Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Robert L. Ayers, Jr. is the is the current Acting Warden at San Quentin, and the Court directs the Clerk to

 reflect this in the case caption.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR JUAN AYALA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 01cv1322-IEG(PCL)

Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on Group 2

Claims and Denying Request for

Evidentiary Hearing [Doc. No. 154];

Granting Respondent’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on Group 2

Claims [Doc. No. 148]

vs.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Acting Warden of

the California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.1

Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala and Respondent Steven Ornoski have moved for summary

judgment on Petitioner’s Group 2 claims which include Grounds 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 of his Third

Amended Petition. The parties have filed opposition and reply briefs. 

A hearing was held before Chief Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on August 15, 2006. Anthony

Dain and Tiffany Salayer appeared on behalf of Petitioner. Steven Oetting of the California

Attorney General’s Office appeared on behalf of Respondent. Following the hearing, upon the

Court’s request, the parties also filed supplemental briefs on the possible implications of two

recent Ninth Circuit decisions on the Group 2 claims.

Upon consideration, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and

GRANTS Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the Group 2 claims.

///

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OVERVIEW

By an amended information filed on January 20, 1987, Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala

(“Petitioner”) and his brother Ronaldo Medrano Ayala were charged with the murders of Jose Luis

Rositas, Marcos Antonio Zamora and Ernesto Dominguez Mendez. The information alleged that

the murders were committed on or about April 26, 1985, during a robbery attempt where the

brothers held four men captive in an automobile repair shop. Both men were also charged with the

attempted murder of Pedro Castillo, who was shot during the drug-related robbery attempt, but

who escaped and survived. At trial, the prosecution also presented evidence that a third man, Jose

Moreno, helped in the commission of these crimes. Castillo provided the information to police

that led to the arrests and was the key prosecutorial witness at trial. 

Petitioner was convicted on August 1, 1989, of three counts of first-degree murder in

violation of California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 187, one count of attempted murder in violation of

CPC §§ 664 and 187, and one count of robbery and three counts of attempted robbery in violation

of CPC §§ 664 and 211 -- each count with findings that Petitioner used a firearm in the

commission of the crimes in violation of CPC § 12022.5. Petitioner was also found guilty of the

two special circumstance allegations, multiple murder under CPC § 190.2(a)(3), and murder in the

attempted commission of a robbery under CPC § 190.2(a)(17)(1). The jury returned a verdict of

death for each of the three murders on August 31, 1989, and the court entered judgment in

accordance with the verdict on November 30, 1989.

Petitioner filed his opening brief on automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court on

April 23, 1998, raising nineteen (19) separate issues. The California Supreme Court denied the

appeal on August 28, 2000. People v. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th 243 (2000). On November 15, 2000, the

state court denied the petition for rehearing. 

On August 9, 1999, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court,

raising three (3) grounds for relief. Petitioner was not granted an evidentiary hearing on those

claims and his petition was summarily denied on the merits on August 30, 2000. On March 15,

2001, Petitioner filed a Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied

on May 14, 2001. On May 14, 2001, his judgment became final.

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On July 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a request for appointment of counsel to handle his federal

habeas petition. Petitioner filed an initial petition in this court on May 14, 2002. After later filing

a Second Amended Petition in this court on December 13, 2002, Petitioner filed a second state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on March 17, 2003. The state petition was filed in

order to exhaust several unexhausted claims.

Petitioner filed his Third Amended Petition with this court on December 9, 2004. On

April 11, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing regarding

Petitioner’s Group 1 Claims (Claims 12 and 13) and granted Respondent’s motion for summary

adjudication of those claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that

the new provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

“generally apply only to cases filed after the Act [AEDPA] became effective.” In capital habeas

actions, cases are typically commenced by the filing of requests for appointment of counsel and

stays of execution of the petitioners’ death sentences. Petitioner filed his request for appointment

of counsel and stay of execution on April 27, 2001 and filed his petition with this Court on May 6,

2002. The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996, when the President signed it into law. 

See id. Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Relevant to this case are the changes AEDPA rendered to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which now reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2005). “A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ . . .

clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our

cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A state

court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] precedent to a new

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extent that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407.

Even when the federal court undertakes an independent review of the record in the absence

of a reasoned state court decision, the federal court must “still defer to the state court’s ultimate

decision.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If the state court decision does

not furnish any analytical foundation, the review must focus on Supreme Court cases to determine

“whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts

also look to Ninth Circuit law for persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law and to

determine whether a particular state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 

TEAGUE v. LANE

The United States Supreme Court, addressing perceived inconsistencies in its prior rulings

regarding retroactive application of its decisions, held that “new” constitutional rules of criminal

procedure will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within two

narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). A new rule is one that “breaks new

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ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or one whose

“result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.” 

Id. at 301. The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1) rules placing certain kinds of private

individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to prohibit, and (2) procedures implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously

diminished. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478

(1993). 

When the state properly argues that a “defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of

constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before considering the merits of the

claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). Under Teague, habeas relief is generally

unavailable if it is based “on a rule announced after [a petitioner’s] conviction and sentence

became final.” Id. Therefore, the court must first ascertain the date on which a petitioner’s

conviction became final. Id. The second step in a Teague analysis is to determine whether a state

court considering the contested claim would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude

that the rule petitioner seeks was required by the Constitution at the time his or her conviction

became final. Id. at 389-90. Third, if the court determines that a petitioner is seeking relief under

a new rule, the court must then decide if that rule falls under one of the two exceptions to Teague. 

Id. at 390.

The Court must determine whether the decision Petitioner relies upon announces a new

rule. If it does, and if neither Teague exception applies, Petitioner may not rely upon that case. 

Even if Petitioner does not seek to apply a decision creating a new rule, “it is necessary to inquire

whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is applied in

a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992),

referencing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414-415 (1990). 

Respondent asserts that this Court is barred from deciding the merits of Claims 1, 2 and 5,

as those three claims propose the creation of new rules of criminal procedure which are barred

under Teague. (Answer to Third Amended Petition [“Ans.”] at 22, 27, 31.) Petitioner disputes

Respondent’s position, maintaining that these claims are not Teague-barred, and arguing that

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2

Respondent erroneously states the standard, as a “new rule” for Teague purposes is one

that was established after a petitioner’s conviction became final and not at the time of his trial. 

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

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“[w]hether a rule of law is ‘new’ is dictated by what the controlling law was at the time

Petitioner’s state court judgment became final.” (Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

[“Pet. MSA”] at 7.) Petitioner argues that this Court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent in

applying Supreme Court law, and that Ninth Circuit holdings can create a ‘clearly established’ rule

of law under Teague. 

Regarding Claims 1 and 2, Petitioner points to the Ninth Circuit holding in United States v.

Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987), as evidence that those claims do not involve a new rule

of law under Teague. (Pet. MSA at 8-9.) Petitioner does not make any argument regarding the

inapplicability of Teague to Claim 5, instead arguing against the application of Teague to Claim 4. 

