Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04828/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04828-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT E. FIGY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LIFEWAY FOODS, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 13-cv-04828-TEH 

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS AND STRIKE; REQUEST 

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Lifeway Foods, Inc.’s motions to 

dismiss and strike Plaintiff Robert Figy’s First Amended Complaint. Defendant also filed 

a request for judicial notice in support of its motions to dismiss and strike. After carefully 

considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss, DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike, and GRANTS Defendant’s 

request for judicial notice, for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint, unless otherwise stated, and are therefore accepted as true for the purposes of 

this motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). 

Defendant is a producer of retail probiotic dairy beverages and products similar to 

yogurt. Dkt. No. 23 (“FAC”) ¶ 28. Plaintiff is a self-proclaimed “health conscious 

consumer who wishes to avoid ‘added sugars’ in the food products he purchases.” Id. ¶ 

70. Plaintiff brings this putative class action on behalf of either a nationwide class or a 

statewide class of California consumers who, since October 17, 2009, purchased any 

product produced by Defendant and labeled with the ingredient “Evaporated Cane Juice” 

(“ECJ”). Id. ¶¶ 1, 136. 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff purchased five such products between October 17, 2009 and the present 

(the “Class Period”). Id. ¶ 1, Exs. 1-5. Specifically, Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s 

Organic Lowfat Peach Kefir, Organic Lowfat Pomegranate/Acai Kefir, Organic Lowfat 

Raspberry Kefir, Nonfat Strawberry Kefir, and Nonfat Raspberry Kefir (the “Purchased 

Products”). Id. Though Plaintiff read the labels on these products and saw ECJ listed as 

an ingredient, id. ¶ 17, he was unaware at the time of purchase that ECJ indicated the 

products contained added sugar: “While Plaintiff was aware that the Lifeway food 

products contained some sugars, he believed these sugars were naturally occurring sugars 

that were found naturally in the ingredients used by Lifeway.” Id. ¶ 70. Plaintiff was so 

unaware because Defendant “utilized the false and misleading term [ECJ] to identify the 

added sugar it added as an ingredient to its food product.” Id. Plaintiff “relied upon this 

misleading and deceptive language . . . when making his decision to purchase” these 

products. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff “would not have purchased these products had he known the 

products (1) contained sugar as an added ingredient, and (2) were illegal to sell and possess 

nor would he have expended the purchase price for products that were worthless due to 

their illegality,” and he therefore paid a premium price for these products. Id. ¶ 53. 

On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff originally filed suit in this Court on 

October 17, 2013, Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1, and filed the FAC on December 20, 2013, 

FAC at 61. In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts thirteen causes of action: separate claims for 

violation of the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs of the California Unfair 

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) (first through third 

causes of action); separate claims for violation of the misleading and untrue prongs of the 

California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. (“FAL”) (fourth 

and fifth causes of action); a claim for violation of the California Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”) (sixth cause of action); common 

law claims for Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty of 

Merchantability, Negligent Misrepresentation, Negligence, Unjust Enrichment, and Money 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 2 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Had and Received (seventh through twelfth causes of action); and a claim for Declaratory 

Judgment (fourteenth1

 cause of action). 

On January 17, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. No. 24 

(“First MTD”). Before the Court ruled on this motion, however, the Court stayed this case 

pending final guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regarding ECJ, 

pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Dkt. No. 44 (“Order Staying Case”). This 

stay remained in effect until January 4, 2016, on which date the Court entered an order 

lifting the stay “in light of the FDA’s delay in providing final guidance on ECJ.” Dkt. No. 

57 (“Order Lifting Stay”). In that same Order, the Court denied Defendant’s request for 

additional briefing in support of the First MTD and ordered Defendant to re-file the First 

MTD updated to reflect any developments in the law. Id. On February 1, 2016, Defendant 

filed “updated” motions to dismiss and strike the FAC and a request for judicial notice in 

support of its motions to dismiss and strike, which are presently before the Court. Dkt. No. 

61 (“Second MTD”); Dkt. No. 62 (“RJN”). Plaintiff timely opposed Defendant’s motions 

to dismiss and strike, Dkt. No. 65 (“Opp’n”), and Defendant timely replied in support 

thereof, Dkt. No. 67 (“Reply”). Oral argument on these motions was continued to June 13, 

2016, per stipulation of the parties. Dkt. No. 70. 

