Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02030/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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1 05cv2030 WQH (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINH V. LE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 05cv2030 WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT REVERSING THE

COMMISSIONER'S ORDER [DOC. NO.

8] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 10]

Plaintiff Vinh V. Le seeks judicial review of Social Security

Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart's determination that he is not

entitled to disability benefits. On October 27, 2005, Le filed his

Complaint for Reversal of the Commissioner's Final Decision [doc.

no. 1]. On February 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Judgment Reversing the Commissioner’s Order [doc. no. 8] and

Memorandum in Support of Motion [doc. no. 9] requesting reversal of

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") James Carletti's June 24, 2005,

decision that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

Le argues the ALJ’s finding is not supported by substantial

evidence because "the defendant ignored the opinions of the

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plaintiff's treating physicians and clinical evidence indicating

that the plaintiff is disabled due to a combination of

cardiovascular and musculoskeletal disease, neck pain and back

pain, depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome." (Pl.'s Mot.

1-2.) Le also contends Judge Carletti's opinion is based on an

error of law because the ALJ failed "to develop the record fully

and fairly" and failed "to provide specific and legitimate reasons

for disregarding the opinions of the plaintiff's treating

physicians" in favor of medical expert Dr. Bolter's opinion. (Id.) 

In his Memorandum in Support of Motion, Le also alleges the

ALJ's decision is in error for several additional reasons: (1)

Judge Carletti incorrectly found Plaintiff did not meet or equal

social security disability listings 12.04 or 12.06; (2) the ALJ

improperly rejected Le's objective and subjective symptom

testimony; (3) Judge Carletti should have found Plaintiff disabled

according to the "Grids," solely based on Le's exertional

limitations and (4) the act of driving is not a simple and

repetitive task. (Pl.'s Mem. 1, 5-18; Pl.'s Reply 2-5.) Le asks

this Court to reverse the Commissioner's determination and remand

his case for the payment of benefits from July 1, 2003, through the

present. (Pl.'s Mem. 25; Pl.'s Reply 10.) 

On March 13, 2006, the Commissioner filed a Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment [doc. no. 10] and a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Cross-Motion [doc. no. 11]. Defendant

also filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

[doc. no. 13]. Le filed a Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment

Reversing the Commissioner's Decision on April 3, 2006 [doc. no.

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15]. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court found this

matter suitable for decision without oral argument [doc. no. 16]. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in Vietnam on May 20, 1949; he was fiftysix years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (Admin. R. at 16,

63.) He attended school in Vietnam through the eighth grade. (Id.

at 16, 336.) Plaintiff has limited English skills, but he can read

and write Vietnamese. (Id. at 70, 267, 335.) 

As a member of the South Vietnamese Army, Le was incarcerated

in Vietnam for six months after the Communist government came to

power in 1975. (Pl.’s Mem. 2.) He was beaten while in prison. 

(Id.) Upon his release, Plaintiff worked as a farmer in Vietnam

until he came to the United States in 1989. (Admin. R. at 297.) 

From August 1991 through July 1, 2003, Le worked as a newspaper

delivery person for the San Diego Union Tribune. (Id. at 71-72,

335.) Plaintiff states he was laid off from his employment because

he contracted tuberculosis. (Id. at 71.) 

Le filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on December 2, 2003, alleging

his disability began on July 1, 2003. (Id. at 63, 71.) Plaintiff

claimed to suffer from “[p]ost tuberculosis disease, chronic

[h]eadache, fainting spells, arthritis pain, skin allergy and

scratches, frequent fever, coughing, sweating, insomnia,

nightmares, memory [l]oss, [a]nxiety, and depression.” (Id. at

71.) 

Plaintiff’s applications were denied on March 2, 2004. (Id.

at 33, 304.) Le filed a request for reconsideration on April 29,

2004. (Id. at 37.) Upon reconsideration, Plaintiff’s applications

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were again denied on July 30, 2004. (Id. at 39, 309.) On August

12, 2004, Le timely requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id. at

45.) Judge James S. Carletti conducted a hearing on Plaintiff’s

application on March 21, 2005. (Id. at 331.) Attorney Alexandra

T. Manbeck represented Le at the hearing. (Id.) Bonnie Sinclair,

a vocational expert, testified regarding Le’s ability to work. 

(Id.) Sidney Bolter, M.D., provided medical expert testimony. 

(Id. at 60, 331.) On June 24, 2005, the ALJ issued a decision

denying Plaintiff’s request for benefits. (See id. at 16-27.) 

The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied

Le’s request for review of Judge Carletti’s decision on September

28, 2005. (Id. at 7.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the

final decision of the Commissioner of the SSA. (Id.) Plaintiff

then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) on October 27, 2005. (Compl. 1);

see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2006). 

II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

A. Le’s Physical Impairments

Plaintiff’s doctor in 2003 was Dr. Kiem Duc Pham. (Admin. R.

at 157-65.) Le saw Dr. Pham on February 20, 2003, complaining of

congestion lasting for two days and a stuffy nose. (Id. at 162.) 

Dr. Pham diagnosed Plaintiff with an upper respiratory infection

and prescribed an antibiotic, an antihistamine, and ibuprofen. 

(Id.); Neil M. Davis, Medical Abbreviations: 10,000 Conveniences

at the Expense of Communications and Safety 220 (7th ed. 1995); A-Z

Health Guides from WebMD: Drugs, Erythromycin, http://www.webmd.

com/drugs/mono-15-ERYTHROMYCIN+BASE%2c+ERYTHROMYCIN+STEARATE+-+ORAL

+TABLET.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); A-Z Health Guides from

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WebMD: Drugs, Phenergan Oral,http://www.webmd.com/drugs/drug-6606-

Phenergan+Oral.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 

Le was referred for an eye examination on March 21, 2003,

because he had a piece of plastic in his eye. (Admin. R. at 163,

177.) On July 2, 2003, Plaintiff again visited Dr. Pham,

complaining of cough with sputum, a mild fever, and nighttime

wheezing for the previous three days. (Id. at 160.) Le also

complained of skin problems. (Id.) Plaintiff was not wheezing

during the doctor visit, but he was diagnosed with bronchitis and

psoriasis and given erythromycin (the same antibiotic he had taken

in February 2003), an Albuterol inhaler, Derma Soothe lotion, and

topical Fluocinonide. (Id.); A-Z Health Guides from WebMD: Drugs,

Derma Soothe Top, http://www.webmd.com/drugs/drug-64451-Derma

+Soothe+Top.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); A-Z Health Guides

from WebMD: Drugs, Fluocinonide Top, http://www.webmd.com/drugs/

mono-719-FLUOCINONIDE+ -+TOPICAL.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 

Dr. Pham also referred Le for a chest x-ray. (Admin. R. at 160);

Davis, supra, at 60 (showing “CXR” means chest x-ray). The x-ray

showed “[c]hronic parenchymal changes at bilateral apices[, but n]o

cardiomegaly or congestive failure” and “[n]o acute process[,]”

meaning that cellular changes could be seen at the apices of the

lungs, but no pathologic conditions or diseases were present. 

(Admin. R. at 173); Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1300, 1429

(Marjory Sraycar et al., eds., 26th ed. 1995). 

Le continued to complain of the same symptoms, plus night

sweats, at a visit on July 10, 2003. (Admin. R. at 161.) Dr. Pham

prescribed Robitussin and Tylenol and ordered lab tests and another

chest x-ray. (Id. at 161, 174-76.) Plaintiff’s lipoproteinCase 3:05-cv-02030-WQH-RBB Document 18 Filed 12/15/06 Page 5 of 78
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cholesterol ratio was low, and his level of neutrophils -- a

specific type of mature white blood cell -- was high, but Le’s

other lab results appeared normal. (Id. at 174-75); Stedman’s

Medical Dictionary, supra, at 1207. The chest x-ray showed “a left

apical soft tissue mass approximately 3 cm in diameter, with

possible . . . scarring in the left upper lobe.” (Admin. R. at

176.) The doctor who interpreted the x-ray, Dr. Michael L. Tobin,

found the mass “concerning for neoplasm,” which is “[a]n abnormal

tissue that grows by cellular proliferation more rapidly than

normal and continues to grow after the stimuli that initiated the

new growth cease.” (Id.); Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, supra, at

1182. Dr. Tobin could not rule out a lung infection and thought

there might also be an air-fluid level in Le’s lungs. (Admin. R.

at 176.)

At a return visit with Dr. Pham on July 11, 2003, Plaintiff

complained of increased coughing, night sweats, fever, and coughing

up blood, although he told the doctor he felt “better.” (Id. at

158.) Dr. Pham reviewed the results of Le’s chest x-ray, noted the

lung mass and neoplasm, and opined that Plaintiff might be

suffering from either pneumonia or tuberculosis. (Id.) The doctor

prescribed Levaquin, an antibiotic, and ordered a computed tomogram

(CT) scan of Le’s chest. (Id.); A-Z Health Guides from WebMD: 

Drugs, Levaquin Oral, http://www.webmd.com/drugs/mono-8235

-LEVOFLOXACIN+-+ORAL. aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).

The CT scan of Plaintiff’s chest was performed, and the

results interpreted by Dr. Rowena Tena on July 14, 2003. (Admin.

R. at 167.) Dr. Tena found “[b]iapical scarring consistent with

old granulomatous disease[, a] 3.5-cm, cavitary, left apical mass

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with an air-fluid level[,] . . . [and an i]ndeterminate, 6-mm,

lingular pulmonary nodule.” (Id.) Dr. Tena believed the left

apical mass with an air-fluid level most likely represented

reactivated tuberculosis, although it could also indicate a fungal

superinfection or a neoplastic disease. (Id.) She recommended

follow-up treatment for the mass, as well as for the 6-mm lesion,

and she relayed her findings to Dr. Pham immediately. (Id.) After

reviewing the results of the CT scan, Dr. Pham suspected

tuberculosis and arranged for Plaintiff’s admission to the

hospital. (Id. at 159.) 

On July 14, 2003, Le was admitted to Scripps Mercy Hospital

for tuberculosis evaluation and observation of any significant

bleeding. (Id. at 143, 168.) Plaintiff denied any shortness of

breath at the time of admission to the hospital. (Id.) Dr.

Michael Sullivan evaluated Le upon intake and indicated his plan

was to order a repeat chest x-ray and to check the CT of

Plaintiff’s chest, as well as a purified protein derivative and a

test of Le’s sputum for acid-fast bacilli (“AFB”). (Id. at 169);

Davis, supra, at 18, 172.

Plaintiff checked into Scripps Mercy Hospital complaining of

fever, chills, night sweats, weight loss (approximately seven

pounds in the prior month), and coughing up phlegm mixed with

streaks of blood during the two weeks prior to his hospital stay. 

(Admin. R. at 140.) Le admitted smoking a pack of cigarettes a day

for about twenty-eight years, but he told the doctor he quit in

1996. (Id.) Plaintiff had a slight fever upon admission, but he

was in no acute distress. (Id. at 141.) Dr. Joseph Resnikoff

evaluated Le’s CT scan and found bifocal infiltrates with

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bronchiectasis (chronic dilation of the bronchi) and subpleural

blebs (small flaccid sacs under the lung membrane), which indicated

the need to rule out an inflammatory disease like tuberculosis or a

fungal infection. (Id.); Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, supra, at

211, 243, 1694, 1933. Dr. Resnikoff’s plan also included ruling

out pneumonia, a possible bronchoscopy, and recommending a biopsy

of Plaintiff’s left upper lobe nodule. (Admin. R. at 141-42.) 

A purified protein derivative given to Plaintiff tested

positive for tuberculosis exposure. (Id. at 135); Davis, supra, at

172. The AFB sputum test, however, was negative. (Admin. R. at

135); Davis, supra, at 18. While in the hospital, Le underwent a

bronchoscopy for evaluation of possible tuberculosis, which tested

negative. (Admin. R. at 135.) A chest x-ray taken on July 17,

2003, revealed a moderate-sized left pneumothorax, but a follow-up

x-ray taken on July 20, 2003, revealed the pneumothorax had

diminished after Plaintiff received oxygen. (Id. at 136). Le was

prescribed diphenhydramine, levofloxacin, and Vioxx and was

instructed to follow up on the culture results for tuberculosis and

a repeat chest x-ray. (Id. at 136.) If the findings on the x-ray

were not resolved, Le would be considered for empiric tuberculosis

therapy. (Id. at 135-36.) Plaintiff was instructed to resume all

his previous activities. (Id. at 136.) 

Le was seen by Dr. Pham again on July 23, 2003, at which time

he was receiving treatment from Dr. Resnikoff, a pulmonologist. 

(Id. at 157.) Dr. Pham’s notes for that day reveal that the doctor

was apparently able to rule out tuberculosis, and Plaintiff was no

longer coughing up blood. (Id. (“No hemoptysis”)); Stedman’s

Medical Dictionary, supra, at 781 (defining “hemoptysis” as “[t]he

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spitting of blood derived from the lungs or bronchial tubes”). 

This was the last visit Le had with Dr. Pham. (Admin. R. at 157,

164.)

Dr. Nadine Sidrick saw Le on August 7, 2003. (Id. at 195.) 

Plaintiff complained that his body was “itchy” for “a long time,”

and he had been coughing with a clear phlegm for the last month. 

