Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02317/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02317-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY HENDERSON,

Plaintiff, No. 2:12-cv-2317 KJN P 

vs.

DR. R. LANKFORD, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Rule 302.

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court

will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s prison

trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to

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make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to

plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to

the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing

fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. However,

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555) (citations and internal

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint in question, id., and construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

1. Defendant Lankford

Plaintiff names his treating physician, Dr. Lankford, as a defendant. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant Dr. Lankford, without proper anesthetic, or prior tests to ascertain the

location of the bullet, performed surgery on plaintiff’s right buttock to remove the bullet,

allegedly inflicting unnecessary and wanton pain, by digging around to locate the bullet, and

thereafter causing plaintiff residual pain and limping. Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently

complained to Dr. Lankford about upper right leg numbness, and burning and excruciating pain,

but Dr. Lankford allegedly told plaintiff to “go sleep it off.” (Dkt. No. 1. at 11.) Plaintiff

contends that Dr. Lankford did not provide plaintiff with pain medications following the surgical

procedure. (Id.) 

To state a section 1983 claim for a constitutional violation based on inadequate

medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To prevail,

plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendant

possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991);

McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992). A serious medical need is one that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, an injury or condition a reasonable doctor or

patient would find worthy of comment or treatment, or the existence of chronic and substantial

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pain. See, e.g., McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs. v. Miller, 104 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc).

Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, delay or intentional

interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is provided. Hutchinson

v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at

847. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. A physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order

to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312,

1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some

treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. Deliberate

indifference in the medical context may also be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006). 

However, it is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of

malpractice from claims predicated on violations of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel

and unusual punishment. In asserting the latter, “[m]ere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical

malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). It is well established that mere differences of opinion

concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981).

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In the instant complaint, plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that Dr.

Lankford acted with a culpable state of mind in performing the surgery. Rather, the facts alleged

demonstrate negligence or medical malpractice, rather than deliberate indifference. Plaintiff may

be able to state a cognizable civil rights claim based on Dr. Lankford’s subsequent failure to treat

plaintiff, or to provide plaintiff with pain medications, but plaintiff’s allegations are too vague

and conclusory to determine whether plaintiff’s claims as to Dr. Lankford are frivolous or fail to

state a claim for relief. Accordingly, plaintiff is granted leave to amend to plead sufficient facts

as to Dr. Lankford. 

2. Remaining Defendants

In addition, plaintiff names various defendants in their supervisory roles, or due to

their roles in addressing plaintiff’s administrative grievances concerning the surgical procedure

performed by Dr. Lankford.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“Congress did not intend

§ 1983 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)

(no affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or

policy demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an

affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (no liability where

there is no evidence of personal participation). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of

personal participation is insufficient).

Here, plaintiff claims that defendant Barns is the Warden of High Desert State

Prison, who plaintiff alleges is legally responsible for the operation of the prison and the welfare

of its inmates. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff claims defendant Dr. Hoffman is a superior of Dr.

Lankford, and that Dr. Hoffman “insisted that an x-ray was not necessary to perform a bullet

removal sitting on plaintiff’s sciatic nerve.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff contends that defendant

Dr. Swingle, the Chief Medical Officer, is the lead medical executive “under which all rules

managing, procedures, and policies falls upon.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 10.) These allegations are based

solely on a theory of respondeat superior, and are therefore not sufficient. Moreover, Dr.

Hoffman saw plaintiff after Dr. Lankford performed the surgical procedure; therefore, his

statement concerning the procedure, standing alone, does not constitute deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Dr. Lee interviewed plaintiff in connection

with his first level appeal of Dr. Lankford’s surgical procedure, and denied plaintiff’s appeal. 

However, prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative

grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling

inmates to a specific grievance process). Put another way, prison officials are not required under

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federal law to process inmate grievances in a specific way or to respond to them in a favorable

manner. Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, plaintiff cannot state a

cognizable civil rights claim for a violation of his due process rights based on allegations that

prison officials ignored or failed to properly process grievances. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon,

2010 WL 445203 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb.2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied

or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment);

Walker v. Vazquez, 2009 WL 5088788 at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Dec.17, 2009) (plaintiff's allegations

that prison officials failed to timely process his inmate appeals failed to a state cognizable under

the Fourteenth Amendment). Therefore, plaintiff should omit allegations concerning the

handling of administrative appeals, and details concerning exhaustion of administrative appeals,

from any amended complaint. Moreover, because the surgical procedure was completed by the

time Dr. Lee reviewed plaintiff’s appeal, her involvement in denying the first level appeal,

without more, does not constitute deliberate indifference.

3. Alleged Conspiracy

Plaintiff makes vague references to an alleged conspiracy among the named

defendants. First, plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation occurred. Even if plaintiff had

alleged a constitutional violation, plaintiff failed to allege a conspiracy. A conspiracy claim

brought under § 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel

Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071

(9th Cir. 2006). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details

of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” 

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a

heightened pleading standard to plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and

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County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). However, although accepted as

true, the "[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A plaintiff must set forth "the grounds of his entitlement

to relief[,]" which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action. . . .” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Here, the alleged involvement of the defendants other than

Dr. Lankford occurred after the surgical procedure was performed. Plaintiff failed to allege any

facts demonstrating that any of the named defendants were even aware that Dr. Lankford would

be performing the surgical procedure. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate

plaintiff’s constitutional rights are insufficient to give rise to a conspiracy claim under § 1983. 

4. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction against defendants. 

However, at the time plaintiff filed the complaint, he was housed at High Desert State Prison,

which is where the named defendants are employed. Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the

California State Prison in Corcoran.

When a prisoner is transferred from a prison, claims for injunctive relief arising

from conditions at the former prison become moot. See Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff does not

allege that there is a reasonable possibility of returning to High Desert State Prison, so his prayer

for injunctive relief does not fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception

to the mootness doctrine. See Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1368. Finally, plaintiff does not allege that

defendants have any authority over plaintiff's housing or other conditions of plaintiff's

confinement at the California State Prison in Corcoran. This court is unable to issue an order

against individuals who are not parties to a suit pending before it. Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Therefore, plaintiff should not renew his claims

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for injunctive relief in any amended complaint.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the court determines that the complaint does not contain a short and

plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

engaged in that support plaintiffs claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will,

however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the

claimed deprivation. Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is hereby informed that the court cannot refer to a prior

pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that

an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This

requirement exists because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each

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defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the

attached Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of

this action.

DATED: December 13, 2012

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

hend2317.14

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY HENDERSON,

Plaintiff, No. 2:12-cv-2317 KJN P 

vs.

DR. R. LANKFORD, et al., NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Defendants.

___________________________/

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's

order filed :

______________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

 

Plaintiff

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