Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02251/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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1

Notwithstanding that Nadeem Hassan's wife, Amber Hassan, was added as a plaintiff

in the amended complaint, we refer only to Nadeem Hassan for ease of discussion. However,

this order applies to both plaintiffs. 

2

Plaintiff's objection to defendants' motion for leave to file a late reply is not a proper

objection, but instead is a sur-reply not permitted by the rules. Nevertheless, we have

considered all arguments asserted by the parties. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nadeem Hassan, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Department

of Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-2251-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 27), plaintiff's1

 response

(doc. 29), defendants' reply and motion for leave to file a late reply (doc. 30), and plaintiff's

objection to the motion for leave to file a late reply (doc. 31).2

 The motion to file the late

reply is hereby granted (doc. 30). 

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I

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Pakistan, lived with his family in Phoenix, Arizona

for a number of years. On January 9, 2002, he filed a Form I-485 (Application to Register

Permanent Residence or Adjust Status). The government interviewed him on July 25, 2005

and December 8, 2005, in connection with his adjustment of status application. On

December 8, 2005, while his application was still pending, plaintiff applied for and received

travel documents, including approval for advance parole (Form I-512), in anticipation of a

trip outside the United States. On December 30, 2005, plaintiff traveled to Saudi Arabia.

On January 13, 2006, while plaintiff was outside the United States, the Citizenship and

Immigration Services (CIS) denied plaintiff's status adjustment application and revoked his

advance parole authorization. Plaintiff returned to the United States on January 19, 2006,

applied for admission at JFK International Airport, and was detained by Department of

Homeland Security officials. Because his advance parole had been revoked, plaintiff was

removed from the United States via expedited removal procedures as an "arriving alien" not

in possession of valid entry documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Plaintiff did not move to

have that order reopened and reconsidered and the opportunity to do so has now expired. 8

C.F.R. § 103.5. However, he has filed a Form I-212 application for waiver of

inadmissibility, which remains pending. 

Defendants' denial of adjustment of status and revocation of parole was based in part

on the determination that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of status because of his

association with an organization known as Jamaat al Tabligh ("JT"), a group identified as a

terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), in that it allegedly provides

material support to al Qaida and the Taliban. Accordingly, the CIS district director

concluded that plaintiff was inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (engaging in terrorist activity by providing material support

to a terrorist organization), and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V) (soliciting individuals for

membership into a terrorist organization). As an independent basis for denying plaintiff's

application, the district director found that plaintiff failed to make full and truthful

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3

The regulations provide that"[n]o appeal lies from the denial of an adjustment

application by the director, but the applicant, if not an arriving alien, retains the right to

renew his or her application in [240 removal] proceedings." 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii)

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disclosures in completing his Form I-485 application when he failed to list his membership

in four organizations, including the JT. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (an alien who by

fraud or willfully misrepresents a material fact while seeking to procure a visa is

inadmissible). 

In addition to these findings of inadmissibility, the district director also denied

plaintiff's application as a matter of discretion. Noting that adjustment of status is an act of

administrative grace–an extraordinary benefit that should be granted only in meritorious

cases–the district director concluded that, because of national security concerns, the

favorable exercise of discretion was not warranted in this case. 

Plaintiff now challenges the denial of his adjustment of status application, arguing that

CIS improperly failed to follow its own regulations, which require that he have an

opportunity to present rebuttal evidence before the decision was rendered. In addition, he

argues that advance parole was improperly revoked, that he was entitled to parole upon return

to the United States, and that he should be allowed to return to the United States and either

resume his adjustment application or appeal the denial in a 240 removal proceeding.3

II

The central issue before us is whether we have jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's

claims. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), Congress gave the Attorney General broad discretion

to adjust the status of an eligible alien to that of a lawful permanent resident. Under §

1255(a), a status adjustment application must meet several prerequisites: (1) the alien must

have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the United States; (2) he must have

submitted an application for adjustment of status; (3) an immigrant visa must be

“immediately available” to the alien at the time the adjustment application is filed; and (4)

he must be "eligible to receive an immigrant visa and . . . admissible to the United States for

permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(a), .2(a). In addition,

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an adjustment of status applicant must demonstrate that he merits status adjustment in the

exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also Elkins v. Moreno,

435 U.S. 647, 667, 98 S. Ct. 1338, 1350 (1978) (“adjustment of status is a matter of grace,

not right"). 

Plaintiff contends that this court has jurisdiction under either the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704; the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361; or 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. Defendants argue, in contrast, that our jurisdiction

is limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which specifically addresses the jurisdiction of

federal courts to review decisions regarding adjustment of status under § 1255, or any other

decision expressly stated to be within the Attorney General's discretion. 

