Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01958/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01958-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 A jurisdictional prerequisite of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is that the petitioner be “in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court.” The conditions and restraints inherent in parole are

sufficient to satisfy the custody requirement. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963). 

Furthermore, once a federal court has jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s habeas action, “it is not

defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of the proceedings on such

application.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Accordingly, petitioner’s release

to parole does not defeat jurisdiction.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARION C. WOLFE, JR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1958 FCD EFB P

vs.

EDWARD D. ALAMERIDA, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, who was a prisoner when he commenced this action but has been released to

parole, proceeds without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus.1

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He

challenges the February 14, 2001, judgment of a state superior court convicting him of

possession of a controlled substance. See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11350. Pending before

the court is petitioner’s April 29, 2005, motion to file a second amended petition and

respondents’ opposition thereto. For the reasons explained below, the court recommends that the

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motion be granted in part, and denied in part.

I. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted on February 14, 2001. The appellate court affirmed the

judgment on June 11, 2002, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on

August 28, 2002. On September 9, 2002, petitioner timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus alleging the following grounds for relief: (1) he was without counsel at his June 7, 1999,

arraignment on charges he possessed drug paraphernalia, heroin and cocaine; (2) counsel

representing him at his change of plea hearing was ineffective for failing to advise petitioner of

the constitutional defect in his original arraignment; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to appeal his unconstitutional arraignment; (4) the June 3, 1999, misdemeanor arrest was

not supported by probable cause; (5) the June 3, 1999, arrest was illegal because the arresting

officer invoked Health and Safety Code § 11364 only after realizing petitioner was not on parole

or probation and therefore could not be arrested for violating the conditions thereof; (6) there

was no probable cause for the June 3, 1999, arrest because the cocaine pipe was four feet from

petitioner on a coffee table outside petitioner’s reach and direct vision and petitioner had a plate

of food in his lap; (7) the June 3, 1999, search was illegal because the officers had no contact

with the parole authority or any parole agent; (8) the February 3, 1999, traffic stop was

pretextual; (9) the February 3, 1999, arrest was made to justify the search of a box inside the car

after petitioner refused to consent to the search; (10) the judge hearing the motion to suppress

evidence was biased; (11) state court interpretation of the law about parole and probation

searches was “irrelevant’” (12) conflict of interest arising from appointment of three different

lawyers from the indigent defense panel; (13) the trial court should have considered the effects

of petitioner’s psychotropic medications before permitting petitioner to represent himself; (14)

the state habeas court should have considered petitioner’s motion for release; (15) appellate

counsel was ineffective by failing to give petitioner an opportunity to review the record on

appeal before filing the appellate brief because page three of a police report was missing from

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the record and its omission could have adversely effected review of his claim the state’s

witness’s testimony at the hearing on his motion to suppress was inconsistent; (16) trial counsel

was ineffective by failing to discover petitioner was not convicted of the offenses used to

lengthen his sentence; (17) the California Supreme Court erred in denying petitioner’s petition

for a writ of mandate (which the court construed as a petition for review); (18) counsel and a

clinical forensic psychologist conspired to formulate a report to justify the decisions of prior

counsel to not investigate an insanity defense; (19) staff at the California Department of

Corrections and the Duel Vocational Institution denied petitioner access to the law library

between April 23 and May 15, 2002, resulting in the denial of a habeas petition. 

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust

available state remedies with respect to claims 2, 3 and 11. A different magistrate found that

these claims were unexhausted and gave petitioner time to file an amended petition and a request

to stay this action and hold it in abeyance pending petitioner’s exhaustion of available state

remedies. See Order of September 26, 2003. The magistrate judge also found that claims 14, 17

and 19 failed to state a cognizable claim, and recommended that they be dismissed with

prejudice. On October 9, 2003, petitioner filed a first amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus omitting the unexhausted and non-cognizable claims, and on October 24, 2003, the

district judge affirmed the order and findings and recommendations. As directed, petitioner filed

a motion to stay the action and hold it in abeyance while he exhausted available state remedies

with respect to his unexhausted claims, which the court granted. See Motion of January 5, 2004;

Order of March 17, 2004.

