Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-01994/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-01994-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

MELINDA ANN GREEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:12-CV-1994-VEH 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Melinda Ann Green (“Green”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a final

adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”), who denied her application for a period of disability, disability

insurance benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).1 Green timely

pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies available before the

1

 In general, the legal standards applied are the same regardless of whether a claimant

seeks Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) or SSI. However, separate, parallel statutes and

regulations exist for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be

considered to refer to the appropriate parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to

citations of statutes or regulations found in quoted court decisions.

FILED

 2015 Feb-24 PM 02:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:12-cv-01994-VEH Document 14 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 14
Commissioner. The case is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).2 The court

has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons which follow, finds that the

decision of the Commissioner is due to be AFFIRMED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Green was forty-two years old on her alleged onset date of August 1, 2008.3(Tr.

24, 213). She has a limited education and past relevant work as a nurse assistant, a

cashier, a cashier stocker, and a sales clerk. (Tr. 723, 765). Green alleged disability

due to osteoporosis, deteriorating bones, arthritis, and disc problems. (Tr. 435). 

Green applied for DIB on July 1, 2008. (Tr. 213). Upon initial review, her

application was denied. (Tr. 213). Green then requested a hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Following that hearing, ALJ Jill Lolley Vincent

issued a decision on September 22, 2010 (“September 22, 2010, ALJ Decision”),

finding Green not disabled (Tr. 217-26). Green’s request for review was denied by the

Appeals Council on March 28, 2012. (Tr. 230). She then filed a complaint seeking

review of that decision on May 25, 2012. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner filed a motion

to remand the case for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence six of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which was granted by the court on October 10, 2012. (Doc. 8).

2

 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) renders the judicial review provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

fully applicable to claims for SSI. 

3

 She originally alleged an onset date of June 30, 2008, but later amended it. (Tr. 403).

2

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Prior to the court’s remand, Green filed a new application for DIB on October

25, 2010 and an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on April 3, 2012.

(Tr. 252). A different ALJ (William Lawson) denied these new applications on

September 20, 2012 (“September 20, 2012, ALJ Decision”). (Tr. 252-60). Following

the Court’s remand, ALJ Vincent held a new hearing on May 3, 2013. (Tr. 31-91).

ALJ Vincent issued a new decision that also found Green not disabled. (Tr. 4-24). In

this new decision, the ALJ considered all three of the above-referenced applications.

(Tr. 4-24). This new decision is the Commissioner’s final decision.

The Commissioner filed an answer to the complaint on March 31, 2014. (Doc.

9). Green filed a supporting brief (Doc. 12) on May 15, 2014, and the Commissioner

responded with her own (Doc. 13) on June 16, 2014.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence

3

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is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. 

This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial

evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no

presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal

standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the

court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide

the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

IV. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period

of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the

Regulations promulgated thereunder. The Regulations define "disabled" as "the

inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12)

months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to disability benefits,

a claimant must provide evidence about a "physical or mental impairment" which

4

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"must result fromanatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can

be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20

C.F.R. § 404.1508. 

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable

C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561,

562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.

1986). The sequential analysis goes as follows:

Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be

found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not

have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the

[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job. 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy

in significant numbers. Id. 

5

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V. ALJ FINDINGS

After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act on December 31, 2010.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the

period from her alleged onset date of August 4, 2008, through her date

last insured of December 31, 2010.

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe

impairment: myalgias and arthralgias, small disc herniation in lumbar

spine at L4-5 with lumbago, cervical degenerative disc disease status

post cervical decompression and fusion, status post right carpal tunnel

syndrome release and status post cervical surgery, adjustment disorder

with depression and anxiety, and learning disorder. 

4. Through her date last insured of December 31, 2010, the claimant did not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the

date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CRF 404.1527(b) except for the

additional restrictions described herein. The claimant can lift/carry

twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; can stand/walk

six hours in an eight-hour day; can sit six hours in an eight-hour day; can

never push and pull overhead with the bilateral upper extremities; can

occasionally be exposed to extreme cold, wetness, humidity, unprotected

heights, can rarely reach overhead bilateral upper extremities;4can

occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl’ can understand, remember

4

 The court suspects this to be a scrivener’s error, as this same finding says earlier that

she “can never push and pull overhead.”

