Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS 

TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” failed to pay them overtime wages, failed to 

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provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages in lieu 

thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. (See

generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 147).) 

Charter now moves to (1) compel arbitration of plaintiff Harper’s 

claims and stay the action and (2) compel arbitration of 

plaintiff Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims and dismiss them 

from the case. (Mots. to Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 

165).)1

I. Facts & Procedural History

Much of this case’s factual background is set forth in 

the court’s accompanying Order Re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify 

the Scheduling Order and for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint. Accordingly, the court will not repeat it here except 

where relevant to the instant motions.

A. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiff Harper worked for Charter from September 2017 

to March 2018. (SAC at ¶ 5 (Docket No. 147).) Upon hire, Harper 

signed an agreement to arbitrate “any and all claims, disputes, 

and/or controversies between [Harper] and Charter arising from or 

related to [Harper’s] employment with Charter,” designating JAMS 

1 The parties have requested that the court take judicial 

notice of two filings in Harper’s related FEHA case, other 

documents filed in this litigation, the American Arbitration 

Association’s rules and procedures, and two unpublished Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions addressing Charter’s motions to 

compel arbitration in other cases. (See Docket Nos. 171, 184, 

185.) Plaintiffs object to Charter’s request as to the Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions. (See Docket No. 191.) Because 

the court does not find these materials relevant to this matter 

or helpful in deciding any of the issues currently before the

court, however, the court declines to take judicial notice of 

these materials.

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as the arbitration provider and stating that JAMS rules, 

procedures, and policies would govern arbitrations under that 

agreement (the “JAMS Agreement”). (Order re Mot. to Compel Arb. 

at 2 (Docket No. 24).) The JAMS Agreement included a waiver of 

representative, collective, and class actions (the “Waiver”) and 

a severance and so-called “poison pill” provision. (Id. at 2.) 

The severance provision stated that if any part of the agreement 

was found to be void or unenforceable, that part would be severed 

and the remainder enforced. (Id. at 2-3.) It went on to state 

one exception (the “poison pill”): that if a dispute involved a 

representative, collective, or class action claim, and the Waiver 

were found to be invalid or unenforceable, “then th[e] entire 

Agreement . . . shall be null and void and the dispute will not 

be arbitrable.” (Id. at 3.)

In October 2017, while Harper was still employed by 

Charter, Charter adopted a new arbitration agreement requiring 

arbitration of claims via “Solution Channel,” Charter’s 

employment-based legal dispute resolution program, which provided 

for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration 

Association (the “Solution Channel Agreement”). (Id. at 3.) 

When announcing the change, Charter notified employees that they 

would be bound by the Solution Channel Agreement unless they 

opted out within thirty days. (Id.) Harper did not do so. 

(Id.)

In November 2018, Harper filed a Demand for Arbitration 

and Request for Rulings as to Inarbitrability with JAMS, seeking 

a ruling on whether his employment-related grievances against 

Charter could be arbitrated under the JAMS Agreement. (Id. at 5-

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6.) Charter consented to and participated in the ensuing 

arbitration process with JAMS, and in April 2019 an arbitrator 

issued an award finding that Harper’s wage-and-hour claims were 

inarbitrable and dismissing the arbitration. (Id. at 6; see Mot. 

to Confirm Arb. Award, Ex. 16 (“Order of Dismissal”), at 157-66 

(Docket No. 9-1).)

Specifically, the arbitrator determined that because 

pre-dispute waivers of representative claims brought under PAGA 

are unenforceable under California law, the JAMS Agreement Waiver 

could not be enforced. (Order of Dismissal at 159-61 (Docket No. 

9-1) (citing Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A. LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 

384 (2014)).) The arbitrator accordingly determined that this 

activated the poison pill, nullifying the entire agreement. 

(Id. at 163-65.) The arbitrator rejected Charter’s argument that 

the poison pill be limited so as to nullify the agreement only as 

to the representative, collective, or class action claim at issue 

as contrary to the JAMS Agreement’s plain text, which included no 

such limitation. (Id.)

