Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00720/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

I OCT 0 5 2018 I CLER~. Li.$ DIS TR; CT COU=l.7 

SOUTHERN O;ST"liCT Cf C~L FOR~IA 

BY DE?~7¥ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CREATIVELY DISRUPTIVE, 

LLC, a California limited liability 

company; ANDY SEELY, an 

individual; RUSSELL 

MASTERS, an individual, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE NATIONAL 

INCORPORATION NETWORK, 

INC., an entity of unknown form 

doing business as Form-A-Corp; 

ADRIAN BRION, an individual; 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 18cv720-WQH-KSC 

ORDER 

22 HA YES, Judge: 

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The matter before the Court is the Defendants' motion to strike. (ECF No. 9). 

BACKGROUND 

In June of 2017, Defendant Brion, on behalf of Defendant National Incorporation 

26 Network (NIN), and Plaintiff Seely, on behalf of Plaintiff Creatively Disruptive 

27 (Creatively), agreed that Creatively would provide certain marketing and website services 

28 to NIN. (ECF No. 1 at 16-27). The parties dispute the scope of the agreed-upon services 

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and whether the services were adequately provided or paid for. (ECF No. 1 at 4-6; ECF 

No. 9 at 13-14). This dispute gave rise to the communications at issue in this case. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Brion and Plaintiff Masters exchanged emails 

regarding the services from November of2017 until March 5, 2018, when Brion requested 

a refund. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6). Plantiffs allege that Brion subsequently threatened Plaintiffs 

through voicemail and text message; submitted negative reviews regarding Creatively on 

its Facebook page, on Ripoffreport.com, and with the Better Business Bureau (BBB); and 

arranged for others to submit negative reviews on Creatively's Facebook page. Id. at 8-9. 

Plaintiffs allege that this course of conduct caused business losses and emotional distress. 

Id. at 9. 

The contents of the Facebook, Ripoffreport.com, and BBB reviews by Brion and 

others are at issue in this this motion. (ECF No. 9 at 5-6). The parties agree that Brion 

posted the following review on Creatively's Facebook page: 

This company has taken $4,400 from my company to do some 

webwork. They have delivered nothing but excuses and garbage 

unusable templates and are refusing to refund our money despite 

not producing any of what we contracted to. They have a fake 

100% Satisfaction Guarantee that doesn't exist. Once they take 

your money, that's all they care about. 

Keep an eye out for them on RlPOFFREPORT. 

DO NOT DO BUSINESS WITH THIS COMPANY. 

20 (ECF No. 1 at 53; ECF No. 9 at 5 n.3). The parties agree that Brion posted the following 

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report on Ripoffreport.com: 

DO NOT DO BUSINESS WITH Creatively Disruptive LLC. 

The only thing they are creative at is conning you out of your 

money and making excuses. 

I contracted with Russell Masters at Creatively Disruptive LLC 

on June 17th of2017. They asked for a period of time to review 

our current website and about a month later had returned with a 

plan to fix some of our websites current issues and build out an 

order system for us with some upgrades. Ever since then it has 

been nothing but excuses and explanations as to why the project 

is still not done. I have repeatedly asked for a refund of the 

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$4,400.00 that we have paid them and they have refused. At this 

time they are in breach of our contract and their false claim of 

having a 100% Satisfaction Guarantee is just more of the scam. 

They are not capable of delivering what they promise and are just 

out to scam you out of your hard earned money. 

(ECF No. 1 at 57; ECF No. 9 at 6 n.4). The parties agree that Brion submitted the following 

complaint to BBB: 

I contracted with Russell Masters at Creatively Disruptive LLC 

on June 17th of2017. They asked for a period of time to review 

our current website and about a month later had returned with a 

plan to fix some of our websites current issues and build out an 

order system for us with some upgrades. Ever since then it has 

been nothing but excuses and explanations as to why the project 

is still not done. I have repeatedly asked for a refund of the 

$4,400.00 that we have paid them and they have refused. At this 

time they are in breach of our contract and their false claim of 

having a 100% Satisfaction Guarantee. It is clear that this 

company knowingly solicited business on Facebook and the 

Internet without the ability to deliver the work they are 

contracting to do. 

