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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNJ;TED STATES COURT OF :APPEA~ 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

NORMA J. WARE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

1r1 L·E D 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirrui~ 

M-~Y 7 '1990' 

ROBERT p; HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 86~1:081 

) 

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 492, ) 

BUTLER COUNTY, STATE OF KANSAS; ) 

BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNIFIED SCHOOL) 

DISTRICT NO. 492, BUTLER COUNTY, ) 

STATE OF KANSAS, and LARRY L. ) 

GEIL, Superintendent of Schools, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

OPINION ON REHEARING 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. CIV No. 62-1278) 

Philip A. Hamm of El Dorado, Kansas, and Robert E. Hough,,. ,Jr. of 

Hough & Hough, P.A., Fort Smith, Arkansas, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Mary Kathleen Babcock and Timothy B. Mustaine of F6ulston, 

Siefkin, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee, Unified School 

District No. 492. 

Daniel J. Sevart of Sevart & Sevart, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellee, Larry L. Geil. 

Before McKAY, BARRETT, and SEYMOUR, Circ,uit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1081 Document: 010110284286 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 1
In Ware v. Unified School Dist. No. 492, 881 F.2d 906 (10th 

Cir. 1989), we reversed a directed verdict in favor of the school 

board on Ware's claim that she was discharged in violation of her 

First Amendment rights. The school board filed a petition for 

rehearing alleging that under Kansas law the board rather than 

Superintendent Geil was the final decisionmaker with respect to 

Ware's employment, and that there was no delegation of authority. 

In addition, the board argues that, in assessing evidence relevant 

to its liability, we erred in applying the deliberate indifference 

standard of City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989), to a 

claim other than the alleged failure to train at issue there. 

After receiving the petition, we asked the parties to brief 

the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jett v. 

Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 s. Ct. 2702 (1989), on the 

question of the board's liability for the termination of Ware's 

employment. For the reasons set out below, we now hold in light 

of Jett that state law vests the board with final decisionmaking 

authority and that the board did not delegate this authority to 

Geil. However, we reaffirm our conclusion that the deliberate 

indifference standard is the appropriate one to use in this case 

to determine whether the requisite "direct causal link" exists 

between the alleged constitutional deprivation and the board's 

decision, as final policymaker, to fire Ware. City of Canton, 109 

S. Ct. at 1203. We likewise do not disturb our conclusion that 

Ware succeeded in raising a jury issue under this standard. Our 

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discussion in Part IV of the original panel decision on the 

board's liability is modified in accordance with this opinion. In 

all other respects the petition for rehearing is denied. No 

active member of the court having requested a poll of the court, 

the request for en bane consideration is also denied. 

I. 

The Court reiterated in Jett that a local governmental entity 

such as a school board may only be held liable for decisions made 

by officials who have authority under state law to speak as final 

decisionmakers on the particular issue. See 109 S. Ct. at 2723. 

The Court then said: 

"[T]he identification of those officials whose decisions 

represent the official policy of the local governmental 

unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the 

trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury. 

Reviewing the relevant legal materials, including state 

and local positive law, as well as '"custom or usage"' 

having the force of law,' ••• the trial judge must 

identify those officials or governmental bodies who 

speak with final policymaking authority for the local 

governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have 

caused the particular constitutional or statutory 

violation at issue." 

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, a 

governmental body will only be held liable for the results of 

decisions made by the final policymaker, as defined by state law. 

However, final decisionmaking authority may be delegated. See id. 

