Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08123/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08123-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kay Anne Riley, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

City of Prescott, Arizona, a political 

subdivision; Marlin Kuykendall, 

individually and in his official capacity as 

Mayor of the City of Prescott, and Tana 

Kuykendall, husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-11-08123-PCT-JAT 

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are defendant City of Prescott, Marlin Kuykendall, and 

Tana Kuykendall’s (collectively, the “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 266) and Plaintiff Kay Anne Riley’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 

271). Also pending are Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Cross-Motions for Discovery 

Sanctions (Docs. 271, 285) related to the spoliation of email evidence. Also pending are 

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Cross-Motions to Strike (Docs. 296, 301) various portions of 

their several opposing statements of facts (Docs. 267, 272, 280, 286, 288, 292). All six 

motions are fully briefed and oral argument on the motions was held on February 11, 

2014. The Court now rules on the motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 For purposes of the Court’s resolution of the pending summary judgment motion, 

the Court considers the relevant facts and background, viewed in the non-moving party’s 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 1 of 38
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

favor,1 to be as follows. 

 Plaintiff Kay Anne Riley (“Riley”) was employed by the Yavapai Human Society 

(“YHS”) from July 2009 to November 2010. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ 

Statement of Facts and Additional Statement of Fact in Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“PCSOF”), Doc. 280 ¶¶ 21, 106; City of Prescott 

Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 

(“DSOF”), Doc. 267 ¶¶ 21, 106). Riley was originally hired as the Marketing Manager 

for YHS and was later promoted to Marketing and Development Director. (PCSOF 

¶ 21). During the relevant time period, YHS offered animal sheltering and other services 

to the City of Prescott, operated out of a City of Prescott building, and had a contract with 

the City of Prescott that provided significant funding for YHS’s activities. (Plaintiff’s 

Statements of Fact in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“PSOF”), Doc. 

272 ¶¶ 3–4, 7; City of Prescott Defendants’ Controverting Statement of Facts Regarding 

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (“DCSOF”), Doc. 286 ¶¶ 3–4, 7). During all relevant time periods, defendant 

Marlin Kuykendall (“Mayor Kuykendall”) was the elected mayor of the City of Prescott. 

(PSOF ¶ 11). 

 In October 2010, Riley co-founded a group called “Prescott Citizens Against 

Bullies” (“PCAB”) for the purposes of raising community awareness of alleged injustice 

committed against a former City of Prescott employee, Ms. Castaneda. (PCSOF ¶ 37). 

On October 26, 2010, Riley issued a press release on behalf of the PCAB regarding a 

planned November 1 protest against Mayor Kuykendall and various city officials for their 

purported involvement in the termination of Ms. Castaneda’s employment and her 

subsequent arrest. (PSOF ¶ 9). 

 Between October 26 and October 28, Mayor Kuykendall, his assistant, his 

campaign manager, and other city officials (including councilmembers) communicated 

 

1

 In the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 2 of 38
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

displeasure with Riley’s planned protest, conduct, and speech to each other and to YHS 

board member Marty Goodman (“Goodman”) and Executive Director Ed Boks (“Boks”). 

(PSOF ¶¶ 12–13, 15–22). On October 28, 2010, YHS placed Riley on administrative 

leave without pay through November 1. (PSOF ¶ 23). Afterwards, Mayor Kuykendall, 

various city officials, YHS board members, and others continued to communicate 

regarding Riley’s planned protest, conduct, and speech. (PSOF ¶¶ 24–30, 33). On 

October 29, Mayor Kuykendall held a press conference to address the Ms. Castaneda 

matter and the planned protest. (PSOF ¶ 31). 

 On November 1, Riley participated in the peaceful PCAB protest. (PSOF ¶ 34). 

The protest received local media coverage both before and after it took place. (PSOF 

¶¶ 14, 16, 25, 34, 38; PCSOF ¶¶ 61, 64, 70). Both before and after the protest, Riley 

posted several messages on Facebook and other media expressing her opinions regarding 

Mayor Kuykendall and city officials’ bullying tactics and abuse of power against Ms. 

Castaneda and herself. (PSOF ¶¶ 12, 25, 30, 39; PCSOF ¶¶ 42–44, 46–47, 50, 54, 79–

80). 

 On November 2, Boks notified Riley that her administrative leave was extended 

indefinitely. (PSOF ¶ 41). On November 4, Riley met with Boks and another YHS 

employee to discuss Riley’s employment at YHS. (PSOF ¶ 50). During the meeting, 

Boks expressed concern that the City of Prescott might terminate their contract with YHS 

because of Riley’s protest, conduct, and speech. (PSOF ¶¶ 51–53). On November 12, 

YHS terminated Riley’s employment. (PSOF ¶ 55). 

 On March 1, 2011, Riley served a Notice of Claim on the City of Prescott and 

Mayor Kuykendall regarding Riley’s allegations that the city officials retaliated against 

Riley’s protest, conduct, and speech by threatening economic harm to YHS unless it 

terminated her employment. (PSOF ¶ 56). On August 10, 2011, Riley filed the 

Complaint (Doc. 1) and commenced the present litigation. 

II. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Defendants move (Doc. 266) for Summary Judgment on Counts I (42 U.S.C. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 3 of 38
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 1983) and III (Tortious Interference With Employment Relationship Under Arizona 

State Law) of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1).2

 Plaintiff cross-moves (Doc. 271) for 

Summary Judgment on Count III. 

 A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record,” including depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers or other 

materials, or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Id. at 56(c)(1). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586B87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

 

2

 The remaining claims (Counts II, IV, V, VI, and VII) in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) were previously dismissed by the Court (Doc. 38). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 4 of 38
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247B48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at the 

summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 B. Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Riley alleges that she is entitled to relief under § 1983 because she was terminated 

from YHS in retaliation for her exercise of First Amendment rights. (Doc. 1 at 14–17, 

¶¶ 79–99). 

Section 1983 provides, 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law 

. . . .” 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no dispute 

of material fact that (1) § 1983 is not available in the instant circumstances; (2) 

Defendants took no unconstitutional action; (3) the City of Prescott and Mayor 

Kuykendall, in his official capacity, are not liable under § 1983 for the alleged actions; 

and (4) Mayor Kuykendall, in his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity. 

(Doc. 266 at 6–14). 

 1. Riley Can Maintain a § 1983 Claim 

 Both parties agree (Doc. 266 at 6–7; Doc. 279 at 4, 6–7) that the Court must 

evaluate Riley’s § 1983 claim through the lens of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 5 of 38
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

decision in Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health because Riley was a private employee of 

YHS, an independent contractor for the City of Prescott, and not a public employee of the 

City of Prescott. 632 F.3d 1091 (2011) (holding that § 1983 can protect the private 

employee of a government contractor from governmental retaliation for the employee’s 

exercise of First Amendment rights). Defendants contend, however, that as a threshold 

matter, Clairmont requires Riley to show that Defendants “directly commanded adverse 

action against [Riley] or threatened to exert economic pressure on [YHS] if adverse 

action as not taken against” Riley. (Doc. 266 at 6–7 (emphasis added)). Defendants 

further argue that “overwhelming” evidence demonstrates that Defendants never directly 

commanded or threatened YHS. (Id. at 7 (citing DSOF ¶¶ 120–70)). 

 Defendants’ insistence that Riley prove “direct” government action, however, 

mischaracterizes the threshold requirement of Clairmont. In Clairmont, the Court of 

Appeals explicitly opined that “First Amendment protection does not depend on whether 

the governmental action is direct or indirect.” 632 F.3d at 1100. Rather, “[w]here the 

government may not prohibit certain speech, it also may not threaten to exert economic 

pressure on a private employer in order to ‘produce a result which [it] could not 

command directly.’ ” Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))). Thus, 

Clairmont applies and Riley may claim protection from § 1983 whether Defendants 

exerted direct or indirect pressure on YHS to adversely act against Riley. 

 Here, it is undisputed that during the relevant time period, YHS had a contract 

with the City of Prescott wherein the City of Prescott provided YHS with the use of a 

building and significant funding. (See PSOF ¶¶ 3–7; DCSOF ¶¶ 3–7; DSOF ¶ 14; 

PCSOF ¶ 14). The City of Prescott could terminate the YHS contract without cause. 

(PSOF ¶ 4; DCSOF ¶ 4). Additionally, sometime between Fall 2010 and Summer 2011, 

the YHS contract was being renegotiated for renewal. (PSOF ¶ 8; DCSOF ¶ 8). It is also 

undisputed that, at deposition, Mayor Kuykendall, various YHS board members, and 

some Prescott city council members testified that Defendants were not involved in the 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 6 of 38
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

termination of Riley’s employment by YHS. (See DSOF ¶¶ 120–70; PCSOF ¶¶ 120–70). 

