Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15903/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY S. HAWN; MICHAEL R. 

No. 08-15903 PRINCE; ARIC A. ALDRICH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.  2:04-CV-02954-

v. SMM

EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT, INC., OPINION Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 12, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed August 16, 2010

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, J. Clifford Wallace,

Circuit Judge, and William H. Alsup, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Wallace

*The Honorable William H. Alsup, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Tod F. Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Bradley H. Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona, on the brief.

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Celeste M. Wasielewski, Duane Morris LLP, Washington,

D.C., for the defendant-appellee. Lorraine P. Ocheltree,

Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, California, and Maureen

Beyers, Osborne Maledon PA, Phoenix, Arizona, on the brief.

OPINION

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:

Gregory Hawn, Michael Prince and Aric Aldrich (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of their former employer, Executive Jet

Management (Executive Jet). We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs are male pilots who were employed by Executive

Jet, which is in the business of aircraft management and charter operations. All of the plaintiffs were terminated after a

female flight attendant, Robin McCrea, alleged that plaintiffs

had sexually harassed her and created a hostile work environment through an array of conduct including sexualized banter,

crude jokes, and the sharing of crude and/or pornographic

emails and websites. According to plaintiffs, however,

McCrea was an active participant in, or initiator of, much of

the conduct of which she accused them. Plaintiffs contend that

their terminations were illegal because McCrea and other

Executive Jet female flight attendants engaged in similar conduct but were not terminated because they were females.

Plaintiffs and McCrea were stationed at Executive Jet’s

base at Williams Gateway Airport in Arizona. On January 6,

2003, McCrea complained to her immediate supervisor, Amy

Jackson, that Aldrich had behaved inappropriately during a

training seminar a few days earlier. Jackson reported the comHAWN v. EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT 11737

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plaint to Executive Jet’s Human Resources Director, Cynthia

Brusman. On January 10, 2003, McCrea faxed a letter to

Brusman that stated she had experienced a hostile work environment at the Williams Gateway base and requested a transfer.

In response, Executive Jet’s Chief Pilot, Michael

Chakerian, interviewed McCrea, Aldrich, Prince, and several

other Executive Jet employees. Chakerian submitted the

results of his interviews in a written report to Executive Jet.

Chakerian’s report reflected that Prince and Aldrich were

“shocked” by McCrea’s allegations because she had participated in, and often encouraged, the banter and joking of

which she complained. Chakerian’s report also reflected that

another male pilot stationed at the Williams Gateway base

was similarly surprised by McCrea’s allegations. A female

flight attendant interviewed by Chakerian described McCrea

as short-tempered, aggressive, and negative. A female pilot

interviewed by Chakerian similarly described McCrea as personally insecure and moody, and also described McCrea as

flustered during the training exercise. Both this female pilot

and the female flight attendant implied to Chakerian that

McCrea’s allegations may have been motivated by her desire

for a transfer to a different Executive Jet base.

On January 14, 2003, McCrea faxed another letter to Brusman. This time, McCrea attached a twelve-page document

that detailed her allegations against Aldrich stemming from

the training seminar. This document also contained new allegations of sexual harassment against Aldrich, Prince, Hawn,

and others. Following receipt of these new and more detailed

allegations, Executive Jet hired an independent investigator,

James Sterling, to look into McCrea’s accusations. This investigation lasted approximately two months. In the meantime,

on January 27, 2003, McCrea filed a discrimination charge

against Executive Jet with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

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Around March 31, 2003, Sterling’s report was submitted to

Executive Jet. In the “Synopsis” of his report, Sterling stated:

The results of this investigation indicate that there

have been confirmed instances of a few of the

behaviors indicated in Ms. McCrea’s document of

complaint. However, there are also a greater number

of incidents that she has alleged happened that have

been unconfirmed, denied or told to me in a different

light, implying that Ms. McCrea either participated

in the actions or in some instances initiated them.

