Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00139/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00139-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332ed Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KATHLEEN BACON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

BED BATH & BEYOND OF 

CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY and DOES 1-25, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 18cv139 JM (BLM) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

 This is an age discrimination case in the employment context. Defendant Bed Bath 

& Beyond of California, LLC (“Bed Bath & Beyond”) moves for summary judgment on 

all of Plaintiff Kathleen Bacon’s claims. (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. No. 28.) 

For the reasons discussed below, the court grants Defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND1

Bacon alleges three causes of action against Bed Bath & Beyond: (1) age 

discrimination in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940; (2) failure to prevent harassment or discrimination in violation 

of FEHA; and (3) wrongful termination. (Doc. No. 1.) 2 

                                                                

1

 The following facts are taken from the parties’ summary judgment submissions. These 

facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

2

 Defendant objects to the following evidence Bacon presents: (1) emails received by 

Bacon complimenting her work, (2) Bacon’s Notice of Termination, (3) Bacon’s 

Separation Agreement, (4) Bacon’s statement in her declaration that she was told in 

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In 2004, Bed Bath & Beyond hired Bacon as a Front End Department Manager in 

its Chula Vista store. In that position, Bacon was responsible for the overall operation of 

the front end of the store. (Doc. No. 25-2, Bacon Depo at 15.)3

 Bacon was 46 years old 

when she was hired. In 2006, Bacon transferred to Bed Bath & Beyond’s Santee store and 

continued to work as a Front End Department Manager. Bacon later transitioned to the 

role of Customer Service Department Manager. In that position, Bacon was responsible 

for product knowledge training, customer service training, mystery shop scores,4

 the bridal 

registry program, and overall customer service. (Doc. No. 25-2, Bacon Depo. at 27-28.) 

In 2013, Michelle Villarreal became Bacon’s District Manager for the remainder of her 

employment with Defendant. Bacon never had “any issues” with Villarreal, and Villarreal 

never said or did anything to suggest she was biased against Bacon because of her age. 

(Doc. No. 25-2, Bacon Depo at 41.) In April 2015, Bacon transferred to Defendant’s 4S 

Ranch store and continued working as a Customer Service Department Manager. 

In 2016, Bacon was transferred to Defendant’s Mission Valley store as a disciplinary 

action. Bacon was disciplined because she told customers that they should purchase a 

mattress valued at about $9,000 from a different store and then was not forthright with 

Villarreal about what she had said to the customers. Villarreal reassigned Bacon as a Bath 

Department Manager in the Mission Valley store because she believed Bacon was no 

longer equipped to handle the Customer Service Department Manager role. (Villarreal 

Decl. ¶ 9.) In this position, Bacon’s responsibilities included merchandising, training Bath 

department associates, providing customer service, generating sales, and assisting with 

overall management of the department. In her deposition, Bacon testified that her 

                                                                

October 2015 that Defendant was no longer hiring Department Supervisors, and 

(5) Bacon’s estimation of other District Managers’ ages. (Doc. No. 32-2.) As discussed 

below, these objections are overruled in part and sustained in part. 

3

 All page citations in this order refer to those generated by the court’s CM/ECF system. 

4

 Mystery shops are covert, anonymous store visits by Bed Bath & Beyond employees or 

consultants who evaluate stores and personnel. (Doc. No. 25-6, Villarreal Decl. ¶ 5.) 

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managers never said or did anything to suggest that they were biased against her because 

of her age. (Doc. No. 25-2, Exh. A at 25, 41-42, 61.)5

The same year, 2016, Bed Bath & Beyond’s human resources and operations team 

determined that the company could save costs by reducing the number of Department 

Managers it employed. (Doc. No. 25-5, Suojanen Decl. ¶ 4.) Before 2016, the company 

had been in a “multi-year expansion phase, during which time it opened many new stores.” 

