Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-16038/USCOURTS-ca9-23-16038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORACLE INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION; ORACLE 

AMERICA, INC., 

Plaintiffs-counterdefendants-Appellees, 

 v. 

RIMINI STREET, INC.; SETH 

RAVIN, 

Defendants-counterclaimants-Appellants.

No. 23-16038 

D.C. No. 

2:14-cv-01699-

MMD-DJA 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 5, 2024

San Francisco, California

Filed December 16, 2024

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit 

Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* District Judge.

* The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the 

District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 

Opinion by Judge Bumatay; 

Partial Dissent by Judge Bybee 

SUMMARY**

Copyright Law 

In an action brought by software developer Oracle 

International Corporation against Rimini Street, Inc., under 

the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, the panel vacated in 

part the district court’s permanent injunction against Rimini, 

a third-party provider and direct competitor with Oracle in 

the software support services market. 

After the district court found that Rimini infringed on 

Oracle’s copyrights, Rimini changed aspects of its business 

model and sought a declaratory judgment that its revised 

process did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. Oracle 

counterclaimed for copyright infringement and violations of 

the Lanham Act. Following a bench trial, the district court 

entered a permanent injunction ordering Rimini to (1) delete 

various software files, and (2) issue a press release 

correcting alleged misstatements and prohibiting Rimini 

from making similar statements about its services again. 

The panel vacated the district court’s holding that Rimini 

created infringing derivative works based solely on Rimini’s 

programs’ interoperability with Oracle’s programs. The 

panel explained that a derivative work must actually 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 3

incorporate Oracle’s copyrighted work, either literally or 

nonliterally. The panel instructed that if the district court 

concludes on remand that Rimini created an infringing 

derivative work under the correct legal standard, the district 

court should then consider whether any of Oracle’s licensing 

agreements authorized the creation of the specific work.

The panel vacated the district court’s ruling striking 

Rimini’s affirmative defense to copyright infringement 

under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), which allows the owner of a copy 

of a computer program to make another copy for certain 

purposes, such as when it’s an essential step in using the 

program. The panel explained that the district court’s ruling 

seemingly relied only on the labeling of the agreements 

between Oracle and its customers as a “license,” but that is 

only one facet of a number of incidents of ownership.

The panel vacated the district court’s ruling that Rimini’s 

creation of 18 “gap customer” environments on its systems 

containing Oracle’s Database program infringed Oracle’s 

copyright, because the plain language of the licensing 

agreement did not prohibit third-party support providers 

from possessing a copy of Oracle’s software to further a 

client’s internal business operations.

The panel vacated the district court’s ruling that Rimini’s 

use of automated tools to deliver PeopleSoft program 

updates from one client to another constituted copyright 

infringement, to the extent that conclusion rested on the 

district court’s erroneous view of “derivative work.” The 

panel also vacated the district court’s ruling that the outright 

delivery of PeopleSoft updates to clients without further 

testing in the clients’ environments constituted copyright 

infringement, for the same reason. The panel instructed the 

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4 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

district court to apply the correct legal standard for 

“derivative work” on remand.

The panel reversed the district court’s ruling that 

Rimini’s security-related statements constitute false 

advertising under the Lanham Act, except for a statement 

about “holistic security.” Some of the statements were about 

the relative security of services offered by Oracle and 

Rimini, which the panel held were puffery. Some of the 

statements were about the need for software patching, which 

the panel could not say were so specific and measurable as 

to become actionable under the Lanham Act. However, the 

panel affirmed the district court’s unrefuted finding that 

Rimini’s offer of holistic security, which the panel accepted 

to mean multi-layered security protection, was false because 

Rimini does not offer multi-level security. The panel vacated 

the injunction as it pertains to the non-actionable statements.

Because the panel vacated much of the district court’s 

ruling, the panel also vacated the portions of the injunction 

appealed by Rimini, and denied Rimini’s motion to stay 

enforcement of the permanent injunction as moot.

Dissenting in part, Judge Bybee disagreed with the 

majority’s conclusion that one of Rimini’s statements—

“Oracle’s [Critical Patch Updates] provide little or no value 

to customers and are no longer relevant”—is puffery. Judge 

Bybee explained that the phrases “little or no value” and “no 

longer relevant” are absolute characteristics that can be 

falsified, as opposed to generalized statements of 

comparison. He would affirm the district court’s finding that 

this statement is actionable.

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 5

COUNSEL

Raechel K. Kummer (argued) and David B. Salmons, 

Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.; Zachary 

Hill, Lindsey M. Shinn, and Benjamin P. Smith, Morgan 

Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, California; Corey R. 

Houmand, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Palo Alto, 

California; Dorian E. Daley, Oracle Corporation, Redwood 

City, California; Karen L. Dunn and William A. Isaacson, 

Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, Washington, 

D.C.; Richard J. Pocker, Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP, Las 

Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiffs-counter-defendantsAppellees.

Mark A. Perry (argued), Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; Jeremy M. Christiansen, Gibson Dunn & 

Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C.; Blaine H. Evanson and 

Jeffrey T. Thomas, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Irvine, 

California; Joseph A. Gorman, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher 

LLP, San Francisco, California; Samuel G. Liversidge, 

Casey J. McCracken, Ilissa S. Samplin, and Eric D. 

Vandevelde, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, 

California; Defendants-counter-claimants-Appellants.

