Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00828/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00828-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Rafael Guzman is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Frazier 

and Snyder based on Plaintiff’s claim for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

On July 20, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 46.) Pursuant 

to court order, Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 16, 2015. (ECF No. 50.) Defendants filed a 

reply on October 23, 2015.1 (ECF No. 51.) 

 

1

Defendants initially oppose Plaintiff’s opposition on the ground that it is untimely. Defendants correctly point out that 

Plaintiff filed his opposition on October 10, 2015, in response to the court’s order of September 18, 2015. Defendants do 

RAFAEL GUZMAN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

A. FRAZIER, et.al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-00828-LJO-SAB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 46]

Case 1:12-cv-00828-LJO-SAB Document 53 Filed 12/17/15 Page 1 of 19
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Washington Mut. Inc. v. 

U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed 

or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials 

cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). 

The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required 

to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

In resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider each party’s 

evidence. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, he must affirmatively demonstrate that 

no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for 

summary judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s case. In re 

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite de 

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

 

not provide a valid basis to not consider Plaintiff’s opposition, particularly given that it was timely filed in response to the 

court’s order and there is a lack of prejudice to Defendants. 

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In arriving at this recommendation, the Court has carefully reviewed and considered all 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses 

thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference to an argument, 

document, paper, or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the 

argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the 

evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

On January 29, 2011, at approximately 8:20 a.m., Defendant Frazier approached Plaintiff in his 

cell and informed him he was allowed to go to yard. Plaintiff was taken out of his cell, and Defendant 

Snyder searched him in the holding cages. Plaintiff was then led down a hallway out of the cell block 

by both Frazier and Snyder. Plaintiff proceeded to make a right turn which would have placed him in 

the proper exercise yard. However, at that point, in the very presence of, and heard by Frazier, Snyder 

ordered Plaintiff to make a left turn to the group yards. 

In the presence of and heard by Frazier, Plaintiff informed and said out loud to Snyder that he 

is member if the Southern Group and his life would be in danger if he was placed in the Northern 

Group yard. In the presence of and heard by Frazier, Snyder told Plaintiff that she is going to see what 

Plaintiff is made of. Plaintiff turned his attention to Frazier and asked her, “what is going on here?” 

Frazier just laughed at Plaintiff. 

Defendants Snyder and Frazier willfully and unlawfully escorted Plaintiff to the Northern 

Group yard. Snyder on one side holding Plaintiff’s arm, and Frazier on the other side holding 

Plaintiff’s other arm. Defendants willfully and unlawfully placed Plaintiff in the Northern Group yard. 

Plaintiff asserts that Snyder and Frazier knowingly, intentionally, and willfully placed Plaintiff 

in the Northern Group yard against his will, resulting in Plaintiff being the victim of an assault causing 

him severe injuries. Plaintiff was also shot in the back by a prison guard with a big block gun.

Prior to Plaintiff being placed into the inmate population, the placement committee interviews 

an inmate California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 1286 report which takes 

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into consideration certain relevant information to prevent certain civil rights violations as occurred 

herein. 

On January 28, 2011, at about 6:40 a.m., Plaintiff was using the toilet in his cell, and Snyder 

kicked his door and said “you’re assed out on your lunches because you have that shit on your 

window!” Plaintiff immediately told Snyder that he did not wish to disrespect her or any other female 

staff while Plaintiff was defecating. Snyder responded loudly to Plaintiff as she was walking out of 

the cell block stating, “If you don’t play by my rules you don’t have shit coming!” Minutes later when 

officer Kephart walked into the cell block, Plaintiff’s cellmate Rivera asked officer Kephart about 

their lunches and also told her what had just occurred with Snyder. Officer Kephart told inmate 

Rivera that Snyder was just trying to mark her territory and that Snyder overreacts sometimes but she 

would talk to her to give them their lunches. However, moments later Snyder opened their tray slot, 

threw two lunches inside the cell, and loudly told Plaintiff, “you want to rat me out, you will see what 

I am made of!” then walked away. 

B. Statement of Undisputed Facts

1. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Rafael Guzman (F-80505) was a state 

prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 

and housed on Facility B, Housing Unit 6 at California Correctional Institute (CCI). 

2. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants Frazier and Snyder were correctional 

officers over Facility B, Unit 6 at CCI. (ECF No. 46-3, Declaration of R. Snyder, ¶ 1 

(hereinafter Snyder Decl); Declaration of A. Frazier, ¶ 1 (hereinafter Frazier Decl.).)

3. At all times relevant to this action, P. Hanson was a correctional officer in the B 

Facility, Unit 6 at CCI. (ECF No. 46-3, Declaration of P. Hanson, ¶ 1 (hereinafter Hanson 

Decl.).)

THE OFFICERS

4. On January 29, 2011, all four correctional officers, Davis, Kephart, Snyder and Frazier, 

were newly assigned to Facility B as they had each only been on the Facility for a couple days. 

(Snyder Decl. ¶ 4; Frazier Decl. ¶ 4; Guzman Deposition Transcript (hereinafter Guzman Dep.)

28:6-29:11, 30:19-22, April 28, 2015.) The officers, including Defendants, were not yet 

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familiar with the inmates in Facility B. (Snyder Decl. ¶ 4; Frazier Decl. ¶ 4.) The observation 

officer, officer Hanson, was also newly assigned to Facility B and unfamiliar with the inmates 

or correctional staff. (P. Hanson Decl. ¶ 4.) 

THE UNIT

5. CCI, Facility B is a Security Housing Unit (SHU) which can house approximately 750 

inmates who have been designated as MAX-Custody and have received an Indeterminate or 

Determinate SHU term. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 2; Snyder Decl. ¶ 2.) All inmate movement within 

the SHU is controlled/escorted by correctional officers, and all inmates being escorted or 

removed from their cells are in handcuffs. (Id.) All inmates, prior to being escorted, are 

required to submit to body inspections/searches and are wanded with a hand-held metal 

detector or processed through a walk-through metal detector. (Id.) Within Facility B, there are 

eight SHU Buildings with a total of 516 cells, which are split between the Facility B yard, 

identified as A-side and B-side. (Id.) During this time period, the B side yard was equipped 

with Individual Exercise Modules for inmates who were not cleared by the Institutional 

Classification Committee (ICC) for group yard based on safety and security concerns for use 

by all eight Housing Units. (Id.) Inmates cleared by ICC for Controlled Compatible Group 

Yards used the exercise yards attached to the housing units for group exercise. (Id.) 

PREPARATION FOR RELEASE TO YARD

 6. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., in response to orders from their sergeant, the officers finished 

providing inmate showers and organized them for yard time on their appropriate yards. 

(Frazier Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Snyder Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) 

7. Correctional officers Snyder, Davis and Frazier finished providing inmate showers and 

returned inmates to their cells while correctional officer Kephart wrote down the yard list 

based off a previously hand written yard list. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 7; Snyder Decl. ¶ 7.) The four 

correctional officers then divided the distribution of work. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 8; Snyder Decl. ¶ 

8.) Defendant Frazier, along with officer Davis, escorted the Northern Hispanic inmates onto 

their yard while officers Snyder and Kephart let out the Southern Hispanic inmates onto their 

yard. (Id.) 

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8. Northern Hispanic and Southern Hispanic inmates have to be separated as the two are 

rival gangs. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 9.) They cannot be placed on the same yard or celled with one 

another, or violence is likely to erupt. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 9; Snyder Decl. ¶ 9; Hanson Decl. ¶ 9.) 

If a Northern Hispanic inmate is accidentally released on a Southern Hispanic yard, or vice 

versa, gang rules require that the rivals fight. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 10; Snyder Decl. ¶ 10; Hanson 

Decl. ¶ 10.) If a Northern Hispanic or a Southern Hispanic does not fight a rival gang member, 

he will be pushed out of the gang and the other gang members will want him killed. (Frazier 

Decl. ¶ 11; Snyder Decl. ¶ 11; Hanson Decl. ¶ 11.) Sometimes, gang members who have been 

ostracized can earn their way back. (Id.) Inmate Guzman, CDCR number F-80505, is a 

documented member of the Southern Hispanic gang. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 12; Snyder Decl. ¶ 12; 

Hanson Decl. ¶ 12.) But, officer Hanson was unaware of Plaintiff’s gang affiliation at the 

time.2 (Hanson Decl. ¶ 12.) 

