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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED'-

uaw States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

MEARL DEAN BOWMAN 

and WANDA BOWMAN, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

SEP 13 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-8030 

Appeal from the United states District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-153) 

George Santini, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Carol A. Statkus, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. 

Freudenthal, United States Attorney, and Aleksander D. 

Radich, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Wyoming, with her on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit 

Judge, and BURRAGE, District Judge.* 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Michael Burrage, District Judge for the Eastern 

and Northern Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-8030 Document: 01019277000 Date Filed: 09/13/1995 Page: 1 
Mearl Dean Bowman and his wife, Wanda Bowman, appeal a 

judgment of the district court granting the motion of the 

United States for summary judgment and dismissing their 

claims against the United States under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. We 

affirm. 

On October 25, 1989, John Bowman, Inc. ("JBI") was 

awarded a government contract for the repair of porches on 

156 historic military family housing units located on the 

F.E. Warren Air Force Base ("Base") in Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

The United States, the appellee, is the owner and operator of 

the Base. The parties agree that, under the contract, JBI 

was an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" of the 

United States. 

Under the terms of the contract, JBI, as the independent 

contractor, had direct supervisory responsibility over the 

work to be done and was further charged with responsibility 

for protecting the lives and health of its employees. The 

contract also included, by reference, the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation ("FAR"), "52.236-13 Accident Prevention," mandating compliance with safety standards issued by the Secretary 

of Labor, and with safety standards included within the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers Safety & Health Requirements Manual at EM-385-1-1. FAR provided that the contractor protect the lives and health of its employees and 

maintain an adequate inspection system and take safety precautions. EM-385-1-1 provided that circular saws "shall be 

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equipped with guards that automatically and completely enclose the cutting edges, splitters and anti-kickback devices." The contract also reserved to the United States the 

right to inspect the job site for compliance with the terms 

of the contract. 

On September 26, 1990, Mearl Bowman (no relation to John 

Bowman of JBI) , a carpenter employed by JBI on the Base 

project, was attempting to make a beveled cut on a board using JBI's table saw when his right hand got caught in the 

saw's blade. The table saw's blade guard was not in place at 

the time of the accident. Bowman's little finger and ring 

finger on his right hand were severed in the accident and his 

entire right hand was severely injured, Bowman having undergone seven surgeries in connection with his accident. 

By a second amended complaint, the Bowmans asserted 

claims under the FTCA against the United States, alleging, in 

essence, that the United States, through its inspectors, either knew, or should have known, that the guard was missing 

from the table saw when Mearl Bowman cut his hand, and the 

United States negligently failed to take corrective action, 

which, if taken, would have prevented the accident.1 The 

Bowmans also named as defendants two supervisory employees of 

JBI. These claims were eventually settled, and the claims 

were dismissed. 

The United States filed its answer and moved to dismiss, 

or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and in support 

1 Wanda Bowman's claim was based on loss of consortium. 

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thereof attached several affidavits. The Bowmans filed what 

they characterized as "Plaintiffs' Resistance to Defendant 

United States of America's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment," with supporting affidavits 

and depositions. As indicated, the district court, after 

hearing, granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the 

United States and entered judgment dismissing the Bowmans' 

claims. The district court's opinion appears as Bow.man v. 

United States, 821 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Wyo. 1993). 

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United 

States cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued, and such 

consent must· be unequivocal. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); United States v. Nordic 

Village, Inc. 503 u.s. 30 (1992). The "consent" relied on by 

the Bowmans appears at 28 U.S.C. § 13462 and reads as follows: 

§ 1346. United States as defendant 

(b) Subject to the prov~s~ons of chapter 

171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court 

for the District of the Canal Zone and the 

District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall 

have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions 

on claims against the United States, for money 

damages, accruing on and after January 1, 

1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 

or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 

the Government while acting within the scope 

2 The "consent" to be sued under § 1346 does not extend to 

acts of independent contractors or their employees. Bird v. 

United States, 949 F.2d 1079, 1080 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private 

person, would be liable to the claimant in 

accordance with the law of the place where the 

act or omission occured. (emphasis added) . 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the Bow.mans would have claims 

against the United States only "if a private person 

would be liable in accordance with the law of the place 

where the act 0r omission occurred," which, in our case, is 

the State of Wyoming. The Bowmans' position is that even 

though JBI is an independent contractor, the Bowmans nonetheless have an FTCA claim against the United States because, 

under Wyoming law, a private person who owns land on which 

work is to be performed by an independent contractor through 

the latter's employees is liable for his own acts of negligence and that in the instant case inspectors of the United 

States who inspected the job site on almost a daily basis 

were negligent. This involves a determination as to whether, 

in the instant case, the United States owed a duty of reasonable care to the Bowmans, which, in turn, involves the 

question as to the degree of control or management reserved 

by the United States in its contract with JBI and its exercise, or non-exercise, of such. 

