Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01150/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01150-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elaine Munoz Sanchez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-1150-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This matter arises on the Motion of Defendants Deputy Brian Woolf,

Deputy Robert Kent, Sheriff Arpaio, and Maricopa County for Summary Judgement.

Based Upon Qualified Immunity. (Doc. 51) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 72) All

parties have consented in writing to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c)(1). After consideration of the parties’ briefing, the Court will grant the Motion in

part and deny it in part. 

I. Background

In her Complaint, Plaintiff Elaine Munoz Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) asserts

violations of her federal constitutional rights and also alleges several state law claims

against Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County; Robert Kent, Deputy

Sheriff of Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”); Brian Woolf, Deputy Sheriff of

MCSO; the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office; and Maricopa County, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 

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Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her arrest on May 28, 2008. She seeks monetary damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona law. The Complaint contains nine causes of action:

(1) Count One - violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and deprivation of her rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Count Two - negligent supervision and/or

training; (3) Count Three - negligent hiring; (4) Count Four - assault; (5) Count Five -

battery; (6) Count Six - false arrest and false imprisonment; (7) Count Seven - negligence

and gross negligence; (8) Count Eight - abuse of process/malicious prosecution; and (9)

Count Nine - deprivation of State constitutional rights. (Doc. 1) 

Defendants Deputy Woolf, Deputy Kent, Sheriff Arpaio, and Maricopa

County move for summary judgment in their favor on Count One on qualified immunity

grounds. (Doc. 51) Because the Court has already granted Defendant Maricopa County’s

separate summary judgment motion as to Count One, the Court will deny, as moot, the

pending Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Maricopa County. (Doc. 80) 

II. Facts

Because this matter arises on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

the Court presents the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Adams v. Speers, 473

F.3d 989, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2007). On May 28, 2008, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Deputies

Kent and Woolf were patrolling in a marked car in the Town of Guadalupe, Arizona. 

(Doc. 52, DSOF ¶ 1; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 3-4) Deputy Woolf was the Field Training Officer

(“FTO”) assigned to Deputy Kent that evening. (Id.) Deputy Woolf was training Deputy

Kent in the proper procedures for traffic stops. (Doc. 52, SOF ¶ 1; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 5-6) 

Deputy Kent was driving and had control of the radio. (Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 4)

At that same time, Plaintiff was driving home from eating at the Native

New Yorker restaurant in Tempe, Arizona with her husband, Manuel Valenzuela. (Doc.

73; PSOF ¶ 9) Plaintiff’s brother, Andrew Sanchez, had also been with Plaintiff at the

restaurant. (Doc. 73; PSOF ¶ 10) Plaintiff’s brother had driven the van that Plaintiff was

driving several days earlier and had been stopped by police for a light being out. (Doc.

73, PSOF ¶ 12) Although which light was out has not identified, Andrew discovered a

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brake light was not functioning properly and had it repaired before May 28, 2008. (Doc.

52, DSOF ¶ 5) Because Plaintiff knew there had recently been problems with the van’s

lights, she routinely checked to make sure they were working. On May 28, 2008, she

checked the van’s lights and confirmed they were working before leaving the Native New

Yorker to drive home. (Id., DSOF ¶ 6; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 13-14) 

After leaving the restaurant, Plaintiff drove to Guadalupe and stopped at a

stop sign at a street named Calle Iglesias. While stopped, Plaintiff observed a marked

Maricopa County Sheriff’s vehicle approaching in the opposite direction. She continued

driving and saw the MCSO vehicle u-turn and proceed to follow her. (Doc. 73, PSOF ¶

15) Deputy Kent reportedly observed Plaintiff’s van in his rearview mirror and noticed

that the rear license plate was not illuminated. (Id.) Deputy Kent u-turned and started

following Plaintiff’s van. He was able to read the license plate because it was illuminated

by his own head-lights and called the license plate number into the dispatcher to make

sure it was safe to stop the van, i.e., that it was not reported stolen and there were no

outstanding warrants for the vehicle which would dictate against turning on the police

vehicle’s emergency lights that might prompt a driver to take evasive action. (Doc. 52,

DSOF ¶ 1; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 23, ¶ 31-33 - citing Kent deposition, pg. 40, 42, 44, 46, 50) 

According to Plaintiff, the MCSO vehicle did not activate its emergency

lights or attempt to stop her van from the point she first saw the MCSO vehicle until she

had turned into her home’s driveway. (Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 29) Kent, on the other hand,

states that he activated the emergency lights just before Plaintiff pulled into her driveway.

