Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01991/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01991-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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CHIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The Clean Water Act (the ʺActʺ) prohibits the ʺdischarge of any

pollutant by any personʺ from ʺany point sourceʺ to ʺnavigable watersʺ of the

United States, without a permit.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A).  The question

presented is whether a transfer of water containing pollutants from one body of

water to another ‐‐ say, in upstate New York, from the more‐polluted Schoharie

Reservoir through the Shandaken Tunnel to the less‐polluted Esopus Creek ‐‐ is

subject to these provisions.   

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (ʺEPAʺ) takes

the position that such a transfer is not covered, on what has been called the

ʺunitary watersʺ theory ‐‐ all water bodies in the United States, that is, all lakes,

rivers, streams, etc., constitute a single unit, and therefore the transfer of water

from a pollutant‐laden water body to a pristine one is not an ʺadditionʺ of

pollutants to the ʺnavigable watersʺ of the United States because the pollutants

are already present in the overall single unit.  Consequently, in a rule adopted in

2008 (the ʺWater Transfers Ruleʺ), EPA determined that water transfers from one

water body to another, without intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial

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activity, were excluded from the permitting requirements of the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ʺNPDESʺ), even if dirty water was

transferred from a polluted water body to a clean one.  The majority holds that

the Water Transfers Rule is a reasonable interpretation of the Act.  I disagree.   

As the majority notes, we evaluate EPAʹs interpretation of the Act

under the two‐step framework of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

(1984).  At step one, we consider whether Congress has ʺunambiguously

expressedʺ its intent.  Riverkeeper Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004).  If

so, we ʺmust give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.ʺ  

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842‐43.  If the statute is ʺsilent or ambiguous,ʺ however, we

turn to step two and determine ʺʹwhether the agencyʹs answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute,ʹ which is to say, one that is ʹreasonable,ʹ 

not ʹarbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.ʹʺ  Riverkeeper, 358

F.3d at 184 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843‐44).

I would affirm the district courtʹs decision to vacate the Water

Transfers Rule.  First, I would hold at Chevron step one that the plain language

and structure of the Act is unambiguous and clearly expresses Congressʹs intent

to prohibit the transfer of polluted water from one water body to another distinct

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water body without a permit.  In my view, Congress did not intend to give a pass

to interbasin transfers of dirty water, and excluding such transfers from

permitting requirements is incompatible with the goal of the Act to protect our

waters.1  Second, prior decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court make clear

that the unitary waters theory is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary

meaning of the text of the Act and its purpose.  Third, even assuming there is any

ambiguity, I would hold at Chevron step two that the Water Transfers Rule is an

unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious interpretation of the Act.  Accordingly, I

dissent.

I

I begin with the language of the Act, its structure, and its purpose.

A. The Statutory Language

The Act provides that ʺthe discharge of any pollutant by any person

shall be unlawful,ʺ 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), except to the extent allowed by other

                                               1   The term ʺinterbasin transferʺ refers to an artificial or man‐made conveyance of

water between two distinct water bodies that would not otherwise be connected.  See

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 F.3d 481, 489‐93 (2d

Cir. 2001) (ʺCatskill Iʺ); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (ʺwater transferʺ is ʺan activity that

conveys or connects waters of the United States without subjecting the transferred

water to intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial useʺ).

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provisions, including, for example, those provisions establishing the NPDES

permit program, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

The Act defines ʺdischarge of a pollutantʺ to include ʺany addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.ʺ  33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added).  It defines ʺpollutantʺ to include solid, industrial,

agricultural, and biological waste.  Id. § 1362(6) (emphasis added).  It defines

ʺnavigable watersʺ as ʺthe waters of the United States, including the territorial

seas.ʺ  Id. § 1362(7) (emphasis added).  And it defines a ʺpoint sourceʺ as ʺany

discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any

pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling

stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,

from which pollutants are or may be discharged.ʺ  Id. § 1362(14) (emphasis

added).  The Act does not define the word ʺaddition.ʺ   

In my view, the plain language of the Act makes clear that the

permitting requirements apply to water transfers from one distinct body of water

through a conveyance to another.  As noted, the Act prohibits ʺany addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.ʺ  Id. § 1362(12)(A).  The

transfer of contaminated water from a more‐polluted water body through a

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conveyance, such as a tunnel, to a distinct, less‐polluted water body is the

ʺadditionʺ of a pollutant (contained in the contaminated water) to ʺnavigable

watersʺ (the less‐polluted water body) from a ʺpoint sourceʺ (the conveyance).  In

the context of this case, as we held in Catskill I:

Here, water is artificially diverted from its natural

course and travels several miles from the [Schoharie]

Reservoir through Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek,

a body of water utterly unrelated in any relevant sense

to the Schoharie Reservoir and its watershed.  No one

can reasonably argue that the water in the Reservoir

and the Esopus are in any sense the ʺsame,ʺ such that

ʺadditionʺ of one to the other is a logical impossibility.  

When the water and the suspended sentiment therein

passes from the Tunnel into the Creek, an ʺadditionʺ of

a ʺpollutantʺ from a ʺpoint sourceʺ has been made to a

ʺnavigable water,ʺ and the terms of the statute are

satisfied.   

