Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05038/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2006 Decided November 3, 2006

No. 05-5038

BRANDON SAMPLE,

APPELLANT

v.

BUREAU OF PRISONS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv00805)

Craig E. Estes, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae for appellant. With him on the briefs were

William M. Hohengarten and David W. DeBruin, appointed by

the court.

Brandon Sample, pro se, filed briefs for appellant.

Megan L. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #05-5038 Document #1002453 Filed: 11/03/2006 Page 1 of 7
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Before: SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Brandon Sample, an inmate at a

federal correctional facility, appeals the entry of summary

judgment in favor of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on his

claim under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552

(2000) (“FOIA”). Pursuant to 1996 amendments to FOIA that

directed agencies to provide records in the format requested,

Sample requested a large number of BOP documents in

electronic format. BOP provided them as paper copies only,

citing prison regulations that restrict inmates’ possession of or

access to electronic media. On cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court held that BOP had fulfilled its

obligations under FOIA and entered summary judgment in its

favor. Because we conclude that the statutory language

unambiguously requires the records to be provided in electronic

format, we reverse and remand to the district court with

instructions to enter judgment in favor of Sample. 

I.

Sample is incarcerated in a federal prison. He requested,

under FOIA, a number of records from BOP’s files, specifying

that the records were to be in an electronic format. Receiving no

response, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia. BOP claimed it had never received

the request and promptly provided paper copies of all the

records. Sample was dissatisfied, however, and continued to

press his claim for the same records in electronic format. 

On BOP’s motion, the district court granted summary

judgment. The court concluded that providing the records in

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electronic format would violate BOP security policies. Those

policies limit inmates’ access to computer disks, CD-ROMs and

computer terminals in an effort to prevent unsupervised

communication with persons outside the facility, and to protect

the integrity of BOP’s computer systems. Similarly, given that

BOP cannot continually supervise inmates’ possession of

material items, the policies prohibit their personal possession of

removable media. Since those policies would be violated if

BOP were ordered to provide Sample’s records in electronic

format, the district court held that BOP satisfied its FOIA

obligation by providing the documents in paper format.

Sample’s cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.

Sample timely appealed the district court’s decision, and this

Court appointed amicus curiae in support of Sample. 

II.

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of an agency in a FOIA case. We

must determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to the requester, present any genuine issue of material

fact. Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

A.

FOIA requires federal agencies to release certain documents

in response to requests from the public. It states that “each

agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably

describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with

published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and

procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly

available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). In 1996,

Congress amended the definition of “record” to include

electronic records. Electronic Freedom of Information Act

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Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049

(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)). The amended

version also directs agencies to provide records in the format

specified by the requester: “In making any record available to a

person under this paragraph, an agency shall provide the record

in any form or format requested by the person if the record is

readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B).

BOP argues that providing the documents in paper format

satisfied its obligations under FOIA because Sample, pursuant

to BOP security regulations, could not receive the records in

electronic format. As a result, with respect to Sample, the

records were not “readily reproducible” in that format. BOP’s

determination as to reproducibility, moreover, must be accorded

“substantial weight” by the reviewing court. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B)

(directing courts reviewing the withholding of records to

“accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency

concerning the agency’s determination as to technical feasibility

. . . and reproducibility”). 

Under any reading of the statute, however, “readily

reproducible” simply refers to an agency’s technical capability

to create the records in a particular format. No case construing

the language focuses on the characteristics of the requester. See,

e.g., TPS, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 330 F.3d 1191, 1195

(9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting “readily reproducible” as referring

to technical capability); see also, e.g., Carlson v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 2005 WL 756573, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that

“readily reproducible” in a requested format means “readily

accessible” by the agency in that format); Landmark Legal

Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2003)

(construing “readily reproducible” as the ability to duplicate). 

