Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02429/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02429-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRUCE PHILLIPI, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:24-cv-02429-SCR P 

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

Petitioner, Bruce Phillippi,1

 is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. On August 23, 2023, he 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Northern District of 

California. (ECF No. 1.) The action was transferred to this court on September 4, 2024, and is 

referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302(c). 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is before the court. For the reasons set forth below, 

the motion to dismiss should be granted. 

I. Background 

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life, with the possibility 

of parole, following a conviction for second degree murder.2

 (ECF No. 10 at 14.) Through the 

1

 Petitioner’s name was incorrectly entered into the docket as “Bruce Phillipi.” The correct 

spelling is “Bruce Phillippi.” 

2

 The court takes judicial notice of the abstract of judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; U.S. ex rel. 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (a court 

Case 2:24-cv-02429-TLN-SCR Document 19 Filed 11/06/24 Page 1 of 6
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present action, petitioner seeks habeas relief relating to a prison disciplinary proceeding for 

attempted murder of another inmate. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) As a result of being found guilty at the 

prison disciplinary hearing, petitioner was subjected to 35 months of solitary confinement and “an 

alteration of good time credits accrued[.]” (Id. at 5.) The discipline is also part of petitioner’s 

prison file and has been used to deny petitioner a “low risk label” for parole. (Id.) 

Petitioner alleges he was not afforded constitutionally required due process protections at 

the hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Specifically, he alleges (1) he was not given the evidence or staff 

statements; (2) he was denied video evidence; (3) he was not allowed to submit evidence or 

questions for witnesses; (4) the hearing officer was not impartial, stating petitioner was guilty at 

the outset; and (5) the hearing officer filed false statements in the disposition. (Id.) Petitioner 

raised these issues to the state courts and alleges the last reasoned state court decision 

adjudicating the claims was contrary to clearly established federal law. 

II. Habeas Jurisdiction 

The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides that the federal courts “shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In general, the courts 

have interpreted this statute to provide relief only where a successful challenge will shorten an 

inmate’s sentence. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has 

held that federal courts generally lack habeas jurisdiction over claims for constitutional violations 

that do not challenge the validity of the conviction or do not necessarily spell speedier release. 

Blair v. Martel, 645 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2011). Instead, such claims must be brought, if 

at all, in a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. With respect to disciplinary 

proceedings, specifically, habeas relief cannot be granted unless those proceedings necessarily 

affect the fact or duration of time to be served. Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 

(2004); Nettles v. Grounds (“Nettles”), 830 F.3d. 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

“may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (citation omitted)). 

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However, courts have also found habeas relief may be available “[w]hen a prisoner is put 

under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that if a prisoner is seeking a 

“quantum change in the level of custody” then habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. Graham 

v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (“if a prisoner claims to be entitled to probation or 

bond or parole, his proper route is habeas corpus, even though he is seeking something less than 

complete freedom”). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has permitted prisoners to request habeas corpus 

relief where the prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation due to validation as a gang 

member and would obtain immediate release from segregation if he successfully challenged that 

validation. Nettles v. Grounds (“Santos”), 788 F.3d 992, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2015).3

III. Discussion 

Petitioner’s claims in the present petition are barred because of his indeterminate sentence 

status. In Nettles, 830 F.3d 922, the Ninth Circuit held that for indeterminately sentenced 

prisoners, neither restoration of credits nor expungement of a disciplinary conviction are 

sufficiently related to duration of confinement so as to be cognizable on habeas corpus. Id. at 935. 

In Nettles, the indeterminately sentenced prisoner argued that his claims affected the duration of 

his sentence because if he succeeded in expunging his rules violation report, he would be more 

likely to receive and earlier parole hearing and would be more likely to receive a favorable parole 

ruling. Id. at 934. Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and held “[s]uccess on the merits of 

[the] claim would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release because the expungement 

of the challenged disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to a grant of parole.” Id. at 

934-35. 

