Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01821/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01821-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Securities Violation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANDREW HALL, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MEDICIS PHARMACEUTICAL

CORP., et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

STEAMFITTERS LOCAL 449

PENSION FUND, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MEDICIS PHARMACEUTICAL

CORP., et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

DARLENE OLIVER, individually and

on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MEDICIS PHARMACEUTICAL

CORP., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-1821-PHX-GMS

ORDER

No. CV-08-1870-PHX-DKD

No. CV-08-1964-PHX-JAT

Case 2:08-cv-01821-GMS Document 40 Filed 03/11/09 Page 1 of 11
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Pending before the Court are two motions to consolidate cases, appoint lead plaintiff,

and appoint lead counsel, the first filed by Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Fund

(“Steamfitters”) (Dkt. # 6) and the second filed by Steven Rand (Dkt. # 9). For the following

reasons, the Court grants both motions with respect to consolidation, and otherwise denies

Steamfitters’ motion and grants Rand’s motion.

BACKGROUND

There are currently three class action complaints filed in this District against

Defendants: Hall v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-01821; Steamfitters

Local 449 Pension Fund v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-01870; and

Oliver v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-01964. Each of the complaints

asserts violations of the federal securities laws stemming from Defendants’ allegedly false

and misleading financial statements about its revenue and earnings. According to the

complaints, Defendants’ actions caused members of the class to purchase securities at

artificially inflated prices. Each plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violated sections

10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (Supp. 2008); see

also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

DISCUSSION

Steamfitters and Rand have both moved the Court to consolidate the three cases, and

they each request that they be designated lead plaintiff and that their counsel be appointed

lead counsel. The Court will address each of these requests in turn.

I. Consolidation

Under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, consolidation is appropriate

“[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact.” Likewise, under

the PSLRA, consolidation is appropriate “[i]f more than one action on behalf of a class

asserting substantially the same claim or claims arising under this chapter has been filed.”

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2008).

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The three cases at issue here all involve common questions of both law and fact, and

they all assert substantially the same claim. All three center on the nature of the information

provided by Defendants in their press releases and fiscal reports between October 30, 2003,

and September 24, 2008, Defendants’ subsequent disclosure that its financial statements

would need to be restated, and whether Defendants’ conduct violated provisions of the

securities laws. No party has opposed consolidation of these cases, and the Court finds

consolidation appropriate under these circumstances. SeeAronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,

79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“It seems obvious that fifty-four separate class

actions predicated on the same set of misstatements by corporate officials, causing an

artificial inflation and then a corrective drop in share prices, present common questions of

fact.”); see also In re MicroStrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 431 (E.D. Va.

2000) (“[C]onsolidation is often warranted where multiple securities fraud class actions ‘are

based on the same public statements and reports.’”) (quoting Werner v. Satterlee, Stephens,

Burke & Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1196, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). Steamfitters’ and Rand’s

motions to consolidate are therefore granted.

The District’s local rules provide that assignment of the consolidated case should be

consistent with the extent to which substantive matters have been considered in any given

case, which judge has the most familiarity with the issues of the cases, whether any given

case is reasonably viewed as the lead or principal case, and any other factor advancing the

interests of judicial economy. See LRCiv 42.1(a)(4). Here, all of the cases are at a fairly

early stage and no judge has considered substantive matters. Given that this Court has

considered the instant motions and is currently assigned the case that was filed first, the

Court assigns the consolidated case to itself under case number CV-08-01821-PHX-GMS

and under the case name In re Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities Litigation.

II. Lead Plaintiff

In a PSLRA class action, a court “shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or

members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of

adequately representing the interests of class members.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).

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Both establishing the presumption and rebutting the presumption require a

determination of whether a given plaintiff will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class.” The Ninth Circuit has resolved this apparent incongruity by holding that “when

the district court makes its initial determination, it must rely on the presumptive lead

plaintiff’s complaint and sworn certification; there is no adversary process to test the

substance of those claims. At the [rebuttal] stage, the process turns adversarial and other

plaintiffs may present evidence that disputes the lead plaintiff’s prima facie showing of

typicality and adequacy.” In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re

Cendant Corp. Litigation, 264 F.3d 201, 264 (3d Cir. 2001)).

