Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00839/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00839-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO JKM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maria L. Villajin, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Michael Mukasey, 

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-0839-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

On June 18, 2008, the Court entered a Temporary Stay of Removal enjoining

Petitioner’s removal from the United States until Monday, July 7, 2008. On July 3, 2008,

the Court extended the stay of removal until 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, July 8, 2008. After

considering the parties’ briefs, the Court will grant Petitioner’s request for a stay of removal

and require further action and briefing from the parties.

I. Background.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was admitted to the United

States on April 21, 1981, as a visitor for pleasure. On October 3, 1985, Petitioner adjusted

her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. On July 27, 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty

to three California offenses: (1) commercial burglary in violation of California Penal Code

(CPC) § 460(b); (2) grand theft in violation of CPC § 487(a); and (3) forgery in violation of

CPC § 470(d). Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of sixteen months in prison on

each count.

Petitioner represented herself in her immigration proceedings and on August 1, 2007,

an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order for her removal from the United States. The IJ

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

found that Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because her

CPC § 460(b) commercial burglary conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (“a theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which the term of

imprisonment [is] at least one year”) and because her CPC § 470(d) forgery conviction

qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (“an offense relating to

commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification

numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one

year”). The IJ further found that Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because her California convictions qualified as convictions for two

separate crimes involving moral turpitude. The IJ also found that Petitioner’s aggravated

felony convictions made her ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). Petitioner reserved the right to appeal, but she did not file a timely appeal to the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

Petitioner subsequently retained counsel and filed a motion to reopen with the IJ on

September 12, 2007. Petitioner argued that her CPC § 460(b) commercial burglary

conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony and that she was, therefore, eligible for

cancellation of removal. On September 28, 2007, the IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen.

On October 18, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel filed a timely appeal to the BIA on her behalf. On

January 8, 2008, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The BIA held that it was

unnecessary to decide whether Petitioner’s commercial burglary conviction qualified as an

aggravated felony because her forgery conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), and that conviction alone made her removable and ineligible for

cancellation of removal.

On February 25, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review with the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On April 18, 2008, the Ninth Circuit dismissed

the petition for lack of jurisdiction because it was not filed within thirty days of the issuance

of the BIA’s order. Villajin v. Mukasey, No. 08-70764 (9th Cir. April 18, 2008). The Ninth

Circuit noted, however, that the petition was dismissed “without prejudice to the filing of a

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

motion to reissue with the BIA, see Singh v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007),

or a petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel in the

district court, see Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2007).” Id. The Ninth Circuit

issued its mandate on May 12, 2008. Id.

On May 1, 2008, Petitioner filed the underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner presents two claims in support of her Petition. First, she claims that the BIA

should have granted her appeal from the denial of her motion to reopen because none of her

California convictions qualify as aggravated felonies. Second, Petitioner claims that her

retained counsel provided her with ineffective assistance by failing to timely notify her of the

BIA’s decision. Petitioner asserts that her attorney faxed the January 8, 2008 BIA decision

to her friend on February 20, 2008, after the deadline for her appeal had run.

On June 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay of Removal, seeking an order

prohibiting Respondent from removing her from the United States until her underlying

Petition is resolved. On June 9, 2008, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Stay of

Removal without prejudice, but required Respondent to file a notice of intent to remove if

he intended to remove Petitioner before the Petition could be resolved. On June 12, 2008,

Respondent filed a Notice of Intent to Remove, indicating that the Government intended to

remove Petitioner to the Philippines on June 20, 2008. On June 13, 2008, Respondent filed

a Response in Opposition to Request for Stay of Removal and Response in Opposition to

Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On June 18, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Stay

of Removal to give Petitioner an opportunity to renew her request for a stay of removal. On

July 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Request for Stay of

Removal. Today, Petitioner also filed a Supplement to her Reply addressing Respondent’s

exhaustion argument. The temporary stay of removal is set to expire this afternoon.

II. Jurisdiction.

Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005),

the district courts no longer have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review a final order of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . ., including

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, . . a petition for review filed

with an appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial

review of an order of removal . . . .”); Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2007) (after

the effective date of the REAL ID Act, a “district court plainly lack[s] habeas jurisdiction”

to review removal orders). The Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to consider

Petitioner’s first claim for relief because it directly challenges the merits of her final order

of removal. 

Petitioner’s second claim for relief, however, does not challenge the merits of her

removal order. Petitioner claims that her attorney provided her with ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to timely notify her of the BIA’s decision on her appeal from the denial

of her motion to reopen. Success on that claim would not undermine the merits of her

underlying final order of removal – it would only entitle her to an order directing the BIA to

reenter its order dismissing her appeal, thereby restarting the thirty-day deadline for filing

a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit. See Singh, 499 F.3d 969 at 979. The REAL ID

Act therefore does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s second claim

for relief. See Singh, 499 F.3d 969 at 980.

