Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02057/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02057-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiffs R.D.G., A.C.G., F.E.G., J.S.G., J.A.G. and M.I.G. are the children of their guardian 

ad litem, Rosemary Lopez and the decent, Abel Gurrola. (Doc. 65 at 2) In this petition, Ms. Lopez 

seeks approval of the compromise of this action on behalf of the children. Id. Defendants have not 

opposed the petition. For the following reasons, the petition will be GRANTED in PART.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On January 1, 3013, “in celebration of the New Year,” Abel Gurrola and two companions 

“fired several rounds from a .22 caliber rifle into the ground of the open field located to the south east 

of the 720 Terrace Way apartment complex.” (Doc. 13 at 2.) At approximately 12:19 a.m., 

Bakersfield Police Officers Woessner and Aleman were dispatched to the apartment complex “to 

investigate a report of shots fired.” (Doc. 1 at 14, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges the officers observed 

Gurrola, who “ran in the opposite direction and into the well lit courtyard of the apartment complex.” 

(Id., ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff asserts Woessner and Aleman “fired their service weapons multiple times,” 

R.D.G, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-02057 JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPROVAL AND COMPROMISE 

FOR MINOR PLAINTIFFS

(Doc. 65)

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striking Gurrola “in the back of the head.” (Id., ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff initiated this action in Kern County Superior Court by filing a complaint against the 

City of Bakersfield; Greg Williamson, individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police of the 

Bakersfield Police Department; Officer Woessner; and Officer Aleman by filing a complaint on 

September 20, 2013. (Doc. 1.) In short, Plaintiff claims Defendants used excessive force and, as a 

result, subjected them to unlawful losses. (See generally Doc. 1 at 8-30.) Though Plaintiff contends 

the children will suffer emotionally due to the death of their father, they suffered no physical injuries 

as a result and have not been treated for emotional injuries. (Doc. 65 at 3)

 Though the action proceeded through the expert discovery period, before expert depositions 

were taken the parties engaged in mediation and agreed to settle the matter for $100,000 to be divided 

equally among the children. (Doc. 65 at 3, 4)

II. Settlement Approval Standards

No settlement or compromise of “a claim by or against a minor or incompetent person” is 

effective unless it is approved by the Court. Local Rule 202(b). The purpose of requiring the Court’s 

approval is to provide an additional level of oversight to ensure that the child’s interests are protected. 

Toward this end, a party seeking approval of the settlement must disclose:

the age and sex of the minor, the nature of the causes of action to be settled or 

compromised, the facts and circumstances out of which the causes of action arose, 

including the time, place and persons involved, the manner in which the compromise 

amount . . . was determined, including such additional information as may be required 

to enable the Court to determine the fairness of the settlement or compromise, and, if a 

personal injury claim, the nature and extent of the injury with sufficient particularity to 

inform the Court whether the injury is temporary or permanent.

Local Rule 202(b)(2). Generally, federal courts refer to applicable state law in determining whether to 

approve the settlement of a minor’s claims. See e.g., Walden v. Moffett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

70507, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007); MAP v. City of Bakersfield, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7519, at 

*5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009); see also Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide: 

Federal Civil Procedure before Trial § 15:138, p. 15-48 (2010). In California, a settlement or 

compromise of a claim of a minor is not enforceable without court approval. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 2504, 

3600 et seq.; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 372 (“The guardian. . . or guardian ad litem so appearing for any 

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minor . . . shall have power, with the approval of the court in which the action or proceeding is 

pending, to compromise the same. . .”) (emphasis added). 

III. Discussion and Analysis

A. Settlement amount

The petition in this case sets forth the information that is required. The children involved are:

R.D.G., a 4-year-old boy; A.C.G., an 11 year-old boy; F.E.G. n 3-year-old boy; J.S.G., a 6 year-old 

girl; J.A.G., an 8 year-old boy; and M.I.G., a 10 year-old girl. (Doc. 65 at 6; Doc. 1 at 10-13) Each 

child is the natural child of the decedent. (Doc. 1 at 10-13)

The motion details that out of the settlement proceeds, Plaintiff’s counsel will be reimbursed 

$31,252.35 for costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this case. (Doc. 65 at 38) In addition, counsel 

will receive 33 1/3% of the settlement proceeds. Id. The remaining 66 2/3% will be divided equally 

between the six children. Id. at 4. Thus, each child will receive $5,902.94. 

Ms. Lopez, through counsel, reports that she “has made a careful and diligent inquiry and 

investigation to ascertain the facts relating to this incident, the responsibility for the incident and the 

nature, extent, and seriousness of Plaintiffs' injuries. Petitioner fully understands that if the 

compromise proposed in this petition is approved by the court and is consummated, the Plaintiffs will 

be forever barred from seeking any further recovery of compensation from the settling defendants 

named below, even though the Claimant's injuries may in the future appear to be more serious than 

they are now or thought to be.” Id. at 3-4. Despite this, Ms. Lopez recommends the Court approve the 

petition as “fair, reasonable and in the best interest of the Plaintiffs.” Id. at 6.

Ms. Lopez seeks to have the entirety of the children’s proceeds accessible to her to spend the 

sum as she deems fit for their current care. (Doc. 65 at 4, 5-6) In the motion, counsel reports the 

family is in need of a vehicle given they currently have no car. Id. at 11. While counsel reports she 

will purchase “a modest family vehicle,” she fails to report the cost of the, how much she will 

contribute to the purchase, how will the cost of insurance be covered or, exactly, why the children’s 

interests are served by this purchase. Id. Likewise, she reports that she will use other money to pay 

for such daily needs of the children like, “food, clothes, rent, and other needs that may arise for each 

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child.” Id. Once again, she fails to explain the current source of support for the children or why this 

current source is insufficient for the children’s needs.