In May 2019, after Harper had initiated this action in 

state court, Charter sought to enforce the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper, who refused. (Order re Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 6-7 (Docket No. 24).) In August 2019, this court 

confirmed and entered judgment pursuant to the JAMS arbitration 

award. (Id. at 19.) Further, the court found that there had 

been a novation as a result of Charter’s acquiescence to 

arbitration under the JAMS Agreement rather than the Solution 

Channel Agreement, held that any rights Charter had as against 

Harper under the Solution Channel Agreement with respect to his 

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wage-and-hour claims were thus “dead and extinguished,” and 

denied a motion by Charter to compel arbitration under the 

Solution Channel Agreement. (Id. at 18-20.)2

In May 2021, Harper again sought employment with 

Charter via an online application. (Fries Decl. at ¶ 16, Ex. D

(Docket No. 162-1).) When proceeding through Charter’s online 

application, applicants are presented with a webpage featuring 

information about Charter’s Solution Channel Agreement, with 

links to the agreement itself and to Solution Channel Program 

Guidelines, both of which applicants may save and print. (Id. at 

¶¶ 7-10.) To proceed with their application, applicants are 

required to affirmatively agree to be bound by the Solution 

Channel Agreement by clicking an “I Agree” button. (Id. at 

¶ 11.) They are informed that if they do not agree, they will be 

removed from consideration for employment; their application is 

not submitted, and they are given the option to begin the 

application process again. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) On May 23, 2021, 

Harper consented to the Solution Channel Agreement and submitted 

an online application to Charter. (Id. at ¶ 16, Ex. D.)

2 In late 2019, the court also adjudicated a separate, 

related action between Harper and Charter brought under 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). See

Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 

6918280 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019). There, Harper had also sought 

to arbitrate his FEHA claims under the JAMS agreement, but this 

time Charter did not participate. Id. at *2. The court held 

that because “Charter did not engage with [Harper’s] FEHA claims” 

in the manner it had with his wage-and-hour claims, there had 

been no novation of arbitration agreements with respect to the 

FEHA claims. Id. at *3. After determining that the Solution 

Channel Agreement applied to Harper’s FEHA claims and was valid, 

the court granted a motion by Charter to compel arbitration of 

those claims under that agreement. Id. at *3-6.

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B. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

In addition to consenting to the Solution Channel 

Agreement in order to complete Charter’s online application, 

individuals who accept offers of employment from Charter are 

again required to consent to the same agreement, or else they 

cannot become a Charter employee. (Fries Decl. re Turner at 

¶¶ 9-18 (Docket No. 165-2).) Plaintiff Turner submitted an 

online application on May 23, 2018, consenting to the Solution 

Channel Agreement, and subsequently completed Charter’s employee 

onboarding process, consenting to the agreement again. (Id. at 

¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Vazquez did the same, 

submitting his application on October 9, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Vazquez at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Abascal did as well, 

submitting his application on November 5, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Abascal at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.)

C. The Solution Channel Agreement

The Solution Channel Agreement contains several

provisions currently at issue. It requires parties to the 

agreement to resolve “all disputes, claims and controversies that 

could be asserted in court or before an administrative agency for 

which you or Charter have an alleged cause of action related to 

pre-employment, employment, employment termination or postemployment-related claims,” including wage-and-hour-related 

claims, through binding arbitration. (Fries Aff., Ex. C 

(“Solution Channel Agreement”), at §§ A, B(1) (Docket No. 165-

2).)

The agreement specifically excludes certain claims from 

arbitration, including “[a]ny claims that have already been filed 

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in federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Id. at § C(14).) It also includes a 

merger clause, providing that the Solution Channel Agreement 

represents the complete agreement between parties on the 

resolution of covered disputes, but noting that “this Agreement 

will not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.) Finally, like the JAMS Agreement, the Solution Channel 

Agreement includes a waiver of representative, class, or 

collective action claims. (Id. at § D.)

II. Analysis

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that a 

written provision in a “contract evidencing a transaction 

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 

thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, 

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. 

§ 2. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, “the central 

. . . purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to 

arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen 

S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 

483, 490 (1987) (under the FAA, arbitration agreements “must be 

rigorously enforced”) (internal quotations omitted, alterations 

adopted).

The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion 

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by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 

shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as

to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). Accordingly, 

“the FAA limits courts’ involvement to determining (1) whether a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether 

the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Cox v. Ocean 

View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotations omitted).

“[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning 

the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 

arbitration, whether the problem at hand is a construction of the 

contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or 

like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); see Poublon v. 

C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 

Upon a showing that a party has failed to comply with a valid 

arbitration agreement, the district court must issue an order 

compelling arbitration. See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble Cooke, Inc., 

841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988).

