Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01575/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01575-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

1

 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996). 2

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES KEITHER McELFRESH,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1575 SMS HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS; DIRECTING CLERK OF

COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT; AND

DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

 BACKGROUND

Following jury trial in the Merced County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

causing injury while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Cal. Vehicle Code §

23153(a)) and causing injury while driving with a blood alcohol limit exceeding .08 percent (Cal.

Vehicle Code § 23153(b)). Additionally, the jury found the great bodily injury enhancement

(Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a)) allegation to be true as to both counts. In a subsequent court 1

trial, the court found the two prior strike allegations as to each count true (§ 1170(c)(2)(A)), yet

ordered stricken one of the prior convictions pursuant to Romero. Petitioner was sentenced to 2

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 The following summary of facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

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Appellate District appearing as Exhibit 5, of the Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court finds

the state Court of Appeal’s summary is a correct and fair summary of the facts of the case. 

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seven years in state prison computed as follows: count 1 - the mid term of two years, doubled to

four years as a second strike sentence, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement;

count 2 - the mid term of four years, to run concurrently, yet stayed pursuant to section 654. 

(Exhibit 1.)

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On March 3, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. (Exhibit 5.)

On April 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, which was denied on May 17, 2006. (Exhibits 6, 7.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 6, 2006. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on February 23, 2007, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on March 8, 2007. (Court Docs. 11, 14.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS3

On April 7, 2001, sometime after 6 p.m., Clinton Wenter, an off-duty

police sergeant, was driving south on Interstate 5. The weather was sunny, warm,

and windy. Wenter was traveling at 75 miles per hour in the “number two” or

slow lane. The speed limit was 70 miles per hour.

As he was driving, Wenter’s attention was caught by “a flash of color” in

his rearview mirror. He looked into the rearview mirror and saw a small car,

about three-tenths of a mile behind him, approaching rapidly. A larger male with

brown hair was behind the wheel and a smaller person with longer hair, silver or

white, was in the passenger seat.

The two people in the car “seemed to be playing.” They were “laughing,

kind of hitting each other.” Wenter made a specific mental note of their behavior

because they reminded him of the movie “Dumb and Dumber.” He even said this

out loud at the time. Wenter observed the people again as their car passed him in

the “number one” or fast lane. He identified the car as white Geo Metro with

Oregon or Washington plates. Wenter estimated the Geo was traveling around 90

to 95 miles per hour.

Shortly after the car passed and was about two to three-tenths of a mile

ahead of him, Wenter observed the Geo suddenly dart to the left into the center

median, and then overcorrect back into the roadway. A truck, which was traveling

in the path of the Geo, slammed on its brakes. The Geo also hit its brakes hard

and was throwing off smoke. The Geo disappeared briefly from sight. After the

truck moved out to the number 1 lane, Wenter could see the Geo again, “going

end over end,” causing a lot of dirt to fly around, before coming to rest.

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Wenter immediately stopped and threw on his flashers. He then ran over

to the Geo. He found both of the car’s occupants lying on the ground outside the

car. The larger male was lying on the driver’s side, partially on the pavement and

partially on the dirt. He was incoherent and his eyes were rolling around. A

smaller male with white hair was lying on the other side of the car. Although

Wenter could see no obvious injuries, the smaller man did “not look good.” 

Wenter told the man not to move and that he was going to get help. The man did

not respond.

In the meantime, California Highway Patrol Officer Steven Schnuck and

other emergency personnel arrived. Wenter told Schnuck that the driver of the

Geo was the larger male with brown hair. Wenter was certain that the brownhaired man was the driver. Based on his experience and training as a police

officer, Wenter opined that the driver was not driving safely and was engaging in

reckless driving by driving at such a high speed. However, Wenter did not see

whether the two men were still engaged in horseplay at the time of the accident.

Officer Schnuck was notified of the accident at 6:36 p.m. and arrived at

the scene around 6:48 p.m. Defendant was lying on the ground about 20 feet

north of the vehicle. The other man, Stuart Woods, was lying about three to four

feet south of the vehicle, near the passenger door. Although both men had facial

hair and long hair, Woods had longer hair and a longer, fuller beard in comparison

with defendant. Woods had a bulge in his thigh area which led Schnuck to

believe he had a broken femur.

