Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08229/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert LaRue Brown, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-08229-PCT-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Robert LaRue Brown, Jr. has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting five grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) In their answer, 

Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of 

limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 11.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that Grounds Two and Three are not cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review, and that federal habeas corpus review of Grounds Two, 

Three, and Five is procedurally barred. Petitioner has filed a reply. (Doc. 12.) For the 

reasons below, the Court finds the Petition untimely, recommends that the Petition be 

dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ alternative arguments. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

 A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing 

 On January 23, 2003, Petitioner was indicted in the Mojave County Superior Court 

on second degree murder, a class one felony (Count One), and theft of means of 

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transportation, a class 3 felony (Count Two).1 (Doc. 11, Ex. A.) On March 31, 2003, 

Petitioner entered a stipulated guilty plea. (Doc. 11, Ex. F.) The plea agreement 

provided that Petitioner would plead guilty to manslaughter and theft of means of 

transportation. (Id. at 1-2.) On March 31, 2003, the trial court accepted the guilty plea, 

concluding that Petitioner’s plea was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (Doc. 11, 

Ex. G.) 

 Before sentencing, the trial court received letters from Petitioner requesting to 

withdraw from the guilty plea. (Doc. 11, Exs, H, I.) The trial court forwarded the letters 

to Petitioner’s counsel. (Id.) On June 16, 2003, defense counsel moved to withdraw due 

to a conflict of interest. (Doc. 11, Ex. J.) The trial court granted the motion, and later 

appointed Mark A. Sippel to represent Petitioner in further proceedings. (Doc. 11, 

Exs. K, L.) 

 On August 1, 2003, defense counsel requested a diagnostic evaluation and mental 

examination pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.5, and the trial court 

granted the request. (Doc. 11, Exs M, N.) The Mohave Mental Health Rule 26.5 

Psychological Evaluation (Rule 26.5 report) was submitted to the trial court before 

sentencing.2

 (Doc. 11, Ex. FF, at 3-4.) Defense counsel also submitted a mitigation 

report completed by an investigator. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) 

 On October 24, 2003, the trial court held an aggravation and mitigation hearing. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. FF.) The trial court stated that it had read the presentence investigation 

report, the letters submitted by interested parties, the “Rule 26.5 diagnostic evaluation 

from Mohave Mental Health,” and the mitigation report. (Id. at 4-5.) After considering 

arguments from counsel and testimony from the victim’s family members, the trial court 

 

1

 Petitioner was charged with killing his mother and taking her car to drive to 

California. (Doc. 11, Exs. A, P.) 

2

 The Rule 26.5 report is contained in the appendix to Respondents’ Exhibit Z, which is Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) The Rule 26.5 report is Appendix B to the petition for review. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z, 

Appendix B.) For ease of reference, the Court cites to the Rule 26.5 report by its CM/ECF document and page numbers. (Doc. 11-3 at 49-55.) 

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imposed a “slightly aggravated” four-year term of imprisonment on the theft of means of 

transportation conviction, and a concurrent, aggravated twenty-one-year term of 

imprisonment on the manslaughter conviction. (Id. at 27-30; Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) 

 B. Rule 32 “Of-Right” Proceeding 

On October 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court to commence an “of-right” proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.3

 (Doc. 11, Ex. R.) The trial court appointed counsel. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) 

Counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel was 

ineffective at sentencing, the trial court improperly considered aggravating factors, and 

Petitioner’s sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because the 

trial court, rather than a jury, determined the aggravating factors. (Doc. 11, Ex. U at 3.) 

Petitioner submitted his mental health records from his incarceration at the Los Angeles 

County Jail, where he was held upon his arrest, and from the Arizona Department of 

Corrections as exhibits to his petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. U - exhibits A and B.)4

 On January 

10, 2005, the trial court concluded that Petitioner failed to present any colorable claims 

and denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) 

 After receiving an extension of time, on March 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition 

for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.5

 (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) Petitioner raised the same 

claims he had presented in his petition for post-conviction relief. (Compare Doc. 11, 

 

3

 Because Petitioner pled guilty, his only avenue of direct review was a Rule 32 

“of-right” proceeding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) ([I]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . 

shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding”). 

