Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01452/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JELANI AKEEM BIGSBY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 15-cv-1452 BEN (KSC) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

17 On July 1, 2015, Jelani Akeem Bigsby ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding 

18 pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") 

19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] In the original writ filed with this Court, 

20 petitioner raised the following grounds for relief: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to 

21 sustain the robbery conviction concerning victims Jacqueline Ibanez and Eva Gomez; (2) 

22 impermissibly suggestive identification procedures; (3) ineffective assistance of trial 

23 counsel; and, (4) prosecutorial misconduct regarding statements made during closing 

24 arguments. Id. at p. 11. 

25 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger 

26 T. Benitez pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil Local Rules 

27 72.1 (d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

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1 Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons outlined below, this Court 

2 RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

3 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

4 Petitioner Jelani Akeem Bigsby is in the custody of respondent based upon a valid 

5 judgment entered in San Diego County, where a jury convicted him on August 25, 201l. 

6 [Doc. No.1, at p. 1.] Petitioner was tried jointly with co-defendant, Oscar Alfredo Ortega, 

7 and both men were convicted offour counts of first degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211; 

8 counts 1,2,3, and 4); one count of burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459; count 5); and, four 

9 counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm, (Cal. Penal Code § 245( d). [Doc. No. 11-

10 12, at pp. 223-232.] The jury additionally found that petitioner used a firearm in the 

11 commission of the crime (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b)). Id. at 228. The jury acquitted 

12 petitioner and Ortega of attempted kidnapping (Cal. Penal Code § 207(a); 664). Id. at pp. 

13 226; 230. 

14 Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

15 District, on June 28, 2012. [Doc No. 11-18.] On appeal, petitioner argued, that the evidence 

16 did not support his conviction on two of the robbery counts. Id. In an unpublished, 8-page 

17 written opinion filed on Mary 31, 2013, the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner's 

18 claim and affirmed the judgment. [Doc. No. 11-23.]. The California Supreme Court 

19 summarily denied the petitioner's appeal on August 14, 2013. [Doc. No. 11-26.] 

20 On June 17, 2014 petitioner sought collateral review by the San Diego County 

21 Superior Court, asserting the following five grounds for relief: (1) an unconstitutionally 

22 suggestive line-up and in-court identifications prejudiced him; (2) ineffective assistance of 

23 trial counsel; (3) prosecutorial misconduct resulting from improper remarks during closing 

24 argument; (4) cumulative error, and; (5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 

25 failing to raise the above-named issues on direct appeal. [Doc. No. 11-27.] In a 7-page 

26 written opinion filed on September 3, 2014, the Superior Court denied his petition. [Doc. 

27 No. 11-28.] 

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1 On September 8, 2014, petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus to the California Court 

2 of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, seeking collateral review. [Doc. No. 11-29.] In a 2-

3 page written opinion filed on October 15, 2014, the Court denied the writ. [Doc. No. 11-

4 30.] Petitioner next sought collateral review of the same issues by filing his petition with 

5 the California Supreme Court on October 27,2014. [Doc. No. 11-31.] The California 

6 Supreme Court summarily denied petitioners writ of habeas corpus on March 18,2015. 

7 The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was timely filed in this Court on July 

8 1,2015. [Doc. No.1.] 

9 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

10 The Court of Appeal's unpublished opinion from petitioner's direct appeal, sets forth 

11 a factual background summarizing the evidence adduced at trial. [Doc. No. 11-23, pp. 2-

12 3.] Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l) creates a statutory presumption that the state court's 

13 findings of facts were correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of disproving these facts 

14 by clear and convincing evidence. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). 

15 This Court has conducted an independent review of the trial record and confirmed that the 

16 Court of Appeal's factual findings comport with the record. The Court of Appeal found: 

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Marco Ibanez, his wife, Elva Ibanez, their 18-year-old daughter, 

Jacqueline Ibanez, and her 19-year-old friend, Eva Gomez, lived in a home 

located in San Diego [ .... ] On the afternoon of September 4, the home was 

burglarized. The burglar stole Jacqueline's and Eva's laptop computers; an 

envelope of money that Elva kept inside a drawer and attempted to pry open 

a floor safe. 

The following morning, defendants entered the home while a cohort 

waited outside in a vehicle. Defendants, armed with semiautomatic handguns, 

confronted Marco and threatened to kill him ifhe did not give them the money 

from his safe. Marco put the cash from the safe into Ortega's backpack. Ortega 

then had Marco give him the money hidden in dresser drawers. Defendants 

stole about $25,000 in cash from the safe and dresser drawers. 

In the meantime, Elva ran into the nearby bedroom shared by 

Jacqueline and Eva, locked the door and told them to call 911. Eva hid in the 

closet and called 911 from her cellular phone. Jacqueline also called 911. 

Bigsby broke into the room while Jacqueline was on the phone, pointed his 

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gun at her saying, "You better not be calling the cops." Bigsby motioned with 

his gun for Jacqueline and Elva to kneel on the floor. 

