Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03193/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03193-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U:1ited States Court of Appetlln TP.nth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MELVIN SLEDD, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

DEC 0 7 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 94-3193 

DAVID R. MCKUNE and 

ROBERT T. STEPHAN, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-3006-DES) 

David J. Gottlieb, Lawrence, 

Appellant. 

Kansas, 

John K. Bork, Assistant Attorney General, 

Assistant Attorney General, with him on the 

Kansas, for Respondents-Appellees. 

for Petitioner-

(Jean M. Schmidt, 

brief) , Topeka, 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and JENKINS, Senior District Judge.* 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior District Judge for the 

District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the district 

court dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The chronology out of which 

the present controversy arose is a bit convoluted, but a recital thereof is necessary to an understanding of our resolution of the appeal. 

Melvin Sledd, the petitioner in federal district court, 

was charged with murder in the district court for Shawnee 

County, State of Kansas.l A jury convicted him of involuntary manslaughter. As will be developed later, the sole 

ground for habeas corpus relief was phrased in Sledd's pro se 

petition in federal district court as "[w]hether the [state] 

trial court violated Mr. Sledd's constitutional rights to a 

fair trial and equal protection of the laws when it accepted, 

as racially neutral, the State's explanations for peremptorily challenging members of his minority race from the venire." 

Sledd is an African American. Thirty-six jurors -were 

qualified for cause, with the State and Sledd each to exercise twelve peremptory challenges, thus arriving at a jury of 

twelve. Of the thirty-six qualified jurors, four were African American. The procedure employed in exercising the peremptory challenges was for the State to exercise its first 

challenge by writing the name of its first challenge on a 

piece of paper and then passing the paper to defense counsel 

1 Sledd was charged with the murder of his girl friend's 

two-year old son, Michael Emery. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 2 
who, in turn, would write the name of his first challenge. 

The paper would then be passed back and forth until each side 

had exercised twelve challenges. 

The State's seventh challenge was to Marcella Brown, an 

African American. So far as we can tell from the record before us, defense counsel made no contemporaneous objection to 

the State's challenge of Marcella Brown. The State's twelfth 

and final challenge was to an African American, Gary Lassiter. Defense counsel did object to that particular challenge, about which more will be said later. The objection to 

the State's challenge of Gary Lassiter was, after hearing, 

overruled. Defense counsel, as his twelfth and last challenge, removed one of the two African Americans still remaining on the petit venire. All of which meant that of the 

twelve jurors who served as jurors at Sledd's trial, eleven 

were white and one was an African American. 

As indicated above, when Marcella Brown was peremptorily 

challenged by the State as its seventh challenge, defense 

counsel made no objection. When the State, as its twelfth 

and last challenge, struck Gary Lassiter from the petit venire, defense counsel did object. In objecting to the striking of Gary Lassiter, defense counsel made only one passing 

reference to the State's seventh challenge to Marcella Brown, 

which, in our view, did not constitute an objection, as such, 

to the striking of juror Brown.2 

2 In challenging the striking of juror Gary Lassiter, 

counsel opened his argument by stating that "[u]nder the 

Batson decision, we have to make our record. The State has 

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Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 3 
Sledd appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals 

for the State of Kansas. In an unpublished opinion, which is 

a part of the record before us, the Court of Appeals reversed 

and remanded for a new trial. The order of the Kansas Court 

of Appeals appears as State v. Sledd, 812 P.2d 766 (Kan. Ct. 

App., June 7, 1991), though, as indicated, their opinion was 

an unpublished one. 

In reversing and remanding, the Kansas Court of Appeals 

held that the State had not articulated a race neutral explanation for the striking of juror Marcella Brown. The 

Court of Appeals did not even consider the striking of Gary 

Lassiter, though observing that the "primary argument" of 

both Sledd and the State related to the challenge of Gary 

Lassiter. The State appealed. 

In a published opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court, in 

turn, reversed the judgment of the Kansas Court of Appeals 

and affirmed the judgment of the district court. State v. 

Sledd, 825 P.2d 114 (Kan. 1992). Sledd's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. Sledd 

v. Kansas, 113 S. Ct. 147 (1992) .3 

elected as strike number twelve to strike Gary Lassiter. Ah 

[sic], strike number seven for the State was Marcella Brown." 

In the rather lengthy argument that followed, there was no 

mention of Marcella Brown, and the argument related solely to 

the striking of Gary Lassiter. 

3 As concerns the cause of death of Michael Emery, 

Kansas Supreme Court spoke as follows: 

"The conclusion at the autopsy was that 

child had been repeatedly struck in the 

dominal area approximately 24 hours before 

death. Numerous bruises were noticed 

various parts of his body." 

