Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01576/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01576-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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 For the reasons discussed below, the Court cannot yet rule on the cross-motions for

summary judgment.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

The State of Arizona, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

-andMonica Kuhlt, a single woman,

Plaintiff-Intervenor 

vs.

City of Cottonwood, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-11-1576-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Declaration of Roger

E. Millsap (Doc. 36).1

 For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied and Defendants will

be granted thirty days to provide evidence rebutting Dr. Millsap’s conclusions.

BACKGROUND

This case involves, among other things, whether a physical fitness test used by the

City of Cottonwood, Arizona (“the City”) to screen police promotional applicants has a

disparate impact on women. The standards for the exam were developed by Fitness

Case 2:11-cv-01576-GMS Document 40 Filed 06/01/12 Page 1 of 5
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Intervention Technologies (“FIT”) after a series of physical tests were performed on law

enforcement officers in Arizona. (Doc. 23 ¶ 9). The test was later implemented by the

Cottonwood Police Department (“CPD”) as a minimal requirement for all officers, though

officers were given three years to train up to the standards of the test. (Doc. 25-16, Ex. 10).

At around the same time that the test was adopted for all officers, CPD included the test as

a requirement for those applying to one of two open sergeant positions. (Doc. 23-1, Ex. C).

Plaintiff Monica Kuhlt applied for a promotion to sergeant, received the second highest score

on the written and oral exams, but failed the physical fitness exam. (Doc. 23 ¶ 32). She later

filed a complaint with the Arizona Civil Rights Division (“CRD”), which eventually led to

this litigation.

At issue currently is a supplemental declaration by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Roger E.

Millsap. (Doc. 33-1. Ex. 1). In Dr. Millsap’s original expert report, he focused on whether

the validation study conducted by FIT demonstrated that the fitness test served a business

necessity for promotion to sergeant in the CPC. (Doc. 36-1). He did not address whether the

results in the underlying study demonstrated that women passed the test at lower rate then

men, though he had stated in his deposition that “[t]here’s a huge difference. There’s no

question of impact. So it wasn’t so ambiguous here.” (Doc.37-1, Ex. B at 36:7–9). In their

Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants stated that the underlying

statistics reported in the FIT study are inadmissible hearsay, and that no other evidence

adequately supports Plaintiffs’ prima facie case that the test has a disparate impact on

women. (Doc. 27 at 2–5). In their reply, Plaintiffs included a supplemental declaration by Dr.

Millsap, analyzing the pass rates for men and women reported in the FIT study. It found that

on each of six of the seven test physical tests that make up the total fitness exam, the

probability that the disparities reported were a product of chance was less than two-onethousandths of a percent. (Doc. 33-1, Ex. 1-A). Defendants have moved to strike Dr.

Millsap’s declaration because it contains expert opinions that were not properly disclosed and

because it contains new evidence that has impermissibly been submitted as part of a reply

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2

 Defendants’ have moved to strike the Declaration of “Rodney E. Millsap.” The

declaration was in fact made by “Roger E. Millsap.” (Doc. 36).

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brief.2 Defendants have not submitted any evidence rebutting the contention that women pass

the FIT test at a rate lower than men. Instead, they argue that the number of people who

actually took the test makes up too small a sample from which to conclude that the test has

any disparate impact on women.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

A party may not use information that it failed to provide as required by Rule 26(a) or

(e) unless the failure “was substantially justified or is harmless.” FED.R.CIV. P. 37(c)(1). In

proving that the failure was substantially justified or harmless, “the burden is on the party

facing sanctions.” Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008). In

crafting sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1), the “district courts have wide latitude.” Harris v.

United States, 132 Fed. Appx. 183, 184 (9th Cir. 2005). The factors to consider when

determining whether a failure to disclose evidence was substantially justified or harmless are

as follows: “1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2)

the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and

(4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Russell v.

Daiichi-Sankyo, Inc., 2012 WL 1085038, at *5 (May 17, 2012) (quoting Lanard Toys Ltd.

v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010)).

2. Analysis

Failing to disclose Dr. Millsap’s analysis was substantially justified. From the moment

that Detective Kuhlt first wrote to then-acting Chief Jody Fanning, Defendants have

acknowledged that the fitness standards have a disparate impact on women. Chief Fanning

wrote a letter to Detective Kuhlt stating that the FIT study “found that there is a disparate

impact on women with these standards.” (Doc. 30-3, Ex. P-4). Later, after CRD made a

finding on Det. Kuhlt’s complaint, the City itself wrote a letter to the CRD stating that “[t]o

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be clear, the City does not dispute the fact that the physical fitness standards set forth in

General Order 206 have a disparate impact on women.” (Doc. 25-19, Ex. 23). Defendants’

own expert, in rebutting Dr. Millsap’s initial report, appears to concede that the test showed

a disparate impact on women, writing that “the results of past validation show the same trend

of female inability to perform essential physical functions.” (Doc. 33-2, Ex. 1-C at 14). As

Defendants note, the purpose of disclosing expert opinions “is to prevent unfair surprise at

trial and to permit the opposing party to prepare for the expert’s cross-examination.” Stamas

v. Cty. of Madera, CV-09-00753 LJO, 2011 WL 826330, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011).

Defendants cannot have been surprised by Dr. Millsap’s conclusions.

It was reasonable for Plaintiffs to take Defendants at their word when they stated, in

writing, that “the City does not dispute the fact that the physical fitness standards set forth

in General Order 206 have a disparate impact on women.” (Doc. 25-19, Ex. 23). Given this

perfectly reasonable reliance, it is understandable that Dr. Millsap did not undertake a

statistical analysis of a test when the results showed “a huge difference” in pass rates

between men and women. (Doc. 37-1, Ex. B at 36:7). Dr. Millsap’s statistical confirmation

of conclusions that Defendants have previously conceded and now wish to challenge simply

does not “prejudice or surprise” Defendants, nor does it suggest that a trial will be disrupted,

nor does it show “bad faith or willfulness” on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Russell, 2012 WL

1085038, at *5. Plaintiffs had apparently been operating under the assumption that when

Defendants stated that they did not dispute the issue of disparate impact they had no intention

of later contesting the issue. The fact that the assumption was in error is not evidence of bad

faith on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Defendants accurately state that they have had no opportunity to rebut Dr. Millsap’s

conclusions, and the Court must consider “the ability of that party to cure the prejudice”

caused by an untimely disclosure. Russell, 2012 WL 1085038, at *5. Defendants therefore

will be granted thirty days to provide any expert report either rebutting Dr. Millsap’s

conclusions or otherwise contesting that the FIT study demonstrated that the physical fitness

standards had a disparate impact on women who took the test.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to strike the Declaration of Roger Millsap (Doc. 36) is

denied.

2. Defendants shall have (30) thirty days from the date of this Order to submit

any evidence rebutting Dr. Millsap’s conclusion or otherwise suggesting that the FIT

standards do not have a disparate impact on female test-takers.

DATED this 1st day of June, 2012.

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