At one point, Jacqueline heard Marco struggling to open the safe, so 

she told Bigsby that she could open the safe. When Bigsby asked Jacqueline 

if she could guarantee that she would be able to open the safe, her mind went 

blank. Eventually, Eva came out ofthe closet and Bigsby had her sit next to 

the other women as he pointed his gun at all of them. Bigsby grabbed 

Jacqueline's phone, Eva's phone, and another phone that was on a shelf and 

threw them to the floor, breaking them. When the police arrived defendants 

escaped by jumping out a window. [Doc. No. 11-23, at pp. 2-.] 

Petitioner was arrested on November 10,2010. [Doc. No. 1. At 238.] On the day that 

9 petitioner was arrested, he was identified by Jacqueline in a live line-up. [Doc. No.1 at 

10 41.] She believed that he may have been manipulating his voice to make it sound higher 

11 than it actually was. Id. DNA testing was also performed on one of the guns and one of the 

12 beanies recovered by police. Id. at 51. Of the two samples taken from the gun, petitioner 

13 was excluded as a potential contributor to one and the results on the other were 

14 inconclusive. Id. at 52. Petitioner was a possible minor contributor to the sample on the 

15 beanie. Id. 

16 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

17 Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to those who are in custody in violation 

18 ofthe Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "A federal court may 

19 not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 

20 37,41 (1984). "[A] mere error of state law is not a denial of due process." Engle v. Isaac, 

21 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 

22 This petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

23 Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA 

24 imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 

25 that state-court decisions be given the benefit ofthe doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

26 19,24 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition 

27 "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

28 granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

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1 proceedings unless the adjudication ofthe claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

2 to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

3 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that 

4 was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light ofthe evidence presented 

5 in the State court proceeding_" 28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)&(2). For purposes of § 2254(d)(I), 

6 "clearly established Federal law" means "the governing legal principle or principles set 

7 forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. 

8 Andrade, 538 US. 63, 71-72 (2003). Therefore, a lack of controlling Supreme Court 

9 precedent can preclude habeas corpus relief. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 US. 120, 126 

10 (2008). 

11 The AEDPA standard is highly deferential and "difficult to meet." Harrington v. 

12 Richter, 562 US. 86, 100 (2011). For mixed questions offact and law, federal habeas relief 

13 may be granted under the "contrary to" clause of section 2254 if the state court applied a 

14 rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a 

15 case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell 

16 v. Cone, 535 US. 685, 694 (2002). The focus of inquiry under the "contrary to" clause is 

17 "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively 

18 unreasonable." Id. "[A]n unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Id. 

19 In other words, federal habeas relief cannot be granted simply because a reviewing court 

20 concludes based on its own independent judgment that the state court decision is erroneous 

21 or incorrect. Id. Habeas relief is only available under § 2254(d)(1) "where there is no 

22 possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts" with 

23 Supreme Court precedents. Harrington, 562 US. at 101. 

24 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, a federal court 

25 "looks through" to the "last reasoned state-court opinion" and presumes it provides the 

26 basis for the higher court's denial of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

27 805-806 (1991). If the state court does not provide a reason for its decision, the federal 

28 court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state 

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1 court's decision is objectively unreasonable. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943,947 (9th 

2 Cir.2010). To be objectively reasonable, a state court's decision need not specifically cite 

3 Supreme Court precedent. "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state4 court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent]," the state court's decision will not 

5 be "contrary to clearly established Federal law." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

6 Here, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment on both 

7 the direct appeal and his habeas petition. Therefore the California Court of Appeal's written 

8 opinion of May 31, 2013 constitutes the "last reasoned state-court opinion" in the record 

9 as to Ground 1, for relief and the California Court of Appeal's October 15, 2014 opinion 

10 constitutes the "last reasoned state-court opinion" in the record as to Ground 2,3, and 4. 

11 This Court will look to the Court of Appeal's decisions when evaluating each of the 

12 petitioner's claims under AEDPA's standards. 

13 IV. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE EXHAUSTED 

14 As a preliminary matter, this Court must determine whether the petitioner's 

15 constitutional claims have been exhausted in the state court. Prisoners in state custody who 

16 seek a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court must first exhaust state judicial remedies 

17 before they can be granted relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(A). Specifically, they must present 

18 the state's highest court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of all claims they assert 

19 in federal court. They may do so either through direct appeal or state collateral attack. See 

20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-134 (1987). As applied to 

21 this case, it is undisputed that petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to each claim. 

22 V. GROUND ONE: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

23 Petitioner asserts that insufficient evidence was presented to sustain his robbery 

24 convictions with regard to Jacqueline Ibanez and Eva Gomez. Specifically, he contends 

25 that the convictions rest on constitutionally insufficient evidence that each of the two 

26 women had possession of the stolen items seized during the course ofthe robbery. 

27 To convict a defendant in a criminal proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable 

28 doubt as to each and every element of a crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). If 

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a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt" then the conviction cannot be vacated for want of further evidence. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979). Once a jury determines that an individual 

is guilty, the court must decide "whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below 

the threshold of bare rationality." The court should not ask whether it believes there was 

sufficient evidence to convict the defendant, but whether "any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319. The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution in 

order to avoid usurping the role of the jury. Id. Accordingly, the jury's finding of guilt is 

to be given deference when determining whether sufficient evidence has been 

presented. Id. 

Procedurally, when a federal court evaluates a habeas petitioner's claim of 

insufficient evidence, "[t]he Jackson standard 'must be applied with explicit reference to 

the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. '" Chein v. 

Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978,982-982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). 

Therefore, this Court must undertake two distinct steps in its analysis of the petitioner's 

claim. First, this Court must look to California law to determine the elements of his crime 

of conviction. Second, this Court must conduct an independent review of the trial record 

to assess whether the Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable when it concluded that 

there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 

1278 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A petitioner who challenges a state court conviction on the grounds of federal due 

process and insufficient evidence "faces a heavy burden." Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. The 

interplay between Jackson and the AEDP A creates a doubly deferential standard of review. 

Specifically: 

[W]hen we assess a sufficiency of evidence challenge in the case of a 

state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief subject to the strictures of 

AEDP A, there is a double dose of deference that can rarely be surmounted. 

The Jackson v. Virginia standard is itself deferential, as it only permits relief 

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when "no rational trier of fact" could have found the elements necessary for 

guilt satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. AEDPA 

adds a second layer of deference, as it is not enough if we conclude that we 

would have found the evidence sufficient or that we think the state court made 

a mistake. Rather, the state court's application of the Jackson standard must 

be "objectively unreasonable" to warrant federal habeas relief for a state 

prisoner. Boyer v. Bellequ, 659 F.3d 957, 964-965 (9th Cir. 2011). 

As directed by Juan H and Boyer, this Court begins its sufficiency review by 

7 determining the elements of the petitioner's crime of conviction under California law. At 

8 the outset, California law defines robbery as the "felonious taking of personal property in 

9 the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 

10 accomplished by means offorce or fear." Cal. Penal Code § 211 (West 2016). "It has been 

11 settled law for nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that 

12 property be taken from the possession of the victim." People v. Scott, 45 Cal. 4th 743, 750 

13 (2009) (citing People v. Nguyen, 24 Cal. 4th 756, 762 (2000)). Either actual or constructive 

14 possession of the property in question is sufficient to satisfy this requirement. People v. 

15 Ugalino, 174 Cal. App 4th 1060, 1064-1065 (2009). Because robbery is a crime against 

16 the person, an individual has constructive possession of a piece of property ifhe or she has 

17 "some type of 'special relationship' with the owner of the property sufficient to 

18 demonstrate that the victim had authority or responsibility to protect the stolen property on 

19 behalf ofthe owner." People v. Weddles, 184 Cal. App 4th 1365, 1369 (20 1 O)(citing Scott, 

20 45 Cal. 4th at 753). "Constructive possession does not require an absolute right of 

21 possession. 'For the purposes of robbery, it is enough that the person presently has some 

22 loose custody over the property, is currently exercising dominion over it, or at least may 

23 be said to represent or stand in the shoes ofthe true owner. '" People v. DeFrance, 167 Cal. 

24 App. 4th 486, 497 (2008) (quoting People v. Hamilton, 40 Cal. App. 1137, 1143 (1995)). 

25 It is possible for multiple individuals to have constructive possession ofthe same piece of 

26 property. Scott, 45 Cal. 4th at 750. 

27 A familial bond often creates the kind of special relationship that gives rise to 

28 constructive possession. In People v. Gordon, 136 Cal. App. 3d. 519, 529 (1982), the 

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1 California Court of Appeal upheld both of the defendant's robbery convictions where he 

2 used force to steal marijuana belonging to the victim's son who resided with them. The 

3 court reasoned that if individuals such as janitors, store clerks, and bar maids were 

4 responsible for protecting the property entrusted to them, then surely parents had the 

5 obligation to protect the property of their adult son who lived with them.ld. In Weddles, 

6 the court confirmed that a special relationship existed between the owner of the safe and 

7 his brother, who was the victim of the robbery. Weddles, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 1370. The 

8 court explained that the victim's close familial relationship to the owner ofthe property, 

9 the frequency with which the victim visited the owner's apartment, and the fact that the 

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victim knew where the property was hidden established constructive possession of the 

property.ld. Petitioner only attacks the "possession" element of his robbery convictions in 

his habeas petition. [Doc. No.1, at p. 14.] 

1. Constructive Possession by Jacqueline Ibanez 

The California Court of Appeal concluded that Jacqueline Ibanez had the requisite 

"special relationship" with her farther Marco Ibanez such that a reasonable jury could 

conclude she had authority or responsibility to protect the stolen property. [Doc. No. 11-

23, at p. 5.] That court explained: 

Substantial evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Jacqueline had constructive possession over the money stolen 

from the safe and dresser drawers. Namely, Jacqueline, an adult, lived at the 

home with her parents and had a key to the home. Jacqueline knew about the 

floor safe, its combination and how the safe opened, but did not know the 

combination by memory as she had never opened it before. Elva also told 

Jacqueline that she kept envelopes of money in dresser drawers. Jacqueline 

told Bigsby that she could open the safe, but her mind "went blank" when 

Bigsby asked her for a" guarantee." This evidence, combined with the fact that 

Bigsby held Jacqueline at gunpoint, showed that Jacqueline was III 

constructive possession of the stolen property. Id. at 5-6. 

