Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06502/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06502-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Defendant Wadkins’ name is misspelled as “Watkins” in the

First Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. 2, n. 1).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNY ROUNDTREE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN DERRAL ADAMS; EDGAR

CASTILLO, M.D.;

MTA F.C. SCHUMACHER;

CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN T. VAUGHN;

C/O WATKINS; SGT. FOUCH;

SGT. YOUNG; C/O RODRIGUEZ III;

LT. WESTPHAL; MTA RAMIREZ;

MTA BUNKER; MTA HEGGE;

C/O A. PETERSEN;

DR. M. FRIEDMAN;

ASSOCIATE WARDEN HILL;

LT. SCHUMACHER; L.G. SCHWIMMER;

DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

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1:01-cv-06502 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b).

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Sergeant Young, Sergeant Fouch, Correctional

Officer Rodriguez, Correctional Officer Wadkins,1 Warden Adams,

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2 In addition to M.T.A. F.C. Schumacher, Plaintiff also

names “Lt. Schumacher” as a defendant. Defendants assert that

Lt. Schumacher has not yet been served. (See Doc. 66, Def.’s

Mem. 2, n. 2).

3 Dr. Castillo joined the Motion to Dismiss by stipulation

on August 3, 2004. (See Doc. 76).

4 An Order to Show Cause why the remaining Defendants (i.e.,

Petersen, Schwimmer, Vaughn, Westpal, Bunker, and Lt. Schumacher)

should not be dismissed issued on July 2, 2004. (Doc. 72). 

Plaintiff responded on July 29, 2004, and requested more time to

respond. (Doc. 75). Plaintiff filed a supplemental response on

August 20, 2004. (Doc. 80). Plaintiff requested further time to

respond. The status of these Defendants is still not clear.

2

M.T.A. F.C. Schumacher,2 Dr. Friedman, Associate Warden Hill,

M.T.A. Hegge, M.T.A. Ramirez, and Dr. Edgar Castillo3

(collectively, “Defendants”) move to dismiss the civil rights

complaint of Plaintiff Benny Roundtree (“Plaintiff”), a state

prisoner in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections. Defendants4 move to dismiss on the grounds that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before

bringing suit.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This civil rights action arises out of Defendants’ alleged

refusal, over the course of about five years, to provide

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, with foot braces and special shoes

that were prescribed to him for an injury to his right ankle. 

(See Doc. 34, First Am. Compl. ¶ 8). Plaintiff filed his

original complaint pro se about three and a half years ago, on

November 19, 2001. (Doc. 1, Compl.). The magistrate judge

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3

ordered the court to request that an attorney review the

complaint and exhibits and notify the court whether he or she is

interested in representing plaintiff. (Doc. 10, Order, filed

August 20, 2002). After court correspondence with a number of

different potential attorneys over the course of approximately

one year, counsel was appointed for Plaintiff on September 3,

2003. (Doc. 27, Order). Plaintiff, with the assistance of

counsel, filed the First Amended Complaint on March 21, 2004. 

(Doc. 34, First Am. Compl.). Plaintiff brings four causes of

action against Defendants: (1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

depriving Plaintiff, under color of law, of rights secured by the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Breach of Mandatory Duty of

Cal. Penal Code §§ 2650-2657; (3) Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress; and (4) Violation of Armstrong Remedial Plan.

Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on

June 21, 2004. (Doc. 65; Notice of Motion; Doc. 66, Def.’s

Mem.). Plaintiff’s attorney requested more time to respond to

the Motion to Dismiss on August 9, 2004. (Doc. 78). The

deadlines to respond and the date of oral argument were continued

several times. Plaintiff finally filed opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss on May 4, 2005. (Doc. 97, Pl.’s Opp.). Oral

argument was scheduled for June 6, 2005. (Docs. 94, 95). 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend the First Amended Complaint and

has also filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 96, [Proposed]

Second Am. Compl., filed May 4, 2005). Defendants replied. 

(Doc. 99, Def.’s Reply, filed May 18, 2005). Plaintiff submitted

a document titled “Response to Defendants’ Reply Re: Motion to

//

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5 The only briefs authorized by the Local Rules for the

Eastern District of California (“Local Rules”) are the Motion,

Opposition, and Reply. See Local Rule 78-230. Plaintiff’s

“Response” was filed in violation of the Local Rules. 

Defendants, however, did not object to Plaintiff’s “Response.” 

