Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01289/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01289-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER DUPREE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HICKMAN, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 05 1289 REC SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF THIRTY

DAYS TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM

 Christopher DuPree (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant

action on October 12, 2005, naming Roderick Hickman, Jeanine Woodford, A.K. Scribner, T.

Hudgins, C. Crammer, S. Taloerico, J. Diaz, J. Hill, L. James, D. Nunez, A. Garcia as

Defendants in this action. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

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which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory actions based

on his physical disabilities and for exercising his first amendment rights for filing litigation in

federal court, requesting modifications under the American’s with Disabilities Act, for pursuing

proper medical treatment, and for exercise of his religious freedoms. Plaintiff alleges the

destruction of personal property. Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages and an investigation. 

C. DISCUSSION

1. American’s With Disabilities Act

The ADA defines “public entity” in relevant part as “any State or local government” or

“any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or

local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) . . . . “Title II of the ADA prohibits

discrimination in programs of a public entity or discrimination by any such entity.” Roundtree v.

Adams, 2005 WL 3284405 (E.D. Cal. 20050) citing Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684,

691 (D. Haw. 2000). The term “public entity,” “as it is defined within the statute, does not

include individuals.” Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999); see

also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). “In suits under Title II of the ADA . . . the proper defendant usually

is an organization rather than a natural person. . . . Thus, as a rule, there is no personal liability

under Title II.” Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Miller v. King, 384

F.3d 1248, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2004); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n. 8 (8th

Cir. 1999); Montez v. Romer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1240-41 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding that

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individual liability does not exist under the ADA); Butler v. City of Prarie Village, 172 F.3d 736,

744 (10 Cir. 1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11 Cir. 1996); Gallo v. Bd of th th

Regents of the University of California, 916 F.Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1995.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim for relief against Defendants, all of whom are

individuals, is not cognizable and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law. 

2. Retaliation

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution. . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must allege

and show that defendants acted to retaliate for his exercise of a protected activity, and defendants'

actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816

(9th Cir. 1994); Pratt 65 F.3d at 807. The injury asserted in retaliation cases is the retaliatory

conduct’s chilling effect on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See Hines v. Gomez, 108

F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate a "but-for" causal nexus

between the alleged retaliation and plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., filing a legal action). 

McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The prisoner must submit evidence, either direct or

circumstantial, to establish a link between the exercise of constitutional rights and the allegedly

retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. Timing of the events surrounding the alleged retaliation

may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. See Pratt 65 F.3d at 808; Soranno’s

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, although Plaintiff states that he experienced retaliation for filing federal litigation,

Plaintiff provides insufficient facts linking a specific Defendant to a particular act or omission

giving rise to the retaliation. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for retaliation. 

3. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

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Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

Here, as in the case above, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts giving rise to an Eighth

Amendment claim and also fails to link named Defendants to such violation. 

4. Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the

inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances

or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries

and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. Because

inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate

cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal

assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate claiming

interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id. 

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts or link named Defendants to them such that he

alleges a cognizable First Amendment claim for relief. 

5. Destruction of Property

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

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Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), neither

negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state employee “constitute a

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the deprivation

was authorized or unauthorized. Further, in the event that the destruction was authorized and

therefore actionable under Section 1983, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he was

deprived of due process. As long as Plaintiff was provided with process, prison officials may

deprive him of his property.

6. 1 Amendment - Religion st

In order to establish a violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,

a prisoner must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from

engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir.1997). "In order to

reach the level of a constitutional violation, the interference with one's practice of religion must

be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or

belief that is central to religious doctrine." Id. at 737 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff again makes only a conclusory statement that his right to practice his religion has

been violated but he provides no specific facts supporting his allegations nor does he link any

Defendants to acts or omissions giving rise to a First Amendment violation. 

7. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

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for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that any of the Defendants named who

occupy a supervisory position personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented

a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. Accordingly, Plaintiff

also fails to state a claim for supervisory liability. 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to do

so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9 Cir. th

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each Defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 th

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

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be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. th

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and 

3. Plaintiff is GRANTED THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order

to:

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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