Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03378/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03378-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The parties stipulated to suspending the Japan action until a final, non-appealable

decision is reached in the U.S. action. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNISYS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

ACCESS CO., LTD.,

Respondent.

NO. C05-3378 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT ACCESS’

MOTION TO TRANSFER

VENUE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

This matter came before the Court on Monday, October 24, 2005, on a motion to

transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) filed by Respondent Unisys Corporation

(“Unisys”). After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court

now GRANTS the motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

ACCESS Co., Ltd. (“ACCESS”) is a Japanese corporation that provides mobile

content and delivery of Internet access technologies. Unisys is an information technology

services and solutions company with a principal place of business just outside Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania. In December 2000, the parties entered into a license agreement

(“Agreement”), which contained an arbitration clause. 

The parties’ dispute arises out of a demand by Unisys for payment by ACCESS of

license fees allegedly owed under the Agreement. In response, ACCESS brought suit in a

District Court in Tokyo, Japan (“Japan action”), alleging that Unisys’ demand for payment

by ACCESS is in violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act.1

 Unisys subsequently
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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initiated arbitration in Philadelphia, pursuant to the Agreement’s arbitration clause, seeking

damages for ACCESS’ alleged breach of the Agreement. On August 19, 2005, Unisys

initiated this action requesting an order compelling ACCESS to arbitrate the disputes set

forth in ACCESS’ Japanese complaint, compelling ACCESS to dismiss its Japanese action,

and awarding Unisys its costs. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in

the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or

division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To successfully move for

transfer under this section, the moving party must establish that the action could originally

have been brought in the district to which transfer is sought. Commodity Futures Trading

Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). The moving party also bears the

burden of “establishing that an action should be transferred.” Los Angeles Memorial

Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 726

F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In ruling on a motion to transfer, a district court must consider each of the factors

enumerated in § 1404(a) – i.e., convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and

the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Other relevant factors include: the plaintiff’s

choice of forum; the local interest in the issue; the relative ease of access to evidence; the

availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses and the cost involved in securing

willing witnesses; and the practical issues that make a case easier or more difficult to try in a

given forum, such as familiarity of each forum with applicable law and the relative court

congestion in each forum. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834,

843 (9th Cir. 1986); Royal Queentex Enterprises, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. C-99-4787

MJJ, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10139, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2000).
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Additionally, ACCESS recently announced its agreement to purchase PalmSource,

Inc., which is located within this district (Sunnyvale).

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DISCUSSION

Unisys and ACCESS do not dispute that this case could have been brought either here

or in a district court in Pennsylvania. Thus, ACCESS’ motion to transfer venue turns on

whether the Court finds it appropriate to transfer the case to Pennsylvania “[f]or the

convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

1. Local Interest in the Action

ACCESS argues that Unisys’ choice of forum should be accorded only minimal

consideration because Unisys does not have its principal place of business in the Northern

District of California, the operative facts did not occur in the Northen District, and the

Northern District does not have a particular interest in the action. See Meyers v. Ciano, No.

C 01-3955 TEH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2556, *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2002) (holding that a

plaintiff’s choice of forum should only be afforded minimal consideration where “she is not a

resident of the district where she instituted suit, the operative facts have not occurred within

the forum, and the forum has no particular interest in the parties or the subject matter”).

Unisys counters that the Northern District of California has an interest in this action

because it is the only district where ACCESS, a Japanese corporation, has a U.S. office.2

Furthermore, Unisys has two offices in this district, employs approximately 2,000 persons in

California and leases and/or owns substantial real and personal property in California. 

It is true that both parties have a presence in this district. However, ACCESS’

arguments as to the lack of connection between the parties’ presence in this district and the

underlying dispute are persuasive. Specifically, none of the events underlying Unisys’

petition to compel arbitration occurred in the Northen District of California and Unisys’

activities within this district are unrelated to the petition to compel arbitration.

This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of venue transfer. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Generally, “[t]he defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant

upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. ACCESS

disputes the degree of deference owed to Unisys’ choice of forum and argues that Unisys’

choice is entitled to only “minimal consideration” because the operative facts have not

occurred within the forum, the forum has no interest in the parties or the subject matter, and

Unisys is forum shopping. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a

plaintiff’s choice of forum “commands only minimal consideration where she is not a

resident of the district where she instituted suit, the operative facts have not occurred within

the forum, and the forum has no particular interest in the parties or the subject matter”); see

also Alltrade Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that

courts should disregard the plaintiff’s forum choice if the suit is a result of forum shopping). 

