Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02783/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02783-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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1 09cv2783 BTM(WVG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ALLEN MILLICAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09cv2783 BTM(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant has filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits.

Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The hearing was held on July 9, 2009, before

Administrative Law Judge Peter J. Valentino (“ALJ”). On August 10, 2009, the ALJ issued

a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. Plaintiff filed a request for review with

the Appeals Council, which was denied. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s

final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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1

 Under the Social Security Regulations, the determination of whether a claimant is

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is a five step process. The five steps

are as follows: (1) Is the claimant presently working in any substantially gainful activity? If

so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is

the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, then the

evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of

specific impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404? If so, then the

claimant is disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Is the claimant

able to do any work that she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled.

If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other

work? If not, then the claimant is disabled. If, on the other hand, the Commissioner can

establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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II. ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through December 31, 2011, and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since October 18, 2006, the alleged onset date.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: multi-herniated disc,

chronic pain, PTSD and depression. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s impairment or

combination of impairments do not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light

work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except no ladders, scaffolds, vibration, or

hazards, and a limitation to work involving simple repetitive tasks and limited public contact.

Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be able to perform the

requirements of representative occupations such as a small parts assembler (DOT 929.587-

010), textile filler (DOT 780.687-046), and textile folder (DOT 789.687-066).1

 Accordingly,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from October 18, 2006, through

the date of the decision. 

 

 III. STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal error

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 The report is stamped “confidential,” leading the Court to wonder if sealed or

confidential documents are filed separately from the main file.

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or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on a report by Dr. Davis Suskind dated

February 9, 2009. According to Plaintiff, this report is not actually included in the

administrative record.

The report is included as Exhibit 27F in the Court’s certified copy of the administrative

record (AR 702-714) and is listed in the “Court Transcript Index” dated February 3, 2010.

According to Defendant, their copy of the administrative record also includes Exhibit 27F.

The Court assumes that Plaintiff contends that Exhibit 27F is missing from the original

administrative file.2 The Court has no way of knowing whether this is the case.

However, whether Exhibit 27F is part of the original administrative file or not, it

appears that Plaintiff may not have had an adequate opportunity to address Dr. Suskind’s

report. During the July 9, 2009 hearing, the ALJ referred to Exhibits 1-25 only. (AR 30.)

Exhibits 26F and 27F appear to have been faxed on July 8, 2009, a day before the hearing.

The fact that no mention was made of Exhibits 26F and 27F at the hearing indicates that the

ALJ did not consider these exhibits until after the hearing. However, it does not appear that

Plaintiff was notified of the ALJ’s consideration of this additional evidence or given the

opportunity to respond to Dr. Suskind’s report.

Courts have held that an ALJ denies a claimant due process by considering a posthearing vocational or medical report without giving the claimant an opportunity to crossexamine the vocational expert or physician or otherwise present rebuttal evidence. In Allison

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v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1983), the Tenth Circuit held: “An ALJ’s use of a

post-hearing report constitutes a denial of due process because the applicant is not given

the opportunity to cross-examine the physician or rebut the report.” Similarly, in Wallace v.

Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit explained, “We believe, however,

that it is unmistakable under the statute that the Secretary may not rely on post-hearing

reports without giving the claimant an opportunity to cross-examine the authors of such

reports, when such cross-examination may be required for a full and true disclosure of the

facts.” See also Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that claimant

was denied due process where the Appeals Council considered materials not presented at

the ALJ hearing – a report of a doctor the claimant saw after the hearing in addition to new

materials from the file of a VA hospital where the claimant had been previously treated —

without giving the claimant the opportunity to subpoena and cross-examine the doctor). 

Furthermore, the Social Security Administration’s own regulations provide for giving

the claimant notice of evidence obtained or developed after the hearing and the opportunity

to review and comment on the additional evidence:

Opportunity to review and comment on evidence obtained or developed by us

after the hearing. If, for any reason, additional evidence is obtained or

developed by us after your disability hearing, and all evidence taken together

can be used to support a reconsidered determination that is unfavorable to you

with regard to the medical factors of eligibility, we will notify you, in writing, and

give you an opportunity to review and comment on the additional evidence.

You will be given 10 days from the date you receive our notice to submit your

comments (in writing or, in appropriate cases, by telephone), unless there is

good cause for granting you additional time, as illustrated by the examples in

§ 404.911(b). Your comments will be considered before a reconsidered

determination is issued. If you believe that it is necessary to have further

opportunity for a hearing with respect to the additional evidence, a

supplementary hearing may be scheduled at your request. Otherwise, we will

ask for your written comments on the additional evidence, or, in appropriate

cases, for your telephone comments.

20 C.F.R. § 404.916(f). It does not appear that Plaintiff received any such notice.

To make matters worse, it appears that Plaintiff may not have ever seen the report or

known of its existence. The report itself states: “I would recommend that this psychiatric reevaluation be kept CONFIDENTIAL. This report should be used only for forensic (workers

compensation) purposes. It should not be made available to Mr. Millican or to his employer

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or supervisors. This report could be detrimental or psychologically harmful to Mr. Millican or

to others, if he should read and misunderstand or misinterpret its contents.” (AR 713.)

If the ALJ’s failure to give Plaintiff an opportunity to comment on Dr. Suskind’s report

was harmless error, no remand would be necessary. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 20 Fed.

Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that any error that may have resulted from the claimant’s

inability to comment on post-hearing reports was harmless). However, the Court cannot

reach such a conclusion. In his report, Dr. Suskind opined that Plaintiff was only minimally

psychiatrically impaired in his capacity to comprehend and follow instructions and perform

simple and repetitive tasks, and had “very slight” impairment with respect to ability to

maintain an appropriate work pace, perform complex and varied tasks, relate to others,

effectively influence people on a consistent basis, make decisions and evaluations without

immediate supervision, and accept and carry out responsibility for direction, control, and

planning. (AR 712.) The ALJ placed significant weight on Dr. Suskind’s report in rejecting

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his disabling symptoms and limitations. (AR 15.)

Because there is a question as to whether Plaintiff had notice or knowledge of the

ALJ’s post-hearing consideration of Dr. Suskind’s report, the Court vacates the ALJ’s

decision and remands the case so that Plaintiff can be afforded the opportunity to rebut the

evidence and/or request an additional hearing. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED, and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The ALJ’s

decision is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this

decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 9, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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