Finally, the Court recalls that counsel reported in an earlier-filed request that the Court seal her 

petition for approval of the minors’ compromise due to the fact that she believed she would be 

harassed by relatives who wished to share in the children’s damage award. (Doc. 62) The current 

petition fails to address this earlier concern and fails to provide any reason to believe this risk has been 

alleviated. The Court cannot take this issue on faith. Its obligation is to protect the children’s best 

interests and, as a result, does not find that releasing the funds to Ms. Lopez serves those interests.

On the other hand, at the hearing, Ms. Lopez reported that she has never owned a car and does 

not drive. Thus, clearly, the family has no need of a vehicle. Likewise, Ms. Lopez indicated that she 

has always wanted the children’s money placed in blocked accounts and did not seek to have the 

money given to her.1 

Based upon the information provided in the petition and the supporting documents, and 

considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds the settlement 

agreement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the children. However, the Court will require 

each child’s share to be deposited from counsel’s trust account into a blocked account, opened for 

each child. Court approval of withdrawal of funds from the accounts may be requested from the Court 

by Ms. Lopez without representation by counsel through an informal letter filed with the Court. Any 

such letter SHALL explain the need for the funds, how the funds will be spent, how the expenditure 

will benefit the children and, to the extent the funds are sought to pay for daily living expenses that are 

typically provided by the parent, the extent to which Ms. Lopez is contributing to the expenses.

B. Attorney’s fees and costs

In addition to approval of the settlement itself, any attorney’s fee to be paid for representation 

of a minor must be approved by the court. Cal. Prob. Code § 3601. To determine whether a request 

for attorney’s fee is reasonable, the Court may consider the time and labor required, whether the 

 

1 The Court presumes counsel felt that it was preferable for Ms. Lopez to have full access to the settlement 

proceeds.

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minor’s representative consented to the fee, the amount of money involved and the results obtained, 

and whether the fee is fixed, hourly, or contingent. See California Rule of Court 7.955(b). 

Where a contingency fee has been proposed, “most courts require a showing of “good cause” 

to award more than 25% of any recovery... As a practical matter, awards for more than 25% of the 

recovery in a minor’s case are rare and justified only when counsel proves that he or she provided 

extraordinary services.” Schwall v. Meadow Wood Apartments, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18819, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008) (quoting 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure before 

Trial §§12:576-12:577, p. 12(II)-17 (2007)). When a fee is contingent, the court should also consider 

the risk of loss, the amount of costs advanced by the attorney, and the delay in reimbursement of costs 

and payment of fees to determine if the amount is reasonable. See California Rule of Court 

7.955(b)(13).

Counsel reports that this was a “quite complicated matter, in light of the fact that Mr. Gurrola 

was firing a weapon before the officers arrived, and the officer testimony suggested that they had seen 

him with a weapon when they first approached him, although he was unarmed when he was eventually 

shot.” (Doc. 65 at 3) Counsel reports further, “Additionally, the matter involved a chase, from which 

Plaintiffs had two central issues affecting the outcome of their case: 1) whether Decedent turned 

toward the officers before he was shot; and 2) Even if he did not turn, were the officers reasonable in 

light of all the circumstances.” Id. at 5. Counsel asserts that this matter involved great risk and 

expense for the firm due to the need to retain various experts stemming from the complicated issues 

raised in the prosecuting the matter. Id.

Here, Ms. Lopez has agreed to the contingency amount between one-quarter and one-third of 

the recovery. (Doc. 65 at 14) After considering the alleged facts and the deposition testimony shared 

with the Court in prior motions, the Court agrees that the risk of loss was substantial. On the other 

hand, the Court does not find the issues involved posed difficult or novel legal questions but, rather, 

posed difficult-to-prove factual questions.

Toward that end, counsel estimates2attorneys in his firm spent approximately 600 hours 

 

2 Though counsel references Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff, 153 Cal.App.4th 257 (2007) for the 

proposition that an attorney need not provide billing records when seeking an award of fees, Mardirossian, did not involve 

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prosecuting this action. (Doc. 69 at 3) Mr. McMurray reports that the attorneys’ time was spent 

meeting with the client, interviewing witnesses and conducting scene inspections, drafting the 

government claim and complaint, conducting nine depositions and responding to and drafting written 

discovery. Id. The Court finds this amount of time to be reasonable for these actions and, that it is 

reasonable for the children for the attorneys to recover this amount.3

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. The petition for approval of the minors’ compromise is GRANTED in PART as 

follows:

a. The settlement amount of $100,000 is APPROVED;

b. The motion to approve attorney fees is GRANTED in the amount of $33,330;

c. The motion to approve costs is GRANTED in the amount of $31,252.35; 

d. Plaintiff’s counsel SHALL deposit the portion of the settlement proceeds for 

the six children, in the amount of $5,902.94 each, in an insured, blocked 

account opened for each child at a financial institution located within this state, 

subject to withdrawal only upon the authorization of the Court; 

e. No later than October 16, 2015, counsel for Plaintiff SHALL file proof of the 

creation of the blocked accounts. These documents SHALL be filed under 

SEAL;

f. No later than ten days after the settlement proceeds are paid to Plaintiff’s 

counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel SHALL file proof of the deposit of the funds into 

the blocked accounts. These documents SHALL be filed under SEAL; and,

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a minor’s compromise. Clearly, the standards for seeking a greater than 25% award does require a sufficient showing that 

extraordinary services were provided to the children which, in most cases, would be documented through billing records. 

3 Notably, at 600 hours, this equates to about $55 per hour.

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2. The stipulated motion to dismiss SHALL be filed no later than November 27, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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