Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01248/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01248-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHANNON MARIE SALADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-1248-TLN-GSA

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TO REMAND 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AND TO 

DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST 

DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY

(Doc. 17, 19)

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Shannon Marie Salado seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for social security disability insurance

benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act.1 

II. Factual and Procedural Background

In the initial application Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of February 12, 2016 (this 

was later amended by Plaintiff to February 12, 2017). AR 208. The Commissioner denied the 

applications initially on February 1, 2019, and on reconsideration on April 3, 2019. AR 107, 113.

Plaintiff appeared for an initial hearing before an ALJ on May 12, 2020, which was continued for 

Plaintiff to obtain counsel. AR 70–76. A second hearing was held on July 2, 2021. AR 41–69.

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision dated July 9, 2021. AR 20–40. The Appeals Council 

1 The parties did not consent to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 8, 10.

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

denied review on May 10, 2022, and this appeal followed. AR 9–14. 

III. The Disability Standard

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), this court has the authority to review a decision by the 

Commissioner denying a claimant disability benefits. “This court may set aside the 

Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal 

error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence within the 

record that could lead a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion regarding disability status. See 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 

When performing this analysis, the court must “consider the entire record as a whole and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Social 

Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). If the 

evidence could reasonably support two conclusions, the court “may not substitute its judgment for 

that of the Commissioner” and must affirm the decision. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 

(9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[T]he court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless 

error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that 

he or she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if . . . 

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not 

only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and 

work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 

in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 

area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether 

he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B).

To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established a 

sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon reaching a dispositive finding that the 

claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927, 416.929.

Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether a claimant engaged in substantial 

gainful activity during the period of alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had medically 

determinable “severe impairments,” (3) whether these impairments meet or are medically 

equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) 

whether the claimant retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant 

work, and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant 

numbers at the national and regional level. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). While the Plaintiff bears 

the burden of proof at steps one through four, the burden shifts to the commissioner at step five to 

prove that Plaintiff can perform other work in the national economy given her RFC, age, education 

and work experience. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

At step one the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

the amended alleged onset date of February 12, 2017. AR 25. At step two the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; delusional 

disorder; depression; anxiety; obesity and scoliosis. AR 25. 

At step three the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination thereof 

that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 26–28.

Prior to step four, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and 

concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with 

the following limitations: occasional postural activities; receive, comprehend, and execute simple 

routine tasks; no public contact; occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors; no assembly 

line work or tandem tasks; no hourly production quotas though daily quotas are permissible. AR 

26–33.

At step four the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a 

real estate property manager or administrative assistant as actually or generally performed. AR 33–

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

34. At step five, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform 

other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy at the light exertional level, 

namely: housekeeper, mail clerk and document specialist. AR 34–35. Thus, the ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff was not disabled since the alleged onset date of February 12, 2017. AR 35. 

V. Issue Presented

Plaintiff asserts two claims of error: 1- the ALJ erred in failing to consider a closed period 

of disability; 2- the ALJ failed to include work-related limitations in the RFC consistent with the 

nature and intensity of Plaintiff’s limitations and failed to offer legitimate reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

A. Closed Period of Disability

1. Legal Standard: Durational Requirement; RFC Generally

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or 

she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

twelve months2. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ must first determine the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity. Nowden v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-00584-JEM, 2018 WL 1155971, 

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018). The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] 

limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, 

including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling 

(“SSR”) 96–8p.

In doing so, the ALJ must determine credibility, resolve conflicts in medical testimony and 

2 There is little dispute that this applies equally to any discrete 12-month period of disability within the period under 

review, and this is so even if the evidence does not support a disability finding for the entirety of the period under 

review given the plain language of the Act’s durational requirement (“a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months”)—in addition to authority in unpublished district court opinions.

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

resolve evidentiary ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). “In 

determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record such as 

medical records, lay evidence and the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably 

attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. See also 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545(a)(3) (residual functional capacity determined based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the 

facts and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986)). 

