Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01122/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10cv1122

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD WAYNE TAYLOR, Civil No. 10cv1122-LAB (PCL)

Petitioner,

REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENIAL OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

PAM AHLIN, Executive Director of 

Coalinga State Hospital, 

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry A.

Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Ronald Wayne Taylor (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a person civilly committed to the

California Department of Mental Health under the authority of California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 6600 et seq., commonly known as the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVP

Act”), is proceeding pro se with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a

Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 4.) Petitioner claims he was

committed in violation of the state and federal constitutions because: his commitment was based

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1

 Because Petitioner has attached additional pages to the First Amended Petition, and because

his Traverse is not sequentially paginated, the Court will refer to the page numbers assigned by the

Court’s electronic case filing system when providing citations to those documents.

10cv1122

on the illegal use of underground regulations (claim one); he received ineffective assistance of

counsel (claim two); the burden of proof rests on Petitioner to prove he is not a sexually violent

predator rather than on the government to prove that he is (claim three); and the SVP Act

violates equal protection (claim four) and ex post facto principles (claim five). (First Amended

Petition “FAP” at 6-35.1

) 

Pam Ahlin, the Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital (hereinafter “Respondent”),

proceeding by and through the California Attorney General, has filed an Answer to the FAP

along with an attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and has

lodged portions of the state court record with the Court. (Doc. No. 9.) Respondent contends that

claim one does not raise a federal question and that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court

remedies as to claims two and five, but that those claims should be denied because they are

without merit. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Answer “Ans. Mem.” at

3-4.) Respondent also contends that, with respect to the claims presented here which were

addressed on the merits by the state court, habeas relief is not available because the state court’s

adjudication was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. (Id. at 4-28.)

Petitioner has filed a Traverse with an attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in support thereof. (Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner contends that all his claims have been properly

exhausted and they all merit federal habeas relief. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Traverse “Trav. Mem.” at 9-34.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

as to any claim presented in this action. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the First

Amended Petition be DENIED. 

/ / /

/ / /

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10cv1122

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

On November 7, 2006, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a Petition for

Involuntary Treatment of a Sexually Violent Predator (hereinafter “SVP petition”) in the San

Diego County Superior Court, which sought Petitioner’s commitment to the custody of the

California Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term. (Lodgment No. 8, Clerk’s

Tr. [“CT”] at 1-4.) Attached to the SVP petition were supporting documents which indicated

Petitioner had suffered convictions for forcible rape in 1975, 1979 and 1989. (Id. at 5-56.) The

SVP petition alleged that Petitioner has a currently diagnosed mental disorder which makes him

a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely he will engage in sexually violent

predatory criminal behavior if released from the state hospital. (Id. at 3.) 

A probable cause hearing was held on March 6-7, 2007, at which the trial judge found

probable cause to believe the allegations in the SVP petition were true. (CT 130-31.) A jury

trial commenced on June 11, 2007. (CT 136.) On June 13, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of

true, and Petitioner was immediately committed to the State Department of Mental Health for

an indeterminate period. (CT 142.)

Petitioner appealed his commitment to the California Court of Appeal, raising the same

claims presented in the instant First Amended Petition, with the exception of several portions

of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented here as claim two. (Lodgment Nos. 1-3.)

The appellate court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the judgment of commitment.

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2009).) On

May 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the appellate court’s decision with the

California Supreme Court, in which he raised claims one, three and four presented in the First

Amended Petition here. (Lodgment No. 2.) On June 10, 2009, the California Supreme Court

denied the petition with an order which stated in full: “Petition for review denied.” (Lodgment

No. 6.) 

/ / /

/ / /

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III.

EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL 

Dana Evan Putnam, a clinical and forensic psychologist in private practice, testified that

he reviewed Petitioner’s records from the Department of Mental Health, as well as police,

probation, and court records relating to his prior criminal offenses, along with psychological and

psychiatric reports filed by previous evaluators. (Lodgment No. 7, Reporter’s Transcript [“RT”]

at 20, 31-33.) He also met with Petitioner for about an hour and forty-five minutes. (RT 33-34.)

Doctor Putnam explained to the jury that there are three parts to an SVP evaluation: (1) review

of the person’s criminal history to determine whether it meets the statutory criteria; (2)

determining whether the person suffers from a mental disorder which predisposes the person to

the commission of sexually violent acts; and (3) making a determination regarding how likely

the person is to commit future sexually violent and predatory acts as a result of that mental

disorder. (RT 26.) 

Doctor Putnam inventoried Petitioner’s criminal history for the jury, and testified that it

met the statutory criteria and therefore satisfied the first part of the SVP evaluation. (RT 51.)

Petitioner was first arrested at age 13 in 1967 for loitering and burglary, resulting in three days

in jail. (RT 37.) Petitioner was arrested for burglary and resisting arrest in 1972, and arrested

again in 1974 for burglary and refusing to provide information. (RT 37.) His first sex offense

occurred in 1975, when he was convicted of rape by force. (RT 38, 41.) In that incident, a

woman was walking to work in the morning when Petitioner rode up to her on a bicycle and told

her, “Run, I’m going to kill you,” or “Run, I’m going to hurt you.” (RT 40.) Petitioner chased

the woman down, knocked her to the ground, dragged her into the bushes, put a pillowcase over

her head, threatened to kill her if she screamed, and raped her. (RT 40-41.) The victim

screamed when she saw a nearby police officer and Petitioner was immediately apprehended.

(RT 41.) He was convicted of forcible rape on June 31, 1975, in the Los Angeles Superior

Court, and sentenced to three years in state prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner was released on parole on July 5, 1978, and forcibly raped another woman on

November 21, 1978. (RT 41-42.) In that incident, Petitioner, who was 24 years old at the time,

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approached a 51-year-old woman in a parking lot while wearing a ski mask and a hood. (RT

42.) Petitioner told the victim, “I’m going to hurt you,” put a rope or cord around her neck, and

choked her until she lost consciousness and hit the ground. (Id.) He dragged her into his car and

drove a short distance to a construction area. (Id.) Petitioner vaginally raped the victim after

she regained consciousness, and unsuccessfully attempted anal penetration. (Id.) When

Petitioner’s car became stuck in the mud, he told the victim to lie in the car for half an hour and

ran away. (Id.) He went to a nearby restaurant, was seen by a waitress throwing his muddy

shoes in the restaurant’s dumpster, and then called the police and reported that his car had been

stolen. (Id.) Petitioner was convicted of rape by force, kidnapping, and assault with a deadly

weapon in San Mateo County Superior Court as a result of that incident, and was sentenced to

nine years in state prison. (RT 43,)

Petitioner was released on parole on March 22, 1984, and committed a third forcible rape

on June 27, 1989. (Id.) In that incident, which occurred in San Diego, Petitioner approached

a woman in the parking lot of a taco stand and asked her if she had a pipe and if she smoked.

(RT 43-44.) She told him “no,” and as she started to walk away Petitioner held a knife to her

back and told her that she was going to go with him. (RT 44.) He walked her to a residence,

entered, and asked her, “Do you want to be fucked standing up?” (Id.) He undressed her,

penetrated her while standing, then threw her to the ground and raped her again. (Id.) He also

penetrated her anally with his finger and orally copulated her. (Id.) Toward the end the woman

asked if she could leave, to which Petitioner replied, “No, not until I’m done with you.” (Id.)

After the rape, he asked her, “Do you feel like you’ve just been fucked?”, to which she replied,

“No, I feel like killing you.” (Id.) Petitioner was convicted in San Diego Superior Court of rape

by force as a result of that incident, and was sentenced to twenty-eight years in state prison. (Id.)

Near the completion of that sentence, Petitioner was referred through the Department of Mental

Health for evaluation as an SVP. (RT 45.) On January 25, 2005, he was found to be an SVP and

committed to the state hospital for a term of two years. (Id.) 

Doctor Putnam testified that the second part of the SVP evaluation had been satisfied in

that he had diagnosed Petitioner as suffering from Paraphilia not otherwise specified, the general

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criteria of which involves intense or current sexual fantasies, urges, or behaviors over a period

greater than six months that involve nonconsenting adults. (RT 50-51, 53.) This was based on

the finding that Petitioner’s criminal sexual behavior shows a clear history of recurrent sexual

fantasies, urges and behaviors involving nonconsenting adults over a period longer than six

months, which he did not stop engaging in despite having been convicted and imprisoned twice.

