Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06823/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANN GIANNINI

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHERING-PLOUGH CORPORATION,

SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER OF SANTA

ROSA, and DR. DAMIEN “RANDY”

PESTANA, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

.

_______________________________________

No. C-06-06823-SBA 

ORDER

[Docket No. 21] 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [Docket No. 21]. Having read and

considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court finds

this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Remand. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ann Giannini filed this action on October 22, 2003 in Alameda County Superior Court

against defendants Schering-Plough Corporation, Dr. Damien Pestana, and Sutter Medical Group,

alleging personal injuries arising from her ingestion of the prescription pharmaceuticals Peg-Intron and

Rebetol allegedly manufactured by Schering-Plough and prescribed by Dr. Pestana. Opp. at 2:24-25;

3:1-3. The case has been transferred several times. Defendant Sutter Medical first moved to transfer

this case from Alameda to Sonoma County. Opp. at 3:6-7. Giannini then had the case transferred to

San Francisco County. Opp. at 3:8-9. Defendant Dr. Pestana successfully moved to transfer this case

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from San Francisco County back to Sonoma County. Opp. at 3:11-12.

On October 3, 2006, Giannini was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint. The

amended complaint contained new class action allegations. Opp. at 3:15-17. In response, Schering

removed the case to federal court on November 2, 2007, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) as amended by the

Class Action Fairness Act. Opp. at 3:17-18. However, despite the fact that Schering was removing the

case was on the basis of the class action claim, Schering asserted that it “firmly believes both that

Plaintiff’s class allegations are unwarranted and that Plaintiff will be unable to establish any of the

prerequisites to certify a class,” and that it would “strenuously oppose any motion for class

certification.” Docket Report No. 1 at 3:16-22. This Court dismissed the class action allegations at

Giannini’s request on April 19, 2007. Giannini now moves for remand, arguing that the elimination of

the class action allegations makes this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction unjustified. Defendant Dr.

Pestana has joined in the motion for remand. Docket Report No. 20 at 5:25-28; 6:1-4. Only defendant

Schering opposes remand, arguing that because jurisdiction existed at the time of removal, this Court

should retain jurisdiction over the remaining state claims even though the claims that formed the basis

for removal have been voluntarily dismissed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Class Action Fairness Act grants original jurisdiction for any civil action, where 1) the

number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is 100 or more, 2) the claims of

the individual class members, in the aggregate, exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000 exclusive of

interest and costs, and 3) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides that “any civil

action brought in a State court . . . may be removed by the defendant or the defendants” to federal court

on the basis of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removal statute is

to be strictly construed against removal and any doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Duncan v.

Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

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related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental

jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S.

156, 172 (1997). District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under

subsection (a) under 1367(c) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim

substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction,(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4)

in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c). 

ANALYSIS

I. Mandatory Remand

The plaintiff argues that remand of this case is mandatory, citing Villano v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores,

Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D.

Ala. 1997) to support the contention that the 1988 amendment of 1447(c) effectively overturned the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).

Mot. at 5:4-7. The Court determined in Carnegie-Mellon that elimination of federal claims subsequent

to removal does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction, although it may use its discretion to remand.

The amended version of Section 1447(c) says, “if at any time...it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The court in

Bailey interpreted this provision to mean that if changes in plaintiff's contentions following removal

result in a loss of the original basis for subject matter jurisdiction, “no discretion remains in the federal

court to retain jurisdiction and . . . remand becomes automatic.” 981 F. Supp. 1415 at 1416-17.

However, the Ninth Circuit has not embraced the Bailey view. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Natal Ass’n

of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998); Millar v. Bart Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110,

1116 (N.D.Cal. 2002). The court in Sparta Surgical Corp. asserted that “jurisdiction must be analyzed

on the basis of pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent amendments,”

which means that “a plaintiff cannot compel remand by amending a complaint to eliminate the federal

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question upon which removal was based.” Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1213. Accordingly, this

Court has discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to remand this case to state court. 

