Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05005/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 2014 Decided August 28, 2015

No. 14-5004

BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

LARRY ELLIOTT KLAYMAN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

______

Consolidated with 14-5005, 14-5016, 14-5017

______

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-851)

(No. 1:13-cv-881) 

______

H. Thomas Byron, III, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellants/cross-appellees. With 

him on the briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney 

General, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Douglas 

N. Letter and Henry C. Whitaker, Attorneys.

Larry E. Klayman argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellees/cross-appellants. 

Cindy A. Cohn argued the cause for amici curiae 

Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. On the brief were Alex 

Abdo, Jameel Jaffer, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Mark Rumold. 

USCA Case #14-5005 Document #1570210 Filed: 08/28/2015 Page 1 of 21
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Paul M. Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae Center 

for National Security Studies. With him on the brief were 

Kate A. Martin, Joseph Onek, and Michael Davidson.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Separate opinions filed by Circuit Judge BROWN and 

Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

SENTELLE.

PER CURIAM: In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT 

Act. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 215 

of that Act empowered the FBI to request, and the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) to enter, orders

“requiring the production of any tangible things (including 

books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an 

investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” 

Id. at § 215, 115 Stat. at 291, codified as amended at 50 

U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). Since May 2006, the government has 

relied on this provision to operate a program that has come to 

be called “bulk data collection,” namely, the collection, in 

bulk, of call records produced by telephone companies 

containing “telephony metadata”—the telephone numbers 

dialed (incoming and outgoing), times, and durations of calls.

The FBI has periodically applied for, and the FISC has 

entered, orders instructing one or more telecommunications 

service providers to produce, on a daily basis over a period of 

ninety days, electronic copies of such data. Decl. of Robert J. 

Holley, Acting Assistant FBI Director, at ¶¶ 10-13, Joint 

Appendix 224-25. 

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Under the program, the collected metadata are 

consolidated into a government database, where (except in 

exigent circumstances) the NSA may access it only after 

demonstrating to the FISC a “reasonable articulable 

suspicion” that a particular phone number is associated with a 

foreign terrorist organization. Gov’t’s Br. at 11-12. Even 

then, the NSA may retrieve call detail records only for phone 

numbers in contact with the original number—within two 

steps, or “hops” of it. Id. at 11. If telephone number A was 

used to call telephone number B, which in turn was used to 

call telephone number C, and if the FISC affirms the 

government’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” that A is 

associated with a foreign terrorist organization, the FISC may 

authorize the government to retrieve from the database the 

metadata associated with A, B, and C. (Before 2014, the 

FISC orders allowed the government to conduct queries for 

any number within three steps of the approved identifier, and 

the FISC did not play any role in assessing the government’s 

“reasonable articulable suspicion” for each query. Id. at 12 

n.3). Once the government has retrieved the metadata, which 

does not include the content of the calls or the identities of the 

callers, it uses the data “in conjunction with a range of 

analytical tools to ascertain contact information that may be 

of use in identifying individuals who may be associated with 

certain foreign terrorist organizations because they have been 

in communication with certain suspected-terrorist telephone 

numbers or other selectors.” Id. at 9, 15. 

Plaintiffs contend that this bulk collection constitutes an 

unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment; they seek 

injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages. Third 

Amended Complaint ¶ 53, Klayman v. Obama, 13-cv-851 

(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2014), ECF No. 77. The district court issued 

a preliminary injunction barring the government from 

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collecting plaintiffs’ call records, but stayed its order pending 

appeal. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 44-45 (2013). 

The court reverses the judgment of the district court, and 

for the reasons stated in the opinions of Judge Brown and 

Judge Williams orders the case remanded to the district court. 

(Judge Sentelle dissents from the order of remand and would 

order the case dismissed.) The opinions of the judges appear 

below after a brief explanation of why the case is not moot.

* * *

Under a “sunset” clause, the section of the U.S. Code

amended by Section 215 was scheduled to revert to its pre2001 form on June 1, 2015 unless Congress acted. See Pub. 

