Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-56423/USCOURTS-ca9-08-56423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOUHAIR KHATIB, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 08-56423

v. D.C. No.

COUNTY OF ORANGE, a political  8:07-cv-01012-

subdivision; MICHAEL S. CARONA, DOC-MLG

an individual; BRIAN COSSAIRT, an OPINION individual,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 9, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed May 3, 2010

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Stephen S. Trott and

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Stephen S. Trott;

Dissent by Chief Judge Kozinski

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COUNSEL

Becki F. Kieffer and Jennifer Mathis, Troutman Sanders,

LLP, Irvine, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

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David D. Lawrence and Christina M. Sprenger, Lawrence

Beach Allen & Choi, PC, Santa Ana, California, for the

defendants-appellees.

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Souhair Khatib sued the County of Orange, California and

some of its officials, alleging a violation of the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. The gravamen of her complaint is

that she was required against her Muslim religious beliefs and

practice to remove her “hijab,” or headscarf, in public while

she was held on two occasions between 9:00 a.m. and 4:30

p.m. in an Orange County Superior Court holding cell pending the disposition by the court of her probation violation. The

district court dismissed with prejudice her complaint pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that a courthouse

holding cell is not an “institution” as defined by RLUIPA. We

have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

FACTS

On June 29, 2006, Mrs. Khatib and her husband pleaded

guilty to a misdemeanor violation of California welfare law.

The Khatibs were placed on probation on condition that they

complete thirty (30) days of community service by a date certain. Two days before that date, they appeared in court seeking an extension. However, the court revoked their probation

and ordered them held in custody in the courthouse pending

disposition later that day of the violation.

When Mrs. Khatib was processed into the courthouse holding cell, officers required over her objection that she remove

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her headscarf for security reasons. To do so in this context

violated her religious beliefs by forcing her with head uncovered to confront strangers, including men to whom she was

not related. As the district court noted, “Appearing in the

presence of male non-family members without a hijab is a

serious breach of faith and a deeply humiliating and defiling

experience.” Later that day, the Superior Court Judge returned

her to his courtroom, reinstated her probation, gave her additional time to complete her community service, and awarded

her one day credit for time served in the “Orange County

Jail.” She was then returned to the holding area from which

she was released later that afternoon.

DISCUSSION

I

[1] Section 2000cc-1 of RLUIPA is entitled the “protection

of religious exercise of institutionalized persons.” Section

2000cc-1(a) prohibits any government from imposing “a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing

in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PRLA”).” Section 1997 in

turn describes in relevant part the term “institution” as follows:

(1) The term “institution” means any facility or

institution —

(A) which is owned, operated, or managed by, or

provides services on behalf of any State or

political subdivision of a State; and 

(B) which is —

. . .

(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility; [or]

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(iii) a pretrial detention facility . . . .

[2] We begin by noting that the facility under examination

in this case — a courthouse holding cell — is not directly

addressed in the statute. Thus, the question here is whether the

courthouse holding cell into which Mrs. Khatib was placed

qualifies as an institution as defined in § 1997, i.e., “a jail,

prison or other correctional facility,” or “a pretrial detention

facility.” We hold on the basis of the text of the statute construed in the light of its purpose that it is not, as we shall explain.1

II

A.

There are as many different types of lockups in courthouses

as there are courthouses. Some are more complex than others,

but many are just secure cells immediately adjacent to courtrooms where prisoners await formal proceedings in front of a

judge or spend recesses in trials and other proceedings. Such

cells typically have no beds and no food service other than

cold lunches provided by the detention facility in which they

reside. Persons in such cells are not accompanied by any of

their personal belongings. The cells themselves are stark, barren, hard, and distinctly utilitarian. Their dual purpose is only

(1) to control persons in custody while they are in the process

of being delivered from the detention facilities to the courtroom, and (2) to ensure the security of all involved, including

the persons themselves as well as judges and courtroom personnel.

1Khatib also argues that the district court erroneously converted her

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by relying upon

materials outside the pleadings. The district court did not convert Khatib’s

motion into one for summary judgment. Rather, the court relied upon the

Grand Jury Reports which contained detailed descriptions of the Orange

County detention facilities, including courthouse holding facilities. Those

reports were submitted by Khatib and judicially noticed by the court.

