Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01971/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01971-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2409(a) Quiet Title Action

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jim Petroff and Marie Petroff, as husband

and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Ed Schafer, in his capacity as Secretary of

the United States Department of

Agriculture; the Department of Agriculture

of the United States; the United States

Forest Service, an agency of the

Department of Agriculture of the United

States; Abigail R. Kimbell, in her capacity

as Chief of the United States Forest

Service; Corbin Newman Jr., in his

capacity as Regional Forester, Southwest

Region, United States Forest Service;

Gene Blankenbaker, in his capacity as

Forest Supervisor, Tonto National Forest,

United States Forest Service; Jerome A.

Mastel, in his capacity as District Ranger,

Pleasant Valley Ranger District, Tonto

National Forest, United States Forest

Service, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV08-1971-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiffs Jim and Marie Petroff (collectively, “the Petroffs”) filed this action under

the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(f) and 2409a, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2201, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, seeking to establish their right to

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use an easement across National Forest lands. (Doc. # 1.) Defendant employees and

agencies of the United States (collectively, “the Forest Service Defendants”) moved to

dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), lack

of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and

failure to join required parties under Rules 12(b)(7) and 19. The United States will be

substituted as sole Defendant, and the pleadings otherwise suffice to vest the Court with

jurisdiction. Because the Government’s reservation of fee title to a road strip does not create

an express easement, the case will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief under

the Quiet Title Act. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court

“is not confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the complaint—it may

consider facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint.” Americopters, LLC

v. FAA, 441 F.3d 726, 732 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006).

 For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint. Porter v. Jones,

319 F.3d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 2003). Though in general a district court may not look

beyond the four corners of the complaint for this purpose, “documents whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The

Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry therefore includes the contents of the alleged “originating

documentation for Homestead Entry Survey No. 143,” including the special instructions,

field notes, plat map, logs, and Register Letter mentioned in the complaint and submitted

by the Defendants without objection. “Reports and records of administrative bodies”

such as correspondence from the U.S. Forest Service (“the Forest Service”) and the same

agency’s archaeological survey the may also be judicially noticed and considered at this

Case 2:08-cv-01971-NVW Document 11 Filed 04/01/09 Page 2 of 9
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stage. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Other maps included with

the pleadings are not part of the record to be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). A summary

of the allegations follows.

On February 13, 1912, Benjamin Peveler submitted Homestead Entry No. 016540

to the Phoenix Land Office of the United States Department of the Interior. A survey

known as Homestead Entry Survey 143 (“HES 143”) was conducted on the property, and

President Woodrow Wilson granted Patent No. 697395 to Mr. Peveler on July 10, 1919. 

HES 143 refers to a parcel of land in the Tonto National Forest encompassing four tracts,

Tracts A-D. Tract A is further subdivided into three parcels, Parcels R1-R3. The Petroffs

purchased parcel R3 on June 19, 2000, encompassing 6.98 acres of HES 143. This parcel

is southerly adjacent to parcel R2, which lies southerly adjacent to parcel R1. 

According to the surveys, a thirty-foot strip of land (“the Road Strip”) was

reserved to the United States for a road, situated so as to provide access through the

Homestead to other National Forest lands beyond the Homestead. The Road Strip passes

in an east-west direction, bisecting HES 143 and extending to its east and west

boundaries. The Road Strip lies to the north of Parcel R1, not touching the Petroffs’

Parcel, but the Petroffs can access it through a series of private easements running northsouth across Tract A. 

The Road Strip does not avail the Petroffs, however, because it has remained

largely undeveloped. Instead, Forest Development Roads 129 and 134 lie mostly on

private property to the north and west of Parcel R3. The roads give no direct access to

Parcel R3. For this reason, the Petroffs’ predecessor in interest Zane Mead obtained

permission to build a temporary access road across National Forest lands. This road (“the

South Cody Road”) was constructed in May 1998 and runs between parcel R3 and Forest

Development Road 134.

In the meantime, the Forest Service was considering what to do with the Road

Strip. On May 8, 2001, a district ranger issued a decision memorandum indicating that

Forest Development Road 129 would be relocated from its present location to the Road

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Strip. A year and a half later, on November 4, 2002, a forest supervisor informed some

property owners within HES 143 (but not the Petroffs) that the Forest Service would not

pursue that relocation plan. The Forest Service is in the process of interchanging title to

the lands underlying the Road Strip with private property owners underlying Forest

Development Road 129.

