Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01211/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01211-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR SOTO-AGUILAR, )

)

)

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Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

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Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1211 REC

(No. CR-F-03-5458 REC) 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE

OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND

DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT 

On September 26, 2005, petitioner Hector Soto-Aguilar filed

a timely motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Petitioner contends that he was denied his guilty plea was

not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the effective

assistance of counsel at during the change of plea proceedings

because counsel “misrepresented to defendant about the condition

of his plea bargain when specifically enquired by defendant in as

much as counsel knew that defendant’s whole behavior and guilty

plea was structured to avoid a plea agreement that would not

Case 1:05-cv-01211-REC Document 4 Filed 10/19/05 Page 1 of 6
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result in a long sentence or prison time.” Petitioner further

contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

at sentencing because counsel failed to seek a downward departure

for aberrant behavior under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a written Plea

Agreement to Count Two of a Superseding Indictment charging him

with attempted possession of pseudoephedrine, a listed chemical,

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

Petitioner, who was under oath during the change of plea

proceedings, stated that he had read the Plea Agreement and that

he had reviewed it with counsel before the change of plea

proceedings. Petitioner stated that he understood that the

court could sentence him to 20 years in prison, no matter what

anyone else may have told him. Pursuant to the Plea Agreement,

the United States agreed that “the base offense level is 30

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3) in effect at the time of the

commission of the offense”, to recommend a two-level reduction

for minor role based on the defendant’s relative culpability, and

to recommend a two-level reduction pursuant to the safety valve,

if defendant qualifies for the safety valve. 

The Advisory Guideline Presentence Report determined

petitioner’s base offense level under the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11 to be

34, taking into account the Government’s recommendation for a 4

level reduction for a mitigating role. The base offense level

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was further reduced by 2 levels for a minor role in the offense,

and by 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility. The resulting

base offense level was 29 and, with petitioner’s criminal history

category of I, the guideline range under the Sentencing

Guidelines was 87 to 108 months. The Advisory Presentence Report

recommended a sentence of 87 months, taking into account the

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) pursuant to United

States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). 

At sentencing, the United States and counsel for petitioner

argued that a reasonable sentence would be 46 months. In so

arguing, the parties contended that the base offense level should

be determined by looking to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which would have

determined petitioner’s base offense level had he pleaded guilty

to Count One of the Superseding Indictment. Then taking into

account the adjustments for acceptance of responsibility and

minor role and mitigating role, the resulting guideline range

would have been 46 to 57 months. The court adopted the arguments

of the parties and sentenced petitioner to 47 months as a

reasonable sentence pursuant to United States v. Booker. 

Petitioner’s counsel did not argue for a further reduction in

petitioner’s sentence for aberrant behavior or post-conviction

rehabilitative efforts.

The standards governing an assertion of ineffective

assistance of counsel are set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). As explained in United States v. QuinteroBarraza, 78 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519

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U.S. 848 (1996):

According to Strickland, there are two

components to an effectiveness inquiry, and

the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing both ... First, the

representation must fall ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness.’ ... Courts

scrutinizing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s conduct must examine counsel’s

‘overall performance,’ both before and at

trial, and must be highly deferential to the

attorney’s judgments ... In fact, there

exists a ‘strong presumption that counsel

“rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.”’ ... In

short, defendant must surmount the

presumption that, ‘under the circumstances,

the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.”’ ... Thus, the proper

inquiry is ‘whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’ ....

If the petitioner satisfies the first prong,

he must then establish that there is ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different ....

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based

on the contention that a guilty plea was not knowing and

voluntary, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s

representation fell below the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). 

Petitioner has not established that his guilty plea was not

knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the effective assistance

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of counsel under the Lockhart standard. Although petitioner

asserts that he believed he would not get a long sentence if he

pleaded guilty, he makes no representation or showing that he

would have gone to trial if he had known that his sentence would

be approximately 41⁄2 years. Therefore, petitioner has not

established the prejudice prong of the Lockhart ineffective

assistance of counsel test.

Prior to United States v. Booker, petitioner could not have

based a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the failure

to argue for a downward departure based on aberrant behavior

under §5K1.20 because petitioner pleaded guilty to a “serious

drug trafficking offense” which precluded such a downward

departure. See U.S.S.G. §5K1.20(c)(3) and Application Note 1.

The court concludes that petitioner cannot establish ineffective

assistance of counsel on this ground even though petitioner’s

sentence was imposed post-Booker. Although the Sentencing

Guidelines are now advisory, “the district courts, while not

bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and

take them into account when sentencing.” Booker, 125 S.Ct. At

767. 

Petitioner makes no showing in his motion of any facts that

would entitle him to a further reduction in his sentence because

of aberrant behavior. Petitioner’s sentence was reduced because

of his minor role in the offense. Given the seriousness of

petitioner’s crime and the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines

prohibited an aberrant behavior reduction because of the crime to

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Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to a post- 1

conviction downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.19.

However, because his Section 2255 motion is denied, petitioner’s

reference to § 5K2.19 is irrelevant. 

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which petitioner pleaded guilty, the court concludes that

petitioner has not established the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test, i.e., that petitioner’s sentence would have been

further reduced by this court had counsel argued for such a

reduction.1

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner Hector Soto-Aguilar’s motion to motion to

vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 is denied.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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