Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02666/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02666-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE A. NARANJO,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-CV-2666-AJB-BGS

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 15); 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS, (Doc. No. 1); 

AND

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

On November 27, 2015, Jose A. Naranjo (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner asserts 

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when (1) the trial court denied 

his motion to withdraw from a guilty plea; and (2) refused to grant him a continuance to 

fully contemplate the decision to plead guilty. (Id. at 1–2.) On March 2, 2016, Respondent 

filed a response to the Petition. (Doc. No. 10.) Petitioner filed a traverse on April 7, 2016. 

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(Doc. No. 14.) 

Magistrate Judge Skomal issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending the Petition be denied on both claims. (Doc. No. 15.) On May 11, 2017, 

Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 18.) Respondent did not reply. For the 

reasons outlined below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut this presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992) (holding that 

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn therefrom, are entitled to 

statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California 

Court of Appeal opinion: 

Naranjo dated the victim for about 10 years. On the evening of the day he 

ended their relationship, she went to a nightclub, which upset him. He drove 

to her home the next evening and she came outside to talk to him. She got into 

his truck and he started hitting her in the face. She tried to get out of the truck 

and escape, but he pushed her back inside and resumed hitting her.

He continued hitting her as he drove her to a carpentry shop about six minutes 

away from her home. When they arrived at the shop, he insulted her and 

threatened to kill her. She removed her shoes, ran away, and yelled for help. 

He caught her and they fell to the ground. He covered her mouth and nose 

with his hand and told her to stop yelling.

He took her back to the shop. As he was trying to open the shop door, she ran 

away again and tried to dial 911 on her phone. He caught her by her hair and 

took the phone from her. She passed out. He lifted her and carried her toward 

the shop. She regained consciousness along the way. He then put her down 

and they walked into the shop, where, after securing the door, he told her he 

was going to chop her into little pieces using the table saw.

He started moving toward the table saw and she begged him not to hurt her. 

He pulled her up and took her to a stool. He asked her why she had 

disrespected him by going to the nightclub. He bent her over the stool, pulled 

her pants down, put his penis into her vagina and started moving. She cried 

and told him she did not want him to do what he was doing. He told her she 

had asked for it by going to the nightclub.

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He then took her off the stool, put her on the floor, and began moving his penis 

in and out of her rectum. She told him he was hurting her and she could not 

breathe because her nose was bleeding, but he did not stop.

After he ejaculated, he had her get dressed and get back into his truck. He ran 

an errand and then took her home. She pretended everything was fine and 

kissed him goodbye. When she got to her door, she called the police. Her 

injuries included bleeding, a fractured nose, bites on her back, and injuries to 

her right thigh.

(Doc. No. 11-13 at 2–3.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

I. Initial Proceedings Before the State Courts

On February 11, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to forcible rape (Cal. Penal Code § 

261(a)(2)), forcible sodomy (Cal. Penal Code § 286(c)(2)), assault likely to produce great 

bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)) enhanced under California Penal Code § 

12022.7(a) based on Petitioner’s admission that he personally inflicted great bodily injury, 

and making criminal threats (Cal. Penal Code § 422). (Doc. No. 11-1 at 24–26; Doc. No. 

11-3 at 3–4.) In exchange for his guilty plea to these charges, additional charges that might 

have resulted in a sentence of 25 years to life were dismissed, and Petitioner received a 

stipulated sentence of 18 years and 8 months. (Doc. No. 11-3 at 9–10; Doc. No. 11-4 at 

20–21.)

On March 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

claiming he entered his plea out of fear and under pressure from counsel and wanted an 

attorney that would dedicate more time to his case and get him a more equitable plea 

agreement. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 28–31.) The trial court appointed new counsel and his new 

counsel filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. at 32–34.)

The trial court held a hearing on the motion on June 3, 2009, heard testimony from 

 

1

Judge Skomal succinctly and accurately summarizes this case’s procedural posture; as 

such, the Court largely incorporates the R&R’s procedural background section into this 

order, though the Court also reviewed the lodgments.

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Petitioner and his prior counsel, and denied his motion. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 1–19.) Petitioner 

was sentenced under the terms of the plea agreement to 18 years and 8 months. (Id. at 20–

21.) Petitioner did not directly appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On June 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in San Diego Superior 

Court, arguing he was unduly influenced by his counsel to plead guilty, he was not aware 

of the charges he was pleading to, he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea, and 

his counsel should have filed an appeal of the denial of the motion to withdraw his plea. 

