Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02113/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Virginia M. Welch, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Wright Medical Technology, Inc., a 

Delaware corporation; and Wright Medical 

Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-2113-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Virginia M. Welch filed her initial complaint on October 27, 2011, 

alleging claims of strict liability for failure to warn, strict liability for design defects, 

strict liability for manufacturing defects, breach of express warranty, negligence, and 

punitive damages. Doc. 1. Defendants Wright Medical Technology, Inc. and Wright 

Medical Group, Inc. (collectively “the Wright Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 7. Plaintiff filed a 

response to the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 16. For the reasons that follow, the Court will 

grant in part and deny in part the Wright Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

I. Background. 

 The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State 

of Arizona. Doc. 1, ¶ 1. On or about February 2, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a right total 

hip arthroplasty. Doc. 1, ¶ 10. In the course of this procedure, Plaintiff received a 

Wright Medical PROFEMUR Z hip implant (“Wright Implant”). Doc. 1, ¶¶ 10, 11. On 

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

or about November 4, 2009, Plaintiff was evaluated by Tina M. Horton, PA-C, in the 

office of Danton S. Dungy, M.D. for continuing right hip pain. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. In this 

evaluation, radiographs revealed that an acetabular cup, right arthoplasty, had rotated 

approximately 90 degrees clockwise. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. Because of this evaluation, Plaintiff 

became aware that the Wright Implant was defective. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. On or about 

November 16, 2009, Plaintiff had the Wright Implant surgically removed. Doc. 1, ¶ 14. 

 Plaintiff makes the following claims against the Wright Defendants: (1) strict 

liability for failure to warn, (2) strict liability for design defect, (3) strict liability for 

manufacturing defect, (4) breach express warranty, (5) negligence, and (6) punitive 

damages. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under Rule 

12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations “‘are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

III. Wright Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

 The Wright Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for strict liability for 

failure to warn, strict liability for design defect, breach of express warranty, and punitive 

damages. 

A. Strict Liability for Failure to Warn. 

 To establish a prima facie case of strict liability, Arizona Law requires plaintiffs to 

show that the defective product “is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Dole 

Food Co., Inc. v. North Carolina Foam Industries, Inc., 935 P.2d 876, 879 (App. 1996) 

(citing Piper v. Bear Medical Systems, Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 410 (App. 1993)); accord 

Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379 (1987) (superseded by 

statute on other grounds). To prove proximate cause in a failure to warn case, “[w]hat is 

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

required is ‘evidence that had a proper warning been given, [the plaintiff] would not have 

used the product in the manner which resulted in his injury, or by evidence that certain 

precautions would have been taken that would have avoided the accident.’” Dole Food 

Co., 935 P.2d 876 at 883 (citing Gosewisch, 737 P.2d at 397); see also Gebhardt v. 

Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 184-85 (D. Ariz. 1999) (granting summary judgment to 

defendant on a failure to warn claim when plaintiff failed to show that a doctor would not 

have used a medical device on plaintiff if alternative warnings were given); Mills v. 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., CV 11-00968-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4708850, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Oct. 7, 2011) (dismissing a failure to warn claim because plaintiff had not pled facts 

sufficient to show that a doctor would not have prescribed a drug if an appropriate 

warning was given). 

 The Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to advance any allegation that her 

doctor would not have recommended the Wright Implant if a warning had been given. 

Plaintiff argues that alleging that failure to warn was one of the causes of Plaintiff’s 

injury is sufficient to avoid a dismissal, but Arizona law requires evidence that Plaintiff 

would have acted differently if a warning had been given. See Dole Food Co., 935 P.2d 

876 at 883. Plaintiff makes no such allegation. See Doc. 1. The Court will dismiss 

Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim. 

B. Strict Liability for Design Defects.

 For a plaintiff to make a strict liability design defect claim, Arizona law requires 

that the product either “‘fai[l] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect 

when used in an intended or reasonable manner’ (the consumer expectation test), or ‘the 

benefits of a challenged design . . . outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design’ 

(risk/benefit analysis).” Stillwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Golonka v. General Motors Corp., 63 P.3d 956, 963 (App. 2003)). This 

standard is analogous to the standard proposed by the Third Restatement of Torts, see

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2(b) (1998) (stating that a design is defective 

“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design”), but the Restatement adopts 

a different standard for design defect claims against manufacturers of prescription drugs 

and medical devices. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 6(c). This standard 

requires that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are 

sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable healthcare providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 

prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.” Id. Arizona courts have 

not formally adopted this test for prescription drugs and medical devices, but it has been 

followed by other judges of this district. See Gebhart, 191 F.R.D. 180, 185; see also

Mills, 2011 WL 4708850, at **2-3 (applying the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 6(c) 

absent guidance from Arizona courts); Harrison v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., CV-06-

0745-PHX-RCB, 2008 WL 906585, at **21-22 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2008) (applying the 

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 6(c) standard absent guidance from Arizona courts). 