For the following reasons, the Court agrees with ACCESS that the appropriate degree

of deference owed to Unisys’ forum choice is minimal.. First, as noted above, none of the

facts underlying the dispute occurred in the Northern District of California. Second, while it

is true that both parties have a presence within this district and this is the only U.S. district

where ACCESS has a presence, Unisys has failed to demonstrate that the forum has a

substantial interest in the parties or the subject matter. Third, one could rationally infer that

Unisys was forum shopping based on (a) the inability of Unisys’ counsel to provide a

persuasive reason for bringing suit in the Northern District of California, (b) the lack of

connection between the action and this district, (c) the delay in time between the filing of the

Japan action (September 22, 2004) and the petition to compel arbitration (August 19, 2005),

(d) the fact that Unisys rejected ACCESS’ offer to stipulate to transfer this action to the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania even though Unisys and counsel are located in

Pennsylvania, and (e) the fact that the Ninth Circuit provides a more favorable rule of
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ACCESS points out that the Third Circuit’s standard for enjoining foreign

proceedings is more restrictive than the Ninth Circuit’s standard. The Fifth, Seventh, and

Ninth Circuits follow the liberal or lax standard by which a court “will issue an injunction

where the policy in the enjoining forum is frustrated, the foreign proceeding would be

vexatious or would threaten a domestic court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction or other

equitable considerations, and finally, where allowing the foreign proceedings to continue

would result in delay.” General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2001). 

By contrast, the Second, Third, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits use a more

restrictive approach, rarely permitting injunctions against foreign proceedings. Id.

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decision.3 See Reiffin v. Microsoft, 104 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 n.12 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that a

plaintiff’s choice of forum will be accorded little deference where it is apparent that plaintiff

is engaged in forum shopping, especially where the plaintiff is offered an equally convenient

forum); see also Royal Queentex Enterprises v. Sara Lee Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

10139, *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2000); Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Corp., No. C 03-

3719 SI, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20338, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2003). 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of venue transfer. 

3. Convenience of the Parties 

In support of their argument that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a more

convenient forum than the Northern District of California, ACCESS primarily points to the

convenience of counsel. However, “convenience of counsel is not a consideration” in

determining whether to transfer an action. E & J Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.P.A., 899 F.

Supp. 465, 466 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 

Unisys argues that despite the fact that counsel representing ACCESS and Unisys in

the Philadelphia arbitration are in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, respectively, all counsel of

record have been admitted pro hac vice by this Court and each party has retained counsel in

San Francisco. Further, Unisys accepts any arguable inconvenience that might arise from its

choice of forum. Accordingly, the Court should not give weight to ACCESS’ arguments of

the inconvenience to Unisys, which brought suit in this district. 

Given that ACCESS failed to identify any real inconvenience as a result of the current

venue and Unisys accepted any arguable inconvenience, this factor does not weigh strongly

in either party’s favor. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4. Convenience of the Witnesses and Access to Evidence

“To demonstrate an inconvenience to witnesses, the moving party must identify

relevant witnesses, state their location and describe their testimony and its relevance.” Sec.

& Exch. Comm’n v. Rose Fund, LLC, No. C 03-04593 WHA, 2004 WL 2445242, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 9, 2004); see also Royal Queentex, 2000 WL 246599 at *6. ACCESS was not able

to identify relevant witnesses and point to specific evidence because the parties stipulated

that no discovery will be required and “the U.S. Action can be resolved based only on the

papers submitted and oral argument by counsel, and without testimony by live witnesses.” 

Decl. of Jeffrey S. Dickey Ex. 4. Therefore, ACCESS’ speculative arguments pursuant to the

Federal Arbitration Act with regard to a district court’s powers “to enforce subpoenas,

compel attendance of witnesses, and punish non-compliant witnesses in arbitration

proceedings” are not relevant to this transfer analysis. Mot. to Transfer Venue at 6. 

Since the parties stipulated that discovery and witnesses are not relevant to this case,

this factor does not weigh in favor of either party. 

5. Deference Owed to the Forum Selection Clause

The license agreement states that, “[t]he validity and interpretation of this Agreement

shall be governed by Pennsylvania law without regard to conflict of laws principles. The

parties further consent to jurisdiction of the state and federal courts sitting in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Decl. of Jeffrey S. Dickey Ex. 2, ¶ 14(e). ACCESS

argues that it would be in line with the orderly and efficient administration of the underlying

arbitration, as well as the license agreement, to transfer this action to the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. Unisys counters that since the forum selection clause is permissive, not

mandatory, it does not prohibit suit in this forum. Further, at oral argument, Unisys argued

that because the forum selection clause does not specify the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

but rather merely Pennsylvania, a clear preference for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is

not articulated. 

Whether a forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive is a matter of contract

interpretation reviewed de novo. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995). While the clause in this case is clearly

permissive, the parties disagree as to the weight that the Court should give the clause. 

Unisys posits that absent language in the forum selection clause providing that the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania is the exclusive forum, the clause authorizes jurisdiction in the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but does not prohibit litigation elsewhere. See Hunt

Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a

forum selection clause that says nothing about exclusive jurisdiction is permissive rather than

mandatory).

ACCESS argues that, “although a permissive forum clause is entitled to less weight

than a mandatory one, the fact that both parties initially accepted the jurisdiction of the courts

of [a certain jurisdiction] must count. A forum selection clause is determinative of the

convenience to the parties” and is entitled to “substantial consideration.” MK Sys. v.