Also, considering the lengthy period of time between the filing

of the original motion and the opposition and reply (almost one

year), and that Defendants raised arguments in their reply that

they did not raise in their original motion (see Doc. 99, Def.’s

Reply 7-8), Plaintiff’s “Response” will be considered.

4

Dismiss” on June 1, 2005.5 (Doc. 100, Pl.’s Response). 

Oral argument was heard on June 6, 2005. Patience Milrod,

Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Kelli Marie Hammond,

Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants.

III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

A. Plaintiff’s First Set of Administrative Appeals.

Plaintiff’s first set of administrative appeals relates to

Plaintiff’s allegation that, from October 1998 to June 28, 2001,

Defendants refused to provide him braces and shoes. Plaintiff

was prescribed soft shoes in October 1998. His family sent them,

and staff at Corcoran refused to allow him to have them. Further

delay led to deterioration of his left ankle, resulting in severe

and constant pain and limitation of his daily activities. 

Plaintiff filed a grievance and a series of appeals in accordance

with the prison’s administrative appeals process.

First, in 1998, Plaintiff submitted an informal grievance on

a standard “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form 602.” (Doc. 97, Pl.’s

Opp. Ex. 1; Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. Ex. A). The “date submitted” on

the form is November 28, 1998. The “date received” on the form

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is December 4, 1998. Plaintiff complains on the form that on

October 30, 1998, he was prescribed soft shoes after an

examination by a physician, but that he had not yet been issued

the soft shoes:

I was examine[d] by Doctor Deering concerning a sever[e]

foot and ankle problem. The Doctor determined that I should

be wearing a special shoe. He Doctor [sic] Deering wrote a

physcian [sic] and for a special shoe chrono, which I

haven’t received? Therefore I was denied soft shoes by the

laundry staff because I had no paperwork to back my claim, I

was also [sic] ankle support high top shoes because I had no

paperwork to back my claim. It has become obvious that I

cannot and will not receive these items until I present a

chrono.

(Id.). The action Plaintiff requested in response to his

grievance was to receive the “chrono” that had allegedly already

been issued by Dr. Deering. (Id.). Plaintiff’s informal

grievance request was denied on March 19, 1999. The 602 form

states, under a section titled “Staff Response,” that Plaintiff

“need[s] to be seen by M.D. for evaluation regarding soft shoe

chrono.” (Id.).

Second, in response to the rejection of the grievance

request, Plaintiff brought a “formal” appeal. (See id.). The

602 form is a pre-printed form that has a section for inmates to

file several formal appeals. An inmate can explain on this

section why he or she is dissatisfied with these decisions at the

lower levels. Plaintiff wrote in the First Formal Appeal section

of the 602 that he had already been evaluated by Dr. Deering and

that a chrono already existed in his medical records:

I’ve already been to the Doctor on 10/30/98 and he order

[sic] my chrono. I had a full evaluation. Therefore the

above statement does not remedy my problem, or explain the

time frame from the medial records received this appeal to

the time they sent it back to me.

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(Id.). Plaintiff seems to be complaining about the length of

time (i.e., over 3 months) it took the prison to rule on his

complaint. The First Formal Appeal is dated March 28, 1999, and

is dated “received” March 29, 1999. Plaintiff’s First Formal

Appeal was granted in part on May 5, 1999. The section titled

“Reviewer’s Action” is signed by Dr. Deering and states that (1)

there was no custody escort for Plaintiff to take him to the

orthotic clinic and that Plaintiff’s appointment was rescheduled;

(2) that Dr. Deering reordered Plaintiff’s chrono to wear soft

shoes until Plaintiff can be seen by orthotics; and (3) that Dr.

Deering requested that Plaintiff be issued soft shoes and support

high tops.

Third, Plaintiff appealed the decision from the First Formal

Appeal on May 12, 1999. As with the first appeal, the section

provided for an inmate’s Second Formal Appeal appears on the preprinted 602 form. Plaintiff wrote on the form that he had not

been issued his shoes and that he seeks a Director’s Review

(i.e., the third and final level of review):

Even though Dr. Deering reordered all these above I have not

received any of my chronos or ankle support-high top soft

shoes [illegible] examinations keep being rescheduled my

ankle is causing pain. I seek director’s review.

Plaintiff’s Second Appeal appears to be dated received either on

May 12, 1999, or on June 21, 1999. The 602 form states that

Plaintiff’s Second Appeal was granted in part. The decision is

dated September 23, 1999. The action to be taken is not clear on

the form.