Both parties rely on Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890 

(Wyo. 1986), the Bowmans contending that under Jones they 

have an FTCA claim against the United States, with the United 

States asserting that Jones dictates the conclusion that the 

United States had no duty to the Bowmans and that accordingly 

the Bowmans have no FTCA claims against the United States. 

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Jones involved an employee of an independent contractor 

who was injured while performing work on some electric lines 

owned by Chevron. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron, finding that Chevron owed no duty 

of reasonable care to the injured worker. On appeal, the 

Wyoming Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. 

In so doing, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that "[a]n 

owner is not obligated to protect the employees of an independent contractor from hazards which are incidental to, or 

part of, the very work the contractor was hired to perform." 

Id. at 894. However, in this regard, the Court went on to 

state that rule was inapplicable "when the owner maintains 

control over the hazard that causes the harm." Id. at 895. 

On the question of the control, or degree of control, 

retained by an owner over the work to be performed by an independent contractor, the Wyoming Supreme Court spoke, at 

length, as follows: 

'To determine whether the nature and extent of 

the control present is sufficient to impose 

liability, both the contractual provisions and 

the actual exercise of control are relevant. 

If the employer reserves and exercises only 

the right to inspect the construction work to 

see that the contract specifications are met 

while the independent contractor controls how 

and when the work is to be done, there is 

probably not sufficient retained control to 

subject it to liability. Similarly, if the 

employer retains only [the right to require 

that the contractor observe safety rules and 

practices] but assumes no affirmative duties 

and never directs the method of performance, 

there is insufficient control or supervision 

to render it liable. 

On the other hand, if the employer retains the 

right to direct the manner of the independent 

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contractor's performance, or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety, the employer has retained sufficient control to be 

held liable if he exercises that control negligently. (Citations omitted and emphasis 

added.)' 

Id. at 896 (alteration in original) (citing Moloso v. 

State, 644 P.2d 205, 211-12, (1982)). 

We hold that an owner of a work site who retains the right to direct the manner of an 

independent contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to 

safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an 

employee of the independent contractor even if 

the employee is injured doing the very work 

the contractor was hired to perform. 

Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d at 896. 

In Jones, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in reversing in 

part, held that the owner, Chevron, did owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to the injured employee, because in the 

contract Chevron reserved to itself the right to determine 

when and whether a particular power line should be deenergized. The employee in Jones was injured while working 

on a power line which had not been de-energized. 

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the 

United States submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of Sgt. 

Michael P. Gaughen, United States Air Force. From that affidavit we learn that Sgt. Gaughen was a construction contract inspector assigned to inspect the work performed by JBI 

at the Base under the contract here involved to insure compliance with the specifications, drawings and requirements of 

the contract. Sgt. Gaughen, in that same affidavit, went on 

to state that he learned of Mearl Bowman's accident shortly 

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after its occurrence and that he "did not see or have personal knowledge of the safety guard being removed at any time 

prior to Mearl Dean Bowman's injury nor was I aware of any 

other injuries to John Bowman, Inc. employees resulting from 

use of the particular saw which injured Mearl Dean Bowman." 

In resisting the motion for summary judgment, the Bowmans submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of Mearl Dean Bowman. In that affidavit, Bowman stated that Sgt. Gaughen made 

regular inspections of the work site and that Bowman "believed that Sgt. Mike Gaughen was a safety inspector and knew 

there was no safety guard on the table saw." 

The Bowmans in this Court emphasize that they are not 

seeking to assert an FTCA claim against the United States 

based on vicarious liability, i.e. the United States is liable for the negligence of JBI, but rather their claims are 

based on the negligence of employees of the United States, 

principally Sgt. Gaughen. Following up, the Bowmans argue, 

by way of example, that the affidavits of Sgt. Gaughen and 

Mearl Dean Bowman demonstrate there was a genuine issue as to 

a material fact that precludes summary judgment under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). This argument, in our view, misses the mark. 

Any difference between the affidavits of Sgt. Gaughen and 

Mearl Dean Bowman does not pertain to a material fact. 

The starting point in our analysis of the matter is the 

general rule that since JBI is an independent contractor and 

not an employee of the United States, the latter is not responsible for the negligence of JBI or its employees. See 

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United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30-31 (lOth Cir. 1965), 

cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979 (1966). The fact that under the 

contract the United States reserved the right to make on-site 

inspections to insure compliance with all the terms and provisions of the contract, and did, in fact, make such inspections, does not change the result. Under Jones, it is only 

"if the employer retains the right to direct the manner of 

the independent contractor's performance, or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety, [that] the employer has 

retained sufficient control to be held liable if he exercises 

that control negligently." Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d at 

896 (citing Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 211-12 (Alaska 

1982). In this regard, we conclude, as did the district 

court, that the United States did not retain the right to 

control and manage the details of JBI's work performance nor 

did it assume affirmative duties with respect to s~fety. 

