Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03226/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14‐3226

NATHANIEL JACKSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LIEUTENANT DAVID WILLIS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:12‐cv‐03023‐CSB‐DGB — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 27, 2016

Before WOOD,Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit

Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.  Nathaniel Jackson, an inmate in the

custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed a

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his rights

undertheEighthAmendment were violatedbyprisonofficials.

He brought the lawsuit against David Willis, a Lieutenant at

Case: 14-3226 Document: 94 Filed: 12/27/2016 Pages: 11
2 No. 14‐3226

Logan Correctional Center, and Eddie J. Payne, a correctional

officer atPinckneyville Correctional Center, in connection with

an incident that occurred at Logan on August 4, 2011, during

his transfer from Dixon Correctional Center to Pinckneyville.

Jackson alleged that he was unconstitutionally subjected to

excessive force and also alleged a failure to protect by the

refusal of his request to be placed in a prison in which he had

no known enemies. The details surrounding the Eighth

Amendment claim are of limited relevance to the issues in this

appeal. In brief, Jackson was scheduled to be transferred from

Logan to Pinckneyville, but when he arrived at Logan he

refused to transfer to Pinckneyville stating that he had made

enemies with correctional officers there. He asserted that he

had a right to refuse a transfer. In support of that contention,

he testified that he had witnessed other prisoners refuse

transfers from Logan, and they were placed in segregation and

issued a disciplinary ticket. He further asserted that in May

2007, he refused a transfer to Shawnee Correctional Center

while he was at Logan because prison employees were his

enemies there, and he was allowed to stay at Logan. In the

August 4, 2011, incident, Jackson’s refusal to transfer met with

a differentreaction. He testified that a number of officers lifted

him over their heads and threw him, head first, into the van,

causing injury. The officers disputed his testimony as to the

manner in which he was transported. They testified that he

refused to walk to the van, and that they carried him there, but

that he stepped inside of his own accord and was not thrown

into it. They further asserted that once inside the van he never

claimed any injury, nor did he request any medical treatment.

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No. 14‐3226 3

Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the

defendants andagainstJackson.Onappeal, counselforJackson

argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court

refused to grant a continuance when his attorney withdrew on

the eve of trial, the court improperly admitted a 7‐year‐old

disciplinary report without a limiting instruction or explana‐

tion, and the court abused its discretion in admitting a 12‐year‐

old burglary conviction as evidence of Jackson’s truthfulness.

None of those alleged errors rendered the trial unfair and

command a new trial.

As he proceeded with his case in the district court, Jackson

filed multiple requests seeking the appointment of pro se

counsel. The district court denied the appointment of counsel

numerous times, including in January andOctober of 2013, and

in June of 2014. Each time, the district court reasoned that

Jackson had experience litigating and that his pleadings

demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts and law. The court

also noted that Jackson had personal knowledge of the alleged

excessive force and should be able to obtain medicalrecords to

corroborate his injuries. The court concluded, in each instance,

that Jackson was competent to proceed pro se in light of the

relative simplicity of his claims. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,

654–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the considerations in

determining whetherto appoint counsel in civil litigation). On

August 26, 2014, the district court procured pro bono represen‐

tation for Jackson. At that time, the court also extended the

final pretrial conference date to September 26. The jury trial

dates of October 7–9 had been set by the court on May 9, and

at the status on August 26 the court made clear that the final

pretrial conference and jury trial dates were firm. Jackson’s

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appointed counsel, Bhairav Radia, appeared in person for the

September 26 pretrial conference, and Jackson appeared by

phone. At that conference, Jackson did not express any

concerns with Radia’s representation. Ten days later, on the

eve of trial in a case that had been pending for 32 months,

Jackson—appearing by phone—asked the court to dismiss

Radia and to grant him a continuance of the trial date. In

addition, at Jackson’s request, his attorney filed a motion to

withdraw in the case. After a discussion with the trial court at

which the court reiterated that the trial date was “firm” and

that Jackson would be disadvantaged if proceeding unrepre‐

sented, Jackson indicated a willingness to proceed with Radia,

but Radia stated that he wanted to proceed with his motion to

withdraw because his client disagreed with his trial strategy

and fundamentally distrusted him personally. The trial court

arranged forJackson and Radia to have the use of the phone in

the courtroom without interruption for around 20 minutes in

order for them to discuss how they wanted to proceed. When

court reconvened, Radia informed the court that Jackson had

confirmed that he fundamentally distrusted Radia and that

they were in agreement that they could not work together as

attorney and client. The trial judge did not inquire of Jackson

separately whether he agreed with that characteriza‐

tion—which would have been preferable—but Jackson has

never assertedthatRadia incorrectly characterizedhis position

in informing the court that they agreed that they could not

work together. At that time, the trial judge granted the motion

to withdraw, but in order to mitigate the adverse impact on

Jackson, the court first required Radia to remain as standby

counsel. The trial judge refused to continue the case,reasoning

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No. 14‐3226 5

that: it was a relatively straightforward case; Jackson knew the

facts as well as anyone; it was late afternoon the day before

trial; it would be difficult to contact all ofthe prospective jurors

given that many worked in the fields on farms in the rural

area; and that many prospective jurors had arranged for time

off work already. The court also stated that it had contacted

many attorneys before finding one available to represent

Jackson the first time, and had no reasonable ability to obtain

additional counsel for him.

