Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03069/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03069-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

WANA F. DYSON PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 06-3069

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff, Wana Dyson, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

November 26, 2007, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $1,958.53 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 8.00 attorney hours at an hourly rate of

$150.00 and 9.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00. (Doc. # 14). The defendant has

filed a response, expressing no objection to this award. (Doc. # 16). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99

Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.

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1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the

absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th

Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A).

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $150.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

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sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the

undersigned believes his argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has

merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to $150.00 per hour.

Plaintiff’s counsel has also requested 9.50 paralegal hours of work at the rate of $75.00

per hour. We find the hourly rate should be reduced to $65.00 per hour. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 1.25 paralegal hours and 1.00

attorney hours for work performed between September 16, 2006, and October 30, 2006. The

Complaint was not filed in this court until November 2, 2006. (Doc. # 1). Time spent at the

administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d

978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, we do note that some of the time submitted was clearly

in preparation for the filing of the Complaint with this court and should be allowed. Therefore,

we will deduct .25 paralegal hours. 

Counsel also requests reimbursement for .50 paralegal hour for preparing letters of

service and perfecting service and .50 paralegal hour for preparing a letter to the plaintiff. The

court finds that these tasks could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc.

v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not

compensable under the EAJA. Therefore, 1.00 paralegal hour must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

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Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 0.50 paralegal hour for preparing a motion to allow

plaintiff to file a brief out of time. Plaintiff’s counsel was given ample time to file a brief on

behalf of his client and should not be allowed compensation for work performed as a result of

his inability to meet the deadlines set by this court. Accordingly, 0.50 paralegal hour must be

deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Further, counsel requests a total of 3.00 paralegal hours for the research and preparation

of the EAJA petition and brief. We find the time sought to be excessive and deduct 0.50

paralegal hour from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Likewise, counsel seeks a total of 1.75 paralegal hours for receiving and reviewing the

IFP application completed by the plaintiff, receiving and reviewing the file-marked copy of the

complaint with attachments, receiving and reviewing the Order of Reference, receiving and

reviewing the notice of consent, receiving and reviewing the briefing schedule, receiving and

reviewing the transcript, downloading the Judgment remanding the case, and receiving and

reviewing the signed affidavit of the plaintiff. We find this time to be excessive, given the fact

that each of these documents consisted of only 1 to 2 pages. Accordingly, we will reduce the

total number of paralegal hours compensated by 1.05 hour. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $46.03 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage and photocopies. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $46.03

to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 8.00

attorney hours at an hourly rate of $150.00 and 6.20 (9.50-3.30) paralegal hours at hourly rate

$65.00, in addition to $46.03 for postage and copies, for a total attorney's fee award of $1,649.03.

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This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff

may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of February 2008.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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