Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02367/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kurt Adam Oldenburg, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Laura Ridge, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 14-02367-PHX-PGR (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT: 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 14). This matter is before 

the undersigned on referral from the District Judge. The Court has a continuing 

obligation to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against an officer or 

employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The screening 

requirement extends to proposed amended complaints. Because a magistrate judge 

cannot decide a “matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition 

challenging the conditions of confinement,” Rule 72(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the undersigned recommends as follows. 

I. Background

 Plaintiff Kurt Adam Oldenburg filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

and dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff filed a First 

Amended Complaint (Doc 8) and the Court ordered Defendants Ridge and Pierce to 

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answer Plaintiff’s ADA claim in Count One and the Eighth Amendment medical claim in 

Count Two regarding Plaintiff’s discharge from the MTU. (Doc. 9.) The Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s claim in Count Two that he was placed in an isolation cell as 

punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. Id. The Court also dismissed 

Defendant Rios and the claim in Count Three that Defendant Rios failed to provide 

mental health care in violation of the Eight Amendment. Id.

 Plaintiff has now filed a motion (Doc. 14) for leave to file his proposed Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) lodged at Doc. 15. 

II. Standard for Granting or Denying a Motion to Amend 

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 governs amendments to pleadings generally. Except when an 

amendment is pleaded as a “matter of course,” as defined by the rule, “a party may 

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts must “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. 

Requests for leave are generally granted with “extreme liberality.” Moss v. U. S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, granting a plaintiff 

leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue 

prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” Bowles v. Reade, 

198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires dismissal of allegations that fail to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted prior to ordering service of an amended 

complaint on the added defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); see, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 

531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial 

of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 

(9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately 

“subject to dismissal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, accepting all of the facts alleged as true. See Steckman v. 

Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). In screening complaints, the 

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Court must liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

 Plaintiff’s proposed SAC attempts to cure the deficiencies in his Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Rios and seeks to add new defendants and new 

causes of action. 

III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints: 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. 

at 681. 

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 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520–21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

IV. Second Amended Complaint

 Plaintiff’s nine-count SAC names the following Defendants: Lead Psych 

Associate Laura Ridge, Deputy Warden Pierce, Psych Associate Elizabeth Rios, Psych 

Associate Elizabeth Fortune, Psych Associate James R. Gilchrist, Psychiatrist Winsky, 

Deputy Warden Stemple, Warden Therese Schroeder, Assistant Deputy Warden Cox, CO 

IV Bartuccio, Nursing Supervisor Venus David, Lead Psychologist Shelly Wolf, and Jane 

and/or John Doe(s). 

 Plaintiff claims that he was incarcerated at ASPC-Phoenix in the Men’s Treatment 

Unit (“MTU”) from February 11, 2014 to March 4, 2014. MTU is an intensive mental 

health care unit designed specifically to treat inmates suffering from serious mental 

illnesses and other psychological disorders who “exhibit functional impairment in the 

general population.” Plaintiff states that he was designated as seriously mentally ill and 

suffers from schizoaffective disorder with risk of deterioration and co-morbidities, 

antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and schizophrenia. 

 From February 13, 2014 through February 22, 2014, Plaintiff was unable to 

contact his sister and became distraught, “manifesting deterioration in routine functioning 

as evidenced by loss of cognitive and volitional control to such a degree that he 

repeatedly beseeched . . . staff members to contact his [sister] . . . to no avail.” On 

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February 21, 2014, “Psych Associate” Coyer met with Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff for his 

sister’s phone number. Coyer called, received no answer, and told Plaintiff that when 

Coyer makes contact, he will call for Plaintiff. On February 22, 2014, Coyer summoned 

Plaintiff to his office and allowed Plaintiff to speak with his sister on the phone. 

 On March 4, 2014, Defendant Ridge called Plaintiff to her office and informed 

Plaintiff that she was placing him on suicide watch “due to plaintiff being (verbally) 

placed on report for a rule infraction.” Defendant Ridge accused Plaintiff of 

manipulating staff in order to receive the phone call to his sister. Defendant Pierce 

arrived shortly thereafter and berated Plaintiff for manipulating staff and stated that 

Defendant Pierce was the one who let Plaintiff “come here” and that he would “think 

about letting [Plaintiff] come back while [he is] in watch.” Plaintiff was then transferred 

to a psychiatric isolation cell in the Flaminco Unit. 