(ECF No. 1 at 60; ECF No. 9 at 6 n.5). 

On April 12, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against all Defendants for breach of 

contract, defamation, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 

Plaintiffs also claim conspiracy, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

against Mr. Brion. (ECF No. 1). On July 3, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to strike the 

defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and conspiracy 

claims on the grounds that they involve conduct protected by California's anti-SLAPP 

statute. (ECF No. 9). Defendants request attorneys' fees and costs for the motion. Id. On 

July 23, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition, also requesting fees and costs. (ECF 

26 No. 68). On July 26, 2018, Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 24). 

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1 DISCUSSION 

2 California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) instructs a court 

3 to strike a plaintiffs claim ifthe underlying allegations arose from the defendant's exercise 

4 of free speech, and if the plaintiff cannot show a probability of success on that claim. Cal. 

5 Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(l); see also Thomas v. Fry's Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206 

6 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that California anti-SLAPP motions apply in federal court); 

7 Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The California 

8 Supreme Court has implemented a two-step approach to a claim under section 425 .16. 

9 Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 617 (Cal. 2016). First, "the moving defendant bears the 

10 burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief 

11 supported by them." Id. The defendant must demonstrate that "relief is sought based on 

12 allegations arising from activity protected by the statute." Id. If that standard is met, the 

13 second step applies-"the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged 

14 claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated." Id. 

15 I. Protected Activity 

16 Defendants move the Court to strike the defamation, intentional interference with 

17 prospective economic relations, and conspiracy claims because they are premised upon 

18 communications that qualify for section 425.16 protection. (ECF No. 9 at 2). Defendants 

19 contend that Brion's Facebook, Ripoffreport.com, and BBB communications were in 

20 exercise of his free speech rights in connection with a matter of public interest, consumer 

21 protection information. (ECF No. 9 at 9-10). 

22 Plaintiffs contend that the alleged conduct is not protected because "it was not done 

23 in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest," and that any protected 

24 activity is "merely incidental" to unprotected activity (ECF No. 19 at 7-8). Plaintiffs also 

25 contend that the alleged text messages and voicemails from Brion are true threats not 

26 protected by the First Amendment. (ECF No. 19 at 9). 

27 A defendant bringing a section 425.16 motion has the initial burden of presenting a 

28 prima facie case that the suit "arises from any act of [defendant] in furtherance of 

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1 [defendant's] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California 

2 Constitution in connection with a public issue." Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452 (quoting 

3 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)). Under section 425.16, an act in furtherance of a person's 

4 right of petition or free speech includes a "written or oral statement or writing made in a 

5 place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." 

6 Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 425.16(e)(3). 

7 The Court of Appeals applied section 425.16 in the context of consumer complaints 

8 to the BBB and on "Internet message boards" in Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 

9 F.3d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 2013). The court found that the plaintiffs letter to the BBB and 

10 online posts were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and confirmed that "a disgruntled 

11 buyer's statements made against a seller" are protected even if "they 'relate solely to her 

12 private concerns."' Id. at 262-63 (quoting Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 

13 2d 514, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). The court found such communications "constituted 

14 consumer protection information because they were intended as 'a warning"' to avoid the 

15 plaintiffs services "and came in the context of information that was 'provided to aid 

16 consumers."' Id. at 263 (quoting Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 508 (Cal. Ct. 

17 App. 2004)). 

18 Statements to the BBB are subject to section 425.16 because the BBB's mission is 

19 "advancing trust in the marketplace by offering objective and unbiased information about 

20 businesses to consumers." Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 263; see also Chaker v. Mateo, 147 Cal. 

21 Rptr. 3d 496, 501-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding "derogatory statements about [the 

22 plaintiff! and his business" on Ripoffreport.com and other online fora were of public 

23 interest). The statute further extends to statements "made in the context of a request" for 

24 the BBB to intercede in a particular dispute. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 263. 

