Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605-80/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANDREW R. LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

S. COOK, Captain; R. MCKEAN, C/O; C. 

ADAMS, Lieutenant; R. JOHNSON; J. 

HARRISON; P. STATTI; D. SHAVER; A. 

NERGENAH; N. MCCLURE; JACKSON; 

D. MORTON, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:03-cv-01605-KJM-DAD 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment. (ECF Nos. 392 & 393.) The court held a hearing on November 17, 2014, at which 

Robert Navarro appeared for plaintiff, and Diana Esquivel appeared for defendants. As explained 

below, the court GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiff’s fifteenth due process claim, but 

otherwise DENIES both motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, the court provides only 

a brief summary of the background before providing its reasoning. The only claim remaining in 

this case brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 arises out of plaintiff Andrew Lopez’s contention that 

prison officials violated his due process rights by validating him as a gang member and placing 

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him in the Security Housing Unit (SHU). (See ECF No. 348 at 2; ECF No. 392 at 18.) The 

action is now proceeding against the following defendants: S. Cook, R. McKean, C. Adams, 

R. Johnson, J. Harrison, P. Statti, D. Shaver, A. Nergenah, N. McClure, Jackson and D. Morton. 

At the hearing on the instant motions, plaintiff conceded that the court may grant summary 

judgment as to defendants S. Cook, R. McKean, C. Adams, P. Statti, A. Nergenah, N. McClure, 

Jackson, and D. Morton with respect to plaintiff’s fifteenth claim for violations of due process 

relating to defendants’ alleged improper gang validation process. Summary judgment is granted 

to this extent. 

 Mr. Lopez has spent the past fourteen years in administrative segregation. (ECF 

No. 397-1 at 2.) This confinement began in 2000, when he was housed in High Desert State 

Prison (HDSP) (id.), and continued after he was transferred to California State Prison-Corcoran in 

2001 (id. at 16). California prison officials placed Mr. Lopez in administrative segregation 

because they found Mr. Lopez was a member of the Northern Structure gang. (ECF No. 175 at 

6.) Mr. Lopez denies he is a member of any gang. (ECF No. 397-1 at 3.) 

 Mr. Lopez first filed suit alleging violation of his constitutional rights in 2003. 

(See generally ECF Nos. 1 & 7.) After the court resolved several pretrial motions, the case 

eventually proceeded to trial on April 4, 2011. (ECF No. 295.) The jury returned a verdict in 

defendants’ favor (ECF No. 301), and the court entered judgment accordingly (ECF No. 304). 

After several post-trial motions, plaintiff appealed the judgment. (ECF No. 327.) The Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and issued its mandate on September 30, 2013. (ECF 

No. 348.) The Ninth Circuit held this court had properly denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment 

as a matter of law because “the identity of the critical decision-maker was a disputed question of 

fact.” (ECF No. 348 at 3.) But this court improperly rejected plaintiff’s “proffered instruction 

that notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided before prison officials complete the 

validation process given the non-emergency circumstances of this case.” (Id.) The Ninth Circuit 

also held this court erred in a prior judge’s “pretrial dismissal of [plaintiff’s] due process claim 

against Special Services Unit Officer Harrison, thereby effectively dismissing him from the case . 

. . .” (Id. at 3-4.) This court in trying the case then erred in “allowing . . . defendants to argue to 

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the jury that Harrison, rather than any of . . . defendants who remained in the case, was the critical 

decision-maker.” (Id.) Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded as follows: 

The judgment in favor of defendants . . . entered on the basis of the 

jury verdict on plaintiff’s due process claim is reversed and the 

claims are remanded. The judgment entered before trial in favor of 

defendant Harrison on plaintiff’s due process claim is reversed and 

the claim against him remanded. . . . The judgment of the district 

court is otherwise affirmed. 

(Id. at 4.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).1 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there 

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular 

parts of materials in the record . . .; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[The 

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.”). Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 

. . . . Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

///// 

 1 Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010. However, it is appropriate to rely on 

cases decided before the amendment took effect, as “[t]he standard for granting summary 

judgment remains unchanged.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56, Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2010 

amendments.

