Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02397/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN JAMES ALLEN WOODALL, Civil No. 13cv2397-DMS (BGS)

Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR A WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; and,

(2) DISMISSING PETITION AS MOOT

vs.

WILLIAM GORE, Sheriff of San Diego

County, and KAMALA HARRIS, Attorney

General of the State of California,

Respondents.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Dana M.

Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Shawn James Allen Woodall (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro

se with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging an April 17, 2012, probation revocation. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner

alleges here, as he did in state court, that California Penal Code section 1203.2, the statute which

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governs probation revocation proceedings, is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied,

because it violates: (1) the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution by permitting a warrant to be issued for a probationer’s arrest which is not required

to be supported by statements made under oath or affirmation; (2) the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it does not require a

preliminary probable cause hearing before revocation; and (3) the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it allows revocation without

notice of the allegations or a record of the evidence. (Pet. at 6-18. ) 1

On January 8, 2014, the California Attorney General (hereinafter “Respondent”) filed an

Answer (“Ans.”), a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support (“Ans. Mem.”), and

lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF No. 22.) Respondent argues that habeas relief

is unavailable because Petitioner has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the state court

adjudication of his claims was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 11-24.) Respondent also states that Petitioner’s custodial

status with regard to the probation revocation he is challenging here has become “questionable”

because he was released from jail by the time the Answer was filed, and “Respondent is pursuing

further investigation in that regard and may request leave to supplement his Answer as necessary

to assist the Court in resolving this matter.” (Ans. at 2 n.1.) On February 4, 2014, Respondent

filed a Supplemental Answer and Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 26.) Respondent argues that

this action is now moot because Petitioner was released from jail on December 3, 2013, and

released from all probationary supervision on January 23, 2014. (Id.) Respondent also argues

this action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute because Petitioner has not notified the

Court or Respondent of a new address after being released from jail. (Id.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that dismissal for failure to prosecute is not

appropriate, but that the Court has been divested of jurisdiction because this action has become

moot. The Court therefore recommends the Petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

When citing to documents filed with the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system, the 1

Court will refer to the pages assigned by that system. 

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II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion affirming the

trial court’s order revoking probation. This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).

A. Probation Grant

On September 29, 2011, defendant (representing himself) pled guilty to

attempted possession of a controlled substance (Oxycodone) for sale, in exchange

for a promise of a one-year sentence. At a sentencing hearing on December 12,

2011, the prosecutor told the court (Judge Melinda Lasater) that defendant had

expressed an interest in participating in the reentry drug court program; the

prosecutor believed defendant was eligible for the program; and defendant had

been offered a one-year stayed sentence and probation grant conditioned on his

participation in the program. Based on these representations, the court scheduled

a sentencing hearing before Judge Desiree Bruce-Lyle, who was presiding over

the reentry drug court program.

On January 3, 2012, the drug court suspended execution of a one-year

prison sentence; placed defendant on three years’ formal probation; and ordered

him to complete a drug court program as a condition of probation. With

defendant’s agreement, counsel was appointed for purposes of representing him

during his participation in drug court. The court scheduled a review hearing for

January 9, 2012.

Defendant was released from jail on January 4 or 5, 2012, and he appeared

at the January 9 review hearing accompanied by a drug court team member.

Defendant told the drug court that he has a “life-threatening illness” and he was

having trouble getting his medication. The court instructed the drug court team

member to assist defendant with this matter, and told defendant to “lean on the

folks at treatment” and “let them know what you need help with.” The court set

the next review hearing for January 17, 2012.

B. Initial Probation Revocation Proceedings

On January 11, 2012, two days after the January 9 review hearing,

defendant left the drug court treatment program without letting anyone from the

program know where he was going or where he was residing. [Footnote: The

record does not indicate the precise nature of defendant’s drug court treatment

program, but it appears he was residing at a drug treatment residence with

outpatient privileges.]

On January 12, 2012, the drug court issued an order finding that defendant

was in violation of the reentry court participant contract because he had “failed to

fulfill terms of the treatment program.” The court summarily revoked his

probation and issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

On February 18, 2012 (over one month after he had absconded), defendant

was arrested. On February 27, 2012, he appeared in custody before the drug court

represented by counsel. The court informed defendant that it and the drug

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treatment team had read a letter he had submitted and discussed whether he should

be permitted to continue in the drug treatment program. The court told defendant

he could personally address the court and say “everything that you want the court

and the (treatment) team to consider.”

