Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55247/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55247-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD TAYLOR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD,

*

 Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-55247

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-05267-

ODW-OP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

September 10, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 21, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman, M. Margaret McKeown,

William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, Richard C.

Tallman, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee, Morgan

Christen and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

 

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Jeffrey

Beard is substituted for his predecessor, Matthew Cate, as Secretary of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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2 TAYLOR V. BEARD

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s denial of

California state prisoner Ronald Taylor’s habeas corpus

petition seeking to set aside his felony murder conviction

predicated on attempted robbery, in a case in which the trial

court originally sentenced Taylor to life without parole based

on a special-circumstance finding that he was the shooter, but

resentenced him to a reduced term, as an aider and abettor,

based on a subsequent determination that he was not the

shooter.

Taylor argued that the conviction should be set aside

because the jury’s finding that he was the shooter meant that

it had not found him guilty on a theory of aiding and abetting.

Reviewing de novo, the en banc court rejected Taylor’s

claim that his constitutional right to a jury trial was violated. 

The en banc court observed that the prosecutor argued and the

jury considered evidence supporting a finding that Taylor was

guilty of felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory

as well as under the theory that he was the shooter, and that

the jury was not required to unanimously choose a particular

theory. The en banc court explained that although the jury

incorrectlydetermined Taylor’s identitywhen considering the

special circumstances, those findings do not prove it rejected

the valid aiding-and-abetting theory when considering

Taylor’s guilt for felony murder. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 3

The en banc court added that Taylor has never established

his innocence as to the aiding-and-abetting theory, which is

unsurprising given the strength of the evidence against him. 

The en banc court wrote that even if a petitioner may be

entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of

actual innocence, an open question, Taylor would not be able

to vacate his felony murder conviction because at best he has

established that the jury relied on an incorrect theory, not that

he was factually innocent of the crime.

COUNSEL

Kurt David Hermansen (argued), San Diego, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R.

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Eric E. Reynolds

(argued), Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, California,

for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 TAYLOR V. BEARD

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

In 1987, two men entered Lewis Lim’s fast food

restaurant, and one of them shot Lim dead. A jury found that

Ronald Taylor was the shooter. Taylor was convicted and

sentenced to life without parole for felony murder predicated

on attempted robbery. After the trial, Taylor told the State

that his cousin was the shooter but admitted that he was the

second person — that he had traveled to and from the

restaurant with his cousin and had been present at the killing. 

The State came to be persuaded that Taylor was not the

shooter. Though its subsequent attempt to prosecute the

person identified by Taylor as the actual shooter was

unsuccessful, the State still supported an effort to have

Taylor’s sentence reduced to the shorter term that would

apply to him if convicted as an aider and abettor and not as

the actual shooter. That effort was ultimately successful, and

Taylor was resentenced to a term of imprisonment with the

possibility of parole.

Taylor objected, however, contending that his conviction

should be entirely set aside. He argued that the jury’s finding

that he was the shooter meant that it had not found him guilty

of felony murder on a theory of aiding and abetting as the

person who accompanied the shooter. A finding of guilt on

that aiding and abetting theory would have required an

additional finding of specific intent, not required to find him

guilty as the actual shooter. That claim was not addressed by

the state courts, so Taylor petitioned the federal court for a

writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that

the State may not continue to hold him on the basis that he

aided and abetted felony murder when the jury did not find

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 5

the facts necessary for the aiding and abetting theory. The

district court denied the petition, and Taylor appeals.

We affirm the district court’s denial of Taylor’s petition. 

Taylor had a fair trial. The jury verdict was valid, and the

subsequent determination that Taylor was the second man,

not the actual shooter, does not require that his conviction be

set aside.

I. Background

The following facts emerged at trial and are undisputed. 

On November 19, 1987, petitioner Ronald Taylor and another

man stole a car with the intent to use it to commit a robbery. 

At around 3:10 p.m. that day, the two men drove the stolen

car to a Pioneer Chicken restaurant in Sunland, California. 

The first man entered the restaurant and requested the key to

the lavatory from Rajinder Kaur, the attendant behind the

counter. Kaur gave him the key and the man went out of the

restaurant to the lavatory, which was entered from the

outside. The man kept the lavatory door ajar and watched

until two customers drove off. The second man remained

outside, sitting either in the car or on its hood, able to see the

lavatory.

