Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02535/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUSTIN HOWARD Civil No. 10cv2535-AJB(RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; RESCHEDULING

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

[Doc. No. 33.] 

v.

BYRON HIBSHMAN; SIAVASH

PAZARGADI; CITY OF SAN DIEGO; DOES

I-X,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants Officer Byron Hibshman, Siavash Pazargadi, and the City of

San Diego’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Justin Howard filed an opposition on March 2,

2012. Defendants filed a reply on March 9, 2012. A hearing was held on June 22, 2012. Iwo

Ostoja, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and John Riley, Esq. appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

After a thorough review of the briefs, supporting documentation, applicable law, and hearing oral

argument, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. 

Procedural Background

On December 10, 2010, Plaintiff Justin Howard filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights

complaint against Defendants Officer Byron Hibshman, Senior Traffic Engineer Siavash Pazargadi

and the City of San Diego. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants Hibshman and the City of San Diego filed an

answer on March 4, 2011. (Dkt. No. 8.) On April 15, 2011, Defendant Pazargadi filed an answer. 

(Dkt. No. 13.) On August 4, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first

- 1 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 1 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 22.) On August 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. 

(Dkt. No. 23.) Plaintiff asserts ten causes of action:

1. First Cause of Action -Violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution against all Defendants;

2. Second Cause of Action - Conspiracy to Violate Federal Rights against Defendants

Hibshman and Pazargadi; 

3. Third Cause of Action - False Imprisonment against Defendants Hibshman and the

City of San Diego; 

4. Fourth Cause of Action - Racial Discrimination against Defendants Hibshman and

the City of San Diego; 

5. Fifth Cause of Action - Slander against Defendant Hibshman; 

6. Sixth Cause of Action - Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against Defendant

Hibshman; 

7. Seventh Cause of Action - Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against

Defendant Pazargadi; 

8. Eighth Cause of Action - Malicious Prosecution against Defendant Hibshman;

9 Ninth Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against

Defendants Hibshman and Pazargadi; 

10. Tenth Cause of Action - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Against

Defendants Hibshman and Pazargadi. 

On September 8, 2011, Defendants filed an answer to the first amended complaint. (Dkt. No.

24.) On January 12, 2012, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 33.) 

Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 2, 2012. (Dkt. No. 40.) Defendants filed a reply on March 9,

2012. (Dkt. No. 49.) On April 25, 2012, the Court set a briefing schedule requiring the parties to

address whether the amended Pedicab Ordinance that became effective on October 11, 2009 is

retroactive or not. (Dkt. No. 51.) On May 5, 2012, Defendants filed a supplemental brief. (Dkt. No.

52.) On May 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed his response. (Dkt. No. 53.) 

/ / / /

- 2 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 2 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Defendants’ Facts

1. March 18, 2010 Incident

On March 18, 2010, around 2:55 p.m., Defendant Officer Hibshman saw Plaintiff in a

pedicab stopped in front of the train station on Kettner Boulevard in San Diego. (Dkt. No. 33-12,

Ds’ Exs., Hibshman Decl. ¶ 2.) Based on the yellow color of the permit, Hibshman determined that

Plaintiff’s permit had expired. (Id.) The 2009 permits were yellow and the 2010 permits were red. 

(Id.) Hibshman wrote a citation for violation of San Diego Municipal Code section 81.0103 - Permit

Requirement to Operate Pedicab.1 (Id. ¶ 3.) Hibshman noticed that Plaintiff was becoming upset

and rather than exacerbate the situation, he did not confiscate the invalid permit. (Id. ¶ 4.) He told

Plaintiff to return the leased pedicab to the owner’s warehouse and not to drive a pedicab until he

obtained a current permit. (Id.) 

After receiving the citation, Plaintiff pulled away from the curb on Kettner Boulevard. (Id. ¶

5.) Hibshman noticed that Plaintiff had a red signal light for his direction of travel but he did not

stop at the limit line but instead pedaled across the limit line as he approached the trolley tracks

where a nearby trolley was approaching from the southwest direction. (Id.) Plaintiff continued

pedaling his pedicab towards the trolley tracks and the trolley driver had to slow the trolley because

of Plaintiff’s approach to the tracks. (Id.) The trolley driver sounded the horn at Plaintiff to gain his

attention. (Id.) During this time, Plaintiff was agitated and continued yelling something to the effect

that the law did not apply to him. (Id.) 

After the trolley passed, Plaintiff crossed through a red signal light, proceeded through the

intersection turning right, heading west on Broadway toward Harbor Drive. (Id. ¶ 6.) Because of

his vehicle code violation, Hibshman proceeded to follow Plaintiff in his motorcycle intending to

stop Plaintiff and cite him for violating the traffic law. (Id.) Hibshman called for backup because of

Plaintiff’s continued agitation and yelling. (Id.) 

Hibshman yelled and signaled at Plaintiff to stop his pedicab but he refused. (Id. ¶ 7.) While

1

Section 83.0103(a) provides, “[i]t is unlawful for any person to operate a pedicab within the

City without having a valid operating permit issued by the City pursuant to this Division.” (Dkt. No.

52-4, Ds’ Ex. 28 at 5.) 

- 3 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 3 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on West Broadway, between Kettner and Harbor Drive, Hibshman tried three times to put his

marked police motorcycle in front of Plaintiff in order to force him to stop. (Id.) On each attempt,

Plaintiff swerved around his motorcycle and avoided stopping. (Id.) On the same stretch of West

Broadway, Hibshman saw a marked San Diego Police car try two times to pull over Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff swerved around the patrol car both times and at one point crossed the double yellow line

and cones that delineate the east and west bound traffic on West Broadway. (Id.) He crossed into

oncoming traffic traveling east and then crossed back into the westbound traffic to continue towards

Harbor Drive. (Id.) 

The SDPD officers in the car activated their lights and siren and followed Plaintiff through

the intersection of West Broadway and Harbor Drive onto the west of Harbor Drive where Plaintiff

struck a stopped patrol car. (Id. ¶ 8.) Police officers used minimal force to overcome Plaintiff’s

resistance lowering him to the ground to handcuff him. (Id.) Hibshman never touched Plaintiff

during the initial stop for the invalid permit and did not touch him during the arrest after the stop on

West Broadway and Harbor Drive. (Id.) 

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was arrested for reckless driving and failure to obey a

traffic officer. (Id. ¶ 9.) In addition to the citation for operating a pedicab without a valid permit,

Plaintiff was charged with resisting arrest in violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1);

unlicensed driving in violation of California Vehicle Code section 12500(a) and reckless driving in

violation of California Vehicle Code section 23103(a). (Id.; Dkt. No. 33-14, Ds’ Ex. 4.) 

On May 5, 2010, the citation of operating a pedicab without a valid permit was dismissed as

part of a negotiated settlement whereby nine sets of charges, representing a long history of

outstanding violations, were “packaged” and civil assessments were imposed totaling over

$1050.00. (Dkt. No. 33-15, Ds’ Ex. 5.) On January 14, 2011, a negotiated plea and settlement

resulted in a dismissal of the remaining charges against Plaintiff in exchange for two days of public

service work. (Dkt. No. 33-14, Ds’ Ex. 4.) 

