Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01893/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01893-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1893

___________

Stanley Carter Liggins, *

*

Petitioner - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Ken Burger, Warden, *

*

Respondent - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: September 1, 2005

___________

Before BYE, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Stanley Carter Liggins was convicted in Iowa state court of first-degree murder

in the death of nine-year-old Jennifer Lewis. Liggins's direct appeal and state petition

for post-conviction relief were denied. Thereafter, he petitioned the federal district

court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court1

 dismissed

the petition and issued a certificate of appealability (COA). On appeal, Liggins asks

us to dismiss the indictment or vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial. We

affirm. 

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I

The burned body of nine-year-old Jennifer Lewis was found on the grounds of

Jefferson Elementary School in Davenport, Iowa, at approximately 9:00 p.m. on

September 17, 1990. A medical examination revealed her death was caused by

manual strangulation; she had been sexually abused prior to death and was not alive

at the time her body was burned. Jennifer, who lived with her mother Sherry Glenn

and stepfather Joseph Glenn in Rock Island, Illinois, had last been seen at

approximately 6:30 p.m. purchasing gum at Mac's Liquor Store in Rock Island. 

On July 27, 1992, Liggins was charged in Iowa state court with first-degree

murder, willful injury, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree kidnapping and arson.

He entered not guilty pleas. On October 1, 1992, Liggins moved to set aside or

dismiss the charges, arguing, among other things, Iowa lacked criminal jurisdiction.

The court denied Liggins's motion and on February 10, 1993, the case proceeded to

trial. At the close of the state's case, the court granted Liggins's motion for judgment

of acquittal on the arson charge but denied the motion as to the remaining charges.

The jury found Liggins guilty on all remaining counts and he was sentenced to three

life terms and a term not to exceed ten years on the willful injury conviction.

On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the willful injury, first-degree

sexual abuse, and first-degree kidnapping convictions concluding the state failed to

present evidence establishing territorial jurisdiction. The Court denied Liggins's

motion to set aside the murder conviction on sufficiency of evidence grounds, but

reversed the conviction because the trial court erred by allowing in evidence of

Liggins's drug dealing. State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 186, 188-89 (Iowa 1994)

(Liggins I). In July 1995, the state retried Liggins on the first-degree murder charge.

The jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

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2

Liggins raised additional arguments in his direct appeal and state postconviction proceedings which are not relevant to this proceeding.

-3-

In his direct appeal following the second trial, Liggins argued the state lacked

territorial jurisdiction over the murder charge because there was no proof the murder

occurred in Iowa. Liggins also argued one of the jury instructions erroneously

advised the jury it did not have to find the murder occurred in Iowa. Finally, he

argued there was insufficient evidence to prove he murdered Jennifer.2

 The Iowa

Supreme Court rejected Liggins's arguments and affirmed the first-degree murder

conviction. State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Iowa 1996) (Liggins II).

Liggins's state-court petition for post-conviction relief was also denied. Liggins v.

State, No. 99-1188, 2000 WL 1827164, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2000)

(Liggins III). 

Liggins next filed a § 2254 habeas corpus petition arguing 1) ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel, 2) lack of territorial jurisdiction, 3)

instructional error, 4) Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, 5)

sufficiency of the evidence, 6) violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

and 7) newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed the petition but

granted a COA. In this appeal, Liggins argues 1) there was insufficient evidence to

prove he murdered Jennifer, 2) Iowa lacked jurisdiction to try him for murder because

there was insufficient evidence to show the murder occurred in Iowa, 3) the jury was

improperly instructed regarding the proof necessary to establish territorial

jurisdiction, 4) the prosecution violated Brady, and 5) the federal district court erred

when it denied his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on his claim of

newly discovered evidence. 

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II

Our review of Liggins's claims is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996(AEDPA). We may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with

respect to any issue decided by the Iowa courts unless the decision "was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court" or the decision "was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), the Supreme

Court reiterated its interpretation of § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable

application of" federal law standards. 

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established

precedent if the state court either "applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases," or

"confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our

precedent." A state court decision will be an "unreasonable

application of" our clearly established precedent if it

"correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it

unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." 

* * * 

Distinguishing between an unreasonable and an incorrect

application of federal law, we clarified that even if the

federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is

appropriate only if that application is also objectively

unreasonable. 

