Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02368/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02368-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD TRAHAN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2368 MCE GGH P

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Pending before the court is

plaintiff’s amended complaint filed July 24, 2006.

Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this

court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently

without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

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month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall be collected

and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

In claim one, plaintiff alleges that defendants Tan and Robinson told him that he

had to participate in a drug treatment program even though he had no history of drug abuse. 

Plaintiff goes on to allege that once in the drug program, he was required to recite religious

statements in violation of his own religion. After refusing to make these statements, he was

punished by defendants Hightower, Blackwell and Irving in violation of his First Amendment

rights. 

Plaintiff has stated a colorable claim for relief against defendants Hightower,

Blackwell and Irving. Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Tan and Robinson knew that the

drug program required plaintiff to make religious statements in violation of religion. Rather, the

only claim against defendants Tan and Robinson is that plaintiff disagreed with their assessment

that he required drug treatment. This allegation does not state a colorable claim. Accordingly,

these claims against defendants Tan and Robinson are dismissed.

In claim two, plaintiff alleges that the appeals coordinator failed to properly

process his administrative appeal. This claim should be dismissed for two reasons. First,

plaintiff does not identify the appeals coordinator by name. Plaintiff has named two appeals

coordinators as defendants (Freese and Smothers) and it is unclear which of these defendants is

associated with this claim. In any event, plaintiff has no right to a grievance procedure. Mann v.

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9 Cir. 1988); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9 Cir. 2003). th th

This claim is dismissed for failing to state a colorable claim for relief.

In claim three, plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for filing

administrative appeals. Inmates have a right to be free from the filing of false disciplinary

charges in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Pratt v. Rowland, 65

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F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo

v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit treats the right to file a prison

grievance as a constitutionally protected First Amendment right. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265

(9th Cir. 1997); see also Hines v. Gomez, 853 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the

right to utilize a prison grievance procedure is a constitutionally protected right, cited with

approval in Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995)).

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that

retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor

behind the defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th

Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of legitimate

correctional goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt at 806 (citing Rizzo at 532). 

Verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d

136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). However, even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim,

because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810

F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice, a

prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s

constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1) (10th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff first alleges that on February 22, 2006, defendant Freese ordered

Correctional Officer Sutton to charge plaintiff with a rules violation report. Plaintiff offers no

facts demonstrating that defendant Freese was retaliating against him for filing administrative

grievances when he ordered plaintiff charged with violating rules. This claim is dismissed

because it is vague and conclusory.

Plaintiff next alleges that on May 5, 2006, defendant Smothers confiscated his

legal materials on grounds that plaintiff was under investigation. Defendant Reynoso

interviewed him regarding the investigation, although plaintiff was never charged. 

Plaintiff had pled no facts demonstrating that defendants Smothers and Reynoso

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were motivated by retaliation. Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that defendant Smothers

told him that he was confiscating his legal property because plaintiff had filed administrative

appeals. The retaliation claims against defendants Smothers and Reynoso are dismissed because

they are vague and conclusory.

Plaintiff next alleges that on May 5, 2006, he filed an administrative appeal

regarding the confiscation of his legal property by defendant Smothers. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants La and Luzados retaliated against him by failing to process plaintiff’s outgoing mail

on the first business day of the week. Plaintiff alleges that on May 9, 2006, defendant Dashiell

told him that the administrative appeal he filed on May 5, 2006, was still in the building on May

9, 2006. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Dashiell and Dahle continued to harass him through the

night because the mail still was not processed. 

Plaintiff has pled no facts supporting his claim that defendants La, Luzados,

Dashiell and Dahle were motivated by retaliation when they did not timely process his outgoing

mail. Rather, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against these defendants is based on conclusory

allegations. Because these claims are vague and conclusory, they are dismissed.

Plaintiff next alleges that on June 13, 2006, defendant Robinson participated in

plaintiff’s annual review. During the interview, plaintiff gave defendant Robinson a written

statement which defendant agreed to present at plaintiff’s classification hearing. Defendants

Long, Ramos, Robinson and Wise participated in plaintiff’s June 15, 2006, classification hearing. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Long instructed defendant Robinson to put in the record that

plaintiff refused to program in retaliation for plaintiff asking for an alternative assignment

program. Plaintiff requested that he be placed in an alternative assignment so that he did not

have to participate in the religious drug treatment program.

Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Ramos or Wise participated in the

decision to enter into his record that his failure to participate in the drug treatment program

constituted failure to program. Accordingly, the court does not find that plaintiff has stated a

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colorable claim against these defendants. Plaintiff has stated a colorable retaliation claim against

defendants Long and Robinson.

The amended complaint contains no specific allegations against defendants Carey, 

Simpson, Thompson, Vicente and Alysworth. The Civil Rights Act under which this action was

filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Because plaintiff has failed to link defendants Carey, Simpson, Thompson,

Vicente and Alysworth to the alleged deprivations, the claims against these defendants are

dismissed. 

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Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. The amended complaint is dismissed but for the claims against defendants

Hightower, Blackwell, Irving, Long, Robinson; plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of

this order to file a third amended complaint; if plaintiff does not file a second amended complaint

within that time, the court will issue further orders. 

4. Plaintiff’s August 21, 2006, motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: 11/8/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

trah2368.1

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