Schnuck detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant, and

noticed defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot. Woods appeared

intoxicated. The officer placed defendant under arrest for driving under the

influence.

The two men were in and out of consciousness. Due to their injuries, they

were flown to different hospitals. Schnuck arranged to have a blood sample taken

from defendant to determine his blood alcohol level. The parties stipulated that

defendant’s blood sample was properly drawn at 8:10 p.m., that there was a

proper chain of evidence, the blood sample was analyzed by the Department of

Justice, and it was determined that defendant had a blood alcohol level of .14.

Based on his observation of the accident scene, Schnuck opined that the

driver made an unsafe turning movement in violation of Vehicle Code section

22107, causing the vehicle to drift to the left. The vehicle then suddenly veered

back to the right, traveling across the southbound lanes, before it left the roadway

and began to overturn. The Geo came to rest about 30 feet from the location on

the dirt shoulder where it started overturning. Schnuck further opined the

accident was caused by the driver’s unsafe turning movement and intoxication.

The Defense

Stuart Woods and defendant were good friends and had known each other

six to seven years. At the time of the accident, they were driving from Seattle,

Washington, to Woods’ mother’s house in Hemet, California. They were driving

Woods’ car. The two were “constantly trading off” driving so they could save

time and not have to stop overnight at a motel.

The driver’s license issued to Woods in 1996 showed “roughly” how he

looked at the time of the accident. Woods acknowledged that at the time of the

accident his hair was longer than it was in the photograph and it had also started

turning white.

Woods could not remember the accident or who was driving at the time. 

As a result of the accident, he suffered a broken femur and pelvis and all his ribs

were broken. He was hospitalized for about five weeks and was unconscious for

three of them.

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Nor did Woods specifically remember speaking with defense investigator

Mario Anaya or telling Anaya that he was driving at the time of the accident. 

Woods did remember speaking with defense investigator Kelly Gilbert, whom he

told his recollection about the accident was vague.

On January 8, 2004, Anaya spoke with Woods about the accident by

telephone. During the conversation, Woods told Anaya that, to the best of his

recollection, he (Woods) was driving the car at the time of the accident.

On March 29, 2004, defense investigator Kelly Gilbert telephoned Woods

in Seattle. Gilbert asked Woods about the accident and who was driving at the

time. Woods told her that he did not remember who was driving. He said it was

possible he was driving and it was possible he was not driving.

(Exhibit 2, at 2-5.)

 DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Merced County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Great Bodily Injury Enhancement/Instructional Error

Petitioner contends that the great bodily injury enhancement imposed for the injuries

sustained by his passenger should be stricken because his passenger was an accomplice, and the

trial court erred by failing to give an accomplice instruction, pursuant to CALJIC 3.01 and 3.02. 

This claim was presented to the California Supreme Court in the petition for review filed

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on April 10, 2006, and was summarily denied on May 17, 2006. (Exhibits 6, 7.) The California

Court of Appeal denied the claim on the merits in the last reasoned state court opinion. (Exhibit

5.) 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). 

The state court’s failure to give a jury instruction does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation unless the failure so infected the trial and deprived the defendant of the fair trial

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds,

859 F.2d 110, 114 (9 Cir. 1988). In determining whether the omission of an instruction has any th

constitutional significance it must be reviewed in light of the evidence in the case. See Duckett

v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9 Cir. 1995); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156 th

(1977). 

In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court of Appeal held, in pertinent part, as follows:

The defendant has the burden of proving the witness’s status as an

accomplice by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Fauber, supra, 2

Cal.4th at p. 834; People v. DeJesus, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p.23.) A witness’s

status as an accomplice is a question for the jury where the facts are in dispute. 

(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174; People v. Verlinde (2002) 100

Cal.App.4th 1146, 1158 (Verlinde). However, when the facts are not in dispute,

the issue is a legal one to be determined by the trial court. (People v. Daniels,

supra, 52 Cal.3d at p.867; Verlinde, supra, at p. 1159.) “‘Where such witness is

an accomplice as a matter of law, the court should so charge . . . . Conversely,

where, as a matter of law, the witness is not an accomplice, the court does not err

in refusing to charge that he is or in refusing to submit the issue to the jury.’”

