Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01580/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW MCFADDEN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv1580 JM(DHB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

v.

CITY OF EL CENTRO,

Defendant.

Defendant City of El Centro (“El Centro”) moves to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Andrew McFadden opposes the motion. 

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this matter is appropriate for decision without oral

argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion to dismiss the

Title VII retaliation claim, declines to reach the state law claims, and grants Plaintiff

ten days leave to amend from the date of entry of this order. 

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2013, Plaintiff commenced thisfederal question action alleging three

claims for relief: (1) retaliation in violation of Title VII and California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) wrongful termination in violation of

public policy; and (3) failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation or harassment in

violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §12940 etseq. On September 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed the

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and added a fourth cause of action for violation of

California Civil Code §56.20. 

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Plaintiff, an African-American male, began working as a police officer with El

Centro in 1989. (FAC ¶17). Between 2002 and 2010, Plaintiff was allegedly subjected

to discriminatory, hostile, and harassing employment practices by employees of the El

Centro Police Department. (FAC ¶18). In 2009 and in 2010, Plaintiff filed charges of

racial discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against several

El Centro police officers and El Centro. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit against

El Centro “alleging race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and

deprivation of civil rights.” (FAC ¶19). After he filed the suit, Plaintiff alleges that the

acts of discrimination “escalated.” (FAC ¶21).

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In January 2011,Plaintiff wassubjected to an “administrative investigation” into

his driving practices. The administrative investigation was allegedly based upon a

citizen’s complaint about the driving practices of the El Centro Police Department in

general. (FAC ¶22). Plaintiff was allegedly the only target of the investigation. (FAC

¶22). On March 29, 2011, Sergeant John Seaman completed his report and

recommended that Plaintiff’s employment with El Centro Police Department should

be terminated. (FAC ¶23). 

Despite two previous Fitness for Duty examinations, El Centro requested that

Plaintiff participate in another Fitness for Duty examination. On September 12, 2011,

Plaintiff traveled to Los Angeles “to attend a Fitness for Duty assessment as demanded

by Defendant’s Human Resources Director.” (FAC ¶25). Upon arrival to the doctor’s

office, Plaintiff was instructed to sign a medical release form. The doctor would not

perform the fitness exam unless Plaintiff signed the release. Plaintiff was unwilling to

On September 26, 2012, Judge William Q. Hayes granted summary judgment

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in favor of El Centro and against Plaintiff on all discrimination claims in that action. 

McFadden v. City of El Centro, Case No. 10cv2042 WQH(WMC). Applying the

McDonnell Douglas formulation, Judge Hayes found that Plaintiff failed to establish

a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation. Judge Hayes also found that

Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) claims or the civil rights claim brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. 

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sign the release. On December 22, 2011, Plaintiff’s employment with El Centro Police

was terminated based upon the investigation into Plaintiff’s driving practices and his

failure to complete the Fitness for Duty test. (FAC ¶26). 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

extraordinary cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Courtsshould grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should dismiss a

complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are insufficient “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly suggest[]” that the

pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (under Rule 8(a),

well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the mere possibility of

misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at

678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear on the face of the

complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material in testing its legal

adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991). The

courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of the complaint. 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.

1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

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Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Title VII Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show

that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) defendants took an adverse employment

action against him, and (3) a causal link exists between his protected activity and the

adverse employment action. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646

(9th Cir. 2003).

Protected Activity

Plaintiff adequately alleges that he was engaged in a protected activity. Plaintiff

alleges that he filed union grievances between 2002 and 2010, he filed charges of racial

discrimination with DFEH in 2009, he filed charges with the EEOC in 2010, and he

filed a civil lawsuit in federal court against El Centro alleging claims for violation of

the ADA, Title VII, FEHA, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 on

September 30, 2010. (FAC ¶18). There is no doubt that filing grievances and pursuing

constitutional and statutory remedies are protected activities.

In sum, this element is satisfied.