Defendant told the court that he suffers from Parkinson’s disease and a

seizure disorder, and based on the court’s earlier order the drug treatment team

had given him advice on where to go to get the life-saving medications he needed

for his terminal illness. Defendant described his repeated efforts to get his

medications at various facilities, which proved fruitless due to a delay in getting

his medical records. He also told the court his medications cost about $1,000

monthly; he could not afford to pay for them; he was “just stressed out” and left

the drug treatment program; and his girlfriend ultimately went across the border

and obtained some medication for his illness.

The court responded that defendant had been in the program for three days;

he then decided to “go do whatever it is (he) felt (he) needed to do”; he had been

gone since January 11; and if he had intended to stay with the program he would

have contacted someone in the program after he started getting his medication

from across the border. The court concluded that defendant was not suitable for

the reentry drug court program, terminated himfromthe program, and revoked his

probation.

At the conclusion of the February 27 hearing, defendant (reinstated to

propria persona status) objected to the “summary revocation process” and

requested an evidentiary hearing as required by [Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471 (1972)]. The court set the matter for hearing on March 23, 2012.

C. Final Probation Revocation Proceedings

To assist the court at the upcoming evidentiary hearing, defendant’s

probation officer (Rico Boco) interviewed defendant at the jail on March 9, and

interviewed defendant’s drug court treatment counselor (Jack Boyce) on March

13. Defendant told Boco that he left the drug treatment program because he

“‘panicked’” when he did not have his medications and felt he “‘could not get

help anywhere’”; he went to Mexico about 10 times to get medication because the

cost was lower; and he “‘had to do whatever it took to save (his) life.’” Drug

counselor Boyce confirmed defendant’s unsuccessful efforts to get his

medications at two medical facilities. After these two failed attempts, on January

11, 2012 (the day defendant absconded from the program), Boyce suggested that

defendant go to the University of California San Diego hospital emergency room;

however, when Boyce later contacted the hospital he was told it had no record of

defendant’s arrival at the hospital.

After interviewing defendant and Boyce, Boco prepared a supplemental

probation report setting forth the alleged probation violations. The report stated

defendant had violated probation by absconding from the reentry drug court

program on January 11, 2012, and by leaving San Diego County and traveling to

Mexico without the probation officer’s permission.

1. March Hearing

Prior to the scheduled March 23 evidentiary hearing, defendant filed

pleadings raising facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the probation

revocation procedures set forth in section 1203.2, claiming that the Morrissey due

process requirements had not been satisfied. At the March 23 hearing, the trial

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court considered his constitutional claims and ruled the Morrissey due process

safeguards were “inherently present” in section 1203.2. Further, the court stated

the upcoming formal revocation hearing, which would afford defendant an

opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, sufficed to protect his due

process rights. The court granted defendant’s request for a continuance based on

his claim that he had not received a copy of the supplemental probation report

until that morning. The evidentiary hearing was reset for April 6, 2012, and

thereafter the hearing was continued to April 17, 2012, at defendant’s request so

he could reissue a subpoena that was defective.

2. April Evidentiary Hearing

For purposes of the April evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that

defendant suffered from a painful medical condition and that he had been

prescribed medication. The court considered Boco’s supplemental probation

report and heard testimony from Boco (called by the prosecution), drug counselor

Boyce (called by defendant), and defendant. During his testimonyBoco reiterated

the probation violations and the explanations provided by defendant as set forth

in the supplemental probation report. Boyce confirmed that defendant told him

he was concerned because he did not have the medications he needed for his

illness, and Boyce tried to help him get his medications.

Testifying on his own behalf, defendant admitted the probation violation

allegations, stating he left the country because he was sick and needed his

medications. He acknowledged he made a mistake, and requested that the court

consider his problem getting his medications as a mitigating factor for his

probation violations. The prosecutor argued that it was uncontroverted that

defendant violated his probation terms, and although he may have a medical

condition requiring medication, his conduct showed he was a “manipulative

person” who would adhere only to those terms and conditions that he chose to

follow.

