Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08168/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Donald Kevin Leacock, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-08168-PCT-JJT (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Petitioner Donald Kevin Leacock (“Petitioner” or “Leacock”) is currently 

incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona. 

Petitioner plead guilty in the Coconino County Superior Court, cases #CR2008-0187 and 

#CR2008-0511, to one count each of sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted sexual 

exploitation of a minor, child abuse, and vulnerable adult abuse. Petitioner is serving a 

30 year aggregate imprisonment sentence for all of the charges except for attempted 

sexual exploitation of a minor, for which he was placed on lifetime probation. Petitioner 

filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(“Petition”) (Doc. 1) on July 11, 2016. In an August 1, 2016, Order (Doc. 3), the Court 

required an answer to the Petition. Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 9), 

asserting, among other things, that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Doc. 16), and the matter is fully briefed. For the reasons below, the Court recommends 

that the Petition be denied as untimely because it was filed more than five years after 

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AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations expired. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence

In two separate indictments, Petitioner was charged with three counts of child 

abuse, eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor, three counts of sexual exploitation of 

a minor1

, one count of vulnerable adult abuse, and two counts of threatening and 

intimidating as well as twenty four counts of sexual exploitation with a minor (Exh. A, 

Doc. 10 at p. 2-8; Doc. 1-1 at p. 9-15).2

 On July 22, 2008, Petitioner pled guilty to one 

count each of sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, 

child abuse, and vulnerable adult abuse, and the numerous remaining charges were 

dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement (Exhs. B, C; Doc. 10 at p. 9-14, p. 15-18). The 

counts of conviction involve three separate victims (Exh. A, Doc. 10 at p. 2-8; Doc. 1-1 

at p. 9-15).3

 On September 5, 2008, the trial court placed Petitioner on lifetime probation 

for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 

30 years’ imprisonment for the remaining counts (Exh. D, Doc. 10 at p. 19-28). 

B. Appeal and PCR Proceedings 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction and sentence, which he could not do, in 

any event, because he was convicted by plea agreement (Doc. 1 at p. 2-3).4

 Petitioner 

initiated several PCR proceedings in the state courts (see Doc. 1 at p. 4). 

Petitioner filed a first notice of post-conviction relief on November 6, 2008 (Exh. 

E, Doc. 10 at p. 29-32). Appointed counsel for Petitioner filed a notice, stating that 

1

 Sexual exploitation of a minor is Arizona’s child pornography law. See A.R.S. 

§13-3551 et. seq. 

2

 The referenced alphabetical exhibits were submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer, Doc. 9, with attachments as Docs. 10-15. The document and page references herein are to this Court’s electronic record. 

3

 The prosecution’s summary of the investigation and charged conduct can be found at Doc. 11-1 at p. 3-5. 

4 See A.R.S. § 13–4033(B); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711-717 (9th Cir. 

2007) (concluding that an “‘of right proceeding,’ available under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty or no contest, is a form of 

‘direct review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)”) 

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counsel had “been unable to find any argument to present” (Exh. F, Doc. 10 at p. 33-35). 

The post-conviction court gave Petitioner 45 days to file a pro se petition for postconviction relief (Exh. G, Doc. 10 at p. 36-37). On March 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a 

petition for post-conviction relief (Exh. H, Doc. 10 at 38-`48). The State responded to 

the petition (Exh. I, Doc. 11 at p. 1-50). The post-conviction court appointed counsel, 

and on September 8, 2009, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a notice of nonsupplementation, stating that he had found “no arguable and no colorable issues to 

present” to the court (Exh. J, Doc. 12-1 at p. 2-4). On September 17, 2009, the postconviction court dismissed the proceeding (Exh. K, Doc. 12-2 at p. 5-6) Petitioner did 

not file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals regarding his first PCR 

proceeding (Doc. 1 at 5). 

On May 22, 2013, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief, and on 

June 21, 2013, he filed a third petition for post-conviction relief (Exhs. L, M, Doc. 12-3 

at p. 1-6, Doc. 13 at p. 1-36).5

 The State responded (Exh. N, Doc. 14 at p. 2-11), and 

Petitioner replied (Exh. O, Doc. 14 at p. 12-16). On July 23, 2013, the post-conviction 

court summarily dismissed the petition (Exh. P, Doc. 14 at p. 17-18). On August 6, 2013, 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exh. Q, Doc. 14 at 

p. 19-21). The State responded (Exh. R, Doc. 14 at p. 22-35), and Petitioner replied 

(Exh. S, Doc. 14 at p. 36-47). On February 12, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review, but denied relief (Exh. T, Doc. 15 at p. 2-5). The court of appeals wrote: 

[Petitioner] could have raised all of these issues in his first petition for postconviction relief. Any issue a defendant could have raised in an earlier 

post-conviction relief proceeding is precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). 

