Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02066/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 08cv2066 BTM (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALERIE NEWMAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 08cv2066 BTM (CAB)

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on her social security appeal [Doc.

20]. Defendant has filed an Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 25].

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and DENIES Defendant’s

Cross-Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s first application for Social Security benefits

Plaintiff has filed three separate applications for Social Security benefits. Although

the third application is the one directly at issue here, the Court reviews the history of

Plaintiff’s filings because they are relevant to the issues before the Court. 

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1

 A protective filing is a claimant’s first application for benefits, and may allow a

claimant to have an application date that is earlier than the actual date of filing. See What

is protective filing?, http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestionsmain20.html (visited March 25,

2010).

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Plaintiff protectively1 filed her first application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) in August 2001, alleging disability since May 1995.

Her claim was denied, and she sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

But her request for a hearing was late, and Administrative Law Judge Burgess (“ALJ

Burgess”) dismissed it as untimely. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Appeals Council,

which found good cause for the late filing and in January 2004, the Council remanded the

case to ALJ Burgess for a hearing.

ALJ Burgess scheduled a hearing and Plaintiff submitted a pre-hearing memorandum,

but it appears that no hearing was ever held. In September 2004, ALJ Burgess issued a

decision, granting Plaintiff a closed period of disability from November 24, 1996 to October

2, 2002. The parties dispute whether the evidence establishes that Plaintiff appealed this

decision. Plaintiff points to an entry in the record stating, “DI filed for Appeal Council

11/09/2004 for closed period—fwd to AC.” Defendant argues that the statement is an

informal notation made by a Social Security employee, and that there is no standard appeal

form in the record nor any indication that Plaintiff’s then attorneys requested an appeal. The

parties do agree that the Appeals Council has not issued a decision on the purported appeal.

B. Plaintiff’s second application for benefits

While Plaintiff litigated her first claim for benefits, she filed a second application for SSI

in December 2002. This claim was denied in January 24, 2003 and it appears she took no

further action on this application.

C. Plaintiff’s third application for benefits—the application at issue here

Plaintiff filed her third application for SSI and DIB in October 2004. After the

application was denied, she requested a hearing before an ALJ. Before the hearing, her

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2

 Because Plaintiff had two prior applications when her attorney wrote this letter, it is

unclear which application her attorney wished to reopen. But in this appeal, Plaintiff only

addresses the failure to reopen the first decision by ALJ Burgess, which granted Plaintiff a

closed period of disability. Defendant does not dispute this characterization. Accordingly,

the Court treats the letter as a request to reopen the first application.

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attorney wrote a letter asking, among other things, that the ALJ “reopen the prior

application.”2

ALJ Peter J. Valentino held a hearing in September 2007 on Plaintiff’s third

application. Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as did medical and vocational experts. In

October 2007, ALJ Valentino issued a decision, which found Plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work and was not disabled. ALJ Valentino did

not explicitly address Plaintiff’s earlier request to reopen her other applications.

Plaintiff requested review of ALJ Valentino’s decision, but the Appeals Council denied

it. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal error

or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision of the ALJ will

not be reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.

2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s appeals on two grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Valentino’s decision

not to reopen Plaintiff’s past applications violated her due process rights. And second, she

argues that ALJ Valentino’s finding regarding Plaintiff’s RFC was not supported by

substantial evidence.

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A. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Denial to Reopen

Before the Court may review ALJ Valentino’s decision not to reopen Plaintiff’s

past applications, the Court must address whether it has jurisdiction to do so. A decision not

to reopen a prior, final benefits decision is generally not subject to judicial review. Evans v.

Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107–09

(1977). But there is a limited exception to this rule when the “Secretary’s denial of a petition

to reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds.” Id. The “exception applies to any

colorable constitutional claim of due process violation that implicates a due process right

either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse

benefits determination.” Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483). A colorable claim is one that is not “wholly insubstantial,

immaterial, or frivolous.” Rolen v. Barnhart, 273 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483).

Here, Plaintiff has asserted a colorable constitutional claim for several reasons. First,

the Appeals Council ordered that ALJ Burgess hold a hearing on Plaintiff’s first application.

But the parties agree that Plaintiff did not have a hearing on her first application for benefits.

