Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08216/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jody L Barker, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn Colvin, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-08216-PCT-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on January 12, 2009.

Plaintiff also filed an application for supplemental security income on January 13, 2009. The

claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Following a hearing held on March

17, 2011, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a decision finding that plaintiff was

not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and denying benefits. The

Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on August 29, 2012, rendering the

ALJ's decision final. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have before us plaintiff's opening brief (doc. 16), defendant's

answering brief (doc. 17), and the administrative record (doc. 15). Plaintiff did not file a

reply, and the time for doing so has expired.

I

A district court may set aside a denial of benefits “only if it is not supported by

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substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as

a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted).

The ALJ followed the Social Security Act's five-step procedure to determine whether

plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff

meets the status requirements of the Social Security Act and has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the date of alleged onset. Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that

plaintiff suffered "severe" impairments including osteoarthritis of hip joints and obesity. Id.

At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff's impairments do not meet the criteria listed in the

regulations. Tr. 21. Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional

capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). Tr. 22. At the hearing, a vocational expert ("VE") testified that

a person limited to plaintiff's RFC could not perform plaintiff's past relevant work. Tr. 87.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's RFC prevents him from performing his past

relevant work. Tr. 26. The ALJ made alternative findings under step five of the sequential

evaluation procedure based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in 20 C.F.R. § 404. The

ALJ concluded that considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC,

Medical-Vocational Rule 201.28 directs a finding that plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 27. 

Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff’s bilateral hip

condition did not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404. Plaintiff

also argues that the ALJ erred by formulating a defective RFC, rejecting his symptom

testimony and relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in step five of the analysis.

Plaintiff urges that we reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for administrative proceedings.

II

Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ erred in finding that his bilateral hip condition did not

meet the standard in Section 1.02(A) of the listing of impairments in the regulations. For a

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claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that his impairment is “equivalent” to one of the

impairments listed in the regulations, “he must present medical findings equal in severity to

all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,

531, 110 S. Ct. 885, 891 (1990) (emphasis in original). In order to meet listing 1.02, a

claimant must show: 

Major dysfunction of a joint . . . characterized by gross anatomical deformity

[. . .] and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or

other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate

medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or

anykylosis of the affected joint(s). With [i]nvolvement of a weight bearing

joint (i.e. hip, knee, or ankle) resulting in an inability to ambulate effectively.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.02(A).

Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s hip arthritis did not

meet or medically equal listing 1.02(A). Tr. 21. X-rays showed bilateral degenerative

changes of the hips and the possibility of bilateral femoral acetabular impingement. Id.

However, as the ALJ noted, the record did not demonstrate that plaintiff had chronic joint

pain and stiffness with limitation or motion or other abnormal motion. Id. Dr. Barker stated

that plaintiff had full range of motion in his hips and other joints. Tr. 325-29. The record

does not reflect plaintiff’s inability to ambulate or an extreme limitation in his ability to walk,

as required for listing 1.02(A). In fact, plaintiff testified that he drives, shops and performs

other daily activities without the use of hand-held or motorized devices. Tr. 21, 243, 315-

316, 325. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that plaintiff’s hip impairment did not

meet or equal listing 1.02(A).

III

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that he has the RFC to perform sedentary

work is based on material errors of law and not supported by substantial evidence. It is the

ALJ's responsibility to assess a claimant's RFC based on all relevant medical evidence in the

record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546; SSR 96–5p. We will affirm an ALJ's RFC determination

if the proper legal standard is applied and if the decision is supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhard, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, the ALJ determined plaintiff’s RFC based on all relevant medical evidence in

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the record. First, the ALJ explained that he gave the most weight to the opinions of the state

agency medical consultants who opined that plaintiff could perform a range of light work.

Tr. 25. Because the ALJ also considered plaintiff’s obesity and potential aggravating factors

from the hip pain, she reduced the RFC to the sedentary level. Id. Next, the ALJ explained

that she gave less weight to the opinions of Dr. Barker and Dr. Jaume because those opinions

were inconsistent with the record as a whole. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Barker’s opinion that

plaintiff had no work-related limitations is inconsistent with the state doctors’ opinions. Tr.

