Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01177/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01177-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEODORE FURTADO MEDEIROS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

MERCED COUNTY SHERIFF )

DEPUTY CLARK, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-09-1177 OWW/GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. 36)

Plaintiff Theodore Furtado Medeiros has filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for Damages against Defendants Merced

County Sheriff Deputy Clark (#5142) and Merced County Sheriff

Deputy Eric Macias (#5185), individually and in their official

capacities, and Does 1-20. The FAC alleges:

2. On or about May 19, 2008 at approximately

7:30 p.m. plaintiff was asked by a friend to

obtain a telephone number of a Frank Rose who

lived nearby. Plaintiff did not know Mr.

Rose and did not know exactly where Mr. Rose

lived.

3. Plaintiff drove his Cushman into the

wrong property located at 609 Fleming Road,

turned around and left. This property was a

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ranch-type residence with a tack room nearby.

4. Plaintiff then drove to the correct

address and obtained the telephone number of

Frank Rose from Cheryl L. Luman who was at

the residence. Plaintiff then telephoned his

friend and gave him Mr. Rose’s telephone

number.

5. While at the Rose property, plaintiff was

approached by a man without any

identification who stated he was a Merced

County Sheriff Deputy. He identified himself

as Deputy Clark. Deputy Clark accused

plaintiff of stealing something from his tack

room. Deputy Clark looked into plaintiff’s

open Cushman and found nothing that may have

been stolen. Deputy Clark was at the Rose

residence within a few minutes of so after

plaintiff arrived at the Rose residence. 

Plaintiff was wearing a tank top, moccasins,

and shorts. Deputy Clark knew or should have

known plaintiff had not taken any items from

the 609 Fleming Road tack room.

6. Plaintiff told Deputy Clark that without

identification he was not a sheriff officer

and that if he was accusing plaintiff of

being a thief he would knock him on his ass. 

Plaintiff then got into his Cushman and drove

home to call the Merced County Sheriff

Department wherein he was told a deputy was

already on the way.

7. Deputy Eric Macias (and another unknown

sheriff officer) drove onto plaintiff’s

property. Defendants Deputy Clark and Deputy

Macias then talked privately for about 20

minutes. Thereafter, Deputy Clark told

plaintiff that his son, Scott Clark, saw

plaintiff walk to and from the tack room and

carry something out. Plaintiff stated, ‘If

that was true, then your son is a liar.’ 

Deputy Clark appeared mad at plaintiff’s

response.

8. Deputy Clark stated he saw tennis shoe

prints in the tack room. Plaintiff said he

was wearing moccasins and this could be

proved by going to the Rose residence because

his moccasin footprints could be plainly seen

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there and would prove his innocence. Both

Deputy Clark and Deputy Macias refused to

investigate whether moccasin footprints were

at the Rose residence.

9. Deputy Clark then accused plaintiff of

changing his shoes when he went into his

residence to call the Sheriff Department. 

Deputy Clark took one of plaintiff’s

moccasins and plaintiff had his wife bring

him a pair of tennis shoes to wear. Deputy

Macias later told plaintiff that his tennis

shoe prints were found inside the tack room. 

Plaintiff became angry at Deputy Macias for

lying.

10. Neither Deputy Clark nor Deputy Macias

questioned Cheryl Luman at the Rose residence

to confirm plaintiff’s explanation that his

moccasin footprints were at the Rose

residence. Plaintiff’s wife was not asked

about the moccasins. Defendants never

contacted Melvin Bettancourt to confirm

plaintiff was asked to find the Rose

residence.

11. Deputy Macias, after another private 20

minutes conversation with Deputy Clark, told

plaintiff he was being arrested for

trespassing on the property at 609 Fleming

Road. Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed

into a sheriff’s car. After being handcuffed

in the sheriff’s car for over an hour,

plaintiff was taken to jail and booked on a

first degree burglary charge. Plaintiff was

completely surprised and shocked that he was

charged with burglary. Bail was set at

$50,000.

12. At the jail, Deputy Macias told

plaintiff his tennis shoe prints were found

in the tack room. Plaintiff again requested

Deputy Macias to check his story out

concerning his moccasin prints at the Rose

residence, which would have proven his

innocence. Deputy Macias refused.

The First Cause of Action is for violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for excessive force, arrest without probable cause,

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imprisonment and false and malicious prosecution, and covering up

these acts and depriving plaintiff of rights to recover for his

damages, and alleges in pertinent part:

25. The events, acts and omissions

complained of ... occurred when defendants

Merced County Sheriff Deputies Clark, Macias,

and Does 1-10, acting individually and in

their official capacity, arrested plaintiff

without probable cause knowing plaintiff had

not committed any crime. Defendants

thereafter wrongfully jailed plaintiff,

fabricated evidence, and made false charges

knowing them to be untrue, filed a knowingly

false sheriff report of the incident, and

intentionally and maliciously had plaintiff

prosecuted for uninvestigated felony burglary

charges supported by lying and fabricated

evidence made and produced by defendants. 

The Second Cause of Action is for malicious prosecution, and

alleges in pertinent part:

34. On or about June 9, 2008, in Merced,

California, defendants caused Bruce Gilbert,

Deputy District Attorney of Merced County ...

to file a criminal complaint in the Superior

Court of Merced County. The complaint

accused plaintiff of the crime of violating

Section 664/559 and Section 459 of the

California Penal Code (felonies). Plaintiff

was arrested May 19, 2008, detained in

custody for one day, charged by criminal

complaint with committing these crimes, and

arraigned on June 30. 2008. The complaint

was entitled ‘The People of the State of

California, Plaintiff, vs. Theodore Furtado

Medeiros, Defendant, action number MF48829.

35. After court appearances in the Merced

County Superior Court on July 23, 2008 and

August 21, 2008, the complaint filed June 9,

2008 was amended on September 24, 2009 by

Merced County Deputy District Attorney

Serrato, amending count one from a Penal Code

Section 664/559, a felony, to a violation of

Penal Code Section 601, a misdemeanor, and

amended count two from a Penal Code Section

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459 violation, a felony, to a violation of

Penal Code Section 459, second degree, a

misdemeanor. On October 8, 2008, the Deputy

District Attorney put plaintiff’s case into

‘deferred prosecution’ on condition plaintiff

stay 100 yards away from 609 Fleming Road for

one year until October 7, 2009 at which time

the case was dismissed. Plaintiff had

refused to plead guilty to any of the

frivolous charges. The condition was not an

alternate punishment of plaintiff. Plaintiff

could not go to 609 Fleming Road without

breaking the law by committing a trespass. 

36. Defendants maliciously acted without

probable cause in initiating the prosecution

of plaintiff in that they did not honestly,

reasonably, and in good faith believe

plaintiff to be guilty of the crime charged

because they knew plaintiff merely mistakenly

drove into the wrong driveway and did not

take anything and drove out of the driveway

while looking for a residence with which he

was familiar.

