Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04620/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04620-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Defendant has filed this Motion as a Motion for Summary

Judgment. Defendant has the right to move for summary judgment at

any time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). However, discovery is still in

the early stages in this case and not scheduled to conclude until

early 2006. See April 8, 2005 Joint Case Discovery Plan and Order. 

In many respects, the substance of the instant Motion more closely

resembles a Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, since the hurdle for

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA RIVERWATCH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MERCER FRASER COMPANY, and DOES 1

TO 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

 

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No. C-04-4620 SC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

OF ISSUES 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Northern California Riverwatch ("Plaintiff") filed

suit against Defendant Mercer Fraser Company ("Defendant"),

alleging violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Briefly

stated, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated and

continues to violate the CWA by discharging pollutants from its

concrete production plants into the waters of the United States. 

In the Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") now before the

Court, Defendant has moved for summary judgment on a variety of

grounds.1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the non-moving party is higher for a Motion for Summary Judgment,

and the Court has ruled here for the non-moving party, whether the

Court treats this Motion as one for dismissal or one for summary

judgment is moot. With respect to the choice made by Defendant and

for the sake of consistency, this Order treats the instant Motion

as one for summary judgment. 

2 Because the Court has denied the Motion in its entirety,

Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance for Additional Discovery as to

Defendant's Motion is rendered moot.

2

Motion in its entirety.2

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a California non-profit public benefit

corporation that works to protect, enhance, and restore the

surface and subsurface waters of Northern California. Complaint

at 2. Plaintiff's members use the waters of Northern California

in a variety of ways. Id. Defendant operates four commercial

aggregate processing facilities with onsite asphalt concrete

production plants. Motion at 3-5. The aggregate processing

facilities include rock crushers, vibrating screens, conveyors,

wash systems, water pumps, generators, and loading equipment. The

asphalt production plants then convert processed aggregates into

asphalt concrete. Wash water is released into onsite man-made

settling basins. Id. The environmental impact of the water in

these settling basins is the parties' main point of dispute.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's facilities violate the CWA

and assert four causes of action. In the first, brought pursuant

to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 and 1342, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is

"in violation of the CWA requirement that discharges of pollutants

from a point source to waters of the United States be regulated by
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

4 The "General Storm Water Permit" refers to NPDES General

Permit No. CAS000001, issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) by the

California State Water Resources Control Board as Water Quality

Order No. 97-03-DWQ. See Opposition, Exhibit A at 1; Defendant's

Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C.

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a NPDES3 permit." Complaint at 6. In the second, brought

pursuant to the same sections of the CWA, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant violates regulations concerning industrial stormwater

discharges. Id. at 7. In the third, brought pursuant to 33

U.S.C. § 1342(p) and 40 C.F.R. §§ 411.10, 436.20, 440.10, 443.10

et seq, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is violating the CWA "by

failing to ensure that discharge of pollutants from their

Facilities do not exceed acceptable established levels for

stormwater and non-stormwater discharge of pollutants as set out

in the General Storm Water Permit4 [("General Permit")] and 40 CFR

Subchapter N Parts 411, 436, 440, and 443." Id. In the fourth,

brought pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342 and 1316, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant has failed to implement mandatory best practices

with regard to its discharges. Id. at 9.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if "there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[T]he movant has the burden of showing

that there is no genuine issue of fact." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Furthermore, "[o]n summary

judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ...
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962).

IV. DISCUSSION

The CWA regulates discharge of pollutants into navigable

waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. Discharge of

pollutants is unlawful except when a permit is obtained in

compliance with the statute. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. "Discharge

of a pollutant" means "any addition of any pollutant to navigable

waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). A "point

source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,

including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,

conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,

concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating

craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14). "Navigable waters" means the waters of the United

States. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

Simply stated, Defendant asserts that summary judgment is

appropriate because its settling basins "are not 'waters of the

United States' and are not subject to jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act ...." Motion at 11. Defendant also alleges that its

"settling ponds and other facilities do not constitute a point

source." Id. at 14. Defendant further alleges that the settling

ponds are neither "waters of the United States" nor "tributary" to

any such waters. Id. at 16. 

