Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04106/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04106-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ROBERT MOSBACHER, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 02-04106 JSW

NOTICE OF QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON

APRIL 14, 2006, AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.

1. In Section IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 of its Cross-Motion, OPIC essentially repeats

verbatim the arguments raised in Section VII.B.1 and VII.B.2 of its initial motion

for summary judgment. (Compare OPIC 11/3/04 Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Nov. 04 MSJ”) at 33:4-35:2 with OPIC’s Cross-Motion and Opposition

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(“OPIC Cross Motion”) at 5:16-7:7; Nov. 04 MSJ at 35:7-21 with OPIC Cross

Motion 8:17-9:9; Nov. 04 MJS at 35:22-37:8 with OPIC Cross Motion at 7:9-

8:16). In its August 23, 2005 Order, the Court determined that the plain language

of the Foreign Assistance Act did not support OPIC’s position that it is not

subject to NEPA.

a. What is before the Court now that was not before the Court then that

would support OPIC’s contention the plain language of the act

demonstrates it is not subject to NEPA?

2. In opposition to the motion to strike, Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs have

never clearly defined what agency action they are challenging ...” and that “[a]s a

result, the materials that Defendants produced to Plaintiffs at the outset of this

case do not reflect the complete administrative record for any particular agency

decision.” (Opp. at 2 n.3.) 

a. How do Defendants reconcile this statement with statements made with

regard to the motion to transfer that the entire administrative record was

located in Washington D.C.? 

b. If Defendants contend there is no conflict between these two positions,

how do Defendants justify not having produced the entire administrative

record to Plaintiffs? 

3. a. Are Plaintiffs proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)? 

b. To the extent Plaintiffs are proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), Plaintiffs

shall be prepared to reiterate the specific actions that they are challenging

and to set forth the specific relief sought as to each such agency action. 

For example, are Plaintiffs contending that the projects in question are the

“actions,” or is it their contention that the actions are the decision to fund

those projects?

c. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants “have violated” NEPA. If Plaintiffs

are not limiting challenges to alleged past violations of NEPA to the

projects specifically identified in the SAC, how could the Defendants

have prepared an administrative record including unspecified projects?

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d. To the extent Plaintiffs are proceeding solely under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the

Court would normally be limited to considering the administrative record

as it existed at the time of the decision relating to the final agency action

in question. However, the Ninth Circuit has enumerated certain

exceptions to this general rule. See Southwest Center for Biological

Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996). Do

Defendants concede that the second and third exceptions enumerated in

Southwest Center would not be applicable to this case?

4. Plaintiffs object to the supplemental declarations of James Mahoney and Harvey

Himburg on the ground that they were not produced by December 16, 2005,

pursuant to this Court’s Order requiring Defendants to “product all documents on

which they intend to rely on all issues relating to the cross-motions for summary

judgment on the merits.” However, the Court intended that Order to apply to

documentary - rather than testimonial - evidence. Plaintiffs could have sought a

Rule 56(f) continuance, if they believed it necessary to refute Defendants’

allegations, but have not done so. What is Plaintiffs’ best argument that the

Court should not consider these declarations in evaluating the motions?

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

1. a. What is Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ assertion that they are

attempting to add new claims by referencing direct loans, which the Court

notes in fact were not referenced in the first round of summary judgment

briefing?

b. What is Plaintiffs’ response to OPIC’s assertion that it is prohibited from

providing loans “to finance any operation for the extraction of oil or gas,”

and, thus, direct loans should not be at issue?

2. a. Plaintiffs assert that causation on the merits of their NEPA claim is

judged under the causation same standard the Court used to determine

standing. In Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153

(9th Cir. 1998) the Ninth Circuit seems to distinguish these two inquiries. 