L. No. 109-177, § 102(b)(1), 120 Stat. 192, 194-95 (2006); 

Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 216, 216 (2011). That 

date came and went without any legislative action. One day 

after the deadline, however, Congress enacted the USA 

Freedom Act, which revived the language added by Section 

215 with some substantial changes. See Pub. L. No. 114-23, 

Tit. I, 129 Stat. 268, 269-77 (2015), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 

1861. The Act’s changes do not take effect until 180 days 

after the date of enactment (June 2, 2015). Id. § 109(a), 129 

Stat. at 276. And the legislation provides for continuation of 

pre-existing authority until the effective date of the new 

legislation: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to alter or 

eliminate the authority of the Government to obtain an order 

under title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 

1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) as in effect prior to the effective 

date . . . during the period ending on such effective date.” Id.

§ 109(b), 129 Stat. at 276. 

Cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only if 

“there is no reasonable expectation . . . that the alleged 

violation will recur.” Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 

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(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, any 

lapse in bulk collection was temporary. Immediately after 

Congress acted on June 2 the FBI moved the FISC to 

recommence bulk collection, United States’ Mem. of Law, In 

re Application of the FBI, No. BR 15-75 (FISC, filed Jun. 2, 

2015), and the FISC confirmed that it views the new 

legislation as effectively reinstating Section 215 for 180 days, 

and as authorizing it to resume issuing bulk collection orders

during that period. See Opinion and Order, In re Application 

of the FBI, Nos. BR 15-75, Misc. 15-01 (FISC June 29, 2015)

(Mosman, J.); Mem. Op., In re Applications of the FBI, Nos. 

BR 15-77, BR 15-78 (FISC Jun. 17, 2015) (Saylor, J.). 

Accordingly, plaintiffs and the government stand in the same 

positions that they did before June 1, 2015.

* * *

The preliminary injunction entered by the district court is 

hereby vacated and the case remanded for such further 

proceedings as may be appropriate.

So ordered.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge: I disagree with the district 

court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have established a 

“substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” See, e.g., 

Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d 891, 893 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). I write separately to emphasize that, while 

plaintiffs have demonstrated it is only possible—not 

substantially likely—that their own call records were 

collected as part of the bulk-telephony metadata program,

plaintiffs have nonetheless met the bare requirements of 

standing. Accordingly, I join the court in vacating the 

preliminary injunction entered by the district court.

In order to establish his standing to sue, a plaintiff must 

show he has suffered a “concrete and particularized” injury. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 560–61 (1992). 

In other words, plaintiffs here must show their own metadata 

was collected by the government. See, e.g., Clapper v. 

Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)

(“[R]espondents fail to offer any evidence that their 

communications have been monitored under § 1881a, a 

failure that substantially undermines their standing theory.”); 

ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 655 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If, for 

instance, a plaintiff could demonstrate that her privacy had 

actually been breached (i.e., that her communications had 

actually been wiretapped), then she would have standing to 

assert a Fourth Amendment cause of action for breach of 

privacy.”); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 999–1000 (D.C. 

Cir. 1982) (“[T]he absence of proof of actual acquisition of 

appellants’ communications is fatal to their watchlisting 

claims.”).

The record, as it stands in the very early stages of this

litigation, leaves some doubt about whether plaintiffs’ own 

metadata was ever collected. Plaintiffs’ central allegation is 

that defendants “violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution when they unreasonably searched and seized and 

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continue to search Plaintiffs’ phone records . . . without 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Third Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 53, Klayman I, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1. Plaintiffs 

have supported this claim with specific facts, notably: (1) The 

NSA operates a bulk telephony-metadata collection program; 

and (2) on April 25, 2013, the FISC issued an order requiring 

Verizon Business Network Services to produce its subscribers’ 

call detail records to the NSA on a daily basis from April 25, 

2013 to July 19, 2013. However, plaintiffs are Verizon 

Wireless subscribers and not Verizon Business Network 

Services subscribers. Thus, the facts marshaled by plaintiffs 

do not fully establish that their own metadata was ever 

collected.

In his opinion below, Judge Leon eloquently explains 

how these facts are nonetheless sufficient to draw the 

inference that “the NSA has collected and analyzed 

[plaintiffs’] telephony metadata and will continue to operate 

the program consistent with FISC opinions and orders.” 

Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013). In 

particular, Judge Leon infers from the government’s efforts to 

“create a comprehensive metadata database” that “the NSA 

must have collected metadata from Verizon Wireless, the 

single largest wireless carrier in the United States, as well as 

AT&T and Sprint, the second[-] and third-largest carriers.” 

