Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS BALDWIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JACOB CUTTING et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No.: 3:16-CV-903-L-KSC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pending before the Court in this civil rights action is Defendants’ joint motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. no. 44.) The motion is fully briefed and 

submitted without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons 

which follow, Defendants’ motion is granted without leave to amend.

I. Background

According to the allegations in the first amended complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff was 

employed by the United States Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”). (FAC ¶ 7.) In the course 

of his employment, he befriended San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Jessica Leon. (Id.

¶ 13.) Subsequently, Leon’s relative David William Centrone became a suspect in an 

investigation of the West Coast Crips, commenced by the East County Gang Task Force 

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(“ECG Task Force”). (Id. ¶ 16.) The ECG Task Force believed that Leon leaked

information about the investigation to Centrone. (Id. ¶ 17.) They tapped her mobile 

phone. (Id.)

Because of the wiretap, the ECG Task Force members had access to text messages 

between Plaintiff and Leon. (FAC ¶ 17.) Leon was Plaintiff's confidante about his

romantic relationship with San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy Sharlene Wilson, the exwife of Defendant Jacob Cutting, a SWAT officer at the El Cajon Police Department. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) The wiretap revealed a number of text messages which "dealt heavily with the 

relationship between [Plaintiff] and Wilson." (Id. ¶ 17.) The messages also "made 

disparaging remarks about the investigation and those conducting it, implying their 

incompetence," "discussed [Plaintiff’s] plans to apply for a job with the San Diego 

Sheriff's Department," and "mentioned Cutting in very negative tones[, including] how 

Cutting was threatening [Plaintiff] and how [Plaintiff] was planning on dealing with the 

situation . . .." (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.) 

Defendants Kai Mandelleh, also a SWAT officer with El Cajon Police 

Department,1and Zeath Sanchez, a San Diego County Deputy Sheriff, both detectives 

with the ECG Task Force, investigated Plaintiff's association with Leon to find out if she 

was the leak, and if she obtained any relevant information from Plaintiff. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 

18, 22.) Plaintiff claims the suspicion was unreasonable, because he had no contact with 

ECG Task Force members during the relevant time, and therefore would have had no 

information to give Leon. (Id. ¶ 32.) Mandelleh and Sanchez interviewed Plaintiff 

ostensibly about the leak; however, they did not ask any questions about that, but instead 

showed Plaintiff text messages he had exchanged with Leon that "were personal in 

nature, pertaining strictly to [Plaintiff's] relationship with . . . Wilson." (Id. ¶¶ 19, 26.) 

Sanchez and Mandelleh concluded that Plaintiff "did not provide sensitive information to 

 

1 Cutting and Mandelleh allegedly knew each other. (FAC ¶ 4.)

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. . . Leon and . . . he became upset [at the interview] because the Detectives had 

intercepted personal information about him." (Id. ¶ 28.)

After the interview, the ECG Task Force reported to the Border Patrol, Plaintiff's 

employer, that he was uncooperative and not forthcoming in the interview. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 

29.) According to Plaintiff, this resulted in a Border Patrol internal investigation. 

Plaintiff denied he was uncooperative or less than forthcoming. (Id. ¶ 30.) His interview 

with Defendants was recorded, but the ECG Task Force refused to provide the recording 

to the Border Patrol for its investigation, leading Plaintiff to contend the failure to 

produce it was to make it more difficult to counter Defndants' report. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 29.) 

As a result of Defendants' report, Plaintiff was transferred to another Border Patrol 

station with downgraded duties, he was no longer able to be assigned to other task forces 

per the ECG Task Force request, and, because the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office as a 

whole no longer considered him trustworthy, Plaintiff would no longer be considered for 

other task force assignments. (FAC ¶¶ 34, 36, 37.) Plaintiff was removed from the 

United States Marshal's San Diego Regional Fugitive Task Force. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 34, 35.) He 

further alleges he is no longer able to pursue a state law enforcement career or testify as 

an agent in federal court. (Id. ¶ 38.) Although Plaintiff was subsequently able to secure a 

position as a Criminal Investigator with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, he 

claims his acceptance was delayed pending the conclusion of Border Patrol's 

investigation, which exonerated him. (Id. ¶ 41.) He is pursuing a grievance through the 

National Border Patrol Council. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants pursued unfounded allegations against him at 

Cutting's request, because he was jealous of Plaintiff's relationship with Wilson, and by 

Sanchez, because Plaintiff had pointed out errors in collecting evidence in Leon's 

investigation. (FAC ¶ 31; see also Opp'n at 5.) Plaintiff claims Defendants' goal was to 

damage his professional reputation and career prospects, as well as precipitate the 

termination of his relationship with Wilson.

