Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01737/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01737-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 15:78m(a) Securities Exchange Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re BRIDGEPOINT EDUCATION,

INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION CASE NO. 12-cv-1737 JM (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

This order addresses Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 70.) 

The motion was fully briefed, and the court determined that the matter was suitable

for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1. For the

reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the proposed

class for the period between May 3, 2011, and July 13, 2012; appoints Plaintiffs as

class representatives; and appoints their counsel as class counsel.

BACKGROUND

A. Consolidation of Cases and Appointment of Lead Plaintiffs

This case is a putative securities-fraud class action against Bridgepoint

Education, Inc. (“Bridgepoint”), and three of its officers, Andrew Clark, Daniel

Devine, and Jane McAuliffe (collectively, “Defendants”). Donald Franke filed the

initial complaint on July 13, 2012. (Doc. No. 1.) Several similar lawsuits followed. 

On motion by the parties, the court consolidated this case with Sacharczyk v.

Bridgepoint Education, Inc., No. 12-cv-1759, and Stein v. Bridgepoint Education,

Inc., No. 12-cv-1841, and appointed two pension plans, City of Atlanta General

Employees Pension Fund, and Teamsters Local 677 Health Services & Insurance

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Plan (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), as lead plaintiffs pursuant to the Private Securities

Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). (Doc. No. 21.) 

B. The Operative Complaint1

On December 21, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint. (Doc.

No. 26.) They asserted claims for violations of three provisions of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934: (1) securities fraud, under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;

(2) control-person liability, under § 20(a); and (3) insider trading, under § 20A. 

(Id. ¶¶ 232–56.) 

According to the consolidated complaint, Bridgepoint is a for-profit postsecondary education company that owns and operates Ashford University

(“Ashford”). (Id. ¶ 19.) Ashford’s main campus is in Clinton, Iowa, but the vast

majority of its students attend classes exclusively online. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 37.) In 2011,

Bridgepoint’s revenue was $933 million, over 90% of which came from Title IV

federal funds. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 41.) Maintaining accreditation with a Department of

Education recognized accreditor is a prerequisite for receiving Title IV funds and,

hence, essential to Bridgepoint’s financial health. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 41.) 

In 2010, the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association

of Colleges and Schools (“HLC”), Ashford’s only accreditor, announced a

“substantial presence” requirement, which would become effective on July 1, 2012. 

(Id. ¶¶ 43,79.) Under the new requirement, institutions accredited by HLC would

be required to have a majority of their educational administration activities,

business operations, and leadership located substantially in the 19-state northcentral region of the country. (Id. ¶ 43.) Although Ashford is in Iowa, the majority

of Bridgepoint’s operations are located in San Diego, California, so Ashford would

not qualify for accreditation under the new requirement. (Id.) Accordingly,

Ashford sought accreditation from the Western Association of Schools and Colleges

 The facts in this section are drawn from the complaint and are not to be 1

taken as proven. 

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(“WASC”), whose jurisdiction includes California. (Id.)

In letters dated May and June 2011, WASC informed Ashford that it was

eligible to pursue accreditation, and it identified the areas the school would need to

address to demonstrate substantial compliance with WASC standards. (Id. ¶¶ 49,

83.) WASC’s concerns included inadequate student retention and completion,

insufficient student-progress tracking, an insufficient core of full-time faculty

members, and the lack of an empowered and independent governing board. 

(Id. ¶ 49.) 

According to Plaintiffs, beginning with a press release on May 3, 2011,

Defendants made a series of false and misleading statements and omissions about

the quality of education at Ashford, Bridgepoint’s efforts to address the problem

areas WASC had identified, the likelihood that WASC would grant accreditation,

and Bridgepoint’s financial forecasts. (Id. ¶¶ 83–193.) 

On July 3, 2012, WASC sent Ashford an action letter denying the school’s

application for initial accreditation and detailing the numerous ways in which the

school had failed to demonstrate substantial compliance with WASC accreditation

standards, including in the problem areas noted in the May and June 2011 letters. 

(Id. ¶¶ 55, 57–75.) 

