Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05045/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2005 Decided August 9, 2005

No. 04-5045

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01246)

David F. Klein argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were John R. Ferguson and Arthur B. Spitzer.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 1 of 32
2

1The appellants do not claim a right to collect signatures inside

post offices, an activity that is also constrained by regulation. See 39

C.F.R. § 232.1(a), (h)(1).

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A United States Postal Service

regulation bans “soliciting signatures on petitions, polls, or

surveys” on “all real property under the charge and control of

the Postal Service.” The district court rejected the plaintiffs’

First Amendment challenge to this regulation, concluding that

even if all exterior postal properties are public forums, the

regulation is a valid restriction on the time, place, or manner of

speech. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the

judgment of the district court and remand the case for further

proceedings. 

I

The appellants are seven individuals and organizations that

attempt to place initiatives on state ballots by collecting

signatures on petitions. They contend that sidewalks and other

exterior areas of post offices are particularly fertile locations for

the procurement of such signatures.1 Until relatively recently,

Postal Service regulations were silent on the subject of soliciting

petition signatures on postal premises, while a 1992 postal

bulletin expressly permitted “issue-oriented petitioning [and]

campaigning for a referendum or ballot initiative.” See POSTAL

BULLETIN 21814 (Apr. 30, 1992). In 1998, however, the Postal

Service amended its regulation governing “[c]onduct on postal

property” to ban that activity. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1. The

regulation now provides as follows, with the relevant change

italicized:

Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for

election to any public office, collecting private debts,

soliciting and vending for commercial purposes . . . ,

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 2 of 32
3

displaying or distributing commercial advertising,

soliciting signatures on petitions, polls, or surveys

(except as otherwise authorized by Postal Service

regulations), and impeding ingress to or egress from

post offices are prohibited.

39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1) (emphasis added). Section 232.1

applies “to all real property under the charge and control of the

Postal Service.” Id. § 232.1(a). The regulation stipulates that it

must be posted “at a conspicuous place on all such property,”

id., and subjects violators to criminal penalties, including fines

and imprisonment. See id. § 232.1(p). 

In 2000, the appellants brought suit against the Postal

Service in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, contending that § 232.1(h)(1) violates the First

Amendment. They argued that the regulation is unconstitutional

on its face and as applied to their specific petitioning activities.

Both sides moved for summary judgment.

The district court initially denied the motions, on the ground

that there were insufficient facts in the record to entitle either

party to judgment as a matter of law. See Initiative &

Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 116 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67

(D.D.C. 2000). The court recognized that the scope of the

plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights depends upon whether the

property at issue is “defined as a traditional public forum, a

designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum.” Id. at 69. That

determination, the court said, “turns on an analysis of the

specific nature and characteristics of the actual property in

question.” Id. at 71. The court added that, in order to hold the

regulation unconstitutional on its face, it “would have to decide

whether all post office exterior property should be deemed a

traditional public forum, a designated public forum or a

nonpublic forum.” Id. at 73. Lacking sufficient “facts about all

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 3 of 32
4

actual post offices,” the court concluded that it could not

determine whether the regulation was “unconstitutional on its

face or [even] as applied.” Id.

The court did, however, find some issues resolvable on the

record before it. First, it decided that § 232.1(h)(1) was content

neutral “because it was not adopted based on a disagreement

with the content of speech.” Id. at 74. Second, the court stated

that it did not need to further investigate whether any postal

property was a designated public forum, because designated

public forums may be closed by viewpoint- and content-neutral

regulations. Id. Finally, the court decided that § 232.1(h)(1)

“would withstand the minimal level of scrutiny applicable to

regulations in a nonpublic forum.” Id. at 75.

Following the district court’s decision, the appellants filed

an amended complaint identifying twelve postal properties on

which they had sought “and in the future would seek to gather

signatures on petitions.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 52, at 14. The

parties then engaged in discovery, and eventually cross-moved

for summary judgment again. At a hearing on those motions,

the Postal Service “announced . . . in open court that it ha[d]

changed its articulated position from the one it took early in this

litigation to one more favorable to plaintiffs on whether certain

alternative channels of communication on exterior postal

properties would violate 39 C.F.R. § 232.1.” Initiative &

Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 00-1246, Order at 1

(D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2002) (“Sept. 2002 Order”). The change in

position was twofold. The Postal Service said that: (1) it would

not apply § 232.1(h)(1) to public perimeter sidewalks that are

indistinguishable from their non-postal counterparts; and (2)

where the regulation’s ban on soliciting signatures remained

applicable, it would limit the ban to the actual collection of

signatures on postal property and not apply it where a petitioner

merely asks people to sign at off-premises locations. See

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 4 of 32
5

Motions Hr’g Tr. at 29, 32-34 (Sept. 24, 2002). The Postal

Service “also expressed willingness to issue a bulletin to its

postmasters directing them to adhere to this changed position.”

Sept. 2002 Order at 1. The district court directed the Postal

Service to submit the text of such a proposed bulletin, and said

that it “would be relying on that changed position in deciding

upon the pending summary judgment motions.” Id.