(Id. at 16.) Respondent does not assert a Teague-bar on Claim 4.

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on August 28, 2000, and

denied rehearing on November 15, 2000. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on

May 14, 2001, at which time Petitioner’s conviction became final.2 Under Teague, Petitioner may

not avail himself of a decision announced after his conviction was finalized, or advocate a decision

by this court, which creates a new rule of criminal procedure.

1. Claims 1 and 2

In Claim 1, Respondent maintains that “at the time of his (Petitioner’s) trial, there were no

clearly established rules of criminal procedure requiring counsel for the defense to be present

when a prosecutor sets forth his reasons for peremptorily challenging jurors under Batson v.

Kentucky.” (Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [“Resp. MTD”] at 2.) In Claim 2, Respondent

asserts that “at the time of his trial there was no established rule of criminal procedure that a

defendant had a right to be personally present when the prosecution provided its reasons for

peremptorily challenging a juror under Batson.” (Id. at 19.) Respondent then aptly asserts that

requiring a prosecutor to state these reasons in the presence of defense counsel and the defendant,

with the failure to do so constituting structural trial error, creates a new rule of criminal procedure

that was not clearly established at the time Petitioner’s conviction became final. (Id. at 12-13, 19-

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20.)

Petitioner submits that in 1987, well before Petitioner’s judgment became final, the Ninth

Circuit held that a “district court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel in this case to hear the

government’s reasons for excluding the black potential jurors and to present argument thereon.” 

(Pet. MSA at 7-9.), citing United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 1987). More

recently, however, the Ninth Circuit has noted that it is not “clearly established” whether defense

counsel must be permitted to make any argument to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral

reasoning for excluding prospective jurors: 

One can argue that a court must allow defense counsel to present argument during

the three-step inquiry, unless the record clearly shows that a decision in the

defendant’s favor is warranted. After all, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of

persuasion, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1712, and has only been

allowed to establish a prima facie case before step three. However, this argument

appears not to have been addressed by courts. Certainly, requiring a court to allow

defense counsel to argue is not clearly established law. Nonetheless, it seems wise

for courts to allow counsel to argue, if only to remove some of the burden of record

evaluation from the court. 

Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 831 fn.27 (9th Cir. 2003)(emphasis added). If a defendant does not

have a clearly established right to offer a rebuttal to a prosecutor’s proffered reasons for exercising

a peremptory challenge, it cannot be said that it is clearly established that the defendant and his

counsel must be present while the prosecution’s proffer is made. 

Respondent concedes that under Ninth Circuit precedent, circuit authority can suffice to

create a clearly-established rule of law under Teague. (Resp. MTD at 16); Leavitt v. Arave, 383

F.3d 809, 819 (9th Cir. 2004); Bell v. Hill, 190 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). Respondent also

notes that other circuit courts disagree with the Ninth Circuit on whether circuit authority can

create a clearly established rule of law under Teague. See Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 598

(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Petitioner cites no Supreme Court authority in existence as of the date

his conviction became final which would have compelled reasonable state jurists to conclude that

trial counsel and Petitioner were constitutionally entitled to be present at the Batson inquiry. In

addition, as the Ninth Circuit held in Lewis, the rules Petitioner seeks to apply to the instant case

are not clearly established rules of law under Teague. The proposed rules do not concern private

individual conduct nor do they concern procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and

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therefore do not fall within either exception to Teague. Thus, Claims 1 and 2 propose the

application of new rules of criminal procedure, and are barred under Teague v. Lane.

2. Claim 5

Respondent argues that, “[a]ny requirement that the state court was required for the first

time on appeal to allow comparison of the responses of jurors who were allegedly excused on the

basis of race with those who were not would amount to a new rule of criminal procedure,” and is

thus barred under Teague v. Lane. (Resp. MTD at 24.) Respondent also argues that “ the Ninth

Circuit has concluded, at the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal, there was no clearly established

law requiring a comparative juror analysis on appeal.” (Id.); Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008,

1014-15 (9th Cir. 2004); Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327, 342-44 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis

added). Petitioner did not initially offer any Teague argument on Claim 5.

The Ninth Circuit has held that comparative juror analysis, as outlined in Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), merely clarifies the Supreme Court’s holding in Batson by offering

another potential tool for the courts to utilize in analyzing such claims, and does not establish a

new rule of criminal procedure. Boyd v. Newland, 455 F.3d 897, 904-06 (9th Cir. 2006). The

Ninth Circuit in Boyd rejected the contention that the claims regarding comparative analysis were

Teague-barred, and ruled on the merits of the claim. Id. at 904. Respondent acknowledged this

point in the supplemental briefings ordered by the Court. (Respondent’s Supplemental Briefing

“Resp. SB” at 4.) Thus, Petitioner’s Claim 5 argument does not propose the application of a new

rule of criminal procedure, and is not barred under Teague v. Lane. 

DISCUSSION OF MERITS OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

1. Claims 1 and 2 -- the Exclusion of Petitioner and his Counsel from the Wheeler/Batson

hearings

Notwithstanding the Court’s finding that Petitioner’s Claims 1 and 2 are Teague-barred,

the Court will also discuss the merits of those claims. Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s

exclusion of defense counsel from the hearing during which the prosecutor proffered its reasons

for exercising peremptory challenges resulted in a “violation of his constitutional rights to an

adversarial hearing, to assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings against him,

to a reliable determination of his death penalty, and to due process.” (Third Amended Petition

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[“Pet.”] at 14.) Petitioner further alleges that the trial court’s exclusion of him personally resulted

in a “violation of his constitutional rights to be personally present . . . .” (Pet. at 21.)

A. Factual Background

Jury selection began in Petitioner’s case on January 17, 1989. [2 RT 41.] The selection

process was divided into three phases: screening for hardship, individual sequestered voir dire

pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.3d 1 (1998), and general voir dire. This process took

three-and-a-half months. During the group voir dire, the defense brought three motions pursuant

to People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at 258, California’s equivalent to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at

79, claiming the prosecution was improperly exercising its peremptory challenges against minority

prospective jurors on the basis of their race or ethnic background. [50 RT 6094-97; 6217-18; 51

RT 6344-50.] 

The trial court asked the prosecution to explain its reasons for the challenges. [50 RT

6094-95; 50 RT 6217-18; 51 RT 6344.] The prosecutor stated he did not wish to reveal his

strategy and requested that the court hold an ex parte hearing from which defendant and his

counsel would be excluded. [50-1 RT 6184-86.] Defense counsel stated that he had no objection

to being excluded from discussions of strategy, but that “I think I am entitled to be present”

otherwise, in case the prosecution’s “statement is a misstatement of the facts” and to “make sure

the record is clear as to what the statement of facts is.” [50 RT 6096.] The court overruled

defense counsel’s objection and held three ex parte hearings. Following each hearing, the trial

court ruled that the prosecutor was not challenging jury panelists because of race or ethnicity. [50-

1RT 6186; 51-1 RT 6307; 51-1 RT 6358.] 