In the concluding “Summary” of his report, Sterling stated

that “[t]hroughout the duration of this investigation, I have

continually found there to be some items in Ms. McCrea’s

document of complaint to be verified.” Sterling continued, “in

the same vein, I must say that there have been numerous

items, which have not been corroborated by this investigation.” He concluded: “The bottom line is that there appears to

be some fact as well as some fiction interwoven throughout

Ms. McCrea’s document of complaint. . . . To conclude this

investigation I believe that the company will have to ‘sift the

wheat from the [chaff],’ in Ms. McCrea’s document of complaint . . . .”

On April 18, 2003, all three plaintiffs were terminated. A

few months later, in July 2003, the EEOC issued a determination of the merits of McCrea’s complaint, finding in part that

“the evidence revealed that Respondent fostered a hostile

work environment created by demeaning, crude, derogatory

sex-based remarks.”

In February 2004, each of the plaintiffs filed a claim of discrimination with the EEOC. All of these claims were dismissed. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action, alleging

discrimination on the basis of race, sex and national origin in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

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Plaintiffs complain that Executive Jet was aware that a

group of five female flight attendants, one of whom was

McCrea, had “engaged in sexual e-mails [and] sexual discussions” similar to the conduct that led to plaintiffs’ terminations. Unlike plaintiffs, however, the female employees were

not disciplined in any way, much less terminated. Plaintiffs

argue that their terminations were thus discriminatory

because, in effect, Executive Jet singled them out for termination because they were “risk free” young, white, American

males, while it failed to terminate females who had engaged

in the same objectionable behavior. Plaintiffs point, in particular, to Executive Jet’s position statement in its response to

McCrea’s EEOC charges. In that document, the company represented that “virtually all” of McCrea’s claims were denied

or uncorroborated and that, in many instances, McCrea was a

participant in or initiator of the conduct at issue. According to

plaintiffs, McCrea’s allegations came suspiciously on the

heels of a training exercise in which she exhibited an abysmal

performance.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of

Executive Jet, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish a

prima facie case of employment discrimination. The district

court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable

issue of material fact that their terminations were a pretext for

unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs seek review of the summary judgment and the district court’s denial of their motion

to exclude all evidence of and references to the EEOC’s determination regarding McCrea’s charge. Although plaintiffs’

complaint states claims for gender, race, and national origin

discrimination, plaintiffs press only their gender discrimination claims before us. Similarly, although plaintiffs asked the

district court to strike all references to the EEOC’s determination in McCrea’s charge and the EEOC’s dismissal of their

complaints, plaintiffs here press only for the exclusion of evidence relating to the EEOC’s determination of McCrea’s

charges.

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II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment de novo.

Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013,

1019 (9th Cir. 2004). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and

whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps,

345 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003). We may affirm the district

court’s summary judgment on any ground supported by the

record. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec.

Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2001).

We analyze plaintiffs’ Title VII claims through the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, plaintiffs must first

establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.

Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).

If plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, “[t]he burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

challenged action.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of

Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000). If defendant

meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of

material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons

for their terminations are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1168; see also Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs must

“introduce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of

material fact” as to pretext). 

[1] To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs “must offer

evidence that ‘give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’ ” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original), citing Tex. Dep’t

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial

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evidence by showing: (1) that they are members of a protected

class; (2) that they were qualified for their positions and performing their jobs satisfactorily; (3) that they experienced

adverse employment actions; and (4) that “similarly situated

individuals outside [their] protected class were treated more

favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse

employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d

885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).

[2] The focus in the case before us is on the fourth element

of plaintiffs’ prima facie case: whether similarly situated

employees engaged in similar conduct but received more

favorable treatment by Executive Jet. The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case

because they did not show that the female employees who

allegedly received more favorable treatment by Executive Jet

were in fact similarly situated to plaintiffs. The district court

offered two primary reasons for this conclusion: First, the

female flight attendants were not similarly situated because

they did not report to the same supervisor as plaintiffs, and

second, even if the female flight attendants had reported to the

same supervisor as plaintiffs, they were not similarly situated

because plaintiffs’ conduct gave rise to a complaint, while the

female flight attendants’ alleged conduct did not.

