Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00019/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Leonardo Barranco-Flores, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-0019-TUC-JGZ

No. CR 11-2090-TUC-JGZ (CRP)

ORDER

Movant Leonardo Barranco-Flores, who is confined in the Florence Correctional

Center in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion for Sentence Relief Under the Federal

Prison Bureau Non-Violent Offender Relief Act of 2003. (Doc. 1.) The following day,

Movant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (§ 2255 Motion). (Doc. 3.) The Court will summarily

dismiss both motions.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry after

deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2). The plea agreement provided for a

binding recommendation of a sentence of 8 to 78 months, depending on his criminal history.

(Doc. 21 at 2-3.) On December 13, 2011, the Court sentenced Movant to a 52-month term

of imprisonment followed by three years on supervised release.

In the first of his two motions, Movant seeks relief under a bill (the Federal Bureau

of Prisons Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 3575, 108th Cong. (2003))

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introduced in Congress to amend 18 U.S.C. § 3624. That bill was never enacted.

Accordingly, Movant’s first motion will be summarily denied. In his § 2255 Motion, Movant

seeks a reduction of his sentence because his sentence was enhanced based on his previous

convictions, which Movant feels is unfair. (Doc. 3.) As discussed below, that motion will

be denied based on waiver. 

II. Summary Dismissal of the § 2255 Motion

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). In this case,

the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted because Movant has

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

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ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the

information or indictment or to the Court’s entry of judgment against the

defendant and imposition of sentence upon the defendant providing the

sentence is consistent with this agreement. The defendant further waives:

(1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any

right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18,

United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to

collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. The

defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal of

any appeal or collateral attack the defendant might file challenging his

conviction or sentence in this case.

(Doc. 21 at 4-5) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had

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discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into

the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 6-7, 8-9.)

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion all pertain to sentencing and not to the

voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of

sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing

issues raised in his § 2255 motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Movant’s Motion for Sentence Relief Under Federal Prison Bureau NonViolent Offender Relief Act is denied. (Doc. 1.)

(2) The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (Doc. 34 in CR11-2090-TUC-JGZ (CRP)) is denied and the civil action opened in

connection with this Motion, doc. 3 (CV12-0019-TUC-JGZ) is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Dated this 6th day of March, 2012. 

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