Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-20429/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-20429-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

**E-Filed 7/17/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PAUL A. REDD, JR.,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

STEVEN CAMBRA, JR., et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 98-20429 JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 91]

Defendant Correctional Officer M. Daley (“Daley”) brings a renewed motion for

summary judgment in this civil rights action. The Court has considered the moving and

opposing papers and the evidence submitted in connection therewith. For the reasons discussed

below, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from an incident that occurred while Plaintiff Paul A. Redd, Jr.

(“Redd”) was incarcerated in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) at Pelican Bay State Prison in

Crescent City, California. On July 24, 1995, Daley and another officer escorted Redd and other

SHU inmates to the prison law library. As was customary, the inmates were handcuffed with

their hands behind their backs, and the handcuffs were attached at intervals to a single chain. On

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

the day in question, Redd was the last man on a six-man chain. A seventh inmate who was

confined in a wheelchair was not put on the chain, but followed closely behind the chain as the

group proceeded to the law library. Upon their arrival, Daley began unhooking the inmates from

the chain one at a time and directing them to assigned study cells. Redd alleges that Daley

unlocked the first four inmates, then skipped the fifth inmate to unlock him. Redd further alleges

that as he was proceeding to his assigned study cell, with his hands still cuffed behind his back,

Daley deliberately kicked the escort chain into his path. Daley states that he cannot remember in

what order he unlocked the inmates and that he has no recollection of kicking the escort chain. 

Daley further states that if he did kick the chain it must have been a reflexive action, that he had

never had any contact with Redd prior to the day in question, and that he had no intent to harm

Redd.

However the incident occurred, there is no dispute that Redd fell and sustained injuries,

including a gash over his left eye. He was taken by wheelchair to the medical clinic for

treatment, then was returned to the prison law library. Later the same day he complained of pain

in his jaw and was reexamined. He was referred for treatment to the dental clinic, and was

treated there the following day for a cracked molar.

Redd filed four administrative appeals relating to this incident, identified by log numbers

95-07011, 95-07012, 05-06935 and 95-06936. In appeal number 95-07011, Redd stated that he

was making a citizen’s complaint against supervisors and staff who refused to use appropriate

safety precautions. In the space for “action requested,” he wrote “Properly instruct all assigned

and relief law library staffs [sic] on controlling and keeping escort chains from hallway walkway

when chaining or releasing prisoners to assigned study cells to prevent future violent fall

incidents to staffs [sic] and prisoners that cause injuries, pain, broken bones and suffering as I

have experienced.” Complaint Exhibit# 2. In appeal number 95-07012, he complained that

Daley’s report on the incident, a copy of which he had received, was incomplete. Under “action

requested,” he asked that the warden instruct Sergeant Lucas (“Lucas”), who was in charge of the

law library, to have each staff member present at the time of Redd’s fall write a full report with

diagrams. He specifically requested that Daley be directed to write a full report stating that he

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 In her declaration filed in support of Defendants’ motion, McLaughlin states that she 1

prepared this statement on July 25, 2004. However, the report bears the date “8-10-95” on its

last line.

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ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

caused the escort chain to be in Redd’s path. In appeal number 95-06935, Redd alleged that the

video cameras inside the law library recorded his fall and requested that the tape be preserved

and that he be given a copy of the tape. In appeal number 95-06936, Redd again claimed that his

injuries had been videotaped on the day of the incident at his request, and asked for a copy of the

videotape.

All four appeals were combined at the first level of review and assigned to Lieutenant

Briddle (“Briddle”), the supervisor responsible for overseeing the operations of C Facility of the

SHU, for a first level response. Briddle interviewed Redd and Daley about the incident. He also

spoke with Deidre McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”), a dental assistant at the prison dental clinic. 

