Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01611/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01611-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Moshir, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Automobili Lamborghini America LLC, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 11-1611-PHX-JAT

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND

EXPENSES; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

STRIKE; PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff Kevin Moshir's Motion for Attorneys’

Fees, Costs, and Expenses (Doc. 40), Motion to Strike (Doc. 47) Defendant Automobili

Lamborghini America LLC’s Amended Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

and Expenses (Doc. 46), and Objections to Admission of Evidence (Doc. 47) proffered in

Defendant’s Response (Doc. 45). The Court now rules on these motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kevin Moshir (“Moshir”) brought this Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

(“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., suit on August 17, 2011. Moshir claimed that he

purchased a defective 2008 Lamborghini Gallardo Spyder from Defendant Automobili

Lamborghini America LLC (“Lamborghini”) on February 21, 2009, that Lamborghini

provided a written warranty for the vehicle, and that Lamborghini’s failure to cure the

vehicle’s defects breached the written warranty in violation of the MMWA and caused a

diminution in the value of the vehicle.

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Moshir originally hired attorney Luis Ramirez of the firm of Pryor, Ramirez & Amar,

LLC to represent him in this matter. Attorney Ramirez and his firm completed substantial

pre-trial work on behalf of Moshir, including preparing and filing the Complaint (Doc. 1) and

Amended Complaint (Doc. 6), creating the case management plan (Doc. 10), attending the

Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting (id.) and Rule 16 Scheduling Conference (Doc. 11), making

initial Rule 26 Disclosures (Doc. 17), and participating in settlement discussions with

Lamborghini (Doc. 45, Exhibit 1, Email Excerpts of Settlement Negotiations, at 1-2). On

October 17, 2011, attorney Ramirez communicated a settlement offer of $85,000 “cash-andkeep” to Lamborghini and Lamborghini responded with a counteroffer for $15,000 (id.).

Moshir fired attorney Ramirez and his firm on December 20, 2012 with the intent that

Moshir's “in-house” counsel assume representation in this matter (Doc. 14). “Primarily

employed as the General Counsel for CellTrust Corporation” (Doc. 40, Affidavit of Attorney

Rebecca Ruegg, at 2)—a company where Moshir is both the President and a co-owner (Doc.

45, Exhibit E, Deposition of Kevin Moshir, at 24-25)—attorney Rebecca Ruegg entered a

Notice of Appearance on behalf of Moshir on January 11, 2012 (Doc. 16). Lacking

experience in civil litigation and believing that hiring experienced co-counsel “was necessary

in this action to comport with Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct Rule ER 1.1” (Doc. 44,

Exhibit A, Statement of Attorney Rebecca Ruegg Certifying Personal Consultation, at 2),

Moshir and Attorney Ruegg hired attorney Brian Foster of the firm of Snell & Wilmer, LLP

“to offer advice and guidance to Attorney Ruegg” (Doc. 40, Affidavit of Attorney Rebecca

Ruegg, at 4).

Attorney Ruegg represented Moshir throughout the remainder of the pre-trial process,

including continued settlement negotiations, procurement of an expert, and a failed

mediation. On January 30, 2012, Moshir rejected Lamborghini's $15,000 counteroffer and

reiterated his demand for $85,000 cash-and-keep. At this time, Lamborghini’s counsel

explained that it was unlikely to ever make an offer greater than $50,000. Attorney Ruegg,

on behalf of Moshir, responded by claiming that it would be quite unlikely for Moshir to ever

accept an offer below $50,000 (Doc. 45, Exhibit 1, Email Excerpts of Settlement

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 The Rule 16 Scheduling Order originally set February 27 as the deadline for Moshir

to disclose the identity of any expert he may use (Doc. 21, at 2). Moshir, however, made two

separate motions to extend the expert disclosure deadline to March 27 and April 27,

respectively (Docs. 24, 27). Because Lamborghini agreed to stipulate to both extensions, this

Court granted them.

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Negotiations, at 1-2). On March 27, 2012, Lamborghini communicated a $20,000 cash-andkeep settlement offer which Moshir promptly declined without counteroffer (id. at 3). 

On April 4, 2012, Moshir hired an expert to examine his 2008 Lamborghini Gallardo

Spyder for mechanical defects and prepare a report on the vehicle’s diminution of value; the

expert submitted the report on April 26, 2012 (Doc. 45, Exhibit B, Diminution of Value /

Inspection Report, at 88, 92). Of particular note is that Moshir'’s expert report does not

proffer an opinion as to the dollar amount of any diminution of value, despite finding the

brake squeal to be greater than usual for a high-performance, premium, sports car (id. at 88-

93). Although Moshir’s expert opined that the vehicle's brake squeal could deter potential

buyers (id. at 91), he characterized “a severely diminished resale value” as being “due to

pages of problematic and unresolved service records,” not a mechanical defect (id. at 92).

Moshir appears to have disclosed this expert report to Lamborghini on April 27, 2012 (see

Doc. 33).1

On May 17, 2012, both parties attended private mediation, ostensibly in an attempt

to settle the dispute (Doc. 45, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Michael B. Brewer, at 2; Doc. 44,

Exhibit C(1), at 6). Although Moshir’s own expert’s report did not ascribe a dollar value to

the vehicle’s diminution of value, Moshir’s final demand at mediation was $135,000 (Doc.

45, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Michael B. Brewer, at 2)—$50,000 more than the $85,000 he had

been demanding since the beginning of the dispute and before receiving his expert’s report.