The primary exception to courts’ obligation to enforce 

arbitration agreements under the FAA comes from the Act’s “saving 

clause,” which “allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 

agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 

the revocation of any contract.’” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 

S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Such “generally 

applicable contract defenses” most frequently include “fraud, 

duress, or unconscionability,” but do not include “defenses that 

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apply only to arbitration.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 

U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).

A. Applicability of the Solution Channel Agreement

Charter seeks to compel plaintiffs Harper, Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal to submit their California Labor Code and 

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claims to arbitration on an 

individual basis. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Harper at 1 

(Docket No. 162); Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 1 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs contend that to do 

so, Charter must prove that (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exists and (2) the agreement encompasses the claims Charter seeks 

to arbitrate. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-17 (citing 

Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000)) (Docket No. 172); Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 

14 (same) (Docket No. 173).)

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal acknowledge that they each 

executed the Solution Channel Agreement both when applying for 

employment with Charter and when accepting their jobs, (see Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9-11 (Docket No. 173)), and Harper 

acknowledges that he did when re-applying for employment with 

Charter in May 2021, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 

(Docket No. 172)). On this basis, plaintiffs concede that a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See id. at 17; Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 (Docket No. 173).) Accordingly, the 

question becomes whether the agreement applies to plaintiffs’ 

Labor Code and UCL claims, of which Charter seeks to compel 

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arbitration.3

The Solution Channel Agreement provides that “[y]ou and 

Charter mutually agree that . . . any dispute arising out of or 

relating to your pre-employment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that relationship, except as 

specifically excluded below, must be resolved through binding 

arbitration.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § A (Docket No. 

165-2).) This is followed by a section titled “Covered Claims,” 

(id. at § B), which specifies that such disputes include “wage 

and hour-based claims including claims for unpaid wages, 

commissions, or other compensations or penalties (including meal 

and rest break claims, claims for inaccurate wage statements, 

[and] claims for reimbursement of expenses),” (id. at § B(1)). 

The parties do not dispute that the claims of which Charter seeks 

to compel arbitration clearly fall into this category.

However, that section is followed by another, titled 

“Excluded Claims,” which lists a variety of claims to which the 

“Covered Claims” section does not apply. (See id. at § C.) 

Notably for purposes of the instant motions, these include “[a]ny 

claims that have already been filed in federal or state court at 

the time you execute this Agreement, provided that such claims 

were not previously subject to any arbitration agreement.” (Id.

3 Although at oral argument the parties briefly discussed 

whether questions of arbitrability should themselves be submitted 

to an arbitrator, neither party raised this issue in their 

briefing. Accordingly, this court will decide whether 

plaintiffs’ claims are arbitrable rather than submit the issue to 

the arbitrator. See also Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (gateway issues of arbitrability are presumptively 

reserved for the court).

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at § C(14).) The aforementioned merger clause, which appears 

later in the agreement, also provides that “this Agreement will 

not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.)

Plaintiffs argue that these two provisions operate to 

exclude plaintiffs Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from mandatory 

arbitration under the agreement. Specifically, they argue that 

because plaintiff Harper had already filed this action by the 

time Vazquez and Abascal executed the agreement, their claims 

qualify as having “already been filed in . . . court” and having 

“been filed with a[ ] . . . court before the Effective Date of 

th[e] Agreement” under these provisions.4 (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 15-19 (Docket No. 173).) 

They argue the same as to Harper, given that he 

executed the operative agreement in May 2021, after bringing this 

action, and contend that his claims “were not previously subject 

to any agreement” pursuant to section C(14) because the 

agreements he previously signed were no longer in effect by May 

2021. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-22 (Docket No. 

172).) In light of the differing arguments put forward with 

respect to Harper and to the other plaintiffs for whom Charter 

seeks to compel arbitration, the court will address the two 

4 Plaintiffs do not make this argument with respect to 

plaintiff Turner, as he had already executed the agreement when 

this litigation began, and therefore they concede that sections 

C(14) and P do not apply to him. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 17 n.6 (Docket No. 173).)

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groups separately.

1. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

Charter argues that Vazquez and Abascal improperly seek 

to avoid arbitration by, in essence, piggybacking off of Harper’s 

already-filed claims, which they did not join until well after 

executing the agreement. (See Def.’s Reply at 5-10 (Docket No. 

