Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00490/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of shooting at an occupied vehicle and six counts of assault 

with a firearm. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 32 years-to-life. In this action, he 

contends the trial court erred when it found him competent to stand trial. Because the Court does not 

find the state court erred when finding Petitioner was competent at the time of trial and the trial court 

was entitled to impose the upper term when it sentenced him, the Court recommends the petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s published/unpublished decision1:

On September 29, 2009, Rosemond was assaulted by at least four men, including Eugene and 

Harry Marshall, while he was waiting at a bus stop near his grandmother's house for a bus to his 

mother's house. Eugene and Harry participated in the attack on Rosemond by holding him to the 

ground and hitting him in the head with a brick. Responding officers felt Rosemond's injuries 

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

MALCOLM ROSEMOND,

 Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, 

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00490 AWI JLT (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS (Doc. 1)

OBJECTIONS MAY BE FILED WITHIN 21 DAYS

Case 1:14-cv-00490-AWI-JLT Document 17 Filed 11/24/15 Page 1 of 13
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were sufficiently severe to require an ambulance. Eugene was arrested in connection with the 

attack; Harry was not. The police recommended the district attorney file charges against Eugene 

for the assault and for violating a court-ordered gang injunction. The record does not indicate 

whether Eugene or Harry was prosecuted in connection with the attack.

On September 12, 2010, Lashonda Marshall was driving to her mother's house when she saw 

her brother, Harry, and one of the other men involved in the attack on Rosemond in 2009. 

Lashonda saw Rosemond walking on the street toward her brother; she thought there would be 

trouble. Lashonda stopped her car and waited. Rosemond and Harry had a staring match and 

possibly exchanged words, after which Harry got into his car and drove off, following 

Lashonda's car.

As Lashonda was driving away, with her boyfriend and three children in the car, a bullet 

penetrated the trunk and rear seat of her vehicle. The bullet struck her seven-year-old daughter, 

Sierra, in the arm and then passed through the front seat, striking Sierra's father, James 

Timmons, in the back.

Lashonda told police she saw Rosemond standing by a tree pointing a gun at the street as she 

drove past; she saw no one else in the area. As Lashonda quickly pushed on the gas pedal to 

drive away, she heard gunshots. Sierra claimed she saw the man running after firing the gun at 

their car. Both Lashonda and Sierra identified Rosemond from a photographic lineup.

Gunfire is common in that neighborhood, formally named Brookhaven, but called the “Dog 

Pound” after a gang. Rosemond did not live in the area, but his grandmother's house was in 

Brookhaven. Lashonda knew Rosemond's mother but did not know Rosemond personally. 

Lashonda claimed she knew Rosemond by the monikor “Pooka” and she had seen him walking 

with members of the Dog Pound gang. A Fresno police officer assigned to the multiagency gang 

enforcement consortium testified he had had multiple prior contacts with members of the 

Marshall family in connection with gang activity; he did not cite any gang contacts with 

Rosemond.

Police never were able to determine the caliber of the bullet that struck Lashonda's car. Police 

searched Rosemond's home at the time of his arrest but found no bullets, weapon, or other 

evidence connecting him to the shooting.

Rosemond was charged with shooting at an occupied vehicle, in violation of Penal Code section 

246,1 and six counts of assault with a firearm, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2). It 

also was alleged that Rosemond personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great 

bodily injury, and that he personally used a firearm.

On November 29, 2010, Rosemond's defense counsel declared a doubt as to Rosemond's 

competency to stand trial. Defense counsel asked the trial court to suspend proceedings and 

appoint doctors to evaluate Rosemond; the prosecution joined in the request. The trial court 

found there was a sufficient basis upon which to declare a doubt as to Rosemond's competency, 

suspended criminal proceedings, and appointed Doctors Harold L. Seymour and Luis H. Velosa 

to evaluate Rosemond pursuant to section 1369.

Velosa found Rosemond to have been a “slow learner,” but found no evidence of any 

psychiatric disorder that would impair Rosemond's concept of reality. Velosa concluded 

Rosemond was able to “understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings” and was capable 

of cooperating with defense counsel.

Seymour found Rosemond to have “mood, substance abuse, and cognitive difficulties.” 

Seymour concluded Rosemond was not competent to stand trial because he “lacks sufficient 

knowledge to competently assist his legal counsel, and he is suspicious of his attorney's 

motives.”