(Case No. 11-CV-1487, Lodgment 4.) It was denied on July 20, 2010. (Case No. 11-CV1487, Lodgment 5.) Petitioner filed a petition with the California Court of Appeal on 

September 16, 2010. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Lodgment 6.) It was denied in a reasoned 

decision. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Lodgment 7.) Petitioner filed a petition with the 

California Supreme Court. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Lodgment 8.) It was summarily denied. 

(Case No. 11-CV-1487, Lodgment 9.)

II. Prior Federal Habeas Proceedings

On July 1, 2011, Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition raising four claims: 

(1) he was unduly influenced by his counsel to plead guilty; (2) he did not understand the 

charges to which he was pleading guilty; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

attorney failed to file a notice of appeal and failed to consult with him about filing a notice 

of appeal. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 1.) The district court denied habeas relief on 

the first three claims, but allowed submission of all relevant evidence in support of claim 

four. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 20 at 4–15.) Following the submission of additional 

evidence, the district court found Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based 

on counsel’s failure to consult with Petitioner about filing an appeal or filing an appeal on 

his behalf on the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. 

No. 27.)

On this basis, the district court granted habeas relief and ordered the state court to 

vacate the June 3, 2009, judgment and reinstate it to allow Petitioner to file a timely appeal. 

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(Id. at 16.) The district court later modified its order to state that “The Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as to claim four. Respondent shall release Petitioner from 

custody on June 9, 2013 unless, prior to that date, the Superior Court of California, County 

of San Diego has vacated its June 3, 2009 order and judgment and then reinstated that order 

and judgment, thereby allowing Petitioner to initiate the appeal process from the reinstated 

judgment by seeking a certificate of probable cause.” (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 29

at 3.) The district court also granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability as to claims 

one, two, and three. (Id. at 3–4.) The initial deadline for the state court to comply was 

extended a number of times by the district court, and then Respondent filed an appeal with 

the Ninth Circuit and sought and obtained a 30-day stay of the district court’s order on July 

17, 2013. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 52.)

III. State Court Proceedings Following First Habeas Petition

On July 17, 2013, a hearing was held before the state trial court to address 

compliance with the district court order. (Doc. No. 11-5 at 3–6.) The trial court noted that 

upon reviewing the situation, he had ordered counsel appointed for Petitioner, who was 

present in court. (Id. at 3.) It appears the trial court determined, after consultation with 

counsel for Petitioner, the attorney general’s office, and the district attorney’s office, that 

the only way the court could obtain jurisdiction to comply with the district court’s directive 

to vacate and reinstate the judgment to allow Petitioner to appeal was for Petitioner to file 

a state habeas petition seeking that relief. (Id. at 3–4.)

After an additional hearing on July 18, 2013, before the state trial court, Petitioner 

filed a state habeas petition on July 30, 2013, seeking the relief granted by the district court.

(See Doc. No. 11-7 at 3.) Petitioner then attempted to rescind it by letter on July 31, 2013, 

but then confirmed on the record at an August 5, 2013, hearing that he wanted it filed. (Id.) 

The trial court granted the state habeas petition during that hearing, finding Petitioner 

received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to consult with 

Petitioner about an appeal or file an appeal of the denial of the request to withdraw his plea.

(Id. at 7.) The trial court vacated the June 3, 2009, judgment, reinstated it, and imposed the 

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same sentence. (Id. at 7–8.)

On appeal, Petitioner again challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea 

as well as claiming the trial court judge became excessively involved in the state habeas 

proceedings and should have granted Petitioner a continuance. (Doc. No. 11-8.) The Court 

of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a reasoned decision. (Doc. No. 11-13.) Petitioner filed 

a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 11-14.) It was 

summarily denied on July 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 11-15.)

IV. Current Federal Petition

On November 27, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petition in which he alleges (1) 

a due process violation for the denial of his motion to withdraw from the guilty plea; and 

(2) a due process violation for the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request for a 

continuance and the trial court’s involvement following the district court’s grant of habeas 

relief. (Doc. No. 1 at 4–15.) On March 2, 2016, Respondent filed an answer to the Petition, 

arguing that the state courts reasonably concluded Petitioner’s claims are meritless, and he 

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (See Doc. No. 10 at 3.)