182).) It contends that because section C creates exceptions to 

section B’s requirement that various claims be arbitrated, the 

two sections must be read together, and that because section B by 

its terms applies to “claims . . . for which you or Charter have 

an alleged cause of action,” the exclusion contained in section 

C(14) is properly read to exclude only already-filed claims 

between the signing party and Charter, rather than any alreadyfiled claims to which Charter is a party. (Solution Channel 

Agreement at § B(1) (emphasis added) (Docket No. 165-2); see id.

at 5-6.) The court agrees.

Because, as a general matter, contract interpretation 

is a matter of state law, the court looks to California law in 

construing these provisions. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 

U.S. 47, 54 (2015) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 

of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). 

Three provisions of the California Civil Code, governing the 

interpretation of contracts, are relevant here. First, “[t]he 

language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the 

language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an 

absurdity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1638. Second, “[a] contract must 

be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of 

the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as 

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the same is ascertainable and lawful.” Id. at § 1636. Third, 

“[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give 

effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause 

helping to interpret the other.” Id. at § 1641.

Under these provisions, it is clear that section C(14) 

of the agreement cannot be read to prevent arbitration of Vazquez 

and Abascal’s claims by virtue of Harper’s previously filed 

claim. Because section C specifically lists exclusions to 

section B, the two must be read together. See also id. Per 

section B’s clear language, claims covered under that section —

and thus excluded under section C — are those between “You” 

(i.e., the individual signatory) “and Charter.” This clearly 

signifies an intention to require arbitration of claims — and

thus, under section C, exclude from arbitration — only claims 

that might arise as between the signatory and Charter. See id.

at §§ 1636, 1638. To allow signatories to avoid arbitration of 

otherwise-covered claims by joining suits filed by individuals 

not party to the contract would plainly frustrate this intention.

For similar reasons, section P likewise does not 

exclude Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from arbitration. As noted 

above, the Solution Channel Agreement’s core provisions specify 

that it applies to disputes between “You and Charter.” Although 

section P does not directly incorporate this language in the 

manner that section C does, to apply it in plaintiffs’ preferred 

manner would run counter to the contract’s central purpose, which 

is to require arbitration of disputes. See id. at § 1636. And 

to the extent that this omission creates a conflict between 

sections P and C(14), “in a contract, when a general and 

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particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to 

the former,” meaning that “a particular intent will control a 

general one that is inconsistent with it.” Karpinski v. Smitty’s 

Bar, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th 456, 464 (1st Dist. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

For these reasons, together with the FAA’s mandate that 

any doubts as to an arbitration agreement’s applicability be 

resolved in favor of arbitration, see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 

460 U.S. at 24–25; Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1259, the court concludes 

that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to compel arbitration 

of Vazquez and Abascal’s claims. Plaintiffs do not contest that 

the agreement applies to Turner’s claims, and sections C(14) and 

P clearly do not exclude them, as this action had not yet been 

filed at the time he executed the agreement. Accordingly, the 

court concludes that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to 

Turner’s claims as well.

2. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiffs also contend that section P of the agreement 

excludes Harper’s claims from its coverage. (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 18-19 (Docket No. 172).) They further argue that, 

because this court confirmed the JAMS arbitrator’s award finding 

that the JAMS agreement was “null and void,” and because it 

subsequently held that Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration effected a novation of Harper’s first Solution 

Channel contract — rendering it “dead and extinguished” —

Harper’s claims do not qualify as “previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement” under section C(14). (See id. at 20-22.) 

Accordingly, they argue that section C(14) excludes Harper’s 

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claims from coverage under the agreement as well. (See id.)

As noted above, section C(14) provides that the 

agreement excludes “[a]ny claims that have already been filed in 

federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § C(14) 

(Docket No. 165-2).) Thus, because it is undisputed that 

Harper’s claims had already been filed in court when he executed 

the agreement, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 

172)), the only question is whether those claims “were . . . 

previously subject to any arbitration agreement,” (Solution 

Channel Agreement at § C(14) (Docket No. 165-2)). The court 

concludes that they were.

While Harper was employed by Charter, he consented to 

the JAMS Agreement, and later to the Solution Channel Agreement. 

Plaintiffs argue that the JAMS arbitrator’s determination that 

the JAMS Agreement was invalid means that Harper’s claims were 

never “subject to” that agreement, contending that claims are

only “subject to” an arbitration agreement if they are validly 

required to be arbitrated under that agreement. (See Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 172).)