B. The California Supreme Court’s Ruling

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in

excluding him and his counsel from the three ex parte hearings. The California Supreme Court

first laid out the legal standard to be applied in ruling upon a defendant’s challenge under Wheeler

and Batson. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th 243, 259-269.

“Under Wheeler, there is a presumption that a prosecutor uses his

peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner. [Citation.] The defendant bears

the burden to show, prima facie, the presence of purposeful discrimination.

[Citation.] If he succeeds, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show its absence.”

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(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 193 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].)

The details of the procedure for conducting an inquiry on a claim of

improper group bias against prospective jurors are well known. In the first step of

the three-part Wheeler inquiry, “‘[i]f a party believes his opponent is using his

peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must

raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such discrimination

to the satisfaction of the court. First, ... he should make as complete a record of the

circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded

are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative

cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a

strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged

because of their group association ....’” (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153,

1187- 1188 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].) Next, the burden shifts to the

challenged party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of

peremptory challenges. (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1284 [91

Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645].) At the third step of the Wheeler challenge process

-- the determination by the trial court whether the opponent of the peremptory

challenge has proved purposeful racial discrimination -- the trial court must

consider at least two possibilities. If the prosecutor acknowledges that he

challenged a prospective juror for an impermissible reason (see U.S. v. Thompson

(9th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 1254, 1256, fn. 1), then, of course, the Wheeler motion

must be granted. If the prosecutor does not so state, but instead offers the court

race-neutral reasons, it must still determine whether those stated reasons are untrue

and pretextual. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 196.)

Id. at 260-61. The California Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has

established no particular procedures which are constitutionally required:

Provided that the inquiry proceeds within the general framework just

articulated, no particular procedures are constitutionally required. As the United

States Supreme Court said of Batson hearings, “It remains for the trial courts to

develop rules, without unnecessary disruption of the jury selection process, to

permit legitimate and well-founded objections to the use of peremptory challenges

as a mask for race prejudice.” (Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 416 [111 S.Ct.

1364, 1374, 113 L.Ed.2d 411].) “The response of courts across the country has

created a rather wide spectrum, ranging from those that recommend an adversary

proceeding of some type to those that permit the prosecutor's explanation to be

received in camera and ex parte.” (Gray v. State (1989) 317 Md. 250, 257 [562

A.2d 1278, 1281].)

Id. at 261. 

The California Supreme Court initially rejected the trial court’s implicit ruling that the

prosecution’s reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges were matters of trial strategy

justifying an ex parte hearing. Id. at 262. The Court further concluded that because no matters of

trial strategy were revealed, it was error “as a matter of state law” to exclude defendant from

participating in the hearings. Id. In finding that the procedure was erroneous under state law, the

California Supreme Court relied heavily upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.

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Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987):

The question whether ex parte communications are proper in ruling on a 

Wheeler motion has not arisen in California decisional law. But the same or closely

related issues have arisen in federal and other state cases discussing analogous

motions brought under Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79. While some

decisions have tolerated an ex parte Batson hearing procedure on the ground that

the United States Constitution permits it (U.S. v. Tucker (7th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d

334, 340; U.S. v. Davis (6th Cir. 1987) 809 F.2d 1194, 1202), it seems to be almost

universally recognized that ex parte proceedings following a motion regarding

peremptory challenges allegedly made on the basis of improper group bias are poor

procedure and should not be conducted unless compelling reasons justify them.

(People v. Hameed (1996) 88 N.Y.2d 232, 237-238 [644 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469, 666

N.E.2d 1339, 1342]; U.S. v. Roan Eagle (8th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 436, 441; Gray v.

State, supra, 317 Md. 250, 257-258 [562 A.2d 1278, 1282]; U.S. v. Tindle (4th Cir.

1988) 860 F.2d 125, 132-133 (conc. & dis. opn. of Murnaghan, J.); U.S. v. Garrison

(4th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 103, 106; U.S. v. Tucker, supra, 836 F.2d at p. 340; U.S. v.

Gordon (11th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 1538; Goode v. Shoukfeh (Tex. 1997) 943

S.W.2d 441, 452 [civil case].) We agree.

U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, presented the issue and the

countervailing values involved: “The question presented to us is ... whether the

district judge erred by permitting the [prosecutor] to state her reasons to him ex

parte and then ruling on the objection without divulging the reasons to defense

counsel. In resolving this issue we must consider and reconcile two fundamental

principles of our criminal justice system. The first is that the district judge has

broad discretion to fashion and guide the procedures to be followed in cases before

him. [Citations.] The second principle is that adversary proceedings are the norm in

our system of criminal justice, [citation], and ex parte proceedings the disfavored

exception.” (Id. at p. 1257.)

U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, further explained: “The right of a

criminal defendant to an adversary proceeding is fundamental to our system of

justice. [Citations.] This includes the right to be personally present and to be

represented by counsel at critical stages during the course of the prosecution.

[Citation.] This is not mere idle formalism. Our system is grounded on the notion

that truth will most likely be served if the decisionmaker-judge or jury-has the

benefit of forceful argument by both sides....

“There are, to be sure, occasional departures from this norm. The district

judge makes an ex parte review of the prosecution's evidence to determine whether

it falls within the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196,

10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [Citations.] Also, the district judge normally considers on

an ex parte basis whether to reveal to the defense the identity of a government

informant. [Citation.] But, as these examples illustrate, situations where the court

acts with the benefit of only one side's presentation are uneasy compromises with

some overriding necessity, such as the need to act quickly or to keep sensitive

information from the opposing party. Absent such compelling justification, ex parte

proceedings are anathema in our system of justice and ... may amount to a denial of

due process.” (U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258-1259, fn. omitted.)

In addition to the foregoing general considerations, it is error in particular to

conduct ex parte proceedings on a Wheeler motion because of the risk that

defendant's inability to rebut the prosecution's stated reasons will leave the record

incomplete.

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Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 262-264. 

The California Supreme Court found, however, that the state law error, and any federal

error that may have occurred, was harmless. Id. at 268-69. In concluding that the error was

harmless, the Court closely examined the record of the voir dire. Based upon that review the Court

concluded as follows:

In summary, the record reveals the following facts in support of the view

that the prosecutor was not engaged in racial or ethnic discrimination. The court

credited the prosecutor's opinions that Olanders D. opposed the death penalty, that

Barbara S. was in a dazed state, that George S. had been a holdout juror and had

been rejected for a law enforcement position, and that Robert M. was less than

desirable from the prosecution's point of view. Galileo S., among other deficiencies,

had (unless the prosecutor was misleading the court) not been honest regarding his

criminal past. Luis M. admitted that he had investigated the case. Gerardo O.

struggled with English and did not understand the proceedings. A prosecution

committee, including a psychologist, gave Barbara S., George S., and Robert M.

poor or mediocre suitability ratings. George S.'s surname is not obviously Spanish,

and the prosecutor stated that he was unaware of his Hispanic heritage.

