Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-07-01599/USCOURTS-ca7-07-01599-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

February 12, 2010

Before

    WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

    RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

    TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐1599

CHERMANE SMITH, EDMANUEL

PEREZ, TYHESHA BRUNSTON,

MICHELLE WALDO, KIRK YUNKER,

and TONY WILLIAMS,

                    Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, PHILIP J. CLINE,

Superintendent of Police, and RICHARD

DEVINE, Cook County States Attorney,

                  Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 06 C 6423

Elaine E. Bucklo,

Judge.

ORDER

The district court, relying on Jones v. Takaki, 38 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994), dismissed the

plaintiffs’ complaint in this case.  On appeal, we overruled Jones, explaining, “[O]ur fresh

look at this issue causes us to conclude that given the length of time which can result

between the seizure of property and the opportunity for an owner to contest the seizure

under the DAFPA, some sort of mechanism to test the validity of the retention of the

property is required.”  Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 07-1599 Document: 63 Filed: 02/12/2010 Pages: 2
No. 07‐1599 Page 2

We remanded the case to the district court to “fashion appropriate procedural relief

consistent with this opinion.”  Id.  Our opinion, because it overruled Jones, was circulated

among all active members of the court pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e).  None of the judges

voted to rehear the case en banc.  The case was not moot when we entered our judgment

reversing the district court.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of

certiorari.  But then, prior to oral arguments, the last of the named plaintiffs’ seized property

was returned to her.  The Supreme Court therefore held that the case (and thus the appeal)

was moot.  It vacated our judgment and remanded the case to us with instructions to

dismiss.  Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576.  The Court cited United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,

340 U.S. 36 (1950), as precedent for the vacatur order.  Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 578, 581‐83.  The

Court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ due process claim.  Thus, neither the

plaintiffs nor the defendants had the benefit of a full and final review of the due process

issue that is at the core of this case.

When parties to a controversy cannot secure final review of the merits because the

case became moot before the Supreme Court could address the merits, the appropriate

relief, it seems, is an order vacating all prior judgments, without prejudice to any party’s

right to proceed or defend.  See Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40.  When, through happenstance,

a case becomes moot before final review is possible, vacatur is necessary to clear “the path

for future relitigation of the issues between the parties, preserving the rights of all parties,

while prejudicing none by a decision which . . . was only preliminary.”  Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at

581 (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40) (internal quotations omitted)).  Considerations of

“equity and fairness,” Alvarez, at 582 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall

Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25‐26 (1994) (internal quotations omitted)), dictate that the parties

start over, without prejudice, when final review is not possible through no fault of the

parties themselves.

For these reasons, we believe the best course of action for us to take at this time is to

vacate our judgment and to remand the case to the district court for consideration, or

reconsideration, of issues that are not moot.

SO ORDERED.

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