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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

F'£ 2 3 gg 

ROBERT L. HOECK:eR 

Clerk 

87-2851 

88-1230 

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS 

OF LONDON, SUBSCRIBING TO 

POLICY NO. EEO8782A830000-500 

AND ENDORSEMENT NO. 508, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

LEE ANN EVANS, Personal 

Representative of the Estate 

of ANDREW GLEN EVANS, Deceased, 

and HARVEY YOUNG AIRPORT, INC., 

an Oklahoma corporation, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

RICHARD HAMM, individually, and 

RICHARD HAMM, doing business as 

United Aviation, 

Defendant. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) On Appeal From The 

) United States District Court 

) For The Northern District 

) Of Oklahoma 

) (D.C. No. 86-C-1007-B) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

- -~Robert A., Todd~: and .Jon B. Wallis, :;Tulsa, ----Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant Lee Ann Evans. 

John Scott Hoff of Lapin, Hoff, Spangler & Greenberg, Chicago, 

Illinois, and Barry G. West of Merrel & West, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellant Harvey Young Airport, Inc. 

Donald L. Sime of Brydges, Riseborough, Morris, Franke & Miller, 

Waukegan, Illinois, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Case No. 88-1230 

Case No. 88-1230 involves a jurisdictional issue in the 

appeal filed by one of the defendants, Harvey Young Airport (HYA), 

and concerning the plaintiffs in the underlying federal court 

action, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London. The facts 

relevant to the jurisdictional issue are as follows. 

On September 28, 1987, the district court entered summary 

judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against all defendants. On 

October 8, 1987, defendant Lee Ann Evans moved for a new trial. 

The district court treated the motion as one to alter or amend the 

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the time within 

which to file notice of appeal was tolled in accordance with Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a}(4}; the district court denied the motion on 

November 17, 1987, and the time for filing notice of appeal began 

to run. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a}(4}. On January 15, 1988, defendant 

HYA filed a motion for enlargement of time for filing notice of 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 2 
appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and requested a 30-day 

extension. Over plaintiffs' objections, the district court, on 

January 19, 1988, granted HYA an extension for filing its notice 

of appeal until February 15, 1988. HYA filed its notice of appeal 

on February 16 due to the legal holiday observed on February 15. 

Asserting that the extension exceeded what is allowed by the 

Federal Rules of Appe l late Procedure, and that the extension was 

otherwise without a sufficient basis, plaintiffs submit that HYA's 

appeal should be dismissed as this court is without jurisdiction 

due to an untimely notice of appeal. Based on the following, we 

agree. 

It is well-established that an appellate court acquires 

jurisdiction of an appeal only upon the timely filing of a notice 

of appeal, and this r equirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. 

See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220; Gooch v. Skelly Oil 

Co., 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir.); Lathrop v. Okla. City Housing 

Authority, 438 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840. 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(l) provides, in pertinent 

part, that a notice of appeal in a civil case "shall be filed with 

the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of 

entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Subsection 4(a)(5) 

o f that -rule, .-in pertinent pa r:t, further .provides that: 

"[t]he district court, upon a showing of 

excusable neglect or good cause, may 

extend the time for filing a notice of 

appeal upon motion filed not later than 

30 days after the expiration of the time 

prescribed by this Rule 4 (a) • No 

such extension shall exceed 30 days past 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 3 
such prescribed time or 10 days from the 

date of entry of the order granting the 

motion, whichever occurs later." 

In addition, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b), in 

relevant part, states that "[t]he court for good cause shown may 

upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by these rules or by its 

order for doing any act, or may permit an act to be done after the 

expiration of such time; but the court may not enlarge the time 

for filing a notice of appeal .. II And, Rule 2 of the 

appellate rules provides that, in certain cases, "a court of 

appeals may, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b), suspend 

the requirements or provisions of any of these rules .. 

Thus, it is clear from reading the above rules together that 

II 

neither the district court nor this court has the authority to 

enlarge the time for filing notice of appeal beyond the time 

limits contained in the appellate rules. 