Plaintiff alleges, however, and this Court must take as true

for purposes of this Motion, that the point sources here are not
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5 The Court notes that Defendant objects to the Russell

Declaration, asserting that it relies on evidence that is

inadmissible. However, with respect to this particular objection,

the Court finds that it is more appropriately dealt with at the

time of trial.

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just the aggregate processing facilities but also the settling

basins themselves. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion

("Opposition") at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that the basins

discharge pollutants to groundwater which finds its way to rivers. 

Id. Plaintiff supports these allegations with an expert

declaration stating that aluminum and silica, and possibly other

pollutants, are "discharged from the facilities to the unconfined

aquifer and riverbed." Declaration of Larry L. Russell at 2.5

Defendant does not dispute that rivers near its facilities, such

as the Van Duzen River, the Eel River, and Willow Creek, are

"waters of the United States." Motion at 15. Therefore, the main

issue now before this Court is whether a man-made wastewater basin

from which pollutants seep into groundwater and subsequently into

waters of the United States is covered by the CWA. The issue is

not whether such seepage actually occurs here because the Court

must accept as true, for purposes of this Motion, that such

seepage does occur.

The Court finds that the regulations of the CWA do encompass

the discharge of pollutants from wastewater basins to navigable

waters via connecting groundwaters. Congress has explicitly

stated that the objective of the CWA "is to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's

waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Therefore, it would hardly make
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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sense for the CWA to encompass a polluter who discharges

pollutants via a pipe running from the factory directly to the

riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the same pollutants into a

man-made settling basin some distance short of the river and then

allows the pollutants to seep into the river via the groundwater.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled directly on this

issue, courts in this district and other districts within the

Ninth Circuit have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.,

N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. 01-04686, 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 1008, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Jan 23, 2004) ("This Court

finds persuasive the line of authority ... holding that the Act

extends federal jurisdiction over groundwaters hydrologically

connected to surface waters that are themselves navigable

waters."); Wash. Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F.

Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994) ("[S]ince the goal of the CWA is

to protect the quality of surface waters, any pollutant which

enters such waters, whether directly or through groundwater, is

subject to regulation by NPDES permit."). District Courts in

other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.,

Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo.

1993) (holding that the CWA applies to discharges of pollutants

that reach navigable waters through groundwater).

Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit has not directly ruled

on the issue of man-made basins being hydrologically connected to

a water of the United States, it has held that there are factual

situations where a man-made basin does fall within the purview of

the CWA. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that settling
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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6

 Defendant cites Leslie Salt for the proposition that

"artificially created waters which are currently being used for

commercial purposes" are excluded from the mandates of the CWA. 

Motion at 12. However, Defendant fails to mention that the Ninth

Circuit stated that under the Army Corps of Engineer regulations at

issue in Leslie Salt, even commercially-used artificially-created

waters were subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA on a "case-bycase" basis of review. 896 F.2d at 360. "Case-by-case" is a

euphemism for determining an issue as a matter of fact rather than

a matter of law. Therefore, rather than providing support for

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basins fall under the provisions of the CWA if they have a

connection to interstate commerce. Leslie Salt Co. v. United

States, 896 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1990). In Leslie Salt, a

connection to interstate commerce was found where migratory birds

or endangered species use the settling basins as a habitat. Id.

The Ninth Circuit stated, "The commerce clause power, and thus the

Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the [Army Corp of

Engineer's] jurisdiction [pursuant to the CWA] to local waters

which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered

species." Id. One of Congress' stated goals in passing the CWA

was "the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and

wildlife ..." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Therefore, this Court

finds that it would defeat the intent of Congress in passing the

CWA to hold that a settling basin is subject to the provisions of

the CWA only if a migratory bird chooses, for reasons unknown to

this Court, to alight directly in the basin, but not if the same

migratory bird chooses to alight in a nearby river, which is

hydrologically connected to that same basin. In other words,

under Leslie Salt, this Court holds that a hydrological connection

between a man-made settling basin and a water of the United States

is sufficient to subject the basin to the provisions of the CWA.6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendant's Motion, the case, at a minimum, demonstrates that

whether Defendant's settling basins are subject to the CWA is a

question of fact ill-suited for summary judgment.