On these facts, we are confident that the prosecutor was not violating 

Wheeler, and that defense counsel's presence could not have affected the outcome

of the Wheeler hearings. [FN3 omitted] Moreover, the trial court's rulings in the ex

parte hearing indisputably reflect both its familiarity with the record of voir dire of

the challenged prospective jurors and its critical assessment of the prosecutor's

proffered justifications. To the extent the rulings expressed agreement with the

prosecutor's characterizations of the prospective jurors and their responses, they

also support the court's implicit conclusion that the prosecutor did not fabricate his

justifications and they were grounded in fact.

Id. at 266-67. The Court recognized the theoretical possibility that exclusion of a defendant from

an ex parte Wheeler hearing may result in an incomplete record. Id. at 267. The Court found,

however, “[o]n this well-developed record . . . we are confident that defense counsel could not

have argued anything substantial that would have changed the court's rulings. Accordingly, the

error was harmless.” Id. at 268.

Finally, the California Supreme Court rejected the contention that the error violated

Petitioner’s right to be present and to be represented by counsel, finding any federal constitutional

error also to be harmless. Id. at 269.

C. Discussion

Assuming that Claims 1 and 2 are not Teague-barred, those claims fail on their merits. In

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court first held that the United States

Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from exercising a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of

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race. Evaluating whether a peremptory challenge was race-based under Batson is a three-step

process, requiring that (1) the defendant must demonstrate a prima facie case that the prosecutor

challenged the contested jurors due to their race, (2) if the defense made a prima facie showing of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate racially-neutral explanations for

those challenges, then (3) the trial court must determine if the defendant met his burden of proving

purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. At the final step, the trial court must

“evaluat[e] ‘the persuasiveness of the justification’ proffered by the prosecutor, but ‘the ultimate

burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of

the strike’.” Rice v. Collins, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 969, 974 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elm,

514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)). 

The Supreme Court has never suggested the exact manner in which trial courts must gather

evidence necessary to make its determination that the exercise of a peremptory challenge was (or

was not) motivated by racial animus. In Batson, the Court specifically left it to the lower courts to

“formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a

prosecutor’s challenges.” Id., 476 U.S. at 99 & fn.24. Seizing upon this language, both the Sixth

and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that a trial court does not err in allowing a

prosecutor to explain his or her reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge in an ex parte

proceeding outside the presence of the defense. United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 337-40

(7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1987). In Tucker, the

Seventh Circuit noted that Batson itself “does not require rebuttal of the Government’s explanation

by defense counsel” nor does it “require the participation of defense counsel . . . .” 836 F.2d at

339; see also Davis, 809 F.2d at 1202 (“Once the defendants had established a prima facie case of

racial motivation sufficient for the district court to make an inquiry of the Government, there was

nothing more defendants were required to do. Their participation was no longer necessary for the

district court to make its determination.”) 

Subsequent to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged,

albeit in dictum, that “[i]n the rare case in which the explanation for a challenge would entail

confidential communications or reveal trial strategy, an in camera discussion can be arranged.” 

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Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992). Just last year, the Second Circuit again noted that

“there also remains doubt whether the defense enjoys the even more rudimentary right to be

allowed access to the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations in the first place.” Majid v.

Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 2005).

In the face of this authority tending to demonstrate that there is no clearly established

federal law prohibiting the trial court from holding ex parte Batson proceedings, Petitioner relies

upon United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987), as well as the general right of a

defendant to be present during critical stages of a felony trial in arguing that he is entitled to relief. 

In Thompson, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a]bsent . . . compelling justification, ex parte

proceedings are anathema in our system of justice and, in the context of a criminal trial, may

amount to a denial of due process.” Id. at 1258-59. The court held that the because the

prosecutor’s proffered reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge were not strategy-related, the

trial court erred in excluding defendant and his counsel from those proceedings. Id. at 1259. 

Petitioner in this case also relies upon general authority establishing that voir dire is a critical stage

of the felony criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has a right, derived from the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to be present. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.

858, 873 (1989) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892)). 

The California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in finding

that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor for exercising the peremptory challenge involved trial

strategy. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 262. The California Supreme Court also concluded that it was an

error of state law for the trial court to hold those proceedings ex parte. Id. The California Supreme

Court did not, however, express an opinion as to whether the exclusion of Petitioner and his

counsel was error of constitutional magnitude. In light of the express holdings of the Sixth and

Seventh Circuits in Tucker, 836 F.2d at 337-40 and Davis, 809 F.2d at 1201-02, the ex parte

proceedings were not constitutional error, as well as the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in

McCollum, 505 U.S. at 58 that in camera discussions are sometimes appropriate, the Court doubts

whether the trial court’s procedure was constitutionally defective as a matter of clearly established

Federal law.

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Even assuming that the trial court erred in hearing the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising

his peremptory challenges outside of the presence of Petitioner and his counsel, however, the state

court’s determination that such error was harmless was neither “contrary to [n]or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner argues

that exclusion of he and his counsel was structural error, requiring automatic reversal. Petitioner

argues that “where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the

proceeding,” prejudice is presumed and reversal is required. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166

(2002); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 fn.25 (1984). Petitioner also relies upon the

Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Thompson, finding the exclusion of defendant and his counsel from the

Batson hearing to be per se reversible because “[t]he government cannot rely on a transcript

reflecting such fundamentally flawed procedures to show that the defendant suffered no

prejudice.” Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1261.

As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thompson is materially distinguishable

from this case. The prosecutor in Thompson relied in part upon the juror’s race as the basis for

exercising the peremptory challenge. Id., 827 F.2d at 1256, fn.1. In addition, the trial judge in

Thompson made no explicit findings on the record regarding the strength or weakness of the

prosecutor’s proffered reasons. In this case, the reasons offered by the prosecutor did not contain a

hint of racial bias. The trial judge who had presided over the entire voir dire process was well

aware of the standards and made explicit findings on the record evaluating the credibility of the

prosecutor’s proffered reasons. Finally, Thompson was a direct appeal of a federal criminal

judgment, not a collateral attack on a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, such that

different standards of review applied. For these reasons, the Court finds the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Thompson, that exclusion of a defendant or his attorney from an ex parte Batson

hearing is per ser reversible, to be inapplicable to this case.

In general, the error alleged by Petitioner here does not fall within the circumstance where

per se reversal is required. The Supreme Court has never held that the exclusion of a defendant

from a critical stage of his criminal proceedings constitutes a structural error. Campbell v. Rice,

408 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). “To the contrary, in Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117

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(1983) (per curiam), the Court determined that the fact that the defendant was denied the right to

be present during an ex parte communication between the judge and a juror was trial error subject

to harmless error analysis.” Campbell, 408 F.3d at 1172. Furthermore, as Petitioner

acknowledges, Mickens holds only that prejudice is presumed where counsel “has been denied

entirely or during a critical stage.” Id., 535 U.S. at 166. Petitioner was not completely deprived of

counsel during the voir dire in this case. Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s decision that

any federal constitutional error in excluding Petitioner and his counsel from the ex parte Batson

proceedings was subject to harmless error analysis was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Finally, Petitioner has not shown that the California Supreme Court’s decision finding the

purported error to be harmless was objectively unreasonable within the meaning of AEDPA. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) (before habeas relief may be granted under AEDPA,

federal court must determine that the state court applied the harmless-error review in an

“objectively unreasonable” manner). The California Supreme Court went to great lengths to

review the reasons proffered by the prosecution, and the trial court’s evaluation of those reasons. 