On May 25, 2016, the FDA issued its final guidance on ECJ. U.S. Food & Drug 

Ass’n, Guidance for Industry: Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice (May 

2016), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments 

RegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm181491.htm. In the final guidance, the FDA 

reiterated its position that “the term ‘evaporated cane juice’ is not the common or usual 

name of any type of sweetener and that this ingredient should instead be declared on food 

labels as ‘sugar,’ preceded by one or more truthful, non-misleading descriptors if the 

manufacturer so chooses (e.g., ‘cane sugar’).” Id. § III. Following this final guidance, the 

Court ordered supplemental briefing “addressing what effect, if any, the FDA’s final 

 

1

 The FAC does not include a thirteenth cause of action. See FAC at 56-59. 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 3 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

guidance has on Defendant’s pending motions to dismiss and strike.” Dkt. No. 77. The 

parties timely complied. Dkt. Nos. 78 (“Pl.’s Suppl. Br.”), 79 (“Def.’s Suppl. Br.”). 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

I. Motion to Dismiss: Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) 

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) 

when a plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Such 

a showing “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

In addition, fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard. “In alleging 

fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 

or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be 

alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The allegations must be “specific enough to give 

defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud 

charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done 

anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). To that end, 

allegations sounding in fraud must contain “an account of the time, place, and specific 

content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 

misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact 

as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Vasquez v. L.A. Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts are not, however, 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Any dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be with leave to 

amend, unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s 

deficiencies. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). 

II. Motion to Strike: Rule 12(f) 

Rule 12(f) provides that “the court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(f). “Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the 

claim for relief or the defenses being plead” and “[i]mpertinent matter consists of 

statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted). “Redundant matter is defined as allegations that constitute a needless repetition 

of other averments or are foreign to the issue” and “[s]candalous[] includes allegations that 

cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person.” Swanson v. Yuba City Unified 

Sch. Dist., No. 2:14-cv-01431-KJM-DAD, 2015 WL 2358629, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 

2015). Moreover, “[w]here the complaint demonstrates that a class action cannot be 

maintained on the facts alleged, a defendant may move to strike class allegations prior to 

discovery.” Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

When ruling on a motion to strike, the court must view the pleading in the light 

most favorable to the pleader. Jacobson v. Persolve, LLC, No. 14-CV-00735-LHK, 2014 

WL 4090809, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014). 

III. Request for Judicial Notice: FRE 201 

“[W]hen the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations is tested by a motion 

under Rule 12(b)(6), [r]eview is limited to the complaint.” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are, however, two 

exceptions to this general rule. First, a court may consider “material which is properly 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 5 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

submitted as part of the complaint.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(emphasis in original). Second, a court may consider judicially noticeable facts. Lee, 250 

F.3d at 688-690. Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 201 allows courts to take judicial 

notice of “adjudicative facts” that are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(a), (b). A fact may be considered not subject to reasonable dispute if it “(1) is 

generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and 

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Motions to Dismiss and Strike 

The First MTD argues the FAC is deficient in three respects: (1) the FAC does not 

comply with Rule 9(b) because Plaintiff fails to plead the specific dates on which he 

purchased Defendant’s products, First MTD at 4-5; (2) the FAC fails to state a claim 

because Defendant’s products were not deceptively labeled or “misbranded,” id. at 5-7; 

and (3) the FAC’s nationwide class allegations should be stricken because California 

consumer protection laws do not apply extraterritorially, id. at 8-9. 

The Second MTD, on the other hand, identifies five issues for resolution: (1) 

whether Plaintiff lacks standing for his UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims because the FAC 

fails to allege a plausible basis for reliance, as required by those statutes, and/or because 

Plaintiff’s claim of “strict liability” lacks merit, Second MTD at 1, 8-12; (2) whether 

Plaintiff lacks standing for injunctive relief because he fails to allege any possibility of 

future injury, id. at 1, 12; (3) whether Plaintiff fails to plead his claims with the 

particularity required by Rule 9(b), id. at 1, 13-14; (4) whether Plaintiff fails to plead 

essential elements of his claims for breach of express warranty, breach of the implied 

warranty of merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, unjust enrichment, 

money had and received, and declaratory judgment, id. at 1, 14-18; and (5) whether 

Plaintiff lacks a basis for certifying a nationwide class under California law, id. at 1, 18-20. 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 6 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a. The Court will not now consider issues raised only in the Second MTD. 

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues the Court should disregard the new issues 

raised in Defendant’s Second MTD, on the theory that they are barred both by Rule 

12(g)(2) and by this Court’s Order Lifting Stay. Opp’n at 2, 2 n.2, 3. Under Rule 

12(g)(2), “a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under 

this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its 

earlier motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). 

Plaintiff is incorrect that Rule 12(g)(2) bars the new issues raised in the Second 

MTD. See Kilopass Tech. v. Sidense Corp., No. 10-cv-2066-SI, 2010 WL 5141843, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (“[T]his rule applies to situations in which a party files 

successive motions under Rule 12 for the sole purpose of delay. . . . .”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Plaintiff is correct, however, that the Second MTD is “an entirely new 

motion that went far beyond refiling the [First] MTD ‘updated to reflect any developments 

in the law’ as the Court directed in its [Order Lifting Stay].” Pl.’s Suppl. Br. at 2. 