Lamborghini, however, increased its offer for settlement to $35,000 (id.). It is unclear if

Lamborghini’s offer would have included a provision for the recovery of attorneys’ fees,

expenses, and costs; Moshir claims that it would not have, but has not alleged that accepting

the offer would have required waiver of a MMWA § 2310(d)(2) claim for attorneys’ fees,

costs, and expenses (Doc. 47, at 3).

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On June 6, 2012, Lamborghini served Moshir with a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment (Doc.

37) for damages of $35,000 under Count 1 of the Complaint (a breach of the MMWA), an

award of “cost[s] and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended)

determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310,” and

judgment in favor of Lamborghini on Count 2 of the Complaint (the alleged Arizona Lemon

Law violation) (Doc. 39, Exhibit A, Defendant's Offer of Judgment, at 1). On June 19, 2012,

Moshir accepted the Offer of Judgment (Doc. 39).

Claiming entitlement to expenses and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 2310, Moshir now

moves the Court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. Accompanying

the motion is an additional motion to strike Lamborghini's Amended Response to Moshir’s

motion (Doc. 46) and objections to admission of evidence proffered by Lamborghini’s

Response. The Court now rules on these motions.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike

In his reply to Lamborghini’s response, Moshir moves to strike Lamborghini’s

Amended Response to Moshir’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 46) under LRCiv

7.2(m)(1), claiming that Lamborghini's Amended Response was not authorized by a statute,

rule, or court order (Doc. 47, p.1). Lamborghini’s original Response (Doc. 45) to Moshir’s

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 40) was filed on August 31, 2012, fourteen days after

August 17, 2012, the day Moshir filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Doc. 44).

Lamborghini filed its Amended Response, however, on September 4, 2012, outside of the

time limit authorized by LRCiv 7.2(c). Lamborghini did not ask for and the Court did not

enter an order authorizing Lamborghini’s amendment. Additionally, Lamborghini has not

responded to Moshir’s motion strike.

A red-line examination of the amended response reveals that the amended response

contains no new substantive arguments, but rather corrects citations, edits language choices

and arguments for clarity, and otherwise appears to be a more final version of Lamborghini’s

Response. The Court will not countenance submission of an early draft to meet filing

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deadlines with the intent of amending the unfinished filing to a “final” version after the filing

deadline has run. Lamborghini’s Amended Response may not have been made with ulterior

motives in this instance, but nonetheless, the Amended Response does not comport with

LRCiv 7.2. Moshir’s motion to strike Lamborghini’s Amended Response (Doc. 46) is

therefore granted.

B. Objections to Admission of Evidence

Pursuant to LRCiv Rule 7.1(m)(2), in his Reply to Lamborghini’s Response, Moshir

makes three evidentiary objections to the content of Lamborghini’s Response based on

Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rule 401, 408, and 601. For the following reasons, the

Court overrules each objection.

1. FRE Rule 408

First, Moshir argues that Lamborghini’s “inclusion of evidence of conduct and

statements made during compromise negotiations” is “inadmissible under [FRE] Rule 408

and should not be considered by the court” (Doc. 47, at 2). Rule 408 requires the exclusion

of evidence of “compromise negotiations” or other settlement negotiations only when offered

as evidence of the “validity,” “invalidity,” or “amount” of the disputed claim. FRE 408(a)(2).

Here, however, Lamborghini offers evidence of settlement negotiations not to attack the

underlying validity or amount of the claim, but solely for its relevance in determining the

reasonableness of Moshir’s claim for attorneys’ fees.

In Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2011), the district court found

that plaintiffs “took unreasonable settlement positions and prolonged the litigation.” Noting

that plaintiffs had initially demanded $425,000 and later settled for a total of $32,000, “an

offer which had been rejected by [plaintiffs] one month before settling for that amount,” the

district court used this evidence from settlement negotiations to reduce the attorneys’ fees

award. Id. Having not previously addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit found that “other

circuits have held that settlement negotiations may be considered by the district court as a

factor in determining a fee award.” Id. (citing Lohman v. Duryea Borough, 574 F.3d 163, 167

(3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3330 (2010); Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life

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Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1012 (8th Cir. 2004); Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir.

2000)). Specifically agreeing with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Lohman (“Rule 408 does

not bar a court’s consideration of settlement negotiations in its analysis of what constitutes

a reasonable fee award,” 574 F.3d at 167), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court may

“consider[] settlement negotiations for the purpose of deciding a reasonable attorney fee

award.” Ingram, 647 F.3d at 927.

In light of Ingram—binding precedent on this Court—the Court overrules Moshir’s

objections to Lamborghini’s proffer of evidence from settlement negotiations and will use

the Court’s discretion to give the evidence the weight it deserves when considering Moshir’s

motion for attorneys’ fees.

2. FRE Rules 401 and 601

Second, Moshir objects to Lamborghini’s “inclusion of statements and conclusions

regarding the ultimate outcome of the case based on facts that may or may not have been

submitted at a trial that did not occur as irrelevant under FRE Rule 401 and speculative under

FRE Rule 602” (Doc. 47, at 2). Moshir makes this objection generally and offers no specific

details or examples of irrelevant facts or speculative conclusions submitted by Lamborghini.

Instead, Moshir simply argues that “much of the evidence presented by [Lamborghini] is

irrelevant” because the “purpose of the current motion is to determine the reasonableness”

of the attorneys’ fees. Equally without specificity, Moshir alleges that Lamborghini’s

presentation of evidence in its response is “frequently inaccurate and incomplete,” and

therefore “any conclusions based upon such evidence would require speculation” (Doc. 47,

at 2).

