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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

U{lited Scares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

M Y 17 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER ------------ Clerk 

LARRY U. PURYEAR, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WYOMING PRODUCTION CREDIT 

ASSOCIATION and PRODUCTION 

CREDIT ASSOCIATION OF THE 

MIDLANDS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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No. 89-8019 

(D.C. No.C88-1012-B) 

(D. Wyo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and 

BABCOCK,** District Judge. 

Defendants-appellants, Wyoming Production Credit Association 

and Production Credit Association of the Midlands (collectively 

PCA), appeal the district court's order denying their post-trial 

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial and 

granting plaintiff-appellee Larry U. Puryear's (Puryear) motion to 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

claim preclussion or issue preclusion. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, United States District Judge for 

the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 1 
correct, alter or amend the judgment. Following trial, the jury 

returned answers to interrogatories that PCA was liable to Puryear 

on four alternative theories (1) breach of a contract to make a 

1985 ranch payment for Puryear, (2) breach of the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, (3) negligent advisement, and (4) negligent 

misrepresentation. By general verdict, the jury awarded Puryear 

$408,000 in damages. 

The district court reduced the damages by twenty-five percent, 

the percentage of comparative negligence attributed to Puryear by 

the jury, and entered judgment in his favor for $306,000. 

Subsequently, the district court denied PCA's motion to set aside 

the jury verdict and, on Puryear's motion, modified the judgment 

to award Puryear the verdict amount of $408,000 on his contract 

claims. 

PCA contends that the district court abused his discretion by 

(1) denying their motions for directed verdict and judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, (2) reinstating the full jury damage 

award after initially reducing the total by the amount of Puryear's 

comparative negligence, (3) permitting the jury to consider lost 

investment, lost profit and emotional distress in calculating 

damages, (4) refusing to direct the jury that Puryear failed to 

mitigate his damages and (5) allowing the negligence theories to 

go to the jury. PCA also asserts that the district court committed 

reversible error in admitting parole evidence and evidence under 

Fed. R. Evid 404(b). 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 2 
Because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict 

on the breach of contract claim, including the damages awarded by 

the jury, we need not address the issues raised by PCA regarding 

the remaining counts. There being no reversible error otherwise, 

we affirm. 

I. Facts 

In 1982, Puryear sold his ranch in Colorado, using the 

proceeds to help finance the purchase of a ranch in Wyoming. He 

forwarded the annual payments from the sale of his Colorado ranch 

to PCA. PCA, in turn, took a security interest in Puryear' s 

livestock and machinery, and made Puryear's 1983 and 1984 payments 

on the Wyoming ranch. PCA also advanced money for Puryear' s 

operating expenses. 

In 1983, Puryear faced many problems on his ranch. His hay 

meadows flooded, many of his cows suffered abortions and some of 

the calves that survived contracted pasteurella. As a result, 

Puryear was in serious financial straits. 

In February, 1984, on PCA's advice, Puryear borrowed 

additional money from PCA to buy cattle. To secure this loan, PCA 

required Puryear to assign to it his Colorado ranch payments. 

Puryear testified that the assignment was also given in return for 

PCA' s agreement to make Puryear' s 1985 Wyoming ranch payment. When 

PCA failed to make the 1985 payment, Puryear was unable to make the 

payment himself. As a result, he was forced to turn the Wyoming 

ranch back to the seller and liquidate his herd and machinery. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 3 
Puryear sued, claiming that PCA breached the contract to make 

the 1985 Wyoming ranch payment, breached the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing, negligently gave advice and made negligent 

misrepresentations. Other claims were dismissed before trial on 

summary judgment and are not now before us. 

II. Breach of Contract & Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

PCA contends that the district court erred by denying their 

motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on Puryear's breach of contract claim. PCA first argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings 

of the existence and breach of a contract to make the 1985 Wyoming 

ranch payment. We disagree. 

We will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for a 

directed verdict or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

"only if, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom point but one way, in favor of the moving party." 

Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990); 

E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 

1171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). Because the 

motions act to deprive the nonmoving party of a jury determination 

of factual issues, overturning a verdict is done cautiously and 

sparingly. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d at 1171. 

The moving party bears the burden of showing that the verdict was 

clearly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. 

Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605, 617 (10th Cir. 1976). These 

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same standards apply in reviewing a district court's denial of a 

motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial. Federal Deposit 

Ins. Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The record reflects evidence that, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to Puryear, established that the parties entered 

into a contract whereby PCA would make Puryear's 1985 payment on 

the Wyoming ranch. Puryear met with PCA regarding the 1985 

payment. R. Vol. I at 198:20-199:10. PCA then prepared a 1984 

loan application which Puryear signed. Puryear understood the 

agreement to be that PCA would make the 1985 payment. R. Vol. I 

at 169:1-11, 201:5-12; R. Vol. II at 16:16-24. Puryear executed 

his promissory note to PCA along with a loan agreement. These 

documents specified an interest rate and repayment terms. Puryear 

testified that PCA employees orally promised make the Wyoming ranch 

payment. R. Vol. I at 198:20-199:18. The $33,050 1985 Wyoming 

ranch payment was a sum certain. 

