Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00174/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00174-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Jeffrey A. Kilbride, 

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV11-0174-PHX-DGC

 CR05-0870 PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 Jeffrey A. Kilbride moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 5. On April 19, 2012, Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson 

issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) that recommended the motion be denied. 

Doc. 17. Petition has filed an objection to the R&R. Doc. 18. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will accept the R&R and deny Mr. Kilbride’s motion. 

I. Background. 

On August 25, 2005, Movant and two co-defendants were indicted in the United 

States District Court, District of Arizona, on numerous counts pertaining to the electronic 

transmission of obscene images. 05-CR-00870-DGC, Doc. 1. Following a jury trial, 

Movant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with 

electronic mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), two counts of committing fraud 

in connection with electronic mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1037(a)(3) and (a)(4) 

(Counts 2 and 3), two counts of importation or transportation of obscene material in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (Counts 4 and 5), two counts of transportation of obscene 

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material for sale or distribution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (Counts 6 and 7), and 

one count of conspiring to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 8). 

CR Doc. 296. 

 On August 24, 2007, the Court denied Movant’s motion for judgment of acquittal 

or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Doc. 334. On September 24, 2007, the Court 

sentenced Movant to 78 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised 

release. CR Doc. 359. This sentence included an enhancement for obstruction of justice 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. CR Doc. 358, at 4. Movant filed an appeal in the Ninth 

Circuit raising several grounds for relief: (1) the Court erred in instructing the jury on the 

definition of “obscene” by too narrowly defining the phrase “contemporary community 

standards,” (2) his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering should be 

vacated because of the lack of a predicate-offense felony conviction, and (3) the Court 

erred in applying the U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

CR Doc. 382; see Doc. 17. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Movant’s conviction and sentence 

and remanded the case to this Court to correct a clerical error in the written judgment. 

CR Docs. 532, 532-1. The Court issued an amended judgment on March 19, 2010. 

CR Doc. 539. 

 On January 26, 2011, Movant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 1. He then filed a motion for leave to 

file a supporting memorandum. Doc. 3. On February 8, 2011, the Court denied the 

motion for leave to file a supporting memorandum, dismissed the § 2255 motion, and 

granted leave to file an amended § 2255 motion. Doc. 4. Movant filed his amended 

§ 2255 motion on March 4, 2011, raising three grounds for relief based on ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. Doc. 5. The government filed a response (Doc. 13) and 

Movant filed a reply (Doc. 14). Judge Anderson issued an R&R recommending that the 

motion be denied and that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Movant has not made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right. Doc. 17, at 19. Movant has filed an objection on 

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Grounds One, Two, and Three, argues that Judge Anderson failed to consider the whole 

record, and raises three factual objections. Doc. 18. The Court will consider Movant’s 

factual objections before turning to those based on law. 

II. Factual Objections. 

 A. Legal Standard. 

A district court must grant an evidentiary hearing on a movant’s § 2255 motion if 

there is a factual dispute and the petitioner’s version, if true, would warrant relief. United 

States v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2000). Evidentiary hearings 

are particularly appropriate when “claims raise facts which occurred out of the courtroom 

and off the record.” United States v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. Discussion.

 Movant objects that the facts he contested in his reply brief (Doc. 14) nonetheless 

appear in Judge Anderson’s R&R. Doc. 18, at 20. Movant takes issue with (1) the 

timeline surrounding the disclosure of Mr. Law’s discovery, (2) the allegation that 

Movant’s Mauritius counsel discouraged Mr. Law from traveling to the United States to 

testify, and (3) the government’s claim that Movant has no standing to take action against 

Deutsche Bank and Inter-Ocean Management in Mauritius. Id. at 20-21. 

 Judge Anderson’s R&R sets forth the following relevant dates with respect to Mr. 

Law. See Doc. 17, at 4-5. On May 9, 2007, the government advised Mr. Law that his 

testimony would be of significant assistance in its case against Movant. On May 11, 

2007, Mr. Law responded that he was willing to assist the government, but that Mauritius 

law limited his ability to discuss the trust he had helped Movant and codefendants 

establish. On May 12, 2007, the government responded that it understood and accepted 

that limitation, but still wanted to speak with Mr. Law. On May 25, 2007, Mr. Law 

agreed to cooperate with the government in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 

The government claims to have provided its May 12, 2007 letter to Movant and 

codefendants in discovery on May 18, 2007. Mr. Law was listed as a witness on the 

government’s witness list, filed on May 30, 2007. On June 8, 2007, three days after trial 

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started, Movant’s Mauritius counsel sought and obtained an ex parte temporary 

injunction from the Supreme Court of Mauritius that limited Mr. Law’s ability to testify. 