Although it is unclear from the record why her scheduled hearing did not happen, it is

presumably because ALJ Burgess issued a decision which he characterized as “fully

favorable.” Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.942 (an attorney advisor may issue a decision without a

hearing if fully favorable to claimant). But ALJ Burgess’s decision granted only a closed

period of disability from November 24, 1996 to October 2, 2002, and Plaintiff sought an open

period. Also, there is no record that ALJ Burgess considered the medical records from the

period of October 3, 2002 to September 13, 2004. So ALJ Burgess’s decision was not

actually fully favorable, and without a hearing she did not have a meaningful opportunity to

be heard as to disability after October 2, 2002. Based on this denial of her right to be heard,

Plaintiff has a colorable claim for a violation of due process. See Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099 (“It

is axiomatic that due process requires that a claimant receive meaningful notice and an

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opportunity to be heard before his claim for disability benefits may be denied.”)

Second, there is evidence in the record that Plaintiff appealed ALJ Burgess’s granting

of a closed period of disability and that the appeal was never decided. There is a notation

that states, “DI filed for Appeal Council 11/09/2004 for closed period—fwd to AC.” Although

Defendant is right that there is no formal request for an appeal in the record, one of

Defendant’s employees noted the filing of an appeal. The evidence supports at least a

colorable claim that Plaintiff did appeal but the appeal seems to have slipped through the

cracks.

And third, ALJ Valentino failed to address Plaintiff’s request to reopen her earlier

applications. Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in

February 2007 seeking to reopen her earlier applications. But ALJ Valentino’s decision,

which issued in October 2007, failed to grant or deny her request. Although Plaintiff’s

counsel did not raise the issue during the hearing, Plaintiff never withdrew her request to

reopen and ALJ Valentino should have addressed it.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has raised a colorable constitutional claim that “implicates

a due process right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration

of an adverse benefits determination.” Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099. The Court therefore has

jurisdiction to review ALJ Valentino’s denial of Plaintiff’s request to reopen. Id.

B. The Request to Reopen Should Have Been Granted

A determination regarding eligibility for social-security benefits may be reopened for

good cause. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(b). Good cause exists if “[n]ew and material information

is furnished,” or if “[t]he evidence that was considered in making the determination or

decision clearly shows on its face that an error was made.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.989(a)(1), (3).

Here, the Court finds there was good cause to reopen because of new medical evidence that

no ALJ has considered, and because Plaintiff was denied an opportunity to be heard

regarding her alleged disability between October 3, 2002 to October 20, 2004. 

Plaintiff argues that in determining whether she was disabled, there are medical

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records from a period of time that no ALJ has explicitly considered: October 3, 2002 to

October 20, 2004. October 3, 2002 is the day after Plaintiff’s closed period of disability, as

found by ALJ Burgess in response to Plaintiff’s first application for benefits. In his decision,

ALJ Burgess did not explicitly address whether Plaintiff was disabled after October 2, 2002.

Then, ALJ Valentino issued his decision on Plaintiff’s third application, and only considered

her eligibility for disability after October 20, 2004, when she filed her third application.

Therefore, Plaintiff argues, no ALJ has reviewed her medical records to find a disability from

October 3, 2002 to October 19, 2004.

The Court has carefully reviewed the records to which Plaintiff cites in support of her

disability during October 3, 2002 through October 19, 2004. (See R. 380–475, 625–722.)

Although there are only a few medical records from that period and most of them have

already been reviewed by ALJ Valentino, they may provide a basis for a finding of disability.

First, there are two records that a California Department of Developmental Services

(“DDS”) physician completed on January 22, 2003 (R. 455–75). One is a psychiatric review

technique form, which states Plaintiff’s diagnosis of depressive disorder not otherwise

specified or bipolar disorder is accompanied by poly-substance abuse. It also says that

“[t]reating sources have doubted accuracy of Cl’s report of symptoms . . . others infer the

affective symptoms are drug induced . . . . Allegations of severe dependency and inactivity

are not fully credible for above reasons – RFC needed.” That day, the same DDS physician

conducted an RFC, or residual function capacity assessment. The RFC found Plaintiff with

moderate limitations in the ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention for

extended periods, and complete a normal workday or week without interruptions from

psychological symptoms. The RFC also found some moderate social limitations, including

the ability to act appropriately with the general public, accept instructions and respond to

criticism from supervisors, get along with coworkers, and maintain socially appropriate

behavior. Overall, the physician concluded that Plaintiff “can perform routine repetitive tasks”

(R. 474).

Second, there are records dated January 7, 2004 and February 4, 2004 documenting

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neck pain (R. 625–29). The February entry states that Plaintiff has full range of movement

in her neck. ALJ Valentino received these records.

