Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02195/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02195-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 This action proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 1

302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and was reassigned by an order entered February 9, 2010. (Dkt. No. 27.) 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DEJESUS RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff, No. 2:09-cv-02195 FCD KJN PS

vs.

UNKNOWN-NAMED DISCIPLINARY

HEARINGS AGENT A.K.A. “SERGEANT

SIMMONS,” et al.,

Defendants. ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Presently before this court is plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and seven

separate requests for judicial notice. For the reasons set forth below, this court recommends that 1

plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction be denied, and orders that plaintiff’s requests for

judicial notice be granted in part and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose DeJesus Rodriguez, a pro se litigant, filed a motion for preliminary

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 This action has not yet been set for an initial status conference (Dkt No. 5). Therefore, the 2

court will direct the clerk’s office to set this matter for a status conference at the conclusion of this

opinion. 

 In his First Amended Complaint, plaintiff names an additional defendant, Deputy A. Knapp. 3

The court directed the marshal’s office to serve that defendant via an order issued March 5, 2010 (Dkt.

No. 32.) 

 Under the previous standard a preliminary injunction could be granted “if the plaintiff

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‘demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable

injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.’” Earth

Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction where the district court had found that

the mere possibility of such harm was speculative).

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injunction in this action on December 29, 2009. (Dkt. No. 16.) Although the motion was 2

originally noticed for January 14, 2009 [sic], this court subsequently took the matter under

submission after permitting defendants 30 days to respond to the request for injunctive relief. 

Defendants Steve Moore, Sheriff of San Joaquin County and Jeffrey Simmons timely opposed 3

the motion. 

DISCUSSION

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction will not issue unless necessary to prevent threatened injury that

would impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra On-Line, Inc.

v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871

F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction represents the exercise of a far reaching

power not to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc.,

326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). The Ninth Circuit recently modified its standard for

preliminary injunctive relief to conform to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Winter v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008), that the moving party must

demonstrate that—absent an injunction—irreparable injury is not only possible, but likely.4

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this standard,

“preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the

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 In cases brought by prisoners (although plaintiff does not contend that he is currently 5

incarcerated) involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the

least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

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merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans,

Inc., at 1127.5

Procedural defects aside, plaintiff has not shown that future irreparable injury is likely or

that he even has standing to bring a request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff, in sum, seeks the

following relief:

That . . . this Court order defendants, their successors, agents,

employees and all persons acting in concert with them to provide

plaintiff and other pretrial detainees in administrative segregation

who have been subjected to a punishment known as “full

restriction,” which among other things denies them a phone call for

up to twenty five (25) days. And that they cooperate when this

Court orders an authorization to the FBI to conduct an investigation

of plain tiff’s [sic] claims. (Dkt. No. 16 at 3.)

 Yet plaintiff does not contend that he is currently incarcerated or subject to confinement

by defendants, nor does he explain why he is actually, as he alleges “in imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” (Dkt. No 16 at 2.) Plaintiff’s request for relief is based upon “contingent

future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United

States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998); B.C. v. Plumas County School Dist., 192 F. 3d 1260, 1264 (9th

Cir. 1999) (finding that plaintiff had no standing to seek injunctive relief against drug searches

where a former student no longer attended the school and had no plans to re-enroll). The court

cannot issue a preliminary injunction unless plaintiff has demonstrated that a threat of harm

presently exists, even if injury is not absolutely certain to occur. FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272,

1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, since plaintiff is not a pretrial detainee of defendants, the

injury from which plaintiff seeks relief is purely speculative. The court cannot find that he faces

an immediate threat of irreparable harm based on speculation. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co.

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 These requests for judicial notice do not appear to relate to any particular motion or matter 6

pending before the court. 

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v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998). Any threatened future injury must be real and

immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno,

98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Moreover, plaintiff does not appear likely to prevail on the merits of his claims. The

evidence and law submitted in this action to date appear to support defendants’ position. See

Clayton Decl. ISO Opp’n to Request for Injunctive Relief; Bell v. Wolfish, 511 U.S. 520, 547

(1979) (recognizing that prison officials are entitled to wide-ranging deference when balancing the

obligations related to inmate and staff safety against the duty to accord inmates certain rights and

privileges). Finally, the balance of the equities and public interest weigh against an injunction. 