 Riley, however, presents copious evidence calling into dispute the truthfulness and 

credibility of these assertions. (See, e.g., PCSOF ¶¶ 120–70; PSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 21–25, 29, 

33, 42).3

 For example, although Mayor Kuykendall and Goodman claim that they never 

conversed with each other regarding Riley’s YHS employment status (DSOF ¶¶ 126, 

147), Riley presents an October 28, 2010 email from Goodman (a YHS board member) to 

Mayor Kuykendall stating 

[Mayor Kuykendall], 

Just so you know, I had a meeting this morning with Ed Boks, 

Director of Yavapai Humane Society. [Riley] has now been placed on administrative leave and we will review this 

situation in more detail at our Board Meeting on Monday. I can assure you that this matter is of our utmost concern we 

sincerely regret any problems caused by her activities. 

Marty [Goodman] 

(PSOF ¶ 24 (quoting Ex. 6 of Kuykendall Dep., PSOF at Ex. 23); see DCSOF ¶ 24). 

Similarly, although Mayor Kuykendall testified that he “has never commented to 

anybody that Riley’s activities were affecting the relationship between YHS and the 

City” (DSOF ¶ 152), Riley presents deposition testimony from Councilwoman Suttles 

stating that, after the protest, she discussed Riley and YHS’s funding with Mayor 

Kuykendall. (PCSOF ¶ 152). Specifically, Councilwoman Suttles testified that she and 

 

3

 Defendants object to some of this evidence as inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 287 at 2–4; DCSOF ¶¶ 18, 21–22, 25, 29, 33). The Court, however, should consider evidence 

subject to a potential hearsay objection because it is inappropriate to focus on the 

admissibility of the evidence’s form at the summary judgment stage. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). The focus at the summary judgment stage in the proceeding is the admissibility of its contents. Id. Here, the various emails and 

documents at issue were purportedly written by various witnesses who have been 

deposed and may be called to testify at trial. Consequently, the contents of the emails and documents could be admitted into evidence at trial in a variety of ways. For example, the emails and documents potentially could be used to refresh a witness’ 

recollection, Fed. R. Evid. 602, or as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment rather than substantive purposes. Fed. R. Evid. 613(b); see United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. White, 68 F. App’x 870 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 7 of 38
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Mayor Kuykendall discussed that “if the city was going to help fund [YHS], how could 

those people come down and do such a protest” (January 30, 2013 Deposition of Mary 

Ann Suttles, PCSOF, Ex. 8 at 42:19–43:20), and “that if the city is paying for [Riley] to 

be part of an organization that is taking care of these animals, how – how do you handle 

it?” (Id. at 45:2–10). In sum, if the numerous issues of credibility and conflicting 

testimony presented by Riley are viewed in a light favorable to Riley, then the summary 

judgment record could reasonably support a factual finding that Defendants exerted at 

least indirect economic pressure on YHS to adversely act against Riley. Accordingly, 

Riley meets the threshold requirement of Clairmont to pursue her § 1983 claim. 

 2. Defendants May Have Taken Unconstitutional Actions 

Throughout their Motion, Defendants generally argue that they took no 

unconstitutional actions. (Doc. 266 at 6–14 (“the Court can start and end by concluding 

that the facts fail to show that Mayor Kuykendall engaged in any unconstitutional 

activity”); Doc. 287 at 2–4 (“The first, and foremost, position taken by the City of 

Prescott Defendants is that they took no unconstitutional action in relation to Plaintiff 

Riley’s employment with YHS.”)). 

 Before addressing whether Riley has demonstrated that Defendants violated her 

constitutional rights, the Court must first determine whether Riley should be considered a 

governmental employee or a private citizen. Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1100; Pickering v. 

Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (the State has interests as an employer in 

regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in 

connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general”). Although it is not 

in dispute that Riley was a private employee of an independent contractor of the City of 

Prescott, both parties appear to contend that she should be treated as a governmental 

employee for purposes of evaluating her First Amendment free speech rights. (Doc. 266 

at 11; Doc. 279 at 3). Thus, the Court, too, will treat Riley as a government employee for 

the purposes of evaluating her First Amendment free speech rights. 

Clairmont sets out the five-part balancing test to determine whether a 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 8 of 38
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

governmental employee has alleged a violation of her First Amendment rights as a result 

of government retaliation for her speech: 

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from other members of the 

general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the 

adverse employment action even absent the protected speech. 

 632 F.3d at 1102–03 (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2009)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the first three areas of inquiry, but the 

burden shifts to the government to prove the last two.4

 Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 

710 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 a. Riley’s Speech was on a Matter of Public Concern 

 The Court has “defined the scope of the public concern element broadly and 

adopted a liberal construction of what an issue of public concern is under the First 

Amendment.” Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 709–10 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can 

fairly be considered to relate to ‘any matter of political, 

social, or other concern to the community.’ ” Johnson v. 

Multnomah Cnty., 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). Speech that deals with “individual personnel disputes and grievances” that “would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies” generally is not of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 

1114 (9th Cir. 1983). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48 

(1983). 

Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1057. 

 

4

 Of course, this division of burdens should not be construed as affecting Defendants’ ultimate burden on summary judgment of demonstrating “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 9 of 38
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Here, it is undisputed that on October 26, 2010, Riley issued a press release on 

behalf of a group called “Prescott Citizens Against Bullies” (“PCAB”) that called for a 

November 1 protest regarding the arrest of former City employee Ms. Castaneda. (PSOF 

¶ 9, Ex. 17; DCSOF ¶ 9). PCAB alleged that Ms. Castaneda had been fired and arrested 

for whistleblowing against the City of Prescott. Id. Riley’s press release invited 

concerned citizens “to join in this peaceful civil protest at City Hall.” Id. Additionally, 

the press release explained that the purpose of the protest was to oppose the perceived 

retaliation against Ms. Castaneda, excessive force used by the police when arresting Ms. 

Castaneda, and “ongoing threats, intimidation, and bullying towards Ms. Castaneda and 

her supporters by the Mayor” and others. Id. Such matters are clearly of public concern. 

See Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072 (finding that speech that deals with the functioning of 

government is a matter of inherent public concern); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 

(9th Cir. 2006) (speech that helps the public evaluate the performance of public agencies 

addresses a matter of public concern); Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 

917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004) (speech alleging that the government engaged in discrimination 

or other civil rights violations is on a matter of public concern); Hyland v. Wonder, 972 

F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992) (speech discussing “threats to public safety” is “of vital 

interest to citizens,” and speech exposing policies that put people in jeopardy is 

“ ‘inherently of interest to the public.’ ”) (quoting Roth v. Veteran’s Admin., 856 F.2d 

1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

 Moreover, on October 29, prior to the protest, Mayor Kuykendall and other city 

officials held a press conference addressing the Ms. Castaneda matter. (PSOF ¶ 31; 

DCSOF ¶ 31). The holding of this press conference strongly implies that Defendants 

believed the subject matter of the protest was a matter of public concern. The media 

coverage received by the protest further evidences its public nature. (See PSOF ¶¶ 14, 

16, 38; DCSOF ¶¶ 14, 16, 38). Thus, regardless of any personal animus Riley may have 

harbored towards Mayor Kuykendall, Riley’s speech appears to have been on a matter of 

public concern. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 10 of 38
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 b. Riley’s Speech was not Part of Her Official Duties at YHS 

 Riley must also demonstrate that the speech in question “was spoken in the 

capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. A 

public employee’s speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is part of the 

employee’s official job duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). Whether 

an employee’s disputed speech is part of his official duties presents a mixed question of 

fact and law. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th 

Cir. 2008). For purposes of considering whether Riley spoke in a public or private 

capacity, at the summary judgment stage we resolve any material factual disputes in 

Riley’s favor. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Initially, the Court notes that Defendants’ argument that Riley spoke in a public 

capacity consists of a single conclusory sentence devoid of citations to the factual 

record.5

 (Doc. 266 at 12). This single sentence fails to meet Defendants’ burden of 

demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on this point. See Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. V. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce 

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or 

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to 

carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”) (citing High Tech Gays v. Defense 

Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990)). Regardless, it is 

undisputed that Riley had no marketing or public relations responsibility to the City of 

Prescott. (See DSOF ¶¶ 10, 16, 21, 23; PCSOF ¶¶ 10, 16, 21, 23; PSOF ¶ 2; DCSOF 

¶ 2). It is also undisputed that Riley helped organize and attended the protest on her own 

personal time, took steps to ensure that her conduct was not attributable to YHS, and 

YHS did not assist or endorse Riley’s actions or speech. (DSOF ¶¶ 49, 51, 67, 68; 

 

