Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01436/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01436-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY EARL RICHARD,

Petitioner, No. 2: 12-cv-1436 GEB DAD P

vs.

SUSAN HUBBARD,

Respondent. ORDER 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s May 29, 2012 

motion for stay and abeyance. 

I. Background

On May 29, 2012, petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, challenging a 2008 judgment of conviction entered in the Sacramento County

Superior Court for attempted murder and robbery, with sentencing enhancements for personal

use of a firearm and causing great bodily injury. On that same date, petitioner filed a motion for

stay and abeyance, asking the court to stay this federal habeas action in order to allow him to

complete the exhaustion process in state court with respect to several of his claims. 

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On October 15, 2012, this court ordered respondent to file a response to both the

habeas petition and the motion for stay and abeyance. On November 14, 2012, respondent filed

an opposition to petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance and a request for extension of time to

file a response to petitioner’s habeas petition. On November 16, 2012, the court granted

respondent’s request for an extension of time and directed respondent to file a response to the

habeas petition within thirty days of any court order denying the motion for stay and abeyance. 

On January 22, 2013, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in

this court. 

II. Stay and Abeyance Procedures

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has analyzed the two

procedures available to habeas petitioners who wish to proceed with exhausted and unexhausted

claims for relief. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the Ninth

Circuit explained “the Kelly procedure,” outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.

2003). Under the three-step Kelly procedure, 

(1) the petitioner amends his petition to delete any unexhausted

claims, (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully

exhausted petition, allowing petitioner the opportunity to proceed

to state court to exhaust the deleted claims, and (3) petitioner later

amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to

the original petition. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1135. A petitioner who elects to proceed under the Kelly procedure will be

able to amend his petition with his newly exhausted claims if they are timely under the statute of

limitations governing the filing of federal habeas petitions. If a petitioner’s newly-exhausted

claims are untimely, he will only be able to amend his petition to include them if they share a

“common core of operative facts” with the claims set forth in his original federal petition. In this

regard, the Kelly procedure, unlike the alternative procedure discussed below, is a riskier one for

a habeas petitioner because it does not protect a petitioner’s unexhausted claims from expiring

during a stay. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. See also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-75

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(2001) (unlike the filing of a state habeas petition, the filing of a federal habeas petition does not

toll the statute of limitations).

As the Ninth Circuit explained in King, the United States Supreme Court has

authorized an alternative procedure which it outlined in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277

(2005). Under the Rhines procedure, the petitioner need not amend his federal habeas petition to

delete unexhausted claims. Instead, the petitioner may proceed on a “mixed petition,” i.e., one

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and his unexhausted claims remain pending

in federal court while he returns to state court to exhaust them. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140;

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Rhines concluded that a district court has

discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner time to return to state court to present

unexhausted claims.”). A petitioner who elects to proceed under the Rhines procedure can, in

many instances, avoid an issue with respect to the timeliness of the claims set forth in his federal

petition. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a “stay

and abeyance [under the Rhines procedure] should be available only in limited circumstances,”

and “district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and

back.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. The Supreme Court explained that district courts should not

grant such a stay if the petitioner has engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay or

if the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. Id. at 278. Further, under Rhines, “‘stay-andabeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the

petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.’” King, 564 F.3d at 1139 (quoting

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78). The decisions in both Kelly and Rhines “are directed at solving the 1

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 The Kelly procedure, which remains available after Rhines, does not require a showing 1

of good cause. King, 564 F.3d at 1140. 

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same problem – namely, the interplay between AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and the

total exhaustion requirement first articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).”2

III. Discussion

A. Background

On direct appeal in state court, petitioner claimed that the trial court violated his

right to a jury trial in removing a juror for misconduct and that the evidence introduced at his

trial was insufficient to sustain the finding that he discharged a firearm causing great bodily

injury. (Doc. No. 1 (Pet.) at 2; see also People v. Richard, Nos. C060092, C062587, 2010 WL

2794942 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Nov. 24, 2010)). Petitioner sought further appellate relief in the

California Supreme Court but his request for relief was denied. (Pet. at 2.) 

In his two federal habeas petitions filed in this court on May 29, 2012 and January

22, 2013, petitioner raises the following claims for relief: (1) the trial court violated his right to a

jury trial in removing a juror for misconduct; (2) the evidence introduced at his trial was

insufficient to sustain the finding that he discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury; (3) the

introduction into evidence at his trial of evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure

violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search and seizure; (5) the

evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder;

(6) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (7) his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance; and (8) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of the

witnesses against him when it admitted hearsay evidence at his trial. (Doc. No. 1 (Pet.) at 16;

Doc. No. 16 at 19.) 

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 Rose requires district courts to dismiss a mixed petition, “leaving the prisoner with the 2

choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas

petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court.” 455 U.S. at 510.

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In both of his habeas petitions filed in this court, petitioner represents that on

October 5, 2011, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, in

which he raised the first three grounds for relief contained in the instant federal habeas petitions,

to wit: (1) the trial court violated his right to a jury trial in removing a juror for misconduct; (2)

the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to sustain the finding that he discharged a

firearm causing great bodily injury; and (3) the introduction into evidence at his trial of evidence

obtained from an unlawful search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. No.

1 at 3; Doc. No. 16 at 3.) Although petitioner states that “4# more issues” were also raised in

that petition, it is unclear what those issues were. (Id.) According to petitioner’s habeas petition

filed in this court on January 22, 2013, his habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court

was denied on an unknown date. (Doc. No. 16 at 3.) 