Once the time for filing notice of appeal began to run in 

thi s case, HYA filed its motion for enlargement of time pursuant 

to Rule 4(a)(S) only one day before the expiration of the 30-day 

period provided therein for such motions, and 59 days after the 

tolling motion was denied. Because the district court granted 

HYA's Rule 4(a)(5) motion for enlargement of time more than 30 

-~.-,days .aft.er "expiration- of.,t.he. 30 .. .days pr.escribed: by ··Rule 4(a) £.or 

filing notice of appeal, the court was authorized by the rules to 

grant, at the most, a 10-day extension from the time of its 

ruling. As noted above, Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) expressly prohibits 

extensions of time for filing notice of appeal beyond the time 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 4 
limits set out in the rules. Thus, even if it is assumed for 

argument that HYA made a sufficient showing of good cause for an 

extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5), the district court lacked 

the authority, under the circumstances of this case, to grant more 

than a 10-day extension for filing notice of appeal. This court 

likewise is without the authority to suspend the rules concerning 

the time limits for filing notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 2. 

Applying the above-cited appellate rules to this case, we 

must find that the extension of time granted by the district court 

was improper. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(b). As a result, HYA's 

notice of appeal in our Case No. 88- 1230 was not timely filed and 

the appeal must be dismissed as this court is without 

jurisdiction. See generally Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 

(10th Cir.) (where extension of time within which to file notice 

of appeal was improperly granted, the appeal had to be dismissed 

for failure to timely file notice of appeal); see also 

United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (timely filing of notice 

of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional). In light of this 

ruling, we need not consider whether HYA made a sufficient showing 

of good cause or excusable neglect for the enlargement of time. 

Although HYA acknowledges that timely filing of a notice of 

-appeal - is .mandatory _and .j ur isdict-ional , . HYA-~ con ten.Els ... tha-t:,- i.t:s.:_.,._,v..::;;;. 

appeal should be heard on the merits because it presents ''unique 

circumstances," citing Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat 

Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, and Thompson v. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384. In essence, HYA claims that 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 5 
because it relied on the district court's extension of time, we 

cannot dismiss the appeal as untimely. We do not agree that those 

cases are controlling in our ruling on HYA's attempted appeal. 

In Harris Truck Lines, the district court found, within the 

initial 30-day period for filing notice of appeal, that there had 

been a showing of excusable neglect sufficient to allow an 

extension of time within which to file notice of appeal; a twoweek extension was granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 

Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely, ruling that appellant 

had failed to make a sufficient showing to the district court of 

excusable neglect warranting an extension of time. The Supreme 

Court reversed the court of appeals, stating that "[i]n view of 

the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial 

judge's finding of 'excusable neglect' prior to the expiration of 

the 30-day period [for filing notice of appeal] and then suffers 

reversal of the finding, it should be given great deference by the 

reviewing court." Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat 

Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. at 217. 

The case at bar is distinguishable from Harris Truck Lines. 

The most important difference lies in the fact that in Harris 

Truck Lines the district court did not grant an extension of time 

for f il,i ng . notice ... of appeaL • .i n ._ e x.c.ess.;,,-,of .tbe_.J:i:m~ s ~-impo.sed by the 

appellate rules. As noted above, the district court here granted 

an enlargement of time for filing notice of appeal which exceeded 

the maximum time limits prescribed by the appellate rules. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 4; 26(b). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 6 
Harris Truck Lines holds that when an extension of time is 

granted within the initial 30-day period for filing notice of 

appeal and is based on a finding of excusable neglect, the 

appellate court should give great deference to that finding. See 

our holding in Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d at 368 (finding 

of excusable neglect for purposes of Rule 4(a), should not be 

disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion); however, such is not 

the case at bar. Our dismissal of HYA's appeal is not based on 

our finding an insufficient showing of good cause or excusable 

neglect underlying the extension of time; our ruling here is the 

result of applying the express language of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. 

In addition, appellant in Harris Truck Lines detrimentally 

relied on the extension of time in allowing the initial 30-day 

period within which to timely file notice of appeal to expire; had 

t he requested extension instead been denied, it still would have 

been possible for a timely notice to have been filed. Here, HYA 

was already outside the prescribed 30-day period, and its motion 

for an extension of time under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) was the 

only available means for filing notice of appeal. In light of 

thi s factual difference, we do not find the "hardship," or 

_ .-.,,de t:r imenta,1,"_r._.c:eli anc.e.#~~ :;HYA Ln ... :t he present . case. as . ..existed in 

Harris Truck Lines. 

