Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02675/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02675-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Armando Flores, et al. 

Plaintiff,

vs.

Metro Valley Painting Corporation, et

al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV-06-2675-PHX-PGR 

 

 ORDER

Among the motions pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Entry of Preliminary

Injunction (doc. #66), which the Court, due to the apparent lack of urgency of the

situation and the passage of time, construes as an application for preliminary

injunction. Having considered the parties’ memoranda in light of the record, the

Court finds that the plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to preliminary

injunctive relief.

One of the named plaintiffs in this collective action seeking overtime pay

pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), is Jesus

Covarrubias. The plaintiffs, alleging in effect that the defendants violated the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), argue that the

defendants had Mr. Covarrubias, who apparently was working in this country

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illegally, arrested for using false identity papers after he participated in picketing

activities outside of the defendants’ office. As a result of Mr. Covarrubias’ arrest,

the plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the defendants and their agents from

“contacting or communicating with, in any way, any local, state or federal

government official or agency, including, but not limited to the United States

Department of Labor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [sic -

Immigration and Customs Enforcement], and Arizona law enforcement officials

regarding Plaintiffs, or any of them, or any current and former employees[.]”

While the parties disagree about the role that certain employees of

defendant Metro Valley Painting Corporation played in the circumstances

surrounding the arrest of Mr. Covarrubias by the Mesa Police Department, that is

not an issue that the Court need resolve at this time. The determinative issue is

whether the plaintiffs have met their burden of persuading the Court that

injunctive relief is necessary to forestall any future violation by the defendants of

the rights of named and opt-in plaintiffs. The Court concludes that they have not.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must make a clear

showing of either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and a

possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that its claims raise serious questions as to

the merits and that the balance of hardships tips in its favor. Connecticut General

Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir.2003). 

The gist of the plaintiffs’ contention is that the defendants retaliated against Mr.

Covarrubias for his role in this FLSA lawsuit and that, unless enjoined, they will

continue to act in such a manner as to chill the First Amendment free speech and

associational rights of other plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs. But even assuming

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that Metro Valley employees instigated the arrest of Mr. Covarrubias, the Court

cannot conclude that injunctive relief is thereby warranted. First, the plaintiffs

have not to date shown that they will probably prevail on the merits of any

retaliation claim because the current record does not establish any close

temporal connection between the filing of this action on November 6, 2006 and

the first contact with the police about Mr. Covarrubias on February 1, 2008. 

Second, the plaintiffs have not shown that there is any reasonable likelihood of

any further retaliation against Mr. Covarrubias by the defendants given that he is

no longer employed by the defendants and is apparently in the custody of federal

immigration officials. Third, the plaintiffs have not shown that there is a

reasonable likelihood that Mr. Covarrubias’ arrest will deter any other persons

from joining this action as the opt-in period closed on October 31, 2007, which

was prior to any of the actions now at issue. Fourth, the plaintiffs have not shown

that the defendants have to date in any way retaliated against any other plaintiff

in this action. Fifth, and most importantly, the plaintiffs have not shown that there

is any reasonable likelihood that the defendants’ conduct to date foreshadows

any future attempt on their part to retaliate against any other plaintiffs who may

exercise their First Amendment rights of association and free speech. As the

Supreme Court has made clear, the sole purpose of an action for injunctive relief

is to forestall future violations. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,

633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897-98 (1953). 

Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First

Amended Complaint (doc. #63), as supplemented (doc. #68), wherein the

plaintiffs seek leave pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) to add a supplemental claim

alleging that the defendants’ instigation of the arrest of Mr. Covarrubias violated

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the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The defendants

oppose the proposed amendment. Having reviewed the parties’ memoranda in

light of the record, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, finds that the

plaintiffs’ motion should be denied.

While leave to permit a supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d) is favored,

a supplemental claim is improper if it introduces a “separate, distinct and new

cause of action” that more appropriately should be the subject of a separate

action. Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th

Cir.1997). While the proposed retaliation claim is to some limited degree related

to the original overtime pay claims set forth in this collective action, it is very

much a separate and distinct claim affecting a single individual and involving

different elements and damages formulations. In light of that, and the resulting 

prejudice to the defendants that would arise from the addition of such a separate

and distinct claim at this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not believe it

would be in the interests of judicial economy to permit the inclusion of the

retaliation claim into this overtime pay action.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

and Order to Show Cause re Entry of Preliminary Injunction (doc. #66), construed

as an application for preliminary injunction, is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First

Amended Complaint (doc. #63) is denied.

DATED this 8th day of October, 2008.

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