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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-5100 September Term, 2024 FILED ON: SEPTEMBER 24, 2024 

LESTER A. LEACH, 

APPELLANT

v. 

JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-03075) 

Before: WILKINS, WALKER and PAN, Circuit Judges. 

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record and on the briefs and oral arguments of the 

parties. The panel has afforded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not 

warrant a published opinion. See Fed. R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the order of the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia be AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Lester A. Leach, an African-American employee of the United States 

Mint, brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 

e-3(a), and e-16, over a series of events that occurred after a subordinate made a workplace 

complaint against him. Since there is insufficient evidence of discrimination or retaliation to send 

this case to a jury, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to DefendantAppellee Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury Department. 

 

I.

Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

Defendant, we “take the following facts from the evidence and read them in the light most 

favorable to” the Plaintiff, the non-moving party, “drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] 

favor.” Cruz v. McAleenan, 931 F.3d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 

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A.

In 2006, Leach became the Director of the Security Division in the Protection Directorate 

of the U.S. Mint. He was selected by Bill Bailey, who is also an African-American and became 

Leach’s first-line supervisor. Dennis O’Connor, a Caucasian, became Leach’s second-line 

supervisor soon after. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 500–01. 

Throughout the years, Leach’s subordinates made a number of complaints about his 

verbally abusive and unprofessional conduct. J.A. 369–71, 501–03. In 2013, Bailey drafted a 

memorandum on Leach’s workplace misconduct to put Leach on notice and noted that he would 

take further action in the future if necessary. J.A. 374–75. Leach’s misconduct continued after 

2013. J.A. 370–71. An Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) investigation found that Leach 

“discriminated against” one of his subordinates in 2014, and that finding prompted Bailey to issue 

a formal oral counseling to Leach. J.A. 370. Even though Leach’s subordinates were repeatedly 

bringing complaints against him, and notwithstanding the EEOC’s finding of discriminatory 

behavior on his part, Leach continued to receive positive performance reviews during the same 

period of time. J.A. 502. 

In August 2016, Leach filed a separate EEO complaint against other Mint officials, 

including Acting Deputy Director David Motl, a Caucasian, for race discrimination after they 

denied him funding to attend a training. J.A. 426–27, 503. The EEO investigator asked Motl to 

explain why he had approved comparable funding for a Caucasian female employee. J.A. 428. 

Leach’s EEO complaint was not against Bailey and O’Connor; they supported funding his 

attendance of the training. J.A. 503.

The series of events giving rise to this suit began later that year. On December 21, 2016, 

Arnaldo Medina, a new Branch Chief who was hired by Leach more than a year before, shared 

with Bailey and O’Connor by email that he “ha[d] been subjected to [Leach’s] constant 

condescending and verbally abusive behaviors[.]” J.A. 360. Medina requested that he be removed 

from Leach’s chain of command and be given 60–90 days to find new employment. Id. As Bailey 

later testified, Medina had previously approached him in person about Leach’s “condescending, 

verbally abusive behavior” several times. J.A. 470.

O’Connor agreed with Bailey’s recommendation to open an administrative investigation 

into Medina’s allegations. J.A. 503. On January 9, 2017, Bailey informed Leach that the Mint 

would investigate his conduct and remove him from supervisory responsibilities until the end of 

the administrative investigation. J.A. 503–04. Leach then contacted an EEO counselor and alleged 

both discrimination and retaliation stemming from the Mint’s investigation and interim removal 

of his supervisory duties.1 J.A. 504–05. 

O’Connor informed Motl and Chief Counsel Jean Gentry of his plans to conduct an 

administrative investigation into Medina’s allegations, but decided later that a more formal 

1 Leach asserted below that he first contacted the EEO on January 11, 2017, J.A. 504, but now claims that he did so 

on January 18, 2017, Appellant Br. 13.

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investigation by the Treasury Department’s Office of the Inspector General was warranted. J.A. 

