Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00504/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00504-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAPHAEL GRAHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

WRIGHT, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 1:22-cv-00504-BAM (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 

ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS

(ECF No. 11)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Raphael Graham (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s 

complaint, and he was granted leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint, filed on July 25, 2022, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 11.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Corcoran State Prison where the events in the complaint 

are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as the sole defendant M. Wright, Correctional 

Officer. Plaintiff alleges violation of a Fourth Amendment invasion of privacy and First 

Amendment right against retaliation.

On 9/6/21, while Plaintiff was assigned to cell 242-3C03, floor officer M. Wright stated: 

“routine inspection” and searched Plaintiff’s assigned cell. He was not authorized to strip search 

(inspect body cavities), but he did so. Plaintiff warned Defendant that “we only strip search 

during a ‘special inspection,’” pursuant to CCR 3287(a)(3) and (b)(5), not during routine 

inspections. Defendant Wright said, “on my watch you do.” Plaintiff was upset because he had 

to show his genitals and anal cavities without a medical setting under direct supervision of a 

physician and called Defendant Wright a fag. Plaintiff said he would 602 Defendant Wright. 

Defendant Wright said we’d see who is a fag and said 602 me. Plaintiff believes that during the 

first search, Defendant’s body camera was off. 

Plaintiff alleges that according to CCR 3287, a routine inspection is completely different 

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from an inspection of body cavities which Plaintiff contends was unconstitutional. Plaintiff 

alleges that the body cavity strip search was done in an unconstitutional manner to invade his 

privacy, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The cell door was wide open which allowed 

other inmates to view the strip search. Defendant said we don’t like 602s around here and the 

institution has the authority to get rid of production of the body cavity cameras video by 

destroying it.

Five days later on 9/13/21, Defendant Wright took actions to silence Plaintiff from 602ing 

him and came back to the building as the floor officer. He immediately abused the strip search 

procedure for a second time as a “ruse to retaliate, harass, shame, humiliate, degrade and punish 

Plaintiff” as motivated by an invasion of privacy. The second strip search was not done for a 

valid penological purpose and was done while there were on lookers in the day room and done 

willfully to have Defendant Wright’s body worn camera activated. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff 

informed Wright of the “red light” being activated on the body worn camera, meaning that the 

camera was still activated. Defendant Wright disregarded Plaintiff and stated for Plaintiff to strip 

naked, and smiled. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wright was trained to deactivate his body 

worn camera during unclothed strip searches and to place all inmates in the shower during 

unclothed strip searches. By not deactivating the camera and strip searching Plaintiff where his 

body cavities could be seen by others was retaliatory and not reasonable exercise of prison 

policies or serve a legitimate correctional goal. Defendant Wright did not shield Plaintiff’s 

unclothed body cavities from inmates view. He opened Plaintiff’s cell wide to search Plaintiff 

while on lookers looked at Plaintiff as he spread his annual cavity. Defendant could have put 

Plaintiff in the showers. The search was done in a manner to deprive Plaintiff of his privacy by 

recording Plaintiff’s body cavities. The action was to silence Plaintiff from 602ing Defendant’s 

unreasonable body cavity searches. Wright refused to deactivate his body camera on 9/13/21 in 

spite of being informed by Plaintiff. His conduct was retaliatory and not a reasonable exercise of 

prison policies. The result was showing Plaintiff’s genitals on film and the video footage was 

viewed by many institutions. 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that the Defendant’s actions complained of violate 

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Plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution. Plaintiff also compensatory and punitive damages

III. Discussion

A. Retaliation

It is well-established that prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances 

and that retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this right is a constitutional violation. 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). “Within the prison context, a viable claim 

of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and 

that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted). To prevail on a retaliation claim, a 

plaintiff may “assert an injury no more tangible than a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.” 

Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269–70. Furthermore, “a plaintiff does not have to show that ‘his speech 

was actually inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the adverse action at issue ‘would chill or 

silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’ ” Id. at 1271 

(citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568–69).

Nevertheless, First Amendment retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse 

activity by a defendant after protected speech; rather, the plaintiff must show a nexus between the 

two. See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot 

rest on the “logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, “after this, therefore because of 

this.” ”). The plaintiff must allege specific facts demonstrating that the plaintiff's protected 

conduct was “the ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant's conduct.” Brodheim, 

584 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 

1989)). A plaintiff may demonstrate retaliatory intent by alleging a chronology of events from 

which retaliation can be inferred. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).

Liberally construing the allegations in the first amended complaint, Plaintiff states a claim 

for retaliation against Defendant Wright for the second strip search on 9/13/21.