It is well established that a “general statute cannot confer jurisdiction when a more

specific statute explicitly denies it.” Vinieratos v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 774

(9th Cir. 1991). In May 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which provides that the

jurisdictional strictures of § 1252(a)(2)(B) apply, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of

law (statutory or nonstatutory), including . . . sections 1361 [Mandamus Act] and 1651 [All

Writs Act] of [Title 28], . . . and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is

made in removal proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). By virtue of this amendment,

Congress made clear that this court has no jurisdiction under the APA, the Mandamus Act

or "any other provision of law,” to review a decision to grant or deny relief under certain

expressly enumerated provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), including the denial

of an application for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Accordingly, our

jurisdiction vel non is derived from § 1252(a)(2)(B).

In the present case, CIS denied the adjustment application based not only on

inadmissibility considerations, but also as a matter of discretion. First, CIS determined that

the plaintiff was inadmissible as an alien found to have engaged in terrorist activity, and for

misrepresenting material facts in his application. Second, CIS denied plaintiff’s application

as a matter of discretion based on national security concerns. In either case, we do not have

jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) broadly states that "no court

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shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section

1255 . . . [or] any other decision . . . specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney

General." It is incontrovertible that the denial of an application for adjustment of status is

within the broad discretion of the Attorney General. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction

to review the denial of adjustment. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that the jurisdictional limitation of § 1252(a)(2)(B) does

not apply because he is not appealing a discretionary decision denying his application, but

instead is asserting that his constitutional due process rights were violated by the defendants'

failure to follow their own regulations in the decision making process, when they deprived

him of the opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence related to his adjustment application, as

required by 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and 103.2(b)(16)(i). In his amended complaint, plaintiff

asks us to issue a writ of mandamus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, to compel the defendants to

perform their nondiscretionary duty to allow him to present rebuttal evidence. 

Here, the decision to deny plaintiff's application was based in large part on his

involvement with the JT. CIS found that when plaintiff was questioned about the JT during

two separate interviews, he offered conflicting testimony about the nature of, and his

involvement in, the group. Plaintiff initially denied that the JT was even an organization, but

ultimately admitted that not only was it an established organization, but that he held a

position of responsibility in it. CIS concluded that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of

status because he made misrepresentations of material facts in his application. 

As an additional ground for finding plaintiff ineligible for adjustment of status, CIS

relied upon a report by the FBI, which concluded that the JT is engaged in terrorist activities,

and that plaintiff provided material support to this organization. Although plaintiff was

specifically questioned about his involvement in the JT, and therefore had an opportunity to

explain his association with the group, he complains that CIS failed to disclose the FBI report

and provide him an opportunity to rebut its contents. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to 8

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4

Although we do not reach the merits of plaintiff's claim, we note that 8 C.F.R. §

103.2(b)(8) does not serve to confer rights upon plaintiff. Section 103.2(b)(8) provides that

when there is no evidence of ineligibility and initial evidence is missing or raises questions

regarding eligibility, CIS may request the missing initial evidence and allows, but does not

require, CIS to request additional evidence. This provision does not apply here because (1)

there is no allegation that initial evidence was missing, (2) the decision to request additional

evidence is discretionary, and (3) in any event this provision does not require CIS to disclose

any evidence, including the FBI report. 

Similarly, it is questionable whether 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) imposed any

obligation on defendants under the circumstances of this case. This regulation provides that

when a decision "will be adverse to the applicant . . . and is based on derogatory

information," the applicant "shall be advised of this fact and offered an opportunity to rebut

the information and present information in his own behalf before the decision is rendered."

8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). Over the course of two interviews, plaintiff was specifically

questioned about his involvement in the JT, thereby providing plaintiff notice of defendants'

interest in the group and an opportunity to explain his association with it. Moreover,

plaintiff's involvement in the JT was only one of the stated reasons for denying his

adjustment application. His failure to adequately and truthfully complete the application was

an independent basis to deny the application, which would not implicate any disclosure

obligation under § 103.2(b)(16)(i). 

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C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and 103.2(b)(16)(i), CIS was required to disclose the FBI report and

afford him an opportunity to rebut its contents.4

 

Regardless of how plaintiff characterizes his claim, this is essentially an appeal from

the denial of his adjustment of status application. We recognize that courts have limited the

scope of the § 1252(a)(2)(B) jurisdictional bar to discretionary decisions only, and not to

purely legal, and hence non-discretionary questions. See, e.g., Montero-Martinez v.

Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that court has jurisdiction to review

nondiscretionary, statutory eligibility determinations). However, here, plaintiff contends that

he was not afforded the appropriate procedures in the application process, and that this

failure resulted in an improper denial of his application. This is not an issue of statutory or

regulatory construction as in Montero-Martinez, but instead is a challenge to CIS' application

of unambiguous regulations to the facts of a particular case. This is the kind of claim

appropriately raised in an appeal of the underlying decision. As previously stated, Congress

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5

We note that plaintiff left the United States while his adjustment application was

pending against the advice of his lawyer. Amended Complaint ¶ 32. He was warned that if

he left the country, it was possible that CIS would deny his application in their discretion,

possibly resulting in his immediate removal. Id. Arguably, this decision constitutes a

knowing waiver of his rights under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a). 