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Defendant has put forth several cases to contest this

conclusion. For example, Defendant pointed to Village of

Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Judson Corp., where the 7th Circuit held

that groundwaters were not subject to the CWA. 24 F.3d 962 (7th

Cir. 1994). However, the court in that case did not specifically

rule on the issue of groundwaters that are hydrologically

connected to a water of the United States, other than to say that

the "possibility of a hydrological connection" is not a

"sufficient ground of regulation." Id. at 965. Although Seventh

Circuit case law is of course not binding on this Court, this

Court agrees with the holding that mere possibility is an

insufficient basis for regulation of a particular settling basin. 

However, the issue here is simply whether Plaintiff has put forth

sufficient facts to defeat summary judgment, and, with respect to

that issue, mere possibility of a hydrological connection is

sufficient. Nevertheless, the Court cautions Plaintiff that as

this litigation moves beyond the current stage, "[i]t is not

sufficient to allege groundwater pollution, and then to assert a

general hydrological connection between all waters. Rather,

pollutants must be traced from their source to surface waters, in

order to come within the purview of the CWA." Wash. Wilderness

Coalition, 870 F. Supp. at 990.

Based on the above discussion, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to bring Defendant's
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For the Northern District of California

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settling basins within the purview of the CWA for purposes of the

Motion now before the Court. Plaintiff has presented evidence in

the form of the Russell Declaration which alleges that Defendant's

facilities discharge pollutants including aluminum and silica into

the surrounding groundwater, which is allegedly hydrologically

connected to waters of the United States. Under the above case

law, this is equivalent to evidence that Defendant has discharged

pollutants into the waters of the United States in violation of

the CWA. In contrast, the declaration of Defendant's expert

states that there is no discharge into any water covered by the

CWA. Declaration of Justin Porteous at 2. Therefore, the Court

finds that there is a material issue of fact and summary judgment

in favor of Defendant would be inappropriate.

Defendant raises several other issues in its Motion. First,

Defendant asserts that the First Cause of Action must be dismissed

because the State of California has determined that state-issued

Waste Discharge Requirements ("WDRs") are not required for the

four sites at issue. Motion at 7. Defendant bases this theory on

case law supporting the proposition that WDRs are equivalent to

CWA permits. Id. Non-controlling case law does in fact suggest

that "[b]y every relevant measure, WDRs are equivalent to CWA

permits." Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 301 F.

Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Nevertheless, the Court

finds Defendant's theory to be unpersuasive because it is based on

communications from the California Regional Water Quality Control

Board in 1986 and 1995. Motion at 6-7. Plaintiff's action is

generally based on a period dating from 1999. Opposition, Exhibit
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A at 4. Therefore, the Court declines to grant summary judgment

on the First Cause of Action based on a state agency decision not

to require WDRs over a decade ago.

Second, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to properly

give the required 60-day notice of intent to sue. Under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(b), a non-governmental plaintiff must give an alleged

violator of the CWA 60-days notice of intent to sue. In the

instant matter, Plaintiff sent notice to Defendant on August 1,

2004 ("Notice") and filed this action on November 1, 2004, well

beyond the 60 day minimum. Opposition, Exhibit A. Defendant

takes issue, however, with the content of the notice. 

Specifically, Defendant alleges that the Notice fails to describe

required details, such as dates, location, or alleged discharge. 

Motion at 22.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) describes the necessary contents of a

notice of intent to sue. The regulation states:

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent

standard or limitation or of an order with respect

thereto, shall include sufficient information to permit

the recipient to identify the specific standard,

limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the

activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person

or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the

location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of

such violation, and the full name, address, and

telephone number of the person giving notice.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(b) and related regulations such as 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) in

a broad fashion. For example, the Ninth Circuit has written, "In

practical terms, the notice must be sufficiently specific to

inform the alleged violator about what it is doing wrong, so that
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For the Northern District of California

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it will know what corrective actions will avert a lawsuit." Cmty.

Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d

943, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has also held:

The purpose of the 60-day notice is to provide the

agencies and the defendant with information on the

cause and type of environmental laws or orders the

defendant is allegedly violating so that the agencies

can step in, investigate, and bring the defendant into

compliance. The point is to trigger agency enforcement

and avoid a lawsuit. Congress did not intend to unduly

burden citizens by requiring them to basically carry

out the job of the agency.

Id. 

In the Notice that Plaintiff sent to Defendant on August 1,

2004, Plaintiff gave five concrete examples of how Defendant had

failed to be in compliance with the CWA from August 1, 1999 to

August 1, 2004. Opposition, Exhibit A at 4-5. Furthermore,

Plaintiff described continuing violations of monitoring and

reporting requirements over the same period of time. Id. at 6-8. 

Based on these examples, and having reviewed the entirety of the

Notice, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the standards set

out by the Ninth Circuit for giving the required 60-day notice.

Finally, the Court turns to Defendant's description of its

conduct subsequent to receipt of the Notice from Plaintiff. One

purpose of the notice requirement is to give potential defendants

an opportunity to correct any violations of the CWA. Henry Bosma

Dairy, 305 F. 3d at 953. Since receiving the Notice, Defendant

has filed Notices of Intent ("NOIs") with the State of California
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7

 As stated earlier in this Order, "General Permit" refers to

NPDES General Permit No. CAS000001, issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(p) by the California State Water Resources Control Board as

Water Quality Order No. 97-03-DWQ. See Opposition, Exhibit A at 1;

Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C.

8 The Court hereby acknowledges Defendant's statement, "Mercer

Fraser's certification of the NOIs at issue is not an admission

that Mercer Fraser is legally obligated to certify the NOIs nor is

it an admission that Mercer Fraser had [sic] ever discharged

pollutants into a protected waterway ..." Motion at 8.

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as required under the General Permit.7 Motion at 8.8 Defendant

has also drafted Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plans ("SWPPPs")

for each site as required by the General Permit. Motion at 9. 

Defendant's Motion appears to put forth the argument that by

filing NOIs and drafting SWPPPs, it has complied with the General

Permit, thus making moot the Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of

Action. Id. at 8-9. In essence, Defendant alleges that since

there have been no discharges of pollutants, "the SWPPP is deemed

not necessary; however, if there is a discharge, the SWPPP ...

will be in place." Id. at 8. The Court finds that this argument

has little substance to support summary judgment in favor of

Defendant. The General Permit prohibits "materials other than

storm water ... that discharge either directly or indirectly to

waters of the United States." Defendant's Request for Judicial

Notice, Exhibit C at 3. In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant has continued to engage in "discharges of stormwater

containing pollutants." Complaint at 7. "Stormwater containing

pollutants" is by definition a "material other than storm water." 

The parties thus dispute the material facts of whether or not

Defendant has discharged pollutants and whether such alleged
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For the Northern District of California

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discharge is prohibited by the General Permit. Therefore, even

considering Defendant's actions since the Notice was received, the

Court holds that summary judgment would not be appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

Overall, the Court reminds both parties that "Congress

intended to create a very broad grant of jurisdiction in the Clean

Water Act, extending to any aquatic feature within the reach of

the commerce clause power." Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 357. With

this in mind, the Court holds that proof of a hydrological

connection between a man-made settling basin and a water of the

United States is sufficient to bring discharges from such a basin

within the purview of the CWA. In the instant matter, Plaintiff

has shown that there is a question of material fact as to whether

or not Defendant is discharging pollutants from its basins into

waters of the United States via groundwater. Therefore, the Court

holds that summary judgment would be inappropriate. Furthermore,

the Court holds that Defendant's other arguments, regarding

communications with California State agencies, the 60-day notice

requirement of the CWA, and Defendant's actions since receiving

the Notice, are insufficient to support summary judgment or

summary adjudication of issues. Therefore, the Court hereby

DENIES Defendant's Motion in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1 , 2005

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE