Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01793/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01793-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cristal Arias,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-21-01793-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

On November 21, 2016, Claimant Cristal Arias applied for Supplemental Security 

Income alleging disability beginning January 1, 1996. (AR. 420–28.) Arias subsequently 

amended her alleged onset date to January 31, 2010. (AR. 429–30.) The Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security denied Arias’ application initially and on reconsideration. 

(AR. 141–45, 157–73.) Arias requested an administrative hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”). She appeared at one on June 20, 2019, and at a supplemental hearing 

on February 4, 2020. (AR. 49–98.) After the case was reassigned to a different ALJ, Arias 

appeared at a third hearing on October 2, 2020. (AR. 101–39.) The ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision on February 25, 2021, finding Arias not disabled within the meaning 

of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). (AR. 17–36.) The Appeals Council denied review of 

that decision, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration. (AR. 1–3.) Arias seeks judicial review of the 

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Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having reviewed the briefs (Docs. 18, 

21, 22) and the Administrative Record, the Court now affirms the ALJ’s decision. 

I. Legal Standard 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for the purposes of the SSA, the ALJ 

must follow a five-step sequential evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but burden then shifts to the 

Commissioner at the fifth step. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial, 

gainful work activity, she is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ 

determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment—or combination of impairments—that meets the duration requirement. Id. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not, she is not disabled. Id. If, however, the 

claimant has such an impairment, the ALJ proceeds to step three, where the ALJ considers 

whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets, or is medically 

equal to, an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If so, the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits under the SSA. 

Id. If not, the analysis proceeds to step four, at which the ALJ assesses the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable 

of performing past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of 

such work, the claimant is not disabled and inquiry ends. If not, the ALJ proceeds to fifth 

and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work 

in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If claimant is not capable of such work, the claimant is disabled 

and is entitled to benefits. Id.

A district court will uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or is 

not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance” and is 

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such that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

(quoting Burch v. Burnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a general rule, a court 

will uphold an ALJ’s decision if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Id. That said, the court should “consider the entire record as a whole and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

Additionally, a court only reviews the issues raised by the party challenging an ALJ’s 

decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Analysis 

Arias raises five argumentsfor the Court’s consideration: the ALJ erred in (1) failing 

to find that Arias’ seizure disorder met or equaled Listing 11.02 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1; (2) discrediting some of Dr. Dane Higgins’ opinions; 

(3) discrediting Arias’ symptom testimony; (4) discrediting lay witness testimony; and 

(5) failing to support her step five finding of “not disabled” with substantial evidence. The 

Court affirms the ALJ’s decisions for the reasons herein. 

A. ALJ’s Step-Three Finding 

At step three, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairments meet or 

medically equal the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d). At issue here is whether the ALJ properly 

concluded that Arias’ seizure impairment does not meet Listing 11.02. To be considered 

disabled under Listing 11.02, a claimant must have documented descriptions of a typical 

seizure. Listing 11.02 describes the characteristics of four types of seizures, each including 

a required frequency of seizure occurrence. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix, 

Listing 11.02. For example, one of the four types of seizures listed is “[g]eneralized tonicclonic seizures . . . occurring at least once a month for at least 3 consecutive months . . . 

despite adherence to prescribed treatment.” Id.

Appendix 1 explains how an ALJ is to count a claimant’s seizures with respect to

Listing 11.02. It provides, 

When we evaluate the frequency of your seizures, we also 

consider your adherence to prescribed treatment. . . . We do not 

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count seizures that occur during a period when you are not 

adhering to prescribed treatment without good reason. . . .We 

will consider you to have had good reason for not following 

prescribed treatment if, for example, . . . you are unable to 

afford prescribed treatment that you are willing to accept, but 

for which no free community resources are available.

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 11.00(H)(4) (emphasis added). 