4

 Respondents’ Exhibit U is Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. U.) That petition has two exhibits, A and B. For ease of reference, the 

Court refers to those exhibits by the CM/ECF document and page numbers. (Doc. 11-2 at 19-44 and Doc. 11-2 at 45-123.) 

5

 Respondents state that Petitioner attached an appendix with several exhibits to 

his petition for review. Respondents identify those exhibits and state that other than 

exhibit B, the Rule 26.5 report, they did not attach the exhibits to petition for review because those documents appear elsewhere in the record. (Doc. 11 at 12 n.8.) 

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Ex. U with Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) On March 2, 2006, the appellate court denied review. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. BB.) Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, raising the same issues presented in the petition for review filed in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals.6

 (Compare Doc. 11, Ex. Z with Doc. 11, Ex. BB.) On 

September 27, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. CC.) On October 3, 2006, counsel moved to withdraw, and the trial court granted her 

request. (Doc. 11, Ex. DD.) 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On November 25, 2014, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises the following five grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel 

was ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate and present mental health 

mitigation evidence and for failing to provide evidence of Petitioner’s mental health to 

the Rule 26.5 evaluator (Ground One); (2) the trial court erroneously considered 

aggravating factors when sentencing Petitioner in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments (Ground Two); (3) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was cruel, 

heinous, or depraved pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C)(5), in violation of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments (Ground Three); (4) the trial court violated the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments and the Blakely decision because the trial court, not a jury, 

determined the aggravating factors (Ground Four); and (5) counsel for Petitioner’s 

Rule 32 of-right proceeding was ineffective for failing to request to withdraw the plea 

agreement (Ground Five). (Doc. 1 at 6-12.) As set forth below, the Court finds the 

Petition untimely and recommends that it be dismissed on that basis. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

6

 Respondents state that Petitioner attached an appendix with several exhibits to 

his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents identify those exhibits and state that they did not file the appendix because the documents contained in 

the appendix are attached elsewhere in the record. (Doc. 11 at 12 n.9.) 

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II. Statute of Limitations 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).7

 Therefore, to assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court 

determines the date on which Petitioner’s judgment of conviction became “final by the 

conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, Petitioner 

was precluded from pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. §13-4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could seek review of his conviction and 

sentence in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Rule 32, which is the functional 

equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 

481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Arizona courts consider Rule 32 ofright proceedings a form of direct review). 

 As Respondents note (Doc. 11 at 10), on October 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a 

timely notice of post-conviction relief to commence a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

(Doc. 11, Exs. Q, R); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the 

 

7

 The statute of limitations commences on the latest of the dates determined by applying §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner 

does not make any allegations indicating that subsections (B), (C), or (D) should apply, or that application of any of these subsections would result in a starting date for the statute of limitations that is later than the date determined under § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner might argue that § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies and that the limitations period did not commence until the Supreme Court decided Blakely on June 24, 2004. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(A) (providing that the limitations period commences on “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”) However, if the limitations period commenced on that date, it would have expired on June 25, 2005, before Petitioner’s conviction 

became final on direct review. See Section II.A. Accordingly, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not 

supply the starting date for the one-year limitations period. 

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appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.”). 

After the trial court denied relief, Petitioner sought review in the appellate court. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) The appellate court denied review on March 2, 2006, and Petitioner 

filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11, Exs. AA, BB.) On 

September 27, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) 

 Because Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding is considered a form of direct 

review, his conviction become final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the expiration 

of the ninety-day period to petition the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, 

or on December 26, 2006. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (providing AEDPA statute of 

limitations begins “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”); Summers, 481 F.3d 

at 717 (when an Arizona petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings were of-right, the “AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations did not begin to run until ninety days after the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied [the petitioner’s] petition for review”). Therefore, the one-year limitations 

period commenced the next day, December 27, 2006, and expired one year later, on 

December 27, 2007. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir.2001) 

(the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Because Petitioner did not file his Petition until 

November 25, 2014, it is untimely unless statutory tolling, equitable tolling, or an 

exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory 

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tolling because he did not file any state post-conviction proceedings after the conclusion 

of his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

C. Equitable Tolling or Exception to the Statute of Limitations 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When 

considering whether to apply equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 

need for ‘flexibility’ and for ‘avoiding mechanical rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 

777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650). 

