Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-1_19-cv-00006/USCOURTS-akd-1_19-cv-00006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

SOUTHEAST ALASKA 

CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

UNITED STATES FOREST 

SERVICE, et al., 

Defendants. 

 Case No. 1:19-cv-00006-SLG 

DECISION AND ORDER 

This is an action in which Plaintiffs Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 

Alaska Rainforest Defenders, Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, 

Defenders of Wildlife, Alaska Wilderness League, National Audubon Society, and 

Natural Resources Defense Council seek the invalidation of portions of the 2018 

Environmental Impact Statement and 2019 Record of Decision for the Forest 

Service’s Prince of Wales Landscape Level Analysis Project for the Tongass 

National Forest. Briefing on the merits concluded on August 23, 2019.1 Oral 

argument was held on February 7, 2020.2 

1 Pursuant to the briefing schedule for administrative agency appeals, see L. R. Civ. P. 16.3(c), 

Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief is at Docket 10, Defendants’ Brief in Opposition is at Docket 12, and 

Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief is at Docket 19. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Notice of Errata and 

Corrected Opening Brief at Docket 22. 

2 Docket 37. 

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BACKGROUND 

The factual background for this case was set out at some length in the 

Court’s prior order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.3 It is 

repeated here to a certain extent with some additions. 

The Tongass National Forest (“Tongass”) is a 16.7 million-acre forest in 

Southeast Alaska.4 The nation’s largest national forest,5 the Tongass has seen 

timber harvesting of varying intensity over the past 100 years.6 In the 1950s, the 

Forest Service awarded several 50-year timber sale contracts in the forest to 

“provide a sound economic base in Alaska through establishment of a permanent 

year-round pulp industry.”7 But logging in the Tongass began to slow in the 1980s 

and 1990s, when several of these long-term contracts were terminated due to 

market fluctuation, litigation, and other factors.8 

Prince of Wales Island, a large island in the Alexander Archipelago, lies 

within the Tongass.9 Two large pulp mills once operated on the island, where 

industrial scale logging occurred in the second half of the 20th century, but both 

3 Docket 27 at 2–7 

4 Administrative Record (“AR”) 833_0404 at 063052, 063054. 

5 AR 833_0404 at 063407. 

6 AR 833_2077 at 069553–55. 

7 AR 833_2077 at 069553. 

8 AR 833_2077 at 069553–55. 

9 AR 833_0404 at 063054. 

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mills closed in the 1990s.10 There are 12 communities on the island with a total of 

approximately 4,300 residents, many of whom are Alaska Native.11 Tourism and 

sport and commercial fishing are important to the local economy,12 and many 

residents rely to some degree on subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering.13

Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) and its 

implementing regulations, the Forest Service has developed land and resource 

management plans, also called forest plans, to govern its management of the 

Tongass.14 Forest plans “operate like zoning ordinances, defining broadly the uses 

allowed in various forest regions, setting goals and limits on various uses . . . , but 

do not directly compel specific actions, such as cutting of trees in a particular area 

or construction of a specific road.”15 Any activity occurring within a national forest 

must comply with the governing forest plan,16 which the Forest Service is required 

to revise at least every 15 years.17 The current forest plan for the Tongass was 

issued in 2016, following the completion of an environmental impact statement 

10 AR 833_2167 at 01750. 

11 AR 833_2167 at 01753; see also AR 833_2167 at 01751, tbl. 70 (showing population 

change). 

12 AR 833_2167 at 001750 

13 See AR 833_2167 at 001753–57 (describing different communities on the island). 

14 See 16 U.S.C. § 1604. 

15 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2003). 

16 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). 

17 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(a). 

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(“EIS”).18 The Forest Plan provides that “[t]imber harvest unit cards will document 

resource concerns and protection measures,” and requires that these “unit cards, 

including a map with relevant resource features, . . . be provided electronically 

when Draft or Final NEPA documents and decisions are published.”19

In late 2016, the Forest Service initiated environmental planning for a 

proposed project within the Tongass: the Prince of Wales Landscape Level 

Analysis Project (“Project”).20 The agency describes the Project as “a large 

landscape-scale NEPA analysis that will result in a decision whether or not to 

authorize integrated resource management activities on Prince of Wales Island 

over the next 15 years.”21 The Forest Service released a final EIS for the Project 

on October 19, 201822 and issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) selecting the 

preferred alternative from the EIS on March 16, 2019.23

The Project encompasses all of the land within the national forest system on 

Prince of Wales Island, consisting of roughly 1.8 million acres.24 It authorizes four 

18 AR 833_0404 at 063039–063554 (2016 Tongass Forest Plan); AR 833_2079 at 071034–

072626 (EIS for Tongass Forest Plan). 

19 AR 833_0404 at 063265. 

20 AR 833_2167 at 001468. 

21 AR 833_2167 at 001459. 

22 AR 833_2167 at 001437–001863 (Final EIS). 

23 AR 833_2427 at 000776–001118; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring agencies to 

prepare a “detailed statement” for actions with significant environmental impacts). 

24 AR 833_2167 at 001460–61; see also AR 833_2427 at 000781 (map showing distribution of 

national forest system land on Prince of Wales Island). 

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categories of activities within this area: vegetation management, including timber 

harvesting; watershed improvement and restoration; sustainable recreation 

management; and “associated actions.”25 The EIS for the Project does not specify 

when and where individual activities will occur within the Project Area. Rather, the 

Project is designed to be a flexible planning framework intended to allow the Forest 

Service to tailor resource management to changing conditions on the ground over 

the course of the Project’s 15-year term. 

The Forest Service appended to the EIS what it terms an Activity Card for 

each of the 46 activities included in the four activity categories.26 “The Activity 

Cards describe each potential activity and the related resource considerations,” 

and include “[p]roject-specific design criteria and mitigation measures.”27 The 

Activity Cards were designed using “on-the-ground inventories, computer (GIS) 

data, and aerial photographs to assess project area conditions and resourcespecific concerns.”28 The Activity Cards describe and govern activities at the 

project level, but they do not identify the specific geographic areas within the 

Project Area where each activity will occur.29 Unlike prior sales, the Project EIS 

25 AR 833_2167 at 001443. 

26 AR 833_2427 at 000848–001030. 

27 AR 833_2167 at 001492; see, e.g., AR 833_2427 at 000848–52 (Activity Card 01). 

28 AR 833_2167 at 001492. 

29 See, e.g., AR 833_2427 at 000848 (Activity Card 01 explaining that “rotational harvest of 

young growth using even-aged management” may occur “within the suitable land base based 

on legal and technical factors” and “within potential harvest units as shown in the [LSTA]”); AR 

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was not accompanied by timber harvest unit cards with maps detailing specific 

harvest configurations.30

In preparing the Project EIS, the Forest Service also developed a Logging 

System Transportation Analysis (“LSTA”) to “identif[y] potential stands for timber 

harvest and the associated transportation network that would be needed.”31 The 

LSTA “was developed for National Forest System lands within the project area 

layer using information from the Forest GIS library, aerial photos, and the Forest 

Service Activity Tracking System database.”32 The LSTA identified 125,529 acres 

of potential timber harvest in the Project Area: 48,140 old-growth acres and 77,389 

young-growth acres.33 The LSTA also identified 643 miles of new roads, 505 of 

them temporary and 138 permanent.34 The Forest Service represented this 

833_2167 at 001459 (“The Activity Cards are used to identify and analyze a suite of possible 

activities that could be implemented in the project area. With this approach, activities can vary 

in magnitude and intensity to respond to resource conditions.”). 

30 Cf. AR 833_2084 at 061279–80 (card for timber harvest unit 101 in 2007 Kuiu Timber Sale 

EIS). 

31 AR 833_2167 at 001561. 

32 AR 833_2167 at 001561; see also AR 833_2167 at 1561–71 (describing Forest Service’s 

methodology and integration of LSTA into Project EIS); AR 833_1369 at 074744 (providing path 

for GIS data .zip file for the draft EIS); AR 833_2115 at 074758 (providing path for GIS data .zip 

file for the final EIS); AR 833_2403 at 074762–074854 (Jan. 1, 2015 spreadsheet documenting 

raw GIS numbers for entire Tongass National Forest). 

33 AR 833_2167 at 001481. The Forest Service further subdivided the Project Area into 18 

Timber Analysis Areas (“TAA”) “[t]o allow for more site-specific analysis.” Id. at 001562; see 

also id. at 001563 (map showing distribution of TAAs); id. at 001569–70 (tables showing 

distribution of old- and young-growth acreage across TAAs). 

34 AR 833_2167 at 001481. 

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information in a Commercial Vegetation Management map,35 which it appended to 

the ROD, and to which it provided a link in the EIS.36 

The Project EIS addresses four alternatives in detail, including a no-action 

alternative.37 Each activity under each alternative must be consistent with the 

applicable Activity Card and certain alternative-specific features, and each activity 

must also occur within the areas identified for that activity in the LSTA.38 Each 

action alternative establishes a maximum potential amount of timber harvest and 

road construction.39 Focusing on timber harvest, Alternative 2, the preferred 

alternative, allows a maximum of 23,269 acres of old-growth harvest and 19,366 

acres of young-growth harvest, or roughly 34 percent of the total potential acreage 

in the LSTA.40 However, the EIS does not identify where the harvest authorized 

35 833_2178. This map is attached as an appendix to this decision. See Docket 40-1. 

36 AR 833_2167 at 001480. 

37 AR 833_2167 at 001479–80. 

38 See AR 833_2167 at 001480 (describing role of LSTA and Activity Cards in comparison of 

alternatives); id. at 001485–92 (describing features specific to the action alternatives). 

