Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01393/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Reynaldo B. Lechuga, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-1393-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking review of the Social Security Administration's

decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits. The court has before it

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. 16), defendant's response (doc. 19) and crossmotion for summary judgment (doc. 20), and plaintiff's reply (doc. 23). 

On April 3, 2001, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, alleging disability since November

17, 2000, due to diabetes and a cut tendon in his thumb. The claim was denied both initially

and upon reconsideration. On May 29, 2003, following a hearing, the Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ") concluded that, although plaintiff was unable to return to his past relevant

work, he was capable of performing work in the national economy and therefore was not

disabled. Accordingly, plaintiff's application for benefits was denied. The decision became

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final when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. He then filed this action

for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

We may set aside a denial of benefits "only if it is not supported by substantial

evidence or if it is based on legal error." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole,

a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the evidence

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's

decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Id. (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's reliance on the vocational expert's ("VE")

testimony was error because the hypothetical question presented did not include all of

plaintiff's limitations, specifically the requirement that he be able to "move around" at work.

Tr. at 266. Medical expert, Clifford Harris, M.D., testified that plaintiff could not do heavy

lifting, walk for more than half a mile without resting, and climb ladders or work at heights

because of a balance problem. Tr. at 259. He also testified that plaintiff needed a sit/stand

option that was not limited to an up/down motion, but included the opportunity to move

around in the work area. Tr. at 266. The VE then testified that plaintiff could not do his past

work because it required heavy lifting or prolonged standing or walking. Tr. at 270.

However, the VE testified that plaintiff could do other work, including parking lot attendant

with no erosion of the number of available jobs, or sedentary-level assembler or cashier, both

with a 25% erosion because of the sit/stand option. Tr. at 270-72.

Plaintiff now argues that in concluding that plaintiff could perform these jobs, the VE

failed to consider the option to "move around" as recommended by Dr. Harris. "If a

vocational expert's hypothetical does not reflect all the claimant's limitations, then the

expert's testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform

jobs in the national economy." Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quotation omitted). At the beginning of her testimony, the ALJ instructed the VE to

consider the restrictions testified to by Dr. Harris. Tr. at 270. The VE had previously heard

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Dr. Harris's testimony that the sit/stand option included the opportunity to move around in

the work area. Tr. at 266. Moreover, in response to a question by the ALJ, the VE

confirmed that her consideration of these jobs included not only the sit/stand option, but also

the ability to move around. Tr. at 276. 

Plaintiff also argues that the VE failed to consider Dr. Harris's suggestion that plaintiff

needs a cane to walk, and how that restriction would affect plaintiff's ability to work.

However, Dr. Harris did not state that plaintiff needs a cane to walk, but rather that it would

"help his balance a lot," and that the use of a cane would be "preferable." Tr. at 267. Instead,

Dr. Harris testified that even without a cane "[h]e can walk." Tr. at 266-67. Therefore, the

VE was not required to consider the use of a cane as a restriction. We conclude that the

record sufficiently establishes that the VE considered all of plaintiff's limitations, and

accordingly, the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony was proper. 

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to comply with his duty to develop the

evidentiary record. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ has

a duty to supplement the record when it is incomplete or ambiguous). He claims that the ALJ

prohibited him from inquiring into the factual basis of the VE's opinion that the jobs plaintiff

was capable of performing would allow him to periodically move around. In addition to

citing the number of jobs available in the local economy, the VE testified that she had

personally conducted job site inspections at several local facilities. Tr. at 272-73, 275. This

testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ's residual functional capacity

finding. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that "a VE's

recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony . . . [t]hus,

no additional foundation is required"). 

Finally, plaintiff contends that the ALJ's credibility findings are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. If the ALJ finds that a claimant's testimony regarding the

severity of his pain and impairments is unreliable, "the ALJ must make a credibility

determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ

did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. In evaluating

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credibility, "an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as

considering claimant's reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in claimant's

testimony." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ may also

discredit the testimony of a plaintiff who failed to seek or follow a prescribed course of

treatment. Id. at 681.

Here, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's testimony was "exaggerated and embellished"

and "not entirely credible." Tr. at 20. First, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not

support plaintiff's subjective complaints, particularly where none of the plaintiff's treating

physicians provided a medical source statement. Tr. at 21. The ALJ also discounted

plaintiff's credibility because of inconsistencies in his testimony, including his allegation that

he had been drug free since 1998, although he was arrested for crack cocaine possession in

January 2003. Tr. at 20. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)

(holding that in reaching his findings, the ALJ is "entitled to draw inferences logically

flowing from the evidence"). Plaintiff also testified that he did not leave his job in November

2000 because of any medical problems, Tr. at 240-42, although he had originally stated in

his disability report that he left because of pain in his feet and blurred vision. Tr. at 91. The

ALJ also found significant plaintiff's ongoing history of noncompliance with his medication

regimen, which is particularly significant given the alleged increase in the severity of his

symptoms and the attendant inability to work at the beginning of 2001. Based on the ALJ's

clear and convincing reasons for partially rejecting plaintiff's testimony, and the substantial

evidence to support that determination, we conclude that the ALJ properly evaluated

plaintiff's testimony.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports

the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled.

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Therefore, IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

(doc. 16) and GRANTING defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 20). 

DATED this 20th day of July, 2006.

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