6

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and carry out simple instructions; can maintain attention for two-hour

time periods in order to complete an eight-hour workday; can adapt to

changes in the work place that are introduced gradually and infrequently

and can occasionally maintain interaction with the general public and coworkers.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any

past relevant work. (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was born on April 26, 1966 and was 44 years old, which

is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date last insured. (20

CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in

English. (20 CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework

supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the

claimant has transferable job skills. (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from August 4, 2008, the alleged onset date, through December 31,

2010, the date last insured. (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

12. The claimant has not been under a disability as defined in the Social

Security Act, at any time from October 25, 2010 to the present date. (20

CFR 404.1520(g)).

(Tr. 7-24).

VI. ANALYSIS

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The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its

responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th

Cir. 1980)).5 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or

substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted). 

Green objects to the ALJ’s findings on her RFC for two reasons. First, she

argues that the ALJ erred by altering the RFC findings in the September 22, 2010,

decision and the September 20, 2012, decision only on the basis of a state agency

physician’s opinion from February 2011, without making specific RFC findings for

the period after her date last insured. (Doc. 12 at 9-12). Second, she argues that the

ALJ violated her duty to develop the record by failing to obtain a medical source

statement for the entire period. (Doc. 12 at 10, 12).6 The court will consider these two

5

Strickland is binding precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981). 

6

 Green also argues that the ALJ was inconsistent when she stated that she would not

reopen the applications denied by the September 20, 2012, decision, but then went on to make a

finding of no disability based on those applications. (Doc. 12 at 11-12). The Commissioner

concedes this point. (Doc. 13 at 6). However, this inconsistency does not undermine the

substance of any of the ALJ’s findings, nor is it an automatic ground for reversal. The court

resolves this inconsistency by holding that the ALJ did reopen the earlier decisions by citing

them as bases for her finding of no disability. (See Tr. 24).

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arguments in turn.

A. There Was No Error In The ALJ’s Failure To Discuss The RFC Findings

From Earlier, Reopened Decisions

Green’s first argument is that the ALJ erred in finding a less restrictive RFC

than found in the previous decisions. She reasons that the ALJ should have explained

why her final RFC findings differed from those earlier ones. (Doc. 12 at 9). Green

says that the ALJ’s action “flouts the principle of ‘the administrative law of the case’

in which it has been held error to fail to discuss the earlier ruling or provide reasons

for setting it aside where there is no evidence of improvement to account for a higher

RFC.” Id. 

As to the issue of the administrative law of the case, Green’s argument is

meritless. She cites a case from this district, Bloodsaw v. Apfel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1223

(N.D. Ala. 2000), which, as a district court decision, is not binding, but is persuasive

authority. However, as the Commissioner’s brief correctly explains (Doc. 13 at 7), the

rule in Bloodsaw does not apply to this case. In Bloodsaw, the ALJ whose findings

were under review had previously issued a denial of an earlier application by the same

claimant. 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 n. 2. That earlier decision was “law of the case and

therefore binding.” Id. at 1228 n. 6. Therefore, the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the

prior decision, despite finding in her second decision that the claimant did not even

have a severe impairment, without any evidence that her condition had improved. Id.

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In this case, on the other hand, neither of the earlier decisions (on September 22, 2010,

and September 20, 2012) were final; rather, as discussed supra, n. 6, they were

reopened by ALJ Vincent at the direction of the Appeals Council. (Tr. 21). Other

cases considering this question have unanimously agreed that a decision that is not

final is not part of the administrative law of the case. See, e.g., Poppa v. Astrue, 569

F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2009), Rudolph v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-2934-AKK, 2014

WL 3689781 (N.D. Ala. July 21, 2014); see also Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790

(5th Cir. 1991) (“When the [Commissioner]remands cases for re-determination, there

is no rule of issue preclusion”).

Green’s general argument — that the ALJ should have explained why her final

RFC findings were less restrictive than found during the previous, reopened decisions

— does not have any other basis as a ground for reversal. Green does not cite any law

to establish an obligation on the part of the ALJ to explain why her RFC findings

differ from those decisions, nor is the court aware of any such rule. Rather, the final

RFC findings must be evaluated on the general statutory grounds, that is, whether they

are supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the legal standards.

