Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01643/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01643-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO G. LIRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BURKS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-01643-LJO-GSA (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1) 

I. SCREENING ORDER

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff, Ernesto G. Lira, (“plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 29,

2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

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exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a

plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the Merced County “Main”

Jail in Merced, California. At the time of filing his complaint, plaintiff was incarcerated at Deuel

Vocational Institution, serving twelve months for violating parole. Plaintiff names as defendants:

Burks (the Merced County Sheriff’s Department Corrections Division “Main Jail” Commander);

Sergeants Carbonarro and Ferguson; Classification Officer Middleton; Deputy Sheriff’s

Gallegos, Rosales, Baker, Lopez, Adams, Jane Doe, Donna, Sheryl, and O’Brian; and Registered

Nurse Ken. 

Plaintiff’s complaint generally relates to a period of confinement in the Merced County

Main Jail wherein he was housed in the SHU next to a violent, mentally ill inmate who

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threatened and eventually assaulted plaintiff; subsequent lack of medical care; disciplinary

hearings on various issues; and confiscation of his personal property. 

Plaintiff alleges six claims for violations of the U.S. and California Constitutions against

various of these defendants, to wit: (1) safety violations by Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos,

O’Brian, Adams, Lopez, Baker and Middleton for exposing plaintiff to assault by a known

mentally ill and violent inmate so as to cause plaintiff physical injury; (2) violation of his due

process rights regarding disciplinary actions by Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, Rosales, Donna,

Sheryl, and O’Brian; (3) violation of his due process rights regarding solitary confinement by

Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, Rosales; (4) violation of his right to access to the courts/law library

by Burks, Carbonarro, Donna, Sheryl, and Ferguson; (5) violation of his rights to due process

regarding confiscation of plaintiff’s personal property by Burks, Carbonarro, Ferguson, Rosales,

Gallegos, and O’Brian; and (6) deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs by

Ken, Baker, Lopez, Carbonarro, Burks, and Gallegos. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory and

compensatory damages. 

C. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

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federal rights.

The Court was only able to find factual allegations against defendants Adams and

O’Brien on one page of plaintiff’s complaint. As to Adams and O’Brien, plaintiff alleges they

told plaintiff that inmate Lua was mentally ill; they told inmate Lua to stop urinating and

throwing trash in the inmate shower; and that plaintiff advised both Adams and O’Brien (along

with Gallegos) that Lua attempted to unplug plaintiff’s television. Doc. 1, pp. 12-13. These facts

fail to link Adams and/or O’Brien to any violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiffs

claims against Adams and O’Brien fail and they are hereby dismissed. 

Plaintiff indicated that he would identify defendant “Jane Doe” when discovery is

initiated. However, the only facts relative to Jane Doe that plaintiff alleges are that she was his

“attornies [sic] investigator;” that she saw his bleeding wounds, declined to interview him at that

time, called for medical assistance, and advised plaintiff she would contact his family and inform

them of his being injured in an attack. There is nothing about these alleged actions by “Jane

Doe” that violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, plaintiff’s claims against “Jane Doe” fail

and she is hereby dismissed.

Plaintiff used the term “Def.s” throughout his complaint, without identifying which

named defendant(s) the term implicated. In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must

allege sufficient facts to support a claim that each defendant named in the complaint either acted

or failed to act in a manner that was adverse to plaintiff and that the defendant did so in

retaliation against plaintiff for either litigating in court or filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff is

cautioned that in his amended complaint, he must clearly identify what actions or omissions led

to the violation of his rights and which defendants were responsible for each act or omission. 

D. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

The Court screens plaintiff’s complaint based on plaintiff’s six delineated claims. A few

of plaintiff’s claims, as plead, are cognizable constitutional violations. Based on the allegations

in plaintiff’s complaint, he may be able, should he chose to amend, to rectify his pleading so as to

state additional cognizable claims for relief under section 1983. 

The Court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

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complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant, as briefly as possible, what action that

defendant took or failed to take and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for litigating in court

or for filing inmate grievances). In the subsections that follow, the Court will provide plaintiff

with the legal standards that, based on plaintiff’s allegations, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff

should utilize the legal standards provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended

complaint.

1. Safety Violations by Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, Lopez, Baker and

Middleton

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, Lopez, Baker, and

Middleton violated their duty to ensure his safety by allowing circumstances to exist such that

plaintiff was attacked and physically injured by a violent, mentally ill inmate (Lua).