Therefore, the district court properly relied upon them. 

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[3] A courthouse holding cell is designed to support a

courtroom during courthouse daytime hours. Time spent by

persons in holding cell custody can be as short as minutes or

as long as hours — but not overnight. Such a cell is not a

place where persons in custody either reside or are institutionalized. As such, it is not a “correctional facility” in the nature

of a jail or a prison. See Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 753

(7th Cir. 2004). The purpose of courthouse confinement is not

to correct, to punish, to deter, or to rehabilitate, but simply to

provide a secure transient environment for persons in custody

while they are in the courthouse awaiting trial or other judicial

proceedings. In the language of the statute, these persons may

be confined in a holding cell, but they are not confined to it.

Accordingly, § 1997(1)(B)(ii) covering “jail[s], prison[s] or

other correctional facilit[ies]” is inapposite.

B.

[4] Courthouse holding cells are not “pretrial detention

facilit[ies]” either. The term “pretrial detention facility” is not

ambiguous; it is a facility where people ordered held in custody pending future court proceedings are sent to reside and

to which they are confined in the interim. See Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (describing pretrial detention

as the “extended restraint of liberty following arrest”). Indeed,

the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in listing the various types of

prisons it operates, sets forth as a specific category of prisons

“Administrative” facilities, which “are institutions with special missions, such as the detention of pretrial offenders.”

Federal Bureau of Prisons, Prison Types & General Information, http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp (last

visited January 18, 2010) (providing examples of pretrial

detention facilities).

[5] A courthouse holding cell is a place where prisoners

are temporarily held during proceedings — there is nothing

“pretrial” about them, unless one reads the words “pretrial”

and “detention” completely out of context and without a clear

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understanding of how the system works. Once inside the

courthouse, the prisoner is no longer in a pretrial detention

facility, but in the institution of the courthouse itself as part

of the judicial branch of government, not the executive. To

hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that the courtroom itself is a “pretrial detention facility” for persons in custody up until the moment that the trial or other proceeding

begins. And, the court’s discretionary award of credit to Khatib for one day served in the “Orange County Jail” does not

convert the holding cell facility in the courthouse into the

Orange County Jail.

III

“In interpreting statutes, the court’s objective is to ‘ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative

will.’ ” Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Service, Inc.,

760 F.2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)). “Legislative intent, however,

is not always evident from the plain language of the statute

and in that event, the courts must look to legislative history

for guidance.” Id. “As we have repeatedly stated, ‘the meaning of language, plain or not, depends on context.’ ” Holloway

v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (quoting Brown v.

Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). Given that the object of

our attention is not explicitly included in the generic language

of the statute, we turn to the Congress for edification.

[6] Our conclusion in this case finds solid support in the

statements of the co-sponsors of RLUIPA, Senators Orrin

Hatch and the late Edward Kennedy. They stated on the official record that the Act covered “persons in prisons, mental

hospitals, and similar state institutions,” because “[f]ar more

than any other Americans, persons residing in institutions are

subject to the authority of one or a few local officials. Institutional residents’ right to practice their faith is at the mercy of

those running the institution, and their experience is very

mixed.” 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01, S7774-S7775 (daily ed.

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July 27, 2000) (Joint Statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis added). No one can persuasively argue that

a person in a courthouse holding cell is a resident of that facility. We find nothing in the legislative history to suggest otherwise, or that this law was intended to cover persons

temporarily in transitional facilities.

Our conclusion in this regard finds confirmation in the context of the law that we interpret, section 1997, which is part

of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980.

This Act was manifestly designed to cover persons “residing

in State institutions.” Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person

Act House Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. 96-897, at 8-

9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 832, 832-33

(emphasis added). We note that Congress described the

intended beneficiaries of this Act as the “residents” of the various facilities and institutions covered by the Act.

