Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07071/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2015 Decided September 18, 2015

No. 14-7071

DICK ANTHONY HELLER, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01289)

Stephen P. Halbrook argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs was Dan M. Peterson.

C.D. Michel, Anthony Pisciotti, and Jeffrey Malsch were 

on the brief for amici curiae CRPA Foundation, Pink Pistols, 

Second Amendment Sisters, and Women Against Gun 

Control in support of appellants.

William J. Olson, Herbert W. Titus, Jeremiah L. Morgan, 

and John S. Miles were on the brief for amici curiae Gun 

Owners of America, Inc., et al. in support of appellants.

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John Parker Sweeney and James W. Porter III were on 

the brief for amicus curiae National Rifle Association, Inc. in 

support of appellants.

Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Eugene A. 

Adams, Interim Attorney General at the time the brief was 

filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Holly M. Johnson, 

Assistant Attorney General.

Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General at the time the 

brief was filed, Office of the Attorney General for the State of 

Maryland, and Joshua N. Auerbach, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tom Miller, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Iowa, Martha Coakley, 

Attorney General at the time the brief was filed, Office of the 

Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of New York, Kamala Harris, 

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of California, George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Russell A. 

Suzuki, Attorney General at the time the brief was filed, 

Office of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii, and 

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 

General for the State of Illinois were on the brief as amici 

curiae States of Maryland, et al. in support of appellees.

Walter A. Smith, Jr., Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, appointed 

by the court, and Karla J. Aghedo were on the brief as amici 

curiae DC Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, et al. in 

support of appellees.

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Howard R. Rubin and Daniel Lipton were on the brief as 

amici curiae The Major City Chiefs of Police Association, 

The United States Conference of Mayors, and International 

Municipal Lawyers Association in support of appellees. 

Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Francesco Valentini, and Jonathan E. 

Lowy were on the brief for amici curiae Brady Center to 

Prevent Gun Violence, et al. in support of appellees.

Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

GINSBURG. 

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge: At issue in this suit is 

the constitutionality of certain gun laws enacted by the 

District of Columbia. The district court determined as a 

matter of law that the District’s efforts “to combat gun 

violence and promote public safety” by means of its 

registration laws were “constitutionally permissible.” Heller 

v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2014). 

Before this court, Dick Anthony Heller and his co-appellants 

challenge both the district court’s admission of, and its 

reliance upon, certain expert reports proffered by the District 

and the final order denying Heller’s and granting the 

District’s motion for summary judgment. 

We hold the district court’s admission of the challenged 

expert reports was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm in 

part and reverse in part the district court’s judgment in favor 

of the District. 

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I. Background

In District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I) the Supreme 

Court held the District of Columbia’s “prohibition of 

handguns held and used for self-defense in the home” was 

unconstitutional. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). Immediately 

thereafter, the D.C. City Council revised the District’s gun 

laws by enacting the Firearms Registration Amendment Act 

of 2008 (FRA). D.C. Law 17-372.

The FRA created a “new scheme for regulating firearms.” 

Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1248 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (Heller II). With limited exceptions, the FRA 

required the registration of all firearms in the District. D.C. 

Code § 7-2502.01. The law also imposed various conditions 

upon the registration of a firearm and limited the persons 

eligible to register a firearm by excluding, for example, 

individuals who within the prior five years had been 

convicted of certain drug or violent crimes or had a severe 

mental health problem, and individuals under the age of 18. 

Id. § 7-2502.03-.07. In addition, the FRA required the gun 

owner to renew the registration of his firearm(s) every three 

years, id. § 7-2502.07a, and prohibited registration — and 

hence possession — of certain firearms, such as shortbarreled rifles and assault weapons. Id. § 7-2502.02.

In July 2008 Heller filed suit challenging the District’s 

new registration scheme as inconsistent with the Second 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The 

district court granted summary judgment to the District and 

Heller appealed. 

On that appeal, we upheld the constitutionality of the 

District’s “basic registration requirement,” insofar as that 

requirement pertained to handguns. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 

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1254-55. We also upheld the portion of the FRA prohibiting 

registration, and therefore possession, of assault weapons and 

magazines with a capacity in excess of 10 rounds. Id. at 

1247-48, 1264. 

We reserved judgment as to the constitutionality of the 

District’s basic registration requirement for long guns, the 

conditions under which a registration certificate would be 

issued, and the duration for which such a certificate would be 

valid. Id. at 1255, 1258-60. We held that both the basic 

registration requirement for long guns, if not de minimis, and 

the conditions for registration were subject to intermediate 

scrutiny, and that the record as it then stood was not sufficient 

for us to evaluate whether those laws were narrowly tailored 

to serve an important governmental interest. Id. at 1258. We 

therefore remanded the case to the district court for further 

evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 1260.

Subsequently, the D.C. Council enacted the Firearms

Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Law 19-170, which repealed

certain of the conditions for registration, such as the 

requirement that a pistol be submitted for ballistic 

identification as part of the registration process, and reduced

the burden upon registrants imposed by other provisions. 

Heller then filed an amended complaint to take account of

these legislative changes. 

During discovery, Heller and the District offered the 

opinion testimony of, respectively, one and four expert 

witnesses. Heller v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d at

40 (Heller III). Largely upon the basis of their testimony, the 

district court entered summary judgment for the District. 

On this appeal, Heller argues the district court erred by 

admitting the opinion testimony of three of the District’s four 

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expert witnesses. In addition, Heller argues the district court 

erred in upholding as constitutional: (1) the basic registration 

requirement as it pertains to long guns, D.C. Code § 7-

2502.01(a); (2) the requirement that one appear in person to 

register a firearm and be fingerprinted and photographed, id.

§ 7-2502.04; (3) the requirement that the registrant bring with 

him the firearm to be registered, which requirement the 

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) may or may not 

invoke as to a particular individual, id. § 7-2502.04(c); (4) the 

expiration of the registration after three years, id. § 7-

2502.07a; (5) the imposition of certain fees for registration, 

id. § 7-2502.05(b); (6) the requirements that a registrant

complete a firearms safety and training course or provide 

evidence of another form of training and that the registrant

pass a test to demonstrate his knowledge of the District’s 

firearms laws, id. §§ 7-2502.03(a)(13), 7-2502.03(a)(10); and 

(7) the prohibition on registration of more than one pistol per 

person in any 30-day period, id. § 7-2502.03(e).

II. Analysis

We first address the district court’s admission of the 

challenged expert reports and related testimony. We then turn 

to Heller’s constitutional challenges.

A. The expert reports and testimony

Heller moved to strike three of the four expert reports 

offered by the District during discovery, viz., those of Cathy 

Lanier, the Chief of the MPD, and of Mark Jones and Joseph 

Vince, Jr., both former agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), but not that of 

Daniel Webster, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for 

Gun Policy. Heller argued the expert reports “fall short of the 

disclosure requirements under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) and that 

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their proposed testimony [was] too unreliable to be admitted 

under FED. R. EVID. 702.” The district court denied Heller’s 

motion. 

On appeal, Heller renews both arguments. We review the 

district court’s admission of expert testimony for abuse of 

discretion, whether that admission is challenged under the 

rules of evidence or under the rules of procedure. United 

States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the challenged testimony.

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) provides that 

an expert witness must submit a written report containing, 

among other things, “a complete statement of all opinions the 

witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,” as 

well as “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming 

them.” A party who fails to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 

generally may not use that witness “to supply evidence on a 

motion ... unless the failure was substantially justified or is 

harmless.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 

The purpose of the rule is to avoid “unfair surprise to the 

opposing party.” Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. ReDirect, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Admitting a report with an 

omission that does not cause “unfair surprise” we deem 

harmless. Id. 

