Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02560/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02560-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Rule 37 provides in pertinent part: “A party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response

to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to

use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so

disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(c)(1).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUMBOLDT BAYKEEPER and

ECOLOGICAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02560 JSW

ORDER REGARDING MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION AND

OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES

FROM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of this Court’s order

denying their Motion in limine No. 1 with respect to undisclosed witnesses. Rule 26 requires

parties to disclose the identity of their expert witnesses “accompanied by a written report

prepared and signed by the witness.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Parties are required to serve

their opening and expert rebuttal reports “at the times and in the sequence directed by the

court.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26 (a)(2)(c). “Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these requirements by

forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not

properly disclosed.”1

 Yetti by Molly Ltd v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2001). This rule excludes untimely expert witness testimony, unless the “parties’ failure to

disclose the required information is substantially justified or harmless.” Id.; see also Carson

Case 3:06-cv-02560-JSW Document 406 Filed 05/27/10 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 22038700, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Excluding

expert evidence as a sanction for failure to disclose expert witnesses in a timely fashion is

automatic and mandatory unless the party can show the violation is either justified or

harmless.”) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating

their failure was either substantially justified or harmless. Yetti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107.

Defendants try to avoid the disclosure and reporting requirements of Rule 26(a) by

arguing that these witnesses are “non-retained” experts and, thus, may provide testimony based

on personal knowledge of a factual situation. However, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence

701, lay witnesses may testify based upon their experience, but they may not provide opinions

“based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 701; see also United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that opinion by lay witness on observations that were not “common” but

required demonstrable expertise was improper). The purpose of this limitation is “to eliminate

the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple

expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory

Committee Notes (2000 Amendment). Thus, “[t]he mere percipience of a witness to the facts

on which he wishes to tender an opinion does not trump Rule 702.” Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d

at 1246. Even the authority Defendants rely on concludes that “[i]f the proposed testimony of a

non-retained expert witness identified pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(A) will exceed the scope of the

individual’s percipient knowledge and ventures into more general expert testimony, a report

will be required.” Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

51171, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2008). 

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Defendants seek to have each of these

three witnesses testify on matters based on their expertise and not merely their percipient

observations. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated that their failure to timely disclose

these witnesses as experts was either harmless or justified. Therefore, the GRANTS Plaintiffs’

partial motion for reconsideration and HEREBY EXCLUDES Frans Lowman, Dr. Terry

Huffman, and John Winzler from testifying at trial.

Case 3:06-cv-02560-JSW Document 406 Filed 05/27/10 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court also addresses the following issues outstanding from the pretrial conference

held on February 16, 2010:

(1) Plaintiffs’ Motion in limine No. 1 with respect to excluding certain documents is

GRANTED as to Exhibits 2097, 2172, 2193, 2196, 2249, 2254-56, 2308-74. Plaintiffs’ Motion

in limine No. 1 is DENIED with respect to Exhibits 2173-2183 to the extent that Defendants

seeks to use these exhibits to support an argument other than the State owns a portion of the

Balloon Track.

(2) With respect to Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 4, to the extent that Defendants seek

to argue that the pipes are not physically located on the Balloon Track, they may make that

argument based on documents that have been properly produced. However, Defendants are

precluded from arguing that the pipes may be physically on the property but are owned by the

State.

(3) Defendant North Coast Railroad Authority (“NCRA”) asserted, for the first time, in

its pretrial conference statement, that Plaintiffs’ claim against it under the Clean Water Act is

preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), 49

U.S.C. § 10501(b). First, the Court notes that the strength of NCRA’s conviction that this

matter is preempted is belied by NCRA’s significant delay in raising this issue. Second, and

more importantly, the Court finds that NCRA fails to demonstrate that the Clean Water Act

claim is actually preempted by the ICCTA. The ICCTA provides that the Surface

Transportation Board (“STB”) will have exclusive jurisdiction over “the construction,

acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or

side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one

State.” See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2). The ICCTA further provides that “the remedies provided

under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the

remedies provided under Federal or State law.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). 

Despite the broad language of the ICCTA, both courts and the STB have limited the

preemptive scope of this Act. As the Eleventh Circuit held, the express preemption of the

ICCTA, “applies only to state laws ‘with respect to regulation of rail transportation.’” Florida

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 NCRA’s reliance on City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998)

is misplaced. In Auburn, the court merely held that the ICCTA preempted local regulations

regarding the function and operation of rail lines. The court noted that if the local authority

had the ability to impose permitting regulations on the reopening of a rail line, such power

would amount to “economic regulation” if the carrier were prevented from conducting such

activity. Id. The Clean Water Act was not at issue in Auburn.

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East Coast Railway Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)) (emphasis in original). ICCTA preemption only displaces

“‘regulation,’ i.e., those state laws that may reasonably be said to have the effect of ‘managing]’

or ‘governing]’ rail transportation” and permits “the continued application of laws having a

more remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.” Id. (finding that the enforcement of

existing zoning ordinances of general applicability were not preempted); see also Association of

American Railroads v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

65685, * 14 (C.D. Cal. April 30, 2007) (finding the Clean Air Act was not preempted, noting

that the “STB has repeatedly held that ‘nothing in section 10501(b) is intended to interfere with

the role of state and local agencies in implementing Federal environmental statutes, such as the

Clean Air Act, the [Clean Water Act], and the [Safe Drinking Water Act].’”) (quoting Boston

and Maine Corp. and Town of Ayer, MA, STB Finance Docket No. 33971, 2001 WL 458685, at

*5 (STB, Apr. 30, 2001)).2

The STB has made clear that “[n]othing in section 10501(b) is intended to interfere with

the role of state and local agencies in implementing Federal environmental statutes, such as the

Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, unless the regulation is

being applied in such a manner as to unduly restrict the railroad from conducting its operations

or unreasonably burden interstate commerce.” See Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket

No. 33966, 2001 WL 928949, *4 (STB, Aug. 10, 2001); see also Boston and Maine Corp. and

Town of Ayer, MA, STB Finance Docket No. 33971, 2001 WL 458685, at *5 (STB, Apr. 30,

2001). NCRA’s only argument that Plaintiffs’ attempted enforcement of the Clean Water Act

unreasonably burdens interstate commerce is that the cost of litigating this action is high. 

NCRA fails to provide any authority demonstrating that the mere cost of litigating a claim may

be found to unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Moreover, if NCRA truly believed that

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs’ claim against it was preempted, it could have moved to dismiss this claim when it

was first filed and, thus, sought to limit the cost of the litigation. The Court finds that the

application of the Clean Water Act to NCRA in this action is not preempted by the ICCTA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02560-JSW Document 406 Filed 05/27/10 Page 5 of 5