B. There Was No Error In The ALJ’s Reliance On A Nonexamining 

Physician’s RFC Assessment

Green also argues that the ALJ erred by basing her RFC findings on remand on

the opinion of a nonexamining, reviewing state agency physician. (Doc. 12 at 10-12).

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She contends that the physician’s opinion was entitled to little weight under Eleventh

Circuit law, and also that the opinion was “out of date by more than two and a half

years at the time of the ALJ’s adjudication.” (Id. at 10). Instead, Green argues, the

ALJ’s duty to develop the record obligated her to obtain a medical source opinion

from a medical expert or consultative exam before making RFC findings. (Id. at 11).

A nonexamining physician’s “opinion is entitled to little weight and taken alone

does not constitute substantial evidence to support an administrative decision.”

Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1990). This is particularly so if

it is contrary to the opinion of a treating physician. Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d

960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985). However, such an opinion is evaluated under the usual

criteria for an expert opinion, such as the physician’s qualifications and expertise in

Social Security rules, the supporting evidence in the case record, and the physician’s

explanations given in support of his opinion. Ogranaja v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 186

F. App'x 848, 850 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2).

Green cites an Eleventh Circuit case for the proposition “[t]he Commisioner’s

duty to develop the record includes ordering a [consultative exam] if one is needed to

make an informed decision.” (Doc. 12 at 11). In that particular case, the Eleventh

Circuit raised the possibility, without reaching a ruling on the issue, that the ALJ had

committed reversible error by failing “to order a consultative examination by an

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orthopedist even though the [Social Security Administration’s] consulting doctor

recommended an evaluation.” Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 522 n. 1 (11th Cir.

1984). In another case, an ALJ was reversed by the Fifth Circuit for failing to order

a consultative psychiatric examination. Ford v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 659

F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1981). There, the claimant had been experiencing emotional

problems, which made her unable to work according to a report from a social worker.

Id. The ALJ determined that she not disabled without the support of any medical

opinion, and, furthermore, did so despite the claimant’s request for a consultative

examination. Id.

The facts of Green’s case do not resemble these aforementioned cases. No other

physician recommended an additional consultation, and there is a medical source

statement from February 2011 on record as to her physical7 RFC. (Tr. 639-46). Green

does not contend that the record before February 2011 was insufficient. Rather, she

asserts that the record as to her later condition was insufficient and so required a

consultative examination. (Doc. 12 at 10). However, she has not provided evidence,

or even alleged, that her condition changed after 2011. It is well-settled that “the

claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is

7

 Green has only challenged the ALJ’s findings as to her physical RFC. (Doc. 12 at 8-12).

However, there is also a medical source statement on her mental RFC. (Tr. 692-94).

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responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355

F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). The claimant, not the ALJ, bears the burden to

provide medical records concerning the period after the filing of the application. Id.

(“The ALJ, however, was in no way bound to develop the medical record for [the two

years after the application was filed]”). Contrary to Green’s assertion, the ALJ’s duty

to develop the record does not entail an obligation to, in effect, order check-ups to see

whether the claimant’s condition has worsened.

The ALJ had substantial evidence for her findings on Green’s RFC. No medical

opinion from a treating physician is present in the record, but the RFC assessments on

record support the ALJ’s findings. The previously discussed physical RFC assessment

by Dr. Sellman (Tr. 639-45), to which the ALJ assigned great weight, reviewed

Green’s medical records, including a consultative examination by Dr. Decontee

Jimmeh. (Tr. 634-7). Dr. Jimmeh’s examination found no problems with Green’s

ability to walk, sit, stand, and take off and put on her shoes. (Id.). He also found a full

range of motion in her wrists, fingers and thumbs, and no deficits in her extremities.

(Id.). The treatment notes on record show complaints of pain and other problems

resulting from Green’s medically determinable impairments, but do not reveal any

limitations greater than those found by the ALJ. Therefore, they also support the

ALJ’s findings. Green has not challenged the ALJ’s findings regarding her mental

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impairments, and the court’s review finds them also to be supported by the reviewing

psychologist’s mental RFC assessment (Tr. 692-95), as well as the other evidence on

record, particularly the psychological evaluation by Dr. Mary Arnold. (Tr. 675-77).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be, and

hereby is, AFFIRMED. A separate final judgment will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of February, 2015.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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