According to Plaintiffs, the truth emerged in two disclosures Defendants

made soon after receiving WASC’s denial. (Id. ¶¶ 76–82.) First, on July 9, 2012,

Bridgepoint filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission

notifying investors that WASC had denied Ashford’s application for initial

accreditation and that the denial was based on the school’s failure to demonstrate

substantial compliance with WASC standards. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 78.) Later that day,

Bridgepoint issued a press release reporting that accreditation had been denied

and that it planned to appeal and reapply. (Id. ¶ 77.) Following this news,

Bridgepoint’s stock fell $7.25 per share, to close at $14.23 per share that evening,

a decline of nearly 34% on high volume of 7.8 million shares. (Id. ¶ 80.) 

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Second, on July 13, 2012, Bridgepoint filed a Form 8-K reporting that HLC,

Ashford’s only accreditor, had put the school on “special monitoring status”

because of the WASC denial, and that Ashford risked losing its accreditation with

HLC. (Id. ¶ 81.) The notice read as follows: 

On July 12, 2012, Bridgepoint Education’s subsidiary, Ashford

University, received a letter from [HLC] requiring Ashford University

to provide certain information and evidence of compliance with HLC

accreditation standards. HLC is a regional accrediting body . . . and is

the principal accreditor of Ashford University and its programs. The

HLC letter relates to the recent visiting team report and action letter

received by the University from [WASC] on July 5, 2012.

The letter requires that Ashford University submit a report to HLC no

later than August 10, 2012 that will be followed by an Advisory Visit

that will occur no later than October 9, 2012. The University’s report

must demonstrate that the University remains in compliance with the

HLC’s Criteria for Accreditation and include: (i) evidence that

Ashford University meets the HLC Criteria for Accreditation relating

to the role and autonomy of the University’s governing board and its

relationship with Bridgepoint Education, including the role of faculty

in overseeing academic policies and the integrity and continuity of

academic programs, (ii) evidence that Ashford University’s resource

allocations are sufficiently aligned with educational purposes and

objectives in the areas of student completion and retention, the

sufficiency of full-time faculty and model for faculty development,

and plans for increasing enrollments, and (iii) evidence demonstrating

that Ashford University has an effective system for assessing and

monitoring student learning and assuring academic vigor. 

The letter states that HLC’s President will present the report of the

Advisory Visit team and the President’s recommendation to the HLC

Board for action at its February 2013 meeting. At that meeting, the

HLC Board may act to continue accreditation, with or without further

monitoring, continue accreditation under sanction or “Show Cause”

order, or withdraw accreditation. The letter further states that Ashford

University would be scheduled for a HLC Board Committee Hearing

prior to any Board action to withdraw accreditation. HLC policies

also provide for a right to appeal any Board action to withdraw

accreditation. 

(Id.) Following this news, Bridgepoint stock fell $3.20 per share to close at $9.77

per share that evening, a decline of nearly 25% on high volume of 6.7 million

shares. (Id. ¶ 82.) 

C. The Motion to Dismiss

In February 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim. (Doc. No. 28.) In September 2013, after extensive briefing, the

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court entered a written order granting the motion in part and denying it in part. 

(Doc. No. 39.) 

In the order, the court concluded that the only allegations that supported a

claim for relief regarded Ashford’s alleged misrepresentations or omissions about

its efforts to improve student retention and completion and student-progress

tracking. (Id. at 26–29.) Bridgepoint had emphasized throughout the class period

that it had implemented student-support initiatives in 2010 and 2011 and that

student persistence had improved. (Id. at 27.) But WASC had found that a

“concerted and systematic approach to improve retention, persistence and

completion, with evidence-based plans, targets, and time lines, [were] not in place

and the impact of recent changes cannot yet be measured.” (Id. at 28.) These facts

supported a plausible claim regarding student-persistence and tracking initiatives

because WASC’s finding suggested that Defendants could not have concluded that

student persistence was improving, and Defendants’ comments could have led an

investor to assume that Bridgepoint was analyzing Ashford’s student persistence

and finding that the numbers had actually improved. (Id. at 28–29.) The court

dismissed the remaining claims and granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended

complaint, (id. at 46), but they did not do so. 

Accordingly, at this point, the consolidated complaint remains the operative

complaint, and the only remaining claims are for securities fraud under § 10(b) and

Rule10b-5 and control-person liability under § 20(a), both related to the alleged

misrepresentations regarding student-persistence and tracking.