Fourth, Plaintiff brought an appeal to the third and final

Director’s Level on September 9, 1999. In it, Plaintiff states:

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6 The 602 attached to the First Amended Complaint does not

contain this section of text. 

7

It has become blatantly obvious that the medical staff here

at SATF/Corcoran don’t adhere to even Dr. Deering’s

requests. I have not been issued any of the above orders. 

However, I was finally escorted to the Clinic for x-ray, and

[sic] which time they x-rayed the wrong ankle. I repeatedly

told the [sic] it was the wrong ankle. After 1YR Im [sic]

still waiting??

(Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A).6 Plaintiff’s Director’s Level Appeal was

granted in full. The Director’s Level Appeal decision is dated

January 11, 2000, and states in relevant part:

Review of the appeal documentation and appellant’s medical

records indicate that administrative procedures have not

been followed in completing CDC 128-C chronos ordered by

treating physicians. There appears [sic] to have been

delays and altogether failures to complete the chronos and

ensuring that the appellant received them.

Case conference with Dr. E. Castillo, Chief Medical Officer

(SMO), SATF, revealed that the appellant was evaluated by

the orthotic specialist, Dr. McKillup, on November 19, 1999,

who issued an order for special boots and a plastic brace

for appellant’s foot and ankle. Nothing has been done to

follow through with this order.

* * *

The institution shall immediately carry out the orders of

Dr. McKillup, Orthotist, on November 19, 1999, and ensure

that the appellant receives the appropriate footwear and

orthotic prostheses.

The Director’s Level Appeal decision also states that “[t]his

issue was discussed with Dr. E. Castillo, CMO, SATF, and the

office of Mr. T. Vaughn, Chief Deputy Warden.

Finally, in August 2000, Plaintiff received the orthotic

braces, although he did not receive the special shoes, without

which the braces were useless. The braces were confiscated in

December 2000 or January 2001 when Plaintiff was transferred to a

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different unit within the Corcoran facility. Thus Plaintiff was

unable to be fitted for special shoes in January 2001 because his

braces were “in lockup.” He never got them back, and Plaintiff

was transferred to the Soledad facility in March 2001 without

them. Plaintiff also alleges that Warden Adams, Defendant

Vaughn, and Lt. Schumacher transferred him to the Soledad

facility in retaliation for his complaints. (Doc. 34, First Am.

Compl. ¶ 15). Efforts by staff at Soledad to secure the braces

from staff at Corcoran were unavailing.

Plaintiff then attempted to secure proper footwear and

braces at Soledad. On March 24, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a

CDC 1824 Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request,

CDC log # 01-00923. (See Doc. 97, Pl.’s Opp. 4; Ex. 5). 

Plaintiff was issued braces on May 24, 2001, and received the

necessary orthopedic shoes on June 28, 2001. 

The first appeals procedure relates to Plaintiff’s

allegation that, from October 1998 until June 28, 2001,

Defendants refused to provide him braces and shoes. (See Doc.

97, Pl.’s Opp. 2). 

B. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and his State Habeas

Petition.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint pro se on November

19, 2001. (Doc. 1, Compl.). Before filing his complaint in

federal court, Plaintiff filed a December 2000 Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the Superior Court of California, County of

Kings. (Id. at Ex. D). That petition appears to have been

rendered moot by the issuance of Plaintiff’s shoes and braces in

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7 Judge Bissig states in this order as follows:

If the medically prescribed footwear and orthopedic

appliances have in fact been supplied to petitioner,

there may be nothing to decide. Petitioner and

respondent are each ordered to file a further short and

focused supplemental response or traverse that shall

include such declarations as are necessary to address

the single issue that the court is inquiring about. 

The supplemental filings herein requested shall be on

file not later than July 1, 2001. If medically

prescribed orthopedic shoes and related appliances have

in fact been delivered to and have been fitted to

petitioner’s feet by that date, it is the court’s

intention to dismiss this petition as moot.

9

June 2001. (See id. at Ex. G, Order for Further Responses to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).7

Plaintiff’s original federal complaint sought monetary

damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages for medical

staff’s deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Id. at

3). In the section of the complaint titled “Statement of Claim,”

Plaintiff states that, on November 19, 1999, he was examined by

Foot Specialist Dr. McKillups and that nothing was done to carry

out the orders of Dr. Deering and Dr. McKillups. Plaintiff

alleges that on November 11, 2000, he was interviewed by CDC

Appeal Examiner C. Hollis. (Id.). Examiner Hollis and Plaintiff

went to the MTA Office to ask why nothing had been done to carry

out the orders of Dr. Killups and Dr. Deering. Senior MTA F.C.

