Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02444/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Crawford; et al, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Phoenix; et al, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2444-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #50).

The Court now rules on the motion.

I. Factual Background

In Spring 2004, Plaintiffs Tracy and Kevin Crawford placed their then 16-year-old

daughter, Plaintiff Krystal Crawford, in therapy for cutting herself and other issues. On June

13, 2004, while in therapy, Krystal told her mother that her father Kevin had removed her

panties on a single occasion and that he had licked and rubbed her vaginal area. Krystal told

her mom that this incident occurred while Tracy was in the hospital for the birth of Krystal's

younger sister, Kirsten Crawford. The next day, Krystal and her mom met with Dr.

Lauritsen. Krystal repeated her story to the doctor. 

Dr. Lauritsen reported the allegation of abuse to the Arizona Department of

Economic Security/Child Protective Services ("CPS"). CPS assigned the case to case worker

Brenda Cagle. Ms. Cagle contacted the Phoenix Police Department ("PPD") to start a

Case 2:05-cv-02444-JAT Document 66 Filed 04/17/07 Page 1 of 7
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criminal investigation regarding the allegation. The PPD assigned Defendant Detective

Maria Acosta as the case agent for the PPD's criminal investigation of Plaintiff Kevin

Crawford. 

Tracy and Krystal went to Childhelp on June 18, 2006. They remained there for

seven hours. At one point, Tracy Crawford called her husband in a recorded phone call and

told him that she believed Krystal was telling the truth about the abuse. On that same day,

another detective interviewed the other Crawford children. 

Also while at Childhelp on June 18, Tracy Crawford related a story to Detective

Acosta regarding an incident involving Kari Crawford. Mrs. Crawford told Detective Acosta

that when her 13-year-old daughter Kari was three or four years old, Kari reported that her

father had "taken her panties off and was starting to rub her" in private areas. Kari had no

memory of her father touching her inappropriately. 

On June 22, 2004, CPS officials and Detective Acosta advised the Crawfords that

Kevin Crawford could have no physical contact with his children during the course of the

investigation. They told him that either he had to remove himself from the family home or

that CPS would remove the children from the home. Mr. Crawford chose to leave the home.

On that same day, Tracy Crawford allegedly told Detective Acosta that Mrs.

Crawford's earlier statement that Kevin Crawford had rubbed Kari was inaccurate. Later, at

her deposition, Tracy Crawford explained that her highly emotional state on June 18 caused

her to make a rubbing allegation that did not occur and that Kari had never reported to her

mother. Mrs. Crawford now claims that the actual incident likely involved Kari's exploratory

play or "humping" discovered by Kevin Crawford. 

Also on that day, Tracy Crawford told Detective Acosta that Krystal's allegations

could not be true because on the date Krystal said Mr. Crawford abused her, Mr. Crawford

was at the hospital with his wife. Mr. Crawford allegedly stayed by his wife's side at the

hospital from her admission until her release because he obsessively feared the hospital

would lose his baby or switch his baby for another baby. According to Tracy Crawford and

her father, Kevin Crawford remained by Tracy's side during the births of all their children.

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Plaintiffs claim that Detective Acosta did not take any action on the investigation

from June 22, 2004 to July 21, 2004, despite Plaintiffs giving her exculpatory evidence.

They also allege that Detective Acosta inconsistently described her progress in preparing her

investigative report and told Tracy Crawford that she had lost part of the report in a computer

failure. Detective Acosta allegedly also told Tracy Crawford that Detective Acosta didn't

believe her report and opinions had any bearing on CPS's decision to allow Kevin Crawford

to return home.

On August 2, 2006, Krystal's counselor, the same one who originally contacted CPS

about the alleged molestation, sent a letter to CPS stating that he believed Kevin Crawford

should return home. Rhonda Cash of CPS made the decision to allow Kevin Crawford to

return home without consulting the PPD. Kevin Crawford returned to his home on August

2, 2004. The Maricopa County Attorney's Office decided not to file charges against Mr.

Crawford. Mr. Crawford lived outside the family home for approximately six weeks. 

II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. State Law Claims

Krystal's counselor reported Krystal's allegations of sexual abuse to CPS pursuant to

A.R.S. §13-3620(A). A.R.S. §13-3620(A) reads, in pertinent part:

A. Any person who reasonably believes that a minor is or has

been the victim of physical injury, abuse, Child abuse, a

reportable offense or neglect that appears to have been inflicted

on the minor by other than accidental means or that is not

explained by the available medical history as being accidental

in nature or . . . shall immediately report or cause reports to be

made of this information to a peace officer or to child protective

services in the department of economic security, except if the

report concerns a person who does not have care, custody or

control of the minor, the report shall be made to a peace officer

only. . .. For the purposes of this subsection, "person" means:

1. Any physician, physician's assistant, optometrist, dentist,

osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, behavioral health

professional, nurse, psychologist, counselor or social worker

who develops the reasonable belief in the course of treating a

patient . . . .

Subsection J of the same statute provides immunity to persons who subsequently investigate

the allegations of abuse. A.R.S. §13-3620(J) provides: 

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A person who furnishes a report, information or records required

or authorized under this section, or a person who participates in

a judicial or administrative proceeding or investigation resulting

from a report, information or records required or authorized

under this section, is immune from any civil or criminal liability

by reason of that action unless the person acted with malice or

unless the person has been charged with or is suspected of

abusing or neglecting the child or children in question.