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In his amended complaint against Cutting, Mandelleh and Sanchez, Plaintiff 

alleges violations of his constitutional due process and first amendment rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. Discussion

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 622 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, 

a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory, yet fails to 

plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 

530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual 

allegations and construe them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Huynh v. Chase 

Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997, 999 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). However, legal 

conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are couched as factual 

allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Similarly, 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff brings two causes of action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim, Plaintiff must plead that (1) Defendants, acting under color of state law, 

(2) deprived Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. 

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144, 150 (1970). 

A. Due Process

In his first cause of action Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process 

rights by making a false report to his employer, which led to the impairment of his 

reputation for honesty and morality under the “stigma-plus” test. Defendants counter, 

among other things, that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to meet the test. 

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A threshold requirement of a procedural due process claim is a liberty or property 

interest protected by the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 

(1972). Plaintiff alleges infringement of his liberty interest. (FAC ¶ 43; Opp'n at 7 n.5.) 

A liberty interest is implicated in the employment context "if the charge impairs a 

reputation for honesty or morality." Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 529 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 

2009). However, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege more. See Wenger v. Monroe, 

282 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc 

(Apr. 17, 2002). 

[D]ue process protections apply only if a plaintiff is subjected to “'stigma 

plus'; i.e., if the state makes a charge against [a plaintiff] that might seriously 

damage his standing and associations in the community,” and “1) the 

accuracy of the charge is contested, 2) there is some public disclosure of the 

charge, and 3) it is made in connection with the termination of employment 

or the alteration of some right or status recognized by state law.

Id. (quoting Llamas v. Butte County College Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In Wenger, the plaintiff, a colonel in California National Guard, was being 

considered for promotion when he spoke as a guest speaker at a dining-in event hosted by 

the Guard. 282 F.3d at 1070-71. After the event, some of the attendees stayed for adult 

entertainment. When Col. Wenger noticed this, he immediately left. The Guard initiated 

an investigation into the post-event entertainment. Pending the investigation, it 

suspended all favorable personnel actions, including Wenger's promotion, which included 

placing a "flag" on Wenger's file, and requesting the return of his personnel file from the 

United States Department of the Army, which was to recognize his promotion. The flag 

on Wenger's file triggered the Army to commence its own inquiry. Because Wenger was 

also a lecturer at the Army War College, the Guard informed the college of the flag, and 

the college informed Wenger that he would not be invited back. Id. at 1070-71. Due to 

the ongoing investigation, and the Guard's "up or out" policy, Wenger was forced into 

retirement before his consideration for promotion could resume. Id. at 1071 & n.2.

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Wenger filed an action against the Guard arguing it violated his due process rights 

by impairing his liberty interest in good name and reputation. Id. at 1073. The court 

analyzed the claim under the "stigma plus" test. Id. at 1074. It found that the 

consequences of the Guard's investigation did not amount to a disciplinary action or 

termination against him, and he was retired not due to the investigation, but "in due 

course as required by law." Id. The Guard's communications with the Army and the 

Army War College about the flag on Wenger's file did not amount to public disclosure, 

because the disclosures were made to other branches of the military and not to the public, 

and were not "made in connection with termination of Wenger's employment, or the 

alteration of some right recognized by state law." Id. n.5. Accordingly, the court 

concluded that Wenger did not establish a violation of his due process rights. Id. at 1074.

The consequences of Defendants' actions in the pending case are less severe than 

those suffered by Wenger. See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 

1988) ("The facts in this case are not nearly as egregious . . .."). Like Plaintiff's task

force assignments here, Wenger lost the ability to participate in lucrative special 

assignments such as teaching at the Army War College. With retirement, however, 

Wenger also lost all opportunities for advancement. On the other hand, Plaintiff 

remained employed by the Border Patrol, albeit at another station with reduced duties. 