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9 Cir. 1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan

th

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1313 (9 Cir. 1995). However, to prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may rely on th

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish

knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Plaintiff alleges that, four days after Middleton classified plaintiff as a SHU inmate,

Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos and Middleton placed inmate Lua in the cell next to plaintiff’s. 

Plaintiff alleges that it was generally known that inmate Lua: was violent and mentally ill; went

into fits of rage and accused plaintiff of having sexual contact with Lua’s mother and girlfriend;

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would “sock the walls” and tell plaintiff how he was going to beat plaintiff up; would urinate and

throw trash in the inmate showers; attempted to unplug plaintiff’s television; and was moved to

the SHU because he antagonized and threatened other inmates in Ad Seg. Plaintiff alleges that,

on January 13, 2005, knowing of these actions by inmate Lua, Gallegos, Carbonarro, Baker,

Burks, Lopez and Middleton released inmate Lua on the same yard plaintiff was on. Inmate Lua

thereafter attacked plaintiff causing plaintiff to sustain a deep bleeding gash on his head, a bite on

his ear, injuries to his knee and back, and impact from being hit on the side of his head near his

eye and temple – such that plaintiff continued to have headaches and difficulty hearing as of the

date he filed his complaint. Thus, plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Gallegos,

Carbonarro, Baker, Burks, Lopez, and Middleton for failing to take reasonable steps to protect

plaintiff from physical harm. 

2. Due Process Violation(s) Regarding Disciplinary Actions by Burks,

Carbonarro, Gallegos, Rosales, Donna, and Sheryl.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, Rosales, Donna, and Sheryl

violated his rights to due process by failing to provide plaintiff with notice, investigation and

hearing prior to four disciplinary findings, all of which resulted in loss of privileges.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-

84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

(citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no

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entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.

2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams,

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under

a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

When a prisoner faces disciplinary charges, prison officials must provide the prisoner

with (1) a written statement at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing that

includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the prisoner, and an explanation for

the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call

witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and (3) legal

assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (9 Cir. 1974); see also Superintendent v. Hill 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); th

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830-31 (9 Cir. 1997); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419- th

20 (9 Cir. 1994); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9 Cir. 1986). th th

“When prison officials limit a prisoner’s right to defend himself they must have a

legitimate penological interest.” Koenig v. Vannelli, 971 F.2d 422, 423 (9 Cir. 1992) (per th

curiam) (concluding that prisoners do not have a right to have an independent drug test

performed at their own expense). The right to call witnesses may legitimately be limited by “the

penological need to provide swift discipline in individual cases . . . [or] by the very real dangers

in prison life which may result from violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or

staff.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985); see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 525

(9 Cir. 1996); Koenig, 971 F.2d at 423; Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 187-88 (9 Cir. th th

1987)(per curiam). 

“[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision

by the prison disciplinary board . . . .” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; see also Touissaint v. McCarthy,

926 F.2d 800, 802-03 (9 Cir. 1991); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9 Cir. 1989); th th

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Jancsek, III v. Oregon bd. Of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987); Cato v. Rushen, 824 th

F.2d 703, 705 (9 Cir. 1987); see especially Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774-74 (9

th th

Cir. 1999) (where there is no evidence of guilt may be unnecessary to demonstrate existence of

liberty interest.) The “some evidence” standard does not apply to original rules violation report

where a prisoner alleges the report is false. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9 Cir. 1997). th

The results of plaintiff’s inmate appeal(s) cannot give rise to any claims for relief under section

1983. 

Here, plaintiff alleges four instances where he was found guilty of infractions without

being provided notice of the charges against him, opportunity to investigate, and an unbiased

disciplinary hearing. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was found guilty of: (1) fighting with

inmate Lua – assessed 60 days loss of privileges; (2) possessing “pruno” – assessed another 60

days loss of privileges; (3) attempting to defraud Sheryl of a phone card – assessed 30 days loss

of privileges; and (4) having money and tobacco – no loss of privileges alleged.

Plaintiff alleges that Burks found him guilty of fighting with Lua without notice of the

charges, opportunity to investigate, or conducting an unbiased hearing. This claim against Burks

is cognizable for violation of plaintiff’s right to due process in a disciplinary proceeding. 

