Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01157/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01157-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 16 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nathan Rawls, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Chuck Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 12-1157-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT:

On May 30, 2012, Petitioner Nathan Rawls, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Eyman in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). On September 4, 2012, Respondents filed an

Answer (Doc. 16), and on September 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 17).

BACKGROUND1

In July of 1999, Petitioner was indicted for three counts of sexual conduct with a

minor under the age of 15 years, one count of molestation of a child under the age of 15

years, and one count of kidnapping – all class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against

children. (Exh. A.) The claims arose between April of 1997 and April of 1998, when

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Petitioner, on various occasions, placed his penis in the victim’s mouth, touched her vagina,

and placed his mouth on the child’s vagina. (Exh. A.)

Petitioner pled guilty on April 13, 2000, to one count of sexual conduct with a minor,

a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime against children (Count I), and one count of attempt

to commit sexual conduct with a minor, a class 3 felony and a dangerous crime against

children (amended Count II). (Exhs. B, C.) Petitioner’s plea agreement provided, “[a]s to

[C]ount I, the defendant shall be sentenced to prison,” and “[a]s to amended Count II, the

defendant shall be placed on supervised lifetime probation consecutive to the term of

imprisonment imposed on [C]ount I.” (Exh. B.)

On May 12, 2000, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 20 years’

imprisonment (Count I), and placed Petitioner on lifetime probation consecutive to the term

of imprisonment (amended Count II). (Exh. D.)

Since pleading guilty, Petitioner has pursued 10 Rule 32 proceedings in the Arizona

courts – all of which have been dismissed:

1. First Rule 32 Proceeding

On February 6, 2002, Petitioner filed an untimely notice of post-conviction relief

(Exh. F), accompanied by requests for preparation of the post-conviction record and

transcripts and minutes of the grand jury proceedings. (Exhs. G, H.)

The superior court dismissed Petitioner’s notice as untimely, because it was not filed

within the 90-day period imposed by Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. (Exh. I.) The court stated, in pertinent part:

Defendant claims he should be excused from the [Rule 32.4(a)] timeliness

requirement because “I have contacted [my] attorney and asked him to start the

appeals process but as of yet I’ve gotten no response.” It was defendant’s

responsibility to file a notice of post-conviction relief within the 90-day time

period, as he was advised at the time of sentencing and in the Notice of Rights

of Review After Conviction and Procedure he signed on October 4, 2001.

Defendant has not shown that the failure to timely file the notice was without

fault on his part, as required by Rule 32.1(f).

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2

 It appears that the superior court mistakenly cited October 4, 2001, as the date

Petitioner signed his Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure. The

record demonstrates that Petitioner actually signed said document on May 12, 2000 – the date

Petitioner was sentenced. (Exh. E.)

3

 Before filing the second notice of post-conviction relief, Petitioner filed a document

entitled “Pleading.” (Exh. J.) Petitioner’s pleading: (i) asked that the superior court dismiss

his case with prejudice; (ii) claimed the trial judge had no right to be on his case; and (iii)

used the words “speedy trial violation,” “miscarriage of justice violation,” and “statute of

limitation.” (Exh. J.)

4

 Again, the date Petitioner signed his Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction

and Procedure was May 12, 2000. (Exh. E.)

5

 On February 20 and 25, Petitioner also filed: (i) a motion to suppress evidence

(2/20/03); (ii) a motion to suppress confession (2/20/03); (iii) a motion for change of judge

(2/25/03); and (iv) a motion to withdraw guilty plea (2/25/03). (Exhs. O-R.) The record

indicates that the superior court did not rule separately on these motions.

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(Exh. I.)2

 Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

2. Second Rule 32 Proceeding

Petitioner filed a second a notice of post-conviction relief on October 24, 2002.3

 (Exh.

K.) The superior court dismissed the second notice finding that it was untimely. (Exh. L.)

The court stated:

Defendant now claims he should be excused from the timeliness requirement

because he was unaware of the ability to file post-conviction relief. The record

shows that defendant was advised at the time of sentencing and in the Notice

of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure he signed on October 4,

2001, of his rights to seek post-conviction relief and the 90-day time period.

Defendant has again not shown that the failure to timely file the notice was

without fault on his part, as required by Rule 32.1(f) ... .

(Exh. L.)4

 Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

3. Third Rule 32 Proceeding

On February 11, 2003, Petitioner filed an “Application to Withdrawal Guilty Plea,”5

in which Petitioner complained that defense counsel had failed to: (i) “adequately conduct

a required ‘pretrial investigation’ into the ‘factual basis’ affecting the constitutional rights

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 Specifically, Petitioner complained about defense counsel’s alleged failure to

investigate the admissibility of the recorded telephone conversations in which Petitioner

apparently confessed.