39 AR 833_2167 at 001480 (“The total acreage and maximum miles of road construction under 

any one alternative is expected to change based on the logging systems used and where 

harvest occurs on the landscape, but would not exceed the amount identified within that 

alternative.”). 

40 AR 833_2167 at 001481. Alternative 3 allows a maximum of 13,014 acres of old-growth and 

36,670 acres of young-growth harvest, or roughly 40 percent of the total potential acreage in the 

LSTA; and Alternative 5 allows a maximum of 6,365 acres of old-growth and 36,670 acres of 

young-growth harvest, or roughly 34 percent of the total potential acreage in the LSTA. Id.

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by each alternative would occur within the potential acreage identified in the 

LSTA.41

In order to capture the “maximum effects” of the Project, the Project EIS 

makes several assumptions in addressing each alternative.42 First, in analyzing 

each alternative, the Forest Service indicates that it assumed that all acres of 

potential harvest in the LSTA would be harvested and all roads proposed by the 

alternative would be built.43 Second, the Forest Service assumed that all acres 

would be harvested using clear-cut methods.44 Third, the Forest Service assumed 

that each Wildlife Analysis Area—a land division used by the Alaska Department 

of Fish and Game—would be harvested to the maximum acreage available.45

As noted above, the alternatives do not provide the specific locations or 

configurations of harvest or roadbuilding within the LSTA. Instead, the Project EIS 

41 Instead, each alternative considers the Project Area as a whole and “describe[s] the 

conditions being targeted for treatments and what conditions cannot be exceeded in an area, or 

place[s] limits on the intensity of specific activities.” AR 833_2167 at 001459. 

42 AR 833_2167 at 001639. 

43 See, e.g., AR 833_2167 at 001629 (“[A]ssumptions include that all harvest stands from the 

LSTA would be harvested . . . .”); AR 833_2167 at 001789–90 (discussing road construction by 

alternative); see also Docket 12 at 31 (describing analytical approach). It is unclear from the 

record whether the Forest Service assumed that the maximum potential harvest in the LSTA 

would be harvested or the maximum acreage under each alternative would be harvested; it 

appears that the agency made different assumptions about harvest intensity depending on the 

impact under consideration. See Docket 39 at 13:23–16:3 (Tr. of Feb. 7, 2020 Oral Arg.) 

(discussing Forest Service’s methodology). 

44 AR 833_2167 at 001450. 

45 See AR 833_2167 at 001500. There are 32 Wildlife Analysis Areas in the Project Area. Id. at 

001514. 

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provides that “site-specific locations and methods” for activities such as timber 

harvest “will be determined during implementation” over the 15-year lifespan of the 

Project.46 It explains that siting decisions and the parameters of actual timber 

sales will be determined pursuant to an Implementation Plan, in a way that is 

consistent with the alternative selected by the ROD and the Activity Cards 

developed for the EIS.47 However, the EIS makes clear that these subsequent, 

site-specific decisions will not be subject to additional NEPA review.48 The Forest 

Service terms this approach “condition-based analysis.”49

The Implementation Plan published with the ROD sets out a nine-step 

process for making site-specific determinations.50 This process includes checking 

the action against the relevant Activity Card, the final EIS, and the ROD, as well 

as engaging in “workshops and other public involvement techniques.”51 It is during 

46 AR 833_2167 at 001459. 

47 AR 833_2167 at 001459; see also 833_2169 at 002076–002126 (Implementation Plan 

attached to Project EIS). 

48 See AR 833_2169 at 002078. At oral argument, the Forest Service maintained that the 

Implementation Plan could require supplemental NEPA analysis if new information arose 

indicating that an “activity is no longer going to have an effect that was disclosed or analyzed” in 

the Project EIS. Docket 39 at 21:18–25. The Court has been unable to locate a specific 

provision in the Implementation Plan that mandates supplemental review, but the plan does 

require the Forest Service to “verify that the effects of the proposed activity [are] within the 

effects analyzed for the Selected Alternative” in the EIS. AR 833_2427 at 001039. 

49 AR 833_2167 at 001443; see also AR 833_2427 at 000802 (“The POWLLA FEIS uses a 

condition-based approach where specific harvest units and roads will be determined during 

implementation through a collaborative public process and interdisciplinary review.”). 

50 See AR 833_2427 at 001037 (graphically describing Implementation Plan). 

51 AR 833_2427 at 001037. The ROD explains that a proposed activity “will take several 

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this process, also, that site-specific unit cards will be developed that describe 

particular harvest configurations.52 The ROD explains that the Implementation 

Plan “is integral to the analysis of effects in the [Project EIS] and the Selected 

Alternative in the [ROD],” and was “developed . . . to provide a linkage from the 

[Project EIS] to the project-specific work without the need for additional NEPA 

analysis.”53 That said, the ROD describes the Implementation Plan as a “living 

document” that “may need to be adjusted.”54

The Forest Service began implementing the Project shortly after issuing the 

ROD. It held a public workshop on April 6, 201955 and published an “Out-Year 

Plan” for fiscal year 2019 that included a proposed timber sale of 1,156.34 acres, 

known as the Twin Mountain Timber Sale.56 The Forest Service also published 

months to a year to go through all steps of the implementation process.” Id.

52 AR 833_2427 at 000826. 

53 AR 833_2427 at 001034. The ROD expanded on the relationship between the Activity Cards 

and the Implementation Plan, stating that the “Activity Cards provide activity-specific design 

criteria, best management practices, and mitigation measures and the implementation plan 

includes site conditions, triggers, or other requirements for each type of activity to inform future 

data needs and field visits to develop treatment scenarios that are consistent with the NEPA 

analysis.” Id.

54 AR 833_2427 at 001034. The ROD explains that “[a]s activities are designed, the process will 

likely be smoother and new technology or expertise may be used.” Id. At oral argument, the 

Forest Service maintained that the Implementation Plan was “not necessary for NEPA 

compliance.” Docket 39 at 18:18–19; cf. Docket 12 at 19 (“Implementation is an integral part of 

the Project’s design.”). 

55 See, U.S. Forest Serv., Prince of Wales Landscape Level Analysis Project, Dear Planning and 

Implementation Participant Letter, 

https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd622020.pdf (last visited March 5, 

2020). 

56 See, U.S. Forest Serv., Prince of Wales Landscape Level Analysis Project, Out-Year Plan, 

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draft unit cards for the sale, which identify the specific locations and method of 

timber harvest in graphical and narrative form.57 

Plaintiffs initiated this case on May 7, 2019.58 The Complaint is brought 

pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702–06, and 

alleges that the Project EIS violates three federal laws: (1) the National 

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332; (2) the Alaska National 

Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), 16 U.S.C. § 3120; and (3) the 

National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1604.59 The Complaint 

seeks declaratory judgment, vacatur of the ROD “or portions of it deemed not in 

compliance with law,” and “preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as needed 

to prevent irreparable harm from implementation of the [Project].”60 Plaintiffs refine 

their claim in their merits briefing, requesting vacatur of the “portions of the ROD 

authorizing vegetation management and road construction.”61

https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd622075.pdf (last visited March 5, 

2020); see also Docket 21-1 at 2-3, ¶ 6 (providing size of sale). 

57 See, U.S. Forest Serv., Twin Mountain Sale Draft Unit Cards, 

https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd641767.pdf (last visited March 5, 

2020). Plaintiffs have produced an area map of the proposed timber activities. See Docket 10-2 

at 5 (Ex. A). 

58 Docket 1. 

59 Docket 1 at 15–19, ¶¶ 47, 51, 58. 

60 Docket 1 at 19, ¶¶ 1–5. Plaintiffs also seek “the costs of this action, including reasonable 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.” Id. at 19, ¶ 6. 

61 Docket 22-1 at 43–44. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction of “the 

vegetation management activities and road construction in the ROD.” Id. at 44–47. 

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On September 23, 2019, the Court entered a preliminary injunction, which 

prohibited the Forest Service from awarding a contract or authorizing grounddisturbing activities associated with the Twin Mountain Timber Sale during the 

pendency of this case.62 In the preliminary injunction order, the Court found that 

Plaintiffs had raised serious questions going to the merits of their NEPA claim.63 

The order also informed the parties that the Court intended to issue a final decision 

on the merits no later than March 31, 2020.64

JURISDICTION

 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 

which “confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action, regardless 

of whether the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate.”65

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the APA.66 Under that statute, a reviewing court 

shall not set aside an agency's decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”67 Agency action is arbitrary 

and capricious if it 

62 Docket 27 at 25. 

63 Docket 27 at 20. 

64 Docket 27 at 8. 

65 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 

66 Docket 1 at 15–19, ¶¶ 47, 51, 58. 

67 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

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relie[s] on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 

entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem, offer[s] 

an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 

the agency, or is so implausible that it c[an]not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.68 

A court’s review of whether an agency action is arbitrary and capricious should be 

“searching and careful,” but “narrow,” as a court may not substitute its judgment 

for that of the administrative agency.69 Courts will generally “uphold agency 

decisions so long as the agencies have ‘considered the relevant factors and 

articulated a rational connection between the factors found and the choices 

made.’”70 

 “Agency action is ‘not in accordance with the law’ when it is in conflict with 

the language of the statute relied upon by the agency.”71 “Whether agency action 

is ‘not in accordance with law’ is a question of statutory interpretation, rather than 

an assessment of reasonableness in the instant case.”72

68 Prot. Our Cmtys. Found. v. LaCounte, 939 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 

(1983)). 

