Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-05913/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-05913-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:203 Equal Pay Act

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-05913-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TERESA TRINH,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA CLARA VALLEY WATER 

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:13-cv-05913-EJD 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 95

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 22, 2016, a jury trial commenced to address the causes of action for violation of 

the Equal Pay Act, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the 

interactive process that Plaintiff Teresa Trinh (“Plaintiff”) asserted in her complaint against 

Defendant Santa Clara Valley Water District (“Defendant”). After four days of evidence, Plaintiff 

now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to amend her complaint in order to add an

unpled retaliation theory. Dkt. No. 95. Defendant opposes the motion.

Having carefully considered the pleadings and the arguments of counsel at the hearing on 

March 28, 2016, the court has determined that permitting the amendment would cause substantial 

prejudice to Defendant. Thus, for the reasons explained, the motion to amend will be denied.

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-05913-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 15(b)(1) 

Rule 15(b)(1) permits amendments to the pleadings at trial. It provides that “[i]f, at trial, a 

party objects that evidence is not within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court may permit 

the pleadings to be amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1). Section (b)(1) amendments should be 

freely permitted “when doing so will aid in presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to 

satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that party’s action or defense on the merits.” 

See United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 989 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 15’s policy of favoring 

amendments to pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality.’”). In addition, “[t]he court 

may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(b)(1). 

Notwithstanding the liberal standard that applies to amendments under Rule 15(b)(1), the 

court may deny a motion to amend after considering the “[f]our factors commonly used to 

determine the propriety of a motion for leave to amend.” Miller v. City of Santa Monica, No. CV 

12-08500-RGK (RZx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34990, at *2, 2013 WL 989854 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 

2013) (citing Webb, 655 F.2d at 989). “These are: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, and futility of amendment.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 

(9th Cir. 1987). “While all these factors are relevant, the crucial factor is the resulting prejudice to 

the opposing party.” Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). “The party 

opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” Id. at 187. 

“In opposing a Rule 15(b) amendment, ‘a party cannot normally show that it suffered 

prejudice simply because of a change in its opponent’s legal theory.’” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 

202 F.3d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 

88 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1996)). “‘Instead, a party’s failure to plead an issue it later presented 

must have disadvantaged its opponent in presenting its case.’” Id. 

Here, Defendant contends it will experience significant prejudice if Plaintiff is permitted to 

pursue a retaliation claim. To that end, Defendant points out that Plaintiff neglected to include in 

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-05913-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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her complaint several causes of action - including one for retaliation - that were listed in the 

charges of discrimination she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). Based on 

that, Defendant argues “that Plaintiff had elected not to pursue these various other theories in the 

litigation” and it could therefore “properly rely on the pleading allegations when it conducted 

discovery and prepared its trial defense.” 

Defendant further states that it relied on Plaintiff’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 

in arranging its discovery plan and defense to the action. Special Interrogatory No. 1 requested 

that Plaintiff list, in chronological order, the “specific detail” of “every wrongful act committed by 

Defendant” for which Plaintiff sought redress in this action. Opp’n, Dkt. No. 96, at Ex. 1. 

According to Defendant, Plaintiff made no reference “at all to retaliation and makes no allegation 

that Defendant terminated her” because of her Complaint to the EEOC. 

In addition, Defendant believes it cannot properly and efficiently defend against a 

retaliation claim if the amendment is permitted at this point in the trial. As indicated at the hearing 

on this motion, Defendant did not retain an expert to explain either the EEOC and DFEH 

complaint processes or the concept of progressive discipline, but would have if Plaintiff had

directly asserted a retaliation theory. Nor did Defendant ask about retaliation at the depositions of 

Plaintiff or other witnesses, or pose questions on that topic to the witnesses who have already 

testified at trial. Moreover, Defendant related that at least one necessary witness, David Drury, is 

no longer employed by Defendant and has not cooperated with trial preparations. 

On this record, Defendant’s protest is well-taken. Although Plaintiff now represents that 

she has always pursued retaliation as a theory of recovery, the documents submitted with the 

parties’ briefing did not sufficiently notify Defendant of her intention. Indeed, Plaintiff excluded a 

retaliation claim from her complaint even though her EEOC and DFEH charges demonstrate she 

was aware of potential facts to prove the claim. And, notably, Plaintiff did not seek leave to 

amend her complaint at any time prior to this motion. 

