Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02758/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02758-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner Mondragon gave a prison official the petition on November 11, 2004. The

federal mailbox rule deems a federal habeas petition filed when a pro se prisoner gives it to

a prison official for mailing. See e.g., Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.2001).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Raul Mondragon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Warden Flanagan, et al. , 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 04-2758-PHX-MHM(CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 2004,1 Petitioner Raul Mondragon filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition," Docket #1). Respondents

filed an Answer to Petition for Habeas Corpus on April 21, 2005 ("Response," Docket #17).

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Charles R. Pyle for a Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying

counts one through six of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as moot due to the

untimeliness of the petition.

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The Petitioner raised six grounds for habeas corpus relief, all of which fail and must

be dismissed because the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition was filed untimely under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

AEDPA took effect on April 24, 1996, and contains a one-year statute of limitation for

prisoners in state custody to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. The

petitioner in the present case handed his petition to prison officials for filing on November

11, 2004, but the statute of limitations ran out on September 7, 2004. This report will briefly

review how the calendar of the statute of limitations ran in this case and why equitable tolling

is inapplicable.

II. DISCUSSION

On April 24, 1997, a jury convicted the Petitioner of one count of burglary, three

counts of kidnaping, three counts of armed robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, and

one count of theft of property valued at more than $25,000 (Exhibit A, Respondents’ Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus). The trial court imposed 15-year, consecutive prison

terms for each of the armed robbery convictions (Id., Exhibit B, R.T. 8/29/97, at 15-18). The

Petitioner was also sentenced to consecutive terms of 21 years, 15 years, and 15 years for

each kidnaping conviction and 15 years for the burglary conviction (Id. at 16-18). The

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on January 26, 1999 (Id. Exhibit A, R.O.A.). The

Petitioner did not file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

The Petitioner’s first notice of post-conviction relief was filed on September 10, 1997

(Id., Exhibit F). With advice from counsel, the Petitioner voluntarily dismissed this first, prose notice on January 15, 1998 (Id., Exhibit G). The Petitioner then filed a subsequent notice

of post-conviction relief on May 28, 1999, and filed his petition for post-conviction relief on

June 20, 2002 (Id., Exhibits H & J). Pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6 (c), the trial court

summarily dismissed the petition on October 23, 2002 (Id., Exhibit K). On August 20, 2003,

the Arizona Court of Appeals also summarily dismissed the petition, due to the Petitioner’s

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untimely filing (Id., Exhibits L & M). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

December 9, 2003 (Id., Exhibit O).

The AEDPA one-year period of limitation runs from the later of two dates: “the date

on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review.” USC § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, because the Petitioner

failed to file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal, the

judgment of guilt is determined by the date that the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his

conviction and sentences, January 26, 1999. Arizona R. Crim. P. 31.19 extends this date by

providing a 30-day grace period to petition for review. Therefore, the judgment of guilt

became final on February 25, 1999. From that day, the Petitioner had one year to file his

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, absent tolling. 

Properly filed state post-conviction applications or other pertinent collateral review

is not counted toward the period of limitation. USC § 2244(d)(2). In the present case, the

Petitioner’s withdrawal, rather than amendment, of his first state post-conviction petition was

fatal to his habeas corpus claims. The AEDPA statute of limitations began running on

February 25, 1999, because the petitioner did not have a pending application of postconviction relief. The time period between the date that the statute of limitations began

running and the date that the petitioner filed his second petition for post-conviction review

amounts to a total of 92 days (February 25, 1999-May 28, 1999). The petitioner's habeas

corpus petition was 75 days late. Had the petitioner amended, not withdrawn, the postconviction petition, his habeas corpus petition would have been timely, with 17 days to spare.

Although equitable tolling is available under AEDPA’s limitations period, such tolling

is permitted "only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), quoted and rev'd on other grounds in Calderon v. United

States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). Therefore, a causal

connection must exist between the circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control and the fact

that the petition is delayed. The use of the word “extraordinary” is indicative of the high bar

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the Ninth Circuit has set on the circumstances which call for equitable tolling. See, e.g., Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (1999) ("equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases")

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1289 (stating that equitable tolling is applicable only when the "high

hurdle" of extraordinary circumstances is surmounted). The contrast between Beeler and

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (2001), exemplifies this bar. Beeler was a capital habeas

corpus case where the court held that the statute was equitably tolled when the petitioner's

attorney moved out of the state, an action that made it impossible for another attorney to file

a petition within the statutory limitation period. 128 F.3d at 1288. This holding was

underscored by the fact that in capital cases an indigent petitioner has a statutory right to

counsel. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). In Frye, a non-capital case, the Ninth Circuit concluded

that defense counsel’s miscalculation of the limitation period and general negligence did not

constitute the “extraordinary circumstances” that call for equitable tolling. 273 F.3d at 1146

(citing Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2000); Taliani v. Chrans, 189

F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir.1999)).

In the present case, the lawyer who wrote the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition did

not miscalculate the limitations period. The time taken by counsel in withdrawing rather than

amending the petition is unfortunate but did not make it infeasible for the Petitioner to file

the habeas corpus petition on time. Indeed, no causal relationship exists, and the lawyer’s

action did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” that necessitate equitable tolling. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket #1).

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

filed on time, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). If

objections are filed, the parties should direct them to the District Court by using the

following case number: CV 04-2758-PHX-MHM. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2006.

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