(PSOF ¶ 23, ¶ 31-33) Plaintiff states that the emergency lights were not turned on until

she was handcuffed and had been taken to the police vehicle. (Doc. 73; PSOF ¶ 29) 

Plaintiff turned into her driveway, drove to the back of the house, and

parked the van. (Doc. 52, DSOF ¶ 2; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 37) Plaintiff and her husband

exited the van and Plaintiff proceeded to the back door of her residence. After Plaintiff

had parked and exited her vehicle, the Deputies drove into her driveway - without

activating the emergency lights. “At that time the Deputies only had their headlights on.”

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(Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 44; Exh. D, Plaintiff’s depo, page 34 lines 5-13) “When she saw the

Deputies, Plaintiff was very confused and afraid and banged on the door of her house

yelling for her mother” because she needed witnesses. (Id., PSOF ¶¶ 44, 45, Plaintiff’s

Affidavit ¶ 7) Plaintiff was not able to enter the back because it was locked. (Id., PSOF ¶

57) When Plaintiff was at the back door of her residence, banging on the door and yelling

for her mother, Deputy Woolf “grabbed [Plaintiff] by the arm and then forced [her]

towards [her] van and pushed [her] against [her] van.” (Id.; PSOF ¶ 46, Plaintiff’s depo,

page 34, lines 11-16)

Plaintiff, who was 32 years of age, is 5’2” and weighed 160 pounds, “was

struggling” because Deputy Woolf “was using too much force on her but she was not

trying to get away and didn’t try to run or anything.” (Id., PSOF ¶¶ 8, 47, 51, Plaintiff’s

depo, page 34, lines 23-25) Then both “Deputies pushed her down to the ground and

used force on her” by “slamm[ing] her face on the dirt.” (Id.; PSOF ¶ 48, Plaintiff’s depo,

page 34, lines 23-25; Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶ 9) One Deputy had his knee on her back, and

the other one held her down. (Id., PSOF ¶ 50, Plaintiff’s depo, page 35, lines 1-3) 

Plaintiff described the force used as “significant,”causing her “pain, fear, and shock.” 

(Id., Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶ 10)

Defendants offer a different version of the events. According to Deputy

Kent, he activated the MCSO vehicle’s emergency lights before following Plaintiff’s van

into her driveway. When Plaintiff and the passenger started to exit the vehicle, Deputies

Kent and Woolf ordered them to return to the vehicle several times, but they did not

comply. Plaintiff did not respond to Deputy Kent’s order, but proceeded to the back door,

tried to open the door, and then started knocking on the door and yelling “mom.” (Id.,

PSOF ¶ 57, Kent depo, page 57-58, 62) Deputy Woolf then grabbed Plaintiff’s left arm

to escort her back to the van. Because Plaintiff “was slightly resisting” and noncompliant, Deputy Woolf grabbed her other arm and escorted back to the van because,

not knowing who or what was inside the house, he wanted her away from the house. (Id.,

PSOF ¶ 59, Kent depo, page 59, lines 4-10) Deputy Woolf took Plaintiff to her vehicle

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and, within seconds, Plaintiff “attempted to sprint back to the house again,” so it was

necessary to take her to the ground and handcuff her. (Id., PSOF ¶ 59, ¶ 63, Woolf depo,

page 59) Deputy Kent also states that Plaintiff was actively trying to get away from them

by pushing and pulling her arms away from the Deputies and yelling,“somebody help

me.” (Id.; PSOF ¶¶ 61, 64, Kent depo, page 58-62) The Deputies then took Plaintiff to

the ground by each taking an arm and trying to take her off balance and put her on the

ground in a “controlled fall.” (Id., PSOF ¶ 62, Kent depo, page 64) 

Plaintiff was placed in the back of the patrol car, advised she was under

arrest, and transported to the Guadalupe substation where she was cited for Disorderly

Conduct, a misdemeanor, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 13-

2904(A)(1), interviewed, and released about 30 minutes later. (Doc. 1; Doc. 73, PSOF ¶¶

67-68, ¶ 72, Exh. G) The disorderly conduct charge was subsequently dismissed in the

Guadalupe Justice Court. (Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 74) 

III. Summary Judgment Standard

A moving party may, at any time, move for summary judgment on all or

any part of a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court may only grant summary judgment if the

pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that “there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Substantive law determines which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In considering the

evidence, the Court is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The

moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec.

