Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00375/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00375-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Ryan Watkins, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-0375-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1), respondents’ answer (doc. 13), petitioner’s reply (doc. 14), the report

and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (doc. 15), and petitioner’s

objection (doc. 18). We accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and deny the petition

as untimely.

On February 18, 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner was convicted of

attempted second degree murder and sentenced to 21 years imprisonment. Petitioner waived

his right to a conventional direct appeal under state law, but retained the right to seek review

in an “of-right proceeding” pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Under Rule 32.4,

petitioner had ninety days after entry of judgment and sentence to file his notice of postconviction relief. He did not file his notice, however, until December 8, 2004. On February

1, 2005, the state trial court concluded that the notice was untimely and summarily dismissed

the post-conviction proceedings. The Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme

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Court denied requests for review. Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on

February 20, 2007. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state

prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year from “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The one-year limitations period is tolled

while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is

pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). A Rule 32 “of-right” petition for post-conviction review is a

form of “direct review” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not

begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that

proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced on February 18, 2000. He had ninety days to

file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief. Because he failed to file a petition within

the prescribed time, the judgment became final for statute of limitations purposes when the

ninety-day period expired, on May 19, 2000. The one-year ADEPA limitations period began

to run on that date. Therefore, petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition no

later than May 19, 2001. He did not file his federal petition until February 20, 2007, almost

six years late. 

Petitioner argues that equitable tolling applies to his otherwise untimely claims. He

asserts that he instructed his trial lawyer to pursue state post-conviction relief immediately

after sentencing and he operated under the assumption that a petition had been filed. It was

only “after a substantial amount of time had passed,” that he inquired into the status of his

petition, Memorandum in Support of Writ at 5, and learned that no petition had been filed.

He claims to have filed a petition pro se as soon as he discovered his lawyer’s error. 

“Equitable tolling is justified in few cases . . . the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling [under ADEPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Spitsyn

v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original). A petitioner “bears the

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burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005). Ordinary negligence on the part of counsel is not

an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (“Attorney miscalculation [of ADEPA’s limitations period] is

simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context

where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.”) Moreover, if the petitioner has not

exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file his petition after extraordinary

circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the

failure to file is broken. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted).

Even if we assume that petitioner’s lawyer ignored instructions to pursue postconviction relief and that counsel’s malfeasance constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance,”

petitioner has not demonstrated that he diligently pursued his rights. He waited more than

four years to inquire into the status of his presumed post-conviction petition. See

Memorandum in Support of Writ at 5 (“After a substantial amount of time had passed,

Petitioner inquired as to the status of his Rule 32 Petition.”). Under these circumstances,

petitioner did not exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to file his petition. 

We conclude that petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was not filed within

the statute of limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), and that he has failed

to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED DENYING the petition for writ of habeas corpus

(doc. 1). 

DATED this 6th day of March, 2008.

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