(Id. ¶ 3.) When opening new stores, Bed Bath & Beyond found that the Department 

Managers employed in each store could serve as a benchmark for future growth. (Id.) In 

2016, the company’s human resources and operations team determined that the Department 

Manager position had become superfluous as the company’s growth slowed. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Department Managers were generally scheduled to work several hours of overtime each 

week and were paid at a higher rate than other hourly employees. (Id.) To save costs, in 

2016, Bed Bath & Beyond stopped hiring Department Managers. (Id. ¶ 5.) Instead, the 

company began to hire new employees in a Department Supervisor position. (Id.) 

Department Supervisor employees were not generally scheduled to work overtime and 

were paid a lower hourly rate than Department Managers. (Id.) At some time after October 

2015, Bacon’s Human Resources District Manager told Bacon that the company would no 

longer be hiring for the Department Manager position. (Doc. No. 28-2, Exh. 1 at 38-39.)6

 

                                                                

5

 Specifically, Bacon testified that her managers Villarreal, Jim McDowell, Gavin 

Edwards, Eric Mercado and David Katoulis, never said or did anything to suggest they had 

a bias against Bacon because of her age. (Id.) McDowell was Bacon’s Store Manager for 

a number of years at the Santee store. (Id. at 24.) Edwards was Bacon’s Store Manager at 

the Santee store from 2014 through 2015, and again in 2016 at the Mission Valley store. 

(Id. at 40-41, 60-61.) Mercado was Bacon’s Store Manager at the 4S Ranch store from 

April 2015 through 2016. (Id. at 46-47.) Katoulis was Bacon’s Assistant Store Manager 

at the Mission Valley store in 2016. (Id. at 60-61.) 

6

 Plaintiff argues that the Human Resources District Manager presented her with an 

“agreement” and gave Plaintiff the impression that declining to sign this agreement would 

not jeopardize her employment. (Doc. No. 28 at 2; Doc. No. 28-3, Bacon Decl. ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiff fails to explain what this “agreement” was. In her deposition, Bacon testified that 

she does not remember being presented with a written agreement at the meeting with the 

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Despite some cost savings, Bed Bath & Beyond determined that it would need to 

eliminate the Department Manager position in its entirety to further reduce payroll 

expenditures and streamline its workforce. (Suojanen Decl. ¶ 6.) In 2017, Defendant’s 

human resources and operations team instructed all District Managers, including Villarreal, 

to assess all Department Managers in their districts. (Id. ¶ 7; Villarreal Decl. ¶ 12.) District 

Managers rated Department Managers on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest) in the 

categories of customer service, business, leadership, and personal effectiveness. (Suojanen 

Decl. ¶ 8.) District Managers could also provide comments about Department Managers’ 

ratings, whether the employee was eligible to be considered for a Manager-in-Training 

position, and whether the employee had the potential to become a Store Manager. (Id.) 

After all assessments were completed, including Villarreal’s assessment of Bacon, 

the company informed District Managers that Department Managers whose assessment 

scores met certain criteria were eligible for transfer into Manager-in-Training or 

Department Supervisor positions. (Id. ¶ 9.) To be eligible for a Manager-in-Training 

position, a Department Manager needed to either: (a) earn a rating of 3 in both customer 

service effectiveness and leadership effectiveness and a rating of at least 2.75 on business 

effectiveness, or (b) be recommended to the position by the District Manager, earn an 

overall total rating of at least 2.75, and have earned the highest overall rating of all 

Department Managers in their store. (Cruz Decl. ¶ 5.) To be eligible for a Department 

Supervisor position, a Department Manager needed to earn a total overall rating of at least 

2.75, a customer service effectiveness rating of 3, and a leadership effectiveness rating of 

at least 2.55. (Id.) Department Managers that did not qualify for a Manager-in-Training 

or Department Supervisor position would be included in the company’s reduction in force 

and terminated. (Id. ¶ 4.) These employees were terminated “because they were not 

                                                                

Human Resources District Manager, did not sign a written agreement, and was not 

provided with any papers. (Doc. No. 28-2, Bacon Depo. at 39-40.) 

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meeting performance expectations, and/or lacked promotional potential, and/or were 

superfluous at their store.” (Suojanen Decl. ¶ 9.) 