2. Analysis

a. Background

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to adequately consider records which she believes establish 

a closed period of disability dating from August 16, 2018 to January 30, 2020. MSJ at 13–16, Doc. 

17. 

Briefly by way of background, prior to Plaintiff’s August 16, 2018 inpatient admission,

Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Aghaie at Apex Medical Group, diagnosed and treated her 

anxiety with Lexapro in addition to managing other conditions such as psoriasis, obesity and back 

pain. See generally Ex. 2F, 5F, 9F (AR 383–427; 519–561; 761–820). 

On August 16, 2018, Plaintiff’s mother took steps to have Plaintiff admitted to a behavioral 

health facility, Marie Green Psychiatric Center, pursuant to a 5150 hold for three days due to 

delusions, auditory hallucinations and associated aberrant behavior including locking herself in a 

gas station office until the police removed her. AR 429–435. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff visited Merced Mental Health for psychiatric medication management 

and therapy (see generally Exs. 3F, 4F, 6F, 8F; (AR 428–499; 500–518; 562–608; 614–760)). 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Although she continued visits with her primary care physician Dr. Aghaie, it appears that Marie 

Green Psychiatric Center, and subsequently Merced Mental Health, took over the psychotropic 

medication management, including discontinuing Lexapro and starting antipsychotics such as 

Zyprexa, Geodon and Vraylar, which will be discussed in more detail below.

3

 

b. Discussion

Plaintiff emphasizes the following records during her inpatient stay at Marie Green 

Psychiatric Center, was well as her follow ups thereafter at Merced Mental Health:

1- August 16, 2018 inpatient exam: guarded behavior, agitated motor 

activity, poor insight, poor judgement, auditory hallucinations and de-realization,

pressured and excessive speech, various mood abnormalities, and exaggerated affect 

(AR 438–39), corresponding diagnoses of delusional disorder, grandiose type, with 

bizarre thought content, multiple episodes, currently in acute episode (AR 429); 2-

August 17, 2018 inpatient examination: continued paranoid delusions, auditory 

hallucinations (AR 446); 3- August 19, 2018 inpatient exam: continuous mood 

changes, delusions, poor insight and judgment, and speech abnormalities (rapid, 

emotional, exaggerated, excessive, and loud) (AR 450); 4- August 23, 2018 exam:

delusions, auditory hallucinations, grandiosity, severe mood swings, excessive 

speech, paranoia, shuts down, tangential; 5- similar findings at August 27, 2018 and 

September 10, 2018 follow ups (AR 485; 488).

Following Plaintiff’s inpatient stay, Plaintiff points to the following records from Merced 

Mental Health psychiatry/medication management visits and therapy visits: 

1- October 29, 2018 medication management visit: hyper-verbosity, racing 

thoughts, delusions, diagnoses of bipolar disorder, mixed with psychotic features vs 

schizoaffective, and prescription for Geodon 20mg (AR 491); 2- December 3, 2018 

therapy visit: depressed, steady, emotionless (AR 495); 3- December 7, 2018

medication management: mania and psychotic symptoms improved quickly on 

Geodon, she was no longer talking about communicating with spirits, but her

depression had worsened as the mania resolved which the clinician assured her was 

often the case with bipolar, and they would try Wellbutrin for depression (AR 497–

98); 4- January 4, 2019 therapy notes: tired, sad, blank stare, teary eyed, emotional, 

per mother Geodon helped with mania but brought her down to a 10 where she was

3 See AR 464 (August 20, 2018 discharge treatment plan from Marie Green Psychiatric Center noting “discontinue 

lexapro to avoid iatrogenic mania. Start Zyprexa 20mg po QD after dinner. Benadryl 50mg po BID prn for 

sleep/EPS/anxiety.”); AR 511 (January 23, 2019 progress note from Merced Mental Health noting “in the past she 

used Lexapro ( SSRI) that benefited her for about 2 years prior to hospitalization, discussed Zoloft, (SSRI) more 

targeted for depression whereas Lexapro was anxiety, patient stated that she no longer feel anxious . . . patient stated 

that [she] was open to possible Zoloft, will consult with MD in 2 weeks when patient is to follow up to see if full 

month of Vraylar made a difference for her. Patient agreed with plan.”).