25 However, private disputes unrelated to the public interest are not consumer 

26 protection information within the scope of section 425 .16; for example, sending allegedly 

27 defamatory letters to a limited number of people for the purpose of exacting "personal 

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1 revenge." Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508 n.6 (distinguishing Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. 

2 Rptr. 4th 1122 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 

3 In this case, the Facebook and Ripoffreport.com communications contain language 

4 specifically warning other consumers not to do business with Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1 at 53, 

5 57; ECF No. 9 at 5 n.3, 6 n.4). The BBB communication is in the context of information 

6 "provided to aid consumers," despite the inclusion of information related to the parties' 

7 dispute. See Makaejf, 715 F.3d at 263. The allegations related to the Facebook, 

8 Ripoffreport.com, and BBB communications support Plaintiffs' defamation, intentional 

9 interference with prospective economic relations, and conspiracy claims. The Court finds 

10 that Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing the defamation, intentional 

11 interference with prospective economic relations, and conspiracy claims arose from acts in 

12 furtherance of protected activity. 1 

13 II. Probability of Prevailing 

14 In the second step, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each 

15 challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually 

16 substantiated." Baral, 376 P.3d at 617. The plaintiff must make "a sufficient prima facie 

1 7 showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff 

18 is credited." Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. The determination is made on the basis of 

19 the pleadings, as well as supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which 

20 the liability or defense is based. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 425.16(b)(2). While a "plaintiff 

21 need not produce evidence that he or she can recover on every point urged," Wilbanks, 1 7 

22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 512, pleadings alone are inadequate to demonstrate a prima facie case. The 

23 plaintiff must submit admissible evidence to show a probability of prevailing at trial. Evans 

24 v. Unkow, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he plaintiffs burden of 

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1 The text messages and voicemails that Plaintiffs identify as true threats excluded from First Amendment 

protection are beyond the scope of this motion. In this motion, Defendants identify only the Facebook, 

Ripoffreport.com, and BBB communications as eligible for anti-SLAPP protection. (ECF No. 9 at 2). 

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1 establishing a probability of prevailing is not high: We do not weigh credibility, nor do we 

2 evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to 

3 the plaintiff and assess the defendant's evidence only to determine if it defeats the 

4 plaintiff's submission as a matter of law. Only a cause of action that lacks 'even minimal 

5 merit' constitutes a SLAPP." Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 

6 3d 29, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 

7 A. Defamation 

8 To prevail on a defamation claim under California law, a plaintiff must prove (1) a 

9 publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, and (4) unprivileged, and that (5) has a natural 

10 tendency to injure or that causes special damage. Taus v. Loftus, 151P.3d1185, 1209 (Cal. 

11 2007). The U.S. Constitution also requires plaintiffs who are public figures to prove actual 

12 malice to recover on defamation claims. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-

13 80 (1964). 

14 1. Publication 

15 Publication requires communication of the allegedly defamatory statement "to a 

16 third person who understands its defamatory meaning as applied to the plaintiff." Shively 

17 v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676, 683 (Cal. 2003). The statement need not reach the '"public' at 

18 large; communication to a single individual is sufficient." Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. 

19 Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (1999) (citations omitted). Online statements are "a medium of 

20 publication." Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 2014). 

21 Neither party asserts that the Facebook, Ripoffreport.com, or BBB communications do not 

22 satisfy the publication element. Plaintiffs provide copies of Defendants' Facebook, 

23 Ripoffreport.com, and BBB statements. (ECF No. 1 at 53-60). The Court finds this 

24 element satisfied. 

25 2. Falsity 

26 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot show a probability of prevailing on the 

27 defamation claim because the Facebook, Ripoffreport.com, and BBB communications are 

28 either true or nonactionable opinions. (ECF No. 9 at 11-16). Plaintiffs contend they can 

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1 show a probability of prevailing because the communications state or imply false assertions 

2 of fact. (ECF No. 19 at 19). 

3 When assessing falsity, "[t]he key is ... 'whether a reasonable fact finder could 

4 conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.'" 

