Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01018/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas Borchers,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Duane Belcher, Sr., et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-1018-PHX-DGC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyeman, in Florence,

Arizona, has filed, through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioner was convicted in Coconino County Superior Court, case number CR74-

006459, of raping a thirteen year old and lewd and lascivious behavior and sentenced to twenty

years to life in prison. (Doc. 7 at 3) Petitioner raises one ground for relief. He asserts that he

was granted parole by the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency (“the Board”) upon certain

conditions after it concluded Petitioner would live and remain at liberty without violating the

law, if released. The Board allegedly rescinded that decision in violation of due process and its

own procedures. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be granted. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In July of 1974, Petitioner was convicted of rape and lewd and lascivious conduct

and sentenced to twenty years to life imprisonment. (Doc. 1 at 4) On February 10, 2006, the

Board granted Petitioner parole under four conditions: “Needs assessment/referral

(Counseling, Vocational, Educational), “No use of alcohol,” “Take part in available

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[programs],” and “Parole to Arkansas only.” (Doc. 1, Exh. A) Petitioner’s parents lived in

Arkansas at that time and Arkansas had agreed to accept Petitioner for supervision under the

Interstate Compact. (Doc. 1 at 4, Doc. 7 at 3)

Before he was released on parole, pursuant to a stipulation of the State of Arizona

and Petitioner, the Coconino County Superior Court entered an order committing Petitioner

to the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center (“ACPTC”) program for

sexually violent offenders at the Arizona State Hospital (“ASH”) pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-

3710. (Doc. 7 at 3) Petitioner entered the program on December 1, 2006. (Doc. 1 at 5-6) 

During the next two years, Petitioner successfully participated in the ACPTC program which

included securing employment and leaving the facility to work. (Doc. 1 at 6; Exhs. B, C) 

On May 14, 2008, the Board modified the terms of Petitioner’s grant of parole pursuant to

an “Addendum to Proclamation of Community Parole Issued February 10, 2006” (the

“Addendum”). (Doc. 1, Exh. A) Significantly, the Board temporarily suspended the

“Arkansas only” condition of parole to enable Petitioner to live in the community as the

final stage of ACPTC program. (Respondents’ Exh. B) The Addendum required Petitioner

to notify the Board and the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) when he received

notice that he was to be discharged from civil commitment. At such time, Petitioner could

request modification of the “Arkansas only” term of release to be made permanent. (Id.) 

Petitioner lived and worked in the Phoenix area during part of 2008 under

supervision of the ACPTC. (Doc. 1 at 6) In late November, 2008, ACPTC recommended

that Petitioner be released from the order of civil commitment. (Doc. 1 at 7) Petitioner

notified his parole officer and the Board. Petitioner completed the ACPTC program in late

December 2008. On January 5, 2009, Petitioner was notified at 4:00 p.m. that the court had

dismissed the civil commitment. At 7:00 p.m. that same day, Petitioner was picked up by

ADOC and returned to custody at the Alhambra facility, the secure prison facility attached

to the Arizona State Hospital, where the ACPTC program is conducted. He was returned to

ADOC custody because his parole conditions no longer permitted him to live in Arizona and

the prior approval by Arkansas had lapsed. (Doc. 1 at 7) 

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1

 The Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders is an agreement between

two or more states for the transfer of supervision of adult offenders per A.R.S.§ 31-467 et seq.

Warner v. McVey, 2010 WL 3239385, * 4 (W.D.Pa. July 9, 2010) (“The Interstate Compact

provides offenders the opportunity to transfer their probation or parole supervision to the

community where they have family, confirmed employment, specialized treatment programs,

and/or educational or vocational opportunities. ”) Arizona has different compacts for juvenile

offenders, and adult offenders supervised in states neighboring Arizona and other states. See

Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991); Arizona Dep’t of Economic Sec. v.

Leonardo, 200 Ariz. 74, 22 P.3d 513 (Az.Ct.App. 2001); Salstrom v. State, 148 Ariz. 382, 714

P.2d 875 (Az.Ct.App. 1986).

2 According to Arizona Court of Appeals, upon Petitioner’s reincarceration, ADOC

“placed him in maximum security detention and designated him as a ‘parole violator.’” (Doc.