69 Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton 

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). 

70 Prot. Our Cmtys. Found., 939 F.3d at 1034 (quoting City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 

1206 (9th Cir. 1206)). 

71 City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 508 F.3d 827, 838 (9th Cir. 2007). 

72 Singh v. Clinton, 618 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. 

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

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DISCUSSION

 The Court will address Plaintiffs’ NEPA, ANILCA, and NFMA claims in turn. 

I. National Environmental Policy Act 

Pursuant to NEPA, agencies must prepare an EIS before taking an action 

“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”73 Regulations issued 

by the Council on Environmental Quality require an EIS to include discussion of 

the direct and indirect effects of the action, as well as “[t]he environmental effects 

of alternatives.”74 After completing an EIS, “the agency must select a course of 

action within the range of alternatives analyzed and issue an ROD,” which 

“explains why the agency chose a particular alternative, whether all practical 

means for avoiding or minimizing environmental harm have been adopted, and, if 

not, why not.”75 

“An EIS must ‘reasonably set forth sufficient information to enable the 

decisionmaker to consider the environmental factors and make a reasoned 

decision.’”76 The agency meets this obligation if its EIS “contains a reasonably 

73 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring a “detailed statement” analyzing “the environmental impact 

of the proposed action,” among other things). 

74 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16. 

75 Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 939 F.3d at 1035 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1505.1, 1505.2). 

76 Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. Armbrister, 131 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Or. Envtl. 

Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also City of Tenakee Springs v. 

Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that EIS must be “sufficient ‘to give to 

decision makers . . . removed from the initial decision sufficient data from which to draw their 

own conclusions.’” (omissions in original) (quoting Coal. for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 

F.2d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1980))). 

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thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental 

consequences.”77 The NEPA process “serves two fundamental objectives”: “First, 

it ‘ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will 

carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental 

impacts,” and “second, it requires ‘that the relevant information will be made 

available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the 

decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.’”78

“NEPA requires . . . procedural steps but does not require an agency to 

reach any particular result.”79 Indeed, agencies retain significant discretion over 

their “methodology and planning strategy” when engaging in environmental review, 

and “NEPA’s ‘requisite “hard look” does not require adherence to a particular 

analytic protocol.’”80 The act “merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—

77 WildEarth Guardians v. Mont. Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

78 Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). Put 

another way: 

The requirement of an EIS serves two ends. A properly prepared EIS ensures 

that federal agencies have sufficiently detailed information to decide whether to 

proceed with an action in light of potential environmental consequences, and it 

provides the public with information on the environmental impact of a proposed 

action and encourages public participation in the development of that information. 

Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d at 492. 

79 Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 939 F.3d at 1035. 

80 Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1188 (9th Cir. 

1997)). 

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agency action.”81 To determine whether an agency has complied with NEPA’s 

requirements, courts apply a rule of reason, which involves “a pragmatic judgment 

whether the EIS’s form, content and preparation foster both informed decisionmaking and informed public participation.”82

One method available for agencies engaging in long-term planning is to first 

prepare a programmatic EIS that considers the broad, program-level effects of a 

coordinated series of actions, and then conduct subsequent site-specific NEPA 

analysis for each action as it occurs, tiering back to the programmatic EIS.83 

Regarding this approach, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]he detail that 

NEPA requires in an EIS depends on the nature and scope of the proposed action,” 

and that “[t]he critical inquiry in considering the adequacy of an EIS prepared for a 

large scale, multi-step project is not whether the project’s site-specific impact 

should be evaluated in detail, but when such detailed evaluation should occur.”84

81 Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 351. 

82 Churchill Cty. v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting California v. Block, 690 

F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

83 See, e.g., W. Watersheds Proj. v. Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that 

agencies can plan at programmatic or site-specific levels and that “[w]hen an agency develops 

an EIS for a programmatic plan . . . , the EIS ‘must provide “sufficient detail to foster informed 

decision-making,” but “site-specific impacts need not be fully evaluated until a critical decision 

has been made to act on site development”’” (quoting Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 

F.3d 789, 800 (9th Cir. 2003))); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (NEPA regulation encouraging 

tiering to “eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues 

ripe for decision at each level of environmental review”). 

84 California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 761. The Circuit added that “[w]hen a programmatic EIS has 

already been prepared, . . . site-specific impacts need not be fully evaluated until a ‘critical 

decision’ has been made to act on site development.” Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 

F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 

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The Forest Service chose not to take that approach here. Instead of 

preparing a programmatic EIS to be followed by site-specific NEPA analyses for 

individual timber sales as they occur, the agency compressed its NEPA review for 

the entire 15-year Project into a single document. The Forest Service maintains 

that its “landscape-scale NEPA analysis” enables informed decision-making about 

integrated resource management at the programmatic level and contains sufficient 

site-specific information and analysis to proceed with individual timber sales over 

the 15-year Project period without additional NEPA review.85

The Court will not here decide whether the nature of the Project required the 

Forest Service to complete a programmatic EIS to which later planning documents 

would tier.86 Nor do Plaintiffs request such a decision.87 Instead, the Court will 

evaluate the analytical method that the agency employed and determine whether 

the Project EIS, a landscape-level long-term planning document, adequately 

evaluated the site-specific impacts of as-yet undefined timber sales that could 

(9th Cir. 1985) (“Where there are large scale plans for regional development, NEPA requires 

both a programmatic and a site-specific EIS.” (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28, 1502.20; Kleppe v. 

Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409–14 (1976))); cf. Prot. Our Cmtys. Found., 939 F.3d at 1039 

(explaining that “a site-specific project demands site-specific analysis” and that “[a]gencies 

cannot rely on a general discussion in a programmatic EIS or other document to satisfy [their] 

NEPA obligations for a site-specific action”). 

85 Docket 12 at 24–35; see also AR 833_2167 at 001459 (describing purpose of EIS); AR 

833_2169 at 002078 (stating that there is no “need for additional NEPA analysis” under the 

Forest Service’s approach). 

86 See Churchill Cty., 276 F.3d at 1074–79 (cataloguing cases regarding the necessity of 

programmatic EISs). 

87 Docket 22-1 at 22–36. 

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potentially occur on certain acreage on Prince of Wales Island over the Project’s 

term. 

Plaintiffs contend that the Project EIS does not provide sufficient site-specific 

information or analysis to comply with NEPA.88 They argue that this case is 

governed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in City of Tenakee Springs v. Block.

89 In 

that case, the Circuit reversed a district court’s decision not to enjoin “construction 

of an 11-mile road through the Kadashan watershed” in the Tongass.90 The 

plaintiffs had challenged the adequacy of an EIS for a five-year operating plan that 

“specified no timber harvesting in the Kadashan Watershed in the years 1981 

through 1986,” but did authorize the construction of the road for future harvest 

activity.91 The Circuit ordered the entry of a preliminary injunction, in part due to 

its conclusion that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about the merits of 

their NEPA claim.92 It explained that the challenged EIS did not “g[ive] any 

indication of its overall plan for timber harvesting” in the designated area and that 

“it [was] impossible to determine where and when harvesting will occur on the 

88 Docket 22-1 at 22–36; see also Docket 1 at 16–17, ¶¶ 44–47 (Count I of Compl.). The Court 

has already considered this argument in its order granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary 

injunction, where it found that Plaintiffs had raised serious questions on the merits on their 

NEPA claim. See Docket 27 at 14–20. The Court will necessarily repeat that analysis to a 

certain degree here. 

89 778 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1985). 

90 Id. at 1403. 

91 Id. at 1408. 

92 Id. at 1407–08. 

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750,000 acres of land.”93 The Circuit held that the EIS was inadequate, reasoning 

that the location and timing of logging would affect “the locating, routing, 

construction techniques, and other aspects of the road, or even the need for its 

construction.”94

In City of Tenakee Springs, the Ninth Circuit separately rejected the trial 

court’s conclusion that the Forest Service had discretion to determine the 

specificity of its environmental review.95 Instead, it held that “[a]lthough the agency 

does have discretion to define the scope of its actions, such discretion does not 

allow the agency to determine the specificity required by NEPA.”96 The Circuit 

explained that “[w]here there are large-scale plans for regional development, 

NEPA requires both a programmatic and a site-specific EIS.”97 

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the Project EIS, with its condition-based analysis, 

is similarly deficient, and that the Forest Service impermissibly limited the 

specificity of its environmental review.98 The Forest Service maintains that it has 

93 Id. at 1408. 

94 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other 

grounds by Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2015)). 

95 Id. at 1407. 

96 Id. (citing California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 765 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

97 Id. 

98 Docket 22-1 at 23–25. 

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complied with NEPA by creating a project-level map that “provide[s] information on 

where timber harvest and road construction activities may take place.”99

The Forest Service used the LSTA to identify “potential stands for timber 

harvest as well as the transportation network needed to access those stands” 

within the roughly 1.8-million-acre Project Area over a 15-year period.100 Through 

this process, the agency identified 125,529 acres of timber for potential harvest: 

48,140 acres of old growth and 77,389 acres of young growth.101 The Project EIS 

links to a Commercial Vegetation Management map, which portrays this potential 

acreage graphically.102 However, the EIS expressly leaves site-specific 

determinations about the actual location of timber harvest within this potential 

acreage for future determination.103 For example, Alternative 2—the selected 

alternative—allows 23,269 acres of old-growth harvest, but does not specify where 

this harvest will be located within the 48,140 acres of old growth identified as 

suitable for harvest in the Project Area.104 The Activity Cards likewise do not 

99 Docket 12 at 26–27, 28–30. 

100 AR 833_2167 at 001480. 

101 See AR 833_2167 at 001481 tbl. 2. The Forest Service also determined that a maximum of 

505 miles of temporary roads and 138 miles of permanent roads would be necessary to access 

the potential timber harvest. Id.; see also AR 833_2178 (showing potential locations of 

temporary and permanent road construction). 

