Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03811/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03811-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONG JUN XUN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03811-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 30, 32

Plaintiff Hong Jun Xun sought judicial review of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary 

P. Parnow’s decision that he is not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. On 

May 29, 2015, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied 

Defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Carolyn W. Colvin’s crossmotion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 28 (“Order”). Both parties now move to alter or amend 

the judgment. For the reasons articulated below, the Court DENIES the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant factual background for these motions is sufficiently laid out in the May 29 

Order, and will not be repeated here. See Order at 1-2, 4-5.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to alter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may be 

granted if “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court 

committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an 

intervening change in controlling law.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Rule 59(e) “offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

Case 4:14-cv-03811-HSG Document 33 Filed 08/19/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 

877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court has considerable 

discretion when considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Turner v. 

Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Motions To Alter Or Amend Judgment

Defendant asserts four grounds for her motion: (1) the Court’s misstatement of the relevant 

facts in Dotson v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-00243-SKO, 2011 WL 1883468 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2011), 

constituted clear legal error; (2) the Court erroneously instructed the ALJ to apply a presumption 

of disability; (3) the Court erroneously concluded that there was not substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s ruling; and (4) the Court’s order to consider the 1993-2008 Case File is 

impossible for the ALJ to comply with because that Case File has been destroyed. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion and separately asks the Court to alter its judgment to 

remand the case for the sole purpose of calculating benefits. Plaintiff argues that SSA’s 

destruction of the 1993-2008 Case File was unlawful, that he is entitled to an adverse inference 

based on the Case File’s destruction, and that as a result “there is nothing further for the ALJ to 

review.” Dkt. No. 32 (“Pl. Mot.”) at 5.

i. Dotson v. Astrue

The only explicit identification of “legal error” in Defendant’s motion relates to the 

Court’s interpretation of Dotson. See Dkt. No. 30 (“Def. Mot.”) at 4. In her cross-motion for 

summary judgment, Defendant argued that Dotson supports the ALJ’s determination that evidence 

related to the 1993 Decision is not relevant to Plaintiff’s current application for disability benefits. 

In the May 29 Order, the Court distinguished Dotson from the present case by noting in a 

parenthetical that the Dotson court found that the “ALJ did not err by failing to consider medical 

evidence submitted in support of prior benefits application where prior application was denied and 

plaintiff claimed a disability onset date after prior application date.” Order at 9. Defendant now 

protests that the Court’s description of Dotson constituted “legal error” because the alleged 

disability onset date in that case actually occurred before both the prior application date and the 

present application date.

Case 4:14-cv-03811-HSG Document 33 Filed 08/19/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

While the Court acknowledges that it inadvertently misstated the timeline of events in 

Dotson, the mistaken parenthetical description does not constitute legal error. Dotson remains 

distinguishable from the present case because the evidence presented by the Dotson plaintiff was 

considered and rejected in her prior benefits application. See 2011 WL 1883468, at *5. Here, the 

Court directed the ALJ to consider clearly relevant evidence that formed the basis for the 1993 

award of disability benefits. Dotson is not persuasive here.

ii. Presumption of Disability

Defendant contends that “[a]lthough this Court noted that Plaintiff is not entitled to a 

presumption of continuing disability, its Order appears to direct the agency to apply such a 

presumption on remand.” Def. Mot. at 6. Defendant does not explicitly argue that the Court 

“committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust” in this regard, nor 

could it. The May 29 Order unambiguously states that “[t]he Court agrees with Defendant” that 

Plaintiff is “not entitled to a presumption of continuing disability where, as here, a claimant 

reapplies for social security benefits more than one year after the termination of a prior benefits 

award.” Order at 9. But, as further elaborated upon in the May 29 Order, “while no presumption

of disability applies here, evidence related to the 1993 Decision and the ensuing 15-year benefits 

payment period is highly relevant and must at least be considered by the ALJ.” Id. (emphasis in 

original).

iii. Substantial Evidence

Defendant also renews her catch-all summary judgment argument that the ALJ’s 

“conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.” Def. Mot. at 9. Again, Defendant does not 

identify any “newly discovered evidence,” clear legal error, or “intervening change in controlling 

law” to support an alteration of the May 29 Order. The Court finds that the relevant facts and law 

have not changed, and thus stands by its conclusion that “[t]he ALJ erred by not providing any 

explanation for her failure to adequately consider the significant probative evidence relating to the 

1993 Decision and the 1993-2008 Case File.” Order at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

iv. 1993-2008 Case File

Finally, Defendant asks the Court to revise the May 29 Order to reflect the fact that SSA 

Case 4:14-cv-03811-HSG Document 33 Filed 08/19/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

destroyed the 1993-2008 Case File in 2010, and therefore the Case File cannot be considered by 

the ALJ. As an initial matter, Defendant inaccurately claims that she “stated in her cross-motion 

for summary judgment[] that [the] file is not missing” and was destroyed in 2010. Def. Mot. at 6. 

Defendant did not acknowledge the actual destruction of the Case File until briefing on the present 

motions to alter judgment. Compare Dkt. No. 23 at 8 (“[T]he agency should have disposed of the 

medical records from Plaintiff’s 1993 claim in 2010, two years after his SSI payments were 

terminated for non-medical reasons.”), with Def. Mot. at 6 (“[T]he agency properly destroyed [the 

1993-2008 Case File] in 2010, pursuant to Federal records destruction mandates.”). Furthermore, 

Defendant ignores the Federal record destruction guidance that requires the preservation of “[a]ll 

claim file records involved in court cases.” Dkt. No. 23-2 at 13. The 1993-2008 Case File 

appears to fall squarely within the category of documents required to be preserved, as the 

termination of Plaintiff’s benefits in 2008 has been the subject of “court cases” ever since. See

Dkt. No. 23 at 3 n.2.

The SSA’s quite possibly improper destruction of highly relevant evidence in this case 

does not relieve the ALJ of her responsibility to comply with the May 29 Order and “consider the 

import of the 1993 Decision and the related medical evidence in the context of that prior 

determination, as well as the 1993-2008 Case File.” Order at 11. If it is true that “[t]he agency 

can make every reasonable effort to reconstruct the records from that file with available evidence,” 

Def. Mot. at 9, then it most certainly should. If certain records cannot be obtained due to their 

destruction, the ALJ should consider whether an adverse inference is warranted. See Akiona v. 

United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991).1 At the very least, pursuant to the May 29 

Order, the ALJ must make a fully-considered evidentiary finding on the record regarding the 1993 

 

1

Plaintiff argues that “he is entitled to an adverse inference regarding [the Case File’s] contents,” 

and cites to Geschke v. Astrue, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124534, *35-36 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 

2008). Pl. Mot. at 4 (emphasis added). On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the 

Geschke plaintiff had not established an adequate basis under Akiona for drawing an adverse 

inference from the spoliation of the plaintiff’s case file. Geschke v. Astrue, 393 Fed. App’x 470, 

473 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore does not rule on whether an adverse inference is 

warranted here, but rather directs the ALJ to consider all of the relevant facts before her in order to 

make that determination.

Case 4:14-cv-03811-HSG Document 33 Filed 08/19/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Decision and the 1993-2008 Case File in order to make the required “complete examination of the 

longitudinal nature of Plaintiff’s mental impairments.” Kimmins v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-04206-

YGR, 2013 WL 5513179, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013). Because material remains for the ALJ 

to consider and weigh, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand directly for the payment of 

benefits. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the parties’ motions are DENIED. The case is remanded for 

further proceedings as set forth in the Court’s May 29 Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-03811-HSG Document 33 Filed 08/19/15 Page 5 of 5