Id. at 27.

As Judge Leon’s opinion makes plain, plaintiffs have set 

forth significant evidence about the NSA’s bulk-telephony 

metadata program. As a result, this case is readily 

distinguishable from cases like Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 

F.3d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2009), in which allegations of unlawful 

surveillance were dismissed as “patently insubstantial.” Id. 

at 1009–10 (concluding that the governmental surveillance 

scheme described in plaintiff’s allegations was “not 

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realistically distinguishable from allegations of little green 

men.”). 

This evidence also sets this case apart from Clapper. 

There, plaintiffs’ claim of standing relied “on a highly 

attenuated chain of possibilities.” 133 S. Ct. at 1148. One 

link of that chain was that plaintiffs’ “theory necessarily rests 

on their assertion that the Government will target other 

individuals—namely, their foreign contacts.”1

 Id. The 

Clapper plaintiffs, however, had “no actual knowledge of the 

Government’s § 1881a targeting practices” nor could they 

even show that the surveillance program they were 

challenging even existed. Id. at 1148–49 (“Moreover, 

because § 1881a at most authorizes—but does not mandate or 

direct—the surveillance that respondents fear, respondents’ 

allegations are necessarily conjectural.”); cf. United 

Presbyterian Church in the USA v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 

1380–81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing a complaint as a 

“generalized grievance” against the “entire national 

intelligence-gathering system” where plaintiffs were unable to 

show the injury they suffered was the result of a specific 

government surveillance program.) By contrast, here,

plaintiffs have set forth specific evidence showing that the 

government operates a bulk-telephony metadata program that 

collects subscriber information from domestic 

telecommunications providers, including Verizon Business 

Network Services. Contrary to the assertions of my 

colleagues, these facts bolster plaintiffs’ position: where the 

Clapper plaintiffs relied on speculation and conjecture to 

press their claim, here, plaintiffs offer an inference derived

 1 The statute authorizing the surveillance program at issue in 

Clapper, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, explicitly provided that, as U.S. 

persons, plaintiffs could not be targeted for surveillance. 133 S. Ct. 

at 1148.

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from known facts. See In re Application of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 

Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business 

Network Services, Inc. on behalf of MCI Communication 

Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business Services, No. BR-13-80 

(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, April 25, 2013), J.A. 

250–53.2

However, the burden on plaintiffs seeking a preliminary 

injunction is high. Plaintiffs must establish a “substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits.” Sottera, Inc., 627 F.3d at 

893. Although one could reasonably infer from the evidence 

presented the government collected plaintiffs’ own metadata, 

one could also conclude the opposite. Having barely fulfilled 

the requirements for standing at this threshold stage, Plaintiffs 

fall short of meeting the higher burden of proof required for a 

preliminary injunction.

Judge Williams is right to remind us that any number of 

unexpected constraints may frustrate the effectiveness of a 

given program. Appropriations may fall short. Technicians 

may err. Legal challenges may stymie the most dedicated 

bureaucrats.

3

 But while post hoc obstacles may undermine a 

program’s efficacy, they do not alter its intended objective, 

which, here, remains (commonsensically) the comprehensive 

collection of telephonic metadata.

 2 Although originally classified “top secret,” this order was 

declassified on July 11, 2013. The order expired on July 19, 2013.

3 FISA provides that a “person receiving a production order may 

challenge the legality of [that order]...by filing a petition with the 

[FISC].” 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (f)(2)(A)(i). However, such petitions 

are filed under seal and may not be disclosed. Id. § 1861 (d)(1), 

(f)(2)(D)(4), (f)(2)(D)(5).

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On remand it is for the district court to determine whether 

limited discovery to explore jurisdictional facts is appropriate. 

See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Pena, 147 

F.3d 1012, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Of course, I recognize 

that, in order for additional discovery to be meaningful, one of 

the obstacles plaintiffs must surmount is the government’s 

unwillingness to make public a secret program. See United 

Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 738 F.2d at 1382; cf. 