Industries Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 685-87 (1986). There is no

genuine issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. 

If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her]

favor.” Id. at 255. Allegations of civil rights violations are to be liberally construed.

Thomas v. Youngblood, 545 F.2d 1171, 1192 (9th Cir. 1976). 

When considering a motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity, district “courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences

‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.’” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). “However,

when the facts, as alleged by the non-moving party, are unsupported by the record such

that no reasonable jury could believe them, we need not rely on those facts for purposes

of ruling on the summary judgment motion.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380); City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,

955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992) (a party cannot

defeat a summary judgment motion by producing a “mere scintilla of evidence to support

its case.”).

IV. Analysis of Qualified Immunity

Police officers and other state officials are entitled to qualified immunity

from section 1983 suits. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n. 12 (1984); Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1989). “Qualified immunity balances two

important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity

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applies regardless of whether the [police officer’s] error is a mistake of law, a mistake of

fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, ___

U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), receded from by Pearson v.

Callahan, ___ U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009), the Supreme Court instructed lower

courts deciding summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity to consider “this

threshold question: Taken in light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. If not,

then “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. If so,

then “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. A

constitutional right is clearly established when, “on a favorable view of the other parties’

submissions” “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Id. 

If the right is not clearly established, the individual public officials are

entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable official could have believed that his or her

conduct was lawful. Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme

Court’s 2009 decision in Pearson, clarified that a district court is “permitted to exercise

[its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

hand.” Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818. The Court will consider the pending motion for

summary judgment in view of the foregoing principles. 

A. Traffic Stop

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Woolf and Kent violated the Fourth

Amendment because they lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Deputies 

Woolf and Kent assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because

they had “probable cause” to initiate a traffic stop. (Doc. 51 at 7) “The temporary

detention of individuals during an automobile stop by the police, even if only for a brief

period, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, an

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auto-mobile stop is subject to the Constitutional requirement that the seizure not be

‘unreason-able’ under the circumstances.” Litzenberger v. Vanim, 2002 WL 1759370

(E.D.Pa. 2002) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). Traffic

stops are investigatory stops, which require only a showing of reasonable suspicion, i.e.,

whether under the totality of the circumstances, Deputies Kent and Woolf had a

reasonable suspicion that a traffic law violation occurred. United States v. Willis, 431

F.3d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1237-

38 (9th Cir. 2006) (a traffic stop may be based on traffic violations observed by another

officer). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1968) (recognizing that a limited stop

and frisk of an individual could be conducted without a warrant based on less than

probable cause); Arizona v. Johnson, ___ U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784 (2009) (permitting

a limited stop “when the police officer reasonably suspects” a traffic violation); United

States v. Lopez- Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment

requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of traffic stops.”). Reasonable suspicion

requires “specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable

inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal

conduct.” United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotations omitted). Reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause, but more than an

“inchoate and unpar-ticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.

1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).

Here, Deputy Kent had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had violated

Arizona’s traffic laws. Specifically, that Plaintiff violated A.R.S. § 28-925(C) which

provides that:

Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and placed

in a manner that illuminates with a white light the rear license plate

and renders it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.

A tail lamp or tail lamps together with any separate lamp for

illuminating the rear license plate shall be wired to provide that the

tail lamp or lamps are lighted whenever the head lamps or auxiliary

driving lamps are lighted.

A.R.S. § 28-925 (West 2010) (Although § 28-925 was amended in 2009, the amendment

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did not change the relevant portion of that statute, see AZ LEGIS 187 (2009)). 

At about 1:00 a.m. on May 28, 2008, Deputies Kent and Woolf were patrolling in

a marked MCSO vehicle in Guadalupe, Arizona. Deputy Kent, who was driving,

observed Plaintiff’s van in his rear view mirror and noticed that the rear license plate light

was not illuminated as is legally required. Deputy Kent shared this information with

Deputy Woolf who instructed Kent to stop the vehicle. Deputy Kent u-turned and followed Plaintiff’s vehicle. Deputy Kent did not see the license plate illuminated by its own

lighting. Plaintiff, who admittedly knew there had recently been problems with her van’s

lights, argues that she had checked the lights before driving home and noted that all the

lights were working. Plaintiff’s statements, however, regarding checking the lights before

driving that night and her opinion that the license plate light was in working order does

not undermine the existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Plaintiff

was inside her vehicle at the relevant time and was not in a position to observe whether

her license plate was properly illuminated at the moment the Deputies drove behind her

vehicle. Other then her own speculation, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to create

a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy Kent had noticed that the

license plate was not illuminated. “Prior to an investigatory stop a police officer is not

required to have absolute certainty, or even probable cause, that wrongdoing has occurred; rather, the officer is required to have merely reasonable suspicion.” Houston v.