9. While using a handwritten copy of the yard list, correctional officer Kephart 

inadvertently transposed cell B107 with B102 while writing the new yard list. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 

13; Snyder Decl. ¶ 13.) A different inmate by the name of Guzman was located in cell B107. 

This second inmate Guzman, was a member of the rival Northern Hispanic gang. (Frazier 

Decl. ¶ 14; Snyder Decl. ¶ 14.) Due to the error in transcribing the cell numbers, and the 

officers’ unfamiliarity with the inmates in the housing unit, all four officers were unaware 

there was an inmate also named Guzman, who was a Northern Hispanic gang member, in cell 

B107. (Id.) Because the transposed list prepared by correctional officer Kephart stated that the 

Guzman located in cell B102 was to be released on the Northern yard, and there was not a 

Guzman in cell B102, the officers though the list was actually supposed to read cell B101. 

(Frazier Decl. ¶ 15; Snyder Decl. ¶ 15.) Inmate Guzman, CDCR number F-80505, a Southern 

Hispanic gang member-the Plaintiff in this case, was located in cell B101. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 16; 

Snyder Decl. ¶ 16.) 

 

2

Defendants attribute this latter sentence as being attributed to themselves (Frazier and Snyder); however, neither Frazier’s 

or Snyder’s declarations state that they were unaware of Plaintiff’s gang affiliation at the time. (See ECF No. 46-3, Exs. 

B&C.) 

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10. At the time, Plaintiff inmate Guzman’s yard time was restricted to an individual 

exercise module and he was not permitted to have regular yard time. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 18; 

Snyder Decl. ¶ 18; Guzman Dep. at 47:12-19.) 

11. Individual exercise modules are 12-feet wide by 14-feet in depth and 10-feet in height, 

constructed of expanded metal. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 19; Snyder Decl. ¶ 19.) They have a partial 6-

inch-by-7-inch corrugated area with a sink and toilet. (Id.) Individual exercise modules are 

used by inmates who are assigned to them by the ICC. (Id.) Inmates assigned to individual 

exercise modules are placed in them alone or with their cellmates. (Id.) 

12. As officer Davis was the only male correctional officer on the facility at the time, he 

performed the strip search of inmate Guzman. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 22; Snyder Decl. ¶ 22.) 

Officers Snyder, Kephart and Frazier are all female. (Id.) Plaintiff did not say anything to 

officer Davis while he was strip searched. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 23; Snyder Decl. ¶ 23.) 

13. The officers remained on each side of inmate Guzman, per policy, as they escorted him 

to the Grill Gate. (Guzman Dep. at 46:11-18.) Before entering the Grill Gate area, Defendant 

Snyder used a hand-held metal detector on inmate Guzman and patted him down to check for 

metal items on his person that could be used as a weapon before allowing him to pass to the 

Grill Gate where officer Kephart stood. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 26; Snyder Decl. ¶ 26; Hanson Decl. ¶ 

13; Guzman Dep. at 42:9-12.) Plaintiff remained silent while Defendant Snyder wanded him 

and patted him down. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 27; Snyder Decl. ¶ 27; Guzman Dep. at 44:4-19.) 

14. The Grill Gate is a metal gated enclosure, measured approximately six-feet by six-feet, 

located between the rotunda and the yard where inmates are placed alone to ensure officer 

safety during the transition from the rotunda to the yard. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 28; Snyder Decl. ¶ 

28; Hanson Decl. ¶ 14.) This safety measure ensures inmates cannot rush and overpower 

officers when they are let back into the housing unit. (Id.) It also allows officers control by 

only allowing one inmate in the Grill Gate at a time. (Id.) Officers do not enter the Grill Gate 

area unless there is an emergency. (Id.) 

15. Once Plaintiff walked into the Grill Gate, officer Kephart closed the door and removed 

Plaintiff’s handcuffs. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 29; Snyder Decl. ¶ 29; Hanson Decl. ¶ 13; Guzman 

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Decl. at 54:1-7.) Defendant Frazier stood nearby while officer Kephart removed the handcuffs 

from inmate Guzman. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 30.) Inmate Guzman remained silent while the 

handcuffs were removed. (Guzman Dep. at 54:4-7.) Inmate Guzman was alone in the Grill 

Gate area. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 31; Snyder Decl. ¶ 31; Hanson Decl. ¶ 13.) 