(RT 52.) In addition, Dr. Putnam observed deviant aspects of the rapes not found in normative

behavior, including maintaining sexual arousal despite or perhaps because of extreme violence

on the victims, and the choice of one victim who was more than twice his age. (RT 52-53.)

There was also a sadistic element to the rapes, and although Petitioner had previously been

diagnosed as having a sadistic disorder, Dr. Putnam said he did not diagnose Petitioner which

such a disorder because his behavior was not completely focused on torturing the victims. (RT

53.) 

Doctor Putnam diagnosed Petitioner with antisocial personality disorder, which he said

aggravates the Paraphilia diagnosis. (RT 54, 59.) The antisocial personality diagnosis was

based on Petitioner’s history and behavior, which showed a pervasive pattern of disregard for,

and violation of, the rights of others beginning at age fifteen. (RT 56.) This pattern includes a

failure to conform to social norms as shown by his criminal record; deceitfulness indicated by

repeated lying, including the use of aliases with the police; and impulsivity shown by his

criminal sexual behavior, his behavior while incarcerated which included fighting and an escape

attempt, as well as recent impulsive behavior while committed at the state hospital in which he

became focused on a female staff member and had inappropriately spoken to her, touched her

clothing, and told her he was in love with her and wanted to marry her. (RT 56-58, 70.) The

pattern also includes Petitioner’s history of consistent irresponsibility in that he has no record

of maintaining a job for any length of time, as well as his lack of remorse in that he has never

acknowledged that he raped anyone, but has blamed the victims by contending they were

prostitutes or had misidentified him as the rapist. (RT 57.) 

Doctor Putnam testified that he observed a predatory aspect to Petitioner’s behavior, in

that Petitioner chose strangers for victims, suggesting that any future offense would be predatory

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in nature as well. (RT 61.) In addition, Dr. Putnam conducted a risk assessment which

supported a conclusion that Petitioner is expected to predatorily reoffend in the future, and

treatment in the community would not reduce that risk. (RT 62-72.) He used an instrument

called Static-99, made up of risk factors which do not change once they are identified. (RT 63.)

These factors include: (1) youth; (2) whether the person has lived with a lover for longer than

two years; (3) whether the conviction involved a non-sexual component such as robbery;

(4) prior nonsexual violence; (5) prior sex offenses; (6) prior prison sentences; (7) convictions

for noncontact sex offenses; and (8) relationship to the victim. (RT 64-65.) Other

considerations which informed Dr. Putnam’s opinion that Petitioner posed a risk included:

(1) intimacy deficits as indicated by his criminal history and lack of commitment to long-term

relationships; (2) problems with sexual self-regulation as indicated by a history of numerous

sexual partners numbering between 50 and 80, including a deviant interest in nonconsensual sex;

(3) a history of attitudes tolerant of sexual assault, which includes blaming the victims and

denying that he caused them harm; (4) lack of cooperation with supervision shown by parole

violations, prison rule violations and difficulty with hospital staff; and (5) problems with selfregulation and lack of insight, including his belief that he does not suffer from a disorder related

to sexual offending and has shown no interest in participating in sex offender treatment. (RT

69-78.) On cross-examination, Dr. Putnam admitted that certain tests ordinarily used by

psychiatrists, as opposed to psychologists like himself, to diagnose personality disorders were

not given in this case, and are not typically given in SVP evaluations. (RT 96-98.) Doctor

Putnam stated that this was mainly due to the fact that there has been a protocol established for

SVP evaluations, and although he said there is some leeway in regard to what tests are

administered, he also stated that such tests “are not the kind of tests that really are helpful in

answering the questions that we’re asked to answer in these evaluations, so they are not routinely

used by anybody.” (RT 104-05.) 

Petitioner was called as a witness by the prosecution. He testified that he has been at the

state hospital for the last two years, and disagreed with Dr. Putnam’s testimony that he had not

been involved in a treatment program because, as he understands it, “the whole hospital is

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supposed to be sex offender treatment.” (RT 115-18.) He also said there was a delay to begin

treatment due to the fact that the hospital had just opened and was crowded, and that he was on

the “waiting list to get on the waiting list” to begin phase one treatment. (RT 119-24.)

Nevertheless, he said he considered himself actively programming in phase one of the five-phase

treatment plan because he was currently taking a computer class, lifting weights, going to the

library, and attending music therapy. (Id.) Petitioner testified that he was not involved in the

first rape for which he was convicted, but that someone else committed the rape and he was

wrongly convicted. (RT 124-26.) With respect to the second rape conviction, he said his car

was stolen and he got a ride to a restaurant where he called the police. (RT 126.) He admitted

to having been arrested and convicted on that occasion, but claimed he had nothing whatsoever

to do with that rape. (RT 126-27.) When asked about the coincidence of twice being falsely

convicted of rapes committed by someone else, he stated that it was a result of the fact that he

suffered from bad luck. (RT 127, 137.)

With respect to the third rape conviction, Petitioner acknowledged that he knew the

victim, but claimed she was a prostitute. (RT 129.) He denied raping her and said he paid her

cocaine in exchange for sex. (Id.) Petitioner stated that he was arrested on another occasion,

although not convicted, when he was flagged down by a prostitute on his way home from work,

told her he did not want sex but agreed to buy her food since she said she was hungry, and she

snatched his money and ran. (RT 129-30.) He grabbed her and took his money back, but the

police intervened and arrested him when they saw him holding her and picking up his money.

(RT 130-31.) He admitted having had about 80 sexual partners during his lifetime, but said less

than five of those were prostitutes, and stated that he had slept with about 80 women during a

two-year period between 1987-89 when he was body-building and working as a stripper. (RT

133-35.)

Petitioner testified that he did not think he had any type of mental disorder, and that he

possessed enough will power to control his passions and urges, which he characterized as normal

in any case. (RT 136-37.) He denied ever being involved in serious misconduct while in prison,

although he admitted he had received about twenty-five disciplinary write-ups. (RT 137-44.)

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He also denied any inappropriate behavior towards the female staff member at the state hospital

mentioned by Dr. Putnam, but explained that the staff member in question had tried to seduce

him, and that the hospital pressured her to report their contact as inappropriate. (RT 144-46.)

He said the staff member sang and danced for him and told him that she could be his soulmate,

and he believed they would be together now but for interference by the hospital. (RT 145-46.)

He denied every raping or harming a woman, and said he would never harm a woman because

he would not want anyone to harm his mother or sister. (RT 149-50.)

John Hupka, a psychologist in private practice, testified that he conducted an evaluation

of Petitioner in order to determine whether he met the three criteria for commitment as a SVP,

as state law requires two evaluations prior to commitment under the SVP law. (RT 107-08,

214.) In preparing his evaluation, Dr. Hupka met with Petitioner for about an hour, reviewed

records relating to his criminal offenses, and reviewed his state hospital records. (RT 213-14.)

Doctor Hupka opined that Petitioner’s criminal history satisfied the first criteria based on the

criminal offenses outlined by Dr. Putnam, and in addition provided information regarding the

incident Petitioner had mentioned during his testimony where he was arrested but not convicted.

(RT 219, 221.) According to the records, that incident involved Petitioner asking the victim, a

five-months pregnant woman, if she wanted a ride, and then telling her, “Shutup, and if you do

what I want you won’t be hurt.” (RT 219.) Petitioner drove the victim to an alley where he told

her, “You’re going to give me some, bitch.” (Id.) When she attempted to run, they struggled

and Petitioner removed her clothes. (Id.) The victim continued to fight, and Petitioner fled

when police officers intervened. (Id.) Petitioner explained the incident to his probation officer

by saying that he and the victim were partying and having fun when the victim attempted to grab

his money, and that he was attempting to restrain the victim when her clothes somehow came

off. (RT 220.) Doctor Hupka testified that when he asked Petitioner about his offenses,

Petitioner at first simply denied committing any of the rapes for which he had been convicted.

(Id.) When asked about the nature of the violence involved, Petitioner indicated that the offenses

were not that bad and that he never hurt the victims. (RT 221.) Doctor Hupka said that

Petitioner took “great umbrage” at the suggestion the rapes involved violence because Petitioner

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did not “stab them” or “rip their guts out,” although he acknowledged that maybe the victims’

dignity may have been hurt a little bit. (Id.) Doctor Hupka opined that these statements were

a roundabout way of acknowledging he committed the offenses. (Id.) 