Thereafter, the Postal Service submitted a proposed bulletin,

styled as a reminder to postmasters about their obligations in

enforcing § 232.1(h)(1)’s regulation of “activities in support of

ballot initiatives and public referenda.” Def.’s Notice of Filing

of Proposed U.S. Postal Service Postal Bulletin, Ex. 1. The

postal bulletin in its published form -- which largely resembles

the version submitted to the district court -- states that §

232.1(h)(1) does

not apply to municipal or other public perimeter

sidewalks, even if the Postal Service’s property line

extends onto such a sidewalk . . . . The beginning of

Postal Service-controlled space must be easily

distinguishable to members of the public by means of

some physical feature. For example, a Postal Service

sidewalk that is perpendicular to the city sidewalk

would indicate to members of the public that they are

entering onto Postal Service property, as would stairs

leading up to the entrance of a Post Office.

POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19 (Jan. 8, 2004). The bulletin

further confines the regulation’s application

to efforts to have members of the public provide

signatures on Postal Service premises, and not to

communications that promote the signing of petitions,

polls, and surveys somewhere other than on Postal

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 5 of 32
6

S[e]rvice premises. . . . Thus, if a petition circulator

wishes to collect signatures for a petition, poll, or

survey, he or she would not be prohibited from

standing on exterior parts of Postal Service property

that are open to the public and passing out

informational leaflets, holding up a sign, or both. The

leaflet or sign could provide relevant information about

the petition, poll, or survey, and direct Postal Service

customers to nearby non-Postal Service property, that

is, property not under the Postal Service’s charge and

control, where they can sign the petition, poll, or

survey, if they so desire.

Id.

On December 31, 2003, the district court granted the Postal

Service’s motion for summary judgment. The court stated that

it could not hold § 232.1(h)(1) unconstitutional on its face unless

the regulation was unconstitutional as to each of the

approximately 34,000 postal installations in the country.

Initiative & Referendum Inst. v.U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp.

2d 143, 148 (D.D.C. 2003). Because “proper forum analysis

require[s] an examination of aspects of each of those

properties,” and because the record still lacked information “that

would be essential to support an injunction applicable to all such

locations,” the court concluded that the only way it could

declare the regulation facially unconstitutional was if “all

exterior post office properties [were] traditional public

for[ums]” and the regulation failed to pass constitutional muster

under the exacting scrutiny that applies to such forums. Id.

Assuming for purposes of analysis that all the exterior properties

were public forums, the court found that § 232.1(h)(1) was a

valid time, place, or manner restriction because “this contentneutral regulation promotes a significant government interest

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 6 of 32
7

and will leave open ample alternative channels of

communication.” Id. at 147. This appeal followed.

II

The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech, . . . or the right of the people . . . to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.” There is no question

that “the solicitation of signatures for a petition involves

protected speech.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 n.5

(1988). Indeed, this kind of speech “is at the core of our

electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms -- an

area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at

its zenith.” Id. at 425 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

The fact that petitioning constitutes protected speech,

however, “merely begins [the] inquiry.” Cornelius v. NAACP

Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). The

Supreme Court “has adopted a forum analysis as a means of

determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use

of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of

those wishing to use the property for other purposes.” Id. at

800. Under that analysis, “the extent to which the Government

can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.”

Id.

Three forum categories have emerged. The first is referred

to as the “traditional” public forum. The analysis applicable to

this category is as follows:

“[P]ublic places” historically associated with the free

exercise of expressive activities, such as streets,

sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 7 of 32
8

be “public forums.” In such places, the government’s

ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is

very limited: the government may enforce reasonable

time, place, and manner regulations as long as the

restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored

to serve a significant government interest, and leave

open ample alternative channels of communication.”

Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition

on a particular type of expression will be upheld only

if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling

governmental interest.

United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citations

omitted) (quoting Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local

Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The second category

is the “designated” public forum, “public property which the

state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive

activity.” Perry Education Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. Restrictions

on expression in such forums are evaluated under the same

standard as that applicable to traditional public forums. Id. at

46. Finally, on government property that is not a public forum,

“the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,

communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech

is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely

because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id.; see

generally Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jewsfor Jesus, Inc., 482

U.S. 569, 573 (1987).

In considering the appellants’ facial challenge to the Postal

Service regulation, the district court made three key

determinations. First, it held that even if all postal properties

were public forums, the ban on soliciting signatures contained

in § 232.1(h)(1) would survive as a reasonable regulation of the

time, place, or manner of protected expression. In Part III, we

explain why in fact the ban fails scrutiny as a time, place, or

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 8 of 32
9

manner restriction in public forums. In Part IV.B, we explain

why one aspect of the ban is invalid (in the absence of a limiting

construction) even for postal properties that are not public

forums. 

The court’s second key determination was that the

appellants’ facial challenge could succeed only by showing that

the regulation was unconstitutional in all of its applications. For

the reasons discussed in Part IV.A, we also disagree with that

determination.

Finally, the district court decided to conduct its inquiry as

though § 232.1(h)(1) had been modified by the then-draft postal

bulletin. For the reasons discussed in Part V, the bulletin

(subsequently issued as Postal Bulletin 22119) can play that role

only in part. We therefore initially analyze the constitutionality

of the regulation as it was published in the Federal Register and

codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.

III

The facial constitutionality of § 232.1(h)(1) depends in

large part on whether the postal properties at issue are public

forums. But we need not resolve the forum status of these

properties if the regulation would be a permissible restriction on

speech even in such forums. We therefore first ask (as the

district court did) whether § 232.1(h)(1) can be constitutionally

applied to public forums.

As noted above, “the government may enforce reasonable

time, place, and manner regulations” restricting expression in a

public forum “as long as the restrictions ‘are content-neutral, are

narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and

leave open ample alternative channels of communication.’”

Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (citations omitted) (quoting Perry

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 9 of 32
10

2See Grace, 461 U.S. at 181-82 & n.10 (ban on picketing and

leafleting on the Supreme Court’s sidewalks “to protect persons and

property” and “to maintain proper order and decorum”); Heffron v.

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-50

(1981) (ban on selling and distributing materials outside fixed

locations on state fairgrounds to “maintain the orderly movement of

the crowd”); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466

U.S. 789, 805-06 (1984) (ban on posting signs on public property to

“eliminat[e] clutter and visual blight”); see also Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Government regulation of

expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without

reference to the content of the regulated speech.” (internal quotation

marks omitted) (emphasis added)).

Education Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45). Although we conclude that §

232.1(h)(1) is content neutral and serves a significant

government interest, we find that it is not narrowly tailored and

does not preserve ample alternative channels of communication.

A

The Postal Service has advanced a significant, contentneutral interest in support of its ban on the solicitation of

signatures on petitions. In explaining its rationale for amending

§ 232.1(h)(1), the Postal Service stated that it wanted “to

minimize the disruption of postal business and to provide

unimpeded ingress and egress of customers and employees to

and from post offices.” 62 Fed. Reg. 61,481, 61,481 (Nov. 18,

1997). The Supreme Court has repeatedly found this kind of

government interest sufficient to satisfy the significance and

content-neutrality elements of the time, place, or manner test.2

But while the government’s interest is sufficient, §

232.1(h)(1) is not narrowly tailored to effectuate it. To be

narrowly tailored, a regulation “need not be the least restrictive

or least intrusive means” of serving the government’s interests.

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 10 of 32
11

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 

Nonetheless, it must not “burden substantially more speech than

is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”

Id. at 799. A “statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and

eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to

remedy. A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if

each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately

targeted evil.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).

The Postal Service “does not suggest that all signaturegatherers engage in harassment of postal customers.”

Appellee’s Br. at 46. It contends only “that the potential exists

and, in fact, occasionally does occur.” Id. (emphasis added). As

the government explained in its memorandum to the district

court, the Postal Service argues that the “restrictions target

precisely the conduct that impinges on the significant

government interests sought to be advanced, i.e., signaturegathering activities that interfere with customer satisfaction by

being, at times, disruptive, that occasionally give the appearance

of bias or partiality on the part of [the Postal Service], and that

at times require postal employees to spend too much of their

time on nonpostal business.” Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts at 36

(emphasis added). “There is no evidence,” the government

insists, that the “regulation restricting signature-gathering

activities on exterior postal property does not serve these

legitimate interests.” Id.

We agree that the regulation serves the government’s

legitimate interests. But it surely does not, in the government’s

words, “target” those interests “precisely.” To the contrary,

since the problems the government identifies arise only

“occasionally” and “at times,” the across-the-board ban on

signature solicitation necessarily bars much solicitation that is

not disruptive, does not give the appearance of partiality on the

part of the Postal Service, and does not require excessive postal

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 11 of 32
12

worker time. Thus, a “substantial portion of the burden on

speech does not serve to advance” the government’s contentneutral goals. American Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 88

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This lack of narrow tailoring was precisely the problem that

led the Supreme Court, in United States v. Grace, to rule

unconstitutional a statutory ban on the display of flags or

banners on the sidewalk in front of the Court’s own building.

As the Court said:

We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons

and property or to maintain proper order and decorum

within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question

whether a total ban on carrying a flag, banner or device

on the public sidewalks substantially serves these

purposes. There is no suggestion, for example, that

appellees’ activities [one appellee had distributed

leaflets; the other had displayed a sign with the text of

the First Amendment] in any way obstructed the

sidewalks or access to the Building . . . or in any way

interfered with the orderly administration . . . of the

grounds.

Grace, 461 U.S. at 182. Similarly, in Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, the Court explained why a total prohibition of

handbilling would be unconstitutional: 

A ban on handbilling, of course, would suppress a

great quantity of speech that does not cause the evils

that it seeks to eliminate, whether they be fraud, crime,

litter, traffic congestion, or noise. For that reason, a

complete ban on handbilling would be substantially

broader than necessary to achieve the interests

justifying it.

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 12 of 32
13

3This court has found the same problem in other government

efforts to restrict speech in public forums. In Community for Creative

Non-Violence v. Turner, for example, we held invalid a regulation,

promulgated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA), that required permits for organized free speech activities

at above-ground areas of WMATA stations. The requirement was not

narrowly tailored, we said, because “[w]hile the Regulation arguably

eliminates the ‘sources of evil’ that allegedly threaten WMATA’s

ability to provide a safe and efficient transportation system, it does so

at too high a cost, namely, by significantly restricting a substantial

quantity of speech that does not impede WMATA’s permissible

goals.” 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Likewise, in

Lederman v. United States, we declared unconstitutional a ban on

demonstrations on the sidewalk on the U.S. Capitol’s East Front. 291

F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Although we recognized that the ban

accomplished the legitimate purpose of reducing pedestrian traffic and

decreasing security risks, we concluded that “[s]ome banned

activities,” such as “a single leafleteer standing on the East Front

sidewalk,” were “no more likely [to] block traffic or threaten security”

than were ordinary pedestrians. Id. at 45. “[T]he Constitution does

not tolerate,” we said, “regulations that, while serving their purported

aims, prohibit a wide range of activities that do not interfere with the

Government’s objectives.” Id. at 44 (quoting Community for Creative

Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 n.7 (citation omitted).