16. Officer Hanson, the observation officer, then requested Plaintiff’s name. (Hanson 

Decl. ¶ 15.) Normally, the officer requests the inmate’s name and CDCR number, but if 

Plaintiff provided his CDCR number, it was inaudible. (Id.) However, if Plaintiff had 

provided his CDCR number, the error may have been caught and he would not have been 

released onto the incorrect yard. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 33.) 

FIGHT ON THE YARD

17. The control booth operator then opened the door to allow Plaintiff to enter the yard. 

(Frazier Decl. ¶ 34; Hanson Decl. ¶ 17; Guzman Dep. at 54:14-55:1.) No one, including either 

Defendant, pushed Plaintiff onto the yard. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 35.) 

18. When the door was opened, inmate Guzman did not yell out to any of the correctional 

officers that he needed help or was being placed on the incorrect yard, even though he had the 

time and ability to. (Guzman Dep. at 64:1-25.) Inmate Guzman then walked approximately 

five feet onto the yard directly up to one of the inmates, a member of the Northern Hispanic 

gang, and shook his hand. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 19; Guzman Dep. at 55:19-23.) The two spoke to 

one another in a calm manner for a brief period. Then, without warning, the two men began to 

fight. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 19; Guzman Dep. at 55:9-12.) 

19. Officer Hanson had the MINI 14 slung over his shoulder, but transitioned to the lesslethal 40mm and lifted it up to aim. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 20.) The gun was loaded with large 

40mm foam, non-lethal bullets. (Id.) Officer Hanson attempted to aim at the inmates’ lower 

bodies to get them to cease fighting, but was unable to do so due to their rapid movement. (Id.

at ¶ 21.) He then shot one round at inmate Guzman who responded to his command and 

assumed a prone position after the shot was fired. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 21; Guzman Dep. at 61:17-

62:13.) He then shot one round at the inmate Guzman was fighting, who was still standing. 

(Hanson Decl. ¶ 21.) The inmate assumed a prone position shortly thereafter. (Id.) 

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20. Officer Hanson was able to stop the fight between the inmates with the minimal amount 

of force necessary. (Hanson Decl. ¶ 22.) The fight lasted approximately fifteen second after it 

started, when it was broken up by officer Hanson. (Id.) 

AFTER THE INCIDENT

21. After the incident, Plaintiff bragged to Defendant Snyder saying he was going to sue 

her. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 39; Snyder Decl. ¶ 39.) Anytime she did something he did not like, he 

said he was going to sue her. (Id.) He did not make the same threats to the other officers, 

despite the fact that Defendant Snyder’s involvement in placing Plaintiff on the incorrect yard 

was limited. (Id.) 

C. Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted). Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to 

protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners because being violently assaulted in 

prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34 (quotation marks omitted); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 

2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable 

under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference occurs 

when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841 (quotations omitted); Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

Where failure to protect is alleged, the defendant must knowingly fail to protect plaintiff from 

a serious risk of conditions of confinement where defendant had reasonable opportunity to intervene. 

Orwat v. Maloney, 360 F.Supp.2d 146, 155 (D. Mass. 2005), citing Gaudreault v. Municipality of 

Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 

2006) (defendant’s deliberate indifference must effectively condone the attack by allowing it to 

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happen); accord, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-834 (if deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively 

condones the attack by allowing it to happen, those officials can be held liable to the injured victim). 

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject 

to demonstrating in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder 

may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was 

obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

D. Defendants’ Version of the Facts

Defendants object to Plaintiff’s opposition because Plaintiff failed to reproduce the itemized 

facts or identify which, if any, of the undisputed facts he claims are disputed. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s opposition fails to cite to any evidence other than his own opinion. Defendants also submit 

that Plaintiff’s October 10, 2015, opposition was not timely as it filed over two months past the due 

date. 

Defendants Snyder and Frazier argue they acted reasonably under the objective prong of the 

deliberate indifference standard and cannot be liable. Defendants’ submit that their actions amount to 

negligence, at best. 

