Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05579/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROMAN GUANA GARZA, ) 

 )

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ALAMEIDA, Director, )

 )

Respondent. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-02-5579 REC SMS HC

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING

SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 

(Docs. 21 & 35) 

On September 7, 2004, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the Court deny Petitioner Roman Guana Garza’s

second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Timely objections have been filed. 

The Court has reviewed the record herein de novo and

concludes that the petition should be DENIED. 

The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation

that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief under the

standards set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Magistrate Judge correctly recommended that the judgment

of the state court was not “contrary to” and did not involve an

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“unreasonable application” of “clearly established Federal law.” 

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L.

Ed. 2d 144 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

The Magistrate Judge properly concluded that defendant

failed to show that juror misconduct impaired his right to a fair

trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court has held, in the

federal habeas corpus context, that a state trial court’s finding

that a juror is impartial only violates the defendant’s

constitutional right to a fair trial where the trial court’s

finding amounts to “manifest error.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.

1025, 1031, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984); see also

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751

(1961). 

The AEDPA requires that a federal court presume that the

state court’s factual findings are correct. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1). Petitioner may rebut these findings with “clear

and convincing evidence.” Id. Where the defendant failed in the

state action to develop the evidence in support of his claim, the

federal court should not hold an evidentiary hearing unless:

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional

law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could

not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for

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constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant

guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Petitioner did not allege that he lacked the opportunity to

develop the record in the trial court. To support his allegation

of juror misconduct before the trial court, he only produced his

own affidavit and the affidavit of Andrea Lari. Each affidavit

featured general averments that lacked details to support

Petitioner’s claim that Juror No. 7 (the “Juror”) knew him, such

as the circumstances of any occasion on which the two met. As

the court of appeal noted, California Evidence Code section 1150

would have allowed Petitioner to produce affidavits from jurors

to demonstrate that conduct, conditions, or events occurring in

the jury room deprived him of a fair trial. See 2d Am. Pet. Ex.

B at 14. There is no evidence that Petitioner even attempted to

do so. If the record before the trial judge was lacking, it was

only because Petitioner failed to develop it. Furthermore,

Petitioner’s claim does not rely on a new rule of constitutional

law, the factual predicate of his claim could have been

discovered through the use of juror affidavits, and the facts are

not sufficient to show that the state court’s decision

necessarily rests on a constitutional error. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge properly denied

Petitioner an evidentiary hearing. 

Whether the state court reasonably applied the law to the

facts should be assessed “in light of the record the [state]

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The Magistrate Judge’s analysis refers to Juror No. 7’s 1

affidavit, which was not before the state courts. Report and

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court had before it.” Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124

S. Ct. 2736, 159 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2004). Accordingly, absent a

finding that the state court of appeal’s rejection of the claim

was unreasonable, the additional affidavits the parties have

submitted are not properly before this Court. See id. (holding

that federal court erred when it found the state court’s

application of law unreasonable “on the basis of evidence not

properly before the state court”).

The court of appeal weighed all of the facts and decided

that they did not establish juror misconduct. It reasonably

concluded that Petitioner’s bare claims that he knew the Juror,

that she drove her daughter to his restaurant, and that he “met

[her] on other occasions” did not establish that the Juror knew

him and was therefore untruthful during voir dire. The court of

appeal also decided that even if the Juror knew Petitioner,

Petitioner’s firing of her daughter did not necessarily establish

bias. Petitioner’s claim was also unsubstantiated, according to

the court of appeal, because he failed to obtain juror affidavits

to support it, despite having a right to do so. See Cal. Evid.

Code § 1150. The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation: the court of appeal’s decision that jury

misconduct did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial was not

unreasonable. Because of this finding, reviewing evidence that

was not before the court of appeal is inappropriate. See 1

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Recommendation at 9. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s showing in the state courts was inadequate does not,

however, rest on the affidavit. The Magistrate Judge included the

Juror’s affidavit to show that “the alleged misconduct did not

prejudice Petitioner to the extent that he did not receive a fair

trial.” Id. The prejudice analysis would only affect this Court’s

holding if the state courts had unreasonably found that Petitioner

did not prove juror misconduct. This Court does not consider the

Juror’s affidavit to conclude that the court of appeal’s decision

was not unreasonable. 

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Holland, 542 U.S. at 652. 

The state courts’ refusal to consider the Lari declaration

is not grounds to grant the petition. The Magistrate Judge

indicates that “‘incorrect’ evidentiary rulings are not the basis

for federal habeas relief.” Report and Recommendation at 8-9. 

While no absolute bar exists to a federal court’s review of a

state court evidentiary ruling, the federal court may base habeas

corpus relief on such a ruling only in severely limited

circumstances. A federal court may grant relief on the basis of

a state court evidentiary ruling only if the ruling itself

amounts to a constitutional violation. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d

520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997,

1003-07 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting writ of habeas corpus where

state trial judge excluded on a hearsay basis exculpatory

statements bearing “strong indicia of reliability”). Successful

petitioners have shown that the evidentiary ruling violates their

due process rights. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530; Chia, 360 F.3d

at 1003. Petitioner does not contend that the state courts’

exclusion of Lari’s declaration violated any of his

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In any event, Petitioner would be unable to make such a 2

showing. Excluding a hearsay statement that “bears persuasive

assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the defense” may

violate due process. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1003 (citing Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297

(1973)). The Court is not aware of any “clearly established

Federal law” that applies the Chambers rationale to evidence not

probative of guilt, such as a determination of jury misconduct.

See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 (“In these circumstances, where

constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt

are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically

to defeat the ends of justice.”) (emphasis added). Additionally,

Lari’s secondhand recollection of her conversation with M.D. lacks

the assurances of trustworthiness present in cases where courts

have found due process violations. See Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004-05

(self-inculpatory statements of declarant while he was “ in real

danger of imminent death”); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-02

(declaration against interest). 

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constitutional rights. 

2

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court abused the

discretion that California law accords him to grant a new trial

is not properly before the Court. A federal court considering

habeas corpus relief does not address errors in state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed.

2d 385 (1991).

The state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim of jury

misconduct was not contrary to clearly established Federal law,

did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The Report and Recommendation of September 7, 2004 is

ADOPTED IN FULL. 

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2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

3. JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT TO BE ENTERED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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