37. Defendants acted maliciously in

instigating the criminal prosecution in that

defendants knew plaintiff did not commit

either felony charge and had specific

knowledge that he was factually innocent of

the alleged criminal charges and maliciously

caused the charges to be filed, had lied and

on information and belief, had others lie to

annoy and punish plaintiff, and to

maliciously demonstrate their power as Merced

County Sheriff officers to individuals such

as plaintiff.

The Third Cause of Action is for false imprisonment and

alleges in pertinent part:

40. On or about November 7, 2008, plaintiff

presented a claim in the amount of $1,004,000

to defendant County of Merced, which at the

time was the amount of compensatory damages

sought in this action. A copy of the County

of Merced’s Notice of Action on Claim dated

January 5, 2009 is attached as Exhibit A ...

Defendant County of Merced rejected by

operation of law plaintiff’s claim on

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December 22, 2009. Plaintiff did not

photocopy the actual claimed filed. 

Defendant County of Merced has plaintiff’s

original form in their possession.

41. On the night of May 19, 2008, plaintiff

was maliciously seized and arrested at his

home ... by defendants ... Clark and Macias,

without a warrant or order of commitment or

any other legal authority of any kind, when

plaintiff had not committed any crime or

public offense. Defendants accused plaintiff

of trespassing at the time of his arrest, but

charged plaintiff with committing the offense

of Penal Code Section 664/459 [sic] and Penal

Code Section 459, but in fact the offenses

had not occurred, nor did defendants have

probable cause to believe that they had

occurred or that plaintiff had committed

them. Defendants did not reasonably

investigate the alleged offenses, fabricated

evidence and filed false reports, and knew

plaintiff was innocent of the charged

offenses.

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff concedes that the Second Cause of Action is barred

by California Government Code § 821.6.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) th

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the

complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead

essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a th

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

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truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). “A district court th

should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d

934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

th

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

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‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitations of

the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice

... Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss ... Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will ... be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense ... But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ....

In keeping with these principles, a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

 Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on

a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

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consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

B. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the

October 8, 2008 Minute Order in People v. Medeiros, No. MF48829,

Merced County Superior Court and Plaintiff’s initial Complaint

filed in this action.

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the

October 7, 2009 Minute Order in People v. Medeiros, No. MF48829,

Merced County Superior Court.

C. HECK v. HUMPHREY.

Defendants move to dismiss the First and Third Causes of

Action on the ground that they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a Section 1983 action

that calls into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s

conviction or confinement is not cognizable and does not,

therefore, accrue until and unless the plaintiff can prove that

his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by

a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When a

plaintiff files a Section 1983 action, the court must determine

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whether “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. On the other hand, if “the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the

absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. Thus, a convicted

plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 claim arising out of

alleged unconstitutional activities that resulted in his criminal

conviction unless the conviction is set aside.

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by action whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck at 486-87. Without such a showing of a “favorable

termination,” the person’s cause of action under § 1983 has not

yet accrued. Id. at 489. Thus if a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed. Id. at

487.

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In moving to dismiss, Defendants rely on the “favorable

termination” rule. The Ninth Circuit has found that “[t]here is

no question” that the “favorable termination” rule bars a

convicted plaintiff’s claim that defendants falsely arrested him

and brought unfounded charges. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951,

952 (9th Cir. 1996). Wrongful arrest and bringing false charges

could not have occurred unless the plaintiff was innocent of the

crime for which he was convicted. Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d

697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006).

Defendants argue that the fact that “deferred entry of

judgment” was entered against Plaintiff in the underlying

criminal proceedings on the condition that Plaintiff stay more

than 100 yards away from 609 Fleming Road for one year does not

constitute a “favorable termination” for purposes of Heck v.

Humphrey. 

The FAC does not allege a deferred entry of judgment; it

alleges “the Deputy District Attorney put plaintiff’s case into

‘deferred prosecution’ on condition plaintiff stay 100 yards away

from 609 Fleming Road for one year until October 7, 2009 at which

time the case was dismissed.” Although Plaintiff correctly

asserts that California Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.8 limits deferred

entry of judgment to specified narcotics and drug abuse cases, as

Defendants note, California Penal Code §§ 1001-1001.9 provides

for misdemeanor pretrial diversion. It appears that this is what

occurred in Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case. 

“[P]retrial diversion refers to the procedure of postponing

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prosecution of an offense filed as a misdemeanor either

temporarily or permanently at any point in the judicial process

from the point at which the accused is charged until

adjudication.” Cal.Penal Code § 1001.1. Section 1001.2(b)

provides:

The district attorney of each county shall

review annually any diversion program

established pursuant to this chapter, and no

program shall continue without the approval

of the district attorney. No person shall be

diverted under a program unless it has been

approved by the district attorney. Nothing

in this subdivision shall authorize the

prosecutor to determine whether a particular

defendant shall be diverted.

§Section 1001.3 provides that “[a]t no time shall a defendant be

required to make an admission of guilt as a prerequisite for

placement in a pretrial diversion program.” A divertee is

entitled to a hearing before his pretrial diverson can be

terminated for cause, Section 1001.4, and no statement or

information procured therefrom, made by the defendant in

connection with determination of eligibility for diversion or

made subsequently to the granting of diversion or while

participating in a diversion program, shall be admissible in any

action or proceeding. Section 1001.5. At the time a defendant’s

case is diverted, all bail is exonerated. Section 1001.6. “If

the divertee has performed satisfactorily during the period of

diversion, the criminal charges shall be dismissed at the end of

the period of diversion.” Section 1001.9 provides:

(a) Any record filed with the Department of

Justice shall indicate the disposition in

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those cases diverted pursuant to this

chapter. Upon successful completion of a

diversion program, the arrest upon which the

diversion was based shall be deemed to have

never occurred. The divertee may indicate in

response to any question concerning his or

her prior criminal record that he or she was

not arrested or diverted for the offense,

except as specified in subdivision (b). A

record pertaining to an arrest resulting in

successful completion of a diversion program

shall not, without the divertee’s consent, be

used in any way that could result in the

denial of any employment, benefit, license,

or certificate.

(b) The divertee shall be advised that,

regardless of his or her successful

completion of diversion, the arrest upon

which the diversion was based may be

disclosed by the Department of Justice in

response to any peace officer application

request and that, notwithstanding subdivision

(a), this section does not relieve him or her

of the obligation to disclose the arrest in

response to any direct question contained in

any questionnaire or application for a

position as a peace officer, as defined in

Section 830. 

Defendants cite a number of decisions in support of their

position.

In United States v. Brosser, 866 F.2d 315 (9 Cir.1989), th

the defendant, charged with forgery under the Assimilative Crimes

Act, pled guilty to the charge and moved to defer acceptance of

her guilty plea under Hawaii law. On appeal, the United States

argued that the Hawaii deferred acceptance rule is a form of

punishment within the meaning of the ACA. The Ninth Circuit

agreed:

In our view the Hawaii deferred-acceptance

rule constitutes a ‘punishment’ for purposes

of the ACA’s requirement that criminal

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defendants prosecuted under the ACA receive

‘a like punishment’ comparable to what they

would receive in state court proceedings. In

essence, the Hawaii rule recognizes that the

fact of having a felony on one’s criminal

record may itself constitute a substantial

penalty for a crime. Giving an individual a

criminal record labels her a law violator, a

label that carries with it a range of social

and economic disabilities. What the Hawaii

rule does is substitute one penalty for

another: it gives a defendant an opportunity

to serve a probation-like sentence in lieu of

having a felony put on her record, on the

understanding that if probation is violated

the guilty plea will be accepted. Like any

probationary sentence, the magistrate’s order

in this case restricted the appellant’s

liberty and backed the restriction with the

threat that if the order was violated she

would suffer a greater penalty. 

