Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08045/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES A. COONES, Individually 

as Trustee of the James A. 

Coones Mineral Trust, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PAUL J. LOMAN, BILLY D. LOMAN 

and BETTY LARGENT, 

Defendants/Third-Party 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

F 1 L 1 D 

United Stutes Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cimfrt 

I OV 2 " 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-8045 

CLARA J. COONES, 

Third-Party Defendant/ 

Appellee. 

(D.C. No. 88-C-1003B) 

(District of Wyoming) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This diversity action arises out of claim to quiet title in 

certain real property and mineral interests in a ranch in Campbell 

County, Wyoming. Defendants appeal the district court's ruling 

that plaintiffs own the real property and mineral rights in the 

ranch and the court's refusal to reform a warranty deed on the 

basis of mutual mistake and unilateral mistake. 

I. 

Beginning in 1959, plaintiff James A. Coones and third party 

defendant Clara Jane Coones leased a ranch from defendants' 

parents, Paul M. Loman and Bessie R. Loman. In September of 1964, 

the Coones drafted an escrow agreement to purchase the ranch from 

the Lomans. The parties, however, did not reach an agreement at 

that time. 

On May 8, 1968, the Coones and Lomans executed an escrow 

agreement for the sale of the ranch. They used the 1964 agreement 

with modifications initialed by the parties. The modified agreement reserved a three-fourths interest in the minerals to the 

Lomans. The warranty deed, however, which was held in escrow 

until the purchase contract was fully paid, did not include any 

such reservation of mineral interests. 

On May 9, 1968, the Lomans sold one-fourth of the threefourths interest they retained in the 1968 escrow agreement to 

W.T. Stalls. This sale was recorded on May 24, 1968, nearly one 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 2 
month prior to the recording of the escrow agreement on June 17, 

1968. 

In 1972, James Coones discovered that the warranty deed was 

missing from the escrow file in Stockman's Bank of Gillette, 

Wyoming. After speaking with Paul M. Loman, Mr. Coones had 

another deed prepared. Mr. and Mrs. Loman signed the new warranty 

deed and returned it to the bank in January 1973. 

On March 17, 1983, Mr. Coones paid the balance of the purchase price and received the warranty deed from Stockman's Bank. 

The Coones contend that upon full payment of the purchase 

price the warranty deed would be delivered to them and they would 

own the property, including all mineral interests. The defendants, the Lomans' children, claim that the warranty deed is in 

error and that their parents intended to retain a three-fourths 

interest in the minerals after the purchase price was paid in 

full. 

Defendants claim that the 1973 warranty deed should be 

reformed due to mutual mistake, fraud and unilateral mistake. The 

district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as 

to the defendants' claim of mutual mistake and fraud. The suit 

proceeded to trial on the issue of unilateral mistake. 

The district court ruled that the defendants were not 

entitled to reformation of the 1973 warranty deed. Although the 

deed and the escrow agreement conflicted, the court concluded that 

"[t]he wording of the warranty deed can be reconciled with the 

wording of the escrow agreement by adopting the position contended 

for by the Cooneses that the mineral reservation to the Lomans 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 3 
lasted only until the purchase price was paid and the escrow 

agreement terminated." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 

March 23, 1990, at 9. 

The defendants raise two issues on appeal. First, they contend that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of 

law were based on improperly admitted evidence due to a violation 

of the parol evidence rule. Specifically, defendants argue that 

the district court improperly admitted testimony by Mr. Coones of 

an oral agreement contemporaneous with the execution of the escrow 

agreement that added to its terms. This testimony demonstrated 

that the reservation of mineral rights to the Lomans lasted only 

until payment of the full purchase price, despite the absence of 

this understanding in the escrow agreement. Appellants claim 

there would have been no evidence to support the Coones' position 

if the district court had properly excluded this testimony. 

Second, appellants contend that the district court 

incorrectly granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue 

of mutual mistake. 

II. 

The district court found that the Lomans did not satisfy 

their burden of proof because they failed to establish unilateral 

mistake by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, March 23, 1990, at 8. We may not 

set aside the court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous . . 

Colon-Sanchez v. Marsh, 733 F.2d 78, 80-81 (10th Cir. 1984). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 4 
Appellants claim the district court committed reversible 

error in admitting Mr. Coones' testimony of an oral understanding 

that the reservation of mineral rights would last only until payment of the purchase price. We disagree. A written agreement may 

consist of more than one document. Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 

90, 94 (Wyo. 1986). In this case, the escrow agreement specifically called for a warranty deed, thereby rendering it part of 

the parties' agreement. See id. The conflict between the escrow 

agreement and warranty deed created an ambiguity in the parties' 

agreement which rendered parol evidence admissible to explain its 

meaning. See Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. 

Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Wyo. 1979). Thus, Mr. Coones' 

testimony was properly admitted to explain the ambiguity. Contrary to appellants' argument, it was not admitted for the 

improper purpose of showing a contemporaneous oral agreement which 

added to the written agreement. See Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 

625, 640 (Wyo. 1986). 

In addition, we note that the admission of Mr. Coones' testimony was not necessary to support the district court's judgment. 

Both parties offered evidence in support of their claims. Evidence was admitted which showed that on November 21, 1985, after 

the Coones' obtained the deed, Mrs. Loman attempted to convey her 

interest in the minerals to her children, in the apparent belief 

that she still owned one-half of the interest in the mineral 

rights. On the other hand, the warranty deed signed by the Lomans 

supports Mr. Coones' position. We cannot state that the district 

court's conclusion that the Coones' argument is "at least as 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 5 
• 

plausible" as the Lemans' claim of mistake is in error. Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, March 23, 1990 at 8. 

III. 

Defendants also appeal the district court's granting of 

plaintiff's summary judgment motion as to defendants' claim of 

mutual mistake. 

Summary judgment should be affirmed if the record before the 

court shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celsius 

Energy Co. v. Mid America Petroleum, Inc., 894 F.2d 1238, 1239 

(10th Cir. 1990). The appellants were required to demonstrate by 

clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that they were 

entitled to reformation of the warranty deed due to mutual mistake. Pfister v. Brown, 498 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 1972). We 

review the district court's order granting summary judgment in 

light of this evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at 

trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

Defendants' argument is premised on their position that if 

the district court had excluded Mr. Coones' testimony, it could 

not have granted summary judgment. We disagree. First, as discussed previously, the district court's admission of Mr. Coones' 

testimony was not in error. Moreover, we agree with the court's 

ruling that defendants failed to offer sufficient evidence to 

establish mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence. The 

Coones' position is supported by the warranty deed signed by the 

Lemans when they were not influenced by the Coones. Although 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 6 
defendants offered evidence supporting their claim that they were 

laboring under the mistaken belief that they had reserved threefourths of the mineral rights of the ranch, we agree with the 

district court that defendants failed to offer sufficient evidence 

to survive a summary judgment motion under the clear and convincing evidence standard. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-7-

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-8045 Document: 010110051362 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 7