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of Petitioner during the accusatory stages resulting in Petitioner entering a plea of guilty;”6

and (ii) raise the State’s alleged violations of (a) Petitioner’s right to a “speedy trial” under

Rule 8, Ariz.R.Crim.P., (b) Petitioner’s right to an initial hearing within 24 hours of his

arrest, and (c) Petitioner’s right to have “all of his original indictments before his plea of guilt

was entered were not filed within 5 days after Petitioner’s initial hearing while he was in

custody.” (Exh. M.)

On February 14, 2003, the superior court denied the application as untimely, stating:

Review of the case history shows that the Defendant’s Petition for PostConviction Relief was dismissed on March 4, 2002, and November 20, 2002.

The Defendant’s Application to Withdraw Plea is denied as untimely.

(Exh. N.) On May 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona Court

of Appeals, arguing that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance claiming that: 

• The tape-recorded conversation between Petitioner and the victim’s father was

“gathered without an electronic warrant,” was obtained without Petitioner’s consent,

and therefore should have been suppressed.

• Petitioner’s confession and statements to the police should have been suppressed

because they were involuntary.

• Petitioner’s “speedy trial rights under [R]ule 8.6 were violated.”

• The State’s witnesses and other evidence against Petitioner should have been

precluded because they were not timely disclosed by the State.

• Judge Ronald S. Reinstein improperly sat on Petitioner’s case.

• The guilty plea proceedings were not recorded “word for word.”

(Exh. T.) The court of appeals subsequently declined to accept jurisdiction. (Exh. U.)

On June 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a delayed motion for an evidentiary hearing, in

which he claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel on various grounds,

including that counsel failed to pursue the State’s alleged violation of Petitioner’s right to a

“speedy trial,” seek suppression of the evidence against Petitioner, and pursue an appeal on

Petitioner’s behalf. (Exh. S.)

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On July 25, 2003, the superior court denied the delayed motion for an evidentiary

hearing and Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel, stating:

In his Delayed Motion, Defendant raises the issue of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. In prior rulings of March 4 and November 20, 2002, Judge

Thomas O’Toole had dismissed Defendant’s Notices of Post-Conviction Relief

as untimely with no other basis that supported the failure to file his notices as

without fault on Defendant’s part. See Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure.

By filing his current pleading, Defendant seeks to circumvent the prior rulings

for failure to file a timely Notice of Post-ConvictionRelief. There is no proper

action that supports an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel.

(Exh. W.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

4. Fourth Rule 32 Proceeding

October 20, 2003, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief claiming

that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to inform

Petitioner of and/or raise various claims, including:

• Petitioner’s “speedy trial rights under Rule 8 were violated.”

• Petitioner should not have been “tried as an adult.”

• All evidence, including the “confrontational call tape” should have been suppressed

as having been improperly obtained through “eavesdropping and or wiretapping.”

• All evidence, including the confrontation call should have been suppressed because

“a copy of the court order to allow the recording of this phone call” was not timely

provided to Petitioner.

(Exh. X.) The superior court dismissed the notice on the grounds that Petitioner’s

ineffectiveness claim was untimely under Rule 32.4(a) and did not fall within any of the

exceptions to the rule. (Exh. Y.)

On February 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exh. Z.) The court of appeals dismissed the petition as untimely on February 20,

2004. (Exh. AA.) Petitioner thereafter sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exh.

BB), which denied review on July 12, 2004 (Exh. CC).

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5. Fifth Rule 32 Proceeding

On March 30, 2007, Petitioner filed an “application to withdrawal [sic] guilty plea,”

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on various grounds, including: (i) defense counsel “failed

to adequately conduct a required ‘pretrial investigation’ into the ‘factual basis’ affecting the

constitutional rights of [P]etitioner, resulting in [P]etitioner entering a plea of guilty;” (ii)

counsel failed to raise various constitutional claims on Petitioner’s behalf; and (iii)

Petitioner’s “plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made due to ineffectiveness of

counsel.” (Exh. DD.)

On June 6, 2007, the superior court treated Petitioner’s application as a notice of postconviction relief, and dismissed the notice on the grounds that it was “untimely” and

“precluded” under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exh. FF.) The

superior court also noted that Petitioner’s request to withdraw was based on the “same

allegations” as his February 11, 2003, application to withdraw, which the court had

previously denied as untimely. (Exh. FF.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

6. Sixth Rule 32 Proceeding

On March 12, 2009, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief, arguing

that “facts exist which establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is actually

innocent.” (Exh. HH.) To his form pleading, Petitioner attached a memorandum in which

he claimed that the superior court lacked “subject matter jurisdiction,” because of alleged

defects in the criminal statutes to which Petitioner pled guilty. (Exh. HH.)