Bacon’s overall assessment score was 2.63 and her customer service effectiveness 

rating was 2. (Cruz-Leach Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Accordingly, Bacon was not eligible for either 

the Manager-in-Training or Department Supervisor positions. (Id. ¶ 6.) On August 3, 

2017, Villarreal informed Bacon that her employment was terminated because her position 

was being eliminated. (Villarreal Decl. ¶ 13.) 

Bacon alleges that she was terminated because of her age. Bacon was 59 when she 

was terminated. (Doc. No. 30., Exh. 16 at 7.) Eleven other Department Managers in 

Bacon’s district were terminated in August 2017 as part of the reduction in force. (Id. at 

7-8.) The ages of these employees, in ascending order, was: 33, 39, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 

58, 59, and 62. (Id.)7

 Nine Department Managers in Bacon’s district were not terminated. 

(Id. at 9.) The ages of these employees, in ascending order, was: 30, 36, 38, 39, 44, 50, 52, 

54, and 57. (Id. at 11.)8 Accordingly, a majority of both terminated and retained 

Department Managers were above the age of 40. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

                                                                

7

 In her declaration, Bacon appears to estimate the ages of the other Department Managers 

at the Mission Valley store at the time of the reduction in force. (Doc. No. 28-3, Bacon 

Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) Defendant objects to this estimation, arguing that Bacon did not have 

personal knowledge of the employees’ ages. (Doc. No. 32-2.) This objection is sustained 

for lack of personal knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. This order instead refers to the 

specific ages of employees provided in other exhibits attached to Bacon’s opposition. (See 

Doc. No. 28-2, Exh. 15 at 93; Doc. No. 30 at 6-7, 10.) 

8

 Excluding Bacon, there were ten Department Managers at the Mission Valley store at the 

time Bacon was terminated. Three Department Managers—ages 30, 36, and 39—were not 

terminated. (Bacon Decl. ¶ 4; Doc. No. 30, Exh. 16 at 11.) The remaining seven terminated 

Department Managers were ages 33, 39, 43, 44, 46, 47, and 58. (Bacon Decl. ¶ 4; Doc. 

No. 30, Exh. 16 at 8.) 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the file that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 contains “no express or implied 

requirement . . . that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar 

materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on 

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by 

[its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 

(internal citations omitted). In other words, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on 

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), and any doubt 

as to the existence of an issue of material fact requires denial of the motion, Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff asserts three claims: age discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, 

and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

I. Age Discrimination 

A. Legal Standards 

In relevant part, FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to bar or to discharge the 

person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to 

discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment” because of age. Gov. Code § 12940(a). Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim 

is governed by the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

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411 U.S. 792 (1973). Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000).9

 First, Plaintiff 

must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Next, the burden shifts to the 

employer to produce evidence “sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and to justify a 

judgment for the employer, that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason.” Id. at 355-56 (quotations and citation omitted). Lastly, the burden shifts back to 

the plaintiff to “attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or 

to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” Id. at 356. “In an appropriate case, 

evidence of dishonest reasons, considered together with the elements of the prima facie 

case, may permit a finding of prohibited bias.” Id. Throughout the analysis, “[t]he ultimate 

burden of persuasion on the issue of actual discrimination remains with the plaintiff.” Id. 

B. Prima Facie Case 

Bed Bath & Beyond argues that Bacon fails to present sufficient evidence to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The court agrees. 

 Generally, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination Plaintiff must provide 

evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the 

position she sought or was performing competently in the position she held, (3) she suffered 

an adverse employment action, such as termination, and (4) some other circumstance 

suggests discriminatory motive, such as her replacement by a significantly younger worker 

with similar qualifications. Id. at 355. 

Bacon was 59 at the time she was terminated, thus satisfying the first and third 

elements of her prima facie case. See id. at 355. Defendant does not dispute that the second 

element, that Bacon was competently performing her position, is met for Bacon’s prima 

facie case. The analysis thus focuses on the fourth element—whether there are 

circumstances suggesting discriminatory motive. 

                                                                

9

 Bacon does not argue that there is any direct evidence of discrimination. See DeJung v. 

Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 533, 549-50 (2008). 