None of the exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) apply. The non-jurisdictional 

aspects of [Petitioner’s] claims – the indictment, the search, and the alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct – were waived when he plead guilty. A plea 

agreement waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, errors and defects which 

occurred before the plea. [Citations omitted]. This includes deprivations of 

 

5

 Petitioner asserts that he filed his second petition for post-conviction relief on March 13, 2015 (Doc. 1 at p. 4), but that appears to be in error, particularly given that he asserts the result was issued on February 12, 2015 (id.), consistent with Respondent’s exhibits. 

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constitutional rights. [Citation omitted]. 

(Exh T, Doc. 15 at p. 5). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court (Exh. U, Doc. 

15 at p. 6-36). On September 16, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied 

the petition (Exh. V, Doc. 15 at p. 37-38). Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (see Doc. 1 at p. 10) 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

In his July 11, 20166

 Petition, Petitioner names Charles L. Ryan as Respondent 

and the Arizona Attorney General as an Additional Respondent. Petitioner raises three 

grounds for relief. 

In Ground One (Doc. 1 at p. 6), Petitioner contends that his due process rights 

under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. He claims the 

indictment failed to include essential elements, such as a concise statement of the facts, 

the location where the crimes occurred, and the victim’s true name and age or date of 

birth. Petitioner also asserts that the State failed to provide protection against double 

jeopardy and failed to allege that the victim was Petitioner’s wife when the crimes were 

committed, therefore making legal his possession of photographs of her. 

In Ground Two (Doc. 1 at p. 7), Petitioner claims his due process rights were 

violated because the indictments were duplicative and defective. Petitioner contends that 

the indictments allege multiple acts in each count; reiterates his assertions that the 

indictments lacked essential elements; and claims the detective involved in the case was 

only interested in the age difference between the 50-year-old Petitioner and his 16-yearold victim, rather than the fact that the victim had been emancipated and was legally 

married to Petitioner. 

 In Ground Three (Doc. 1 at p. 8), Petitioner contends his Fifth and Fourteenth 

 

6

 This is the date Petitioner delivered the Petition to prison officials (Doc. 1 at 12), 

as indicated by the date he inscribed next to his signature, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 270-71 (1988) (stating a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 

1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the mailbox rule in the context of a habeas petition). 

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Amendment rights were violated because the State lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 

because the indictment did not include essential elements. 

 Respondents assert the following regarding the Petition: 

Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, and he is not entitled to statutory or 

equitable tolling. In addition, each of his claims is procedurally defaulted, 

and Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice to excuse the default of 

his claims. Petitioner also waived each of his claims by pleading guilty. 

Petitioner’s claims, which relate to the sufficiency of the indictment, are not 

cognizable on federal habeas because he does not assert that the indictment 

gave him constitutionally insufficient notice of the charges. Finally, to the 

extent that Petitioner’s claims assert only errors of state law, they are not 

cognizable in federal habeas. Therefore, this Court should deny and dismiss 

the habeas petition with prejudice. 

(Doc. 9 at p. 2). 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Statutory Tolling 

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of the AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). 

 1. One Year Limitations Period 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a defendant is convicted pursuant 

to a guilty or no contest plea, then the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a 

form of direct review and the conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 of right proceeding concludes. Summers v. Schriro, 

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481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea agreement is final on 

expiration of the time for seeking Rule 32 relief). 

Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced on 

September 5, 2008. On November 6, 2008, Petitioner timely initiated his first PCR 

proceeding by filing a PCR notice. On March 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for 

post-conviction relief. The State responded to the petition. The post-conviction court 

appointed counsel, and on September 8, 2009, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a 

notice of non-supplementation, stating that he had found “no arguable and no colorable 

issues to present” to the court. On September 17, 2009, the post-conviction court 

dismissed the proceeding. Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. Petitioner thereafter had 35 days to file a petition for review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3, which he 

failed to do (see Doc. 1 at p. 5). A prisoner is not entitled to the 90 days for filing a 

petition for writ of certiorari if he did not take the matter to the state supreme court. See 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012). 