Ayala, 24 Cal. 4th at 264-266. Upon such review, the California Supreme Court concluded that

the trial court’s exclusion of Petitioner and his counsel from the proceedings “could not have

affected the outcome of the [Batson] hearings.” Id. at 267. The California Supreme Court also

discussed and distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Thompson, noting there was nothing in

the record to suggest any impropriety in the prosecutor’s exercise of his peremptory challenges. 

Id. at 267-68.

The Court has reviewed the record of the voir dire. As discussed in detail below with

regard to Petitioner’s Claim 4, the Court finds the prosecutor’s proffered non-discriminatory

reasons for exercising each of the peremptory challenges was amply supported by the record. This

is not a case where the prosecutor offered patently inappropriate or even marginal reasons for

striking the jurors. The Court finds that the state court’s harmless error analysis was not

objectively unreasonable. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 1 and 2.

2. Claim 4 -- Equal Protection rights of prospective jurors

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Petitioner alleges that the “ex parte, in camera Batson proceedings violated the equal

protection rights of the seven minority prospective jurors who were the subjects of those

proceedings,” resulting in a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. (Pet. at 23.) Respondent

argues that this claim was rejected on the merits by the California Supreme Court. (Ans. at 29.) 

A. California Supreme Court’s Opinion

In the direct appeal opinion, the state supreme court concluded:

In tandem with his Wheeler claim, defendant also maintains that the ex parte

proceedings make it impossible to determine whether race-based exclusion may

have occurred, to the detriment of prospective jurors who enjoy a right under the

equal protection clause not to be discriminated against in jury selection on the basis

of race. (Powers v. Ohio, supra, 499 U.S. 400, 409, [111 S.Ct. 1364, 1369-1370].) 

Again, on the record before us, we are confident that no such exclusion occurred. 

The prosecutor articulated, at a minimum, plausible criteria for his excusals, the

trial court agreed that the excusals were proper, and to the extent the written record

before us touches on the prosecutor’s stated reasons, it confirms that they were not

pretextual. 

Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 269.

B. Discussion

As set forth above, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), first

held that the United States Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from peremptorily challenging

potential jurors solely on the basis of race. Evaluating whether a peremptory challenge was racebased under Batson is a three-step process, requiring that (1) the defendant must demonstrate a

prima facie case that the prosecutor challenged the contested jurors due to their race, (2) if the

defense made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution to

articulate racially-neutral explanations for those challenges, then (3) the trial court must determine

if the defendant met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id., 476 U.S. at 96-98. 

The Supreme Court has also held that a prosecutor’s race-based exclusion of jurors can

constitute a violation of the Equal Protection rights of those jurors, which a petitioner does have

standing to challenge even when the prospective jurors in question do not share racial identity with

him or her. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). State law allows for significant trial court

discretion and acknowledges that a peremptory challenge may be based on a broad range of

evidence intimating juror partiality. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 275 (1978).

Petitioner argues that while the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on direct

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appeal, the state court’s review of the record was “illusory” because it “failed to include

participation, and a record made, by the defense.” (Pet. MSA at 16.) Petitioner concludes that, as

the state supreme court failed to properly apply clearly established federal law, habeas relief

should be granted on this claim. (Id.) 

Respondent maintains that the California Supreme Court “correctly identified and applied

Batson,” and the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

controlling precedent. (Resp. MTD at 21-22.) Respondent further argues that the trial prosecutor

offered specific reasons for challenging each prospective juror in question and the California

Supreme Court found those reasons to be race-neutral. (Id. at 22.) 

State supreme court factual findings are presumed to be correct absent clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary. Rice v. Collins, ___U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974 (2006); Mitleider v.

Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1046-48 (9th Cir. 2004). At trial, defense counsel argued that of the seven

minority prospective jurors who were the subject of the prosecution’s peremptory challenges, that

it is “clear that these jurors are not significantly different from the white jurors that the prosecution

has chosen to leave on the jury both in terms of their attitudes on the death penalty, their attitudes

on the criminal justice system, and their attitudes on the presumption of innocence and burden of

proof, that I’m more concerned with generally.” [51 RT 6347.] The trial court then stated that this

showing “will make a prima facie case of discrimination based on group, and will request a further

clarification from the people.” [Id.] Then, in an ex parte hearing, the prosecution disclosed to the

trial court their reasons for a number of their peremptory challenges. 

The prosecution stated that their challenge of prospective juror Galileo S. was because they

found him to be a “nonconformist person who has had numerous run-in’s with the law,” who had

“three or four more arrests than those that he has told us about,” with arrests for drunk driving and

drugs among the list. [50 RT 6184-85.] The trial court noted for the record that the information

about the additional arrests was “shared with defense counsel prior to group questioning.” and also

agreed with the prosecution that Galileo S. had “a healthy paranoia, if you will, concerning the

justice system.” [Id. at 6185.]

The prosecution opined that their primary concern with Olanders D. was “his ability to vote

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for death during the penalty phase.” [Id.] The prosecution added that “[o]n his questionnaire he

indicated that he does not believe in the death penalty. He did indicate that his view had changed

over the years.” [Id.] The prosecution was also concerned by his “lack of ability to express himself

well” and said that his answers “did not make a lot of sense.” [Id.] The court concluded that

counsel’s observations were “accurate and borne out by the record.” [Id. at 6186.]

When the next set of prospective jurors were challenged or accepted, the defense objected,

stating that two individuals challenged by the prosecution consisted of “one hundred percent of the

jurors of Hispanic extraction that have gotten in the jury box.” [50 RT 6217.] The trial court

replied: “Again, I don’t think the record at this point is sufficient for a prima facie showing. 

However, again I’m going to request an independent statement for the record with reference to the

people’s challenge of both Hispanic jurors.” [Id. at 6218.]

The prosecution stated, again during an ex parte hearing, that the challenge of Luis M. was

partly due to the fact that “he has had second, or perhaps third thoughts with regards to the death

penalty.” [51 RT 6305.] In addition, the prosecution was uncomfortable with the jury including “a

person who went out and investigated the case” and “left the military at the rank of E-2, suggesting

some sort of misconduct or inability.” [Id.] 

The prosecution felt that Gerardo O. was a “standoffish type of individual” and had

concerns about the fact that he “indicated to us at the beginning that he was illiterate...and that he

therefore had the questionnaire translated to him, so that he could make responses.” [Id. at 6306.] 