We think it is a matter of common sense that

the deferred-acceptance rule is designed as a

form of punishment, representing Hawaii’s

judgment that in some circumstances crime is

more appropriately sanctioned by a probationlike sentence than by the stigma of a

permanent criminal record.

866 F.2d at 316-317.

In United States v. Sylve, 135 F.3d 680 (9 Cir.1998), the th

defendant, who was charged under the Assimilative Crimes Act with

driving under the influence of alcohol within a federal enclave

in the State of Washington, moved for deferred prosecution under

Washington law. The motion was denied. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit held that Washington’s deferred prosecution program was a

form of punishment to be incorporated through the ACA:

Washington’s deferred prosecution scheme is a

form of preconviction probation available to

persons charged with misdemeanors or gross

misdemeanors who admit under oath that their

wrongful conduct resulted from alcoholism,

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drug addiction, or mental problems for which

they are in need of treatment ... To qualify,

the petitioner must execute a statement

waiving his right to testify, the right to a

speedy trial, the right to call witnesses to

testify, the right to present evidence in his

defense, and the right to a jury trial ... He

must stipulate to the admissibility and

sufficiency of the facts contained in the

written police report ... He must acknowledge

‘that the statement will be entered and used

to support a finding of guilty if the court

finds cause to revoke the order granting

deferred prosecution.’ ... The petitioner is

‘advised that the court will not accept a

petition for deferred prosecution from a

person who sincerely believes that he or she

is innocent of the charges or sincerely

believes that he or she does not, in fact,

suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, or

mental problems.’ ....

The two year alcoholism program mandated

under the deferred prosecution program is

rigorous, imposing various disabilities upon

the participant such as twice-weekly recovery

meetings, relinquishment of the right to

refuse certain prescription drugs, and total

abstinence from alcohol and nonprescribed

drugs. The participant’s driving privileges

are placed on probationary status for five

years by the department of motor vehicle

licensing ... The court may also appoint the

probation department to supervise the

petitioner, making contact ‘at least once

every six months.’ ....

If a petitioner who has been accepted for

deferred prosecution fails to fulfill any

term or condition of his treatment plan, the

overseeing facility must immediately report

the breach to the court ... The court must

then hold a hearing to determine whether the

petitioner should be removed from the

deferred prosecution program ... If the court

revokes the petitioner’s deferred

prosecution, ‘the court shall enter judgment

pursuant to RCW 10.05.020.’ ... That section

provides that the petitioner’s statement

waiving rights and stipulating to facts ‘will

be entered and used to support a finding of

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guilty.’ ....

The Washington statute envisions an extremely

abbreviated process for the bench trial,

because almost every possible defense usually

open to a defendant is foreclosed. The

official form to be used by petitioners

contains the following description:

‘Petitioner understands there will not be a

trial; the Judge will simply read the police

report to determine guilt or innocence of

Petitioner.’ 

...

The Supreme Court of Washington has

determined that the deferred prosecution

scheme at issue is ‘a form of sentencing.’

... Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme

Court of Washington views the deferred

prosecution program as a form of punishment.

The government argues that the deferred

prosecution scheme cannot be characterized as

punishment because it precedes, rather than

follows, the usual prerequisites to

punishment: plea, acceptance of plea, trial,

and conviction. However, the deferred

acceptance (of plea) scheme found to be

‘punishment’ in Bosser also effectively

postponed the acceptance of plea and

conviction stages. It also obviated the need

for a trial. The only difference between

Washington and Hawaii’s programs is that in

Hawaii, petitioners must formally lodge

guilty pleas. In Washington, they need not

do so. However, Washington petitioners must

waive all essential rights, stipulate to all

facts necessary to ensure their conviction,

and disclaim their innocence. Thus, the

difference between the two programs is a

formality: Washington’s deferred prosecution

scheme is functionally equivalent to Hawaii’s

deferred acceptance scheme.

Further, like the Hawaii legislature in

Bosser, the Washington state legislature

appears to have intended to defer (and in

successful cases, entirely avoid) much of the

formal procedure. The granting of deferred

prosecution is conditioned upon the

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petitioner enabling the state to develop and

preserve all the evidence necessary to ensure

a swift verdict of guilty in a summary

proceeding should the petitioner stray from

the substance abuse program. As with the

Hawaii law, the petitioner in Washington

state places his head on the block, where it

remains for the probationary period.

135 F.3d at 681-683. 

In DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th

Cir.2007), the plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal

of his Section 1983 action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey. In the

underlying criminal proceeding, the plaintiff was charged with

aggravated assault of a police officer, pleaded guilty, and

received a deferred adjudication. The Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure, art. 42.01, § 1, provided:

[W]hen in the judge’s opinion the best

interest of society and the defendant will be

served, the judge may, after receiving a plea

of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere,

hearing the evidence, and finding that it

substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer

further proceedings without entering an

adjudication of guilt, and place the

defendant on community service.

The district court ruled that plaintiff’s deferred adjudication

barred his section 1983 claims pursuant to Heck because he had

admitted his guilty to aggravated assault in a judicial

confession. The Fifth Circuit addressed “whether a deferred

adjudication in Texas is a ‘sentence or conviction’ for the

purposes of Heck. Id. at 652-653. In pertinent part, the Fifth

Circuit ruled:

A second argument remains, resting on a

different characterization of an order

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deferring adjudication, viewing it as a final

judicial act, not as one state in an ongoing

criminal proceeding. And while unknown at

common law in 1871, it is fairly viewed as

akin to judgments of conviction. Deferred

adjudication was not intended as a radical

departure, rather, the Texas legislature

enacted these procedures with ‘the purpose

... to remove from existing statutes the

limitations ... that have acted as barriers

to effective systems of community supervision

in the public interest.’ And although the

Texas courts have in all circumstances held

that these orders are not convictions, they

have been accorded finality, for instance in

the appellate context, where the defendant is

released on bail pending the disposition of

his appeal of a deferred adjudication order,

which does not become final until the

appellate court’s mandate issues. Likewise,

although there is no finding of guilt, there

is at least a judicial finding that the

evidence substantiates the defendant’s guilt,

followed by conditions of probation that may

include a fine and incarceration. We

conclude that a deferred adjudication order

is a conviction for the purposes of Heck’s

favorable termination rule. This case does

not require that we decide whether a

successfully completed deferred adjudication,

with its more limited collateral consequences

under Texas law, is also a conviction for the

purposes of Heck, and we do not decide that

question.

Id. at 655-656.

