Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05668/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05668-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL JUAREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05668-LJO-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND FOR ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(B)

(Doc. 88)

Plaintiff Manuel Juarez (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 17, 2007, plaintiff

filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting defendant Rangel’s motion to dismiss

the Eighth Amendment claim against him for failure to exhaust the available administrative

remedies. Fed. R. C iv. P. 12(b). (Docs. 83, 85, 88.) Defendants Rangel, Verdin, Gentry, Haws,

Fisher, Schmidt, and Travers did not file a response. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. A district court may relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds of

“mistake . . .” or “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(1),(6). “The Rule 60(b)(6) ‘catch-all’ provision . . . applies only when the reason for

granting relief is not covered by any of the other reasons set forth in Rule 60.” Delay v. Gordon, 475

F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007). Rule 60(b)(6) is to be “‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to

prevent manifest injustice’ and ‘is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented

///

Case 1:04-cv-05668-LJO -GSA Document 89 Filed 10/11/07 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

a party from taking timely action . . . .’” Id. (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,

984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the Court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). When filing a

motion for reconsideration, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different

facts or circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior

motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

In his motion, plaintiff contends that under applicable law, dismissal of plaintiff’s claim

against defendant Rangel without prejudice is improper and plaintiff must be allowed to proceed

with his claim. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks leave to appeal the dismissal of the claim.

Plaintiff’s contention that dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim without prejudice is

improper and is without merit. Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 923-26 (2007) (unexhausted claims

may not be considered but action may proceed on exhausted claims); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164,

1175 (9th Cir. 2005)(unexhausted claims should be dismissed by court). Plaintiff was provided with

the opportunity to oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss and to object to the findings and

recommendations. Plaintiff availed himself of both opportunities, and his arguments were rejected.

A motion for reconsideration is not intended to provide plaintiff with a third bite at the apple.

Plaintiff has set forth no grounds entitling him to relief from the Court’s order dismissing his Eighth

Amendment claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and his motion is for reconsideration is denied.

Plaintiff’s request for leave to appeal the dismissal at this juncture is construed to be brought

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows the Court to enter judgment on

fewer than all of the claims in a multi-claim lawsuit. There exists “a long-settled and prudential

policy against the scattershot disposition of litigation,” and “entry of judgment under [Rule 54(b)]

should not be indulged as a matter of routine or as a magnanimous accommodation to lawyers or

Case 1:04-cv-05668-LJO -GSA Document 89 Filed 10/11/07 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

litigants.” Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 42 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of

multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced

by the pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or

parties.” Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). There is nothing

unusual about the dismissal of an unexhausted claim from a multi-claim action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). Rather, the procedure is routine in cases such as this. Plaintiff has set forth no grounds

warranting entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) and the Court can discern none. Therefore, the

motion is denied. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration or for entry of judgment

pursuant to Rule 54(b), filed September 17, 2007, are HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05668-LJO -GSA Document 89 Filed 10/11/07 Page 3 of 3