Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01090/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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PVBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CAROLYN FRYMIRE, JOHN H. OLSON, ) 

JERRY ROBINETT, C. DEAN STEPPLER, ) 

MICHAEL E. LUTZ, MARK J. ) 

MACCERELLA, GORDON McMANUS, DAVID ) 

R. BERG, RICHARD C. GOIN, MICHAEL ) 

C. SHANNON, PHYLLIS MARTINEZ, ) 

JAMES PLATT, ARTHUR D. WOOD, JR., ) 

FRANK BOERNER, DIANA MADSEN, E. ) 

CHARLES ROBINSON, FRED AMMERMANN, ) 

f.lle! p ....... U1dtM T~nth Clreu\t 

SHARON CANALES, LaJUANA BREMER, ) 

DONALD N. TOW, DONALD R. SUIT, ) 

SHIRLEY L. KNOTT, DAVE RUBY, MARK ) 

C. YARNS, HOWELL E. SHEPARD, ) 

SHIRLEY S. ELLIOTT, ROBERT B. WOOD,) 

JAMES W. McWILLIAMS, KENT G. ) 

KARPER, RICHARD ALDERMAN, TOM ) 

CARLEY, ROSE ROYBAL, KENNETH W. ) 

BROWN, JUANITA B. NICHOLS, BONNIE ) 

STATON, CAROLYN J. NEWLAND, ROBERT ) 

WALLACE, DANIEL J. SILVA, JEANNETTE) 

A. PORTREY, JACK EVANS, LESLIE GENE) 

WARD, JAMES F. SOULE, JR. , MARY ) 

JANE KIMMEL, MITSUKO SMELKER, JUDY ) 

HOYLE, LAURI GLORIA, ART BACA, SUE ) 

M. HARRISON, RANDY W. LEE, ROBERT ) 

M. PUCCI, JR., MICHAEL GORHAM, PAUL) 

A. HANN, JO ANN HANN, DOYLE ) 

McALISTER, GLEN MEISSNER, JOANNE ) 

GIANNI, PAUL BOX, JoANNE M. ) 

RUNSTADLER, BOBBY VANLANDINGHAM, ) 

CHRISTOPHER JACOBSEN, ROBERT ) 

KALKMAN, JEFFREY FOERSTER, DOUGLAS ) 

DOW, STEVEN MOHR, DANIEL GREENLEAF,) 

CECILIA CORDOVA, DAVID BLAIR, ) 

ROBERT SALAZAR, CHRIS CACERES, on ) 

behalf of themselves and all others) 

similarly situated, ) 

v. 

Appellees/ ) 

Cross-Appellants, ) 

) 

) 

) 

AMPEX CORPORATION, a California ) 

Corporation, and AMPEX SYSTEMS ) 

CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation) 

and successor in interest to Ampex ) 

Corporation, ) 

Appellant/ ) 

Cross-Appellee. ) 

No. 94-1059 

No. 94-1090 

JULl 9 1995 

PATIUCK FISHER 

Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-1090 Document: 01019277825 Date Filed: 07/19/1995 Page: 1 
Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 91-S-1858) 

Barney Iuppa of Iuppa, Simons & Martin, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

for appellees/cross-appellants. 

Joseph A. Schwachter (John C. Fish, Jre of Littler, Mendelson, 

Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, San Francisco, California and Cecil R. 

Hedger of Harding & Ogborn, Denver, Colorado with him on the 

brief), of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, San 

Francisco, California, for appellant/cross-appellee. 

Before KELLY, BRIGHT,* and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

*The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Judge, United States Court 

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 

I. Introduction 

Frymire and eighty-four other employees ("Plaintiffs") of 

Ampex Corporation ("Ampex") brought this action against Ampex, 

alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 

Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2109. The WARN Act 

requires large employers who are either closing a plant or 

instituting mass layoffs to provide sixty-days advance notice to 

those employees who will be laid off or who will have their hours 

substantially reduced. After a bench trial, the district court1 

determined that Ampex had violated the notice requirements of WARN 

and instituted a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs totalling 

1

The Honorable Daniel B. Sparr, United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado. 

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$577,728.23 in damages, post-judgment interest and attorneys fees. 2 

See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Colo. 1994). 

Ampex raises six issues on appeal: (1) the district court 

abused its discretion in refusing to allow Ampex to amend its 

complaint to raise a statute of limitations defense, and erred as 

a matter of law in applying Colorado's three-year contract 

limitations period to Plaintiffs' WARN claim, as opposed to the 

National Labor Relations Act's six-month limitations period for 

§ 10(b) claims; (2) the district court erred in its determination 

that the Video Systems facility and Recording Systems facility 

constituted two separate "single sites of employment" and thus 

erred in concluding that Ampex violated WARN; (3) the district 

court abused its discretion in not reducing Ampex's liability for 

its "good faith" efforts to comply with WARN's requirements; (4) 

the district court erred in not reducing Ampex's liability by the 

amount of "pay in lieu of notice" benefits distributed to each 

Plaintiff; (5) the district court erred as a matter of law in using 

"calendar days," and not "work days," in calculating the 

Plaintiffs' back pay damages; and (6) the district court erred in 

awarding Plaintiffs prejudgment interest. 

In its cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district 

court erred in not counting thirty-one temporary employees for 

purposes of determining the threshold liability amount required by 

WARN. We do not reach this issue. 

2

The court later adjusted, without objection, the damages award 

to $586,762.99, and pursuant to post-trial motions, awarded the 

Plaintiffs prejudgment interest. 

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Several of the WARN issues present matters of first impression 

in this circuit. After careful consideration, we affirm in part, 

reverse in part, and remand to appropriately reduce the damages 

awarded against Ampex. 

II. Backqround 

Ampex Corporation designs, engineers, manufactures and markets 

highly sophisticated electronic audio and video recording products. 

Headquartered in Redwood City, California, Ampex has several 

manufacturing plants around the country, including one in Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, which is the subject of this cause of action. 

At the Colorado Springs facility, Ampex is further divided into two 

separate, wholly owned subsidiaries. Ampex Recording Systems 

Corporation ( "RSC") produces recording devices that are comparable, 

albeit in more highly technical form, to one's home videocassette 

recorder. Ampex Video Systems Corporation ( "VSC") produces 

computer-generated animation, graphics and special effects 

equipment, as well as switchers and editing equipment. 

Historically, the employees at the Colorado Springs campus 

worked in one building located at 600 Wooten Road and were part of 

one division within the Ampex corporate structure--the Audio/Video 

Systems Division. In 1988, Ampex divided the Audio/Video Systems 

Division into two separate divisions, and in 1989, Ampex separately 

incorporated them into vsc and RSC. In February 1990, Ampex moved 

vsc into a separate building located approximately 150 feet from 

the RSC building. 

In many respects, the 

geographically almost contiguous, 

two 

still 

corporations, although 

functioned separately. 

First, RSC and vsc had, by and large, separate management teams. 

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Second, the two corporations had no employees in common. And 

although certain employees were employed by one corporation while 

providing services to both corporations, their numbers were small. 

Finally, each corporation produced separate and distinct products 

which, while designed to work together and often marketed together, 

were nevertheless frequently sold separately and incorporated into 

the audio/video systems of Ampex's competitors. Despite these 

divisions, however, there still existed a sufficient amount of 

interfacing between the two corporations on both a formal and 

informal basis to suggest at least some unity and common design. 

