Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17106/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 160
Nature of Suit: Stockholder's Suits
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID RAINERO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARCHON CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-17106

D.C. No.

2:07-cv-01553-GMN-PAL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 17, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed December 21, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and

Carlos T. Bea and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Chief Judge Thomas

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2 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

SUMMARY*

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act /

Jurisdiction

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a class

action suit, brought on behalf of a class of preferred stock

shareholders, for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction; and held,

inter alia, that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards

Act did not provide an independent basis for federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The sole claim in plaintiff’s complaint was a breach-ofcontract claim arising under Nevada law.

The panel held that the district court properly concluded

that it lacked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 because the plaintiff did not assert a federal claim and

the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 77p(d)(1)(A), did not provide an independent basis for

federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law claim.

The panel also held that the district court properly

concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over the class

action suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because of the

exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C), which provides that

§ 1332(d)(2) shall not apply to any class action that solely

involves a claim relating to a security. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 3

Finally, the panel held that the district court properly held

that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff’s individual

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and therefore could not

exercise § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over the class

members’ claims. Specifically, the panel held that plaintiff’s

original complaint did not even plead individual diversity

jurisdiction, nor did it contain allegations that would be

sufficient to create such jurisdiction. The panel further held

that granting leave to amend would have been futile because

plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also failed to allege

a sufficient amount in controversy.

COUNSEL

Joseph N. Mott (argued) and Steven J. Parsons, Law Offices

of Steven J. Parsons, Las Vegas, Nevada; Steven E. Goren,

Goren Goren & Harris P.C., Bingham Farms, Michigan; for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

John Desmond (argued) and Justin J. Bustos, Gordon Silver,

Reno, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Judge:

This appeal presents the question, inter alia, of whether

the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 112 Stat.

3227, provides an independent basis for federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We conclude that it

does not, and affirm the district court’s dismissal of this class

action suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I

On August 20, 1993, Archon Corporation (“Archon”), a

Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Las

Vegas, created a class of equity securities designated as

Exchangeable Redeemable Preferred Stock (“preferred

stock”). After filing a Certificate of Designation

(“Certificate”) with the Nevada Secretary of State, Archon

issued shares of the preferred stock. The Certificate reserved

Archon’s right to redeem the preferred stock, in whole or in

part, at Archon’s election and upon providing notice to the

shareholders. Upon redemption, shareholders would be

entitled to $2.14 per share in addition to accrued, unpaid

dividends. According to the terms of the Certificate,

dividends would “cease to accrue on the shares redeemed . . .

provided that the redemption price . . . has been duly paid or

provided for.”

On July 31, 2007, Archon issued a Notice of Redemption

(“Notice”) to the holders of outstanding shares of preferred

stock, announcing its intent to redeem all outstanding shares

of the preferred stock on August 31, 2007. The Notice also

announced that the preferred stock’s redemption price would

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 5

be $5.241 per share. Rainero, a resident of Pennsylvania,

claims that he held 9,140 shares of preferred stock at the time

of redemption.

On November 20, 2007, Rainero filed a complaint in the

U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging breach

of contract. He argued that, under the terms of the

Certificate, the redemption price should have been $8.69 per

share; therefore, he and other shareholders were entitled to an

additional $3.45 per share. He brought the suit on behalf of

himself and other holders of outstanding preferred stock at

the time of redemption. According to Rainero’s complaint,

the class members held a total of 1,483,270 outstanding

shares of preferred stock at the time of redemption. The sole

basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction alleged in the

complaint is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), which confers federal

subject matter jurisdiction over certain class action lawsuits.

Shortlybefore Rainero filed his complaint, the investment

group D.E. Shaw Laminar Portfolios, LLC (“D.E. Shaw”)

filed a similar complaint against Archon. D.E. Shaw v.

Laminar Portfolios, LLC v. Archon Corp., 755 F. Supp. 2d

1122 (D. Nev. 2010). After Rainero filed his complaint, the

investment group Leeward Capital filed its own complaint

against Archon. Leeward Capital, L.P. v. Archon Corp.,

759 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Nev. 2010). The three cases were

consolidated only for the purpose of discovery; discovery in

D.E. Shaw was to govern all three cases. On December 22,

2010, the district court held in D.E. Shaw and Leeward that

the properly calculated redemption price was $8.69 and that

Archon owed the shareholders of preferred stock an

additional $3.449 per share. D.E. Shaw, 755 F. Supp. 2d at

1128; Leeward, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1257. This Court

subsequently affirmed the district court’s decision in a

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6 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

consolidated appeal. D.E. Shaw Laminar Portfolios, LLC v.

