Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00773/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00773-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMALIA GONZALEZ-AMEZCUA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-00773 JSW

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

REMANDING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING IN PART AND

REMANDING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Amalia Gonzalez-Amezcua’s (“Gonzalez”) Motion for

Summary Judgment and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the motions

have been submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having carefully reviewed the

administrative record and considered the parties’ papers and the relevant legal authority, and good

cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES IN PART and REMANDS IN PART Gonzalez’s Motion

for Summary Judgment and GRANTS IN PART and REMANDS IN PART the Commissioner’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gonzalez brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(g) to obtain judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner denying her request for Social Security benefits. 

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 1 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Gonzalez is a 40 year old woman, formerly employed as a customer service representative, a data

entry clerk, and a telephone order clerk. (AR at 15.) She claims she became disabled on August 1,

2000, due to bilateral carpal syndrome and other upper bilateral extremity problems. (Id.)

On April 17, 2001, one treating physician, Dr. Damore, diagnosed Gonzalez with bilateral

carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral thoratic outlet syndrome. (Id. at 215.) On September 4, 2001,

Dr. Damore set limitations of lifting no more than 15 pounds and typing no more that 20 minutes per

hour or five minutes consecutively. (Id. at 211.) 

On September 19, 2001, qualified medical examiner Dr. Pang diagnosed overuse syndrome

with limitations on typing. (Id. at 190.) On September 17, 2002, Dr. Damore reiterated his

limitations set in September 2001, and opined that Gonzalez could achieve substantial gainful

employment. (Id. at 200-01.) On October 18, 2002, the non-examining medical expert Dr. Newton

opined that Gonzalez could perform sedentary work with limitations on lifting and constant typing. 

(Id. at 219-226.)

On June 11, 2003, an MRI revealed mild disc protrusion in Gonzalez’s lower back. (Id. at

230.) On November 13, 2003, another treating physician, Dr. Banuelos, opined that Gonzalez’s

limitations included lifting no more than five pounds and typing no more than 30 minutes. (Id. at

285-291.) He also stated that Gonzalez could sit/stand/walk for only one hour at a time, and that she

needed to lie down for three hours during an eight-hour day. (Id.)

On August 27, 2002, Gonzalez filed an application for disability benefits. (Id. at 60-62.) The

Social Security Administration denied her application initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 44,

49.) Gonzalez appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at a hearing conducted on

August 5, 2004. (Id. at 311-348.) 

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing. (Id. at 333-348.) The VE testified that

Gonzalez could not perform her past work but had developed transferable skills of customer service

work and record-keeping. (Id. at 336.) Based on Gonzalez’s limitations and skills set, the VE

testified that two jobs were appropriate for Gonzalez: security guard and receptionist/information

clerk. (Id. at 337-38.) Due to Gonzalez’s limitations, however, the VE reduced the available

number of available jobs in each of these fields by two-thirds. (Id.) Even with the two-thirds

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 2 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reduction, the VE testified that 60,000 security jobs and 40,000 receptionist/information clerk jobs

were available in California. (Id.)

The ALJ found that although Gonzalez could not perform her past work, she could adapt to

other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy and therefore was not considered

disabled. (Id. at 19-20.) In making this finding, the ALJ relied in part on the VE’s testimony about

the types of jobs Gonzalez could perform, found Gonzalez’s testimony not to be credible, and

rejected the opinion of Dr. Banuelos. (Id.) The Social Security Administration denied Gonzalez’s

request to review the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 6.) 

On June 22, 2005, Gonzalez commenced this action for judicial review of the ALJ’s

decision. Gonzalez argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to offer specific reasons for rejecting the

testimony of one of her treating physicians; (2) improperly determining her residual functioning

capacity because he did not consider her ability to perform sustained work; (3) failing to offer

specific reasons for finding her testimony incredible; and (4) improperly relying on the VE’s

testimony to determine that she could perform other work.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review of Commissioner’s Decision to Deny Social Security Benefits.

A federal district court may not disturb the final decision of the Commissioner unless it is

based on legal error or the fact findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Considering the administrative

record as a whole, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). To determine whether

substantial evidence exists, courts must look to the record as a whole, considering both evidence that

supports and undermines the ALJ’s findings. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). An ALJ’s decision must be upheld, however, if the evidence is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir. 1984).