With respect to the second criteria, Dr. Hupka opined that Petitioner suffers from

Paraphilia marked by a disturbed desire for sexual gratification by sadistically raping

nonconsenting females. (RT 221-25.) He said that Petitioner’s disorder is quite rare, as most

people who engage in rape never rape again, but Petitioner reoffends because sadistic rape

defines his sexual orientation. (RT 226-27.) Doctor Hupka also found that Petitioner suffers

from antisocial personality disorder, although he said that alone does not satisfy the criteria for

an SVP in that about 75% of all prisoners are antisocial. (RT 228.) Doctor Hupka opined that

the combination of Petitioner’s antisocial personality with his Paraphilia provides a formidable

obstacle to change and an obstacle to participation in treatment programs, which further supports

his opinion that the third criteria has been satisfied in that it is likely Petitioner will engage in

sexually violent predatory criminal behavior if released. (RT 229-38.) Doctor Hupka testified

that the hospital records indicate that Petitioner has not participated in treatment during his twoyear commitment to the state hospital, and that the programs Petitioner has participated in were

not related to SVP treatment. (RT 238-51.) 

The court took judicial notice of Petitioner’s three rape convictions. (RT 265.) The

People rested, after which the defense immediately rested without presentation of evidence. (RT

265-66.) The jury was instructed (RT 269-78), heard closing arguments (RT 279-97), and

deliberated about forty-five minutes before returning a true finding. (RT 305-08; CT 141-42,)

Petitioner was immediately committed to the State Department of Mental Health for an

indeterminate period. (CT 142.)

IV.

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

(1) Petitioner was committed based on the use of illegal underground regulations in

violation of federal due process because the SVP commitment protocol was not enacted through

the rule-making process of the California Administrative Procedures Act. (FAP at 6-10.)

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(2) Petitioner was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel because his counsel failed to: (a) file a motion to have the SVP petition dismissed based

on the use of illegal underground regulations; (b) object to testimony as to statements he made

regarding his prior offenses; (c) object to the use of the Static-99 actuarial instrument; (d) retain

an expert witness; and (e) argue that the SVP petition was untimely. (FAP at 11-16.)

(3) The SVP law impermissibly places the burden of proof on Petitioner to prove that he

is no longer dangerous in order to end his indefinite detention, rather than on the government to

prove that he continues to present a danger, in violation of federal due process. (FAP at 17-23.)

(4) The SVP law violates state and federal equal protection guarantees. (FAP at 24-32.)

(5) The SVP law violates state and federal ex post facto principles. (FAP at 33-35.)

V.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

as to any claim presented. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the First Amended

Petition be DENIED.

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as

amended by AEDPA:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases[]” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. An unreasonable

application may also be found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from [Supreme 

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order to satisfy

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

The Supreme Court has indicated that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the

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correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).) “As a condition for

obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington. 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. “If this standard is difficult to meet,

that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 786. “It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases

where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court decision

conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Id.

B. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief as to Claim One.

Petitioner contends in claim one that he was committed based on the use of illegal

underground regulations in the evaluation and screening process in violation of federal due

process. (FAP at 6-10.) Specifically, he alleges that the commitment protocol used in his case

was “improperly prepared in conformity with a standardized assessment protocol that should

have been, but was not, enacted as a regulation under the provisions of the administrative

procedures act.” (Id. at 7.) In other words, Petitioner contends that the failure to formally adopt

the SVP commitment protocol through the state Administrative Procedures Act via the

appropriate rule-making process renders it void, and therefore he has not been legally committed

to the Department of Mental Health. In support of this claim, Petitioner argues that a state court

ruling upholding that portion of the SVP protocol which provides that he has no right to the

presence of counsel at the mental health evaluations, “contradicts the well established Discovery

Act.” (Id. at 8.) Although Petitioner appears to present this as an example as to why adopting

the SVP protocol through the rule-making process has created a conflict with other provisions

of state law, Respondent reads this allegation as presenting a separate, unexhausted federal claim

alleging denial of right to counsel during his meetings with Drs. Hupka and Putnam. (Ans.

Mem. at 7-8.)

Respondent’s main contention with respect to claim one is that Petitioner has not stated

a federal claim regarding the use of underground regulations, but has at best alleged a violation

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of state law. (Ans. Mem. at 7.) Respondent also argues that the aspect of claim one alleging a

denial of the right to counsel at the mental health evaluations should be denied on the merits

irrespective of Petitioner’s failure to present it to the state court. (Id. at 3, 7-8.)

Petitioner presented claim one to the state supreme court in a petition for review in the

same manner it is presented in the First Amended petition, although without mention of a right

to counsel during mental health evaluations. (Lodgment No. 5 at 2-3.) That court issued an

order which stated: “Petition for review denied.” (Lodgment No. 6.) Because the California

Supreme Court did not articulate its rationale for denying the claim, this Court applies the

following rebuttable presumption: “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting

a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim

rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991).

Petitioner presented the same claim to the state appellate court on direct review.

(Lodgment No. 1 at 18-36.) The appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s commitment in an

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 4.) This Court will therefore determine whether the state

appellate court opinion rejecting the claim on the merits was objectively reasonable within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. 

Before turning to the merits of Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court noted that on

August 15, 2008, the Office of Administrative Law issued a determination that the SVP protocol

constituted an “underground regulation” because it should have been but was not adopted

pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. (Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No.

D052948, slip op. at 3, n. 4.) The appellate court addressed Petitioner’s claim, stating:

Taylor contends that the [Department of Mental Health] determines who

is an SVP under [California Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6601 based on

a handbook of procedures not enacted under the Administrative Procedures Act

(APA). [Footnote omitted] The Office of Administrative Law determined the

handbook contained numerous underground regulations. [Footnote omitted]

Taylor contends, “the district attorney lacked the authority to file a petition for

commitment and, therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to conduct a

probable cause hearing, a trial, or to commit (him).” He claims that he was

illegally recommitted and seeks reversal of the commitment order and his

immediate release.

Under section 6601, subdivision (a)(1), “an individual who is in custody

under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and

who is either serving a determinate prison sentence or whose parole has been

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revoked,” may be determined by the secretary of the department to be a potential

SVP. An SVP is defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually

violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that

it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”

(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) When a potential SVP is identified, “the secretary shall, at

least six months prior to that individual’s scheduled date for release from prison,

refer the person for evaluation in accordance with this section.” (§ 6601(a)(1).)

When this occurs, the potential SVP is referred to two mental health evaluators,

who must agree that the individual has a diagnosed mental disorder and is likely

to engage in acts of sexual violence absent appropriate treatment in custody.

(§ 6601, subds. (b), (d), & (i).) A “‘(d)iagnosed mental disorder’ includes a

congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that

predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree

constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600,

subd. (c).) “Once two mental health evaluators agree that the person has a

diagnosed mental disorder, and once the (secretary) has filed a petition, and the

superior court has found probable cause, the individual has the right to counsel

and to a jury trial.” (See In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1257.)

After Taylor filed his appellate briefs, the Second District Court of Appeal,

Division Five, decided the issue presented here. It disagreed with the defendant’s

central contention that the use of the protocol-based mental health evaluations at

the preliminary phases of the commitment proceedings deprived the trial court of

fundamental jurisdiction to order commitment following the jury trial. The court

stated, “‘In general, the only act that may deprive a court of jurisdiction is the

People’s failure to file a petition for recommitment before the expiration of the

prior commitment.’ (Citations.) Moreover, even in cases involving the denial of

fundamental rights in the analogous preliminary hearing stage of a criminal

prosecution, it is well established that reviewing courts apply the harmless error

standard set forth in People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529-530.”

(People v. Castillo (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1177.) The First District Court

of Appeal, Division One also recently reached this same conclusion in People v.

Medina (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 805. We agree with this conclusion.

We have held the failure to obtain the evaluation of two mental health

professionals, which is required by the closely related provision of section 6601,

subdivisions (c) and (d), did not deprive a court of fundamental jurisdiction to

nonetheless act on an SVP petition. (See People v. Superior Court (Preciado)

(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128-1130 (Preciado ).) We concluded this defect

“was not one going to the substantive validity of the complaint, but rather was

merely in the nature of a plea in abatement, by which a defendant may argue that

for collateral reasons a complaint should not proceed.” (Id. at p. 1128.) For the

same reason, we reject Taylor’s contention that a defect in adoption of the

department’s evaluation handbook somehow prevented the court from acting on

respondent’s petition. The requirement that the handbook meet the APA

requirements is collateral to the merits of Taylor’s petition.