An independent review of the record confirms the decision by the California Court 

of Appeal. Jacqueline and Marco enjoyed a special relationship as father and daughter 

similar to that found in Weddles. While the testimony alone concerning the quality of their 

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1 relationship might be sufficient to establish constructive possession, here Jacqueline also 

2 lived in the house where the property was kept, and knew of safe's location and 

3 combination. Given the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude 

4 Jacqueline Ibanez had construction possession of the stolen property. Consequently, the 

5 conclusion by the California Court of Appeal is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

6 application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

7 2. Constructive Possession by Eva Gomez 

8 The California Court of Appeal additionally concluded that Eva Gomez had the 

9 requisite "special relationship" with Marco and Elva Ibanez such that a reasonable jury 

10 could conclude she had authority or responsibility to protect the stolen property. [Doc. No. 

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Substantial evidence also existed from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that based on her special relationship with Marco and Elva, Eva had 

constructive possession of the stolen property because she similarly "had 

authority ... to protect the stolen property on behalf of the owner." Eva was the 

best friend of Jacqueline and had lived with the Ibanez family for about one 

year to attend school. At the time of the robbery, Eva was an adult and Elva 

considered her to be a family member. Although there was no direct evidence 

presented that Eva had a key to the residence, the jury could reasonable infer 

that she did based on the above evidence. Similarly, there was no direct 

evidence that Eva knew about the safe or the money hidden in the drawers but 

the jury could reasonably infer that she had such knowledge because she was 

present when the police investigated the burglary that occurred the day before 

the robbery where the burglar attempted to open the safe and stole an envelope 

of money that Elva kept inside a drawer. [Doc. No. 11-23, at p. 6] (Internal 

citation omitted). 

23 From these facts, the Court of Appeal concluded that a reasonable jury could have 

24 found that Eva had constructive possession of the stolen property. An independent review 

25 of the records confirms the California Court of Appeal's decision. Further, Eva's 

26 relationship with Marcos and Elva Ibanez is distinguishable from that ofthe individuals in 

27 People v. Ugalino, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1060 (2009), where the court found an absence of 

28 the requisite special relationship. There, two individuals had been living together for three 

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1 to four months however no other special relationship existed between the parties_ Id. at 

2 1065. The California Court of Appeal found a simple roommate status insufficient to give 

3 rise to an authority or duty to protect the stolen property in question. Id. Here, Eva Gomez 

4 was considered a member of the Ibanez family. [Doc. No. 11-2, at p. 154.] Over the course 

5 of the year she lived in the residences, Marcos and Elva had developed a close familial 

6 relationship with Eva. Id. Additionally, Eva utilized the vehicles of Marcos Ibanez for 

7 transportation.ld. at 147. Most notably, although the home had four bedrooms, Eva stayed 

8 in the same bedroom as Jacqueline Ibanez. 11-1, at p. 146. Jacqueline and Eva cohabitating 

9 in the same bedroom weighs heavily against considering Eva's status as that of an 

10 independent roommate. This is especially true given that the two other bedrooms were 

11 empty. Id. If Eva were simply a roommate of the Ibanez family, she likely would have 

12 occupied her own space separate from the rest ofthe family. 

13 Additionally, the room Eva and Jacqueline occupied was located directly across the 

14 hall from Marcos and Elva. Id. From these facts a reasonable jury could conclude that Eva 

15 had a close special relationship with Marcos Ibanez and therefore had authority or 

16 responsibility to protect the stolen property. The fact that no direct evidence was introduced 

17 regarding Eva's knowledge of the safe's location is insufficient to undermine the evidence 

18 of her close relationship to Marcos and Elva Ibanez. Consequently, the conclusion by the 

19 California Court of Appeal is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

20 established Supreme Court precedent. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the District 

21 Court DENY the petitioner's Ground One for relief. 

22 VI. GROUND TWO: PETITIONER'S LINE-UP 

23 Petitioner's second ground for relief is a claim that the trial court improperly 

24 admitted evidence of an unduly suggestive lineup and allowed an in-court identification to 

25 occur. [Doc. No.1, at pp. 14-15.] Petitioner first asserts that the lineup was improper 

26 because the other members selected had lighter skin color than his own and because "there 

27 is no substantial evidence to support any finding that petitioner was actualy [sic] faking his 

28 voice [during the lineup]." [Doc. No. 12, at p. 8.] Respondents assert that there was little 

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1 physical variance between the six men in the lineup, three out of four victims failed to 

2 identify petitioner during the lineup, and petitioner's unusual voice1 was attributed to his 

3 conduct during the lineup and not to the procedures utilized. [Doc. No. 10-1, at p. 45.] In 

4 reaching their decision, the California Court of Appeal concluded that petitioner's 

5 unsupported assertions were "insufficient to establish that the line-up was unduly 

6 suggestive or that the identification was not otherwise reliable under the totality of the 

7 circumstances." [Doc. No. 11-30, at pp. 1-2.] 

8 Evaluating whether an identification has been irreparably tainted by a suggestive 

9 procedure requires a two-part analysis. See United States v. Love, 746 F.2d 477, 478 (9th 

10 Cir. 1984). First, the Court must determine whether the challenged procedure was 

11 impermissibly suggestive. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Second, if the 

12 process was suggestive, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to 

13 determine whether the witness's identification was nonetheless reliable. Manson v. 

14 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). The factors to be considered in assessing reliability 

15 are: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime, (2) the 

16 degree of attention of the witness, (3) the accuracy of the witness's description, (4) the 

17 witness's level of certainty at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the 

18 crime and the confrontation. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-

19 200). 