McLaughlin approached Briddle on July 25, 2004 and told him that she had been at the dental

clinic that day and had heard Redd discussing the incident with the dentist; that she had been at

the law library the previous day and actually witnessed Redd’s fall; and that her recollection of

the incident differed sharply from Redd’s account. McLaughlin hand-wrote a statement

regarding Redd’s fall. In this statement, she indicated that on July 24, 2004 she was on her way

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to the law library but stopped at “the desk” because inmates were being released and taken into

cells, blocking her entry. She stated that she saw Redd purposely loop his foot in the escort

chain, walk a few steps and then drop to the ground. She further stated that when she was at the

dental clinic the following day, Redd stated that he was a victim of negligence that resulted in a

broken tooth and asked to have the tooth extracted. Finally, she expressed the opinion that Redd

intended to falsify an incident in order to create a lawsuit against the State.

The first level response with respect to Redd’s four combined appeals was issued in

August 1995. The appeal decision was “Partially Granted.” The response stated that no

information or evidence supported any findings of misconduct, negligence or unprofessional

behavior on the part of Daley and that contrary information indicated that Redd purposely injured

himself. Accordingly, Redd’s requests for copies of the video taken of his injuries, for

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number 95-06935, was not addressed.

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

administrative action against Daley, and that Daley submit further documentation stating that he

had caused Redd’s injury were denied. His requests that the circumstances of the incident be

documented and that staff be advised of safety precautions were “Partially Granted.” Redd 2

pursued his appeals to the second level of review (warden’s level) and to the final level of review

(director’s level), where further relief was denied. 

In September 1995, Redd filed a fifth appeal, identified by log number 95-08583. In that

appeal, Redd stated that he was making a citizen’s complaint against McLaughlin for writing a

false report. Under “action requested,” he asked that the warden designate an official above the

rank of lieutenant to investigate his complaint throughly; that the warden personally review the

videotape of Redd’s fall in the prison library; and that McLaughlin’s employment be terminated. 

Appeal number 95-08583 was assigned to Briddle for a first level response. That appeal was

denied at the first level and assigned to S. Upton for a second level of review, at which time it

was screened out as duplicative of Redd’s prior appeals.

Also in September 1995, Redd filed a sixth appeal, identified by log number 95-0882. 

Defendants have no copy of that appeal and no record as to its nature. Redd asserts that it was a

complaint against Briddle and Long for handling the first five appeals improperly. The appeal

was assigned to Long for a first level response and was denied. It was assigned to Upton for a

second level of review, and, like the appeal regarding McLaughlin, was screened out as

duplicative of Redd’s prior appeals.

Redd filed the instant action on December 27, 1996. He filed the operative amended

complaint on May 5, 1997. Approximately one year later, the case was assigned to this Court. A

number of motions were filed by both sides, and on August 3, 1999, this Court issued an order

(“August 3rd Order”) clarifying the status of the action and stating that Redd had asserted the

following cognizable claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: deliberate indifference in violation of

the Eighth Amendment against, Daley and Lucas; and retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment against, Briddle, Long and McLaughlin; and various state law claims. Aug. 3rd

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 This was the first motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 45 3

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Order 4. On August 31, 1999, Defendants moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment with

respect to all claims. Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not show that his First Amendment

rights were chilled as a result of the alleged retaliation, that Plaintiff had not stated a cognizable

retaliation claim, that Plaintiff could not bring pendent state claims since he did not file a timely

state tort claim, and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

3

On October 26, 1999 the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion

(“October 26th Order”). The Court first concluded that it should treat the motion as a motion for

summary judgment rather than dismissal. The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants

as to Redd’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, First Amendment retaliation, and state

law claims. The Court also held that Redd’s Eighth Amendment claim could be classified as an

excessive force claim, and that Redd had identified witnesses who stated that Daley’s eyewitness

was not present when the incident occurred, and that Daley kicked the escort chain directly into

Redd’s path, causing him to fall. October 26th Order 8. The Court concluded that there was a

“triable issue of material fact as to whether Daley deliberately kicked the escort chain into Redd’s

path.” Id. 8. The remaining claims were dismissed. 