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

stuck (AR 507); 5- January 8, 2019 psychiatry medication management: complained 

of sleep disturbance, lack of ambition to get out of bad or do household activities, 

Wellbutrin and Geodon were discontinued and Vraylar was added (AR 509); 6-

January 23, 2019 psychiatric medication management visit: no change with Vraylar

per patient, increasingly depressive, clinician proposed Zoloft for depression as a 

better alternative than Lexapro and patient was open to it (AR 511); 7- January 28, 

2019 therapy notes: sad, tearful, flat affect, blank stare, low energy, no interest in 

doing things though she did spend time with children, her husband left her due to 

severity of her emotional state (AR 513); 8- February 6, 2019 psychiatric medication 

management visits: mother reported medication working well, MSE showed 

appropriate affect, smiling, flat affect disappearing, more involved in household 

activities, helping with children, journaling (AR 515); 9- February 26, 2019: same

(517); 10- March 12, 2019 medication management visit: symptoms the same with

no changes, tired all the time, MSE noted tearfulness; 11- On March 9, 2019

medication management visit: continued symptoms of bipolarity, worried, sad, 

depressed, poor concentration, but without hallucinations or delusions, Vrylar 

increased to 3.0 (AR 573–74); 12- March 22, 2019 therapy visit: spending more 

time with children, was more initiating and more independent per mother but 

increase emotional reactions, therapist notes “continues to meet medical necessity 

and is at risk of decompensation. . . she is currently being cared for by her mother.” 

(AR 575); 13- At the April 4, 2019 medication management visit: starting to feel 

her emotions again, tearfulness, but logical and linear thought process, no 

hallucinations or delusions, sleeps and eats well, rates her progress a 5/10 (AR 577); 

14- On April 25, 2019 medication management: same exam findings, no change 

from prior visit, but was noted to be more expressive (AR 579); 15- May 5, 2019

therapy notes: presented with intense stare, tearful, reported inability to feel 

emotions (AR 581); 16- May 24, 2019 therapy notes: presented teary eyed but 

smiling for the first time (AR 583); 17- June 14, 2019 therapy visit: teary eyed and 

remained silent while children expressed their feelings (AR 669); 18- July 8, 2019

therapy notes: presented as emotional, mother had to clarify her feelings, clinician 

noted she is still at risk of decompensation and being cared for by her mother (AR 

587); 19- July 9, 2019 medication management visit: alert and oriented x4, linear 

and logical thought process, no delusions or hallucinations, Wellbutrin added for 

depression (AR 674); 20- July 30, 2019 medication management: same findings and 

continued on Vraylar and Wellbutrin (AR 590); 21. September 10, 2019 medication 

management: stable with mood swings but still depressed, Wellbutrin was increased 

(AR 592); 22- October 18, 2019 medication managemenr: alert and oriented x4, 

logical and linear thought process, reported depression improved with increased 

Wellbutrin dose, she had finally restarted driving, was now taking care of her 

children, and was no longer under her mother’s care (AR 594); 23- December 9, 

2019 medication management: improving on increased Wellbutrin but still very sad, 

felt inadequate, not accepting her mental illness and impending divorce, presented 

with sad mood, congruent affect, crying spells, fair insight, fair judgment, but was 

noted to be stable and no longer cycling (AR 596); 24- January 27, 2020, PCP visit 

reporting continued depression and anxiety with PHQ-9 depression scores in the 

severe range (AR 528); 25- January 30, 2020 mental health reassessment: noted she 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

was declined enrollment in CalWorks services due to mental health impairments,

4

she reported ongoing depressed mood and 100 weight gain in two years; sleep

disturbance, low energy and motivation, poor concentration and memory; MSE 

noted clean a kept, cooperative, frequently tearful, “affect was content [sic] mood at 

full range and appropriate to the content of her speech,” speech was clear, normal 

perception, oriented to time and place, normal cognition and judgment, good insight, 

assessed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type and was noted to require 

counseling and medication services to prevent decompensation. (AR 566–70).

