Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02416/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02416-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUSHUN A. WHITE,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2416 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") November 5,

2003 decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on October 3, 2005, the court found that petitioner's claim

that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not comport with

due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally construed, and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

California inmates do not have a liberty interest in early release on parole that is

protected by federal due process because the Supreme Court of California held in

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of California Penal

Code section 3041, setting forth California's parole scheme, is not mandatory.

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Per order filed on September 6, 2006, the court denied respondent's

motion on the ground that the "Ninth Circuit recently rejected respondent's

argument and made clear that 'California inmates continue to have a liberty

interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005).' Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2006)." Sept. 6, 2006 Order at 2. The court reinstated its previous

order and again ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has now filed an answer to the order to show

cause and petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

On September 18, 1984, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder in

Los Angeles County superior court and was sentenced to an indeterminate term

of 15 years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each time he has appeared

before the BPT. On November 5, 2003, petitioner appeared before the BPT for a

subsequent parole consideration hearing. The BPT again found him not suitable

for parole and denied him a subsequent hearing for one year.

Petitioner challenged the BPT's November 5, 2003 decision in the state

superior, appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California

denied his petition for review on April 27, 2005, the instant federal petition for a

writ of habeas corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

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when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's November 5,

2003 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for one year, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due

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process. Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record and is improperly based on the unchanging facts of his

commitment offense and pre-commitment conduct. Petitioner also claims that

the BPT is biased against life inmates and violated his plea agreement by

depriving him of the reduced punishment he bargained for when he entered a

guilty plea to the charged offense. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

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Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT panel afforded petitioner and his counsel

an opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. 

The panel concluded that petitioner "would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society, a threat to public safety if released from prison at this time." 

Nov. 5, 2003 Hr’g Tr. at 46 (Resp’t Ex. H). The panel explained that it found

that the offense was carried out "in vicious and brutal manner" and that it

demonstrated an "exceptionally insensitive disregard for human suffering." It

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also found that the motive was "inexplicable and very trivial in relation[] to the

offense" and that there were multiple victims. Id. at 47. Petitioner and three

companions approached a parked car in which the victim and three others were

seated with the intent to rob them. When the victim made a hand motion,

petitioner shot and killed him and took his money. The panel also found that

petitioner had a "record of assaultive behavior, escalating pattern of criminal

conduct, [and] a history of unstable and tumultuous relationships with others"

characterized by gang activity and heavy marijuana use. Id. at 47. Petitioner's

prior criminal history included convictions for theft and assault with a deadly

weapon as a member of the "Crips" gang. The panel further found that petitioner

had failed to profit from society's previous attempts to correct his criminality,

which included juvenile probation and parole. Id. at 47-48. Only a few months

after being released on parole, petitioner committed two robberies and the

underlying murder.

The panel noted that petitioner had remained disciplinary-free since 1999,

but before then had received 11 counseling memos ("128s") and eight

disciplinary write-ups ("115s"). Id. at 48. It expressed concern with the fact that

it took a long time for petitioner to start changing his behavior in prison: "Part of

the problem for us . . . is that you did not come to prison saying right now I've got

to change. It took you a while." Id. You "turned a corner" in 1999, but "you

still need to distance yourself some more from [your prior negative behavior in

prison]." Id. at 48-49.

The panel noted that petitioner's psychological report and parole pans

were adequate, as was the counselor's report. Id. at 49. However, this was not

enough because you "need to demonstrate the ability to maintain these gains that

you've accomplished. They are fairly recent . . . ." Id.

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The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPT and the state

appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The superior court reviewed

the evidence relied on by the panel and determined that "the Board's findings are

supported by 'some evidence.'" In re Dushun White, No. BH002801, slip op. at 3

(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2004) (Resp't Ex. E). Although the court found no

evidence in the record that the commitment offense "included an 'exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering,' or even that the motive was 'inexplicable'

or 'very trivial,'" it found that the offense was committed in a "cruel manner"

because it involved multiple victims. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c)(1)(A)). It also found that the board's findings as to the other factors

showing unsuitability were supported by some evidence in the record. Id.