On July 9, 2009, the superior court dismissed the notice as untimely. (Exh. II.) The

court noted that, although Petitioner framed his claim as one of “newly discovered evidence,”

his argument was that the statutes under which he was charged did not have a “valid enacting

clause.” (Exh. II.) The court concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the requirements for

“newly discovered evidence,” because any “evidence” regarding the “enacting clause” could

have been discovered before Petitioner agreed to plead guilty. (Exh. II.) The court also

concluded that “[Petitioner’s] claim is more properly characterized as an argument that the

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Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, a claim which [Petitioner] cannot [raise]

in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Exh. II.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

7. Seventh Rule 32 Proceeding

On July 16, 2009, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief, reasserting

the claims set forth in his previous Rule 32 proceeding. (Exh. JJ.) In August of 2009,

Petitioner filed a motion for notice of status of notice of post-conviction relief, (Exh. KK),

followed by a motion to dismiss his criminal case because the “above court lacked

jurisdiction” (Exhs. LL). On October 30, 2009, the superior court dismissed the notice as

untimely and precluded – again rejecting Petitioner’s claim that his arguments constituted

“newly discovered evidence.” (Exh. MM.)

Petitioner then filed a “motion for judgment in favor of relief of Defendant’s Rule 32

petition for failure of the trial judge and failure of the State to answer the Defendant’s Rule

32 petition in a timely manner,” alleging that his “6th Amendment rights to due process of

the State of Arizona Constitution” had been violated because the court had taken more than

90 days in which to decide his latest notice of post-conviction relief, and the State had not

responded within 45 days. (Exh. NN.) The superior court denied Petitioner’s motion on

February 9, 2010. (Exh. OO.)

On February 24, 2010, Petitioner filed another pleading entitled “motion for judgment

in favor of relief of defendant’s notice of post conviction relief petition, for failure of the trial

judge and failure of the state to answer defendants notice of post conviction relief petition

in a timely manner,” (Exh. PP), followed by a pleading entitled “motion for the

reconsideration of the Court’s decision to deny Defendant’s pro per’s [sic] motion for

judgment in this case,” (Exh. QQ). The superior court denied both motions. (Exh. RR, TT.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review.

8. Eighth Rule 32 Proceeding

On May 5, 2010, Petitioner filed his eighth Rule 32 proceeding by filing an “Affidavit

of Claim,” in which he argued that his convictions and sentences were “all unconstitutional

under the Arizona Constitution” on the grounds that the superior court lacked “subject matter

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7

 Despite its caption, Petitioner did not file the above pleading in the Arizona Court

of Appeals.

8

 After Petitioner filed his reply, (Exh. AAA), he filed a petition for review in the

Arizona Supreme Court, which was returned to Petitioner because it did not comply with the

applicable rules. Petitioner then filed a pleading entitled “motion to take leave of court to

have this court adend [sic] and add claims, arguments, issues, exhibits, and factor, to the

petition for review filed in the above court on or around Oct., 27, 2010,” (Exh. DDD), and

a motion for reconsideration, (Exh. EEE), both of which the court of appeals denied (Exhs.

CCC, FFF.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court,

complaining about the court of appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,

(Exh. GGG), which the court denied on July 20, 2011, (Exh. HHH).

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jurisdiction” because the relevant criminal statutes did not have an “enacting clause” and a

“title.” (Exh. UU.) In July of 2010, Petitioner followed his “Affidavit” with:

• A petition for special action complaining that the superior court had failed to dismiss

Petitioner’s criminal case notwithstanding his “Affidavit of Claim” (Exh. VV);7

 and

• A motion to vacate judgment under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 60(c) in which

Petitioner again claimed that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and

that the relevant statutes did not have an enacting clause.

(Exh. WW.)

On August 10, 2010, the superior court interpreted Petitioner’s motion to vacate

judgment as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, and dismissed the claim on the

grounds that Petitioner failed to state a claim in which relief could be granted in an untimely

Rule 32 proceeding. (Exh. XX.)

On September 2, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, arguing that his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by

the superior court’s dismissal of his motion to vacate judgment. (Exhs. YY, ZZ, AAA.)8

The court of appeals denied review on April 12, 2012. (Exh. III.)

9. Ninth Rule 32 Proceeding

On May 19, 2011, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief, claiming:

The defendant has just remembered on the date of May 11, 2011, while doing

legal studies in the prison library, that newly-discovered evidence occurred on

the date in which the defendant was in a court hearing in front of the Hon.