102 AR 833_2167 at 001480; see also AR 833_2178. 

103 AR 833_2167 at 1459 (“The site-specific locations and methods [of activities authorized by 

the EIS] will be determined during implementation based on defined conditions in the alternative 

selected in the [ROD] in conjunction with the Activity Cards . . . and Implementation Plan.”). 

104 AR 833_2167 at 001481 tbl. 2. Similarly, the Project EIS does not specify where the 129 

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identify with specificity where harvesting will occur, although they do contain 

mitigation measures that could constrain future siting decisions.105 

The Forest Service maintains that it properly exercised its discretion to 

determine the scope of the Project while at the same time providing the specificity 

required by NEPA.106 The agency argues that through Project EIS, it “has provided 

information on where timber harvest and road construction may take place and is 

not ‘attempt[ing] to justify’ any lack of information, or to opt-out of any of NEPA’s 

requirements.”107 However, similar to the EIS found inadequate by the Ninth 

Circuit in City of Tenakee Springs, the Project EIS does not include a 

determination—or even an estimate—of when and where the harvest activities or 

road construction authorized by each alternative will actually occur.108 Rather, it 

reserves actual siting decisions for the future, as individual timber sales are 

offered. 

miles of temporary roads and 35 miles of permanent roads would be located. See id. The EIS 

explains that for each alternative, “[t]he total road miles needed will be determined by the 

specific harvest units offered and the needed transportation network.” AR 833_2167 at 001789. 

105 See, e.g., AR 833_2168 at 001935–36 (Activity Card for old-growth clearcutting requiring 

Forest Service to, among other things, “limit the size of even-age openings to 100 acres with 

certain exceptions” and “locate activities outside of required nest/den buffers” where feasible); 

but see Docket 12 at 29 (Forest Service asserting that the “Activity Cards are site-specific to the 

Project Area in that they reflect analyses by resource specialists who used on-the-ground 

inventories, GIS data, and aerial photographs to develop them”). 

106 Docket 12 at 26–28 (distinguishing City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 

(9th Cir. 1985)). 

107 Docket 12 at 26–27 (alteration in original) (quoting Docket 22-1 at 24). 

108 See, e.g., AR 833_2167 at 001789 (“The total road miles needed will be determined by the 

specific harvest units offered [for sale] and the needed transportation network.”). 

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The Forest Service contends that the phrase from City of Tenakee Springs

on which Plaintiffs rely—that it “is impossible to determine where and when 

harvesting will occur on the 750,000 acres of land”—was factually inaccurate, 

citing the district court’s decision on remand.109 But regardless of that statement’s 

factual accuracy, the Circuit’s reasoning is still binding precedent: NEPA requires 

that environmental analysis be specific enough to ensure informed decisionmaking and meaningful public participation.110 The Project EIS’s omission of the 

actual location of proposed timber harvest and road construction within the Project 

Area falls short of that mandate. 

The Forest Service maintains that Plaintiffs are demanding more detail than 

is required by NEPA. The agency relies on Stein v. Barton, which concerned a 

challenge to the EIS for a five-year operating plan for an area of the Tongass that 

was then being logged pursuant to a long-term contract held by the Ketchikan Pulp 

109 Docket 12 at 27; see City of Tenakee Springs v. Courtright, No. J86-024 CIV., 1987 WL 

90272, at *3 (D. Alaska June 26, 1987) (“The [Ninth Circuit] opinion also contains puzzling 

language suggesting that the EIS did not state where and when harvesting would take place in 

the APC contract area. This may be an improperly-drafted allusion to the fact that the final EIS 

did not reveal where and when logging would take place along the Kadashan Road . . . .”). 

110 City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407–08 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Alaska 

Ctr. for Env’t v. Armbrister, 131 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997) (“An EIS must ‘reasonably set 

forth sufficient information to enable the decisionmaker to consider the environmental factors 

and make a reasoned decision.’” (quoting Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th 

Cir. 1987))). Also, the Court notes that the district court in City of Tenakee Springs v. Courtright

invalidated an EIS that did not provide sufficient site-specific detail for “information 

[to] . . . sufficiently correlat[e] with environmental factors, such as distribution of fish and wildlife 

populations, to facilitate public discussion of the [four alternative road and harvest] 

configurations.” 1987 WL 90272, at *4. 

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Company.111 Among other issues, the plaintiffs in that case argued the “harvesting 

plans for each area” were not sufficiently site-specific, “object[ing] that they cannot 

determine from the FEIS ‘where, when, and how logging and roading activities will 

occur on the 812,477 acres of land.’”112 The district court rejected this argument, 

concluding that the EIS “contain[ed] comprehensive, detailed quantitative and 

qualitative descriptions of the logging and roading plans for each harvest unit.”113 

The court noted that “the only details that the FEIS does not disclose are exact 

timetables and locations on the ground for planned harvesting activities in each 

harvest unit,” but that this was not a fatal omission since “the Forest Service does 

not develop these details at the pre-implementation stage.”114 

The Forest Service contends that Plaintiffs’ arguments are similar here and 

that NEPA does not require disclosure of the exact location of actual timber harvest 

in the Project Area.115 But the EIS that survived review in Stein contained 

significantly greater site-specificity than the Project EIS at issue here. In Stein, the 

district court described a “nine-volume FEIS [that] employ[ed] a combination of 

annotated topographic maps, textual, and tabular data to describe the project 

111 Docket 12 at 26 (citing 740 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Alaska 1990)). 

112 Stein, 740 F. Supp. at 749 (citing plaintiffs’ briefing). 

113 Id.

114 Id. 

115 Docket 12 at 26. Plaintiffs note in their reply that they “do not fault the [Project EIS] for lack 

of timetables.” Docket 19 at 13. 

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alternatives and their impacts on cognizable values within the affected areas” and 

contained “comprehensive, detailed quantitative and qualitative descriptions of the 

logging and roading plans for each harvest unit.”116 Similarly, in Alliance for the 

Wild Rockies v. Weber, another case the Forest Service cites,117 the district court 

upheld an environmental analysis for a timber sale that “identif[ied] the project 

boundaries down to the township and range level” and contained maps that would 

“allow the Plaintiffs to identify where those activities will take place in relation to 

bull trout critical habitat,” a resource value the plaintiffs had claimed was 

inadequately addressed.118 

The Project EIS at issue here does not approach this level of specificity; it 

does not delineate harvest units, let alone identify planned activities within them 

and describe their impacts on localized cognizable values. Nor does the Project 

EIS allow the public to identify where specific harvest activities will occur in relation 

to various cognizable values on Prince of Wales Island.119 Far from “unwarranted 

116 Stein, 740 F. Supp. at 749. 

117 Docket 12 at 25. 

118 979 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125–28 (D. Mont. 2013). Moreover, the district court in Alliance for 

the Wild Rockies held that the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the sale at issue fell 

within a categorical exclusion, such that no NEPA analysis was required at all. Id. at 1124–25; 

see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (authorizing agencies to categorically exclude activities from 

NEPA’s analysis requirements). 

119 As Plaintiffs maintained at oral argument: “The island complex is 130 miles long and 60 

miles wide. So if you live in one of the 12 subsistence communities on this island, the timber 

sales that have been approved in this project might be right next door to you, or they might be a 

hundred miles away.” Docket 39 at 8:24–9:3. 

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‘fly-specking,’”120 Plaintiffs’ objections identify serious shortcomings in the 

sufficiency of the Project EIS’s environmental analysis. 

 Moreover, the district court in Stein rejected the plaintiffs’ site-specificity 

claims because they had not asserted or “show[n] why disclosure of more details 

regarding site-specific impacts [was] necessary in order to ‘foster both informed 

decision-making and informed public participation.’”121 Here, Plaintiffs maintain 

that more detailed information about the specific location of timber harvest under 

the Project is necessary to properly assess its ecological and subsistence 

impacts.122 

The Forest Service contends, however, that the EIS satisfies NEPA because 

it analyzes the Project’s maximum potential impacts.123 In its briefing before this 

Court, the agency describes the Project EIS as assuming that “the 

entire . . . Project Area would be harvested by clear-cut methods and that every 

120 Stein, 740 F. Supp. at 749. 

121 Id. (quoting Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

122 See Docket 22-1 at 28–34. For example, Plaintiffs argue: 

[W]hile all of [the species occurring within the Project Area] depend to some degree 

on old growth, the extent of that dependence varies, and they have different needs 

respecting forest structure, elevation, proximity to beaches and streams, proximity 

to roads, prey availability, and fragmentation of their habitat. For all these 

reasons . . . the specific locations proposed for new logging and road construction 

matter a great deal for wildlife, for hunters, and for other people who use and enjoy 

the forest. 

Docket 22-1 at 34. 