D. The Instant Motion for Class Certification

There was some delay in this case so that the parties would have an

opportunity to resolve discovery issues and address the impact of Halliburton Co.

v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), which held that

defendants in a securities-fraud action “must be afforded an opportunity before

class certification to defeat the presumption [of reliance] through evidence that an

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alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.” Id.

at 2417. On August 6, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant amended motion for class

certification. (Doc. No. 70.) Defendants opposed the motion on October 7, (Doc.

No. 72), and Plaintiffs replied on November 19, (Doc. No. 75). The matter, which

was originally set for hearing on December 8, was taken under submission

on December 1. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To come within the exception, a putative class-action plaintiff must provide facts

sufficient to show that the claim meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432

(2013). Under Rule 23(a), a class may be certified only if “(1) the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law

or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 

Additionally, the party seeking certification must show that the action

satisfies at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). In this case, Plaintiffs

seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires the court to find that “the

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

“[C]ertification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous

analysis,” that these requirements are satisfied. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Such an analysis will frequently entail overlap

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with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). But “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits

inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,

— U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). “Merits questions may be considered

to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether

the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id. at 1195. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move to certify a class consisting of all persons who purchased

Bridgepoint common stock between May 3, 2011, and July 13, 2012, excluding

Defendants, directors and officers of Bridgepoint, and their families and affiliates. 

(Doc. No. 70-1 at 1 & n.1.) Defendants do not oppose class certification generally,

but they contend that the class period must end on July 9, 2012, because Plaintiffs

cannot show predominance after that date. (Doc. No. 72.) The court addresses this

issue and the other Rule 23 requirements below. 

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

1. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all

class members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs assert, and

Defendants do not dispute, that Bridgepoint had more than 51.3 million shares of

common stock outstanding during the proposed class period, a reported trading

volume of more than 160.4 million shares, and an average reported daily trading

volume of more than 529,000 shares. (Doc. No. 70-1 at 7–8.) Joinder of individual

class members of a class this size would undoubtedly be impracticable. 

2. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). For this inquiry, “even a single common question

will do.” Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted). Here there are a number of common questions, including whether

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Bridgepoint made false statements, whether those statements were material, whether

they were intentionally false, and whether they caused class members’ losses. 

3. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 

“[R]epresentative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably coextensive with those

of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise

from the same events and conduct that gave rise to the claims of other class

members. They are, therefore, typical of the class.

4. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “Resolution

of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their

counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the

named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the

class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 

Plaintiffs assert, and the court agrees, that these requirements are met. As

Plaintiffs point out, there is no antagonism because all class members have allegedly

suffered losses due to the same conduct, and they are institutional investors who

have every incentive to actively litigate this case. Plaintiffs submitted declarations

attesting to their commitment to vigorously litigating this case, and their counsel,

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, has documented its experience in litigating

securities-fraud class actions. 

B. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Rule 23(b)(3) requires “that the questions of law or fact common to class

members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and

that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

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adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

1. Predominance

The predominance analysis “focuses on the relationship between the common

and individual issues.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. “When common questions

present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of

the class in a single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute

on a representative rather than on an individual basis.” Id. 

To recover damages for violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a private

plaintiff must prove “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;

(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the

purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;

(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

In the typical securities-fraud case, as in this case, the factual and legal issues

related to most of these elements are common to the class, so the requirements for

class certification are usually “readily met.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521

U.S. 591, 625 (1997). Typically, the only individualized issue is damages, which,

alone, cannot defeat class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3). See Leyva v. Medline

Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013).

The main sticking point in securities-fraud class actions is reliance. To avoid

the need to prove the reliance of individual investors, plaintiffs in securities-fraud

class actions ordinarily show reliance by establishing “fraud on the market,” which

gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2408. 

The premise is that “the price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect

all publicly available information about a company,” so that “a buyer of the security

may be presumed to have relied on that information in purchasing the security.” 

Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1190. 

