Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00540/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00540-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD BRANTLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

BORG-WARNER MORSE TEC,

INC., et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 12CV540-GPC(JMA)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR

AN ORDER GRANTING AN

EXTENSION OF TIME TO

COMPLETE DISCOVERY

PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 6(b) 

[Doc. No. 162]

Presently before the Court is a an ex parte application by Plaintiff

Lisa Grande for an order granting an extension of time to complete

discovery. [Doc. No. 162.] The application is opposed by Defendants The

Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California [Doc. No. 168], Ford Motor

Company [Doc. No. 170], and The Crane Co. [Doc. No. 171]. As set forth in

further detail below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte application. 

I. Background

This action was initiated by Gerald Brantley, who passed away in

February 2013. [Doc. No. 119.] Thereafter, Ms. Grande, his daughter and

successor-in-interest, was substituted as the Plaintiff is this action. [Doc.

No. 134.] Due to Mr. Brantley’s failing health, discovery commenced in this

action in mid-2012, prior the issuance of a scheduling order by the Court.

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Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) were

served on July 6, 2012. Decl. of Luis A. Barba (“Barba Decl.”), ¶ 12 [Doc.

No. 168-1]. Thereafter, Mr. Brantley submitted to a 10 day long deposition

from October 22 to November 7, 2012, which took place in the home of Ms.

Grande, who was present for nearly the whole time. Id. ¶ 5.

On January 8, 2013, the parties lodged their Joint Discovery Plan,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), proposing, in pertinent part, the deadline

for completion of all fact discovery be set for May 31, 2013. The Court

conducted a Case Management Conference the following week, on

January 15, 2013, to discuss the scheduling and case management issues

raised in the parties’ Joint Discovery Plan and on the same day, after

conferring with counsel, issued a scheduling order requiring all fact

discovery be completed by the date proposed by counsel. [Doc. No. 114 &

115.] Shortly thereafter, on or about February 8, 2013, Mr. Brantley passed

away. [Doc. No. 119.]

On April 23, 2013, the Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel permitted Ms. Grande

to substitute in as Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 134.] The following week, Plaintiff filed

a motion requesting the Court continue the May 31, 2013 deadline for

completion of fact discovery, as well as the deadlines for the exchange of

supplemental expert designations and expert disclosures, by approximately

three months. [Doc. No. 138.] Plaintiff stated the continuance was needed

because Mr. Brantley had recently passed away and activity in the case

was essentially stayed due to difficulties in communicating with Ms. Grande

and Plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts to substitute her into the case. Id. Plaintiff’s

motion was granted and the Court reset the deadline for completion of fact

discovery on August 30, 2013, the date requested by Plaintiff, and also

reset the other discovery deadlines as requested by Plaintiff. [Doc. No.

142.] 

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Thereafter, on August 2, 2013, the Court conducted a Case

Management Conference to discuss, among other matters, the status of

discovery. [Doc. No. 158.] Plaintiff’s counsel provided no indication that

Plaintiff would be unable to complete fact discovery by the August 30, 2013

deadline. 

II. Discussion 

Plaintiff now requests an additional seventy days in which to

complete fact discovery and, “[i]n order to prevent any inconvenience to all

parties involved in preparing their expert reports,” Plaintiff also requests a

similar continuance of the deadline for Initial Expert Disclosures, Rebuttal

Expert Disclosures and the deadline for completion of expert discovery.

[Doc. No. 162, p. 2.]1

 Plaintiff’s ex parte application requests the extension

of time pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 6(b)(1); however, the relief sought,

an extension of the deadlines to complete fact and expert discovery,

implicates the good cause requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), as well

as the meet and confer requirements of Loc. Civ. R. 26.1.a and the

undersigned’s Chambers Rules.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated Diligence in Conducting Discovery or Good Cause to Continue Discovery Deadlines

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) allows a schedule to be modified for good

cause and with a judge's consent. Rule 16(b)' s “good cause” standard

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. See,

e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th

Cir.1992); See also Rich v. Schrader (S.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 3710806 at

2. Thus, in order to demonstrate good cause, a party must demonstrate its

diligence in taking discovery, its diligence in propounding or noticing the

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 Although Plaintiff cites the convenience of all parties as the basis for the requested

continuance, no defendant has joined Plaintiff in making the request and, in fact, three of the

remaining defendants oppose it. 

