Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00716/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00716-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Martin Edward Hussak, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0716-PHX-DLR (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Martin Edward Hussak has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his timely Petition. Petitioner’s claims 

are meritless. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

 On August 20, 2010, officers responded a “shots fired” call. (Doc. 20-3 at 61.) 

Petitioner’s counsel told the court during sentencing proceedings that Petitioner 

confronted the victims when they came to his residence to repossess a car. (Doc. 20-3 at 

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35.) Due a “lack of impulse control,” counsel told the court that Petitioner grabbed a gun 

. . . “and fire[d] it into the air.” (Id.) On November 18, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty to 

one count of aggravated assault. (Doc. 20-1 at 4, 5, 8, 12.) During his change of plea, 

Petitioner agreed to his attorney’s summary of his conduct: “In or near Casa Grande and 

that’s in Pinal County and it was on August 20, 2011, my client made a mistake, Judge, 

and that was shooting a gun in a manner that was threatening, placed an individual in 

eminent fear of serious harm by holding – firing that gun, and that he did that knowingly 

and voluntarily.” (Doc. 20-1, Ex. D, at 19.)1

 

b. Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On July 3, 2012, after an aggravation/mitigation hearing, Petitioner was sentenced 

to a presumptive term of 3.5 years of imprisonment. (Doc. 20-1 at 30-49.) Petitioner did 

not file a direct appeal. (Doc. 20-2 at 2.) 

c. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On September 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) 

pursuant to Rule 32. (Doc. 20-2 at 2.) On October 30, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se

PCR motion alleging that his plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 20-2 at 4.) On April 29, 2013, the trial court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for PCR on the merits. (Doc. 20-2 at 37.) 

 On August 9, 2013, Petitioner filed for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

On January 14, 2014, the court granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 20-3 at 27, 70.) 

Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. (Doc. 20-3 at 

76.) 

d. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On June 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a second Notice of PCR, which was dismissed as 

untimely. (Doc. 20-4 at 2, 25.) 

 Petitioner sought review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which granted review 

but denied relief. (Doc. 20-4 at 28.) 

 

1

 A summary of the offense is also contained in the Presentence Report. (Doc. 5-1 at 74.) 

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e. Petitioner’s Third Motion for PCR 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that Petitioner’s June 5, 2014, Notice of 

PCR was part of his third PCR proceeding. (Id.) On September 8, 2014, the Court of 

Appeals denied relief. (Doc. 20-4 at 30.) 

f. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On April 15, 2015, Petitioner filed this habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed 

briefs in support of the Petition (Docs. 4 and 8) and an Appendix in Support of the 

Petition (Doc. 5). On September 1, 2015, Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition. 

(Doc. 20.) Petitioner did not file a reply. Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: 

1. Trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to raise issues 

during plea negotiations, failed to object to inaccurate information in 

the plea agreement, and failed to object to inaccurate information in 

the PSR report. 

2. PCR counsel was ineffective because PCR counsel failed to raise 

Petitioner’s claims described in Ground One; 

3. Denial of his 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights where the 

trial court violated his rights for the reasons contained in Ground 

One, and the trial court improperly dismissed his Rule 32 

proceedings. 

 (Doc. 1 at 6-8.) 

III. THE PETITION

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

The Petition is timely. 

a. Procedural Default

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

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upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . 

(2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

The Court may review the merits of an argument in the interest of judicial 

economy. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524–25 (1997) (explaining that the 

court may bypass the procedural default issue in the interest of judicial economy when 

the merits are clear but the procedural default issues are not).2

b. Merits Review 

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

 

2

 Here, Petitioner filed numerous motions for post-conviction relief, filed two briefs and an appendix, alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, and argues Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012), excuses any procedural default (Doc. 8 at 34). Petitioner’s arguments are not a model of clarity. The Court elects to review Petitioner’s claims on their merits in interest of judicial economy. 

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F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this 

Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as a 

condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a 

formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 

S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to 

meet”—and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s 

criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. 

Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

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federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 

S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an 

incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief 

simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a 

certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also 

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (internal 

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quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

AEDPA otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not 

harmless: “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not 

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

a. Ground One 

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for three reasons: 1) trial 

counsel “failed to raise issues during plea negotiation stage of case proceeding”; 2) trial 

counsel “failed to object to guilty plea based on inaccurate information”; and, 3) trial 

counsel “was ineffective where state probation officer . . . submitted inaccurate 

information in P.S.R.” that was used in Petitioner’s sentencing. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

i. Failure to Raise Issue During Plea Negotiation Stage

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel “was ineffective where he failed to raise issues 

during plea negotiation stage of case proceedings.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) In his supporting brief, 

Petitioner “contends trial counsel’s failure to inform Hussak correctly at plea negotiations 

and upon the correct charge for his actions under statutory law and also to object to 

inaccurate information in (P.S.R.) constitutes (I.A.C.) claim . . . .” (Doc. 4 at 21.) 

