Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00185/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

LADONNA CREAMER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No.: 3:15cv185-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Ladonna Creamer (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for social security income 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., on December 5, 

2011. Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then 

requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the 

application date of December 5, 2011, through the date of the decision. Plaintiff 

appealed to the Appeals Council, which rejected her request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 10). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS the matter for further 

proceedings. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is 

unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie

case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One 

through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then 

show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can 

perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is 

still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. 

at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

 

3

 McDaniel is a supplemental security income (SSI) case. The same sequence applies to disability 

insurance benefits. Supplemental security income cases arising under Title XVI of the Social Security 

Act are appropriately cited as authority in Title II cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412 

(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 876 n.* (11th Cir. 2012) (“The 

definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has a disability is the same for 

claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income.”). 

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Vocational Guidelines4 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

 

4

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was twenty years old on the application date, and had completed the 

ninth grade. Tr. 36, 39. Following an administrative hearing, and employing the fivestep process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since December 5, 2011, the application date[.]” Tr. 14. At Step Two, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: “obesity; 

bipolar disorder; malingering; and intellectual disability - borderline intellectual 

functioning ("BIF").” Tr. 14. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity 

of one of the listed impairments[.]” Tr. 15. Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC as 

follows: 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium 

work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except the claimant can never climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can never be exposed to 

dangerous machinery, dangerous tools, hazardous processes, or unprotected 

heights. The claimant can never operate a commercial motor vehicle. The 

claimant can be exposed to moderate noise levels. The claimant can only 

remember short, simple instructions and would be unable to deal with 

detailed instructions. She can do simple, routine, and repetitive tasks but is 

unable to do detailed or complex tasks. She would be able to accept 

constructive non-confrontational criticism, work in small group settings, 

and be able to accept changes in the workplace setting if introduced 

gradually and infrequently. The claimant is limited to simple work-related 

decisions. She can have frequent interaction with supervisors but only 

occasional interaction with co-workers and the public. She is unable to 

perform assembly line work with production-rate pace but can perform 

goal-oriented work with supervision and periodic reminders regarding 

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production requirements. Any time off task would be accommodated by 

normal workday breaks. 

Tr. 17. Having consulted with a VE at the hearing, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that 

Plaintiff had no past relevant work experience. Tr. 22. Finally, at Step Five, and based 

upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Tr. 22. The 

ALJ identified several representative occupations, including “Packager,” “Store 

Laborer,” and “Dietary Aide.” Tr. 23. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

“has not been under a disability . . . from December 5, 2011, the date the application was 

filed[.]” Tr. 23-24. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents two issues for the court to consider in its review of the 

Commissioner’s decision. First, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should 

be reversed because the ALJ “erred by failing to provide adequate rationale addressing 

the medical opinions of record expressed by [Plaintiff’s] treating physician.” Pl.’s Br. 

(Doc. 14) at 3. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be 

reversed because the ALJ “failed to apply the correct legal standards in evaluating 

[Plaintiff’s] Intellectual Disability.” Id. 

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V. DISCUSSION 

A. The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s treating physician’s medical opinion without 

good cause. 

“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other 

acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the 

claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, 

what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or 

mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). Absent “good cause,” 

an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians “substantial or considerable 

weight.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2). Good cause exists “when the: (1) treating 

physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary 

finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the 

doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 

2004). With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, but he 

“must clearly articulate [the] reasons” for doing so. Id. at 1240–41.

Moreover, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different 

medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a 

reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is 

rational and supported by substantial evidence.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 

(11th Cir.1981). Therefore, when the ALJ fails to “state with at least some measure of 

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clarity the grounds for his decision,” a court will decline to affirm “simply because some 

rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 

1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). In such a situation, “to say that [the ALJ’s] decision 

is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to 

scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are 

rational.” Cowart, 662 F.2d at 735 (quoting Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th 

Cir.1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to provide adequate rationale 

for discounting the medical opinions expressed by Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Schuster. (Doc. 14) at 3. The court agrees. 

