Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Medical Malpractice

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1 Plaintiffs filed their first such action in Nevada State Court on July

11, 2006. Mot. (doc. 10), exh. C thereto. Plaintiffs’ filed this second action,

on August 21, 2006, against substantially all of the defendants whom they named in

the original state court action. On September 1, 2006, plaintiffs filed another

action in federal district court, naming “Mark E. Luce, M.D. and Jane Doe Luce,

husband and wife; DOES I through V and ROES DOES I through V, inclusive[.]” Amended

Co., “NO. 3:06-cv-2127-PCT-SMM” (doc. 11) at 1. The latter two actions are the

subject of a pending motion to consolidate. See Mot. (doc. 24). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla M. Lacombe, individually)

and as Administrator for the )

Estate of David Nichols, ) No. CIV 06-2037-PHX-RCB

deceased; Donald A. Nichols, )

father of David Nichols; )

Nancy Nichols, mother of ) O R D E R

David Nichols, )

Plaintiffs )

vs. )

)

Bullhead City Hospital Corp., )

a Tennessee corporation doing )

business in Arizona as Western)

Arizona Regional Medical )

Center; et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Background

This medical malpractice action is one of three which

plaintiffs filed arising out of the death of David Nichols.1 The

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2 Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, all references to the

“complaint” shall be read as referring to this amended complaint.

3 Through either motion practice or voluntary dismissal, of the ten

originally named defendants, only WARMC and Mark E. Luce, M.D. and Jane Doe Luce

remain as defendants. See Docs. 21, 36 and 37. 

4 WARMC did not specify upon which subdivision of Rule 12(b) it is

relying. However, because it is arguing lack of diversity, obviously it intends

to rely upon Rule 12(b)(1) which provides for dismissal if subject matter

jurisdiction is lacking.

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amended complaint2 alleges that Mr. Nichols’ death was due to the

administration of “a broad spectrum antibiotic which is in the same

general class as penicillin.” Co. (doc. 5) at 6, ¶ 30. The

complaint further alleges that decedent Nichols had a “known

allergy to penicillin[.]” Id. at 7, ¶ 35. Plaintiffs, decedent’s

wife and parents, commenced the present action against a host of

health care providers and entities. 

One of the remaining defendants,3

 Western Arizona Regional

Medical Center (“WARMC”), is moving to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b).4 Mot. (doc. 10). WARMC contends that this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is not complete

diversity of citizenship. Alternatively WARMC requests that in its

discretion the court “dismiss this case or abate it pending the

outcome of” the Nevada state court action. Id. at 6 and 5. If the

court denies this dismissal motion altogether, WARMC is seeking

dismissal of decedent’s estate as a plaintiff, contending that it

is not a proper party under Arizona’s wrongful death statute,

A.R.S. § 12-612. 

Discussion

I. Diversity Jurisdiction

Section 1332 provides in relevant part that district courts

“shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the

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matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of

different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (emphasis added). To

establish federal jurisdiction under this statute, two requirements

must be met. First, “each defendant [must be] a citizen of a

different state from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co.

v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis in original); see

also Tosco Corp. v. Communities For Better Environment, 236 F.3d

495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (”Subject matter jurisdiction based upon

diversity of citizenship requires that no defendant have the same

citizenship as any plaintiff.”) Second, the complaint must include

allegations that the amount in controversy “exceeds” $75,000.00. 

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege “jurisdiction based on

diversity of citizenship[,]” but they do not mention 28 U.S.C. §

1332 - the diversity jurisdiction statute. See Doc. 5 (Co.) at 2,

¶ 1. The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that “‘[i]f the facts

giving the court jurisdiction are set forth in the complaint, the

provision conferring jurisdiction need not be specifically

pleaded.’” Aguirre v. Automotive Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 174 (9th

Cir. 1980) (quoting Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 954

(9th Cir. 1969)) (other citation omitted); see also Love v. U.S.,

915 F.2d 1242, 1249 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis

added) (“We have consistently held that no jurisdiction-conferring

provisions need be specifically pleaded, as long as the complaint

sets forth facts giving the court jurisdiction.”) As will be seen,

the complaint in the present case does not adequately allege the

facts conferring diversity jurisdiction upon this court. Thus,

plaintiffs’ failure to indicate the specific statutory basis for

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5 Since the filing of this motion, it appears that the “Nevada

defendants” have been dismissed.

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jurisdiction is problematic. 

More problematic though is plaintiffs’ failure to adequately

plead the facts necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction. 

This omission would be understandable if this action had been

removed from state court. “Indeed, it is not uncommon for a state

court pleading to omit the necessary facts needed to determine

diversity.” Harris v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 425 F.3d

689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005). That is so because “[o]bviously,

diversity of citizenship is a federal, not a state, concern.” See

id. The fact remains, however, that the present action was not

removed from state court. Therefore, it was incumbent upon

plaintiffs to adequately plead diversity, which they did not do. 