And third, there is an initial mental health assessment by the San Diego Health and

Human Services Agency dated October 11, 2004 (R. 640–47). The psychologist who

conducted the assessment concluded Plaintiff had bipolar disorder and recommended

medication management and group therapy. ALJ Valentino reviewed this assessment and

relied on it in concluding Plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder (R. 23).

These are the only medical records dated within the period between October 3, 2002

and October 19, 2004, and ALJ Valentino received all but one of them. Even though the

medical records by themselves may not establish disability during October 2002 to October

2004, the Court questions ALJ Burgess’s granting of a closed period of disability, ending

October 2, 2002. Not only did ALJ Burgess not hold a hearing and give Plaintiff an

opportunity to be heard, but he decided that Plaintiff was no longer disabled on the day she

was discharged from a psychiatric hospital on October 2, 2004. ALJ Burgess found that she

had been hospitalized because she was a danger to herself and exhibited several symptoms,

including flight of ideas, irritability, depression with suicidal thoughts and auditory

hallucinations commanding her to kill herself (R. 493). “She had a protracted hospital course

with psychotic symptoms that were very difficult to treat.” Id. Although she gradually

improved until her discharge on October 2, her symptoms were severe. ALJ Burgess should

not have found she was no longer disabled after being released from the hospital without

giving Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that Plaintiff

would no longer be disabled the day after being released from in-patient psychiatric care. 

ALJ Valentino erred in failing to consider Plaintiff’s request to reopen her past

applications. There was good cause to reopen them, and the Court remands to the

Commissioner of Social Security to reopen Plaintiff’s first application. The Commissioner

should reconsider the finding that Plaintiff was no longer disabled after October 2, 2002 and

make specific findings supported by the evidence as to any period of disability thereafter. 

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3

 Defendant disputes that Plaintiff applied for DIB in her third application for SSI. But

ALJ Valentino agreed that an application for SSI was a tacit application for DIB, (R. 726–27),

since the application for SSI requests “benefits under the other programs administered by

the Social Security Administration.” See, e.g., (R. 479).

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C. ALJ Valentino Erred in Not Addressing Plaintiff’s Eligibility for Disability

Insurance Benefits

At the hearing on Plaintiff’s third application, her counsel asked ALJ Valentino to

evaluate her eligibility for DIB. Although ALJ Valentino agreed to do so, he did not address

Plaintiff’s eligibility in his decision. Specifically, ALJ Valentino did not calculate Plaintiff’s date

last insured. Plaintiff claims that this failure is a violation of her constitutional rights to due

process and equal protection under the law.

Plaintiff applied for both SSI and DIB.3 In order to receive DIB, a person must be “both

[1] insured for disability benefits and [2] disabled within the meaning of the Act.” Harvell v.

Chater, 87 F.3d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A), (E)). Plaintiff

focuses on the first element of this test—that she must be insured—and alleges error based

on the ALJ’s failure to address her date last insured with respect to her third application for

benefits. 

Plaintiff is right that ALJ Valentino should have calculated her date last insured. On

remand, the Commissioner of Social Security shall calculate her last date insured for

purposes of determining her eligibility for DIB from October 3, 2002 onward.

D. ALJ Valentino’s Residual Functional Capacity Finding Was Not Based on

Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff argues that ALJ Valentino’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence. The evidence supporting a decision must be “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewin v. Schweiker,

654 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court must look at the record as a whole in reviewing

an ALJ’s decision. Id. Moreover, an “examiner’s findings should be as comprehensive and

analytical as feasible,” and the examiner must “make specific findings” so “that a reviewing

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4

 Plaintiff testified at her hearing that she stayed overnight at San Diego County

Medical Services sometime in April 2007, probably for psychiatric reasons, although it is not

completely clear why she was hospitalized.

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court may know the basis for the decision.” Id. at 635.