Defendants submit that on January 29, 2011, the four correctional officers working, David, 

Kephart, Snyder and Frazier, were newly assigned to Facility B and had each only been on the Facility 

for a couple days. The officers, including Defendants, were not yet familiar with the over 100 inmates 

in Facility B. After completion of inmate showers, officer Kephart wrote down the yard list based off 

a previously hand-written yard list. 

Officers Snyder, Davis and Frazier finished inmate showers and returned the inmates to their 

cells, while officer Kephart wrote down the yard list based off a previously hand-written yard list. The 

four officers then divided the distribution of work. Defendant Frazier, along with officer Davis, 

escorted the Northern Hispanic inmates onto their yard, while Defendant Snyder and officer Kephart

let out the Southern Hispanic inmates onto their yard. 

While using a previously handwritten copy of the yard list, officer Kephart inadvertently 

transposed cell B107 with B102 while writing the new yard list. A different inmate by the name of 

Guzman was located in cell B107. The second inmate Guzman was a member of the rival Northern 

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Hispanic gang. Due to the error in transcribing and interpreting the cell numbers, and the officers’ 

unfamiliarity with the inmates in the housing unit, all four officers were unaware there was an inmate 

also named Guzman, who was a Northern Hispanic gang member in cell B107. Because the 

transposed list prepared in error by officer Kephart stated that the Guzman located in cell B102 was to 

be released on the Northern yard, and there was not a Guzman in cell B102, the officers thought the 

list was actually supposed to read cell B101. Therefore, he was released from his cell to yard on 

January 29, 2011. At the time, Plaintiff inmate Guzman’s yard time was restricted to an individual 

exercise module and he was not permitted to have regular yard time.

Defendant Frazier escorted the Northern Hispanic onto the Northern yard with officer Davis. 

Officer Kephart and Defendant Snyder finished the escort of the Southern Hispanic inmates to their 

yard before officer Davis and Defendant Frazier finished escorting the Northern Hispanic inmates to 

their yard. Officer Davis and Defendant Frazier then escorted Plaintiff to the cell module located 

inside the housing unit for a strip search, which is customarily performed before inmates are allowed 

onto the yard. As officer Davis was the only male correctional officer on the facility at the time, he 

performed the strip search of inmate Guzman. Officer Kephart and Defendants Snyder and Frazier are 

all female. Plaintiff did not say anything to officer Davis while he was strip searched. 

Officer Davis and Defendant Frazier then allowed inmate Guzman to put his clothes back on 

and lead him down to the rotunda. Plaintiff remained silent during the escort, despite knowing he was 

not supposed to go to yard and instead was supposed to go to the individual exercise module for 

exercise. Before entering the Grill Gate area, Defendant Snyder used a hand-held metal detector and 

patted Plaintiff down to check for metal items on his person that could be used as a weapon before 

allowing him to pass to the Grill Gate where officer Kephart stood. Plaintiff remained silent while 

Defendant Snyder wanded him and patted him down.

Once Plaintiff walked into the Grill Gate, officer Kephart closed the door and removed 

Plaintiff’s handcuffs. Defendant Frazier stood nearby while officer Kephart removed the handcuffs 

from inmate Guzman. Defendant Snyder was not near Plaintiff at this time and did not place him in 

the Grill Gate area. Plaintiff was alone inside the Grill Gate area. Correctional staff are not to enter 

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the Grill Gate area with inmates as it creates a safety hazard. The Grill Gate area is meant as a barrier 

between the yard and the rotunda to prevent inmates in the yard from charging officers in the rotunda.

Officer Hanson, the observation officer, then requested Plaintiff’s name. Plaintiff either 

mumbled his CDCR number or failed to provide it. However, if Plaintiff had audibly provided his 

CDCR number, or informed staff they were placing him on the incorrect yard, the error could have 

been remedied. Plaintiff, instead, remained silent as to the issue.

The control booth operator then opened the door to allow Plaintiff to enter the yard. No once, 

including Defendants, pushed Plaintiff onto the yard. He walked out on his own volition. He then 

walked up to one of the Northern Hispanic gang members, and shook his hand. The two engaged in a 

brief conversation, and then, without warning, began to fight. The fight lasted approximately fifteen 

seconds, when it was broken up by officer Hanson.