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at 2724; see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 

124 (1988) (plurality opinion). On the other hand, 

"[s]imply going along with discretionary decisions made 

by one's subordinates, however, is not a delegation to 

them of the authority to make policy. It is equally 

consistent with a presumption that the subordinates are 

faithfully attempting to comply with the policies that 

are supposed to guide them. It would be a different 

matter if a particular decision by a subordinate was 

cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly 

approved by the supervising policymaker. It would also 

be a different matter if a series of decisions by a 

subordinate official manifested a 'custom or usage' of 

which the supervisor must have been aware. • • • In 

both those cases, the supervisor could realistically be 

deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have 

been formulated or initiated by a lower-ranking 

official. But the mere failure to investigate the basis 

of a subordinate's discretionary decisions does not 

amount to a delegation of policymaking authority, 

especially where (as here} the wrongfulness of the 

subordinate's decision arises from a retaliatory motive 

or other unstated rationale." 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added). In the present 

case, the school board argues that it was the final policymaking 

authority, that it did not delegate its authority to Geil, and 

that it should not be held liable for approving Geil's decision 

because it had no notice of the wrongful motive underlying that 

decision. 

We agree with the board that it is the final decisionmaking 

authority under state law. Ware served as clerk to the board and 

as secretary to the superintendent of the school district. The 

relevant Kansas statutes provide that "[t]he board of education of 

each school district shall appoint a clerk, who shall serve at the 

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( 

pleasure of the board," Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8202c (1985), and 

that "the board of education of any school district may appoint 

other officers and employees to serve at the pleasure of the 

board, id. § 72-8202e. We have found no authority in Kansas law 

under which a school board has the power to delegate its statutory 

prerogative to appoint employees to serve at its pleasure. To the 

contrary, the Kansas Supreme Court has stated that "[school 

districts and other subdivisions of the state have only such 

powers as are conferred upon them by statute, specifically or by 

clear implication, and any reasonable doubt as to the existence of 

such power should be resolved against its existence." Hobart v. 

Board of Educ. of Unified School Dist. No. 309, 230 Kan. 375, 634 

P.2d 1088, 1094 (1981) (quoting State ex rel. McAnarney v. Rural 

High School Dist. No. 7, 171 Kan. 437, 233 P.2d 727, 730 (1961)). 

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that lawfully 

empowered decisionmakers cannot insulate themselves from liability 

under section 1983 by knowingly allowing a subordinate to exercise 

final policymaking authority vested by law in the decisionmakers. 

See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126-27. Accordingly, the Court has 

articulated circumstances in which a governmental entity will be 

held liable for the decisions of a subordinate due to a delegation 

of final decisionmaking power. As we noted above, in Praprotnik 

the plurality discussed the circumstances in which a final 

policymaker will be considered to have delegated its policymaking 

authority to another official. Such delegation arises when a 

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subordinate's decision is couched as a policy statement expressly 

approved by the policymaking entity, or when the decision 

manifests a custom or usage of which the entity must have been 

aware. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130. Delegation does not occur 

when a subordinate's decisions are constrained by policies not of 

his making or when those decisions are subject to review by the 

authorized policymaker. 

In this case, Geil's decision to terminate Ware's employment 

clearly was not cast in the term of a policy statement, nor is 

there any other indication that Geil's decision represented a 

custom or usage with the force of law. 1 The board instead 

retained and exercised its authority to review Geil's decision. 

This case is thus distinguishable from Flanagan v. Munger, 890 

F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990). In Flanagan, the governmental entity 

conceded below that it had delegated final policymaking authority 

to a subordinate. Moreover, the relevant provisions of the 

1 We note evidence in the record that during the board's 

executive session on April 8, the board discussed the fact that it 

was Geil's privilege to nonrenew his secretary and get another 

one. Rec., supp. vol. I, at 132-33. Another board member 

testified that when Geil began his job as superintendent, "it was 

the understanding between him and the board that he could choose 

his immediate secretary." Id. at 213. While this evidence could 

be construed to support an inference that the board delegated its 

final authority to Geil, we no longer consider it significant in 

view of the Supreme Court's admonition that the identification of 

final decisionmakers must be done as a matter of law upon review 

of "the relevant legal materials, including state and local 

positive law, as well as '"custom or usage" having the force of 

law.'" Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2723 

{1989) {quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 

n. 1) • 

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municipal code gave direct authority to the subordinate, and no 

established procedure existed by which the subordinate's decisions 

were reviewed. Id. at 1568-69. Here, to the contrary, the board 

has not conceded the delegation of its authority, no provision of 

law arguably vested Geil with final authority, and his decision 

was subject to review by the board. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the board retained final decisionmaking authority with respect to 

the termination of Ware's employment. 

