Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05451/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Anthony Barquera,

Petitioner,

v. 

Samuel Rogers, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-05451-PHX-DLR (MTM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Mark Anthony Barquera has filed a Motion to Stay (doc. 14) and 

Respondents Samuel Rogers and the Arizona Attorney General’s Office have filed a

Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer (doc. 16) to the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (doc. 1). 

I. Summary of Conclusion.

The Petition is before the Court here at the same time as one of its stated claims for 

relief remains pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner seeks a stay in the 

interest of judicial economy. The Court should deny Petitioner’s Motion to Stay. The 

Petition is a “mixed” petition of unexhausted and exhausted claims, which the Court is 

precluded from considering under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). While Petitioner 

may seek a stay pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 

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269 (2005), Petitioner is required to demonstrate good cause for failing to exhaust his state 

court remedies before proceeding to federal court. Petitioner has failed to do so, because 

the general interest in efficiency and economy is insufficient to explain why Petitioner did 

not fully exhaust his claims in state court first. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Stay 

should be denied, and he should be given leave to file an amended petition that does not 

include unexhausted state court claims. Additionally, Respondents’ Motion for Extension 

of Time should be denied as moot.

II. Factual Background.

On February 26, 2016, Petitioner pled no contest to one count of manslaughter in 

violation of A.R.S. § 13-1103. (Doc. 1 at 176, 178.) On May 20, 2016, Petitioner was 

sentenced to a term of eighteen (18) years in prison. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner filed his first 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure with the 

Maricopa County Superior Court on July 18, 2016. (Id. at 3.) The Superior Court denied 

relief, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on July 6, 2017. (Id. at 4). On January 

25, 2019, Petitioner filed a Second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief with the Maricopa 

County Superior Court. On February 19, 2019, the Superior Court dismissed the petition 

summarily. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s decision to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, which has yet to issue its decision. (Id.) 

On October 21, 2019, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 

1). According to Petitioner, the Second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief involves newly 

discovered evidence not previously available to Petitioner in his first state court postconviction proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 4.) On February 24, 2020, Petitioner filed the present 

Motion to Stay (doc. 14), arguing that judicial efficiency warrants staying these 

proceedings until the Arizona Court of Appeals rules on Petitioner’s second state court 

post-conviction relief proceeding. Respondents do not oppose Petitioner’s motion but do 

request that they not be required to answer the Petition until thirty (30) days after the Court 

rules on the motion to stay. (Doc. 15 at 1.)1

1 Respondents’ Motion for Extension of Time (doc. 16) requests effectively the same relief: 

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III. Legal Standard.

An order denying a stay in a habeas proceeding is generally considered a dispositive 

order outside the authority granted to a magistrate judge. Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 

1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2015). Because denial of the stay may ultimately result in the loss 

of some of Petitioner’s claims if they are eventually found to be unexhausted, dismissed, 

or outside the statute of limitations, a report and recommendation is the preferable method 

to address Petitioner’s motion.2 See e.g., Miguel Zepeda v. U.S., No. CV-17-1229-PHXROS (JFM), 2019 WL 885369 *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2019) (addressing prisoner’s 

unopposed motion to stay via report and recommendation “in an abundance of caution” as 

to whether the motion is dispositive).

A stay of a habeas proceeding should only be granted in limited circumstances. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Generally, a district court is required to dismiss a “mixed” petition 

involving exhausted and unexhausted state court claims. Rose 455 U.S. at 510. A stay of a 

“mixed” petition is appropriate if (1) the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust 

his claims in state court; (2) the petitioner’s unexhausted claims are meritorious; and (3) 

there is no indication the petitioner engaged in “intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.”

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. Good cause may be established where the petition “can set forth 

a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify” the failure to exhaust 

petitioner’s claims in state court. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014).

IV. Analysis.

A. Stay and Abeyance Under Rhines.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that a stay of these proceedings under Rhines is 

appropriate. Petitioner has met the second and third prongs of the Rhines test; Petitioner’s 

unexhausted claim regarding an allegedly fabricated toxicology report is not plainly 

a thirty (30) day extension to file their Answer to the Petition.

2

It is possible that Petitioner’s Ground Two, which is based on allegedly newly discovered 

evidence (doc. 1 at 4), is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) and is subject to equitable 

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) while the Arizona Court of Appeals considers 

Petitioner’s claim. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). However, 

Respondents did not brief the issue when responding to Petitioner’s motion, and a 

determination as to timeliness would be premature at this juncture.

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meritless, and Petitioner has not engaged in any dilatory litigation tactics. However, it is 

the first prong of the Rhines test that Petitioner is unable to overcome. Petitioner does not 

set forth either a “reasonable excuse” or “sufficient evidence” under Blake to demonstrate 

good cause. Petitioner may be able to provide that justification and evidence within the 

period to file objections to this Report and Recommendation, but on this record, the 

justification required by Blake is not present for Petitioner to obtain a Rhines stay.

While Petitioner does cite to “judicial efficiency and economy” in support of his 

Motion to Stay, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) sets a higher 

bar for staying habeas proceedings. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. (“Staying a federal habeas 

petition frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to 

delay the resolution of federal proceedings.”). Judicial efficiency and economy, without 

more, do not explain Petitioner’s failure to fully litigate his claims in state court before 

proceeding to federal court. See Wright v. Oubre, 768 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1283 (N.D. Ga. 

2011) (“Rhines requires good cause for failure to exhaust state remedies, not simply good 

cause for granting a stay because a petitioner may face time constraints and experiences 

anxiety because of the AEDPA limitations period.”) Accordingly, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated good cause to stay his current federal habeas proceeding under Rhines.

B. Alternative Remedial Measures.

As the Court stated in its February 10, 2020 Order (doc. 10), district courts cannot 

adjudicate “mixed” petitions of exhausted and unexhausted claims. (Id. at 2 n.1.) However, 

a court is required to give a prisoner an opportunity correct the petition before dismissal is 

appropriate. Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2013.) A prisoner not 

entitled to a Rhines stay may elect to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed on 

exhausted claims only. Alternatively, under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), 

overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) a 

prisoner may voluntarily dismiss unexhausted claims, petition the court to hold the 

exhausted claims in abeyance until the unexhausted claims are exhausted, and then amend 

the newly exhausted claim back into his petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). However, the 

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statute of limitations will resume running on his unexhausted claims unless he is entitled 

to equitable tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Additionally, a habeas claim does not 

“relate back” when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ “in both 

time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 

(2005). This means that once dismissed, the amendment may be improper under the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure if the amended claim differs too significantly from the exhausted 

claims. Accordingly, the Petitioner should be granted an opportunity to decide which 

option to take.3

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(1) Petition’s Motion to Stay (doc. 14) be denied.

(2) Petitioner be given leave to file an amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus that does not include any claims not fully exhausted in state court.

(3) Respondents’ Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response (doc. 16) be

denied as moot. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

3 As an amendment to the petition or an abeyance under Kelly will provide Respondents 

with all the relief from filing their Answer that they seek, Respondents’ Motion for an 

Extension of Time should be denied as moot.

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findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 20th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

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