Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05398/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05398-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2009 Decided June 26, 2009

No. 08-5398

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE COMPANY

AND DEL MONTE FOODS U.A.E. FZE,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-02143)

Daniel G. Jarcho argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Anisha S. Dasgupta, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and

Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel. R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, ROGERS and GRIFFITH,

Circuit Judges.

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1

 A “unilateral agricultural sanction” is defined as:

any prohibition, restriction, or condition on carrying out an

agricultural program with respect to a foreign country or

foreign entity that is imposed by the United States for reasons

of foreign policy or national security, except in a case in

which the United States imposes the measure pursuant to– 

(A) a multilateral regime and the other member

countries of that regime have agreed to impose

substantially equivalent measures; or 

(B) a mandatory decision of the United Nations

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Dissenting opinion by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The only question on appeal is

whether the district court erred in dismissing as moot a

complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. We hold that it did.

I.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act

of 2000 (the “TSRA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211, limits

restrictions imposed unilaterally by the President on exports of

food, medicine, and other agricultural products to Iran, Libya,

North Korea, Sudan, and Cuba. Aimed at lifting embargoes to

expand export opportunities particularly for agricultural

products, see 146 Cong. Rec. 23,110-11 (2000) (drafters’

statement of Sens. Hagel and Ashcroft), the TSRA provides that

“the President may not impose a unilateral agricultural sanction

or unilateral medical sanction against a foreign country or

foreign entity” without the prior approval of Congress. 22

U.S.C. § 7202(a).1

 As relevant here, § 906 of the TSRA

USCA Case #08-5398 Document #1193363 Filed: 06/26/2009 Page 2 of 20
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Security Council. 

22 U.S.C. § 7201(6).

2

 Section 906(a)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter (other

than section 7203 of this title), the export of agricultural

commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Cuba, the

Taliban or the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the

Taliban, or to the government of a country that has been

determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly

provided support for acts of international terrorism under

section 2371 of this title, section 2405(j)(1) of Title 50,

Appendix, or section 2780(d) of this title, or to any other

entity in such a country, shall only be made pursuant to 1-year

licenses issued by the United States Government for contracts

entered into during the one-year period of the license and

shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of

the signing of the contract, except that the requirements of

such 1-year licenses shall be no more restrictive than license

exceptions administered by the Department of Commerce or

general licenses administered by the Department of the

Treasury, except that procedures shall be in place to deny

licenses for exports to any entity within such country, or in

the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban,

promoting international terrorism. 

22 U.S.C. § 7205(a)(1) (emphasis added).

authorizes limited restrictions on exports of agricultural products

to countries that the State Department has determined “to have

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”

Id. § 7205(a)(1).2

 Such exports require a one-year license,

which will authorize exports pursuant to contracts entered into

during the license period so long as the products are shipped

within one year of the signing of the covered contract. The

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3

 A Commerce Department license exception under the

Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401-20, is

defined as an “authorization . . . that allows [an exporter] to export or

reexport under stated conditions, items . . . that would otherwise

require a[n individual] license.” 15 C.F.R. § 740.1(a). Commerce

regulations governing agricultural commodities prevented overseas

shipments to an entity on the lists of Specially Designated Terrorists

or Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.18(b)(1), or where

another federal agency objects on grounds the recipient “may promote

international terrorism,” as long as the objection is lodged within nine

business days of the referral and within eleven business days after

receipt of notice of application for license, id. § 740.18(c)(4). When

the TSRA was enacted, Treasury regulations authorized general

licenses for exporters of agricultural products to Iran to enter into

executory contracts, but required specific licenses “issued on a caseby-case basis to permit the performance” of such executory contracts.

See Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Libyan Sanctions Regulations;

Iranian Transactions Regulations: Licensing of Commercial Sales of

Agricultural Commodities and Products, Medicine, and Medical

Equipment, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,784, 41,792 (Aug. 2, 1999) (codified at

31 C.F.R. § 560.530) (amended Nov. 1, 1999; repealed July 12, 2001).

 

licensing requirements “shall be no more restrictive than license

exceptions administered by the Department of Commerce or

general licenses administered by the Department of the

Treasury,”3

 except for procedures involving export licenses to

an entity in such country, or in the Taliban-controlled area of

Afghanistan, “promoting international terrorism.” Id. 