We thus turn to whether the board may be held liable under 

section 1983 for the alleged constitutional deprivation arising 

from its own decision to fire Ware. Because liability under 

section 1983 cannot rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, 

see City of Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203, a direct causal link must 

exist between the acts of the governing body sought to be held 

liable and the alleged constitutional deprivation, id. Of course, 

"[i]f the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action is 

properly made by [the] government's authorized decisionmakers, it 

surely represents an act of official government 'policy' as that 

term is commonly understood." Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Moreover, contrary to the board's argument 

on rehearing, we remain convinced that a causal connection between 

the unconstitutional act and the authorized decisionmakers may be 

established when the governing body has exercised its 

decisionmaking authority with deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional rights of those affected by its decisions. See 

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City of Canton, 109 S. Ct. 1204-06; Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 

368-69 (7th Cir. 1985). 

In applying the deliberate indifference standard to assess 

municipal liability for failure to train, the Supreme Court stated 

in City of Canton that this rule was most consistent with the 

Court's "admonition in Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and Polk County v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981), that a municipality can be 

liable under§ 1983 only where its policies are the 'moving force 

[behind] the constitutional violation."' City of Canton, 109 s. 

Ct. at 1204-05. The Court rejected the lesser standard of gross 

negligence, id. at 1204 & n.7, stating that "[t]o adopt lesser 

standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to 

unprecedented liability under§ 1983," id. at 1206. The board has 

provided no reason for limiting to its facts the Court's 

conclusion in City of Canton that the relatively high deliberate 

indifference standard supports the "causal link" requirement. 

Accordingly, we reiterate our holding that deliberate indifference 

is the proper standard by which to determine the board's 

liability. 2 See,~ D.T. v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 

894 F.2d 1176, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 1990); Stoneking v. Bradford 

Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989). 

2 It is important to distinguish between the standard for 

determining when a governmental entity will be liable under 

section 1983 for constitutional wrongs committed by its employees 

and the degree of fault, if any, which a plaintiff must show to 

make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation. See 

~, City of Canton v. Harris, 109 s. Ct. 1197, 1204 n.8 (1989). 

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There is evidence in the record to support Ware's claim that 

the board acted with deliberate indifference to her First 

Amendment rights in approving her termination. School boards are 

chargeable with the knowledge that employees "may not be dismissed 

in retaliation for lawful exercise of first amendment freedoms.'' 

Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 279 ~-4 (8th Cir. 1978). The 

record contains evidence that the board members knew about Ware's 

public stand on the bond issue and were informed of her belief 

that her termination was in retaliation for that stand. One 

member, Dale Remsburg, testifie9 that he believed the bond issue 

was the cause and that another member told him he thought so as 

well. The board meeting itself was attended by an unusually large 

number of patrons and was apparently disorderly. Some evidence 

indicates that the bond issue and Ware's termination were raised 

from the floor. Significantly, Remsburg testified that at the 

executive session he raised the possibility that Geil's 

recommendation was tied to the bond issue and that Geil's 

proffered reasons were not valid. Rec., supp. vol. III, at 34. 