With regards to his consideration of Dr. Schuster’s medical opinion, the ALJ 

states: 

Robert [Schuster]5

, M.D., completed a Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) on 

May 2, 2013 wherein he opined that the claimant had marked limitation in some 

areas of understanding, remembering and carrying out instructions as well as 

sustaining concentration and persistence. Additionally, Dr. [Schuster] opined that 

the claimant had the most limitation in terms of interacting appropriately with 

supervisors, co-workers, and the public or changes in routine work setting. 

Despite these findings of marked limitation however, the undersigned notes 

that the majority of Dr. [Schuster’s] findings reflected only moderate 

limitation. Nevertheless, the undersigned afforded his MSS some weight, to the 

extent that it is consistent with [the] objective record and the residual functional 

capacity highlighted above. 

Tr. at 21. (emphasis in original). 

 

5

 The ALJ’s opinion refers to Plaintiff’s treating physician as Dr. Schultz, but the evidentiary 

record reflects that she received treatment from Dr. Robert Schuster. Tr. 272. 

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The ALJ’s justification for discounting Dr. Schuster’s medical opinion – that Dr. 

Schuster identified some of Plaintiff’s limitations as “moderate” and others as “marked” 

in Plaintiff’s MSS – in no way provides the “good cause” required to discount a treating 

physician’s medical opinion. Indeed, the fact that Dr. Schuster identified differing 

degrees of Plaintiff’s limitations is the point of the MSS. To the extent the ALJ made 

such a statement with the implication that Dr. Schuster’s findings of marked and/or 

moderate limitations contradicted the medical evidence presented in the record, that 

implication would be unfounded. Plaintiff’s medical records from Dr. Schuster support, 

and do not contradict, his determinations concerning Plaintiff’s limitations as measured 

by the MSS.6

 The ALJ’s opinion does not point to any differences because the ALJ does 

not address other records from Dr. Schuster. Further, medical evidence in the record 

 

6 During Plaintiff’s treatment sessions with Dr. Schuster, Dr. Schuster noted that Plaintiff suffered from mood 

swings, manic episodes, sleep problems, racing thoughts, and poor concentration. Tr. 255-62, 273-88. Dr. Schuster 

diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder, ADD, NOS, and Mild Mental Retardation, and he prescribed several 

medications for treatment. Id. In completing the MSS, Dr. Schuster noted that Plaintiff had the following moderate 

limitations: Understand and remember simple instructions; Carry out simple instructions; The ability to make 

judgments or simple work-related decisions; Understand and remember complex instructions; Interact appropriately 

with the Public; Interact appropriately with Supervisor(s); Interact appropriately with co-workers; Respond 

appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting; The ability to ask simple questions 

or request assistance; The ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; The ability to 

perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; and 

The ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision. Tr. 290-92. He noted the following marked 

limitations: Carry out complex instructions; The ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions; The 

ability to remember locations and work-like procedures; The ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately 

to criticism from supervisors; The ability to get along with co-workers or peers without distracting them or 

exhibiting behavioral extremes; The ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic 

standards of neatness and cleanliness; The ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; 

The ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; The ability to set realistic goals or make plans 

independently of others; and The ability to work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted 

by them. Tr. 290-92. Dr. Schuster attributed these limitations to Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, mental retardation, and 

ADD. Tr. 290-92. He noted that Plaintiff was unable to count money or tell time. Tr. 292. He also opined that 

Plaintiff could not manage benefits in her own best interest, that she could not make appropriate work decisions, and 

that she would likely be absent from work as a result of her impairments for more than four days per month. Tr. 

292. Dr. Schuster noted that these impairments were found when Plaintiff was in tenth grade, but were likely 

present since childhood. Tr. 292. 