On March 7, 2005 Daley filed the instant renewed motion for summary judgment on

Redd’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Daley argues that his conduct did not

constitute excessive use of force, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Daley argues that

the unsigned affidavits attached to Redd’s opposition to the instant motion are inadmissible, that

Redd cannot create a triable issue of fact by submitting a statement that contradicts his prior

deposition, and that lay witnesses are not qualified to offer an opinion regarding Daley’s mental

state. Redd opposes the motion. 

Redd has submitted a number of affidavits from eyewitnesses. Redd attached signed

affidavits from witnesses Terflinger, Rodgers, Taylor, and Mosely (collectively “Complaint

Affidavits”) to his complaint. See docket no. 1. Terflinger states that “as Paul Redd walked to

the assigned study cell, Officer M. Daley pushed the lengthy escort chain away from his feet in

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 Redd did not provide a Signed Affidavit by Rodgers 4

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

the direct path of Paul Redd, who immediately slipped on the chain,” Terflinger Complaint

Affidavit 2, and that “Dental Assistant Deidre McLaughlin was never present in the law library

on July 24, 1995.” Terflinger Complaint Affidavit 1. Rodgers states that “other prisoners and

correctional staff members slip and/or fall on the escort security chain that officers leave lying on

the floor in the pathway.” Rodgers Complaint Affidavit 3. Redd has attached unsigned

affidavits by Terflinger, Rodgers, and Mosley (collectively, “Unsigned Affidavits”) to his

opposition to the instant motion. In his unsigned affidavit, Mosley states that “while

Correctional Officer Daley unhooked each prisoner, he held the chain in his left hand until he got

directly behind the fifth prisoner.” Mosley Unsigned Affidavit 2, and that “[Daley] looked at

Plaintiff and then looked down at the pile of chain and intentionally kicked the chain directly into

Plaintiff’s walkway, causing Plaintiff to step on the chain and fall.” Id. Redd later provided

signed affidavits from Terflinger and Mosley (collectively “Signed Affidavits”) that are

otherwise identical to the Unsigned Affidavits. 

4

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56©; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the

initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate

the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents

evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that

party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49;

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Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen’s Union of Pac., 777 F.2d 1390, 1398, Fn.3 (9th Cir. 5

1985) does not apply to the instant case. There the court denied a party’s attempt to admit an

unsigned affidavit. However, the court ruled that the affidavit was inadmissible because the

content of the affidavit contained inadmissible legal conclusions that violated Rule 701 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. 

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

In the October 26th Order, the Court found a triable issue as to whether Daley used

excessive force. October 26th Order 8. By the instant motion Daley asks the Court to revisit that

determination in light of additional legal arguments and intervening changes in the law with

respect to judicial immunity. After considering the motion anew, the Court reaffirms the

conclusion that Redd has presented sufficient, admissible evidence to create a material issue of

fact as to his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. 

B. Unsigned Affidavits 

Daley asserts that there is no genuine issue of material fact because Redd’s Unsigned

Affidavits are inadmissible. Reply 2. The Court may consider affidavits in summary judgment

proceedings that were originally unsigned if they later are signed. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240,

242 (9th Cir. 1989). In Sanchez, plaintiff submitted unsigned affidavits to the court on October

7, 1987 with a notation that he would send signed ones at a later date. Id. The affidavits were

signed on October 21, 1987, and the court entered summary judgment on March 11, 1988. Id.

The court held that the time between March 11 and October 21 was not so long that the

defendant was prejudiced by the court’s consideration of the signed affidavits. Id. In the instant

case, Plaintiff filed the Unsigned Affidavits with his opposition on August 26, 2005. Plaintiff

filed Terflinger’s signed affidavit on January 26, 2007 and actually had filed Mosley’s signed

affidavit on August 17, 2005, nine days before filing the unsigned version. The delay in filing

Terflinger’s signed affidavit is unfortunate, but Redd had attached signed affidavits by Mosely,

Rodgers, Taylor, and Terflinger to his complaint that contained substantially the same content.5

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 Docket Nos. 111 and 117 6

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Daley will not be prejudiced if the Court considers the

signed affidavits of Mosely and Terflinger. 