The prosecution also noted that Gerardo O. said he was not sure if he could “take someone’s life

into his hands” and felt “a little shaky” about his responsibilities as a juror in this case. [Id. at

6306-07.]

The prosecution stated that they used a peremptory challenge on George S. [51 RT 6351]

for multiple reasons, including the fact that “he was one hold-out” in his prior jury service, that he

placed “undue emphasis on the Bible” and opined that “God would punish” those who did wrong

and that he “applied and was rejected back in 1969 to be a police officer,” which caused them to

speculate on the “psychological aspects” of his rejection. [Id. at 6351-52.] The prosecutor also

stated that he was “not aware that he was Hispanic” until the defense protested the peremptory

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challenge, as he thought the prospective juror was maybe of “Greek” ancestry. [Id. at 6352-53.]

The prosecutor stated that the challenge of Barbara S. was due to the fact that he “thought

there was something wrong” with her, as “her responses were extremely slow,” “her answers did

not make sense” given the questions asked, and the prosecution suspected she was “possibly under

the influence of drugs.” [Id. at 6354-55.] The prosecutor added that he believed Barbara S.

appeared “somewhat angry” upon her initial entrance into court, and displayed “a great deal of

nervousness.” [Id. at 6355.] The trial court did not agree with the prosecution’s characterization of

her demeanor, opined that many prospective jurors were nervous, and stated that Barbara S. did

not appear to be hostile. [Id. at 6356.] However, the court did concur with prosecution’s notice of

the “incomplete, if you will, answers, non sequiturs.” [Id.]

The prosecution stated that they felt reluctance regarding whether Robert M. would

actually vote for the death penalty, and were concerned with his interest in “following of the

Saigon Penn case.” [Id. at 6356-57.] The prosecution noted that Robert M. said while he believed

in the death penalty it would be “hard for him to be involved in the death penalty.” [Id. at 6357-

58.] The trial court noted Robert M.’s agreement with the idea of the death penalty, and conceded

that the prosecution could have a legitimate concern whether this prospective juror would actually

impose it in a case. [Id. at 6358.]

The prosecutor offered credible reasons for challenging the jurors in question, and the trial

court concluded that those reasons were sufficient and race-neutral. The California Supreme Court

found no evidence of a due process violation under Powers v. Ohio, based its findings on the

record before it, and properly applied controlling federal law. 

This Court cannot say the state court’s denial of this claim was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. As a result, this claim does not entitle

Petitioner to habeas relief.

3. Claim 5 -- Loss of juror questionnaires

Petitioner alleges that the loss of the majority of the juror questionnaires in his case

resulted in a violation of his rights to meaningful appellate review, to a reliable penalty

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determination, and to due process. (Pet. at 24.) Respondent argues that the California Supreme

Court considered this claim and rejected it on the merits, and further asserts that the claim is

“procedurally barred.” (Ans. at 30.) Respondent initially argued that “Petitioner has not shown

that the claim does not rest upon a new rule barred under Teague v. Lane.” (Id.) 

A. Procedural arguments

Respondent’s Teague claim was discussed and rejected above on page 8. Respondent also

asserts Petitioner’s claim 5 is “procedurally barred,” because the state supreme court ruled it

would not have engaged in comparative juror analysis between seated and non-seated jurors, and

thus, Petitioner could not have suffered prejudice from the loss of the questionnaires. (Ans. at 29-

30.) 

This Court may decline to render an opinion on the adequacy of procedural default rules

and decide this claim on the merits. Established precedent in the Ninth Circuit dictates that a

court’s decision with respect to evaluating procedural default is to be informed by furthering “the

interests of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127

(9th Cir. 1998). Thus, if deciding the merits of a claim proves to be less complicated and less

time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court may exercise discretion

to take this course of action in its management of the case. Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864

(9th Cir. 1982), quoted by Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1127. This is the case here.

B. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court denied this claim on direct appeal, concluding:

Defendant claims that his constitutional right to a meaningful review of his

conviction and sentence has been infringed by the loss of the bulk of prospective

juror questionnaires. The questionnaires of the seated jurors and alternates were

preserved, but almost all others have been lost.

As a general matter, we disagree. We addressed, and rejected, a similar

claim in People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, where we said: “[D]efendant

maintains that his Wheeler[-]Batson claim must be resolved in his favor on the

ground that the record on appeal is not adequate to permit meaningful review. The

deficiency of which he complains is the absence of certain questionnaires, which

were completed by prospective jurors, then lodged with the superior court,

subsequently lost by its clerk’s office, and finally determined by the superior court

to be beyond reconstruction. A criminal defendant is indeed entitled to a record on

appeal that is adequate to permit meaningful review. That is true under California

law. [Citation.] It is true as well under the United States Constitution–under the

Fourteenth Amendment generally, and under the Eighth Amendment specifically

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when a sentence of death is involved. [Citation.] The record on appeal is

inadequate, however, only if the complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the

defendant’s ability to prosecute his appeal.” (Id. at p.196, fn.8.)

With regard to the prospective jurors whose questionnaires were lost but

who are not identified by the defendant as the subject of the Wheeler challenges:

this court will not in any event compare the views of those jurors excused by

peremptory challenges with those who were not excused on that basis. (People v.

Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1997 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254]; cf. id. at

pp. 1249 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [urging a contrary approach].) Under this court’s

precedent, therefore, the loss of the questionnaires could not have prejudiced him. 

With regard to the prospective jurors whose questionnaires were lost and who were

the subject of Wheeler challenges, we have already explained that the record is

sufficiently complete for us to be able to conclude that they were not challenged

and excused on the basis of forbidden group bias. Thus, even if there was federal

error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, [87 S.Ct. 824, 828]), and under state law any error also was

harmless (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836). 

Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 269-70.

Petitioner points out that Chief Justice George dissented from the California Supreme

Court’s conclusions in Ayala, finding the harmless error analysis used by the majority to examine

Petitioner’s claims to be “suspect.” Id. at 295. Chief Justice George further opined that the court’s

exclusion of defense counsel and the defendant from the hearings where the prosecutor disclosed

his reasons for the peremptory challenges, coupled with the loss of the juror questionnaires,

warranted relief. In the dissent, he wrote: 

Further, a remand also would be impracticable and inadequate in this case

because the extensive written juror questionnaires of the vast majority of panelists

who participated in the general voir dire have been lost and apparently destroyed. 

Thus, as a result of the trial court’s error, we are left with a record that is inadequate

for our review and that cannot be reconstructed at this time. Accordingly, a

reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial is the only appropriate

remedy.

Id. at 297.

C. Discussion

Due process requires that the record of proceedings must be sufficient to permit adequate

and effective appellate review. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). A criminal defendant

has the right to a record on appeal which includes a complete transcript of the proceedings at trial. 

Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-82 (1964). Where part of the record is missing, a

petitioner must demonstrate prejudice to his or her appeal before relief may be granted. United

States v. Carrillo, 902 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1990). Petitioner maintains that the loss of the

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juror questionnaires violated his right to a meaningful appellate review consisting of “comparing

the responses on the questionnaires of the challenged minority prospective jurors with the

responses to those same questions by non minority prospective jurors who were not the subject of

peremptory challenges by the prosecution.” (Pet. MSA at 17.)

Petitioner relies on the Ninth Circuit holdings in United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175

(9th Cir. 1987), and the Ninth Circuit’s review of that case on appeal of the remand, United States

v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1990), to meld the arguments from Claims 1 and 2 with the

argument in Claim 5. In Alcantar, a federal district judge held an ex parte hearing to hear the

prosecution’s reasons for their peremptory challenges, and the Ninth Circuit remanded the matter

for the district court to conduct a new hearing, concluding that defense counsel should have been

afforded an opportunity to argue that the reasons given by the prosecution for challenging the

minority jurors were merely pre-textual. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1180. On remand, the district court

found no improper use of peremptory challenges and reaffirmed the conviction. Alcantar, 897

F.2d at 438. The Ninth Circuit again reversed, ordering a new trial, finding the “passage of time

has rendered such a hearing meaningless,” and had not served the purposes of allowing the defense

an opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s reasons and to “preserve a full record on appeal.” 

Alcantar, 832 F.2d at 1180; Alcantar, 897 F.2d at 438. Petitioner asserts that the same interests

were thwarted in this case, as the loss of the jury questionnaires deprived Petitioner of a full record

on appeal which would have allowed him to conduct a comparative juror analysis. 

California courts do not entertain comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. 

People v. Montiel, 5 Cal.4th 877, 909 (1993) (“an appellate court will not reassess good faith by

conducting its own comparative juror analysis.”) Federal courts do consider comparative juror

analysis a useful tool for analyzing peremptory strikes under federal law, and the Ninth Circuit

strongly suggested that the California courts “should” use this tool on appeal. Boyd, 455 F.3d at

906; see also Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit

believes that “Supreme Court precedent requires a comparative juror analysis even when the trial

court has concluded that the defendant failed to make a prima facie case.” Boyd, 455 F.3d at 907. 

In this case, the trial court did find that defendant had made a prima facie case, heard the reasons

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of the prosecutor for challenging the prospective jurors, and concluded that the challenges were

not made on an impermissible basis. In addition, in Boyd, the Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on

the fact that the reviewing courts denied the petitioner access to a full voir dire transcript. Id. at

900. The circumstances between Boyd and the instant case are distinguishable, as this Petitioner

has access to the full voir dire transcript and questionnaires from all seated jurors and alternates

from his trial.

In the recently decided Kesser v. Cambra, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2589425 (9th Cir.

Sept. 11, 2006) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that a state prosecutor improperly struck a

prospective juror on the basis of race, reversing an earlier decision denying habeas relief. The

Court’s majority concluded that while the prosecutor’s motive for the peremptory challenge was

plausible when considered out of context, once it was considered in comparison with “the

background and responses of the jurors who were seated, reveal[ed] the prosecutor’s purposeful

and plainly racial motives in excusing” the contested prospective jurors. Kesser, at *9. The Ninth

Circuit concluded that the state court, in refusing to consider comparative evidence in the record

before them, made an unreasonable determination of facts in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2),

which warranted reversal of the judgment and a grant of the writ. Id. at *6. 

Respondent accurately points out that Claim 5 is not a direct Batson claim, but “involves

the sufficiency of the record” after a number of juror questionnaires were lost or destroyed. (Resp.

SB at 4.) The questionnaires of the seated jurors and alternate jurors were preserved, and the state

court’s ruling was limited to the impact of the lost questionnaires of challenged and otherwise nonselected jurors. As such, the nature of Petitioner’s comparative analysis claim is strikingly

different than the one advocated by the Ninth Circuit in Kesser. Petitioner alleges prejudice from

the loss of the questionnaires of non-serving jurors in his case, as he is unable to make

comparisons between the written answers provided in those materials with the prosecutor’s stated

reasons for striking certain minority jurors from the panel. 

However, comparative analysis is intended to draw parallels between challenged jurors and

those allowed to serve. Petitioner has access to those materials in the record, in the form of the

voir dire transcript, the prosecution’s stated reasons for challenging certain jurors, and the

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questionnaires of the empaneled jurors and alternates. Comparing the questionnaire answers of

non-challenged and non-seated jurors with the jurors who were the subject of the prosecution’s

peremptory challenges would serve little purpose. The California Supreme Court held that they

“will not in any event compare the views of those jurors excused by peremptory challenges with

those who were not excused on that basis” and concluded that the loss of the contested

questionnaires did not result in prejudice to Petitioner. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 270. 

Here, the record on appeal provides a meaningful and effective presentation of Petitioner’s

claims, and appears sufficient to resolve the contentions presented in his federal habeas petition. 

The reporter’s transcript of jury selection proceedings, available to Petitioner, is 6461 pages in 51

volumes and thoroughly recounts the voir dire. Objections to peremptory challenges, challenges

for cause and motions regarding prospective jurors are all contained in the available record. The

trial judge and counsel specifically questioned potential jurors regarding their responses in the

questionnaires, thoroughly exploring their ability to serve as a juror in Petitioner’s trial. In

addition, the questionnaires of the seated jurors and alternates were preserved for review on

appeal. The record in this case does allow a reviewing court to examine whether the prosecution

exercised its peremptory challenges in an appropriate manner. 

It is true that, due to the loss of certain questionnaires, comparisons between challenged

juror’s answers and non-challenged and non-seated juror’s responses cannot be made. However,

the California Supreme Court concluded that the record on appeal was sufficiently complete to

conclude that the challenged jurors were not excused due to any constitutionally forbidden

reasons. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 269-70. The state supreme court found that if there was an error in

the jury selection proceedings, it was harmless. Id. 

It is not mandatory for a state court to engage in comparative analysis of challenged jurors

to non-challenged and non-seated jurors, and the failure to do so is not an unreasonable application

of, or contrary to, clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result,

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the loss of those jury questionnaires violated his rights to

meaningful appellate review, to a reliable penalty determination, or to due process, and is not

entitled to habeas relief.

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4. Claim 9 -- Prospective Juror Linda J.

Petitioner alleges that “the trial court excluded prospective juror Linda J. [sic] for cause on

the ground that her views on the death penalty would substantially impair her ability to perform

her duties as a juror,” which violated Petitioner’s rights to a fair and impartial jury and to due

process. (Pet. at 33.) Respondent argues that the California Supreme Court considered this claim

on direct appeal and rejected it on the merits. (Ans. at 41.) 

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

The state supreme court did consider this claim on direct appeal, concluding:

Defendant claims that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution were violated when the trial court granted the prosecution’s

motion to excuse a prospective juror for substantially impaired ability to follow the

law regarding capital punishment. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424

[105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841].) 