 

The Treasury Department, through the Office of Foreign

Assets Control (“OFAC”), published an interim rule on July 12,

2001 to carry out TSRA § 906 with regard to exports to Iran and

other countries, stating in the preamble it was adopting an

expedited licensing process, with deadlines for agency action

that in material respects are the same as those of the Commerce

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4

 See Exports of Agricultural Products, Medicines, and

Medical Devices to Cuba, Sudan, Libya, and Iran; Cuba

Travel-Related Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,683 (July 12, 2001).

The preamble to the interim rule stated that OFAC had “endeavored

to implement the TSRA in a way that is consistent with both the

statutory language and the intent of its drafters and in a manner that

also provides exporters with an efficient and expedited process for

engaging in authorized exports of agricultural commodities, medicine,

and medical devices.” Id. at 36,684. Specifically, OFAC stated:

The expedited process will include, when appropriate, referral

of the one-year license request to other government agencies

for guidance in evaluating the request. If no government

agency raises an objection to or concern with the application

within nine business days from the date of any such referral,

OFAC will issue the one-year license, provided that the

request otherwise meets the requirements set forth in this rule.

If any government agency raises an objection to the request

within nine business days from the date of referral, OFAC

will deny the request for the one-year license. If any

government agency raises a concern short of an objection with

the request within nine business days from the date of referral,

OFAC will delay its response to the license request for no

more than thirty additional days to allow for further review of

the request.

Id. at 36,684-85 (emphasis added). The TSRA drafters’ statement of

purpose stated: “We expect that regulations to implement [the TSRA]

will promptly liberalize the current administrative procedures for the

export of agriculture and medicine.” 146 Cong. Rec. at 23,110. 

Department.4 Under this expedited process, OFAC would refer

the application to other agencies, and, provided the license

application met the requirements set forth in the regulations,

OFAC would issue the license so long as no objection was

received within nine business days. However, on March 20,

2007, OFAC announced that the events of September 11, 2001

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had “magnified concerns about international terrorism,” that

“the volume of license requests has increased substantially since

the inception of the TSRA program, and [that] applications are

now much more complicated than the earlier ones.” Sudanese

Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Sanctions Regulations, 72 Fed.

Reg. 12,980, 12,981 (Mar. 20, 2007) (“OFAC March 2007

Regulations”). Although confirming it would continue to

conduct a review of license applications “consistent with the

requirements of section 906 of TSRA,” OFAC stated, however,

that “OFAC’s processing . . . may take longer than the time

periods suggested at the inception of the TSRA program.” Id. 

Del Monte Fresh Produce Company is a vertically

integrated producer, marketer, and distributor of fresh fruits and

vegetables, and facilitates sales abroad by its foreign affiliates,

such as Del Monte Foods (U.A.E.) FZE (together “Del Monte”).

On August 8, 2007, Del Monte submitted an application to

OFAC for a one-year license (the “August 2007 license”) to

export agricultural commodities to ten entities in Iran, none of

which were listed on either of the two terrorists lists identified

in Commerce Department regulations. Del Monte alleges that

because the August 2007 license application contained all of the

information specified in OFAC regulations, OFAC referred the

application to the State Department on August 17, 2007, and that

the State Department responded on September 13, 2007 without

raising an objection to issuance of the license. Still, OFAC did

not issue the license. Del Monte’s repeated inquiries to OFAC

about the status of the license revealed only that its application

was pending. On November 27, 2007 Del Monte was advised

by OFAC’s “help desk” that its August 2007 license application

was still pending. 

On November 28, 2007 Del Monte filed suit. It had been

more than 110 days since OFAC had received the August 2007

license application, more than 100 days since OFAC referred the

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application to the State Department, and more than 75 days

since the State Department’s response. On November 29 Del

Monte filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district

court scheduled a status conference on that motion, and OFAC

issued the August 2007 license to Del Monte.