Here, the ALJ determined Arias’ condition did not meet or equal criteria for Listing 

11.02 because, while adhering to prescribed treatment, Arias did not have seizures at the 

required frequency. The ALJ acknowledged that “[a]lthough the frequency of the 

claimant’s seizures exceeded the level set forth in listing 11.02 in 2013 and 2014, it is noted 

throughout those records that the claimant was unable to comply with prescribed treatment 

due to financial difficulty.” (AR. 23.) As a result, the ALJ did not count Arias’ seizures 

from this period of time; instead, the ALJ considered the frequency of Arias’ seizures once 

she began adhering to prescribed treatment. (Id.) The ALJ noted that when Arias was taking 

her anti-epilepsy medication as prescribed, there was a “marked decrease” in her seizure 

frequency such that she had not had a seizure since 2014. (Id.) During this period of time, 

Arias’ seizures did not occur at the required frequencies listed under 11.02 and thus Arias’ 

epilepsy did not meet the criteria for Listing 11.02. 

Arias contends that the ALJ erred in considering the frequency of her seizures when 

she was on medication, rather than the frequency of her seizures in 2013 and 2014 when 

she was unable to afford medication. She argues that because an inability to afford 

treatment is an acceptable reason for failing to adhere to prescribed treatment, the ALJ 

should have considered her seizure frequency in 2013 and 2014. 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. As Appendix 1 explains, an ALJ 

will count seizures that occur during a period when a claimant is not adhering to prescribed 

treatment if the claimant has a good reason for not following the treatment. One such 

reason is an inability to afford treatment that a claimant is “willing to accept, but for which 

no free community resources are available.” Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision to not count Arias’ seizures during 2013 and 2014. Even if Arias could not afford 

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treatment, the record shows that community resources were available to support her 

adherence to prescribed treatment. The medical records the ALJ expressly referred to as 

noting Arias’ financial difficulty also note that Arias’ doctor directed her to a patient

assistance program to help her afford and adhere to treatment. (See e.g., AR. 821 (“I had a 

long talk with the patient . . . about the importance of taking her medication and the fact 

that if she is unable to afford it, we can send them to patient assistance program.”)). Indeed, 

Arias began using the patient assistance program to receive her medication. (See e.g., AR.

822–24.) And once she did, there was a “marked decrease” in the frequency of Arias’

seizures. (Id.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Arias’ seizure 

frequency despite adherence to treatment did not meet the requirements under Listing 

11.02.

B. Dr. Higgins’ Opinions

Because Arias’ claim was filed before March 27, 2017, pre-2017 SSA regulations 

apply. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. These regulations divide medical opinions into three 

categories: treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. 

Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). Generally, the 

opinion of an examining physician is “entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a 

nonexamining physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). If the opinion 

of an examining physician is uncontradicted, the ALJ can only reject the opinion for “clear 

and convincing reasons.” Id. at 830. If, however, the examining physician’s opinion is 

contradicted, the ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting the opinion. Id. at 830–31. 

Arias contends the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinions of Dr. Dane 

Higgins, Arias’ neuropsychologist. Dr. Higgins examined Arias on two occasions and 

provided multiple medical opinions for review. The ALJ weighed each of Dr. Higgins’ 

opinions separately. The parties do not dispute that the ALJ could only reject Dr. Higgins’ 

opinions for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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(Doc. 18, 21.) Rather, Arias contends that the ALJ failed to give adequate reasons for 

discounting some of Dr. Higgins’ statements and opinions. The Court disagrees. 

1. Dr. Higgins’ Opinions from May 15, 2018, and June 12, 2019

On May 15, 2018, Dr. Higgins opined that Arias has severe limitations in all areas 

of mental functioning. (AR. 941–43.) Dr. Higgins opined the same thing the following 

year, on June 12, 2019. (AR. 1072–74.) The ALJ afforded these opinions “little weight,” 

noting the inconsistency between Dr. Higgins’ opinion and his own objective testing of 

Arias.

Inconsistency between an examining consultant’s opinion and objective medical 

findings is a specific and legitimate reason for affording little weight to the opinion. Matney 

v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019–1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that inconsistency between 

clinical findings and doctor’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s work limitations is a specific 

and legitimate reason for disregarding physician’s conclusions); see also Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, inconsistency between an

examining consultant’s opinion and the consultant’s own notes is a specific and legitimate 

reason for rejecting it. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). 

Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Higgins’ own 

objective testing of Arias is inconsistent with his conclusion that Arias suffers from severe 

limitations in all areas of mental functioning. For instance, Dr. Higgins’ testing of Arias in 

2018 shows that although Arias “exhibited difficulty learning/encoding either auditory/ 

verbal information or visual information . . . [,] her performance on tests of delayed recall 

of either auditory/ verbal information or visual information placed her well within normal 

limits.” (AR. 857.) Additionally, Dr. Higgins’ notes indicate that Arias exhibited only 

“occasional word finding difficulties” and that, overall, Arias’ verbal skills were still 

generally functional, “carrying on conversations with mild difficulty.” (AR. 854.) 

Arias directs the Court’s attention to parts of Dr. Higgins’ assessments of Arias 

demonstrating “several deficits in [her] neurocognitive functioning, especially on tests 

sensitive to right frontal and left frontal functioning.” (Doc. 18 at 9.) These same tests, 

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however, also demonstrate that “Arias’ performance placed her within normal limits, in the 

average range of functioning . . . on other neurocognitive measures,” such as verbal 

comprehension, abstract reasoning with auditory/ verbal information, and delayed recall of 

auditory/ verbal information. (AR. 1103.) Where the evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. It was rational to 

find that Dr. Higgins’ “severe limitations in all areas of mental functioning” opinion 

inconsistent with his own objective testing of Arias. Thus, the ALJ provided a specific and 

legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence to afford less weight to Dr. Higgins’ 

opinions from May 15, 2018, and June 12, 2019.

2. Dr. Higgins’ Opinions from April 21, 2016, March 8, 2017, June 11, 2019, and 

October 29, 2020

On April 21, 2016, Dr. Higgins opined that Arias is totally and permanently disabled

and is not expected to be able to return to work. (AR. 852.) On March 8, 2017, Dr. Higgins 

opined that Arias is never expected to improve to a level where seeking work or 

maintaining work is possible. (AR. 921.) On June 11, 2019, Dr. Higgins opined that Arias 

is not expected to be able to return to work. (AR. 1104.) Last, on October 29, 2020, Dr. 

Higgins opined that Arias is prevented from working in a safe or effective manner due to 

her impairment. (AR. 1142.) The ALJ afforded “no special significance” to any of these 

four opinions because “the issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner” and “[t]here 

is no indication that Dr. Higgins has any specialized vocational knowledge to assess the 

ability to work or the requirements of all jobs in the national economy.” (AR. 32–33.)

Arias contends that although “the ALJ is not bound by a physician’s opinion on an 

issue reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ must still evaluate the opinion and provide 

specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence to reject the opinion.” 

(Doc. 18 at 11.) That is not so. 

An opinion from a medical source is not necessarily a “medical opinion.” Rather, 

some opinions from a medical source are “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner 

because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.” 20 C.F.R. 

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§ 404.1527(d). One such issue reserved to the Commissioner is whether a claimant is 

“unable to work.” Id. (listing “statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or 

‘unable to work’” as an example of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner); 

Sager v. Colvin, 622 Fed. Appx. 629 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that opinion 

on whether claimant is unable to work is not a “‘medical opinion’ but rather a question 

reserved to the ALJ.”). SSA regulations require that when an opinion from a medical source 

speaks to an issue reserved the ALJ, the ALJ must “not give any special significance” to 

that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). 

That is exactly what the ALJ did here. All four of Dr. Higgins’ opinions speak to 

whether Arias is disabled and whether she is unable to work. Thus, all four opinions are on 

issues reserved to the ALJ. The ALJ did not err in affording each of these four opinions 

“no special significance.” 

C. Arias’ Symptom Testimony 

To evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding pain and symptoms, 

the ALJ must perform a two-step analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th

Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). Second, 

if the claimant meets this first test and absent evidence of malingering, the ALJ then “can 

reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id.; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015. This 

is the most demanding standard in Social Security cases. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015. “A 

finding that a claimant’s testimony is not credible ‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a 

reviewing court to conclude the [ALJ] . . . did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s 

testimony regarding pain.’” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Here, the ALJ found that although Arias’ medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the 

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intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely consistent 

with other evidence in the record. (AR. 26.) Arias does not challenge the ALJ’s analysis of 

her symptom allegations with respect to her seizure disorder; in fact, Arias concedes that 

her “seizures have been controlled with medication for many years.” (Doc. 18 at 16.) 