 On March 5, 2014, psychologist Dr. Jason Newell “countermanded and reversed” 

Defendant Ridge’s decision to place Plaintiff on suicide watch. Later that day, Dr. 

Newell informed Plaintiff that Defendants Ridge and Pierce had discharged Plaintiff from 

MTU. On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Tucson, Whetstone Unit. 

 In a March 25, 2014 meeting, Defendant Rios informed Plaintiff that Defendant 

Rios had personally participated in a statewide mental health teleconference with the 

clinical team in Phoenix at MTU, concerning Plaintiff’s readmission to MTU. Defendant 

Rios stated to Plaintiff that “the decision by the clinical team at MTU was that plaintiff 

could re-apply to MTU in one (calendar) year from the date of his discharge.” Defendant 

Rios further stated to Plaintiff that if he follows her instructions he could go to mental 

health treatment at Flaminco Unit in ninety days. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rios 

told him that he was not to attempt to contact her “via an uninvited visit”; he was not to 

submit Health Needs Requests as an excuse to see her and that he would receive a 

disciplinary ticket if he did so; and that he was to wait until called for weekly meetings. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rios failed to meet with Plaintiff on a weekly 

basis, and when she did meet with Plaintiff the meetings lasted no more than five 

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minutes. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rios met with Plaintiff on June 4, 2014, to 

discuss a grievance Plaintiff had filed. Defendant Rios told Plaintiff that the reason she 

was not calling him for the weekly meetings was because Corizon does not provide 

sufficient mental health staff to allow her to meet with Plaintiff weekly as promised 

because she has too many patients on her caseload. 

 Plaintiff claims that on September 17, 2014, he met with Defendant Rios to 

request his return to MTU, and Defendant Rios told him that he had to wait one year 

before MTU would even consider whether to take him back. 

 On October 16, 2014, Plaintiff met with Psych Associate Gilchrist and requested 

non-pharmaceutical mental health treatment through mental health programming, 

services, and activities at Whetstone. Defendant Gilchrist responded “[t]hat’s just not 

going to happen here, I’m sorry.” Plaintiff alleges that on October 17, 2014, he learned 

that the clinical team had considered his request to return to MTU and had decided that 

Plaintiff could reapply 90 days from the date of his discharge, not one year. 

 Psyche Associate Elizabeth Fortune succeeded Defendant Rios and took over the 

mental health caseload for Corizon and the referrals for the MTU. Plaintiff was 

reassigned to Defendant Fortune and met with her on October 17, 2014. At the meeting, 

Defendant Fortune indicated that she was aware of Plaintiff’s mental health condition and 

aware of Defendant Rio’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s one-year wait to return to 

MTU. Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Fortune about the 90-day reapplication 

determination made by the team in Phoenix. Defendant Fortune stated she would discuss 

that matter with Psych Associate James R. Gilchrist, and would call Plaintiff in one week 

to discuss the matter. 

 When Defendant Fortune failed to call for Plaintiff in one week, Plaintiff initiated 

a meeting with Defendant Fortune on October 27, 2014. Plaintiff again requested mental 

health treatment and Defendant Fortune responded “[t]hat will not happen anytime in the 

near future.” Defendant Fortune told Plaintiff that she believed that Plaintiff had misread 

the response from the Director regarding reapplying to the MTU. Plaintiff alleges that 

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Defendant Fortune stated that Plaintiff’s proposal to be immediately returned to MTU 

was denied, she then began to speak of a grievance Plaintiff had filed against Psychiatrist 

Winsky. When Plaintiff requested an application for MTU, Defendant Fortune indicated 

that she would not recommend Plaintiff’s acceptance into MTU because Plaintiff had 

filed grievances against mental health and that is her department. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Fortune stated that Plaintiff’s grievances show that Plaintiff is “in a chaotic, 

confused state” and that Plaintiff should quit filing grievances, get on medication “and 

then we will talk about it.” Defendant Fortune told Plaintiff that MTU had changed their 

requirements and they would not accept Plaintiff if he was not on medication. Defendant 

Fortune then told Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s participation in mental health treatment at 

Whetstone would “not happen anytime in the near future.” 