Defendants here participated in the investigation of the sexual abuse allegations

against Kevin Crawford. They claim that A.R.S. §13-3620(J) therefore immunizes them

from liability for Plaintiffs' state law claims. A.R.S. §13-3620(J) does provide immunity for

investigators, but only to the extent the investigators acted without malice. Arizona statutory

law defines malice as "a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, or an intent to do a

wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." A.R.S. §1-215(2).

No presumption of malice exists in this case. Plaintiffs therefore must produce

sufficient proof of malice to defeat summary judgment. In their Response, Plaintiffs offered

only the following regarding the alleged maliciousness of Defendants: 

Instead, Plaintiffs allege liability for the human Defendants'

investigative conduct (constituting inaction) for 3-4 weeks

which included conduct after clear exculpatory evidence was

first made available just days after the police investigation began

. . .. 

The facts of the instant case reflect that the primary investigator

(Defendant Detective Acosta) and her supervisors (Defendants

Bell, Sanders and Harris) knew PPD Operations Orders were

violated when Defendant Detective Acosta failed to advise of

the exculpatory evidence first given to her on June 22, 2004 and

her 3-4 weeks of inaction relating to corroboration of same in

violation of PPD Operations Orders 2.2.2.E(2), 2.3.1.A and

2.3.1.B(1), (2), (3). Reasonable jurors could find that the

manner of Detective Acosta's unjustified delay, during which the

family unit remained torn apart, was intentional and aimed to

injuring the adults she perceived as criminals. Reasonable

jurors could determine such intent also extended and/or

transferred to the children.

(Doc. #58, p.17).

Notably, Plaintiffs do not make a single citation to the statement of facts or the record

in support of their argument. Local Civil Rule 56.1(e) states that a memorandum of law filed

in opposition to a motion for summary must include citations to the specific paragraph in the

statement of facts that supports the factual assertion made in the memorandum. It is not this

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Court's job "to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact." Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). The Court relies "on the

nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment." Id. Plaintiffs cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment with mere

speculation and allegation. Nelson v. Pima Cmty College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.

1996) (stating, "[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes

of summary judgment.").

Although without proper citation, Plaintiffs do argue that Acosta's failure to advise

of exculpatory evidence and her inactivity for three to four weeks create an issue of fact as

to malice. Even if the Court assumes that Detective Acosta told Tracey Crawford that

Detective Acosta would not include any of the hospital stay information or other

"exculpatory" evidence in her police report, the record shows that Detective Acosta did in

fact supplement her report by including the hospital information and other information Mrs.

Crawford provided in the June 22 phone call. (Doc. #59, Exhibit 1). Accordingly, failure

to include the "exculpatory" evidence in the police report cannot serve as a basis for denying

summary judgment. That leaves only Plaintiffs' allegations of delay to support a finding of

malice.

Plaintiffs claim that Detective Acosta took no action on the Crawford case for three

to four weeks, despite having "exculpatory" evidence. The Court knows nothing about the

caseloads of Detective Acosta or her supervisors, but can imagine they oversee many cases.

Nor can the Court speak to the length of time police should spend investigating serious

allegations of sexual abuse. Even assuming Detective Acosta should have taken more action

on the investigation during the three to four week period, however, the Court does not find

that the delay in any way indicates malice. Plaintiffs simply have not pointed to any record

evidence that would permit a jury to make a finding of malice. The Court therefore grants

summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' state law claims. See L.A.R. v. Ludwig, 821

P.2d 291, 295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (granting summary judgment to counselor on child abuse

reporting claims where no evidence that counselor acted with malice).

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B. Federal Civil Rights Claims

1. Section 1983 Claim

Children and parents have a constitutional right to one another's company. Mabe v.

San Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants deprived them of that right in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Defendants argue that no constitutional deprivation occurred; that, in any case, the individual

officers have immunity; and that Plaintiffs have introduced no evidence of a policy or custom

of constitutional violations. 

A §1983 claim has two elements: "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed

by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived a person of

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."

Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). It is

undisputed that the police did not remove Mr. Crawford from his home. He voluntarily left.

Consequently, no constitutional violation can attach to Mr. Crawford's initial departure from

the home. 

Plaintiffs seem to argue that Defendants constructively removed him from the home.

True, Detective Acosta and Ms. Cagle advised Mr. Crawford that he would either have to

leave the home or CPS would remove the children from the home. But, as Defendants note,

people can waive their constitutional rights. United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 553 (9th

Cir. 1989) (stating that forcing a choice between asserting a constitutional right and a

compromise, while difficult for the decision maker, is not unconstitutional). The Court

appreciates that Mr. Crawford faced a difficult choice, but he did make the choice. 

If Mr. Crawford's departure from the home did not trigger any constitutional

violations, did the length of the investigation? Mr. Crawford resided outside the home for

approximately six weeks. Did Mr. Crawford have a constitutional right to a speedier

investigation? Plaintiffs have cited no cases that so hold. The PPD was investigating

allegations of sexual abuse of two different children. The Court cannot say that six weeks

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is too much time to spend on such serious allegations. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs

had a constitutional right to a speedier investigation. 

Because no constitutional violation occurred, the Court will grant summary judgment

to Defendants on Plaintiffs' §1983 claim.

2. §1985

In Count Six of their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged causes of action under both 42

U.S.C. §1983 and §1985. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the §1983 claim, but

made no mention of the §1985 claim. The §1985 claim therefore still stands, and the Court

will treat the present motion as one for partial summary judgment.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#50) shall be treated as a motion for partial summary judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING partial summary judgment to Defendants

on Counts One through Five of the Complaint and on the 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim of Count

Six. Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. §1985 claim still stands.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2007.

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