Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02323/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02323-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KELLIE ANNE JACOB, in her 

individual and representative 

capacity as Trustee—The 

Kellie Anne Revocable Trust; 

and VALLEY BREWING COMPANY, 

INC., a California 

Corporation,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02323-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Scott Johnson’s 

(“Plaintiff’s”) Motion for Leave to File a First Amended 

Complaint (FAC) (Doc. #36). Plaintiff brought this action based 

on barriers to access he encountered at the Valley Brewing 

Company, Inc. establishment (“Valley Brew”). Defendants Kellie 

Anne Jacob and Valley Brewing Company, Inc. (“Defendants”) oppose 

the motion (Doc. #38), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. 

Case 2:14-cv-02323-JAM-EFB Document 41 Filed 05/09/16 Page 1 of 8
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#40).1 For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.2

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed October 3, 2014, 

alleges violations of the (1) Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (2) Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, (3) California Disabled Persons 

Act, id. §§ 54–54.8, and (4) a cause of action for negligence 

(Doc. #1). Defendants filed their answer on June 26, 2015 (Doc. 

#21). On December 8, 2015, both parties’ experts conducted a 

site inspection of Valley Brew. Mot. 2:17–20; Opp’n 2:1. On 

March 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the current motion. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

In his motion, Plaintiff relies on the standard set out in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15(a)(2), which 

provides: “[A] party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court 

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(2). However, the Court has already issued a PTSO in 

this matter specifying amendments to the pleadings require a 

 

1 The Court has considered only the first five pages of the latefiled reply brief, as Plaintiff was advised in the Status (PreTrial Scheduling) Order (PTSO) that “the Court will not consider 

any arguments made past the page limit” of five pages for reply 

memoranda. PTSO (Doc. #28) at 3:2–3. 2 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 3, 2016.

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showing of good cause. 

Although Rule “15(a) liberally allows for amendments to 

pleadings,” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th 

Cir. 2000), this policy does not apply after a district court has 

issued “a pretrial scheduling order that established a timetable 

for amending the pleadings, and the deadline ha[s] expired.” Id.

Rather, parties seeking to amend their pleadings “must show good 

cause for not having amended their complaints before the time 

specified in the scheduling order expired.” Id. “This standard 

‘primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 

amendment.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 

975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

If good cause exists, parties next must satisfy Rule 15(a). 

Cf. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. As stated, Rule 15(a)(2) makes 

clear that courts should “freely give leave when justice so 

requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and the Ninth Circuit has 

noted that the policy is one “to be applied with extreme 

liberality,” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 

1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). In exercising their discretion to 

permit or deny a party to amend its pleading, Ninth Circuit 

courts consider five factors: (1) whether the amendment was filed 

with undue delay; (2) whether the movant has requested the 

amendment in bad faith or as a dilatory tactic; (3) whether the 

movant was allowed to make previous amendments which failed to 

correct deficiencies of the complaint; (4) whether the amendment 

will unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (5) whether the 

amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962). Whether amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing 

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party is the most important factor in a court’s analysis under 

Rule 15(a). Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint as follows: remove 

his California Disabled Persons Act and negligence causes of 

action; include violations discovered after the site inspection; 

and clarify whether violations occurred before or after a

renovation to the Valley Brew property. Defendants argue in 

their opposition that Plaintiff does not have standing to sue 

under the ADA, and therefore, amendment would be futile.

1. Rule 16

Although the parties do not address Rule 16, the Court must 

nonetheless first determine whether Plaintiff meets Rule 16’s 

good cause requirement. The initial Complaint advised Defendants 

in pertinent part: “Plaintiff will amend the complaint, to 

provide proper notice regarding the scope of this lawsuit, once 

he conducts a site inspection.” Compl. ¶ 18. The site

inspection occurred on December 8, 2015, after Plaintiff 

requested a site inspection as early as January 27, 2015. Mot. 

1:23–25, 2:17–20; Opp’n 2:1. Thereafter, Defendants’ expert 

issued his report on January 29, 2016, Decl. of Kim Blackseth 

¶ 2, and Plaintiff’s expert issued his report on February 24, 

2016, Decl. of Paul Bishop ¶ 5. Plaintiff filed this motion on 

March 15, 2016, which is less than a month after Plaintiff’s 

expert issued his report, and the amendment incorporates

information from the reports. Overall, Plaintiff has established 

he was diligent in seeking the amendment; accordingly, Plaintiff 

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meets Rule 16’s good cause requirement. 