 Petitioner acknowledges that his Petition is untimely. (Doc. 1 at 14.) He argues 

that equitable tolling applies because: (1) he “has been on has been on a regimen[] of 

psychoactive prescriptions drugs to stabilize his mental state. He is currently under the 

care of the Dept. of Corrections Psychiatric Dept., and for the first time is cognizant of 

his Pro Per rights to pursue a Habeas Review”; and (2) the “recent Supreme Court 

Decision of Martinez v. Ryan should apply to the Petitioner’s Constitutional rights to 

allow initial post-conviction ineffective assistance claims be presented.” (Doc. 1 at 14; 

Doc. 12 at 5-6.) As Respondents argue (Doc. 11 at 16-21), neither reason justifies 

equitably tolling the AEDPA limitations period. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 1. Mental Health Issues do not Toll the Limitations Period 

 In Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit set 

forth a two-part test to determine when a habeas petitioner is eligible for equitable tolling 

based on a mental impairment. To establish such tolling, a petitioner must show: 

(1) [h]is mental impairment was an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond his control . . . by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either 

 (a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file, or 

 (b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing[; and] 

(2) [d]iligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand 

them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. 

Id. at 1099-1100; see also Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(noting the Bills standard “reiterates the stringency of the overall equitable tolling test” 

and “the mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the but-for cause of the 

delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate 

diligence”). 

 As Respondents argue, Petitioner’s allegations regarding his mental health are 

insufficient to justify equitably tolling the limitations period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 

549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007) (finding claim of mental incapacity was not an “extraordinary 

circumstance” requiring equitable tolling when petitioner “made no factual showing of 

mental incapacity”); Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736, 742 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting “a blanket 

assertion of mental incompetence is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations” and that 

“a causal link between the mental condition and untimely filing is required.”). 

 To support his assertion that a mental impairment prevented him from filing a 

timely federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner states that he “had been 

prescribed and is currently still prescribed some . . . mental health prescription drugs,” 

which he lists. (Doc. 1 at 11.) To further support his claim, Petitioner relies on the 

memorandum of points and authorities included in his petition for post-conviction relief 

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filed in the trial court in 2004, and the memorandum he filed in the appellate court on 

review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 14 (citing to the 

attached memoranda); Doc. 1, Exs. A, C ).) 

 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present evidence regarding Petitioner’s mental health to the Rule 

26.5 evaluator and the trial court. (Doc. 1 at 18.) Petitioner argued that he took 

prescribed medication for his mental health when he was incarcerated in the Los Angeles 

County Jail in 2003, shortly before he was transferred to Arizona for his criminal trial. 

(Doc. 1 at 20.) Petitioner also argued that records from the Los Angeles County Jail 

indicated that he was suicidal, on suicide watch at the jail, diagnosed with substanceinduced mood disorder and a major depressive disorder, and prescribed antidepressant 

and mood stabilizing medications. (Id.) That memorandum also noted that during 2004, 

Petitioner was treated at the Arizona Department of Corrections for bipolar disorder with 

mixed psychosis, and was prescribed medications. (Id.) Petitioner raised these same 

issues in his petition for review. (Doc. 1 at 41-42.) Petitioner does not present any other 

evidence to support his claim that an alleged mental impairment and treatment with 

“psychoactive” prescription medication prevented him from filing a timely petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. (Docs. 1, 12.) 

 In their answer to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondents accurately 

note that the most recent medical evidence in the record is from 2004. (Doc. 11 at 17; 

Doc. 11-2 at 19-123.) Respondents also note that, other than a handwritten list of his past 

and current medications, Petitioner has not provided evidence related to his mental health 

or mental health care during the relevant period — the time from when the AEDPA 

statute of limitations commenced and was running. (Doc. 11 at 17 (citing Doc. 1 at 11).) 