Moreover, because we believe that an appellant has a duty to 

familiarize himself with the appellate rules, and HYA admits that 

i f Rule 4(a)(5) had been "literally followed," a 10-day extension 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 7 
was the maximum allowable under the circumstances of this case, we 

cannot say that HYA's reliance on the extension was reasonable 

reliance. Indeed, in light of the fact that HYA's motion for 

enlargement of time was filed only one day prior to the expiration 

of the 30-day period beyond the initial 30-day period prescribed 

by Rule 4(a) for filing notice of appeal, HYA either knew or 

should have known that a 10-day extension from the date of the 

district court's ruling was the maximum allowable under Rule 

4(a)(5). For the same reason, we also agree with plaintiffs' 

claim that HYA's motion improperly asked for a 30-day extension at 

a time in the proceedings when a 10-day extension was the maximum 

allowable. We believe that any error which may have been invited 

regarding Case No. 88-1230 was invited by HYA. 

We do not find either unique or extraordinary circumstances 

in the present case. Based on the foregoing, we must dismiss 

HYA's appeal. 

Case No. 87-2851 

The issues presented by Case No. 87-2851 are quite different. 

Lee Ann Evans, as personal representative of the estate of Andrew 

Glen Evans, deceased, had filed a wrongful death action in an 

Oklahoma state court. Andrew Evans died as the result of a plane 

_.,_,.:-.:;-,;;. ,-?cras.h;:while -. r i-ding· .. wi.th .Richard ·Hamm, .. the owner_. .and pilot of the 

aircraft and a participant in the 42nd Annual Fly-In at the Harvey 

Young Airport. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London 

(plaintiffs) filed this underlying federal action seeking 

declaratory judgment on their claim that the death of Andrew Evans 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 8 
was not covered by the insurance policy issued by them for the 

Fly-In. Plaintiffs and Evans both moved for summary judgment, and 

summary judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Underwriters. 

The district court's grant of summary judgment was based upon 

certain exclusionary language contained in the insurance policy. 

On appeal, Evans asserts several claims of error in the federal 

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, 

this court must view the case in the same manner as did the 

district court. Baker v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 650 

(10th Cir.). In considering the motions and in determining 

whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and, if not, 

whether the substantive law was correctly applied, we must view 

the record in light of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. Conclusory 

allegations, however, do not establish an issue of fact under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56. 

Because the material facts which underlie this action are not 

in dispute, we must determine whether the district court correctly 

applied the substantive law in ruling that decedent was a 

"passenger" in Hamm's aircraft for purposes of the exclusionary 

·· ·· pro.v::ision ·.contained . :in the· ·insurance policy--~· Where, as here, our 

review is for whether the substantive law was correctly applied, 

we may affirm the granting of summary judgment if any proper 

ground exists to support the district court's ruling. Hokansen v. 

United States, 868 F.2d 372, 374 (10th Cir.). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 9 
Evans claims the district court erred in ruling that the 

unambiguous language of the insurance policy excluded coverage for 

decedent's death. In granting plaintiffs' motion for summary 

judgment, the district court correctly stated that under Oklahoma 

law the terms of an insurance policy are to be examined in their 

plain and ordinary meaning, relying on Continental Oil Co. v. 

National Fire Ins. Co., 541 P.2d 1315 (Okla.). The district court 

then stated that the automobile cases cited by Evans were 

inapplicable because there was no need in this case to look at 

decedent's paying status to determine if he was a "passenger" for 

purposes of the insurance policy. The court noted that ''the term 

'passenger' is commonly defined as a 'person who travels in a 

train, airplane, ship, bus, or other conveyance, without 

participating in its operation,'" citing the American Heritage 

Dictionary of English Language. Because it is undisputed that 

decedent rode in the rear seat of the aircraft and had no access 

to the controls, the court found that he was a "passenger" in the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the term. 

Evans urges this court to rule that decedent was a guest in 

the aircraft, rather than a passenger, because the ride given him 

by Hamm was gratuitous. It is submitted that if such a 

distinction ; is_~made:_.llased o_n ·decedent's nonpaying status, then the 

exclusionary language in the insurance policy would not apply to 

preclude coverage. Having reviewed the authorities cited by 

Evans, we are not persuaded that the district court was incorrect 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 10 
in its application of the substantive law when it determined that 

decedent was a "passenger" in Hamm's aircraft. 