The court stated that although it empathized with defendant’s medical

condition, it did not find his condition a sufficient excuse for violating his

probation conditions. The court assessed that defendant did not give the treatment

program members sufficient time to attempt to help him address his medical

condition, and that his focus was “on getting medication and doing treatment his

way.” The court concluded he was no longer appropriate for the drug court

program; revoked his probation; and ordered execution of the one-year sentence.

People v. Woodall, 216 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227-30 (2013). 

III.

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

(1) California Penal Code section 1203(a) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied

to Petitioner’s probation revocation proceeding because it permits the issuance of arrest warrants

which are not required to be supported by affidavits sworn under oath or affirmation, in violation

of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pet. at 10-

12.)

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(2) California Penal Code section 1203.2 is unconstitutional because it does not provide

for a preliminary revocation hearing as mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pet. at 12-16.) 

(3) The state drug court violated Petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by revoking probation without

providing him notice of the allegations or making a record of the evidence used to support the

revocation. (Pet. at 17-18.)

IV.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss the Petition for failure to prosecute be DENIED, that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

this action as moot be GRANTED, and that the Petition be DISMISSED as moot.

A. Failure to Prosecute

Respondent contends that this action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute because

Petitioner has not notified the Court or Respondent of his new address following his release from

jail. (Resp.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s failure to update his

address indicates an intention to abandon this case, in that he has extensive experience litigating

such cases in this Court, as well as extensive experience with the criminal justice system as

evinced by his lengthy criminal record. (Id.) 2

Respondent correctly points out that by failing to update the Court with his new address,

Petitioner has violated this Court’s October 16, 2013, Order, which stated in part: “Petitioner

shall immediately notify the Court and counsel for Respondent of any change of Petitioner’s

Petitioner currently has pending in this Court a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2

in So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 13cv2231-H (KSC), in which he is represented by counsel, and it would

therefore appear that both the Court and Respondent have the means of contacting Petitioner through

counsel if necessary. The Court notes that in the numerous civil cases Petitioner has litigated in this

Court he has conscientiously updated the Court with his changes of address, as many as ten times in

some cases, thereby supporting Respondent’s contention that Petitioner has abandoned this case. See

So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case Nos. 12cv0817-AJB (RBB); 10cv1890-BTM (BGS); 10cv1218-MMA (CAB);

10cv1127-BEN (WVG); 08cv1132-BTM (RBB); 07cv01583-H (AJB); 05cv1478-W; 04cv1534-W

(WMc); 04cv1499-IEG (JFS); 04cv0168-IEG (NLS); 02cv2383-W; 02cv1845-H (POR); 02cv1835-H;

02cv1812-JM (RBB); 02cv1714-IEG (RBB); 01cv0180-BTM (LAB); 01cv0179-BTM (POR); 01cv

0004-BTM (JMA); and 00cv2584-JM (LSP).

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address. If Petitioner fails to keep the Court informed of where Petitioner may be contacted, this

action will be subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute.” (ECF No. 6 at 3.) “In determining

whether to dismiss a [petition] for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order,

the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/

respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002),

citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Although it is preferred, it

is not required that the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has

considered these factors and we may review the record independently to determine if the district

court has abused its discretion.”) 

“[T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642, quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th

Cir. 1999). However, the merits of the habeas claims in this case were fully briefed and ready

for determination as soon as Respondent filed the Answer on January 8, 2014, after being

granted a one-month extension of time, at a time when Petitioner was still on probationary

supervision for the probation revocation challenged in the Petition. Petitioner was instructed that

he may, if he wished, file a Traverse on or before February 7, 2014, (see ECF No. 18), but has

not done so. However, it is unlikely a Traverse would assist in the resolution of the merits of

the claims presented, as Petitioner, who was represented by counsel throughout the state court

proceedings in which he exhausted his state court remedies for the claims presented here, is now

proceeding pro se and relying upon the same arguments presented his state court pleadings to

support his claims. In any case, as set forth below, this action became moot two weeks before

the Traverse deadline expired. Because the Court was divested of jurisdiction at a time when

Petitioner was permitted but not obligated to file a Traverse, Petitioner’s failure to provide a

current address has not delayed the resolution of this matter or interfered with the Court’s

management of its docket, and the first two factors do not weigh in favor of dismissal. See

Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261 (finding the first two factors supported dismissal where the “case

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dragged on for over a year and a half before it was finally dismissed.”) Similarly, Respondent

has not alleged nor shown that the ability to prosecute this action has been hampered by

Petitioner’s failure to provide a new address, and the third factor weighs against dismissal. 