2. Permit Revocation and Administrative Hearing

On April 1, 2010, thirteen days after his arrest, Plaintiff applied for a new operating permit at

the City’s Transportation Engineering Division, Engineering and Capital Projects Department

- 4 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 4 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“TED”). (Dkt. No. 33-16, Ds’ Ex. 6.) When he applied, Plaintiff failed to state that there were

pending Vehicle Code violations against him. (Id.) 

On the next day, April 2, 2010, TED became aware of the Vehicle Code violations and sent a

letter of suspension by Certified Mail, signed by Defendant Sivash Pazargadi to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No.

33-17, Ds’ Ex. 7, Pazargadi Decl. ¶¶ 3, 10, ) The letter advised Plaintiff that his pedicab permit was

suspended and that he had 10 days to appeal the suspension. (Id.) The letter was returned “not

deliverable” to TED. (Id., Ds’ Ex. 8.) Pazargadi states that had Plaintiff fully and truthfully

disclosed the material fact that he had Vehicle Code violations related to the unsafe operation of a

pedicab pending at the time of his application, it would have been denied. (Dkt. No. 33-17, Ds. Ex.

7, Pazargadi Decl. ¶ 6.) 

On August 12, 2010, Plaintiff appeared at an administrative hearing, waiving any notice

defects in the newly scheduled hearing. (Dkt. No. 33-19, Ds’ Ex. 9.) The hearing officer

determined that pursuant to San Diego Municipal Code section 83.0127(a)(5), the City’s April 2,

2010 suspension of Plaintiff’s permit was proper. (Id.) Plaintiff did not appeal the administrative

ruling. 

Sometime after the revocation of Plaintiff’s pedicab permit, Officer Thompson seized

Plaintiff’s revoked permit issued on April 1, 2010. (Dkt. No. 33-10, Howard Depo., 192:25-194:25.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Facts

1. Background to March 18, 2010 Incident

According to Plaintiff, from 2004 to April 2010, he has been operating pedicabs in

downtown San Diego with valid permits. (Dkt. No. 47, Howard Decl. ¶ 1.) He has known

Defendant Byron Hibshman and Officer Scott Thompson, Hibshman’s partner, since 2004. (Id.) He

has rented his pedicab from Alley Cabs since 2007. (Id.) 

Since 2006, Plaintiff has been active on pedicab issues before the City Council. (Id. ¶ 2.) He

considers himself a “bicycle rights activist.” (Id.) He has spoken on pedicab issues during at least

fourteen City Council meetings. (Id.) He has also contacted City Council members and City

bureaucrats about illegal and arbitrary stops by police officers, selective enforcement of laws against

operators from other pedicab companies, and amendments to the municipal code that would not help

- 5 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 5 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the pedicab industry. (Id.) He has also distributed leaflets under the pen name, Triple Wagon

Express. (Id.) Plaintiff’s proposals were contrary to the amendments restricting pedicabs proposed

by Defendant Hibshman and Scott Thompson. (Id.) Hisbhman and Thompson were involved in

drafting the 2010 pedicab ordinance amendments. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that as a result of Plaintiff’s involvement on these pedicab issues, Officers

Hibshman, Thompson and other officers would harass Plaintiff, stop him for no reason, and scare off

customers. (Id.) In 2008, his permit was stolen by cops for three months. (Id.) 

On January 13, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a complaint with the Citizen’s Review Board on

Police Practice against Officer Thompson for harassing pedicab operators. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff states

that the complaint angered Thompson. (Id.) As a result, Defendant Hibshman and other officers

retaliated against him on March 18, 2010. (Id.) 

2. March 18, 2010 Incident

Plaintiff states that on March 18, 2010, around 2:45 p.m., he was operating a pedicab

southbound on Kettner Boulevard by the train station. (Id. ¶ 3.) He had his operating permit #115,

which was valid until April 30, 2010, properly displayed. (Id.) At that time, about 60% of pedicab

operators were using the yellow permits. (Id.) Defendant Hibshman drove up right in front of

Plaintiff and gave him a citation for not having a valid operating permit. (Id.) After Plaintiff signed

the citation, Hibshman asked to see Plaintiff’s permit and requested that he call the owner of his

pedicab. (Id.) Plaintiff told Hibshman he had a valid permit and business tax certificate and that he

will operate the pedicab himself. (Id.) Hibshman did not respond. (Id.) 

Plaintiff continued to slowly operate the pedicab southbound on Kettner. (Id. ¶ 4.) His

pedicab rolled past the limit line but stopped at a distance 323 feet from the trolley tracks crossing

Kettner. (Id.) When he stopped, a trolley was crossing Broadway and honked like it frequently does

when approaching this busy area. (Id.) After the trolley passed, seeing a green light, and Hibshman

not saying anything, Plaintiff made a right turn onto Broadway. (Id.) Hibshman then drove up to

Plaintiff and on three occasions, he drove into the front wheel of the pedicab in order to cause a

collision. (Id.) Each time, Plaintiff swerved to the side to avoid a collision. (Id.) Hibshman never

told Plaintiff to stop and Plaintiff was afraid for his safety, so he kept pedaling to the ferry landing

- 6 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 6 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

where there would be witnesses who would deter Hibshman from trying to hurt him. (Id.) Two

patrol cars also tried to crash into Plaintiff’s pedicab but he managed to avoid them by making sharp

swerves. (Id.) During this time, nobody told him to stop. (Id.) When he got to the ferry landing, he

got off the pedicab, raised his hand and said jokingly to some passersby “Folks, how about a ride?” 

(Id.) The police ran to him, tackled him to the ground and handcuffed him face down. (Id.) 

Hibsman approached Plaintiff and took off his permit and said, “Now we got you. Your pedicab

career is over. You’re done pedicabbing. You’ll never pedicab here in San Diego again.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff responded, “You never know . . . .” (Id.) Hibshman then held the permit in the air as a

trophy piece, in order to brag to the other pedicab riders and bike owners that Plaintiff was done

pedicabbing. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was taken to county jail and not given a bed until 3:00 a.m. (Id.) He was in jail

from March 18, 2010 until March 22, 2010 without a hearing or attorney. (Id.) Around March 23,

2010, Plaintiff complained about Hibshman’s conduct to the Citizen’s Review Board on Police

Practice who referred him to Internal Affairs. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

After the police took his permit, Plaintiff decided to apply for another one since his permit

would expire in another month. (Id.) On April 1, 2010, Plaintiff went to Transportation and

Engineering Division, paid money and got a new permit. (Id.) He went back to operating pedicabs. 

(Id.) On April 2, 2010, he went to speak at a City Council meeting. (Id.) The next day, Thompson

asked to see his permit and after seeing his permit, he said, “I can’t believe they gave the permit

back to you.” (Id.) On April 24, 2010, Hibshman and Thompson approached Plaintiff and stole the

new operating permit without giving him a citation. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

3. Criminal Proceedings

Two criminal proceedings were initiated against Plaintiff. One was a May 5, 2010

arraignment hearing on the citation for an invalid permit. When he appeared and showed the judge

his citation, a copy of his permit and receipts, the judge said “this doesn’t make any sense” and

ordered dismissal of the case. (Id. ¶ 72.) The judge then looked up his court records and noticed

there were 10 pedicab citations over 6 years given to him where he failed to appear. (Id.) 

