Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02268/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02268-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MINERVA ABUBAKAR, et al

Plaintiffs,

v. NO. CIV. S-06-2268 LKK/EFB

COUNTY OF SOLANO,

O R D E R

Defendant.

 /

This is a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action for

uncompensated overtime wages and other relief brought by various

correctional officers against their employer, Solano County.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to disqualify defendant’s attorneys,

one of whom allegedly established an attorney-client relationship

with nine of the plaintiffs in this action while representing the

county in a separate suit. The court resolves the matter upon the

parties’ papers and after oral argument. For the reasons explained

below, the court denies the motion.

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I. Background

This is an FLSA action filed in October 2006 by Solano County

correctional officers. The complaint alleges that the county

failed to pay overtime for certain pre- and post-shift activities.

First Am. Compl. (FAC) ¶ 1. At present, there are approximately

160 plaintiffs in the action. Mr. Terence Cassidy and Mr. John

Whitefleet of the law firm of Porter Scott represent the county.

A. Events Giving Rise to Asserted Conflict of Interest

In April 2007, the county retained one of these same

attorneys, Mr. Cassidy, to represent it in another action filed in

this district, Todd v. County of Solano, No. 07-CV-726 FCD/EFB.

Decl. of Terence Cassidy (“Cassidy Decl.”) ¶ 5. Todd is a

currently pending class action arising from the strip search

policies and practices of the Solano County Adult Jail.

In connection with that case, on October 10, 2007, Mr. Cassidy

requested that the Sheriff’s Department coordinate meetings with

the officer-witnesses identified in the Todd defendants’ mandatory

initial disclosures. Id. ¶ 6. The following day, on October 11,

2007, Mr. Cassidy met with a total of approximately fifteen

officers. Id. ¶ 8. He met with them in groups of four or five for

approximately forty-five minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes

each. Id.

During each meeting, Mr. Cassidy explained that he was

representing the county in a lawsuit regarding its strip search

policies and practices. Id. ¶ 8. He also volunteered to represent

the officers for the specific and limited purpose of defending them

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as witnesses in the Todd case and for purposes of depositions. Id.

During the meetings, Mr. Cassidy and the officers discussed the

operating procedures regarding strip searches of inmates at the

main jail. Id. Not discussed, according to Mr. Cassidy, was this

case, nor the officers’ wages, overtime, or compensation. Id. ¶

9. In addition, Mr. Cassidy maintains that he did not obtain any

information from the officers regarding strip searches that could

not have been obtained through deposition. Id. ¶ 8.

Of the approximately fifteen officers who met with Mr.

Cassidy, nine were plaintiffs in this suit. They include officers

David Amiccuci, Reyes Carbajal, James Castro, David Chapman, David

Holsten, Randy Pratt, Scott Rosenkild, Mark San Augustin, and

Thomas Schlemmer. Decl. of James Carr (“Carr Decl.”), Ex. C. 

B. Events After Officer Meeting

Later in the day after the meetings had concluded, Mr. Cassidy

realized for the first time that some of the officers with whom he

had met might also be plaintiffs in this action. Cassidy Decl. ¶

10. Upon confirming that his suspicions were accurate, Mr. Cassidy

immediately informed plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. Both parties then

conducted research on the ethical obligations under the

circumstances. Id.

Approximately a week later, on October 18, 2007, Mr. Cassidy

wrote to each of the nine officers to inform them that he had “a

conflict of interest in representing [them] as [] witness[es] in

the Todd case.” Carr Decl., Ex. C. This correspondence was copied

to counsel. Cassidy Decl. ¶ 11.

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On November 6, 2007, plaintiffs sent Mr. Cassidy a written

letter requesting that he (and all other Porter Scott attorneys,

including Mr. Whitefleet) voluntarily recuse themselves from

continued representation of the county in this action. Id., Ex.

A. Then, on November 12, 2007, plaintiffs contacted Mr. Whitefleet

about potentially adding a new plaintiff. Decl. of John Whitefleet

¶ 7. At that point, Mr. Whitefleet informed plaintiffs that given

the recusal request, and in an abundance of caution, Porter Scott

would not be conducting any further activity on the case. Id.