None of the officers, including Defendants, intentionally placed, or took part in placing, 

Plaintiff on the Northern Hispanic yard. Due to the error in transcribing the yard list, all officers, 

including Defendants, thought they were placing the Northern Hispanic gang member Guzman onto 

the yard.

After the incident, Plaintiff bragged to Defendant Snyder saying he was going to sue her. 

Anytime she did something he did not like, he said he was going to sue her. He did not make the same 

threats to the other officers, despite the fact that Defendant Snyder’s involvement in placing Plaintiff 

on the incorrect yard was limited. 

E. Plaintiff’s Version of the Facts

As previously stated, although Plaintiff filed an opposition, it is not signed under penalty of 

perjury and cannot itself be considered as an opposing affidavit and suffices to present argument only, 

not evidence. Thus, in order to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendants Snyder and 

Frazier, Plaintiff’s complaint and deposition testimony must include enough “factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

556), that both Snyder and Frazier knew Plaintiff was a Southern Hispanic gang member and could 

not be placed on the Northern Hispanic gang exercise yard, and failed to take reasonable action to 

abate it. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Plaintiff’s point of view differs with respect to the interaction on January 29, 2011, and 

Plaintiff’s version of events is corroborated by the testimony he provided at his deposition taken on 

April 28, 2015. (ECF No. 47, Guzman Dep. at 23-28, 40-54.) 

Plaintiff contends that on January 29, 2011, at approximately 8:20 a.m., Defendant Frazier 

approached Plaintiff in his cell and informed him he was allowed to go to yard. Plaintiff was taken out 

of his cell, and Defendant Snyder searched him in the holding cages. Plaintiff was then led down a 

hallway out of the cell block by both Frazier and Snyder. Plaintiff proceeded to make a right turn 

which would have placed him in the proper exercise yard. However, at that point, in the very presence 

of, and heard by Frazier, Snyder ordered Plaintiff to make a left turn to the group yards. 

In the presence of and heard by Frazier, Plaintiff informed and said out loud to Snyder that he 

is member if the Southern Group and his life would be in danger if he was placed in the Northern 

Group yard. In the presence of and heard by Frazier, Snyder told Plaintiff that she is going to see what 

Plaintiff is made of. Plaintiff turned his attention to Frazier and asked her, “what is going on here?” 

Frazier just laughed at Plaintiff. 

Defendants Snyder and Frazier willfully and unlawfully escorted Plaintiff to the Northern 

Group yard. Snyder on one side holding Plaintiff’s arm, and Frazier on the other side holding 

Plaintiff’s other arm. Defendants willfully and unlawfully placed Plaintiff in the Northern Group yard. 

Plaintiff asserts that Snyder and Frazier knowingly, intentionally, and willfully placed Plaintiff 

in the Northern Group yard against his will, resulting in Plaintiff being the victim of an assault causing

him severe injuries. Plaintiff was also shot in the back by a prison guard with a big block gun.

On January 28, 2011, at about 6:40 a.m., Plaintiff was using the toilet in his cell, and Snyder 

kicked his door and said “you’re assed out on your lunches because you have that shit on your 

window!” Plaintiff immediately told Snyder that he did not wish to disrespect her or any other female 

staff while Plaintiff was defecating. Snyder responded loudly to Plaintiff as she was walking out of 

the cell block stating, “If you don’t play by my rules you don’t have shit coming!” Minutes later when 

officer Kephart walked into the cell block, Plaintiff’s cellmate Rivera asked officer Kephart about 

their lunches and also told her what had just occurred with Snyder. Officer Kephart told inmate 

Rivera that Snyder was just trying to mark her territory and that Snyder overreacts sometimes but she 

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would talk to her to give them their lunches. However, moments later Snyder opened their tray slot, 

threw two lunches inside the cell, and loudly told Plaintiff, “you want to rat me out, you will see what 

I am made of!” then walked away. Plaintiff’s version of events that took place on January 28, 2011, is 

corroborated by his deposition testimony. (ECF No. 47, Guzman Dep. at 33-39.) 

F. Analysis and Findings on Defendants’ Motion

1. Failure to Protect

Defendants initially argue that they acted reasonably under the objective prong of the 

deliberate indifference standard and cannot be held liable. Defendants reason that their actions 

amount to negligence, at best. Defendants argue that their actions were not “repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. Defendants submit that the mistake in 

transcribing the yard list and corresponding cell numbers and yard placement was understandable 

given their relative newness to the housing unit. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff cannot meet 

the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard. 

