Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02258/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHASE BANK USA, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LEANDRO H. DURAN,

Defendant

___________________________________

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

 /

No. C-06-2258 MMC

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Before the Court is cross-defendant Arrow Financial Services LLC’s (“Arrow”) Notice

of Removal, filed March 29, 2006. Arrow asserts the district court has federal question

jurisdiction over the action because a cross-complaint filed by Leandro H. Duran (“Duran”)

against plaintiff Chase Bank USA, N.A. and third parties, including Arrow, purportedly

contains a federal question.

A third-party defendant, such as Arrow, has no right to remove a case to federal

court. See First Nat’l Bank v. Curry, 301 F. 3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing cases and

treatises so holding). As a result, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an

action removed by a third- party defendant. See id. at 467. Because this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the above-titled action, the action must be remanded. See

Case 3:06-cv-02258-MMC Document 12 Filed 04/05/06 Page 1 of 2
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Arrow cites two cases in its Notice of Removal. Neither involves a complaint

removed under a theory of complete preemption, nor is the subject of complete, as

opposed to defensive, preemption addressed. See Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank, 371 F.

Supp. 2d 1139, 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Davis v. Maryland Bank, 2002 WL 32713429,

*11-14 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 

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28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

Further, even assuming Arrow could have removed the instant case, the grounds

asserted by Arrow do not support removal jurisdiction. Each claim alleged by Duran arises

under state law. Although Arrow asserts that Duran’s state law claims are completely

preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), specifically, by 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681t(b)(1)(F), and thus are removable, Arrow cites no authority to support such

assertion. Indeed, those courts that have examined the issue have found FCRA

preemption does not support removal. See, e.g., King v. Retailers Nat’l Bank, 388 F. Supp.

2d 913, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding FCRA does not “completely preempt” state law claims

for purposes of removal jurisdiction); Watkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1217,

1220-23 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (holding “complete preemption doctrine” inapplicable to FCRA;

finding “Congress did not intend to make state law causes of action defensively preempted

by the FCRA removable to federal court”); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.

386, 393 (1987) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on

the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption.”) (emphasis in

original).1

Accordingly, the Court hereby REMANDS the above-titled action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to the Superior Court of the State of

California, in and for the County of Alameda.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02258-MMC Document 12 Filed 04/05/06 Page 2 of 2