Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02385/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02385-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUTY MOLINA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02385-JCS 

ORDER REVIEWING COMPLAINT 

UNDER 28 USC § 1915

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nathaniel Rogers asserts federal civil rights and related state law claims based on 

events alleged to have occurred at Laguna Honda Hospital on February 25, 2015. The only 

defendants who have been identified in the Complaint are the City and County of San Francisco 

and San Francisco Sheriff‟s Deputy Molina.1 Having previously granted Plaintiff‟s Application to 

Proceed in Forma Pauperis, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff‟s Complaint should be 

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal of an in forma pauperis 

complaint that is (1) frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 

Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of 

the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s complaint meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

1915 and therefore orders that the United States Marshal serve the Complaint, a copy of this order 

 

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Plaintiff also names in his complaint certain unidentified employees of the City and County of 

San Francisco. As the United States Marshal is unable to serve the complaint on these defendants 

until they have been identified the Court does not reach the adequacy of Plaintiff‟s claims as to 

those individuals at this time.

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and any scheduling orders on the Defendants who have been identified, that is, Deputy Molina and 

the City and County of San Francisco.

II. BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiff, he is disabled, bound to a wheel chair and at the time of the relevant 

events, was a long-term resident of Laguna Honda Hospital. Compl. ¶ 12. He alleges that on 

February 25, 2015 at 11:00 pm he was in the emergency room for an eye problem and “had been 

lying there in the dark on a gurney since about 0530 hours and no one had seen him. Also, the 

paramedics who transported him left him without his wheelchair, and he requested a wheelchair so 

he would be mobile.” Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that instead of providing a wheelchair, a hospital 

employee called Sheriff‟s deputies, including Deputy Molina, who then threw him to the ground 

from the gurney, kicked him, choked him, and handcuffed him behind his back. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. He 

also alleges that they seized blessing oil that he uses to practice his religion. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff 

alleges that “[a]fter [t]he Defendants injured Plaintiff [they] released him and [they] presented him 

with a citation to appear in court for fare evasion and a new and second offense, delaying, 

resisting, obstructing and interfering with public employees in performance of their duties.” Id. ¶

24. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he new and second offense was bogus and a complete fabrication to 

attempt to intimidate the Plaintiff into not pursuing his legal rights.” Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that 

“[n]ot only was the arrest unlawful, but when Plaintiff went to court, all of the charges, including 

the original fare evasion charges were dropped, or otherwise dismissed.”

Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: 1) First 

Amendment Violation of Free Exercise Clause in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against all 

Defendants except the City and County Of San Francisco); 2) Fourth Amendment Unreasonable 

Seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against all Defendants except the City and County Of 

San Francisco); 3) Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Inadequate Training and 

Supervision (against the City and County of San Francisco); 4) Battery (against all Defendants); 

5) false imprisonment (against all defendants); and 6) intentional infliction of emotional distress).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

If a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is permitted to 

proceed in forma pauperis, the court must undergo a preliminary screening of the complaint and 

dismiss any claims which: (1) are frivolous and malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must make “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the Complaint, the Court takes “all allegations of material fact 

as true and construe(s) them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of 

Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1990). The “tenet that a court must accept a 

complaint‟s allegations as true,” however, “is inapplicable to . . . mere conclusory statements.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 

(2007)). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must allege facts 

sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, the court generally 

looks only to the face of the complaint and the documents attached thereto. Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). 

B. Claims Asserted Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims One through Three)

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 

law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 

create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 

governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 

bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred „under color of state law‟ 

and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under 

section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: 

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there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Id. 

1. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause

The First Amendment protection of the freedom of religion is embodied in two clauses:

the “Establishment Clause” and the “Free Exercise Clause,” providing that “Congress shall make 

no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. 

Const. amend I. In order to establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must show

that the challenged conduct resulted in an impairment of the plaintiff‟s free exercise of genuinely 

held beliefs. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256–57, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 

(1982). A violation of the First Amendment also may occur when a law enforcement officer 

conducts a seizure or uses unreasonable force in retaliation for the plaintiff‟s protected speech. 

See Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). Liberally construed, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently pled First Amendment violations based on both of these theories by 

alleging that he was subjected to unreasonable force by Defendants, acting under color of state 

law, because of his request to be moved or given a wheelchair and that Defendants interfered with 

his right to practice his religion by seizing his blessing oil. Therefore, this claim survives the 

Court‟s review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

2. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure

The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons . . . 

against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[W]here there is no need for force, 

any force used is constitutionally unreasonable.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (quoting 

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, 

Plaintiff alleges that he was lying on a gurney, unable to move, and that he was choked and beaten 

because he requested that he be moved or given a wheelchair. These allegations are sufficient to 

survive the Court‟s § 1915 review as to his unreasonable seizure claim.

3. Monell Liability

Municipal liability lies in a policy or custom that leads to the commission of a 

constitutional violation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 

L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To establish municipal liability based on inadequate training, a plaintiff must 

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show not only that “a particular officer reacted inappropriately to a situation or was 

unsatisfactorily trained or supervised, but that there is a „widespread practice‟ of inadequately 

training officers under circumstances showing a deliberate indifference to the need for new or 

additional training.” Ramirez v. County of San Diego, No. 06-cv-1111 JM, 2009 WL 1010898, at 

*8 (S.D.Cal., Apr. 15, 2009) (citing Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th 

Cir.1989); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). 

Although Plaintiff‟s allegations of inadequate training and supervision are general, they are 

sufficient at this early stage of the case to survive the Court‟s preliminary review.

C. Battery

“A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the person 

of another.” Ashcraft v. King, 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 (1991). To prevail on a claim for battery, a 

plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made contact with the plaintiff with the intent to harm 

or offend; (2) that the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) that the plaintiff was harmed 

or offended by the contact. Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1051 (N.D.Cal.2006) 

(citing Ashcraft, 228 Cal.App.3d at 611). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all of the elements of 

battery to survive the Court‟s § 1915 review.

D. False Imprisonment

“Under California law, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: (1) the 

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an 

appreciable period of time, however brief.” Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 

(9th Cir.2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital, 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (2000)). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully bound and constrained by Defendants without probable 

cause when the deputies beat him and handcuffed him. These allegations are sufficient to meet the 

requirements of § 1915.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) 

extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or 

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extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

defendant's outrageous conduct. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation 

marks omitted). Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was severely beaten, kicked and 

choked merely for asking to be moved after waiting for hours in a hospital emergency room, even 

though he was unable to move himself and posed no threat. These allegations are sufficient to 

meet the requirements of § 1915 as to Plaintiff‟s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff‟s claims are sufficient to survive the Court‟s 

preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Accordingly, the U.S. Marshal shall serve the 

Complaint, a copy of this order and any scheduling orders on Deputy Molina and the City and 

County of San Francisco.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2015

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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