Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03761/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3761

___________

Stacy Lane VanHorn, * 

* 

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* 

v. * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the 

Dennis Oelschlager, Individually and in * District of Nebraska.

his capacity as Executive Secretary of * 

the Nebraska State Racing Commission; *

Dennis P. Lee, Individually and in his * 

capacity as Chairman of the Nebraska *

State Racing Commission; Janell * 

Beveridge, Individually and in her * 

capacity as Commissioner of the * 

Nebraska State Racing Commission; *

Bob Volk, Individually and in his * 

capacity as Commissioner of the * 

Nebraska State Racing Commission, *

*

Defendants - Appellants, * 

____________________ *

*

Douglas L. Brunk, * 

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Dennis Oelschlager, Individually and * 

in his capacity as Executive Secretary * 

of the Nebraska State Racing * 

Commission; Dennis P. Lee, * 

Appellate Case: 06-3761 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2007 Entry ID: 3355663
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The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska. 

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Individually and in his capacity as * 

Chairman of the Nebraska State Racing * 

Commission; Janell Beveridge; * 

Bob Volk, Individually and in his * 

capacity as Commissioner of the * 

Nebraska State Racing Commission, * 

*

Defendants - Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2007

Filed: September 26, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Dennis Oelschlager, the Executive Secretary for the Nebraska State Racing

Commission ("the Commission"), and its three appointed Commissioners, Chairman

Dennis P. Lee, Janell Beveridge, and Bob Volk ("the Commissioners") seek an

interlocutory appeal. Oelschlager and the Commissioners request reversal of the

district court's1

 denial of their motion to reconsider its order directing that lawsuits

filed by Dr. Stacy Lane VanHorn and Dr. Douglas L. Brunk shall proceed against

Oelschlager and the Commissioners in their official capacities. We now dismiss the

interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

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I. Background

The background facts underlying this dispute are fully set forth in our prior

opinion, VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 457 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2006) ("VanHorn I"). We

repeat the underlying facts here only as necessary to the instant appeal. 

Dr. VanHorn and his employer, Dr. Brunk, licensed veterinarians in the State

of Nebraska, brought suit against Oelschlager and the Commissioners, alleging that

they were denied due process and equal protection. They contended that the

Commission violated these constitutional rights when it disciplined and banned them

from treating race horses. The district court denied Oelschlager and the

Commissioners' motion for summary judgment based on qualified or quasi-judicial

immunity. On appeal, we reversed the district court, holding that "[u]pon careful

review, we find that the appellants are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity."

VanHorn I, 457 F.3d at 847. We concluded that "the holding in Dunham [v. Wadley,

195 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1999),] [was] controlling in the instant case." Id. at 848. We

therefore reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Oelschlager and

the Commissioners and "remanded for further proceedings consistent with th[at]

opinion." Id. at 848. 

On remand, the district court denied in part Oelschlager and the Commissioners'

motion for summary judgment, finding that the claims against them in their official

capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief should proceed. Oelschlager and the

Commissioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court

should have dismissed the case in its entirety based on our holding in VanHorn I. 

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, explaining that

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity "only applies to individual capacity suits" and that

the only immunities that apply in an official-capacity action "'are forms of sovereign

immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.'"

(Citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)). 

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Additionally, the district court rejected Oelschlager and the Commissioners'

argument that they were absolutely immune from suit for injunctive or declaratory

relief. The district court noted that the 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided

that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." According to

the district court, no authority existed for the proposition that Oelschlager and the

Commissioners qualified as "judicial officers" merely because this court concluded

that their actions "were functionally comparable to those of judges and prosecutors."

VanHorn I, 457 F.3d at 848. Furthermore, the district court noted that this court

previously held in Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525,

530–31 (8th Cir. 2005), that prosecutors are not immune from suit for injunctive relief

under § 1983.

Finally, the district court found no support for Oelschlager and the

Commissioners' claim that judicial officers cannot be sued for declaratory relief under

§ 1983. Thus, the district court ordered the actions against Oelschlager and the

Commissioners in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief to

proceed. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, Oelschlager and the Commissioners argue that the district court (1)

erred in holding that absolute, quasi-judicial immunity "only applies to individual

capacity suits," as the issue of immunity goes to the act, rather than the actor, and is

based upon the function performed and (2) erroneously implicitly applied Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in concluding that absolute, quasi-judicial immunity does

not extend to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 

In response, Dr. VanHorn and Dr. Brunk argue that this court lacks jurisdiction

to hear the appeal. They acknowledge that a denial of summary judgment based on

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qualified immunity is immediately appealable to the extent that the appellant seeks

review of the purely legal determinations made by the district court. They argue,

however, that no immunity exists for claims against the appellants in their official

capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. Thus, they assert that Oelschlager and

the Commissioners cannot take an interlocutory appeal to this court. 