 

Del Monte filed an amended complaint on January 10, 2008

seeking a declaratory judgment that OFAC’s failure to issue the

August 2007 license until November 29, 2007 constituted

agency action that was both unlawfully withheld and

unreasonably delayed under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). In addition to alleging facts

relating to OFAC’s unlawful delay in issuing the August 2007

license, Del Monte alleged that OFAC’s “licensing inaction

and/or action at issue in this case is in its duration too short to be

fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,” because the

time required to litigate the case was longer than the mandatory

deadlines and the time necessary for the government to review

the application. Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Further it alleged, “[b]ecause

facilitating sales of, and selling, food products to Iran is, and has

been, a part of Del Monte’s ongoing business plan, Del Monte

will continue to apply for OFAC licences in the future on a

continuing basis,” id. ¶ 33, and “[t]here is a reasonable

expectation that Del Monte will be subject to the same inaction

and/or action by OFAC again in the future with respect to future

license applications,” id.

The district court granted the government’s motion to

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on

grounds of mootness pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United

States, 565 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2008). The district court

observed that where a plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief as

a remedy for a defendant’s past conduct, the action will be moot

unless one of two exceptions to mootness applies. With regard

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to the capable of repetition yet evading review exception, the

district court concluded that because Del Monte’s amended

complaint only sought relief for the handling of the August 2007

license application, and OFAC had already issued that license,

“it is impossible for delay of that application to reoccur.” Id. at

113. With regard to the voluntary cessation exception, the

district court credited the representations of OFAC and

concluded that its issuance of the August 2007 license on

November 29, 2007 was independent of Del Monte’s lawsuit. 

II.

Del Monte appeals the dismissal of its amended complaint

on the principal ground that the claim for relief falls within the

capable of repetition but evading review exception to the

mootness doctrine. Our review is de novo. See Munsell v. Dep’t

of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

“A case is moot when ‘the challenged conduct ceases such

that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be

repeated’ in circumstances where ‘it becomes impossible for the

court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing

party.’” United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-5267,

slip op. at 63 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2009) (quoting City of Erie v.

Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)). In at least two kinds of

cases the fact that the specific conduct that gave rise to the case

has ceased does not mean that the challenge to the legality of

that conduct is moot. City of Houston, Tex. v. Dep’t of Housing

& Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

First, a plaintiff’s challenge will not be moot where it seeks

declaratory relief as to an ongoing policy. Id. at 1429. In Super

Tire Engineering v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125 (1974), the

Supreme Court held that although a claim for injunctive relief

preventing payment of welfare benefits during a strike was moot

USCA Case #08-5398 Document #1193363 Filed: 06/26/2009 Page 8 of 20
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because the strike had ended, the employers’ request for

declaratory relief was not moot because the state’s ongoing

policy of paying strike benefits was, on the employers’ theory of

the case, “immediately and directly injurious to the [employers’]

economic positions.” Of course, plaintiffs challenging an

ongoing policy must demonstrate “standing to bring such a

forward-looking challenge and [that] the request for declaratory

relief is ripe.” City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1429.

Second, even though the specific action that the plaintiff

challenges has ceased, a claim for declaratory relief will not be

moot even if the “plaintiff has made no challenge to [an]

ongoing underlying policy, but merely attacks an isolated

agency action,” so long as “the specific claim fits the exception

for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, or

falls within the voluntary cessation doctrine.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). In Olmstead v. L.C. ex

rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 594 n.6 (1999), the Supreme Court

held that the challenge by two mental patients to their

confinement in a segregated environment was not mooted by

their post-complaint transfers because “in view of the multiple

institutional placements [they had] experienced, the controversy

they brought to court [was] capable of repetition, yet evading

review.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,

578 (1987). Del Monte has chosen this second route by alleging

that OFAC’s failure to act promptly on Del Monte’s August

2007 license application is capable of repetition yet evades

review.