Plaintiff alleges that Rosales falsely implicated plaintiff of possessing “pruno;” that

plaintiff was found guilty without notice, investigation, or hearing; and that Carbonarro and

Burks denied his appeals at the higher levels. Per Hines, plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim

against Rosales for filing a false report against him. However, plaintiff’s claims regarding the

decisions by Carbonarro and Burks denying plaintiff’s appeals are not cognizable and cannot

serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Plaintiff alleges that Sheryl falsely implicated plaintiff for attempting to defraud her of a

phone card; that plaintiff was found guilty without notice, investigation, or hearing; and that

Carbonarro and Burks denied his appeals at the higher levels. Per Hines, plaintiff has stated a

cognizable claim against Sheryl for filing a false report against him. However, plaintiff’s claims

regarding the decisions by Carbonarro and Burks denying plaintiff’s appeals are not cognizable

and cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

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Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely implicated of possession of money and tobacco; that

plaintiff was found guilty without notice, investigation, or hearing; and that Carbonarro and

Burks denied his appeals at the higher levels. Per Hines, plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim

against the unnamed person who filed a false report against him. However, plaintiff’s claims

regarding the decisions by Carbonarro and Burks denying plaintiff’s appeals are not cognizable

and cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.

Plaintiff fails to link Donna in any of his factual allegations regarding disciplinary

actions. Thus, plaintiff’s claims against Donna for violation of his right to due process fail and

are dismissed.

3. Due Process Violations by Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos, and Rosales

which subjected Plaintiff to Cruel and Unusual Conditions of

Confinement

Plaintiff’s third claim states that Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos and Rosales violated his

right to due process and subjected him to over 120 days of psychological and oppressive

conditions of confinement which violated of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to confinement 24 hours a day, for 120 days in a

windowless, cement, isolation cell, within earshot of inmate Lua’s yelling and ranting where he

was denied visitation, yard exercise, television, and canteen privileges. Plaintiff further alleges

that he was “subject to cruel treatment by defendant’s (sic) where serious injuries were inflicted

by their indifference to his punitive conditions.” Doc. 1, pg. 21. Plaintiff alleges that one

evening inmate Lua was so out of control pepper pallets were used and that inmate Lua was

moved and plaintiff was moved into inmate Lua’s cell. Plaintiff alleges that he pled guilty to the

charges against him in court just so he would be transferred to another facility. Doc. 1, pg. 21-

22. 

Plaintiff’s claims on this incident fail and are dismissed for a number of reasons.

First, in plaintiff’s factual statement, he fails to link Burks, Carbonarro, Gallegos and

Rosales to these alleged violations. In fact, his entire commentary on the 120 days in the

isolation cell fails to link the egregious conditions, or any lack of due process to any defendant. 

Second, plaintiff’s claims for violation of his due process rights fail as he did not allege

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any facts regarding the circumstances that precipitated his placement in the isolation cell, and

whether he received any notice, opportunity to investigate, and a hearing prior thereto. 

 Finally, plaintiff’s claims for the conditions of confinement within the isolation cell do

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for

purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id.

at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n]

[Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect

to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment

violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make

out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). A windowless cement cell, combined with audio

disturbances from a ranting mentally ill inmate, denial of visitation, yard exercise, television, and

canteen privileges simply does not rise to the level of extreme deprivations that is required for a

conditions of confinement claim under the Eight Amendment. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim for the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth Amendment.

4. Access to the Courts/Law Library Violations by Burks, Carbonarro,

Donna, Sheryl, and Ferguson

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Burks, Carbonarro, Donna, Sheryl, and Ferguson denied

him access to the courts by denying him access to the law library – particularly in light of his

having a case pending in the 9 Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiff alleges that his appeal was th

dismissed due to his inability to comply with an order to pay the docket fee and perfect his

appeal. 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the

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inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances

or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries

and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. However,

actual law libraries may be replaced “with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of

court-provided forms such as those that contained the original complaints in two of the more

significant inmate-initiated cases in recent years ... and ... forms that asked the inmates to

provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal analysis.” (Citations omitted.) Id at 352. 

Because inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal

assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law

library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate

claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual

injury. Id at 351.

Plaintiff alleges the actual injury of dismissal of his case in the 9 Circuit Court of th

Appeals due to his being denied access to the law library at the Merced County Main Jail. 