2

Paragraph 7 is mistakenly numbered as 6. (Dkt. No. 47 at 5, line 24.)

- 7 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 7 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Therefore, the judge ordered civil assessments to be imposed but Plaintiff has not paid any of the

assessments. (Id.) 

As to the misdemeanor case charging him with violations of three statutory provisions,

Plaintiff states that the City offered to dismiss the case for two days of public work and no fines;

however, Plaintiff refused the deal and appeared for a trial readiness hearing on January 14, 2011. 

(Id.) Trial was set for February 23, 2011. (Id.) He appeared on the trial date and the City Attorney

discussed a new plea bargain offer to some minor infraction. (Id.) While he was considering the

offer, the judge informed him that the case had been dismissed by the City. (Id.) Plaintiff states

there was never any settlement or compromise entered by him. (Id.) 

According to other pedicab operators, Officer Thompson refers to Plaintiff as “The Angry

Black Man.” (Id. ¶ 8.) During 2010, there were only about 6 black pedicab operators out of about

600 pedicab operators and all have had problems with the San Diego Police. (Id.) Mr. Cedric

Torain, Mr. Stacy Walker, Mr. Andrew Marshall and Plaintiff had their permits either suspended or

denied. (Id.) Plaintiff is not sure what happened with one other black operator. (Id.) Mr. Roy is the

only black pedicab operator who continued operating. (Id.) 

Discussion

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendants filed a request for judicial notice as to their exhibits numbered 4, 5, 11, 12, 13,

14. (Dkt No. 33-3.) These documents concern records from the Superior Court of California and

California Civil Jury Instructions Nos. 1602, 1603, 1500 and 1600. (Id.) Defendants filed another

request for judicial notice as to the Certified Copy of City of San Diego Ordinance No. O-19898. 

(Dkt. No. 52-1.) The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable

dispute that is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Plaintiff has not objected to the request for judicial notice. 

The Court concludes that these documents are appropriate for judicial notice. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ requests for judicial notice. 

B. Evidentiary Objections

- 8 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 8 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff objects and seeks to strike the declaration of Defendant Pazargadi. Plaintiff alleges

that Pazargadi has refused to attend his deposition. (Dkt. Nos. 46, 48.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that

he left several messages with defense counsel to reschedule but counsel never returned his phone

calls. (Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 2.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Pazargadi had not yet been

deposed. 

According to Defendants, Plaintiff scheduled the deposition of Pazargadi on the last day of

fact discovery on February 14, 2012. (Dkt. No. 49-1, Riley Decl. ¶ 3.) On February 14, 2012,

Pazargadi called in sick to work. (Id.) The City offered to extend the discovery deadline by way of

a joint motion but Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Defense counsel contends that Plaintiff’s assertion that he

called defense counsel several times to reschedule the deposition without a return call is false. (Id. ¶

4.) Defense counsel highlights that Plaintiff’s counsel has not provided any written evidence

memorializing his efforts to reschedule Pazargadi’s deposition. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff did not

bring this discovery dispute to the Court’s attention. (Id.) 

The Court agrees with Defendants. At the motion hearing, Plaintiff did not provide any facts 

to show any diligence in trying to cure any defects on this discovery issue. There were many

options available to Plaintiff which he did not pursue. In addition, the facts in Pazargadi’s

declaration are not directly disputed. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to strike

the declaration of Defendant Pazargadi. 

Defendants also seek to strike the declarations of Maciej Grzegorek and Abraham Viergen

which were provided for the first time by Plaintiff in his opposition. (Dkt. No. 43.) Defendants

argue that Plaintiff did not identify these persons in his initial Rule 26(a) disclosures, in written

discovery or in his deposition. Defendants argue that introducing these new declaration is improper,

and unduly prejudicial to them. Defendants also claim that these declarations contradict and

supplant Plaintiff’s previous deposition testimony. At the hearing, Plaintiff states that he was unable

to locate these witnesses until after the filing of the motion for summary judgment in February or

March 2012. However, Plaintiff has failed to show diligence in pursuing these witnesses throughout

discovery. In addition, these declarations do not assist Plaintiff in establishing a genuine issue of

material fact as to slander or racial discrimination. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

- 9 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 9 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion to strike the declarations of Grzegorek and Viergen. 

C. Legal Standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary

judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact

is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues

of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element

of his or her claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the

moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need

not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60

(1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the

mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this

determination, the court must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court does not engage in

credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts;

- 10 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 10 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

these functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

D. First Cause of Action - Violation of Federal Civil Rights Against All Defendants

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a vehicle for a

plaintiff to bring federal statutory or constitutional challenges to actions by state and local officials. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th

Cir. 2006). To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendants deprived him of a

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the defendants acted under color of state law. West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. It alleges violations of Plaintiff’s “right to free speech, to petition grievances, due process,

and equal protection as secured by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution.”3 (FAC ¶ 13.) In the next paragraph, Plaintiff specifically states that Defendants’

actions violated “Plaintiff’s substantive due process right to liberty. Plaintiff has been deprived of

his liberty by the Defendants through a series of constant acts of harassment of Defendants that

shock the conscience.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendants appear to move for summary judgment only on the

procedural due process claim. Plaintiff opposes.4

 

1. Procedural Due Process

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for violation of his procedural due

process rights. Plaintiff opposes arguing that failure to hold a pre-deprivation hearing and failure to

3

In their moving papers, Defendants also argue that “Plaintiff Cannot Sustain a Claim for

Violation of the Fourth Amendment for Excessive Use of Force” because in discovery Plaintiff alluded

to an excessive amount of force used in his arrest. In response, Plaintiff provides an opposition to

Defendants’ arguments. The Court notes that the first amended complaint does not allege a claim of

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Court does not address the excessive force

issue as it is not a cause of action in the FAC. 

4

As part of his opposition, Plaintiff discusses the issue that stealing his valid permit on March

18, 2010 amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, (opp. at 2-3), and that there is clear

evidence of a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for exercising his First Amendment rights. (Opp.

at 3.) First, there is no cause of action for seizure under the Fourth Amendment in the first amended

complaint. Second, based on the briefs, it appears that Plaintiff’s first amendment cause of actions is

based on retaliation. Defendants do not move for summary judgment on this issue; therefore, it will not

be discussed. 

- 11 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 11 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hold a post-deprivation hearing regarding the suspension of the permit he obtained on April 1, 20105

for six months violated his procedural due process rights. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This

provision imposes “procedural limitations on a States power to take away protected entitlements.” 

