Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01912/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01912-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Milton Lee Tucker, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1912-PHX-NVW (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges

his criminal convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. CR

159112. (Doc. 7) Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(the “Answer”) and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 17, 19) As explained below, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition be denied as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Factual Summary

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the State criminal case as

follows:

On June 12, 1986, the appellant and Raymond Rigsby robbed a bank in Mesa,

Arizona. The appellant took $611 from a bank teller at gunpoint while Rigsby

waited outside in a running car. Police officers of the Mesa Police Department

were watching the appellant and gave chase after the robbery. When the

appellant attempted to flee on foot, pursuing police officers ordered him to

stop. The appellant turned and fired his gun at the officers, who returned fire.

The appellant was captured shortly after the shooting incident.

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 The Honorable E.G. Noyes, Jr., presided over the trial and sentencing.

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(Doc. 17, Exhibit (“Exh.”) E)

B. Trial and Sentencing

On June 20, 1986, Petitioner was indicted on one count of Armed Robbery, a Class

2 dangerous felony under Arizona law, and one count of Aggravated Assault, a Class 3

dangerous felony. (Doc. 17, Exh. A, E) Following a jury trial in the Superior Court in

October 1986, Petitioner was convicted of both counts.1

 (Id.) Based on his prior felony

convictions and other aggravating factors, Petitioner was sentenced on November 18, 1986,

to 28 years in prison for the armed robbery conviction and a consecutive term of 20 years in

prison for the aggravated assault conviction. (Id.) 

C. Direct Appeal

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal on November 24, 1986.

(Doc. 17, Exh. B) After briefing was completed, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a

Memorandum Decision on February 2, 1988, in which it affirmed Petitioner’s convictions

and sentences. (Doc. 17, Exh. E) Petitioner, again through counsel, filed a Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court on March 2, 1988. (Doc. 17, Exh. F) The Court

denied review on April 20, 1988. (Doc. 17, Exh. H) 

D. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 On June 6, 1988, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc.

17, Exh. J) Pursuant to Petitioner’s request, the trial court appointed counsel to represent

Petitioner in the post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 17, Exh. K) On June 30, 1988, counsel

filed a Notice of Non-Supplementation of Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Relief Petition, in

which he stated that, after review of the record and Petitioner’s pro se petition, he found no

basis to amend or supplement what Petitioner filed. (Doc. 17, Exh. L) The State of Arizona

filed a Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on the same day as counsel’s notice

was filed. (Doc. 17, Exh. M) The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on July 5,

1988. (Doc. 17, Exh. N)

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2

 It appears this document was filed in case number CR-110385 only, even though in

the body of the document Petitioner challenged his convictions in both CR-110385 and CR159112. 

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On July 15, 1988, Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing, which was denied. (Doc.

17, Exhs. P, R) After Petitioner filed, and the trial court granted, a Motion for Leave to File

a Delayed Petition for Review, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 17, Exhs. S, T and U) On July 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued a

Memorandum Decision, granting review but denying relief. (Doc. 17, Exh. V) Petitioner’s

subsequent Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on February 19,

1991. (Doc. 17, Exhs. W, X) 

According to portions of the State-court record provided by Respondents, Petitioner

submitted nothing else to challenge his convictions in the State case until he filed a “Motion

for Void Judgment” in the Superior Court on January 25, 2011. (Doc. 17, Exh. Z) He then

filed a “Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” on March 22,

2011. (Doc. 17, Exh. AA) The motion lists two Maricopa County Superior Court case

numbers, the one at issue in the instant Petition, CR-159112, and CR-110385. The latter case

number is the subject of another petition filed by Petitioner in CV-12-1909-PHX-NVW

(LOA), for which a second Report and Recommendation is being issued simultaneously

herewith. On October 11, 2011, Petitioner filed in the Superior Court a document titled

“Acceptance of Contract,” which is in the form of a letter to Attorney General Tom Horne.2

(Doc. 17, Exh. BB) 

On December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 17, Exh. CC) The Court of Appeals dismissed the matter on December 9,

2011, because “the trial court ha[d] not entered any final order in post-conviction relief

proceedings.” (Doc. 17, Exh. DD) 

On December 15, 2011, the trial court issued an order, addressing Petitioner’s

“Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” filed on March 22,

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3

 The trial court’s order did not address Petitioner’s “Motion for Void Judgment,” filed

on January 25, 2011, and this Magistrate Judge is unaware of any order that addressed this

motion.