 On October 30, 2014, Plaintiff requested non-pharmaceutical mental health 

treatment by submitting an HNR. Plaintiff has never been called by any mental health 

staff to discuss the HNR. 

 On November 7, 2014, Plaintiff met with Defendant Gilchrist at the Whetstone 

medical inmate waiting area and told Defendant Gilchrist that Plaintiff had been 

instructed by his attorney from the Arizona Center for Disability Law to fill out an 

application for MTU. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gilchrist refused to give Plaintiff 

an application and indicated that “[w]e’re not going to recommend you and they’re (i.e. 

MTU) not going to accept you.” 

 Defendant Winsky is a psychiatrist at Whetstone Unit. In May, 2014, Plaintiff met 

with Defendant Winsky in response to a Health Needs Request (“HNR”) that Plaintiff 

submitted, complaining of being “discombobulated from being too heavily medicated by 

Def. Winsky on psychotropic medication loxitane.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Winsky responded that Plaintiff had just been “self-medicating for emotional problems 

and insomnia.” On June 1, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an HNR complaining of adverse 

side-effects from the Loxitane causing muscle spasms in Plaintiff’s face and neck 

muscles. On June 10, 2014, Defendant Winsky met with Plaintiff in response to the HNR 

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and discontinued the Loxitane. Plaintiff alleges that he requested prescriptions for 

Seroquel, Brupropion and Adavan, but Defendant Winsky advised Plaintiff that he cannot 

prescribe the requested medications because they are restricted in the ADOC. Plaintiff 

alleges that although this June 10 meeting only lasted two minutes, Defendant Rios 

informed Plaintiff that Defendant Winsky downgraded Plaintiff’s SMI diagnosis, 

classification and determination to “none” after the meeting. Defendant Winsky accessed 

Plaintiff’s mental health records, files and computer files. Defendant Rios clarified to 

Plaintiff that Defendant Winsky cannot do that and that she would correct it. On August 

29, 2014, Plaintiff met with Defendants Rios and Winsky, and when asked what drugs 

Plaintiff thought would work, Plaintiff again requested Seroquel, Bropropion, and 

Adavan. Defendant Winsky responded that he had already told Plaintiff that those are all 

restricted by ADOC policy. 

 On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff met with Defendants Winsky, Gilchrist and 

Fortune. When Plaintiff was called from the waiting room, he asked Officer Haynes if he 

would accompany Plaintiff because Plaintiff was uncomfortable meeting with the 

Defendants by himself in light of the grievances he had filed against the Defendants and 

the lack of witnesses present. Officer Haynes agreed to accompany Plaintiff. Defendant 

Winsky again stated that the medications Plaintiff requested were restricted by ADOC. 

When Plaintiff responded that they both knew that wasn’t true, Defendant Winsky 

indicated that there may be a couple from Alhambra or parole violators that are here for 

a very short period time, like for the weekend. Defendant Winsky also informed Plaintiff 

that Plaintiff’s request to review his mental health records was “very rare” and was being 

denied. Plaintiff then asked Defendant Gilchrist for an application to MTU. Defendant 

Gilchrist responded that they were not going to recommend Plaintiff, and Defendant 

Fortune stated that they were not recommending Plaintiff because he was not stable. 

Plaintiff then asked Defendant Winsky if he was refusing Plaintiff his medication, and he 

replied “no, DOC is.” Plaintiff then asked the Defendants to write down everything that 

they said to Plaintiff during the meeting, and they refused. After the meeting, Plaintiff 

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returned to his housing location and was informed that the Defendants had arranged for 

Plaintiff to be transported to a psychiatric isolation cell at ASPC-Tucson, Rincon Unit via 

radio calls for a transport vehicle, but that the transport had been cancelled just prior to 

Plaintiff arriving back at his housing location. 

 On November 19, 2014, Plaintiff learned from a Corizon nurse that his SMI 

classification had been downgraded to “none” after the November 17th meeting. 

Defendant Gilchrist also informed Plaintiff on November 19, 2014, that they were 

changing his SMI status to “none.” 