C. Prior Contradictions in Testimony

Next, Daley argues that Redd is attempting to create a dispute of fact by contradicting his

own deposition testimony. Daley asserts that Redd stated at his deposition that Daley allowed

the escort chain to drop to the floor each time he unlocked a prisoner. Reply 3. Now, according

to Daley, Redd is claiming that Daley held the escort chain in his hand, and never let it drop until

he was behind the fifth prisoner. Id. Daley asserts that whether he held or dropped the chain is

significant because if Daley had dropped the chain then it would have been impossible for him to

kick it onto Redd’s walking path. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, before the Court will disallow a

statement when considering summary judgment, a party must show that the conflict between

deposition testimony with later statements is a sham attempt to create an issue of fact. Kennedy

v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991). Daley provides insufficient evidence

to support a finding that any of Redd’s latest statements is a sham. Moreover, regardless of

whether Redd made different statements as to whether Daley held or dropped the escort chain

before kicking it, Redd provided his signed affidavits from witnesses who state “Officer Daley

did not drop the chain to the floor until he was directly behind the fifth prisoner.” Terflinger

Signed Affidavit 2. Accordingly, the Court concludes that any contradictions by Redd are 6

insufficient to support summary judgment. 

D. Lay Witnesses Not Qualified to Offer an Opinion on Defendant’s Mental State 

Daley asserts that Redd’s witnesses are not qualified to offer an opinion regarding

Daley’s mental state at the time of the incident. Daley relies on Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, which states:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness testimony in the form of

opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)

rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear

understanding of the witness testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and

© not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the

scope of Rule 702.

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Fed. R. Evid. 710. The inference that Daley kicked the chain intentionally is rationally based on

the perceptions reported by the witnesses of the incident at issue. Accordingly, the affidavits are

not barred by Rule 701. 

E. Qualified Immunity 

Finally, Daley argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. A determination as to an

officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity involves a two-pronged inquiry. First, do the facts

alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendant’s

conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Sorrels v.

McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a

constitutional right, was that right clearly established? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Sorrels, 290

F.3d at 969. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. This inquiry is wholly objective; the

defendant’s subjective belief as to the lawfulness of his or her conduct is irrelevant. Sorrels, 290

F.3d at 970. As the Court held in the October 26th Order, there is a triable issue of fact as to

whether Daley used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. It would be clear to a

reasonable officer that intentionally kicking an escort chain into the pathway of a handcuffed

inmate to trip him is unlawful conduct. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Redd has raised a

sufficient issue of material fact as to qualified immunity to prevent application of that defense at

the summary judgment stage. 

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED. The parties shall submit pretrial statements within ninety days

of the issuance of this order. 

DATED: July 17, 2007

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C-98-20429-JF

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Copies of Order served on:

Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Allen Robert Crown: allen.crown@doj.ca.gov, ecfcoordinator@doj.ca.gov;

docketingsfawt@doj.ca.gov; delia.desuyo@doj.ca.gov; sandee.agustin@doj.ca.gov;

maricris.argarin@doj.ca.gov 

Paul D. Gifford: paul.gifford@doj.ca.gov, rhonda.owens@doj.ca.gov 

Catherine A. McBrien: catherine.mcbrien@doj.ca.gov, 

Julianne Mossler: Julianne.Mossler@doj.ca.gov, lucille.santos@doj.ca.gov,

docketingSFCLS@doj.ca.gov 

Notice will be delivered by other means to:

David P. Druliner 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Bill Lockyer 

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Paul A. Redd, Jr

C6 114

CSP-Sacramento

CA State Prison-Folsom(New)

P O Box 290066

Represa, CA 95671

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