ALJ Valentino’s decision suffers from several factual errors that undermine his

conclusion. First, he wrote that the “claimant has not generally received the type of medical

treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual. She has not required any

inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, PHP intervention, or emergency care treatment for

exacerbations of her mental symptoms.” (R. 24.) Although this may be true of the period

after she filed her third application for benefits in October 2004,4

 Plaintiff has been

hospitalized several times. From September 1995 to June 2001, Plaintiff was under

psychiatric care at Chartres-Pontchartrain Mental Health Center (“CPMHC”), where she was

diagnosed with “Major Depression and Cocaine Abuse in partial remission.” (R. 492.) She

was on several medications, including Remeron, Xanax, Desyrel, Mellaril, Benadryl, Lithium,

Ambien and Ativan. Id. She was hospitalized for depression and suicidal observation from

June 12 to June 18 of 2001, and then diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Id. She was

readmitted to a hospital on October 21 until October 27, 2001 for suicidal thoughts. Id. Then

from November 2001 to April 2002, she was again under psychiatric care at CPMHC. Id.

She was in inpatient care again on June 8, 2002, and started on Lithium, Klonopin, and

Risperdal. Id. at 493. She was discharged on June 24. Plaintiff was then admitted to the

hospital again on September 26 through October 2, 2002. These were all findings made by

ALJ Burgess in Plaintiff’s first application for benefits. And as of 2006, Plaintiff still took

several medications, including Trazadone, Lexapro, Ambien, Klonipin, Seroquel, and others.

(R. 649–672.)

Second, ALJ Valentino found that the “objective medical evidence shows that the

medications have been relatively effective in controlling the claimant’s symptoms.” (R. 24.)

This is flatly contradicted by the records of treating physician Dr. Alice Krull, who saw Plaintiff

from late 2004 through 2007. In many sessions with Dr. Krull, Plaintiff complained of

insomnia, and feeling worried, stressed and anxious. (R. 648–672, 714–722.) She told Dr.

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Krull that she rarely left her room. Dr. Krull often noted that Plaintiff appeared depressed,

irritable, and often tearful. Id. On January 19, 2007, she told Dr. Krull that she talked to

things that “are not there.” (R. 718.) Plaintiff also specifically mentioned some of her

medications, Roserem and Lunesta, were not working. (R. 651, 719.) 

Third, ALJ Valentino wrote that Plaintiff “has not alleged any side effects from the use

of medications.” (R. 24.) But Dr. Krull noted several times in 2005 and 2006 that Plaintiff

complained of side effects, including feeling drugged, hallucinating, and diarrhea. (R. 653,

654, 662.) Plaintiff also told Dr. Krull that she no longer wanted to take Lithium, although her

reasons are not stated in the record. (R. 717.)

Fourth, ALJ Valentino erred in finding that “[t]here is no evidence of sleep deprivation

due to depression.” (R. 24.) Plaintiff complained of insomnia in almost every session with

Dr. Krull. (R. 649, 650, 652, 653, 654, 657, 658, 659, 662, 664, 665, 716.)

Fifth, the ALJ said that Plaintiff can “run errands and go shopping.” (R. 24.) But in an

October 11, 2004 medical assessment by psychologist Greg Koch, he quoted Plaintiff as

saying she spends “hours in a grocery store just reading labels,” and that “shopping centers

make [her] nervous, there’s too much to choose from and it’s too much. Grocery stores are

fine.” (R. 672.)

Sixth, he wrote that Plaintiff “even uses the vehicle to take semi-annual trips to New

Orleans.” (R. 24.) At the hearing, however, Plaintiff said she flew to New Orleans. (R. 732.)

Seventh, ALJ Valentino said that “[n]one of the claimant’s physicians have opined that

she is totally and permanently disabled from any kind of work.” (R. 24.) But two

psychologists from the same clinic as Plaintiff’s treating physician gave Plaintiff Global

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores of 30 and 31, in October 2004 and November

2005, respectively. (R. 646, 657.) And in September 2006, Dr. Krull found Plaintiff was

unable to work and had marked limitations in virtually every category in a mental residual

functional capacity assessment form. See (R. 692–97.) 

Each of these factual errors supported ALJ Valentino’s conclusion that the “claimant’s

allegations are not credible to establish a more restrictive residual functional capacity.” All

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these errors undermine his conclusion, which is not supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Indeed, in many instances his findings and conclusions are directly contradicted.

E. The ALJ Failed to Give Specific and Legitimate Reasons for Rejecting the

Treating Physician’s Opinion

Psychologists at the San Diego County Department of Health and Human Services,

who work in the same office as Plaintiff’s treating physician, gave Plaintiff GAF scores of 30

and 31, in October 2004 and November 2005, respectively. (R. 646, 657.) And her treating

physician, Dr. Krull, found Plaintiff was unable to work and had marked limitations in virtually

every category in a mental residual functional capacity assessment form. See (R. 692–97.)

