Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00737/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00737-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHARON DOWNING,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:15-cv-00737-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case is before the court on Defendant Midland Funding, LLC’s Motion for More 

Definite Statement (Doc. # 43) and Motion to Stay Discovery and Suspend Scheduling Order

(Doc. # 44), both filed December 3, 2015. The Motions are both fully briefed. (Docs. # 43, 49, 

52; 44, 50, 53). 

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on April 30, 2015. (Doc. # 1). Defendant Midland Funding, 

LLC (“Midland”) timely filed an Answer to that Complaint. (Doc. # 16). After the court held a 

scheduling conference, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 38). The Amended 

Complaint added no new parties, but increased the number of counts (which alleged violations of 

the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)) and also made additional factual 

allegations. (Id.). 

Midland responded by filing the subject Motions (Docs. # 43, 44), which are opposed by 

Plaintiff. (Docs. # 49, 50, 52, 53). Midland argues that the Amended Complaint is a disfavored 

“shotgun pleading” making it impossible for Midland to formulate a meaningful response. 

FILED

 2016 Jan-12 PM 04:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00737-RDP Document 59 Filed 01/12/16 Page 1 of 9
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(Docs. # 42, 52). Midland also requests a stay of discovery pending Plaintiff’s filing of a new 

complaint and Midland’s possible filing of a motion to dismiss. (Docs. # 44, 53). Plaintiff has 

responded by asserting that Midland’s Motions are disingenuous and that Midland can ascertain 

the allegations against it. (Docs. # 49, 50).

After careful review, and for the reasons stated below, the court concludes that Midland’s 

Motions (Docs. # 43, 44) are due to be denied.

II. Analysis

In its Motion for More Definite Statement, Midland moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(e), for a more definite statement in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 8 and 10, and also asserts that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. # 38) is a 

disfavored “shotgun pleading.” (Doc. # 43). Midland also argues in its Motion To Stay 

Discovery And Suspend Scheduling Order that discovery should be stayed pending the outcome 

of the Motion For More Definite Statement and any subsequent motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 44).

A. The Amended Complaint is not a disfavored “shotgun pleading”

Rule 12(e) provides in pertinent part that “[a] party may move for a more definite 

statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A Rule 

12(e) motion is an appropriate response to a “shotgun pleading.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of 

Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996). A shotgun pleading tends to violate

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)1 and 10(b).2

 Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s 

 1 A pleading “must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

2 “A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a 

single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so 

would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence--and each defense other than a 

denial--must be stated in a separate count or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Case 2:15-cv-00737-RDP Document 59 Filed 01/12/16 Page 2 of 9
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Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “The problem with shotgun pleadings ‘is that they 

fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice 

of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.’” Wright v. Watson, 

No. 15-cv-34, 2015 WL 4873381, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2015) (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 

1323).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is not a shotgun pleading, even if it bears some 

characteristics of one. The Amended Complaint is akin to that reviewed by the court in Wright

and adjudged to suffice under Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b). See Wright, 2015 WL 4873381. First, as 

in Wright, the Amended Complaint contains “multiple counts where each count adopts the 

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before.”3

 

Id. at *3 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321). But, while it may have been preferable for 

Plaintiff not to have pleaded her claims in this fashion, “this is not a situation where a failure to 

more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the 

burden of understanding the factual allegations underlying each count.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 

1324. Indeed, “[i]t is not difficult to understand what the Defendants ‘were alleged to have done 

and why they were liable for doing it.’” Wright, 2015 WL 4873381, at *3 (quoting Weiland, 792 

F.3d at 1324). 

The Amended Complaint puts Midland on notice of the allegations against it—that is, 

eight counts “exclusively against Defendant Midland” alleging violations of the FDCPA (Counts 

I-VIII); one count against all Defendants for invasion of privacy arising in part from debt 

collection activities (Count IX); three counts “exclusively against Defendant Midland” regarding 

 3 Unlike many shotgun pleadings, however, the Amended Complaint does not contain multiple counts 

where each one adopts the allegations of each preceding count, “causing each successive count to carry all that came 

before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis 

added); (see Doc. # 38).