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s discussion of this evidence was inadequate insofar as the ALJ 

cited only 3 medical record entries during the period of August 16, 2018 to January 30, 2020. Br. 

at 14, Doc. 17. 

At the outset, it is worth noting that Plaintiff’s contention is incorrect. In the paragraph 

immediately preceding the discussion to which Plaintiff refers, the ALJ in fact cited 22 entries from 

Plaintiff’s primary care physician Dr. Aghaie at Apex Medical Group (Ex. 2F, 5F, 9F), at least half 

of which were dated during the time period in question, which is the alleged “closed period of 

disability” existing between August 16, 2018 and January 30, 2020. See AR 29 (citing (Ex. 

2F/7,9,14,16,21,26,28,31; 5F/6,8,14,17,20,22; 9F/12,19,22,30,33,40). 

As Defendant and the ALJ emphasize, during these PCP appointments “the claimant 

reported symptoms of depression and anxiety, but she routinely had mild or normal mental status 

exam findings, with good judgment and normal recent/remote memory noted,” and she was noted 

as stable on two occasions. AR 29. However, these were abridged psychiatric findings from a 

general internist who was managing unrelated conditions including psoriasis, obesity and back pain. 

As explained above, prior to Plaintiff’s August 2018 manic episode and inpatient stay, Dr. Aghaie 

was also treating Plaintiff’s anxiety with Lexapro. After this episode it was Merced County Mental 

Health that was managing Plaintiff’s psychiatric medications and care, including Lexapro, and 

4 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ ignored this fact, however the cited record does not necessarily establish that she was 

declined enrollment in Calworks due to her mental health as this was contained in her report to the clinician. Further,

it is not clear what the significance of this fact is.

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

provided more detailed and comprehensive mental status examination findings. Plaintiff was also 

regularly being seen by a therapist as a part of that treatment team who took detailed and extensive 

notes as summarized above. 

Collectively, Plaintiff attended at least 26 appointments over the 17-month period in 

question between psychiatry and therapy at Merced County Mental Health. Simply put, the 

recycled and abridged psychiatric findings of Plaintiff’s PCP as to mood, judgment and memory

(Exs. 2F, 5F, 9F) have relatively minimal evidentiary value compared to the detailed 

contemporaneous records of an inpatient psychiatric institution and an outpatient psychiatric 

treatment team at Merced County Mental Health (Exs. 3F, 4F, 6F, 8F) which Plaintiff visited at 

least 26 times over 17 months.

As to the latter records, the ALJ’s discussion was quite limited. The ALJ did acknowledge

the 3-day inpatient stay due to auditory hallucinations after which she received treatment through 

Merced County Department of Mental Health. The ALJ explained as follows:

At times, the claimant presented with hallucinations and other psychotic 

symptoms. However, these symptoms appeared to stabilize with medication. For 

instance, during an October 2018 appointment, the claimant presented with racing 

thoughts and she was noted to be delusional, with limited insight and impaired 

judgement (Ex. 3F/64). She was treated with medication adjustments. During a 

December 2018 appointment, the claimant’s mother reported the claimant improved 

quickly with her current medication, and she was much calmer and no longer 

psychotic (Ex. 3F/70). On exam, the claimant had a normal appearance with good 

grooming and eye contact. She was cooperative attentive and responsive. Her mood 

was depressed but she no longer had hyper-verbal or tangential/circumstantial 

speech/language (Ex. 3F/70).

However, the ALJ failed to recognize that despite improved manic symptoms at the 

December 2018 exam Plaintiff’s mother noted her depression had worsened. Shifting from one

extreme of the bipolar spectrum to the other (manic to depressive) does not result in a net gain in 

functionality. Moreover, a patient may improve in one respect while worsening in the other as

noted by the clinician that a depressive phase commonly follows improvement in manic symptoms, 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

in which case they would initiate Wellbutrin for depression. AR 497–98. 