Further, plaintiff alleges that, despite having the funds available in his account, he was unable to

pay the $255.00 filing fee to the 9 Circuit because defendants failed and/or refused to forward

th

the money. Thus, plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Burks, Carbonarro, Donna,

Sheryl, and Ferguson for denial of access to the courts. 

5. Due Process Violations Regarding Plaintiff’s Personal Property by

Burks, Carbonarro, Ferguson, Rosales, Gallegos, and O’Brian

Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided a disciplinary hearing prior to: (1) removal of

his jail provided T.V. and telephone – subsequent to the attack by inmate Lua; and (2) removal of

his private property by Rosales, Carbonarro and Burks – subsequent to being found guilty of

possessing money and tobacco. Doc. 1, pp. 17 & 21. Plaintiff further alleges that it was a

common practice by defendants to take plaintiff’s canteen whenever plaintiff filed a grievance. 

Doc. 1, pg. 21. 

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), neither

negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state employee “constitute a

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Plaintiff fails to link the removal of the jail issued T.V. and telephone to any specific

defendant(s). Additionally, plaintiff’s claim is that the T.V. and telephone that were removed

were “jail issued” – not his personal property. Thus, plaintiff’s claim regarding removal of the

jail issued T.V. and telephone are not cognizable. 

Plaintiff’s claim that Rosales, Carbonarro, and Burks removed his personal property

subsequent to a finding of guilt on possession of money and tobacco would not generally rise to

the level of violating the Due Process Clause. However, since plaintiff has alleged that the

finding of guilt against him was based on a false report, and that no disciplinary hearing was

conducted, he has stated a cognizable claim against Rosales, Carbonarro, and Burks.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the removal of his canteen each time he engaged in

protected activities (filing grievances) are vague and insufficient to state a cognizable claim for

violation of the Due Process Clause. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court also reviewed

this claim under the standards for stating a cognizable claim for retaliation. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

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adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Removal of a canteen every time plaintiff filed a grievance is not adverse action that

“would chill a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in that activity. Further, plaintiff did

not make any allegations as to whether removal of his canteen advanced a legitimate correctional

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goal. Thus, plaintiff’s allegation regarding removal of his canteen each time he filed a grievance

fails to state a cognizable claim. 

6. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs by Ken,

Baker, Lopez, Carbonarro, Burks, and Gallegos. 

Plaintiff alleges that, subsequent to being attacked by inmate Lua, his injuries were vastly

ignored and ultimately untimely treated.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison

official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians

provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on

other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to

further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Commr’s, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under

this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the

inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

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matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Further, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison

medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff

“must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk

to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations

omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that, subsequent to the incident with inmate Lua, defendants Carbonarro,

Lopez, Gallegos, Baker and R.N. Ken saw that he was bleeding profusely; left him in a dry

interview room for several hours; and delayed his receipt of treatment from the jail’s doctor who

ultimately cleaned, stapled, and medicated his wounds. While plaintiff does state that he suffers

from headaches and hearing problems from the incident to this day, he failed to allege that the

delay of medical treatment led to further harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Commr’s, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). Thus, plaintiff fails to

state a conginzable claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

7. Visitation with Plaintiff’s Fiancé

While plaintiff does not list a claim directed at visitation, near the end of his complaint,

plaintiff alleges that he was denied visits from his girlfriend since she had spent time in the

Merced County Jail. Doc. 1, pg. 25. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60

(1989). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff

must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty

interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). “The denial of prison access to a particular visitor ‘is well within the

terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,’ and therefore is not

independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 460

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(quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468). Restricting visitation from persons who have been

incarcerated in the past is based on legitimate safety/security concerns and does not violate the

Due Process Clause. 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for being denied visits from his

girlfriend. 

E. State Law Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under §

1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Because plaintiff may be able to state a claims for relief under section 1983, the court

reserves discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and to address plaintiff’s state law

claims after plaintiff files his amended complaint so as to allow plaintiff opportunity to state

cognizable claims for relief under section 1983.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty days. If plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this

order, plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than thirty days from the

date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

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(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff is reminded that Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) provides that “‘[a] party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus, multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A

against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners

pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of

frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28

U.S.C. § 1915 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

 Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

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b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the court

as viable/cognizable in this order; and

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 1, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij UNI 8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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