“Arizona has demonstrated a willingness to look to” the Restatement “as the current 

statement of the law[.]” Gebhart, 191 F.R.D. at 185 (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 904 P.2d 861, 867 (1995)). This Court will apply the Restatement § 6(c) standard. 

 Under this standard, the Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim because she has not alleged that the Wright Implant would not be prescribed by a 

reasonable healthcare provider to any class of patients. The Court does not agree. 

Plaintiff clearly has pled a design defect claim. The facts that must be proved to establish 

that claim under § 6(c) need not be pled in every detail in the complaint. The Court will 

not dismiss this claim 

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of Express Warranty.

 Under Arizona law, to create an express warranty, a seller must provide an 

“affirmation of fact or promise,” “a description of the goods,” or “a sample or model” 

that becomes “part of the basis of the bargain.” A.R.S. § 47-2313(A). Thus, to avoid a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, Plaintiff must allege that the seller has provided an affirmation 

of fact, a promise, a description of the goods, a sample, or a model. 

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim is 

“vague and conclusory” and fails to provide specifics of when and how the warranty was 

communicated. Doc. 7, at 6. Plaintiff argues that alleging that the Wright Defendants 

“warranted to Plaintiff’s healthcare provider and to the ultimate consumers of the 

products, including Plaintiff Virginia Welch, that the Wright [Implant] would safely and 

efficiently act as a comprehensive component in a hip implant system for patient 

undergoing total hip arthroplasty” is sufficient to avoid a dismissal. Doc. 1, ¶ 35. But 

Plaintiff fails to allege the affirmation of fact, promise, description of the goods, sample, 

or model that gave rise to this warranty. See Doc. 1. This is a critical defect in the 

pleading, because Defendants are given no notice of the actions that allegedly created the 

warranty at issue. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for breach of express 

warranty. 

D. Punitive Damages.

 Arizona law allows punitive damages when the defendant has an “evil mind.” 

Volz v. Coleman Co., Inc., 748 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ariz. 1987). See also Gurule v. Illinois 

Mut. Life and Cas. Co., 734 P.2d 85, 86 (Ariz. 1987); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 

565, 578 (Ariz. 1986). An evil mind is established with “evidence that defendant either 

(1) ‘intended to injure the plaintiff [or (2)] consciously pursued a course of conduct 

knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.’” Gurule, 734 

P.2d at 87 (citing Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578-79). 

 Plaintiff argues that the allegations of paragraphs 52-57 of the complaint meet the 

standard of punitive damages. See Doc 13, at 13-14. There, Plaintiff alleges that her 

injuries resulted from “intentional wrongdoing, reckless disregard and/or gross 

negligence.” Doc. 1, ¶ 52. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Wright Defendants’ conduct 

“involved an extreme degree of risk” and that the Wright Defendants had a “subjective 

awareness of the risk involved.” Doc. 1, ¶¶ 53-54. These facts meet the Arizona 

standard of “consciously pursu[ing] a course of conduct knowing that it create[s] a 

substantial risk of significant harm to others.” Gurule, 734 P.2d at 87 (citing Rawlings,

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

726 P.2d at 578-79). 

 The Wright Defendants argue that the Arizona Supreme Court has “expressly 

rejected awarding punitive damages based on gross negligence or mere reckless disregard 

of the circumstances.” Doc. 7, at 7 (citing Volz, 748 P.2d at 1194). But when reckless 

disregard rises to the level of the Arizona standard, a standard the Wright Defendants 

themselves propose, punitive damages can be awarded. See Doc. 7, at 7. Further, the 

Wright Defendants fail to address Plaintiff’s claim of “intentional wrongdoing,” a claim 

that can also meet the Arizona standard. Doc. 1, ¶ 52. The Court will deny the Wright 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. 

IV. Leave to Amend 

 Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint in the event any portion of 

Defendants’ motion is granted. Doc. 16, at 17. The Wright Defendants do not oppose 

this request. The Court will grant the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint by 

October 19, 2012. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Wright Defendants motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is granted and part and 

denied in part as set forth above. 

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before October 19, 2012. 

Dated this 3rd day of October, 2012. 

Case 2:11-cv-02113-DGC Document 45 Filed 10/03/12 Page 6 of 6