5

 “Riley’s intentional introduction of YHS into her ‘speech,’ as well as her attempts to use her YHS-related public persona to advance herself, tends to show that she 

was speaking, not as a public citizen, but in her continuing role as YHS spokesperson.” (Doc. 266 at 12). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 11 of 38
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

PCSOF ¶¶ 49, 51, 67, 68). Consequently, Riley’s speech was not part of her official 

duties at YHS; she spoke in the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee. 

c. Riley’s Speech May Have Been a Substantial Motivating Factor in Her Termination 

 “The third inquiry—whether [Riley’s] testimony was a substantial or motivating 

factor in [her] termination6

—‘is purely a question of fact . . . . [W]e must assume the 

truth of the plaintiff's allegations.’ ” Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Eng, 552 F.3d 

at 1071). Defendants claim that they played no role in Riley’s termination. (Doc. 266 at 

12). Rather, they claim that YHS terminated Riley because of her alleged unwillingness 

to disclaim YHS’s involvement in her activities, references to YHS in her speech, and 

insubordinate conduct. (Id. (citing DSOF ¶¶ 39, 41–58, 63–85, 105–109)). Riley, 

however, offers substantial evidence disputing these facts and the credibility of 

Defendants’ witnesses. (See PCSOF ¶¶ 39, 41–58, 63–85, 105–109). Moreover, Riley 

offers evidence calling into question whether, during the relevant time period, Defendants 

communicated with YHS about Riley’s employment and whether YHS board members 

may have felt pressured to terminate Riley’s employment. (See, e.g., PSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 

21–25, 29, 33, 42; but see DCSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 21–25, 29, 33, 42). Further, the temporal 

proximity between Riley’s speech and termination create an inference of retaliation. 

Paige v. Coyner, 613 F.3d 273, 283 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Temporal proximity between the 

protected conduct and the adverse action by the state actor alone may be significant 

enough to constitute indirect evidence . . . to create an inference of retaliatory motive.” 

(internal citation and quotation omitted)). Thus, Riley has presented sufficient evidence 

to create a dispute of material fact whether her speech was a substantial motivating factor 

in her termination. 

d. Defendants Failed to Give an Adequate Justification for Treating Riley Differently Than Other Members of the 

Public 

 The government bears the burden of showing that under the Pickering balancing test, “the relevant government 

6

 Termination is clearly an adverse employment action. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 12 of 38
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. “Although the Pickering balancing inquiry is ultimately a legal question, like the private citizen inquiry, its resolution often entails underlying factual disputes.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. As we have emphasized, we must view all disputed facts in the light most favorable to [Riley]. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 701. 

Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1106–07. Adequate justification means that “government’s 

legitimate administrative interests outweigh the employee’s First Amendment rights.” 

Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation omitted). “These interests include promoting 

efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties and maintaining proper 

discipline in the public service.” Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1107 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. 

at 150–51). To weigh the parties’ respective interests, the Court “examines disruption 

resulting both from the act of speaking and from the content of the speech.” Id. 

Moreover, because Riley’s speech is examined in the context of independent contractors, 

this test is “adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as contractor rather than as 

employer.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996). 

 Here, Defendants sole argument supporting adequate justification is that Riley’s 

speech and conduct disrupted YHS. (Doc. 266 at 7, 12–13; see Doc. 287 at 2–4). If true, 

then YHS may have had adequate justification in terminating Riley. Such an argument, 

however, does nothing to evidence Defendants’ adequate justification for allegedly 

applying pressure on YHS to terminate Riley for her speech. Because Defendants have 

not argued that their interest in regulating Riley’s speech was sufficient to outweigh 

Riley’s free speech interest, Defendants have waived this argument. See, e.g., Butler v. 

Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008). Regardless, Defendants have neither alleged 

nor offered any evidence to support a conclusion that pressuring YHS to terminate Riley 

for her speech was “necessary for [the City of Prescott or Mayor Kuykendall’s office] to 

operate efficiently and effectively.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 

147). On the record before the Court at this stage in the case, Defendants have not met 

their burden under the Pickering balancing test. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 13 of 38
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

e. Defendants Failed to Show That Riley Would Have Been Terminated Even Absent Their Actions 

 “[I]f the government fails the Pickering balancing test, it alternatively bears the 

burden of demonstrating that it ‘would have reached the same [adverse employment] 

decision even in the absence of the [employee’s] protected conduct.’ ” Eng, 552 F.3d at 

1072 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 808 

(9th Cir. 2004)). 

In other words, it may avoid liability by showing that the employee’s protected speech was not a but-for cause of the 

adverse employment action. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). This 

question relates to, but is distinct from, the plaintiff’s burden to show the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating 

factor. It asks whether the “adverse employment action was 

based on protected and unprotected activities,” and if the state “would have taken the adverse action if the proper reason alone had existed.” 

Id. (quoting Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1996)). This 

inquiry is “purely a question of fact” and “we must therefore once again assume the truth 

of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id.

 Here, Defendants contend that YHS acted independently and terminated Riley’s 

employment for insubordination and poor performance. (Doc. 266 at 7, 12–14 (citing 

DSOF ¶¶ 39, 41–58, 63–85, 105–109)). Riley, however, disputes Defendants’ “facts” 

and offers deposition testimony and emails from YHS board members suggesting that it 

was only after Riley’s speech and Defendants’ subsequent economic pressure that YHS 

decided to terminate Riley. (See PCSOF ¶¶ 30, 39, 41–58, 63–85, 105–109; PSOF 

¶¶ 22–24, 33, 42, 48). For example, Riley submits an email from Boks (Director of 

YHS) that indicates that on the morning of the protest Boks was aware that Defendants 

may be so upset about Riley’s speech that the relationship between Defendants and YHS 

could be affected. (PSOF ¶¶ 33 (citing Doc. 273, Ex. 29)). Additionally, the temporal 

proximity between Riley’s speech, Defendants’ alleged actions, and YHS’ termination of 

Riley creates an inference of retaliation. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (a causal link may be inferred from proximity in time). Because “[i]mmunity 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 14 of 38
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

should be granted on this ground only if the state successfully alleges, without dispute by 

the plaintiff,” that YHS would have taken the adverse action “even absent the questioned 

speech,” the Court concludes that, when viewing the record evidence in the light most 

favorable to Riley, Defendants have not met their burden on this issue. Clairmont, 632 

F.3d at 1108 (citing Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072). Therefore, Defendants have not 

demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment on this alternative ground. 

In sum, on the basis of the summary judgment record and when viewing the record 

in the light most favorable to Riley, the Court holds that Riley has presented sufficient 

evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that her speech was 

constitutionally protected and that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights. 

3. Riley Can Maintain a § 1983 Claim Against the City of Prescott and Mayor Kuykendall, in His Official Capacity 

 Defendants argue that the City of Prescott and Mayor Kuykendall, in his official 

capacity, cannot be liable under § 1983 because Mayor Kuykendall was not a final 

policymaker with regard to the issues presented in this matter. (Doc. 266 at 7–9). “[A] 

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y. et al., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Under 

Monell, municipal liability may be based on any of three theories: (1) an expressly 

adopted official policy; (2) a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) the decision of a 

person with final policymaking authority. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 

2004). There is no allegation in this case that a Mayor Kuykendall or other City of 

Prescott employees were acting pursuant to an express official policy. (See Doc. 279 at 

12–16). Instead, Riley argues that she is entitled to relief under the second and third 

Monell prongs. (Id.). 

 “[A] local government may be held liable under § 1983 when ‘the individual who 

committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority’ or 

such an official ‘ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis 

for it.’ ” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)). “ ‘There must, 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 15 of 38
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

however, be evidence of a conscious, affirmative choice’ on the part of the authorized 

policymaker.” Id. Moreover, “[i]t does not matter that the final policymaker may have 

subjected only one person to only one constitutional violation.” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 983. 

“A municipality can be liable for an isolated constitutional violation when the person 

causing the violation has final policymaking authority.” Id. (quoting Christie v. Iopa, 

176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 Identifying a policy-making official is a question of law for the Court to decide by 

reference to state law, not one of fact to be submitted to the jury. Jett v. Dallas Indep. 

Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); see Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346 (“Whether a 

particular official has final policy-making authority is a question of state law.”) (citing 

Jett, 491 U.S. at 737). Although the first step in identifying a final policymaker is 

examination of state law, “[d]epending on the circumstances . . . we may also look to the 

way a local government entity operates in practice.” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982–83 (citing 

Jett, 491 U.S. at 737) (trial judge must identify official policymakers based on “state and 

local positive law, as well as custom or usage having the force of law”) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted)). “When determining whether an individual has final 

policymaking authority, [the court] ask[s] whether he or she has authority ‘in a particular 

area or on a particular issue.’ ” Id. at 983 (emphasis in original) (quoting McMillian v. 

Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)). 

 Here, Defendants argue that Mayor Kuykendall “was not a final policymaker on 

the issue of municipal contracts, or the administration or termination of those contracts, 

nor was he a final policy-maker [sic] with regard to any other issues presented in this 

matter.” Doc. 266 at 9 (citing DSOF ¶¶ 1–6); see id. at 7–9; Doc. 287 at 8–11. Although 

Riley disputes this (Doc. 279 at 12–14), Defendants are correct insofar as Mayor 

Kuykendall clearly did not have the authority to unilaterally enter into or cancel the YHS 

contract. Article VIII of the City of Prescott Charter codifies Prescott’s ability to enter 

into municipal contracts and specifies that “[t]he city council shall prescribe by ordinance 

the manner and method of purchases and entering into contracts, the manner and method 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 16 of 38
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of executing change orders, and shall set forth therein the purchases and contract amounts 

which shall require approval of the city council.” City of Prescott Charter, Art. VIII § 3, 

PCSOF at Ex. 46. The Prescott City Code further provides that the city council must 

approve municipal contracts, like the YHS contract, that are valued at over $10,000. See

Prescott, Ariz. Code §§ 1-27-11(C)–(D), 1-27-16 (2013). Furthermore, the YHS 

contract, itself, specified that “the Prescott City Council shall determine whether to renew 

the contract” and termination was at the discretion of “the City.”7

 (Animal Sheltering 

Service Agreement, §§ 4(A)–(B), Doc. 267-1 at Ex. A). Thus, with regard to the YHS 

contract, the Prescott City Council was the final policymaker—not Mayor Kuykendall 

unilaterally as mayor. 

 Defendants are incorrect about the status of Mayor Kuykendall not as a final 

policymaker for municipal contracts, however, insofar as Mayor Kuykendall was 

indisputably a voting member of the Prescott City Council (DSOF ¶ 2; PCSOF ¶ 2). 

Under Arizona state law, “[t]he mayor of the common council shall be the chief 

executive officer of the town, and shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law 

and ordinance.” A.R.S. § 9-236. The City of Prescott Charter defines the mayor’s duties: 

[t]he mayor shall be the chairman of the council and preside over its deliberations. He may make and second motions and 

shall have a voice and vote in all proceedings. He shall be a 

chief executive of the city government for all purposes and . . . shall have executive by no regular administrative duties. 

City of Prescott Charter, Art. II § 6, PCSOF at Ex. 46.8

 Of course, as only one of seven members of the Prescott City Council, Mayor 

Kuykendall could not, in his official capacity as chairman of the Prescott City Council, 

 

7

 Although “the City” is not as unambiguous as specifying “the Prescott City Council,” the Court interprets the term to refer to the Prescott City Council and not to the 

mayor of Prescott. This is because the YHS contract never mentions the mayor of Prescott (although the mayor did sign the contract on behalf of the City) and only ever specifies the Prescott City Council. (Animal Sheltering Service Agreement, Doc. 267-1 at Ex. A). 

8

 Additionally, “[a]ll contracts shall be . . . executed in the name of the City of Prescott by the mayor.” City of Prescott Charter, Art. VIII § 1, PCSOF at Ex. 46. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 17 of 38
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unilaterally approve renewal of or terminate the YHS contract. Here, however, the 

alleged constitutional violation is not direct action by the Prescott City Council. Rather, 

Riley alleges indirect action: Mayor Kuykendall’s threat of later direct action by the 

Prescott City Council. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that § 1983 liability 

can accrue from indirect actions, not only direct actions. Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1100 

(“First Amendment protection does not depend on whether the governmental action is 

direct or indirect. . . . the government . . . may not threaten to exert economic pressure on 

a private employer in order to produce a result which [it] could not command directly.”). 

Therefore, it stands to reason that indirect actions by a member of the city council, not 

only direct actions by the full city council, impute liability onto the municipality. 

 The alternative to holding the City of Prescott liable for credible threats of adverse 

policymaking levied by members of the City Council is to hold that the City cannot be 

liable unless the City Council, as a governing body, officially ratifies the threat through 

direct action. Such a holding would absurdly give councilmembers carte blanche to 

violate constitutional rights through the indirect action of threatening later adverse direct 

action by the City Council. Essentially, a party threatened by a councilmember would 

have only two choices: (1) acquiesce to the threat—an indirect action—and render the 

City unaccountable because there was no need to follow through with direct City Council 

action; or (2) resist the threat and hope that the councilmember was bluffing and the City 

Council takes no adverse direct action. Either way, unless and until the City Council 

actually takes direct final policymaking action ratifying the threat, the City remains 

unaccountable for the earlier threat (an indirect action) by its councilmember. That 

cannot be the law because if it were, then the threat, itself clearly unconstitutional under 

§ 1983, would not be a redressable harm. See Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc. v. City of 

Oakland, No. C-06-4094 VRW, 2006 WL 2850016, at *4 (N. Dist. Cal. Oct. 4, 2006) 

(finding that where a municipality argued that multiple city officials were involved in 

making a final policymaking decision, the law does not allow a municipality to “avoid 

liability by obscuring its organizational structure and suggesting that the buck stops 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 18 of 38
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

nowhere”). Such an alternative holding is no alternative, after all. Consequently, Mayor 

Kuykendall should be considered a final policymaker in the context of his threat of 

economic harm to YHS via not renewing or canceling its municipal contract. 9

 But even if Mayor Kuykendall is not a final policymaker in the instant context, the 

Court notes that Riley advances an alternative argument to justify attributing Monell

liability to the City of Prescott. Riley argues that “there is both direct and circumstantial 

evidence that several City Council members also interfered with her employment[,] . . . 

expressed dismay and were upset with [Riley’s] participation in the protest.” (Doc. 279 

at 14 (citing PSOF ¶¶ 18, 33, 36–37, 44–45 (indicating that it may have been 

communicated to YHS that multiple councilmembers expressed displeasure with Riley’s 

speech and YHS); but see DCSOF ¶¶ 18, 33, 36–37, 44–45)). Although scant, Riley’s 

proffered evidence does raise a genuine dispute of material fact over whether a majority 

of the City Council exerted indirect economic pressure on YHS to retaliate against Riley. 

A majority of the City Council is capable of carrying out its threats and therefore surely 

constitutes a final policymaker in this context. 

 In sum, in this case, Mayor Kuykendall was a final policymaker because, as a 

member of the Prescott City Council, he had a portion of the final policymaking authority 

of the City of Prescott for purposes of the YHS contract. Alternatively, in the context of 

a threat of later direct City Council action, a majority of the members of the Prescott City 

Council constitutes a final policymaker for purposes of Monell liability. Accordingly, 

Riley may maintain her § 1983 claim against the City of Prescott and Mayor Kuykendall, 

 

9

 The Court notes that Mayor Kuykendall’s dual status as chief executive of the 

City of Prescott and chairman of the Prescott City Council undoubtedly provided him significant influence over the Prescott City Council and its policymaking. This obvious influence would have provided significant credibility to Mayor Kuykendall’s threat of economic pressure if YHS did not retaliate against Riley. Moreover, because of Mayor Kuykendall’s elevated stature on the Prescott City Council, YHS could have reasonably believed that Mayor Kuykendall’s threats represented the position of other councilmembers and the City Council, as a body. (See PSOF ¶¶ 18, 33, 36–37, 44–45 (indicating that it may have been communicated to YHS that other councilmembers 

expressed displeasure with Riley’s speech and YHS); but see DCSOF ¶¶ 18, 33, 36–37, 44–45). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 19 of 38
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in his official capacity. 10

4. Mayor Kuykendall, in His Personal Capacity, is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants argue that Mayor Kuykendall, in his personal capacity, is entitled to 

qualified immunity because he took no unconstitutional action and, even if he did, 

Riley’s constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the violation. (Doc. 

266 at 9–14; Doc. 287 at 4–8). A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified 

immunity from damages for civil liability if his or her conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). There is a two-step sequence 

for resolving a qualified immunity claim: the “constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified 

immunity inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The “constitutional 

inquiry” asks whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If so, 

a court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and asks if the right was clearly 

established at the relevant time. Id. at 201–02. This second inquiry “must be undertaken 

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. at 201. 

Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 

(2009). 