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particular outstanding discovery, and explain why the parties could not

exchange the particular discovery before the discovery cut off date.

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the

modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of

the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification.

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 . If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should

end. Id.

Plaintiff explains that Ms. Grande’s deposition did not occur until

August 12, 2013, and at that time she testified to new information and

potential documents and witnesses “that both Plaintiffs (sic) and

Defendants have an interest in exploring further.” Id. p. 7. Furthermore,

Plaintiff adds that because counsel was “awaiting the outcome of Ms.

Grande’s deposition, Plaintiffs (sic) have yet to depose the various persons

most knowledgeable for each defendant.” Id. pp. 6 & 7. Notices of those

depositions were served on August 20, 2013. Decl. of E. Page Allison

(“Allison Decl.”), Ex. B [Doc. No. 162-1]. Plaintiff’s ex parte application was

filed the next day, on August 21, 2013, just nine days before the deadline

for completion of fact discovery.

Plaintiff explains the delay in seeking the deposition of defendants’

person(s) most knowledgeable was because these depositions “would not

be effectual until... Ms. Grande had been deposed[;]” however, the

evidence before the Court indicates otherwise. Plaintiff’s counsel stipulated

prior to her deposition that Ms. Grande would not serve as a product

identification witness, demonstrating that Ms. Grande did not have any

product identification testimony. Decl. Of Paul Lannus (“Lannus Decl.”), ¶

20, Ex. F [Doc. No. 170-1] and Barba Decl., ¶ 7. Mr. Brantley, the key

product identification witness, testified as to the identity of the defendants

and their products to which he worked around and with during his

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deposition ten months prior, allowing Plaintiff ample time to propound any

necessary discovery on defendants. Barba Decl., ¶ 5. Moreover, even if it

had been necessary to delay the taking of defendants’ depositions until the

completion of Ms. Grande’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel still has not

demonstrated it acted with diligence in seeking this discovery. At a

minimum, counsel could have served notice of these depositions prior to

Ms. Grande’s deposition with the depositions scheduled to occur

afterwards. Instead, Plaintiff’s counsel waited until August 20, 2013, eight

days after the completion of Ms. Grande’s deposition and ten days prior to

the deadline to complete fact discovery to serve notice of any defendant’s

deposition.

Plaintiff’s argument that Ms. Grande offered testimony as to potential

new witnesses and documents also does not demonstrate good cause for

Plaintiff to reopen discovery. Plaintiff does not identify who the new

potential witness(es) is/are or what the potential new document(s) is/are,

instead referring the Court to portions of the rough cut transcript of Ms.

Grande’s deposition. [Doc. No. 162, p. 7.] Plaintiff also offers no

explanation as to why this information did not or could not come to light

earlier. According to Plaintiff’s ex parte application, documents may exist

that contain the names of additional witnesses. Id. p. 6. Ms. Grande

testified, however, that the documents in question were stored in Mr.

Brantley’s home. Allison Decl., Ex. A, Rough Cut of Tr. of Dep. of Ms.

Grande, 44:21-45:5. In fact, she further testified that she believed some of

the “new” documents had already been provided to “Mark” – i.e., Marc

Willick the attorney with the Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik & Associates firm

that represented Plaintiff until December 28, 2012. Id., 46: 8-20. If the

documents were in Mr. Brantley’s possession, or possibly even in his

attorney’s possession, this information should have been disclosed long

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ago – if not in connection with Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures, which were

served on July 6, 2012, or Plaintiff’s ongoing duty to supplement the Initial

Disclosures, then in response to written discovery requests by defendants

or, most recently, in connection with the Request for Production of

documents that accompanied the notice of Ms. Grande’s deposition. Decl.

of Stephen Farkas (“Farkas Decl.”), Ex. A., Request No. 29 [Doc. No.

170.1]. Nonetheless, Defendants report these “new” documents still have

not been produced, despite repeated requests by counsel. Farkas Decl. ¶¶

6-7; Lannus Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; Furthermore, the sole witness identified in the

excerpts of Ms. Grande’s deposition to which Plaintiff refers the Court is

Larry Durante, who is not a “new” witness as he was first identified by Mr.