III. Preliminary Stay of Removal.

A. Standard.

The standard for a stay of removal is the same as the standard for a preliminary

injunction. Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Abbassi v. INS,

143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Maharaj v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

2002) (applying the same standard to motions for stay of removal pending appeal from a

decision denying an alien’s habeas petition). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing,

carries the burden of persuasion.” See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)

(quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129-30

(2d ed. 1995)). A party seeking a stay of removal must demonstrate “‘either (1) a probability

of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious legal

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips sharply in [its] favor.’” Andreiu, 253

F.3d at 483 (quoting Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514). “‘These standards represent the outer

extremes of a continuum, with the relative hardships to the parties providing the critical

element in determining at what point on the continuum a stay pending review is justified.’”

Andreiu, 253 F.3d at 483 (quoting Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514). However, if the applicant

shows no chance of success on the merits, the injunction should not issue. Arcamuzi v.

Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Balance of Hardships.

In her Motion for Stay of Removal, Petitioner argued that her removal would cause

her irreparable harm because she is a single mother who would be forcibly separated from

her three United States citizen children. Respondent’s brief does not address the hardship

issue. The Court, therefore, finds that Petitioner’s imminent removal from the United States

tips the balance of hardships sharply in her favor.

C. Serious Question on the Merits.

“For the purposes of injunctive relief, ‘serious questions’ refers to questions which

cannot be resolved one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction and as to which the

court perceives a need to preserve the status quo lest one side prevent resolution of the

questions or execution of any judgment by altering the status quo. Serious question are

‘substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for

more deliberative investigation.’” Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355,

1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d

738, 740 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.)). For the reasons explained below, this case presents

serious questions.

Petitioner claims that her former counsel prevented her from filing a timely petition

for review in the Ninth Circuit by failing to give her timely notice of the BIA’s dismissal of

her appeal from the denial of her motion to reopen. Petitioner claims that her former attorney

faxed a copy of the BIA’s decision to her friend on February 20, 2008 – more than a week

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

after expiration of the deadline for the filing of a petition for review with the court of appeals.

An alien’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in the immigration

context derives from the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process. Rojas-Garcia v.

Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 2003). “An alien’s due process rights are violated

when ineffective assistance rendered ‘the proceeding . . . so fundamentally unfair that the

alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.’” Id. (quoting Lopez v. INS, 775

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985). To succeed on a claim that counsel provided ineffective

assistance by depriving the alien of an appellate proceeding, the alien must satisfy three

requirements. Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 824-26. First, the alien must demonstrate that she

has substantially complied with the procedural prerequisites to an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Rojas-Garcia,

339 F.3d at 824-25. Second, the alien must show prejudice. Although prejudice is presumed

“when counsel’s error ‘deprives the alien of the appellate proceeding entirely,’” the

presumption is rebuttable. Id. at 826 (quoting Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d

1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Third, to avoid rebuttal of the presumption of prejudice, “the

alien must ‘show plausible grounds for relief.’” Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 826 (quoting

Dearinger, 232 F.3d at1046). The Court will address each of these elements briefly.

1. Compliance with Lozada.

Under Lozada, an alien alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must: “(1) provide

an affidavit describing in detail the agreement with counsel; (2) inform counsel of the

allegations and afford counsel an opportunity to respond; and (3) report whether a complaint

of ethical or legal violations has been filed, and if not, why.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320

F.3d 1061, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner does not claim to have complied with all of

the Lozada requirements. Instead, she suggests that she need not comply with those

requirements because the Ninth Circuit made no mention of Lozada in Dearinger. But the

Ninth Circuit recently explained that an alien raising a Dearinger-type claim is not excused

from substantially complying with the Lozada requirements:

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Dearinger held only that where, as here, an alien is prevented from filing an

appeal in an immigration proceeding due to counsel’s error, the alien may seek

habeas review in a district court without filing a motion to reopen. Dearinger

did not address the issue of Lozada. Although the requirements of Lozada are

not rigidly applied, especially when the record shows a clear and obvious case

of ineffective assistance, an alien generally must satisfy the procedural

requirements of Lozada.

Singh, 499 F.3d at 979 n.12 (internal quotation omitted). 

The first Lozada requirement has been substantially satisfied in this case. Although

Petitioner has not filed an affidavit describing in detail her agreement with her former

counsel, it is undisputed that counsel represented her on her appeal to the BIA. Respondent

argues that Petitioner has not met the first Lozada requirement because she has not

demonstrated that her former counsel was retained to represent her on appeal to the Ninth

Circuit. But Petitioner does not claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to timely file

an appeal to the Ninth Circuit; she claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to give her

timely notice of the BIA’s decision so that she could file a timely appeal pro se. The

undisputed record, therefore, substantially satisfies the first Lozada requirement because it

is apparent that counsel’s agreement to represent Petitioner before the BIA obliged him to

provide Petitioner with timely notice of the BIA’s decision.