The events most relevant to this appeal took place in the 

latter part of 1990, approximately six months after Ampex housed 

RSC and VSC in separate buildings. On September 17, 1990, Ampex's 

then-President, Ron Ritchie, informed all Ampex employees that 

despite considerable operating improvements the company would have 

to eliminate a number of positions in the coming months. On 

November 13, 1990, Ritchie updated his employees, informing them 

that the company would have to eliminate approximately 350 

positions by the first quarter of the year with some layoffs 

occurring immediately. Finally, on January 24, 1991, Ampex issued 

termination notices to the Plaintiffs and informed them that they 

would be entitled to Ampex's "pay in 1 ieu of notice" benefits, 

pursuant to company policy. 

Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" policy, instituted months 

before WARN was enacted, provided that employees who were fired 

without advance notice would still receive regular wages and 

benefits for a period of time commensurate with each employee's 

length of service. Additionally, Ampex provided each of its 

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dismissed employees two-days worth of job placement counseling, 

including resume assistance and job search strategizing. 

Despite these benefits, dismissed employees from both the VSC 

and RSC facilities brought this action against Ampex, claiming they 

were entitled to sixty-days advance notice and, not having received 

such notice, sixty-days worth of back pay. Pursuant to Ampex's 

motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the two 

facilities constituted separate "single sites of employment" and 

granted Ampex summary judgment as to those Plaintiffs who were 

employed by RSC as not meeting WARN's threshold requirement. However, because the percentage of VSC employees laid off exceeded 

WARN's threshold dismissal rate, see § 2101 (a) (3), the court denied 

Ampex's motion as to these employees/Plaintiffs. Frymire v. Ampex 

Corp., No. 91-S-1858 (D. Colo. Sept. 14, 1992) (order). The court 

subsequently denied Ampex's motion for reconsideration and in an 

order filed February 26, 1993, granted class certification to the 

Plaintiffs. 

This matter proceeded to trial and on January 7, 1994, the 

district court issued its opinion holding Ampex liable under the 

WARN Act and assessing damages. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. 

Supp. 1081 (D. Colo. 1994). This appeal followed. 

III. Discussion 

A. statute of Limitations 

As an initial matter, we must determine whether Plaintiffs' 

cause of action is time-barred. Ampex first raised the time-bar 

issue in its Rule 15(a) 3 motion for leave to amend its defense. 

3Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure provides, 

in relevant part, that "a party may amend the party's pleading only 

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There, Ampex contended that Plaintiffs' WARN Act claim was barred 

under the applicable statute of limitations borrowed from § 10(b) 

of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 u.s.c. § 160(b). 

Both parties agree that approximately nine months elapsed between 

the time that this cause of action accrued, January 24, 1991, and 

Plaintiffs filed suit, October 24, 1991. The NLRA establishes a 

six-month statute of limitations period and if applicable to WARN 

would render this suit dismissable. 

After reviewing Ampex's motion, the district court refused to 

apply the NLRA limitations and instead determined that the threeyear statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in 

Colorado provided a more appropriate analogy to Plaintiffs' WARN 

claim. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp. 651, 654-55 (D. Colo. 

1993) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1) (a)). Accordingly, 

the court denied Ampex's Rule 15(a) motion. Ampex appeals that 

judgment, arguing that the district court went beyond the scope of 

Ampex's motion to amend by determining without adequate briefing 

what the applicable statute of limitations should be. 

Alternatively, Ampex suggests that even if the district court had 

the authority to rule on the merits of Ampex's time-bar defense, 

the court erred in not selecting the most analogous federal or 

state statute of limitations period. Upon review of the relevant 

case law, we disagree with Ampex's claims of error and affirm the 

district court. 

Based on the record before this court, we believe the district 

court had been adequately briefed and thus had appropriately 

by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 

leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 

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addressed the merits of Ampex's time-bar defense. Plaintiffs 

addressed the issue of the applicable statute of limitations in 

their memorandum brief in opposition to Ampex's motion to amend. 

Thereafter, Ampex filed a reply brief that while disavowing the 

need for and the appropriateness of addressing the merits of the 

time-bar defense nevertheless reasserted Ampex's contention that 

the NLRA' s statute of limitations should apply. In sum, the 

court's decision to rule on the substantive merits of Ampex's timebar defense was perfectly appropriate and did not constitute an 

abuse of discretion. 

This, however, does not end the analysis. We must still 

decide whether the district court erred as a matter of law in 

applying Colorado's three-year limitations period for contract 

actions to Plaintiffs' WARN claim. Based on the Supreme Court's 

recent decision in North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, Nos. 94-834 and 

94-835, 1995 WL 318637 (U.S. May 30, 1995), we conclude that the 

district court committed no error. 

Immediately after oral argument in this appeal, there still 

existed an unresolved split in four circuit courts of appeals as to 

whether the NLRA's six-month limitations period for § lO(b) claims 

clearly offered a more appropriate analog for WARN causes of action 

than other available state limitations periods. Because the WARN 

Act contains no statute of limitations provision, courts had been 

left to borrow a myriad of periods to limit such claims. See, 

~' United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, 

Inc., 999 F. 2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Vermont's six-year 

statute of limitations for contract actions and not the NLRA's sixmonth statute); United Mine Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Peabody 

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Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 {6th Cir. 1995) {applying the NLRA's 

limitations period for 10{b) claims), vacated, 63 U.S.L.W. 3644 

{U.S. June 5, 1995) {No. 94-1398) ; Halkias v. General Dynamics 

Corp., 31 F.3d 224 {5th cir. 1994) {opting for the NLRA standard), 

reh'q en bane granted {Sept. 22, 1994). However, after this case 

was submitted for our deliberation, but before its filing, the 

Supreme Court in Thomas partially resolved the statute of 

limitations issue, holding that a period of limitations for WARN 

should be borrowed from state, not federal, law. 

What that decision did not decide is which state statute of 

limitations to apply. In Thomas, the lower appeals court had 

identified four statutes of limitations that could apply to WARN 

claims, including a four-year period for breach of implied 

contracts in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The other three 

statutes provided periods of limitations spanning two to six years. 

Because the complaints in Thomas "were timely even under the 

shortest of these [limitations periods]," the Supreme Court elected 

not to decide which state limitations period to apply. Thomas, 

Nos. 94-834 and 94-835, 1995 WL 318637 at *4. In this case, 

however, Ampex would have us apply the six-month statute of 

limitations period applicable to either the Colorado Labor Peace 

Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-3-102, or the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-401. Because 

Plaintiffs filed suit approximately nine months after their cause 

of action accrued, adoption of either of these statutes would 

render Plaintiffs' claim dismissable. Thus, unlike the Court in 

Thomas, we must decide which state limitations apply. 4 

4Interestingly, even the Plaintiffs assert that the most 

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Although the district court has not fully presented its 

reasons for borrowing a contract limitations period for WARN 

claims, we agree with the decision. First, borrowing a universally 

recognized cause of action, such as a contract action, will 

necessarily further the presumptively important goal of uniformity. 

See Lampf. Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 

u.s. 350, 357 (1991); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff 

& Assocs .. Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 153 (1987) (noting the importance of 

adopting a common species of state statute of limitations 

provisions). 