123 Docket 12 at 30–32. 

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mile of road would be constructed up to the maximum number of harvest acres 

and miles of road authorized under each alternative.”124 The Forest Service 

maintains that as a result of this worst-case-scenario analysis, “whatever units [it] 

ultimately selects within the constraints outlined in the alternatives, Activity Cards, 

and Implementation Plan, the Project will produce environmental effects that fall 

within those already disclosed and analyzed in the EIS.”125 

It is not entirely clear from the record, but for at least some of the impacts 

analyzed, the Project EIS assumes that considerably more timber would be 

harvested than is actually authorized under each alternative. For example, to 

determine the effects of each alternative on wildlife and subsistence, the Project 

EIS focused on the 32 Wildlife Analysis Areas (“WAA”)—“land divisions used by 

[the Alaska Department of Fish and Game] for wildlife analysis and regulating 

wildlife populations”—situated in the Project Area.126 In its briefing, the Forest 

Service explained that “for each WAA, the Service assumed [timber] harvest would 

be concentrated in that WAA and would occur at the maximum level.”127 At oral 

argument, the agency confirmed that this approach could cause the EIS to assume 

that more harvest would occur under each alternative than actually allowed by that 

124 Docket 12 at 31 (citing AR 833_2167 at 001449, 001634). 

125 Docket 12 at 32 (citing WildEarth Guardians v. Conner, 920 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 

2019)). 

126 AR 833_2167 at 001514. 

127 Docket 12 at 37. 

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alternative.128 And language in the Project EIS itself indicates that this approach 

assumed that all potential harvest stands identified in the LSTA were cut, 

regardless of the acreage authorized by the alternative in question.129 The Project 

EIS makes these assumptions despite its recognition that “[t]he specific location 

and amount of harvest in each WAA would be determined during implementation 

and vary by alternative.”130 

The Forest Service cites WildEarth Guardians v. Conner to defend its 

approach.131 There, the Tenth Circuit upheld an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) 

128 Docket 39 at 19:1–18. 

129 See, e.g., AR 833_2167 at 001629 (“For purposes of analysis [of impacts to wildlife], 

assumptions include that all harvest stands from the LSTA would be harvested and the only 

harvest method would be clearcut.”); id. at 001634 (“The effects of the POW LLA Project [on 

wildlife] are similar between all alternatives because all alternatives assume that all acres 

proposed for timber harvest will be harvested.”). 

130 AR 833_2167 at 001639. 

131 Docket 12 at 17 n.5, 31, 32 (citing 920 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2019)). The Forest Service also 

cites Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Jewell, No. 13CV575, 2014 WL 1364453, at *9 

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014), aff’d 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2016), to support its assertion that its 

maximum-impacts analysis satisfied NEPA. Docket 12 at 31. However, the narrow holding in 

that case is inapplicable to the Project EIS. There, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 

“adopted a cautious and conservative approach to measuring turbine noise” in completing the 

EIS for a proposed wind facility. 2014 WL 1364453, at *9. This analysis led BLM to conclude 

that the facility would result in adverse noise impacts and caused it to develop a “site-specific 

noise mitigation plan.” Id. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that BLM should 

have modelled turbine noise using larger turbines and that it had therefore “underestimate[ed] 

overall noise levels,” citing the agency’s scientific expertise. Id.; see also Native Ecosys. 

Council v. Weldon, 697 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A court generally must be ‘at its most 

deferential’ when reviewing scientific judgments and technical analyses within the agency’s 

expertise under NEPA.” (quoting N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 

1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011))). This issue was not raised on appeal, but the Ninth Circuit did 

address the BLM’s consideration of inaudible noise impacts and similarly deferred to the 

agency’s judgment. Prot. Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 584 (9th Cir. 2016). The 

present case does not concern a discrete “evaluation of complex scientific data” such as the 

proper method to model noise impacts from a wind turbine, id.; rather, it presents a broad legal 

question about the general structure of the Project EIS. Moreover, as Plaintiffs note, BLM in 

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for a tree-thinning project designed to address a beetle infestation in two national 

forests.132 The EA “evaluat[ed] the Project’s effects on lynx in a worst-case 

scenario in which all the mapped lynx habitat in the Project area is treated.”133 Due 

to the listing of the Canada lynx as a threatened species, the Forest Service had 

previously amended the forest plans for the two forests to prohibit the clearcutting 

of more than 15% of lynx habitat or precommercial thinning of more than 1% of 

lynx habitat in a given analysis area after analyzing the impact of these changes 

in an EIS.134 In the subsequent EA for the tree-thinning project, the Forest Service 

took “the conservative approach of assuming that all lynx habitat in the Project 

area w[ould] be treated.”135 Using that approach, the Forest Service found that 

only 6% of lynx habitat would be subject to clearcutting, and no more than 0.2% 

subject to precommercial thinning—well below the percentages prohibited by the 

governing forest plans.136 The Tenth Circuit held that because the project’s 

impacts to lynx habitat were below the caps established in the amended forest 

Protect our Communities Foundation “was not substituting the worst-case analysis for sitespecific decisions,” but was instead using the analysis to assess the impact produced by a wind 

facility in a specific location. Docket 19 at 15. 

132 920 F.3d at 1251. 

133 Id. at 1258. 

134 Id.at 1252–53, 1256. Precommercial thinning is “a process of thinning stands that were 

clear-cut 20-30 years earlier, so that growth can be concentrated on the more commercially 

valuable trees.” Id. at 1255. 

135 Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original). 

136 Id. at 1255–56. 

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plans, which had been adopted after a full analysis of the lynx-habitat impacts in 

the EIS, the Forest Service “could reasonably assess the maximum impact that 

the Project could have on the lynx and conclude it was unlikely to adversely affect 

them.”137

Although in the instant case the Forest Service applied an analytical 

framework similar to the one it used in WildEarth Guardians v. Conner, the 

difference between an EA and an EIS renders that case inapplicable. An EA is 

meant to determine whether a proposed action will have a significant impact on 

the environment, such that an EIS is necessary.138 In contrast, an EIS must 

compare the environmental impacts of different alternatives, not just determine 

whether environmental impacts will occur.139 While an agency’s analysis of a 

proposed action’s maximum potential impacts may be appropriate for an EA, the 

Forest Service’s analytical framework in this case is not sufficient to meet the 

requirements for an EIS.140 

137 Id. at 1257. 

138 See id. at 1251 (describing purpose of EA). 

139 See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(d) (requiring discussion of “[t]he environmental effects 

of alternatives including the proposed action”); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (requiring EIS to 

“[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives”). 

140 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit explained in WildEarth Guardians v. Conner that it had earlier held 

an EIS inadequate that did not base its analysis of impacts to vegetation and wildlife on the 

actual location of the project, “reasoning that ‘the location of development greatly influences the 

likelihood and extent of habitat preservation’” because “’[d]isturbances on the same total surface 

acreage may produce wildly different impacts on plants and wildlife depending on the amount of 

contiguous habitat between them.’” 920 F.3d at 1257–58 (quoting Richardson v. Bureau of Land 

Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 706–07 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Docket 17 at 14 (Plaintiffs arguing that 

“[w]here . . . significant environmental impacts demand an EIS for a site-specific project, the 

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The Forest Service candidly acknowledges in the EIS that its analytical 

framework overestimates the Project’s impacts and is unlikely to reflect the actual 

extent and nature of activities under each of the proposed alternatives within the 

Project Area.141 By focusing on the Project’s maximum potential impacts for all 

alternatives rather than its actual or foreseeable impacts for each alternative, the 

EIS falls short of NEPA’s directive to “contain[] a reasonably thorough discussion 

of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences” for each 

alternative.142 This approach, coupled with the lack of site-specific information in 

the Project EIS, detracts from a decisionmaker’s or public participant’s ability to 

conduct a meaningful comparison of the probable environmental impacts among 

the various alternatives. For example, in the introduction to the section discussing 

the Project’s impacts to wildlife habitat, the EIS states that “[t]he effects . . . are 

similar between all alternatives because all alternatives assume that all acres 

agency must disclose with specificity where it intends to undertake the project, what the impacts 

will be, and what alternatives are available.”). Yet the Tenth Circuit was careful to note that its 

holding in Richardson was not “that an agency’s EA or EIS always must specify the precise 

locations within a project area that will be affected.” WildEarth Guardians v. Conner, 920 F.3d at 

1258 (emphasis added). 

141 See, e.g., AR 833_2167 at 1634 (“The total acres estimated to be needed to meet timber 

needs are likely over-estimated and therefore the effects are likely over-estimated as well.”). 

The Forest Service’s briefing admits this as well, stating that the Project EIS “analyz[es] the 

Project’s maximum potential impacts, . . . even though in reality impacts would be less.” Docket 

12 at 31; see also id. at 31 n.10 (noting that “under Alternative 2, about fifty-seven percent of the 

old-growth acreage proposed for harvest would be harvested using uneven-aged harvest 

prescriptions,” even though the EIS’s analysis assumed that all acres would be clear-cut). 

142 WildEarth Guardians v. Mont. Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(emphasis added) (quoting City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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proposed for timber harvest will be harvested. The analysis also assumes that all 

acres will be harvested by even-aged harvest methods.”143 Due to these identical 

assumptions for each alternative, it appears that at least with respect to wildlife 

impacts, the Project EIS only meaningfully analyzed the different mitigation 

measures contained in each alternative, not the harvest limits.144 And where the 

Project EIS does differentiate between alternatives, it does so in partly conditional 

terms due to its lack of site-specific information. For example, when discussing 

impacts to high productive old growth habitat, the EIS concludes that Alternative 2 

“may result in two [Wildlife Analysis Areas] dropping below 50% habitat 

remaining.”145

The Project EIS identified a total acreage of potential timber harvest, but not 

the distribution of the specific acreage authorized by each alternative within these 

areas. This omission is meaningful given the duration and scale of the project.146 

Despite “additional parameters that limit the ultimate selection of units and 

143 AR 833_2167 at 001634; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 

144 See, AR 833_2167 at 001642–43 (differentiating impacts of alternatives to deep snow habitat 

purely in terms of mitigation measures). 

