Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-00506/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-00506-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

In August 2005, pursuant to a state statute, the ADH merged with the Arkansas Department of

Human Services, creating the Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (ADHHS). Subsequently,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

STAN FALK, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

vs. * No. 4:06CV00506 SWW

*

MARTHA PHILLIPS, Individually and in her *

Official Capacity as Employee of the Division *

of Health, Arkansas Department of Health and *

Human Services; CHARLES McGREW, *

Individually and in his Official Capacity as *

Employee of the Division of Health, Arkansas *

Department of Health and Human Services; *

PAUL HALVERSON, Individually and in his *

Official Capacity as the Director of the *

Division of Health, Arkansas Department of *

Health and Human Services; and DR. GLEN *

BAKER, Individually and in his Official *

Capacity as Director of the Public Health *

Laboratory, Division of Health, Arkansas *

Department of Health and Human Services; *

*

Defendants. *

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment to which plaintiff

responded. After careful consideration of the motion, response, briefs, statements of facts,

exhibits, and attachments, the Court finds the motion should be granted.

Background

Plaintiff Stan Falk is a former employee of the Arkansas Department of Health

(“ADH”).1

 He began his employment at the ADH in1976 and retired effective April 1, 2006. 

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a state statute was passed, authorizing the Governor to separate the agencies. In July 2007, the two agencies

de-merged.

2

CLIA stands for the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1988.

3

The Court assumes “Manny” refers to Dr. Mani Chidambarram, a chemist with the PHL. See Resp.

to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8.

2

During his tenure with the ADH, Falk held several positions, including acting director of the

Public Health Laboratory (“PHL”). At the time of his retirement, he was Assistant Director of

the PHL. In addition to the central unit lab, the ADH has at least one local health unit (“LHU”)

in each county in the state. All the labs must be certified for compliance with CLIA regulations.2

The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) is the federal regulatory agency

charged with ensuring compliance with CLIA mandates. Federal regulatory inspectors, called

surveyors, conduct regularly scheduled inspections at least every two years. 

When Michael Loeffelholz was named Director of the PHL in August 2003, Falk became

Assistant Director. Mot. Summ. J., Falk Dep. at 31. Falk testified he “was in charge of chemical

hygiene and biological safety issues, for the maintenance of the facility and the operation of the

BSL-3 [Bio-Safety Level 3] laboratory.” Id. at 22. In 2004, the Director assigned Falk

additional responsibilities, naming him Interim Section Director of Newborn Screening. He

handled the administrative issues, such as making sure all of the personnel reviews are done and

that the staff had the supplies and equipment they needed. Id. as 23. He also conducted

chemical hygiene and bio-safety training as well as some CLIA training. Id. at 24. A man

named Mani3

 was in charge of the technical aspects of Newborn Screening which, according to

Falk, included quality control and assurance. Id. at 23.

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According to the complaint, proficiency test samples concern the testing of newborns. Am. Compl.

at 14.

3

Falk testified that in late October 2004, he learned that in August 2004, Mani took a

proficiency test specimen4

 to an outside lab to be tested. Id. at 61-2. Falk testified that Keisha

Payne, a lab technician, told him Mani was concerned that an analysis she performed might be in

error and he asked the Director if he could take the specimen to another lab. He ended up taking

the specimen to the VA hospital. Id. at 62-4. Falk testified that when he returned from a trip, he

asked Mani about the incident and Mani confirmed that he had done it. Id. at 65-66. Falk said

he told Mani that CLIA regulations forbid taking proficiency samples to an outside lab, and

asked Mani to inform the CLIA inspectors and the Director. Falk said he and Mani both

informed the Director on approximately November 1, 2004. Falk said he also told Pat Darcy, his

quality assurance coordinator. Id. at 68. 

At Falk’s request, Mani prepared a Corrective Action Plan, which was provided to the

Director in November 2004. Falk said he also conducted additional training with Mani. Id at

75, 80. Falk said that when he suggested to the Director that they self-report the violation, the

Director’s response was “maybe they won’t find it.” Id. at 83. Falk said they needed to self

report; that the CLIA regulations say that if you are a laboratory and someone brings a

proficiency test specimen to you, you are to immediately report that laboratory to the CLIA

surveyor. Id. at 83. 