II. Permissive Remand

The court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims even if the federal claims over

which it had original jurisdiction are dismissed. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d

1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 383 U.S. 715, 728 (1966); Brady v. Brown

51 F.3d 810, 816. (9th Cir. 1995). However, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary,

and dismissal is a factor for the court to consider in deciding whether to decline to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); City of Chicago v. International College of

Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc) (holding that a district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over nonfederal claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction). 

Schering argues that remand is impermissible because diversity jurisdiction is not affected by

post-removal changes. “Diversity jurisdiction is determined at the time the action commences, and a

federal court is not divested of jurisdiction if a party subsequently moves to another state. . . or if the

amount in controversy subsequently drops below the minimum jurisdictional level.” Hill v. Blind Indus.

& Servs. of Md, 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). As noted above, this Court’s jurisdiction was not

automatically divested when the class action claims were dismissed, however it does not follow that

remand is impermissible. In this case, diversity jurisdiction was only established under the minimal

diversity requirements for class actions pursuant to CAFA. As the class action claims have been

dismissed, the only basis for retaining jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction, which is a doctrine of

discretion. See International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172. Schering notes that federal

jurisdictional rules that fix diversity at the time of removal exist to prevent plaintiffs from manipulating

the process to facilitate remand to state court. It argues that the frequent transfers of this case

demonstrate that Giannini is forum shopping. Opp. at 2:3-4, 3:5-9. However, defendant Sutter Medical

Group first moved to transfer this case from Alameda to Sonoma County. Opp. at 3:6-7. Giannini then

had the case transferred to San Francisco County, which was the only time she moved to transfer. Opp.

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at 3:8-9. Later defendant Dr. Pestana successfully moved to transfer the case from San Francisco

County to Sonoma County. Opp. at 3:11-13. Schering then removed the case to this Court, based

entirely on class actions claims that it argued were meritless and would strenuously oppose. Docket

Report No. 1 at 3:16-22. Giannini’s actions do not support the conclusion that she is engaged in forum

shopping, and, in fact, Schering’s removal, based on class action claims it considered meritless, does

not appear to be in good faith. 

The Ninth Circuit uses a two-part analysis to determine whether it is appropriate for a court to

exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (“While

discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the

presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs values ‘of economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.’”). First, a court must look to whether the case falls under one of

the four enumerated circumstances under 1367(c). In this case, the Court has dismissed the only claim

that served as a basis for jurisdiction, therefore this Court has discretion under Section 1367(c)(3).

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Second, the court must consider whether the values of economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity will be served by exercising jurisdiction. 

A. Economy

In some cases a court may conclude there has already been so much judicial energy expended

in the action to justify retention of jurisdiction over the supplemental claims. Schneider v. TRW, Inc. 938

F.2d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 1991). However, this Court’s involvement in this case has been minimal. There

were no other motions filed by either plaintiff or defendant prior to this motion. This Court has not

performed any substantive legal analysis that will need to be duplicated by the state court. Moreover,

this case spent over three years in state court prior to its removal to this Court. Accordingly, the factor

of judicial economy weighs in favor of remand. 

B. Convenience and Fairness

The Sonoma County Superior Court is located in Santa Rosa, California. Plaintiff Giannini and

defendant Dr. Pestana are both Sonoma county residents and prefer to have the case in state court. See

Joint Case Management Statement [Docket Report No. 20 at 5:25-28, 6:1-4]. Schering offers no reason

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why it is more convenient or fair to have this case proceed in this Court rather than in state court. The

value of convenience would be better accommodated by remanding the case to Sonoma County. A state

forum will provide just as fair a proceeding as a federal one, so the factor of fairness cuts markedly in

neither direction. 

C. Comity

Comity is “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country

is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National

Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate

functions in their separate ways . . . .” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Needless decisions

of state law should be avoided as a matter of comity. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

(1966). The class action claim was the only basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Giannini now proceeds

exclusively on her state claims. The factor of comity weighs in favor of remand. 

When the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity indicates that a case

properly belongs in state court, as when the federal claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early

stages, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction. Executive Software No. America,

Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, the values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity are better served by granting the motion to remand. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [Docket No. 21] is

GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of

Sonoma. The clerk is directed to terminate any pending matters and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: 6/22/07 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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