273 F.3d at 492.

EPA contends that such a transfer of contaminated water, from a

polluted body of water to a distinct and pristine one, is not an ʺadditionʺ because

all the waters of the United States are to be ʺconsidered collectively,ʺ EPA Br. at

2, that is, because the polluted and pristine bodies of water are both part of the

waters of the United States and all the waters of the United States are considered

to be one unit, the transfer of pollutants from one part of the unit to another part

is not an ʺaddition.ʺ  I do not believe the words of the Act can be so interpreted.  

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The critical words for our purposes are ʺadditionʺ and ʺnavigable waters.ʺ  I take

them in reverse order.

1. ʺNavigable Watersʺ

EPAʹs position ‐‐ accepted by the majority ‐‐ requires us to add

words to the Act, as we must construe ʺnavigable watersʺ to mean ʺall the

navigable waters of the United States, considered collectively.ʺ  Contra Dean v.

United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (courts must ʺordinarily resist reading

words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its faceʺ) (quoting Bates v.

United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)).

EPA also argues that if Congress had intended the NPDES

permitting requirements to apply to individual water bodies, it would have

inserted the word ʺanyʺ before ʺnavigable waters.ʺ  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)

(ʺany addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point sourceʺ).  This

interpretation is flawed, for the use of the plural ʺwatersʺ obviates the need for

the word ʺany.ʺ  The use of the plural ʺwatersʺ indicates that Congress was

referring to individual water bodies, not one collective water body.  The

Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in its discussion of ʺthe waters of the

United Statesʺ in Rapanos v. United States.  There the Court considered the issue of

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whether § 1362(7)ʹs definition of ʺnavigable watersʺ meant ʺwaters of the United

States,ʺ and the Court squarely held that ʺwatersʺ referred to ʺindividual bodies,ʺ 

not one collective body:

But ʺthe waters of the United Statesʺ is something else.  

The use of the definite article (ʺtheʺ) and the plural

number (ʺwatersʺ) shows plainly that § 1362(7) does not

refer to water in general.  In this form, ʺthe watersʺ refers

more narrowly to water ʺ[a]s found in streams and

bodies forming geographical features such as oceans,

rivers, [and] lakes,ʺ or the flowing or moving masses, as

of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies.ʺ  

Websterʹs New International Dictionary 2882.   

547 U.S. 715, 732 (2006) (alterations in original) (emphases added).  Hence, the

Supreme Court concluded the plural form ʺwatersʺ does not refer to ʺwater in

general,ʺ but to water bodies such as streams, lakes and ponds.2  

                                              

2   The majority writes that the Supreme Courtʹs holding in Rapanos ʺdoes not

compel the conclusion that the statutory phrase ʹnavigable watersʹ is unambiguous

because that phrase, unlike the phrase in Rapanos, is not limited by a definite article.ʺ  

Op. at 44, n.24.  While Rapanos may not ʺcompelʺ that conclusion, it certainly supports

it.  In Rapanos, the Supreme Court was interpreting the same definition of ʺnavigable

watersʺ in operation here, § 1362(7), which defines ʺnavigable watersʺ as ʺthe waters of

the United States.ʺ  The lack of the word ʺtheʺ before ʺnavigable watersʺ in § 1362(12)(A)

hardly negates the Supreme Courtʹs holding that the definition of ʺnavigable watersʺ as

found in § 1362(7) does not refer to water in general, but water bodies.  Moreover, the

existence or non‐existence of a definite article before a noun, on its own, has no bearing

on the plural or singular nature of a noun.  ʺTheʺ can be used to refer to a particular

person or thing or a group.  See Bryan A. Garner, Garnerʹs Modern American Usage: The

Authority on Grammar, Usage and Style, 883 (3rd Ed. 2009) (ʺThe definite article can be

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As the majority acknowledges, the Act contains multiple provisions

suggesting that the term ʺnavigable watersʺ refers to multiple water bodies, not

one national collective water body.  Op. at 43 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A),

(c)(4), 1313(d)(1)(B), 1314(2), 1314(f)(2)(F), 1314(l)(1)(A)‐(B), 1342)).3  Likewise,

EPAʹs own regulations suggest that ʺnavigable watersʺ refers to individual water

bodies.  For example, 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4) regulates intake credits.  As the

Supreme Court has observed, this regulation is incompatible with the ʺunitary

watersʺ theory:  

The ʺunitary watersʺ approach could also conflict with

current NPDES regulations.  For example, 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.45(g)(4)(2003) allows an industrial water user to

obtain ʺintake creditʺ for pollutants present in the water

that it withdraws from navigable waters.  When the

permit holder discharges the water after use, it does not

have to remove pollutants that were in the water before

                                              

used to refer to a group <the basketball team> or, in some circumstances, a plural <The

ideas just keep on flowing>.ʺ).

3   There are additional sections in which the term ʺnavigable watersʺ clearly refers

to individual water bodies.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (requiring any applicant for

federal license or permit ʺto conduct any activity, including but not limited to, the

construction or operation of facilities which may result in any discharge in the

navigable watersʺ to obtain a state certification that any discharge of pollutants will

comply with the receiving water bodyʹs water‐quality standard), 1344(a) (requiring

permits for ʺ[d]ischarge into navigable waters at specified disposal sitesʺ by establishing

a separate permit program for discharges of ʺdredged or fill material,ʺ which by

definition come from water bodies); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a), (d)(1)(A), 1313(e)(4),

1314(l)(1), (b)(1), (d)(2)(D), (h)(9), (h)(11)(B).