Taylor does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence at the probable cause

hearing or at trial-and the protocol played no role in his trial. The Office of

Administrative Law determination is not binding on the courts, but it is entitled

to deference. (Grier v. Kizer (1991) 219 Cal.App.3d, 422, 434-435, disapproved

on other grounds by Tidewater Marine Western, Inc., v. Bradshaw (1996) 14

Cal.4th 557, 577.) Nonetheless, that determination did not suggest the DMH’s

protocol was deficient or unreliable as an instrument for assessing a person’s

status as a potential SVP. Instead, OAL Determination No. 19 stated the Office

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of Administrative Law “has neither the legal authority nor the technical expertise

to evaluate the underlying policy issues involved in” the SVPA. Taylor’s

speculation that APA compliance likely will result in a materially different

protocol more favorable to him does not undermine the legitimacy of his

commitment following a unanimous jury verdict. Apart from asserting the

protocol’s status as an “underground regulation,” Taylor fails to explain how use

of the protocol in the proceedings against him resulted in actual prejudice, either

by depriving him of a fundamental right or a fair trial. 

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 4-6.)

Respondent first contends that Petitioner has not stated a federal claim, but has merely

alleged a violation of state law. Although Petitioner alleges in the First Amended Petition that

his federal due process rights were violated by the failure to properly adopt the SVP protocol,

he did not specifically argue to the state appellate or supreme court that a federal violation had

resulted. (See Lodgment No. 1 at 18-36; Lodgment No. 5 at 2-3.) His claim was silently denied

by the state supreme court and, as quoted above, the state appellate court did not explicitly

mention federal due process. However, the appellate court, in rejecting Petitioner’s contention

that the failure to properly adopt the SVP protocol did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction

over his SVP petition, and would require harmless error analysis in any event, relied on People

v. Castillo, 170 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1177 (2009), overruled on other grounds by People v.

Castillo, 49 Cal.4th 145 (2010). The California Supreme Court in Castillo recognized: “longestablished procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court . . . [which]

explain that substantive rights relating to ‘life, liberty, and property . . . cannot be deprived

except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.’” Castillo, 49 Cal.4th at 165, quoting

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Thus, the state court

applied federal due process principles in analyzing Petitioner’s claim.

Furthermore, it is clear that the basis for analyzing general due process claims in SVP

proceedings in California courts is inextricably intertwined with federal due process principles.

See People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1188-93 (2010) (upholding California’s recent changes

to the SVP law against federal due process challenge, discussing and applying Kansas v.

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding SVP law similar to the California SVP law against

due process, ex post facto and equal protection challenges), Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71

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(1992) (upholding due process challenge to state statute which permitted confinement of

mentally ill persons without a finding of dangerousness), Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354

(1983) (upholding statue providing for confinement of persons found not guilty by reason of

insanity), and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (recognizing the power of a state to

confine persons who, by reason of a mental disease, constitute a threat to society). Thus,

although not explicitly mentioned by the appellate court, federal due process principles certainly

underlie its analysis of Petitioner’s due process claim. In addition, in presenting claim one to

the state appellate and supreme courts, Petitioner cited state cases which apply federal due

process principles, including Castillo and McKee, among others. (See Lodgment No. 1 at 18-36;

Lodgment No. 5 at 4-11.) Respondent has not shown that Petitioner has failed to exhaust a claim

alleging a federal due process violation, or that he has not stated a federal claim in this Court.

See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding “that, for purposes of

exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same

purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.”)

Nevertheless, Petitioner has not alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a

violation of federal due process. As the state appellate court noted, Petitioner has failed to show

how the failure to properly adopt the SVP evaluation protocol through the rule-making process

of the California Administrative Procedures Act had any effect whatsoever on the outcome of

his commitment proceedings. The state appellate court’s determination to that effect, as well as

the determination that any error would be harmless for the same reason, is neither contrary to,

nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Hendricks, 521

U.S. at 360 (finding that the Kansas SVP civil commitment scheme, which is very similar to

California’s (see Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1157 (1999)), did not violate

federal due process because mental disorder “coupled with prediction of future dangerousness,

adequately distinguished [petitioner] from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more

properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.”) 

To the extent Petitioner alleges that the failure to enact the SVP protocol in a manner

consistent with state law created a due process violation arising from the failure to properly enact

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it under state law (as opposed to the substantive nature of the protocol itself creating a due

process violation), his claim fails. Errors of state law do not merit federal habeas relief. Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief is not available merely

for an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). There are extreme cases

where deprivation of state procedures can give rise to a federal due process violation, such as

where the actions by the state court are “so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent

due process” violation. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). This is not such a case,

however, because, as the state appellate court observed, there is no indication whatsoever that

had the SVP protocol been enacted through the state rule-making process it would have been any

different than the protocol applied in Petitioner’s case, or that Petitioner’s SVP proceedings

would have been any different in procedure or result. Rather, the state court noted that the

determination by the Office of Administrative Law that the SVP protocol was an underground

regulation did not suggest that the protocol was deficient in any manner or unreliable as an

instrument of assessing a person’s status as a potential SVP, merely that its adoption violated

state procedures. (Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 6.) Neither has

Petitioner demonstrated anything arbitrary or capricious about permitting his SVP proceedings

to proceed under a protocol which had not been adopted through the state rule-making process.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to identify any clearly established federal law supporting his claim

that federal due process was violated in this regard. Because a fairminded jurist could agree with

the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner did not suffer a federal due process violation from the

failure to adopt the SVP protocol through the state rule-making process, federal habeas relief is

not available with respect to this claim. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the denial of claim one by the state court was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and

recommends habeas relief be denied as to this claim. To the extent Petitioner intended to present

a separate claim alleging denial of his right to counsel during his evaluations, it is discussed

immediately below in connection to claim two.

/ / /

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C. Petitioner is not Entitled to Habeas Relief as to Claim Two.

Petitioner contends in claim two that he was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because his trial counsel failed to: (1) file a

motion to have the SVP petition dismissed based on the use of illegal underground regulations;

(2) object to testimony by Dr. Hupka regarding statements made by Petitioner about his prior

offenses; (3) object to the use of the Static-99 actuarial instrument; (4) retain an expert witness;

and (5) argue that the SVP petition was untimely. (FAP at 11-16.) The Court will also consider

Petitioner’s allegation in claim one that his right to counsel during the meetings with the

evaluation doctors conflicts with state law. (Id. at 8.) 

Respondent contends claim two is unexhausted because it was never presented to the state

supreme court. (Ans. Mem. at 3-4.) Respondent argues this claim should be denied

notwithstanding the failure to exhaust because it is without merit. (Id. at 9-12.) 

Petitioner presented the first aspect of claim one to the state appellate court on direct

appeal, alleging that counsel should have filed a motion to dismiss the SVP petition on the basis

that the proceedings were predicated on the use of underground regulations. (Lodgment No. 1

at 37-39.) The appellate court denied the claim, stating:

Taylor has not shown prejudice under People v. Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27

Cal.3d 519; therefore, his ineffectiveness of counsel claim must fail under the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-698

(defendant must demonstrate prejudice in order to establish ineffective assistance

of counsel].) “(A) court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on

the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that

course should be followed.” (Id. at p. 697; In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063,

1079.)

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 6-7.)

Petitioner did not present this aspect of claim two to the state supreme court, and has

failed to present the remainder of his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations to any state

court. In order to properly exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must

generally present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of

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every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v.

Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). The petitioner must have raised the same federal claims

brought in the federal petition before the state supreme court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995). Applications for writs of habeas corpus that contain unexhausted claims

generally must be dismissed, although federal courts have the discretion to deny a habeas

application on the merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to fully exhaust state judicial

remedies. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(b)(2) (West 2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.”) 

However, even where a claim has not been presented to the state’s highest court, such as

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the Petition here, if a petitioner no longer

has state court remedies available to him, he has satisfied the technical requirements of

exhaustion. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A habeas petitioner who

has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”), quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 732 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(c) (West 2006) (“An applicant shall not be

deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning

of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,

the question presented.”) In such a situation the claim would likely be procedurally defaulted

in this Court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (holding that a procedural default arises when a

petitioner has “failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the

claims procedurally barred.”)