Our discussion begins by recognizing that the Supreme Court 

of Oklahoma has held that when a person rides on a train and gives 

consideration therefor, whether by deed or money, he is a 

passenger. See St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. v. Kerns, 136 P. 169, 172 

(Okla.). Evans would have us read this case as requiring some 

form of payment in order for someone to attain the status of 

"passenger." However, our reading of that case, and other 

authorities cited by Evans, does not convince us that such a 

narrow reading is warranted. Indeed, while the United States 

Supreme Court has said that the term "passenger" "would at least 

include [someone] ... with a ticket in his possession, [and] 

riding on the steps of the train," the Court then distinguished a 

"passenger" from "those employed to render service in connection 

with the journey." Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & Guar. 

Co., 292 U.S. 80, 85 (emphasis added). 

While it is clear that one who pays for his transportation is 

a "passenger," it does not necessarily follow that one is a 

"passenger" only if payment for the transportation is made. The 

dictionary definition of "passenger" relied upon by the district 

·- court· in- thj;-s·.case-::i.s -at least .. _pe.rsuasive . that--. the term was given 

a common meaning for purposes of construing the provision of the 

insurance policy in question. Cf. Aschenbrenner v. United States 

Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S. at 85 (dictionary definitions are at 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 11 
least persuasive that meanings which they do not embrace are not 

common). 

Because the definition of "passenger" adopted by the district 

court in this case is not in conflict with Oklahoma precedent or 

Oklahoma statutory law, we hold that the district court correctly 

applied the substantive law in finding that decedent was a 

"passenger" in Hamm's aircraft for purposes of the insurance 

policy. 

We also find no basis for reversal in the district court's 

ruling that the automobile cases relied upon by Evans are not 

controlling in the disposition of this case. Plaintiffs correctly 

have pointed out that an aircraft does not come within the 

definition of "vehicle" under Oklahoma law. See Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 47, § 1-186 (West 1988). Accordingly, motor vehicle law is 

not controlling here. 

Evans then submits that even if the district court correctly 

decided decedent was a ''passenger," the exclusionary provision of 

the insurance policy is sti ll inapplicable because Hamm's aircraft 

was only used "in connection with" the Fly-In, and not "used 

directly" in the event. The "used directly" is the term used in 

the exclusion in reference to the aircraft. 

-'l,1he -- fol·lowing a ·re . the .. un.dispu·ted facts r·elevant· to this 

issue. Prior to the HYA Fly-In, radio advertisements promoting 

the event announced that Hamm's aircraft, the Breezy, would be at 

the Fly-In. Hamm arrived at HYA on Friday, the first day of the 

weekend Fly-In, and he attended the cookout that night at the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2851 Document: 01019964448 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 12 
airport. Having obtained approval from the organizers of the 

Fly-In, Hamm flew his aircraft during the Fly-In all day Saturday, 

selling ''Breezy" tee shirts and giving rides to those members of 

the public who purchased a tee shirt. Hamm was also at the Fly-In 

on Sunday, the final day of the event. It was on this last day of 

the Fly-In that Hamm took decedent on the fateful ride which ended 

in an accident resulting in decedent's death; decedent did not 

purchase a tee shirt for his ride in the Breezy as Hamm was a 

personal friend of decedent's parents, both of whom had gone for a 

ride in the Breezy just prior to the accident in question. 

Thus the facts are undisputed that the plane, the Breezy, was 

"used directly" in the Fly-In. 

Because the facts as to Hamm's participation in the Fly-In 

are undisputed, and the facts as to the use of the plane are 

undisputed, and the status of the decedent is undisputed, the task 

of the district court was an application of the insurance policy 

to these facts. See Rigsby v. Mutual of New York, 331 F.2d 353 

(10th Cir.) (where facts are undisputed and only issue was 

application of insurance policy provisions, case is properly 

considered on motion for summary judgment). 

The district court in reaching its summary judgment 

· __ :-· necessar.ily _co·nsidered . and-~ decided.-a.11 el·eme.nt·s ·in · the e.xclusion 

clause--the "passenger" status of the decedent and "used directly" 

(in the Fly-In) status of the plane. The whole exclusionary 

clause had to be considered also in the denial of Evans' motion 

for summary judgment. The facts were undisputed as to the 

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elements. It is not significant that the district court may not 

have separately discussed the elements. 

The district court's ruling was the result of an application 

of the insurance policy provisions under the prevailing law to the 

undisputed facts. Disposing of the case on summary judgment was 

proper as was the result. See Rigsby v. Mutual of New York, 331 

F.2d 353 (10th Cir.). 

The appeal of HYA in Case No. 88-1230 is DISMISSED, and the 

summary judgment at issue in Case No. 87-2851 is AFFIRMED. 

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