Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00795/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00795-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANTOS CUETO-PARRA,

Petitioner,

CASE NOS. 12-CR-1854-H

 13-CV-795-H

ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S APPLICATION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §

2255

[Doc. No. 32]

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On March 18, 2013, this Court sentenced Santos Cueto-Parra (“Petitioner”) to

fifty (50) months of custody for illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326. (Doc. No. 31 at 1-2) On April 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for

1

habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 32.) On October 3, 2013,

Respondent filed a response in opposition to Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. No. 38.) The

Court denies Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus.

Background

On December 13, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty to an indictment charging himwith

one count of illegal entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. (Doc. No.

23 at 1.) Petitioner pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. (Doc. No. 21 at

Docket numbers in this order reference filings in 12-CR-1854-H. 1

- 1 - 12cr1854/13cv795

Case 3:13-cv-00795-H Document 2 Filed 04/18/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10.) Under the plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally

attack his sentence unless the Court imposed a sentence above the high end of the

sentencing guideline range recommended by Respondent. (Id.)

Under the plea agreement, the parties jointlyrecommended an advisory guideline

range of fifty-seven (57) to seventy-one (71) months based on a resulting offense level

of nineteen (19) and a criminal history category of V. (Doc. No. 38-2 at 8, Doc. No 38-

4 at 2.) Respondent recommended a sentence of seventy-one (71) months. (Doc. No.

38-4 at 2.) After considering the advisory guidelines and each of the sentencing factors

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court sentenced Petitioner to 50 months of custody. (Doc.

No. 38-7 at 9.) 

Discussion

According to Title 28, United States Code, section 2255:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 is designed to provide a remedy when a sentence

violates a constitutional right, a sentence is greater than the statutory maximum, or a

court acted beyond its authorized jurisdiction.

Petitioner challenges the Bureau of Prisons’s determination that he is ineligible

for a one-year sentence reduction through a drug program or for early release into a

half-way house. (Doc. No. 32 at 2.) He claims that he is being deprived of access to

these programs based on his illegal alien status in violation of his right to equal

protection under the U.S. Constitution. (Id.)

Petitioner’s equal protection claim fails on the merits. Generally, federal laws

classifying persons on the basis of alienage receive lesssearching judicial scrutiny than

state laws classifying on that basis due to the overriding federal interests in

immigration and foreign relations. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101

- 2 - 12cr1854/13cv795

Case 3:13-cv-00795-H Document 2 Filed 04/18/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1976). Therefore, in cases where federal interests predominate, judicial scrutiny of

alienage classifications is relaxed to rational basis review. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426

U.S. 67, 83 (1976). “A government policy is valid under the rational basis test so long

asit isrationally related to a legitimate government interest.” McLean v. Crabtree, 173

F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).

The United States has a legitimate interest in allowing United States citizen inmates,

who must reenter civil society, to participate in rehabilitative and other programs while

denying that privilege to illegal alien inmates, who may not reenter civil society. See

Rendon-Inzunza v. U.S., No. 09-CV-1258, 2010 WL 3076271, at *1-2. Excluding

illegal alien inmatesfromthese programs isrationally related to thislegitimate interest.

See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1186. The Court denies Petitioner’s motion on the merits

because his ineligibility for a one-year sentence reduction through a drug program or

for early release into a half-way house do not violate the Constitution’s guarantee of

equal protection. 

Furthermore, Petitioner waived his right to file a petition under § 2255 to

challenge his sentence as part of his plea agreement. (Doc. No. 21.) Petitioner’s plea

agreement states in relevant part:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement,

defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and any lawful restitution order, except

a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The defendant also waives, to the full extent of the

law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack his sentence, except a postconviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end

of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to his

agreement at the time of sentencing.

(Id. at 10.) The Ninth Circuit has upheld the enforceability of such waivers, reasoning

that the right to bring a collateral attack is derived by statute, and “[a] knowing and

voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable.” United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993.) In Abarca, the petitioner-defendant Abarca’s plea

agreement waived his right to collaterally attack pretrial orsentencing issues unless his

- 3 - 12cr1854/13cv795

Case 3:13-cv-00795-H Document 2 Filed 04/18/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sentence exceeded the applicable guideline range. Id. at 1013. Abarca received a

sentence below the recommended range and proceeded to collaterally attack his

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, relying on newly discovered exculpatory evidence.

Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Abarca “relinquished his right to seek relief, direct or

collateral, from his sentence on the ground that he has discovered new exculpatory

evidence that undermines the factual basis of the trial court’s sentencing decision.” Id.

at 1014.

Like the plea agreement that the NinthCircuit upheld in Abarca, Petitioner’s plea

agreement explicitly waives the right to collaterally attack his sentence as long as the

Court did not impose a sentence above the high end of the guideline range Respondent

recommended. (Doc. No. 21 at 10.) The Court did not impose such a sentence. (Doc.

No. 38-8 at 9.) In fact, the Court imposed a sentence below the low end of the

sentencing guideline range Respondent recommended. (Id.) Moreover, there is no

evidence that the plea was involuntary or unknowing, and Petitioner does not argue

otherwise. (Doc. Nos. 21, 23.) In the plea agreement, Petitioner represented that his

plea was knowing and voluntary. (Doc. No. 21 at 5.) Moreover, Petitioner’s sworn

representations in response to the magistrate judge’s careful and detailed questioning

at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy demonstrate that Petitioner knowingly and

voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. (Doc. No. 38-3, Transcript of Change of

Plea Hearing, at 10.) Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s application. 

Conclusion

The Court concludes that a reduction in Petitioner’s sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court denies the petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2014

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

- 4 - 12cr1854/13cv795

Case 3:13-cv-00795-H Document 2 Filed 04/18/14 Page 4 of 4