Because Moshir has not identified any specific evidence to which he objects, the

Court finds the objections overly broad and lacking sufficient clarity to enable the Court to

apply FRE Rules 401 and 602. Consequently, the Court overrules Moshir’s objections to the

admission of evidence and will use the Court’s discretion to give the evidence the weight it

deserves when considering Moshir’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

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C. Attorneys’ Fees under the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2310

Under the MMWA, a prevailing plaintiff “may be allowed by the court to recover 

. . . a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys’ fees

based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred

by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this provision and in accordance with

the accepted Offer of Judgment (Doc. 39, Exhibit A), Moshir has moved for attorneys’ fees,

costs, and expenses in the aggregate amount of $55,047.90 (Doc. 44, at 11). Lamborghini,

in its Response, argues that Moshir’s motion should be denied in its entirety and, if not, that

several discrete portions of Moshir’s claimed fees should be denied or reduced as being

unreasonable (Doc. 45). For the following reasons, the Court awards Moshir a total of

$22,031.40 in attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

1. Appropriateness of Awarding Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses

Lamborghini first argues that an award of attorneys’ fees is inappropriate because the

Offer of Judgment accepted was a fraction of Moshir’s original demand (thereby

demonstrating limited success in his claims) and the fee request is “grossly disproportionate

to [Moshir’s] recovery” (Doc. 45, at 1-9). The MMWA does, indeed, allow “the court in its

discretion [to] determine that such an award of attorneys’ fees would be inappropriate.” 

§ 2310(d)(2). In this case, however, Lamborghini, in its Offer of Judgment (which Moshir

accepted), specifically offered to award Moshir “a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost

and expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the

Court to have been reasonably incurred pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310” (Doc. 39, Exhibit

A, at 1) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Court will not find an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees inappropriate in this case. Instead, the Court will examine Moshir’s Motion

for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses for reasonableness with particular attention to the

discrete portions challenged by Lamborghini.

2. Reasonableness of Moshir's Claimed Attorneys’ Fees

The “case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly” to all federal

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fee-shifting statutes. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). In determining

a reasonable attorney’s fee, the Court must begin with the “lodestar” figure which is “the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). There is a “strong presumption” that

the lodestar is the reasonable fee. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for

Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). When deciding the reasonable number of hours

expended and the reasonableness of the hourly rate, a court may consider: “(1) the novelty

and complexity of the issues[;] (2) the special skill and experience of counsel[;] (3) the

quality of representation[;] and (4) the results obtained.” Cabrales v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235

(9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, “[i]n determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the burden

of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.

Those hours may be reduced by the Court where documentation of the hours is inadequate;

if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; [or] if the hours expended are deemed

excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th

Cir.1986), reh'g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987) (internal

citations omitted). The court will adhere to these factors in its analysis of the reasonableness

of each discrete portion of Moshir’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses.

a. Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Costs of Pryor, Ramirez &

Amar, LLC

Moshir seeks a total of $5,500 on behalf of his initial attorneys, Luis Ramirez and

Shalev Amar: $5,096.80 in attorneys’ fees, a $350 complaint filing fee, and $53.20 in total

service fees (Doc. 44, at 12). Attorneys Ramirez and Amar performed 20.7 hours of work

between August 2011 and December 9, 2011, including filing the initial and amended

complaint, handling the Rule 16 scheduling conference, drafting the proposed case

management plan and initial Rule 26 Disclosure Statement, and conducting settlement

negotiations with Lamborghini (Doc. 40, Exhibit A(2); Doc. 44, at 5-6). Because

Lamborghini “has no qualm with the time-and-task entries or the billing rate of Pryor,

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Ramirez & Amar, LLC” (Doc. 45, at 16), the Court will not delve deeper into a

reasonableness analysis.

The lodestar calculation of 20.7 hours multiplied by $300 per hour yields total

attorneys’ fees of $6,210. In addition, Pryor, Ramirez & Amar, LLC paid a total of $403.20

in filing and service costs, yielding a grand total of $6,613.20 (Doc. 40, Exhibit A(1)). Pryor,

Ramirez & Amar, LLC, however, agreed to accept a total of $5,500 as “payment in full” to

“resolve all outstanding interests involving the [f]irm,” and Moshir has already transmitted

payment to the firm (Doc. 40, Exhibit A(3)). Thus, the Court finds the $5,500 in total

attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs claimed for Pryor, Ramirez & Amar, LLC reasonable.

b. Attorney's Fees of Rebecca Ruegg

Moshir seeks $39,978.50 in attorney’s fees, representing 216.1 hours at a rate of $185

per hour, on behalf of Attorney Rebecca Ruegg (Doc. 44, at 12). Lamborghini objects both

to the entirety of Attorney Ruegg’s claimed attorney’s fees, and to several discrete portions

of those fees.

Aside from the proportionality and limited success arguments discussed above, the

crux of Lamborghini’s objection to the entirety of the claimed fees is that they were not

actually “incurred” within the meaning of the MMWA fee-shifting statute, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2310(d)(2). Lamborghini argues that because Attorney Ruegg is the salaried “in-house

counsel” of a company where Moshir is both a co-owner and president, awarding any

attorney’s fees for Ruegg’s work constitutes an inappropriate windfall for Moshir (Doc. 45,

at 10-11).

