Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04341/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04341-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

SECURITY ALARM FINANCING 

ENTERPRISES, L.P. d/b/a SAFEGUARD 

SECURITY a Limited Partnership, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

MIKAYLA NEBEL, an individual, 

RUSSELL NIGGEMEYER, an individual, 

and DOES 1-25, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 15-04341 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND 

TRANSFERRING THE ACTION 

Plaintiff Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, L.P. (“Plaintiff” or “SAFE”) brings 

the instant action against Defendants Mikayla Nebel (“Nebel”) and Russell Niggemyer 

(“Niggemyer”) (collectively “Defendants”) in the Northern District of California.1

 Dkt. 1. 

The action arises out of Plaintiff’s withdrawn corporate sponsorship of Nebel in her 

capacity as a professional boxer. The parties are presently before the Court on Nebel’s 

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, Dkt. 20, and 

Niggemyer’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Memorandum in Support, Dkt. 23. Having 

read and considered the papers filed in connection with these matters and being fully 

informed, the Court hereby GRANTS Nebel and Niggemyer’s respective motions, for the 

reasons stated below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

 1 Plaintiff erroneously sued Niggemyer as “Russell Niggemeyer.” See Niggemyer 

Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. 32-2. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 1 of 13
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL SUMMARY 

Plaintiff is a limited partnership formed under the laws of the State of California, 

with its principal place of business in San Ramon, California. Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 1.2

 

Plaintiff is “in the business of selling, installing, servicing, and monitoring residential and 

commercial security alarm systems throughout the United States and Canada.” Id. Plaintiff 

has obtained several trademarks. Id. ¶ 3. 

Nebel is a boxer who has participated in eight professional bouts. Compl. ¶ 6; Nebel 

Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Dkt. 21.3

 She is a citizen and resident of Nevada. Nebel Decl. ¶ 1. 

Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that Niggemyer “manages Nebel’s boxing 

activities, including her advertising and promotional activities, and acts as Nebel’s agent.” 

Compl. ¶ 7. Niggemyer is a citizen and resident of both Nevada and Ohio. Niggemyer 

Decl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 23. 

In October 2014, immediately after Nebel’s seventh professional boxing match in 

Washington, D.C., SAFE President and Chief Executive Officer Paul Sargenti (“Sargenti”) 

“approached Nebel to determine if Nebel was interested in a sponsorship deal with SAFE.” 

Compl. ¶ 13; see also Sargenti Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 26. Sargenti, who was present at the boxing 

match as a spectator, handed Nebel “a $100 gratuity and his business card.” Nebel Decl. 

¶ 26; see also Sargenti Decl. ¶ 7. Shortly thereafter, in November 2014, Nebel sent 

Sargenti an email to thank him for the gift and “follow up as to whether he was still 

interested in supporting [her] career through . . . a sponsorship.” Nebel Decl. ¶ 27; see also 

Sargenti Decl. ¶ 8. They exchanged no further communications for several months. 

 2

 Plaintiff consists of two partners: Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc. and 

SAFE Security, Inc. Compl. ¶ 1. 

3 Although Plaintiff alleges that Nebel “competes in venues throughout the United 

States,” Compl. ¶ 6, Nebel has “never had a boxing match in the State of California,” Nebel 

Decl. ¶ 12. Nebel has participated in boxing matches in New Jersey, New York, 

Connecticut, Washington, D.C., and Arizona. See Nebel Decl. ¶¶ 13-20 and Exs. 1-8. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 2 of 13
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

In March 2015, Sargenti sent Nebel an email stating that he would be traveling to 

Las Vegas in April and “wanted to see if [Nebel] w[as] available to catch up a bit.” 

Sargenti Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 2. Sargenti stated, “I think about you often and remember how 

determined and focused you[] were in the ring.” Id. Nebel responded that she was 

interested in a meeting. Id., Ex. 3. On April 16, 2015, Sargenti and Nebel met in Las 

Vegas to discuss Nebel’s boxing career and Sargenti’s interest in sponsoring Nebel. Nebel 

Decl. ¶ 32. Sargenti also brought along Gary and Carmela Franklyn to “discuss marketing 

and public relations.” Id. Sargenti “suggested that SAFE would purchase items for Nebel 

necessary for Nebel to market herself, and in return Nebel would market SAFE’s products 

and services by wearing clothing emblazoned with SAFE’s trademarked emblems and 

logos.” Compl. ¶ 14. 