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Courts are to “adopt a presumption” that the most adequate plaintiff is the plaintiff who: (1)

has either filed a complaint or moved to be named lead plaintiff, (2) has the largest financial

interest in the relief sought by the class, and (3) satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). Rule 23(a) requires that “the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the

class” and that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class.” If a party becomes the presumptive lead plaintiff, that presumption may be

rebutted only upon “proof” that the party “will not fairly and adequately protect the interests

of the class” or “is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of

adequately representing the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).1

Here, both Steamfitters and Rand meet the first requirement for becoming the

presumptive lead plaintiff, as both have made qualified motions. Of the two, Rand has the

largest financial interest in the relief sought, as he asserts damages in the amount of $21,091,

while Steamfitters seeks a nominal amount less – $20,690. Steamfitters conceded at oral

argument that it does not contest the accuracy of Rand’s damage calculation. Thus, if Rand

satisfies the relevant requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, he will become the

presumptively most adequate plaintiff. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he district court must compare the financial stakes of the various plaintiffs and

determine which one has the most to gain from the lawsuit. It must then focus its attention

on that plaintiff and determine . . . whether he satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a), in

particular those of ‘typicality’ and ‘adequacy.’”). “This inquiry need not be as ‘searching as

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the one triggered by a motion for class certification,’ because the inquiry focuses solely on

whether the person will be an appropriate class representative, and not whether the class may

ultimately be certified.” MicroStrategy, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (quoting Switzenbaum v.

Orbital Scis. Corp., 187 F.R.D. 246, 250 (E.D. Va. 1999)); see also Aronson, 79 F. Supp. 2d

at 1158 (“At the lead plaintiff selection stage, all that is required is a ‘preliminary showing’

that the lead plaintiff’s claims are typical and adequate.”) (quoting Wenderhold v. Cylink

Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 546

(N.D. Tex. 1997)).

Rand has made a sufficient preliminary showing that he has met the typicality and

adequacy prongs of Rule 23. Typicality is satisfied “when each class member’s claim arises

from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to

prove the defendant’s liability.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997)). This is not an exceedingly

exacting test, for “[u]nder [Rule 23’s] permissive standards, representative claims are

‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need

not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.

1998). In this case, Rand’s claims arise from the same course of events as those of the

broader class, namely Defendants’ allegedly false and misleading press releases and financial

reports issued between October 30, 2003, and September 24, 2008. Rand also asserts

violations of the same sections of the federal securities laws, and thus his claim is based on

the same legal arguments as the rest of the class. Rand has therefore made a sufficient

showing of typicality under Rule 23.

Rand also satisfies the adequacy test. “Resolution of two questions determines legal

adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with

other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action

vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. Here, there is no conflict of

interest with other class members. There is likewise no indication that Rand, or his counsel,

will not vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the class. Indeed, Rand has indicated

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his willingness to serve as the class representative and to testify at deposition and at trial, he

has secured competent counsel, and he has alleged a significant pecuniary interest in

pursuing the claim. Rand therefore satisfies the adequacy prong of Rule 23.

Because Rand has satisfied all of the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), he is entitled to the presumption that he is the most adequate plaintiff to be

appointed lead plaintiff. As noted, that presumption may be rebutted only upon “proof” that

Rand “will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” or “is subject to unique

defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). It is at this point in the inquiry that Steamfitters’ objections should

be addressed. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 263-64 (“[T]he threshold determination of whether

the movant with the largest financial losses satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements

should be a product of the court’s independent judgment, and . . . arguments by members of

the purported plaintiff class as to why it does not should be considered only in the context

of assessing whether the presumption has been rebutted.”).

Steamfitters asserts that Rand is atypical because he purchased and sold put options,

as opposed to Defendants’ underlying securities. However, Steamfitters has explicitly

declined to offer any evidence that Rand’s specific options are themselves atypical;

Steamfitters only argues that the claims of all options holders are inherently atypical such

that they cannot represent common stockholders. There are some cases that disfavor making

options purchasers lead plaintiffs because of valuation differences between options and

common stock, as well as the potential that the defendant could assert unique defenses

against the options holder. See Andrada v. Atherogenics, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 00061, 2005 WL

912359, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (“Were South Ferry to be appointed lead plaintiff

for the entire class, factual issues specific to South Ferry in determining the precise value of

the options – e.g., the maturity, the volatility of the price of the Atherogenics stock, the level

of short term interest rates, and the competitive structure of the market in which the options

are traded – would likely ‘threaten to become the focus of the litigation.’”) (quoting Weikel

v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.N.J. 1998)).