Moreover, the school board president testified that he was 

concerned prior to the board meeting about Ware's speech. He 

stated that "my main concern was that here you've got an employee 

of your District, and if they're out saying you don't need this 

here bond issue, that was my main concern, that it just wouldn't 

look as good." Rec., supp. vol. I, at 151. Notwithstanding the 

above indications that the board knew Geil's recommendation was in 

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{ 

I 

retaliation for Ware's position on the bond issue, the board made 

no independent investigation, asked Geil no questions about the 

reasons for his decision, and asked Ware only one question, the 

answer to which it did not take into consideration. This evidence 

is sufficient to create a jury question on whether the board acted 

with deliberate indifference to Ware's First Amendment rights in 

approving Geil's recommendation. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1081 Document: 010110284286 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 10
No. 86-1081, NORMA J. WARE V. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 492, 

BUTLER COUNTY, STATE OF KANSAS; AND LARRY L. GEIL, SUPERINTNDENT 

OF SCHOOLS 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Twice now the majority has assumed the role of ultimate fact 

finder. 

On direct appeal from the district court's directed verdict 

in favor of the School District and its judgment n.o.v. in favor 

of Superintendent Geil, the majority of this court reversed. See 

Ware v. Unified School Dist. No. 492, 881 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 

1989). The majority did so even though the district court 

faithfully complied with the rigid standards of the rule it was 

aware of governing those motions, i.e., that the court cannot 

reweigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 

In my dissent in Ware, supra, I agreed with the district 

court that, on the record made, the jurors could not have 

reasonably inferred that Ware's First Amendment opposition to the 

bond issue was a substantial or motivating factor in either Geil's 

recommendation for Ware's termination or the Board's 4-3 vote in 

support of her termination. The trial court .concluded, and I 

agreed, that the overwhelming weight of the evidence established 

that the School Board terminated Ware for legitimate reasons which 

had no relationship to the bond issue. 

The majority "found," contrary to the district court, support 

for Ware's contention that the School Board had delegated its 

authority to terminate Ware "[b]y the undisputed fact that Geil 

changed the locks to Ware's office, thus locking her out, the day 

Appellate Case: 86-1081 Document: 010110284286 Date Filed: 05/07/1990 Page: 11
after he told her he was going to recommend her nonrenewal and 

five days before the school board meeting at which his 

recommendation was presented." On the School Board's petition for 

rehearing and based upon the Supreme Court opinion in Jett v. 

Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989), the majority 

now holds that the School Board did not delegate its final 

decision-making authority to Geil. Even so, the majority insists 

on re-affirming its holding-conclusion that the School District is 

nevertheless liable to Ware based upon flimsy evidence the 

majority has determined to be "sufficient" to show that the School 

Board "[a]cted with deliberate indifference to Ware's First 

Amendment rights in approving Geil's recommendation." (Emphasis 

supplied). The majority thus ignores the trial court's view of 

the undisputed evidence1 and, instead, relies on flimsy, 

lightweight evidence to establish "deliberate indifference" on the 

part of the School Board. 

This court has recently held that to establish "[d]eliberate 

indifference there must be evidence demonstrating a higher degree 

of fault than negligence, or even gross negligence, but less than 

that required to demonstrate an intentional and malicious intent.'' 

See Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okla., Nos. 86-1934 and 86-2003 

(10th Cir. 4/10/90), Slip opinion, p. 11). This is consistent 

with the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Canton v. Harris, 

1 "The undisputed evidence convincingly demonstrates that the 

bond issue played no part whatsoever in the Board's decision to 

terminate Ware. The bond issue was not raised at the board 

meeting and the board members testified that the issue was not 

considered by them. Ware presented no testimony to the contrary." 

(R., Vol. I, Doc. 64, p. 11). 

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U.S. 109 s.ct. 1197, 57 u.s.L.W. 4270 (1989) which rejected 

the gross negligence standard in assessing municipal liability 

under § 1983 in favor of the higher "deliberate indifference" 

standard. The Court there held that in order to establish 

deliberate indifference the facts in the case must prove a degree 

of culpable conduct greater than that required to establish gross 

negligence. There is simply no evidence in this record supporting 

the imposition of School District liability under the "deliberate 

indifference" standard. 

presented to the jury. 

Thus, the issue should never have been 

I would affirm the district court. 

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