The ALJ continued:

Throughout 2019, the claimant continued received individual counseling, during 

which she reported schizoaffective related symptoms, including mood swings, 

delusions, hallucinations, excessive disorganized speech, and irritability (Ex. 4F/14; 

6F). However, medication adjustments were made and improvement was routinely 

noted throughout treatment. During a March 2020 therapy session, the claimant was 

dressed appropriately; she had a calm and friendly affect and she denied suicidal 

thoughts. She reported she was stable on medication and there were no adverse side 

effects. She further reported that she still felt depressed but she felt much better on 

medication (Ex. 6F/41).

Again, the ALJ’s reliance on non-specific “improvement [that] was routinely noted 

throughout the record” is not a particularly helpful observation, particularly in the case of a bipolar 

disorder. The broad generalization was also insufficiently supported by a citation to the record. 

For example, the ALJ describes one exam from March 2020 despite innumerable exams between 

August 2018 and January 2020 as summarized above. The ALJ’s oversimplification of these 

treatment records fails to recognize that despite seemingly sustained improvements in manic 

symptoms, the records appear to suggest only fleeting improvement in depressive symptoms. 

Further, the notion that Plaintiff’s symptoms routinely improved following medication adjustments 

is somewhat belied by the sheer number and variety of medication adjustments, including adding 

and discontinuing Lexapro, adding and discontinuing Zyprexa, adding and discontinuing Geodon, 

adding Wellbutrin, adding Vraylar, increasing the dose of Wellbutrin and increasing the dose of 

Vraylar. 

Finally, as Defendant emphasizes, the ALJ added the following:

Recent records show the claimant has experienced a positive response to medication 

therapy and therapy, and her symptoms appear reasonably stable. For instance, 

during a January 2020 appointment, the claimant the claimant continued to report 

ongoing depression and anxiety (Ex. 8F/144). However, on exam, her speech was 

clear and unremarkable; affect was congruent to mood and mood was unremarkable; 

thoughts/perception was normal and insight and judgment were good (Ex. 8F/146). 

Similarly, during a May 2021 follow-up, the claimant had a relatively unremarkable 

mental status exam. She reported she was doing well and just needed medication 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

refills. No changes were made to her medication and she was advised to follow up 

in three months (Ex. 8F/134).

Here, the ALJ misidentified the date of the January 2020 appointment which was actually

dated January 26, 2021 (AR 757), leaving little discussion of the records dating from August 2018 

to January 2020, which was not rectified by the citation to a May 2021 exam.

Notably, elsewhere in the decision the ALJ appeared to concede that the records from 2018 

through 2019 were anomalous in some respects. The ALJ also rejected the opinion of the nonexamining psychiatric consultant, Dr. Sampson, that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in some 

areas of mental functioning. In so concluding, the ALJ explained as follows:

Further, this opinion is not consistent with the mental status exam findings, 

particularly those in 2018-2019, where the claimant presented with limited insight 

and judgment, as well as impaired speech due to hallucinations and delusions. 

Overall, the record supports moderate limitations in all four areas of mental 

functioning, with correlating residual functional capacity limitations, including in 

the area of adapting/managing oneself.

AR 32 (emphasis added). 

Although the ALJ appeared to recognize the importance of these records, a more thorough 

discussion by the ALJ was needed than was provided.

Defendant further emphasizes at some length the ALJ’s analysis of therapy records from 

2017 with LMFT Stark (Resp. at 4), but this is not responsive to Plaintiff’s claim on appeal, namely 

a closed period of disability during the period of August 16, 2018 to January 30, 2020. Defendant 

also discussed at some length the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s physical RFC, including strength, 

gait, and range of motion. Resp. at 5–6. Again, this is not responsive to Plaintiff’s claim on appeal

that her mental impairments support a closed period of disability from August 2018 to January 

2020. 