[7] In addition, Congress’ decision to incorporate the

PLRA’s definition of institution into RLUIPA provides support for our conclusion that courthouse holding facilities are

not pretrial detention facilities. “Congress enacted [the PLRA]

to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner

suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials

time and opportunity to address complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle,

534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). In enacting RLUIPA, Congress

was similarly concerned about frivolous litigation and the

ability of officials to address complaints internally prior to the

initiation of litigation. This concern led Congress to incorporate the PLRA’s definition of institution into RLUIPA. See

146 Cong. Rec. S6678-02 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement

of Sen. Kennedy) (“Congress . . . passed the [PLRA], which

includes a number of procedural rules to limit frivolous prisoner litigation. Those procedural rules will apply in cases

brought under [RLUIPA].”). Frivolous prisoner litigation

would be a real threat if RLUIPA’s protections were applied

to courthouse holding facilities, because stays at those faciliKHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 6595

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ties are never longer than twelve hours and so officials would

not be afforded the time to address grievances internally prior

to the initiation of litigation. Therefore, Congress’ decision to

apply the PLRA’s definition of “institution” into RLUIPA

indicates Congress did not intend that the phrase “pretrial

detention facility” apply to courthouse holding facilities.

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge KOZINSKI, dissenting:

Freud is reported to have said that sometimes a cigar is just

a cigar. And a facility used for holding prisoners prior to trial

is a pretrial detention facility. The Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) covers prisoners held

in certain kinds of institutions—defined to include both correctional facilities (such as prisons and jails) and pretrial

detention facilities. Souhair Khatib was held in a facility

where prisoners are routinely detained awaiting trial and other

court appearances. She was therefore held in a facility covered by RLUIPA and is entitled to its protections. This pretty

much sums up the case for me. Everything below is unnecessary and you could easily skip it.

The majority takes a convoluted path to reach the contrary

result, but its analysis just proves how wrong they are. For

starters, the opinion overlooks the fact that the statute here has

its own rules of construction, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc3. Among those rules is the following: “This chapter [meaning RLUIPA] shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by

the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” Id. at

§ 2000cc-3(g) (emphasis added). Not every law that Congress

passes has such a handy guide to interpretation; in fact, very

few do. It seems to me that when Congress goes to the trouble

of telling us how to construe a statute, and uses such phrases

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as “broad protection” and “the maximum extent permitted,”

we need to pay close attention and do as Congress commands.

The Supreme Court routinely relies on such express instructions. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,

497-98 (1985) (relying directly on the “express admonition

that RICO is to ‘be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes’ ”). And some of our nation’s hottest jurists

have called for their more frequent use. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable

Offense?, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 807, 819 (1998) (“[O]ne

would hope that Congress would do the next best thing:

instruct the courts how to resolve the close cases. This would

not usurp the judicial function in any way; it would merely

give judges instructions how to go about discovering the statute’s fine nuances.” (citing Hearings Before the Joint Comm.

on the Organization of Cong., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82

(1993) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Judge, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals))). 

The question then is not the usual one when we interpret

statutes, namely what is the most plausible construction.

Instead, we must ask the following question: Stretching the

term “pretrial detention facility” to its maximum limit, does

the place where Khatib was incarcerated for several hours

possibly fit within that definition?

As if the answer isn’t perfectly clear, let’s take a stroll

through the record and see what we find. In the same document that the majority approves of at page 6592, note 1

(namely the 2006-2007 Orange County Grand Jury Report),

we find courthouse holding facilities described as follows:

COURT HOLDING FACILITY is a secure detention facility located within a court building used for

the confinement of persons solely for the purpose of

a court appearance for a period not exceeding 12

hours.

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Grand Jury Report at 1. I don’t need to tug very hard at the

corners of “pretrial detention facility” to get it to include a

facility fitting this description. But there’s more, right in the

middle of Orange County’s brief:

The court holding facility is staffed with only [sic]

20 sworn deputies, who are responsible for the daily

comings and goings of approximately 600 inmates

from the various Orange County Jails. (ER 98.) In

addition to inmates from the Orange County Jails,

the court holding facility temporarily holds custody

of a significant number of persons taken into custody

at the courthouse every day. (ER 208.) Moreover,

the sworn deputies are responsible for ensuring that

the persons in the court holding facility make it

through a “labyrinth of sub-basements, tunnel[s],

secured elevators, and holding cells . . . one-by-one

. . . .” (ER 98.)

Answering Brief at 22-33 (footnote omitted) (alterations in

original).