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On January 10, 2011, the trial court noted the conflicting opinions of Velosa and Seymour. 

Defense counsel asked for the appointment of a third doctor to evaluate Rosemond; the 

prosecutor suggested the appointment of two additional doctors, and the defense did not object. 

The trial court appointed Doctors Robert C. Taylor and Richard Kendall to examine Rosemond.

Kendall opined that during his examination, Rosemond “attempted to feign (in an 

unsophisticated manner) psychotic impairment.” Kendall found “no credible evidence that 

[Rosemond] has any psychiatric impairment which would prevent him from being able to stand 

trial.”

Taylor found Rosemond to be “a cognitively limited, emotionally immature and uncooperative 

young man.” Taylor noted Rosemond had a “lengthy history of being treated for attention 

deficit/hyperactivity and depressive issues.” Taylor opined that “if [Rosemond ] chooses to 

cooperate,” he would have “the capacity to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings 

and be able to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner.” Taylor 

concluded Rosemond’s uncooperative behavior was “a manifestation of oppositional and 

defiant attitudes, cognitive limitations and an awkward attempt, at times, to malinger rather than 

the product of a psychotic or mentally retarded individual.”

On March 22, 2011, the parties submitted the issue of competency to stand trial on the doctors’

reports. The trial court found Rosemond competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal 

proceedings. 

On June 16, 2011, Rosemond indicated he wanted to proceed to trial, although the trial court 

had urged the parties to discuss and consider a plea agreement. The trial court then asked 

defense counsel, “I’m assuming, counsel, whether you agree or not with his decision, you are 

satisfied he understands what’s going on here and knows what he’s got at risk?” Defense 

counsel responded, “I believe so, Your Honor.”

A jury was empanelled on June 16, 2011, and trial commenced. At trial, Rosemond presented 

character witnesses. A staff person at the high school from which Rosemond graduated 

described him as “always polite and nice.” Rosemond’s mentor in the Big Brothers/Big Sisters 

program described Rosemond as nonviolent, polite, respectful, and mild mannered.

On June 22, 2011, the jury convicted Rosemond of all counts and found all enhancements true. 

On September 14, 2011, the trial court sentenced Rosemond to a term of 32 years to life.

(Doc. 16)

II. DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other 

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after 

statute’s enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore 

governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

The Court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) unless 

the petitioner shows that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

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The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to federal due process when it found 

him competent to stand trial and when it imposed the upper term as to the conviction for shooting at an 

occupied vehicle.

A. Petitioner’s competency to stand trial

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

I. Mental Competency 

Definition of Incompetency

The trial court must order a competency hearing whenever it becomes aware of substantial 

evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about whether a defendant is mentally 

competent to stand trial. (People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1415 (Castro ).) Mental 

incompetence may be the result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, or both. (Id. at 

pp. 1413, 1414.) A defendant is presumed to be mentally competent unless, by a preponderance 

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of the evidence, it is proved that he or she is incompetent. (§ 1369, subd. (f); Medina v. 

California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448–453 (Medina ).) Section 1367, subdivision (a) defines 

mental competency as:

“A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally 

incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a 

result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to 

understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a 

defense in a rational manner.”

In Medina, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s statutory scheme of placing 

the burden of proving incompetency on a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence did not 

violate a defendant’s due process rights. (Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 448–452.)

The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court for assessing whether a person is 

competent to stand trial is “ ‘whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as 

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 

U.S. 402; see also Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 171.)

In People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 808, the California Supreme Court determined “ ‘ 

“To anyone but a hairsplitting semanticist, the two tests [California and federal] are identical” ’ 

” and the state standard comports with federal due process requirements. (See also People v. 

Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1216; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1063.) 

Thus, Rosemond’s argument that California’s statutory definition is too narrow necessarily fails 

as the California Supreme Court has determined that the standard for determining competency 

to stand trial is the same under the federal and state standards and complies with due process. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, a finding on the issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial “cannot be 

disturbed if there is any substantial and credible evidence in the record to support the finding. 

[Citation.]” (Castro, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) We view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine if it supports the trial court's finding. (People v. Marshall

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.) “ ‘Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid 

value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.) “ ‘In addition, a reviewing 

court generally gives great deference to a trial court's decision’ ” on the defendant's competence 

to stand trial. (People v. Kaplan (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 372, 383, quoting Marshall, at p. 33.)