There are less drastic alternatives available to the Court than dismissal for failure to

prosecute, including contacting Petitioner though his counsel in his other pending case should

that be necessary, dismissal based on mootness as recommended in this Report, or, to the extent

the Court is not divested of jurisdiction, addressing the merits of the fully-briefed claims. Thus,

the fourth factor does not support dismissal for failure to prosecute. Because public policy

favors disposition of cases on their merits, all five factors weigh against dismissal for failure to

prosecute. The Court therefore recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss this action

for failure to prosecute be DENIED.

B. Mootness

Respondent contends this action is moot because Petitioner is no longer in custody under

the probation revocation decision he is challenging, and is not subject to any collateral

consequences flowing from that revocation. (Resp.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-6.) Petitioner was

convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of possession of a controlled substance for sale on

September 29, 2011; he was sentenced to serve a one-year term in jail, which was suspended,

and three years of formal probation, a condition of which required completion of a drug

program. Woodall, 216 Cal.App.4th at 1227. Probation was revoked on April 17, 2012, due to

his failure to complete the drug program, and Petitioner was ordered to serve the one-year jail

term. Id. at 1227-30. He was given 345 days of credit for time already spent in custody. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 252.) After his release from jail, and while he was on

supervised release into the community serving the remainder of his three-year probation term,

he was charged with attempted importation of marijuana, and was incarcerated in the San Diego

County Jail at the time the Petition was constructively filed in this action on October 1, 2013.3

(Pet. at 1-2.)

Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which provides for constructive filing 3

of court documents as of the date they are submitted to the prison authorities for mailing to the court. 

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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In order for this Court to have jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition from a state

prisoner, the petitioner must be “in custody” under the judgment challenged at the time the

Petition is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Petitioner alleges that he was “in custody” under the April 2012, probation revocation at the time

the Petition was filed, because he had been placed on mandatory probation supervision pursuant

to the order of a three-Judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District

of California regarding reduction of the state’s inmate population. (Pet. at 6-7.) Respondent has

not challenged Petitioner’s contention, other than to note that his custodial status became

“questionable” while this action was pending (see Ans. at 2 n.1), but in fact confirms that

contention though the declaration proffered in support of the Motion to Dismiss, and the record

therefore supports a finding that the “in custody” requirement was satisfied at the time the

Petition was filed. 

4

However, the “case-or-controversy requirement [of Article II, section 2 of the United

States Constitution] subsists through all stages offederal judicial proceedings,” and requires that

throughout the entire proceeding, Petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual

injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.

472, 477-78 (1990). “The burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one.” Cantrell v. City

of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001). “A case becomes moot whenever it ‘los(es)

its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory

opinions on abstract propositions of law.’” Id., quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). 

“A case is moot if the issues presented are no longer live and there fails to be a ‘case or

The declaration provided by Respondent supports Petitioner’s position. (See Decl. of Volsky 4

[ECF No. 26].) According to the declaration, a probation officer who works with persons released on

probation pursuant to California’s program to reduce the state’s inmate population through supervised

release of low risk offenders, informed the declarant that, at the time this action was commenced,

Petitioner was still under probationary restraints arising from the probation revocation proceeding

challenged here, because at that time he was in jail awaiting a hearing regarding revocation of that

probation as a result of the new charges of importation of marijuana. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) The probation

officer indicated that Petitioner eventually admitted the probation violation, was released with credit for

time served onto probation supervision on December 3, 2013, and was released from all probationary

supervision obligations on January 23, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.)

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controversy’ under Article III of the Constitution.” In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.

2005). “If the controversy is moot, both the trial and appellate courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction.” Id. 

