Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02628/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02628-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT SCHUTZA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv2628 JM(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

FRN OF SAN DIEGO, LLC,

Defendant.

Defendant FRN of San Diego, dba Witt Lincoln, (“Witt”) moves to dismiss this

disability discrimination action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Plaintiff Scott Schutza (“Schutza”) opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local

Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters presented appropriate for decision without

oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion to dismiss

and grants Plaintiff 15 days leave to amend from the date of entry of this order. 

BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint

alleging a single federal claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq., and three state law claims for violation of the

Unruh Civil Rights Act, violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, and

negligence. Plaintiff is an individual with physical disabilities who uses a wheelchair

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for mobility. Witt is an automobile dealer in San Diego County.

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In June 2014, Plaintiff went to Witt to test drive a vehicle. (Compl. ¶7). 

Plaintiff, who cannot use his legs to drive, “wanted to test drive vehicles before he

purchased a vehicle.” (Compl. ¶9). Witt does not “offer and will not install vehicle

hand controls on vehicles for persons with disabilities to test drive the vehicles.” Id. 

One Witt employee “told plaintiff that defendants would provide a rental car for him

to test drive (with hand controls) but they would not provide any of the cars that it had

for sale on the lot for use in test driving.” Id. The failure to provide the hand controls

allegedly deprives Plaintiff of his rights under the ADA to “full and equal access.” 

(Compl. ¶11). 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

The court notes that Plaintiff is a frequent filer in this judicial district, having 1

filed at least 97 cases since June 13, 2012.

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on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Motion to Dismiss

Witt argues that the ADA does not require the installation of hand controls on

its vehicles-for-sale in order for disabled individuals to test drive the vehicles. The

court concludes that the ADA statutes concerning architectural and physical barriers

do not, as currently pleaded, apply to the vehicles sold by Witt. As there may be

circumstances under which Plaintiff may state a claim, the court grants the motion to

dismiss with 15 days leave to amend from the date of entry of this order. 

The ADA sets forth “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the

elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.

§12101(b)(1). To achieve that goal, the ADA prohibits discrimination in public

accommodations with respect to the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public

accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. §12182(a). The definition of the term “public

accommodation” includes private facilities such as a “shopping center or other sales

or rental establishment.” 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(A)(E). The Witt facility is clearly a

place of public accommodation. 

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Plaintiff’ legal theory for ADA liability arises under Title III of the ADA which

defines disability discrimination to include “a failure to remove architectural barriers,

and communications barriersthat are structural in nature, in existing facilities. . . where

such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(A)(iv). The regulations

highlight that “A public accommodation shall remove architectural barriersin existing

facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable and

able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 28 C.F.R. §36.304(a). The

regulation than provides a listing of 21 different items as examples of readily

removable barriers. The list includes such things as installing ramps, widening doors, 

repositioning telephones, installing accessible door hardware, grab barsin toiletstalls,

raised toilet seats, accessible parking spaces, and removing high pile carpeting. 

However, one item on the list, “installing vehicle hand controls,” 28 C.F.R.

§36.304(21), does not appear to readily relate to the facility’s architectural barriers. 

The court notes that it is not clear from the record what “installing vehicle hand

controls” means. At a minimum, however, “installing vehicle hand controls” must

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relate to the scope of the regulation. That is, the removal of architectural barriers in

existing facilities, and not the regulation of vehicles sold at the facility. 

Here, there is no doubt that Witt, the automobile dealership, is a place of public

accommodation subject to the architectural barrier requirements of the ADA. 

Plaintiff’s claims, however, do not arise out of orrelate to architectural barriers existing

at the facility. Rather, Plaintiff claims that the vehiclessold by Witt must be retrofitted

to accommodate his desire to test drive every vehicle sold by Witt, whether a new,

certified, or used vehicle. Plaintiff asserts that the absences of hand controls is an

impediment to his “being able to take advantage of this privilege [a test drive] because

it requires a person to be able to use their legs.” (Oppo. at p.2:3-5). This argument

ignores that 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(a)(iv), the statute under which Plaintiff seeks

 In any amended pleading, Plaintiff is instructed to identify what he means by

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“installing vehicle hand controls.”

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relief, applies to the removal of “architectural barriers in existing facilities . . . where

such removal is readily achievable. 28 C.F.R. §36.304(a). As the predicate to

Plaintiff’s claim relatesto the vehicles, and not “existing facilities,” the complaint fails

to state a claim under this statute.

As currently pleaded, the complaint also failsto state a claim under the auxiliary

aids orservices provision. The ADA also has a specific statute defining discrimination

to include:

(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no

individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or

otherwise treated differently than other individuals because ofthe absence

of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that

taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good,

service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or

would result in an undue burden;

42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). This auxiliary aids or services provision applies “to

a wide range of services and devices for ensuring effective communication.” 28

C.F.R., Part 36, Appendix C, analysis for §36.303. The Department of Justice noted

that a number ofinterested partiessuggested the expansion of the scope of the auxiliary

aids or services provision. However, the definition was not expanded and limited to

communications.

Several commenters suggested the addition of current technological

innovations in microelectronics and computerized control systems (e.g.,

voice recognition systems, automatic dialing telephones, and infrared

elevator and light control systems) to the list of auxiliary aids and

services. The Department interprets auxiliary aids and services as those

aids and services designed to provide effective communications, i. e.,

making aurally and visually delivered information available to persons

with hearing, speech, and vision impairments. Methods of making

services, programs, or activities accessible to, or usable by, individuals

with mobility or manual dexterity impairments are addressed by other

sections of this part, including the requirements for modifications in

policies, practices, or procedures (§ 36.302), the elimination of existing

architectural barriers (§ 36.304), and the provision of alternatives to

barriers removal (§ 36.305).

Id. Accordingly, this provision does not provide relief for Plaintiff’s claim that the

ADA imposes on Witt the duty to install vehicle hand controls on its vehicles for sale

in order for the mobility disabled to take the vehicle for a test drive. This provision is

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limited to services or devicesfor ensuring effective communications. See 28 C.F.R., 3

Part 36, Appendix C, analysis for §36.303.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss and grants Plaintiff 15 days leave

to amend from the date of entry of this order to plead a sufficient claim if he is able to

do so.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties 

The court notes that Plaintiff’s claim is particularly broad. The complaint 3

alleges that Witt offered to provide Plaintiff with a rental car of similar make, model,

and year with the required hand controls. (Compl. ¶9). Under Plaintiff’s view, the

ADA imposes on automobile dealers the duty to install, or make available for

installation, hand controls on every vehicle if so requested. 

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