The court assumes, for these purposes, that plaintiffs’ 

construction of “subject to” is correct, such that Harper’s 

claims were not “previously subject to” the JAMS Agreement. Even 

so, it is clear that they were nonetheless “previously subject 

to” the Solution Channel Agreement. Although this court 

determined that there was a subsequent novation, extinguishing 

that agreement, the fact remains that for a period of time --

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beginning when Harper first executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement and ending with Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration -- Charter could have asserted the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper with respect to any wage-and-hour claims 

he had. Under the plain meaning of “previous” -- earlier in time 

-- Harper’s claims, at the time he executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement in May 2021, were “previously subject to” the earliersigned copy of the same agreement. As such, Harper’s claims are 

not excluded from arbitration under section C(14).5

To the extent that Harper challenges Charter’s ability 

to compel him to arbitrate his individual claims arising out of 

his prior employment because his latest execution of the Solution 

Channel Agreement occurred when he applied for another position, 

(see id. at 14), at least one other district court in California 

has already held that the Solution Channel Agreement applies in

such circumstances. In Durruthy v. Charter Communications, LLC, 

like in this case, the plaintiff was hired by Charter, was later 

terminated, subsequently reapplied for employment, and in doing 

so executed the agreement, which Charter then sought to enforce 

against her. Durruthy, 20-CV-1374-W-MSB, 2020 WL 6871048, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2020). As the court in the Southern District 

5 Plaintiffs contend that to find that Harper’s claims 

were previously subject to the initial Solution Channel 

Agreement, the court would need to reconsider whether that 

agreement was extinguished by the previously mentioned novation, 

which they argue the court is precluded from doing under the law 

of the case doctrine. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 

(Docket No. 172).) However, plaintiffs are mistaken in their 

logic, as finding that an applicable agreement had terminated is 

not the same as concluding that it was never applicable in the 

first place. Although the court did the former, it did not do 

the latter.

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of California observed:

The Agreement covers “any dispute arising 

out of or relating to [an applicant’s] 

preemployment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that 

relationship . . . .” The Agreement does 

not limit its application to future 

employment, nor does it exclude claims from 

prior employment periods. Therefore, an 

objective reading supports that “employment” 

reasonably means any employment period 

between the two parties of the agreement. 

. . . . Plaintiff’s alleged lack of consent 

to arbitrate claims from her prior 

employment period with Defendant are absent 

from the Agreement, and “unexpressed 

subjective intentions are irrelevant 

. . . .”

Id. at *4-5 (quoting Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc., 51 Cal. 

App. 5th 962, 970 (2020)) (alterations in original). This court 

agrees with the Durruthy court’s analysis of this issue.6

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the 

Solution Channel Agreement applies to Harper’s claims.

B. Unconscionability

Plaintiffs also argue that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is unconscionable. (See id. at 22-38; Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 19-34 (Docket No. 173).) If true, this would mean

that the contract was not validly entered into in the first 

instance, allowing the court to invalidate the agreement pursuant 

to the FAA’s saving clause. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.

“Unconscionability under California law has ‘both a 

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on 

oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the 

6 This court’s agreement with the Durruthy court’s 

evaluation of the Solution Channel Agreement, however, does not 

extend to its unconscionability analysis.

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latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.’” Kilgore v. 

KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 

83, 99 (2000)). While courts “use a ‘sliding scale’ in analyzing 

these two elements . . . . [n]o matter how heavily one side of 

the scale tips . . . , both procedural and substantive 

unconscionability are required for a court to hold an arbitration 

agreement unenforceable.” Id. (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 

99).

This court previously assessed whether the Solution 

Channel Agreement is unconscionable in the related action between 

plaintiff Harper and Charter. See Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 

2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

18, 2019). There, the court determined that the agreement was 

not procedurally unconscionable, relying in large part on the 

fact that when Harper was first confronted with the Solution 

Channel Agreement, it was via an email notifying employees of 

their ability to opt out of the agreement within thirty days. 

Id. at *1, 5 (citing Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 

1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (deeming an arbitration 

agreement not procedurally unconscionable because it noted the 

option to opt out within sixty days of signing)). Here, on the 

other hand, there is no indication that plaintiffs were given the 

same option to opt out; indeed, they assert that they received 

none, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 24 (Docket No. 172); 

Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 (Docket No. 173)), which 

Charter does not contest, (see Def.’s Reply at 15-17 (Docket No. 

182); Def.’s Reply at 16-18 (Docket No. 183)).