Here, based on California’s rule barring untimely petitions for post-conviction relief,

which the United States Supreme Court has found to be clearly established and consistently

applied, it appears that Petitioner no longer has state court remedies availablewith respect to any

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120,

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2

 Although Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are probably procedurally

defaulted by virtue of his failure to timely present them to the state courts, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735

n.1, Respondent has waived the affirmative defense of procedural default by failing to raise it in the

Answer. Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2005). As a practical matter,

however, Petitioner could attempt to show cause to excuse a default by establishing constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Nevertheless,

because, as discussed in this section of the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner cannot establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, the result is the same (federal habeas relief is not available) whether

or not the Court addresses these claims on their merits, finds them to be procedurally defaulted, or

determines they are unexhausted.

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1125-31 (2011) (holding the California’s timeliness requirement providing that a prisoner must

seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or

counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the

claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied), citing

In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 805 (1998) (holding that a habeas claim “that is substantially

delayed” will not be considered unless “the petitioner can demonstrate ‘good cause’ for the

delay.”)

The United States Supreme Court has stated that federal habeas courts should not treat

California’s timeliness rules as differing significantly from other states which consider petitions

untimely after unexplained delays of thirty or sixty days. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S 189, 199-

201 (2006), citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002). Petitioner could have presented

his ineffective assistance and denial of counsel claims to the state courts in a habeas petition filed

contemporaneously with his direct appeal, which was filed on September 17, 2008. (Lodgment

No. 1.) Based on Petitioner’s unexplained delay of nearly three years and counting, it appears

that he has no state court remedies remaining for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, all

of which arose during his commitment proceedings, and he has therefore met the technical

requirements of exhaustion. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.5. In any case, as discussed immediately

below, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are without merit. Respondent’s

contention that the claims should be denied on their merits notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure

to present them to the state court is therefore well taken. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d

139, 142 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the exhaustion requirement is generally inapplicable to

claims which do not present a colorable claim for relief).2

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For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must

demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. Id. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious they deprived

Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong,

Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would

have been different absent the error. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

A reasonable probability in this context is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prejudice inquiry is to be considered in light of

the strength of the prosecution’s case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir.), amended,

311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). 

1) Failure to file motion to dismiss

The first aspect of claim two, alleging that counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the

SVP petition on the basis that the SVP protocol had not been formally adopted through the rulemaking process of the Administrative Procedures Act, is without merit for the reasons stated by

the appellate court. Petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the failure to

file such a motion for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim one, namely,

because he cannot demonstrate that the failure to adopt the protocol through the state rulemaking process had any effect whatsoever on the outcome of the SVP proceedings. Habeas

relief is therefore unavailable, irrespective of Petitioner’s failure to present the claim to the state

supreme court, because Petitioner has not shown the existence of “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome” arising from counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

2) Failure to object to Dr. Hupka’s testimony

In the second aspect of claim two, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was deficient

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3

 To the extent Petitioner contends the introduction of Dr. Hupka’s testimony regarding

Petitioner’s statements violated federal due process (see Trav. Mem. at 19), his claim is without merit.

State evidentiary rulings do not give rise to claims cognizable on federal habeas proceedings unless the

evidentiary ruling violated Petitioner’s due process right to a fair trial. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70; Gordon

v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). In order to establish a due process violation, Petitioner

must show that the trial court’s rulings were so prejudicial that they rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner cannot make this showing for the same reason he has not

established prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of Dr. Hupka’s testimony.

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in failing “to object to prejudicial statements presumably made by petitioner to state

psychologist.” (FAP at 13.) He refers specifically to Dr. Hupka’s testimony that, during their

interview, when Dr. Hupka commented upon the nature of the violence in Petitioner’s offenses,

Petitioner “took great umbrage” and insisted that he had not hurt his victims, that his offenses

were not that bad, and that maybe he had hurt the victims’ dignity but did not really damage

them because he did not “stab them or rip their guts out.” (Trav. Mem. at 18, citing RT 221.)

 Dr. Hupka opined that these statements, in connection to Petitioner’s statement that the sex was

consensual, were an indirect admission of guilt by Petitioner. (RT 220-21.)

Respondent contends that these statements were admissible under California Evidence

Code sections 1220 (admission of a party), and 802 (statement of basis of an expert’s opinion).

(Ans. Mem. at 10.) Respondent also contends that Petitioner has not established prejudice

arising from any error in failing to object to those statements because there was overwhelming

evidence supporting the finding that he qualified as an SVP. (Id.)

Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance in connection to counsel’s failure

to object to Dr. Hupka’s testimony regarding the statements Petitioner made during their

interview. Even assuming a proper objection could have been raised and would have been

sustained, Petitioner cannot show that their introduction rendered his trial unfair.3

 Rather,

overwhelming evidence was introduced to establish that Petitioner had forcibly raped the

victims. The record reveals that Petitioner was convicted after jury trials on those charges,

during which he was presumably provided with all the attendant due process protections which

accompany a criminal trial, including the presumption of innocence, all of which were

overcome. He attempted to contradict the fact of those convictions by providing an implausible

explanation as to why an innocent man would twice be convicted of forcible rape committed by

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another man, that he suffered from “bad luck.” (RT 127, 137.) Moreover, Petitioner only denied

involvement in the crimes where he and the victim were the only witnesses, and admitted

involvement in the incident where he was arrested during an altercation with a woman whom

he claimed was a prostitute and who had somehow ended up with her clothes off after he had

agreed to buy her food. Thus, Dr. Hupka’s testimony that Petitioner had indirectly admitted guilt

and made statements minimizing the violent nature of the crimes, when considered in light of

the strength of the prosecution’s case, which included not only the record of the prior

convictions on those charges but Petitioner’s failure to participate in the sex offender treatment

program while housed at the state hospital for two years, does not undermine confidence in the

outcome of the SVP proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Luna, 306 F.3d at 966. The

Court recommends denial of habeas relief as to this aspect of claim two irrespective of the failure

to present it to any state court.

 To the extent Petitioner argues that such statements would never have been made in the

first place had he been afforded counsel during his interviews with the doctors, such a claim also

fails. As Respondent points out, Petitioner does not have a state law right to counsel at his

mental health interviews. (Ans. Mem. at 7, citing People v. Burns, 128 Cal.App.4th 794, 803-05

(1995) (holding that there is no right to the presence of counsel during updated SVP mental

evaluation interviews.) Moreover, there is no federal right to counsel during mental health

evaluations. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 & n.14 (1981) (holding that although a

defendant has a right to consult with counsel before undergoing a psychological evaluation, there

is no right to counsel during the interview itself, as “an attorney present during a psychiatric

interview could contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination.”) Thus, to the

extent Petitioner intended to present this allegation as a separate claim, it is without merit. The

Court recommends denial of habeas relief as to this aspect of claim two irrespective of the failure

to present it to any state court. 

3) Failure to object to the use of the Static-99 actuarial instrument

The third aspect of claim two alleges a failure to object to the use of the Static-99

actuarial instrument to predict the chance of future propensity to reoffend, in lieu of other

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standard psychological tests. (FAP at 18-19.) Dr. Hupka testified that other standardized tests

“are not the kind of tests that really are helpful in answering the questions that we’re asked to

answer in these evaluations, so they are not routinely used by anybody.” (RT 104-05.)

Petitioner has not identified a basis for interposing an objection to the use of the actuarial

instrument by the doctors, and has not shown that other tests would be more reliable. In any

case, both doctors identified in detail all the factors upon which they relied in forming their

opinion that Petitioner posed a danger to reoffend. (RT 69-78, 229-51.) Petitioner has not

shown that the accuracy of the doctors’ determinations regarding his propensity to reoffend was

hampered by the use of the Static-99 actuarial instrument, or that the jury was not in a position

to make a determination regarding whether the People had established that Petitioner was likely

to reoffend based on the individual factors identified by the doctors. Thus, the failure to object

to the use of the Static-99 actuarial instrument does not undermine confidence in the outcome

of the SVP proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court recommends denial of habeas

relief as to this aspect of claim two irrespective of the failure to present it to any state court. 

4) Failure to retain an expert

The fourth aspect of claim two alleges a failure to retain an expert witness to assist

Petitioner’s defense. (FAP at 19.) Petitioner contends that he asked counsel why he had not

retained an expert, and counsel responded that “he could not find any experts.” (Id.) Petitioner

contends that he then gave counsel “ a list of several expert evaluators who, if given prior notice,

would assist in defense examinations.” (Id.) 