(Id. at 195.) Dr. Sidrick diagnosed Le with psoriasis, a lung

mass, and osteoarthritis. (Id. at 195.) He was prescribed

Clarinix (an antihistamine for allergy relief). (Id.); A-Z Health

Guides from WebMD: Drugs, Clarinix Oral, http://www.webmd.com/

drugs/mono-5324-DESLORATADINE+-+ORAL.aspx?drugid=22326&drugname=Cla

rinex+Oral (last visited on August 16, 2006). Le reported on

August 14, 2003, that the Clarinix had worked, so his prescription

was renewed. (Admin. R. at 195.) In a visit on November 21, 2003,

Plaintiff complained of pain to his left lung for “a long time”

with coughing and green phlegm during the previous two months. 

(Id. at 194.) Dr. Sidrick diagnosed Le with sinusitis and

psoriasis of the nails and scalp. (Id.) 

B. Le’s Mental Impairments

1. Treating Doctors

a. Dr. Henderson

Dr. Harry C. Henderson, a psychiatrist, treated Plaintiff on

July 31, September 13, October 18, and December 13, 2003. (Id. at

180-83.) Le reporting feeling hopeless, helpless, worthless, and

useless. (Id. at 182-83.) Dr. Henderson also noted Plaintiff had

low energy, but was not suicidal. (Id.) On November 19, 2004, Dr.

Henderson conducted a follow-up evaluation. (Id. at 293.) The

doctor examined and interviewed Le with the assistance of an

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interpreter and reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records “consisting of

Dr. Sidrick’s treating notes, Dr. Ginsberg’s notes, Scripps Mercy

hospital notes, psychologist Dr. DiCicco’s report and psychiatrist

Dr. Engelhorn’s psychiatric evaluation.” (Id.) 

Dr. Henderson stated, “[T]he patient continued to suffer

severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder dating from

his refugee experiences in Vietnam and chronic obstructive

pulmonary disease and status post tuberculosis that continue to

bedevil him.” (Id.) The psychiatrist reported Le’s “most severe

impairment, however, results from chronic orthopedic pain and

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease that end up causing him to be

unable to work.” (Id.) 

Dr. Henderson administered the Raven’s Standard Progressive

Matrices test to Le. (Id. at 294.) The test is considered

culture-neutral, and the IQ obtained correlates with the Wechsler

Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS”) and Stanford-Binet IQ tests. 

(Id.) Le scored an eighty-five on the test, indicating a lowaverage IQ. (Id. at 295.) Plaintiff performed poorly on the WAIS

test, and Dr. Henderson believed this was not due to malingering. 

(Id.) The doctor noted that making an effort caused increased pain

and anxiety for Plaintiff, thus drastically interfering with his

short-term memory. (Id.) Dr. Henderson diagnosed Le with

recurrent major depression with psychotic features and chronic

post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id. at 296.) The doctor also

noted previous diagnoses of chronic and throbbing headaches,

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, status post tuberculosis,

lower back pain and degenerative discogenic disease of the lumbar

spine, grade I retrolisthesis, and spinal instability. (Id.) Dr.

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Henderson approximated Le's Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) score at forty-five. (Id. at 296.) A score between 41-50

indicates "serious symptoms" or "any serious impairment in social,

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to

keep a job).” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed. Text Rev. 2000) (hereinafter “DSM-IVTR”). The GAF score may reflect an impairment that does not relate

to the ability to hold a particular job.

Dr. Henderson reported that Le’s “mental disability is

permanent and stationary” and existed since the onset of his lung

problems in 2003. (Admin. R. at 296.) According to Dr. Henderson,

Plaintiff was depressed and unable to work. (Id.) Le’s depression

was worsened by his back and neck pain and difficulty breathing. 

(Id.) Dr. Henderson found Plaintiff had marked restrictions in

activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, and frequent deficiencies of concentration,

persistence, or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a

timely manner in work settings or elsewhere. (Id.) Furthermore,

“[h]is ability to adapt to stresses in the working environment

[was] severely limited and [was] not sustainable in the workplace.” 

(Id.) The doctor felt these conditions combined “would prevent

[Le] from gainful employment [because] [h]e would not be able to

compete in the workplace and is in need of continued therapy.” 

(Id.) 

After the ALJ’s decision, Dr. Henderson conducted another

follow-up psychiatric evaluation of Le on July 12, 2005. (Id. at

317.) The evaluation involved a review of Plaintiff’s medical

records, hospitalization records for tuberculosis treatment,

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psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Zappone, and Dr. Grisolia’s

neurologic report. (Id.) The doctor’s diagnosis was the same as

in 2004. (Compare id. at 317, with id. at 293-96.) Dr. Henderson

stated that during therapy sessions, Le consistently performed in

the “grossly deficient/severely disabled ranges.” (Id.) He rediagnosed Le with recurrent major depression with psychotic

features and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, but this time,

the doctor gave Plaintiff a lower GAF score of forty. (Id.) A

score between 31-40 indicates “some impairment in reality testing

or communication OR major impairment in several areas, such as work

or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.” DSM-IVTR, supra, at 34. 

b. Dr. Morgan 

Dr. Jacob R. Morgan, a cardiologist, completed a medical

history report on Le on November 1, 2004. (Admin. R. at 23, 283.) 

The report is not accompanied by any treatment records and without

any support in the administrative record, Le argues that Dr. Morgan

treated him for over three years. (Id.; Pl.’s Mot. 20-21.) Dr.

Morgan's report suggests that he did not examine Le; the doctor's

findings all begin with “I am told . . . .” (Admin. R. at 283.) 

Dr. Morgan unequivocally states only Le’s weight, blood pressure,

and cardiovascular tests. (Id. at 284.) 

Dr. Morgan concluded that Plaintiff was very limited in his

residual functional capacity, suffers from severe depression and

post-traumatic stress syndrome, and should be restricted to

sedentary activities. (Id.) The doctor also found that Le had

marked restrictions in daily activities and social functioning, was

unable to concentrate or perform simple repetitive tasks, and was

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unable to compete in the workforce. (Id.) Dr. Morgan stated

Plaintiff was not vocationally capable in spite of the medications

Le was taking. (Id.) 

c. Dr. Zappone

Dr. Ronald A. Zappone, a psychiatrist and neurologist, treated

Le before and after the administrative hearing on March 21, 2005. 

(Id. at 285; Pl.’s Reply 7, Ex. A.) On March 6, 2005, Dr. Zappone

diagnosed Le as having recurrent, severe major depression with

psychotic features, "[c]hest pain, asthma, history of tuberculosis

numbness and tingling in [the] hands[,] . . . [p]roblems related to

social environment and acculturation to a new country;

occupational, economic problems[,] . . . impairment in

communication; impairment in work and relationships, [and] mood

problems." (Admin. R. at 286.) He assessed Plaintiff’s GAF at

forty-six. (Id.) 

Dr. Zappone reported that Le “appeared very depressed and

anxious[,] . . . admitted hearing voices[,] . . . [and] had

difficulty concentrating.” (Admin. R. at 286.) Le was oriented to

time, place, and person. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, had problems

with memory, which were evidenced by an inability to “remember

three items after several minutes . . . to do digits forward or

backward . . .[or] to do serial 7s.” (Id.) Le’s “affect was flat

and his mood was depressed.” (Id.) Dr. Zappone stated Le “had

suicidal ideation.” (Id.) 

The doctor found Le “had a marked inability to comprehend and

follow instructions . . . [and] a marked inability to perform

simple and repetitive tasks.” (Id.) He also found Plaintiff had a

“severe inability to perform complex and varied tasks[,] . . . to

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relate to other people beyond giving and receiving instructions[,]

. . . to influence people[,] . . . to make generalizations,

evaluations and decisions without immediate supervision . . . [and]

to accept and carry out responsibility for direction, control and

planning.” (Id. at 286-87.) In Dr. Zappone’s opinion, Le was

permanently disabled but able to handle his own funds. (Id. at

287.) 

Dr. Zappone’s Psychiatric Review Technique form noted that Le

had mental disorders that met the listing of impairments for 12.04

(affective disorders) and 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders). (Id.

at 288.) The doctor indicated Le showed signs of disturbance of

mood accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome

as evidenced by anhedonia (“[a]bsence of pleasure from performance

of acts that would ordinarily be pleasurable”), appetite

disturbance, sleep disturbance, psychomotor agitation, decreased

energy, feelings of guilt, and difficulty concentrating or

thinking. (Id. at 288-89); Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, supra, at

90. The form also noted Plaintiff suffered from anxiety disorder

as evidenced by motor tension, autonomic hyperactivity,

apprehensive expectation, and vigilance and scanning. (Admin. R.

at 290.) Dr. Zappone found Le had marked restrictions of

activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, frequent deficiencies of concentration,

persistence, or pace, and one or two episodes of deterioration

(marked by a withdrawal from the situation or an exacerbation of

signs or symptoms). (Id. at 291.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 12.06

anxiety-related disorder resulted in complete inability to function

independently outside of his home. (Id. at 292.) 

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2. Examining Doctors

a. Dr. Engelhorn

On July 15, 2004, Dr. H. Douglas Engelhorn, a psychiatrist,

examined Le. (Id. at 235.) No medical records were available to

Dr. Engelhorn to review before the examination. (Id.) The doctor

found Plaintiff alert, cooperative, and expressive. (Id. at 236.) 

Dr. Engelhorn diagnosed Le as having an adjustment disorder with

depressed mood, very mild possible psychotic disorder with visual

hallucinations, recurrent skin rashes by history, and respiratory

disease with possible tuberculosis by history. (Id. at 237.) The

doctor estimated Le’s current GAF at sixty-five to seventy, which

indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild

insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school

functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the

household), but generally functioning pretty well, [with] some

meaningful interpersonal relationships.” (Id.); DSM-IV-TR, supra,

at 34. 

Dr. Engelhorn found no evidence of active psychosis, severe

depression or any significant levels of anxiety. (Admin. R. at

236.) He noted Le’s concentration and attention seemed adequate,

and his insight and judgment seemed intact though neither were

formally tested. (Id. at 237.) The doctor also stated Plaintiff

did not exhibit flat affect, psychomotor retardation, loosening of

associations, delusions, or hallucinations. (Id.) 

Dr. Engelhorn reported that Le appeared “to have developed a

reactive/adjustment type of depression,” but had no suicidal

tendencies. (Id.) He found Plaintiff’s alleged hallucinations

were not “particularly disabling” because they only occurred at

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night and “may well be part of a dream state.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s

daily activities were within normal limits, and no cognitive

impairment was found. (Id.) From the doctor’s “psychiatric point

of view, the patient is capable of doing simple, repetitive tasks”

but may have “considerable difficulty performing detailed and

complex work.” (Id.) According to the doctor, Le’s disability

“appear[ed] to be mostly related to his respiratory disease.” 

(Id.) Dr. Engelhorn also found Plaintiff could “adequately relate

to peers and supervisors in the workplace” and could “be expected

to make routine adjustments in the workplace.” (Id.) 

b. Dr. Grisolia

On August 31, 2004, Dr. James Santiago Grisolia, a

neurologist, examined Le regarding complaints of a three-year

history of daily headaches. (Id. at 267.) The doctor found

Plaintiff to be alert and cooperative with minimal English skills. 

(Id.) Dr. Grisolia’s comprehensive neurologic examination was

“normal including cranial nerves, muscle strength, bulk and tone,

pin, vibration sense, muscle stretch reflexes, coordination, and

gait.” (Id.) The doctor reported that Le’s headaches seemed to be

triggered by his history of depression and insomnia; he concluded

the headache disorder “is of apparently disabling intensity.” 

(Id.) 

After the ALJ’s decision, Dr. Grisolia reevaluated Le on July

19, 2005. (Id. at 329.) The doctor attributed Plaintiff’s

headaches to his severe depression. (Id.) The headaches also

caused lightheadedness, resulting in gait instability and

tiredness. (Id.) According to Dr. Grisolia, this lightheadedness

“makes it impossible for [Le] to move safely on [or] around

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dangerous machinery where there is any falling danger.” (Id.) The

doctor stated Plaintiff’s “headaches were dramatically improved

with the Depakote (a drug used to prevent migraine headaches and

other psychiatric disorders), but continued daily.” (Id.); A-Z

Health Guides from WebMD: Drugs, Depakote Oral http://www.webmd.

com/drugs/drug-1788-Depakote+Oral.aspx?drugid=1788&drugname=Depakot

e+Oral (last visited August 16, 2006). He further reported Le was

“still severely depressed and he is disabled on this basis.” 

(Admin. R. at 329.) 

c. Dr. DiCicco

Dr. David A. DiCicco, a clinical psychologist, evaluated Le on

February 7, 2005. (Id. at 297.) The doctor administered portions

of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (“WAIS-III”) test

which were the least dependent on knowledge and use of the English

language. (Id. at 297-98.) Dr. DiCicco also reviewed Plaintiff’s

records and held a brief interview through an interpreter. (Id. at

297.) Le’s scores were in the average range, which indicates an

average IQ. (Id. at 298.) Dr. DiCicco diagnosed Le with posttraumatic stress disorder, major depression, problems with primary

support group and education, occupational problems, and problems

related to the social environment. (Id.) The doctor assigned

Plaintiff a GAF score of fifty, the high end of the 41-50 range for

serious symptoms or serious impairments. A GAF of 51-60, in

comparison, indicates moderate symptoms or impairments. DSM-IV-TR,

supra, at 34. The doctor further stated Le lacked energy, had

limited skills, suffered from a variety of physical symptoms, was

depressed, and was relatively isolated with few friends. (Admin.

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R. at 298-99.) Dr. DiCicco concluded: “It would be hard for this

evaluator to see this patient working.” (Id. at 299.) 

3. Nonexamining Doctors

a. Dr. Manolakas

Dr. R. Manolakas completed a Physical Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment for the SSA on February 27, 2004. (Id. at 257-

64.) The doctor concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally lift

and carry twenty pounds and frequently lift and carry ten pounds. 