Id. at 1163 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear

Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)) (stating that “NEPA requires ‘a

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reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical

environment and the effect at issue,’” and although the court found “an

adequate string of causation necessary to confer standing, it does not

necessarily follow that such a highly attenuated chain of causation as the

Club alleges would lead to injuries cognizable under NEPA”). How

would Plaintiffs distinguish Presidio Golf?

b. Notwithstanding its holding in Presidio Golf, the Ninth Circuit has also

stated that in order to prevail on a claim that an agency violated a duty to

prepare an EIS, “a plaintiff need not show that significant effects will in

fact occur,” which would seem to support Plaintiffs’ position with respect

to causation. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th

Cir. 1988). In Sierra Club v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 235

F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Ore. 2002), relying on Idaho Sporting, the court

stated that it would be “enough for the plaintiff to raise substantial

questions whether a project may have a significant effect on the

environment.” Sierra Club, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 

i. How would Defendants distinguish these cases with

respect to the “causation” requirement? 

ii. What is Defendants’ best argument that Plaintiffs have not

“raised substantial questions” about whether their projects

have significant effects on the environment?

3. a. Is it Defendants’ position that the specific projects identified in Plaintiffs’

SAC do not constitute “major federal actions” as that term is used in

Executive Order 12114 and their own environmental procedures? 

b. If that is not Defendants position, why would the actions not qualify as

“major federal actions” under NEPA, i.e. what support do Defendants

have that the terms do not share the same meaning? See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §

1508.1 (“The terminology of this part shall be uniform throughout the

Federal Government”).

c. Plaintiffs assert Defendants should not be able to rely on the argument

that the projects or alleged programs in question do not constitute “major

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federal actions,” because that is a post hoc rationale. Can the Defendants

point the Court to any evidence in the Administrative Record in which

Defendants contended that the actions in question were not “major federal

actions?” 

d. Assuming the Court determines the “major federal action” argument is

not a new rationale, what is Plaintiffs’ best argument that the Court

should not determine whether the actions in question resolve the issue as

a matter of law?

e. If the “action” in question is the decision to provide a loan guarantee or

financing for a particular project, do Defendants concede that they can

control whether they will approve or disapprove funding and/or condition

such funding on taking certain environmental measures? Why do those

facts not satisfy the requisite level of control necessary to render the

projects major federal actions? 

f. Do Plaintiffs concede that the persons responsible for the daily operations

of the various projects are, in general, not U.S. federal actors? 

i. If so, do Plaintiffs have any authority to suggest that the

Court should look solely to Defendants’ ability to control

the authorization of financing for these projects in its

NEPA analysis? 

ii. Why should the Court not consider the Defendants’ ability,

or lack thereof, to control the manner in which the various

projects will be constructed and/or operated (especially

with respect to environmental issues) in determining

whether NEPA applies? See, e.g., Goos v. Interstate

Commerce Comm’n, 911 F.2d 1283, 1296 (8th Cir. 1990)

(“NEPA seeks only to regulate federal action and not

private action ... .”).

4. What evidence exists in the record to demonstrate that Defendants

“power portfolio” involves sufficiently concerted actions to qualify as a

“program” for NEPA purposes?

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a. Do Plaintiffs have any authority supporting a conclusion that, on

facts analogous to this case, Defendants actions would meet the

standards contemplated in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) to qualify as

a program? 

5. In High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth

Circuit noted that although a decision not to prepare an EIS is normally judged

under the arbitrary and capricious standard, “where an agency has decided that a

project does not require an EIS without first conducting an EA, we review under

the reasonableness standard.” Id. at 640 (citing, inter alia, Ka Makani ‘O Kohala

Ohana, Inc. v. Dept. of Water Supply, 295 F.3d 955, 959 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).) 

Although Plaintiffs equated the Defendants climate change reports to FONSI’s in

the first round of summary judgment briefing, the Court understands Plaintiffs’

primary argument to be that Defendants have not complied with NEPA’s

requirements at all.

a. What standard of review do Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply to their

APA claim?

6. a. With regard to the extraterritoriality argument (assuming the Court

determines it is appropriate to address this issue), would Defendants

concede that if Plaintiffs are asking only that Defendants undertake EA’s

or EIS’s as to the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the

environment in the United States, the presumption against extraterritorial

application of law would not be an issue? Or, are Defendants arguing

that the presumption would still apply because of the potential impact a

NEPA analysis could have on the provision of funds to projects overseas?

b. What is Plaintiffs’ best argument that the extraterritorial argument is not

pertinent to the merits of their claims against Defendants?

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c. Plaintiffs argue that the proximity of the projects Defendants finance to the

United States should not matter. Would Plaintiffs agree that proximity to the

United States may be pertinent to determining whether a particular project has

substantial effects within the United States? 

Dated: April 13, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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