(FAC ¶37.) A transfer, even with reduced duties, does not rise to the level of a due 

process violation. Learned, 860 F.2d at 930, 933 (no violation where plaintiff transferred 

to another division with reduced responsibilities); see also Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1128 (a 

bar from any future employment with a school district not sufficient to state a claim

because it allowed for employment elsewhere); Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 

F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (no violation where plaintiff transferred to another school in 

the same school district). In addition to continued employment with the same agency, 

Plaintiff's application to work as a Criminal Investigator with Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement was successful. (FAC ¶41.) 

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Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends Defendants' disclosure caused an "alteration of 

some right or status recognized by state law.” Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1074. He asserts that 

as a law enforcement officer he must be able to testify as a witness, and that he is now 

less effective. For example, he points out that federal prosecutors have a policy to ask 

law enforcement witnesses "whether they ever have been accused of perjury or told they 

were considered untrustworthy." (FAC ¶38.) He argues his status has been altered 

because of the “reluctance of prosecutors to work with" him based on the false accusation 

of untrustworthiness. (Opp'n at 10.) He also argues that the fact that he would have to 

disclose he is considered untrustworthy has rendered him less desirable as an agent. 

Accepting Plaintiff's contenntion at face value, he has not shown that his desirability as 

an agent or effectiveness as a witness is a "right or status recognized by state law," as 

required by the "stigma plus" test. See Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1074. This alone is 

sufficient to dismiss Plaintiff's due process claim.

Alternatively, the claim is dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged the 

stigmatizing charge was publicly disclosed. He alleges internal dissemination of the 

statements, i.e., that the ECG Task Force “reported to the Border Patrol that he had been 

questioned and was uncooperative and not forthcoming." (FAC. ¶20.) However, 

disclosure within or between government agencies is not a public disclosure. Wenger, 

282 F.3d at 1074 n.5.

Plaintiff also argues he made a public disclosure to the National Border Patrol 

Council when he filed a grievance. (FAC ¶ 40; Opp'n at 9.) He suggests that because the 

National Border Patrol Council is not a governmental agency his disclosure was public. 

(Opp'n at 9.) The alleged disclosure, however, was not public because “due process 

rights are not implicated by [one's] own disclosures.” Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1130-31.

Next, Plaintiff suggests that his self-disclosure of "the effect of Defendants' 

accusations on his own cases" (Opp'n at 9) is a public disclosure. These disclosures also 

do not meet the "stigma plus" test because they were made by Plaintiff himself within the 

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pertinent government agencies for a limited purpose. See Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1130-31;

Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1074 n.5. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that “a public disclosure occurs when, as here, the 

interagency sharing of information stigmatizes the plaintiff throughout the federal 

government.” (Opp'n at 9.) He cites two cases from the Seventh Circuit: Larry v. Lawler, 

605 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1978), and Hannon v. Turnage, 892 F.2d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 

1990). 

In Larry, the plaintiff sued the Civil Service Commission because it had published 

false statements regarding his use of intoxicating beverages, and rated him “ineligible” 

for federal employment, which resulted in a bar from all federal employment for three 

years. Larry, 605 F.2d at 955-56. These facts led the court to determine plaintiff had an 

actionable claim under the “stigma plus” test. Id. at 959. Larry is distinguishable

because Plaintiff continues to work as a law enforcement officer for the federal 

government.

Hannon noted that Larry was an exception to the general rule that “there is 

generally no abridgement of a liberty interest when the government circulates 

information among a limited number of agencies for a specified purpose.” Hannon, 892 

F.2d at 660. The court did not find that exception to apply where the Veterans 

Administration shared with the Office of Personnel Management the reason for plaintiff’s 

dismissal. Id. As in Hannon, Defendants' disclosures were to related government 

agencies rather than the public. Hannon and Larry therefore do not support Plaintiff's 

argument.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff does not state a claim for violation of his due 

process rights under the “stigma-plus” test. The Court next considers whether to grant 

leave to amend. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 15 

advises leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC 

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v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as undue delay, bad 

faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the 

amendment, etc. – the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely 

given. 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Dismissal without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by amendment. See id.