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 3 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

B. Legal Standard for Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Disability.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disability. Id. at 1452. The

disability assessment by the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 

First, the claimant must not be working. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant’s impairment

must be “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, when the claimant has an impairment that meets

the duration required and is listed in Appendix 1 (a list of impairments presumed severe enough to

preclude work located in subpart P of part 404 of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920), or is equal to a listed

impairment, benefits are awarded without considering the claimant’s age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a

listed impairment, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity to

determine if the claimant can perform past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). Benefits are denied if the

claimant can do past work. Id. Fifth, if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past

relevant work, the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity are

considered to see if the claimant is capable of performing other work that exists in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). The claimant is not entitled to benefits if the claimant can adjust

to other work. Id.

In this matter, the ALJ used the five-step analysis to determine that (1) Gonzalez was not

working; (2) her mild carpal tunnel syndrome and mild back problem constituted “severe”

impairments; but (3) her impairments did not meet or medically equal the listings in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; (4) she was unable to perform her past work; but (5) she has the

residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of sedentary jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy, namely a security guard or receptionist/information clerk. (AR at

19-20.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Gonzalez was not disabled. (Id. at 20.)

C. Treating Physician’s Opinion.

Gonzalez asserts that the ALJ’s rejection of the opinion of Dr. Banuelos’, her treating

physician, is not supported by specific reasons rooted in substantial evidence in the record. 

In general, a treating physician’s opinion is afforded greater weight than a non-treating

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 4 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the “ALJ may

disregard the treating physician’s opinion” if the ALJ “‘make[s] findings setting forth specific and

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Id. (quoting

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ can meet this burden “by setting

out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).

Gonzalez stated that Dr. Damore was a treating physician, but also referred to Dr. Banuelos

as her “regular doctor.” (AR at 330, 325.) The ALJ found Dr. Damore to be the treating physician. 

(Id. at 17.) Both parties agree that both Drs. Damore and Banuelos served as Gonzalez’s treating

physician at one time. (Br. at 20; Opp. Br. at 5.) Regardless of Dr. Banuelos’ status, the ALJ

provided specific reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record and therefore properly

rejected Dr. Banuelos’ opinion.

The ALJ listed the detailed finding and limitations set forth by Drs. Damore and Banuelos, as

well as conclusions of a Qualified Medical Examiner and non-examining medical expert. (AR at 16-

17.) The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Banuelos, explaining that the opinion “is not supported by

the substantial medical evidence of record. Dr. Banuelos offers no explanation for the great

limitations in residual functional capacity and his opinion is contradicted by the Qualified Medical

Examiner and the claimant’s long time treating physician Dr. Damore.” (Id. at 17.) These constitute

specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Banuelos’ opinion.

Additionally, the reasons are supported by the record. Dr. Banuelos’ evaluation form states

that Gonzalez can lift five pounds, cannot use her hands/arms for more than 30 minutes per day, and

must lie down for three hours during an eight hour day. (Id. at 285-291.) According to the VE, lying

down for three hours every workday would render an employee unemployable. (Id. at 339.) The

other medical evaluations contradict this assessment of Gonzalez’s limitations. Dr. Damore, another

treating physician, found that Gonzalez is limited to 20 minutes of typing per hour, five minutes of

consecutive typing, and lifting 15 pounds, but “would be able to achieve gainful employment.” (Id.

at 200-01.) Dr. Pang, the Qualified Medical Examiner, listed only preclusion from heavy lifting and

prolonged keyboarding. (Id. at 186-193.) Dr. Newton, a non-examining medical expert, found that

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 5 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Gonzalez’s could lift 10-15 pounds, stand/walk for six hours, sit for six hours, but could not perform

constant fingering or handling. (Id. at 219-226.) None of these sources indicate limitations as severe

as those assessed by Dr. Banuelos. Additionally, Dr. Banuelos’ conclusions were not substantiated

by evidence of such severe limitations. (Id. at 285-291.) An ALJ “need not accept a treating

physician’s opinion which is ‘brief and conclusory.’” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (quoting Young v.

Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ has set forth specific and substantially supported

reasons for rejecting Dr. Banuelos’ opinion and, in this part, denies Gonzalez’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and grants the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

D. Gonzalez’s Residual Functional Capacity.

Gonzalez asserts that the ALJ improperly determined her residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) because he did not consider her ability to perform sustained work. Regarding Gonzalez’s

RFC, the ALJ determined that Gonzalez could lift up to 10 pounds and use her bilateral upper

extremities for 20 minutes per hour. (AR at 18.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that

Gonzalez could perform sedentary work. (Id. at 18-19.)

The ALJ’s determination of Gonzalez’s RFC is substantially supported by the record. The

ALJ’s description of Gonzalez’s RFC reiterates the limitations set forth by the physician evaluations

discussed above. Drs. Damore, Pang, and Newton all articulated limitations in keyboarding, but

none mentioned limitations that would interrupt a sustained schedule. In addition, Dr. Damore

indicated that despite Gonzalez’s limitations, she “would be able to achieve gainful employment.”

(Id. at 201.) Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ properly determined Gonzalez’s RFC and, in

this part, denies Gonzalez’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the Commissioner’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment.

E. Vocational Expert Testimony.

Gonzalez claims that the ALJ erroneously relied on the VE’s confusing and inconsistent

testimony in determining that Gonzalez could adapt to alternate work. 

The ALJ determined that Gonzalez was able to perform sedentary work, and had no

transferable skills. (AR at 20.) Sedentary is the least of the exertion levels, and unskilled is lowest

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 6 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

of the skill levels. Despite Gonzalez’s limitations, the ALJ concluded that Gonzalez could adapt to

alternate jobs, namely a receptionist/information clerk and a security guard. (Id.) 

Neither the security guard position given by the VE nor any of the four types of

receptionist/information clerk positions listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)

comport with the requirements of both sedentary and unskilled levels. See DOT 372.667-034; DOT

237.367-018; DOT 237.367-022; DOT 237.367-038; DOT 352.677-014.

“[A]lthough the DOT raises a presumption as to the job classification, it is rebuttable.” 

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). “An ALJ may rely on expert testimony that

contradicts the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support such a

deviation.” Id. Regarding the receptionist/information clerk position, the VE did not attempt to

contradict the DOT. He offered the receptionist/information clerk as a semi-skilled position, one

appropriate for Gonzalez’s transferable skills of customer service work and record-keeping. (AR at

338). Offered as a semi-skilled job, appropriate semi-skilled receptionist/ information clerk

positions exist. See DOT 237.367-038. However, no appropriate unskilled receptionist/information

clerk positions exist without persuasive evidence indicating otherwise. See DOT 237.367-018; DOT

237.367-022; DOT 352.677-014.

Likewise, the VE also offered the security guard position as semi-skilled, as classified by the

DOT. (AR at 341-42.) He recognized Gonzalez’s transferable “skills as those that would fit into

[the security guard] occupation” and that she “would be well qualified based on the[] very minimal

semi-skills that are necessary to perform the job.” (Id.) However, VE did admit that, in his

experience, the security guard job can be an unskilled position. (AR at 341, 342.) The VE testified

that, because someone could learn the tasks required by a security guard in less than 30 days, the

position could be classified as unskilled. (Id. at 342.) To explain the deviation between the DOT

and his personal experience, the VE explained that the difference between a skilled and unskilled

position could be just one day of training. (Id. at 341.) Therefore, “there are security guard positions

that would be at a higher level than the very basic security guard.” (Id. at 343.) The higher level

security jobs require more skills than the basic unskilled job, so the security job could also be

classified as semi-skilled. (Id.) 

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 7 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

In addition to contradicting the skill level of the security guard position, the VE also

contradicted the exertion level. The DOT lists a security guard as a light position. DOT 372.667-

034. However, the VE claimed that “there is a portion of [a security guard job] that is sedentary as

opposed to light [as listed] by the DOT.” (Id. at 343.) For this reason, the VE estimated the number

of security guard positions available to Gonzalez was drastically reduced due to “an erosion of the

occupational base by two-thirds . . . [s]ince the security guard is technically classified as a light job

by the DOT.” (Id. at 338.) The VE “wiped out two-thirds” of the available security jobs to exclude

those light jobs for which the hypothetical person would not qualify, for reasons such as “frequent

reaching and handling.” (Id. at 344.) In other words, in the VE’s experience, one-third of the

available security guard jobs only require sedentary exertion.

