the factual record supporting the claim. Id., at 922-23. The court observed that it had

previously “held that a ‘putative habeas petitioner’s mental incompetency [is] a condition that is,

obviously, an extraordinary circumstance beyond the prisoner’s control,’ so ‘mental incompetency

justifies equitable tolling’ of the AEDPA statute of limitations.” Laws, supra at 923, citing Calderon v.

U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly V), supra, 163 F.3d at 541. The court delineated an exact legal standard to apply

when a petitioner requests further development of the record to support his entitlement to equitable

tolling, as Petitioner in this case has done: to secure an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must make a

“good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.” Id. 

Here, Petitioner has submitted a verified habeas complaint, along with a motion and opposition

to the instant motion, both signed under penalty of perjury, alleging mental incompetence during the

relevant time period. Additionally, Petitioner submits part of his prison medical record, at least a small

fraction of which contains records pre-dating the relevant time period, in which prison staff referred

Petitioner for mental health services based on his history of psychiatric care, his need for a reassessment

of his psychiatric condition, and for pyschotropic medication review. (See Petition, Ex. “D,” 2.) 

Petitioner went for a period of years, from 2003 through 2006, without pursuing any collateral appeals,

at the state or federal level. Beginning in 2006, when Petitioner commenced his collateral actions, he

did so only with the assistance of a fellow inmate. Because the record is currently devoid of any

medical records from that time period, the Court cannot determine whether his mental state was the “but

for” cause of his failure to pursue his post-conviction remedies. Respondent has not submitted any

evidence rebutting Petitioner’s allegation of mental incompetence. In accordance with Laws, an

evidentiary hearing may be necessary in order for Petitioner to substantiate his claim of entitlement to

equitable tolling. However, an evidentiary hearing is not required or needed if a court has sufficient

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facts before it to fully and fairly rule on the merits of the disputed issues. Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74-81 (1977). In addition, the need for an evidentiary hearing may be obviated by expansion of

the record. Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds that augmentation of

the current record to include, for example, Petitioner’s mental health/medical records from 2000 through

the present, the entirety of his current period of incarceration, may provide the Court with sufficient

facts upon which to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations due to his alleged mental incompetency. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DEFER ruling on

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10]. The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] be GRANTED and Petitioner be

appointed counsel for the limited purpose of resolving the issue of whether Petition is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Finally, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

record of this case be augmented and both parties be ordered to file supplemental briefing on the issue of

Petitioner’s mental competency and the timeliness of his habeas petition. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations in

Title 28, United States Code, section 2244(d), unless he can establish that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the limitations period. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has made a “good-faith allegation

that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling,” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.

2003), and therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court DEFER ruling on Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10]. The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] be GRANTED and Petitioner be appointed counsel for the

limited purpose of resolving the issue of whether Petition is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations in this case. Finally, the Court RECOMMENDS that the record of this case be augmented

and both parties be ordered to file supplemental briefing on the issue of Petitioner’s mental competency

and the timeliness of his habeas petition. 

/ / /

/ / /

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This report and recommendation by the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code,

section 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 20, 2008 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than March 28, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 20, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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