Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00990/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Efrin Osuna Chavez, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 14-0990 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

May 5, 2014. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9)

on June 19, 2014. Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his

petition on July 8, 2014. See Doc. 10.

I Procedural History

An grand jury indictment returned against Petitioner

and several co-defendants on November 19, 2007, in Maricopa

County Superior Court, charged Petitioner with three counts of

kidnapping, each classified as a class 2 dangerous felony

(Counts 1–3); one count of aggravated assault, alleged as a

class 3 dangerous felony (Count 4); three counts of theft by

extortion, each classified as a class 2 dangerous felony (Counts

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5–7); one count of smuggling, a class 4 felony (Count 8); and

misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 felony (Count 9). See

Answer, Exh. A. The charges were related to Petitioner’s

involvement in operating what is known as a “drop house” for

illegal migrants in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area. 

At the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was found

guilty as charged on Counts 1 through 8. Id., Exh. C at 2-4 &

Exh. B at 6-7. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision on

Count 9, and, as a result, the state dismissed that count

against Petitioner. Id., Exh. B at 7-8. The trial court

subsequently sentenced Petitioner to various consecutive and

concurrent sentences of seven and five years imprisonment,

comprising an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years

imprisonment. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner’s appointed

counsel submitted an Anders brief to the court, averring he

could not find any arguable claim to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. F at 2. Petitioner “was afforded the

opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona,”

but did not file such a brief. Id., Exh. F. On March 2, 2010,

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, while

correcting a discrepancy in the record. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id., Exh. G.

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On September 15, 2011, Petitioner docketed a notice of

intent to seek state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. H. The state

trial court noted that Petitioner’s notice was not timely but,

nonetheless, the court appointed counsel to “investigate the

potential claims that may entitle [Petitioner] to

post-conviction relief.” Id., Exh. I at 2. Petitioner’s

appointed post-conviction counsel reviewed the record and

averred to the court he could not find any colorable claims to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. J at 1-2. Petitioner

filed a pro se petition in his Rule 32 action, asserting he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel in his trial

proceedings. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner subsequent sought to

amend his Rule 32 pleading, asserting he had failed to include

“2 additional grounds that were omitted along with 2 exhibits.”

Id., Exh. M at 1. Petitioner also asserted that he wanted to

raise a newly-discovered-evidence claim under Rule 32.1(e) and

that his failure to timely file his Rule 32 action was not due

to his own error, citing Rule 32.1(f). Id., Exh. M at 2. 

In a decision entered August 23, 2012, the state trial

court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action as both untimely and

for failing to state a colorable claim for relief. Id., Exh. N.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which granted review and denied relief in a decision

entered December 23, 2013. Id., Exh. P. The appellate court

concluded that the petition was not timely and, as a result,

that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

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were precluded. Id., Exh. P at 3-5. The appellate court also

concluded that Petitioner had abandoned his claim of newly

discovered evidence, and further found that a claim under Rule

32.1(f) was not cognizable because Petitioner was not a

“pleading defendant.” Id., Exh. P at 4 & n.2.

II Analysis

Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled

to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of

a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515

F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court

for review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ March 2, 2010,

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decision affirming his convictions and sentences in his direct

appeal. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final,

therefore, on April 2, 2010, when the time expired to seek

review of the Court of Appeals’ decision denying relief in

Petitioner’s direct appeal. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the one-year

statute of limitations began to run on April 2, 2010, and

expired on April 2, 2011, unless statutorily tolled.

The limitations period may be statutorily tolled by a

properly-filed state action for post-conviction relief. See,

e.g., Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (9th Cir.

2001). Petitioner’s state Rule 32 action, filed in September of

2011, after the statute of limitations with regard to his

federal habeas action expired, could not and did not restart the

statute of limitations with regard to Petitioner’s action for

federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 417, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005); Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d

964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010)

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

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(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

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789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In reply to the response to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that his first Rule 32 action was “of right”

and was considered by the state court to be timely, that his

claims are not procedurally defaulted and that any failure to

timely file his state Rule 32 action was attributable to his

counsel. Petitioner also avers that he is not trained in the

law and that he is not an American citizen and, therefore, that

he is unfamiliar with the American legal system. Petitioner

further acknowledges that he has only a sixth-grade education.

Petitioner further asserts his federal habeas action is timely

because it was filed within five months of the last state-court

order in his Rule 32 action.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

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circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The

vicissitudes of prison life are not “extraordinary”

circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas

petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner has not made a showing of actual innocence.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations based on the theory of actual innocence.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the

statute of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

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III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Osuna Chavez’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 10th day of July, 2014.

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