ACLU, 493 F.3d at 655 (“In the present case, the plaintiffs 

concede that there is no single plaintiff who can show that he 

or she has actually been wiretapped. Moreover, due to the 

State Secrets Doctrine, the proof needed either to make or 

negate such a showing is privileged, and therefore withheld 

from discovery or disclosure.”). It is entirely possible that, 

even if plaintiffs are granted discovery, the government may 

refuse to provide information (if any exists) that would further 

plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs’ claims may well founder in that 

event. But such is the nature of the government’s privileged 

control over certain classes of information. Plaintiffs must

realize that secrecy is yet another form of regulation, 

prescribing not “what the citizen may do” but instead “what 

the citizen may know.” DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE 

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 59 (1999). Regulations of this sort 

may frustrate the inquisitive citizen but that does not make 

them illegal or illegitimate. Excessive secrecy limits needed

criticism and debate. Effective secrecy ensures the 

perpetuation of our institutions. In any event, our opinions do 

not comment on the propriety of whatever privileges the 

government may have occasion to assert.

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: “[A] party seeking a 

preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things, 

a likelihood of success on the merits.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 

U.S. 674, 690 (2008) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted); see also Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 

1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (requiring a “substantial

likelihood of success on the merits”) (emphasis added) 

(quotations and citations omitted). In this context, the 

“merits” on which plaintiff must show a likelihood of success 

encompass not only substantive theories but also 

establishment of jurisdiction. The “affirmative burden of 

showing a likelihood of success on the merits . . . necessarily 

includes a likelihood of the court’s reaching the merits, which 

in turn depends on a likelihood that plaintiff has standing.” 

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 328 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (Williams, J., concurring and dissenting). And to show 

standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact” that 

is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). 

Plaintiffs claim to suffer injury from government

collection of records from their telecommunications provider

relating to their calls. But plaintiffs are subscribers of 

Verizon Wireless, not of Verizon Business Network Services, 

Inc.—the sole provider that the government has 

acknowledged targeting for bulk collection. Gov’t’s Br. at 

38; Appellees’ Br. at 26-28; see also Secondary Order, In re 

Application of FBI, No. BR 13-80 (FISC, Apr. 25, 2013) 

(Vinson, J.). Thus, unlike some others who have brought legal 

challenges to the bulk collection program, plaintiffs lack 

direct evidence that records involving their calls have actually 

been collected. Cf. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d 

Cir. 2015) (finding that Verizon Business subscribers had 

standing to challenge the bulk collection program because 

“the government’s own orders demonstrate that appellants’ 

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call records are indeed among those collected as part of the 

telephone metadata program”). 

Plaintiffs’ contention that the government is collecting 

data from Verizon Wireless (a contention that the government 

neither confirms nor denies, Gov’t’s Br. at 38-39), depends 

entirely on an inference from the existence of the bulk 

collection program itself. Such a program would be 

ineffective, they say, unless the government were collecting 

metadata from every large carrier such as Verizon Wireless; 

ergo it must be collecting such data. Appellee’s Br. 27-28. 

This inference was also the district judge’s sole basis for 

finding standing. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 

& n.36 (2013).

Yet the government has consistently maintained that its 

collection “never encompassed all, or even virtually all, call 

records and does not do so today.” Gov’t’s Br. at 39; Decl. of 

Teresa Shea, NSA Signals Intelligence Director at ¶ 8, 

Addendum to Gov’t’s Br. at 101 (similar). While one district 

judge has claimed that “the Government acknowledged that 

since May 2006, it has collected this information for 

substantially every telephone call in the United States,” 

neither of his sources—an Administration “White Paper” and 

a declaration by an NSA official—actually supports the claim. 

ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 

vacated and remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); see 

Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony 

Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act at 3 

(Aug. 9, 2013) (“FBI obtains orders from the FISC directing 

certain telecommunications service providers to produce 

business records that contain information about 

communications between telephone numbers . . .” (emphasis 

added)); Decl. Teresa Shea ¶ 14, ACLU v. Clapper, 13-cv3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2013), ECF No. 63 (“FBI obtains 

orders from the FISC directing certain telecommunications 

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service providers to produce all business records created by 

them (known as call detail records) that contain information 

about communications between telephone numbers” 

(emphasis added)). 

I note the Second Circuit’s observation that the 

government had not “seriously” disputed the contention that 

“all significant service providers” were subject to the bulk 

collection program. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 797. But in that case 

the government said, “Various details of the program remain 

classified, precluding further explanation here of its scope,” 

and went on to insist that “the record does not support the 

conclusion that the program collects ‘virtually all telephony 

metadata’ about telephone calls made or received in the 

United States. Nor is that conclusion correct.” See

Appellees’ Br. at 7, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42 (2d Cir. 

filed Apr. 10, 2014) (citations omitted). Thus the 

government’s assertions in the two cases are parallel. Of 

course the Second Circuit’s comment was irrelevant to its 

conclusion, as the plaintiffs in that case were not subscribers 

of Verizon Wireless but of Verizon Business, whose data the 

government acknowledged collecting. See ACLU, 785 F.3d 

at 801.

It appears true, as plaintiffs and the district court suggest,

that the effectiveness of the program expands with its 

coverage; every number that goes uncollected reduces the 

utility of the government’s “two-hop” querying. Indeed, it 

may well be that a reduction in coverage of, say, 50% would 

diminish the effectiveness of the program by far more than 

that proportion. Yet, in the face of the government’s 

representations that it has never collected “all, or even 

virtually all” call records, I find plaintiffs’ claimed inference

inadequate to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” of injury. 

Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 

(2013), represents the Supreme Court’s most recent 

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evaluation of comparable inferences and cuts strongly against 

plaintiffs’ claim that they have a substantial likelihood of 

prevailing as to standing. There, a group of US-based 

“attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media 

organizations” challenged the surveillance authorized by the 

FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Id. at 1145. The statute 

empowered the Attorney General and the Director of National 

Intelligence to jointly seek an order from the FISC 

authorizing “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to 

be located outside the United States to acquire foreign 

intelligence information” for a period of up to one year. 50 

U.S.C. § 1881a. Plaintiffs claimed they were injured by the 

surveillance because their work required them “to engage in 

sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail 

communications with colleagues, clients, sources, and other 

individuals located abroad” and that “some of the people with 

whom they exchange foreign intelligence information [we]re 

likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a” because they 

communicate with “people the Government ‘believes or 

believed to be associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘people 

located in geographic areas that are a special focus’ of the 

Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts, and 

activists who oppose governments that are supported by the 

United States Government.” 133 S. Ct. at 1145.

But as the Court observed, the Clapper plaintiffs had “no 

actual knowledge of the Government’s § 1881a targeting 

practices” and accordingly “merely speculate[d] and ma[d]e 

assumptions about whether their communications with their 

foreign contacts will be acquired under § 1881a.” Id. at 1148. 

The premises for their speculation were hardly trivial. They 

claimed (and it was not disputed) (1) that they engaged in 

communications eligible for surveillance under the disputed 

section, (2) that the government had a strong motive to 

intercept these particular communications because of the 

subject matter and identities involved, (3) that the government 

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had (under separate legal authority) already intercepted 

10,000 phone calls and 20,000 emails involving one 

individual who is now in regular communication with one of 

the plaintiffs, and (4) that the government had the capacity to 

intercept these communications. Id. at 1157-59. The Court 

held that these allegations left it merely “speculative whether 

the Government w[ould] imminently target communications 

to which respondents [we]re parties,” and so provided an

inadequate basis for standing. Id. at 1148-49 (citations and 

some quotations omitted). 

Here, the plaintiffs’ case for standing is similar to that 

rejected in Clapper. They offer nothing parallel to the 

Clapper plaintiffs’ evidence that the government had 

previously targeted them or someone they were 

communicating with (No. 3 above). And their assertion that 

NSA’s collection must be comprehensive in order for the 

program to be most effective is no stronger than the Clapper

plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the government’s motive and 

capacity to target their communications (Nos. 2 & 4 above). 

The strength of plaintiffs’ inference from the

government’s interest in having an effective program rests on 

an assumption that the NSA prioritizes effectiveness over all 

other values. In fact, there are various competing interests 

that may constrain the government’s pursuit of effective 

surveillance. Plaintiffs’ inference fails to account for the 

possibility that legal constraints, technical challenges, budget 

limitations, or other interests prevented NSA from collecting 

metadata from Verizon Wireless. Many government 

programs (even ones associated with national defense) seem 

to be calibrated or constrained by collateral concerns not 

directly related to the program’s stated objectives, such as 

funding deficiencies, bureaucratic inertia, poor leadership, 

and diversion to non-defense interests of resources nominally 

dedicated to defense. It is possible that such factors have 

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operated to hamper the breadth of the NSA’s collection. In 

fact, both the district court and the plaintiffs contradict their 

own assertions about the effectiveness of the program by 

emphatically asserting its ineffectiveness in support of their 

conclusions that it violates the Fourth Amendment. See 

Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (“I have serious doubts 

about the efficacy of the metadata collection program . . . .”); 

Appellees’ Br. at 47-49; Appellees’ Reply at 30-33. 