To support its argument, Lamborghini first points to the ambiguous and incomplete

description of Attorney Ruegg’s professional relationship with Moshir contained in Moshir’s

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

Specifically, Attorney Ruegg’s role as general counsel for CellTrust Corporation is disclosed,

but plaintiff Moshir is described only as having previously worked with Ruegg at CellTrust

because of his “role within CellTrust”—his ownership interest and presidency are not

disclosed (Doc. 44, at 9; Doc. 44, Exhibit D, at 3). Lamborghini further avows that Attorney

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Ruegg has informed Lamborghini that she has continued to receive her full salary as general

counsel during the dispute despite attending Mr. Moshir’s deposition, the mediation

conference, and having numerous phone calls and email exchanges with Lamborghini during

normal business hours on weekdays (Doc. 45, Exhibit A, at 2; see Doc. 47, at 6-7).

Lamborghini also draws attention to the fact that Moshir has not yet paid Attorney Ruegg any

attorney’s fees for her claimed hours (Id.). Lastly, Lamborghini cites to Moshir’s fee

agreement with Attorney Ruegg as evidence that Ruegg will be paid only by the fee award

and not by Moshir: “fees shall be payable upon resolution of this matter, . . . [i]f attorney’s

[sic] fees or costs are awarded in your favor in this agreement, you agree that all such equal

to the amount incurred for the work I performed under this agreement will be received by

me” (Doc. 40, Exhibit B(1)). 

Attorney Ruegg characterizes her attorney-client relationship with Moshir as “separate

representation of . . . an individual,” regarding a “personal case,” and the work involved as

“in addition to and completely separate from [her] role as General Counsel for CellTrust

Corporation” (Doc. 44, at 9). Attorney Ruegg further avows that she “works hours that

include late evenings, weekends, early mornings, and holidays to ensure that she meets her

obligations to CellTrust and any separate client she represents” and that CellTrust does not

and has not compensated her for her representation of Moshir” (Doc. 47, at 6-7). Lastly,

Attorney Ruegg explains that her fee agreement is a standard form she uses to collect fees

“only upon resolution of matters” because she “does not maintain a trust account to hold

client funds” during the pendency of a matter and that Moshir is contractually bound to pay

the incurred fees regardless of a fee award (Id. at 7).

The record available to the Court does not provide enough conclusive evidence to

justify denying Attorney Ruegg’s claimed attorney fees on the basis that it would merely be

a windfall for Moshir. Attorney Ruegg’s sworn characterization of the representation as

arms-length and requiring personal payment from Moshir for fees “incurred,” regardless of

the disposition of this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, is supported by the record before the

Court (Doc. 47, Affidavit of Attorney Ruegg at ¶ 6(g)). Consequently, the Court will

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examine the reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg’s claimed hours and her rate to create a

lodestar calculation.

i. Block-Billing by Attorney Ruegg

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that many of Attorney Ruegg’s time-and-task

entries, such as the March 19 entry, are “block-billed” in that they contain multiple individual

and unrelated tasks in violation of LRCiv 54.2(e)(1)(b). Block-billing is not inappropriate per

se when the party seeking fees meets the basic requirements of “listing his hours and

identifying the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” Fischer v. SJP–P.D. Inc.,

214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at

433 (noting that although the fee applicant bears the burden of submitting “evidence

supporting the hours worked and rates claimed,” an applicant is “not required to record in

great detail how each minute of his time was expended”). While not forbidden by case law,

block-billing makes it nearly impossible for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the

hours spent on each task. Where the Court cannot distinguish between the time claimed for

the various tasks, the Court will reduce the award accordingly. LRCiv 54.2(e)(2); see

Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210.

ii. Attorney Ruegg’s Duplicative Efforts

Lamborghini objects to the reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg billing 26.7 hours of

time for efforts previously accounted for in the time-and-task entries of Pryor, Ramirez &

Amar, LLC, such as “reviewing emails, disclosures, and case documents, and researching the

Arizona Lemon Law and MMWA,” before Moshir chose to change counsel to Attorney

Ruegg (Doc. 45, at 11-12). “In determining a reasonable number of hours, the Court must

review detailed time records to determine whether the hours claimed by the applicant were

unnecessary, duplicative or excessive.” Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assoc., Inc., No. 03–0651,

2004 WL 1874978 (N.D.Cal. Aug.10, 2004) (citing Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210).

Mr. Moshir originally hired Pryor, Ramirez & Amar, LLC to represent his interests

in this litigation, however, Moshir fired attorney Ramirez and his firm on December 20, 2012

and Attorney Ruegg entered a Notice of Appearance on Jan. 11, 2012. Attorney Ruegg

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defends her duplicative efforts as necessary because “when [Moshir] changed trial counsel,

[Moshir's] case had not been fully briefed and discovery was just beginning” (Doc. 47, at 8).

Moshir has not, however, provided any legal support to rebut the general rule that duplicative

hours are not reasonable. See Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.

Instead, Moshir attempts to distinguish his case from those cited by Lamborghini in support

of eliminating duplicative hours. Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., regardless of its

different facts and circumstances, supports the proposition that duplicative efforts are

unreasonable and may be eliminated from a fee award in an MMWA case. 402 F.3d 912,

919-20 (9th Cir. 2005).

A litigant has the right to counsel of his choice in many circumstances, including this

case. Moshir, however, has presented no legal authority—and the Court has found

none—that would require Lamborghini to pay for the hours Attorney Ruegg expended to

become “caught-up” after a change of counsel entirely within Moshir’s discretion. Even if

the MMWA was to be interpreted to require Lamborghini to subsidize Moshir’s change of

counsel, the Court will not penalize Lamborghini for Moshir’s choice to replace expert

MMWA counsel, Pryor, Ramirez & Amar, LLC, with Attorney Ruegg who was, in her own

sworn words, an inexperienced litigator and lacking the necessary competence in the

MMWA at the beginning of her representation (Doc. 47, at 8-9). In sum, the Court finds the

hours expended by Attorney Ruegg to “catch-up” in this MMWA case unreasonably

duplicative.