532 U.S. at 792-93 (citations omitted).

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When reviewing a district court's denial of a § 2254 petition, we review the

district court's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law (as cabined by

AEDPA) de novo. King v. Bowersox, 291 F.3d 539, 540 (8th Cir. 2002).

A

Liggins first argues there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder. Within the context of § 2254, we consider

"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ("[U]nder 28

U.S.C. § 2254 . . . the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that

upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citation omitted). We presume the

findings of fact made by the Iowa courts are correct unless Liggins rebuts the

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hall v.

Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Iowa courts held the jury properly

convicted Liggins of first-degree murder. The evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, demonstrates the following. At the time of the murder,

Liggins resided at the Hillside Motel in Rock Island. He became acquainted with

Joseph and Sheri Glenn the summer before the murder and frequently visited their

home. About a week before the murder, a neighbor noticed Liggins's car parked a

block from the Glenn home at about 6:30 p.m. and saw Jennifer talking to him

through the window. On the day of the murder, Liggins stopped by the Glenns' house

at approximately 5:30 p.m. At about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer's stepfather told her she

could ride her bicycle to a friend's home. Within minutes, Liggins excused himself

and left. A neighbor testified she saw Liggins drive his car down the street and stop

before motioning Jennifer over to his car. The two spoke briefly before Jennifer got

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on her bicycle and returned home. Liggins returned to the Glenn house ahead of

Jennifer and reentered. After Jennifer returned, Liggins said he wanted some

chewing gum and Jennifer produced a dollar bill saying she was going to nearby

Mac's Liquor store to buy him gum. Within minutes of Jennifer's departure, Liggins

left the Glenn home. 

Charlotte McCray, the owner of Mac's, testified Jennifer bought a package of

gum from her at approximately 6:30 p.m. A second witness, Antonio Holmes,

testified he stopped at Mac's at 6:30 p.m. and saw a man matching Liggins's

description standing outside the store next to a car. Upon entering the store, Holmes

saw a young girl buying a package of gum with a dollar bill. When he left, Holmes

noted the girl and Liggins were nowhere to be seen; Jennifer was not seen alive again.

Two days after the murder, Holmes picked Liggins's photograph from a photographic

lineup. 

Jennifer's burned body was discovered across the river in Davenport, Iowa

around 9:00 p.m. The investigation revealed her body had been doused in gasoline

and set on fire. A witness, Lloyd Eston, testified he and his wife drove by Jefferson

School between 8:15 and 8:30 p.m. and saw a man standing by a red four-door

foreign-looking car (Liggins frequently drove a red Peugeot registered to his

girlfriend Brenda Adams). Eston could not describe the man or state conclusively

whether he made these observations on the night Jennifer was killed, but testified he

was "pretty sure" the car was the red Peugeot. 

 A second witness, Wanda Hughes, testified she observed the red Peugeot near

the school around 9:00 p.m. and noticed a fire burning on the school grounds.

Hughes also testified one of the car's taillights was dimmer than the other. At trial,

the state offered the rear portion of the Peugeot into evidence and demonstrated when

illuminated one of the lights was dimmer. 

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The state also offered testimony from a resident of the Hillside Motel

indicating he heard Liggins take a forty-five-minute shower at 4:00 a.m. the morning

after the murder. Additionally, the state offered statements Liggins made to police

showing he lied about his whereabouts the night of the murder. Liggins told police

he went home after leaving the Glenn residence and called his sister twice but got an

answering machine. Telephone records disproved the claim. Further, Liggins told

police he had not seen or talked to Jennifer on the street the evening of the murder,

but later admitted talking to her when told neighbors had seen her talking to a man

they identified as Liggins. Next, the state offered testimony from Donna Atkins,

Liggins's neighbor, indicating she walked by the Peugeot the day after the murder,

smelled gas and saw a gas can in the backseat. Next, the state offered a gas can

recovered from the Peugeot bearing Liggins's fingerprints, as well as evidence

suggesting the backseat of the car had been washed recently. Finally, the state called

Frank Reising who testified Liggins confessed to murdering Jennifer while the two

shared a jail cell. Reising testified that after watching a television news report about

the murder, Liggins told him he "did it and wouldn't get [convicted] for it" because

"they didn't have nothing on [him]." 

Liggins does not contend the evidence, if accepted, is insufficient to support

the verdict. Rather, he offers additional evidence to show the state's evidence was

largely unreliable. For example, he argues Holmes testified he contacted police after

the murder because McCray told him Jennifer was in the store when he came in.