City of Coquille, 2007 WL 4287769 (D.Or., 2007) (finding that officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop plaintiff for failure to have proper light illuminating license plate). 

Deputy Kent observed the absence of proper lighting on the license plate before following

Plaintiff’s vehicle into her driveway. The law allows an officer to conduct an

investigatory traffic stop if he or she has a reasonable suspicion to believe that an offense

has occurred. Deputy Kent’s observations provided him reasonable suspicion to believe

that Plaintiff violated Arizona’s traffic laws. United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097,

1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable

suspicion.”); United States v. Padilla, 2010 WL 1859988 (D.Ariz. 2010) (finding police

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1

 Arizona’s disorderly conduct statute provides:

A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the 

peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge 

of doing so, such person:

1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior; or

2. Makes unreasonable noise; or

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officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a driver for lack of illuminated license plate). 

Therefore, a traffic stop was authorized and there was no violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights based on the investigatory traffic stop. Because Plaintiff fails to create

a question of fact regarding a constitutional violation based on the initial traffic stop,

Defendants are immune from suit on this claim. Saucier, supra. 

B. Probable Cause to Arrest

Plaintiff also alleges that Deputies Woolf and Kent violated the Fourth

Amendment because they lacked probable cause to arrest her for disorderly conduct. 

“Unsurprisingly, it is clearly established that an arrest without probable cause violates a

person’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citing Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 1989)); Turner v.

County of Washoe, 759 F.Supp. 630, 634 (D.Nev. 1991) (stating that “a police officer

who arrests without probable cause has committed a civil rights violation.”). The Court,

therefore, will consider whether the facts show that the Deputies’ conduct violated the

Fourth Amendment. 

Defendants claim that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

violating Arizona’s disorderly conduct statute. Resolving all factual disputes and drawing

all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that there is a triable

issue of fact regarding probable cause for the arrest. The elements of Disorderly Conduct

are knowingly or intentionally disturbing the peace by any of several categories of

conduct. A.R.S. § 13-2904.1

 The record indicates that Plaintiff was cited for violating

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3. Uses abusive or offensive language or gestures to any person present in a

manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation by such person; or

4. Makes any protracted commotion, utterance or display with the intent to

prevent the transaction of the business of a lawful meeting, gathering or

procession; or

5. Refuses to obey a lawful order to disperse issued to maintain public safety

in dangerous proximity to a fire, a hazard or any other emergency; or

6. Recklessly handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument.

A.R.S. § 13-2904. Disorderly conduct, without the use of a weapon or dangerous instrument,

is a Class 1 misdemeanor and carries a maximum term of incarceration of six months. A.R.S.

§§ 13-2904(B), 13-707(A)(1).

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A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1) which provides that “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if,

with the intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with

know-ledge of doing so, such person . . . [e]ngages in fighting, violent or seriously

disruptive behavior.” Id. 

In determining whether an arrest was lawful under the Fourth Amendment,

“[f]ederal law asks only whether the officers had probable cause to believe that the

predicate offense, as the state has defined it, has been committed.” Williams v. Jaglowski,

269 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause exists if ‘at the moment the arrest

was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the police officer’s] knowledge and of

which [the police officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to

warrant a prudent man in believing’ that [the arrestee] had violated [the law].” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “The

validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime;

the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which [s]he is arrested is

irrelevant to the validity of the arrest. We have made clear that the kinds and degree of

proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to

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2

 This statute was amended in 2010 but the amendment did not change the version that

is applicable to this case.

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a valid arrest.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (citations omitted);

Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 603-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting it is irrelevant

to the probable cause analysis what crime a suspect is eventually charged with, and

finding no constitutional violation where probable cause supported one of the four

charges on which the defendant was arrested); Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903

(9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the fact that the disorderly conduct charge against Plaintiff was

later dis-missed, is not relevant to determining the existence of probable cause at the time

of arrest. 

Whether a police officer has probable cause to arrest is ascertained by

looking at the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest. Turner, 759 F.Supp. at

634. In Arizona, a police officer may execute a warrantless arrest if the officer has

probable cause to believe:

1. A felony has been committed and probable cause to believe the person 

to be arrested has committed the felony.