Consequently, the convictions became final 35 days after the superior court’s 

dismissal of the first post-conviction relief proceeding., and AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations began running on October 23, 2009, the date on which Petitioner could no 

longer seek further review. See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711-717; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(c) (requiring a petition for review that challenges the final decision in a PCR 

proceeding be filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals within 30 days); State v. Savage, 

573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that Rule 1.3 from the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure allows 5 additional days for mailing). Therefore, in the present case, 

AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations began to run on October 23, 2009, and expired one 

year later, on October 23, 2010, unless a second, timely PCR proceeding was filed, which 

would have tolled the limitations period. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245-46; section 

III(A)(2), infra. 

 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

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“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state petition that is not filed within 

the state’s required time limit, however, is not “properly filed,” and is thus not entitled to 

statutory tolling. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6–7 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely 

state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA tolling provision); 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is 

untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

 Petitioner filed his second post-conviction relief proceeding on May 22, 2013; by 

then, the AEDPA one year time limit had already expired. Once the one-year AEDPA 

time limit has passed, a habeas petitioner cannot restart his federal time limit by filing an 

action in state court. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) “does 

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition 

was filed”). “‘[A] properly and timely filed petition in state court only tolls the time 

remaining in the federal limitation period.’” Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1335 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001)). There can be 

no tolling following the expiration of the limitation period because “there is no period 

remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). 

 Despite Petitioner’s argument otherwise (see Doc. 16 at p. 2-3), Petitioner’s 

second, untimely PCR petition did not statutorily toll the running of the limitations period 

because an untimely petition is not a “properly-filed” application, and does not toll the 

running of the statute. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a 

post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2)”) (internal quotation omitted); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, a second PCR proceeding that is deemed untimely does 

not toll the time between the first and second PCR proceedings. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 

495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Therefore, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition by October 

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23, 2010, absent any equitable tolling or showing actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). See sections III(A)(3)&(4), infra. 

 3. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 

(2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The diligence required for equitable 

tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and 

[the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) 

(citations and internal emphasis omitted). Petitioner must also establish a “causal 

connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely 

petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 

While Petitioner gives no basis for equitable tolling in his Petition (Doc. 1 at p. 

11), in his reply, Petitioner asserts one basis (Doc. 16). Petitioner asserts that he is 

entitled to equitable tolling because of the restrictions on legal resources and the like 

while he has been incarcerated (see Doc. 16 at p. 3). 

 A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the 

law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication 

is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also

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Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV-06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances). Further, a prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

In Ramirez v. Yates, the petitioner argued that he had limited access to the law 

library and copy machine during the period in which he remained in administrative 

segregation. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). In denying equitable 

tolling for that period of time, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[o]rdinary prison 

limitations on [petitioner’s] access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial 

altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most 

common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit 

the exception to swallow the rule—according to [petitioner’s] theory, AEDPA’s 

limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner’s stay in 

administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as 

well.” Id.; see also Gutierrez-Valencia v. Ryan, No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

1762978, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2014) (where petitioner did not allege a complete lack of 

access to his legal file, only his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security 

facility, court held that “Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details 

regarding what legal materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his 

habeas filing . . . [and] Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary 

prison limitation.”). 

 Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

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Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances or 

reasonable diligence that would justify equitable tolling. Additionally, the undersigned 

has reviewed the record and it does not reveal any extraordinary circumstances that 

prevented Petitioner from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. It is 

recommended that the Court find that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

 4. Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway 

Petitioner claims he has shown actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, entitling 

him excuse from AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations (Doc. 16 at p. 6-7). Petitioner 

is correct that if a district court finds that a federal habeas petition is untimely, the 

untimeliness may be excused by an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931–34 (2013), the Supreme 

Court held that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied 

to procedural bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518 (2006) extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual 

innocence gateway” is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of 

justice exception.” 

To pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish 

his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th 

Cir.2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 

S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. 

at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in 

virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 

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Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 

U.S. 538, 559 (1998). 

For the Schlup/actual innocence gateway in habeas cases challenging a conviction 

by guilty plea, such as in this case, the considerations may differ in some respects. First, 

it is unclear “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners 

who plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We are 

aware of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual innocence gateway 

announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or no contest) pleas.... 