The Court notes that Lamborghini has claimed that 26.7 of Attorney Ruegg’s hours

were spent catching up, but Lamborghini has not specifically identified which dates or timeand-task entries total to this number. During its review, however, the Court has found that

every entry prior to Jan. 31, except for two 0.5 hour entries on Jan. 10 and Jan. 17, indicate

“catch-up” work and total to 25.5 hours. Additionally, a Feb. 8 entry for 1.2 hours describes

“catch-up” work (“[e]mails w[ith] prior counsel L. Ramirez re[garding] evidence [and]

review of same”) (Doc. 44, Exhibit C(1), at 2-3). In sum, these entries total 26.7 hours, which

matches the amount of time claimed by Lamborghini to be unreasonably duplicative. The

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3

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two motions: Feb. 23 for 1.0 and 3.3 hours; Feb. 24 for 0.2 and 1.2 hours; Feb. 27 for 0.7

hours; March 19 for 3.1 hours; March 20 for 1.7 hours; and March 22 for 0.4 hours.

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Court therefore finds the 26.7 hours described above to be unreasonably duplicative and will

reduce the reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation accordingly.

iii. Unopposed Extensions of Moshir’s Expert Disclosure

Deadlines

Lamborghini objects to the reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg billing 10 hours2

 of

time to prepare and file two unopposed extensions of Moshir’s expert disclosure deadline

(Doc. 45, at 15). Moshir argues that these time extensions were reasonable because Moshir

had unique difficulty in finding an expert capable and willing to testify against Lamborghini

(Doc. 47, at 10). Even if Moshir’s claim of unique difficulty in finding an expert were true,

the Court sees no unusual difficulty in drafting and filing two short, stipulated motions for

an extension of time when neither motion included nor required a substantial recitation of

facts or law (Doc. 24; Doc. 27). Moshir has provided no justification as to why Attorney

Ruegg billed 11.6 hours3

 to prepare, file, and review these two simple motions. In the Court’s

experience, each motion should have required, at most, half of an hour (0.5) to complete.

Therefore, the Court finds only one (1.0) hour to be reasonable, the remaining 10.6 hours to

be unreasonable, and will reduce the reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation

accordingly.

iv. Motion to Correct Rule 60(a) Scheduling Order

Lamborghini objects to the reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg billing 6.2 hours of time

to prepare and file an unopposed motion to correct the Court's Rule 16 Scheduling Order

(Doc. 45, at 15). In the original order, the Court mistakenly stated a June 29, 2012 discovery

deadline as June 29, 2011, a date that predated the November 28, 2011 order, itself (Doc. 12).

Despite the obviousness of the error, Moshir filed a formal motion and a proposed order on

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4

 During its review, the Court identified two (2) time-and-task entries related to the

motion: Feb. 1 for 3.2 hours; and Feb. 2 for 0.7 hours.

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Feb. 2, 2012 (Doc. 19), for which Attorney Ruegg billed 3.9 hours4

 to research, prepare,

review, and file. Moshir attempts to defend the indefensible by claiming that this time was

“necessary to have a clear and correct record” and “to avoid relying upon assumption” of the

correct 2012 deadline. The Court finds these 3.9 hours to be unreasonable and will reduce

the reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation accordingly.

v. Legal Fees and Costs Associated with Mediation

Lamborghini objects to Attorney Ruegg billing 51.4 hours and $1,757.50 in total

mediation fees to prepare for and attend a mediation, claiming that the MMWA does not

authorize such fees, the amount of fees claimed is unreasonable, and Moshir should bear his

own fees because his unreasonable settlement positions are to blame for the failure of the

mediation process.

First, Lamborghini contends that Moshir “offers no relevant legal authority for an

award of fees for mediation preparation and attendance” (Doc. 45, at 13). Moshir, however,

relies on the plain-language of the MMWA's fee-shifting provision which allows recovery

of “a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based

on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the

plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis added). Lamborghini argues that “the commencement and

prosecution” of an action includes only litigation and not mediation. To support its argument,

Lamborghini cites to Mota v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 530 (5th

Cir. 2001) for the proposition that “[m]ediation costs do not fall within the limited category

of expenses taxable under Title VII.” Aside from not being binding precedent on the Court,

Lamborghini’s analogy fails because § 2310(d)(2) allows for the “aggregate amount of costs

and expenses,” a much broader fee award than the limited language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k), which only allows “a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the

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5

 During its review, the Court identified four (4) time-and-task entries related to

preparation of the mediation statement: May 7 for 7.3 hours; May 8 for 6.3 hours; May 9 for

7.5 hours; and May 10 for 6.8 hours.

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costs.”

Unconvinced by Lamborghini’s argument and believing that mediation can be

connected to the “commencement and prosecution” of an MMWA claim, the Court reads the

plain language of § 2310(d)(2) to allow mediation fees and costs if, and only if, the Court

determines that the mediation fees and costs were reasonably incurred in an effort to resolve

the litigation (e.g. “for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such

action”). Consequently, the Court will examine the reasonableness of Moshir’s claimed hours

and fees for mediation with an eye towards their connection to resolving Moshir’s claim.