Defendants argue that even if they knew Plaintiff was a Southern Hispanic gang member, 

their actions were in no way indicative of them having any knowledge that Plaintiff would engage in a 

fight once placed on the yard. However, contrary to Defendants’ argument, Defendants Frazier and 

Snyder declare (and it is undisputed) that Northern Hispanic and Southern Hispanic inmates have to be 

separated as the two are rival gangs. They cannot be placed on the same yard or celled with one 

another, or violence is likely to occur. (Frazier Decl. ¶ 9; Snyder Decl. ¶ 9.) If a Northern Hispanic is 

accidentally released on a Southern Hispanic yard, or vice versa, gang rules require that the rivals 

fight. (Id. ¶ 10.) If a Northern Hispanic or a Southern Hispanic does not fight a rival gang member, 

he will be pushed out of the gang and other gang members will want him killed. (Id. ¶ 11.) Indeed, 

the danger was evident in this case based on the fact that Plaintiff was involved in a fight with a rival 

Northern Hispanic gang member. Defendants cannot creditably argue that placement of Plaintiff in a 

yard with a rival gang member does not constitute an objectively serious harm. 

In addition, viewing in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence that 

Defendants Snyder and Frazier were subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s Southern Hispanic gang status 

and knowingly allowed and/or released him to the Northern Hispanic exercise yard. Although Snyder 

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and Frazier both insist that they had no prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s gang affiliation and Plaintiff did 

not inform either of them on the day of January 29, 2011, there is conflicting evidence presented. 

First, although Defendants Snyder and Frazier deny knowledge of Plaintiff’s Southern Hispanic gang 

affiliation, neither of their declarations specifically declares such fact (and is at least subject to 

debate). (See ECF No. 46-3, contrast Hanson Decl. ¶ 12 (Ex. D.), with Snyder Decl. ¶ 12 (Ex. B.) & 

Frazier Decl. ¶ 12 (Ex. C).) Second, Plaintiff declares that he specifically informed Defendant Snyder 

in the presence of Defendant Frazier that he is member if the Southern Group and his life would be in 

danger if he was placed in the Northern Group yard. In the presence of and heard by Frazier, Snyder 

told Plaintiff that she is going to see what Plaintiff is made of. Plaintiff turned his attention to Frazier 

and asked her, “what is going on here?” Frazier just laughed at Plaintiff. Third, Plaintiff submits 

evidence, which if believed by the jury, could establish a motive on the part of Defendants. Plaintiff 

alleges, by way of verified complaint, that just one day prior to the incident on January 28, 2011, at 

about 6:40 a.m., Plaintiff was using the toilet. Defendant Snyder kicked the door and said, “You’re 

assed out on your lunches because you have that shit on your window!” Plaintiff’s cell door was 

partially covered. Plaintiff immediately told her that he did not wish to disrespect her or any other 

female staff while Plaintiff was defecating. Snyder responded loudly at Plaintiff as she was walking 

out of the cell-block, “If you don’t play by my rules you don’t have shit coming!” Minutes later when 

officer Kephart walked into the cell-block, Plaintiff’s cellmate Rivera asked Kephart about their 

lunches, and also told her what had just taken place with officer Snyder. Kephart then told inmate 

Rivera that officer Snyder was just trying to mark her territory and Snyder over-reacts sometimes but 

she would talk to Snyder to provide their lunches. Moments later, Defendant Snyder opens the tray 

slot, throws two lunches inside the cell, and loudly said to Plaintiff, “You want to rat me out, you will 

see what I am made of!” then walked away. (ECF No. 17, 2nd Amd. Compl. at 7-8.) Defendants 

deny all of Plaintiff’s allegations. 

Defendants argue repeatedly that Plaintiff failed to inform any officer, including themselves 

that he was a Southern Hispanic gang member and could not be released to the Northern Hispanic 

exercise yard. Defendants argue and Plaintiff admits that he remained silent while the handcuffs were 

removed and did not yell for help prior to entering the Northern Hispanic exercise yard. However, 

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Plaintiff explained at his deposition that he was threatened and warned that his failure to comply with 

officers’ orders would result in a rules violation report. (See Guzman Dep. at 51-53, 63-64, 67-68.) 