As the district court noted, each of the challenged expert 

reports contained an explicit statement as to the basis for that 

witness’s opinion, to wit, that his or her report was based “on 

my experience, my review of numerous studies and books, the 

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District of Columbia’s firearms laws and regulations, and 

discovery materials from this case made available to me.” In 

addition each report recounts in detail the expert’s relevant 

experience. The district court stated:

Plaintiffs have had an opportunity to depose these 

experts and examine more fully the bases for their 

opinions .... Where Defendants have provided 

adequate notice of the opinions they expect these 

experts to offer and Plaintiffs have had and continue to 

have opportunities to challenge these conclusions, the 

goals of Rule 26(a) are satisfied, and there is no basis 

for striking the reports and preventing these experts 

from testifying.

Heller v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 133, 139 

(D.D.C. 2013).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in so 

holding. The experts’ reports adequately established the 

bases for the opinions they expressed in the reports and in 

their declarations. Heller had the opportunity to probe the 

bases for the witnesses’ opinions when he deposed them.

2. Federal Rule of Evidence 702

Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in 

the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of 

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fact to understand the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 

data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable 

principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 

and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702. 

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the 

Supreme Court held Rule 702 requires courts to ensure that 

expert testimony is “not only relevant, but reliable.” 509 U.S. 

579, 589 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 

U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (noting that “Daubert’s general 

principles apply” not just to scientific testimony but to all “the 

expert matters described in Rule 702”). Therefore, courts are 

obligated to “determine whether [expert] testimony has a 

reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the 

relevant] discipline.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149 (second 

alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has said “the trial 

judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a 

particular case how to go about determining whether 

particular expert testimony is reliable.” Id. at 152. 

In this case the district court reasoned:

[I]t appears here that the opinion evidence is 

connected to the existing facts – the registration 

requirements and the state of gun violence in the 

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District – by a methodology precisely contemplated by 

Daubert and Rule 702: each expert’s professional 

judgment obtained through long experience in the 

field. Each of the reports specifically identifies this 

experience as being the basis for the opinions 

proffered, and each provides some justification – in 

the form of information gained from the expert’s 

relevant experience – for those opinions.

Heller v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 142.

As the district court rightly suggested, each of the 

challenged experts has decades of relevant experience. Still, 

the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 provide that a 

witness who is “relying solely or primarily on experience ...

must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion 

reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the 

opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the 

facts.” In this case the experts’ explanation of the connection 

between their experience and their conclusions was

sometimes fatally sparse. Likewise, the district court failed 

meaningfully to evaluate the factual bases for the experts’ 

opinions, noting only that they were supported by “some 

justification — in the form of information gained from the 

expert’s relevant experience.” 

As this court has noted, however, the “admission of 

[expert] testimony does not constitute an abuse of discretion 

merely because the factual bases for an expert’s opinion are 

weak.” Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 

567 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Nor is this a case in which the experts’ 

reports consisted of “subjective belief or unsupported 

speculation,” which the rules of evidence preclude. Id. at 570 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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In addition to invoking his or her generalized 

“experience,” each expert claimed to have relied upon 

specific news stories, academic studies, or other research in 

forming an opinion. Moreover, each of the three experts was

in a position to state whether the cited materials comported 

with his or her personal experience. 

In light of the challenged experts’ substantial relevant 

experience and the sources they cited in support of their

conclusions — the above-noted stories, studies, and research 

— we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the challenged expert reports and the subsequent 

expert declarations. Rather, as the district court noted, 

Heller’s “concerns about the conclusions [to which] these 

experts’ experience led them ... go to the weight of the 

testimony,” not its admissibility. Heller v. District of 

Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 142.

B. The constitutional challenges

We review the district court’s summary judgment 

determination de novo, considering the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e., Heller. See 

Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 

2013).

In Heller II, we adopted a two-step approach to 

determining the constitutionality of the District’s gun 

registration laws: “We ask first whether a particular provision 

impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment; if 

it does, then we go on to determine whether the provision 

passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional 

scrutiny.” 670 F.3d at 1252. We determined that level was

intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1252-53. 

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For a challenged provision to survive intermediate 

scrutiny, the District has to show, first, that it “promotes a 

substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less 

effectively absent the regulation,” and second, that “the means 

chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve 

that interest.” Id. at 1258 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782-83 (1989)). To meet the first 

requirement, the District must demonstrate that the harms to 

be prevented by the regulation “are real, not merely 

conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these

harms in a direct and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 

v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-64 (1994) (Turner I). We do not, 

however, review de novo the District’s evidence of the harm 

to be prevented and the likely efficacy of the regulation in 

preventing that harm. See id. at 666. Rather, it is our remit to 

determine only whether the District “has drawn reasonable 

inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. If it has done 

so, and if the means chosen are not overbroad, then “summary 

judgment ... is appropriate regardless of whether the evidence 

is in conflict.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 

185, 195-96, 211 (1997) (Turner II); see also Heller II, 670 

F.3d at 1263 (upholding the District’s ban on assault weapons 

on the basis that “the evidence demonstrates a ban on assault 

weapons is likely to promote the Government’s interest in 

crime control”).

1. Impingement

In Heller II we held the basic registration requirement as 

applied to handguns did not impinge upon the Second 

Amendment and was therefore constitutional. 670 F.3d at 

1254-55 (“[T]he basic requirement to register a handgun is 

longstanding in American law .... Therefore, we presume the 

District’s basic registration requirement including the 

submission of certain information does not impinge upon the 

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right protected by the Second Amendment. Further, we find 

no basis in either the historical record or the record of this 

case to rebut that presumption.”) (citations omitted); see also 

Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26 (“longstanding” firearm 

regulations are “presumptively lawful”). We left open the 

question whether requiring the registration of long guns 

impinges upon the Second Amendment. 670 F.3d at 1255 

n.**; see also D.C. Code § 7-2502.01(a). We now hold it 

does not.

Requiring the registration of handguns is legally different 

from requiring the registration of long guns only in that “basic 

registration of handguns is deeply enough rooted in our 

history to support the presumption that [it] is constitutional,” 

Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1253; the registration requirement for 

long guns lacks that historical pedigree. Id. at 1255. 

Even absent the presumption that attends the pedigree, 

however, the basic registration requirement as applied to hand 

guns falls into the category of requirements that are “selfevidently de minimis, for they are similar to other common 

registration or licensing schemes, such as those for voting or 

for driving a car, that cannot reasonably be considered 

onerous.” Id. at 1254-55. On Heller’s previous appeal, we 

were unable to determine whether requiring the registration of 

long guns is similarly a de minimis burden because the record 

was “devoid of information concerning the application of 

registration requirements to long guns.” Id. at 1255 n.**. We 

therefore allowed Heller, during the discovery proceedings on 

remand, the opportunity to introduce evidence that might 

differentiate the registration requirement for long guns from 

other registration requirements that undoubtedly entail a de 

minimis burden upon a constitutional right. As the district 

court subsequently determined, however, Heller offered no 

evidence distinguishing the basic registration requirement as 

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applied to long guns. See Heller III, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 

Indeed, he did not even argue the point.1

Because the burden of the basic registration requirement

as applied to long guns is de minimis, it does not implicate the 

second amendment right. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1255; see 

also Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 773-75 (7th Cir. 

2009) (holding local ordinance “requiring the registration of 

all firearms” is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Heller I). It is therefore constitutional.

 1 In his reply brief in this court, Heller argued for the first time that 

the registration requirement impinges upon the Second Amendment 

right to bear arms because a person can “go to prison and receive a 

lifetime ban on possession of firearms for failure to register or 

reregister.” See D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.03, 7-2507.06, 7-2502.08 

(providing generally violation of the registration requirements may 

result in fines, imprisonment, and ineligibility to register weapons 

in the future). This assertion, however, is too little, too late. It 

comes too late because we do not ordinarily notice an argument that 

first appears in a reply brief. See Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 

No. 14-1062, 2015 WL 4450952, at *5 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2015) 

(“[A]rguments not clearly raised in a party’s opening brief are 

generally considered to be forfeit”). In any event, it is too little 

because in Heller II we instanced other licensing schemes we think 

impose a de minimis burden notwithstanding that failure to comply 

with those schemes may result in criminal penalties; so it is with 

the basic registration requirement for long guns. See Heller II, 670 

F.3d at 1254-55 (describing licensing schemes “such as [that] for 

... driving a car” as “self-evidently de minimis”); D.C. Code § 50-

1403.01(e) (providing that an individual found guilty of “operating 

a motor vehicle in the District” while that person’s license is 

“revoked or suspended” may be fined or imprisoned for up to one 

year).