 

Under the capable of repetition yet evading review

exception to mootness, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1)

the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully

litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would

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be subjected to the same action again.” Clarke v. United States,

915 F.2d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Murphy

v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)) (alteration in original); see

also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-20 & n.6 (1988). When

these “two circumstances [are] simultaneously present,” Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998), the plaintiff has demonstrated

an “exceptional circumstance[],” id., in which the exception will

apply, id.; see Clarke, 915 F.2d at 704. “Its theoretical

justification is somewhat obscure,” Christian Knights of the Ku

Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia

(“KKK”), 972 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1992) — the “evading

review” aspect perhaps suggesting justiciability by necessity

while its “capable of repetition” aspect “assuring that the parties

have a sufficient interest in the result,” id. — but the exception

is well established. Del Monte has met its burden on both

prongs. 

First, a challenge to the timeliness of OFAC’s response to

applications for a one-year license cannot be fully litigated

before the expiration, let alone the granting, of the requested

license. By “evading review” “the Supreme Court has meant

evading Supreme Court review.” Id. This court has held that

agency actions of less than two years’ duration cannot be “fully

litigated” prior to cessation or expiration, so long as the short

duration is typical of the challenged action. Pub. Utils. Comm’n

v. FERC, 236 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Burlington N.

R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir.

1996). The TSRA license covers only contracts signed during

a one year period; shipments pursuant to the contract must be

made within a year of the date the contract is signed. 22 U.S.C.

§ 7205(a)(1). Moreover, even though OFAC has announced that

it may not be able to process license applications within the

deadlines allegedly required by the TSRA, the longest delay

identified by Del Monte was only 111 days and the average time

for OFAC to act on license applications from July 2006 to

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March 2007 did not exceed 74 business days. Am. Compl. ¶¶

27-28; Del Monte’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1. Del

Monte’s challenge thus meets the evading-review prong of the

exception.

Second, in order to decide whether the same type of

inaction or unreasonable delay is sufficiently likely to recur, the

court must first determine “exactly what must be repeatable in

order to save [the] case from mootness.” People for the Ethical

Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens (“PETA”), 396 F.3d 416,

422 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Clarke, 915 F.2d at 703. Three

circuit precedents provide instruction:

• In PETA the court adopted a functional approach,

explaining that “[t]he ‘wrong’ that is, or is not, ‘capable of

repetition,’ must be defined in terms of the precise

controversy it spawns,” that is, the wrong must be “put in

terms of the legal questions it presents for decision.” 396

F.3d at 422-23 (emphasis added). In that case the issue

presented by PETA’s First Amendment challenge to the

government’s allegedly pretextual rejection of PETA’s

submission to a city-wide display of privately-designed,

government-selected statues was highly fact-dependent.

As such, the court concluded that the wrong suffered by

PETA was unlikely to recur, and that the claim was

therefore moot. 

• In Clarke, the en banc court explained that the wrong

at issue for mootness purposes is defined by the plaintiffs’

theory set forth in the complaint. Clarke, 915 F.2d at 703-

04. There, Members of the D.C. Council challenged a

federal statute as a violation of their First Amendment

rights because it conditioned appropriations for the District

of Columbia on the D.C. Council’s amendment of the D.C.

Human Rights Act. Id. The United States had suggested

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the injury be defined as “congressional use of funding to

induce appellees to enact specific language allowing

religiously affiliated institutions to discriminate against

homosexuals;” the D.C. Council Members had suggested

the issue was “whether Congress can coerce [their] votes by

withholding appropriated funds.” Id. at 703. This court

rejected both suggestions: the United States’ position

because it included “facts completely irrelevant to any

intelligible formulation of plaintiffs’ claim,” and the D.C.

Council Members’ suggestion because it attempted to press

“a broader notion of their injury than the one on which they

originally sought relief.” Id. Instead, the court focused on

identifying the factors that were “essential to plaintiffs’

original theory of their claim,” concluding that even

“broadly conceived” the “injurious act” of which the

Council Members complained — Congress’s conditioning

of funding on the Council’s “enactment of legislation in

specific language” — was not reasonably likely to recur.

