Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00405/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00405-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Carly Morton, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Phoenix Police Department, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00405-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on March 5, 2015. (Doc. 1.) On April 2, 

2015, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the 

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 6.) The Court dismissed the City 

of Phoenix Police Department and Plaintiff’s negligence claim. (Doc. 6 at 8.) The Court 

also dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s allegations of falsification of records, failure 

to investigate, and her claims against Defendant Metelski. (Id.) The Court stated that 

Plaintiff could file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies noted in the Court’s 

order by April 16, 2015. (Id. at 9.) 

 On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 7.) As discussed below in Section III.A, the Amended Complaint 

names the Phoenix Police Department as the only Defendant. Because the Court granted 

Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, it screens the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons below, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint 

with prejudice. 

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I. Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

 When a party has been granted in forma pauperis status, the district court “shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty is 

untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and (B)(i)-(iii). Although much of 

§ 1915 details how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, § 1915(e) applies to 

all in forma pauperis proceedings not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 “[A] complaint containing both factual allegations and legal conclusions is 

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). “A case is malicious if it 

was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). When reviewing the adequacy of 

a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court applies the same standard for dismissal 

of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted contained in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a 

question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 In reviewing the complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the 

allegations of the complaint, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolves all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Allegations in pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings 

drafted by lawyers, and must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff “‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 Additionally, to satisfy the pleading standards of Rule 8, a complaint must contain 

more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it must contain 

factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain 

something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a 

legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). At a minimum, a plaintiff 

should state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) should be with leave to amend unless it is clear 

from the face of the complaint that the action is frivolous and could not be amended to 

state a federal claim, or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 

See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissed as frivolous). 

II. The Allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint

 Plaintiff alleges that in 2012 she was a sports official with the Arizona 

Interscholastic Association, Inc. (AIA). (Doc. 7 at 2.) Plaintiff refereed games that were 

on the AIA schedule. (Id.) On October 9, 2012, Plaintiff went to the AIA headquarters 

to speak with a staff member about game assignments and sexual harassment. AIA 

called 911 and reported that Plaintiff was trespassing. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Police 

Officer Mark Metelski and two other officers arrived on the scene. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Charles Schmidt, the Associate Executive Director and Chief Operating 

Officer of AIA, stated that Plaintiff’s employment as a referee had been terminated and 

that she did not have any games on the schedule. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Schmidt 

did not have the authority to terminate her employment and that her employment was not 

terminated before April 9, 2012. (Id.) She also alleges that she told the police officers 

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she was a member of AIA, she had not been terminated, she had games on the schedule, 

and Schmidt was harassing her. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that the “police officers” bullied her and “unreasonably 

interrogated” for two to three hours. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the police officers 

coerced her and took her to a psychiatric facility. (Id.) She also alleges that “Defendant 

later falsified public records with AIA stating that Plaintiff left and came back with 

‘something’ referring to a weapon or something violent in nature.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 

that she was denied “equal protection of the laws” because “they didn’t tell Schmidt they 

were getting angry with him, or suggest that he leave” and the “police officers did not 

investigate a higher income Chief Operating Officer [Schmidt], or coerce him as a 

harasser who needs help.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that her Due Process 

and Equal Protection rights were violated because the police officers “failed to 

investigate by discriminating against Plaintiff and in taking a man’s word over a woman.” 

(Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that she was injured by being unlawfully brought to a psychiatric 

facility by Metelski and that Defendant has a custom of improperly dropping people off 

at Connections AZ. (Doc. 7 at 4.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for intimidation 

tactics, embarrassment, depression, loss of work, feelings of hopelessness, and a negative 

public record that portrays Plaintiff as mentally unstable. (Id.) She also seeks an order 

expunging the “Police and Magellan Health records.” (Id.) 

III. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim 

 “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must 

[allege] that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” 

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). “Section 1983 ‘is not 

itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) 

(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 

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 Additionally, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting 

that (1) the conduct about which she complains was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived her of a federal constitutional or 

statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must 

also allege that she suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular 

defendant and she must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of 

that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. The Phoenix Police Department 

 The caption of the Amended Complaint names the Phoenix Police Department as 

the only Defendant. (Doc. 7 at 1.) Additionally, the first paragraph states that Plaintiff 

makes “the following claims against Defendant Phoenix Police Department, a party, 

hereinafter ‘Defendant.’” (Doc. 7 at 1.) She later describes “Defendant” as “a governing 

body of law enforcement . . . .” (Id. at 2.) The body of the Amended Complaint includes 

allegations against police officer Mark Metelski and two John Doe police officers. 

(Doc. 7 at 3.) However, the Amended Complaint does not refer to Metelski or the John 

Doe police officers as Defendants. Similar to the Amended Complaint, the caption of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint named the “City of Phoenix Police Department” as the only 

Defendant. (Doc. 1.) However, because the body of the Complaint specifically 

identified Metelski as a Defendant, the Court considered him a Defendant. (Doc. 6 at 1 

n.1.) Because the Amended Complaint identifies the Phoenix Police Department as the 

only Defendant, and the body of the Amended Complaint does not identify any other 

individual or entity as a Defendant, the Court finds that the Phoenix Police Department is 

the only Defendant in this matter. 

 A municipal police department is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. 