Judge Ronald S. Reinstein on April 11, 2000, or on April 12, 2000, or on April

13, 2000.

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(Exh. JJJ.) Petitioner’s notice was accompanied by a request for preparation of postconviction relief, which claimed: “At [one] of his court hearing[s] ... the defendant told both

this judge and his lawyer in the courtroom out loud; that he wanted his lawyer to file his

[R]ule 32 appeal for him after he was convicted and sentenced.” (Exh. JJJ.)

On June 10, 2011, the superior court dismissed the above notice, stating “it is

successive and untimely filed.” (Exh. KKK.) The court found that Petitioner’s claim did not

qualify as newly discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e), and thus, Petitioner had failed to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted “in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Exh.

KKK.)

On September 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a “motion to file delayed appeal” in the

superior court, claiming that, in the year 2000, Petitioner had stated “he wanted his lawyer

to file his [R]ule 32 appeal for him after he was convicted and sentenced.” (Exh. LLL.)

On November 15, 2011, Petitioner filed a special action in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exh. MMM.) Petitioner complained that the superior court was “threatening to

hear and rule on or decide on the petitioner’s filed notice of post conviction relief,” which

Petitioner claimed violated his state and federal constitutional rights. (Exh. MMM.)

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction. (Exh. NNN.) On

December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review and a motion to stay appeal in the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhs. OOO.) The Supreme Court denied both pleadings. (Exhs.

PPP, VVV.)

10. Tenth Rule 32 Proceeding

On November 21, 2011, Petitioner filed his tenth notice of post-conviction relief,

making essentially the same argument that he made in his ninth Rule 32 proceeding, i.e., that,

in the year 2000, Petitioner had stated in court that he wanted his lawyer “to file his rule 32

appeal for him after he was convicted and sentenced.” (Exh. QQQ.)

On December 1, 2011, the superior court dismissed Petitioner’s notice on the grounds

that it failed “to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32

proceeding.” (Exh. RRR.) The court stated, “[r]egardless of the truth of the Defendant’s

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statement, he cannot obtain relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(f),” which is provided to

defendants “who are filing their first, or in some cases, second notice of post-conviction

relief and is considered to be ‘of-right’. As this is the Defendant’s seventh [sic] Rule 32

proceeding, it is not ‘of right.’” (Exh. RRR.)

On December 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona

Court of Appeals arguing that the superior court “had proceeded in excess of jurisdiction and

subject matter jurisdiction and legal authority” by dismissing Petitioner’s notice of postconviction relief, which Petitioner claimed violated his “14th amendment state due process

and ... 5th amendment federal due process rights!” (Exh. SSS.) Petitioner also reasserted the

subject matter jurisdiction argument raised in his various prior proceedings. (Exh. SSS.)

The court of appeals dismissed the petition, (Exh. TTT), and Petitioner filed a

“petition for review of a special action decision of the court of appeals” by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which the court denied on May 9, 2012. (Exh. VVV.)

DISCUSSION

On May 30, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises one ground for relief, claiming that he was denied his Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because the Maricopa County Superior Court and

a Maricopa County Superior Court judge “proceeded in excess of jurisdiction and subject

matter jurisdiction and legal authority, by hearing and ruling and ordering a decision to

dismiss the petitioner’s filed notice of post conviction relief.”

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

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536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a

limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, ––– U.S. –––, –––, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177

L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances

stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace,

544 U.S. at 418).

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on May 12, 2000. Petitioner had

90 days to file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). He failed to file a petition within that

time period and, thus, the statute of limitations began to run on August 11, 2000 – one day

after the 90-day period expired. The statute of limitations then expired one year later – on

August 11, 2001.

Petitioner’s filed his first petition for post-conviction relief on February 6, 2002 –

almost six months after the statute of limitations expired. Because the statute of limitations

had passed by the time Petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction relief, the petition

(or any other post-conviction relief petition filed thereafter) did not toll the limitations period.

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition

are filing conditions which, if not met, preclude a finding that a state petition was properly

filed). An untimely state post-conviction petition does not restart an already expired statute

of limitations. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner filed the

instant habeas petition on May 30, 2012 – over 10 years after the limitations period expired.

The habeas petition is therefore untimely.

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The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Here, Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling. To the contrary, Petitioner has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to

pursue post-conviction relief. Additionally, Petitioner’s pro se status, an “inadequate” law

library, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his habeas petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of October, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-01157-ROS Document 18 Filed 10/23/12 Page 14 of 14