Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01972/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01972-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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09cv1972

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS GOMEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LARRY SMALL, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 09-CV-1972-W (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner Louis Gomez (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

January 17, 2008 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) to deny him

parole. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all

the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and

evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the August 20, 2008 opinion of the

Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on a petition for writ of habeas

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corpus filed by Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 3.) This Court gives deference to state court

findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138,

1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by

clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts as

found by the Los Angeles Superior Court are as follows:

Petitioner was received in the Department of Corrections on July 26, 1983

after a conviction for second-degree murder with use of a firearm. He was

sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. He was later convicted of

assault on an inmate and was sentenced to an additional six years to run

consecutively. His minimum parole eligibility date was April 24, 1995. The

record reflects that on February 2, 1982, petitioner and three accomplices

who were all members of the Primiera Flats gang attempted to rob the

victim. One of the accomplices was armed with a semi-automatic rifle. 

When the victim refused to give up his money, petitioner and his crime

partners began to beat him. The victim was able to defend himself and

escape. He ran into an apartment building chased by the armed

accomplice. Petitioner and his other friend started to return to their car

when they heard a gunshot. They entered the building. Petitioner drew a

dagger from [a] holster on his waist and stabbed the victim four times. 

The victim finally surrendered his wallet. The victim died as a result of

gunshot and stab wounds. Petitioner claimed he did not realize that the

victim died because he gave them the wallet after the attack.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 1.) The Board conducted a parole hearing on January 17, 2008 and

found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Pet. at 1.) 

On or about June 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, contending that his prison

term had exceeded the constitutional maximum, his due process rights had been

violated by the Board’s reliance on the crime and other unchanging factors in denying

him parole, and the Board was not lawfully constituted. (Lodgment No. 2.) That court

denied the petition on August 20, 2008. (Lodgment No. 3.) On or about October 30,

2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal, in which he asserted the same three grounds for relief raised in his previous

habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 4.) On December 30, 2008, that court denied the

petition. (Lodgment No. 5.) On January 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court, again asserting the same three claims

previously raised. (Lodgment No. 6.) The petition was denied on July 8, 2009. 

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(Lodgment No. 7.) 

On September 8, 2009, Petitioner initiated the instant proceedings by filing a

federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Pet., Doc. No. 1). Petitioner again raises

the same three claims: he alleges his due process rights were violated in connection

with the parole hearing by the Board’s continued reliance on unchanging and static

factors, including the crime, to deny him parole for a seventh time (Ground 1); the term

of his confinement has become constitutionally disproportionate to his sentence, which

was imposed when he was a juvenile (Ground 2); and the Board was unlawfully

constituted, resulting in a purported bias (Ground 3). (Id. at 6-8 & Supporting Facts

[Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-14].) Respondent initially filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied

on July 8, 2010. (Doc. No. 15.) Respondent subsequently filed an Answer on

November 2, 2010, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on December 21, 2010. (Doc. Nos.

20, 24.) 

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review

for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The current Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Under section 2254(d)(1), state court decision is “contrary

to” Supreme Court authority if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court decision is an

“unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority if it correctly identifies the

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. Under section 2254(d)(2),

a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

The last reasoned state court decision serves as the basis for the state court

judgment. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007). Where there is

no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the

underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003));

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need

not cite to or even be aware of Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas

corpus claim, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts” such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

//

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B. Ground One

Petitioner contends that his right to due process was violated by the Board’s

continued reliance on the crime and other unchanging factors in his background to deny

him parole. (Pet. at 6.) Petitioner argues that the Board has not provided any

reasonable explanation as to how these factors render him an unreasonable risk to

public safety. (Id.) Respondent contends that Petitioner does not have a federal

constitutional right to a parole decision supported by some evidence of his current threat

to public safety and that he received the due process protections required under clearly

established federal law. (Resp’t. Mem. at 4, 5-8.)