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The Ninth Circuit has previously held that an

arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable where it 

was presented to employees “on an adhere-or-reject basis,” with 

no opportunity to opt out. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 

Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v. Am. 

Mortg. Mgmt. Servs., 2:12-cv-00085 WBS JFM, 2012 WL 5349511, at 

*4-5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (holding pre-employment 

arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it did 

not contain an opt-out clause). Conversely, it has also held 

that an arbitration agreement that included an opt-out provision 

was not procedurally unconscionable. See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., 

Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Thus, an arbitration agreement that individuals are 

required to sign as a condition of employment, with no ability to 

opt out, is procedurally unconscionable, though Ninth Circuit 

precedent also establishes that this form of procedural 

unconscionability is “low” on California’s sliding scale 

analysis. See Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1261. In such a situation, 

if “there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, then 

the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of 

substantive unconscionability is high.” Id.

Regardless of the particular degree of procedural 

unconscionability present here, however, in order for their 

unconscionability defense to succeed, plaintiffs must also show 

that the agreement is substantively unconscionable. See Kilgore, 

673 F.3d at 963. And as this court previously held in the

related action between Harper and Charter, in which Charter 

sought to enforce the Solution Channel Agreement against him with 

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respect to claims not present in the current litigation, the 

agreement is not substantively unconscionable. See Harper, 2019 

WL 6918280, at *5-6.7 Because the agreement at issue in this 

litigation is the same as the one upon which the court ruled in 

the separate litigation, and plaintiffs do not allege that it has 

changed,8 the court again concludes that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is not substantively unconscionable.

Because the Solution Channel Agreement is not 

substantively unconscionable, plaintiffs’ unconscionability 

defense must fail.

C. California Labor Code Section 432.6

7 Specifically, the court determined that (1) the 

Solution Channel review process was not one-sided, as Harper 

contended, but rather its requirements applied equally to 

employees and to Charter; (2) the agreement did not enable 

Charter to conclusively decide whether a claim is arbitrable, 

instead providing claimants the ability to proceed with 

arbitration on this and other issues; and (3) a provision of the 

agreement requiring “each party [to] bear its own attorney’s fees 

regardless of the action brought,” although unenforceable under 

California law, could be severed pursuant to the agreement’s 

severability clause in light of the court’s determination that 

the agreement was “not otherwise permeated by unconscionability.” 

See Harper, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (citing Serpa v. Cal. Sur. 

Investigations, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 4th 695, 709-10 (2d Dist. 

2013)).

8 Although plaintiff Harper refers to the Solution 

Channel Agreement to which he consented the first time as the 

“Old SC Agreement” and the one to which he consented when reapplying as the “New SC Agreement,” his bases for these 

differences in nomenclature are that the former was included in 

an email informing him that he could opt out, whereas the latter 

was not — not that the agreement itself had changed. (See Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9 n.1 (Docket No. 172).)

Moreover, the Solution Channel Agreement is dated 

September 25, 2017 — well before plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and 

Abascal first applied for employment with Charter — further 

indicating that it had not changed between when plaintiff Harper 

first signed it and when they did. (See Solution Channel 

Agreement (Docket No. 165-2); supra Section II.B.)

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Finally, in supplemental briefing, plaintiffs argue 

that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce 

of the United States v. Bonta, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 4187860 (9th 

Cir. Sept. 15, 2021), precludes enforcement of the Solution 

Channel Agreement against Harper. (See Not. of Supp. Auth. at 2

(Docket No. 196).) That decision upheld part of California Labor 

Code section 432.6, which prohibits employers from “requir[ing] 

any applicant for employment or any employee to waive any right, 

forum, or procedure” established under the Labor Code or 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act as a condition of 

employment, on the basis that it was not preempted by the FAA.9 

See id. at *4-10; Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(a).

Plaintiffs contend that under Chamber of Commerce, 

Charter’s use of the Solution Channel Agreement violates section 

432.6 because Harper’s consent to the agreement was a mandatory 

condition for consideration of his application and for any 

subsequent employment, with no ability to opt out. (See Not. of 

Supp. Auth. at 2 (Docket No. 196).) Per Chamber of Commerce’s 

clear language, however, whether this requirement violated

section 432.6 has no effect on the court’s present decision to 

enforce the Solution Channel Agreement: “§ 432.6 does not make 

invalid or unenforceable any agreement to arbitrate, even if such 

agreement is consummated in violation of the statute.” 2021 WL 

4187860, at *7 (emphasis added); see also 2021 WL 4187860, at *6 

9 Because section 432.6 came into effect after Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal executed the Solution Channel Agreement, but 

before Harper did in May 2021, plaintiffs only contend that the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision applies to Harper. (See Not. of Supp. 