 The record before the Court includes evidence that Petitioner had some mental 

health issues at least until 2004, and that he received some mental treatment while in the 

Los Angeles County Jail and the Arizona Department of Corrections. (Doc. 11-2 at 19-

123; Doc. 1 at 16-20.) The record also indicates that Petitioner took “mental health” 

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medications in the past, and currently takes some “mental health” medication. (Doc. 1 at 

11, 14.) However, the record does not include evidence of Petitioner’s mental health 

treatment during the period that the AEDPA statute of limitations was running, December 

27, 2006 through December 27, 2007, or during the period after the limitations period 

expired through the date Petitioner filed his pending Petition. 

 Petitioner bears the burden of proving that equitable tolling is appropriate. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418. In their answer, Respondents assert that Petitioner has not presented 

evidence of how his mental health prevented him from filing a timely petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. (Doc. 11 at 17.) However, aside from stating that he had “semi or severe 

depression” (Doc. 12 at 6), Petitioner’s reply does not include further evidence or 

discussion of Petitioner’s mental health or how it prevented him from filing a timely 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (Doc. 12.) Thus, Petitioner has not 

satisfied his burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. See 

Bevel v. Ryan, 2014 WL 1410449, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2014) (concluding that 

petitioner’s unsupported statements did not establish that the severity of his mental 

impairment prevented him from filing a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus). 

 Additionally, the evidence in the record does not demonstrate that Petitioner had a 

mental impairment that was so severe that he was unable to file a timely petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100; (See Doc. 11-2 at 19-123; Doc. 11-3 

at 49-55.) The psychologist who examined Petitioner for the Rule 26.5 evaluation, 

Dr. Mark Harvancik, concluded that Petitioner made an “unsophisticated attempt to 

appear mentally ill,” and his “profile appeared to be characteristic of individuals who are 

feigning a mental disorder and is rarely seen in clients responding truthfully.” (Doc. 11-3 

at 54.) The psychologist concluded that “while [Petitioner] might have been exhibiting 

some signs and symptoms of either a depressive disorder or a mood disorder, possibly 

associated with being incarcerated, along with evidence of substance dependence, he 

presented with what appeared to be ingrained antisocial patterns and behaviors which are 

not amenable to change through therapeutic or psychiatric interventions.” (Id. at 55.) 

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Dr. Harvancik noted that Petitioner referred to treatment he received while incarcerated, 

but he did not have those records. (Doc. 11-3 at 54-55.) 

 At sentencing, the trial court acknowledged that it received the Rule 26.5 report. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 3-4.) The court stated that although there was evidence that 

Petitioner had some “emotional and behavioral issues,” they did not appear to “impair 

[his] judgment” and “the record is rather clear in that [Petitioner] as a manipulator is 

attempting to place the blame in something other than where it should lay, and that would 

be upon him.” (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 27-30.) 

 On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to present additional evidence of Petitioner’s mental health to the Rule 26.5 

evaluator and to the trial court. (Doc. 11, Ex. U at 3.) As exhibits to his petition, 

Petitioner attached his mental health records from his incarceration in the Los Angeles 

County Jail and the Arizona Department of Corrections. (Doc. 11-2 at 19-123.) In its 

response to the petition for post-conviction relief, the State indicated that it forwarded 

those records to Dr. Harvancik, the Rule 26.5 evaluator, and Dr. Harvancik stated that 

“the records generally confirm his original observations in his report to the Court” and 

that “he still believes [Petitioner] was feigning and exaggerating his symptoms.” 

(Doc. 11, Ex. V at 1-2.) The post-conviction court concluded that the mental health 

records “records reveal no significant mental health issue.” (Doc. 11, Ex. X.) The 

appellate court affirmed that ruling. (Doc. 11, Ex. AA.) 

 Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not met his 

burden of showing that he had a severe mental impairment that constitutes an 

extraordinary circumstance. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100; Roberts v. Marshall, 627 

F.3d 768, 770-73 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that petitioner’s alleged mental health 

issues did not warrant equitable tolling when medical records showed that although 

petitioner was taking “psychotropic medications to treat his severe psychotic depression 

disorder before and during the statute of limitations period,” the records also showed that 

petitioner’s “mental functions were repeatedly classified as ‘good,’ ‘fair,’ or ‘within 

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normal limits.’”). Petitioner claims that he has been on a regimen of psychoactive 

prescription drugs to stabilize his mental state, but fails to identify any specifics, such as 

his diagnosis, the relevant dates, or the duration of any mental health issues. (Doc. 1 at 

14.) Petitioner also includes a list of medications that he either took in the past or 

currently takes. (Doc. 1 at 11.) However, he does not indicate what medications he was 

taking during the relevant time, which is after the limitations period commenced on 

December 27, 2006 and when the limitations period was running. Although the record 

includes evidence that Plaintiff received some mental health treatment until at least 2004, 

Petitioner does not attempt to relate that treatment to the relevant time period, or to 

explain how it interfered with his ability to file a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this Court. 

 Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that he acted diligently in pursuing his 

claims. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101. Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceedings concluded 

on September 27, 2006. (Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) Petitioner did not take any action to pursue 

his claims until he filed a habeas corpus petition with this Court on November 25, 2014. 

Petitioner does not explain what efforts he made to pursue his claims during those eight 

years, and does not explain how his alleged mental health impairment prevented him 

from filing his petition during those eight years. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101 (stating to 

show diligence, a petition “must diligently seek assistance and exploit whatever 

assistance is reasonably available,” or must show that his “mental impairment prevented 

him from locating assistance or communicating with or sufficiently supervising any 

assistance actually found”); Lopez v. Felker, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1158-59 (C.D. Cal. 

2008) (concluding that equitable tolling was not warranted despite medical records 

showing depression, auditory hallucinations, attempted suicide, hospitalization, and 

medication for depression because the records did not “establish that Petitioner’s alleged 

mental illness made it impossible for him to file his federal habeas petition on time”). 

 Petitioner asserts that equitable tolling is appropriate because “for the first time he 

is cognizant of his Pro Per rights to a Habeas Review.” (Doc. 1 at 14.) However, “a pro 

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se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see also Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n.4 (“[A] pro se petitioner’s confusion or 

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”) 

Additionally, a lack of knowledge of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not 

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 

(2005). Accordingly, the Court concludes that equitable tolling is not appropriate. 

 2. The Martinez Decision does not Toll the Limitations Period 

 Petitioner also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct 1309 (2012), delays or tolls the AEDPA limitations period. (Doc. 1 at 

14; Doc. 12 at 5.) In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, under limited circumstances, 

the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute cause to excuse the 

procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1315; see also Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293-95 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(extending the holding in Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel). 

 The Martinez decision does not address the timeliness of a habeas petition or the 

tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. See Wheelwright v. Wofford, 2014 WL 

3851155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an equitable 

one, it applied only to procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable tolling 

principles pertinent to the AEDPA limitations issue.”); see also White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 

882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide procedural default issues 

is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas petition was barred by the 

AEDPA statute of limitations); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 

2014) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that Martinez delayed the start of the limitations 

period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) and finding that “Martinez has no 

applicability to this action as it does not concern the timeliness of a habeas petition.”). 

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 3. Actual Innocence Exception 

Finally, Petitioner has not established that he has a credible claim of actual 

innocence that constitutes an equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations.8

 

(Docs. 1, 12.) In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the 

United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of 

limitations for a claim of actual innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence 

gateway previously recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for 

excusing the bar to federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. 

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) 

 The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension of the time 

statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 

133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address 

the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims; the Supreme 

Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides 

a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown 

that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

(Docs. 1, 12.) Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not 

excuse his untimely filing. 

/ / / 

 

8

 Although Petitioner does not raise this issue, the Court addresses it because 

Respondents discussed it in their answer. (Doc. 11 at 20-21.) 

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III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner did not file the pending habeas petition until November 25, 2014, nearly 

seven years after the statute of limitations expired on December 27, 2007. Therefore, the 

petition is untimely. As set forth above, statutory tolling does not apply and Petitioner’s 

assertions about his mental health issues and the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez

do not warrant equitably tolling the limitations period. Additionally, Petitioner has not 

established a fundamental miscarriage of justice to warrant an exception to the statute of 

limitations. Finally, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal 

assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations 

period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a 

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the 

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances). 

 Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably 

tolling or avoiding the AEDPA statute of limitations, his § 2254 habeas petition should 

be denied as untimely. Therefore the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative 

grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

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fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 9th day of June, 2015. 

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