On November 15, 2007, Mr. Cassidy explained in writing the

reasons why he felt that recusal was not required under the

circumstances. Cassidy Decl., Ex. B. Plaintiffs did not respond

to this correspondence; instead, on December 10, 2007, they

inquired about the inspection of documents that had previously been

scheduled for that date (before Mr. Cassidy’s meeting with the nine

officer plaintiffs). Id. ¶ 9. Defendant stated that it would not

produce documents because the conflict of interest issue appeared

to remain pending. Carr Decl., Ex. D. Plaintiffs responded that

defense counsel was improperly conditioning the production of

documents, as well as its stipulation to add new plaintiffs, upon

a waiver of the conflict of interest issue. Carr Decl. ¶ 15. 

Following this exchange, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel

on December 18, 2007. The magistrate judge assigned to this case

ruled that if the present motion to disqualify were denied, the

county would have 30 days to produce the documents, and that if the

present motion were granted, the county would have 30 days to

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produce the documents from the date it obtained new counsel.

II. Discussion

Motions to disqualify are decided under state law. See In re

County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000); L.R. 83-

180(e) (“[T]he Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of

California . . . are hereby adopted as standards of professional

conduct in this court.”). Whether an attorney should be

disqualified is within the discretion of the trial court.

Henriksen v. Great Am. Savings & Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 113

(1992). Disqualification, however, is a drastic remedy that courts

should hesitate to impose unless necessary. Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v.

First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see

also In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 16 Cal. App. 4th 556, 562-63

(1993) (noting that disqualification may impose financial burden

on client and interfere with client’s choice of counsel). An

appearance of impropriety by itself is generally not sufficient to

warrant disqualification. Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App.

3d 291, 300 (1989) (“‘[A]ppearance of impropriety is simply too

slender a reed upon which to rest a disqualification order except

in the rarest of cases.’”).

Here, plaintiffs argue that defense counsel violated two

California Rules of Professional Conduct. First, plaintiffs

maintain that defense counsel violated the rule against concurrent

representation of adverse interests. See Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3-

310(C) (stating that an attorney “shall not, without the informed

written consent of each client . . . [r]epresent a client in a

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matter and at the same time in a separate matter accept as a client

a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse

to the client in the first matter”). Second, plaintiffs contend

that defense counsel violated the rule prohibiting ex parte contact

with represented parties without consent. See Cal. R. Prof.

Conduct 2-100(A) (stating that an attorney “shall not communicate

directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with

a party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the

matter” without obtaining that lawyer’s consent).

A. Waiver

As an initial matter, defendant argues that plaintiffs have

waived any right to move to disqualify. In general, waiver occurs

where one evinces the intention to relinquish a right, or engages

in conduct so inconsistent with that right as to induce a

reasonable belief that it has been relinquished. Mardirosian v.

Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 474, 477 (9th Cir. 1984).

“Implied waiver, especially where it is based on conduct manifestly

inconsistent with the intention to enforce a known right, may be

determined as a matter of law where the underlying facts are

undisputed.” Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alamedia County Coliseum,

Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 1175, 1191 (2006). 

Here, defendant argues that plaintiffs have impliedly waived

the right to seek disqualification based upon their conduct.

Specifically, defendant points to the fact that after plaintiffs’

initial recusal request and defendant’s response (on November 6 and

15, 2007, respectively), plaintiffs did not pursue the conflict

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issue any further but instead pressed forward with its request for

production of documents (on December 10, 2007). In defendant’s

view, it is inconsistent to argue that there has been an ethical

violation warranting disqualification but then demand that defense

counsel continue litigating the case.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that unless the very

utterance of an ethical objection operates as an automatic stay of

all proceedings, Mr. Cassidy and Mr. Whitefleet still had a

continuing duty to represent the county, which included responding

to discovery requests. In addition, plaintiffs contend that their

conduct has been no more inconsistent than defendant’s position

that there has been no ethical violation but that it has no

obligation to honor its discovery obligations pending a resolution

of the ethical objections.