Schumacher told Mr. Hollis and Plaintiff that she would ensure

the physicians’ orders were fulfilled. Plaintiff goes on to

allege that F.C. Schumacher never did so, and that his pain and

limping continued and worsened. Plaintiff also alleges that Mr.

Hollis spoke with Chief Deputy Warden T. Vaughn regarding the

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matter, but still received no relief. 

C. Plaintiff’s Second Set of Administrative Appeals.

On August 13, 2002, the footwear and braces issued to

Plaintiff in June 2001 were confiscated in a cell search. (Doc.

34, First Am. Compl. ¶ 18). They were never found, and Plaintiff

began again the process of attempting to get staff’s attention to

have his feet measured for new braces and boots. On August 14,

2002, Plaintiff filed another informal grievance on a CDC 602

Inmate Appeal Form, CDC log # 03-00242. The informal grievance

is dated “received on November 12, 2002.” The informal grievance

was granted in full at the informal level. The First Level of

Appeal is stamped “BYPASS.” The Second Level of Appeal is also

stamped “BYPASS,” although the 602 form also appears to state

that the Second Level Appeal was granted in full on February 13,

2003. The 602 form attaches a letter that states in relevant

part: “[Y]our 602 appeal is GRANTED at the Second Level of

Review. You be [sic] provided with a replacement pair of

orthopedic boots at no cost to you.” (Doc. 97, Pl.’s Opp.

Ex. 6). 

Defendant Hill was ordered to provide Plaintiff with

replacements no later than March 14, 2003. (Doc. 34, First Am.

Compl. ¶ 19). The modification order was re-sent on March 17,

March 25, April 1, May 19, June 30, July 28, and September 26,

2003. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Friedman, Hill, and

Schwimmer, failed to comply with the order, depriving him of his

constitutional rights. Plaintiff was finally provided with shoes

and braces about ten months later, on December 27, 2003. (See

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Doc. 96, [Proposed] Second Am. Compl. ¶ 31). The allegations

regarding the events that are the subject of the second set of

administrative appeals appears in the First Amended Complaint,

which was filed by Plaintiff, with the assistance of newlyappointed counsel, on March 31, 2004.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint pursuant to the “non-enumerated” provisions of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This

section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires

prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing suit challenging prison conditions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted.

24 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

In the Ninth Circuit, “failure to exhaust nonjudicial

remedies that are not jurisdictional should be treated as a

matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion rather than a motion for summary judgment.” Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have

properly brought their motion pursuant to a non-enumerated

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provision of Rule 12(b). 

There is no pleading requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. 

Plaintiff is not required to plead and prove exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Id. Defendants have the burden to

raise and prove the absence of exhaustion. Id. The policy

behind this requirement is that “it is considerably easier for a

prison administrator to show a failure to exhaust than it is for

a prisoner to demonstrate exhaustion.” Id. (quoting Ray v.

Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)).

“In ruling on an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust, ‘the court may look beyond the pleadings

and decide disputed issues of fact’ by, for example, considering

affidavits submitted by the parties.” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358

F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119-20)). Generally, on a motion to dismiss, a court may

consider two types of “extrinsic” material. First, “a court may

consider material which is properly submitted as part of the

complaint on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). A court may even consider materials not

physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not

contested and the complaint necessarily relies on them. Id. 

Second, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public

record under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Id. For example, matters of

public record may be considered, including pleadings, orders and

other papers filed with the court or records of administrative

bodies. See id. Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations,

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unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need

not be accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

B. The Exhaustion Requirement and the California State

Inmate Administrative Appeals Process.

The PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust all administrative

remedies before bringing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The

exhaustion requirement is mandatory. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 741 (2001). “The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to

all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 532 (2002). 

According to the Ninth Circuit, there are two principal

policies behind the administrative exhaustion rule:

The first is to protect an administrative agency’s authority

by giving the agency the first opportunity to resolve a

controversy before a court intervenes in the dispute.

[citation] The second is to promote judicial efficiency by

either resolving the dispute outside of the courts, or by

producing a factual record that can aide the court in

processing a plaintiff’s claim. [citation].

Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).

A California state inmate exhausts his administrative

remedies within the meaning of the PLRA by pursuing

administrative appeal through all appropriate and available

levels of review. Hazleton, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 929. The

following four steps are available to California state prisoners:

(1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC

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602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the

institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to

the Director of the California Department of Corrections.