In the Joint Case Management Statement submitted just prior to the Order Lifting 

Stay, Defendant “request[ed] that the Court allow additional briefing on the issues raised

in its [First MTD], and set a hearing on that motion.” Dkt. No. 54 (“Joint CMC 

Statement”) at 7-8 (emphasis added). Defendant explained that additional briefing was 

warranted due to “developments in California law” and proposed that “the Court allow 

each side to file simultaneous briefs of no more than 10 pages to address recent 

developments that impact [the First MTD].” Id. at 12. The Court denied this request. 

Instead, the Court held “Defendant may re-file the [First MTD], updated to reflect any 

developments in the law . . . .” Order Lifting Stay at 1 (emphasis added). 

What Defendant actually filed in the Second MTD is a far cry from an “updated” 

First MTD. The Second MTD’s “standing” and “essential elements” arguments (issues 1, 

2, and 4) were raised in neither the First MTD nor the Joint CMC Statement requesting 

additional briefing on the First MTD; indeed, neither document makes any mention of 

“standing” or the “essential elements” of Plaintiff’s common law claims. Though 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 7 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Defendant argues expanding the scope of the Second MTD was a “reasonable 

interpretation” of the Order Lifting Stay, Reply at 2, it is hard to imagine how Defendant 

could have read the Court’s denial of its request for additional briefing on the issues raised

in the First MTD and order permitting a refiling of the First MTD as authorization to more 

than double the scope of the First MTD. And reasonable belief or not, this is neither what 

Defendant requested nor what the Order Lifting Stay actually authorized. 

Accordingly, the Court will limit its review of the Second MTD to issues raised in 

the First MTD. The Second MTD remains the operative motion because the Court did 

order Defendant to “re-file” the First MTD. But the Court will consider only the issues 

raised in the First MTD, as “updated” in the Second MTD. In effect, then, only issues 3 

and 5 from the Second MTD – whether Plaintiff fails to plead his claims with the 

particularity required by Rule 9(b) and whether Plaintiff lacks any basis for certifying a 

nationwide class under California law – are appropriate for resolution at this time.2

 

b. Allegations of purchases “during the Class Period” satisfy Rule 9(b). 

Defendant argues the FAC must be dismissed for failure to plead with the 

particularity required of Rule 9(b), because Plaintiff fails to allege the specific date he 

purchased Defendant’s products. Second MTD at 13.3

 

The Court disagrees. The FAC alleges Plaintiff bought the Purchased Products 

“during the Class Period,” which is October 17, 2009 to the present. FAC ¶ 1. Numerous 

courts in this district have found that such allegations satisfy Rule 9(b) and have declined 

to require plaintiffs to allege a specific date of purchase. See, e.g., Bruton v. Gerber 

Prods. Co., No. 12-CV-02412-LHK, 2014 WL 172111, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) 

(holding allegations plaintiff “bought the Purchased Products throughout the class period 

. . . are sufficient to place Gerber on notice as to the time period in which [plaintiff’s] 

 

2

 Defendant withdrew the First MTD’s second argument, that the FAC fails to state a 

claim because Defendant’s products were not deceptively labeled or “misbranded.” Reply 

at 3. 

3

 Defendant made but withdrew two additional Rule 9(b) arguments. See Second MTD 

at 13-14; Reply at 3 n.2. 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 8 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

allegations arise” under Rule 9(b)).4 Defendant cites only one case to the contrary. See 

Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Although the 

complaint alleges that Yumul purchased [the product] ‘repeatedly’ during the class period, 

it does not allege with any greater specificity the dates on which the purchases were 

made.”).5

 The Court declines Defendant’s invitation to follow this out-of-district opinion, 

and instead finds – consistently with the many well-reasoned opinions from within this 

district – that the FAC’s allegations of purchases “during the Class Period” are “specific 

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to 

constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny 

that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen, 780 F.2d at 731. 

Defendant also argues Plaintiff must clarify a “discrepancy” concerning when he 

purchased Defendant’s products; namely, that the expiration dates on the product labels 

attached to the FAC suggest the products were purchased after Plaintiff learned that ECJ is 

added sugar. See Second MTD at 13; Reply at 8-9. This argument is unavailing, for the 

simple reason that Defendant has not actually identified any “discrepancy” in the FAC. 

The FAC explains the attached labels are merely “[e]xemplar labels of the products 

purchased by Plaintiff.” FAC ¶ 18. Attaching exemplars, purchased after Plaintiff realized 

the true nature of ECJ or not, is entirely consistent with Plaintiff’s repeated allegation that 

he purchased Defendant’s products “during the Class Period.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 123, 141. Taking 

these latter allegations as true – which this Court must on a motion to dismiss, Vasquez, 

487 F.3d at 1249 – Plaintiff has undoubtedly alleged a purchase within the Class Period, 

and no clarification on this point is necessary. 