Both parties’ responses to their predicaments are somewhat

understandable. Mr. Cassidy and Mr. Whitefleet, on the one hand,

were placed in a position where they would either be forced to

continue litigating a case where they potentially had a conflict

of interest, or to cease all activity at the risk of violating its

discovery obligations. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, needed to

continue discovery but felt it was unfair for defense counsel to

condition that discovery upon a waiver of ethical objections.

Throughout this entire dispute, plaintiffs consistently

maintained the position that they were not waiving the conflict of

interest issue -- and defendant was aware of this fact. Given this

context, plaintiffs’ conduct in pressing forward with discovery

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would not induce a reasonable belief that plaintiffs were

relinquishing their rights. More fundamentally, the conduct at

issue -- a request for production of documents -- is not

sufficiently clear to constitute implied waiver. See Dole

Bakersfield, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 64 Cal. App. 4th

1273, 1277 (1998) (requiring a “clear showing of an intent to

relinquish [the] right”). This is not a case, for example, where

a party knowingly refrained from raising a grounds for

disqualification, cf. Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft

Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983), or where a party

unreasonably delayed in raising the objection, cf. River W. v.

Nickel, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 1309 (1987). Rather, plaintiffs

timely expressed their opinion that defense counsel should be

disqualified from this action. Accordingly, the court finds that

plaintiffs have not waived the right to bring the present motion.

B. Conflict of Interest

1. Concurrent versus Successive Adverse Representations

Turning to the merits, plaintiffs first argue that Mr. Cassidy

created a conflict of interest by representing clients with adverse

interests: the county, in this action, and the officers, in Todd.

Conflicts of interest may arise in one of two ways. First, an

attorney may successively represent clients with adverse interests.

Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 275, 283 (1994). Under those

circumstances, the chief fiduciary value at jeopardy is that of

confidentiality. Accordingly, the legally relevant question is

whether there is a substantial relationship between the former and

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1 These exceptions include instances where an attorney

“immediately withdraws from an unseen concurrent adverse

representation which occurs by ‘mere happenstance,’” Florida Ins.

Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. Carey Canada, 749 F. Supp. 255, 261 (S.D. Fla.

1990), and where the attorney played no role in creating the

conflict of interest, such as when a corporate client is acquired

by another company, Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Min. & Smelting Co., 738

F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990). See generally State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. v. Federal Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1432 (1999)

(discussing exceptions). Also, as contemplated by the text of Rule

3-310(C), no disqualification is required where there is informed

written consent by both clients. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3-310(C);

see also Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 286, n.4.

Although I need not reach the issue of whether an exception

applies given that I ultimately conclude that no attorney-client

relationship was formed for conflict of interest purposes, the only

one that might apply here is Carey Canada’s “mere happenstance”

exception. But it is unlikely defendant could satisfy its

requirements. It was not unforeseeable that the prospective

witnesses in Todd were plaintiffs in this action. Mr. Cassidy’s

ability to immediately confirm the witnesses’ status in this action

after his meeting with them proves that. Although it is

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subsequent representations; if so, access to confidential

information by the attorney in the course of the first

representation is presumed and disqualification in the second

representation is required. Id. at 283.

 Second, an attorney’s duty of loyalty may be violated when

he or she simultaneously represents clients with adverse interests,

which is what plaintiffs contend happened here. Under this second

set of circumstances, the chief fiduciary value at stake is not one

of confidentiality but that of loyalty. Id. at 284 (“The primary

value at stake in cases of simultaneous or dual representation is

the attorney's duty -- and the client's legitimate expectation --

of loyalty, rather than confidentiality.”). Accordingly, there is

no requirement that the two representations be substantially

related. Instead, unless an exception applies,1 “the rule of

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understandable that the numerosity of plaintiffs in this action

makes it difficult to remember all their names, that is a

foreseeable risk that should have counseled more caution, not less.