Petitioner offers no specifics regarding his claim, but argued he “is entitled to secure 

appropriate relief on the grounds raised in his” PCR proceedings. (Doc. 4 at 20.) In his 

PCR proceedings, Petitioner alleged he was not “informed of the elements of the offense” 

and the “trial court failed to establish on ‘record’ that the conduct Movant stipulated to, in 

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fact, constituted the ‘factual basis.’” (Doc. 5-1 at 4.) Petitioner cites to State v. Donald, 

10 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that “Arizona courts recognize that a 

defendant may seek relief from a conviction on the basis that counsel’s ineffective 

assistance induced a guilty plea.”). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that: 

[Petitioner] seems to be arguing that there was an inadequate factual basis for the plea. The record belies that contention. 

Counsel provided the factual basis for the plea and, when the 

court asked Hussak whether counsel had accurately 

summarized the facts and what had occurred, he responded, “Yes, sir.” Thus, he agreed he had fired a gun in a threatening manner and placed the victims in imminent fear of serious 

physical harm, thereby establishing Hussak had committed the offense of aggravated assault. 

... 

The record also shows the trial court addressed Hussak 

personally, reviewing with him the plea agreement and the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering the plea and assuring Hussak understood the terms of the plea agreement 

after having reviewed them with counsel. The court was 

entitled to rely on the representations Hussak made. 

... 

Additionally, nothing in the record before us supports Hussak’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion 

by rejecting summarily his claim that trial counsel had been 

ineffective in connection with the entry of the plea, thereby invalidating it. 

State v. Hussak, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0216-PR, 2014 WL 118533, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

Jan. 14, 2014). 

 Petitioner has failed to establish that the state appellate court decision was contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. “The Sixth Amendment 

guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be informed of the nature and 

cause of the charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of a defense.” 

Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). “To determine whether a defendant 

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has received fair notice of the charges against him, we look first to the indictment. The 

principal purpose of an indictment is to provide the defendant with a description of the 

charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense and plead 

double jeopardy in a later prosecution.” Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 

1988) (citation omitted). The indictment in this case accurately contained the elements of 

Aggravated Assault under Arizona law.3

 (Doc. 20-1, Ex. A, at 2.) Petitioner was 

sufficiently advised of the elements of the offense prior to his change of plea proceeding. 

 Petitioner’s claim that the “trial court failed to establish on ‘record’ that the 

conduct Movant stipulated to, in fact, constituted the ‘factual basis’” is meritless. (Doc. 

5-1 at 4.) At the conclusion of the change of plea proceeding, the trial court stated “[t]hen 

I do find there is a factual basis for the plea and I find that it was entered knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily and I will accept it for the record.” (Doc. 20-1, Ex. D, at 

20.) 

 Petitioner’s general claim that “trial counsel was ineffective where he failed to 

raise issues during plea negotiation state of case proceedings” (Doc. 1 at 6) is waived and 

meritless. The Arizona Court of Appeals found Petitioner waived “all claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the validity of the plea.” 

Hussak, 2014 WL 118533, at *2. The state court determination is correct. An 

unconditional guilty plea “cures all antecedent constitutional defects.” United States v. 

Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1997). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly 

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258, 267 (1973). “He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty 

plea.” Id. 

 

3

 Count One of the Indictment reads: “On or about 08/20/2010, in or near Pinal 

County, Arizona, MARTINE HUSSAK committed Aggravated Assault by assaulting DAVID A. GALIENDO, while using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to wit: a 

handgun, in violation of A.R.S. §§13-1204(A)(2), 13-1203, 13- 704, 13-610, 13-701, 13-

702, 13-712, and 13-801, a class 3 dangerous felony.” (Doc. 20-1, Ex. A, at 2.) 

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 In his Brief in Support of Petition, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective 

because “the appropriate charge in this case is a class two misdemeanor” under A.R.S. § 

13–2904(B) (Disorderly Conduct). (Doc. 8 at 33.) Petitioner cites to Sanchez v. Arpaio, 

No. CV-09-1150-PHX-LOA, 2010 WL 3938353, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2010) (noting the 

“elements of Disorderly Conduct are knowingly or intentionally disturbing the peace by 

any of several categories of conduct. A.R.S. § 13–2904”). (Id.) Petitioner argues that if he 

proceeded to trial, “he would have won” because “beyond a reasonable doubt would be a 

class 2 misdemeanor conviction.” (Id.) Petitioner admitted he fired a gun near the victims 

in a threatening manner and placed them in imminent fear of serious physical harm, 

which satisfied the elements of Aggravated Assault. (Doc. 20-1, Ex. D, at 8.) The 

decision to charge Aggravated Assault was properly decided by the State of Arizona. 