Because Respondent has demonstrated that Petitioner is no longer in custody as a result

of the probation revocation proceeding he challenges, “some concrete and continuing injury

other than the now-ended incarceration or parole-some ‘collateral consequence’ of the

conviction-must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. The Ninth Circuit

has indicated that “[i]n this day of federal sentencing guidelines based on prior criminal

histories,” there is an irrebuttable presumption that collateral consequences flow from any

criminal conviction. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the

Supreme Court has refused to extend to parole revocation proceedings the same presumption of

collateral consequences given to criminal convictions. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12-13, citing Lane

v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632-33 n.13 (1982) (“The parole violations that remain a part of

respondents’ records cannot affect a subsequent parole determination unless respondents again

violate state law, are returned to prison, and become eligible for parole. Respondents themselves

are able-and indeed required by law-to prevent such a possibility from occurring.”); see also

Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing, in

addition to the collateral consequences doctrine, other major exceptions to the mootness

doctrine, including “wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review,” and “voluntarycessation”

of the allegedly illegal conduct), quoting Burrell, 415 F.3d at 998.

Petitioner has identified no collateral consequences arising from a failure to have the

allegedly unconstitutional revocation proceeding invalidated. The Ninth Circuit has stated:

“(T)he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon

the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure

release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 

Federal courts have a fair amount offlexibilityin fashioning specific habeas relief. 

“A federal court is vested with the largest power to control and direct the form of

judgment to be entered in cases brought up before it on habeas corpus. The court

is free to fashion the remedy as law and justice require and is not required to order

petitioner’s immediate release fromphysical custody.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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In Burnett, a parolee challenged a parole deferral decision, but while the federal petition

was pending, he was released on parole, violated parole, and reincarcerated for the remainder

of his original sentence as a result of the parole violation. Id. at 997. Because petitioner was

incarcerated for violating parole, his ongoing incarceration was not a result of the parole board’s

original action deferring parole, and the Court found that “(t)he ‘actual injury traceable to the

(State of Oregon)’ for which Burnett seeks relief [i.e., an unconstitutional delay in granting

parole] cannot be ‘redressed by a favorable . . . decision’ of the court issuing a writ of habeas

corpus.” Id. at 1000-01, quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. The Court therefore found that the

petitioner’s release on parole and subsequent re-imprisonment rendered the habeas action moot. 

Id. at 1001.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has found, in the immigration context, that a habeas challenge

to “the length of [a petitioner’s] detention, as distinguished from the lawfulness of the

deportation order,” was moot, because “his grievance could no longer be remedied once he was

deported.” Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, the Ninth

Circuit has rejected a mootness argument in the context of release of a prisoner onto supervised

release where the petitioner could obtain habeas relief by reduction of the duration of the

supervised release. Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560, 565 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Abdala, 488

F.3d at 1064 (collecting habeas cases which were found not to be moot where collateral

immigration consequences persisted which could be remedied, such as a bar from seeking

cancellation of removal for twenty years). 

Because Petitioner is no longer under any probationary supervision obligations

whatsoever with respect to the 2012 probation revocation he is challenging here (see Decl. of

Volsky at ¶¶ 5-7), the relief he seeks, a declaration that California’s probation revocation

procedures are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Petitioner during his 2012

probation revocation proceeding, could only conceivably benefit Petitioner if he committed a

new crime, was sentenced to probation, violated probation, and then underwent new probation

revocation proceedings which, assuming he succeeds on the merits of his claim(s) here, would

have been modified to conform with some or all of the federal constitutional guarantees he seeks

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to vindicate through this action. Although it is plausible that Petitioner may violate the terms

of anypossible future probation, Respondent correctlypoints out that the United States Supreme

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Court in Spencer rejected a similar rationale to avoid mootness. In that case, the Court held that

the petitioner was unable to show any continuing collateral consequences from the parole

revocation proceeding challenged in his federal petition, because during the pendency of the

federal proceedings he had been re-released on parole and his termofimprisonment had expired. 

Spencer, 523 U.S. at 3-6. The Spencer Court found no collateral consequences from the parole

revocation, rejecting arguments that the revocation, if permitted to stand, could be used to: (1)

petitioner’s detriment in future parole proceedings; (2) increase petitioner’s sentence in a future

sentencing proceeding; (3) impeach petitioner should he appear as a witness, litigant or

defendant in a future criminal or civil proceeding; or (4) bar petitioner from seeking damages

in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 14-18. The Court also found that the case

did not fall within the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are “capable of

repetition, yet evading review,” because it satisfied neither requirement that: “(1) the challenged

action (is) in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2)

there (is) a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party (will) be subject to the same

action again.” Id. at 17, quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481; see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (holding that “the capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional

circumstances.”) 