McCray, however, testified she did not recall if anyone else was there when Jennifer

came in. She further testified Jennifer said a friend was waiting and McCray thought

a girl was waiting outside. Liggins also points to a police report indicating Holmes

was intoxicated when he identified Liggins's photograph and later told police he was

uncertain of the identification.

Next, Liggins attacks the testimony of the witnesses who observed his car in

the area of the murder. Liggins argues Eston's identification of the Peugeot was

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tentative; Eston could only state the car he saw was similar to the Peugeot. Further,

Eston was unable to provide any description of the person standing near the trunk of

the car except to say it was a male. Liggins also argues Eston's testimony is

unreliable because it was presented by deposition and he was unable to cross-examine

the deposition. Finally, Eston saw no fire at the time he observed the car. 

Similarly, Liggins argues Hughes's testimony is unreliable because she saw the

fire "a little after nine" while evidence established the police were called before 9:00

p.m. Further, Liggins contends Hughes was unable to provide an exact date for when

she observed the fire and initially testified she could not even give a month. Later,

Hughes testified it was likely September. Finally, Liggins argues Hughes's testimony

regarding the appearance of the taillights was unreliable because she saw the vehicle

at a distance of three blocks. Hughes testified nothing impeded her vision but was

impeached with her testimony from the first trial indicating there may have been

bushes blocking her view. 

Liggins's attacks on the other evidence are of a similar ilk. He counters the

state's evidence about the backseat of the Peugeot by arguing a window seal was

defective and allowed rain to seep in soaking the floor. Liggins attempts to rebut

evidence about the lengthy shower with testimony from his girlfriend indicating he

spent the night at her home. Liggins counters Atkins's testimony about smelling gas

with testimony from his girlfriend stating she had the car at the time Atkins claims to

have made her observations. As for the purported jailhouse confession, Liggins

argues Reising's testimony is unreliable because he admitted Liggins rarely spoke, did

not trust him, and only testified to curry favor with police. Finally, Liggins points to

the absence of any forensic evidence, e.g., hair, fibers, blood, etc., connecting him to

the crime despite an exhaustive investigation. 

The district court found some of the evidence conflicting and less than helpful

to the prosecution but concluded the jury properly weighed the evidence and

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credibility of the witnesses. The district court further found the Iowa courts'

determination that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict was not

unreasonable. We agree. We presume the findings of fact made by the Iowa courts

are correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1).

Because we are not satisfied Liggins has presented sufficient evidence to call these

findings into question, we reject his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. 

B

Liggins next argues the Iowa Supreme Court erred in concluding there was

sufficient evidence to prove the murder occurred in Iowa.

Under Iowa law, a person is subject to criminal prosecution if "[t]he offense

is committed either wholly or partly within this state." Iowa Code § 803.1(1)(a).

Because territorial jurisdiction is an essential element of the crime, it must be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Liggins I, 524 N.W.2d at 184-85. In cases of murder,

Iowa Code § 803.1(2) creates a permissive rebuttable presumption of territorial

jurisdiction by providing "[i]f the body of a murder victim is found within the state,

the death is presumed to have occurred within the state." Id. at 185. 

In his direct appeal, Liggins argued there was insufficient evidence to prove

territorial jurisdiction. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding 

Jennifer's body was found in Davenport, Iowa. Further, the evidence in

the record does not conclusively establish if she was killed in Iowa or

Illinois. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish

Iowa's territorial jurisdiction on the murder charge and that Liggins did

not rebut the statutory presumption.

Liggins II, 557 N.W.2d at 266-67. 

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The district court held the Court's territorial jurisdiction ruling did not violate

Liggins's due process rights because "there was a 'rational connection' between the

basic fact proved, that is, the location of Jennifer's body, and the ultimate fact

presumed, that is, her death occurred in Iowa." Liggins, however, contends the

location of Jennifer's body was insufficient proof she was killed in Iowa. He points

to the Iowa Supreme Court's ruling that there was insufficient evidence to prove the

other crimes occurred in Iowa and argues the statutory inference alone is

constitutionally insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). "This bedrock,

axiomatic, and elementary [constitutional] principle prohibits the State from using

evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State

of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of

a crime." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). "[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational'

or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial

assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact

on which it is made to depend." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). 