Judge Brown distinguishes Clapper on the grounds that 

the plaintiffs here have offered “specific evidence” about the 

government’s bulk collection program. Op. of Brown, J., at 3. 

But, assuming their evidence to be in some sense more 

specific, the relevant inquiry is whether that evidence 

indicates that the program targets plaintiffs. As to that, the 

plaintiffs here do no better than those in Clapper.

Plaintiffs complain that the government should not be 

allowed to avoid liability simply by keeping the material 

classified. But the government’s silence regarding the scope 

of bulk collection is a feature of the program, not a bug. The

Clapper Court rejected a request for “in camera” review of 

classified government materials precisely on the ground that 

any such approach would tend to undermine the program’s 

effectiveness: 

As an initial matter, it is respondents’

burden to prove their standing by pointing to 

specific facts, not the Government’s burden to 

disprove standing by revealing details of its 

surveillance priorities. Moreover, this type of 

hypothetical disclosure proceeding would allow 

a terrorist (or his attorney) to determine whether 

he is currently under U.S. surveillance simply 

by filing a lawsuit challenging the 

Government’s surveillance program. Even if 

the terrorist’s attorney were to comply with a 

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protective order prohibiting him from sharing 

the Government’s disclosures with his client, 

the court’s postdisclosure decision about 

whether to dismiss the suit for lack of standing 

would surely signal to the terrorist whether his 

name was on the list of surveillance targets.

133 S. Ct. at 1149 n.4 (citations omitted). These 

considerations apply with equal force here, where the 

government has sought to maintain a similarly strategic 

silence regarding the scope of its bulk collection. 

It is true that Clapper came to the Court on review of 

cross-motions for summary judgment, not a preliminary 

injunction, but the Court’s rejection of the Clapper plaintiffs’ 

claims is nonetheless telling. Those plaintiffs actually faced a 

lighter burden than do ours: in granting the government’s 

motion for summary judgment, the Court necessarily found 

that plaintiffs’ inferences were inadequate even to preserve 

the question of standing as a “genuine issue.” See Amnesty 

Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 

2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), vacated and remanded 

sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 

2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). Here, by contrast, 

plaintiffs must show a “substantial likelihood” of standing. 

Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is 

collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise 

suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their 

burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and 

are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. 

It remains possible that on remand plaintiffs will be able 

to collect evidence that would establish standing. Indeed, 

noting that the government was “uniquely in control of the 

facts, information, documents, and evidence regarding the 

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8

extent and nature of their mass surveillance,” they moved in 

the district court to depose “an employee of the NSA.” Pls.’ 

Mot. For Leave, Klayman v. Obama, 13-cv-851 (D.D.C. Oct. 

30, 2013), ECF No. 15. But the district judge denied the 

motion as moot after granting the preliminary injunction. 

Minute Order, Klayman v. Obama, 13-cv-851 (D.D.C. Jan. 

21, 2014). Given the possibility that plaintiffs’ efforts along 

these lines may be fruitful, I join Judge Brown in remanding 

to the district court for it to decide whether limited discovery 

to explore jurisdictional facts is appropriate.

I am uncertain about the meaning of Judge Brown’s 

view that although plaintiffs have failed to show a substantial 

likelihood of success on standing, they have nonetheless 

“fulfilled the requirements for standing,” if only “barely.” 

Op. of Brown, J., at 4. If the latter “fulfill[ment]” means 

simply that standing cannot be ruled out and thus poses no 

jurisdictional obstacle to discovery on standing, I agree. To 

the extent that Judge Brown regards the “burden of proof 

required for a preliminary injunction” as “higher,” id., I don’t 

understand in what sense the burden would be higher than in 

other contexts (motions for judgment on the pleadings, for 

summary judgment, or after hearing), or the basis for 

regarding it as higher than in those contexts. 