Both of the habeas petitions filed by petitioner in this court reflect that in May,

2012, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Superior Court, in

which he raised at least the following four issues, and possibly four others: (1) the trial court

violated his right to a jury trial in removing a juror for misconduct; (2) the evidence introduced at

his trial was insufficient to sustain the finding that he discharged a firearm causing great bodily

injury; (3) the introduction into evidence at his trial of evidence obtained from an unlawful

search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (4) the trial court abused its discretion

in denying petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful

search and seizure. (Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 16 at 4.) Petitioner states that this petition is still

“pending” before the California Supreme Court (Id.) At another point in both habeas petitions

filed in this court, petitioner states that five unspecified claims contained in the instant petition

are currently pending “before the California courts.” (Doc. No. 1 at 12; Doc. No. 16 at 12.)

Although petitioner states that he has included an exhibit with his petition which include

“collateral pleadings currently ‘pending’ before the California Courts” (Doc. No. 1 at 17; Doc.

No. 16 at 20), no such exhibit has been filed with this court. 

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Petitioner’s May 29, 2012 motion for stay and abeyance requests a stay of this

federal habeas action “until the California courts have ruled on Richard’s federal claims now

presented in this federal petition of [sic] writ of habeas corpus.” (Doc. No. 2.) Although

petitioner does not describe which of the claims contained in his federal habeas petition are

currently pending before the California courts, and which of those claims, if any, are fully

exhausted, he does characterize his federal habeas petition as “a mixed petition.” (Id. at 3.) 

Accordingly, it appears that at least some of petitioners federal claims have been exhausted in

state court. However, petitioner does not explain here why he did not file all of his claims in one

petition in the California courts or why he was unable to exhaust his claims in state court before

filing his habeas petition in federal court.3

In her opposition to petitioner’s pending motion for stay and abeyance, respondent

calculates that “approximately six” of the claims petitioner raises in the instant federal habeas

petition are “not exhausted.” (Doc. No. 11 at 1.) She also argues that petitioner has failed to

demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust these claims in state court prior to filing his

federal habeas petition. (Doc. No. 11 at 1.) Respondent notes that all of petitioner’s claims

appear to be based on his trial proceedings, and she argues that he should have been able to raise

those claims in state court and obtain a ruling prior to filing his federal petition. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Respondent also argues that the Kelly procedure, outlined above, “flatly violates” the

Rhines procedure and should not be utilized by this court. (Id. at 3.) 

B. Analysis

It is not clear from the documents submitted by petitioner to this court which of

his claims are exhausted and which are still pending before the state courts. Accordingly, the

court is unable to rule on the merits of petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance. Under the 

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 The court also notes, however, that petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance appears to 3

have at least one page missing from the end of the motion, and therefore may not be complete. 

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circumstances of this case, the court will direct petitioner to inform the court on how he wishes to

proceed. 

Petitioner appears to be asking this court to stay his mixed petition so that he may

return to state court and exhaust an additional claim or claims. His request in this regard is more

akin to seeking a stay utilizing the Rhines procedure, which applies to stays of mixed petitions. 

If petitioner wishes to pursue a stay pursuant to the Rhines procedure, he will need to now file an

amended federal petition containing all of his exhausted and unexhausted claims. In addition,

petitioner will need to file a renewed motion for a stay and abeyance setting forth sufficient facts

and information necessary to satisfy the requirements of Rhines discussed above. In any renewed

motion for a stay and abeyance he may elect to file, petitioner must (1) show good cause for his

failure to exhaust all claims before filing this action, (2) demonstrate why each of his

unexhausted claims is potentially meritorious, (3) describe the status of any state court

proceedings on the unexhausted claims, and (4) demonstrate that he has acted diligently in

pursuing his unexhausted claims. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. Specifically, petitioner must

inform the court which of his claims are fully exhausted, which are “pending” before a court in

California, and the dates of any relevant decisions by the Sacramento County Superior Court or

California Supreme Court. 

If petitioner wishes to proceed by seeking a stay under the Kelly procedure, he

must inform the court that he wishes to do so, and file an amended habeas petition in this court

containing only exhausted claims. At that point, the court may stay and hold in abeyance that

amended, fully exhausted petition, while petitioner proceeds in state court on his unexhausted

claims. However, as discussed above, petitioner would only be allowed to proceed in this court

with his newly-exhausted claims if those claims are timely filed in this court or if they share a

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common core of operative facts with the claims set forth in his original federal petition.4

At this time the court will also relieve respondent of the obligation to file a

response to petitioner’s original petition until further ordered to do so. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, petitioner shall either:

(a) file a declaration indicating he wishes to proceed under the Kelly stay

procedure and file an amended habeas petition in this court containing only exhausted claims, or

(b) file an amended petition that contains all of his exhausted and

unexhausted claims, together with a renewed motion for a stay and abeyance with sufficient facts

and information to satisfy the requirements of Rhines;

2. Respondent is relieved of the obligation to file a response to petitioner’s

original petition for writ of habeas corpus until further ordered to do so; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send petitioner the court’s form for filing

a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

DATED: February 8, 2013.

DAD:8:

richard1436.stay

 The court rejects respondent’s argument that the Kelly procedure “flatly violates” 4

Rhines and should not be utilized, since binding precedent holds otherwise. See King v. Ryan,

564 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 and fns.

2 & 4 (9th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005).

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