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The additional registration requirements, however, cannot 

be said to be de minimis. In Heller II, we held the additional 

requirements, as they then stood, “affect[ed] the Second 

Amendment right because they [we]re not de minimis” —

that is, they “ma[d]e it considerably more difficult for a 

person lawfully to acquire and keep a firearm ... for the 

purpose of self-defense in the home.” Id. at 1255. The 

subsequent repeal of some of those requirements and the 

amendment of others somewhat reduced the burden imposed 

upon District residents’ exercise of their Second Amendment 

rights. The District does not go so far as to argue, however,

that the amended requirements are de minimis. Those 

requirements are therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2. Intermediate scrutiny

We previously identified two substantial governmental 

interests served by the registration requirements enacted by 

the District: (1) protecting police officers by enabling them to 

determine, in advance, whether guns may be present at a 

location to which they are called and (2) aiding in crime 

control. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1258. On remand, the District 

recharacterized the second interest as a broader interest in 

“promoting public safety.” Heller III, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 49. 

On appeal, the District identifies more particularly its interest 

in “protecting police officers” and reiterates its interest in

“promoting public safety” generally. 

Heller does not dispute that these are substantial 

governmental interests. Rather, he challenges the closeness of 

the fit between the asserted interests and the various 

registration requirements. We agree with Heller that the 

District has not offered substantial evidence from which one

could draw a reasonable conclusion that the challenged 

requirements will protect police officers; but we think the 

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District has pointed to substantial evidence that some of the 

requirements — but not others — will promote public safety.

 

a. Police protection

Heller argues the registration requirements do not 

advance the District’s interest in protecting the police because 

MPD officers very rarely check the registration records in 

responding to a call, conducting an investigation, or executing 

a search warrant. The District responds that although the 

“MPD does not routinely check registration records prior to 

responding to a call for service ... such a check is a tool 

available for use in appropriate circumstances.” It is 

undisputed that such checks have taken place, albeit rarely. 

Therefore, the question remains whether that “tool” 

promotes the District’s asserted interest in police protection. 

Discovery subsequent to our decision in Heller II indicates it

does not. 

According to the deposition testimony of an MPD officer, 

District police “are trained to treat situations where there 

might be a crime in progress or domestic dispute or some 

other situation possibly involving violence as always having a 

potential to have a dangerous weapon present.” Further, one 

of the District’s expert witnesses stated that if the registration 

system indicated no weapon was present at an address, then 

officers “would continue to exercise caution.” The best the 

District’s expert could offer was that positive confirmation of 

a gun might raise officers’ “caution level ... that much 

higher.” 

The testimony of the District’s own witnesses, therefore, 

indicates that the records established via the registration 

requirements, when queried at all, have little to no effect upon 

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the conduct or safety of police officers. In light of this 

additional evidence, we agree with the statement of our 

colleague in Heller II that the asserted interest in police 

protection “leaves far too many false negatives to satisfy ...

intermediate scrutiny.” 670 F.3d at 1295 (Kavanaugh, J., 

dissenting).

b. Public safety

Drawing directly upon the Report of the Judiciary 

Committee of the D.C. Council with respect to the Firearms

Amendment Act of 2012, the District claims the various 

registration requirements advance its interest in public safety

by “distinguishing criminals from law-abiding citizens, 

enabling police to arrest criminals immediately, facilitating

enforcement against prohibited persons obtaining or 

continuing to possess firearms, reducing gun trafficking, and

increasing the difficulty for criminals to acquire guns.” We 

next address whether the District has, with regard to each 

challenged registration provision, offered substantial evidence 

from which it could reasonably have concluded the provision 

will mitigate various threats to public safety “in a direct and 

material way,” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664, whether in one of 

the ways anticipated by the D.C. Council or otherwise. 

i. In-person appearance, fingerprinting, and 

photographing, D.C. Code § 7-2502.04

The District has presented substantial evidence from 

which it could conclude that fingerprinting and photographing 

each person registering a gun promotes public safety by 

facilitating identification of a gun’s owner, both at the time of 

registration and upon any subsequent police check of the 

gun’s registration. The requirement that registrants appear in 

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person is necessary in order for a photograph and fingerprints 

to be taken. 

First, the fingerprinting requirement: The Report of the 

Committee on the Judiciary stated that “[t]he initial 

fingerprinting requirement is fundamental for the [MPD] to 

fulfill its public safety obligations in registering firearms —

being able to screen the registrant to ensure that he or she is 

not disqualified from possessing a firearm.” In support of this 

assertion, the District points to the testimony of Chief Lanier, 

who said “[u]sing biometrics [i.e., fingerprints] to positively 

identify an individual is far more effective than relying simply 

on a name and social security number.” Chief Lanier 

reiterates this conclusion in her expert declaration, and it is 

echoed in Webster’s expert declaration. 

In addition, the District points to evidence suggesting 

background checks using fingerprints are more reliable than 

background checks conducted without fingerprints, which are

more susceptible to fraud. Specifically, the District points to 

an investigation conducted by the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, in which five “agents acting in an 

undercover capacity used ... counterfeit driver’s licenses in 

attempts to purchase firearms from gun stores and pawnshops 

that were licensed by the federal government to sell firearms.” 

GAO-01-427, FIREARMS PURCHASED FROM FEDERAL 

FIREARM LICENSEES USING BOGUS IDENTIFICATION 2 (2001). 

Those attempts were, without exception, successful. Id. at 2-

3. The report concluded that federal background checks 

conducted by the firearm dealers “cannot ensure that the 

prospective purchaser is not a felon or other prohibited person 

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whose receipt and possession of a firearm would be 

unlawful.” Id. at 2.2

Heller argues the District has not experienced a problem 

with fraud in the registration of firearms. He also implies the

problem is unlikely to arise, given the increased difficulty of 

manufacturing fraudulent identification documents today, as 

compared to 2001, when the GAO concluded its investigation. 

Even if this is true, however, a prophylactic disclosure 

measure such as the one at issue here survives intermediate 

scrutiny if the deterrent value of the measure will materially 

further an important governmental interest. See Barry v. City 

of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559-61 (2d Cir. 1983) 

(upholding under intermediate scrutiny a law requiring 

financial disclosures by certain publicly employed individuals 

in the face of a right-to-privacy challenge on the basis that it 

could “help deter corruption,” despite a “virtually corruptionfree history” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The GAO study indicates the fingerprinting requirement 

would, indeed, help to deter and detect fraud and thereby 

prevent disqualified individuals from registering firearms.

Regarding the requirement of a photograph: The 

Committee on the Judiciary emphasized “the importance of a 

registrant being able to present a registration certificate with a 

photograph, so police can quickly identify whether and to 

 2 The states in which the GAO conducted its study had adopted the 

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), see 

18 U.S.C. § 922(t), under which, then as now, the following 

information is required of each individual who undergoes a NICS 

check: (1) name, (2) sex, (3) race, (4) date of birth, and (5) state of 

residence. 28 C.F.R. § 25.7. A dealer may, in addition, report the 

purchaser’s Social Security or other identifying number and 

physical description. Id.

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20

whom the firearm has been legally registered.” The 

Committee pointed to the testimony of Chief Lanier, who 

asserted that “a certificate with a photo helps to quickly and 

safely communicate” the fact of registration to police officers, 

which, “in turn, helps to keep both the officer and the 

registrant safe.” Heller, while maintaining that photographing 

a registrant will not deter fraud, does not contest that 

photographic confirmation of a registrant’s identity would be 

beneficial to public safety when the police encounter an 

armed registrant. See D.C. Code § 7-2502.08(c) (“Each 

registrant shall have in the registrant’s possession, whenever 

in possession of a firearm, the registration certificate, or exact 

photocopy thereof, for such firearm, and exhibit the same 

upon the demand of a member of the [MPD], or other law 

enforcement officer”).