Corynne McSherry, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San 

Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier 

Foundation, Computer & Communications Industry 

Association, Foundation for American Innovation, Public 

Knowledge, Engine Advocacy, Mozilla Corporation, U.S. 

PIRG Education Fund, Digital Right to Repair Coalition, 

iFixit, and Creative Commons.

Philip H. Cohen, Greenberg Traurig LLP, New York, New 

York, for Amici Curiae Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. and Betsy 

Rosenblatt.

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6 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

OPINION

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

For over a decade, Oracle International Corporation and 

Rimini Street, Inc., have waged a pitched copyright war. 

This dispute has been fought up and down all levels of the 

federal judiciary. This appeal is the latest battle. 

At issue is Rimini’s ability to service its clients who use 

Oracle’s software programs. Past rulings have determined 

that Rimini’s processes infringe on Oracle’s copyrights—at 

least in part. Those rulings ordered Rimini to halt this 

infringement. In response, Rimini developed new processes 

for servicing its Oracle-using clients. After a bench trial, the 

district court ruled that many of these new processes still 

infringe Oracle’s copyrights and issued a permanent 

injunction against Rimini’s infringement.

On appeal, Rimini raises a host of issues. It claims that 

the district court erred by (1) applying the wrong definition 

of “derivative work” under 17 U.S.C. § 101; (2) striking 

Rimini’s affirmative defense under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a);

(3) incorrectly construing licenses for two Oracle software 

programs; (4) misapplying the Lanham Act to its securityrelated statements; and (5) ordering an impermissibly 

overbroad injunction.

We vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Background

Oracle develops software programs for businesses and 

other organizations. These programs help manage day-toCase: 23-16038, 12/16/2024, ID: 12917037, DktEntry: 55-1, Page 6 of 32
ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 7

day business functions—things like financials, human 

resources, procurement, project and risk management, and 

supply chain operations. One of Oracle’s products is 

PeopleSoft. PeopleSoft is a flexible tool; it can be 

customized to manage all sorts of business processes. Some 

use it to manage HR processes, like timekeeping, benefits

administration, and recruitment. Others use it to manage

financial processes, like expense tracking and payroll. Some 

use it for both and more. Oracle also provides optional 

software support for PeopleSoft. For those using its support 

services, Oracle provides PeopleSoft updates to reflect 

changes to tax laws and other regulations. But customers 

need not use Oracle’s support program to stay up-to-date; 

customers can also modify and customize the software

themselves or through third-party providers. 

Rimini Street is a third-party provider and direct 

competitor with Oracle in the support-services market. It

offers various products, including troubleshooting support 

and software updates. When troubleshooting Oracle 

programs or creating updates for its clients, Rimini uses

Oracle’s products and creates files that only work with 

Oracle’s products. 

Oracle first sued Rimini for copyright infringement in 

2010. Rimini was found to have infringed Oracle’s 

copyrights in its PeopleSoft, Database, and other programs

by engaging in “cross-use” and creating copies of Oracle’s 

materials on Rimini’s computer systems. The district court 

entered a permanent injunction against Rimini, which we 

largely affirmed. See Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 

879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., 

Inc., 783 F. App’x 707 (9th Cir. 2019). The district court 

later found that Rimini violated the injunction and held it in 

contempt on five issues, four of which we upheld on appeal. 

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8 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 81 F.4th 843 (9th Cir. 

2023).

After the finding of infringement, Rimini changed

aspects of its business model and sought declaratory 

judgment that its revised process, called “Process 2.0,” did 

not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. Oracle counterclaimed for 

copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act, 

seeking more than one billion dollars in damages.

At the pleadings stage, the district court struck Rimini’s 

affirmative defense to copyright infringement under 

§ 117(a). At summary judgment, the district court held that 

Rimini had infringed Oracle’s PeopleSoft copyrights by 

engaging in cross-use prohibited by PeopleSoft license 

agreements. Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 473 F. 

Supp. 3d 1158, 1181–213 (D. Nev. 2020). The district court

also held that the update created for the City of Eugene’s 

PeopleSoft software environment was a “derivative work.”

Id. at 1209–12.

After Oracle abandoned its claims for monetary relief on 

the eve of trial, the case proceeded to a bench trial solely on 

declaratory and equitable relief. The district court ruled that 

Rimini (1) created infringing derivative works, (2) violated 

Oracle’s PeopleSoft and Database licensing agreements, and 

(3) made several statements violating the Lanham Act. See 

Oracle Int’l Corp. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-1699, 2023 

WL 4706127, at *1 (D. Nev. July 24, 2023). The district 

court then entered a permanent injunction against Rimini, 

ordering it to delete various software files. The district court 

also ordered Rimini to issue a press release correcting the

alleged misstatements and prohibited Rimini from making 

similar statements about its services again.

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 9

Rimini moved to stay the enforcement of the permanent 

injunction pending appeal. The district court denied that 

motion. Oracle Int’l Corp. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:14-cv1699, 2023 WL 5221947, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2023). It 

granted, however, a temporary administrative stay to allow 

this court to consider the stay factors. Id. at *5–6. Rimini 

also moved to stay the permanent injunction in this court.

That motion remains pending.

Our review of legal questions and contract interpretation 

is de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 

1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard 

Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937–38, 955 (9th Cir. 2010). We 

review factual findings underlying an injunction for clear 

error, and the grant of a permanent injunction and its scope 

for abuse of discretion. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 

Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). Oracle bears the 

burden of proving copyright infringement. Petrella v. 