Ordering an injunction in this action will not preserve the status quo and an issuance of an

injunctive relief against a governmental entity will not serve the public interest in this case. City

of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 

Because plaintiff’s motion suffers from numerous procedural defects, is not supported

with sufficient evidence demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable injury, and does not meet the

legal standards in support of an injunction, his motion should be denied. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

65 and Local Rule 231. 

Requests for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff has also filed seven separate requests for judicial notice, citing Federal Rule of

Evidence 201 in support thereof. Upon a properly supported request by a party, a federal court 6

may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a),(d). Facts subject to judicial

notice are those which are either “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court may not take judicial notice of a

matter that is in dispute. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9 Cir. 2001). The party

th

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requesting judicial notice bears the burden of persuading the court that the particular fact is not

reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to

a source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” In re Tyrone F. Conner Corp., Inc.,

140 B.R. 771, 781 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The court finds as follows: 

1. Request for Judicial Notice filed 1/7/10. (Dkt. No. 20.) Plaintiff asks the court to take

judicial notice that there exists a California state statute entitled California Penal Code section

851.5. This request is granted. 

2. Request for Judicial Notice filed 1/29/10. (Dkt. No. 22.) Plaintiff filed a request that

the court take judicial notice that:

“Federal Rule of Evidence 201 does not allow defendants’ challenge to the

authenticity or admissibility of its findings on August 18, 2009 and the

later finding on January 5, 2010. Plaintiff further requests, pursuant to

Fed. R. Evid. 201, that the Court declare the rights of plaintiff with respect

to defendants’ premature motion to dismiss, and finally, that the Court

enter an order or an instruction to the parties defining the scope of

information the Court will be considering concerning future ‘Motions to

Dismiss.’” (Dkt. No. 22 at 3).

This matter is not properly subject to judicial notice and is therefore denied. It is

furthermore moot since defendants’ earlier motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 12) was denied (Dkt. No.

17) following the filing of plaintiff’s amended complaint. 

3. Request for Judicial Notice filed 2/5/10. (Dkt No. 26.) Plaintiff filed a request for

judicial notice regarding the propriety of defendants’ request for judicial notice, which was

allegedly brought contemporaneously with defendants’ formerly pending motion to dismiss. This

court has previously denied that motion to dismiss as moot, and therefore any dispute over

accompanying requests for judicial notice is likewise moot. 

4. Request for Judicial Notice filed 2/18/10. (Dkt. No. 28.) Plaintiff filed a request for

judicial notice regarding the propriety of defendants’ eighteenth affirmative defense. This matter

is not properly subject to judicial notice and is therefore denied.

5. Request for Judicial Notice filed 2/19/20. (Dkt. No. 29.) Plaintiff filed a request for

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judicial notice regarding the propriety of defendants’ third affirmative defense. This matter is not

properly subject to judicial notice and is therefore denied.

6. Request for Judicial Notice filed 3/1/10. (Dkt. No. 30.) Plaintiff filed a second request

for judicial notice regarding the propriety of defendants’ third affirmative defense. This matter is

duplicative, not properly subject to judicial notice and is therefore denied.

7. Request for Judicial Notice filed 3/4/10. (Dkt. No. 31.) Plaintiff filed a request for

judicial notice contesting the propriety of defendant’s nineteenth affirmative defense. This matter

is not properly subject to judicial notice and is therefore denied.

Plaintiff is cautioned against further filings of requests for judicial notice,

particularly where such requests fail to relate to a pending motion or where they are outside the

scope of judicially noticeable facts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Any future requests

for judicial notice suffering from the same defects may be disregarded. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 16, be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, Dkt. No 20, is granted and the remainder, Dkt.

Nos. 22, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 31, are denied; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to reissue the Order Setting Status Conference

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(Dkt. No. 5) to set a date and time for the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference in this

action. The parties are reminded that they must comply with the additional provisions of that

order, which require the submission of status reports to this court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: March 9, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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