A case cited by Defendants in order to distinguish it is

McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11 Cir.2007). In McClish, a th

plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action arising out of his

arrest. The Eleventh Circuit ruled:

Holmberg’s § 1983 claim arose out of his

arrest for allegedly interfering with the

ongoing arrest of McClish by Deputies Terry

and Calderone. The deputies arrested

Holmberg for ‘resisting arrest without

violence,’ ... and the charge was eventually

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dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

Florida’s pretrial intervention program, see

Fla. Stat. § 834.02. The district court

determined that Heck barred Holmberg from

bringing a § 1983 claim because of his

participation in PTI. Although we have never

determined that participation in PTI barred a

subsequent § 1983 claim, the district court

cited to Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit

cases holding that a defendant’s

participation in PTI barred subsequent § 1983

claims ... (citing Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d

197 (3 Cir.2005); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d rd

453 (5 Cir.1994); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 th

F.2d 850 (2 Cir.1992). The district court nd

concluded that ‘Holmberg’s participation in

PTI, which resulted in a dismissal of the

charge of resisting arrest without violence,

is not a termination in his favor, and,

therefore, he is barred from bringing a §

1983 claim for false arrest.’ We disagree.

Heck is inapposite. The issue is not, as the

district court saw it, whether Holmberg’s

participation in PTI amounted to a favorable

termination on the merits. Instead, the

question is an antecedent one - whether Heck

applies at all since Holmberg was never

convicted of any crime. The primary category

of cases barred by Heck - suits seeking

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment - is plainly

inapplicable. Instead, the district court

based its Heck ruling on the second, indirect

category of cases barred by Heck: suits to

recover damages ‘for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid.’ ... The

problem with using this second Heck category

to bar Holmberg’s § 1983 suit is definitional

- to prevail in his § 1983 suit, Holmberg

would not have to ‘negate an element of the

offense of which he has been convicted,’

because he was never convicted of any

offense.

Id. at 1251. 

In Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091 (10 Cir.2009), th

the plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action alleging that, in two

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separate incidents, Kansas law enforcement authorities falsely

arrested him for driving under the influence and disorderly

conduct and forged plaintiff’s signature on a pre-trial diversion

agreement. The District Court dismissed the action pursuant to

the “favorable termination” rule of Heck. The Tenth Circuit

reversed:

... Contrary to the district court’s

conclusion, under Kansas law a ‘[d]iversion

is ... a means to avoid a judgment of

criminal guilt,’ the opposite of a

conviction.

Here, there is no related underlying

conviction that could be invalidated by Mr.

Vasquez’s § 1983 actions. The diversion

agreements resulted in deferral of

prosecution of the offenses at issue. As a

consequence, under Kansas law there are no

‘outstanding ‘judgments,’ or ‘convictions or

sentences’ against Mr. Vasquez either for

driving under the influence and

transportation of open containers of alcohol,

or for disorderly conduct and battery - the

charges from which his § 1983 claims stem. 

Courts disagree as to whether the Heck bar

applies to pre-trial diversion programs

similar to diversion agreements ... In our

judgment, holding that the Heck bar applies

to pre-trial diversions misses the mark. 

The Supreme Court in Wallace made clear that

the Heck bar comes into play only when there

is an actual conviction, not an anticipated

one. 549 U.S. at 393 ... The Court explained

why this is so:

What petitioner seeks ... is the

adoption of a principle that goes

well beyond Heck: that an action

which would impugn an anticipated

future conviction cannot be brought

until that conviction occurs and is

set aside. The impracticality of

such a rule should be obvious. In

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an action for false arrest it would

require the plaintiff (and if he

brings suit promptly, the court) to

speculate about whether a

prosecution will be brought,

whether it will result in

conviction, and whether the pending

civil action will impugn that

verdict ... all this at a time when

it can hardly be known what

evidence the prosecution has in its

possession. And what if the

plaintiff (or the court) guesses

wrong, and the anticipated future

conviction never occurs, because of

acquittal or dismissal? We are not

disposed to embrace this bizarre

extension of Heck.

Id.; see also Butler, 482 F.3d at 1279 (‘The

starting point for the application of Heck

... is the existence of an underlying

conviction or sentence that is tied to the

conduct alleged in the § 1983 action. In

other words, a § 1983 action implicates Heck

only as it relates to the conviction that it

would be directly invalidating.’). There is

no such conviction here.

589 F.3d at 1095-1096.

Plaintiff responds that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar his §

1983 claim and the cases relied upon by Defendants are

inapplicable:

Once discovery is completed, depositions will

show that plaintiff refused to plead guilty

to any crime and stated in effect that he did

not care what the District Attorney did (in

his underlying case), but he was not guilty

of anything. The District Attorney for

reasons yet to be determined deferred

plaintiff’s case for one year. The only

condition was that plaintiff could not go

within 100 yards of 609 Fleming Road. The

condition was not an alternative punishment. 

Plaintiff did not care that the District

Attorney stated he could not goto 609 Fleming

Road. This address is the address where Mr.

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Medeiros mistakenly went in his attempt to

locate another residence. This is the

residence where the defendants maliciously

alleged plaintiff committed a residential

burglary. 609 Fleming Road is located down a

private road on a private ranch in the

country. Evidence will show that Mr.

Medeiros had no intention of ever going to

609 Fleming Road before the deferred judgment

was entered and has no reason to go there

after the deferred judgment. The 609 Fleming

Road address is a fenced in property and

plaintiff may be trespassing if he went to

Fleming Road.

Defendants reply that whether or not Plaintiff pled guilty

is irrelevant because Plaintiff stipulated to a restraining order

for a full year as a deferred prosecution. 

The Ninth Circuit decisions upon which Defendants rely do

not address the application of Heck v. Humphrey and do not

control resolution of this issue. 

In Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9 Cir.2002), cert. th

denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004), the plaintiff brought a Section

1983 action challenging the revocation of good time credits and

the imposition of administrative segregation following a prison

disciplinary proceeding. The District Court dismissed the case

based on Heck. By the time the appeal was heard, the plaintiff

had been released from prison and was on parole. The Ninth

Circuit noted that as a result of his release, any federal habeas

challenge to the disciplinary proceedings would be dismissed as

moot, as plaintiff had “fully served the period of incarceration

that he is attacking.” Id. at 875-876. Although a prisoner who

has completed a sentence and seeks to challenge his or her

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conviction in habeas may do so because of the “collateral

consequences that survive [the prisoner’s release],” habeas is

not available to former prisoners who attack a deprivation of

good time credits because such former prisoners who challenge a

term of incarceration for a parole violation have no collateral

consequences stemming from the challenged action. Id., citing

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1998). The Ninth Circuit

then inquired whether the unavailability of a remedy in habeas

corpus because of mootness permitted the plaintiff to maintain a

Section 1983 action for damages, even though success in that

action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary

proceedings that caused revocation of the good-time credits. Id.

at 876. “Informed as we are by the opinions in Spencer, we

conclude that Heck does not preclude Nonnette’s § 1983 action.” 

Id. at 877. In Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704-705 (9th

Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit ruled emphasized that where habeas

relief is not available through no fault of the plaintiff, Heck

does not bar a Section 1983 action. 