7-1 at 21 n. 1)

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On January 6, 2009, Petitioner received a telephone call from Respondent Belcher,

telling him the Board would conduct a hearing on January 15, 2009 to determine his status. 

During that hearing, Chairman Belcher stated, “I just want to point out for the record to all

individuals here that although Mr. Borchers was in the custody of the Department of

Corrections, it was not for any wrongdoing. This is not a revocation hearing.” (Doc. 1, Exh.

E at 5-6) The Board declined to permanently modify the “Arkansas only” condition of

Petitioner’s parole. (Id. at 35-36) Thus, Petitioner remained in custody. (Respondents’ Exh.

C) 

The State of Arkansas reconsidered whether to accept Petitioner. Petitioner was

notified on April 9, 2009, that Arkansas had denied his request under the Interstate Compact

due to a lack of records from ASH. The Arizona Interstate Compact1

 officials resubmitted

the request along with the hospital records. Arkansas investigated the home of Petitioner’s

parents. The officials told Petitioner’s parents that he would have to remain at their home for

a minimum of six months under their supervision, could not use an answering machine,

computer, or the internet. Petitioner’s parents did not agree to that arrangement and Petitioner’s release to Arkansas was not approved. (Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 7 at 4) 

Petitioner was transferred to the Arizona State Prison Complex - Eyman,2

 in

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 The Honorable Joseph Kreamer presided.

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Florence, Arizona where he remains. On July 7, 2009, the Board again considered Petitioner’s status. (Respondents’ Exh. D; doc. 1, Exh. D) Petitioner, who was represented by

counsel, participated telephonically. Witnesses presented information in favor and in

opposition of modifying the “Arkansas only” condition of Petitioner’s parole. The Board

again denied Petitioner’s request to modify the condition of parole to “Arkansas only.” (Id.)

On September 24, 2009, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the Maricopa County Superior Court. The court construed it as a petition

for special action and accepted it as Cause No. LC2009-000696-001 DT. On February 12,

2010, the court3

 conducted a hearing on the special action. The court ordered the Board to

“conduct either a rescission or revocation hearing within ninety (90) days of [February 12,

2010].” (Respondents’ Exh. E) The court further ordered that, if the Board did not conduct

such a hearing, the original terms of Petitioner’s February 10, 2006 parole remained in

effect. (Id.) The Board declined to conduct a rescission or revocation hearing and allowed

the “Arkansas only” condition to remain in effect. (Respondents’ Exh. F) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Further Relief with the Superior Court, asking the

court to order his release from custody. On May 19, 2010, the court denied Petitioner’s

motion. (Respondents’ Exh. G) 

On June 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. On January 6, 2011, the

Arizona Court of Appeals found that the Board had afforded Petitioner “the due process

rights to which he may have been entitled” and affirmed the lower court’s orders denying

relief. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and a Petition

for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court. On April 19, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. I) 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court.

Petitioner argues that his return to ADOC custody violated his right to due process as

provided in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1972). Petitioner presented this

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claim to the Arizona courts. The Superior Court ruled that, if the Board chose not to conduct

a rescission or revocation hearing, the original terms of parole remained in effect. (Respondents’ Exh. E) The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the Board provided the process to

which Petitioner was due under Morrissey. (Respondents’ Exh. H) The Arizona Supreme

Court affirmed summarily the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision, thus the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision is the last reasoned decision of the State courts which is subject to habeas

corpus review. 

II. Habeas Corpus Relief - Cognizable Claims

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) sets forth the scope of federal habeas corpus review:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the habeas

statute “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state

prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 15 (2010) (per

curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Accordingly, “[a] habeas petition must allege the

petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state

law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990)); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 349 (1993) (stating that “mere error of state

law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on

federal habeas.”). The purpose of habeas proceedings under § 2254 is to ensure that state

convictions satisfy federal constitutional requirements applicable to states. Burkey v. Deeds,

824 F.Supp. 190, 192 (D.Nev. 1993). A habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state law issue

into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d

573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

To the extent that Petitioner challenges the Arizona parole procedure, his claim

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involves the interpretation and application of Arizona law. The United States Supreme Court

has held that a parole-eligibility claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.

