Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00447/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00447-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH PUCKETT, )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

JUDGE JONES, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 05-CV-00447-REC-SMS 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS (DOC. 3)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS OF SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

(DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO SEND

PLAINTIFF A BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

COMPLAINT FORM 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner at the Fresno County Jail

proceeding pro se with an action for damages and other relief

concerning alleged civil rights violations. The matter has been

referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)

and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to

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 Plaintiff is advised that the court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious,"

that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). The court will direct the United States Marshal to serve

plaintiff’s complaint only after the court has screened the complaint and determined that it contains cognizable

claims for relief against the named defendants. 

2 The statutory filing fee for all but habeas corpus actions is $250.00. 

28 U.S.C. § 1914, as amended effective February 7, 2005.

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proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), plaintiff is required to

pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action.2 Because

Plaintiff has no funds, no initial partial filing fee will be

assessed by this order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff will be

obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account. These

payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk

of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds

$10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

II. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

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faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir.

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984). 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

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or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

Here, Plaintiff sues Judge Jones, Attorney Magill, Judge

Kapetan, the District Attorney’s Office, and the Superior Court.

He seeks damages and equitable relief. He complains that he was

convicted in 1996 of grand theft, apparently in the Superior

Court of San Francisco. Subsequently, he entered into a plea

bargain in December 2004 in the Fresno Superior Court that

included pleading to a strike under California’s Three Strikes

Law, namely, a robbery that did not constitute part of

Plaintiff’s criminal record. Plaintiff complains that the

District Attorney wrongfully filed the strike allegation, and

that it caused him pain, suffering, and emotional distress. In

March 2005 Plaintiff sought to withdraw the guilty plea, which

precipitated Judge Kapetan’s appointing a public defender, which

Plaintiff alleged was a violation of his rights.

A. Defendants’ Conduct

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] 

 . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution. . .

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shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that

defendants acted under color of state law at the time the act

complained of was committed and that the defendants deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

Further, the statute plainly requires that there be an

actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. 

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit

has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to link each of the named

defendants with some affirmative act or omission that resulted in

an alleged deprivation of federally protected rights. Although

the complaint must be dismissed, Plaintiff will be given an

opportunity to amend to state a claim. 

B. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff appears to allege that Judge Jones’s conduct in

accepting Plaintiff’s plea and sentencing Plaintiff resulted in a

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violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Further, it appears that he is

alleging that Judge Kapetan’s conduct in appointing a public

defender was a violation of his constitutional rights. 

Absolute judicial immunity from damage actions under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 extends to judges for acts performed in their

official capacities and to officers whose functions bear a close

association to the judicial process. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d

155, 156 (9th Cir. 1986); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075

(9th Cir. 1986). It appears that the actions of which Plaintiff

complains are within the scope of judicial immunity.

C. Prosecutorial Immunity

State prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability

for acts taken in their official capacity that are closely

associated with the judicial process, such as initiating

prosecution and presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-431 (1976); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d

1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff names the District Attorney’s office as a

defendant, apparently with respect to charging decisions. Such

conduct would constitute conduct in the prosecutor’s official

capacity of prosecuting the case such that absolute immunity

would attach. 

D. Invalidation of Plaintiff’s Conviction

Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

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into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488.

Plaintiff has not alleged that the underlying conviction or

sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated by a state

tribunal. Accordingly, the claim should be dismissed. 

E. Defendant Magill

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead

(1) that the defendant acted under color of state law and (2)

that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are

not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939

F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff names attorney Magill as a defendant. It appears

that Magill was acting as a private attorney in defendant

Plaintiff in the criminal action. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

showing how Defendant Magill was acting under color of state law.

Even if Magill was acting as Plaintiff’s public defender,

Plaintiff nevertheless has failed to allege facts showing how

Defendant Magill has acted under color of state law. In order to

recover under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and prove that

Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of

a right secured by the Constitution or federal statute. KarimPanahi v.Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). It is established that a public defender does not act

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under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981); Rivera v.

Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).

F. Malice

It is not clear, but it is possible that Plaintiff is trying

to relitigate issues determined in a prior action, including

actions previously pending in this Court, such as Puckett v.

Fresno Superior Court, CIV F 03 6161 REC DLB; Puckett v.

Winchester, CV F 96-5207 OWW LJO, Puckett v. Hennessey, CV F 96-

6057 AWI SMS, Puckett v. Duncan, CV F 98-5845 OWW HGB. If this is

the case, is may be that Plaintiff’s complaint is malicious and

should be dismissed. However, because Plaintiff’s complaint is so

unclear, it is not possible to determine if the complaint is

malicious. 

III. Dismissal with Leave to Amend the Complaint

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim against the Defendants and has failed to plead

facts demonstrating jurisdiction in this Court. However, it is

possible that Plaintiff can allege a set of facts, consistent

with the allegations, in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies of

this complaint. Failure to cure the deficiencies will result in

dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

In addition, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended

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complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis IS GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff IS OBLIGATED to pay the statutory filing

fee of $250.00 for this action. No initial filing fee will be

required. All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with

this court’s order to the Fresno County Jail filed concurrently

herewith; and

3. Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED; and

4. The Clerk IS DIRECTED to send to Plaintiff a blank

form for a civil rights complaint; and

5. Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies

with the requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of

Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number

assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint";

Plaintiff must file an original and one copy of the amended

complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance

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with this order will be considered to be a failure to comply with

an order of the Court pursuant to Local Rule 11-110 and will

result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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