(Id. at 258.) Le could sit, stand and walk about six hours in an

eight-hour workday. (Id.) Dr. Manolakas also stated Plaintiff was

not limited in his pushing or pulling capacity. (Id.) Le had no

postural, manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations. (Id.

at 259-61.) Plaintiff did have an environmental limitation to

avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor

ventilation. (Id. at 261.) The doctor summarized that Le’s

“allegations regarding functional limitations based upon intensity

and persistence of symptoms are given little weight, because there

are material inconsistencies with other substantial evidence in

file, and other medical and non-medical factors to consider.” (Id.

at 262.) He concluded the “severity or duration of [Le’s] symptoms

. . . is disproportionate to the expected severity or expected

duration on the basis of the claimant’s medically determinable

impairment(s).” (Id.) Dr. Manolakas’s assessment was affirmed by

Dr. George G. Spellman. (Id. at 264.)

b. Dr. O'Malley

On July 23, 2004, Dr. Edward O’Malley, a psychiatrist,

completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment for the

SSA. (Id. at 239-41.) He found Le had a possible psychotic

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disorder and adjustment disorder. (Id. at 243, 245-46.) According

to the doctor’s assessment, Plaintiff was able to understand and

remember simple instructions; understand, remember and carry out

short and simple instructions on a consistent basis in a typical

work environment; interact appropriately with coworkers,

supervisors, and the general public; and adapt to changes in work

routine and location. (Id. at 241.) Dr. O’Malley found Le’s

impairments caused mild restriction of activities of daily living,

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace,

with no episodes of decompensation. (Id. at 253.) The doctor

reported that, based on the medical evidence, Le “is able to

persist at simple tasks (unskilled work).” (Id. at 241.)

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 

A. The Plaintiff’s Testimony

Le testified through an interpreter at the hearing before

Judge Carletti on March 21, 2005. (Id. at 335-43, 358-60.) He

said lung cancer or lung disease caused him to stop working. (Id.

at 336, 339-40.) Le stated he does not know if he still suffers

from lung disease, but he has been taking medication for a long

time. (Id. at 336, 339-40.) Plaintiff also testified that he

stopped working because of a combination of physical and mental

problems. (Id. at 338.) He takes several forms of medication that

seem to help ease his symptoms, but the medication makes it

difficult to wake up. (Id. at 337.) 

The ALJ questioned Le about his refusal to see Dr. Valet. 

(Id. at 336-37.) Le did not remember who told him to sign the form

stating he refused to see Dr. Valet, and he did not know whether he

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was able to read it. (Id. at 336.) Plaintiff had no idea who Dr.

Valet was, but he said that if the judge told him to see someone,

he would follow the judge’s instructions. (Id. at 336-37.)

Le testified he can only walk “a little bit more than a

block.” (Id. at 339.) He also claimed sitting causes back pain so

severe that he can only sit for limited amounts of time, and he can

only lift five to ten pounds. (Id. at 339.) Plaintiff’s back pain

is constant and requires him to roll out of bed, rather than

sitting up in the morning. (Id. at 341-43.) Le also experiences

neck pain two to three times a day that makes him unable to rotate

his neck. (Id. at 341-42.) After taking medication and lying

down, the neck pain subsides within “a little over an hour.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff takes medication for his back pain at night as well. 

(Id. at 342.) The medication causes dizziness and sleepiness. 

(Id. at 343.)

Le testified that before he was admitted to the hospital on

July 14, 2003, he had difficulty breathing and would cough up

blood. (Id. at 340.) He tried to return to work after being

discharged from the hospital but was unable to perform the job

because he still had difficulty breathing. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claimed his emotional problems started long before

his physical problems, and when his wife left him to raise four

children alone, Le’s emotional problems worsened. (Id. at 339-40.) 

Plaintiff’s condition has become even worse since Le stopped

working because he has no energy, worries about his four children,

and frequently feels ill. (Id. at 343.)

Plaintiff has trouble sleeping, but he takes medication to

help him sleep. (Id.) The medication prevents Le from driving. 

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(Id. at 359.) Plaintiff testified that his former newspaper

delivery job required three to four hours of walking per day and

one to two hours of driving per day. (Id. at 359.) But in a

signed disability report submitted to the Social Security

Administration, Le stated the job required six hours of walking,

two hours of standing, and lifting up to five pounds. (Id. at

358.) 

B. The Medical Expert’s Testimony

Sidney Bolter, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, testified

at the hearing as a medical expert. (Id. at 60, 344, 349-50, 352-

54.) Dr. Bolter did not treat or examine Plaintiff but reviewed

most of Le’s medical reports before testifying. (Id. at 344.) He

testified that Dr. Henderson’s and Dr. Engelhorn’s reports were

complete. (Id. at 352.) 

Dr. Bolter agreed with Dr. Engelhorn’s report and opined that

Le’s diagnoses would include adjustment disorder with depressed

mood under listing 12.04. (Id.) The medical expert placed Le in

the moderately limited range for social functioning and in the

mildly limited range for concentration, persistence, and pace. 

(Id. at 353.) He believed the limits on Plaintiff’s social

functioning had more to do with his physical condition than any

mental or emotional problems. (Id.) The doctor estimated Le’s

impairments to be “mild for simple repetitive tasks, non-public

environment, and minimal contact with peers and supervisors, [with]

one to two [episodes of] decompensation.” (Id. at 354.) 

Dr. Bolter also noted Plaintiff’s severe lung problems and

testified that Le’s disability “hinges on the lung disease, not on

psychiatric diagnosis.” (Id. at 352.) But Dr. Bolter did not

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comment on Plaintiff’s respiratory ailments because he is not a

specialist in that area. (Id. at 354.) 

C. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Bonnie Sinclair testified as a vocational expert. (Id. at

348, 354-58, 360.) Sinclair stated that Le’s past work as a

newspaper delivery person was unskilled, light work with a specific

vocational preparation level (“SVP”) of two. (Id. at 348); see

also 1 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 232 (4th ed.,

rev. 1991) (hereinafter “DOT”) (defining Newspaper Carrier under

Occupational Group Arrangement No. 292.457-010). She opined that

if Plaintiff is limited to light, unskilled, simple repetitive

tasks with minimal to no public contact, he could still perform his

past work. (Admin. R. at 355.) 

If Le is unable to walk six hours a day, Plaintiff would be

unable to perform the newspaper delivery job. (Id. at 360.) If he

is unable to drive two hours a day, Le would also be unable to

perform his past work. (Id.) The vocational expert could not

express an opinion regarding whether driving was a simple,

repetitive task or a more complex task. (Id. at 357-58.) She

stated this issue was “really relatively subjective[,]” depending

on whether Plaintiff drove on a freeway or suburban side streets

and whether he drove the same route every day or different routes,

among other variables. (Id. at 358.)

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION 

In his decision, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s medical, work,

and educational history, as well as the evidence presented at the

administrative hearing. (Id. at 16-26.) Judge Carletti then made

the following findings:

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1. The claimant met the disability insured status

requirements of the Act on July 1, 2003, the date

the claimant stated he became unable to work, and

continues to meet them through the date of this

decision.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since July 1, 2003.

3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant

has severe pulmonary disease, arthritis, dermatitis,

and adjustment disorder, but that he does not have

an impairment or combination of impairments listed

in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.

4. Pursuant to the law of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, Social Security Rulings 96-3p, 96-4p, and

96-7p, and pertinent regulations, the claimant’s

allegations of the degree of his impairments and

limitations are rejected as not credible.

5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work. He is able to lift and/or carry

ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds

occasionally, sit, stand and/or walk six hours per

eight hour workday, and must avoid concentrated

exposure to lung irritants. The claimant is able to

understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions on a consistent basis. The claimant is

able to perform simple repetitive tasks. The

claimant is able to interact appropriately with

others in the workplace. The claimant is able to

adapt to changes in work routine and work location. 

The claimant is able to make routine adjustments in

the workplace. The claimant is able to respond

appropriately to usual work situations (20 CFR §§

404.1545 and 416.945).

6. The claimant’s past relevant work as newspaper

delivery person, as actually performed, did not

require the performance of work-related activities

precluded by the above limitation(s) (20 CFR §§

404.1565 and 416.965). 

7. The claimant’s impairments [do] not prevent the

claimant from performing his past relevant work.

8. The claimant was not under a “disability” as defined

in the Social Security Act, at any time through the

date of the decision (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c) and

416.920(c)).

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(Id. at 26-27.) Based on all of the above, Judge Carletti

concluded that Le is not entitled to a period of disability or

disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income. 

(Id. at 27.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show that: (1) He or she suffers from a

medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last for

a continuous period of twelve months or more or result in death;

and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of

performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national

economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West Supp.

2005). An applicant must meet both requirements to be classified

as “disabled.” Id. 

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the SSA to seek

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2005). The court should

affirm the Commissioner’s decision unless “it is based upon legal

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell

v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]

conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It means “‘more than a mere

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scintilla but less than a preponderance’” of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

"'[T]he court must consider the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.'" Frost v.

Barnhart, 314 F.3d. 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985), and citing Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-488 (1951); Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001)).

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520. If an applicant is found to be “disabled” or “not

disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further. Ukolov

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schneider

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Although the ALJ must assist the applicant in developing a record,

the applicant bears the burden of proof during the first four

steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir.

1999). If the fifth step is reached, however, the burden shifts to

the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The steps for evaluating a claim

are:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant

is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance

benefits. If the claimant is not working in a

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If

not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation

proceeds to step three.

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Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of

a list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If

the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of

the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four.

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he

or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is

“not disabled” and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work

he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation

proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 

If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner

must establish that there are a significant number of

jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There

are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of

showing that there is other work in “significant numbers”

in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to

the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled

to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner

cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving

an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42

U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 2006). The matter may also be

remanded to the Social Security Administrator for further

proceedings. Id.

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VI. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Properly Rejected the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating

Physicians in Favor of Examining Physicians Dr. Engelhorn and

Dr. O’Malley and Nonexamining Medical Expert Dr. Bolter.

Plaintiff contends Judge Carletti improperly rejected treating

doctors’ opinions and instead relied on nontreating physicians’

opinions without giving specific, legitimate reasons. (Pl.’s Mem.

1, 18-25.) A treating physician’s opinion must be accorded

controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case

record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (West 2006). If the

treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the

following factors are applied in determining what weight to give

the opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the

frequency of examination, (2) the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4)

the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the

specialization of the treating physician, and (6) any other factors

brought to the attention of the ALJ which tend to support or

contradict the opinion. Id. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii), (d)(3)-(6).

“Cases in [the Ninth Circuit] distinguish among the opinions

of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant

(treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine

nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Opinions of treating physicians may only be rejected under

certain circumstances. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the treating

doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be

rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d

at 830 (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir.

1991)); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.

2002). “Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by

another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion

without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by

substantial evidence in the record . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830

(citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).

Similarly, the opinion of an examining doctor is entitled to

greater weight than that of a nonexamining doctor. Id. (citing

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984)). “In addition, the

regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to

those that are not, and to the opinions of specialists concerning

matters relating to their specialty over that of nonspecialists.” 

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (5)). An ALJ must provide clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an

examining physician, and even when the examining physician’s

opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the opinion may only be

rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the

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opinion of either an examining or a treating physician.” Id. at

831 (citing Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506 n.4; Gallant, 753 F.2d at

1456)). “[T]he report of a non-treating, non-examining physician,

combined with the ALJ’s own observance of the claimant’s demeanor

at the hearing d[oes] not constitute substantial evidence” and does

not support an ALJ’s “decision to reject the examining physician’s

opinion that the claimant [is] disabled.” Id. (quoting Gallant,

753 F.2d at 1456) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This does not mean that an ALJ may never reject a treating or

examining physician’s opinion in favor of a nonexamining medical

expert’s testimony. “[T]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining

physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other

evidence in the record supports those findings.” Saelee v. Chater,

94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonexamining physician’s

opinion must be “supported by other evidence in the record and

consistent with it.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 

When a nontreating physician’s opinion contradicts that

of the treating physician - but is not based on

independent clinical findings, or rests on clinical

findings also considered by the treating physician - the

opinion of the treating physician may be rejected only if

the ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so

that are based on substantial evidence in the record. 

Id. (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

The ALJ must set out a “detailed and thorough summary of the

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation

thereof, and making findings.” Id. at 600-01 (quoting Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 750). The ALJ is not required to discuss each item of

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evidence, but the record should indicate that all evidence

presented was considered. Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th

Cir. 2000); Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir.

1996). “[A]n ALJ may not make ‘speculative inferences from medical

reports’ and may reject ‘a treating physician’s opinion outright

only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence’ and not due to

his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion.” 

Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999), and citing

Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988); Kent v.

Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Further, an ALJ may

discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief,

and unsupported by the record as a whole, or by objective medical

findings . . . .” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Tonapetyan v.

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The reviewing court must “consider the record as a whole,

weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts

from the Secretary’s conclusion.” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan,

2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

In this case, Le complains that the ALJ improperly rejected

the opinions of five treating physicians: Dr. Henderson, Dr.

Zappone, Dr. Grisolia, Dr. Morgan, and Dr. Sidrick. (Pl.’s Mem.

18-21.) The ALJ is not obligated to accept or reject the opinion

of a treating physician in full. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48

(3d Cir. 1994). The ALJ "may properly accept some parts of the

medical evidence and reject other parts, but [the ALJ] must

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consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting the

evidence [he] rejects." Id.