District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009). This Clause

clothes individuals with the right to both substantive6

 and procedural due process. United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (analyzing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 

Substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the

conscience . . . or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . .” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Procedural due process requires that the government’s

deprivation of life, liberty, or property, even if consistent with substantive due process, “be

implemented in a fair manner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To plead procedural due process violations, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a liberty or property

interest exists that has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures attendant

upon the deprivation of an existing interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky Dept. of

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990). 

a. Property Interest 

The threshold issue is whether Plaintiff had a property interest in the permit he obtained on

April 1, 2010. Defendants argue that because the renewed permit was fraudulently obtained, there is

no property interest in the permit. Plaintiff alleges that being deprived of his right to engage in his

5

The Court assumes that the parties are discussing the suspension of the permit he obtained on

April 1, 2010. Plaintiff’s permit was taken by officers two times. The first time it was taken was when

he was arrested on March 18, 2010. The second time, his new permit, obtained on April 1, 2010, was

suspended on April 2, 2010. Consequently, his permit was taken by officers sometime after April 2,

2010. In the motion for summary judgment, Defendants summarily argue the procedural due process

issue as to both incidents. Plaintiff’s opposition does not address which incident he is talking about as

to the pre-deprivation hearing but discusses the April 2, 2010 suspension in the post-deprivation hearing

discussion. The administrative decision concerned the April 2, 2010 suspension. Therefore, the Court

addresses procedural due process as it relates to the April 2, 2010 suspension. 

6

Defendants do not move for summary judgment on the substantive due process claim.

Therefore, that claim remains. 

- 12 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 12 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

business or profession is a protected property right. 

Whether a property right exists is a question of state law. See Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d

957, 963 (2011). Property interests are not constitutionally created but “are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law-rules . . . .” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). “To

have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire

for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate

claim of entitlement to it.” Id. If a cognizable property interest is implicated, a court must then

determine whether the government’s action was arbitrary or irrational. Crowley v. Courville, 76

F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1996).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have a property interest in his 2010 permit because it

was fraudulently obtained. Defendants state that Plaintiff was given a post-deprivation hearing on

August 12, 2010 where he waived any error in the service of the notice of hearing. Alternatively,

Defendants contend if Plaintiff had a valid permit and a viable property interest at the time his

pedicab permit was seized, the City had a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of the public. 

The city was able to meet both public safety and Plaintiff’s due process rights by providing a postdeprivation hearing. 

In California, only one court has addressed pedicab permits in connection with a procedural

due process claim. Wawrzynski v. City of San Diego, D059336, 2012 WL 1201902 (Cal. Ct. App.

Apr. 11, 2012). In that case, the San Diego City Council approved the new pedicab business

regulations in September 2009. Id. at 1. The regulation designated downtown San Diego as a

restricted pedicab zone and required an owner to obtain a pedicab restricted zone decal for each

pedicab and authorized the city counsel to set the number of pedicab restricted zone decals to be

issued. Id. at 2. The city council limited the number of pedicab restricted zone decals that could be

issued each year to 250, 35 of which were issued to new entrants in the pedicab business. Id. The

decals had to be renewed every year. Id.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the city based on the adverse impact the new pedicab

regulation had on his business and alleged “the City’s refusal to issue him as many pedicab decals as

- 13 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 13 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

it has in the past, without prior notice and hearing, violated his procedural due process rights.” Id. at

2. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain without leave to amend the

City’s demurrer. The court of appeal stated that Plaintiff had not “identified any existing state law

rule that entitled him to receive each year the same number of pedicab decals the City has issued

him in the past.” Id. at 4. Therefore, the allocation of restricted pedicab zone decals did not violate

his federal due process rights. Id. (citing Luxor Cab Co. v. Cahill, 21 Cal. App. 3d 551, 558 (1971)

(holding that using the street by taxicabs is a privilege that may be granted or withheld without

violating due process)). 

In another case, a court held that there is no protected property interest in obtaining a

“Certificate of Public Necessity and Convenience” to operate “for hire” vehicles, including

pedicabs. Green Turtle Landscaping Co. v City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A. 01-1666, 2003 WL

22272188 *1-3 (E.D. La. Oct. 2, 2003) (explaining that plaintiffs understood the temporary nature of

the permission to operate a pedicab); see also Wasatch Pedicab Co., LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

07-CV-546-TS, 2008 WL 2224830 (D. Utah May 27, 2008) (granting motion to dismiss as to due

process claim because complaint did not allege more than a unilateral expectation that the Revocable

Permit’s conditions would be altered or that the City would enact an ordinance that provided lower

insurance rates as these were discretionary acts). 

Further, courts have held there is no property interest in a discretionary grant of a license or

permit. Neuwirth v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1988) (use of the word

“may” and not “shall” in obtaining dental license did not create a constitutionally protected property

or liberty interest in dental license); Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1179-

83 (1996) (participation of biased city official in hearings did not support damages claim for

violation of substantive or procedural due process because applicant had no protected property

interest in a discretionary permit); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir.

1985) (allegations that agency officials acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying discretionary

land use permit does not state a section 1983 claim because plaintiff has no protected property

interest in discretionary permit). 

Plaintiff cites to Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) which held that there is a property

- 14 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 14 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interest in a driver’s license. However, no court has held that a pedicab license contain the same

property interests as a driver’s license. 

The Court concludes there is no property interest in a pedicab permit. Lower courts have

held that there is no property interest in operating a pedicab. See Wawrzynski, 2012 WL 1201902 at

2; Green Turtle Landscaping Co., 2003 WL 22272188 at 1-3; Wasatch Pedicab Co., LLC, 2008 WL

2224830 at 5. In addition, Plaintiff’s pedicab permit is a discretionary one. The ordinance grants

the City, based on certain factors, discretion to deny an applicant a permit. See Dkt. 33-13, Ds’ Ex.

3, S.D. Mun. Code section 83.0101 et seq. 

b. Procedures 

Alternatively, even if there was a property interest in a pedicab permit, Plaintiff received the

process he was due at the post-deprivation hearing. The basic requirements of due process are the

right to notice and the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982). The extent and manner of determining

what process is due in any given situation depends on “(1) the private interests at stake; (2) the risk

that the procedure used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value of the suggested

procedural safeguard; (3) and the governmental interests affected.” Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13

(1981) (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). This “balancing test” determines

what the due process clause requires, even if state law or prison regulations call for something

different. Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Vitek v. Jones, 445

U.S. 480, 491 (1980).

“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation

demands.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 (1997) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972)). The Supreme Court has held that due process does not always require a

pre-deprivation hearing and “where a State must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to

provide pre-deprivation process, post-deprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due

Process Clause.” Id. at 930; see also F.D.I.C. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988) (holding that

suspension of indicted bank officers may be necessary to protect interests of depositors and to

maintain public confidence in the banking institutions.) “An important government interest,

- 15 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 15 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in

limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the

initial deprivation.” Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. 

Defendants argue that the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing does not violate due process

because they have a legitimate interest to protect the safety of pedicab passengers and the public

safety when they suspended his permit on April 2, 2010. Plaintiff had pending charges for reckless

driving. Plaintiff opposes arguing that failure to hold a pre-deprivation hearing violated his due

process rights because his private interest in trying to earn a living is very substantial. He cites Bell

v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) where the Supreme Court held that there is a property interest in a

driver’s license; however, as discussed above, no court has held that a pedicab permit is similar to

the protected property right of a driver’s license. 

In this case, Plaintiff’s permit was suspended under San Diego Municipal Code section

83.0127(a)(5). (Dkt. No. 33-18, Ds’ Ex. 8.) San Diego Municipal Code provides that when a notice

of suspension is issued, the operator may request a hearing within 10 days of service of the notice. 