5 Overstock.com, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 39--40 (citations omitted). "Even ifthe speaker 

6 states the facts upon which [he or she] bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect 

7 or incomplete, or if [the speaker's] assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still 

8 imply a false assertion of fact" and be actionable. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 

9 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990). The Ninth Circuit has defined a three-part test to apply this standard: 

10 "(1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the defendant 

11 was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic 

12 language that negates the impression, and (3) whether the statement in question is 

13 susceptible of being proved true or false." Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 

14 2009) (citations omitted). 

15 In Chaker, the court found that statements indicating a person "picks up street 

16 walkers and homeless drug addicts and is a deadbeat dad" constituted "insulting name 

17 calling" but could not support a defamation claim. 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 504. The court 

18 observed that, on websites inviting "exaggerated and insulting criticisms of businesses and 

19 individuals," statements "lack[ing] any specificity as to the time or place" are 

20 nonactionable opinions. Id. On the other hand, in Sanders v. Walsh, the court found certain 

21 Ripoffreport.com and other online postings to be "specific factual claims" because they 

22 "recited alleged historical facts detailing perjury and fraud" and taking bribes for awarding 

23 city contracts. 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 192, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (analyzing statements 

24 such as "Fact: Because of the actual lies and fabrication that came out of [the plaintiff and 

25 her mother's] mouths that day in court we thought for sure that we had won. But .... 

26 purgury took place and false evidence was submitted and not followed up" and "Cheryl 

27 Sanders in the planning dept. ... Our residents are tired of our tax dollars being sunk ... 

28 into the friends and family members (sub-contractors) of the employees of the planning 

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department! How much extra 'under the table' money is being made from our planning 

dept?????"). 

In this case, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' statements convey to third parties that 

"Plaintiff does not perform its duties under the terms of the contracts" and is "unable to 

produce useable websites." (ECF No. 1 at 10). Plaintiffs assert the following excerpts 

from Defendants' statements are false or imply false assertions of fact: 

• "delivered nothing but excuses and garbage," 

• "at this time they are in breach of our contract," 

• "produced nothing on contract," and 

• "at this time they are in breach of our contract and their false claim of having 

a 100% Satisfaction Guarantee is just more of the scam. They are not capable 

of delivering what they promise and are just out to scam you out of your hard 

earned money." 

Defendants' statements include specific dollar amounts, dates, and details regarding the 

nature of the agreement and communications with Masters. See ECF No. 1 at 57; ECF No. 

9 at 6 n.4 ("I contracted with Russell Masters at Creatively Disruptive LLC on June l 71

h of 

2017 .... [T]o fix some of our websites current issues and build out an order system for us 

with some upgrades .... I have repeatedly asked for a refund of the $4,400.00 that we have 

paid them and they have refused."). Plaintiffs provide declarations from Seely and Masters 

20 stating that they "worked diligently at the direction of Defendant for over 5-6 months" and 

21 that "Defendant fell behind on his payments under the contract." (ECF No. 19-1at2; ECF 

22 No. 19-2 at 2). 

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Plaintiffs have shown prima facie evidence that Defendants made a false statement 

of fact or stated an opinion implying a false assertion of fact regarding compliance with 

the contract. The Court does not weigh evidence at this stage; whether Plaintiffs actually 

26 delivered any work product or breached the contract is irrelevant for purposes of this 

27 motion. See Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 511-12 (rejecting the argument that a 

28 defendant's evidence could "defeat" the plaintiffs for purposes of defendant's motion to 

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1 strike plaintiffs defamation and unfair business practices claims). The Court finds this 

2 element satisfied. 

3 3. Defamatory; Natural Tendency to Injure or Special Damages 

4 Libel, a form of defamation, "is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, 

5 printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person 

6 to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, 

7 or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Cal. Civ. Code § 45; see also 

8 Barnes-Hind, Ind. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("A 

9 corporation can be libeled by statements which injure its business reputation."). "A 

10 statement that is defamatory without the need for explanatory matter such as an 

11 inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, constitutes 'a libel on its face,"' or libel per 

12 se. Overstock.com, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 39 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code§ 45a); see also 

13 Barnes-Hind, Ind., 226 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 ("If ... a reader would perceive a defamatory 

14 meaning without extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common sense, then 

15 under section 45a ... there is libel per se.") (internal citation and parenthetical omitted). 