On April 4, 2017, Judge Skomal issued an R&R, in which he made the following 

findings: (1) Petitioner’s first claim is meritless because even when undertaking a de novo

review of the record, Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and counsel was not 

ineffective in advising him on the plea deal; and (2) Petitioner’s second claim is meritless 

because he was not prejudiced by not receiving a trial after the district court granted him 

limited habeas relief, and the trial judge’s conduct did not deprive Petitioner of due process; 

and (3) there is no reason to conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 15.)

On May 11, 2017, Petitioner filed three objections to the R&R: (1) state law 

questions are cognizable under § 2254; (2) his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and he 

therefore should have been permitted to withdraw it; and (3) he was entitled to a trial, which 

the trial court prevented. (Doc. No. 18.) Respondent did not reply to Petitioner’s objections.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

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(“AEDPA”), applying a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

333 & n.7 (1997)). Federal habeas relief may be granted if the state court (1) applied a 

rule different from the governing law provided by the United States Supreme Court; or 

(2) correctly identified the governing legal principle, but unreasonably applied it to the 

facts of the case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its 

burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be 

reviewed de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later 

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same 

ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). Here, the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a reasoned decision, rejecting Petitioner’s 

challenges to the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and the trial court’s conduct of 

the post-habeas proceedings. (Doc. No. 11-13.) The Supreme Court summarily denied 

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Petitioner’s petition for review, (Doc. No. 11-15); thus, the Court “looks through” the 

Supreme Court’s denial to review the appellate court’s decision, Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806.

I. Due Process Violation Regarding Voluntariness of Guilty Plea

In his first claim, Petitioner argued that he was deprived of due process because his 

guilty plea was entered under duress; thus, the trial court should have permitted Petitioner 

to withdraw it. (Doc. No. 1 at 4–7.) Petitioner asserted he “feared that his attorney was not 

prepared to defend him at trial” and was thus pressured into taking the plea. (Id. at 6.) In 

the R&R, Judge Skomal found this claim had already been evaluated and rejected by the 

state appellate court. (See Doc. No. 15 at 11–12, 14; see also Doc. No. 11-13 at 6–8.) 

Therefore, his only task was to determine whether the state court’s denial of the claim was 

unreasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, federal habeas courts are not required to address whether the plea was knowing and 

voluntary, but rather whether there is any reasonable argument to support the state court’s 

conclusion that the plea was knowing and voluntary. See id. at 101–02.

The California Court of Appeal found substantial evidence in the record existed to 

conclude that Petitioner’s “guilty plea was not the result of any factor overcoming his 

exercise of free judgment,” including the colloquy that took place between the trial judge 

and Petitioner at the time he entered the plea; the reasonableness of the decision to accept 

a determinate (albeit long) sentence as opposed to facing the possibility of never being 

released from prison if he went to trial and lost; and Petitioner representing he wanted to 

withdraw his plea, not because he believed the charges against him were defensible, but 

because he wanted a “better deal.” (Doc. No. 11-13 at 8–9.) Judge Skomal agreed, finding 

that the state courts’ conclusions that Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary were

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. (Doc. No. 15 at 

15.)

In response to Judge Skomal’s recommended denial of relief for the first claim, 

Petitioner asserts two objections. First, Petitioner argues a due process violation based upon 

California Penal Code section 1018 is cognizable under § 2254. (Doc. No. 18 at 2.) Second, 

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Petitioner emphasizes that his attorney and the prosecutor “grossly misstated” the potential 

sentence he faced if he went to trial. (Id. at 3.) Because the resolution of Petitioner’s first 

objection depends on resolution of the second, the Court will address the second objection 

first.

A. Voluntariness of Petitioner’s Guilty Plea

“Due process . . . require[s] that a defendant’s guilty plea be voluntary and 

intelligent.” United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (quoting Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988)). A defendant who 

pleads guilty based upon the advice of counsel does not justify setting aside an otherwise 

valid guilty plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1989). When a defendant 

wishes to attack a guilty plea based upon his attorney’s assistance, relief may be provided 

only if a court determines that the advice received was outside the scope of advice provided 

by competent attorneys handling criminal cases. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–

67 (1973) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).