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 683 (2014).

II.

A.

Derivative Works

A copyright owner has the exclusive right to prohibit or 

authorize the preparation of derivative works. 17 U.S.C. 

§ 106(2). The district court held Rimini-written files and 

updates developed during the “Process 2.0” period were 

infringing derivative works because they “only interact[] and 

[are] useable with” Oracle software. Oracle Int’l Corp., 

2023 WL 4706127, at *66. In effect, the district court 

adopted an “interoperability” test for derivative works—if a 

product can only interoperate with a preexisting copyrighted 

work, then it must be derivative. But neither the text of the 

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10 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

Copyright Act nor our precedent supports this

interoperability test for derivative works.

The Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as:

a work based upon one or more preexisting 

works, such as a translation, musical 

arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 

motion picture version, sound recording, art 

reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or 

any other form in which a work may be 

recast, transformed, or adapted.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

While the Copyright Act uses broad language to describe 

derivative works, there are limits to its scope. After all, 

almost every work “borrows and must necessarily borrow” 

from other works and uses what was “well known and used 

before.” Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 

(9th Cir. 1998); see also 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 3.01

(2024) (“In a broad sense, almost all works are derivative 

works in that in some degree they are derived from preexisting works.”). So focusing only on whether a work is 

“based upon” a preexisting work would make the derivativeworks definition “hopelessly overbroad.” Micro Star, 154 

F.3d at 1110.

Luckily, Congress provided several textual clues limiting 

its definition. First, Congress gave examples of work “based 

upon” preexisting work—things “such as” translations, 

movie adaptations, and reproductions. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 

And so “derivative work” must have a meaning related to 

those examples. While the term “such as” means the list of 

examples isn’t exhaustive, Congress provides the kind of 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 11

works that fall into the derivative-work category. See Easom 

v. US Well Servs., Inc., 37 F.4th 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(holding that a statute listing examples “such as” “floods, 

earthquakes, and droughts” limited the term “natural 

disaster” to disasters of the “same kind”). So to be “based 

upon” another work requires copying of the kind exhibited 

in translations, movie adaptations, and reproductions. Mere 

interoperability isn’t enough.

Next, we have the canon of noscitur a sociis, which 

means we define a term by “the company it keeps.” Yates v. 

United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015). We use this canon 

when “a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid 

the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” 

Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 124–25 (2023) 

(simplified). The effect of the canon is to “limit a general 

term to a subset of all the things or actions that it covers.” 

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 196 (2012). So when “several 

items in a list share an attribute,” it favors “interpreting the 

other items as possessing that attribute as well.” Beecham v. 

United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994).

Here, “[t]he examples of derivative works provided by 

the Act all physically incorporate the underlying work or 

works.” Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 

964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992). Take a “translation.” 

Translating a novel from English incorporates the original 

expression of the novel in a new language. A motion picture 

takes elements of the novel’s original expression and 

incorporates them into an audio-visual experience. The 

same goes for an abridgment—it incorporates the novel’s 

original expression into a condensed version. Thus,

Congress’slist of examples suggeststhat a “derivative work” 

must be in the subset of works substantially incorporating

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12 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

the preexisting work. Once again, whether a work is 

interoperable with another work doesn’t tell us if it 

substantially incorporates the other work. 

Based on this textual analysis, we’ve said that “a work is 

not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from 

the prior work.” Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 

(9th Cir. 1984); see also 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 3.01 

(2024) (“A work is not derivative unless it has substantially

copied from a prior work.”). And we have held that “[a]

derivative work must incorporate a protected work in some 

concrete or permanent ‘form.’” Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 

964 F.2d at 967.

To be sure, the incorporation of a preexisting work can 

take several forms. First, the incorporation can be “literal.”

See Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google, LLC, 90 F.4th 962, 

971 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that a website’s source code is 

a “copyrightable literal element[]”). So copying substantial 

portions of PeopleSoft’s copyrighted code outright would be 

an example of literal incorporation. 

Second, the incorporation can be nonliteral, such as 

copying the “total concept and feel” of a preexisting work.

Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357; see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. World 

Programming Ltd., 64 F.4th 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2023) 

(stating that the nonliteral elements of a computer program 

“include the program architecture, structure, sequence and 

organization, operational modules, and user interface”). 

Take the case of Duke Nukem 3D, a popular video game. A

third-party distributor sold software that continued the video 

game’s story by creating extra levels of gameplay. Micro 

Star, 154 F.3d at 1109. The third-party distributor argued its 

product was not a copyright infringement because it didn’t 

incorporate any of Duke Nukem’s protected expression. Id. 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 13

at 1112. As a technical matter, the distributor explained that 

its product “reference[d]” Duke Nukem’s “source art 

library” but did “not actually contain any art files.” Id. We 

held that these new Duke Nukem levels were derivative 

works because they copied the video game’s “story itself,” 

including the “plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, 

characters, etc.” Id. We likened the extra game levels to a 

book version of the game that recasts the central character

even though it doesn’t copy pictures or code of the game. Id.

Here, we’re mostly concerned with nonliteral copying. 