Plaintiff was previously granted leave to amend his due process claim because it 

appeared possible he could allege a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (Order 

Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (doc. no. 37) at 9.) His amended complaint did 

not bear this out. The Court declines leave to amend the same claim again. See Salameh 

v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) ("A district court's discretion to 

deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff has previously amended.") 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 

552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff's first cause of action for violation of his 

due process rights is therefore dismissed without leave to amend.

B. First Amendment

In his second cause of acton Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his first 

amendment right against retaliation for protected speech. See Hagen v. City of Eugene, 

736 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 2013.) To determine whether Plaintiff can state a claim, 

the Court must consider the following factors:

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the 

plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the 

plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate 

justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the 

general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse 

employment action even absent the protected speech.

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Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)(brackets in original)(quoting 

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 301 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 

Among other things, Defendants argue that the speech for which Plaintiff was 

allegedly retaliated did not address a public concern. Plaintiff bears the burden on this 

issue. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070. "The public concern inquiry is purely a question of law . . 

.." Id. "If the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern, then the 

speech is unprotected . . .." Id. at 1070-71. If Plaintiff cannot prevail on this issue, he 

cannot prevail on his first amendment claim. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 

1067 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) ("all five factors are independently necessary" and 

"failure to meet any one of them is fatal to the plaintiff's case").

Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered 

to relate to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. 

But speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and 

that would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance 

of governmental agencies is generally not of public concern. Whether an 

employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined 

by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 

whole record.

Id. at 1070 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff maintains that the speech for which he was retaliated addressed a matter 

of public concern because it "discuss[ed] in general terms the hypothetical bases for a 

criminal investigation which might implicate . . . Leon . . .." (Opp'n at 13, see also FAC 

¶ 56 ("Plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern insofar as his private communications 

were addressed to a friend and law enforcement colleague who has some questions and 

concerns about her possible status.").) 

Plaintiff's argument is contradicted "by the content, form, and context [of his 

statements], as revealed by the whole record." Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1067 n.4. Plaintiff 

alleges that Sanchez and Mandelleh interviewed him at Cutting's request (see Opp'n at 5 

(Mandelleh and Sanchez "acceeded to . . . Cutting's desire to retaliate against Plaintiff")), 

and retaliated against him because "Cutting was jealous of the relationship between 

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[Plaintiff] and Wilson," "Cutting believed it would precipitate the termination of 

[Plaintiff's] relationship with Wilson," and "Sanchez became angry when [Plaintiff] 

pointed out Sanchez's error in the collection of evidence and possession of personal text 

messages." (FAC ¶ 31.) 

Plaintiff's statements about his relationship with Wilson are undoubtedly personal 

in nature. His statements about the impropriety of Sanchez' possession of purely personal

text messages unrelated to the leak investigation and any other criticism of the evidence 

collection in the investigation are also personal in nature, because Plaintiff's interview

originated in Cutting's desire to interfere in Plaintiff's relationship with Wilson. Plaintiff 

has alleged no facts to indicate that the evidence collection errors, including failure to 

observe minimization rules, were present in any other investigations but his. He claims 

he was sigled out, and violations committed against him, because of Cutting's jealousy. 

His statements do not amount to a matter of public concern such as disclosing an 

improper law enforcement practice or policy, but to a personal matter. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was retaliated against for speaking on matters of public 

concern.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for violation of his first 

amendment rights. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1067 n.4. As with the due process claim, 

leave to amend the first amendment claim is not warranted despite the liberal policy 

favoring amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1051. 

Plaintiff was already granted leave to more fully articulate his first amendment claim in 

light of Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's speech was not protected. (See doc. no. 37 

at 4 n.1; Mem. of P.&A. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (doc. no. 24-1) at 8-9 

(motion to dismiss the initial complaint).) As Plaintiff has been unable to sufficiently 

amend this claim, and it does not appear possible, in light of the facts already alleged, 

that Plaintiff could allege speech on matters of public concern, leave to amend is denied 

as futile. See Salameh, 726 F.3d 1133; Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1007.

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III. Conclusion and Order

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2018

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