Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00854/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00854-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVIS MORENO CONSTRUCTION, )

INC., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

FRONTIER STEEL BUILDINGS )

CORPORATION, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-08-854 OWW/SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL (Docs.

71 & 71)

Before the Court is Defendant Frontier Steel Building

Corporation's ("Frontier") motion for certification of

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule

5(a)(3), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Frontier seeks 1

Rule 5(a)(3), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 1

(a) Petition for Permission to Appeal.

...

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certification of interlocutory appeal of the Memorandum Decision

and Order filed November 9, 2009, (November 9 Memorandum

Decision, Doc. 66), which denied Frontier's motion for

reconsideration of the Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May

26, 2009, (Doc. 37), denying Frontier's motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction and for change of venue or to

transfer.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides:

When a district judge, in making in a civil

action an order not otherwise appealable

under this section, shall be of the opinion

that such order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation, he shall so

state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an

appeal of such action may thereupon, in its

discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from

such order, if application is made to it

within ten days after the entry of the order;

Provided, however, That application for an

appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings

in the district court unless the district

judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge

thereof shall so order.

The party seeking interlocutory review “‘has the burden of

persuading the court of appeals that exceptional circumstances

(3) If a party cannot petition for appeal

unless the district court first enters an

order granting permission to do so or stating

that the necessary conditions are met, the

district court may amend its order, either on

its own or in response to a party’s motion, to

include the required permission or statement. 

In that event, the time to petition runs from

entry of the amended order.

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justify a departure from the basis policy of postponing appellate

review until after the entry of a final judgment.’” Coopers &

Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). The standard to

certify a question of law is high and a district court generally

should not permit such an appeal where “it would prolong the

litigation rather than advance its resolution.” Syufy Enter. v.

Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 694 F.Supp. 725, 729 (N.D.Cal.1988). 

Section 1292(b) is to be used only in exceptional situations in

which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and

expensive litigation. United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359

F.2d 784, 785 (9 Cir. 1966). Plaintiff must demonstrate that th

(1) there is a controlling question of law, (2) that there are

substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and (3) that an

immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d

1020, 1026 (9 Cir. 1982). “‘In applying these standards, the th

court must weigh the asserted need for the proposed interlocutory

appeal with the policy in the ordinary case of discouraging

“piecemeal appeals.”’” Association of Irritated Residents v. Fred

Schakel Dairy, 634 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1087 (E.D.Cal.2008).

Frontier seeks certification of the following issues for

interlocutory appeal:

1. Whether the Court abused its discretion

or erred as a matter of law in refusing to

enforce the parties’ bargained for choice of

Colorado law contract provision;

2. Whether the Court erred as a matter of

law in its application of the California

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Contractor’s License statute to a Colorado

Defendant, a party who contract to design and

supply, but not erect, a pre-engineered steel

building for a California Project;

3. Whether the Court erred as a matter of

law or abused its discretion by failing to

apply the appropriate burden of proof

required to sustain Plaintiff’s Complaint,

including the burden of proof for purposes of

determining whether Defendant may be subject

to the California Contractor’s License

statute or the Court may refuse to enforce a

bargained for choice of Colorado law.

Frontier asserts that these issues should be certified

because they “may be controlling issues of law,” “are too

important to deny review because, in a diversity action, they

void a bargained for choice of Colorado law clause and apply a

California statute which may include disgorgement remedies; both

on which materially control the scope of trial and both of which

materially alter the remedies available to the Court,” and

because “[a]s a practical matter, a Colorado Defendant may be

unable to obtain a fair review of a judgment pursuant to the

California Contractor License Law because of the extraordinary

bankrupting character of the remedies of that law, and the

operation of the rules on appeal.” 

2

Frontier contends that the Court “has previously evidenced 2

the significance of the issues presented by publishing its opinion

in this case.” The May 26, 2009 Memorandum Decision denying

Frontier’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, for

change of venue to transfer action is reported by Westlaw as Davis

Moreno Const., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs., 2009 WL 1476990

(E.D.Cal., May 26, 2009). The November 9, 2009 Memorandum Decision

denying Frontier’s motion for reconsideration is reported by

Westlaw as Davis Moreno Const., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs., 2009

WL 3763706 (E.D.Cal., Nov. 9, 2009). The Court played no part in

Westlaw’s decision to report either of these Memorandum Decisions. 

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Frontier has not sustained its burden of proof that the

three specified issues are controlling issues of law with respect

to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion. 

Frontier’s contentions pertinent to enforcement of the

contractual choice of law provision and the applicability of

California’s contractor licensing provisions posed a mixed

question of law and fact which could not be finally resolved in

the November 9 Memorandum. The issue there was reconsideration

of the Court’s ruling that this Court possesses personal

jurisdiction over Frontier and that venue in this district is

appropriate. 

Further, Frontier has not carried its burden of

demonstrating that immediate appeal of the three issues will

materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. 

Frontier’s primary concern is that the remedies that might be

applied should Davis Moreno prevail in this litigation will be

more onerous than those that might be applied under Colorado law. 

These concerns have little or nothing to do with advancing the

ultimate termination of the litigation by an interlocutory

appeal. They turn rather on conflict of laws jurisprudence and

the mutual intent of the contracting parties, matters to be

resolved at trial based on mixed questions of law and fact. 

CONCLUSION

There is a question of fact whether the parties modified

The Court did not direct that either be reported or published and

neither has been reported in West’s official reports. 

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Frontier’s purchase order to authorize the complaining party to

establish jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Frontier’s application for

certification of an interlocutory appeal will do nothing to

achieve termination of the case. Once jurisdiction and choice of

law are resolved, the case will have to be tried to resolve the

underlying contractual dispute over the California public works

project. Frontier has not carried its burden of demonstrating

exceptional circumstances pursuant to the Section 1292(b) factors

that justify certification of immediate appeal.

For the reasons stated, Frontier’s motion for certification

of interlocutory appeal is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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