Archon Corp., 483 Fed. App’x 358 (9th Cir. 2012)

(unpublished).

In light of the decisions in D.E. Shaw and Leeward,

Rainero sought partial summary judgment as to the method

for calculating the redemption price. The district court

granted Rainero’s motion on November 7, 2013. On January

21, 2014, Archon filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because the class members’ claims did not

reach the $5 million amount in controversy required by

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Archon argued in its motion to

dismiss that the class held only 1,439,270 shares of preferred

stock, and therefore the amount in controversy is only

$4,964,042.23. Without ruling on Archon’s motion, the

district court entered a minute order on September 11, 2014,

requiringRainero to show cause why the action should not be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9), which excludes certain class actions

from § 1332(d)(2)’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Both

parties submitted briefs addressing the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction. In addition, Rainero filed a motion for leave to

amend his original complaint and submitted a proposed first

amended complaint. Whereas Rainero’s original complaint

relies solely on class action diversity jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), his proposed first amended complaint

also asserts federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 77p, individual diversity jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and supplemental jurisdiction

over the class members’ claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The

district court subsequently dismissed the case, without

prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rainero

timely appealed. We review de novo a district court’s

dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 7

jurisdiction. Young v. United States, 769 F.3d 1047, 1052

(9th Cir. 2014).

II

The district court properly held that it lacked federal

question subject matter jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” “The presence or absence of federal question

jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’

which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s

properly pleaded complaint.” California ex rel. Sacramento

Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d

1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The sole claim

in Rainero’s complaint was a breach-of-contract claim arising

under Nevada law. Because Rainero did not assert a federal

claim, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under § 1331.

Rainero argues that the Securities Litigation Uniform

Standards Act (“SLUSA”), Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227

(codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 77p), provides a basis

for the district court’s federal question jurisdiction under

§ 1331 because 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(A) is a federal statute

that allows certain class actions, including this one, to be

maintained in either state or federal court. Specifically, he

asserts that this case is a “covered class action” under § 77p

that is “based upon the statutory or common law of the state

in which the issuer is incorporated,” 15 U.S.C.

§ 77p(d)(1)(A), and therefore the federal district court has

jurisdiction over this case. Contrary to Rainero’s arguments,

SLUSA does not create an independent basis for federal

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8 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

question jurisdiction. Although we have not had the occasion

to review this issue, the D.C. Circuit addressed it in Campbell

v. American International Group, Inc., 760 F.3d 62, 63 (D.C.

Cir. 2014), and held that SLUSA “does not confer federal

jurisdiction over . . . state-law claims.” We agree with and

adopt Campbell’s analysis of this issue.

“As with any question of statutory interpretation, [a

court’s] analysis begins with the plain language of the

statute.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009).

“[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, [courts]

must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their

place in the overall statutory scheme.’” King v. Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citations omitted). If the

statutory language is plain, we must enforce the statute

according to its terms. Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 118.

As explained by the D.C. Circuit in Campbell, 760 F.3d

at 64, the plain language of the provision shows that § 77p(a)

simply preserves state law claims except as set forth in

§ 77p(b):

(a) Remedies additional

Except as provided in subsection (b), the

rights and remedies provided by this

subchapter shall be in addition to any and all

other rights and remedies that may exist at

law or in equity.

(b) Class action limitations

No covered class action based upon the

statutory or common law of any State or

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 9

subdivision thereof may be maintained in any

State or Federal court by any private party

alleging–

(1) an untrue statement or omission of a

material fact in connection with the

purchase or sale of a covered security; or

(2) that the defendant used or employed

any manipulative or deceptive device or

contrivance in connection with the

purchase or sale of a covered security.

15 U.S.C. § 77p(a)–(b). Subsection 77p(b) is commonly

referred to as the “preclusion provision” because it bars

individuals from bringing certain state-law securities fraud

claims as class actions in either state or federal court. See

Campbell, 760 F.3d at 64. Then, § 77p(c) ensures that federal

courts have jurisdiction for the limited purpose of

determining whether a certain state action is precluded under

§ 77p(b):

(c) Removal of covered class actions

Any covered class action brought in any State

court involving a covered security, as set forth

in subsection (b), shall be removable to the

Federal district court for the district in which

the action is pending, and shall be subject to

subsection (b).