2

 Not all courts have framed this requirement in terms of

whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed. For

example, other courts have required “standing” to bring

disqualification motions, which is conferred by “a breach of the

duty of confidentiality owed to the complaining party, regardless

of whether a lawyer-client relationship existed.” DCH Health

Servs. v. Waite, 95 Cal. App. 4th 829, 832 (2002) (noting that a

lawyer may be disqualified after improper contacts with an opposing

party’s expert witness); see also Am. Airlines v. Sheppard, Mullin,

Richter, & Hampton, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1033-34 (2002) (holding

that conflict may arise from an attorney’s relationship with a nonclient where confidential information has been disclosed or there

is an expectation that the attorney owes a duty of fidelity);

Coyler v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding

that non-clients have standing to raise serious ethical breaches).

The difference in approach, however, is oftentimes “largely

semantic.” Dino v. Pelayo, 145 Cal. App. 4th 347, 353 (2006)

(finding that so long as “some sort of confidential or fiduciary

relationship” existed, disqualification motion is proper).

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disqualification in simultaneous representation cases is a per se

or ‘automatic’ one.” Id. at 285. Merely converting a present

client into a former client is, under the aptly-named “hot potato

rule,” insufficient to cure the conflict. Id. at 288.

2. Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship

In analyzing the conflict of interest issue, the initial

question that must be answered is whether Mr. Cassidy formed an

attorney-client relationship with the nine plaintiff officers

during the meeting.2 See Civil Service Comm’n v. Superior Court,

163 Cal. App. 3d 70, 76-77 (1984) (“Before an attorney may be

disqualified . . . because his representation . . . is adverse to

the interest of a current or former client, it must first be

established that the party seeking the attorney's disqualification

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3 This initial focus on whether confidential information has

been disclosed is therefore somewhat anomalous. Nevertheless, the

relationship between an attorney and a client must mature to a

sufficiently serious stage before courts will intervene to protect

a would-be client’s trust in his or her attorney -- particularly

with the harsh remedy of disqualification. The disclosure of

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was or is ‘represented’ by the attorney in a manner giving rise to

an attorney-client relationship.”).

Under the California Supreme Court’s decision in SpeeDee Oil,

the formation of an attorney-client relationship for conflict of

interest purposes turns on “whether and to what extent the attorney

acquired confidential information.” People ex rel. Dept. of

Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135,

1148 (1999). “An attorney represents a client -- for purposes of

a conflict of interest analysis -- when the attorney knowingly

obtains material confidential information from the client and

renders legal advice or services as a result.” Id. When one

seeking legal advice consults with an attorney and secures that

advice, an attorney-client relationship is presumed. Id. An

attorney-client relationship may be formed even when the

conversation between the lawyer and client is brief, or where there

has been no fee agreement or retainer. Id.

As noted above, the primary fiduciary value at stake in

concurrent representation cases is that of loyalty rather than

confidentiality, but the court must nevertheless consider whether

Mr. Cassidy obtained confidential information for the limited

purpose of ascertaining whether an attorney-client relationship was

formed.3 Plaintiffs have submitted the declarations of two of the

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confidential information may not be a perfect barometer of that

maturation, but it is not an irrational line to draw. In any

event, this court is bound to follow the California Supreme Court’s

holding in SpeeDee Oil.

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nine officers who met with Mr. Cassidy. Both officers declared

that the discussion with Mr. Cassidy at the October 11, 2007

meeting “generally involved the operating procedures regarding

strip-searches of inmates in the jails.” Decl. of David Holsten

(“Holsten Decl.”) ¶ 6; Decl. of Thomas Schlemmer (“Schlemmer

Decl.”) ¶ 6. They also stated that Mr. Cassidy discussed the

general aspects of a deposition. Holsten Decl. ¶ 7; Schlemmer

Decl. ¶ 7. Neither officer, however, stated that they divulged

confidential information. Mr. Cassidy has also affirmed that the

officers did not disclose confidential information, and that he did

not render any legal advice during the meeting. Cassidy Decl. ¶

8.