 Plaintiff filed and pursued numerous grievances against the Defendants from May 

29, 2014 to December 24, 2014, alleging constitutional violations while he was 

incarcerated at Whetstone. On January 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed a formal grievance against 

Defendant Winsky, and Defendant Bartuccio received, signed, and processed the 

grievance on January 12, 2015. On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff was notified of a “psych 

line 1” appointment scheduled for January 13, 2015. Plaintiff attended the meeting, 

where Defendants Bartuccio, Cox, Stemple, David, Winsky, Gilchrist and Wolf were 

present. Defendant Wolf communicated to Plaintiff that it is the position of the 

Defendants present that Plaintiff is abusing the grievance procedure by filing duplicate 

grievances that are burdening limited resources like staff time. Defendant Stemple 

indicated that filing duplicate grievances was against grievance policy, and that if 

Plaintiff filed any more grievances they will be unprocessed and Plaintiff will receive a 

group B disciplinary violation (i.e. major/felony) for hindering staff. Plaintiff asked if 

this was in relation to his most recent grievance against Defendant Winsky, and 

Defendant Wolf responded that it was not. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Whetstone has two Psych Associates (sometimes only one) 

for approximately 1,250 inmates, approximately 770 inmates have a mental health score 

of three, and approximately 170 inmates are SMI. Plaintiff alleges that Whetstone had 

not had an on-site Psychologist since January, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that Psych 

Associate Fortune possesses only a LISAC—Licensed Substance Abuse Counselor. 

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 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. 

1. Count One

 Count One of Plaintiff’s SAC is Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Ridge 

and Pierce in their official capacities, which the Court previously held was sufficient to 

state a claim. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants Ridge and Pierce be 

required to answer Count One of Plaintiff’s SAC. 

 2. Count Two 

 A. Isolation Cell

 Plaintiff claims Defendants Ridge and Pierce violated his Eighth Amendment 

rights when they placed him in isolation as a form of punishment. Plaintiff claims the 

isolation cell exacerbated his mental illness and that he “experienced debilitating 

deterioration of his mental, moral, and physical health, and suffered through 

uncontrollable apprehension/fright, acute and severe anxiety–seizing his chest . . . in 

conjunction with extremely elevated heart-rate, blood pressure, migraine headaches and 

mental anguish.” 

 “Holding inmates with serious mental illness in prolonged isolated confinement 

may cause serious illness and needless suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1335–36 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Colemen v. 

Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (mentally ill inmates in administrative 

segregation faced substantial risk of serious harm, including exacerbation of mental 

illness and potential increase in suicide risk)). Courts must consider both the length of 

the segregated confinement of inmates with serious mental illness and the specific 

conditions of the confinement, when determining whether segregated confinement meets 

constitutional standards. Graves, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1336 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 

U.S. 678, 686 (1978)). Conditions to be considered include: 

(1) the length of time prisoners with mental illness spent in 

solitary confinement (approximately 22 hours or more a day); 

(2) the extent to which solitary confinement interfered with 

prisoners’ ability to obtain adequate mental health treatment; 

(3) the conditions accompanying the solitary confinement 

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experienced by prisoners with serious mental illness; and (4) 

the extent to which systemic deficiencies at the facility, e.g., 

deficiencies in mental health programming, screening, and 

accountability, contributed to an overreliance on solitary 

confinement as a means of controlling prisoners with serious 

mental illness. 

Id. (citing Coleman v. Brown, CV-90-00520-LKK-DAD, Doc. 4919, 2013 WL 6071977 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013) (publication of the United States Department of Justice, Civil 

Rights Division)). 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies in his isolation cell 

claim. The only facts that Plaintiff has added in his proposed SAC, are that he was 

stripped of every article of clothing and personal property upon entering the isolation cell, 

but Dr. Newell ordered his clothing returned to him on March 5, 2014; that Dr. Newell 

told Plaintiff “clearly you are not suicidal”; and Plaintiff clarifies his duration in the 

isolation cell. Because Plaintiff alleged that he was placed in the isolation cell on March 

4, 2014, and that Dr. Newell countermanded and reversed the decision to place Plaintiff 

on suicide watch on March 5, 2014, the Court previously held that Plaintiff’s short 

confinement—less than twenty-four hours—is not sufficient to rise to the level of an 

Eighth Amendment violation and the Court dismissed this portion of Count Two. (Doc. 9 

at 7). Plaintiff now clarifies that although Dr. Newell reversed the decision on March 5, 

2014, Plaintiff remained in the isolation cell from approximately 4:45 p.m. on March 4, 

2014, to 5:30 a.m. on March 10, 2014. 

 Whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of a constitutional violation 

may depend, in part, on the duration of an inmate’s exposure to those conditions. Keenan 

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 

(1978) (“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the 

confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 

‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”)). 

Although Plaintiff now alleges that he was in the isolation cell for five-and-a-half days, 

that duration does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation without other 

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conditions accompanying the solitary confinement. Although Plaintiff alleges that he 

was stripped of every article of clothing and personal property upon entering the isolation 

cell, his clothing was returned to him the following day. Plaintiff has not alleged any 

other specific conditions of the confinement. The Court recommends that the isolation 

cell claim in Count Two be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

 B. Discharge from MTU

 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Ridge and Pierce violated his Eighth Amendment 

rights when they “deliberately circumvented Dr. Newell’s professional medical decision 

to have plaintiff returned to MTU, under Dr. Newell’s care, supervision, and treatment.” 

Plaintiff claims that in discharging Plaintiff from MTU, Defendants Ridge and Pierce 

“deliberately placed plaintiff in a precarious psychological position.” The Court 

previously held that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment medical claim with regard to 

his discharge from MTU, against Defendants Ridge and Pierce in their individual 

capacities. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants Ridge and Pierce be 

required to answer this claim in the SAC. 

3. Count Three

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rios violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 

failing to provide adequate mental health care; specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Rios intentionally and purposefully interfered with a clinical team decision 

that Plaintiff could reapply to MTU 90 days after his discharge from MTU, not one year 

after as she told Plaintiff. The Court previously held, in finding that Plaintiff failed to 

state a claim against Defendant Rios in Count Three of the First Amended Complaint: 

To the extent Defendant Rios informed Plaintiff he could reapply to the MTU in one year rather than 90 days, Plaintiff 

alleges no facts to support his claim that this was an 

intentional misrepresentation by Defendant Rios. With 

respect to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Rios failed to 

meet with him on a weekly basis, Plaintiff states that 

defendant Rios informed him Corizon did not provide 

sufficient mental health staff for Defendant Rios to meet with 

plaintiff as frequently as she would like, and that she had too 

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many patients in her caseload. Plaintiff has not demonstrated 

that Defendant Rios was indifferent to his medical needs, but 

rather that institutional-level administrative and staffing 

decisions prevented her from meeting with him on a weekly 

basis. 

(Doc. 9 at 8). 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rios was aware of Plaintiff’s diagnosis and the 

severity of Plaintiff’s mental health condition, that she stated the she personally 

participated in the March 24, 2014 statewide mental health teleconference with the 

clinical mental health team in Phoenix at MTU concerning Plaintiff’s readmission, and 

that she intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiff the determination made by the team. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim in Count Three and 

the Court recommends that Defendant Rios be required to answer this claim in the SAC 

which regards the allegation that Defendant Rios intentionally misrepresented the period 

for reapplication to MTU. 

4. Count Four

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Fortune violated his First and Eighth Amendment 

rights by retaliating against Plaintiff for filing grievances against the mental health 

department and for denying him mental health treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Fortune refused to recommend Plaintiff’s acceptance to MTU, refused to provide Plaintiff 

with an application to MTU, and denied Plaintiff’s participation in mental health 

treatment at Whetstone. 

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(retaliation claims requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in 

retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action 

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“advanced no legitimate penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of 

demonstrating that his exercise of his First Amendment rights was a substantial or 

motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 

1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fortune indicated she would not recommend 

Plaintiff’s acceptance into MTU because Plaintiff had filed grievances against the mental 

health department. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant Fortune stated that Plaintiff’s 

grievances show that Plaintiff is “in a chaotic, confused state” and that Plaintiff should 

quit filing grievances and get on medication, and that MTU had changed their 

requirements and they would not accept Plaintiff if he was not on medication. Plaintiff 

has failed to allege that Defendant Fortune acted in retaliation for his exercise of a 

constitutionally protected right or that her actions did not advance a legitimate 

penological interest. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation in Count Four. 

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Fortune violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

by denying him mental health treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fortune refused 

to recommend Plaintiff’s acceptance to MTU, refused to provide Plaintiff with an 

application to MTU, and denied Plaintiff’s participation in mental health treatment at 

Whetstone. 