On or about February 11, 2005, Sandy Pearson, a surveyor for CMS, was in town

surveying LHUs and helping the central unit prepare for its upcoming inspection. Falk said the

lab asked Pearson to come in and do some training on the CLIA regulations. Id. at 45-6. Falk

said he found out that the Virology Laboratory was reporting out unvalidated influenza results,

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Defendants dispute whether Falk in fact told Pearson about the proficiency test incident. Pearson

said at one point she did not recall Falk telling her. See Mot. Summ.J., Falk Dep. at 106. Defendants also

contend that if Falk had reported the incident, the surveyors would have taken action immediately in light of

the seriousness of the violation. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the Court assumes Falk

told Pearson.

4

and during a meeting with Pearson and “all of the supervisors and the lab personnel,” Falk

questioned the lab person representing the Virology Laboratory as to whether they were testing

for influenza and whether the results are being reported directly to the physicians. The lab

person said they were testing but said she did not want to talk about the reporting because she

did not want to get in trouble. Id. at 48. Falk said the lab person did eventually admit the results

were being reported. Id. at 49. Falk said it was part of his job responsibilities to make sure the

reporting was being done properly. Id. at 48-49. Falk said he then told Pearson he would like to

have lunch with her because he had some “serious issues to talk to [her] about.” Id. at 49. Falk

claims that during that lunch, he asked Pearson if she had heard from the Director. When she

said no, Falk said he told Pearson about the influenza reporting violation and the proficiency test

violation, id. at 84-5, but told her he was not officially self-reporting, id. at 97, and was not

doing it as a part of his role as Quality Assurance Office.” Id. at 49.5

On March 21, 2005, CMS surveyors arrived at the Arkansas PHL to conduct their routine

inspection of the laboratory. They found a number of deficiencies, including that the lab

intentionally referred a Newborn Screening proficiency test sample to an outside laboratory

which was a direct violation of the CLIA regulations. The violation called for a mandatory

revocation of the lab’s operating certification. See Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7. The upper

management of ADH determined that the lab had to be brought into compliance and hired an

outside consultant. In the meantime, the ADH merged with the Department of Human Services,

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and the PHL was allowed to continue to operate with restrictions with the new combined agency

as the certificate holder. Newborn Screening, however, was suspended at the PHL until

compliance was achieved. The ADH conducted an investigation, and in November 2005, Falk

was demoted. Id., Ex. 3. He subsequently resigned in April 2006. Id., Ex. 4.

Falk alleges he was demoted and forced into retirement because he told Pearson, the

CMS/CLIA surveyor, about the proficiency test incident. He contends defendants violated his

First Amendment right to free speech by retaliating against him for reporting the incident to

federal regulators. 

Defendants move for summary judgment arguing Falk cannot establish his speech was

protected and, even if he can, there is no evidence he was disciplined because of his speech or

that he was constructively discharged. Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified

immunity.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party must

demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for

summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of

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his pleading but must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

 “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute of fact; (2) the disputed

fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine, that is, a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49

F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(citations omitted). Further, summary judgment is particularly appropriate where an unresolved

issue is primarily legal, rather than factual. Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1326

(8th Cir. 1995). 

Discussion

Falk asserts defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment. Defendants argue

they are entitled to summary judgment because Falk’s alleged statement was not the cause of his

alleged constructive discharge and that Falk’s speech is not protected because it was part of his

job duties.

The individual defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Falk’s

claims against them in their individual capacities. For the reasons stated below, the Court

agrees. “Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions .

. . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then,

this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

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the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right? This must be the initial inquiry. . . . If no constitutional right would have

been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could

be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to

note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition . . .

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001). 

To establish a claim of unlawful retaliation for protected speech, a public employee must

prove that he spoke out as a citizen, on a matter of public concern; the defendant took adverse

employment action against him; and his protected speech was a substantial or material factor in

the adverse employment action. See Altonen v. City of Minneapolis, 487 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir.

2007)(citation omitted). Falk alleges defendants terminated him in retaliation for speaking with

the surveyor from CLIA. He argues, however, that even though he was speaking about a subject

that was part of his employment, there is a material issue of fact was to whether the speech was a

part of his job duties.

“To decide whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, a

court must first determine whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public

concern.” McGee v. Public Water Supply Dist #2 of Jefferson Co., Mo., 471 F.3d 918. 920 (8th

Cir. 2006)(quotation omitted). “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their

official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the

Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti v.

Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). “Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to

the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an

employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that

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Jason Lee was the Section Director for Microbiology and LHU lab director, responsible with Falk

for implementing and making sure the labs were complying with regulations. See Mot. Summ. J., Falk Dep.

at 15; Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2 (organizational chart).

8

conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First

Amendment purposes.” Id. at 1962.

Falk testified he had some responsibility with quality assurance and quality control issues

but he “had a helper” who was responsible for most of it. See Mot. Summ J., Falk Dep. at 22. 