The Supreme Court’s recent per curiam decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, --- U.S. -

---, 131 S.Ct. 859 (2011) is dispositive of Petitioner’s claim. The Court stated that the

only federal right at issue on the petitioners’ due process claims regarding their parole

determinations was procedural, not substantive, and thus the relevant inquiry was what

process the petitioners received, not whether the state court had decided their cases

correctly. Id., 131 S.Ct at 863. The Court provided a two-step due process inquiry: 

first, it must determined “whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a

person has been deprived,” and if so, “whether the procedures followed by the State

were constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 861. As to the first step, the Supreme Court left

in place Ninth Circuit precedent that California law creates a liberty interest in parole. 

Id.; see also Pearson v. Muntz, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 1238007 (9th Cir. 2011). The

Court emphasized, however, that this interest is a state interest created by California

law. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. at 862 (emphasis in original).

 When such an interest is created, the second step of the due process inquiry

requires federal courts to evaluate whether the state provided “fair procedures” for the

vindication of that interest. Id. In the parole context, only minimal procedures are

required. Id. When an inmate is allowed an opportunity to be heard and is provided a

statement of the reasons why parole was denied, due process is satisfied. Id. (citing

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). 

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In Cooke, the petitioners “were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest

the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were

notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. at 162. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hat should have been the beginning and the end of the federal

habeas courts’ inquiry into whether [the petitioners] received due process.” Id. As the

Court explained, “[I]t is no federal concern . . . whether California’s ‘some evidence’ rule

of judicial review . . . was correctly applied.” Id. As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit,

“Stated otherwise, there is no substantive due process right created by California’s

parole scheme. If the state affords the procedural protections required by Greenholtz

and Cooke, that is the end of the matter for purposes of the Due Process Clause.” 

Roberts v. Hartley, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 1365811, at *3 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Petitioner does not argue that he was denied an opportunity to speak at his

hearing and contest the evidence against him, that he was denied advance access to

his record, or that he was not notified of the reasons why parole was denied. Rather, he

argues that the parole board’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence that he

presents an unreasonable risk to public safety. This is precisely the kind of claim that

Cooke holds is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Accordingly, the Court

recommends that this claim be denied.

C. Ground Two

Petitioner next argues that the term of his confinement has exceeded the

constitutional maximum because at the time of his sentence, juveniles tried as adults

could not be sentenced to life without parole. (Pet. at 7.) He claims that he has served

26 years on a 15 years to life sentence, and argues that he is serving a de facto

sentence of life without parole because the Board has set his parole date at “life” and

continues to rely on static, unchanging factors in his background to deny him parole. 

(Id. & Supporting Facts [Doc. No. 1-1 at 9-11].) He further argues that his age (16) at

the time of the committed offense is not being considered. (Id.) Respondent, analyzing

this issue as an Eighth Amendment disproportionate sentence claim, argues that

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Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as the state court’s decision does not run afoul

of any clearly established federal law. (Resp’t. Mem. at 12-13.) Petitioner refutes the

characterization of his claim as an Eighth Amendment claim and argues that “[t]his

issue pertains to Equal Protection.” (Traverse at 4.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in the habeas petitions filed in both the California

Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment Nos. 4, 6.) As both

courts denied the respective petitions without a reasoned decision, the Court “looks

through” these denials to the Los Angeles Superior Court’s opinion as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying this claim, the Los Angeles Superior

Court stated: 

Petitioner argues that the Board’s decision is invalid because he was a

juvenile at the time he commit[ted] the murder. He claims that, by denying

parole after his minimum eligible parole date, the Board has transformed

his sentence to life without the possibility of parole, which was an unlawful

sentence for juvenile offenders at the time. (Citation omitted.) However,

contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the Board has not transformed his

sentence. Petitioner was given a sentence that carries a maximum of life

in prison. “One who is legally convicted has no vested right to the

determination of his sentence at less than the maximum.” (Citation

omitted.) A prison[er] may not be paroled until the Board finds that he no

longer poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society regardless of his

age at the time of the commitment offense or the number of years served. 

In this case, the Board found that petitioner continues to pose such a risk.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 1-2.) 

Whether based upon the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, this claim fails. As the Supreme Court enunciated in

Cooke, the U.S. Constitution does not require states to offer parole to its prisoners. 

Cooke, 131 S.Ct at 862; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. To the extent that a state does offer

parole, a federal court’s inquiry begins and ends with assessing whether the prisoner

received due process. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. at 862 (emphasis added). Here, as discussed

above, Petitioner does not dispute that he received the requisite degree of process.