503–04. On January 17, 2017, O’Connor shared Medina’s email containing his allegations with 

the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), and OIG accepted the matter for investigation a week 

later. Id. OIG interviewed eight Mint employees and gave Leach the opportunity to submit any 

relevant documents. J.A. 505. On November 17, 2017, almost ten months after opening the 

investigation, OIG issued its final report. J.A. 506. Therein, OIG concluded that Medina’s 

allegation was substantiated and that several other subordinates had corroborated Leach’s 

inappropriate behavior. 

On January 31, 2018, Bailey proposed to suspend Leach without pay for five days due to 

the following charges: (1) conduct unbecoming a federal government manager; (2) failure to 

timely pay his federal government-issued travel credit card; (3) failure to follow instructions; and 

(4) failure to respond to supervisor’s request. J.A. 378–79. On April 11, 2018, O’Connor sustained 

the charges, but reduced the suspension to two days. J.A. 357. As a result of this suspension, 

Leach’s teleworking privileges were revoked. Id.

Bailey detailed Leach to the Mint’s Information Technology Directorate from February 

2018 to March 2019. J.A. 507. Leach returned to the Protection Directorate after March 2019, 

but served in a nonsupervisory position. Id.

In May 2017, while the OIG investigation was still ongoing, the Protection Directorate 

created a new position, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Police. J.A. 508. Leach applied and was 

interviewed by an independent three-person panel, which gave the other two candidates higher 

scores and decided not to refer Leach to Bailey, who ultimately selected another individual for the 

position. J.A. 508–09. That individual is African-American, a twenty-year veteran, and an 

experienced official at the Mint. Id.

B.

On December 21, 2018, Leach brought this suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation 

claims based on the following actions by his employer: (1) the initial administrative investigation 

into his conduct; (2) the temporary removal of his supervisory duties; (3) the referral of the matter 

to OIG; (4) OIG’s decision to open an investigation into the matter; (5) his supervisors’ conduct 

during the OIG investigation; (6) the proposed five-day suspension, which was made after the 

completion of the OIG investigation; (7) the two-day suspension, which also revoked his 

teleworking privileges; (8) the decision to reassign him to a nonsupervisory role in the Information 

Technology Directorate; (9) the creation of a new Assistant Deputy Chief of Police position in the 

division where he worked; and (10) his non-selection for that new position. J.A. 509–11.

Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. J.A. 509. To survive 

summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff must show that their claims are actionable and present 

sufficient evidence to prove that such actions are discriminatory or retaliatory. See Baloch v. 

Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196–98 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing required elements for Title VII 

discrimination and retaliation claims). As relevant here, the plaintiff must demonstrate as part of 

that showing that the challenged actions qualify as adverse actions. See id.

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The District Court assumed without deciding that all of the ten challenged actions here are 

actionable discrimination claims. It further found that all of those actions—except for the OIG 

referral and the proposed suspension—are actionable retaliation claims. The District Court 

concluded that Leach had not produced any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find 

those actions discriminatory or retaliatory and granted summary judgment on that basis. It thus 

did not need to decide whether all of the ten challenged actions are indeed actionable 

discrimination claims. Leach now appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

II.

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This Court 

reviews the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 638 

(D.C. Cir. 2020). We must “consider[] the record taken as a whole, . . . view[] the evidence in the 

light most favorable to [Leach], and draw[] all reasonable inferences in [his] favor[.]” Id. (citations 

omitted). Credibility determinations and evidence-weighing considerations are not permitted. Id.

A.

As we agree with the District Court that there is insufficient evidence of discrimination and 

retaliation for reasons discussed below, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on that basis 

without deciding whether the challenged actions are actionable discrimination and retaliation 

claims. We assume that they are for the purpose of this appeal. 

B.

When an employee has suffered adverse actions and the employer “has asserted a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [such] action[s], . . . . we ask [] whether the employee 

produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated 

against the employee on an impermissible ground.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1197 n.2 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The Mint provided non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for all of the challenged 

actions in this case. To create a genuine dispute for trial, Leach must present evidence that tends 

to rebut those reasons but he fails to do so. Id.