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it was withdrawn.  There is a caveat, however: EPA

extends such credit ʺonly if the discharger demonstrates

that the intake water is drawn from the same body of

water into which the discharge is made.ʺ  The NPDES

program thus appears to address the movement of

pollutants among water bodies, at least at times.   

S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 107‐08 (2004).  In all of

these instances, the phrase ʺnavigable watersʺ refers to individual water bodies

and not one collective national water body.  Indeed, neither the majority nor the

parties have identified a single provision in the Act where ʺnavigable watersʺ 

refers to the waters of the United States as a unitary whole.

2. ʺAdditionʺ

EPAʹs interpretation also requires us to twist the meaning of the

word ʺaddition.ʺ  Because the word ʺadditionʺ is not defined in the Act, we

consider its common meaning.  See S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Environ. Prot., 547

U.S. 370, 376 (2006)  (in considering the definition of ʺdischargeʺ in 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12), noting that where a word is ʺneither defined in the statute nor a term

of art, we are left to construe it ʹin accordance with its ordinary or natural

meaningʹʺ (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994))); see also Perrin v. United

States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (words should be interpreted according to their

ʺordinary, contemporary, common meaningʺ).   

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The ordinary meaning of ʺadditionʺ is ʺthe result of adding:

anything added: increase, augmentation.ʺ Websterʹs Third New International

Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 24 (1968); see also Websterʹs New

World Dictionary of the American Language 16 (2d College ed. 1970 and 1972) (ʺa

joining of a thing to another thingʺ).  Transferring water containing pollutants

from a polluted water body to a clean water body is ʺaddingʺ something to the

latter; there is an ʺadditionʺ ‐‐ an increase in the number of pollutants in the

second water body.  In this context, ʺadditionʺ means adding a pollutant to

ʺnavigable watersʺ when that pollutant would not otherwise have been in those

ʺnavigable waters.ʺ  Words should be given their ʺcontextually appropriate

ordinary meaning,ʺ Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 70 (2012), and the context here is a statute intended to

eliminate water pollution discharges.  See Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 486.  That context

makes clear that the word ʺadditionʺ encompasses an increase in pollution

caused by an interbasin transfer of water.

The plain words of the statute thus make clear that Congress did not

intend to except water transfers from §§ 1311 and 1362 of the Act.

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B. The Structure of the Act

Congressʹs intent to require a permit for interbasin water transfers is

even clearer when we consider the statutory language in light of the Actʹs

structure.  In determining whether Congress has spoken to the precise question

at issue, we consider the words of the statute in ʺtheir context and with a view to

their place in the overall statutory scheme,ʺ FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000), because ʺthe meaning ‐‐ or ambiguity ‐‐ of certain

words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context,ʺ King v.

Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133);

see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (ʺreasonable

statutory interpretation must account for both ʹthe specific context in which  . . .

language is usedʹ and ʹthe broader context of the statute as a wholeʹʺ (citations

omitted)); Davis v. Mich. Depʹt of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (a

ʺfundamental canon of statutory constructionʺ is ʺthat the words of a statute

must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall

statutory schemeʺ).   

Here, EPAʹs ʺunitary watersʺ theory, when considered in the context

of other provisions of the Act, contravenes Congressʹs unambiguous intent to

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subject interbasin transfers to permitting requirements and is therefore

unreasonable.  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (a ʺprovision that may seem ambiguous

in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because

only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is

compatible with the rest of the lawʺ (citing United Sav. Assʹn of Tex. v. Timbers of

Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988))).   

First, the Water Transfers Rule creates an exemption to permitting

requirements, in violation of the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which

cautions against finding implied exceptions where Congress has created explicit

ones.  Section 1311(a) of the Act prohibits ʺ[t]he discharge of any pollutant by any

person.ʺ  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  The Supreme Court has held that ʺevery point

source dischargeʺ is covered by the Act:   

Congressʹ intent in enacting the [1972] Amendments [to

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act] was clearly to

establish an all‐encompassing program of water

pollution regulation. Every point source discharge is

prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly

subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus

established by Congress to achieve its goals.  The ʺmajor

purposeʺ of the Amendments was clearly to ʺestablish a

comprehensive long‐range policy for the elimination of

water pollution.ʺ  S. Rep. No. 92‐414, at 95, 2 Leg. Hist.

1511 (emphasis supplied).  No Congressmanʹs remarks

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on the legislation were complete without reference to

the ʺcomprehensiveʺ nature of the Amendments.

See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).  

Congress created specific exceptions to the prohibition on the

discharge of pollutants, as § 1311(a) bans such discharges ʺ[e]xcept as in

compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344.ʺ  

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  These include specific exemptions to the NPDES permitting

requirements for, e.g., return flows from irrigated agriculture, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(l)(1), stormwater runoff, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2), and discharging dredged

or fill material into navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  Congress did not create

an exception for interbasin water transfers.

It is well‐settled that when exceptions are explicitly enumerated,

courts should not infer additional exceptions.  See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct.

1943, 1953 (2013) (ʺWhere Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a

general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of

evidence of contrary legislative intent.ʺ (citing Andrus v. Glover Constr., Co., 446

U.S. 608,  616‐617 (1980))).  This prohibition against implying exceptions has been

applied to the Actʹs permitting requirements.  See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,

1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ʺThe wording of the statute, legislative history and

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precedents are clear: the EPA Administrator does not have authority to except

categories of point sources from the permit requirements of § [1342]ʺ); Nw. Envir.

Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1021‐22 (9th Cir. 2008) (EPA may not ʺexempt

certain categories of discharge from the permitting requirementʺ); N. Plains Res.

Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (ʺOnly

Congress may amend the CWA to create exemptions from regulation.ʺ).  

Defendantsʹ position that all water transfers between water bodies are exempt

from § 1342 permitting requirements is a substantial exemption that Congress

did not create.   

Second, the Act also sets forth a specific plan for individual water

bodies.  The Act requires States to establish water‐quality standards for each

distinct water body within its borders.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1), (2)(A).  To

establish water‐quality standards, a State must designate a use for every

waterway and establish criteria for ʺthe amounts of pollutants that may be

present in [those] water bodies without impairingʺ their uses.  Upper Blackstone

Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 33

U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)).  The NPDES permit program is ʺthe primary meansʺ by

which the Act seeks to achieve its water‐protection goals.  Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

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503 U.S. 91, 101‐02 (1992).  The NPDES program covers all ʺpoint sources,ʺ 

including ʺany pipe, ditch, channel, [or] tunnel,ʺ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), and a

broad range of pollutants, including chemicals, biological materials, rock, and

sand, id. § 1362(6).

This carefully designed plan to fight water pollution would be

severely undermined by an EPA‐created exception for water transfers.  A Stateʹs

efforts to control water‐quality standards in its individual lakes, rivers, and

streams would be disrupted if contaminated water could be transferred from a

polluted water body to a pristine one without a NPDES permit.  It is hard to

imagine that Congress could have intended such a broad and potentially

devastating exception.  Indeed, exempting water transfers from the NPDES

program would undermine the ability of downstream States to protect

themselves from the pollution generated by upstream States.  The NPDES

program provides a procedure for resolving disputes between States over

discharges.  See Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist., 690 F.3d at 15

(citing City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 325‐26).  When a State applies for a permit

that may affect the water quality of a downstream State, EPA must notify the

applying State and the downstream State.  If the downstream State determines

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that the discharge ʺwill violate its water quality standards, it may submit its

objections and request a public hearing.ʺ  Id.  If water transfers are exempt from

NPDES requirements, the ability of downstream States to protect themselves

from upstream states sending their pollution across the border will be severely

curtailed.4   

The City and certain of the States argue that subjecting water

transfers to permitting requirements will be extremely burdensome.  As we have

repeatedly recognized, however, there is ample flexibility in the NPDES

permitting process to address dischargersʹ concerns.  See Catskill Mountains v.

EPA, 451 F.3d 77, 85‐86 (2d Cir. 2006) (ʺCatskill IIʺ); see also Nw. Envtl., 537 F.3d at

1010 (ʺObtaining a permit under the CWA need not be an onerous process.ʺ).  

                                               4   Downstream states would have to resort to common law nuisance suits in the

courts of the polluting state, instead of addressing permit violations with EPA.  As the

district court points out, ʺEPA never explains how states, post Water Transfers Rule, can

address interstate pollution effects ʹthrough their WQS [water quality standards] and

TMDL [total maximum daily loads] programsʹ or ʹpursuant to state authorities

preserved by section 510,ʹ given that states do not have authority to require other states

to adhere to effluent limitations or state‐based regulations.  See Intʹl Paper Co. v.

Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987).ʺ  Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. U.S.

E.P.A., 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 552 (2014).  Indeed, at oral argument before the district court,

counsel for the State of Colorado conceded that a downstream Stateʹs only remedy for

interstate pollution of this sort is a common‐law nuisance suit and ʺdrink[ing] dirty

water until this case makes its way up to the courts.ʺ  Id. at 553.  This cannot be what

Congress intended.

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The draft permit issued in this case allows for variable turbidity level restrictions

by season and exemptions from the limitations in times of drought to remedy

emergency threats or threats to public health or safety.  Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 86.  

Point source operators can also seek a variance from limits.  See 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.3(b).   

In addition, much of the concern over water transfers involved

agricultural use, but water diversions from a ʺnavigable waterʺ for agricultural

use direct water away from a ʺnavigable water,ʺ and thus do not trigger the need

for a § 402 permit.  Waters returning to a ʺnavigable waterʺ which are

ʺagricultural stormwater dischargesʺ and ʺreturn flows from irrigated

agricultureʺ are specifically exempted from the statutory definition of ʺpoint

source.ʺ  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (exempting ʺdischarges

composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agricultureʺ from permitting

requirements).  Thus, the catastrophic results of applying NPDES permits to

water transfers bemoaned by appellants are exaggerated.5   

                                               5   In addition, general permits can be issued to ʺan entire class of hypothetical

dischargers in a given geographic region,ʺ and thus covered discharges can commence

automatically without an individualized application process.  Nw. Envtl., 537 F.3d at

1011 (citations omitted); see 40 C.F.R. § 122.28.

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Third, as discussed above, Congress used the phrase ʺnavigable

watersʺ to refer to individual water bodies in numerous provisions of the Act.  