Moreover, as a general matter, “[S]o long as the sentence imposed does not

exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” 

United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, Petitioner has

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not established that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Petitioner’s

sentence of 15 years to life carries no guaranteed parole date, and carries with it the

potential that he could serve the entire term. See Pearson, --- F.3d at ----, 2011 WL

1238007, at *1 (explaining that prisoners serving indeterminate life prison sentences

[i.e., those whose life sentences do not include ‘without the possibility of parole’] may

serve up to life in prison, but become eligible to be considered for parole after serving

minimum terms of confinement). Under California law, the parole board is not required

to set a parole release date until it determines that an inmate no longer poses an

unreasonable threat to public safety. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.

4th 1181, 1210 (2008). Though Petitioner relies upon the terms of imprisonment set

forth in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2403(c) to support his argument that the term of his

confinement has exceeded the constitutional maximum, this section pertains to the base

term of confinement utilized by the parole board once an inmate is found suitable for

parole. See 15 C.C.R. § 2403 (emphasis added). Because Petitioner has not been

found to be suitable for parole, section 2403 has no application here. Id.; see also

Paddock v. Mendoza-Powers, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128-29 (C.D. Cal. 2009). To the

extent that Petitioner’s claim rests upon Eighth Amendment grounds, the claim fails.

Additionally, the “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985) (quotation omitted). Although Petitioner frames this claim as a matter involving

the Equal Protection Clause, Petitioner has provided no argument or evidence to

support an equal protection claim. He has not, for example, demonstrated that he is

being treated differently than any other similarly situated inmate. Accordingly, to the

extent Petitioner’s claim rests upon Equal Protection grounds, the claim is without merit.

The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court authority. Therefore, the Court recommends that this

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claim be denied.

D. Ground Three

Petitioner next argues that he did not receive an impartial parole hearing

because the Board was not lawfully constituted. He relies upon Cal. Penal Code

section 5075, which requires parole commissioners to “reflect as nearly as possible a

cross section of the racial, sexual, economic, and geographic features of the population

of the state.” Cal. Penal Code § 5075(b). Petitioner asserts that in the 14 years since

his initial parole consideration hearing, the Board panels considering his case have

been primarily composed of male Caucasians from the “upper economic strata.” (Pet.

at 8 & Supporting Facts [Doc. No. 1-1 at 12-14].) 

Although Petitioner raised this claim in each of his state habeas petitions (see

Lodgment Nos. 2, 4, 6), none of the state court decisions include a reasoned opinion

with regard to this claim. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 5, 7.) When a federal habeas petition

contains a claim in which there is no reasoned state court decision denying an issue

which was presented to the state court, the Court must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado, 223

F.3d at 982. Although the state courts did not expressly decide this issue, this Court

should, nevertheless, defer to the state courts’ denials. See Harrington v. Richter, ---

U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Fairness requires the absence of actual bias and

of the probability of unfairness. Id. “Because parole board officials perform tasks that

are functionally comparable to those performed by the judiciary, they owe the same

duty: ‘to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong

feelings because the litigant’s liberty is at state.’” O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418,

422 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981). 

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.

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Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 

Here, the record of Petitioner’s parole hearing does not establish any basis for a

violation of due process or a finding of bias. The record may reasonably be seen to

reflect that the commissioners considered many factors in connection with Petitioner’s

suitability for parole, that they properly considered the evidence, including evidence

submitted by Petitioner, and that they made an individualized assessment of the

circumstances of Petitioner’s case. (See Lodgment No. 1.) Petitioner himself chose not

to avail himself of the opportunity to appear before the Board. (Id. at 3, 21-22.) The

Court finds no evidence that the Board exhibited any bias or unfairness while it presided

over Petitioner’s hearing.

Because Petitioner does not contest that the “minimal” procedures required by

Cooke have been met in this case, this claim is likely foreclosed by Cooke. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated bias on the part of the Board, and thus

has not shown that the state court’s decision upholding the Board’s denial of parole was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, the

Court recommends that this claim be denied.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to federal habeas relief

under the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment

be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Thomas J.

Whelan, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than June 28, 2011, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than July

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12, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 31, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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