 The dates in Judge Anderson’s R&R match the dates alleged by Movant in his 

reply brief (Doc. 14, at 2-3) and his objections to the R&R (Doc. 18, at 18-19 n.3), with 

the exception of the May 18, 2007 date on which the government allegedly provided 

Movant with a copy of its May 12, 2007 letter to Mr. Law. Movant argues that, “[f]or 

this claim to be true, the Government would have to have disclosed Law’s planned 

appearance at trial before offering him conditional immunity on May 25, 2007 or his 

acceptance of the offer on May 29, 2007.”1

 Doc. 14, at 3. The government does not 

claim, however, that it disclosed Mr. Law’s planned appearance at trial on May 18, 2007, 

but merely that, on that date, it provided Movant with its May 12, 2007 letter to Mr. Law. 

See Doc. 13, at 7. Movant offers no other evidence to refute the implication that he was 

at least aware of the government’s communications with and interest in Mr. Law by 

May 18, 2007. 

 Movant agrees that the government filed its witness list naming Mr. Law as a 

witness on May 30, 2007. Doc. 14, at 3; Doc. 18, at 18 n.3. Movant also concedes that 

his Mauritius counsel did not file an injunction against Mr. Law until June 8, 2007, three 

days after the start of trial. Doc. 14, at 3. Movant’s argument that his trial counsel 

requested all discovery related to Mr. Law on June 2, 2007, and that the government 

provided this discovery on June 3, 2007 (Doc. 18, at 18-19 n.3), does not alter the fact 

that Movant was aware from the May 30, 2007 witness list that Mr. Law would testify at 

trial, and yet waited until after the start of trial and only days before Mr. Law was 

scheduled to take the stand to initiate the Mauritian injunction. As the Court noted in its 

order explaining Movant’s sentence, the timing of these events confirmed its conclusion 

 

1

 Movant’s reply brief lists May 25, 2007 as the date the government sent Mr. Law an offer of conditional immunity (Doc. 14, at 2), but in Movant’s objections to the R&R, he notes that “Laval Law did not accept the Government’s offer of immunity until May 25, 2007” (Doc. 18, at 18 n.3). It appears that the government indeed sent Mr. Law an offer of conditional immunity on May 25, 2007, and that Mr. Law accepted on May 29, 2007. See CR Doc. 259-1, at 43-45. 

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that Movant initiated the lawsuit in Mauritius not to protect the confidential information 

of Ganymede Marketing, Ltd. (“Ganymede”), Movant’s shell corporation in Mauritius, 

but to interfere with Mr. Law’s testimony. CR Doc. 358, at 5. 

 Movant disputes the government’s allegation that his Mauritius counsel 

discouraged Mr. Law from traveling to the United States to testify. He claims that this 

allegation was refuted by Mr. Law’s United States counsel. Doc. 14, at 5. Lawrence 

Palles, Mr. Law’s United States counsel, did clarify on the record that “[n]o threat was 

ever made. No request or statement that [Mr. Law] shouldn’t come here and testify was 

ever made.” Doc. 272, at 6. Mr. Palles stated, however, that “the substance of the 

conversation [between Movant’s Mauritius counsel and Mr. Law] and the tone of it 

[were] quite at odds with what the version [sic] that we have from the defendant’s 

Mauritius counsel.” Id. In expressing his concern about potential repercussions that his 

client might face in Mauritius as a result of testifying in Movant’s trial, Mr. Palles said: 

“My concern is not with local counsel. My concern is with what happens in Mauritius. I 

don’t have any reason to feel as confident with regard to the defendant’s lawyer in 

Mauritius. . . . Mr. Goldsobel told us that the Mauritius lawyer had said that the 

conversation he had on the phone with Mr. Law a week or two ago was very limited to 

asking for documents and asking if he had counsel. I believe if Mr. Law were asked to 

testify about that, he would tell a very different story.” Id. Thus, while the substance of 

their conversation is uncertain, the record indicates that Movant’s Mauritius counsel did 

have a conversation with Mr. Law while he was represented by counsel, and that this 

conversation entailed more than a limited request for documents. Given the timing of the 

Mauritian injunction against Mr. Law, even if the Court were to find that Movant’s 

Mauritius counsel never discouraged Mr. Law from testifying, Movant has not shown 

that his version of the events would warrant relief. The injunction itself was sufficient to 

warrant the obstruction of justice enhancement. 