To establish the presumption, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the alleged

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misrepresentations were publicly known, (2) that they were material, (3) that the

stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock

between the time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was

revealed.” Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2408. The defendant may rebut the

presumption, for example, “by appropriate evidence, including evidence that the

asserted misrepresentation (or its correction) did not affect the market price of

the defendant’s stock,” id. at 2414 (internal quotation marks omitted), or “by

showing that the market was already aware of the truth behind the defendant’s

supposed falsehoods and thus that those falsehoods did not affect the market price

(the so-called ‘truth-on-the-market’ defense), or . . . that a particular plaintiff would

have bought the stock without relying on the integrity of the market price.” Conn.

Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2011). 

To make use of the presumption at the class certification stage, however, “[t]he

only elements a plaintiff must prove . . . are whether the market for the stock was

efficient and whether the alleged misrepresentations were public.” Id. at 1177.

In this case, Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and omissions were publicized in various releases, statements, and on

Bridgepoint’s website, and they provided an expert report demonstrating that

Bridgepoint common stock traded in an efficient market over the course of the class

period. (Doc. No. 70-3.) The court is satisfied, based on the report, that the market

was efficient, and Defendants have not offered any contrary evidence or otherwise

suggested that the market was inefficient. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately

established the prerequisites for invoking the presumption at this stage. 

Defendants contend, however, that the class period must end on July 9,

2012, because the July 13 disclosure was unrelated to student persistence, and the

July 9 disclosure fully revealed the alleged truth related to student persistence,

so that “Plaintiffs cannot use the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to

establish predominance for any investors who purchased Bridgepoint stock after

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July 9, 2012.” (Doc. No. 72.) 

The court is not persuaded two reasons. First, it is not clear that the July 13

disclosure was entirely unrelated to student persistence, as part of the message

was that HLC was concerned that Ashford’s resource allocations were not

“sufficiently aligned with educational purposes and objectives in the areas of

student completion and retention.” (Emphasis added.) Second, as Plaintiffs point

out, a truth-on-the-market defense cannot be used to rebut the presumption of

reliance at the class-certification stage because the defense “is a method of refuting

an alleged representation’s materiality,” and it is well established that “a plaintiff

need not prove materiality at the class certification stage to invoke the

presumption.” Amgen, 660 F.3d at 1177 (affirming the district court’s refusal to

consider a truth-on-the-market defense at the class- certification stage), aff’d, 133

S. Ct. at 1203. Halliburton did not change that. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2416

(“[M]ateriality . . . should be left to the merits stage, because it does not bear on the

predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).”); see also Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm.

Partners, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 669–71 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (rejecting the applicability

of the truth-on-the-market defense at class certification post-Halliburton for this

reason). 

Accordingly, for now, the class period is May 3, 2011, through July 13, 2012. 

If it is later shown that the presumption does not apply after July 9, 2012, the court

can modify the class period at that time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order

that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final

judgment.”).

2. Superiority

Whether a class action is the superior method of litigation depends on

(1) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or

defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning

the controversy already begun by or against class members; (3) the desirability or

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undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;

and (4) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

In this case, given the identical claims shared by members of the class,

the relatively small size of the typical claim, and the geographical dispersion of

the class members, a class action is superior to individual litigation. See Epstein v.

MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 668 (9th Cir. 1995) (shareholder claims based on identical

facts and law fit Rule 23’s requirements “like a glove”), rev’d on other grounds sub

nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 

C. Appointment of Class Representatives

Plaintiffs ask to be appointed as class representatives. This inquiry, which

is governed by Rule 23, is distinct from the inquiry regarding their appointment

as lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA. See In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL

4249902, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007) (reviewing authorities on the issue). 

The court has concluded that Plaintiffs will adequately represent the class under

Rule 23’s requirements. Accordingly, the court appoints City of Atlanta General

Employees Pension Fund and Teamsters Local 677 Health Services & Insurance

Plan as class representatives. 

D. Appointment of Class Counsel

Rule 23(g) requires the court to appoint class counsel when certifying a

case as a class action. The court must consider “(i) the work counsel has done in

identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience

in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted

in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources

that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). Having

reviewed their submissions, the court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ counsel should

serve as class counsel. Accordingly, the court appoints Robbins Geller Rudman

& Dowd LLP as class counsel.

///

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CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, (Doc. No. 70). 

The court appoints City of Atlanta General Employees Pension Fund and Teamsters

Local 677 Health Services & Insurance Plan as class representatives, and appoints

their counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, as class counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 15, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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