Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00995/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00995-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL CLEO CONSTABLE, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:07-cv-995-OWW-SMS 

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN

THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER (DOC. 1)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on

July 12, 2007.

I. Screening the Complaint 

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

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malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. th

ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6 Cir. 1998). th

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

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favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

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faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

Plaintiff names as defendants the state of California;

Stanislaus County; James Brazelton, County District Attorney;

Regal Wilson, Chief Executive Officer; Lisa Constant Dickson; and

individuals described as employees of District 1, including Pat

Paul, Thomas W. Mayfield, Nick W. Blom, Ray Simon, Paul W.

Caruso, Ron Woods, Bruse Kirby, Jeff Scout Driben, and Cash Edith

Dudley. (Cmplt. pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff’s allegations concern state

court’s rulings in various civil actions concerning child custody

and support and marital status as well as related actions of

county employees and his former spouse and mother of his

children; they also involve allegations of false imprisonment in

connection with a state criminal proceeding. Plaintiff seeks

injunctive and declaratory relief to effectuate the cessation of

all actions against him, reunification with his children, and

damages for false imprisonment.

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I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity of State

Plaintiff names the state of California as a Defendant but

does not state any facts concerning the conduct of Defendant

state of California. Plaintiff has not linked this Defendant to

any conduct resulting in deprivation of rights.

More fundamentally, a state is not a person for the purpose

of an action pursuant to § 1983; hence, a section 1983 claim

against a state is legally frivolous. Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997). Further, a state has

immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Brooks v. Sulphur

Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. 1991). th

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s claim against

the state must be dismissed. 

II. Failure to Allege Conduct of Defendants County,

 District Attorney James C. Brazelton, and County

 Supervisors and Executive Officer

Plaintiff names Stanislaus County, County District Attorney

James C. Brazelton, named County Supervisors, and the Executive

Officer as defendants.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

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immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In order for a person acting under color of state law to be

liable under § 1983, the person must be shown to have personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of rights; there is no

respondeat superior liability. Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d

858, 867 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would render

the county or district attorney liable as a defendant. With

respect to the supervisors and county executive, Plaintiff

alleges only that they were informed of the actions of the

various “judicial employees” but nothing came of it; there are no

allegations of their participation in any of the actions in

question, and there are no facts indicating that the supervisors

had any authority over any judicial officers. Likewise, there is

no allegation that the executive officer participated in any

deprivation of rights.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against the county, district

attorney, supervisors, and executive officer should be dismissed.

III. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff does not name any judges in the caption of the

proceeding, but he asserts that judges engaged in a conspiracy

with others to deprive Plaintiff of his rights, and he complains

of the rulings of various judges of the Superior Court of

Stanislaus County in the cases described below.

Judges and officers whose functions bear a close association

to the judicial process are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for judicial

acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. Demoran v.

Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9 Cir. 1986). A judge loses judicial th

immunity for judicial acts only when the judge acts in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not

judicial in nature. Shucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th

Cir. 1988). The factors relevant in determining whether an act is

judicial “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether

it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the

judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-357, 362 (1978). Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations

that a judge conspired with a third party. As long as the judge’s

ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9 Cir. 1986). th

The allegations of the complaint before the Court establish

that the judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

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Plaintiff is complaining of actions or rulings made by the judges

in cases pending before the respective courts. The actions or

rulings made by the judges in connection with plaintiff’s cases

to which the judges were assigned were within their jurisdiction.

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue the

judges who made the decisions of which Plaintiff complains,

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.

IV. Color of Law

Many of the actors alleged to have wronged Plaintiff appear

to have been private parties. The Court anticipates the filing of

an amended complaint and informs Plaintiff that to state a claim

under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant

acted under color of state law. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d

1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are not

acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “[a]ction taken by private

individuals may be ‘under color of state law’ where there is

‘significant’ state involvement in the action.” Howerton v.

Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1983).

V. Jurisdiction to Review State Court Proceedings

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and an injunction

stopping all actions against the Plaintiff. Plaintiff complains

of various rulings in state court civil actions: an order of

attachment, a default judgment by family support services that

assigned to Plaintiff child support and arrears; an assertedly

fraudulent judgment for divorce and sole custody of the children

that Plaintiff alleges is void; dismissal of Plaintiff’s motion

for visitation; dismissal of Plaintiff’s motion for visitation

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without Plaintiff’s being present; failure to allow Plaintiff to

cross-examine a court investigator; and the denial, dismissal,

and the striking of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate an allegedly

void default judgment for divorce and child custody without

Plaintiff’s being present. (Cmplt. pp. 4, 6-11.) 