S.D. Mun. Code § 84.0128(b). In addition, when the pedicab is operated in a manner that creates an

immediate safety hazard, the Code provides for the immediate seizure of the permit by a peace

officer. Id. § 83.0129. Further, the purpose of the pedicab ordinance is to “protect the health, safety

and welfare of the general public, and passengers using pedicabs. It is further the intent of this

Division to facilitate the safe, orderly flow of traffic and to relieve congestion and traffic hazards

associated with pedicab use.” S.D. Mun. Code § 83.0101. 

Based on the fact that Plaintiff had pending citation and criminal charges against him for

improperly operating a pedicab, the government interest was high. Therefore, confiscating

Plaintiff’s permit according to the provisions in the ordinance, did not violate due process. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown there is a genuine issue of material

fact that his procedural due process rights were violated by not having a pre-deprivation hearing. 

In addition, as to the post-deprivation hearing, TED sent the suspension letter and notice on

April 2, 2010. (Dkt. No. 33-18, Ds’ Ex. 8.) It was sent to the address he provided in his application. 

However, the letter was returned undeliverable. (Id.) Plaintiff does not state what specific date he

- 16 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 16 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

received the suspension letter but it appears he received it after his new permit was taken by

Hibshman and Thompson sometime after April 24, 2010. (Dkt. No. 47, P’s Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff

does not provide any facts showing when he filed his appeal.7

 

A hearing was eventually held on August 12, 2010. At the hearing, Defendants provided

Plaintiff an opportunity to delay the hearing due to “defective notice.” However, Plaintiff declined a

delay and proceeded with the hearing. (Dkt. No. 33-19, Ds’ Ex. 9.) Plaintiff did not appeal the

administrative decision revoking his permit. 

Based on the record, Plaintiff has not come forth with facts to create a genuine issue of

material fact that a delay of his hearing violated due process. He has not shown that the delay was

not caused by him not providing an accurate mailing address on his permit application. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the procedural

due process claim. 

E. Second Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Rights Against Defendants

Hibshman and Pazargadi

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff failed to show that his procedural due process rights

were violated, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that there was a conspiracy to violate his federal rights. 

In addition, Defendants argue that he failed to establish the necessary elements for this claim. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues there is sufficient evidence to support a conspiracy claim

against the City8

, Hibshman and Pazargadi because their misbehavior was directed at forcing

Plaintiff out of business violating his due process rights. 

To prove a conspiracy in a §1983 case, there must be “(1) the existence of an express or

implied agreement among the defendant officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2)

an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.” Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d

7

In his declaration, Plaintiff provides facts about how his new permit was taken, how he tried

to get it back, and how he finally got a hearing date; however, he does not provide any facts to show he

complied with the provisions in the ordinance regarding appealing a suspension letter. He does not

provide specific dates as to when he received the suspension letter, when and whether he filed an appeal

of the suspension, and when he received notice of the hearing. (Dkt. No. 47, P’s Decl. ¶ 6.)

8

The Court notes that the conspiracy cause of action in the FAC is only alleged against

Defendants Hibshman and Pazargadi. 

- 17 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 17 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991). There must be an “agreement or meeting of minds to violate” Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989).

The plaintiff must provide specific facts to support the existence of the alleged conspiracy. Burns v.

County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, a claim for conspiracy fails if there is

no underlying constitutional deprivation. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Because the Court has determined that there was no procedural due process right violation,

there can be no conspiracy to violate procedural due process. Alternatively, even if there was a

procedural due process claim, Plaintiff has not come forward with facts to demonstrate a genuine

issue of a material fact that there was a conspiracy to violate his procedural due process rights. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Pazargadi and Hibshman had a meeting of the

minds in order to form a conspiracy to deprive him of his rights. In his deposition, Plaintiff states

that Pazargadi is a defendant because he was the one who signed the letter suspending Plaintiff’s

pedicab permit. (Dkt. No. 33-9, Ds’ Exs. 1, Howard Depo. at 131:25-135:13.) Plaintiff testified that

he had never met and did not even know who Pazargadi was before he signed the letter. (Id. at 132:

4-9.) In a declaration, Pazargadi states that he never met Plaintiff prior to April 2, 2010 and at the

time he signed the letter, he was not aware of his race or national origin. (Dkt. No. 33-17, Ds’ Ex. 7

¶ 8.) Pazargadi also states that he was not told by Hibshman to suspend the April 1, 2010 pedicab

operators permit. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff summarily argues that he can maintain a conspiracy against

Defendants and cites to Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1988) which is not

supportive as it does not concern a conspiracy cause of action. Plaintiff summarily states that

Thompson, Hibshman and other cops would harass Plaintiff when he operated a pedicab, stopped

him for no reason and scared off customers. In addition, his permit was stolen on March 18, 2010

and again on April 24, 2010 by officers. As a result, Plaintiff was put out of business by Hibsman,

Thompson and Pazargadi. (See Dkt. No. 47, Howard Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 8.) 

Plaintiff has not disputed Defendants’ facts that he never met Pazargadi until the letter of

April 2, 2010 was signed, or that Pazargadi and Hibshman had any discussions about suspending

Plaintiff’s permit. Plaintiff only summarily makes a statement that Hibshman and Pazargadi put him

- 18 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 18 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

out of business. There are no factual allegations to support a conspiracy. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to conspiracy to

violate his procedural due process rights. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as

to the claim for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. However, the

remaining conspiracy claims to violate other constitutional rights remain. 

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Hibshman and Pazargadi argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on the

procedural due process claim. Plaintiff opposes. Because the Court grants Defendants’motion for

summary judgment as to the procedural due process claim, it need not address the issue of qualified

immunity. 

G. State Law Claims

In order to address the state law claims, the retroactivity of the Pedicab Ordinance

Amendments needs to be addressed. Pursuant to the Court’s order, Defendants filed a supplemental

brief on the retroactivity of the ordinance on May 5, 2012 and Plaintiff filed a response on May 14,

2012. (Dkt. Nos. 52, 53.)

1. Retroactivity of Pedicab Ordinance Amendments

Plaintiff obtained a pedicab permit in April 2009 which expired a year later on April 30,

2010. (Dkt. No. 47-4, Howard Decl. attached.) Permits under the former ordinance expired a year

after issuance. On September 11, 2009, the San Diego City Council amended the pedicab ordinance,

which became effective on October 11, 2009. The amended ordinance changed the date regarding

the validity of an operating permit. New permits were to be valid from the date issued through

December 31st of the year for which it is issued. S.D. Mun. Code § 83.0106(a). When Plaintiff was

stopped by Officer Hibshman on March 18, 2010 for an invalid permit, the parties disagree whether

Plaintiff had a valid permit. That question is contingent on whether the amendment was retroactive

or not. 

 There is a traditional presumption against the retroactive application of legislation. 

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, (1994). In California, “[i]t is an established canon

of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to

- 19 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 19 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appear that such was the legislative intent.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 30

Cal. 2d 388 (1947). The California Supreme Court “has consistently held that a statute should not

be given retroactive effect so as to deprive an individual of a pre-existing right unless the Legislature

has clearly expressed its intention to accomplish that end.” Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20

Cal. 3d 512, 520 (1978). The Legislature is well acquainted with this fundamental rule and uses

clear language when it intends a statute to apply retroactively. Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist.,

11 Cal. 3d 821, 828 (1974). For example, the legislature was clear when a statute that was enacted

in 1947 provided that any person “since the first day of July, 1944 has been or hereafter convicted . .

. .” would apply retroactively. Di Genova v. State Bd. of Ed., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 176 (1962). In

addition, it was clear when the Education Code statute providing for permissive rather than

mandatory denial of credentials for conviction that occurred “prior to the effective date” of the

provision, was retroactive. Id.

“Whether a statute should apply retrospectively or only prospectively is, in the first instance,

a policy question for the legislative body enacting the statute.” Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 

25 Cal. 4th 197, 221–222 (2001). Although a statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively

only, when retroactive application is clearly intended, that legislative intent must be carried out

unless due process considerations prevent it. Id. at 222.

San Diego Municipal Code section 83.0106 states, “[a]n Operating permit shall be valid

from the date issued through December 31st of the year for which it is issued.” (Dkt. No. 52-4,

City’s Ex. 28 at 7.) In addition, section 3 of the ordinance passed on September 11, 2009 states “this

ordinance shall take effect and be in force on the thirtieth day from and after its final passage.” (Id.

at 26.) 

Here, Defendants argue that the plain reading of the ordinance demonstrates that the City

Council intended the provision to be applied retroactively. Plaintiff contends that the “shall”

language demonstrates that the statute applies to permits issued in the future, not existing ones. 

Because both parties’ interpretations are plausible, the ordinance is ambiguous as to what the

City Council intended. In their supplemental brief, Defendants have not provided any legislative

documents to show the City Council’s intent to make this section retroactive to permits issues prior

- 20 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 20 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the ordinance’s enactment which expired on a yearly basis. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

the ordinance is not retroactive. Therefore, Plaintiff had a valid permit on the day of the incident on

March 18, 2010. 

H. Third Cause of Action - False Imprisonment Against Defendants Hibshman and City of

San Diego 

Defendants argue that since Hibshman had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff and the

other officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, he is not liable for false imprisonment. Plaintiff

does not provide an opposition on this issue. 

The first amended complaint alleges that on March 18, 2010, Plaintiff was seized and

arrested by Hibshman and two other policemen employed by the City of San Diego. He claims that

he was arrested without probable cause and was imprisoned for four days when he was released on

his own recognizance. (FAC ¶¶ 31-32.)

“Under California law, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: (1) the

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an

appreciable period of time, however brief.” Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital, 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000)). 

“[F]alse arrest” and “false imprisonment” are not separate torts. False arrest is but one way of

committing a false imprisonment . . . .’ [Citation.]” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles,15 Cal. 4th 744,

753 n. 3 (1997). 

Although there is no governmental immunity for false imprisonment, California Penal Code

section 847 provides that there is no civil liability for false imprisonment if the peace officer, at the

time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. Asgari, 15 Cal. 4th at 752;

O’Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 548 (2006). “Reasonable cause to arrest exists

when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a reasonable person to have a strong

suspicion of the arrestee’s guilt.” O’Toole, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 511 (citation omitted). This is an

objective standard. People v. Adair, 29 Cal. 4th 895, 904–05 (2003). Where the facts are disputed,

the issue of reasonable cause for an arrest is a question of law.” Id. A city can be vicariously liable

for injuries proximately caused by a public employee who acted within the scope of his employment. 

- 21 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 21 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a). 

In their moving papers, Defendants argue that the Officers had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff and therefore they argue that the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Plaintiff

does not provide an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on false imprisonment. 

At the hearing, Defendants agreed that there were two separate incidents on March 18, 2010. 

The first being the initial detention of Plaintiff for either visibility of permit or failure to have a valid

permit. The second being the chase and subsequent arrest of Plaintiff. 

According to the front of the citation, the first detention by Officer Hibshman was for failure

to have a valid permit because it expired. However, on a different page of the same citation, there

are handwritten notes by Hibshman that state, “[p]ermit could not be seen.” (Dkt. No. 33-15, Ds’

Ex. 5.) Although it is an issue of fact as to the reason why Plaintiff was initially stopped, it does not

create a genuine material issue of fact as to false imprisonment. If Plaintiff was stopped because his

permit could not be seen, then the stop was reasonable. If Plaintiff was stopped improperly by

Hibshman because he believed he had an invalid permit, he would be immune under Cal. Penal

Code section 847(b)(1). Although the Court determined that the amended ordinance was not

retroactive, Hibshman believed the ordinance was valid when the ordinance became effective on

October 11, 2009. As the Court stated above, the ordinance itself is not clear whether it applied

retroactively or not. The ordinance could be interpreted to be either retroactive or not. Therefore, a

reasonable person reading the statute could come to a conclusion that the ordinance was applicable

on the effective date of the amended ordinance. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it was

reasonable for Officer Hibshman to believe that the ordinance was retroactive. 

As to the second detention, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The second detention by Hibshman and the officers occurred

when Hibshman and a patrol car attempted to get Plaintiff to stop because he was violating traffic

rules. (Dkt. No. 33-12, Ds’ Exhibit 2, Hibshman Decl. ¶ 5-7.) Hibshman stated that he yelled and

signaled at Plaintiff to stop; however, Plaintiff proceeded to evade them and in the process drove

recklessly, violating vehicle and penal codes, down to Harbor Drive. (Id. ¶ 7.) In his declaration,

Plaintiff states that Hibshman never told him to stop or said anything. (Dkt. No. 47, Howard Decl. ¶

- 22 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 22 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4.) Plaintiff asserts that Hibshman and the patrol car were ramming their vehicles into his pedicab

and he was swerving to avoid getting injured. (Id.) 

Based on these disputed facts, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff

was falsely imprisoned. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim as to the first incident and DENIES

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim as to the second

incident. 

 I. Fourth Cause of Action - Racial Discrimination against Defendants Hibshman and City

of San Diego

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot show a genuine issue of fact to support a claim of

racial discrimination. Plaintiff argues there was racial discrimination because other black pedicab

operators were forced to stop pedicabbing. 

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges racial discrimination against Defendants

Hibshman and the City of San Diego. (FAC ¶¶ 35-40.) He states, “Defendants denied Plaintiff the

benefits of equal protection in enforcement of their laws, considering Plaintiff grievances, and

obeying their own laws and discriminated against Plaintiff also because of his race.” (Id. ¶ 37.) The

City operated one or more programs that receive federal financial assistance. (Id. ¶ 36.) 

“Defendants acted knowingly, willfully, and maliciously, and with reckless and callous disregard for

Plaintiff’s federally protected rights.” (Id. ¶ 40.) Based on the language of the first amended

complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging an equal protection claim under the United States

Constitution.9 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall

‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

9

The Court notes that this claim is duplicative as Plaintiff alleges an equal protection claim in

the First Cause of Action. 

