Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01047/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01047-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WHITFIELD, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

JOSEFINA SANDOVAL, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-01047-AWI-SMS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND (DOC. 16)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with an action for damages

and other relief concerning alleged civil rights violations. The

matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint filed on August 24, 2007.

I. Screening the Complaint

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

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The Court will screen the complaint and any amended complaint that is 1

filed and will issue an order determining that claims against specific

defendants have been stated before the Court will direct that the complaint be

served on any defendant.

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or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).1

A. Screening Standard 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. th

ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6 Cir. 1998). th

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

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accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

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Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

B. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that his action is authorized by 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff alleges that on three occasions, namely, on or

about July 5, 2006, November 13, 2006, and January 1, 2007,

Defendants filed and served Plaintiff with a notice which stated

to tenants and all persons in possession that they were notified

that they were demanded to pay rent or quit within three days of

receipt of the notice. Plaintiff alleges that this violated

Plaintiff’s statutory rights within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §

1692g, which requires thirty days’ notice for disputing a debt.

He also alleges that it constituted a violation of Plaintiff’s

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rights under § 1692e(5), which prohibits debt collectors from

using, in connection with the collection of any debt, a threat to

take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not

intended to be taken. 

Title 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides in pertinent part:

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication

with a consumer in connection with the collection

of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the

following information is contained in the initial

communication or the consumer has paid the debt,

send the consumer a written notice containing–

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the

debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer,

within thirty days after receipt of the notice,

disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion

thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by

the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies

the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day

period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is

disputed, the debt collector will obtain

verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment

against the consumer and a copy of such verification

or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt

collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written

request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector

will provide the consumer with the name and address

of the original creditor, if different from the current

creditor. (Emphasis added.)

Title 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) defines a “debt collector” as

follows:

(6) The term "debt collector" means any person who

uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the

mails in any business the principal purpose of which is

the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects

or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.

Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of

the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes

any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own

debts, uses any name other than his own which would

indicate that a third person is collecting or

attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of

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section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate

commerce or the mails in any business the principal

purpose of which is the enforcement of security

interests. The term does not include–

(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while,

in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such

creditor;

(B) any person while acting as a debt collector

for another person, both of whom are related by common

ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the

person acting as a debt collector does so only for

persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if

the principal business of such person is not the

collection of debts;

(C) any officer or employee of the United States

or any State to the extent that collecting or

attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of

his official duties;

(D) any person while serving or attempting to

serve legal process on any other person in connection

with the judicial enforcement of any debt;

(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the

request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer

credit counseling and assists consumers in the

liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from

such consumers and distributing such amounts to

creditors; and

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect

any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental

to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide

escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was

originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which

was not in default at the time it was obtained by such

person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person

as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction

involving the creditor. (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff has not alleged facts reflecting that either of

the named Defendants, Josefina Sandoval and Martha Martinez,

constitute debt collectors within the meaning of the statute.

Plaintiff’s previous complaint, the first amended complaint,

also suffered from this defect. In its order dismissing

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to amend, the

Court informed Plaintiff of the fact that only debt collectors

are regulated by the pertinent statute, and further that

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Plaintiff would have the opportunity to allege facts showing that

the Defendants were debt collectors who were regulated by the

statute. (Order pp. 5-6.) However, Plaintiff has failed to allege

any facts showing that Defendants are debt collectors within the

meaning of the statute. It thus appears that Plaintiff has not

stated a claim pursuant to the statute.

Further, the Court concludes from Plaintiff’s failure that

Plaintiff cannot allege facts showing that the Defendants are

debt collectors regulated by the federal statute pursuant to

which Plaintiff seeks to proceed.

II. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint BE DISMISSED without leave to amend.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

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1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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