For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume without deciding that the actual 

innocence gateway is available to [the plea-convicted habeas petitioner].”). 

Decisions in which the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme Court have 

considered gateway claims of actual innocence in a plea context involved case law 

subsequent to conviction that arguably rendered the defendant’s acts non-criminal. See, 

e.g. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621–23 (1998); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 

1131, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2013) (“One way a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence 

is to show in light of subsequent case law that he cannot, as a legal matter, have 

committed the alleged crime”); United States v. Clark-Aigner, No. 3:02-CR-00007-01-

JWS, 2014 WL 3058391, at *2 (D. Alaska July 7, 2014) (the Schlup gateway cannot be 

“based upon an interpretation of a statute that had already been determined at the time of” 

the judgment of conviction being challenged); see also U.S. v. Avery, 719 F.3d 1080, 

1084–85 (9th Cir. 2013) (allowing actual innocence gateway based on a United States 

Supreme Court case decided several years after the petitioner’s conviction). 

Petitioner alleges no change in law and no new evidence in support of his request 

for Schlup/actual innocence relief from the untimeliness of the Petition. Petitioner argues 

that because he was married one of the victims in June, 2007, when he was fifty years old 

and she was fifteen years old, Petitioner could have sexually explicit photos of that 

victim. Petitioner also supplies a certified copy of the marriage certificate (Doc. 1-1 at p. 

22-23). Yet, Petitioner asserts no change in law under which he conduct was considered 

criminal when he plead guilty but that the same conduct now would not be considered 

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violative of the criminal laws under which he plead guilty. 

Petitioner’s argument is, in any event, fatally flawed because it is not legal under 

Arizona law to have sexually explicit photos of a fifteen year old spouse, and Petitioner 

has presented the Court with no applicable law supporting his argument. While marriage 

is a defense to Arizona’s statutory rape law, see A.R.S. §13-1407(D), it is not a defense 

to child abuse under A.R.S. §13-3623(B)(1) or sexual exploitation of a minor under 

A.R.S. §13-3553(A)(2). 

Further, Petitioner received the benefit of over twenty five counts, some more 

serious than his counts of conviction, being dismissed as part of his plea agreement. This 

alone disqualifies Petitioner for Schlup/actual innocence relief from convictions resulting 

from his guilty pleas. “In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges 

in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also 

extend to those charges.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. at 624. Here, “Otherwise, a 

petitioner could escape criminal liability because of a prosecutor's leniency in agreeing to 

conviction on less serious, but now invalid, counts in obtaining the plea.” Vosgien v. 

Persson, 742 F.3d at 1136. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated actual innocence of all of the more serious charges 

which were dismissed as part of his plea agreement. Indeed, even if Petitioner was 

correct (and he is not) that the marriage certificate may have been a defense to the 

charges against him involving his wife after marriage, multiple charges from conduct 

before the marriage were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. For example, the first 

five counts of the indictment in #CR20050551 (Doc. 10 at pages 3-4) were for child 

abuse with the risk of death or serious bodily injury, sexual conduct with a minor, and 

sexual exploitation of a minor (knowingly recording, filming, or the like a minor while 

engaged in sexual conduct or exhibition) when the victim was fourteen or fifteen years 

old and before the date of the marriage certificate. Further, count 13 of the indictment, 

which was dismissed as part of the plea agreement, alleged that Petitioner intentionally 

and knowingly solicited or commanded the victim to engage in sexual intercourse or oral 

contact with another minor victim (Doc. 10 at p. 7). Dismissed count 15 alleged that 

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Petitioner knowingly distributed a sexually explicit photo taken of the victim two and a 

half years before the date on the marriage certificate (Doc. 10 at p. 8). Petitioner has not 

made any showing of actual innocence of such dismissed charges, let alone the 

substantial showing of actual innocence required by Schlup. 

 As explained above, Petitioner’s argument and the evidence he presents to the 

Court (the marriage certificate) are insufficient to establish an actual innocence/Schlup

gateway claim to excuse the statute of limitations. See Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2013) ( “[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a 

petitioner’s evidence of innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was 

insufficient to overcome otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). The undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the petition timely. Further, 

Petitioner has not made an actual innocence showing entitling him to relief from 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Because the Petition is untimely, the Court does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the petition be denied and dismissed. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent the Court 

adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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