145 AR 833_2167 at 001500 (emphasis added). 

146 For example, Alternative 2 authorizes a maximum 42,635 acres of timber harvest—23,269 

acres of old growth and 19,366 acres of young growth—which is roughly 34 percent of the 

125,529 acres identified for potential old- and young-growth harvest in the Project Area. AR 

833_2167 at 001481. 

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activities,”147 such as mitigation measures contained in the Activity Cards,148 the 

Project EIS’s structure creates ambiguity about the actual location, concentration, 

and timing of timber harvest and road construction on Prince of Wales Island.149 

By doing so, the Project EIS fails to provide a meaningful comparison of 

alternatives. 

By authorizing an integrated resource management plan but deferring siting 

decisions to the future with no additional NEPA review,150 the Project EIS violates 

NEPA. The Forest Service has not yet taken the requisite hard look at the 

environmental impact of site-specific timber sales on Prince of Wales over the next 

15 years. The Forest Service’s plan for condition-based analysis may very well 

streamline management of the Tongass and decrease the amount of falldown 

acreage associated with each timber sale;151 however, it does not comply with the 

147 Docket 12 at 29. 

148 See, e.g., AR 833_2168 at 001935–39 (Activity Card for “Rotational Harvest of Old Growth 

Using Even-aged Management”). 

149 See Docket 19 at 9 (“Even the maximum level of logging . . . and road-building . . . could be 

distributed in countless combinations around the 125,529 acres allowed in the Project.”) 

150 The ROD states that the Implementation Plan is to “provide a linkage from the [Project EIS] 

to the project-specific work without the need for additional NEPA analysis.” AR 833_2427 at 

001034. As Plaintiffs note, the Forest Service’s “approach might be permissible if the agency 

were going to prepare a subsequent EIS” for decisions at the site-specific level. Docket 22-1 at 

26; see also City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Where 

there are large-scale plans for regional development, NEPA requires both a programmatic and a 

site-specific EIS.” (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.28, 1502.20)); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 

(9th Cir. 1982) (“The detail that NEPA requires in an EIS depends upon the nature and scope of 

the proposed action. . . . The critical inquiry in considering the adequacy of an EIS prepared for 

a large scale, multi-step project is not whether the project’s site-specific impact should be 

evaluated in detail, but when such detailed evaluation should occur.”). 

151 Docket 12 at 10 (describing condition-based management as “superior method to analyze 

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procedural requirements of NEPA, which are binding on the agency.152 “NEPA 

favors ‘coherent and comprehensive up-front environmental analysis to ensure . . . 

that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision 

after it is too late to correct.”153 Plaintiffs have therefore established Count I of the 

Complaint; the Project EIS violates NEPA and is therefore not in accordance with 

law.154

 II. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act

Congress enacted ANILCA to “cause the least adverse impact possible on 

rural residents who depend upon subsistence uses of the resources of [the public 

lands in Alaska].”155 To achieve this purpose, § 810 of ANILCA imposes 

the environmental effects of multi-year, landscape level analyses such as this one”). At oral 

argument, the Forest Service explained that one motivation behind the decision to adopt 

condition-based analysis was to minimize downward reductions of harvest volume as sales are 

finalized, known as “falldown.” Docket 39 at 19:20–20:8; see also AR 833_2167 at 001561 

(describing falldown). The Court notes that while the EIS does discuss falldown, neither it nor 

the ROD identifies falldown as a motivating factor in the Project’s design. 

152 See Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. LaCounte, 939 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2019) (“NEPA 

requires . . . procedural steps but does not require an agency to reach any particular result.”). In 

its briefing, the Forest Service maintained that “resource concerns and mitigations measures 

[would be] further refined” through the Implementation Plan “after treatment units are identified.” 

Docket 12 at 29–30. But the Implementation Plan is not a valid substitute for NEPA. For 

example, NEPA provides for a minimum 45-day comment period on draft EISs, 40 C.F.R. § 

1506.10(c), while the Implementation Plan allows for only a 30-day comment period. AR 

833_2427 at 001035. The ROD notes that the Implementation Plan may be altered by the 

Forest Service, see AR 833_2427 at 000811, and the agency maintained at oral argument that 

the Project would be NEPA-compliant even if no Implementation Plan existed. Docket 39 at 

18:6–13. 

153 Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 939 F.3d at 1035 (alterations in original) (quoting Churchill Cty. v. 

Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

154 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

155 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987) 

(“The purpose of ANILCA § 810 is to protect Alaskan subsistence resources from unnecessary 

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procedural requirements upon federal decisionmakers; pursuant to its terms, an 

agency proposing an action resulting in the “use, occupancy, or disposition of 

public lands” must evaluate that action’s effects on “subsistence uses and needs,” 

the availability of other lands for the same purpose, and “other alternatives” that 

would reduce the impacts to subsistence uses.156 Upon determining that the action 

“would significantly restrict subsistence uses,” the agency must provide notice to 

the affected communities, hold public hearings, and make three findings: 

[T]hat (A) such a significant restriction of subsistence uses is 

necessary, consistent with sound management principles for the 

utilization of the public lands, (B) the proposed activity will involve the 

minimal amount of public lands necessary to accomplish the purposes 

of such use, occupancy, or other disposition, and (C) reasonable 

steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts upon subsistence 

uses and resources resulting from such actions.157

When the proposed action requires completion of an EIS, the agency “shall provide 

the notice and hearing and include the findings required by [ANILCA § 810(a)] as 

part of such [EIS].”158

The Project EIS contains a section discussing the impacts to subsistence 

activities.159 This section recognizes that “[s]ubsistence hunting, fishing, trapping, 

and gathering activities are a major focus of life for many residents on Prince of 

destruction.”). 

156 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a). 

157 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(1)–(3). 

158 16 U.S.C. § 3120(b). 

159 AR 833_2167 at 001540–1559. 

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Wales Island.”160 The EIS notes that commenters were particularly concerned 

about the Project’s impacts to Sitka black-tailed deer, which the EIS “considered 

an ‘indicator’ for potential subsistence resource effects concerning the resources 

associated with old-growth forest habitat.”161 Using the maximum-impact 

methodology described in the previous section of this order,162 the Forest Service 

determined that the Project presents “a significant possibility of a significant 

restriction for the use of deer,” largely “due to the loss of deep snow habitat in 

some WAAs [Wildlife Analysis Areas].”163 The Project EIS identified “five WAAs of 

concern . . . [:] 1214, 1315, 1317, 1318, and 1420,” which are “near the 

communities of Thorne Bay, Coffman Cove, Hollis and Klawock.”164

In light of this determination, the Forest Service held seven subsistence 

hearings in Prince of Wales Island communities after issuing the draft EIS.165 In 

160 AR 833_2167 at 001540. 

161 AR 833_2167 at 001540. 

162 See supra 26–27; see also Docket 12 at 37 (“In other words, for each WAA [Wildlife Analysis 

Area], the Service assumed [timber] harvest would be concentrated in that WAA and would 

occur at the maximum level.”) 

163 AR 833_2167 at 1557. Regarding other subsistence resources, the Forest Service 

concluded that “[n]one of the project alternatives would present ‘a significant possibility of a 

significant restriction’ of subsistence uses for most subsistence resources (food plants, personal 

use timber, upland game birds and waterfowl, furbearers, and marine mammals).” AR 

833_2167 001545; see also AR 833_2167 at 001548 (finding same for aquatic resources). 

164 AR 833_2167 at 001550. The Project EIS noted that “[t]he Forest Plan estimates that with 

full implementation of the Forest Plan, WAAs 1420 and 1421 in the project area may retain 50 

percent or less of the estimated deer habitat capability.” AR 833_2167 at 001554; see also AR 

833_2167 at 1500–01 (showing impacts of various alternatives to different habitats). 

165 AR 833_2167 at 001470. The Forest Service held subsistence hearings in Whale Pass, 

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response to concerns raised at two of these hearings, the agency decided “not to 

authorize commercial harvest of old-growth stands in the area ‘North of the 20 

Road, and in VCU 5280.”166 In the final Project EIS, the Forest Service made the 

three findings required by ANILCA § 810(a)(3).167

Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he lack of site-specific information in the [Project 

EIS] violates not only NEPA, but also section 810 of ANILCA.”168 They maintain 

that “analysis of impacts on subsistence uses under section 810 should be at least 

as site-specific as that for the environmental impacts under NEPA.”169 As such, 

Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service’s § 810(a)(3) findings were premature 

since they were made “before deciding the specific location or extent of logging or 

road construction over the next 15 years.”170

The Forest Service argues that Plaintiffs have simply repackaged their 

NEPA claim.171 However, due to the similarities between the procedural 

requirements of NEPA and ANILCA, courts have evaluated the two statutes under 

Klawock (twice), Hydaburg, Point Baker, Kasaan, and Naukati. Id.

166 AR 833_2427 at 000787. The “area North of 20 Road” is on the northern tip of Prince of 

Wales Island, to the East of the communities of Point Baker and Port Protection. See AR 

833_2178. 