15 U.S.C. § 77p(c); see Campbell, 760 F.3d at 64. In short,

subsection (a) provides the general rule, subsection (b)

creates an exception to the general rule, and subsection (c)

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10 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

gives a limited grant of jurisdiction to render subsection (b)

effective. See Campbell, 760 F.3d at 65.

Considering these three preceding subsections, as the

D.C. Circuit noted in Campbell, it is evident that the plain

language of § 77p(d) “‘carefully’ carves out exceptions to the

preclusive reach of subsection (b)”:

(d) Preservation of certain actions

(1) Actions under State law of State of

incorporation

(A) Actions preserved

Notwithstanding subsection (b) or (c),

a covered class action described in

subparagraph (B) of this paragraph

that is based upon the statutory or

common law of the State in which the

issuer is incorporated (in the case of a

corporation) or organized (in the case

of any other entity) may be maintained

in a State or Federal court by a private

party.

(B) Permissible actions

A covered class action is described in

this subparagraph if it involves–

(i) the purchase or sale of

securities by the issuer or an

affiliate of the issuer exclusively

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 11

from or to holders of equity

securities of the issuer; or

(ii) anyrecommendation, position,

or other communication with

respect to the sale of securities of

the issuer that–

(I) is made by or on behalf of

the issuer or an affiliate of the

issuer to holders of equity

securities of the issuer; and

(II) concerns decisions of

those equity holders with

respect to voting their

securities, acting in response

to a tender or exchange offer,

or exercising dissenters’ or

appraisal rights.

15 U.S.C. § 77p(d); Campbell, 760 F.3d at 65 (citing Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87

(2006)). As the Campbell court stated, “[t]here is no

indication . . . that Congress intended subsection (d)(1)(A) to

go substantially further, so as to create federal jurisdiction

over a category of state-law securities class actions.” 

Campbell, 760 F.3d at 65 (emphasis in original). Indeed, “the

introductory clause of subsection (d)(1)(A)—

‘Notwithstanding subsection (b) or (c)’—confirms that the

provision responds to subsections (b) and (c). It does not

embark on a wholly independent mission to confer federalcourt jurisdiction on state-law actions.” Id.

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12 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

In summary, the district court here correctly concluded

that it lacked federal question jurisdiction under § 1331

because Rainero did not assert a federal claim, and

§ 77p(d)(1)(A) does not provide an independent basis for

federal question jurisdiction over Rainero’s state-law claim.

III

The district court also properly concluded that it lacked

diversity jurisdiction over the class action suit under

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because of the exception provided in

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C). Under § 1332(d)(2), a federal

court may exercise diversity jurisdiction over a class that has

more than 100 members who are minimally diverse and

whose aggregated claims exceed $5 million. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(b); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.

Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348 (2013). However,

§ 1332(d)(9)(C) bars the district court from exercising

diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2) in this case. 

Subsection (d)(9)(C) provides that § 1332(d)(2) “shall not

apply to any class action that solely involves a claim” that

“relates to the rights, duties . . . and obligations relating to or

created by or pursuant to any security.”

Rainero does not dispute that the preferred stock was the

type of security covered by § 1332(d)(9)(C). Instead, he

argues that, because the shares of preferred stock were

redeemed, and thereby cancelled, on August 31, 2007, “the

Archon preferred stock was no longer in existence” when

Rainero filed his complaint on November 20, 2007. As a

result, he argues, § 1332(d)(9)(C) does not apply.

However, the plain language of § 1332(d)(9) does not

require that the covered security be “in existence” at the time

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 13

the complaint is filed. Rather, it applies to “any class action”

solely raising claims relating to the rights, duties, and

obligations “relating to or created by or pursuant to . . . any

security.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C); see also Greenwich

Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3 LLC v. Countrywide

Fin. Corp., 603 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that

§ 1332(d)(9)(C) “applies to suits that enforce ‘the terms of

instruments that create and define securities’” (citation

omitted)); Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31–32

(2d Cir. 2008); Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc.,

673 F.3d 609, 619–20 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Eminence

Investors, LLLP v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 782 F.3d 504, 506,

507 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting the Second Circuit’s analysis of

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) in Greenwich Fin. Servs. in

interpreting the “virtually identical language” in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1453(d), which precludes CAFA removal for a claim that

“relates to the rights, duties . . . and obligations relating to or

created by or pursuant to any security.”) Because Rainero’s

claim seeks to enforce the terms of the Certificate, which set

forth the rights, duties, and obligations relating to the

preferred stock, § 1332(d)(9)(C) divests the federal courts of

jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2).