The first man then reentered the restaurant, walked behind

the counter into the kitchen area, and gave the key back to

Kaur with his left hand while pulling a gun from his pocket

with his right. The second man had by then also entered the

restaurant and was sitting in the dining area near the

restaurant cook, who was eating lunch. The owner of the

restaurant, Lewis Lim, caught the attention of the gunman. 

While the gunman was distracted by Lim, Kaur went through

the kitchen door to the dining area to summon help. The first

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6 TAYLOR V. BEARD

man (“shooter”) then punched Lim and shot him through the

head. As Kaur tried to leave, the second man (“lookout”)

struck her on the back and threw her to the floor. The two

men fled in the stolen car in which they had arrived. The car

was later found wiped down with brake fluid to remove

fingerprints, but Taylor’s palm print was recovered. 

Taylor was arrested and charged with murdering Lim in

violation of California Penal Code § 187(a). The State also

alleged three special circumstances which, if found true,

would increase the sentence Taylor faced upon conviction. 

First, it alleged that Taylor committed the murder while in the

attempted commission of a robbery in violation of Penal

Code § 190.2(a)(17).1 Second, the State alleged that Taylor

personally used a firearm during the crime. Third, the State

alleged that a principal was armed with a firearm during the

offense.

There was a dispute at trial whether Taylor, if he was

present at all, was the shooter or the lookout. The prosecutor

argued that both men, shooter and lookout, were guilty of

felony murder. Because Lim was killed during the course of

the robbery, the lookout could be found guilty of felony

murder under an aiding and abetting theory for attempting to

rob the Pioneer Chicken, and the jury was so instructed. But,

as the prosecutor acknowledged at the time, the jury could not

properly find the § 190.2(a)(17) special circumstance “true”

as to Taylor on an aiding and abetting theory.

1 That section provides, in relevant part: “The murder was committed

while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the

commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after

committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: (A) Robbery

in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.”

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 7

Under California law, someone found guilty as “an actual

killer” does not need to “have had any intent to kill at the

time of the commission of the offense” for the special

circumstance to be found true, but someone who aided and

abetted the murder is subject to the special circumstance only

if it is found that he acted with “the intent to kill.” Cal. Penal

Code § 190.2(b)–(c). The prosecutor conceded that he had

not proven that the lookout had the intent to kill Lim, so he

told the jury that it could not convict Taylor of the special

circumstance if it found Taylor was the lookout. This made

a difference for Taylor’s sentence. Taylor would only be

eligible for life without parole or the death penalty if the jury

found the special circumstance true. Cal. Penal Code

§ 190.2(a). Otherwise, Taylor would be subject to the lesser

term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole. Cal.

Penal Code § 190(a).

At trial Taylor could not deny, in light of his palm print,

that he had helped wipe down the stolen getaway car, but he

otherwise tried to minimize his involvement. His attorney

argued that he wasn’t “necessarily . . . even there at the time

of the robbery.” If he was there, the attorney argued, he had

no idea that the shooter planned to commit a robbery. Or, the

attorney argued to the jury, the shooter might simply have

wanted to execute Lim, not commit a robbery. If the jury

believed this last theory, then even if it found that Taylor was

the shooter, it could not convict Taylor of the first special

circumstance, robbery murder.

In the face of the evidence against him, Taylor’s defense

amounted to a high-risk gamble. Taylor lost. The jury found

him guilty of first degree felony murder, attempted robbery,

and the unlawful taking of a vehicle, and found true the

allegations that the murder was committed while Taylor was

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8 TAYLOR V. BEARD

engaged in an attempted robbery and that Taylor personally

was armed with and used a firearm.

After the verdict was rendered but before sentence was

imposed, Taylor told his lawyer that he was present during

the robbery but that someone else was the shooter. Taylor

filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, sought to

strike the findings that he was the shooter and that he had

personally used a firearm. The trial court denied that motion,

and he was sentenced to life without parole. The verdict was

upheld on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied

Taylor’s petition for review.