Another well‐settled rule of statutory interpretation holds that the same words in

a statute bear the same meaning.  See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990)

(ʺthe ʹnormal rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in

different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.ʹʺ (internal

citations omitted)); Prus v. Holder, 660 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2011) (ʺthe normal

rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different parts of

the same act are intended to have the same meaningʺ).  When the Act is read as a

whole, it is clear that Congress did not intend the phrase ʺnavigable watersʺ to be

interpreted as a single water body because that interpretation is ʺinconsisten[t]

with the design and structure of the statute as a whole.ʺ  Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at

2442; see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 63 (ʺA textually permissible

interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the documentʹs purpose should

be favored.ʺ).   

Accordingly, in my opinion, the structure and context of the Act

show clearly that Congress did not intend to exempt water transfers from the

permitting requirements.

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C. The Purpose of the Act

The Act was passed in 1972 to address environmental harms caused

by the discharge of pollutants into water bodies.  As the Act itself explains, its

purpose was to ʺrestore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nationʹs waters.ʺ  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); accord Miccosukee, 541 U.S.

at 102; Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 490‐91 (2d Cir. 2005); see also

Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 486 (ʺ[T]he Act contains the lofty goal of eliminating water

pollution discharges altogether.ʺ).   

The Water Transfers Rule is simply inconsistent with the purpose of

the Act and undermines the NPDES permit program.  It creates a broad

exemption that will manifestly interfere with Congressʹs desire to eliminate

water pollution discharges.  As the majority acknowledges, water transfers are a

real concern.  Artificial transfers of contaminated water present substantial risks

to water quality, the environment, the economy, and public health.  If interbasin

transfers are not regulated, there is a substantial risk that industrial waste, toxic

algae, invasive species, and human and animal contaminants will flow from one

water body to another.  Accepting the argument that water transfers are not

covered by the Act on the theory that pollutants are not being added but merely

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moved around surely undermines Congressʹs intent to restore and maintain the

integrity of our waters.  See Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 31 (2014) (ʺThe

task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to

Congressʹs purposes.ʺ).

In sum, based on the plain words of §§ 1311 and 1362, the structure

and design of the Act, and its overall purpose, I would hold that Congress has

ʺunambiguously expressedʺ its intent to subject water transfers to the Actʹs

permitting requirements.

II

As the majority notes, our Court has twice interpreted these precise

provisions of the Act as applied to these very facts.  See Catskill I, 273 F.3d 484‐85;

Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 79‐80.  The decisions are not controlling, however, because

EPA had not yet adopted the Water Transfers Rule and we conducted our review

under a different deference standard.  See Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 490 (ʺIf the EPAʹs

position had been adopted in a rulemaking or other formal proceeding, [Chevron]

deference might be appropriate.ʺ (emphasis added)); Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 82

(ʺThe City concedes that this EPA interpretation is not entitled to Chevron

deference.ʺ).  Nonetheless, the two decisions are particularly helpful to the

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analysis at hand.  Similarly, Supreme Court decisions have also suggested that

EPAʹs unitary waters theory is inconsistent with the plain wording of the Act.

A. Catskill I and II

In Catskill I and II, we conducted our inquiry under Skidmore v. Swift

& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See

Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 491; Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 83 n.5.6  Our application of the

Skidmore/Mead framework does not imply that we found the Act to be

ambiguous.  Rather, to the contrary, we concluded in Catskill I and II that the

meaning of the Act was plain and unambiguous.

                                               6   While we discussed Mead and Skidmore in Catskill I and II, we rejected EPAʹs

position as unpersuasive.  In Catskill I we held:

[C]ourts do not face a choice between Chevron deference and

no deference at all.  Administrative decisions not subject to

Chevron deference may be entitled to a lesser degree of

deference: the agency position should be followed to the

extent persuasive.  See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2175‐76 (citing

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  For the

reasons that follow, however, we do not find the EPAʹs

position to be persuasive.

273 F.3d at 491.  In Catskill II, we observed that because EPAʹs position was not the

product of a formal rulemaking, the most EPA could hope for was to persuade the court

of the reasonableness of its position under Skidmore, a position we did not accept.  

Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 83 n.5 (ʺ[W]e do not find the [ʹholisticʹ] argument persuasive and

therefore decline to defer to the EPA.ʺ).

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1. Skidmore

Under Skidmore, the court applies a lower level of deference to

certain agency interpretations and considers ʺthe agencyʹs expertise, the care it

took in reaching its conclusions, the formality with which it promulgates its

interpretations, the consistency of its views over time, and the ultimate

persuasiveness of its arguments.ʺ  Community Health Ctr. v. Wilson‐Coker, 311 F.3d

132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002); accord In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 83 (2d

Cir. 2004); see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  The appropriate level of deference

afforded an agencyʹs interpretation of a statute depends on its ʺpower to

persuade.ʺ  Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  Unlike Chevron,

however, Skidmore does not require a court to make a threshold finding that the

statute is ambiguous before considering the persuasiveness of the agencyʹs

interpretation.  Instead, Skidmore merely supplies the appropriate framework for

reviewing agency interpretations that ʺlack the force of law.ʺ  Id.   

As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held

that courts must find ambiguity before applying the Skidmore framework.  While

there is some scholarly authority for the proposition that ʺʹthe Skidmore standard

implicitly replicates Chevronʹs first step,ʹʺ Op. at 34 (quoting Kristin E. Hickman

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& Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L.

