Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-01349/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-01349-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act (Definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE MYERS, Acting as

guardian ad litem for L. Myers, a

minor,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 02cv1349-BEN 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

UNITED STATES’ MOTION

TO ENFORCE ORDER

vs. (Dkt. No. 576)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 Defendant moves the Court to enforce its Discovery Order dated September

19, 2012, shifting costs and attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant seeks

payment of $359,946.63. The motion is granted in part. 

DISCUSSION

Long after the close of discovery, Plaintiff sought leave to add a soil fate and

transport expert witness named Chorover. The request was based on a change in

trial strategy and Defendant objected. Although adding Chorover as an expert

witness was clearly late, notwithstanding FRCP Rule 37(c)(1)’s self-executing

sanction of evidence preclusion, Plaintiff was permitted to use Chorover at trial. 

Rather than precluding Plaintiff from calling Chorover at trial, the Court entered its

discovery order dated September 19, 2012, directing that, “Plaintiff’s counsel shall

bear the costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees for the deposition of Dr.

Chorover as well as any supplemental reports and deposition expenses incurred by

Defendant that are reasonably necessary to rebut Dr. Chorover’s report and

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testimony.” 

Two weeks prior to the discovery order, on September 5, 2012, the trial date

was continued to February 20, 2013. As the date for trial was delayed but still near,

the order was intended to ameliorate any unfair surprise and additional expenses

incurred by Defendant to prepare quickly because of Plaintiff’s counsel’s tactical

decision. This expense shifting, of course, is the lesser sanction contemplated by

Rule 37(c)(1): “. . . instead of this sanction [of evidence preclusion] the court may

on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard: (A) may order payment of

the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.”1

The continuation of the trial date should have ameliorated some of the

expense Defendant incurred to meet the Chorover testimony. However, Plaintiff

disclosed a surprise sur-rebuttal expert report or supplemental report of Dr.

Chorover the month before trial (on January 9, 2013). The Defendant immediately

moved to strike and exclude matters in Chorover’s new report. That motion was

denied and Plaintiff was permitted to proceed. This turn of events, however, forced

Defendant to spend additional time on an urgent basis preparing its own soil fate

and transport expert as the time for trial quickly approached. 

See Suzuki v. Helicopter Consultants of Maui, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist LEXIS 89065*17-20 (D. 1

Haw. July 8, 2016), which observed,

Rule 26(a)(2)(D) requires a party to make the above disclosures at the times and in the

sequence that the court orders. Moreover, such disclosure deadlines are to be taken

seriously. Timely and careful compliance with the requirements of Rule 26(a) is

essential, both as a matter of fairness to litigants and as a matter of orderly procedure

particularly during events which occur in the final phases of discovery, motion work

and trial preparation. The purpose of the rule is to eliminate unfair surprise to the

opposing party. Accordingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) gives teeth to

these requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be

disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed. The Rule, amended in 1993,

significantly broadened the duty to supplement Rule 26 disclosures by making

mandatory preclusion the required sanction in the ordinary case. The Advisory

Committee Notes to Rule 37(c)(1) describe the sanctions as self-executing and

automatic. Rule 37(c)(1) does not require a finding of bad faith or callous disregard

of the discovery rules as a precondition before imposing sanctions. The range of

sanctions provided in Rule 37(c), from the most harsh (total exclusion and dismissal

of the case) to more moderate (limited exclusion and attorney’s fees), gives the district

court leeway to best match the degree of non-compliance with the purpose of Rule 26's

mandatory disclosure requirements. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

Defendant incurred costs of $293,442.01 for its own expert witness, Dr.

Shields. This was for all work done in response to Dr. Chorover’s opinions. 

Among other reasons, Plaintiff objects that the monthly statements provided by the

Defendant lack detail and include fees for the work of others assisting Dr. Shields,

however the statements are sufficiently detailed. Most of the costs are for ordinary

work done in ordinary preparation for offering expert testimony. Had Plaintiff

disclosed Chorover as an expert before the Rule 26 deadline had passed, Defendant

would ordinarily have had to incur on its own these types of costs in the preparation

of its defense. 

The language of the Discovery Order is broad and covers all of these

expenses incurred for which Defendant seeks to be reimbursed. Nevertheless, the

Court now exercises its discretion to limit the reach of its order. It would be unfair

to shift all of these expenses to Plaintiff’s counsel. After careful consideration, the

Court hereby limits its order to the those expert expenses incurred in responding to

the surprise sur-rebuttal report by Chorover disclosed the month before trial. And it

contemplates only those expenses of Defendant’s expert Dr. Shields, as opposed to

others who may have assisted him in some way. With this aim in view, the detailed

statements of Dr. Shields have been examined with respect to the time period

between the date of Chorover’s January 9, 2013 report and the start of trial on

February 20, 2013. See United States’ Reply in Support to Enforce Court’s Award

of Costs and Fees (filed Jan. 5, 2015), Exh. “E.” These statements indicate Dr.

Shields invoiced Defendant $18,330 specifically for Chorover rebuttal work and

trial preparation. Id. at “E” pages 41, 46 (1/21 - 1/25, 1/28 - 1/30, 2/4 - 2/6, 2/8,

2/11 - 2/12, and 2/15). As it cannot be determined from the exhibits what other fees

or expenses were incurred in response to the surprise sur-rebuttal report, although

there no doubt were fees and costs, those costs are not awardable.

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CONCLUSION

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Enforce is granted in part. Counsel for

Plaintiff, jointly and severally, are to pay to the Defendant the amount of $18,330.00

pursuant to FRCP Rules 26 and 37, and to do so within 45 days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 2017

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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