Gomez v. Winslow, 177, F. Supp. 3d 977, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2001)

(internal citations omitted); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15

§§ 3084, et seq. 

To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must

pursue his appeal through all three levels of administrative

appellate review (i.e., to the Director’s level), unless further

appeal would be futile. Brady v. Attygala, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1016,

1021 (C.D. Cal. 2002). If an appeal at the Second Level is

granted, the prisoner need not appeal to the Director’s Level. 

Id. at 1021-22. In Brady, the court held that an inmate

exhausted his administrative remedies when the prison granted the

inmate’s appeal at the Second Level. The Court reasoned that

granting the prisoner’s appeal constituted the extent of the

relief the prison could offer. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.5(d)); accord Clement v. Cal. Dept. of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding

“Plaintiff had received all the relief that the prison

administrative appeal could provide” when prison granted both

Second Level Appeals and provided colonoscopy and special diet

for inmate). 

C. California Tort Claims Act.

Under the California Tort Claims Act, no suit for “money or

damages” may be brought against a public entity until a written

claim has been presented to the public entity and the claim

either has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected. 

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Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal. App. 4th 766, 778 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999). The CTCA requires a plaintiff to file a timely tort claim

with the public entity; if the claim is not timely, the public

entity may reject the claim.

If a claimant fails to timely file a claim with the public

entity, and its claim is consequently rejected by the public

entity for that reason, courts are without jurisdiction to hear

the claimant’s cause of action. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County

of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480, 487 (1986); Moyer v. Hook,

10 Cal. App. 3d 491, 492-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Carr v. State of

Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 139, 144-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Williams

v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848-9

(Cal. Ct. App. 1978). For causes of action for death, personal

injury, or injury to personal property, a claimant must file a

claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. 

The CTCA also permits the filing of an application to file a

late claim for certain claims: “[w]hen a claim that is required

by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after

the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that

time, a written application may be made to the public entity for

leave to present that claim.” Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4. The

CTCA’s six-month limitations period applies to causes of action

for death, personal injury, or injury to personal property. Id.

at § 911.2. If a claimant fails to timely file a petition to

file a late claim, courts are without jurisdiction to hear the

cause of action. 

The overall policy of the claim requirements and time

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limitations of the California Tort Claims Act include the

following: (1) to “give the governmental entity an opportunity to

settle just claims before suit is brought;” (2) to “permit the

entity to make an early investigation of the facts on which a

claim is based, thus enabling it to defend itself against unjust

claims and to correct the conditions or practices which gave rise

to the claim;” and (3) to “avoid multiple suits arising out of

the same transaction or occurrence and thus further[] the goal of

judicial economy.” Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487

(quoting Gehman v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 3d 257, 262, 265

(Cal. Ct. App. 1979), disapproved on other grounds by Dept. of

Transportation v. Super. Ct. (“Frost”), 26 Cal.3d 744, 759 n. 5

(1980)).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Plaintiff Exhausted Administrative Remedies.

Defendants have the burden to raise and prove the absence of

exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff is

not required to plead and prove exhaustion of administrative

remedies. Id. However, both Plaintiff and Defendants have

provided copies of documents relating to Plaintiff’s grievances

and appeals within the prison administrative system. In ruling

on an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the court may consider materials

outside the pleadings if they are properly submitted as part of

the complaint or if they are properly judicially noticeable, such

as matters of public record. See Hazleton, 358 F. Supp. 2d at

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928; Lee, 250 F.3d at 668.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before bringing suit. First, Defendants

argue that the administrative remedies pursued by Plaintiff were

deficient because Plaintiff does not name individual Defendants

in his grievances and administrative appeals, thus failing to put

defendants on notice of Plaintiff’s claims against them. (See

Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. 6; Doc. 99, Def.’s Reply 4). Second,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals make no

mention of the facts giving rise to his retaliation claim against

Warden Adams for his transfer from Corcoran to Soledad and

against other certain Defendants for having confiscated his shoes

and braces in 2003. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

failed to bring a Director’s Level appeal regarding the refusal

of Defendants to provide Plaintiff with his shoes and braces

during the time period after 2001. (Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. 7; Doc.

99, Def.’s Reply 6).

1. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeals

Regarding Individual Defendants.

First, Plaintiff correctly argues that Defendants cite no

authority supporting their position that each and every prison

official who the prisoner intends to sue must be named in the

grievance and administrative appeal forms. (Doc. 100, Pl.’s

Response 5-6). Defendants cite a Sixth Circuit case, Curry v.