The case here is similar to Spencer. Petitioner is no longer under any custodial restraint

as a result of the probation revocation proceeding he challenges in this action. The relief he

seeks, a finding that his 2012 probation revocation was unconstitutional, can only conceivably

benefit himif he is convicted of another criminal offense, placed on probation, violates the terms

of that probation, and is subject to a new round of revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court

has specifically rejected such a possibility as a collateral consequence because petitioners are

expected to avoid violating the law in the future. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12-15. Any other

Petitioner has indicated in his other pending case that he has in the past intentionally violated 5

probation in order to seek medical care through the San Diego County Jail. (See Complaint [ECF No.

1] at 12-19 in So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 13cv2231-H (KSC).)

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potential collateral consequences arising from permitting Petitioner’s probation revocation to

stand are too speculative to prevent a finding of mootness. Id.; Lane, 455 U.S. at 632-33. 

Petitioner alleges in his Petition that this case comes under the “capable of repetition, yet

evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. (Pet. at 7.) He refers to a previous case

he litigated in this Court in So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 08cv1132-BTM (RBB), in which he

challenged a 2006 probation revocation, and where he alleged that his due process rights were

violated when his probation was revoked without a probable cause hearing or a formal probation

revocation hearing. (See Pet. [ECF No. 1] at 6-10 in So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 08cv1132-BTM

(RBB).) This Court denied the petition on the merits of the claims presented, and Petitioner

appealed that judgment; the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal on the basis that, at the time the

petition was filed, Petitioner was not “in custody” under the probation revocation he challenged. 

Woodall v. Beauchamp, 450 Fed.Appx. 655 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner had been convicted in

that case on September 28, 2006, of evading a police officer with reckless driving, and sentenced

to three years of formal probation; he violated probation by committing another crime, and on

October 19, 2007, had his original probation extended two years to run concurrently with the

four-year prison sentence on the new crime. Id. 655 n.1. He was not in custody under the

probation revocation at the time he constructively filed his federal petition in this Court on June

13, 2008, because at his October 19, 2007, sentencing, he received credit for time served in

excess of the extended two-year probation sentence. Id. at 655. 

In order to satisfy the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the

mootness doctrine, Petitioner must show that he does not have enough time to present his claims

before his probation revocation term expires, and “a reasonable expectation that [he](will) be

subject to the same action again.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481. 

Because Petitioner is no longer under any probationary supervision obligations, “the ‘actual

injury traceable to [the State of California]’ for which [he] seeks relief cannot be ‘redressed by

a favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus,’” unless Petitioner commits

another crime, is convicted and sentenced to probation, violates the terms of that new probation,

and is provided the same allegedly unconstitutional probation revocation procedures challenged

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here. Burnett, 432 F.3d at 1000, quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. The Supreme Court has

rejected the use of such a rationale to invoke the “capable of repetition yet evading review”

exception to the mootness doctrine because, as discussed above, Petitioner is expect to obey the

law, and therefore cannot show “a reasonable expectation that [he](will) be subject to the same

action again.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s completion of all probationary supervision

obligations during the pendency of this action renders this action moot. The Court also finds that

no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. As such, this Court has been divested of subject

matter jurisdiction over the Petition. Burrell, 415 F.3d at 998. The Court RECOMMENDS that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition as moot be GRANTED, and the Petition

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered granting in part and denying in part Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,

and dismissing this action as moot. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 24 , 2014, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.

The Court also notes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over either of the two named

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Respondents here, the San DiegoCountySheriff and the California AttorneyGeneral, because Petitioner

is no longer under any custodial restraints. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir.

1996) (holding that a habeas petitioner must name as respondent “the state officer who has official

custody” of him, and that “failure to name the correct respondent destroys personal jurisdiction.”) When

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction in a habeas action, it must dismiss the petition unless it is timely

amended to name the proper respondent. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir.

1992). Even if Petitioner could name a proper respondent, which appears impossible, it would be futile

for him to attempt to do so because this action is moot. See Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21

F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that because petitioner had not named his custodian as

respondent, the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the petition on abstention grounds, and “we

vacate its dismissal and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction unless Stanley can

timely amend his petition to name the correct party as respondent and can demonstrate that his claims

. . . are ripe for federal habeas review.”) (emphasis added).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than April 7, 2014. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 3, 2014 ______________________________

HON. BERNARD G. SKOMAL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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