Id. at 704.

• In KKK, 972 F.2d at 369-70, although the Klan

challenged no regulations on their face, and its complaint

concerned only its requests for an October 28, 1990 parade

permit, the court held the controversy was capable of

repetition because there was a reasonable likelihood that in

the future the Klan would seek parade permits, raising the

same concerns of violence. The Klan had requested a

permit to march along Constitution Avenue from 14th to

3rd Streets on October 28, 1990; citing the risk of violence

incited by the Klan’s presence, the District government

granted a parade permit for only four blocks. As this court

subsequently explained, the wrong in the KKK case was not

limited to the treatment of the Klan’s application for the

October 28, 1990 parade, but rather “consisted of the

District [government]’s refusal, in alleged violation of the

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First Amendment, to grant a parade permit because the

march would provoke violence.” PETA, 396 F.3d at 423.

The district court’s approach in identifying the wrong

alleged in Del Monte’s amended complaint failed to adhere to

this precedent. In agreeing with this approach, our dissenting

colleague does likewise. Dis. Op. at 1. The district court

concluded, and the government maintains on appeal, that Del

Monte’s claims are not capable of repetition because the alleged

wrong was the delay in acting on Del Monte’s August 2007

license application. On this view of the mootness inquiry,

because the August license was granted, the wrong is not

capable of repetition. However, the district court’s approach

focuses on whether the precise historical facts that spawned the

plaintiff’s claims are likely to recur, rather than whether the

legal wrong complained of by the plaintiff is reasonably likely

to recur, as our precedent requires. See PETA, 396 F.3d at 422;

KKK, 972 F.2d at 370; Clarke, 915 F.2d at 703-04. 

Del Monte has shown there is a reasonable likelihood it will

be subjected to the same challenged action in the future. It

alleged that OFAC was required to, but did not, grant Del

Monte’s properly-prepared license, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 30,

“nine business days after [OFAC] refer[red] the application for

review by other agencies, [when] the other agencies lodge[d] no

objection within that nine business-day period,” id. ¶ 20.

According to the amended complaint, this deadline was imposed

by TSRA § 906’s incorporation of Commerce and Treasury

Department regulations as a ceiling on the restrictiveness of the

licencing procedures and by OFAC’s adoption of the ninebusiness-day deadline. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. OFAC’s failure to respond

to the August 2007 application until November 29, 2007 was,

Del Monte alleged, unlawful in two ways: it constituted action

unlawfully withheld and action unlawfully delayed. Id. ¶¶ 35-

36, 39-40. Therefore, under the theory in the amended

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complaint, it was irrelevant whether OFAC can or will delay

action on the now-granted August 2007 license application;

what matters is whether it is reasonably likely that Del Monte

will suffer the same type of legal wrong — unlawfully withheld

approval or unlawful delay by OFAC in violation of TSRA §

906 — in the future. To answer this jurisdictional question, we

look to the complaint and the undisputed facts in the record.

Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.

1992).

When Del Monte filed suit on November 28, 2007, OFAC

had not granted the August 2007 license; because standing is

assessed as of the time a suit commences, Del Monte has

standing to seek declaratory relief. See Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190-91

(2000). With regard to mootness, Del Monte proffered the

unchallenged declaration of its associate general counsel that

“[s]elling food products to Iran is, and has been, a part of [Del

Monte’s] business plan” and that Del Monte “will definitely

apply for OFAC licenses in the future, on a continuing basis.”

Decl. of Jeffrey S. Bailey, ¶ 4, Feb. 7, 2008. Del Monte also

proffered unchallenged evidence tending to show that OFAC

will not act on Del Monte’s future licenses within the mandated

time limits and indeed that the delays may be substantial.