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has divested this court of jurisdiction to consider such appeals. See 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B).

Even if we were persuaded that the question presented is purely legal, and thus nondiscretionary, we are faced with the question of whether the issues in this case present a live

case or controversy. A case loses its character as a present, live controversy and becomes

moot when the court no longer can issue any effective relief. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach,

241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001). Given the procedural posture of this case, our review of

the procedures applied by CIS in its decision making process is incapable of providing any

effective relief. To be eligible for an adjustment of status, an applicant must be "admissible."

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien who was "previously removed" is not "admissible." 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9). Plaintiff's advance parole was revoked,5

 rendering him an "arriving alien"

without valid entry documents upon his return, and consequently subject to expedited

removal. Because plaintiff was removed, he is ineligible for adjustment of status. Any

decision by this court will have no effect on the removal order entered and executed in New

York. Moreover, even if we had jurisdiction to review the removal order, review is restricted

to habeas corpus proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), and the limited scope of review prohibits

review of inadmissibility determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5). The inevitable conclusion

is that plaintiff remains removed, rendering him inadmissible, and consequently ineligible

for adjustment of status. Therefore, our reconsideration of the adjustment denial is incapable

of providing plaintiff with any effective relief, and accordingly the issue presented is moot.

See Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 916 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Because we conclude that

Nyaga is no longer eligible to receive a visa, the district court could not provide meaningful

relief to the Plaintiffs and the court was compelled to dismiss this case as moot.").

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Finally, even if we concluded that we had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's

constitutional challenge, we would nevertheless reach the same result because plaintiff had

no constitutional right to the regulatory process. Relying on United States ex rel. Accardi

v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268, 74 S. Ct. 499, 504 (1954), plaintiff argues that the failure

of an agency to follow its own regulations violates the Due Process Clause. However, "an

expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due

Process Clause." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n.12, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1748 n.12

(1983). "Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive

interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." Id. at 250, 103 S. Ct.

at 1748. It is well established that the availability of discretionary benefits does not create

a liberty interest. See, e.g., Tovar-Landin v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004)

("aliens have no fundamental right to discretionary relief from removal for purposes of due

process and equal protection"); Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2003)

("[s]ince discretionary relief is a privilege created by Congress, denial of such relief cannot

violate a substantive interest protected by the Due Process clause"). Moreover, the

application process for a discretionary benefit cannot itself constitute a protected liberty

interest. Olim, 461 U.S. at 250, 103 S. Ct. at 1748 ("An expectation of receiving process is

not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. . . . The Court of

Appeals thus erred in attributing significance to the fact that the prison regulations require

a particular kind of hearing before the administrator can exercise his unfettered discretion.");

Nguyen v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that aliens have

a due process right to a discretionary relief hearing, because "neither relief from removal

under discretionary waiver nor eligibility for such discretionary relief is entitled to due

process protection") (emphasis omitted). Therefore, because the relief sought was entirely

discretionary, the regulatory process related to the application for such discretionary relief

affords no liberty interest. 

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III

Plaintiff argues that even if we leave undisturbed the denial of the adjustment

application, he nevertheless is entitled to renew his application in a 240 removal proceeding

because he was not an "arriving alien" upon his return to the United States. 8 C.F.R. §

245.2(a)(5)(ii) ("[n]o appeal lies from the denial of an application by the director, but the

applicant, if not an arriving alien, retains the right to renew his or her application in [240

removal] proceedings"). Plaintiff contends that because he obtained advance parole prior to

leaving the country, he should have been treated as a non-arriving alien upon his return and

placed in a 240 proceeding where he could appeal the denial of his adjustment application.

We do not have jurisdiction to review the revocation of plaintiff's advance parole.

The Attorney General has broad discretion to grant or revoke parole, 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5)(A) (“[t]he Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United

States . . . any alien”); see also Samirah v. O'Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085, 124 S. Ct. 2811 (2004) ("the Attorney General has the discretion

to revoke advance parole after it has been granted"). Because Congress expressly specified

that the authority to grant or revoke parole is within the discretion of the Attorney General

judicial review of that decision is precluded. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (barring review of the

"grant, revocation, or denial of . . . parole"); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (barring review of

decisions committed to the discretion of the Attorney General); Samirah, 353 F.3d at 549

(holding that the decision to grant or revoke parole is "squarely within the ambit of §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), . . . [and a] district court lack[s] jurisdiction to review, much less reverse,

the revocation of . . . parole"). Therefore, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), we have

no jurisdiction to review the revocation of plaintiff's advance parole. 

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IV

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the issues

presented in plaintiff's amended complaint. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING

defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 27). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING

defendants' motion for leave to file a late reply (doc. 30). 

DATED this 30th day of October, 2006.

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