Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01726/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony G. Brokaw, husband, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

No. CV13-1726 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant United States has filed a motion to dismiss the claim of Plaintiff 

Deanna Brokaw. Doc. 9. The motion is fully briefed and no party has requested oral 

argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background. 

 This case arises from an automobile accident involving Plaintiff Anthony Brokaw 

and an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Doc 9 at 2:3-5. Mr. Brokaw 

filed an administrative claim for the injuries caused by the accident. Doc 9 at 2:6-7. The 

administrative claim lists no other claimants. Doc. 9, Ex. 1. Plaintiff Deanna Brokaw did 

not file a separate administrative claim. Doc 9 at 2:10-11. 

 Plaintiffs filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Doc 5 at 2:7-8. 

Plaintiffs seek damages for Mrs. Brokaw for loss of company, companionship, and 

consortium. Doc 5 at 4:9-12. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. Brokaw’s claims 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Doc 9 at 1:20-24. 

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II. Analysis. 

 The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the 

parties or the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the Court is not limited to allegations in the pleadings if the jurisdictional 

issue is separable from the merits of the case. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 

1177 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court is “free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to 

rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.” Augustine, 

704 F.2d at 1077; see Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177. 

 Defendant contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mrs. 

Brokaw’s claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by 

the FTCA. Doc 9 at 1:22-25. Plaintiffs argue that Mrs. Brokaw did not need to file a 

separate administrative claim because a loss of consortium claim is derivative in Arizona 

and included under the injured party’s claim. Doc. 11 at 1:24-2:1. Plaintiffs do not 

dispute that Mrs. Brokaw failed to file an administrative claim. Doc 11 at 2:8-9. 

 The FTCA authorizes private tort actions against the United States when the 

claimant has exhausted her administrative remedies. Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d 517, 518 

(9th Cir. 1992). “An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States 

for money damages for injury . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim 

to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the 

agency[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Administrative exhaustion of claims is a prerequisite 

for district court jurisdiction. McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1980). 

 The derivative nature of Mrs. Brokaw’s claim does not excuse her failure to 

comply with the FTCA exhaustion requirements. In Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 

1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983), the court upheld the dismissal of a spouse’s claim for loss of 

consortium because she failed to exhaust FTCA claim procedures. The Ninth Circuit 

explained that “[t]he primary goal of the procedures established by the FTCA is to 

facilitate satisfactory administrative settlements,” and the spouse’s “failure to file a claim 

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for loss of consortium precluded the possibility of any such settlement.” Id. The same is 

true here. Whether derivative or not, Mrs. Brokaw’s loss of consortium claim was not 

identified in the claim form submitted by Mr. Brokaw and Mrs. Brokaw was not 

identified as a claimant. See Doc. 9, Ex. 1. As a result, the United States was afforded 

no opportunity to consider or resolve Mrs. Brokaw’s claim before litigation, frustrating 

the goal of the FTCA exhaustion requirement. This Court has previously dismissed a 

loss of consortium claim for failure to exhaust FTCA procedures, see Jarrett v. United 

States, CV 05-78 TUC DCB, 2006 WL 571629, *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2006), as have other 

district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Dugan v. United States, C06-5705RBL, 2008 

WL 65504, *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2008). 

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is granted. 

Plaintiff Deanna Brokaw’s loss of consortium claim is dismissed for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

 Dated this 30th day of January, 2014. 

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