4

With regard to CR-110385, the trial court explained that Petitioner did not file a

direct appeal or seek post-conviction relief until he filed the “Motion of Petition for the Court

to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice.” (Doc. 17, Exh. EE) The trial court found this request

for post-conviction relief timely because it was the first one filed in that case and, at the time

Petitioner was sentenced, there was no time limit for seeking post-conviction relief. (Id.)

(citing Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (Ariz. 1998)).

Consequently, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner and allowed the matter

to proceed. (Id.) 

5

 Petitioner also addressed CR-110385 in the Petition for Review and “reserve[d] the

opportunity” to seek review in that case if it became necessary at a later time. (Id.) 

6

 Petitioner submitted the original Petition on August 31, 2012. (Doc. 1) The docket

reflects the original Petition was actually filed on September 10, 2012. (Id.) The August 31,

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2011, and Petitioner’s “Acceptance of Contract,” filed on October 11, 2011.3

 (Doc. 17, Exh.

EE) In the order, the Superior Court construed Petitioner’s “Motion of Petition for the Court

to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice” as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.)

 With regard to CR-159112, the State case being challenged in the instant Petition, the

Superior Court dismissed the post-conviction proceedings because Petitioner had previously

filed a post-conviction relief petition on June 6, 1988. (Id.) The trial court treated the new

notice of post-conviction relief as successive and determined the claims contained therein

were precluded.4

 (Id.)

On January 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, challenging the trial court’s dismissal of post-conviction proceedings in CR159112.5

 (Doc. 17, Exh. FF) The Court of Appeals treated the Petition for Review as a

Petition for Special Action, at least as to CR-159112, and declined jurisdiction on February

3, 2012. (Doc. 17, Exh. GG)

E. Federal Habeas Petition

On December 6, 2012, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this District Court.6

 (Doc. 7) Petitioner raises nineteen grounds for relief in the

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2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the original Petition, doc. 1 at 23, and reflects

the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.

2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Petition. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the Maricopa County Superior Court had no

jurisdiction over his case because it failed to prove its jurisdiction in response to Petitioner’s

jurisdictional challenge. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges the Superior Court did not have

jurisdiction or authority to convert his “Motion for Void Judgment and Motion to Dismiss:

No Contract” into a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges the Superior Court defaulted when

it failed to address the “Motion for Void Judgment and Motion to Dismiss: No Contract,”

which he submitted on January 19, 2011. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges the State

statutes used to convict him in this case did not have enacting clauses. Thus, he contends the

Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges

the Superior Court Judge who presided over his trial and sentencing “did not have a valid and

lawful oath of office secured by a fidelity bond on file.” In Ground Six, Petitioner claims the

Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because there were no original

charging documents, including an arrest warrant, an information, and a supporting affidavit.

In Ground Seven, Petitioner alleges the United States and the State of Arizona are not

sovereign. In Ground Eight, Petitioner alleges his identity was “concealed by novation,” and

an artificial person was named in the case. In Ground Nine, Petitioner alleges the United

States and the State of Arizona are bankrupt and cannot participate in court actions. In

Ground Ten, Petitioner alleges the statutes used to charge him in the State case are

copyrighted and not for public use. In Ground Eleven, Petitioner alleges the Superior Court

was a commercial tribunal and not a criminal tribunal. In Ground Twelve, Petitioner alleges

his criminal sentence in the State case was actually a debt for which he cannot be imprisoned.

In Ground Thirteen, Petitioner alleges his sentence in the State case was unlawful because

the Superior Court Judge’s discretion was unlawfully restricted by mandatory sentencing.

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In Ground Fourteen, Petitioner alleges double jeopardy based on the trial court’s refusal to

sever his trial from his co-defendant’s until prejudicial statements by his co-defendant forced

a mistrial and subsequent retrial. In Ground Fifteen, Petitioner alleges a violation of his right

to a speedy trial. In Ground Sixteen, Petitioner alleges judicial misconduct based on the trial

judge’s alleged failure to ensure his right to a speedy trial, and for allegedly forcing a mistrial

that resulted in a double jeopardy violation. In Ground Seventeen, Petitioner alleges the trial

judge unlawfully imposed consecutive sentences. In Ground Eighteen, Petitioner alleges his

two armed robbery convictions in CR-110385 were unlawfully used to enhance his sentence

in the instant case, CR-159112. Lastly, in Ground Nineteen, Petitioner alleges a conflict of

interest in that both his defense counsel and the prosecutor were employed by Maricopa

County. 

