Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_13-cv-05630/USCOURTS-cand-1_13-cv-05630-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Plaintiff was released from custody on December 2, 2013. County Brief for Motion

for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 19 (“MSJ2"), Ex. C at 22.

2 A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the

opposing party has failed to file an opposition. See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95

& n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (unopposed motion may be granted only after court determines that there

are no material issues of fact). This is so even if the failure to oppose violates a local rule.

See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (nonmoving party's failure

to comply with local rules does not excuse moving party's affirmative duty under Rule 56 to

demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

DAVID PRESTON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

STEVE FREITAS, et. al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 13-5630 NJV (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a former detainee at Sonoma County

Jail.1 Plaintiff presents claims of inadequate medical care and violations of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Defendants Sonoma County and Dr. Fadaki filed separate

motions for summary judgment on November 10 and 12, 2014, respectively. Plaintiff has

not filed an opposition or otherwise communicated with the court despite defendants filing

an additional notice of plaintiff’s non-opposition on December 15, 2014. The court will still

look to the merits of the motions and for the reasons set forth below, the motions for

summary judgment are granted.2

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DISCUSSION

Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that he has club feet and had open wounds on his feet when he was

arrested and taken to the jail. Complaint at 3. He states that he had trouble walking

because of the pain and, due to defendant Dr. Fadaki’s actions, he was not provided proper

pain medication from September 3, 2013, to November 1, 2013. Complaint at 11-12. 

Plaintiff also states that while there is a bench in the shower, there was no shower chair

and he had to crawl to get to the bench. Complaint at 14. He claims that no

accommodation was provided after he voiced his concerns. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form

of money damages. Complaint at 3.

Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

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 Even though pretrial detainees' claims arise under the Due Process Clause, the Eighth

Amendment serves as a benchmark for evaluating those claims. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74

F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (8th Amendment guarantees provide minimum standard of care

for pretrial detainees). The Ninth Circuit has determined that the appropriate standard for

evaluating constitutional claims brought by pretrial detainees is the same one used to evaluate

convicted prisoners' claims under the Eighth Amendment. "The requirement of conduct that

amounts to 'deliberate indifference' provides an appropriate balance of the pretrial detainees'

right to not be punished with the deference given to prison officials to manage the prisons."

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (abrogated

on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

3

Medical Care

When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the proper inquiry

is whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to

that need. Id. at 1059.3

 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

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he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how

severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A

difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981). In addition “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a

claim of deliberate medical indifference.... [Prisoner] would have had no claim for deliberate

medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.” Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of State

Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

ADA

Title II of the ADA "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability." Lovell v.

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II provides that "no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to

discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates

within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213

(1998).

In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA,

a plaintiff must show: he is a "qualified individual with a disability"; he was either excluded

from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of

Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff may bring a claim under Title II of the ADA against state entities for

injunctive relief and damages. See Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional Institute, 384

F.3d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 2004). The standard for recovery of damages is deliberate

indifference to plaintiff's rights under the ADA. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

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1138 (9th Cir. 2001). "Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a

federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood." Id.

at 1139. 

B. Facts

The court has reviewed defendants’ motions for summary judgment and plaintiff’s

verified complaint. The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. 

Medical Care

Plaintiff’s original pain medication, Neurontin, was ordered after plaintiff arrived at

the jail but was discontinued on September 4, 2013. This was because plaintiff refused the

medication on the mornings of September 2 to September 4, as well as the evenings from

September 1 to September 3. Fadaki Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 27

(“MSJ1") at 2.

On September 26, 2013, plaintiff indicated that he wanted his medication. Id. at 3. 

On September 27, 2013, Dr. Fadaki had her first direct contact with plaintiff. Id. She

performed a complete clinical examination and found that plaintiff was experiencing some

pain on passive movement of his clubbed feet, but there was no swelling, effusion, or

erythema. Id. Dr. Fadaki prescribed Naproxen for pain relief, as it would be more

appropriate for the sedentary lifestyle of plaintiff’s incarceration and because he was using

a wheelchair. Id. However, she noted that Neurontin could be added when needed. Id.

On October 25, 2013, plaintiff reported to nurses that the pain medication was not

working. Id. At that time, Dr. Fadaki mistakenly thought plaintiff was receiving Neurontin,

so that prescription was not restarted until October 31, 2013. Id. Plaintiff was still being

provided Naproxen during this time. MSJ1, Ex. to Kolman Declaration Part 2 at 10.

