Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00012/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00012-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL EARLE BOYER, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

ANNE FRANCES PETERS, ) 

 )

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00012-AWI-SMS

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN

THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER (Doc. 12)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

SERVE A COPY OF THIS ORDER ON ANN

FRANCES PETERS

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304. After the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint

with leave to amend, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint

(FAC) on March 29, 2006.

I. Screening the Complaint

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990); Lewis v.

ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1998).

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The

test for malice is a subjective one that requires the Court to

determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good faith.

Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see

Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1986). A

lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive suits

filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free

filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984).

II. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

In the first amended complaint (FAC), Plaintiff names as

defendants the state of California, Kern County Sheriff’s

Department, attorney Daniel Jon Tobias, attorney Jamie Gelber,

and Anne Frances Peters. Plaintiff complains of proceedings in

state court. It is not clear, but it appears that Plaintiff is

complaining of both civil and criminal proceedings. Plaintiff

seeks dismissal of an unspecified stay order and a nunc pro tunc

accounting of the Wheeler Ranch property. He also seeks

injunctive relief, and compensatory damages for abuse of process,

as well as punitive damages based on Defendant’s evil motive or

intent, or reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s

rights, including Plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Plaintiff alleged that court clerk Johnna Nunn, who is not

named as a defendant, concealed minute orders and records from

“client” (Cmplt. at p. 2), which revealed evidence of court

actors’ fabrication of the record that a negotiated or

anticipated settlement occurred. He appears to allege that the

clerk incorrectly noted that the parties stipulated that the

clerk need not take down the details of the agreement and would

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

rely on the court reporter’s transcript; he could not possibly

understand the language in the transcript. Plaintiff alleges that

he was not aware he was in open court and that thus any

settlement was unauthorized or involuntary. He also refers to

Nunn’s having presented a misleading mock record and having

concealed unspecified minute orders.

With respect to attorney Tobias, Plaintiff appears to be

alleging that he was misled by attorney Tobias by deliberate

deceit that the procedure (apparently a reference to an agreement

or settlement that was put on the record in open court) would

allow Plaintiff to contest the judge’s orders by trial, and that

unspecified orders remained unimplemented as was promised.

Plaintiff referred to unspecified unauthorized submissions from

Tobias and Tobias’s failure to obtain a necessary continuance on

February 28, 2001. Again, the precise nature of the proceedings

in question is not specified.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Peters knew that an

initiated complaint was groundless and made unspecified

misrepresentations to Deputy Thatcher to “gain suspect status on

[Plaintiff] and a collateral advantage over the property.” (Id.

at 5.)

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Gelber, Peters, and Tobias

all made unspecified utterances on the record that “can be

evidentiary in a case of malicious abuse of process.” He refers

to bringing evidence to light that would prove the fraud and

intent of the actors.

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Larry Thatcher was aware of

numerous witnesses and/or corroborators of false domestic

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

violence allegations but refused to acknowledge his findings and

knowingly avoided timely investigation and concealed untimely

report with knowledge that concealment of an exculpatory but

biased report would deprive Plaintiff of fair due process. The

sheriff’s four-day delay in investigating, threats and fraud, and

false statements of Petitioner caused there to be errors in the

report that were used by the prosecutor and judge against

Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Thatcher knowingly excluded

from an unspecified report witnesses to an assault and a plot by

Petitioner (understood as Defendant Peters) on Plaintiff. The

evidence was allegedly referred to by a prosecutor who “jailed”

Plaintiff. There is a reference to Thatcher’s testifying on

September 13, 2005, immediately followed by a reference to a

prosecutor. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of equal protection

and his right to redress as a result of the concerted unlawful

and malicious conspiracy of all Defendants; Defendants

maliciously used a legal process to accomplish some ulterior

purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was

not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed. 

III. Rule 8 Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) calls for a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief. Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice pleading,

whereby the pleader need only give the opposing party fair notice

of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule

8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a

plaintiff may ultimately rely upon at trial, but only a statement

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. at

47.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy Rule 8's minimal

standard of notice pleading because it is ambiguous and unclear.

IV. Section 1983 Claim

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.

1986).

Further, the statute plainly requires that there be an

actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit

has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

V. Claim against the State of California

Plaintiff names the state of California as a Defendant but

does not state any facts concerning the conduct of Defendant

state of California. Plaintiff has not linked this Defendant to

any conduct resulting in deprivation of rights.

More fundamentally, a state is not a person for the purpose

of an action pursuant to § 1983; hence, a section 1983 claim

against a state is legally frivolous. Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997). Further, a state has

immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Brooks v. Sulphur

Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff’s claim against the state must be dismissed.

VI. Claim Pertaining to Criminal Prosecution

The complaint refers to Plaintiff’s being imprisoned.

Because Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear and ambiguous, the

extent to which Plaintiff seeks relief concerning arrest,

charging, conviction, imprisonment, or other consequences from a

criminal conviction is uncertain. However, it may be the

Plaintiff is seeking damages or injunctive relief with respect to

an injury that was a result of Plaintiff’s being convicted of a

criminal offense.

When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his

custody, or raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle

him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of

habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young

v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct.

