Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00609/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY S. RIDEAU, JR., Civil No. 13cv0609 MMA (KSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]; 

AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

vs.

GERALD J. JANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

Gregory Rideau (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently housed at the California State

Prison - Los Angeles County, and proceeding pro se, has filed this civil action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2]. 

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). As defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation,

pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Because Plaintiff is

currently incarcerated, he is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), and therefore

subject to the PLRA’s requirements and limitations. 

Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall

be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

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to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts

“have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773

F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however, “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand

a motion to dismiss.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated when prison

officials at Centinela State Prison applied funds that Plaintiff received from a settlement

to the restitution amount he owed. Plaintiff seeks recovery of these funds. (See Compl.

at 11.) However, where a Plaintiff alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest

caused by the unauthorized negligent or intentional action of an official, the Plaintiff

cannot state a constitutional claim where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate

post-deprivation state remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of property. 

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate

state post-deprivation remedy and his claims relating to the loss of his property are not

cognizable in this § 1983 action, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2).

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Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for the reason set

forth above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint to

correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No.

2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street,

Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in

which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have

been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

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it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as

a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 9, 2013

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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