The court inquired as to whetherJackson had seen all of the

documents in the case, and Radia indicated that Jackson had

not seen a set of documents that were prepared as trial

exhibits. The court then altered the schedule for the next day

in order to give time for Jackson to review them with standby

counsel. Instead of proceeding with the trial the next day, the

court limited the proceedings to jury selection in the morning,

and made arrangements for Jackson to stay at the courthouse

all day that day to allow him to review the exhibits in the

Marshal Service area withRadia, orto take thedocuments back

to the correctional center.

Jackson recognizes that he had no right to counsel in his

civil proceeding, and does not argue that the court erred in

failing to obtain substitute counsel for him after Radia was

allowed to withdraw. His only claim is that the trial court

should have granted a continuance to allow him to either

obtain substitute counsel on his own or prepare to defend

himself pro se.

A district court’s decision to deny a continuance is re‐

viewed only for abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only

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6 No. 14‐3226

if the record contains no evidence upon which the judge could

have rationally based his decision. Wasson v. Peabody Coal Co.,

542 F.3d 1172, 1175 (7th Cir. 2008). “This court has emphasized

that ‘district judges must be allowed considerable leeway in

scheduling civil cases, and therefore in denying continuances

that would disrupt their schedules ... .’” Id. at 1175, quoting

Research Sys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicite, 276 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir.

2002). Jackson argues that the court abused its discretion in

refusing the continuance because: this was his first and only

continuance in the 32‐month‐old case; the request was made in

good faith; he had not received all discovery in a timely

fashion; and having persuaded Jackson that he needed

experienced trial counsel, the court should not have permitted

appointedcounselto withdraw without granting a continuance

sufficient to allow Jackson to obtain substitute counsel or

prepare to try the case pro se. None of those arguments

establish an abuse of discretion here.

Jackson’s argument that it was his first request for a

continuance and that discovery was not timely received suffer

from the same defect, in that the continuance request was

made on the eve of trial. Jackson appeared by phone ten days

prior, and neither requested a continuance nor did he even

complain of his representation orthediscovery concerns atthat

time. The compressed time period in which to prepare to try

his case was a result of his failure to raise those concerns

earlier.Moreover,Jackson’s complaintthatthe court convinced

him of the need for counsel but then failed to grant him time to

prepare his case ignores the sequence of events on October 6,

the day before trial. Jackson initially agreed to retain his

counsel when questionedby the court and afterthe court made

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No. 14‐3226 7

clear to him that no continuance to the trial would be granted;

nevertheless, after he was given time to consult privately with

his counsel, Radia informed the court that Jackson had con‐

firmed that he fundamentally distrusted Radia and that they

were in agreement that they could not work together as

attorney and client. Therefore, even with the knowledge that

the court would not continue the case, Jackson agreed that he

still wanted his counsel to withdraw.

The trial court attempted to minimize the adverse impact

of Jackson’s decision by requiring Radia to remain as standby

counsel. The court also altered the trial schedule for the next

day, so that jury instruction would end in the morning and

ensuring that Jackson had access to Radia and all trial exhibits

for the remainder of the day. Those provisions appeared to

have ameliorated the adverse impact of the denial, because the

court noted in a subsequent order that Radia had done an

admirable job as standby counsel and that Jackson consulted

with Radia frequently. Finally, the court had already deter‐

mined numerous times that Jackson was capable of handling

the litigation pro se, holding that he had experience litigating,

that his pleadings demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts

and law, that he had personal knowledge of the facts, and that

the claims were relatively simple. The court expressed its

concern with the impact of such a last‐minute continuance on

the prospective jurors, who had arranged to take time off from

their work to appear the next day for the trial, and who could

not be easily contacted. Those are relevant considerations for

a court in determining whether to grant a continuance. In

conclusion, there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision to deny the continuance given that it was made on the

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8 No. 14‐3226

eve of trial in a case that had been pending for 32 months, a

continuance would not result in the appointment of new

counsel because the court did not believe it could reasonably

obtainadditionalrepresentation,Jacksonhaddemonstratedan

ability to litigate the case pro se, the court modified the trial

schedule to allow time for Jackson to familiarize himself with

the trial exhibits that had been prepared by appointed counsel,

and appointed counsel would remain as standby counsel.