2. A misdemeanor has been committed in his presence and probable cause 

to believe the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

****

4. A misdemeanor or a petty offense has been committed and probable 

cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the offense. . . .

B. A peace officer may stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary

to investigate an actual or suspected violation of any traffic law committed

in the officer’s presence and may serve a copy of the traffic complaint for

any alleged civil or criminal traffic violation. . . .

A.R.S. § 13-3883(A) (2010) (emphasis added)2

; State v. Keener, 206 Ariz. 29, 75 P.3d

119, 121 (Az.Ct.App. 2003) (police officers had authority to arrest defendant for

misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license, even though they did not

witness defendant driving, provided they had probable cause to believe offense had

occurred and defendant had committed it.).

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Construing all evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, an ordinarily prudent officer

could not reasonably have concluded Plaintiff had committed the offense of Disorderly

Conduct. The incident happened at 1:00 a.m. in the back of Plaintiff’s own residence. 

Although the Deputies contend that Plaintiff actively (“slightly”) struggled against them

and resisted, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s version that she only minimally struggled

with the Deputies. Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in “fighting” or

“violent” behavior. A.R.S. § 13-3904(A)(1). Plaintiff’s conduct - yelling, “mom,” and

banging on the back door of her own home for a few moments - is unlikely to constitute

“unreasonable noise” or a “protracted commotion” with the intent or knowledge of

disturbing a person for purposes of violating either subsection 2 or 3 of the disorderly

conduct statute. Theilen v. Maricopa County, 2010 WL1743961 (D.Ariz. 2010) (stating

that clapping for a short period at a public meeting is unlikely to constitute “unreasonable

noise” or “protracted commotion” with the intent or knowledge of disturbing a person,

and that concluding that plaintiffs adequately allege that they were arrested without

probable cause.); A.R.S. § 13-2904(A). 

Under Supreme Court law, an arrest is lawful even though there is no

probable cause to support the offense cited by the arresting officer so long as the facts

known to the officer establish probable cause for some offense, even if that offense is not

closely related. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-56 (2004). In Devenpeck, the

Supreme Court held that an officer’s subjective intent for an arrest is irrelevant: Even if

probable cause did not exist with respect to the stated basis for the arrest, the arrest is

valid if any valid basis existed. Id.

To the extent Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff for resisting arrest, there are material questions of fact that preclude summary

judgment on that issue. Under Arizona law, resisting arrest by a peace officer is a Class 6

felony. A.R.S. § 13-2508(B). The statute “plainly states that ‘a person commits resisting

arrest by intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent’ an arrest by a police officer if

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either (A)(1) or (A)(2) is satisfied.” State v. Lee, 217 Ariz. 514, 176 P.3d 712

(Az.Ct.App. 2008) (quoting A.R.S. § 13-2508(A) (emphasis in original)). 

[T]he language of subsection (A)(1) does not require any particular

type of physical conduct so long as that conduct qualifies as

“physical force against the peace officer or another.” A.R.S. §

13-2508(A)(1). Those who use physical force against police officers

attempting to arrest them are not entitled to engage in “minor

scuffling” whether it is usual or unusual in the context of an arrest.

This is consistent with our prior decisions. See State v. Stroud, 207

Ariz. 476, 480-81, ¶¶ 15-17, 88 P.3d 190, 194-95 (App.2004) (In

attempting to flee from an arrest, the defendant was “kicking his

feet” and “pushing on [the officer's] arm.”), rev’d on other grounds, 209 Ariz. 410, 103 P.3d 912 (2005); State v. Sorkhabi, 202 Ariz.

450, 451-52, ¶¶ 2, 9-10, 46 P.3d 1071, 1072-73 (App.2002)

(conviction for resisting arrest appropriate when “defendant

struggled with” the arresting officers). . . . 

Lee, 217 Ariz. at 517, 176 P.3d at 715 (“Lee’s conduct in jerking her arm away from the

officers, physically resisting the placement of the handcuffs, and kicking the officers after

the handcuffs were placed, meets the (A)(1) requirement.”). 

Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, when

Deputy Woolf grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and when both Deputies forced her to the ground,

the Deputies had not activated the MCSO vehicle’s emergency lights or otherwise

indicated to Plaintiff it was their intent to arrest her. State v. Womack, 174 Ariz. 108,

118, 847 P.2d 609, 615 (Ariz.Ct.App.1992) (defendant must be aware by officer’s

conduct that officer intends to effectuate an arrest). Although Plaintiff slightly struggled

with Deputy Woolf, she was only attempting to move away from Deputy Woolf because

he was using too much force on her. There is no evidence she used “physical force

against” either of the Deputies, A.R.S. § 13-2508(A), or tried to hit or kick either of them. 

