Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04101/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIA SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC., and

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendant. /

No. C 16-04101 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment discrimination action, defendant moves to dismiss. For the reasons

stated below defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Julia Smith began working for defendant Constellation Brands, Inc., in October

2014 as a financial analyst. In December 2014, Smith, who is represented by counsel,

submitted documentation to a human resources representative that “outlined and described her

disability requirements” and requested an alternative work schedule. Apart from a vague

reference to “back pain” the complaint contains no description of Smith’s disability. Smith

requested a temporary alternative work schedule that included “working four hours a day for

four days and working one day from home.” The request was apparently granted for a fixed

duration, though the complaint lacks any indication of that duration (Compl. ¶ 6). 

Case 3:16-cv-04101-WHA Document 12 Filed 09/02/16 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On some unspecified date, the effects of Smith’s disability “mandated further extensions

of her leave of absence.” Smith alleges her requests for extensions were denied, but a letter

from Constellation — appended as Exhibit A to her complaint — states that Constellation

granted several extensions and allowed her to return to work part-time in March. Smith alleges

she returned to work on March 4, 2015, but on March 13, 2015, she received a letter from the

manager of human resources stating that because she had been absent without leave for eight of

nine work days, her employment would be terminated effective immediately (Compl. ¶ 6,

Exh. A). 

In June 2015, Smith filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission and the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. She commenced this action

in San Francisco Superior Court in June 2016. Defendants removed the action to federal court

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Smith asserts five claims: (i) disability discrimination,

(ii) failure to accommodate, (iii) failure to engage in the interactive process, (iv) failure to

prevent discrimination, and (v) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Defendants

move to dismiss all claims. This order follows full briefing.

ANALYSIS

Constellation contends that Smith’s complaint must be dismissed because it fails to

allege facts plausibly establishing her eligibility for any disability-related protections — a

necessary element of each claim asserted. Indeed, Smith does not deny that her complaint fails

to plead facts that address the nature of her purported disability. Rather, she contends her

complaint is adequate because it alleged that she gave Constellation notice of her disability

when she requested her accommodations. The conclusory allegation that Smith’s notice to

Constellation indicated some unspecified disability is not entitled to the presumption of truth. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). Nor does the vague reference to “back pain”

plausibly support an inference that she is entitled to any disability-related protections.

Whether Smith’s notice to Constellation informed it of her alleged disability and request

for accommodation does not speak whether the complaint gives adequate notice of the basis for

her claims — the relevant inquiry here. Smith cannot be allowed to sap the resources of the

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Court or drag Constellation into litigation without first demonstrating that she is plausibly

entitled to relief. Her complaint fails to make that showing.

Smith cites Olson v. Mono County Superior Court, No. 13-2445, 2014 WL 1671586

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014) (Judge Lawrence K. Karlton), for the position that she “need not

plead her prima facie case . . . but only needs to plead facts that give notice to the employer of

the details of the disability” (Pl.’s Opp. at 4). Contrary to Smith, neither Olson, nor the

authority it relied on, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002), held that a

plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss based solely on the allegation that she gave the

employer notice of an unspecified disability. Rather, Olson and Swierkiewicz held that a

plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case under the traditional burden-shifting analysis for

discrimination where the facts alleged directly support a claim for discrimination. That is not

our case. Smith’s complaint fails to support a claim for discrimination under any theory of

liability, whether direct or circumstantial, inasmuch as it lacks any facts plausibly showing that

Smith qualified for any protections on the basis of any disability. Indeed, Olson specifically

stated “[a]t the very least, plaintiff should plead facts describing the nature of her disability and

the adverse actions that she alleges she was subjected to” as a result of that disability. Mere

back pain, without more, is not a disability under the statute.

Smith argues that finding her complaint inadequate here would be inconsistent with the

fact that she also declined to provide details of her disability in her EEOC or DEFH complaints. 

Those filings were not subject to the same pleading standards set forth herein. Furthermore,

there is no indication that the relevant agencies found those complaints adequately pled. Thus,

the presence of the aforementioned defects in pleadings in other fora has no bearing on the

adequacy of the complaint here.

Smith’s complaint may ultimately suffer from additional defects, but those defects

cannot be evaluated until the most fundamental aspect of her complaint — her purported

disability — is alleged. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The hearing

scheduled for September 8 is hereby VACATED.

Smith may seek leave to amend her complaint by filing a formal motion noticed on the

normal 35-day calendar within FOURTEEN DAYS from the date of this order. The motion must

identify how the proposed amendments cure the defects identified above and any others

addressed in Constellation’s motion. Smith must plead her best case. Smith’s motion must be

accompanied by a proposed amended complaint and a redlined copy of the proposed amended

complaint. Failure to timely file a motion seeking leave to amend will result in dismissal of the

action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2016. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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