Adverse Employment Action

Plaintiff argues that he suffered four distinct adverse employment actions. First,

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a 90-day administrative investigation into his

driving practices. Plaintiff alleges that El Centro received a citizen’s complaint

regarding the driving practices of El Centro police officers and that he was a subject

of the investigation. (FAC ¶22). The court concludes that an investigation into the

driving practices of Plaintiff, standing alone, does not constitute an adverse

employment decision. See Nichols v. Southern Ill. University-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d

772, 786 (7th Cir. 2007) (placing a police officer on paid administrative leave pending

an internal investigation is not a materially adverse employment action).

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Second, Plaintiff contends that the March 29, 2011 investigative report -

recommending that Plaintiff be terminated - constitutes an adverse employment action

because the report contained a negative review of Plaintiff’s driving performance, a

negative evaluation of Plaintiff’s character, and a recommendation that Plaintiff’s

employment with El Centro be terminated. (FAC ¶18, 23, 24). Plaintiff argues that the

investigative report was used to “detrimentally alter the terms and conditions of

employment.” (Oppo. at p.6:3-4). The court notes that an investigative report

recommending an employee’s discharge and acted upon by management constitutes an

adverse employment action. Here, however, the investigative report standing alone

does not in itself constitute an adverse employment action because it had no tangible

effect until it was acted upon at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge on December 22, 2011. 

See Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir.1999) (a

negative performance review does not in itself constitute an adverse employment

action, as it has no tangible effect upon the recipient's employment). The court

concludes that the FAC’s allegations concerning the investigative report are

insufficient to establish an adverse employment action as of March 29, 2011. 

Third, Plaintiff contends that he was required to travel to Los Angeles on

September 12, 2011 to complete a Fitness for Duty examination. Plaintiff alleges that

he traveled to Los Angeles but upon arrival at the doctor’s office, he was required to

sign a mandatory authorization and release of medical information form. (FAC ¶25). 

Plaintiff felt “uncomfortable” with some of the language in the authorization form and

refused to sign the document. The doctor then refused to performthe evaluation unless

Plaintiff signed the authorization. Without more, the court concludes that the

requirement that Plaintiff submit to a fitness exam is not actionable. Plaintiff argues

that he is capable of alleging additional facts demonstrating that the fitness exam

constitutes an adverse employment action. (Oppo. at p.6:22-24). As leave to amend

is to be freely given, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the court grants Plaintiff ten days leave

to amend from the date of entry of this order.

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Fourth, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s termination on December 22, 2011

constitutes an adverse employment decision. 

The Causal Connection

This element requires Plaintiff to allege a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646. The

court concludes that the requisite causal connection allegations are insufficient to state

a claim. Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected activities from 2002 through

2010 by filing union grievances and claims of discrimination, including the September

30, 2010 filing of his race, disability, and retaliation complaint brought pursuant to

Title VII, FEHA, the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. §1983. (10cv2042, Ct. Dkt. 1). 

Plaintiff appears to heavily rely upon the temporal closeness of the alleged

protected activities which formed the basis for his earlier dismissed action (10cv2042

WQH) and his discharge to establish the requisite causal connection. See Passantino

v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000)

(noting that causation can be inferred from timing alone). The most recent alleged

protected activity occurred on September 30, 2010 when Plaintiff filed his earlier

discrimination lawsuit, and his discharge occurred on December 22, 2011. This 15-

month passage of time is insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. As

noted in Paluck v. Gooding Ruber Co., 221 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000), “in order to

support an inference of retaliatory motive, the termination must have occurred fairly

soon after the employee’s protected expression.” Id. 1009-10 (one year period of time

is too long to raise an inference of discrimination). Even entertaining the questionable

assumption that the issuance of the investigative report on March 29, 2011 could be

deemed an adverse employment action, it was not acted upon for nine months, a period

of time too attenuated to establish the requisite causal connection.

In sum, the court dismisses the retaliation claim with 10 days leave to amend

from the date of entry of this order. 

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The State Law Claims

The court declines to address the state law claims until Plaintiff states a federal

claim. As this court’s jurisdiction is based upon federal question jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §1331, the court informs the parties that, in the absence of a viable federal

claim, it will likely decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 4, 2014

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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