Second and third, Lamborghini contends that the amount of fees claimed is

unreasonable and Moshir should bear his own fees because his unreasonable settlement

positions are to blame for the failure of the mediation process. These two closely related

contentions encapsulate the argument that Attorney Ruegg’s time, billed as related to

mediation, was not reasonably utilized to advance the resolution of Moshir’s claim, and

therefore is not recoverable under § 2310(d)(2). As quoted above, when deciding the

reasonable number of hours expended, a court may consider: “(1) the novelty and complexity

of the issues[;] (2) the special skill and experience of counsel[;] (3) the quality of

representation[;] and (4) the results obtained.” Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1464.

For the first factor, the Court notes that Moshir’s complaint involved a rather simple

and straightforward MMWA claim turning on just a few issues of fact. Despite this, Attorney

Ruegg claims she required 27.9 hours5

 to prepare Moshir’s mediation statement. For the

second factor, Attorney Ruegg, herself, argues that she possessed no special skills and such

inexperience that she deemed herself to be incompetent without co-counsel (Doc. 47, at 8-9).

For the third factor, there is no direct evidence in the record before the Court of the quality

of Attorney Ruegg’s representation during the mediation preparation and process.

For the fourth and final factor, the results of the mediation reveal the true nature of

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6

 It is unclear if Lamborghini’s $35,000 settlement offer at mediation explicitly

provided for additional recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Moshir

claims that it did not, but has not alleged that accepting Lamborghini’s mediation offer would

have required waiver of Moshir’s implicit right to claim recovery of reasonable attorneys’

fees, costs, and expenses under § 2310(d)(2) (Doc. 47, at 3).

7

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filing of acceptance of Lamborghini's offer of judgment (June 20), inclusive, total 35.0 hours.

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Moshir’s position weighs against the reasonableness of his claim for fees. Despite having

recently received and disclosed to Lamborghini his expert’s report—a report that did not

pinpoint a mechanical defect or quantify in dollars any diminution of value (Doc. 45, Exhibit

B, Diminution of Value / Inspection Report, at 88-93)—Moshir demanded $135,000 dollars

in damages to settle (Doc. 45, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Michael B. Brewer, at 2). Moshir's

demand appears particularly unreasonable because it was $50,000 more than the $85,000 he

had been demanding since the beginning of the dispute and before receiving an expert’s

report that did not significantly advance his claims. Moreover, at the May 17, 2012

mediation, Moshir rejected Lamborghini’s offer to settle for $35,000.6

 Yet, one month later,

after 35.0 more hours7

 of time claimed by Attorney Ruegg and apparently without any

significant new evidence, Moshir accepted Lamborghini’s offer of judgment for $35,000 in

damages. In his Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Reply, Moshir offers no explanation for his

change of heart or rationale as to how the Court can interpret his mediation tactics as

something other than a ploy to needlessly prolong the litigation and increase Attorney

Ruegg’s fees. 

Thus, the Court finds that the mediation was not reasonably in furtherance of

resolving the dispute. Therefore MMWA § 2310(d)(2) does not provide for recovery of the

attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses related to the failed mediation and Moshir should bear

his own costs for its failure. The Court has counted a total of 48.3 hours related to mediation:

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8 See n.5, supra.

9

 During its review, the Court identified thirteen (13) time-and-task entries related to

the failed mediation, but not to the mediation statement: March 7 for 0.2 hours; March 11 for

0.2 hours; March 15 for 0.4 and 0.2 hours; March 16 for 0.5 hours; March 22 for 2.7 hours;

March 27 for 2.2 hours; April 17 for 0.7 hours; April 18 for 0.3 hours; April 25 for 0.7 hours;

May 4 for 0.1 hours; May 11 for 2.8 hours; and May 17 for 9.4 hours.

10 See n.7, supra.

11 48.3 hours + 35.0 hours - 2.0 hours = 81.3 hours.

12Attorney Ruegg claims 27.4 hours to prepare and file the initial motion and an

additional 5.0 hours to prepare and file the reply (Doc. 44, pp. 5, 8; see Doc. 47, p.11). 

13 Specifically, two block-billed entries related to the acceptance of Lamborghini’s

Offer of Judgment: June 19 for 8.7 hours; and June 20 for 1.1 hours. Apparently, Attorney

Ruegg had calculated the entirety of these 9.8 hours as related to the Motion for Attorneys’

Fees.

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27.9 hours8

 to prepare the mediation statement and another 20.4 hours9 for preparation and

attendance. Additionally, the Court finds that because Moshir could have settled at the May

17 mediation on effectively identical terms as Lamborghini’s soon-after accepted Offer of

Judgment, the 35.0 hours10 of legal work provided between the failed mediation and filing

the acceptance of the Offer of Judgment was an unreasonable and needless furtherance of the

failed mediation process, except for 2.0 hours that the Court, in its experience, has found

reasonable to prepare and file a Notice of Acceptance of an Offer of Judgment. In sum, the

Court finds these 81.3 hours11 and the $1,757.50 in total mediation fees to be unreasonable

and will reduce the costs and expenses awarded and the reasonable hours component of the

lodestar calculation accordingly.

vi. Legal Fees and Costs Associated with Moshir's

Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses

In addition to recovery for legal work during the pendency of this dispute, Moshir’s

Motion for Attorney’s Fees seeks to recover a total of 32.4 hours12 of Attorney Ruegg’s time

related to the preparation and filing of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Reply. After

accounting for 9.8 hours13 of time-and-task entries already found unreasonable, the Court

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14 The district courts are free to adopt local rules regarding the filing of motions for

attorneys’ fees and expenses. See Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1982)); see also Grove v. Wells

Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Warren,

601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.1979) (“[o]nly in rare cases will we question the exercise of

discretion in connection with the application of local rules”).