Omitting any references to citizenship, initially WARMC

contended that the court must dismiss this action for lack of

diversity because “it is between parties from the same state[.]”

Mot. (doc. 10) at 4 (emphasis added). Also failing to acknowledge

the relevance of citizenship here, plaintiffs nonetheless

“concede[d] that there is a lack of complete diversity as to the

Nevada defendants.” Resp. (doc. 12) at 2. However, instead of

dismissing this action entirely, plaintiffs “request that only the

Nevada defendants be dismissed” and that the case be allowed to go

forward “against the Arizona defendants.” Id. Dismissal of the

“Nevada defendants” is appropriate, plaintiffs assert, because they

are dispensable parties and in their absence “complete diversity

will be achieved [between the Plaintiffs and remaining Arizona

defendants].” Id. at 3. These references to “Nevada defendants”5 

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or “Arizona defendants” are non-responsive because, as will be

fully explained below, the critical issue is the defendants’

citizenship – a factor which plaintiffs wholly failed to consider

either in pleading or in their Response.

WARMC replies, among other things, that “[p]laintiffs’ failure

to allege the citizenship of any party is, by itself, sufficient

grounds for dismissal.” Reply (doc. 16) at 4. WARMC also points

out, which it did not initially, that complete diversity is lacking

here because plaintiffs have named fictitious Jane Doe defendants,

and fictitious defendants “Does I through V and Roes Does I through

V, inclusive[.]” Co. (doc. 5) at 1.

A. Citizenship

1. Individuals

Even though 28 U.S.C. § 1332 “speaks of citizenship, not of

residency,” plaintiffs herein did not allege the citizenship of any

of the parties. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857

(9th Cir. 2001). Instead, plaintiffs Lacombe and Nancy Nichols

allege that they are Nevada “resident[s.]” Co. (doc. 5) at 2, ¶¶ 3

and 5. Likewise, plaintiff Donald Nichols alleges that he is a

“resident of Massachusetts[.]” Id.. at 2, ¶4. Plaintiffs further

allege that the remaining named individual defendant, Mark E. Luce

is “a resident of . . . Arizona[,]” as opposed to being an Arizona

citizen. See id. at 3, ¶ 11. 

Recently this court reiterated “the simple allegations needed

to establish a natural person’s state of citizenship[]” under §

1332(a)(1):

To be a citizen of a state, a natural person must 

first be a citizen of the United States . . . . 

The natural person’s state citizenship is then 

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determined by her state of domicile, not her state 

of residence. A person’s domicile is her permanent 

home, where she resides with the intention to remain 

or to which she intends to return. . . . A person

residing in a given state is not necessarily 

domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a 

citizen of that state.

Western World Insurance Company v. Ramirez, 2007 WL 1839594, at *1

(D.Ariz. June 26, 2007) (quoting Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857)(emphasis

added by Western World court). This court went on to explain that

“[t]he distinction between domicile and residence is an

uncontroversial principle to which the Supreme Court has spoken

long ago:

‘[A]n averment that a party resided within the 

State or the district in which the suit was 

brought was not sufficient to support the 

jurisdiction, because in the common use of words 

a resident might not be a citizen, and therefore 

it was not stated expressly and beyond ambiguity 

that he was a citizen of the State, which was the 

fact on which the jurisdiction depending[.]’” 

Id. (quoting Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 447 (1892)). 

Applying these well settled diversity jurisdiction pleading

requirements to the present case, plaintiffs’ failure to allege the

state of citizenship of any of individual parties is fatal because

“the party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of

proof[.]” See Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857-58 (citation omitted). Like

Western World, this court “cannot simply assume” the state of

citizenship of the individual parties “based on where they reside

or have resided.” See Western World, 2007 WL 1839594, at *2. 

2. Corporate Defendant

Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations are also wholly

inadequate in terms of the moving corporate defendant, WARMC. 

Corporations have dual citizenship for purposes of diversity

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jurisdiction, in contrast to individuals. A corporation is deemed

to be a citizen of both the State in which it is incorporated “and

of the State where it has its principal place of business[.]” 28

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 

Here, plaintiffs do not specifically allege the state of

WARMC’s incorporation, although arguably it can be inferred from

plaintiff’s allegation that WARMC is “a Tennessee corporation[.]”

Co. (doc. 5) at 2, ¶ 8. In this motion, however, WARMC clarifies

that it “is an Arizona Corporation with its principal place of

business in Tennessee.” Mot. (doc. 10) at 3; and exh. B thereto

(Arizona Corporation Commission’s website public information

pertaining to this defendant). Even assuming that plaintiffs had

explicitly and correctly pled WARMC’s state of incorporation as 28

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) requires, their allegations pertaining to the

citizenship of this defendant still would be insufficient. 

