Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02131/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02131-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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Plaintiffs have a motion for class certification pending before the Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller. (Doc. No. 75.)

1 09cv2131-JM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SABRINA LAGUNA, et al., Civil No. 09cv2131-JM (BGS)

Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR ARBITRATION

DISCOVERY

[Doc. No. 212]

v.

COVERALL NORTH AMERICA, INC.; et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to serve limited arbitration related discovery. 

(Doc. No. 212.) Plaintiffs seek to conduct this discovery for the purpose of opposing Defendants’

motions to compel arbitration. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this motion is suitable for

disposition on the papers submitted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against Defendants based on a purported franchise

agreement between the parties for the provision of janitorial and cleaning services.1

 (Doc. No. 147.) 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) states the following twelve causes of action: (1) breach

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Defendants Coverall North America, Inc., CNA Holding Corporation, and Ted Elliott have a motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for misleading advertising pending before Judge Miller. (Doc. No. 162.) 

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of contract; (2) misleading advertising in violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq.;2

(3) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1194, 1194.2 & 1197; (4) failure

to pay overtime compensation in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 510 & 1194 et seq.; (5) failure to

provide rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.7 and

relevant California Industrial Wage Commission (“IWC”) orders; (6) failure to provide meal periods or

compensation in lieu thereof in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.7 & 512 and relevant IWC

orders; (7) failure to reimburse for reasonable business expenses in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE 

§ 2802; (8) unlawful deductions from wages in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 221 & 223; (9)

conversion; (10) unfair business practices under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq.;

(11) theft of labor in violation of CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 216, 553 & 1199 and CAL. PENAL CODE

§§ 484 & 532; and (12) injunctive relief. 

Plaintiffs Laguna and Salas each signed arbitration provisions when they entered into their

Janitorial Franchise Agreements (“JFA”) with Coverall North America, Inc. (Doc. No. 205-2, Exs. AB.) The arbitration clause requires the parties to submit their disputes to binding arbitration on an

individual basis. (Id.) The relevant portions of the arbitration provision state:

A. Arbitration. Except as otherwise provided in Paragraphs 21A(14) and 21B, all

controversies, disputes or claims between Coverall, its officers, directors, agents and/or

employees (in their respective capacities ) and Franchisee (and Franchisee’s owners,

officers, directors, and/or any guarantors of this Agreement) arising out of or related to

the relationship of the parties, this Agreement or the validity of this Agreement, any

related agreement between the parties, and/or any specification, standard or operating

procedure of Coverall, including those set forth in the Coverall Policy and Procedure

Manual, which controversies, disputes, or claims are not resolved in accordance with

Paragraph 20, shall be submitted promptly for arbitration.

(1) Arbitration shall be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and not

any state arbitration law and, except as otherwise provided in this

Agreement or agreed upon by the parties in writing, the then

current Rules of the American Arbitration Association for

Commercial Arbitration.

* * *

(6) The arbitrator or appointed arbitrators shall not alter or otherwise

reform the terms of this Agreement, or award any relief or grant

any remedy not provided for in this Agreement or specifically

excluded by this Agreement.

* * *

(11) Franchisee and Coverall agree that arbitration shall be conducted

on an individual, not a class wide basis, which restriction shall be

enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law. An arbitration

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between Coverall and Franchisee shall not be consolidated with

any other proceeding between Coverall and any other Franchisee. 

Only Coverall (and its officers, directors, agents and/or employees)

and Franchisee (and Franchisee’s owners, officers, directors,

and/or any guarantors) may be parties to any arbitration

proceeding described in this Paragraph 21.A.

(Doc. No. 205-2, Exs. A & B, § 21.) Plaintiff Laguna signed her JFA September 28, 2006 and Plaintiff

Salas signed her JFA August 24, 2006. (Id. at Exs. A & B) Plaintiffs Laguna and Salas have never

disputed that they entered into a JFA or that the agreements do not contain an arbitration provision

specifically barring Plaintiffs from arbitrating their claims on a class wide basis. (Doc. No. 205-1 at 10.) 