See Shivers v. City of Phoenix Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 2802521, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jul. 14, 

2010) (citing Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dep’t, 541 F. Supp. 2d 504, 510 

(D. Conn. 2008)); Watson-Nance v. City of Phoenix, 2009 WL 792497, at *9 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 24, 2009) (stating that “the Phoenix Police Department is an unauthorized 

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Defendant under federal and state law and must be dismissed.”); Pahle v. Colebrookdale 

Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 366 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Therefore, the Phoenix Police 

Department is not a proper Defendant. 

 In the April 2, 2015 Order, the Court dismissed the Phoenix Police Department as 

an improper Defendant. (Doc. 6 at 4-5, 8.) After stating that the Phoenix Police 

Department was not a proper Defendant, the Court advised Plaintiff that a municipality is 

a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and, therefore, a municipality such as a city or county, 

may be sued. (Doc. 6 at 4-5 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence 

and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs of the 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).) The Court also explained how to state a 

claim against a municipality under § 1983. (Doc. 6 at 4-5.) Despite this information, 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint names only the Phoenix Police Department as a 

Defendant. Because the Amended Complaint does not name a proper Defendant under 

section 1983, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint. Additionally, as discussed 

below, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim. 

B. Equal Protection Claim 

 The Amended Complaint alleges an equal protection claim. (Doc. 7 at 3.) The 

Complaint did not specifically allege an equal protection claim. (Doc. 1.) However, the 

Court found that, liberally construed, Plaintiff appeared to allege a violation under the 

Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 6 at 5-7, 8.) The Court discussed the standard for stating 

an Equal Protection claim and dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s equal protection 

claim for failure to state a claim. (Id.) As discussed below, although the Amended 

Complaint includes more detail than the Complaint, it does not state a claim for a 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 

State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal 

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quotations omitted). An equal protection claim may be established in two ways. The 

first requires a plaintiff to “show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not allege that 

Defendant acted with discriminatory intent based on Plaintiff’s membership in a 

protected class. Accordingly, she does not state a claim under this theory. 

 When the challenged action does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff 

may establish an equal protection claim by showing that she was “intentionally treated 

differently from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference 

in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Plaintiff 

alleges that the police officers did not tell a male, Schmidt, that they were getting angry 

with him or suggest that he leave, and did not interrogate Schmidt, a higher income Chief 

Operating Officer, or coerce him as a harasser. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff does not allege 

that she was similarly situated to Schmidt, that she was intentionally treated differently 

from him, or that there was no rational basis for any alleged difference in treatment. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Equal Protection claim. 

C. Falsification of Public Records and Failure to Investigate

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant falsified public records and failed to 

thoroughly investigate. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff asserted these same claims in her 

Complaint and the Court dismissed them without prejudice. (Doc. 6 at 7-8.) The 

Amended Complaint does not cure the deficiencies that the April 2, 2015 Order 

identified. Accordingly, based on the reasoning in the April 2, 2015 Order, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s allegations of falsification of public records and failure to investigate 

for failure to state a claim under § 1983. 

D. Due Process Claim 

 Finally, Plaintiff argues that her due process rights were violated because “the 

police officers failed to investigate by discriminating against Plaintiff in taking a man’s 

word over a woman.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) She states that, as a result, Metelski drove her to a 

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psychiatric facility, she was “released by the facility,” and she was “offered a bus pass by 

ConnectionsAZ.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant has a custom of 

improperly dropping people off there.” (Id. at 4.) 

 As previously stated, the only Defendant in the Amended Complaint is the 

Phoenix Police Department, which is not a proper Defendant in a section 1983 action. 

Additionally, even assuming Plaintiff named a municipality as a Defendant, a local 

government entity “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 

employees or agents. Instead, it is only when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 

responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has a policy of improperly dropping people off at 

ConnectionsAZ, which she identifies as a psychiatric facility. This conclusory allegation 

is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. See Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 

637 (9th Cir. 2012) (conclusory allegation that defendant county had policies, customs, or 

practices relating to the custody and care of dependent minors failed to state a claim); see 

also Nevels v. Maricopa Cnty., 2012 WL 1623217, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2012) (quoting 

Hernandez, and finding the plaintiff's complaint insufficient where it failed to “identify 

any specific policies or customs . . . or explain how those policies led to the deprivation 

of his constitutional rights.”); Fernandez v. City of Phoenix, 2012 WL 2343621, at *2 

(D. Ariz. Jun. 20, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts concerning the City’s 

particular policies, practices or customs surrounding excessive force. Their non-specific 

allegation is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”). Accordingly, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s due process claim for failure to state a claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to name a proper Defendant and fails to state 

a claim. Because the Court has already granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her 

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Complaint, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Furthermore, 

Plaintiff’s claims are untimely and permitting further amendment would be futile.1

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) is DISMISSED

with prejudice because it fails to name a proper defendant and fails to state a claim. 

 Dated this 15th day of April, 2015. 

 1

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations are based on events that occurred on 

October 9, 2012. “It is well-established that claims brought under § 1983 borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims[.]” Action Apt. Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007). “The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona is two years.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the Amended Complaint is based events that occurred on October 9, 2012 and Plaintiff commenced this section 

1983 action on March 5, 2015, Plaintiff’s claims are untimely. 

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