Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00013/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JAMES MORRIS ALDRIDGE, }

 }

Plaintiff, }

 } CASE NO. 5:13-CV-13-SLB

v. }

 }

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, }

Commissioner, Social }

Security Administration, }

 }

Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff James Morris Aldridge (“plaintiff”) appeals the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Upon review of the record, the

submissions of the parties, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the

Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initially filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on June 16,

2010, alleging a disability onset date of April 17, 2010, (R. 56, 97), due to degenerative disc

disease in his shoulders and knees, diverticulitis, depression/anxiety, and hearing loss, (R.

142). After the Social SecurityAdministration [“SSA”] denied his application, he requested 1

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to 1

each document as it is filed in the court’s record. When the document cited is duplicated

FILED

 2014 Sep-08 PM 03:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00013-SLB Document 11 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 13
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”], which was held on November 23,

2011. (R. 37.) After the hearing, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or

a combination of impairments listed in, or medically equivalent to one listed in, the Listing

of Impairments. (R. 28); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ also found that plaintiff has

the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to perform medium work with the exceptions of

performing assembly line work and engaging in “more than occasional interpersonal contact

with the public and coworkers,” (r. 29), and that there are “jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that [plaintiff] can perform,” (r. 32). In light of these

findings, the ALJ found that Mr. Aldridge was not disabled from April 17, 2010 through the

date of the decision, December 15, 2011, and denied his request for a period of disability and

DIB. (R. 33.)

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. (R. 1.)

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)

Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, plaintiff filed an appeal in this

court. (Doc. 1.) He requests that this court reverse the Commissioner’s decision or, in the

alternative, remand the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further

consideration. (Doc. 7 at 11.)

in the bound physical copy of the transcript of the entire record of the proceedings, the

page number of that transcript is given, [“R ___”].

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. APPEAL OF THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court “is limited to an

inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart,

284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.

1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. 

Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court “may not decide the

facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner];

rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))

(internal quotations and other citation omitted). “The Commissioner’s factual findings are

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin,

894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). “Substantial evidence

is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178

(11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted)

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The court reviews the Commissioner’s conclusions of law de novo. Cornelius, 936

F.2d at 1145. “[N]o . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] conclusions

of law.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982). 

B. REQUEST FOR REMAND

“Section 405(g) permits a district court to remand an application for benefits to the

Commissioner . . . by two methods, which are commonly denominated ‘sentence four

remands’ and ‘sentence six remands,’ each of which remedies a separate problem.” Ingram

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

405(g)). “The fourth sentence of section 405(g) provides the federal court ‘power to enter,

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding

the cause for a rehearing.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

DISCUSSION

A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION

The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation

to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability, SSI, and/or DIB. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476

U.S. 467, 470 (1986). “[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of

[determining eligibility for DIB/SSI] if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

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be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also § 416(i)(1);

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:

1. Substantial Gainful Employment

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in

“substantial gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations

define “substantial gainful activity” as “work activity that is both substantial and gainful.”2

20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; § 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the

Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled, regardless ofthe claimant’s medical

condition or age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); § 416.920(b).

“Under the first step, the claimant has the burden to show that he is not currently engaged in

The regulations define “substantial gainful activity”: 2

(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that

involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be

substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid

less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before.

(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you

do for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually

done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.

(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like

taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school

attendance, club activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful

activity.

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substantial gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862,

863 (11th Cir. 2012).3

The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his

alleged onset date of April 17, 2010. (R. 27.)

2. Severe Impairments

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must

next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic

work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “[A] ‘physical

or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratorydiagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations

provide: “[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which

significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find

that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not

consider your age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); § 416.920(c). 

“An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be 3

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions

are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 

11th Cir. R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

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such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the

individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v.

Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); § 416.921(a). 

A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none

of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001

(11th Cir. 1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; § 416.923. A claimant has the burden to

show that he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley,

457 F. App’x at 863.

The ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “major depression

and residual effect of a left foot fracture.” (R. 27.)

3. The Listings

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine

whether the claimant’s impairment meets the duration requirement and whether it is

equivalent to any one of the listed impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e);

§ 404.1525; § 404.1526. Listed impairments are so severe that they prevent an individual

from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant’s impairment meets or

equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); § 416.920(d). 

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The claimant has the burden of proving that his impairment meets or equals the criteria

contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863.

The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled a Listing. (R. 28.)

4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work 

If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must

prove that his impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f); § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner

“will first compare [the Commissioner’s] assessment of [the claimant’s RFC] with the

physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1560(b); § 416.960(b). “Past relevant work is work that [the claimant has] done within

the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [him]

to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1); § 416.960(b)(1). If the claimant is capable of

performing his past relevant work, the Commissioner will find he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1560(b)(3); § 416.920(f). The claimant bears the burden of establishing that the

impairment prevents him from performing past work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at

863.

The ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to “perform medium work as defined in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) except he cannot engage in assembly line work or more than occasional

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interpersonal contact with the public and coworkers.” (R. 29.) The ALJ found that plaintiff

could not perform any of his past relevant work. (R. 31-32.)