Additionally, section 28 of the JFA contains a severability clause. The clause states: “If any term,

provision, covenant, or condition of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be

invalid, void, or unenforceable, the remainder of the provisions shall remain in full force and effect and

shall in no way be affected, impaired, or invalidated.” (Doc. No. 205-2, Exs. A & B, § 28.) (emphasis

added.) 

Recently, the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, — U.S.

—, 131 S.Ct. 1740, — L.Ed.2d — (2011). The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)

preempts California’s unconscionability law regarding exemption of certain claims from arbitration, at

least for actions in federal court. Concepcion declared that states cannot refuse to enforce arbitration

agreements based on public policy. 131 S.Ct. at 1746, 1752 (holding that the rule set forth in Discover

Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (2005), is preempted by the FAA because it is inconsistent with

the FAA’s purposes, despite “its origins in California’s unconscionability doctrine and California’s

policy against exculpation”). Prior to Concepcion, the Discover Bank rule was consistently applied to

render any consumer contract of adhesion containing a class-action waiver unconscionable. Under

California law, courts may refuse to enforce any contract deemed “unconscionable at that time it was

made,” or may “limit the application of any unconscionable clause.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5. Thus,

courts would not enforce arbitration agreements that contained class-action waivers. See Concepcion,

131 S.Ct. at 1746. Accordingly, Concepcion drastically altered the law governing arbitration

agreements in California. 

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At this time Defendants do not seek to compel arbitration against the other named plaintiff, Carlos

Acevedo, because neither party is able to locate his signed JFA. (Doc. No. 205-1 at n.1.)

4

Plaintiffs claims against Allied/Ares are solely based on alter ego, joint enterprise, and joint employer

theories of liability. See Doc. Nos. 132, 147. 

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As a result of the change in law, on June 10, 2011, Defendants Coverall North America, Inc.,

CNA Holding Corporation, and Ted Elliott (collectively “Coverall Defendants”) filed a motion to: 

(1) compel arbitration of Plaintiffs Laguna and Salas’ claims and stay this action pending arbitration;

and (2) strike all class allegations in the FAC as to Laguna and Salas.3 (Doc. No. 205.) On June 14,

2010, Defendants Allied Capital Corporation and Ares Capital Corporation (herein “Allied/Ares”) filed

a motion to compel arbitration and stay this action under the FAA. (Doc. No. 207.)4 

In response to Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for

leave to conduct limited discovery regarding the existence, formation, and application of the arbitration

agreements. (Doc. No. 212.) Specifically, Plaintiffs seek discovery regarding the enforceability of the

arbitration agreements. (Id. at 4.) In order to explore whether the agreements are enforceable, Plaintiffs

request leave to take “two or three Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions. (Id.) At least

one of the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions will be directed to Allied/Ares. (Id.) Plaintiffs also want to

propound Requests for Production of Documents to ascertain whether written arbitration agreements

exist for the entire putative class. (Id. at 3.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Extending Time

 When a motion is made after time has expired, the court may extend the time “if the party failed

to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has instructed

courts to determine the issue of excusable neglect within the context of a particular case and to weigh a

number of equitable factors in determining whether an extension is appropriate. See Pincay v. Andrews,

389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2004) (referring to Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates

Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

applies a four factor test to determine whether neglect is excusable. The factors are: “(1) the danger of

prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings;

(3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Bateman v. U.S. Postal

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Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).

The deadline for the completion of fact discovery was February 1, 2011. (Doc. No. 48.) 

Defendants did not move to compel arbitration until June 10 and June 14, 2011. (Doc. Nos. 205, 207.) 