Further, he alleges misconduct of various persons in

connection with such proceedings, including his former wife, Lisa

Constable, who allegedly concealed the children and thus obviated

any duty of Plaintiff to pay child support, offered unspecified

false and misleading statements in the case, prevented Plaintiff

from being properly served and thus being present in court to

object to proceedings, conspired with attorney Dudley and

unspecified others to supply unspecified false information into

the record, tried with Dudley to have Plaintiff put in jail for

molesting his own children; attorney Cash Dudley who filed a

petition to have the minor children declared free from the

father’s parental custody and control, used allegedly tainted but

unspecified testimony of several child support officers and

counselors to try to support their false allegations against

Plaintiff in the proceeding to terminate parental rights, and

made representations of fact favorable to Lisa Constable in court

at a time she did not represent Constable and thereby violated

professional ethics; court investigator Ron Wood, who

investigated some aspects of one of the cases but allegedly

failed to report fraud of Lisa Constable (although Plaintiff

states that he prevailed in the proceeding to declare the minors

free from custody and control of Plaintiff); Deputy District

Attorney Jeffrey Drabin, who used a statement in court to have

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Plaintiff’s unspecified motions dismissed and in an affidavit,

and who failed to bring forth unspecified facts allegedly

established in investigator Wood’s first investigation; court

mediator Bruce Kirby, who failed to comply with a judge’s order

to conduct a criminal investigation; Judge Maria Silvera and

Dudley, who allegedly conspired to obstruct justice and struck

Plaintiff’s application to vacate the void judgment; and

Stanislaus County Supervisors Pat Paul, Thomas W. Mayfield, Nick

W. Blom, Ray Simon, and Paul W. Caruso, and County Executive

Officer Regal Wilson, who were given notice of the actions of

“their judicial employees” but did nothing. (Cmplt. pp. 4-7, 11-

12.)

It is established that a federal court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review final determinations of state courts, as

well as claims “inextricably intertwined” with final state court

decisions, even if such “inextricably intertwined” claims were

not actually raised in the state court. See District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-87, 483 n. 16

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Olson

Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9 Cir. 1998) th

(holding the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine is jurisdictional). A

federal district court is a court of original jurisdiction, and

as such has no authority to review the final determinations of a

state court in judicial proceedings. Worldwide Church of God v.

McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9 Cir. 1986); Dubinka v. Judges of th

Superior Court of State of Cal. for County of Los Angeles, 23

F.3d 218, 221 (9 Cir. 1994). “[A] losing party in state court th

is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate

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review of the state judgment in a United States District Court,

based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself

violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512

U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief with respect to

these actions. Plaintiff’s claims regarding these civil

proceedings are essentially an invitation to this Court to review

the determinations of a state court which were made over five

years ago and which appear to be final. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims regarding the state court rulings should be dismissed

because Plaintiff has not stated a basis for this Court’s

jurisdiction and has not stated facts demonstrating subject

matter jurisdiction in this Court.

VI. Malicious Prosecution

The complaint also addresses a criminal proceeding or

proceedings, concerning criminal contempt and/or possibly failure

to support his minor children, in which Judge Cole is alleged to

have made rulings concerning Plaintiff’s defense counsel and to

have jailed Plaintiff, Judge Griffey ignored a motion Plaintiff

filed, Judge Silvera denied Plaintiff a jury trial because

Plaintiff was not to be incarcerated for more than 180 days, and

Judge Lacey held trial in absentia and thereafter incarcerated

Plaintiff. (Cmplt. p. 8, 9, 10.) Plaintiff alleges that one case

of two consolidated cases was conceived in fraud and was dropped

by Deputy District Attorney Drabin because of obvious fraud; then

in the other consolidated case, Drabin proceeded with an order to

show cause for contempt against Plaintiff in connection with the

same money, and later filed another contempt charge against

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Plaintiff in 2001; Drabin and Judge Silvera conspired to extort

money from Plaintiff and protect unspecified judicial officers

from lawsuits, as well as deny Plaintiff his right to a jury

trial and confrontation of the accuser. (Cmplt. pp. 9-10.)

“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of

malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show that the

defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of

denying [him] equal protection or another specific

constitutional right.’” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing to Freeman v. th

City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)).

“Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits

against prosecutors but may be brought . . . against

other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to

be filed.” Id. “An individual seeking to bring a

malicious prosecution claim must generally establish

that the prior proceedings terminated in such a manner

as to indicate his innocence.” Id. at 1068. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was jailed; it appears that

Plaintiff suffered a criminal conviction, and Plaintiff has not

alleged that the criminal proceeding or proceedings complained of

terminated in a manner as to indicate his innocence. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution must be dismissed.

VII. Challenge to Criminal Proceedings or Conviction

The allegations of the complaint are ambiguous and

uncertain, but it appears that the complaint concerns allegations

of wrongful arrest, charging, and conviction based on matters

that have been the subject of a criminal conviction. When a

prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or

raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an

earlier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v.

Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090

(1991). Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

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unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), a § 1983 action that would call into question

the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not

cognizable and does not, therefore, accrue until and unless the

plaintiff can prove that his conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal. The Heck principle applies to claims

that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction

that might have resulted form the prosecution of the dismissed

charge, including pending charges in addition to actual

convictions. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9 Cir. th

2000). It applies generally to charges of unlawful or false

arrest. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380

(9 Cir. 1998); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d at 1014-15. th

Again, Plaintiff has not alleged that his apparent

conviction has been invalidated. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim/s

concerning his conviction should be dismissed.

VIII. Amendment of the Complaint

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim against the defendants and has failed to plead

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facts demonstrating jurisdiction in this Court. However, it is

possible that Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent

with the allegations, in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies of

this complaint. Failure to cure the deficiencies will result in

dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id. 

An amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997);

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at

567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED with leave to amend;

and

2) Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of service

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of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the

requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended

complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must

be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; failure to file an amended

complaint in accordance with this order will be considered to be

a failure to comply with an order of the Court pursuant to Local

Rule 11-110 and will result in dismissal of this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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