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the 

abhis 

on 

the 

Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 4 
In reversing the Kansas Court of Appeals, the Kansas 

Supreme Court focused exclusively on Gary Lassiter and did 

not consider, in any way, Marcella Brown. The Kansas Supreme 

Court noted that in denying the challenge to the striking of 

Lassiter the district court stated that "[t]he other black 

juror [Marcella Brown] is not in contention here. Her husband works for the Kansas Highway Patrol. She was removed by 

State challenge." 

As concerns juror Lassiter, the Kansas Supreme Court, 

agreeing with the trial court, concluded that, under the 

circumstances, Sledd had failed to make a prima facie case 

that Lassiter was challenged because of his race. Having 

thus decided, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to consider 

the trial court's alternative holding which accepted the 

State's proffered reasons for striking Lassiter from the 

panel. 

As above indicated, the state district court denied 

Sledd's challenge to the State's striking of juror Lassiter 

from the petit venire. Before doing so, however, the district court heard from the prosecutor, who stated her reasons 

for striking Lassiter. In so doing, she spoke, inter alia, 

as follows: 

I would proffer at this point my reasons for 

exercising the strike in regard to Mr. Lassiter, he, number one, he has not been in the 

community for very long, he is a member of a 

church, one of the largest organizations, he 

has told us, that he is in charge of a very 

active instructing of the members of his 

church in all sorts of religious instruction. 

I specifically asked him about his -- what his 

opinions were or beliefs were in regard to the 

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Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 5 
use of corporal punishment. Corporal punishment is one of the possible elements at issue 

in this case. And he gave -- he gave a very 

honest answer, but stated that he in his religious beliefs is convinced that corporal 

punishment is appropriate to use. 

I am persuaded by the fact that he has an 

opinion that it is all right to use corporal 

punishment. He said it is appropriate to use 

the rod. He takes an active role in defining 

for other people what the limits of corporal 

punishment should be. And in this case, I 

believe that that strength might impair his 

ability to apply a standard. We do not have a 

"law" against the use of corporal punishment. 

His idea of corporal punishment can go way 

beyond what is appropriate in this case being 

a child abuse case. There is going to be 

evidence or there may be evidence depending on 

how it comes out as to why the strikes or the 

blows were inflicted on this little boy. Some 

of the people have testified in previous proceedings that it was a form of punishment for 

crying and wetting his pants. Those are 

definitely areas where the issue of punishment 

will come up. And I believe his beliefs are 

too strong in this regard, that it is all 

right to strike a child and it is all right to 

strike a child with an object. 

Because the State offered a "race neutral" explanation 

for striking juror Lassiter from petit venire, which the 

state trial court accepted, the federal district court held 

that the question of whether Sledd made a prima facie showing 

that the State struck juror Lassiter because of his race was 

"moot." The federal district court then went on to conclude 

that the state trial court's finding "that the prosecutor had 

articulated clear, reasonable, neutral and legitimate reasons 

specific to the case" was not clearly erroneous and on that 

basis dismissed Sledd's petition. 

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The federal district court made no mention in its opinion of juror number seven, Marcella Brown, who, as mentioned, 

was struck by the State as its seventh challenge without 

contemporaneous objection thereto. In this Court, Sledd, 

however, does argue that no "race-neutral explanation" was 

ever offered by the State for its striking of Brown. Such is 

correct, nor was such necessary, since there was no objection 

in the state trial court to the State's striking of Brown. 

Such being the case, there is no basis for us to review the 

peremptory challenge of Brown. Accordingly, we are of the 

view that we are only concerned with Sledd's objection to the 

striking of juror Lassiter from the petit venire. 

In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the 

Supreme Court held that a State denies an African American 

defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on 

trial before a jury from which members of his race have been 

purposefully excluded. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1986), the Supreme Court held that the same equal protection 

principles as are applied to determine whether there is discrimination in selecting the venire also govern the State's 

use of peremptory challenges to strike individual jurors from 

the petit venire. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Batson at p. 89 spoke as follows: 

"[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the 

prosecutor to challenge potential jurors 

solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be 

unable impartially to consider the State's 

case against a black defendant." 

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Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 7 
As concerns the burden on a defendant to establish, 

prima facie, "purposeful discrimination in selection of a 

petit jury," the Court in Batson at page 96 said: 

To establish such a case, the defendant 

first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor 

has exercised peremptory challenges to remove 

from the venire members of the defendant's 

race. Second, the defendant is entitled to 

rely on the fact, as to which there can be no 

dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute 

a jury selection practice that permits "those 

to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Finally, the defendant must show 

that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of 

their race. This combination of factors in 

the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the 

selection of the venire, raises the necessary 

inference of purposeful discrimination. (citations omitted) . 