 With regard to a claim that a defendant violated the plaintiff’s Eight Amendment 

right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment with regard to a prisoner’s medical 

treatment, the plaintiff must show the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to the 

plaintiff’s “serious medical need.” See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference . . . only if the [prison 

official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson 

v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” 

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but that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994). “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 

[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” 

Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). A “serious medical need exists if the failure 

to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). “Indifference may appear when prison 

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown 

by the way in which prison [officials] provide medical care.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the alleged indifference to the 

prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial; mere indifference, negligence, or even an 

allegation of medical malpractice, is insufficient to state an Eight Amendment claim. 

Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1062, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Id. at 1082 (citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fortune stated that Plaintiff was not eligible for 

admittance in MTU because he was not on medication. Plaintiff has failed to allege that 

Defendant Fortune was deliberately indifferent by failing to give him an application or 

recommending him to MTU. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Fortune violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

by denying Plaintiff mental health treatment. Despite the statement Plaintiff attributes to 

Defendant Fortune in October 2014, Plaintiff did meet with other mental health 

professionals while at Whetstone. According to Plaintiff, he had been medicated as a 

part of his mental health treatment in 2014 as well as had multiple visits with a 

psychiatrist, Defendant Winsky, before and after Defendant Fortune’s statement. 

Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Fortune acted with deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. For there to be a claim, the indifference must be 

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substantial; the action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Fortune. 

5. Count Five

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gilchrist violated his First and Eighth Amendments 

rights by retaliating against Plaintiff and denying Plaintiff mental health treatment. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gilchrist acted in collusion with Defendant Fortune to 

retaliate against Plaintiff for filing grievances against medical health staff. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Gilchrist was aware of Plaintiff’s diagnosis and the severity of 

Plaintiff’s mental health condition, and interfered with Plaintiff’s attempts to resume 

mental health treatment at MTU. 

 Plaintiff alleges that when Plaintiff requested non-pharmaceutical mental health 

treatment through mental health programming, services, and activities at Whetstone, 

Defendant Gilchrist responded “[t]hat’s just not going to happen here, I’m sorry.” 

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Gilchrist refused to give Plaintiff an application for 

MTU and indicated that “[w]e’re not going to recommend you and they’re not going to 

accept you.” Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Gilchrist acted in retaliation for 

Plaintiff’s exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that his actions did not advance 

a legitimate penological interest. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation in 

Count Five. 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Gilchrist violated his Eighth Amendment 

rights by denying Plaintiff mental health treatment. Despite the statement Plaintiff 

attributes to Defendant Gilchrist, Plaintiff did meet with other mental health professionals 

while at Whetstone. According to Plaintiff, he had been medicated as a part of his 

mental health treatment in 2014 as well as had multiple visits with a psychiatrist, 

Defendant Winsky, as well as two other Psyche Associates, Defendant Rios and 

Defendant Fortune, before and after Defendant Gilchrist’s statement. There is no 

allegation that Defendant Gilchrist directed the actions of Defendants Winsky, Rios, or 

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Fortune regarding medical care for Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant 

Gilchrist acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The 

indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Plaintiff has 

failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gilchrist. 

6. Count Six

 Plaintiff claims Defendant Winsky violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

regarding his mental health care. Plaintiff alleges that the psychotropic drugs that 

Plaintiff requested, and that Defendant Winsky stated were not allowed by ADOC policy, 

are in fact allowed and have been prescribed by Defendant Winsky to other inmates at 

ADOC. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Winsky downgraded Plaintiff’s mental health 

diagnosis and denied Plaintiff non-pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical mental health care, 

treatment, programming, and services. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fortune stated that he had to get on medication to 

be eligible to apply to MTU. Although a disagreement with his medical provider’s 

decision regarding which medications to prescribe does not rise to the level of deliberate 

indifference, Plaintiff also alleges that medical attention was denied entirely after the 

Loxitane prescribed by Defendant Winsky in May, 2014, was discontinued on June 10, 

2014, on Plaintiff’s request. Although Defendant Winsky met with Plaintiff after June 

10, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that no medications or therapies were thereafter offered or 

provided to treat Plaintiff’s mental health. Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an 

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Winsky for failure to provide Plaintiff with 

mental health treatment after June 10, 2014. 

