Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03618/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Upon screening, the Court dismissed the City of Phoenix Police Department and

Officer Anders as Defendants (Doc. #3).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Cheatham, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Phoenix Police Department, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 05-3618-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Charles Cheatham brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Phoenix Police Officer Nathan Schug (Doc. #1).1

 Defendant filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. #41). Plaintiff did not respond. The Court will grant Defendant’s

motion and dismiss the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim arose during his arrest in March 2004 (Doc. #1; Doc. #42, Def.’s

Statement of Facts (DSOF) ¶ 2). Defendant and another officer responded to a call regarding

an assault, and, upon arriving at the scene, individuals identified Plaintiff as the suspect (Doc.

#42, Ex. A, Schug Aff. ¶ 7). Defendant and the other officer observed Plaintiff run from the

scene; they chased Plaintiff, apprehended him, and placed him in handcuffs (id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 12-

13). After interviews with various individuals involved in the incident, the officers

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).

- 2 -

confirmed that Plaintiff assaulted another individual, so they arrested Plaintiff and placed him

in the back seat of their patrol car (id. ¶¶ 18, 20).

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant then “viciously slammed the door on the plaintiff’s

legs,” which were still outside of the patrol car (Doc. #1 at 4). Plaintiff claimed that

Defendant’s action caused serious leg injuries that ultimately necessitated surgery on his left

leg (id.). The Complaint alleged that Defendant used excessive force in violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (id.). 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) he is entitled to

qualified immunity and (2) he was not negligent (Doc. #41). In support, Defendant submits

his own affidavit; copies of police incident reports; excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition; and

the affidavit of Dr. Ronald Lampert, who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records (Doc. #42,

Exs. A-E). The Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the

summary judgment motion (Doc. #43).2

 Plaintiff did not file a response memorandum. The time to respond has expired and

the motion is ready for ruling.

II. Legal Standard 

A. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the

record, together with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th

Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion,

the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819

(9th Cir. 1995); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory

allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party

must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show

there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052,

1056 (9th Cir. 1995). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmovant.

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). If the moving party

presents evidence that, taken by itself, would establish the right to a directed verdict at trial,

the motion for summary judgment must be granted in the absence of any significant probative

evidence tending to support the opposing party’s theory of the case. First Nat’l Bank v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968); THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp.,

627 F.2d 991, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1980). 

B. Excessive Force

A claim that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an

arrest should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The reasonableness of the use of force “must

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the 20/20

vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. When determining whether the totality of the circumstances

justifies the degree of force, the court must consider “the facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The inquiry is “whether the officers’

actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). 

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

III. Analysis

A. Qualified Immunity

Defendant’s first argument for summary judgment is that he is entitled to qualified

immunity. A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages

for civil liability if his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). The existence of qualified immunity generally turns on the objective

reasonableness of the actions, without regard to the knowledge or subjective intent of the

particular officer. Id. at 819. Whether a reasonable officer could have believed his conduct

was proper is a question of law for the court and should be determined at the earliest possible

point in the litigation. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1993).

In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the Court must determine: (1) whether a

constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged and (2) whether the right

was clearly established when viewed in the specific context of the case. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

The first inquiry is whether—viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party—the facts show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Brosseau

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004). Defendant contends that even if the events occurred

as Plaintiff alleges, Defendant’s actions when he placed Plaintiff in the patrol car do not

amount to a constitutional violation (Doc. #41 at 7).

In evaluating the nature and quality of the intrusion on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

interests, the Court must consider “the type and amount of force inflicted” on him. Chew v.

Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the force inflicted was a car door slammed

into Plaintiff’s legs. Although such force is not life-threatening or deadly, this intrusion is

not insignificant. The Court must next balance the intrusion against the governmental

interests at stake. As stated, the factors considered in this evaluation include the severity of

the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Here, the crime at issue was assault. According to Defendant’s evidence, a search of

Plaintiff’s vehicle at the time of the arrest yielded the butt stock of a firearm, body armor,

marijuana, and a rifle loaded with a banana clip (Doc. #42, Ex. A, Schug Aff. ¶¶ 16-17). But

during the search of his vehicle, Plaintiff was already apprehended, in handcuffs, and sitting

on the curb (id. ¶ 13). Defendant attests that he then placed Plaintiff in the back seat of the

patrol car and warned Plaintiff that he was going to close the door (id. ¶¶ 20, 22). There is

no evidence that after he was hand-cuffed, Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety

of officers or other individuals in the area. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that Plaintiff

resisted arrest or resisted placement into the back of the patrol car. 

In his affidavit Defendant does not indicate whether, when he closed the door of the

patrol car, the door hit Plaintiff’s legs. Defendant states only that Plaintiff did not complain

of any pain or injury after he was placed in the patrol car (id. ¶ 24). He further attests that

he did not hear Plaintiff make any complaint of pain to anyone else and that Plaintiff did not

complain of any pain or injury during transport to the precinct (id. ¶¶ 25, 29). Plaintiff’s

deposition testimony, however, disputes Defendant’s claims that he made no complaints

about pain. Plaintiff stated that after Defendant slammed the door on his knees, “I screamed

like crazy. I went to cussing, Goddamned it, Goddamned it, you hurt my knees” (Doc. #42,

Ex. D, Pl. Dep. 48:19-23, Jan. 25, 2007). 

But this dispute over whether Plaintiff suffered injury or pain is not material.

Summary judgment may be entered when an essential element of a legal theory is shown to

lack evidentiary support, irrespective of factual disputes over other aspects of the claim. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In fact, Plaintiff’s own evidence shows nothing more than

negligent or accidental conduct, which is insufficient for a constitutional violation.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant did not pay attention to the fact that

Plaintiff’s legs were still outside the patrol car when he slammed the door (Doc. #1 at 4).

And in his deposition, Plaintiff stated:

To me he wasn’t paying attention. He wasn’t paying attention of me getting

in the car at all. He figured I was in the car, but I wasn’t all [the] way in the

car. I was getting ready to scoot back. Before I could scoot back he slammed

it (Doc. #42, Ex. D, Pl. Dep. 48:15-19).

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

“[T]he Fourth Amendment addresses ‘misuse of power’, . . . not the accidental effects of

otherwise lawful government conduct.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)

(quoting Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). Torts that happen to be committed

by public officials are not actionable as constitutional claims. See Brower, 489 U.S. at

596-97. Thus, negligent or accidental conduct by police officers does not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation. 

The record reflects that throughout the apprehension and arrest of Plaintiff, Defendant

acted lawfully and with reasonable force (Doc. #42, Ex. A, Schug Aff. ¶¶ 11-31). Plaintiff’s

own allegations confirm that Defendant simply failed to realize Plaintiff’s legs were not in

the patrol car when the door was shut; therefore, Defendant’s actions were not objectively

unreasonably in the circumstances. Consequently, there is no constitutional violation, and

the Court need not proceed any further in the qualified immunity analysis. Summary

judgment will be granted for Defendant on the excessive force claim.

B. State Law Claim

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is one of negligence

under state law, it should be dismissed (Doc. #41 at 8). Defendant further argues than even

under a negligence claim analysis, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant breached a duty

that was owed to Plaintiff or that such a breach proximately caused Plaintiff’s damages (id.

at 8-11). 

A court may decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once it

has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d

817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs.,

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (although discretionary, claims under state law

should be dismissed when associated federal claims are dismissed before trial). The Court

will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claim, and it will be

dismissed. This dismissal is without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,

40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissal of pendent state claims following dismissal of

related federal claims must be without prejudice).

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #41) is granted. Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim is dismissed with prejudice.

(2) The remaining negligence claim under state law is dismissed without prejudice.

(3) The Clerk of Court must terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-03618-MHM-MEA Document 47 Filed 12/14/07 Page 7 of 7