Disability Accommodations

On plaintiff’s arrival at the jail on September 1, 2013, he was medically evaluated for

disabilities. MSJ2 at 3. Plaintiff was provided a wheelchair and housed in a wheelchair

accessible cell and housing unit. Id. The shower areas plaintiff used were wheelchair

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accessible, had shower benches, and shower grab bars. Id. The showers had a smooth

flattened threshold and a large maneuverable space within for an inmate to roll a

wheelchair directly into the shower and position it next to the shower bench. Id. Plaintiff

conceded these facts in his deposition. MSJ2, Ex. C at 40-42. Plaintiff filed no grievances

regarding the shower facilities. MSJ2 at 3-5.

C. Analysis

As noted above, plaintiff has not filed an opposition or otherwise communicated with

the court, but the court has reviewed his verified complaint in considering the motions for

summary judgment. It is undisputed that plaintiff declined Neurontin for his pain on several

occasions and when plaintiff indicated he required pain medication on September 26, he

was seen the next day by defendant Dr. Fadaki. It is undisputed that Dr. Fadaki prescribed

Naproxen for pain relief as well as Neurontin when required. 

While plaintiff requested Neurontin on October 25, the medication was not provided

until October 31, due to an error. However, plaintiff was still being provided Naproxen

during this time. While Dr. Fadaki could perhaps have been negligent in her mistake, it

does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. A claim of medical malpractice or

negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th

Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit

in claims stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken

nose and providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than

negligence).

Defendant has met her burden in demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to plaintiff’s medical claim and the treatment he received. A

review of the record demonstrates that plaintiff received a great deal of care and was

provided pain medication. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial regarding defendant’s mistake or any other

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 While defendant has also argued that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies, the court will look to the merits of the claim.

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aspect of his medical claim. Therefore, summary judgment is granted to defendant Dr.

Fadaki for this claim.

Sonoma County has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to plaintiff’s ADA shower claim.4

 Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief, only

monetary damages. As noted above, the standard for recovery of damages is deliberate

indifference to plaintiff's rights under the ADA. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. "Deliberate

indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood." Id. at 1139. 

It is undisputed that plaintiff was provided a wheelchair and housed in a wheelchair

accessible cell and housing unit. The shower areas plaintiff used were wheelchair

accessible, had shower benches, and shower grab bars. The showers had a smooth

flattened threshold and a large maneuverable space for an inmate to roll a wheelchair

directly into the shower and position it next to the shower bench. In his deposition, plaintiff

conceded that there were shower accommodations, but stated they were not reasonable

for him. MSJ2, Ex. C at 42-43.

However, plaintiff cannot obtain relief by showing that defendant did not

accommodate all of his requests. See, e.g., Memmer v. Marin County Courts, 169 F.3d

630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999). Rather, plaintiff must show that defendant discriminated against

him in terms of making prison programs and activities unavailable to him when compared to

non disabled inmates. See. e.g., Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 521 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish “the existence of specific reasonable

accommodations” that the jail failed to provide. Memmer, 169 F.3d at 633. In this

summary judgment context, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating an issue of fact that

what he proposed was indeed necessary and reasonable. Plaintiff has failed to meet his

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burden to demonstrate deliberative indifference in light of all the accommodations in the

shower area including the shower bench, grab bars, and wide area to maneuver the

wheelchair provided for him. While plaintiff states he requested a shower chair, he has not

shown that defendant was deliberately indifferent for failing to provide a chair when all of

these other accommodations were provided. Summary judgment is granted to defendant

for this claim.

CONCLUSION

1. The motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 18, 27) are GRANTED. 

2. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2015. 

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

DAVID PRESTON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVE FREITAS, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. 1:13-CV-05630 NJV

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on March 16, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of

the attached by placing said copy in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person listed below, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail.

David Preston Brown 

2066 Mendocino Avenue 

#54 

Santa Rosa, CA 95401

Dated: March 16, 2015

 Linn Van Meter

Administrative Law Clerk to the

Honorable Nandor J. Vadas

Case 1:13-cv-05630-NJV Document 29 Filed 03/16/15 Page 9 of 9