Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01297/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN MARCETTE DAVIS, Civil No. 14-cv-01297 BAS(NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2);

(2) DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF No.

3); AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

COMPLAINT PURSUANT 

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

R. WALKER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Juan Marcette Davis (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated

at the CaliforniaRehabilitation Center (“CRC”) in Norco, California, and proceeding pro

se, has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No.

1). 

Plaintiff claims Defendants, all Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility medical

and correctional officials, violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical

treatment in 2012 and 2013 by failing to “honor [the] recommendations of [his previous]

doctors and specialists,” and failing to provide him appropriate care and physical

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accommodations after he received surgery on his left foot. See Compl. at pp. 3-4, 8-14. 

Plaintiff alleges that a result of Defendants’ failure to honor his prior chrono for a lower

bunk assignment, he fell and further injured his back. Id. at 3, 4, 9-10. He seeks

damages “to be determined” and demands a jury trial. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee; instead he has filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2), as

well as a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3). 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP without prepayment nevertheless remains

obligated to satisfy his fee obligation in installments regardless of whether his action is

dismissed for other reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281

F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1,

2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of

the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding

month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted certified copies of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement,

as well as the prison certificate issued by an accounting clerk at CRC verifying his

available balances, and has determined that he has no money in his account, and had no

monthly deposits or balance credited to his account during the 6-month period preceding

the filing of his Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff has no available funds fromwhich to pay

any initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based

solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2)

and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire

$350 balance of the filing fee owed will be collected by the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

///

///

///

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II.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff has also filed a form requesting the appointment of counsel pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) based on his indigence. See Pl.’s Mot. (ECF No. 3). While

section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides for the appointment of counsel under specified certain

circumstances in employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, see Johnson v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 27 F.3d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir.

1994), Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

§ 1343(a)(3); therefore, the Court liberally construes his request as a Motion to Appoint

Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) instead. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting court’s “‘obligation’...‘where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’”) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1

(9th Cir. 1985)).

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

district courts have discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil

litigant. Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). This

discretion is generally exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the Court declines to exercise its

discretion under § 1915(e)(1), and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice. As

explained below, Plaintiff appears capable of articulating the factual basis for his Eighth

Amendment claims and the legal basis for them is not at all complex. Id. Moreover,

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while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaintsufficient to survive the mandatory screening

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), the likelihood of his ultimate

success on the merits is not at all yet clear. Id. Therefore, neither the interests of justice

nor any exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at thistime. LaMere

v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP, and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), (h), & § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state

a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). The court may

not, however, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v.

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims contain

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face,’” and thus, his Complaint is sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening

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required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

2

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to an “obvious,”

“painful” and “pre-existing” foot condition when they “failed to honor recommendations

of [his] doctors and specialists,” and “interfered with treatment,” including a lower bunk

assignment, which had been “prescribed” by his treating physicians. See Compl. (ECF

No. 1) at pp. 3-14. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants’ failures resulted in his fall from

an upper bunk and caused injury to his back. Id. at pp. 3-4.

“[D]eliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of [a] prisoner[]

constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain...proscribed by the Eighth

Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Deliberate indifference may be shown through a prison doctor’s

inadequate response to an inmate’s serious medical needs, when “prison guards

intentionally deny[] or delay[] accesstomedical care,” orif they “intentionally interfer[e]

with...treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-105; Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 897

(9th Cir. 2011); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding

allegations that a prison official ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician

sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference). 

Accordingly, the Court will direct U.S. Marshal service on Plaintiff’s behalf. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and

perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that

service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal...if the plaintiff is

authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

///

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2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a

defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.

Cal. 2007). 

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3) is DENIED without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

3. The Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, is DIRECTED to collect from

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by calculating

monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the

preceding month’s income and forwarding those paymentsto the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint

(ECF No. 1) upon DefendantsWALKER,CASIAN,FLORES, and CLARK, and forward

it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each of these Defendants.3

In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, a certified

Plaintiffincludes “Does 1-10” as Defendants in the caption of his Complaint, but

3

nowhere in its body does he identify these purported parties, describe their roles, or

allege any facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief against them. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. “The title of the complaint must name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);

Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 766 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). A defendant is not presumed

a party to the action if he is not served or named in the caption, unless he is specifically

and sufficiently identified in the body of the complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d

1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] party may be properly in a case if the allegations in the

body of the complaint make it plain that the party is intended as a defendant.”). 

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copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1), and the summons so that he may serve each named

Defendant. Upon receipt ofthis “IFP Package,” Plaintiffis DIRECTED to complete the

Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, and to return them to the United

States Marshal according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter included

in his IFP package. Upon receipt, the U.S. Marshal is ORDERED to serve a copy of the

Complaint and summons upon each Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form

285s. All costs of service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

6. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint

within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted

to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted

its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus,

has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant isrequired

to respond).

7. Plaintiff mustserve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered

by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff must include with the

original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in

which a true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants, or counsel for

Defendants, and the date ofsuch service. Any paper received by the Court which has not

been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 5, 2014

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