Seven years later, hoping that “somehow [he wouldn’t]

die in prison,” Taylor tried again to convince the State that

he had not been the actual killer, identifying his cousin, Hugh

Hayes, Jr., as the shooter. The Los Angeles Police

Department and Los Angeles County District Attorney’s

Office concluded that Taylor’s assertion was true, and the

district attorney’s office filed an information charging Hayes

with murder. Taylor testified at Hayes’s preliminary hearing

that he and Hayes stole the car and drove around with a

loaded gun looking for a place to rob, and that he had been

with Hayes at the Pioneer Chicken during the attempted

robbery. In 1999, Hayes was tried for the murder but was

acquitted.

Despite the failure to convict Hayes as the shooter, the

district attorney wrote to the California Board of Prison

Terms requesting that Taylor’s case be returned to the trial

court for resentencing, given the new evidence that Taylor

was not the shooter. The board denied the request.

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 9

Taylor continued to challenge his conviction and sentence

in state court. In May 2005, while the California Supreme

Court was considering a habeas petition filed by Taylor pro

se, the district attorney again wrote to the California

Department of Corrections and the California Board of Prison

Terms to request that they recommend that the trial court

recall Taylor’s sentence and resentence him. The district

attorney repeated that new evidence showed that Hayes, not

Taylor, was the shooter. The California Supreme Court then

instructed the California Attorney General to submit an

informal response to Taylor’s petition that addressed the

district attorney’s requests.

In its informal response, the State suggested that the

California Supreme Court issue an order to show cause to the

State regarding Taylor’s claim that he was not the shooter.2

This would allow the State to file a statement of

non-opposition to Taylor’s claim. The State added, however,

that even if Taylor was not the shooter, he was an aider and

abettor, and urged that he was therefore properly convicted of

the underlying crime of felony murder. The State suggested

that the trial court strike the “special-circumstance” and

firearm-use findings and resentence Taylor as an aider and

abettor. In March 2006, the California Supreme Court issued

an order requiring the State to show cause to the trial court

why Taylor was “not factually innocent of the special

circumstance and the firearm-use allegation, and why he

should not be resentenced.”

 

2

 We affirmatively commend the Los Angeles district attorney and the

State for their support of Taylor’s resentencing. But for their efforts, it

seems likely that Taylor would still be subject to a sentence of life without

parole.

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10 TAYLOR V. BEARD

In its response to the order filed in the trial court, the State

conceded that the “special-circumstance” and firearm-use

findings were incorrect. The State again argued, however,

that Taylor was properly convicted of felony murder because

the jury could have found that, as the second man, he aided

and abetted the attempted robbery. The State urged that the

trial court strike the special findings and resentence Taylor as

an aider and abettor. Taylor objected to his resentencing on

the basis that vacating the special circumstance and firearm

use findings also vacated his felony murder conviction and

that the resentencing violated due process and his right to a

jury trial.

The trial court declined to consider the merits of Taylor’s

argument on the procedural ground that the California

Supreme Court order to show cause only directed inquiry into

the special circumstance and firearm findings and did not

permit Taylor to contest the felony murder conviction itself. 

Taylor was resentenced by the trial court to a term of 25 years

to life as an aider and abettor, plus an additional six years

because of his felony record and prior prison time. He was

given credit for the time that he had already served and for

days already earned for good time and work time.

Taylor appealed, and the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the trial court’s decision for the same procedural

reason: that considering the conviction itself was beyond the

authority granted by the order to show cause issued by the

California Supreme Court. Taylor petitioned to the California

Supreme Court for review of this decision, but the petition

was summarily denied.

In 2008, after the resentencing and the unsuccessful

appeal, Taylor filed another habeas corpus petition with the

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 11

California Supreme Court. Taylor argued that the jury had

already found that he was not the aider and abettor in Lim’s

murder because it had determined that he was the shooter, so

he could not be sentenced for murder as an aider and abettor

under the Sixth Amendment. The petition was summarily

denied.

Taylor then filed in federal district court a substantively

identical petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

petition was referred to a magistrate judge for report and

recommendation. The magistrate judge concluded that the

applicable standard was set by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), whereby habeas relief may only be granted if

the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

The judge concluded that the state court decision was not

unreasonable under that standard and recommended that the

petition be denied. The district court adopted the report and

recommendation and denied Taylor’s petition. It also denied

a certificate of appealability. Taylor sought a certificate from

this court, and we issued a certificate of appealability as to

“whether resentencing appellant as an aider and abettor

violated appellant’s due process and jury trial rights.”