Rather, Arias challenges the ALJ’s credibility assessment of her testimony regarding her 

mental impairments. (Id.) Arias contends that her cognitive deficits and brain damage from 

earlier seizure activity are such that she is unable to sustain activity for a full workday and 

work week. (Id.). Accordingly, the Court only reviews the ALJ’s credibility assessment of 

Arias’ testimony regarding her mental impairments. Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673,3d 

991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and 

distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”). 

“In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh consistencies between 

the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among 

other factors.” Bray v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that claimant’s daily 

activities provided substantial evidence to support ALJ’s conclusion that the record “was 

inconsistent with the severity of the limitations” claimant described in his testimony). 

Additionally, an ALJ may consider whether objective medical evidence supports the 

claimant’s testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). 

That is what the ALJ did here. The ALJ found that Arias’ schools records, clinical 

records, psychological and psychometric testing, and activities of daily living (“ADLs”) 

all appeared inconsistent with her claims of complete mental disability. (AR. 28–30.) For 

example, Arias’ school records showed that, generally, she received Bs and Cs throughout 

high school and that she received a high school diploma. (AR. 28.) While records indicated 

that Arias received special education services, Arias also reported taking “normal classes.” 

(Id.) Clinical records demonstrated that Arias functioned well, with only moderate 

limitations. (Id.) She was oriented to person, place, time, and situation. (Id.) Her language 

was intact for naming, comprehension, and repetition. (Id.) Moreover, her judgement and 

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reasoning were intact. (Id.) Arias also scored 30 out of 30 on the Mini-Mental Statement 

Examination. (AR. 29.) Although Arias reported anxiety and depression, treatment records 

indicated that she was being treated with medication and demonstrated improvement while 

on it. (Id.)

The ALJ also noted that objective psychological and psychometric testing belied 

Arias’ allegation of complete disability. (Id.) From 2016 until 2019, Arias had the 

following full-scale intelligence quotients: 79 (borderline range), 87 (low average), 97 

(average), 89 (low average), 97 (average), and 93 (average). (Id.) The ALJ reasoned that 

while these scores suggest that Arias will likely have some mental limitations, “they are 

not indicative of complete disability.” (Id.)

Further, Arias’ ADLs did support her claim total mental impairment. (AR. 29–30.) 

Arias reported that she is independent with her ADLs. (Id.) She performs household chores 

with reminders, can prepare simple meals, does puzzles and plays video games, goes 

grocery shopping alone, manages her own doctor’s appointments, and spends time with 

friends. (Id.) Again, while Arias demonstrates some limitations, her ADLs do not support 

her allegation of complete disability. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be 

grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims 

of totally debilitating impairment.”). 

In sum, the ALJ provided specific, cogent reasons for discrediting Arias’ claim of 

complete mental impairment. Because those reasons are supported by substantial evidence 

in the record, the Court affirms the ALJ’s credibility assessment. 

D. Lay Witness Testimony

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454

F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006). An ALJ may not simply disregard competent lay witness 

testimony without comment, but instead “must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. “Where the ALJ gives clear and convincing reasons 

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to reject a claimant’s testimony, and where a lay witness’ testimony is similar to the 

claimant’s subjective complaints, the reasons given to reject the claimant’s testimony are 

also germane to reject the lay witness testimony.” Caleb H. v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-5006-

EFS, 2020 WL 7680556, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2020); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1114–15. 

Here, the ALJ afforded the opinion of Arias’ sister, Constanza Guerrero Diaz, 

limited weight, explaining that Diaz’s statements pertaining to claimant’s impairments and 

limitations were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence showing that claimant’s 

seizures have been well controlled sine June 2014. (AR. 33.) Arias contends that ALJ failed 

to give germane reasons for discounting Diaz’s testimony regarding Arias’ mental 

impairments. (Doc. 18 at 17.) Arias argues the “ALJ failed to note that many of the 

limitations Diaz described, such as forgetfulness, difficulty understanding instructions, and 

difficulty with concentration and memory, are related to Arias’ cognitive disorder and are 

not based on Arias continuing to have seizures.” (Id.) Thus, Arias primarily challenges the 

ALJ’s weighing of Diaz’s testimony with respect to Arias’ mental impairments—testimony 

that is similar to Arias’ subjective complaints discussed above.

The Court already found that the ALJ had clear and convincing reasons to discredit

Arias’ testimony regarding the severity of her mental impairments. It follows then that the 

ALJ had germane reasons to discredit Diaz’s testimony regarding the same impairments. 