Second, while employees in most states, including Colorado, 

are at-will employees, the WARN Act imposes a federal mandate upon 

employers that effectively obligates them as if bound by the terms 

of an employment contract. Cf. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 246 (Wisdom, 

J., dissenting) ("I view an action under WARN as essentially an 

action for damages caused by an alleged breach of an employer's 

obligation. Such an action closely resembles an action for breach 

of contract cognizable at common law." (internal quotation 

omitted)). Additionally, the WARN remedy of back pay mirrors the 

type of remedy afforded those who fall victim to an implied 

contract breach--giving individuals what they would have been 

entitled to had there been no breach. Cf. id. at 246-47. 

Third and finally, other circuit judges have seen fit to apply 

the contract standard to WARN causes of action. See United 

appropriate statute of limitations period may not be the 

limitations period for contract claims, but rather the Coloroado 

statute providing for a two-year limitations period for "all 

actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period 

of limitations is provided in said federal statute." Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-80-102(1) (g). 

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Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 

51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that while it could not "find any 

state substantive claim perfectly analogous to WARN," the contract 

statute of limitations should be applied); Halkias, 31 F.3d at 246 

(Wisdom, J., dissenting). And, even the Supreme Court has noted 

that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period for breach of an 

implied contract would be an acceptable state analog for WARN 

actions. Thomas, Nos. 94-834 and 94-835, 1995 WL 318637 at *4. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 

application of Colorado's three-year contract claim limitations 

period to WARN and reject Ampex's contention that Plaintiffs' WARN 

claim is time-barred. 

B. Single Site Determination and the WARN Violation 

As its second major contention on appeal, Ampex would have us 

conclude that its actions did not constitute a WARN violation. 

To constitute a WARN violation, an employer must have ordered 

a plant ·closing or mass layoff without providing each employee, 

either individually or through her representatives, with sixty-days 

advance notice. 29 u.s.c. § 2102. A "mass layoff" refers to a 

reduction in force which results in an employment loss at a single 

site of employment during any thirty-day period for fifty or more 

employees who comprise at least 33% of the total number of 

employees at that particular site. § 2101(a) (3). 

For purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that if the VSC 

building constitutes a separate work location, separate and 

distinct from the RSC site, then the firing of ninety VSC employees 

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without the requisite sixty-day notice violates the WARN Act. 5 

Thus, the principal issue before this court is whether the district 

court properly determined that the vsc and RSC facilities 

constituted two separate sites of employment for purposes of the 

WARN Act. 

The district court opinion refers to its disposition of this 

issue at various times during trial proceedings. 6 There, the court 

noted, among other things, that the two divisions: 

appear[ed to] have several bases for being separate. 

They had different managers. They had different 

department heads. I think Mr. McWilliams' testimony was 

that they had different controllers, they had different 

quality control, engineering, operations, they had a 

different secretary, purchasing material. They make 

different products. Granted, they're the same or similar 

types of products, but so are the products made by 

Western Electric, the Mountain States Telephone Company, 

and AT & T, but that doesn't make them all single, 

individual corporations. 

Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II, at 549-50 (trial transcript). 

In reviewing the district court's determination that two 

separate sites of employment existed at the Ampex compound, we 

apply the clearly erroneous standard. Although a "single site of 

employment" determination is a mixed question of law and fact, the 

5

The parties disagree, however, as to whether Ampex's layoffs 

from both vsc and RSC would satisfy the 33% threshold level if the 

two divisions were considered one single site of employment. 

In its cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district 

court erred in not counting thirty-one temporary employees for 

purposes of determining that more than 33% of all of the workers at 

the Colorado Springs campus had been dismissed. Because 

consideration of this issue is conditioned on our reversing the 

district court's "single site" determination, we need not address 

it here. 

6

The issue was first raised and ruled upon in Ampex's motion 

for summary judgment. It was re-raised and ruled upon in Ampex's 

motion for reconsideration. It was once again raised during the 

trial and ruled upon in the court's final order and judgment. 

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parties concur in their assessment of the relevant legal standard 

and only disagree as to the facts and the interpretation of those 

facts in light of the legal standard. Because the district court 

is "better positioned" than we are to decide this primarily factual 

issue and because "appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the 

clarity" of this inherently ambiguous legal determination, we apply 

the more deferential standard of review. Salve Regina College v. 

Russell, 499 u.s. 225, 233 (1991); cf. Armstrong v. C.I.R., 15 F.3d 

970, 973 (lOth Cir. 1994) (holding that tax court's determination 

that notice was mailed to petitioner's "last known address, " within 

meaning of federal statute, was a mixed question of law and fact 

and subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review because the 

determination primarily involved a factual inquiry). But see 

Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 

1275, 1289 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the "single site" 

determination is a mixed question of law and fact, but applying de 

novo review because the historical facts were largely undisputed), 

cert. denied, 115 s. ct. 933 (1995). 

The WARN Act does not define a "single site of employment." 

The rules promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, however, do 

provide some guidance. These provisions, in relevant part, 

stipulate that: 

(1) A single site of employment can refer to either a 

single location or a group of contiguous locations. 

Groups of structures which form a campus or industrial 

park, or separate facilities across the street from one 

another, may be considered a single site of employment. 

(2) There may be several single sites of employment 

within a single building, such as an office building, if 

separate employers conduct activities within such a 

building. For example, an office building housing 50 

different businesses will contain 50 single sites of 

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employment. The offices of each employer will be its 

single site of employment. 

(3) Separate buildings or areas which are not directly 

connected or in immediate proximity may be considered a 

single site of employment if they are in reasonable 

geographic proximity, used for the same purpose, and 

share the same staff and equipment. An example is an 

employer who manages a number of warehouses in an area 

but who regularly shifts or rotates the same employees 

from one building to another. 

(4) Non-contiguous sites in the same geographic area 

which do not share the same staff or operational purpose 

should not be considered a single site. For example, 

assembly plants which are located on opposite sides of a 

town and which are managed by a single employer are 

separate sites if they employ different workers. 

(5) Contiguous buildings owned by the same employer which 

have separate management, produce different products, and 

have separate workforces are considered separate single 

sites of employment. 

20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i) (emphasis added). 

Taken together, these regulations suggest that proximity and 

contiguity are the most important criteria for making single site 

determinations. They, in fact, establish whether a site will be 

presumed a single or multiple site. However, once a court makes 

the contiguous/non-contiguous determination, the operational, 

managerial and labor variables become the decisive factors and can 

defeat or reinforce the presumptions established by the proximity 

and contiguity factors. 7 

7

To be sure, the regulations do not characterize these "single 

site" factors in exclusive terms. Other factors or criteria could 

influence the "single site" determination, and, as some appellate 

decisions reveal, they have. See, e.g., International Union, UMW 

v. Jim Walter Resources, 6 F.3d 722, 726 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting 

the importance of the fact that the federal government has, in 

other contexts, treated each site as separate and that each site 

uses separate facilities, such as separate parking lots); 

Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 

1275, 1290 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the creation of a separate 

division because of space or financial concerns weighed in favor of 

determining there to be one single site of employment), cert. 

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In the case of Ampex, the parties appear to have reached an 

agreement that RSC and VSC were near-contiguous buildings owned by 

the same employer, which, while usually constituting a single site 

of employment, could constitute two separate sites of employment if 

each building housed separate management and separate workforces 

and produced different products. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i) (5). The 

disagreement between Ampex and the Plaintiffs centers, therefore, 

on whether the record supports the district court's determination 

that the VSC and RSC facilities housed separate management and 

labor and produced a different product. As we read the record, we 

believe the district court did not clearly err in its conclusion. 