 Similarly, Movant’s objection to the government’s claim that he had no standing 

to take action in Mauritius against Deutsche Bank and Inter-Ocean Management, if 

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accepted, would not warrant relief. The government does not now assert that Movant had 

no standing to assert rights regarding Ganymede; rather, the government made that 

argument at a June 12, 2007 hearing on the government’s emergency motion for a 

protective order relating to Mr. Law. See Doc. 13, at 8; CR Doc. 259, at 4. The Court’s 

post-sentencing order indicates that Movant hid his interest in Ganymede and forced the 

government to prove, through an affidavit filed by Movant in the Mauritius action, that he 

actually owned and controlled the company. CR Doc. 358, at 6. At the same time, 

Movant argued that the legal actions he initiated in Mauritius were legitimate because he 

was the true owner of Ganymede. Id. The Court was convinced by Movant’s duplicity 

relating to his interest in Ganymede that the Mauritius lawsuit was not filed for the 

legitimate purpose of protecting Ganymede, but for the illegitimate purpose of interfering 

with evidence at trial. Id. 

 In sum, none of Movant’s factual objections, even if credited, would warrant 

habeas relief. See Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d at 1159. The Court therefore declines to 

hold an evidentiary hearing, and will proceed to address Movant’s legal objections. 

III. Legal Objections. 

 A. Standard of Review. 

Section 2255 provides, in relevant part: 

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal] court . . . claiming the 

right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . or is 

otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed 

the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

 A party may file specific written objections to the R&R’s proposed findings and 

recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must 

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are 

made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

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328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 In the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “[j]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. When 

reviewing counsel’s performance, the Court engages a strong presumption that counsel 

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. To 

prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must show that “(1) his 

attorney’s performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards, and 

(2) a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results would 

have been different.” United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)). Strickland defines 

reasonable probability as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. 

B. Failure to Review the Whole Record. 

Movant objects that the R&R makes no reference to Movant’s reply brief 

(Doc. 14), other than to acknowledge its existence (Doc. 17, at 1). Doc. 18, at 20. All 

citations in the R&R to Movant’s arguments refer to his amended motion (Doc. 5) and 

accompanying memorandum (Doc. 6). Id. Movant contends that Judge Anderson failed 

to review the whole record because he did not incorporate any of the arguments made in 

Movant’s reply brief. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]he record must show that the district court 

examined all relevant parts of the state court record.” Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 

F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, the R&R shows that Judge Anderson carefully 

analyzed all of the claims set forth by Movant. The Court cannot conclude, solely based 

on lack of citations, that Judge Anderson completely disregarded Movant’s reply brief. 

 C. Ground One: Defining Obscenity According to a National Standard. 

On direct appeal, Movant argued that “obscenity disseminated via email must be 

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defined according to a national community standard” because there is “no means to 

control where geographically their messages will be received.” United States v. Kilbride, 

584 F.3d 1240, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit found that the Court should 

have instructed the jury to apply a “national community” standard based on Ashcroft v. 

ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), which “most directly addressed” Movant’s argument. Id.

at 1252. The Ninth Circuit also found, however, that the error, which was not raised at 

trial, was “far from plain, and thus not reversible.” Id. at 1251, 1255. In Ground One, 

Movant argues that because the Ninth Circuit found that the Court should have instructed 

the jury to apply a national community standard, trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request such an instruction. Doc. 5, at 5; Doc. 6, at 6. 

 1. Deficient Performance. 

 Judge Anderson found that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient given the 

unsettled nature of the law at the time of Movant’s trial concerning the relevant 

geographical community for determining whether materials disseminated via email were 

obscene. Doc. 17, at 11. On direct review, the Ninth Circuit relied on Ashcroft v. ACLU, 

in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Child Online Privacy 

Act. See Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he divergent 

reasoning of the justices in and out of the majority in Ashcroft leaves us with no explicit 

holding as to the appropriate geographic definition of contemporary community standards 

to be applied” to Movant’s case. Id. at 1253. The court nonetheless “derive[d] guidance 

from the areas of agreement in the various opinions,” and ultimately held that “a national 

community standard must be applied in regulating obscene speech on the Internet, 

including obscenity disseminated via email.” Id. at 1254. In so holding, the Ninth 

Circuit acknowledged that prior to its decision “the relevant law in this area was highly 

unsettled” and that its conclusion “was far from clear and obvious to the district court.” 

