Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01996/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01996-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE JUAREZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CARMEN BUTTS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1996 JAM AC P (TEMP) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess 

an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments shall be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the 

Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in 

full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

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 I. Screening Standards 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 

236 (1974). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a 

claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial 

plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered 

to be part of the complaint for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal 

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Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.1990). 

II. Plaintiff’s Claims 

The complaint alleges that Dr. Carmen Butts, a physician at the California Health Care 

Facility, discontinued plaintiff’s prescription for morphine “without due process.” (Complaint 

(ECF No. 1) at 3. It also alleges that defendant Rackley, the warden at the prison health care 

facility, violated due process by “his failure to correct this problem on administrative appeal” and 

“in the course of his supervisory responsibilities[.]” (Id. at 4.) The complaint also suggests that a 

Dr. Hlaing violated plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to 

prescribe appropriate medication. 

A. Claims Against the Warden 

First, with respect to Warden Rackley’s alleged liability for not providing plaintiff with 

any relief in his administrative appeal, “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003). “Therefore, 

plaintiff cannot state a cognizable civil rights claim against defendants ... based solely on their 

roles in denying a prison grievance.” Johnson v. Hill, No. 2:10-cv-2522 KJN P, 2010 WL 

4386722 at *2 (E.D.Cal. October 28, 2010). Furthermore, it is well established that a state actor 

in a supervisory position cannot be held individually liable in a civil rights action for the 

constitutional violations of a subordinate. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). 

To state a claim against a supervisor, a plaintiff must aver some causal connection between the 

supervisor’s conduct and the violation. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 

1446 (9th Cir.1991). Here, the complaint avers no connection between the warden’s conduct and 

the medical care the plaintiff received, nor could any be reasonably inferred. The complaint thus 

contains no plausible basis for any civil rights claim against the warden. 

B. Claims Based on Medical Care 

The complaint alleges that Dr. Butts’ decision to discontinue plaintiff’s prescription for 

morphine violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 

contrary to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s “established state-wide 

policy[.]” (Complaint at 3, 7.) A state’s correctional regulation creates a liberty interest protected 

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by the requirements of due process only when enforcement of that regulation “imposes atypical 

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin 

v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). State policies that guide physicians in their treatment 

of inmates do not give rise to any such liberty interest. 

Instead, when a prisoner claims he suffered inadequate medical care while incarcerated, 

he invokes the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Although this plaintiff has chosen to frame his allegations 

of inadequate medical care against Dr. Butts as a claim for violation of due process, and although 

he can pursue no viable cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment based on those 

allegations, the court will construe plaintiff’s claim under the applicable standards of the Eighth 

Amendment. 

 1. Eighth Amendment Standards 

As a general matter, a prisoner who alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment must 

allege and prove that he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation (the objective prong of the 

claim) and that officials acted with deliberate indifference in allowing or causing the deprivation 

to occur (the subjective prong of the claim). Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). Thus 

when a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of medical care, the prisoner 

must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A viable Eighth Amendment medical claim, 

then, states two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc). 

A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include 

“the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. 

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at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the 

objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834 (1994). 

If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical need, he must then show that 

prison officials responded to it with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In general, 

a prisoner may show deliberate indifference with evidence that officials denied, delayed, or 

intentionally interfered with medical treatment, or he may show it by the way in which prison 

officials actively provided medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights were violated by inadequate medical 

care, however, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ 

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter 

Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also 

Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Mere negligence in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment rights.”); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (same). Deliberate indifference is “a state of 

mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for 

the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). 

Mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff or between medical 

professionals as to the proper course of treatment for a medical condition do not give rise to a 

civil rights claim. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 

1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 2. Sufficiency of the Allegations Against the Physician-Defendants 

The complaint contains only one of the two necessary elements of a claim against Dr. 

Butts for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Specifically, the complaint’s 

allegation that plaintiff suffered morphine withdrawals severe enough to put him in San Joaquin 

General Hospital could, if true, state a serious medical need – i.e., the “objective prong” of an 

Eighth Amendment medical claim. (Complaint at 3.) However, the complaint does not in any 

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way describe Dr. Butts’ state of mind – i.e., the “subjective prong” of an Eighth Amendment 

medical claim – nor is there any factual material from which the court could reasonably infer that 

element. The allegations against Dr. Butts are not, therefore, sufficient for plaintiff to proceed 

with them beyond the screening stage. However, as explained below, plaintiff will be provided 

another opportunity to plead his claim with the requisite specificity. 

As for the allegations against Dr. Hlaing, plaintiff expressly invokes the Eighth 

Amendment but fails to state facts that establish a violation of that constitutional provision. The 

complaint is too vague to infer anything other than plaintiff’s belief that Dr. Hlaing did not 

prescribe adequate medication. (See Complaint at 4.) Thus the pleading falls short on both 

elements of the claim against Dr. Hlaing: it does not describe the serious medical condition that 

plaintiff supposedly presented to Dr. Hlaing, nor is there any statement from which the court 

could divine the doctor’s state of mind in denying medication. According to a two-page 

document submitted among the 194 pages of exhibits attached to the complaint, Dr. Hlaing 

examined plaintiff in the course of a medical appeal,1 but that document does not shed any light 

on what plaintiff means to aver against Dr. Hlaing, nor can the doctor’s participation in the 

appeals process be the basis of liability. See Johnson v. Hill, supra. 

 III. Conclusion 

The court finds that the complaint does not pass the screening test set by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A as to any claim against any defendant. Therefore the complaint will be dismissed. 

However, the court will grant plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

or conduct of which he complains have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). That is, the amended complaint must provide the 

court with factual allegations that meet each and every element of the claim(s) he means to allege. 

Also, the amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link 

 

1

 It appears that Dr. Hlaing issued plaintiff a knee brace following the exam. (See Complaint at 

45-46), 

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or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 

violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 Furthermore, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

 Finally, plaintiff is informed that if he does not file an amended complaint or otherwise 

respond to this order, the court will recommend that this case be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and Local Rule 110. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 

number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff must file an 

original and two copies of the amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint or 

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otherwise respond to this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for 

failure to prosecute. 

DATED: December 18, 2015 

 

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