As collateral for the note, Puryear assigned to PCA his right 

to the annual payments from the sale of his Colorado ranch. R. 

Vol. II at 15: 9-16: 24. The assignment stated that it was 

consideration for "future financing, if any.'' The loan was also 

secured by Puryear's cattle and his equipment. Furthermore, the 

contract is consistent with the parties' prior course of dealings 

whereby they would budget for the Wyoming ranch payment a year in 

advance. Finally, it is undisputed that PCA did not make the 1985 

Wyoming ranch payment. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 5 
The jury found that there was a "contract. in which the 

Production Credit Association agreed to make the plaintiff's 1985 

ranch payment." We conclude that there is ample evidence from 

which the jury could reasonably have found all the essential 

elements of a contract and breach. See Doud v. First Interstate 

Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1989); Union State 

Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 717 (N.D. 1989). This is not a 

situation in which all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence point in favor of PCA. 

PCA next argues that the district court erred in admitting 

parol evidence. We find no error. We agree with the district 

court that the agreement here is ambiguous. Thus, the parol 

evidence rule does not apply. Johnson Storage and Moving Co. v. 

Victory. Inc., 774 P.2d 636, 638-39 (Wyo. 1989). As the district 

court instructed the jury, without objection from PCA, "the writing 

in evidence in this case was not the entire agreement between the 

parties. The agreement consists of both written and oral 

promises." Accordingly, there was no error in admitting evidence 

of oral representations and promises that shed light on the 

ambiguous terms of the parties' agreement. 

III. Jury Damage Award 

A. Comparative Negligence 

PCA contends that the district court abused his discretion in 

granting Puryear's motion to alter, amend or correct the verdict. 

We disagree. 

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The jury found by general verdict that Puryear suffered 

$408,000 in damages. It also found that Puryear was twenty-five 

percent comparatively negligent. The district court reduced the 

jury's general award by twenty-five percent and entered judgment 

in favor of Puryear for $306,000. On Puryear' s motion, the 

district court reinstated the original jury award because 

comparative negligence does not off-set liability for breach of 

contract. 

Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-

109(a), has not been extended beyond actions for, or similar to, 

negligence, Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 617 (10th Cir. 1983), 

or beyond actions for breach of warranty, Sheldon v. Unit Rig & 

Equip. Co., 797 F.2d 883, 886-88 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 1090 (1987). We see no reason to believe that the Wyoming 

Supreme Court would expand the scope of its state statute to the 

contract claim in this case. See Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 

187, 194 (Wyo. 1979) ("[d]amages resulting from willful and wanton 

misconduct are not 'damages for negligence' as that term is used 

in§ 1-1-109"); see also Becker v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank, 478 N.E.2d 

776, 781 (Ohio 1985) (contributory negligence does not reduce 

liability for breach of contract). 

Moreover, reducing the award by the amount of comparative 

negligence would be tantamount to concluding that the jury found 

PCA liable only for the negligence claims. This is contrary to the 

jury's answers to the special interrogatories. The general damages 

verdict applies to the breach claims as well. As the district 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 7 
court noted, "where more than one cause of action is submitted to 

the jury, if one cause of action is error-free, is supported by 

substantial evidence and provides an appropriate basis for a 

general verdict, it should be affirmed." Puryear v. Wyoming Prod. 

Credit Assoc., C88-1012-B, slip op. at 5 (D. Wyo. Feb. 13, 1989); 

see Farm Corp. Energy. Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank of Wash., 750 P.2d 

231, 241-42 (Wash. 1988); Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 

1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987). As we concluded before, Puryear's 

breach of contract claim is supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Lost Investment. Lost Profit and Emotional Distress 

PCA further asserts that the $408,000 damage award was 

excessive and not supported adequately by the evidence. PCA argues 

that the amount Puryear could have been damaged by the breach was 

no more than $33,050, the amount of the 1985 ranch payment. PCA 

claims that the evidence of lost profit and wages was too 

speculative, and, therefore, the award was excessive. We disagree 

with these contentions. 

Evidence of damages must be sufficient to allow a jury to 

strike a "fair and reasonable approximation." T.F. Scholes. Inc. 

v. United States, 295 F.2d 366, 369-70 (10th Cir. 1961); see 

Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 767 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1989). 