Scott, 249 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001), in support of their

argument. In Curry, the Sixth Circuit “applied a bright line

rule that a prisoner must identify every person that he

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ultimately intends to sue during the administrative process in

order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.” Irvin v. Zamora,

161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Curry, 249

F.3d at 505). 

However, Sixth Circuit authority is not binding on this

court. In addition, the holding from Curry has been called into

question by federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. See

Irvin, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. The plaintiff in Irvin

complained that prison officials sprayed pesticides in his prison

unit and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The

Irvin court held that “[w]ithout further guidance from the

Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit on the standard that should be

applied in determining whether prison grievances are factually

sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement in section

1997e(a), [it] cannot [be] conclude[d] that petitioner

has...failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect

to [defendants not named in his initial complaint].” Id. The

court based its decision in part on the requirement in the Ninth

Circuit that the pleadings of pro se prisoner plaintiffs should

be construed liberally and be given the benefit of the doubt. 

Id. (citing Klingle v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir.

1988). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has held that the

complaint of a blind prisoner that he had been denied reasonable

accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

should not be dismissed where his administrative appeals form did

not name any Defendants who were named in his federal district

court complaint. Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1182-3 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

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The Southern District of California has recently upheld the

dismissal of prisoner complaints for failure to exhaust because

the plaintiff failed to name the defendants in his administrative

complaint. Ornelas v. G. J. Giurbino, 358 F. Supp. 2d 955 (S.D.

Cal. 2005); Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Cal.

2004). Both of these cases, however, are distinguishable. Those

cases involved allegations of single, isolated incidents of

excessive force. Here, as in Irvin, the allegations relate to

ongoing deprivations of medical accommodation.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for

failure to name all individual defendants on the grievance and

appeals forms is DENIED.

2. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeals

Regarding his Retaliation Claim. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s administrative appeals do

not set forth facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims

based on his transfer from Corcoran to Soledad and on the refusal

of Defendants to provide the shoes and braces from March 2003 to

December 2003. (Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. 8). Plaintiff does not

appear to contest Defendant’s argument. Plaintiff provides no

citation to a claim of retaliation in his grievance or appeals

forms. Administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional

prerequisite for bringing suit.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

retaliation claims is GRANTED with leave to amend subject to the

applicable statute of limitations. 

//

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8 There are a number of exceptions to the informal

grievance requirement, all of which, save one, are not relevant

here. The relevant exception here is an appeal of “[t]he denial

of disabled inmate requests for reasonable modification or

accommodation filed on CDC Form 1824 (1/95), Reasonable

Modification or Accommodation Request, pursuant to section 3085.” 

Cal. Code Regs, tit. 15 § 2084.5(a)(3)(H). Plaintiff filed a CDC

1824 Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request on March

24, 2001. Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot base his argument

for exhaustion on the submission of this form. (doc. 99, Def.’s

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3. Whether Plaintiff Exhausted All Available

Administrative Remedies. 

Defendants’ briefs appear to confuse the two separate

substantive violations alleged. Plaintiff explains that the two

violations are: (1) certain Defendants’ refusal to provide braces

and shoes to Plaintiff from October 1998 through June 2001; and

(2) certain Defendants’ confiscation of and subsequent refusal to

provide braces and shoes from August 2002 to December 2003. (See

Doc. 97, Pl.’s Opp. 2; Doc. 100, Pl.’s Response 4). Plaintiff’s

first set of administrative appeals relates to the October 1998

through June 2001 violation, and Plaintiff’s second set of

administrative appeals relates to the August 2002 to December

2003 violation. Plaintiff filed his original complaint after the

October 1998 through June 2001 violation. Plaintiff, with the

assistance of counsel, filed his First Amended Complaint on March

31, 2004, and added the second set of alleged violations. 

The California inmate grievance and appeals process is set

forth in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3084, et seq. First, the

inmate must file an informal appeal whereby “the appellant and

staff involved in the action or decision attempt to resolve the

grievance informally.”8 Id. at § 3084.5(a). Second, if the

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Reply 5). Plaintiff correctly notes that this form is explicitly

recognized by this section of the California Code of Regulations. 

However, the only argument against exhaustion that Defendants

appear to make regarding the 1824 form is that the 602 is the

only form recognized by the Regulations. Defendants do not

appear to argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the appeals

process relating to the 1824 form. The issue whether Plaintiff

exhausted his administrative remedies by filing and/or appealing

the 1824 Request Form will therefore not be addressed.