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calculates a total of 22.6 hours claimed by Attorney Ruegg related to Moshir’s motion for

attorneys’ fees.

In the District of Arizona, motions for attorneys’ fees and costs are governed by Local

Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2.14 A motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses must “cite the

applicable statutory or contractual authority upon which the movant seeks an award of

attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable expenses.” LRCiv 54.2(c)(1). “If the moving party

claims entitlement to fees for preparing the motion and memorandum for award of attorneys’

fees and related non-taxable expenses, such party also must cite the applicable legal authority

supporting such specific request.” LRCiv 54.2(c)(2). A motion must also discuss the

reasonableness of the requested award, using the factors provided in the Local Rule, such as

the time required, novelty of the questions presented, and the customary fee charged. LRCiv

54.2(c)(3).

While Moshir has complied with LRCiv 54.2(c)(1) and (3), he has failed to

specifically cite any applicable legal authority supporting his claim of entitlement to fees for

preparing the motion and memorandum for award of attorneys’ fees, as required by LRCiv

54.2(c)(2). Specifically, Moshir has made no argument that Attorney Ruegg’s preparation

of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees was reasonably incurred “for or in connection with the

commencement and prosecution of” Moshir’s MMWA claim. See, § 2310(d)(2).

Accordingly, Moshir has not shown that he is entitled to recovery for the 22.6 hours of

attorney time spent in preparing his motion for fees and costs. The court will reduce the

reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation accordingly.

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15 April 10 for 1.2 hours; and April 12 for 0.8 hours.

16 March 7 for 0.8 hours.

17 March 15 for 1.8 hours; March 16 for 0.2 hours; May 7 for 3.8 hours.

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vii. Other Unreasonable Hours Claimed by Attorney

Ruegg

During its review of Attorney Ruegg’s remaining hours for reasonableness, the Court

has identified numerous other unreasonable time-and-task entries.

Attorney Ruegg has claimed 2.0 hours15 were necessary to re-mail Moshir’s Second

Supplemental Disclosure statement and file notice with the Court because PACER had an

incorrect address listed for Lamborghini. In the Court’s experience, the correction of such

a minor clerical mistake should reasonably require no more than 0.2 hours, thereby rendering

1.8 hours unreasonable.

Attorney Ruegg has claimed 0.8 hours16 to “[e]mail reminder to [Moshir] regarding

transcript review; discussion re[garding] paid transcript fee” (Doc. 44, Exhibit C(1), at 3).

In the Court’s experience, emailing a reminder to a client and noting that a fee will be

required to procure transcripts should reasonably require no more than 0.1 hours, thereby

rendering 0.7 hours unreasonable.

Attorney Ruegg has claimed 5.8 hours17 for three time-and-task entries regarding

Attorney Brian Foster that, for the reasons discussed below, were unreasonable because they

were either unnecessary or merely mentoring of Attorney Ruegg.

In sum, the Court finds an additional 8.3 hours to be unreasonable and will reduce the

reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation accordingly.

viii. The Reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg's Hourly Rate

Lamborghini has not objected to the reasonableness of Attorney Ruegg’s $185 hourly

rate and Attorney Ruegg has complied with LRCiv 54.2(d)(4)(B) (requiring, “as

appropriate,” a discussion of “the comparable prevailing rate”) (Doc. 44, Exhibit D, at 4-5).

Accordingly, the Court finds Attorney Ruegg’s rate of $185 per hour reasonable and will use

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18 From subsections II.C.2.b.ii-vii, respectively: 26.7 hours + 10.6 hours + 3.9 hours

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this rate in its lodestar calculation.

ix. Lodestar Calculation of Attorney Ruegg's Reasonable

Fees

For the efforts of Attorney Ruegg, Moshir’s motion for attorneys’ fees seeks recovery

of 216.1 total hours of time at the rate of $185 per hour. As detailed above, the Court has

found a total of 153.418 of those hours to be unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds

Moshir entitled to recover the remaining 62.7 hours at the rate of $185 per hour. These sums

yield a final lodestar calculation of $11,599.50. Because there is a “strong presumption” that

the lodestar is the reasonable fee, Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. at 565, the Court finds $11,599.50

in total attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs claimed for Attorney Ruegg to be reasonable.

c. Attorney’s Fees of Brian Foster

Moshir seeks $2,880.00 in attorney's fees, representing 6.4 hours worked, on behalf

of Attorney Brian Foster. Moshir claims that Foster “was retained to offer advice and

guidance to Attorney Ruegg . . . [,] answer[] questions[,] and offer[] insight to ensure the case

properly proceeded” (Doc. 40, Affidavit of Attorney Rebecca Ruegg, at 4), and that he “was

utilized for 6.4 hours advising and consulting with Attorney Ruegg” (Doc. 44, at 9). Many

of Attorney Foster’s time-and-task entries, such as multiple phone conferences regarding

tactics and “send[ing] sample requests for production and non-uniform interrogatories to R.

Ruegg” (Doc. 40, Exhibit B(1)), are more accurately described as “mentoring” for Attorney

Ruegg than legal services reasonably incurred by Moshir in furtherance of his claim. The

remaining time-and-task entries, such as “review[ing] [the] complaint and amended

complaint” (an activity the Court notes was already performed by three other lawyers),

numerous reviews of various correspondence, and “review[ing] [Lamborghini’s] mediation

memorandum” (id.), are, at best, unnecessarily duplicative of the services performed by

attorneys Ramirez, Amar, and Ruegg.