He said that when the Director asked him to be the interim section director for Newborn

Screening, he made it very clear that he could only operate in an administrative role because he

was not qualified for the technical side, and because he thought it would be a conflict of interest

to be involved in quality assurance in the Newborn Screening lab as he was already in charge of

overall quality assurance. Falk said he told the Director he could advise Newborn Screening on

quality assurance issues but quality assurance could not fall under his purview. Id. Falk said he

was never responsible for training the staff as far as CLIA was concerned, but he also said he

and Jason Lee6

 would give local health units “extensive training” on the CLIA regulations that

pertained to them, and he did a “similar presentation, but it was a little more involved with the

staff at the . . . Central Unit.” Id. at 25.

Falk asserts it was not a part of his job responsibilities to report deficiencies to the federal

authorities; that his responsibilities required him to report to the Director only. See Resp. to

Mot. Summ. J., Falk Aff. He submits an e-mail he received from the Director in December

2003, in which Loeffelholz told Falk: “Functionally, we don’t have an assistant director. Rather,

we have a team of senior directors . . . who report to me.” See Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2. 

He also submits the testimony of separate defendant Phillips who said that she was not sure it

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was a part of Falk’s job description to report the actions of the lab to the federal authorities, id. ,

Ex. 3 at 25, and the testimony of Dr. Bates, an advisor to the Director and part of the Director’s

leadership team, who said he thought it would have been the Director’s job to report violations. 

Id., Ex. 5 at 28. 

In support of his argument, Falk cites Lindsey v. City of Orrick, Missouri, 491 F.3d 892

(8th Cir. 2007). In Lindsey, the Eighth Circuit held that where an employee whose job duties

included attending city council meetings to report on park, water, sewer, and street maintenance

deviated from his report to lecture the City that it was violating state sunshine law requirements,

and there was no evidence that his job duties included checking for sunshine law compliance, the

employee was speaking as a citizen and not as part of his official duties.

In McGee v. Public Water Supply Dist. # 2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 918 (8th

Cir. 2006), the court held that McGee, the district manager, was not speaking as a citizen when

he complained to two board members about environmental compliance of two district projects. 

McGee argued he was “removed from the water pipe relocation project and was told not to

concern himself with the septic tank problem; therefore, his statements regarding environmental

compliance were not made pursuant to his official job duties.” Id. at 921. The court held that

the projects fell within McGee’s “overall supervisory duties as District Manager and his

admitted duty to advise the Board regarding regulatory and legal requirements.” Id. In Bradley

v. James, 479 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2007), the court held that a university campus police officer had

an official responsibility to cooperate with an investigation of an incident that occurred on

campus and, therefore, his speech was pursuant to his official and professional duties. The court

noted that the plaintiffs allegations were made at no time other than during the investigation.

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“[T]he question of whether a particular incident of speech is made within a particular

plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed question of fact and law.” Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231,

240 (3rd Cir. 2007). Falk’s job performance evaluations and his job duties indicate he had

responsibilities for training, quality assurance, quality control, and proficiency testing

procedures. See Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 1 and 2. One of his major functions and job tasks as

Assistant Director is “Technical Assistance, monitors the data provided by PHLabs as part of the

assurance of accuracy and reliability.” Id. Falk testified he delegated many of the

responsibilities of quality assurance to his quality assurance coordinator, Mot. Summ. J., Falk

Dep. at 37, but admits that part of his role was to insure accurate and reliable testing results on

proficiency tests. Id. at 77-78. Falk also admits that when he was Interim Director, he would

have expected that person to self-report:

Q: Stan, when you were the Interim Director over all the lab, if something had

come to your attention like this . . . if somebody in your role had came [sic] to

you, would you have expected them to self-report that to CLIA?

A: I would have expected that. Yes. Absolutely.

Q: And in your role as Interim Director, you would not have determined or in any

way said that was a violation of any policy or regulation of the Department of

Health?

A: I would certainly hope not.

Id. at 98. The parties agree that Falk prepared an affidavit at the request of ADH to document

and affirm his meeting with Pearson in February 2005. See Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed

Facts at 14; Pl’s. Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts at 14. Dr. Bates testified that he

“spoke on numerous occasions about the fact that we self-reported and thought of that as a good

citizen act on our part, and used that, without success, with CLIA to say you shouldn’t punish us

so severely for this violation.” Resp. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 5 (Bates Dep.) at 10.