For the foregoing reasons, we believe the District has 

adduced substantial evidence from which it reasonably could 

conclude that fingerprinting and photographing registrants 

will directly and materially advance public safety by 

preventing at least some ineligible individuals from obtaining 

weapons and, more important, by facilitating identification of 

the owner of a registered firearm during any subsequent 

encounter with the police. Those requirements are therefore 

not unconstitutional. The additional requirement that 

registrants appear in person to be photographed and 

fingerprinted is but a corollary necessary to implement those 

requirements. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1249 n.* (noting that 

administrative provisions “incidental to the underlying 

regime” are “lawful insofar as the underlying regime is 

lawful”).

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21

ii. Bringing the firearm, D.C. Code § 7-

2502.04(c)

The District argues that the “requirement that the firearm 

be made available for inspection allows MPD to verify that 

the application information is correct and that the firearm has 

not been altered or switched with another firearm.” The 

District, however, has offered no evidence — let alone 

substantial evidence — from which it can be inferred that 

verification will promote public safety. The district court 

acknowledged as much when it noted that not one of the

District’s four experts “specifically addresse[d] the 

requirement that registrants bring the gun to be registered 

with them.” Heller III, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 59. The district 

court nonetheless deemed it a “common-sense inference” that 

“if in-person appearance is necessary to verify the identity of 

the registrant, then physically bringing the gun is similarly 

necessary to verify the character of the registered weapon.” 

Id. Yet common sense suggests a person would not go to the 

trouble of obtaining a registration certificate for a weapon 

other than a weapon in his possession. On the contrary, 

common sense suggests that bringing firearms to the MPD 

would more likely be a threat to public safety; as Heller 

maintains, there is a “risk that the gun may be stolen en route 

or that the [would-be registrant] may be arrested or even shot 

by a police officer seeing a ‘man with a gun’ (or a gun case).” 

iii. Re-registration, D.C. Code § 7-2502.07a

The District has offered three justifications for the 

requirement that a gun owner re-register his firearm every 

three years. None is supported by substantial evidence from 

which the District could reasonably have concluded that 

requiring re-registration would advance an important 

governmental interest.

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First, the District’s experts argued that re-registration 

“will improve public safety by making sure that, in the time 

since [the gun owner] first registered, [he has] not fallen into a 

category of persons prohibited from owning a firearm.” 

Heller III, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 67-68. As Heller rightly points 

out, however, “District officials and experts conceded [that]

background checks could be conducted at any time without

causing the registrations to expire.” The re-registration 

requirement cannot survive intermediate scrutiny on the 

(dubious) basis that it will make this task easier. Cf.

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540 (2014) (“To meet 

the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government must 

demonstrate that alternative measures that burden 

substantially less speech would fail to achieve the 

government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is 

easier”).

Second, the District argues triennial re-registration will 

help to maintain the accuracy of the registration database. 

This seems self-evidently true, but it is far from an adequate 

reason for burdening every gun owner when there is already a 

requirement that gun owners report relevant changes in their 

information, such as a new address. D.C. Code § 7-2502.08 

(requiring such reporting). To the extent that a gun owner’s 

death or disposal of a registered gun is a fact of which the 

District should be aware, the District’s registration 

requirements as applied to any new owner within the District 

should satisfy that interest. 

Third, the District argues that it has “an interest in its 

residents verifying the whereabouts of their firearms” in order 

“to determine when firearms have been lost or stolen.” 

District law, however, separately requires a gun owner to 

report the loss or theft of a weapon “immediately upon 

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23

discovery” of the loss or theft, and imposes a monetary 

penalty for failure to do so. Id. § 7-2502.08(a)(1). In 

contrast, the re-registration provision imposes no penalty for 

failure to re-register except the revocation of one’s

registration certificate, but a person whose weapon has been 

lost or stolen no longer has need of a certificate. Although the 

District fails to make the argument express in its brief, the 

report of its Committee on the Judiciary, on which the brief 

relies in general, asserted that the re-registration provision 

may complement the loss-reporting provision because it 

“likely causes the owner to look for his or her gun if it hasn’t 

been used” for a while, but that is mere speculation. The reregistration process requires only that a gun owner affirm that 

he still has the registered weapon; it does not require the gun 

owner physically to examine the weapon. See id. § 7-

2502.07a. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that an 

owner who does not suspect his gun has been lost or stolen is 

likely to look for the registered weapon prior to re-registering 

it. 

iv. Fees, D.C. Code § 7-2502.05

Heller argues “[t]he District may not condition exercise 

of a fundamental constitutional right on the creation of a 

burdensome registration regime and then justify imposing 

‘administrative costs’ to pay for it.” He does not argue the 

registration fees of $13 per firearm and $35 for fingerprinting, 

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2320.3(c)(3), are unreasonably 

high. 

As we already said in Heller II, “administrative ...

provisions incidental to the underlying regime” — which 

include reasonable fees associated with registration — are 

lawful insofar as the underlying regime is lawful. 670 F.3d at 

1249 n.*; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577

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(1941) (holding, in response to a First Amendment challenge 

to a parade licensing statute, that a government may impose a 

fee “to meet the expense incident to the administration of the 

act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter 

licensed”); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165–69 (2d 

Cir. 2013) (holding constitutional a $340 fee for a license to 

possess a handgun in one’s home). As such, reasonable fees 

associated with the constitutional requirements of registration 

and fingerprinting are also constitutional.

v. Education requirements, D.C. Code §§ 7-

2502.03(a)(10), 7-2502.03(a)(13)

The District has presented substantial evidence from 

which it could conclude that training in the safe use of 

firearms promotes public safety by reducing accidents 

involving firearms, but has presented no evidence from which 

it could conclude that passing a test of knowledge about local 

gun laws does so. The safety training, therefore, is 

constitutional; the test of legal knowledge is not.

 

Regarding the one-hour firearms safety course, available 

online or at the MPD, FIREARMS SAFETY TRAINING COURSE, 

https://dcfst.mpdconline.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015), the 

District’s experts each testified to their belief in the value of 

training to prevent accidents. Heller responds that “the 

District’s experts cite no studies showing that mandatory 

training or testing in gun safety reduce unintentional 

discharges.” The District, however, need not present such 

evidence. Rather, the Supreme Court has “permitted litigants 

to justify ... restrictions ... based ... on history, consensus, 

and simple common sense” when the three are conjoined. Cf.

Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In this case, the District has 

offered anecdotal evidence showing the adoption of training 

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25

requirements “in most every law enforcement profession that 

requires the carrying of a firearm” and a professional 

consensus in favor of safety training.3

 Though its experts 

have characterized the training requirement as a matter of 

“common sense,” this is not a case in which the District has 

asked the court to rule upon the basis of “common sense” 

alone.

None of the District’s experts, however, offers any reason 

to believe that knowledge of the District’s gun laws will 

promote public safety. Indeed, the closest the District’s 

experts came to addressing the subject was the statement by 

Chief Lanier that “in order to make registrants more clearly 

accountable under the law, it is important to be able to 

demonstrate that they were taught and aware of the 

requirements.” This assertion, however, does not tie 

knowledge of the law to the District’s interest in public safety. 

Furthermore, even if acquiring knowledge of the law 

were demonstrably helpful, the imposition of a requirement 

that registrants prove their knowledge of the law on “a test 

prescribed by the Chief” is an additional burden, see D.C. 

Code § 7-2502.03(10), the utility of which is supported by no 

evidence whatsoever, not even anecdotal evidence. 

Moreover, only a few of the 15 questions in the test actually 

 3 J.A. 394 (Lanier declaration) (“California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 

Massachusetts, and Michigan all have laws requiring some sort of 

training or safety certification as part of the registration process, 

and other jurisdictions are considering instituting similar 

requirements”); J.A. 407 (Vince declaration) (stating that he “do[es] 

not know of one firearm expert or law enforcement trainer who has 

not strongly recommended attending and successfully passing a 

safety course prior to owning or using a firearm”).