Section 232.1(h)(1)’s absolute prohibition against soliciting

signatures on petitions anywhere on postal property suffers from

the same flaw these cases describe.3

Further evidence that § 232.1(h)(1) prohibits substantially

more speech than is necessary to achieve its aims is the fact that

the Postal Service already accomplishes those purposes through

myriad other means that do not involve an outright ban on the

solicitation of signatures. Such means include separate bans, in

the same regulation, against disturbing postal patrons and

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 13 of 32
14

4See 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(e) (“Disorderly conduct, or conduct . . .

which obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers, corridors, offices,

elevators, stairways, and parking lots, or which otherwise tends to

impede or disturb the public employees in the performance of their

duties, or which otherwise impedes or disturbs the general public in

transacting business or obtaining the services provided on property, is

prohibited.”); id. § 232.1(h)(1) (“[I]mpeding ingress to or egress from

post offices [is] prohibited.”); id. § 232.1(k)(4) (“The blocking of

entrances, driveways, walks, loading platforms, or fire hydrants in or

on property is prohibited.”); see also POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19

(noting that the activities of petition circulators “are still subject to

other provisions in the regulations pertaining to all parts of Postal

Service property, such as those prohibiting disturbances, soliciting

contributions or collecting private debts, campaigning for public

office, vending, commercial advertising, impeding ingress and egress,

depositing or posting literature, and setting up tables, stands, or other

structures”).

employees and against impeding entry.4 Of course, the

availability of other means of accomplishing a governmental

objective does not foreclose the government’s ability to pursue

its chosen course. But it is probative of whether the government

is burdening substantially more speech than is necessary to

accomplish that objective. A petition circulator who reduces a

passerby “to tears” or otherwise harasses or impedes postal

patrons -- concerns invoked by the Postal Service in support of

the regulation, see Appellee’s Br. at 45 -- can readily be dealt

with under those other provisions. 

Both the Supreme Court and this court have considered the

availability of other means when evaluating a restriction’s

tailoring. In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,

the Court noted that “ordinances that absolutely prohibit[]

handbilling on the streets [are] invalid” because cities can

“adequately protect the esthetic interest in avoiding litter

without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 14 of 32
15

those who actually litter.” 466 U.S. 789, 808-09 (1984); see

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (noting that

the defendant city could adopt “more temperate measures” than

a near-total ban on residential signs that “could in large part

satisfy [the city’s] regulatory needs without harm to the First

Amendment rights of its citizens”). And in Lederman v. United

States, we held that “[p]erhaps the most troubling aspect” of the

ban against “demonstration activity” on the sidewalk on the East

Front of the U.S. Capitol was “the ready availability of

substantially less restrictive alternatives that would equally

effective[ly] promote safety and orderly traffic flow,” such as

“existing laws” that bar disruptive conduct and obstructing

passage, and the possibility of requiring advance permits for

demonstrations. 291 F.3d 36, 45-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, the Postal Service disputes the suggestion that

prohibitions targeted at disturbances and impediments fully

accomplish its purposes, since “people who come to post offices

to engage in postal business may well be irritated by even the

nicest circulator, however brief the interruption may be, because

they are being interrupted in what they set out to do, questioned

about something plainly personal . . . , and asked to think about

an issue that presumably was not on their minds when they set

out to engage in postal business.” Appellee’s Br. at 46-47. But

the “ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to

shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . .

dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are

being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Erznoznik

v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975) (quoting

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). “Speech is often

provocative and challenging. . . . That is why [it is] . . . protected

against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to

produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil

that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 15 of 32
16

5See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.

288, 293 n.5 (1984) (noting that “it is common to place the burden

upon the Government to justify impingements on First Amendment

interests”); United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(holding that the government has the “burden of showing that [a]

regulation is ‘narrowly tailored’ to further the government’s interest

. . . in . . . an acknowledged public forum”).

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). There is

simply no reasonable argument that either an invasion of the

“substantial privacy interests” of postal patrons, or a “clear and

present danger of a serious substantive evil,” lurks in the

importuning of postal patrons on public sidewalks.

B

Section 232.1(h)(1) also fails a second element of the time,

place, or manner test: it does not leave open ample alternative

channels of communication. Rather, the plain language of §

232.1(h)(1) completely denies petition circulators the ability to

seek support for their petitioning efforts anywhere on postal

premises. 

The Postal Service contends that it nonetheless satisfies this

element because the appellants “may seek to gather signatures

on their initiatives and referenda in numerous other places on

non-postal property.” Appellee’s Br. at 52. We put to one side

the fact that the Service has not shown that there are such other

places anywhere near postal property,5 because it is in any event

not enough that petitioners may solicit signatures at other

locations. The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of

providing access “within the forum in question.” Heffron v.

International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.

640, 655 (1981). “[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty

of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 16 of 32
17

6See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802 (finding that New

York City’s sound-amplification guideline for use of the Central Park

bandshell left open ample alternatives because it “continue[d] to

permit expressive activity in the bandshell” (emphasis added)); cf.

International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee [ISKCON v.

Lee], 505 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1992) (upholding a ban on soliciting

contributions inside nonpublic-forum airport terminals, in part because

solicitation was permitted on exterior terminal sidewalks and thus “the

resulting access of those who would solicit the general public [was]

quite complete”).

may be exercised in some other place.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.

844, 880 (1997) (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.

147, 163 (1939)).

Indeed, the United States made the same argument, to no

avail, in Grace. There, the government asserted that “the

inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court grounds

but should focus on ‘the vicinity of the Supreme Court’ or ‘the

public places of Washington D.C.’” Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.