- 23 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 23 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a

protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

“Where the challenged governmental policy is “facially neutral,” proof of its disproportionate

impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some

invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.” Id. Stark statistical evidence may

constitute proof of a practice of discrimination. The Committee Concerning Community

Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 703 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (noting that absent evidence of very

stark statistical disparities, “impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other

evidence.”)). “If there is no evidence of intentional discrimination, then the court assumes that the

challenged actions were not based on discrimination and must inquire only whether the actions were

rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Id. (citing Hispanic Taco Vendors of

Washington v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1993)). In a selective law enforcement

equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory

motive. Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1988).10

Without providing a legal standard, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show a genuine

issue of material fact to support a claim of racial discrimination. They discuss Plaintiff’s deposition

where he states that he was racially discriminated against because Defendants are jealous because he

speaks to beautiful women, because Hibshman belongs to the NRA and Officer Thompson is a

Mormon. (Dkt. No. 33-8, Ds’ Ex. 1, Howard Depo. at 126:7-127:10.) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff bases his claim of racial discrimination against the City on Pazargadi. Plaintiff states that

he was racially discriminated against by Pazargadi because he concluded that Plaintiff was a danger

to the public. (Id. at 232:22-224:18.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff states that Hibshman and non-defendant Thompson refer to him as

10 Plaintiff cites to Benigni in opposing the motion. In Benigni, a jury entered judgment for the

Plaintiff. The City appealed and the Court, for reasons other than the evidence shown, held that

evidence was sufficient to submit theory of equal protection to jury. Id. at 477-78. The facts in this case

are not helpful on the issues in this case. 

- 24 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 24 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“The Angry Black Man.”11 (Dkt. No. 47, Howard Decl. ¶ 8.) He states that there were only six 

black pedicab operator in San Diego during 2010 out of about 600 pedicab operators. (Id.) There

was Plaintiff, Mr. Roy, Mr. Torain, Mr. Walker, Mr. Marshall and one additional person whose

name he does not know. (Id.) Mr. Marshall had his pedicab decal suspended because his insurance

coverage was not being purchased from Hibshman’s insurance person. (Id.) Mr. Walker was

arrested and had his permit denied for not following an officer’s instruction to move his pedicab fast

enough. (Id.) Mr. Torain also had his pedicab permit suspended. (Id.) Mr. Roy is the only black

pedicab operating. (Id.) 

Plaintiff does not provide any declarations or affidavits from these black pedicab operators

who have allegedly been forced to stop pedicabbing. Based on Plaintiff’s statements, it is not clear

that the reasons they stopped pedicabbing was based on racial discrimination by Defendants. In

addition, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient data to demonstrate proof of racial discrimination. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ racially

discriminated against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to racial discrimination. 

J. Fifth Cause of Action - Slander Against Defendant Hibshman

Defendants assert that Defendant Hibshman is not liable for slander because Plaintiff had an

expired permit so his statement was true based on the ordinance provision. Plaintiff argues that

Hibshman’s statement that Plaintiff is barred from pedicabbing in San Diego is false. Hibshman

made these statement in front of other pedicab owners and as a result he lost business and reputation. 

Plaintiff alleges that in March 2010, Defendant Hibshman made statements to third persons

who knew Plaintiff was operating a pedicab in San Diego that Plaintiff was prohibited from

operating a pedicab in the City of San Diego. (FAC ¶ 42.) Plaintiff claims these statements were

slanderous per se because Hibshman accused Plaintiff of violating laws, and the statements were

false and unprivileged, and were not made as part of his employment duties. He claims he suffered

loss of reputation and loss of business opportunities. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

11Both parties addressed Plaintiff’s deposition where he stated that Officer Thompson referred

to him as the “angry black man.” (Howard Depo. 125:4-6.) However, page 125 is not provided in the

record. It is omitted from Defendants’ exhibit and Plaintiff has not provided it to the Court. 

- 25 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 25 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered . . . which: . . . 3. Tends

directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him

general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or

by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural

tendency to lesson its profits . . . .” Cal. Civil Code § 46. A statement that makes charges under any

of the four specific categories in the slander statute is “slander per se” and requires no proof of

damages. Duste v. Chevron Prods., Co., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

Based on Defendant Hibshman’s reasonable belief that Plaintiff was driving without a valid

permit, the statement that Plaintiff was prohibited from operating a pedicab in San Diego was true. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant Hibshman is

liable for slander. 

In addition, Defendant claims he is immune under California Government Code section

821.6. Hibshman asserts that there were criminal charges pending and he was part of the

investigation and prosecution. Without providing legal support, Plaintiff argues that the immunity

does not apply because his statement was not in furtherance of prosecution or investigation because

they were made to individual persons who were not potential witnesses or parties to any of the

incidents involved. 

Section 821.6 provides, “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting

or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if

he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. This immunity

provision is to be construed broadly so as to further “its purpose to protect public employees in the

performance of their prosecutorial duties from the threat of harassment through civil suits.” Gillan

v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1048 (2007). Section 821.6 applies to police officers

as well as public prosecutors. Strong v. State, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1439, 1461 (2011). 

When Plaintiff was arrested, it was the beginning of an investigation and Hibshman made an

erroneous comment that Plaintiff can no longer pedicab in San Diego. Such statements are immune

under section 821.6. See Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1486 (1989) (holding that

investigator and Dept. were immune from slander liability for erroneous statements about amount of

- 26 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 26 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

squid confiscated that defendants were found guilty of underweighing, since statement were made

part of prosecution process); Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033 (2007) (press

releases during the course of investigation reporting progress or results of investigation cannot give

rise to liability). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to

slander. 

K. Sixth Cause of Action - Violation of Cal. Civ. Code section 52.1 against Defendant

Hibshman

Defendants argue that California Civil Code section 52.1 claims essentially duplicates 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims and courts have concluded that an adverse ruling on 1983 claims bars relief for

the same claims under 52.1. Plaintiff contends that the section 52.1 claims do not duplicate 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims. 

California Civil Code section 52.1 establishes a private right of action for damages and other

relief against a person who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion,” or attempts to so

interfere, with the exercise or enjoyment of a individual’s constitutional or other legal right. Cal.

Civ. Code § 52.1

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff only alleges that he has the right to petition the

government for grievances under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1 of the

California Constitution. (FAC ¶ 48.) On January 3, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a complaint with the

Citizen’s Review Board on Police Practice against Officer Thompson for harassing various pedicab

operators. (Id. ¶ 48.) Hibshman’s act of stopping him for an invalid permit and then following him

again to the pier to get arrested constituted malicious retaliation and an attempt at intimidating and

coercing Plaintiff from exercising his constitutional right to petition for grievances. (Id. ¶¶ 49-51.) 

On April 24, 2010, Hibshman and Thompson approached Plaintiff and stole Plaintiff’s new

operating permit and did not give him a citation. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 50.) 

In their moving papers, Defendants argue claims of procedural due process, excessive force

and racial discrimination under section 52.1. In opposition, Plaintiff only contends that the section

52.1 claims do not duplicate 1983 claims and cites to Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007,

1016 (9th Cir. 2002). However, that case does not concern section 52.1 nor any of the claims

- 27 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 27 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

against the defendants. 