167 AR 833_2167 at 001558–59. 

168 Docket 22-1 at 36; see also Docket 1 at 17–18, ¶¶ 48–51 (Count II in Complaint). 

169 Docket 22-1 at 37. 

170 Docket 22-1 at 39. 

171 Docket 12 at 35. 

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similar standards.172 Although there is little case law on the issue, at least one 

court has looked to NEPA decisions to determine the site-specificity required by 

ANILCA § 810. In City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, the district court rejected 

the plaintiffs’ claims that supplemental EISs were “deficient because they discuss 

site-specific impacts of proposed harvesting on subsistence resources but do not 

correlate those impacts with the specific subsistence needs of each affected 

community.”173 The court cited Stein v. Barton’s description of NEPA sitespecificity as the relevant standard, stating that “[p]roposed activities must be 

sufficiently correlated with environmental factors in each affected area to facilitate 

public discussion of the project.”174 But the court found that no additional sitespecificity was necessary to comply with ANILCA because the “EIS’s identify sitespecific impacts on subsistence resources, incorporate maps identifying which 

sites are important for subsistence use generally, and catalog how and to what 

extent each community utilizes subsistence resources, including data on per capita 

consumption.”175

172 See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass’n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 731 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (evaluating adequacy of EIS’s consideration of alternatives under NEPA and ANILCA 

together); City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1310–12 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); 

Sierra Club v. Penfold, 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Alaska 1987) (“NEPA case law is helpful in 

interpreting § 810.”). 

173 750 F. Supp. 1406, 1422 (D. Alaska 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

174 Id. at 1422 (quoting Stein v. Barton, 740 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Alaska 1990)). 

175 Id.

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 The Court has already determined that the Project EIS does not contain the 

level of site-specificity required by NEPA. For the same reasons, the Court finds 

that despite the public hearings it held and the findings it made, the Forest Service 

has failed to comply with ANILCA § 810. The purpose of that section is to promote 

informed decision-making, such that the impacts of an action to subsistence 

activities are considered; those actions “which would significantly restrict 

subsistence uses can only be undertaken if they are necessary and if the adverse 

effects are minimized.”176 This purpose can only be fulfilled if specific information 

about the actual, not the potential, proposed action is available. This is made clear 

by the statute’s command to consider site-specific aspects of a proposed action, 

such as its effect on local “subsistence uses and needs.”177 

The Forest Service contends that it has fulfilled its duty under ANILCA by 

“identifying where Project activities would occur, evaluating the maximum impacts 

of the Project on subsistence uses, and by taking actions to benefit subsistence 

uses and reduce the adverse effects of the project on . . . those uses.”178 However, 

as discussed above, the Commercial Vegetation Management map only identifies 

the potential, and not the actual, locations of timber harvest and road building 

within the 1.8-million acre Project Area. The Forest Service’s evaluation of the 

176 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987). 

177 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a); see also supra note 119. 

178 Docket 12 at 35–36. 

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Project’s maximum impacts does not evaluate the Project’s actual expected 

impacts.179 By not developing actual site-specific information, the Forest Service 

limited its ability to make informed decisions regarding impacts to subsistence uses 

and presented local communities with vague, hypothetical, and over-inclusive 

representations of the Project’s effects over a 15-year period.180

The Implementation Plan does envision additional information-gathering 

and public participation before site-specific decisions are made.181 However, as 

Plaintiffs note, this process does not require the Forest Service to make additional 

findings under ANILCA § 810(a)(3) or provide the public with a right of appeal.182 

Moreover, the Implementation Plan is subject to change by the Forest Service, and 

there is no certainty that its public participation provisions will last for the Project’s 

15-year duration.183 Without either an up-front discussion of actual site-specific 

impacts or future ANILCA analysis when siting decisions are made, the Project 

EIS and ROD are inconsistent with ANILCA § 810. Plaintiffs have therefore 

179 See supra 30–32. As noted previously, see supra note 146, Alternative 2 authorized 42,635 

acres of timber harvest, or 34 percent of the 125,529 acres identified for potential harvest by the 

LSTA, but gave no indication of where that harvest would occur within the total acreage. AR 

833_2167 at 001481. 

180 As Plaintiffs note, “subsistence activities are inherently location-specific,” and “[p]eople care 

about the places they use for subsistence and how the action will affect those places and 

nearby habitat.” Docket 19 at 18. 

181 See AR 833_2427 at 001037 (describing implementation process). 

182 Docket 19 at 19. 

183 See AR 833_2427 at 000811 (“The plan is meant to be a ‘living’ document and may need to 

be adjusted . . . .”). 

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established Count II of the Complaint; the Project EIS violates ANILCA and is 

therefore not in accordance with law.184

 III. National Forest Management Act

Pursuant to NFMA, the Forest Service must prepare a land and resource 

management plan, also called a “forest plan,” for each forest it manages.185 

Projects occurring in a national forest must comply with that forest’s management 

plan.186 Standard and Guideline TIM3.I.C in the 2016 Forest Plan that currently 

governs management of the Tongass provides: 

Timber harvest unit cards will document resource concerns and 

protection measures. The unit cards, including a map with relevant 

resource features, will be provided electronically when Draft or Final 

NEPA documents and decisions are published. (Consult Tongass 

National Forest Supplement 1909.15-2015-1.)187

Tongass National Forest Supplement 1909.15-2015-1, which “[e]stablishe[d] 

procedures for producing and distributing unit and road cards associated with 

NEPA documents,”188 was rescinded by the Forest Service in October 2018.189 

184 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

185 See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). 

186 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); see also Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (“[P]ursuant to the NFMA, the Forest Service must demonstrate that a site-specific 

project would be consistent with the land resource management plan of the entire forest.” 

(quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 

1998))). 

187 AR 833_0404 at 63265. Forest plans for the Tongass have included a unit-card requirement 

since at least 1997. AR 833_2076 at 068765 (1997 Tongass Forest Plan). 

188 AR 833_2526 at 074726. 

189 AR 833_2525 at 074720–25. 

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The Project EIS does not contain unit cards, and the ROD explains in the 

section describing Activity Cards that “[u]nit cards would be developed for any 

timber sales when site-specific locations are determined” through the 

Implementation Plan.190 Plaintiffs contend that the “Forest Service violated the 

forest plan requirement to include unit cards with the draft or final EISs for the 

Prince of Wales Project.”191 

Responding to comments arguing that the Project EIS had failed to comply 

with the Tongass Forest Plan, the Forest Service explained that it understood the 

rescission of Tongass National Forest Supplement 1909.15-2015-1 to have 

rendered “the timing for when electronic unit cards are provided . . . no longer 

applicable.”192 The Forest Service added that the Implementation Plan’s 

“opportunity for public comment on the maps, and unit and road cards meets the 

intent of Forest Plan TIM3.I.C.”193 

In its briefing to this Court, the Forest Service advances a different 

argument. It now contends that TIM3.I.C is ambiguous regarding “the contents 

190 AR 833_2427 at 000826; see also id. at 000802 (“The Implementation Plan identifies that 

unit and road-specific cards will be developed when specific harvest units and road locations 

are determined as part of the Implementation Plan process.”) 

191 Docket 22-1 at 39; see also Docket 1 at 18–20, ¶¶ 52–58 (Count III in Complaint). 

192 AR 833_2440 at 000020 (Responses to Comments on Draft ROD); see also AR 833_2427 at 

000802 (ROD determining that publishing unit cards during Implementation Plan “is an 

alternative way to fully comply with Forest Plan Standard TIM3.I.C, which is no longer applicable 

in terms of timing when unit cards are provided”). 

193 AR 833_2171 at 002149 (Responses to Comments on Draft EIS). 

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and format of unit cards, except that the cards ‘will document resource concerns 

and protection measures’ and ‘include[e] [sic] a map with relevant resource 

features.’”194 The Forest Service maintains that the Activity Cards and Commercial 

Vegetation Management map provided with the Project EIS comply with this 

requirement. 195

The Forest Service argues that its interpretation of TIM3.I.C is entitled to 

Auer deference, which accords “defer[ence] to agencies’ reasonable readings of 

genuinely ambiguous regulations.”196 But Auer deference is not automatic; the 

Supreme Court has explained that “before concluding that a rule is genuinely 

ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” meaning 

it “must ‘carefully consider[]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a 

regulation.”197

Addressing first the Forest Service’s position in the administrative record, 

the Court finds no ambiguity in TIM3.I.C about when the agency is required to 

provide unit cards, notwithstanding the rescission of the supplement cited therein. 

The Standard and Guideline clearly states that “[t]he unit cards . . . will be provided 

194 Docket 12 at 42 (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting AR 833_0404 at 063265). 

195 Docket 12 at 41–45. 

196 Kisor v. Wilkie, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 

452 (1997)). 

197 Id. at 2415 (2019) (second alteration in original) (first quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984), then quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 

Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 

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electronically when Draft or Final NEPA documents and decisions are 

published.”198 Under the plain language of the Forest Plan, the Forest Service 

must provide unit cards when the relevant NEPA document is published. 

Regardless of the provision’s intent,199 the Forest Service departed from the 

unambiguous directive of TIM3.I.C. The agency’s decision to delay the publication 

of unit cards until the Implementation Plan, after NEPA review was completed for 

the Project, is therefore inconsistent with the Forest Plan. 

 The Court finds the Forest Service’s position in its briefing to be no more 

convincing. While TIM3.I.C does not fully explain what a unit card should contain, 

it is clear from the Standard and Guideline’s language that each card must relate 

to a discrete geographic area, or “[t]imber harvest unit,” within the Project Area.200 

The Commercial Vegetation Management map does not identify specific timber 

harvest units,201 and the Activity Cards “document resource concerns and 

protection measures at the Project level.”202 They are not unit cards within the 

meaning of TIM3.I.C. 203

198 AR 833_0404 at 63265 (emphasis added). 

199 See AR 833_2171 at 002149 (stating that Implementation Plan’s “opportunity for public 

comment on the maps, and unit and road cards meets the intent of the Forest Plan TIM3.I.C”). 