“Viewed in this light,” the government contended, there were

“sufficient alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as

the streets around the Court or the sidewalks across those

streets[,] to permit [the statute] to be considered a reasonable

‘place’ restriction.” Id. The Court rejected the argument,

holding that the statutory ban on displaying flags or banners on

the Supreme Court’s perimeter sidewalk was unconstitutional.

See id. at 181. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v.

Turner, this court likewise held that a Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority (WMATA) regulation, which required

permits for organized free speech activities at Metro stations,

failed the ample alternatives prong because there were “no

WMATA areas not covered by the permit requirement” and

hence “no intra-forum alternative[s].” 893 F.2d 1387, 1393

(D.C. Cir. 1990).6

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 17 of 32
18

7See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 (recognizing that certain “means of

communication” -- including handbilling, solicitation, and marching --

may “not be completely banned” in residential areas).

8See Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial v. Kennedy, 116

F.3d 495, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The cases protecting the right to

solicit contributions in a public forum do so not because the First

The Postal Service also maintains that its total ban on

signature solicitation is saved by the fact that other forms of

communication, including leafleting and talking about the issue

raised by the petition, may take place on postal property. But in

Grace, the statutory prohibition on the display of a “flag,

banner, or device” was not saved by the fact that the statute did

“not prohibit all expressive conduct.” 461 U.S. at 181 n.10.

Instead, the Court emphasized that exacting scrutiny should be

applied to an “absolute prohibition on a particular type of

expression.” Id. at 177 (emphasis added); see id. at 181 (noting

that the statute “totally bans the specific communicative activity

on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds” (emphasis

added)). Similarly, in City of Ladue, the Court rejected a city’s

claim that its ban against signs on residential property satisfied

the time, place, or manner test because residents “remain[ed]

free to convey their desired messages by other means, such as

hand-held signs, letters, [and] handbills.” City of Ladue, 512

U.S. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted

that expression via residential signs is a “means of

communication that is both unique and important,” id. at 54, and

that its “prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws

that foreclose an entire medium of expression.” Id. at 55.7

Moreover, although in the context of bans on soliciting

funds it is possible to separate the protected speech involved in

the solicitation from the related conduct of actually collecting

funds,8“the circulation of a petition involves the type of

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 18 of 32
19

Amendment contemplates the right to raise money, but rather because

the act of solicitation contains a communicative element.”); see also

ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 704-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgments) (stating that, although a ban on “all speech that requested

the contribution of funds” would be unconstitutional, a prohibition

that reached “only personal solicitations for immediate payment of

money” was permissible because it was “directed only at the physical

exchange of money, which is an element of conduct interwoven with

otherwise expressive solicitation”).

interactive communication concerning political change that is

appropriately described as ‘core political speech.’” Meyer, 486

U.S. at 421-22 (emphasis added). That interactive

communication comprises both the request for the signature and

the signature itself, because the circulation of an initiative

petition not only involves the “expression of a desire for

political change,” id. at 421, but also is a means of “plac[ing] the

matter on the ballot, [and thus making] the matter the focus of

statewide discussion,” id. at 423. Indeed, the circulation of a

petition involves an element of speech beyond leafleting or signholding, because the collection of signatures -- particularly for

an initiative or referendum ballot -- is essential to accomplishing

the circulator’s purpose.

The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on petition

circulation can impermissibly impede protected speech even if

they do not ban signature collection outright. In Meyer v. Grant,

the Court struck down a state law regulating the initiative

process that made it a felony to pay petition circulators. Id. at

416. As the Postal Service does here, the state argued there that,

“even if the statute imposes some limitation on First

Amendment expression, the burden is permissible because other

avenues of expression remain open to” the plaintiffs. Id. at 424.

Rejecting this argument, the Court held:

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 19 of 32
20

That appellees remain free to employ other means to

disseminate their ideas does not take their speech

through petition circulators outside the bounds of First

Amendment protection. [The] prohibition of paid

petition circulators restricts access to the most

effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue

of political discourse, direct one-on-one

communication. That it leaves open “more

burdensome” avenues of communication, does not

relieve its burden on First Amendment expression.

Id. Like the state law in Meyer, the Postal Service’s prohibition

of signature solicitation “limits the size of the audience” the

appellants can reach and “makes it less likely that [they] will

garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on

the ballot.” Id. at 423. Section 232.1(h)(1) thus “trenches upon

an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections

is ‘at its zenith,’” id. at 425, and we “are not persuaded that

adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech”

that the Postal Service has closed off. City of Ladue, 512 U.S.

at 56.

In sum, the Postal Service’s ban on soliciting signatures

neither is narrowly tailored nor ensures ample alternative

channels of communication. It therefore cannot be upheld as a

time, place, or manner restriction of speech if applied in a public

forum.

IV

The conclusion that § 232.1(h)(1) fails scrutiny if exterior

postal property constitutes a public forum does not alone resolve

the appellants’ facial challenge. That is not, however, because

the appellants must prove that all applications of the regulation

are unconstitutional in order to succeed on a facial challenge.

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 20 of 32
21

To the contrary, there “are two quite different ways in which a

statute or ordinance may be considered invalid ‘on its face’ --

either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable

application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of

protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally ‘overbroad.’”

Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796. Although the “every

application” formulation is the general rule, the latter is the rule

for facial challenges brought under the First Amendment. “The

showing that a law punishes a substantial amount of protected

free speech, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

sweep, suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law.”

Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted); see Ashcroft v. Free Speech

Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 256 (2002). As the Supreme

Court has explained, it “provided this expansive remedy out of

concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may

deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech -- especially

when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.” Id. at

119.

A

Given our conclusion that § 232.1(h)(1) is unconstitutional

when applied to a public forum, one way in which the regulation

would be overbroad is if a substantial number of exterior postal

properties constitute public forums. If they do, the regulation

creates an unacceptably high risk of chilling constitutionally

protected solicitation on such properties. See Hicks, 539 U.S. at

119; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872. 

Certain kinds of postal sidewalks present hard questions

regarding their forum status. In United States v. Kokinda, four

Justices concluded that a particular postal sidewalk -- one

“constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals

engaged in postal business” and that “le[d] only from the

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 21 of 32
22

parking area to the front door of the post office” -- was not a

public forum. 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,

announcing the judgment of the Court and joined by three

Justices). Those four also concluded that a ban on “soliciting

alms and contributions” (a separate clause of the same

regulation at issue here) was “reasonable as applied” to that

sidewalk. Id. at 737. Four other Justices, however, found that

“the sidewalk in question” was a public forum, and that the

restriction was not a permissible time, place, or manner

restriction. Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., joined by three Justices,

dissenting). Justice Kennedy, writing separately, agreed there

was a “powerful argument” that “this postal sidewalk . . . is

more than a nonpublic forum,” id. at 737 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in the judgment), but concluded that it was

unnecessary to decide the question because even if the sidewalk

was a public forum, “the postal regulation me[t] the traditional

standards we have applied to time, place, and manner

restrictions of protected expression.” Id. at 738. As the district

court noted and the Postal Service agrees, the split nature of the

decision in Kokinda “provides no definitive guidance” on the

forum status of postal sidewalks. Appellee’s Br. at 17 (quoting

Initiative & Referendum Institute, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 70).

But while a sidewalk like that in Kokinda may be hard to

categorize, the Supreme Court has made categorization of

another kind of sidewalk straightforward. In Grace, the Court

held that it could “discern no reason why” the “sidewalks

comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds” --

sidewalks that are “indistinguishable from any other sidewalks

in Washington, D.C.” -- should not be treated as traditional

public forums. 461 U.S. at 179. The Court explained:

Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public

property that traditionally have been held open to the

public for expressive activities and are clearly within

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 22 of 32
23

those areas of public property that may be considered,

generally without further inquiry, to be public forum

property. . . . There is no separation, no fence, and no

indication whatever to persons stepping from the street

to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of

the Court grounds that they have entered some special

type of enclave. . . . Traditional public forum property

. . . will not lose its historically recognized character

for the reason that it abuts government property that

has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for

public expression.

Id. at 179-80. Given that the “public sidewalks forming the

perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds” are public forums, id.

at 180, there can be no doubt that similar sidewalks abutting post

offices qualify as well. “The mere fact that a sidewalk abuts

property dedicated to purposes other than free speech is not

enough to strip it of public forum status.” Henderson v. Lujan,

964 F.2d 1179, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see id. (holding that two

sidewalks within the area designated as the Vietnam Veterans

Memorial, “indistinguishable from ordinary sidewalks used for

the full gamut of urban walking,” constitute public forums);

Lederman, 291 F.3d at 44 (holding that the sidewalk on the East

Front of the Capitol, at the foot of the Capitol steps, is a public

forum).

It is uncontested that some postal properties contain what

we will hereinafter refer to as Grace sidewalks. For example,

on the list of twelve postal facilities assembled by the appellants

in support of their as-applied challenge is the Georgetown Post

Office in Washington, D.C., which directly abuts a sidewalk that

is indistinguishable from the municipal sidewalk. See

Appellants’ Br. at 55. At oral argument, the Postal Service

conceded that this sidewalk, which the Postal Service owns,

constitutes a Grace sidewalk and hence a public forum. See

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 23 of 32
24

Oral Arg. Tape at 37:43-39:18. The appellants contend that

their evidentiary “exhibits show[] that the pedestrian sidewalks”

at the other urban post offices on the list also are

“indistinguishable from the types of public sidewalks that courts

have always described as ‘quintessential public forums.’”

Appellants’ Br. at 54. The Postal Service does not deny this

contention.

Not all post offices, of course, have Grace sidewalks.

Although it seems likely that many urban post offices do, and

that the regulation’s restraint on protected speech is thus

substantial, the district court did not consider the question

because it wrongly believed that a facial challenge requires

proof that all exterior postal properties constitute public forums.

See Initiative & Referendum Inst., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 148.

Accordingly, on remand the district court will have to determine

whether the Postal Service’s regulation “abridges protected

speech . . . in a good number of cases.” Ruggiero v. FCC, 317

F.3d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring).