Although the district court found several examples of Rimini 

literally copying Oracle’s source code, Rimini doesn’t 

challenge that ruling on appeal. Instead, we focus on the 

district court’s ruling that Rimini’s software programs are

derivative works “even if the work[s] do[] not contain any of 

[Oracle’s] copyrighted code.” Oracle Int’l Corp., 2023 WL 

4706127, at *3. It determined that Rimini created 

“infringing derivative works because they interact only with 

PeopleSoft.” Id. at *72. The district court relied on the fact 

that “Rimini’s PeopleSoft updates are extensions to and 

modifications of Oracle’s copyrighted software” and they 

“cannot be used with any software programs other than 

PeopleSoft.” Id. Rimini claims that thousands of its files 

fall into this category—programs that are interoperative with 

Oracle’s PeopleSoft but do not contain Oracle’s copyrighted 

code. 

Without more, mere interoperability isn’t enough to 

make a work derivative. Both the text of the Copyright Act 

and our case law teach that derivative status does not turn on 

interoperability, even exclusive interoperability, if the work 

doesn’t substantially incorporate the preexisting work’s 

copyrighted material. Another video-game case makes the 

point. Nintendo made a well-known gaming console. Lewis 

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14 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 967. Another company then 

developed the Game Genie, which allowed players to alter 

several features of Nintendo games. Id. The Game Genie 

worked by being inserted in between a Nintendo game 

cartridge and a Nintendo gaming console. Id. It then 

blocked the value for a single data byte sent from the game 

cartridge to the gaming console, thereby altering parts of the 

game. Id. The Game Genie was “useless by itself” and it 

“c[ould] only enhance . . . a Nintendo game’s output.” Id. at 

969. Despite this exclusive interoperability with the 

Nintendo system, the Game Genie was not a derivative 

work. Instead, a “derivative work must incorporate a 

protected work in some concrete or permanent form” and the 

“Game Genie does not physically incorporate a portion of a 

copyrighted work.” Id. Because it didn’t “duplicate or 

recast[]” any of Nintendo’s copyrighted material, it couldn’t 

be a derivative work. See id.

In sum, the district court erred by concluding that Rimini

created infringing “derivative works” just because its 

programs “only interact[] and [are] useable with” Oracle 

software. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2023 WL 4706127, at *66. 

Something more is needed under the Copyright Act. Instead, 

a derivative work must actually incorporate Oracle’s 

copyrighted work, either literally or nonliterally. And as 

Galoob Toys shows, simply being an extension or 

modification of a copyrighted work without any 

incorporation is not enough to create a derivative work. 

Aside from concluding that a limited number of Rimini files

copied Oracle’s code, the district court made no finding that 

Rimini incorporated nonliteral copyrighted material in its 

PeopleSoft updates or programs. 

We thus vacate the district court’s holding that Rimini 

created infringing derivative works based solely on Rimini’s 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 15

programs’ interoperability with Oracle’s programs. As the

issue was not briefed by the parties, we do not decide which 

specific parts of Oracle’s programs are protectable nonliteral 

elements or how to determine whether Rimini’s programs

incorporate any of those elements. See SAS Inst., Inc., 64 

F.4th at 1326 (“Court decisions vary in the methods used to 

identify and analyze copyrightability for nonliteral elements 

of computer programs.”). 

Finally, because the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard in determining whether Rimini created derivative 

works, we do not reach Rimini’s alternative argument that 

Oracle’s licensing agreements nonetheless authorize any 

derivative work. If the district court concludes that Rimini

created an infringing derivative work, the district court 

should then consider whether any of Oracle’s licensing 

agreements authorized the creation of the specific work. 

B.

Ownership of a Copy of the Computer Program

Under the Copyright Act, no copyright infringement 

exists if an “owner of a copy of a computer program . . .

mak[es] . . . another copy or adaptation of that computer 

program” for certain purposes, such as when it’s an 

“essential step” in using the program. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a). 

We’ve described this provision as an “affirmative defense to 

infringement.” Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109

(9th Cir. 2010). At the pleadings stage, the district court 

struck Rimini’s assertion of this affirmative defense because 

it found that “Oracle’s customers only license, rather than 

buy, Oracle’s copyrighted software.” Rimini St., Inc. v. 

Oracle Int’l Corp., No. 2:14-cv-01699, 2015 WL 4139051, 

at *2 (D. Nev. July 9, 2015). In the district court’s view, 

because none of Oracle’s customers “owned” a copy of 

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16 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

PeopleSoft, Rimini could not step into their shoes to claim 

the defense. Rimini challenges this categorical ruling. 

To determine whether a party is an “owner of a copy” of 

a computer program, we look to whether the party has 

“sufficient incidents of ownership” over the copy of the 

software program. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 

628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011) (simplified). And the 

question is not about ownership of the copyrighted 

material—it’s about ownership of a copy of the copyrighted 

material. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“Ownership of a copyright 

. . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in 

which the work is embodied.”). In deciding this question, 

we review the totality of the parties’ agreement. See Vernor, 

621 F.3d at 1109.

Over the years, we’ve looked at several factors to 

determine the “incidents of ownership.” 

First, we’ve started with “whether the copyright owner 

. . . specifies that a user is granted a license.” Id. at 1110. A 

licensing agreement, rather than an outright bill of sale, may 

show the lack of a transfer of ownership. Of course, the

“mere labeling of an arrangement as a license rather than a 

sale, although it [i]s a factor to be considered, [i]s not by 

itself dispositive of the issue.” UMG Recordings, 628 F.3d 

at 1180. After all, “some purported software licensing 

agreements may actually create a sale.” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. 

Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015).

Second, we’ve considered whether the parties’ 

arrangement “significantly restricts the user’s ability to 

transfer the software.” Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110–11. “The 

right to transfer is one of the most essential sticks in the 

bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 

property.” Shackleford v. United States, 262 F.3d 1028, 1032 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 17

(9th Cir. 2001) (simplified). So generally, for a copy of a

computer program to become the “property” of a user, that 

user must be able to transfer the copy. Thus, if users are 

“entitled to use or dispose of [the copies] in any manner they 

s[ee] fit,” then that’s a strong sign of ownership. See UMG 

Recordings, 628 F.3d at 1180. On the other hand, significant 

restrictions on transfer may indicate a license rather than 

ownership. 

Third, we’ve looked at whether the agreement “imposes 

notable use restrictions.” Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. Again, 

the concern is ownership of the copy of the copyright—not 

of the copyright itself. So use restrictions that only protect 

against the infringement of the copyrighted material are less 

relevant here. Instead, we’re interested in use restrictions 

that affect using the copy of the computer program, such as 

limiting the user to “one working and one back up copy of 

the software,” forbidding the “examination, disclosure, 

copying, modification, adaptation, and visual display of the 

software,” and permitting the “software use on [a] single 

computer, [while] prohibit[ing] multicomputer and multiuser arrangements, and permitt[ing] transfer to another 

computer no more than once every thirty days.” Id. at 1111

n.11.

Other “incidents of ownership” may be considered. 

Relevant considerations are whether the user paid

“significant consideration to develop the programs for [the 

user’s] sole benefit” and whether the user could use the 

“programs ‘forever,’ regardless of whether the parties’ 

relationship terminated.” Id. at 1114 (quoting Krause v. 

Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

The district court’s ruling on the pleadings seemingly 

relied only on the labeling of the agreements between Oracle 

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18 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 

and its customers as a “license.” This is not enough. That 

Oracle only provides PeopleSoft and its other programs 

through licensing agreements is an important but not 

dispositive fact. It reflects only one facet of the “incidents 

of ownership.” Whether other incidents of ownership can be 

proven is undetermined. Both sides of this dispute agree that 

this is a fact-bound question, and we don’t undertake an 

analysis of the purported 375 agreements involved in this 

case in the first instance. We thus vacate the district court’s 

ruling striking Rimini’s § 117(a) affirmative defense and 

remand for reconsideration under this opinion. We take no 

position on whether Oracle’s customers are ultimately 

owners or licensees of the copies of Oracle’s software. And 

we do not reach whether Rimini can establish the other 

elements of the “essential step” defense under § 117(a)(1), 

which the district court did not reach. 

C. 

Database and PeopleSoft Copyrights 

Rimini next appeals from the district court’s conclusions 

that it infringed Oracle’s copyrights for both Database and 

PeopleSoft. We address each argument in turn. 

1. Database 

Rimini challenges the district court’s ruling that it 

infringed the Oracle Database licensing agreement by 

creating “18 ‘gap customer’ environments on its systems . . . 

that included copies of Oracle Database.” Oracle Int’l 

Corp., 2023 WL 4706127, at *79. The district court ruled 

that the creation of these environments violated rulings from 

the Rimini I litigation because Rimini maintained a copy of 

Oracle Database on its computers. 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 19

But we recently held that the plain language of the Oracle 

Database licensing agreement did not prohibit third-party 

support providers, like Rimini, from possessing a copy of 

Oracle’s software to further a client’s “internal business 

operations.” Rimini St., 81 F.4th at 854–55. In the appeal of 

the contempt proceedings, “Oracle [could not] point[] to 

[any] location restriction” in the Oracle Database licensing 

agreement. Id. at 855. Nor did the district court here identify 

a “location restriction” in the use of Oracle Database. While 

we affirmed any activity that directly fell within Rimini I’s 

injunction, we declined to extend it to a “different situation.” 

See id. 

We thus vacate the district court’s ruling that the 18 “gap 

customer” environments containing Oracle Database

violated Oracle’s licensing agreement. 

2. PeopleSoft

Rimini next challenges the district court’s ruling that

both (1) its use of “automated tools” to deliver PeopleSoft

updates from one client to another and (2) the “outright” 

delivery of PeopleSoft updates to clients without further 

testing in the clients’ environments constitute copyright 

infringement.

Automated Tools

Rimini’s “automated tools” allow Rimini to enter one 

customer’s environment, generate an update, and then 

deliver it to other customers. The district court considered

these tools to be “impermissible cross-use” because they 

require copying Rimini’s PeopleSoft updates in one client’s 

environment and then distributing those copies to other 

customers. See Oracle Int’l Corp., 2023 WL 4706127, at 

*24. If these distributed Rimini files contained Oracle’s 

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20 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

code or nonliteral protected material, we would have no 

problem affirming. As the district court found, these copies 

don’t benefit the original client at all, and so they don’t fall 

under the copying allowed for the client’s “internal data 

processing operations” permitted under Oracle’s licensing 

agreement. See id. at *20. Rimini protests that there would 

be no functional difference between using these “automated 

tools” and manually recreating the files in the other clients’ 

environment, which the district court said would be noninfringing. Id. at *96. While the end result may be the same

under the two methods, the difference is significant under 

copyright law because the “automated tools” may require the 

extra copying of Oracle’s protected expression with no 

benefit to the initial client. 