200 AR 833_0404 at 63265. 

201 AR 833_2178. 

202 Docket 12 at 44; see also AR 833_2427 at 000826 (describing Activity Cards). 

203 Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (“However, an 

agency’s interpretation does not control, where, as here, it is plainly inconsistent with the 

regulation at issue.”). The Forest Service has previously used the term “activity cards” 

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 Moreover, even if TIM3.I.C were ambiguous, the current interpretation 

advanced in the Forest Service’s briefing would not be entitled to Auer deference. 

Throughout the administrative record, the Forest Service’s position is consistent: 

provision of unit cards after the completion of NEPA review complies with TIM3.I.C 

due to the rescission of Tongass National Forest Supplement 1909.15-2015-1. It 

is only in its briefing to this Court that the agency asserts that the Activity Cards 

and the Commercial Vegetation Management map themselves constituted the unit 

cards required by TIM.3.I.C.204 “[A] court should decline to defer to a merely 

‘convenient litigating position’ or ‘post hoc rationalization[n] advanced’ to ‘defend 

past agency action against attack.’”205 And the administrative record itself belies 

the Forest Service’s litigation position; in the ROD, the agency differentiated 

collectively to refer to cards “used to explain site-specific proposed activities,” including “timber 

harvest units and proposed and existing roads.” AR 833_2084 at 061267 (EIS for Kuiu Timber 

Sale). Unlike the Activity Cards in this case, the Kuiu Timber Sale unit cards described harvest 

activities in specific geographic locations, including both graphical and narrative information for 

each harvest unit. See AR 833_2084 at 061279–80 (card for unit 101); see also id. at 061268–

76 (describing activity cards, as defined by that project, and locating individual harvest units and 

roads on map of Project Area). Although Forest Supplement 1909.15-2015-1 was still effective 

when the Kuiu Timber Sale EIS was prepared, the Court finds a comparison between the timber 

harvest unit cards in that case and the Activity Cards used here to be instructive. 

204 At oral argument, the Forest Service maintained that the agency had twice asserted in the 

administrative record that the Activity Cards and Commercial Vegetation Management map 

themselves complied with TIM3.I.C. Docket 39 at 24:24–26:19 (citing AR 833_2427 at 000802 

and AR 833_2171 at 002149). Not so. As discussed above, the two pages of the record cited 

by the Forest Service concern the timing of unit card publication.

205 Kisor v. Wilkie, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (alteration and emphasis in 

original) (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 

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between Activity Cards and unit cards and explained that the latter would be 

provided through the Implementation Plan in an effort to comply with TIM3.I.C.206

 Due to their failure to include timber harvest unit cards corresponding to 

discrete geographic locations, the Project EIS and ROD are inconsistent with the 

2016 Tongass Forest Plan. Plaintiffs have therefore established Count III of the 

Complaint; by not complying with the applicable forest plan, the Project violated 

NFMA and is therefore not in accordance with law.207 

206 The ROD lays out the difference between Activity Cards and unit cards, explaining that the 

former inform but do not replace the latter: 

The POWLLA FEIS uses a condition-based approach where specific harvest units 

and roads will be determined during implementation through a collaborative public 

process and interdisciplinary review. Activity Cards and maps were included with 

the FEIS and Draft ROD and will also be part of this Final ROD. The Activity Cards 

were designed to honor the public process developed at the community level 

during the POW LLA NEPA process, to be a resource for the public and Forest 

Service resource specialists, to assist in alternative development, and to 

accompany the EIS to provide clarity for environmental effects analysis and guide 

implementation . . . . The Implementation Plan identifies that unit and road -specific 

cards will be developed when specific harvest units and road locations are 

determined as part of the Implementation Plan process. This Implementation Plan 

allows for more collaboration during implementation, and responsiveness to 

dynamic on-the-ground conditions, new science information, and public input. This 

process provides for publishing unit and road cards online and providing an 

opportunity for public review and comment before final line officer decisions on 

specific project activities are made. This has been clarified in the Implementation 

Plan, ROD Appendix 2, under step 4. I have determined this process is an 

alternative way to fully comply with Forest Plan Standard TIM3.1.C, which is no 

longer applicable in terms of the timing of when unit cards are provided. 

AR 833_2427 at 000802. 

207 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

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Nevertheless, the Forest Service asserts that this error was not 

prejudicial.208 “Relief is available under the APA only for ‘prejudicial error.’”209 

Plaintiffs challenging agency action bear the burden of showing prejudice, but this 

is not “a particularly onerous requirement.”210 Plaintiffs have met their burden here. 

They argue that they “were prejudiced by the lack of unit cards that would have 

given them the opportunity to provide meaningful input on logging locations, 

impacts, and alternatives.”211 The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that an error 

that affects the public’s ability to meaningfully participate in the NEPA review 

process is prejudicial.212 

The Forest Service contends that Plaintiffs had the opportunity to comment 

on the Activity Cards and Commercial Vegetation Management map, which 

contain “proposed locations of timber harvest.”213 However, as discussed above, 

208 Docket 12 at 45–47. 

209 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 

706). 

210 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 410 (2009). 

211 Docket 19 at 24; see also supra note 119. 

212 See, e.g., Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding error to 

be prejudicial where “the public was not able to tailor its comments to address concerns 

regarding the potential winter presence of sage grouse” because “baseline conditions [were] 

inadequately established”); Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 

1998); cf. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(reaffirming Circuit’s “consistent case law holding that ‘harmless error’ requires a determination 

that the error ‘had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of [the] decision 

reached’” (alteration in original) (quoting Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 

2005))). 

213 Docket 12 at 46. 

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these documents do not contain the level of site-specificity required by TIM3.I.C—

or by NEPA for that matter—and did not allow Plaintiffs to meaningfully comment 

on the specific harvest activities that would have been identified on timber harvest 

unit cards had they been published with the draft EIS.214 The Court therefore finds 

that the NFMA violation was prejudicial and that relief is warranted under the APA. 

IV. Proper Remedy

Having determined that Plaintiffs prevail on all three counts in their 

Complaint, the Court turns to the question of the proper remedy. Plaintiffs request 

a judgment declaring that the Project EIS “violates NEPA, section 810 of ANILCA, 

and NFMA,” and “vacating those portions of the ROD authorizing vegetation 

management and new road construction.”215 The Forest Service contends that 

remand without vacatur may be appropriate, and requests the Court to allow 

supplemental briefing to address the proper remedy.216

 Vacatur is the default remedy under the APA, which directs reviewing courts 

to “hold unlawful and set aside” unlawful agency action.217 The Ninth Circuit has 

214 Further, the ability to comment on draft unit cards produced pursuant to the Implementation 

Plan does not render the error harmless, see Docket 12 at 47, since the Implementation Plan is 

subject to change and does not provide for the same public participation and review process as 

NEPA. See supra note 152. 

215 Docket 22-1 at 43. 

216 Docket 12 at 47–49. 

217 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Both partial and complete vacatur of the offending agency action are 

acceptable forms of relief under the APA. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 

139, 165–66 (2010) (“If a less drastic remedy (such as partial or complete vacatur of APHIS’s 

deregulation decision) was sufficient to redress respondents’ injury, no recourse to the additional 

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explained that a court should “order remand without vacatur only in ‘limited 

circumstances,’” and “leave an invalid rule in place only ‘when equity demands.’”218 

To determine whether to remand an action without vacatur, a court is to “weigh the 

seriousness of the agency’s errors against ‘the disruptive consequences of an 

interim change that may itself be changed.’”219

The Forest Service maintains that “[b]oth considerations are informed by the 

Court’s decision on the merits,” and the agency “believes the consequences of 

vacatur would be extremely disruptive due to the recent low and uncertain supply 

of timber in Southeast Alaska, which threatens businesses in the region.”220 The 

Forest Service maintains that “[t]he economic need for Project timber and the harm 

that would be caused by delaying timber harvesting activities authorized by the 

Project cannot be adequately addressed within the page limits for [its] merits 

brief.”221 In response, Plaintiffs note that the Forest Service “made a strategic 

choice to devote more pages to the merits of the claims, with no basis to assume 

it was entitled to supplemental briefing on the remedy.”222 Since Plaintiffs did

and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted.”). 

218 Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(first quoting Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 688 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 

2012) then quoting Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

219 Id. (quoting Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 992). 

220 Docket 12 at 48. 

221 Docket 12 at 49. 

222 Docket 19 at 26. 

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choose to devote a section of their briefing to the remedy issue, they maintain that 

allowing supplemental briefing would unfairly prejudice them.223

 The Court finds that supplemental briefing on the appropriate remedy could 

be helpful. Any prejudice to Plaintiffs as a result of this delay will be eliminated 

because the Court will keep the preliminary injunction in effect until the appropriate 

remedy is determined. 

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223 Docket 19 at 26. 

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CONCLUSION

 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 Plaintiffs’ request at Docket 10 for declaratory relief is GRANTED. The 

Project EIS violates NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a), 

and NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). It is therefore “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”224

Each party may file a supplemental brief addressing the proper remedy in 

this case within 21 days of the date of this order; such brief shall not exceed 

15 pages. Each party will then have an additional 14 days to file a response, 

not to exceed 8 pages. 

The preliminary injunction at Docket 27 shall remain in place until the Court 

enters a final judgment. 

DATED this 11th day of March, 2020 at Anchorage, Alaska. 

 

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

224 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

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