It’s pretty clear from this description that the facility in the

Santa Ana Courthouse isn’t a makeshift cell in the corner of

the courtroom, designed to hold the occasional unruly drunk

while he waits for the judge, as the majority posits at page

6592-93 of the opinion. The Santa Ana facility is a fullfledged jail with its own permanent staff, schedule and procedures. While the inmates don’t sleep there, they are treated

pretty much the same as in all correctional facilities, “segregated by race, gang affiliation, criminal level of intensity, and

other characteristics to prevent trouble.” Grand Jury Report at

4. Note, also, that aside from the central facility itself, there

are a number of other secure areas in the courthouse, including “holding cells” dispersed throughout the building. Those

holding cells may not themselves be facilities, and thus not

covered by RLUIPA, but surely the central facility itself—

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where hundreds of inmates are detained every day while waiting to go to court—is a pretrial detention facility. 

Is this the best interpretation of the statute? I think so, but

it doesn’t have to be. Applying RLUIPA’s rule of generous

construction, we must ask ourselves whether this is a permissible construction if we read the term “to the maximum extent

permitted” so as to achieve a “broad protection of religious

exercise.” Can we honestly say that a mammoth facility in the

bowels of the Santa Ana courthouse, whose main purpose is

to hold inmates while awaiting trial, cannot possibly be a pretrial detention facility? Is that really like calling a fish a fowl

or an elephant a donkey?

But there’s more. Just think about what Congress was trying to do when it crafted the definition of institution in section

1997:

(1) The term “institution” means any facility or

institution . . .

(B) which is . . .

(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility;

(iii) a pretrial detention facility;

(iv) for juveniles—

(I) held awaiting trial;

(II) residing in such facility or institution for purposes of receiving

care or treatment; or

(III) residing for any State purpose

in such facility or institution

. . . .

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(v) providing skilled nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial

or residential care. 

42 U.S.C. § 1997. Looking at subsections (ii) and (iii), we see

that Congress divided the universe of institutions holding

adults caught up in the criminal justice system into two parts:

those whose inmates are incarcerated after they’ve been found

guilty; and those whose inmates are incarcerated while awaiting an adjudication of guilt. Congress chose to define facilities in terms of the kinds of inmate they would hold rather

than in terms of their physical characteristics such as whether

they have beds or bars on the windows. It included all facilities for convicted inmates and all facilities for inmates who

are still presumptively innocent, thereby covering the entire

universe of facilities holding people who become enmeshed

in the criminal justice system. It’s hard to imagine how Congress could have spoken more broadly. What would they have

had to say to make sure that the Orange County Court’s holding facility is covered? Would they have had to mention it by

name and zip code?

The majority’s contrary arguments only prove my point.

The suggestion that “[t]he term ‘pretrial detention facility’ is

not ambiguous,” maj. at 6593, and includes only facilities

where inmates spend the night, is wrong on its face. The

opening provision in the RLUIPA states: “No government

shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of

a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added). If Congress had

meant to include only institutions with beds, there would have

been no point in adding “or confined to” following “residing

in,” would there? More fundamentally, where in RLUIPA

does Congress include a residency requirement—one so clear

that it absolutely excludes all facilities that don’t have beds?

I note that elsewhere in the same definition section, the statute

refers repeatedly to residency, so Congress surely knew how

to say so when it meant to. See, e.g., id. at

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§ 1997(1)(B)(iv)(II), (iv)(III), (v). Instead of stretching the

statute to its maximum limit, as Congress said we should, the

majority pulls out of thin air requirements that constrict

RLUIPA’s plain language. Is this what my colleagues see as

“broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum

extent permitted by the terms of” the statute? If so, I’d hate

to see what a grudging interpretation looks like.

Nor am I moved by the majority’s ex cathedra disquisition

about courthouse holding cells generally being “stark, barren,

hard, and distinctly utilitarian.” Maj. at 6592. I suppose

they’re quite different from your ordinary jail cell, which

comes equipped with flat-screen TVs, mini-bars, iPod docking stations and Frette linens. None of this is in the record, nor

is the majority’s speculation that “[o]nce inside the courthouse, the prisoner is no longer in a pretrial detention facility,

but in the institution of the courthouse itself as part of the

judicial branch of government, not the executive.” Id. at 6594.