"As an initial matter, this court must consider its jurisdiction of the interlocutory

appeal." Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 435 F.3d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2006). "A court

has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." United States v. Haskins, 479 F.3d

955, 957 (8th Cir. 2007). "The denial of summary judgment is not generally a final

order subject to immediate appeal." Alternate Fuels, 435 F.3d at 858. Under the

collateral order doctrine, however, when the defense of absolute immunity is

available, "an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of absolute immunity." Id. 

Here, Oelschlager and the Commissioners are appealing from the denial of

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for claims against them in their official capacities

for declaratory and injunctive relief. As an initial matter, we must first determine

whether such immunity is available to them when they are sued in their official

capacities. If it is not available, then this court cannot entertain their interlocutory

appeal from the denial of such immunity. Specifically, the question is whether in

VanHorn I, in finding that Oelschlager and the Commissioners were entitled to

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity, we extended such immunity to them in both their

individual and official capacities. 

In VanHorn I, we concluded that Oelschlager and the Commissioners were

entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity based on our holding in Dunham. At

issue in Dunham was a veterinarian's appeal of the district court's grant of summary

judgment to members of the Arkansas Veterinary Medical Examining Board ("the

Board") based on the veterinarian's § 1983 claims. 195 F.3d at 1008. The district court

had held that the Board members were absolutely immune from suit "by virtue of the

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In the district court's order granting the defendants' motion for summary

judgment in Dunham, the district court stated that the plaintiff brought the § 1983

action "against defendants, all members or former members of the Arkansas

Veterinary Medical Examining Board ("the Board"), in their individual capacities."

(Emphasis added). 

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fact that their proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature." Id. On appeal, we

determined that "[p]ersons who perform quasi-judicial functions are entitled to

absolute immunity." Id. at 1010. Because we found that "the defendants' actions were

functionally comparable to those of judges and prosecutors," we held that they were

"entitled to absolute immunity." Id. at 1011.

In Dunham, however, the plaintiff only brought suit against the defendants in

their individual capacities, not in their official capacities.

2

 Therefore, Dunham does

not resolve whether Oelschlager and the Commissioners are entitled to absolute,

quasi-judicial immunity for claims against them in their official capacities. 

We have previously indicated that immunity only extends to claims against

government employees sued in their individual capacities. Johnson v. Outboard

Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Qualified immunity is not a

defense available to governmental entities, but only to government employees sued

in their individual capacity."); Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 710 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004)

(approving of the district court's conclusion that neither qualified immunity nor

absolute immunity was available to a government employee sued in his official

capacity). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that "[t]he only

immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign

immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment."

Graham, 473 U.S. at 167. 

Case law from our sister circuits also supports the conclusion that absolute,

quasi-judicial immunity only extends to claims against defendants sued in their

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individual—not official—capacities. See, e.g., Lonzetta Trucking & Excavating Co.

v. Schan, 144 Fed. Appx. 206, 210–211 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished) ("Therefore, it

follows that the zoning officials . . . would be entitled to absolute immunity in their

individual capacities if they were performing 'quasi-judicial' functions. However, the

zoning officials in their official capacities . . . are not entitled to absolute immunity.")

(emphasis in original); Denton v. Bedinghaus, 40 Fed. Appx. 974 (6th Cir. 2002)

(unpublished) ("Of critical importance here is that plaintiffs sue defendants in only

their official capacities. Yet, immunity defenses apply to individual capacity suits and

they do not shield municipalities from § 1983 liability."); Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire

& Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting municipal fire

and police service board members' argument that the district court erred in not holding

that the board and its members were entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity in

their "official capacities" because such an argument "misconstrues the distinction

between immunities available for 'individual-capacity' and 'official capacity' suits

under § 1983"); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810–11 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that

"as a result of being sued only in their official capacities, Sheriff Zimmerly and Judge

Irving cannot claim any personal immunities, such as quasi-judicial or qualified

immunity, to which they might be entitled if sued in their individual or personal

capacities."). 

We, like the Fifth Circuit, acknowledge that confusion can often arise in

litigation when "[c]ourts discuss immunity defenses without clearly articulating to

whom and in which capacity [immunity] defenses apply. . . ." Turner, 229 F.3d at 485.

Nevertheless, this court's precedent, Supreme Court precedent, and case law from our

sister circuits make clear that absolute, quasi-judicial immunity is not available for

defendants sued in their official capacities. This court in VanHorn I did not extend

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity to such claims and, in fact, specifically found

Dunham controlling—a case that only extended absolute, quasi-judicial immunity to

the defendants sued in their individual capacities. 

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Therefore, we hold that the defense of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity is not

available to Oelschlager and the Commissioners for claims against them in their

official capacities; thus, they cannot seek an interlocutory appeal from the denial of

such immunity.

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

______________________________

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