A.

At the outset, plaintiffs assert that the district court engaged

in an overly narrow inquiry in conducting its examination of

their prima facie case. Plaintiffs complain that the district

court erroneously focused on whether similarly-situated persons received more favorable treatment. Instead, according to

plaintiffs, the district court should have looked more broadly

at whether the record as a whole gave rise to an inference of

discrimination.

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[3] It is true that the elements and contours of a prima facie

case will differ according to the facts at hand. In McDonnell

Douglas, the Court explained that a prima facie case will vary

according to the unique factual circumstances presented in

every action: “the prima facie proof required from respondent

is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. We have also stated that

a plaintiff may show “an inference of discrimination in whatever manner is appropriate in the particular circumstances.”

Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985).

A plaintiff may do so through comparison to similarly situated individuals, or any other circumstances “surrounding the

adverse employment action [that] give rise to an inference of

discrimination.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603.

[4] Here, however, plaintiffs’ case relies on a comparison

between themselves and a group of female employees. Plaintiffs’ action sounds in disparate treatment and seeks to raise

an inference of discrimination based solely on circumstantial

evidence. Plaintiffs’ proof of discrimination is that McCrea

engaged in or encouraged the language and conduct of which

she later complained, and that she and other female flight

attendants engaged in lewd and inappropriate conduct but

were not disciplined or terminated as were plaintiffs. Plaintiffs invoke the comparison to a group of allegedly similarlysituated female employees to make out a claim of disparate

treatment. The district court did not err by focusing on the

inference of discrimination that is central to plaintiffs’ case.

B.

Plaintiffs next take issue with the district court’s analysis

insofar as it determined that plaintiffs and the suspect female

flight attendants were not similarly-situated because they did

not report to the same supervisor. The district court held that

to be similarly situated, “coworkers must have been dealt with

by the same supervisor, subject to the same standard, and

engaged in similar conduct.” Plaintiffs argue that the district

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court improperly focused on whether the female employees

had the same supervisor as them.

[5] It was error for the district court to impose a strict

“same supervisor” requirement. We have stated that “whether

two employees are similarly situated is ordinarily a question

of fact.” Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union

Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 885 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). The employees’ roles need not be identical; they must only be similar “in

all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th

Cir. 2006); see also Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal,

Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2002). Materiality will

depend on context and the facts of the case. 

Generally, we have determined that “individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar

conduct.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

641 (9th Cir. 2003). In Vasquez, for example, we considered

that employees were not similarly situated where the type and

severity of an alleged offense was dissimilar. Id. Likewise, in

Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc., a case decided after

entry of summary judgment here, we held that an alleged distinction between a female pilot and several male pilots was

not material. 580 F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2009). Under

the allegations of that case, we concluded that a female pilot,

who had deficient communication and cooperation skills, was

similarly situated to male pilots, who had deficiencies in their

technical piloting skills, because both types of deficiencies

could be addressed through retraining. Any distinction

between the two types of skill sets was “not material for purposes of determining whether the male pilots were ‘similarly

situated’ to” the plaintiff; therefore, the female pilot had made

out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the

male pilots received remedial training for their deficiencies

while she received no such instruction. Id. at 1126. Nicholson

again demonstrates that whether employees are similarly situated — i.e., whether they are “similar in all material

respects,” id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted) — is

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a fact-intensive inquiry, and what facts are material will vary

depending on the case.