Despite the contradictions between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, “[t]he Social Security

regulations do not require the Secretary or the expert to rely on classifications in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles.” Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 (quoting Conn v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

51 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir.1995)). Because of a VE’s familiarity with the claimant’s limitations, he

may “be used to show that the particular jobs, [regardless of classification by the DOT], may be the

ones that a particular claimant can perform. In fact it seems an eminently appropriate use of the

vocational expert’s knowledge and experience.” Id.

The VE in this case offered two semi-skilled occupations that the ALJ adopted as unskilled

options appropriate for Gonzalez. The receptionist/information clerk position, while appropriate

based on the VE’s semi-skilled assessment of Gonzalez, may not appropriate under the ALJ’s

conclusion that Gonzalez was only qualified for an unskilled position. Additionally, the security

guard position, while classified as a light/semi-skilled job, was described by the VE as a

sedentary/semi-skilled job, but adopted in the ALJ’s conclusions as a sedentary/unskilled job. It is

unclear if a security guard position is indeed an appropriate position in light of Gonzalez’s particular

limitations.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is within

the discretion of the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2000). If

additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, or will allow

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 8 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

the Commissioner properly to complete the administrative proceedings, the case should be

remanded. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980). Remand is necessary here in

light of the confusion regarding the vocational findings by the VE and ALJ and to determine if there

is an appropriate position to which Gonzalez can adapt. If no such position exists, benefits must be

awarded. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Therefore, this case is remanded to the Commissioner for

additional proceedings to clarify this issue.

F. Claimant’s Credibility.

Gonzalez contends that the finding by the ALJ that her testimony was not credible was not

supported by specific reasons. The ALJ found that: 

The claimant’s testimony is not wholly credible. She has some credible pain symptoms

based on the history of overuse syndrome of the upper extremities and some mild pain due to

very mild lumbar spine problems. However, the degree of severity alleged by the claimant is

not supported by the substantial medical evidence of record or her treating physician’s

opinion of her capacity to work.

(AR at 18.) 

In determining claimant credibility, the ALJ’s findings “must be supported by specific,

cogent reasons.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ can “rely either on

reasons unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between

[her] testimony and [her] own conduct, or on internal contradictions in that testimony.” Light v.

Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). Examples of specific reasons include the

ability to do household chores that conflicts with claimed limitations, a poor work history because it

negatively affects one’s credibility regarding the inability to work, and inconsistencies about drug

use because it affects one’s credibility for truth-telling. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Here, the ALJ cited general inconsistencies between the pain alleged by Gonzalez and the

medical record as a reason for discrediting Gonzalez’s testimony. (AR at 18.) However, “[o]nce a

claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not

discredit the claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are

unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Id.; see also Rice v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th

Cir. 1991). The ALJ did precisely what is proscribed – Gonzalez produced evidence of underlying

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 9 of 10
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

impairments, but the ALJ discredited her testimony because the medical records did not corroborate

the severity of the impairment. The “ALJ must identify what testimony is credible and what

evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Rice, 947 F.2d at 345. 

The ALJ did not perform this specific analysis, and “[g]eneral findings are insufficient.” Reddick,

157 F.3d at 722. Therefore, the ALJ failed to set forth specific reasons for discounting Gonzalez’s

credibility. As a result, this case is remanded to the Commissioner for additional proceedings to

reconsider Gonzalez’s credibility. The ALJ can identify specific reasons for disbelieving Gonzalez

testimony, accept her testimony, or re-evaluate the credibility of her subjective complaints. See

Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th

Cir. 1993). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES IN PART and REMANDS IN PART

Gonzalez’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS IN PART and REMANDS IN PART the

Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Further proceedings shall be limited to the

reconsideration of Gonzalez’s credibility and to determine if a position exists that Gonzalez can

adapt to based on her RFC and transferable skills.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-00773-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/22/06 Page 10 of 10