Whether a plea is valid turns on “whether the plea represents a voluntary and 

intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 

(1970)). When determining whether a plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, the 

record must be reviewed to disclose whether the defendant understood the plea and its 

effects. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–49 & n.4 (1970). Of particular 

importance is that the defendant enter a guilty plea with “sufficient awareness of the 

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748. A plea is coerced when the 

defendant was induced by promises or threats that would render the plea inherently 

involuntary. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986).

Petitioner asserts his plea was coerced because his defense attorney and the 

prosecutor “grossly misstated” the sentence he faced if he went to trial. (Doc. No. 18 at 3.) 

Specifically, Petitioner states he was threatened with a sentence of 64 years-to-life, a 

sentence which he could not have received because he was “not a[] habitual offender under 

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California Law,” and his sentence could not be enhanced under California Penal Code 

section 667.5. (Id.)

Having reviewed the record de novo, the Court finds that Petitioner’s contention is 

not borne out by the record. The first time it was indicated to Petitioner that he could face 

a determinate term of 64 years-to-life was on July 18, 2013, at a status hearing in state court 

after the district court granted Petitioner relief on his first habeas petition. (Doc. No. 11-6 

at 2, 8.) Petitioner pled guilty on February 11, 2009. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 24–26.) Clearly, a 

representation made four years after he entered his guilty plea could not have coerced said 

plea. What was represented to Petitioner at the time he entered his plea was that he could 

face a sentence of 25 years-to-life. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 12.) Accordingly, the representation 

that Petitioner could face 64 years-to-life could not have coerced him into pleading guilty.

See Gray v. Yates, No. C 06-0535 MJJ (PR), 2007 WL 3146942, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

25, 2007) (“Petitioner’s plea was not coerced by threats of a life sentence because the only 

reference the trial court made to a life term occurred at the sentencing hearing, over a month 

after Petitioner entered his plea.”).

When reviewing the information Petitioner had at the time he entered his guilty plea,

the Court finds the trial court’s determination that Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently 

entered his guilty plea was not contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. On the change-of-plea form, Petitioner acknowledged the 

voluntariness of his plea by individually initialing the statements, “I have not been induced 

to enter this plea by any promise or representation of any kind,” and “I am entering my 

plea freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat to me or anyone closely related to me.” 

(Doc. No. 11-1 at 24.) Petitioner also acknowledged the constitutional rights he was giving 

up and the sentence he would receive by initialing each item. (Id. at 24–26.)

At the change-of-plea hearing, Petitioner confirmed the voluntariness of his plea. 

The trial judge asked Petitioner whether anyone had threatened him or anyone he cared 

about to force him to change his plea, and whether anyone forced him to change his plea. 

(Doc. No. 11-3 at 4.) Petitioner answered both questions negatively. (Id.) After Petitioner 

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acknowledged understanding the rights he was giving up and admitting his guilt to each of 

the counts, the trial judge found that Petitioner “entered a knowing, voluntary and 

intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.” (Id. at 9.) The trial judge further found 

Petitioner “underst[oo]d the nature of these charges and the consequences of the plea.” (Id.

at 9–10.) Petitioner’s “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of 

verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Furthermore, the trial judge’s 

finding that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent “constitute[s] a formidable 

barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Id. Based on the record as a whole, the 

Court cannot say that the trial court was objectively unreasonable in its application of 

established federal law.

Nor is the Court convinced that Petitioner’s defense counsel provided Petitioner with 

advice that fell outside the scope of advice provided by competent attorneys handling 

criminal cases. As the appellate court stated, defense counsel conveyed the difficult choice 

facing Petitioner, namely, a long determinate sentence with the promise of one day being 

released from prison, or an indeterminate sentence with no assurance of ever being 

released. (Doc. No. 11-13 at 8–9.) This advice did not fall outside the scope of advice 

provided by competent attorneys.2 The appellate court’s determination was therefore not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. The Court thus 

OVERRULES Petitioner’s second objection. 

B. Violation of State Law

Federal habeas writs may not issue on the basis of a perceived error of a state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas 

 

2 Nor does the pressure that is inherently entailed in making the choice between a long 

determinate sentence and potential life imprisonment render Petitioner’s plea involuntary. 

See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–50; see also id. at 758 (“Although Brady’s plea of guilty may 

well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are 

convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to 

doubt that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful.”).