Rev. 1235, 1247 (2007)), the Supreme Court has decided numerous cases under

Skidmore without finding that a statuteʹs language was ambiguous, see, e.g., EEOC

v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (applying Skidmore without

finding ambiguity in statute and noting that agencyʹs interpretation ʺlacks

support in the plain language of the statuteʺ); Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S.

1, 11 (1980) (applying Skidmore without finding ambiguity in statute and holding

that regulation was permissible after considering statuteʹs ʺlanguage, structure

and legislative historyʺ); see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., I Admin. L. Treatise

§ 6.4 (5th ed. 2010).

Of course, the Supreme Court did not hold, in either Skidmore or

Mead, that ambiguity was a threshold requirement to applying the framework.  

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (An agency ruling is entitled to ʺrespect proportional to

its ʹpower to persuade,ʹ . . . .  Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its

writerʹs thoroughness, logic, and expertness, and any other sources of weight.ʺ  

(citations omitted)); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 164 (ʺThe weight of [an agencyʹs]

judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its

consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later

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pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking

power to control.ʺ).  Rather, the Skidmore/Mead framework adopts a less rigid,

more flexible approach, see U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commʹr, 270 F.3d 1137, 1142

(7th Cir. 2001) (referring to ʺthe flexible approach Mead described, relying on . . .

Skidmoreʺ), as it presents ʺa more nuanced, context‐sensitive rubricʺ for

determining the level of deference a court will give to an agency interpretation,

Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevronʹs Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833,

836 (2001); see also Pierce, supra, § 6.4, at 444 (ʺThe Court has referred to a variety

of factors that can give an agency statement ʹpower to persuade.ʹ . . .  [N]o single

factor is dispositive . . . .ʺ).

Ambiguity in a statute, of course, can be a factor, and in the sliding‐

scale analysis of the Skidmore/Mead framework, the ʺpower to persuadeʺ of an

agency determination can be affected by the clarity ‐‐ or lack thereof ‐‐ of the

statute it is interpreting.  Indeed, upon applying the Skidmore/Mead framework, a

court may uphold ‐‐ or reject ‐‐ an agency interpretation because the

interpretation is consistent with ‐‐ or contradicts ‐‐ a statute whose meaning is

clear.  See Pierce, supra, § 6.4, at 443.  Here, we did not defer to the agencyʹs

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interpretation of the Act in Catskill I and II, precisely because the Water Transfers

Rule contravened the plain meaning of the Act.   

2. The Plain Meaning of the Act

The majority dismisses the notion that we ruled on the plain

meaning of the Act in Catskill I and II, asserting that there were only a ʺfew

references to ʹplain meaningʹʺ in our decisions.  Op. at 36.  To the contrary,

through both our words and our reasoning, we made clear repeatedly in Catskill I

and II that the agencyʹs unitary waters theory was inconsistent with the

unambiguous plain meaning of the Act.   

In Catskill I, we held that defendantsʹ interpretation was

ʺinconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word ʹaddition.ʹʺ  273 F.3d at 493

(emphasis added).  Specifically, we held that there is an ʺadditionʺ of a pollutant

into navigable water from the ʺoutside worldʺ ‐‐ thus triggering the permitting

requirement ‐‐ any time such an ʺadditionʺ is from ʺany place outside the

particular water body to which pollutants are introduced.ʺ  Id. at 491 (emphasis

added).  We reasoned that:

Given the ordinary meaning of the [Act]ʹs text and our

holding in Dague, we cannot accept the Gorsuch and

Consumers Power courtsʹ understanding of ʺaddition,ʺ at

least insofar as it implies acceptance of what the Dubois

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court called a ʺsingular entityʺ theory of navigable

waters, in which an addition to one water body is

deemed an addition to all of the waters of the United

States. . . .  We properly rejected that approach in Dague.  

Such a theory would mean that movement of water from one

discrete water body to another would not be an addition even

if it involved a transfer of water from a water body

contaminated with myriad pollutants to a pristine water body

containing few or no pollutants.  Such an interpretation is

inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word

ʺaddition.ʺ 

Id. at 493 (emphases added).7  As a result, we held that ʺthe transfer of water

containing pollutants from one body of water to another, distinct body of water

is plainly an addition and thus a ʹdischargeʹ that demands an NPDES permit.ʺ  Id.

at 491 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we clearly were relying on the plain

meaning of the Act in reaching our conclusion.  

    We also noted that ʺ[e]ven if we were to conclude that the proper

application of the statutory text to the present facts was sufficiently ambiguous

to justify reliance on the legislative history of the statute, . . . that source of

                                              

7   In Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991), the City of Burlington

argued that ʺpollutants would be ʹaddedʹ only when they are introduced into navigable

waters for the first time,ʺ id. at 1354, an argument mirroring those raised by defendants

here.  We rejected the contention, in light of ʺthe intended broad reach of § 1311(a),ʺ 

noting ʺthat the definition of ʹdischarge of a pollutantʹ refers to ʹany point sourceʹ 

without limitation.ʺ  Id. at 1355 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)).  We rejected the assertion

that water flowing from a pond to a marsh was not an ʺaddition.ʺ  See Catskill I, 273 F.3d

at 492.   

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legislative intent would not help the City.ʺ  273 F.3d at 493.  That language

certainly makes clear we concluded the statutory text was not ambiguous.