20 The fact that an individual may have appeared different from others in a line-up does 

21 not alone establish that the line-up was impermissibly suggestive. In Coleman v. Alabama, 

22 399 U.S. 1,6 (1970), that petitioner asserted that the line-up procedure and subsequent in23 court identification were impermissibly suggestive because he was the only individual 

24 wearing a hat. The Supreme Court found that the procedure was not improperly suggestive 

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During the robbery both perpetrators made multiple statements to the victims. [Doc. No. 11-2. at 

pp. 55; 63-64; 66; 69; 73-74.] At the lineup, the officer directed each of the six men to repeat three 

difference sentences said by the "tall suspect" during the robbery. [Doc. No. 11-14, at pp. 59-64.] 

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1 for two reasons. Id. First, the petitioner had voluntarily worn the hat and refused to remove 

2 it when prompted. Id. Second, the witness had not relied on the hat when making the 

3 identification.Id. Thus, the Court found that the witness's identification was not induced 

4 by the procedures of the line-up which made it impermissibly suggestive. Id. 

5 Here, the procedures utilized by the police during the lineup were not impermissibly 

6 suggestive. While petitioner claims that the identification procedures where improperly 

7 suggestive because of the height, color, and voice of the other men selected for the lineup 

8 were impermissibly different form his height, color, and voice [Doc. No. 12, at p. 8], there 

9 is nothing in the record to support his claim. Any difference in skin color and height were 

lOde minimis and certainly do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See [Doc. No. 

11 11-33, at pp. 1-6] (photographs showing the six men in the lineup); [Doc. No. 11-33 at p. 

12 72] (Showing the respective heights of the men at 6'2"; 6'4"; 5' 1 0"; 6'3" [petitioner]; 

13 6'3"; and, 6'4"). 

14 Petitioner's claim of impermissible identification of his voice by the victim is also 

15 unfounded. During the identification, Jacqueline noted that petitioner appeared to be 

16 "faking his voice" when required to state the three different lines. [Doc. No. 11-29, at p. 

17 75.] A video of the entire lineup, including the audio, was shown to the jury during the 

18 trial. [Doc. No. 11-2, at pp. 8-13.] Petitioner took the stand and testified in his own defense. 

19 [Doc. No. 11-8, at pp. 75-226.] During his testimony, at the prosecutor's request, he stated 

20 loudly the same three lines each of the six men spoke during the lineup. The jury had ample 

21 opportunity to compare the voice utilized by petitioner at the lineup against the one he used 

22 at trial during his testimony. While this Court is not able to pierce the jury's deliberation 

23 to determine how they viewed evidence, there are only two possible inferences that may 

24 be fairly drawn from this evidence, either: (1) Jacqueline's assertion that petitioner was 

25 manipulating his voice to avoid detection is confirmed; or (2) petitioner's in court 

26 testimony and the voice used during the lineup are identical thereby discrediting 

27 III 

28 III 

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1 Jacqueline's identification. However, no inference can be drawn from the VOlce 

2 identification that the procedures utilized were unduly suggestive thereby causing a risk of 

3 misidentification.2 

4 Petitioner further argues that the in-court identification of petitioner was also 

5 improper because the procedures at the preliminary hearing were impermissibly suggestive 

6 and therefore tainted the later identification in front of the jury. [Doc. No. 12, at pp. 8-9]; 

7 See [Doc. No.1, at pp. 245-246.] Petitioner's argument fails to acknowledge that 

8 Jacqueline made a proper identification at the out-of-court lineup before the preliminary 

9 hearing. Accordingly, the "taint" alleged by petitioner was negated by Jacqueline's prior 

10 identification at the constitutional out-of-court lineup. Additionally, petitioner's entire 

11 cross examination of Jacqueline focused on her inability to observe the second "tall 

12 suspect" during the robbery. See [Doc. No. 11-2, at pp. 97-107.] An in-court identification 

13 may be unduly suggestive if it creates a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

14 misidentification. Neal v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 

15 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). Here, petitioner failed to present any evidence that Jaqueline's short 

16 in-court identification presented any likelihood of "irreparable misidentification" as the 

17 victim had already identified petitioner during a prior proper lineup. Furthermore, defense 

18 counsel presented extensive cross examination regarding Jacqueline's inability to observe 

19 the petitioner during the robbery. Petitioner has not presented evidence suggesting any 

20 likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Consequently, the California Court of Appeal's 

21 decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court 

22 precedent. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY the 

23 petitioner's Ground Two for relief. 

24 III 

25 

26 

27 2 The Court notes that petitioner implicitly relied on the validity of the very same lineup he now 

attacks to argue that three out of the four witnesses failed to identify him at the lineup. [Doc. No. 11-12, 

at pp. 142-145.] 28 

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1 VII. GROUND THREE: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

2 The petitioner raises two general claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ("lAC") 

3 in his instant petition: (1) failure to properly prepare for trial; and, (2) strategic errors during 

4 the course oftriaL 

5 The standard of review for a claim of lAC is well established under Strickland v. 

6 Washington, 466 ns. 668 (1984), and "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an 

7 easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). To prevail, a defendant must 

8 show two things: first, that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall short of the 

9 guarantee of "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment; and second, that counsel's errors were 

10 so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair triaL Strickland, 446 ns. at 687. The 

11 Strickland standard is "highly deferential" to counsel; the Supreme Court recognized that 

12 "[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after 

13 conviction or adverse sentence." Id. at 689. The Court further held that "a court must 

14 indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

15 reasonable professional assistance." Id. 