The opinions of Dr. Henderson, Dr. Zappone, and Dr. Grisolia

were contradicted by examining psychiatrists Dr. Engelhorn and Dr.

O’Malley and medical expert Dr. Bolter. (Compare Admin. R. at 235-

38, 243-56, 352-54, with Admin. R. at 267, 285-99, 317-21.) Dr.

Morgan’s and Dr. Sidrick’s opinions regarding pulmonary ailments

were contradicted by Dr. Resnikoff, and any opinions they may have

formed regarding whether Plaintiff was disabled because of

depression and post-traumatic stress disorder were contradicted by

Drs. Engelhorn, O’Malley, and Bolter. (Compare id. at 184-85, 276-

84, with id. at 188-89, 201-16; compare id. at 184-85, 276-84, with

id. at 267, 285-99, 317-21; see also Pl.’s Mem. 20-21 (arguing

Judge Carletti improperly rejected the opinions of Drs. Morgan and

Sidrick regarding Le’s depression and post-traumatic stress

syndrome).) Thus, although clear and convincing reasons for

disregarding the contradicted opinions of Le's treating and

examining physicians were not required, the ALJ must give specific,

legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the

record. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1148; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

Judge Carletti summarized the contradicting reports in his

decision. (Admin. R. at 18-25.) The ALJ accorded little weight to

the opinions of Drs. Sidrick, Grisolia, Morgan, Zappone, and

Henderson based on their prior inconsistent submissions. (Id. at

20, 22-24.) 

Judge Carletti took administrative notice of the numerous

disability claims before him filed by Attorney Manbeck that

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involved claimants whom she had sent to the same doctors. (Id. at

17.) In those prior cases, “the above referenced physicians and

psychologist[s] . . . routinely set forth medical source statements

purporting significant and/or debilitating impairments and

limitations in a manner at odds with the remaining evidence of

record from practitioners to whom a claimant was not referred by

Attorney Manbeck.” (Id.) An ALJ “may not assume doctors routinely

lie to help their patients collect disability benefits. [But,] may

introduce evidence of actual impropriety[.]” Lester, 81 F.3d at

832 (quoting Ratto v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 839 F. Supp.

1415, 1426 (D. Or. 1993)). Thus, Judge Carletti needed specific

reasons for rejecting the doctors’ opinions in this case.

1. Dr. Sidrick

Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Sidrick’s

assessment of Le’s depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. 

(Pl.’s Mem. 20-21.) Plaintiff contends that “[u]nder Ninth Circuit

law, Dr. Sidrick’s . . . opinion may not be disregarded on the

grounds that [she is] not [a] psychiatrist[].” (Id. at 21.) Le

asserts that Dr. Sidrick expressed an opinion regarding the

combined impact of both Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations

and that her opinion should be accorded controlling weight as the

opinion of a treating physician. (Id.) 

The ALJ attributed less weight to Dr. Sidrick’s opinion

because (1) she was a general practitioner and not a lung

specialist; (2) neither her treatment notes nor the record reflects

that Plaintiff would be unable to work for twelve months or more;

(3) her opinion was not supported by objective, longitudinal

medical evidence of record; (4) her opinion was not consistent with

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that of the lung specialist Dr. Resnikoff, who was treating the

Plaintiff; and (5) she opined on matters reserved to the

Commissioner. (Admin. R. at 20-21.) 

The ALJ first limited the weight of Dr. Sidrick’s opinion

concerning Le’s lung condition because she is not a lung

specialist. (Id. at 20.) The courts “generally give more weight

to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his

or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not

a specialist.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(5); see also Holohan, 246

F.3d at 1202 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)). Dr. Sidrick is a

general practitioner; this is a legitimate reason for giving less

weight to her opinion regarding Le's lung condition than given to

the opinion of a lung specialist.

Second, Dr. Sidrick did not opine that Plaintiff’s impairments

would continue for more than twelve months. (Admin. R. at 20-21.) 

To be found disabled, a claimant’s impairments must “be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). None of Dr. Sidrick’s treatment notes

indicate Le’s impairments would be expected to last more than

twelve months. (See Admin. R. at 193-95, 276-81.) On the

Authorization to Release Medical Information form, Dr. Sidrick

indicated Le had an "acute" condition that began in July of 2003

and was expected to last until February of 2004. (Id. at 184.) 

This is only eight months and does not meet the twelve month

requirement. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2006). 

This is a specific and legitimate reason to limit the weight of Dr.

Sidrick’s opinion. See Shiver v. Chater, No. 94-0918-P-S, 1996

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7336, at *37 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 1996) (rejecting

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treating doctor’s opinion because it lacked evidence that

disability met the durational requirement).

The third reason Judge Carletti discounted Dr. Sidrick’s

opinion is that it is not supported by longitudinal objective

medical evidence. (Id. at 20.) The ALJ noted that although Dr.

Sidrick diagnosed Le with osteoarthritis, “[a] comprehensive

orthopedic examination was not performed.” (Id. at 21.) 

Additionally, no laboratory tests were done on Plaintiff’s spine,

despite Le’s complaints of back and neck pain. (Id.) Indeed, the

doctor's treatment notes do not contain the results of any

objective tests that would support her diagnosis. (See id. at 276-

81.) Dr. Sidrick stated that Le had a lung mass that made him

unable to work; yet, on November 21, 2003, she reported that his

lungs were clear. (Id. at 20-21, 194.) Her treatment notes on

March 5, 2004, indicate Plaintiff had increased lung sounds, but

otherwise her records do not contain objective evidence of tests

performed on Le’s lungs. The lack of objective medical findings to

support Dr. Sidrick’s diagnoses is a specific and legitimate reason

for the ALJ to limit the weight of her opinion. See Batson, 359

F.3d at 1195. 

The ALJ noted that Dr. Sidrick's opinion was not shared by Dr.

Resnikoff, the lung specialist. (Id. at 20-21.) In Plaintiff’s

July 21, 2003, discharge summary from Scripps Hospital, after the

surgery performed by Dr. Resnikoff, Le was instructed by Dr. Dahms

to resume all previous activities as tolerated. (Id. at 136.) Dr.

Sidrick, on the other hand, assessed Le with a lung mass in 2004,

but she still found that Plaintiff’s lungs were “normal.” (Id. at

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276-82.) This discrepancy provides specific and legitimate reason

to discredit Dr. Sidrick’s opinion. 

As a fifth reason for limiting the weight of Dr. Sidrick’s

opinion, the ALJ states she opined on matters reserved for the

Commissioner. (Id. at 21.) On the Authorization to Release

Medical Information form, the doctor indicated Le would be unable

to work. (Id. at 184.) The claimant’s ability to work is a matter

reserved for the Commissioner and is a specific and legitimate

reason for disregarding Dr. Sidrick’s conclusion. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e)(1). 

On the whole, the ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons

supported by the record for the limiting the weight of Dr.

Sidrick’s opinion.

2. Dr. Grisolia

The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Grisolia’s psychiatric

opinion because the doctor (1) did not provide treatment notes, (2)

did not discuss the duration of Le’s depression, (3) did not set

forth any laboratory findings, (4) did not set forth an opinion of

specific work-related limitations, and (5) equivocally stated that

the Plaintiff’s purported headaches were “apparently disabling.” 

(Id. at 22.) The ALJ also discounted Dr. Grisolia’s opinion that

Le’s daily headache disorder was “apparently disabling” because the

alleged three-year history of headaches did not affect Plaintiff’s

prior work history, and Le denied having headaches to other

doctors. (Id.) 

The ALJ’s first and third reasons for limiting the weight of

Dr. Grisolia’s opinion correctly state that Dr. Grisolia submitted

only a one-page letter with no treatment notes and no laboratory

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findings. (See id. at 22, 267.) “[A]n ALJ may discredit treating

physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by

the record as a whole, or by objective medical findings.” Batson,

359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019; Tonapetyan, 242

F.3d at 1149). This is a legitimate reason to disregard a

physician’s opinion, especially because there is no indication that

Dr. Grisolia created any treatment notes. See Webb v. Barnhart,

433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1150) (requiring further development of the record only when the

evidence is ambiguous, the ALJ finds the record is inadequate to

make a disability determination, or the ALJ relies on a medical

expert who finds the record ambiguous). 

The ALJ’s second, fourth, and fifth reasons to accord little

weight to Dr. Grisolia’s opinion were that the doctor did not

discuss the duration of Le’s impairments or their functional

limitations and was “equivocal” in making his findings. (Admin. R.

at 22.) The doctor stated that Plaintiff’s headaches are “of

apparently disabling intensity.” (Id. at 267 (emphasis added).) 

Other than his statement that Le's daily headaches require that he

lay down, the doctor gave no indication of how the headaches or

depression interfere with Le's ability to work. (See id.) Dr.

Grisolia also commented that Le’s symptoms would be “refractory

because of concomitant depression” indicating they would be

resistant to treatment. (Id. at 267.) This finding does not

address whether Plaintiff’s depression-related headaches could be

expected to last more than a year, and the doctor did not make any

other assertions regarding the likely severity or duration of

Plaintiff’s ailments. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

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These are specific and legitimate reasons to give less weight to

Dr. Grisolia’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (medicallydeterminable disabling impairment must last or be expected to last

more than twelve months); Garner v. Shalala, No. 93-0665-BH-S, 1994

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19351, at *24-25 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 1994) (finding

doctor’s failure to restrict claimant from performing any specific

activity a legitimate reason to reject the physician’s opinion);

Clark v. Bowen, 668 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (upholding

ALJ’s rejection of physician’s equivocal opinion of disability that

was brief, conclusory, and unsupported by clinical findings). 

Judge Carletti also noted that the alleged headache disorder

did not inhibit Le’s ability to work “prior to his being laid off.” 

(Admin. R. at 22.) On August 31, 2004, Le reported a three-year

history of headaches. (Id. at 267.) But, the alleged onset date

of Le’s disability was July 1, 2003. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff,

therefore, worked for nearly two years while experiencing allegedly

“disabling” headaches. This contradiction provides another

legitimate reason to limit the weight given to Dr. Grisolia’s

opinion. Cf. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir.

2005) (finding evidence that claimant worked five-hour shifts

contradicted physician’s opinion that she could only work for two

hours a day provided a legitimate reason to discredit the

physician’s opinion). 

All of the ALJ’s reasons for giving less weight to Dr.

Grisolia’s opinion are specific, legitimate, and supported by the

record evidence at the time of Judge Carletti’s decision. The

evidence submitted less than one month after the ALJ’s decision, a

letter from Dr. Grisolia dated July 19, 2005, presents essentially

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the same opinion the doctor gave before. (See Admin. R. at 329.) 

Dr. Grisolia's letter does not cannot change the analysis. Judge

Carletti’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Grisolia’s opinion

regarding Le’s headaches and depression should be upheld.

3. Dr. Morgan

Le argues the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Morgan’s assessment

of his depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Pl.’s Mem.

20-21.) Plaintiff contends that “[u]nder Ninth Circuit law, . . .

Dr. Morgan’s opinion may not be disregarded on the grounds that [he

is] not [a] psychiatrist[].” (Id. at 21 (citing Sprague, 812 F.2d

at 1231; Lester, 81 F.3d at 829).) Le further asserts that Dr.

Morgan’s opinion regarding the combined impact of both Plaintiff’s

physical and mental limitations should be accorded controlling

weight as the opinion of a treating physician. (Id.) 

Judge Carletti’s reasons for attributing little weight to Dr.

Morgan’s opinion are the following: (1) None of the impairments

Dr. Morgan discussed relate to his specialty as a cardiologist or

matters for which he treated Le; (2) all of Dr. Morgan’s statements

are conclusory and based on either Plaintiff’s self-report or his

attorney’s report and begin with “I am told that”; (3) Dr. Morgan

provided no treatment notes; and (4) Dr. Morgan opined on matters

reserved to the Commissioner. (Admin. R. at 23.) 

The ALJ’s first reason for discrediting Dr. Morgan’s opinion

concerning Le’s mental condition is that he is not a psychiatrist. 

(Id. at 23.) The courts “generally give more weight to the opinion

of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of

specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.” 

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(5). Dr. Morgan is a cardiologist but his

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opinion does not address Le's heart condition; instead it addresses

Le’s back, lung, and mental conditions. (See Admin. R. at 283-84.) 

These facts are legitimate reasons to give less weight to Dr.

Morgan’s opinion regarding Le’s mental condition. See Holohan, 246

F.3d at 1202 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)). But see Sprague

v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that

psychiatric evidence may be found in a primary care physician’s

treatment notes and opinions). 

Second, Judge Carletti discounted Dr. Morgan’s opinion because

it was conclusory. (Admin. R. at 23.) Dr. Morgan stated that

Plaintiff was his patient, but he repeatedly states that he was

“told” of Le’s various ailments. (See id. at 283-84.) The doctor

did not include any treatment notes. (See id.) Furthermore, he

did not perform any objective tests regarding Le’s mental

impairments. (See id.) “[A]n ALJ may discredit treating

physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by

the record as a whole, or by objective medical findings.” Batson,

359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019; Tonapetyan, 242

F.3d at 1149). 

Plaintiff belatedly submitted treatment notes to support Dr.

Morgan’s assessment. With his Memorandum of Points and

Authorities, filed February 10, 2006, Plaintiff attached one page

of treatment notes from Dr. Morgan, spanning the period from August

11, 2003, through November 21, 2005. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. A.) Other

than the first paragraph of Dr. Morgan’s newly submitted treatment

notes, the rest of the page contains one-line entries primarily

listing Le’s weight and blood pressure; no other diagnosis is

apparent from the entries. (Id.) The exhibit does not explain how

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the cardiologist learned the information in his November 1, 2004,

assessment, nor does it provide any greater detail regarding how he

was able to diagnose orthopedic, pulmonary, and emotional problems. 