“As we [have] explained..., ‘[w]hen a prospective juror’s views about the

death penalty “would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or

her] duties as a juror’” [citation], the juror is not impartial and may be challenged

“for cause”’” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 853 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978

P.2d 15].) This test applies equally to defense and prosecution challenges. (Ibid.) 

As stated, “‘if the juror’s statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court’s

determination of the juror’s state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency,

we will uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence.

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] A juror’s bias need not ‘be proven with unmistakable

clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite

impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially

apply the law in the case before the juror.’” (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th

1016, 1035.)

Linda J’s answers were inconsistent. Initially she testified that she would

“find it difficult” to return a verdict of death. She stated that she went beyond being

unsure about imposing the death penalty; rather, “I don’t think I’m capable of that.” 

But she also testified that she favored the death penalty in the abstract, and she

hypothesized that the trial might enable her to summon the will to impose it.

After initially denying the prosecution’s challenge for cause on the grounds

that Linda J. was “impaired, but not substantially,” the trial court later reversed

itself, finding that her ability to serve as a juror was substantially impaired. 

Because Linda J.’s answers were inconsistent, but included testimony that

she did not think herself capable of imposing the death penalty, we are bound by the

trial court’s determination that her candid self-assessment showed a substantially

impaired ability to carry out her duty as a juror. There was no violation of any

constitutional right. 

Ayala, 24 Cal.4th at 274-75.

B. Discussion

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The United States Supreme Court has held that a sentence of death cannot be upheld if the

jury that imposed or recommended it excluded prospective venirepersons who expressed opinions

against the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1968). In 1980, the

Supreme Court further held that “a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about

capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of

his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.

38, 45 (1980). The Court later affirmed that the Adams standard was the proper standard by which

to evaluate allegations of improper exclusion of prospective jurors. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.

412, 423 (1985). 

Appellate review of a trial court’s decision regarding issues arising from juror voir dire is

obligatorily deferential, as a “reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire,

is not as well-positioned as the trial court to make credibility determinations.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). In the instant case, the trial court initially denied the state’s

challenge for cause and later reversed its own decision, ultimately striking Linda J. for cause based

on her views regarding capital punishment. This reversal, on its own, does not allow this court to

conclude that the trial court erred. Rather, Petitioner must demonstrate that the state supreme court

made an unreasonable determination of facts or applied the law in an unreasonable manner in

rejecting this claim on appeal. 

Upon initial questioning by the trial court, Linda J. said that she would “find it difficult” to

vote for the death penalty. [43 RT 4969.] During questioning by defense counsel, she maintained

that she would have no difficulty deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant [Id. at 4970], but

“to say whether a person is going to die, I don’t think I’m capable of that.” [Id. at 4975.] She

conceded that it was “possible” that she could vote for the death penalty if she was placed on the

jury, if she was “totally convinced” that it was the right decision. [Id. at 4976, 4979.] 

When the prosecutor began inquiring into her views on capital punishment, she stated that

“When I just think about it, without listening to-- having to go through the steps getting to it, I

would have to say I couldn’t do it.” [Id. at 4991.] She expanded on this, explaining that if she took

it “step by step, probably I could listen and come up with a choice,” but that when she considered

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the death penalty issue as a whole, she did not think she could impose it. [Id. at 4991-92.] Linda J.

repeated her discomfort with the death penalty throughout her juror interview, and only expressed

the hope that she could “possibly” develop an ability to impose the death penalty after sitting

through the trial as a juror. [Id. at 4994-95.] 

The trial court initially rejected the prosecutor’s challenge for cause, stating that “I think

Linda J. [sic] is impaired, but not substantially.” [Id. at 4998.] The court opined that, regarding a

decision on the death penalty, that “she [Linda J.] probably can do it.” [Id. at 4999.] The trial

court later reconsidered the state’s motion in support of a challenge for cause of Linda J. on the

basis of briefs submitted by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. [48 RT 5748.] Both parties

declined further oral argument on the subject, and the trial court ultimately decided that Linda J.

was in fact “substantially impaired” on the penalty issue and granted the challenge for cause. [Id.

at 5784-85.]

The Supreme Court has stated that in conducting juror interviews,

[M]any veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where

their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; these veniremen may not know how

they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to

articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the

printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the

definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and

impartially apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully infra, this is

why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.

Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26, footnote omitted.

The Supreme Court has opined that a trial judge’s “power of observation often proves the

most accurate means of ascertaining the truth.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 434. Contrary to Petitioner’s

assertions, the Court finds substantial support for the conclusions reached by both the trial court

and the state supreme court in determining that Linda J. was “substantially impaired” in her ability

to perform as juror due to her views on the death penalty. Witt, 469 U.S. at 433. 

The California Supreme Court’s determination that the trial judge did not commit error in 

excusing Linda J. was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

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EVIDENTIARY HEARING STANDARD

In his Reply, Petitioner argues that if the Court does not grant his Motion for Summary

Adjudication, then in the alternative an evidentiary hearing should be granted. (Pet. Reply at 8.)

Respondent notes that, in Petitioner’s Group Two Motion for Summary Adjudication, Petitioner

himself asserted that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and he was thus entitled to

summary adjudication on the Group Two claims. (Id., citing Pet. MSA at 1.) Respondent

maintains that the instant case is therefore controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), not 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e). At oral arguments on the Group Two claims, Petitioner explained to the Court that he

exercised an abundance of caution in requesting an evidentiary hearing but did not himself believe

that any further facts could be discovered on the Group Two claims.

Generally, the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing requires Petitioner to make a

showing he is entitled to habeas relief. 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter

of right on a claim where the facts are disputed if two conditions are

met: (1) where the petitioner’s allegations would, if proved, entitled

him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full

and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411

(9th Cir. 1998). The first prong is typically referred to as the requirement of asserting a “colorable

claim.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1994). To properly assert a

“colorable claim,” a petitioner is “required to allege specific facts which, if true, would entitle him

to relief.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998).

A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the second prong is met through a

showing that:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the

state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the

fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full

and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or

(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair hearing.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1 (1992). When a petitioner is able to establish a colorable claim for relief, did not fail to

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develop the facts surrounding his claim, and was never given a state hearing on the claim, the

district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670

(9th Cir. 2005), quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999).

In addition to being entitled an evidentiary hearing as of right when the petitioner presents

colorable allegations and the state court has not reliably found the relevant facts through no fault

of the petitioner, a federal court retains discretionary authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. at 318; Seidle v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1998).

The AEDPA further limits a district court’s decision to conduct evidentiary hearings in

§ 2254 proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2); see Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165,

1171 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(e) provides as follows:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the

applicant shows that:

(A) the claim relies on:

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by th Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e) (West. Supp. 2005).

As stated above, the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing requires Petitioner to

make a showing he is entitled to relief if the facts alleged can be proven. Petitioner has failed to

do so. Petitioner has not shown that any of these claims rely on either a new rule of constitutional

law or a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through due diligence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 23, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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