16 The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in a 

17 federal habeas petition is even more deferentiaL Here, the petitioner's claim has already 

18 been evaluated and rejected once by the state court. This Court, therefore, is not called 

19 upon to determine anew whether trial counsel was ineffective. Rather, the only question 

20 before this Court is whether the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim on this basis 

21 was "unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). A state court's 

22 decision is reasonable as long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of 

23 the decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 ns. 652, 664 (2004). 

24 As the Supreme Court explained in Harrington, a federal court's review of a state 

25 court's denial of an ineffective assistance claim receives double deference: "The standards 

26 created by Strickland and § 2254( d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when the two apply 

27 in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Harrington, 562 ns. at 105, citing Knowles v. 

28 Mirzayance, 556 ns. 111, 123 (2009). "Federal habeas courts must guard against the 

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1 danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under 

2 § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were 

3 reasonable, but rather whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

4 Strickland's deferential standard." Id. 

5 Petitioner's claim ofIAC in the instant writ constitutes approximately a page of 

6 vague argument without indication as to the specific acts or omissions that warrant relief. 

7 [Doc. No.1, at pp. 16-17.] Petitioner clarifies his lAC claims in his Traverse, asserting that 

8 his trial counsel failed to investigate an alibi witness, failed to consult experts regarding 

9 the DNA, and failed to introduce a medical expert regarding petitioner's injuries. [Doc. 

10 No. 12, at pp. 5-7.] In denying petitioners writ for habeas corpus, the California Court of 

11 Appeal determined that, "Bigsby provides nothing more than speculation that ifhis counsel 

12 had retained certain experts and investigated potential evidence, such evidence may have 

13 bolstered his defense at trial." [Doc. No. 11-30, at p. 2.] 

14 An independent review of the entire record confirms the California Court of 

15 Appeal's conclusion. For example, petitioner asserts that his trial counsel should have 

16 investigated his alibi witness. Contrary to petitioners assertions, both Octavio Felix and 

17 Ismael Escobar were interviewed by defense investigators on more than one occasion. 

18 [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 35]; Id. at 52. Additionally, the very section of the record cited by 

19 petitioner undermines his own position. [Doc. No. 11-8, at pp. 67-72.] This section 

20 demonstrates that petitioner's counsel was able to present an alibi defense witness without 

21 giving the prosecution notice or time to investigate and rebut the evidence. See [Doc. No. 

22 11-8, at pp. 68-69] (Noting that the prosecution was not notified that Mr. Escobar would 

23 testify as a defense witness until the day before trial and there was no indication that he 

24 would be providing alibi testimony for petitioner until he was on the stand in front of the 

25 jury.) Petitioner fails to recognize the significant tactical advantage he gained by his 

26 counsel's actions and more importantly, he fails to assert how additional investigative steps 

27 would have resulted in a different outcome. 

28 III 

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1 Petitioner's second lAC assertion results from claims that his counsel failed to 

2 consult experts regarding the DNA evidence, and failed to introduce a medical expert 

3 regarding petitioner's injuries. The California Court of Appeal's rejected petitioner's claim 

4 noting that petitioner provided only speculation and self-serving assertions to support his 

5 position. [Doc. No. 11-30, at p. 2.] Respondents assert that without an affidavit or 

6 declaration from petitioner's trial counsel indicating what he did or did not do prior to trial, 

7 the only remaining evidence is petitioner's self-serving speculative assertions. Id. 

8 Petitioner has failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that his trial counsel 

9 failed to consult with a DNA expert or that consulting with an expert would have resulted 

lOin a different outcome in his trial. Petitioner asserts that it was error to attack "the 

11 accurateness and reliability of the DNA results, instead of the statistical significance." 

12 [Doc. No. 12, at p. 6.] This unsubstantiated assertion is the exact type of "second guessing" 

13 the Supreme Court cautioned against in Strickland. Petitioner has failed to provide any 

14 additional evidence that his counsel's advice or conduct concerning the DNA evidence fell 

15 below that of a competent attorney. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

16 that his counsel's representation was ineffective. 

17 Finally, petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective by failing to call a medical 

18 expert to present evidence of his physica11imitations. [Doc. No. 12, at pp. 6-7.] In general, 

19 an attorney's decision not to call a witness constitutes a matter of trial tactics which this 

20 Court should not second-guess. See United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 

21 1988); see also Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305,323 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Courts applying 

22 Strickland are especially deferential to defense attorneys' decisions concerning which 

23 witnesses to put before the jury. The decision not to call a particular witness is typically a 

24 question of trial strategy that reviewing courts are ill-suited to second-guess.") (citation, 

25 internal quotations and brackets omitted); Williams v. Carter, 76 F.3d 199,200 (8th Cir. 