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff only presents a claim for the right to petition the

government for grievances under the United States and California Constitution. Defendants’

argument concerning procedural due process is not directed at Plaintiff’s claim concerning the right

to petition the government for grievances under the United States or California Constitution. In

opposition, Plaintiff does not provide any facts or law to support its position. Accordingly, because

Defendant Hibshman failed to bear his burden on a motion for summary judgment, the Court

DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to violation of California Civil Code section

52.1 against Defendant Hibshman. 

L. Seventh Cause of Action - Violation of Cal. Civ. Code Section 52.1 against Defendant

Pazagardi

Similar to the sixth cause of action, Defendant Pazagardi maintains that the California Civil

Code section 52.1 claims essentially duplicates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and courts have concluded

that an adverse ruling on 1983 claims bars relief for the same claims under section 52.1. Plaintiff

opposes arguing the section 52.1 claims do not duplicate 42. U.S.C. § 1983 claims. 

The first amended complaint alleges a violation of Civil Code section 52.1 against Defendant

Pazargadi for the right to petition the government for grievances under the United States and

California Constitution. Both parties present the same arguments as in the Sixth Cause of Action

against Defendant Hibshman. For the same reasons discussed in the reasoning above as to

Defendant Hibshman, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to a

violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 against Defendant Pazargadi. 

M. Eighth Cause of Action - Malicious Prosecution Against Defendant Hibshman

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. First,

Hibshman had a reasonable belief Plaintiff was violating the ordinance and the termination of

Plaintiff’s legal proceedings was not adjudicated in his favor. In opposition, Plaintiff contends that

Defendant did not have probable cause to detain Plaintiff and that the criminal proceedings

terminated in his favor. 

“In order to establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution. . . a plaintiff must

- 28 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 28 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demonstrate ‘that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and

was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without

probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations].’” Sheldon Appel Co. v

Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 871 (1989) (quoting Bertero v. Nat’l Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 50

(1974)). 

Defendants argue that there was probable cause to detain and cite Plaintiff for violation of

the Municipal Code based on his expired permit. Similarly, there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff for reckless driving, refusal to obey the directions of the traffic officers and the interference

with an officers’ attempt to stop him for traffic violations. Plaintiff disagrees and contends there

was no probable cause. 

As discussed above, Defendant Hibshman had a reasonable belief, even though incorrect, to

stop and cite Plaintiff for violation of the Municipal Code based on Plaintiff’s expired pedicab

permit and he had reasonable belief to stop and cite him for not having a visible permit. Therefore,

Plaintiff has not shown there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was no

probable cause. Therefore, there is no need to discuss whether the two legal actions against Plaintiff

was terminated in his favor. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to the malicious prosecution cause of action.

O. Ninth Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Defendants 

Hibsman and Pazargadi

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet the elements of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. They assert that Hibshman’s action of detaining and citing Plaintiff and

Pazargadi’s signing a suspension letter provided for in the ordinance does not rise to the level of

outrageous conduct or recklessness. In addition, they allege Plaintiff has not alleged nor provided

facts to show severe emotional distress. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that “arresting an innocent

man and then prosecuting him with two charges both of which are later dismissed can constitute

such” extreme and outrageous behavior. (Dkt. No. 47, Howard Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff further states he

has “severe emotional and financial distress.” Id.

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of both Defendants was

- 29 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 29 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

extreme and outrageous. (FAC ¶ 67.) “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention

of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050

(2009) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)); see also

Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). “A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous'

[only] when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bound of that [which is] usually tolerated in a civilized

community.’” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1050–51 (quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001). A plaintiff may

recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress if the defendant is aware of the presence of

the plaintiff, yet engages in outrageous conduct in reckless disregard to the probability that it will

cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 905. “Severe emotional

distress means emotional distress of such substantial . . . or enduring quality that no reasonable

[person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051 (quoting

Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004). 

Defendants argue that Hibshman had probable cause to detain and cite Plaintiff. In addition,

they argue Pazargadi was simply following protocol as provided for in the ordinance when he signed

a letter advising Plaintiff about his suspension. Lastly, they assert that Plaintiff has not shown

severe emotional distress. 

Plaintiff does not provide any substantive facts or arguments opposing the motion as to

Hibshman and provides no opposition as to Pazargadi. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to show

there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Hibshman and Pazargadi’s conduct was extreme

and outrageous. Hibshman conduct of stopping Plaintiff the first time based on either his allegedly

invalid permit based on a mistake of the law or the fact that his permit could not be seen, does not

constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. Plaintiff has also not shown that both Defendants had

the requisite intent or reckless disregard to cause emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim. 

- 30 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 30 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

/ / / /

P. Tenth Cause of Action - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Defendants

Hibshman and Pazargadi

Defendants assert that California will not allow the independent tort of negligent infliction of

emotional distress and California limits this cause of action to special relationships which does not

apply in this case. Without providing any legal authority, Plaintiff argues that Hibshman had a

mandatory pre-existing duty to not arrest Plaintiff without a warrant or probable cause required by

the Fourth Amendment. As to Pazargadi, Plaintiff claims he had a duty not to suspend permits for

more than 30 days without a hearing pursuant to section 83.0128 of the San Diego Municipal Code. 

In California, in order to state a prima facie case of negligent infliction of emotional distress,

plaintiff must plead “[t]he traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages”. 

Fluharty v. Fluharty, 59 Cal. App. 4th 484, 490 (1997). Where there is a “special relationship,” such

that there is justified reliance by plaintiff on the defendant’s statement or promise, a duty has been

found to exist. Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance, 39 Cal. App. 3d 588, 593 (1974); see also

Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938 (1964) (deputy sheriff voluntarily promised to

warn decedent if defendant, who had made threats on her life, was released; defendant was released,

but sheriff did not warn and heirs had cause of action against county). “A ‘special relationship’

exists if and only if an injured person demonstrates the public officer ‘assumed a duty toward [him]

greater than the duty owed to another member of the public.’” Strong v. State, 201 Cal. App. 4th

1439, 1453 (2011) (citations omitted). “A special relationship has been found to arise when a public

employee expressly or impliedly promises to undertake a special duty on a plaintiff's behalf . . . or

when a public employee causes an injured and dependent person to rely on the public employee to

his detriment. Id. 

Defendants argue that there is no duty between Defendants and Plaintiff. In opposition,

Plaintiff summarily asserts, without any legal or factual support, that there is a pre-existing duty by

both Hibshman and Pazargadi owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not shown there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether there was a duty owed by Defendants Hibshman and Pazargadi to

Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

- 31 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 31 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’

 motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action

only as to procedural due process; 

2. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Second Cause of

Action for conspiracy only as to procedural due process; 

3. GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to the Third Cause of Action for false imprisonment;

4. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Cause of

Action for racial discrimination; 

5. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Fifth Cause of Action

for Slander; 

6. DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Sixth and Seventh

Cause of Action for violations of Cal. Civ. Code section 52.1; 

7. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Eighth Cause of

Action for Malicious Prosecution; 

8. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Ninth Cause of

Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and 

9. GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Tenth Cause of

Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

Based on the Court’s schedule, the pretrial conference set for July 13, 2012 is vacated and

continued to August 3, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 29, 2012

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

- 32 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 32 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Judge

- 33 - [10cv2535-AJB(RBB)]

Case 3:10-cv-02535-GPC-RBB Document 58 Filed 06/29/12 Page 33 of 33