(See id.; Admin. R. at 23.)

“A reviewing court may remand a case to the Secretary for

consideration of new evidence where: (1) the new evidence is

material; and (2) good cause exists for the claimant’s failure to

incorporate the evidence in a prior proceeding.” Cotton v. Bowen,

799 F.2d 1403, 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Key

v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1551 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Mayes,

276 F.3d at 462. “To be material, the new evidence must bear

directly and substantially on the matter in issue” and have a

reasonable possibility of changing the outcome. Cotton, 799 F.2d

at 1409 (citing Key, 754 F.2d at 1551; Booz v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984)). “To show

good cause, the claimant must establish that she could not have

obtained the evidence at the time of the administrative

proceeding.” Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1409 (citing Key, 754 F.2d at

1551). 

The new treatment notes from Dr. Morgan do not "bear 'directly

and substantially on the matter in dispute.'" Mayes, 276 F.3d at

462 (quoting Ward v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Nor does the submission of this single page have a reasonable

probability of changing the outcome at the administrative hearing. 

See id.; (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. A). Although the tardy submission

addresses one of the ALJ's criticisms of Dr. Morgan's opinion,

Plaintiff does not show why this evidence could not have been

obtained earlier. (See Pl.'s Mem. 1-25.) Absent materiality and

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good cause, this new evidence cannot be considered by this Court in

deciding whether to affirm the ALJ’s decision. Cotton, 799 F.2d at

1409. 

Finally, the ALJ discredits Dr. Morgan for opining on matters

reserved to the Commissioner. (Admin. R. at 23.) Dr. Morgan

stated Le "is not considered vocationally capable." (Id. at 284.) 

This is a finding reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e)(1).

The ALJ’s decision to attribute little weight to Dr. Morgan’s

opinion is supported by specific and legitimate reasons; it should

be affirmed.

4. Dr. Zappone

The ALJ found Dr. Zappone’s opinion was “not entitled to

significant weight” for the following reasons: (1) The doctor’s

diagnosis that Le satisfied the “C” criteria of the 12.06 listing

(anxiety disorder) was inconsistent with Le’s allegations; (2) his

report was inconsistent with his Psychiatric Review Technique form;

(3) Dr. Zappone “performed a limited mental status examination and

did not perform objective testing[;]” (4) no treating records were

provided; (5) the doctor did not state Plaintiff responded to

internal stimuli; (6) he opined on matters reserved for the

Commissioner; (7) he did not assess insight and judgment; (8) the

opinion was conclusory; (9) the opinion was not supported by

longitudinal objective evidence of record; and (10) it was unclear

when signs and symptoms commenced or if they would remain for the

requisite period. (Admin. R. at 23-24.) 

Judge Carletti faults Dr. Zappone’s opinion for diagnosing Le

with “C” criteria of the 12.06 (anxiety disorder) listings. (Id.

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at 23.) Anxiety disorder includes symptoms “[r]esulting in

complete inability to function independently outside the area of

one’s home,” but the ALJ asserted that “the claimant himself does

not allege complete inability to function independently outside his

home.” (Id. at 23, 292); 20 C.F.R. § 404 App. 1 to Subpart P

12.06. Dr. Zappone found the “C” criteria of a 12.06 listing

present. (Admin. R. at 292.) The doctor’s report states that Le

has a severe inability to perform in the workplace, relate to other

people, make decisions, and carry out responsibility for direction,

control, and planning. (Id. at 286-87.) Le did not allege any

mental conditions in his Request for Hearing by an ALJ. (See id.

at 45.) But Plaintiff did claim to suffer from “nightmares, memory

loss, anxiety, and depression” in his December 2003 disability

application. (Id. at 71.) Le also testified that he stopped

working because of a combination of mental and physical problems. 

(Id. at 338.) Judge Carletti’s first reason is not a legitimate

reason for discrediting Dr. Zappone because it is not supported by

the record. 

The ALJ further noted inconsistencies in Dr. Zappone’s

diagnosis. (Id. at 23.) The doctor stated that Le “appeared very

depressed and anxious” and that “he has auditory hallucinations

. . . .” (Id. at 286.) Dr. Zappone diagnosed Le with recurrent

and severe major depression with psychotic features. (Id. at 286.) 

On his Psychiatric Review Technique form, however, the doctor did

not indicate that any psychotic disorders were present. (Id. 288.) 

The doctor did mark that anxiety-related disorders were present,

but his diagnoses did not include any anxiety disorders. (Compare

id. at 290 with id. at 286-87.) This inconsistency is a specific,

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legitimate reason for questioning the value of Dr. Zappone’s

opinion. See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995).

Third, the ALJ stated that Dr. Zappone did not perform

independent objective testing and only administered a limited

mental status exam. (Admin. R. at 24.) But Dr. Zappone

interviewed Plaintiff and conducted a number of mental status exams

including short term memory, serial sevens, and counting forward

and backward. (Id. at 286.) The doctor also reported that Le

“showed poor eye contact and he appeared quite preoccupied.” (Id.) 

He further noted that Plaintiff “was sloppily dressed and he

appeared quite distracted.” (Id.) Dr. Zappone found Le “was

oriented to time, place and person . . . [but was] unable to recall

what he had for breakfast.” (Id.) Dr. Zappone performed objective

testing and a mental status exam, therefore, the ALJ’s third reason

to disregard Dr. Zappone’s opinion is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record. 

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Zappone’s opinion because no

treatment records were supplied. (Id. at 24.) An ALJ may

discredit opinions “that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by

. . . objective medical findings.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. 

Further development of the record is only required when the

evidence is ambiguous, the ALJ finds the record is inadequate to

make a disability determination, or the ALJ relies on a medical

expert who finds the record ambiguous. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1150. Judge Carletti did not need further evidence of Le’s mental

impairments to make a determination of Le’s disability, so further

development of the record is not required. The ALJ had a

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legitimate reason to discredit Dr. Zappone’s opinion because no

treatment notes were submitted. 

Long after the ALJ’s decision became final on September 28,

2005, Plaintiff attached Dr. Zappone’s pre- and post-hearing

treatment notes to his Reply in this case. (See Pl.’s Reply, Ex.

A.) This new evidence submitted after the ALJ’s decision cannot be

considered by this Court in deciding whether to affirm the ALJ’s

decision. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1409. “A reviewing court may remand

a case to the Secretary for consideration of new evidence where:

(1) the new evidence is material; and (2) good cause exists for the

claimant’s failure to incorporate the evidence in a prior

proceeding.” Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1409 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Key, 754 F.2d at 1551). The more recent treatment notes appear to

be cumulative, and the Plaintiff does not explain why the predecision evidence was not introduced in the administrative

proceeding. (See Pl.’s Mem. 1-25.) Accordingly, the late

submission of this evidence does not warrant a remand to the

Secretary for further consideration.

 The ALJ’s fifth and seventh criticisms of the doctor’s

opinion are that he did not conclude that Le was responding to

internal stimuli, and he failed to assess Le's insight and

judgment. (Admin. R. at 24.) Dr. Zappone did not specifically

address these items. (See id. at 285-87.) There is no specific

requirement that a psychiatrist assess the response to internal

stimuli to render an opinion on the claimant's mental capacity. 

“The individual case facts determine the specific areas of mental

status that need to be emphasized during the examination.” 20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 1, § 12.00(D)(4) (listing the

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areas generally included in a comprehensive mental status

examination); see also Lowe v. Barnhart, No. 04 C 2022, 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 19609, at *30 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2004). There is

nothing in the record to indicate that judgment, insight and the

response to internal stimuli are central to the assessment of Le's

condition. Standing alone, these are not specific and legitimate

reasons to accord less weight to Dr. Zappone’s opinion. But see 20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 1, § 12.00(D)(4) (describing a

comprehensive mental status exam as generally including a

description of judgment and insight).

The ALJ’s sixth reason to limit Dr. Zappone’s opinion is that

the doctor opined on matters reserved for the Commissioner. Dr.

Zappone stated that Le is “permanently disabled.” (Admin. R. at

287.) This is a matter reserved for the Commissioner and is a

specific and legitimate reason for disregarding the doctor’s

conclusion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). 

Judge Carletti's eighth criticism was that the doctor’s

opinion was conclusory. (Admin. R. at 24.) Dr. Zappone described

his interview with the Plaintiff and a number of mental status

exams including short term memory, serial sevens, and counting

forward and backwards. (Id. at 286.) The doctor also reported

that Le “showed poor eye contact and he appeared quite

preoccupied.” (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Zappone noted that

Plaintiff “was sloppily dressed and he appeared quite distracted.” 

(Id.) Le “was oriented to time, place and person” at the

examination. (Id.) Plaintiff could not “recall what he had for

breakfast[,]” stated that he would burn food when attempting to

cook, and “had difficulty concentrating.” (Id.) "He showed

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psychomotor retardation." (Id. at 286.) The doctor’s evaluation

was based on these assessments. Therefore, the ALJ's criticism

that the opinion was conclusory is not a legitimate reason to

disregard Dr. Zappone’s opinion. 

Ninth, the ALJ discounted Dr. Zappone’s opinion because it was

“not supported by longitudinal objective evidence of record.” (Id.

at 24.) An ALJ may discredit opinions “that are . . . unsupported

by . . . objective medical findings.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. 

Le testified that Dr. Zappone treated him “three or four times.” 

(Admin. R. at 338.) Belatedly, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Zappone

treated Le on January 22, and February 11, 2005. (Pl.’s Reply 7.) 

Attached to the Reply were Dr. Zappone’s treatment and progress

notes, which corroborate these treatment dates. (See Pl.’s Reply,

Ex. A.) This new evidence was submitted after the ALJ’s decision

and without good cause for the tardy submission. It cannot be

considered by this Court in deciding whether to affirm the ALJ’s

decision. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1409. The record available to Judge

Carletti only included Dr. Zappone’s March 6, 2005, report and

review form along with Le’s hearing testimony. (See Admin. R. at

285-92, 338.) Without the additional record supplied after the

ALJ’s decision, this is a legitimate reason for discounting Dr.

Zappone’s opinion. 

Finally, the ALJ also disregarded the doctor’s opinion because

the evaluation was “unclear” regarding the duration of Le’s

impairments. (Id. at 24.) Dr. Zappone, however, stated that Le

“has become increasingly depressed and despondent since his wife

left him many years ago.” (Id. at 285.) The doctor then stated Le

is “permanently disabled.” (Id. at 287.) This implies that the

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depression began at the inception of Le’s marital problems and will

continue indefinitely. The duration, according to Dr. Zappone,

spans more than the requisite twelve-month period. See 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A); see also Gutierrez v. Apfel, 199 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2000) (finding that the durational requirement was satisfied

where the treating physician "does not express any opinion that the

claimant's condition will materially improve within twelve

months[]"). Therefore, this is not a specific and legitimate

reason for rejecting Dr. Zappone’s opinion.

Overall, the district court should affirm Judge Carletti’s

decision to discount Dr. Zappone’s opinion because the ALJ gave

sufficient specific and legitimate reasons for giving the doctor's

opinion minimal weight.

5. Dr. Henderson

Judge Carletti accorded little weight to the opinion of Dr.

Henderson for the following reasons: (1) The doctor provided

limited and illegible treating notes; (2) the evidence of record as

a whole does not support the doctor’s conclusions; (3) Dr.

Henderson opined on matters reserved to the Commissioner; (4) the

opinions concerned matters for which Dr. Henderson did not treat

Plaintiff and which were outside his area of expertise as a

psychiatrist; (5) his opinions were conclusory and based upon

Plaintiff’s self-report or information provided by Le's attorney;

(6) Dr. Henderson acted as an advocate for Le; (7) he “did not set

forth the report of any comprehensive mental status examination,

but rather, summarized the purported signs exhibited by the

claimant in treatment notes which are not a part of the record; and

(8) the extraneous treatment notes reflected an improvement in Le’s

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condition, which was not consistent with Dr. Henderson’s final

report. (Admin. R. at 20, 24.) 

First, the ALJ discredited Dr. Henderson’s opinion because of

limited and illegible treatment notes. (Id. at 24.) The ALJ has a

duty to develop the record “when there is ambiguous evidence, or

the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the

evidence.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 462. Dr. Henderson’s 2003 treatment

notes consisted of two pages with limited writing. (See Admin. R.

at 182-83.) Although illegible notes would be considered

ambiguous, the ALJ would only have a duty to develop the record if

he thought it necessary to review the notes to make a determination

of Le’s disability claim. The ALJ did not require the added

evidence to make this determination because he had Dr. Henderson's

November 19, 2004, report at the hearing. The July 12, 2005,

letter from Dr. Henderson, submitted to the Appeals Council, was

duplicative of Dr. Henderson's November 19, 2004, report and does

not change the analysis. (Id. at 8, 293-96, 329.) Nevertheless,

the partial-legibility of the notes was not a legitimate reason to

discredit Dr. Henderson’s opinion. 

Second, Judge Carletti criticizes Dr. Henderson’s conclusion

because the evidence does not reflect longitudinal symptoms or

clinical or laboratory abnormalities consistent with the doctor’s

findings. (Id. at 24.) Dr. Henderson, however, treated Le longer

than any of the other doctors –- approximately six months. (Id. at

182-83.) Furthermore, he prepared a follow-up report approximately

one year after last treating Le. (Id. at 293-96.) The doctor

stated that Le “consistently performed in the grossly deficient/

severely disabled ranges” in his therapy sessions. (Id. at 295.) 