In the end, however, we vacate the district court’s ruling 

on the “automated tools” to the extent that its conclusion

rests on its erroneous view of “derivative work.” The district 

court ruled that Rimini’s “automated tools” required the 

copying of Oracle’s protected expression, including “the 

copying of individual PeopleSoft files, derivative works

thereof, and RAM copies of the prototype files or 

PeopleTools.” Id. at *74. The district court also found that

“the files and documentation Rimini claims it created [as 

part of its “automated tools”], even those without Oracle 

code, and then distributed to multiple customers, were

derivative works because they leveraged portions of existing 

Oracle programs and were created in PeopleSoft 

environments with PeopleSoft tools for use in PeopleSoft

environments.” Id. at *22. On remand, the district court 

should apply the legal standard articulated above for 

“derivative work” before deciding whether Rimini’s 

“automated tools” violate copyright laws. 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 21

Outright Delivery

Next, the district court found that Rimini violated 

Oracle’s copyright when it developed an update in the City 

of Eugene’s PeopleSoft environment and then delivered it 

“outright” to three other clients. Id. at *2. Rimini argues 

that this was not cross-use because the City of Eugene 

needed the update itself and it was free to deliver the update 

to other clients when multiple clients have the same problem. 

Oracle counters that this was impermissible cross-use 

because the distribution of an update “outright” necessarily 

means that Rimini used the City’s environment to 

“prototype” the update for multiple clients rather than only 

for the City’s “internal data processing operations.” 

Once again, we vacate this ruling based on the district 

court’s erroneous view of “derivative work.” The district 

court’s decision presumed that this individual update was a 

“derivative work” because it “only interacts and is useable 

with PeopleSoft,” even if the update “contained only Rimini 

written expression.” Id. at *66. As discussed above, this 

analysis is incomplete. The district court must first 

determine whether this update copies Oracle’s protected 

expression, either literally or nonliterally. If the district court 

finds protected expression in this update, it would be

relevant to know if any extra copies of the update were 

created in the City’s environment solely because Rimini

planned to distribute the update to other clients. In other 

words, further explanation is required of why “prototyping” 

the update in the City’s environment for non-City clients 

“necessarily” violates the “internal data processing 

operations” provision.

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22 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

D.

The Lanham Act

The Lanham Act prohibits any person from making a

“false or misleading” description or representation of fact 

about “goods or services” in “commercial advertising or 

promotion.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). But false

advertising doesn’t extend to statements of opinion and 

puffery—that is, “exaggerated advertising, blustering, and 

boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely.” 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 

1145 (9th Cir. 1997) (simplified). When “the question of 

truth or falsity is a close one,” we should “err on the side of 

nonactionability.” Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1995) (simplified).

The district court ruled that Rimini made several 

statements that constitute false advertising under the 

Lanham Act. See Oracle Int’l Corp., 2023 WL 4706127, at 

*40–41 (listing statements). On appeal, Rimini only 

challenges whether 12 statements about its security services 

were misleading. 

As a background, Oracle provides periodic security 

patches, known as “Critical Patch Updates,” to customers 

who purchase Oracle software support. Oracle develops and 

releases security patches that fix vulnerabilities in its 

products’ source code that hackers may exploit. Rimini 

offers its own security service using a technology called 

“virtual patching.” Unlike Oracle’s patches, virtual patching 

does not modify the software program’s source code. 

Instead, virtual patching acts as a firewall for software 

programs, attempting to intercept and block any 

vulnerabilities from reaching the program. 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 23

Rimini’s 12 security-related statements can be divided 

into three subgroups: (1) statements about the relative 

security of the services offered by Oracle and Rimini; 

(2) statements that Rimini offers “holistic” security; and 

(3) statements about the need for software patching. We 

consider each category in turn.

1. Relative Security of Services

In this category are Rimini’s statements that customers 

can be more secure if they use Rimini’s security services 

than if they remain with Oracle support. We take this 

subcategory to include the following statements:

• “Security professionals have found that 

traditional vendor security patching 

models are outdated and provide 

ineffective security protection.”

• Oracle’s [Critical Patch Updates] are 

unnecessary to be secure.

• It is not risky to switch to Rimini and 

forgo receiving [Critical Patch Updates]

from Oracle.

• Virtual patching can serve as a 

replacement for [Oracle] patching.

• “Virtual patching can be more 

comprehensive, more effective, faster, 

safer, and easier to apply than traditional 

[Oracle] patching.”

• “Rimini Security Support Services helps 

clients proactively maintain a more 

secure application compared to [Oracle’s]

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24 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

support program which offers only 

software package-centric fixes.”

• Rimini provides more security as 

compared to Oracle. 

• Rimini’s [Global Security Services] can 

“pinpoint and circumvent vulnerabilities 

months and even years before they are 

discovered and addressed by the software 

vendor.”

These statements are puffery. Whether a statement is 

factual or mere puffery often turns on the “specificity or 

generality of the claim.” Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 

513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). A statement is factual 

if it is “specific and measurable, . . . capable of being proved 

false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of 

objective fact.” Ariix, LLC v. NutriSearch Corp., 985 F.3d 

1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021) (simplified). In other words, “a 

statement that is quantifiable, that makes a claim as to the 

specific or absolute characteristics of a product” may be 

actionable under the Lanham Act. Newcal Indus., 513 F.3d 

at 1053 (simplified). In contrast, puffery is characterized by 

subjective claims, including “merely stat[ing] in general 

terms that one product is superior.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, 

Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (simplified); see also Southland Sod Farms, 108 

F.3d at 1145 (“[P]roduct superiority claims that are vague or 

highly subjective often amount to nonactionable puffery.”). 