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26

prescribed by the Chief plausibly reflect a concern with public 

safety.4

 

Because the District has offered no evidence from which 

the court can infer it reasonably concluded that knowledge of 

its gun laws, as shown by passing its test, will promote public 

safety, on this record the requirement must be held

constitutionally invalid. 

vi. One-pistol-per-month rule, D.C. Code. § 7-

2502.03(e)

The District has not presented substantial evidence to 

support the conclusion that its prohibition on the registration 

of “more than one pistol per registrant during any 30-day 

period,” D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(e), “promotes a substantial 

governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively 

absent the regulation.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1258 (quoting 

Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 782-83). It is therefore 

unconstitutional.

The District argues that the limitation could reduce gun 

trafficking and that it would further promote public safety by 

limiting the number of guns in circulation, as the District 

“could reasonably conclude that more guns lead to more gun 

theft, more gun accidents, more gun suicides, and more gun 

crimes.” 

 4 Compare J.A. 834 (“When handling a firearm, you should always: 

(A) Treat it as if it is loaded; (B) Point it in a safe direction; (C) 

Both A and B”) with J.A. 834 (“To purchase ammunition in the 

District of Columbia you must have the following in your 

possession: (A) A U.S. Passport; (B) A valid firearm registration 

certificate; (C) A valid driver’s license”).

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As for the District’s first argument, what little expert 

testimony it presented indeed indicates that limiting gun 

purchases in turn might limit trafficking in weapons. The 

experts’ conclusion that limiting gun registrations would 

likewise reduce trafficking is, however, unsupported by the 

evidence. For example, Chief Lanier stated “[s]tudies have 

shown that laws restricting the registration or purchase of 

multiple firearms in a given period are effective in disrupting 

illegal interstate trafficking of firearms.” Yet the only study 

she and the District’s other witnesses cited has nothing to do 

with “laws restricting registration,” as its title attests. See 

Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Limiting 

Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms, 275 

J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1759 (1996). One of the experts also 

testified from his own observation that when Virginia limited 

firearm purchases to one every 30 days, fewer guns bought in 

Virginia were used in crimes committed in the District; 

traffickers, he observed, instead sourced more guns through 

straw purchasers in Maryland. But even if this is true, the 

suggestion that a gun trafficker would bring fewer guns into 

the District because he could not register more than one per 

month there lacks the support of experience and of common 

sense. Indeed, as Heller notes, even Chief Lanier 

acknowledged that the efficacy of purchasing limitations in 

preventing trafficking may have little bearing upon the 

efficacy of registration limitations in doing so. 

As for the District’s second argument, one of its experts

testified that, in his opinion, “the most effective method of 

limiting misuse of firearms, including homicide, suicide, and 

accidental injuries, is to limit the number of firearms present 

in a home.” Accepting that as true, however, it does not 

justify restricting an individual’s undoubted constitutional 

right to keep arms (plural) in his or her home, whether for 

self-defense or hunting or just collecting, because, taken to its 

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logical conclusion, that reasoning would justify a total ban on 

firearms kept in the home. See Parker v. District of 

Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom.

Heller I (rejecting the District’s argument that a ban on one 

type of gun was constitutional because the “prohibition ...

[did] not threaten total disarmament” and noting that, if such 

argument were adopted “[i]t could similarly be contended that 

all firearms may be banned so long as sabers were 

permitted”). 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s final 

order is AFFIRMED with respect to: the basic registration 

requirement as applied to long guns, D.C. Code § 7-

2502.01(a); the requirement that a registrant be fingerprinted 

and photographed and make a personal appearance to register 

a firearm, D.C. Code § 7-2502.04; the requirement that an 

individual pay certain fees associated with the registration of 

a firearm, D.C. Code § 7-2502.05; and the requirement that 

registrants complete a firearms safety and training course, 

D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(13). The district court’s order is 

REVERSED with respect to the requirement that a person 

bring with him the firearm to be registered, D.C. Code § 7-

2502.04(c); the requirement that a gun owner re-register his 

firearm every three years, D.C. Code § 7-2502.07a; the 

requirement that conditions registration of a firearm upon 

passing a test of knowledge of the District’s firearms laws, 

D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(10); and the prohibition on 

registration of “more than one pistol per registrant during any 

30-day period,” D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(e).

So ordered.

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 28 of 46
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring 

in part and dissenting in part: Regulating firearms in order to 

combat gun violence is a grave and complex task. The 

Supreme Court has made that legislative endeavor 

considerably more difficult by “tak[ing] certain policy choices 

off the table,” Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 

(2008), and divining a new—and incomplete, see id. at 635—

definition of what the Second Amendment protects. Heller

has “hand[ed] our democratic destiny to the courts” by 

inviting litigants to draw them into this political thicket. 

J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the 

Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 257 (2009). 

Happily, the “dominoes” have not fallen as quickly as 

expected, Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting), as 

most of our sister circuits have afforded a healthy level of 

deference to the law-makers. But today I fear the majority 

has initiated a retreat—at least in part—from the practice of 

restraint.

My colleagues uphold six District of Columbia firearms

laws but strike down four of them. Because I would uphold 

them all, I concur in part and dissent in part. In my view, the 

firearms laws that my colleagues invalidate (hereinafter, the 

remaining laws) satisfy intermediate scrutiny and, 

accordingly, I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the 

district court. See 45 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D.D.C. 2014).

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, this Court 

analyzes Second Amendment challenges under a two-step 

framework. First, we ask whether the law “impinges upon” 

Second Amendment rights, i.e., whether it has “more than a 

de minimis effect” on the right to keep and bear arms. Heller 

v. Dist. of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). Second, if it does, we evaluate it under “the 

appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 1252. In 

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2

an earlier iteration of this case, we concluded that the 

challenged laws were “not de minimis” because they were

“novel” and “ma[d]e it considerably more difficult for a 

person lawfully to acquire and keep a firearm . . . [for] selfdefense in the home.” Id. at 1255 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 

630). We also determined that intermediate scrutiny, not 

strict scrutiny, is the proper yardstick because the laws “do 

not severely limit the possession of firearms.” Id. at 1257 

(alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Intermediate scrutiny has its genesis in the Supreme 

Court’s equal protection and free speech jurisprudence. See, 

e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); United States 

v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). It is a middle-ground 

approach that “offer[s] proper protection in the many 

instances in which a statute adversely affects constitutionally 

protected interests but warrants neither near-automatic 

condemnation (as ‘strict scrutiny’ implies) nor near-automatic 

approval (as is implicit in ‘rational basis’ review).” United 

States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., 

concurring in judgment). It essentially imposes a balancing 

test: the law is constitutional if “the governmental interest 

outweighs the burden [on constitutional rights] and cannot be 

achieved by means that do not infringe . . . rights as 

significantly.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn.

Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 n.7 (1983). “[T]he fit 

between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective

need only be reasonable, not perfect,” Schrader v. Holder, 

704 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alterations and quotation 

marks omitted), and the challenged law “need not be the least 

restrictive or least intrusive means of” achieving the 

government’s interest, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 

U.S. 781, 798 (1989).

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3

The application of intermediate scrutiny “varies to some 

extent from context to context, and case to case.” Bartnicki v. 

Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 124 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 

(2001). In this case and context, I believe the following 

principles should shape our analysis.

First, the nature of firearms regulation requires ample

deference to the legislature. We have previously held that, in

the Second Amendment context, “we afford ‘substantial 

deference to the predictive judgments of [the legislature].’ ” 

Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 

FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). This is because 

“the legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary to 

make sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional 

limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the 

manner to combat those risks.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Firearm policy is a “complex and dynamic” issue implicating

“vast amounts of data” that the legislature is “far better 

equipped” to gather and analyze. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665–

66. Such “information can be difficult to obtain and the 

impact of certain conduct difficult to assess,” Holder v. 

Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010), due to the 

different challenges facing different jurisdictions and the 

multiple factors that contribute to gun violence. Indeed, the 

data that does exist is either incomplete or influenced by 

partisanship:

Few topics in the realm of U.S. justice and politics 

elicit a more polarizing response than that of gun 

control. . . . At the center of the debate is the 

fundamental question of whether firearms, 

specifically those owned and wielded by private 

citizens, do more harm than good in deterring violent 

crime. Despite intense scrutiny from so many fields, 

however, scholars have reached few solid 

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4

conclusions to date. The answers to even basic 

questions (who is victimized, how many are 

victimized, and at what cost are they victimized) are 

fiercely disputed, resulting in a nebulous yet hotly 

contested understanding of the interplay between 

guns and crime. . . . Data exists to support both 

sides; the difficulty lies in separating partisanship 

and underlying attitudes from empirical observation 

and objective analysis. In truth, the isolation of such 

objectivity may be a logical impossibility.

II AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 505–

06 (Michael Shally-Jensen ed. 2015). Intermediate scrutiny is

a flexible framework that allows for different perspectives and 

a range of approaches to firearms regulation. See Fla. Bar v. 

Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995) (intermediate 

scrutiny does not require “the single best disposition” to 

problem); Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. United States, 211 

F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“In applying intermediate 

scrutiny, we inquire ‘not whether Congress, as an objective 

matter, was correct . . . .’ ” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 

v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997) (emphasis 

added))).

Indeed, judicial humility is especially important in the

context of firearms regulation. Although our Second 

Amendment precedent draws on First Amendment and 

voting-rights cases, see, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257, the 

right to bear arms is meaningfully different from the rights to 

speak and vote. See Bonidy v. USPS, 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 

(10th Cir. 2015) (“The risk inherent in firearms and other 

weapons distinguishes the Second Amendment right from 

other fundamental rights that . . . can be exercised without 

creating a direct risk to others.”). At the same time, however,

the Second Amendment is not a “second-class right,” 

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 32 of 46
5

McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) 

(plurality), but the reality of gun violence means our 

constitutional analysis should incorporate deference to the 

legislature, see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34–

36. One of our sister circuits said it well:

This is serious business. We do not wish to be even 

minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act 

of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial 

chambers we miscalculated as to Second 

Amendment rights. . . . If ever there was an occasion 

for restraint, this would seem to be it.

United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 

2011). 

Second, the District of Columbia is sui generis. The 

plaintiffs are quick to point out that the District’s firearms

laws are the toughest in the country and that a few have no 

parallel in other jurisdictions. But their point is unhelpful if

the District is different from other jurisdictions. And it is. 

Most notably, the District is the seat of our national 

government. The record amply documents the unique 

security risks presented by a city full of high-level 

government officials, diplomats, monuments, parades, 

protests and demonstrations and, perhaps most pertinent, 

countless government buildings where citizens are almost 

universally prohibited from possessing firearms. See, e.g., 18 

U.S.C. § 930(a), (g)(1) (unlawful to “knowingly possess[] or 

cause[] to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in 

. . . a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal 

Government, where Federal employees are regularly present 

for the purpose of performing their official duties,” other than 

a Federal court facility); id. § 930(e)(1) (unlawful to 

“possess[] or cause[] to be present a firearm or other 

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6

dangerous weapon in a Federal court facility”); 40 U.S.C. 

§ 5104(e)(1)(A) (unlawful to “carry on or have readily 

accessible to any individual on the Grounds or in any of the 

Capitol Buildings a firearm”); see also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(q)(2)(A) (making schools gun-free zones); Lanier Test. 

2–5. Indeed, walking around this town, one gets the 

impression that it is one big government building. Cf. Heller, 

554 U.S. at 626 (“the right secured by the Second 

Amendment is not unlimited” and can give way to regulations 

of “the carrying of firearms in sensitive places” like

“government buildings”). Although the Constitution does not 

stop at the Beltway, our analysis should account for the 

unique challenges that confront the District as it struggles to

regulate firearms in our Nation’s capital. See City of L.A. v. 

Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439–40 (2002) (“A 

municipality considering an innovative solution may not have 

data that could demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal 

because the solution would, by definition, not have been 

implemented previously.”).

II. THE REMAINING LAWS

My colleagues strike down the District’s laws requiring

registrants to pass a knowledge test, D.C. CODE § 7-

2502.03(a)(10); present their firearms for inspection, id. § 7-

2502.04(c); renew their registration every three years, id. § 7-

2502.07a(a); and register no more than one pistol per month, 

id. § 7-2502.03(e). I address these laws seriatim and explain 

why, in my view, each one satisfies intermediate scrutiny.

A. Knowledge Test

Before an individual can register a gun, he must

demonstrate his knowledge of the District’s firearms laws by 

passing a test. Id. § 7-2502.03(a)(10). The test is not 

particularly onerous: it consists of two pages with thirteen 

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7

multiple-choice questions and two True/False questions.

1

 The

examinee must answer eleven questions correctly (a score of 

70%). He need pass the test only once, id., and he can retake 

it as many times as he wants. See 24 DCMR § 2311.7–.8. 

The test is intended to ensure gun owners have a “basic level 

of knowledge” about the District’s firearms laws. Comm. 

Report 17. Those laws, in turn, promote the public safety. Id.

The plaintiffs contend, and my colleagues agree, that the

District presented “no evidence” its knowledge test furthers

its alleged interests. Appellants’ Br. 53–54; Maj. Op. 24. But

the notion that test-taking promotes knowledge is obvious—

ask any teacher, student or professional licensing board in the 

country. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) 

(“States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those 

qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles . . . 

[and] are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road 

. . . .”); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 

413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (“a regular program of traditional 

internal testing designed to measure pupil achievement” plays 

an “obviously integral role . . . in the total teaching process”); 

Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (“A 

State can require high standards of qualification, such as . . . 

proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar

. . . .”). Several of the District’s experts testified to that effect. 

 1

 The questions are not difficult. Consider, for example, 

Question 3: 

Firearms may be lawfully discharged on public space in the 

District of Columbia: 

(A) Into the air on New Year’s Eve. 

(B) At registered turkey hunts on Thanksgiving. 

(C) After obtaining a special written permit from the 

Chief of Police authorizing the weapon to be 

discharged on public space.

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 35 of 46
8

See Lanier Decl. ¶¶ 23–24; Jones Decl. ¶ 23; Webster Decl. 

¶ 35; Lanier Test. 2; Jones Report 10. Under intermediate 

scrutiny, the District does not need to cite empirical studies 

for the common-sense notion that mandatory testing promotes

knowledge of, and obedience to, its laws. See Lorillard 

Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“[W]e have 

permitted litigants . . . even[] in a case applying strict 

scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, 

consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’ ” (quoting Went For 

It, 515 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added)); Nat’l Cable & 

Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (we do not require “exhaustive evidence documenting 

the necessity of [a given law]” and we have “relied on [the 

legislature’s] reasonable, commonsense determination that 

[the law is] required”). See generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo.

Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (“The quantum of 

empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial 

scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with 

the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”).

The plaintiffs do not identify any alternative means by 

which the District can achieve its goals. Their implied 

alternative—no test at all—is plainly lacking. Given the 

uniqueness and complexity of the District’s firearms laws, it 

has an especially pressing need to educate its citizens about 

their contents. Under intermediate scrutiny, the District can 

“add[] a prophylaxis to the law,” even if it “focuses upon 

behavior already arguably proscribed by other laws.” Time 

Warner, 211 F.3d at 1320; see also United States v. Mahin, 

668 F.3d 119, 127 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Second Amendment 

does not disable Congress and the states from erecting 

preventative measures . . . .” (emphasis added)). Granted, in 

criminal cases, courts usually presume that individuals know 

the law. See McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 

2304 (2015) (“[I]gnorance of the law is typically no defense 

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 36 of 46
9

to criminal prosecution . . . .”). But this presumption is a legal 

fiction, not an accurate description of the world. See McBoyle 

v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); see also JOHN 

SELDEN, TABLE-TALK 174 (Constable & Co. 1827) 

(“Ignorance of the law excuses no man; not that all men know 

the law, but because ‘tis an excuse every man will plead, and 

no man can tell how to confute him.” (emphasis added)). All 

too often, individuals do not know the law and legislatures do 

well to ensure they are informed before they can own and use

a dangerous weapon. 

