Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01659/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01659-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff included a class of defendants of “unknown parties” including officials at

NSA/CSS, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, DEA and local police departments.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Renee Pittman Mitchell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

National Security Agency; et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-1659-PHX-JAT

ORDER

On October 23, 2009, this Court denied Plaintiff’s various requests for equitable

relief. On October 26, 2009, Plaintiff again moved for equitable relief. For the reasons

stated in the October 23, 2009 order, that request is denied.

In this case, Plaintiff sued at least 10 Defendants.1

 Of the identifiable Defendants, six

have moved to dismiss. It is unclear whether the rest have been properly served. Among the

motions to dismiss is the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security and

National Security Agency’s (“United States Defendants”) motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. #43. The Court will consider the jurisdictional motion first.

Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Market Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir.

Case 2:09-cv-01659-JAT Document 53 Filed 12/18/09 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

2003) (“inquiring whether the court has jurisdiction is a federal judge’s first duty in every

case.”).

The United States Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

based on the substantiality doctrine. Under the substantiality doctrine, a federal court lacks

jurisdiction over claims that are so insubstantial that they are devoid of merit, or if the claims

are obviously frivolous. See generally Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974),

superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175 (3rd

Cir. 2001). In other words, “[U]nder the substantiality doctrine, the district court lacks

jurisdiction when the question presented is too insubstantial to consider.” Cook v. Peter

Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, as the United States

Defendants noted, because they are raising a factual attack to jurisdiction, Plaintiff, as the

party invoking this Court’s jurisdiction, must present evidence establishing subject matter

jurisdiction. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Further, this Court does not have to presume Plaintiff’s allegations

to be true and can resolve factual disputes. Id.

On October 23, 2009, this Court warned Plaintiff that if she did not respond to the

motions to dismiss, the Court would treat her failure to respond to be consent to the motions

being granted. On October 26, 2009, Plaintiff filed a document titled “response” to motion

to dismiss, which the Court has treated as a response to all the motions to dismiss. 

Plaintiff’s response cites no cases and no statutes. It attaches no evidence. Instead,

it continues Plaintiff’s diary-like account of what she believes in happening in her life. For

example, she states, “There is nothing written to the Court that that [sic] is not view [sic]

beforehand by [Defendants’] use of the technology inside my residence as I type Court

documents on my laptop for submission to the Court. The scales of justice are not titled in

my favor as a result of [Defendants’] previous viewing of all legal documents as they are

typed as these individuals blatantly disregard of [sic] my rights.” Doc. #51 at 5. These

allegations appear to be a continuation of Plaintiff’s allegations that some government

agency is using satellite or other technology to monitor Plaintiff in her home, and on her

Case 2:09-cv-01659-JAT Document 53 Filed 12/18/09 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Because the Court is dismissing the entire complaint based on the substantiality

doctrine, the Court has not considered the United States Defendants’ alternative arguments

for dismissal such as immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

3

 Additionally, because this dismissal is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and

not failure to state a claim, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. See Schreiber

Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating district

court must give leave to amend once under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) if dismissal

is for failure to state a claim, unless amendment could not cure the deficiency). 

- 3 -

phone, and to speak directly into her mind. Doc. #46 at 3-5. In her response, Plaintiff

continues that, “I stand by the fact that the Discovery process will reveal the dominant theme

of my complaint which is based on the personal intrusiveness and approved use of the

technology as directed at me.” Doc. #51 at 4.

The Court agrees with the United States Defendants that the claims in the complaint,

as continued in the request for injunctive relief (Doc. #46) and the response to the motion to

dismiss (Doc. #51) are wholly insubstantial. See Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (claims are patently insubstantial if they are basically fictitious; for example, claims

of bizarre conspiracy theories, fantastic government manipulations of the plaintiff’s mind or

will, or any type of supernatural intervention.). Because the Court finds the entire complaint

in this case to be insubstantial, the Court will dismiss this entire case, for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Cook, 775 F.2d at 1035.2

 Further, as to all other Defendants, the

Court will also dismiss the case, regardless of whether they have been served or moved to

dismiss on this basis, because the legal result as to all Defendants would be the same. See

Abigninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A [d]istrict [c]ourt

may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to

dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants.”).

3

 

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. #51) is

denied.

Case 2:09-cv-01659-JAT Document 53 Filed 12/18/09 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (Doc. #43) is granted and

this case is dismissed, with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the

substantiality doctrine as to all Defendants, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly (all remaining motions to dismiss are denied as moot).

DATED this 18th day of December, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-01659-JAT Document 53 Filed 12/18/09 Page 4 of 4