Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03237/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03237-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE KAUFMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE & 

WAREHOUSE UNION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03237-JST 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Re: ECF No. 35

Before the Court is Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union (“ILWU”) 

and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 34’s (“Local 34”) Motion for Sanctions. 

The Court will deny the motion.1 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Ronnie Kaufman and Alphonce Jackson, proceeding pro se, brought claims 

against Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union and ILWU Local 34 for 

violations of section 501 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and 

section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. See Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 

18. Plaintiffs primarily alleged that Defendants breached the duty of fair representation and 

fiduciary duty by failing to preserve seniority rights and vesting rights in certain clerk planner 

jobs. Id. Defendants answered the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, including 

Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust internal and administrative remedies and the statute of limitations. 

ECF No. 20. 

Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that summary judgment 

 

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The Court does not require further briefing in resolving the Motion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 

request to continue the Motion and extend the briefing schedule, ECF No. 38, is denied.

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was appropriate because the claims were untimely, Plaintiffs did not exhaust internal and 

administrative remedies, and the claims failed on the merits. ECF No. 22. The Court granted the 

motion, ECF No. 31, and entered judgment for Defendants, ECF No. 33. The Clerk of the Court 

taxed $1,885.80 in costs. ECF No. 37. 

Defendants now bring the present Motion for Sanctions. ECF No. 35. Defendants request 

that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1927 and the court’s inherent authority, the Court levy 

sanctions against Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs’ claims were procedurally improper, substantively 

frivolous, and pursued in bad faith. Id. Defendants request an award of $57,821.25, representing 

the attorneys’ fees and costs expended in defending this suit since Defendants answered the 

Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 7; Morton Decl., ECF No. 35-1 at 6. Alternatively, 

Defendants request $8,577.50—the fees incurred since Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the 

Motion for Summary Judgment. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court derives its authority to sanction a party for improper conduct from three primary 

sources: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, (2) 28 U.S.C. section 1927, and (3) the Court’s 

inherent authority. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.2d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants request that the 

Court impose sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. 

28 U.S.C. section 1927 states:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court 

of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 

required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 

expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 

conduct.

Before imposing sanctions pursuant to section 1927, a court must make a finding of 

subjective bad faith. Trulis v. Martin, 107 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995). “Bad faith is present 

when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or argues a meritorious 

claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Id. (quoting New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. 

Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989)). Section 1927 sanctions may be imposed upon a 

pro se plaintiff. See Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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The court also has the “inherent power to levy sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, for 

‘willful disobedience of a court order . . . or when the losing party has acted in bad faith, 

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting Roadway 

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)). Under the court’s inherent power, however, 

sanctions are only available “if the court specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad 

faith.” Id. at 994. Conduct that is tantamount to bad faith includes “recklessness when combined 

with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Id. The 

inherent power to sanction is meant to “vindicat[e] judicial authority.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 U.S. 32, 34 (1991). “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with 

restraint and discretion.” Id. at 44.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs pursued their claims without attempting to address the 

defects that Defendants raised in their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint or Motion for 

Summary Judgment. ECF No. 35 at 4–5. Defendants maintain that the Court should award 

attorneys’ fees and costs because Plaintiffs persisted in litigating the case even after Defendants 

provided plainly meritorious defenses. Id. at 6. 

Defendants cite to Pascual v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 4:13-CV-02005-KAW, 2014 WL 

582264 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) to support their position. In Pascual, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit 

against a bank regarding the origination of a home loan, and the bank filed a motion to dismiss, 

arguing that the claims were time-barred and preempted. Id. at *1. The plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint, but the amended complaint did not address the statute of limitations or preemption 

issues. Id. at *2. Plaintiff’s counsel represented clients in 16 other cases against the same 

defendants, and preemption and the statute of limitations defenses were raised in motions to 

dismiss in all of the cases. Id. at *3. Three of the cases settled but the remaining cases resulted in 

dismissals. Id. at *8. Two such dismissals were with prejudice because of preemption because 

claims were time-barred. Id. The court concluded that based on the attorney’s experience, the 

plaintiff’s counsel had no reason to think that defendants would not raise such arguments in 

responding to the amended complaint. Id. The court found that in filing the first amended 

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complaint, plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings such that 

sanctions under section 1927 would be appropriate. Id.

Wages v. IRS is also instructive. In that case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the imposition of 

section 1927 sanctions against a pro se plaintiff. 915 F.2d at 1235–36. The plaintiff’s amended 

complaint “did not materially differ” from the one the district court had dismissed for failing to 

state a claim. Id. at 1235. Additionally, the plaintiff “continually” moved for alternations in the 

district court’s original judgment “despite that court’s clear unwillingness to change its mind,” 

which evidenced bad faith in unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings. Id.

Although Defendants listed their affirmative defenses in their answer and articulated them 

in their summary judgment motion, and although Defendants ultimately prevailed on those 

defenses, the Court nonetheless concludes that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs acted in 

bad faith. Defenses that would appear meritorious to a lawyer may not be as clearly recognizable 

to a pro se litigant, particularly where the case turns on procedural grounds. See Coleman v. 

Teamsters Local 853, No. 12-05981 SC, 2013 WL 3790900, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013)

(declining to award sanctions under Rule 11 because plaintiff proceeded pro se and required 

“more leniency”). Nor does the Court find that Plaintiffs unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied 

the proceedings in this case. This case is unlike Pascual, where the plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint that did not address the deficiencies raised by the first motion to dismiss and where 

motions to dismiss in other cases filed by plaintiff’s counsel raised the same deficiencies. Nor is 

this case like Wages, where the pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint did not address deficiencies 

identified by the Court.

Finally, the imposition of sanctions has a chilling effect, Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 

No. C-09-03596 CRB, 2014 WL 3703993, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2014); Passillas v. 

McDonald’s Corp., No. CV 88-4065 FFF (EX), 1989 WL 418779, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1989) 

aff’d sub nom. Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1991), and a court should 

therefore avoid imposing them unless the misconduct is clear. For the foregoing reasons, the facts 

in this case do not rise to that level. 

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 24, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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