E. ALJ’s Step-Five Finding 

At step five, the ALJ considers a claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 

experience to determine whether a claimant can make an adjustment to other work. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If a claimant can make the adjustment to other work, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. To make this determination, the ALJ may rely on a vocational 

expert (“VE”) to testify as to: “(1) what jobs the claimant, given [her RFC], would be able 

to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy. At the hearing, the ALJ 

poses hypothetical questions to the [VE] that ‘set out all of the claimant’s impairments’ for 

the [VE’s] consideration.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Here, the ALJ asked the VE whether jobs exist in the national economy for an 

individual of Arias’ age and with her education, work experience, and RFC. (AR. 21.) The 

VE testified that, given these factors and Arias’ limitations, Arias would be able to perform 

the requirements of the following occupations: housekeeping cleaner, hand packager, and 

small products assembler. (Id.) Given that each of these jobs exist in significant numbers 

in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that Arias is not disabled. (Id.)

Arias argues the ALJ’s step-five finding is not support by substantial evidence for 

three reasons: (1) in the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert (“VE”), the 

ALJ omitted the limitations alleged by Arias and Diaz and assessed by Dr. Higgins; (2) 

Arias’ RFC limitation requiring that she receive “redirection and reminders” at the start of 

each shift and throughout the day amounts to “a sheltered work setting,” which is an 

accommodation that would deem Arias disabled; (3) two of the representative 

occupations—hand packager and small products assembler—provided by the VE are 

inconsistent with Arias’ RFC limitation of only infrequent changes introduced gradually. 

The Court disagrees. 

First, where the hypothetical the ALJ poses to the VE contains all of the limitations 

the ALJ finds credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record, the “ALJ’s 

reliance on testimony the VE gave in response to the hypothetical . . . [is] proper.” Bayliss 

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that ALJ did not err in omitting limitations 

not supported by substantial evidence in the record from the hypothetical posed to the VE). 

As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility assessment of Dr. 

Higgins’, Diaz’s, and Arias’ opinions. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in omitting 

limitations that lack substantial evidence in the record from the hypothetical. 

Second, Arias’ argument that her RFC limitation—which she renames as an 

“accommodation”—deems her “disabled” is neither supported by SSA regulations nor the

singular case Arias draws the Court’s attention to. Arias points to Cleveland v. Policy 

Management Systems Corp. for the proposition that because she “cannot work without 

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accommodations, she is deemed disabled.” 526 U.S. 795, 802–03 (1999). Arias misreads 

that case. The Supreme Court clarified that an individual who can perform the essential 

functions of her job but requires “reasonable accommodation” may be deemed “disabled” 

under the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) but not necessarily under the 

SSA. Id. Unlike under the ADA, “when the [Social Security Administration] determines 

whether an individual is disabled for [benefit purposes], it does not take the possibility of 

‘reasonable accommodation’ into account.” Id. at 803. Arias does not point to any other 

authority supporting her argument here.

Moreover, the VE specifically opined that an individual with Arias’ limitations—

including her need for redirection and reminders—could perform work in the abovementioned occupations. (AR. 134.) Arias neither challenges this part of the VE’s testimony 

nor the VE’s qualifications to make this determination. Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 

(9th Cir. 2021) (“ALJ’s reliance on qualified, cogent, and uncontradicted expert testimony 

generally constitutes substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s finding.”) (citing Ford, 

950 F.3d at 1159). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Arias can 

make successful adjustment to other work in light of her limitations. 

Finally, the Court need not reach the issue of whether two of the representative 

occupations—hand packager and small products assembler—are inconsistent with Arias’ 

RFC limitations because the alleged error, if any, is harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 

(“[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where it is consequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of whether 

these occupations are indeed inconsistent with her RFC limitations, the ALJ found that 

Arias would be able to work as a housekeeping cleaner, an occupation with 400,000 jobs 

nationwide. (AR. 35.) Arias does not challenge the ALJ’s finding with respect to this 

occupation. And where a claimant can make successful adjustment to other work that exists 

in significant numbers in the national economy, an ALJ will find the claimant “not 

disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c). Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five 

determination of “not disabled.” 

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IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to 

enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2023.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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