This insufficiency arises from the fact that plaintiffs did

not allege the state where WARMC has its principal place of

business – the second basis for citizenship of a corporate

defendant such as WARMC. Rather, the complaint alleges that WARMC

is “authorized to do and doing business in Arizona[.]” See Co.

(doc. 5) at 2, ¶ 8. As with residency and citizenship,

plaintiffs overlook the fact that “doing business” and a “principal

place of business” are separate and distinct legal concepts. The

fact that a corporation is doing business in a given state does not

mean that that state is necessarily its “principal place of

business” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under section

1332. See Tremble v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 WL

1582759, at *2 (S.D.Ga. 2007) (internal quotation marks and

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6 See also Verhouvsek v. Degraffin, 554 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing

Goodlett v. Louisville R. Co., 122 U.S. 391 (1887)) (“The fact that the two

defendant corporations may ‘do business’ in the District of Columbia is not

sufficient to render them citizens of D.C.”); and Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352

F.Supp. 867, 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

(“[T]ransacting or doing business in New York . . . is not the standard for

locating ‘principal place of business to determine whether duality of citizenship

exists which would bar removal.”) 

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citations omitted) (“[T]he mere fact that a corporation is doing

business or is licensed to do business in a state does not make it

a citizen of that state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”).6

Therefore, as with the individual parties, plaintiffs have not met

their burden of proof in terms of pleading the citizenship of the

corporate defendant WARMC so as to support a finding of diversity

jurisdiction based upon section 1332. 

3. Doe Defendants

There is one other way, as WARMC notes, in which plaintiffs’

complaint is defective in terms of alleging diversity of

citizenship. Plaintiffs’ complaint includes allegations against

unknown defendants “DOES I through V and ROES I through V[.]” See,

e.g., Co. (doc. 5) at 5, ¶ 25. This Circuit has long “rejected

naming ‘Doe’ defendants in diversity actions,” such as this, “on

the grounds that complete diversity cannot exist if the identity

and citizenship of some defendants (i.e., the ‘Does’) are unknown.” 

Medina v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 2006 WL 2091665, at 

*6 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Fifty Associates v. Prudential Life Ins.

Co. Of America, 446 F.2 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1970)). 

“It is fundamental to our system of government that a court of

the United States may not grant relief absent a constitutional or

valid statutory grant of jurisdiction.” A-Z Intern. v. Phillips,

323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

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citation omitted). Consequently, the presumption is that “a

federal court . . . lack[s] jurisdiction in a particular case

unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Id. (Internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). As should be abundantly

clear by now, diversity jurisdiction does not “affirmatively

appear” on the face of the complaint given plaintiffs’ failure to

allege the citizenship of each of the parties at the time the

action was commenced. See Western World, 2007 WL 1839594, at *2

(citing, inter alia, Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. V. K N Energy, Inc.,

498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)) (“It is well settled that allegations

invoking diversity jurisdiction must show that complete diversity

existed at the time the action was filed.”) Accordingly, the court

could dismiss this action. See Tosco, 236 F.3d at 499 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (“A plaintiff suing in

federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and

distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal

jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the

defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must

dismiss the case, unless the defect be corrected by amendment.”)

As just alluded to though, “[t]he Court is mindful that

‘[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon

terms, in the trial or appellate courts.’” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1653; and Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir.

2002) (“The primary purpose of section 1653 is to permit

corrections of incorrect statements about extant jurisdiction.”))

Therefore, the court will allow plaintiffs ten (10) days from the

date of entry of this order in which to file and serve a second

amended complaint properly alleging subject matter jurisdiction. 

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Such amendment also will allow plaintiffs to correct what they term

“an unintentional error[,]” which was their failure to allege an

amount in controversy -- another essential element of jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Resp. (doc. 12) at 4. 

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has long recognized that “‘without

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.’” Steel

Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94

(1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). 

Because “the Court is not at liberty to proceed on the basis of

hypothetical jurisdiction[,]” Western World, 2007 WL 18395494, at

*2 (citing Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 94-95), it will take WARMC’s 

motions to dismiss under advisement and allow plaintiffs ten days

within which to file and serve a second amended complaint. If

plaintiffs do not file a second amended complaint within ten days,

defendant WARMC’s motions to dismiss will be granted.

IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) defendant WARMC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject

jurisdiction (doc. 10) is taken under advisement;

(2) defendant WARMC’s alternative motion to dismiss based upon

the pending state court action (doc. 10) is taken under advisement;

(3) defendant WARMC’s motion to dismiss decedent’s estate as a

party is taken under advisement; and 

(4) plaintiffs have ten (10) days from the date of entry of

this order in which to file a second amended complaint adequately

alleging subject matter jurisdiction. If plaintiffs do not amend

their complaint accordingly within the ten (10) days allotted for

that purpose, the amended complaint which is the subject of this

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motion (doc. 5) will be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED.

DATED this 11th day of September, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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