    Finally, in the penultimate paragraph of Catskill I, we made

absolutely clear that our holding was based on the plain meaning of the statutory

text.  We held:  

In any event, none of the statuteʹs broad purposes

sways us from what we find to be the plain meaning of its

text. . . .  Where a statute seeks to balance competing

policies, congressional intent is not served by elevating

one policy above the others, particularly where the

balance struck in the text is sufficiently clear to point to an

answer.  We find that the textual requirements of the

discharge prohibition in § 1331(a) and the definition of

ʺdischarge of a pollutantʺ in § 1362(12) are met here.  

Id. at 494 (emphases added). 8

Our analysis in Catskill II was similar, as we dismissed defendantsʹ 

arguments as merely ʺwarmed‐upʺ versions of those rejected in Catskill I, made

no more compelling by EPAʹs new ʺholisticʺ interpretation of the statute.  451

                                               8   At least one commentator has agreed that we found in Catskill I that ʺthe statuteʹs

plain meaning was clear.ʺ  Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent and Metaphysics,

Interpreting the ʺAdditionʺ Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. News

& Analysis 10770, 10792 (2014) (ʺAlthough the Second Circuit did not explicitly employ

the two‐step Chevron deference test to EPAʹs water transfer rule, it left no doubt as to

how it would have decided the case under Chevron.  With regard to the first step,

whether the statute is ambiguous, the court in Catskill I held that the statuteʹs plain

meaning was clear.ʺ).  

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F.3d at 82.  We rejected New York Cityʹs ʺʹholistic arguments about the allocation

of state and federal rights, said to be rooted in the structure of the statute,ʺ 

because, we concluded, they ʺsimply overlook its plain language.ʺ  Id. at 84.  

(emphasis added).  We noted our dismissal of the unitary waters theory in

Catskill I based on the ordinary meaning of the word ʺadditionʺ:  

We also rejected the Cityʹs ʺunitary waterʺ theory of

navigable waters, which posits that all of the navigable

waters of the United States constitute a single water

body, such that the transfer of water from any body of

water that is part of the navigable waters to any other

could never be an addition.  We pointed out that this

theory would lead to the absurd result that the transfer of

water from a heavily polluted, even toxic, water body to

one that was pristine via a point source would not

constitute an ʺadditionʺ of pollutants and would not be

subject to the [Act]ʹs NPDES permit requirements.  

Catskills I rejected the ʺunitary waterʺ theory as

inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word

ʺaddition.ʺ 

Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  Again, we considered the

very interpretation of ʺnavigable watersʺ proffered in the current appeal and

rejected it based on ʺthe plain meaningʺ of the Actʹs text.  Id. at 82.9   

                                               9   The majority suggests that we ruled on the meaning of ʺadditionʺ based on the

plain meaning of the statute without reaching the meaning of ʺaddition . . . to navigable

waters.ʺ  Op. at 36‐37 (emphasis added) (ʺWe do not . . . think that by referring to the

ʹplain meaningʹ of ʹadditionʹ in Catskill I we were holding that the broader statutory

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I do not suggest that we are bound by our prior decisions.  But in

both decisions, we carefully considered the statutory language, and in both

decisions, based on the plain wording of the text, we rejected an interpretation of

§§ 1311 and 1362 that construes ʺnavigable watersʺ and ʺthe waters of the United

Statesʺ to mean a single water body.  Hence, we have twice rejected the theory

based on the plain language of the Act.  That plain language has not changed,

and neither should our conclusion as to its meaning.

B. The Supreme Court Precedents

Finally, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the

validity of EPAʹs ʺunitary watersʺ theory, it has expressed serious reservations.  

In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.

1537 (2004), the Court strongly suggested that the theory is not reasonable.  First,

the Court remanded for fact‐finding on whether the two water bodies at issue

                                              

phrase ʹaddition . . . to navigable watersʹ unambiguously referred to a collection of

individual ʹnavigable waters.ʹʺ (internal citations and quotations omitted)).  It is not

possible, however, to define ʺadditionʺ without defining the object to which the

addition is made, as the concepts are inexorably linked.  It is clear from our reasoning in

Catskill I and II, that we considered the entire phrase in reaching our conclusion.  Thus,

when we stated ʺthat the discharge of water containing pollutants from one distinct

water body to another is an ʹaddition of [a] pollutantʹ under the CWA,ʺ we could only

have meant that the discharge of water containing pollutants constitutes ʺan ʹadditionʹ 

of [a] pollutantʺ to navigable waters.  Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 80.

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were ʺmeaningfully distinct water bodies.ʺ  541 U.S. at 112.  That disposition

follows from Judge Walkerʹs soup ladle analogy in Catskill I: ʺIf one takes a ladle

of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has

not ʹaddedʹ soup or anything else to the pot (beyond, perhaps, a de minimis

quantity of airborne dust that fell into the ladle).ʺ  273 F.3d at 492.  In Catskill II,

we noted that such a transfer would be an intrabasin transfer, from one water

body back into the same water body, and we then applied the analogy to the

facts of this case:  ʺThe Tunnelʹs discharge . . . was like scooping soup from one

pot and depositing it in another pot, thereby adding soup to the second pot, an

interbasin transfer.ʺ  451 F.3d at 81.  In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court cited the

ʺsoup ladleʺ analogy with approval, and remanded the case to the district court

to determine whether the water bodies in question were ʺtwo pots of soup, not

one.ʺ  541 U.S. at 109‐10; see also id. at 112.  If the ʺunitary watersʺ theory were

valid, however, there would have been no need to resolve this factual question.  