Here, the presumption of territorial jurisdiction in the murder charge was

neither irrational nor arbitrary. Jennifer's body was discovered within a few hours of

her disappearance only minutes from where she was last seen. She was strangled and

the evidence tended to show she died within minutes. Additionally, Liggins was in

the area of Jennifer's kidnaping when it occurred, was seen talking to her, and had

ample time to transport her to Iowa, kill her, and return to Illinois. Thus, there is

substantial assurance the presumed fact (Jennifer was murdered in Iowa) is more

likely than not to flow from the proved fact (Jennifer was found murdered in Iowa).

Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.

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C

Liggins next argues an improper jury instruction relieved the jury of its

obligation to find the murder occurred in Iowa. We disagree. 

Liggins was tried for first-degree murder under a theory of felony-murder,

requiring the state to prove Liggins either 

(a) acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with a specific intent

to kill Jennifer Lewis; or 

(b) was participating in the offense of Willful Injury, Sexual Abuse, or

Kidnapping of or to Jennifer Lewis as defined in Instruction No. 23. 

App. at 393A. 

The jury was further instructed it had to find one of the alleged offenses "was

committed wholly or partly within the State of Iowa." App. at 393A. Finally, Jury

Instruction 23 told the jury: "A person participates in an offense beginning with the

first act done toward the commission of the offense and ending when the person has

been arrested or has escaped from pursuers." App. at 393B. 

Liggins contends these jury instructions permitted the jury to find territorial

jurisdiction "[a]s long as [Liggins] got to Iowa before he was arrested, [because] all

'acts' that were 'done toward the commission of the offense' continued in Iowa." In

other words, if the jury believed Liggins committed any of the acts alleged, and then

later traveled to Iowa, territorial jurisdiction was established irrespective of where the

acts occurred. 

The Iowa Supreme Court concluded the instructions were a correct statement

of Iowa law, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of

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"participating" because Liggins was tried on the theory of felony murder. Liggins II,

557 N.W.2d at 267. "The definition contained in Instruction No. 23 was used to

define the concept of 'participating in a forcible felony' for purposes of the felonymurder rule." Id.

Generally, issues relating to jury instructions in state-court proceedings involve

"the application and interpretation of state law." Louisell v. Dir. of Iowa Dept. of

Corrections, 178 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67-68 (1991)). An instruction correctly setting forth state law does not, however,

necessarily satisfy due process concerns. Id. We may grant habeas corpus relief

when a "jury instruction constituted 'a fundamental defect' that resulted 'in a complete

miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of a

fair trial." Id. (citations omitted). Here, we find no such defect or omission. The jury

was instructed it had to find one of the offenses was committed partly or wholly in

Iowa. Instruction 23 defining participating in an offense did not relieve the jury of

its duty to make such a finding. Thus, we find no merit in Liggins's argument. 

D

Liggins next contends the state suppressed several police reports in violation

of Brady v. Maryland. Under Brady, the government must disclose any evidence

both "favorable to an accused" and "material either to guilt or to punishment." 373

U.S. at 87. Brady applies to exculpatory and impeachment evidence, United States

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), whether or not the accused has specifically

requested the information, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995). Evidence

favorable to the accused is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id. at 433-34 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). "The question is not

whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict

with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as

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a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Id. at 434. When analyzing a

Brady claim, we do not consider the items of suppressed evidence individually, but

rather collectively to determine whether they undermine confidence in the verdict.

United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S.

at 436).

1. Sarah Bea

Liggins contends a police report detailing an interview with Sarah Bea

conducted on the evening of the murder contains, or would have led him to,

exculpatory evidence. The report states

[Bea] had been driving [past Jefferson School on the evening of the

murder]. She thought right around 9:00 p.m. or so. She observed what

she thought was garbage burning in the field behind Jefferson School

with a couple other smaller fires in that general area. She thought

nothing unusual of it and drove by, said she saw what she thought was

a red Camaro also driving by slowly in front of her, westbound, had no

idea of the plates or any description of the occupants. She had no

further information. 