[6] We do not exclude the possibility that the presence or

absence of a shared supervisor might be relevant in some

cases. But here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that whether

plaintiffs and the female flight attendants shared the same

direct supervisor should not have been determinative of

whether they were similarly situated, because plaintiffs’ direct

supervisor, Chakerian, was excluded from the decision to terminate them. Instead, the decision to terminate plaintiffs was

made directly by Executive Jet’s president, Albert Pod. The

fact that plaintiffs and the female flight attendants had different direct supervisors did not render them dissimilar in a

material respect, because the relevant decision-maker, Albert

Pod, was aware of both the allegations against plaintiffs and

the allegations plaintiffs had made against the female flight

attendants. Similarity between two persons or groups of people is a question of fact that cannot be mechanically resolved

by determining whether they had the same supervisor without

attention to the underlying issues.

III.

Therefore, we turn to the alternate ground on which the district court concluded that plaintiffs were not similarly situated

to the female flight attendants. The district court held that,

even assuming the female flight attendants reported to the

same supervisor as plaintiffs, the two groups were not similarly situated because the female employees’ alleged conduct

was not unwelcome and never resulted in a complaint. This

consideration provides an independent and sufficient basis to

affirm the district court’s summary judgment. See Venetian

Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 941.

A.

The concept of “similarly situated” employees may be relevant to both the first and third steps of the McDonnell DougHAWN v. EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT 11745

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las framework. In this case, plaintiffs sought to establish that

the relevant female flight attendants were “similarly situated”

to them but received more favorable treatment in step one of

the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See, e.g., Peterson, 358

F.3d at 603. Turning to step three of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis, plaintiffs alleged that Executive Jet’s explanation for

their terminations was pretextual because, among other

things, the company failed to discipline or terminate McCrea

even though she was similarly situated to them. See Vasquez,

349 F.3d at 641; see generally Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs.

of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing

different ways in which an employment discrimination plaintiff might establish pretext). 

Even though a comparison to “similarly situated” individuals may be relevant both to plaintiffs’ prima facie case and

proof of pretext, these inquiries constitute distinct stages of

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See generally Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577

(1978); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337

(9th Cir. 1981) (first and third stages must remain distinct

because, “[t]o do otherwise would in many instances collapse

the three step analysis into a single step at which all issues

would be resolved”); Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1124. The difference between the first and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not without some consequence. Among

other things, a plaintiff’s burden is much less at the prima

facie stage than at the pretext stage. Compare Tex. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), and Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889, with Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22, and

Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)

(requiring “specific, substantial evidence of pretext” to defeat

employer’s motion for summary judgment); see also Wheeler

v. Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing pretext stage as “rigorous,” but prima facie stage as “not

onerous”). 

The district court considered the relevant inquiry —

whether plaintiffs and the subject female employees were

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similarly situated — in the context of both plaintiffs’ prima

facie case and at the pretext stage. Insofar as the district court

considered Executive Jet’s argument in the context of plaintiffs’ prima facie case of discrimination, this was unusual. Our

cases generally analyze an employer’s reasons for why

employees are not similarly situated at the pretext stage of

McDonnell Douglas, not the prima facie stage. See, e.g.,

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. It may well be that the present

inquiry is more appropriate for resolution at the third stage of

the McDonnell Douglas analysis rather than that of pretext.

The pretext determination is often cast in terms of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer for

taking adverse employment action against a plaintiff. See,

e.g., Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641; Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Although we seek to conduct our inquiry at the proper

McDonnell Douglas step, we keep in mind that “[t]he prima

facie case method established in McDonnell Douglas was

‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather,

it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence

in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’ ” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983), citing Furnco, 438 U.S.

at 577. Thus, we keep sight of the ultimate issue in this case:

“whether the employer is treating some people less favorably

than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.” Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (quotation marks

and citation omitted). In this case, there is no need to discuss

the issue further. The district court held that plaintiffs had not

made out a prima face case because, among other reasons,

they had not shown they were similarly situated to the female

employees in question. The district court then went on to hold

that Executive Jet’s argument was not pretextual for the same

reasons. We may therefore turn to the substance of plaintiffs’

claims. 

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B.

Turning to the substance of the issue, plaintiffs seek to

blunt the relevance of the complaints made against them.