26 1996) ("The decision whether to call witnesses is normally a judgment by counsel which 

27 the courts do not second-guess.") (citation omitted); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279,282 

28 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the decision to call or exclude a particular witness is generally 

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1 "within the realm of trial strategy'} While petitioner concedes that his medical records 

2 were presented to the jury by his counsel, he argues that without an expert the jury could 

3 not decipher their meaning. [Doc. No. 12, at p. 6.] Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the 

4 plain language of the medical records indicates petitioner's physical limitations. See e.g. 

5 [Doc. No.1, at p. 188] (noting a 50% loss of grip strength in his left arm); [Doc. No.1, at 

6 pp. 189] ("Left hand examined ... weakness ... hand was clumsy or awkward.") 

7 Additionally, petitioner's trial counsel presented direct observational evidence by two 

8 defense witnesses as to petitioner's physical limitations. [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 22-23]; Id. 

9 at 38-42. Assertions that a medical expert would have explained petitioner's physical 

10 inability to escape from the scene of the crime are not supported by the record or by an 

11 affidavit or declaration of a medical expert. Conclusory allegations not supported by 

12 specifics do not warrant relief. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995); James v. 

13 Borg, 24 F.3d 20,26 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Popoo/a, 881 F.2d 811,813 (9th Cir. 

14 1989). 

15 Mindful of AEDPA's doubly deferential standard of review of a state court's denial 

16 ofIAC claims, this Court finds that the California Court of Appeal acted reasonably when 

17 it denied the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court 

18 RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY the petitioner's Ground Three for relief. 

19 VIII. GROUND FOUR: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

20 In his original federal writ, petitioner raised two claims of prosecutorial misconduct: 

21 (1) the prosecutor made misleading statements regarding the DNA3 and alibi evidence; and, 

22 (2) the prosecutor made impermissible inflammatory statements regarding petitioner's 

23 credibility. [Doc. No. 12, at pp. 9-11.] The California Court of Appeal's decision rejected 

24 petitioner's claim, finding that the prosecutors remarks did not appear to be inflan1lllatory 

25 

26 

27 3 In his Traverse, petitioner concedes that his comments regarding the DNA were not sufficient to 

28 rise to the level or harm. [Doc. No. 12, at p. II] ("Petitioner acknowledges that in itself the error is 

harmless.") Therefore this Court will not address this issue. 

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1 or improper and did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. [Doc. No. 11-30, at 

2 p.2.] 

3 In assessing claims of prosecutorial misconduct on habeas review, federal courts 

4 must assess whether a prosecutors comments, "so infected the trial with unfairness as to 

5 make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 

6 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). "Th[is] 

7 standard allows a federal court to grant relief when the state-court trial was fundamentally 

8 unfair but avoids interfering in state-court proceedings when errors fall short of 

9 constitutional magnitude." Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir.2000). 

10 A. Commenting On Petitioner's Credibility 

11 During closing arguments the prosecutor stated, "However, it's not my opinion that 

12 counts, but I submit that the 12 of you who are going to decide this case haven't been fooled 

13 by that story .... Come back with a unanimous verdict on all counts and in one clear voice, 

14 you will tell them, you didn't fool us. You didn't fool anybody. You are guilty of 

15 everything you're charged with." [Doc. No. 11-12, at pp. 199; 201.] Petitioner asserts that 

16 these statements impermissibly appealed to the passion ofthe jury. [Doc. No. 12, at p. 11]; 

17 [Doc. No.1, atpp.17-18.] 

18 "In closing arguments, both defense attorneys and prosecution attorneys are allowed 

19 reasonably wide latitude. They may strike 'hard blows' based upon the testimony and its 

20 inferences .... " United States v. Gorostiza, 468 F.2d 915,916 (9th Cir.1972). Prosecutors 

21 are entitled to argue that the opposing witnesses are not telling the truth. See United States 

22 v. Sarno, 73 F 3d 1470, 1496 (9th Cir.1995). In cases where the jury is presented with two 

23 conflicting versions of events it is reasonable to infer and argue that one of the two sides is 

24 lying. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1991) 

25 Here, the jury was presented with two conflicting versions of events. Kody Carstens 

26 and co-defendant Oscar Ortega testified that petitioner was the second gunmen in the house 

27 during the in-home robbery of the Ibanez family. Petitioner and Ismael Escobar testified 

28 that at the very same time of the robbery, they were at Mr. Escobar's home. There is no 

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way to reconcile these versions of events unless one version is in fact a lie. Nothing in the 

arguments of the prosecutor or in the language chosen to attack petitioner's credibility 

amounted to "inflaming the passions of the jury." See United States v. Marrale, 695 F .2d 

658, 667 (2d Cir. 1982) (where a prosecutor's repeated warning that the jury not be "fooled" 

by the defense tactics did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, "since one who is fooled is 

not thereby necessarily a fool, and one who fools another does not necessarily exhibit a 

moral defect."). Even assuming that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on 

petitioner's credibility or vouched for the evidence, the comments were so fleeting and 

isolated in nature that any assumed violation would not rise to the magnitude of a 

constitutional violation. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to habeas relief under this 

theory. 

B. Prosecutor's Misstatement of Fact During Closing Arguments 

During closing arguments the prosecutor stated: 

[Petitioner] can't even get his boys to get their story straight. Ismael 

comes in and tells you, "oh yeah, he rode his bike to my house. He showed up 

riding his bike at 7 :30 in the morning. I was just hanging out, even though we 

were drinking until 4:00 A.M., and all of a sudden he like just needed a ride, 

and I didn't ask any questions because I was helping my boy. I didn't see 

anybody down there, but I gave him a ride down to south bay, drove him back 

to his house" What's his credibility? Does he have a motive to help his boy 

and get Je1ani off? [Doc. No. 11-12, at pp. 98-99.] 