 First, regarding the “constitutional inquiry,” after performing the 5-step Clairmont

inquiry above, the Court finds that Riley has presented sufficient evidence to establish a 

genuine dispute of material fact that her speech was constitutionally protected and that 

Defendants violated her First Amendment rights. Second, regarding the “qualified 

immunity inquiry,” “it is well settled that the state may not abuse its position as employer 

 

10 In light of the Court’s conclusion that Riley’s rights were allegedly violated by a “final policymaker,” the Court need not address Riley’s alternative ground for municipal liability under Monell (that the City of Prescott’s retaliation against Riley was pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom (Doc. 279 at 15–16)). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 20 of 38
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to stifle ‘the First Amendment rights [its employees] would otherwise enjoy as citizens to 

comment on matters of public interest.’ ” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Pickering, 391 

U.S. at 568). Additionally, the Court previously found that Riley’s constitutional right to 

engage in free speech free of government interference was clearly established when she 

was terminated from YHS. (Doc. 38 at 7 (citing Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1100) (“Where 

the government may not prohibit certain speech, it also may not threaten to exert 

economic pressure on a private employer in order to produce a result which [it] could not 

command directly.”)). Accordingly, Mayor Kuykendall, in his personal capacity, is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. 

 In sum, (1) Riley can maintain her § 1983 claim; (2) there is a dispute of material 

fact whether Defendants took unconstitutional action; (3) the City of Prescott and Mayor 

Kuykendall, in his official capacity, are proper defendants; and (4) Mayor Kuykendall, in 

his private capacity, is not entitled to qualified immunity. Because Defendant has failed 

to demonstrate that there is not a genuine dispute of material fact, Defendant is not 

entitled to summary judgment on Riley’s § 1983 claim. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 266) with respect to Count I. 

 C. Count III: Tortious Interference with Employment Relationship 

 Riley alleges in Count III of her Complaint (Doc. 1 at 19–20, ¶¶ 110–19) that 

Mayor Kuykendall intentionally interfered with Riley’s employment relationship with 

YHS by threatening to cancel or not renew the YHS contract because of Riley’s 

involvement with the PCAB and her participation in the public demonstration against him 

and other city officials. Riley alleges that this threat ultimately led to her termination 

from YHS. Defendants (Doc. 266 at 14–16) and Riley (Doc. 271 at 7–12) have each 

moved for summary judgment on Count III. 

 1. Legal Standard 

 “Tort liability may be imposed upon a defendant who intentionally and improperly 

interferes with the plaintiff’s rights under a contract with another if the interference 

causes the plaintiff to lose a right under the contract.” Snow v. Western Sav. & Loan 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 21 of 38
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Ass’n, 730 P.2d 204, 211 (Ariz. 1986) (internal citations omitted). “To plead a prima 

facie case of intentional interference with contract, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the 

existence of a valid contractual relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part 

of the interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach; (4) resultant 

damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted; and (5) that the defendant 

acted improperly.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 2. Analysis 

 a. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 In their motion, Defendants do not mention elements one, two, and four (Doc. 266 

at 14–16), and therefore concede at least that those elements are in dispute. Defendants, 

however, argue that Riley cannot meet her burden on elements three and five by 

claiming, without specificity, that “there are no facts showing that the City of Prescott 

Defendants engaged in any actions that induced or caused a breach of Riley’s 

employment contract, or that the City of Prescott Defendants engaged in any improper

action that caused Riley’s job termination.” (Doc. 266 at 15) (emphasis in original). 

Defendants are incorrect on both elements. 

 Regarding element three, first, as discussed above, Riley has demonstrated there is 

a genuine dispute of material fact whether Mayor Kuykendall threatened economic harm 

to YHS if YHS did not terminate Riley’s employment. Supra, II.B.2. Riley also offers 

evidence calling into question whether, during the relevant time period, Defendants 

communicated with YHS about Riley’s employment and whether YHS board members 

may have felt pressured to terminate Riley’s employment. (See, e.g., PSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 

21–25, 29, 33, 42; but see DCSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 21–25, 29, 33, 42). Lastly, Riley offers 

deposition testimony and emails from YHS board members suggesting that it was only 

after Riley’s speech and Defendants’ subsequent economic pressure that YHS decided to 

terminate Riley. (See PCSOF ¶¶ 30, 39, 41–58, 63–85, 105–109; PSOF ¶¶ 22–24, 33, 42, 

48). Consequently, element three is in genuine dispute. 

 Regarding element five, whether Defendants’ actions were improper, the Supreme 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 22 of 38
- 23 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court of Arizona has opined that “the ‘improper’ element . . . ‘generally is determined by 

weighing the social importance of the interest the defendant seeks to advance against the 

interest invaded.’ ” Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020, 1026, ¶ 21 (2005) 

(quoting Snow v. Western Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 730 P.2d 204, 212 (Ariz. 1986)). Here, 

Defendants’ alleged actions were clearly improper. As discussed above, the Court finds 

that Riley has demonstrated that there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether 

Mayor Kuykendall threatened economic harm to YHS if YHS did not terminate Riley’s 

employment. Supra, II.B.2. Riley has also demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact 

whether such threat was unconstitutional. Id. Because an unconstitutional action is 

inherently improper, element five is in genuine dispute. 

 Because Defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is not a genuine dispute of 

material fact, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Riley’s tortious 

interference claim.11 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 266) with respect to Count III. 

 b. Riley’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

 In her motion, Riley argues that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to 

elements one (Riley was employed by YHS), two (Defendants were aware of Riley’s 

employment), and four (Riley suffered damages caused by the termination of her 

employment). (Doc. 271 at 8). Riley also argues that “[t]he Court should find as a 

matter of law that there is no genuine dispute as to element [three] (intentional 

interference) and [five] (improper conduct), based on undisputed facts as further 

supported by Defendants’ spoliation of evidence.” (Id.). 

 First, the Court notes that Defendants have offered copious evidence disputing the 

 

11 The Court notes that Defendants also argue that the City of Prescott is entitled to 

summary judgment because Riley has no evidence that the alleged tortious conduct was committed by an employee of the City of Prescott in the course and scope of his employment. (Doc. 266 at 16–17). Here, it is undisputed that Mayor Kuykendall and the councilmembers’ scope of employment includes the negotiation, renewal, and cancelation of municipal contracts. Thus, the pressure allegedly applied by Mayor Kuykendall and other councilmembers on YHS concerning the municipal contract is within the scope of the Mayor and the councilmembers’ employment. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 23 of 38
- 24 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

factual basis of Riley’s claim. Specifically, Defendants have demonstrated a reasonable 

dispute of material fact over whether Mayor Kuykendall threatened economic harm to 

YHS if YHS did not terminate Riley’s employment. It is undisputed that, at deposition, 

Mayor Kuykendall, other councilmembers, and various YHS board members testified 

that Defendants were not involved in the termination of Riley’s employment by YHS. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 120–70; see PCSOF ¶¶ 120–70 (admitting that deponents testified as noted, 

but disputing the truthfulness of the statements)). Although Riley presents abundant 

evidence challenging the credibility of the deponents testimony (see, e.g., PCSOF 

¶¶ 120–70; PSOF ¶¶ 17–18, 21–25, 29, 33, 42), credibility determinations are within the 

province of the jury, not the Court at the summary judgment stage. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 

F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, 

should be left to the jury.”) (internal citations omitted). When viewed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party (here, Defendants), there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact over whether Defendants acted intentionally or improperly. 

 Second, Riley’s reliance on sanctions for Defendants’ spoliation of evidence is 

unwarranted and does not entitle Riley to summary judgment on Count III. As explained 

below, infra III.A.3.d., Riley is entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction, not the 

factual findings she seeks. Unlike a factual finding, at the summary judgment stage an 

adverse inference jury instruction does not resolve the genuine factual disputes presented 

here. Accordingly, the Court denies Riley’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 271) 

with respect to Count III. 

III. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 

Riley’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment includes a Motion for Discovery 

Sanctions. (Doc. 271 at 12–21). Defendants include in their Response a Cross-Motion 

for Discovery Sanctions. (Doc. 285 at 23–25). 

 A. Riley’s Motion 

 Riley argues (Doc. 271 at 12–21) that she is entitled to claim-dispositive sanctions 

due to Mayor Kuykendall’s alleged spoliation of various email evidence. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 24 of 38
- 25 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Defendants must be sanctioned for their willful misconduct. 

This Court should, as a sanction, find that the spoliated evidence would have established (1) Defendants intentionally interfered with Riley’s employment relationship causing her termination, and (2) Defendants’ conduct was improper. 

Upon making this determination, the Court should grant summary judgment in [Riley’s] favor on her tortious 

interference claim. 

(Doc. 271 at 19). 

 1. Evidence of Spoliation 

Riley argues that the following facts show that Mayor Kuykendall has destroyed 

or failed to preserve email evidence relevant to this litigation: 

 Although Riley has made multiple requests for production of emails between 

Defendants and YHS, and specifically between Mayor Kuykendall and Goodman, 

Defendants have not produced such emails. (Doc. 271 at 6, 16; PSOF ¶¶ 62, 65, 

67, 74, 76–77). Moreover, Mayor Kuykendall explicitly denied that he and 

Goodman communicated by email. (PSOF ¶ 84; DSOF ¶ 84 (“the Mayor’s 

position [is] that he does not use email”)). 