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from Dr. Clark, who provided a one-time psychiatric consult of Plaintiff, also validates – 

with minor discrepancies – the opinions of Dr. Schuster in the MSS.7

 While there is 

evidence in the record to indicate that Plaintiff might have been malingering, only one 

consultative physician, Dr. Brantley, came to that conclusion.8

 Tr. 270. 

The ALJ’s discount of Dr. Schuster’s MSS is also concerning considering that the 

ALJ afforded the opinions of Dr. Clark and Dr. Brantley, who were both one-time 

consultative physicians, with “substantial weight.” Tr. 20. Other than a blanket 

statement regarding the consistency, or lack thereof, of Dr. Schuster’s medical opinion 

with the objective record, the ALJ provides no additional support for discrediting Dr. 

Schuster’s medical opinion. Tr. 21. Without more, the court “cannot affirm based on a 

post hoc rationale that ‘might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Dempsey v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. App’x 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Owens v. Heckler, 

748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, this case is due to be remanded 

back to the ALJ. See, e.g., Dempsey, 454 F. App’x at 733 (“Without a clear explanation 

of the ALJ’s treatment of [a treating physician’s] opinion, we cannot determine whether 

 

7

 The opinion of Dr. Clark, to whom the ALJ afforded significant weight, suggests similar findings to those of Dr. 

Schuster. As part of a psychiatric consult examination, Dr. Clark determined that Plaintiff suffered from depressive 

disorder and that her intellectual abilities likely fall in the mild range of mental retardation to borderline range. Tr. 

267. Dr. Clark also found that Plaintiff is mildly impaired in her ability to understand instructions, and moderately 

impaired in her ability to remember and carry out instructions, and in her ability to respond appropriately to 

supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting. Tr. 267. Other than determining that Plaintiff was 

mildly impaired to understand instructions when Dr. Schuster determined that Plaintiff was moderately impaired in 

that area, the opinions of Dr. Schuster and Dr. Clark are similar. 

8 The ALJ afforded Dr. Brantley’s assessment “significant weight,” noting that Dr. Brantley found no evidence of 

mental illness or mood disorder, and that Plaintiff was only mildly immature with mild cognitive diminishment. Tr. 

20. However, it is important to note that Plaintiff was sent to Dr. Brantley for the purpose of IQ testing with an 

administration of the WAIS-IV. Tr. 270. Prior to testing, Dr. Brantley interviewed Plaintiff. Tr. 270. It is from 

that interview that Dr. Brantley made his observations about Plaintiff’s mood, mental illness, and malingering. Tr. 

270. 

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the ALJ’s ultimate decision on the merits was rational and supported by substantial 

evidence.”) On remand, if the ALJ decides to discount Dr. Schuster’s medical opinion, 

adequate reasons supported by substantial evidence should be clearly articulated. 

B. The ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff's intellectual disability. 

Listing 12.05 sets forth the requirements for mental retardation.9

 In order to meet the 

Listing, a claimant must meet the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph 

and any one of the four sets of criteria in paragraphs A – D. The introductory paragraph 

states: 

Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual 

functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during 

the developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset 

of the impairment before age 22. 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05 (2012). Thus, to meet the introductory 

paragraph, a claimant must at least (1) have significantly subaverage general intellectual 

functioning; (2) have deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) have manifested deficits in 

adaptive behavior before age 22. Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 

1997). 

If a claimant satisfies the introductory paragraph, she must then meet the 

requirements in paragraphs A, B, C, or D to satisfy the listing. To meet paragraph C,10 a 

 

9 On August 1, 2013, the Social Security Administration (SSA) changed the terminology in Listing 12.05 from 

“mental retardation” to “intellectual disability.” See Hickel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F. App’x 980, 982 n.2 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (acknowledging a change in terminology). Because the ALJ issued his decision prior to the change in 

terminology, the court will use the terminology from Listing 12.05 in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision. 