The Mint’s initial administrative investigation into Leach’s conduct was warranted by 

Medina’s email regarding Leach’s behavior, Medina’s prior complaints of such behavior, and 

documented evidence of Leach’s prior conduct issues. J.A. 516–18. The Mint also had a 

legitimate reason for the temporary removal of Leach’s supervisory duties, as several of his 

subordinates complained about Leach’s behavior over the years and Medina planned to leave his 

job due to it. J.A. 517–21. Leach’s years-long pattern of behavior was “objectively troubling” 

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and Leach identifies no evidence to suggest that it was pretext for the decision to investigate and 

temporarily suspend him. J.A. 517. 

Further, Leach’s supervisors had to refer Medina’s email complaint to OIG, as Treasury 

Order 114-01 requires that complaints of possible “abuse of authority” be reported to OIG. J.A. 

339–40. The complaints about Leach’s conduct fall into that category. Moreover, Bailey’s 

proposed five-day suspension was based on the OIG report itself, which found that Leach subjected 

Medina to verbally abusive behavior. J.A. 520. O’Connor’s decision to impose a two-day 

suspension was also based on that report. The one-year reassignment allowed Leach to perform 

nonsupervisory tasks away from the work environment in which he had been accused of verbally 

abusive behavior. J.A. 521–22. Leach does not appeal his non-selection for the new position in 

the Security Division, so we need not evaluate the Mint’s reasons for that decision. 

Instead of demonstrating that the Mint actually had discriminatory reasons for its 

challenged actions, Leach focuses on his retaliation claims and alleges that he was retaliated 

against for bringing an EEO complaint against Motl and other Mint employees, who are not 

relevant to this suit, in August 2016. J.A. 517–19. In trying to prove retaliation, Leach contends 

that Gentry and Motl were “exceptionally antagonistic toward African Americans engaging in 

EEO activities” and points to two African-American employees, A.B. and Dickerson, who 

allegedly had similar experiences with Gentry and Motl. According to Leach, after A.B. testified 

as part of an EEO investigation into Motl’s retaliatory efforts against a different individual, Gentry 

placed A.B. under investigation as a punishment. But Leach fails to present evidence of such 

investigation into A.B. Leach also emphasizes how Dickerson previously filed an EEO complaint 

against Motl and also became the subject of a separate administrative investigation. The

administrative investigation, however, began before Dickerson engaged in any EEO activity and 

so the investigation could not have been a retaliatory decision against her for engaging in an EEO 

activity, as Leach alleges. J.A. 497. 

According to Leach, Gentry and Motl were the ones who decided to refer Medina’s email 

to OIG and Bailey and O’Connor concealed that fact. Leach says the fact that Gentry and Motl 

decided to make the referral is evidence of retaliation because Leach previously brought an EEO 

complaint against Motl and both Gentry and Motl allegedly retaliated against other AfricanAmericans for similar reasons. J.A. 519. But as discussed above, Leach does not present evidence 

of any prior retaliation by Gentry and Motl. 

Leach also raises questions regarding who knew about his prior EEO complaint at the time 

of the OIG referral and the role that Motl played in the referral decision. Those questions, however, 

are not sufficient for the jury to find that the Mint’s asserted nonretaliatory reason was not the 

actual reason for the OIG referral. As Medina’s allegations fall under the “abuse of authority” 

category, the OIG referral was required under Treasury Order 114-01. Even assuming that no 

decision-making supervisor knew of this requirement, that would not render the referral decision 

pretextual, because the referral was still warranted by Leach’s alleged conduct, and Leach failed 

to produce evidence that discrimination was the actual reason for his referral. 

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Leach also argues that Bailey and O’Connor knew that Medina’s allegations were false and 

that both of them tainted the OIG investigation. Bailey and O’Connor did not “taint” the 

investigation by notifying the OIG about witnesses supportive of Medina’s allegations. Further, 

Leach’s positive performance reviews alone do not raise an issue of fact as to whether Bailey and 

O’Connor believed Medina’s allegations, particularly where the OIG found that Medina’s 

allegations were substantiated and corroborated by several current and former employees. See 

Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1101 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the 

challenged actions discriminatory or retaliatory under Title VII. We accordingly affirm the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee. 

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition 

for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41. 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

BY: /s/

 Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk 

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