 Nonetheless, Riley discovered numerous emails relevant to this litigation where 

either Mayor Kuykendall or his assistant were senders or recipients of the emails. 

These emails were discovered from third-parties, YHS, Goodman, and Google, 

Inc. (Doc. 271 at 6; PSOF ¶¶ 67, 74–83). 

 On March 1, 2011, Riley served the City of Prescott and Mayor Kuykendall with 

the Notice of Claim. (PSOF ¶ 56; see DCSOF ¶ 56 (acknowledging that Mayor 

Kuykendall received the Notice of Claim)). 

 On May 18, 2011, Riley served a Public Records request on the City of Prescott 

requesting, among other things, emails between Mayor Kuykendall and YHS, 

Boks, or Goodman. (PSOF ¶ 62; DCSOF ¶ 62; DSOF at Ex. 53). 

o Mayor Kuykendall had the responsibility to locate and produce records 

responsive to a public records request, although the IT Department was 

available to assist with the process. (PSOF ¶ 63; DCSOF ¶ 63). 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 25 of 38
- 26 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On August 15, 2011, Riley sent Defendants a Notice of Request to Preserve 

Documents and Electronically Stored Information. (PSOF ¶ 65; DCSOF ¶ 65). 

 On July 16, 2012, Riley discovered twenty-four emails potentially relevant to this 

litigation through Google, Inc’s search (pursuant to subpoena) of Mayor 

Kuykendall’s private email address. This discovery revealed only the “to,” 

“from,” and “date” fields of the email, not the subject line or body. (Doc. 171 at 

16; PSOF ¶ 74). 

o Riley had previously requested these emails on May 18, 2011 and May 15, 

2012. Riley again requested Defendant produce these emails on July 30, 

2012. (PSOF ¶ 76; DCSOF ¶ 76). Defendants did not search Mayor 

Kuykendall’s home computer and personal email account until August 16, 

2012. (PSOF ¶ 78). Defendants produced none of the twenty-four emails 

from the Google list. (PSOF ¶ 77; DCSOF ¶ 77). 

 On or about October 30, 2012, five emails were discovered through third-party 

Goodman (pursuant to a subpoena). Three of these emails were from Goodman to 

Mayor Kuykendall and two of these emails were from Mayor Kuykendall’s 

assistant to Goodman. This discovery revealed the full text of all five emails. 

(PSOF ¶ 67; DCSOF ¶ 67). Defendants had not previously produced these emails. 

 On March 19, 2013, over Defendants’ objections, Riley obtained a court order 

directing Google, Inc. to produce copies of each of the twenty-four emails 

previously identified in Mayor Kuykendall’s private Gmail account. On or about 

March 25, 2013, Google, Inc. searched its servers but “did not identify or locate 

among its business records” any of the twenty-four emails. (PSOF ¶¶ 79–80; 

DCSOF ¶ 79). Google’s Custodian of Records produced a declaration confirming 

that, on July 16, 2012, the twenty-four emails existed in Mayor Kuykendall’s 

Gmail account, but that “[r]ecords regarding whether, when, how or by whom any 

emails that may have existed were deleted are not reasonably accessible to 

Google.” (PSOF at Ex. 51; DCSOF ¶ 80 (acknowledging the contents of the 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 26 of 38
- 27 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

declaration, but objecting that the declaration “leaves open the possibility that an 

employee of Google may have taken some action, either in July 2012 or March 

2013[,] that resulted in the deletion of emails from the Mayor’s Googlemaintained e-mail account”)). Defendants have not produced any of these twentyfour emails. 

 In Response, Defendants deny destroying evidence relevant to this case during the 

period when Defendants were obligated to preserve evidence. Specifically, Defendants 

allege that Mayor Kuykendall is neither proficient in nor a regular user of email. (Doc. 

285 at 7). With regard to Mayor Kuykendall’s city-assigned email account, Mayor 

Kuykendall alleges that it is his assistant, not himself, who accesses and uses his cityemail account. (DCSOF ¶¶ 75, 99). Mayor Kuykendall also claims that due to City of 

Prescott IT limitations, his city-emails are not archived and his assistant regularly deletes 

emails after approximately two weeks. (DCSOF ¶¶ 39, 58–60, 69–71, 114–17). Mayor 

Kuykendall further explains that the City’s email server only stores user-deleted email for 

30 days. (DCSOF ¶¶ 61–64). Mayor Kuykendall argues that consequently, any of 

Mayor Kuykendall’s city-emails relevant to this litigation would have been routinely 

deleted and irretrievable prior to receipt of Riley’s Notice of Claim on March 1, 2011.12

 With regard to Mayor Kuykendall’s private Gmail account, Mayor Kuykendall 

alleges that it is his wife, not himself, who accesses and uses his Gmail account. 

(DCSOF ¶¶ 81–85). Mayor Kuykendall also claims that his wife uses his Gmail account 

to correspond with his assistant and campaign manager. (DCSOF ¶¶ 83–85, 108–10). 

Mayor Kuykendall further claims that he has insufficient technical knowledge to delete 

emails from his personal account, and that he is not aware of anyone taking affirmative 

steps to delete emails from his Gmail account during the pendency of the litigation. 

(DCSOF ¶¶ 111, 113). Additionally, Mayor Kuykendall argues that the Google 

declaration is insufficient to justify sanctions because it does not specify the source of the 

 

12 Riley’s YHS employment was terminated on November 12, 2010, over three 

months prior to the Notice of Claim. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 27 of 38
- 28 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

emails’ deletion, whether a technological glitch could be to blame, or whether a Google 

employee could be responsible.13 (Doc. 285 at 10). 

 Aside from arguing that no emails were destroyed during the period when 

Defendants were obligated to preserve them, Defendants argue that the alleged spoliation 

does not hamper Riley’s ability to prosecute her case because she had access to 

Goodman’s email, and therefore had access to any relevant emails between Mayor 

Kuykendall and Goodman. 14 (Doc. 285 at 10–11). Consequently, Defendants argue that 

their actions warrant no sanctions of any kind. (Id. at 15–18). 

 2. Legal Standard 

The Court has discretion under its inherent powers to sanction a party who causes 

the spoliation of evidence. See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 

2006). This discretion is broad and can range from minor sanctions, such as the awarding 

of attorneys’ fees, Leon, 464 F.3d at 961, to more serious sanctions, such as dismissal of 

claims, id. at 958, or instructing the jury that it may draw an adverse inference, In re 

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 386–87 (9th Cir. 2010). Sanctions under these 

“inherent powers must be exercised with restraint” and should be appropriate to the 

conduct that triggered the sanction. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 

(1991). 

 Destruction of evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as 

evidence in pending litigation constitutes spoliation. See United States v. Kitsap 

Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, failure to “preserve 

electronic or other records, once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the issue of 

spoliation of evidence and its consequences.” Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 

 

13 Mayor Kuykendall also implies that because an email could linger on Google’s servers for up to 60 days beyond the date of user deletion, the twenty-four emails could have been deleted up to 60 days prior to Google’s July 16, 2012 response to Riley’s subpoena. (Doc. 285 at 10). Considering that March 1, 2011 was over 400 days prior to July 16, 2012, it is unclear how this fact, even if true, could possibly excuse the disappearance of the twenty-four emails. 

14 Riley responds that the five Goodman emails are only a fraction of the emails Mayor Kuykendall destroyed. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 28 of 38
- 29 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.Supp.2d. 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003)); see also Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (noting 

willful destruction of electronic files constituted spoliation). 

 “A party seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence must prove the following 

elements: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it 

when it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a 

‘culpable state of mind;’ and (3) the evidence that was destroyed or altered was ‘relevant’ 

to the claims or defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated 

evidence[.]” Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1005 (quoting Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 

632 F.Supp.2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009)). The Court will now examine each of these 

elements to determine if Riley has sufficiently established that Mayor Kuykendall 

engaged in conduct that led to the spoliation of evidence and warrants sanctions.

 3. Analysis 

 a. Obligation to Preserve 

 “It is well established that the duty to preserve arises when a party knows or 

should know that certain evidence is relevant to pending or future litigation.” Surowiec, 

790 F.Supp.2d at 1005 (internal citation and quotation omitted). “Stated differently, the 

duty to preserve is triggered not only during litigation, but also extends to the period 

before litigation when a party should reasonably know that evidence may be relevant to 

anticipated litigation.” Id. (internal citations omitted). At the very latest, Mayor 

Kuykendall’s duty to preserve the contents of his city-assigned email account and private 

Gmail account arose when he received Riley’s Notice of Claim on March 1, 2011. Riley, 

however, argues that Defendants’ obligation to preserve evidence in both email accounts 

arose earlier. The Court will address each account in turn. 