Take the example we used in Cook. Saying that a lamp 

was “far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home 

movies” was a generalized statement of puffery. Cook, 911 

F.2d at 246 (simplified). But making the claim more specific 

and quantifiable, like saying that the lamp was superior 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 25

because of its “35,000 candle power and 10-hour life,” made 

the statements factual. Id. 

Comparative assertions about effectiveness, riskiness, 

and security are the kinds of generalized statements of 

product superiority that we have routinely found to be 

nonactionable. Here, neither Oracle nor the district court 

provided any objective, quantifiable metric to measure 

software’s security, risk to vulnerabilities, or security 

protocols’ effectiveness to prove the falsity of Rimini’s 

statements. Indeed, the possibility of exploitation by hackers 

always exists. No product can offer complete “security” or 

eliminate all “risk.” Without an objective measure of the 

difference between perfect security and the security 

programs offered by Rimini’s and Oracle’s products, any 

statement about comparative security is necessarily tinged 

with subjectivity. As Oracle’s security expert 

acknowledged, “security experts can reasonably disagree on 

what constitutes adequate security.” 

The district court also ruled that Rimini’s statement that 

its security services could “pinpoint” future vulnerabilities 

“before they even exist” was literally false because such 

technology is “not technically feasible.” Oracle Int’l Corp., 

2023 WL 4706127, at *45. But that is a misreading of 

Rimini’s statement. Rimini never claimed clairvoyance in 

spotting vulnerabilities; instead, it was merely claiming that 

its products can spot problems before they are “discovered 

and addressed by the software vendor.” So it was again 

making a comparative statement of superiority—not a 

statement of psychic ability. Indeed, Rimini presented 

evidence that it had identified and addressed specific 

vulnerabilities before Oracle released a patch to address 

them.

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26 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 

We thus reverse the district court’s ruling on these 

statements. 

2. Holistic Security

In the next subcategory is Rimini’s statement about 

“holistic” security. The subcategory contains only one 

statement:

• Rimini offers “holistic security” solutions 

for Oracle software for enterprises. 

The district court determined that “holistic security” is a 

term of art within the world of software security that refers 

to “a comprehensive approach to security at all layers of a 

system, and includessecurity patching at the software level.” 

Id. at *44. It is true that industry standards can provide 

objective meaning to otherwise subjective or ambiguous

terms in particular contexts. See Enigma Software Grp. 

USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 69 F.4th 665, 672 (9th Cir. 

2023) (holding that a term may become “substantively 

meaningful and verifiable in the cybersecurity context”). On 

appeal, Rimini doesn’t challenge the district court’s contextspecific definition of “holistic security” or the factual 

conclusion that it doesn’t provide source-code level 

protection. That makes the statement actionable. 

Look to Ariix. In that case, a company created a 

certification award for nutritional-supplement 

manufacturers. Ariix, 985 F.3d at 1122. The company

described its certification as “a binary determination” based 

on two “falsifiable criteria.” When the company did not give 

the award to a particular manufacturer, we held that the 

company made “specific and measurable statements” about 

the manufacturer—it was “falsely impl[ying] to consumers” 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 27

that the manufacturer did not meet the standards 

undergirding the certification. Id. Because “[t]hese 

implications are specific, measurable, and capable of being 

falsified,” they were actionable statements under the 

Lanham Act. Id. 

Whether a support service provides “holistic security,” 

which we accept means multi-layered security protection 

including at the source-code level, is a type of “binary 

determination” with “falsifiable criteria.” Id. Either the 

product provides protection at multiple layers or it doesn’t. 

The district court found that Rimini doesn’t offer multi-level 

security. And since Rimini doesn’t refute either the 

definition or the facts here, we affirm the district court. 

3. Need for Software Patching 

In the last subcategory are statements about the need for 

software patching. This subcategory includes Rimini’s 

statements that: 

• Oracle’s [Critical Patch Updates] provide 

little to no value to customers and are no 

longer relevant.

• Once an Oracle ERP platform is stable, 

there is no real need for additional 

patches from Oracle.

• If you are operating a stable version of an 

Oracle application platform, especially 

with customizations, you probably cannot 

apply or do not even need the latest 

patches.

The district court held that these statements were 

misleading because the “security community recognizes that 

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28 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 

software-level patching is one of the most important aspects 

of any modern IT security strategy.” Oracle Int’l Corp., 

2023 WL 4706127, at *41. 

While a closer case, Rimini’s statements about what 

customers “need” or “value” resemble the “type of 

generalized boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would 

rely.” Southland Sod Farms, 108 F.3d at 1145; see also 

Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins., 173 F.3d 

725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) (A statement “was puffery because 

a reasonable consumer would not interpret the statement as 

a reliably factual claim.”). The record shows that Oracle’s 

customers are “some of the most sophisticated companies in 

the world” and “take the security of their systems seriously.” 

Whether to deploy or skip software patching is a matter of 

subjective discretion. One Oracle customer testified that it 

made the decision not to apply Oracle’s Critical Patching 

Updates because it focused on its firewall security and 

believed that the patches could introduce new problems—all 

before it considered signing up with Rimini. 