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I will 

not restate either the facts or the background law, as I fully 

agree with my colleagues’ statements on those subjects. 

Indeed, I agree with virtually everything in Judge Williams’ 

opinion, save for its conclusion, and I even agree with part of 

that. My colleagues believe that the preliminary injunction 

entered by the district court must be vacated, as plaintiffs have 

failed to establish a “substantial likelihood of success on the 

merits.” Brown Op. 1; Williams Op. 3. I agree. However, 

my colleagues also believe that the case should be remanded 

for further proceedings. I do not agree. Like Judge Williams, 

I believe that the failure to establish the likelihood of success 

depends at least in the first instance on plaintiffs’ inability to 

establish the jurisdiction of the court. I also agree with Judge 

Williams that plaintiffs have not established the jurisdiction of 

the court. That being the case, I would not remand the case 

for further proceedings, but would direct its dismissal.

As my colleagues recognize, in order to bring a cause 

within the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiffs must 

demonstrate, inter alia, that they have standing. “[T]o show 

standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an ‘injury in fact’ that is 

‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” 

Williams Op. at 1 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 

Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). 

As Judge Williams goes on to note, “[p]laintiffs claim to 

suffer injury from government collection of records from their 

telecommunications provider relating to their calls.” Id. at 1; 

see also Brown Op. 2. However, plaintiffs never in any 

fashion demonstrate that the government is or has been 

collecting such records from their telecommunications 

provider, nor that it will do so. Briefly put, and discussed in 

more detail by Judge Williams, plaintiffs’ theory is that 

because it is a big collection and they use a big carrier, the 

government must be getting at their records. While this may 

be a better-than-usual conjecture, it is nonetheless no more 

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2

than conjecture. 

As Judge Williams further notes, “Clapper v. Amnesty 

International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), represents the Supreme 

Court’s most recent evaluation of comparable inferences and 

cuts strongly against plaintiffs’ claim that they have a 

substantial likelihood of prevailing as to standing.” Williams 

Op. at 3–4. While Clapper involved collection under a 

different statutory authorization, the standing claims of the 

plaintiffs before us and the plaintiffs in that case are markedly 

similar. In fact, the plaintiffs’ claim before us is weaker than 

that of the Clapper plaintiffs. The Clapper plaintiffs at least 

claimed that the government had previously targeted them or 

someone with whom they were communicating. The 

plaintiffs before us make no such claim. I would go farther 

than Judge Williams. Clapper does not just “cut[ ] strongly 

against plaintiffs’ claims that they have a substantial 

likelihood of prevailing as to standing,” Clapper cuts their 

claims out altogether. 

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they suffer injury 

from the government’s collection of records. They have 

certainly not shown an “injury in fact” that is “actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Friends of the 

Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180. I agree with the conclusion of 

my colleagues that plaintiffs have not shown themselves 

entitled to the preliminary injunction granted by the district 

court. However, we should not make that our judicial 

pronouncement, since we do not have jurisdiction to make any 

determination in the cause. I therefore would vacate the 

preliminary injunction as having been granted without 

jurisdiction by the district court, and I would remand the case, 

not for further proceedings, but for dismissal.

In Clapper, the Court stated, “Yet respondents have no 

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3

actual knowledge of the Government’s . . . targeting practices. 

Instead, respondents merely speculate and make assumptions 

about whether their communications with their foreign 

contacts will be acquired . . . .” 133 S. Ct. at 1148. After 

discussing the speculative nature of plaintiffs’ claims, the 

Supreme Court summed up its decision as “respondents’ 

speculative chain of possibilities does not establish that injury 

based on potential future surveillance is certainly impending 

or is fairly traceable to [the government’s acts].” Id. at 1150. 

Therefore, in a conclusion fully applicable to the case before 

us, the Supreme Court held “that respondents lack Article III 

standing because they cannot demonstrate that the future 

injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and 

because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs 

in anticipation of non-imminent harm.” Id. at 1155. 

Without standing there is no jurisdiction. Without 

jurisdiction we cannot act. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Therefore, I 

agree with my colleagues that the issuance of the preliminary 

injunction was an ultra vires act by the district court and must 

be vacated. However, I believe we can do no more. I would 

remand the case for dismissal, not further proceedings. 

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