26. Dr. Jaume’s opinion is also inconsistent with the record because he refers to x-rays in

his notes, but there are no x-rays attached to his opinion, and he states that no x-rays were

taken at the time of examination. See Tr. 405. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ did not “wholly exclude evidence about

his borderline intellectual functioning and learning disorder.” Doc. 16 at 14. The ALJ

explicitly stated that he considered Dr. Gill and the state agency psychologists’ assessments

regarding plaintiff’s mental impairments. Tr. 20, 26. Dr. Gill and the state agency

psychologists opined that claimant had some learning and concentration problems, but that

those impairments would not prevent basic work activities at the unskilled level. Tr. 319,

332-348. The ALJ stated that she gave some weight to those opinions to the extent that they

were consistent with the record as a whole, including plaintiff’s testimony and reported daily

activities. Tr. 26. Because the ALJ assessed the medical evidence in the record regarding

both physical and mental impairments, and supported her findings with substantial evidence

in the record, we affirm her RFC determination.

IV

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility of his

symptom testimony. Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ must give clear

and convincing reasons in order to reject the plaintiff's symptom testimony. Molina v.

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, the ALJ

is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain." Id. When weighing a

plaintiff's credibility, "the ALJ may consider his reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies

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either in his testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and

effect of the symptoms of which he complains." Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,

792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The ALJ may also consider the dosage and

effectiveness of any treatment or pain medication for relief of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947

F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991). "If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial

evidence in the record, we may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

Here, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons to reject the plaintiff's symptom

testimony. First, the ALJ discussed inconsistencies regarding plaintiff’s alleged onset date

of February 2, 2007. Tr. 23. As noted by the ALJ, the record reflects that plaintiff alleged

in his initial benefits application that his hip injuries first interfered with his ability to work

in 1990, yet he did not stop working until February 2007. Tr. 22, 217. The ALJ also noted

that there were no treatment records showing that plaintiff sought treatment for his hip pain

in the years leading up to, or for 18 months after his February 2007 alleged onset date. Id.

Second, the ALJ noted that plaintiff’s reported daily activities were inconsistent with his

claimed limitations. Id. During the hearing, plaintiff stated that “it just kills me to do

anything hardly anymore because of the arthritis in my hips.” Tr. 70. Yet, he reported to

various doctors that he was able to run errands, drive, water trees, clean up after the dogs,

and shop. Tr. 315-316, 325. Finally, the ALJ noted that the lack of treatment plaintiff

received after he saw his treating physician for his hip problems suggests that the symptoms

may not have been asserious as alleged. Tr. 24-25. Dr. Jaume recommended a conservative

treatment course of anti-inflammatory medications and possibly cortisone injections. Tr.

405. However, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff refused the treatment without explanation. Tr.

388 “[U]nexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment may be the basis

for an adverse credibility finding unless one of a number of good reasons for not doing so

applies.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). Therefore, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that the lack of treatment was

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inconsistent with the plaintiff’s level of complaints. 

The inconsistencies in the record regarding plaintiff’s alleged onset date,

inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s testimony and his daily activities, and the lack of

evidence of treatment for his hip problems together constitute clear and convincing reasons

in support of the ALJ's credibility determination.

V

Finally, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by relying on the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines to determine that plaintiff was “not disabled.” The Commissioner may show that

plaintiff can perform some other work that exists in significant numbers in the national

economy in two ways: “(a) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (b) by reference to the

Medical–Vocational Guidelines [GRIDS].” Lockwood v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin.,

616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). The GRIDS are inapplicable “when a claimant's

non-exertional limitations are ‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the range of

work permitted by the claimant's exertional limitations.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071,

1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ could not rely on the GRIDS because the

non-exertional impairments identified by Dr. Gill and Dr. Peyrera cannot be disregarded.

However, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s mental impairments are “not severe.” The

ALJ’s finding is supported by the guidelines set out in the regulations for evaluating mental

disorders and by Dr. Peyrera’s opinion that the plaintiff would be capable of performing

simple and repetitive tasks on a sustained basis despite his alleged mental impairments. Tr.

20-21, 348. Because the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s non-exertional impairments are “not

severe” is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the reliance on GRIDS was

reasonable and appropriate. 

VI

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not

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disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED

AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying disability benefits. The clerk shall

enter final judgment.

DATED this 13th day of September, 2013.

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