After the meeting in Las Vegas, Sargenti sent an email asking Nebel if she was 

satisfied with “the action plan that [wa]s developing.” Sargenti Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 4. Sargenti 

mentioned that Gary and Carmela Franklyn were “working to get [Nebel] on a [boxing] 

card in the Phoenix area” and to “interest Iron Boy promoters to schedule a female bout.” 

Id. Nebel responded that the “Phoenix possibility sounds incredible.” Id. In or around 

April 2015, SAFE “began providing Nebel with goods, services and cash.” Compl. ¶ 16. 

“SAFE also provided Nebel with apparel,” including a silver boxing dress, “that was 

emblazoned with SAFE’s trademarked emblems and logos.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff secured a 

boxing match for Nebel at the event sponsored by Iron Boy Promotions in Phoenix, 

Arizona. Sargenti Decl. ¶ 13. During the match, which took place on July 25, 2015, Nebel 

wore the silver dress emblazoned with SAFE’s trademarks. Id. 

Shortly after the Phoenix match, the Plaintiff’s relationship with Nebel soured; the 

parties disagree as to the cause. On the one hand, a dispute arose when Nebel “accused 

SAFE of ‘sexualizing’ [her]” after Carmela Franklyn posted a photograph on Facebook of 

Nebel wearing yoga pants. Sargenti Decl. ¶ 15; see also Nebel Decl. ¶¶ 35-37. Nebel 

asked that Carmela remove the photograph, and Carmela complied. Nebel Decl. ¶ 36. 

However, Sargenti immediately advised Nebel, “I’ve just been made aware of your email to 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 3 of 13
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Carmela which was very disturbing to me and the tone of which is inappropriate and hardly 

recognizable. I’m profoundly disappointed and we are clearly not on the same page. I will 

give you a call to discuss our plans for disengagement.” Id. ¶ 37; Nebel’s Mot., Ex. 16. 

Nebel contends that this dispute over her image led Sargenti to cancel the sponsorship. 

On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that Sargenti canceled the sponsorship after he 

learned, on July 28, 2015, “that representations previously made by Nebel were not true.” 

Compl. ¶ 18. According to Plaintiff, Nebel had represented that: (1) she “was not then 

represented by a manger or agent,” when in fact she was “represented and managed by 

[Niggemyer]”; and (2) “there was nothing in her background, or the background of those 

associated with her that if known by the public would discredit SAFE as Nebel’s sponsor,” 

when in fact Nebel associated with Niggemyer, “who had been arrested on multiple counts 

of assault and domestic violence.” Compl. ¶ 15. Upon learning of these purported 

misrepresentations, “SAFE immediately sent a letter to Nebel cancelling the sponsorship 

and informing her that she was to return all property that SAFE had acquired for [her], to 

return all SAFE apparel, and to cease using any of SAFE’s trademarks.” Id. ¶ 19.4

On August 6, 2015, Nebel posted a photograph of herself on her Facebook page. 

Compl. ¶ 20. In the photo, Nebel is wearing the silver boxing dress with SAFE’s trademark 

symbol prominently displayed. Id. Upon seeing the photograph, SAFE sent Nebel a 

second cease and desist letter, which again demanded that Nebel return all property SAFE 

had given to her and cease using SAFE’s trademarks. Id. ¶ 21. In alleged disregard of 

Plaintiff’s letters, Nebel has “willfully infringed upon SAFE’s trademarks by continuing to 

market herself on social media, including Facebook and Instagram, using SAFE’s 

trademarks.” Id. ¶ 23. According to Plaintiff, there exists a strong likelihood of confusion 

on the part of its customers that “SAFE continues to sponsor Nebel.” Id. ¶ 26. 

 4 Plaintiff does not allege how the purported misrepresentations came to light. 

However, it appears Nebel’s new trainer, Armin Van Damme, was involved. See Sargenti 

Decl. ¶ 17; Van Damme Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 27. According to Van Damme, Niggemyer stated 

on July 24, 2015, “that all decisions regarding Nebel’s boxing career were to be made by 

him [i.e., Niggemyer], and that SAFE was a ‘tool to be used.’” Van Damme Decl. ¶ 4. 

Van Damme relayed this information to Sargenti. Sargenti Decl. ¶ 17. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 4 of 13
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On September 22, 2015, Plaintiff initiated the instant action, alleging causes of 

action for: (1) trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 

against Nebel and Niggemyer; (2) false endorsement in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1125, against Nebel and Niggemyer; and (3) intentional misrepresentation, against 

Nebel only. Plaintiff alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction). Plaintiff 

asserts that the Court enjoys personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they “purposely 

actively market and promote Nebel in California . . . via the Internet, on Facebook and 

Instagram websites.” Compl. ¶ 11. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that “Nebel purposely 

made fraudulent misrepresentations . . . aimed at a citizen of the forum state of California, 

[i.e.,] SAFE, knowing that injury to SAFE would occur in California.” Id. 