Taylor filed his appeal, and a divided three-judge panel of

this court reversed, holding that Taylor’s right to jury trial

had been violated and that the State could not continue to

hold him in prison on the theory that he aided and abetted a

robbery when the jury did not make the findings necessary to

convict him of aiding and abetting. It remanded the case to

the district court with instructions to grant the writ. Taylor v.

Cate, 772 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014). A majority of the

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12 TAYLOR V. BEARD

nonrecused active judges on our court subsequently voted to

rehear the case en banc. Taylor v. Cate, 787 F.3d 1241 (9th

Cir. 2015).

II. Discussion

We review the decision of the district court de novo. 

Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Unlike the district court, however, we do not apply the

deferential standard of review that pertains to state court

decisions on the merits under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).3

Our review of Taylor’s claim is de novo.

The crux of Taylor’s claim is that his constitutional right

to a jury trial was violated. The trial court vacated the special

circumstance findings that Taylor was the shooter and had

personally used a firearm. According to Taylor, that required

that his felony murder conviction be vacated. If he was not

the shooter, the felony murder conviction could only rest on

an aiding and abetting theory. California law requires that to

hold a defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting theory,

the jury must find that the defendant acted with the intent to

commit or facilitate the crime. See People v. Beeman, 674

P.2d 1318, 1326 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) (listing elements of

aiding and abetting liability). The jury in Taylor’s trial was

3 The State has acknowledged on appeal that the district court erred in

applying the deferential AEDPA standard of review. That standard only

applies to claims that have been “adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The State has not argued that any

California court adjudicated the merits of Taylor’s constitutional claim

that the jury did not make the findings necessary to support the conviction

for felony murder as an aider and abettor for which he was resentenced.

We accordingly apply de novo review. See James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911,

914–16 (9th Cir. 2013).

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 13

so instructed, having been given California Jury Instruction

Criminal 3.01 (listing elements of aiding and abetting). 

Though the jury was correctly instructed, it did not need to

make that finding, which was necessary for a guilty verdict

on an aiding and abetting theory, because it found that Taylor

was the shooter and rejected the alternative possibility that he

was the lookout. Therefore, argues Taylor, his conviction

was not based upon a jury determination.

The Fifth Amendment “guarantees that no one will be

deprived of liberty without ‘due process of law’; and the

Sixth, that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury.’” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10

(1995). The Supreme Court has held “that these provisions

require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination

that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with

which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 510. 

Although Taylor alleges that his resentencing violated his

rights under these provisions, we conclude that there was no

constitutional error.

Taylor’s resentencing was based upon his 1989

conviction for felony murder. Taylor does not allege that his

constitutional rights were violated at the jury trial that

resulted in that conviction. His conviction for felony murder

rested on the jury’s findings that (1) he had the specific intent

to commit robbery and (2) a person was killed during the

attempt or commission of that robbery. See People v. Friend,

211 P.3d 520, 556 (Cal. 2009). Accordingly, Taylor’s felony

murder conviction did in fact rest upon a jury determination

that Taylor was guilty of every element of the crime of felony

murder. The jury was given adequate evidence to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Taylor was present at the

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14 TAYLOR V. BEARD

attempted robbery, (2) both the shooter and the lookout had

the intent to commit robbery, and (3) that Lim was killed

during the attempted robbery. Taylor does not argue that

there was insufficient evidence to support those findings, or

that the verdict was unfairly obtained by way of prosecutorial

misconduct or any other violation of due process. He

therefore has not established that his Sixth Amendment or

due process rights were violated at his trial.

Despite his fair trial, Taylor argues that the vacating of

the special circumstance findings vitiated his conviction

because the jury factually did not convict him of felony

murder based upon the lookout theory. Taylor derives

support for his argument from the prosecutor’s admission at

trial that if the jury found he was the lookout, it could not

convict him for the special circumstance of robbery murder

because the prosecution did not prove that the lookout had the

intent to kill, a necessaryelement for the special circumstance

to apply. In Taylor’s view, because the jury could not convict

him as the lookout for the special circumstance, it likewise

had to reject that theory when determining his culpability for

felony murder.

We disagree with Taylor’s characterization of the jury’s

findings. At trial the prosecutor argued and the jury

considered evidence supporting a finding that Taylor was

guilty of felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory

as well as under the theory that he was the shooter. The jury

was not required to unanimously choose a particular theory. 