The report was not disclosed to the defense and Bea did not testify at either

trial. On September 24, 1996, Bea contacted the Davenport Police Department

claiming she had information about Jennifer's murder. An officer conducted an

interview of Bea on November 6, 1996. During the interview, Bea reported driving

to pick up a prescription just before 9:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. On the way

home, she claimed to have observed three white males in a small white car near

Jefferson School. She said a very thin man wearing a hat exited the white car and

stood by what she believed were burning logs. Bea reported seeing the man return

to the white vehicle and drive it wildly towards her car. Although she was

accompanied by two young daughters, Bea claimed she positioned her car so the

white vehicle would collide with her car if it attempted to pass by. Bea further

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claimed she confronted the other driver about setting her neighborhood on fire and

asked whether he wanted to fight.

Bea described the driver's hat as a brown, winter-looking style hat with a

broken arrow in the headband. Bea claimed the driver yelled, acted "crazy," and then

left by driving into the ditch to get past her car. Bea told the investigator she got out

of her car and walked to the fire. After discovering she had no blanket with which

to extinguish the fire, she pounded on the school door to alert others. According to

Bea, she was unable to make any contact and returned home where she placed a call

to police. Bea claimed she reported this information and provided her name, address,

and the license plate number of the white car. Thereafter, Bea drove to the bus station

to pick up her husband but later returned to the fire where she spoke to a detective

who took her to the site of the fire. Bea said she withheld her name from the

detective during this return visit but did give her address. Bea then claimed she

returned home and spoke to her husband who instructed her not to speak to the police

about the incident. Despite her husband's instruction, she returned to the scene a third

time and told police her name was Peggy Ross. According to Bea, she did not give

her real name because she felt physically threatened by her husband and hoped the

investigating officers would contact her friend, Peggy Ross, who would send them

to her. Bea claimed she did not contact the authorities again because her husband

cautioned her to think about the risks posed to him and their children.

During the interview, Bea told the investigator she saw a television report

about Jennifer's funeral a few days after September 17, 1990. She claimed the report

showed a man helping a woman into a limousine and he was wearing the same hat she

had seen on the driver of the white car. Bea said she called the County Attorney's

office and the offices of Liggins's lawyers during the 1995 trial but received no return

call. Finally, Bea told the interviewer her son was an inmate at the same penitentiary

as Liggins and she had asked him to get a message to Liggins. A few days later,

Liggins called and asked her to talk to his attorney.

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Liggins contends the police report of the 1990 Bea interview contains

exculpatory information and the state suppressed it in violation of Brady. He argues

suppression of the report prevented him from presenting Bea's favorable and material

testimony. The state contends Liggins failed to prove the report was suppressed and

argues it is neither favorable nor material.

The Iowa Court of Appeals and the district court concluded the report was

suppressed. We agree. To constitute a Brady violation, however, there must be "a

reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result

of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The state

court found notable inconsistencies between the substance of the September 17, 1990,

police report and Bea's version of events six years later. For example, on the night

of the murder, Bea reported seeing a red Camaro but six years later she recalled

confronting a small white vehicle. The September 17, 1990, report says Bea was

unable to give a description of the occupants of the red Camaro, but six years later

she gave detailed descriptions of the occupants of the white car and their clothing.

The earlier report indicates Bea could not provide the license plate number of the

Camaro, but six years later she claimed to have provided the license plate of the white

vehicle. Finally, the state court found the credibility of Bea's 1996 statement

diminished by her natural motivation to improve conditions for her son at the

penitentiary. Liggins III, 2000 WL 1827164, at *4. 

2. Daryl Sheese, Shawn Saunders, and Michael Armstrong

On the date of the murder, Liggins was the tenant at Hillside Apartments in

Rock Island. The state called Donna Atkins who testified she frequently saw the

Peugeot parked in front of her boyfriend Daryl Sheese's apartment in the Hillside

Apartments' parking lot. She testified she walked past the vehicle on the morning of

September 18, 1990, noticed the strong odor of gasoline, and saw a gas can sitting on

the back seat. In September 1990, police interviewed Daryl Sheese, Shawn Saunders,

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and Michael Armstrong about Liggins and their observations of his Peugeot. The

reports of those interviews were not disclosed to the defense and Liggins contends

they were exculpatory because they cast doubt on Atkins's testimony.