Therefore, Plaintiffs were not on notice that arbitration related discovery may be necessary until well

after the close of fact discovery. Defendants filed the motions to compel arbitration well into the case,

and should have known that as a result, Plaintiffs might need to conduct limited discovery to investigate

the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Therefore, there is no danger of prejudice to Defendants in

reopening discovery for this narrow purpose. Additionally, any delay that may ensue if the Court allows

Plaintiffs discovery narrowly tailored to opposing the motions to compel arbitration will not adversely

impact the proceedings. Finally, Plaintiffs acted in good faith by requesting leave to conduct this

discovery soon after Defendants filed their motions to compel arbitration. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at

1223-24. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ neglect is excusable, and therefore, the request to

reopen discovery in order to oppose the motions to compel arbitration is timely.

B. Motions to Compel Arbitration

Pursuant to the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save

upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The

court’s only role is to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the scope of

the parties’ dispute falls within that agreement. Id. at §4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diognostic Sys., Inc.,

207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). “Under § 4 of the FAA, a district court must issue an order

compelling arbitration if the following two-pronged test is satisfied: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate

exists; and (2) that agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” United Computer Systems, Inc. v. 

AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130 (citing 9 U.S.C.

§ 4; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 719–20 (9th Cir.1999)). 

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“Arbitrability” is a term of art. Abitrability is defined as the ability to be arbitrated. Throughout this

order arbitrability concerns the preliminary question of whether an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over the

dispute. 

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In certain circumstances, however, the court must first consider whether the parties’ agreement

reserved for the arbitrator questions regarding the validity and/or enforceability of the arbitration

agreement itself. See e.g. Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2009); accord

Terminix Int'l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v.

Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d

821, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2003). This initial consideration is referred to as a “gateway” question. The

Supreme Court recognizes that parties may agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability.’5

Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). Before a court submits the question of

arbitrability to the arbitrator, the court must first determine that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate 

arbitrability is clear and unmistakable. Id.; see also First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45; Rodriquez v.

American Tech., Inc., 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1123 (2006); Greenspan v. LADT, LLC, 185 Cal.App.4th

1413 (2010). Furthermore, the cases hold that where the agreement to arbitrate includes an agreement to

follow a particular set of arbitration rules— such as the Commercial AAA Rules—that provide for the

arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, the gateway question is decided by the arbitrator.” Visa

USA, Inc. v. Maritz Inc., 2008 WL 744832, *4 (N.D. Cal. March 18, 2008); see also, e.g., Poponin v.

Virtual Pro, Inc., 2006 WL 2691418, *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006); Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,

2005 WL 1048700, *2-4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2005); Terminix, 432 F.3d at 1332. 

The AAA Commercial Rules provide that: “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or

her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the

arbitration agreement.” AAA Commercial Rule R-7(a). By explicitly incorporating the AAA rules,

courts routinely hold that the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed that questions of arbitrability

would be submitted to arbitration for resolution. See, e.g., Contec, 398 F.3d at 208; Terminix, 432 F.3d

at 1332 (holding that “by incorporating the AAA rules, including [Rule 7], into their agreement, the

parties clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration clause is 

valid”); Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, 124 Cal.App.4th 547, 557 (2004) (holding that a

contract containing language stating that binding arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the

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AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent that the

arbitrator will decide any dispute over arbitrability). 

When the contract clearly and unmistakably reserves issues of arbitrability for the arbitrator, the

question becomes whether the provision delegating that gateway question is enforceable. Rent-A-Center

West, 130 S.Ct. at 2778. The court may only intervene if a party solely challenges the delegation

provision and not the validity and/or enforceability of the entire arbitration agreement. See id. at 2778-

79. 

A few California cases have held that when read together, an arbitration provision and a

severability provision in an agreement may create an ambiguity regarding who determines the gateway

question of validity and/or enforceability. See Parada v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565

(2009); Baker v. Osborne Devel. Corp., 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 891-894 (2008); Hartley v. Superior

Court, 2011 WL 2535582 *5 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. June 28, 2011). Where one section of the agreement

states that the issues of enforceability or voidability are to be decided by the arbitrator, but another

provision of the agreement indicates that a court might find a provision unenforceable, the arbitration

agreement does not necessarily “clearly and unmistakably” reserve to the arbitrator the gateway

question of arbitrability. Id. If the court decides that an ambiguity exists and that as a result the

delegation provision is not clear and unmistakable, the court rather than the arbitrator will be tasked

with deciding gateway questions of enforceability and/or validity. 