Plain-tiff disputes the Deputies’ claim that she was non-compliant, tried to pull her arms

away from the Deputies, and that she tried to run from them. In view of the conflicting

versions of the events - whether Deputies had indicated their intent to arrest Plaintiff and

the manner in which Plaintiff slightly struggled or resisted the Deputies - there are

material issues of fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of probable cause to

arrest. State v. Stroud, 207 Ariz. 476, 480-81, 88 P.3d 190, 194-95 (Az.Ct.App.2004),

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3 See A.R.S. 13-707(A)(2) (stating that the sentence for “a class 2 misdemeanor” is

“four months.”).

4

 This Court’s recent ruling in Bohnert v. Mitchell, 2010 WL 3767566, * 9 (D.Ariz.

2010) is not inconsistent with this ruling. Bohnert involved a wrong-way driver on Interstate

8 who was ordered to exit his vehicle while the vehicle was still on the roadway. Clearly, the

DPS officer’s order in Bohnert was directly related to “direct[ing], control[ling], or

regulat[ing] traffic” and the operator of the vehicle. A.R.S. § 28-622. 

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vacated on other grounds, 209 Ariz. 410, 103 P.3d 912 (Ariz. 2005) (affirming conviction

for resisting arrest where defendant struggled and was generally combative with officer

trying to arrest him). 

Defendants also argue that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

failure to comply with a police officer’s order. Under Arizona law, the failure to comply

with a police officer’s lawful order is a Class 2 misdemeanor that carries up to four

months in jail.3

 A.R.S. § 28-622(A) (“A person shall not wilfully fail or refuse to comply

with any lawful order or direction of a police officer invested by law with authority to

direct, control or regulate traffic.”) In 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals in State v.

Gonzalez, 221 Ariz. 82, 84, 210 P.3d 1253, 1255 (Az.Ct.App. 2009) determined that the

misdemeanor offense of Failure to Obey a Police Officer pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-622

“requires proof that: (1) a person (2) wilfully (3) failed or refused to comply with (4) any

lawful order or direction (5) of a police officer invested by law with authority to direct,

control or regulate traffic.” 210 P.3d at 1255. Arizona law is not clear, however, whether

A.R.S. § 28-622(A) is limited to police orders related to directing, controlling, or

regulating vehicular traffic and the operators of motor vehicles.4

 Arguably, if Plaintiff’s

version of the events are believed, A.R.S. § 28-622(A) may be inapplicable because

Plaintiff’s van was stopped, parked on private property off the public roadway, and she

was out of the van at or near her back door when the Deputies ordered her to return to her

van. Even if A.R.S. § 28-622(A) were sufficiently related to directing, controlling, or

regulating vehicular traffic to empower the Deputies to give Plaintiff a lawful order, 

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summary judgment is inappropriate.

Here, the facts are disputed regarding at what point the Deputies

communicated to Plaintiff that they intended to conduct a traffic stop. According to

Plaintiff’s version of the facts, the Deputies drove behind her without turning on their

emergency lights or otherwise signaling Plaintiff to stop the van. Plaintiff drove into her

driveway, proceeded to drive to the back of her house, exited and stepped away from her

van before the Deputies entered her property and, at that point, the Deputies still had not

activated their emergency lights. According to Plaintiff, it was at this time that the

Deputies directed Plaintiff to return to her van. Plaintiff admits, however, that, rather

than complying with the Deputies’ order, she took “two steps” to the back door of her

house and banged on the door and yelled for her mother. (Doc. 73-5, Sanchez depo, page

34) Although Defendants contend that Deputy Kent activated the emergency lights just

before the Deputies pulled into the drive-way behind Plaintiff, they observed Plaintiff exit

the van and directed her to return to the vehicle – an order she admittedly ignored -- the

Court must accept Plaintiff’s version of the facts on summary judgment.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court will

deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants’ lacked probable cause to arrest her in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Assuming arguendo that A.R.S. § 28-622(B) applies to this case,

whether taking two steps while on private property after the Deputies directed Plaintiff to

return to her van and whether Plaintiff’s conduct under the circumstances was “wilful”

sufficiently establish probable cause to arrest the scared Plaintiff for the crime of Failure

to Obey a Police Officer pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-622, a crime for which Plaintiff was not

cited, is for a jury to decide. 