On April 23, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer and supporting exhibits. (Doc. 17)

Petitioner then filed his Reply on June 7, 2013. (Doc. 19) 

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was not

filed within one year of the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Alternatively, Respondents contend the Petition fails to state a

valid claim for relief as Petitioner’s claims are vague, conclusory, and fail to specify the

nature of any alleged constitutional violation. Respondents also argue Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

Because the information presented clearly establishes the Petition was filed after the

limitations period expired, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds the Petition is barred and

recommends it be denied on that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’

alternative arguments.

A. Legal Standards

 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

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 The AEDPA, which was enacted on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas petitions

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997).

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corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).7

 The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief remains

“pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the state’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-

220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court,

but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925

(9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

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dismissing his petition as untimely.”). 

An application for post-conviction relief is also pending during the intervals between

a lower court decision and a review by a higher court. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 223). The time between a first and second

application for post-conviction relief, however, is not tolled because no application is

“pending” during that period. Id.; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The

petitioner was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one

round of state collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Moreover, filing a

new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended

before the new petition was filed. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

State prisoners whose convictions became final before the AEDPA effective date of

April 24, 1996, had a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas petitions. Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, absent any tolling, the deadline to file

a habeas petition under these circumstances was April 24, 1997. Id. at 1246. 

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis 

1. Limitations Period

Here, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction and sentences were imposed on November

18, 1986. (Doc. 17, Exh. A) Direct review ended when the time expired for Petitioner to file

a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court following the Arizona

Supreme Court’s denial of review on April 20, 1988. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of

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certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files

such a petition.”). Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceeding, which began on June 6,

1988, when he filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, ended on February 19,

1991, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review. 

Because Petitioner’s convictions became final well before the AEDPA was enacted

in 1996, Petitioner had a one-year grace period, until April 24, 1997, to file a federal habeas

petition. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245. As indicated above, Petitioner submitted the

original Petition to this District Court on August 31, 2012, more than fifteen years after the

AEDPA deadline. 

Additionally, statutory tolling of the limitation period is inapplicable here.

Petitioner’s “Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” construed

as a second petition for post-conviction relief, was not filed until March 22, 2011, almost

fourteen years after the limitations period had expired. The time between the termination of

Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceeding on February 19, 1991, and his second

application for post-conviction relief on March 22, 2011, was not tolled because no

application was “pending” during that period. See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048 (holding that the

time between the completion of a first round of post-conviction review and the beginning of

a second round is not tolled). As a result, Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction

relief, filed in 2011, had no impact on the already-expired limitations period. See Ferguson,

321 F.3d at 823. For these reasons, this federal Petition was untimely filed.

2. Equitable Tolling

As referenced above, the limitations period set forth in § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his rights diligently and

extraordinary circumstances prevented the petitioner from filing a timely petition. Holland,

130 S.Ct. at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary

circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009). Equitable tolling is not available in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

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the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). An

“external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A pro se petitioner’s

ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see also Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context, rejecting

movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and lack of legal

sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural

ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for

promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n. 4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating

it is warranted in his case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter

alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner has failed to show extraordinary circumstances stood in his way,

preventing him from filing a timely federal petition. In the section of the Petition that

directed Petitioner to explain why the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)

does not bar the Petition, Petitioner simply asserted, without explanation, that it does not

apply. (Doc. 7 at 27) Petitioner also addressed the timeliness issue in his Reply, writing he

had never heard of the AEDPA and was “suspicious” of whether Respondents are correctly

applying the statute to this case. (Doc. 19 at 7) Thus, Petitioner has presented no basis to

apply equitable tolling.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner filed the Petition after

the limitations period expired. In addition, this Magistrate Judge finds there is no legal or

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factual basis to apply statutory or equitable tolling. Consequently, the Petition is barred by

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 7, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 25th day of November, 2013.

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