First, the record indicates that vsc and RSC had separate 

plant managers, operations managers, engineering managers, quality 

control managers, finance managers, human resource managers, 

management information systems managers, traffic managers, 

purchasing managers and separate plant controllers. Although, as 

Ampex contends, there existed some overlap and coordination of 

otherwise distinct managerial responsibilities (particularly with 

the human resource and traffic managers) 8--and in fact some 

instances of common management (particularly with respect to 

technical and supervisory training), the district court reasonably 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995). 

We, however, focus our inquiry on the management, labor and 

product variables, taking into consideration "other" factors only 

insofar as they assist our assessment of Ampex's "good faith" 

defense. See infra subsection III.C. 

8

The record suggests, however, that even when one manager took 

over the responsibilities for another manager in the other 

building, either on a temporary or more permanent basis, the costs 

associated with those additional responsibilities were oftentimes, 

though not always, allocated between the two corporations. 

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concluded that the two corporate subsidiaries were, by and large, 

separately managed. 

Second, the fact that no employees existed in common between 

the two corporations strongly supports the district court's 

conclusion that RSC and VSC had separate and distinct workforces. 

Although Ampex attempts to present evidence to the contrary, such 

evidence taken in its larger context fails to persuade. 

For example, Ampex makes much of Sharon Genberg's testimony 

that employees freely transferred between the two buildings without 

any loss of seniority or benefits. A careful review of the record 

indicates, however, that transfers did not occur as often as Ampex 

would have us believe. And even assuming transfers did occur 

frequently, we certainly cannot equate this phenomenon with the 

"shifting," "rotating" or even "sharing" of employees that 

presumably defines a non-"separate" workforce. 

§§ 639.39(i)(3), (4), (5). 

20 C.F.R. 

Ampex additionally contends that because some employees were 

employed by one division but serviced both divisions, the district 

court should have concluded that the two workforces were not 

separate, but rather overlapping. While it is certainly true that 

the reliability engineering, chemical waste disposal and health 

departments were staffed by individuals who wh.ile employed by one 

division serviced both, the number of "overlappers" was 

inconsequential. In fact, the chemical waste disposal and health 

departments were staffed by only one person respectively. 

As to the third variable in our "single site" equation--

"different products"--the record once again supports the district 

court's conclusion. RSC produces recording devices that are 

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comparable to one's home videocassette recorder. VSC produces 

computer-generated animation, graphics and special effects 

equipment, as well as switchers and editing equipment. Although 

these products were designed to work together, are often marketed 

together, and even share some component parts, they are nevertheless distinct and fungible. For instance, Ampex did not design 

VSC's video graphics systems for exclusive use with RSC merchandise, and, in fact, Ampex's competitors often incorporated VSC 

graphics into their own recording systems. The fact that RSC and 

VSC did not necessarily have the same competitors additionally 

suggests that the video systems market remained independent from 

the recording systems market. 

No bright lines exist to guide us in evaluating the district 

court's two single site determinations. Although the Department of 

Labor has provided relatively detailed standards to guide 

employers, employees and the courts, in close cases such as this 

one we cannot say with absolute certainty that one right answer 

exists. The district court rendered a reasonable conclusion given 

the close facts of this particular case. Accordingly, we will not 

overrule that conclusion, either as a factual matter (in that we 

are governed by the clearly erroneous standard) or as a legal 

matter (in that the statute and accompanying regulations do not 

require a contrary ruling). 

c. Good Faith Exception 

Although we have decided that the district court did not err 

in its "single site" determination, Ampex would nevertheless have 

us conclude that the district court abused its discretion in not 

mitigating Ampex's liability. As its principal claim for reduction 

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of damages, Ampex contends that because it had entertained a "good 

faith" and reasonable belief that the Colorado Springs campus 

constituted a "single site of employment" the district court should 

have reduced its liability pursuant to § 2104(a} (4} of the WARN 

Act. 

Section 2104(a} (4} provides that: 

If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to 

the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission 

that violated this chapter was in good faith and that the 

employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the 

act or omission was not a violation of this chapter the 

court may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of the 

liability or penalty provided for in this section. 

29 u.s.c. § 2104(a} (4}. The few federal courts that have 

considered this "good faith" defense have interpreted it to require 

proof of the employer's subjective intent to comply with the Act, 

as well as evidence of objective reasonableness in the employer's 

application of the Act. Washington v. Aircap Indus •. Inc., 860 F. 

Supp. 307, 315-17 (D.s.c. 1994}; Oil. Chemical and Atomic Workers 

Int'l Union v. American Home Products Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1441, 

1451-1452 (N.D. Ind. 1992) . As applied to this case, if Ampex 

reasonably believed that the Colorado Springs campus constituted a 

"single site of employment" and if it had significant evidence 

suggesting that it had "good faith" intentions to comply with WARN, 

then the district court would have erred in refusing to reduce 

Ampex's liability. 

Ampex's conclusion that the Colorado Springs campus 

constituted a "single site of employment"--even if wrong--was at 

least "reasonable." The "single site" determination has proven to 

be an elusive concept. Although we agree with the district court's 

conclusion that the multiple work locations at the Colorado Springs 

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campus constituted separate sites of employment, we readily 

acknowledge that reasonable minds could come to an entirely 

different conclusion. There were, in fact, no absolute, clear-cut 

dividing lines between VSC and RSC employees and between VSC and 

RSC managers, and even less of a clear division between the 

products they produced. And if we consider variables not outlined 

in the regulations but rather relied upon in other appellate 

decisions, Ampex's conclusions appear even more reasonable. 

For example, factors such as other federal agencies treating 

an employer's multiple work locations as a "single site of 

employment," or the sharing of parking lots and cafeterias have 

each been deemed relevant for purposes of making a "single site" 

determination. See, e.g., International Union, UMW v. Jim Walter 

Resources, 6 F.Jd 722, 726 (11th Cir. 1993). Relying on these 

factors, Ampex has persuasively presented evidence that its 

Colorado Springs campus could reasonably have been interpreted to 

be a "single site of employment." At Ampex, employees interfaced 

daily on a formal and informal level. Employees had access to a 

centralized phone system and were paid through a centralized 

payroll system. Employees at one building had free access to the 

other building, shared the parking lots, cafeteria, credit union, 

gym and athletic fields located on the Colorado Springs campus. 

Moreover, in 1989, the EEOC notified Ampex that although VSC was 

scheduled to move into a separate building Ampex had to fill out 

only one EE0-1 form and develop only one affirmative action 

program. 

When all these factors--both those outlined in the regulations 

and those deemed relevant in the caselaw--are considered, it is 

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difficult to conclude that Ampex did not act at least reasonably in 

believing that it was complying with the requirements of WARN. And 

given the presumption embodied in the regulations that contiguous 

or near-contiguous buildings are "single sites of employment," we 

are additionally struck by the reasonableness of Ampex's belief 

that the presumption had not been defeated. 

Of course determining that Ampex had reasonably believed that 

it was complying with WARN does not, standing alone, absolve Ampex 

of liability, let alone justify reducing its liability. Ampex must 

also present evidence that it had subjectively intended to comply 

with the Act. Such evidence can include proof that the employer 

worked with legal counsel to determine whether the company was in 

compliance with WARN, as well as more general evidence that the 

company had its employees' welfare in mind. 9 See , e. g. , Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 

1287-1288 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 s. ct. 933 (1995); In 

re Old Electralloy Corp., 162 B.R. 121, 126 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1993); 

Oil. Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 790 F. Supp. at 1452 

(emphasizing the importance of notifying the employees of impending 

layoffs as soon as that information is available, even if the 

technical notice requirements of WARN are not followed). In this 

case we believe that Ampex has presented sufficient and 

uncontroverted evidence to satisfy the subjective prong of the 

"good faith" test. Not only had Sharon Genberg, Ampex's Human 

Resources Director, spoken extensively with corporate counsel about 

9

The fact that the EEOC deemed the entire Colorado Springs 

campus to be a "single site of employment" also supports Ampex's 

contention that it subjectively believed it was in compliance with 

federal regulations. 