///

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B. Fourth Amendment – Strip Search

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 558 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasonableness of the search is 

determined by the context, which “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search 

against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Factors that 

must be evaluated are “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, 

the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id.; Bull v. City and Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Routine visual strip searches do 

not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529 (“[W]holly random searches are 

essential to the effective security of penal institutions.”); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders 

of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 327–28 (2012) (“[D]eterring the possession of contraband 

depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without predictable exceptions.”)

To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was “not authorized” to conduct an 

unclothed search of his body, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable. Routine strip searches have been 

held constitutional. See generally Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d at 333. 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment for the first strip 

search. Plaintiff claims it was conducted in his cell with the cell door open. Plaintiff alleges it 

was not done under medical supervision. However, the Fourth Amendment permits correctional 

officers conduct strip searches without medical personnel present. Plaintiff also claims it was 

done in his cell with the door open for others to see. However, strip searches within the confines 

of the prisoner’s cell have been held constitutional. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that strip searches should be conducted within the cell because

searches outside the prisoners' cells are reasonably required to protect the safety of the officers 

conducting them.). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not require the door to remain closed, 

as closing the officer within the cell with the inmate involves an issue of officer safety. A prisoner 

need not be strip searched in the most private location available if that venue would jeopardize 

the officer's safety. Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that 

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strip searches must be conducted out of view of other prisoners and reaffirming that court would 

not question prison officials' judgment that conditions might require searches outside cells in

order to protect the safety of the officers conducting them); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 

494-95 (9th Cir.1985) (rejecting prisoners' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against 

female guards who were assigned to positions that required infrequent and casual observation or 

observation at a distance of sometimes disrobed prisoners.)

Plaintiff alleges that the second strip search was done in a manner to invade his privacy by 

recording the search on Defendant’s body worn camera. The Fourth Amendment applies to the 

invasion of bodily privacy in prisons and jails. Bull, 595 F.3d at 974–75. “[I]ncarcerated prisoners 

retain a limited right to bodily privacy.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333. The Ninth Circuit has 

long recognized that “[t]he desire to shield one's unclothed figure from view of strangers, and 

particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal 

dignity.” York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963). “The [Supreme] Court [has] obviously 

recognized that not all strip search procedures will be reasonable; some could be excessive, 

vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d 

at 332.

As to the second strip search, liberally construing the allegations in the complaint, 

Plaintiff states a Fourth Amendment violation for conducting the second strip searches with an 

activated body camera, exposing Plaintiff’s genitals on camera.

1

 

D. Verbal Harassment

Allegations of name-calling, verbal abuse, or threats generally fail to state a constitutional 

claim. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[V]erbal harassment generally 

does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 135 F.3d 1318 

(9th Cir. 1998); see also Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a 

prisoner's allegations of threats allegedly made by guards failed to state a cause of action).

1 This screening order recognizes a cognizable claim only for the strip search in which the body camera was 

activated. Where the strip search was conducted without the body camera being activated, the Court does not find a 

cognizable claim.

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E. Title 15 and Policy Violation

To the extent that Defendant has not complied with applicable state statutes or prison 

regulations for the searches, these deprivations do not support a claim under § 1983. Section 1983 

only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. See, e.g., Nible v. 

Fink, 828 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations do not create private right of action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal constitutional right); 

Prock v. Warden, No. 1:13-cv-01572-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 5553349, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 

2013) (noting that several district courts have found no implied private right of action under title 

15 and stating that “no § 1983 claim arises for [violations of title 15] even if they occurred.”); 

Parra v. Hernandez, No. 08cv0191-H (CAB), 2009 WL 3818376, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) 

(granting motion to dismiss prisoner's claims brought pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code 

of Regulations); Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW (PC), 2009 WL 

1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of action under 

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations).

F. Declaratory Relief

To the extent Plaintiff's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, it is unnecessary. “A 

declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of 

judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., 

333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful 

purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and 

afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. 

Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). If this action reaches trial and the jury returns a 

verdict in favor of Plaintiff, then that verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff's constitutional rights 

were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that any defendant violated Plaintiff's rights is 

unnecessary.

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a 

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cognizable claim against Defendant M. Wright for violation of the Fourth Amendment for 

conducting the second strip search on September 13, 2021, with an activated body worn camera, 

exposing Plaintiff’s genitals on camera and for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief. Despite being 

provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the 

identified deficiencies and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a 

District Judge to this action.

Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed July 25, 2022 (ECF 

No. 11) against Defendant M. Wright for violation of the Fourth Amendment for 

conducting the second strip search with an activated body camera, exposing Plaintiff’s 

genitals on camera and for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and

2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which 

relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 

Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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