Defendants argue that because the JFA’s arbitration clause reserves for the arbitrator all

questions regarding its validity and/or enforceability, Plaintiffs’ request for discovery into the arbitration

clause’s enforceability should be directed to the arbitrator. (Doc. No. 216 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs appear to

argue that because the JFA contains a severability clause, the court, rather than the arbitrator, will decide

the gateway question of arbitrability. (Doc. No. 218 at 2; see also id. at Ex. 1.) The arbitration clause

specifically provides that “all controversies, disputes or claims . . . arising out of or related to the

relationship of the parties, this Agreement or the validity of this Agreement, any related agreement

between the parties, and/or any specification, standard or operating procedure . . . shall be submitted

promptly for arbitration.” (Doc. No. 205-2, Exs. A & B, § 21.) The agreement further states that

“[ar]bitration shall be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and not any state arbitration law and, except

as otherwise provided in this Agreement or agreed upon by the parties in writing, the then current Rules

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of the American Arbitration Association for Commercial Arbitration.” (Id.) Nonetheless, the JFA also

contains a severability clause stating: “If any term, provision, covenant, or condition of this Agreement

is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void, or unenforceable, the remainder of the

provisions shall remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired, or

invalidated.” (Id. at § 28.) (emphasis added.) 

 “The issue of who should decide arbitrability turns on what the parties agreed in their contract.” 

First Options, 514 U.S. at 943; Dream Theater, 124 Cal.App.4th at551. When deciding this issue,

courts generally apply ordinary state-law principles governing contract formation. Dream Theater, 124

Cal.App.4th at552. California Civil Code section 1643 provides: “The words of a contract are to be

understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless

used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which

case the latter must be followed.” When a contract is capable of two different reasonable

interpretations, the contract is ambiguous. See Harvey v. Landing Homeowners Ass’n, 162 Cal.App.4th

809, 817 (2008). 

Because contract interpretation is a matter of law, Judge Miller will decide whether the

severability clause in the JFA creates an ambiguity such that the contract does not clearly and

unmistakably reserve for the arbitrator questions of validity and/or enforceability. To make this

determination, the court will conduct a “facial and limited” review of the contract in order to decide

whether the parties “have in fact clearly and unmistakably agreed to commit the question of arbitrability

to the arbitrator.” Anderson, 2005 WL 1048700, *4 (citations omitted). 

C. Discovery In Connection with Motions to Compel Arbitration

Although the Federal Rules generally allow for broad discovery in civil actions, discovery in

connection with a motion to compel arbitration is limited under the FAA. The Ninth Circuit has

explained that the FAA provides for discovery in connection with a motion to compel arbitration only if

“‘the making of the arbitration agreement . . . be in issue.’” Simula, 175 F.3d at 726 (citing Prima Paint

Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)). Moreover, a court must limit

discovery when “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking

into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of

the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the

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issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp.2d

1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that

its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D.

603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that

discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its

objections with competent evidence. DirectTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 

1. Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions to Conduct Discovery Regarding 

the Enforceability of the Arbitration Clause

a. Deposition of Coverall Defendants

Unless Judge Miller determines that the severability provision creates an ambiguity, the

determination of whether the arbitration clause is enforceable will be set before the arbitrator. 

Accordingly, unless an ambiguity exists, all discovery relating to the enforceability of the arbitration

agreement will take place in the arbitration context. At this stage, the necessity for discovery is unclear. 