10 Because Plaintiff disputes only that the ALJ erred in concluding that she failed to meet Listing 12.05(c), the court 

will address only the requirements in paragraph C.

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claimant must have “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related 

limitation of function.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05 (2012). “Generally, a 

claimant meets the criteria for presumptive disability under section 12.05(C) when the 

claimant presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 inclusive, and evidence of an additional 

mental or physical impairment that has more than ‘minimal effect’ on the claimant's 

ability to perform basic work activities.” Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 

1992). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of paragraph C when he found 

that “while [Plaintiff] had other impairments – they did not significantly impact her 

functional ability to do basic work.” (Doc. 14) at 14. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that 

the ALJ’s finding directly conflicts with the ALJ’s Step Two determination in which he 

found that Plaintiff “suffered from the additional medically severe impairments of obesity 

and bipolar disorder” under 20 CFR 416.920(c). Id. The court agrees, and notes an 

additional concern with the ALJ’s analysis. 

With regards to Listing 12.05(C), the ALJ states: 

Finally, the “paragraph C” criteria of listing 12.05 are not met because the 

claimant does not have a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 

70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function. Although the undersigned found 

the claimant to have other impairments – they do not significantly impact the 

claimant’s functional ability to do basic work. 

Tr. 16. Of initial concern is the ALJ’s failure to explicitly address whether Plaintiff met 

the requirements of the introductory paragraph of the listing. Instead, the ALJ proceeded 

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directly to analyze whether Plaintiff met the requirements for paragraph C, in addition to 

Listing 12.05’s paragraphs A, B and D, as well as Listing 12.04’s paragraphs B and C. It 

appears from that progression of analysis that the ALJ may have concluded that Plaintiff 

met the diagnostic description set forth in the introductory paragraph of Listing 12.05. 

While that would make logical sense, the ALJ does not explicitly make such a finding. 

Therefore, the court is unable to conduct a proper meaningful review of whether 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not meet the 

listing. 11 See Thomas v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 3366150, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 7, 2004). 

Assuming arguendo that the ALJ determined – albeit implicitly – that Plaintiff met 

the introductory paragraph of Listing 12.05, the ALJ’s reason for concluding that Plaintiff 

did not meet Listing 12.05(C) is legally inadequate. Because the ALJ determined, at Step 

Two, that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of obesity and bipolar disorder, 

the ALJ could not then determine in paragraph C that those impairments did not 

significantly impact the claimant’s functional ability to do basic work. The court agrees 

with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s determination directly conflicts with his previous finding 

that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of obesity and bipolar disorder. 

Accordingly, the reason expressed by the ALJ for determining that Plaintiff failed to meet 

Listing 12.05(C) is legally inadequate. See Carroll v. Astrue, No. 1:08cv74-SRW, 2009 

WL 1708073, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. June 17, 2009). Accordingly, this case is due to be 

 

11 The court notes that substantial evidence might indeed exist, as Defendant argues, that Plaintiff 

does not meet the “significant loss of adaptive functioning” requirement for Listing 12.05’s 

introductory paragraph. However, the court cannot conduct a review of that evidence because 

the ALJ did not choose to address the introductory paragraph at all. 

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remanded back to the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ should evaluate whether Plaintiff meets 

the introductory paragraph for Listing 12.05, and make those findings explicit in his 

opinion. Further, if the analysis proceeds to an evaluation of paragraph C, the ALJ may 

not find that Plaintiff does not meet the listing because she does not have a physical or 

other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation 

of function if the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe impairments at Step Two. 

Because the ALJ failed to explicitly evaluate whether Plaintiff met the 

introductory paragraph of Listing 12.05, and because the ALJ determined Plaintiff failed 

to meet paragraph C on a legally insufficient basis, the matter is due to be remanded so 

that the ALJ can clarify his findings and determine if Plaintiff meets Listing 12.05. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this 

matter is REMANDED back to the Commissioner. A separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 30th day of March, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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