Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02909/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph M. Meza, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-2909-PHX-SMM (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph M Meza, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex -

Safford Unit in Safford, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Court will order

Defendant Barrie to answer Counts I and II of the Complaint and will dismiss the remaining

claims and Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $55.40. The remainder of

the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will

enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward

the fees according to the statutory formula. 

Case 2:06-cv-02909-SMM Document 3 Filed 12/14/06 Page 1 of 8
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1

 The Court assumes that Officers Barrie and Hiett are employees of the Maricopa County

Jail System. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Complaint

Plaintiff presents three claims for relief against (1) Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph

Arpaio, (2) Maricopa County, (3) Officer Barrie, (4) Officer Hiett,1

 and (5) Correctional

Health Services (CHS) related to an altercation between Plaintiff and Officer Barrie. In

Count I, Plaintiff claims that on February 27, 2006 Officer Barrie transported Plaintiff from

the Maricopa County Superior Court to the Towers Jail. Plaintiff further avers that he was

both handcuffed and shackled during his transportation. Then, as Plaintiff took his lunch bag

out of his pocket, Officer Barrie took Plaintiff's lunch bag and proceeded to throw Plaintiff

against a metal door, severely breaking and cutting Plaintiff's thumb. In Count II, Plaintiff

claims that because Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County operate the jail, and they are

supervisors of the jail, they are responsible for Plaintiff's injuries. In Count III, Plaintiff

avers that he was denied necessary medical care after his thumb was re-injured. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. CHS

CHS is not a proper Defendant. While Arizona places responsibility for operating

county jails by law upon the sheriff, see A.R.S. §§ 11-141(A)(5), 31-101, Maricopa County

is responsible for the provision of medical care to inmates. CHS is an administrative creation

of the County that is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Therefore, CHS will be

dismissed as an improper Defendant. 

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B. Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County

Although Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County may properly be sued for

constitutional violations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against either. “A plaintiff must allege

facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the

deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official

acted as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294

F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). A supervisor in his individual capacity, “is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not alleged that Arpaio enacted or enforced

a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the denial of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Further,

Plaintiff has not alleged that Arpaio directly violated her constitutional rights or that Arpaio

was aware that Plaintiff’s rights were being violated but failed to act. Thus, Plaintiff fails

sufficiently to set forth a cause of action against Arpaio in his Complaint.

Further, a municipality may not be held liable unless its policy or custom caused the

constitutional injury. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978). Thus, a municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by

one of its employees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th

Cir. 2006). Rather, the municipality is liable only when the execution of its policy or custom

inflicts the constitutional injury. Id.; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 868 (9th

Cir. 2005). Therefore, a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant “cannot succeed as a

matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a policy

or custom pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury; and (2) explains how such policy or

custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006)

(affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), cert.

denied, 126 S.Ct. 2864 (2006). Plaintiff has not alleged that Maricopa County has enacted

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or enforced a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the denial of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

Thus, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Maricopa County.

C. Failure to Allege Facts Supporting a Claim against Officer Hiett

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that after Officer Barrie assaulted him, Officer Hiett

approached Plaintiff and asked why Officer Barrie did not take Plaintiff to the hospital.

Plaintiff replied that he did not know why Officer Barrie did not transport him. Plaintiff then

claims that Officer Hiett did not take Plaintiff to the hospital, but instead called Officer

Barrie who transported Plaintiff back to the Towers Jail. Plaintiff was then transported to the

hospital. Plaintiff apparently is claiming that Officer Hiett should have taken Plaintiff

directly to the hospital. However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Officer Hiett.

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff, whether a convicted inmate or

pretrial detainee, must show that defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to the alleged

constitutional violations. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir.

1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). To state a § 1983 medical claim under

the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted with “deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct.

285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Deliberate indifference may occur if “prison officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hutchinson v. United States,

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. Shapley v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must show

the delay in treatment was harmful. Id. 

The indifference must be substantial, and the conduct must rise to a level of

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291.

Inadequate treatment due to malpractice or even gross negligence does not constitute an

eighth amendment violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Hiett knew Plaintiff needed immediate

medical attention and then failed to assist him. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was

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taken back to the jail, taken to the hospital, and was given medical treatment for his thumb

(Doc. # 1 at 4, 6). Consequently, the Court must dismiss Officer Hiett. 

D. Failure to Allege Facts Supporting a Civil Rights Violation in Count III 

In Count III, Plaintiff avers that he was denied medical care for his broken thumb.

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was denied physical therapy to rehabilitate his thumb.

As articulated above, to state a § 1983 medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff

must show that Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The

indifference must be substantial, and the conduct must rise to a level of “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291. Inadequate treatment

due to malpractice or even gross negligence does not constitute an eighth amendment

violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, differences

in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical

diagnosis or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 585 (1996); Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff has alleged nothing more than a difference

of opinion. Plaintiff acknowledges that he had surgery to repair his thumb (Doc. # 1 at 6).

Yet, Plaintiff has not articulated why physical therapy was necessary or how he was harmed

without it. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege that a particular individual knew that this

treatment was necessary, yet failed to provide it. For these reasons, Count III will be

dismissed. 

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

At this early stage, Plaintiff states a claim for excessive force against Officer Barrie

in Counts I and II of his Complaint.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

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the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,filed with the Complaint,

is granted. 

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $55.40.

(3) Count III and Defendants CHS, Joseph Arpaio, Maricopa County, and Officer

Hiett are dismissed without prejudice.

(4) Defendant Barrie must answer Counts I and II. 

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(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. # 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendant Barrie.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of this

action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

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return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint must

return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin pursuant to Rules 72.1

and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2006.

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