In sum, I believe the District’s knowledge test satisfies 

intermediate scrutiny. It ensures a gun owner has a basic 

understanding of the District’s firearms laws—laws that 

unquestionably promote the public safety.

B. Presenting the Firearm

The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) can require

a potential registrant to present his firearm for inspection. 

D.C. CODE § 7-2502.04(c). The law has an obvious, 

straightforward purpose: verification. See Appellees’ Br. 47–

48; Defs.’ Summ. J. Reply Br. 25 n.21. The MPD wants to

conduct a physical inspection to “verify that the application 

information is correct and that the firearm has not been 

altered.” Appellees’ Br. 47–48; see 24 DCMR § 2313.8(c)

(“The Director may require an applicant to return with the 

firearm if . . . the information relating to the weapon on the 

application [appears] incorrect, misleading, or incomplete.”). 

It also wants to ensure the firearm is in safe operating 

condition and does not belong to a prohibited class of 

weapons. See 24 DCMR § 2313.8(b) (“The Director may 

require an applicant to return with the firearm if . . . the 

firearm may be unregisterable, defective, or in a dangerous 

condition or state of disrepair.”).

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The plaintiffs contend, and my colleagues agree, that

physically inspecting a firearm is unnecessary because no one

would both register a firearm and lie about its physical 

characteristics—they would simply decline to register it in the 

first place. See Maj. Op. 21. But the present-the-firearm

requirement is not targeted at falsehoods only; the District is 

also worried about innocent mistakes. See 24 DCMR 

§ 2313.8(c) (“The Director may require an applicant to return 

with the firearm if . . . the application [appears] incorrect . . .

or incomplete.” (emphases added)). And many registrants 

will not be aware that their firearm is unsafe to operate or 

ineligible to be registered, see id. § 2313.8(b), until they 

present it and allow the MPD to take a closer look.

The plaintiffs further contend that the District’s interest 

in verification is outweighed by the burdens that presenting

the firearm imposes on registrants. According to the 

plaintiffs, a person who presents his firearm to the MPD could 

be arrested, have his gun stolen or be mistaken for an 

assailant. These risks, in my mind, are quite overblown. For 

starters, it is not a crime to transport a firearm to the MPD for 

the purpose of registering it. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504.01; 

22-4504.02(a); 18 U.S.C. § 926a. Moreover, registrants are 

instructed to leave their firearm at home unless asked to 

present it, 24 DCMR § 2313.7, and must transport the firearm 

“in accordance with [section] 22-4504.02,” D.C. CODE § 7-

2502.04(c)—i.e., unloaded, stored in a locked container, 

separate from any ammunition and inaccessible to the driver 

and any passenger, see id. § 22-4504.02(b)–(c). These 

provisions minimize the risk of an accident. And any 

remaining risk of theft or misunderstanding is an inherent

feature of owning a firearm—not a unique problem created by

the District’s laws.

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Accordingly, I believe the present-the-firearm 

requirement satisfies intermediate scrutiny. It imposes a 

slight burden on registrants and allows the District to verify

that the firearm is described correctly, has not been altered, is 

safe to operate and is eligible for registration.

C. Re-Registration

The District’s registration certificates expire every three 

years. Id. § 7-2502.07a(a). Thus, a gun owner who wants to 

maintain his registration must periodically renew it. Id. 

Renewal is “simple” by design. Comm. Report 10. The 

registrant fills out a two-page form online, by mail or in 

person. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.07a(c). The form includes a 

questionnaire to determine whether the registrant remains

qualified to possess a firearm and requests his current address 

and an attestation that he continues to possesses the firearm. 

See Firearms Registration Renewal Application, METRO.

POLICE DEP’T, available at http://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/

files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/Firearms%20Regi

stration%20Renewal%20Form%2012.18.13.pdf (last visited

September 17, 2015).

2

 The District reminds a registrant to 

renew his certificate ninety days in advance, D.C. CODE § 7-

2502.07a(e)(1), and gives him a ninety-day grace period after 

 2

 To renew the certificate for a firearm registered before

January 1, 2011, a registrant must also appear in person and be 

fingerprinted. See 24 DCMR § 2326.2. This process is a one-time 

requirement and does not apply to subsequent renewals. See

Firearms Registration Renewal: Complete Renewal Procedures, 

METRO. POLICE DEP’T, available at http://mpdc.dc.gov

/page/firearms-registration-renewal-complete-renewal-procedures 

(last visited September 17, 2015) (“Subsequent registration 

renewals will be done online or by mail.”). It is constitutional for 

the same reasons that the re-registration, fingerprinting and inperson appearance requirements are constitutional.

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 39 of 46
12

the renewal period expires, see 24 DCMR § 2326.4. Reregistration serves several purposes. It promotes public safety 

by allowing the District to monitor whether a gun owner has 

fallen into a class of people who cannot legally possess a 

firearm (e.g., felons, the mentally ill, subjects of protective 

orders). See Comm. Report 4, 11–12; Jones Decl. ¶ 23; 

Lanier Decl. ¶ 21; Vince Decl. ¶ 22; Webster Decl. ¶ 30. And 

it keeps the District’s firearms registry up to date. See Comm. 

Report 4, 10. The MPD needs updated information, including

the registrant’s most recent address, so that it knows where to 

retrieve the firearm if the owner becomes disqualified to 

possess it. See Lanier Decl. ¶ 21; Webster Decl. ¶ 30; see 

also Appellees’ Br. 48 (“The District . . . has a population that 

is significantly more transient than other states.”). Moreover, 

re-registration helps combat the loss and illegal transfer of 

firearms by requiring a registrant to account for his weapons 

on a regular basis and by providing MPD with “up-to-date 

information about the firearm’s last legal whereabouts.” 

Comm. Report 11; see also id. at 8, 10; Webster Decl. ¶ 30. 

The plaintiffs argue that the District could achieve each 

of these goals with less burdensome alternatives. As for 

ensuring that a registrant does not fall into a disqualified 

class, the plaintiffs note that the District is free to run 

background checks whenever it pleases. Yet background 

checks are less efficient and effective than a universal reregistration requirement, the latter ensuring that everyone

remains eligible to own a firearm. See Jones Decl. ¶ 24 (reregistration provides “mandatory accountability to . . . public 

safety officials”); id. at ¶ 23 (re-registration “compels a 

systemic review of all legally registered firearms and 

registrants”). “Of course, administrative convenience and 

economic cost-saving are not, by themselves, conclusive 

justifications for burdening a constitutional right under 

intermediate scrutiny. However, such considerations are 

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 40 of 46
13

relevant to [the Second Amendment analysis].” Bonidy, 790 

F.3d at 1127 (emphasis added). At bottom, the District needs 

to show that re-registration does not burden “substantially 

more [rights] than is necessary,” not that it is the “least 

intrusive means” of keeping tabs on gun owners. McCullen v. 

Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward, 491 

U.S. at 798–99). Assuming they could reveal all the reasons 

someone might become disqualified to possess a firearm (a 

dubious proposition, see generally D.C. CODE § 7-

2502.03(a)), I fail to see how dragnet background checks are

“substantially” less burdensome than filling out a two-page

form every three years. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535. 

Moreover, background checks plainly do not further the 

District’s interests in updating its firearms registry and

promoting accountability of gun owners. 

As for the latter interests, the plaintiffs point out that a 

gun owner is already required to notify the District if he 

changes his address or loses his firearm. See D.C. CODE § 7-

2502.08(a). But the District tried to rely on registrant

notification for several years and the experiment failed. 