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court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”) A petitioner cannot 

transform a state law issue into a federal one by labeling it a due process or equal protection

violation. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (Petitioner “may not 

[] transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due 

process.”).

In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated California Penal Code 

section 1018 by denying Petitioner’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Doc. No. 1 

at 5–6.) A violation of state law that does not also amount to a violation of a constitutional 

right, however, cannot serve as the basis for federal habeas relief. See Little v. Crawford, 

449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating federal courts “cannot treat a mere error 

of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision 

by a state court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question”).

The California statute Petitioner asserts was violated states, in pertinent part, “On 

application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . . , the court may, . . . for a good 

cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 1018. In California, “[w]ithdrawal of a guilty plea is left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. A denial of the motion will not be disturbed on appeal absent 

a showing the court has abused its discretion.” People v. Huricks 32 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 

1208 (1995) (quoting People v. Nance, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1456 (1991)). Nothing in this 

standard “remotely suggests that a state court judge’s exercise of such discretion would 

give rise to a federal due process violation. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant federal 

habeas relief.” Wagner v. Diaz, No. 1:12-cv-01782-LJO-JL, 2015 WL 3563026, at *14 

(E.D. Cal. May 28, 2015). In light of the Court’s conclusion in the preceding section, the 

Court finds any purported violation of section 1018 cannot serve as the basis for federal 

habeas relief. See, e.g., Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding 

habeas petitioner’s allegation that state court misapplied state law or “departed from its 

earlier decisions” does not provide basis for habeas relief); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 

740 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating federal habeas relief is available “only for constitutional 

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violation, not for abuse of discretion”). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

first objection.

II. Due Process Violation Based on Judicial Involvement

In the Petition, Petitioner contends the trial court violated his rights to due process 

and a fair trial by excessively inserting itself into the proceedings and pressuring him into 

filing a state habeas petition. (Doc. No. 1 at 10–15.) This is the same argument the 

California appellate court considered and rejected. (Doc. No. 11-13 at 9–14.) Accordingly, 

Judge Skomal’s only task on the R&R was to determine whether the state court’s denial of 

the claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100–01.

In the R&R, Judge Skomal determined that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because 

he has not established any prejudice, the proceedings before the trial court following the 

grant of habeas relief were neither unfair nor in violation of any fundamental conception 

of justice, and the trial court’s insistence on expeditiousness in the face of the district 

court’s order was not arbitrary. (Doc. No. 15 at 22–28.) Petitioner objects, arguing that he 

“was entitled to have his day in court (i.e. a trial).” (Doc. No. 18 at 4.)

Having reviewed the record de novo, the Court agrees with Judge Skomal that 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he cannot show actual prejudice. See 

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (stating habeas relief is available only if 

prejudice is established). Petitioner’s position that he was entitled to having the judgment 

vacated and proceeding to trial is fundamentally flawed because he was not afforded that 

relief by the district court. Rather, the district court granted him the limited relief of 

ordering the state court to “vacate its June 3, 2009 order and judgment and then reinstate[] 

that order and judgment, thereby allowing Petitioner to initiate the appeal process from the 

reinstated judgment by seeking a certificate of probable cause” based on defense counsel’s 

failure to consult with Petitioner about an appeal after the trial court denied his motion to 

withdraw his plea. (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 27 at 16.) The district court expressly 

found that Petitioner “failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal’s decision, 

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finding that Petitioner voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea, was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” (Case No. 11-CV-1487, Doc. No. 

20 at 7.) The district court also found “the decision of the state court to deny Petitioner’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

Supreme Court precedent.” (Id. at 9.)

In light of the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that Petitioner got exactly what he 

was afforded under the district court’s order granting him federal habeas relief: the 

opportunity to appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court 

expressly denied him habeas relief relating to the entry of the guilty plea and denial of the 

motion to withdraw the plea. Petitioner cannot now object on the basis of being denied “his 

day in court.” (Doc. No. 18 at 4.) There being no prejudice to Petitioner, there can be no 

habeas relief. On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s third objection. 

III. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). Here, the Court finds that 

reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s conclusion and therefore DECLINES to 

issue a certificate of appealability.

//

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. No. 

18), ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 15), DENIES Petitioner’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2017

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