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He reiterated a similar conclusion on July 12, 2005. (Id. at 329.) 

Dr. Henderson’s opinion is also consistent with the opinions of

Drs. Morgan, DiCicco, Grisolia, and Zappone. (See id. at 267, 283,

285, 297.) “Because treating physicians are employed to cure and

thus have a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as

an individual, their opinions are [generally] given greater weight

than the opinions of other physicians.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d

759, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1989); Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1230). This

reason for rejecting the doctor’s opinion is not supported by the

record evidence.

The third reason given by the ALJ to detract from Dr.

Henderson’s opinion was that the doctor rendered opinions on

matters reserved for the Commissioner. (Admin. R. at 24.) Dr.

Henderson stated Le is “unable to work” and that his condition

“would prevent him from gainful employment.” (Id. at 295.) These

are decisions reserved for the Commissioner and a legitimate reason

to disregard this aspect of the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e)(1).

Fourth, the ALJ stated that Dr. Henderson commented on Le’s

physical ailments, which are not within his area of expertise as a

psychiatrist and for which he did not treat Plaintiff. (Admin. R.

at 24.) The doctor reported that Le “has severe orthopedic

problems in addition to his status post tuberculosis.” (Id. at

294.) He also found that Le’s x-rays indicated cervical

instability and discogenic disease “causing him pain in addition to

the chronic obstructive pulmonary disease which make[s] him short

of breath upon the slightest exertion.” (Id.) The fact that Dr.

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Henderson is a psychiatrist, and not a physician specializing in

physical ailments, is a legitimate reason to give less weight to

his opinion regarding Le’s physical ailments. See Holohan, 246

F.3d at 1202 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)); but see Sprague,

812 F.2d at 1232. 

The ALJ’s fifth and seventh concerns about Dr. Henderson’s

opinion were that it was conclusory and that the doctor performed a

limited mental status exam. (Admin. R. at 24.) Dr. Henderson

noted Plaintiff was “frail” and looked “older than his stated age

and [wa]s not oriented to date, place and time.” (Id. at 293.) 

The doctor conducted an intelligence test and interviewed Le

several times. (Id. at 293-96.) He reported that Le was unable to

“perform serial 3s” and could not “recall three nouns after three

minutes.” (Id. at 294.) Dr. Henderson also administered a portion

of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. (Id. at 295.) The

opinion was based on these tests, evaluations, and observations. 

(See id.) Several other physicians drew similar conclusions after

examining Le. (See id. at 286 (Dr. Zappone), 298 (Dr. DiCicco).) 

These opinions add credibility to Dr. Henderson’s findings. See

Lester, 81 F.3d at 832. Therefore, these are not legitimate

reasons for discrediting Dr. Henderson’s opinion.

Judge Carletti’s sixth reason for limiting the weight of the

doctor’s opinion was that Dr. Henderson advocated for Le by

attacking Dr. Engelhorn’s evaluation. (See id. at 295.) 

“Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ.” Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Russell v. Bowen,

856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988)). Dr. Henderson’s critical

discussion of Dr. Engelhorn’s evaluation and allegation that Dr.

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Engelhorn had a "pervasive bias against applicants for social

security benefits" reads like the report of an advocate, not a

healer. (Admin. R. at 295.) Therefore, Dr. Henderson's opinion

may be discounted for this reason.

Finally, the ALJ’s states treatment notes of Dr. Henderson

that are not a part of the record conflict with the doctor’s

opinion and reflect improvement in Le’s condition. (Admin. R. at

24.) This Court cannot comment on treatment notes not in the

record. According to the treatment notes in the record, Plaintiff

continuously showed signs of helplessness, suicidal thoughts,

panic, depression, and paranoia. (Id. at 182-83.) Because the

treatment notes in the record contradict the ALJ’s statement, this

is not a legitimate reason for discrediting Dr. Henderson’s

opinion.

Nevertheless, the ALJ had legitimate reasons to limit the

weight of Dr. Henderson's opinion: The opinion related to matters

reserved for the Commissioner; the psychiatrist provided an opinion

on Le's physical conditions; and Dr. Henderson's advocacy was an

attack on another doctor's motivation. Although the legitimate

reasons for discounting Dr. Henderson's opinion are limited, they

infect his entire opinion. Consequently, the ALJ gave specific and

legitimate reasons for discounting the opinion of this treating

psychiatrist. 

"Where, as here, the record contains conflicting medical

evidence, the ALJ is charged with determining credibility and

resolving the conflict.” Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956-57

(9th Cir. 2002)). Where the medical expert’s assessment is

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inconsistent with other evidence in the record, the ALJ only needs

legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence for rejecting the

treating physicians’ opinions, not clear and convincing reasons. 

Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). Contrary

opinions may serve as additional specific and legitimate reasons. 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Here, Le’s treating physicians’

opinions were contradicted by the opinions of examining

psychiatrist Dr. Engelhorn and by non-examining psychiatrist, Dr.

O’Malley, physician, Dr. Manolokas, and medical expert Dr. Bolter.

(Id. at 235, 241, 344.)

Judge Carletti’s opinion included specific and legitimate

reasons based on substantial record evidence to discredit the

doctors’ opinions. "If the evidence can support either outcome,

the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ." 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Matney, 981 F.2d at

1018.) Therefore, the district court should DENY Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment; the ALJ did not improperly reject the

opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians.

B. The ALJ Properly Rejected Plaintiff’s Subjective Pain and

Symptom Complaints.

Le argues that Judge Carletti “failed to consider plaintiff’s

objective and subjective symptom testimony in evaluating his

physical impairments.” (Pl.’s Mem. 5.) Plaintiff’s complaint

alleged the following conditions: lung disease, tuberculosis,

severe lung lesion, heart disease, lung mass, dermatitis, chronic

obstructive pulmonary disease, osteoarthritis, sleep disorder,

cardiomegaly, left ventricular hypertrophy, diabetes, lumbar and

cervical spine disease, left inguinal hernia, spinal instability,

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degenerative discogenic disease of the lumbar spine and cervical 

spine, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id. at 2-

3.)

At the hearing, Le testified that he stopped working due to a

combination of physical and mental problems. (Admin. R. at 338.) 

Plaintiff stated he could only walk about one block, sit for a

limited time, and lift or carry five to ten pounds. (Id. at 339.) 

Le also said he suffered from lung disease, had difficulty

breathing, and back and neck pain. (Id. at 340-41.) Plaintiff

reported he suffered from depression, which began after his wife

left him and worsened when he stopped working. (Id. at 343.)

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective pain or symptom

testimony entirely if the claimant fails to produce any objective

medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected

to produce the claimed symptoms or pain. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407. 

The severity of pain need not be proven by objective medical

evidence; the medical evidence must only show that some degree of

the claimed symptom could result from the impairment. Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1282 (citing Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th

Cir. 1994); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

The level of pain experienced from a given physical impairment

varies from person to person. Id. (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 601). 

The severity of the pain is an individual, subjective phenomenon

that no social security claimant is required to prove through

objective medical evidence. Id. at 1282 n.2. The ALJ may not

reject the claimant’s subjective testimony without “specific, clear

and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. 

“Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

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malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the

claimant’s testimony must be ‘clear and convincing.’” Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d

at 834; Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

The ALJ must also state with specificity the symptoms he is

rejecting as not credible and the facts in the record on which he

is basing his decision. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also Varney

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (Varney I), 846 F.2d 581, 584

(9th Cir. 1988), modified on reh’g, 859 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1988)

(holding that an ALJ’s failure to “isolate particular complaints of

pain and discuss the evidence suggesting that those complaints

[we]re not credible. . . . [was] improper as a matter of law”).

In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may

consider his reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies

either in his testimony or between his testimony and his

conduct, his daily activities, his work record, and

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning

the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which

he complains.

Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The

ALJ must also consider the observations of physicians and other

third parties, precipitating and aggravating factors, and

functional restrictions caused by the symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1284. “[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be

premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the severity of

his pain.” Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).

Plaintiff presented objective medical evidence of the

following conditions: lung lesion, left pneumothorax,

tuberculosis, neck and back pain, osteoarthritis, headaches,

psoriasis, inguinal hernia, depression, anxiety, psychotic

features, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Admin. R. at 135-

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36, 195, 268, 281, 296.) Judge Carletti did not find that Le was

malingering. (See id. at 16-26.) Therefore, the ALJ was required

to give specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by the

record for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See

Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th

Cir. 1999) (finding reasons given by ALJ insufficient when not

supported by substantial evidence in the record). 

In Le’s case, the ALJ listed ten specific reasons for

rejecting Le’s allegations. (Admin. R. at 25.) First, the ALJ

found that Le “is able to perform work activities” based on Dr.

Bolter’s opinion. (Id. at 25.) Judge Carletti rejected Le's

subjective symptom testimony because it differed from Dr. Bolter’s

opinion. (Id.) Le complained of a long list of physical

impairments and mental impairments that Plaintiff claims make him

unable to work. (Pl.’s Mem. 2-3; Admin. R. at 338.) Dr. Bolter,

the medical expert, stated Plaintiff’s mental conditions only

moderately or mildly affected his daily living, social activities,

persistence, pace, concentration, and decompensation. (Admin. R.

at 354.) The doctor stated Le had mild restrictions on simple

repetitive tasks in non-public environments with peer and

supervisor contact; however, Dr. Bolter, a psychiatrist, did not

comment on Plaintiff’s physical impairments. (Id.) Le could be

disabled on the basis of his physical impairments or based on a

combination of his physical and mental impairments, as he argues. 

(Pl.’s Mem. 25); see 20 C.F.R. § 220.102; Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1403. 

Because Dr. Bolter could not opine on the effect of Plaintiff’s

physical impairments on his ability to work, the first stated

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rationale is not a legitimate reason for rejecting Le’s

allegations.

This is also true of Judge Carletti’s second and third reasons

–- that Dr. Engelhorn and agency psychiatrists opined the claimant

was able to perform simple, repetitive tasks. (Admin. R. at 25.) 

Dr. Engelhorn expressed no opinion regarding Le’s physical

impairments, other than to state that Le’s disability “appears to

be mostly related to his respiratory disease.” (Id. at 237.) He

did conclude that "[f]rom a strictly psychiatric point of view, the

patient is capable of doing simple, repetitive tasks." (Id.) 

Likewise, the state agency psychiatrists determined Le is “able to

persist at simple tasks (unskilled work).” (Id. at 241.) The

agency physicians, not psychiatrists, noted Plaintiff’s need to

avoid lung irritants. (Id. at 261-62.) Judge Carletti’s second

and third reasons are not entirely supported by the record. 

Nevertheless, even if the ALJ’s first three reasons for

discrediting Le’s subjective symptom testimony are not clear and

convincing reasons to reject the allegation that Plaintiff is

disabled due to physical impairments or a combination of

impairments, Judge Carletti gives additional reasons that satisfy

the standard.

The ALJ’s fourth reason for rejecting Le’s subjective symptom

testimony was that “the record does not contain ongoing reports of

symptomology consistent with the claimant’s allegations[,]” Dr.

Sidrick’s treating records “were generally benign except for

occasional reports of orthopedic pain[,]” and Plaintiff’s lung

condition had resolved and “is not associated with ongoing symptoms

or clinical abnormalities.” (Id. at 25.)

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First, Judge Carletti did not find Le’s degenerative disc

disease or his neurologic and headache disorder to be severe. (See

id. at 26.) Dr. Resnikoff reported that Le felt his conditions had

improved. (Id. at 201.) The ALJ noted that Le denied having

significant headaches in his physical treatment records, including

the July 2003 laboratory examination for tuberculosis and five

follow-up visits between September and December of 2003. (Id. at

19-20; see id. at 157-63, 193-95, 201-05, 213.) Dr. Grisolia’s

“comprehensive neurologic examination [indicated Le was] normal[,]”

but he noted a "daily headache disorder." (Id. at 267.) Regarding

Le’s psoriasis, the ALJ properly noted Le “was treated only through

December 1997, at which time he had no symptoms of significance.” 

(Id. at 18; see id. at 107-34.) 

Second, Judge Carletti correctly found Dr. Sidrick’s

evaluation “generally benign except for occasional reports of

orthopedic pain,” between January 15, 2004, and November 1, 2004,

but on November 1, 2004, Dr. Sidrick reported Plaintiff’s lungs

were normal, although there was some back and neck pain. (Id. at

25, 276, 279.)

Finally, the ALJ noted the hospital discharged Plaintiff with

instructions to resume all previous activities as tolerated after

treatment for his lung ailments. (Id. at 19, 25, 136.) The ALJ

also reported that the November 2003 treating records of Dr.

Resnikoff, the pulmonologist to which Scripps referred Le,

indicated an improving condition. (Id. at 19, 201.) The record

supports the ALJ’s findings and shows Le’s lung condition was

properly treated, and Plaintiff’s functioning returned to normal. 

The ALJ’s fourth rationale stated clear and convincing reasons for

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rejecting Le’s subjective allegation of disability caused by his

prior physical ailments. (See id. at 25.)

The ALJ also rejected Le’s subjective symptom testimony for a

fifth reason: "[T]he record does not contain references to reports

of disabling side effects of medications.” (Id. at 25.) On

November 19, 2004, Dr. Henderson mentioned medication side effects. 

(Id. at 293, 296.) Dr. Henderson stated Le has “chronic fatigue

and sedation due to residual effects of narcotics medication

. . . .” (Id. at 296.) The doctor’s treatment notes indicate a

side effect ("panic") was present. (Id. at 182-83.) Dr. Zappone

reported that Plaintiff “needs medication monitoring for his

antidepressant and antipsychotic medication.” (Id. at 287.) Dr.