The state court's rejection of petitioner's due process claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, or was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s

November 5, 2003 decision to deny petitioner parole is supported by some

evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See,

e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of

offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of

parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment);

Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history,

cruel nature of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry

under Hill is simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56

(emphasis added). There is – the crime involved multiple victims, which under

California law suffices to show that it was conducted in a cruel manner;

petitioner has a pre-commitment record of escalating criminal activity and

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1

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release

date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that, over time, denying a prisoner parole strictly

because of the nature of his offense and his prior conduct “would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole . . . and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

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unstable and tumultuous relationships with others characterized by gang activity

and marijuana use; petitioner received multiple disciplinary write-ups and

counseling memos while in prison; and his gains in remaining disciplinary-free,

and upgrading educationally/vocationally and in terms of appreciating the impact

of his actions, are relatively recent. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) & (d)

(listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and circumstances

tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh the evidence." 

Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner argues that the BPT's continued reliance on the immutable

circumstances of his murder offense and pre-commitment conduct conflicts with

the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Biggs.

1

 The argument is without merit because the

BPT panel's denial of parole was not based solely on petitioner's commitment

offense and conduct prior to incarceration. Much of the panel's denial decision

focused on its concern that petitioner's "gains" were quite recent: 

Part of the problem for us . . . is that you did not come to prison

saying right now I've got to change. It took you a while . . . . 

[You] turned a corner [in 1999, but] "you still need to distance

yourself some more from [your prior negative behavior in prison]. 

. . . .

[Y]ou still need to demonstrate the ability to maintain these gains

that you've accomplished. They are fairly recent . . . ." 

Nov. 5, 2003 Hr'g Tr. at 48-49; see also In re Dushun White, No. BH002801, slip

op. at 3 n.6 (noting that panel discussed that "[p]etitioner's gains are recent and

encouraged him to continue in programming so that he can better understand the

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factors that lead him to lead a gang lifestyle and to commit the life offense"). 

The panel properly considered the relative recency of petitioner's gains and

reasonably concluded that petitioner needed to show the ability to maintain a

good record for a longer period of time. After all, petitioner had been in prison

for nearly 15 years accumulating a significant disciplinary record before he

"turned a corner" in 1999 and started making "gains." The panel's legitimate

concern with the relative recency of petitioner's gains constitutes some evidence

under Hill. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (inquiry under Hill is simply whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the BPT).

Petitioner also claims that the BPT is biased against life inmates and

violated his plea agreement by depriving him of the reduced punishment he

bargained for when he entered a guilty plea to the charged offense. Both claims

are without merit.

Petitioner has set forth no evidentiary support for his bias claim. But even

if he had, there is no evidence in the record indicating that this alleged bias

affected the BPT’s decision or served as the basis for denying parole. To the

contrary, the transcript from petitioner’s November 5, 2003 parole hearing

demonstrates that he received an individualized assessment of his potential parole

suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the high percentage of parole denials for life

inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s alleged bias against parole for life

inmates. Cf. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11

(1995) (citing that 90% of California inmates are found unsuitable for parole as

evidence that deferring annual parole suitability hearings was lawful).

The state superior court rejected petitioner's claim that the BPT violated

his plea agreement: "[T]he Board was not a party to Petitioner's [plea] agreement

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28 G:\PRO-SE\CRB\HC.05\White1.denial.wpd 10

and Petitioner received an indeterminate sentence. Thus, while his minimum

sentenced in fifteen years, he could potentially serve the maximum of life in

prison." In re Dushun White, No. BH002801, slip op. at 2 n.3. The state court's

rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state

court reasonably determined that petitioner only bargained for the "possibility" of

release on parole and that he consequently may be lawfully retained in custody

for a term of life unless he is found suitable for release on parole by the BPT. 

See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987) (construction of state court

plea agreement is governed by state contract law, and federal court should not

disturb a reasonable state court interpretation); see also Evenstad v. United

States, 978 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (change in the law regarding

parole eligibility does not render an earlier guilty plea involuntary).

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 26, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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