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2

Steamfitters cites Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 414-15 (8th Cir.

1983), for the proposition that options holders do not have standing to sue a corporation

trading only in common stock. (Dkt. # 19 at 6.) The Court finds merit in Judge Posner’s

explanation that Laventhall is circumscribed by the nature of fiduciary obligations in insidertrading cases. See Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1996). Regardless, other

circuits disagree with Laventhall, see, e.g., id. at 938-39; Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp.,

841 F.2d 502, 506-07 (3d Cir. 1988), and authority within this Circuit has likewise taken a

different view, see Adobe, 139 F.R.D. at 155 (“Clearly, since the value of options is directly

related to the value of common stock, defendants had reason to expect that option traders

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However, many courts have appointed options traders as lead plaintiffs to represent

the interests of common stockholders. See, e.g., In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571

F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Priceline.com Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 99

(D. Conn. 2006) (citing In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119, 123-24

(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. Del. 1990);

Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1989)); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.,

139 F.R.D. 150, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that the typicality requirement of Rule 23 was

met for options traders, and appointing them class representatives, because there was no

arguably unique challenge to standing for options traders and that “since the value of options

is directly related to the value of common stock, defendants had reason to expect that option

traders would rely on their alleged misrepresentations”).

Given that there is a divergence of authority on the subject, and given Steamfitters’

concession at oral argument that there are no defenses applicable to the common stock

holders that are not also applicable to the options holders, the Court is reluctant to disqualify

Rand simply because he trades in options. Had Steamfitters adduced some evidence specific

to Rand suggesting that the nature of his options, the history of their purchase and sale, or

some other factor made him inadequate to represent the class, then the Court might have

occasion to disqualify him. In the absence of any such specific evidence, Steamfitters has

not met its burden to provide “proof” that Rand will not fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class or is otherwise subject to unique defenses that would render him

incapable of doing so.2

 See In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 261, 263 (D.D.C.

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would rely on their alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs have standing under Rule 10b-5

as options traders.”). The Court therefore finds that, to the extent that Steamfitters is

asserting that Laventhall should block the appointment of Rand as lead plaintiff, it has not

met its burden of rebutting the statutory presumption that Rand should be lead plaintiff.

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2006) (rejecting a party’s challenge to a prospective lead plaintiff because the movants

“offer[ed] no proof” of how potential conflicts would become actual conflicts and because

their arguments were “too speculative and hypothetical to rebut the presumption”).

Nor can the Court disregard the statutory scheme merely because it may believe that

Steamfitters reflects the putative plaintiff class better than Rand, or even because the Court

may believe that Steamfitters would do a better job litigating the case. “That the district

court believes another plaintiff may be ‘more typical’ or ‘more adequate’ is of no

consequence. So long as the plaintiff with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and

adequacy requirements, he is entitled to lead plaintiff status, even if the district court is

convinced that some other plaintiff would do a better job.” Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732.

Steamfitters also seems to argue, in response to Rand’s motion, that options holders

are outside the purported plaintiff class – despite the fact that Steamfitters conceded at oral

argument that options holders would be members of the class under a consolidated complaint.

Regardless, Steamfitters’ complaint purports to bring an action on behalf of all purchasers

of Medicis “securities” during that time. (No. CV-08-01870, Dkt. # 1 at 1.) Steamfitters’

motion to consolidate the actions likewise provides that the “three putative securities class

actions [are] brought on behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired [Medicis]

securities between October 30, 2003 and September 23, 2008.” (Dkt. # 7 at 1.) Put options

are securities for the purpose of the securities laws, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (Supp. 2008);

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975), and Steamfitters’

complaint does not limit the plaintiff class to the purchasers of securities issued by Medicis.

Rather, Steamfitters describes a class that includes all those who acquired Medicis securities,

and Rand falls within that class.

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Indeed, courts typically treat both stockholders and options holders as members of the

same plaintiff class. See MicroStrategy, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (“[T]he claims of optionsholders and stockholders are in most cases sufficiently similar that they should be

consolidated ‘in form and in fact,’ and thus litigated by the same lead plaintiff and lead

counsel.”) (quoting In re Orbital Sciences Corp. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 237, 240 (E.D. Va.