Here, because Plaintiff was never convicted of any crime, he

could not challenge the misdemeanor pretrial diversion through

appeal or habeas corpus. Plaintiff was never incarcerated and

suffers no collateral consequences as a result of the misdemeanor

pretrial diversion. See Nickerson v. Portland Police Bureau,

2008 WL 4449874 at *8 (D.Or., Sept. 30, 2008): “With no habeas

remedy available, and no allegations of any collateral

consequences stemming from a traffic conviction, Heck does not

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bar plaintiff’s section 1983 equal protection claim.”); see also

Cole v. Doe I Thru 2 Officers of the City of Emeryville Police

Dep’t., 387 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1092-1093 (N.D.Cal.2005).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action as

barred by Heck is DENIED.1

D. PROBABLE CAUSE.

Defendants move to dismiss all three causes of action on the

ground that probable cause to arrest is demonstrated by the

allegations of the Complaint and the FAC.

“‘Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have

knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to

lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense

has been or is being committed by the person arrested.’” Rodis v.

City and County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th

Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1050 (2010).

At the hearing, Defendants referred to California Penal Code

To the extent that Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on 1

Heck is directed to the state law causes of action, by its terms,

Heck v. Humphrey applies to a Section 1983 action. See Nuno v.

County of San Bernardino, 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1130 n.3

(C.D.Cal.1999):

Defendants similarly fail to address the state

claims pled in the third cause of action of

the FAC. Heck is a rule of federal law that,

absent its adoption by the California courts,

has no application to these state law claims. 

Nonetheless, the Court concludes that, if the

federal civil rights causes of action must be

dismissed, it will decline to exercise its

discretion to retain the state law causes of

action. 

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§ 602(m):2

Except as provided in paragraph (2) of

subdivision (v), subdivision (x), and Section

602.8, every person who willfully commits a

trespass by any of the following acts is

guilty of a misdemeanor:

...

(m) Entering and occupying real property or

structures of any kind without the consent of

the owner, the owner’s agent, or the person

in lawful possession.

California Penal Code § 7 provides:

The following words have in this code the

signification attached to them in this

section, unless otherwise apparent from the

context:

1. The word ‘wilfully,’ when applied to the

intent with which an act is done or omitted,

implies simply a purpose or willingness to

commit the act, or make the omission referred

to. It does not require any intent to

violate law, or to injure another, or to

acquire any advantage. 

A violation of Section 602(m) requires occupation of the

property, “‘a nontransient, continuous type of possession.’” In

California Penal Code § 602.8(a) provides: 2

Any person who without the written permission

of the landowner, the owner’s agent, or the

person in lawful possession of the land,

wilfully enters any lands under cultivation or

enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied

by, another, or who willfully enters upon

uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs

forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals

not less than three to the mile along all

exterior boundaries and at all roads and

trails entering the land, is guilty of a

public offense.

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re Catalano, 29 Cal.3d 1, 10 n. 8 (1981), citing People v.

Wilkinson, 248 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 910 (1967); see also Edgerly

v. City and County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th

Cir.2010):

The Officers cited Edgerly for violating

California Penal Code section 602(l), now

section 602(m). Under this section, a person

commits a trespass if he or she ‘wilfully ...

[e]nter[s] and occup[ies] real property or

structures of any kind without the consent of

the owner.’ Long before Edgerly’s arrest,

however, the California Supreme Court had

clearly held that section 602(l) ‘requires

occupation of the property, a “nontransient,

continuous type of possession.”’ In re

Catalano ... As Wilkinson explained, section

602(l) requires the specific ‘inten[t] to

remain permanently, or until ousted.’ ...;

see also Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 16.340

(6 ed.1996)(requiring, for a conviction th

under section 602(l), proof that the

defendant ‘entered and occupied the property

with the specific intent to dispossess those

lawfully entitled to possession’). Here, the

Officers knew only that Edgerly was not a

resident of the Cooperative and that he had

been on the property for a matter of minutes. 

On the basis of these facts, a reasonable

officer would not have believed that Edgerly

had violated or was about to violate section

602(l). 

Defendants refer to allegations in Plaintiff’s initial

complaint where he admits he was on the property without

permission:

• Plaintiff drove into the driveway and at

the bottom of the driveway looked around for

some sign of construction equipment since he

figured that if Sonny Rose here there would

be some type of construction equipment

present. Plaintiff did not see anything that

looked like a person in the construction

business lived there and knew he must be in

the wrong residence. [2:18-22]

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• The man on the dirt bike wanted to know if

plaintiff has just been in his driveway and

what was he doing there. (A few days later

plaintiff found out that the man on the dirt

bike did not live there but that his motherin-law lives there and she was not home at

the time. Plaintiff told the man on the dirt

bike that he had made a mistake by going to

his house and the man left. [3:13-17].

• Defendant Sheriff Deputy Eric Macias asked

what plaintiff was doing on the Cohen

property and plaintiff again repeated he was

looking for Sonny Rose’s house and that he

had gone to the wrong residence. After a few

minutes, defendant ... Macias got a call on

his car radio and said that he was placing me

under arrest for trespassing ... [¶]

Plaintiff told ... Macias that if turning

around in a driveway constituted trespassing,

plaintiff guesses he was trespassing. [5:13-

17, 20-21].

Defendants also refer to the allegations in the initial Complaint

that Plaintiff’s footprints were found in the tack room and

Plaintiff’s tire tracks were all around the dirt on the property:

• Defendant ... Macias and defendant ...

Clark approached plaintiff and said they

wanted to take one of his moccasins to

compare it to the tracks in the tack room

[5:7-9]

• He asked plaintiff to show him the bottom

of his shoes. Plaintiff did as he was asked

and ... Macias appeared excited and said he

knew plaintiff had done it because those were

the tracks all around the tack room. [7:6-8].

• ... Macias told plaintiff there were tire

tracks from plaintiff’s Ranger all around the

dirt on the Cohen property. [7:12-13].

Defendants refer to the allegations in the FAC that “Deputy Clark

told plaintiff that his son, Scott Clark, saw plaintiff walk to

and from the tack room and carry something out.” 

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As explained in Team Enterprises, LLP v. Western Inv. Real

Estate Trust, 2009 WL 1451635 at *4 (E.D.Cal., May 20, 2009):

Statements in a pleading may be party

admission. See Andrews v. Metro North

Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2nd

Cir.1989) (a prior pleading may be admissible

in evidence against the pleader as an

admission or prior inconsistent statement). 

However, the factual representations may be

explained. Contractor Util. Sales Co., Inc.

v. Certainteed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061,

1084 (7 Cir.1981); Intergen N.V. v. Grina,

th

344 F.3d 134, 144 (1 Cir.2003)(information st

may be learned through discovery. 

Accordingly, whether the Team Enterprises,

Inc. was converted to the Team Enterprise,

LLC will be subject to proof. The motion to

dismiss on this point is denied.