Swarthout v. Cooke, __ U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (holding that the application of

constitutionally adequate parole procedures are issues of state law and not subject to federal

habeas corpus review); see also Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994)

(finding that petitioner’s claim that the state court erred in imposing consecutive sentences was

not cognizable in federal habeas); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that “claim regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively concerned

with state law and therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”).

In addition to challenging the parole procedure, Petitioner brings a federal Due

Process challenge which is subject to federal habeas corpus review. 

III. Standard of Review

This Court’s review of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the applicable standard

of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role

in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure

that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in § 2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.”

Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S., ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of

imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court

proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is

a ‘guard against extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for

ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332

n. 5 (1979)).

If an habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings,” federal habeas relief is not available unless it is shown that the state

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the

United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Green v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 2011 WL 5335411, at

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* 3 (Nov. 8, 2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (or that it “involved an

unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2)); Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 785; see also Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). This is a

“difficult to meet,” Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 786, and “highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proof. Id. at 25.

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the

Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Green, 2011 WL at * 3;

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866

(2010)). Even if the state court neither explains its ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court

authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to

determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784

(citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). 

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell

v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal

rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Id. at 405; Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect application of federal law does not satisfy this

standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is

available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable.”).

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long

as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter,

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131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application

was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Id. 

IV. Analysis 

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process when he was returned to ADOC

custody without written notice or a proper hearing. Petitioner contends that he was entitled to

the due process protections articulated in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, because his status was

tantamount to a parolee based on his release pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3714 to participate in the

ACPTC, and the temporary suspension of the “Arkansas only” condition of parole. 

Although “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.

Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), an individual already enjoying certain forms

of conditional release has a protected liberty interest in retaining them. In Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause creates a liberty

interest in parole. The Court explained that a parolee’s liberty is unlike the minimal liberties of

those who reside behind prison walls. It is the freedom to “be gainfully employed,” “to be with

family and friends,” and “to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey,

408 U.S. at 482. The Court recognized that, “the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal

prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not

apply to parole revocations.” Id., 408 U.S. at 480. However, a parolee’s liberty involves

significant values within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, and termination of that liberty requires an informal hearing to give assurance that

the finding of a parole violation is based on verified facts to support the revocation. Id., 408

U.S. at 481-82. 

Similarly, in Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), the Supreme Court determined

that the petitioner had a liberty interest in his participation in a “pre-parole” program.

Analogizing the program to traditional parole that received due process protection in Morrissey,

the Court noted that “[the petitioner] kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and

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maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment.” Id. at 148.

To determine how the Due Process Clause should apply to the liberty interests of prisoners

serving sentences in an alternative form of confinement, courts “compar[e] the specific

conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized

by Morrissey.” Holcomb v. Lykens, 337 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, this Court will

consider Petitioner’s specific situation “along a spectrum of liberty that extends from the

‘ordinary incidents of prison life’ at its lowest end to parole at its highest.” Gonzalez-Fuentes

v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 877 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding petitioners’ release on electronic

supervision program similar to that of the parolee in Morrissey where participants lived in their

own homes on work release, attended church in the local community, and had the freedom to

be with family and friends.)

Respondents argue that, unlike the situation in Morrissey, Petitioner’s parole was not

revoked. Rather, the original grant of parole remains in effect and Petitioner has failed to satisfy

the condition that his parole is “to Arkansas only.” Respondents’ argument disregards the

specific facts of this case. At the time Petitioner was returned to ADOC custody, he had

completed the six levels of the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center program

(“ACPTC”). The ACPTC is a unit of the Arizona State Hospital and is operated by the Arizona

Department of Health Services (“ADHS”), not the ADOC. See State ex rel. Ariz. Dep’t of Health

Servs. v. Gottsfield, 213 Ariz. 583, 146 P.3d 574, 576 (Az.Ct.App. 2006); A.R.S. § 36-

3707(B)(1); Bloom v. McCarville, 2008 WL 466169, at * 2 n.2 (Az.Ct.App. Feb. 7, 2008)

(noting that “when §36-3707(B)(1), (then § 13-4606(B)), was amended in 1996, the legislature

substituted ADHS for ADOC and deleted ‘operated by the state department of corrections . . .

.”). 