1999) (“Even if the shareholders and the optionholders are not identically situated in every

respect, they share a mutual interest in having the Court resolve these questions about

whether the Defendants made any misstatements or omissions, whether they did so with

scienter, and whether the price of [the defendant’s] common stock became artificially inflated

as a result. The efficiency of resolving these and other questions at once in a single

proceeding is beyond serious debate. . . . Under these circumstances, the only appropriate

solution is to consolidate the two actions both in form and in fact.”) (internal citations

omitted)); Priceline.com, 236 F.R.D. at 93, 98-99 (rejecting the argument that a plaintiff who

“traded almost exclusively in put options” could not be lead plaintiff, and appointing him as

such, even though the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of “all persons who purchased or

otherwise acquired securities of [the defendant]”); cf. Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936, 938

(7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the presence of options traders in a class action including common

stockholders).

Further, by Steamfitters’ own standard, Rand is a member of the plaintiff class. In its

motion to be appointed lead plaintiff, Steamfitters identified four “questions of law and fact

common to the members of the class which predominate over questions which may affect

individual class members”: (1) whether Defendants “violated the 1934 Act”; (2) whether

Defendants “omitted and/or misrepresented material facts”; (3) whether Defendants’

statements “omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”; and (4) whether Defendants

“knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false and misleading.” (Dkt. # 7

at 5.) These questions are just as applicable to Rand as to Steamfitters, and Rand has the

same incentive to establish these four points as Steamfitters (indeed, for the purposes of the

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PSLRA, Rand has more of an incentive, as he is alleged to have suffered a greater loss).

Thus, even under Steamfitters’ own enunciation of the nature of the purported class, Rand

is a member.

Steamfitters also makes much of the fact that it is an institutional investor and that

Congress intended to favor the involvement of institutional investors in securities class

actions. However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that the plain language of the PSLRA

does not permit the Court to favor Steamfitters over another plaintiff with a greater financial

stake merely because Steamfitters is an institutional investor. Rather, the Court must follow

the statutory test as written:

The court discounted the significance of the statutory

presumption based on its understanding that the presumption

was an effort by Congress to encourage the involvement of

institutional investors in securities class actions. . . . This, of

course, was error. Congress enacts statutes, not purposes, and

courts may not depart from the statutory text because they

believe some other arrangement would better serve the

legislative goals. Here, the [PSLRA] provides in categorical

terms that the only basis on which a court may compare

plaintiffs competing to serve as lead is the size of their financial

stake in the controversy.

Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 730. For the same reason, the Court cannot rely on the fact that the

difference between Steamfitters and Rand is only a few hundred dollars. Rand has a greater

financial stake in the controversy, however minute that greater stake may be in relation to the

overall damage claim. He otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 23, and Steamfitters has

failed to provide proof that Rand will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class or is otherwise subject to unique defenses that would render him incapable of doing so.

Rand’s motion to be appointed lead plaintiff is therefore granted, and, for the same reasons,

Steamfitters’ motion is denied.

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III. Lead Counsel

Once a lead plaintiff has been designated, that plaintiff “shall, subject to the approval

of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).

“The statute vests the initial selection with the plaintiff; the court’s role is limited to approval

of that choice.” Aronson, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. No objection has been raised as to the

adequacy of Rand’s counsel. Rand has provided a resume for his selected firm, and the court

is satisfied that the firm is qualified and experienced, and that it will adequately represent the

interests of the class. Rand’s motion to appoint its selected firm as lead counsel is therefore

granted. By necessity, Steamfitters’ analogous motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Steamfitters’ motion to consolidate, appoint lead plaintiff, and

appoint lead counsel (Dkt. # 6) is GRANTED with respect to consolidation and DENIED

in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rand’s motion to consolidate, appoint lead

plaintiff, and appoint lead counsel (Dkt. # 9) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall consolidate the

following three cases: Hall v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-1821;

Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Fund v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-

1870; and Oliver v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., et al., No. CV-08-1964. The cases will

be consolidated before this Court under Case No. CV-08-01821-PHX-GMS as In re Medicis

Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities Litigation. The parties are hereby directed to utilize that

name and case information for all future filings.

DATED this 10th day of March, 2009.

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