Respondent answers that Petitioner has not established that any of the experts willing to

“assist in defense examinations” would have provided favorable opinions, and that this Court

must presume that counsel made a strategic decision not to call his own expert, probably because

counsel could not find one favorable to Petitioner. (Ans. Mem. at 11.) Respondent also

contends that in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at the commitment proceedings,

Petitioner cannot establish that he would have received a more favorable outcome had he called

his own expert. (Id.)

This aspect of claim two relies on speculation that counsel could have found an expert

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witness capable of, and willing to, provide testimony favorable to Petitioner. Speculative and

conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel provided ineffective assistance.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner has failed to overcome the “strong presumption that [counsel acted] for tactical

reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (holding that counsel is “strongly presumed” to made decision in the

exercise of professional judgment). In any case, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice.

See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (speculation that counsel could have

retained an expert does not establish prejudice where there was no evidence that an expert would

testify favorably for petitioner). The Court recommends denial of habeas relief as to this aspect

of claim two irrespective of the failure to present it to any state court. 

5) Failure to file motion to dismiss SVP petition as untimely

The fifth and final aspect of claim two alleges that trial counsel failed to argue that the

SVP petition should have been dismissed as untimely because it was filed a year after expiration

of his previous commitment. (FAP at 19-20.) Respondent contends that the SVP petition in this

case was filed over two months before Petitioner’s prior commitment expired. (Ans. Mem. at

11-12.) 

Petitioner filed two pro se motions to dismiss the SVP petition on the grounds it was

untimely. (CT 59-74.) Petitioner’s counsel later submitted the motions on Petitioner’s behalf

and the trial judge, who had apparently been assigned after the motions had been filed, agreed

to look at and rule on them. (RT 4-6.) Petitioner is therefore unable to demonstrate deficient

performance by counsel in failing to make such a motion because it was actually made, and is

unable to demonstrate prejudice because the motion was in fact placed before and considered

by the trial judge.

Accordingly, the Court finds that habeas relief should be denied as to claim two,

irrespective of Petitioner’s failure to present the claims to the state supreme court, because they

are without merit.

/ / /

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/ / /

D. Petitioner is not Entitled to Habeas Relief as to Claim Three.

Petitioner contends in claim three that by imposing an indeterminate term of commitment

which can only end when he proves he no longer poses a danger to society, the SVP law

impermissibly places the burden of proof on him to prove that he is not an SVP, rather than on

the government to prove that he is, in violation of federal due process. (FAP at 17-23.)

Respondent contends that the state appellate court’s adjudication of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans.

Mem. at 12-16.)

Petitioner presented claim three to the state supreme court in the petition for review.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 12.) That court issued an order which stated: “Petition for review denied.”

(Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner also presented the claim to the state appellate court on direct

review. (Lodgment No. 1 at 40-56.) The appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s commitment in

an unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 4.) This Court will therefore look to the state appellate

court opinion in order to determine weather the awas objectively reasonable within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. The state appellate court denied the claim,

stating:

Taylor contends his indeterminate recommitment under the SVPA violates

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his right to due process under

the California Constitution. He maintains that due process requires that the state

carry the burden of proof in all commitment proceedings, including a proceeding

to continue his detention as an SVP.

Prior to 2006, a person who was found to be an SVP was committed for a

two-year term under the SVPA. At the end of that term, the People were required

to file another petition seeking a determination that the person remained an SVP.

If the People did not file a recommitment petition, the person would have to be

released. (Former § 6604, as amended by Stats.2000, ch. 420, § 3.) On filing of

a recommitment petition, a new jury trial was conducted at which the People again

had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person was currently

an SVP. (Former §§ 6604, 6605, subds. (d), (e); People v. Munoz (2005) 129

Cal.App.4th 421, 429 (“(A)n SVP extension hearing is not a review hearing.... An

SVP extension hearing is a new and independent proceeding at which ... the

(People) must prove the (committed person) meets the (SVP) criteria, including

that he or she has a currently diagnosed mental disorder that renders the person

dangerous”).)

In 2006, the SVPA was amended first by the Legislature and then, with the

passage of Proposition 83, by the electorate. The amended SVPA provides that

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an individual who is determined to be an SVP must be “committed for an

indeterminate term to the custody of the (DMH) for appropriate treatment and

confinement in a secure facility.” (§ 6604.) Once committed, the individual must

have “a current examination of his or her mental condition made at least once

every year.” (§ 6605, subd. (a).) After the examination, the Department must file

a report in the form of a declaration that addresses (1) “whether the committed

person currently meets the definition of (an SVP),” and (2) “whether conditional

release to a less restrictive alternative or an unconditional release is in the best

interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect

the community.” (Ibid.) The Department is to file this report with the trial court

that committed the person, and must serve the report on the prosecuting agency

and the committed individual. The committed individual may retain, or the court

may appoint, a qualified expert to examine him or her. (Ibid.)

If the Department concludes in the report that the committed individual no

longer meets the requirements of the SVPA, or that conditional release is

appropriate, the Department must authorize the committed individual to petition

the trial court for release. (§ 6605, subd. (b).) Upon receipt of the petition for

conditional release or unconditional discharge, the trial court is to set a probable

cause hearing at which the court “can consider the petition and any accompanying

documentation provided by the medical director, the prosecuting attorney or the

committed person.” (Ibid.) If the trial court determines that probable cause exists

to believe the petition has merit, it must set a hearing on the issue, at which time

the committed individual is “entitled to the benefit of all constitutional protections

that were afforded him or her at the initial commitment proceeding.” (Id., subds.

(c), (d).) Either side may demand a trial by jury and may retain experts to

examine the committed individual. (Id., subd. (d).) If the Department has

authorized the individual to petition for conditional release or unconditional

discharge, the state bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

committed individual is still an SVP. (Ibid.)

The Department is required to seek judicial review of an individual’s

commitment not only at the time of the annual examination, but at any time that

the Department “has reason to believe” a committed individual is no longer an

SVP. (§ 6605, subd. (f).) Similarly, if the Department determines that the

committed individual’s “diagnosed mental disorder has so changed that the person

is not likely to commit acts of predatory sexual violence while under supervision

and treatment in the community,” the Department must send a report

recommending conditional release of the committed individual to the trial court,

the county attorney, and the committed individual's attorney. (§ 6607, subd. (a).)

The trial court is required to hold a hearing on the report once it is received. (Id., subd. (b).)

After the first year of commitment, a committed individual may petition the

trial court for conditional release or unconditional discharge even without the

“recommendation or concurrence” of the Department. (§ 6608, subds. (a), (c).)

The committed individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel in preparing and

filing the petition. The individual must serve the Department with the petition.

(Id., subd. (a).) After receiving such a petition, the trial court “shall endeavor

whenever possible to review the petition and determine if it is based upon

frivolous grounds and, if so, shall deny the petition without a hearing.” (Ibid.)

If, after receiving a petition filed by an individual without the

recommendation or concurrence of the Department, the trial court determines that

a hearing is appropriate, the committed individual has the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that the petition should be granted. (§ 6608,

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subd. (i).) If the trial court determines that the committed individual “would not

be a danger to others due to his or her diagnosed mental disorder while under

supervision and treatment in the community,” the trial court must order that the

individual be placed in a state-operated forensic conditional release program. (Id., subd. (d).) The court retains jurisdiction of the person throughout the course of

the conditional release program and, at the end of one year, the court must hold

a hearing to determine whether the individual should be unconditionally released

from commitment. (Ibid.) If the trial court denies the petition, the committed

individual must wait a year before petitioning the trial court again. (Id., subd. (h).)

The trial court must deny any subsequent petition filed by that individual “unless

it contains facts upon which a court could find that the condition of the committed

person had so changed that a hearing was warranted.” (Id., subd. (a).)

As a result of Proposition 83’s amendment to section 6604 making an

SVP’s commitment term indeterminate, as opposed to a two-year term, an SVP

now remains committed, either fully or in a conditional release setting, “until he

successfully bears the burden of proving he is no longer an SVP or the (DMH)

determines he no longer meets the definition of an SVP.” (Bourquez v. Superior

Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287.)

“[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation

of liberty that requires due process protection.” (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441

U.S. 418, 425 (Addington ).) “Due process requires that the nature of commitment

bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is

committed.” (Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 79 ( Foucha ).)

For an initial civil commitment, due process requires that the state prove

by clear and convincing evidence both that the person is mentally ill and that the

commitment is required for his or her own welfare or for the protection of others.

(Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 358; Addington, supra, at pp. 426 427,

432 433.) Once the person has been committed, due process permits the state to

hold the person only as long as he or she is both mentally ill and dangerous, but

no longer. (Foucha, supra, at pp. 71-78 (continuing to hold dangerous person

who is no longer mentally ill violates due process); Jones v. United States (1983)

463 U.S. 354, 368, 370 (Jones ) (“acquittee is entitled to release when he has

recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous”).)

Taylor relies primarily on Foucha, supra, at p. 71 for his argument that

sections 6605 and 6608 improperly place the burden on him to prove that he

should be released, rather than placing the burden of proof on the state to prove

that he is still an SVP. In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court considered

the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that provided for the indefinite

involuntary commitment of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity who

were determined to be dangerous, but not mentally ill. The trial court had

determined that the defendant had a personality disorder that was not considered

a mental illness or, for that matter, a treatable disorder. There was testimony that

the defendant was not suffering from either a neurosis or psychosis, and the state

was “not claim(ing) that Foucha is now mentally ill.” (Id. at p. 75, 80.) The court

found that “a law like Louisiana’s, which permits the indefinite detention of

insanity acquittees who are not mentally ill but who do not prove they would not

be dangerous to others,” violated the Due Process clause. (Foucha, supra, at p.

83.)

Foucha prohibits the continued confinement of insanity acquittees who are

no longer mentally ill, particularly in a situation in which the state has not proven,

by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual poses a danger to the

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community. Foucha does not address the burden of proof that would apply at

future release hearings, after the state had already established beyond a reasonable

doubt that the individual is mentally ill and poses a danger, and thus does not

support Taylor’s due process challenge to section 6608’s provision that places the

burden on him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to

release because he no longer meets the SVP criteria.

In Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pages 357, 366-368, the insanity acquittee bore

the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was no longer

mentally ill or dangerous. The Jones court observed, “The statute provides several

ways of obtaining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee is entitled

to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for release, at which he has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer

mentally ill or dangerous. (Citation). If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day

hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be released, with court

approval, upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of service.

(Citation.) Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing every six

months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is

entitled to release.” (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 356-357, fn. omitted.) The

Jones court thus implicitly approved a review procedure similar to the one at issue

here.

The initial commitment hearing under the Act provides a significant level

of due process protection by requiring a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that

the individual meets the SVP criteria. The required periodic reviews of a

committed individual’s mental health status and the procedures that permit these

individuals to petition for release minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation

of liberty. Accordingly, we conclude there was no due process violation.

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 7-13.)

Respondent correctly points out that there is no clearly established federal law which

prohibits California from assigning the burden to Petitioner to establish that he is no longer an

SVP after he has been committed under the SVP commitment proceedings. See Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (holding that a state court adjudication is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law where no Supreme Court decision

“squarely addresses the issue” or gives a “clear answer to the question presented.”); Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 73-76 (2006) (holding that because the Supreme Court had never

addressed the effect of the particular conduct at issue on a defendant’s fair trial rights, it was “an

open question in our jurisprudence” and there was no clearly established federal law on the

issue). Moreover, as the state appellate court pointed out, the Supreme Court in Jones rejected

a federal due process challenge to a state law which provided that the petitioner bore the burden

of proof to show that he is no longer insane in order to obtain relese. Jones, 463 U.S. at 356-57.

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Thus, to the extent there is any clearly established federal law on the issue, it cuts against

Petitioner’s position. The state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law

to this claim because it did not “unreasonably extend[] a legal principle from [Supreme Court]

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuse[] to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U. S at 407. Accordingly, the

adjudication of claim three by the state appellate court was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Id.; Jones, 463 U.S. at 356-57. The

Court therefore recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim three.

E. Petitioner is not Entitled to Habeas Relief as to Claim Four.

Petitioner contends in claim four that the SVP law violates his right to equal protection

under the state and federal constitutions. (FAP at 24-32.) Respondent contends that the state

appellate court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 17-24.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in the petition for review.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 12.) That court issued an order which stated: “Petition for review denied.”

(Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner presented the claim to the state appellate court on direct review.

(Lodgment No. 1 at 57-77.) The appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s commitment in an

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 4.) This Court will therefore determine whether the state

appellate court opinion was objectively reasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. The state appellate court denied the claim, stating:

Taylor contends the SVPA violates state and federal guarantees of equal

protection because defendants are treated differently from those offenders civilly

committed under other statutes like the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act (section

5300 et seq.) relating to confinement for imminently dangerous persons; the

mentally disordered offender (MDO) statute (Pen.Code, § 2960, et seq.) and the

scheme for those found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) (Pen. Code, § 1026,

et seq.).

This court summarized Proposition 83’s changes to the Act in People v.

Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559 (Shields.) We explained that under

Proposition 83, “former section 6604 was amended to eliminate the two-year term

provision and to provide for an indeterminate term of confinement (subject to the

SVP’s right to petition for release).” (Shields, at p. 562.) Section 6604 of the Act

now provides in relevant part: “If the court or jury determines that the person is

a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an indeterminate

term to the custody of the (DMH) for appropriate treatment and confinement....”

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(Italics added.) Proposition 83 did not change section 6604’s requirement that a

person’s commitment as an SVP be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.

(§ 6604.)

“The statements of intent contained in Proposition 83 confirm the obvious

intent of the Legislature in amending section 6604. The Proposition expressly sets

forth the intent to strengthen SVP confinement laws: ‘“(E)xisting laws that

provide for the commitment and control of sexually violent predators must be

strengthened and improved. [¶] ... [¶] It is the intent of the People of the State of

California in enacting this measure to strengthen and improve the laws that punish

and control sexual offenders.”’ (Citation.) More specifically, Proposition 83

states that the change from a two-year term to an indeterminate term is designed

to eliminate automatic SVP trials every two years when there is nothing to suggest

a change in the person's SVP condition to warrant release: ‘“The People find and

declare each of the following: (¶) ... (¶) (k) California is the only state, of the

number of states that have enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitments

for persons identified as sexually violent predators, which does not provide for

indeterminate commitments. California automatically allows for a jury trial every

two years irrespective of whether there is any evidence to suggest or prove that the

committed person is no longer a sexually violent predator. As such, this act

allows California to protect the civil rights of those persons committed as a

sexually violent predator while at the same time protect society and the system

from unnecessary or frivolous jury trial actions where there is no competent

evidence to suggest a change in the committed person.”’” (Shields, supra, 155

Cal.App.4th at p. 564, quoting Historical and Statutory Notes, 47A West’s Ann.

Pen.Code (2007 supp.) foll. § 209, p. 430 (now Historical and Statutory Notes,

47C West’s Ann. Pen.Code (2008 ed.) foll. § 209, p. 52) & Prop. 83, §§ 2(h), 2(k),

31.)

“The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is whether persons are

‘similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’” (In re Lemanuel C.

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 33, 47; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253

(Cooley ).) The question is whether the state has adopted a classification that

affects similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (Cooley, at p. 253.) “A

statute does not violate equal protection when it recognizes real distinctions that

are pertinent to the law’s legitimate aims.” (In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43

Cal.4th 757, 873.) Indeed, California “‘may adopt more than one procedure for

isolating, treating, and restraining dangerous persons; and differences will be

upheld if justified. (Citations.) Variation of the length and conditions of

confinement, depending on degrees of danger reasonably perceived as to special

classes of persons, is a valid exercise of (state) power.’” (People v. Hubbart

(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217, quoting Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980)

28 Cal.3d 161, 172.) “Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard against which to

measure claims of disparate treatment in civil commitment.” (People v. Green

(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 921, 924.) Under this standard, the state has the burden of

establishing it has a compelling interest that justifies the law and that the

distinctions, or disparate treatment, made by that law are necessary to further its

purpose. (Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641; see also People v.

Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.)

In our view, SVPs are not similarly situated to those committed under the

MDO, LPS and NGI schemes for the purposes of an equal protection analysis.

There are notable differences among those schemes regarding their purposes, the

degree and type of danger posed by individuals committed under them, and the

severity of the individuals’ mental illnesses and their prognosis. For example,

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those involuntarily committed under the LPS include individuals who have not

committed any crime. (§ 5300.5, subd. (b).)

To a significant degree, SVPs are civilly committed because of the

likelihood they will engage in future sexually violent criminal acts. (See Ballot

Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Proposition 83, p. 127 (“Sex offenders

have very high recidivism rates. According to a 1998 report by the U.S.