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will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (emphasis in 

original). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and 

views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine 

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

A court may consider evidence as long as it is “admissible at trial.” Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). “Admissibility at trial” depends not on the 

evidence’s form, but on its content. Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). The party seeking admission of evidence “bears the 

burden of proof of admissibility.” Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking admission must 

direct the district court to “authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, 

hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in 

question could be deemed admissible . . . .” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385–86 

(9th Cir. 2010). However, courts are sometimes “much more lenient” with the affidavits and 

documents of the party opposing summary judgment. Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 

1243 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, the court need not address defendants’ evidentiary objections (see

ECF No. 397 at 10; ECF No. 400 at 3) because the court does not consider the materials to which 

defendants object in ruling on the instant motions. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 

973 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The summary judgment standards do not change when parties file cross-motions 

for summary judgment: “[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits.” Fair Hous. 

Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the court must review the evidence submitted in support of 

each crossmotion.” Id.

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 As a threshold matter, the court notes “[d]efendants do not dispute that an 

indeterminate term in the SHU implicates a state-created liberty interest, such that [p]laintiff was 

entitled to certain minimal procedural due-process protections, including an informal 

nonadversarial hearing . . . .” (ECF No. 397 at 4.) “Nor do [d]efendants dispute that, under the 

law of this case, [plaintiff] was entitled to such a hearing before prison officials completed the 

gang validation process.” (Id.) Defendants also do not dispute that plaintiff “was not afforded 

such a hearing before he was validated in November 2000.” (Id.) Nonetheless, defendants argue 

“summary judgment is inappropriate because a factual dispute exists regarding the identity of the 

critical decisionmaker.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff counters that the precise identity of the decision-maker is not crucial 

because whoever “the decision-maker is, he is in the ‘locked room’ and this [c]ourt can adjudicate 

that question to the extent that a particular finding must be made.” (ECF No. 401 at 2.) Plaintiff 

further responds whether the court or a jury identifies the decision-maker is irrelevant because 

either Johnson, or Harrison, or Shaver was the decision-maker. (Id. at 4.) “Because the identity 

of the particular decision-maker would not prevent an adverse verdict for defendants, the question 

itself is not material for purposes of summary judgment.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

 It is undisputed that evaluation of a prisoner’s due process challenge to gang 

validation requires determination of the “prison official [who] was the critical decisionmaker.” 

See Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Castro v. Terhune, 237 F. 

App’x 153, 155 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the identity of the 

critical decision-maker was a disputed question of fact.” (ECF No. 348 at 3 (“The district court 

correctly instructed the jury that determining the identity of the critical decision-maker is a 

question of fact . . . .”).) 

 Here, the court finds plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that no genuine 

dispute of material fact exists as to the identity of the decision-maker responsible for plaintiff’s 

gang validation. Although the Ninth Circuit, in Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th 

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Cir. 1990), underscored that the decision-maker must be the person who actually determines the 

prisoner’s status, the evidence, here, is not so clear as to allow the court to conclusively determine 

who the actual decision-maker was. Rather, as the Ninth Circuit observed, “it is a disputed 

question of fact,” to be decided by a trier of fact. (ECF No. 348 at 3.) 

 From the record, it is evident that all three officers, Shaver, Johnson, and Harrison, 

were involved in the process of determining plaintiff’s fate, but it is not clear who had the critical 

decision-making authority. For example, on the one hand, Shaver testified that as an Institutional 

Gang Investigator (IGI), his responsibilities stopped when he completed the validation package 

and submitted the package to the Special Services Unit (SSU); thus indicating he did not make 

the final decision. (Shaver Test. 618:11–25, ECF No. 341.) Johnson testified that he verified the 

package assembled by Shaver before submitting the package to the SSU; this implies his decision 

was superior to Shaver’s decision. (Johnson Test. 635:17–24, ECF No. 341.) Shaver testified 

that on many occasions the SSU would reject a package submitted by the IGI Unit, thus 

indicating the SSU had the final decision making authority. (Shaver Test. 619:1–4, ECF 

No. 341.) 

 On the other hand, Captain Cook testified that the SSU merely “rubber stamped” 

recommendations submitted by the IGI Unit, suggesting the IGI Unit was effectively the final 

decision-maker. (See Cook Test. 333:15–19 (“So until the investigation is complete, is reviewed 

by [SSU], rubber stamped and a document comes back, we do not do a final report that says that 

this is what it was.”)). Shaver also testified that when he “validate[d] somebody, the validation 

[was] used against [that person],” thus suggesting that he may have been the final decision maker 

in the process of validating plaintiff as a gang member. (Shaver Test. 616:9–11.) 

 Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that the evidence he cites supports only 

one conclusion. Indeed, from the evidence described above, a reasonable fact-finder could find 

that any of the three persons involved in the process was the final decision-maker. There is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to the precise identity of the critical decision-maker. The court 

DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 

///// 

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B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

As noted, “the only claim [plaintiff’s] lawsuit currently pursues is the Fifteenth 

[claim], based on the violations of due process relative to his [alleged] improper gang validation 

and the decision makers associated with the validation, including defendant Harrison.” (ECF 

No. 398 at 5.) 

1. Critical Decisionmaker 

 Defendants first argue that defendant Harrison was the critical decision-maker in 

plaintiff’s gang validation process. (ECF No. 393-1 at 11–12.) Yet, as explained above, there is 

a genuine dispute of material fact as to who the decision-maker was in plaintiff’s validation 

process. Defendants, in their motion, have not met their burden of showing the contrary. The 

court DENIES defendants’ motion to the extent it is based on the critical decision-maker 

argument. 

2. Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants next argue that Harrison, Johnson and Shaver are entitled to qualified 

immunity because their conduct was objectively reasonable and the law affecting their decisions 

was uncertain. (See ECF No. 393-1 at 12–17; ECF No. 400 at 3.) Plaintiff’s response is twofold. First, plaintiff counters that defendants have waived qualified immunity. (ECF No. 398 at 

8–12.) Second, even if there is no waiver, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.

at 12–24.) 

“Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil damages for performance 

of discretionary functions. It is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability 

. . . .’” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Government officials are shielded from suit unless their conduct 

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity test 

applies two prongs. Under the first prong, the court considers whether the alleged facts, taken in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff, show that defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. 

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Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009). Under the second prong, the court must determine whether 

that constitutional right was “clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Courts have 

discretion to address the prongs in any order in light of the circumstances of each 

case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

 Here, the court finds defendants have not met their burden of showing entitlement 

to qualified immunity. As noted above, defendants do not dispute that “under the law of this 

case” plaintiff was entitled to “a hearing before prison officials completed the gang validation 

process.” (ECF No. 397 at 4.) In addition, defendants do not dispute plaintiff “was not afforded 

such a hearing before he was validated in November 2000.” (Id.) Hence, the first prong for 

purposes of this motion is satisfied. 

 The second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry focuses on whether the right 

was clearly established “at the time of the violative conduct.” Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 

867, 875 (9th Cir. 2012). Determining whether a right was clearly established is a contextspecific inquiry not amenable to “‘broad general proposition[s].’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. 

at 201). At the same time, to demonstrate a right is clearly established, it is not necessary that a 

defendant’s specific behavior had been previously declared unconstitutional; instead, it is enough 

that “‘the unlawfulness was apparent in light of preexisting law.’” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 885 

(quoting Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

 Here, in remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit held this court should have 

instructed the jury “that notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided before prison 

officials complete the validation process given the non-emergency circumstances of this case.” 

(ECF No. 348 at 3.) In so holding, the Ninth Circuit cited two Supreme Court cases, Zinermon v. 

Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982), 

which were decided before plaintiff’s gang validation in 2000. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit 

implicitly found the alleged unlawfulness in this case was apparent in light of preexisting law at 

the time of plaintiff’s gang validation. See Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 904 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (discussing the rule of mandate and the law of the case doctrines). Following the 

Ninth Circuit’s mandate, the court cannot enter summary judgment in favor of Johnson, Shaver, 

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and Harrison on the basis of qualified immunity. Defendants’ motion is DENIED except as 

granted above. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of S. Cook, R. McKean, 

C. Adams, P. Statti, A. Nergenah, N. McClure, Jackson, and D. Morton is 

GRANTED. 

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of R. Johnson, 

J. Harrison, and D. Shaver is DENIED. 

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 

4. The Final Pretrial Conference is set for April 16, 2015 at 3:30 p.m. The 

parties’ joint pretrial conference statement is due by March 26, 2015. The trial 

is set for June 1, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. Trial briefs are due by May 18, 2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 2, 2015. 

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