It is highly doubtful that the allegations in the initial

Complaint constitute admissions; the allegations purport to

recite what the Defendants told Plaintiff, all of which Plaintiff

denies is true. Accepted as true, these allegations do not

appear to provide probable cause to arrest for trespassing in

violation of Penal Code § 602(m). Although Plaintiff admits he

was on the property and he did not have permission to enter, the

allegations in the FAC do not infer that Plaintiff entered the

property to occupy it. The officers allegedly found footprints

and tire tracks on the property that matched Plaintiff’s shoes

and tires, and Defendant Clark’s son told Defendant Clark that he

had seen Plaintiff go into the tack room and carry something out. 

The fact that Plaintiff denies he went into the tack room or even

got out of his car does not negate probable cause unless

Plaintiff can establish that Defendants made up everything,

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including the report by Defendant Clark’s son. Defendants’

motion to dismiss on the ground that probable cause exists on the

face of the FAC is DENIED. Factual issues that can be resolved

only by summary judgment or trial exist. 

E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of Action on the

ground of qualified immunity from liability for damages under

Section 1983.

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Pearson v. Callahan,

___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), the Supreme Court summarized

the purpose of qualified immunity:

Qualified immunity balances two important

interests-the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties

reasonably. The protection of qualified

immunity applies regardless of whether the

government official's error is “a mistake of

law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on

mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v.

Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting that qualified

immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment,

whether the mistake is one of fact or one of

law”)).

Because qualified immunity is “an immunity

from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability ... it is effectively lost if a

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case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

526 (1985) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, we

have made clear that the “driving force”

behind creation of the qualified immunity

doctrine was a desire to ensure that

“‘insubstantial claims’ against government

officials [will] be resolved prior to

discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640, n. 2 (1987). Accordingly, “we

repeatedly have stressed the importance of

resolving immunity questions at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per

curiam).

Deciding qualified immunity normally entails a two-step analysis.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officers’ conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). If the court determines that the conduct did not violate

a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. However, if the court determines

that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, Saucier’s

second prong requires the court to determine whether, at the time

of the violation, the constitutional right was “clearly

established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. This

inquiry is wholly objective and is undertaken in light of the

totality of the specific factual circumstances of each case. Id.

at 201. Even if the violated right is clearly established,

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Saucier recognized that, in certain situations, it may be

difficult for a police officer to determine how to apply the

relevant legal doctrine to the particular circumstances he faces. 

If an officer makes a mistake in applying the relevant legal

doctrine, he is not precluded from claiming qualified immunity so

long as the mistake is reasonable. If “the officer’s mistake as

to what the law requires is reasonable, ... the officer is

entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205. In Pearson, the

Supreme Court ruled that “while the sequence set forth [in

Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as

mandatory.” Pearson, id. at 818. “The judges of the district

courts and the courts of appeal should be permitted to exercise

their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. In

Brosseau v. Haugan, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), the Supreme Court

reiterated:

Qualified immunity shields an officer from

suit when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S., at 206 (qualified immunity

operates ‘to protect officers from the

sometimes “hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force”’). Because the focus is on

whether the officer had fair notice that her

conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is

judged against the backdrop of the law at the

time of the conduct. If the law at that time

did not clearly establish that the officer’s

conduct would violate the Constitution, the

officer should not be subject to liability

or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.

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It is important to emphasize that this

inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’ Id., at 201. As we

previously said in this very context:

‘[T]here is no doubt that Graham v.

Connor, supra, clearly establishes

the general proposition that use of

force is contrary to the Fourth

Amendment if it is excessive under

objective standards of

reasonableness. Yet, that is not

enough. Rather, we emphasized in

Anderson [v. Creighton] “that the

right the official is alleged to

have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more

particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of

the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable officer

would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.’ ... 

The relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he

confronted.’ ... 

The Court of Appeals acknowledged this

statement of law, but then proceeded to find

fair warning in the general tests set out in

Graham and Garner ... In so doing, it was

mistaken. Graham and Garner, following the

lead of the Fourth Amendment’s text, are cast

at a high level of generality. See Graham v.

Connor, supra, at 396 (‘”[T]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is

not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application”’). Of course, in an

obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly

establish’ the answer, even without a body of

relevant case law.’

543 U.S. at 198-199. However, as explained in Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied sub nom. th

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Scarrot v. Wilkins, 543 U.S. 811 (2004):

Where the officers’ entitlement to qualified

immunity depends on the resolution of

disputed issues of fact in their favor, and

against the non-moving party, summary

judgment is not appropriate. See Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 ... (Ginsberg, J.,

concurring)(‘Of course, if an excessive force

claim turns on which of two conflicting

stories best captures what happened on the

street, Graham will not permit summary

judgment in favor of the defendant 

official.’). 

Probable cause to arrest exists if, “under the totality of

the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent

person would have concluded that there was a fair probability

that [the plaintiff] had committed a crime. Beier v. City of

Lewiston, 354 F.2d 1058, 1065 (9 Cir.2004). The proper inquiry th

where an officer is claiming qualified immunity for a false

arrest claim is “whether a reasonable officer could have believed

that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Franklin

v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 (9 Cir.2002). Qualified immunity th

does not depend on whether probable cause actually existed.

Defendants argue that the allegations in the initial

Complaint and the FAC demonstrate their entitlement to qualified

immunity. Defendants contend that they were not required to

perform a final investigation proving guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt and that, even if there assessment of the facts was

incorrect, those facts nonetheless established probable cause

that Plaintiff had trespassed on property and taken something

from the tack room on that property.

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Plaintiff responds that, because a violation of California

Penal Code § 459 carries a mandatory four year prison term,

reasonable officers would have conducted a thorough investigation

into the facts of the case. Plaintiff further asserts, upon

information and belief, that discovery will show:

1. Deputy Clark knowingly used his son,

Scott Clark, either by alleging his son

stated he saw plaintiff enter the tack room

and leave the tack room carrying something

when his son did not so state, or by having

his son actually lie by stating that his son

told him he saw plaintiff walk to the tack

room and carry something out of the tack

room.

2. Initially Deputy Clark stated he found

tennis shoe prints in the tack room

(allegedly broken into by plaintiff and this

is stated in the police report) and accused

plaintiff of changing into moccasins when

plaintiff went to his house to call police. 

Defendants moving papers state there were

moccasins in the tack room.

3. Plaintiff informed both Deputy Clark and

Deputy Macias that his moccasin footprints

would be at the Sonny Rose property because

he walked around the goat heads. Both

deputies refused to investigate to see if

there were moccasin prints at the Sonny Rose

residence.

4. Deputy Macias had plaintiff give one of

his moccasins to Deputy Clark who left to go

to the tack room.

In defendant’s [sic] moving papers defendant

states moccasin tracks were found in the tack

room. Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges

on information and belief that if these

moccasin tracts [sic] were there, they were

put there by defendant officers.

5. Defendants did not contact witness Melvin

Bettancourt to verify the reason plaintiff

gave for mistakenly driving into the 609

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Fleming Road address (to go to the Sonny Rose

residence to get the phone number for

Melvin). Defendants intentionally and

maliciously did not contact Cheryl Luman who

was at the Rose residence to verify why

plaintiff was at the Rose residence and to

verify plaintiff was wearing moccasins.