Id. at 1255. Judge Anderson was not persuaded by Movant’s argument on Ground One 

because it was based on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, which was not available during 

Movant’s trial, and thus relied heavily on hindsight. Doc. 17, at 10. 

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 Movant objects that his argument does not rely on hindsight and that trial counsel 

simply failed to adequately research existing case law in order to raise a timely objection 

to the community standards in the Court’s jury instructions. Doc. 18, at 4. Movant’s 

national community standard argument “is not an entirely novel one.” Kilbride, 584 F.3d 

at 1250. Ashcroft was published in 2002 and had been precedent for five years prior to 

Movant’s trial. Doc. 18, at 5. Although the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion may have been 

“far from clear and obvious,” Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255, appellate counsel was able to 

distill the “extremely fractured” opinion of Ashcroft v. ACLU and present an argument for 

a national community standard on appeal. Doc. 18, at 4. Movant argues that trial counsel 

was able to find the relevant cases and conduct the same analysis as appellate counsel, 

and that counsel’s failure to do so constituted deficient performance. Id. at 5. 

 The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that “every effort be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The clarity or lack of clarity in federal case law on 

determining whether materials distributed via email are obscene is important in 

determining whether trial counsel’s actions were reasonable at the time the jury 

instructions were given. The Ninth Circuit expressly noted that, prior to its decision in 

this case, “the relevant law in this area was highly unsettled[.]” Kilbride, 584 F.3d 

at 1255. Movant takes issue with the fact that Judge Anderson cited a Ninth Circuit 

unpublished disposition to support his conclusion that counsel’s performance was not 

deficient in view of the unsettled law. Doc. 18, at 6; see Doc. 17, at 11 (citing United 

States v. Marshall, 6 Fed. Appx. 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2001)). But other circuits similarly 

have declined to hold counsel liable for errors in judgment based on unsettled law. See 

United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel’s 

failure to move to dismiss an indictment under the Vienna Convention did not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel when, at the time, no court of appeals had held that the 

provision at issue formed a basis for a motion to dismiss an indictment); Smith v. 

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Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s an acknowledgement that law is 

no exact science, the rule that an attorney is not liable for an error of judgment on an 

unsettled proposition of law is universally recognized[.]”) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim has no merit when, at the time of trial, the 

question of whether conspiracy could serve as a predicate act was an unsettled question 

of law); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 908 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 17, 1981) (“[C]ounsel 

is normally not expected to foresee future new developments in the law[.]”). 

 Movant’s ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to object to 

the community standards jury instruction has no merit because it is unacceptably based 

on hindsight. Applying “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, the Court 

cannot find fault with Movant’s trial counsel. 

 2. Prejudice. 

Judge Anderson concluded that even if trial counsel had performed deficiently by 

failing to propose a national community standard jury instruction, Movant has not 

established that he was prejudiced as a result. Doc. 17, at 12. Movant objects that Judge 

Anderson’s reasoning fails to account for the constitutional error that occurred. Doc. 18, 

at 8. Movant contends that the Court’s jury instructions misstated an element of his 

offense by inaccurately defining the term “obscenity,” and that under de novo review 

“[a]ny omission or misstatement of an element of an offense in the jury instructions is 

constitutional error and, therefore, requires reversal” unless the error is found “harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1247); see 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 

 While Chapman’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies on 

direct review, a less onerous standard applies on habeas review for constitutional error. 

The test on collateral review is whether the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 

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(1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Under this 

standard, petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can 

establish that it resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 

U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that Brecht’s harmless error 

review is unnecessary for alleged Strickland violations “because ‘[t]he Strickland

prejudice analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for an additional harmless-error 

review.’” Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. 

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001)). 