Grisolia reported Le “denie[d] medication sensitivities . . . .” 

(Id. at 267.) Le apparently did not complain of side effects to

these doctors, and no other doctors reported on the presence or

absence of disabling side effects caused by Plaintiff’s

medications. (See id. at 267, 283, 285-87, 296.) In his August

13, 2004, disability report, Le stated that none of the medications

he was taking at the time caused any side effects. (Id. at 102,

106.) But Plaintiff testified at the hearing that his medications

caused sleepiness, some dizziness, and prevented him from driving.

(Id. at 337, 343, 359.) In the five-page, post-hearing report by

Dr. Henderson (id. at 317-21), he noted that different medications

have been prescribed for Le, but the treating doctor does not

describe any medication side effects. (Id. at 317.)

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s allegations of disabling side

effects when the record contains no evidence that the side effects

were ever reported to treating physicians. See Ownbey v. Shalala,

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5 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1993). Judge Carletti did not err in

rejecting Le's allegations of disabling medication side effects.

The ALJ stated as a sixth reason for rejecting Le’s subjective

complaint that Dr. Resnikoff reported that Le felt improved; his

examinations remained unremarkable; his condition was stable; and

he needed only a nine-month course of treatment. (Admin. R. at

25.) On July 21, 2003, Le was discharged from Scripps Hospital and

instructed "to resume all previous activities tolerated . . . ." 

(Id. at 136.) He was also told to return for "pain not relieved by

medicine." (Id.) Dr. Resnikoff reported that Le had mild back

pain on November 24, 2003, but on December 23, 2003, Plaintiff was

feeling a little better. (Id. at 201-02.) Examinations of Le

indicated only minor ailments such as cough, skin problems, and

orthopedic pain. (Id. at 201-05.) Judge Carletti’s sixth reason

for rejecting Le’s subjective complaints is clear and convincing

and based on substantial record evidence.

The ALJ’s seventh reason was that “there are no psychiatric

treatment records after December 2003, as of which time there were

no medication side effects and thoughts were clear, according to

Dr. Henderson.” (Id. at 25.) Dr. Henderson’s treatment notes from

December 13, 2003, indicate Le’s thoughts were clear, and except

for panic concerns, there were no medication side effects. (Id. at

183.) Treatment records of Dr. Zappone submitted after the ALJ’s

decision do not meet the standard for delayed submissions, so they

cannot be considered by this Court in deciding whether to affirm

the ALJ’s decision. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1409. The absence of

evidence of continuing psychiatric treatment is a clear and

convincing reason to reject Le’s subjective complaints of

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continuing mental ailments. Dr. Henderson's July 12, 2005,

critique of both Dr. Bolter's testimony and the decision of the

administrative law judge (id. at 217-21) does not change this

conclusion.

As an eighth reason for rejecting Le’s complaints, the ALJ

stated that “aside from the claimant’s acute episode of reducible

hernia, after 2003 the claimant was only treated by Dr. Sidrick

. . . during which time complaints were variable, and clinical

signs were generally benign and certainly not consistent with

greater limitations than those which [the ALJ] f[ou]nd.” (Id. at

25.)

In treatment records throughout 2004, Dr. Sidrick noted that

Le’s heart and lungs were normal, and his general physical

functioning was also normal. (See id. at 276, 278-81.) At the

same time, Dr. Sidrick diagnosed Le with an upper respiratory

infection on January 15, 2004, and with chronic pulmonary emphysema

on March 5 and April 15, 2004. (Id. at 279-81.) Dr. Sidrick also

diagnosed Plaintiff with a lung mass and tuberculosis. (Id. at

279.)

Plaintiff’s symptom complaints varied. In April and November

2004, he complained of neck pain, and he saw a radiologist in

October 2004 for an x-ray exam of his cervical and lumbar spine. 

(Id. at 275-76, 279.) On March 5, 2004, Le reported difficulty

sleeping, but this complaint does not appear in Dr. Sidrick’s other

notes. (Id. at 280.) Plaintiff reported coughing and sneezing at

several appointments. (Id. at 276, 278, 281.) Le’s complaints are

fairly consistent throughout Dr. Sidrick’s treatment notes. Judge

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Carletti’s rejection of Le’s allegations of physical impairments is

not supported by the record. 

The ninth reason set forth by the ALJ for rejecting Le’s

allegation of disability is that being fired from his job due to

tuberculosis “is not the same as being unable to perform that

position secondary to the severity of his impairments.” (Id. at

25.) In Plaintiff’s initial disability report, Le states that the

following conditions limited his ability to work: post

tuberculosis disease, chronic headache, fainting spells, arthritis

pain, skin allergy and scratches, frequent fever, coughing,

sweating, insomnia, nightmares, memory loss, anxiety, and

depression. (Id. at 71.) Le reports he was first bothered by his

alleged conditions in 1998, but he continued to work until 2003. 

(Id.) In 2003, Le “could no longer engage in[] the part time job

due to fewer [sic] and frequent tiredness, and fainting spell[s].” 

(Id.) Le, however, stated that he stopped working because he was

laid off due to his tuberculosis, not because of inability to

perform the work. (Id.) This is a clear reason for rejecting

Plaintiff’s subjective allegations.

Finally, Judge Carletti cites Le’s “multiple inconsistent

statements as to his literacy and ability to communicate in

English” to question Plaintiff’s credibility and reject Le’s

subjective complaints. (Id. at 25.) “In assessing the claimant’s

credibility, the ALJ may use ‘ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation,’ such as considering the claimant’s reputation for

truthfulness and any inconsistent statements in h[is] testimony.” 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1147-48 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 n.5). 

Le testified he could not read or write in English. (Admin. R. at

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335.) Plaintiff also stated that he used to understand some

English but no longer remembers any. (Id. at 335.) Le used an

interpreter in his consultations with Drs. Engelhorn, Henderson,

and DiCicco. (Id. at 235, 293, 297.) Drs. Henderson and DiCicco

both stated that Le did not speak English. (Id. at 293, 298.) In

his Disability Report, however, Le stated he could read and write

limited English, and he could speak very limited English. (Id. at

70.) Dr. Grisolia stated Le “understands a little English, but

speaks minimal English.” (Id. at 267.) The ALJ’s reasoning is

clear but not convincing. Le’s slight inconsistencies regarding

his minimal English capabilities do not amount to a reason for

attacking his credibility.

Where the ALJ has made specific findings “supported by

substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to second-guess

that decision.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. Not all of Judge

Carletti's reasons for rejecting Le's subjective complaints were

clear and convincing. Nevertheless, the district court should DENY

Plaintiff’s request for reversal because the ALJ provided several

clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial record

evidence for rejecting Le’s subjective complaints.

C. Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments Do Not Meet Listings 12.04 OR

12.06.

At step three of the five-step process, Judge Carletti found

Le’s impairments –- pulmonary disease, arthritis, dermatitis, and

adjustment disorder -- were severe, but did not meet or equal any

listing in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, either in

combination or separately. (Admin. R. at 18, 26.) Plaintiff

disagrees and argues that he meets the criteria for Medical Listing

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12.04 (affective disorder) and 12.06 (anxiety-related disorder). 

(Pl.’s Mem. 14-18.)

Eight separate reports were submitted regarding Le’s mental

status. (See Admin. R. at 218, 235, 241, 267, 283, 285, 293, 297.) 

The findings in these reports address the criteria of 20 C.F.R.

sections 404 App. 1 to Subpart P 12.04 and 12.06.

Analyzing an alleged mental disability requires two inquiries. 

Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th

Cir. 2000). First, the “ALJ must determine whether there is

evidence to ‘medically substantiate the presence of a mental

disorder.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 1 §

12.00A). Second, “the ALJ must determine whether the ‘severity’ of

the claimant’s ‘functional limitations’ are ‘incompatible with the

ability to work.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app.

1 § 12.00A). 

Medical Listing 12.04 describes affective disorders as

“[c]haracterized by a disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or

partial . . . depressive syndrome. Mood refers to a prolonged

emotion that colors the whole psychic life; it generally involves

either depression or elation." 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app.

1 § 12.04. To meet the listing for an affective disorder based

upon depression, a claimant must meet two different sets of

criteria:

A. Medically documented persistence, either

continuous or intermittent, of one of the following:

1. Depressive syndrome characterized by at least

four of the following:

a. Anhedonia or pervasive lost of interest in

almost all activities; or

b. Appetite disturbance with change in weight; or

c. Sleep disturbance; or

d. Psychomotor agitation or retardation; or 

e. Decreased energy; or

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f. Feelings of guilt or worthlessness; or

g. Difficulty concentrating or thinking; or 

h. Thoughts or suicide; or

i. Hallucinations, delusions or paranoid thinking

OR . . .

AND

B. Resulting in at least two of the following:

1. Marked restriction of activities of daily

living; or

2. Marked difficulty in maintaining social

functioning; or

3. Marked difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace; or

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of

extended duration;

OR

C. Medically documented history of a chronic

affective disorder of at least 2 years' duration that has

caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do

basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently

attenuated by medication or psychosocial support, and one

of the following:

1. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of

extended duration; or

2. A residual disease process that has resulted in

such marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in

mental demands or change in the environment would be

predicted to cause the individual to decompensate; or

3. Current history of 1 or more years' inability

to function outside a highly supportive living

arrangement, with an indication of continued need for

such an arrangement.

20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 1 § 12.04 (2006).

Similarly, to meet the listing for an anxiety-related

disorder, a 12.06 Listing, a claimant must meet both:

A. Medically documented findings of at least one

of the following:

1. Generalized persistent anxiety accompanied by

three out of four of the following signs or symptoms:

a. Motor tension: or

b. Autonomic hyperactivity; or

c. Apprehensive expectation; or

d. Vigilance and scanning; 

OR

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2. A persistent irrational fear of a specific

object, activity, or situation which results in a

compelling desire to avoid the dreaded object, activity,

or situation; or

3. Recurrent severe panic attacks manifested by a

sudden unpredictable onset of intense apprehension, fear,

terror and sense of impending doom occurring on the

average of at least once a week; or

4. Recurrent obsessions or compulsions which are a

source of marked distress; or

5. Recurrent and intrusive recollections of a

traumatic experience, which are a source of marked

distress;

AND

B. Resulting in at least two of the following:

1. Marked restriction of activities of daily

living; or

2. Marked difficulty in maintaining social

functioning; or

3. Marked difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace; or

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of

extended duration.

OR

C. Resulting in complete inability to function

independently outside the area of one's home.

20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 1 § 12.06 (2006).

Whether an individual is disabled under the Social Security

Act is an administrative finding, not a medical one. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(e)(1) (2005). Judge Carletti found Plaintiff’s medical

impairments and adjustment disorder severe, but he concluded they

did not, “individually or in combination, meet or equal any of the

criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments, Appendix I,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.” (Id. at 18, 25.) The ALJ gave

greater weight to the opinions of Le’s examining doctor, Dr.

Engelhorn, and the administrative hearing’s nonexamining medical

expert, Dr. Bolter. (Id.) The ALJ's decision shows that he

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emphasized the "B" and "C" criterion for medical listing

impairments 12.04 and 12.06. (Id. at 18.)

Judge Carletti found that Le exhibited “moderate restrictions

of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, mild difficulties in maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace; and one or two episodes of decompensation.” 

(Id.) Judge Carletti decided Le was able to “understand, remember,

and carry out simple instructions on a consistent basis and able to

perform simple repetitive tasks.” (Id. at 18, 26.) He also

determined Plaintiff was able to interact appropriately with others

in the workplace and was able to adapt to changes in work routine

and work location. (Id.) The ALJ further decided Le was capable

of making routine adjustments in the workplace and responding

appropriately to usual work situations. (Id.) 

As discussed above, Le’s treating physicians’ opinions were

contradicted by the opinions of examining psychiatrist Dr.

Engelhorn and nonexamining psychiatrists Drs. O’Malley and Bolter.

(Id. at 235-41, 352-54.) Where the medical expert’s contradictory

assessment is consistent with other evidence in the record, the ALJ

only needs legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence for

rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions, not clear and

convincing evidence. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d at 502. Dr.

Engelhorn’s and Dr. O’Malley’s examinations supply this added

contradictory evidence. Judge Carletti gave specific, legitimate

reasons limiting the weight of the treating psychiatrists'

opinions.

Accordingly, Judge Carletti supported his findings with the

opinions of Drs. Engelhorn, O’Malley, and Bolter. (See Admin. R.

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at 16-27.) Dr. Engelhorn diagnosed Le as having adjustment

disorder with depressed mood and a "very mild form" of possible

psychotic disorder. (Id. at 237.) Dr. O’Malley found Le exhibited

possible psychotic disorder and adjustment disorder. (Id. at 245-

46.) Dr. Bolter also diagnosed Plaintiff with adjustment disorder

with depressed mood under 12.04. (Id. at 352.) These doctors,

however, did not find that Le met the listings under parts B or C

of 12.04 or 12.06. 

Even Le's doctors drew some conclusions that support the ALJ's

findings. For example, Dr. Zappone believed that Plaintiff could

"handle his own funds." (Id. at 287.) Dr. DiCicco noted that Le

"takes his children to school, comes back, does some cooking, and

stays most of the day in the house." (Id. at 297.) He stated Le

"was cooperative and friendly" during the interview. (Id. at 298.) 

Plaintiff was “adequately dressed and groomed, although he

[did] not wear shoes to the interview” with Dr. Engelhorn. (Id. at

236.) The doctor stated Le “is fully capable of taking care of all

of his basic needs[,]” but does not “involve himself in any

household chores.” (Id.) Le’s children take care of the household

chores. (Id.) Le also told Dr. Engelhorn that he is capable of

driving but does not drive because of his medications. (Id.) Dr.