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Under the only plausible reading of “readily reproducible,”

there is no dispute as to BOP’s ability to reproduce the records

electronically. BOP has conceded as much by offering to

provide the records in electronic format to Sample’s non-inmate

designee. Thus BOP’s reliance on the “readily reproducible”

language is misplaced. There is a clear statutory obligation to

produce the records in electronic format when that format is

requested.

It is true that case law construing the statute before the 1996

amendments supports BOP’s position that format requests need

not be honored. Several circuits, including this one, held that an

agency satisfied its obligations under FOIA by providing records

in any format. In Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d

57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1990), this Court held that FOIA was satisfied

when an agency, rather than provide the individual records

directly to the requester, made all of the potentially responsive

records available in a public reading room for the requester to

search himself. Oglesby relied on Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in which we

noted that “an agency need not respond to a FOIA request for

copies of documents where the agency itself has provided an

alternative form of access.” These cases established that

providing some form of access – even if not the exact one

sought by the requester – was sufficient to discharge an agency’s

obligations under FOIA. Id.

BOP argues that this principle was recently reaffirmed,

notwithstanding the 1996 amendments, in Martinez v. Bureau of

Prisons, 444 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In that

case, an inmate sued under FOIA to obtain paper copies of his

presentence investigation reports (“PSRs”) that he could keep in

his cell. Id. at 621. BOP refused to provide them, citing its

policy prohibiting inmates from retaining copies of their PSRs

in their cells, but it did permit Martinez to view and take notes

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on the documents. Id. at 625. Relying on pre-1996 cases, this

Court held that since Martinez was “afforded a meaningful

opportunity to review his PSRs and to take notes on them,”

FOIA did not entitle him to retain a copy of them. Id. We noted

that prison administration – particularly as reflected in policies

driven by safety concerns – ought not be subject to judicial

second-guessing. Id. 

BOP relies on Martinez for the proposition that FOIA, even

after the 1996 amendments, does not require it to provide

Sample’s documents in electronic format because he was given

the same records in paper copy. This reading of the case,

however, is too broad. Martinez did not construe the “form or

format” requirement at all because format – in the sense of paper

documents or electronic data – was not at issue. Rather, our

holding in Martinez was limited to whether FOIA required BOP

to permit an inmate to possess records in his cell, an issue that

was unaffected by the 1996 amendments. Therefore, Martinez

is not applicable here.

B.

We note, however, that Sample’s reading of BOP’s

obligations under FOIA is also too broad. Sample argues that

BOP not only must provide the records in electronic format, but

also must facilitate Sample’s ability to access them in the

requested format. That is, Sample argues that FOIA entitles him

to view the records on a computer, notwithstanding BOP’s

asserted policy prohibiting or restricting inmates’ access.

Policies enacted pursuant to BOP’s statutory mandate to

administer the nation’s prisons are entitled to great deference.

See Martinez, 444 F.3d at 625 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 531 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405

(1974)) (noting that “a court would be loath to second-guess”

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policies that “reflect[] a judgment regarding prison

administration”). Whether the policy asserted here trumps

BOP’s obligations under FOIA, however, is not before us. In

this case, BOP performs two roles with respect to Sample: FOIA

respondent and custodian of inmates. We have already

concluded that BOP, as FOIA respondent, must provide the

records in the form or format requested. The FOIA case is

resolved. BOP’s role as custodian in receipt of electronic

records intended for an inmate, by contrast, only comes into play

after the FOIA request has been completed. Since we cannot

pass on conduct that may or may not occur after BOP provides

these records, questions of access or possession are not before

this Court. Once BOP, in its role as FOIA respondent, has

provided the records in electronic format, its FOIA obligation is

complete. If BOP – in its role as Sample’s custodian – then

decides to limit or prohibit access to the material, any question

raised by that decision is not before us. 

III.

Since the records sought by Sample are “readily

reproducible” under the statute, BOP must produce them in

electronic format. The district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of BOP is reversed, and the case is remanded

to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor

of Sample.

So ordered.

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