On October 30, 2015, Nebel filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (“Nebel’s Mot.”). Dkt. 20. Nebel seeks dismissal of the 

action on the alternate grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction and that venue in 

this district is improper. On November 9, 2015, Niggemyer, acting pro se, filed the instant 

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Memorandum in Support (“Niggemyer’s Mot.”). Dkt 23. 

Although labeled a motion, Niggemyer’s filing reads like a declaration, wherein he avers, 

among other things, that he has no contacts with California. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Nebel’s Motion to Dismiss (“Opp’n to Nebel’s 

Mot.”), Dkt. 25, and an Opposition to Niggemyer’s motion to Dismiss (“Opp’n to 

Niggemyer’s Mot.), Dkt. 33, on November 13 and 23, 2015, respectively. On November 

20, 2015, Nebel filed a Reply. Dkt. 32.5

 

 5 Notably, although Nebel’s motion seeks dismissal of the action for improper 

venue, see Nebel’s Mot. at 13, Plaintiff responds that Nebel has failed to show Nevada is a 

more convenient forum. See Opp’n to Nebel’s Mot. at 15. In her reply, Nebel counters 

that Nevada is a more convenient forum, and urges transfer of the action in the event that 

the Court finds dismissal unwarranted. See Reply at 15. As demonstrated below, the Court 

need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding proper venue and forum. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 5 of 13
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Upon such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 

jurisdiction is proper. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Where 

the district court acts on the motion without an evidentiary hearing, “‘the plaintiff need only 

make a prima facie showing of the jurisdictional facts.’” Id. (citation omitted). The Court 

accepts as true any uncontroverted allegations in the complaint, and resolves in the 

plaintiff’s favor any factual conflicts presented in the parties’ affidavits. Glencore Grain 

Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The 

court may not, however, “‘assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are 

contradicted by affidavit[.]’” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 

1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)). 

“When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the 

law of the forum state.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015. Because California’s long-arm 

statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analysis 

under either standard is the same. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223. For a court to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have “certain 

minimum contacts” with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not 

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’ Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 

Under a minimum contacts analysis, jurisdiction may be either general or specific. 

Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016. In the instant action, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants 

are subject to general jurisdiction; thus, only specific jurisdiction is at issue. Specific 

jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying 

controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 

therefore subject to the State’s’ regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 

Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). In other words, “specific jurisdiction is confined to 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 6 of 13
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 

establishes jurisdiction.’” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit analyzes specific jurisdiction under a three-prong test: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities 

in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 

 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and 

 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 

i.e., it must be reasonable. 

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1227-28 (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying 

the first two prongs; if the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to “set 

forth a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. 

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Both Nebel and Niggemyer move to dismiss the instant action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Alternatively, Nebel moves to dismiss the action for improper venue, and/or to 

transfer the action to a more convenient forum--the United States District Court for the 

District of Nevada. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motions. 

A. PROCEDURAL DEFECTS

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff contends that the Court should reject Niggemyer’s 

motion for failure to “comply with the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 6(c)(1) and [Civil] Local Rule 7.2(a).” Opp’n to Niggemyer’s Mot. at 1. The 

Court acknowledges the procedural deficiencies of Niggemyer’s motion.6

 Nevertheless, in 

 6 A duly noticed motion “must be filed, served, and noticed in writing on the motion 

calendar of the assigned Judge for hearing not less than 35 days after filing of the motion.” 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-2(a). The noticed hearing date and time must appear on the first page 

of the motion in the space opposite the caption and below the case number. Id. 7-2(b)(1). 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 7 of 13
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the interests of justice and judicial economy, and for the reasons stated below, the Court 

declines to dismiss Niggemyer’s motion on procedural grounds. 

First, when Niggemyer filed his motion, Nebel had already filed her motion, with a 

hearing noticed for January 13, 2016.7

 Second, notwithstanding any procedural objection, 

Plaintiff “construes” Niggemyer’s motion as one “to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction,” and opposes the motion on the merits. Opp’n to Niggemyer’s Mot. at 1. The 

alleged procedural defects therefore have not prejudiced Plaintiff. Third, Nebel and 

Niggemyer are similarly situated with respect to the pertinent jurisdictional inquiry; 

therefore, consistent and concurrent rulings are preferred. Accordingly, the Court addresses 

Niggemyer’s motion on the merits. 