Contrary to the prosecutor's comments, petitioner and Mr. Ismae1 Escobar 

consistently testified that on the morning of the burglary, petitioner walked over to Mr. 

Escobar's house because he left his bike there the prior evening. [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 42] 

(Testimony of Mr. Escobar concerning the bike); [Doc. No. 87; 96.] In an attempt to 

impeach petitioner during the cross examination, the prosecutor questioned petitioner 

about why he originally told Detective Wolf he rode his bike over to Mr. Escobar's house 

on the morning of September 5, 2010. [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 195.] Petitioner did not 

remember saying that to the detective. Id. Correcting his error after the cross examination, 

the prosecutor stipulated that there was no evidence petitioner told Detective Wolf that he 

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1 rode his bike over to Mr. Escobar's on the morning of the burglary. [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 

2 215.] 

3 Petitioner asserts that the statement in the prosecutor's closing argument regarding 

4 whether he rode his bike or walked over to pick his bike up from Mr. Escobar's house was 

5 prejudicial because it falsely attacked the main alibi defense. [Doc. No. 12, at p. 11.] After 

6 reviewing the record, the Court finds that the assertion by the prosecutor was not supported 

7 by the evidence and was therefore made in error. However, to prevail under federal habeas 

8 corpus review, petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice in the misconduct that renders 

9 the trial fundamentally unfair. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, 

10 the comment by the prosecutor, when read in context, was an attack on the overall story 

11 and credibility of Mr. Escobar and petitioner, and not limited to whether he rode his bike 

12 or walked over. Additionally, any error inserted by the prosecutor's attempt to impeach 

13 petitioner during cross examination with statements he never made to Detective Wolf was 

14 immediately cured by the above-referenced stipulation of counsel. 

15 Petitioner has failed to show that prosecutor's comments during closing arguments 

16 rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The statement in closing argument was fleeting and 

17 isolated. Given the overwhelming evidence against petitioner, it is improbable it would 

18 have impacted the jury's decision. See id. ("The defendant must show that there is a 

19 reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

20 proceeding would have been different.") 

21 Finally, petitioner argues that it was ineffective for his trial counsel to fail to object 

22 to the misstatement made by the prosecutor during closing argument. However, many 

23 lawyers refrain from objecting during opening statements and closing arguments for a 

24 variety of reasons. Refraining from objecting, or failing to object, is therefore within the 

25 "wide range" or permissible professional legal conduct when the misstatements are not 

26 egregious. United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the 

27 failure of defense counsel to immediately object to the erroneous comment by the 

28 prosecutor during a lengthy oral summation, does not rise to the level of ineffective 

21 

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1 assistance of counsel. This is especially true in light of the acknowledgment and stipulation 

2 by the prosecutor that he was wrong in asserting that the petitioner told Detective Wolf a 

3 different version of events [Doc. No. 11-8, at p. 215], and the trial judge's repeated 

4 admonishment that the questions, comments, and arguments of counsel were not evidence. 

5 See e.g. [Doc. No. 11-12, at p. 39] ("And I'll remind the jury that what the lawyers say is 

6 not evidence, and all the comments throughout the trial are not evidence, only the 

7 witnesses' answers are."); [Doc. No. 11-7, at pp. 202-203] ("There's no need to strike a 

8 question because a questions is not evidence even when the attorney's trying to testifY .... 

9 You're to ignore the question because questions are not answers or are not testimony."); 

10 [Doc. No. 11-7, at p. 97] ("A stipulation is the exception to the rule [that] when the 

11 attorneys are talking that is not evidence."); [Doc. No. 11-1 at, p. 66] ("Please keep in mind 

12 that nothing that is said by the attorneys in this trial is evidence."); [Doc. No. 11-12, at p. 

13 83] ("Please keep in mind that you have heard all of the evidence in this case. What the 

14 attorneys tell you now is not evidence, but they will be recalling the evidence in the case, 

15 and if your recollection is different from ... any of the attorneys in this case, it's your 

16 recollection that really counts .... ") 

17 Petitioner has failed to show that, had his attorney objected, the outcome of the trial 

18 would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, (1984). Therefore, 

19 this Court finds that the California Court of Appeal's denial of petitioner's claim for 

20 prosecutorial misconduct did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

21 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

22 Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

23 determination of the facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

24 The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY petitioner's Ground 

25 Four for relief. 

26 IX. CONCLUSION 

27 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

28 Roger T. Benitez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I), Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) and HC.2 ofthe 

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1 United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons 

2 outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) 

3 approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and, (2) directing that Judgment 

4 be entered denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

5 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT any party may file written objections with the 

6 District court and serve a copy on all parties no later than Mav 2. 2016. The document 

7 should be entitled "Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

9 the Court and served on all parties no later than Mav 16. 2016. 

10 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

11 waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's Order. See Turner v. 

12 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylsf, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 

13 1991). 

14 

15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

16 Date: P-L/ / ,2016 

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28 

. CRAWFORD 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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