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Bacon relies on statistical evidence of the ages of retained and terminated 

Department Managers. She argues that the three Department Managers at the Mission 

Valley store who were transferred to Department Supervisor positions instead of 

terminated were ages 30, 36, and 39—with an average age of 35. “[A] prima facie 

inference of discrimination can arise from evidence that during a work force reduction, a 

satisfactory age-protected worker was laid off, while younger employees were retained in 

similar jobs, or were reassigned to positions for which the plaintiff also qualified.” Guz, 

24 Cal. 4th at 367. However, statistical evidence that is unreliable or gathered from too 

small a sample pool may not suffice. See id. 

Here, the statistical evidence is not probative of the issue of age discrimination for 

several reasons. First, the statistical evidence does not clearly indicate that members of 

Plaintiffs’ proposed protected class, employees over the age of 40, were treated worse than 

their younger counterparts. A majority of both terminated and retained Department 

Managers were over the age of 40. The correlation between an employees’ age and their 

termination is weak when Bacon’s entire district is considered. Eleven out of the twenty 

other Department Managers in Bacon’s district were terminated during the reduction in 

force. (Doc No. 28-2, Exh. 17 at 93; Doc. No. 30, Exh. 16 at 6-7, 10.) The terminated 

employees were between the ages of 33 and 62, with an average age of 48. (Id.) The nine 

transferred employees were between the ages of 30 and 57, with an average age of 44. (Id.) 

More than half of these employees were over the age of 40. (Id.) 

Second, Bacon’s analysis only considers two variables—the employee’s age at the 

time of the reduction in force and whether the employee was terminated. “The numbers 

show a statistically significant relationship between these two variables, but [the Ninth 

Circuit] and others have treated skeptically statistics that fail to account for other relevant 

variables.” Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 748 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting 

cases). A critical variable not considered in this analysis is the criteria used to determine 

whether an employee was eligible for transfer—the employee’s performance in customer 

service, business, leadership, and personal effectiveness. 

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Lastly, the statistical evidence may not be reliable as it is based on a very small 

employee pool. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 367. At the time of the reduction in force, there 

were only ten Department Managers at Bacon’s store and twenty total Department 

Managers in her district. 

Bacon also argues that her duties were taken over by younger employees. Bed Bath 

& Beyond argues that Bacon was not replaced; her job duties were assumed by a number 

of other preexisting store employees. Plaintiff mischaracterizes the evidence on this issue. 

In her opposition, Bacon cites to Defendant’s interrogatory responses, stating that 

“Defendant has admitted that many of Plaintiff’s duties have been performed by an

employee who is 30 years old.” (Doc. No. 28 at 9) (emphasis added.) This is inaccurate 

and a substantial misstatement of Defendant’s interrogatory response. Defendant’s 

response states that “[t]he ages of the bath department associates who absorbed some of 

Bacon’s duties were: 20, 20, 23, 56, 57, and 69 and Ms. [Redacted] was 30 years old as of 

August 4, 2017.” (Doc. No. 30, Exh. 16 at 5.) Bacon further states in her opposition that 

the Human Resources District Manager informed her that Department Supervisors held the 

same job duties as Department Managers, citing to her deposition testimony. (Doc. No. 28 

at 7.) But nowhere in the cited portion of her deposition testimony does Bacon state that 

she was informed that Department Managers and Department Supervisors held the same 

job duties. (See Doc. No. 28-2, Bacon Depo. at 38-39.) 

Bacon fails to present evidence suggesting that she was replaced by younger 

employees. Bacon does not identify the names, qualifications, or ages of the employees 

she argues assumed her duties. Nor does she identify which of Bacon’s duties were 

assumed by these employees. Thus, the court does not know whether these employees 

were similarly qualified, which duties they assumed, or whether they replaced Bacon. See 

Holtzclaw v. Certainteed Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding 

plaintiff was not replaced by a younger employee who began performing some of plaintiff’s 

duties in addition to the duties he was already performing). This argument is not supported 

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with sufficient evidence to create a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

C. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons for Termination 

Even if Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of discrimination, she fails to 

present any evidence of pretext. Bed Bath & Beyond presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Bacon’s termination. See Guz, 24 Cal. at 367-68. Bacon’s 

position was useful while the company was expanding, but as growth slowed, Bed Bath & 

Beyond’s human resources and operations team determined that Department Managers 

were no longer necessary. Employees in the Department Supervisor position could 

perform the necessary functions of Department Managers at a lower hourly rate and with 

fewer overtime hours. In 2016, the company stopped hiring Department Managers. In 

2017, the company determined that it needed to further reduce costs by eliminating the 

Department Manager position altogether. Employees were included in the reduction in 

force based on assessments by District Managers of their customer service, business, 

leadership, and personal effectiveness. Based on her assessment scores, Bacon was not 

qualified for transfer to another position and was included in the reduction in force. 

The burden thus shifts to Bacon to establish pretext. “A plaintiff may establish 

pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation 

is unworthy of credence.” Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 

F.3d 728, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted). “If a plaintiff uses 

circumstantial evidence to satisfy this burden, such evidence must be specific and 

substantial.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 

Bacon admits that Villareal, the District Manager who provided her disqualifying 

assessment scores, never did or said anything to suggest that she was biased against Bacon 

because of her age. (Doc. No. 25-2, Exh. A at 41-42.) Bacon would thus have the court 

believe that the entire assessment-based procedure Bed Bath & Beyond implemented to 

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identify employees for inclusion in the reduction in force was a sham. She fails to present 

any evidence suggesting this is the case. 

First, Bacon argues that her annual performance reviews indicate she consistently 

met and exceeded expectations. Bacon’s performance reviews are decidedly mixed. 

Bacon’s annual performance evaluations used the following scale, from lowest to highest 

score: “Doesn’t Meet Expectations” (“DM”), “Meets Some Expectations” (“MS”), “Meets 

Expectations” (“ME”), “Exceeds Expectations” (“EE”), and “Significantly Exceeds 

Expectations” (“SE”). Bacon’s annual performance reviews indicate that her store 

supervisors believed she met most expectations and exceeded some expectations. But they 

also indicate that Bacon was consistently asked to improve her attendance and 

accountability for employees and training in her department. 

Year Total 

SE 

Scores 

Total 

EE 

Scores 

Total 

ME 

Scores

Total 

MS 

Scores

Total 

DM 

Scores

Customer 

Service 

EE 

Scores 

Customer 

Service 

ME 

Scores 

Customer 

Service 

MS 

Scores 

2005 0 16 34 0 0 2 4 0 

2006 0 6 41 2 0 0 5 1 

2007 0 16 27 1 0 2 4 0 

2008 0 14 30 1 0 1 5 0 

2009 0 11 30 1 0 2 5 0 

2010 0 6 36 1 0 1 6 0 

2011 0 4 38 1 0 1 6 0 

2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 

2013 0 3 39 1 0 1 6 0 

2014 0 2 39 5 0 1 5 1 

2015 0 3 34 6 0 1 5 2 

2016 0 2 29 11 0 0 2 3 

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(Doc No. 28-2, Exhibit 2-12.)10 In the last few years of her employment, between 2013 

and 2016, Bacon received fewer “Exceeds Expectations” scores and more “Meets Some 

Expectations” scores. In these years, Bacon also received more “Meets Some 

Expectations” scores in her customer service performance than in all other years combined. 

In 2016, the year before she was terminated, Bacon received her lowest scores yet. She 

received particularly low scores for her customer service performance. During that year, 

after Bacon was dishonest about an interaction with customers, Villarreal transferred 

Bacon to a different store and position because she did not believe that Bacon was equipped 

to handle the Customer Service Department Manager role. In 2017, Villarreal assessed 

Bacon’s performance. Bacon received an overall score of 2.63 and a customer service 

score of 2, on a scale of 1 to 3. Bacon’s scores were too low to qualify her for transfer to 

a Department Supervisor or Manager-In-Training position. These scores were consistent 

with her recent annual review scores. Without more, Bacon’s annual reviews do not 

suggest that she was terminated because of her age or that Defendant’s reasons for 

termination were pretextual.11

 Second, Bacon argues that she was never placed on a performance improvement 

plan.12 Bacon was not terminated for cause. She was terminated because her assessment 

scores did not qualify her for transfer to another position, and thus, she was included in the 

reduction in force. Although Bacon’s assessment scores were based on her performance, 

                                                                

10 The summary judgment record does not contain Bacon’s 2012 annual review. 

11 Bacon attaches emails from customers complimenting her performance. (Doc. No. 28-

2, Exh. 13 at 78-83.) Defendant objects to these emails as lacking foundation on personal 

knowledge, hearsay, and lack of authentication grounds. (Doc. No. 32-2.) Defendant’s 

objection is overruled, however, the court accords minimal weight to these emails because 

of the lack of authentication and hearsay concerns. 

12 Bacon argues that she was “never placed on any type of performance improvement plan,” 

citing her deposition testimony. (Doc. No. 28 at 12.) In her cited deposition testimony, 

Bacon states only that she was not placed on a performance improvement plan for her 

attendance issues. (Doc. No. 28-2, Exh. 1 at 44.) 

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nothing in the record suggests that a performance plan was necessary prior to her 

termination. 

 Third, Bacon argues that the termination document and separation agreement do not 

mention her performance.13 In her deposition, Bacon testified that at the time of her 

termination she was not told that performance was a factor in the decision to terminate her. 

(Doc. No. 28-2, Exh. 1 at 43.) The undisputed evidence indicates that Bacon was included 

in the reduction in force because her overall assessment score and customer service score 

did not meet the cutoff for transfer to another position. Defendant’s failure to communicate 

that Bacon’s performance was assessed when deciding whether she qualified for transfer 

to another position does not conflict with this evidence. 

Lastly, Bacon argues that her position was not actually eliminated because after her 

termination she saw the Department Supervisor position posted online. Bacon fails to point 

to any evidence suggesting that the fact that Defendant was hiring Department Supervisors 

meant that the Department Manager position was not actually eliminated. Undisputed 

declarations from Bed Bath & Beyond’s human resources employees and supervisors state 

that the position was eliminated.14 The fact that Defendant was hiring Department 

Supervisors, a separate position, is not evidence that the Department Manager position was 

not eliminated.15

                                                                

13 Defendant objects to Bacon’s Notice of Termination and Separation Agreement on lack 

of foundation, lack of authentication, and hearsay grounds. This objection is overruled as 

these documents are statements of an adverse party. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 

14 Defendant’s employees declare that the Department Supervisor position was created 

before the Department Manager position was dissolved because Department Supervisors 

were paid a lower hourly rate and scheduled to work less overtime. Eventually, 

Defendant’s employees declare, the Department Manager position was eliminated. Bacon 

does not dispute these facts. 

15 Bacon also reiterates her arguments that her duties were assumed by a younger employee 

and most terminated employees at the Mission Valley store were over the age of 40. These 

arguments are unavailing for the same reasons the court rejected them above. 

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In sum, Bacon fails to proffer any evidence suggesting that Defendant’s reason for 

terminating her was pretextual. It strains credulity for Plaintiff to argue on this record that 

the entire reduction in force protocol leading up to her termination was a pretext when she 

ultimately presents no evidence—direct, circumstantial, or otherwise—that this was the 

case. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Bacon’s age discrimination claim is 

granted as she fails to present a prima facie case of discrimination or any evidence 

suggesting that Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Bacon’s termination 

was pretextual. 

II. Remaining Claims 

Plaintiff concedes that her claims for wrongful termination and failure to prevent 

discrimination and harassment are based on the same facts and derivative of her age 

discrimination claim. (Doc. No. 28 at 13-14.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact for her remaining claims as she does not present sufficient evidence 

of discrimination. See also Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1315-

17 (2015) (failure to prevent discrimination or harassment claim requires a showing of 

actionable harassment or discrimination); Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 

215, 229 (1999) (granting summary judgment on wrongful termination claim because 

FEHA discrimination claim failed). The court need not address Bacon’s request for 

punitive damages as she fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact for any of her claims. 

CONCLUSION 

 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court is 

instructed to enter judgment in Defendant’s favor. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 18, 2019 JEFFREY T. MILLER 

 United States District Judge 

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