B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

 Plaintiff alleges trademark infringement and false endorsement claims against Nebel 

and Niggemyer, and an intentional misrepresentation claim against Nebel. “Personal 

jurisdiction over each defendant must be analyzed separately.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. 

Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, 

personal jurisdiction must exist “for ‘each claim asserted against a defendant.’” Picot v. 

Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. 

Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Court therefore addresses 

Plaintiff’s claims in turn. 

 1. Trademark Infringement and False Endorsement

 In analyzing the first prong of the tripartite test for specific personal jurisdiction over 

a tort claim, the Ninth Circuit applies the three-part “effects” test. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1213-

14 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).8 “Under this test, a defendant personally 

directed his activities at the forum if he ‘(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly 

 7 The Court subsequently took the matter under submission on the papers. 

8 Trademark and false advertising claims are akin to tort claims, and therefore, are 

analyzed under the purposeful direction test. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 

F.3d 1316, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying purposeful direction test in trademark 

dilution action).

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 8 of 13
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered 

in the forum state.’” Id. (citations omitted). In applying this test, the court “must ‘look[] to 

the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with 

persons who reside there.’” Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014)). 

“Thus, a ‘mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.’ 

Rather, ‘an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has 

formed a contact with the forum State.’” Id. (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1225). 

 a. Nebel 

 Nebel does not dispute that she committed an intentional act, or that she knew 

Plaintiff would likely suffer harm in the forum state. Thus, the pertinent inquiry is 

“whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious action was ‘expressly aimed at the forum.’” 

Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted). “The exact form of our analysis varies from case 

to case and ‘depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful 

conduct at issue.’” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction because Defendants “market and promote Nebel in California, including the 

Northern District of California, via the Internet, on Facebook and Instagram websites.” 

Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that Nebel “willfully infringed upon SAFE’s trademarks by 

continuing to market herself on social media, including Facebook and Instagram, using 

SAFE’s trademarks.” Id. ¶ 23. Thus, the court must consider whether Nebel expressly 

aimed her allegedly infringing activity at California. In view of relevant precedent, the 

Court finds that Nebel has not. 

“Not all material placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its universal 

accessibility, expressly aimed at every state in which it is accessed.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 

1231. Maintenance of a “passive website,” i.e., one that “does little more than make 

information available to those who are interested in it,” Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 

Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Penn. 1997), cannot satisfy the express aiming prong. 

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229. Operating a passive website “in conjunction with ‘something 

more’--conduct directly targeting the forum--is sufficient,” however. Id. (quoting Rio 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 9 of 13
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002)). “In determining 

whether a nonresident defendant has done ‘something more,’” courts consider several 

factors, including “the interactivity of the defendant’s website, the geographic scope of the 

defendant’s commercial ambitions, and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a 

plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 As Nebel persuasively argues, her social media posts are insufficient to establish 

personal jurisdiction. Contrary to Plaintiff’s unsupported allegation, see Compl. ¶ 6, Nebel 

has never “maintained a website.” Nebel Decl. ¶ 23. Nebel maintains personal, noncommercial profiles on Facebook and Instagram, which merely provide information 

regarding Nebel and her boxing career to interested parties. Id. ¶¶ 24-25.9

 Plaintiff has 

offered no evidence, and the Court finds none, that Nebel’s Facebook and Instagram posts 

were in any way directed or targeted at California or a California audience. Cf. Mavrix, 

647 F.3d at 1230 (holding that the defendant expressly aimed its conduct--posting of the 

plaintiff’s copyrighted photographs on the defendant’s website--at the forum because the 

defendant “anticipated, desired, and achieved a substantial California viewer base”); 

Burdick v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 4th 8, 26 (2015) (holding that the defendant did 

not expressly aim his conduct--posting of defamatory comments about the Plaintiff on his 

Facebook page--at the forum because there was no evidence that “the Facebook page or the 

posting were directed at the State of California or a California audience”). For example, 

Plaintiff has not shown that the persons to whom Nebel directed her postings resided in 

California, or that Nebel tailored the content of her posts for a California audience. Nebel’s 

social media presence therefore did not form the requisite contact with California. 