C. Excessive Force

Plaintiff further claims that the Deputies used excessive force in arresting

her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has held that a § 1983 claim

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may be based upon the Fourth Amendment if the police used excessive force during an

arrest. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985). Police officers may only use force

that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386

(1989). In the Ninth Circuit, courts evaluate claims of excessive force under the objective

reasonableness standard. Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.

1996). “[T]he reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the

question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Trial courts must balance “the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal citations omitted). 

Assessing the “nature and quality” of a given “intrusion” requires the fact finder to

evaluate the “type and amount of force inflicted.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th

Cir. 1994). The governmental interest is measured by considering: (1) the severity of the

crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others; (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest, and any other

exigent circumstances present at the time. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; Deorle v.

Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001). Because this balancing “nearly always

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences

therefrom, [the Ninth Circuit] has held on many occasions that summary judgment or

judgment as a matter of law in exces-sive force cases should be granted sparingly.” 

Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s

claim of excessive force. The Court must determine, viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, whether the facts alleged show the Deputies’ conduct violated a constitutional

right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility “are manifestly the province of the jury.” Santos, 287 F.3d

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at 852. 

It is clearly established that “[t]he use of excessive force by police officers

in an arrest violates the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an

unreasonable seizure.” White v Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986). Here,

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Woolf grabbed her arm and forced her back to her

vehicle. Plaintiff, who is 5’2” and weighed 160 pounds, slightly struggled because

Deputy Woolf “was using too much force,” but, according to Plaintiff, she did not try to

run. Deputy Kent and Woolf together forced her to the ground and slammed her face into

the dirt. One Deputy had his knee on her back and the other held her down. The

Deputies hand-cuffed Plaintiff while she was face down on the ground. Plaintiff claims

that she neither resisted the Deputies nor struggled once arrested. Although Plaintiff

admits she did not suffer a physical injury, the absence of a physical injury does not

defeat her claim of excessive force. Marlowe v. Pinal County, 2008 WL 4264724

(D.Ariz. 2008) (finding that plaintiff’s claim that he was never so upset or terrified during

the incident and that it was the worst thing that had ever happened to him outside the

death of his son, sufficient to support claim of excessive force); Flores v. City of

Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that psychological injuries can be

sufficient to support a claim of excessive force.). 

Defendants tell a different story. Defendants contend that when Plaintiff

and the passenger started to exit the vehicle, they were instructed several times to return

to the vehicle, but did not comply. Plaintiff did not respond to Deputy Kent’s order, but

simply proceeded to the back door, tried to open the door, knocked on the door and yelled

for her “mom.” (Doc. 73, PSOF ¶ 57, Kent depo, page 57-58, 62) Deputy Woolf states

that when he first contacted Plaintiff, he grabbed her left arm. Plaintiff was slightly

resisting and non-compliant, so he grabbed her other arm and escorted back to the car

because, not knowing what was inside the house, he wanted her away from the house. 

Deputy Woolf took Plaintiff to her vehicle and, within seconds, Plaintiff tried to “sprint”

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back to her house, so it was necessary to take her to the ground and handcuff her. (Doc.

73, PSOF ¶ 59, ¶ 63 Woolf depo, page 59) Deputy Kent also states that Plaintiff was

actively trying to get away from the Deputies by pushing and pulling her arms away from

the Deputies and yelling, “somebody help me.” (Doc. 73; PSOF ¶ 61, 64, Kent depo,

page 58-62) The Deputies then took Plaintiff to the ground by each taking an arm and

trying to take her off balance and put her on the ground in a “controlled fall.” (Doc. 73,

PSOF ¶ 62, Kent depo, page 64) 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a

reasonable jury could find the Deputies violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment

by using excessive and unnecessary force against her. If Plaintiff’s version of the facts is

believed, Defendants used excessive and unnecessary force during her arrest. 

Under the qualified immunity analysis, “[i]f a [Constitutional] violation

could be made out on a favorable view of the party’s submissions” the Court must ask the

next question: whether the right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The

doctrine of qualified immunity operates “to protect officers from the sometimes ‘hazy

border between excessive and acceptable force.’” Id. at 206. “Because the focus is on

whether the officer had fair notice that [the officer’s] conduct was unlawful,

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct. If the

law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the

Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or even the burdens of litigation. 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (“Of course, in an obvious case, the[]

standards [enunciated in Graham] can ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body

of relevant case law”). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The Fourth

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Amendment prohibits a wide range of governmental intrusions on the person. “The

Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a seizure be reasonable prohibits more than the

unnecessary strike of a nightstick, sting of a bullet, and thud of a boot.” Fontana v.

Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2001). Even “[t]he use of handcuffs is the use of

force, and such force must be objec-tively reasonable under the circumstances.” Muehler

v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 102 (2005) (concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy citing

Graham).

Plaintiff argues that, although she struggled a bit with Deputy Woolf, she

did not resist arrest and she was not a threat to the safety of the Deputies or others. The

incident took place behind Plaintiff’s own home. There is no evidence that Plaintiff used,

or threatened to use, force against the Deputies, or that she appeared to have any sort of

weapon in her possession. At most, Plaintiff posed a de minimus threat to the Deputies

because she admittedly disregarded their order to return to her car when she was at or

near her back door, unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to her residence, and the

Deputies did not know who, or what, was inside the residence. Chew, 27 F.3d at 441(the

“threat posed is the most significant Graham factor.”)

The Deputies followed Plaintiff based on a very minor traffic violation - an

improperly illuminated license plate. Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct,

which is not a particularly serious crime. The nature of the offense in this case provides

little, if any, basis for the use of physical force. Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181,

1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that no reasonable officer could conclude that a

individual sus-pected of driving with expired license plates “posed a threat that would

justify slamming him against the hood of a car” and stating that a “passive offense[]”,

such as failing to display a license plate, cannot give rise to a reasonable inference that

the suspect is dangerous.).

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that whether the force used to arrest

an individual is reasonable is “ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” Liston v. County

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of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1997 ) (citing Forrester v. City of San

Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994)). Viewing the record in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff on her excessive force claim, the Court finds that she has established the

existence of disputed issues of material fact which may only be resolved by a jury. 

Because Plaintiff and the Defendants offer varying accounts of the events surrounding

Plaintiff’s arrest - namely whether Plaintiff failed to obey the Deputies, resisted arrest,

tried to run from the Deputies, and whether the they forced her to the ground, slammed

her face into the ground, and placed a knee in her back and held her down, the Court finds

that summary judgment is inappropriate. 

V. Claims Against Defendant Sheriff Arpaio

Defendant Arpaio contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on

Count One. Count One does not contain any specific allegations against Defendant

Arpaio. (Doc. 1 at 6) Rather, Plaintiff generally asserts that Sheriff Arpaio is

responsible for the actions of Maricopa County sheriff’s deputies including, but not

limited to, Deputy Kent and Deputy Woolf. (Doc. 1 at 3) Plaintiff further asserts that

Sheriff Arpaio is “responsible for the actions of [his] individual deputies and employees

under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Id. at 16) 

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and thus Sheriff

Arpaio cannot be held liable based solely on his position as Maricopa County Sheriff.

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). It is undisputed Sheriff Arpaio

was not present during the incident at issue and thus had no personal involvement in

Plaintiff’s arrest. Because Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Sheriff Arpaio personally participated in, or had any knowledge, of the claimed

deprivations, or that he otherwise directed or set into motion the Deputies’ actions - by a

policy or custom, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Arpaio

on Count One. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978) (section 1983

does not impose liability upon state officials for the acts of their subordinates under a

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respondeat superior theory of liability); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (The party opposing

summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s]

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.”).

VI. Conclusion 

In conclusion, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, as

moot, as to Defendant Maricopa County in view of the prior order, doc. 80, granting

summary judgment to Maricopa County on Count One. The Court will grant summary

judgment in favor of Defendant Arpaio on Count One and Defendants Kent and Woolf on

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One that the Deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to

conduct a traffic stop. The Court will deny summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims that Defendants Kent and Woolf lacked probable cause to arrest her

and used excessive force in effectuating her arrest.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Motion of Defendants Deputy Woolf, Deputy Kent,

Sheriff Arpaio, and Maricopa County for Summary Judgement Based Upon Qualified

Immunity, doc. 51, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, doc. 51, is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Arpaio on Count One and

Defendants Kent and Woolf on Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One that the Deputies

lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, doc. 51, is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims that

Defendants Kent and Woolf lacked probable cause to arrest her and used excessive force

in effectuating her arrest.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, doc. 51, is DENIED as moot as to Plaintiff’s claims asserted against

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Defendant Maricopa County in Count One. 

Dated this 5th day of October, 2010.

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