1. Mayor Kuykendall and City Employee’s City- Assigned Email Addresses 

 Defendants argue that no spoliation of emails from Mayor Kuykendall’s cityassigned email account occurred because any relevant emails would have been routinely 

deleted prior to March 1, 2011, the date when Defendants argue an obligation to preserve 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 29 of 38
- 30 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence arose. Riley, however, argues that Defendants had a preexisting duty to 

preserve relevant emails because: (1) Mayor Kuykendall and City employees are public 

officers subject to state public records laws and regulations; and (2) the City had a 

contractual business relationship with YHS. Specifically, Riley argues (Doc. 271 at 13–

15) that applicable Arizona public records laws, A.R.S. §§ 39-121, et seq., obligated 

Defendants to preserve all emails related to municipal contracts (which would include 

emails related to YHS and, by extension Riley, during the entirety of all events alleged by 

Riley). Riley appears to argue that because Arizona’s public records laws are designed, 

in part, to preserve documents of legal significance,15 Defendants either knew or should 

have known that emails related to a municipal contract hold legal significance that 

obligate their preservation. 

 The Court notes that although Defendants have responded to most of Riley’s 

spoliation argument in their Response, they ignore this argument.16 (Doc. 285 at 6–9, 

13–14). Consequently, for the purposes of this motion, the Court will consider 

Defendants to admit that under Arizona public records laws, Defendants became 

obligated to preserve emails between city employees and YHS at some point prior to 

October 26, 2010, the date Riley first publicized the protest. From the facts presented at 

this stage of the hearing, it is not in dispute that sometime after October 26, 2010, 

multiple emails potentially relevant to this litigation were deleted from Mayor 

Kuykendall’s city-assigned email account. Accordingly, with regard to Mayor 

Kuykendall’s city-assigned email account, Riley has made a showing that spoliation 

occurred after Defendants’ duty to preserve evidence had arisen. 

 

15 “Records shall not be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by any agency of this state unless it is determined by the state library that the record has no further 

administrative, legal, fiscal, research or historical value.” A.R.S. § 41-151.15(B) 

(emphasis added). 

16 Defendants argue (Doc. 285 at 13–14) that Mayor Kuykendall merely followed the established City of Prescott IT policy between October 26 and March 1, 2011. This 

argument goes to culpability, not Defendants’ underlying obligation to preserve evidence. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 30 of 38
- 31 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 2. Mayor Kuykendall’s Private Gmail Account

 At the very latest, Mayor Kuykendall’s duty to preserve the contents of his 

private Gmail account arose when he received Riley’s Notice of Claim on March 1, 2011. 

From the facts presented, it appears that Mayor Kuykendall’s private Gmail account 

contained emails relevant to this litigation on March 1, 2011. Twenty-four identified 

emails appear to have been deleted from Mayor Kuykendall’s personnel Gmail account 

no earlier than mid-May, 2012, more than one year after Mayor Kuykendall knew of his 

obligation to preserve evidence. Nonetheless, despite multiple requests from Riley, 

Mayor Kuykendall never produced these emails and the emails were deleted from his 

Gmail account, rendering them irretrievable. Accordingly, with regard to Mayor 

Kuykendall’s private Gmail account, Riley has made a showing that at least some of the 

spoliation occurred after Defendants’ duty to preserve had arisen. 

 b. Culpable State of Mind 

 “Courts have not been uniform in defining the level of culpability—be it 

negligence, gross negligence, willfulness, or bad faith—that is required before sanctions 

are appropriate.” Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1006 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). “Nor is there consensus as to how the level of culpability is to be determined, 

or what prejudice, if any, may be presumed from culpable conduct.” Id. at 1006–07. 

However, it is clear that “[a]n allegedly spoliating party’s culpability must be determined 

case-by-case.” Id. at 1007. 

1. Mayor Kuykendall and City Employee’s City- Assigned Email Addresses 

 In this case, Defendants argue that “there is no evidence that City emails were 

deleted except in the exercise of normal city practice; that does not constitute destruction 

with any culpable state of mind.” (Doc. 285 at 14). From the facts presented at this stage 

of the proceedings, it appears that through the combination of Mayor Kuykendall’s 

personal email retention policy and the IT policies of the City of Prescott, emails 

potentially relevant to this litigation that were sent to and from Mayor Kuykendall’s cityassigned email address would, under normal circumstances, not be preserved for more 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 31 of 38
- 32 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

than approximately 45 days.17 Thus, any email relevant to this litigation created before 

approximately mid-January, 2011,18 would have been destroyed prior to March 1, 2011. 

Defendants have produced emails retrieved from city-assigned email addresses that postdate March 1, 2011, and Riley has not made a factual showing that Defendants deleted 

emails from city-assigned addresses after March 1, 2011. 

 Nonetheless, Defendants have not attempted to explain why the “normal city 

practices” exercised here fail to follow Arizona public record requirements. Moreover, 

Defendants have not satisfactorily explained why they failed to preserve emails between 

city employees and board members of an entity (YHS) that has a contract with the City. 

Defendants claim that if any relevant emails had existed, then Mayor Kuykendall’s 

assistant would have classified them as “non-city business” and deleted them 

accordingly. Such non-compliance with Arizona state law and misclassification of 

emails is, at best, grossly negligent and, at worst, willful. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that the totality of the facts presented show that Defendants deleted emails related to this 

lawsuit, and did so with sufficient culpability to warrant sanctions. 

 2. Mayor Kuykendall’s Private Gmail Account

 In this case, Defendants argue that “there is no evidence that any City of Prescott 

Defendant deleted any ‘evidence’ from the Mayor’s Gmail account” and that “the Google 

Declaration leaves room for the possibility that the emails are missing because of some 

issue on Google’s end.” (Doc. 285 at 14–15). Here, Defendants’ explanations for their 

failure to preserve evidence are not reasonable. From the facts presented at this stage of 

the proceedings, it is evident that emails related to this lawsuit remained in Mayor 

Kuykendall’s Gmail account over one year after Mayor Kuykendall received Riley’s 

Notice of Claim. Despite numerous requests for production, Mayor Kuykendall 

 

17 Defendants allege that any emails related to Riley would have been classified as “non-city business” by Mayor Kuykendall’s assistant, Mayor Kuykendall’s assistant deletes such emails approximately every two weeks, and the City’s back-up server only retains deleted emails for 30 days. (DCSOF ¶¶ 39, 58–64, 69–71, 114–17). 

18 Mid-January is approximately 45 days before March 1, 2011. Riley was terminated on November 12, 2010. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 32 of 38
- 33 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

produced nothing from his Gmail account. After a subpoena to Google revealed that 

emails existed, Mayor Kuykendall continued to refuse production and the emails were 

deleted. Even if Defendants’ argument that Google deleted the emails was factually 

accurate, it does not explain Mayor Kuykendall’s refusal to produce the emails during the 

year post-Notice of Claim that the emails indisputably existed. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Mayor Kuykendall acted willfully and in bad faith, and, thus, with a culpable 

state of mind. 

 c. Relevance to the Claims 

 Riley has shown that the evidence destroyed was likely relevant to her claims. 

Riley discovered multiple emails in Goodman’s email account that were sent to Mayor 

Kuykendall or his assistant. These emails indicate that Mayor Kuykendall was 

discussing Riley and YHS with Goodman both before and after the protest. (PSOF ¶ 67, 

Exs. 23–25). Additionally, from Google, Riley discovered the existence of nine emails 

which indicate that Mayor Kuykendall was corresponding with his assistant, Goodman, 

and Edelbrock during the critical period of October 26–29, 2010. (PSOF ¶ 74). 

Defendants produced none of these emails. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants 

destroyed emails relevant to this case.

 d. Appropriate Sanctions 

 Riley argues that Defendants’ actions entitle her to claim-dispositive sanctions. 

Specifically, Riley asks the Court to “find that the spoliated evidence would have 

established that (1) Defendants intentionally interfered with Riley’s employment 

relationship causing her termination, and (2) Defendants’ conduct was improper.” (Doc. 

271 at 19). Here, such a sanction is claim-dispositive because it would effectively be a 

finding that the two disputed elements of Riley’s tortious interference claim are not in 

genuine dispute. See, supra, II.C.2.b. Riley also requests an award of attorneys’ fees and 

costs incurred in connection with seeking the spoliated evidence and incurred in 

connection with this motion. (Id. at 21). The Court “must determine which sanction best 

(1) deters parties from future spoliation, (2) places the risk of an erroneous judgment on 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 33 of 38
- 34 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the spoliating party, and (3) restores the innocent party to their rightful litigation 

position.” Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1008 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 There is a five-part test to determine whether a sanction determining liability in 

favor of one party is just: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the other party; (4) 

the public policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability 

of less drastic sanctions.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(internal citation omitted). 