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“[S]peech may be made pursuant to an employee’s official duties even if it deals with

activities that an employee is not expressly required to perform. The ultimate question is

whether the employee speaks as a citizen or as a government employee - an individual acting ‘in

his or her professional capacity.’ Consequently, if an employee engages in speech during the

course of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the

employee’s performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the employee’s

official duties.” Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Just prior to having lunch with Pearson, Falk and other staff members were meeting with

her. Falk testified he brought up the mis-reporting of influenza results in that meeting,

prompting a staff member of the Virology Lab to admit to faulty reporting. See Mot. Summ. J.,

Falk Aff. at 49. During lunch, Falk says he proceeded to tell Pearson about the questionable

actions regarding influenza reporting and the proficiency test screening. While Falk says he put

on his “public citizen hat” when he was speaking with Pearson at lunch, he apparently was

speaking pursuant to his official and professional duties in the meeting just before lunch. The

information allegedly supplied to Pearson pertains to Falk’s employment and is a direct result of

his employment. He acted as a government employee when he spoke with Pearson; he did not

make a public statement or inform the news media about the violation. 

The Court concludes Falk’s speech was pursuant to his official and professional duties

and that he was not speaking as a citizen when he reported problems at the lab to the federal

surveyor. It is clear that Falk’s job duties included quality assurance and quality control.

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The Court further finds that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that Falk was constructively discharged for reporting the violation. He said no one told

him he was subject to disciplinary action because he reported the violations to Pearson, but

complains that the disciplinary procedures were not followed. Mot. Summ. J. at 100. He said

Phillips told him the committee was considering what disciplinary action they were going to take

against him and he had 24 hours to respond to the charges but she would not tell him what the

charges were. Id. at 102. Falk received a demotion and a final written warning in November

2005. He complains that he was never assigned any job duties and defendants harassed him

about moving his office. He also points out that no other people who left employment at the lab

received any formal documented punishment. The record reflects that in November 2005, Jason

Lee was given the option of being fired, resigning or starting retirement; Lee resigned effective

December 2005. Mani Chidambarram resigned his position effective November 2005, and Mike

Loeffelholz resigned effective November 5, 2005.

Falk was the person whose formal job duties included quality assurance and quality

control. The federal regulators issued two deficiency reports where they found numerous

problems in the PHL, including the local health unit laboratories. The PHL was cited for serious

deficiencies and its certificate to operate the main laboratory was revoked for at least one year. 

Falk submits no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his report to Pearson was

a substantial or material factor in the decision to demote him.

The Court further finds no evidence that Falk was constructively discharged. To prove

constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show: 1) a reasonable person in his situation would find

the working conditions intolerable; and 2) his employer intended to force him to quit. Devin v.

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Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 491 F.3d 778, 789 (8th Cir. 2007). “‘The conduct complained of

must have been severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work

environment, and additionally the plaintiff must subjectively perceive the environment to be

abusive.’” Id. (citation omitted).

After carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds Falk fails to establish that he was

constructively discharged. Falk testified that after he served his 14-day suspension, he was reassigned. See Mot. Summ. J., Falk Dep. at 109. Apparently, one of his new duties was to be

doing work with the Mass Spectroscope. Id. at 128, 140. In January 2006, he notified

defendant Baker that he had been diagnosed with carpel tunnel syndrome and would not be able

to perform bench work. Falk said at that point Baker told Falk he wanted to talk to Human

Resources before deciding on Falk’s job duties. Id. at 128-29. Baker did ask Falk to move his

office downstairs, and Falk said he hired a moving crew to move him because the maintenance

people were busy. Id. at 129-131.

Falk said he retired because of the “ruthless behavior” by the ADH. He said his

disciplinary action was not handled according to policy and he was continually asked to

complete a form setting out his job responsibilities duties. He testified “there were certain

analytical responsibilities that I was going to have to do. And that if I couldn’t do them, well,

there was no accommodation and they would have to let me go because I was filling a position

that required analytical capability. I mean, you know, I can read between the lines.” Id. at 138-

9. He also complained about the fact that he could not get help moving his office and that

defendants told him not to discuss his reassignment with any of the people downstairs. Id. at

144. Falk testified that between December and April he was reading and studying and there was

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not anything for him to do. Id. at 139. He said he never did fill out the form saying what his job

duties would be because he did not know what his position was. Id. at 141-42. Eventually Falk

told defendants he was retiring because his daughter was ill. He said he needed to keep his

insurance for his family and would lose coverage if he were fired. Id. at 141-2.

While Falk was obviously uncomfortable and frustrated with his situation, the Court

cannot find that he has established that he was subjected to an objectively hostile or abusive

work environment.

Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment [docket

entry 28] is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. Judgment will be enter accordingly.

 DATED this 20th day of December 2007.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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