Schmidt, No. 04 Civ. 8106 (RWS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3877, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,

2005); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3rd. Cir. 1995) (giving substantial,

yet not dispositive, weight to “the parties’ agreement as to the most proper forum”). Thus,

ACCESS argues that even though the forum selection clause is permissive, it should still be

given some deference.

The Court finds that, although the forum selection clause is permissive, the fact that

the parties contemplated Pennsylvania as a possible forum is entitled to “substantial

consideration” in this analysis. Id. at 880. Further, “[w]hile courts normally defer to a

plaintiff's choice of forum, such deference is inappropriate where the plaintiff has already

freely contractually chosen an appropriate venue. . . . [Thus,] the plaintiffs bear the burden of

demonstrating why they should not be bound by their contractual choice of forum.” Jumara

v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, after providing Unisys the

opportunity at oral argument to explain “why they should not be bound by their contractual

choice of forum,” Unisys failed to provide the Court with a salient reason why deference to

the choice of forum in the forum selection clause is inappropriate. Further, the Court does
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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not give weight to Unisys’ overly technical argument that a clear preference is not articulated

in the forum selection clause because it does not specify the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

In light of all of the above, this factor weighs in favor of venue transfer. 

6. Choice of Law 

In its motion for preliminary injunction, Unisys argues that Pennsylvania law strongly

supports arbitration. In response, ACCESS contends that the resolution of the petition to

compel arbitration may involve interpretation of Pennsylvania law and, therefore, a

Pennsylvania court should handle the case. However, district courts regularly apply the law

of states other than the forum state, and this factor alone does not require the transfer of an

action pursuant to section 1404(a). See Noreiga v. Lever Bros. Co., 671 F. Supp. 991, 996

(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Turrett Steel Corp v. Manuel Int’l Inc., 612 F. Supp. 387, 390 (W.D. Pa.

1985). 

Because neither party pointed to any Pennsylvania law that necessarily applies to this

case, and because this factor does not, in any event, have dispositive weight, this factor does

not favor either party. 

7. Practical Issues in Trying a Case

The action before this Court is related to the ongoing arbitration in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, and counsel handling the arbitration are in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

(Unisys), and Westfield, New Jersey (ACCESS). Thus, it appears logical that the current

action should also proceed in Pennsylvania. 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of venue transfer. 

8. Interests of Justice

a. Judicial Enforcement

Unisys argues that if judicial enforcement becomes necessary, this district is the most

appropriate to compel ACCESS, which has a presence in this district but none in

Pennsylvania, to comply. ACCESS counters that should Unisys obtain a favorable decision

in the arbitration in Pennsylvania, Unisys can seek confirmation of that award in any district. 

9 U.S.C. § 207 (“[A]ny party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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under this chapter . . . for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the

arbitration.). 

Since any favorable decision that necessitates enforcement can be confirmed in any

district, the Court does not give weight to Unisys’ arguments that issues of enforcement

make transfer inequitable. 

b. Preliminary Stage of Proceedings

ACCESS also argues that transfer is appropriate because the Court is still at the

preliminary stage of the proceedings. The fact that litigation has scarcely begun weighs in

favor of transferring the action. Meyers, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2556, at *10 (finding it was

within interests of justice to transfer the action because litigation had not progressed far). 

c. Trial Efficiency

At oral argument, Unisys argued that denying the motion to transfer would promote

efficiency. Specifically, Unisys stated that the resources they expended in preparing the

motion for preliminary injunction would be wasted if the transfer is granted. While it is true

that both parties expended resources in preparing for the motion for preliminary injunction,

the amount of resources expended was not inordinate and the Court does not find Unisys’

argument to be persuasive. 

9. Summary

The Court finds that ACCESS has met its burden of demonstrating that transfer of

venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is warranted. In particular, ACCESS has

established that (1) there is a lack of local interest in the action and thus Unisys’ choice of

forum should only be accorded minimal consideration; (2) the choice of forum in the parties’

forum selection clause is entitled to substantial consideration; (3) practical issues in trying

the case, including the ongoing arbitration in Philadelphia and the location of counsel trying

the case, weigh in favor of transfer; and (4) the fact that the case is still in the preliminary

stages of the proceedings weighs in favor of transfer. 

The Court finds the lack of local interest in the action and the choice of forum in the

parties’ forum selection clause to be the most persuasive factors supporting transfer of venue.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Namely, given the inability of Unisys’ counsel to provide a persuasive reason for bringing

suit in the Northern District of California and their inability to explain why they should not

be bound by the forum selection clause, the Court finds transfer appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

In short, for the reasons discussed above, ACCESS has met its burden of

demonstrating that transfer is warranted under the factors enumerated in § 1404(a). 

Accordingly, with good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. ACCESS’ motion to transfer venue is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close the file

and transfer this case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

2. Unisys’ motion for preliminary injunction is VACATED. Unisys may renew its

motion in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, if it so desires.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/23/05 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT