Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02851/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02851-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: Environmental Matters

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVE DRILING ENVIRONMENTAL 

ENGINEERING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARGARET THERSIA GAMBLIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02851-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 52

 I heard argument on October 14, 2015, concerning intervenor Fireman’s Fund Insurance’s 

(FFI) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) on the basis that the six year 

statute of limitations has run on plaintiff’s claim under the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). The procedural and 

factual background of this case has been fully explained in my prior Order (Docket No. 48) and is 

incorporated by reference. Finding that the claim is not time barred on its face, I DENY the 

motion to dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “is appropriate only where the 

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). In deciding 

whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court accepts the 

plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See 

Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “A statute of limitation defense 

may be raised by a motion to dismiss if the running of the limitation period is apparent on the face 

of the complaint.” Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991). A motion to dismiss 

based on the running of the statute of limitations may be granted “only if the assertions of the 

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complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute 

was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). 

DISCUSSION 

 Under CERCLA, activities to clean up hazardous waste are characterized as “removal 

actions” or “remedial actions.” Removal actions are interim actions to clean up or remove 

hazardous materials1and remedial actions are efforts to permanently remedy the presence of 

hazardous materials. 2 See, e.g., Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“That is, ‘removal actions generally are immediate or interim responses, and remedial actions 

generally are permanent responses.’” (quoting Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 

917, 926 (5th Cir. 2000))). A claim to recover damages for a removal action must be filed within 

3 years after completion of the removal. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A). A claim to recover damages 

for a remedial action must be filed within six years after initiation of physical on-site construction 

of the remedial action. Id., § 9613(g)(2)(B). 

 Plaintiff characterizes the work underlying its CERCLA claim as a remedial action covered 

by the six year statute of limitations. Opposition (Docket No. 56) at 2, 7. In its FAC, plaintiff 

 

1 A removal action is “the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the 

environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of 

hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, 

and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed 

material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate 

damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a 

release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security 

fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary 

evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 

9601(23). 

2 A remedial action is one “consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to 

removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the 

environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not 

migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the 

environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as 

storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, 

neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, 

recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, 

repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or 

incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to 

assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. . . . [T]he term 

includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of 

hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 

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contends that the “remedial work” began in or around April 2009. FAC ¶ 13. But FFI argues that 

the statute of limitations has run because, contrary to plaintiff’s current position, plaintiff initiated 

on-site construction of the remedial work in 2006 or 2007, not as late as April 2009. 

FFI relies on following facts to support its argument: 

(i) In a prior court hearing, plaintiff’s CFO stated she could not recall the exact date “in 

2007” when work at the site commenced (Dkt. 49 fn. 5); 

(ii) invoices submitted to the Court by plaintiff show that work at the property dated back 

to April 20, 2007 (Dkt. 27-3 at 2); 

(iii) in a FAC in the prior related action, plaintiff cited a San Mateo Health Department 

January 9, 2007 letter asking for “further work” related to the cleanup of the property 

(Case No. 13-3801, Dkt. 9 ¶ 9); and 

(iv) a December 2007 “Revised Report of Soil and Groundwater Sampling,” indicated 

work was ongoing at that time (Dkt. No 54-2). 

Motion to Dismiss (“MTD,” Dkt. No. 52) at 6. 

 With these examples, FFI assumes that work done to investigate the scope of the hazardous 

waste problem at the site and develop an adequate solution is the same as the “initiation of 

physical on-site construction of the remedial action.” But plaintiff’s CFO’s comments are 

unspecific as to the type of “work” that may have taken place in 2007. The invoices from 2007, 

the report showing the soil and ground water sampling, and the communications between plaintiff 

and San Mateo County show only that plaintiff was involved in determining the scope of the 

hazardous waste problem and proposing a plan for its remediation or removal.3

 These documents 

do not show that plaintiff was working to permanently remediate the hazardous waste in 2007.4

FFI cites no authority to support its argument that work done to investigate the scope of a 

 

3

 For example, the December 2007 report encompasses only drilling temporary wells and taking 

water and soil samples in order to determine the extent of contamination. The report does not 

decide what remedial action is necessary (although options are presented) and does not indicate 

any remedial activity occurred. 

4

 FFI also relies on an invoice filed by plaintiff in this case indicating that injection wells were 

installed at the site in January 2009, not April 2009. Dkt. 27-3 at 6, 9. However, even if that work 

could be assumed to be remedial on this record, January 2009 falls within the six year statute of 

limitations. 

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hazardous waste problem and develop a remedy plan is the same as “initiation of physical on-site 

construction of the remedial action.” Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has drawn significant distinctions 

between work done prior to and after the adoption of a final remedial action plan (RAP) governing 

a cleanup. See Cal v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 667-669 (9th Cir. 2004). It may be that 

discovery will show that the work undertaken by plaintiff in 2007 and early 2008 was physical 

construction of a remedial plan, but that cannot be determined on this motion to dismiss based on 

the facts pled by plaintiff and those subject to judicial notice. 

FFI also argues that this action is governed by the three year statute of limitations for a 

removal action and not the more generous remedial action statute of limitations because no final 

RAP was approved by the appropriate government authorities. MTD at 8-9.5

 FFI contends that 

under applicable statutes a RAP must have been subject to public scrutiny at a noticed public 

meeting and approved by a public body. MTD at 8 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25356.1 

& 25358.7). Because one of FFI’s attorneys declares that he could find no evidence in the public 

record that a RAP for the site had been discussed or approved, FFI asserts that the work at the site 

must not be “remedial.” Id. at 9; Declaration of Paul A. Desrochers. 

As an initial matter, it is not clear to me that in order for plaintiff’s work at the site to be 

considered remedial plan a RAP had to be adopted and approved by a public body at a noticed 

public hearing. See Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co. 358 F.3d 661, 667 n.3 (noting that private cleanup 

actions may still have RAPs, despite lack of governmental oversight); see also Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 25356.1(h)(3) (discussing waiver of certain remedial action plan requirements). 

But even so, the only evidence in the record that is properly subject to judicial notice is that there 

was a RAP in place for the work at issue as of August 2008 and an Amended Remedial Action 

Plan in place as of December 2008, which the California Regional Water Quality Control Board 

(RWQCB) knew of and relied on in closing the “site investigation and remedial actions” at the 

 

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 FFI contends that plaintiff cannot benefit from the three year statute of limitations for a removal 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B), because it did not file suit within three years of the 

completion of the removal work. Plaintiff does not dispute that this case was filed more than three 

years after the completion of the work at issue. 

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site. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 57-1.6 Therefore, even if FFI is correct that 

public agency approval of a RAP was necessary for the work at issue to be considered remedial 

under CERCLA, further evidence may show that public agency approval was received. That FFI’s 

attorney could not find such approval despite his search for it does not prove as a matter of law 

that it did not occur. 

 Finally, FFI argues in Reply that the work for which plaintiff seeks compensation cannot 

be considered remedial because it was not designed to permanently remediate the contamination 

but to simply “minimize and mitigate” it as a removal action. Reply (Dkt. No. 59) at 4-5. FFI 

relies solely on the October 30, 2009 closure letter from the RWQCB that plaintiff submitted for 

judicial notice. In its letter, the RWQCB found that the “remedial action” and “remedial program” 

proposed and carried out was implemented to “reduce” but not eliminate the level of PCE in the 

soil.” The RWQCB also indicated that if the building at the site is demolished in the future, 

further testing should occur prior to redevelopment. Dkt. 57-1 at 6. These statements, FFI 

contends, show that the work was one for removal and not permanent remediation. However, the 

RWQCB itself referred to the work repeatedly as “remedial.” Moreover, that future testing may 

be required does not prove as a matter of law that plaintiff’s work cannot be considered remedial 

as that term is used in CERCLA. 

 In sum, plaintiff’s CERCLA claim as pleaded is not time-barred. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, FFI’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2015 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

 

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Plaintiff requests that I take judicial notice of the closure letter from RWQCB regarding the site 

and the Case Summary, both available on the RWQCB website. Dkt. No. 57. FFI requests that I 

take judicial notice of a complaint filed in state court and a Report of Soil and Ground Water 

Sampling for the site accessible from the RQWCB’s website. Dkt. No. 54. I grant the requests for 

judicial notice of these public records under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

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