5. Other Work in the National Economy

If the claimant establishes that he is unable to perform his past relevant work, the

Commissioner must show that the claimant—in light of his RFC, age, education, and work

experience—is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the

national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863; see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c)(1); § 416.920(g). The regulations provide:

If we find that your residual functional capacity does not enable you to do any

of your past relevant work . . . we will use the same residual functional

capacity assessment when we decide if you can adjust to any other work. We

will look at your ability to adjust to other work by considering your residual

functional capacity and the vocational factors of age, education, and work

experience . . . . Any other work (jobs) that you can adjust to must exist in

significant numbers in the national economy (either in the region where you

live or in several regions in the country). 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1); § 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing

such other work, the Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g); § 416.920(g). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff was 41 years old on the alleged onset date and that he has

a high school education. (R. 32.) The ALJ determined that whether plaintiff had any

transferable job skills was irrelevant. (Id.) The ALJ consulted a Vocational Expert [“VE”]

to determine whether any jobs exist in the national economy that plaintiff, considering his

RFC and vocational factors, could perform. The VE testified that an individual with

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plaintiff’s limitations and vocational factors could perform the jobs of cleaner, kitchen

helper, and garment sorter. (R. 32-33.) These jobs exist in significant numbers in Alabama

and in the national economy. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled.

B. MR. ALDRIDGE’S CLAIM

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ lacked substantial evidence to support a finding that

plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work. (Doc. at 6-7.) To begin, plaintiff argues and

the Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred in assigning “great weight” to the assessment

of Mr. C.V. Brewington, a non-examining State agency single decision maker who wrote a

“physical summary” of plaintiff’s pre-existing examinations (only one of which occurred

after the alleged onset date). (See R. 30, 55; doc. 9 at 12.) The “physical summary” is merely

a summary ofsome of plaintiff’s treatment notes, (R. 55.), and it does not express an opinion.

Nevertheless, the ALJ noted that “the claimant’s application for disability benefits was

denied” by the State agency, and gave this “assessment . . . great weight to the extent it is

consistent with the medical record.” (R. 30.) The Commissioner agrees that these “forms are

not opinion evidence and . . . are entitled to no weight.” (Doc. 9 at 12) (citing Program

Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 24510.05, 2001 WL 1933365). 

The Commissioner argues that the error “was harmless because the remaining record

evidence . . . provided substantial evidence” for the ALJ’s findings. (Doc. 9 at 13.) The court

agrees.

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In finding plaintiff’s physical impairments not disabling, the ALJ relied on the report

of Dr. Bhavna Sharma, an examining State agency consultant, in which he “found normal

range of motion in all major muscle groups” and “did not articulate any functional limitations

due to the claimant’s impairments.” (R. 29-30; see also R. 215-219.) Dr. Sharma’s findings

are consistent with plaintiff’s reports from June through October 2011 that he exercised at

the gym five to six days a week and spent “much time” fishing. (R. 306-07, 398.) In

November, plaintiff testified that he exercised less but still managed to work out at the gym

about two to three times a week. (R. 41.) Collectively, this constitutes substantial evidence

on which the ALJ could rely to find that plaintiff’s physical impairments were not disabling

and allowed him to perform “medium work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), with

certain restrictions related to his psychological impairment. 

This is so even though another examiner, Wendy Riddle, a nurse practitioner, opined

that, for purposes of qualifying for a Veteran’s Affairs Compensated Work Therapyprogram,

plaintiff was “unable to stand, walk, climb stairs, bend/stoop/kneel without pain due to

[degenerative joint disease] in knees and shoulders, and pain in left foot and ankle, as well

as chronic back pain,” and that plaintiff was only capable of non-restricted lifting up to ten

pounds. (R. 319-20.) The ALJ was entitled to rely upon evidence from a physician who

examined plaintiff for disability purposes over the opinion of a nurse practitioner who

examined plaintiff for other purposes. See SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (rather than

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being “acceptable medical sources,” nurse practitioners are “other sources,” and information

fromother sources “cannot establish the existence of a medicallydeterminable impairment”).

The ALJ did not err by not adopting a “medical source statement” as an RFC. It is not

the court’s prerogative to decide whether the ALJ took the best possible course of action or

compiled an exhaustive record on which to rely. Instead, the court reviews to ensure that the

ALJ relied on substantial evidence. As plaintiff admits, “there is no express requirement for

a medical source opinion (MSO) or [RFC] assessment to be of record in order for the ALJ

to make RFC findings,” and plaintiff points to no source of law from which the court could

imply such a requirement. (Doc. 7 at 6.) When presented with similar arguments, the

Eleventh Circuit has responded that “the burden lies with the claimant to prove [his]

disability.” Green v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F. App'x 915, 923 (11th Cir. 2007).

Regarding plaintiff’s mental impairment, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s major

depression is a severe impairment, but the impairment did not last for a continuous period

of at least twelve months as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). See also § 416(i)(1);

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ noted that Dr. Smith, a State agency psychologist, found plaintiff’s

Global Assessment of Functioning [“GAF”] score to be 45, thus indicating the severe

impairment of plaintiff’s adaptive and social functioning. (R. 30, 223.) However, plaintiff’s

GAF score fluctuated, sometimes in as little time as a week, between 45-50 and 60-65, with

the latter score range indicating moderate symptoms and only some difficulty in social

functioning. (R. 31.) 

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Plaintiff does not attack the ALJ’s findings limiting him to only “occasional

interpersonal contact with the public and his coworkers” due to his major depressive

disorder. (R. 30-32.) Based on its review, the court finds that the ALJ was justified in relying

on Dr. Estock’s evaluation to make that determination. The ALJ could appropriatelydiscount

any limitations Dr. Estock found in light of new evidence gained after plaintiff’s visit with

Dr. Estock that indicated plaintiff was improving his ability to cope with depression. (See,

e.g., R. 250 (December 21, 2010 Progress Note from Psychologist), 317 (February 25, 2011

Progress Note), 313 (April 26, 2011 Progress Note).)

The ALJ committed no error in assessing plaintiff’s mental impairment. 

Additionally, because the court found substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

findings, there is insufficient legal error to warrant a sentence four remand. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons stated above, this court is ofthe opinion that the Commissioner’s

decision is due to be affirmed. An Order in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will

be entered contemporaneously herewith.

DONE this 8th day of September, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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