(People v. Hoover (1974) 12 Cal.3d 875, 880, quoting People v. Jones (1964) 228

Cal.App.2d 74, 94-95; see also Verlinde, supra, at p. 1159.)

“Ordinarily, accomplice liability under a coperpetrator theory or an aider

and abettor theory is not associated with the crime[] of . . . felony drunk driving

because of the individual nature of the act and mental state involved.” (Verlinde,

supra, 100 Cal.APp.4th at p. 1160.) Notwithstanding defendant’s assertions to

the contrary, we find nothing in the present case distinguishing it from the

ordinary drunk driving case where accomplice liability is simply not at issue. The

prosecution claimed that defendant personally committed the offenses, and the

defense denied it, claiming the eyewitness was mistaken in his identification of

defendant and that Woods was actually the driver. Neither side claimed or

presented any evidence suggesting that both men were driving the car at the same

time, which would support accomplice liability under a coperpetrator theory. 

(See, e.g., Verlinde, supra, at pp. 1155, 1160 [intoxicated witness controlled the

steering wheel while intoxicated defendant operated the pedals].)

Nor was any evidence presented to demonstrate that Woods intentionally

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encouraged defendant to drive under the influence or gave him control of the car

knowing he was under the influence, which would support accomplice liability

under an aider and abettor theory. (See, e.g. Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 1155, 1162 [intoxicated witness who had shared driving with intoxicated

defendant relinquished control of steering wheel to defendant and fell asleep

before fatal accident].) “To establish criminal liability on an aiding and abetting

theory, the defendant must have ‘act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose

of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of

encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’” (Verlinde, supra, 100

Cal.App.4th at p. 1161, citing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) 

Although Woods had a vague recollection of trading off driving

responsibilities with defendant during the trip, and the evidence suggested both

were intoxicated at the time of the accident, unlike Verlinde, there was no

evidence Woods handed over the steering wheel to defendant knowing he was

under the influence. The record is devoid of evidence concerning the

circumstances of their consumption of alcohol or how they decided who would

drive near the time of the accident or whether they were already intoxicated when

they made that decision. Moreover, defendant has cited no authority for his novel

suggestion that Woods qualified for accomplice status because it was only chance

or luck that prevented him from being the driver of the car when the accident

occurred (“It was a toss of the dice as to which one drove on the occasion of the

accident”). The mere chance that he could just have easily been driving as

defendant when the accident occurred does not establish the requisite knowledge

and intent for accomplice liability. 

In short, there was no evidence from which the jury could have reasonably

concluded Woods was an accomplice under either a coperpetrator theory or aiding

and abetting theory. Accordingly, the court was under no obligation to give

accomplice instructions and we find no basis for striking the enhancement

imposed under section 12022.7 for the injuries inflicted on Woods. For the same

reason, we also reject defendant’s related contention that his counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request accomplice instructions. 

Moreover, because Woods testified for the defense, the standard accomplice

instructions, which would have told the jury to view his testimony with care and

caution, could have been prejudicial to the defense. (§ 1111; CALJIC No. 3.18;

see People v. Melone (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 291, 297-298 [“To give without

request, such an instruction when the accomplice witness is called by the defense

may prejudice the constitutional rights of the witness by unnecessarily and

inadvisedly commenting on the evidence and discrediting the witness.”].) In light

of how the case was argued and tried, it is not surprising that neither the parties

nor the court considered accomplice instructions pertinent.

(Exhibit 5, at 6-9.) 

Under California law, an accomplice is defined as “one who is liable to prosecution for

the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of

the accomplice is given.” § 1111. To be held liable for an identical offense, the witness must be

a principal under section 31. People v. Horton, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1113 (1995). A principle is

defined as one who has advised and encouraged the commission of a crime. § 31; People v.