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the hiring, training and supervision of incompetent debt collectors (one for negligence, one for 

wantonness, and one for intentional) (Counts X-XII); one count against all Defendants for 

negligence and wantonness (Count XIII); one count “exclusively against Defendant Midland” for 

malicious prosecution (Count XIV); and one count against all Defendants for violations of the 

FCRA (Count XV). (Doc. # 38). These counts stand in contrast to the five causes of action 

alleged in the initial Complaint which alleged violations of the FCRA by all Defendants (Count 

One); invasion of privacy by all Defendants (Count Two); negligent, wanton, and/or intentional 

hiring and supervision of incompetent employees or agents by all Defendants (Count Three); 

negligence/wantonness by all Defendants (Count Four); and malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process by Midland only (Count Five). (Doc. # 1). Midland filed an Answer in response to the 

initial Complaint, even though that Complaint combined more types of causes of action into a 

single count (e.g., Count Three) and did not as clearly specify which Defendant is liable for 

which cause of action as does the Amended Complaint. (Compare Docs. # 1 and 38). While not 

conclusive, the filing of the Answer to the initial Complaint tends to persuade the court that 

Defendant understood Plaintiff’s allegations and therefore “did not [then] move for a more 

definite statement under [Rule] 12(e) or otherwise assert [any] difficulty knowing what [was]

alleged . . . and why [it was] liable . . . .” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. And now, if anything, the 

Amended Complaint better separates claims and clearly specifies which counts apply to 

Midland.4

 (See Doc. # 38). Thus, Midland has no sufficient basis to move for a more definite 

statement now.

Even so, it is true that the Amended Complaint does set forth a number of allegations 

such that it, at times, “is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously 

 4 The court notes that the Amended Complaint adds eight counts of violations under the FDCPA, which 

would require related factual allegations to prove.

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connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. To be sure, Plaintiff 

makes reference to multiple unnamed other lawsuits by and against Midland, and asserts the 

findings of Congress in passing the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.5

 (Doc. # 38). Also, the 

Amended Complaint repeats some paragraphs that appear to re-state some facts instead of 

reciting or alleging something new. (Id.). Granted, these instances are confusing and make the 

Amended Complaint more cluttered than it perhaps should be, and even may cause it to look like 

a classic shotgun pleading. 

However, just as students are often warned against judging a book by its cover, the fate of 

a complaint is not to be determined by stylistic shortcomings. To that end, while the Amended 

Complaint bears many of the hallmarks of a shotgun pleading, the Eleventh Circuit in Weiland 

suggests that district courts in our circuit should look to substance over form. See Weiland, 792 

F.3d at 1326 (holding that the court is “not retreating from this circuit’s criticism of shotgun 

pleadings, but instead [is] deciding that, whatever [its] faults, [the complaint is] informative 

enough to permit a court to readily determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted”). The court in Weiland examined more than sixty published decision regarding shotgun 

pleadings and, “[i]n the hope [it] could impose some clarity,” determined that “[t]he unifying 

characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in 

one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the 

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1321, 1323. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit 

ruled that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s third amended 

complaint on the grounds that it was a shotgun pleading that (1) incorporated all of the factual 

allegations contained in forty-nine paragraphs inclusive, and (2) failed to identify which 

 5 The court presumes these references are made to support a case for punitive damages, which are requested 

in the Prayer For Relief. (Doc. # 38).

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allegations were relevant to the elements of which legal theories. Id. at 1324, 1326. Significant 

to the Weiland court was that “this is not a situation where a failure to more precisely parcel out 

and identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the burden of understanding the 

factual allegations underling each count.” Id. at 1324.

As in Weiland, the Amended Complaint here “looks, at first glance, like the most 

common type of shotgun pleading. But it is not.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. For one thing, 

“[t]he allegations of each count are not rolled into every successive count on down the line.” Id. 

And, for another, “[t]he task of figuring out which of the [135] paragraphs that are incorporated 

into [the counts] are relevant to [each] claim . . . is hardly a task at all.” Id. at 1324-25. Indeed, 

“[i]t is greatly simplified by the organization of the [135] paragraphs of factual allegations into 

[five] subsections” (in addition to the introduction and sections on jurisdiction, venue, and the 

parties).6

 Id. at 1325; (Doc. # 38). Just as such factors weighed against finding a shotgun 

complaint in Weiland, they weigh against such a finding here. 

Further, the stylistic inefficiencies of the Amended Complaint do not violate the 

requirement that the complaint be a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Moreover, and in any event, Plaintiff’s 

failure to specify purportedly similar lawsuits by and against Midland does not cause the 

Amended Complaint to rise to the necessary level of vagueness or ambiguity required for a grant 

of the Motion For More Definite Statement. See Erickson v. Hunter, 932 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 

(M.D. Fla. 1996). Moreover, “[d]iscovery is the correct vehicle to obtain information necessary 

for trial.” Id. at 1384.