Addressing past conduct, an international trade specialist at Del

Monte’s law firm described how OFAC had failed to act on Del

Monte’s license applications within the nine-day deadline on

five separate occasions in the past. Decl. of Katia Gousset, ¶¶

2-8, Feb. 7, 2008. In that regard, the specialist noted that at least

one of OFAC’s past delays in acting was substantial — 100

days from when Del Monte submitted the application and nearly

two months after OFAC learned that the State Department did

not object to issuance of the license. Addressing OFAC’s intent

in addressing future applications, Del Monte pointed to OFAC’s

announcement on March 20, 2007 that its “processing of

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one-year license requests may take longer than the time periods

suggested at the inception of the TSRA program.” OFAC March

2007 Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,981.

With the allegations in the amended complaint and these

uncontested declarations, Del Monte has shown a reasonable

likelihood that in the future OFAC will fail to act on its

applications within the purportedly mandatory period and that

at least some of those delays will be as unreasonable as the

August 2007 license application delay, and has thereby met its

burden of showing a reasonable likelihood that it will be subject

to the same legal wrong. See KKK, 972 F.2d at 370-71. Neither

Clarke, on which the district court relied, nor other precedent

requires that the very same facts must recur for the capable of

repetition exception to apply. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co.,

75 F.3d at 689. Indeed, in Clarke, 915 F.2d at 703, the en banc

court rejected a similar government suggestion that the plaintiffs

were required to demonstrate that Congress was likely to use

funding to induce the D.C. Council to enact a specific provision

of law on the exact same issue in the future, writing that the

issue on which Congress induced the D.C. Council to act was

“completely irrelevant to any intelligible formulation of

plaintiffs’ claim,” and therefore “equally irrelevant to the

mootness issue.” So too, here. The unrepeatable particulars of

OFAC’s delay of Del Monte’s August 2007 application — when

the delay occurred, the contracts that the delay endangered —

are irrelevant to Del Monte’s legal theory in the amended

complaint for declaratory relief. 

The government presents two responses: First, because Del

Monte’s amended complaint did not seek relief from OFAC’s

general policy of handling license applications, the wrong is

limited to OFAC’s delay on the August 2007 application.

Second, the amended complaint should not be construed as a

challenge to OFAC’s general policy because such a challenge is

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5

 Because Del Monte’s challenge is only to delay relating to

the August 2007 license, the court has no occasion to decide whether

Del Monte could bring a forward-looking challenge to OFAC’s

license-processing policy under § 706(1) of the APA. Neither does

the court have the occasion to address the limits, if any, that § 706(1)

would impose on Del Monte’s request for declaratory relief, for any

limits are not jurisdictional, see Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 185

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

not authorized under § 706(1) of the APA. These responses fail

because they conflate the plaintiff’s choice of the scope of relief

with the legal determination — for mootness purposes only —

of “the injury that is capable of repetition,” Clarke 915 F.2d at

703. Del Monte seeks declaratory relief for OFAC’s delay of its

August 2007 license application, contending that its claim is not

moot because the legal wrong it suffered — the delay

purportedly in violation of TSRA § 906 — is likely to recur. In

City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1429-30, the court distinguished

between requests for declaratory relief as to specific agency

actions and as to ongoing policies, explaining that where, as

here, the plaintiff only challenges a specific agency action, its

claim for declaratory relief will not be moot if it can show that

the legal wrong allegedly inflicted by the agency is capable of

repetition yet evading review.5

 

Del Monte’s amended complaint presents a classic example

of a legal injury that is capable of repetition yet evading review.

It engages in an ongoing commercial enterprise — exporting

food products to clients located in Iran — that requires one-year

licenses. It has proffered unrebutted evidence that it is

reasonably likely that the licensing agency will not conform to

the expedited procedures that Del Monte contends are mandated

by Congress. Moreover, as of March 20, 2007 the agency itself

confirmed that such delays were likely to recur in the future.

Del Monte has encountered a series of substantially similar

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injuries from delays of substantially similar license applications

in the past, and given its business plan it anticipates suffering

similar injuries in the future. See Am. Compl. ¶ 33. As the

same parties will encounter the same type of circumstances

involving alleged violations of the same laws, we hold that Del

Monte’s request for a declaratory judgment falls within the

exception to mootness for legal wrongs that are capable of

repetition yet evade review, notwithstanding that the August

2007 license that occasioned this lawsuit has been issued.