2. Rule 15

Once the movant establishes good cause under Rule 16, the 

Court will then consider the permissibility of amendment under 

Rule 15. Cf. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. On balance, the Rule 15 

factors favor Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not previously been 

granted leave to amend, and for the reasons discussed above, the 

undue delay factor weighs in favor of granting amendment. 

Furthermore, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that 

Plaintiff acted in bad faith in filing this motion. Nor does it 

appear to the Court that amendment will unduly prejudice 

Defendants. 

Defendants argue, however, that granting leave to amend 

would be futile. Proposed amendment to pleading is “futile,” and 

properly denied by a court, “only if no set of facts can be 

proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute 

a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., 

Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997). Specifically, 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege “how each 

of the alleged barriers (new or old) affect[s] his specific 

disability,” and he therefore lacks standing to bring an ADA 

cause of action. Opp’n 2:6–8 (emphasis removed).

To allege standing in this action, Plaintiff must allege 

that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, that the injury is 

traceable to Defendants’ actions, and that the injury can be 

redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “At the pleading stage, general 

factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 

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conduct may suffice . . . .” Id. at 561. As relevant here, a

disabled person “has suffered an injury-in-fact by encountering a 

barrier that deprives him of full and equal enjoyment of the 

facility due to his particular disability.” Chapman v. Pier 1 

Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2011). The 

Ninth Circuit has explained:

Once a disabled individual has encountered or become 

aware of alleged ADA violations that deter his 

patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to 

a place of public accommodation, he has already 

suffered an injury in fact traceable to the 

defendant’s conduct and capable of being redressed by 

the courts, and so he possesses standing under Article 

III to bring his claim for injunctive relief forward.

Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In his proposed FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he encountered 

at least eight barriers to access at Valley Brew before the 

renovation, and he alleges that some barriers remain postrenovation. See Proposed FAC ¶¶ 9–16, 18–21. Plaintiff further 

alleges as follows: 

The plaintiff frequents the Stockton area on a 

constant and ongoing basis. He has shopped, stayed, 

eaten and otherwise visited Stockton on scores and 

scores of occasions over the last many years and will 

continue to do so in the future. He ate at the Valley 

Brewing Company in April of 2014 and encountered the 

barriers. He ate there again in July of 2014 and 

encountered the barriers. He has been deterred on 

other occasions since July of 2014 from attempting 

patronage because of his knowledge of the barriers.

In encountering and dealing with the lack of 

accessible facilities, the plaintiff experienced 

difficulty and discomfort.

Proposed FAC ¶¶ 22–23. For some of the barriers, Plaintiff also 

provides a brief description of how the barrier affected him 

because of his disability. For example, he alleges that the 

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improperly configured toilet stall was “too small for wheelchair 

users because the toilet stall door swung into the stall itself 

and a wheelchair does not have sufficient maneuvering space to 

close the door while in the stall.” Proposed FAC ¶ 11. In light 

of these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed 

amendments are not futile. Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1393 (futility 

is found where “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment 

to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient 

claim or defense.”); see, e.g., Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 

F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiff suffered an 

injury in fact, where undisputed facts demonstrated plaintiff 

“had visited the [store] in question at least ten times between 

October 2007 and August 2008, and that on one of these visits, he 

discovered that it was difficult to use the accessible stall in 

the men’s restroom”). 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a FAC. The Proposed FAC 

(Doc. #36-2) shall be deemed filed as of the date of this Order. 

Defendants’ responsive pleading shall be filed within twenty days 

of the date of this Order. 

As a final matter, Plaintiff’s reply is two pages longer 

than the page limit allowed by the PTSO. See PTSO 2:22–24. In 

accordance with the PTSO, Plaintiff’s counsel, Center for 

Disability Access, is sanctioned in the amount of $100. Id. at 

3:1–3 (“A violation of this Order will result in monetary 

sanctions being imposed against counsel in the amount of $50.00 

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per page . . . .”) Plaintiff’s counsel is to pay this amount 

within five days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2016

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