Petitioner entered the ACPTC program in December 2006. He successfully

participated in the program during the next two years and was permitted to leave the facility at

the ASH to work. (Doc. 1, Exhs. B, C) In 2008, Petitioner reached level six of the ACPTC

program. This level involved release to live in the community. Petitioner had a job in the

community and lived and owned a home from August 2008 to early 2009. (Doc. 1 at 6) 

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Petitioner wore a GPS device that was monitored by ADHS. (Id. at 7) On May 14, 2008, the

Board modified the terms of Petitioner’s parole to temporarily suspend the “Arkansas only”

condition provided he was participating in the treatment program. (Respondents’ Exh. B) The

conditions of Petitioner’s parole issued on February 10, 2006 were modified by an Addendum

to reflect the following:

1. The phrase “conditioned upon compliance with those regulations specified by the

ADOC for conduct while on parole” is temporarily amended to “conditioned upon

compliance with all terms and conditions ordered by the Court in connections with

[Petitioner’s] civil commitment pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3707 in Coconino County

Superior Court Case No. CV06-0590, . . . as well as any specific terms and conditions

imposed on [Petitioner] by the Superintendent of the Arizona State Hospital pursuant

to A.R.S. § 36-3710 . . . . 

* * *

4. The Board condition “Parole to Arkansas” only is temporarily suspended until

such time as [Petitioner] is discharged from his civil commitment in Coconino County

Superior Court Case No. CV06-0590 pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3714. Upon receiving

notice that he is to be discharged, [Petitioner] shall immediately notify the Board and

the Arizona Department of Corrections. At that time, [Petitioner] may ask the Board

to consider permanent modification of the “Parole to Arkansas only” condition of his

grant of parole.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. B)

Arizona courts have recognized that commitment for treatment under Arizona’s

Sexually Violent Persons Act (the “SVP Act”), A.R.S. § 36-3701 through 36-3717, does not

constitute imprisonment and that “neither ACPTC nor ASH falls within the definition of a

prison.” Bloom, 2008 WL 4661699, at * 2-3. Petitioner analogizes his release to participate in

the ACPTC program, combined with the temporary suspension of “Arkansas only” condition of

parole, to release on parole. See Young, 520 U.S. at 148-49 (1997) (holding that Oklahoma’s

pre-parole release program was sufficiently like parole as to create a protected liberty interest

warranting the same pre-termination due process procedures afforded to parolees).

In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited Morrissey but did not specifically

address whether Petitioner’s status was the equivalent of parole for due process purposes.

Rather, the appellate court assumed - without deciding - that Petitioner was entitled to the same

due process procedures afforded parolees and found that he was accorded the process to which

he was due. 

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4

 The Modification of Parole Conditions for Petitioner specified that he would be

“subject to monitoring, surveillance and supervision by the Arizona Department of Corrections,

including reporting requirements imposed by the Arizona Department of Corrections in

consultation with the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center.” (Respondents’

Exh. B)

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The Court finds that Petitioner’s case is similar to Young v. Harper, 520 U.S.143

(1997), where the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma’s pre-parole program, as it existed at the

time Harper was released, was a type of parole and, therefore, Harper was entitled to due process

before his participation in the program was terminated. The Court considered the pre-parole

program similar to parole because Harper was released from prison before the expiration of his

sentence, “kept his own residence; sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and lived a life

generally free of the incidents of imprisonment.” Young, 520 U.S. at 148. Although the

modification of Petitioner’s parole specified that he remained subject to monitoring by the

ADOC,4

 and Petitioner wore a GPS device, there is no evidence that Petitioner had to report to

ADOC or had other direct contact with an ADOC facility. Additionally, monitoring by a GPS

device, “unlike institutional confinement of any kind, allowed [Petitioner] to . . . form

relationships with neighbors, lay down roots in [his] community, and reside in a dwelling of [his]

own choosing . . . .” Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607 F.3d at 891. Additionally, the Addendum provided

that the parole to “Arkansas only” condition was suspended “until such time as [Petitioner] is

discharged from his civil commitment in Coconino County Superior Court Case No. CV06-0590

pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3714.” (Respondents’ Exh. B) The Addendum also provided that,

“upon receiving notice that he is to be discharged, [Petitioner] shall immediately notify the