Remand is therefore appropriate for the ALJ to reevaluate the mental health evidence during 

the period of August 16, 2018 to January 30, 2020, to determine whether it supports a closed period 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

of disability.

B. Subjective Complaints

1. Applicable Law

An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

subjective pain or symptoms is credible. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2014); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; S.S.R 16-3p at 3. First, the claimant must produce objective 

medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of 

the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281–82. If the 

claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must “evaluate the 

intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms to determine the extent to which the 

symptoms limit an individual’s ability to perform work-related activities.” S.S.R. 16-3p at 2. 

An ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s testimony must be supported by specific, clear and 

convincing reasons. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014); see also S.S.R. 16-3p 

at *10. Subjective testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated 

by objective medical evidence,” but the medical evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining 

the severity of claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 

(9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). 

As the Ninth Circuit recently clarified in Ferguson, Although an ALJ may use “inconsistent

objective medical evidence in the record to discount subjective symptom testimony,” the ALJ 

“cannot effectively render a claimant's subjective symptom testimony superfluous by demanding 

positive objective medical evidence fully corroborating every allegation within the subjective 

testimony.” Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).

In addition to the objective evidence, the other factors considered are: 1) daily activities; 2) 

the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 3) precipitating and 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

aggravating factors; 4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication; 5) 

treatment other than medication; 6) other measures the claimant uses to relieve pain or other 

symptom; 7)) Other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to 

pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff’s second claim of error overlaps to a large extent with the first insofar as Plaintiff

appears to identify her testimony only as another piece of evidence in support of her closed period 

of mental disability during the period of August 16, 2018 to January 30, 2020. But in terms of 

content, the testimony she summarizes somewhat mirrors most, if not all, of the statements she 

made to her clinicians and therapists as summarized above. Further, her testimony, in contrast to 

the statement made to her clinicians, is not as readily applicable to specific dates or discrete periods 

of time and as such it is somewhat ill-suited to her claim of error on appeal.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ reached faulty conclusions about her activities of 

daily living by failing to acknowledge that Plaintiff’s activities were generally limited to the home 

and, when not limited to the home, required that she be accompanied by another family member 

such as her children accompanying her to the store, or her mother accompanying her to her medical 

appointments. The argument is reasonably well taken in that the circumstances of her daily 

activities appear to have been overlooked by the ALJ. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed 

to acknowledge Plaintiff’s drowsiness as a side effect of her medications, and indeed no such 

discussion is apparent in the ALJ’s decision. 

In sum, having already identified a basis for remand additional discussion of this issue is 

not necessary as all of Plaintiff’s statements, whether offered to her treating providers at the initial 

hearing, or at her future re-hearing, will be subject to reconsideration on remand.

VI. Findings

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Remand is appropriate for the ALJ to conduct a new hearing and issue a new decision. 

Specifically, the ALJ should reconsider all evidence concerning Plaintiff’s mental health during the 

period between August 16, 2018 and January 30, 2020, and determine whether the record supports 

a closed period of disability. Particular attention should be given:: 1-to the records from Marie 

Green Psychiatric Center and Merced County Mental Health (Exs. 3F, 4F, 6F, and 8F); 2-to

Plaintiff’s depressive symptoms and potential worsening thereof in the months following the 

addition of antipsychotics, and this notwithstanding that those antipsychotics improved her manic 

symptoms; and 3-to side effects caused by her medication, chiefly drowsiness.

VII. Recommendations

For the reasons stated above, the recommendation is as follows:

1. That Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) be GRANTED.

2. That Defendant’s cross-motion (Doc. 19) be DENIED.

3. That the matter be remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the 

Findings and Recommendations.

4. That the Court Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff

Shannon Marie Salado and against Defendant Commissioner of Social Security. 

VIII. Objections Due Within 14 Days

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2024 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:22-cv-01248-TLN-GSA Document 22 Filed 07/22/24 Page 15 of 15