Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00090/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00090-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Padilla Baldonado, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-0090-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 2), respondents’ response (doc. 12), petitioner’s reply

(doc. 13), the report and recommendation by the United States Magistrate Judge (doc. 14),

petitioner’s objections (doc. 17), and respondents’ response (doc. 18).

On June 19, 1992, following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree

murder and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

the conviction and sentence on November 8, 1994. On June 23, 1995, the Arizona Supreme

Court denied the petition for review. 

On December 16, 1994, while his direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed a notice

of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. On June 5, 1995, the trial

court dismissed the petition concluding that it failed to present a colorable claim for relief.

Under Rule 32.9(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P., petitioner then had 30 days to file a petition for review

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We reject petitioner’s argument that the PCR court’s dismissal of his 2008 petition

for post-conviction relief was based on “ambiguous and inconsistent grounds.” Objections

at 3. Noting that the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on July 19, 1995, and citing Rule

32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., the PCR court held that the petition was “untimely.” (Doc. 2, ex.

2). This ruling is clear, unequivocal and correct. 

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in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not file his petition for review, however,

until September 15, 1995, more than 2 months outside the 30-day period. On April 17, 1996,

the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review as untimely. 

Over 12 years later, on July 22, 2008, petitioner filed a second petition for postconviction relief in state court. On August 12, 2008, the PCR court dismissed the petition,

concluding that it was (1) precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P.; (2)

precluded under Rule 32.2(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., because the claims either were or could have

been raised on appeal or in his prior Rule 32 petition; and (3) the petition was not entitled to

an exception from preclusion under Rule 32.1(g), Ariz. R. Crim. P., because contrary to

petitioner’s claim, State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2000), was not a

significant change in the law.1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s petition for

review on December 14, 2009, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 21,

2010. Petitioner filed the present petition for federal habeas review on January 13, 2011.

The Magistrate Judge recommends that we dismiss the writ of habeas corpus with

prejudice because it is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) and no statutory or equitable tolling is available (doc. 14).

AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1)(A)

provides that the 1-year limitations period runs from the latest of (1) “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review,” or (2) “the expiration of time for

seeking such review.” The 1-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). A state petition that is not filed within

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the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and therefore does not support statutory

tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005). 

We reject petitioner’s specious argument that the phrases in 28 U.S.C. § 2244—“the

date on which the judgment became final” and “the pertinent judgment”—refer to the “state

judgment denying the PCR claims” rather than “the judgment of conviction.” Objections at

6. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the term “judgment” in § 2244(d)(1)(A) “refers to the

judgment of conviction and sentence,” and “direct review” is the “direct appellate review of

that judgment.” Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, under

§ 2244(d)(1)(A), a judgment becomes final when a judgment of conviction is rendered, the

availability of appeal exhausted, the United States Supreme Court denies a petition for

certiorari, affirms the conviction on the merits, or when the time for seeking certiorari

expires. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Clay v.

United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 1076 (2003)). The Supreme Court has

expressly rejected the theory that would allow a state prisoner to “toll the [AEDPA] statute

of limitations at will simply by filing untimely state postconviction petitions.” Pace, 544

U.S. at 413, 125 S. Ct. at 1812. “This would turn § 2244(d)(2) into a de facto extension

mechanism, quite contrary to the purpose of AEDPA, and open the door to abusive delay.”

Id. “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414, 125 S. Ct. at 1812 (quotation omitted)

Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal on September 21, 1995, when

the 90-period for seeking certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired, which was

prior to the effective date of AEDPA. For petitioners whose convictions were final prior to

the enactment of the AEDPA, the statute’s 1-year limitation period began to run on

AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996, and absent any form of tolling, expired on April

24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, petitioner

had until April 24, 1997, to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner did not file his pending

habeas petitioner until January 13, 2011, more than 13 years after the expiration of the oneyear deadline. Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling, the habeas petition is timeCase 2:11-cv-00090-FJM Document 19 Filed 12/19/11 Page 3 of 4
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barred. When petitioner filed his second petition for state post-conviction relief on July 22,

2008, the federal limitations period had long-since expired, and no statutory tolling was

available. Petitioner’s successive petition for post-conviction relief did not revive the already

expired limitations period. 

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling where a petitioner can

show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814. However, plaintiff has failed to assert any grounds for

equitable relief. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his habeas

petition is therefore time-barred under AEDPA.

IT IS ORDERED ACCEPTING the recommended decision of the Magistrate Judge

(doc. 14) and DENYING AND DISMISSING with prejudice the amended petition for writ

of habeas corpus (doc. 2). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a certificate of appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis because the dismissal of the petition is justified by a plain

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable. Indeed,

petitioner’s contention is frivolous.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2011.

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