6. Defendants did not contact Mrs. Cohen

(assuming this is her name) who owns the

residence at 609 Fleming Road to determine if

her home or tack room had been broken into or

if anything was missing from either her tack

room or her home. If a reasonable

investigation was made, defendants would have

found that nothing was missing from the tack

room or home and that there was no break-in

of either the tack room or residence. 

Defendants would have found that plaintiff’s

explanation was true and that he committed no

crime.

7. Deputy Clark (when he first saw plaintiff

at the Sonny Rose residence) looked into

plaintiff’s small open Cushman and knew that

there was no items from the tack room or the

residence at 609 Fleming Road in his Cushman. 

Plaintiff was wearing a tank top and shorts

at the time of the alleged break-in. Deputy

Clark had personal knowledge that plaintiff

had nothing from the tack room or residence

in his personal possession.

8. Deputy Clark and Deputy Macias had an

agreement and/or understanding to arrest

plaintiff without probable cause and to

wilfully fail to investigate, wilfully

fabricate evidence, and manufacture probable

cause and conspired to maliciously prosecute

plaintiff ....

Citing Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1004-1007 (6th

Cir. 1999), Plaintiff contends that law enforcement officers are

not entitled to qualified immunity for non-testimonial acts,

i.e., allegations that they wrongfully investigated, prosecuted,

fabricated evidence, manufactured probable cause, and conspired

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to maliciously prosecute.

In Spurlock, plaintiffs, whose convictions on reprosecution

for murder were subsequently vacated, sued the deputy sheriff and

other defendants for civil rights violations under Sections 1981,

1983 and 1988, and for malicious prosecution. On appeal, the

Sixth Circuit rejected Defendant Satterfield’s assertion that he

was entitled to qualified immunity from liability because none of

the alleged acts, standing alone, caused constitutional injuries,

and that, in any event, these acts did not violate clearly

established constitutional rights. The Sixth Circuit held:

We conclude that, here, plaintiffs

sufficiently raised claims that allege

violations of their constitutional and/or

statutory rights. Namely, that Satterfield

and other defendants wrongfully investigated,

prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated them;

that Satterfield fabricated evidence and

manufactured probable cause; that they were

held in custody, despite a lack of probable

cause to do so; and that Satterfield and

others conspired to maliciously prosecute and

convict them ... Satterfield cannot seriously

contend that a reasonable police officer

would not know that such actions were

inappropriate and performed in violation of

an individual’s constitutional and/or

statutory rights. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83

... (State has duty to disclose exculpatory

evidence); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216

... (1942)(knowing use of false testimony to

obtain conviction violates Fourteenth

Amendment); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,

112-13 ... (1935)(same); Albright, 510 U.S.

at 274 ... (malicious prosecution of an

individual and continued detention of an

individual without probable cause clearly

violate rights afforded by the Fourth

Amendment).

Finding that plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged violations of their constitutional

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rights, we next decide whether these

constitutional rights were clearly

established at the time in question. In so

determining, we may rely on decisions of the

Supreme Court, decisions of this court, and

in limited instances, on decisions of other

circuits ... To be clearly established,

‘[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer

would understand what he is doing violates

that right.’ .... 

This court, in Smith v. Williams ... found

that the right to be free from malicious

prosecution was a right clearly established

under the Fourth Amendment ....

Further, the requirement of probable cause is

one of the cornerstones of Fourth Amendment

protection ... Thus, a reasonable police

officer would know that fabricating probable

cause, thereby effectuating a seizure, would

violate a suspect’s clearly established

Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable seizures ... Similarly, a

reasonable police officer would be on notice

that unlawfully detaining a suspect, despite

the fact that the evidence used to detain

that individual was fabricated, would also be

unlawful. We also find unpersuasive

Satterfield’s argument that the act was not

completed, and thus no injury occurred, until

the false testimony was given at trial. The

injuries alleged here occurred much earlier

than that point - indeed, at the very point

at which Spurlock and Marshall continued to

be detained, despite the lack of probable

cause for such detention. Thus, Satterfield

is not entitled to qualified immunity for

these alleged acts, because they violated the

plaintiffs’ clearly established

constitutional rights.

Id. at 1005-1007. See also Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031

(9 Cir.1985)(“[I]f an arrest is made in bad faith, there may be th

a cause of action under § 1983 as an illegal, unconstitutional

arrest”).

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Defendants reply that Plaintiff merely repeats the

allegations of the FAC and further contend that Spurlock is

distinguishable because Plaintiff concedes that his cause of

action for malicious prosecution is barred by California

Government Code § 821.6.

Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Spurlock is without

merit. Although Plaintiff concedes dismissal of the Second Cause

of Action for malicious prosecution under state law, the First

Cause of Action for violation of Section 1983 also alleges

malicious prosecution.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of qualified

immunity is DENIED. As noted above, it is arguable that

Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

trespassing in violation of Penal Code § 602(m) and that

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Edgerly,

supra, 599 F.3d at 954. The facts underlying Plaintiff’s arrest

for burglary are disputed. Given Plaintiff’s allegations that

Defendants fabricated probable cause for the burglary and

manufactured evidence, dismissal of the First Cause of Action on

the basis of qualified immunity from liability is inappropriate

at this juncture.

F. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for

false imprisonment on two grounds.

Defendants cite Harris v. Business, Transp. and Housing

Agency, 2007 WL 1574553 at *8 (N.D.Cal., May 30, 2007):

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A claim for false imprisonment does not

ordinarily state an independent claim under §

1983 absent a cognizable claim for wrongful

arrest. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

142-45 ... (1979).

Asserting that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for false arrest,

Defendants contend that the Third Cause of Action fails to state

a claim.

First of all, the Third Cause of Action is predicated on

state law, not Section 1983. Secondly, the allegations of the

FAC allege that Plaintiff’s arrest was not supported by probable

cause but, rather, was based on fabricated facts.

Defendants further move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action

on the ground that Defendants are entitled to immunity from

liability under state law.

Defendants cite California Government Code § 820.2:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public employee is not liable for an injury

resulting from his act or omission whether

the act or omission was the result of the

exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion was abused.

There is fairly recent California Supreme Court authority

discussing immunity under Section 820.2 for discretionary acts,

which is not cited by Defendants. In Caldwell v. Montoya, 10

Cal.4th 972 (1995), the California Supreme Court, citing Johnson

v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 (1968), ruled:

... Johnson concluded, a ‘workable

definition’ of immune discretionary acts

draws the line between ‘planning’ and

‘operational’ functions of government. 

(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 793, 794.) 

Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy

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decisions [which have] ... been [expressly]

committed to coordinate branches of

government,’ and as to which judicial

interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ (Id.

at p. 793 ....) Such ‘areas of quasilegislative policy-making ... are

sufficiently sensitive’ (id. at p. 794) to

call for judicial abstention from

interference that ‘might even in the first

instance affect the coordinate body’s

decision-making process’ (id. at p. 793).