B

But § 232.1(h)(1) has another facial flaw, apart from its

application to Grace sidewalks. On its face, the regulation

appears to bar pure solicitation -- in the sense of asking postal

patrons to sign petitions -- even if the signatures themselves are

to be collected off postal premises. See 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1)

(“[S]oliciting signatures on petitions, polls, or surveys . . . [is]

prohibited.”). The ordinary meaning of “solicit” is merely to

request, without reference to whether an immediate response is

expected. See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

1118 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “solicit” as to “entreat” or

“approach with a request or plea”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1427 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “solicitation” as the “act or an

instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something; a request

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 24 of 32
25

9See, e.g., People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8, 13 (Colo. 1982) (en

banc) (“The offense of soliciting is complete when the offender

solicits another for prostitution . . . . The prostitute’s subsequent

decision to engage or not to engage in a sexual act with her customer

is not essential to th[is] crime[].”); People v. Burt, 288 P.2d 503, 505

(Cal. 1955) (“[Solicitation of a felony,] unlike conspiracy, does not

require the commission of any overt act. It is complete when the

solicitation is made, and it is immaterial that the object of the

solicitation is never consummated, or that no steps are taken toward

its consummation.”).

or petition”). In criminal law, “solicitation” is regarded as a

freestanding offense: requesting the unlawful act is itself a

crime, regardless of whether the request is consummated. See

id.9 Indeed, the district court described the more limited

prohibition contained in the draft postal bulletin -- which only

barred on-site collection of signatures -- as a “change” in the

Postal Service’s own previously “articulated position” regarding

the meaning of the regulation. Sept. 2002 Order at 1. 

It is clear that a broadscale prohibition against asking postal

patrons to sign petitions at other locations, whether such

requests are made verbally or in distributed pamphlets, is

unconstitutional even if all postal properties are nonpublic

forums. Although restrictions on speech in such forums are

permissible, they still must be “reasonable.” Perry Education

Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held

absolute bans on pamphleteering and canvassing invalid,

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 25 of 32
26

10See Lee v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

[Lee v. ISKCON], 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a ban

on leafleting in airport terminals); Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 575-76

(holding unconstitutional a ban that effectively prohibited, within an

airport terminal, “talking” or “the wearing of campaign buttons or

symbolic clothing” that was not “airport related,” noting that “no

conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute

prohibition of speech”).

11See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of

Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160 (2002) (noting that “[f]or over 50 years,

the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and

pamphleteering”).

whether applied to nonpublic governmental forums1 0 or to

private property,11 because of their substantial overbreadth.

None of the government interests previously identified --

against disturbing postal patrons, impeding their access, or

invading their privacy -- reasonably justifies an across-the-board

prohibition of pure solicitation on postal sidewalks. Although

simply asking for a signature might in some circumstances

create one or another of those problems, it is doubtful that it

would do so in many. Nor is there any reason to believe that

requesting signatures is any more disruptive, or invasive, than is

approaching (or talking to) a postal patron in the course of

“[l]eafleting, distributing literature, picketing, and

demonstrating,” which the postal regulations do not prohibit on

exterior postal property. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(3). Indeed, the

Postal Service does not even attempt to defend the regulation if

it is construed as applying to pure solicitation. See Oral Arg.

Tape at 44:51-45:29.

To do so would appear to be an impossible task in light of

Supreme Court precedent. In Watchtower Bible, for example,

the Court found facially unconstitutional a municipal ordinance

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 26 of 32
27

12The Court’s per curiam opinion in Lee v. ISKCON invalidated

the leafleting ban “[f]or the reasons expressed in the opinions of

Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter” in ISKCON

v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 831.

that required a permit before one could go on private property

to engage in advocacy of a political cause. Watchtower Bible &

Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v.Villageof Stratton,536 U.S. 150, 160

(2002). The Court acknowledged that the interests advanced in

support of the ordinance -- prevention of fraud and crime, and

the protection of residents’ privacy -- were “important interests

that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of

regulation of solicitation activity.” Id. at 165. Nonetheless, the

Court said, “[w]e must also look . . . to the amount of speech

covered by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate

balance between the affected speech and the governmental

interests that the ordinance purports to serve.” Id. Even though

the government’s interests “arguably” could support such an

ordinance if “applie[d] only to commercial transactions and the

solicitation of funds,” id., the Court found the ordinance too

broad because those interests did not “support . . . its application

to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for

unpopular causes,” id. at 168. Similarly, in Lee v. ISKCON the

Court held that a ban on the distribution of literature in airport

terminals was invalid under the First Amendment, 505 U.S. 830,

831 (1992), with Justice Kennedy12 distinguishing the ban from

one reaching only “in-person solicitation of money for

immediate payment.” ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 693

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments) (emphasis added);

see id. at 704 (declaring that, while a “solicitation regulation”

that “prohibit[ed] the ‘solicitation and receipt of funds’” was

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 27 of 32
28

13See also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733 (O’Connor, J., joined by

three Justices) (finding a ban on “soliciting alms and contributions” on

postal premises reasonable because, “[s]ince the act of soliciting alms

or contributions usually has as its objective an immediate act of

charity, it has the potentiality for evoking highly personal and

subjective reactions” and thus is “inherently disruptive” (emphasis

added)); Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574 (holding unconstitutional a

ban on First Amendment activities in an airport because it “does not

merely regulate expressive activity . . . that might create problems

such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of those who use”

the terminal).

constitutional, one that prohibited “all speech that solicits

funds” would be unconstitutional (emphasis added)).13

The Postal Service has marshaled no stronger interest than

those rejected in Watchtower and ISKCON v. Lee in defense of

the regulation, as construed to ban pure solicitation.

Accordingly, we conclude that this most straightforward

construction of § 232.1(h)(1) renders the regulation

unconstitutional on its face.

V

A limiting construction that is “fairly” possible can save a

regulation from facial invalidation. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at

575; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982)

(“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute

challenged as overbroad, it should . . . construe the statute to

avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a

limiting construction”). The Postal Service argues that Postal

Bulletin 22119 is adequate to perform that office. The Bulletin

modifies 39 C.F.R. § 232.1 in two respects: it permits pure

solicitation -- i.e., asking for signatures but not immediately

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 28 of 32
29

14See POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19 (stating that the regulation

“extends only to efforts to have members of the public provide

signatures on Postal Service premises, and not to communications that

promote the signing of petitions, polls, and surveys somewhere other

than on Postal Service premises”).