Engelhorn stated Le’s “daily activities appear to be within normal

limits, especially when one factors in cultural issues.” (Id. at

237.) The doctor found Le was capable of taking care of his daily

needs and capable of simple repetitive tasks, but he did not

comment on any episodes of deterioration. (See id. at 235-38.)

 Dr. Engelhorn noted that Le was “an expressive person . . .

[and was] socially comfortable throughout the interview.” (Id. at

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236.) He also said Plaintiff was not cognitively impaired. (Id.) 

Le told the doctor that he has “no outside social life and [that

he] does not attend any type of religious services.” (Id. at 236.) 

Dr. Engelhorn scored Le’s GAF at sixty-five to seventy. (Id. at

237.) He found Le “could adequately relate to peers and

supervisors in the workplace . . . [and] he could be expected to

make routine adjustments in the workplace.” (Id. at 237.) 

Dr. O’Malley stated Plaintiff “is able to interact

appropriately with coworkers, supervisors and the general public.” 

(Id. at 241.) He also found Plaintiff “able to adapt to changes in

the workplace.” (Id.) Dr. O’Malley found Plaintiff had mild

limitations on daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, mild deficiencies of concentration, pace, or

persistence, and zero to one episode of decompensation. (See id.

at 253.) Dr. Bolter found Le had moderate limitations on daily

living and social functioning, mild deficiencies of concentration,

persistence, or pace, and one to two episodes of decompensation. 

(See id. at 353-54.) Therefore, Judge Carletti’s decision that

Le’s mental impairments did not meet or equal listings 12.04 or

12.06 was supported by substantial record evidence. 

D. The ALJ’s Finding That Le Can Perform His Past Relevant

Work Should Be Affirmed.

Judge Carletti found that Le could return to his work as a

newspaper delivery person. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ

erred by not finding Le disabled under the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines )the “grids”). (Pl.’s Mem. 11-13.) Le claims that

because Drs. Sidrick, Morgan, and Grisolia limited him to sedentary

work, he is “clearly disabled” under the grids in light of his age,

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limited education, and unskilled work experience. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Plaintiff asserts that "under a proper step-five analysis the ALJ

should have found the plaintiff disabled." (Id. at 13.)

In determining disability under the five-step process, the ALJ

assesses Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and past relevant

work at step four. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Residual

functional capacity is the measure of claimant’s ability to

function despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). If the

claimant can still perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will

find plaintiff is not disabled. Id. "[T]he Grid is applied only

if the claimant is unable to perform 'his or her vocationally

relevant past work.'" Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th

Cir. 1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §

200.00(a)) (emphasis added).

Although he complains about application of the grid, Le is

also disputing that he is capable of doing his past relevant work. 

Only if the ALJ finds that the claimant cannot perform his past

relevant work, does “the burden shift[] to the Commissioner to show

that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in

‘significant numbers’ in the national economy, taking into

consideration the claimant's residual functional capacity, age,

education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at

1100-01 (citing 20 CFR § 404.1560(b)(3)). “There are two ways for

the Commissioner to meet th[is] burden . . . (a) by the testimony

of a vocational expert, or (b) by reference to the MedicalVocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.” Id.

(citing Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d

573, 577-78 (Pregerson, J. concurring) (9th Cir. 1988)). 

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“[W]here an individual with a severe medically determinable

physical or mental impairment(s) is not engaging in substantial

gainful activity and the individual’s impairment(s) prevents the

performance of his or her vocationally relevant past work[,]” the

judge generally consults the tables of the Secretary's

Medical-Vocational Guidelines in determining the individual’s

ability to participate in substantially gainful activities. 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, subpart P, app. 2 § 200.00(a) (2006). The Grids

dictate the ALJ must find the claimant disabled or not disabled

based on “the findings of fact made with respect to a particular

individual's vocational factors and residual functional capacity.” 

Id.

Le is currently unemployed and not engaged in substantial

gainful activity. (Admin. R. at 336, 338.) Consequently, the ALJ

had to determine whether Plaintiff is capable of performing his

past work. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles defines a

newspaper carrier as light work and a newspaper delivery driver as

medium work. DOT, supra at 232. Both listings require minimal

reasoning, language, and mathematical skills. (Id.) 

At Plaintiff’s hearing, the ALJ heard the testimony of

vocational expert Bonnie Sinclair. She assessed Le’s prior work as

a newspaper delivery person as light work. (Id. at 355.) Sinclair

testified that with the residual functional capacity to perform

light work, Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a

newspaper delivery person. (Id.) 

The ALJ decided Le “has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work.” (Admin. R. at 26.) Light work is defined as

follows:

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(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more than

20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of

objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight

lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when

it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when

it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing

and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered

capable of performing a full or wide range of light work,

you must have the ability to do substantially all of

these activities. If someone can do light work, we

determine that he or she can also do sedentary work,

unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss

of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of

time.

20 C.F.R § 404.1567 (2006). 

Judge Carletti determined Le is capable of the following: 

lifting ten pounds frequently, lifting twenty pounds occasionally,

sitting, standing or walking six hours per eight hour workday with

the avoidance of lung irritants, understanding, remembering and

carrying out simple instructions on a consistent basis, performing

simple repetitive tasks, interacting appropriately with others in

the workplace, adapting to changes in work routine and work

location, make routine adjustments in the workplace, and responding

to usual work situations. (Id. at 26.) 

Judge Carletti’s finding that Plaintiff could perform his past

work was based on the vocational expert’s testimony and the judge’s

assessment of Le’s residual functional capacity. (Id.) “A

vocational expert’s testimony in a disability benefits proceeding

‘is valuable only to the extent that it is supported by medical

evidence.’” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Sample v.

Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 643-44 (9th Cir.1982)). Thus the ALJ’s

finding must be supported by the record evidence.

As discussed in section VI.A, Judge Carletti gave clear and

convincing reasons based on substantial record evidence for

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attributing less weight to the opinions of Drs. Henderson, Morgan,

DiCicco, Grisolia, and Zappone and instead relying on the opinions

of Drs. Engelhorn, O’Malley, and Bolter. Dr. Engelhorn reported

that Le could do simple, repetitive tasks, relate to supervisors in

the workplace, and could make “routine adjustments in the

workplace.” (Id. at 237.) Dr. O’Malley found Le had mild

restrictions on daily living activities, moderate difficulties in

maintaining social functioning, and mild difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id. at 253.) 

Dr. Bolter testified that Le had moderate restrictions on daily

activities, moderate restrictions on social functioning, mild

difficulties in maintaining concentration, moderate difficulties in

performing complex tasks, and mild difficulties in performing

simple repetitive tasks. (Id. at 356-57.) 

The ALJ’s findings are consistent with a capability of

performing light work as defined by 20 C.F.R § 404.1567. The

vocational expert testified that newspaper delivery was light work

and that Le can perform his past relevant work. (Id. at 335.) If

a claimant is capable of performing his past work, the ALJ does not

consult the grids. Macia, 829 F.2d at 1012 (citing 20 C.F.R. 404,

subpart P, app. 2, § 200,00(a)). Accordingly, Judge Carletti did

not err in failing to consult the grids in making Le’s disability

determination. The ALJ’s decision that Le is capable of performing

his past relevant work should be affirmed.

E. Plaintiff’s Limitation to Simple, Repetitive Tasks Does Not

Prevent Him from Performing His Past Work.

In his Reply, Plaintiff contends that driving, which is part

of Le's past employment, is not a simple, repetitive task and,

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therefore, he is unable to perform his past work. (Pl.’s Reply 2-

5.) Le testified that as a newspaper delivery person, he drove

"about an hour-something to two hours." (Admin. R. at 359.) 

Sinclair testified that whether driving a car was a simple and

repetitive task is “really relatively subjective” and depends on

the route taken and the consistency of the route each day. (Id. at

359.) She further stated that if Le was unable drive two hours per

day, he would not be able to do the job of delivering newspapers. 

(Id. at 360.) 

Le had a newspaper delivery route. He threw newspapers onto

the front door of approximately 200 customers. (Id. at 72.) He

walked about six hours each day, and some standing was involved. 

(Id.) Plaintiff testified that he no longer drives "[b]ecause he

take[s] too many sleeping pills that affected [him]." (Id. at

359.) Le contends that this prevents him from driving, so he

cannot perform his past relevant work as a newspaper delivery

person. (Pl.'s Reply 3-4.)

The ALJ rejected Le's subjective complaints and addressed

medication side effects. Judge Carletti concluded that "the record

does not contain references to reports of disabling side effects of

medications." (Admin. R. at 25.) In Le's disability report, he

listed his medications and wrote that there were no side effects. 

(Id. at 102-06.) Le told Dr. Grisolia he had no medication

sensitivities. (Id. at 267.) Drs. Zappone, Henderson and Morgan

did not note any side effects from sleeping pills. (Id. at 283,

287, 296, 317.) But, Dr. Morgan found that Le's antidepressant

medications affected his cognitive function. (Id. at 283.) Dr.

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Henderson thought the pain medication caused chronic fatigue and

sedation. (Id. at 296.)

In an analogous social security case, the ALJ asked the

testifying vocational expert what work a claimant could perform if

limited to lifting or carrying ten pounds, standing, walking, or

sitting six hours, simple and repetitive tasks, and a non-public

environment (the same limitations as found for Le). Mendell v.

Commissioner, Civil No. 00-6087-JO, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21448, at

*13-14 (D. Or. 2000). “The [vocational expert] responded that,

under these limitations, claimant could still work as an escort

vehicle driver.” Id.; see also Walston v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 580,

586 (6th Cir. 1967) (describing driving as a “simple function[]”). 

Here, Judge Carletti determined the limited amount of driving

involved in Le’s past vocation did not involve tasks beyond those

that are simple and repetitive. (See Admin. R. at 25-26.) This is

consistent with other courts’ findings. See Mendell, 2000 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 21448, at *13-14; Walston, 381 F.2d at 586. 

Furthermore, “‘[w]hen the evidence before the ALJ is subject to

more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s

conclusion.’” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

F. The Court Should Affirm The ALJ's Decision.

The record in this case has been thoroughly developed. Judge

Carletti listed specific and legitimate reasons for accepting the

examining and nonexamining doctors’ opinions of adjustment disorder

over those of the treating and other examining doctors’ opinions

diagnosing Le with affective and anxiety disorders. The ALJ also

provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting

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Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of disability. Although the

evidence conflicted, the ALJ did not find it ambiguous. Nor did he

conclude that the record was inadequate for the proper evaluation

of the evidence. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. 

A decision to remand for additional evidence or to award

benefits is a matter of discretion. Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d

683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988)). “‘In Social Security

cases the ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the

record . . . .” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Brown v. Heckler,

713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). “This duty exists even when

the claimant is represented by counsel.” Id. However, “[a]n ALJ’s

duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459-60

(citing Tenapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150; see also Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503,

514 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, if there is no evidence in the

record to support a finding for or against a claimant, the record

is inadequate and further development is needed. See Armstrong v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff claims that Judge Carletti erred in “failing to

develop the record fully and fairly.” (Pl.’s Mot. 1.) Le argues

the ALJ should have subpoenaed Dr. Zappone’s treatment notes and

Dr. Henderson’s notes after July 12, 2004. (Pl.’s Reply 7, 9;

Pl.’s Mem. 19.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected

Dr. Henderson’s opinion because the doctor’s notes were largely

illegible. (Pl.’s Mem. 19; see also Pl.’s Reply 9.) This is not

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true. Judge Carletti gave eight reasons for attributing little

weight to Dr. Henderson’s opinion. (Admin. R. at 24.) The ALJ had

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the doctor’s opinion,

as discussed above. Additionally, the record contains sufficient

medical evidence for the ALJ to use in making his disability

determination.

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ should have subpoenaed Dr. Zappone’s

treatment notes, which would have established that he was a

treating physician. (Pl.’s Reply 7.) The ALJ gave specific

reasons for attributing little weight to Dr. Zappone’s opinion,

including the fact that the doctor’s diagnosis had internal

inconsistencies and was not based on objective medical findings. 

(See Admin. R. at 23-24.) Dr. Zappone’s opinion was not ambiguous,

and the record contained sufficient medical evidence for the ALJ to

make his decision. Thus, Judge Carletti did not err in failing to

subpoena additional notes from Drs. Henderson and Zappone. The ALJ

did not have a duty to recontact Drs. Zappone and Henderson. 

Therefore, the district court should DENY Plaintiff’s motion and

affirm the ALJ’s decision.

G. The Court Should Grant Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment.

The Defendant moved for summary judgment on April 10, 2006,

stating that “the ALJ appropriately assessed Plaintiff’s

credibility[,] . . . residual functional capacity[,] . . . and

severity of . . . impairments.” (Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summary

Judgment 4-10.) “The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld

if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner

applied the correct legal standards.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v.

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Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v.

Massanari, 250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Substantial

evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

As discussed above, this Court finds Judge Carletti applied

the correct legal standards. The ALJ gave specific, clear and

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence of record to

limit the weight of Le’s subjective complaints of pain and gave

legitimate and specific reasons supported by substantial evidence

of record to limit the weight of the opinions of Drs. Sidrick,

Morgan, Henderson, Grisolia, Zappone, and DiCicco. The ALJ also

appropriately assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. 

Therefore, the district court should GRANT Defendant’s Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment should be DENIED, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment should be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 4, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 17, 2007. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2006 ____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

All parties of record

 

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