“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions 

that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 

114, 124 (1979). Petitioner’s claim fails. 

ii. Failure to Object to Inaccurate Basis for Plea 

 Petitioner alleges trial counsel “was ineffective, where he failed to object to guilty 

plea concerning whether Hussak entered into plea agreement based on accurate 

information under statutory law . . . for sentencing purposes.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals found that “[c]ounsel provided the factual basis for the plea and, when 

the court asked [Petitioner] whether counsel had accurately summarized the facts and 

what had occurred, he responded, ‘Yes, sir.’” Hussak, 2014 WL 118533, at *1. The court 

determined Petitioner “agreed he had fired a gun in a threatening manner and placed the 

victims in imminent fear of serious physical harm, thereby establishing [Petitioner] had 

committed the offense of aggravated assault. See A.R.S. §§ 13–1203.” (Id.) 

 Moreover, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his factual basis was insufficient to 

constitute aggravated assault. A.R.S. § 13–1203 defines assault as “[i]ntentionally placing 

another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.” Petitioner 

agreed he “knowingly and voluntarily” fired a gun in a manner that threatened the victim 

with imminent “fear of serious physical harm.” (Doc. 20-1, Ex. D, at 8.) Petitioner did 

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not object when his attorney told the court that Petitioner’s voluntary act satisfied the 

factual basis for intentional conduct. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim is 

reviewed by looking at the elements of the offense under state law and, in determining 

whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, federal courts are bound by a state 

court’s interpretation of state law. See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 

2011). The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s pleadings and the record before the Court, 

and determines Petitioner’s claim fails. 

 Petitioner’s counsel was also not ineffective for failing to object to Petitioner’s 

guilty plea when the record demonstrates Petitioner willingly pleaded guilty. Petitioner 

told the trial court he wished to plead guilty. (Doc. 20-1, Ex. D, at 14.) When asked if he 

was entering the agreement “of your own free will,” Petitioner told the court “Yes, sir.” 

(Id.) At sentencing, Petitioner told the court he wanted to accept responsibility for what 

he did and told the court he did not intend to harm anyone. (Doc. 20-1, Ex. F, at 45.) The 

record reflects that Petitioner was hoping to receive a sentence of probation, and only 

now complains because he instead received a sentence of imprisonment. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals found that “nothing in the record before us supports Hussak’s 

contention that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting summarily his claim that 

trial counsel had been ineffective in connection with the entry of the plea, thereby 

invalidating it.” Hussak, 2014 WL 118533, at *2. The court’s determination that 

Petitioner presented “no such evidence” that counsel was ineffective was not contrary to 

clearly established federal law. 

iii. Probation Officer Submitted Inaccurate Information in PSR 

 The Petitioner argues that the trial counsel was ineffective because of a failure to 

object to inaccuracies in PSR, which “breached the plea... creating an involuntary plea”4

and “was used for sentencing purposes.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) In his Brief in Support of Petition, 

 

4

 Petitioner’s claim that the presentence report breached the plea agreement is meritless and unsupported. Petitioner’s plea agreement permitted the court to sentence Petitioner to imprisonment. (Doc. 20-1, Ex. C, at 8.) See also Greenway v. Schriro, 653 

F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner’s] cursory and vague claim cannot support habeas relief”). 

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Petitioner asserts “incompetent evidence was used for enhancement purpose at 

sentencing.” (Doc. 4 at 25.) Petitioner refers to a pro se “Notice of Facts” (Doc. 5-1 at 

23-34) filed in the state court, which contains a description of alleged inaccuracies. (Doc. 

4 at 26.) 

 Petitioner’s claim fails because he does not establish that the aggravating factors 

listed in the presentence report were false. 

 The presentence report contains the following aggravating factors: 

 • Use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime. 

 • The emotional harm caused to the victims. 

 • The defendant has a prior record as a juvenile and as an adult. 

 • The defendant’s prior criminal history reflects involvement in 

 numerous misdemeanor offenses. 

 • The defendant has pled guilty to a federal offense, and will be 

 sentenced on February 15, 2012. 

 • The defendant shows no remorse. 

 • More than one victim was involved. 

 • The defendant’s failure to benefit from past lenient treatment by the Court. 

