Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00868/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00868-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983bv Bivens Non-Prisoner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF JAVIER GOMEZ, by 

and through RHONDA WHITLOW 

GOMEZ, an individual and Wife of 

Decedent, BERTIN GOMEZ, an

individual and Father of Decedent, 

GERTRUDIS GOMEZ, an individual and 

Mother of Decedent,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a public 

entity, KAI BOWMAN, an individual, 

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00868-GPC-NLS

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

[DKT. NO. 7]

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this suit in California Superior Court against the 

County of San Diego, Officer Kai Bowman, and ten unnamed defendants. (Dkt. No. 1-

2.) The complaint alleges that Officer Bowman shot and killed Javier Gomez. (Id. at 2–

3.1) Before filing this suit Plaintiffs “filed a claim with the County of San Diego for 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Violations; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Unlawful Polices, Customs or 

Habits; Wrongful Death, Negligence; Battery and Civil Code § 52.1 Civil Rights 

 

1 Citations to specific pages in the parties’ filings refer to pagination provided by the CM/ECF system.

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Violations,” which the County denied on March 1, 2018. (Id. at 3.) The complaint in this 

suit asserts four causes of action: (1) violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of 

California Civil Code § 52.1, (2) wrongful death, (3) “assault/battery,” and 

(4) negligence. (Id. at 5–7.) In support of the first cause of action—violation of 

California Civil Code §52.1—the complaint alleges that Bowman’s “acts of excessive 

force constituted violation of Mr. Gomez’s rights guaranteed by the California 

Constitution (Article I, Section 13) and the United States Constitution, particularly the 

Fourth Amendment thereto.” (Id. at 5.) 

Defendants removed the case to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Soon after, the Court 

issued an order expressing skepticism that it possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over 

this case and ordering Defendants to show cause why the Court should not remand this

case to state court. (Dkt. No. 4.) Both parties responded to the order. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6.)

A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action brought in a State court 

of which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The 

removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction [and] [t]he defendant 

bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque 

v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “Where 

doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” 

Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendant argues that the Court possesses “federal question” jurisdiction over this 

case. (Dkt. No. 6 at 1.) The Court’s federal question jurisdiction is guided by the “well 

pleaded complaint rule,” which states that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The rule makes the plaintiff the 

master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on 

state law.” Id. As noted, the complaint in this case asserts only state law claims. A 

“corollary” to the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is the “artful pleading doctrine,” 

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which prevents a plaintiff from “avoid[ing] federal jurisdiction by omitting from the 

complaint allegations of federal law that are essential to the establishment of his claim.” 

Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Hansen v. Blue Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989)). “[C]ourts have used 

the artful pleading doctrine in: (1) complete preemption cases, and (2) substantial federal 

question cases.” Id. (citations omitted). With respect to the former, there has been no 

contention that federal law completely preempts any of the four claims in this suit. As 

for the latter, a “substantial federal question” exists “when: (1) a substantial, disputed 

question of federal law is a necessary element of . . . the well-pleaded state claim, or the 

claim is an inherently federal claim articulated in state-law terms; or (2) the right to relief 

depends on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question.” Id. at 1042

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of those conditions exists here. 

As explained in more detail below, federal law need not be considered for Plaintiffs to 

prevail on their claims. And it is clear that Plaintiffs’ right to relief in this case does not 

depend on federal law.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint presents a substantial federal question 

because (1) the first cause of action invokes the Fourth Amendment to the Federal 

Constitution, and (2) Plaintiffs’ original claim with the County of San Diego included a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court disagrees on both grounds. As to the first 

argument, while the complaint does identify the Fourth Amendment as a basis for 

Defendants’ liability under § 52.1, it also asserts that Defendants are liable under § 52.1 

because they violated Gomez’s rights under Article I, Section 13 of the California 

Constitution. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5.) “The invocation of [federal] law as a basis for 

establishing an element of a state law cause of action does not confer federal question 

jurisdiction when the plaintiff also invokes a state constitutional provision or a state 

statute that can and does serve the same purpose.” Rains v. Ctierion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 

339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs have identified, as an independent basis for 

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liability under the first cause of action, “a state constitutional provision . . . that can and 

does serve the same purpose.” Id. Indeed, Article I, Section 13 of the California 

Constitution, is “virtually identical” to the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, 

and its protections “parallel” the Fourth Amendment. Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 

F.3d 1178, 1186 n.7 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Sanchez v. Cty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 

928–29 (9th Cir. 2006)). Because the California Constitution provides an independent 

basis for Defendants’ liability as to the first cause of action, that claim does not present a 

substantial federal question.2

As to Defendants’ second argument, the fact that Plaintiffs raised a federal claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an administrative dispute with the County of San Diego does 

not confer this Court with subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have chosen to remove 

that claim from this suit. What remains are four state law causes of action, none of which 

are preempted by federal law or present a substantial federal question.

In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that this Court possesses subjectmatter jurisdiction over this case. The Court REMANDS the case to state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2018

 

2 Nor is there any reason to believe that any interpretation of federal law would be involved in 

adjudicating the complaint’s other causes of action of wrongful death, “assault/battery,” or negligence.

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