Thus, it is doubtful that any of Oracle’s customers would 

be fooled about its own security needs merely based on 

Rimini’s fanciful but vague statements. Indeed, Oracle 

could not identify “any customers that left Oracle and went 

to Rimini because of a statement about security.” Nor did 

Oracle present any evidence of a security breach suffered by 

a Rimini client. So while these statements border on 

falsehood, we cannot say that they are so specific and 

measurable to become actionable under the Lanham Act. We 

thus reverse. 

* * * 

In sum, we reverse the district court’s ruling that

Rimini’s security-related statements constitute false 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 29

advertising under the Lanham Act, except for the statement 

about “holistic security.” We also vacate the injunction as it 

pertains to these nonactionable statements. 

E. 

Scope of the Permanent Injunction

Rimini asks us to vacate or narrow the district court’s 

permanent injunction for four reasons. First, it argues that 

injunctive relief itself is improper because damages are the 

appropriate remedy for past infringement, and any infringing 

acts were in the past. Second, it argues that the district court 

improperly required it to delete all its software files with the 

prefixes “RS” or “RSI,” despite finding that only some of 

those files were infringing. Third, it argues that the district 

court wrongly required it to delete “any version” of the 

TAX960ST.SQR file, even though that file is a standard 

Oracle component of PeopleSoft. And fourth, it argues that 

the district court’s injunction improperly applies to certain 

DAT files, despite the district court’s holding that Oracle 

didn’t meet its burden of proving infringement. 

Because we vacate the district court’s ruling on 

“derivative works” and the § 117(a) affirmative defense, we 

also vacate the portions of the injunction appealed by 

Rimini. On remand, should the district court conclude that 

Rimini committed any copyright infringement, it should 

consider the arguments in this appeal in fashioning any 

injunction. 

III. 

For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s 

holding that (1) Rimini created infringing derivative works, 

(2) Rimini could not invoke the § 117(a) affirmative defense, 

and (3) Database and PeopleSoft infringed Oracle’s 

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30 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 

copyrights. We reverse the district court’s ruling that 

Rimini’s security-related statements constitute false 

advertising under the Lanham Act, except for the statement 

about “holistic security.” Because we vacate much of the 

district court’s ruling, we also vacate the portions of the 

injunction appealed by Rimini. Rimini’s motion to stay the 

enforcement of the permanent injunction pending appeal 

(Dkt. No. 7) is denied as moot. Each party shall bear its own 

costs on appeal. 

VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED.

Bybee, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 

I join the majority opinion except for a portion of Part 

II.D.3. In subpart D.3, the majority opinion discusses 

whether certain statements made by Rimini constitute false 

advertising under the Lanham Act or if they are merely 

puffery and therefore not actionable under the Act. I 

disagree with the majority’s conclusion that one of these 

statements—“Oracle’s [Critical Patch Updates] provide 

little or no value to customers and are no longer relevant”—

is puffery.

The Lanham Act prohibits any person from making a 

“false or misleading” description or representation of a fact 

about “goods or services” in “commercial advertising or 

promotion.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). “Statements of 

opinion and puffery, however, are not actionable.” Ariix, 

LLC v. NutriSearch Corp., 985 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2021) (internal citation omitted). 

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ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC. 31

“Puffing is exaggerated advertising, blustering, and 

boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely . . . .” 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 

1145 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (9th 

Cir. 1997). “A statement is considered puffery if the claim 

is extremely unlikely to induce customer reliance. 

Ultimately, the difference between a statement of fact and 

mere puffery rests in the specificity or generality of the 

claim.” Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 

(9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). A quantifiable 

statement that makes a claim “as to the specific or absolute 

characteristics of a product[] may be an actionable statement 

of fact while a general, subjective claim about a product is 

non-actionable puffery.” Id. (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). 

The majority admits that Rimini’s Critical Patch Updates 

statement is a “closer case” but deems it puffery, construing 

it as “generalized boasting upon which no reasonable buyer 

could rely.” See Southland Sod Farms, 108 F.3d at 1145. In 

this statement, Rimini says Oracle’s product provides “little 

or no value” and is “no longer relevant.” These are “absolute 

characteristics,” Newcal Indus., 513 F.3d at 1053, and can 

be “falsified”—Oracle’s product is either valueless and 

irrelevant or not, Ariix, 985 F.3d at 1122. This is true even 

if, as the majority suggests, using software patching is a 

discretionary decision, and Oracle’s “sophisticated” 

customers would not be “fooled” by this statement. As the 

district court explained, Rimini “internally acknowledges 

that patching . . . is necessary,” and has said that “no one is 

thinking of not applying patches at all.” 

I join the majority in finding that most of the statements 

by Rimini are puffery because those statements use 

qualifiers—words like “probably,” “can,” and “more”—and 

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32 ORACLE INT’L CORP. V. RIMINI ST., INC.

make generalized statements as to why Rimini’s products are 

superior to Oracle’s. This statement, on the other hand, lacks 

qualifiers, and instead opts for absolute language (“no longer 

relevant”) and does not compare the two products. Labeling 

Oracle’s product irrelevant moves this statement beyond 

“generalized boasting” and is sufficiently specific and 

absolute to be actionable under the Lanham Act. 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision on this 

statement and would affirm the district court’s decision 

finding it actionable. 

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