Rosemond asserts that due to his attention deficit disorder (ADD), depression, and low average 

or below average intelligence, he was incapable of meaningful consultation with defense 

counsel or of assisting in his own defense. We disagree.

Four doctors evaluated Rosemond and three provided more than sufficient evidence that he was 

competent to stand trial.

The record establishes that Rosemond did not suffer from a mental illness or developmental 

disability that precluded him from cooperating with counsel and assisting in his own defense. 

Rosemond graduated from Cambridge High School and enrolled in Fresno City College but 

dropped out his first semester. Although he suffered from ADD, he was on medication as a 

child and young adult to address the symptoms of ADD. After his arrest, he was diagnosed with 

“depressed mood” and was prescribed antidepressant medication. Evidence of a mental illness 

and use of medication does not mean a defendant is unable to understand the proceedings and 

assist in a defense. (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 502.)

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When interviewed, Rosemond’s thinking process was linear, his thought content was rational, 

and his attention and concentration were within normal limits. He was capable of explaining 

why he had been arrested and articulating concerns regarding his identification as the 

perpetrator in the line-up and the notification of his constitutional rights. Rosemond was 

described as having “low average intelligence.” Low intelligence and learning disabilities do 

not necessarily equate to incompetence to stand trial. (Walton v. Angelone (4th Cir.2003) 321 

F.3d 442, 460.)

Rosemond was found to have the “capacity to function in a rational manner.” He understood the 

nature and severity of the charges against him, the difference between a felony and 

misdemeanor, the nature of pleas and their consequences, the right to remain silent, and the role 

of various court room officials. He did not have any paranoid ideation, delusions, or thought 

disorganization that would impair his ability to assist his attorney in a rational manner.

Rosemond was found to be uncooperative, difficult, and unpleasant in interactions. Three 

doctors concluded Rosemond had the capacity to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings against him, and, if he chooses to cooperate, would be able to assist defense 

counsel in a rational manner. The test for competency is not actual cooperation, but the ability 

to cooperate. (People v. Superior Court (Campbell) (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 459, 464.)

Substantial evidence established that ADD, depressive mood, any learning disability, or low 

average intelligence did not prevent Rosemond from understanding the proceedings and 

assisting in his own defense. The trial court did not err in finding Rosemond competent to stand 

trial.

(LD 4, pp. 2-6).

2. Analysis

The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 

517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). The state court properly identified the federal standard in this regard. 

Notably, to prevail on a substantive due process claim that a defendant was incompetent during trial, 

the petitioner must show that “at the time of trial he lacked either sufficient ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational and factual understanding of 

the proceedings against him.” See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 608 (citing Dusky v. United 

States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). 

The state court’s factual findings here are subject to deference in these proceedings.2 See Davis 

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir.2003) (stating it would defer to the state courts' decisions not 

to order a competency hearing “unless they are ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2)”); Waller v. Wofford, 2012 WL 5870762 at *3 (C.D.Cal. Nov.19, 2012). When a habeas 

petitioner alleges a state court made a unreasonable determination of fact under § 2254(d)(2), the 

 

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Petitioner does not contend there is evidence outside of the record, which addresses his competency to stand trial.

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federal habeas court “must be particularly deferential to [its] state-court colleagues” on their 

determinations of fact. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The federal district

court “may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court 

record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Id. at 999.

“Challenges under § 2254(d)(2) fall into two main categories. First, a petitioner may challenge 

the substance of the state court's findings and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by 

substantial evidence in the state court record. Second, a petitioner may challenge the fact-finding 

process itself on the ground that it was deficient in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 

1140, 1146 (9th Cir.2012) (relying on Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999–1001). 

Notably, here, Petitioner does not claim that the process by which the court found him 

competent was defective. Indeed, Petitioner was evaluated by four mental health professionals and

concluded he was competent to stand trial. Rather, he claims the trial court made the wrong 

determination. However, the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to support the findings of the 

court. As noted by the 5th DCA, despite his low-intelligence, his thinking was linear and rational, he 

understood the nature of the charges and could explain them, he had normal attention and concentration 

and was able to explain why he believed the photo line-up was constitutionally infirm. In addition, the 

evidence demonstrated that Petitioner attempted to skew the evaluations to overstate his 

mental/emotional problems. When he was reminded that he must do his best on tests, he then was able 

to do quite well. This demonstrates an ability to cooperate when he chose. Finally, as Respondent 

notes, Petitioner’s low intelligence, ADD or depression is not equivalent to incompetency. “[N]either 

low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with 

mental incompetence to stand trial.” Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000), citing 

Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 875 

(9th Cir. 1991), as amended on denial of reh'g (Feb. 11, 1992) [Defendant properly found to be 

competent despite evidence of “major depression, mental retardation, [and] borderline intelligence.”]