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

1090 (1991). Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), a § 1983 action that would call into question

the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not

cognizable and does not, therefore, accrue until and unless the

plaintiff can prove that his conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal. The Heck principle applies to claims

that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction

that might have resulted form the prosecution of the dismissed

charge, including pending charges in addition to actual

convictions. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir.

2000). It applies generally to charges of unlawful or false

arrest. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380

(9th Cir. 1998); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d at 1014-15.

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims relate to a

criminal prosecution, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed

because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the conviction has

been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

VII. Claim against Kern County Sheriff’s Department

Plaintiff alleges conduct by Deputy Sheriff Larry Thatcher,

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

but Thatcher is not named as a Defendant; rather, the Sheriff’s

Department was named. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege facts concerning any

conduct engaged in by the County that would subject it to

liability under § 1983. The Court notes that a local governmental

unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees

under a respondeat superior theory of liability; a county could

be liable for its own actions in the nature of policy or customs,

factual circumstances which Plaintiff has not alleged. See Bd. of

County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating a claim against the

Sheriff’s Department.

VIII. Claim against Attorney Jamie Gelber

Plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct by Defendant

Gelber that resulted in any violation of rights of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alludes to inaccurate, falsified documents drafted by

attorney Gelber, but Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of

this conduct deprived Plaintiff of a federally protected right. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant

Gelber.

IX. Claim against Attorney Jon Tobias

Plaintiff alludes to inaccurate, falsified documents drafted

by attorney Tobias; redundant submissions intended to defeat

Plaintiff; and being misled deliberately by Tobias that an

unspecified procedure would permit Plaintiff to contest the

judge’s orders by trial. Further, unspecified orders remained

unimplemented.

A. Action under Color of State Law

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

The capacity in which Tobias acted is unclear; it is not

known whether he was a public defender, other appointed attorney,

or private counsel. It is further unclear whether Tobias’s

conduct related to a civil proceeding, criminal proceeding, or

both.

In order to recover under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and

prove that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive

Plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal

statute. Karim-Panahi v.Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, private parties are not acting

under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-

08 (9th Cir. 1991). Likewise, it is established that a public

defender does not act under color of state law when performing a

lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a

criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317,

325 (1981); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).

Thus, no claim against attorney Tobias is stated because of

Plaintiff’s failure to allege action under color of state law. 

B. Conspiracy

Action taken by private individuals may be under color of

state law where there is significant state involvement in the

action. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1983).

Further, a conspiracy between a private party and a state

official to deprive others of constitutional rights may result in

action by a private party under color of state law, but to prove

a conspiracy between the state and private parties under section

1983, the Plaintiff must allege an agreement or meeting of the

minds to violate constitutional rights; each participant in the

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each

participant must at least share the common objective of the

conspiracy. United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d

1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The defendants must by

some concerted action have intended to accomplish some unlawful

objective for the purpose of harming another which results in

damage. Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192

F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff must allege some facts with respect to the

conspiracy. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant

to section 1983, such a complaint must “allege specific facts to

support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” 

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.

1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants

conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of

California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Here, Plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff believes actors were collectively motivated

to obtain an unfavorable outcome through artifice in

order to conceal misdeeds of sheriffs and attorneys that

actors intended to avoid inaccurate, falsified, and

concealed documents drafted by Sheriffs, Attorneys

Gelber and Tobias, and Anne Frances Peters.

(FAC at 1-2.) This amounts to nothing more than a statement of

belief as to a legal conclusion; it is not an allegation of fact.

Plaintiff further alleges:

As a result of the concerted unlawful and malicious

conspiracy of all Defendants, Boyer was deprived of

his right to equal protection of the laws, right to

redress, and the due course of justice was impeded, in

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

Constitution of the United States.

(FAC at 2.) Again, these allegations are bereft of facts

regarding the existence of a conspiracy. Plaintiff also alleged:

Defendants maliciously used a “legal process to

accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not

designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate 

purpose for the particular process employed.”

This allegation amounts to a legal conclusion, not an allegation

of fact. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing an agreement

or a meeting of the minds that would amount to a conspiracy that

would render otherwise private action cognizable under § 1983 as

action taken under color of state law.

X. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process

 Claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest are not

cognizable as substantive due process violations; rather the

plaintiff must allege the denial of equal protection or another

specific constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2004); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 271 & n. 4 (1984). 