On April 29, 2005, petitioner notified the court that the state court proceedings had

concluded, and filed a request for leave to “supplement” the first amended petition with six

proposed claims. Accordingly, the court lifted the stay and ordered a response to petitioner’s

request to file a second-amended petition. See Order of February 24, 2006. On March 9, 2006,

respondents filed a document styled, “Motion to Dismiss.” The court construes petitioner’s

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April 29, 2005, motion as one to file a second-amended petition containing his previously

exhausted claims and his six proposed claims, and construes respondent’s motion to dismiss as

an opposition to petitioner’s motion.

II. Law Governing Amendment of Habeas Petitions

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended . . . as provided in the rules

of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. The amendment of a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus is governed by the same standards as a complaint in other civil actions. 

Thus, the instant motion is governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Fayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649 (2005).

Rule 15 provides that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” In

this circuit, this policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health

Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001)(quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose,

893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990)). In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme

Court instructed that a district court should consider the following factors in deciding whether to

grant leave to amend:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave

sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

Id., at 182.

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[n]ot all of the factors merit equal weight. As

this circuit and others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that

carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2003). The party opposing amendment “bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987). Absent prejudice, or a strong

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in

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favor of granting leave to amend. Eminence Capital, LLC, at 1052. Here, prejudice of having

to litigate claims that appear to be otherwise time-barred is at issue.

The question is whether petitioner may amend to assert claims that would be deemed

untimely, given the one-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d). To bring

these claims now, they must relate back to the date of the original pleading which, in a habeas

action is the initial habeas petition. Fayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). This requirement

is satisfied if,

The claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arouse out of the conduct,

transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

pleading . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). As in ordinary civil cases, a claim satisfies this standard if the new

claims arise from a “common core of operative facts” as the timely filed claims. Felix, 545 U.S.

at 664. Otherwise stated, an amended petition “does not relate back . . . when it asserts a new

ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original

pleading set forth.” Id., at 650.

III. Analysis

Petitioner seeks to amend with the following claims (as petitioner has enumerated them):

(11) the parole search leading to petitioner’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment; (22)

petitioner’s no contest plea was involuntary; (24) the nine-year sentence for possession of a

controlled substance is excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (25) the state superior

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept petitioner’s no contest plea because petitioner

was never arraigned; (27) the errors alleged in the first 26 grounds for relief cumulatively had the

effect of denying petitioner a fair procedure in state court. Respondent asserts that although

petitioner may amend his application with one of the proposed six claims, i.e. claim 11, the

remaining five are untimely and unexhausted. As respondent concedes, petitioner has shown

that he presented claim 11 to the state courts as ordered. Therefore, petitioner may file an

amended petition containing this claim. 

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However, as respondent asserts, claims 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 are untimely, and in any

event petitioner has failed to exhaust them. Petitioner argues that he proceeded without counsel

and this prevented him from formulating these claims for his initial petition. He also argues,

without meaningful explanation, that the claims relate back to the initial petition. Petr.’s Opp’n,

at 9. Petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel’s assistance in post-conviction proceedings. 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Therefore, the fact that he filed his initial

petition without counsel’s assistance has no bearing on whether his proposed claims relate back,

except that this court must liberally construe his allegations. See Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887,

890 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing district courts’ obligation liberally to construe petitioner for

writs of habeas corpus).

Respondents’ argument is unhelpful in determining whether petitioner’s claims relate

back. They itemize the claims from the original petition and petitioner’s proposed claims, and

conclude that the new claims “constitute a new ground of relief supported by facts that differ in

both time and type from those the original pleadings set forth.” Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., at 8. 

Respondents accurately quote the holding of Felix, 545 U.S. at 649, but offer no analytical

support for the conclusion asserted.

The proper focus requires an examination of the relationship between the original claims

and those now proposed with some explanation of whether they differ in time and type, and if so,

how.

A. Proposed Claim 22

Petitioner seeks to amend with a claim that his no contest plea was involuntary because

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. In support of this claim, he alleges that counsel pressured him

to enter a plea of guilty, and that counsel did not discuss potential trial strategies. This new

claim includes no allegations about an arraignment or a lack thereof. In ground two of the

original application, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to ensure

petitioner was arraigned and ignored petitioner’s insistence on defending the charges at every

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stage of the proceeding. Both claims focus on the same time-frame, i.e., the initial stages of the

prosecution. They also rely on some of the same facts, i.e., petitioner’s desire to proceed to

trial. But the new claim depends upon facts of a distinct type. Petitioner now alleges that

pressuring him to enter a plea of no contest and failing to defend at every stage constitutes acts

or omissions which were not the result of reasonable strategic decisions, and were professionally

unsound judgments. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).