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Horton, 11 Cal.4th at 1113-1114; People v. Fauber, 2 Cal.4th 792, 833-834 (1992). The person

need not directly commit the act constituting the offense and need not even be present to be held

liable under § 31. An accomplice must have a guilty knowledge and intent with regard to the

commission of the crime. People v. Daniels, 52 Cal.3d 815, 866-867 (1991); People v. DeJesus,

38 Cal.App.4th 1, 23 (1995). Thus, the witness must act “‘with knowledge of the criminal

purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging

or facilitating commission of, the offense.’” People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal.3d 72, 90-91 (1990);

People v. DeJesus, 38 Cal.App.4th at 23. The state court of appeals properly based its

decision that an accomplice instruction was not warranted on California law and the factual

determinations presented at the trial court. On collateral review, the state courts findings of fact

must be presumed correct, and can only be overcome by the presentation of clear and convincing

evidence that the state court’s findings were erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Specifically, a

state court finding that the facts are insufficient to justify an aider and abetting instruction is

entitled to a presumption of correctness. Mitzel v. Tate, 267 F.3d 524, 536 (6 Cir. 2001); see th

also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9 Cir. 2005) (state court’s finding of th

insufficient evidence of imminent peril to warrant an instruction on imperfect self-defense is

entitled to a presumption of correctness). 

As stated by the Court of Appeal, there is simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate

that both Petitioner and Mr. Woods were driving at the time of the collision, nor is there any

evidence to suggest that Mr. Woods gave over the driving duties with knowledge that Petitioner

was intoxicated. At best the evidence produced at trial raised doubt, which the jury obviously

rejected, as to whether Petitioner was driving the vehicle at the time of the collision. In fact, this

was precisely the defense presented at trial. (See RT 143 [issue is who was driving at time of

collision].) No evidence supports the finding that, if Petitioner was driving, Mr. Woods was an

accomplice and/or aider and abetter. Although Petitioner contends that Woods interfered and

impeded his ability to drive, this is insufficient to support a finding that Woods was an

accomplice and/or aider and abetter under California law. There was no evidence that Woods

encouraged Petitioner to drive under the influence or gave him control of the car knowing he was

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under the influence; consequently, there was no showing that Woods had the requisite knowledge

and intent for accomplice liability. See People v. Verlinde, 100 Cal.App.4th at 1161. Moreover,

as pointed out by the Court of Appeal, because Woods testified on behalf of Petitioner, an

instruction that his testimony should be viewed with caution could have damaged Petitioner’s

defense. As stated by the Court of Appeal, the circumstances of this case amount to nothing

more than the ordinary drunk driving offense involving individual culpability, and the trial court

did not err by failing to give an accomplice liability instruction or striking the great bodily injury

enhancement. 

 D. Trial Court’s Failure to Strike Both Prior Convictions

Petitioner contends that California does not regularly and consistently apply the same

discretion under Romero motions in violation of his equal protection rights. (Petition, at 5-6.) 

Respondent argues that this claim is unexhausted and alternatively fails to state a federal

question. The Court agrees.

In the petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that

the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike both of Petitioner’s prior strike offenses

for attempted murder pursuant to a Romero motion. Petitioner urged that the strikes were remote

in time and his criminal record was otherwise minimal in nature. (See Exhibit 6, at 24-30.) In

the instant federal petition, Petitioner raises a related but substantively different claim. Petitioner

contends the following:

California does NOT regularly and consistently apply a same [sic]

discretion under Romero (Motions), petitioner-defendant was denied equal

protection under the law. Petitioner’s prior(s) were in fact 1 case, but totally

unrelated to his instance offense [sic]; in such circumstances, et alia, have been

(under Romero) stricken, even murder vs. current drug offense. California cannot

prove otherwise. Petitioner requests an Evidentiary Hearing, with appointment of

counsel, and Discovery (to set precedent under Romero) so et al be treated

equally. Petitioners prior(s) should be stricken or reversed.

(Petition at 5-6.) As Respondent correctly submits, the instant claim is distinct from the claim

raised before the California Supreme Court. To the California Supreme Court Petitioner merely

argued that the trial court abused its discretion, yet the instant federal claim alleges an equal

protection violation based on the California courts’ alleged failure to “regularly and consistently

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apply” its discretion under Romero. (Petition, at 5.) Thus, the instant equal protection claim is

substantively distinct from the mere claim that the trial court abused its discretion. As such, the

equal protection claim raised in the instant petition is unexhausted as it was not presented to the

California Supreme Court for review. 