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the single site issue, but Ampex had also instituted a "pay in lieu 

of notice" policy before WARN was even enacted. This policy 

provided dismissed employees with at least three-weeks notice or 

pay in lieu of notice so that they could more easily seek 

employment elsewhere. 10 Additionally, while Ampex did violate 

WARN's sixty-day notice requirement, the company had provided all 

of its employees, months in advance, more generalized notice that 

major layoffs were imminent. 

In sum, we believe the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to reduce Ampex's liability in light of Ampex's "good 

faith" efforts to comply with WARN. We, of course, do not intend 

to suggest that all plausible interpretations of WARN will justify 

a "good faith" defense. Given the degree of ambiguity surrounding 

implementation of the WARN requirements, such an approach would 

certainly undermine WARN's effectiveness. Instead, we limit our 

holding to the particular facts of this case, where the "single 

site" determination was especially difficult and the evidence of 

subjective good intentions on the part of Ampex remained 

uncontroverted. 

In reversing the district court on the "good faith" 

determination, we remand with instructions to reduce Ampex's 

liability. WARN does not specify the magnitude of reduction for a 

"good faith" defense and we believe that determination is better 

1

0rrhe policy, which was fully described in Ampex's Supervisor's 

Manual, also provided that " [ e] mployees should be given as much 

advance notice of layoff as possible, in order to seek other work 

while still employed and, if possible, avoid any period of 

unemployment." Appellant's Appendix, Vol. III, at 603. 

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left with the district court. However, the following discussion 

should be carefully considered on remand. 

D. "Pay in Lieu of Notice" setoff 

As the second basis for its claim that the district court 

erred in not reducing its liability, Ampex relies on 

§ 2104(a) (2) (B) of the WARN Act, which provides that "[t]he amount 

for which an employer is liable • • . shall be reduced by • • . any 

voluntary and unconditional payment by the employer to the employee 

that is not required by any legal obligation." Ampex contends that 

because it voluntarily provided severance benefits to discharged 

employees its liability should be reduced by at least the amount of 

those benefits. 

Under what became known as the "pay in lieu of notice" policy, 

Ampex provided that if an employee was fired with no advance 

notice, Ampex would still continue to pay that employee's regular 

wages and benefits for a period of time commensurate with his or 

her length of service. Although Ampex expended over one-half 

million dollars in "pay in lieu of notice" benefits, the district 

court refused to reduce Ampex's liability by this amount, 

concluding that the company was contractually obligated to pay 

those benefits under Colorado law and thus precluded from claiming 

the§ 2104(a) (2) (B) reduction. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. 

Supp. 1081, 1084 (D. Colo. 1994). 

We review the district court's decision under the clearly 

erroneous standard because the issue of whether the parties have 

entered into a contract is a question of fact under Colorado law. 

Tuttle v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 797 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo. Ct. 

App. 1990); Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619, 

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623 (Colo. ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Nov. 28, 1988); Stahl v. 

Sun Microsystems. Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 536 (lOth Cir. 1994); see also 

Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 u.s. 225, 233 (1991). 

Under Colorado law, an implied contract can arise out of an 

employment manual, handbook or any other document reflecting 

company policy. Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F. 3d 1460, 1464 

(lOth Cir. 1994). To establish such a contract, however, employees 

must first show that the employer's actions manifested an intent to 

be bound by the provisions of that document. Evenson v. Colorado 

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. co., 879 P.2d 402, 408-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 

1993), cert. denied (Aug. 29, 1994). To establish an employer's 

binding intent, the terms of that offer must be communicated to all 

employees, Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1464, those terms must be sufficiently 

definite and detailed, id. at 1465; Tuttle, 797 P.2d at 828, and 

the offer must not include a disclaimer provision, Evenson, 879 

P.2d at 409; Redies v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 570, 

573 (D. Colo. 1989). Once the employees establish that an offer 

was made, they can further establish that the offer was accepted 

and consideration provided by simply indicating that their 

continued employment with the company could at least reasonably 

have been motivated by the terms of the offer. Continental Air 

Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (en bane); 

see also Tuttle, 797 P.2d at 828 (noting how the legal significance 

of an employer's sexual equality policy could be grounds for 

continued employment with a given employer and thus constitute 

acceptance of that employer's offer); Vasey, 29 F. 3d at 1465 

(indicating that employees must at least have been aware of the 

company's "offer"). 

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Applying these legal standards to Ampex's "pay in lieu of 

notice" policy, we conclude that the record sufficiently supports 

the district court's decision that Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" 

policy constituted a binding contract. 

Ampex promulgated its "pay in lieu of notice" policy 

applicable in this case on March 23, 1988. In an amended version 

of its Supervisor's Manual, Ampex included a nine-page termination 

policy, which among other things detailed a schedule of minimum 

notice and "pay in lieu of notice" procedures for employees 

affected by a workforce reduction. The manual included a specific 

schedule of benefits and employed language that strongly indicated 

Ampex's intention to be bound. 11 Ampex did not circulate this 

particular document to non-managerial employees. 

In a November 28, 1989, interoffice memorandum, however, 

Ampex's then-president, Ron Ritchie, informed all Ampex employees 

that it had a "very generous severance policy." The memorandum 

then detailed the specific terms of that policy, laid out exactly 

as presented in the Supervisor's Manual. Appellees' Supp. 

Appendix, at 93. Less than one year later, Ron Ritchie reminded 

all Ampex employees that the company would continue to pay wages 

and benefits "based on Ampex service in accordance with [its] 

normal policies." Appellant's Appendix, Vol. III, at 689. And 

when Ampex laid-off the Plaintiffs on January 24, 1991, the company 

once again reminded those employees that they would be given pay in 

11 For example, Ampex introduced the terms of its noticef"pay in 

lieu of notice" policy by indicating that "[e]mployees affected by 

a workforce reduction will be entitled • " Appellant's 

Appendix, Vol. III, at 602 (emphasis added). 

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lieu of notice, "in accordance with company policy 32.02." 

Appellant's Appendix, Vol. III, at 691. 

In sum, the record sufficiently supports the district court's 

conclusion that Ampex had manifested the intent necessary to be 

bound by its "pay in lieu of notice" policy. 

As for whether Ampex's employees had accepted Ampex's pay and 

"pay in lieu of notice" package for purposes of Colorado contract 

law, the record strongly indicates that they did. First, Ron 

Ritchie's frequent distribution of Ampex's reduction-in-force 

policies suggests that affected employees must have been aware of 

the pay and "pay in lieu of notice" package. Second, Ampex's "pay 

in lieu of notice" policy guaranteed its employees significant 

benefits, regardless of WARN's applicability, and thus could 

reasonably have motivated those employees to continue working with 

Ampex despite apparent economic difficulties with the company. In 

fact, Plaintiffs presented the testimony of James McWilliams, a 

named party Plaintiff, who indicated that he had been aware of and 

had personally "relied upon" Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" 

policy. Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II, at 545. 