If all the navigable waters of the United States were deemed one collective

national body, there would be no need to consider whether individual water

bodies were distinct ‐‐ there would be no need to determine whether there were

two pots of soup or one.

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Second, as previously discussed, the Court observed that ʺseveral

NPDES provisions might be read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary

waters approach.ʺ  Id. at 107.  The Court noted that under the Act, states ʺmay set

individualized ambient water quality standards by taking into consideration ʹthe

designated uses of the navigable waters involved,ʺ thereby affecting local

NPDES permits.  Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)).  ʺThis approach,ʺ the

Court wrote, ʺsuggests that the Act protects individual water bodies as well as

the ʹwaters of the United Statesʹ as a whole.ʺ  Id.10   

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions support this reading of

Miccosukee.  In Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a water transfer between one

portion of a river through a concrete channel to a lower portion of the same river

did not trigger a NPDES permit requirement.  133 S. Ct. 710 (2013).  The Court

observed that ʺ[w]e held [in Miccosukee] that th[e] water transfer would count as

a discharge of pollutants under the CWA only if the canal and the reservoir were

ʹmeaningfully distinct water bodies.ʹʺ  Id. at 713 (emphasis added) (citations

omitted).  In holding that ʺthe flow of water from an improved portion of a

                                              

10   In Catskill II, we concluded that ʺ[o]ur rejection of [the unitary waters] theory in

Catskill I . . . is supported by Miccosukee, not undermined by it.ʺ  451 F.3d at 83.

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navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the very same waterway

does not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA,ʺ id., the Court

again suggested that it would be a discharge of pollutants if the transfer were

between two different water bodies.

In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court acknowledged the concerns that

have been raised about the burdens of permitting, but also observed that ʺit may

be that such permitting authority is necessary to protect water quality, and that the

States or EPA could control regulatory costs by issuing general permits to point

sources associated with water distribution programs.ʺ  541 U.S. at 108 (emphasis

added).  Indeed, recognizing the importance of safeguarding drinking water,

Congress created an extensive system to protect this precious resource, a system

that would be undermined by exempting interbasin water transfers.   

Hence, the Supreme Courtʹs decisions in Miccosukee and Los Angeles

County support the conclusion that water transfers between two distinct water

bodies are not exempt from the Act.

III

In my view, then, Congress has ʺunambiguously expressedʺ its

intent to subject interbasin water transfers to the requirements of §§ 1311 and

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1362 of the Act.  Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court

based on step one of Chevron.  Even assuming, however, that the statutory text is

ambiguous, I agree with the district court that the Water Transfers Rule also fails

at Chevron step two because it is an unreasonable and manifestly contrary

interpretation of the Act, largely for the reasons set forth in the district courtʹs

thorough and carefully‐reasoned decision.  I add the following:

First, Chevron deference has its limits.  ʺDeference does not mean

acquiescence,ʺ Presley v. Etowah County Commʹn, 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992), and

ʺcourts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have

engaged in reasoned decisionmaking,ʺ Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 484‐85

(2011).   

Second, an agencyʹs interpretation of an ambiguous statute is not

entitled to deference where the interpretation is ʺat oddsʺ with the statuteʹs

ʺmanifest purpose,ʺ Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assʹns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001), or

the agencyʹs actions ʺʹdeviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent,ʹʺ 

Chem. Mfrs. Assʹn v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Small Refiner

Lead Phase‐Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).  See

Katzmann, Judging Statutes 31 (ʺThe task of the judge is to make sense of

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legislation in a way that is faithful to Congressʹs purposes.  When the text is

ambiguous, a court is to provide the meaning that the legislature intended.  In

that circumstance, the judge gleans the purpose and policy underlying the

legislation and deduces the outcome most consistent with those purposes.ʺ).  As

discussed above, in my view the Water Transfers Rule is manifestly at odds with

Congressʹs clear intent in passing the Act.

Third, the Water Transfers Rule is not entitled to deference because

it will lead to absurd results.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015)

(ʺNo regulation is ʹappropriateʹ if it does significantly more harm than good.ʹʺ);

see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 234 (ʺA provision may be either disregarded

or judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if

failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could

approve.ʺ).  Indeed, this Court has already held ‐‐ twice ‐‐ that the ʺunitary

watersʺ theory would lead to absurd results.  In Catskill I, we concluded that

ʺ[n]o one can reasonably argue that the water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are

in any sense the ʹsame,ʹ such that ʹadditionʹ of one to the other is a logical

impossibility.ʺ  273 F.3d at 492 (emphasis added).  In Catskill II, we rejected the

ʺunitary waterʺ theory for a second time, observing that it ʺwould lead to the

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absurd result that the transfer of water from a heavily polluted, even toxic, water

body to one that was pristine via a point source would not constitute an

ʹadditionʹ of pollutants.ʺ  451 F.3d at 81 (emphasis added).  It would be an absurd

result indeed for the Act to be read to allow the unlimited transfer of polluted

water to clean water.  Clean drinking water is a precious resource, and Congress

painstakingly created an elaborate permitting system to protect it.  Deference has

its limits; I would not defer to an agency interpretation that threatens to

undermine that entire system.   

*  *  *

I would affirm the judgment of the district court, and, accordingly, I

dissent.

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