In the present case, petitioner argues in opposition to dismissal that the Supreme Court has 

left open the possibility of habeas relief in this situation. (ECF No. 12 at 5.) It is true that the 

3

 The 2015 Ninth Circuit panel decision in Nettles involved two petitioners: Damous Nettles and 

Matta Santos, both prisoners in California state prisons. The panel’s discussion and opinion 

regarding a change of custody level was limited to Santos’ case. The 2016 decision was a 

rehearing en banc that only involved the panel’s holding regarding Nettles. The panel’s opinion 

regarding Santos’ claim about change in level of custody was not re-heard. 

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Supreme Court, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 144 (2017), “left open the question whether 

they might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus.” However, leaving a question open is different than issuing a precedential decision that 

would overrule contrary lower court decisions, and this court remains bound by Ninth Circuit 

precedent. Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Petitioner also argues the court has jurisdiction over the petition because he brings a “level 

of custody” argument. (ECF No. 12 at 4-5.) Specifically, petitioner argues that due to the current 

disciplinary infraction, he is housed in the highest security level other than the SHU, level four. 

(Id. at 4.) In reply, respondent argues the Nettles (Santos) panel decision held that challenges to 

continued placement in segregated or disciplinary housing are within habeas jurisdiction, but that 

such relief is unavailable for prisoners who are merely seeking a different program or location or 

environment, even if the program or location or environment challenged is more restrictive than 

the alternative sought. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) See Nettles (Santos), 788 F.3d at 1004. 

The petition itself does not explicitly seek relief in the form of a quantum change, or any 

change, in the level of petitioner’s custody. Based on the petition’s exhibits, it does not appear 

petitioner sought such relief in his administrative appeals (see ECF No. 1 at 49-52, appeal of 

grievance and office of appeals decision) or in the state courts (see id. at 21, asking state court to 

grant petitioner’s habeas by requiring the prison to withdraw the guilty finding of attempted 

murder and order a new hearing for only battery of an inmate). Moreover, and in any event, 

although petitioner now argues he is seeking to reduce his level of custody, the change he argues 

would result—downward from level four custody—does not constitute a “quantum change” in 

custody similar to release to parole or probation or release from administrative segregation to 

general population. See Nettles (Santos), 788 F.3d at 1004; Graham, 922 F.2d at 381 (“if [a 

petitioner] is seeking a different program or location or environment, then he is challenging the 

conditions rather than the fact of his confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law, even if, 

as will usually be the case, the program or location or environment that he is challenging is more 

restrictive than the alternative that he seeks”). 

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Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on habeas corpus and may be brought, if at all, only 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. Thus, the court considers whether to 

convert the habeas petition to a civil rights action. See id. at 936 (“a district court may construe a 

petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 after notifying and 

obtaining informed consent from the prisoner”). “If the complaint is amenable to conversion on 

its face, meaning it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief, the court may recharacterize the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of the consequences of the 

conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or amend his or her 

complaint.” Id. 

The undersigned will not recommend the court convert the present petition to a civil rights 

action. The petition contains no specific allegations against the named respondent, and it is 

unclear who petitioner seeks to hold personally responsible for the alleged denial of his federal 

rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must 

be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose 

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”). The exhaustion 

requirements for petitioner to file a civil rights complaint also differ from those required for this 

federal habeas action, and it is unclear whether petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement 

for a civil rights complaint. 

Moreover, provisions of the PLRA would subject petitioner to filing fee requirements, sua 

sponte review of his complaint by the court, and limits on the number of actions a prisoner may 

be permitted to file in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The 

filing fee for a habeas petition is five dollars, and if leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, 

the fee is forgiven. However, prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis in civil rights cases are 

required to pay the $350 filing fee by way of periodic deductions from the prisoner’s trust 

account, see 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed. Bruce 

v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 86 (2016). Also, a civil rights complaint which is dismissed as 

malicious, frivolous, or for failure to state a claim would count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(g), which is not the case for habeas petitions.4

Because the instant petition is not amenable to conversion, and due to the differences and 

disadvantages that re-characterization may have on petitioner’s claims, the undersigned will not 

recommend that the present petition be re-characterized as a civil rights complaint. However, 

petitioner may file a new complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he wishes to do so. 

IV. Conclusion 

In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall assign a 

district judge to this case. 

In addition, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be granted. 

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed. 

3. The court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 

filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 5, 2024 

4

 The undersigned expresses no opinion as to the merits of the present claims if presented in a 

civil rights complaint. 

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