Plaintiffs respond that the nine officers had a reasonable

belief that Mr. Cassidy was their attorney, based on both his

verbal promise to represent them as witnesses, as well as his

subsequent letter terminating any attorney-client relationship with

the officers. Carr Decl., Ex. C (“[W]e hereby withdraw our

representation of you as a witness in the Todd case.”). But the

“reasonableness” of their beliefs ultimately turns on a question

of law: when is an attorney-client relationship formed for conflict

of interest purposes? Under SpeeDee Oil, the answer is whenever

confidential information is disclosed. Here, the silence of the

officer declarations on that issue is telling. While certainly not

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4 Although plaintiffs argue that the exchange of confidential

information may be presumed where the two actions are substantially

related, Civil Service Comm’n, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 79, that is not

the case here, see infra n.5, and this presumption applies in

successive as opposed to concurrent adverse representation cases.

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dispositive, the short length of the meetings (approximately one

hour), combined with the fact that Mr. Cassidy did most of the

talking, also supports the inference that no confidential

information was disclosed.4

 

Moreover, the court’s present finding dovetails with the

practical reality that any harm suffered by plaintiffs is likely

minimal. Even if the nine officers believed that Mr. Cassidy was

their attorney, Mr. Cassidy disabused them of this belief a week

later when he sent his letter. This absence of practical harm is

juxtaposed against the serious consequences that would flow from

disqualification, including financial burdens on the county and

interference with its choice of counsel.

Accordingly, the count finds that plaintiffs never formed an

attorney-client relationship with Mr. Cassidy for conflict of

interest purposes.

C. Ex Parte Contacts

Plaintiffs next argue that Mr. Cassidy violated the rule

against communicating with a represented party without the consent

of that party’s lawyer. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 2-100(A) (“While

representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or

indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the

member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,

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5 Although the court need not resolve the issue of whether

there was a substantial relationship between Mr. Cassidy’s

representation of the county in this action and his brief

representation of the officers in Todd, the omission of any mention

of strip searches in the complaint in this case would counsel

against such a finding.

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unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer.”).

Here, both officers have stated that strip searches were

performed “prior to and/or immediately after the end of the

scheduled work shift without compensation” and that strip searches

constitute part of their overtime claim in this action. Schlemmer

Decl. ¶ 11; Holsten Decl. ¶ 11. Curiously, there is no allegation

in the complaint that the plaintiffs conducted strip searches as

part of their uncompensated overtime work.5 See FAC ¶¶ 38-39

(discussing pre- and post-shift activities, such as obtaining

assignment information, gathering paperwork, logging in/out of

computers, returning keys, and briefings). Nevertheless,

plaintiffs need not recite every single fact in support of their

claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring only a “short and plain

statement of the claim”), and the present complaint can be fairly

read to encompass strip searches.

Mr. Cassidy’s October 11, 2007 meeting therefore violated the

rule against ex parte communication. But, given that his

communication was obviously inadvertent, and that no confidential

information was disclosed during this contact, the harsh penalty

of disqualification would not be appropriate. 

Generally, disqualification for ex parte communication is only

appropriate where the misconduct will be certain to have

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“continuing effect” on the judicial proceedings. See Marcum v.

Channel Lumber Co., No. 94-2637, 1995 WL 225708, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 24, 1995); Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc., 110 Cal. App.

3d 597, 607 (1980). Here, plaintiffs argue that they are

prejudiced by virtue of the fact that Mr. Cassidy had the

opportunity to examine the credibility of the nine officer

plaintiffs. They contend that where an employer fails to record

time and keep proper records, an employee’s testimony is relevant

to proving damages. See, e.g., Brock v. Seto, 790 F.2d 1446 (9th

Cir. 1986). But this same credibility assessment can also be made

during the course of depositions. See Marcum, 1995 WL 225708, at

*2. (“Nothing was discussed which could not have been learned

through [] depositions.”). More fundamentally, it does not rise

to the level prejudice warranting disqualification.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the motion to disqualify

(Dock. No. 64) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 4, 2008.

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