(Doc. 5-1 at 82.) Petitioner’s factual objections to the presentence report do not dispute 

the aggravating factors listed in the PSR. Instead, Petitioner disputes family history, the 

neutrality of the PSR writer, the subjective nature of the opinions presented in the report, 

and the reasons for Petitioner’s misdemeanor convictions. (Doc. 5-1 at 23-33.) A 

sentence may violate due process if it is based upon material “misinformation of 

constitutional magnitude.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980). To 

prevail on his claim, Petitioner must show (1) that the information before the sentencing 

court was materially false, and (2) that the court relied on the false information in 

imposing the sentence. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). Petitioner 

fails to meet both of these requirements. See also United States v. Donn, 661 F.2d 820, 

824 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[Petitioner’s] conclusory allegations of inaccuracies in the report 

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are unsupported and do not suggest the report as a whole is misleading.”). 

 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show 

that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 

(2) the deficiency in counsel’s performance prejudiced him. See, e.g., Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). To establish prejudice, the defendant “must show 

a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure . . . he would have 

prevailed on his appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). “When the claim 

at issue is one for ineffective assistance of counsel, moreover, AEDPA review is doubly 

deferential . . . because counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment . . . [and] federal courts are to afford both the state court and the defense 

attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Etherton, - S.Ct. -, 2016 WL 1278478, at *2 

(U.S. Apr. 4, 2016) (quotations and citations omitted). 

 Regarding Petitioner’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance at 

sentencing, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim. The court found Petitioner 

failed to: 

raise a colorable claim that trial counsel had been ineffective 

with respect to sentencing. Rather, the record shows counsel 

urged the court to place Hussak on probation and, 

alternatively, a mitigated prison term. Counsel presented ample evidence in mitigation including the fact that Hussak had been involved in an automobile accident that purportedly resulted in neurological impairment, and that his childhood 

was difficult. 

Hussak, 2014 WL 118533, at *2. 

 Petitioner fails to establish that counsel provided ineffective assistance at 

sentencing. The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the record and accurately described 

counsel’s conduct regarding sentencing. Petitioner fails to establish that counsel’s 

conduct was unreasonable or deficient. Whether the state court properly weighed 

aggravating and mitigating factors under state law is not reviewable here. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The Arizona Court of Appeal’s determination was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of any holding of the United States Supreme 

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Court. 

b. Ground Two

 Petitioner alleges that “appellate counsel” was ineffective for failing to raise the 

three grounds Petitioner argues in Ground One. Because the Court determines 

Petitioner’s claims fail in Ground One, Petitioner’s counsel did not provide ineffective 

assistance on post-conviction review for failing to raise them. See Baumann v. United 

States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

c. Ground Three

 Petitioner presents five arguments in Ground Three. First, Petitioner renews a 

claim presented in Ground One, and argues that “the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying [Petitioner’s] plea agreement based on accurate information to the stipulated plea 

to Aggravated Assault without considering the real facts of the case.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Petitioner’s claim is denied for the reasons stated above. 

 Petitioner next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied or 

dismissed Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding. Petitioner claims the trial court “abused its 

discretion denying [Petitioner’s] first Rule 32 (P.C.R.) proceedings, as of right appeal 

(court claims it review case with authority but never cited any authority in its ruling . . 

.).” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner cited the trial court’s ruling of April 29, 2013, which denied 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding. (Id.) In a Brief in Support of Petition, Petitioner 

“contends that the trial court abused its discretion for failure to adjudicate all his claims 

on the merits of the facts and the law, state and federal, and based on citing ‘no’ authority 

in its ruling . . . .” (Doc. 4 at 35.) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this argument 

and found “not only did the court state it had considered all relevant filings and 

authorities, we presume it did so in ruling on the petition before it.” State v. Hussak, No. 

2 CA-CR 2013-0216-PR, 2014 WL 118533, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014). This 

Court has considered the merits of Petitioner’s claims and also rejected them. Petitioner 

fails to specifically identify additional arguments and prejudice. See James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“conclusory allegations which are not supported by a 

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statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

 Petitioner also claims the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s 

second and third PCR petitions as untimely. The Arizona Court of Appeals found the 

dismissals proper because “[n]othing in Rule 32 permits a trial court to review a decision 

in a previous postconviction proceeding.” State v. Hussak, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0198-PR, 

2014 WL 4403148, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2014). Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

barred. “Where a state court has declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because 

the prisoner has failed to meet a state procedural requirement, there is a general bar 

against a federal habeas action.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, the Court has reviewed the substance of the claims brought in the Petition and 

finds them meritless. 

 Petitioner’s final argument renews a claim presented in Ground One, and argues 

that “the trial court abused its discretion when letting the state prosecutor commit 

prosecutorial misconduct at plea agreement stage of proceedings, entering inaccurate 

information for sentencing purposes of higher charge and sentence.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Petitioner’s claim is denied for the reasons stated above. The Court has reviewed 

Petitioner’s claim and found the prosecution was within its discretion to bring these 

charges, and the Arizona Court of Appeal’s rulings were not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of any holding of the United States Supreme Court. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are timely, but meritless. The Court will therefore recommend that the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 19th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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