 6 Those subsections are labelled “Recognition By Congress of the Widespread Abuse by Collectors,” “The 

Small Claims Court Complaint,” “Midland Loses The collection Case,” “Defendants Falsely Credit Reports on 

Plaintiff’s Credit,” and “Remaining Factual Allegations.” (Doc. # 38).

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At worst, some allegations are “over-inclusive” and “poorly drafted,” but in this instance 

verbosity and poor draftsmanship do not inhibit the provision of adequate notice. Weiland, 792 

F.3d at 1321, 1325. To be sure, this court is able to establish the claims asserted against 

Midland. And, if the Amended Complaint were a true shotgun pleading, it would be “difficult to 

understand what the Defendants ‘were alleged to have done and why they were liable for doing 

it.’” Wright, 2015 WL 4873381, at *3 (citation omitted). But, Midland’s Co-Defendant TD 

Bank USA did not appear to have any difficulty in understanding what it was alleged to have 

done and why—TD Bank filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 41); cf. Weiland, 

792 F.3d at 1316 (“The complaint . . . does not approach th[e] ideal [pure statement free of 

surplusage matter], but it claims that the plaintiff has a case, and parts of it do a good enough job 

telling what that case is to require the defendants to say ‘either that that is not so, or something 

else is so.’”). While it is Midland’s Motion For More Definite Statement that is under 

consideration here (and not TD Bank’s), the court determine that the Amended Complaint puts 

Defendants on adequate notice, and Midland can reasonably file an appropriate responsive 

pleading.

Accordingly, the court “concludes that the ‘counts are informative enough to permit a 

court to readily determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’” Wright, 2015 

WL 4873381, at *4 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1326). The court cannot say that “it is 

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for 

relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366) (emphasis in original)

(internal quotations omitted). Thus, the court will not order a more definite pleading, and

Midland’s Motion For More Definite Statement (Doc. # 43) is due to be denied. 

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B. Discovery does not need to be stayed in this case

Midland’s Motion To Stay Discovery And Suspend Scheduling Order (Doc. # 44) is also 

due to be denied. First, the court’s denial of Midland’s Motion For More Definite Statement

leaves the stay request unsupported. Second, Midland is on notice that Plaintiff alleges certain 

violations, including violations of the FDCPA. Whether each individual cause of action may 

survive a later-filed dispositive motion, if any, is not a reason to halt discovery. 

Additionally, Midland has previously answered Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. (Doc. # 16). 

That Complaint alleged similar violations of (1) the FCRA, (2) invasion of privacy, (3) 

negligent, wanton, and/or intentional hiring and supervision of incompetent employees or agents, 

(4) negligence/wantonness, and (5) malicious prosecution and abuse of process. (See Docs. # 1, 

16). These same counts appear in the Amended Complaint (albeit separated into eight causes of 

action instead of five). (Doc. # 38). Further, the count for invasion of privacy (which included 

an express reference to the FDCPA) arose from Midland’s (and other Defendant’s) allegedly 

illegal debt collection actions. (See Docs. # 1, 38; see also Doc. # 16). The fact that Midland 

filed an Answer to those claims indicates that, as early as June 29, 2015 (the date the Answer to 

the initial Complaint was filed), Midland understood the claims asserted against it and was 

prepared to conduct discovery regarding those claims. 

And, the discovery as to those causes of action would include quite similar (if not, in 

many instances, precisely the same) discovery as the causes of action newly alleged in the 

Amended Complaint. (Compare Docs. # 1 and 38). Therefore, because there is no danger of 

“extended and largely aimless discovery” that would drown this court “in an uncharted sea of 

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depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits,” there is no reason to suspend discovery.7 Johnson 

Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Midland’s Motions For More Definite Statement and To Stay 

Discovery And Suspend Scheduling Order (Docs. # 43, 44) are due to be denied. A separate 

order will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this January 12, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 7 However, the parties Joint Motion For Extension of Deadlines (Doc. # 57) is due to be granted in a 

separate order, and the discovery deadlines (among others) will be extended. 

Furthermore, the court’s denial of the request for a blanket stay of discovery does not mean that the parties 

cannot agree to voluntarily halt discovery (at least on certain issues) pending the outcome of the pleading stage. For 

example, Midland may not be able to answer Interrogatory No. 1 (attached as “Exhibit A” to Midland’s reply brief) 

until filing a responsive pleading asserting affirmative defenses. (See Doc. # 53-1). During the course of this 

litigation, counsel can and should be professional and courteous to each other, and that professionalism and courtesy 

must begin now.

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