Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-mc-80109/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-mc-80109-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80109-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER;” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

IN RE:

FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

Debtor.

FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING INC.,

 Defendant.

Case No. 5:16-mc-80109-EJD 

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO 

RECUSE;” DENYING 

“ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER;” DENYING 

“REQUEST FOR MANDATORY 

JUDICIAL NOTICE”

Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5

Debtor and Appellant Fareed Sepehry-Fard (“Debtor”) sought to proceed in forma pauperis 

with respect to an appeal from an order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court. Debtor 

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) in the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 

Ninth Circuit, which transferred the motion to this court. The matter was then referred to the 

undersigned for general duty review, as was denied. Dkt. No. 2. 

Now before the court are: (1) a document entitled “Debtor’s Motion to Recuse - Bias or 

Prejudice,” (2) another document entitled “Administrative Motion to Vacate Void Order,” and (3) 

a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice.” Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5. These 

matters are nearly identical to documents that Debtor filed in another case1and, like those, are

suitable for decision without a hearing. Having reviewed them, the court finds, concludes and 

orders in the same manner it did previously:

 

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The other case is Sepehry-Fard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Case No. 5:16-mc-80112-EJD. 

Case 5:16-mc-80109-EJD Document 7 Filed 08/04/16 Page 1 of 3
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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80109-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER;” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

1. The “Motion to Recuse” appears to arise under 28 U.S.C. § 455. According to that

statute, a district judge has a duty to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or where “he has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1).

2. Notably, the standard employed to determine whether recusal is appropriate under § 

455 is an objective one. Clemens v. United States Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005). 

It asks “‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the 

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 

1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“The ‘reasonable person’ in this context means a ‘well-informed, thoughtful observer,’ as opposed 

to a ‘hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.’” Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178 (citing In re 

Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).

3. “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking 

disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler 

Fin. Co., No. C 07-00915 JW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83154, at *4, 2007 WL 3165665 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 

2001)). Indeed, “[f]ederal judges are obligated not to recuse themselves where there is no reason 

to question their impartiality.” New York City Housing Develop. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 

980 (7th Cir. 1986).

4. As the court understands it, Debtor’s motion is based on three primary allegations. 

First, he asserts the undersigned was “bribed” and was disqualified from determining whether his 

proposed action was barred by the prefiling order because of some purported partnership or 

conspiracy with Judge Lucy H. Koh “to aid and abet Defendants/pretender lenders/alleged 

creditors to continue to steal monies and properties from Debtor.” This speculative allegation is 

not sufficient to justify recusal under § 455. See Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178-79 (holding that 

Case 5:16-mc-80109-EJD Document 7 Filed 08/04/16 Page 2 of 3
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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80109-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER;” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

“[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual 

matters” are not ordinarily sufficient to require a § 455 recusal). Nor is the fact that Debtor 

attempted to sue another judge of this court. See id. (holding that recusal is not required because 

of “mere familiarity with the defendant(s)”).

5. Similarly, Debtor cannot seek the undersigned’s recusal based on rulings made in 

prior actions involving Debtor. To be sure, “[b]ias under 28 U.S.C. § 455 must derive from 

extrajudicial sources.” Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1502; accord Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994) (holding that judicial rulings alone are not a valid basis for a recusal motion as 

they do not establish reliance on an extrajudicial source).

6. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for Debtor’s theory that the undersigned “gave 

tacit agreement” of a “lifetime bar” from presiding over cases involving Debtor. Instead, 

“[d]isqualification is case-specific; the statute does not put a whole subject matter out of bounds to 

a judge with no concrete investment in a particular dispute.” Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 950.80 

Acres of Land, 525 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2008).

Thus, for the reasons explained, the “Motion to Recuse” is DENIED. The “Administrative 

Motion to Vacate” is also DENIED because it is based on the same disqualification theory. The 

“Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice” is DENIED because the documents attached to that 

motion are not the proper subjects for such relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-mc-80109-EJD Document 7 Filed 08/04/16 Page 3 of 3