Even though both claims focus primarily on events during the initial stages of the

prosecution, proposed claim 22 depends upon facts about counsel’s conduct which bore on

plaintiff’s decision to waive a trial. Nowhere in the original petition does petitioner claim that

the plea itself was involuntary because of counsel’s conduct. Thus, the core facts and allegations

of petitioner’s proposed claim 22 are significantly different in kind from that of claim two of the

original petition. The court cannot find that claim 22 relates back to the original petition.

B. Proposed Claim 24

In this claim, petitioner alleges that his 9-year sentence for possession of a controlled

substance is excessive in relation to others convicted of the same offense. Therefore, he claims,

the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

No claim in the initial petition challenges the sentence. Therefore, there is no basis for finding a

common core of operative facts, and claim 24 does not relate back to the initial petition.

C. Proposed Claim 25

Petitioner asserts in claim 25 that he was arrested June 3, 1999, and was supposed to have

been arraigned on June 7, 1999, but was not. Therefore, he says, the state court had no

jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. As his first ground for relief in the initial petition,

petitioner alleges that there was “no arraignment or entry of plea during arraignment,” following

his June 3, 1999, arrest when charges in various charging documents were consolidated. Thus,

he argued, the judgment is invalid. While the claims are not a model of clarity, petitioner

specifies the same arrest date in each claim. Only in the initial petition does he state the date

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when he should have been arraigned, but the identity of arrest dates in the claims is sufficient to

establish a temporal connection. Furthermore, the alleged violation is the same now as it was

then: he claims he was not arraigned, or at least not properly arraigned, thereby allegedly

rendering the judgment void. For these reasons, the court finds that the claims not only arise

from a common core of operative facts, but for all intents and purposes are the same. Thus,

claim 25 relates back to the original petition.

D. Proposed Claim 26

Claim 26 faults petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues

identified in petitioner’s proposed claims 11 and 22-25. Ground three of the initial petition

alleges that appellate counsel failed to challenge the fact that he was not arraigned, which

identifies the defect alleged in proposed claim 11. Ground 16 of the original petition faults trial

counsel for not investigating the existence of the prior convictions relied upon to lengthen

petitioner’s sentence. Essential to proposed claim 26 are factual allegations to support an

argument that his attorneys engaged in acts or omissions which were not the result of reasonable

strategic decisions, and were professionally unsound judgments. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690. Nowhere in the initial petition does petitioner challenge counsels’ effectiveness on the

grounds he now alleges.

Therefore, the present allegations are different in time and type from those of the initial

petition. There is no common core of operative facts; and, therefore, this proposed claim does

not relate back to the initial petition.

E. Proposed Claim 27

Finally, petitioner seeks to add the claim that cumulatively, all the errors alleged in his

initial petition and in his proposed claims entitle him to relief. This claim inherently includes all

the claims and factual allegations from the initial petition. However, its legal basis is distinct. A

claim of cumulative error challenges the outcome of the entire proceeding based on the

fundamental unfairness resulting from all the other errors, regardless of whether any other claim

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independently would be a sufficient basis for relief. It is grounded in notions of due process and

a fair trial. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 302-03 (1973). Because this claim

has a distinct legal basis, it does not relate back to the original petition. Moreover, it is

necessarily predicated, in part, on the claims noted above that do not relate back. For these

reasons, Rule 15 does not save it from being time-barred.

F. Failure to Exhaust Available State Remedies - Claim 25

Respondents assert that petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies with respect

to proposed claim 25. As stated above, this claim asserts that petitioner was arrested June 3,

1999, but was not arraigned. He claims that as a result, the state court had no jurisdiction to

enter judgment against him. The court need not review the law of exhaustion. The court has

found that petitioner raised this claim in his initial petition, and a district judge of this court has

found that petitioner exhausted available state remedies with respect to this claim. Thus, the

matter is decided.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s motion to

file a second amended petition be granted in part, and denied in part, as follows:

1. The motion be granted with respect to proposed claim 22, and that petitioner be

permitted to amend his petition with this claim;

2. The motion be denied with respect to proposed claims24 through 27; and

3. Petitioner be given 30 days to file a third amended petition containing the claims in

his October 9, 2003, amended petition and proposed claim 22.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: December 5, 2007.

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