Moreover, the trial court was in a position to observe and assess Petitioner’s behavior and to 

communicate with him during the course of pre-trial and trial proceedings, and would have been in a 

position to observe any visible or discernable changes in his mental state. See Moran v. Godinez, 57 

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F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1995). Notably, as Petitioner admits, the trial court inquired of Petitioner 

whether he understood the risks involved in having a trial—as opposed to taking a plea deal—and 

Petitioner was able to respond and to do so appropriately. (Doc. 1 at 13)

Given the medical expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s was significant, the Court cannot 

conclude that the state court’s findings of fact were wrong or, more importantly, unreasonable. Taylor 

v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 999. Accordingly, the state court’s adjudication and its fact-finding were not 

objectively unreasonable and the petitioner claim must be rejected.

B. Imposing the upper term

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

II. Sentencing Issues

Rosemond contends his sentence to the upper term on count 1 must be set aside 

because (1) the trial court did not understand its discretion, and (2) the trial court 

improperly relied on “unintended assault convictions” as an aggravating factor . . . 

Factual Summary

The probation report stated that the aggravating and mitigating factors were “balanced” 

and recommended the midterm of five years be imposed on count 1. The probation 

officer found as an aggravating factor that Rosemond had engaged in “violent conduct 

[that] indicates a serious danger to society.” As a mitigating factor, the probation 

officer found that Rosemond had no prior record or an insignificant prior record. The 

ultimate recommendation of the probation department was that the midterm be imposed 

on all counts, with the terms stayed as to two convictions, plus two indeterminate terms 

of 25 years to life. The term recommended was 14 years, four months of a determinate 

term, plus two 25–to–life indeterminate terms.

At sentencing, defense counsel argued that Rosemond's lack of criminal history and his 

prior beating at the hands of members of the Marshall family constituted factors in 

mitigation and urged the trial court to impose “the least amount of punishment as 

possible.” The prosecutor stated that Rosemond's having been “severely beaten” by 

members of the Marshall family was “somewhat of a mitigating factor.”

After mentioning the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, the trial court 

stated it had “very little authority but to impose the sentence it's going to impose here.” 

The trial court stated there were “substantial circumstances in mitigation,” including 

Rosemond's lack of criminal history and the unprovoked attack on Rosemond by 

members of the Marshall family, but that circumstances in aggravation outweighed the 

mitigating factors.

The trial court imposed the upper term, seven years, for the count 1 offense, shooting at 

an occupied motor vehicle. On counts 2 and 3, the trial court imposed the mitigated 

term, but stayed imposition of punishment pursuant to section 654. On the remaining 

counts, the trial court imposed the mitigated term, to run concurrently with the count 1 

term. A single section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement was imposed. The total 

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term imposed was seven years, plus one 25–year–to–life enhancement. A $30 court 

security fee and a $40 assessment fee were imposed for each count.

Analysis

“An erroneous understanding by the trial court of its discretionary power is not a true 

exercise of discretion. [Citation.] ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made 

in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.]’ 

[Citation.] A court cannot exercise that ‘informed discretion’ where it is unaware of the 

scope of its discretionary powers. [Citation.]” (People v. Bruce G. (2002) 97 

Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247–1248.)

The record here reflects that the trial court understood, and exercised, its discretionary 

sentencing powers. Its comment that it had “very little authority but to impose the

sentence it's going to impose” was nothing more than a comment reflecting the trial 

court's assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors and the circumstances of 

the offenses. Immediately after making that comment, the trial court proceeded to 

outline the aggravating and mitigating factors and its assessment of those factors.

The trial court's comment was made after it had noted for the record that it had read the 

probation report, which urged a midterm, and after both counsel had made their 

comments on the content of the probation report, with defense counsel arguing for a 

lower term than recommended. During comments from counsel, reference was made to 

the trial court's discretion in sentencing.