16 If a plaintiff adequately alleges and proves a libel per se claim, there is no need to prove 

17 special damages; rather, damage to plaintiffs reputation is presumed. See Barnes-Hind, 

18 Ind., 226 Cal. Rptr. at 356. "A corporation can be libeled by statements which injure its 

19 business reputation." Id.; Fer/auto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1401 (1999) ("In 

20 evaluating whether language used is defamatory, courts look not so much [to the allegedly 

21 libelous statement's] effect when subjected to the critical analysis ofa mind trained in the 

22 law, but [to] the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader.") 

23 (quotation and citations omitted)). Accordingly, as the defamation claim is presently pied, 

24 damage to Plaintiffs' reputation is presumed. See DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 30 

25 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) ("[I]fthe publication reasonably and naturally has 

26 the effect of bringing the business of the corporation into public contempt, and of making 

27 it odious in the estimation of those with whom it has business dealing or connections, then 

28 the law will presume that the publication was actionable per se without either pleading [or] 

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1 proof of special damage. It will be inferred that the publication did injure it in a business 

2 way, for it is only in a business way, resulting in pecuniary loss, that a corporation can be 

3 damaged by an alleged libelous publication.") (alteration in original; quotation omitted). 

4 The Court finds this element satisfied. 

5 4. Privilege 

6 Defendants have not raised affirmative defenses related to privilege. The Court finds 

7 this element satisfied. See Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015) 

8 ("[A] defendant that advances an affirmative defense to [anti-SLAPP] claims properly 

9 bears the burden of proof on the defense."). 

10 5. Public Figures; Actual Malice 

11 There are two types of public figures who must show actual malice to bring 

12 defamation claims: (1) "all purpose" public figures, who "occupy positions of such 

13 persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes," Gertz 

14 v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); and (2) a "limited purpose" public figure, 

15 who has "voluntarily inject[ ed] himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and 

16 thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at 351. For private 

17 figures, if the "defamation action involv[ es] statements of public concern," the plaintiff 

18 must show the defendant's statement was at least "negligent or unreasonable." Gardner, 

19 563 F.3d at 989 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (1974)). 

20 At this stage in the proceedings no party contends that Plaintiffs are public figures, 

21 that the statements relate to a matter of public concern, or that actual malice is otherwise 

22 applicable. The Court finds this element satisfied. The Court finds Plaintiffs have shown 

23 a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim. The Court will deny the motion to 

24 strike as to the defamation claim. 

25 B. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations 

26 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants intended to disrupt, and have disrupted, its business 

27 relationships by submitting, and causing others to submit, negative reviews on social media 

28 platforms. (ECF No. 19 at 6). The elements of tortious interference with prospective 

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1 economic advantage in California are "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff 

2 and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) 

3 the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional [wrongful] acts on the part 

4 of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the 

5 relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the 

6 defendant." Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008) 

7 (alteration in original) (quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 

8 950 (Cal. 2003)). In Sybersound, the court found conclusory allegations of business and 

9 economic relationship disruption insufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with 

10 prospective economic relations. Id. 

11 Plaintiffs allege that Creatively typically brings in four new clients, or $10,000 of 

12 business, per month. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Plaintiffs further allege that Creatively signed no 

13 new clients in March because of Defendants' actions, and that it has "lost prospective 

14 clients and business." Id. at 9, 11. Plaintiffs provide declarations by Seely and Masters 

15 stating "Substantially all of Creatively Disruptive' s business relationships are established, 

16 fostered, and satisfied on this platform," and "The conduct of Defendants, and others who 

1 7 have never interacted with Plaintiffs, imply an agreement between them to quickly and 

18 immediately harm Plaintiffs and to interfere with their business relationships." (ECF No. 