21

informal grievance is rejected, an inmate may file a First Formal

Appeal with the prison’s Appeals Coordinator within fifteen

working days. Id. at §§ 3084.5(b), 3084.6(c). Third, the Second

Formal Appeal is brought before the “institution head or regional

parole administrator, or their designee.” Id. at § 3084.5(e)(1). 

Fourth, the third level appeal is brought before the Director of

the Department of Corrections. Id. at § 3084.5(e)(2).

Here, Plaintiff initiated two separate grievance procedures,

outlined in detail above. As to the alleged violations that

occurred between October 1998 and June 2001, Plaintiff appealed

through the Director’s Level. Plaintiff’s complaints and

grievances were submitted on the preprinted CDC 602 form, as

required by California prison regulations and California state

law. First, Plaintiff complained informally that Dr. Deering

prescribed him soft shoes that he never received. His request

was denied. Second, Plaintiff instituted the First Formal Appeal

by appealing the denial of his grievance. The First Formal

Appeal was granted in part by Dr. Deering, who ordered that shoes

and braces be delivered to Plaintiff and that he be scheduled for

an orthotic medical examination. Plaintiff appealed this

decision to the Second Formal Appeal level when his shoes were

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not issued. This appeal was granted in part. Plaintiff still

received no shoes. Plaintiff then appealed to the Director’s

Level, where his appeal was granted in full. The Director

ordered that prison officials carry out the order and that shoes

and orthotics be provided to Plaintiff. The shoes and braces

were finally issued in June 2001.

When Plaintiff’s shoes and braces were confiscated in August

2002, Plaintiff instituted a second grievance procedure relating

to the second set of alleged violations. First, his informal

grievance was granted in full. It is not clear from the form

whether Plaintiff instituted a First Formal Appeal because there

are several “BYPASS” stamps on the second page. However, the

form also states that the Second Formal Appeal was granted in

full, and a letter is attached to that appeal ordering that new

shoes and orthotics be provided to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff did

not appeal this decision to the Director’s Level. 

Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies relating

to his inadequate medical care claim in compliance with Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3084, et seq. Defendants argue that because

Plaintiff did not appeal the second set of violations to the

Director’s Level, his complaint against Defendants who are

alleged to have committed the second set of violations (i.e.,

Defendants Friedman and Hill) should be dismissed. Defendants

are incorrect. Plaintiff exhausted all available administrative

remedies despite that he did not take his appeal to the

Director’s Level. Exhaustion of administrative remedies occurs

when a prison offers a prisoner all the relief of which it is

capable. Brady, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1021; Clement, 220 F. Supp.

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9 Defendants’ argument that the events giving rise to the

second alleged set of violations occurred after the original

complaint was filed does not require dismissal of these

allegations. It appears that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

was filed as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). Despite that over two years passed after the filing of

the original complaint, no responsive pleading had been filed. 

However, the First Amended Complaint contains allegations of

events that transpired after the original complaint was filed. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) permits such “supplemental pleadings”;

however, leave of court is required to add supplemental

allegations. Plaintiff failed to request leave of court to do so

and therefore filed the supplemental allegations in the First

Amended Complaint in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

However, Plaintiff has now requested leave of the Court to

amend the First Amended Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff points

out that filing a new case regarding the second alleged set of

violations would be a waste of judicial resources and would not

further the goals of judicial economy. Plaintiff is granted

LEAVE TO AMEND to add allegations arising out of the alleged set

of violations, subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

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2d at 1106. A grant of an appeal does not, by virtue of its

having been granted, require further appeal. Once an appeal is

granted in full, the process ends.9 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s claim under the “Armstrong Remedial

Plan.”

Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under

the “Armstrong Remedial Plan” because Plaintiff “has not filed a

Director’s Level Appeal that presented the factual circumstances

giving rise to his claim....” (Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem. 8). 

Defendants assert that the factual circumstances giving rise to

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10 Neither party provides any context for or discussion of

Plaintiff’s claim under the “Armstrong Remedial Plan.” Plaintiff

attaches to the First Amended Complaint a permanent injunction

issued against Gray Davis (as Governor of the State of

California), Robert Presely (as Secretary to the California Youth

and Adult Corrections Agency), James Nielsen (as Chairman of the

California Board of Prison Terms (BPT)), and the BPT, their

agents, employees, successors in office and all persons acting in

their aid or participating with them, by the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois in the case Armstrong v.

Davis, No. C 94-02307 CW. (See Doc. 34, First Am. Compl. Ex. 1). 