Brantley on October 24, 2012, during his deposition. Lannus Decl., Ex. G,

Tr. of Dep. of Gerald Brantley, Vol. 2, 116: 24-25. 

B. Plaintiff Has Also Not Complied with Civ.L.R. 26.1 or the Undersigned’s Chambers Rules

Although the Court denies Plaintiff’s ex parte application due to

counsel’s failure to demonstrate due diligence or good cause, the Court

also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel completely failed to follow the letter and

spirit of the Local Rules and this Court’s Chambers Rules in their meet and

confer efforts, and instead chose to saddle this very busy Court with a

problem entirely of their own making by means of an eleventh hour ex

parte application. As indicated earlier, the relief sought by Plaintiff

implicates Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 in that it seeks to amend the discovery plan

determined by the parties and ratified by this Court. Civ. L.R. 26.1.a states

“[t]he court will entertain no motion pursuant to Rules 26 through 37, Fed.

R. Civ. P., unless counsel will have previously met and conferred

concerning all disputed issues.” “If counsel have offices in different

counties, they are to confer by telephone” prior to filing a discovery motion.

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See also Chambers Rules of the Hon. Jan. M. Adler. In this case, Plaintiff’s

counsel failed to satisfy this requirement. 

The declaration submitted by Keenan W. Ng (“Ng Decl.”) outlines

what Plaintiff describes as the efforts to meet and confer with the other

parties. Ng reports that on the morning of August 20, 2013, between 9 and

9:45 a.m., he placed separate calls to defense counsel to request they

each stipulate to the requested continuance and advise them an ex parte

application would be filed if an agreement could not be reached. Ng Decl.

¶¶ 3-13. It appears he did not speak with counsel for Defendants

BorgWarner Morse Tec., Inc., Genuine Parts Company and National

Automotive Parts Association, IMO Industries, Inc., J. T. Thorpe and Son,

Inc., and Pep Boys Manny Moe and Jack of California prior to the filing of

the ex parte application; however, because some of the attorneys he spoke

with indicated they would oppose the request, Plaintiff proceeded with filing

the ex parte application anyway. Merely making a phone call to inform the

parties that Plaintiff would seek additional time to conduct discovery

through an ex parte application is inappropriate and does not satisfy the

meet and confer requirement of Civ. L.R. 26.1.a. or the undersigned’s

Chambers Rules. Plaintiff’s counsel should have instead, timely and with

reasonable notice, convened an “all party” conference during which

Plaintiff’s proposal could have been fully and openly discussed by all

affected.

Furthermore, the undersigned’s Chambers Rules require all disputes

regarding discovery be brought to the Court’s attention through the filing of

a Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute, which is prepared

with the participation of all parties and only after meet and confer efforts do

not result in a consensus. Plaintiff’s counsel instead elected to circumvent

that requirement by unilaterally filing the ex parte application.

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III. Conclusion

It was not Ms. Grande's unavailability for deposition until August 12,

2013 that prevented Plaintiff from timely completing fact discovery. Rather,

it was Plaintiff's counsel’s lack of diligence in locating and producing

relevant documents and information and waiting until the final days of fact

discovery to notice the depositions of defendants’ person(s) most

knowledgeable. This is a situation in which Plaintiff’s counsel sat on their

hands, did little to litigate the case as the months passed by, served

discovery only days before the discovery cut off, did nothing to resolve their

disputes in a professional, competent manner, and then dumped

everything in the Court’s lap at the last minute. Plaintiff’s ex parte

application is, therefore, DENIED. 

Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California requests

the Court issue an evidence preclusion order pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1),

prohibiting Ms. Grande from using at trial any of the documents mentioned

in her deposition testimony that have not previously been produced. [Doc.

No. 168, p. 4.] The Court declines to recommend an evidence preclusion

order, but because these documents indeed should have been produced

long ago (see Section II. A., pp. 5-6 above), orders Plaintiff to produce

them to Defendants by September 23, 2013 to the extent they have not

already been produced. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 13, 2013

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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