On the other hand, said Johnson, there is no

basis for immunizing lower-level, or

‘ministerial,’ decisions that merely

implement a basic policy already formulated. 

(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 796.) 

Moreover, we cautioned, immunity applies only

to deliberate and considered policy

decisions, in which a ‘[conscious] balancing

[of] risks and advantages ... took place. 

The fact that an employee normally engages in

“discretionary activity” is irrelevant if, in

a given case, the employee did not render a

considered decision ....’ (Id. at p. 795, fn.

8).

Recognizing that ‘it is not a tort for

government to govern’ ..., our subsequent

cases have carefully preserved the

distinction between policy and operational

judgments. Thus, we have rejected claims of

immunity for a bus driver’s decision not to

intervene in one passenger’s violent assault

against another ..., a college district’s

failure to warn of known crime dangers in a

student parking lot ..., a county clerk’s

libelous statements during a newspaper

interview about official matters ...,

university therapists’ failure to warn a

patient’s homicide victim of the patient’s

prior threats to kill her ..., and a police

officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic

investigation once undertaken ....

On the other hand, we have concluded that the

discretionary act statute does immunize

officials and agencies against claims that

they unreasonably delayed regulations under

which a murdered security guard might have

qualified himself to carry a defensive

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firearm ... or negligently released a violent

juvenile offender into his mother’s custody.

10 Cal.4th at 981-982. See also Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal.4th 675

(2000). In Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033,

1051 (2007), the Court of Appeals held:

The decision to arrest Gillan was not a basic

policy decision, but only an operational

decision by the police purporting to apply

the law. The immunity provided by Government

Code § 820.2 therefore does not apply.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of Section 820.2

immunity is DENIED.

Defendants cite California Government Code § 821.6:

A public employee is not liable for injury

caused by his instituting or prosecuting any

judicial or administrative proceeding within

the scope of his employment, even if he acts

maliciously and without probable cause. 

Plaintiff responds by citing California Government Code §

820.4:

A public employee is not liable for his act

or admission exercising due care in the

enforcement of the law. Nothing in this

section exonerates a public employee from

liability for false arrest or imprisonment. 

As explained in Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th

744, 751 (1997):

Under California law, a police officer may be

held liable for false arrest and false

imprisonment, but not for malicious

prosecution. (§§ 820.4, 821.6). 

Here, because Plaintiff concedes dismissal of the Second Cause of

Action for malicious prosecution because of Section 821.6,

Defendants’ reliance on Section 821.6 is moot and the motion to

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dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

Defendants also cite Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal.4th

501, 207 P.3d 506 (2009), asserting that “the California Supreme

Court made it clear that under California law, a law enforcement

officer’s decision to effectuate a lawful arrest is not

actionable in tort.” 

In Hernandez, family members of a decedent brought a

negligence action against city police officers and the city,

after decedent was shot and killed by officers while fleeing

arrest. The California Supreme Court granted review to consider:

When a federal court enters judgment in favor

of the defendants in a civil rights claim

brought under 42 United States Code section

1983 ..., in which the plaintiffs seek

damages for police use of deadly and

constitutionally excessive force in pursuing

a suspect, and the court then dismisses a

supplemental state law wrongful death claim

arising out of the same incident, what, if

any, preclusive effect does the judgment have

in a subsequent state court wrongful death

action? Based on principles of issue

preclusion (collateral estoppel), the Court

of Appeal held in this case that the federal

judgment precludes plaintiffs from recovering

on the theory that the police officers failed

to exercise reasonable care in using deadly

force, but does not preclude plaintiffs from

recovering on the theory that the officers

failed to exercise reasonable care in

creating, through their preshooting conduct,

a situation in which it was reasonable for

them to use deadly force ... As explained

below, we hold that on the record and

conceded facts here, the federal judgment

collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing

their wrongful death claim, even on the

theory that the officers’ preshooting conduct

was negligent.

207 P.3d at 510. In the course of so holding, the California

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Supreme Court stated:

[W]e agree with defendants that, in light of

the finding that the shooting was reasonable,

liability in this case may not be based on

the officers’ alleged preshooting negligence. 

The starting point for our conclusion is the

validity of the initial detention. Based on

the conceded fact that the Thunderbird was

being illegally operated at night without

lights ..., Officer Cooper was legally

justified in attempting to detain both of the

car’s occupants and asking them to exit the

vehicle ... When Hernandez, in response to

Cooper’s request that he exit the car, moved

into the driver’s seat and drove off with the

headlights unilluminated, Cooper had

reasonable cause to believe Hernandez had

committed two public offenses: (1) driving

during darkness without lighted headlamps ...

(2) and wilfully resisting, delaying, or

obstructing a peace officer ‘in the discharge

or attempt to discharge any duty of his or

her office.’ ....

Because Cooper had probable cause to arrest

Hernandez, under both statutes and case law,

Cooper was not obliged simply to let

Hernandez go. Long ago, we explained that an

officer with probable cause to make an arrest

‘” is not bound to put off the arrest until a

more favorable time”’ and is ‘under no

obligation to retire in order to avoid a

conflict.’ ... Instead, an officer may ‘press

forward and make the arrest, using all the

force [reasonably] necessary to accomplish

that purpose.’ ... Consistent with these

principles, Penal Code section 835a provides

that a peace officer with reasonable cause to

make an arrest ‘may use reasonable force to

effect the arrest’ and ‘need not retreat or

desist from his efforts [to make an arrest]

by reason of the resistance or threatened

resistance of the person being arrested.’ 

Thus, California law expressly authorized

Cooper to pursue Hernandez and to use

reasonable force to make an arrest.

Id. at 518-519.

Defendants assert:

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Here, like in Hernandez, defendants were not

only expressly authorized to arrest the

plaintiff, but had a duty to the community to

carry out their obligation to promote lawabiding, orderly conduct, including, where

necessary, detaining and arresting suspected

perpetrators of offenses. Here, the

plaintiff was a suspected perpetrator of an

offense. As such, the decision to effectuate

the arrest is not actionable.

Assuming that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff,

Defendants are correct that they cannot be liable in tort for

that arrest (except for perhaps excessive force). However,

Hernandez addressed an issue and factual circumstances far

different from those involved in this action.

In Defendants’ reply brief, Defendants assert that Plaintiff

did not respond to their assertion of statutory immunities for

state law causes of action. This is simply not correct;

Plaintiff did respond. Defendants also assert:

‘It is well-established that issues adverted

to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by

some effort at developed argumentation, are

deemed waived.’ (Dillery v. City of

Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 569 (6 Cir.2005).) th

‘ ... the [sic] argument must contain the

contentions of the appellant on the issues

presented, and the reasons therefor, with

citations to the authorities, statutes, and

parts of the record relied on.’ (United

States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1544 (9th

Cir.1995). As plaintiff has not address the

above issue, he has waived any opposition to

it. 

Plaintiff’s response to this aspect of the motion to dismiss

complied with these requirements, even assuming they apply to a

response to a motion to dismiss in the district court.

 CONCLUSION 

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For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

The Second Cause of Action for malicious prosecution is DISMISSED

as barred by California Government Code § 821.6.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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