 

4

 See also Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV-02724-LHK, 2013 WL 

5487236, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013) (same); Clancy v. The Bromley Tea Co., No. 12-

CV-03003-JST, 2013 WL 4081632, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (same); Astiana v. 

Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Nos. C 10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, 

at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (same). 

5

 Meanwhile, Defendant’s Reply fails to address any of the cases Plaintiff cites for the 

proposition that allegations such as those contained in the FAC satisfy Rule 9(b). See 

Reply at 8-9. 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 9 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC for 

Plaintiff’s failure to plead his purchases with particularity under Rule 9(b). 

c. Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations need not be stricken at this stage. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations should be stricken because 

Defendant “is an Illinois corporation and there is no basis to apply California law to the 

claims of nonresidents.” Second MTD at 18.6

 

The parties correctly identify the required analysis: California applies a three-step 

“governmental interest analysis” to determine whether California law should apply 

extraterritorially: (1) whether the laws of the affected jurisdictions differ; (2) if so, whether 

there is a “true conflict” given each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law 

under the facts; and (3) if so, which jurisdiction’s interests would be most impaired if its 

laws were not applied. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 

2012). But neither party argues whether the three prongs of the “governmental interest 

analysis” counsel for or against maintenance of a nationwide class. Rather, Defendant 

simply states that “consumer protection laws are different,” Second MTD at 19, while 

Plaintiff argues only that courts within the Ninth Circuit routinely decline to even address 

this question at such an early stage in the litigation, Opp’n at 24-25. 

Only Plaintiff is correct. In Forcellati v. Hyland’s, Inc., for example, the district 

court denied defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s nationwide class claims, recognizing 

that “[c]ourts rarely undertake choice-of-law analysis to strike class claims at this early 

stage in litigation.” 876 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2012). As the court explained: 

Mazza (and nearly every other case cited by Defendants) 

undertook a class-wide choice-of-law analysis at the class 

certification stage, rather than the pleading stage at which we 

find ourselves. Until the Parties have explored the facts in this 

case, it would be premature to speculate about whether the 

differences in various states’ consumer protection laws are 

material in this case. 

 

6

 See infra § II (granting Defendant’s request for judicial notice that it is an Illinois 

corporation). 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 10 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Id. Other courts in this district have followed suit. See, e.g., Bruton, 2014 WL 172111, at 

*13 (“Although Gerber may ultimately prove correct in its argument that California law 

cannot be applied to out-of-state purchases made by out-of-state consumers, whether or not 

this is so depends, in substantial part, on a case-specific choice-of-law analysis that the 

parties and the Court have yet to undertake.”) (citing Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589-94); 

Werdebaugh, 2013 WL 5487236, at *16 (“[T]he Court finds that striking the nationwide 

class allegations at this stage of this case would be premature. . . . Absent the sort of 

detailed choice-of-law analysis that guided the Ninth Circuit in Mazza, the Court declines 

to evaluate how California’s choice-of-law rules affect Werdebaugh’s class claims at this 

time.”). And this Court now finds, consistent with this line of cases, that Defendant’s 

motion to strike Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations is premature. 

As the Court cannot resolve any choice-of-law challenge at this stage in the 

litigation, Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations is hereby 

DENIED. 

II. Request for Judicial Notice 

Defendant requests judicial notice of a document, from the Secretary of State of 

Illinois, certifying that Defendant is incorporated in Illinois. RJN at 1, Ex. A. 

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s request, which is unsurprising given the FAC 

alleges Defendant “is an Illinois corporation.” FAC ¶ 27.7

 Defendant’s incorporation in 

Illinois is therefore “not subject to reasonable dispute,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), as it is not 

subject to dispute at all. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS, as unopposed, 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice.8

 

 

7

 In support of its request, Defendant cites a passing reference in the FAC to Defendant 

being “a California corporation.” FAC ¶ 33. But it is clear, both from the FAC’s 

description of the “Parties,” where it identifies Defendant as an Illinois corporation, id. ¶ 

27, and from Plaintiff’s non-opposition to Defendant’s request for judicial notice, that 

Plaintiff knows and alleges Defendant is an Illinois corporation. 

8

 The fact of Defendant being an Illinois corporation has no effect on the Court’s 

decision not to strike Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations. See Bruton, 2014 WL 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike, and GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial 

notice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 08/16/16 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

 

172111, at *13 (finding it premature to determine whether Plaintiff “cannot sue under 

California’s consumer protection statutes on behalf of out-of-state putative class members, 

who made out-of-state purchases of products made by an out-of-state company”) 

(emphasis added). 

Case 3:13-cv-04828-TEH Document 81 Filed 08/16/16 Page 12 of 12