That the court and the detention facility are housed under the

same roof is neither here nor there; it’s quite common to have

executive agencies housed inside federal courthouses, yet

surely no one suggests that the offices of (say) the United

States Attorney are “part of the judicial branch of government, not the executive.” The grand jury report tells us that

Orange County’s courthouse holding facilities are in fact

under the jurisdiction of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, not the court. [ER 95, 98] This is confirmed by the

Sheriff’s website, which tells us that its “Court Operations

Division is committed to protect and serve the judiciary and

the public by ensuring a safe environment in the Superior

Court of Orange County,” which includes “[s]taffing all

courthouse holding facilities.” Orange County Sheriff’s

Department, Court Operations Division, http://www.ocsd.org/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130&

Itemid=85 (last visited April 22, 2010). This argument, which

the majority comes up with on its own, just shows the folly

of writing an opinion based on judicial intuition rather than

the record and arguments presented by the parties.

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But it don’t matter anyhow. Even if we assume, contrary to

fact and common sense, that the courthouse holding facilities

in Orange County are entirely under the jurisdiction of the

Superior Court, so what? RLUIPA doesn’t exempt facilities

operated by courts. The holding facilities are separate units

within each courthouse, designated for a specific purpose—

holding inmates while they await court appearances. It

doesn’t matter who runs them; there’s no judicial immunity

for RLUIPA. The facilities are covered by the statute and who

operates them makes no difference.

In a creative effort to find support for its untenable position, the majority tries to rely on the interplay between

RLUIPA and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, maj. at

6595-96, but the attempt boomerangs. As I understand the

majority’s argument, it is that RLUIPA can’t apply to courthouse holding facilities because the prisoners aren’t there long

enough to file grievances under the PLRA to resolve their

RLUIPA claims. Maj. at 6595-96. This argument has a simple

answer, namely that the PLRA only covers “jail[s], prison[s]

or other correctional facilit[ies].” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Pretrial detention facilities (however defined) are categorically

exempt from the PLRA, although they are covered by

RLUIPA. The interplay between the two regimes actually

undermines the majority’s position. This is another argument

the majority brings up on the fly with no input from the parties. And, once again, the majority gets it wrong.

Finally, the majority seeks refuge in legislative history.

Maj. at 6594-05. As the late, great Judge Harold Leventhal

said, consulting legislative history is like looking over the

heads of a crowd and picking out your friends. Alas, the

majority here finds few friends; they’re more like cool

acquaintances. From the hefty legislative history of RLUIPA,

the majority plucks a couple of quotes where Senators Hatch

and Kennedy indicate that the primary purpose of the statute

is to protect individuals residing in institutions. It is not surprising that a floor statement would focus on the most serious

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abuses the law is meant to target, which will almost invariably

involve long-term residents of institutions. One wouldn’t

expect a floor statement to cover every wrinkle of the statute.

But nothing the senators say precludes applying the statute to

Khatib’s case. Keep in mind that we are commanded to read

the statute broadly and give it the maximum effect. Do Senators Hatch and Kennedy stand in the way? Certainly not. 

Congressman Canady, who is not a friend, gets no wave

from the majority, or even a nod. Yet, Canady was one of the

bill’s co-sponsors in the House and entered a section-bysection analysis into the Congressional Record. This analysis

explains that, just like it says, RLUIPA is designed to “protect

the religious exercise of persons residing in or confined to

institutions defined in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized

Persons Act.” 146 Cong. Rec. E1563-01, E1563 (extension of

remarks) (Statement of Congressman Canady) (emphasis

added). So much for the conceit that the statute only protects

inmates who reside in institutions.

* * *

This is not a hard case. The statute here clearly covers

courthouse holding facilities like the one where Souhair Khatib was confined and forced to uncover her head in the presence of men who were not her husband. As the district court

recognized—and the majority acknowledges—this is a serious

affront to her religious beliefs. I can see no plausible reason

why a facility which has a permanent staff of 20 deputies and

handles thousands of inmates a week ought to be exempted

from RLUIPA. If accommodating an inmate’s religious

beliefs is too burdensome or inconvenient, defendants need

not do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). But that is not something we can adjudicate at this stage of the proceedings. All

we can decide right now is whether there is any conceivable

way that a courthouse holding tank is a pretrial detention

facility, as specified in RLUIPA. You don’t have to be the

White Queen to believe that it is. Freud, Leventhal and KenKHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 6603

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nedy are looking down on us and shaking their heads in disappointment. We need to reverse and send the case back for

trial.

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