See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1991) (plurality

opinion) (jurors can validly rely on different theories in order

to return a guilty verdict); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S.

175, 184–85 (2005) (defendant’s admission that he was not

the shooter of the victim did not justify withdrawal of his

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 15

guilty plea for aggravated murder because he could be liable

as an aider and abettor). Thus, the jury was not forced to

determine Taylor’s identity as either shooter or lookout until

it considered the special circumstances.4 Although the jury

incorrectlydetermined Taylor’sidentitywhen considering the

special circumstances, those findings do not prove it rejected

the valid lookout theory when considering Taylor’s guilt for

felony murder.5

4 Taylor argues that the jury did not in fact consider holding him guilty

under an aiding and abetting theory because ofJury Instruction No. 2.11.5,

which states as follows:

There has been evidence in this case indicating that a

person other than defendant was or may have been

involved in the crime for which the defendant is on

trial. Do not discuss or give any consideration to why

the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or

whether he has been or will be prosecuted.

We are not persuaded by this argument. The instruction only asked

the jury to disregard two things: 1) why the other man was not a defendant

in the trial and 2) whether the other man would be prosecuted. The

instruction did not tell the jury that it could not consider if the second man,

whether lookout or shooter, was likewise guilty. On the contrary, the

instruction validly allowed the jury to determine if both the shooter and

the lookout were guilty because, in order to evaluate whether the lookout

was guilty of felony murder under the aiding and abetting theory, the jury

had to determine if the shooter killed Lim in the course of committing a

robbery. Accordingly, this instruction in no way limited the jury from

considering both theories of felony murder and concluding that Taylor

would be guilty under either one.

5 Shortly after Taylor’s conviction, he filed a motion for a new trial or,

in the alternative, for the court to strike the special circumstance findings. 

The California Supreme Court’s order in effect gave Taylor the relief he

requested in his new trial motion, albeit years later. Taylor’s assertion that

his resentencing was unfair based upon the striking of the special

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16 TAYLOR V. BEARD

Taylor has never established his innocence as to the

lookout theory, which is unsurprising given the strength of

the evidence against him. To convict him of felony murder

as an aider and abettor, the jury had to find that Taylor (1)

had “knowledge of the unlawful purpose” of the robber, (2)

intended to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission

of the robbery, and (3) “by act or advice aid[ed], promote[d],

encourage[d] or instigate[d]” the commission of the robbery. 

Beeman, 674 P.2d at 1326. Unlike the aiding and abetting

theory for the special circumstance murder finding, which

required a finding of the intent to kill, the prosecutor only

needed to prove that Taylor had intent to rob in order to

convict him as an aider and abettor to felony murder. See

Friend, 211 P.3d at 574; People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561,

586–87 (Cal. 1990). The evidence presented to the jury

indicated that Taylor assisted the shooter in stealing a car

prior to the robbery, sat in the restaurant as a lookout, and

intentionally struck Kaur on the back and threw her to the

floor as she ran out of the kitchen to call for help. Taylor’s

palm print on the car indicated he later helped to wipe down

the getaway car in an attempt to remove evidence. Those acts

demonstrated that Taylor was not some innocent bystander. 

Rather, he had the intent to commit — and was an active

participant in — the attempted robbery. It is hard to imagine

how the jury could have concluded otherwise.

The evidence Taylor submitted after his trial did nothing

to establish his innocence. Instead, it confirmed his guilt. 

Taylor admitted that he and the shooter intended to rob a fast

food restaurant that day and stole a car for that purpose. He

also admitted that they had robbed five or six restaurants in

circumstance findings rings hollow in light of the fact that he himself

originally requested such relief.

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 17

the previous month. The sentencing judge therefore had no

reason to assume the jury had affirmatively rejected the

lookout theory as invalid in convicting Taylor for felony

murder or that Taylor was innocent of the crime of felony

murder.

Accordingly, Taylor fails to establish any error under

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The

sentencing judge did not find facts that “expose[d] the

defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the

jury’s guilty verdict.” Id. at 494. We see no constitutional

unfairness in the sentencing judge’s reliance on a conviction

that had been fully and fairly litigated before a jury.

Taylor attempts to rely on Griffin v. United States, 502

U.S. 46 (1991), to establish a due process violation based on

the special circumstance findings, but that case does not

support Taylor’s argument. In Griffin, the Supreme Court

declined to vacate a conviction when the prosecution

presented two theories for the jury to consider in returning a

verdict, one of which was not supported by sufficient

evidence. Id. at 47–48, 60. The Court determined that there

was no constitutional error, citing with approval the

traditional common-law rule that juries may be presumed to

reach verdicts on valid factual theories “in the absence of

anything in the record to show the contrary.” Id. at 49–50

(quoting Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146–47

(1891)). Taylor points to the above quoted language,

contending that the special circumstance findings

demonstrated that his constitutional rights were violated

because it proved the jury relied solely upon the factually

incorrect theory. As explained above, however, the vacating

of the special circumstance findings did not prove that the

jury solely relied on the shooter theory, especially when there

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18 TAYLOR V. BEARD

was more than sufficient evidence to find Taylor guilty on the

lookout theory.

Even if we accepted Taylor’s argument that the jury relied

solely on the theory that he was the shooter, his claim would

still be unpersuasive. Taylor’s contention that the jury

wrongly convicted him of felony murder by accepting the

factually incorrect shooter theory amounts to nothing more

than a freestanding actual innocence claim. See Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). He does not argue that

there was insufficient evidence in order to convict him on the

shooter theory, that there was any other mistake committed

by the trial court, or that there was an abuse of prosecutorial

power that resulted in the jury’s finding. In other words, he

fails to tie the jury’s mistake of adopting the shooter theory

to a constitutional violation. It is still an open question as to

whether a petitioner “may be entitled to habeas relief based

on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v.

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013). Even assuming that

such a claim exists, it is doubtful that Taylor’s new evidence

would have entitled him to relief because “the threshold

showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be

extraordinarily high.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. Moreover,

although Taylor produced evidence that he was not the

shooter, he did not produce evidence proving that he was not

the lookout. Accordingly, Taylor would not have been able

to vacate his felony murder conviction because at best he has

established that the jury relied on an incorrect theory, not that

he was factually innocent of the crime.

The Supreme Court has held that “in state criminal

proceedings the trial is the paramount event for determining

the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id. at 416. Because

Taylor received a fair trial, he comes before this court not

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TAYLOR V. BEARD 19

innocent but guilty “in the eyes of the law.” Id. at 399–400. 

He did not prove his factual innocence of felonymurder. The

sentencing judge did not err by resentencing him based upon

that felony murder conviction, and he has not been

incarcerated by the State in violation of his constitutional

rights.

In sum, this case does not represent the kind of “extreme

malfunction[] in [a] state criminal justice system[]” that may

justify granting habeas relief. Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in

judgment)). There is no malfunction of any kind, let alone an

extreme one, when a State voluntarily moves to resentence a

prisoner in response to that prisoner’s belated confession. In

the eyes of the law, he is presumed legally guilty, not

innocent, because he was convicted of felony murder after a

fair trial. Taylor’s evidence showing that he was not the

shooter did not establish his innocence as to felonymurder on

the aiding and abetting theory, so he is not entitled to habeas

relief regarding his conviction for felony murder.6

6 Even if Taylor had established constitutional error, such error would

be subject to harmless error review. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.

279, 306–07 (1991). Only a “very limited” number of constitutional

errors are deemed “structural” and require automatic reversal. Johnson v.

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). The error alleged by Taylor in

this case is not one of them.

Any alleged error committed by the sentencing judge stemmed from

the argument that the jury was presented with and allegedly relied upon

a factually false theory of liability. We have held that it is not structural

error for a prosecutor to knowingly put false evidence before a jury. 

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). There is no

reason why a prosecutor’s inadvertent submission of a false factual theory

should be treated differently. Our conclusion is also supported by the

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20 TAYLOR V. BEARD

III. Conclusion

Although the district court erred by applying AEDPA’s

deferential standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we reach the

same result as the district court because Taylor has not

established that his constitutional rights have been violated. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court denying

Taylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.

Supreme Court’s analysis in Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58, 61

(2008) (per curiam), where the court concluded that the submission of an

invalid legal theory in addition to a valid theory was subject to

harmlessness review. All that separates this case from Pulido is that one

of the theories here was wrong as a matter of fact, not of law, and we see

no principled reason whyPulido’s analysis would not apply equally to this

case.

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