Department of Justice, sex offenders are the least likely to be cured and the most

likely to reoffend....”) Therefore, SVPs pose a substantial danger to the

community. By contrast, the other classification groups may include individuals

whose mental illnesses are of shorter duration, less recurrent, and more amenable

to successful treatment. (See, e.g., People v. Buffington, supra, at p. 1163

(determining that SVPs and MDOs are not similarly situated for purposes of equal

protection based on differential treatment requirements).)

Even if we assume that SVPs, MDOs, NGIs and LPSs are similarly situated

for the purpose of the asserted equal protection claim, we conclude California has

shown a compelling interest in imposing an indeterminate commitment term for

SVPs. Before the Proposition 83 amendments, the California Supreme Court

observed that the SVP law “narrowly targets ‘a small but extremely dangerous

group’ of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders (who)

can be identified while they are incarcerated.” (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.

253.) “The problem targeted by the Act is acute, and the state interests-protection

of the public and mental health treatment-are compelling.” (Hubbart v. Superior

Court, supra, at p. 1153, fn. 20.) When voters passed Proposition 83, they had

before them the facts that sex offenders “prey on the most innocent members of

our society”; that such offenders “have very high recidivism rates” and are the

“least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend.” (Historical and Statutory

Notes, 47C West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2008 ed.) foll. Pen. Code § 209, p. 52; see

Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, p. 127.)

We do not agree with Taylor that the circumstances in Baxtrom v. Herold

(1966) 383 U.S. 107 are apposite. In Baxtrom, the court found an equal protection

violation when the state deprived a prisoner of a jury trial and finding of

dangerousness when it sought to civilly commit him at the end of his prison term,

in view of the fact these protections were available to other civilly-committed

persons. (Baxtrom, 383 U.S. at p. 111; see In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251,

1264.) The SVPA, however, does not deprive persons subject to an initial

commitment petition of a jury trial or finding of present inability to control

sexually violent behavior. (§ 6604.) Further, under the SVPA, an SVP committed

to an indeterminate term has the opportunity for meaningful judicial review via

annual petitions for release, provided they are not frivolous and are supported by

sufficient factual allegations. (§§ 6605, 6608.)

We conclude the characteristics of dangerousness and amenability to

treatment recognized by the Proposition 83 voters justify any disparate treatment

of SVPs from those civilly committed under the MDO, LPS and NGI schemes.

The voters intended to enhance the confinement of SVPs, eliminating automatic

SVP trials every two years when there is nothing to suggest a change in the

person’s condition to warrant release. (Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp.

563-564.) These voters reasonably concluded based on the above-referenced

considerations that SVPs should be committed to indeterminate terms, subject to

hearings on petitions for release at which they may bear the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that they are no longer SVPs. Because imposition

of an indeterminate term for SVPs under the amended Act has been shown

necessary to further compelling state interests, the amended Act does not violate

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state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection under the law.

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 13-18.)

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.

630 (1993). The inquiry is whether California treats all similarly situated detainees the same.

See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431 (“The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop

a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.”) Even if

Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated detainees in California, the state

could justify that treatment by showing a rational basis for the disparity. City of Cleburne, 473

U.S. at 440; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (“The

constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state action

rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest.”).

As quoted above, the state appellate court discussed at length its rationale for finding that

SVPs such as Petitioner are not similarly situated to persons confined as imminently dangerous

persons, as mentally disordered offenders, or as those found not guilty by reason of insanity. In

Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 781-82 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit accepted the reasons

given by the California Court of Appeal in that case, which are nearly identical to the ones given

by the appellate court here, for justifying the distinction between mentally disordered offenders

and SVP detainees, and held that the state court’s rejection of the equal protection claim on that

basis did not conflict with clearly established federal law. Id. at 781-82, citing Hendricks, 521

U.S. at 359 (rejecting equal protection challenge to Kansas SVP law) and United States v.

Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1990). The Hubbart Court also found that the appellate

court’s determination in that case, just as here, that even if SVPs are similarly situated to other

types of detainees, the SVP law “is narrowly tailored to further the state’s compelling interest

in identifying and containing sexually violent prisoners,” does not violate equal protection

guarantees and is consistent with clearly established federal law in that regard. Hubbart, 379

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F.3d at 781-82, citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 and Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. 

/ / / 

Petitioner has made no attempt to distinguish this controlling precedent. See Duhaime

v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Ninth Circuit cases may be

persuasive authority for purpose of determining whether a particular state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law and may be relevant to determining what law

is clearly established). The appellate court’s determination that Petitioner was not denied equal

protection is nether contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. The Court therefore recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim four. 

F. Petitioner is not Entitled to Habeas Relief as to Claim Five.

Petitioner contends in his fifth and final claim that the SVP law violates state and federal

ex post facto principles. (FAP at 33-35.) Respondent contends that Petitioner’s failure to

present the claim to the state supreme court renders it unexhausted. (Ans. Mem. at 3-4.)

Respondent also contends that the state appellate court’s determination that the claim fails on

its merits is neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. (Id. at 24-28.)

Although Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate court on direct review

(Lodgment No. 1 at 78-86), it was not included in the petition for review filed in the state

supreme court. (Lodgment No. 5 at 12.) The appellate court denied the claim, stating:

Taylor also argues the changes made to the SVPA convert the statute from

one concerned about commitment for treatment to one concerned about

punishment, in violation of the ex post facto and double jeopardy laws.

Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution provides: “No State

shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law....” The constitutional ban on ex post facto

legislation “prohibits only those laws which ‘retroactively alter the definition of

crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.’” (Hubbart v. Superior

Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, at pp. 1170-1171, italics omitted, quoting Collins

v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 41-44 (Collins ).)

In People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 660 (Bright), overruled on other

grounds in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550, footnote 6, the California

Supreme Court explained that, “(t)he double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution,

guarantee that a person shall not be placed twice ‘in jeopardy’ for the ‘same

offense.’ The double jeopardy bar protects against a second prosecution for the

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same offense following an acquittal or conviction, and also protects against

multiple punishment for the same offense.” (Bright, at p. 660, Emphasis added.)

A subsequent appellate court case (People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322,

348) rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the SVPA based on Hubbart v.

Superior Court. We find nothing in the amendments of the SVPA contained in

Senate Bill 1128 and Proposition 83 to alter the conclusion reached in Hubbart v.

Superior Court and Carlin.

As the court pointed out in Hubbart v. Superior Court, the legislative

characterizations of a law play a critical role in determining whether or not a law

inflicts punishment within the meaning of Collins, supra, 497 U.S. at page 43.

(Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, at p. 1171.) The court noted,

among other things, that the SVPA legislative scheme makes clear that persons

eligible for commitment as SVPs “are to be viewed ‘not as criminals, but as sick

persons’” pursuant to section 6250. (Hubbart v. Superior Court, at p. 1171.)

Furthermore, “(c)onsistent with these remarks, the SVPA was placed in the

Welfare and Institutions Code, surrounded on each side by other schemes

concerned with the care and treatment of various mentally ill and disabled

groups.” (Ibid.) The court also relied on the ex post facto analysis in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pages 361-368, which found the Kansas Act did not inflict

punishment within the meaning of the ex post facto clause. (Hubbart v. Superior

Court, supra, at pp. 1171-1175.) Also, as we have already noted, the Legislature

in 1996 intended that SVPs “be committed and treated for their disorders only as

long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive purposes” (Stats.1995, ch.

763, § 1). Nothing in the statute’s amendments indicates an alteration of this

intent. We conclude that defendant’s ex post facto and double jeopardy rights

were not violated by the amended SVPA.

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Taylor, No. D052948, slip op. at 18-20.)

The appellate court correctly concluded that the United States Supreme Court has found

that SVP laws such as California’s do not violate ex post facto principles because they are civil

in nature and do not punish for past criminal behavior. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267

(2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-69. The Hendricks Court also addressed the concern

apparently raised by Petitioner here of the possibility of indefinite detention because there is no

cure or available treatment for his illness (or, as he believes, he has no illness), and rejected that

as a basis for finding an ex post facto violation. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366. 

Habeas relief is unavailable with respect to this claim as it is without merit. Accordingly,

the Court recommends denying habeas relief as to claim five notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure

to raise it in the state supreme court.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

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issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 29, 2011, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than September 9, 2011. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 12, 2011

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

CC: ALL PARTIES

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