A jury's award of damages will not be set aside as excessive unless 

it shocks the judicial conscience. Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 

228 (10th Cir. 1962); Carlson v. BMW Indus. Serv., Inc., 744 P.2d 

1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987) (same standard under Wyoming law); see 

O'Gilvie v. International Playtex. Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1448 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 8 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). When supported by 

the evidence, the jury's determination of the amount of damages is 

considered inviolate. Barnes, 305 F.2d at 228; Carlson, 744 P.2d 

at 1390. 

The jury was instructed that Puryear 

is not to be awarded purely speculative damages .... 

(L]ost profits may be included in the damages awarded 

only when there is some reasonable basis in the evidence 

in the case for determining that (Puryear] has in fact 

suffered a loss of profits, even though the amount of 

such loss is difficult of ascertainment. 

The district court, in denying PCA' s motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, held that the amount awarded was 

reasonable and supported by sufficient evidence, even if based 

solely on the contract claims. We conclude that the jury could 

reasonably have found that Puryear was damaged by the breach beyond 

the $33,050 value of the loan. 

We agree with the district court that: 

(E]ven if non-economic damages are ignored altogether, 

the verdict amount still is supported by sufficient 

evidence. (PCA] do(es] not challenge the $132,039 

(Puryear] sought for damages due to a deficiency owed to 

PCA. Further, the jury reasonably could have found that 

(Puryear] sustained $229,500 in damage to his property 

and lost future profits, by losing the value of 150 cows, 

and losing the ability to use ranch income to pay half 

his mortgage. Adding $50,000 for (Puryear's] lost 

investment in his ranch ( less than one-third of the 

$166,100 plaintiff contends he lost) , puts the total over 

$408,000. 

Puryear, C88-1012-B, slip op. at 15-16. 

Because there was ample evidence to support the jury's 

reasonable damage award, we need not address PCA's contention that 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 9 
the district court erred in instructing the jury that they could 

award damages for emotional distress. 

c. Mitigation of Damages 

PCA contends that the district court should have directed the 

jury that Puryear failed to mitigate his damages as a matter of 

law. The issue of mitigation was presented to the jury on 

conflicting evidence. The jury was provided an instruction and a 

Special Interrogatory on mitigation. PCA did not object to either. 

There is substantial evidence in the record to support a 

finding that Puryear mitigated his damages. After Puryear learned 

that PCA was not going to make his 1985 ranch payment, he attempted 

to work with the party to whom the payments were due in an effort 

to avoid default. R. Vol. I at 215:7-21; Vol. II at 208:2-209:17. 

However, the record reflects that PCA was unwilling to help in that 

endeavour. R. Vol. I at 216: 5-217: 25. Puryear also attempted 

unsuccessfully to obtain financing from the Farmers' Home 

Administration. R. Vol. I at 218: 13-20. In addition, Puryear 

sought and obtained employment. R. Vol. I 231:13-234:4. There was 

no reversible error in the court refusing to direct a verdict on 

the mitigation issue. 

IV. Pattern Evidence 

PCA contends finally that the trial court erred in permitting 

testimony by witnesses involved with PCA in prior lending 

arrangements because the testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 

& 403. We may not reverse the trial court on his evidentiary 

rulings absent an abuse of discretion. Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 10 
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1242 (10th Cir. 1990). We 

find no such abuse here. 

Evidence of prior acts is admissible to show "motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, 

absence of mistake or accident. " 

plan, knowledge, 

Fed. R. Evid. 

identity, or 

404 (b) . The 

evidence is not admissible if its sole purpose is to prove the 

disposition of the party against whom it is offered. Here, the 

testimony was not presented to show that PCA acted in conformity 

with the disposition insinuated by the prior conduct. Rather, the 

testimony was offered to establish motive, intent, plan and 

knowledge by showing that PCA dealt with Puryear in a manner 

similar to its course of dealing with other parties. 

In Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 

1056-57 ( 10th Cir. 1988) , we held that evidence that defendant 

"failed to advance the promised amount in other deals and then 

foreclosed would, if believed, support plaintiffs' position 

regarding [defendant's] motive, intent, or plan." As such, the 

evidence was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404 (b). Likewise, 

here, if believed, the testimony bolsters Puryear's claim that PCA 

breached the contract. Furthermore, each time pattern testimony 

was presented, the court instructed the jury of the limited purpose 

for which the testimony was given. See, ~, R. Vol. III at 

144:17-25. 

Although PCA argues that the lending situations about which 

testimony was given were dissimilar to the Puryear loan, the record 

does not support PCA's conclusion that the district court abused 

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his discretion in admitting the evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 

& 404 (b) . 

V. Other Theories 

Because the evidence in the record reasonably supports the 

jury's verdict on Puryear's breach of contract claim, we need not 

address the alleged errors with regard to the remaining claims. 

Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 613 n.4 (10th Cir. 1984). 

For the these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

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Entered for the Court: 

Lewis T. Babcock 

District Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-8019 Document: 01019970214 Date Filed: 05/17/1990 Page: 12