On June 16, 2004, a district ranger ordered the Petroffs to cease and desist

maintenance of the South Cody Road. He accused the Petroffs of illegal occupancy

trespass of National Forest Lands. The Forest Service has not yet adjudicated all the

Petroffs’ requests for administrative action establishing access to their parcel. The

Petroffs contend that without their alleged express easement in the Road Strip, they lack

legal access to their property rendering it, among other things, unmarketable. Plaintiffs

brought this action for a declaration of title to their alleged easement. They also seek a

writ of mandamus “compelling the authorized officer of the [Forest Service] to provide

the Plaintiffs a permanent right-of-way or easement over the federal public lands at issue

herein,” as well as preliminary injunctive relief and attorney fees. 

Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the Complaint does not seek damages.

ANALYSIS

I. Proper Parties

The Forest Service Defendants contend that the Petroffs have failed to name the

proper parties. They are correct. The proper Defendant in this case is the United States

rather than the Forest Service Defendants. The Quiet Title Act, which waives sovereign

immunity as to only the United States, is the “exclusive means by which adverse

claimants [can] challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Block v. North Dakota

ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983). The Act provides for relief

against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a); Block, 461 U.S. at 280, 284.

Whether or not the Defendant agencies are suable entities, see Blackmar v. Guerre, 342

U.S. 512, 514 (1952), they are not proper parties to a Quiet Title Action, and for the same

reason mandamus relief will not lie against the officers. Id. at 284-86. The original

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complaint named federal agencies and was served on the U.S. Attorney General and the

U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona. The U.S. Attorney appeared for the Forest

Service Defendants and both parties are amenable to substitution. Therefore, the motion

will be treated as an unopposed motion to substitute the United States as the sole

Defendant, and it will be granted to that extent. 

There is no failure to join other landowners under Rule 19. If the Petroffs prevail,

any need to pursue an additional easement across private land to reach Forest

Development Road 134 arises entirely subsequent and collateral to the existence of their

express easement on the Road Strip. The suit does not purport to alter the scope of the

Petroffs’ existing easements across their neighbors’ land. The Government identifies no

other landowner as holding a protected interest in the Road Strip that is dependent upon

or hostile to the existence of the Petroffs’ alleged easement. This case does not present

any dispute regarding other potential easements on the Road Strip, and so it does not

implicate the use or sale rights of any other potential easement holders. The Court can

accord complete relief in the absence of third parties without impairing their interests or

exposing the Government to inconsistent obligations within the meaning of Rule 19. 

II. The Quiet Title Act

To state a claim under the Quiet Title Act, a plaintiff must allege two conditions:

(1) that the United States claims an interest in the real property at issue, and (2) that there

is a disputed title to the property. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), (d). To establish such a dispute,

the complaint must “set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest

which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was

acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.” Id. § 2409a(d). In

addition, a twelve year statute of limitations limits the power of any court to adjudicate

such disputes. In the particular context of this statute, a “failure to file a quiet title suit

within the applicable limitations period is jurisdictional.” State of Nev. v. U.S., 731 F.2d

633, 636 (9th Cir. 1984). All of the jurisdictional requirements are met in this case.

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A. Non-Frivolous Claim

The Government argues that subject matter jurisdiction is wanting because there is

no sufficiently pled claim under the Quiet Title Act. The Quiet Title Act is the only

possible basis for federal question jurisdiction in this case. The Declaratory Judgment Act

does not provide freestanding jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). The Mandamus Act does not provide relief

against the lone party in this case, the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361. However, the

Court will not abdicate its responsibility to decide a non-frivolous federal question on the

merits. “[W]hen a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the

federal court and the plaintiffs’ substantive claim for relief, a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim is proper only when

the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.” Thornhill Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Poore v. Simpson Paper Co., 544 F.3d

1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008) (Graber, J., dissenting). The Petroffs’ allegations are nonfrivolous. They raise a legitimate question respecting the interpretation of the original

land patent and rights granted thereon by the Quiet Title Act. The case will therefore be

decided on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6).

It is undisputed that the United States claims an interest in the property; it is the

United States’ claim that the Petroffs dispute. It is also apparent, contrary to the

vehement arguments of the United States, that the Petroffs themselves claim an interest

that will sustain Quiet Title Act jurisdiction. An easement is an “interest” in land for

purposes of the Act. Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In their First Cause of Action, the Petroffs seek to “Quiet Title in a Permanent Right-ofWay or Easement Across National Forest Lands.” They refer repeatedly to the

“easement” at issue, claiming that it was reserved to them in the original land grant, and

that they are entitled to enjoy its “unfettered use.”

The easement that the Petroffs claim is readily distinguishable from other right-ofway claims that will not support jurisdiction. For instance, the existence of a public road

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does not entitle every member of the public to assert Quiet Title Act jurisdiction. 

Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159, 160 (10th Cir. 1978). Similarly, ownership of

land abutting a public road does not create an interest in the road under the Act. Hazel

Green Ranch, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 07-CV-414, 2008 WL 4755325, at *7

(E.D. Cal. 2008); Hazel Green Ranch, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 07-CV-414,

2008 WL 2876194, at *13-15 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Contrary to the contentions of the

Government, these cases do not apply where, as here, the plaintiff claims the creation of

an express private appurtenant easement on the land at issue. See Kinscherff, 586 F.2d at

161.

B. Statute of Limitations

The Government also contends that the statute of limitations precludes jurisdiction; 

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) imposes a 12-year limitations period on Quiet Title Actions. The

period begins to run when “the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have

known of the claim of the United States.” Non-possessory interests such as easements are

consistent with the United States’ claim of ownership, and therefore the limitations period

only begins to run when plaintiffs receive notice that the government, acting “adversely to

the interests of plaintiffs,” has denied or limited their use of the easement. Michel v.

United States, 65 F.3d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1995); see also McFarland v. Norton, 425 F.3d

724, 727 (9th Cir. 2005) (reasonable regulations restricting use of easement do not trigger

limitations period); Park County, Mont. v. United States, 626 F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir.

1980) (forest service sign prohibiting traffic on disputed right of way triggers limitations

period); State of N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Block, 789 F.2d 1308, 1312-13

(8th Cir. 1986) (administrative conduct inconsistent with plaintiff’s asserted interest

triggers limitations period). 

The United States identifies no such denial other than the “patent and related

documents,” but these documents have no such effect. This is not a case where the

plaintiffs directly challenge a conveyance to the federal government, so that notice of the

conveyance itself starts the running of the limitations period. See, e.g., Adams v. United

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States, 687 F. Supp. 1479, 1486-89 (D. Nev. 1988), aff’d in relevant part, 3 F.3d 1254,

1260 (9th Cir. 1993); Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 913

(8th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of the Road Strip reservation. 

Rather, they contend that an easement arose out of its very terms. In essence, the

Government’s limitations argument assumes victory on the merits by claiming that the

original Road Strip reservation granted no easement and that it therefore “denied” access

to the Petroffs’ predecessors-in-interest. The statute of limitations has no application in

this sense. After all, it is this self-same asserted “denial” of the Road Strip reservation

that Plaintiffs argue gave rise to their easement. If the reservation did give rise to an

easement, the Government identifies no denial or limitation of the putative easement’s use

before or during November 1996, the last date on which the twelve-year limitations

period would bar the present suit. Therefore, the statute of limitations is no obstacle. 

Jurisdiction is established and the Court turns to the merits of the claim.

C. The Merits of the Claim

The allegations and the relevant documents confirm that the Road Strip was

reserved from the original HES 143 land patent. It is also inferable that the strip was

intended as the location of a road. The allegations contain nothing, however, to indicate

that the intent of the original patent was to create a third-party property interest such as an

easement on the Road Strip. An express easement must be expressly conveyed to support

a Quiet Title Act claim, and no such conveyance occurred here. McFarland v.

Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). “The intent to grant an easement

[against the Government] must be so manifest on the face of the instrument ... that no

other construction can be placed on it.” Fitzgerald Living Tr. v. United States, 460 F.3d

1259, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 25 Am Jur 2d Easements and Licenses in Real

Property § 15 (2004)). The Petroffs cite nothing in the language of that reservation that

shows an unmistakable intent to create an easement interest running to the homestead

land. Documents from the time of the patent simply refer to the Government’s

reservation of a “road,” a “roadway,” or a “road strip.” There is no mention of any other

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interest created. More recent correspondence from the Forest Service may have

contemplated plans to build a road, but it did not gainsay this conclusion. The high

standard of Fitzgerald is not met.

The Petroffs concede that they seek no implied easement in this suit. Nor does this

suit concern agency action under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43

U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785, which seems to offer the Petroffs an administrative means to

redress their access problems. Favorable administrative action seems likely; the Forest

Service has expressed its agreement “that Parcel R owners should be able to access their

properties.” The Plaintiffs have not suggested any documents not before the Court

showing the creation of an easement at the time of the land patent. Amendment therefore

is futile, and leave to amend would be pointless.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants’ unopposed motion to

substitute the United States as sole Defendant (Doc. # 8.) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 8) is

denied to the extent that it is based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (7) and is granted to

the extent it is based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment dismissing this action

with prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate the case.

DATED this 1st day of April, 2009.

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