15See POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19 (stating that the regulation

does “not apply to . . . public perimeter sidewalks, even if the Postal

Service’s property line extends onto such a sidewalk,” and that it does

not apply to exterior Postal Service property unless the “beginning of

Postal Service-controlled space [is] easily distinguishable to members

of the public by means of some physical feature”).

collecting them -- on any exterior postal property;14and it

permits both signature solicitation and collection on Grace

sidewalks.

1 5

 We conclude that the first modification is a

plausible limiting construction, but that the latter is not.

Although the ordinary meaning of “solicit” is merely to ask,

we cannot say that it would be unreasonable to read a ban on

“soliciting signatures on petitions” as the Postal Service does:

to apply only “to efforts to have members of the public provide

signatures on Postal Service premises, and not to

communications that promote the signing of petitions, polls, and

surveys somewhere other than on Postal Service premises.”

POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19. In his separate opinion in

Kokinda, for example, Justice Kennedy accepted the

government’s representation that the Postal Service’s ban on

“[s]oliciting alms and contributions” permitted the respondents

“to distribute literature soliciting support, including money

contributions, provided there is no in-person solicitation for

payments on the premises.” 497 U.S. at 739 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Similarly, in her plurality opinion,

Justice O’Connor observed that “the act of soliciting alms or

contributions usually has as its objective an immediate act of

charity.” Id. at 733 (O’Connor, J., joined by three other

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 29 of 32
30

Justices) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we regard the Postal

Service’s construction of “soliciting” as adequate to cure the

problem identified in Part IV.B.

The Bulletin’s statement regarding the regulation’s

application to Grace sidewalks, however, is another matter.

Although a “statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as

to avoid . . . the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, . . .

avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of

disingenuous evasion.” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose,

289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). Section 232.1 states

that it “applies to all real property under the charge and control

of the Postal Service.” 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(a) (emphasis added).

Neither a postal patron nor a postal employee charged with

enforcement could reasonably read the regulation’s language

and conclude -- as the Bulletin declares -- that the regulation

actually “does not apply to . . . public perimeter sidewalks, even

if the Postal Service’s property line extends onto such a

sidewalk.” POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at 19 (emphasis added);

cf. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 575, 577 (holding that a

resolution barring “all ‘First Amendment activities’” was “not

fairly subject to a limiting construction”). Nor could a patron or

employee read § 232.1’s broad language as meaning that, in

order for it to apply, the “beginning of Postal Service-controlled

space must be easily distinguishable to members of the public by

means of some physical feature.” POSTAL BULLETIN 22119, at

19. This conclusion is not particularly surprising, because this

provision of the Bulletin is not really an “interpretation” of the

regulation at all. Rather, as the government explains, it is “no

more than an agency decision not to enforce the Postal Service’s

regulations on [the described] property.” Appellee’s Br. at 56.

Of course, it is perfectly permissible for the Postal Service

to change its enforcement policies or regulations in order to

eliminate the basis for a constitutional challenge. The problem

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 30 of 32
31

with the change at issue here is its format. It is “published”

solely in the form of an internal bulletin: it is not published in

the Federal Register, is not contained in the Code of Federal

Regulations, and is not posted for public examination in post

offices. By contrast, all of these things are true of § 232.1,

which by its terms “shall be posted and kept posted at a

conspicuous place on all” postal property. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(a).

The contrast in format, coupled with the facial

inconsistency between the regulation and the Bulletin, is

decisive. Citizens interested in circulating petitions have no way

of knowing that the Bulletin, rather than the regulation, states

the Postal Service’s current policy. Were they to go to a post

office and examine its public announcements board, they would

find only the posted regulation. The same would be true were

they to check the relevant Code section. Indeed, even if a

citizen were to become aware of the existence of the Bulletin, he

or she could not confidently rely on it. Section 232.1 expressly

states that soliciting signatures on petitions is prohibited “except

as otherwise authorized by Postal Service regulations,” 39

C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1), and it is undisputed that the enforcement

policy stated in the Bulletin is not a “Postal Service regulation.”

As a consequence, the Postal Bulletin cannot alone temper

the regulation’s chill of First Amendment rights. That is

particularly so because the regulation makes its violation

punishable by criminal fine and imprisonment. See 39 C.F.R. §

232.1(p)(2). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the

“severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to

remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful

words, ideas, and images.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872

(emphasis added); see Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244.

We will therefore remand this case to the district court with

instructions to determine whether, by its application to Grace

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 31 of 32
32

sidewalks, § 232.1 abridges “a ‘substantial’ amount of protected

free speech.” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118 (quoting Broadrick v.

Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). If it does, the regulation

is facially invalid on that ground. See supra Part IV.A. Of

course, that issue may be pretermitted if the Postal Service

amends the regulation to exclude such sidewalks from the

prohibition against solicitation. See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119

(holding that “all enforcement” of a facially overbroad statute is

barred “‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial

invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or

deterrence to constitutionally protected expression’” (quoting

Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613)). Because we need go no further to

dispose of this appeal, and because further analysis may be

unnecessary depending upon the outcome of the remand

proceedings, we do not consider the appellants’ other challenges

or the district court’s other rulings.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-5045 Document #911321 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 32 of 32