In light of the record, we agree with the district court that 

Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" policy constituted a binding 

contract and that Ampex should not benefit from a reduction in 

liability that is based on § 2104 (a) (2) (B). Nevertheless, we 

believe that the amount of money expended under this "pay in lieu 

of notice" policy evidenced Ampex's good intentions and should have 

some consideration in the district court's implementation of the 

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"good faith" reduction of liability discussed above, ~ subsection 

C, supra. 12 We remand accordingly. 

E. Calendar Days or Work Days 

As the third basis for its claim that the district court erred 

in not reducing its liability, Ampex contends that the district 

court mistakenly used "calendar days, " and not "work days, " in 

calculating back pay damages. See 29 u.s.c. § 2104(a) (1). Under 

the district court's analysis, if an employee was denied sixty-days 

notice as required by WARN, he would receive his daily salary times 

sixty. 13 Frvmire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (D. Colo. 

1994). Ampex argues that the appropriate calculus requires the 

court to determine the number of days worked within the sixty-day 

violation period and multiply that number by the daily salary. 

Thus, a person who worked five days a week over a sixty-day period 

would have worked approximately forty-four "work days," and would 

be entitled to significantly less damages than that afforded by the 

district court. 

As this is an issue of first impression for this court, we 

turn first to the WARN Act itself in an attempt to decipher some 

meaning from the statutory text. In relevant part, the WARN Act 

provides that: 

12As we indicated in our "good faith" discussion, the "good 

faith" reduction in liability is justified by the peculiar facts of 

this case and thus any reduction that may be guided by (but not 

result from) Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" expenditures should 

also be understood as peculiar to the particular facts of this 

case. We have no intention of, nor do we condone, using the "good 

faith" exception to thwart the proscriptions detailed in other 

parts of the WARN Act. 

13Because both parties agreed that Ampex had voluntarily 

provided two-days worth of transitional employment assistance, the 

district court actually used 58 days as its penalty multiplier. 

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Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in 

violation of section 2102 of this title shall be liable 

to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss 

as a result of such closing or layoff for--

(A) back pay for each day of violation at a 

rate of compensation not less than the higher 

of • . • • 

Such liability shall be calculated for the period of 

violation, up to a maximum of 60 days, but in no event 

for more than one-half the number of days the employee 

was employed by the employer. 

29 u.s.c. § 2104(a) (1). 

Concluding that the ordinary meaning of "days" is not "work 

days," the district court refused to credit Ampex's contention that 

"days" referred to "work days" only. Frymire, 858 F. Supp. at 

1084. Plaintiffs additionally insist that the phrase "back pay for 

each day of violation" necessarily includes weekends and holidays 

because why otherwise would Congress include the qualifying phrase 

"for each day of violation" and why would "liability • . be 

calculated for a period of violation, up to a maximum of 60 days," 

if one could not use a sixty-day multiplier. 

An alternative and equally plausible interpretation of these 

provisions suggests that an employee can receive "back pay for each 

day of violation," but if that employee did not work on a 

particular violation day, there would be no back pay to receive. 

Thus, an employee would receive no back pay for Saturdays and 

Sundays if he only worked on weekdays, but an employee who did work 

Saturdays and Sundays would receive back pay for those weekend days 

of violation. Moreover, the sentence, "liability could be 

calculated for a period of violation, up to a maximum of 60 days" 

could simply mean that we start with sixty days as a base and then 

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subtract those days during the sixty-day period that the employee 

did not work (weekends, for example) and those days during the 

sixty-day period that the employee had notice. 

Because the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable 

interpretation, we would ordinarily turn to other legislative 

materials to ascertain Congress' intent. Our review of these 

materials, however, reveals that Congress' various attempts at 

clarification remain susceptible to the same multiple 

interpretations outlined above. Compare H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-

576, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1052 (1988), reprinted in 1988 

u.s.c.c.A.N. 1547, 2085 (reiterating that the maximum violation 

period is sixty days) with s. Rep. No. 62, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 

24 (1987) (report on earlier draft of bill which provides that 

"damages are to be measured by the wages . . . the employee would 

have received had the plant remained open or the layoff had been 

deferred until the conclusion of the notice period"). 

In sum, given the textual ambiguity, as well as the ambiguity 

surrounding the statute's legislative history, it is understandable 

that the other two circuits that have reviewed this issue have 

split in their determination of whether calendar or work days 

applies. Compare Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores. 

Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1282-1286 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying "work 

days"), cert. denied, 115 s. Ct. 933 (1995), with United 

Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 41-43 

(3d Cir. 1993) (applying "calendar days"), cert. denied, 114 s. Ct. 

1060 (1994). 

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The various principles of statutory interpretation supporting 

contrary conclusions are articulated in these cases. We agree that 

some ambiguity exists in the statute. 

While both opinions have merit, we adopt the views of the 

Fifth Circuit in Dillard and agree for the reasons stated therein 

that damage calculations based on "work days," rather than 

"calendar days," better reflects the statutory purpose. 

Accordingly, we instruct the district court to reduce the level of 

liability in accordance with a "work days" calculus . 14 

14Ampex also challenges the imposition of liability for the 

four Ampex employees who were notified on January 24, 1991 of their 

impending layoff but remained employed for more than 30 days. 

These four individuals were Nicholas Bacica, Paul Box, Jeffrey 

Foerster and Michael Lutz. The district court reduced the awards 

to each of these individuals by the days worked in the 60-day time 

period. See Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-1086 

(D. Colo. 1994). 

Relying on 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.3(c) (1) and 639.5(a) (1) (i), Ampex 

contends that because a mass layoff for the purpose of WARN 

includes only those employees laid-off during any 30-day period the 

four employees who continued to work more than 30 days beyond 

January 24, 1991 should not be entitled to any damages. A review 

of these provisions indicates, however, that they refer only to the 

calculations used in determining whether enough employees were 

laid-off so as to activate the prescriptions of WARN. See 29 

u.s.c. § 2101(a) (3) (B). The WARN Act is silent as to whether these 

considerations play into determining who the employer is liable to. 

As a policy matter, however, we do not agree with Ampex that 

it should not be obligated to pay these employees. If we concluded 

otherwise, Nicholas Bacica, Paul Box, Jeffrey Foerster and Michael 

Lutz would receive less compensation than they would have received 

had Ampex fully complied with WARN. Since we have characterized 

WARN as remedial in nature, see supra subsection III.A., these four 

party Plaintiffs are entitled to WARN damages, as calculated by the 

district court under Section 2104(a) (2) (A), which requires damages 

to be reduced by "any wages paid by the employer to the employee 

for the period of the violation." 

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F. Prejudqment Interest 

By post-trial motion, Plaintiffs sought and were awarded 

prejudgment interest on their WARN claim. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 

No. 91-S-1858 (D. Colo. May 26, 1994) (order). As its final 

argument on appeal, Ampex contests the award of prejudgment 

interest, claiming that WARN's "exclusive remedies" provision 

precludes it. See 29 u.s.c. § 2104(b) (stipulating that "[t]he 

remedies provided for in this section shall be the exclusive 

remedies for any violation of this chapter"). 