Jackson next challenges the court’s evidentiary decision to

admit a 2007 disciplinary report. The trial court enjoys broad

discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evi‐

dence, and therefore we willreverse such evidentiary determi‐

nations only for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. Flannery,

840 F.3d 922, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2016); Empress Casino Joliet Corp.

v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 833 (7th Cir. 2016). At

trial, Jackson testified that based on his own personal experi‐

ence, he believed that he could refuse a transfer at the Logan

Correctional Center. He testified that on May 16, 2007, he had

arrived at Logan to be transferred to Shawnee, and he success‐

fully refused the transfer to Shawnee. He stated that rather

than being transferred, he was placed in segregation at Logan

and issued a disciplinary ticket. In response to that testimony,

the defendants cross‐examined Jackson as to that May 2007

incident. The defendants asked Jackson whether in May 2007

he had refused a direct order to get on the bus and had then

threatened to kill one of the officers at Shawnee if forced to go

there. Jackson responded that he did not remember making

that statement, and deniedthreatening the staff at Shawnee. At

that point, defendants’ counsel introduced the May 2007

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No. 14‐3226 9

disciplinary report to impeach Jackson, in which Jackson was

found guilty of threatening correctional officers.

Jackson did not object to the introduction of thatreport and

therefore the admission of the report can be reviewed only for

plain error, which is available only in extraordinary cases. Fed.

R. Evid. 103; Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car System, 802 F.3d 918,

924 (7th Cir. 2015). Under that standard, Jackson must show

that exceptional circumstances exist, substantial rights are

affected, and a miscarriage of justice will result if review is

denied. Id. He cannot meet that burden here.

The evidence of the disciplinary report, though potentially

prejudicial, was relevant to rebut Jackson’s contention that he

was allowed to refuse the transfer in this case because he had

been allowed to do so in May 2007. The report demonstrated

that additional factors were present in the May 2007 incident,

in that the correctional officers believed that he had threatened

to kill officers at Shawnee in the May 2007 incident, which

rendered it a fundamentally different situation from the

transfer at issue here. Jackson himself rendered that evidence

relevant by relying on that incident, and the court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing it. See e.g. Gomez v. Ahitow, 29

F.3d 1128, 1139 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the admission of

threat evidence where the evidence was probative to an issue

otherthan credibility).In fact, the court attempted to minimize

the adverse impact by denying the defendants’ request for a

Gilbert instruction, which would have instructed the jury that

Jackson threatened prison staff as indicated in the report

despite his denial. Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir.

2008). The court decided to admit the report rather than issue

the instruction in orderto minimize the likelihood that the jury

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would unduly focus on that past incident. Jackson has failed to

demonstrate that his substantialrights are affected resulting in

a miscarriage of justice.

Jackson’s final argument is also without merit. He asserts

that the court erred in allowing defense counsel to ask whether

he was incarcerated for a felony, to which he replied “burglary,

yes.” Jackson never objected to that question, so once again

review is limited to the plain error standard, and requires a

showing that his substantial rights were violated and a

miscarriage of justice will result. Id. He cannot meet that

burden.Jackson hadalready revealedin his opening statement

that he was incarcerated for burglary, so there was no preju‐

dice to him from it. That is particularly true in a case such as

this challenging actions that occur during a prison transfer,

because the fact of his incarceration is already known, so the

risk of prejudicial impact is lower. Furthermore, Jackson has

failed to indicate how introduction ofthat evidence could have

affected his substantial rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

Jackson filed a pro se brief in this appeal, raising a number

of additional issues, butthose too are without merit. He alleges

that the defendants offered conflicting testimony, but it is the

province of the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses

and make the final determination. Perry v. New Hampshire,

132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). Moreover, he asserts that he should

have been allowed to present evidence as to grievances he had

pursued against Pinckneyville prison officials, but that is not

relevant to the narrow issue before the court in this case as to

the excessive force claim. He also challenges the inability to

pursue additional discovery, but concerns about discovery

were pursued in the August 26, 2014 status hearing, and the

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No. 14‐3226 11

court directed the defendants to ensure all discovery was

provided by September 2nd. The court began the status

hearing on September 26 by inquiring whether Radia had

received all discovery and Radia responded that he had and

agreed with the court that it was a “dead issue” now. Jackson

did not indicate any disagreement with that statement.

Accordingly, any such challenge raised in this appeal is

waived. Jackson has raised no meritorious challenge in this

appeal.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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