 Movant admits that trial counsel’s proposed obscenity instruction included an 

expansive definition of the “present-day community” and did not attempt to limit that 

community to a precise geographical area. Doc. 6, at 9; see 05-CR-00870-DGC, 

Docs. 234, 241. He acknowledges that, at closings, trial counsel argued that the jury 

should adopt an “expansive” view of the relevant community and consider not only 

material purchased by defense investigators from several communities in Arizona, but 

also materials available on “the entire worldwide web.” Doc. 6, at 9. The Court 

instructed the jury: “Contemporary community standards are set by what is in fact 

accepted in the community as a whole; that is to say by society at large, or people in 

general . . . . The ‘community’ you should consider in deciding these questions is not 

defined by a precise geographic area. You may consider evidence of standards existing 

in places outside of this particular district.” CR Doc. 330, at 37-38. In view of these jury 

instructions, Movant has not shown a reasonable probability that, had counsel requested 

an instruction on national community standards, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

D. Ground Two: Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering. 

 In Ground Two, Movant argues that if his obscenity convictions are reversed, then 

it follows that the government failed to establish the requisite underlying unlawful 

activity to support a conviction for conspiracy to launder money. Doc. 18, at 10. 

Movant’s conviction for 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) was premised on his knowledge 

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“that the transportation, transmission, or transfer of the money was designed in whole or 

in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 

control of the proceeds from one of the specified unlawful activities, in this case the 

transportation of obscene material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 . . . or the 

transportation of obscene material for sale or distribution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1465[.]” Doc. 330, at 48 (Jury Instruction No. 46). For the reasons discussed above, 

Movant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his 

underlying convictions for transporting obscene material. 

E. Ground Three: Sentencing Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice.

 In Ground Three, Movant alleges that trial counsel had a conflict of interest which 

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Doc. 5, at 7; Doc. 6, at 15. Movant 

contends that counsel’s attempts to distance himself from the Mauritian injunction 

against Mr. Law led the Court to apply the obstruction of justice sentencing 

enhancement.2

 Id. Judge Anderson correctly applied a Strickland analysis. The Sullivan

exception to the ordinary requirements of Strickland is inapplicable because Movant does 

not allege a conflict of interest caused by joint representation of more than one defendant. 

Doc. 17, at 16. See Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1182-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that 

the Supreme Court in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), expressly limited the 

“actual conflict of interest” exception in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980), to 

cases involving joint representation, and that Strickland otherwise applies). Movant does 

not object to the application of Strickland, but objects to Judge Anderson’s findings that 

Movant has not demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice. 

 1. Deficient Performance. 

 Movant has submitted several emails purporting to show that trial counsel initiated 

the Mauritian injunction against Mr. Law. Doc. 6, at 29-37. The Court agrees with 

Judge Anderson that these emails indicate that trial counsel participated in 

 

2

 Judge Anderson has set forth the relevant facts relating to the Mauritius lawsuit. Doc. 17, at 4-6. The Court will not repeat them here. 

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communications regarding the Mauritian injunction, but not that trial counsel was 

responsible for initiating the injunction. See id.; Doc. 17, at 16. 

 Movant claims that trial counsel did not merely omit mentioning his personal 

involvement with the injunction, but that he “made the objectively unreasonable decision 

to lie to the District Court.” Doc. 18, at 13-14. According to Movant, trial counsel lied 

by actively denying his involvement and casting the perceived blame for the injunction 

onto Movant and Movant’s counsel in Mauritius, and asserting that Movant’s counsel in 

Mauritius acted alone in drafting the pleading filed with the lawsuit and injunction. Id.

at 14. The record does not support these allegations. Trial counsel did deny having a 

role in the Mauritian injunction. See Doc. 18, at 39 (Mr. Goldsobel: “The government 

also casts the proceeding in Mauritius as one limited to Mr. Law. That is not the case. 

The proceeding in Mauritius which, by the way, Your Honor, I do not have a role in, 

relates to Deutsche Bank as well as Inter Ocean Management Limited[.]”). The Court 

interprets this statement as a denial of any strategic involvement beyond communicating 

with Mauritian counsel about proceedings in the district court. Movant has provided no 

evidence that trial counsel’s statements were false. Trial counsel did not, as Movant 

suggests, cast the blame for the injunction onto Movant; rather, trial counsel repeatedly 

defended Movant before the district court. Doc. 18, at 40 (The Court: “How is that 

consistent with your assertion that you didn’t know until you got this pleading that [Mr. 

Law] was going to testify about anything beyond the e-mails?” Mr. Goldsobel: “Your 

Honor, I didn’t have any role in drafting that pleading. . . . I don’t believe Mr. Kilbride 

saw that pleading either before it was filed.”); id. at 45 (Mr. Goldsobel: “[W]e obtained a 

lawful order in Mauritius, or Mr. Kilbride through his counsel in Mauritius.”); id. at 36 

(Mr. Goldsobel: “Mr. Kilbride never saw the pleading before it was filed in court. He 

never signed it. Never notarized it. He didn’t see it. He saw it after the injunction was 

already obtained. It was a pleading drafted by the lawyer in Mauritius.”). 