In Batson, the Supreme Court held that when the defendant made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination 

by the State in selecting the jury through the use of its 

peremptory challenges, the burden then shifted to the State 

to come forward with a "neutral explanation" for challenging, 

in that case, an African American petit juror. Further, if 

the State offers a neutral explanation, then the trial judge 

must determine whether the defendant, based on the record as 

made, has established purposeful discrimination. 

In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the 

prosecutor in a state trial peremptorily challenged two 

Latinos, to which defense counsel objected; Without waiting 

for a ruling on whether Hernandez had established prima facie 

a case of discrimination, the prosecutor volunteered that he 

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Appellate Case: 94-3193 Document: 01019280400 Date Filed: 12/07/1995 Page: 8 
had struck these two jurors, in part, because each was bilingual and that he had doubt that they would listen and accept the translation of an interpreter who was to be used in 

the trial of the case. In this connection, the prosecutor 

also stated that the two jurors had "looked away from me" and 

hesitated before responding to his question concerning their 

willingness to accept the translations of the court interpreter. The state trial judge then overruled the objection, 

the judge choosing to believe the prosecutor's explanation 

and rejecting Hernandez' assertion that the reasons were 

pretextual. On appeal, the state appellate court affirmed. 

On direct review of Hernandez' conviction, the Supreme 

Court affirmed. In so doing, the Supreme Court said that 

since the prosecutor had offered an explanation, the preliminary question as to whether Hernandez had made a prima 

facie showing of discrimination was moot. On the ultimate 

issue, i.e. whether race discrimination was proven, the Supreme Court held that under all of the circumstances of that 

case, the trial court did not commit clear error in holding 

that the prosecutor did not discriminate on the basis of the 

Latino juror's ethnicity. 

In United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 (lOth Cir. 

1991) , after considering the principles of both Batson and 

Hernandez, we concluded that where the prosecutor offered a 

race neutral explanation for his peremptory challenges, the 

question of whether a defendant has, in the first instance, 

made a prima facie case of discrimination becomes moot. 

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Hence, we hold in the instant case that the question of 

whether Sledd made a prima facie case of discrimination in 

the State's striking of Lassiter from the petit venire is 

moot. And we shall proceed to consider the explanation offered by the State for striking Lassiter and the trial 

court's acceptance thereof. 

In overruling Sledd's objection to the State's peremptory challenge of Lassiter, the state trial court, after 

hearing counsel and reviewing the questions and answers asked 

on voir dire, spoke, at length, as follows: 

In considering other circumstances and 

all relevant circumstances and the totality of 

the circumstances, I'm not persuaded at this 

point the defendant has established or made a 

prima facie showing that there has been a 

discriminatory purpose on the part of the 

prosecutor in the case at bar. 

However, if we go beyond that point and 

look at the State's reason for exercising its 

peremptory challenge toward Mr. -- or Reverend 

Lassiter, it appears that the explanation has 

to do with his comments which were fully reported by the court reporter with respect to 

the commonplace saying with respect to sparing 

the rod and spoiling the child. Those exact 

comments are set forth in the record, and I 

need not reiterate them at this point. 

The State makes the argument that this is 

a concern to the State because the instant 

case does deal with alleged child abuse and 

that a punishment of a small child might be a 

factor in the evidence, it might be a matter 

that the jury will have to consider or discuss. 

In the Court's view, there is nothing 

racially oriented about that kind of comment 

on the part of Mr. Lassiter -- or Reverend 

Lassiter or the State's concern. It seems 

that this is a view which standing on its own 

does provide a neutral ground and a neutral 

explanation for challenging Reverend Lassiter. 

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He volunteered that on his own. It's true 

that there was other inquiry with respect to 

other jurors, but he seems to have brought 

that up and to have made more of a point of it 

than other jurors. The fact that the State is 

concerned about it whether or not it's a concern that all prosecutors would have in the 

case does not affect whether it is a neutral 

concern or not. And so, without addressing 

the problem otherwise or the comment otherwise, I do not see that it is a racially oriented concern or is a ground which would constitute the basis for the Court to find that 

there is a lack of neutral explanation. 

The Court therefore finds that this 

ground in the case at bar does constitute a 

neutral explanation for challenging this particular juror. And for these reasons, the 

Court would determine that there is no basis 

to legally challenge under Batson v. Kentucky 

the exercise of the State's peremptory challenge. 

We agree with the federal district court that the state 

trial court's holding that the prosecutor had articulated a 

clear, reasonable, neutral and legitimate reason for challenging Lassiter is not clearly erroneous. And, to us, it 

seems quite correct. Child abuse was a part and parcel of 

the case against Sledd, and Lassiter, much more than any 

other potential juror, was a believer in the tenet that to 

spare the rod is to spoil the child. We hold that the 

prosecution's peremptory challenge of Lassiter was exercised 

in a constitutionally permissible manner. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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