7. Count Seven

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Winsky, Gilchrist and Fortune violated his First and 

Eighth Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances and by denying 

him mental health treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misdiagnosed and 

downgraded his SMI status after meeting with Plaintiff for no more than five minutes, 

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with no evidence to support their clinical findings. To the extent Plaintiff’s claims in 

Count Seven are duplicative of his claims in Counts Four, Five and Six, they should be 

denied. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the downgrading of his SMI status also fail to 

state a claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Winsky downgraded his status to “none” 

following the June 10, 2014 meeting. Although Plaintiff alleges that the meeting only 

lasted a few minutes, he also states that Defendant Winsky accessed Plaintiff’s mental 

health records, files and computer files. Although Plaintiff also alleges that a nurse told 

him that his SMI classification was downgraded to “none” after the November 17, 2014 

meeting, and that Defendant Gilchrist informed Plaintiff on November 19, 2014, that 

“they” were changing his SMI status to “none,” Plaintiff does not allege who downgraded 

his status or if in fact is was downgraded. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in Count Seven.1

 

8. Count Eight

 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Stemple, Schroeder, Cox, Bartuccio, David, 

Winsky, Gilchrist and Wolf, retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First 

Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the January 13, 2015 meeting was for the sole purpose 

to demonstrate an unequivocal show of force and solidarity in support of a retaliatory 

intimidation tactic. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants told him not to file 

grievances, but rather they told him to stop filing duplicate grievances. Plaintiff fails to 

allege that the January 13, 2015 meeting was an adverse action that chilled his exercise of 

his First Amendment rights or that Defendants’ actions did not advance a legitimate 

penological interest. Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count Eight and it should be 

dismissed. 

 

 

1

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have disregarded the Settlement Agreement in Parsons v. Ryan, CV 12-00601-PHX-DKD (Doc. 1185). However, the Settlement 

Agreement provides the terms for monitoring compliance and relief under the Settlement 

Agreement should be pursued in that case pursuant to those terms. 

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9. Count Nine

 Plaintiff alleges Jane and/or John Doe(s) violated his Eighth Amendments rights 

by denying him mental health treatment. Plaintiff identifies Jane and/or John Doe(s) as 

employed by Corizon as institutional-level administrator(s) and/or Whetstone 

administrator(s) or supervisor(s) whom are/is responsible for mental health staffing 

decisions at Whetstone during the events at issue. Plaintiff alleges that the Jane/John Doe 

Defendants have refused to replace the vacant Psychologist position at Whetstone since 

January 2014. Plaintiff alleges that allowing Defendant Fortune to perform the duties of 

a Psych Associate with only a LISAC license and without the supervision of a 

psychiatrist and/or psychologist constitutes deliberate indifference. 

 To state a § 1983 claim based on a policy, practice, or custom, the Plaintiff must 

show that: (1) plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy 

or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the “moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.” Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 

F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “A policy of medical 

understaffing may show deliberate indifference.” Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 

(D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 

1988), vacated and remanded, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 

1989)). 

 Plaintiff fails, however, to allege facts to support that any of them promulgated or 

endorsed a policy or custom that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. Further, because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a 

defendant’s position as the employer of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights does not make it liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 

1045. Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory, particularly regarding when, how, 

or what policies resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Although pro se 

pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), 

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conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal 

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 

that were not initially pled. Id. Accordingly, Count Nine fails to state a claim. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated: an ADA claim in Count One against 

Defendants Ridge and Pierce; an Eighth Amendment medical claim in Count Two 

regarding his discharge from MTU, against Defendants Ridge and Pierce; an Eighth 

Amendment medical claim in Count Three against Defendant Rios regarding Defendant 

Rios’ communication of the timeframe for reapplication to MTU; and an Eighth 

Amendment medical claim in Count Six against Defendant Winsky. The Court 

recommends that the remaining claims and Defendants be dismissed. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend/Correct (Doc. 14) be 

granted as set forth herein. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order the Defendants 

named in Section IV herein to answer the claims set forth in that section, within 60 days 

of the Court’s order on this Report and Recommendation. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court find Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Extension of Time to Effect Service (Doc. 13) moot. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

 Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

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Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length. 

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 

 Dated this 15th day of October, 2015. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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