Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01390/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maryelizabeth Aguado, Sheila Pilat, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

First Magnus Financial Corporation,

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Mortgage

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,

America’s Servicing Company, Deutche

Bank National Trust Company, New

Century Mortgage Corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-1390-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2009 (Dkt.#5) On September 2, 2009,

the same Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Ruling (Dkt.#13) regarding the Motion to

Dismiss. As they pointed out, Plaintiffs’ Response was due on July 31, 2009. They also

cited to Local Rule 7.2(i), which provides that when no opposing motion is timely filed,

“such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and

the court may dispose of the motion summarily.” (Dkt.#13 at 1-2) Defendants requested that

the Court grant their motion, dismiss the case with prejudice, and award their costs and

attorneys’ fees. (Id.) 

On August 28, 2009, Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Deutche Bank National

Trust Company filed a separate Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#12). On September 28, 2009, these

Case 2:09-cv-01390-MHM Document 16 Filed 11/20/09 Page 1 of 4
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same Defendants also filed a request for a summary ruling, citing to Local Rule 7.1(i) and

emphasizing that the text of this rule makes it clear that the rule also applies “unrepresented

part[ies].” (Dkt.#14)

On October 23, 2009, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a responsive memorandum

to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss no later than November 16, 2009. As of this date, no

responsive memorandum has been filed. LRCiv 7.2(i) provides in part if the opposing party

“does not serve and file the required answering memorandum, ...such non-compliance may

be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the

motion summarily.” 

“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474

(9th Cir. 1979)). “Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure.” Id. at 54 (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th

Cir. 1987)). “Before dismissing the action, the district court is required to weigh several

factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need

to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [party seeking dismissal]; (4) the public

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.’” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

“The first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the

fourth cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and

availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

The dismissal factors in this case are similar to those present in Ghazali. In that case,

the Ninth Circuit upheld summary dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for the failure to

follow a Nevada district court local rule. Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53. The Nevada rule, like

Local Rule 7.2(i), considered the failure to file a response to a motion to “constitute a consent

to the granting of the motion.” Id. (quoting D. Nev. R. 140-6). The Court reasoned that the

dismissal was proper because the pro se plaintiff was bound by the rules of procedure, and

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was given notice of the motion and ample time to respond. Id. at 54 (citing King, 814 F.2d

at 567).

Similarly, Plaintiffs in this case have not responded despite receiving notice of both

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and motions for summary disposition. (Dkt.#13,14) Further,

the motions specifically warned that the lack of a timely response may be deemed a consent

to the granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily. While the

public policy favoring resolution on the merits weighs against dismissal, it is no more

compelling here than it was in Ghazali. As noted in Wanderer, the first two

factors—expeditious resolution and docket management—generally favor dismissal.

Wanderer, 910 F.2d at 656. They weigh especially heavily here because of Plaintiffs’ total

failure to respond to three dispositive motions. The third and fifth factors that Wanderer

emphasized—prejudice and availability of other sanctions—are virtually identical to those

present in Ghazali, because that case involved a pro se litigant in exactly the same procedural

position as Plaintiff. Thus, under Ghazali, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case under the local rule

is justified. Pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i), the Court deems Plaintiffs’ failure to serve and file the

required answering memorandum a consent to the granting of the Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss. Moreover, given the statute of limitations and standing issues raised by Defendants

in their Motions to Dismiss, it appears that granting Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) would be futile.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (Dkt.# 5, 12).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing this case with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Ruling

(Dkt.#13) and denying the request for attorneys’ fees and costs contained therein without

prejudice to Defendants moving, consistent with the Local Rules, for attorneys’ fees and

costs pursuant to Rule 83.

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Ruling Re: Motion

to Dismiss (Dkt.#14).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to close this case.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-01390-MHM Document 16 Filed 11/20/09 Page 4 of 4