In reviewing the district court's award of prejudgment 

interest, we usually apply the abuse of discretion standard. In re 

Investment Bankers. Inc., 4 F.3d 1556, 1566 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 114 s. ct. 1061 (1994). However, when the award hinges, in 

part, on an interpretation of federal law, we review de novo that 

portion of the analysis. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Federal Sav. & 

Loan Ins. Corp., 25 F.3d 1493, 1506 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

In order to determine whether the award of prejudgment 

interest was appropriate under federal law, we must first determine 

whether the federal law in question either expressly allows or 

expressly forbids the inclusion of prejudgment interest. In the 

absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest, we must "test 

whether such interest should be included . . . by appraising the 

'congressional purpose in imposing the obligation in light of 

general principles we deem relevant.'" United States v. Patty, 992 

F.2d 1045, 1049 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting with alteration Rodgers 

v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947)). 

Here, the issue is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant our 

looking at the congressional purpose. Although WARN does contain 

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an "exclusive remedies" provision,§ 2104(b), WARN also contains a 

provision which stipulates that the very "rights and remedies 

provided to employees by this chapter are in addition to, and not 

in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies 

of the employees." § 2105 (emphasis added). Therefore, if some 

"other" statutorily-based right to prejudgment interest existed, 

§ 2105 provides that WARN plaintiffs could recover prejudgment 

interest. Taking its cue from the language of § 2105, at least one 

other circuit has reasoned that 28 u.s.c. § 1961(a) is the "other" 

statute that guarantees civil plaintiffs in federal district court 

a right to prejudgment interest. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. 

Dillard Dep't Stores. Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288 (5th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 115 s. ct. 933 (1995). 

Section 1961(a) provides, among other things, that interest 

"shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered 

in a district court." As interpreted by this court, however, 

§ 1961(a) does not necessarily control the award of prejudgment 

interest in all cases, particularly where historically it has been 

disallowed. Wilson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 803 F.2d 563, 

564 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 946 (1987). Dillard's 

decision awarding prejudgment interest under WARN is entitled to 

strong consideration and WARN does not precisely speak to these 

issues. 15 In any case, if there had been any doubts and Congress 

15Apparently the Supreme Court has tacitly agreed that 

§ 1961(a) does not control the award of prejudgment interest. In 

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 u.s. 827 (1990), 

four Justices noted that § 1961 was a postjudgment and not a 

prejudgment statute and suggested that the remaining Justices on 

the Court agreed. Id. at 859 (White, J., dissenting). The Court, 

however, rendered this decision after WARN was enacted, and thus 

presumably ambiguity remained when Congress drafted § 2105. 

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had wanted to preclude the award of prejudgment interest in WARN 

claims, Congress could have done so expressly. That Congress did 

not expressly preclude such an award strongly suggests that 

§§ 2104(b) and 2105 can be reasonably read together as evidencing 

at least Congress' intent not to preclude the award of prejudgment 

interest in WARN actions. 

As for whether Congress affirmatively envisioned prejudgment 

interest as an acceptable WARN remedy, we believe it did. First, 

the congressional purpose underlying passage of the WARN Act fully 

supports an award of prejudgment interest. As the court in Dillard 

analyzed the issue: 

[G] iven our holding that back pay damages essentially are 

wages to which employees would have received had proper 

notice been provided, an award of prejudgment interest 

furthers the congressional purpose behind the WARN Act--

providing compensation to employees in lieu of proper 

notice such that the employees would be put in the same 

position as if the full sixty days notice had been 

provided. 

15 F.3d at 1288. Second, because Congress instituted WARN for 

purposes of obligating employers and because Ampex's breach of that 

obligation has caused Plaintiffs actual monetary loss, WARN is also 

quintessentially the type of Act that under "historic judicial 

principle[s]" should bear interest. Rodgers v. United States, 332 

u.s. 371, 373 (1947). 

That prejudgment interest can be given, however, only resolves 

part of our inquiry. We must also review for an abuse of 

discretion the district court's actual award of prejudgment 

interest. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rocket Oil Co., 865 F.2d 

1158, 1160 (lOth Cir. 1989). Under the abuse of discretion 

standard, we will not disturb a trial court's decision unless that 

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court has made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

permissible choice in the circumstances. Id. at 1160 n.l. 

In deciding whether prejudgment interest should have been 

awarded, we must determine whether the award of prejudgment 

interest served a compensatory function and reflected "fundamental 

considerations of fairness. " Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co. , 

977 F.2d 1549, 1554 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 s. Ct. 1841 

(1993); u.s. Indus .. Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 

1256-1257 & nn.47-49 (lOth Cir. 1988). Ampex contends that the 

prejudgment interest award overcompensated the Plaintiffs in light 

of the substantial amount of monies already received by the 

Plaintiffs pursuant to Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" policy. We 

disagree. 

As already discussed, Ampex had a separate contractual 

obligation to provide its employees "pay in lieu of notice" 

benefits. The district court predicated the award of prejudgment 

interest on Ampex's violation of the WARN Act, not on any 

infringement of Ampex's contractual obligations. Thus, in the 

strictest sense, Ampex's "pay in lieu of notice" benefits had no 

bearing on the Plaintiffs' entitlement to full compensation for 

Ampex's statutory violation. Granted, in reassessing Ampex's WARN 

liability we have acknowledged (and suggested that the district 

court consider) Ampex's payment of "pay in lieu of notice" 

benefits. However, because we have done so for purposes of 

calculating a "good faith" reduction of Ampex's WARN liability, we 

hold that preserving the award of prejudgment interest on remand 

properly balances the equities that have guided this opinion and 

certainly does not overcompensate the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, we 

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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding Plaintiffs prejudgment interest. 16 

:IV. conclusion 

For the reasons presented above, we affirm the district 

court's opinion in part and reverse in part. We remand with 

instructions to reduce Ampex's liability in light of its "good 

faith" efforts to comply with the requirements of WARN, and to 

award back pay damages on the basis of "work days, " and not 

"calendar days." 

16The district court calculated prejudgment interest pursuant 

to federal law, 28 u.s.c. § 1961(a), and not as prescribed by 

Colorado state law. Ampex does not appeal this part of the 

judgment and accordingly we affirm. 

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Nos. 94-1059, 94-1090, Carolyn Frymire, et al. v. AMPEX 

Corporation, a California Corporation, et al. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien. Voltaire, Dramatic Art. 

For many of the reasons stated by the court, WARN does not 

apply to AMPEX's Colorado Springs operation because it is a single 

site lacking the requisite number of laid-off employees, 

therefore, I respectfully dissent. If I agreed with the court 

that the operations constituted two separate sites, I would concur 

in the results reached in parts III(A) (limitations), (C) (good 

faith) and part of (E) (calendar or work days) , but I would 

dissent in Part III(D) ("pay in lieu of notice"). I would not 

reach Part III(F) (prejudgment interest). 

WARN should not be interpreted in a vacuum. The purpose of 

WARN is clear--to lessen the economic impact of a plant closing or 

mass layoff on employees. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1. It is not to be 

applied punitively against an employer for having to shrink its 

operations in order to remain viable, especially where, as in this 

case, the employer has taken steps in good faith to ameliorate the 

economic impact of such economic contraction. 

A. 

Applying the law to the virtually uncontroverted evidence, 

Ampex's characterization of VSC and RSC as a "single site of 

employment" is correct. If we are dealing with a "single site of 

employment" the requisite number of employees were not affected by 

the layoff and WARN does not apply. 