They argue that the presence or absence of a complaint is not

a sufficient justification for differential treatment and that

McCrea’s complaint was not actually the basis for their terminations. Plaintiffs point to (1) the Sterling report, which

reflected that many of McCrea’s allegations were uncorroborated; (2) Executive Jet’s position statement submitted to the

EEOC, in which it maintained that McCrea could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the “overwhelming majority” of the incidents could not be

corroborated and McCrea could not show that the conduct

was unwelcome; and finally, (3) Brusman’s testimony that the

use of sexual language or the telling of sexual jokes to

coworkers was inappropriate behavior warranting termination,

“whether anybody is offended by it or not.”

Executive Jet management was aware, at the time of plaintiffs’ terminations, of plaintiffs’ accusations that McCrea and

several female flight attendants had engaged in sexualized

banter and other similar conduct. Chakerian’s report to his

superiors indicated that plaintiffs Aldrich and Prince found

McCrea’s allegations surprising because she had participated

in the conduct giving rise to her complaint. Sterling’s report

reflected an allegation by Prince that McCrea had “hit him on

the butt twice,” an allegation by Aldrich that McCrea asked

“quite frequently about his sex life,” and allegations that

McCrea participated in “raunchy” banter, as well as some

sexually-oriented emails sent by another flight attendant.

[7] Plaintiffs’ accusations, nevertheless, do not demonstrate that the designated female employees were similarly situated to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cite the Sterling report

selectively. The report confirmed several of McCrea’s complaints, including that Hawn pinched McCrea on the buttocks;

that Prince forwarded obscene emails to his coworkers; that

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pilots, including Prince, had romantic relationships with flight

attendants; and that Aldrich called the lead flight attendant a

“fat cow.” Sterling’s report concludes that “the company will

have to ‘sift the wheat from the [chaff]’ in Ms. McCrea’s document of complaint . . . .” Even if Executive Jet believed that

the majority of McCrea’s allegations were not corroborated,

and that McCrea participated in some of the complained-of

conduct, several instances of sexually harassing behavior by

Aldrich, Prince and Hawn were undisputed.

[8] Moreover, plaintiffs and the female flight attendants

are distinguishable because plaintiffs’ conduct gave rise to a

complaint of sexual harassment, while the female flight attendants’ alleged conduct did not. Plaintiffs never complained of

discriminatory treatment or sexual harassment to Executive

Jet contemporaneous to the alleged conduct by the female

flight attendants. When plaintiffs did report such conduct, it

was made defensively in the context of the company’s investigations into McCrea’s accusations against them. Even in the

context of the company’s investigations, plaintiffs did not

lodge a complaint at any time, and they did not report that

they found the female flight attendants’ alleged conduct

harassing or unwelcome. We have distinguished misconduct

by one employee from misconduct by another employee on

the basis of whether it prompted complaints or consternation

by other employees. In Meyer v. California and Hawaiian

Sugar Co., we upheld summary judgment for an employer

where the female plaintiff had been terminated after making

racially insensitive remarks, even though male employees also

had made racist remarks but received no discipline, because

the female plaintiff’s comments “had such an adverse impact

on minority employees that they impaired her usefulness in

her sensitive duties in the Personnel Department and, coming

from her, reflected unfavorably on [the employer’s] policies

toward its minority employees.” 662 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.

1981). We concluded that, where there was no evidence that

the male employees’ remarks had “provoked anything comparable to the vigorous reaction” that resulted from the plainHAWN v. EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT 11749

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tiff’s comments, the other incidents were “not such parallels

to her case as to raise a genuine issue of pretext.” Id.

[9] The presence of complaints has also been deemed a

valid distinguishing factor by other circuits. See Yeager v.