Plaintiff argues that, even if Nebel’s social media posts constitute a passive web 

presence, “Nebel’s act of sending SAFE, a known California resident, emails both 

 9 Plaintiff reproduces Nebel’s allegedly infringing social media post from August 6, 

2015. See Opp’n to Nebel’s Mot. at 7. The post includes a photograph of Nebel and an 

opponent in the boxing ring. Nebel is wearing the silver boxing dress emblazoned with 

SAFE’s trademarked emblem. An excerpt from an article reviewing Nebel’s boxing 

performance accompanies the photograph. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 10 of 13
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

requesting a promotional deal and continuing negotiations with SAFE” constitutes the 

requisite “something more” necessary to establish personal jurisdiction. Opp’n at 9. The 

Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. Although Plaintiff asserts that Nebel 

reached out to SAFE and requested a sponsorship deal, see Opp’n to Nebel’s Mot. at 9, the 

facts demonstrate otherwise. Sargenti first approached Nebel in Washington, D.C., offered 

her a “gratuity,” and broached a sponsorship. Compl. ¶ 13; Sargenti Decl. ¶ 7. Likewise, 

after a few months without contact, Sargenti emailed Nebel to arrange a meeting in Las 

Vegas, which is where the parties eventually discussed the proposed sponsorship. Sargenti 

Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 3; Nebel Decl. ¶ 32. For her part, Nebel authored a few emails in response to 

inquiries from Sargenti. Moreover, “our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with [a 

plaintiff] who reside[s] there.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1122. “Due process requires that a 

defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, 

not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with 

other persons affiliated with the State.” Id. at 1123 (citation omitted) (“jurisdiction over an 

out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant 

that creates the necessary contacts with the forum”). Nebel’s contacts with Sargenti did not 

create an affiliation between Nebel and California, but rather, between Nebel and Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Nebel with 

respect to Plaintiff’s trademark claims. 

 b. Niggemyer 

As stated above, Nebel and Niggemyer are similarly situated with regard to the 

jurisdictional inquiry. Plaintiff does not allege that Niggemyer posted any material on 

Nebel’s social media profiles, but rather, that Niggemyer “manages Nebel’s . . . 

promotional activities.” Compl. ¶ 7; see also Opp’n to Niggemyer’s Mot. at 1 (asserting 

that Niggemyer “directed Nebel’s acts”). Plaintiff contends that this is sufficient for the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Niggemyer. Setting aside the threshold matter of 

whether Niggemyer even committed an intentional act (an issue that Niggemyer fails to 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 11 of 13
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

directly contest),10 the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Niggemyer based 

on the same analysis set forth above with regard to Nebel--i.e., that Defendants did not 

expressly aim the allegedly infringing activity at California. 

 2. Intentional Misrepresentation 

Personal jurisdiction over Nebel is lacking with respect to Plaintiff’s trademark 

claims. Having found a lack of personal jurisdiction over Nebel with regard to all claims 

over which this Court has federal question jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation 

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to 

exercise supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over pendent state law claims after 

dismissing all federal law claims). 

C. TRANSFER OR DISMISSAL

Upon a finding “that there is a want of jurisdiction,” a federal district court “shall, if 

it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in which the 

action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1631; Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, “transfer will be 

in the interest of justice because normally dismissal of an action that could be brought 

elsewhere is ‘time-consuming and justice-defeating.’” Id. (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. 

Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962)); see also Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. Mkt. Quest Grp. 

Inc., 793 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (“transfer will generally be in the interest of justice, 

unless it is apparent that the matter to be transferred is frivolous or was filed in bad faith”). 

 No party has addressed the issue of transfer or dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court 

finds that transfer is appropriate in this case. Both Nebel and Niggemyer are citizens of 

Nevada, see Nebel Decl. ¶ 1; Niggemyer’s Mot. ¶ 1, and thus, the District of Nevada would 

 10 Niggemyer avers that he has never acted as a boxing manager or agent on behalf 

of Nebel, and has never “maintained a website, [F]acebook, Instagram, [T]witter, or any 

other social media” for himself or anyone else. Niggemyer’s Mot. ¶¶ 11, 17. However, 

Niggemyer does not expressly argue that he committed no intentional act. 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 12 of 13
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss for lack or personal jurisdiction and TRANSFERS the action to the 

United States District Court for the District of Nevada. In view of the foregoing, the Court 

DENIES as MOOT Nebel’s alternative motion to dismiss for improper venue and/or to 

transfer to a more convenient forum. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Nebel and Niggemyer’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

are GRANTED, and the action is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for 

the District of Nevada. 

2. Nebel’s alternative motion to dismiss for improper venue and/or transfer to a 

more convenient forum is DENIED as MOOT. 

3. All pending dates before this Court, including the upcoming case 

management conference, are vacated. 

This terminates Dockets 20 and 23. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/10/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

Case 4:15-cv-04341-SBA Document 52 Filed 03/14/16 Page 13 of 13