Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04951/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04951-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-4951 RS (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

*E-Filed 6/28/10*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ROBERT LEE,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT K. WONG, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 09-4951 RS (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

This is a federal habeas corpus action filed by a pro se state prisoner pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied. 

BACKGROUND

In 1977, a Fresno County Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of kidnapping for

robbery with the use of a firearm. The trial court sentenced petitioner to seven years to life. 

In 2008, the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) found petitioner unsuitable for parole on

grounds that he “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public

safety if released from prison.” (Pet., Ex. A at 74.) In response to the Board’s decision,

petitioner sought, though was denied, relief on state collateral review. (Pet. at 5–7.) This

Case 3:09-cv-04951-RS Document 8 Filed 06/28/10 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-4951 RS (PR)

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federal habeas petition followed. 

In reaching its decision, the Board considered the facts of the commitment offense. 

In July 1977, petitioner, armed with a rifle, approached a group of three women who were

swimming in a motel pool. He ordered them out of the pool, took them to their room, made

them face the wall, and took their money. Petitioner then fled, taking one of the women,

Martha, with him to his car. He ordered her to lie on the floor of his car, and he drove off. 

Police tracked down the vehicle, and chased petitioner, who eventually stopped the car and

fled. Martha escaped uninjured. (Id. at 9–10.) At the parole hearing, petitioner stated that in

committing the crime, he was “just acting on impulse, not thinking, not realizing I could have

hurt somebody.” (Id. at 13.) 

In addition to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board cited as factors 

in its decision petitioner’s criminal and social history, his behavior in prison, and his

psychological report. Petitioner’s criminal history, which, the Board stated, indicates that

petitioner has “a hard time learning,” includes three terms in prison, an arrest for loitering,

and convictions for burglary, robbery, conspiracy, assault to kill, and assault with a deadly

weapon. (Id. at 19–23.) The Board noted that petitioner’s social history includes heavy use

of alcohol, a hostile relationship with his alcoholic father, and dropping out of high school. 

(Id. at 27, 29, 30–31.) While in prison, petitioner received sixteen citations for serious

misbehavior, and twenty-four for minor infractions. (Id. at 45.) Though all of these citations

were given ten or more years ago, the Board considered petitioner’s disciplinary

improvements “recent.” (Id. at 75.) Petitioner’s psychological report stated that there was a

“moderate” risk for future violence and recidivism. (Id. at 49.) In light of all these factors,

the Board concluded that petitioner posed an unreasonable threat to public safety and denied

him parole. (Id. at 74.) 

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Case 3:09-cv-04951-RS Document 8 Filed 06/28/10 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-4951 RS (PR)

3 ORDER DENYING PETITION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that the Board’s decision

violated his federal right to due process because it was not supported by some evidence. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-4951 RS (PR)

4 ORDER DENYING PETITION

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision violated his right to due process because it

was not based on “some evidence” that he currently poses an unreasonable risk to public

safety. (See Order to Show Cause at 2.) Due process requires that the Board’s decision to

deny a California prisoner parole be supported by “some evidence” of current dangerousness. 

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Pearson v. Muntz, No. 08-

55728, 2010 WL -- (9th Cir. May 24, 2010) (per curium). Accordingly, in reviewing federal

habeas claims that a California prisoner was denied parole in violation of due process, courts

must “decide whether the California judicial decision approving the governor’s [or the parole

board’s] decision rejecting parole was an “unreasonable application” of the California “some

evidence” requirement, or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence.” Hayward, 604 F.3d at 562–63. 

The commitment offense alone does not always provide evidence that a petitioner

poses a current threat to public safety. (Id. at 562.) The offense does not establish current

dangerousness “unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or

post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state” supports an

inference of dangerousness. (Id., citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1214 (Cal. 2008).) 

Here, the record shows that there was “some evidence” to support the state court’s

approval of the Board’s parole denial. First, the circumstances surrounding the commitment

offenses suggest an impulsive personality, lacking self-control. Second, the record

establishes that petitioner’s pre- and post-conviction history supports an inference of current

dangerousness — in particular his criminal history and his most recent psychological

evaluation. The record, as noted, shows that petitioner’s criminal history is extensive,

including three terms in prison, and convictions for serious crimes such as assault and

robbery. Petitioner also received many disciplinary infractions, sixteen serious and twentyfour minor, during his early incarceration. Also, petitioner’s psychological report rated the

risk of petitioner committing violence as “moderate.” While such a rating is not conclusively

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prohibitive, it does constitute some evidence of current dangerousness in addition to the

commitment offense, as does petitioner’s criminal and alchohol-abuse history. In fact, the

Ninth Circuit addressed a similar scenario in Hayward:

Hayward’s most recent psychological evaluation reasonably can be read to

indicate that Hayward had not yet reached that point, and the Governor so read

it. The evaluation concluded that measures of both static and dynamic risk

factors associated with violence placed Hayward in “a category that represents

a low to moderate risk for future violence in the community.” These factors

include the violent criminal history just described, as well as early adjustment

problems in the prison community, “episodes of relationship instability,”

including current estrangement from two of his daughters, and a history of

substance abuse problems, including prior use of cocaine and marijuana. The

evaluations are far from damning — they cite Hayward’s “increased level of

maturity and insight, his participation in substance abuse recovery” — and they

indicate that the “historical risk factors now seem to be adequately contained.”

Nevertheless, the evaluation concludes that Hayward presents a “low to

moderate risk” of danger to the community. The state court did not

unreasonably determine that this evaluation, and the evaluation’s assessment of

Hayward’s commitment offense and his violent history, are evidence that

Hayward’s release would pose a possibly “moderate” risk to public safety.

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 570–71 (Berzon, J., concurring). 

Turning to the instant matter, it is reasonable to infer from this record of past and

recent violence and misbehavior that, if released, petitioner currently poses an unreasonable

risk of danger to society, or a threat to public safety. Because the Board’s decision is

supported by sufficient evidence in the record, including circumstances other than those of

the commitment offense, petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision was unsupported by

“some evidence,” or otherwise violated his right to due process, is without merit. The state

court’s approval of the Board’s decision, therefore, was not an “unreasonable application” of

the California “some evidence” requirement, nor was it “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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6 ORDER DENYING PETITION

CONCLUSION

The state court’s denial of petitioner claims did not result in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor

did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is

DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 28, 2010 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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