 ALJ Valentino rejected these scores and conclusions as inconsistent with the treating

record. Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting

Dr. Krull’s opinion.

Generally, opinions of treating physicians are given controlling weight when supported

by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and when not inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-2p. Where a

treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject the

treating physician’s opinion without providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1990).

In doing so, the ALJ must do more than proffer his own conclusions—he must set forth his

own interpretations and why they are superior to that of the treating physician’s. Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ may meet this burden by conducting

a detailed and thorough discussion of the facts and conflicting evidence, and by explaining

his interpretations and findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, ALJ Valentino’s rejection of the treating physician’s opinion was not supported

by substantial evidence, and he failed to give specific and legitimate reasons for his rejection.

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5

 The GAF scores were not assigned by Dr. Krull, but by psychologists in the same

clinic. See (R. 646, 657.)

6

 Although two psychological evaluations were done at Plaintiff’s clinic, only was done

at the time Dr. Soliman evaluated Plaintiff.

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ALJ Valentino noted that Dr. Krull5 had assigned Plaintiff GAF scores of 30 and 31, but gave

those scores “very little weight.” He explained that Dr. Krull’s “GAF ratings and the marked

limits in most mental functional domains are not substantiated by the treating progress notes

nor indicated by Dr. Mouni Soliman’s consultative evaluation, who found Plaintiff had no

mental limits and assigned a GAF rating of 65.” But Dr. Krull’s treating notes show that

Plaintiff tried several different types of medications to manage her mental symptoms, and

was frequently depressed, sleep deprived, anxious, and paranoid. The notes also show that

she rarely left her house, and was fearful of public places. ALJ Valentino does not discuss

why these progress notes do not substantiate the marked limitations that Dr. Krull found.

He also places too much weight on Dr. Soliman’s evaluation, which found Plaintiff had

a GAF score of 65. Dr. Soliman’s report is conclusory, and fails to discuss why his GAF

score differs so much from the GAF 30 score given by the psychologist at Plaintiff’s clinic.6

He does not mention Plaintiff’s bipolar diagnosis, her insomnia, or that she rarely leaves the

house. He writes that she cannot concentrate on daily activities, yet later says that she can

understand, carry out and remember simple and complex instructions. And he failed to

discuss the treating notes, which indicate that Plaintiff was significantly more disabled. 

ALJ Valentino’s two justifications for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion, the

treating records and Dr. Soliman’s opinion, are invalid. He failed to explain why the treating

records do not support the low GAF scores, and Dr. Soliman’s report was largely conclusory

and failed to consider all the medical evidence. ALJ Valentino did not overcome the

presumption given to the treating physician’s opinion, and he should have given Dr. Krull’s

opinion controlling weight.

The Court also notes that the medical examiner at the hearing equivocated on the

degree of Plaintiff’s impairments. First he said that he was impressed with Dr. Krull’s notes

because they “give a fairly good description of the problem.” (R. 758.) And he was “inclined

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to think that the county is doing a good job and that [he] need[s] to respect their opinion.”

Although he said that Plaintiff’s demeanor at the hearing did not support a GAF of 30, he

noted that some mentally ill people can function for thirty or forty minutes without difficulty,

“[b]ut it doesn’t always tell us actually how sick they are.” (R. 761.) In other words, the

medical examiner regarded the treating physician’s notes as credible and did not rule out the

possibility the Plaintiff was disabled.

For these reasons, ALJ Valentino failed to overcome the presumption afforded to the

treating physician’s assessment. The ALJ’s findings and conclusions were not supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and the treating physician’s opinion is controlling. 

The vocational expert testified that, assuming the treating physician’s assessment was

true, Plaintiff could do no work. Therefore, the Court REVERSES ALJ Valentino’s decision,

and holds that Plaintiff has been disabled and incapable of performing any work since

October 20, 2004, the date the application was filed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 20] and DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

25]. The Court REMANDS the application to the Commissioner of Social Security for the

reopening of Plaintiff’s first application for benefits and evaluating her for disability from

October 3, 2002 and October 19, 2004, and REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision

finding Plaintiff not disabled. Plaintiff has been disabled since October 20, 2004. This case

is further REMANDED to the Commissioner for calculation of SSI and DIB for the period

after October 20, 2004 and any prior period during which the Commissioner finds on remand

Plaintiff to be disabled.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-02066-BTM-CAB Document 29 Filed 06/18/10 Page 13 of 13