Plaintiff also attaches a document titled “Remedial Plan” which

appears to be a set of regulations relating to the California

Department of Corrections’ Disability Placement Program. (Id. at

Ex. 2). This document states in part: 

The Disability Placement Program (DPP) is the

Department’s set of plans, policies, and procedures to

assure nondiscrimination against inmates/parolees with

disabilities. The DPP applies to all of the

Department’s institutions/facilities, all programs that

the Department provides or operates, and to all inmates

who have disabilities that affect a major life activity

whether or not the disabilities impact placement.

(Id. at § I.A.). 

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Plaintiff’s claim under the Armstrong Remedial Plan include the

following: (1) certain Defendants failed to insure that

Plaintiff’s receipt of his brace and special shoes was not

unreasonably delayed; (2) certain Defendants failed to insure

that custody staff knew of Plaintiff’s special needs;

(3) Defendants were required to establish special procedures for

the inspection of his appliances during searches; and

(4) Defendants were required to insure that Plaintiff not be

deprived of his health care appliances absent a documented safety

or security reason or medical determination that the appliances

were no longer medically necessary.10 (See Doc. 66, Def.’s Mem.

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Defendants’ representations regarding the factual

allegations relating to the Armstrong Remedial Plan describe the

purported purpose of the “Armstrong Remedial Plan.” Defendants’

representations will be taken as true for the purposes of this

motion since Plaintiff does not contest Defendants’

representations in his papers.

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8 (citing Doc. 34, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40-2)).

These factual allegations generally relate to asserted

inadequate medical care that are contained in Plaintiffs’

administrative appeals forms. As stated above, Plaintiff’s

appeals regarding these allegations were granted in full at the

Second Level. No Director’s Level Appeal was necessary for the

exhaustion requirement to have been met. Brady, 196 F. Supp. 2d

at 1021; Clement, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under the “Armstrong Remedial Plan” for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is DENIED. It remains

to be determined whether an independent (private right of action)

for damages exists under the “Armstrong Remedial Plan.” 

B. California Tort Claims Act.

In their reply, Defendants raise for the first time the

argument that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the

California Tort Claims Act. Under the California Tort Claims

Act, no suit for “money or damages” may be brought against a

public entity until a written claim has been presented to the

public entity and the claim either has been acted upon or is

deemed to have been rejected. Hart, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 778. If

a claimant’s claim is consequently rejected by the public entity

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for that reason, courts are without jurisdiction to hear the

claimant’s cause of action. Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at

487; Moyer, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 492-3; Carr, 58 Cal. App. 3d at

144-6; Williams v. Mariposa County, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 848-9.

In Plaintiff’s “Response to Defendants’ Reply,” Plaintiff’s

counsel states that she has written to her Plaintiff to determine

whether he filed a claim pursuant to the California Tort Claims

Act. At the time of filing the Response (June 1, 2005),

Plaintiff’s counsel had still not heard back from Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s counsel states in the Response that she “will either

seek leave to allege the filing and denial of the tort claim, or

will file a notice of dismissal of his state law claims pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).” (Doc. 100, Pl.’s Response 8-9). 

Plaintiff’s counsel reiterated this intent during the June 6,

2005 oral argument. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

state law claims for failure to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Leave to Amend.

Plaintiff filed a “Second Amended Complaint” on May 4, 2005. 

Plaintiff added allegations regarding compliance with the PLRA’s

administrative exhaustion requirement. However, Defendants argue

that Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint in violation of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In her response, Plaintiff’s counsel

concedes that she erroneously filed the proposed complaint

without seeking leave to amend from the Court, which is a

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Plaintiff requests leave to

amend in the Response.

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 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that “a party may amend the

party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of

the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice

so requires.” The propriety of granting a motion for leave to

amend is generally determined by analysis of several factors: (1)

undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and

(4) prejudice to the opposing party. Hurn v. Retirement Fund

Trust of Plumbing, Heating and Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 648 F.2d

1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants do not argue that amendment would result in

prejudice or undue delay, or that Plaintiff’s request for leave

to amend is the result of bad faith. Defendants argue that

amendment would be futile. As explained above, Plaintiff has

adequately exhausted administrative remedies. Amendment of his

complaint to allege facts relating to exhaustion would not be

futile. Whether state law claims are viable remains to be seen.

Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is GRANTED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim insofar as it is based on claims of

retaliation is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND; 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

for failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act is

GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND;

//

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on all

other grounds is DENIED.

Any amended complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days

of electronic service of this order.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June _23__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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