19 19-1 at 3; ECF No. 19-2 at 3). The declarations do not reference the disrupted business 

20 relationships or economic damage alleged in the Complaint. Given the pleadings and 

21 evidence related to the remaining elements of the claim, however, the Court cannot find 

22 the claim "lacks even minimal merit" at this stage in the proceedings. See Overstock.com, 

23 Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (quotation omitted). 

24 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a probability of prevailing on their 

25 intentional interference with prospective economic relations claim. The Court will deny 

26 the motion to strike as to the intentional interference with prospective economic relations 

27 claim. 

28 c. Conspiracy 

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Under California law, the elements of civil conspiracy are "(1) the formation of a 

group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious 

act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages." 

City of Industry v. City of Fillmore, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 433, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). Civil 

conspiracy is not an independent tort. Id. "A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does 

not per se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting 

in damage." Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 

1994) (citations omitted); see also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 

32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ( "[civil conspiracy] is not itself a 

substantive basis for liability."). "By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy 

presupposes that the coconspirator is legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or 

she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for 

breach of that duty." Applied Equip. Corp., 869 P.2d at 457. 

Plaintiffs base their conspiracy claim on the same allegations underlying the 

defamation and intentional interference with prospective economic relations claims. 

Plaintiffs provide declarations that "Defendants, and others who had never interacted with 

Plaintiffs" agreed to harm Plaintiffs' business, (ECF No. 19-2 at 3; ECF No. 19-3 at 3), 

and "a personal friend" other than Defendant posted on Creatively's Facebook page 

regarding the dispute between the parties (ECF No. 1 at 62). Plaintiffs have adequately 

shown a probability of prevailing on the defamation and intentional interference with 

prospective economic relations claims, providing independent substantive bases for 

conspiracy liability. Plaintiffs' declarations also reference emotional damage from 

"fearing for their safety" and a "fear of violence that Plaintiffs felt and the disruption on 

Plaintiffs' life based on that fear." (ECF No. 19-2 at 2; ECF No. 19-3 at 2). The Court 

finds that Plaintiffs have shown a probability of prevailing on their conspiracy claim. 

III. Fees 

"[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover 

his or her attorney's fees and costs." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c). "The Court has 

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1 broad discretion in determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs to award 

2 to a prevailing defendant." Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Warnick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222 

3 (S.D. Cal. 2002). The fee award must be supported by "substantial evidence." Id. "[I]n 

4 the context of awarding attorney fees and costs," "the statute 'shall be construed broadly."' 

5 Id. at 1224. 

6 A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to "costs and reasonable attorney's fees" in 

7 accordance with Section 128.5 if"the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous 

8 or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c). 

9 Section 128.5 defines "frivolous" as "totally and completely without merit or for the sole 

10 purpose of harassing an opposing party." Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 128.5(b)(2). 

11 Defendants request $15,600 in fees and costs. (ECF No. 9-1 at 16-17; ECF No. 9-

12 2 at 3-4). Defendants do not prevail on the motion to strike. The Court finds Defendants 

13 are not entitled to fees or costs. 

14 Plaintiffs request $13,525 in fees and costs. (ECF No. 19-3 at 2-10). Plaintiffs 

15 contend the motion is frivolous because "Defendants' publications were clearly not based 

16 on conduct taken in furtherance of Defendants' free speech or petition rights, and the 

1 7 motion to strike is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." (ECF No. 19 at 21 ). These 

18 contentions are inadequate to support a finding that the motion was frivolous. The Court 

19 will deny Plaintiffs' request for fees and costs. 

20 CONCLUSION 

21 Defendants' motion to strike pursuant to California Civil Code section 425.16 is 

22 denied. Defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs is similarly denied. Plaintiffs' 

23 request for attorneys' fees and costs is denied. 

24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to strike is DENIED. (ECF No. 9). 

25 

26 DATED: 

27 

28 

WILLIAM Q. HAY 

United States Distri 

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