We believe our analysis of the present case is in accord 

with a Wyoming case decided after Jones. See Ramsey v. Pacific Power and Light, 792 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1990). There the 

Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for a land 

owner, Pacific Power and Light ("PP&L"), when sued by an injured employee of an independent contractor, NESCO, under 

contract with the land owner. One theory of the injured employee for recovery was that PP&L, the landowner, through its 

safety coordinator, exercised "control over the work site at 

the time of the injury." In his deposition, PP&L's safety 

coordinator stated that he had responsibility to coordinate 

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safety programs at the plant for PP&L employees; that he 

would make contractors aware of special safety policies when 

they began work at the plant; and that if he observed a 

safety deficiency in connection with the contractor's work, 

he would notify one of the contractor's supervisors of it and 

see that the deficiency was corrected. In this regard, the 

Wyoming Supreme Court held that such statements "fall far 

short of that set out in Comment (c) to § 414 Restatement 

(Second) of Torts, . as necessary to retain control of 

the work place."3 Id. at 1388. 

We also believe that our analysis of the instant case is 

in accord with the rationale of prior Tenth Circuit cases 

considering the matter, although those cases did not involve 

Wyoming law. In United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (lOth 

3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414 (1977): 

One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but 

who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose 

safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable 

care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his 

control with reasonable care. 

Comment (c) : 

In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, 

the employer must have retained at least some degree of 

control over the manner in which the work is done. It is 

not enough that he has merely a general right to order 

the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or 

to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right 

is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean 

that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of 

work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a 

retention of a right of supervision that the contractor 

is not entirely free to do the work his own way. 

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Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979 (1966), an action was 

brought under FTCA against the United States for damages resulting from the death of an employee of an independent contractor under contract with the United States. The district 

court, after trial, found for the plaintiffs and the United 

States appealed. The basis for the district court's resolution of the matter was that the United States owed a duty to 

the decedent because under the contract the United States 

reserved the right to prescribe safety regulations in addition to those in the contract and also reserved the right to 

inspect the contractor's plant and work performed therein. 

In reversing, we spoke as follows: 

The fact that the contract may have reserved 

to the United States the right to inspect the 

work and facilities of the independent contractor, and the right to stop the work, does 

not in itself override or alter the general 

rule of non-liability for the torts of the 

contractor because no duty is created to employees or third parties. This includes the 

reservation to inspect for the adherence to 

contract safety provisions. {citation omitted) . . . . The fact that the work and duties 

of the independent contractor and of his employees originate in a contract, in plans, or 

regulations issued by the Government does not 

create a duty by it to the employees where 

there was not such an affirmative control and 

direction by Government officials over the 

employees or interference in the work of the 

contractor as to create conditions where there 

was in fact no independent contractor .... 

Could it be that the United States is liable 

because although it may not have a duty, it 

undertook to administer a safety program and 

thereby became liable for its negligence in 

carrying it out? (citations omitted). 

Hercules [the independent contractor] had the 

primary responsibility for the safety of its 

employees; it had the direct control and supervision over them, and they were working in 

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its plant. Further, it had the duty to perform and supervise the individual functions, 

the total of which produced the end product. 

The function the decedent was performing was 

but one of many of these in this chain of 

production. It and the safety of those then 

working was under the exclusive control and 

supervision of Hercules. The safety program 

of the Government did not constitute an exercise of any such control. 

Id. at 30-31. 

In Flynn v. United States, 631 F.2d 678 (lOth Cir. 

1980), an employee of an independent contractor made claim 

against the United States under FTCA and he appealed a judgment of the district court in favor of the United States. In 

affirming, we held that since the United States did not control the "physical performance of the contractor," it could 

not be held liable under the FTCA. Id. at 681. In Flynn, 

the injured employee also sought to hold the United States 

liable because of an Air Force safety program which was not 

enforced. In rejecting that particular argument, we spoke as 

follows: 

Id. 

Plaintiff contends that under the contract the 

United States had the right to inspect the 

work of Dynalectron [the independent contractor] to determine whether Dynalectron was enforcing Air Force safety regulations. Plaintiff says that the safety program was not enforced. The existence of a safety program 

does not create liability when the contractor, 

as here, is primarily responsible for safety. 

(emphasis added) . 

Judgment affirmed. 

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