The record in this case shows that the trial court understood its discretionary authority 

and it weighed all of the competing factors prior to imposing sentence. It imposed the 

upper term on count 1, concurrent terms on the assault counts, and one section 

12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, all of which differed from the probation 

department's recommendation. In view of these facts and circumstances, Rosemond's 

argument fails.

We also disagree with Rosemond's claim that the trial court considered an inappropriate 

factor when imposing the upper term on count 1.

In every felony proceeding, a probation report must be prepared and must be read by 

the sentencing judge. (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 213.) The trial court 

expressly stated it had read the probation report and asked for comments on the report. 

Facts bearing upon the offenses and defendant, Rosemond, were set forth in the 

probation report. The trial court is not bound to follow the recommendation of the 

probation department, but it is bound to consider all facts bearing upon the offenses and 

the defendant. (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 910.)

The probation report did not list as an aggravating factor that there were two victims of 

the shooting and a total of six potential victims. A trial court, however, is not limited to 

the factors mentioned in the probation report. It may look to “the case record, the 

probation officer's report, other reports and statements properly received, statements in 

aggravation or mitigation, and any evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing” in 

exercising its sentencing discretion to select the upper, mid, or lower term. (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 4.420(b).) It may use as a factor in aggravation: “The defendant was 

convicted of other crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been imposed 

but for which concurrent sentences are being imposed.” (Id., rule 4.421(a)(7).)

Here, the jury found Rosemond guilty of six counts of assault with a firearm; each 

count alleged a different victim. The trial court used these assault counts as a basis for 

an aggravated term on count 1 (shooting at an occupied vehicle) and, instead of 

imposing consecutive terms for these counts as recommended in the probation report, 

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imposed concurrent terms on the assault counts.

The trial court's imposition of the upper term also comports with the requirements of 

Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 

U.S. 270. The aggravating factor relied upon by the trial court was based upon facts 

found by the jury as reflected in the guilty verdicts on the assault charges. (People v. 

Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1220–1221.)

There was no error by the trial court in sentencing Rosemond.

2. Analysis

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s decision to impose the upper term on Count 1 was 

improper because the court relied upon facts not found by the jury. Likewise, Petitioner claims that 

the trial court erred in imposing the upper term due to its lack of understanding of its authority to 

impose a lesser standard. 

As noted by the 5th DCA, here, the jury found Petitioner guilty of six counts of assault with a 

firearm as a result of his shooting at the vehicle in which the victims were passengers. Thus, the trial 

court was entitled to consider this information when determining Petitioner’s sentence. That Petitioner 

wished ill only on one of the passengers did not exonerate him of shooting the second victim and it did 

not exonerate him of shooting at a vehicle with six people in it. Despite Petitioner’s arguments to the 

contrary, the trial court’s reliance upon these jury-determined facts to impose the upper term comports 

with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and the cases following it. Thus, there is no 

showing of constitutional error.

Moreover, the trial court was entitled under California law to exercise its discretion to 

determine whether to impose the lower, mid or upper term. California Penal Code § 1170(b) [“When a 

judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of 

the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.”] The 5th DCA reasonably 

determined that the trial judge’s statement that it had “very little authority but to impose the sentence 

it’s going to impose,” was a recognition not of a lack of authority, but of the danger of Petitioner’s 

action coupled with the jury’s determination that he assaulted six people when he shot at the occupied 

car. Indeed, the trial court’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors supports this 

conclusion.

On the other hand, because there is no independent constitutional violation as demonstrated 

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above, “federal habeas review of a state court’s application of its own sentencing laws is limited to 

determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an 

independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 

780 (1990). “Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s missapplication of its own 

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 

1994). Petitioner does not demonstrate that the trial court’s decision to impose the upper term was 

fundamentally unfair. The state court considered the number of victims Petitioner shot, the number of 

victims at whom Petitioner shot and the inherent danger of shooting at a carload of people. Trial 

judges are entitled to rely upon “those facts [they] deem[ ] important to the exercise of [their] 

sentencing discretion,” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 643 (9th Cir. 2008) quoting Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 30. Thus, the upper term sentence did not amount to a fundamentally 

unfair sentence. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1), be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 days

after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be 

served and filed within 10 days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The 

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 24, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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