 Trial counsel’s performance was reasonable at both the trial and sentencing stages. 

At trial, he argued that the Mauritian injunction was lawfully obtained and repeatedly 

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emphasized that it was not intended to impede Mr. Law’s ability to testify. CR Doc. 439, 

at 8-9, 10, 12-13, 25. Trial counsel also submitted a supplemental memorandum before 

sentencing, which reiterated that an obstruction of justice enhancement should not be 

imposed because the Mauritian injunction was lawfully obtained from a foreign 

jurisdiction and not intended to prevent Mr. Law from testifying. CR Doc. 355, at 2-4. 

Trial counsel further argued that the enhancement should not apply because the Mauritian 

injunction did not actually prevent Mr. Law from testifying, that the injunction merely 

prevented Mr. Law from disclosing confidential information that was protected under 

Mauritian law, and that he was unaware of any legal authority that a lawfully issued court 

order could form the basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement. Id. at 2, 4. Movant 

may have wanted his trial counsel to mention his personal involvement with the 

Mauritian injunction, but effective assistance need not be “infallible” assistance. United 

States v. McAdams, 759 F.2d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, it is clear that trial 

counsel acted within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 690. 

 2. Prejudice. 

 Movant argues that the Court was initially amenable to trial counsel’s argument 

that the injunction was not specifically targeted at preventing Mr. Law from testifying, 

and that it was only counsel’s continued deception that caused a loss of faith with the 

Court. Doc. 18, at 45. Moreover, Movant argues that the Court imposed an obstruction 

of justice enhancement “precisely because counsel refused to clearly and honestly declare 

his involvement in the lawsuit and injunction against Mr. Law in Mauritius.” Id. at 19. 

Movant relies on the following portion of the Court’s sentencing order: “When Defendant 

Kilbride’s United States counsel learned of the Mauritius lawsuit, he promptly took steps 

to have Defendant Kilbride eliminate the injunction against Mr. Law. These events 

confirm the Court’s conclusion that Defendant Kilbride initiated the lawsuit in Mauritius 

. . . to interfere with Laval Law’s testimony.” Id. (quoting CR Doc. 358, at 5). 

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 Movant has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the result of his sentencing 

would have been different had the Court been aware of trial counsel’s alleged 

involvement in obtaining the Mauritian injunction. In the same order referenced by 

Movant, the Court explained its reasons for concluding that the injunction was a tactical 

maneuver for the purpose of interfering with Mr. Law’s testimony. See CR Doc. 358, 

at 5. Movant took no action when the government obtained documents from Ganymede 

and provided these documents to Movant during the course of discovery. Id. During 

May 2007, the government arranged for Mr. Law to travel to the United States and testify 

against Movant and his codefendants at trial; this information was disclosed to Movant 

before trial, and yet he still took no action in the Mauritius courts. Id. It was not until 

June 8, 2007, after trial began and only days before Mr. Law was to testify, that Movant 

initiated legal action in Mauritius concerning Mr. Law’s anticipated testimony in this 

Court. Id. Even if trial counsel had revealed his communications with Movant’s counsel 

in Mauritius, the Court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the 

obstruction of justice enhancement would not have applied. The fact remains that the 

injunction was sought on Movant’s behalf through his counsel, and that Movant 

ultimately was responsible for the injunction. 

IV. Conclusion. 

Counsel’s performance “falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, and Movant has not shown that the result at trial 

would have been different had counsel challenged the community standards instruction 

for obscenity or disclosed his communications with Mauritius counsel. The Court will 

accept the R&R on Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

 The R&R also recommended denying a certificate of appealability (“COA)” and 

leave to appeal in forma pauperis because “Movant has not made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” Doc. 17, at 19. Movant has failed to establish that 

a COA and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are warranted, and the Court therefore 

adopts these recommendations. The Court also concludes that Movant has been 

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sufficiently able to set forth his arguments, and that appointment of counsel is not 

warranted. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The factual findings and conclusions in Judge Anderson’s R&R (Doc. 17) 

are accepted. 

 2. Jeffrey A. Kilbride’s petition to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 

(Doc. 5) is denied. 

 3. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied as stated above. 

 4. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 28th day of June, 2012. 

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