 Here, the first two factors favor Riley. Because the Court and the public have a 

strong interest in judicial efficiency and the prompt resolution of litigation, Defendants’ 

failure to preserve evidence, and the resulting delay caused by discovery disputes and the 

instant motion for sanctions, weigh in favor of granting the factual findings sought by 

Riley. See Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1009. 

 The third factor weighs neither for, nor against, granting the factual findings 

sought by Riley. The third factor, prejudice, “looks to whether the spoliating party’s 

actions impaired the non-spoliating party’s ability to go to trial or threatened to interfere 

with the rightful decision of the case.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (citation and brackets 

omitted). Here, it is apparent that Riley has been prejudiced by the spoliation. However, 

Riley did have access to Goodman’s email account and discovered multiple emails 

supporting her claims. Thus, Riley possesses at least some of the relevant emails that 

Defendants destroyed. Additionally, Defendants, Goodman, Boks, and others have all 

provided deposition testimony stating that Defendants did not play a role in YHS’s 

decision to terminate Riley’s employment and that relevant emails never existed. 

Although Riley has offered substantial evidence that relevant emails existed and 

challenging the credibility of the various deponents, their testimony nonetheless indicates 

that the previous existence (and destruction) of any “smoking gun” emails is speculation. 

Consequently, the Court finds that Riley has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice for the 

third factor to weigh in her favor. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 34 of 38
- 35 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The fourth and fifth factors weigh against granting the factual findings sought by 

Riley. Here, there is a genuine dispute of fact which public policy favors be resolved on 

its merits. Moreover, granting the factual findings Riley seeks would hinder the 

resolution of Riley’s § 1983 claim on its merits.19 Consequently, the Court finds that a 

lesser sanction would correct any interference with a rightful decision of the case 

attributed to the spoliation. See Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (quoting Rimkus Consulting 

Group, Inc.v. Cammarata, 688 F.Supp.2d at 618 (S.D. Tex. 2010)) (“When a party is 

prejudiced, but not irreparably, from the loss of evidence that was destroyed with a high 

degree of culpability, a harsh, but less extreme sanction than dismissal or default is to 

permit the fact finder to presume that the destroyed evidence was prejudicial.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that a sanction granting the factual findings Riley seeks 

would be inappropriate in this case. 

 However, the Court finds adverse inference instructions to be warranted to the 

extent Defendants’ spoliation affects Riley’s ability to prove her claim. The Parties shall 

submit proposed adverse inference instructions with the other jury instructions to be filed 

before trial. 

 4. Attorneys’ Fees 

 Riley also requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection 

with seeking the spoliated evidence and incurred in connection with this motion. “Under 

its ‘inherent powers,’ a district court may also award sanctions in the form of attorneys’ 

fees against a party or counsel who acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 

oppressive reasons.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 961 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

“Before awarding such sanctions, the court must make an express finding that the 

sanctioned party’s behavior constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “A party demonstrates bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or 

 

19 Because Riley’s tortious interference and § 1983 claims rely on some overlapping factually allegations (that Defendants threatened YHS with economic harm 

unless YHS terminated Riley), dispositive factual findings for the tortious interference claim could be used collaterally to resolve disputed issues of fact in Riley’s § 1983 claim. Riley, however, has not asked for sanctions in relation to her § 1983 claim. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 35 of 38
- 36 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

hampering enforcement of a court order.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The bad faith 

requirement ensures that the district court’s exercise of its broad power is properly 

restrained, and preserves a balance between protecting the court’s integrity and 

encouraging meritorious arguments.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

“Additionally, the amount of monetary sanctions must be reasonable.” Id. (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). The Court has already found that Defendants acted in 

bad faith. Accordingly, Riley is entitled to her reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in 

connection with this motion and seeking spoliated evidence. 

 The Parties are directed to confer in good faith to resolve any disputes concerning 

the amount of reasonable expenses and fees. See L.R. Civ. 54.2(d)(1). If the Parties are 

unable to agree, Riley may file a motion pursuant to Local Rule 54.2. Any such motion 

shall be filed, with a supporting memorandum, on or before March 28, 2014, with the 

response and reply briefs due in accordance with the time periods provided in Local Rule 

54.2(b)(3) and (4).

 B. Defendants’ Motion 

 Defendants’ Response (Doc. 285) to Riley’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 271) includes a Cross-Motion for Discovery Sanctions. (Doc. 285 at 23–

25). Defendants’ allege that Riley deleted numerous emails that may have been relevant 

to this litigation and even closed an email account. (Id.). Defendants’ argue that if the 

Court evaluates Riley’s conduct through the same lens it uses to evaluate Defendants’ 

conduct, then Riley’s actions warrant “either default or an adverse inference, and 

attorneys’ fees.” (Id. at 24). 

 As explained above, 

[a] party seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence must 

prove the following elements: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it when it was 

destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was 

accompanied by a ‘culpable state of mind;’ and (3) the 

evidence that was destroyed or altered was ‘relevant’ to the 

claims or defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence[.] 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 36 of 38
- 37 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1005. Here, Defendants cannot be entitled to sanctions 

against Riley because Defendants have made no attempt to satisfy the third element, 

relevance. (See Doc. 285 at 23–25; Doc. 297). Even assuming that Defendants’ factual 

allegations regarding Riley’s conduct are true, Defendants have not made any showing 

regarding what, if any, evidence possibly could have been lost that may be relevant to 

Riley’s claims or Defendants’ defenses. Indeed, Defendants have not even speculated as 

to what relevant evidence may have been discovered in Riley’s email. Accordingly, the 

Court denies Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Discovery Sanctions (Doc. 285). 

IV. CROSS-MOTIONS TO STRIKE 

Both Parties have cross-motions to strike various portions of the several 

statements of fact submitted to support their motions for summary judgment and crossmotions for discovery sanctions. Riley moves (Doc. 296) to strike Defendants’ 

“Controverting Statement of Facts Regarding Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of Facts in 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 288) because “it is not 

authorized by L.R. Civ. 56.1.” (Doc. 296 at 1). Additionally, Riley “requests that the 

Court strike legal arguments that Defendants improperly raised in their oppositions 

[(Docs. 267, 286)] to Plaintiff’s statement of facts.” (Id.). Responding that what’s good 

for the goose is good for the gander, Defendants filed a Cross-Motion to Strike Riley’s 

“Response to Defendants’ Supplemental Statement of Facts in Support of Defendants’ 

Cross Motion for Sanctions” (Doc. 292) and various “legal arguments” couched as 

“facts” in Riley’s other statements of fact (Docs. 280, 292, 294-1, 295, 295-2). 

 First, the Court notes that it has not relied on either Parties’ objected-to statements 

of facts (Docs. 292, 296) when reaching its decisions on the four summary judgment and 

sanctions motions. Therefore, whether or not either filing is authorized by the Local 

Rules is moot. Second, to the extent that both Parties base their cross-motions to strike 

on the fear that this Court will be unduly swayed by the opposing party’s legal arguments 

couched as factual contentions, the Court reminds both parties that the Court is fully 

capable of delineating between factual statements supported by the record and arguments, 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 37 of 38
- 38 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

no matter their nom de guerre. As such, the Parties have no cause for dread; the Court 

has not misconstrued any legal arguments contained in the multiple statements of fact as 

factual evidence of a genuine dispute over any material facts. In sum, the Court finds that 

the quantity and form of the Parties’ various statements of fact has not prejudiced either 

party. Accordingly, both Parties’ Motions to Strike (Docs. 296, 301) are denied. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 266) 

and Riley’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 271) are DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Riley’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions (Doc. 

271) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth in this Order. As set forth in 

this Order, the Parties shall submit proposed adverse inference instructions with the other 

jury instructions to be filed before trial. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties are directed to confer in good faith 

to resolve any disputes concerning the amount of reasonable expenses and fees related to 

Defendants’ spoliation. See L.R. Civ. 54.2(d)(1). If the Parties are unable to agree, Riley 

may file a motion pursuant to Local Rule 54.2. Any such motion shall be filed, with a 

supporting memorandum, on or before March 28, 2014, with the response and reply 

briefs due in accordance with the time periods provided in Local Rule 54.2(b)(3) and (4). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Discovery 

Sanctions (Doc. 285) is DENIED. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Riley’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 296) and 

Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Strike (Doc. 301) are DENIED. 

 Dated this 18th day of February, 2014. 

Case 3:11-cv-08123-JAT Document 312 Filed 02/19/14 Page 38 of 38