Petitioner has not demonstrated substantial compliance with the other two Lozada

requirements, but the Court concludes that her ineffective assistance claim nonetheless raises

serious questions – questions warranting more deliberative consideration. On the present

record, it is undisputed that counsel represented Petitioner before the BIA and failed to

provide the timely notice of the BIA’s decision. Given this clear appearance of ineffective

assistance, the fact that Petitioner is proceeding pro se, and the fact that the Lozada

requirements are not “rigidly applied” in this Circuit, Singh, 499 F.3d at 979 n.12, the Court

concludes that the status quo should be maintained while the Court considers the issues of

this case more fully. The Court will, however, require Petitioner to comply with the second

and third elements of Lozada or explain why she is unable to do so.

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

2. Presumed Prejudice.

As noted above, prejudice is presumed “when counsel’s error ‘deprives the alien of

the appellate proceeding entirely.’” Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 826 (quoting Dearinger, 232

F.3d at 1045. Petitioner alleges that her counsel failed to provide notice of the BIA decision

until after the time for appeal had expired, depriving her entirely of her right to appeal and

giving rise to the presumption of prejudice. Respondent seeks to rebut the presumption by

arguing that the BIA was clearly correct in deciding that Petitioner’s forgery conviction

constituted an aggravated felony, but in making this argument Respondent has failed to

address two key issues.

First, although Respondent argues that Petitioner’s CPC § 470(d) conviction is a

categorical match for the federal definition of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(R), he fails to fully address the elements of the California forgery statute that

may be broader than the federal common law definition of forgery. “The essential elements

of the common law crime of forgery are ‘(1) a false making of some instrument in writing;

(2) a fraudulent intent; [and] (3) an instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.”

Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting

Morales -Alegria v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)). On its face, CPC

§ 470(d) encompass crimes that do not fit within the common law definition of forgery. The

California statute provides: “Every person who, with the intent to defraud, falsely makes,

alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters, publishes, passes or attempts or offers to pass, as true

and genuine, any of the following items, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or

counterfeited, is guilty of forgery: [listing instruments].” Cal. P. Code § 470(d) (2005)

(emphasis added). Because a person may “pass” a forged document without having “made”

the document, the statute would appear to encompass an offense that does not share the first

element of the common law forgery offense. The same potential problem arises in the

context of a modified categorical approach because Petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge that

she “did willfully and unlawfully, with the intent to defraud, falsely make, alter, forge or

counterfeit, utter publish, pass or attempt to offer to pass, as true and genuine, checks totaling

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

$1,600.00 knowing the same to be false, altered or counterfeited.” Dkt. #8-3 at 9 (emphasis

added). Respondent will be required to address this issue in additional briefing.

Second, even if CPC § 470(d) covers offenses that do not fall under common law

forgery, Respondent has not explained whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) itself extends to

offenses that do not fall under the strict common law definition of forgery. Specifically, the

statute defines as an aggravated felony “an offense relating to . . . forgery . . . for which the

term of imprisonment is at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (emphasis added).

Respondent will be required to brief the question of whether an “offense relating to forgery”

includes a person who “passes” a document forged by another person.

3. The Plausibility of Petitioner’s Argument.

Petitioner can avoid rebuttal of the presumption of prejudice by showing “‘plausible

grounds for relief.’” Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 826 (quoting Dearinger, 232 F.3d at1046).

The plausibility of Petitioner’s position turns in part on the two statutory questions addressed

above – questions not addressed by either party. The Court will require Petitioner to address

these issues on the same schedule as Respondent. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Petitioner’s application for a preliminary injunction is granted. Respondent

shall take no action to remove Petitioner from the United States until further

order of this Court.

2. Within 30 days of the date of this order, Petitioner shall comply with the

second and third elements of Lozada: “(2) inform counsel of the allegations

and afford counsel an opportunity to respond; and (3) report whether a

complaint of ethical or legal violations has been filed, and if not, why.”

Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 1071-72. The Court recommends that Petitioner

provide her former counsel with a copy of this order, and do so in time for

counsel to respond to her allegations by August 8, 2008.

3. On or before August 8, 2008, Respondent and Petitioner shall file

supplemental memoranda addressing the two statutory issues identified above.

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

4. The reference to Magistrate Judge Voss is withdrawn with respect to the

memoranda to be filed by the parties on August 8, 2008 and any response

from Petitioner’s former counsel. 

DATED this 8th day of July, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00839-DGC Document 14 Filed 07/08/08 Page 10 of 10