Board and the Arizona Department of Corrections. At that time, [Petitioner] may ask the Board

to consider permanent modification of the “Parole to Arkansas only” condition of his grant of

parole.” (Id.) Although the Addendum provided that the “Arkansas only” condition was only

temporarily suspended, nothing in the Addendum indicates that upon his discharge from the

ACPTC program, Petitioner would immediately be returned to ADOC custody. Rather, the

Addendum is silent regarding what would happen after Petitioner notified the Board and the

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ADOC that he had received “notice that he is to be discharged” from civil commitment pursuant

to A.R.S. § 36-3714. (Respondents’ Exh. B; doc. 1, Exh. A) The Addendum does provide,

however, that Petitioner could seek permanent modification of the “Arkansas only” condition

of parole. (Id.) 

Although the Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s parole was not

technically revoked, Petitioner’s release pursuant to the ACPTC program, the temporary

suspension of the “Arkansas only” parole condition, and Petitioner’s significant freedom within

the Phoenix community indicates that Petitioner was entitled to liberty that cannot be taken away

without due process. See Young, 520 U.S. at 566 (holding that the requirements of Morrissey

applied to the return of a prisoner to custody after release on a pre-parole program); Kim v.

Hurston, 182 F.3d 113, 118 (2nd Cir. 1999) (holding that the ability to live in one’s home while

working a job rendered a work-release program “virtually indistinguishable from either

traditional parole or the Oklahoma program considered in Young.”); Paige v. Hudson, 341 F.3d

642, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “[t]he difference between being confined in a jail

and being confined to one’s home is much greater than the difference between being a member

of the general prison population and an inmate of a prison’s segregation wing. . . .”). Petitioner

had the liberty to “be gainfully employed” and “be with family and friends and to form the other

enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.

In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that, even assuming the Board had

revoked Petitioner’s parole, it provided him the due process to which he was entitled.

(Respondents’ Exh. H) The Court disagrees and finds that the State court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of Morrissey. The Supreme Court in Morrissey held that when a parole

revocation hearing takes place, the parolee is entitled to, at a minimum, the following due

process rights: (1) written notice of the claimed violation of parole; (2) disclosure of the evidence

against the parolee; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and

documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the

government shows good cause for not producing the witness); (5) a neutral and detached hearing

body; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons

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for revoking parole. Id. at 489 (emphasis added). As stated earlier, the Supreme Court later held

that the due process rights articulated in Morrissey apply to petitioner’s release on conditions

equivalent to parole. 

Here, Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s assertion that he did not receive written

notice of the claimed parole violation. Rather, after Petitioner had been returned to ADOC

custody, he only received a telephone call from Duane Belcher, advising him that the Board

would conduct a hearing on January 15, 2009 to consider his status. (Doc. 1 at 7) The Arizona

Court of Appeals did not specifically discuss whether Petitioner received written notice of the

January 15, 2009 hearing. Likewise, there is no evidence that Petitioner received notice of the

evidence against him. Petitioner was not physically present at the hearing, and was not permitted

to cross-examine witness against him. (Doc. 1, Exh. E, transcript of January 15, 2009 hearing)

Petitioner has shown that the Arizona courts’ resolution of his due process claim involved an

“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. Although the Arizona courts

applied the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard under Morrissey, the State courts’

conclusion that he Board afforded Petitioner the process to which he was due when he was

returned to ADOC custody is unreasonable. The Arizona Courts did not discuss the specific

requirements of Morrissey, and ignored that Petitioner did not receive written notice, was not

physically present at the hearing, and had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against

him. In short, Petitioner did not receive the due process to which he was entitled.

Petitioner requests release from custody upon terms and conditions that are the least

restrictive. The Court finds, however, that Petitioner’s immediate release is not the appropriate

remedy. Rather, Respondents must promptly provide Petitioner with a hearing to consider his

status that fully complies with Morrissey. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc.

1, be GRANTED. If the assigned District Judge adopts this Report and Recommendation,

Respondents must provide Petitioner with a prompt hearing that fully complies with Morrissey

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v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1972), no later than thirty days of the entry of date the District

Judge’s order. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

GRANTED because the issues are “debatable among jurists of reason,” or “the questions are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757,

770–71 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), superseded on other

grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).

DATED this 9th day of March, 2012.

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