IV

Finally, the district court properly held that it lacked

diversity jurisdiction over Rainero’s individual claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and therefore could not exercise § 1367

supplemental jurisdiction over the class members’ claims. 

Rainero did not allege individual diversity jurisdiction in his

original complaint, nor did he allege facts that would, if

proven, establish diversity jurisdiction.

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14 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction under

§ 1332(a), the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000,

and the parties must be citizens of different states. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Rainero did not allege diverse

citizenship; he alleged only that he was a resident of

Pennsylvania, and that Archon had its principal place of

business in Nevada. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the diversity

jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, speaks of citizenship,

not of residency.”). Nor did he make any allegation as to the

amount in controversy for his individual claim, or that his

individual claim exceeds $75,000 as required by § 1332(a).

“The party seeking to invoke the district court’s diversity

jurisdiction always bears the burden of both pleading and

proving diversity jurisdiction.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig,

LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2016). When a plaintiff

originally files in federal court, as Rainero did here, “‘the

amount in controversy is determined from the face of the

pleadings.’” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka

ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted). Therefore, “‘[t]he essential elements of diversity

jurisdiction . . . must be affirmatively alleged in the

pleadings.’” Bautista v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc.,

828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Given

the lack of pleading as to diverse citizenship and amount in

controversy, the original complaint plainly failed to allege all

the “essential elements of diversity jurisdiction,” id., required

under § 1332(a). Therefore, the district court correctly

determined that it lacked diversity jurisdiction.

Rainero alleged in his proposed first amended complaint

that the amount in controversy for his individual claim

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 15

exceeded $75,000, without offering further explanation.1

However, in both his original complaint and the proposed

first amended complaint, Rainero sought damages only for a

difference in $3.45 per share. He conceded in discovery, and

in briefing, that he owned 9,140 shares; therefore, his

maximum individual damages would be $31,533. Thus,

granting Rainero leave to file his proposed first amended

complaint would have been futile in establishing individual

diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy

pleaded, by his own concession, did not exceed $75,000.

Rainero argues, in briefing, that he may be entitled to

additional damages in excess of $75,000 in the form of postAugust 31, 2007 dividends. However, Rainero did not make

this claim in his original complaint; he alleged damages only

in the amount of $3.45 per share. Rainero’s proposed

amended complaint alleges the same amount of damages, and

again contains no mention of this additional liability and

damage theory. Accordingly, Rainero placed in controversy

only a potential individual claim for $31,533, far below the

requirement for individual diversity jurisdiction. Thus, his

tendered amended complaint was facially deficient to

establish federal jurisdiction, and the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying leave to file it.

In sum, Rainero’s original complaint did not even plead

individual diversity jurisdiction, nor did it contain allegations

that would be sufficient to create such jurisdiction. As a

result, no diversity jurisdiction existed over his individual

claim, and the district court could not exercise supplemental

1 He also failed to plead diverse citizenship, but all parties concede

that diversity of citizenship existed, so we need not reach that issue,

although the proposed pleading on its face is plainly deficient.

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16 RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP.

jurisdiction over the class members’ claims. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant

Rainero’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. Metzler

Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072

(9th Cir. 2008).

Granting leave to amend would have been futile because

Rainero’s proposed amended complaint also failed to allege

a sufficient amount in controversy, and the district court did

not abuse its discretion by failing to afford Rainero yet

another opportunity to cure the jurisdictional defect rather

than dismissing the complaint without prejudice. See Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that futility and

failure to cure justify denial of leave to amend).

V

We recognize that this litigation proceeded for several

years before the district court dismissed it for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. If a court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, it is obligated to dismiss the case, regardless of

how long the litigation has been ongoing. “[S]ubject-matter

jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a

case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Therefore, objections to

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “even

by a party that once conceded the tribunal’s subject-matter

jurisdiction over the controversy.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l

Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). This is true even

though such an objection “may also result in the waste of

judicial resources and may unfairly prejudice litigants.” 

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434

(2011). If a court determines that it lacks subject matter

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RAINERO V. ARCHON CORP. 17

jurisdiction, it is required to “dismiss the complaint in its

entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

The district court properlydismissed Rainero’s complaint

for lack of jurisdiction. We need not, and we do not, reach

any other issue urged by the parties.

AFFIRMED.

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