Therefore, the burden and expense of permitting discovery into issues that may not materialize far 

outweighs the potential benefit of allowing the discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

If Judge Miller does determine that the severability provision creates an ambiguity such that he

will decide arbitrability questions, Plaintiffs may be entitled to limited discovery. At that time, Plaintiffs

may request a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery into “the making and performance of the

agreement to arbitrate.” Simula, 175 F.3d at 726 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04). Because the

FAA only permits limited discovery when a motion to compel arbitration is pending, Plaintiffs’

discovery must be narrowly tailored to determining whether the arbitration clause is enforceable under

California law. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 2007 WL 738612, *9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2007); see also

Hamby v. Power Toyota Irvine, 11-cv-544-BTM, Doc. No. 25 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2011); Toppings v.

Meritech Mortgage Services, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d. 683, 685 (S.D. W.Va. 2001). At this time, however,

the request for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the Coverall Defendants is DENIED without prejudice.

b. Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Allied/Ares

Defendant Allied/Ares oppose Plaintiffs’ request to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to

ascertain whether Allied/Ares is a party to the arbitration agreement. (Doc. No. 217 at 2.) Allied/Ares

is named in the complaint under joint employer, joint enterprise, and alter ego theories of liability. 

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(FAC, Doc. No. 147 at ¶ ¶ 15-17; See also Doc. No. 132 at 3.) Allied/Ares does not seek to compel

arbitration on the basis that it is a party to the JFA, but rather because the doctrines of alter ego and

equitable 

estoppel permit a non-signatory defendant to compel signatory plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. (Doc.

No. 217 at 4.) 

Where plaintiffs would not otherwise have an independent right to recover against non-signatory

defendants, even if the contract containing the arbitration clause was void, equitable estoppel will

prevent plaintiffs from avoiding arbitration of their claims against non-signatory defendants. See JLM

Industries, Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2nd Cir. 2004); Bellizan v. Easy Money of Louisiana,

Inc., 2002 WL 1066750 (E.D. La. 2002); Bloxom v. Landmark Pub. Corp., 184 F. Supp.2d 578 (E.D.

Tex. 2002). Additionally, where the arbitration agreement reserves questions of arbitrability for the

arbitrator, the issue as to whether a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement can compel arbitration is

a question regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement that is reserved for the arbitrator. Contec,

398 F.3d 205.

For all of the reasons stated above with respect to the Coverall Defendants, discovery is

inappropriate unless Judge Miller determines that the JFA does not reserve the gateway question of

arbitrability for the arbitrator. If the arbitrator is to determine the validity and/or enforceability of the

arbitration provision, the arbitrator will also be charged with deciding the ability of Allied/Ares to

enforce the arbitration clause. See id. As such, it is not clear at this time that discovery will be

permitted in this venue, thus, the burden and expense of the proposed deposition outweighs its benefit

given the current context of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Accordingly, the request for a

30(b)(6) deposition of Allied/Ares is DENIED without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Arbitration Clauses for 

Putative Class Members

Defendants have produced the JFAs for both Laguna and Salas. In fact, the agreements were

attached to the Coverall Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. No. 205-2, Exs. A & B.)

Additionally, Laguna’s JFA was attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (See

Doc. No. 75-27, Ex. 2.) Thus, Defendants have produced the arbitration clauses for each named Plaintiff

that is currently subject to a motion to compel arbitration. If Defendants eventually seek to compel

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arbitration against the absent class members, at that time they will be required to produce a valid JFA

containing an arbitration clause for each franchisee. Until then, there is no basis for the Court to require

Defendants to produce the JFAs for absent class members. In fact, Defendants cannot move to compel

arbitration against putative class members prior to certification of a class. See Salah v. Titan Corp., 353

F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2004); see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, 2011

WL 1753784, * 4 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011). Because no class has been certified, Plaintiffs’ request for

production of the written arbitration agreements for all putative class members is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to serve limited arbitration related discovery,

the Court orders the following:

1. Plaintiffs’ request for a 30(b)(6) deposition of the Coverall Defendants is DENIED

without prejudice.

2. Plaintiffs’ request for a 30(b)(6) deposition of Allied/Ares is DENIED without

prejudice.

3. Plaintiffs’ request for production of the written arbitration agreements for all putative

class members is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 26, 2011 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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