According to the Committee Report, “[relying on notification 

alone] has not been effective. Thousands of registrants have 

moved, died, disposed of their guns (or perhaps lost them) and 

have not notified MPD. . . . [M]any registrants cannot be 

located.” Comm. Report 10; see also Jones Decl. ¶ 24. 

Instead of continuing to depend on registrant-initiated 

notification, the District’s re-registration requirement provides 

“mandatory accountability” by forcing a registrant to update 

his information under threat of cancellation. Jones Decl. ¶ 24; 

see also Vince Decl. ¶ 22; Webster Decl. ¶ 30 (re-registration 

“is analogous to the widely-accepted Federal requirement that 

licensed gun dealers be audited periodically to make sure that 

they can account for their firearms”). This is a permissible 

alternative under intermediate scrutiny. See Nat’l Cable & 

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14

Telecomm’ns Ass’n, 555 F.3d at 1002 (affirming opt-in 

scheme because “opt-out is only marginally less intrusive than 

opt-in” and agency “carefully considered the differences 

between the[] two” and made “reasonable, commonsense 

determination” (citation omitted)). “[T]he Constitution does 

not require that the [District] choose ineffectual means.” 

Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 n.10 (1973).

My colleagues do not believe the re-registration

requirement deters the loss or illegal transfer of firearms 

because it does not require a registrant to produce the gun; it 

“requires only that [he] affirm that he still has [it].” Maj. Op. 

23. In other words, my colleagues believe registrants will not

be truthful on their re-registration forms. The plaintiffs do not 

make this argument in their briefs, however, so we need not—

indeed, should not—consider it. See Schrader, 704 F.3d at 

991–92. Nor is the argument persuasive. A re-registrant must 

attest, under penalty of perjury, that he still possesses the 

firearm. See Firearms Registration Renewal Application, 

supra, at 11. In my view, the District reasonably assumes that 

most re-registrants will tell the truth. Cf. Rehberg v. Paulk, 

132 S. Ct. 1497, 1505 (2012) (threat of perjury prosecution 

adequately deters false testimony).

In short, I believe the District’s re-registration 

requirement passes constitutional muster. It imposes only 

minimal burdens on Second Amendment rights and 

simultaneously satisfies the District’s interests in preventing 

disqualified people from owning firearms, keeping the 

firearms registry up-to-date and deterring the loss and illegal 

transfer of firearms.

D. One Pistol Per Thirty Days

The District prohibits a registrant from registering more 

than one pistol in the same thirty-day period. D.C. CODE § 7-

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15

2502.03(e); 24 DCMR § 2305.3; see also D.C. CODE § 7-

2501.01(12) (defining “pistol” as “any firearm originally 

designed to be fired by use of a single hand or with a barrel 

less than 12 inches in length”). This limitation does not apply 

to an individual who relocates to the District and wants to

register pistols he lawfully owned in another jurisdiction for 

at least six months. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(e); 24 DCMR 

§ 2305.4.3 The parties agree that the purpose behind the onepistol-per-thirty-days rule is to stem the illegal trafficking of 

handguns. See Comm. Report 10, 14–15. 

The plaintiffs argue, however, that the one-pistol-permonth limitation does nothing to further this goal. No one, 

they point out, would bring pistols into the District, register 

them and then traffic them. The person would simply never 

register the pistols at all. But the plaintiffs focus on the 

wrong side of the equation. The one-pistol-per-thirty-days 

limitation is directed at the supply side, rather than the 

demand side, of illegal handgun trafficking. As stated in the 

Committee Report:

The law burdens gun traffickers and the straw 

purchasers they hire to supply them with guns, and it 

makes it more difficult for the rare dirty gun dealer 

who is willing to look the other way when a single 

individual walks in to his store asking to buy five or 

10 or even 20 or more inexpensive handguns to be 

sold on the street.

Comm. Report 16 (quoting Douglas Weil, A Law that GunRights Advocates Should Be Fighting to Keep, WASH. POST

 3

 And the one-pistol-per-thirty-days limitation applies to the 

initial registration only; an individual can simultaneously reregister as many pistols as he wants. See 24 DCMR § 2305.3.

USCA Case #14-7071 Document #1573768 Filed: 09/18/2015 Page 43 of 46
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(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com

/opinions/a-law-that-gun-rights-advocates-should-be-fightingto-keep/2012/02/16/gIQAvcASKR_story.html); see also 

Jones Decl. ¶ 18; Lanier Decl. ¶ 29; Vince Decl. ¶ 17. In 

other words, the one-pistol-per-thirty-days limitation deters 

dealers from selling more than one handgun at a time because 

they know multiple handguns cannot be registered and, thus, 

cannot be possessed or used for a lawful purpose. The 

Committee Report points to Virginia as an example of a 

jurisdiction that, after enacting a similar law, successfully 

reduced illegal handgun trafficking. See Comm. Report 15–

16; see also Jones Decl. ¶ 19. True, notwithstanding the onepistol-per-thirty-days limitation, a firearms trafficker could 

acquire handguns from another jurisdiction and transport

them into the District. See Maj. Op. 27. But the law

nonetheless deters the rapid acquisition of multiple firearms 

within the District. See Comm. Report 16 (“Since other states 

permit multiple gun sales—including, now, Virginia—our 

District law remains important. Indeed, the other states 

should follow, so as to erect a wide web to frustrate the 

traffickers.”) The District need not—indeed, cannot—solve 

problems created by the relatively lax firearms laws in other 

jurisdictions. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 

1668 (2015) (even under strict scrutiny, “[a] State need not 

address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop; 

policymakers may focus on their most pressing concerns”).4

 4

 My colleagues point out that the sources cited in the 

Committee Report discuss limitations on the purchase, not the 

registration, of handguns. See Maj. Op. 27. The plaintiffs,

however, do not make this argument and I do not believe we should 

do so on their behalf. See Schrader, 704 F.3d at 991–92. Even if 

we did, I think any distinction between purchase and registration is 

immaterial. Because the District prohibits the possession of 

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17

Given the record evidence supporting it, the one-pistolper-thirty-days limitation is constitutional—a conclusion that 

is bolstered by the fact that it imposes very little burden on 

Second Amendment rights. The plaintiffs contend—and my 

colleagues suggest, see Maj. Op. 27–28—that an individual

has as much constitutional right to a second pistol as he does

the first. They note that the Second Amendment discusses the 

right to keep and bear “Arms,” plural. See id. But I doubt 

their textual point has much force: the Second Amendment 

also uses the word “people,” plural, so the “s” on “Arms” is 

grammatically necessary. And Heller does not support their 

position either. The “core” of the Second Amendment is the 

right to use a firearm for self-defense in the home, Heller, 554 

U.S. at 630—a right that is vindicated with one handgun. The 

plaintiffs’ position has no stopping point: it would authorize

everyone to possess his own Rambo-style armory. Cf. id. at 

627 (noting that Second Amendment does not protect right to 

form “effective” militia (emphasis added)). In any event, we

need not decide whether the Second Amendment protects the 

right to a second firearm as much as the first firearm because, 

even assuming it does, the one-pistol-per-month limitation is 

only a small (and temporary) limit on Second Amendment 

rights. It imposes a thirty-day waiting period on the right to 

acquire a second pistol—an acceptable burden, given the 

availability of the first pistol, the availability of other firearms 

and the deadly costs of illegal handgun trafficking. Cf.

Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760–62 (requiring party registration 

eight months in advance of presidential primary is 

constitutional means of preventing one party’s voters from 

designating themselves as another party’s voters).

 

unregistered firearms, D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a), a limitation on 

registration is the functional equivalent of a limitation on purchases.

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In conclusion, I agree with my colleagues’ decision to 

uphold the District’s long-gun registration, registration fee, 

in-person appearance, photographing, fingerprinting and 

training requirements. Those parts of the majority opinion 

display proper deference to the District in its ongoing efforts

to formulate a workable firearms policy for our Nation’s 

capital. I believe my colleagues too readily abandon this

approach, however, with respect to the knowledge test, 

present-the-firearm, re-registration and one-pistol-per-thirtydays requirements. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.

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