While a potential retaliation claim can be insinuated from Plaintiff’s response to Special 

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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Interrogatory No. 1, it was reasonable for Defendant to presume that an affirmative cause of action 

for retaliation was not being asserted given the absence of such a claim from Plaintiff’s pleading 

or other pretrial proceedings. See Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 

462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The main purpose of the complaint is to provide notice of what 

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which the claim rests. . . . plaintiff must at least set forth 

enough details so as to provide defendant and the court with a fair idea of the basis of the 

complaint and the legal grounds claimed for recovery.”); see also William Inglis & Sons Baking 

Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The federal rules 

contemplate that the process of defining and narrowing the issues raised in the pleadings will be 

accomplished through discovery and other pretrial procedures.”). This explains why, as Plaintiff’s 

counsel observed at the hearing, discovery directed at a claim for retaliation was not undertaken 

before trial. 

Defendant’s inability to retain an expert witness who is able to testify in short order, and 

the potential inability to procure a critical witness relevant to the issue of retaliation, also places it 

at a serious disadvantage at this stage. Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the EEOC and DFEH 

complaint processes are complex and are proper subjects for expert testimony. Similarly, lay 

jurors may not be familiar with the mechanics of progressive discipline, making that topic suitable 

for the commentary of an expert as well. Although alternatives to an expert were raised at the 

hearing, including the presentation of a settled statement addressing certain issues or a 

representative from the EEOC, the court does not believe the alternatives are adequate substitutes 

for an expert chosen by the sponsoring party when a case is tried to a jury. 

Furthermore, the prejudice to Defendant cannot be alleviated through a continuance “to 

enable the objecting party to meet the evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1). A brief adjournment 

would allow Defendant to complete certain discreet tasks, such as a continued deposition of 

Plaintiff, and would correspondingly alleviate some disadvantage. A continuance would not, 

however, resolve the prejudice attributable to the lack of an expert. And given the fact that it will 

be at least two months before the trial could resume with a qualified expert who has studied the 

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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issues, complied with the disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), and 

been deposed, a continuance in the midst of the proceedings would result in unreasonable delay. 

Even if the current jurors could accommodate the extended interruption to avoid a mistrial, the 

potential impairment to their memories renders this option prohibitive. Even Plaintiff’s counsel 

acknowledged this problem. 

In sum, the court finds after balancing the equities that Defendant will sustain significant 

prejudice if the complaint is amended to add a retaliation theory. On that basis, the motion under 

Rule 15(b)(1) will be denied. 

B. Rule 15(b)(2) 

Under Rule 15(b)(2), “[w]hen an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ 

express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.” Plaintiff 

argues that Defendant’s introduction of its Exhibits 1075 and 1077, which were admitted without 

objection, shows that Defendant impliedly consented to try a retaliation theory.

This argument is unpersuasive because the emails between Anna Noriega and Plaintiff that 

were admitted as Exhibits 1075 and 1077 do not constitute “the type of evidence so clearly 

intended to introduce the issue of [retaliation] that is required to support an amendment under Rule 

15(b).” Ryan v. Editions Ltd. West, 786 F.3d 754, 767 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2015). Rule 15(b)(2) does 

not permit amendments “to include issues which may be ‘inferentially suggested by incidental 

evidence in the record.’” Consol. Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 

396 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Cole v. Layrite Prods. Co., 439 F.2d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

Although Noriega mentions Plaintiff’s EEOC charge in both emails, they largely address 

efforts to accommodate Plaintiff, recognizing, of course, that Plaintiff disputes the adequacy of 

those efforts. Since Exhibits 1075 and 1077 are relevant to other causes of action that are actually 

asserted by Plaintiff, the court cannot infer from them that Defendant has impliedly consented to

try a claim for retaliation. See Quillen v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 789 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[A]

court will not imply consent to try a claim merely because evidence relevant to a properly pleaded 

issue incidentally tends to establish an unpleaded claim.”); see also Moncrief v. Williston Basin 

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-05913-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

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Interstate Pipeline Co., 174 F.3d 1150, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Implied consent cannot be based 

upon the introduction of evidence that is relevant to an issue already in the case when there is no 

indication that the party presenting the evidence intended to raise a new issue.”). Thus, the motion 

under 15(b)(2) will also be denied. 

III. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to amend is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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