Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02713/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

16cv2713-MMA (KSC) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

COLUMBUS ALLEN, JR., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JEFFREY BEARD, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 16cv2713-MMA (KSC) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION 

[Doc. No. 40] 

 Plaintiff Columbus Allen, Jr., a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various violations of his 

Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care by more than a dozen individual 

defendants. See Doc. No. 1. Defendants J. Clark Kelso, M. Ayala, J. Dogonyaro, K. 

Reilly, P. Nava, K. Allen, G. Hernandez, M. Voong, B. Paul, G. Chavarria, W. 

Montgomery, E. Estock, C. Espitia, J. Lewis, S. Kernan, J. Beard, and Hull (erroneously 

sued as Hall) previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them. See Doc. Nos. 

26, 28, 35. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ motions, and the Court granted the 

motions and dismissed his claims against these Defendants without prejudice. See Doc. 

No. 38. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration by the Court of its dismissal order. See 

Doc. No. 40. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 

Case 3:16-cv-02713-MMA-KSC Document 49 Filed 11/29/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 4
2 

16cv2713-MMA (KSC) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), district courts have the power to 

reconsider a previous ruling or entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion 

under Rule 59(e) seeks “a substantive change of mind by the court.” Tripati v. Henman, 

845 F.2d 205, 205 (9th Cir. 1988). Under Rule 59(e), it is appropriate to alter or amend a 

previous ruling if “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) 

the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly 

unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” United Nat. Ins. Co. v. 

Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009). Rule 60(b)(6) provides 

that a motion for “relief from judgment or order” may be granted “for any other reason 

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

To carry the burden of proof, the party seeking reconsideration must show more 

than a disagreement with the Court’s decision or a recapitulation of the cases and 

arguments previously considered by the court. See United States v. Westlands Water 

Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). A motion for reconsideration may 

not be used as a vehicle to re-litigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present 

evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of the judgment. See Exxon Shipping 

Co. v. Baker, 544 U.S. 471, 486-87 (2008); see also Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of 

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a motion for reconsideration 

“may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they 

could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”). 

                                               

1

 Although Plaintiff brings this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a timely 

motion for reconsideration may be brought under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Taylor v. Knapp, 871 

F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Case 3:16-cv-02713-MMA-KSC Document 49 Filed 11/29/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 4
3 

16cv2713-MMA (KSC) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Analysis 

 Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal order, arguing that 

dismissal of his claims “conflicts with this Court’s express finding that Plaintiff stated a 

claim sufficient to survive requisite 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and 1915A(b) screening.” 

Doc. No. 40 at 1. Plaintiff asserts that he believed no response to Defendants’ motions 

was necessary because Defendants’ motions to dismiss were “an attack” on the Court’s 

screening order, such that Plaintiff “expected an order denying Defendants’ motion[s] to 

dismiss as frivolous with a warning for sanctions for future disregard of the Court’s time 

and resources.” Id. at 7. This argument is quickly disposed of, as “the sua sponte 

screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any 

subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. 

Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

Plaintiff also laments his lack of a copy of this District’s Local Rules, which he 

claims contributed to his apparent misunderstanding of the requirement that he respond to 

Defendants’ motions. Id. at 4. However, the Local Rules merely set forth the ordinary

deadline for opposing a motion. See SD CivLR 7.1.e. The Court specifically advised 

Plaintiff in its screening order that Defendants would be responding to his complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. See Doc. No. 3 at 7 (ordering 

“Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the 

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a).”). 

Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that he has a 2009 copy of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure at his disposal. See Doc. No. 40 at 4. Even a cursory review of Rule 12 makes 

clear that a defendant may assert several types of defenses in a motion, and if so, the 

motion “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b). Thus, Plaintiff was on notice that any of the named defendants could respond to 

Plaintiff’s complaint by filing a motion to dismiss his claims. 

Plaintiff is not a stranger to motion practice, including those challenging the 

plausibility of his claims under Rule 12(b). Rather, Plaintiff is a seasoned litigant who 

Case 3:16-cv-02713-MMA-KSC Document 49 Filed 11/29/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 4
4 

16cv2713-MMA (KSC) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

has prosecuted multiple previous federal civil rights actions. See, e.g., Allen v. County of 

Stanislaus, Case No. 1:13-cv-00012-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.); Allen v. Cheung, Case No. 

1:09-cv-00930-AWI-JLT (E.D. Cal.); Allen v. Kernan, Case No. 3:16-cv-1923-CABJMA (S.D. Cal.). Thus, his alleged unfamiliarity with litigation generally, the rules 

applicable to civil cases, and the requirement that he support his claims, is suspect at best. 

The Court also notes that Plaintiff has previously failed to oppose motions to 

dismiss his claims, been advised by the court of his need to actively litigate his case, and 

then later sought relief based on similar arguments which he raises in his current motion 

for reconsideration. See Doc. No. 35 at 2, Case No. 1:13-cv-00012-DAD-SAB (E.D. 

Cal.) (asserting that he failed to oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss because he 

construed their motion as “an attempt to delay the filing of an answer.”). As such, 

Plaintiff’s contention of ignorance of the applicable law and procedure is not credible. In 

any event, “ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se prisoner, generally does 

not excuse prompt filing.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999). 

 Finally, and importantly, Plaintiff has not otherwise demonstrated any meritorious 

substantive basis for relief under the applicable legal standards, and has therefore not met 

his burden as the party moving for reconsideration. Mindful of its duty to “construe pro 

se pleadings liberally,” Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 

2003), the Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s motion, and finds that Plaintiff fails 

to assert any legally cognizable basis to support reconsideration of the Court’s previous 

ruling. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: November 29, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

Case 3:16-cv-02713-MMA-KSC Document 49 Filed 11/29/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 4