In this circuit, generally a malicious prosecution claim is

not cognizable under § 1983 if process is available in the state

judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, when a

malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a

person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended

to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights, such as

a conspiracy to convict on groundless charges by perjury and

falsification of evidence with the intent to deny a fair trial,

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

then an exception to the general rule exists. Johnson v. Barker,

799 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) A malicious prosecution claim

under § 1983 is based on state law elements. Usher, 828 F.2d at

562. The essential elements of malicious prosecution in both

criminal and civil contexts are 1) that the prior proceeding

commenced by or at the direction of the malicious prosecution

defendant; 2) the proceeding was pursued to a legal termination

favorable to the plaintiff; 3) the prior proceeding was brought

without probable cause; and 4) the prior proceeding was initiated

with malice. Ayala v. KC Environmental Health, –F.Supp.2d —, 2006

WL 845754 at *9 (E.D.Cal. March 30, 2006) (citing Villa v. Cole,

4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1335 (1992)). Thus, to prevail, a malicious

prosecution plaintiff must show that the defendant prosecuted her

with malice and without probable cause, and for the purpose of

denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional

right. Freeman v. City of Sanata Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th

Cir. 1995). Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to

suits brought against prosecutors but may be brought against

other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2004)

(citing Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2002). Despite the presumption that a decision to

prosecute a criminal case is the independent decision of the

prosecutor, a claim may be brought against state or local

officials who improperly exert pressure on the prosecutor,

knowingly provide misinformation to the prosecutor, conceal

exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engage in wrongful or bad

faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

initiation of legal proceedings. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067;

Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1126-27.

Here, Plaintiff does not name Deputy Thatcher. However,

Plaintiff appears to allege that some criminal imprisonment or

penalty followed action by the deputy sheriff, attorneys, and

court personnel. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to

allege a malicious prosecution claim, he has not alleged

favorable termination of the criminal proceeding or a lack of

probable cause.

Further, Plaintiff has not alleged false evidence or perjury

or other corruption of due process of law. Plaintiff has not

shown that the judicial process of the state is unavailable to

provide a remedy for the alleged abuse of process. He has not

alleged intentional denial of a constitutional right or denial of

such a right.

XI. Defendant Anne Frances Peters

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Peters made utterances on

the record claiming unspecified evidence, witnesses, and hideous

injuries, and that the utterances could be “evidentiary in a case

of malicious abuse of process.” (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff alleges

that Peters knew that “the complaint,” the precise nature of

which is unclear, was groundless and made misrepresentations to

Deputy Thatcher to make Plaintiff a suspect and to gain an

advantage to obtain Plaintiff’s property. He states that

Defendant maliciously used a legal process to accomplish an

ulterior purpose, apparently, to obtain property.

With respect to a malicious prosecution action, Plaintiff

has failed to allege a favorable termination or lack of probable

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

cause. It is not clear that he has alleged that Defendant Peters

actually directed or instituted a proceeding against Plaintiff.

Indeed, the nature of the proceedings is unclear. Plaintiff has

not alleged that the judicial process of the state courts are

unavailable to Plaintiff. Even indulging all inferences in

Plaintiff’s favor and construing the FAC liberally, Plaintiff’s

complaint is not a plain statement of facts as required by Rule

8. 

Further, as previously noted, Plaintiff has not alleged

facts indicating that Peters acted under color of state law.

Given the uncertainty of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning

Peterson and the proceedings that she initiated or in which she

was involved, Plaintiff’s allegations do not suffice.

XII. Conspiracy

Section 1985(3) states, in relevant part,

If two or more persons... conspire... for the purpose of

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws... the party so AAA

deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages

occasioned by such... deprivation, against any one or more of the

conspirators. “The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: (1) the

existence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal

protection of the laws; (2) an act in furtherance of the

conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer,

Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) The United States

Supreme Court has held that in a § 1985(3) action, a claimant

must show “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'

action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation

of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.”

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29

L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that

“ § 1985(3) extends ‘beyond race only when the class in question

can show that there has been a governmental determination that

its members require and warrant special federal assistance in

protecting their civil rights.’” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207,

1217 n. 4 (9th Cir.2001).

Plaintiff’s complaint, construed liberally, does not allege

the requisite discrimination upon which a § 1985(3) claim could

be based.

XIII. Motion of Defendant Peters

The Court notes that on April 4, 2006, Defendant Peters

filed a document styled as a motion but consisting of a request

to permit Defendant Peters to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint

despite not being properly served. It appears that Peters learned

of the complaint when Plaintiff served a document on her. 

Peters’ request is premature in that before the Court will

authorize service of Plaintiff’s complaint on any defendant,

including Defendant Peters, the Court must complete screening the

complaint, which in this case will involve at the least

Plaintiff’s filing a second amended complaint pursuant to this

order, the Court’s review of the second amended complaint once it

is filed, and the Court’s issuance of a screening order that

identifies the cognizable claims stated and authorizes service.

Before service is authorized, service is not to occur. Therefore,

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Defendant Peters is at this time not in default.

The Clerk IS DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order on Ann

Frances Peters at Post Office Box 661, Inyokern, California

93527. 

XIV. Amendment of the Complaint

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim and has failed to plead facts demonstrating

jurisdiction in this Court. However, it is possible that

Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent with the

allegations, in support of the claim or claims that would entitle

him to relief. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff one more

opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies of

this complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint to cure the

deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without

leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id.

In addition, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended

complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED; and

2) The Clerk IS DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order on

Ann Frances Peters at the address stated in part XIII of this

order; and 

3) Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of service

of this order in which to file a second amended complaint that

complies with the requirements of the pertinent substantive law,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of

Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number

assigned this case and must be labeled "Second Amended

Complaint"; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance

with this order will be considered to be a failure to comply with

an order of the Court pursuant to Local Rule 11-110 and will

result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 14 Filed 05/02/06 Page 19 of 19