Moshir defends Attorney Foster’s participation by claiming that because Attorney

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19 The Court notes that Attorney Foster’s time-and-task ledger includes three entries,

totaling 1.3 hours, prior to March 14, 2012 (the day Attorney Foster prepared a Notice of

Appearance). These entries were either duplicative (reviewing previously prepared and filed

materials, mentoring (phone conference with R. Ruegg regarding case tactics), or so

inadequately described as prevent evaluation for reasonableness (“work on claims and

discovery needed to prevail on claims”). See LRCiv 54.2(d)(2).

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Ruegg lacked civil litigation experience, hiring experienced co-counsel “was necessary in

this action to comport with Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct Rule ER 1.1” (Doc. 47,

at 8). The Court does not find Moshir’s argument persuasive because Moshir did not enter

into a formal fee agreement with Attorney Foster until March 16, 2012 (Doc. 40, Exhibit

B(2)), more than two months after Attorney Ruegg began her representation.19 Additionally,

Attorney Ruegg’s time-and-task entries do not mention Attorney Foster until February 23,

2012, and do not discuss engaging his services until February 24 and March 15, 2012 (Doc.

44, Exhibit C(1), at 2-4). Thus, despite her apparent insistence to the contrary, the Court will

presume that Attorney Ruegg would not have intentionally violated ER 1.1 by representing

Moshir until March 16 without necessary experienced-assistance if she had actually believed

that she was incompetent.

Lastly, Moshir defends his claim that Attorney Foster’s fees were reasonable by

arguing that by primarily utilizing Attorney Ruegg (at an allegedly reduced billing rate) and

only supplementing her efforts with Attorney Foster’s greater experience when necessary,

total legal fees would be less than “if Attorney Foster had been utilized as sole counsel”

(Doc. 47, at 9). The Court finds this conclusion inconsistent with the fees claimed in this

case. The Court notes that Attorneys Ramirez and Amar, specialists in the MMWA, required

only 20.7 hours combined to complete a majority of the work in this case that was reasonably

necessary for pursuing and resolving Moshir’s claim. Moshir has produced no evidence or

support that an attorney more experienced than Ruegg, such as Foster, would have required

even one-quarter of the 183.7 hours Attorney Ruegg claims were required to finish resolving

Moshir’s MMWA claim.

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20 Instead, Lamborghini only highlights the lack of analogy and binding precedence

of Moshir's citation to Holmes v. LG Marin Corp., 521 S.E.2d 528 (Va. 1999), and attacks

the impact on the merits that Moshir’s expert may have had if the case proceeded to trial.

Neither reason, however, changes the plain meaning of the statute.

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work. See Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the

Court finds that Attorney Foster expended zero reasonable hours, that examining the

reasonableness of Attorney Foster’s rate is moot, and that the lodestar calculation results in

a reasonable fee of $0.00.

3. Non-Testifying Expert Fees

Lamborghini objects to $4,647.90 in expert witnesses fees charged by Moshir’s expert

as being outside of the scope of the applicable MMWA fee-shifting provision, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2310(d)(2): “cost[s] and expenses” are recoverable if “determined by the court to have been

reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and

prosecution” of the action. Moshir relies on the plain language of § 2310(d)(2) to argue that

his expert fees are a “cost or expense” that was “reasonably incurred . . . in connection with

the . . . prosecution” of the action. On this issue, apparently of first impression within the

Ninth Circuit, the Court agrees with Moshir.

Lamborghini has offered no legal authority contradicting Moshir’s plain-meaning

interpretation of § 2310(d)(2).20 The Court, in its research, has found no binding or

conclusive authority supporting either party. Because of this, the Court must rely on its

interpretation of the plain-language of the statute. Here, Moshir had “retained [his] expert[]

in anticipation of trial” (Doc. 47, at 11) and to evaluate Moshir’s vehicle for defects,

calculate a diminution of value, and prepare an expert report. Hiring an expert for these

reasons is certainly a reasonable pre-trial step in a MMWA action involving an allegedly

defective high-performance sports car where the defendant claims that no defect exists. Thus,

the Court finds that, within the plain-language of § 2310(d)(2), this expert witness fee can

be considered to have been “reasonably incurred” by Moshir “in connection with the . . .

prosecution” of this action. The Court also notes that Lamborghini has not objected to the

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reasonableness of the dollar amount of the expert witness fee. Accordingly, the Court finds

the $4,647.90 in expert witness fees reasonable and will include them in its final award.

4. Transcript Fee

Included in Moshir’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is a claim for the recovery of

$284.00 in deposition transcription expenses. Although Moshir has not clarified their use or

reasonable necessity, Lamborghini has not objected to their reasonableness. Accordingly, the

Court finds the $284.00 in expenses reasonable and will include them in its final award.

5. Total Calculation of Award Amount

Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses:

Pryor, Ramirez & Amar: $5,500 (includes complaint filing and service fees)

Rebecca Ruegg: $11,599.50

Brian Foster: $0.00

Mediation Fees: $0.00

Expert Witness Fees: $4,647.90

Deposition Transcript Fee: $284.00

Total: $22,031.40

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting Moshir’s Motion to Strike Lamborghini’s Amended

Response to Moshir’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 46). Doc. 46 is stricken.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED overruling Moshir’s evidentiary objections in

Moshir’s Reply to Lamborghini’s Response (Doc. 47).

/ / /

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Case 2:11-cv-01611-JAT Document 48 Filed 02/26/13 Page 23 of 24
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Moshir’s Motion

for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses (Doc. 40), and awarding Moshir a total of

$22,031.40 in attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, as described above.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2013.

Case 2:11-cv-01611-JAT Document 48 Filed 02/26/13 Page 24 of 24