Plaintiff also testified that he refused to allow the handcuffs to be taken off while inside the grill gate 

out of fear for his safety, but he was threatened with a rules violation. (See Guzman Dep. at 53.) In 

addition, Plaintiff testified that he had gang tattoos consisting of the number 13 on his knuckles (which 

is a well-known symbol of the Southern Hispanic gang) and gang member name of Babrrio Pobre on 

his forehead and neck-which may give rise to a reasonable inference of knowledge. (Id. at 57-60.) 

The extent of Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s gang affiliation and the exact events leading up to 

his release to the Northern Hispanic exercise yard are disputed and are issues to be resolved by the 

trier of fact, not the Court. 

Based on the conflicting testimony presented by way of verified affidavits and deposition 

testimony, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants Snyder and Frazier failed 

to protect Plaintiff from harm on January 29, 2011, by allowing his release to the Northern Hispanic 

exercise yard. The Court cannot weigh the parties’ conflicting evidence or make credibility 

determinations on summary judgment, see, e.g., George v. Edhom, 752 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 

2013) and Plaintiff’s evidence suffices to create a disputed issue of material fact as to whether 

Defendants Snyder and Frazier knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. Summary 

judgment in their favor should be denied.

2. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is 

“immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is 

effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Qualified immunity shields government 

officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests - the need to hold public 

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably,” Pearson v. Callahan, 

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555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009), and it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law,” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

In resolving the claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether, taken in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, whether 

the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993. 

While often beneficial to address in that order, the Court has discretion to address the two-step inquiry 

in the order it deems most suitable under the circumstances. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (overruling 

holding in Saucier that the two-step inquiry must be conducted in that order, and the second step is 

reached only if the court first finds a constitutional violation); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993-94. 

a. Constitutional Violation

“The constitutional right at issue in this case is the right to be free from violence at the hands 

of other inmates,” Castro v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 785 F.3d 336, 344 (9th Cir. 2015), and the fact 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2013). This case involves violence between rival gang members during outside yard 

exercise. 

Plaintiff is a Southern Hispanic gang inmate and, in January 2011, was restricted to individual 

exercise module in January 2011 and he was not actually permitted to have regular yard time. On 

January 29, 2011, Plaintiff was released on the Northern Hispanic exercise yard and was involved in 

the physical altercation with a rival gang member. Plaintiff contends, by way of verified complaint, 

that on January 29, 2011, he informed Defendant Snyder, in front and heard by Defendant Frazier, that 

he was a Southern Hispanic gang member and his personal safety would be in jeopardy if released to 

the Northern Hispanic exercise yard, yet Defendant Snyder told him that she is going to see what 

Plaintiff is made of. 

Plaintiff’s evidence regarding the events in question, accepted as true at this juncture, is 

sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants knowingly disregarded an objectively 

serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Foster v. Runnels, 

554 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2009). 

///

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b. Clearly Established Right 

Regarding the second step of the inquiry, “[f]or a constitutional right to be clearly established, 

its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he/she is 

doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). While the reasonableness 

inquiry may not be undertaken as a broad, general proposition, neither is official action entitled to

protection “unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 

739. “Specificity only requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under preexisting law,” Clement v. 

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and prison personnel “can still be on 

notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,” Hope, 536 U.S. 

at 741.

The existence of material factual disputes does not necessarily preclude a finding of qualified 

immunity. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1053. “Qualified immunity gives government officials 

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,” Ashcroft v. 

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011). Here, however, the duty to protect inmates form harm at the hands of 

other inmates had long been established by 2011, and no reasonable officer could have believed that 

releasing a Southern Hispanic gang member inmate on to the Northern Hispanic gang yard was 

appropriate when they were notified by Plaintiff of his gang affiliation. The Court reiterates that to the 

extent Plaintiff’s version of events lack credibility and/or is undermined by some of the facts 

presented, that evaluation must be made by the jury. See, e.g., Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1053 

(9th Cir. 2015); Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

IV.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, filed on July 20, 2015, be DENIED, and this action be set for trial.

This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with this Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file written objections with the 

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Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendation.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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