City Water & Light Plant, 454 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2006)

(“An employer that promulgates a sex harassment policy may

reasonably distinguish between sexually oriented conduct that

elicits a complaint from an offended co-worker, and arguably

comparable conduct that is nonetheless tolerated by coworkers without complaint”). In a case presenting similar

facts to this action, Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., two

male employees were terminated after complaints of sexual

harassment were brought against them. 152 F.3d 559, 560

(7th Cir. 1998). They filed an action, complaining that their

employer had enforced its sexual harassment policy more

strictly against males than against similarly-situated females.

Id. at 560. Affirming the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the employer, the Seventh Circuit stated,

Wal-Mart’s quick decision to terminate the plaintiffs

may seem unfair in a work environment that appears

rife with similarly off-color conduct. . . . Although

some of Wal-Mart’s female employees seem to have

engaged in questionable behavior, there is no evidence that any of this behavior sparked complaints

of harassment like those that Wal-Mart received concerning [plaintiffs]. Without evidence of similar

employee complaints, Wal-Mart cannot be faulted

for failing to respond to these incidents in the same

way that it responded to [plaintiffs’] situations.

Id. at 564. 

[10] We do not support a “race to the Human Resources

office” as the sole determinant of the relevance of a complaint. The existence of a complaint may not always be material or determinative in light of the facts in a given case. We

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stress again that the determination whether a plaintiff and a

coworker are similarly situated will generally be a question of

fact. But in the case before us, plaintiffs’ conduct was the subject of a complaint to Executive Jet, while the conduct of

McCrea and other female flight attendants was not. Moreover,

plaintiffs’ reports of inappropriate conduct by female employees were made only in the context of the independent investigation by an outsider, and contain no indication that the

conduct was unwelcome or harassing to them. In the course

of that investigation, several allegations of harassing conduct

by plaintiffs was not only corroborated, but also admitted by

plaintiffs. That difference was properly taken into consideration when the district court entered summary judgment.

IV.

[11] In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., we

held that a plaintiff has a “right to introduce an EEOC probable cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit.” 656 F.2d 502,

505 (9th Cir. 1981). But Plummer’s rule was created in the

context of the admissibility of an EEOC probable cause determination in a Title VII action by the same plaintiff who complained to the EEOC. The Plummer rule is not applicable to

all EEOC determinations. In Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons

Imports, Inc., we held that a letter of violation was a “substantially different” document than an EEOC probable cause

determination in that a letter of violation represented the

EEOC’s conclusion that a violation has occurred. The letter

of violation thereby posed a much greater risk of unfair prejudice, because a “jury may find it difficult to evaluate independently evidence of age discrimination after being informed

that the EEOC has already examined the evidence and found

a violation.” 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986). We therefore concluded that Plummer did not establish a per se rule of

admissibility for all EEOC documents, and that the district

court should instead exercise its discretion to admit or exclude

a letter of violation. Id.

HAWN v. EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT 11751

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Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion

by denying their motion to strike all reference to the EEOC’s

determination in the McCrea charge. They assert that, because

the rule of per se admissibility of EEOC findings applies

“only in cases in which the issue in the court proceeding was

identical to that which the EEOC had earlier investigated,” the

EEOC’s determination should not have been admitted here.

Further, plaintiffs assert that the McCrea determination is

irrelevant because it was issued months after they were terminated.

[12] Admission of the EEOC determination was not an

abuse of discretion. As Plummer stated, there is little reason

to fear prejudice in a bench trial, where “the admission of

incompetent evidence over objection will not ordinarily be a

ground of reversal if there was competent evidence received

sufficient to support the findings. The judge will be presumed

to have disregarded the inadmissible and relied on the competent evidence.” Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The same rationale applies here, where plaintiffs’ motion to strike was made in the context of a summary

judgment proceeding where there could be no jury, thereby

reducing the danger of the type of prejudice expressed in Gilchrist. See Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 (“[T]here is support for

the general proposition that the admissibility of evidence varies between jury and non-jury trials”). The district court exercised its discretion in weighing the admissibility of the

document, as required under Gilchrist, and plaintiffs have

made no showing of prejudice from its admission.

AFFIRMED.

11752 HAWN v. EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT

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