Auth. at 2 n.1 (Docket No. 196).)

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(“§ 432.6 cannot be used to invalidate, revoke, or fail to 

enforce an arbitration agreement . . . .”).

The most that Chamber of Commerce does to aid employees 

who seek to challenge arbitration agreements is to simply 

reaffirm the applicability of the FAA’s saving clause to 

arbitration agreements under section 432.6. See id. at *6 

(citing Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(f) (“Nothing in this section is 

intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is 

otherwise enforceable under the [FAA].”)) (other citations

omitted). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit observed, in dicta:

[A]n employee may attempt to void an 

arbitration agreement that he was compelled 

to enter as a condition of employment on the 

basis that it was not voluntary. If a court 

were to find that such a lack of 

voluntariness is a generally applicable 

contract defense that does not specifically 

target agreements to arbitrate, the 

arbitration agreement may be voided in 

accordance with saving clause jurisprudence.

Id. at *9. However, here the court has addressed Harper’s

“generally applicable contract defense[s]” and determined that 

they do not apply here. Chamber of Commerce thus has no impact 

on this decision.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant 

Charter’s motions to compel arbitration of plaintiffs Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

D. Motions to Dismiss or Stay Judicial Proceedings

In its motion to compel arbitration of Harper’s Labor 

Code and UCL claims, Charter requests that, should the court 

grant that motion, the court stay this case -- including Harper’s 

PAGA claim -- pending arbitration of the other claims. (See Mot. 

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to Compel Arb. re Harper at 23-24 (Docket No. 162).) Charter 

suggests that although it has not sought arbitration of the PAGA 

claim, staying proceedings as to the PAGA claim would avoid 

conflicting rulings between this court as to the PAGA claim and 

the arbitrator as to the other claims. (See id. at 24.) 

Plaintiffs oppose this request, pointing out that because this 

court will not be bound by any rulings the arbitrator might make, 

staying Harper’s PAGA claim would not in fact avoid conflicting 

rulings. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 38-39 (Docket No. 

172).) They further argue that proceedings as to the PAGA claim 

should not be stayed because of the distinct nature of a PAGA 

claim, which belongs to the state rather than to Harper. (See

id. at 39.)

Further, in its motion to compel arbitration of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims, Charter also requests that, should 

the court grant that motion, the court dismiss those plaintiffs 

from the case. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 20-21 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs oppose this 

request and instead request that the court stay proceedings as to 

these plaintiffs pending arbitration of their individual claims. 

(See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 35 (Docket No. 173).) In 

response to the court’s questioning at oral argument, counsel for 

plaintiffs indicated that they preferred a stay of plaintiff 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration of the other 

plaintiffs’ individual claims.

The FAA provides that, where a suit presents “issue[s] 

referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 

arbitration,” the court “shall on application of one of the 

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parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 

been had.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Further, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “[i]n some cases, it may be advisable to stay litigation 

among the nonarbitrating parties pending the outcome of the 

arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983).

Because plaintiffs have requested a stay of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims, the court will stay 

those claims pending arbitration. Additionally, because Charter 

has requested that the court otherwise stay this case pending 

arbitration of Harper’s individual claims, because plaintiffs’ 

counsel supported a stay of Sinclair’s individual claims at oral 

argument, and because the court agrees that a stay of Sinclair’s 

claims pending arbitration is “advisable,” the court will stay 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration as well. 

However, because a stay would impede vindication of 

California’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code through 

representative PAGA actions, discussed above, and because the 

PAGA claim represents a distinct “action” in this case, the court 

will not stay Harper’s PAGA claim. See Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto 

Grp., 53 Cal. App. 5th 539, 557 (1st Dist. 2020) (“Because a PAGA 

claim is representative and does not belong to an employee 

individually, an employer should not be able dictate how and 

where the representative action proceeds.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Charter’s Motions to 

Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 165) be, and the same hereby 

are, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to the claims presented 

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in Counts One through Nine of the Second Amended Complaint only,

this action is STAYED pending arbitration of plaintiff Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

Dated: October 12, 2021

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