Sheese was a resident of Hillside Apartments at the time of the murder. When

shown a photo of the maroon Peugeot, he did not recall seeing the vehicle on

September 18, 1990, but did recall seeing a brown Mustang. Liggins contends the

report proves Atkins was mistaken about seeing his car and she really saw a brown

Mustang. The Iowa Court of Appeals found the report was suppressed and might

have been useful to the defense. The court, however, determined the report was not

material because Sheese was an alcoholic who was moving out of his apartment and

into an alcohol treatment facility. Further, the court concluded Sheese's statement he

"did not remember" seeing the Peugeot on September 18, 1990, and his recollection

of seeing the brown Mustang, were not so compelling as to generate a reasonable

probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at *5. 

Police also interviewed Shawn Saunders, another resident of the Hillside

Apartments. The police report disclosed Saunders owned a brown Mustang,

frequently parked it in the Hillside Apartments' parking lot, but it never had a gas can

in it. The report also said Saunders had seen the Peugeot and Liggins in the vicinity

of the apartments in the past. The Iowa Court of Appeals found the report was

suppressed and at least somewhat favorable to the defense because it corroborated

Sheese's statement about a brown Mustang. Nevertheless, the court concluded the

report was not material because it did not address whether the Peugeot was present

on September 18, 1990, as Atkins claimed, and there was no reasonable probability

a different outcome would have resulted if the Saunders report had been produced.

Id.

Finally, Michael Armstrong , another resident of the Hillside Apartments was

interviewed. The report of the interview indicated Armstrong could not say whether

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he had ever seen the Peugeot, but he acknowledged using a brown Mustang owned

by Saunders. He denied having a gas can in the vehicle. The state court again found

the police report was suppressed and possibly favorable to Liggins, but concluded it

was not material because Armstrong's equivocal statements concerning the Peugeot

did not substantially refute Atkins's testimony. Id.

We do not condone the state's conduct in failing to make these reports available

to the defense. Nevertheless, we cannot say that taken collectively there was a

reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different had they

been produced. Bea's statement is replete with inconsistencies and her credibility is

dubious. The remaining three reports are of questionable value. They hint at the

possibility Atkins may have confused the Peugeot with the Mustang, but do not

sufficiently undermine her testimony as to create a reasonable probability the verdict

would have been different. Thus, we agree there was no Brady violation. 

3. Funeral Videotape

At both trials Liggins argued Jennifer's stepfather, Joseph Glenn, was the

murderer. The factual predicate for this theory came, in part, from the testimony of

Roberta Kadera. Kadera stated she drove past Jefferson School at about 9:00 p.m. on

September 17, 1990, saw a fire, and saw a man with long hair running toward the

woods. Kadera testified the man was wearing a black leather jacket with "silver studs

and fringes." Patricia Rhoads, a neighbor of the Glenns, testified Joseph wore a

"black leather jacket all the time." Rhoads described the jacket as having "silver

buttons or silver punch things and . . . tassels." Sherri Glenn testified her husband

once owned such a coat but pawned it prior to September 17, 1990. Joseph testified

he did not own or have access to a leather jacket with metallic decorations in

September 1990.

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Liggins contends Joseph Glenn's testimony was false. In support of his

contention, Liggins offers a videotape of Jennifer's funeral showing Joseph Glenn

wearing a leather coat. The videotape was broadcast by a Rock Island television

station in September 1990, and a copy was in the possession of the state but not

produced to the defense. Liggins's counsel obtained a copy of the tape after Liggins

was convicted for the second time. The Iowa Court of Appeals found the tape was

not suppressed because it was broadcast by a television station and Brady only

applies when evidence discovered after trial was "known to the prosecution but

unknown to the defense." Id. at *6 (citations omitted). In other words, the videotape

was not evidence known only to the prosecution because it was seen by many people

in the Rock Island area and was equally accessible to the defense. The court further

concluded the tape would not have changed the outcome of the trial because there

were no metallic decorations visible on the jacket. Id.

The district court concluded the Iowa state court's ruling was a reasonable

application of federal law based upon a reasonable determination of the facts. We

agree. Brady applies to information "exclusively within the prosecutor's control and

knowledge." United States v. Oliver, 908 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Lugo v. Munoz, 682 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1982)). Because the videotape was widely

disseminated and equally available to the defense, we find no Brady violation.

Additionally, having carefully reviewed the videotape, we, like the Iowa Court of

Appeals, are unable to detect any metallic decorations. 

E

Liggins's final argument is the district court erred by refusing to allow

additional discovery and in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing. We conclude the

district court properly rejected this claim and affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

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III

We affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief and dismissal of Liggins's

§ 2254 petition.

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