Nonetheless, irrespective of Petitioner’s failure to exhaust this claim, the claim fails on

the merits and must be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“[a]n application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available in the courts of the State”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d, 614, 624 (9 Cir. th

2005) (a federal court considering a habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits

when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not “colorable”). 

Habeas corpus relief is not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's

application or interpretation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475,

480 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). A petition alleging only

a violation of state law is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Howell v.

Mississippi, 543 U.S. 440 (2005). A state law claim merely rephrased by simply citing a due

process violation, likewise does not state a claim. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th

Cir. 1999). Although Petitioner attempts to phrase his claim as a federal constitutional challenge,

it is nonetheless a claim of error involving application of state law. An equal protection claim

cannot be based on the theory that the state court misapplied state law differently from other

similarly situated defendants. Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1081-1083 (9 Cir. 2006). As th

stated in Little:

Little’s claim, at most, amounts to an allegation that in his case Nevada

law was misapplied or that the Nevada Supreme Court departed from its earlier

decisions. Under clearly established Supreme Court law, such contention neither

gives rise to an equal protection claim, nor provides a basis for habeas relief. []

See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-555 [] (1962); see also Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 [] (1991) (“We have stated many times that federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. Today, we reemphasize

that it is not the province of a federal habeas corpus court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.” 

Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d at 1082, footnote omitted. Like Little, Petitioner argues that the trial

court’s failure to strike both of his prior convictions pursuant to California law violated his equal

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protection rights. To the contrary, because equal protection of the law does not ensure uniformity

of judicial decisions, Petitioner’s claim fails. Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d at 1082. Nor has

Petitioner demonstrated that the trial court’s alleged error resulted in “a fundamental defect

which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice,” or “exceptional circumstances

where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Id. at 1083.

(citation omitted.) 

E. Petitioner’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Appointment of Counsel and Discovery

In support of his equal protection claim, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing,

appointment of counsel, and discovery. (Petition, at 6.) 

1. Evidentiary Hearing

28 U.S.C. section 2254 states:

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

claims unless the applicant shows that - 

(A) the claim relies on - 

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner has failed to develop these facts in the state

courts and in fact has never presented the underlying allegations to the state courts for review. In

addition, Petitioner has not demonstrated that his claim satisfies either (e)(2)(A) or (B), and

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is simply unfounded. 

2. Appointment of Counsel

There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. 

See e.g., Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958); th

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Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8 Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984). However, Title 18 th

U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of counsel at any stage of the case “if the interests of

justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In the present case, the

court does not find that the interests of justice would be served by the appointment of counsel. In

addition, as Petitioner has failed to meet his burden with regard to an evidentiary hearing, the

appointment of counsel is not necessary. Id.

3. Request for Discovery

Although discovery is available pursuant to Rule 6, it is only granted at the Court’s

discretion, and upon a showing of good cause. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997);

McDaniel v. United States Dist. Court (Jones), 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9 Cir. 1997); Jones v. Wood, th

114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9 Cir. 1997); Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254. Good cause

th

is shown “where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner

may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.”

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. at 908-09 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 287 (1969). Discovery

will not be allowed so that the petition can “explore [his] case in search of its existence,” looking

for new constitutional claims. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9 Cir. 1999). If th

good cause is shown, the extent and scope of discovery is within the court’s discretion. See

Habeas Rule 6(a). The Court’s duty in a habeas proceeding is to determine whether or not

petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated in the course of the conviction. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause in support of his request for discovery. In

fact, Petitioner has not set for any “cause” for the need to conduct discovery, and his request is

nothing more than a “fishing expedition” and must be denied. 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent; and,

3. The court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (a COA should be granted where

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the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,” i.e., when “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong”; Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926,

943 (9 Cir. 2006) (same). In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable th

jurists would not find it debatable that the state courts’ decision denying

Petitioner’s direct appeal were “objectively unreasonable.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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