 

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the amended

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and we remand the case to

the district court to address the merits of Del Monte’s request for

declaratory relief.

USCA Case #08-5398 Document #1193363 Filed: 06/26/2009 Page 17 of 20
SENTELLE, Chief Judge, dissenting: Briefly put, I would

affirm the decision of the district court because I believe the

district court’s decision is exactly correct. I will not belabor the

facts, as they are set out by the majority above and are readily

available in the district court’s opinion. See Del Monte Fresh

Produce Co. v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108-09

(D.D.C. 2008). In summary, appellants filed this action seeking

a judgment declaring that the Office of Foreign Assets Control

(OFAC) unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed issuance

of a single license for food shipments to Iran in violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

Appellants filed that complaint on November 28, 2007;

appellants received the license on November 29, 2007.

As the district court stated, “‘[i]f events outrun the

controversy such that the court can grant no meaningful relief,

the case must be dismissed as moot.’” Del Monte, 565 F. Supp.

2d at 110 (quoting McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council

Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the

U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Since it is apparent that

this case falls within that description, the district court rightly

entered a judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, by

reason of mootness.

Granted, appellants argue that this case falls within one or

both of two discrete exceptions to the mootness

doctrine—“capable of repetition yet evading review” and

“voluntary cessation.” To allow this case to go forward based

on either of those exceptions is to allow the exception to

swallow the mootness doctrine.

As the district court reminded us, “[t]he ‘capable of

repetition yet evading review’ exception ‘applies only in

exceptional situations, where the following two circumstances

[are] simultaneously present: (1) the [alleged wrong is] in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

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2

expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party [will] be subject to the same [alleged

wrong] again.’” Id. at 112 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.

1, 17 (1998)). The action sought relief as to delay on one

license. That license has been issued. The Trade Sanctions

Reform and Export Enhancement Act cannot delay the issuance

of that license any more. The case is moot. Any possible future

licenses may or may not be delayed; indeed, may or may not be

sought, and may or may not be issued. In some sense, any

action is capable of repetition. Certainly, the grant or delay of

grant of any license can recur. There is nothing exceptional

about the current circumstances to differentiate it from the grant

or delay of grant of any other license. Such a case can become

moot. It does not automatically fall within the capable of

repetition yet evading review exception.

The most that appellants point to in arguing for application

of the exception is that OFAC has been slow in granting

previous licenses. The Supreme Court has told us repeatedly

“that past wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and

immediate threat of injury necessary to make out a case or

controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103

(1983). That is all appellants offer here. The relief sought had

been granted before the complaint even reached the judge. The

preexisting controversy was therefore moot. The district court

correctly dismissed the case. There was no showing that the

alleged wrong was likely to recur.

Appellants also rely on the “voluntary cessation” exception

to the mootness rule. Such an exception, perhaps even rarer

than the capable of repetition exception, applies when a

defendant has voluntarily stopped the transaction, but may

“return to [its] old ways.” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345

U.S. 629, 632 (1953). It does not apply where “‘there is no

reasonable expectation . . . that the alleged violation will recur’

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and . . . ‘interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” Del Monte, 565

F. Supp. 2d at 113 (quoting Doe v. Harris, 696 F.2d 109, 111

(D.C. Cir. 1982)).

The district court correctly ruled that this exception is

unavailable for multiple reasons. First, the exception is

designed to prevent a defendant from “rendering a case moot

through manipulative unilateral action after the case is filed.”

Id. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 649). In

this case, although Del Monte did not learn of the grant of its

license until after it had filed the lawsuit, responsible OFAC

officials signed the license six days prior to the filing of the

complaint. Therefore, the exception is inapplicable at the outset.

Even if the exception otherwise applied, appellants have failed

to bring this case within it, in that they have shown no

reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and

events have completely eradicated the effects of the delay in the

issuance of the license.

In short, I would affirm the decision of the district court. I

therefore respectfully dissent.

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