Appellate Case: 94-1090 Document: 01019277825 Date Filed: 07/19/1995 Page: 35 
The court makes two legal errors in affirming the district 

court's determination that VSC and RSC were two single sites: (1) 

applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, and (2) 

treating the factors contained in the regulations narrowly, and as 

exclusive determinants of the "single site" inquiry. The court 

declines to consider other factors, as other appellate courts 

have, which bear on the "big picture." See Prop. Op. at 14-15 

n.7. The court considers these other factors only insofar as 

Ampex's good faith is concerned. Id. This is error--the broader 

approach of the other circuits is correct. 

The "single site of employment" determination is a mixed 

question of fact and law. As the Court's discussion of the legal 

principles underlying the applicable regulation, 29 C.F.R. 

§ 639.3(i), makes clear, Prop. Op. at 13-14, application of the 

law to the established facts predominates the inquiry. 

Accordingly, I would review the district court's determination de 

novo. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 

15 F.3d 1275, 1289 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 

(1995). See also Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961-62 (lOth 

Cir. 1986). Apparently, the district court regarded the issue 

initially as a legal inquiry--it made its determination on summary 

judgment on the erroneous belief that "the two corporations are 

separate corporations for tax purposes." Aplt. App. at 252, 

278-79 (affidavit of Ampex Tax Manager that consolidated federal 

returns and combined state returns were filed) . The district 

court declined to reconsider its ruling, Aplt. App. at 308, but 

added the rationale relied upon by this court in response to 

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Ampex's motion for judgment on partial findings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(c). Aplt. App. at 547, 549-554. See also Frymire v. Ampex, 

858 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D. Colo. 1994) (district court adheres to 

its summary judgment order) . The district court treatment of this 

issue was hardly consistent, and undermines its decision on this 

issue because it is not possible to tell to what degree its 

decision was influenced by a factual finding which was clearly 

erroneous. Even under a clearly erroneous standard, however, the 

district's court's determination on this issue should be reversed 

because the uncontroverted evidence on how the operation 

functioned requires a contrary conclusion. 

RSC and VSC are near-contiguous buildings owned by AMPEX. 

The court acknowledges, as it must, that such an arrangement would 

usually constitute a single site of employment. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 639.3(i) (1). The contiguous site factor is especially important 

in this case against a backdrop of Ampex's history in Colorado 

Springs. If the operations of Ampex had remained in the same 

building, no one would seriously question that a single site of 

employment was involved. The company's expansion to a second 

building 150 feet from the original building yielded no 

significant change in operations. On closely analogous facts, the 

Fifth Circuit has found a single site of employment. See 

Carpenters Dist. Council, 15 F.3d at 1290 (certain divisions moved 

to another site to relieve overcrowding, job functions remained 

closely integrated and the same as before the move; held, single 

site of employment) . This is not a situation in which there were 

two separate plants or two separate mines, situations in which a 

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finding of multiple sites of employment would be appropriate. See 

International Union, UMW v. Jim Walter Resources. Inc., 6 F.3d 

722, 726 (11th Cir. 1993) (four mine sites); United Paperworkers 

Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard. Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 

1993) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 1045, 

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078, 2079 ("For example, General 

Motors has dozens of automobile plants throughout the country. 

Each plant would be considered a site of employment . • II ) ) • 

Far from separate management, different products and separate 

workforces, which could support the conclusion of "separate 

sites," see 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i) (5), the record reflects two 

divisions of one company functioning together to make 

complementary products, both before and after one division moved 

next door. In my view, this is not a case where§ 639(i) (5) 

applies. The two divisions produced highly specialized electronic 

equipment, often to be sold as a system, utilizing substantial 

amounts of common parts. "There were, in fact, no absolute, 

clear-cut dividing lines between VSC and RSC employees and between 

VSC and RSC managers, and even less of a clear division between 

the products they produced." Prop. Op. at 19. Rather, there was 

substantial overlap between the two divisions regarding support, 

such as purchasing, human resources, quality control, training and 

engineering. Several requirements were handled on behalf of both 

divisions with assistance from the parent corporation, such as 

accounting, management information systems and payroll. There was 

a centralized phone system, and "[e]mployees at one building had 

free access to the other building, shared the parking lots, 

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cafeteria, credit union, gym and athletic fields on the Colorado 

Springs campus." Prop. Op. at 19. The two divisions were treated 

as one by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for purposes 

of compliance and affirmative action. The two divisions 

functioned as a single site, both before and after the move. 

In its discussion on "good faith," the court acknowledges 

that Ampex's determination that the Colorado Springs campus was 

"reasonable," "that reasonable minds could come to an entirely 

different conclusion," that "if we consider variables not outlined 

in the regulations but rather relied upon in other appellate 

decisions, Ampex's conclusions appear even more reasonable," and 

that "given the presumption embodied in the regulations that 

contiguous or near-contiguous buildings are 'single sites of 

employment,' we are struck by the reasonableness that the 

presumption had not been defeated." Prop. Op. at 18-20. Ampex's 

characterization is not only reasonable, it is also correct. 

B. 

Ampex should receive credit for its "pay in lieu of notice" 

provision under 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2) (B). The court indicates 

that "Ampex promulgated its 'pay in lieu of notice' policy 

applicable in this case on March 23, 1988." Prop. Op. at 24. 

However, the record also reflects that Ampex has voluntarily 

continued its employees on the payroll following a layoff for at 

least 22 years. Aplt. App. at 494-95. This beneficence on the 

part of Ampex was not compelled by Congress and is not the product 

of any contract negotiation. Merely because employees anticipated 

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the payments in the event of a layoff should not preclude Ampex 

from receiving credit. Under the court's interpretation, if an 

employer announced in an employee handbook that it would comply 

with WARN, which it must do, by providing 60 days of severance pay 

in lieu of notice, an additional 60 days of pay would be required 

because the employer had announced its legal obligation and its 

employees had relied upon that announcement. 

To be sure, the statute requires that the payment be 

"voluntary and unconditional" and "not required by any legal 

obligation." 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2) (B). But this requirement 

should be construed to apply to previously negotiated labor 

agreements or to payments bargained for between individual 

employees and the employer, in those situations where no blanket 

agreement exists. To apply the provision literally, is to punish 

an employer that voluntarily provided for its employees during a 

time of economic contraction. Ampex expended $566,012 for the 

very same purposes for which the trial court ordered the payment 

of an additional $568,000. The court's construction of "legal 

obligation" will quickly result in the elimination of voluntary 

severance provisions that frequently confer more generous benefits 

on employees than those bestowed by Congress. 

Of the 90 employees found eligible for WARN payments, 41 

received significantly more from Ampex's voluntary "pay in lieu of 

notice" program than would have been required under WARN. See 

Aplt. App. at 698-700. The balance received somewhat less. I 

would credit any amounts received against Ampex's WARN liability 

on a dollar for dollar basis, by employee. 

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Alternatively, since the record establishes that employees 

receiving "pay in lieu of notice" were kept on the payroll and 

paid their regular wages, including benefits, for the period they 

qualified for, Aplt. App. at 417, I would treat these payments as 

wages paid to the employees during the period of violation. See 

29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2) (A). The employer's liability would be 

reduced by the payments and thus would avoid what I consider to be 

a patently unfair result. 

c. 

I agree with the court in part III(E) that "work days" should 

be the proper measure of damages under WARN. I also agree with 

n.14 on page 29, to the extent it requires that the four employees 

who were notified of their impending layoff on January 24, 1991, 

but who continued to work past 30 days, receive awards reduced by 

the the number of days worked in the 60-day period. 

Section 2104(a) (2) (A) plainly requires that any damages be reduced 

by "any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the period 

of violation." 

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