Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00983/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00983-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeffrey Alan Taylor, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Beth Anne Alexander, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-0983-PHX-RCB (JFM) 

 O R D E R 

On May 9, 2013, Plaintiff Jeffrey Alan Taylor, who is confined in the Fourth 

Avenue Jail in Phoenix, Arizona, filed an unsigned pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an incomplete Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. In an Order dated July 25, 2013, the Court denied the deficient Application to 

Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days to pay the filing and administrative fees or file a 

complete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and to submit a completed and 

signed Certificate certifying that Plaintiff’s signature on the Certificate shall serve as an 

original signature on his Complaint. 

On August 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed a document, which the Court docketed as a 

Motion (Doc. 5), requesting that the Court, among other things, issue an order to “have In 

Forma Pauperis form(s) tendered by the Inmate “Trust” Account personnel *Only* . . . 

and not by or interferences by I.L.S. Staff/Personnel, without any form of retaliations.” 

On August 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed an incomplete Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (Doc. 7) and a signed certificate certifying that Plaintiff’s signature on the 

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Certificate serves as an original signature on his Complaint. The Court will deny the 

Motion and the deficient Application to Proceed and will dismiss the Complaint and this 

action for failing to state a claim. 

I. Payment of Filing Fee 

 When bringing an action, a prisoner must either pay the $350.00 filing fee and a 

$50.00 administrative fee in a lump sum or, if granted the privilege of proceeding in 

forma pauperis, pay the $350.00 filing fee1

 incrementally as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). An application to proceed in forma pauperis requires an affidavit of 

indigence and a certified copy of the inmate’s trust account statement for the six months 

preceding the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). An inmate must submit 

statements from each institution where the inmate was confined during the six-month 

period. Id. To assist prisoners in meeting these requirements, the Court requires use of a 

form application. LRCiv 3.4. 

 If a prisoner is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will assess an 

initial partial filing fee of 20% of either the average monthly deposits or the average 

monthly balance in Plaintiff’s account, whichever is greater. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). An 

initial partial filing fee will only be collected when funds exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 

The balance of the $ 350.00 filing fee will be collected in monthly payments of 20% of 

the preceding month’s income credited to an inmate’s account, each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Application Fails to Comply With Statute

 Plaintiff has used the court-approved form and submitted a trust account 

statement, but the “Certificate of Correctional Official as to Status of Applicant’s Trust 

 

1

 Effective May 1, 2013, the Clerks of Court for the United States District Courts 

are required to collect a $50.00 administrative fee for the filing of a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court. See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Miscellaneous Fee Schedule &14 (effective May 1, 2013), foll. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. 

However, the administrative fee “does not apply to applications for a writ of habeas corpus or to persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Id.

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Account” section is not completed. In light of this deficiency, the Court will deny the 

Application to Proceed. 

III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of 

advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. 

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to 

decide whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend, because 

the defects cannot be corrected. 

IV. Complaint 

 Plaintiff’s two-count Complaint alleges violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. He sues public defender Beth Anne Alexander and Maricopa 

County prosecutor Margaret (Peggy) Wu. Plaintiff seeks release from jail, dismissal of 

the indictment against him, expungement of his record, and compensatory and punitive 

damages. 

 In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that his former public defender, Alexander, failed to 

provide him with copies of statutes related to a September 4, 2012 indictment against 

him, urged him to plead guilty to six felony charges, failed to file any motions on his 

behalf, failed to adequately review the indictment against him, and conspired with the 

prosecutor to convict him. 

 In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Wu used “dissembling means” to obtain an 

indictment against him, is using “fall[a]cious and dissembling police and unconfirmed 

medical reports” to prosecute him, and is conspiring with Alexander against him. 

V. Failure to State a Claim

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

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state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that 

he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he 

must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 A. Defendant Alexander 

 A prerequisite for any relief under § 1983 is allegations to support that a defendant 

acted under the color of state law. The “under color of state law” component is the 

equivalent of the “state action” requirement under the Constitution. Lugar v. Edmondson 

Oil Co, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982); Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 

U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). “Acting under color of state law is ‘a jurisdictional requisite for a 

§ 1983 action.’” Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting West, 

487 U.S. at 46). Whether an attorney representing a criminal defendant is privately 

retained, a public defender, or court-appointed counsel, he or she does not act under color 

of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981); Miranda v. Clark 

County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For this reason, Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim against Alexander and she and Count I will be dismissed. 

 B. Defendant Wu 

 Plaintiff sues Maricopa County prosecutor Wu for acts taken in prosecuting him. 

A prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for conduct in “‘initiating 

a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case’” insofar as that conduct is “‘intimately 

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 

U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th 

Cir. 1986). That is, “[a] prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability for 

damages under § 1983 ‘when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.’” 

Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 

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522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997)). Absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor “eliciting false or 

defamatory testimony from witnesses” or for making false or defamatory statements 

during, and related to judicial proceedings. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270 (citations omitted). 

“However, ‘the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they 

are performed by a prosecutor.’” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 

273). Rather, prosecutorial immunity depends on “‘the nature of the function performed, 

not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127). A 

prosecutor is only entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when 

she performs administrative or investigative functions. Id. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Wu concern her prosecution of Plaintiff. Such 

conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of criminal proceedings against 

Plaintiff and is entitled to absolute immunity. As discussed herein, such allegations are 

not a basis for liability under § 1983. For this reason, Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

against Wu and she and Count II will be dismissed. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant, his Complaint and this 

action will be dismissed. 

C. Abstention 

 In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks release from jail, dismissal of the 

indictment against him, and expungement of his record. The abstention doctrine set forth 

in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevents a federal court in most circumstances 

from directly interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. The Younger

abstention doctrine also bars requests for declaratory and monetary relief for 

constitutional injuries arising out of a plaintiff’s ongoing state criminal prosecution. 

Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, the Younger abstention 

doctrine applies while a case works its way through the state appellate process, if a 

prisoner is convicted. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 

491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). Only in limited, extraordinary circumstances will the Younger

doctrine not bar federal interference with ongoing (non-final) state criminal proceedings. 

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Such circumstances include when a prisoner alleges that he is being subjected to double 

jeopardy. See Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992). Speedy trial 

claims may also be reviewed if a detainee is seeking to compel the state to bring him to 

trial, rather than seeking dismissal of the charges, and the detainee has exhausted all of 

his state court remedies. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 

484, 489-90 (1973); see In re Justices of Superior Court Dep’t of Mass. Trial Court, 218 

F.3d 11, 18 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2000). The failure to state a claim includes a claim to which 

the abstention doctrine applies. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 

L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Central Ariz. Water 

Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Plaintiff does not allege that he has been charged or held in violation of the 

Double Jeopardy or Speedy Trial Clauses. Therefore, disruption by a federal court is not 

required. For the additional reason that Plaintiff fails to state a claim pursuant to the 

abstention doctrine, Plaintiff’s claims and this action will be dismissed. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7) is denied. 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 5) is denied. 

 (3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 

. . . . (4) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 23rd day of October, 2013. 

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